EN ECB -PUBLIC  
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 14 June  2022  
on payment to Central Bank of Ireland in respect of certain IMF -related  transactions  
(CON/20 22/21) 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 29 May 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Irish Minister for Finance 
for an opinion on  draft legislative provisions revising the Bretton Woods Agreements (Amendment) Bill 2022 
(hereinafter the ‘ draft legislative provisions ’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union  and the third  indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft legislative provisions  relates to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) . In accordance with the first 
sentence of Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 
has adopted this opinion.  
1. P
urpose of the draft legislative provisions
1.1 The draft legislative provisions  revise  a draft law  on which the ECB has previously opined  but which,
at the date of this opinion, has not ultimately been enacted, regarding Ireland’s adherence to the 
New Arrangements to Borrow with the International  Monetary Fund (IMF)2. The draft legislative 
provisions empower the Minister for Finance to make a payment  out of the Irish Government’s 
Central Fund to the CBI, with the total amount not exceeding EUR 6 600 000. 
1.2 The draft legislative provisions  relate to certain historical transactions between Ireland and the IMF 
relating to the IMF’s ‘deferred charges adjustment’3, the IMF’s ‘SCA -1 account’4, the IMF’s ‘Somalia 
Administered Account’5, and the IMF’s ‘Sudan Administered Account’6 (hereinafter  collectively 
referred to as  the ‘historical transactions ’), and  following  which the CBI financed  payments to certain 
IMF trust funds to finance debt relief for Somalia and Sudan. A share of the transferred proceeds 
was payable to the CBI and the amount specified in the draft legislative provision is intended to empower the Minister for Finance to reimburse the CBI.  
1 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29  June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
2 See Opinion CON/2022/1. All ECB Opinions ar e published on EUR -Lex. 
3 As referred to in Section V 2(b) of Decision No. 8348 -(86/122) on ' Income Position - Principles of “Burden Sharing” , 
Income Target for FY 1987 and FY 1988, Rate of Charge, and Rate of Remuneration ’, which was adopted by the 
Executive Board of the International Monetary Fun d on 25 July 1986, as amended from time to time.  
4 The first Special Contingent Account established by Decision No. 8619- (87/90), which was adopted by the Executive 
Board of the International Monetary Fund on 17 June 1987.  
5 T he account established by Decision No.16626 -(19/103), which was adopted by the Executive Board of the 
International Monetary Fund on 18 December 2019.  
6 T he account established by Decision No.17042 -(21/46), which was adopted by the Executive Board of the International 
Monetary Fund on 10 May 2021.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 1.3 As noted in the Minister’s consultation request, the CBI’s reimbursement facility is intended to remedy 
participations which were not compatible with the monetary financing prohibition contained  in 
Article  123(1) of the Treaty.  
 
2. Monetary financing prohibition  
2.1 Article 123(1) of the Treaty prohibits the national central banks of the Member States  (hereinafter the 
‘NCBs’) from granting overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility to public authorities and 
bodies of the Member States. This prohibition is , however , subject to certain exemptions contained 
in Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 .7 In particular, Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 
provides that the financing by NCBs of obligations falling upon the public sector vis -à-vis the  IMF is 
not regarded as a ‘credit facility ’ within the meaning of Article 123(1)  of the Treaty. Recital 14 of 
Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate 
to authorise the financing by N CBs of obl igations falling upon the public sector vis -à-vis the IMF 
because such financing ‘results  in foreign claims which have all the characteristics of reserve assets’. 
Therefore, the exemption contained in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 must be interpreted 
in line with this rationale.8 
2.2 Where the IMF invites Member States to contribute non- refundable resources  to IMF debt relief 
programmes  through transactions such as the historical transactions referred to in paragraph 1.2 of 
this opinion,  the financing of their contribution by the NCBs will not result in any foreign claims.9 
Consequently, the CBI’s financing of the historical transactions does not fall under the exemption 
laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93,  and is therefore not compatible with the 
monetary financing prohibition.   
2.3 Against this backdrop, the ECB welcomes the fact that the draft legislative provisions  provide for  
corrective action in the form  of the reimbursement  to be made by the Minister for Finance to the CBI 
of the resources contributed in connection with Ireland ’s participation in the historical transactions 
referred to in paragraph 1.2 of this opinion .10 
 
This opinion will b e published on EUR -Lex.  
  
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 June 2022.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine  LAGARDE  
 
7  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
8  See Opinions CON/2005/29, CON/2013/16, CON/2017/4 and CON/2021/39. With regard to the issue of NCBs’ 
financing of IMF quota increases, see Opinions CON/2011/97, and CON/2012/65.  
9  See paragraph 2.9 of Opinion CON/2021/39 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion  CON/2021/23.  
10    See also  paragraph 2.10 of  Opinion CON/2021/39.