EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 27 October  2017  
on the role of Národná banka Slovenska in supervising the education of financial intermediaries 
and financial agents  
(CON/20 17/43) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 22 September 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of 
Finance of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draft Law amending and supplementing Law 
No. 186/2009 on financial intermediation and financial consultancy and on the amendment and 
supplementation of certain laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent  of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law relates to Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) . In accordance with the first sentence of 
Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted 
this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft l aw 
1.1 The primary aim of the draft law is to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/97  of the European Parliament 
and of the Council2 and to improve the transposition of the provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU  of 
the European Parliament and of the Council3, as regards the cross- border performance of financial 
intermediation or financial consultancy in the field of real -estate credit.  
1.2 In addition to the transposition of Union directives, the draft law introduces stricter regulation of 
specialised financial education with respect to the requirements for professional competence of 
financial intermediaries and financial agents as well as stricter conditions to be fulfilled by legal 
entities providing specialised financial education.  
1.3 As a part of the reform of  financial education, the draft la w introduces a new task for NBS in 
relation to the supervision of financial education4.  
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  Directive (EU ) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution 
(recast)  (OJ L 26, 2.2.2016, p. 19).   
3  Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for 
consumers relating to residential immovable proper ty and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 ( OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34).  
4   Point 54 of the draft law which introduces  a new Article 22a on specialised financial education in Law N o. 186/2009 
and Point 90 of the draft law, which amends Article 38(1) of Law No. 186/2009 assigning competence to NBS to 
supervise the implementation of specialised financial education.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 1.3.1  More specifically , NBS will be obliged to maintain a register of specialised financial education 
providers.  NBS will assess whether an applicant to be included on the list of specialised financial 
education providers has provided sufficient evidence that : (i) the applicant is authorised to perform 
educational activity; (ii) the applicant is of a good character (in the case of an individual) or each 
member of the statutory body or management body of the applicant responsible for providing 
specialised financial education is of a good character (in the case of a legal entity); and (iii) the 
applicant has the technical and organisational expertise for providing specialised f inancial 
education5. 
1.3.2  NBS is furthermore entrusted with the general task of supervising the implementation of financial 
education by specialised financial education providers6 as well as by financial institutions providing 
specialised financial education to employees, financial agents and financial consultants. This 
includes the power to impose specific sanctions  on specialised financial education providers  and 
on persons providing specialised financial education,  which is not in line with Law No. 186/2009,  as 
amended by the draft law , or who are not  on NBS’s register .7 
 
2. General observation s 
2.1 This opinion does not consider whether the draft law effectively implements into national law  
Directive (EU) 2016/97 or certain provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU. The EC B only assess es the 
provisions of the draft law that impact on the tasks of NBS as a national central bank (NCB) and as 
a member of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  
2.2 The draft law confers upon NBS the new task of  supervising  financial education and specialised 
financial education providers , as specified in paragraph 1.3. Where a new task is conferred on an 
NCB in the ESCB  it must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 
123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b) (ii) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3603/938 defines ‘other type of credit facility’  as, inter alia,  ‘any financing of the public 
sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties’.  
2.3 Ensuring that Member States  implement a sound budgetary policy  is one of the key objectives of 
the monetary financing prohibition,  which may not be circumvented9. In view of this , the task of 
financing measures, which are normally the responsibility of the Member States and funded from 
their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what 
constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties, which can be 
translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the s cope of central bank tasks, it is 
necessary to carry out on a case- by-case basis an assessment of whether the task to be 
undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the 
responsibility of the Member States. In other words, adequate safeguards must be in place to 
                                                 
5  Point 54 of the draft law introducing a new Article 22a in Law N o. 186/2009.  
6  Point 90 of the draf t law amending Article 38(1) of Law N o. 186/2009.  
7  Point 94 of the draft law introducing, among others, Article 39(3) of Law No. 186/2009.  
8  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibi tions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
9  Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank 
independence.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a 
sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place.  
2.4 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down 
by the T reaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for 
determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the 
meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes  a 
government task as follows:  
First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been 
conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tas ks are 
mainly defined in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 
and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new 
tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, 
are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are 
atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly dischargedon behalf of and i n the exclusive interest of 
the government or of other public sector entities should be considered government tasks.  
Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 
on behalf of and in the exclusive i nterest of the government or other public sector entities is the 
impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB.  
In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  
(a) Whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central 
bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement those 
existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, 
sufficient saf eguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity 
between a new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so 
as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarit y 
should also be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks;  
(b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 
to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the 
capac ity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks;  
(c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the 
light of central bank independence and accountability considerations;  
(d) whether the performance of the new t ask harbours substantial financial risks;  
(e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision- making 
bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their 
personal independence and, in particu lar, on the guarantee of term of office set out in 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
 
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4 3. Specific observations  
On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether NBS’s new task is in 
line with the monetary financing pr ohibition.  
3.1 New tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB  
The supervision of financial education or specialised financial education providers  is not among the 
central banking tasks listed in Ar ticle 127(2) or (5) of the Treaty or otherwise conferred upon the 
NCBs by the Statute of the ESCB. Although the new task conferred on NBS relates , inter alia,  to 
the provision of financial education by financial institutions , it does not form part of  NBS’s  prudential  
supervisory tasks . According to the explanatory report accompanying the draft law , the objective of 
the new task  is rather one of financial consumer protection10. It follows that  the new task conferred 
on NBS under the draft law is  not directly  related to the tasks conferred on the ECB and the NCBs 
by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Consequently, a careful assessment of the conferral of 
this task on NBS  is required in order to determine whether it constitutes a  government task and 
whether  the related funding gives rise to monetary financing concerns.  
3.2 Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks  
The new task relating to the supervision of financial education widens the scope of the current 
tasks carried out by NBS in relation to the supervision of financial intermediaries and financial 
advisors by extending NBS’ s tasks to include the supervision of specialised financial education 
providers. Currently, the tasks carried out by NBS u nder Law No.186/2009  include supervision  of 
financial intermediation by an independent financial agent and of the provision of financial advice 
by financial adviser s. In line with its current remit, NBS  already possesses the powers necessary to 
ensur e that the professional qualifications of financial intermediaries and fi nancial agents  meet the 
required standards . In particular , NBS, or a person appointed by it, currently ensures  the conduct of 
professional examinations  for specific financial sectors and the levels of professional qualifications 
of certain persons active i n the financial intermediation and financial advisory services11. NBS is 
also responsible for nominat ing the (vice- ) chairmen and other members of the examining board 
and for approving examination regulations12. NBS also records  information on the  completion of 
special ised financial education and professional examinations  in its register of financial agents and 
financial intermediaries13.  
In contrast with the tasks currently performed by NBS under Law N o.186/2009 , the content and 
scope of special ised financia l education, the manner in which it is provided and other relevant 
details are only determined by the Decree of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic N o. 
600/200914 (hereinafter the ‘decree’ ). According to t he decree,  specialised financial educatio n is 
provided by financial institutions or educational facilities . In defining an educational facility, the 
decree refers  to Law N o. 131/2002 on universities and Law N o. 245/2008 on training and education 
                                                 
10  See Explanatory Report to the draft  law. 
11  Article 22( 3) of Law N o. 186/2009.  
12  Article 22( 2) of Law N o. 186/2009.  
13  Article 17(1)(n) and (o) and 17(7)(l) and (m) of Law N o. 186/2009.  
14  The legal basis for the decree is Article 22(9) of Law N o. 186/2009.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 (school law) . Therefore, the adequate provision of specialised financial education falls within the 
scope of government policies on education.  It follows that  even where the new task conferred on 
NBS might be regarded as being complementary to a certain extent to the supervision currently 
exercised by the NBS over entities providing financial services to consumers  due to the fact that it 
contributes to ensuring appropriate professional qualifications of financial intermediaries and 
financial agents , this task would nonetheless  be at least partially discharged on behalf of and in the 
interest of the government.  
It is, consequently,  necessary to analyse whether the new task to be conferred on NBS relating to 
the supervision of specialised financial education is a typical task that is also undertaken by other 
NCBs of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). While the majority of NCBs  of the ESCB 
do not appear to have been assigned specific tasks of this nature, the ECB has identified a number 
of Member States , including Croatia15, the Czech Republic16, Greece17, Hungary18, Portugal19 and 
                                                 
15  In Croatia, where there is i nsufficient evidence to support claims of the required level of knowledge and competency 
Hrvatska narodna banka (HNB ) may reject an application for , or terminate,  a licence as a credit intermediary. In 
accordance with the requirements laid down by Directiv e 2014/17/EU a nd transposed into Croatian law, HNB issues 
a by-law outlining the process f or training sales staff and a certificate of adequate knowledge and expertise. A credit 
institution is also obliged to prepare a training program me and submit it to H NB no later than 31 January of each 
calendar year.  
16  In the Czech Republic, persons who are required to sit  professional exams as a precondition for providing particular 
services in the financial market (e.g. consumer credit, capital market s, pensions , handling banknotes and coins) may 
be examined only by providers of financial educ ation holding accreditation from Česká národní banka (ČNB). ČNB 
may issue Decrees regulating the precise operation of providers of financial education. Č NB may also impose 
administ rative penalties and sanctions  in connection with the supervision of accredited providers of financial 
education.   
17  In Greece, pursuant to Article 14 of Law 3606/2007, implementing Directive 2004/39/EC  of the European Parliament  
and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets  in financial instruments amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC and 
93/6/EEC and Direct ive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 
93/22/EEC (OJ L 145, 30.402004, p. 1) , the Bank of Greece (BoG) was assigned the task of ensuring that persons 
providing investment services or performing investment activities on behalf of credit institutions possess the required 
knowledge and competence. This task is exercised through Joint Decisions of the BoG and the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission ( HCMC) . Candidates are required to pass c ertification examinations on a specified syllabus or 
to successfully complete the relevant c ertification training course. In both case s, they obtain a certificate confirming 
their knowledge and competence to provide investment services or engage in investment activities. For  renewal of 
the certificate , candidates are required to pass the c ertification examination or successfully complete a r efresher 
course. The BoG is assigned a number of tasks in relation to the certification process, including the eligibility 
assessment proc edure and handling of the relevant documentation. T he conditions for participating in the 
certification examinations, the examination syllabus, issues relating to the organisation of the r efresher courses, the 
examinations procedure, the conditions and procedure for the renewal and withdrawal of the c ertificate , as well as 
the fees to be paid by the candidates  are all outlined in a Joint BoG/HCMC Decision. The examinations and relevant 
courses may be carried out by various entities, following an assessment of their capability by the BoG and the 
HCMC. The supervision of the examinations is  assigned to a three- member Board of Examiners, of which one 
member is recommended by the BoG. Remuneration of the members of the Board of Examiners is specified in a 
Joint Decision of the HCMC and the BoG and the relevant cost falls on the HCMC and the BoG, which in turn charge 
examination fees to the candidates.  
18  In Hungary, under the 40/2015. (XII.30.) Decree of the Ministry of National economy related to f inancial, insurance 
and capital markets service providers’ agents , the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) is responsible for ensuring that the  
requirements for official examinations and examiners’ activity are complied with. The financial education of financial, 
insurance and capital markets service providers’ agents may be carried out by a trainer firm registered with the MNB,  
and by an announced trainer, based on the requirements defined by the law . The MNB organises the official exams 
of financial, insurance and capital market s service providers’ agents, and ensures the examiners . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
6 Slovenia20, where NCB s appear to perform  tasks similar to that  conferred on NBS by the draft law.  
The new task conferred on NBS  regarding the supervision of specialised financial education does 
not, therefore,  appear to be  atypical  for a national central bank  of the ESCB . 
3.3 Impact of the tasks on the independence of NBS 
The impact of the new task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of NBS must 
also be taken into consideration.  
3.3.1  Extent to which the performance of t he new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central 
bank tasks  
No apparent conflicts of interest with other existing central bank tasks arise from the NBS’s new 
task of supervising  specialise d financial education providers.   
3.3.2  Extent to which the performance of the new task places a disproportionate burden on NBS’s 
financial or organisational capacity  
The principle of financial independence requires that Member States may not put their NCBs in a 
position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out both their ESCB -related tasks 
and their national tasks, from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, when 
allocating specific new tasks to NCBs, each NCB concerned should have  additional financial and 
human resources  at its disposal  to ensure that the tasks can be carried out without impacting on  
the NCB’s operational or financial capacity (including sufficient human resources) to perform its 
ESCB tasks. In order to ensure that NBS’s capacity to perform its ESCB -related tas ks is not 
impacted, NBS must , therefore,  be in a position to avail  itself of the necessary resources, including 
personnel, for  performing assessments  and registrations and issuing  directions under the draft law.  
In this regard, it is noted that the draft law requires applicants to pay a fee for  entry in the register of 
specialised financial education providers. The application fee represents income for NBS21.  
However, given that NBS’s new task  would  extend beyond the maintenance of the register of 
speciali sed financial education providers , to also include assessing  whether the conditions of the 
draft law are met , it is difficult at this stage to predict the resources that would be required to ensure 
the sound supervision of specialised financial education. Therefore, it is not clear whether  the 
                                                                                                                                                             
19  In Portugal, following the transposition of Directive 2014/17/EU, credit institutions will be required to ensure that their 
staff have an appropriate level of knowledge and competence. Under Decree- Law 74- A/2017 of 23 June 2017, ( entry 
into force on 1 January 2018)  credit institutions will have complied with regulatory requirements where, for instance, 
their employees hold a certificate of professional competence. Credit intermediaries must also conform to  specific 
requirements of knowledge and competence and, for those providing services on mortgage credit agreements, the 
knowledge and competences of their staff. Under the Credit Intermediaries Law (recently approved by Decree- Law 
81-C/2017, of 7 July 2017), the Banco de Portugal must  assess compliance with the relevant  requirements 
throughout  the authorisation procedure. Compliance with the relevant  requirements can, again, only be ascertained 
by a certificate of professional competence. According t o Decree- Law 74- A/2017 and the Credit Intermediaries Law, 
certificates of professional competence may only be issued by entities certified by the Banco de Portugal. Under the 
relevant provisions, the Banco de Portugal is also responsible for monitoring those entities  and may revoke its  
certification if it concludes that the conditions required have ceased to exist. However, the Banco de Portugal has not 
been empowered to impose administrative penalties or sanctions on those entities. The fulfilment of these tasks is 
financed by the Banco de Portugal.  
20  In Slovenia, under the Consumer Credit Act credit providers and credit intermediaries  must have properly qualified 
staff. Banka Slovenije is responsible for the supervising compliance with the Consumer Credit  Act of credit 
institutions, leasing companies and certain credit intermediaries . Banka Slovenije’s  supervision extends to 
compliance with the provisions of Consumer Credit Act that regulates education. These tasks of Banka Slovenije are 
financed by the subjects of its supervision.  
21   Point 54 of the draft law which introduces a new Article 22a(8) in Law No. 186/2009.  
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7 application fees would cover all the costs related to performing the new task , or whether additional 
resources would be required, which could  impact  NBS’s regular budget .  
3.3.3  Extent to which performance of the new task f its into NBS ’s institutional set-up, in the light of the 
principles of central bank independence and accountability  
Given that the objective underpinning the new task conferred on NBS by the draft law is similar to 
the objective of  ensuring adequate professional qualifications of financial intermediaries and 
financial agents, which underlies NBS’s existing supervisory tasks as mentioned in paragraph 3.2, 
the performance of the new task does not appear to conflict  with NBS’s institutional set -up.  
3.3.4  Extent to  which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
The draft law does not directly address NBS ’s potential liability in the event of any legal action, 
application or other legal proceeding for damages in relation to the exercise (or failure to exercise)  
of its powers  under the draft law. In the absence of any provision in the draft law excluding NBS’s 
liability  in performing the tasks under the draft law,  NBS would ultimately be liable for damages in 
accordance with Slovak state liability rules. Therefore, the new task conferred on NBS under the 
draft law would entail additional financial risks.  
3.3.5  Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of NBS ’s decision -making 
bodies to disproportionate political risks and has an impact on their personal independence  
The performance of the  new task does not appear to expose NBS ’s decision -making bodies to any 
disproportionate political risk or  to have an impact on their personal independence. As mentioned 
in paragraph 3.3. 3, the new task shares a  common objective with existing supervisory task s of NBS 
to ensure appropriate professional qualifications of financial intermediaries and financial agents.  
3.4 Conclusion regarding the compatibility of the draft law with the prohibition on monetary  financing  
The supervision of financial education or specialised financial education providers is not among the 
central banking tasks listed in the Treaty. The new task  conferred on NBS could be regarded as  
complement ing the supervisory tasks currently performed by NBS , in the light of  its contribution to 
the objective of ensur ing adequate professional qualifications of financial intermediaries and 
financial agents. Furthermore, this task might be seen as a legitimate task to be conferred on the 
NBS given t hat this task does not appear to be atypical for NCBs in the ESCB. However, ensuring 
the sound provision of specialised financial education forms part of the educational policies of the 
State . In this respect , the new task would be administered at least in part on behalf of and in the 
interest of the government . Additionally, there is uncertainty as regards  the additional financial 
burden imposed on NBS  in undertaking this task . The ECB therefore recommends that the 
consulting authority take these  concerns into account in its decision on  whether to confer  the new  
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8 task of supervising specialised financial education on NBS.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 27 October  2017.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DR AGHI