EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 11.3.2016 SWD(2016) 57 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT



IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC No 1967/2006, (EC) No1098/2007, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1343/2011 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 {COM(2016) 134 final}

{SWD(2016) 56 final}



This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission Table of Contents 1.Introduction 2.Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties 2.1.Organisation and timing 2.2.Internal consultations 2.3.Regulatory Srcutiny Board 2.4.Consultation with stakeholders 2.5.Expert advice 2.6.Other relevant studies 3.Policy Context 3.1.What are technical measures? 3.2.The history of technical measures in the CFP 3.3.The current governance structure of technical measures 3.4.Technical measures in the new CFP 3.5.The landing obligation 3.6.Regionalisation 3.7.Technical measures and other elements of the CFP

4.Problem Definition 4.1.Sub-optimal performance 4.2.Difficult to measure effectiveness 4.3.Prescriptive and complex rules 4.4.Lack of flexibility in the management framework 4.5.Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision making process 4.6.Underlying drivers of the problems 4.7.The affected stakeholders 4.8.Evolution of the problem 4.9.Necessity and subsidiarity 5.Objectives 5.1.General objectives 5.2.Specific and operational objectives 6.Consistency with other EU Policies 7.Policy options 7.1.Selection of policy options 7.2.Baseline scenario 7.3.Option 1: Consolidation 7.4.Option 2: Framework Approach 7.4.1.Sub-option 2.1 – Framework Approach without baselines

7.5.Option 3: Elimination of technical measures 7.6.Summary of policy options 8.Analysis of impacts 8.1.Methodology 8.2.Baseline scenario 8.2.1.Economic impacts 8.2.2.Social impacts 8.2.3.Environmental impacts 8.2.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden 8.2.5.Impacts on SMEs 8.3.Option 1: Consolidation 8.3.1.Economic impacts 8.3.2.Social impacts 8.3.3.Environmental impacts 8.3.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden 8.3.5.Impacts on SMEs 8.4.Option 2: Framework Approach 8.4.1.Economic impacts 8.4.2.Social impacts 8.4.3.Environmental impacts

8.4.4.Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden 8.4.5.Impacts on SMEs 8.5.Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines 8.5.1.Economic impacts 8.5.2.Social impacts 8.5.3.Environmental impacts 8.5.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden 8.5.5.Impacts on SMEs 8.6.Option 3: Elimination of technical measures 8.6.1.Economic impacts 8.6.2.Social impacts 8.6.3.Environmental impacts 8.6.4.Simplification, administrative costs and burden 8.6.5.Impacts on SMEs 8.7.Summary of impacts 9.Comparing the options 9.1.Qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational objectives 9.2.Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability 9.3.Risk Assessment 10.Ranking the options

11.Monitoring and Evaluation 11.1.Monitoring 11.2.Evaluation REFERENCES LIST OF ANNEXES ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL MEASURES ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNENCE STRUCTURES FOR TECHNICAL MEASURES BY REGION ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR BY MEMBER STATE AND BY GEAR TYPE ANNEX X DESCRIPTION OF BASELINES AND THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT



Executive Summary Sheet Impact assessment on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council for the conservation of fishery resources and for the protection of marine organisms through technical measures A. Need for action Why? What is the problem being addressed? The current technical measures regime (31 regulations) is no longer fit for achieving the sustainability objectives of the new CFP. Specifically the current measures are: based on negative, mostly coercive incentives in a top-down governance system creating mistrust amongst stakeholders as measures are seen as inequitable, leading to non-compliance;  impossible to measure their impact on the achievement of the conservation objectives of the CFP; numerous and overly complex making compliance and control more difficult; controlling too many aspects of fishing operations undermining the sector's confidence in the measures; providing little incentive to fish selectively where there is no cost to discarding, or of catching vulnerable species or impacting adversely on the seabed; and sub-optimal in respect of achieving broader environmental and ecological policy objectives The catching sector (around 82,000 vessels, employing 98,500 FTE) is most affected. What is this initiative expected to achieve? This initiative aims to: (1)Optimise the contribution of technical measures to achieving the key objectives of the new CFP that came into force on 1 January 2014. (2)Create the flexibility required to adjust technical measures by facilitating regionalised approaches (consistent with the objectives in EU law). (3)Simplify the current rules in line with Commission's REFIT programme. The current rules are overly complex and difficult to enforce, and simplification will lead to reductions in administrative costs and burden. It also addresses the need for simplification of technical measures outlined in an earlier Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP. What is the value added of action at the EU level? Provisions in the proposal relating to the conservation of marine biological resources falls under the exclusive competence of the EU according to Article 3(1d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Therefore, the subsidiarity principle does not apply for those provisions. However, at the heart of this proposal is the concept of regionalisation whereby Member States should cooperate regionally to develop and implement conservation measures. B. Solutions What legislative and non-legislative policy options have been considered? Is there a preferred choice or not? Why? The baseline scenario maintains the existing set of 31 Regulations. Option 1: Consolidation – A new regulation with a limited scope which would bring together and consolidate in one Regulation for common rules with regionally specific rules remaining in the existing regulations. Regionalisation would happen if and where the Member States submit joint recommendations for multiannual plans. Option 2: Framework – A framework regulation containing general provisions and corresponding standards; common rules and technical provisions; and baseline standards by region corresponding to identified results which would function as a default measures in the context of regionalisation. The baselines and default technical measures that correspond to the objectives would be applicable unless and until regionalised measures are designed and introduced into Union law. A sub-option (2.1) is a framework regulation without defined baselines. Option 3: Elimination of existing rules – Repeal of the majority of the existing regulations (except for essential nature conservation measures). Any necessary technical measures in the longer term would be developed regionally under multiannual plans. This option assumes that the landing obligation is a result-driven measure in itself and will lead to clean fisheries. Option 2 best meets the objectives set and provides a level of security that conservation objectives will continue to be met while regionalisation develops. Who supports which option? Retaining the baseline scenario was not considered an acceptable option by any of the stakeholders Option 1 received very little support from any of the key stakeholders. Option 2 was supported by some of the catching sector, Member States and NGOs. They were divergent views in the content of the framework amongst stakeholders. The catching sector argued for a framework without baselines (sub-option 2.1) but Member States, NGOs and some of the Advisory Councils argued against this. Option 3 was favoured by certain sections of the catching sector but was rejected by Member States, NGOs and other parts of the catching sector who considered it a high-risk strategy. C. Impacts of the preferred option What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)? The economic impacts would be positive as the framework approach would drive regionalisation, leading to the delivery of MSY for all stocks and reductions in unwanted catches. This would lead to increased fishing opportunities and increase revenues from landing bigger more valuable fish (estimated at 10-40%). This would steadily improve over time. Employment levels should stabilise quickly under this option and there is potential for increased employment. Once MSY levels are achieved, fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant increase has a potential to create new jobs in the catching sector. Fishing on sustainable stocks would also increase income and wages and therefore job attractiveness. Average wages will nearly double as a result of fishing sustainably. Environmental impacts would be positive. The framework would manage the transition to regionalisation and ensure that the environmental sustainability objectives of the CFP are not jeopardised. In the longer-term there would be positive benefits to fish stocks and better protection for sensitive species and habitats. What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)? How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected? Administrative costs and burden would be reduced in that there would be immediate simplification of the current regulations and a greater role for the catching sector through the Advisory Councils in the development of technical measures. In addition the potential move to a results-based system in the longer-term would lead to further simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching sector. Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations? The move to regionalisation will lead to increased costs for national administrations (estimated at €80,000-120,000) for the development of a single multiannual plan. Not all of these costs are directly associated with technical measures which form only part of such plans. These costs would be largely front-loaded during the development of these plans. In the short-term costs for control will reduce as a result of simplification although there will be some extra costs for implementation of the landing obligation. In the longer-term control costs should diminish considerably particularly if regions move towards results-based management where the need for enforcing prescriptive rules at sea diminishes. Currently costs for enforcing technical measures at sea are very high. Will there be other significant impacts? The approach simplifies the structure: One regulation will replace 6 Regulations, partially replace 3 Regulations and repeal 10 Commission Regulations. It provides a direct route to regionalisation in line with the CFP. D. Follow up When will the policy be reviewed? An ex-post evaluation should be carried out before 2022 when the landing obligation should be fully operational, MSY achieved for all stocks and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems. This evaluation would directly feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022.





GLOSSARY Acoustic Deterrent Device (ADD) Devices to make species such as marine mammals aware and warn them from fishing gears Advisory Council The Advisory Councils were established under the CFP to promote a balanced representation of all stakeholders and to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CFP. Biomass Biomass refers to the size of the stock in unit of weight. Often, biomass refers to only one part of the stock (e.g. spawning biomass, recruited biomass or vulnerable biomass, the latter two of which are essentially equivalent). Codend The part of a trawl net where the catch is retained. Demersal Descriptive of a fish which lives at or near the bottom of the water column, e.g. cod or haddock. Discards Unwanted catches returned to the sea as a result of fishing operations. Exploitation pattern How fishing pressure is distributed across the age profile of a stock Fishing mortality (F) An expression of the rate at which fish are removed from the stock from fishing operations (including fish subsequently discarded). It is approximately the stock annual removal expressed in percentage. Fishing Opportunities Fishing opportunities or Total allowable catches (TACs), are catch limits (expressed in tonnes or numbers) that are set for most commercial fish stocks. The Commission prepares the proposals, based on scientific advice on the stock status from advisory bodies such as ICES and STECF. FMSY A biological reference point. It is the fishing mortality rate that, if applied constantly, would result in an average catch corresponding to the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and an average biomass corresponding to BMSY. Good Environmental Status (GES) The environmental status of marine waters where these provide ecologically diverse and dynamic oceans and seas which are clean, healthy and productive Highly migratory species Fish species or stocks that carry out extensive migrations and can occur in both EEZs and high seas. (e.g. tuna and tuna-like species, marlins and swordfish) Joint Deployment Plan (JDP) A joint deployment plan (JDP) is a plan for coordinated joint deployment of national means (inspection vessels, surveillance aircraft, mobile mixed inspection teams, etc.) to monitor and inspect fishing activities that fall under the rules of the CFP. The JDP gives effect to a specific control and inspection programme which sets out the objectives, priorities and benchmarks for control and inspection by Member States. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) Theoretically the largest yield (or catch) that can be taken from a species' stock over an indefinite period. It is the maximum use that a renewable resource can sustain without impairing its renewability through natural growth and reproduction. Mesh size Mesh size of a towed net refers to the mesh size of any codend or on board a fishing vessel and attached to or suitable for attachment to any towed net. Minimum conservation reference size (mcrs) The size of a living marine aquatic species taking into account maturity, as established by Union law, below which restrictions or incentives apply that aim to avoid capture through fishing activity; such size replaces, where relevant, the minimum landing size Minimum landing size The size of a marine organism below which, if caught must be returned to the sea. Natura 2000 A network of nature protection areas in the territory of the European Union. It is made up of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Special Protection Areas (SPAs) designated respectively under the Habitats Directive and Birds Directive Pelagic In relation to fish, the term 'pelagic' refers to fish which live in the upper layers of the water column, e.g. herring, sprat and mackerel. Recruitment The number of new fish added to the exploitable portion of the stock resulting from growth of juvenile fish into adults, or migration of smaller fish. Regionalisation The process by which the Member States with direct interest for fisheries of a given geographical region organize themselves with the aim to agree on common management measures. The agreed measures as joined recommendation are submitted to the Commission and after scientific assessment adopted as Commission delegated acts. Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) An electronic system, that remotely monitors fishing vessels' catches through a system of sensors and CCTV cameras Selective fishing Refers to a fishing method's ability to target and capture organisms by size and species during the fishing operation allowing non-targets to be avoided or released unharmed. Selectivity devices Gear modifications or devices fitted which allow the escape of unwanted catches by species (i.e. species selectivity) or by size (i.e. size selectivity). Spawning Stock Biomass Numbers (weights) of individual fish which are old enough to reproduce. This generally corresponds to the minimum landing size and so defines the 'fishable' population. Stock The population of a given species that forms a reproductive unit and spawns little if at all with other units. The “total stock” refers to both juveniles and adults while “spawning stock” refers to the adult population (see above). TAC Total allowable catch; the maximum biomass of fish that can be caught from a given stock in a given year. Technical measures Measures that regulates the composition of catches by species and size and the impacts on components of the ecosystems resulting from fishing activities by establishing conditions for the use and structure of fishing gear and restrictions on access to fishing areas.



LIST OF ACRONYMS AC Advisory Council ADD Acoustic Deterrent Devices BSAC Baltic Sea Advisory Council CC Catch Composition CCALMR Convention on Conservation on Antarctic Living Marine Resources CCTV Closed-circuit television CFA Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture CFP Common Fisheries Policy CQM Catch Quota Management DCF Data Collection Framework EAPO European Association of Producer Organisatins EESC The European Economic and Social Committee EFCA European Fisheries Control Agency EFF European Fisheries Fund EMFF European Maritime and Fisheries Fund EP Exploitation Pattern ER Exploitation rate EWG Expert Working Group FMC Fishery Monitoring Centre Fmsy Fishing mortality that produces MSY FTE Full-time Equivalents GES Good Environmental Status GVA Gross Value Added IA Impact Assessment ICCAT International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea JDP Joint Deployment Plan LIFE Low Impact Fishers of Europe MCRS Minimum Conservation Reference Size MLS Minimum Landing Size MPA Marine Protected Area MS Member States MSFD Marine Strategy Framework Directive MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation NEAFC Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission NUTFA New Under Ten Fishermen's Association NWWAC North Western Waters Advisory Council NSAC North Sea Advisory Council PO Producer Organisation Vessel Monistoring Systems RBM Results-based Management REFIT Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme REM Remote Electronic Monitoring RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organisations SAC Special Area of Conservation SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises SSB Spawning Stock Biomass STECF Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries SWFPA Scottish Whitefish Producers Association TAC Total Allowable Catch TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union VMS Vessel Monitoring System Fishery Monitroign Centres Lead DG: DG MARE Other departments involved: SG, SJ, DG ENV, DG EMPL, DG FISMA, DG SANTE, DG RTD. Agenda planning/WP reference: 2013/MARE/002 1.Introduction This impact assessment (IA) concerns a proposal to simplify and modernise in light of the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP1) a set of 31 regulations containing technical measures (such as minimum mesh sizes, closed areas and minimum landing sizes) that define where, when and how individual fishing operators can exploit and interact with marine resources and the wider marine ecosystem. This initiative aims to: (1)Optimise the contribution of technical measures to achieving the key objectives of the new CFP that came into force on 1 January 2014. (2)Create the flexibility required to adjust technical measures by facilitating regionalised approaches (consistent with the objectives in EU law). (3)Simplify the current rules in line with Commission's REFIT programme2. The current rules are overly complex and difficult to enforce, and simplification will lead to reductions in administrative costs and burden. It also addresses the need for simplification of technical measures outlined in an earlier Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP3. 2.Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties 2.1.Organisation and timing The proposal for a new technical measures regulation is provided for in ‘Agenda Planning’ (2013/MARE/002), in the 2011 Management Plan of the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). It has been included since 2012 in the Commission Work Programme (CWP) as a policy output under the activity "Conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources", as well as, since 2013, in the Commission's REFIT programme4.

This IA has progressed in several steps following adoption by the Commission of the proposal for the new CFP "Basic Regulation"5 in mid-2011. As a first step, an internal DG MARE Working Group made up of the relevant units was set up in July 2011 to carry out initial scoping work. In December 2012, an evaluation of technical measures6 was externally contracted to a consortium led by the consultancy firm MRAG. This study consisted of a retrospective evaluation of the existing technical measures regulations in place in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptance. During the course of this evaluation extensive consultations were held with representatives of the fishing industry, national administrations and the research agencies of seven Member States7. This was completed in June 20138. It was followed by a prospective evaluation of the likely economic, social and environmental impacts as well as the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability of different defined policy options. This study was completed in July 20148. 2.2.Internal consultations An Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was formed in January 2013, which in addition to DG MARE comprised of representatives from seven other Directorates-Generals (DG) and services - Secretariat General (SG), the Legal Services (SJ), DG Environment (DG ENV), DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), DG Health & Food Safety (DG SANTE), DG Research & Innovation (DG RTD) and DG Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA). The IASG met on five occasions - 14 February 2013, 9 July 2013, 10 January 2014, 28 February 2014 and 15 April 2015 and worked to finalise a draft of the IA by written consultation following the last meeting. Between these meetings regular contact was maintained with the members of the IASG. 2.3.Regulatory Srcutiny Board The impact assessment report has been revised considerably following the opinion received from the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 19 June 2015. This opinion listed three main recommendations for improvement: (1)The scope of the initiative: The policy context section has been redrafted to provide more detail on the governance structure of the current technical measures regulations as well as providing more detail on what has been decided in the CFP. A section on how regionalisation would work in practice and in particular the role of stakeholders in the process has also been added. Additional information has been provided in annexes (Annexes IV, V, VI and VII) to support this section of the report. (2)Content of the technical measures proposed: The policy options section has been re-drafted to provide more detail on the different measures and structures that would be included under the different options. A table clarifying the difference between common and regional measures has been added. An annex (Annex X) describing the criteria for developing the baseline standards has also been included. A sub-option has been added to option 2 in line with the comments received from the stakeholders during the public consultation. This sub-option comprises a framework without baseline standards included. Further sub-options with different levels of baseline standards have not been considered as technical measures such as mesh sizes, closed and minimum sizes cannot be considered in isolation. In the context of regionalisation more detail on what incentives are foreseen to encourage compliance with the rules and ensure a level playing field have been included in the policy options section and also discussed further in section 8.2. Detail of how the framework would be monitored is included under section 10. (3)The effectiveness of the options: The impacts section has been enhanced with additional examples illustrating the likely impacts. However, this remains very much a qualitative analysis. Section 9 comparing the options has been expanded to provide a more detailed description of the effectiveness of the options and sub-option and how they will tackle the sub-optimal performance of the current regulations. The table providing a qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational objectives of each option has been revised to better explain the scoring for each option. The issue of uneven implementation or creation of an uneven playing field is addressed in section 8.3. In addition to these points the objectives of the initiative have been revised to link better with the options and identified problems. A section assessing the likely impacts of the different options on the competitiveness of the catching sector has been added. The problem definition has been re-structured and the examples put into boxes as suggested. The examples in the impacts section have similarly been moved into boxes to improve readability. A glossary of technical terms has also been added. The executive summary and executive summary sheet have been redrafted in line with the changes made to the new report. On the basis of the second opinion received on the 30 October 2015 on a revised IA, several additional elements have been included to improve clarity. These relate to three aspects as follows: (1)Content of the options: The options have been re-drafted in line with the comments of the RSB to avoid inconsistencies. A summary table has been added at the end of Section7 which summarises the main elements of the different options and sub-option and illustrates the differences between them in terms of content, structure, mechanisms for regionalisation and also the level of simplification introduced by each option and sub-option. Reference to measureable targets that will act as success indicators has been added into Section 7 for the different options (Options 1 and 2 and sub-option 2.1 would contain such targets). Additional clarifications have been added to sections 9.2 and 9.3 on the incentives that are foreseen under the preferred option to encourage compliance and also on the positives and negatives that would ensue in the event of uneven implementation across regions. (2)Assessment of impacts: The analysis of impacts section (Section 8) has been screened and for the preferred option a justification for why there would be rapid improvements in the economic, social and environmental impacts compared to the baseline scenario. It is also highlighted that the positive benefits predicted will be dependent on the speed of regionalisation. There is likely to be period of adjustment to the new governance structure introduced by the framework regulation where economic impacts would be similar to the baseline scenario. After this transitional period regionalisation of technical measures should be accelerated provided Member States pro-actively embrace the regioanlisation process. (3)Effectiveness of the options: In section 9, clarification is provided to explain how regionalisation will tackle the problems of poor effectiveness of the current technical measures. It is also clarifies that even if regionalisation is a slow process, the simplification introduced throughout the framework approach in the preferred option. There will be immediate benefits to the catching sector in complying with the technical rules remaining in place pending regionalisation and for Member States in controlling and monitoring compliance with these rules. In section 11 more detail on the operational monitoring arrangements to assess the effectiveness of the new framework has been provided. In addition the IA has been checked for inconsistencies and grammatical errors. The Executive summary has also been revised in line with the changes detailed above. 2.4.Consultation with stakeholders A 12-week internet-based public consultation was launched from January to May 20149. A total of 59 detailed contributions were received from fifteen Member States, five of the seven Advisory Councils (ACs), the main industry representative organisations (covering more than 80% of the catching sector), eleven of the main NGOs dealing with fisheries issues, consumer protection groups and the general public. The contributions received have been published11. Annex I contains a summary of the findings from this consultation. The stakeholders' views are reflected throughout this report but the main conclusions were as follows: (1)Any new technical measures regulation(s) should move away from micromanagement towards a results-based management approach. (2)Fishermen should become more accountable for what they catch rather than the construction and operation of the fishing gears they deploy.

(3)Simplification of the rules is a fundamental objective but simplification should not create inequalities in the management systems across Member States (“maintaining a level playing field”). (4)Regionalisation is seen as an important opportunity to introduce simplification of technical measures regulations. (5)A framework approach is preferred. This should contain overarching objectives and minimum common standards to be applied across the EU. It should also contain safeguards to ensure action can be taken if problems in fisheries emerge. (6)Improvements in selectivity have been achieved in the past when incentive structures have been aligned with management objectives. Such structures need to be built-in to any new regulatory framework for techncial measures. Apaprt from the public consultation, numerous workshops, consultations and meetings were held during the period from 2011 to early 2015 with the key stakeholders (i.e. Member States, European Parliament, Advisory Councils, the catching sector and NGOs). A full list of these meetings is provided in Annex II. The combination of the public consultation and the extensive follow-up dialogue with the key stakeholders (i.e. the catching sector, NGOs and Member States) have ensured that the views expressed fully represent the different stakeholder groups. 2.5.Expert advice Two meetings of an Expert Working Group (EWG) of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) were convened in October 201211 and March 201312. These meetings explored the potential of technical measures as a management tool in the context of the reform of the CFP. The findings of these reports helped to define the options that were considered in the perspective evaluation carried out by the external consultants to support this IA. In addition to these meetings, several ad hoc requests were made to STECF and also the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) on specifc issues relating to: –Fishing gear selectivity13 –Replacing mesh size and catch composition rules14 –Bycatch of marine mammals and other protected species15&16 –Existing closed and restricted areas17 2.6.Other relevant studies The findings from impact assessments carried out to support a previous revision of technical measures in 200818 (this proposal was subsequently withdrawn) and the CFP19 have provided information for the preparation of this IA. In addition a number of externally contracted studies and several studies undertaken on behalf of the European Parliament have also provided background material on specific issues. These are listed in Annex III. 3.Policy Context 3.1.What are technical measures? Technical measures are rules governing how and where fishermen may fish. They aim to control the catch that can be taken with a given amount of fishing effort and also to minimise the impacts of fishing on the ecosystem. They form an integral part of most fishery management systems including the CFP. Technical measures can be grouped into: –measures that regulate the operation of the gear (e.g. prohibitions of certain gear types, maximum limits on how long or what type of gear can be deployed); –measures that regulate the design characteristics of the gears that are deployed (e.g. mesh size and catch composition rules); –minimum landing sizes below which fish must be returned to the sea (e.g. for cod the minimum landing size is set at 35cm);

–measures that set spatial and temporal controls (e.g. closed/limited entry areas and seasonal closures) to protect aggregations of juvenile or spawning fish; and –measures that mitigate the impacts of fishing gears on sensitive species (e.g. cetaceans, seabirds or sea turtles) or closed areas to protect sensitive habitats (e.g. coldwater coral reefs) referred to hereafter as "nature conservation measures". 3.2.The history of technical measures in the CFP The history of technical measures applying in European fisheries legislation within the framework of the CFP is one of numerous regulations, amendments, implementing rules and temporary technical measures introduced as stop-gaps to resolve emerging problems. Since 1980, no less than 90 different technical measures regulations or regulations containing technical measures have been enacted by the EU across the different sea basins and in non-EU waters11. Figure 3.2.1 shows the progression of these regulations over time. A full list of regulations enacted since 1980 is provided in Annex IV. 3.3.The current governance structure of technical measures The regulatory structure of technical measures has become highly complex and somewhat dis-jointed. Across all EU sea basins and non-EU waters in which Union vessels operate there are 31 regulations which contain technical measures. Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the regulatory structure in place. Annex V provides more detailed information on the scope and content of these different regulations while Annex VI illustrates the governance structure across sea basins. Figure 3.3.1: Current Regulatory Structure for Technical Measures (Source: Author) Within this complex structure, there are three detailed technical measures regulations enacted under the ordinary legislative procedure covering the main sea basins as follows: Regulation (EC) No 850/9820 covering the North-eastern Atlantic including the North Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat; the outermost regions (e.g. Guyana, Martinique and Réunion) and the Black Sea (since 2013); Regulation (EC) No 1967/200621 covering the Mediterranean; and Regulation (EC) No 2187/200522 covering the Baltic Sea. These regulations contain a mixture of common rules applying across sea basins which mainly relate to the operation of fishing gears and regionally specific rules that regulate the design characteristics of the gears used (e.g. mesh sizes), set minimum landing sizes and establish closed or restricted areas to protect juvenile and spawning aggregations of fish species. They also contain limited nature conservation measures which tend to be regionally specific although similar mitigation measures apply across sea basins in some cases. Each of these regulations contained limited empowerments to allow the adoption of detailed rules relating to specific gears types or gear construction or relating to specific area closures. In addition Regulation (EC) 850/98 contains a specific empowerment for the Commission (Article 45) to adopt technical measures in cases where the conservation of specific stocks calls for immediate action (e.g. Regulation (EC) 2056/200123 which sets out emergency measures to protect cod in the North Sea). The regulations in the Northeast Atlantic and Baltic also allow for Member States to implement technical measures applying to their own vessels under national law provided such measures are more stringent than Union law. Member States have tended to use this empowerment to introduce technical measures into fisheries for shellfish (e.g. minimum sizes for crab, clam and lobster) inside their own territorial waters. However, there are examples of Member States introducing measures applying to their own vessels in fisheries outside their own territorial waters in response to specific stock conservation problems (e.g. Denmark have introduced a requirement for Danish vessels to use sorting grids in the industrial fishery for Norway Pout in the North Sea). Specific to the Mediterranean, there are provisions allowing for the development of national management plans adopted under national law (Article 19). In most cases these national plans contain technical measures for certain fisheries and/or gears as well as rules for the protection of sensitive habitats and sensitive species. To date 28 such national management plans involving fisheries with trawl nets, purse seines and other type of surrounding nets, and boat seines have been adopted by Member States24. There is also an empowerment to allow the Council to adopt management plans for specific Mediterranean fisheries, in particular, in areas totally or partially beyond the territorial waters of Member States. They can include specific technical measures, including where appropriate temporary derogations to the common rules. No such plans have been adopted into Union law to date.

Additional flexibility for amending technical measures or introducing new measures was afforded in the past through the Fishing Opportunities Regulations setting annual TACs and quotas in the Northeast Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea and for deepsea species. These were a mixture of supposedly temporary technical measures with a mixture of regionally specific measures and derogations from general provisions contained in other regulations. Following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)25 such measures could no longer be included in the Fishing Opportunities Regulation except for those measures with a direct functional link to the catch limits of a particular stock or stocks. Therefore only a limited number of such measures are now contained in the Fishing Opportunities Regulations. For example there is a closed area off the west coast of Ireland to protect Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) relating to the TAC for this species in this area26. There are several co-decided regulations that transpose technical measures agreed for third-country waters covered under Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) such as the Convention on Conservation on Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCALMR) and the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Measures emanating from other RFMOS such as the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) are also still included in the Fishing Opportunities Regulation for the North-east Atlantic as temporary measures. 3.4.Technical measures in the new CFP Technical measures are considered an integral part of the new CFP. The CFP aims to ensure that fishing and aquaculture are environmentally, economically and socially sustainable and provide a source of healthy food for EU citizens. Its goal is to foster a dynamic fishing industry and ensure a fair standard of living for fishing communities. Annex VII presents the main elements of the CFP in more detail. The CFP has three key objectives: –Exploitation of living marine biological resources restores and maintains populations of harvested species above levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for all stocks by 2015 and by 2020 at the latest (Article 2.2). –The gradual elimination of discards on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the best available scientific advice, by reducing unwanted catches and gradually ensuring that catches are landed (Article 2.5(a)). –Coherence with Union environmental legislation, in particular the objective of achieving a good environmental status (GES) by 2020 under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD27), as well as with other Union policies28&29 (Article 2.5(g)). Technical measures as tools to contribute to achieving the main objectives CFP have an important and significant role in attaining each of these objectives as follows: The attainment of MSY will be facilitated by the application of technical measures which regulate exploitation pattern (i.e. how fishing pressure is distributed across the age profile of a stock). Obtaining MSY from a given stock will require that the exploitation pattern avoids fishing on younger age groups. To achieve this will require a combination of effective technical measures (i.e. measures that regulate the operation and design of the gear, minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) and spatial/temporal closures). The gradual elimination of discards and minimisation of unwanted catches will require the application of technical (gear operation and design) as well as tactical changes (closed or restricted areas) to drive increased selectivity and avoidance of unwanted catches (i.e. fish below mcrs). The landing obligation (see section 3.5) introduced to achieve this objective will require a rethink on the current governance structure of technical measures to allow for more flexibility to achieve this goal. Ensuring fishing activities are consistent with wider ecological considerations will depend on the application of technical measures that minimise the impacts of fishing gears on the ecosystem (e.g. mitigation measures or closed areas). Specifically technical measures can contribute to the attainment of Good Environmental Status (GES) with respect to 4 out of the 11 descriptors included under the MSFD - Biological diversity (Descriptor 1); Maintaining exploited populations within safe biological limits and with a healthy age-distribution (Descriptor 3); Maintaining all elements of marine food webs at normal abundance (Descriptor 4); and Maintaining sea-floor integrity (Descriptor 6). The CFP "Basic Regulation" outlines a range of measures for the conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine biological resources which include technical measures (Article 7). The types of measures available are listed. Specific reference is made to fish stock recovery areas to protect juveniles or spawning aggregations (Article 8) and to minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) that replace minimum landing sizes (Article 15) in the context of regionalisation (as described in the following section). The new CFP also acknowledges the contribution technical measures can make to sustainable fishing. Article 1730 provides the opportunity for Member States to incentivise the use of selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact through the allocation of increased fishing opportunities. This is the first time that a direct link between "responsible" fishing and fishing opportunities has been included in the CFP. 3.5.The landing obligation The new CFP includes a new approach to solve the long-standing problems of overfishing and discarding, through an obligation to land all catches. This "landing obligation", which constitutes a ban on discarding, applies to all catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs) and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species which are subject to minimum sizes (only blue-fin tuna is under TAC in this sea basin). It is to be introduced gradually over the period 2015 and 2019 and follow a fishery based approach. It is designed to trigger behavioural change and encourage fishermen to improve selectivity voluntarily to avoid catching small, low value fish that will now have to be landed and counted against quotas. The landing obligation aims to trigger innovation in fishing gears, techniques and strategies, linking it directly with technical measures. In addition to improvements in selectivity anticipated, the landing obligation comes with a set of potential exemptions and flexibility instruments to make the transition to, and timely implementation of, the landing obligation possible. These include quota flexibilities, exemptions for species that have a high survival rate and a de minimis exemption to cater for residual unwanted catches that are unavoidable and cannot be eliminated through improved selectivity. 3.6.Regionalisation The concept of regionalisation The new CFP promotes regionalisation as a new governance approach. It represents a fundamental shift in the governance structure of fisheries policy. It moves away from centralised micro-management to regionalised decision-making with direct involvement of stakeholders in developing specific conservation measures, tailored to the specificities of the fisheries in a region. Regionalisation provides an opportunity to utilise technical measures much more as a driver for the achievement of sustainable fisheries rather than simply as restrictive and coercive measures complementing TAC and quota and effort restrictions. However, regionalisation is an option that Member States can choose to use rather than an obligation.

The regionalisation process and role of stakeholders Article 18 of the CFP "Basic Regulation" describes the process of regionalisation. It allows groups of Member States from the sea basin concerned to formulate “joint recommendations”. These joint recommendations can contain technical measures, specific measures to implement the landing obligation allowed for in the CFP, as well as the establishment of nature conservation measures within Natura 2000 sites. Provided such measures are consistent with the objectives of the CFP, the Commission can transpose these joint recommendations into Union law through delegated or implementing acts. The CFP recognises the Advisory Councils (AC) as the key stakeholder representative groups in the context of regionalisation. It contains an obligation for Member States to consult the AC on joint recommendations and for the advice of the AC to "be taken into account" in formulating regionalised measures31. Other stakeholders such as individual industry representative groups or NGOs do not have any formal role in regionalisation as the ACs are considered representative of these groups although they may be consulted informally by Member States in developing measures or assist the ACs in formulating their advice. The main tools for regionalisation The main tools for regionalisation are multiannual management plans. These plans aim to establish a framework for the sustainable exploitation of stocks or combinations of stocks and marine ecosystems concerned. Multiannual plans are established as separate co-decided regulations containing the objectives, quantifiable targets, clear time-frames to reach the quantifiable targets and safeguards to ensure that quantifiable targets are met. Within these plans, it is possible to include an empowerment for the Commission to adopt specific technical measures to facilitate the implementation of the plan by means of a delegated/implementing act. These technical measures are agreed as joint recommendations. The scope of what technical measures can be included is not defined so potentially any combination of measures deemed necessary for the implementation of the plan can be included. Since the inception of the CFP the Commission has come forward with one proposal for a multiannual plan for fisheries in the Baltic Sea32 and intends to adopt further proposal for multiannual plans for demersal fisheries in the North Sea and Northeast Atlantic and pelagic fisheries in the Mediterranean during 2015 and 2016. As a temporary measure in the absence of a multiannual plan, Member States may also choose to develop discard plans for the implementation of the landing obligation under regionalisation. These plans are limited in duration to 3 years and are implemented through a Commission Delegated act. Within discard plans technical measures that are specifically required to implement the landing obligation can be included. Principally these are derogations to existing measures that regulate the design and characteristics of fishing gears, minimum conservation reference sizes (that replace minimum landing sizes) and closed areas to protect juveniles or spawning grounds. Discard plans have been enacted for fisheries for pelagic species and for most fisheries in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of 2015 to implement the first timeline of the landing obligation33. However, these plans have contained only limited technical measures. Regionalisation of nature conservation measures necessary for compliance with obligations under Union environmental legislation (e.g. MSFD, Habitats and Birds Directives) is also envisaged under Article 11 of the CFP. These Directives impose certain legal obligations on Member States as regards Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) where specific technical measures may be needed. Such measures can be developed by way of joint recommendations agreed regionally by Member States and enacted into legislation through a delegated act. Principally these are closed or restricted areas where the use of certain fishing gears is restricted. The first of these delegated acts was recently adopted for several areas in the Baltic and Kattegat34. Figure 3.6.1 summarises the options for regionalising technical measures under the new CFP. As a safeguard measure, in all cases where MS cannot agree on joint recommendations or the joint recommendations are incompatible with the objectives of the CFP, the Commission can step-in and propose measures under ordinary legislative procedure. Further safeguards to avoid the collapse of fisheries are provided in the CFP under Article 12 and Article 13 which allow the Commission or Member States respectively to adopt emergency measures on the basis of evidence of a serious threat to conservation of a stock or to the marine ecosystem from fishing which requires immediate action to alleviate the threat. Such measures can include technical measures (e.g. closure of a specific area) but they are strictly time limited.



Discard Plans Delegated Acts with maximum duration of 3 years Pre-CFP Technical Measures under Regionalisation Nature Conservation Measures under Delegated Acts Regionalised Technical Measures as part of Delegated Act Regionalised Technical Measures as part of multiannual plans under Delegated Act Multiannual Plans under co-decision which include the objectives for technical measures Technical Measures under 31 Separate Regulations No Regionalisation

Figure 3.6.1: Regionalisation under the CFP (Source: Author) 3.7.Technical measures and other elements of the CFP Technical measures are inextricably linked to other elements of the CFP particularly control and enforcement and the provision of scientific data. To ensure that the rules of the CFP are followed in practice, the policy includes a control system with the necessary tools to enforce them. The system is laid down in the Control Regulation35 which entered into force on 1 January 2010. Under Article 118 of the Control Regulation an evaluation of the impact of this Regulation on the CFP must be undertaken by the Commission five years after its entry into force. This evaluation is currently being undertaken and the Commission are due to report by the end of 2015. The effectiveness of technical measures regulations in contributing to the objectives of the CFP is dependent on them being coherent and consistent with the control system and vice-versa. Therefore any future revision of the control Regulation arising from this evaluation needs to take account of changes to the technical measures and equally in revising the technical measures, controllability must be a central consideration. Measuring the effectiveness of technical measures relies heavily on the provision of accurate scientific data. Article 25 of the CFP sets out the key principles for data collection and requires Member States to collect data on fleets and their fishing activities in particular biological data on catches and on the potential environmental impacts of fishing activities on the ecosystem under a Data Collection Framework (DCF) Regulation36. A Commission proposal to update and enhance the DCF is currently being prepared. Ensuring that data needs to monitor and measure the effectiveness of technical measures will be an integral part of this proposal. 4.Problem Definition

The main benefit of the current technical measures identified by stakeholders is that measures (e.g. minimum landing sizes) which are harmonised across EU fisheries have established a "level-playing field" amongst the catching sector of different Member States. However, this is in contrast to a number of studies, including the retrospective evaluation that show technical measures in their current format have largely not delivered on the objectives of the CFP effectively. This is more evident in some sea basins than others but the general perception is one of multiple complex and ineffective rules contained in an inflexible governance structure. With the new challenges thrown up by the new CFP, including the move to fishing at MSY, the introduction of the landing obligation and the achievement of GES the current regulatory structure will continue to fail to deliver. The current structure is also out of line with the new governance approach introduced by regionalisation. In this context, there are five identifiable weaknesses with the existing technical measures. 4.1.Sub-optimal performance Progress has been made in moving towards sustainably fisheries in the last decade. Currently 26 stocks (out of the MSY assessed total of 62) are being fished sustainably at or below MSY in the Atlantic EU waters, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea from only 5 stocks in 200937. For many of these stocks the move to sustainable fishing has been as a result of a decrease in fishing pressure following from reductions in fishing opportunities or fishing effort or for economic reasons (market forces) fishermen have been forced out of business. However, there are stocks where technical measures collectively have contributed towards regulating exploitation pattern8&11 (how fishing pressure is distribution across the age profile of a stock). One such example is provided in example 1. Example 1: According to ICES, in the Baltic Sea there have been significant improvements in exploitation patterns for cod. This has been brought about largely through the use of more selective gears with larger mesh sizes and escape windows in fisheries for cod in combination with closed areas to protect juvenile cod. Discarding of undersize fish in these fisheries has been reduced significantly to less than 10% compared to 50-60% in the early 1990s11. In other fisheries, in combination with technical measures at Union level, Member States have taken their own measures to improve selectivity with good results. Such measures have been developed with direct consultation with the fishing industry giving them a level of legitimacy with the catching sector (See example 2). Example 2: In the Norway Pout fishery in the North Sea, Danish fishermen are required to use sorting grids to reduce bycatch of non-target species such as haddock, whiting and saithe under national legislation. Discards of haddock and whiting in these fisheries have been reduced by 57% and 37% respectively following this initiative which resulted from an acceptance that catches of undersize cod and haddock in these fisheries were unacceptably high38. Similarly Swedish fishermen in the Skagerrak fishing for Nephrops are required to use sorting grids in this fishery to reduce bycatch of cod. Since their introduction unwanted catches of cod have been reduced by approximately 90% from previous levels39. Technical measures have also delivered positive benefits in reducing ecosystem impacts. For example the limited number of spatial measures taken to protect sensitive habitats such as coldwater corals in the Northeast Atlantic and seagrass beds in the Mediterranean have been effective8, while some strict restrictions on the use of certain gear types have also provided protection to sensitive species such as cetaceans, seabirds and sea turtles as illustrated by example 3. Example 3: Regulation (EU) No 894/9740, which established a prohibition on the use of large-scale driftnets above 2.5km for highly migratory fish (e.g. tunas and swordfish) have also had positive benefits. This prohibition has succeeded in significantly reducing incidental catches of sensitive species such as cetaceans and seabirds which were frequently caught in these gears41&42. Technical measures have performed less well in other fisheries and sea basins as evidenced by the retrospective evaluation6, the Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP43, the IA report accompanying the Commission's proposal for the new CFP19 as well as the reports from STECF11&12. Currently out of 176 assessed stocks there are 19 stocks in the North-east Atlantic, 88 stocks in the Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to be fished unsustainably (i.e. above MSY)37. For some of these, technical measures have failed to control exploitation patterns and discards for these stocks are generally high. Table 4.1.1 and Annex VIII provide some examples of fisheries where these problems are most acute. This information was collated in a study carried out as part of the IA to support the CFP44. Fishing Gear Area No of Vessels Target Species Discarded Species Indicative Discard Rates Beam Trawls North Sea, English Channel, Irish Sea and Celtic Sea ~470 Sole, Plaice Plaice dab, whiting, grey gurnard 60-90% Beam Trawls Southern North Sea ~450 Crangon shrimp Plaice, dab, whiting 56-72% Bottom Trawls English Channel, Irish Sea, Celtic Sea, Bay of Biscay ~2500 Nephrops & mixed demersal species and Nephrops, whiting , haddock, anglerfish, megrim, cod, hake 36-70% Bottom Trawls Iberian Peninsula ~450 hake, horse mackerel, anglerfish, megrim Hake, horse mackerel, blue whiting 30-60% Bottom Trawls Adriatic ~1000 Nephrops Multiple species 40-50% Bottom Trawls Ionian Sea ~500 Red shrimp Multiple species 20-50% (Source: Vessel numbers extracted from STECF 2013b; Discard rates taken from IA report to support the CFP44) In these cases this sub-optimal performance is caused by a number of factors relating to the effectiveness of the measures themselves and the management framework they operate in as follows: (1)Technical measures, particularly measures that regulate the operation and design characteristics of the gear (e.g. mesh size regulations) are viewed by fishermen as a way to restrict their activities and which result in losses of revenue through direct (loss of fish) and indirect costs (cost of gear replacement) with no apparent benefit. This is particularly prevalent in the demersal fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean. Their reaction has been to mitigate the impacts of such measures through technical innovation as illustrated by example 4. Example 4: The use of illegal gear attachments (so-called “blinders”) which obstruct the mesh opening nets, contravening the mesh size rules has been widespread in fisheries heavily reliant on young fish that may be close to or just above the minimum landing size (e.g. beam trawl fishery for sole and trawl fisheries for Nephrops). This is because the current mesh size results in loss of marketable catch of these fish above the minimum size providing an incentive to circumvent the mesh size rules45. (2)Despite there being many ways to improve selectivity through the use of selectivity devices such as square mesh panels, sorting grids or increases in mesh sizes, the innovation potential of the fishing industry has been directed away from the deployment of more selective fishing towards a sub-optimal harvesting strategy where the sole objective is to reduce losses. The result has been uptake of selective gears has been limited to fisheries where legislation making the use of such gears mandatory has been introduced, despite such gears providing the means to reduce unwanted catches. This is particularly the case in trawl fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean targeting a number of different species (i.e. mixed fisheries) where a range of species are caught together (e.g. cod, haddock and whiting). In these fisheries, fishermen often discard large amounts of both undersized and marketable fish species to remain legal as illustrated by example 5. Example 5: In the North Sea flatfish fishery for which the legal gear (beam trawl with a mesh size of 80 mm) may be effective to support a relevant exploitation pattern for the target species, sole, this gear is unselective for other species caught during the same fishing operations such as plaice. This imbalance results in high rates of discards (for plaice greater than 60%44). (3)The use of minimum landings size (mls) and catch composition (CC) regulations in the Northeast Atlantic, the North Sea and to a lesser extent in the Baltic Sea have created an obligation for fishermen to discard in some circumstances. As highlighted by STECF11 these were introduced to act as coercive incentives to avoid areas with high concentrations of juveniles or unwanted species. There is no clear evidence to suggest that this has been the case. The predominant reaction by fishermen to both these rules has been to comply through discarding of fish below mls or in excess of permitted CC percentages, particularly if moving to other areas would result in a reduction in potential revenue (i.e. movement to an area with fewer marketable fish). See example 6. Example 6: The catch composition rules require that catches of species which exceed the catch composition percentages laid down in the regulations must be discarded prior to each landing. A skipper is required to reconcile his catch with the catch composition rules and record it in the logbook within 24 hours. Depending on the species mix on any particular day, a skipper may be obliged to discard fish to meet the catch composition requirements for that day. A day later he may catch and keep on board more of the species he discarded the day before because it fits within the rules after the catch composition changed as a result of fishing that day, and so on during the rest of the trip. In practice fish in excess of the percentages are either discarded just before return to port or misreported and landed illegally.

(4)The effectiveness of nature conservation measures to minimise interactions with sensitive species or to reduce the impacts of fishing gears on vulnerable habitats (e.g. coldwater corals) has also been sub-optimal. This is not necessarily because the measures themselves are ineffective but more that coverage has been limited, the process to put such measures in place has been lengthy6 or they have been rendered ineffective through the introduction of multiple derogations. In some cases they have been targeted in the wrong areas or fisheries or relied on unproven mitigation devices. This is illustrated by example 7. Example 7: Regulation (EC) 812/200446 requiring the use of Acoustic Deterrent Devices (ADDs) to reduce the catches of cetaceans (i.e. dolphins and whales) in gillnet and pelagic fisheries has not delivered the desired results47&48. The devices have been shown to be effective at reducing incidental catches of one species in one gear type (i.e. harbour porpoise in gillnet fisheries) but ineffective for other cetacean species (e.g. common dolphins) or for other gear types (e.g. pelagic trawls). Additionally only vessels greater than 12m are required to use these devices yet scientific evidence48 shows that significant numbers of cetaceans are incidentally caught by such vessels fishing in inshore waters. This has resulted in incidental catch of cetaceans remaining a problem in a number of fisheries49. 4.2.Difficult to measure effectiveness The objectives set for technical measures are broadly defined in legislation but quantifying the effectiveness of these measures individually or collectively in a Union context has proved difficult. This is for several reasons: (1)There is an absence of any defined metrics on which to measure success as illustrated by example 8. Example 8: Regulation (EC) 850/98, the overarching regulation covering the Northeast Atlantic states without specified targets that technical measures should "ensure the protection of marine biological resources and the balanced exploitation of fishery resources in the interests of fishermen and consumers in line with the objective of the CFP". This Regulation also includes a number of broad, rather non-specific sub-objectives such as "reducing the capture of juveniles of marine organisms through mesh size and catch composition rules". The result has been that it is impossible to measure the success of this Regulation due to the lack of quantifiable targets11. The Mediterranean Regulation (Reg. (EC) 1967/2006) is even less specific and in fact contains no specific objectives or targets whatsoever. (2)In trying to assess effectiveness, it has only really been possible to compare the measures taken collectively with the outcomes observed and not to quantify what the linkages between these are in practice6&11. This is further confounded as technical measures are often part of an overall package of complex input and output controls including fishing effort and Total allowable catches (TACs) preventing any comparative analysis. It is often impossible to quantify whether specific measures have had any impact or contributed to the achievement of the overall conservation objectives of the CFP as illustrated by example 9. Example 9: Closed areas put in place in the Celtic Sea to protect cod were assessed as part of a wider review of closed areas by STECF17. They concluded that while the closures had benefits for conservation of the cod stock, it was not possible to give a quantitative assessment of the impact of these closures area as it was difficult to disentangle the effect of the closure from other factors such as the impact of TAC reductions. (3)From a political perspective, technical measures, particularly mesh sizes, restrictions on specific gears and closed areas often form part of a negotiation strategy, potentially leading to a dilution of the final measures agreed, rendering them sub-optimal. This can often be driven by perceived negative impacts (losses of marketable catches) in the fishery and the desire of managers to broker a deal, even though the measures agreed may prove ineffective. This results in measures being introduced without any scientific basis, making any judgment on how they may benefit the overarching policy objectives, impossible. See example 10. Example 10: A closed area introduced into the Irish Sea to protect cod under Regulation (EC) No. 300/200050 has been diluted by multiple derogations for certain fleet segments to fish within the closure on economic grounds. The introduction of these derogations have negated the benefits of the closure and reduced the protection provided to the cod stock, which was the original intention of the closure17. A similar assessment has been made of the plaice box in the North Sea51. 4.3.Prescriptive and complex rules The current management approach to technical measures as input tools (e.g. defining mesh sizes or imposing restriction on fishing gears) has resulted in a large number of complex and highly prescriptive rules particularly in the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean. These rules attempt to control many technical aspects of fishing operations, rather than focusing on the desired outputs (e.g. a specific catch profile or level of fishing pressure). This has led to the following difficulties: (1)The focus on regulating the technical inputs rather than the output has introduced a strong incentive to negate the regulations. This has led to the adoption of more legislation to counter circumvention of the rules, increasing complexity in the regulations. This is demonstrated by the cumulative growth in technical measures in the EU many of which are simply ‘catch-up’ regulations across the different sea basins. Figure 4.3.3.1 below illustrates how the current framework of technical measures in the EU has led to the introduction of more and more legislation, affecting control and enforcement activities and undermining confidence in the measures by the catching sector. Example 11 provides a practical example of what has occurred. Figure 4.3.1: The effects of how the current framework of technical measures in the EU affects control and enforcement activities (Source STECF 2012a page 25) Example 11: The use of stiffer twine to offset previously introduced increases in mesh size from 90 to 100mm in the North Sea (Regulation (EC) No 345/9252) became widespread in the early 1990’s. This subsequently led to research into the potential impact on codend selectivity. The results of the research were subsequently used as the basis to introduce additional legislation which limited the thickness of twine that could be used (Regulation (EC) 850/98). However, it took another five years to develop and objective method to measure twine thickness and implement this into legislation through Regulation (EC) 129/200353. (2)Not enough attention has been given to the practicalities of control and enforcement when introducing technical measures or during the negotiation of particular measures, controllability considerations have been overlooked. This has resulted in the introduction of measures that have been difficult and costly to enforce. Most technical rules can only be monitored effectively through seaborne or airborne inspections. The retrospective evaluation6 estimates that the control costs for Denmark, Ireland, the UK, France and Spain combined to be around €163 million euros annually (an average of around EUR 33 million per Member State). Of these costs for these Member States, 25 % are land-based inspection, 57% seaborne, 6% airborne, 2% VMS/FMCs with 10% administration costs (i.e. approximately €102 million euros is spent on seaborne and airborne inspections). While all of this expenditure is not directly attributable to the enforcement of technical measures, interviews with inspectors carried out as part of the retrospective evaluation6, showed the costs for measuring elements of fishing gear construction such as mesh size and twine thickness are questionable. The variation in measured selectivity associated with fishing gears is high while the actual conservation benefit of strictly controlling such measures is relatively low. Additionally according to fisheries inspectors monitoring technical measures at sea can be extremely challenging particularly in bad weather6&11. This has not been taken into account when defining the technical rules. The difficulties in controlling technical measures are illustrated in example 12. Example 12: Under a broad objective of protecting deep-sea species (principally deep-sea sharks), regulations first introduced under the fishing opportunities regulations and now incorporated into Regulation (EC) 850/98 regulate the use of fixed nets likely to interact with these species. Whilst the legislation prohibits use of fixed nets at charted depths greater than 200 metres, derogations are possible for fishing with fixed nets in waters with a charted depth of more than 200 metres but less than 600 metres under certain conditions. The derogations also require prescriptions on the maximum height of nets, maximum length, maximum soaking time and hanging ratios. These conditions vary according to the mesh sizes used. In practice, Member State control authorities report that this legislation is not controllable; not only because the hanging ratio and procedures to measure it are not defined, but also because controlling compliance would require a disproportionate amount of time and effort at sea for determining the soak time, checking depths, and controlling dimensions of series of nets that can measure up to 100 km in length per vessel6. 4.4.Lack of flexibility in the management framework

Although there are in-built flexibility mechanisms (section 3.3) in the current regulations, technical measures have tended to be adopted under ordinary legislative procedure. Prior to the adoption of the TFEU this was by the Council, and, now under co-decision, by the Council and European Parliament. This has created the following difficulties: (1)The ordinary legislative procedure is a complex, lengthy and politically-driven process which is not well suited to defining detailed technical rules that may need frequent updating as illustrated by example 13. Example 13: No political agreement for a new package of technical measures for the Northeast Atlantic has been reached in the last ten years. Previous Commission proposals in 200254 and in 200855 failed for a number of reasons even those these were presented by the Commission as consolidations. Member States argued that the text had grown too complicated and difficult to interpret. In addition, they did not reflect regional differences while the advantages of harmonising measures across different areas were questioned. More recently a recent amendment (Regulation (EU) No. 227/201354), which was principally to make temporary measures introduced through the fishing opportunities regulation, permanent, took more than 9 months to complete due to disagreements between the co-legislators on the scope of this regulation. (2)There is a lack of flexibility in the decision-making process for technical measures that has restricted the ability to adjust or revise them or to react to changes in fishing conditions or to take advantage of innovation in gear technology. This has created frustration and a level of mistrust amongst the catching sector. The lack of in-built flexibility in the current legislative regime is demonstrated in example 14 concerning the haddock stock in the Celtic Sea. Example 14: Scientific advisory bodies identified a strong recruitment of juvenile haddock at into the Celtic Sea at the end of 2009. This incoming year class was identified as being under threat if the selectivity of legal fishing gears was not modified to take account of this pulse in recruitment. However, following long discussions with Member States and the NWWAC it was not until the end of 2012 that the Commission was able to adopt an ‘emergency act’ to enforce more selective fishing techniques, Member States having failed to agree on national measures. By that time, this year class had been heavily fished, resulting in a failure to reap the long-term stock benefits that would have resulted if the strong year class had been protected8. (3)Stakeholders argue that measures brought in on a temporary basis either as in cases where the conservation of specific stocks calls for immediate action or under the Fishing Opportunities, have actually become permanent measures. They argue that the flexibility mechanisms have been used as a way to impose long-term restrictions on their operations under the guise of short term, reactionary measures. This is illustrated by example 15. Example 15 Regulation (EC) 2056/2001 introduced technical measure to recovery the cod stock in the North Sea as short-term emergency measures. However, these measures which included increased mesh sizes significantly and the use of certain selectivity devices which resulted in losses of marketable catches have been in place for more than 14 years without amendment. Another example is a temporary derogation for use of an electric pulse trawl in the North Sea to catch flatfish. This was introduced to allow scientific research into the impacts of this fishing gear but 10 years later and despite extensive research being carried out it remains unchanged. (4)Inflexibility is apparent in the implementation of nature conservation measures to protect sensitive habitats. There is little dispute amongst stakeholders6 that such habitats need to be protected but the introduction of such measures has been slow and out of line with available knowledge. To designate an area closed to fishing currently requires a change to the technical measures regulations often resulting in lengthy negotiation and dilution of the final measures agreed, either through the introduction of derogations or a reduction in the size of the area protected. This is illustrated by example 16. Example 16: The delineation of closed areas to protect coral reefs off the coast of Ireland took more than 3 years to negotiate6 because Member States could not agree on the extent of the closures proposed. The main issues were related to the size of the areas and agreeing on continued access to vessels using fishing gears that have minimal or no impacts on the seabed. 4.5.Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision making process Several independent reviews of the management framework of technical measures57,58&59 have concluded that successful use of technical measures depends largely on their acceptance by fishermen. This is in contrast to the current technical measures which are mostly coercive resulting from a hierarchical governance system (i.e. top-down rather than bottom-up approach) with little or no incentive for fishermen to comply. Fishermen and other stakeholders generally do not feel part of a participatory process where measures are agreed and often do not consider them as legitimate or equitable. Their hierarchical formulation lead fishermen to perceive that technical measures are impractical, they do not represent current fishing practice and are sometimes contradictory as illustrated by example 17. Example 17: Interviews with the fishing industry conducted as part of the retrospective evaluation6 identified that the industry believe that many closed areas are “set in stone”. They have highlighted closed areas to protect Norway Pout and herring in the North Sea which have remained unchanged since the 1980s yet the fishing patterns and fishing practices in these fisheries have changed significantly since their introduction and the closures now serve no conservation purpose. 4.6.Underlying drivers of the problems The conclusion from the retrospective analysis6, the public consultation9, the previous IA on technical measures (2008 proposal18) and also from STECF11&12 is that technical measures have an important role to play in fisheries management but the governance framework in which they operate needs to be re-examined in light of the challenges generated by the new CFP. The underlying drivers of the problems are regulatory rather than market driven. Table 4.4.1 summarises the identified problems, the drivers of these problems and their effects. The drivers are very much interlinked.



Problems Drivers Effects Sub-optimal performance Technical measures are viewed by the catching sector as restrictive and provide little incentive to fish selectively. Failure to control exploitation patterns leading to high levels of discards in mixed fisheries. Circumvention, both legally and illegally, of technical rules to minimize the economic impacts. Limited uptake of selective gears or mitigation measures to reduce incidental catches of sensitive species. Limited protection afforded to sensitive habitats Mitigation measures are targeted in the wrong areas or fisheries. Difficult to measure effectiveness There is an absence of any defined metrics on which to measure success. Technical measures are part of an overall package of complex input and output controls including effort and TACs. Impossible to quantify whether the technical measures have had any impact or contributed to the achievement of the overall conservation objectives of the CFP. Dilution of the final measures agreed as they are the outcome of a political negotiation resulting in measures being introduced without any scientific basis making assessment of their effectiveness impossible Prescriptive and complex rules Technical measures attempt to control too many technical aspects of fishing operations. Undermines the catching sector's (i.e. fishermen) confidence in the measures and provide a strong incentive to negate the regulations. Adoption of more legislation to counter circumvention of the rules Difficult for control authorities of Member States to enforce the measures and fishermen to comply with them. Imposes a high burden and administrative costs on the control authorities of Member States. Lack of flexibility Technical measures are decided following a complex, inflexible and lengthy politically-driven process which is not well suited to defining detailed technical rules that need frequent updating and periodic review. Restricts the ability to adjust or revise technical measures to react to changes in fisheries, fishing conditions or to take advantage of innovation in gear technology. Supposedly temporary rules or derogations have remained in place unchanged for long periods. Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision- making process Technical measures are based on negative, mostly coercive incentives in a hierarchical governance system (i.e. top-down rather than bottom-up). Fishermen and stakeholders do not feel part of a participatory process. Fishermen perceive that technical measures are impractical, they do not represent current fishing practice and are sometimes contradictory. Table 4.4.1: Summary of problems underpinning the current technical measures (Source: Author) 4.7.The affected stakeholders Technical measures are tools to support the CFP and contribute to achieving its objectives. Therefore the stakeholders directly affected are a sub-set of those identified in the CFP reform IA report as summarised in table 4.5.1.

Stakeholder Description Key interests Catching sector in the EU EU vessel owners, operators and crew Maintaining profitability and livelihoods Sector regulators National, regional and local bodies regulating fishing Ensuring an efficient, effective and practical management framework that balances a wide range of stakeholder needs Sector research Scientific research bodies contributing to the conservation and management of stocks; improvements in the selectivity of fishing gears; and reducing the ecosystem effects of fishing on the ecosystem Contribution to an effective fisheries management regime through the timely access to fishing vessels to measure selectivity, impacts on the ecosystem and new low impact fishing. NGOs Non-governmental organizations advocating sustainable management of fisheries. To maintain fish populations, marine biodiversity, and the amenity value of the oceans Table 4.5.1: Summary of stakeholders affected by the reform of the technical measures regulation and of their respective key interests (adapted from the IA supporting the reform of the CFP) (Source: Author) The catching sector comprising 82,047 vessels and employing 98,500 FTE60 is the most affected by potential changes to the technical measures regulations. Of these approximate 82,000 fishing vessels, almost 98% of them would be classified as micro-enterprises employing fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €2 million61. Annex IX provides a more detailed breakdown of the catching sector in terms of number of vessels, gears deployed and numbers employed. Other stakeholders affected are the sector regulators in the Member States. This comprises national administrations, regional and local bodies with a fisheries management role and the control and enforcement agencies within the Member States. Any changes to the regulatory structure will require a re-adjustment of the management and control regime. Sector research agencies within Member States as well as ICES and STECF who are the main providers of advice to the Commission will also be affected. Changes in technical measures will require experimentation and evaluation of any new measures. NGOs have a direct interest in ensuring technical measures are effective given that they are one of the main tools of the CFP to regulate the impacts of fishing on the marine ecosystem. The main NGOs as members of the ACs will have a direct involvement in the development of technical measures under regionalisation. Other sectors indirectly affected under this initiative include: –Dependent business and communities; –Processing and marketing sector; –Third Countries fishing in Union waters (e.g. Norway, Faroes in the northeast Atlantic and Turkey, Morocco and Ukraine in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea); and –Consumers. 4.8.Evolution of the problem This section focuses on summarising the evolution of the presented problems in the context of the objectives of the CFP. The baseline scenario is based on the current regulatory structure illustrated in Figure 3.1.1 and presented in section 6.2. The evolution of the identified problems in terms of economic, social and environmental impacts is assessed in section 7.2. For the purposes of this IA, two assumptions are made. Firstly, the three main technical measures Regulations (NE Atlantic20, Mediterranean21 and Baltic22) have been aligned with the TFEU concerning establishment of current Commission empowerments under delegated or implementing Acts. Commission proposals to make these alignments are currently under negotiation with the Council and European Parliament62,63&64. Secondly, it is assumed that certain provisions within the current regulations that run contrary to the landing obligation and oblige fishermen to discard fish have been removed or amended. This technical adjustment has been achieved through a recently adopted Regulation (EU) 812/2015 (the so-called "omnibus"65). The omnibus, which is very much a “quick fix” solution, amends a number of technical measures regulations by requiring all unintended catches (defined as incidental catches the fishing for which is prohibited in the relevant conditions) subject to the landing obligation caught in excess of legal provisions (catch composition rules, bycatch provisions) must be landed and counted against quota. It also requires the definition of minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) to replace the current minimum landing sizes and minimum catching sizes in the Mediterranean. This is a change in name only and the sizes remain as they are currently. All catches below the mcrs subject to the landing obligation must be landed and counted against quota. Based on the history of technical measures over the last 25 years within successive CFPs11, these changes alone are unlikely to improve the contribution of technical measures to achieving the objectives of the new CFP in a relevant and coherent way across sea basins. The effectiveness and efficiency of the current measures will not improve without changes to the governance structure and simplification of the measures. There will continue to be a low level of acceptability of the measure amongst stakeholders and the identified weaknesses will continue or persist or even intensify over time. Specifically: Attainment of the MSY objective for overfished stocks will be impeded through a failure to improve selectivity in fisheries for these stocks. This will result in significant cuts in fishing opportunities for these stocks and in the Mediterranean, where there are no fishing opportunities, reductions in fishing effort or additional technical measures. Levels of unwanted catches will remain high in many mixed fisheries. Economic viability will be threatened because under the landing obligation those unwanted catches would have to be landed for non-human consumption purposes and counted against quota. Quotas are likely to be exhausted faster and vessels would risk having to tie-up earlier in the year even allowing for the flexibility mechanisms66 included under the CFP (i.e. De minimis, high survivability and quota flexibilities) that will alleviate some of these problems. The adoption of nature conservation measures will continue to be a slow process. Delays in enacting such measures will likely result in damaging or even irreversible impacts on sensitive species and habitats and threatened the attainment of GES under the MSFD.

The current regulatory structure will not create any new incentive for fishermen to improve selectivity. Any new measures introduced will continue to be mostly coercive that add new rules or impose increases in selectivity that lead to economic losses. Regionalisation of technical measures would be possible through discard plans and multiannual plans but is likely to only add on new rules that derogate from existing technical rules where applicable rather than simplify or introduce opportunities for adaptive management. The Advisory Councils as the key stakeholder in regionalisation are unlikely to engage openly with such an approach. The strong focus on control of technical measure in situ and the inflexible framework based on low regional specificity and acceptability will continue to undermine cost efficiency. 4.9.Necessity and subsidiarity According to Article 3(1d) of the TFEU, the Union shall have exclusive competence in the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP. Other aspects of fisheries are, under Article 4(2d) of the TFEU, share competences between the Union and the Member States. Article 43(2) of the TFEU establishes the Union’s power to adopt the provisions necessary for the pursuit of the objectives of the CFP. As technical measures relate to the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP (i.e. the Union has exclusive competence) there is no need therefore necessarily to justify measures with regards to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under regionalisation the role of the co-legislators will change fundamentally. Focus will be much more on setting the objectives and targets centrally for managing fisheries, leaving the detailed rules needed to achieve these objectives to be set regionally by Member States and stakeholders. This has added value in that the role of the co-legislator in agreeing detailed technical measures has often been criticised by stakeholders. The catching sector believe the measures finally agreed usually lead to economic losses and are unrealistic and impractical, while NGOs claim the measures are often diluted during the political process rendering them ineffective. Leaving the definition of technical rules to the regional level has added value in giving certain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. 5.Objectives 5.1.General objectives As tools to support the implementation of the CFP, the general objectives of technical measures are to contribute to: –the bringing of all European fish stocks to a state where they can produce the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 2015 or 2020 at the latest; –the reduction of unwanted catches and elimination of discards in fisheries subject to catch limits by 2019; and –the achievement of Good Environmental Status (GES) by 2020, as established under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). In achieving these general objectives the regulation of technical measures should be guided by the principles of good governance set out in Article 3 of the CFP. In particular point (b) which expresses the need to take account of "regional specificities, through a regionalised approach" and point (f) which states that "appropriate involvement of stakeholders, in particular Advisory Councils, at all stages – from conception to implementation of the measures" are important. 5.2.Specific and operational objectives In order to achieve these general objectives and address the main problems identified a number of specific and operational objectives can be defined. Specific objectives Develop a regulatory structure for technical measures that: –leads to an improvement in the effectiveness of technical measures; –defines clear objectives, targets and success criteria for technical measures; –eliminates over-regulation and simplifies the current technical measures;

–creates a more flexible legal framework and acts as a vehicle for regionalisation of technical measures; and –promotes a transparent and participatory approach to the definition and specification of technical measures. Operational Objectives The following operational objectives will contribute to the achievement of these specific objectives: –Establish incentive structures linked to the added flexibility offered by regionalisation and rewarding of "responsible fishing" in line with Article 1730 of the CFP that will deliver improvements in the effectiveness of technical measures; –Establish targets for the reduction of unwanted catches and for the reduction of the negative impacts of fishing on marine ecosystems that can be achieve through technical measures; –Establish indicators to measure the success of technical measures in achieving these defined targets respecting the timelines contained in the CFP; –Delete redundant rules and simplify other rules from the 31 regulations that currently contain technical measures to make them understandable and controllable in line with the Commission's REFIT programme2; –Manage the transition to regionlisation in the period up to 2020 by defining baseline standards based on current exploitation patterns and consolidate measures that will apply pending the development of regionalised plans; –Establish the necessary legal architecture to allow deviation from these baseline standards and provide for the development of alternative measures to achieve the overarching objectives under regionalisation; and –Establish linkages with the CFP to allow for stakeholder involvement in the development of technical measures at the regional level. Figure 5.2.1 illustrates the problem tree with the links between problems, the drivers and the objectives. Figure 5.2.1 Problem tree with the links between problems, their drivers and the objectives 6.Consistency with other EU Policies Two of the specific objectives contained in the CFP are to: –Implement the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management so as to ensure that negative impacts of fishing activities are minimised (Article 2 paragraph 3); and –Ensure coherence with Union environmental legislation (Article 2 paragraph 5(j)). Given that implementation of the MSFD is a legal requirement under the Treaty, dedicated measures to reach GES for marine resources are implicitly required in compliance with the Directive. Technical measures, as tools to support the implementation of the CFP consitute an important element in achieving this objective. Technical measures must also be coherent with other Union enviromental legislation notably the Birds28 and the Habitats Directives29. The full implementation of these Directives is part of the EU’s response to its commitments under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and is reinforced by the commitment made by EU Heads of State "to halt the loss of biodiversity [in the EU] by 2010"; it is further reiterated in the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 202067. Technical measures have also the potential to contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy68, in particular its resource efficiency flagship initiative through better use of fish stocks. In addition, the reform of technical measures will contribute to the REFIT programme2 through the simplification and deletion of a number of existing regulations and specific measures.

7.Policy options 7.1.Selection of policy options A screening of different policy options has led to the identification of a number of options that are most likely to meet the objectives and address the problems identified in section 4. An initial evaluation indicated that improving flexibility and creating incentive structures within the CFP to achieve improvements in the general effectiveness should be the focus rather than making wholesale changes to the measures themselves. This is for three reasons: (1)Previous attempts in 200254 and 200855 made to introduce changes to the structure and the substance of the regulations failed to reach political agreement. Member States strongly argued that such changes would lead to negative socio-economic impacts on different fleets. (2)Regionalised decision-making was introduced into the CFP by the co-legislators to avoid having to make frequent changes to the substance of technical measures contained in co-decided acts. Making changes to the substance under this initiative would go against this philosophy. (3)The stakeholder consultations showed that changing the substance of the technical measures was clearly not an option preferred by the key stakeholders (i.e. the catching sector and the Advisory Councils) or the Member States. Adapting the regulatory structure and simplifying the rules should be the key objectives. As a result of this initial evaluation, three policy options with one sub-option have been considered against the baseline scenario. It was decided that the policy options defined would cover all sea basins except non-Union waters, where technical measures would continue to be part of international agreements with the measures emanating from these agreements. Regionalisation is not applicable in non-Union waters. 7.2.Baseline scenario The current regulatory architecture of the technical measures would be retained: a 'web' of regulations with the CFP as the central element, elaborated in a series of technical and other conservation regulations surrounding the CFP Regulation. See Figure 3.3.1. The prescriptive, means-oriented architecture without clear expected outcomes or results would be retained. The Regulations would include recent adjustments that remove legal contradictions with new obligations under the new CFP (as described in Section 4.8), in particular the landing obligation and that all of the existing Regulations on technical measures would be aligned with the TFEU concerning establishment of current Commission empowerments under delegated or implementing Acts. Changes to the principle regulations in the northeast Atlantic, Baltic and Mediterranean would continue to be under co-decision. Flexibility would mainly be through the existing mechanisms and empowerments included in the current regulations (i.e. detailed rules to define gears, national measures or measures for stocks of immediate conservation concern). Regionalisation would be possible through the mechanisms set out in the CFP (i.e. multiannual plans, discard plans and Article 11 for nature conservation measures within Natura 2000 Sites) but would be very much "piece meal" and essentially limited to adding on new rules at the regional level that derogate from existing measures, simply expanding the 'web' of regulations further. Figure