EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 13.11.2008 
SEC(2008) 2869 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
accompanying the 
GREEN PAPER 
 
TOWARDS A SECURE, SUSTAINABLE  AND COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN 
ENERGY NETWORK 
 
OIL INFRASTRUCTURES  
An assessment of the existing and planned oil infrastructures within and 
towards the EU  
{COM(2008) 782} 
 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
OIL INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
An assessment of the existing and planned o il infrastructures within and towards the EU 
Introduction  
In the next decades, due to the depletion of  European indigenous resources, substantial 
quantities of crude oil will need to be imported into the EU  through existing or  new pipelines 
and/or via tankers. This situati on raises concerns both in terms of security of supply and with 
regard to the environmental threat  of tanker accidents in our seas.  
The purpose of this document is to analyse th e current and future possibilities for supplying  
oil to the European Union.  This document provides an over view of the existing oil supply 
infrastructures towards and within the EU. An assessment of the feasibility of new pipelines 
in terms of their economic viability and their c ontribution to our objectives of security of 
supply and sustainable development is also provided.  
The document is divided in the following five chapters: (1) The present and future contributi on of oil to the EU energy mix 
(2) Internal oil market  
(3) Supply infrastructures: ports, ta nkers, refineries and pipelines 
(4) Chokepoints at world scale and in Eur opean waters (Baltic  and Black seas) 
(5) Conclusions 
Crude oil pipelines are not included in the Guidelines for trans-European energy networks
1 of 
6 September 2006. The Commission's Legal Servi ce has indicated however that no obstacles 
exist to the inclusion of oil infrastructures in the trans-European energy networks and the Council has previously indicated a willingness to consider Commission proposals in this respect
. 
In view of a revision of the Guidelines, a Green Paper on Eur opean energy networks will be 
adopted by the Commission in November 2008. The Green Paper assesses, inter alia, the need 
for including oil infrastructure, alongside ga s and electricity networks, in the European 
Energy Networks.  
                                                 
1 Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament end the Council of 6 September 2006 laying 
down guideline for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision 
1229/2003/EC 
 
EN 3   EN 1 The present and future contribution of oil to the EU energy mix  
In 2006, oil and petroleum products covered 37% (673 million toe) of the EU27 primary 
energy demand of 1825 million toe (Mtoe)2. In the same year, our indigenous production of 
oil was 123 Mtoe, consequently 84% of our  oil consumption was covered by imports. 
The 2007 PRIMES Baseline Scenario3, which takes into account policy initiatives 
implemented by the end of 2006 and assumes an oil price of 61$ per ba rrel in year 2005 $, 
indicates that by 2020 oil, with 702 Mtoe, will s till represent more than  35% of our primary 
energy demand of 1968 Mtoe.  
Therefore according to this scenario, in the ne xt decade, oil will remain the main element of 
our energy mix,  although its consumption in 2020 will exceed the current level only by 
approximately 5%. The Baseline Scenario also i ndicates that due to the progressive depletion 
of EU27 indigenous resources, onl y 53 Mtoe of oil will be produced in the EU in 2020. As a 
consequence, by that time, more than 90% of our oil consumption will be imported .  
The PRIMES model has also been used to asse ss the impact of high oil prices (100 $ per 
barrel in year 2005 $) and new EU energy po licy initiatives (beyond  2006) on our future 
energy requirements.  
A scenario considering the effects of a high oil price (100 $ bbl (barrel))  compared to the 
baseline scenario has been produced. The impact  of a high oil price in  terms of oil demand 
and import is outlined in table 1. According to  this high oil price scenario, a moderate 
decrease in oil demand (7.6%) in  comparison with the baseline scenario could be expected by 
2020. However, due to the progressive depletio n of EU indigenous oil reserves, oil import 
requirements will increase in comparison to the 2005 level by more than 10%, to 651 Mtoe.  
A further scenario "Energy Policy", which incl udes the impact of the new EU energy policy,  
has also been developed. The "Energy policy" scenario includes for example the objective by 
2020 of:  
• a 20% share of renewables in final energy dema nd including a sectoral objective of 10% of 
renewable energy in transport;  
• a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 20% below the 1990 levels through energy 
policy measures; 
EU27 Mtoe 2005 Baseline 
scenario, oil price 61$/bbl Baseline 
scenario, oil price 100$/bbl  New Energy 
Policy scenario, oil price 61$/bbl  New Energy 
Policy scenario, oil price 100$/bbl 
Primary Energy demand  1811 1968 1903 1712 1672 
Oil demand  666 702 648 608  567 
                                                 
2 Eurostat: "Energy – Yearly Statistics 2006 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2007/index_en.htm 
 
EN 4   EN EU oil 
production  133 53 53  53 52 
EU net oil 
import  590 707 651 610  569 
 Table 1 result of the PRIMES baselin e and new energy policy scenario 
• a 13% to 15% reduction in primary energy demand in 2020, compared to developments 
under a moderate oil price Baseline projecti on, which brings the EU a long way towards 
the 20% savings objective. The range provide d for the reduction in the primary energy 
demand stems from the assumption regarding the oil price environment, with higher values 
corresponding to the "New Energy Policy"  scenario with high oil prices. 
In the Energy Policy Scenario, total primar y energy demand will be reduced to 1672-1712 
Mtoe by 2020, depending on the oil price. In particular, the demand for oil will be reduced to 567-608 Mtoe, which corresponds to a 9% to 15% decrease from the current level. However,
 
due to the considerable reducti on in EU indigenous oil produc tion, more than 90% of our oil 
needs will still need to be imported.  
Finally it should be remembered that modelling and scenario analysis involves many 
assumptions in terms of: oil and energy prices , inflation, GDP growth, population growth etc. 
and therefore cannot be taken as predictions. They can however help in assessing possible 
future developments of our energy needs and in deciding new policy initiatives.  
Figure 1 indicates the main countries providing EU oil import in 2006. Since oil is a global 
commodity traded on international markets it will be extremely di fficult to identify which will 
be the major source countries for European oi l imports by 2020. However, it can be assumed 
that, considering the forecast increased cont ribution of OPEC to world oil consumption4, a 
substantial amount  of our additional requirements of o il would be met by increased supplies 
from OPEC countries.  
                                                 
4 IEA World Energy Outlook 2007 
 
EN 5   EN Russia 
32%Saudi Arabia 
9%Others
18%Norway 
16%
Libya 
9%Iran 
6%
Iraq 
3%Nigeria 
4%Algeria 
3%
 
Figure 1 EU 27 import of crude oil in 2006 
All the EU countries with th e exception of Denmark are net oil importers. The UK, which 
since the 1980s managed to cover its internal demand through its oil production in the North 
Sea, became in 2006 a net oil importer.  
Some analysts suggest that new Member States, such as Romania, which holds the largest oil 
and gas reserves in Central Europe, have a considerable potenti al for additional oil 
production. However, in 2005, oil production in Ro mania was only 6 Mtoe with an internal 
consumption of more than 10 Mtoe5. Therefore with its curre nt oil production, Romania, 
which is also a mature oil region, is not in the position to alleviate EU oil import dependence.  
The North Sea, which is by far the major oil pr oducing region in the EU, is a mature oil and 
gas area in which production is declining. Howeve r, its field still hold a considerable amount 
of reserves and the North Sea production, including the EU and Norway, makes this region 
still the fourth in the world in terms of total oil and gas output (figure 2). 
Notwithstanding the sovereignty of individual Member Stat es over thei r hydrocarbon 
resources, the EU as a whole has an interest  in continuation of hydr ocarbon exploration and 
production in the North Sea and other EU produc ing areas, for security of supply reasons, 
creation of employment and promotion of  EU service industry and technology .  
The exploitation of indigenous o il resources in the EU is linke d to technological progress and 
human resources expertise in E xploration and Production activitie s. The continuation of such 
technological progress and availabi lity of human resources expertis e in the EU would result in 
extending the lifetime of our o il fields through furt her increases in recovery rates from 
existing producing areas and discove ry of new hydrocarbon reservoirs.  
                                                 
5 EU energy and transport in figures Statistical Pocket Book 2007/2008 
 
EN 6   EN 
Figure 2 cumulative oil and gas production million barrels oil equivalent per day (Source 
BP Statistical Review 2007)  
 
EN 7   EN 2 Internal oil market  
The EU oil market has generally  been considered as an open market where crude and refined 
products move smoothly and freely. Nevertheless,  doubts have recently been raised as to 
whether legal, technical and logistic obsta cles might prevent genuine free trade and 
circulation of crude  and oil products.  
For example one issue of particular concern is  the limited connection between the pipeline 
networks of eastern and western Europe sinc e the two systems are currently connected only 
through the Ingolstadt-Kr alupy-Litinov pipeline  (see chapter 3.2.2 on EU in ternal pipelines).  
The Directorate General for Energy and Tr ansport has launched a study "Survey of the 
competitive aspects of oil and oil product markets in the EU". The study is expected to be 
completed during 2009 and will provide an in depth analysis of various aspects of the internal 
market for oil and oil products in the EU. 
The oil sector differs from other energy sect ors in terms of storage, transmission and 
distribution  since oil and its products can  be transported and stored  more easily and cheaply 
than gas and electricity. 
In particular, transport and distribution of o il and refined products, both at a global scale and 
in the EU internal market, can be assured by many different competing infrastructures: 
pipelines, short-sea shipping, inland wate rways, railways and road transportation. 
Due to this multiple choice of transport options, in  contrast to the electricity and gas markets, 
the oil sector has not been regulated by specifi c EU legislation on thir d party access (TPA) for 
transport and distribution.  General EU competition rules apply however and have been used 
in a number of cases. 
 
EN 8   EN 3 Supply infrastructures: ports, ta nkers, refineries and pipelines  
3.1 Ports and tankers 
Most of our imported oil, approximately 80%, is brought into the EU territory by tankers  and 
only the remaining part arrive s through two pipelines Druzhba  and Norpipe (see chapter 3.3 
on pipelines for details).  
Most of the oil imported by tankers reaches th e territory of the EU  through a dozen major 
ports. Figure 3 indicates the major EU oil te rminals, the quantity of oil imported is 
proportional to the size of the anchor.  
The progressive depletion of EU indigenous oil reserves and the need for additional imports 
of oil, together with the predicted rise in international oil trade sea flows will generate an increasing density of maritime traffic in European waters in the years to come. This situation 
raises concerns with regard to environment, for example the increased pollutant emissions in 
our seas and ports and also the risk of tanker accidents.   
 
Figure 3 major ports and oil terminals in the EU  
The Erika and Prestige accidents, and the e nvironmental damage caused by the resulting oil 
spills highlighted the importance of the highest safety standards in maritime transport. The 
EU took robust action at European and intern ational level through the accelerated phasing-out 
of single hull tankers, the detection and prosecution of polluters and the availability of pollution response means. The third maritime safety package
6 currently under negotiation 
contains seven legislative proposals to furt her enhance quality sh ipping and combat sub-
standard operators. 
                                                 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/mariti me/safety/2005_pa ckage_3_en.htm 
 
EN 9   EN Beside tanker transport, new pipe lines can provide alternative rout es for imports of crude into 
the EU in the years to  come. Chapter 3.3 provides an overv iew of existing and newly planned 
oil pipelines which are likely to influence oi l supply to the EU in the years to come. 
 
EN 10   EN 3.2 Refineries 
Beside supply of crude oil from third countries , the EU also relies on international trade to 
balance its demand in refined products sin ce its refining industry is characterised by 
overcapacity in production of gasoline and insu fficient supply of di esel and other middle 
distillates.  At the same time, in the US there is an  oversupply of diesel and a shortage of 
gasoline. This situation makes both markets complementary and has generated a trade in 
refined products between the EU and the US. However, most of our  diesel needs, not satisfied 
by the EU local production, are impor ted from the Russian Federation7.  
Since the 1980s and until recently, the refining  industry at global sc ale has experienced a 
period of overcapacity and low profitability wh ich has prevented investment in new plants. 
Therefore very limited new refinery capacity has been built in the US and the EU in the past 
twenty years.   
However, in the past few years, a combina tion of demand growth and refinery capacity 
rationalisation has resulted in a tighter bala nce between refining capacity and demand for 
refined products. This tighter balance coupled w ith lack of investment in the past decades 
raised some concerns on future availability of  refining capacity both in the EU and at global 
scale.  This prompted the Commission to launch th e "Study on oil refining and oil markets" 
which has analysed in detail the current situation and the likely development of the refining 
sector as well as its possib le impact on oil prices.  
The study was completed in November 20078 and its main outcomes were:  
• until now the OECD countries accounted for most of the de mand for refined products. The 
situation will change and in the future, de veloping countries will require massive amount 
of refined products. China for example is exp ected to increase its demand for oil products 
five fold by 2030;  
• the structural deficit in diesel and excess pr oduction of gasoline in the EU will continue in 
the next years  and will be exacerbated by the increase d penetration of diesel vehicles. 
Industry will try to compensate with increas e in international trad e of refined products 
rather than with additional investments in new refining capacity. As a consequence, EU 
imports of diesel and other refined products from Russia and other areas are forecast to 
increase; 
• in the next decades, in addition to incr easing demand for refined products, important 
drivers of the refining sector would be: tight er fuels specification, new emissions trading 
schemes and taxation regimes for different products; 
• Approximately 200 new refining projects have been announced globally which should lead 
to a capacity increase of 5 million barrels (Mbbl) per day by 2012 . This amount will 
roughly satisfy additional demand by that tim e. However, by 2020 much more additional 
capacity is needed than is currently planned. 
                                                 
7 In 2005, 28 Mton of diesel products were imported from Russia into the EU (source EUROPIA). 
8 Purvin & Gertz Inc Study on Oil Refining and Oil Markets 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/security/studies/index_en.htm   
 
EN 11   EN 3.3 Pipelines 
3.3.1 Existing pipelines from third countries  
As indicated earlier, most of our imported oi l, approximately 80%, is  brought into the EU 
territory by tankers  and only the remaining part arri ves through two pipelines: Druzhba, 
which connects Russia to countries of Central & Eastern Europe, and Norpipe, an offshore 
trunk line linking Norwegian and British oil fields to the Teeside facilities in the UK. 
Druzhba, the longest pipeline in the world  (4000 km), was put in operation during the 
1960s with the scope to supply oil to western regi ons of Former Soviet Union and countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, members at  that time of the Warsaw Pact.  
The Druzhba pipeline (figure 4) begins in Tatarstan,  southeastern Russia, where it collects oil 
from western Siberia, the Urals, and the Caspian Sea. It runs to Mozyr in Belarus, where it 
splits into a northern and a southern branch.  
The northern branch  crosses the remaining part of Belarus across Poland and Germany 
supplying the refineries of P łock, Schwedt and Leuna. In Schwedt the Druzhba pipeline is 
connected through the MVL pipeline to the Ge rman port of Rostock. In Poland the northern 
branch is connected by the P łock-Gdansk pipeline with the Po lish oil terminal in Gdansk.  
 
Figure 4 the Druzhba pipeline 
The southern branch runs south through Ukraine,  in Uzhgorod the pipeline splits into two 
lines one to Slovakia, Druzhba 1 and anothe r to Százhalombatta in Hungary, Druzhba 2. 
Druzhba 2 is also connected through the Adria pipeline, from Százhalombatta in Hungary to 
the Adriatic port of Omisalj in Croatia. 
 
EN 12   EN In Brody, the Druzhba pipeline is also connected with the Odessa-Brody pipeline, (see later in 
the text) which is currently used to ship oil from  the Druzhba pipeline to the port of Odessa in 
the Black Sea. 
Within the territory of the Russian Federation, the main trunk of Druzhba has a spur line to 
the Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania. From Mažeikiai, two additional branches connect with the oil terminals of Butinge in Lithuania and Ventspils in Latvia.  
In 1997, with the objective of diversifying its e xport routes, Transneft started the construction 
of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), see figur e 10. The BPS was completed in 2001 and in 
2006 reached a capacity of 65 Mtons per year allowi ng Russia to divert oil, originally sent 
through the Druzhba and to th e Mažeikiai refinery, to th e Russian port of Primorsk. 
 
The delivery of Russian crude to the Latvian po rt of Ventspils ceased in 2003. In 2006, noting 
some leaks on the Druzhba pipeline, Transneft stopped also the delivery of crude to the Lithuanian port of Butinge. Russia did not accept se veral offers to jointly evaluate the extent 
of the damage and to collaborate in the repair s. These decisions allowed Transneft to stop the 
delivery of oil to the Mažeikiai re finery and to the Baltic ports as  well as to avoid the transit 
of part of its exports through the territory of Belarus and Ukraine. As a consequence, the full 
capacity of Druzhba of 100 Mtons pe r year is not utilized and th e current flow is reduced to 
approximately 65-70 Mtons per year.  
More recently, further to the January 2007 Russia -Belarus dispute on oil transit, the Russian 
Government approved in May 2007 the constructi on of the Baltic Pipeline System-2 (BPS-2)  
see figure 10.  BPS-2 is a new pipeline with a transport capacity of  50-75 Mtons per year, to 
run from the Unecha junction of the Druzhba pipeline before the Russia-Belarus border to the 
Russian oil terminal of Ust-Luga (near Primorsk ). The project also involves the enlargement 
of the Primorsk oil terminal to  a capacity of 150 Mtons per year. 
If implemented, the BPS-2 project9 will divert additional quantities of oil from Druzhba to 
Russian Baltic ports. This will lead to a big in crease in tanker traffic in the environmentally 
sensitive Baltic area, which creat es big concerns about the poten tial danger of accidents and 
oil spills (see also chapter 4 on chokepoints) . In 2007, 171 Mtons of oil were transported 
through the Danish Straits, doubli ng the volume from 2000 (80 Mtons).  
An additional concern is that if more oil is  diverted from Druzhba to Primorsk, through BPS-
2, a number of inland refineries, in Easter n Europe, currently fed through the Druzhba 
pipeline, will need to seek alternative and probably more expensive supply routes. 
The 354 kilometres Norpipe oil pipeline  starts in the Norwegian continental shelf, crosses 
British water and lands in Teeside in the UK (figure 5). 
The 34 inch Norpipe oil pipeline  carries oil from different No rwegian fields (Ekofisk, Eldfisk, 
Embla, Tor, Valhall, Hod, Ule Gyda and Ta mber) as well as crude  production from other 
offshore British fields. 
                                                 
9 The BPS-2 project has a construction cost estimated at $ 2-2.5 billion and there are indications that the 
cost of oil transportation through the new pipeline would be considerably higher than the cost through 
the existing Druzhba. However, rece nt declarations from the Russian Government indicated that Russia 
intends to proceed with the project.  
 
EN 13   EN The design capacity of the pipe line is 45 Mtons per year; howeve r its flow rate is limited by 
the capacity of the receiving facilities in Teeside in the UK of 40 Mtons per year. 
 
Figure 5 Norpipe Pipeline  
3.3.2 Existing pipelines within the t erritory of the European Union  
Beside pipelines which supply oil from third countries, the EU has a network which ensures 
transport and distribution of crude and oil products in its internal market.   
Figure 6 is a map of the major pipelines in the cen tral part of the territ ory of the EU. A full 
map is provided in annex 1. Owners of such pipelines are generally  joint ventures of 
companies from the countries crossed by the in frastructure. For example, the Trans Alpine 
Pipeline (TAL)10, bringing oil from the Italian port of  Trieste to Austria and Germany is 
owned by a consortium of companies11 from the three countries crossed by the pipelines.  
Two other major internal oil pipelines are SPSE12 connecting the French port of Fos sur Mer 
to the French refinery of Feyzin and further up to the German refineries of Karlsruhe and 
                                                 
10 In 2007 TAL transported approximately 34 Mtons of oil. 
11 Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung GmbH (DE), Transalpine Ölleitung Ges.m.b.H (AT) and Societá 
Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A (IT) 
12 SPSE Société du Pipeline Sud-Européen http://www.spse.fr/en/accueil/index.html  supplies the 
refineries and petrochemical plants from Fos to Karlsruhe through France, Switzerland and Germany. 
The current level of transport is 23 Mtons per year.  
 
EN 14   EN Reichstett) and RAPL13 which connects Rotterdam, the bigge st European oil terminal with 
Antwerpen and also to the German refinery of Wilhelmshaven.  
 
Figure 6 Pipelines in territory of the EU and neighbouring countries  
A major feature of EU internal pipeline netw orks is the limited connections between the 
western European pipeline networ k and the eastern infrastructures.  This is a consequence of 
the fact that the eastern Europ ean pipeline network (an extens ion of the final part of the 
Druzhba pipeline) was conceived and built during the Cold War period and had, at that time, 
no pipeline link with the western network.  
Currently the only pipeline connection between the eastern and the west ern EU oil networks 
is the Ingolstadt-Kralu py-Litinov (IKL) pipeline  built in early 90s14. An additional link 
between the eastern and the western part of th e EU oil network, which has been discussed in 
the past few years, is the conne ction between the Bratislava a nd Schwechat near Vienna. This 
pipeline is only 60 kilometres long but faces major hurdles since it crosses environmentally 
sensitive areas and the Danube River.  
                                                 
13 Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding http://www.rapl.nl/ 
14 Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litinov has a length of 349 km (Vohburg and der Donau – Central Crude Oil Tank 
Farm in Nelahozeves) and a transport capacity of 10 Mtons of oil per year 
http://www.mero.cz/en/ikl_technicke_udaje.html) 
 
EN 15   EN An additional important feature of the internal EU oil network is that the western part is 
connected via pipeline to major European ports while most of the Central and Eastern Europe 
refineries are supplied through the Druzhba pipelines.  If the Russian policy of redirecting its 
oil export from the Druzhba to Primorsk conti nues, Central European countries might face 
difficulties and increased costs for their suppl y of oil and oil products through alternative 
routes.  
Another important network of pipelines is also managed by NATO wh ich has operated its 
own pipeline systems since 1950. The NATO pipe line network comprises nine separate 
military storage, transport and distribution systems for oil products . 
The biggest of the nine NATO systems is the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) which 
manages 5.200 km of pipeline, 84 pump stations and 36 storage facilities with a capacity of 
1.100.000 cubic meters of oil products. 
3.3.3 New Pipelines and additional supply from the Caspian region  
The Caspian region holds considerable amounts of  oil reserves estimated to be in the same 
order of magnitude as the North Sea. Productio n from the Caspian countries will increase 
substantially in the next decades15; Kazakhstan for example, plans to triple its oil production, 
from the current 75 Mtons per year, to 200 Mtons by 2030. This additional oil production will 
allow diversifying global and EU oil supply por tfolio avoiding excessive dependence from a 
restricted number of suppliers.  
However, due to the landlocked nature of th e Caspian areas, its reserves are not easily 
accessible and transportation of crude to the inte rnational market will require construction of 
new oil pipeline(s) as the Turkish straits16 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (figure 7) will not be 
able to transit the future addi tional oil. If such pipelines ar e not built, Caspian oil producing 
countries will look for alternativ es oil routes for example towa rds eastern markets. Swaps of 
Caspian oil are already taking place with Iran. 
                                                 
15 Oil production will come primarily  from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan fi elds: Tengiz and Karachaganak 
in Kazakhstan and Azeri, Chirag a nd Guneshli in Azerbaijan. Substan tial additional production is also 
expected from the Kazak Kashagan field currently be ing developed by a consor tium of international oil 
companies. 
16 The Turkish straits currently transit some 2.4 Mbbl of oil per day (120 Mtons per year). 
 
EN 16   EN 
 
Figure 7 Samsun CeyhanPipeline 
A number of pipeline projects have been proposed for bringing additional Caspian oil 
production to the internati onal market: the Samsun-Ceyhan (figure 7), the Burgas-
Alexandropoulos, the Burgas-Vlore, the Cons tanta-Trieste and the Odessa-Brody-Plock 
(figure 8). 
Beside the advantage of bypassing the Turkish Straits,  all these projects would permit a 
geographical diversificati on of routes as well as sources to the EU and to the international 
market. Of the following projects, the Constant a-Trieste (PEOP) and the Odessa-Brody-Plock 
pipelines offer the advantage of being directly  connected to the EU’s internal oil network.  
 
 
EN 17   EN Figure 8 Planned pipelines  
Samsun-Ceyhan: also known as Trans-Anatol ian Pipeline (TAP), is  a crude oil pipeline 
between Samsun in the Black S ea and the Mediterranean oil te rminal of Ceyhan in Turkey  
(figure 7).  In its final part, the pipeline will follow the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline’s route17.  
The project was conceived in 2003, when Italy’ s energy company Eni studied different oil 
export routes from the Caspian area. On 26 September 2005, Eni and Çal ık Enerji signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding for the project. On June 2008 the promoters completed the 
Front End Engineering and Desi gn (FEED) of the project.  
The planned cost of the pipeline is $1.5 - 2 billion. The 555 km pipeline will be built by 
TAPCO, a company owned by Eni and Çalik. It will initially transport 50 Mtons of oil per 
year (1 Mbpd) with the possibility of expansion to 75 Mtons at a later stage.  
The project includes a new terminal close to Samsun, a pipeline from Samsun to Ceyhan, and 
additional storage capacity in Ce yhan. When completed, the pipelin e will give Turkey, and its 
Ceyhan terminal, a strategic role in the export of oil from the Ca spian area to the international 
market.   
Burgas-Alexandropoulis Pipeline (BAP): the project to build a 280 kilometre oil pipeline 
linking the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas with Alexa ndroupolis on the Mediterranean 
coast of Greece was first considered in 1994. Th e project has been discussed for many years: 
on 12 April 2005, Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria  signed a memorandum of understanding, on 
15 March 2007 the agreement on the construction of the oil pipeline was signed and in December 2007, Russian President Putin and Greek  premier Karamanlis signed the agreement
 
to form a company for the development of the BAP pipeline. 
The annual capacity should initially be some 35 Mtons and later should grow to 50 Mtons per 
year 
The main advantages of BAP compared to other proposed projects in the ar ea is that it is the 
shortest and cheapest route to bypass the Turkish Straits and it s construction does not seem to 
raise major environmental concerns.  Moreover with the recent increases in oil tanker fees and 
possible long waiting times in the Turkish Straits, the financial viability of this pipeline seems 
to be guaranteed. Like the Samsun-Ceyhan pi peline, it would be designed to serve the 
international market. 
The ownership of the pipeline involves thr ee Russian companies (Transneft, Rosneft and 
Gazprom Neft) which will together have a 51% st ake in the project, with Bulgarian and Greek 
companies each holding 24.5% stakes. If the pipe line is completed, it will represent the first 
transport pipeline in the territory of th e EU controlled by a Russian consortium18.  
                                                 
17 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is a crude oil pipeline which connects Baku, Tbilisi, to the Turkish 
port of Ceyhan. Oil is produced in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea. The pipeline 
is the only export line for Caspian oil which bypasses both the Russian network and the Bosphorus 
Straits.  
18 The third country clause included in the third p ackage on internal energy market adopted by the 
Commission on September 2007 covers only electricity and gas networks, oil pipelines are therefore 
excluded 
 
EN 18   EN Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria pipeline (AMBO): this planned, 900 kilometres (35 Mtons 
per year) pipeline connects the Bu lgarian Black Sea port of Burgas  with the Albanian Adriatic 
port of Vlore, allowing exports of Russian and Caspian oil via the Adriatic Sea to the 
international market.  
The AMBO pipeline would be longer and more expensive than BAP. Its promoters have 
however indicated that with a throughput tariff of $1.33 per barre l, it would be economically 
viable19. Such a tariff is competitive with curre nt tanker transport fees, particularly 
considering the risk of waiting time in the Turk ish Straits. Unlikely the BAP, the consortium 
for the construction of AMBO is a US regist ered company owned by private investors.  
An important advantage is that this pipeline will reduce tanker traffic and the possibility of 
related accidents, not only in the Turkis h Straits but also in the Aegean Sea.  
Constanta-Trieste (PEOP): the Constanta - Trieste oil pipelin e also called Pan European Oil 
Pipeline (PEOP) would run from the Black Sea port of Constanta to the o il hub of Trieste in 
Italy, through Romania, Serbia , Croatia, Slovenia and Italy20. On 3 April 2007, a ministerial 
declaration on next steps to build the pipeli ne was signed by Ministers of the concerned 
countries and Commissioner Piebalgs in Zagreb.  
The capacity of the 1.400 km pipeline is expected to be approximately 60 Mtons per year (1.2 
Mbbl per day). Besides creating an alternative route for exporting oil from the Caspian basin, 
a major advantage of this pipeline for EU security  of supply is that, it wi ll be connected at its 
end to the Trans Alpine Pipeline feeding o il to Italy, Austria, Germany and the Czech 
Republic .  
A further advantage is that this pipeline could substantially reduce tank er traffic not only in 
the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean but al so in the environmentally sensitive Adriatic  
Sea. 
While Serbia, Romania and Croatia strongly s upport the project, the position of Slovenia 
remains to be confirmed since part of the pipeline route would cross environmentally sensitive karst areas in this country. In  addition, Slovenia has limite d interest in additional oil 
supply/transit as the country ha s no refinery. An option to ci rcumvent Slovenia (subsea) has 
been mentioned as more costly but feasible.  
An Interstate Committee for PEOP, in which th e Commission participates, has been created 
and meets regularly. On 22 April 2007 in Buchares t, the companies involved in the creation of 
a "Project Development Company" signed a shareholders' agreement.  
Odessa-Brody-Plock: In 2001, Ukraine built the Odessa-Br ody pipeline with the purpose of 
supplying oil from the Caspian region countries to  the EU. However, so far, the pipeline has 
been used "in reverse mode" to transport Russian  oil to the Black Sea port of Odessa. During 
2007, approximately 9 Mtons of oil were  transported from Brody to Odessa
21.  
                                                 
19 Balkan & Black Sea Conference Bucharest April 2007 
20 A PHARE study, limited to the Romanian part of the pipeline, was completed in 2005 indicated a 
construction cost of € 3Bn for a construction of a pipeline able to transport 90 Mtons per year.  
21 see http://www.tnk-bp.com.ua/en/operations/projects/brodyodessa/  
 
EN 19   EN If reversed and extended from Brody to Plock (the main Polish refinery), this pipeline will 
enhance the EU’s energy security  by facilitating Caspian oil supplies to the EU (particularly 
to Poland, the Baltic States, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) through Ukraine bypassing 
both the congested Turkish Straits and the Russ ian pipeline network. It  would also further 
promote the integration of Ukraine into the EU’s internal energy market.  
The EU support for the pipelin e has included: a €2 million TACIS technical assistance 
project, including the completion of a Framewor k Business Plan for the extension of the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline to Plock in Poland. Th e Business Plan, which was presented on 12 
January 2007, demonstrated a bus iness case for the project.  
On 10 October 2007 in Vilnius, Poland, Ukraine,  Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed 
an inter-governmental agreement  to create a new joint venture "Sarmatia LTD"22 for the 
implementation of the pipeline extension. The Samartia joint venture launched a new 
feasibility study for the implementation of the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline.  
A follow-up Energy Security Summit was held on 22-23 May 2008 in Kiev. The participants reiterated their political suppor t for the practical implementati on of the Odessa-Brody-Plock-
Gdansk project by the signing of a Joint Statem ent. The need to mode rnise the under-utilised 
Ukrainian refinery system in order to be able to process the Caspian oil and make the Odessa-
Brody-Plock-Gdansk project pr ofitable was also discussed
23. Discussions will continue at the 
Summit planned at the end of 2008 in Azerbaijan. 
One specific problem concerning transit of Ca spian oil through the Odessa-Brody pipeline 
and then into the Druzhba pipeline to the EU is  the need to avoid the mixing of different oil 
qualities  as for example Caspian light oil and Russian  export blend. In order to avoid such 
mixing, it is proposed to alternat e the pumping of either type of  oil. Discussions are ongoing 
with the Slovakian pipeline operator Transpetrol24 to perform pumping tests.  
                                                 
22 The Samartia LTD consortium includes companies from the 5 countries involved in the project.  
23 The Ukrainian refineries have been designed and bu ilt to process Ural crude produced in Russia in order 
to refine Caspian light oil they will be need to be refurbished and modified.  
24 Transpetrol is 49% owned by Yukos Finance BV 
 
EN 20   EN 4 Chokepoints at world scale and in Eu ropean waters (Baltic and Black seas) 
Chokepoints are narrow channels used for transit of large volumes of international sea trade 
including oil . The concerns related to chokepoints can be  different: geopolitical  in the case of 
transit through potentially  unstable areas, environmental and in particular in relation to 
damage from an accident, economic if tran sit through a chokepoint requires long waiting 
times, security in connection to possible terrorist attack etc...  
Chokepoints (figure 9) therefore represent critic al bottlenecks in the energy transport network 
since they transit high volumes of crude and produc ts and the impact of interruptions of transit 
through them would affect seve rely the global oil market.  
The Strait of Hormuz  leading out of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca  linking the Indian 
and the Pacific Oceans are the world’s most strategically important chokepoints. Other 
important passages are: Bab el-Mandab  which connects the Arabian and the Red Sea, the 
Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and Atla ntic Oceans, the Suez Canal  and the Sumed 
Pipeline  linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, the Baltic Sea  and the Turkish Straits  
joining the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  
 
Figure 9 World chokepoints 
In 2007, approximately half of  the total world oil product ion of 86 Mbpd was moved by 
tankers on maritime routes.  As the global oil market is de pendent upon secure and reliable 
transport, the blockage of a chokepoint, even te mporary, will result in supply disruptions with 
consequence including substantial increases in oil prices. A shipping accident through a 
chokepoint, besides the ne gative effect on oil supply and pri ces, can also have a disastrous 
environmental impact in case of oil spills or ship wrecks.  
In conclusion, problems at chokepoints even in  remote areas such as the Persian Gulf will 
have an impact on oil supply to the EU sin ce oil is a commodity which is traded and 
exchanged on global market.  
 
EN 21   EN A description of the major c hokepoints, on a global scale, is in annex 2. Two chokepoints 
located along the border of the EU, the Baltic Sea and the Turkish Straits, are described in the following chapters. 
Baltic Sea 
The Baltic Sea today is one of the busiest seas in the world, accounting for more than 15% of 
the world’s cargo transportation. Each month 3, 500-5,000 ships cross the waters of the Baltic 
Sea. Approximately 17-25% of these ships ar e tankers transporting approximately 170 million 
tonnes of oil a year.  
With the expansion of the transport capacity of  the Baltic Pipeline System (BTS in figue 10) 
to 65 Mtons per year in 2006 and the planned c onstruction of the Baltic Pipeline System 2 
(BTS-2 in figure 10), tanker tra ffic in the environmentally sens itive Baltic area is going to 
increase substantially. It is expected that by building the Baltic Pipelines System 2, Russia 
will be able to increase  its export capacity from the Primor sk and Ust-Luga oil terminals to 
approximately 150 Mtons per year.   
Through the construction of the proposed Baltic Pipeline System 2, Russia will divert oil from 
the Druzhba pipeline to its Baltic ports. Doi ng that, Russia will have  the opportunity to bypass 
a number of transit countries and to deliver oil cargo from its Baltic ports (Primorsk and Ust-
Luga) not only to European clients but also to the wider international market. 
All the Baltic littoral states, except Russia, have expressed on various occasions and in 
different fora their concerns about the Baltic Pipeline System 2 as an oil spill or a tanker 
accident in the area will have severe, some experts argue irrecoverable, environmental 
repercussions.  
 
EN 22   EN 
e 
Figure 10 Baltic Pipeline System (BTS) an d proposed Baltic Pipeline System 2 (BTS-2) 
Turkish Straits (Bosphor us and Dardanelles)  
The Turkish Straits comprise the Bosphorus an d Dardanelles and divide Asia from Europe. 
The Bosphorus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles link the 
Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea.  
Less than a kilometre wide at their narrowest po int, the Turkish Straits are one of the world's 
most difficult waterways  to navigate, due to their sinuous geography. With 50,000 vessels, 
including 5,500 oil tankers, pass ing through the straits annually, they are one of the world’s 
busiest and most dangerous chokepoints. 
In 2006, oil shipments through the Turkish Stra its were 2.4 Mbbl per day (120 Mtons per 
year). In 2007, some 1,200 tankers, totalling 135 m deadweight tons, of Panamax size and 
larger, along with a large number of smalle r tankers, passed throug h the Turkish Straits. 
Unless alternative pipeline routes are built (s ee chapter 3.3), traffi c through the Straits is 
expected to increase to an unsustainable level  as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan plan to increase 
substantially their crude producti on and exports in the future.  
On different occasions, Turkey has raised concerns over the navigational safety and 
environmental threats to the Straits. Commerci al shipping has the right of free passage 
through the Turkish Straits but Tu rkey claims the right to impos e regulations for safety and 
environmental reasons.  
 
EN 23   EN 5 Conclusions 
The PRIMES Baseline scenario as well alterna tive energy policy scenarios which include the 
impact of high oil prices and the implementation of the new EU energy policy indicate that oil 
will still be the main elemen t of our energy mix in 2020.  
Moreover by 2020, due to the decline in Nort h Sea oil production, ap proximately 90% of 
EU27 oil consumption will be imported  from third countries. However, if planned energy and 
climate policies are successfully implemented (e nergy policy scenario), by 2020 oil imports in 
absolute quantity would be only slightly above leve ls of 2005. If oil prices were to return to 
100 $ per barrel, in addition to assuming the implementation of the new Energy Policy, the net imports would be sli ghtly lower than in 2005. 
This note has analysed the existing and planned oil infrastructures within and towards the EU. 
Currently most oil arrives in the EU via po rts and tankers. Due to the depletion of EU 
indigenous resources and the expect ed increase in international oi l sea trade, in creased tanker 
traffic is expected in European waters in the next decades. Such an increase raises concerns
 
for the environment in relation to greenhouse gas emissions, air quality, o il spills and possible 
accidents; particularly in environmentally sens itive areas such as the Baltic and Black seas. 
Additional concerns exist about the risk of supply disruption should one of these transit routes 
be blocked.  
Construction of  new pipelines can provide environmenta lly viable alternatives to increased 
tanker transportation as well as a contribution to security of  supply through new diversified 
routes.  While the construction of new pipelines should be left to the private sector, 
consideration should be given as to whethe r complementary initiatives can help the 
development of such new infrastructures where they are of specific in terest for the EU’s 
security of energy supplies.  
A number of initiatives at different stage of advancement are listed hereafter:  
• Assessment of the results of the study "Survey of the competitive aspects of oil and oil 
product markets in the EU"  which are expected during 2009. The study will provide a 
thorough analysis of the functioning of the internal market for oil and oil products and should indicate whether new po licy measures are required.  
• While different pipeline options to bring oil to  the EU have been individually assessed by 
promoters, an overall comparison of the pros and cons of different pipeline options is 
missing. A study to enable an independent comp arison of the different options should be 
therefore considered, including the compar ison with possible new ship routes and 
corresponding infrastructure. The study should pa y attention not only to security of supply 
issues but also to all environmental threats for both – maritime and pipeline transport. 
Particular attention should be  given to EU waters and par ticularly the Baltic, Black and 
Mediterranean seas. The study should make it possi ble to prioritise the projects, as it seems 
that at least some of them w ould compete for the same oil.  
 
EN 24   EN • To develop an oil dimension in the Energy Community25. This proposal was on the agenda 
of Energy Community Ministerial Council in J une 2008. This issue is highly relevant given 
that Contracting Parties of th e Energy Community are supplied fo r most of their oil via the 
Adriatic Sea and the Danube Ri ver, supply routes which repr esent in some cases a high 
cost associated to an environmental risk. The Meeting Conclusions of the Energy Community Ministerial Council
26 of 27 June 2008 included a specific point on the 
development of an oil dimension within the Community, including a request to the 
Secretariat to prepare a draft in view of a possible decision at the following Ministerial 
Council Meeting on December 2008.  
• The possibility of inclusion of oil infrastr ucture in the Trans-European Energy network 
should be considered.27 Even if the limited budget provisio n available for trans-European 
Energy Network (TEN-E) projects is not likely to have a financial impact on the execution 
of new projects, the inclusion of  strategic projects in the guidelines will encourage political 
support for such projects.  
• The assessment of the effectiveness of environmental policy tools in taking into full 
account the impact of oil transport infrastr ucture on the environment, in relation to 
maritime transport (including ports and termin als) as well as the pipeline transport 
(including construction of new pipelines).  
• The issue of oil transporta tion and supply should be kept  under review in relevant 
Committees and bodies, as for example the Berlin Fossil Fuel Forum and the Oil Supply 
Group.  
• Energy Dialogues with major oil supplie rs (OPEC, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Mediterranean countries, Norway, EU-Russia En ergy Dialogue etc...) should pay attention 
to the issue of oil tr ansportation and supply. 
                                                 
25 The Treaty establishing the Energy Community relates to electricity and gas. However, from the outset 
the Parties envisaged its extension at a later stage to  "other energy products and carriers", including oil 
products and infrastructures. At its Article 100 (iii), the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, 
even foresees a simplified procedure allowing its Ministerial Council to decide by unanimity to extend 
it "to other energy products and carriers or to other essential network infrastructures". In particular, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Italy and Romania signed in Zagreb on 3 April 2007 a "Ministerial declaration on the development of the hydrocarbons dimension of the Energy Community" in which 
they call for the establishment of an Oil Forum. 
26 http://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/IN ST_AND_MEETINGS/Ministerial_Council/2008/2
7_Jun 
27 The inclusion of oil infrastructures in existing guidelines was considered but eventually dropped in 
2003. To be noted also that in 2003, some of the countries crossed by planned pipelines as BAP, 
AMBO, PEOP and Odessa Brody Plock were not yet part of the EU. 
 
EN 25   EN Annex 1  
 
 
EN 26   EN Annex 2  
Chokepoints  
Strait of Hormuz  
The Strait of Hormuz (figure 11) is by far the world’s most important chokepoint with an oil 
flow of approximately 17 Mbbl per day  (850 Mtons per year) in 2006. It connects the Persian 
Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.  
At its narrowest point the Strait is 34 kilome tres wide, and consists of two 1.6 km wide 
channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic.  
The majority of oil exported from the Strait of  Hormuz is shipped to Asia, the United States, 
and Western Europe. Most of the crude expor ted through the strait tr avels long distances by 
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) whic h can carry over 200.000 tons of oil.  
Closure of the Strait of Hormuz  would require use of longer al ternate routes with increased 
times and transportation costs. Alternate r outes include the 1200 km long Petroline, also 
known as the East-West Pipeline, across Saudi Arabia which has a capacity to move 250 
Mtons per year. Other alternate routes could include the deactiv ated 82 Mtons per year Iraqi 
Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (I PSA), and the 25 Mtons per y ear Tapline to Lebanon. Oil 
could also be pumped north from Iraq to the Ceyhan oil terminal in Turkey.  
 
Figure 11 Strait of Hormuz  
 
EN 27   EN Strait of Malacca  
The Strait of Malacca (figure 12), located be tween Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, links 
the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and P acific Ocean. Malacca is the shortest sea route 
between Persian Gulf suppliers and the Asian cons umers. It is the key chokepoint in Asia with 
an estimated flow of 750 Mtons during 2006.  
At its narrowest point in the Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait, Malacca is only 2.7 km 
wide creating a natural bottleneck,  as well as potentia l for collisions, grounding, or oil spills.  
Over 50,000 vessels transit the Strait of Mal acca per year. If the Strait were blocked, 
transiting tankers would be required to reroute around the Indonesian archipelago through 
Lombok Strait, located between the islands of Bali and Lombok, or the Sunda Strait, located 
between Java and Sumatra. In 2007, Malaysia n, Indonesian and Saudi companies signed a 
contract to build a $7 billion pipeline across the north of Ma laysia and sout hern border of 
Thailand to reduce the tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca. 
 
Figure 12 Strait of Malacca  
Suez Canal  
The Suez Canal (figure 13) is located in Egypt, and connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez 
with the Mediterranean Sea.  Oil shipments from the Persia n Gulf travel through the Canal 
primarily to European ports, but also to th e United States. In 2006, an estimated 200 Mtons 
per year of oil flowed northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, while 30 
Mtons travelled southbound into the Red Sea.  
Over 3,000 oil tankers pass through the Suez Cana l annually, and represent around 25% of the 
Canal’s total revenues. With only 300 meters at  its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to 
 
EN 28   EN handle large tankers. The Suez Canal Authority has discussed widening and deepening the 
Canal to accommodate VLCCs and U ltra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC).  
The 320 km long Sumed Pipeline,  or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, also provides a route 
between the Red and Mediterranean Seas by cro ssing the northern region of Egypt from the 
Ain Sukhna to the Sidi Kerir Terminal. The pipelin e provides an alternativ e to the Suez Canal, 
and can transport 155 Mtons of oil per year. In  2006, nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s northbound 
shipments (approximately 115 Mtons per year of  crude) were transpor ted through the Sumed 
pipeline.  The pipeline is owned by Arab Petroleu m Pipeline Co., a jo int venture between 
EGPC, Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC, and Kuwaiti companies.  
Closure of the Suez Canal and the Sumed Pipe line would divert tankers around the Cape of 
Good Hope, adding 9600 kilometres to the transit route. 
 
Figure 13 Suez Canal  
Strait of Bab el-Mandab  
The Strait of Bab el-Mandab (figure 14) is a ch okepoint between the horn of Africa and the 
Middle East, and a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.  It is 
located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects th e Red Sea with the Gulf of 
Aden and the Arabian Sea.  
Bab el-Mandab is 30 km wide at its narrowe st point, making tanker traffic difficult and 
limited to two 3 km-wide channe ls for inbound and outbound shipme nts. Closure of the Strait 
could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf fr om reaching the Suez Canal or Sumed Pipeline, 
diverting them around the s outhern tip of Africa addi ng transit time and cost.  
The Strait of Bab el-Mandab could be bypasse d through the East-West oil pipeline, which 
crosses Saudi Arabia and has a capacity of 250 Mtons per year  capacity. However, 
southbound oil traffic would still be blocked. S ecurity remains a concern of foreign firms 
 
EN 29   EN doing business in the region, after a French tank er was attacked off th e coast of Yemen by 
terrorists in October 2002. 
 
Figure 14 Bab el-Mandab  
Panama Canal  
The Panama Canal is an important route connect ing the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea 
and Atlantic Ocean.  According to the Panama Canal Auth ority, 25 Mtons per year of crude 
and petroleum products were transported thr ough the canal in 2006. However, the relevance 
of the Panama Canal to the global oil trade ha s diminished, as many m odern tankers are too 
large to travel through the canal . Some oil tankers, such as u ltra-large crude carriers (ULCC), 
are nearly five times larger than the maximu m capacity of the canal. The largest vessel that 
can transit the Panama Canal is known as a PANAMAX-size vessel (s hips ranging from 
50,000 – 80,000 dead weight tons.  
The Canal is 80 km long and only 30 meters wide at its narrowest  point. Around 14,000 
vessels transit the Cana l annually of which around half acc ount for traffic to and from the 
United States. However, the Panama Canal is not a significant route for US petroleum imports.  
In September of 2007, the Government of Pana ma began work on a $ 5 billion project to 
expand the Canal.  The expansion will add a third lane of traffic that will handle wider loads 
and new locks that will be 50 meters wide (c ompared to the current 30 meters) as well as 
deeper and wider access canals that will allow for larger modern ships to pass. However, it is 
unlikely that oil flows would increase dramati cally, as biggest oil tankers would still be 
unable to use the canal. On the other hand, the expansion would open the new possibility of 
using the canal to transport li quefied natural gas (LNG), as al most all existing LNG tankers 
are too large to use the canal as it now stands.  
 
EN 30   EN Closure of the Panama Canal would increase transit times and costs adding over 13.000 km of 
travel since vessels would have to reroute around the Straights of Ma gellan and Cape Horn.