[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |

Brussels, 15.05.2007

SEC(2007) 692

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Joint Technology Initiatives:Background, State-of-Play and Main Features

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Joint Technology Initiatives:Background, State-of-Play and Main Features

1. Introduction

Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) are a major new element of the Seventh Framework Programme [1]. They provide a new way of realising public-private partnerships in research at European level. They focus on key areas where research and technological development can contribute to Europe's wider competitiveness.

In this context, this document has four main purposes. Firstly, it sets out the origins and definition of JTIs. Secondly, it highlights a number of potential positive leveraging and mobilising effects of JTIs on research investment. Thirdly, it assesses possible implications with regard to competition policy. Fourthly, recognising the novelty of the instrument, it sets out a number of common features for JTIs.

2. Background

2.1 Origins and Definition

JTIs are public-private partnerships in key areas where research and technological development could contribute to Europe's wider competitiveness goals and where the traditional instruments of the Framework Programme (e.g. collaborative research) are not adequate.

The Seventh Framework Programme identifies JTIs as a means to support trans-national cooperation in fields of key importance for industrial research. JTIs will be set up under Article 171 of the Treaty[2] as a new way of realising public-private partnerships in research at European level.

Such partnerships can play an important role in fostering stronger links between research and industry and so contributing to the realisation of the European Research Area. European industry is increasingly hindered by inadequate technological content. At the same time, the capacity of the research sector to contribute to redressing this situation is weakened by inadequate funding and lack of scale to focus on key strategic projects that have high downstream industrial potential.

Accordingly, increasing the scale and impact of research investment , enhancing the co-ordination and integration of research in Europe and raising the technology content of industrial activity are essential if Europe is to strengthen its position as a technologically innovative economy with the potential to develop comparative advantage in new areas.

Public-private partnerships involving industry, the research community and public authorities can play a significant role in meeting these challenges. JTIs are a new way of realising public-private partnerships at European level. They send a strong signal of the EU's intention to enhance co-ordination of research efforts. This is an important argument in addressing any misperception that JTIs, in effect, reserve Community financing for more technologically advanced Member States.

As described in the Commission report to the June 2005 European Council[3], JTIs arise primarily from the work of European Technology Platforms (ETPs). ETPs are informal networks that bring together stakeholders, led by industry, to define and implement medium to long-term strategic research agendas. In a small number of cases, ETPs have achieved such an ambitious scale and scope that they require public-private partnerships in the form of legal entities to be set up to mobilise large-scale public and private investments as well as substantial research resources to implement important elements of their Strategic Research Agendas. JTIs are proposed as an effective means of meeting the needs of this small number of ETPs.

Based on a thorough and rigorous identification process detailed in the Co-operation Specific Programme[4], six areas emerged where a JTI could have particular relevance: Fuel Cells and Hydrogen ("FCH"), Aeronautics and Air Transport ("Clean Sky"); Innovative Medicines ("IMI"); Nanoelectronics ("ENIAC"); Embedded Computing Systems ("ARTEMIS"), and Global Monitoring for Environment and Security ("GMES"). It is not excluded that, following the mid-term review of FP7, additional proposals for JTIs may be identified.

The budgets foreseen, including the anticipated Community contribution, are indicated in Annex I.

2.2 Preparation of JTI Proposals

JTIs are being developed by means of close collaboration with industry , as well as in consultation with and, in the case of ARTEMIS and ENIAC, the participation of, Member States.

A roadmap for JTIs was presented in the December 2006 Competitiveness Council . It was also sent to the European Parliament .

The roadmap establishes the process leading to the presentation of JTI proposals (a timetable is included in Annex II). It indicates that to assess the state of preparedness, two inputs are required for each potential JTI. The industrial partners participating in the potential JTIs are required to demonstrate how the "keys for success" (notably additionality, market failure, governance and the role of Member States) will be met. At the same time, the Commission services responsible for the JTIs undertake an objective analysis of the economic and social effects of each JTI, with the support of external, independent experts where appropriate.

3. Leveraging and Mobilising Effects of JTIs on Research Investment

JTIs can be expected to have a leverage effect on both private investment and national funding in the technological areas being addressed by the JTIs for a number of reasons.

JTIs facilitate a pan-European approach that will create sufficient critical mass in the face of competing initiatives worldwide and make Europe a more attractive location for inward investment in research.

By creating a co-ordinated approach that allows different sources of investment to be brought together in a way that traditional instruments of the Framework Programme cannot facilitate, JTIs will make possible investments that could not take place otherwise.

- The industry contribution to research can be higher than with the traditional instruments of the Framework Programme. For example, in IMI, the industry partners will pay 100% of their research costs, whereas under the Framework Programme instruments, industry only pays 50% of its costs.

- JTIs allow funding from the Framework Programme to be combined with other public funding sources , including, where appropriate, the Structural Funds and the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility and, in the case of ARTEMIS and ENIAC, national funds. This can have a significant leverage effect on private investment in JTIs and related economic activity.

- JTIs, by facilitating increased networking between large companies and SMEs, can be expected to facilitate greater investment in research by SMEs .

- The pan-European approach embodied in JTIs can also be expected to facilitate greater co-ordination with the priorities of national programmes in similar areas.

In addition, there are key elements in JTIs that are expected to contribute to a greater mobilisation of research across Europe .

JTIs are open to new members from all countries.

- JTIs will lead to the formation of wide partnerships that will involve a very large number of players from industry, including notably SMEs, the research community and wider society.

- A particular advantage of JTIs is that they will involve SMEs in their networks . As SMEs focus on technological niches across the full range of Member States, their involvement will help in particular the smaller Member States to become involved.

- Given the long-term partnerships that underpin JTIs, they can serve to increase the breadth of technological coverage in the areas that they focus on, thus having a positive effect on research across the 27 Member States and countries associated to the Framework Programme and so fostering Europe's competitive position in a global perspective.

4. Competition Policy Aspects

In developing proposals for JTIs, it is important to ensure that their design is compatible with competition rules .

Any competition assessment will depend on a set of facts that is specific to each case. Accordingly, the assessment may change if new and/or diverging facts are brought to the attention of the Commission services. A detailed description of the competition rules that have particular relevance to JTIs is included in Annex IV. The aspects that require particular consideration relate to state aid, anti-trust and merger control .

JTIs will channel substantial amounts of public money to selected undertakings in areas that may give them a technological edge and therefore a competitive advantage. The Community should not apply different project selection principles in the frame of JTIs to the principles defined – in the context of state aid policy - for the selection of projects by Member States.

The state aid framework for Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) has introduced a series of criteria for evaluating whether a given RDI project is acceptable. These guidelines should be used for guidance in selecting projects to benefit from JTI funding. In particular, JTI funding should by definition target a market failure, have an incentive effect (additionality), be proportional and result in only limited distortions to competition and trade.

While funding by JTIs should follow state aid rules, it appears, from a procedural point of view, that it will not constitute State aid within the scope of Article 87(1) EC. No notification to the Commission of any JTI funding will therefore be necessary.

Where national funding is linked to JTI funding, it cannot be excluded that this national funding could constitute State aid and must be notified to the Commission. However, if national funding is automatically granted to projects selected by the JTI, the rules and governance relating to the selection of projects by the JTI should be designed in such a way as to avoid any Member State having a dominant influence on the selection of projects. This is necessary to avoid state aid implications.

Under certain circumstances, joint research and development may give rise to anti-trust issues such as restrictive effects on prices, output, innovation, or variety and quality of products. Projects which are restrictive of competition and not automatically exempted under the R&D Block Exemption Regulation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis .

It must also be borne in mind that cooperation should not be misused by participants as a forum for exchanging commercially sensitive information between competitors which is not directly related to the project as such. This risk is greater to the extent that companies from the same industry operating on the same markets participate in some of the JTIs.

To the extent that a JTI might constitute a full-function joint venture with a Community dimension, scrutiny under the EC Merger Regulation [5] may be required to check for any possibly adverse impact on competition which the arrangement might bring about.

5. Main Features of JTIs

Certain guiding principles have been identified with regards to the governance and management structures of JTIs to help ensure their success, at the same time recognizing that a "one-size-fits all" approach is not appropriate due the specific characteristics of each JTI in terms of nature of the technological challenges addressed, the stakeholders involved and the financial engineering needs. These guiding principles relate to the efficiency and durability of structures, long-term stakeholder commitment and implementation of the principles of openness, transparency, co-operation and sound financial management.

To reflect this, the proposed structures of JTIs include a number of common features , as described below.

5.1 Legal structure

The legal entities for JTIs will take the form of Joint Undertakings established on the basis of Article 171 of the Treaty.

The legal texts which will be agreed for the first proposals can serve as models for subsequent JTIs. For example, the provision on transparency regarding the beneficiary of funds[6], which has recently been added to IMI and ARTEMIS, must be included in subsequent proposals.

In line with the concept that structures established on the basis of Article 171 of the Treaty are set up under Community law and receive Community funds, Joint Undertakings in the case of the six JTIs identified in the Seventh Framework Programme, will be set up as Community bodies as referred to in Article 185 of the Financial Regulation.

In its note on ELE (the European ITER Joint Undertaking), the Legal Service of the Council assimilates ELE to a Community agency for the purpose of applying Article 47 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA)[7] and as a Community body for the purposes of Article 185.2 of the Financial Regulation[8]. Accordingly, as in the case of ELE, this has the following implications for JTIs : discharge for the implementation of the budget by the European Parliament[9], the application of the framework Financial Regulation for bodies set up by the Communities[10] with derogations as necessary and that the European Parliament must approve the budgetary implications of setting up a Joint Undertaking[11]. In addition, the Principle of Transparency (in particular Article 30 of the Financial Regulation) applies.

Derogations from the framework Financial Regulation can be allowed in the case of well justified specific needs[12], subject to prior consent of the Commission.

In contrast to the legal structures of SESAR and Galileo, which involve an international organisation as a founding member, as well as third country representatives, the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities applies and Joint Undertakings can benefit from tax exemptions (VAT, excise duties).

The Commission is the ‘ordonnateur’ for the Community contribution to the Joint Undertaking. The Executive Director is responsible for the implementation of the activities and the budget of the Joint Undertaking and represents the Joint Undertaking with regard to the discharge procedure. As the public and private contributions are linked in the operation of the JTI and form a consolidated whole in its accounts, it is envisaged that Parliament's discharge will cover the entire JTI budget. It will be made clear, however, that this constitutes a precedent and that in this context the specificities of the public-private partnership , in particular of the private sector contribution, will have to be taken into account.

However, a Community body does not mean that a JTI will be a Community agency since the objective is to create a public-private partnership. An appropriate account should be taken of the specificities resulting from the needs of JTIs as public-private partnerships.

The Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities will be applied to staff of the Joint Undertakings, with the necessary flexibility in terms of the implementing rules .

The Joint Undertakings will have their own internal audit capability . The Commission and the Court of Auditors may carry out on-the-spot checks on the Joint Undertaking and among the recipients of the Joint Undertaking's funding. Necessary provisions will be made for this in the grant agreements and contracts with funding beneficiaries

5.2 Form of the Community contribution to JTIs

In accordance with the Financial Regulation[13], the Community financial support for JTIs does not constitute a grant, but a contribution .

A Joint Undertaking which is created as a structure under Community Law falls under Article 54.2.b of the Financial Regulation. Moreover, contributions to such bodies do not constitute a grant in the meaning of Title VI of the Financial Regulation (Article 108.2.f of the Financial Regulation) and consequently Article 120.2 of the Financial Regulation ("cascade grants") does not apply.

The draft legislative proposals for JTIs include several provisions in order to protect the financial interests of the Community . These, in particular, address:

- Veto right of the Community: a list of minimum issues on which the Community should enjoy a veto right is being established (such as the use of the Community contribution, the modification of the Statutes, the derogations to the framework Financial Regulation, the method of calculating in kind contributions);

- Internal and external controls by the Joint Undertaking;

- On-the-spot checks by the Court of Auditors and the Commission (including OLAF) on the recipients of funding;

- Right of the Community to recover amounts unduly received or to reduce or suspend its contribution to the Joint Undertaking if irregularities are discovered or obligations are not respected.

Financial contributions are not subject to the specific rules on grants defined in the Financial Regulation. Furthermore, the Rules for Participation of the Seventh Framework Programme are not applicable to contributions made to bodies set up under Article 171 of the Treaty. However, the aspects of the Rules relating to participation and to dissemination should be taken into account in the internal regulations of the Joint Undertaking.

Moreover, the rules regarding participation and dissemination should be seen in the context of the added value of each JTI in comparison with alternative approaches, in particular conventional support under the Framework Programme. An important issue is the need to strike an appropriate balance between the provisions to be included in the JTI Regulation and/or the Statutes and those which could figure in the internal regulations of the Joint Undertaking.

To ensure full transparency, two separate budget lines will be created; one for the running costs of the Joint Undertaking and another one for the research costs. However, when establishing the Preliminary Draft Budget, the Joint Undertaking's running costs will be considered as operational expenditure and will not be accounted as administrative expenditure under the terms of the Seventh Framework Programme.

At the same time, terminology used in the rules of participation and dissemination of the Joint Undertaking will, as a general rule, be in line with the overall terminology applied in the Seventh Framework Programme and, notably, as set out in its Rules for Participation.

5.3 Organisation of consortia/calls for proposals

As stated in the Commission report to the June 2005 European Council[14], JTIs should not be "closed shops", but should be open structures .

As regards the issue of the openness of JTI consortia, any legal entity established in a Member State or country associated to the Seventh Framework Programme is eligible to become a member of a Joint Undertaking during its operation.

With regard to calls for proposals, the Community contribution to JTIs will be used to support projects selected via open calls for proposals , in addition to supporting part of the running costs of the Joint Undertakings.

'Open calls' implies that any legal entity is eligible to respond to calls for proposals to be organised by the Joint Undertaking. Community funding will be allocated on the basis of the Framework Programme principles of excellence and competition . The key principle is that the research should be performed in Europe.

If exceptions to open calls, for example calls only open to members of a JTI, were to be considered, they would need to be provided for in the legal base. In addition, particular attention would need to be paid to the respect of competition rules .

5.4 Accountability, communication and reporting

Common features in terms of accountability, communication and reporting are as follows:

- Annual activity report (scientific and financial issues) from the Joint Undertaking to its members (activities undertaken during the previous year and foreseen during the following year);

- Annual report from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on the activities of the previous year;

- Accountability of the Commission and Joint Undertaking (the latter through its Executive Director), to the Council and European Parliament (the latter gives discharge to the Joint Undertaking)[15];

- Mid-term and final evaluation of the Joint Undertaking by the Commission (possibly with the support of independent experts) and presentation of results to the Council and European Parliament;

- Harmonisation regarding the dissemination of calls (e.g. announcement in CORDIS and/or the Official Journal).

5.5 Protection of the financial interests of the Community

The legislative proposals for JTIs include the standard provisions regarding the protection of the financial interests of the Community (further details are provided in Annex III).

Furthermore, the contribution of the Community is limited in all cases to a maximum of 50% of the total cost of projects supported by the Joint Undertaking and the provision on effective and efficient internal control[16] of the Financial Regulation applies.

5.6 Intellectual Property Rights

A harmonised approach to intellectual property rights (IPR) has been taken across JTIs as regards the terms and definitions as well as the ownership and access rules. In addition, unless required by individual JTIs for operational reasons, the detailed rules should be included in the internal regulations of the JTI.

5.7 In-kind contributions

A set of principles to assess the value of in-kind contributions at project level has been developed. These are as follows:

- Use of the Implementing Rules of the Financial Regulations as guidelines;

- Additional items covered by International Accounting Standards;

- Assessment of contributions to research projects in accordance with the values generally accepted on the market in question (Art 172(2)(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Financial Regulation); verification by an independent auditor.

In general, the Rules for Participation of the Seventh Framework Programme provide an appropriate basis for identifying and calculating eligible costs.

5.8 Financial issues

Financial resources are necessary to support the running costs of the Secretariat as well as the costs of the R&D. In all JTIs, these will be provided jointly by the public and private partners.

The way in which the R&D will be financed differs between JTIs. In addition, the financial mechanisms for JTIs are tailored to their specific objectives and stakeholder base. While the procedures for organising calls for proposals are open in all JTIs, the precise way in which funds will be disbursed differs.

5.9 Governance structure

Each Joint Undertaking will include one or more decision-making bodies , a Secretariat, Executive Director (appointed by the decision-making body; responsible for day-to-day management; legal representative of the Joint Undertaking) and in some cases a scientific advisory committee.

In addition, clear rules for the adoption of the annual implementation plan and its implementation (e.g. via calls for proposals or public procurement) are defined by each JTI.

5.10 Role of the Commission in governance

The European Community (represented by the Commission) is a founding member of each JTI and is involved in the decision-making process. In each initiative, the Commission enjoys a veto right (a list of minimum issues on which the Commission enjoys veto right is being established).

At the same time, the nature of the Commission's involvement in individual JTIs is dependent on the specific characteristics of its governance structure.

6. Conclusions

Given the political importance of JTIs, it is important that the principles and features of the JTIs are fully understood from the outset.

In addition, the definitive commitment letters to be signed by the private partners (before adoption of the Regulations by Council) will include references not only to the overall budget to be committed by industry, but also to their commitment to the governance and financial aspects of the Joint Undertakings, particularly acknowledging the consequences of the specific legal status of the Joint Undertakings under Community law.

Annex I Anticipated Budgets of JTIs and Request for Contributions from the Community

Total Budget (billion €) | Requested Community Contribution (billion €) |

Fuel Cells and Hydrogen (FCH) | 0.8-0.9 | 0.4-0.45 |

"Clean Sky" | 1.6 | 0.8 |

Innovative Medicines (IMI) | 2.0* | 1.0 |

Nanoelectronics ("ENIAC") | 3.0 | 0.42-0.45 |

Embedded Computing Systems ("ARTEMIS") | 2.7 | 0.42 |

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) | (to be confirmed) | (to be confirmed) |

*For IMI, the total budget refers only to the contributions of the Community and of the industry founding partners. It does not take account of other expected contributions such as contributions at project level from other organisations that are expected to contribute with own resources (i.e. for profit organisations that are not SMEs)

Annex II Timetable

Each potential JTI will only be submitted to the Commission for adoption and presented to Council when it has achieved the appropriate level of preparedness. This is assessed thoroughly on the basis of two inputs:

- Demonstration by the industrial partners participating in the potential JTIs that the "keys for success" (notably additionality, market failure, governance and the role of Member States) are met.

- An objective analysis of the economic and social effects of each JTI, undertaken by the Commission services with the support of external experts where appropriate.

When it has been verified that a sufficiently advanced level of preparedness has been reached, the Legislative Proposal and formal Impact Assessment are finalised.

On the basis of these two inputs, the Commission considers that the first two JTIs (Innovative Medicines and ARTEMIS) have reached a sufficiently advanced level of preparedness and these JTIs are being proposed for adoption now. Two further JTIs ("Clean Sky" and ENIAC) are at an advanced state of preparation with a view to early presentation for adoption. It is to be noted that the German Presidency has foreseen two Competitiveness Council meetings when these JTIs could be presented/discussed (21-22 May and 25-26 June 2007).

The Fuel Cells & Hydrogen JTI is expected to be presented in autumn 2007 and GMES in 2008.

The Commission recognises the urgency to set up JTIs. However JTIs are new large-scale initiatives and the Commission will make every effort to ensure that only high quality, comprehensive proposals are put forward.

Annex III Issues Concerning Political/Financial Responsibility of the JTIs / Audit Issues

The Proposals for Council Regulations establishing the Joint Undertakings for the JTIs will include provisions regarding political/financial responsibility of the JTIs and audit issues as follows.

1. The Joint Undertaking shall ensure that the financial interests of its Members are adequately protected by carrying out or by allowing the carrying out of appropriate internal and external controls.

2. In case of irregularities committed by the Joint Undertaking or its staff, the Members shall reserve the right to recover amounts unduly spent or to reduce or suspend any subsequent contribution to the Joint Undertaking.

3. For the purposes of combating fraud, corruption or other illegal acts, Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council[17] shall apply.

4. The Commission and/or the Court of Auditors may, if necessary, carry out on-the-spot checks among the recipients of the Joint Undertaking's funding and the agents responsible for allocating it. To that end, the Joint Undertaking shall ensure that grant agreements and contracts provide for the right of the Commission and/or the Court of Auditors to carry out, on behalf of the Joint Undertaking, the appropriate controls and, in the event of the detection of irregularities, to impose dissuasive and proportionate penalties.

Annex IV Compatibility of the JTI Proposals with Competition Rules

In order to ensure the smooth operation of the JTIs and avoid any subsequent problems, it is important that the design of JTI is from the outset compatible with the competition rules. Those rules which are most relevant to the functioning of JTIs are shortly summarised in the remainder of this section. Given the significant specificities of each JTI proposal, case-by-case examinations will however also be needed.

State aid aspects

JTI will channel substantial amounts of public money to selected undertakings, in areas that may give them a technological edge and therefore a competitive advantage. For that reason, it is important to make sure that the impact on competition of the JTI funding is considered in the selection of the beneficiaries of the JTI's contributions, and the benefits of the funding outweigh any possible harm to competition. This is in fact inherent with the concept of market failure, one of the principles which guide the operation of all JTIs. It would not be understandable if the Community were to apply different principles for the selection of projects by JTI from the principles it has defined – in the context of State aid policy - for the selection of projects by the Member States.

The State aid framework for Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) has introduced a series of criteria for evaluating whether a given RDI project is acceptable; in other words, whether its positive effects outweigh its negative effects on the market[18]. These guidelines should be used as a source of inspiration for selecting projects to benefit from JTI funding. In particular, JTI funding should by definition target a market failure, have an incentive effect (creating additional research) be proportional and result in limited distortions to competition and trade.

Even though funding by JTI should follow State aid substantial rules, it appears, from a procedural point of view, that it will not constitute State aid within the scope of Article 87(1) EC. No notification to the Commission of any JTI funding will therefore be necessary.

For JTI funding to be considered State aid, four conditions have to be fulfilled:

5. there has been an intervention by the State or through State resources;

6. the intervention confers an advantage to the recipient on a selective basis;

7. competition has been or may be distorted;

8. the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States.

Whereas the last three conditions appear likely to be met in the case of JTI[19], it appears that JTI funding is not attributable to the State and/or does not constitute State resources.

First, as the contribution by Member States to JTI remains within this legal entity and does not go through State budget before it is attributed to any research project, JTI funding can be considered not to constitute State resources, and consequently not to be qualified as State aid.

Moreover, the design of the rules and governance of the JTI should make it possible to avoid that any Member States has a dominant influence on the selection of the beneficiaries of JTI funding[20]. Consequently, any JTI funding would not be imputable to any Member State

For the sake of completeness, it is also worth mentioning situations of co-financing, where national funding is linked to JTI funding[21]. It may be that national funding directly provided by Member States could be granted together with JTI funding. In such a case, this national funding would clearly constitute State resources. Depending on the circumstances of the selection of the projects, it may be that one or several Member States could have directly or indirectly a dominant influence on the use of their State resources.

First, if a Member State would decide independently to grant additional national funding to one or another project receiving JTI funding, this national funding would in all likelihood constitute State aid in the meaning of Article 87.1 EC and State aid rules and procedures would apply.

Second, it may also be that national funding is tied with JTI funding, and is attributed automatically to the projects selected by the JTI[22]. In such cases, it can not be excluded that the national funding tied with JTI funding could be imputable to one or several Member States, in particular as they take part in the selection of projects by the JTI. This would lead to the national funding constituting State aid[23] and State aid rules and procedures having to apply. However, the design of the rules and governance regarding the selection of projects by the JTI could make it possible to avoid that any Member State has a dominant influence on the selection of the projects, avoiding such a situation.

Anti-trust aspects

Cooperation in research and development may reduce duplicative or other unnecessary costs as well as lead to significant cross fertilisation of ideas and experience and thus result in products and technologies being developed more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. Under certain circumstances, however, joint research and development may cause anti-trust problems such as restrictive effects on prices, output, innovation, or variety and quality of products. The Commission has provided ample guidance on these issues in its Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements[24] (the "Horizontal Guidelines") and by the Commission Regulation (EC) 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements[25] (the "R&D Block Exemption Regulation").

In a nutshell, in many cases research and development cooperation will not even restrict competition and therefore not fall under Article 81(1).

- First, this can be said for agreements relating to cooperation in research and development at a rather theoretical stage, far removed from the exploitation of possible results.

- Moreover, research and development between non-competitors does generally not restrict competition. The competitive relationship between the parties has to be analysed in the context of affected existing markets and/or innovation.[26]

- Also, if the (private) parties are not able to carry out the necessary research and development independently, there is no competition to be restricted. This can apply, for example, to firms bringing together complementary skills, technologies and other resources. The decisive question is whether each party independently has the necessary means as to assets, know-how and other resources.

- Finally, research and development which does not include the joint exploitation of possible results by means of licensing, production and/or marketing rarely falls under Article 81(1). Those 'pure' research and development agreements can only cause competition problems, if effective competition with respect to innovation is significantly reduced.

Research and development cooperation projects that cannot be assessed from the outset as clearly non-restrictive may fall under Article 81(1) and have to be analysed in their economic context. Many of them will however be automatically exempted under Article 81(3) by virtue of the R&D Block Exemption Regulation. The R&D Block Exemption Regulation exempts research and development projects,

- Provided that the combined market share of the parties in the affected market(s) does not exceed 25%;

- The agreement does not include one of the hard core restrictions listed in Article 5 of the R&D Block Exemption Regulation (such as the limitation of output or sales, price-fixing or allocation of markets or customers etc.); and

- The access conditions in Article 3 are fulfilled. All the parties must have access to the results of the joint research and development for the purposes of further research or exploitation. Where the research and development agreement provides only for joint research and development (i.e. to the exclusion of joint exploitation), each party must be free independently to exploit the results of the joint research and development and any pre-existing know-how necessary for the purposes of such exploitation. Such right to exploitation may be limited to one or more technical fields of application, where the parties are not competing undertakings at the time the research and development agreement is entered into.

Research and development projects which are restrictive of competition and not automatically exempted under the R&D Block Exemption Regulation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, such projects can cause negative effects in the form of restricting innovation, coordinating the parties' behaviour in existing markets and foreclosure at the level of the exploitation of possible results. On the other, most research and development projects bring about economic benefits by means of cost savings and cross fertilisation of ideas and experience, thus resulting in improved or new products and technologies being developed more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. The criteria for the purposes of such individual assessment are laid down in more detail in the Horizontal Guidelines.[27]

In some instances, JTIs might also have as their object the definition of technical standards. Chapter 6 of the Horizontal Guidelines gives detailed guidance on the competition assessment of this type of cooperation. Where participation in standard setting is unrestricted and transparent, such cooperation, which set no obligation to comply with the standard, does not restrict competition. A restriction of competition can occur, however, where the parties do not remain free to develop alternative standards or products that do not comply with the agreed standard. Also, standards which are not accessible to third parties may discriminate or foreclose such third parties according to their geographical scope of application.

If a JTI cooperation in the area of standard setting is prima facie restrictive of competition, it needs to be assessed whether it can be exempted under Article 81(3) since it is indispensable to reap certain economic benefits. In order for those benefits to materialise, the necessary information to apply the standard must usually be available to those wishing to enter the market and an appreciable proportion of the industry must be involved in the setting of the standard in a transparent manner.

Finally, whatever the exact purpose of the JTI, it must also be borne in mind that this form of cooperation should not be misused by participants as a forum for exchanging commercially sensitive information between competitors which is not directly related to the project as such. The risk is greater to the extent that companies from the same industry operating on the same markets participate in the JTI. As for industry associations, one might consider avoiding any risks of exchanges of commercially sensitive information by providing for the presence of a neutral person in and the drawing up of minutes of meetings between the parties.

Merger control aspects

To the extent that a JTI might constitute a full-function joint venture with a Community dimension, it may fall to be scrutinised under the EC Merger Regulation[28] for any possibly adverse impact on competition which the arrangement might bring about. In that regard, the criteria set out in Article 1-3 of that Regulation and in the Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures[29] should be borne in mind.

Procedure

The Commission services are committed to screening – from a competition policy point of view – the individual JTIs in the framework of the ongoing and upcoming inter-service consultations. In order for this screening to be effective, it is recommended that the JTI proposals contain sufficiently detailed information, covering the aspects set out in the framework proposed above. In particular, it is important to clearly identify the product and/or innovation markets concerned by the cooperation. In view of the importance of the facts of each particular case for the competition screening, the assessment will only be valid for the set of facts known at the time and could be altered when and if additional or diverging facts are brought to its attention.

[1] Decision 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18/12/2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013)

[2] Article 171 states that "The Community may set up joint undertakings or any other structure necessary for the efficient execution of Community research, technological development and demonstration programmes"

[3] Report on European Technology Platforms and Joint Technology Initiatives: Fostering Public-Private R&D Partnerships to Boost Europe's Industrial Competitiveness, SEC(2005) 800 of 10.06.2005

[4] Council Decision 971/2006/CE of 19/12/2006 adopting a Specific Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration: 'Cooperation' (2007 – 2013)

[5] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24 of 29.01.2004, p. 1.

[6] New Article 30.3 of the Financial Regulation

[7] Opinion 6838/07 of the Legal Service of the Council of 27.02.2007, paragraph 12

[8] Opinion 6838/07 of the Legal Service of the Council of 27.02.2007, paragraph 15

[9] Article 185, paragraph 2, of the Financial Regulation

[10] Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities

[11] Article 47 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement

[12] Article 185, paragraph 1, of the Financial Regulation

[13] New Articles 108a.1 and 108.2.f of the Financial Regulation

[14] Report on European Technology Platforms and Joint Technology Initiatives: Fostering Public-Private R&D Partnerships to Boost Europe's Industrial Competitiveness, SEC(2005) 800 of 10.06.2005

[15] Article 47 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement

[16] Article 28a of the Financial Regulation

[17] OJ L 136, 31.05.1999, p. 1-7

[18] C323, see notably chapter 7.

[19] JTI funding given to some undertakings will reduce their own costs and support the development of new products they may be able to sell in the market. Competition may be distorted as a result, since the undertakings having benefited from the JTI funding may benefit from the R&D outcomes and will have a first-mover-advantage for any product development resulting from the joint R&D, to the detriment of companies not participating in the JTI funding. This is likely to affect trade between Member States

[20] The jurisprudence of the Court provides some indications as to the imputability to the State of certain activities. Notably, what matters is whether the State can have directly or indirectly a dominant influence on the use of the State resources. See e.g. C-278/00 République hellénique contre Commission of 29/04/2004. The examination of whether some Member States could have a dominant influence on the selection of the projects receiving JTI funding will have to be based on the circumstances of the case and it is not possible to give a general rule as to when one would conclude that a dominant influence is present. The following criteria may notably be used: voting and veto rights held by the Commission; contribution to the funding of the JTI by each Member States; percentage of the voting rights held by each Member States; rules governing voting majority; number of Member States making the decision; circumstances of the decision-making process

[21] This is the scenario foreseen by the ARTEMIS JTI.

[22] This is the scenario foreseen by the ARTEMIS JTI

[23] This could be the case, for instance, if one Member State would have a majority of votes.

[24] OJ C 3 of 6.1.2001, p. 2.

[25] OJ L 304 of 5.12.2000, p. 7.

[26] For more detail on how to define these markets and to carry out the assessment, please see §§ 44 et seq. of the Horizontal Guidelines.

[27] §§ 61 et seq.

[28] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24 of 29.01.2004, p. 1.

[29] Commission notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66 of 02.03.1998, p. 1.

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