EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 30 November  2020  
on amendments to the Law on Parliament  
(CON/20 20/30) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 19 October  2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Swedish Parliament 
(hereinafter the ‘Parliament’) for an opinion on a draft law amending,  inter alia,  the Instrument of 
Government1 (which forms part of the Swedish Constitution) and the Law on Parliament2, as far as they 
concern issues  regarding the functioning of the Parliament which have implications for authorities  such as  
Sveriges Riksbank , (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . The draft law forms part of  an inquiry report on the 2019 
Overview of the Riksdag3 (hereinafter the ‘Report’)  by the Committee for the 2019 Overview of the 
Riksdag (hereinafter the ‘Committee’).  
The EC B’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC4, as 
the draft law concerns Sveriges Riksbank.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law 
1.1 Composition of General Council of Sveriges Riksbank  
The draft law states that if a member of the Parliament ceases for any reason to be a member of a  
political party  represented in the Parliament,  that member of the Parliament shall also cease to be 
a member of the committees and other  parliamentary  bodies and delegations  – including the 
General Council of Sveriges Riksbank – to which that member of the Parliament has been 
appointed on the basis of their membership of that  political party5. According to the Committee, t he 
main reason for this element  of the draft law  is to ensure that the composition of the committees 
and other parliamentary bodies and delegations  reflect s the political majority in the Parliament6. 
Although, under the current law,  membership of a political party is required in order to become a 
member of the Parliament7, membership of the Parliament is a personal position which,  as a 
                                                 
1  Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform . 
2  Riksdagsordningen (2014:801) . 
3  2020/21:URF1 2019 års R iksdagsöversyn. Available at www.riksdagen.se/ . 
4 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
5  See Chapter 12, Section 13 second paragraph and supplementary provision 12.13.1 of the draft law.  
6  See Chapter 9.7 of the Report.  
7  See Chapter 3, Section 1 of Instrument of Government. See  also pages  107 to 108 of the Report.  
ECB-PUBLIC  
2 general  rule, a person cannot be forced to give up . However , membership of a committee or other 
parliamentary body or delegation is not a personal position, but one to which a person is appointed 
on the basis of membership of a political party  represented in the Parliament8.  
1.2 Preparatory requirements for submissions  made to Parliament by General Council and Executive 
Board of Sveriges Riksbank  
The draft law states that parliamentary bodies and del egations  – including the General Council and 
the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank  – shall, before making submissions to the Parliament, 
obtai n the necessary information and opinions9. According to the Committee, t he reason for this 
element  of the draft law is to align the preparatory requirements for submissions  made to the 
Parliament by parliamentary bodies and delegations  – such as the General Council and the 
Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank  – with the preparatory requirements which appl y to 
legislative proposals made to the Parliament by the Swedish Government10. However, the draft law 
also states that the Rikdagsstyrelsen (the Riksdag Board) rather than General Council and the 
Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank is  required to obtain opinions from Lagrådet  (the Swedish 
Council on Legislation)11. According to the Committee, another reason for not requiring the General 
Council and the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank to obtain the opinion of the Swedish C ouncil 
on Legislation  is that the right of the General Council and of the Executive Board of Sveriges 
Riksbank to put forward a  submission is more limited than the right of the Riksdag Board to do 
so12. The General Council and the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank do not, as a general rule,  
propose legislation to the Parliament, and it is very rare that a legislative proposal made by  the 
General Council or the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank is referred to the Swedish Council on 
Legislation  for consultation. In any case, if an opinion from the Swedish Council on L egislation 
were needed on a submission from the General Council or the Executive Board of Sveriges 
Riksbank, such an opinion could be obtained during the preparation of the relevant  submission13. 
 
2.  General observations  
2.1 Composition of General Council of Sveriges Riksbank  
2.1.1  The ECB understands that the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank is responsible for the 
operations of Sveriges Riksbank14, and that it is the decision- making body of Sveriges Riksbank  
responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank ’s ESCB- related tasks . The General Council 
is responsible for , inter alia,  the appointment of  the Executive Board and the Governor  and Deputy 
Governors  of Sveriges Riksbank15, the determination of the remuneration of the members of the 
                                                 
8  See Chapter 9.7 of the Report.  
9  See Chapter 9, Section 17a of the draft law.  
10  See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report.  
11  See Chapter 9, Section 17b first paragraph of the draft law.  
12  See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report.  
13  See Chapter 19.9.2 of the Report.  
14  See Chapter 9, Section 1a of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank ( Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges Riksbank ). 
15  See Chapter 1, Section 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
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3 Executive Board16, the removal  of the members of the Executive Board on specified grounds17, the 
supervision of the Executive Board’s work18, the audit function in relation to the review of the 
Executive Board’s work19, proposal s in relation to Sveriges Riksbank’s distr ibutions from  the profit 
and loss account20, and the design of banknotes and coins issued by Sveriges Riksbank21. While 
the distribution of competences between the Executive Board and the General Council of Sveriges 
Riksbank lies beyond the scope of this opinion, the ECB  wishes to reiterate that, having regard 
both to the structure of the General Council, as a constituent part of Sveriges Riksbank, and to its 
tasks, the General Council may not seek to influence the Executive Board in its capacity as 
Sveriges Riksbank’s decision -making body responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank’s 
ESCB- related tasks22. 
2.1.2  The ECB understands that the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank consists of 11 members 
appointed by the Parliament23. The members of the General Council are appointed by the  
Riksdagens valberedning (Nominations  Committee of the Parliament )24 for the same term of office 
as the members of the Parliament ; such appointment occur s as soon as possible after the relevant 
general election has been held25. As a general  rule, the Nominations C ommittee of the Parliament  
provides a proposed list of members of the General Council , based on the proportional 
representation of the political  parties represented in the Parliament , for the Parliament t o decide 
on26. The ECB understands that currently , six of the 11 members of the General Council of 
Sveriges Riksbank are members of the Parliament and all 11 are members of political parties that 
are represented in the Parliament27. However, there is no requirement that a member  of the 
General Council of Sveriges Riksbank must be a member of the Parliament or of a political party  
represented in the Parliament28. 
2.1.3  The ECB understands that  under the existing law,  if a person ceases to be a member of  the 
Parliament, they also cease to be a member of the committees and other  parliament ary bodies and 
delegations  of which they are a member on the basis of  their membership of the Parliament29. 
Further, if a person ceases to be a member of a committee or other parliamentary body or 
                                                 
16  See Chapter 4, Section 5 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
17  See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government.  
18  This is the case although it is not expressly stated in the Law on Sverige Riksbank (see, e.g., pages  1370 to 1371 of 
the Swedish Government Official Report 2019:46:  A new L aw on Sveriges  Riksbank).  
19  See Chapter 9, Section 2 and 2a of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
20  See Chapter 10, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
21  See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
22  See paragraph 14.2.4 of Opinion CON/2020/13. See also paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2002/16, paragraph 2.3 of 
Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/7.  
23  See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government.  
24  See Chapter 12, Section 2 of the Law on Parliament.  
25  See Chapter 13, Section 21 and Chapter 12, Section 5 of the Law on Parliament.  
26  See Chapter 12, Sections 7to 8 of the Law on Parliament and Chapter 9.3.1. of the Report.  
27  The Estonian central bank (Eesti Pank)  is an example of another national central bank in the European System of 
Central Banks which has a supervisory board with functions comparable to the General Council of Sveriges 
Riksbank, whose membership is partly composed of members of the national parliament representing political 
factions in the parliament. See paragraphs  1.6 and 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/7.  
28 See supplementary provision ( tilläggsbestämmelse) 13.21.1 of the Law on Parliament, relating to Chapter 13, 
Section 21 of the Law on Parliament . 
29  See Chapter 12, Section 13 of the Law on Parliament.  
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4 delegation – such as  the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank  – the political party by which that 
person was appointed nominates  their replacement and informs  the speaker of the Parliament  
accordingly , who then declares  the nominee elected30. However, there is currently no requirement 
that a member of the Parliament who ceases to be a member of a political party represented in the 
Parliament must  cease to be a member of the committees and other parliamentary bodies and 
delegations  (including the General Council of Sveriges Riks bank ) of which  they have  become a 
member on the basis of their membership of that  political party31. The ECB understands  that the 
situation where a member of the Parliament ceas es to be a member of a political party occurs 
relatively frequently32. Against this backdrop, the ECB further understands that the proposed 
amendment regarding the composition of the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank constitutes a 
limited change to ensure that the composition of the committees and other parliamentary bodies 
and delegations reflect s the political  majority in the Parliament to the greatest extent possible.  
2.2 Preparatory requirements for submissions  made to Parliament by General Council and Executive 
Board of Sveriges Riksbank  
The ECB understands that the General Council and the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank 
each have the right to make submissions to the Parliament (i)  regarding matters concerning 
Sveriges Riksbank’s competence, organisation, personnel and forms of operation33, and (ii)  within  
their own areas of responsibility34. In this regard, the ECB also understands  that such submissions 
can include not only legislative proposals, but also other forms of legal acts and documents.  The 
ECB welcomes the proposed preparatory requirements for submissions made to the Parliament, as 
they may enhance the legislative process and the quality of legal acts adopt ed by the Parliament.  
 
This opinion will be published on EUR -Lex.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 November  2020.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine LAGARDE  
                                                 
30  See Chapter 12, Section 14 of the Law on Parliament.  
31  See Chapter 9.1 of the Report.  
32  See Chapter 9.4 of the Report.  
33  See Chapter 9, Section 17 of the Law on Parliament.  
34  See supplementary provision 9.17.4 of the Law on Parliament, relating to Chapter 9, Section 17 of the Law on 
Parliament.