EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 23.5.2008 
SEC(2008)1957 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 
Synthesis of responses  
to the Green Paper on detection technologies  in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities 
 
EN 2   EN Synthesis of responses 
to the Green Paper on detection technologies  in the work of law enforcement, customs 
and other security authorities 
Introduction  
Recognising the important part that detection equipment plays in security, the Commission 
organised a Conference in 2005 entitl ed: Public-Private Security Dialogue: Detection 
Technologies and Associated Technol ogies in the Fight against Terrorism . As a follow-up to 
this conference, a Green Paper on detection te chnologies was issued at the end of 2006. The 
objective of this Green Paper is to improve the common approach to detection technologies 
by initiating a public-private dialogue, defini ng the role the Comm ission should play, and 
identifying the steps forward. This document su mmarises the responses that the Commission 
received in reaction to the Gr een Paper. This synthesis of responses does not commit the 
Commission to following up on any of the options outlin ed below. Concrete  policy options on 
detection technologies may be pursued in spec ific areas, such as explosives, chemical, 
biological, radiological and nucle ar substances (CBRN), etc. 
Respondents  
The majority of the Member States, severa l EU-related bodies, companies and security 
analysts submitted their answers.  
Public sector 
22 of the 27 Member States and a regional govern ment from Spain submitted responses to the 
Green Paper on detection technologies. 
Furthermore, 5 EU-related bodies responded to the Green Paper: Europol, the Article 29 
Working Party, the JRC-IPSC (Joint Research  Centre — Institute for the Protection and 
Security of the Citizen), the CTPG (Count er-Terrorism Project Group) and the ECAC 
Technical Task Force (European  Civil Aviation Conference).  
Private sector 
The Commission received 23 responses from indi vidual companies, (research) centres or 
institutes and 9 from associati ons or consortia. Additionally, 5  security experts reacted on a 
personal basis. 
Reading Instructions  
The answers are divided into two broad categories: public a nd private sector. The public 
sector can be broken down into the Member St ates (MS) and EU-related bodies (EUR). The 
private sector responses are from  individual companies and (researc h) centres (I),  consortia or 
associations (C) and pe rsonal responses (P).  
 
EN 3   EN The answers are summarised pe r category and per question. Not all respondents answered 
every question. How many respondents submitted an answer is indicated for each question. 
When speaking of ‘all’ or  ‘most’, this is relative to the num ber of respondent s that answered 
the specific question; it does not re fer to the whole body of respondents. 
 
EN 4   EN 1. Standardisation and security research  
1.1 Standardisation 
1.1.1.  Are common standards needed in  detection and related technologies used in the 
work of security authorities?  
18 Member States responded to this question.  They saw common, or at least minimal, 
standards as being useful. The 4 EU-related b odies that answered this question all think 
common standards are needed. 7 consortia and 17 individual companies or research 
centres/institutes/institutes answered this questi on. All believed that standardisation would be 
useful. 5 security experts re sponded to this ques tion. All but one supported the need for 
standards. All stakeholders id entified several areas in which standards would be beneficial.  
Additional remarks include: 
• Legal implications of data exchange must be kept in mind. 
• Human rights legislation should be complied with. 
• Standards should not hinder ne w technological development. 
• Standardisation is important to safeguard both the integrity and authenticity of 
data shared between authorities (1 I),  and the balance between security and 
privacy (1 I). 
Some remarks were made regarding the way in which to proceed during the process of 
standardisation: 
• Standardisation should be market-led and developed in cooperation with the 
industry (1 C, 1 I). 
• The European Committee for Standardisa tion (CEN) should prepare and develop 
standards (1 C, 1 I). 
• All stakeholders should be involved (3 I). 
• Systems that have proven to be effective can form the basis for the development 
of technological and operational standa rds. Standards should be set for the 
different technologies that (sub) systems of a network are made up of so as to 
provide a baseline for de tection procedures. Well identified requirements and 
operational capabilities should be  taken into account (1 I). 
Some observations or re servations include:  
• Standardisation should not be only Europ ean; the US and Europe should engage 
in a joint standardisation effort. Ideally, standardisation should be carried out on a 
global level (2 C, 2 I). In addition, EU le gislation should be t echnology-neutral (1 
C). 
 
EN 5   EN • Standards pose a problem with regard to who they are designed  for: manufacturers 
or users (2 I). 
1.1.2.  What standards do you consider to be a priority? 
13 MS indicated their priorities. The question was interpreted differently by different MS. 3 
EU-related bodies answered th is question. 7 consortia or associations, 10 individual 
companies or (research) centres/i nstitutes and two security expe rts indicated their priorities. 
All stakeholders identified a num ber of areas and sta ndards that should be considered to be a 
priority. 
1.1.3.  What standards lack financial support  in the pre-standardisation phase? 
4 MS answered this question. One Europe an body said it developed its technological 
standards out of a budget prov ided by volunteer Member St ates. 4 individual companies 
answered this question. None i ndicated specific sta ndards that needed financial support. 
In general, all stakeholders that responded to  this question supported the idea of financial 
support for the development of standards. Few specific areas for standardisation were considered to lack financial support. 
1.1.4.  To avoid any duplication and to improve  transparency, would a regularly 
updated list/handbook/searchable databa se of past, ongoing and planned 
standardisation efforts in detection and closely related technological fields at 
national and European level be useful? 
Public (MS) 
All MS (12) that answered think an updated list/handbook/database woul d be useful. Secure 
access needs to be guaranteed. 
Public (EUR) 
3 EU-related bodies answered this question. 
One did not consider a database to be a useful instrument (1  EUR) whereas another thought it 
could be, although some standards may be too se nsitive to be made public (1 EUR). The third 
organisation recognised the probl em of bringing together th e end-users of technology. It 
proposed alternatively that the standardisation body CEN/CE NELEC take the lead in 
standardisation activities (1 EUR). 
Private (I & C) 
9 individual companies or research centres/ins titutes/institutes and 5 consortia responded to 
this question. All responded favourably to the idea of a regularly updated 
list/handbook/searchable database. One expressed doubts as to the usefulness of a database (1 
I). 
Private (P)  
 
EN 6   EN Five experts responded to this  question. All felt the propose d list/database/handbook is a 
useful or necessary tool (5 P). It would also prevent vested interest groups from agreeing on a 
standard ‘in secret’ and there by putting other application vendor s at a disadvantage (1 P).  
1.1.5.  Would you be interested in identifying a nd exchanging best practice in the use 
and handling of data and information collec ted by detection tools in an effort to 
comply in full with the relevant legi slation and rules governing the use of 
evidence in court proceedings? 
Public (MS) 
14 out of 16 MS are interested in identify ing and exchanging best practices. However, 
because of differences in legal systems and re gulations, a single ‘best practice’ might not be 
suitable for all MS. 
Public (EUR) 
3 EU-related bodies answered this question, of wh ich 2 indicated their in terest in identifying 
and exchanging best practice. The third agency said that use of evidence in court was of no 
interest. 
Private (I & C) 
4 consortia and 9 individual companies or research centres answ ered this question. 
9 individual companies or research centres and 3 consortia or associations said they were 
interested. One consortium was not interested. 
Private (P)  
All five experts would be interested in id entifying and exchanging best practice, since 
compliance with legislation is an important  issue (5 P). One expressed doubts regarding 
whether commercial entities w ould be interested (1 P). 
1.1.6 What would be the best way of identifying and exchanging these practices? 
Public (MS) 
12 MS and a Spanish region mentioned several methods of identifying and exchanging best 
practices in the field mentioned above. The three methods most mentioned are: 
• expert meetings / working groups; 
• secure web portal; 
• seminars/conferences. 
Public (EUR) 
One EU-related body answered that it could play  a role by fully supporting these activities. 
 
EN 7   EN Private (I & C) 
8 individual companies/research centres and 2 consortia provided suggestions. These are:  
• A ratification process in which each country specifies where and how the 
standards are adopted (1 I). 
• A European network of excellence on secu rity research involving all the Member 
States, and responsible for reporting the main research results and their applications to crime prevention at national level (1 C). 
• A European Union organisati on could be created (1 I). 
• Workshops for end-users and technology pr oviders with restricted access (2 I). 
• Semi-formal working parties on specific t opics, which in turn report to a central 
management group that disseminates the information (1 I). 
• EU and Member States-sponsored forums  with private sector involvement. 
Interaction and cross-fertilis ation of ideas with the public and private sector of 
other nations (e.g. the US) would also be  beneficial. ISO standards committees 
have begun to identify promising technologi es and processes. Their efforts will 
benefit from the support of EU cust oms and security experts (1 I). 
• Establishing public-private partnerships , workshops, either public or private 
sector-sponsored conferences (1 I). 
• Standard tests should be set up and the resu lts disseminated to the relevant parties 
(1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts answered this question. They suggested the following methods: 
• The EU CEN-European Committee for Sta ndardisation could be assigned this 
task. The results could be disseminated thr ough a dedicated web-s ite (2 P) and/or 
an e-guide (1 P). 
• A central online reference point (1 P). 
• Trusted open and closed environment (1 P). 
• Group of personalities brainstorming (1 P). 
1.2 Security Research 
1.2.1 How should information on security resea rch in Europe be disseminated in order 
to promote competitiveness while avoiding waste of scarce resources?  
Public (MS) 
 
EN 8   EN 13 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. 
It was remarked that the issue of confidentiality and the free market principle should be borne 
in mind. Overall, it was seen as positive to diss eminate information at European level. The 
mode most mentioned was a separate, secure m echanism or a secure database. A web portal, a 
network of contacts and a centre of  excellence were also mentioned . 
Public (EUR) 
Two EU-related organisations answered th is question. One empha sised the issue of 
confidentiality when disseminating information on security research. Th e other stressed the 
need for a strong central coordination of research  efforts and the sharing of information on a 
restricted basis in Europe. 
Private (I & C) 
9 individual companies and 7 consortia or a ssociations answered this question. Some 
respondents remarked that common action and be tter coordination and information exchange 
is required at national level, across the European  Union (EU) and with other close allies, e.g. 
the United States (1 C, 2 I). Another agreed that dissemina tion of information regarding 
research will be most effective if conducted on a global scale (1  I). One consortium added that 
there is a need to improve internal EU diss emination in order to increase external EU 
competitiveness. Moreover, publications should be processed with clearance similar to that of 
defence research (1 C) 
The availability of information on security resear ch is the key factor for a quick and effective 
answer to the growing s ecurity requirements. It is important  to underline that  security cannot 
be considered a regional issu e: one country’s secu rity depends on the levels of security 
guaranteed in the other count ries of the Union (1 C). 
One company remarked that this disseminatio n only applies to research funded by public 
organisations. In this case, ES RAB would be the obvious coordi nator. Commercial research 
will be driven by need and published as marketing collateral (1 I). 
The proposals for dissemination that were  put forward mostly suggest creating a 
database/website, organising workshops or f ounding a new agency. More specifically, the 
following suggestions were made: 
• The Commission should coordina te EU-funded projects bett er in order to prevent 
duplication (2 C, 2 I). At the very leas t, EU R&D funds should not be spent on 
technologies that have been developed by non-EU companies. Ideally, a system 
should be created in which experts from all over the globe are regularly consulted. 
Moreover, the EU and the US could identif y lighthouse security projects in which 
they could invest jointly (2 C). 
• Projects and their results should be readily  accessible (1 I). Th ey could be put on 
the internet (2 I), a web portal (2 C) or in a database (2 I) similar to Medline — 
along with the standards (1 I). However, security would need to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
EN 9   EN • Information should be disseminated both ‘hor izontally’ (between companies in the 
same sector to boost their competitiveness and develop innovative detection 
solutions) and ‘vertically’ (b etween manufacturer companies and users in order to 
direct research into finding solutions  to real life situations) (1 C). 
• The currently available information should be categorised and an automated 
classification system could be devised to classify, label and disseminate new 
documents, according to the taxonomy (1 I) 
• A summary of non-classified information coul d be sent to releva nt parties. Those 
with a key role (funds, governments, indus trial partners) could request further 
information (2 I). 
• With regard to OSINT, the Commission should promote:  
– informal meetings where specific Member States’ agencies exchange 
notes on best practices in OSINT; 
– a trade fair of OSINT suppliers to enable all agencies to see what 
technologies and met hodologies exist; 
– a website where all European OSINT suppliers are illustrated, broken 
down by the sub-segment in which they operate; 
– the creation of an In-Q-Tel type of organisation in Europe (1 C). 
• A web-based journal (1 I). 
• Organise a conference/workshop/forums (1 C, 1 I). Scientists, the industry and 
law enforcement agencies should take part (1 C). 
• Found a security research observatory in which public, private and academic 
stakeholders take part (1 C). 
• Create an independent European body to c oordinate the activiti es of security 
research between public and private organi sations (2 I). Because of the dilemma 
whether to adopt an open source or a propr ietary source approach — as both have 
their advantages — it was proposed that the open source paradigm be adopted in 
the field of research, in combination with the creation of a transnational 
organisation in charge of  collecting, testing, verify ing, adopting and promoting 
the most interesting and “secure” solutions (1 I). 
• Public national or European organisations  could take on this role in consultation 
with the private sector (2 I). 
• A list of recognised security research  providers could be developed. This 
establishes an entry barrier to deter the uncommitted, yet sets the barrier at a level that still promotes competition a nd potentially collaboration (1 I). 
• ESRAB could coordinate disseminati on. It has the following advantages: 
 
EN 10   EN – a single point of contact for all involve d parties combines security needs, 
legislator needs, research and industry; 
– access to working and discussions groups  should be kept “internal only” 
due to the security need; 
– participants can be screened / cont rolled (for instance a “clearance” 
document is required); 
– functionality of ESRAB is also  controllable by the EU (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Five experts answered this question. The following suggestions were made: 
• Academic institutions and non-academia shoul d cooperate to a gr eater extent so 
that research results are better circulated (1 P). 
• A private-public framework should be se t up. Present examples from the USA are 
In-Q-Tel and DARPA (2 P). 
• A central online reference poi nt and a discussion forum or a headline group with 
subgroups focusing on the different tec hnologies and their implications and 
restrictions should be set up (1 P). 
• Central authority with regional offices (1 P). 
 
EN 11   EN 2. Needs and Solutions  
2.1 Technological needs and solutions 
2.1.1 Are you interested in a broader debate on the role of detection technologies and 
the influence their use potentiall y has on European societies? 
Public (MS) 
15 MS were interested in a broader debate on  the role of detecti on technologies and the 
influence their use potentially has on European societies. It was emphasised that human rights 
should be safeguarded when using and developing  detection technologies. In some areas, such 
as aviation security, th is debate is ongoing. 
Public (EUR) 
Two EU-related bodies responded to this question. On e indicated its interest in such a debate, 
while the other emphasised that, when consid ering the European economic interests of 
detection, the right bala nce should be struck between secu rity needs and European values. 
Private (I & C) 
11 private organisations and 4 consortia replied to this question. All but 1 association were 
interested or very interested in the debate. 
Such a debate was considered important for the following reasons: 
• to strike the balance between security a nd legal demands versus individual rights 
(5 I, 1 C); and to communicate this to the industry. Detection technologies and 
related issues such as interoperability and data sharing should be discussed, as 
should the impact on societies that interact with Europe (1 I); 
• to investigate the role of  detection technologies in  the context of Homeland 
Security (1 I); 
• to address concerns regarding the use of detection technology (1 I); 
• to improve the European Research di alogue on detection te chnologies (1 C); 
• to address the role of detection tec hnology in supporting staff: how to enhance 
human capabilities by utilising the potential of technology (1 C); 
• because the evolution of (cargo) security should take account of the effect it has 
on societies, including its effect on commerce, public health and safety, and 
personal privacy (1 I); 
• because of interest from a marketing cor porate citizenship and strategic evaluation 
stance (1 I); 
 
EN 12   EN • because only by continuous consultation will there be a complete match between 
what the public authorities need and wh at the private sector can offer (1 I). 
It was also remarked that some needs or topics  should be discussed in a restricted context to 
avoid, for example, availability of det ection thresholds to  the general public. 
Private (P)  
Five experts answered this question. All said they were interested in the debate. Both the 
balance between security and civil liberties and privacy (3 P) and the social and moral impacts 
that technological innovation ha s were mentioned as topics of specific interest (2 P). 
2.1.2 In what specific areas do the relevant s ecurity authorities require technological 
improvements? Please specify the level of priority in relation to specific needs. 
17 Member States, 3 EU-level bodies, 10 companies and research centres, 4 
consortia/associations and 5 e xperts answered this question. Several specific areas were 
identified. 
2.1.3 Is there a gap between requirements for de tection capabilities and the technology 
currently on offer on the market? 
In general, stakeholders identified seve ral areas where improvements could be made.  
Public (MS) 
The 13 MS that answered were divided on th e issue of whether there is a gap between 
requirements for detection capabilities and th e equipment currently on offer on the market. 
Six were of the opinion that equipment is av ailable, albeit at high cost. The other seven 
Member States felt there was a gap. This ga p is mainly caused by the invisibility and 
shallowness (specificity) of the market. The latter is partly related to differences in legal frameworks. 
Public (EUR) 
2 EU-related bodies answered this question. One f eels there is a gap. The other thinks there is 
technology on the market that can fulfil th e requirements, albeit at high cost. 
Private (I & C) 
11 private companies and 4 consortia answered this question. Answers can be grouped into 
three categories: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ a nd ‘In Between’ (Perhaps/Depends). 
One company thought there was no gap, as it  had never encountered requirements from 
clients it had not been able to meet (1 I). 
Most respondents (7I & 2 C) thought there was a gap. 2 companies or research 
centres/institutes and 1 associa tion stated that this depended on the segment of the market 
considered (2 I and 1 C). 
Private (P)  
 
EN 13   EN Three experts answered this question a nd all of them agreed there was a gap. 
2.1.4 What are possible solu tions to these gaps? 
Public (MS) 
6 Member States proposed solutions to bridge the abovementioned gaps. 
The main solutions proposed are: 
• (European) standardisation/harmonisation to increase the size of the market 
(making it less selective and more visible); 
• exchange of information and increased in teraction between users and producers; 
• funding and stimulating research (new  research, ongoing research and the 
transformation of research  results into products). 
Public (EUR) 
One organisation proposed investing in coor dinated research on ne w technologies at a 
multilateral level within Europe to obtain a goo d balance between detection capabilities and 
costs.  
Private (I & C) 
3 companies and 2 consortia answered this question. One company thought there are no 
obvious solutions to these problems w ith the present technologies (1 I). 
Others proposed the following: 
• Solutions have to be both operationa lly and technologically based (1 I). 
• A working group of experts could give an overview of what is missing. Both 
major players and smaller busines ses should be involved (1 C). 
• Providers could propose easy to use material s (plug and play, etc. ) to end-users (1 
I). 
• A possible solution to filling the gaps is both to integrate available technologies 
and to undertake research into future new technologies. Technical evaluation by 
reference centre is essential to help purchasers take an informed decision. 
However, the detailed plan of technologi cal solutions addressing a specific threat 
is confidential. Fast detec tion of some of the most da ngerous biological threats 
identified already exists. The cost-effectiveness of these solutions will depend on the size of the market (1 C). 
Private (P)  
Two experts offered a solution: 
 
EN 14   EN • Making the technology producers work alongside the Institutions and Public 
Administrations in order to  focus better on current effo rts, particularly in the 
phase of defining requirements and analysis (1 P). 
• Offering an open, readily accessible public forum in which any solution provider 
can present their technologies to the authorities. It is important to engage all the 
possible stakeholders simultaneously so as to arrive at a practical solution that 
meets all requirements (1 P). 
2.1.5 In what specific areas does the private sector already offer, or plan to offer 
technological solutions? Please  state the timescale for when  such solutions would be 
available, and cost-effective. 
Public (MS) 
In general, specific areas were identified. 
5 MS answered this question. One said that th e private sector did not yet offer solutions. 
While one said it could not provide a specific list, another specified some of the areas. Yet 
another stressed the importance of a cost-benef it analysis. Another MS highlighted the higher 
interest of the private sect or in one particular area. 
One EU-related body answered that, in one part icular field, manufacturers in the private 
sector continuously develop new equipment (oft en with government funding) and launch it on 
the market. 
14 companies and 3 consortia re sponded to this question. Seve ral made general remarks; 
others highlighted specific tec hnologies or applicat ions. Three experts believed that private 
technological solutions were ava ilable on the market at different levels of development (2 I). 
Market analysts forecast that the sector of detection technologies is one in which much 
research will be done and many solutions will ap pear in the coming years (1 P). Furthermore, 
several areas were mentioned as being the most innovative. 
2.1.6 Would it be helpful and useful to create  a Europe-wide searchable list/database 
containing specific areas of needs of the rele vant security authorities, and at the same 
time solutions offered by the private sector? 
Public (MS) 
13 of the 17 MS that responded were supportive  of the idea of a European database. One 
doubted the additional value over existing da tabases and exchange mechanisms. The 
following views were ex pressed several times: 
• It is important to identify the needs of  users (so that the market can respond). 
• It is important for users and producers to communicate. 
• The database should be able to guarantee security/confid entiality of the contents 
and access should be restricted to author ities and relevant (private) partners. 
Public (EUR) 
 
EN 15   EN 4 EU-related organisations answ ered to this question. One supported the idea; the others 
raised questions or preferre d other ways of bringing pr oducers and end-users together. 
The agency that opposed the proposed database suggests a website containing case studies in 
which people share their experience regardin g a technological solution they have used. 
Another would like to see first how the data base would work. Safeguards, such as the 
transparency of decisions regarding which soluti ons to include, should be put in place. The 
organisation that supported the Green Paper’s su ggestion remarked that a sufficient volume of 
potential buyers is important fo r the development of technology. Searchable lists could play a 
role in this. Confidentiality issu es should be addressed, of course. Where the area of interest is 
very specific, however, the agen cy proposes the establishment of  a task force (like the ECAC 
technical task force). The fourth agency supports the idea of the creation of a Task Force. This 
Task Force – in which the private sector shou ld be involved to a certain extent – would 
oversee the different application areas, iden tify obstacles and communalities and duly inform 
both sides. 
Private (I & C) 
15 private companies/research centres and 7 consor tia/associations respo nded to this question. 
5 consortia and 10 companies supported the idea  of a secured EU-wide database. 8 companies 
and 1 association provided a lternative solutions. More specifically, 3 companies and one 
consortium both supported the database and provided alternatives; 5 companies and 1 
consortium only provided alternative solutions. 
One company explicitly opposed the idea, ha ving doubts regarding atte mpts by governments 
to interfere with private companies’ product deve lopment. It said that companies are perfectly 
capable of identifying the needs of the market, ev en when the market is  made up of the public 
sector. It feels government or EU interference with research and product development in the 
private sector may in fact lead to investment  errors and consequently wasted resources. It 
therefore advises against the idea of EU harm onisation of private industry’s development of 
control and detection technologies (1 I). 
Remarks that were made by those in favour of the database: 
• Access should be well protected given the se nsitive contents of the database (1 C). 
• Updating and implementing such databa se will be costly. Moreover, it is 
questionable to all intents and purposes who the central authority should be (1 I). 
• It will give oversight of the real needs while maintaining competitiveness among 
manufacturers. In the event that the Co mmission provides financial assistance, it 
must be researched how the initiative can boost the competitiveness of European Industries (1 C). 
• The availability of a Europe-wide searchable  database is the right way to promote 
public and private sector dialogue a nd it can be the source of identifying 
guidelines in the security research domain (1 C). 
• A database for Member States to identif y what analysis tools or methodologies 
exist, and to create a list of the equipm ent available, is useful. Similar work is 
 
EN 16   EN currently being done by DG ENTR in th e Defence Industry Field (MEDI study — 
Mapping of European Defence Industry (1 I). 
• We should include present and future need s and solutions to this database and 
establish priorities (1 I). 
• Steps should be taken to ensure that innovation is not stifle d by the development 
of stringent standardisation (1 I). 
• Such a list/database is  valuable, but it should be global (1 I) 
• This would be a good way of stimulating development of the required solutions 
and might be an attractive marketing invest ment for some providers. It has to be 
verified, however, whether setting up this  database/list does not overlap with any 
existing initiatives. Moreover, the security  of the requirements might be a concern 
for the commissioning authorities if the database were freely available (1 I). 
• It would be a helpful tool for offering existing solutions and developing new ones. 
A list of solutions may be of use if capabilities are reported fairly and the 
presentation of strengths/weaknesses and capabilities has been well thought 
through (1 I). 
• Such a list/database would be essential to match the capacity to prevent and to 
respond to an attack while iden tifying multiple threats (1 C). 
• This initiative would be useful, but only unde r strict conditions. First of all, this 
database should be accessible to all tec hnology vendors, irrespective of whether 
they are European. Excluding non-European vendors would deprive EU public authorities of the opportunity of using t echnology that might be already available 
elsewhere. At the same time, however, this  database must be closely protected, as 
it would contain much security- and commercially-sensitive information: if the integrity of the database were not guaranteed, technology vendors would probably 
not participate (1 C). 
• It would be useful for both research orga nisations and security organisations. It 
could be hosted on an appropriate websit e. A global approach is needed however. 
References/links to wider global equivalent s would be beneficial, both for cross-
fertilisation and for access to solutions th at exist already outside the EU (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Five experts answered that this would be he lpful. It would help identify priorities for a 
developing new market (1 P). The private sector could also make suggestions for threats that 
might not yet have been recogni sed by the authorities (1 P). 
If not, what other solutions would you propos e in order to improve the information flow 
between those who need technological solutions and those who offer them? 
Public (MS) 
 
EN 17   EN 4 MS provided the following comments: 
• A secure website could be an alternative. 
• Interconnection of existing databases could be a subsequent step after a European 
database. 
• It is important to look to the future  and invest in anticipated needs. 
• Other, existing initiatives, such as the ESRP, should be involved. 
Public (EUR) 
(See previous question) 
• A website containing case studies drawn up by users. 
• A public-private Task Force. 
Private (I & C) 
3 companies and one consortium both supported the database and provided alternatives; 7 
companies and 1 consortium only provided alternative solutions (see also above). 
Alternative solutions: 
• There is a need for better interaction between users and producers/researchers. 
Users from specific sectors should coordina te and compile their needs, after which 
they can enter the dialogue with produ cers. The EC could facilitate this 
coordination. Moreover, an inventory s hould be made of methods and equipment 
that have been tested for specific task s. Presently, compilations mostly just 
include producers´ information but th e users would need comparisons and 
evaluations (2 I). 
• There exists unfortunately a real dist ortion between the available technological 
offer on the market and the knowledge th ereof by the security services. The 
solution would be more ‘exchanges’ and the setting-up of mechanisms that make suppliers and users of technology familia r with each other’s activities. These 
exchange mechanisms could be instituti onalised by the creation of a European 
agency for security technologies that would propose different tools 
(questionnaires, supplier-user workshops, webs ites, etc.) in order to devise a road 
map (1 I). 
• A working group on CBRN detection techno logies could be set up to improve 
public-private dialogue and to design future standards (1 C). 
• A science portal where users and/or pr oviders can enter their needs and their 
offers could be set up. There may, however , be some constraints regarding EU 
directives on procurement and constraint s regarding secure information (1 I). 
 
EN 18   EN • Publication of a st udy identifying European companie s producing technologies of 
use in OSINT, to establish ´a map´ of Eu ropean industrial interests. At the same 
time, MS should be encouraged to  produce a common list of required 
functionalities in order to understand what is needed (1 C). 
• Creating a bidirectional flow of informa tion to close the gap between security 
organisations and private companies work ing in security technologies. The flow 
could be implemented in this way: 
– From firms to organisations by us ing a web portal where firms can 
advertise their solutions using a defi ned classification. Private companies 
will have the advantage of using free advertising space for their solutions. 
– From organisations to firms by using periodic communica tions to explain 
their needs and requirements. The por tal and the data inside will be 
protected by secure access (1 I). 
• The WCO (World Customs Organization) currently maintains a database of 
available systems. It would be valuable to add an assessment process to this 
database so that users can benefit from an  independent analysis of these solutions 
(1 I). 
• The traditional mechanism is that the managers responsib le on each side take note 
of what is going on in the market. Trade journals and exhibitions are the main 
channels for communication (1 I). 
• A database for Member States to identif y what analysis tools or methodologies 
exist; and the creation of an inventory of what is available. A similar initiative is 
currently being deployed by DG ENTR in the Defence Industry (MEDI study — 
Mapping of European Defence Industry (1 I). 
• The information flow should be promoted at two levels: procedural and 
technological. In the first instance, the information flow among public institutions 
can help to define the baseline of pr ocedural standards.  Subsequently, the 
operational specifications in terms of pro cess flow and detection performance will 
determine the minimum technology requi rements needed to accomplish the 
standards, and also the va lidity and completeness of the technology available on 
the market. 
• Organisation of meetings and seminars fo r end-users and the pr ivate sector (1 I). 
• Successful processes and tec hnologies will be introduced either directly as de 
facto standards, or through official standards issued  by bodies such as the ISO or 
EU CEN. 
• Given that supply-side fragmentation is one of the problems, the Commission can 
help by establishing a sub-group focusing on OSINT issues to encourage large 
companies to act as systems integrators, as  they have the scale to bring together 
 
EN 19   EN small technology providers, while being mi ndful of the need to grow smaller 
innovative businesses and to protect their IP (Intellectual Property rights) (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Two experts responded to this question. The need for better in teraction between those who 
need and those who offer technological solutions was emphasised as a critical point that is often overlooked (1 P). Two methods of interaction were proposed:  
• Appoint a board (like ESRAB) responsible  for defining a platform for detection 
technologies and a searchable database (1 P). 
• Create an open, unrestricted forum. It is  crucial, however, to discuss the needs 
with end-users and not, for example, polic y-makers. Moreover, it is important to 
include SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) who may have problems 
overcoming the bureaucratic hurdles that o fficial tenders bring with them (1 P). 
Versatile Solutions 
2.1.7 For what existing tools and equipment co uld the applicability and effectiveness be 
improved by enhancing their versatility? 
Public (MS) 
11 MS answered this question. The types of an swers differed greatly. Possibly versatility was 
understood differently by different  MS. Some MS underlined the benefits of versatility in 
terms of, for example, efficien cy. Others mentioned specific tools that would benefit from 
versatility. Yet others mentione d the substances to be detected. One MS pointed out that 
detection tools had specific appl icability and were not particular ly useful for other purposes. 
Public (EUR) 
One EU-related body observed that equipment that  has already been developed in one area 
(e.g. aviation security) can also be of use in other areas. 
Private (I & C) 
9 private companies and one consortium an swered this question. 5 companies and 1 
consortium provided suggestions for tools that would be more  efficient when versatile. 
One company remarked in general that poor  knowledge of the opera tional capacity of 
equipment can lead to redundancy and unfortunate  financing (1 I). Two companies questioned 
the value of versatility. One doubts the efficiency of versatility as a minimum time is needed 
to reconfigure a deployed solution to face new th reats without decreasing security (1 I). Two 
companies stated that an increas e in versatility may lead to the eclipse of some technologies; 
it is sometimes better to have a multitude of  equipment, each covering a specific threat 
extremely well, than one machine handling th em all reasonably well. Varying detection 
thresholds based on threat levels can be dangero us too, as terrorist may adapt their strategies 
accordingly. 
 
EN 20   EN Private (P)  
Three experts responded to this question. They believed all equipment would benefit from 
versatility (3 P). It was also re marked that the versatility of tools must be enhanced through a 
modular approach to the software architecture used to manage these tools and equipment (1 
P). 
2.1.8 What new versatile tools and equipment are needed? 
8 Member States answered this question and specified details. One EU-related body, 6 
companies, 2 associations and two experts pr ovided suggestions for new versatile tools. 
In general, end-users should not specify te chnology, but rather prepare statements of 
capability and desired effect. Better training on current technological solutions should be 
provided by end-users to the operato rs of detection systems (1 P). 
Portable and mobile solutions 
2.1.9 What existing tools and equipment could be better and more effectively used in the 
work of the relevant security authorit ies if they were mobile and portable? 
Public (MS) 
14 MS answered this question. All agreed that m obility and portability of  tools increase their 
usability and effectiveness. A minority felt that most mobile tools were  already on the market. 
Others mentioned various tools that would specifica lly benefit from mobility. 
Public (EUR) 
One organisation answered that portability will enable equipment developed for the airport 
environment to be deployed in  other areas, e.g. mass events.  
Private (I & C) 
8 Companies and 4 consortia or asso ciations responded to this question. 
One company responded that mobility is not always possible. Moreover, it tends to be the 
case that systems work better when they are not  mobile. Compromises on detection/reliability 
tend to be made when mobility is increased (1  I). Another said that  since the demand for 
portability was growing, Europe  should participate in resear ch concerning new detection 
tools, particularly as applied to mobile solu tions (1 I). One company considered that most 
military equipment could be used for civilian  security after some adjustments (including 
mobile and portable solutions). On the other hand, for security reasons, it may be difficult to 
transfer military technology to civilian use (1 I). 
When considering the deployment and procurement of mobile and portable tools, the overall 
objectives need to be taken into account. Detect ion technologies are just one component in the 
system of solutions. Furthermore, the working / hosting environment needs to be considered, 
in terms, for example, of spatial and power requirements (1 I). 
Private (P)  
 
EN 21   EN One expert also made concrete suggestions. 
2.1.10 What new portable and mobile tools and equipment are needed? 
Public (MS) 
10 MS answered this question. They felt that th ere was a need for new mobile tools and that 
most, if not all, equipment could bene fit from mobility and portability.  
Public (EUR) 
2 EU-related bodies responded to this questi on. They mentioned several examples of 
equipment and tools.  
Private (I & C) 
6 companies and 1 consortium answered this question. One respondent stated that the focus 
should be more on components that make mobility possible (like low consumption 
components, light and high power energy source , robustness of the equipment, easy to use 
equipment) than on mobile and portable equipm ent as such (1 I). Another added that the 
heaviest, most expensive and most immovable co mponents of a security installation should be 
looked at to explore how these can be made tran sportable or virtualised in some way (1 I). A 
number of other concrete suggestions were made. 
Private (P)  
Two experts gave their opinions and s uggested several types of equipment. 
2.2 Interoperability of systems 2.2.1 What systems need improved interoperability? 
Public (MS) 
14 MS answered this question. All believed that in teroperability or at l east the possibility of 
exchanging data between systems is important. The need for databases and data systems of 
EU national authorities to be able to communi cate was what Member States mentioned most. 
Possible legal constraints were  acknowledged. Other specific systems were also mentioned. 
Public (EUR) 
3 EU-related bodies answer ed this question. One declared th at all EU security information 
systems should be made interoperable, as shou ld process-orientated systems that provide 
support to workflows. Another identified the need for interoperability between 
complementary detection equipment to enhanc e the detection capabil ities of screening 
systems while reducing false alarm rates. Yet another stressed the importance of interoperability of equipment between agencies and States. 
Private (I & C) 
14 companies and 4 consortia reacted to this question. 
 
EN 22   EN The following remarks were made with regard to interoperability:  
• Interoperability is one of the main requirements for detection systems because of 
the presence of vertical pl atforms, which are currently not interoperabl e (1 I). On 
the other hand, interoperability should not be overdone (1 I). 
• Interoperability must be investigated at three levels: network, application and data 
management (1 I). 
• Interoperability is fundamental to the success of both national and pan-European 
security and law enforcement activiti es; without true root and branch 
interoperability, European Authorities will fail in their responsibilities to protect 
citizens (1 I). 
• Interoperability has two sides: technology and behaviour/culture. In terms of 
technology, IP (Intern et Protocol) could function as  the universal technology to 
enable authorities to work together . Common standards of processes and 
behaviour, however, are more important. Without mutual confidence that all are 
working with the same high standards, ex change of information will not take 
place. The benefits that can be accrue d from real interoperability possibly 
outweigh the outcomes from all ot her potential activities (1 C). 
• Another company divided interoperabili ty into operational and technological 
interoperability. Operational interoperability  consists of vertical (from local up to 
transnational levels) and horizontal interope rability (different institutions sharing 
the operation within a phys ical subsystem). In terms of technological 
interoperability, IP networks have been  able to overcome some of the issues. 
However, some system components conti nue to need improve d interoperability: 
– operational workflow among security organisations; 
– sensor information of diverse nature (sensor fusion); 
– COMMON fusion data models; 
– Executive Information Systems (EIS); 
– inter-application and inter-applicatio n communication protocols (1 I). 
• For commercial reasons, it has proven di fficult to get vendors to put data in 
formats available to other companies. If such cooperation or common formats of 
data are required, it may be necessary to regulate or legislate common data 
standards (1 I). 
• Many current detection technologies and their support systems have limited 
interoperability. However, types of mi ddleware infrastructure exist that can 
facilitate interoperability and accessibility  of these systems with each other (1 I). 
• All systems should improve interoperability (1 C). 
Private (P)  
 
EN 23   EN According to two experts, all systems need inte roperability. However, interoperable databases 
are what is most urge ntly needed (2 P).  
1.1.6.  2.2.2 Would a study on legal and other constraints for interoperability of 
systems across the EU be usef ul to identify limitations?  
Public (MS) 
14 Member States answered th e question. All thought such a study would be useful, to serve 
as a basis for either agreements, common standa rds or even legal harmonisation. Privacy and 
data protection principles  should be kept in mind. 
Public (EUR) 
Two public bodies answered this question. Both supported the idea of such a study. One 
pointed out that it would shed light on the full potential of the systems. The other highlighted 
the importance of legal safeguards and data  protection principles when establishing 
interoperability; the fact that access to or exchange of data is possible may become a powerful 
drive in itself for de fact o accessing or exchanging data. 
Private (I & C) 
9 businesses and 3 consortia answered this question. 8 companies and 1 consortium thought a 
study of this kind would be useful. One compa ny believed that the study would be too broad, 
and thus its value would be questionable. 
One consortium proposed a way of identifying in teroperability issues regarding the use of 
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence): by making a model of what steps (modules) must be 
taken to move from information to intelligence , the ‘fault lines’ betw een technologies can be 
identified. Subsequently, a matrix can be devi sed to locate all European technology suppliers 
that play a role in each module. The Commissi on could inject the model into a wider industry 
debate to make sure all cons traints are identified (1 C). 
The following remarks were made with  respect to the suggested study: 
• Studies of legal constraints (especially in tellectual property) would help to ensure 
the definition of open standards and studi es of technical and business constraints 
would help to ensure effective, practical interoperability (1 I). 
• The study could take profiles based on le gal and organisationa l constraints as a 
starting point. These profiles could be implemented using Role-Based Access 
Control (an approach to restrict system access to authorised users) to make sure 
that legal requirements are met (1 I). 
• Apart from investigating the interoperability of systems, the constraints between 
European countries should be addressed (1 I).  
Private (P)  
 
EN 24   EN Five experts responded to this question. Four an swered that such a study would be useful (4 
P). The fifth expert stated that  it probably would, as most (but  not all) systems are usually 
designed to meet a local requireme nt, not an EU-wide one (1 P). 
2.3 Integration of information from differe nt detection technologies and improved data 
analysis . 
2.3.1 In what areas do you believe that the integration of information from different 
detection technologies would improve overall performance? 
All MS (12) that answered this question felt that the integration of different detection 
technologies would improve overall performa nce. 3 EU-related bodies responded to this 
question, one of them saying that data minimi sation and purpose specification should be built 
into data analysis systems so as to prev ent unrestricted data matching and database 
navigation. 9 companies and 3 consortia answer ed this question. Three experts responded to 
this question.  
Answers from stakeholders identified several specific areas that would benefit from the 
integration of information of different detection technologies. 
2.3.2 In what areas are improved da ta analysis techniques required? 
10 Member States, one EU-related body, 7 companie s or research centres/institutes and one 
association responded to this question. Four expe rts also shared their views. Stakeholders 
identified concrete themes which required improved data analysis techniques. 
 
EN 25   EN 3. Use and certification of equipment and tools  
3.1 Best practice and the use of existing tools and equipment 
3.1.1 What would be the best way of identifyin g and sharing best practice in this field? 
Public (MS) 
10 Member States and one Spanish region answered this question.  
The ways most mentioned of identifyi ng and sharing best practices are:  
• expert conferences, meetings and seminars (5); 
• web portal or database (6); 
• working groups (3); 
• (experts) exchanging information and experience (3); 
• operational cooperation and contact w ith experts in the field (3). 
Public (EUR) 
3 EU-related bodies answered this question. One of  them suggested a web portal as a tool for 
systematic information exchange; another propos ed a regular exchange of information in a 
well-organised structure. This  would provide an overview of all the information to be 
maintained. The structure could take the fo rm of working groups of security experts 
representing both governments and the private sector.  
A third body would like to  see the processing of personal da ta minimised as part of best 
practice. 
Private (I & C) 
10 companies and 5 consortia responded to this question. 
General remarks  
• Best practice should be iden tified and shared within e ach sector rather than at 
overall national level (2 C). Best practices  must include aspects relating to human 
resources and training where these involve demonstrating vigilance and 
watchfulness to counter terrorist risks (1 C). 
• Best practices are only relevant to the ex tent that users have the same setting, goal 
and aim or use is not affect ed by these factors (2 I). 
Specific Suggestions  
Interactive  
 
EN 26   EN • Common tests and exercises where practiti oners directly interact and exchange 
experiences in the field. Projects should  be funded for the testing and evaluation 
of methodologies and equipment (1 I). 
• A forum where representative s of different governments with different expertise 
come together (like ECAC TTF in the area of aviation) (1 I). 
• User forums, discussions and newslett ers (a secure environment must be 
provided) (1 I). 
• Conference/workshop with representative s from all relevant areas (science, 
industry, public sector) (1  C) / End-users workshop w ith feedback to technology 
or solution providers (2 I). 
• Peer review among representatives of di fferent organisations to examine best 
practices(1 I). 
• Construction of a secure wiki-based s ite for knowledge sharing across multiple 
agencies, services and countries (1 C). 
• To raise awareness of how OSINT can se rve different areas of civil security: 
– informal meetings where specific Member States agencies exchange 
notes on best practices in OSINT; 
– a trade fair of OSINT suppliers to enable all agencies to see what 
technologies and met hodologies exist; 
– a website where all European OSINT suppliers are illustrated, broken 
down by the sub-segment in which they operate; 
– the creation of an In-Q-Tel t ype of organisation in Europe. 
‘On paper’  
• Articles in a relevant magazine (1 I). 
• ESRAB can identify and disseminate best practices (2 I), for example by way of a 
website / project database /mailing list, accessible for “cleared” participants only (1 I). 
• Creation of benchmarks to validate a best practice or solution (1 I). 
• Root cause analysis of threat resolu tions to introduce feedback into the 
organisation and verify that the identif ied best practice re sponds to all the 
identified threats (1 I). 
• Creation of a capability maturity model to assess the level of maturity and quality 
of best practices (1I). 
Private (P)  
 
EN 27   EN One expert suggested paying more attention to suggestions from frontline officers and 
personnel, who have specialised  knowledge (regardless of th eir rank), and giving such 
officers a forum in which to share their ideas with colleagues from other Member States and 
with the solution providers. Another expert wi shed to see more meetings of experts and 
groups of personalities. 
Identification of best practice 3.1.1.1. Would it be through peer evaluation or questionnaires sent to the Member 
States? 
Public (MS) 
12 Member States and a Spanish region answered this question. 
Peer evaluation (7) and questionnaires (9) were seen as equally valid methods for identifying 
best practice by the majority of the MS. Several other formats, su ch as those mentioned in the 
previous question, were repeated. The idea was put forward to create a data base to collect best 
practices that will ultimately re sult in a ‘European Standard’. 
Public (EUR) 
Two public agencies responded to  the question. One indicated a preference for questionnaires. 
The other stated that, aside from peer evaluati ons or questionnaires, a well organised structure 
(such as mentioned in the previ ous question) should be establishe d. Certification is a highly 
technical activity with grave c onsequences if not done properly. 
Private (I & C) 
5 private entities respond ed to this question. All had a different view. 
• Neither evaluations nor questionn aires should be used (1 I). 
• Questionnaires or feedback forms could be used to report usability issues on tools 
and equipment. An organisation should be established to collect and disseminate 
results (1 I). 
• The most appropriate mechanism, whethe r peer evaluations or questionnaires, 
should be global and needs to be considered on a case by case, or theme by theme 
basis (1 I). 
• Peer evaluation is the best solution, a lthough questionnaires could be used as a 
first inventory (1 I). 
• The best way is through meetings (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts identified peer evaluation as the preferred method (4 P). One added that peer 
evaluation would also make it possi ble to define the best benchm ark against which to validate 
tools and equipment (1 P). 
 
EN 28   EN Dissemination of best practice 
3.1.1.2 Would it be through a secure and searchable database or through meetings and 
seminars? 
Public (MS) 
13 Member States and a Spanish region answered  this question. The s ecure and searchable 
database (11) was the slightly preferred op tion over meetings and seminars (8). Many MS 
thought both methods were suitable. 
Public (EUR) 
Two public bodies responded to this question.  One preferred sharing experience through 
meetings, seminars and documents produced by working groups. The other favoured a secure 
and searchable database of jointly assessed case studies. 
Private (I & C) 
7 companies and 3 consortia gave their opinions  on the disseminati on of best practice. 
Searchable database (1 I) 
• Meetings and seminars are too costly in terms of time. The prime source should 
be a searchable database with seminars and exhibitions as a secondary source (1 
I). 
Meetings and seminars (1 C, 4 I) 
• Meetings and seminars esta blish a real network (1 C)  and avoid poor translation 
problems (2 I). 
• Meetings and seminars, followed up by re gular communication to  the industry (1 
I). 
• The idea of an “enhanced specific public -private sector di alogue on detection 
technology”, including the organisation of  restricted seminars with Member 
States, the European Commission and the European Parliament, was supported (1 
I). 
• The effectiveness of security measures will be compromised if security practices 
are not kept confiden tial, and a database — even pr otected by passwords or other 
methods — would pose a high risk. As a result, meetings or other tightly controlled communications may prove a more effective method (1 I).  
Both / Neither (2 C, 1 I) 
• Both, to ensure the widest and most effec tive dissemination of best practice and to 
promote the sharing of knowledge about s ecurity among the Member States (1 C). 
 
EN 29   EN • Both databases and conferences pose the same problems regarding confidentiality, 
the choice of participants and those authorised to possess confidential information 
(1 C). 
Private (P)  
Four experts reacted to this question. One cons idered both methods to be appropriate (1 P). 
The other three stated that meetings and se minars are the most reliable method, although a 
database may be useful. 
3.1.2 Can you suggest any other options on how best to identify and disseminate best 
practice in this field? 
Public (MS) 
11 MS and a Spanish region answered this quest ion. Not all of them mentioned methods that 
they had not suggested in the questions above. Online distribution, for example in the form of a website, was mentioned most (3). Coopera tion and contact between law enforcement / 
security authorities of the MS were also put forward.  
It was proposed that certification efforts should be led by government bodies. The private 
sector, however, should be involved. 
Public (EUR) 
One public organisation suggested  that this could be a function of the Council or the 
Commission.  
Private (I & C) 
8 private companies and 1 consortium  provided the following suggestions: 
General (1 C) 
• Best practice studies shoul d target not only Member St ates, but also sub-state 
stakeholders such as organisations and ev en citizens in order to examine not only 
best detection practices, but also “use” pr actices and the legality of the detection 
method employed (1 C). 
Via existing structures (5 I, 1 C) 
• Identification and dissemination can be ha ndled by the national regulator (1 I). 
• Articles from users and test personnel (1 I). 
• Evaluation of security systems by Member  States or a centralised testing body 
with information shared in a forum (suc h as the ECAC TTF for aviation) (1I). 
• Establishment of best pract ices in training and methodol ogy for each type of civil 
security force, possibly in the form of a manual similar to that produced by NATO 
for military purposes (1 C). 
 
EN 30   EN • A comprehensive audit of all existing t ools and equipment should be performed, 
followed by the formation of technology-specific, multi-national user and 
manufacturer groups, to identify and deve lop best practice. Results would be 
disseminated via a secure database. Res ponsibility for continuous best practice 
development would rest with the te chnology-specific user group (1 I). 
• To establish best practice, representatives  of the Member States should participate 
in a ‘workspace committee’ that focuses on a specific domain of detection (e.g. 
customs) or on cross-cutting areas. The cross-cutting workspaces would work on 
topics like ‘architecture’ and ‘common data elements’ a nd coordinate the specific 
domains where they interact (1 I). 
New organisation/body (2I) 
• A subcommittee established from a community of experts from the EU that deals 
with, for example, border issues. The subc ommittee can be extended to include all 
major trading partners (1 I). 
• A new organisation that manages feedback  forms and disseminates them to the 
Member States. The Member States may n eed to tailor them to their own needs 
(1I). 
Private (P)  
Three experts answered this qu estion. All suggested dedicated conferences and seminars of 
relevant national experts (2 P). 
3.1.3 If an upgrade of a tool or equipment was considered necessary and no authority 
in other Member States would have perfor med such an upgrade, would consultation 
with the private sector on the subject be acceptable? 
Public (MS) 
18 MS answered this question. 7 MS thought that  the private sector should be consulted. 4 
were in favour of consultation under certain c onditions. Lastly, one MS stated that innovation 
in detection instruments is by definition a process based on communication between public 
institutions and the private sector. 
Public (EUR) 
Both public agencies that answer ed this question feel  consultation with th e private sector is 
acceptable. Appropriate control of restricted or confidential information is necessary, however. 
Private (I & C) 
10 Private companies and 2 consortia shared their views on consultation with the private 
sector. One merely stated that it is not e nough to look at the te chnical capabilities of 
equipment; the purpose for which specific equipment can be recommended or certified (1 I) 
 
EN 31   EN also needs to be considered. The others all felt  that consultation with the private sector was 
acceptable, or even natural or essential (8I, 2 C). 
The following remarks were made: 
• Confidentiality should be taken into account (1I). 
• Closer public-private partnership is desirable (1I). 
• The term ‘private sector’ n eeds to be specified (1 C). 
• Since the private sector manufactures th e equipment and typically performs the 
upgrades, consultation with th e private sector is often standard practice (4 I). 
• Although upgrading existing equipment is usua lly the best and most efficient way 
to enhance detection capabilities, some times new technology is needed. Vendors 
and developers are the experts and should be consulted (2 C). 
• If this implies public-priva te funding of the project, the private sector would 
probably be happy to be involved (1 I). 
Private (P)  
All three experts that answered considered  this consultation to  be acceptable (1 P). 
3.2 Identification and dissemination of best  practice and the use of new tools and 
equipment . 
3.2.1 What would be the best way of identi fying and sharing information and best 
practice in this field? 
Public (MS) 
11 MS and a Spanish region answered the ques tion. Most frequently mentioned were the 
following ways of identifying and shar ing information and best practices: 
• seminars and conferences (6); 
• secure electronic database (4); 
• working groups and meetings (5). 
Public (EUR) 
3 EU-related bodies answered this question. One of  them suggested a web portal as a tool for 
systematic information exchange; the other pro posed a regular exchange of information in a 
well-organised structure. This  would provide an overview of all the information to be 
maintained. The structure could take the fo rm of working groups of security experts 
representing both governments and the private sector.  
 
EN 32   EN A third body would like to see the processing of personal data minimised as part of the best 
practice. 
Private (I & C) 
6 companies and 2 consortia gave suggestions on  how to identify and share information. They 
proposed the following:  
• Articles from users and test personnel (1 I). 
• End-user workshops with feedback to t echnologies or solutions  providers (2 I). 
• Databases and meetings or seminars, bot h with limited access, can complement 
one another. Moreover, the ro le to be played by public  and private stakeholders 
needs to be clarified (1 C). 
• Common forums, theme conferences, discussi ons and newsletters are very useful. 
Security needs to be taken into account (1 I). 
• Conferences and requests for informati on to industry, academia and research 
institutes (1 I). 
• ESRAB could identify and disseminate information (1 I). 
• Both the availability of a secure and s earchable database an d the organisation of 
meetings and seminars on such issues are necessary to ensure the widest and most 
effective dissemination (1C). 
Private (P) 
Four experts on security s uggested the following methods: 
• Close links between security authoritie s and technology/sol utions providers, 
organised within a standing European  committee (possibly around a public 
“champion” for each sector, e.g. Europol or OLAF or ENISA), where periodic 
meetings and exchange of information are expected (1 P). 
• The producers and the final consumers of the technological solutions working side 
by side (2 P). 
• Encouraging cooperation between specialis ts from all sectors across Member 
States (1 P). 
Identification of best practice 
3.2.1.1. Would it be through peer evaluation or questionnaires sent to the Member 
States? 
Public (MS) 
 
EN 33   EN 11 MS and a Spanish region answered the quest ion. Peer evaluation and questionnaires were 
mentioned equally often as methods of identifyi ng best practice. Most MS thought that both 
ways are suitable. Other possible means that were mentioned included mostly personal contact between experts or authorities. 
Public (EUR) 
The organisation that responded di d not consider questionnaires to  be an appropriate method; 
group consensus would tend to yield the lowest co mmon practice rather than the best practice. 
Private (I & C) 
4 companies provided an answer to this que stion. Two found neither peer evaluation nor 
questionnaires to be a suitable method (2 I). One considered meetings to  be a better approach. 
The others did not comment on either method but noted that identificati on of best practice 
should be global in scale (2 I) and needs to be  considered on a case by case, or theme by 
theme basis (1 I). 
Private (P) 
Four experts on security expressed their view s on this question. One deemed both suggested 
methods to be appropriate (1 P). The othe rs indicated that de vising a good questionnaire 
would be difficult in this phase, since it concerns the use of new tools (2 P). One expert was 
doubtful about this option. 
Dissemination of information and best practice 3.2.1.2. Would it be through a secure and sea rchable database or through restricted 
meetings and seminars? 
Public (MS) 
12 MS and a Spanish region answered the quest ion. A secure database was mentioned by 11 
MS, the restricted meetings and seminars by 9.  The vast majority of the MS and a Spanish 
region deemed both methods to be appropriate. 
Public (EUR) 
One EU-related body answered that meetings a nd seminars are preferable. However, since 
these may be too time-consuming for some MS , an additional database would be useful. 
Private (I & C) 
4 companies indicated their preferences. One pr eferred a database, th e other three favoured 
restricted meetings and seminars. The following remarks were made: 
Database (1 I): 
• Meetings and seminars are too costly in terms of time. The prime source should 
be a searchable database with seminars and exhibitions as a secondary source (1 
I). 
 
EN 34   EN Meeting/Seminars (3 I) 
• The effectiveness of security measures will be compromised if security practices 
are not kept confiden tial, and a database — even pr otected by passwords or other 
methods — would pose a high risk. As a result, meetings or other tightly controlled forms of communi cations may prove a more effective method (1 I).  
Private (P)  
Four experts reacted to this question. One felt both methods were approp riate (1 P). The other 
three stated that meetings and seminars are the most preferred method (3 P), although a database may be useful (2 P). 
3.2.2 Have you any other suggestions for how to identify best practice  in this field and 
disseminate them effectively? 
Public (MS) 
- 
Public (EUR) 
One organisation responded. It subm itted the following suggestions: 
• experts groups involving end-users and regulators; 
• (security) audits. 
Private (I & C) 
6 companies provided the following suggestions  with regard to th e identification and 
dissemination of best practice: 
• Articles from users and test personnel (1I). 
• Through expert groups (such as ECAC) (1 I). 
• For non-sensitive information, a variety of  channels are available: database, 
publications, conferences, work ing groups, websites (1 I). 
• A secure collaboration site for Member  States to post que stions and seek 
help/advice from others w ould be useful. Collaborati on tools can be used to 
disseminate information in a secure environment (1 I). 
• A comprehensive audit of all existing tools and equipment, followed by the 
formation of technology-specific, multinat ional user and manufacturer groups to 
identify and develop best practice. Resu lts would be disseminated via a secure 
database. Responsibility for continuous be st practice developmen t would rest with 
the technology-specific user group (1 I). 
 
EN 35   EN • To establish the best of best practices, representatives of Me mber States should 
participate in ‘workspace committees’ that  focus on a specific domain of detection 
(e.g. customs) or on cross-cutting areas . The cross-cutting workspaces would 
work on topics such as ‘architecture’ a nd ‘common data elements’ and coordinate 
the specific domains wher e they interact (1 I). 
• A centralised point of contact  at EU level for both Memb er States and industry (1 
I). 
Private (P)  
Two experts proposed a network of end-user s who would communicate and work together 
through a dedicated website (2 P). 
Experimental and new tools 3.2.3 Are you interested in the trialling of ne w or experimental tools and equipment? 
If yes/no, please explain 
Public (MS) 
The 13 MS that answered the question were all interested in the trialling of equipment. Many 
had additional remarks or reservations. Some  emphasised the importance of experimental 
tools and trials, others underlined the importance of carrying out research at European level in 
order to avoid duplication a nd to be more resourceful. 
Public (EUR) 
One public agency answered this question. It is interested in trialling as experimenting with 
new tools is of vital importa nce to enhancing security. 
Private (I & C) 
8 companies and 3 consortia expressed their intere st in the trial of new or experimental tools 
and equipment. One company would be happy to o ffer its expertise, anot her to offer its tried 
and tested tools. Additional remarks were made. 
Private (P)  
All five experts were interested in the trialling of new or experi mental tools as they pave the 
way for improvement and new solutions (5 P).  
3.2.4. Would partial financing of trials of ne w or experimental t ools and equipment by 
the Community and/or the private sector be of interest?  
Public (MS) 
12 MS answered this question. All MS think th at partial financing of  trials of new or 
experimental tools and equipment by the Commun ity and/or the private sector could be of 
interest; one claimed that it already exists. It was mentioned that the private sector does not 
 
EN 36   EN always have sufficient resources, especially in the initial stages, nor do some MS. In a 
qualification process, however, some degree of independence from the private sector must be 
maintained. 
Public (EUR) 
Two EU-related bodies responded to the question. They agreed that pa rtial funding would be 
useful. Neither industry nor public stakeholders  are normally willing to pay for large-scale 
demonstration projects. Moreover, some test s require funding to b uy prototypes and to 
maintain the research facilities. 
Private (I & C) 
7 companies and 4 associations commented on th is question. All thought co-financing by the 
Community and/or private sector would be of interest. The following issues were brought to 
the fore:  
• The most promising tools should be test ed, irrespective of whether they are 
European or not (1 C). 
• Trials should be conducted with a spirit of cooperation so th at everyone involved 
learns lessons and benefits. Real world data collection can be key for technology 
development, but because of the costs involved financial assistance should be 
considered (1 I). 
• It is important to stress that the independence and integrity of the authority and 
freedom to choose other solutions ar e not affected by the trial (1 I). 
• An overall financial package would stre ngthen solidarity and could increase 
Europe's industrial competitiveness (1 C). 
• Trialling is extremely expensive. Furtherm ore, trials are currently repeated in 
multiple Member States, multiplying the co st to industry and government. Sharing 
data will significantly reduce costs. A si ngle trial with a broader scope would be 
much more cost-effective th an multiple tests (1 I). 
• To avoid any waste of funds, such fundi ng should be carefully apportioned to 
companies that can demonstrate the deve lopment of technologi es that are both 
flexible and adaptable over a significant life-cycle (1 I). 
• As public authorities are the main beneficiaries of detection technology, they 
could co-finance its development, in pa rticular the ‘pre-competitive tests’. 
Qualification and certification have to be  addressed for the pre-standardisation 
process. The private sector raised the que stion of the type of pathogens to be 
identified; the degree of specific ity or sensitivity, etc. (1 C). 
Private (P)  
All five security experts supported the idea of partial financing. It wa s mentioned that public-
private partnerships of this kind have already been established in the US (1 P). Moreover, 
 
EN 37   EN such partnerships could launch pi lot projects (1 P). Additionally, it was suggested that sharing 
the cost of development may lower th e cost of the final product (1 P). 
3.3 Use of data and text-mining tools 
Awareness raising exercise 
3.3.1 Would Member States and the relevant Euro pean bodies be interested in sharing 
best practice and in the potential benefits arising from the use of data- and text-mining 
tools? 
Public (MS) 
13 MS answered this question. The vast majority ( 10) of the states that answered this question 
suggested that they woul d be interested in sh aring best practices. The others did not respond 
negatively, but pointed out th at certain problems could arise when sharing knowledge. 
Public (EUR) 
Two EU-related bodies reacted to this question. They commented  mainly on what the content 
of such best practices should be. One public body strongly advocated that best practice should 
include compliance with da ta protection principles. 
Private (I & C) 
1 consortium and 1 company answered this ques tion, stating that Memb er States should be 
interested because their applic ation to crime detection objectives could provide an innovative 
insight into security issues (1 C). Sharing is  considered essential although privacy laws in 
individual Member States are likely to create  a significant barrier to  data sharing (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts answered this question in the affirm ative (4 P). This topic is of interest to both 
academic and other entities (1 P). 
3.3.2. Would Member States authorities using this technology be willing to share 
experience with their peers? 
Public (MS) 
All 9 MS that responded to this question answer ed ‘Yes’. One MS added that the sharing of 
information in this field with other authoritie s and the procedures fo r exchanging information 
could be laid down in a common agreement between all or some of the countries taking part.  
Public (EUR) 
The results of Europol’s trials could be made available for interested parties. 
Private (I & C) 
 
EN 38   EN One company answered that authorities were li kely to want to share experiences. Sharing 
data, however, is more of a problem (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts answered this question. Three es timated that authorities  would not always be 
willing to share information because of the degr ee of sensitivity involved (3P). It was added, 
however, that it would be important to define th e procedural protocols and standards that go 
hand in hand with progress in information technology (1 P). 
3.3.3 Would restricted seminars on the subj ect organised by the Member States, 
Europol or OLAF be useful?  
Public (MS) 
13 MS and a Spanish region answered this questi on. All but one felt that such seminars were 
useful. Another MS specified that their usefulness would de pend on the topic. It was 
underlined once again that sharing experience is valuable , especially at European level. With 
topics like these, however, confidentiality s hould be guaranteed. Europol  was mentioned as a 
suitable candidate for organising seminars. 
Public (EUR) 
This might be a task for CEPOL ultimately. Howe ver, Europol would be glad to contribute to 
seminars.  
Private (I & C) 
4 companies and 2 consortia responded to this  question. Three comp anies and 1 consortium 
supported the organisation of restricted semi nars (3 I, 1 C). Another emphasised that 
collaboration between Member States and the relevant bodies  is useful to identify the 
‘champions’ in data and text mining technologi es (1 I). Moreover, it was suggested that the 
Commission should draw up a list of available analysis tools and me thodologies (1 C). 
Private (P) 
Four security experts answered that su ch initiatives would be useful (4 P). 
Enhancement of the EU capacity for data and text mining 3.3.4 Would a centre of excellence at European  level accessible to all Member States 
and their relevant authorities help to tap the potential of these tools in practice? 
Public (MS) 
13 MS and a Spanish region answer ed this question. The majority (9) were in favour. It was 
felt that such a centre could, for example, enha nce the EU’s data mining capacity, cope with 
numerous languages, establish an agreed format  of data and possibly relieve the burden of 
Europol. 4 MS expressed concer n, among other things for reas ons of redundancy because of 
already existing centres. 
 
EN 39   EN Public (EUR) 
One public body remarked that the usefulness of  data mining and text mining tools would 
have to be proven in a number of specific bus iness scenarios. While the technology might be 
impressive, the delivery of better information to the right person in the right place at the right 
time is the only real test of worth. 
Private (I & C) 
4 companies and 3 associations responded to this question.  
1 association and 2 companies replied that the creation of a network of excellence would be a 
first step towards bridging the ga p between Member States with differing levels of expertise 
(1 C) and avoiding duplication of research and improving synergy at  EU level (1 I). 
3 companies and 2 consortia supported the esta blishment of a centre of excellence. More 
specifically,  
• setting up of an I-Q-Tel type of organi sation would help to  stimulate growth 
among small local technologies (1 C); and 
• it would provide the opportunity to ca pture and deploy best  practice (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts believed that such a centre would be  useful (4 P), especially since security is a 
European issue (1 P). 
3.3.5 If not, what other options would you su ggest to maximise the potential of these 
tools?  
Public (MS) 
2 MS suggested other options. One suggested the sharing of best practices, seminars and 
exchanges. Another put forward the possibility of temporary use of demo versions (engines) 
of commercial and non-commer cial technological solutions. 
Public (EUR) 
- 
Private (I & C) 
- 
Private (P)  
One expert suggested the networki ng of different centres of excel lence dedicated to the use of 
these tools in an application security environment (1 P). 
Identification and dissemina tion of best practice 
 
EN 40   EN 3.3.6 Would a peer evaluation or a questionnaire sent to the Member States be useful 
in identifying best practice in the use of these tools? 
Public (MS) 
10 MS answered this question. 7 MS felt both p eer evaluations and questionnaires are useful 
tools for identifying the best practice in data mi ning tools. 2 MS prefer red questionnaires. It 
was remarked that questionnaires  serve mainly to generate ge neral and basic information. 1 
MS believed that it was not possible to establish a universal best practice in this area. 
Public (EUR) 
One public body responded that it did not think thes e tools useful as they would risk being too 
qualitative. 
Private (I & C) 
2 companies answered this question. One agreed  with both options. The other did not think 
questionnaires a suitable mechanism for accura te data gathering on complex systems and 
suggested peer review, backed by dedi cated study and user groups, instead.  
Private (P)  
Four experts answered this question. Two indicated that bot h methods may be useful, but 
possibly difficult to carry out in practice (2 P) . Since none of these tools is standardised, 
designing a valid questionnaire or organising a peer evaluation is a problem (2 P). One expert 
supported only peer evaluation. 
3.3.7 If not, what other approaches would you su ggest to identify best  practice in this 
area? 
Public (MS) 
3 MS answered this question. The three approaches mentioned are: 
• a secure database; 
• sending out questionnaires to the universities and research  institutions that are 
doing research in this field; 
• sharing best practices, seminars  and exchanges (as above).  
Public (EUR) 
One body proposed a collection of case studies to il lustrate the benefits of using the tools, 
balanced against their full cost in terms of mo ney and time. The point is that some agencies 
may find data mining more profitable than others. It may depend on the intelligence requirement. 
Private (I & C) 
 
EN 41   EN One consortium and a compa ny suggested the following: 
• The Commission should encourage pilo t or rapid prototyping projects to 
implement an end-to-end OSINT solution fo r specific types of security agencies 
across several MS and/or the EU institutions themselves. Such projects — with operators, security forces and privat e players — would develop technical 
integration and operational use and he lp to improve common methodological 
standards (1 C). 
• Vendors can recommend best practices or re fer to organisations that are currently 
using the tools (1 I). 
• EU-sponsored meetings of delegates from the Member States (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Two experts in the field of security  proposed the following alternatives: 
• a review of the existing lite rature on the subject (1 P); 
• the appointment of a trusted board or a network of private and public specialists, 
which exchange of information between th emselves, with the EU and the MS (2 
P). 
Enhancement of the regional capac ity for data and text mining 
3.3.8 Would there be any spare capacity ava ilable in Member States and European 
bodies to help Member States that do not possess this technology to work on their documents?  
Public (MS) 
9 MS and a Spanish region answered this question. Opinions were sharply divided.  
Public (EUR) 
Two EU-related bodies responded to this qu estion. Both had thei r doubts regarding the 
proposal. One would like to see it clarified furthe r. The other saw the lo gistics of the proposal 
as a problem as the responsibility fo r errors would be hard to manage. 
Private (I & C) 
Two companies responded to this question. One stated that data and text mining are so 
sensitive that outsourcing is inappropriate (1 I). The other suggested that the Community look 
at ways of streamlining requirements for text  mining in order to a void duplication. Private 
industry could assist in this process (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Three experts answered that they believed such capacity to be available (3 P).  
 
EN 42   EN 3.3.9. If there were no such spare capacity or  only a limited capacity, would an EU-
funded increase of capacity in Member States or at the European level be useful and practical? 
Public (MS) 
9 MS answered this questi on. All Member Status though t the proposed funding was both 
useful and practical. 
Public (EUR) 
One agency pointed out that this would de pend on whether good research methods validated 
the usefulness of the tools. 
Private (I & C) 
One company answered that it would be worth a try (1 C). 
Private (P) 
Three security experts answered this question. They considered an EU-funded increase to be 
highly recommendable (2 P). 
3.3.10 Would Member States that la ck sufficient data and text -mining capacity consider 
using the tools of other bo dies, if made available? 
Public (MS) 
The 5 MS that answered this question would all consider using the tools of other bodies. 1 MS 
did not consider this to be  a very practical approach. 
Public (EUR) 
- 
Private (I & C) 
Two companies responded to this question. One answered that it might be possible if there 
were assurances that these tools do not ‘report their activities back’ to other authorities (1 I). 
The other strongly advised that Me mber States acquire their own tools as security authorities 
are most effective when they can manage and search for information themselves. Moreover, governments do not want other au thorities to work on their doc uments. For financially less 
capable states, leasing or funding op tions could be considered (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Three experts responded positively to this ques tion, provided that data  protection was taken 
into account (2 P). It was remarked that tools have already been borrowed in the past by way 
of intergovernmental agreement (1 P). 
 
EN 43   EN 3.3.11 Would it be possible to create European or regional centres for data and text 
mining which several Member States and thei r authorities could use for data and text 
mining? 
Public (MS) 
11 MS answered this question. A slight majority (6 ) favoured the creation of regional or 
European centres. One MS felt the creation of such centres was probable, while another accepted the idea conditionally. Three MS oppose d the idea. One felt that Europol already 
fulfilled the function; the othe r supported national centres. 
Public (EUR) 
Two public agencies answered this question. On e supported the idea of such centres; the other 
requested further clarification as to what su ch a centre would mean. It should not consist 
merely of a ‘clearinghouse’ of techniques for data extraction. 
Private (I & C) 
4 companies and one consortium answered this qu estion. All think the creation of such centres 
would be possible (4 I) or even desirable (1 I)  or necessary (1 C). A number of remarks were 
made on the issue: 
• It may be useful to extend collaboration to include strategic non-EU countries (1 
I). 
• Such centres should have the responsibil ity of organising and handling all the 
regional efforts on security research by means of data and text mining, and 
promoting collaboration betw een the public and private sectors in order to tailor 
private solutions to MS authorities’ needs (1 C). 
• These centres should also serve as inte lligence ‘fusion centres’ for collaboration 
between security agencies. To encourage increased information sharing and 
cooperation between national s ecurity authorities, implementation of an extremely 
successful model, such as the California n Joint Regional Intelligence Centre, is 
recommended (1 I). 
Private (P)  
Four experts stated that this would be possible (4  P) and that such cent res already exist (1 P). 
3.3.12 Do existing data and text mining tools su fficiently deal with the various languages 
within Europe?  
9 MS, one EU-related body, one company and one c onsortium, and four experts answered this 
question. Several concrete issues were identified. 
3.3.13 Are there adequate tools to support author ities dealing with foreign language text 
and documents?  
 
EN 44   EN 9 MS, three companies and four experts answered  this question. Several concrete issues were 
identified.  
Other 
3.3.14 If you disagree with any of the option s suggested above, how would you address 
the concerns raised by this point ? 
Public (MS) 
One MS suggested another approach. 
3.4 Testing and certifying the qual ity of equipment and tools 
3.4.1 Would creating a network of national cer tifying authorities sharing experience 
and knowledge, along with a system of quality certification and benchmarking, be 
useful?  
Public (MS) 
14 MS answered this question.  All support the id ea of creating a ne twork of certifying 
authorities. It would enhance efficien cy. Moreover, harmonisation and minimum 
requirements would be beneficial to both public  and private players. However, it should not 
have a negative impact on high national security standards. 
Public (EUR) 
Three EU-related bodies responded to  this question. All three were  (tentatively) supportive of 
the idea. One put forward the example of EC AC as a successfully functioning network of 
authorities. 
Private (I & C) 
General remarks  
• Compliance with stringent standards should not stand in the way of the 
development of innovative technology (1 I, 1 C). 
• Testing and certifying should be discussed together with standardisation efforts. 
Descriptions/specifications/list  of tested equipment should  be available to ‘cleared 
participants’ only (1 I). 
Answer to the question  
6 companies or research centres and 3 asso ciations responded to this question. Three 
supported the creation of a network (2 I), tw o respondents supported th e creation of EU-wide 
authorities – whether in the form of a network or  a single European certification agency (2 C). 
Another preferred a single agency over a ne twork (1 I) and one opposed the creation of a 
single authority (1 I). One consortium suggested that there is no need for such a network or 
authority (1 C) 
 
EN 45   EN The following additional remarks were made: 
• Commonly agreed standards should be us ed and approval by one authority should 
be accepted by the others (1 I). 
• This network could be responsible for publishing articles comparing tools and 
equipment (1 I). 
• A certifying authority would be useful to the extent that certification and 
benchmarking promote quality, standardis ation and open architecture. However, 
unnecessary certification requirements that  would impede the development and 
implementation of security technolo gy must be avoided (1 I, 1 C). 
• As technology is deployed globally, US and EU standards should be recognised 
reciprocally. In addition, the EU should c onsider an equivalent of the US Safety 
Act. This EU safety legislation would a llow technology to be certified and rated at 
different levels, so that technology users coul d have benefits if using the best rated 
technology (of a fiscal, insurance or othe r nature). It coul d also supply risk 
mitigation mechanisms to companies that could be sued following a terrorist attack (2 C). 
Private (P)  
Four experts answered this questi on. Three believed it would be a useful initiative (3 P). The 
other stated that the definition of agreed benchmarks is a prerequisite to correct comparison and certification (1 P). 
3.4.2 If not, what other solution would yo u suggest to address the problem raised?  
Public (MS) 
Three MS provided suggestions. One felt certifi cation and verification should be managed by 
Community legislation. The sec ond stated that, for objective evaluations, it is necessary to 
have volumes of reference data. Such evalua tion campaigns require considerable manpower, 
however. The third MS suggested exchange of  experience with new detection tools among 
security authorities. 
Public (EUR) 
One agency suggested that it may be appropriate to have different states/laboratories 
responsible for testing and certifying different  technologies, i.e. metal detectors, EDS 
systems, trace detection systems, biometric and access systems, imaging systems, etc. 
Private (I & C) 
One consortium suggested using a European Qualit y Mark rather than a network of authorities 
or centralised authority. 
Private (P)  
 
EN 46   EN One expert suggested a network of trust. 
3.4.3 Would common standards for certifying and benchmarking be helpful? 
Public (MS) 
14 MS answered this question. Practically all favoured the creation of common standards. It 
was thought that such standards 
• are essential to acceptable certification; 
• would complement cooperation efforts between public and private testing 
structures; 
• build trust, which will enable MS to rely on each other’s judgments. 
Public (EUR) 
Two bodies responded to this question. Both think common standards for benchmarking and 
certifying would be helpful, but that sensitive parts of security specif ications should not be 
made public. Moreover, some states may feel  more threatened and therefore require 
performance levels above the norm. 
Private (I & C) 
8 companies and 2 consortia answ ered this question. All agreed that such standards would be 
helpful or even necessary or essential. Cer tification should however be performance-based 
(capability) (1 I). The following remarks were made:  
Such standards would be helpful: 
• in guaranteeing consistency in the treatment of international activities across the 
Member States (to identify liability in the event of an attack and also to reduce the 
cost of protection and dete ction systems or installations by streamlining their 
production) (1 C); 
• for data exchange and interoperability (1 I); 
• to ensure that players in the critical market provide quality solutions (1 I). 
In addition to common standards fo r benchmarking and certification: 
• Compliance with standards should be considered as a certification activity. 
Moreover, the skills of th e ‘certifiers’ should be test ed and guaranteed (2 I). 
• The Community should urgently consider  tools for approval and calibration. 
These tools could be put in place at st ate level. But in that case, mutual 
recognition mechanisms (cross-certificat ion) of this approval and calibration 
should also be included (1 I). 
 
EN 47   EN It was also remarked that a single set of co mmon standards would be consistent with a single 
international certifying authority (1 I). 1 consortium believed that this was part of the 
European Quality Mark. 
Private (P) 
Four experts answered this question. All be lieved this would be useful, although the 
development of standards takes considerable time and effort. Moreov er, devising standards 
for such novel technologies may be difficult (2 P).  
3.4.4 If not, how would you ensure transparen cy of this process and usability of the 
results across the EU? 
Public (MS) 
One MS and a Spanish region answered this que stion. The following s uggestions were made: 
• Through a secure website for the author ities, which would contain the results 
and/or reports in que stion and which would allow us ers to comment on the quality 
of its contents. 
• The European Commission should draw up a Common European Standard for 
certifying and benchmarking, such the Eur opean Standards for the requirements 
on information (as referred to above). Once the Common Standards are established, the technol ogies have to be certified and benchmarked by the 
Member States. 
Public (EUR) 
One public agency proposed the following process:  
A document containing technical specifications will be made available for the appropriate 
authorities. This document will have been drafted by working groups of specialists. 
Stakeholders and manufacturers will be info rmed of the process. Information will be 
controlled and released only to producers that  manufacture a specific piece of equipment. 
They will be obliged to keep this information secure.  
Private (I & C) 
- 
Private (P)  
- 
 
EN 48   EN 4. Studies  
4.1. Would you be interested in receiving studies on these topics based on the 
background information outlined in the Annex?1 
Public (MS) 
15 MS answered this question. All were intere sted in receiving stud ies. Some indicated 
preferences. One MS highlighted  the importance of pr otecting data in case the development of 
new technologies should lead to more data processing. Another pointed out that some subjects have already been studied in the context of  the ESRP and that DG JLS and DG ENTR should 
coordinate their activities in an effort to consolidate the links that exist between new technologies and their use by the authorities.  One MS indicated that a study on law and 
specific detection technology a nd a study on specific detection technology and its practical 
use (studies 3 and 4 of the Green Pa per) come under national jurisdiction. 
Public (EUR) 
Three EU-related bodies answered  this question. All agreed that such studies would be of 
interest. One suggested that a privacy impact assessment should also be carried out. Another 
added that some studies may need to be pe riodically updated to take account of technology 
development and threat assessment. 
Private (I & C) 
9 companies and 5 consortia answered this question. 
All were interested in receiving studies. Th e question was raised as to how access could be 
gained to the studies. Moreover, some res pondents offered their expertise (1 I, 1 C). 
The following topics were mentioned specifically: 
• protection of mass events (2 C, 1 I); 
• cooperation and information sharing among forensic laboratories and security 
research in states (1 C, 1 I); 
• law and specific detection technology (2 C, 1 I); 
• specific detection technology a nd its practical use (3 C); 
                                                 
1 Studies on: 
(1) technology and the protection of mass events; (2) obstacles to cooperation and information-sharing among forensic laboratories and security research 
institutes;  
(3) legal provisions regulating the use of specific detection technology; 
(4) practical use of speci fic detection technology; 
(5) legal framework governing the use of personal detection (including surveillance) across the EU; (6) levels of acceptance of personal detection (incl uding surveillance and use of biometrics) across the 
EU. 
Further information is available in Annex III of the Green Paper 
 
EN 49   EN • personal detection technologi es and biometrics (3 C). 
Additional topics: 
• data and text mining tools (1 C); 
• mass land transport (1 I) / mass transit (1 C); 
• equipment that meets genuine needs and works in operational environments (1 I); 
• evaluation of (combination of) tools for use in a specific sector (1 I); evaluation 
not just of the detection capability but al so of how they operate within the whole 
process of identification of , for example, CBRN (1 I); 
• inventory of what capacities are needed at what level (if EU-certified laboratories 
of other countries can be used, a nationa l laboratory may not be needed) (1 I); 
• use of high-tech infrastructure in the area of security (1 C); 
• role of data protection in the case of pe rsonal protection (protection of persons) (1 
C). 
Private (P) 
Four experts answered. They would be interested in receiving these studies. 
4.2 If not, please specify reasons and sugge st alternatives of how to address the 
concerns raised 
Public (MS) 
- 
Public (EUR) 
- 
Private (I & C) 
One company specified that laboratories should  also be certified to make it clear what 
capabilities it has and what anal yses it can carry out (1 I). 
Private (P) 
- 
 
EN 50   EN 5. Implementation of results of consultation  
5.1 Enhanced specific public-pri vate dialogue on detection an d associated technologies  
5.1.1 Would a tool such as an enhanced speci fic public private dialogue on detection 
and associated technologies be helpful in  implementing the results of the public 
consultation on this paper? 
Public (MS) 
17 MS answered this question. 14 supported an enhanced specific public-private dialogue. 1 
MS questioned the added value of formalising su ch debate. It was emphasised that experience 
and information should be shared on a techno logical level and not include personal data. 
Public (EUR) 
Three public bodies answered this question. A ll supported the idea of public-private dialogue. 
Such a tool is needed to identify and streamlin e different agendas. It was remarked that the 
main misunderstanding between th e political side and research and industry is that defence 
and internal security are at the same time similar and different. A coherent strategy on 
European internal security can only be ac hieved if Member States have the same 
understanding and vision. Before the public aut horities can have a mean ingful dialogue with 
the private sector, public stakeholders should communicate amongst themselves.  
In civil aviation, public-priva te dialogue on security has already been set up.  
Private (I & C) 
12 companies or research centres  and 7 consortia responded. A ll thought this dialogue was 
helpful. Two respondents specifically indicate d their willingness to contribute (1 C, 1 I). 
Some additional remarks were made: 
• Dialogue should be confined to practical solutions to specific problems (1 I). 
• Best practices and guidelines should be th e responsibility of th e public sector and 
not influenced by the private sector (1 I). 
• Dialogue should take place through a forum (1 I). 
• Such a dialogue should be open not only to security authorities but also to the 
private sector, data protection agencies and citizens so as to ensure the legitimate 
implementation of security controls (1 C). 
• Any initiative that promotes communica tion between the private and the public 
sector is beneficial (1 I).  Private stakeholders and acad emia need vehicles through 
which they can communicate with Member States’ governments (1 I). 
• Technical specifications should be available to ‘cleared’ participants only (1 I). 
 
EN 51   EN • This dialogue can be used for the public authorities to express their needs and the 
private sector to present its new technol ogies. It could al so address privacy 
concerns. Sometimes, new technologies ar e hampered in their deployment by 
existing EU regulations or standards. Th erefore, legislation should have rapid 
built-in systems to allow fast introduc tion of breakthrough te chnologies (2 C). 
• The EU Detection Forum has been set up to create an open di alogue with industry 
and public bodies in order to help shape European Policies in Security Research 
with the focus on detection (1 C). 
• The dialogue should include providers from non-European countries in order to be 
meaningful (1 C). 
• Security would need to be ensured (1 I). 
Private (P) 
Three experts answered this question. They responded positively to the suggestion of an 
enhanced public-private dialogue. One consid ered that a network would be necessary. 
5.1.2 If yes, would you agree with the above suggestions or do you have different ideas? 
Public (MS) 
11 MS answered the question. 9 agreed and one  provided the following suggestion: a working 
group involving the Member States should be set up to summarise the results of the 
consultation on the Green Paper. Subsequently, it should identify the prio rity areas in which 
specific action should be take n; without duplicating other measures implemented by the 
Commission such as FP7.  
One MS specified that steps should be taken to  improve coordination between the private and 
public sectors in order to close the gaps in th e areas under consideration here. However, it did 
not agree with the creation of another body or entity, but felt th at the scope and powers of 
existing bodies should be extended by crea ting forums for discussion and analysis. 
One MS considered that for aviation securi ty the current structures are sufficient. 
Public (EUR) 
Two agencies answered this que stion. One agreed, and the other suggested that the structure 
of exchange should be permanent in order to be  able to release sensiti ve parts of technical 
specifications. This body should assess what in formation should be kept confidential and 
direct it to the right recipients.  
Private (I & C) 
5 companies and 2 consortia responded to this  question. Three compan ies agreed with the 
above suggestions. Others added the following:  
 
EN 52   EN • open hearings in Member States in whic h the views of authorities, citizens and 
businesses are expressed (1 C); 
• public-private dialogue on the use of technology in spec ific areas to focus the 
debate and avoid the formation of in appropriate general theories (1 I); 
• a permanent body to oversee the public-private dialogue. The body should have a 
broad, global perspective and provide  continuity over time (1 I); 
• a CBRN task force made up of companie s and public bodies to identify and 
discuss best practice on detection an d associated technologies (1 C); 
• a network of excellence, to be created (1 C).  
Private (P)  
Three experts responded to this question. Two ag reed with the above suggestions, whereas the 
other proposed an alterna tive solution (see below). 
5.1.3. If not, what other mechanisms would you  suggest to follow up the results of the 
public consultation of this document? 
Public (MS) 
A Spanish region provided the following suggestion: 
It would not be necessary to set up a new specific body because the Specific Group (within 
the Centre of Excellence mentioned earlier) could fulfil the functions.  
As set out in the Green Paper, the Specifi c Group should consist of the following:  
• Participation : the security services should take part in it. 
• Concrete and clearly defined objectives . for it to be effective. 
• Standing committee . to provide weight; 
• Forum : for experts from both the public and private sectors.  
The relevant regional authorities would be interested in helpin g to set up this body. 
Public (EUR) 
- 
Private (I & C) 
One consortium and one compa ny answered this question: 
• deliver a presentation to indus try on what is required a nd how it is to be managed 
(1 I); 
 
EN 53   EN • adopt an integrated approach with a clea r identification of difficulties in order to 
set the priorities (1 C). 
Private (P)  
The following alternative was proposed: 
• setting up an internationa l body consisting of specialis ts, public authorities and 
solutions providers (1 P). 
5.1.4 Would you be interested in contributing to  its work or directly  participating in 
it? 
Public (MS) 
12 MS answered this question. 11 expressed their interest; one indicated they could not yet 
provide an answer. Reservations included th e point that participation depended on the 
proposals and resources. Confidential information should be protected.  
Public (EUR) 
Three public bodies answered this  question. Two indicated their interest in contributing. The 
other would also be interested, provided restricted and sensitive information is dealt with appropriately. The final decision, however, would have to be taken by the relevant 
hierarchical structures. 
Private (I & C) 
8 companies/research centres and 6 consortia an swered this question. Al l would be willing to 
contribute. 
Private (P) 
Three experts responded. They would be willing to contribute (3 P). 
Action Plan 5.2.1 Would an action plan be a useful tool fo r implementing the measures identified in 
the replies to this document? 
Public (MS) 
16 MS answered this question. 13 supported the idea, 3 were dubious. Comments that were 
made include:  
• An action plan will ensure that results  do not get lost and provides a tool for 
monitoring progress. 
• First the results of the GP should be di sseminated, then the action plan should be 
drawn up. 
 
EN 54   EN • The action plan should take into account th at detection technol ogies are a national 
matter. However, it could lay the fo undations for closer EU cooperation. 
Public (EUR) 
Three bodies answered to this question. All fe lt an action plan to be a useful tool.  
Current existing initiatives s hould be taken into account. 
Private (I & C) 
9 companies and 6 consortia responded to this qu estion. All considered an action plan to be a 
useful tool. Some additional remarks were made: 
• The action plan should be developed in  active conjunction w ith the respondents, 
including the private sector (2 I). 
• Publication should be restricted to cleared persons (1 I, 1 C). 
• The action plan should be made up of c oncrete proposals and not merely set out 
targets (1 C). 
Private (P)  
Three experts responded. They s upport the idea of an action plan.