13.9.93♦
OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC249/15
OpinionontheproposalforaCouncilDirectiveamendingDirective85/611/EEConthe
CoordinationofLaws,RegulationsandAdministrative ProvisionsrelatingtoUndertakings
forCollectiveInvestmentinTransferableSecurities(UCITS)(*)
(93/C249/08)
On2March1993theCouncildecided,inaccordancewithArticle57(2)oftheEECTreaty,
toconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommitteeontheabovementioned proposal.
TheSectionforEconomic,FinancialandMonetaryQuestions,whichwasresponsiblefor
preparingtheCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon8June1993
(Rapporteur :MrGiacomelli).
Atits307thPlenarySession(meetingof30June1993),theEconomicandSocialCommittee
adoptedthefollowingOpinionwithnovotesagainstand3abstentions .
suchco-ordination isnecessarytothesetting-upofa
Europeancapitalmarket.TheCommitteeapprovesthebroadlinesofaCom­
missionproposaltoextendthe1985Directiveon
'undertakingsforcollectiveinvestmentintransferable
securities'(UCITS)toincludefundsoffunds,money
marketfundsandtreasuryfunds(bankdeposits),which
isaninnovation .Awareoftheneedtoprotectthe
interestsofsaversandinvestors,theCommitteeDISAP­
PROVESofthepossibilitygiventoMemberStatesof
allowingtheirUCITStochooseadepositaryestablished
inanothercountry.1.1.4.Thesecondrecitalinparticularpointsoutthat
moneymarketfundsandfundsoffundshaveshown
considerablegrowthincertainMemberStatesinrecent
yearsandthat,giventheiroperationalfeaturesand
investmentobject,thesetwocategoriesoffundsmay
beregardedasbeingverymuchlikeUCITS,tosuchan
extentthattheyshouldbebroughtwithinthescopeof
the1985Directive.
1.Introduction
2.Generalcomments
1.1.ObjectandFoundationoftheProposedDirective
2.1.ProtectionofInvestors'Savings1.1.1.TheCouncilDirectiveof20December1985
(85/611/EEC)ontheco-ordinationoflaws,regulations
andadministrative provisionsrelatingtoundertakings
forcollectiveinvestmentintransferable securities
(UCITS)statesinitssixthrecitalthatthosecollective
investmentundertakingsnotcoveredbyitsprovisions
shouldbethesubjectofco-ordinationatalaterstage,
andtheregulationofsuchundertakingsshoulduntil
thenbelefttonationaldiscretion .2.1.1.Someofthefundsnotatpresentcoveredby
theUCITSDirectivehavebeenagreatsuccesswith
investors;ifthissuggeststheyshouldbebroughtunder
theUCITSDirective,onemustbearinmindthatthe
rulesadoptedcanonlybejustifiedifthesafetyand
qualitycriteriausedarecomparabletothosecurrently
inforceforfundsinvestingintransferablesecurities.
1.1.2.TheUCITSDirectivedoesnotatpresentcover
moneymarketfunds(exceptwherecertaincountries
haveexplicitlycoveredthemintheirdefinitionoftrans­
ferablesecurities),realestatefunds,futuresandoptions
funds,commodityfunds,venturecapitalfundsorfunds
offunds.2.1.2.OneofthebasicconcernsoftheUCITSDirec­
tiveistoprotectinvestors'savings.Itnowseemsthat
someofthefundsnotpreviouslycoveredbytheDirec­
tivearereadytobebroughtunderit,inviewoftheir
investmentpoliciesandtherisksinherentinthem;
othersarenot,forthesamereason.
1.1.3.Thepresentproposalrightlystatesinitsfirst
tworecitalsthatthe1985Directiveshouldbeextended
tocoverotherfundsnotpreviouslycoveredandthat2.2.Scope
{!)OJNoC59,2.3.1993,p.14.2.2.1.Bearinginmindthatthepresentproposalis
onlyonemoresteptowardsasinglemarketininvest­

NoC249/16 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 13.9.93
■
Thisshouldendthepresentdiscrepanciesininterpret­
ationwherebysomeMemberStatesallowUCITSto
investinMMIswhileothersdonot.mentfundsandthattherulesmustcontinuallybe
adaptedtomarketdevelopments wherenecessary,
initialplansaretoextendtheUCITSDirectivetocover
fundsinvestinginmoneymarketinstrumentsand/or
bankdepositsand'fundsoffunds',i.e.investmentfunds
whichinvesttheirassetsinUCITScoveredbythe
Directive(knownas'coordinatedUCITS');thisis
becausesuchfundshavefeaturesandalevelofinvestor
protectionsimilartocoordinatedUCITS.3.1.1.2.2.Thepresenttextoftheproposalstatesthat
thetermmoneymarketinstrumentsmeansthoseclasses
oftransferablesecuritiesnormallydealtinonthemoney
marketwhichtheMemberStatesconsidertobeliquid
andhaveavaluewhichcanbeaccuratelydetermined
atleastwithacertainfrequency.2.2.1.1.Butalthoughthefourthrecitaljustifies
allowingUCITStoinvestinbankdepositsbytheneed
totakeaccountofmarketdevelopments ,suchamove
isnotaco-ordinationofexistinginstrumentsbutan
innovation .
3.1.1.2.3.Butnothingissaidaboutthequalityofthe
issuerofsuchinstruments,incontrasttoArticle19(1)(a)
and(d)oftheDirective,whichstatesthatthesecurities
mustbelistedonanofficialstockexchangeoratleast
tradedonaregulatedmarketwhichoperatesregularly.2.2.2.Inviewofthepresentextensionofscope,
especiallytheinnovationintroducedbyallowing
UCITStoinvestinbankdeposits,theDirectiveshould
begivenamoreappropriatetitle,asitcurrentlyonly
referstoundertakingsforcollectiveinvestmentintrans­
ferablesecurities.
3.SpecificcommentsItwouldalsobedesirabletoincludequalitycriteriafor
MMIssoastobringaboutbetterprotectionforthe
investor,andthusforpeople'ssavings.3.1.Article1
ItisthisArticlewhichcontainstheprincipalamend­
mentstotheUCITSDirective.Therecouldbemoreriskforinvestorsiftheconcept
ofliquidityisinterpretedtoofreelybythenational
authoritiesofeitherthecountrywhoselawsgovernthe
operationsoftheinvestmentfundorofthecountryof
issueoftheMMIs.3.1.1.Article1(1)[concerning Article
1(2)]
DefinitionsandScope.
3.1.1.2.4.Quiteapartfromanyinterventionbythe
authorities,theproposeddefinitionofaneligibleMMI
couldinvolvesomerisksforinvestors:MMIsmight
stillcomplywiththedefinition,andthusfindtheir
wayintoportfolios,eventhoughtheywereissuedby
companieswhichcouldnot'reasonably'beexpectedto
fulfiltheircommitments .3.1.1.1.Article1(1)[concerningArticle1(2)(ii)]
InordernottomaketheUCITSDirectivedirectly
dependentontheInvestmentServicesDirective(ISD),
itwouldbepreferablenottousethelatterasareference
buttoincludethedefinitionof'transferablesecurities'
actuallycontainedinthetextofCouncilDirective93/
22/EECof10May1993onInvestmentServices(1).
Althoughtheriskofdefaultcannotberemovedentirely,
itshouldbefixedwithinacceptableandgenerallyrecog­
nisedlimits.3.1.1.2.Article1(1)[concerningArticle1(2)(iii)]
3.1.1.2.1.Intheinterestsofharmonisinginterpret­
ationoftheUCITSDirectiveatEuropeanlevelitisa
goodideatospecifythatmoneymarketinstruments
(MMIs)tradedonanorganisedmarketaretobetreated
astransferablesecuritiesandarethereforeeligibleunder
theDirectiveasaninvestmentforaUCITS.3.1.1.2.5.Itisadelicatemattertocomeupwitha
definitionwhichisbothclearandcanbegenerally
appliedtoawiderangeofissuersinboththefinancial
andnon-financialsectors(e.g.banks,theirsubsidiaries
orbranches,financialintermediaries ,insurancefirms,
industrialfirmsetc.);itisthereforeproposedthatthe (J)OJNoL141,11.6.1993,p.27.

13.9.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC249/17
operationsperformedbyaUCITS[seeArticles7(3)and
14(3)oftheUCITSDirective],itisobviousthatthe
depositarywillhavetorefertothelawoftheUCITS'
homecountry;butthequestiontobeaskedisunder
whatlawsorprocedurescouldthedepositary'sliability
bechallenged,eitherbytheUCITS'supervisoryautho­
ritiesorbythesaversthemselves,ifitfailstocarryout
thisobligation.followingthirdandfourthindentsbeaddedtoArticle
l(2)(iii)inordertodefinewhatis'reasonable':
'—either:(i)theissuerofsuchinstruments,or(ii)
securitiescurrentlyissuedbytheissuer,or(iii)
theundertakingguaranteeingtheissueinques­
tion,or(iv)securitiescurrentlyissuedbythat
undertakingmustbesubjecttosupervision
designedtoensureinvestorprotection.
;—suchinstrumentsmustbeissuedorguaranteed
byastate,itslocalauthoritiesorapublicinter­
nationalbody.'3.1.2.4.Finally,itseemsdoubtfulthatinvestorpro­
tectionisaidedbyallowingnationalauthoritiesto
exemptunittrustsfromtherequirementthatthedeposi­
tarybankbeestablishedinthesameMemberStateas
themanagementcompany.Asinglesetofcontrols
exercisedbyasinglesupervisoryauthority,oratleast
byauthoritiescoveredbythesamenationallegislation,
mustbeaprioritywhenoneisdealingwiththeprotec­
tionofpeople'ssavings.
Thecomplications whichwouldresultifonehadto
instituteproceedingsundertwodifferentlegalsystems
seemsatoddswiththespiritoftheUCITSDirective,
whosemainaimwastoprotectthesaveraseffectively
aspossiblebybringingsupervisionbytheauthorities,
thedepositarybankandindependentauditorsundera
singlejurisdiction,i.e.thatofthecountrywherethe
investmentfundisestablished .
3.1.2.5.Bearinginmindthatthewholepointof
theUCITSDirectiveistoprotectpeople'ssavingsby
consolidatingsupervisionunderasinglejurisdiction,
whichistheonlypracticalsolutioninviewofcurrent
lawandpractice,onemustconcludethattheproposed
newArticle8(4)shouldbeabandonedandthetextof
theUCITSDirectivekeptinitsoriginalform,sincethe
needtoprotecttheinvestorandpeople'ssavingsismore
importantthanafiyfreedomofchoice,thepotential
benefitsofwhichfortheinvestorhaveyettobeproven.3.1.2.Article1(3)[concerning new
Article8(4)]
3.1.2.1.ItisproposedthatMemberStatesbeallowed
toauthoriseUCITSundertheirjurisdictiontochoose
adepositarysituatedinanotherMemberStateprovided
thatthedepositaryisauthorisedtocarryoutsafekeep­
ingandadministration ofsecuritiesundertheInvest­
mentServicesDirective.
SuchaproposalwouldthereforeallowaMemberState,
ifitthoughtfit,tobreakwiththeprinciplewherebya
UCITSanditsdepositarycomeunderasinglejurisdic­
tion;itisuponthissinglejurisdictionprinciplethatthe
authoritiesofthecountryinwhichtheUCITSissitu­
atedbasetheirsupervisorypowersanduponwhich
saversrelywhentakinganylegalaction.
\
Suchabreakwouldcauseproblemswhich,ifunre­
solved,wouldmakeitlesssafeforUCITStooperate
andweakensaverandinvestorprotection.
3.1.2.2.RetainingArticles9and16oftheUCITS
Directiveintheirpresentformwouldonlycloudthe
issue,asthesearticleslaydownthatadepositaryis
liable,underthenationallawofthestatewherethe
managementcompany(inthecaseofaunittrust)or
investmentcompanyhasitsregisteredoffice,tothe
managementcompany,investmentcompanyandunit­
holdersforanylosssufferedbythemasresultofthe
depositary'sunjustifiablefailuretoperformitsobli­
gationsoritsimproperperformanceofthem.
Itisdifficulttoimaginethatthedepositary'ssafekeep­
ingdutiesandtheliabilitypertainingtothemcanbe
regulatedotherthanbythelawofthestatewhere
thesedutiesarecarriedout,orthattherecanbeany
disassociation betweenthelawcoveringtheperform­
anceofanactivityandthatapplyingtotheassociate
liability.
3.1.2.3.Asregardsthesecondaspectofthedeposi­
tary'sduties,namelymonitoringthelegalityofcertain3.1.3.Theaboveremarksalsoapplytothatpartof
Article1(5)(additionofanewparagraph4toArticle
15)concerningtheplannedexemptionforinvestment
companies .
3.1.4.Article1(6)[concerning Article
19(1)e)
3.1.4.1.AsMMIsaretobetreatedastransferable
securities[seenewArticle1(2)(iii)]itseemsunnecessary
tomentionthemhere.
Itwouldbebettertomentiondepositswithcredit
institutions ,astheseareneithertransferablesecurities
norMMIsregardedastransferablesecurities.

NoC249/18 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 13.9.93
notberetainedintheproposal'srecitals,butitcould
fruitfullybereplacedbythefollowingwording:3.1.4.2.Inviewoftheproposedextensionto
thescopeoftheUCITSDirective,Article19(4)should
bedeleted;thisreads'Unittrustsandinvestment
companiesmayholdancillaryliquidassets.''itisdesirablethatUCITSshouldbeable,while
respectingthesaidlimit,tousefuturescontracts
andoptionstomakeuptheirportfolio'.
3.1.5.Article
Article1(8)
21(3)1[concerning new
3.1.5.5.1.Similarly,thethirdrecitalonpage11ofthe
Commissionproposal(doc.COM(93)37final—SYN
453)shouldberedraftedtoreadasfollows:
3.1.5.1.TheproposalstatesthatUCITSmaycarry
outtransactionsinfinancialderivativeinstrumentspro­
videdtheyholdassetsenablingthemtofulfilobligations
whichexistormayarisefromsuchinstruments .'WhereasArticle21ofDirective85/611/EECcon­
tainstherulesunderwhichUCITSareallowedto
usederivativeinstruments;whereasitisnecessary
fortheprotectionofinvestorstoprovidefora
harmonisedframeworkbyintroducingamaximum
quantitativeceilingfortheutilisationoffinancial
derivatives,whichwouldmakeitimpossiblefor
UCITStocommittheirassetsmorethanonceto
suchinstruments ;whereas,consideringthenew
portfoliomanagement techniqueswhichhave
developedinrecentyears,itisdesirablethatUCITS
mayuse,incompliancewiththeabovequantitative
limit,andprovidedtheyholdsufficienttechnical
andfinancialresources,financialfutures,options
andotherfinancialderivativeswithaviewtogood
portfoliomanagement.'3.1.5.2.Toremoveanydoubtaboutusingthepro­
cedureof'nettingout'commitments (i.e.offsetting
oppositepositionsinidenticalfinancialinstruments,
whichthustendtobalanceeachotherout),itisprefer­
abletoleaveoutanyreferencetotherealityornotof
anycommitmentscontractedthroughfinancialderiva­
tiveinstruments .
3.1.5.2.1.Article21(2)shouldbewordedasfollows:
3.1.6.Article1(9)[concerning Article
226) 'InthiscontextUCITSmaycarryouttransactions
infinancialderivativeinstrumentsprovidedthey
holdsufficienttechnicalandfinancialresourcesto
enablethemtofulfilobligationswhichexistormay
arisefromsuchinstruments.' 3.1.6.1.UndertheproposalaUCITSwouldnotbe
allowedtoplacemorethan20%ofitsassetsindeposits
withthesamecreditinstitutionorcreditinstitutions
withinthesamegroup.
3.1.6.2.Intheinterestsofprotectingpeople's
savings,onemustaskwhetheraqualitystandardwould
notbemoreusefulasaprotectionforinvestorsthana
maximumpercentageaimedatspreadingrisk.3.1.5.3.Thisobligationshould,however,beinter­
pretedinabroad,ratherthananarrowsense,soasto
permituseoftheindexfuturesmarket.Itissuggested
thatArticle21(3)shouldberedraftedasfollows,so
thatthereisoneinterpretationthroughoutEurope:
'....inthesensethatUCITSmust,inaggregate,
eitherdirectlyorindirectly,holdassetsenabling
themtofulfilobligationswhichexistasaresultof
thederivativesthemselves.'3.1.6.3.However,itseemsdifficult,ifnotimposs­
ible,togetridofapercentagelimitentirely.Indeed,
thebasicprincipleofspreadingrisksshouldruleout
thepossibilityofaUCITSdepositing,onapermanent
basis,100%ofitsassetswithasinglecreditinstitution.
ThisisallthemoreobviousbecausetheUCITSDirec­
tiveatpresentlaysdowna35%ceilingoninvestments
insecuritiesissuedbyasinglegovernmentbody(leaving
asidethe100%rulewhichonlyappliestogovernment
issuerswhicharespeciallyapprovedbytheappropriate
supervisoryauthority).3.1.5.4.Letusstressonceagainthatderivative
-instrumentsareusedintheinterestsofgoodportfolio
management ,andnotjusttocoverrisks.Theconcept
ofgoodportfoliomanagementdoesnotruleoutthe
useofderivativeinstrumentsasapartofinvestment
policyprovideditissubjecttothemaximumceilings
(andnotminimumceilingsasindicatedinthepro­
posal'srecitals)providedforinArticle21(3).
3.1.6.4.Inviewofthespecialmonitoringcarriedout
bynationalsupervisoryauthoritiesoncreditinsti­
tutionsintheircountryofestablishment ,itisproposed3.1.5.5.Asaresultthereferenceto'adjustingtheir
portfolio'scompositiononatemporarybasis'should

/
13.9.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC249/19
thatthenationalauthoritiesofaMemberStatesbe
allowed,inaccordancewiththeprincipleofsubsidiar­
ity,toallowexemptionsfromthe20%limitreferred
toinparagraph3.1.6.1onthebasisofobjectiveand
verifiablecriteria.monitorinvestmentfunds,itshouldbepossibleto
includeintheproposalapossibilityofexemptionfor
theUCITS'depositarybank.Itisthereforeproposed
thatanewArticle22(6)(c)beadded,readingasfollows:
'(c)Thepercentagereferredtoinsub-paragraph
(b)abovemaybeexceededinthecaseof
amountsdepositedwiththedepositarybank
oftheUCITSdesignatedinaccordancewith
Article8ofthisDirectiveintheexecutionof
itsduties.'Suchexemptions,andthecriteriausedwhendeciding
onthem,wouldhavetobementionedintheinvestment
fund'sofficialsalesdocuments;thiswoulddrawinves­
tors'attentiontotheexemptionandenablethemto
takeaninvestmentdecisionwithafullknowledgeof
thefacts.
3.1.7.Investments inSecurities withthe
SameIssuer[Article23(1)1 3.1.6.5.Itisalsosuggestedthatthepercentagebe
linkedtoaqualitystandardforthecreditinstitution
concerned.Inthisconnectionitisdifficultandimprac­
ticaltobaseaqualityruleonanythingotherthanthe
geographicallocationofacreditinstitution.So,itis
proposedthatreferencebemadetotheideaofacredit
institutionestablishedinamembercountryofZoneA
oftheOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationand
Development (OECD).3.1.7.1.Somerepresentatives oftheinvestmentfunds
industryhavehighlightedaproblemencounteredin
practicewhenapplyingArticles22(3)and23(1)ofthe
UCITSDirective.
3.1.6.6.Theaimoftherelevantprovisioninthe
proposalistoensurethespreadingofrisks,whichis
thebasicaimofaUCITS.Butitisgoingtoofarto
considerallinvestments increditinstitutionsinthe
samegroupasasourceofoverallrisk.Moreover,the
ideaofa'group'istoovaguetobeusedassuchwithout
furtherdefinition.Article22oftheDirectivestatesthataUCITSmay
investnomorethan5%(or10%)ofitsassetsin
securitiesissuedbythesamebody.Thisceilingof5%
(or10%)mayberaisedto35%bytheMemberStates
ifthesecuritiesareissuedorguaranteedbyaMember
State,byitslocalauthorities,byanon-MemberState
orbypublicinternationalbodiesofwhichoneormore
MemberStatesaremembers.
Itisworthaskingwhetherintroducingtheconceptof
agroupintotheUCITSDirectivewouldhelpprotect
people'ssavings,aseachindividualsubsidiaryofa
bankinggroupissupervisedbyitshomeMemberState's
authoritiesandmaythereforehavetocomplywith
differentassessmentcriteria.UnderthepresentArticle23(1),theMemberStatesmay
raisethelimitfrom35%to100%providedthatthe
UCITSinquestionholdsecuritiesfromatleastsix
differentissues,butsecuritiesfromanyoneissuemay
notaccountformorethan30%ofitstotalassets.
3.1.6.7.ItisthereforeproposedthatthenewArticle
22(6)beamendedtoread:3.1.7.2.Inthislastcase,thismeansthatassoonas
theUCITSexceedstheceilingof35%ofthesecurities
fromoneissuebythesameissuer,itmustsellsomeof
thesesecuritiesinordertore-investinfiveotherissues
bythesameissuerandtherebyfallonceagainbelow
theceilingof30%fortheissueoriginallyheldinits
portfolio.'6.(a)AUCITSmayonlyplaceitsassetsin
depositswithcreditinstitutionsestablished
inZoneAoftheOECD;
3.1.7.3.ToavoidaUCITSfindingitselfinsucha
situationinthefuture,andsince,inreality,therisk
runbytheUCITSdependsontheissuer(whoalways
remainsthesame,eveniftheUCITSportfoliois'diver­
sified'byinvestmentinsixdifferentissues),itispro­
posedthatthefirstsub-paragraph ofArticle23(1)to
readasfollows:(b)AUCITSmayplacenomorethan20%of
itsassetsindepositswiththesamecredit
institutionoritsbranchesunlessanexemp­
tionfromthisruleisgrantedbythe
nationalsupervisoryauthoritiesonthebas­
isofobjectiveandverifiablecriteriaand
suchanexemption,andthecriteriagovern­
ingit,areexpresslymentionedinthesales
documentsoftheUCITS.'
'AsaderogationfromArticle22,andwithoutpreju­
dicetoArticle68(3)oftheTreaty,MemberStates
mayauthoriseUCITStoinvestupto100%oftheir
assetsinoneormoreissuesoftransferablesecurities3.1.6.8.AsadepositarybankofanyUCITS,byits
verynature,hastoreceiveverylargedepositsandis
subjectedtospecialsupervisionbytheauthoritieswhich

NoC249/20 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 13.9.93
fessionalmanagement .Itcouldalsomakeitmorediffi­
cultforUCITStoinvestinmedium-sizedcompanies.issuedorguaranteedbyaMemberState,byitslocal
authorities,byanon-memberStateorbypublic
international bodiesofwhichoneormoreMember
Statesaremembers.'
Thethirdsub-paragraph ofArticle23(1)wouldthen
bedeleted.Forallthesereasonsitisthereforerecommended that
theDirectivenotbeamendedonthispoint.
3.1.8.Article1(14)[concerning new
Article26a(a)and(b)l3.1.10.Article1(10)■—(18)(concerning
Articles24,25,26a,44,47,50
and53a)
Toharmonisetheterminologyusedandleavenodoubt
whatsoeverabouttheban,itissuggestedthat'must
not'bereplacedby'maynot'ineachofthetwo
paragraphs .Theotherchangesputforwardintheproposalare
sufficientlyexplainedintheExplanatoryMemorandum
anddonotcallforanyparticularcomments.
3.1.9.Article1(12)[concerning Article
251)
i
3.1.11.Article6ofthe1985Directive
InthischapteronupdatingtheDirective,especially
withregardtodevelopments inEClegislation,one
factorhasnotbeentakenintoaccountintheproposal:
thedirectiveonpensionfunds.
ThepresentwordingofArticle6oftheUCITSDirective
onlyallowsamanagementcompanytomanageunit
trustsorinvestmentcompanies,thusrulingoutthe
possibilityofmanagingpensionfunds.3.1.9.1.TheCommissionisproposingtointroduce
additionalrulesregardingtheprincipleadoptedinthe
1985DirectivewherebyUCITSmaynotacquireany
securitiesenablingthemtoexercisesignificantinfluence
overthemanagementoftheissuingbody.
Undertheseadditionalrulesaninvestmentcompanyor
amanagementcompany,actinginconnectionwithall
oftheunittrustswhichitmanagesandwhichfall
withinthescopeoftheDirective,maynotacquireany
votingshareswhichdirectlyorindirectlyrepresent10%
ormoreofthecapitalorvotingrightsoftheissuer.
Astheselimitsapplytobothaninvestmentcompany
andamanagementcompanyinconnectionwithallthe
unittrustswhichitmanages,theyintroduceadistortion
betweenthetwolegalformswhichaUCITSmayhave.
Ofcourse,inthecaseofaninvestmentcompanywith
legalpersonalityvotingrightsareexercisedbythecom­
pany,whileinthecaseofaunittrustvotingrightsare
usuallyexercisedbythemanagementcompany,and
notbytheunit-holders .
ButitshouldberememberedthatArticle10(2)ofthe
UCITSDirectivestatesthatthemanagementcompany
mustactsolelyintheinterestoftheunit-holders .So,
theuseofvotingrightsforanyotherpurposewould
beunethical.Asaresulttheproposeddirectiveonthefreedomto
manageandinvestfundscollectedbypensioninsti­
tutionsallowsonlycreditinstitutions,insurancecom­
paniesandfirmsauthorisedbytheInvestmentServices
Directivetomanagesuchfunds.
AstheactivitiesofaUCITSmanagementcompany
consist,bydefinition,solelyofmanagingonbehalfof
thirdparties,andasoneofthebasicaimsofthe
proposedpensionfundsdirectiveistoallowallpro­
vidersofmanagementservices,withoutexception,to
offertheirservicestopensionfunds,Article6ofthe
UCITSDirectiveshouldbeamendedtoallowUCITS
managementcompaniestomanagepensionfunds.
Inaddition,asismentionedintheCommission'scom­
mentsonthedirective(page20),eventhoughamanage­
mentcompanycanonlycarryoutthoseactivities
referredtoinArticle6,itmaystillmanageitsownassets
andcarryoutauxiliarytransactionsdirectlylinkedto
itsmainactivity(declarationintheCouncilMinutes).Retentionoftheproposedprovisionswouldpenalise
largemanagementcompanies,whichwouldruncounter
tothedevelopmentofindependentmanagementcom­
panieshavingtheresourcesnecessaryforrealpro­

13.9.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC249/21
3.2.Article2—FinalProvisions Itisthereforeproposedthatthefollowingtextshould
beaddedattheendofArticle6oftheUCITSDirective
(Directive85/611/EECof20December1985):
t
'andpensionfunds.Amanagementcompanymay
manageitsownassetsandcarryoutauxiliarytrans­
actionsdirectlylinkedtoitsmainactivity.'Thedeadlineof1July1994forincorporation ofthe
proposalintonationallegislationseemsrealisticand
doesnotcallforanyparticularcomments.
DoneatBrussels,30June1993.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN
OpinionontheCommissionstaffworkingpaperontheproblemofthetimetakentomake
paymentsincommercialtransactions
(93/C249/09)
«
On22December1992,theCommissiondecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCom­
mittee,underArticle198oftheTreatysettinguptheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,on
theCommissionstaffworkingpaperontheproblemofthetimetakentomakepaymentsin
commercialtransactions .
TheSectionforIndustry,Commerce,CraftsandServices,whichwasresponsibleforpreparing
theCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon2June1993.TheRapporteur
wasMrPardon.
Atits307thPlenarySession(meetingof30June1993),theEconomicandSocialCommittee
adoptedthefollowingOpinionunanimously .
1.Summary morefirms,particularlywheninequitabletradingcon­
ditionsareimposed.
1.1.Itisuptooccupationalorganizationsandoccu­
pationalchambersinthewidestsense(chambersof
commerce,chambersoftrade,etc.)tocollectanddis­
tributeinformationonpaymentperiodsforeachMem­
berStateandineacheconomicsector.1.5.Onpaymentdelays,theCommissionshould:
continueitsworkinordertohaveadeeperknow
ledgeofcurrentlegislationandpracticeintheMem
berStates; 1.2.Theseinitiativesshouldbesupportedbythe
Euro-Info-Centres whoseaimispreciselytoprovidean
information service.
1.3.Attentionmustbedrawntothetrainingof
enterprisemanagersinvolvedininter-statetrade,and
especiallytotheirin-servicetraining.onthisbasis,makerecommendations totheMem­
berStates,whilerespectingcontractualfreedom,
dealingwith:transparencyofpaymentconditions;
compliancewiththoseconditions;strictapplication
ofagreeddeadlineswithouttheneedfornotifi­
cation;applicationofdelayinterestimmediatelythe
deadlinehaspassed;freedomtofixthatinterestat
alevelcorresponding tocommercialinterestrates;
validityofpenaltyclauses;resorttoarbitration;
introductionofsummaryproceduresforpayment
injunctions ;1.4.Oncontractualpaymentperiods,theCom­
missionandtheMemberStatesmusttakeactiononthe
basisofArticle86oftheTreatyinordertoprevent
unfairexploitationofadominantpositionbyoneor