EN Official Journal of the European Union C 24/48

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The development of regional areas for the management of fish stocks and the control of fishing’ (own-initiative opinion)

2012/C 24/09

Rapporteur: Brendan BURNS

On 20 January 2011 the European Economic and Social Committee, under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on

The development of regional areas for the management of fish stocks and the control of fishing (own-initiative opinion).

The Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 6 October 2011.

At its 475th plenary session, held on 26 and 27 October 2011 (meeting of 27 October 2011), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 147 votes to 6 with 15 abstentions.

1. Recommendations

1.1 The Committee welcomes the intention to radically reform the CFP and in particular its objective to establish a de-centralised policy, less dependent on detailed decisions taken in Brussels and allowing more opportunity for local and regional involvement in fisheries management. However, the essential detail, clarity and sanctions regime needed for such a policy to work effectively is missing and needs to be included.

1.2 Without flourishing fish stocks there can be no sustainable fishing industry. It is therefore recommended that environmental sustainability should be prioritised as the basis for economic and social sustainability and specifically included in the Basic Regulation. This will require policy to be led by a scientific, ecosystem approach governed by the precautionary principle.

1.3 To be effective the strengthening of quota-based management plans based on ‘maximum sustainable yield’ (MSY) requires higher levels to be established that genuinely enable all regulated species to flourish and this should be done by 2015.

1.4 The proposed market-based system of tradable fishing rights with permits allocated on historical participation in a fishery risks allowing those responsible for past over-fishing to continue. The Committee therefore recommends that Member States use the provision that those receiving allocations must be required to demonstrate that their activities do not damage the marine environment and that they make significant contributions to coastal fishing communities. In this way the implicit privatisation of fish stocks will be subject to social and environmental controls.

1.5 The Committee welcomes the partial ban on discarding fish but suggests that it should be specifically linked to improvements in selective fishing techniques.

1.6 Continuing subsidies should be used for developing fishing fleets that fish in a less environmentally destructive way (less damage to fish stocks and the ocean floor, less discarding, etc.) and not be used to increase fishing capacity.

1.7 The standards and rules that govern the EU fleets when they fish at home should also apply when they fish on the high seas and in the waters of third countries – there should be no double standard.

2. Introduction

2.1 During the development of this Opinion the Commission proposals for the second revision of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were published. It proposes a whole-scale and fundamental reform to address the current reality of overfishing, fleet overcapacity, heavy subsidies, low economic resilience and decline in the volume of fish caught by European fishermen. This Opinion therefore sets its comments on the development of regional areas for the management of fish stocks within the broader context of the proposed reform.

3. Background

3.1 The EU Treaties and the present CFP confer upon the Commission the right of initiative and upon the Council, exclusive competence for the conservation of marine biological resources. This systemic centralisation, or more specifically the ‘top-down’ approach chosen in executing the responsibilities of the CFP, has not produced workable solutions for the many different conditions and geographical jurisdictions of the CFP. The phrase ‘one size does not fit all’ is often used in critical reference to the resultant body of regulation.

3.2 The necessity for stakeholder engagement was recognised in the first reform in 2002 resulting in the establishment of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) which only offer advice.

3.3 Upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty very significant material changes have occurred. Co-decision now exists between Parliament and Council for all matters of fisheries regulation, excepting the setting of fishing opportunity, which remains the exclusive competence of the Council.

3.4 In an attempt to address every problem, the Commission and the Council have produced regulations that are over complicated and have failed to address the problems that exist within European waters.

3.5 According to the fishing industry there is an ‘almost comical profusion of detail’ - gear specifications, permitted compositions of landings and technical regulation, all included in 900 pieces of regulation. This minutia of detail slows up innovation by providing no incentive to find workable solutions. It has also resulted in a loss of trust between the fishing industry and the political mechanisms and committees that are meant to control the CFP. This inevitably results in attempts to evade rather than comply.

3.6 Under the present CFP, innovation and experimentation by the industry has not been encouraged but there are some good examples that have been instigated by fishers. In Scotland, there is a consistent record of innovation, e.g. conservation of cod in the North Sea. Significant decommissioning of vessels has taken place along with Real Time Closures: smart management of limited days at sea: development of selective gear and trials in the use of CCTV. This has help to reduce discards, improve competitiveness and improve conservation. Others, too, have contributed much, including, for example, the beam-trawl industry of the Netherlands in changing and developing gear types and decommissioning.

3.7 The hallmark of all these initiatives is the recognition by the fishing industry that there are problems (e.g. reducing discards) and the industry must be the major contributor to finding and implementing solutions. Other examples of regional solutions are available and they prove that regional solutions do produce better results rather than generic regulation made in Brussels.

3.8 However, these trials all share a fundamental constraint, i.e. under the current CFP there is no delegation of responsibility. The final outcome of innovation, experimentation and development can only influence regulation if the commission decides to pick it up.

3.9 The tendency by the Commission to keep an excessively close hold on regulation is perhaps explainable due to a strong desire not to fail in meeting the responsibilities. This was particularly the case pre-Lisbon and has become, regrettably, a self-perpetuating process. The more the legislation becomes centralised, complex and ill-fitting; the more the trust of stakeholders is lost and consequently, the less likely full compliance will occur. This creates a justification for tighter central regulation, and so the cycle continues.

4. General comments

For all the reasons explained in the section 3 above (Background), the logic for establishing regional authorities for the implementation of EU policies is self evident. This in turn raises several questions.

4.1 Delegation of authority

4.1.1 For Regional authorities to have true value, they need to have strategic targets based upon scientific evidence set in Brussels. Brussels should also:

— be responsible for ensuring a level playing field between regions and fisheries;

— police the industry to ensure that compliance with EU quotas, targets and other objectives are met.

4.1.2 Due to the variety of geographical and other factors of each fishery area; management tools need to be given to Member States. This will ensure that the development of rules and regulations at both the EU level and the regional level will be done with the full participation of the fishing industry and by those experts who know and understand what will or will not work in each area.

4.2 Fishing Regions and Regional Authorities

4.2.1 The wide variety of areas that will be covered by these changes does not allow this opinion to suggest definite objectives other than to recommend that all regions should be established through representative bodies that includes Member States and stakeholders; In particular, those bodies that only represent a regional interest but do not have a pan-European remit.

4.3 Discards

4.3.1 This has become an important issue specifically discarding that takes place during the catching process. Commissioner Damanaki has responded to this media attention by proposing a partial discard ban in the revision of the CFP.

4.3.2 The potential consequences of an ill-judged approach to fish discarding could be disastrous for the fishing communities and the industry.

4.3.3 The primary cause of volume discarding lies in the present regulations governing mixed fisheries – where several species are unavoidably caught together. Management by ‘total allowable catches’ for each individual species, overlaid with ‘catch composition’ rules governing the proportions of different species that may be landed, creates a rigid matrix of rules that does not reflect the abundance and proportions of certain fish presented in that ecosystem.

4.3.4 One of the main objectives of the revised CFP should be to support the introduction of better working practices as detailed in section 3 of this opinion so that discards can be reduced to negligible levels.

Brussels, 27 October 2011. The President of the European Economic and Social Committee Staffan NILSSON