EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 12 December 2005 
at the request of the Swedish Parliament  
on a draft law amending the Sveriges Riksbank Act by introducing certain provisions from the 
State Budget Act 
(CON/2005/54) 
 1. On 12 September 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB)  received a request from Sveriges riksdag 
(the Swedish Parliament, hereinafter the ‘Riksd ag’) for an opinion on a draft law amending the 
Sveriges Riksbank Act (1988:1385) (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).  
2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based  on the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consulta tion of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions
1, as the draft law contains provisions concerning 
the Swedish national central bank (NCB). In accordan ce with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the European Centra l Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this 
opinion. 
3. The draft law is one of several legislative propo sals which aim to introduce certain provisions from 
the State Budget Act (1996:1059) into the legi slation governing authorities under the Riksdag’s 
authority. This opinion only concerns the draf t law amending the Sveriges Riksbank Act and the 
ECB is not commenting on the other legislative proposals. 
4. The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law’s proposed amendments to the Sveriges Riksbank 
Act (hereinafter the ‘Riksbank Act’) aim to ensure good economic and budgetary administration 
within Sveriges Riksbank. The draft law contains certain elements which need to be carefully 
considered against the requirements of central bank independence, as laid down in Article 108 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community a nd Article 7 of the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Cent ral Bank. It is recalled that Article 108 of the 
Treaty also applies to the NCBs of the Member St ates that have not yet adopted the euro and that 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) established a list of features of central bank independence 
in 1997 (including institutional, personal and financial independence), which were subsequently 
affirmed by the ECB2. 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
2  The concept of central bank independence has been desc ribed in detail in the EMI’s, and subsequently the ECB’s 
Convergence Reports (all availa ble on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.int ). See, for example: European Monetary 
2 5. Under the draft law’s proposal to amend Article 2 of Chapter 8 of the Riksbank Act, Sveriges 
Riksbank must obtain the Riksdag’s consent prio r to acquiring shares in companies and limited 
partnerships and similar rights, or assuming obligati ons linked to such rights, if the acquisition or 
assumption of obligations does not fall within Sv eriges Riksbank’s tasks as a central bank. The 
explanatory memorandum to the draft law states3 that the term ‘tasks as a central bank’ should be 
interpreted narrowly and that in the event of dou bt Sveriges Riksbank should request the Riksdag’s 
consent. The ECB is of the view that the wordi ng ‘tasks as a central bank’ must comprise all tasks 
relating to the European System of Central Banks (E SCB) so as to be compatible with Article 108 
of the Treaty. In order to avoid any misunderstandi ng, the legislative proposal should be clarified 
on this point.  
6. Similarly, the draft law inserts a new Article 2a in to Chapter 8 of the Riksbank Act, stating that 
Sveriges Riksbank may sell shares in companies a nd limited partnerships and similar rights, but 
that the Riksdag’s prior consent is required if this  sale means that the State’s ownership is reduced 
in companies where the State has at least 50 % of the voting rights or if the sale is of significant 
public economic interest. The ECB notes that this new provision does not refer to ‘tasks as a central 
bank’, which could be interprete d as meaning that the Riksdag’s consent in accordance with this 
provision would be needed for sales both within a nd outside the scope of Sveriges Riksbank’s tasks 
as a central bank. Accordingly, a provision similar to the one in Article 2 of Chapter 8 excluding 
ESCB-related tasks from the application of the re quirement for the Riksdag’s prior consent should 
therefore be inserted in the new Article 2a in Ch apter 8 of the Riksbank Act as well. Moreover, the 
ECB considers that the formulation ‘significant p ublic economic interest’ is too wide and leaves 
excessive room for discretion in its application, wh ich could hamper Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to 
independently carry out its tasks as a central bank.  In view thereof, the proposed wording of the 
new Article 2a of Chapter 8 of the Riksbank Act,  concerning the obligation on Sveriges Riksbank 
to seek the Riksdag’s consent, would be incomp atible with Sveriges Riksbank’s independence and 
Article 108 of the Treaty. 
7. The draft law’s amendment to Article 4 of Chapte r 8 of the Riksbank Act states that Sveriges 
Riksbank must obtain the Riksdag’s consent prior to acquiring4 or selling real property intended for 
the activities conducted by Sveriges Riksbank, or in which it takes part, if the value exceeds 
SEK 20 million. The reasoning behind this provisi on is unclear and if it is implemented as 
presently worded, it could affect Sveriges Riksbank’ s institutional and financial independence. An 
NCB’s overall independence is jeopardised if it cannot autonomously avail itself of sufficient 
financial resources to fulfil its mandate (i.e. to perform its tasks as an NCB). Imposing such an 
obligation on Sveriges Riksbank could affect Sv eriges Riksbank’s financial independence, as the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Institute, ‘Progress Towards Convergence 1996’, pp. 100-103 ; European Monetary Institute, ‘Convergence Report: 
Report required by Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the European Community’, 1998, pp. 291-295; and European 
Central Bank, ‘Convergence Report 2004’, pp. 25-30. 
3  At Section 11.2. 
4  Unless the purpose is to protect a monetary claim. 
3 conduct of its activities would be dependent on a thir d party’s consent. This would be incompatible 
with Article 108 of the Treaty. The draft law should therefore explicitly state that acquisitions and sales of real property that Sveriges Riksbank ma kes in order to independently fulfil its ESCB-
related tasks are excluded from the requirement to  obtain the Riksdag's prior consent. In this 
connection, the ECB would also like to draw atte ntion to another outstanding matter relating to 
financial independence requiring legislative ch ange, as recalled in the ECB’s Convergence 
Report 2004, namely the need to introduce statut ory provisions in Swedish legislation concerning 
the distribution of Sveriges Riksbank’s profits
5. 
8. The ECB welcomes the draft law’s proposed ame ndment to Article 3 of Chapter 10 of the 
Riksbank Act, whereby Sveriges Riksbank undertak es to apply sound accounting principles to the 
obligation to keep accounts, thereby applying relevant provisions of Guideline ECB/2002/10 of 5 December 2002 on the legal framework for accoun ting and financial reporting in the European 
System of Central Banks
6. In this connection, the ECB would also like to mention the statistical 
reporting requirements contained in Regulati on ECB/2001/13 of 22 November 2001 concerning the 
consolidated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions sector7, which will apply to 
Sveriges Riksbank as a monetary financial ins titution and a member of the Eurosystem upon 
Sweden’s adoption of the euro. 
9. The new Article 5 of Chapter 10 of the Riksbank Act provides that Sveriges Riksbank will report 
annually to the Riksdag with regard  to measures it has taken or intends to take in the light of 
comments received from the Swedish National Audit Office. An express statutory obligation for an 
NCB to consult third parties ex ante  with regard to its ESCB-related tasks provides such third 
parties with a formal mechanism to influence the fi nal decision, and is therefore incompatible with 
the Treaty and the Statute. The ECB therefore em phasises that the reporting requirement in the new 
Article 5 of Chapter 10 of the Riksbank Act mu st be for information purposes only and must not 
imply an obligation to consult the Riksdag ex ante .  
10. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
  Done at Frankfurt am Main, 12 December 2005. 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET 
                                                 
5  European Central Bank, Convergence Report 2004, p. 236. 
6  OJ L 58, 3.3.2003, p. 1. 
7  OJ L 333, 17.12.2001, p. 1. Regula tion as last amended by Regulation E CB/2004/21 (OJ L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42).