EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 28.12.2004 
SEC(2004) 1628 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Annex to the   
 
 
Proposal for a Regulation to the Eu ropean Parliament and to the Council 
  
concerning the Visa Information System (V IS) and the exchange of data between 
Member States on short stay-visas 
   
EXTENDED IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
 
 
 
{COM(2004)835 final} 
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Purpose of the Extended Impact Assessment............................................................... 3 
2. Problems in the current situation.................................................................................. 3 2.1. Inefficiencies in the implementa tion of the common visa policy ................................ 4 
2.2. Visa application fraud and travel document fraud ....................................................... 4 2.3. Visa shopping............................................................................................................. .. 5 
2.4. Limitations of checks at external borders .................................................................... 5 2.5. Ilegal Immigration........................................................................................................ 5 
2.6. Application of the Dublin II Regulation ...................................................................... 6 2.7. Internal Security and terrorism..................................................................................... 6 2.8. Impacts on bona fide travellers .................................................................................... 6 3. Political objectives  and orientation set out by the Council.......................................... 6 
4. Policy Options.............................................................................................................. 7 
4.1. Option 1: No VIS ......................................................................................................... 7  
4.2. Option 2: Entry-Exit-System ....................................................................................... 8 4.3. Option 3: Visa Information System without biometrics .............................................. 8 
4.4. Option 4: Visa Information System with biometrics ................................................... 9 5. Impacts of the policy options ....................................................................................... 9 5.1. Benefits and costs of Option 1: No VIS..................................................................... 10 5.2. Benefits and costs of Option 2: Entry-exit system..................................................... 11 5.3. Benefits and costs of Option 3: VIS without biometrics ........................................... 13 
5.4. Benefits and costs of Opti on 4: VIS with biometrics................................................. 16 
5.5. Impact summary tables .............................................................................................. 20 6. Flanking Measures to bala nce negative impacts........................................................ 23 
6.1. Proportionality of the data stored............................................................................... 23 6.2. Disproportionality of the st orage of scanned documents........................................... 23 
6.3. Proportionality of the use of data............................................................................... 24 6.4. Data protection safeguards:........................................................................................ 25 7. Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................ 26 8. Stakeholder Consultation ........................................................................................... 27 
 
EN 3   EN 8.1. Member States............................................................................................................ 2 7 
8.2. Public consultations ................................................................................................... 28 9. Commission draft proposal and justification ............................................................. 29 9.1. Proportionality and European added value of the options ......................................... 30 
9.2. Final Policy choice..................................................................................................... 31  
 
EN 4   EN 1. P URPOSE OF THE EXTENDED IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
The establishment of the Visa Information System (VIS) represents one of the key 
initiatives within the EU policies aimed at supporting stability and security. Given 
the potential for significant impact arising from action in this field, the Commission, 
in its Annual Policy Strate gy for 2004, decided that an Extended Impact Assessment 
should be carried out. The Commission furthe r decided that the re sponsible services 
(Directorate General Justice and Home Affa irs) due to the signi ficant crosscutting 
impacts and the high political significance  would be assisted by an inter-service 
steering group including the most concerne d services. This decision ensured that 
horizontal multi-sectoral aspects, in part icular economical and social impacts could 
be taken into account in the process as earl y as possible. The task  of this steering 
group was to define the scope, to monito r the progress of the Extended Impact 
Assessment and to supervise the completion of the impact assessment report. 
The Commission decided further to consu lt an external contractor, who had to 
provide the Commission with a wide range of supporting services to assist the 
responsible services and th e inter service steering group  in the preparation and 
conduction of the Extended Impact Assessment.  These services consisted of analysis 
of existing data, collection of  additional information and providing general advice or 
studying specific points (e.g. data prot ection and the use of biometrics). 
The Contractor provided the methodologica l tools in line w ith the Commission’s 
guidelines and the handbook on impact assess ments. He carried out an integrated 
assessment of the direct and indirect imp acts of a range of policy options, defined 
after careful analysis of the problems and objectives by using the appropriate 
analytical methods and participatory approach es in the framework of the meetings of 
the Interservice Steering Group and with Member States experts. The Extended 
Impact Assessment focused on the estimati on of the potential im pacts of various 
options under consideration fo r the VIS. Economic/financial  impacts were taken into 
account as well as social/po litical ones. Furthermore proportionality of the storage 
and the use of data as well as data pr otection issues have been considered. 
2. P ROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION  
The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the 
common borders between the Benelux count ries, Germany and France aimed at the 
abolition of the checks at internal bor ders. The Schengen Convention created a 
common area where checks at internal borders are abolished and checks at external borders for all Schengen States were to be  carried out in accordance with a common 
set of rules. Another flanking measure of the lifting of internal border controls is 
common visa policy. Currently there are 15 States which apply in full the Schengen 
acquis on visas. These Schengen States are 13 Member States of the European Union 
plus Norway and Iceland. Furthermore an Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Conf ederation on the latter’s association 
with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis was 
signed on 26 October 2004 but needs to be ratified. Neither the United Kingdom nor 
the new Member States, which acceded  the EU in May 2004, are currently 
participating in the common visa policy. At present there are 134 third countries 
 
EN 5   EN whose citizens are required to have a visa  issued by a Member State to enter the 
territory of Schengen States. Current statistics show th at Member States receive 
about 12 million visa requests per year. Based on these figures, it is expected that the number of visa requests will reach 20 m illion as of 2007, taking into account the new 
Member States.  
The study has identified the following ma in problems inherent in the current 
situation: 
2.1. Inefficiencies in the implemen tation of the common visa policy 
Currently a third country national can obtain a Schengen visa and tr avel freely within 
the territory of Schengen Stat es. However, information about his visa application is 
routinely held only by the Member State which issued the visa. If a bona fide 
traveller applies for a Schenge n visa again, but to the aut horities of another Member 
State, the record(s) of his last visa application(s) is/are not readily available to the consular authorities of the other Member St ate. Also, when a third country national is 
refused a Schengen visa, the record of the rejection is routinely stored by the authorities of the Member State which refu sed the application. Apart from a rejection 
stamp in his passport (which can easily be removed or a new passport obtained) 
authorities of other Member States do not know about such a refusal, when the same 
person applies for another Schengen visa to the authorities of another Member State. 
There is some exchange of visa data in the current situation such as local consular 
cooperation and VISION consultation. VISION  is a Schengen consultation network 
established for the purpose of  consultation on visa applications between central 
authorities of the Member States. It is  a message exchange system, based on the 
bilateral exchange of information. The st udy came to the conclusion that the existing 
information arrangements are partial, time consuming and can be inaccurate. The 
existing kind of exchange of information does not ensure that the information is 
always available in a timely fashion. 
2.2. Visa application fraud and travel document fraud 
There is a sizable proportion of people who currently try to obtain a Schengen visa 
on dubious grounds. In Germany for example,  around 15% of all visa applications 
were rejected or visas refused in 2002. At present Member States have difficulties in ascertaining whether a visa applicant is usin g a false identity to obtain a Schengen 
visa. It is relatively easy to change identi ty by means of new counterfeit or falsified 
passports without it becoming immediately apparent to consul ar or border check 
posts. Information on stolen or false tr avel documents and information on dubious 
references to support visa applications (pers ons or companies) is not readily available 
to consular posts and border checking point s. The study concluded that the existing 
system for exchanges of information does not ensure that information reaches the 
missions or border control points that  require it and need it on time. 
Statistics from several Member States show  that there is a large scale of travel 
document fraud. In France, 13,952 persons were carrying false documents in 2002 which was a rise of 14% compared to 2001. These fraudulent documents are either 
complete counterfeits or documents genuine ly issued to another person having been 
altered without authority. Often such origin al documents have been stolen from or 
 
EN 6   EN lost by the genuine holder. Skilled forger s produce extremely convincing copies of 
passports and other identity documents, and of other documents needed to obtain them such as birth certificates.  
2.3. Visa shopping 
There exist multiple forms of bypassing the criteria for the determination of the 
Member State which is responsible for th e examination of the visa application 
(known as “visa shopping”). In particular , after refusal of a Schengen visa by one 
Member State, the same applicant can apply for a visa to another Member State, even 
within the same country of application, w ith a high possibility that a previous visa 
refusal would not be identified. There is no formal information system for authorities 
to check whether the applicant has applied and been refused, or has failed to pursue a 
Schengen visa application prev iously, or indeed whether a visa has been granted to 
the individual in the past. 
2.4. Limitations of checks at external borders 
Existing border checks are based on the exam ination of the holder  of the document, 
of the document itself, and of any visa contained. In making such checks, border 
control officers rely on the passports shown to  them. If there is a need to check in 
another Member State whether the visa a pe rson carries in his passport was given to 
the holder of the passport or whether it ha s been transposed from another passport, 
this is possible, but is a time consuming procedure. One difficulty experienced by those control authorities seeki ng to exchange information is that their counterparts in 
other countries may be part of different authorities. The same applies for checks 
within the territories of Member States. 
2.5. Illegal Immigration 
In 2001, around 360,000 people illegally presen t in the EU territory were 
apprehended. In the same year around 390,000 people illegally present in the EU 
territory have been removed and ar ound 1.2 million non EU-citizens have been 
refused entry. 
The study showed that illegal immigration may result in  a number of different modus 
operandi: 
• By entering clandestinely 
• By using counterfeit or falsif ied travel documents or visa 
• By using false or falsified supporting documents (e.g. regarding the financial 
background) or making false or falsified statements in order to obtain a visa 
• By “visa shopping” 
• By overstaying. Where statistics exist, th ey show that the overstayers are the 
biggest number of illegal immigrants. 
Many of the apprehended ille gal immigrants have no travel  or other identification 
documents with them or use counterfeit or  falsified documentation. In such cases the 
 
EN 7   EN identification process is sl ow, time consuming and expensive. In case people have 
destroyed their travel docume nts, authorities currently do not have a readily available 
system to check the identities of the undocumented illegal immigrants. 
2.6. Application of the Dublin II Regulation 
The “Dublin II” Regulation (EC) No 343/ 2003 defines the criteria for determining 
the State responsible for examining applica tions for asylum. A basic criterion for that 
responsibility is whether a Member State has issued to the asylum seeker or extended 
a visa. At the moment, Member States do no t have efficient means to check whether 
an asylum applicant has had a visa issued  by another Member State, verify the 
identity of the person, and find out how long the validity of the visa is/was. All this 
information is required to identify the Memb er State responsible for the examination 
of an asylum application. Moreover such information would also be needed for examining the application for asylum. 
2.7. Internal Security and terrorism 
The inefficiencies in combating visa shopping, fraud and in conducting checks are 
causing also inefficiencies in relation to internal security of the Member States. Criminals and suspected persons could get a visa or have chances to use a falsified 
visa when entering the Schengen area. Persons  involved in terrorism or in organised 
crime usually don’t travel under their own iden tity but alter their personal details to 
make identification more difficult. They are aware of the reliance placed by control authorities on intelligence and other inform ation about those involved in terrorist 
activity. They may also have substantia l financial backing to allow skilful, 
unauthorised alternations to be made to their travel documents or to obtain high 
quality counterfeits.  
2.8. Impacts on bona fide travellers 
Of all travellers applying for a Schengen visa, 20% are estimated to be regular 
travellers, i.e. applying for a visa several times. For these travellers there is currently little scope for speedi ng up the visa processing times wh ich would take into account 
the fact that such travellers have complied with the visa and immigration requirements in the past, for example for professional drivers in the land transport 
sector. In cases of lost or stolen travel  documents bona fide travellers have to go 
through a complicated process to establish their identities to acquire new travel 
documents. There is also a high risk in this situation with such stolen travel 
documents and visas used to enter the terri tory of Schengen states – the original 
holder may need to re-apply if he has not yet used the visa, and the document holding 
the visa may be used by a person not entitled to it. 
3. P
OLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ORIENTATION SET OUT BY THE COUNCIL  
To meet the problems inherent in the curre nt situation, the European Council decided 
to develop and establish a system for th e exchange of visa data. The JHA Council 
adopted on 19 February 2004 conclusions to gi ve the necessary political orientation 
on the basic elements of the VIS. According to these conclusions the Visa 
 
EN 8   EN Information System (VIS) is “a system fo r the exchange of visa data between 
Member States, which must meet the following objectives: 
(a) constitute an instrument to facilita te the fight against fraud, by improving 
exchanges of information between Member  States ( at consular posts and at 
border crossing points) on visa app lications and responses thereto; 
(b) contribute to the improvement of consular  cooperation and to the exchange of 
information between central  consular authorities; 
(c) facilitate checks that the carrier and the holder of the visa are the same person, 
at external border checkpoints or at immigration or police checkpoints; 
(d) contribute to the preven tion of “visa shopping”, 
(e) facilitate application of Council Re gulation (EC) 343/2003 determining the 
State responsible for examini ng applications for asylum; 
(f) assist in the identification and docum entation of undocumented illegals and 
simplify the administrative procedures for returning citizens of third countries; 
(g) contribute towards improving the admini stration of the common visa policy 
and towards internal security and to combating terrorism.” 
There is a close correspondence between the specific objectives of VIS and the 
problems identified and elaborated in Se ction 2 of this document. The VIS is 
primarily intended to improve the impl ementation of the common visa policy, 
including the use of visa data for the objec tives set out in the Council conclusions. It 
should be stressed however, that it is a component of these policies and does not 
itself introduce new policies. 
4. P OLICY OPTIONS  
On the basis of the problem analysis  and the objectives set out above, the 
Commission defined four policy options which were assessed by the contractor in the 
study. 
4.1. Option 1: No VIS 
The first option highlights the situati on where the VIS would not be created. 
However the following developments in the current situation which have potential to contribute towards the political  objectives should be noted: 
• Implementation of common EU visa polic y, including such recent developments 
as making visas more secure and difficult to  counterfeit, exchanges of information 
on visa issuing trends at lo cal consular level and establishment of liaison officers 
at immigration hot spots will be further developed. 
• Continuing use of VISION which is a netw ork to support current consultation of 
central authorities. However, it is wo rth noting that the nature of VISION 
consultation process differs substantially from the comprehensive system of visa 
 
EN 9   EN information exchange system in that VISION consultation is limited to the third 
country nationals from sensitive countries a nd it is a process of  bilateral exchange 
of information in these specific cases. 
• Current developments of SIS II result from  the necessity to connect new Member 
States, benefit from the late st developments in the field of information technology 
and allow for easy introduction of new func tionalities in the system. In addition, it 
has recently been agreed that authorities responsible for issuing visas will have access to search SIS data on blank official  documents and identity papaers which 
have been lost, stolen or misappropriated. 
• Continuing use of Eurodac database, wh ich was introduced to implement the 
Dublin II regulation determining the Member State responsible for examining the 
application for asylum. The Eurodac finge rprint database, wh ich has been in 
operation since 15 January 2003, stores th e fingerprints of persons who have 
lodged an asylum application.  It allows for the comparison of these fingerprints 
and helps to determine the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application according to  the Dublin II Regulation.  
4.2. Option 2: Entry-Exit-System 
The main aims of an entry-exit system ar e to enable people arriving and departing to 
be examined, and for appropriate information to be gathered, which is relevant to their immigration and residence status. One of the examples of entry-exit system is 
the US VISIT system, which is envisaged as a continuum of security measures, 
making full use of biometrics. When a traveller applies for a visa, his fingerprints are 
taken at the consular post and are stored in a central data base. When the visitor 
comes to the country, the biometric data are us ed to verify that the person at the entry 
point is the same person who received th e visa, or to see whether there is new 
information about any involvement in terroris m or crime. Foreign visitors exiting the 
country will be required to confirm their depa rture at the exit points (this is currently 
at pilot stage at several selected US exit points). This should demonstrate their 
compliance with immigration requirements and facilitate their future travels. This 
information is also stored in the central  data base. People who overstay their visas 
would also be identified in this part of the system. In principle, entry-exit system 
would be a computerised system for collec ting personal details of all visa holders 
entering and exiting the Schengen territory.  
4.3. Option 3: Visa Information System without biometrics 
Visa Information System without biomet rics would be an electronic system 
containing information about the visa applic ant from the visa application form and 
the decisions hereto as well as the photograph of the appl icant, as introduced as a 
security feature in the uniform sticker fo r the Schengen visas. Access to enter and 
update visa data would be granted to persons  authorised to be involved in the visa 
issuing process or in the process to annul , revoke and extend visas. These authorities 
would also have access for the purposes of consultation. Provided th at visa data is 
required for the performance of their tasks,  other authorities with responsibility for 
controlling border checkpoints as well as other competent authorities of each 
Member State would have access in accord ance with the purposes of the VIS. 
 
EN 10   EN 4.4. Option 4: Visa Information System with biometrics 
Visa Information System with biometri cs would contain all the information 
envisaged in VIS without biometrics  (and the same access and consultation 
procedures), but crucially it wi ll also include biometric information of visa applicants 
such as fingerprints. 
The choice of the biometric identifier should follow a coherent approach for 
documents and databases, as requested by the European Council of Thessaloniki. 
According to the VIS feasibility study, which has been submitted by the Commission in May 2003, fingerprint technology provi des the required accu racy to identify 
individuals. Even if the biometric technol ogy changes, fingerprint databases will still 
be used for a long time. Background checks to prevent threats to in ternal security can 
be done with fingerprints, contrary to  for example iris technology. Further 
development at a later stage might enab le the use of photographs for facial 
recognition. The current proposals for the introduction of fingerprints in the visa 
sticker foresee a two-finger image (flat prints). The VIS-feasibility study recommends taking a ten-finger (flat) imag e from the applicant. “Flat fingers” are 
easier and faster to take and no physical c ontact is necessary between the applicant 
and the official. However, the standards a nd procedures for taking the biometric data, 
including the obligation a nd specifying the exceptions for recording biometrics, 
should be laid down in a further legal instrument amending the Common Consular 
Instructions. 
5. 
IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS  
The study assessed the relative financial, opportunity and possible retaliation costs 
and possible reductions in business travel and tourism as well as the impact on 
privacy and human rights. More over the benefits of the di fferent policy options were 
assessed. In this context “financial cost s” mean the over and above costs already 
incurred or anticipated under current a rrangements or planned developments. 
”Opportunity costs” are those for visa applicants, both fina ncial and other costs, in 
terms of travel time and travel costs, to apply for and obtain a visa to enter the territory of the Schengen stat es. “Retaliation costs” are those which wo uld occur if 
the introduction of the policy options s hould lead to third countries imposing 
restrictions or additional re quirements and costs on EU trav ellers wishing to visit the 
countries in question. 
The impacts have graphically b een indicated with symbols: 
√* impact conditional on the effectiveness of current 
developments and developments planned 
√ Small impact 
√√ Medium impact 
√√√ Very significant impact 
√√√√  Exorbitant impact 
 
EN 11   EN 5.1. Benefits and costs of Option 1: No VIS 
• Financial cost : no change  
• Opportunity costs: no change 
• Retaliation cost: no change 
• Reductions in business travel  and tourism: no change 
• Impact on fundamental rights, in particul ar the protection of  personal data and 
privacy:  no change 
There would be no additional costs or social impacts, as the current situation in visa 
application process remain unchanged. 
• Efficiencies in the implementation of Common Visa Policy: no change 
The ‘No VIS’ option would not improve the current lack of information exchange 
about visa applications. In case a visa  information exchange system is not 
introduced, the current situati on will continue, meaning th at information about visa 
applications of a third country national will be routinely held only by the Member 
State which issued the visa. Such inform ation would not be r eadily available to 
authorities of other Member States when a third country national makes subsequent 
visa applications to the authori ties of another Member State.  
• Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √* 
Some document fraud reductions are antic ipated through new functions of the 
Schengen Information System and improved security of visas. However, these developments to increase visa security are counteracted by incr easing sophistication 
of forgery and counterfeiting techniques. One can expect yet further enhancements in 
the degrees of sophisticat ion practised by forgers and despite exchanges of 
information and mutual assistance on document examination techniques, it is likely that there will continue to be many cases in which falsified documents are not identified. 
• Increased efficiency of border checks: √* 
Some improvements in efficiency of borde r checks are anticipated with the probable 
introduction of new functions in the SIS II (and especially biometric data). SIS II will 
allow for the integration of the new Memb er States and updat e the technology used 
in the system. 
• Reductions in illegal immigration and f acilitation of the Dublin Regulation: √* 
Some reductions in illegal migration can be anticipated through implementation of 
existing measures and plans at the EU level. Some measures to tackle illegal migration (as far as visa policy is con cerned) have already been implemented.  
 
EN 12   EN No improvement of the current situation due to the lack of exchange of visa data to 
facilitate the determination of the Memb er State responsible for examining the 
asylum application and for the examination of the asylum application. 
• Contributions toward internal security: √* 
Existing instruments and processes (e.g. national security agencies, Europol, 
Interpol) can be expected to continue to improve internal security and reduce 
terrorism.  
• Increase efficiencies for bona  fide travellers: no change 
• Other spin offs: no change 
5.2. Benefits and costs of Opti on 2: Entry-exit system. 
• Financial cost: √√√√  
Financial costs for an entry exit system are extremely high. The cost estimates for an 
entry-exit system with biometrics in  the US are around $15 billion, covering the 
introduction and operation of appropriate t echnology in all consular posts, entry and 
exit posts. It can be anticipated that similar costs would apply to EU entry-exit system.  
• Opportunity costs: √√ 
Opportunity costs for visa applicants can be  expected, as applicants would have to 
travel to consular posts to provide biometri c data. Also time will be lost at entry and 
exit points by providing and checking bi ometric data. The study comes to the 
conclusion that opportunity costs in this opt ion are higher as the opportunity costs in 
VIS with biometrics. These costs would include  the time and travel costs to travellers 
of providing biometric data at visa applic ation stage and at entry and exit points. The 
Commission does not share this opinion as there were no additional travels to make. Checks in the VIS with biometrics could equally lead to further questioning of 
travellers. 
• Retaliation cost: √ 
Retaliation to entry-exit system with biomet rics by third countries currently requiring 
visas for visitors from the EU should be considered as a risk. At the moment, in 
response to the introducti on of US VISIT, only Braz il introduced retaliatory 
measures by fingerprinting and photograp hing Americans arriving at Brazilian 
airports. Should at least some degree of  retaliation occur, it could impose 
considerable costs on EU citizens (time lost  travelling to the consular post, actual 
time giving biometrics at the consul ar post, entry and exit point).  
• Impact on fundamental rights, in particul ar the protection of  personal data and 
privacy: √√√√  
Impact of entry-exit system  on human rights would be ex tensive, and there would be 
a substantial need to meet personal data pr otection and data security requirements in 
 
EN 13   EN particular in view of the us e of biometrics, since there w ould be a risk of misuse. The 
study comes to the conclusion that there are very significant impacts on fundamental 
rights. However the Commission is of the opinion that the impacts would be even 
exorbitant as the entry-exit-system does not  only store data from the applications 
including biometrics but also data from the movement across the borders. 
• Reductions in business travel and tourism: √ 
Due to the opportunity costs for visa appli cants and the extensive impact of entry-
exit system on privacy and human rights some reductio ns in business travel and 
tourism can be anticipated.  
• Efficiencies in the implemen tation of Common Visa Policy: √√√ 
Although an entry-exit system would provide  a continuum of measures to monitor 
the movements of third country nationals from  their application for an entry visa to 
the arrival at the external border and departure from a territory, the implementation of such a system would go far beyond the objective of improving the implementation 
of Common Visa Policy through better exch ange of information between Member 
States and other objectives set by the Council for a VIS. 
• Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √√√ 
Considerable reductions in visa fraud (and some reduction in other document fraud) 
can be anticipated. The introduction of biom etric data would provide a reliable base 
to establish the identity of visa applicants . It would help to establish a link between 
visa holder and traveller, and reduce the possibility of impostors travelling with visas 
issued to other people. Considerable re ductions in visa shopping could also be 
anticipated. Records of previous visa appl ications would be readily available to 
consular authorities when a person applies for a visa subsequently. The inclusion of 
biometric data would provide a reliable basis to confirm the identity of visa applicants, and reduce the possibility for visa  applicants to conceal their previous 
visa application histor y (such as a rejected visa or removal from the territory of 
Schengen states). 
• Increased efficiency of border checks: √√√ 
Highly efficient border checks allowing a "b eginning to end" su rvey of movements 
will be possible. The entry-exit system w ould provide a continuum of measures to 
monitor the movements of third country nati onals from their application for an entry 
visa to the arrival at the ex ternal border and departure from  a territory. Such a system 
would allow the confirmation that the person who was issued a visa is also the same person who enters and leaves the territory of  the state. The entry-exit system would 
also enable more efficient after-entry immi gration controls, including enforcement of 
the immigration laws. It w ould be possible to check, wh en a foreign national was 
leaving the territory, whether he complied with the immigration requirements, and 
this information would be available when a visa was subsequently sought, and/or on 
subsequent arrivals. The inclusion of biom etric data would provi de a reliable basis 
for establishing the identity of third c ountry nationals through out the process.  
• Reductions in illegal immigration and facilitation of D ublin Regulation: √√√ 
 
EN 14   EN Efficient immigration checks could be anticip ated to lead to re ductions in illegal 
migration. Undocumented illegal migrants apprehended in the territory would be 
identified quicker and more efficiently th rough the entry-exit system in case they 
have applied for a visa in the past. Th e absence of an exit check would reveal 
applicants who didn’t return after expiry of the visa. 
Exchange of visa data would facilitate the determination of the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum appli cation as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 
• Contributions towards internal security: √√ 
Biometric information would allow the identification and tracking down the 
movements of organised criminals and terrorist s, even if they use other identities to 
apply for subsequent visas or to cross ex ternal EU borders. This impact would, 
however, occur only if terrorists and orga nised criminals are known as such. In 
addition, the effects would be limited and dependant on the eff ectiveness of other 
instruments.  
• Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√√ 
There would be substantial advantages for bona  fide travellers re quiring visas as past 
visa history could be established in the same way as VIS with biometrics. This would 
be especially beneficial fo r regular travellers, who make  repetitive applications for 
Schengen visas. In such cases, the entry- exit-system would cont ain full information 
about a visa applicant from all the pr evious visa applications, which would 
automatically be available to authorities in all Member States. An additional advantage of an entry-exit-system/VIS with biometrics against VIS without 
biometrics is that biometric information w ould enable the identif ication of bona fide 
travellers almost beyond any doubt (e.g. in case of lost or stolen travel documents), 
and thus reducing the possibility of fraud and abuse of the visa system. 
• Other spin offs: √√√ 
The entry-exit system would provide a big stimulus for IT industries, as it would 
require the installation and running of state- of-art equipment to capture biometrics 
and perform checks of travellers in all cons ular authorities, and entry and exit points 
of the territory of Member States.  
5.3. Benefits and costs of Option  3: VIS without biometrics 
• Financial cost: √ 
The study showed that this policy option woul d carry medium financial costs. To the 
Community budget, the cost is estimated to be €30 million in 2004-2006 (one-off investment), and afterwards €8 million a year for running the system. These costs 
would cover the operation of the central part  of the VIS without biometrics system. It 
has proved difficult to obtain th e cost estimates for the operation of such a system 
directly from the Member St ates. VIS feasibility study es timated that the expenditure 
for a medium-sized visa issuing office fo r alphanumeric data and photos would be 
€4,000 one-off investment costs and €2,000 a nnual operational costs. Given that 
 
EN 15   EN there are around 3,500 consular posts of EU Member States worldwide, such costs 
would be €14 million one-off investment costs and €7 million annual operational 
costs.  
• Opportunity costs: no change  
No additional opportunity costs for visa ap plicants are expecte d, as there would be 
no change from current visa application pr ocess. The personal information of visa 
applicants would be collected, processed and stored in the same way as in the present 
situation. 
• Retaliation cost: no change  
• Reductions in business travel  and tourism: no change 
No retaliation nor reductions  in business and leisure travel is anticipated, as there 
would be no change from current visa application process. 
• Impact on fundamental rights, in particul ar the protection of  personal data and 
privacy: √√ 
The study expects only limited impacts on the protection of personal data, since there 
will be no biometric data included. However the storage of data in a central European database and the exchange of data be tween Member States would significantly 
increase the number of authorities havi ng access and potential further processing of 
data. 
• Efficiencies in the implemen tation of Common Visa Policy: √√ 
The introduction of VIS without biometrics  would meet the obj ective of facilitating 
the implementation of common visa policy through better exchange of information 
about visa applications. This information should not only compri se data on the visa 
application but also on the decisions taken thereto includ ing the data of the visa 
sticker. It would ensure that records a bout visa applications, which are currently 
stored by the authorities of Member States where the visa was issued, are available to 
the consular authorities in all Member St ates. VIS without biom etrics would have 
beneficial institutional impacts, such as in creased exchange of information and co-
operation, which will improve the im plementation of Common Visa Policy. 
According to the Council Conclusions of  19 February 2004 on the development of 
the VIS, the technical functionalities of  the VISION network for consulting the 
central authorities shou ld be integrated into the VIS.  This means that the VIS should 
not change the current system of consulti ng the central authorit ies on the basis of 
Article 17(2) of the Schengen Convention, including the backgr ound checks against 
national alert lists and data basis which ar e carried out according the national law of 
the Member States. However, such techni cal integration would avoid redundancy of 
data flow. 
• Reductions in fraud and visa shopping: √√ 
 
EN 16   EN Furthermore some reductions in visa appl ication fraud and vi sa shopping can be 
expected as comprehensive records of visas issued (as well as visas cancelled, revoked, or annulled) would be kept electr onically and shared  across the Member 
States. When a third country national bypasses  the criteria for the determination of 
the Member State responsible for examini ng the visa application for another visa 
after rejection of an application, his past  application record would immediately be 
available to consular authori ties without the need to rely  on rejection stamp in the 
passport to provide this information. The in clusion of data on persons or companies 
issuing an invitation or bei ng liable to pay the costs fo r living during th e stay would 
help to identify those persons and compan ies which issue fraudul ent invitations. This 
would be important information in the fi ght against visa fraud, illegal immigration, 
human trafficking and the related criminal  organisations which often operate on an 
international scale. The identification of fraudulent sponsors is not only an issue for 
the Member State in which the sponsor is resident. Given the international nature of illegal immigration, it seems necessary to stor e such kind of data at central level, in 
particular in such cases in which an i ndividual, a company or  another organisation 
has been involved in fraudulent cases dealt wi th by more than one participating state. 
• Increased efficiency of border checks:  √√ 
Some increased efficiency in border checks can be anticipated. If a border guard has 
access to the system to check whether a trav eller was issued a valid visa, this would 
improve, to some extent, existing border ch ecks based on the visual inspection and 
the use of document examination equipment to examine the holder of the passport, 
the passport itself and a visa contained in it.  The inclusion of visa sticker data would 
significantly improve checks at external borde rs and within the territory of a Member 
State, in both directions: to detect falsified visas but also to facilitate the verification 
of bona fide travellers. 
• Contributions to the fight against illega l immigration and the facilitation of the 
Dublin Regulation: √ 
VIS without biometrics would have a minor impact in reducing ill egal migration as it 
would remain difficult to identify undocumente d illegals as such illegal migrants are 
unlikely to give their true identity. 
Exchange of visa data would facilitate the determination of the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum appli cation as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 
• Contributions toward internal security: √ 
VIS without biometrics would have a minor  impact in improving internal security 
and for the fight against terrorism. Te rrorists and organised criminals (who are 
known as such to authorities) are unlikely to  give their true identity when applying 
for a Schengen visa or travel ling through external borders. 
• Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√ 
There would be advantages for bona fide tr avellers as past visa history could be 
established in VIS without biometrics. Th is would be especially beneficial for 
 
EN 17   EN regular travellers who apply for a Schengen visa several tim es. In such cases, the VIS 
without biometrics would contain full inform ation about a visa applicant from all the 
previous visa applications, which would auto matically be available to authorities in 
all Member States. This would enable consul ar authorities to ma ke more appropriate 
decisions about repeat visa a pplications and thus result in  simplifications and shorter 
waiting times for regular travellers or in th e issuing of multiple entry visas valid for a 
longer period of time. 
• Other spin offs: √ 
VIS without biometrics will have some spin  offs, also because national visa systems 
need to be adapted. 
5.4. Benefits and costs of Opti on 4 VIS with biometrics 
• Financial cost: √√√ 
The study expects very significant financial costs of this option. For the Community 
budget the biometrics would cost €93 milli on in 2007-2011 for investment costs, and 
afterwards €14-16 million a year for operational costs. Concerning the costs for the national systems, two Member States provid ed estimates of costs of installing and 
running VIS with biometrics in  their consular posts. Fran ce (one of largest visa 
issuing Member States) indicated that the one-off investment costs would be around 
€11 million, with the subsequent annual operational costs of  €1 million. Sweden 
(Member State which issues a small number of visas) estimated that the one-off 
investment costs would be around €2.8 milli on with annual operational costs of €2.5 
million. For 27 participating Member States, such costs would amount to around €200 million one-off investment cost a nd around €50 million annual operational 
costs. Such estimates are however to be tr eated with caution, give n the lack of more 
comprehensive financial assessments from a greater number of Member States. The 
total costs, mentioned below do not include the costs for the border crossing points as 
these costs cannot be estimated at the present time. 
 One-off investment costs Annual operational 
costs 
Costs for the Community €93 million €14-16 million 
Costs for the Member States (national systems) €186 million €49 million 
Total costs for VIS and 
consulates €246-256 million €55-57 million 
• Opportunity costs:  √√ 
Opportunity costs for visa applicants can be  expected, as applicants would have to 
travel to consular posts to provide biometri c data. Also time will be lost at entry and 
exit points by providing and checking biometric data.  
• Retaliation cost: √ 
 
EN 18   EN Retaliation to VIS with biometrics by thir d countries currently requiring visas for 
visitors from the EU should be considered as a potential risk. 
• Reductions in business travel and tourism: √ 
Due to opportunity costs for visa applicants  and perceived invasion into privacy and 
human rights, some reductions in business tr avel and tourism might be anticipated. It 
can be expected that most genuine visitors  will have nothing to hide and will provide 
biometric data. They would accept a trade-off between providing personal 
information and safer and easier travel to Europe, especially if  providing biometric 
data will mean that subsequent issuing of visa will guarantee entry into the European Union as the security is higher and the iden tity of the travellers could be confirmed 
more quickly. Only a small number of people will find the taking of biometric data intrusive and unacceptable and may refrain from travelling to Europe. 
• Impact on fundamental rights, in particul ar the protection of  personal data and 
privacy: √√√ 
The collection, storage and use of highly personalised data in a EU-wide central data 
base, such as biometrics of all travellers applying for a visa to enter the territory of Schengen States, would raise concerns over the proper use and pr otection of personal 
data of travellers on such a massive scale. The principl es of proportionate and fair 
use of personal data and high security in th e system would have to be implemented in 
full. 
• Efficiencies in the implemen tation of Common Visa Policy:  √√√ 
Further to the support of the implementa tion of Common Visa Policy through better 
exchange of information about visa applic ations, VIS with biometrics would ensure 
exact identification and verification of visa  applicants. VIS with biometrics will 
provide a strong impetus for improvements in the implementation of common visa policy and institutional co-operation through joint consular activities in third countries. Given the high costs of VIS with  biometrics, Member States might decide 
to pool resources and proceed with common vi sa application centres , at least in posts 
where this is operationally feasible.  
Moreover, if biometric data is included in  the VIS, this would lead to additional 
qualitative change and improvements to VI SION consultation process, as it would 
provide authorities with mean s for reliable person verifica tion. In particular the use 
of the fingerprint data would significantly improve the possibility to detect persons 
who constitute a threat to internal securit y. In particular these functionalities of the 
VIS would strengthen the horizontal task of  visa authorities to contribute to the 
prevention of such threats for any of the Member States. 
• Reductions in fraud and visa shopping:  √√√ 
Very significant reductions in fraud and vi sa shopping in addition to the impacts of 
VIS with biometrics are anticipated as it would be possible to identify a person 
applying for applications in several consulat es and despite attempts to conceal true 
identity or use another identity. With the use of biometric data , it would be possible 
to identify a person disregarding the spelli ng of the name or other personal data. 
 
EN 19   EN Biometrics might not identify the ‘true’ identity of the person, but it would fix an 
identity to the person who applies for a visa. 
• Increased efficiency of border checks: √√√ 
Very significant increases in efficiency of  border checks are anticipated in the VIS 
with biometrics. The use of biometric da ta would ensure that the person who is 
travelling with the visa is the same pers on for whom the visa was issued, and thus 
confirm the identity of the traveller. 
• Contributions to the fight ag ainst illegal immigration and facilitation of the Dublin 
II Regulation: √√ 
VIS with biometrics will have signifi cant impact on the fight against illegal 
migration. Undocumented illegal migrants w ho are apprehended in the territory of 
Member States would be easily identified w ith the help of biometric data.This would 
be of value, not only in checking whether th ey entered lawfully, w ith a visa, but also 
in documenting them for removal. 
Exchange of visa data would facilitate the determination of the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum appli cation as well as the examination of the 
asylum application. 
• Contributions toward internal security: √√ 
The improvement of the assessment of visa  applications incl uding the consultation 
between central authorities, and the verification and identi fication of applicants at 
consulates and at checkpoints contributes to the internal  security of the Member 
States and towards combating terrorism, wh ich constitutes a horizontal objective and 
basic criterion for the common visa polic y. Biometric information would allow 
identifying applicants even if they use ot her identities to apply for subsequent visas 
or cross external EU borders. 
• Increase efficiencies for bona fide travellers: √√√ 
There would be substantial advantages for bona  fide travellers re quiring visas as past 
visa history could be establis hed in VIS with biometrics. This would be especially 
beneficial for regular travellers, who make repetitive applications for Schengen visas. 
In such cases, the VIS with biometrics w ould contain full information about a visa 
applicant from all the previous visa a pplications, which would automatically 
available to authorities in all Member St ates. An additional advantage of VIS with 
biometrics against VIS without biometrics  is that biometric information would 
enable the identification of bona fide trav ellers almost beyond any doubt (e.g. in case 
of lost or stolen travel documents), and thus reducing the possi bility of fraud and 
abuse of the visa system. This would particul arly be useful for professional drivers in 
the transport sector as thei r good repute record is more securely protected in this 
system and authorities can rely on the da ta provided. This helps both in getting 
consecutive visas and passing borders. 
Visa applicants who are family members of  EU citizens will continue to be under 
obligation to travel to the consular author ities to provide their biometric data, which 
 
EN 20   EN would entail costs, both of travel and of time spent in the consular post. However, 
provision of biometric data would help to verify their bona fide status once they 
apply for a visa the next time. The travel of  such individuals woul d also be facilitated 
at crossing external border, as the avai lability of biometric data could speed up 
border checks. 
• Other spin offs: √√√ 
A strong stimulus for the IT industry is anti cipated, given the costs associated with 
this policy option. VIS would require the installation and running of state-of-art 
equipment to capture biometrics and perfor m checks of travellers in all consular 
authorities of Member States. Such inst allation and training would occur in 3,500 
consular posts, with 12,000 us ers. It can be anticipated that in the short term VIS 
would cause negative impact for the travel industry, and authorities need to be prepared for that through a PR campaign. It  should be focused on end-customer, and 
explain why, for whom, and what benefits the system will bring to the traveller. 
5.5. Impact summary table 
The following table will show the costs and benefits of the different policy options
1:
                                                 
1 √:Small impact- √√:Medium impact- √√√:Very significant impact- √√√√ :Exorbitant impact 
 
EN 21  
 EN Costs Financial costs Opportunity 
costs for visa 
applicants Retaliation costs 
for EU travellers Reductions in 
business travel 
and tourism Impact on 
fundamental rights, 
in particular the 
protection of 
personal data and 
privacy 
No VIS  - - - - - 
Entry-exit 
system  √√√√  √√ √ √ √√√√  
VIS without 
biometrics √ _ _ _ √√ 
VIS with 
biometrics  √√√ √√ √ √ √√√ 
 
EN 22  
 EN Benefits2 Efficiencies in 
implementation 
of Common 
Visa Policy Reductions 
in fraud and 
visa 
shopping Increased 
efficiency of 
border checks Reductions in 
illegal 
migration Facilitation 
of the 
Dublin 
Regulation Contribution 
towards 
internal 
security Increased 
efficiencies 
for bona 
fide 
travellers Other 
spin offs 
No VIS  - √* √* √* - √* - - 
Entry-exit 
system  √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√√ √√√ 
VIS 
without 
biometrics √√ √√ √√ √ - √ √√ √ 
VIS with 
biometrics √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√√ √√ √√√ √√√ 
                                                 
2 √*:impact conditional on the effectiveness of current developments and developments planned- √:Small impact- √√:Medium impact- √√√:Very significant impact-
√√√√ :Exorbitant impact 
 
EN 23   EN Policy options Advantages Drawbacks 
No VIS Low financial cost No improvements 
Entry-exit 
system Substantial improvements 
however a huge organisation step from the current situation, risky and extremely costly to implement Exorbitant financial costs 
Very extensive impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 
Risk of retaliation 
VIS without 
biometrics Moderate financial cost 
Non-financial costs low 
(opportunity costs for visa applicants) 
Some improvements in the current 
situation No reliable person identification and 
verification 
No substantial contribution to fight 
against illegal migration 
Considerable impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 
VIS with 
biometrics Substantial improvements in most 
domains High financial costs and high indirect 
costs 
No data on exits Extensive impacts on privacy and 
fundamental rights 
Risk of retaliation 
 
EN 24   EN 6. F LANKING MEASURES TO BALANCE NEGATIVE IMPACTS  
Since the VIS is an instrument of the first pillar, the community legislation on data 
protection (Directive 95/46/EC and as fa r as a Community body is processing data 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001) is applicable. Thes e rules ensure the protection of privacy 
and fundamental rights of third country na tionals applying for visa as well of EU 
citizens issuing invitations with regard to the processing of thei r personal data. Since 
background checks against data in their nationa l alert lists and data bases are carried 
out exclusively by the Member States, th e national laws implementing the data 
protection requirements of Di rective 95/46 will apply, as it is currently the case for 
the consultation between central national authorities. 
As outlined in the study Member States shall provide inter alia that personal data 
must be processed fairly and lawfully, that  they are collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not  further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes. Furthermore the processing of personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the pur poses for which they are collected and 
processed, it must be accurate and, wh ere necessary, be kept  up to date. Every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure th at data which are inaccurate or incomplete 
are erased or rectified. 
To balance the negative effects of th e abovementioned drawbacks the following 
flanking measures should be considered: 
6.1. Proportionality of the data stored 
A basic requirement for proportionality and da ta protection is that the personal data 
collected are adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are necessary co llected. Since the VIS itself shall primarily support the 
implementation of the common visa policy only these data shall be stored in the VIS 
which are gained upon the visa application and the decisions taken thereto and which 
are needed for the exchange of visa data between the Member States to meet the objectives of the VIS. 
The source for the alphanumeric personal da ta should be the visa application form. 
As not all data are needed after a decision has been taken, the storage of all these 
data in each case would be disproportional. To balance this effect, one should foresee 
two sets of data, one for each application a nd one added in case that further data are 
needed for the purpose of the consultation between central aut horities, because only 
for about 20% of the visa applications su ch consultation between  central authorities 
is needed. For this purpose the integration of the technical functionalities of the 
VISION network for this consultation, woul d not only avoid redundancy of the data 
flow but improve the current consultati on and the related b ackground checks in 
national databases accordi ng to the national law.  
6.2. Disproportionality of the st orage of scanned documents 
The Council Conclusions fores ee the storage of scanned doc uments in the VIS, as a 
possible further step in addition to th e inclusion of alphanumeric data, the 
 
EN 25   EN photograph and biometrics. However, the study came to the conclusion that the 
storage of scanned documents could not  be considered as proportional.  
A major obstacle for effective return is uncertainty concerning the identity of the 
person concerned and/or his or  her lack of necessary trav el documents. Countries of 
origin often delay or deny th e issuing of return travel documents because  of missing 
information on nationality or identity. In order to avoid removal, illegal residents 
may therefore hide or destroy their tr avel documents and frequently claim a 
completely false identity and/or nationality. As a consequence, lengthy and expensive procedures have often been conducted, which include presentation of the returnee at several embassies of third c ountries or conducting a language or dialect 
analysis.  
However, if all travel documents are scanne d in the Consular posts and stored in the 
VIS, this would mean that for all visa applicants, estimated at 20 million per year, an extra operation at the Consular Posts would be needed. Eurostat figures show that 
annually only around 350,000 person s who are illegally presen t in the EU  territory 
are apprehended; meaning that at least 98% of the scanned documents never will be used for identification of illegal immigrants. On the other hand, the alphanumeric 
data on the travel document should be in an y case introduced in the VIS as well as 
the visa issuing authority  
Furthermore, the travel documents are currently photocopied and stored in the 
consular post. If a Member State requires copies of these documents for returning an 
illegal immigrant, the competent authority can use the VIS to localise the consular 
post that stores the document s, and may even use the VIS infrastructure to ask for 
these documents. The travel documents can subsequently be faxed or sent by normal 
mail to the competent authority that needs them, in case that the alphanumeric data 
on the travel document which ar e stored in the VIS are not sufficient for the specific 
purpose. 
6.3. Proportionality of the use of data 
In accordance with data protection legislati on, the access should be given to the data 
stored in the VIS only for sp ecified, explicit and legitimat e purposes. This means that 
the authorities which should have access to the VIS have to be defined by the 
specific purpose. Therefore the access for consulting the data should be reserved 
exclusively to duly authorised  staff of the authorities of each Member State which 
are competent for the specific purposes of th e VIS and limited to the extent the data 
are required for the performance of the tasks in accordance with these purposes. Access to enter and up-date the data should only be given to duly authorised staff of the consular post or another visa aut hority competent for examining the visa 
application. Therefore it is essential for the legal instrument, to define the purposes 
for which the data stored in the VIS may be  used, the data which could be used for 
the specific purposes and the search criteria, which would allow access to these data in case of a “hit”, indi cating that the data are stored in the VIS. 
For the purposes of examining the application all information stored in the VIS may 
be relevant. Therefore the competent visa authority may have access to the complete 
application file and the linked application files of previous applications of the 
 
EN 26   EN applicant and of group members. To prevent threats to intern al security, in particular 
fingerprint data may be used for back ground checks in national databases.  
For checks on visas to verify the identity of the person who presents the visa with the 
applicant and/or to verify the visa presen ted or claimed to be issued, the competent 
authorities for carrying out checks at external  borders and within the territory of the 
Member State, could have access to the da ta taken from the application form, the 
photographs and the data on the decisi ons of the visa authorities.  
For the purposes of identif ication and return of illega l immigrants the competent 
immigration authority could have access to the complete application file and the 
linked application files of previous appl ications of the app licant and of group 
members.  
For the purposes to facilitate the application of the Dublin II Regulation the 
competent authorities should have access to consult the relevant data of the visas issued or extended. Furthermore the Dublin  Regulation provides that each Member 
State shall communicate to any Member Stat e on request such data. These data on 
visas concerning the asylum seeker may be used for examining asylum applications 
as is appropriate, relevant and non-ex cessive. For these purposes the competent 
asylum authorities should have access to all alphanumeric and photo data stored in the VIS.  
For the purposes of reporting and statistics , the competent visa authorities should 
have access only to the VI S for data which do not a llow identifying individual 
applicants. This makes reporting and statis tics possible for the Member States but 
does not give any possibility to conclude on the individual person behind these data.  
6.4. Data protection safeguards 
The very principles for a legal framework of data protection ar e already laid down 
and recognised at European level, in partic ular in Article 8 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, Artic le 8 of the European Conve ntion of Human Rights as 
well as in the Data Protection Directiv e 95/46/EC and the Council of Europe 
Convention of 1981 for the Protection on I ndividuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data. The above-men tioned principles must be read alongside 
Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Un ion which declares that respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the principles on which the Union is founded. 
For the determination of the retention period it has to be taken into account that for 
reasons of data protection, pe rsonal data should be kept no longer than it is necessary 
for the purposes of the VIS. If  personal data should be reta ined only for the period of 
the visa's validity, the contribution to thes e purposes would be very limited. This 
retention period would not al low any speeding up of subsequent applications for 
regular travellers, as their re cord would only be stored for the time period the visa is 
valid. In addition, it would be  unlikely that such a period of validity would assist in 
the documentation of illegal migrants, who, at some stage had applied for a visa. However, for the start of the retention pe riod it should be di stinguished whether a 
visa has been issued, a visa has been a nnulled, revoked or extended or if no decision 
 
EN 27   EN has been taken on the application. It s hould be ensured that  the data on the 
application should be automatically erased  after the retention period has expired.  
Furthermore in case that a third country na tional has required the nationality of a 
Member State, all data on this applicant sh all be erased immediately as soon as the 
Member State responsible becomes aware of that fact. 
Applicants, but also persons issuing inv itations shall be informed according to 
Article 10 of Directive 95/46/EC by the Memb er State which enters the data in the 
VIS. In relation with the applicant the information that the data from the application form, the photograph and the fingerprints s hould be processed in the VIS and about 
his/her rights should be provided on the visa application form. Persons issuing 
invitations should be informed about the processing of their da ta by the related 
forms.  
An effective data protection regime needs an independent data supervisory regime. 
Since the user of the VIS will be the Member States and their competent authorities, it seems appropriate that the personal data wi ll be processed in th e VIS on behalf of 
the Member States. This implies that the data controllers are within the Member States. Therefore the national supervisory au thorities should be responsible for the 
monitoring of the lawfulness of the processi ng of data in accordance with national 
data protection legislation by the Member  States. This monitoring includes in 
particular the transmission to and from the VIS and the use of the data. For the reasons given in the study, it is appropriate that the European Data Protection 
Supervisor as established by Regula tion (EC) No 45/2001 should monitor the 
activities of the Commission or another operational EC body in  relation to the 
protection of personal data. 
7. M
ONITORING AND EVALUATION  
The effective monitoring of the VIS requi res evaluation in regular intervals. For 
these purposes it is necessary that systems are in place to monitor the functioning of the VIS against objectives, in terms of outputs, cost-effectiveness and quality of 
service. The study recommends that ev ery two years a report on the technical 
functioning of the VIS should be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council. This report should include info rmation on the performance of the VIS 
against quantitative indicat ors predefined by the Commi ssion. Moreover, in further 
regular intervals like four years an overa ll evaluation of the VIS should be produced, 
including examining results ach ieved against objectives a nd assessing th e continuing 
validity of the underlying rationale and any implications of future options.  
On the basis of these observations, the following indicators could be applied to 
measure performance of a visa informati on system. Detailed indicators and targets 
would need to be developed, in order to ga uge the success of a VIS, with or without 
biometrics. 
Monitoring and evaluation indicato rs could be in particular: 
– System availability rate 
 
EN 28   EN – Number of entries on the system 
– Numbers of visas refused, annulled, re voked indicating the standard grounds 
– Number of repeat applications in th e 12 month period after a visa refused. 
Other indicators could be base d on national statistics such as: 
– Average time taken to process an application 
– Processing times at border checkpoints 
– Average application processing time 
– Number of illegal immigrants identified 
– Number of visa hits for the Dublin Regulation 
8. S TAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  
The Extended Impact Assessment had to ensu re that the relevant stakeholders, in 
particular the Member States  but also data protection au thorities and the interested 
public have been involved and consulted as regards the diffe rent competences 
touched upon by the proposal in complia nce with the Commission´s standards on 
consultation. 
Stakeholders’ consultations were held between April and July 2004. In several 
workshops experts from the Member States  contributed with their input to the 
Extended Impact Assessment. Furthermore th e public had the possibility to comment 
on the possible impacts of the establishment of the VIS. Moreover an interview with 
the European Travel Commission (ETC),  a representative body of 33 national 
tourism organisations has been conducted. 
8.1. Member States 
The study has reviewed replies received from  12 Member States to the questionnaire 
distributed by Co mmission Services. 
• The majority of Member States remarked that there are substantial problems with 
the consular co-operation as  exchange is based on meetings, phone calls or paper 
documents. Visa shopping occurs because repeat applicants present new or recently issued passports or rejection st amps are skilfully removed. Border checks 
are limited to the visual inspection of applicants and travel documents. Most Member States have the problem of illegal migrants apprehended without 
documents.  
• Member States did not see any alternativ e to the VIS as a common system for the 
exchange of visa data to ensure the same  effectiveness and quality of exchange of 
information.  
 
EN 29   EN • The main impacts expected are in the proc ess of visa issuing (easier assessment of 
application), prevention of visa shopping, and reduction in document fraud. With 
biometric data changing identities or manipulating documents will become more 
difficult. VIS with biometrics would al so aid the identification of undocumented 
illegal migrants and speed up the return procedures.  
• Most Member States view biometric functionalities as essential for the 
effectiveness and value added of the VIS.  
• Border checks might be slower, but some Member States expect quicker 
processing procedures for frequent trav ellers, VIPs, and low risk groups.  
• Opinions are divided over the usefulness of integrating scanned documents. Some 
Member States are sceptic about the use of scanned documents and fear large 
costs, other Member States are in fa vour of integrating scanned documents.  
• In terms of processes and or ganisational issues, most Memb er States will have to 
adapt their national systems to the VIS, and consular posts will be most affected 
by such change. Changes in national le gislation are also anticipated by some 
Member States. 
8.2. Public consultations 
The contributions submitted in the process of public on line consultation on the VIS 
have been examined including those from Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA), Standing Committee of  experts on international immigration, 
refugee and criminal law, Data Protection Authorities and Contributions from private 
persons.  
The following observations could be made from the analysis of these responses: 
• Most consultees expressed a view that VI S is a disproportionate response to the 
perceived threats posed by third country nationals travelling to the EU. Most 
travellers are lawful travellers since visas issued significantly outnumber visas 
refused and since most of them comply with immigration requirements. The SIS, 
if consulted in a systematic way, should be sufficient to counteract the threats 
posed since it records information on pers ons who should be refused entry to the 
Schengen area.  
• There is a concern that a system like VIS is contemplated before any attempts are 
made to reform and improve the current sy stem for issuing Schengen visas. In this 
context, a recommendation was made to  amend the ambiguous rules of Common 
Consular Instructions which provide fo r a large degree of discretion in making 
visa issuing decisions.  
• VIS proposals so far have been presented in  the repressive terms, i.e. to catch 
criminals and abusers of the visa system. There has been no examination to what 
extent VIS would have positive effects for regular travellers to the EU.  
• Data protection and privacy concerns  have loomed large in the public 
consultation. In particular, concerns over the inappropriate use of data and 
 
EN 30   EN unauthorised access have surfaced. There is also a fear that the rejection of a 
previous visa application would automatica lly result in a future rejection. In 
addition, a recommendation was made that VIS includes only ‘hard’ data and not 
improvable facts or suspicions by authori ties. Security of processing of personal 
data must also be ensured to prevent any possibility of identity fraud, hacking or abuse from the unauthorised access.  
• Legal safeguards and rights of third count ry nationals should be included in the 
VIS and third country nationals must be made aware of these rights.  
• There is also concern over the storage of personal data of EU citizens issuing 
invitations to third country nationals as it  would constitute an invasion of their 
privacy. 
• The main benefit from the establishment of  VIS would be, according to the tourist 
industry, for repeat visitors in terms of si mplification of repeat visa applications, 
which is a welcome development. VIS w ill have no benefits for the first time 
traveller. From this point of view, collection and shari ng of visa data should be 
welcomed as facilitation of visa applica tion, as long as data protection is fully 
enforced. 
• Any form of VIS should bring more transp arency to the visa application process 
and make it more accessible and easier fo r visa travellers. Europe must be 
perceived as a place of welcome, and VIS should not be about policing the 
issuance of visas, but facilitating the application process a nd providing ease of 
access for business and leisure travellers. It would be even better if VIS could lead 
to reduced queues and improve some of the treatment of visa travellers. If 
consular authorities have access to th e right information about the person, 
especially in the repeat a pplication, that could make th e service more professional, 
more successful and speedier. People shoul d be treated in a civilised way, and not 
like second class citizens. 
• The idea of electronic visa application s hould be looked into. Australia has this, 
and travellers can apply electronically, or vi a a travel agency. If biometric data is 
introduced, there could be places like trav el agencies, or passport issuing offices, 
where travellers could provide their biomet ric data (it was not clear whether this 
would be possible in the VIS). 
9. C
OMMISSION DRAFT PROPOSAL AND JUSTIFICATION  
9.1. Proportionality and European added value of the options 
Based on the assessment of the four opti ons in chapter 5, proportionality and the 
European added value of the options can be summarized as follows: 
 
EN 31  
 EN  Proportionality European added value 
No VIS Does not address all of the political objectives set and only some 
improvements in the problems in the current situation could be anticipated  None  
Entry-exit 
system Substantial improvement, however  huge organisa tion step from 
the current situation, risky and extremely costly to implement As VIS with biometrics but also enables comprehensive 
immigration controls  
VIS without 
biometrics Improvement of the current situation but would meet only some 
of the political objectives  Facilitates exchange of information on visas on a regular and 
comprehensive basis to enable implementation of common visa 
policy  
VIS with 
biometrics Despite of extensive impacts on fundamental rights and high 
costs this option would tackle many of the problems identified and meet political objectives  set out. By introducing the 
abovementioned flanking measures the extensive impact will be counterbalanced Facilitates exchange of information on visas on a regular and 
comprehensive basis to enable implementation of common visa 
policy 
Identification of visa applicants with the use of biometrics enables 
reliable and immediate exchange of information 
Contributes to an eff ective return policy  
 
EN 32   EN 9.2. Final Policy choice 
The assessment of the different parameters  shows that option 4, the establishment of 
a Visa Information System integrating biometric identifiers is the option which closely meets the objectives and purposes out lined in the Council Conclusions of 19 
February 2004. In a large da tabase it is not possible to identify persons with 
alphanumeric data alone. Even for bona-fide tr avellers the spelling of the same name 
can be different from one country to anothe r, many instances of the same name exist 
and in some countries date s of births are not comp letely known. Identifying 
undocumented persons or persons is virt ually impossible without biometrics.  
Inclusion of biometric data in the VI S would not only significantly support the 
assessment of applicants in view of prev enting ‘visa shopping’, fraud and threats to 
internal security, but have positive conse quences for bona fide travellers. Matches 
against biometric data would help to verify their identity in case of a new application or at checks, but also in case of lost or st olen travel documents as bona fide travellers 
could quickly prove their identity to get new travel documents and visas. Moreover, the inclusion of biometric da ta would also significantly support the identification of 
undocumented illegal immigrants and the return procedures, if these illegal 
immigrants have once applied for a visa.  
An EU entry-exit system, incorporating biom etrics for visa applicants would provide 
a continuum of measures to control the m ovements of third count ry nationally, from 
a visa application stage through arrival at ex ternal border to leaving the territory of 
the Schengen states. Such a system would en able much more efficient and effective 
border controls to be operated. There al so would be improvement to immigration 
control arrangements, overall, due to the existence of more comprehensive records. 
However it would be extremely costly to implement. It therefore appears to be less 
advantageous than VIS with biometrics. A VIS without biometrics would ensure 
improvement of consular cooperation but w ould have little impact  as a contribution 
towards internal security and fight against terrorism and on the fight against illegal 
immigration. Furthermore bona fide travelle rs would profit to a small extend from a 
VIS without biometrics as there were just  some improvements in the visa issuing 
process but no improvement in case of lost or  stolen travel documents as they could 
not proof their identity quickly. Opti on 1 (No VIS option) would not create 
improvements in exchanges of visa appl ication information between consular 
authorities of Member States. The absence of a visa information exchange system 
would not address some of the most pressing  issues, such as visa shopping and visa 
fraud and therefore this option would not achieve the objectives of the Council 
Conclusions of 19 February 2004. 
For the preparation of the proposal the flanking measures outlined in section 6 of this 
document should be born in mind in orde r to minimize and balance the negative 
drawbacks of the chosen option.