No C 318/50 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 12. 88 
2.16A. If the Council has not acted within a period 
laid down by itself, which may not exceed three months, 
the measures are adopted by the Commission. 
Done at Brussels, 29 September 1988. 
General considerations 
1. Over the last few months the Study Group on 
GATT/Uruguay Round has been monitoring the Uru­
guay Round negotiations. EC Commission officials 
have given informal briefings on specific subjects 
covered by the negotiating groups; the views of rep­
resentatives from contracting countries such as India, 
Brazil and the United States have been heard; the Study 
Group Rapporteur and Chairman have had contacts 
with the Director-General of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Secretariat; GATT has 
been covered at ESC meetings with the countries of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and at a 
public hearing of the European Parliament's External 
Relations Committee; and the Secretariat of the external 
relations section has also kept the study group regularly 
supplied with extensive documentation from the speci­
alized press. 2.16.5. The power thus granted to the Commission 
to act on its own seems excessive. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alfons MARGOT 
2. Major progress has been made since the Punta del 
Este declaration on the general objectives of the new 
round and during the sectoral negotiations which took 
place in 1987. This progress is pleasing both in terms 
of the volume of work carried out, and because of the 
active contributions of many delegations in determining 
the goals and procedures to be followed on the huge 
number of specific problems under negotiation. 
The current far more difficult stage began in January 
1988. This covers the negotiations proper, the sub­
mission of demands, and the offering of concessions by 
the individual contracting parties. 
A ministerial mid-term review is scheduled for the 
beginning of December. This will assess progress so far, 
providing a political boost for the further negotiations 
which should in principle finish by the end of 1990. Opinion on the 'GATT/Uruguay Round' negotiations: the current situation and future 
prospects from the viewpoint of relations between the European Community and the main 
industrialized countries, the developing countries and the State-trading countries 
(88/C 318/16) 
On 31 May 1988 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the fourth paragraph of 
Article 20 of its rules of procedure, decided to draw up an Opinion on the current situation 
and the future perspectives of the GATT/Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The section for external relations, trade and development policy, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 16 September 1988. 
The rapporteur was Mr Romoli. 
At its 258th plenary session (meeting of 29 September 1988) the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion unanimously. 
12. 12. 88 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 318/51 
In the run-up to this mid-term review, which is to take 
place in Montreal on 5 December, the Committee feels 
it useful to give the Commission and Council its views 
on the negotiations, as they have emerged during the 
study group's discussions. The aim of this is to help 
provide a clearer picture of the European Community's 
standpoint in relationship to the other participants. 
3. As the Committee is also currently preparing a 
separate Opinion on the negotiations in the agriculture 
sector, the present Opinion will not be covering this 
subject. The Committee would, however, note that 
progress on the agricultural aspects is crucial to the 
final success of the Uruguay Round. 
4. In general, the Committee fully endorses the Com­
mission's overriding concern to ensure that the nego­
tiations are treated as a single package as pledged in 
the declaration of Punta del Este. 
The negotiations must always be seen as one whole, in 
which the various problems and aspects remain closely 
interlinked. The sub-division of the negotiations into 
fourteen specific subjects (plus the separate topic of 
'services') is no reason for pursuing separate paths, with 
varying aims and timescales for arriving at piecemeal 
solutions (although some of the main negotiating par­
ties actually seem to want this). 
One of the most serious dangers facing the negotiations 
is that they will become over-technical and will concen­
trate on specific individual topics. This would lose sight 
of the main goal, which is to distribute benefits and 
obligations fairly between the parties, thus securing a 
general increase in international trade and cooperation. 
5. For this reason too, the Committee feels it best to 
consider the sectoral aspects of the negotiations within 
an overall assessment of the Community's current and 
future relations with industrialized countries, develop­
ing countries and State-trading countries. 
It is vital to fix priorities in the discussions. Above all, 
it is vital to ascertain whether an effective and clear 
line is being taken on the basic issues, the differences 
in approach and the most deeply-rooted sources of 
conflict between the main partners. If not, there is a serious danger of pursuing compromise 
solutions of a technical nature, or — worse still — 
merely glossing over the issues without getting to grips 
with the contradictions and conflicts of interest: these 
would resurface immediately the negotiations are over, 
as they unfortunately already have in various areas 
covered by the Tokyo Round. 
The European Community's relations with the industri­
alized countries 
6. The Community's relations, with Western indus­
trialized nations are covered by the GATT, based on 
the principles of non-discrimination ('most-favoured 
nation' clause) and reciprocity. 
The lowering of tariff barriers has been given priority in 
past negotiations, and the satisfactory results achieved 
(particularly in the Tokyo Round), as reflected by a 
general fall in the average level of customs duties in 
industrialized countries, leave little scope for further 
significant reductions in the present negotiations. 
Some problems remain concerning the reduction of 
particularly high tariffs, uniform classification of cus­
toms headings, customs valuation, consolidation of cer­
tain concessions etc., but the path ahead for the relevant 
negotiating group does not seem too difficult. 
7. A much more complicated problem is how to 
restore order in the jungle of non-tariff barriers which 
impede trade between industrialized countries too. 
Technically it should not be difficult (though it will be 
laborious) to decide which non-tariff measures should 
receive priority. However, it is well known that more 
access to other countries' markets is the key problem 
in relations with many countries, including some of the 
most highly developed (such as Japan). 
The Committee stresses here that, despite the 
undoubted efforts and definite progress made, Japan's 
trade surplus (particularly vis-a-vis the Community) 
and the serious difficulties of penetrating the Japanese 
market remain one of the most serious problems facing 
GATT. Japan's efforts to develop its domestic market 
and imports must be stepped up, and not simply con­
tinued. 
8. A glance down the list of negotiating groups 
reveals a number which seek to define relations between 
the industrialized and the developing countries. This 
applies to the negotiations on tropical products, textiles, 
safeguards, anti-dumping and export licences. 
No C 318/52 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 12. 88 
9. Other subjects have a direct bearing on present 
and future relations between the developed countries 
(i.e. between the European Community, the United 
States, Japan and the other industrialized market-econ­
omy countries). 
Take, for example, subsidies, State aid and discriminat­
ory public procurement policies; or the failure to respect 
the 'standstill' commitments and the tendency of some 
leading nations to push through national legislation 
(such as the United States Congress's recent Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988) in breach 
of multilateral commitments) or again, the common 
tendency to seek bilateral solutions and voluntary 
agreements outside GATT. 
If viewed in the longer term, these 'grey area' agree­
ments to some extent represent a transitional phase in 
the difficult process of opening up national economies 
to which the new rules of international competition do 
not apply at present. 
However, some of the 'grey area' voluntary restraint 
agreements are a reaction on the part of importing 
countries to certain industrialized or newly industrializ­
ing countries' aggressive trade policies in certain sectors. 
10. Nevertheless, all this creates a climate of uncer­
tainty and unease in international trade as a whole, and 
systematic efforts are needed to dispel it. 
11. In these circumstances, it is important that the 
credibility of the GATT system should be restored, first 
and foremost by strengthening the dispute settlement 
procedure. A special negotiating group is tackling this 
subject. 
However, there does not yet seem to be sufficient con­
sensus among the major nations or among the develop­
ing countries on how to make the dispute settlement 
procedure more effective in tackling the more politically 
charged disputes. 
12. Little progress has also been made in revising the 
GATT Articles. The deluge of proposed amendments 
risks distracting attention from the really important 
points. The EC Commission, for example, would like 
to see amendments to Article XII (restrictions to safe­
guard the balance of payments of developing countries), 
Article XVII (State-trading enterprises), Article XXV 
(non-application of the agreement between contracting 
parties), and the Protocol on provisional application. However, the real problem is that in the absence of 
consensus or political will, the provisions of the treaty 
(which are inevitably general) are not implemented 
precisely and uniformly, and too often receive a biased 
interpretation. 
Attention should focus here on 'how' the rules should 
be applied, rather than believing that a radical review 
of the treaty would everything. 
13. Unfortunately views, opinions and theories differ 
in the most developed nations on these points. In fact, 
these differences are only partly caused by differing 
ways of thinking and are very often simply a cover for 
the defence of national or sectoral interests. 
14. For all these reasons, some in-depth clarification 
must be made and a preliminary consensus must be 
sought between the main industrialized nations on a 
few basic issues. 
For example, one question which should be asked is 
how the principle of 'comparative advantage' in the 
production of goods and services, which some people 
feel should always have priority, can exist alongside 
the principle of the right to defend national interests 
(contained in various articles of the GATT) when 
threatened by aggressive foreign competition. 
In the Committee's view, it is unreasonable always to 
expect strict application of the principle of comparative 
advantage if serious tensions in international economic 
relations are to be avoided. 
Both at international level and within GATT, much 
of the current talk about subsidies, national aid, the 
protection of domestic markets, and piecemeal sol­
utions outside the multilateral framework, stems pre­
cisely from the fact that this conflict of principles has 
never been cleared up. 
At the centre of this problem is the survival of major 
sectors (steel, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, agriculture 
and many more) which are widely felt to be strategic. 
15. Hence the paradox of looking for piecemeal or 
compromise solutions within GATT, when questions 
of principle have not yet been tackled or resolved 
Even the reasonable proposal to add a safeguards code 
to Article XIX of the GATT, containing obligations on 
notification and transparency, in order to bring all 
protectionist measures under the GATT umbrella, 
would have little chance of success unless the main 
trading partners could agree on the basic premises 
12. 12. 88 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 318/53 
underpinning it. The EC could give a lead here 
by systematically giving formal notification of its 
measures. 
16. At all events, the safeguard clause of Article XIX 
—which is non-selective and provides for degressive 
temporary measures—is ill-equipped to tackle unfair 
anti-GATT practices by one or more countries (sub­
sidies for industrial products, obstacles to the import 
of specific products, etc.). These practices are generally 
an attack on specific production sectors and can be 
highly damaging to whole areas of Community indus­
try. In such circumstances, specific voluntary restraint 
measures against the countries engaging in these prac­
tices are perfectly legitimate and should be pursued for 
as long as the practices which occasioned them con­
tinue. However, such measures should be transparent, 
and in particular should be notified to GATT. 
17. The Committee considers that it is up to the main 
industrialized nations to start discussing the underlying 
issues and clarifying the future course of international 
economic relations in order to give the multilateral 
trade system regulated by GATT a solid foundation. 
This is the only way to prepare the ground for an 
effective package of rules to govern relations between 
the industrialized world and the developing countries. 
The European Community should play an active part 
in promoting these clarifications, which are political 
rather than technical, and should take place at the 
highest level. 
Here the Committee would refer back to its Opinion 
on the impact of current United States economic and 
political developments on the Uruguay Round and 
international trade, adopted on 2 July 1987. 
This stated that: 
'The time has therefore come for the European 
Community to propose to the United States that a 
frank comprehensive assessment be made of the 
situation with a view to working together for a new 
international equilibrium based on solidarity and 
sincere reciprocity. 
These discussions—which should later involve all 
major Western countries—should not be limited to 
trade issues, i.e. to bringing the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT multilateral negotiations to a successful 
conclusion. They should also cover the international 
monetary system and the search for a healthy bal­
ance between demand for and supply of raw 
materials and agricultural products.' 18. The Committee now reiterates this recommen­
dation, at the same time specifying that this does not 
mean establishing ad hoc rules for the main industrial­
ized nations, but rather clarifying the principles which 
should form the basis of an effective multilateral GATT 
system. Clearly it would have been preferable to clarify 
matters before the Uruguay Round began; but the 
decision can be put off no longer. The installation of 
the new United States administration following the 
forthcoming elections could provide a good opportunity 
for a careful assessment. 
The Committee regrets to note that the adoption of the 
new Trade Act bij the United States Congress is not a 
step in the right direction, and confirms the fears voiced 
in the Committee Opinion of July 1987. The Trade 
Act encourages a protectionist attitude worldwide, and 
favours neither the retention of the status quo requested 
by the instigators of the Uruguay Round nor the multi­
lateralism which is the cornerstone of GATT. It should 
prompt the Community seriously to reconsider the sig­
nificance and prospects of the present negociations. 
In the meantime the Commission of the EC should give 
immediate consideration to the adoption of similar 
provisions mirroring the United States legislation. 
The Committee notes that trade problems cannot be 
divorced from monetary problems, and that a cur­
rency's excessive depreciation (whether voluntary or 
not), or conversely its excessive overvaluation, often 
has a far greater effect than customs duties. 
Progress in the GATT negociations should go hand in 
hand with progress in setting up a satisfactory inter­
national monetary system. 
The European Community's relations with the develop­
ing countries 
19. The negociations on the subjects which directly 
affect relations between industrialized and developing 
countries involve some complex considerations. 
Firstly, the spontaneous moves by all developing 
countries to join an informal 'group of developing 
countries', regardless of their economic and social con­
ditions and their prospects for the future, makes it 
difficult to pinpoint the best solutions for their individ­
ual problems. 
Part IV (Trade and Development) of the GATT pro­
vides for more favoured differential treatment of the 
developing countries by the developed nations, who are 
No C 318/54 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 12. 88 
to renonce the principle of reciprocity and encourage 
exports from those countries. 
A general consensus is already emerging that the poorest 
countries (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) should receive more 
favoured treatment, and specific aid programmes are 
also proposed for these countries. 
However, points of uncertainty remain. 
It is well known, for example, that the newly in­
dustrializing countries of South-East Asia have no exter­
nal debts and do in fact have large surpluses in their 
trade balances of payments. This has been partly due 
to the linkage of local currencies to the United States 
dollar at the time of its most serious depreciation, thus 
forcing up exports. Mention should also be made of 
the policies pursued by these countries in specific sectors 
where massive subsidized investments allow them to 
profit from the most up-to-date plant while pay and 
social security remain at rock-bottom levels. 
It is worth asking whether it is right for the GATT 
negociations to treat these countries in the same way 
as Latin American and other nations which have heavy 
debts and are obliged to follow extremely tight econ­
omic policies. See the information report of the ESC on 
African, Carribbean and Pacific (ACP) States' indebted­
ness (1987). 
20. It should be noted that all the ACP States spon­
taneously joined the Group of Developing Countries 
(headed by a few individual countries), without any 
distinction being made for their preferential links with 
the European Community. 
The ACP States are concerned about possible erosion 
of the advantages they have won from the Community, 
and continually seek the Community's solidarity. It 
would be well if they could extend their recognition of 
the Community's role to the Uruguay Round nego­
tiations. 
21. Some progress has been achieved in the dis­
cussions of the various negotiating groups, for example 
over the liberalization of tropical products. However, 
they are many more points causing dissent and conflict 
between the contracting parties and the work is pro­
ceeding very slowly. Some of the divergences have been 
inherited from earlier negotiations (textiles, agricultural 
products, safeguard measures, anti-dumping, etc.). 
Other problems concern subjects not tackled in previous 
rounds, such as the trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights, trade-related investment measures (on 
which the developed countries rightly insist, though with little success so far), and the service sector, about 
which the developing countries are extremely wary. 
Here too, many of the main problems stem from the 
failure to clarify a few basic issues which continue to 
cloud relations between industrialized and developing 
countries. 
22. For example, nothing has been done about the 
problem of social dumping—the absence (or very low 
level) of basic rights and safeguards for local workers 
in many developing countries. 
The Geneva negotiations should take account of the 
stands of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
on this, which have been endorsed by the European 
Community and cited by the Economic and Social 
Committee on a number of occasions. 
The legitimacy of a 'comparative advantage' in pro­
duction costs obtained by such means and at such a 
price to question. 
23. Further study is also needed of the policies of 
some raw material producing countries where export 
prices are much higher than the very low (in some cases 
non-existent) prices charged to local industries for the 
same materials. 
Many raw material producing countries have for many 
years faced difficulties arising mainly from the drop in 
world prices. However, this must not blind us to the 
existence of practices which run counter to GATT 
rules. These involve petrochemical and high-energy 
products in certain Middle Eastern countries, discrimi­
natory two-tier pricing, hoarding of scarce raw 
materials (such as non-ferrous metals), closing of mar­
kets, dumping of semi-processed products, etc. These 
practices are pursued not only by many developing 
countries, but also by various industrialized or newly 
industrializing countries such as Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Brazil. 
24. Consideration has also not been given to the 
restrictive line adopted by certain well-known cartels 
of producer countries [not only Oil producing and 
exporting countries (OPEC)] which for decades have 
been abusing dominant positions won by restrictive 
trade practices. 
The negociating group on natural resource-based prod­
ucts is bogged down by a number of outstanding prob­
lems and by the uncertainties which exist within the 
12. 12. 88 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 318/55 
industrialized nations themselves. Discussion continues 
on the inclusion of energy products, access to fisheries 
resources, and the situation of certain specific products. 
The industrialized nations have even failed to agree 
hitherto on the classification criteria for developing 
countries which are to benefit from the Generalized 
System of Tariff Preferences (GSP). This is a further 
reason for considering their position vis-a-vis the devel­
oping countries. 
25. The developing countries are generally very clear 
about one basic point: the call for wider and freer access 
to Western markets. 
However, there is total silence on the other side of the 
coin: their own closed markets and the existence of 
entrenched practices which impede imports, impen­
etrable licensing systems, quotas, monetary constraints 
and sky-high customs duties, which cut these countries' 
markets off—albeit with some exceptions—from nor­
mal free-market trade. 
It is clear that this lop-sided interpretation of the pur­
pose of the GATT negotiations is unacceptable. 
The European Community and the other Western 
nations should keep reminding the developing countries 
of the commitment made at Punta del Este. Although 
worded in the negative, its meaning was clear: 
'the developing countries will not be expected to 
make contributions which are inconsistent with 
their individual development, financial and trade 
needs'. 
In positive terms, this means that those developing 
countries which have already achieved high levels of 
growth, production, consumption and financial equilib­
rium, are duty-bound to assume their share of obli­
gations, i.e. to liberalize their national markets in line 
with the benefits which they already enjoy and could 
use to increase international trade. 
These countries should be explicitly excluded from the 
provisions of part IV of the GATT covering con­
cessions, privileges and exemptions from the obligations 
of the agreement. 
26. There remains the critical problem of the third 
world countries whose external debts are so heavy that 
their servicing now eats up a large proportion of the 
countries' export revenue. In the current GATT negotiations, these countries find 
it quite impossible to open up or integrate their econom­
ies any further into the international economic system. 
The communique issued by the seven leading industrial­
ized nations at the Toronto summit of 19-21 June 
contained a statement on this point. 
27. In such a situation, the Committee feels that 
there are two courses open to the European Community 
and the other industrialized nations. 
The first is to increase the powers and efficiency of the 
GATT system, by defining precise codes of conduct 
and coherent technical procedures, so that the system 
can carry out its role as the guardian of multilateralism 
and defender of the need for open and liberalized inter­
national markets. 
The aim must be a coherent, efficient system which 
functions smoothly. 
It must be borne in mind here that many developing 
countries will not be able to adhere to the new rules 
immediately. A longer term approach will be required 
if these countries' structural imbalances and more 
especially their debt problems are to be ironed out. 
An efficient and balanced GATT system of standards 
and codes, geared to a changing world, will be a vital 
tool for checking the full commitment of each develop­
ing country—which will need support and financial aid 
from the Western world—to a free market economy 
underpinned by GATT. 
28. The GATT negotiations are thus crucial if the 
Western industrialized nations are finally to define a 
more global and coherent policy towards the inter­
national economy, calling on all countries who are in 
a position to do so to accept their respective responsi­
bilities. 
While the GATT system can hardly be blamed for the 
world economic crisis, the contribution which a healthy 
increase in trade could make to world growth has been 
severely underestimated in the last few decades. 
For a long time the prescriptions for economic recovery 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 
developing countries seeking financial assistance, have 
inexorably led to a squeeze on domestic consumption 
and a cut in imports and hence investment. It would 
No C 318/56 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 12. 88 
have been more sensible to try and achieve balance by 
increasing these countries' trade (export/imports) and 
investment, within the international economic system. 
29. Turning to the second course of action, the Com­
mittee is pleased that for some time now the EC Com­
mission has been calling for closer ties between various 
multilateral bodies; a more strongly structured GATT 
organization, with higher-level representation from its 
contracting governments, can take its place alongside 
the IMF and the World Bank. The policies of these 
latter institutions also need to be revised and revitalized. 
The Committee therefore calls on the Council and the 
Commission to press ahead with the action in hand. 
The long-term strategy of the Western nations must be 
a steady revival of the developing countries' economies, 
thereby freeing them from the serious structural prob­
lems which for a number of reasons have held them 
back for so long. 
Gradual integration of these countries, their economies 
and their citizens into the world trade network can 
provide an enormous boost to world economic growth, 
and the European Community can play a full role in 
this. 
The State-trading countries' participation in the GATT 
negotiations 
30. The Uruguay Round negotiations are being 
attended by Czechoslovakia (a founder member of the 
General Agreement), Poland, Rumania and Hungary in 
their role as members and the People's Republic of 
China which has applied to be reinstated as a founder 
member of GATT. Bulgaria has recently made a formal 
application for GATT membership. The Soviet Union 
has for the time being merely expressed a general inter­
est in closer ties with GATT, as part of the present 
leadership's greater openness on economic matters. 
31. The Punta del Este declaration of September 
1986 makes no explicit reference to the problems posed 
by the participation of the State-trading countries in 
GATT's multilateral system though it is widely realized 
that there are major problems in both theory and prac­
tice. The State-trading countries which belong to 
GATT became members between 1967 and 1973; their 
admission was due first and foremost to political 
reasons, that is to say the wish that economic and other 
relations with those countries should be improved. 
Right from the start, however, it was realized that the 
General Agreement was hardly suitable, in its original 
form, for regulating trade relations with countries whose economies are differently structured and have 
nothing in common with the principles of a market 
economy. 
The protocols governing these countries' accession to 
GATT (Poland 1967, Rumania 1971 and Hungary 1973) 
have selective safeguard clauses which make it possible, 
for example, to introduce trade quotas and to initiate 
anti-dumping and countervailing procedures if the State-
trading countries engage in distorting trade practices. 
32. However, no detailed consideration has ever 
been given to the main problem: the fact that most of 
these countries' foreign trade has so far been in the 
hands of an impenetrable centralized monopoly in 
which the authorities have full latitude to issue special 
authorizations or bans, or vary volume, prices, licences 
and currency reserves, according to needs. Under these 
circumstances duties and tariffs become meaningless 
and it is not possible to observe the 'most favoured 
nation' principle, i.e. the non-discrimination of freely 
competing countries and operators on which GATT's 
multilateral system is founded. 
In addition, the fact that prices are not determined by 
supply and demand and the means of production are 
publicly owned means that there is no point in these 
countries' authorities pledging not to grant subsidies or 
aid. It is also difficult for other countries to apply anti­
dumping procedures or countervailing duties, because 
domestic prices and production costs cannot be used as 
a benchmark. 
These difficulties have come clearly to the fore in recent 
years. 
33. In other words, the participation of State-trading 
countries in GATT has so far been little more than an 
empty gesture. It has been tolerated above all because 
of the political importance of maintaining a forum for 
talking with these countries, while waiting to see what 
the future brings. 
However, the prospect of active participation in GATT 
by populous economic and political powers such as the 
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union means 
that the problem cannot be ignored any further. 
34. Hence the need to start considering whether 
GATT can be adapted structurally to these require­
ments. If so, one possible suggestion might be to set up 
a relevant working group straight away as part of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
For example, a transitional phase should be established 
for the candidate countries before they become full 
members. Periodic checks should be made on the pro-
LuLL88 Othcial]ournalot the European Communities ^oC31^eo7 
^ress achieved, and on whether commitments have been 
respected. 
Care must also betaken to ensure that the mass entry 
ot the ^tatetradin^ countries does not lead to the 
political exploitation ot relations between CATTmem 
bers. 
3eo. Alternatively, consideration could be ^iven to 
the possibility ot hocusing on specihc machinery or 
agreements t^or intertacin^ between ditterently struc 
turedeconomies ^asinthe case ot incompatible com 
putersP 
mother words, is CATTthe only possible instrument 
tor tacldin^ these problems^ 
3^. At all events, the aimwill clearly have to bea 
sharp increase in trade and closer relations and cooper 
ation, especially inviewot the ^reateropennessnow 
emer^in^ between the EEC and the Comecon countries, 
which must be encouraged. 
The Committee things that the European Community 
should ^ive this subject its maximum attentionin par 
ticularghe Commission should mal^e an indepthanaly 
sis ot possible solutions,thereby tn^enn^ottacon 
structive debate within the Community institutions. 
lOoneatBrussels,^^eptemberl^88. Additional considerations 
37. TheOpimonhas notconsideredseveralpomts 
on which thereisabroadconsensuswithmboththe 
Community and the Organisation tor economic Coop 
eration and development ^OECfo^ 
— extension otCATTtoservices^respectm^ the l^ey 
principles ot reciprocity,transparency,treatment on 
apar with nationals,nondiscriminationsandthe 
definition ot rules tor consumer protection with 
particular reterence to services provided by the lib 
eral professions^, 
— respect tor intellectual property, through the ere 
ationota^enerala^reemenC which newly industn 
aliped countries and some developing countries 
would also si^n. 
This Ceneral Agreement should cover not only counter 
teitin^ but also trade marl^s, designation ot origin, 
geographical indications, designs and models, copy 
n^ht, patents etc. 
38. Lastly,the Committee stresses that there must be 
no conflict between the completion ot the Community^ 
internal market by 1^^ and its participation in the 
Uruguay Round. The advantages ot the internal market 
tor ourCALTpartners must be reciprocated ^especially 
with regard to standards, public procurement, and the 
littin^ or globalisation otquotasP