STATE AID — BELGIUM

State aid SA.54915 (2019/N) — Capacity remuneration mechanism

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 346/03)

By means of the letter dated 21 September 2020 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified Belgium of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the abovementioned measure.

Interested parties may submit their comments on the measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

European Commission Directorate-General Competition State aid Greffe 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË Fax + 32 22961242 Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

These comments will be communicated to Belgium. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments and/or of parts of the comments submitted may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

SUMMARY

1. Procedure

Belgium pre-notified the measure on 3 July 2019. Several questionnaires were exchanged with the Belgian authorities and meetings were organised to discuss the pre-notification file. Belgium notified the measure on 19 December 2019.

2. Description of the measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure

The objective of the proposed capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) is to ensure security of supply, as defined by a reliability standard in the Electricity Act of 29 April 1999. Belgium has identified a risk for security of supply due to the upcoming phasing-out of its nuclear fleet in 2025.

In the Belgian capacity mechanism, the Transmission System Operator (TSO) buys the capacity from the capacity providers in the form of reliability options. The capacity providers that are selected in the auction sell the reliability options to the TSO and receive a fixed capacity remuneration in return. Whenever the reference price (i.e. the day-ahead electricity price) exceeds a pre-defined level, the so-called strike price, the capacity provider must pay back to the TSO the difference between the reference price and the strike price.

The TSO organises a CRM auction in function of the level of capacity resources that are needed to guarantee an adequate level of resource adequacy to reach the reliability standards. The capacity auction is held every year for delivery in four years’ time in a ‘Y-4 auction’. A further year-ahead auction is held in the year immediately prior to the delivery year of the main auction (‘Y-1 auction’).

The costs of the CRM (i.e. those incurred to fund capacity payments to providers) will be financed based on a ‘public service obligation’ via the TSO’s network tariffs.

The legal basis of the measure is the Electricity Act of 29 April 1999 on the organisation of the Belgian electricity market modified by a law published on the 16 May 2019 in the Belgian Official Gazette (‘Belgisch Staatsblad’/‘Moniteur belge’). Secondary legislation in the form of Additionally, Royal Decrees and Market Rules will be adopted and will elaborate the Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM) modalities further. The drafts of these texts are available on the website of the Ministry of Energy (1).

3. Assessment of the measure

3.1. Existence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU

The Commission considers that the CRM is financed from State resources since it is financed from the proceeds of a para-fiscal levy imposed by the State and which are managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of the legislation. The Commission notes that the successful bidders receive, through the notified mechanism, a revenue they would not receive if they continued to operate in the electricity market on normal economic conditions selling electricity and ancillary services only. Moreover, the measure confers an advantage to only certain undertakings able to help tackle the identified adequacy problem that compete with other electricity producers. The notified measure will thus confer an economic advantage to undertakings that are in a comparable factual and legal situation to other electricity producers. As a result, the measure is selective. Electricity generation as well as electricity wholesale and retail markets are activities open to competition throughout the EU. Therefore, an advantage from State resources to any undertaking in that sector has the potential to affect intra-Union trade and to distort competition. Consequently, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

3.2. Lawfulness of aid

By notifying the scheme before its implementation, the Belgian authorities have fulfilled their obligation according to Article 108(3) TFEU.

3.3. Compatibility of the measure

The Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure with the internal market based on the conditions established in Section 3.9 of the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (2)(EEAG), which set specific conditions for aid to generation adequacy and have been applicable since 1 July 2014. On 2 July 2020, the Commission adopted a communication prolonging the EEAG until 31 December 2021 and amending them (3).

3.3.1. Objective of common interest and necessity of the aid

Belgium identified the need for the CRM in an Adequacy and Flexibility study published in 2019 by the TSO Elia (4). The study identifies risks for the Belgian resource adequacy, with reference to the national reliability standard described especially in the EU-HiLo (High impact — low probability) scenario, which assumes that several nuclear units are unavailable in France (on top of ‘normal’ unavailability). The Commission considers that the use of the EU-HiLo scenario in a market-wide capacity mechanism does not seem appropriate to determine the level of the resource adequacy problem since it risks overestimating this problem and distorting the electricity market. The methodology used in Elia’s study has been criticised by the national regulator (CREG) (5).

The Commission has therefore doubts as to whether the resource adequacy problem has been identified precisely enough and has been properly analysed and quantified by the Belgian authorities, in particular with regard to points (221) and (222) of the EEAG.

3.3.2. Appropriateness of the aid

The Commission doubts that the measure is appropriate, according to point (226) of the EEAG, in view of its restrictive way of calculating investment thresholds leading to multi-year contracts (of 3, 8 or 15 years). The thresholds take into account the installed capacity (i.e. maximum capacity that the unit is designed to run) instead of the de-rated capacity (i.e. their pre-defined availability rate and their contribution to the objective of resource adequacy). The Commission takes the view that this feature may prevent fair competition between technologies equally contributing to resource adequacy and discourage in particular intermittent technologies with high de-rating factors from participating altogether (notably intermittent solar and wind RES).

3.3.3. Incentive effect

The objective of the measure is to ensure security of supply by keeping available sufficient capacity. Without a proportionate capacity mechanism there would probably be insufficient capacity to ensure security of supply because a significant portion of plants is projected to make insufficient revenues from the energy-only market to cover their costs. In addition, the payback obligation creates a financial incentive to be available at times of scarcity. Moreover, Belgium has introduced monitoring procedure for availability before and during the delivery period and appropriate testing and penalties to ensure compliance with the availability obligation. The Commission therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the measure has in principle an incentive effect.

3.3.4. Proportionality

The Commission seeks clarifications whether the measure is proportionate according to section 3.9.5 of the EEAG. The Commission has doubts as to whether: (i) the competitive bidding process is based on non-discriminatory criteria due to the investment thresholds mentioned in section 3.3.2 above; (ii) the methodology defining the demand curve used to calculate the amount of capacity to be procured in each auction is proportionate since it can be based on the unrealistic EU-HiLo sensitivity or other sensitivities assuming additional unavailability of French nuclear plants.

3.3.5. Avoidance of negative effects on competition and trade

Belgium will apply an intermediate price cap to capacity in the one-year contract category, to avoid windfall profits. Consequently, these capacities will neither be allowed to bid at a price higher than this cap, nor to receive a clearing price higher than it. No individual assessment of capacities is foreseen to grant them with a derogation if they face higher costs.

In the CRM, indirect foreign capacity will be subject to the intermediate price cap. The Commission takes the preliminary view that the conjunction of the absence of multi-year contracts and the application of the intermediate price will prevent these capacities from bidding their true costs in the auction in case they are higher than the intermediate price cap. Therefore, they may be discouraged from participating in the CRM altogether. The Commission considers that this creates a discrimination against foreign capacity, in breach of point (232) of the EEAG.

Moreover, point (233) (c) of the EEAG provides that capacity mechanisms should not ‘undermine investment decisions which preceded the measure’. However, the intermediate price could have the effect of preventing existing capacity from bidding their true costs, while not being able to apply for multi-year contracts, leading to their exclusion from the CRM and even their exit from the electricity market. The Commission thus seeks further information to assess the effect of the intermediate price cap and its compatibility with this point of the EEAG.

Belgium explained that it would allocate the congestion revenues resulting from the allocation of cross-border tickets (i.e. access rights for foreign capacity providers to participate in the CRM) as provided for by Article 19(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). The Commission considers that further information is required to assess the compatibility of the CRM with point (233) (a) of the EEAG, i.e. make sure that the congestion revenues will be used in order for the CRM to provide the right incentive to invest in interconnection capacity ensure.

3.3.6. Compliance of the aid measure with intrinsically linked provisions of Union law

If a State aid measure entails aspects which are indissolubly linked to the object of the aid and which breach other provisions of Union law, such a breach could affect the assessment of compatibility of that State aid. In this regard, the Commission reaches the preliminary conclusion that the financing mechanism of the CRM does not introduce any restrictions that would infringe Article 30 or Article 110 TFEU since Belgium will allow the participation of foreign capacities in the CRM. However, the Commission has doubts as to whether the CRM is in line with Article 22(1)(c) and Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since both the national Adequacy and Flexibility study and the reference scenario used to determine the volume of capacity to be auctioned are based on assumptions about foreign electricity supply (additional unavailability of French nuclear plants).

In accordance with Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (7), all unlawful aid can be subject to recovery from the recipient.

TEXT OF LETTER

(1) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(2) OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1.

(3) See Communication C(2020) 4355 final (OJ C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2).

(4) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(5) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(6) OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54.

(7) OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9.

(8) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385).

(9) Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 29 april 1999 betreffende de organisatie van de elektriciteitsmarkt, teneinde een capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme in te stellen” / “Loi modifiant la loi du 29 avril 1999 relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité portant la mise en place d'un mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(10) Projet d’arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Finaal voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de berekeningsmethode van het noodzakelijke capaciteitsvolume en de parameters die nodig zijn voor de organisatie van de veilingen in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(11) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit betreffende de criteria en nadere regels voor het in aanmerking komen voor de prekwalificatieprocedure voor wat betreft de regels inzake de minimumdrempel en de combinatie van steunmaatregelen

(12) Proposition d’arrêté royal fixant les seuils d’investissements et les critères d’éligibilité des coûts d’investissement en vue du classement des capacités dans les catégories de capacités — Voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de investeringsdrempels en de criteria voor het in aanmerking komen van investeringskosten met het oog op de klassering van capaciteiten in capaciteitscategorieën

(13) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit houdende vaststelling van de voorwaarden waaronder houders van rechtstreekse en onrechtstreekse buitenlandse capaciteit kunnen deelnemen aan de prekwalificatieprocedure in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(14) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(15) See: https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200828_public-consultation-crm-functioning-rules

(16) LOLE95 refers to a 95th percentile standard according to which during severe conditions with a chance of 5 % of occurring (i.e. a very cold winter that occurs once in 20 years), the LOLE must be inferior to the given standard, which is, in the case of Belgium, 20 hours.

(17) These values are to be considered as preliminary.

(18) https://www.plan.be/uploaded/documents/201709280927450.Addendum_CBA.pdf

(19) OJ C 121, 6.4.2018.

(20) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(21) See State aid decision C(2018) 589 final, in case SA.48648 (2017/NN) — Belgium — Strategic Reserve.

(22) The ‘EU-BASE’ scenario takes into account the latest known policies of all modelled European countries (nuclear and coal trajectories, expected new built gas generation, demand-side response and storage developments, capacity mechanisms, flow based, rules of the Clean Energy package, expected grid development…).

(23) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(24) See State aid decision C(2016) 7086 final in case SA.39621 2015/C.

(25) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Mecanisme-remuneration-capacite-Note-E2-02-10-2019.pdf

(26) Albrecht, Johan, Hamels, S., & Thomas, L. (2017). Le trilemme énergétique: une exploration du paysage Belge de l’electricité en l'An 2030. Gent: Skribis., https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8560302; Study by Energyville: https://www.energyville.be/sites/energyville/files/downloads/2018/gp_bbl_iew_report_-_v2018_03_06_final.pdf

Study by the Federal Planning Bureau: https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201802260841090.OPREP201802.pdf

(27) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/MAF_2018_Methodology_and_Detailed_Results.pdf

(28) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%201%20-%20Detailed%20Results%2C%20Sensitivities%20and%20Input%20Data.pdf

(29) A ‘Coal Phase-out’ sensitivity is performed. In total, around 23,6 GW of generating capacity were removed from the 2025 Base-Case scenario, mainly through reductions in lignite and hard coal capacities.

(30) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%203%20-%20Country%20Comments.pdf

(31) https://www.benelux.int/files/4515/8998/1576/PENTAreport_FINAL.pdf

(32) Like for MAF 2019, ‘for 2025 a need of 2,5 GW new capacity is thus assumed in this study to be delivered under the CRM in 2025 in order to reach adequacy for Belgium.’

(33) ‘For the “Low Gas Sensitivity” in PLEF for Belgium, the assumed new capacity of 2,5 GW was removed from the PLEF “Base Case”’. ‘Belgian and French gas capacities are respectively 2,5 GW and 2,2 GW lower than in the base case. For Austria (1,2 GW less gas capacity), the Netherlands (1,6 GW less gas capacity) and Luxemburg (0,1 GW less gas capacity)’

(34) ‘For the Low Nuclear / CH NTC sensitivity, nuclear capacity is 1 700 MW lower in France and 1190 MW lower in Switzerland. For all other countries, the installed capacity is unchanged compared to the base case. Additionally, NTCs between Switzerland and the neighbouring zones are reduced in order take account increasing unscheduled flows through Switzerland due to the fact that Switzerland may not be included in the flow-based market coupling (FBMC) in 2025.’

(35) See also recital (38) below.

(36) SA.48648 Belgian Strategic Reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(37) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/consultation-belgiums-market-reform-plan_en

(38) Commission opinion C(2020) 2654 final: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/markets-and-consumers/capacity-mechanisms_en

(39) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Belgian-electricity-market-Final-implementation-plan-CRM-22062020.pdf

(40) https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/grid-development/investment-plan/federal-development-plan-2020-2030.

(41) These percentages are based on the definitions used by the Interconnection Target Experts Group (ITEG), i.e. interconnection rate = Total import / Total generation capacity, with total import implying “maximum power flow that the cross-border asset can transmit in accordance with system security criteria.

(42) https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(43) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/avis-a2030

(44) ‘The use of a Hi-Lo scenario, in which extreme events are assumed to be the base case, can hardly be considered to be a “statistically normal year”. On the contrary, a Hi-Lo scenario implies, by definition, an exceptional situation. The CREG does not deny that extreme situations may actually occur, but these must be included with their probability in a probabilistic simulation. Instead, Elia’s security of supply analyses based on a Hi-Lo scenario involves a calculation of an average LoLE with a statistically anomalous base assumption (i.e. “low probability”).’

(45) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/note-z2024

(46) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(47) Expected Energy Not Served: forecast of annual demand that cannot be provided by resources available on the energy market, expressed in MWh

(48) https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201403170843050.WP_1403.pdf

(49) https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Infrastructure_and_network%20development/Infrastructure/Documents/CEPA%20study%20on%20the%20Value%20of%20Lost%20Load%20in%20the%20electricity%20supply.pdf

(50) Other elements of the CREG’s proposal can be found here: https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(51) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(52) See article 23 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(53) See article 24 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(54) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/AR-methode-de-calcul-volume-de-capacite-parametres-encheres-mecanisme-de-remuneration-de-capacite-Annexe-1-Rapport-de-consultation.pdf; notably: ‘La DG Énergie constate que globalement, CBS soutient la méthode alternative telle que proposée par la DG Énergie. En particulier, CBS apprécie également que la possibilité soit prévue pour que des sensibilités HiLo puissent être prises en compte et que des volumes de balancing soient intégrés’, and ‘le paragraphe 4 de l’article 4 déroge des propositions précédentes d’Elia, en ce sens que la possibilité subsiste de tenir compte d’évènements HiLo, mais qu’il s’agit à présent d’une possibilité parmi d’autres. Elia peut se retrouver dans cette approche plus ouverte’. [‘DG Energy notes that, overall, CBS supports the alternative method proposed by DG Energy. In particular, CBS appreciates the possibility of taking into account HiLo sensitivities and that balancing volumes are integrated’, and ‘Article 4 (4) derogates from earlier proposals from Elia, in the sense that the possibility remains to take account of HiLo events, but is now one of several options. Elia supports this approach, which it find more open.’]

(55) Net-CONE represents the revenues that the best new entrant technology would need to earn in the capacity market to compensate for its ‘missing money’ in the energy market for 1 year. It is calculated by removing market revenues and ancillary service revenues from the Gross-CONE.

(56) The CREG launched a public consultation from 1 July 2020 to 13 July 2020 on a proposal of values of the CONE for a short-list of reference technologies, the WACC and the correction factor X (see recital (58)(b)).

(57) Considering CCGT, OCGT and Diesels in the short-list of reference technology and assuming average values for gross-CONE, energy market revenues and ancillary services revenues

(58) https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200505_public-consultation-on-the-scenarios-sensitivities-and-data-for-the-crm

(59)

‘2.2.1 French nuclear availability- The first sensitivity is in line with the 10-year Adequacy and Flexibility study 2020-30 (Elia, 2019) and is presented in § 2.6.8. It includes a nuclear availability reduced by 4 units in winter.’

(60) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c2105

(61) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/avis-dg-energie-projet-proposition-2105-signed.pdf

(62) https://www.creg.be/fr/consultations-publiques/consultation-publique-relative-au-projet-de-proposition-2086-relative-au

(63) Elia launched a public consultation on the scenarios, sensitivities and data for the CRM parameter calculation for the Y-4 Auction for Delivery Period 2025-2026 (see recital (58)(a)).

(64) Derived from Figure 2-63, page 83 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 -2030. Note that for the OCGT technology, the values for units >25 are used, as there are OCGT units in the Belgian control zone that are older than 25 years.

(65) Derived from Section 4.4.5. Fixed costs under LTSA, page 36 of the Pöyry study in the context of CONE determination for the I-SEM

(66) Derived from data published on the Elia website regarding contracted volumes and prices for strategic reserves (https://www.elia.be/en/suppliers/supplier/energy-purchases/strategic-reserve-volume-and-prices), considering the average activation price for SDR winter period 2015-2016 for a 4h activation (hence corresponding to a 40 % derating), and assuming one availability test of 15 minutes per year, as follows:

(67) Considering the derating factor range for ‘large scale thermal’ varies between 85 and 95 %, as illustrated in Figure 4-5 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030, a derating factor of 90 % is applied for the CCGT, OCGT and Turbojet technology. For the Market Response technology, a range is used from 30 % (2h availability; low) — 40 % (4h availability; mid) — 55 % (8h availability; high) to take into account the variety of possibilities included in the Market Response technology.

(68) Calculated as follows:

(69) Based on estimations done in the context of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030. The revenue estimations considered in this calibration exercise are derived based on a reference scenario for 2025. Furthermore, it is considered that by means of intervention, missing money is covered such that the — in the study so-called ‘not-viable gap’ — is filled, meaning that sufficient capacity is assumed in the system in 2025 to meet the adequacy requirements. The yearly inframarginal rents from the electricity market (MID values) are derived as P50 revenues from a probabilistic simulation. For the LOW and HIGH values, for the sake of this indicative calibration a range of 20 % around the estimated revenues is considered.

(70) Derived from the data published on the Elia website regarding capacity auctions for the balancing services (https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/balancing/capacity-auction-results), considering the overall average of average procurement prices for all auctions related to delivery periods from January 2017 until December 2019. Note that only mFRR reservation fees below 10EUR/MW/h are taken into account towards the overall average value, as prices above this cut-off point are considered to represent periods with adequacy issues and therefore not representative for this analysis. The LOW/MID/HIGH values are calculated as 60/75/90 % of the overall average value, to account for variable costs associated with the reservation of mFRR, such as for instance a cost for making a bid. The net revenues from the provision of frequency-related balancing services, in order to avoid double counting and consider only net revenues, have been considered to the following extent:

— FCR revenues are not considered, since Batteries are likely to become the dominant technology to provide FCR. The Batteries technology is not considered for the calibration of the intermediate price cap, as they are considered to derive a positive business case from the provision of FCR.

— aFRR revenues are not considered, as it is assumed that technologies who provide aFRR arbitrage between the provision of aFRR and selling energy. Therefore, aFRR reservation fees are assumed not to represent a net revenue on top of the inframarginal rents earned on the energy market.

— mFRR revenues are considered relevant for the Turbojet (assumed to provide mFRR standard product) and Market response (assumed to provide mFRR flex product) technologies, as they typically provide these services currently in the market. More specifically, revenues for Turbojet and Market response are determined by a percentage of the average mFRR reservation fee or the inframarginal rent from the energy market, according to whichever of both leads to the highest value.

(71) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides

(72) The threshold for instance corresponds to the size of the larger existing units in the Belgian market and thereby such volume can be critical to create a competitive effect.

(73) Capacity providers are only eligible for capacity contracts up to their eligible volume, defined as their reference power (taking into account the opt-out volumes) multiplied by the derating factor.

(74) Arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(75) Based on Figure 4-5 of the latest Belgian Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 — 2030 by Elia-https://www.elia.be/-/media/project/elia/elia-site/company/publication/studies-and-reports/studies/13082019adequacy-and-flexibility-study_en.pdf

(76) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c1907

(77) The volume that a CMU is obliged to make available during availability tests and availability monitoring.

(78) The CMU’s capacity that is actually available during the availability monitoring mechanism or the availability test.

(79) The maximum power (in MW) that the Delivery Point can inject into (or take off) the Elia grid for a certain quarter-hour, taking into account all technical, operational, meteorological or other restrictions known at the time of notification to Elia with the Daily Schedule, without taking into account any participation of the Delivery Point in the provision of balancing services.

(80) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité (Draft royal decree on the establishment of the conditions under which holders of direct and indirect foreign capacity can participate in the prequalification procedure within the framework of the capacity remuneration mechanism).

(81) ‘Nominated electricity market operator (NEMO)’ means an entity designated by the competent authority to perform tasks related to single day-ahead or single intraday coupling — see article 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

(82) https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&leftmenu=no&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm? lang=F&legislat=55&dossierID=1220

(83) https://www.creg.be/sites/default/files/assets/Publications/Decisions/Z1109-10FR.pdf

(84) Case 76/78 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraph 21; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 58; Case C-706/17 Achema [2019] paragraph 47 and following.

(85) Case C-345/02, Pearle and Others [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:448.

(86) Case C-677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:348.

(87) Case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268 , paragraph 68.

(88) See case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268, paragraphs 68 and 72; case C-706/17 Achema and Others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, paragraph 57 and case T-217/17 FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:T:2019:633, paragraph 111.

(89) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others, C-39/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 1999, Spain v Commission, C-342/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

(90) See notably Regulation (EC) no714/2009, Directive 2009/72/EC, Regulation (EU) no2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944.

(91) OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1, as corrected by the corrigendum adopted by the Commission in OJ C 290, 10.8.2016, p. 11.

(92) See Communication C(2020) 4355 final — In particular, in point (16) of the EEAG, the following sentence has been added: ‘These Guidelines shall, however, apply to undertakings which were not in difficulty on 31 December 2019 but became undertakings in difficulty in the period from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021.’

(93) COM(2016) 752 final .https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mechanisms_final_report_en.pdf

(94) SA.4864 Belgian Strategic reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(95) SA.42011 Italian capacity mechanism (OJ C 158, 4.5.2018) (see recitals 79 and 80)

(96) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); SA.46100 Polish capacity mechanism (OJ C 462, 21.12.2018) (see recitals 46, 47, 48); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 70)

(97) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 71)

(98) Available at https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(99) See recital (25) of the Commission Decision in State aid SA.40029 (2014/N) ‘Reintroduction of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II — H1 2015’ (OJ C 136, 24.4.2015, p. 4). See recital (29) of Commission Decision in State aid SA.42215 (2015/N) ‘Prolongation of the Greek financial support measures (art. 2 law 3723/2008)’ (OJ C 277, 21.8.2015, p. 11).

(100) Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] I-1777, paragraph 30.