2.2.94 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC34/83
OpinionontheXXIIndReportonCompetitionPolicy
(94/C34/24)
On9July1993theCommissiondecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,
underArticle198oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,onthe
XXIIndReportonCompetitionPolicy.
TheSectionforIndustry,Commerce,CraftsandServices,whichwasresponsibleforpreparing
theCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon3November1993.The
RapporteurwasMrBagliano.
Atits310thPlenarySession(meetingof24November1993)theEconomicandSocial
CommitteeadoptedthefollowingOpinionunanimously .
1.Anewcontext,theslowdownineconomicgrowthTheguidelinesofanti-trustandcompetitionmonitoring
policieshavegraduallychangedaccordingly .
Theseguidelinesarefocusingmoreandmoreonthe
efficiencyofbusinessesandtheeconomicsystemasa
wholeandgiveprioritytothestrategiesoffirmsrather
thantotheirsizeorthegoodstheyproduce.1.1.TheSingleMarketincreasinglyrequiresauni­
form,clearandconsistentcompetitionpolicy.The
EconomicandSocialCommitteesharestheCom­
mission'sviewthatwearelivinginchangedcircum­
stancesresultingfromtheslowdownineconomic
growthandtheapplicationofthesubsidiarityprinciple
andthatcompetitionpolicythereforeneedsnewguide­
linesandgreatervigilance. Protectionorsafeguardofthe'market'-—seenasan
agglomeration ofconsumersandproducers (ofboth
goodsandservices)—isthereforenolongerstatic.It
isnolongerenoughtoban'all'restrictiveagreements,
mergersortake-overswhichcreatemorepowerfulpro­
ducergroups.1.2.TheCommissionincludesamongthesenew
guidelinestheneedtotakeadynamicviewofmarkets,
whichcallsfor'greaterflexibilityinadaptingtothe
newsituationandstayingintunewiththeobjectives
whichtheCommunityhassetitselfforeconomicand
socialcohesion,....'.Protectionorsafeguardofthe'market'(i.e.therules
forensuringhealthy,effectivecompetition )mustin
futurebedynamic:inshort,restrictiveagreements,
mergersandtake-oversmustbeassessed'casebycase'. 1.3.Itiswiththesecorrect,pragmaticremarksthat
theCommissionopensitsXXIIndannualreporton
CompetitionPolicy.AsusualtheReportisaclear
documentbutthistimeitisevenmoremeticulousand
well-documented .2.3.Thepaceofchangeisincreasing,andnotonly
intheeconomicsphere,anddecisionsneedtobe
implementedmoreswiftly.Itisrightthatallinterested
partiesshouldbeconsultedbeforeadecisionisadopted,
butexcessivelyprotracteddraftingproceduresand
effortstoachieveconsensus,anddelaysthatlackany
realjustification ,arenolongeracceptable .2.Adynamicviewofmarkets
2.1.TheCommitteeconsidersthattherequirement
totakeadynamicviewofmarketsholdstruenotonly
forcompetitionpolicybutalsoforeconomicoperators.
Bytakingaccountof'potential'competitioninits
assessmentofmergeroperations,theCommission is
followingthesamestrategicapproachascompanies,
whichhavealwayshadtobedynamicandlookahead.2.4.Inits1981OpiniontheEconomicandSocial
Committeemadeitclearthatitwasnecessarytoshape
competitionpolicyonthebasisofarealisticviewof
overall,world-wideinterdependence .
2.2.Technicalprogress—evolvinginthedirection
ofgreaterflexibilityandlowercost—combinedwith
growinginternationalcompetition (withtheincreas­
inglytangiblethreatofnewplayersenteringthemarket
asmarketsbecomemoreandmoreopen)hasledtoa
radicalchangeincorporatemarketstrategies.TheCommitteementionsthisnotmerelyforthesatis­
factionofshowingthatithasinthepastsaidthings
thatremaintopicaltoday;theCommitteefeelsituseful
torecallitspastOpinionsbecausetheyarerelevantto
itsconsiderationoftheXXIIndreport.Thequotation
shouldgivetheCommissionfurtherconfirmationof

NoC34/84 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 2.2.94
theusefulnessofconsultingtheCommittee—apoint
whichhasbecomeincreasinglyclearrecently.staff.Today,eveninaperiodofbudgetausterity,a
solutioncouldbefoundbymakingbetteruseofexisting
resources.TheMaastrichtTreatyinanycasebrings
withitnewstructuresandresponsibilities whichwill
inevitablyalterthebalanceofmeans/endsinsome
Directorates-General .
3.Thesubsidiarityprinciple
4.Theroleofthenationalcourts
3.1.TheCommitteeagreeswiththeCommissionin
identifyingTreatyArticles85and86(whosegeneral
applicabilitytotheentireCommunitymarketiscon­
firmedintheselfsameTreatyofRome)asanearly
exampleofthesubsidiarityprinciple:theexclusion
fromthecompetitionrulesofminoragreements,and
thecriterionoftheeffectonintra-ECtrade,arealready
aclearandpracticalillustrationofthis.Thesameisalso
trueofthemergercontrolRegulation,whichallowsthe
Commissiontorefercasestothenationalauthorities .4.1.Article5oftheTreatyestablishestheprinciple
ofpermanent,faircooperationbetweentheCommunity
andtheMemberStates.However,cooperationbetween
thenationalcourtsandtheCommission —nowfor­
malizedintheCommission'snoticeof13February
1993,albeitonlyinindicativeterms—stillhastoprove
itself.
4.2.Concernarisesfromthetraditionalindepen­
denceofthenationalcourtsandthedifficultiesof
carryingoutcomplexeconomicassessmentswhichdo
notfallwithintheusualsphereofresponsibilityof
courtsoffirstinstance.3.2.Atnationallevel,however,MemberStatelegis­
lationdesignedtosafeguardthemarketandfreecompe­
titioncontinuestoplayavitalandcomplementary role.
InthisconnectiontheEconomicandSocialCommittee
agreeswiththeCommissionthat,inordertoensure
maximumconsistencywithCommunitylegislation,
thereisaneedtopushaheadmorevigorouslywith
progressiveharmonization ofnationalanti-trustlegis­
lationinordertopreventdistortionsinintra-Com­
munitytradeandsignificantchangesintheequivalence
oftermsofcompetitionbetweentheMemberStates,
whichwouldunderminetheCommunity'sowncompe­
titionpolicy.4.3.Atallevents,cooperationbetweennational
courtsandtheCommission mustnotbeunderstood
asentailingany'renationalization 'whatsoeverofthe
Community'scompetitionpolicy.Communitycompe­
titionlawsstillneedtobeinterpretedandapplied
uniformlyinalltheMemberStates—somethingwhich
canbeguaranteedbytheCourtofJustice—although
thenationalcourtsshouldbeencouragedtoinvolve
themselvesmorecloselyinproceduralmattersandques­
tionsofapplication . 3.3.Moreover,thesituationinmanysectors—such
asthepharmaceutical industry,onwhichtheCom­
mitteehasalreadydeliveredspecificOpinions—shows
forexamplethattherearedifferencesinnationallaws
andthatmarkedpricedifferentialsbetweenMember
StatescanonlybetackledatCommunitylevel.5.ActivitiesoftheCommission
3.4.Inconnectionwiththeallocationofresponsi­
bilitiesbetweentheCommission andthenational
authorities,concernmightberaisedbytheCom­
mission'sreferenceinitsAnnualReporttoits'limited
resources'.5.1.TheCommitteerecognizesthattheCommission
wasextremelyactivein1992,bothinhandlingindivid­
ualcasesandinapprovinggeneralmeasures.Thelatter
includedRegulationsandnoticesdesignedinparticular
toencouragecertaintypesofcooperationbetween
firms;measurestobroadenthescopeofcertainblock
exemptionRegulations ;andanoticeoncooperative
jointventures.
Clearlyitisnotforthisreason,i.e.tolightenits
workload,thattheCommissionintendstogivean
increasingroletothenationalauthorities .Thecriteria
shouldremain—rightly—bothlegalandeconomic,
inlinewiththerules,practiceandpolicyoftheCom­
mission.5.2.TheCommitteeurgestheCommissiontoissue
officialguidelines,intheformofnoticesspellingout
thestancetakenbyitsdepartments ,asitistheywho
inpracticeassessfirms'circumstances andaction.This
wouldhelptoimprovetherelationshipbetweenbusi­
nessesandtheDirectorate-General forCompetition
andwouldspeedupadministrative proceduresand
legalproceedings .Indeed,thelitigationstagecouldbe
shortened .Preciselybecauseofthisconcernabout'limited
resources'theCommitteehasrepeatedlycalledforthe
CompetitionDirectorate-General tobeallocatedmore

2.2,94 OfficialjournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC34/85
5.3,TheCommission isalso,issuinganincreasing
amountofinformation .TheCommitteeisparticularly
pleasedthatithasbecomeregularpracticetopublish
guidelines,codesanddraftframeworksforcertainsec­
torsandproblemsintheECOfficialJournal.6.3.2.Itisnotaquestionoflackoftrustinaparticu­
larCommissioner orDirector-General ;onthecontrary,
theabovementioned procedureisapracticalmechanism
forconsistentlyapplyingtheCommission'sfullpolitical
responsibilities inthedelicatetaskofmonitoring,cor­
rectingandstimulatingtheECeconomyinorderto
promoteharmoniousdevelopmentthroughoutthe
Communityandboosteconomicandsocialcohesion.
Atrulydynamicandflexiblecompetitionpolicycannot
stopshortatapplyingfixedrigidstructuralcriteria.It
mustberesponsivetoallaspectsofchangingeconomic
andsocialtrends,andtheseareoftennotmoulded
solelybythebehaviouroftheindividualprotagonists .
Eachdecisionthusalsoacquiresapoliticalvalue,and
isamatterof'Communitypolicy'inthefullestand
mostresponsiblesense.5.4.Theneatifbriefpresentationofanumberof
'studies'inoneoftheAnnexesisofgreatinterestand
value.Someofthesestudiesneverthelessdeservemore
detailedcoverageandwiderdissemination .TheCom­
mitteeiswellawarethatthecomplextopicof'compe­
tition',embracingasitdoesallaspectsofsocialand
economiclife,civicactivitiesandtheactivitiesofindi­
viduals,requiresthoseresponsibleforanalyzingand
takingdecisionsregardingtheimplementation ofmar­
ket-regulating provisionstocontinuallyupdatetheir
professionalskillsandgeneralculture;thisisasplendid
investmentwhichisdulyreflectedinthehighquality
oftheworkofthoseconcerned .
6.CoordinationofCommunitypolicies
6.1.TheXXIlndreportbeginsbynotingthat'along­
sidetheestablishment ofacommonmarket,compe­
titionpolicyisoneofthetwogreatstrategiesbywhich
theTreatyofRomesetsouttoachievetheCommunity's
fundamentalobjectives'.Hencecompetitionpolicyis
not'anendinitself',butaninstrumentfor
implementingtheobjectivessetoutinArticle2ofthe
TreatyofRome.Thiswasalreadytheviewofthe
Commissioninitsfirstannualreportin1971,andthe
pointwasalsostressedbytheCommitteeinitsfirst
Opinionin1981.7.Competitionpolicyandtheconsumer
7.1.Theadvantagesofthesinglemarketmustbe
allowedtoreboundfullyontheconsumer,asinthe
finalanalysisitistheconsumerwhoshouldbethe
ultimatebeneficiaryofthegoalsoftheTreatyofRome.
7.1.1.Inordertobenefitfullyfromthesinglemarket,
consumersmustbeallowedtoplayamoreeffective
roleinthevariousrepresentative bodies;thiswould
alsohelptoboostthespeedandeffectivenessofthe
monitoringwhichtheCommissionalreadycarriesout
asfarasispracticallyfeasibleinthelightofthe
resourcesavailable.
Inparticular,inordertoallowconsumers'representa­
tivestoplayanactivepartintheapplicationofcompe­
titionpolicy,thirdpartiesshouldbegiventhewidest
possibleaccesstodossiers,andallowedreasonable
deadlinesforthesubmissionofcomments;thesedead­
linesshouldtakeaccountoftheneedtocollectand
analyzerelevantdata.
7.2.Competitionpolicymustbeallowedtooperate
effectivelyinallMemberStates,notonlyinorderto
tackletheproblemsgeneratedbyconsiderabledifferen­
tialsinthepricesofgoodsandservicesbutalsotohelp
breakupthemonopolieswhichstillexistincertain
sectorsinsomeMemberStatesandwhich,inparticular,
areactuallycreatedbysubstantialpricedifferentials .
7.3.Themostsensitivesector—andtheonewhich
consumerscanjudgemostdirectly,intermsofend­
price—isundoubtedlythedistributionsector(goods
andservices).
Moreover,theefficiencyofthedistributionsectoralso
dependsonefficientinfrastructure ,whichplaysakey
roleinthetransportation offoodandenergy.6.2.Whiletheserepeatedaffirmationsmayreassure
usastothesourceofthisprovision—Article2ofthe
Treaty—theyalsobringaneedforconsistentaction.
Inthecaseofcompetitionpolicy,wheretheaimisto
pursuetheobjectivesenshrinedintheTreaty,this
meanstakingaccountofabroadercontextwhich
embracesallCommunitypolicies.Hencetheneedfor
coordination .
6.3.InthisrespecttheEconomicandSocialCom­
mitteehasalreadymadeclear,asfarbackasitsfirst
Opinionof1981,theneedfor'closecoordination'with
otherCommunitypolicies.
6.3.1.Thisneedtoincreasecoordination ofallCom­
munitypoliciescantosomeextentbemetifappropriate
CommissionproceduresareusedwithintheCom­
missionandifalldecisionsconcerningtheimplemen­
tationofArticles85to93andthemergercontrol
Regulation (noticesanddecisions)arerigorouslyadopt­
edbytheCommissionactingcollectively .Any'dero­
gations'couldberestrictedtothepreparatorystage
andtointernaladministrative measures .

NoC34/86 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 2.2.94
8.Blockexemptionregulations—Cooperation—
Technologytransfer—Cooperativeventures8.5.2.Atallevents,theCommitteeurgestheCom­
missiontoextendthepossibilityofexemptionfrom
Article85(3)tosmallandmedium-sized cooperative­
typedistributionandcraftbusinesses,soastoallow
thisimportanteconomicgrouptoformeffectiveassoci­
ationsandgroupingsthatwillenablethemtocompete
withthelargedistributiongroups.8.1.TheCommitteewarmlysupportsthemoveto
extendthescopeoftheblockexemptionsallowedby
theRegulationsonspecializationagreements,research
anddevelopmentagreements,patentlicensingagree­
ments,andknowhowlicensingagreements .
9.Mergercontrol
8.2.Subjecttoamaximummarketshareandturn­
over,cooperativeandnon-concentrative jointventures
arenowalsotobeexemptedfromArticle85(3)ofthe
Treaty.Thisfillsagapwhichinsomewaysbenefited
'concentrative 'jointventuressubjecttothemore
favourableproceduresofRegulation4064/89.9.1.TheCommission viewstheabsencein1992of
decisionstoprohibitmergers,andtheriseinthenumber
ofcaseswhereplanswereapprovedaftermodification ,
asawelcomedevelopment .Thisisonepossible
interpretation ,butinsomecasesitcouldalsoindicate
thatfirmsprefercompromisetolengthy,costlylegal
proceedingsofuncertainoutcome.8.3.Suchmeasuresareapracticalwayofencourag­
ingcooperationbetweenfirms.
8.4.TheCommitteewouldherestressthecloseinter­
relationbetweencompetitionpolicyandtechnology
transfer,whichisconductedlargelybymeansofcooper­
ation,thisbeingthekeyfeatureofthestructuralecon­
omicchangestakingplaceinresponsetothenewchal­
lengesofinternationalcompetition .TheplannedRegu­
lationontechnologytransferisthereforeeagerly
awaited,sinceitshouldenabletheCommissiontoact
withgreaterflexibilityandhelpstrikeabalance
betweenresearchandtheprotectionofintellectual
property.9.2.TheCommitteewouldherereiterateitsearlier
callsforamorecautiousapproachto;dominantpos­
itionsheldbysinglefirms;dominantpositionsheld
jointlybyanumberoffirms;andthecreationor
strengtheningofduopoliesandoligopolies.Caremust
betakentoavoidinfluencingthemarketinpointless
andperhapsdamagingwayswhichtheCommission
itselfmaynotintend.TheCommissionobviouslydoes
notseektodictatetheoptimumnumberofcompetitors
inagivensector.Monitoringanddisciplinarymeasures
mustbeclearlycircumscribed toavoidanytemptation
ordangerofdirigisme.
TheCommitteerecallsitsOpinionontheXVIIIth
annualreport,whichproposedthatpreparatorystudies
becarriedouttoassessthecaseforspecialrules.The
Commissionhasacteduponthis.9.3.Whilstitmaybesaidthatbusinessesare'in
general'reasonablysatisfiedwiththeapplicationofthe
mergercontrolRegulation,thereisstillplentyofroom
forimprovement ,particularlywithregardtopro­
cedures.ThishasbecomeclearnowthattheRegulation
hasbeeninforceforafewyears. 8.5.Anotherareawherespecialrulesarejustifiedis
thecooperativesector,whichhasitsowntotallyunique
characteristics .
8.5.1.Specificfirmsshouldreceivespecifictreat­
ment,especiallyasregardsrestrictiveagreementsand
mergers.Thisisparticularlytrueoftheusers'cooperat­
iveswhichoperateinmanysectors(insurance,savings
banks,housing,pharmacies,etc.).Wheretheintention
ofsuchcooperatives istoformafederationandcooper­
ateonatransnationalbasis,itisself-evidentthatthey
willoperateintheinterestoftheuser-owners .This
distinguishing feature—recognizedinthedraftstatute
foraEuropeancooperativesociety—promptsthe
CommitteetourgetheCommissiontoadoptaspecial
approachinthismatter.9.4.AlthoughtheCommitteeisfullyawareofthe
effortswhichhavealreadybeenmade,itnevertheless
callsupontheCommissiontoshowgreatertrans­
parencybyincreasingthequalityandquantityofthe
informationprovidedtothirdpartiesduringthefirst
andsecondstages.Itwouldalsoimprovetransparency ,
andbeveryusefulforsubsequentdiscussionsifthe
CommissionweretopublishtheOpinionsofallthe
AdvisoryCommittees ,andnotjustthatoftheAdvisory
CommitteeonConcentrations .Pressreleasesshould
alsobemorecomprehensive andcontaintheviewsof
interestedparties.Thelattershouldattheveryleastbe
sentacopyofthePreliminaryReport.

2.2.94 NoC34/87 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities
9.5,TheNoticeregardingmergerandcooperation
transactionsunderRegulation4064/89shouldalsobe
updatedinthelightofnewRegulationsandsubsequent
caselawinthearea.10,5.TheCommitteeremainsstronglyinfavourof
aphasedreductioninstateaid,thoughthismustbe
pursuedwithconsistentdetermination .Particularcom­
mitmentsandderogationsshouldberigidlylimited
intime-scaleandarea,andextensionsshouldnotbe
granted.TheCommitteeispleasedtoreadinthe
XXIIndannualreportthattheCommissionsupports
theideaclearlyrepeatedintheCommittee'sOpinion
ontheXXIstannualreport,namelythatstateaid
shouldbe'transparent,temporaryanddegressive'.The
CommitteealsourgestheCommissiontoapplythe
samerulestopublicandtoprivatefirms,withoutany
formofdiscrimination .10.Stateaids
10.1.Thisisundoubtedly acomplexanddelicate
subject,inwhichregionalandtemporalaspects(i.e.the
durationofaid)areinterwoven .Agivenaidmayhave
differentimplications ,anditsjustificationbestronger
orweaker,dependingonwhetheritisshort,medium
orlongterm.Thesocialaspectsshouldalsobevery
carefullyscrutinizedintandemwiththeregionalcon­
siderations .10.6,Whilethecooperationprovidedforinthe
TreatyontheEuropeanEconomicAreaasregardsthe
controlofstateaidiswelcomeandnecessary,thepolicy
ofdrawinguppreciseprovisionsonaidinvolvingthird
countriesmeritsevengreaterapprovalandencourage­
ment.
10.2.TheCommission isshowingagrowingflexi­
bility,Experienceshowsthat'casebycase'assessment
ismorehelpfulthanstrictbureaucraticapplicationof
rigidrules.10.6.1.TheagreementswiththeCentralandEastern
Europeannationsareaconcreteandpositiveexample,
buttheCommitteecallsforamoredeterminedand
promptresponsetoaberrantStateaidswhichruncoun­
tertotheCommission'spolicyofaligninganti-trust
lawsmoreclosely.
Thismaybeanambitiousgoal,butstrictcontrolsare
vital.However,theCommission'sresponsibility inapplying
acriterionofflexibilityhereneedstobebackedbyfair
cooperationfromtheMemberStates,soastoensure
thateconomicandsocialcohesionispursuedfairlyand
effectively .
10.6.2.Thiscombinationofalignmentandcontrol
must,asamatterofprinciple,beborneinmindwhen
dealingwithallthirdcountrieswithwhichtheCom­
munityhasorseekstohavegeneralorspecialrelations,
particularlywithintheframeworkofthecommontrade
policy.10.3.MemberStates'stateaidpoliciescontinueto
differmarkedly,dependingtoalargeextentonthelevel
ofprosperityandhencetheresourcesavailable.The
Commissionitselfpointsoutthatbetween1988and
1990themanufacturing industriesofthefourlargest
MemberStatesreceived79%ofthetotalamountof
stateaidgrantedtothisparticularsectorinthewhole
oftheCommunity .10.7.Atallevents,theCommitteewouldliketosee
opennessaboutaidrulesonbothsides,asthisisa
preconditionforfairrelationsregardlessoftheirexact
natureorpurpose.
Thisconcentration ofStateaidinthestrongesteconom­
iesisdeplorable,particularlyinthelightoftherepeated
callsforcohesion.
10.8.TheCommitteealsowishestodrawtheCom­
mission'sattentiontothequestionof'indirect'aid,i.e.
concessionary Stateexportcreditsandexportcredit
guarantees .10.4.TheCommitteeapplaudstheregularattention
—intheformofperiodicreports—whichtheCom­
missiondevotestothisproblem,whichvariesgreatly
fromonesectortothenext.Sufficeittoconsiderthe
coal,steelandshipbuildingindustries.Thereisaclear
contradictionbetweentheCommission'spolicyofpha­
sedbutradicalreductionsinaid,andthesituationin
anumberofMemberStateswhichsubsidizecertain
industries(e.g.coal)orwhichlevyspecialenergytaxes.ItisnotonlyexportcreditsfacilitatedbyaStatewhich
canconstituteaidwithinthemeaningofArticles92et
seq.oftheTreaty,butalso—andthisproblemtoo
seemstohavereceivedinsufficientconsideration —
creditswhichoneStategrantsanotherinorderdirectly
orindirectlytosupportitshomeindustry.

NoC34/88 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 2,2.94
possible,thereisatendencytosacrificetransportsafety,
therebyincreasingthepotentialdangerofpollution
ofseaandports.Thelowcostscausednotonlyby
inadequatesafetyequipmentandinadequatemainten­
ance,butalsoinmanycasesbythelowwagespaidto
thecrews,constituteaclearexampleof'dumping'.10,9.TheCommitteeisparticularlyconcernedatthe
Commission'sadmissionthatitisreceivingmoreand
morecomplaintsaboutfailuretonotifyaidmeasures.
Onemustaskwhynationaland—perhapsmorefre­
quently—regionalauthoritiesarenotmeetingtheir
obligationtonotifyaidmeasuresinadvance.TheCom­
missionmaybecorrectinsayingthatthesecomplaints
demonstrateeconomicoperators'growinginterestin
stateaid.However,itisalsopossiblethateventhe
publicauthoritiesarepoorlyinformedaboutsuchkey
Communitysubjectsasaid,anddonotpaysufficient
attentiontothematter.13.Competitionpolicyatinternationallevel
13.1.Tradeingoodsandservicesbetweencountries,
economicareasandcontinentsisgrowingapaceand
increasinglybecomingafeatureoftheeconomicscene. 11.Competitionpolicyandsmallandmedium-sized
enterprises (SMEs)
Thegradualdismantlingoftariffandnon-tariffbar­
riers,thoughvital,isnotsufficienttoachieveeffective
liberalization ofinternationaltradeonthebasisoffair
termsofcompetition .
However,'freedom'implies'responsibility'.
Greater,moreopenfreecompetitiononaworldscale
mustgohandinhandwithheavierresponsibilityforall
operators:privateorpublicenterprises,governments ,
internationalorsupranationalorganizations .11.1.TheCommissionshouldstrengthenitsSMEs
policy,andmakethispolicymoreselectivesoasto
ensurethattheaiditauthorizesisgenuinelycalculated
tomakeSMEsmoreefficientandboosttheirtraining,
fundingsourcesandresearchactivities.
11.2.TheaimisnottoprotectSMEsfromlarge
firms,buttopreventabusesofdominantpositions.
Particularattentionneedstobepaidheretothe
phenomenonofconcentrations ofhypermarkets .
11.3.SMEsplayavitaleconomicandsocialrolein
theCommunity .Smallandmedium-sized businesses,
includingcraftfirms,accountfor70%oftheEC's
employmentandturnover.
11.4.Tohelpthesefirmsboosttheircompetitiveness
inthesinglemarket,competitionpolicymustpromote
Communitycooperationandinformationinstruments,
strengtheningthemandensuringthattheyaredissemi­
natedaswidelyaspossible.13.2.Itisnowgenerallyacknowledgedthatallecon­
omicdevelopmentsarepartlyconditionedbynon-econ­
omicfactors—especiallysocialaspects,forwhich
everyonebearsamandatoryresponsibility .
Inparticular,differencesinworkingconditionsand
labourregulationsincertainthirdcountries,because
oftheirsignificantimpactoncosts,maygenerateabnor­
mal,artificialdiscrepancieswhicharetotallyaliento
thenatural,healthyandeffectiveprocessoffairecon­
omicandproductivecompetition .
12.Environmental policyandcompetitionpolicy
13.3.Themajorchallenge—requiringcourageand
steadfastness —whichtheCommission mustmeet
withoutdelayistoreconcilemeasuresdevisedtosafe­
guardcompetitioneffectivelyatinternationallevelwith
Communitypolicies.12,1.Whilenationalandregionalenvironmental
legislationisnecessary,itmustnotbeusedasapretext
forgrantingornotgrantingconcessions,orforintrodu­
cingdiscriminatory measures.Situationswhichdistort
competitionmustatalleventsbeavoided.Careful
ongoingmonitoringisneeded,withdueconsideration
forthefactthatenvironmental policynowfigures
amongthebasicpoliciesoftheTreaty.Thisisparticularlythecasewherepreferentialrelations
stillexistwithless-favouredordevelopingcountries.
Onnoaccountmustsuchrelationscausedistortionof
tradeorunwarrantedchangesintermsofcompetition .
12.2.TheCommitteewouldhighlightthespecial
situationsurroundingthetransportofoil,asthishas
implicationsforcompetitionandisalsoimportanton
socialandsafetygrounds.Inordertocutcostswherever13.4.Thecurrentcrisis,bothwithinandoutsidethe
Community,makesthisproblematoppriority.

2.2.94 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC34/89
14.Conclusions Tosetinmotionaprocessofeconomicrecoveryin
thesedifficulttimesfortheCommunityandtheworld
atlargecallsaboveallforaforcefulpolicy
encompassing theentirerangeoftheCommission's
operationalresponsibilities .
13.5.Tocreatenewoutletsandmarketswemust
fostertheconditionsneededtoenabletheeconomies
ofless-favouredcountries,orthosegrapplingwiththe
difficulttaskoftransformingtheirinternalpolitical
andsocio-economic structures,tolaunchthemselves
speedilyininternationalcompetitiononequalterms,
bothassuppliersandbuyers,andthustoplayacon­
structivepartinthegeneralintegrationandsocio-econ­
omicgrowthprocess.
13.6.Suchawide-ranging andall-embracing
approachmustnot,however,obscuretheneedfor
moreincisiveactiontoharmonizenationalanti-trust
legislation,bothwithinandoutsidetheCommunity,so
astoattainthedesiredgoalofeffective,fairinter­
nationalcompetition .
ThoughtheCommissionisalreadyworkingalongthese
lines,theCommitteewouldurgeittopressaheadwith
greaterconvictionanddecisiveness .
13.7.BearinginmindthattheCommunityderives
itscompetenceinmattersrelatingtocompetitionpolicy
directlyfromtheTreaty,theCommitteecallsonthe
Commissiontoframeitsown'policy'regardlessofthe
delaysanddiscouragement generatedbyfailureinthe
monetarysectorandontheGATTfront,toquotejust
twoexamples .Thecompetitiveness ofCommunityfirms,bothwithin
theECandatinternationallevel,isasinequanonfor
growthanddevelopment ,besidesbeingindispensable
toenableotherCommunitypoliciesspeedilytorecover
theiroriginalmomentum .
Amajordrive,backedbyfirmconvictionandaclear
vision,isneededtoachieveapolicycommensurate with
thepresentchallenge.
Nowmorethanever,Communitycompetitionpolicy
mustkindleentrepreneurial spiritandinitiativewhile
concurrentlyexpandingtheoptionsavailabletocon­
sumersandhencetheirpowerstoselect.
Anewopennessisalsoneededininternationaltrade.
Businessesmustbeabletomakethechoiceswhichsuit
them,andaccepttherisksinvolved,inaclimateof
opennessthatalsoappliestolawsandregulations .
Likewise,consumers—whoareplayinganincreasingly
activeroleontheeconomicstage—mustbekeptmore
fullyinformedsothattheycanmakerationalchoices.
Theymustthereforehaveaccesstoabroader,more
variedandreasonablypricedrangeofgoodsandser­
vices,withoptimumqualityandsafetyguarantees.
TheCommissionmustfindtheresourcesneededtogive
itsfullattentiontothesemattersandadoptafirmer
stanceintherelevantinternationalnegotiations .
DoneatBrussels,24November1993.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN