EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 21 January 2015 
on the role of Národná banka Slovenska in the resolution in the financial market 
(CON/2015/3) 
 
Introduction and legal basis 
On 29 October 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovak Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft law on resolution in the financial market and on amendments to certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC
1, as the draft law relates to a national central bank (NCB) and the rules applicable to financial 
institutions which materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance with 
the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 
Council has adopted this opinion. 
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law 
The draft law is intended to transpose Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council2 
(hereinafter the ‘BRRD’) into Slovak law. In this context, new responsibilities are to be assigned to Národná banka Slovenska (NBS). 
The draft law establishes a resolution authority called the Resolution Council (hereinafter the ‘Council’). In 
the matters which fall into its competence, the Council  will be empowered to carry out supervision under 
Law No 747/2004 on supervision in the financial market and will be responsible for its conduct
3. The 
Council will have legal capacity and will be composed of nine members. Four members will be appointed by the Governor of NBS, who will include a member of the NBS Board, the head of the new unit and two 
other NBS staff members holding managerial positions. The Minister for Finance will appoint four other members from among staff members of the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter the ‘Ministry’) holding 
managerial positions, one of whom will be the State Se cretary of the Ministry. The Director of the Debt 
                                                      
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
2 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 
3  Article I Section 5(7) of the draft law. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
2 and Liquidity Management Agency will be the nint h member. A person directly deciding on the 
supervisory procedure may not be a member of the Council4. 
A new organisational unit will be established within NBS (hereinafter the ‘new unit’) to provide expertise 
to, and organise the functioning of, the Council. The ne w unit will ensure that the tasks of the Council are 
carried out independently from other tasks of NBS. NBS staff from the new unit may not take part in the 
supervision of entities subject to the draft law unless the Council is competent in the matter. 
All costs associated with the functionin g of the Council will be borne by NBS5. Members of the Council will 
not be entitled to remuneration or reimbursement of expenses related to their function6. The ECB 
presumes that the expenses of the members appointed by the Governor will be borne by NBS. 
The entities subject to the draft law will be obliged to pay annual ex ante  contributions to the national 
resolution fund (hereinafter the ‘resolution fund’) ad ministered by the Deposit Protection Fund (DPF). 
Monies belonging to the resolution fund will be held in an account with NBS, separate from other funds 
and assets of the DPF. 
 
2. Role of NBS 
2.1 Under the principle of financial independence, an NCB must have sufficient means not only to 
perform its tasks related to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), but also its national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations
7. Financial independence also implies 
that an NCB should always be sufficiently capitalised8. Previous ECB opinions have pointed out 
that the allocation to the NCBs of specific non-E SCB related tasks needs to be accompanied by the 
allocation of adequate human and financial resources allowing such tasks to be carried out in a 
manner which will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to carry out their ESCB-related tasks9. 
Additionally, in including NCB representatives in collegiate decision-making supervisory bodies or 
other authorities, due consideration would need to be given to safeguards for the personal independence of the members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies. These comments are valid 
also in relation to the role of NBS under the draft law. 
2.2 In addition, given that the separate organisational unit supporting the performance of the tasks of 
the Council is part of NBS, it is important to ensure that decisions adopted by the Council will not 
jeopardise the finances of the NBS as a whole. In  this respect, the ECB notes that the Council will 
have legal personality and understands that the resp onsibility for carrying out its tasks will be borne 
by the Council
10. It is advisable that this is clarified and stated explicitly in the draft law.11 
                                                      
4  Section 5(2) of Law No 747/2004. 
5  Explanatory memorandum to the draft law, Specific part, explanations to the Part two of Article I Sections 3 to 5. 
6  Article I Section 4(4). 
7  See the ECB’s Convergence Report, June 2014, p. 25. 
8  See the ECB’s Convergence Report, June 2014, p. 25. 
9  See for example paragraph 3 of Opinion CON/2007/8, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2011/7 and paragraph 9 of 
Opinion CON/2011/84. 
10  Article I Section 5(4) of the draft law, in connection with Section 43(1) of Law No 747/2004. 
11  The ECB understands that this observation was reflected in Section 99(2) of the adopted version of the draft law.   
ECB-PUBLIC  
3 2.3 Furthermore, the ECB underlines the importance of safeguarding compliance with the prohibition 
on monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty. The new task entrusted to NBS under the draft law is neither an ESCB-related task, nor a traditional central banking task. Rather, 
the new task is linked to a task for government, i.e. resolution in the financial market. Therefore, if NBS is to be entrusted with such a task, it needs to be adequately remunerated in advance, to 
ensure compliance with the monetary financing prohibition
12. 
 
3.  Funding of the resolution fund 
Pursuant to Article I Section 93(8) of the draft law, the Council may ask, inter alia , NBS to provide credit 
to the resolution fund. However, as resolution in the financial market is neither an ESCB-related task, nor a traditional central banking task, NBS would be assu ming a Government task by financing the resolution 
fund. The BRRD provides that resolution costs should in principle be borne by shareholders and creditors and, where these funds are not sufficient, by financing arrangements. In line with the monetary financing 
prohibition, NCBs may not fund these financing arrangements
13 and replenish the resolution fund by 
providing credit to it. Therefore, this provision of the draft law interferes with the monetary financing 
prohibition14 and should be deleted.  
 
4. Relationship between the contributions to the resolution fund and the proceeds of the bank 
levy 
4.1  The ECB has in the past opined on draft legislation introducing a bank levy in Slovakia, the 
proceeds of which are held in a separate extra-budgetary account and intended to cover costs 
related to the resolution of financial crises in the banking sector and to the protection of the stability 
of the banking sector in Slovakia15. The ECB understands that the obligation of the banks, as well 
as branches of foreign banks, to pay contributions to the resolution fund (hereinafter the 
‘contributions’) will not affect their duty to continue paying the bank levy. The ECB supports the idea that the cost of resolution should be borne by the banking sector rather than the taxpayer. 
However, it is not clear what the relationship w ill be between the proceeds of the bank levy and the 
resolution fund for bank resolution purposes. The ECB recommends making clear in which part of 
the resolution financing process the income from the bank levy is to be employed and how it will interact with the resolution fund in order to avoid duplication of instruments. 
 
5.  Operational separation of NBS’s resolution function from its supervisory and other tasks 
5.1 Article 3(3) second subparagraph of Directive 2014/59/EU requires the staff involved in carrying out 
the functions of the resolution authority pursuant to this Directive to be structurally separated, and 
                                                      
12  See the ECB’s June 2014 Convergence Report, p. 29, as well as paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/30 and 
paragraph 3 of Opinion CON/2013/29. 
13  See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2012/99. 
14  See the ECB’s June 2014 Convergence Report, p. 28. See also paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2011/103, 
paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2011/93, paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON/2011/39 and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion 
CON/2008/59. 
15  Opinions CON/2011/66 and CON/2012/53. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
4 subject to separate reporting lines, from the staff involved in carrying out the tasks pursuant to 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and Directive 
2013/36/EU of the  European Parliament and of the Council17 or with regard to the other functions of 
the relevant authority. 
5.2 The draft law aims at ensuring independence of the Council members from the institutions which 
they represent18. It also contains several provisions to ensure operational independence of the new 
unit19. Since the unit supporting the Council will be part of the structure of a different entity, namely 
NBS, the draft law should expressly state the reporting line of the new unit and should at the same 
time respect NBS’ autonomy in staff matters, which is an aspect of the principle of financial independence of an NCB. In addition to the limited provisions on the competence of the Council 
vis-à-vis the staff of the new unit
20 contained in the draft law, it is advisable to distinguish clearly 
between the competences of the Council and NBS Board in respect of the staff of the new unit. 
5.3 Finally, the ECB reiterates that the separation of the tasks of the new unit from the supervisory 
function of NBS should not prevent the staff of the new unit from having access to any necessary information which is available to the supervisory function
21. 
 
6.  Membership of an NBS Board member in the Council 
Pursuant to the draft law, one of the NBS representatives in the Council will be a member of the NBS 
Board22. At the same time, the draft law provides that the member of the Council who is the NBS Board 
member in charge of supervision in the financial market will not have voting rights23.  
The consulting authority should make it clear whether  the NBS Board member appointed as a member of 
the Council is the one charged with supervision in the financial market, since this would have an impact on the voting rights of the member in question. 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 January 2015. 
 
[signed] 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI 
                                                      
16  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 
17  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of 
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credi t institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
18  Article I Section 4(1),(2) and (5), Section 5(3) and (4), Section 6(3). 
19  Article I Section 3(2). 
20  The staff of the new unit will carry out supervision on behalf  of the Council (Article I Section 5(4)). The Council will be 
competent to remove the obligation from the staff of the new unit to maintain confidentiality (Article I Section 8(2)). 
21  See paragraph 3.3 of the Opinion CON/2014/62. 
22  Article I Section 4(1). 
23  Article I Section 6(3).