EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 2.7.2008 
SEC(2008) 2170 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
accompanying the   
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMI TTEE OF THE REGIONS 
 
"A renewed commitment to social Euro pe: Reinforcing the Open Method of 
Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion" 
  
Summary of the Impact Assessment  
{COM(2008) 418 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2169} 
EN 2   EN The impact assessment relates to the Communication on 'A renewed commitment to social 
Europe: reinforcing the Open Method of Coor dination for Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion'. This Communication, included as a priority initia tive in the Commission Work 
Programme 2008, is now part of the package that will accompany the Renewed Social 
Agenda. 
From 2000 the Open Method of Coordination (OMC ) has successively been applied to social 
inclusion policy, to pension pol icy and to health a nd long-term care polic y. In 2006 the three 
separate strands were streamlined into one in tegrated OMC for Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion (hereinafter “Social OMC”).  
This method of coordination comprises an agreement on EU common objectives, setting out 
high-level, shared goals to drive the entire  process, the definition of a set of common 
indicators to enable monito ring of progress towards the co mmon objectives, the preparation 
by Member States of national stra tegic report translating these ag reed objectives into concrete 
policies, and the joint assessment of progr ess and of policy efforts by the European 
Commission and the Member States in the fr amework of the Social Protection Committee. 
The overall assessment of the results of the Social OMC by the different actors involved in 
the process has been largely positive. The Social OMC has supported mutual learning, 
promoted wider involvement of stakeholders, increased awareness of the multi-dimensional 
nature of exclusion and povert y, given impulse to the modern isation of social protection 
systems, forged a shared approach to th e common challenges and brought to the fore 
emerging common issues.  
However, delivery on the common objectives has been too slow or insufficient. While it 
would be unrealistic to expe ct that an open coordinatio n process, based on voluntary 
cooperation between Member Stat es, could produce large-scale re sults in a limited period of 
time, there is a widespread consensus that th e potential of the Social OMC remains largely 
unexploited, that a number of w eaknesses should be corrected and that strategic reinforcement 
of the method would go some way towards improving delivery on the common objectives.  
The analysis points to a lack of political co mmitment and visibility and a need for better 
horizontal policy coordination and mainstreaming of social protection and social inclusion 
concerns in all relevant policy areas. Furthermore, there is a need for a stronger analytical 
underpinning of policy and more involvement of regional and local actors in the Social OMC 
process. Civil society representatives should al so play a bigger part and the mutual learning 
process should be enhanced.  
The need for reinforcement of the Social OM C is supported by a number of institutional and 
policy developments. In addition to the Renewed Social Agenda, there is the prospect of the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (with its mainstreaming requirement), the approach of 
the European Year for combating poverty and social exclusion in 2010, and the upcoming 
Commission initiative on active inclusion. 
EN 3   EN In order to assess the merit of a strengthened Social OMC and to identify the most effective 
ways to achieve it, three po licy options have been retain ed for in depth examination1.  
The first option is described as the “status quo”. This takes into account the fact that the 
Social OMC is by nature an evolutionary pro cess and that, even in the absence of major 
changes, it will continue to evolve through in cremental changes and gradual improvements in 
working methods.  
The second option is described as a “fundament al overhaul” of the process, whereby the 
scope of the Social OMC is widened and the process is remodelled to embrace all dimensions of EU social policies, to ensure effective ma instreaming and to become a sort of Social 
Lisbon'.  
The third option is defined as “comprehensive and ambitious reinforcement within the present 
structure”. This option builds on the approach used so far in th e Social OMC, of consensual 
and incremental progress, but is at the same  time “strategic” and “forward-looking”, as it 
introduces a new dynamic into the system. It pr ovides scope to explore new tools and working 
methods that would be tested and introduced in close cooperation with Member States, with a 
view to reinvigorating the process and optimising its implementation.  
When comparing the alternative options one sh ould distinguish between the procedural and 
the substantive impacts of the changes proposed.  
The impact assessment is mainly concerned wi th procedural and govern ance aspects. It is 
assumed that more effective coordination and mutual learning will have a positive impact on 
the achievement of the common objectives: pover ty reduction, more sust ainable and adequate 
pension systems, equitable and effective health and long-term care systems. It is also assumed 
– in line with the spirit of the common social  objectives – that better  social protection and 
social inclusion will contribute to the Growth  and Jobs Strategy and, more generally, to 
sustainable economic development. For exam ple, active inclusion policies can not only 
reduce poverty but also increase labour supply. Pension reforms can not only help 
intergenerational equity but also raise activity rates and en sure public finan ce sustainability. 
Similarly, good healthcare systems not only pr omote individual well-being but also have 
positive effects on labour supply and on labour productivity.  
However, it is clear that the Social OMC can only facilitate the achievement of those 
objectives, in a situation where the main res ponsibility for social inclusion and social 
protection policy remains with Member States. Th erefore, the questions to be answered are: 
"Will the proposed measures help to make the Social OMC an adequate and viable 
mechanism of coordination between the nationa l and European levels? Will they make it a 
more suitable tool with which the comm on social objectives can be pursued?"  
In other words, the appraisal of the measures c onsidered under the different options is more a 
qualitative evaluation of their pot ential effects on the Social OM C than of their consequences 
in terms of final policy outcomes. For this reason, a separate assessment of the overall social, economic and environmental impact of the op tions identified is not made. However, the 
                                                
 
1 Two policy options – complete abandonment of the Social OMC and full integration of the Social OMC 
in the Growth and Jobs Strategy - have been considered but have not been retained for in depth analysis. 
The reasons for this are explained in the impact assessment. 
EN 4   EN microeconomic aspects (administrative costs, resources implications) are duly taken into 
consideration in the impact analysis, while asse ssing the “feasibility” of  the various options.  
In the impact assessment the proposed measur es are clustered on the basis of the four 
objectives of the Communication: increase the po litical commitment and visibility of the 
process, strengthen the positive interaction with other EU policies, reinforce the analytical 
underpinnings of the process and increase owners hip in the Member St ates. They are then 
rated with reference to the magnitude of thei r impact on the problems addressed and to their 
feasibility. The concept of feasibility refers to political acceptance, ava ilability of human and 
financial resources, administrative burden and th e availability of basic tools. The analysis 
points to the following results: 
As regards option 1:  'status quo' :  
Incremental changes made by implementing a numb er of previously agreed improvements are 
likely to have a positive but in general slow and limited impact on the problems identified. Moreover, the risk attached to this option is that the Social OMC falls victim to “process 
fatigue” and progressively looses credibility an d the confidence of its actors and supporters. 
In any case, it seems highly unlikely that these limited improvements will be sufficient to give 
the Social OMC the strength and effectiveness th at are needed to ensure better delivery on the 
common social objectives and to reinforce the social dimension of European integration.  
Feasibility, on the other hand, seems high.  In fact, most of these measures have already been 
accepted by the Commission and the Member States (see Joint Report 2008). The (limited) increase in the human and financial resources that is needed (incr eased monitoring, better 
dissemination of results, reinforcement of  the analytical framework, etc.) can be 
accommodated through efficiency gains and higher re liance on external expertise. There is no 
obvious impact on administrative burdens for the Member States. 
Concerning option 2:  'fundamental overhaul:
 
The measures envisaged under this option are li kely to go a long way towards addressing the 
weaknesses identified and substantially reinforc ing the process. In most cases, they are 
designed to ensure almost “ideal” working of  the system by means of a combination of 
considerably tighter procedures  and a massive investment in resources. There are, however, 
downside risks. First of all, the Social OMC wo rks on the basis of consensus and the principle 
of subsidiarity. A considerable tightening of  the procedures proposed by the Commission may 
be rejected by Member States and fail to produ ce the expected impact in terms of ownership. 
A radical reform of the method, only a few year s after the restructuring and "streamlining", 
may not be understood and may somewhat aliena te the actors that have  supported and helped 
design the Social OMC in its  present conf iguration.  
The feasibility of this policy option in the short to medium term seems rather low. As stated 
above, political acceptance by Member States is  far from guaranteed. Although there is a 
strong recognition that Europe ha s a role to play in helpi ng Member States tackle the 
important social challenges, MS  are very attached to their prerogatives and powers in the 
social field, and would probabl y be reluctant to accept some  (or most) of the measures 
envisaged under this scenario. At present, ther e are no treaty provisions  on the basis of which 
individual recommendations co uld be issued. Moreover, this  policy option presupposes a 
strong investment in human a nd financial resources. It will also lead to an increased 
EN 5   EN administrative burden on governments because of the additional reporting that will be 
required, the internal coordination effort and the requirements as far as participation of 
stakeholders is concerned. 
As for option 3:  'comprehensive and ambitious reinfo rcement within the present structure' :  
Although remaining within the current structure,  this option has the potential to make a 
significant impact on the objectives identified, th anks to a mix of consolidation of ongoing 
improvements and a gradual “phasing in” of i nnovative elements. The gradual definition of 
EU or national targets, whenever justified on the basis of the e volution of the common 
analytical framework, would certainly lead to incr eased political visibility of the process. As 
illustrated by the example of countries that have  adopted them, quantified targets can raise the 
accountability of governments and help clarify pr iorities across all rele vant policy areas and 
all levels of government, provided that they are based on a strong analytical underpinning. 
Reinforced analytical capacity and mutual learning would improve the quality of policy 
making in the social area. The development of  a common analytical framework would help 
Member States identify the key challenges they face in common and allow them to learn from 
each other in the areas that concern them the mo st. It would also feed into other Community 
policies, and through this channe l there would be more eviden ce-based policy making also in 
other areas. In this way, the positive interact ion with other policie s, including economic 
policy, would be strengthened.  
Most of the measures envisage d under this policy option seem  feasible. Again, interaction 
with other policies largely depends on factors that are outside the Social OMC. Although the 
most substantial changes will be “phased in” only gradually, some investments in human resources will be necessary. As for financial resources, those alloca ted under the PROGRESS 
programme should be broadly sufficient. In general, several of the measures proposed 
(targeting, increased monitoring etc…) will require political support a nd commitment from 
Member States. At national level, better coordination across polic y areas (horizontal 
coordination and mainstreaming) and with different layers of government (vertical 
coordination) will also entail some additio nal administrative burden, which, however, should 
produce consistent “returns” in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 
The impact assessment concludes by highlighting th e third option as the best choice. It is the 
option nearest to addressing the problems iden tified without excessively disrupting current 
ways of working in the Commi ssion and the Member States. In fact, such an option should be 
implemented gradually, not only because of its re source implications, but also because of the 
need to properly discuss and “anchor” the e nvisaged improvements with Member States and 
with stakeholders.