COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
C0M(94) 383 final 
Brussels, 07.09.1994 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN RADIOACTIVL SUBSTANCES 
AND NIK LEAR MATERIAL 
INTRODUCTION 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in the fragmentation of the centralized 
control and management structures for nuclear materials and radioactive substances. The 
whole of the Soviet nuclear industry was subject to a system of security specific to the 
existing regime, but the stringent controls and physical security rules which were part of 
this system have now been considerably relaxed. The highly centralized system was 
based on completely different criteria from those applied in the West (absence of 
accounting for nuclear materials, for example), and on almost total interpénétration 
between civil and military activities. 
This dangerous situation has become more acute because a number of States in the 
region, particularly Russia and Ukraine, have undertaken an ambitious programme of 
dismantling their nuclear arsenals, sometimes with huge support from the West, with the 
indirect result of a growing risk that certain fissile materials might move from an area 
subject to control to less well-controlled areas where malicious acts cannot be ruled out. 
This combination of elements is helping to promote an illicit traffic in dangerous 
radioactive materials, fraudulently acquired and resold secretly. 
The emergence in certain republics, including Russia, of very powerful criminal 
organizations adds to the risks of diversion. Such organizations could take advantage of 
the situation and establish export channels. In addition, where this traffic is conducted 
by organizations rather than isolated individuals, experience shows that the networks in 
question have branches throughout the entire world, and that the potential final users of 
the stolen materials are in all probability third countries or clandestine operators based 
outside the territory of the Union. 
This factor, which could undermine the security of States and individuals in Europe, calls 
for an overall response from the Union. It is clearly in the common interest of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries and the 
European Union that a solution be found. 
The joint work that needs to be embarked upon will make it possible to give firm shape 
to certain aspects of the rapprochement between the European Union and Eastern Europe 
iiirough partnership with the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in particular 
Russia and Ukraine, and through the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern 
European countries. Stability in Europe cannot be achieved without such joint approaches 
and practical cooperation. 
The aim of this communication is to draw attention to the gravity of this problem and 
suggest some ways in which it can be tackled effectively and systematically, using the 
various instruments at the disposal of the European Union and its Member States. 
1. THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
For obvious geographical reasons, there is a risk that the territory of the Union could 
increasingly become the hub for this dangerous trade. A number of attempted transactions 
of this sort have been blocked in time by the competent authorities of the Member States, 
mostly in Germany. Some cases have also been reported in Switzerland and Austria. 
The materials concerned are generally of no interest in military terms, even if they present 
a real contamination hazard. However, a few cases of illegal possession of plutonium, a 
highly dangerous material which can be used for military purposes, have come to light 
recently, spectacularly raising the level of public awareness of the scope of the problem 
and the dangers of the situation. 
The dangers inherent in this trade are considerable. The risk of radiation, which varies 
according to the material involved, exists for those who handle the material but in some 
cases there is also a risk for the general public. 
As far as traffic in the most dangerous substances is concerned, such as plutonium or 
highly enriched uranium, there is also a risk of nuclear proliferation, since nuclear 
materials involved in this traffic are not only of interest to States or organizations which 
are seeking to by-pass the various levels of control set up at national and international 
level. 
A note recently sent to the Council by the German delegation (No 7861/94 of 16 June 
1994) reports a large increase in the number of recorded cases of illicit traffic in nuclear 
or radioactive materials. The document quotes the figure of 41 cases in 1991, 158 in 1992 
and 241 in 1993. 
An even greater source of anxiety are two cases reported in May and July 1994 
concerning materials capable of being used for military purposes, namely plutonium 
seized in Germany and enriched uranium intercepted in St. Petersburg. The major 
seizures by the German authorities in August were given considerable media publicity, 
and undoubtedly highlighted the need for a rapid and effective response to this problem. 
For the moment, the illicit presence of uranium and plutonium has been reported only in 
Germany and Italy. Other less serious cases involving radioactive materials such as 
caesium 137, which is used in hospitals, have also come to light in Germany and 
Belgium. 
The vast majority of cases recorded so far are concerned with radioactive substances and 
not nuclear materials. Experience shows, however, that the people guilty of this traffic are 
sometimes not aware of the real nature of what they are transporting. In other cases, 
dealers have simply tried to pass off relatively innocuous substances as material of high 
value, the price being in direct proportion to the potential danger of the stolen material. 
An important distinction must be made between the legal frameworks governing the 
materials in question. Simplifying somewhat, a distinction can be made between: 
- nuclear materials, which are materials subject to "safeguards" (safety controls), whether 
under the Euratom Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and in regard to which there is a substantial risk, 
according to the substance in question, of direct or indirect military use. 
These materials (for example, plutonium or highly enriched uranium) are the most 
dangerous and, in addition to the danger of contamination, they present a threat in terms 
of nuclear proliferation; and, 
- radioactive substances, which are not subject to safeguards and regarding which the 
threat of contamination derives from the radiation emitted by the substance, but without 
the possibility that the substance can be used as a fuel in its present state. This is the 
case, for example, with certain substances commonly used for medical purposes. 
As used in the Euratom Treaty, the term "safeguards" refers to a set of measures designed 
to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses, with the 
implication that any diversion would be for military purposes, and implementing at 
Community level the obligations incumbent on the Member States as a result of their 
international commitments. The question of safeguards is thus quite different from that 
of nuclear safety (safety of design and operation of nuclear installations), radiation 
protection (protection against the harmful effects of radiation), environmental protection, 
etc. 
1.2 INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMISSION 
Since March 1992 the Commission has been involved, at the initiative of the Member 
State concerned, in handling numerous cases involving attempted illegal transactions. 
The Commission's Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DG XVII-E), based in Luxembourg, 
and the Joint Research Centre's Institute for Transuranium Elements, based in Karlsruhe, 
have been closely involved in tackling the problem. 
As far as safeguards are concerned, Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty states that the 
Commission shall satisfy itself that, in the territories of Member States, ores, source 
materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared 
by the users. 
To this end the Commission established the Euratom Safeguards Directorate (ESD) in 
Luxembourg as part of the Directorate-General for Energy. 
This Directorate has a body of specialist nuclear inspectors who are responsible for on-
the-spot checks to ensure that nuclear materials for civil purposes in the possession of the 
800 or so installations in the Union are not diverted from their declared uses. 
The units of the ESD are responsible for: 
- auditing the materials held by installations, mainly uranium, plutonium and thorium; 
- negotiations with the Member States and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna; 
- discharging the Commission's obligations under the bilateral agreements between the 
IAEA and the two Member States of the Union which have a nuclear capability and the 
Agreement between Euratom, the non-nuclear weapon Member States and the IAEA; 
- devising control strategies,providing computer back-up, and developing and installating 
monitoring instruments. 
For a broader and detailed view of the activities of the Safeguards Directorate, the reader 
should refer to the recent report on the operation of Euratom safeguards 1991-1992 
(COM(94)282 of 6 July 1994). 
It should also be emphasized that, under the Euratom Treaty, the Commission is required 
to establish the legislative basis at Community level for radiation protection for the public 
and workers exposed. 
Given the enormous dangers involved in illicit handling or the discharge into the 
environment of radioactive substances or materials, under Council Directives 
80/836/Euratom and 80/467/Euratom, the Member States are required to introduce health 
protection measures to ensure that the maximum limit values for radioactive doses and 
intakes are not exceeded. 
By way of illustration of the Commission's involvement in these cases, we can refer to 
a typical case from March 1992 which represented the start of the collaboration described. 
Here the Bavarian police arrested four people trying to sell 1.2 kilos of low enriched 
uranium in a car park near Augsburg. 
The competent authorities immediately asked the Commission to assist them in 
identifying the materials and where they came from. 
An inspector from Luxembourg then went to the scene with the necessary instruments, 
and the uranium was finally conveyed to Karlsruhe where detailed analyses were carried 
out. The JRC was able to identify the origin of the materials and the evidence provided 
by the officials was crucial in the prosecution of the persons arrested. 
The collaboration took place to the satisfaction of all concerned, with the result that the 
German authorities proposed to formalize it, and this was done by an exchange of letters 
between the German Permanent Representation and the Directorate-General for Energy. 
These letters describe methods of communication, coordination and analysis, and the 
organization of contacts between the various authorities and institutions involved. 
*** 
1.3 THE ROLE OF THE JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE 
The Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe has the necessary resources for the 
reception and handling of all samples containing radioactive substances or nuclear 
materials. In addition, it possesses instruments capable of analysing the radioactive 
properties and isotopic composition of fissile elements. 
These analyses make it possible to evaluate in particular the mass of fissile elements, the 
nature of the treatment they have undergone and the date thereof. 
From the information provided by these analyses, such as the degree of purity, and by 
comparing this information with data in the Institute's database, the JRC is frequently able 
to determine the origin of these materials, the reactor for which they were prepared, and 
the installation in which the materials were treated. 
In all the cases in which samples have been forwarded to Karlsruhe, it was possible to 
establish a full identity sheet for the materials, including possible uses, and precise 
information was sent by the JRC to the Commission Safeguards Directorate and to the 
national authorities in the cases referred to. 
This information naturally constitutes vital assistance for police and judicial enquiries, 
and, generally speaking, for any organized action to combat this traffic. 
*** 
1.4. THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED. COHERENT RESPONSE 
It is therefore clear that the situation is ripe for what could be very dangerous traffic on 
the territory of the Union. 
The current situation clearly indicates that the present level of safety controls in certain 
newly independent States is quite inadequate, given the quantities of dangerous products 
located on their territory. This means that there is a major risk of contamination, in 
particular by plutonium, caesium and other radioactive substances. 
The effect of this information on public opinion may be considerable in view of the 
technical nature of the subject and the difficulty which sometimes exists in evaluating 
correctly and rationally the risk of contamination. 
The opening of internal frontiers means that what constituted a specific danger for a 
limited number of Member States, for geographical reasons, is now becoming a risk 
throughout the Union's territory. 
The Council Working Party on Atomic Questions displayed a major interest in this 
problem at an early stage. The question was raised several times and a preliminary report 
from the Commission's departments was presented in June 1993. This report described 
the ad hoc procedures set up between the Commission and the authorities of certain 
Member States to try to tackle the problem. 
Since this report was produced, the working party has stated several times that it was in 
favour of a joint approach to this problem. The document already quoted from the 
German delegation reached the same conclusion. 
The Working Party on Non-Proliferation also considered the matter on 1 September. 
The question which therefore arises is what type of strategy could be adopted by the 
Union and the Member States to prevent this worrying problem from escalating. 
Given the gravity and specific nature of the risk arising from this traffic, everything 
should be done to maximize the preventive impact of any measure taken at national or 
Union level. 
The Commission considers that a response at Union level would be better suited to the 
scope of the problem and therefore more effective. 
The Union already has at its disposal a wide range of instruments which could be used 
to combat this illicit trade. This integrated approach must involve the three "pillars"of the 
Communities, a common foreign and security policy and cooperation in the fields of 
justice and internal affairs, an approach already developed, for example, in 
communications relating to immigration and asylum, and in the European Union action 
plan to combat drug abuse (1995-1999). 
These instruments could be grouped together under three main headings: 
A. Improvement of the operating conditions of the local nuclear sectors; 
B. Cooperation with the States concerned; 
C. Cooperation between the Member States of the Union. 
* * 
2. THE INSTRUMENTS FOR A EUROPEAN RESPONSE 
A. IMPROVEMENT OF CONDITIONS IN THE NUCLEAR SECTOR IN THE 
COUNTRIES CONCERNED 
It is clear that in the medium term the problem can only be resolved by an improvement 
in the economic and political conditions of the countries concerned. In the short term, 
however, action focusing on the control of their nuclear industries should produce positive 
results. 
It is essential that the nuclear industry should restore an adequate level of control, and 
that a strict materials accounting system be reestablished, so that the authorities of the 
States from which the materials originate are able to cooperate fully with those of transit 
countries in particular in the fight against this traffic. 
Unlike the measures mentioned under point C below, for example police cooperation, the 
forms of cooperation described below are more concerned with prevention. 
It should be noted that the situation with regard to safeguards systems in the Central and 
Eastern European countries is much better than in Russia and the newly independent 
republics, including the Baltic States. 
1 he Commission is contributing towards efforts to set up safeguard systems by supplying 
specialized technical assistance. This cooperation is being organized for the Commission 
by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate and in the context of the technical assistance 
programmes (TACIS) with the help of the Joint Research Centre. 
1. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SAFEGUARDS 
A cooperation programme to restore a reliable safeguards system has been set up by the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate and the Russian Federation. The programme was 
launched in 1992 and formalized in 1993. 
The aim of this programme is to help design, establish and implement a strict system for 
the control and accounting of nuclear materials. The programme is already operational 
and is starting to show concrete results. 
The cooperation is primarily geared to the Russian Federation and complements action 
by the IAEA in the same field, in particular in so far as the Vienna Agency refrains from 
taking action in States with a military nuclear potential except at the express request of 
the State in question. 
The initial phase of this cooperation focuses on the training of inspectors and the drawing 
up of operational concepts in the field of safeguards. 
A number of seminars have been organized and Russian experts have been invited to 
work temporarily in Luxembourg to gain familiarity with control methods. The aim is to 
help the experts to develop a satisfactory safeguards system, while supplying direct 
logistical assistance (documentation, computers, etc.). Russian experts have also 
accompanied Euratom safeguards inspectors in on-site visits, thanks to the cooperation 
of the Member State authorities concerned. 
This first phase of cooperation will cost a total of ECU 1.5 million for 1993 and 1994 
under budget heading B 4.2001. 
In a second phase, starting in 1995, specific projects concerned with the establishment of 
national and installation-level nuclear control and accounting systems are to be launched. 
These projects are already at the study stage and relate to three main fields, namely: 
- collection, processing and evaluation of information; 
- inspection procedures and implementation thereof; 
- accounting for materials in each installation. 
The budget heading in question has so far been allocated a token entry ("p.m.") for 1995. 
*** 
2 COOPERATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
The Commission has included in the TACIS programme a project aimed at helping to 
establish more reliable safeguard systems, with the technical support of the Joint Research 
Centre. 
At present cooperation concerns the three republics pursuing major nuclear activities: 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the projects have been 
launched in close cooperation with the Swedish authorities and mainly concern the 
training of local authorities and operators. 
As far as Russia in particular is concerned, the projects and ideas put forward by the JRC 
aim to ensure coherence in the action by the Community. 
The main thrust of JRC cooperation is concerned with training for future Russian 
inspectors and operators. The setting up of a safeguards system will call for the use of 
several hundred persons by the authorities and operators. The success of the first aspect 
will therefore also depend on establishing a training infrastructure in Russia. 
In the Community, training of Euratom inspectors is mainly provided at the JRC, which 
has also trained operators in the past and continues to do so for third countries at the 
request of the IAEA. This second aspect would have to be very much the responsibility 
of the JRC, given that there would have to be complementarity with the ESD action 
described above. 
The visit to Ispra of two senior officials from the atomic energy ministry ("Minatom") 
and the national inspection service ("GAN") produced very encouraging reactions and has 
resulted in ambitious projects in keeping with the challenge which the Russian authorities 
are facing. 
The particular importance of these contacts is that they involve the authorities directly 
responsible for installations where thefts of materials could have taken place. 
The setting up of a training centre in Obrinsk (south of Moscow), under the responsibility 
of Minatom but also accessible for GAN inspectors, is under consideration. It would 
benefit from existing infrastructures and would contribute to the installation and operation 
of a modern nuclear material accounting and control system at national and installation 
levels. 
The existence and effectiveness of such a system is a prerequisite to stop any further 
smuggling and, moreover, it would enable many Russian military experts to use their 
expertise in civil activities. 
The JRC would provide technical support for the projects and provide training for the 
trainers, with the assistence of European Union industrial operators who have already said 
that they are very much in favour of such collaboration. 
During their first visit to Ispra, the Russian authorities raised the question of 
instrumentation, equipment and reference materials for materials controls. In the official 
minutes of the visit, the Russians called for the establishment of cooperation with the JRC 
in order to develop the instruments available in Russia. Given the urgency, equipment 
could also be supplied both to the future training centre and in the context of direct 
assistance to the authorities. The JRC has every intention of meeting these requests in 
close collaboration with the European Union industrial operators who have said that they 
are very much in favour. The arrangements for financing the project as a whole will be 
examined in detail. 
A complementary element in this cooperation could be the establishment of a pilot 
installation, as completely theoretical training would not have the desired impact. In 
addition, the logical complement to the training centre would be the existence of at least 
one installation which fully complies with internationally recognized rules on safeguards 
in the widest sense of the term. 
10 
The basic idea would be to choose a fuel cycle installation and perform a retrofit 
programme, as is done for reactors under the TACIS programme. A Russian operator 
would be the beneficiary here and his cooperation would be required. The task would thus 
fall primarily to industrial operators within the Union. However, because of the size of 
the task, cooperation with third partners, in particular the United States, could be 
envisaged. The recent events show the necessity to accelerate this technical assistance. 
The JRC is also interested in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. An initial training programme has 
been organized for five future inspectors in each State. This type of cooperation should 
be continued and expanded, but it is also clear that the real needs of both republics are 
huge and go beyond the financial possibilities which are currently available. Other forms 
of funding are being looked at. 
*** 
3. INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTRE 
The Moscow-based International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) was set up by 
an international agreement to which the European Union is a contracting party. Its aim 
is to prevent the proliferation of technologies and knowhow relating to weapons of mass 
destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile-launching systems). It 
seeks to minimize the possible incentive for scientists specializing in these areas to 
contribute towards such proliferation by offering them the opportunity of redirecting their 
expertise to peaceful activities, such as civil scientific research projects. 
The Centre has been fully operational since March 1994. A hundred or so projects have 
been submitted to the ISTC's Governing Board, 55 of which, with a total value of over 
ESD 30 million, have already been approved, and some of these have already been 
carried out. The aim of one of them is to establish a safeguards system for nuclear 
materials in complex installations. Other projects concerning materials controls are 
envisaged in the future. 
As can be seen, despite its rather different objective, the ISTC can make an important 
medium-term contribution to the overall effort to combat traffic in nuclear materials. 
* 
* * 
11 
B. COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED 
Active cooperation from the countries concerned, i.e. the countries from which the 
materials involved in the illicit traffic have been stolen, is clearly essential if efforts to 
combat such traffic are to succeed. 
The Commission therefore takes the view that in order to resolve this problem there is 
also a need for constructive dialogue with the countries concerned, in particular Russia. 
Given the very high level of expertise of scientists, engineers and authorities in the 
Russian nuclear sector, there is considerable mutual benefit in stepping up cooperation 
between Russia and the Union, both between industrial operators and between the 
competent authorities. 
Cooperation could also take a bilateral form, as part of association or partnership 
agreements concluded or to be concluded with the countries in question, and a multilateral 
form, and in connection with the efforts to renew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
in the context of joint action by the European Community. 
Use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in this context 
could also be looked at. 
In addition, there could also be, if necessary, contacts and cooperation with other 
countries which are concerned by the problem. 
1 COOPERATION IN THE EXISTING CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In addition to the technical assistance already described, the European Union can make 
use of dialogue and cooperation opened up by: 
- the partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia and some of the republics of 
the CIS; 
- the Europe Agreements concluded with the six Central and Eastern European countries. 
These agreements provide for political dialogue and offer possibilities for specific forms 
of administrative cooperation, in particular on the basis of existing protocols relating to 
administrative assistance on customs matters which enable there to be active cooperation 
between the authorities concerned, with a view to combating illicit traffic. 
The fight against nuclear proliferation is a major objective for the European Union, and 
an in-depth dialogue has already been set in motion with the Central and Eastern 
European countries on these issues. It could be beneficial to supplement this dialogue 
with discussions on specific aspects. 
The partnership and cooperation agreements will complement the technical assistance 
currently provided, both politically and through the technical cooperation opportunities 
they provide. 
12 
With regard to the future agreements with the Baltic Republics and Slovenia, and the 
partnership and cooperation agreements to be negotiated with other CIS Republics, two 
lines of action should be explored for the future: 
- firstly, the insertion of specific clauses based on provisions in the existing 
agreements relating to drugs and the laundering of proceeds; 
- secondly, taking as a model Article 84 of the cooperation and partnership 
agreement with Russia, the use of the general provisions on the prevention of 
illegal activities, including fraudulent transactions involving nuclear materials 
and radioactive substances. 
Up to February 1994 the Commission was negotiating an agreement with Russia on the 
trade in nuclear materials. The negotiations were not wholly successful in as much as 
outstanding issues were finally resolved in the context of the partnership agreement. This 
is only a temporary solution, however, since the agreement states that a text specifically 
relating to the nuclear trade will be the subject of a separate agreement, as intended at 
the outset. The draft nuclear agreement contained useful provisions on safeguards, 
physical protection and administrative cooperation which could be taken over in the 
additional agreement to be negotiated. 
During discussions on the interim agreement to be concluded with Russia pending the 
entry into force of the partnership agreement, Russia proposed the inclusion of provisions 
on cooperation on the prevention of illicit acitivities. Since this form of cooperation is 
essentially the responsibility of the individual Member States, the Russian proposal has 
not so far been accepted. The partial inclusion of certain specific areas could be a 
possibility. 
The Commission recently asked the Council for authorization to negotiate bilateral 
nuclear cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan which would also include such provisions. In addition, in its proposals for a 
new Union strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine, the Commission emphasized the urgent need to 
improve the quality of nuclear activities. 
As regards radiation protection, it should be pointed out that, where the international 
transport of materials is concerned the Convention on physical protection requires its 
signatories to apply physical protection measures plus sanctions. Euratom and the Member 
States, Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Rumania are 
parties to this convention. In addition, voluntary guidelines have been adopted by the 
Vienna Agency. 
Moreover, in order to guarantee the protection of the public against radiation hazards, 
there would have to be a firm commitment from the various authorities responsible for 
iidiation protection and, if necessary, the means for increased cooperation with them. 
li should also be pointed out that Council Directive 89/618/Euratom concerning 
information for the public provides for prior information (Article 8) and information in 
emergencies (Article 6). The Commission could examine with the competent national 
authorities in the Member States the possibility of including the illicit traffic in 
radioactive materials in this directive (Article 2.2). 
13 
The possibility should also be examined of helping to launch publicity campaigns in 
Russia to inform the general public of the risks of holding dangerous materials. Such 
publicity could also contribute indirectly towards the successful stamping out of illicit 
practices. 
*** 
2. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
The aim of joint action based on the guidelines of the Corfu European Council, confirmed 
by the July General Affairs Council, is to strengthen the international system of nuclear 
non-proliferation by promoting the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in 
particular by extending it on an unlimited and unconditional basis. 
Accession by a State to the NPT implies that the State agrees to conclude an agreement 
with the IAEA which provides for the application of safeguards to all the nuclear 
activities pursued on the State's territory {"full scope safeguards regime"). This involves 
the setting up of a national safeguards system with the objective of monitoring the 
application of this agreement. 
The joint action approved by the Council provides explicitly for the possibility of the 
European Union assisting States which, desiring accede to the NPT, face the obligation 
of setting up control procedures. This joint action therefore constitutes an instrument 
which, among other things, helps to combat the illicit trade in nuclear materials. 
The European Union could examine in this connection whether new measures should be 
proposed to deal with this problem. 
*** 
3 COOPERATION WITH CERTAIN THIRD COUNTRIES 
Other States outside the Union have also voiced their concern at the risks associated with 
the illegal trade in nuclear materials. They have initiated various kinds of action to 
provide assistance to the competent authorities of the CIS republics concerned, and to 
intensify the prevention of all forms of criminal activity. 
This assistance is either channelled by an international organization (IAEA) or based on 
bilateral cooperation. 
In the latter connection, mention can be made of Sweden which, in close liaison with the 
JRC, has undertaken assistance projects in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the United States 
which wishes to combine its efforts with those of the Union and the Member States. 
Following a preliminary technical meeting held in Washington at the end of July at the 
request of the Department of Energy, an American delegation returning from Moscow 
will go to Ispra at the end of September. 
The United States clearly stated its intention recently to step up the fight against this form 
of criminal behaviour. At the opening of the Moscow office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Louis Freeh, director of the FBI, described efforts to combat the 
traffic in nuclear materials as a priority area of cooperation with the Russian authorities. 
14 
As regards customs matters, the fruitful contact between the Directorate-General for the 
Customs Union and the American Customs Administration and in particular the 
forthcoming signature of a customs cooperation agreement between the Union and the 
United States, should make it possible to gradually coordinate the respective endeavours 
of these services in this connection. This is likely to concern in particular technical 
assistance and specific training to be provided to the customs administrations of the 
countries concerned. 
In general terms, going beyond the specific forms of cooperation already mentioned, the 
problem of the illicit nuclear traffic is expected to be on the agenda in connection with 
relations with third countries for which the Council meeting on Justice and Home Affairs 
is due to establish the framework shortly, on the basis of work in progress. 
In view of this, the fact that the Council Presidency, at the request of the European 
Council in Corfu, put this question on the agenda of the Conference on drugs and 
organized crime held in Berlin on 8 September 1994, where the EU Member States, the 
Commission, the candidates for accession and Central and Eastern European countries 
with association agreements were represented at ministerial level, certainly represents a 
significant first step. This matter will also be referred to other Council meetings and the 
informal Usedom meeting. 
Setting such cooperation in motion should eventually achieve concrete operational results, 
such as the identification of contact points in the third countries most directly affected by 
the origin, transit or destination of products, and the expansion of the role of liaison 
officers seconded to these countries by the police services of the Member States. 
* 
* * 
15 
C. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES 
Given the elimination of controls at borders between Member States, there is a need for 
greater cooperation between Member States to deal with this problem. As with other 
threats currently facing the Union as a whole, there should be cooperation at several 
levels: 
- (1) the development of cooperation already established on an informal ad hoc basis by 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate; 
- (2) the development of customs cooperation between Member State administrations and 
between them and the Commission departments: 
- (3) in the context of the cooperation structures established in the field of justice and 
home affairs; 
- (4) the exchange of information on industrial cooperation. 
The complexity of the problem and the variety of players and instruments means that very 
intensive coordination will be crucial for die success of any attempt to put a stop to this 
traffic. 
In this connection, the setting up of an ad hoc Council working party, as proposed by the 
Presidency, would certainly be useful, particularly as such a working party would be in 
a good position to make use of the considerable work carried out in the existing bodies. 
1. COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS 
Cooperation between Commission departments and the national and local authorities 
affected by the problem has been highly successful. 
However, a new situation is emerging from the fact that, firstly, cases of illicit traffic are 
increasing and, secondly, there is a very real risk that such activities may spread 
throughout the territory of the Union. 
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that informal cooperation on an ad hoc basis 
should be extended to the Member States concerned. 
The Commission believes that only concerted and in some cases structured action 
involving total cooperation with the territorial and judicial authorities will be capable of 
putting a stop to this illicit trade in the Union. 
The possibility should be examined as to whether and for what specific area it would be 
beneficial to make use of Article 135 of the Euratom Treaty (consultations and setting up 
of committees by the Commission). 
16 
Cooperation could cover the following fields, the objective being to monitor the materials 
and achieve the widest possible coordination, without prejudging at this stage which 
authorities should be responsible for inspections, or which instruments it would be 
desirable to mobilize: 
- prevention of illicit entry and transportation of materials into/within the Union; 
- seizure, transportation, storage of and access to illicit materials; 
- coordination of action; 
- identification of contacts in the Member States; 
- identification of contacts in third countries. 
*** 
2. CUSTOMS COOPERATION 
The Member States' customs administrations are the first line of defence at the Union's 
external frontiers and will have a decisive role to play in the action to combat this traffic. 
Their activities can be divided into two main areas: 
(1) Tighter controls at the external frontiers 
There is a need for more uniform and more effective checks at the external frontiers. In 
order to achieve more targeted customs controls, the Directorate-General for the Customs 
Union is endeavouring to develop the risk analysis technique through specific measures. 
In addition, in 1995 under the MATTHAEUS programme there are plans for training 
schemes, seminars and exchanges between customs officials of the Member States with 
expertise in the combating of traffic in nuclear materials. 
(2) Action to combat illicit traffic 
In the case of materials covered by the EAEC Treaty, cooperation between 
Member States, and between the latter and the Commission is based on the provisions 
governing mutual assistance on customs matters (Council Regulation 1468 of 
19 May 1981). 
The customs information system (CIS) administered by the Commission is of vital 
importance to the efforts to combat illicit traffic. The CIS ensures real-time 
communication between the 240 terminals installed in the frontier posts of the Union and 
supplements the secure customs enforcement network (SCENT) whereby information is 
exchanged confidentially between the competent authorities in connection with suspected 
or established cases of illicit traffic. 
In addition, cooperation is being established with the customs authorities of the third 
countries concerned by this traffic on the basis of the provisions of the cooperation, 
association and partnership agreements (where mutual administrative assistance is 
17 
concerned) and in the PHARE and TAOS framework (where technical assistance is 
concerned, e.g. training schemes and detection equipment). 
* * 
3. JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
As the Brussels European Council emphasized, the fact that all questions relating to 
justice and home affairs cooperation are now handled in the new single institutional 
framework, with a bigger role for the Commission and the Council Secretariat, will ensure 
greater coherence between the various levels of Community or intergovernmental 
intervention - and will therefore enhance the overall efficiency of the action of the 
Union. 
With due regard for the institutional balance defined by Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Commission therefore thinks it essential to bring a number of 
considerations to the Council's attention, without it being able to claim, in relation to 
many of the points referred to, any right of initiative under Article K.3. 
In accordance with Article K. 1 of the Treaty on European Union, for the purposes of 
achieving the objectives of the Union and without prejudice to the powers of the 
European Community, the Member States regard a number of areas as matters of common 
interest Of these, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, customs cooperation in the 
non-harmonized sectors, and police cooperation for the purpose of preventing and 
combating serious forms of international crime would appear to be the most concerned 
by action to combat the illicit trade in nuclear materials. The possibility of specific 
initiatives with a view to combating fraud on an international scale (Article K. 1(5)) is also 
opened up by Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
In the context of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, there would appear 
to be a need, first and foremost, for measures of the type referred to in Article K.3(l) of 
ihe Treaty, whereby "Member States shall inform and consult one another within the 
{'ouncil with a view to coordinating their action. To that end, they shall establish 
collaboration between the relevant depailments of their administrations". 
If necessary, these measures could take the form of joint action "in so far as the 
objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States 
acting individually, on account of the scale or effects of the action envisaged" 
(Article K.3(2)(b). If, on scrutiny of national legislation, there would appear to be a need, 
the Member States could envisage concluding a convention on the subject, as mentioned 
below. The possibility should also be borne in mind of adopting joint positions which 
would subsequently be expressed by the Member States in the international organizations 
and at international conferences in which they participate. 
It is already apparent that completion of work in progress in the context of this 
cooperation, work which was assigned priority in the 1994 work programme adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 30 November 1993, could make a significant 
contribution to stepping up the action to combat this form of traffic. 
Among other things, this includes the adoption of the Convention establishing a European 
information system, the implementation of various recommendations concerning action 
18 
to combat organized international crime, as approved by the Council last November, 
tougher action to combat the laundering of the proceeds of crime, scientific and technical 
research into this particular form of crime, the training of the members of the services 
concerned, and the speeding up and simplification of mutual assistance injudicial matters. 
This work should contribute in particular to three objectives which now seem essential 
in order to bring the situation under better control, namely a joint assessment of the 
phenomenon, the establishment of rapid communication networks, and the identification 
of partners in the Member States and within the Commission. 
Where customs cooperation is concerned, and without prejudice to what was mentioned 
above, special attention should be paid to the early finalization of the Convention on the 
customs information system and the development of a control strategy at external 
frontiers. 
As regards police cooperation, the Commission can only approve the possibility, currently 
under consideration, of extending the authority of the future European Police Office 
(Europol) to the traffic in nuclear materials and radioactive substances, under the heading 
of "other serious forms of international crime" with which the Office would be dealing 
under Article K.l(9) of the Treaty on European Union. 
*** 
POSSIBLE FORMS OF COOPERATION 
I Illicit import and transport of nuclear materials 
For obvious practical reasons, the first stage in any attempt to stop this illegal trade 
would be to prevent nuclear materials and radioactive substances from entering the 
territory of the Union illegally. This is mainly the task of customs cooperation, as 
described above. 
This objective would be more easily achieved if the capacity of frontier posts (including 
airports) outside the Union for detecting and handling such materials was improved; 
special equipment and training is necessary. 
Coordination of such efforts between the Member States would be sure to have a positive 
impact, for example by reducing the cost of training and equipment, by organizing control 
exercises, and by exchanging information on the identity and movements of persons 
suspected of involvement in this trade. 
Once materials and substances are brought into Community territory, handling and 
transportation thereof are covered by Community, national and regional rules and 
regulations regarding radiation protection, under which prior notification and authorization 
are necessary. Lack of such authorization makes these operations illegal, except where 
the level of radioactivity is very low. 
Penalties are provided for in cases where these regulations are not observed. Substantial 
differences in penalties between Member States could create the risk that materials would 
be channelled towards the States where legislation was less strict. It would therefore be 
desirable to see whether such differences exist and how great the need is for laws in the 
19 
Member States to be aligned with regard to illegal imports and carriage of nuclear 
materials. 
With this in mind, the legal instrument to be envisaged would no longer be joint action 
but the convention drawn up by the Council which "it shall recommend to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements", based 
on Article K.3(2)(c). This convention could be established in the context of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters or police cooperation. 
II. Access to materials held by the competent authorities 
If it appears that seized materials contain uranium or plutonium, the relevant provisions 
of the Euratom Treaty will apply, in particular as regards safeguards. The competent 
Commission departments must therefore be informed thereof. If necessary, an inspector 
may be sent to the scene to identify the materials. 
The materials seized may be transported to a national or Community research centre so 
that analyses may be carried out to identify, among other things, the exact origin of the 
materials. 
III. Identification of contact points in the Member States 
Each Member State possesses its own structures for handling the different stages of an 
operation, such as seizure, storage of seized materials, etc., which involve various national 
or local authorities. Study of recent cases shows that there is a clear need to identify well-
defined, rapid channels of communication. This is a crucial point in the smooth 
functioning of the system. 
4. COORDINATION OF INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE 
Several Member States have already embarked upon industrial cooperation in the nuclear 
field with certain CIS republics and certain Central and Eastern European countries. The 
European industry wishes to establish links with its counterparts and very often the 
authorities are keen to facilitate such contacts. In addition, the European Union has 
launched assistance projects to improve the safety of nuclear installations, including fuel 
cycle installations. 
Clearly the presence of national or Community officials or industry representatives in an 
installation which proved to be the origin of illicit traffic would create a delicate situation. 
The industry and the authorities are perfectly aware of this potential problem and are 
ready to take the action needed to avoid it. The cooperation of the local authorities is 
necessary, but they tend to make the same requests to several parties. 
The need for a degree of coordination therefore quickly became apparent. The ESD and 
the JRC have reacted to this need. In June the JRC held a first meeting, which was 
20 
attended by representatives of the Member States' authorities and industries. This meeting 
identified certain joint priority lines of action, particularly as regards the instrumentation 
needed. 
* 
* * 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of the illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials is serious, 
complex and of a wide geographical range, thus necessitating a suitably large-scale 
response. 
That response must involve the various instruments which can make a major contribution, 
each in its own legal context, but bearing in mind the common final objective. In the light 
of all this, a European Union response should be directed towards the following 
objectives: 
(1) The conditions of operation of the nuclear sector, i.e. nuclear safeguards, in the 
countries concerned by the traffic in certain dangerous materials need to be 
improved. 
The Commission proposes that maximum use be made of the possibilities of the 
assistance programmes already operational in this area, and in particular: 
the assistance provided by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate; 
the technical assistance provided under the TACIS programme, with the support 
of the Joint Research Centre; 
the Moscow-based Science and Technology Centre. 
In addition, the industrial assistance provided by the various donors and operators should 
be the subject of information and coordination. 
(2) Every effort must be made to ensure that the introduction of nuclear materials into 
the territory of the European Union is stopped at the Union's external frontiers. 
To this end: 
the Commission intends to strengthen customs cooperation, with the aim of 
boosting the capacity of the services responsible for preventing and detecting 
attempted illicit traffic; 
the possibilities offered by Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union (Justice 
and Home Affairs) should be explored and utilized to the full; 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate and the Joint Research Centre will continue, 
as in the past, to place their expertise at the disposal of the national authorities 
confronted with this problem. 
21 
(3) The cooperation of all the States concerned is absolutely necessary. 
The Commission therefore considers that: 
all the possibilities for cooperation offered by the agreements already concluded, 
in particular the partnership agreements and the Europe agreements, should be 
exploited in order to ensure a common approach to the problem and practical 
responses; 
future agreements should, where necessary, include provisions to enable such 
cooperation to take place; 
in the context of the common external and security policy, the possibility of 
making use of the joint action already decided upon concerning nuclear non-
proliferation should be examined, as should any other action likely to help combat 
this traffic; 
close cooperation should be maintained or established with third countries likely 
to help combat this traffic, in particular the United States. 
Only a comprehensive response will make it possible to combat the illicit traffic in 
nuclear materials effectively. Hence the various suggestions contained in this 
communication should be looked at by the Council in such a way as to guarantee the 
success of the integrated approach proposed by the Commission. 
Where the budgetary aspects are concerned, it should be noted that any Community action 
has to be examined in the context of the budget resources available. 
The Council and Parliament are invited to take note of this communication and support 
the suggestions it contains. 
22 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM (94) 383 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 15 12 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-94-408-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-80576-5 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
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