EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 29 March 2010  
on a new legal framework concerning integrity and prevention of corruption as regards its 
application to Banka Slovenije and its decision-making bodies  
(CON/2010/27) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 9 March 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law on integrity and prevention of corruption (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent  of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Ce ntral Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions
1, as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije . In accordance with the first sentence of 
Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Eur opean Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted 
this opinion. 
 1.
  Purpose of the draft law 
1.1 The draft law is designed as a comprehensive le gal framework concerning prevention of corruption 
in Slovenia. While taking on board a large number of current legal provisions in this area, the draft 
law introduces several new provisions which go be yond the narrow definition of measures for the 
prevention of corruption. Its aim is namely to provide the necessary conditions for employees and 
officials to perform their duties in an honest, pr ofessional and transparent manner, and to promote 
honest and transparent behaviour of public serva nts and good practices of any person involved in 
decision-making processes.  
1.2 The draft law applies to the public sector, except where certain issues are regulated by other laws, 
and to the private sector where this is explicitly  provided for. It foresees the continuation of the 
work of the Commission for the prevention of corruption (hereinafter the ‘Commission’), an independent State body with the central role in the combating and prevention of corruption, and entrusted with other tasks. The Commission is give n important tasks and competences, in particular 
regarding (i) monitoring compliance with the draft law by its addressees; (ii) requesting information from legal entities; (iii) issuing ot her requests; (iv) giving information and making 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
2 proposals to other competent authorities and organi sations; and (v) imposing fines for breaches of 
the draft law’s provisions.  
1.3 A large part of the draft law is addressed to ‘o fficials’. This term, as defined in the draft law, 
includes persons holding public office such as the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, 
members of the National Assembly, ministers, judges and, explicitly, high-ranking officials of 
Banka Slovenije, ‘unless their rights and obligatio ns are otherwise regulated by the law governing 
Banka Slovenije or other regulati ons binding upon Banka Slovenije’2.  
1.4 The main provisions applying to officials are the following: 
a) Rules on incompatibility of functions  prohibit officials, with certain exceptions, from holding 
other offices or carrying out other activities with the intention of earning income or acquiring other benefits. An official assuming an office must terminate any such other offices or activities within a defined period. If this does not happen, the Commission issues a warning to the official and sets a deadline for comp liance. If the Commission establishes that the 
official has not ceased to hold the office or perform the activities concerned, it communicates 
its findings to the body responsible for initiati ng proceedings to terminate the official’s 
office. The Commission may also impose a fine on the official concerned. 
b) Acceptance of gifts  in connection with officials’ discharge of office is restricted to gifts not 
exceeding a defined low value and completely proh ibited if a gift does or could influence the 
official’s objective and unbiased discharge of office. All gifts received must be entered in a list maintained by the body or organisation wher e an official holds office, and copies of such 
lists must be sent annually to the Commission which will then publish information on the 
gifts on its website. The Commission also assesses if rules on acceptance of gifts are being followed and, upon discovery of a breach, impos es a fine and informs other competent 
authorities where appropriate. 
c) Restrictions on business are aimed at restricting entities where an official holds office from 
conducting business with other, especially comme rcial, entities with which the official has 
managerial or ownership connections. Such rest rictions apply during the official’s term of 
office and, to some extent, within one or two years after leaving office. 
d) Conflicts of interest , both actual and potential, should be avoided by all public officers as 
defined in the Slovenian Criminal Code
3. The ECB understands that the definition of public 
officers includes officials as well as certain other categories of persons. If an actual or potential conflict of interest arises, the public officer in question must immediately cease his work in the relevant area and inform his supe rior or, if there is no superior, the Commission 
thereof. If it is established that a conflict of inter est exists or could exist, the public officer is 
removed from the relevant area of work, unless other laws provide for specific procedures for the removal of a public officer. The Co mmission may also institute a procedure for 
                                                 
2  Article 4(5) of the draft law. 
3  Article 37 of the draft law in connection with Article 4(9) of the draft law. 
3 identifying conflicts of interest in the official  activities of public officers and, if suspicion is 
confirmed, communicate its findings to the officer’s employer or the relevant competent body and request feedback on the measures taken. 
e) Supervision of wealth of professional officials and certain other categories of persons, 
including persons responsible for public proc urement, is performed by the Commission. 
Under the draft law, these persons are obliged  to periodically provide the Commission with 
information on their personal wealth, e.g. income , real estate, securities and cash holdings. If 
a person fails to provide the re levant information, the Commission has the power to impose a 
fine and also to decide that the person’s sal ary is gradually reduced every month by one 
tenth, to the level of the minimum salary, until he provides the requested information. Furthermore, if the Commission establishes that  there is a disproportionate increase in a 
person’s wealth relative to his income from the activities allowed by law, or that the 
information provided differs substantially from th e data contained in tax records, the person 
is required to provide an explanation. If the explanation is not to the Commission’s satisfaction, it communicates its findings to th e authority where the person works or holds 
office or the authority responsible for electing or appointing the person, and this authority 
initiates proceedings for removal from office or other appropriate proceedings.  
 2. General observations  2.1 The draft law defines ‘public sector’ as having the same meaning as in the Law on public servants
4. 
The ECB understands that the definition of public  sector in Article 1(2) of that Law does not 
include Banka Slovenije and, therefore, the rele vant provisions of the draft law do not apply 
thereto. As a consequence, this opinion concentr ates on issues which have been identified, through 
other definitions and provisions, as applicable to Banka Slovenije. 
2.2 In general, various definitions of entities and persons covered by the draft law may cause 
uncertainty regarding the applicability of its provisions in individual cases. 
2.3 Article 51 of the draft law requires the National Assembly to adopt a reso lution for the prevention 
of corruption. In the implementation of this re solution and of plans for its implementation, the 
Commission collaborates with a wide range of en tities, including organisations from the public and 
private sectors. The Commission will monitor the im plementation of the resolution on the basis of 
an action plan, in collaboration with executive ag encies indicated in that action plan. The ECB 
understands that such activities will not interfere with the independent functioning, organisation 
and decision-making of Banka Slovenije.  
 
                                                 
4  Article 4(3) of the draft law. 
4 3. Requirements applicable to members of  Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board as ‘officials ’ 
3.1 General  
 As mentioned in paragraph 1.3, pursuant to Artic le 4(5) of the draft law the Governor and other 
members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board ar e subject to the draft law’s provisions with 
respect to officials ‘unless their rights and obliga tions are otherwise regulated by the law governing 
Banka Slovenije or other regulati ons binding upon Banka Slovenije’. To the extent that this 
definition ensures that the draft law does not jeopardise compliance with the provisions on central bank independence included in the Treaty and in the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinaft er the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) (in particular, 
Article 130 of the Treaty and Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB), the ECB welcomes it
5, as it takes into account the special position of the national central bank and its decision-making 
bodies as regulated by other legislation. For reas ons of legal certainty and clarity, however, a 
provision could be included in the draft law exp licitly identifying which provisions apply to the 
Governor and other members of Ba nka Slovenije’s Governing Board. 
3.2 Incompatibility of functions, conflicts of interest  
 The comment in paragraph 3.1 on the need for co mpliance with the relevant articles of the Treaty 
and of the Statute of the ESCB applies especially to the draft law’s provisions on incompatibility of 
functions and conflicts of interest. The E CB understands that the quoted definition from 
Article 4(5) ensures that the draft law’s provisi ons on incompatibility of functions and on grounds 
and procedures for relief from office of official s and removal from an area of work of public 
officers do not apply to the members of Banka Sl ovenije’s Governing Board, since these issues are 
explicitly regulated by Articles 38, 39 and 39a of the Law on Banka Slovenije. 
3.3 Acceptance of gifts  
 The main provisions of the draft law concerning acceptance of gifts by officials correspond to the 
relevant provisions of the draft law on restric tions and prohibitions for public office holders on 
which the ECB issued its opinion CON/2008/436. As noted in paragraph 3.2 of that opinion, these 
provisions are similar to the requirements laid  down in the ECB’s Code of Conduct for the 
members of the Governing Council7 (hereinafter the ‘Code of Conduct’). Although the restrictions 
in the draft law are to a certain extent stricter th an the corresponding provisions in Article 3.3 of the 
Code of Conduct (as regards maximum value, form of gift and applicability of the provisions to 
officials’ family members), they follow the same ba sic principles as stated in Article 2 of the Code 
of Conduct. The public disclosure of gifts recei ved also serves the principle of transparency. 
                                                 
5  On a similar issue, see e.g. paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/64 of 27 July 2009 on public access to information 
on officials' wealth. All ECB op inions are available on the ECB website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
6  ECB Opinion CON/2008/43 of 17 September 2008 at the request of the Slovenian Mini stry of Public Administration on a 
draft law on restrictions and proh ibitions for public office holders.  
7  Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of Conduct for th e members of the Governing Council (OJ C 123, 24.5.2002, 
p. 9), as amended by the Memorandum of Understanding amending the Memorandum of Understanding on a Code of 
Conduct for the members of the Governing Council (OJ C 10, 16.1.2007, p. 6). 
5 3.4 Supervision of wealth  
 The main provisions of the draft law concerning supe rvision of wealth, to the extent that they apply 
to officials, correspond to the relevant provisions  of the draft law on public access to information 
on officials’ wealth on which the ECB issued its opinion CON/2009/64. The main difference, apart from the fact that pursuant to the new draft law the competent authority is the Commission and not 
the Court of Audit, is the absence in the new draft law of a fine in the amount of the value of any 
undeclared wealth or of wealth from unexplai ned sources. Instead, the Commission may forward 
the case to the State Prosecutors’ office  or to other competent authorities. 
 The ECB understands that the possibility of reduci ng the salaries of members of Banka Slovenije’s 
Governing Board will apply as a general sanction, equivalent to a fine, under the Slovenian legal 
system and will not interfere with the legal relationship between the central bank and its 
independent decision-making officials. Under this assumption, the sanction of salary reduction would not jeopardise the personal independence of  Banka Slovenije officials as provided for in 
Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statut e of the ESCB, despite th e fact that the sanction 
is linked to the salary of the Governor and the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board, 
provided that the ECB’s understanding as follows is correct.  
 The sanction of salary reduction is understood to be used to speed up the provision of information 
requested by the Commission and it applies, in a ddition to certain other persons, to all professional 
officials in Slovenia, including the President of  the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of 
the National Assembly. Moreover, the sanction w ill be imposed by the Commission, which is an 
independent body, and the conditions for the deci sion on the salary reduction (i.e. the grounds, 
amount and duration) as well as the legal remedy agai nst such a decision are clearly provided for in 
the draft law. Pursuant to Article 45(2) of th e draft law, the Commission communicates findings on 
unjustified increases of wealth, or on lack of explanation regarding such increases, to the body competent for electing or appointing the relevant of ficial. In this context, the importance of the 
appropriate reading of the term ‘officials’, as explai ned in paragraph 3.1, is reiterated. On the basis 
of the above assumptions and understanding, the ECB is of the opinion that the provisions of the 
draft law on supervision of wealth and the related sanctions are not incompatible with the principle 
of personal independence. 
 4. Banka Slovenije’s duty to present information and documents Pursuant to Article 16(1) of the draft law, all lega l persons governed by public or private law (therefore 
including Banka Slovenije) are obliged to give the Commission, at its reasoned request and regardless of 
other laws, all information and documents necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks. Although such a 
request must include the legal basis, reasons for an d purpose of such a request, this obligation is very 
broad, in particular with respect  to Banka Slovenije. Namely, the relevant information necessary for the 
fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks might not only  include information on the performance of tasks by 
Banka Slovenije, its employees and decision-making bodi es themselves, but also confidential information 
6 obtained by Banka Slovenije from other entities in the performance of supervisory and statistical tasks. 
The ECB would recommend an amendment to the draft la w to ensure that any exchange of information 
between Banka Slovenije and the Commission is consis tent with Union law regulating the exchange of 
supervisory and statistical info rmation and professional secrecy8, as well as with Article 479 of the Law 
on Banka Slovenije.  
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 29 March 2010. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET 
                                                 
8  As regards the relevant Union legi slation, see e.g. footnote 27 of ECB Op inion CON/2008/39 of 1 September 2008 at the 
request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the Financial Stability Committee.  
9  Pursuant to Article 47(2) of the Law on Banka Sloveni je, ‘Banka Slovenije may send confidential data under the 
conditions set out by a law and the Statute of the ESCB’. Purs uant to paragraph 3 of the same Article, ‘Banka Slovenije 
shall prescribe the criteria for defining confidential data and the procedures for handling confidential data concerning the 
performance of Banka Slovenije’s tasks pursuant to this La w or any other law or concerning the activities of Banka 
Slovenije in the European System of Central Banks.’