EN

Brussels, 19.12.2007

SEC(2007) 1723

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying document to the

PROPOSAL FROM THE COMMISSION TO

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL

for a regulation to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars

Impact Assessment

{COM(2007)856 final}

{SEC(2007)1724}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties (...)5

1.1. Background in the development of the proposal (...)5

1.2. Organisation and timing (...)5

1.3. Consultation and expertise (...)5

1.4. Inter-institutional process so far (...)7

1.4.1. Council (...)7

1.4.2. European Parliament (...)8

1.5. Results of the consultation of the Impact Assessment Board (...)8

2. Problem definition (...)9

2.1. What is the issue or problem that may require action? (...)9

2.2. What are the underlying drivers of the problem? (...)10

2.2.1. Increase in demand for transport (...)11

2.2.2. Global perspective (...)14

2.3. Stakeholders affected (...)14

2.4. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? (...)15

2.5. Subsidiarity principle (...)16

3. Objectives (...)16

3.1. Policy objectives (...)16

3.2. Consistency with horizontal objectives of the European Union (...)17

3.2.1. Lisbon strategy (...)17

3.2.2. Sustainable Development strategy (...)18

4. Policy options (...)19

4.1. Introduction and options discarded at an early stage (...)19

4.2. Design parameters (...)19

4.2.1. Who should be responsible for delivering CO2 reductions under the new system? (...)20

4.2.2. How can the burden be shared between car manufacturers? (...)21

4.2.3. Flexibility mechanisms (...)27

4.2.4. Compliance mechanisms (...)28

4.3. Conclusion and summary of the policy options identified (...)31

5. Analysis of impacts (...)32

5.1. Description of the methodology (...)32

5.1.1. Ex-ante estimates from the supporting study (...)33

5.1.2. Dynamic modelling with TREMOVE (...)33

5.2. Economic impacts (...)34

5.2.1. Least cost solution for the society and cost-effectiveness (...)34

5.2.2. Distributional effects in terms of relative retail price increases at the level of manufacturers and relative reduction requirements per manufacturer (...)36

5.2.3. Impacts of the flexibility (trading and pooling) (...)38

5.2.4. Innovation and trade aspects (...)56

5.3. Social impacts (...)61

5.3.1. Employment aspects (...)61

5.3.2. Social aspects: social equity and distributional effects within the fleet (...)65

5.4. Environmental impacts (...)75

5.4.1. Discussion on the environmental outcome against the various Options (...)75

5.4.2. Compliance mechanism: influence of the financial penalties on the environmental outcome (...)76

5.4.3. Overall impacts in terms of emissions (...)85

6. Comparing the options (...)86

6.1. Tradeoffs between the three options (...)86

6.1.1. Social equity (...)86

6.1.2. Competitive neutrality (...)87

6.1.3. Cost-effectiveness (...)87

6.1.4. Environmental outcome (...)87

6.2. Overall comparison of the three options (...)88

6.3. Discussion on the utility parameter (Option 2 only) (...)90

6.4. Assessment of different slopes on the basis of the five criteria set out in the earlier Commission Communications of February 2007 (...)91

7. Monitoring and evaluation (...)92

7.1. What are the core indicators of progress towards meeting the objectives? (...)92

7.2. What is the broad outline for possible monitoring and evaluation arrangements? (...)92

1. Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties

1.1. Background in the development of the proposal

In its parallel Communications from February 2007 on the revised CO2 and cars strategy [1] and on a Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework for the 21st Century CARS 21 [2] (referred to as "the earlier Communications" in this document) the Commission decided to pursue an integrated approach with a view to reaching the EU objective of 120 g/km carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on average from new cars by 2012. On the basis of the two impact assessments [3] (the "earlier impact assessments") accompanying these Communications, the Commission announced that it would propose a legislative framework, if possible in 2007 and at the latest by mid 2008, to achieve the EU objective of 120 g/km CO2, focusing on mandatory reductions in the emissions of CO2 to reach the objective of 130 g CO2/km on average for the new car fleet by means of improvements in vehicle motor technology, and a further reduction of 10 g CO2/km, or equivalent if technically necessary, by other technological improvements and by an increased use of bio-fuels.

The proposal which this impact assessment accompanies follows from the earlier Communications and their impact assessments, which set out the overall ambition level as well as the principles and design criteria for the future legislative framework. Consequently, this impact assessment builds upon the earlier impact assessments by considering the specific question of the design of the legislative framework for the achievement of the 130 g CO2/km target for passenger cars (so-called "M1" vehicles).

1.2. Organisation and timing

For the preparation of this initiative (agenda planning number 2007/ENV/005) close interservice cooperation was ensured through the establishment of an interservice group which oversaw and followed the supporting study investigating of possible regulatory approaches (see 1.3). The services involved in this group were the following: three coordinating Directorates General (DG Environment, DG Enterprise and Industry and Secretariat General), DG Transport and Energy, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Employment, DG Research, Legal Service.

1.3. Consultation and expertise

In support of the earlier Communications, a first round of consultation of interested parties and of the general public was carried out by the Commission in 2005-2006 via an online Internet consultation complemented by a dedicated working group established under the European Climate Change Programme [4]. The CARS 21 stakeholder group [5] reviewed the role of environmental policy and CO2 emissions as part of developing an overarching integrated policy framework for the automotive sector.

Building on this work, the following additional consultations were carried out, together with an external study aimed at investigating possible regulatory approaches to reducing CO2 from light-duty vehicles:

– Between May and July 2007, an online internet public consultation was carried out, aimed at gathering the views of all stakeholders and members of the public on the implementation of the revised CO2 and cars strategy;

– To complement this Internet consultation, a public hearing was organised by the Commission on 11 July 2007, where the stakeholders directly concerned by the upcoming legislation (automotive industry, suppliers, environmental NGOs, social partners, consumers…) had the opportunity to present their positions. The final report is attached in Annex II.

The minimum standards for the consultation [6] have been respected, as shown by the assessment below:

(1) Clear content of the consultation process

The objectives of the new legislative framework and the principles for its design were clearly described on the public consultation website. The public hearing has been publicised to relevant stakeholders as well as widely through a press release. The Commission services have made clear how comments received would be dealt with and how the process would proceed.

(2) Consultation target groups

The future legislative framework concerns the setting of CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars in the EU and represents an important measure for combating climate change. It was therefore necessary to involve in the consultation automotive industry and the related branches, which would be affected by the regulation, such as automotive suppliers, environmental organisations, the Member States and the large public. The different industries were represented mainly through EU wide organisations.

(3) Publication

The preparation of the future regulatory framework was announced in the earlier Communications. Interested parties were aware that there was to be consultation on the issues to be addressed in line with the better regulation principles. A special website was created for the public consultation and the public hearing.

(4) Time limits for participation

The Commission provided stakeholders with a month or more notice of the public hearing. It has given 10 full weeks for the submissions of written comments to the public consultation. Stakeholders have been given adequate time to provide written comments to the public consultation, as well as make a public statement in the public hearing. Overall, the Commission has been in ongoing dialogue with stakeholders and met with all interested stakeholders requesting so. All stakeholders should therefore be able to express their views.

(5) Acknowledgement and feedback

Responses from stakeholders following the stakeholder meetings have been acknowledged and the stakeholders’ responses, namely the organisations' responses, are publicly available at: http://ec.europa.eu/reducing_co2_emissions_from_cars/index_en.htm.

According to the privacy statement, no individuals’ contribution can be posted therein without their consent. The Commission has not responded to the points raised in individual responses given the wide range of issues raised, it was however able to identify the main issues.

(6) Main results and how these have been taken into account

The majority of consultation responses have been made publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/reducing_co2_emissions_from_cars/index_en.htm. The Commission has analysed the comments made, and the results of the consultation are presented in Annex III.

Input from stakeholders has been taken into account in assessing the different possible options to regulate CO2 emissions from cars, particularly with regard to the design of the legislation, possible unwanted effects, implications for competition on automotive markets, global industrial competitiveness and environmental outcome. External expertise was used to assess the various options available, including aspects raised during the consultation process (the external contractor attended the public hearing and was informed about the results of the Internet consultation).

1.4. Inter-institutional process so far

1.4.1. Council

The earlier Communications have been well received in the Council. The Competitiveness Council, in May 2007, supported "an integrated approach as proposed by the Commission, for reducing CO2 emissions from motor vehicles" and underlined "that all the players must make their contribution to reducing emissions harmful to the climate" and that "the opportunity for a regulatory framework which is cost-effective, ensures affordable mobility and contributes to preserving the global competitiveness of the automotive industry". The Environment Council, in June 2007, "urged the European Commission to come forward, as soon as possible and before the end of 2007, with a legislative framework to reduce CO2 emissions from cars (…)"

These two Council formations, as well as the Transport Council in June 2007, called "on the Commission to configure the planned framework for attaining the target for average CO2 emissions from the fleet of new cars sold in the EU on the basis of a thorough impact assessment in a way that is as neutral as possible from the point of view of competition, and which is socially equitable and sustainable. It should be framed in such a way as to ensure that all manufacturers intensify their efforts to make their whole vehicle production more environmentally friendly in a cost-effective way".

1.4.2. European Parliament

In its resolution adopted on 24 October 2007, the European Parliament welcomed the Commission's plan to propose legislation and proposed that binding emission targets be implemented from 2011 onwards in order to ensure that by technical improvements to vehicles alone, the average new car fleet would reach 125 g CO2/km in 2015. The Parliament also insisted that the average new car fleet should reach 95 g CO2/km by 2020 and possibly 70 g CO2/km by 2025 subject to a confirmation or review by the Commission no later than 2016.

Regarding the design of the legislation, the Parliament recommended that reduction targets be defined through a footprint (trackwidth times wheelbase) based limit value and proposed the creation of a closed market mechanism called "Carbon Allowance Reductions System" (CARS) separately from the EU ETS and linked to financial penalties expressed in €/gram. It was also recommended that carmakers should be allowed to exclude from the scheme up to 500 vehicles per year, and that carmakers selling less than 300.000 vehicles and new entrants with a market share below 1% be addressed through specific yet ambitious provisions.

1.5. Results of the consultation of the Impact Assessment Board

Two draft versions of the impact assessment report have been submitted to the Impact Assessment Board. The discussion has triggered substantial improvements in the methodology applied for the assessment of the policy options. In its final opinion, the Board stated [7] that the IA contains robust analysis of impacts and an appropriate range of options, based i.a. on an extensive Stakeholder consultation and a comparison with other compliance schemes. The final opinion recalled some more technical aspects that, given the importance of the proposal, needed to be clarified. These comments have been taken on board in the final draft of the IA as follows:

– The impact of the different policy options on the fleet composition (section 5.3.2.) and the effect it may have on attaining the target have been clarified (section 5.4.3.). The methodology is described with further details (section 5.1), in particular the difference between results from TREMOVE and ex-ante analysis, and the limits of the TREMOVE modelling exercise in this specific context.

– Given that the modelling and other estimates rely on a set of variables that might be influenced by external events, a sensitivity analysis for the ex-ante cost-effectiveness calculations has been performed on fuel prices and on autonomous weight increase parameters (section 5.2.1.)

– Regarding premiums, the report further explains the advantages/disadvantages of the different methodologies for level-setting and the way they could be introduced. (sections 4.2.4. and 5.4.2.)

– The report provides an overview of the expected market developments, complemented by an indication of where the automotive industry is concentrated, so as to provide a basis for an analysis of employment impacts (Section 5.3.1.)

– A short discussion on effects on the automotive supplier industry, mergers and takeovers, and competitiveness on external markets is included in section 5.2.3.

2. Problem definition

2.1. What is the issue or problem that may require action?

The overall rationale for a revised CO2 and cars strategy based on an integrated approach and implemented through a legislative framework has been analysed and explained in detail in the earlier Communications and impact assessments:

· All sectors must contribute to the fight against climate change: the EU is at the forefront of the fight against climate change and must deliver the greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions to which it has committed under the Kyoto Protocol for the 2012 horizon. Taking a longer perspective, the EU has committed itself to achieve at least a 20% reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, and up to a 30% reduction compared to 1990 as part of an international agreement. To avoid distortions, and for the sake of economic and social fairness, all sectors must contribute to the reduction effort, including transport;

· The CO2 performance of new vehicles should improve at a faster rate: passenger car use accounts for about 12% of overall EU emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), the main greenhouse gas. Improvements in vehicle technology, in particular fuel efficiency, have led to a 14 % fuel efficiency improvement between 1995 and 2006. However, improvements in fuel efficiency have been offset mainly by the increase in demand for transport and vehicle size. While the EU as a whole has reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) by just under 5% over the 1990-2004 period and emission have been declining in non-transport sectors, the CO2 emissions from road transport have increased by 26%. This is partly linked to the limited progress in fuel efficiency improvements, and partly linked to the increase in demand for transport and vehicle size. Despite significant improvements in vehicle technology, in particular in fuel efficiency which also means lower CO2 emissions, progress has been too slow in view of the EU objective of reaching an average new car fleet of 120 g CO2/km;

· Road transport needs to use less oil: there is a direct link between improved fuel efficiency and lower CO2 emissions. Road transport relies heavily on oil for which the EU's import dependency is higher than 80%. This has a significant impact on the EU's security of energy supply and makes the EU economies more susceptible to oil shocks. Road transport alone accounted for as much as 25% of the final energy consumption in the EU25 in 2004;

· Further reductions in CO2 emissions must be achieved cost-effectively without undermining sustainable mobility and the car industry's competitiveness: cars are an important part of the everyday lives of a large number of Europeans and provide mobility, which is essential to European society and economy: in 2005, road transport accounted for ca. 86% of passenger transport activity and ca. 70% of freight transport activity in Europe. The automotive industry itself is a significant source of employment and growth in many regions of the EU. Europe is the world’s largest producer of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles with ca. 30% of these vehicle types produced in Europe. The European automotive industry is a major component of Europe's manufacturing base. The vehicle industry accounts for about 20% of Europe’s manufacturing R&D investment (over €20 billion), contributed about €60 billion to Europe’s trade balance and contributes more than €350 billion in fiscal revenues, which represents ca. 8% of the European Union's total general government revenues. Consequently, the legislative framework must be designed in a way that does not undermine affordable mobility and compromise the global competitiveness of the automotive industry in Europe and its role in contributing to the Growth and Jobs agenda.

The overarching problem as identified in the earlier Communications is that existing policies to reduce CO2 emissions and improve the fuel efficiency of new cars sold in the EU have not been able to deliver the progress needed for reaching the long-standing EU objective of an average new car fleet emission of 120 g CO2/km. As a result, the Commission has decided to propose a legislative framework to implement the "integrated approach" as described in Section 1.1.

In the earlier Communications, the Commission also outlined the principles, conditions and considerations on which the future legislative proposal to achieve the 130 g CO2/km target for passenger cars is to be designed. These are as follows: "...the legislative framework implementing the average new car fleet target will be designed so as to ensure competitively neutral and socially equitable and sustainable reduction targets which are equitable to the diversity of the European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between automobile manufacturers. The legislative framework will be compatible with the overall objective of reaching the EU's Kyoto targets...".

The specific problem which needs to addressed is how to design the legislative instrument which reflects the above criteria as set by the Commission.

2.2. What are the underlying drivers of the problem?

As far as overall CO2 emissions from road transport are concerned, a wide range of factors influence the observed and predicted growth in CO2 emissions from passenger road transport, such as supply and demand for cars, individual mobility needs, the availability of alternative public transport services and the costs of car ownership.

2.2.1. Increase in demand for transport [8]

While vehicle efficiency has been increasing to a certain extent, this has been offset by increased journey lengths and other trends leading to higher greenhouse gas emissions. The overall share of cars in passenger traffic has remained fairly constant over the years (73.5 % in 2004). Transport demand has for its part grown significantly and the number of passenger-kilometres driven by passenger cars increased by 17.7 % over the 1995-2004 period. The level of car ownership also increased substantially as shown below:

Table 1 - Evolution in car ownership and vehicle stock in the EU25 between 1990 and 2004

EU 25 | 1990 | 2004 | Change |

Number of cars per 1000 inhabitants | 355 | 469 | + 32% |

Vehicle stock (Million) | 156 | 215 | + 38% |

This increase took place despite a significant increase in consumer prices for the operation of personal transport equipment: over the 1996-2005 period, indexed operation costs increased by 38% (indexed vehicle purchase prices increased by less than 5%).

(...)Figure 1 presents the evolution of the physical characteristics of passenger cars on the EU15 car market, over the 1995-2004 period: important increases in mass (+15%) and even more so in power (+28%) have taken place in parallel to a 12.4% reduction in specific CO2 emissions.

Figure 1 - Physical evolution of ACEA's car fleet compared to base-year 1995 (source SEC(2006)1078)

(...PICT...)

This trend towards bigger and more powerful cars is explained by the evolution of manufacturers' offer and consumer demand, and by the measures and strategies adopted to influence these two parameters (such as advertising practices, fuel efficiency labelling etc.). A market environment characterised by cost competition and the fact that vehicle manufacturers need to sell cars in order to gain revenue from related products and services have also created a situation whereby consumer prices for cars have increased significantly less than headline inflation over the last years, de facto making better equipped, cleaner and more powerful cars cheaper than in the past [9].

The CO2 profile of new cars sold by ACEA on the EU market between 1995 and 2004 is shown on (...)Figure 2 and (...)Figure 3, showing a clearly identifiable "wave-effect" towards reduced CO2 emissions and an increase in the sales of low emitting vehicles.

Figure 2 - ACEA's "wave-effect" of CO2 categories towards reduced CO2 emissions (source SEC(2006)1078)

(...PICT...)

Figure 3 - Change in ACEA's Fleet Composition by "aggregated CO2 Categories" (source SEC(2006)1078)

(...PICT...)

Global perspective

The EU has one of the most fuel efficient new car fleets in the world, which needs to be considered from the angle of the global competitiveness of the European automotive industry: the promotion of fuel efficiency will create a first mover advantage especially in the perspective of the penetration of emerging markets where oil is already scarce. The EU has thus an interest in promoting fuel efficiency in vehicles in other parts of the world, where it will be able to reap the rewards of its technological leadership in this field. The recent years have seen a move from third countries towards either the adoption or the reinforcement of fuel efficiency/GHG standards for light vehicles.

At the same time, the ambition level of the domestic targets and the way in which they are implemented must take into account the short-term competitiveness of the European automotive industry. An underlying driver of the limited progress in the CO2 reductions observed up to 2006 is linked to the lack of truly level playing field amongst carmakers: this situation stems from the fact that so far a voluntary approach was pursued under which it appears that manufacturers have applied very varying degrees of effort in delivering the reductions that were required. It may thus be that the approach pursued so far did not provide for sufficient pressure amongst stakeholders to ensure the overall delivery of the EU objectives.

2.3. Stakeholders affected

A wide range of stakeholders are affected by the problem:

· The population of the European Union is increasingly affected by climate change through the increased climate variability and more frequent extreme weather events, and their related impacts (higher maximum temperatures, more hot days and heat waves lead to increased incidence of death and serious illness in older or more sensitive groups of the population; more intense precipitation events lead to increased floods, landslide, avalanche, mudslides, soil erosion and related increased pressure on Government and flood insurance systems and disaster relief; increased summer drying over mid altitude continental zones and associated risk of drought lead to decreased crop yields, water resource quantity and quality as well as increased risk of forest fire and damage to building foundations caused by ground shrinkage).

· The consumers of motor vehicles are affected by possible increases in the price of new vehicles and reductions in their running costs, due to stricter requirements on CO2 emissions and related improvements in fuel consumption. Consumers of motor vehicles are also affected by possible changes in the level of performance (power, comfort) of new vehicles. Conversely, poor fuel efficiency contributes to an enhanced dependency on foreign oil imports and to the related exposure to possible price surges due to supply shortages.

· Carmakers will be affected by the obligation to comply with the new regulatory scheme to reduce CO2 emissions through resulting increases in the cost of car production and the need to further modify the structure of their product portfolios. As the level of ambition sought by the legislative framework has been set already, the distributional effects of the future legislation will be of key importance as these will determine how the legislative framework will impact individual carmakers, their production costs, the retail price of their products and profit margins. The EU is the largest car market in the world and stricter fuel efficiency requirements in Europe will affect those vehicle manufacturers who sell their products on the EU market by requiring improvements to new vehicles through the development and introduction of better technologies. Component suppliers will also be affected by increasing demand for advanced technologies and higher pressure on costs as a result of the impact of the delivery of the targets on consumer prices.

2.4. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?

(...)Figure 4 presents the evolution of the average specific CO2 emissions from new cars sold in the EU over the 1995-2006 period. The analysis of the reduction trends over this period shows that prior to the entry into force of the car industry's voluntary commitments (1995-1997), the average yearly reduction ranged in the order of 2 grams per year; in the absence of a dedicated policy instrument, this could be considered an "autonomous" improvement implemented by carmakers without regulatory push. In the early years of the Commitments (1999-2001), the yearly reduction rate increased significantly, up to 5 grams per year, but subsequently slowed down at 1-2 grams per year up to 2006. The improvement rates necessary to deliver the 130 g CO2/km will require a return to earlier levels, at 5 gram per year over the 2007-2012 period.

Figure 4 – Evolution of the average new car fleet CO2 emissions in the EU

(...PICT...)

While it is difficult to precisely predict what the average new car emission would be in 2012 in the absence of additional measures, it is useful to establish some considerations for a baseline against which various options will be compared. Several influences need to be factored in.

· The recent trend may continue without additional measures, implying 1.5 gram reduction per year (average over the 2002-2006 period). The likely 2012 emission level would be 151 g CO2/km based on a linear projection in the absence of additional measures.

· A less conservative approach would be to assume that in light of the revised CO2 and cars strategy and the announcement of the upcoming legislative framework, car manufacturers will step up their efforts ahead of the actual entry into force of the legislation.

· Alternatively, an inverse trend may be observed, whereby in the absence of a dedicated instrument, especially after 2008-9 and the end of the voluntary agreements, average CO2 emissions would in fact be reduced at a slower rate, and possibly increase due e.g. to a continued autonomous power and weight increase.

In any case, in its recent review of the EU CO2 and cars strategy, the Commission has underlined that, based on the experience gained in the past in the implementation of the strategy, the EU objective of 120 g CO2/km would not be reached by 2012 in the absence of additional measures. None of the assumptions above put into question the earlier assessment made by the Commission in which it proposed to adopt a revised strategy, based on an integrated approach: a legislative framework will be proposed in order to meet the 120 g CO2/km objective, focusing on mandatory reductions of the emissions of CO2 to reach the objective of 130 g CO2/km for the average new car fleet by means of improvements in vehicle motor technology, and a further reduction of 10 g CO2/km, or equivalent if technically necessary, by other technological improvements and by an increased use of biofuels.

In order to provide a basis for the assessment of the future legislative framework, baseline assumptions have been made and are presented in section 4.2.

2.5. Subsidiarity principle

The subsidiarity principle is respected, since the policy objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by actions of the Member States, and can be better achieved at Community level. European Community action is necessary because of the need to avoid the emergence of barriers to the single market notably in the field of the automotive industry, and because of the transnational nature of climate change. At the national level, Member States can monitor the average specific CO2 emissions of the new cars registered in their territory for the purpose of compilation and comparison at the EU level against the established target. However, in view of the widely varying characteristics of the new cars sold in the various EU Member States, domestic action would not allow for the achievement of a target defined as the average of the EU new car sales. Taking a wider perspective, Member States can also facilitate the implementation of the legislation via action at the national level, notably to raise awareness about climate change and drive consumer demand towards more fuel efficient vehicles.

3. Objectives

3.1. Policy objectives

The proposal pursues the following general policy objectives:

· Providing for a high level of environmental protection in the European Union and contributing to reaching the EU's Kyoto targets,

· Improving the EU energy security of supply,

· Fostering the competitiveness of the European automotive industry and encouraging research into fuel efficiency technologies.

The specific objectives cover:

· Reducing the climate change impacts and improving the fuel efficiency of passenger cars by reaching the objective of an average emission value of 130 g CO2/km for newly sold cars.

The operational objectives include:

· Designing a legislative framework efficiently implementing the average new car fleet target ensuring competitively neutral and socially equitable and sustainable reduction targets which are equitable to the diversity of the European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between automobile manufacturers. The legislative framework will be compatible with the overall objective of reaching the EU's Kyoto targets.

3.2. Consistency with horizontal objectives of the European Union

3.2.1. Lisbon strategy

The policy objectives of the revised strategy are in line with the three pillars of the European Union’s Lisbon strategy, namely "making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work", "knowledge and innovation for growth" and "creating more and better jobs".

Tighter requirements on CO2 emissions and fuel efficiency for passenger cars will encourage the development and application of new environmental technologies. The policy objectives therefore promote innovation and technological development, enabling the EU car industry to achieve global leadership in the field of clean and fuel efficient technologies. Europe already has world leading diesel engine technology, and will be able to further develop this technology while making advances in petrol engines fuel efficiency and hybrid powertrains.

Leadership in fuel efficiency should in the short term pave the way to exports of technologies and vehicles to emerging markets where oil is scarce and that have set ambitious fuel efficiency targets. In the longer term, it is expected to provide a long-standing competitive edge and the advanced technologies required to move towards a truly low-carbon road transport system.

By promoting further advances in technologies, the strategy will promote highly qualified jobs in Europe. Although the industry has pointed to the risk of the production capacity being relocated outside the EU to reduce labour costs while meeting fuel efficiency standards, it should be noted that non-EU manufacturers (from Japan, Korea and the United States) will be subject to the same standards as regards their exports to Europe, and that stringent fuel efficiency policies are already implemented in their domestic market and, in some cases, currently subject to a revision. It should, however, be noted that those European producers that have proportionally higher sales on the European market will be proportionally more affected by the new policy instrument than some of their international competitors. To ensure that the new legislative framework is in line with the Lisbon Strategy, the design of the instrument will seek to minimise the cost consequences to manufacturing and to consumers while ensuring that the diverse nature of the European car industry (which plays a substantial role in its global competitiveness) is preserved.

3.2.2. Sustainable Development strategy

The overall objective of the Renewed Sustainable Development Strategy (RSDS) of the European Union [10], as regards sustainable transport is "to ensure that our transport systems meet society’s economic, social and environmental needs whilst minimising their undesirable impacts on the economy, society and the environment". The related operational objective and targets are to ensure the decoupling of economic growth and the demand for transport with the aim of reducing environmental impacts, achieving sustainable levels of transport energy use and reducing transport greenhouse gas emissions and "in line with the EU strategy on CO2 emissions from light duty vehicles, the average new car fleet should achieve CO2 emissions of 140g/km (2008/09) and 120g/km (2012)".

The policy objectives of the revised CO2 and cars strategy are in line with the RSDS by contributing to a more sustainable mobility. Making transport more sustainable would facilitate achieving other sustainable development goals. This relationship is particularly strong between transport and climate change, public health, conservation of natural resources and social inclusion. Leaner vehicles will bring economic, social and environmental benefits by reducing the energy consumption induced by their use. The implementation of the RSDS also means that challenges must be addressed in parallel in the face of sometimes conflicting objectives. Such situations include for example air quality and climate change (e.g. reducing nitrogen oxides vs. reducing CO2) or environment and safety (e.g. impacts on average car weight), and all aspects must be addressed in a compatible way. The assessment of Member States contributions to the first progress report on EU SDS implementation shows that all Member States are taking some action on promoting sustainable energy use and reducing greenhouse gas emissions via mainly fiscal measures designed to stimulate the purchase of smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles and to promote alternative fuels. However, it is clear that only few Member States perform well in terms of taking actions to realize the objectives. There is therefore a justified concern about the effectiveness of Member States action in this field and the proposed initiative taken at the EU level could substantially support the action of Member States.

4. Policy options

4.1. Introduction and options discarded at an early stage

On the basis of the earlier impact assessments accompanying the review of the CO2 and cars strategy and the CARS21 Communication, the Commission has concluded in February 2007 that "as the voluntary agreement did not succeed, (it) considered necessary to resort to a legislative approach". As a result, the options of "no policy change" and of "alternatives to regulation" (voluntary agreement) have been discarded at an early stage.

The use of regulatory market mechanisms could be envisaged as a regulatory option, but was also discarded at an early stage:

· Concerns about its effectiveness and the difficulty of adopting proposals on the basis of unanimity have led to excluding the option of relying exclusively on excise duties in transport fuels as a policy option;

· As regards a possible link of road transport to the EU Emission trading system, the Commission has announced that it would consider this option for the third trading period, which will begin in 2013. This assessment will take into account differences in sectoral abatement costs, market impacts, the compatibility of this approach with a possible sector specific target setting for road transport, the need to promote technological innovation as well as to achieving CO2 reductions in a globally cost-effective manner. This option has thus been also discarded for the present exercise, because the timetable as defined by the Commission committed for the delivery of the 130 g CO2/km target in 2012.

This section will thus focus on the various ways in which a "conventional" regulatory approach could be designed so as to follow the criteria outlined by the Commission in the earlier Communications (as described in Section 3.1).

4.2. Design parameters

The EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from light vehicles defines CO2 emission targets for the "average new vehicle fleet sold in 2012". This means that, the average of the CO2 emissions of all the new vehicles of all models and segments placed on the market by all EU and non EU manufacturers need to respect the stated CO2 objectives. The question thus arises of how to translate this "overall" average-based target into a legislative proposal in a way that allows a burden sharing between the various stakeholders concerned, taking into account in particular the specific and operational objectives listed in Section 3.1. The main questions of the present impact assessment are thus linked to distributional compliance with an established target: who is responsible for the delivery, how, what are the flexibilities and what is the compliance mechanism?

A number of parameters need to be considered in order to be able to design a legislative framework, which would be cost-effective, efficient, consistent and practically workable.

4.2.1. Who should be responsible for delivering CO2 reductions under the new system?

Consideration must be given to who should be regulated i.e. amongst which stakeholders the burden (the delivery of the EU average target) will be shared.

The legal obligation could rest directly on the automotive industry (i.e. on the car manufacturers in the general sense namely the person or entity responsible for the type approval of the vehicles placed on the market), on dealers and retailers of vehicles in Member States, or on Member States themselves, which would then have to translate the obligations at the national level through secondary legislation.

Options setting the obligations at the level of Member State would not offer the necessary practical workability: indeed, they would not allow an easy link to be made between the national obligations and the overall EU targets which are defined for the average of all the new cars sold in the EU27 in 2012. This problem would be complicated from the start by the fact that average new car sale CO2 emissions are very different in various Member States (in 2006, the average new car sold in Portugal emitted 144 g CO2/km, against 187 g CO2/km in Sweden – see (...)Figure 5). Such an approach would thus either impose an un-transparent "burden sharing" between Member States which creates difficulties and goes against the spirit of EU-wide policies of the CO2 efficiency of cars as assisting Member States in meeting the targets for the non EU ETS sectors. First of all, it is unknown how much EU-wide measures will deliver exactly in each Member State. EU-wide regulations of the CO2 efficiency of cars will reduce emissions in relative terms per car, but actual reductions will depend on the amount of cars sold, the amount of mileage driven, driving behavior, or the extent to which a Member State takes supplementary measures such as car (CO2) taxation, fuel taxation etc. Secondly this approach could also contribute to distortions of competition between national car markets. As Member States have little control over the contributions that manufacturers could make to their targets, defining national targets could contribute to an unwelcome fragmentation of the market with little certainty over their environmental outcome (restrictions on certain vehicles in certain countries would likely be circumvented by consumers purchasing in other more flexible countries).

Figure 5 - Average new car fleet CO2 emissions in EU15, EU10 and individual Member States (source: data reported by Member States under Decision 1753/2000/EC, year 2006)

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To a great extent, attributing the obligation to dealers or retailers of cars would raise similar problems as with Member States being the regulated entity: dealers are usually implanted nationally and they have little control over the cars that are produced by carmakers.

Car manufacturers on the other hand operate on the basis of a single European market and are directly in control of the product mix they offer for sale on the various EU national markets, and can better follow the evolution of their sales in the course of a year. They cannot directly influence the marketing choices made by their competitors (and related impacts on the fleet average CO2 emissions) but they are able to put in place an EU wide sales policy more compatible with the definition of the EU target. Furthermore, car manufacturers have a long standing experience in monitoring their sales and CO2 performance: although the voluntary commitments did not prove successful, the monitoring mechanisms in place have shown the ability of both Member States to deliver good quality data, and of manufacturers to follow accurately their performance under the agreement.

As a result, it was decided to consider regulatory options having car manufacturers as regulated entity, without prejudice as to whether the CO2 limit would be defined at the vehicle or manufacturer level.

4.2.2. How can the burden be shared between car manufacturers?

Having selected car manufacturers as the regulated entity, it is then necessary to devise a method in order to share the reduction burden between the stakeholders concerned. Three main options have been identified to that effect:

· Uniform target: the same obligation could be given to all car manufacturers i.e. they would all have to individually meet the 130 g CO2/km target by 2012. In view of the wide variety of vehicles and emission levels on the market today (ranging from 88 to 560 g CO2/km), the achievement of a uniform 130 g CO2/km target would only be possible with the introduction of market mechanisms (cap and trade) at the manufacturer level. This would ensure that the objective of 130 g CO2/km is met, provided that all manufacturers respect the target or that it is possible to trade a sufficient number of “credits” between manufacturers.

· Utility based targets: in this approach, the CO2 obligation would be defined as a function of a so-called "utility" parameter reflecting the utility of the cars as perceived by customers. This would reflect the fact that different cars have different utilities and emit different levels of CO2 (i.e. that a family station wagon emits more than a mini urban car). As regards the utility function that could be used, both linear and non-linear approaches have been considered in the supporting study. However non-linear approaches have been discarded because the sales-weighted cloud of points representing cars' utility and CO2 did not show a marked non-linear trend. Besides non-linear approaches did not appear to deliver benefits in terms of cost-efficiency/competitive neutrality (an assessment confirmed by subsequent analysis - see section 5.2.2) compared to linear functions that are more transparent and thus less sensitive to regulatory capture. It should also be underlined that linear functions do not imply that small and big cars have to deliver the same relative effort – see discussion on the slope of the curve in Box 2. The question that arises is which utility parameter would be the most suitable. After analysis based on external expertise and taking into account the results of the public consultation, two parameters have been retained for further consideration: mass [11] and footprint [12]. These two parameters are also the ones used on the other important world markets (USA use footprint for light trucks, and Japan and China use mass for passenger cars). This system, which reflects better the "diversity" of cars/car makers, would provide more realistic targets for individual manufacturers, but could be the source of perverse incentives (e.g. if carmakers chose to increase utility instead of decreasing CO2 – see discussion below on utility parameters). Means to prevent such perverse incentives should be considered in order to ensure that 130 g CO2/km target is respected.

· Percentage reduction based targets: in this approach, the CO2 obligation would be defined as a function of a percentage reduction compared to earlier performance. The "% reduction" method is based at the manufacturer level on a % reduction applied to a baseline (e.g. the 2006 emission level) and could include fines/feebates or trading. This method respects diversity and seems a priori fair to all manufacturers as all have to deliver the same relative reduction, although in absolute terms bigger emitters will have to deliver more CO2 reductions than small ones (percentage). This method requires agreement to be reached on a baseline and can only be applied at the manufacturer level (since it is impossible to know how individual cars will evolve in five years - the 2012 "Golf" cannot be asked to emit X% less than the 2006 "Golf"). Special provisions would be needed for new entrants on the market, since they would not have a baseline against which to define the reduction target.

In practical terms, deriving the 2012 obligation for all three options and analysing their impacts require assumptions to be made on the evolution from the 2006 situation, and the related costs and CO2 impacts (see boxes 1 and 2).

Box 1: defining the obligation for all three options, taking into account potential changes in the fleet composition

The baseline relies on the 2006 data [13] of cars sold in the EU15. New cars sold in the EU10 represented just above 3% of EU25 sales in 2006 (no data available for Bulgaria and Romania for 2006), and it is not expected that EU10 sales will follow significantly different patterns than those of EU15 up to 2012 (although likely to increase in absolute terms). Consequently it is considered that the EU15 baseline provides enough information for the purpose of EU27 projections at the 2012 horizon.

By using 2006 data on CO2 emissions and utility it is possible to determine a sales weighted correlation-line for 2006 (with CO2 emissions as a function of utility). On this basis, assumptions need to be made in order to derive a baseline for the 2012 new car fleet. The model used for the cost assessment relies on an overall segmentation [14] which is not expected to vary significantly between now and 2012. The most relevant factor [15]to take into account to project the 2012 fleet is the evolution of its average mass, and assumptions need to be made on the expected Autonomous Mass Increase (AMI) between 2006 and 2012 as a function of historic trends, price signals including measures addressing demand such as fiscal incentives. This was previously analysed in the earlier impact assessments. In the earlier impact assessments, two assumptions were made: the historic assumption assumed that a 1.5 % per year mass increase will take place between 2006 and 2012 – this assumption was based on historic data, a lower assumption of 0.82 % per year assumed that due to external factors (e.g. revised labelling directive, fiscal measures in Member States) and because safety improvements (which tend to add additional mass to vehicles) will not have the same weight effect as in the past. This is because the most important "passive safety" measures (restraint systems, airbags) are "one-offs" that have by now been introduced on most new cars while additional systems and new auxiliaries will largely relate to electronics based "active safety" with limited mass implications. Two additional scenarios were modelled assuming an extreme mass increase of 2.5 % and no mass increase assuming that the proposed legislative framework will provide a strong deterrent against any further mass increase.

Consequently, to account for the variety of possible futures and the important uncertainties involved in forward projections of consumers and producers behaviours, the impact assessment is conducted on the basis of multiple AMI scenarios: 1. 0%, 2. 0.82 %, 3. 1.5 % and 4. 2.5 %.

Because mass increase leads to an increase in CO2 emissions, AMI will have an impact on the costs to achieve the target because its CO2 impact needs to be compensated (this means that if AMI occurs, even maintaining a constant CO2 emission level has a cost, as the mass effect on CO2 needs to be compensated).

Building on these four 2012 scenarios, it is then possible to define 2012 trend lines such that by that year, the average new car fleet respects the 130 gram target: clearly, for Option 1 "Uniform target", the 2012 lines corresponds to a horizontal line (y=130 gram – see (...)Figure 6) that manufacturers must respect; the line is independent of the AMI assumptions, which will only affect costs. Similarly for Option 3 "% reduction", the manufacturer targets are defined against their 2006 levels, and thus again AMI affects the costs, not the target setting. For Option 2 "Utility line" however, because the 2012 line will define for each vehicle a CO2 objective as a function of a utility parameter, AMI needs to be considered when building the target curve if mass is used as utility. The 2012 line derived from the 2006 line without compensating for any AMI-related CO2 increase would result in the fleet not reaching 130 grams on average. On the other hand, if an assumed AMI does not occur in practice manufacturers would have to deliver more than 130g CO2/km on average. As can be seen from the graphs in (...)Figure 6 assuming a 0.82% AMI with mass as the parameter, would lead to a higher percentage reduction in CO2 than is the case with using pan area as parameter. For Option 2, (should mass be used as the utility parameter) the linear function must therefore make a correct assumption on the AMI (or include an adaptation mechanism, which would allow to correct the AMI assumption made today in order to reflect real-world developments closer to the target date) to ensure that the target to be met in 2012 is in reality 130 g CO2/km and to avoid an over or under achievement.

The figure below represents the 2006 trend line, the horizontal line for Option 1 (y=130 g CO2/km) and different inclinations of the utility line for Option 2 for mass and for footprint (Option 3 cannot be represented graphically since it would be based on a table giving per manufacturer the CO2 objective to be reached).

Figure 6 - Examples of graphical representations for Options 1 and 2 using mass and footprint as utility parameter assuming an AMI of 0.82% without any prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen (for mass, the 0.82% AMI assumption per year leads to a higher overall reduction requirement than for footprint: the reasons is that the increased CO2 emissions resulting from the AMI have to be compensated by an additional CO2 reduction requirement, explaining the figure of -21% for weight against -18.3% for footprint).

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The following figure illustrates the influence of different assumptions on AWI on the limit value curve for the case of a 60% slope.

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Box 2 – refining Option 2 through different inclinations

As explained in Box 1, Option 2 will be represented by a linear function giving the CO2 limit as a function of utility: the line is such that, taking into account the assumption made on the AMI, the average new car fleet in 2012 will respect 130 grams. The most straight forward way to derive the 2012 curve is to start from the 2006 curve to which a uniform reduction [16] is applied: this results in shifting downwards and tilting the 2006 line into a 2012 limit line. By definition, the 2006 trend line provides the best statistical relation between utility parameter and CO2; applying the same relative reduction to all points on the 2006 line to derive the 2012 line will maintain this “fully parametered” relation. It will be called the 100% inclination.

On this curve, the point having the 2012 average utility and average CO2 value (130 gram) will be the centre of gravity of the 2012 sales. This means that if the 2012 limit line was rotated around this point, the average would still be 130 grams, and thus the objective achieved. The rotation could have the effect of making the curve flatter than the 100% inclination curve, in which case the cars with a higher utility would have to reduce emissions relatively more than lower utility cars (compared to the 100% curve which strictly maintains the utility/CO2 relation): these curves will have a lower inclination (see 40, 60, 80% lines on (...)Figure 6). Alternatively, the curve could be steeper than 100%: small utility cars would be asked more reductions than bigger cars (see 120% inclination on (...)Figure 6). Variations in inclination will have different impacts on manufacturers, depending on their current levels and on their abatement costs, and on the achievement of the environmental outcome.

The curves as depicted in Figure 6 can be expressed in the following form:

Target = 130g/km + a × (u - u0)

a = slope parameter

u = utility parameter of the vehicle

u0 = projected average utility parameter

The parameters a and u0 are shown in the following table for a number of slopes and for mass as utility parameter.

AMI | Slope | a [(g/km) / kg] | M0 [kg] |

0% | 40% | 0,0305 | 1289,0 |

| 50% | 0,0381 | 1289,0 |

| 60% | 0,0457 | 1289,0 |

| 70% | 0,0533 | 1289,0 |

| 80% | 0,0610 | 1289,0 |

0.82% | 40% | 0,0294 | 1353,7 |

| 50% | 0,0367 | 1353,7 |

| 60% | 0,0441 | 1353,7 |

| 70% | 0,0514 | 1353,7 |

| 80% | 0,0588 | 1353,7 |

1.5% | 40% | 0,0285 | 1409,4 |

| 50% | 0,0357 | 1409,4 |

| 60% | 0,0428 | 1409,4 |

| 70% | 0,0499 | 1409,4 |

| 80% | 0,0571 | 1409,4 |

Each of the above mentioned main options include a wide variety of sub-options, depending on whether the CO2 limit is defined at the vehicle or manufacturer level, depending on whether and what flexibility mechanisms are foreseen, the types of compliance mechanisms etc. These additional parameters are discussed below.

4.2.3. Flexibility mechanisms

Flexibility will be an important determinant of the cost implications of future legislation. Different levels of flexibility will be envisaged:

· Fleet averaging: manufacturers could average their CO2 emissions over their fleet (rather than having to respect a target for each car they sell);

· Pooling: manufacturers could do the same fleet averaging amongst companies belonging to the same group; similarly different manufacturers could be allowed to create a pool on their own initiative and trade the credits they need, should this help to optimise the cost of delivering CO2 reductions needed;

· Trading: an internal trading system could be put in place, whereby manufacturers would buy and sell the credits needed in order to overall achieve the target set by the legislation;

· Specialist derogation for small volume independent manufacturers:some specialised independent manufacturers who make small numbers of vehicles such as sports cars may not find either solution accessible e.g. through a lack of pooling partners.

Fleet averaging will be modelled by the fact that at the manufacturer level, the model assumes that the cheapest reductions are delivered first. Trading will also be modelled, with the same assumption across the whole fleet. These two flexibility options will set the boundaries for the impact of pooling on abatement costs as this option can be considered as an intermediate option between fleet averaging and full trading.

Banking and borrowing are additional options that introduce a time related flexibility whereby car manufacturers could either bank overachievement in year N, and use it in year N+1 if they under achieve, or do less in year N (borrowing) provided they deliver more in year N+1. Because the objective must be reached at a given date (2012), borrowing will not be considered. The relevance of banking will be assessed.

The possibility of combining Options 2 and 3 has also been put forward. The idea would be to give the choice to manufacturers of either meeting a utility based target, or delivering a % reduction. This solution could provide flexibility for niche manufacturers who would face a very high burden against a utility curve, and could thus be better off delivering a % reduction, even if it was an above average reduction.

The specialist derogation has not been investigated in further detail because of its very small impact on the overall level of achieved average emissions.,A suitable level of cut-off appears to be an annual production volume of 10,000 vehicles.In order to provide incentives for such manufacturers to also improve their vehicles, ad-hoc targets could be set for each one, in view of the efforts made by the bulk of the vehicle fleet and depending on the characteristics of their own fleet.

4.2.4. Compliance mechanisms

Two main types of compliance mechanisms can be envisaged in the case of an automotive legislation:

· Market access restrictions in case of non-compliance: this is the most rigid system. Because average fleet can only be calculated ex-post, such an ex-ante system can only be applied at the level of individual vehicles. Because the EU target is defined as the average of the CO2 emissions of the new cars sold in a given year, even if non compliant vehicles are prevented from accessing the market, there will be no guarantee that the average emission level will respect the set target (unless the target is uniform for all vehicles, which is not realistic as explained in section 4.2.2). Finally such an approach would not allow for any flexibility due to the very nature of market access restrictions. Besides, using market access restrictions would not allow targets to be set as a fleet average for manufacturers, since it would then be impossible to identify the vehicles to exclude from the market.

· Financial penalties in case of non compliance: non-compliance would result in a payment of an excess emission premium (EPP) defined in €/gram above the established target, depending on the regulatory system in place. On the one hand, the objective of the regulatory scheme is to deliver the CO2 targets and penalties should act as a deterrent to ensure that emissions reductions are delivered (in order to prevent a cheap buy out instead of the delivery of the target). On the other hand, penalties should remain proportionate, take into account the cost of CO2 and not undermine the global competitiveness of the European automotive industry (European manufacturers will be more affected due to having a higher proportion of global sales on the EU market). The premium could be paid for every vehicle above the limit, or be calculated at the manufacturer level after fleet averaging (which would allow low emitting cars to offset cars above the limit); in the latter case the premium would be calculated as the product of the distance to target (in grams) by the premium level (€/gram) and by the number of cars sold by the car manufacturer under consideration.

Based on the above considerations, financial penalties have been identified as being the most suitable way forward. The level of the premium will obviously be of crucial importance for both the effectiveness of the scheme as well as the competitiveness of the automotive industry. Three aspects have been taken into account when considering possible premium levels:

· Deterrent effect against non compliance: the objective of the legislation being the achievement of the CO2 average fleet targets, penalties must be sufficiently high in order to have a deterrent effect. A possible benchmark to guarantee this deterrent effect would be to set the level of the penalties at least at the level of the technical costs to achieve the target: under this approach it would basically cost more to miss the target than to introduce the technologies needed to meet it. For this approach, it should be noted that the technical cost curves are not linear, which means that different actors in the market face different marginal costs of abatement: achieving a deterrent effect across the board would require basing premium levels on the upper range of the marginal abatement costs (150 €/gram) for certain manufacturers. A premium of 150 €/gram could be considered as an example of a premium level which would provide a very strong deterrent effect, while 25 €/gram would reflect the lower range of the average abatement cost. An upper range of the marginal abatement costs (95 €/gram) for mainstream manufacturers could be also considered [17].

· Competitiveness dimension: the second effect to consider when setting the level of the penalties is their effect on global competitiveness and the automotive value chain's ability to continue contributing to the Growth and Jobs agenda. Depending on the level of premiums and on the extent to which the target could be missed, a manufacturer could potentially face very high overall penalties. (see section 5.3.2). Given that the marginal CO2 abatement cost through vehicle technology is relatively high, premium levels based on technical costs could led to high premium levels. Furthermore, high premium levels will have a different overall impact on different market participants depending on the proportion of their global sales in the European market. The issue of proportionality should also be considered given that premiums based on technical costs would price CO2 at a significantly higher price than the price of CO2 under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. This issue also has to be placed into the context of the EU industry's competitiveness as a whole: on the one hand a number of sectors within the ETS are more subject to international competition when placing their products on the EU market than car manufacturers, who will all have to respect the EU CO2 legislation; on the other hand, sectors in the ETS have the opportunity to purchase CO2 on the open market at the market price, which the automotive industry cannot do. A premium level of 7€/g - 10€/gram would reflect a range for the expected price of carbon under the ETS system in the future while a premium level of 25€ /gram would reflect the ETS penalty price.

· Time dimension: Together with the competitiveness dimension, it should also be taken into account that manufacturers do not have full control over the average of their sales in a given year and the target is defined as the average of all the cars placed on the market. This creates a margin for error, which manufacturers could to a degree reduce through putting in place continuous sales monitoring or through introducing a safety margin for uncertainties. The combination of these factors suggests that there would be a case for allowing a gradual increase in the premium level over time, to reflect the uncertainties faced by manufacturers. Using such a gradual approach could be designed in such a way that it becomes more and more costly to miss on the delivery of the target. Such an approach could be to introduce a gradually increasing premium, whereby the premium in year N+1 would be higher than the premium in year N.

Against this background, premium levels set in legislative frameworks pursuing similar objectives are of interest, although situations are not stricto sensu comparable:

· Fines under the U.S. CAFE programme (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) are set at $5.5 for every tenth gallon/mile by which the target is exceeded and US fines correspond to roughly 10-15 €/gCO2/km [18]. The US CAFE programme is based on a uniform fuel efficiency target set for the average fleet of all manufacturers selling cars in the US. It was designed in the 1970s, and reflects the fact that major car manufacturers offer vehicles in all market segments, thus being able to overall deliver on the fleet targets. As far as European carmakers are concerned, because their average fleet did not meet the CAFE standards, they have regularly been fined for non compliance: in 2004, Porsche paid more than 6.3 M$, Volkswagen 3.4 M$ and DaimlerChrysler 8.5M$ [19]. Although the fact that only certain manufacturers pay fines reflects one of the drawbacks of a uniform target based approach, it also shows that the level of the fines did not achieve a deterrent to non compliance in the US;

· Fines for non-compliance in the Japanese top-runner system at set at circa € 6000 per manufacturer: while the figure is very low, it is noteworthy that all manufacturers subject to the system have met the 2010 Japanese standard way ahead of the deadline, which would indicate either that compliance with the standard was relatively easy, or that in Japan other considerations than the deterrent effect of financial penalties would have driven car manufacturers to deliver targets that were attributed to them by the authorities;

· Another relevant example is that of the compliance mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading Directive, whereby the penalty level for non compliance is set at 100 € per ton of CO2 for the 2008-2012 trading period. This level of financial premium, which would correspond to an estimated 25€ per g CO2/km [20] is considerably lower than marginal costs to reach the 130 g CO2/km. However it should be underlined that, to remain inline with the EU ETS approach, the missing reductions in year N would be subject to both the said penalty and the obligation in year N+1 to deliver the missing reductions.

· Taking into account the current discussions regarding the GHG/RES impact assessments, a premium level of 7 to 10€/gram would reflect the possible future price of carbon post-2012.

Based on the cost estimates provided in the supporting study and taking into account the above mentioned considerations five hypotheses have been retained for the further analysis: 7€ per g, 10€ per g, 25€ per g, 95€ per g and 150€ per g. Consideration will also be given to a possible gradual increase in the level of the premiums over time. A careful balance has to be struck between the deterrent effect on the one hand and the effects on the global competitiveness on the other.]

4.3. Conclusion and summary of the policy options identified

Based on the analysis of the possible options described in the previous sections, the following regulatory options have been considered as possible means to meet the policy objectives identified in section 3.1:

(1) Uniform target: this option sets a common CO2 emission limit for each manufacturer for the average of their new passenger car fleets sold in 2012. To be workable, this option needs to rely on a trading mechanism providing the necessary flexibility in view of the current diversity of car manufacturers;

(2) Utility parameter based limit curve: a linear function provides the CO2 limit to be respected as a function of the utility of the vehicle under consideration. Two utility parameters have been identified: mass and footprint. Furthermore there are various ways to establish the linear function, as an inflexion of its inclination will influence the way in which the burden is shared amongst manufacturers and the certainty of the environmental outcome;

(3) % reduction based targets: on the basis of the 2006 emission levels averaged per manufacturer, reduction targets are established corresponding to the distance between the current level and the 2012 target (e.g. for passenger cars the distance between the 2006 level of 160 g CO2/km and the 2012 target of 130 g CO2/km corresponds to a circa 19% reduction, so all manufacturers would have to deliver by 2012 a 19% against their 2006 levels).

For all options, flexibility mechanisms, and compliance mechanisms based on premium levels of 7€/gram, 10€/gram, 25€/gram, 95€/gram and 150 €/gram will be considered, including the possibility of a gradual increase in the level of the premiums over time.

5. Analysis of impacts

In its February Communication, the Commission has set out the operational objectives listed in section 3.1. These principles will be considered as part of the overarching economic, social and environmental impacts for the purpose of the analysis of the options.

The economic impacts are primarily analysed with regard to overall cost-effectiveness, distributional effects among manufacturers and innovation and trade. The social impacts are primarily analysed with regard to employment, affordability of cars and the effect on different segments of the vehicle market. The environmental impacts are primarily analysed with regard to effectiveness of the different options.

It should be underlined that the respect of these principles, which can broadly be grouped into social equity, neutrality for competition and cost-efficiency (including achievement of the environmental outcome) can in some cases lead to trade offs for example between the competitive position of certain manufacturers on the one hand, and the objective of maintaining the affordability of cars on the other; similarly, depending on its stringency, the compliance mechanism could influence significantly the environmental outcome of the scheme as well as the competitive position of European manufacturers compared to both domestic and international competitors. The analysis of the impacts will thus be carried out taking into account the separate principles first in the present section, and then bringing together the assessment in Section 6 in order to provide an overview of the impacts and possible trade offs of the three options considered against the said principles.

5.1. Description of the methodology

The methodology followed for the analysis of the impacts of the policy options builds upon the analytical framework developed in support of the earlier impact assessments complemented by the supporting study and stakeholder input provided through the public consultation. To reflect in the modelling the overall socio-economic impacts, the modelling time horizon is 2020.

The quantitative assessment of the economic, environmental and social impacts of the policy options for the regulation is function of the cost increase per segment, the related fuel cost savings, and the way in which manufacturers will pass through costs to consumers at the segment level and by cross subsidisation between segments since fleet averaging would be allowed. Obviously, modelling the evolution of the car market segmentation, and different manufacturers behaviour, is difficult, and the IA report relies on two assessment sources in order to provide the upper and lower boundaries of the cost effectiveness of the options pursued.

5.1.1. Ex-ante estimates from the supporting study

The cost model used in the supporting study is based on 6 cost curves covering small, petrol and large diesel and petrol vehicles (see (...)Figure 7), and is well known to stakeholders: the cost curves have been developed further to an extensive consultation in the preparation of the earlier impact assessments [21].

Figure 7 - Cost curves for manufacturer costs and retail price increase (based on Task A but excluding manufacturer and dealer margins)

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As explained in Box 1, on the basis of fleet evolution assumptions between 2006 and 2012, the cost model used in the supporting IEEP/TNO/CE study provides ex-ante compliance cost estimates at the manufacturer level, and thus cost-effectiveness estimates taking into account the related fuel savings. In this ex-ante assessment, no significant variation to overall segmentation of the car market is expected by 2012, bearing in mind that the segmentation under consideration is not the refined market segmentation (mini, sedan, sport...) but the six general segments of the cost model: small, medium and large for petrol and diesel vehicles.

5.1.2. Dynamic modelling with TREMOVE

In addition to the modelling of cost impacts at manufacturer and consumer level, TREMOVE runs have been carried out. TREMOVE is a transport and emissions simulation model developed for the European Commission. It is designed to study the effects of different transport and environment policies on the emissions of the transport sector. The model estimates the changes in transport demand, modal split, vehicle fleets, emissions of air pollutants and welfare level of different policy scenarios. The scenarios for the present IA report have been modelled using the latest version of the model TREMOVE 2.52, which covers all EU-27 Member States over the period 1995-2030. The details on the model structure and the baseline can be found in the final report of the service contract for the development of the model [22].

For the present report, a variant of the baseline, called 2.53, has been used, modifying both the type-approval CO2 emissions and vehicle retail costs over the period 2006-2012 and beyond, in order to be fully consistent with the assumptions used in the [supporting study] for baseline b1. The results presented here cannot therefore be directly compared to the calculation of cost-effectiveness of SEC(2007) 60, that referred to 140g by 2008/9 as a baseline. Another factor makes difficult any comparison with the TREMOVE runs undertaken in 2006: the model has been substantially improved in 2007 by Transport & Mobility Leuven, on the basis of the expert model review and stakeholder suggestions: The main changes are an update of the emission factors model (from Copert III to Copert IV) and the improvement of the vehicle choice logit module (i.a. introducing imperfect consumer information on fuel savings over lifetime, as discussed in June 2006 workshop on TREMOVE vehicle choice modelling). Moreover, the present simulations are performed very close to TREMOVE model boundary conditions. The coarse segmentation in 6 vehicle categories was very useful to define ambition levels – and this was done in 2006 for SEC(2007) 60 – but is less adapted for the fine tuning of the regulation.

Against that background, the three options have been modelled with TREMOVE (for Option 2, both mass and footprint and slopes of 40 and 80% have been considered in order to provide a representative overview of the slopes under consideration). The scenarios implemented consist in a variation of the car purchase price, for each vehicle category (small, medium and large, for both petrol and diesel cars), over the period 2006-2012, together with a variation in fuel consumption, both variables expressed in relative terms as a percentage variation over 2002 absolute levels (TREMOVE does not take into account increased maintenance costs for the purpose of assessing the impacts of environmental legislation). Using the TREMOVE model allows assessing the effect of potential changes in sales structure on the cost-effectiveness of the scheme.

5.2. Economic impacts

5.2.1. Least cost solution for the society and cost-effectiveness

The economic impacts for the society as a whole are first and foremost function of the level of ambition of the targets which were defined by the Commission in its earlier Communications on the basis of the earlier impact assessments. Based on the ex-ante cost assessment model used to assess different approaches/options for target setting, the least cost option for the society at manufacturer level would be based on Option 2, with a % inclination of circa 123% [23] i.e. a line which would require more savings from cars with a small utility compared to bigger cars. This is mainly explained by the fact that the bulk of the sales in the EU take place in the small and medium segments (thus reductions in the bigger segments only would not suffice to deliver the average targets).

Obviously, the least cost solution would lead to substantially higher cost increases for small cars and thus raise concerns in terms of affordability. It is noteworthy that although the optimum lies above 120%, the average cost variations per car when fleet averaging is allowed do not vary much for inclinations between 60% up to 140%; even at a 40% inclination, the average cost is still less than 4% above the least cost solution. It can thus be concluded that other inclinations than the cost-optimised solution could be taken, in view of other objectives and of the fact that the cost variation remains limited. Indeed, the earlier Communication on CO2 and cars endorsed a wide-ranging notion of cost-effectiveness that accounts notably for security of energy supply, sensitivity to international competition, affordability for consumers and positive rebound effects, effects that could not be modelled completely in such cost-optimisation.

In terms of net present value and cost effectiveness, (...)Table 2 provides an indication of the cost-effectiveness of the options, based on the two methods described above

Table 2 - Cost-effectiveness of the three options over the 2006-2020 period (source Supporting study and TREMOVE)

| Cost effectiveness in €/t CO2 | TREMOVE | Supporting study (ex-ante) |

| | NPV Cost to society 2006-2020 (M€) | WtW CO2eq Abatement 2006-2020 (Mt) | €/t CO2 | |

Option 1 | Uniform target per manufacturer with trading | 9.746 | -624 | 15.6 | 45.6 |

Option 2 | 40% slope – Footprint | 22.159 | -638 | 34.7 | 39.8 |

| 80% slope – Footprint | 21.008 | -634 | 33.1 | 36.4 |

| 40% slope – Mass | 21.674 | -638 | 34.0 | 38.7 |

| 80% slope - Mass | 20.523 | -634 | 32.4 | 34.8 |

Option 3 | Percentage reduction per manufacturer | 17.922 | -626 | 28.6 | 34.3 |

As described later in the report, the TREMOVE runs suggest a substantial change in the sales structure, which triggers a much better cost-effectiveness of the scenario with respect to the static ex-ante estimates. This effect is even stronger in the case of Option 1, for which the changes in relative price structure (expressed in lifetime cost for car driver) are bigger. This is why the range of cost-effectiveness values - between the static ex-ante simulation and the dynamic TREMOVE runs – is the widest for this scenario.

As regards the ex-ante calculation, the calculation is based at vehicle level for each vehicle category and aggregated using 2012 TREMOVE 2.52 baseline sales structure per vehicle category. The variation in vehicle purchase price (excluding taxes) is added to the fuel savings (average current 2006-07 average price excluding taxes) over the lifetime of the vehicle, using a 4% discount rate (inline with the IA guidelines). This is why for this calculation, only cost effectiveness results are provided, and neither total costs nor CO2 savings. The accuracy of the ex-ante calculation is function of the distance between the static approach taken and how market trends will actually evolve. It can be considered that both TREMOVE and ex-ante approaches provide respectively a lower and an upper boundary of the cost effectiveness of the legislation.

The output of the [supporting study] can be further exploited to provide useful insights on cost-effectiveness. A sensitivity analysis presented in (...)Table 3 has been performed on two key parameters:

(1) Autonomous weight increase (a.w.i.). The central calculation is based on 0.82% annual increase. Two additional sets of value are provided for respectively 0% and 1.5% a.w.i.

(2) Fuel price. The central estimates are based on an average fuel price before tax of respectively 0.50 and 0.40 for petrol and diesel, based on average prices in the period 2006-2007. A modulation of +/- 30% has been performed.

Table 3 – Sensitivity analysis on ex-ante Cost-effectiveness of the three options, based on alternative autonomous weight increases and fuel prices (source Supporting study)

| Cost effectiveness in €/t CO2 | Alternative Autonomous weight increase | Alternative fuel price |

| | 0.00% | 1.50% | -30% | +30% |

Option 1 | Uniform target per manufacturer with trading | 19.6 | 70.4 | 82.8 | 8.4 |

Option 2 | 40% slope – Footprint | 14.3 | 64.2 | 77.1 | 2.5 |

| 80% slope – Footprint | 11.1 | 60.8 | 73.8 | -1.0 |

| 40% slope – Mass | 13.3 | 63.2 | 76.0 | 1.4 |

| 80% slope - Mass | 9.6 | 59.2 | 72.1 | -2.6 |

Option 3 | Percentage reduction per manufacturer | 8.4 | 59.2 | 71.5 | -3.0 |

Clearly, the way in which the target is delivered, and in particular the burden sharing amongst car manufacturers, will also influence the economic impacts, at least at the level of the automotive industry. Because of the potential distributional effects of different regulatory approaches, one of the specific objectives of the Commission (see section 3.1) is to ensure “competitively neutral targets” that are “equitable to the diversity of European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between automobile manufacturers”.

Against this background, a thorough analysis has been carried out on the impacts at manufacturer level of Options 1, 2 (for mass and footprint and for different inclinations of the line) and 3.

5.2.2. Distributional effects in terms of relative retail price increases at the level of manufacturers and relative reduction requirements per manufacturer

(...)Figure 9, (...)Figure 10, (...)Figure 11 and (...)Figure 12 present the impacts of the three options for the achievement of the 130 g CO2/km target expressed in terms of relative price increase and 2006-2012 reduction requirement, including different inclinations of the line for Option 2 in the case of mass ((...)Figure 9 and (...)Figure 11) and in the case of footprint ((...)Figure 10 and (...)Figure 12).

(...)Figure 13, (...)Figure 14, (...)Figure 15 and (...)Figure 16 present the absolute retail price increase and lifetime fuel savings linked to the achievement of the 130 g CO2/km target at the manufacturer level , including different inclinations of the line for Option 2 in the case of mass ((...)Figure 13 and (...)Figure 15) and footprint ((...)Figure 14 and (...)Figure 16).

These results confirm the intuitive result that the flatter the curve, the more advantageous for manufacturers of smaller cars, which is true for both utility parameters. The use of mass results in slightly higher relative retail price increases for those manufacturers, but the impact remains limited. However, while the same types of manufacturers follow similar patterns, the speed of their cost variation is not the same for all manufacturers. Differences in distributional effects between the different options analysed are much larger than differences in impact on average cost per vehicle.

As regards Option 1 (represented in the subsequent figures by the 0% slope), the consequence of using a uniform target is that manufacturers of relatively smaller cars would find it substantially easier to comply with the future legislation than manufacturers of relatively bigger cars. Using a uniform target raises concerns as to the respect of the diversity of European car manufacturers and does not meet the requirement of competitive neutrality for the European car market, as it would penalise manufacturers of larger cars while not providing sufficient incentive for manufacturers of smaller cars to continue reducing their CO2 emissions once they have reached the level of 130 g CO2/km in the absence of a trading system. As regards trading, an operational system would have to assume that there are sufficient "credits" available on the market.

Option 2 delivers the most even sales-weighted distribution [24] of relative retail price increase per manufacturer, for slopes between 74% and 80% for mass as utility parameter, and between 64% and 68% for footprint (depending on the assumptions made on autonomous mass increase). The most even un-weighted distribution of relative retail price increase per manufacturer is delivered for slopes between 39% and 47% for mass as utility parameter, and between 18% and 27% for footprint (again, depending on the assumptions made on autonomous mass increase). The scatter of relative retail price increases per manufacturer remains quite important, at +/- 4% around the average value of 6%. It derives from this that a linear utility function cannot be tailored to fully equalise the burden per manufacturer in terms of relative retail price increase.

However, the analysis provided by the supporting study (technical note #4) has concluded that in view of the underlying factors leading to this scatter around the mean average, the use of a non-linear utility function would not improve the equalisation of relative retail price increase over the manufacturers.

In (...)Figure 8 below, scatter diagrams show the distribution of CO2 emissions in relation to the two principal utility parameters currently available as listed above. A sales weighted regression line also illustrates that either of these parameters is at first sight a suitable choice. That is, they show a reasonably close correlation to CO2 emissions, but also have a significant R2 value, ie there is a significant ‘bandwidth’ which suggests that there is room for improvement in relation to either parameter. Both also exhibit a significant number of ‘outlier’ models towards the top or right-hand side of the cloud. These figures are based on the complete database of vehicles available on the market in 2006.

Figure 8 - distribution of CO2 emissions in relation to the two principal utility parameters

Vehicle pan area [l x w] | Vehicle mass (empty) |

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Source: Supporting study

Regarding Option 3, the % reduction target leads to a lower average cost per car than for Option 1 or 2, and to a seemingly even distribution of the relative retail price increase per car over all manufacturers (see (...)Figure 9, (...)Figure 10, (...)Figure 11 and (...)Figure 12). However the relative retail price increase per car is higher for manufacturers of small/light/low CO2 emitting cars than for manufacturers of large/heavy/high CO2 emitting cars and thus raises affordability and fairness concerns. Furthermore, in terms of competitiveness and market strategies, an important drawback of Option 3 is that it locks the manufacturers of small/efficient vehicles in their present market position, while manufacturers of large/inefficient vehicles can meet their target by widening their market offering towards smaller segments. Finally, Option 3 leads to higher costs for early movers as they have to climb further on the cost curve to meet the target.

5.2.3. Impacts of the flexibility (trading and pooling)

As explained in section 4.2.3, three forms of flexibility will be addressed: fleet averaging, pooling and trading between manufacturers. Introducing flexibility is partly indented to provide manufacturers with a broader range of options to meet their emission targets, but the extent to which flexibility is used could also have important implications for the overall cost-effectiveness of the system. The cost of reducing CO2 emissions is vehicle specific and consequently the cost-effectiveness of the system would not be optimised if every vehicle would have to comply with specific emission targets. The differences in abatement costs at the vehicle level are independent of the way the targets are set and the three flexibility options would improve cost-effectiveness under all target-setting options.

Applying the target to manufacturers’ average fleet rather than individual vehicles would allow manufacturers to decide for themselves how and in which segments to reduce their average emissions. Reduction of average emissions may be achieved by reducing the emissions of the models where such reductions cost the least although manufacturers are also likely to take portfolio and market considerations into account. The average retail price increase is approximately 6% if the target is applied to manufacturer averages (see (...)Figure 9 and (...)Figure 10), while it increases to 8 % (depending on the way the target is set) if the targets are applied to individual vehicles. The fleet averaging option consequently reduces the overall cost of meeting the targets.

Pooling between two or several manufacturers is in essence a continuation of fleet averaging applied to several manufacturers. Similarly to different vehicles being subject to different abatement costs, different manufacturers are also faced with varying costs of abatement. By allowing pooling, the abatement costs of different manufacturers could theoretically move towards averaging costs, which would result in increased cost-effectiveness. In addition, pooling would allow for niche producers to combine their portfolios with mainstream producers hence helping to address the problem of outliers within the overall system. While the precise impact of pooling on cost-effectiveness will depend on the extent to which manufacturers use this possibility and the nature of the agreements they reach between one another, it is likely that it will take place in practice and has been supported by representatives of the automotive industry during the consultation process.

As regards the effects of trading on the costs of abatement, this flexibility leads to a more even distribution of relative price increases, and sensitivities of manufacturers to the inclination of the line in the case of Option 2 is reduced. At the segment level, the trading option promotes small diesel vehicles, for which additional reductions would not be cost effective without the trading incentive. The supporting study shows that trading does not greatly influence costs for the mainstream manufacturers, but that it could significantly reduce costs for niche/high-emitting manufacturers (an effect that could be achieved with pooling as well). The assessment shows that Option 1 leads to the highest trading activity (5,63.107 g CO2/km or an average of nearly 4 g CO2/km traded for each car sold), with three times more credits exchanged than with Option 3. Option 2, depending on the inclination used for the curve but irrespective of the parameter lies between these two extremes. The fact that traded volumes represent a significant share (10-20%) of the total costs of reaching 130 g CO2/km could justify setting up a trading system although of course the modelling assumes that the overall 2012 target will be met on average and that the market will behave perfectly, and thus trading results in an optimal solution. However, liquidity of the market is not certain (in a worst case scenario if the overall target is missed in 2012 there will not be enough credits to trade) and transaction costs entailed by flexibility mechanisms have not been estimated, although it is very likely that pooling would induce lower transaction costs than implementing a separate, formal sector-wide trading scheme within the timeframe applicable to the future legislation. The outcome of the public consultation has shown that the car industry would rather be in favour of a voluntary "pooling" scheme than of a full scale industry wide scheme. Pooling would thus appear to be the most promising option, especially if sufficient time is offered to manufacturers to assess their potential offer/demand for credits during a given year. In addition, in fact if pooling works perfectly, it could achieve similar result to trading. Consequently, fleet averaging and pooling appear to be the most promising flexibility options at this time to help maximise cost-effectiveness.

It is not expected that the option of pooling or trading would significantly influence decisions on mergers and take overs, as drivers for such operations go far beyond the impacts of a future CO2 legislation. In this respect, Ford has recently announced that it would sell Land Rover and Jaguar, two high emitting brands, without assurances regarding the future regulatory system regarding CO2 and possible flexibilities.

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Figure 9 - Relative retail price increase at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using mass as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study)

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Figure 10 - Relative retail price increase at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using footprint as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study)

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Figure 11 - Relative reduction target expressed as % of 2006 emissions using mass as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (based on supporting study)

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Figure 12 - Relative reduction target expressed as % of 2006 emissions using footprint as parameter (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (based on supporting study)

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Figure 13 - Absolute retail price increase at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using mass as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study)

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Figure 14 - Absolute retail price increase at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using footprint as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study)

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Figure 15 - Absolute fuel savings at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using mass as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study with lifetime mileage of 208.000 km and 4% discount rate)

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Figure 16 - Absolute fuel savings at the manufacturer level for options 1, 2 (incl. variations) and 3, using footprint as utility (a) assuming 0% AMI and (b) assuming 0.82% AMI (without prejudice to the AMI level eventually chosen) and allowing fleet averaging (source supporting study with lifetime mileage of 208.000 km and 4% discount rate)

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5.2.4. Innovation and trade aspects

The possible effects of legislation on areas such as research and development and external trade should also be considered.

The automotive industry accounts for approximatively 20% of manufacturing R&D in Europe and is one of the most important R&D investors in Europe.

Table 4 - Top 20 industrial R&D investors in Europe, 2005

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The 130 g CO2/km target as set out in earlier Communications provides the main stimulus for impacts in the area of research. The ambition level set out by the Commission can be expected to speed up the development and market introduction of more fuel efficient vehicles in the future. Although there are already technologies available to deliver the 130 g CO2/km target by 2012, the entry into force of the legislation will promote further technological advances in this field, foster research and development and accelerate the market penetration of advanced combustion and power-train technologies as manufacturers seek to achieve scale production effects.

It is worth briefly considering whether the way in which the achievement of the target may affect particular technologies or segments of the market. It is not expected that there will be a strong shift in the segmentation of vehicles, at least in the short-term. It is probable that the proposed legislation will limit possible vehicle upsizing and that the design of cars will take vehicle mass into consideration significantly more than previously. The use of diesel technology has played an important role in past CO2 reductions and it is expected that the diesel penetration rate will continue increasing in the short term. Other specific improvements are likely to include a speedier introduction of elements such as hybrid powertrains, stop-start systems and gasoline direct injection systems.

Automotive suppliers account for circa 2/3 of the final product and over 50% of research in this sector. Effective supply chain management is one of the key competitive advantages of the European industry while production of advanced components is an important strength of the European supply industry.

The worldwide demand for vehicles is set to grow significantly in the medium term with most of the global demand increases for vehicles projected to come from rapidly developing economies (e.g. China, India, Russia etc.). The 2004 Competitiveness Report also concludes that “worldwide demands for safer and more environment-friendly vehicles will continue” and that these demands will have a