COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
( OM(^) 447 final 
Brussels, 1 October 1993 
Proposal for 
COUNÇ;iL RJEGULATJONiJEliQ 
imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil 
(presented by the Commission) 
FXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1. In a notice published in Official Journal No C I 15 of 6 May l(>92, the Commission 
announced a review, in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of Council Regulation 
(IIX ) No 2423/88, of the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of ferro-silicon 
into the Community originating in Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Venezuela, Brazil, the 
Republics of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia 
2 The Commission carried out its investigation in the period between I January 1991 and 
M) April 1992. 
V Normal value has been constructed for Norway, Iceland and Venezuela, since there 
were not enough representative sales on their respective domestic market. 
For Brazil, because of the endemic inflation, normal value was determined on a 
monthly basis, either by reference to domestic sales or, where necessary, by reference 
to a constructed value when domestic puces did not permit recovery of all costs 
For Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia, which are considered as non-market economy 
countries, Norway was selected as analogous country No objection was raised by the 
exporters The normal value has been constructed on the basis of the Norwegian costs 
of production 
No dumping has been calculated for the Republics of the former Yugoslavia, since the 
contribution to injury was minimal. 
4. The comparison between normal value and export price to the Community showed 
dumping margins for Brazil ranging from 9.2% to 25%, Venezuela 20.4%, Norway and 
Iceland 6.8%, Sweden 7.4%, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia 74%. 
j 
I 
) \ 
5. As far as injury is concerned, investigations sought to determine whether there had been 
any changes in the situation of the Community industry as a result of the behaviour of 
the exporters on the Community market since the imposition of the anti-dumping 
measures under review Furthermore, the Commission also examined whether the expiry 
of existing anti-dumpmg measures would be likely to lead to recurrence of injury 
The investigation showed that the present situation of the Community, falling sales, loss 
of market shares and financial losses meant that protection was still required against 
dumped imports originating in the abovementioned countries It was found that the 
measures under review had not prevented the undercutting of Community producer's 
price by the dumped imports. Under these circumstances, the lifting of the anti-dumpmg 
measures in force could not be justified. 
6. With respect to Community interests, the removal of the unfair advantages gained by 
the dumping practices is designed to prevent the further decline of the Community 
industry and thus helps to maintain the availability to the consumer of widest possible 
choice of producers 
There is also evidence, given the negligible part of ferro-silicon in the steel production, 
that the consumer prices would not be significantly affected by the continuation of the 
measures. 
7. Accordingly, the anti-dumping measures should be maintained and adjusted in the light 
of the results of the review. 
8. Since the injury thresholds were higher than the dumping margins, the duties sliould be 
based on the dumping margins found, which are: 
Norway 6.8% 
Iceland 6.8% 
Sweden 7.4% 
Venezuela 20.4% 
Brazil 9.2% to 25% 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 74% 
Proposal for a 
COUNÇIL REGUJLAT 1 ON {EEC) 
imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of I I July 1988 on protection against 
dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic 
Community"', and in particular Articles 14 and 15 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, presented after consultations within the 
Advisory Committee as provided for by the Regulation, 
Whereas: 
A PROCEDURE 
(1) By Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87'"', the Commission imposed a provisional anti­
dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepted 
undertakings offered by a Brazilian company and by Promsyrio-Import of the USSR 
(2) By Regulation (EEC) No .1650/87"', the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil. 
«it 
(.M 
( u OJ No I. 209, 2 8 1988, p I 
OJ No L 219, 8 8 1987, p. 24 
OJ No L 343, 5.12 1987, p I. 
(3) In February 1990, the Council, by Regulation (EEC) No 341/90", accepted 
undertakings and imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, except ferro-silicon 
sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings had been accepted 
(4) By Regulation (EEC).No 1115/91°', the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping 
duty following the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Brazil. 
By Decision 91/240/EEC'"', the Commission accepted undertakings offered by certain 
exporters following the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Brazil and terminated the investigation as far as those exporters 
were concerned. 
(5) In February 1992, the Commission published a notice'7' of the impending expiry of the 
undertaking accepted from the Soviet company, Promsyrio-Import, in accordance with 
Article 15 of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 (hereinafter referred to as "the Basic 
Regulation"). 
(6) In its request lodged in February 1992, the Liaison Committee of Ferro-Alloys 
Industries in the European Community (CLIFA), which acts on behalf of Community 
producers and represents, allegedly, 98% of the Community's ferro-silicon production, 
asked for a review of all the abovementioned measures (recitals I to 4). 
(7) Having decided, after consultation, that there was sufficient evidence to justify a review, 
the Commission decided to institute a review of the Regulations and Decisions 
mentioned in recitals (1) to (4) in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the Basic 
Regulation, and opened an investigation by a notice published in May 1992(8). 
(•ii 
(/) 
(K) OJ No L 38, 10 2 1900, p. I 
OJ No I. ill, 3.5 1991, p. |. 
OJ No L III, 3.5.1991, p. 47. 
OJ No C 37, 15.2.1992, p. 22. 
OJ No C 115, 6.5.1992, p. 2. 
(K) In August 1992, in accordance with the provisions of Article 15(4) of the Basic 
Regulation, the Commission published a notice' ' concerning the continuation, during 
the review proceeding, of the anti-dumping measures in force against the former 
Soviet Union. 
(9) Ihe Commission officially notified the exporters and the Community producers known 
to be concerned of the opening of the proceeding and gave them the opportunity to 
make known their views in writing and to request a hearing. 
(10) Furthermore, the Commission, at the request of an importer and in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 7(6) of the Basic Regulation, gave the parties directly concerned 
an opportunity to meet 
(11) The Commission sought and verified all information it considered necessary for a 
determination of dumping and injury and carried out investigations at the premises of 
the following 
(a) Community producers 
Sociedad Espanola de Carburos Metâlicos, Spain 
Péchiney Electrométallurgie, France 
SKW Trostberg AG, Germany 
(b) Exporting producers 
Fesil KS, Norway 
Elkcm A/S, Norway 
Icelandic Alloys, Iceland 
Vargon Alloys, Sweden 
CVG Fesilven, Venezuela 
Companhia Brasileua Carbureto de Câlcio (CIJCC), Brazil 
Companhia de Ferroligas da Bahia Ferbasa, Brazil 
Italmagnésio SA, Brazil 
Companhia Paulista de Ferroligas, Brazil 
Tovarna Dusika Ruse, Slovenia 
OJ No C 186, 23 7 1992, p 25. 
(c) Unrelated importers 
Considar, Belgium 
S.A. des Minerais, Luxembourg 
(d) Related importers 
Elkem GmbH, Germany 
Elkem Alloys Ltd, UK 
Fesil Alloys Ltd, UK 
Fesil GmbH, Germany 
(12) The Commission requested and received submissions from the complainants, from the 
exporters named and from a number of related and unrelated importers and verified the 
information provided to the extent considered necessary 
(I J) Ihe exporters, telated importers, one unrelated impoitei and the complainant industry 
requested and were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of 
which it was planned to recommend the imposition of amended anti-dumping duties. 
Due account was taken of the representations of the parties concerned in the findings 
of the Commission. 
(14) Ihe investigation into dumping practices covered the period from I January 1991 to 
30 April 1992 
B PRODUCT 
(15) Product description 
The product under investigation is ferro-silicon containing between 20% and 96% of 
silicon by weight and exported by the countries under review, falling within CN codes 
7202 21 90, 7202 21 10 and ex 7202 29 00. 
(16) An exporter and an importer claimed that the physical characteristics of frequently 
traded grades of ferro-silicon, namely ferro-silicon containing 45% of silicon and ferro-
silicon containing 75% of silicon, are substantially different as far as chemical 
composition, gravity, weight, bulk, density, colour, hardness and chill-factor are 
concerned and that their metallurgical properties are not the same. They also asserted 
that the production process for the two types of products requires different production 
facilities and therefore leads to differences in classification, handling, consumption, 
supply and pricing. 
Furthermore, (hose two parties pointed out that ferro-silicon containing 45% of silicon 
is not interchangeable with ferro-silicon containing 75% of silicon. For all these 
reasons, ferro-silicon containing 45% of silicon should, they claimed, be excluded from 
the proceeding. 
(17) in that respect, the Commission recalls that where the product concerned consists of 
several grades or qualities, the question as to whether those different types of product 
have to be regarded as forming one product has to be answered on the basis of the 
physical or chemical characteristics and uses of those grades or qualities. 
(18) The investigation has shown that both ferro-silicon containing 45% and that containing 
75% of silicon have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics. In addition, 
they are interchangeable in their main applications as a deoxidiser m steel manufacture 
and/or as an alloying component for high-temperature steel alloys and sheet metal and 
have therefore to be regarded as forming one product for the purpose of this proceeding. 
(19) Like product 
The Commission established that the ferro-silicon produced in the Community and the 
ferro-silicon sold or produced in Brazil, Venezuela, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the 
Republics of the former Yugoslavia are alike in all respects to the product concerned 
as exported from the countries concerned by this proceeding. 
(20) The Council confirms those findings. 
C NORMAL VALUE AND EXPORT PRICE 
I. Norway 
(a) Normal value 
(21) The Norwegian producers formed part of two separate corporate groups and sold 
through related sales companies which exported most of their merchandise to related 
importers in the Community. 
(22) In no case did the volume of sales on the Norwegian domestic market attain 5% of the 
volume of exports of the product to the Community, which has consistently been 
considered by the Commission to be a minimum representative volume for comparison. 
(23) Normal value for the Norwegian producers has therefore been calculated in accordance 
with Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Basic Regulation It has been constructed on the basis of 
the fixed and variable raw material and manufacturing costs for the product exported 
to the Community, together with a reasonable amount for selling, administrative and 
other general costs, as well as a reasonable margin of profit As regards each of the two 
Norwegian groups, a weighted average of the manufacturing costs of their producing 
subsidiaries was calculated. 
Since there were, in both cases, no domestic sales in representative quantities of ferro-
silicon or of products in the same business sector, the selling, general and 
administrative costs and profit were established on the basis of data available to the 
Commission concerning this product sector in Norway. This basis was considered 
reasonable and thus in accordance with Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Basic Regulation. 
A profit margin of 6% was added to the full costs of the product. That profit was in 
line with the profit considered necessary for the Community industry to remain viable 
(b) Export price 
(24) Where sales were made direct to independent importers in the Community, export 
prices were determined on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the 
product sold for export to the Community 
(25) Where exports were made to related importers in the Community, export prices were 
constructed in accordance with Article 2(8)(b) of the Basic Regulation on the basis of 
resale prices to the first independent purchaser, adjusted to take account of all costs 
incurred between importation and resale, together with a 3% profit margin which was 
considered reasonable in view of the information available to the Commission on the 
product sector concerned 
2 Iceland. 
(a) Normal., value 
(26) Since there were no sales of ferro-silicon on the domestic Icelandic market, normal 
value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Basic Regulation. 
As far as selling, general, administrative expenses and profit were concerned, the 
situation was the same as for Norway and the determination was therefore made on the 
same basis (see recital 23) 
(b) Export price 
(27) The sole producer in Iceland, Icelandic Alloys Ltd, channelled its sales to the 
Community through a Norwegian group which has a significant shareholding in this 
producer (see recital 21 ). 
(28) Therefore, in order to achieve comparability between the normal value and export price, 
the latter had to be constructed on the basis of the price at which the product concerned 
was resold by the Norwegian company to independent Community customers, as 
provided for by Article 2(8)(b) of the Basic Regulation In accordance with that 
provision, allowance was made for an estimated margin of 3% arising from profits 
realized on sales on the sector concerned 
-* Sweden 
(a) Normal value 
(29) Domestic sales of the Swedish producer exceeded 5% of exports to the Community and 
therefore represented a volume sufficient to constitute a representative market and an 
adequate basis for calculating the normal value. 
(30) Normal value has therefore been calculated on the basis of the weighted average 
domestic prices for ferro-silicon sold on the domestic market at prices made in the 
ordinary course of trade, in accordance with Article 2(3)(a) of the Basic Regulation 
(31) The prices were net of all discounts and rebates directly linked to the sales under 
consideration. 
(b) Export price 
(32) Since all exports were made direct to independent importers in the Community, export 
prices were determined on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the 
product sold for export to the Community. 
4. Venezuela 
(a) Normal value 
(33) Domestic sales of the Venezuelan producer exceeded 5% of exports to the Community 
and therefore represented a volume sufficient to constitute a representative market and 
an adequate basis for calculating the normal value. 
(34) 70% of the sales on the domestic market were sold to related companies for processing 
and could not be considered reliable and made m the ordinary course of trade. The 
remaining sales were made at prices which did not permit the recovery in the normal 
course of trade of all costs reasonably allocated Normal value was therefore 
constructed in accordance with Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Basic Regulation. 
Given the volume of domestic sales, the Commission was in a position to calculate the 
selling, general and administrative expenses by reference to the expenses incurred by 
the producer on its sales on the domestic market 
A profit margin of 6% on the total costs of production was considered reasonable 
(see recital 23) 
12 
(b) Export price 
(35) Since sales were made direct to independent importers in the Community, export prices 
were determined on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the product sold 
for export to the Community. 
5 Brazil 
(a) Normal value 
(36) Domestic sales of all the Brazilian producers exceeded 5% of export sales to the 
Community and therefore represented a volume sufficient to constitute a representative 
market and an adequate basis for calculating the normal value 
(37) In view of the significant price variations which are the result of the high inflation in 
Brazil, normal value was determined on a monthly basis, either by reference to 
domestic sales or, where necessary, by reference to the constructed value as defined 
hereafter. 
(38) The Commission examined whether the domestic sales had been made in the ordinary 
course of trade, by comparing each domestic transaction with the production cost per 
tonne of each producer during the same monthly period. 
During the months when sales were considered profitable, normal values were 
determined for that month, on the basis of the domestic prices in accordance with 
Article 2(3)(a) of the Basic Regulation 
In all other cases, normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3)(b)(ii) 
of the Basic Regulation. 
Given the volume of domestic sales the Commission was in a position to calculate the 
selling, general and administrative expenses by reference to the expenses incurred by 
the producer on its sales on the dome tic market A profit margin of 6% was also added 
(see recital 23). 
13 
(b) Export price 
(39) Since sales were made direct to independent importers in the Community, export prices 
were determined on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the product sold 
for export to the Community. 
6. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia 
(a) Normal value 
(40) On the basis of the information available to the Commission, of the countries of the 
former USSR, production facilities for ferro-silicon existed only in Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and Russia It was, however, not possible to distinguish the products by origin since 
they were exported to the Community by a Russian trader which made no such 
distinction. 
Since all three countries are State-trading countries within the meaning of Article 2(5) 
of the Basic Regulation, normal value was based on information obtained from a market 
economy in which the product was manufactured. 
For this purpose, the Commission chose Norway. The choice was not questioned by the 
producers in the three countries concerned. The Norwegian ferro-silicon industry 
reported high production volumes and low production costs and appeared, by 
comparison with all other known producing countnes, to be an efficient producer given 
the ease of access to hydroelectrical power, the most costly input in the production of 
ferro-silicon. Norway was therefore considered to be an appropriate and not 
unreasonable choice of analogous market. 
(41) Normal value for Norway was established as explained in recital 23. 
(b) Export prices 
(42) The producers from Ukraine and Russia did not cooperate, while the questionnaire 
completed by the producer from Kazakhstan was found to be inaccurate as far as export 
prices were concerned and the information contained therein could therefore not be 
used. 
14 
The Commission verified more than 70% of the total imports made through the trading 
organization, Promsyrio-Import, which represented producers in Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and Russia This quantity was considered representative of all transactions of the 
producers in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia during this period. 
Accordingly, export prices were determined on the basis of the prices to the first 
independent buyer. 
£>• COMPARISON 
(43) For each country concerned, in comparing the normal value with export prices, 
transaction by transaction, the Commission, in accordance with Article 2(9) and 2(10) 
of the Basic Regulation, took account, where warranted, of the differences directly 
affecting price comparability, such as certain selling expenses, namely credit terms, 
transport, insurance and handling costs, packing and ancillary costs. 
For Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia, an allowance was made for differences in physical 
characteristics, in particular screening, crushing and weighing. Normal value for all 
three countries was adjusted, since the alleged difference was substantiated, by an 
amount based on a reasonable estimate of the value 
(44) All comparisons were made at the same level of trade 
K DUMPING MARGINS 
(45) The margins of dumping equalled the amount by which the normal value established 
exceeded the price for export to the Community. 
I Norway 
(46) The weighted average dumping margin for the companies Elkem and Fesil, expressed 
as a percentage of the CIF-Commumty-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, was 6 8% 
(17) Since it was established that those two companies were responsible for all exports of 
ferro-silicon of Norwegian origin to the Community, it was considered appropriate that 
the above margin should be applicable to Norway as a whole 
15 
Iceland 
(48) The weighted average dumping margin for the company concerned, expressed as a 
percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, is 6.8%. 
(49) Since it was established that the company was responsible for all exports of ferro-
silicon of Icelandic origin to the Community, it was considered appropriate that the 
above margin should be applicable to Iceland as a whole. 
3. Sweden 
(50) The weighted average dumping margin for the company concerned, expressed as a 
percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, is 7,4%. 
(51) Since it was established that the company was responsible for all exports of ferro-
silicon of Swedish origin to the Community, it was considered appropriate that the 
above margin should be applicable to Sweden as a whole. 
4. Venezuela 
(52) The weighted average dumping margin for the company CVG Fesilven, expressed as 
a percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, was 20.4%. 
(53) In the case of firms which had failed to cooperate in the investigation or had not replied 
satisfactorily to the Commission's questionnaire, the Commission considered that the 
dumping should be determined on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with 
Article 7(7)(b) of the Basic Regulation. In this respect, it was considered that the 
margin found for the company Fesilven would be the most appropriate. 
Brazil 
(54) The weighted average dumping margins for the companies concerned, expressed as a 
percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, were as follows: 
Companhia Brasileua Carbureto de Càlcio 9.2% 
Ferbasa 22.8% 
Italmagnésio 25% 
16 
(55) In the case of Brazilian companies which cooperated in the investigation and were 
found not to have exported during the investigation period (Rima 
Electrometalurgia S.A., Companhia Paulista de Ferroligas, Companhia Ferroligas Minas 
Gérais Minasligas) the Commission considers that the best evidence available is the 
weighted average dumping margin found for the companies which did export. This was 
found to be 20.5.3%. 
(56) In the case of firms which had failed to cooperate in the investigation or had not replied 
satisfactorily to the Commission's questionnaire, the Commission considered that the 
dumping should be determined on the basis of the facts available in accordance with 
Article 7(7)(b) of the Basic Regulation. In this respect, the Commission considered that 
the most reasonable facts were those established in the investigation and that, in order 
to prevent duty-circumvention and to avoid offering a bonus for non-cooperation, the 
highest margin found for Brazil would be the most appropriate 
6. Kazakhstan^ Ukraine arid Russia 
(57) The weighted average dumping margins for the countries concerned, expressed as a 
percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier prices, customs duty unpaid, were as follows: 
Kazakhstan 74% 
Ukraine 74% 
Russia 74% 
7. The. remaining Republics of the formerJUSSR 
(58) Since no ferro-silicon originating in the remaining Republics of the former USSR was 
imported into the Community during the investigation period, any review of the 
measures, as they concerned those Republics, was inappropriate. Accordingly, the anti­
dumping measures in respect of those Republics should not be maintained. 
8 Former Yugoslav Republic of Maceiioniaaiid the Republics of Bpsni.a-Herzegovjnaand 
Slovenia 
(59) For the producers in the abovementioned countnes, given that their contribution to 
injury was de minimis no dumping calculations were made (see recital 62). 
17 
9. Conclusion 
(60) The Council confirms the above conclusions 
F INJURY 
1 Cumulation 
(61) The effects of the imports from the countries under review have, in general, to be 
analysed cumulatively, since the exports originating in each of those countries 
comprised significant quantities of the product under consideration and competed with 
the Community production and with each other, and because the exporters' market 
behaviour was similar 
(62) However, imports from the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were minimal While the mere fact that 
imports from those countries, after the imposition of duties, were negligible is not a 
circumstance justifying ipso, tac to in a review proceeding the lifting of duties against 
those countries or precluding the cumulation with other imports, it was found that the 
plant located in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been seriously damaged and 
will be out of operation for a significant period of time. 
The current capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia is 
such that it is unlikely that their exports to the Community will go beyond a negligible 
volume in the near future. It can therefore be expected that the volumes imported from 
those three countries, after lifting of measures, will remain at an insignificant level. Any 
contribution to further injury or any threat of injury cannot therefore be attributed to 
these imports 
(63) The Council confirms these findings 
2. Volume, market share and prices of the dumped...imports 
Volume of imports 
(64) The volume of ferro-silicon imported from the countries under review, as a percentage 
of consumption, increased from 56% in 1988 to 60% in 1991 and 69% at the beginning 
of 1992: 
the imports originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine rose considerably from 
30 000 tonnes in 1988 (6% market share), 72 000 tonnes in 1991 (14% market 
share) to 90 000 tonnes in 1992 (16% market share); 
the volume of the imports from Norway (approximately 200 000 tonnes per year), 
from Iceland (approximately 20 000 tonnes per year), from Sweden (approximately 
12 000 tonnes per year) remained relatively stable between 1988 and 1992 with 
market shares of some 40% for Norway, 4% for Iceland and over 2% for Sweden 
in 1992; 
the imports originating in Brazil increased from 9 000 tonnes in 1988 (nearly 2% 
market share), to 16 600 tonnes in 1991 (3.2% market share) to approximately 
28 000 tonnes in 1992 (5.5% market share calculated on an annual basis); during 
the same period Venezuelan imports went up from I 000 tonnes in 1988, to 
8 600 tonnes in 1991 to approximately 9 000 tonnes (nearly 2% market share); 
the imports from the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the sole countries of the former Yugoslavia 
producing ferro-silicon, decreased drastically from 18 000 tonnes in 1988 (nearly 
4% market share) to 3 000 tonnes for Slovenia, 2 000 tonnes for the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and less than I 000 tonnes for Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992 (less than 1.2% market share for those three 
countries together). 
Piice of the dumped imports 
(05) The prices CIF, at Community frontier, duty paid, to the first independent buyer in th 
Community for the product imported from the countnes under review were lower than 
the Community producers' average ex works prices, which were already depressed 
The comparison, earned out at the same level of trade, showed the following average 
price undercutting margins 
9.9% for Norway, 
9.9% for Iceland, 
7.8% for Sweden, 
- 20.1% for Brazil, 
20% for Venezuela, 
58.2% foi Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan 
(66) The Council confirms these findings 
3 Situation of ihe Community industry 
PïwiiictïoBi., charily sine! uiiliz-i^ion rate 
(67; ComNiumiy produuion of feno-silicon fell from nearly 190 000 tonnes in 1989 to 
(32 000 tonnes ir« I 9<) J and !02 000 tonnes m J992. Though production capacity feil 
fiom nearly 25T, 0';U tonnes in I9K0 to appioximately 200 000 tonnes in 1.992, the 
uîdization ïaie ncwiJieless decreased from 75% in 1989 to 48% in 1992. 
Sales id'i'éïist :s>ctî :<•< "*j*t ih.-.iv 
((K ) J'he '.jbantiiy of ïc*vo-sdicon sold in the Commumiy by the Community producers fell 
fioiu 163 000 tonnes in i989 to 135 000 tonnes in 1990, to 122 000 tonnes in 1991 and 
lo approximately 100 000 tonnes in 1992. 
Between 1989 and 1902 She Community industry's market share declined as follows: 
30% m 1989, 25% in i990, 23% in 1991 and 13% in 1992 (four months), while the 
Community's annual consumption increased between 1988 and 1989 from 
490 000 tonnes to 53 5 000 tonnes and has since remained at that level. 
20 
Price evolution 
(69) The low level of import prices over the investigation period meant that Community 
producers had to sell the product in the Community at prices which, in most cases, did 
not cover their production costs. The low level of prices not only prevented Community 
producers from raising their prices in order to reflect the rise in production costs, but 
even forced them to lower their prices, although this did not stop them from losing 
market shares. 
Profits 
(70) Due to the price depression and the declining capacity utilization which negatively 
affected the coverage of fixed costs in relation to this highly capital-intensive industry, 
the Community industry overall has recorded poor financial results since 1987 (with the 
exception of 1989, when a small profit was realized) The situation had further 
deteriorated since 1990 and particularly during the investigation period, with all 
Community producers suffering heavy losses. A weighted average of the Community 
industry's results shows a loss of some 34% on turnover during that period. 
Employment and investment 
(71 ) It should be noted that the ferro-silicon industry is not labour intensive. However, there 
has been a small, but steady curtailment in employment levels. 
Investments have been cut, and in Italy three companies stopped their ferro-silicon 
production 
Conclusion 
(72) Given the financial losses and the reduction of its market shares, the Community 
industry's position has declined considerably. Ihe Commission concludes accordingly 
that the industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the 
Basic Regulation 
21 
(73) The Council confirms these findings and conclusions 
4 Causal link between dumped imports and injury 
(74) The Commission examined whether the material injury suffered by the Community 
industry was caused by the effects of the dumping, and found that the increased influx 
of imports of the countries under review coincided with a significant loss of market 
share and a reduced profitability on the part of the Community industry. The 
Community ferro-silicon market is a transparent and price-sensitive market in which the 
price-undercutting practised by the producers of the countries under review had an 
immediate depressive effect on the prices of the Community industry The Community 
producers had to adjust their prices to meet this downward trend in prices. 
(75) The Council confirms these findings. 
5 Other factors 
(76) The Commission also considered whether other factors than the dumped imports of 
ferro-silicon could have caused injury to the Community industry. 
(77) It has already been found that many of the difficulties encountered by the Community 
ferro-silicon industry have been caused by the dumped imports of other third countries 
(like South Africa and China) However, this does not detract from the conclusion that 
considerable quantities and the low prices of the dumped imports from the countries 
under review also had a substantial influence on the unfavourable situation of the 
Community industry. 
(78) The Commission did not find any other factors which could explain the precarious 
economic situation of the Community industry. Indeed, there were neither substantial 
imports, other than those mentioned, nor was there any contraction in demand between 
1990 and 1992. 
22 
> I 
6 Conclusion 
(79) In those circumstances, and even allowing for the fact that imports from South Africa, 
China, Poland and Egypt have also contributed to the poor situation of the Community 
industry, the Commission has come to the conclusion that the effects of the dumped 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, Venezuela, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia, taken in isolation, have to be considered as still 
causing material injury to the Community industry Any lifting of the measures against 
these producers would therefore increase the existing injury That being so, the present 
circumstances do not justify the repeal of the measures On the contrary, the situation 
as found requires the adjustment of the existing measures to the new situation. 
Indeed, should the measures in force remain unchanged, lapse or be repealed, the result 
would certainly be further price decreases in the imports, causing further price 
depression on the whole Community market, and further loss of market shares and 
profitability for the Community industry. 
(80) The Council confirms these findings and conclusions. 
G COMMUNITY INTEREST 
(81) In assessing the Community interest, the Commission took account of certain basic 
elements The prevention of the distortion of competition arising from unfair 
commercial practices, and hence the re-establishment of open and fair competition on 
the Community market, is the very purpose of anti-dumping measures and is 
fundamentally in the general Community interest Furthermore, failure to maintain 
measures in force would aggravate the already precarious situation of the Community 
industry, especially noticeable from the lack of profitability and the shrinking of market 
shares, making its viability questionable Should the industry be forced to cease 
production, the Community would be rendered entirely dependent for its supply on third 
countries. 
Without anti-dumpmg measures, the disappearance of certain Community producers is 
quite probable in the near future, given the level of losses incurred by certain of them 
over an extended period It should be noted in this respect that some Italian producers 
ceased operating at the beginning of 1991 Any further deterioration would endanger 
jobs and investment in the sector concerned 
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(82) The Commission recognizes that the imposition of anti -dumping duties could affect 
price levels of the exporters concerned in the Community and subsequently may have 
some influence on the relative competitiveness of their products. However, the 
competitive advantage that is being lost is due to unfair trade practices which anti­
dumping measures are designed to remove. 
(83) It has also been argued that anti-dumping measures would reduce the number of 
competitors on the market. However, the Commission considers that the number of 
competitors on the Community market will not be reduced by the adoption of 
anti dumping measures. On the contrary, the removal of the unfair advantages gained 
by the dumping practices is designed to arrest the decline of the Community industry 
and thus to help to maintain the availability of a wide choice of ferro-silicon producers. 
(84) As to the interests of the processing industry, namely producers of speciality steel 
which are end-users of the product concerned in the Community, its short-term price 
advantages have to be viewed against the background of the longer-term effect of not 
retaining fair competition Indeed, to refrain from maintaining measures in force would 
seriously threaten the viability of the Community industry, the disappearance of which 
would in fact reduce supply and competition to the detriment of consumers Moreover, 
it has to be borne in mind that the price of ferro-silicon represents, on average, only 
0.2% of the cost of a tonne of steel. Any cost increase of ferro-silicon due to anti­
dumping measures would therefore have an insignificant impact on the final consumers. 
(85) Ihe Commission considers that it is therefore in the Community's interest to call for 
the continued imposition of anti-dumping measures in order to prevent further injury 
being caused by the dumped imports. 
(86) The Council confirms these conclusions 
H UNDERTAKI NOS 
(87) Two companies proposed revised price undertakings. 
(88) The prices cited in previous undertakings have all systematically been undercut and the 
Commission considers that the undertakings can no longer be considered an appropriate 
remedy 
(89) The Council confirms this approach 
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1 LEVEL OF THE DUTY 
(90) In order to adapt the measures to the changed circumstances and prevent the recurrence 
of further injury, it is considered that anti-dumping measures should be established in 
such a way as to allow the Community industry to make a reasonable profit in the 
future and to stem the fall in its sales 
(91) The Commission has calculated the weighted average production cost of the 
Community producers, a profit of 6%, based on past performance and considered 
reasonable fv.r guaranteeing the industry's productive investment on a long-term basis. 
Since the difference between those costs and the average import prices on 
a CIF-Community-frontier basis, duty unpaid, is higher than the dumping margins for 
all companies or countries concerned, the duties should be based on the dumping 
margins recorded 
(92) Accordingly, the following anti-dumping duties should be imposed: 
Norway: 6.8% 
Iceland: 6 8% 
Sweden: 7.4% 
Venezuela: 20.4% 
Brazil: 25% 
Companhia Brasileira 
Carbureto de Câlcio 9 2% 
Fer basa 22.8% 
Rima Electrometalurgia 20 5% 
Companhia Paulista de Ferroligas 20 5% 
Companhia Ferroligas Minas Cïerais 
Minasligas 20 5% 
Russia: 74% 
Ukraine: 74% 
Kazakhstan: 74% 
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(93) In the case of firms which failed to cooperate in the investigation, the Commission 
considered that the duties should be established on the basis of the facts available in 
accordance with Article 7(7)(b) of the Basic Regulation In order not to reward non-
cooperation, it was considered that the most reasonable facts were those established 
during the investigation and that there was no reason to believe that any duties lower 
than the highest duties considered necessary would be sufficient to remove the injury 
caused by the imports. Accordingly, it is considered appropriate to impose the highest 
duty calculated for ferro-silicon originating in each country under investigation. 
(94) The Commission is, as always, prepared to carry out a newcomer review in the case of 
those companies which did not export during the investigation period, and are not 
related to companies which did export during that period and intend to commence the 
exports to the Community 
(95) The Council confirms the above. 
J REPE: AL OF REGI.!LATJ ONS_ AND_ PILCJ SIQN S 
(96) Regulations (EEC) Nos 2409/87, 341/90, 1115/91 and Decision 91/240/EEC should 
accordingly be repealed, 
26 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article I 
1 A definitive anti-dumpmg duty is hereby imposed on imports of ferro-silicon containing 
between 20% and 96% of silicon by weight falling within CN codes 7202 21 10, 
7202 21 90 and ex 7202 29 00 (Taric code 7202 29 00 II) and originating in Norway, 
Sweden, Iceland, Brazil, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. 
2 fhe rate of duty, calculated on the basis of the free-at-Commumty-frontier price of the 
product, not cleared through customs, shall be 
6.8% for ferro-silicon originating in Norway 
6 8% for ferro-silicon originating in Iceland 
7.4% for ferro-silicon originating in Sweden 
20.4% for ferro-silicon originating in Venezuela 
25% for ferro-silicon originating in Brazil (additional Taric code 8731), 
with the exception of that produced by the companies below, to which 
the following rates shall apply 
9.2% Cia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio, Rio de Janeiro 
(additional lane code 8729) 
22.8% Cia de Ferro Ligas da Bahia (Ferbasa), Pojuca, Bahia 
(additional Taric code 8730) 
20.5% Cia Rima Electrometalurgia S.A., Belo Honzonte 
(additional lane code 8734) 
20.5% Cia Pauhsta de Ferroligas, Sào Paulo (additional Taric 
code 8734) 
20 5% Cia Ferroligas Minas Gérais, Mmasligas, Contagem, MG 
(additional Taric code 8734) 
74% for ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
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3 The provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply 
4. Regulations (EEC) Nos 2409/87, 341/90, 1115/91 and Decision 91/240/EEC are hereby 
repealed. 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, for the Council 
The President 
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KSN 0254-1475 
COM (93) 447 fina! 
DOCUMENT 
EN 08 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-93-490-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-59454-3 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
29