9.2.84 OfficialJournal of the European Communities No C 35/7 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes 
(84/C 35/04) 
The text referred to the Committee has been published in Official Journal of the Euro­
pean Communites No C 134 of 21 May 1983, page 7. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 23 May 1983 the Council referred the abovementioned proposal to the Economic 
and Social Committee in accordance with Article 100 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community. 
Procedure 
The matter was referred to the Section for Social Questions and Mr E. Brian Roycroft 
was appointed rapporteur. 
The Section opinion was adopted by 34 votes to nine, with five abstentions on 10 Nov­
ember 1983. 
B. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The Economic and Social Committee adopted its Opinion at its 213th plenary session 
held on 14 and 15 December 1983 by a large majority with 15 votes against and four 
abstentions. 
The full text of the opinion is as follows: 
1. General comments 
1.1. The Committee broadly approves the proposal 
for a Council Directive on the implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment for men and women 
in occupational social security schemes. It also 
agrees that affiliation to occupational insurance 
schemes forms part of the conditions of employ­
ment in the sense that it derives, directly or indi­
rectly, from the contract of employment or from the 
exercise of the occupational activity, as covered by 
Article 119 of the Rome Treaty. 
1.2. The principle of providing equal treatment in 
occupational schemes, therefore, ought to be imple­
mented and respected where collective agreements 
or company schemes based on special 'reserve' or 
'staff expenditure' funds are in use. 
It is possible to adopt alternative broad approaches 
to the interpretation of the principle of equal treat­
ment; that is: 
— the principle may be interpreted in terms of the 
day-to-day living standards of individual men and women. This requires equal periodic ben­
efits and contributions, or 
it may be interpreted in terms of the total 
amount of benefit received by the average man 
or woman by the time he or she dies or is off 
work through illness. Here differing actuarial 
factors as between the sexes could be taken into 
account. That is, equal periodic benefits could 
be paid, but unequal employees' contributions 
would be necessary due to the greater total life­
time benefits which women on average would 
receive; or conversely unequal periodic benefits 
could be paid, with equal employees' contribu­
tions; or it would be possible to combine the 
two at some intermediate level of benefits and 
contributions. 
The Committee, acknowledging that equal rights 
sometimes require financial mechanisms for the 
application and maintenance of these rights, 
believes that the first of these interpretations, con­
cerning day-to-day living standards and the per­
sonal well-being of real individuals, is the most 
meaningful in direct human terms. The Committee 
No C 35/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 9.2.84 
notes that this approach is concerned with net 
incomes in work (as affected by employees' contrib­
utions) as well as in retirement (as affected by ben­
efits paid). 
The Committee recognizes, however, that difficul­
ties will be involved, and draws attention to these in 
various comments throughout the text. It is essential 
to take these into account as, while recognizing the 
central role of statutory social security schemes, the 
Committee thinks that one should neither discour­
age their supplementation or enhancement via 
sound occupational schemes nor encourage an 
excessive cumulation of occupational benefits 
which in reality creates inequalities of privileges at 
variance with equality of treatment. 
1.3. The Committee especially notes, that prob­
lems would arise where occupational insurance 
schemes are organized on a basis through the ser­
vices of a private insurance agency whose very busi­
ness method is to discriminate between various risk 
categories, including risk variation between working 
men and working women. (Though firm data is dif­
ficult to attain, the Commission has barely 
attempted to examine this key problem area.) 
The Committee believes, nonetheless, that equal 
treatment is an overriding principle (backed up by 
the Treaty), the application of which should strive to 
be deemed fair by all parties concerned. 
In this sense, it is clearly unfair when money pur­
chase schemes operate systematically against 
women on a no-loss risk assessment basis, e.g. 
charging women a higher health insurance rate on 
account of higher health risks, yet also levying 
higher contributions from, or paying lower benefits 
to, women on account of their higher life expect­
ancy. It can equally be considered unfair to expect 
private insurance agencies to lose out on both 
counts, e.g. to charge women equal health insurance 
rates as men despite higher risks, as well as pay 
women an equal pension as men for equal contribu­
tions despite the expectancy that they will draw it 
for longer. 
A possible solution to this dilemma might be to 
make provisions for supplementary funding by 
which benefits calculated by, say, private insurance 
agencies could, in order to take account of equal 
treatment, be levelled out by, for example: — the company for which an occupational scheme 
is provided, and/or 
— male employees whose contributions would be 
on a par with women through collective agree­
ments, and/or 
— statutory agencies which could also help to con­
tribute (perhaps for smaller enterprises). 
1.4. At the same time, the Committee stresses that 
both low paid men and women, below a defined 
working income and involved in or brought into 
money purchase or other occupational insurance 
schemes, should not be adversely affected by the 
implementation of equal treatment in terms of 
higher or new contributions which might be difficult 
to meet. In order to protect the minority of very low 
paid workers, the distribution of contributions could 
be spread out, where necessary, among relevant bet­
ter paid male and female employees and/or 
employers concerned. That is, some concession in 
contribution rates could be offered to very low paid 
workers. 
1.5. Whatever apportionment of supplementary 
funding is in the final event used, the employer (and 
not, for example, the actuary) should be ultimately 
responsible for not discriminating in the fixing of 
employees' contributions and the payment of ben­
efits. This should be made clear in the Directive. It 
may therefore be necessary to specify that the Direc­
tive applies only to schemes to which the employer 
contributes. 
1.6. The Committee notes that, in order to secure 
equal contributions and benefits, it is not necessary 
to employ unisex actuarial tables in assessing costs 
(which could well be disruptive to a scheme's finan­
cial planning). The Directive should make it clear 
that actuarial assessments should proceed on a 
sound and realistic basis, the process of levelling out 
of benefits and contributions taking place subse­
quently at the level of employer/employee agree­
ment (and, where relevant, with public authorities 
concerned as described in point 1.3 above). 
1.7. It has also to be accepted that equal occupa­
tional schemes could cause difficulties for small 
firms, where a disintegration into a number of indi­
vidual schemes or indeed no scheme at all might 
result. It may therefore be appropriate to specify a 
minimum number of employees below which it 
would be permissible for actuarial differences with 
regard to sex to be reflected in benefit and/or con­
tributions. 
9. 2. 84 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 35/9 
1.8. A related point concerns the self-employed. 
Difficulties arise here in applying the concept of 
equal treatment. In individual cases there is, by defi­
nition, no employer. If the Directive refers only to 
group schemes, this should be made clear. However, 
group schemes themselves normally amount to no 
more than a collection of individual contracts, with 
no cross-funding between members. It would seem 
expedient to examine whether a solution can be 
found to this problem without excluding the self-
employed from the Directive. 
1.9. It has to be acknowledged that, while equality 
of regular periodic contributions and benefits is 
clearly achievable, and should be implemented, 
there are problems and anomalies where options are 
exercised to convert pensions, or parts of pensions, 
into total cash values, or vice versa. For example, 
equal lump sums would purchase unequal annuities 
on the open market. It may therefore be necessary to 
exclude the exercise of such options from the scope 
of the Directive. Thus, nothing in the foregoing 
would preclude the taking into account of actuarial 
factors as to sex, when calculating the level of any 
optional benefit where the option in question is 
exercisable solely at the employee's discretion. 
(However, periodic benefits paid in the event of 
early retirement should not be regarded as an option 
in this way, as frequently the circumstances of early 
retirement — for example, ill-health or as an alter­
native to redundancy — do not amount to the exer­
cise of a choice in a meaningful sense.) 
1.10. The Committee also alerts the Commission 
and the Council to the organizational complications 
with which equal occupational insurance schemes 
will have to deal in view of the rapidly growing 
number of flexible and early retirement schemes 
now being set up. 
2. Specific comments 
2.1. Article 3 of the Directive, broadly indicating 
members of the working population concerned, is at 
times misleading and ought to be explained more 
closely. In particular, the Directive can only cover 
those 'persons seeking employment' who have been 
in work. It cannot cover the growing number of per­
sons with no employment record. The position of 'self-employed persons', the Section has earlier sug­
gested, should be examined. 
2.2. With regard to Article 5 and Article 6.1 (b), sec­
toral differences and employment variations also 
need to be considered in the equal fixing of partici­
pation in occupational insurance schemes. Some 
low paid part-time women workers, for example, 
might well object to having to contribute to compul­
sory schemes enjoyed by the better paid full-time 
employees of a certain concern. Possible approaches 
to this problem have been dealt with in point 1.4. 
2.3. Article 6.1 (f), on the equal fixing of retirement 
ages, ought to refer to Article 9 which (albeit with 
restrictions) specifically provides for the right to 
defer on this very point. 
2.4. Article 6.1 (h) and (i), on equal calculation of 
benefits and contributions despite actuarial differ­
ences, ought to be much better explained and 
defended. 
The Commission explanatory memorandum, in fact, 
is very ambiguous on this specific problem of risk 
assessment: it first attempts to duck the issue argu­
ing that 'differences in life expectancy are very 
clear-cut between categories of male workers, 
according to the occupation pursued: if account is 
not generally taken of them in calculations it is dif­
ficult to see why an exception should be made in the 
case of female workers'. It later admits, however, 
that 'it must be stressed that the Directive is not 
opposed to actuarial factors being taken into 
account; it is opposed only to the application of dif­
ferent actuarial factors for workers of one or the 
other sex.' It further stresses that, in any case, 'every­
thing suggests' that the life expectancy of women 
workers 'does not correspond to the overall average' 
of the female population, thereby suggesting that 
there is no real risk difference between working men 
and women in terms of life expectancy and that a 
'generalized coverage' is the best solution. 
This is simply not a convincing argument. No evi­
dence is given to support it. And no reason is given 
as to why insurance agencies apparently deliberately 
No C 35/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 9. 2. 84 
discriminate against women in money purchase 
schemes in the absence of any valid risk assessment 
reason for doing so. The overriding principle of 
equal treatment, and its implementation through a 
'generalized coverage', deserve a better defence than 
this. 
Two further, specific points may be made here: 
Firstly, to take account of the possible provision of 
supplementary funding by the employer, to level out 
benefits or contributions, Article 6.1 (i) should be 
amended to read: 
'set employees' contributions at different rates', 
etc. 
Secondly, if the principle of supplementary funding 
(from whatever source) in order to permit equal 
employees' contributions and benefits, is accepted, 
then Article 6.1 (h) and (i) could perhaps be consid­
erably simplified by shortening them so as to read: 
'(h) provide for benefits whose level or amount 
differ, 
(i) set employees' contributions at different 
rates'. 
2.5. The last part of Article 6.2,'.. . the said bodies 
must take account of the principle of equal treat­
ment', should be modified to read as follows: '. . . 
the said bodies must observe the principle of equal 
treatment'. 
2.6. With regard to Article 8, a more realistic dead­
line than 1 January 1986 is required in order to 
implement some of the more complex provisions 
relating to equal treatment in occupational schemes, 
especially money purchase schemes. The Committee 
suggests that a date, no more than two years after 
the Directive has been passed by the Council, 
should be adopted. While we are certainly mindful 
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1983. of the need to avoid unnecessary delay, the need for 
orderly transition, not least in the interests of the 
beneficiaries, must be considered. 
2.7. In this same connection, the two important 
points, namely equal determination of pensionable 
age and surviving spouses' pensions, listed in 
Article 9 as areas where a right to defer compulsory 
application of the principle of equal treatment is 
permitted, result from their identical exclusion from 
the Directive 79/7/EEC on statutory schemes. 
Desiring a rapid though realistic implementation of 
the proposed Directive on occupational schemes, 
the Committee is disappointed that the two above-
mentioned points have not yet been subject to a 
new Directive on statutory schemes, and the Com­
mittee considers that the Commission remains far 
too vague about the timing and specific contents of 
this projected draft Directive on statutory schemes. 
For example, problems relating to the absence of, or 
unequal treatment of, widowers' pensions can be 
resolved only when the Directive on the progressive 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women in matters of social security (19 
December 1978) no longer excludes the widower's 
pension from its field of application. 
This right of deferral weakens the whole thrust of 
the proposed Directive on occupational schemes. It 
might also lead to a whole series of 'spin-off loo­
pholes, say connected to flexible and early retire­
ment schemes, in terms of unequal contributions 
and benefits. For example, could discrimination 
because a scheme does not permit time for a woman 
to build up full entitlement be protected under 
Article 9? 
2.8. Article 11 refers to the role of the 'courts' and 
of 'other competent authorities' in order to ensure 
the application of equal treatment. In what way 
might the European Community institutions also 
facilitate this right of redress? 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Francis CEYRAC 
9. 2. 84 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 35/11 
ANNEX 
to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Rejected amendments 
The following amendment to the Section opinion, tabled in accordance with the Rules of Proce­
dure, were rejected by the Committee during plenary session discussions: 
Page 2, point 1.2, second paragraph, first sentence 
Replace: 'the first of these interpretations' in the third and fourth lines by 'the second of these 
interpretations'. 
Note: If this amendment is accepted the entire opinion will have to be brought into line. 
Reasons: 
The Commission proposal (COM(83) 217 final) states on page 8, under h), that different actuarial 
factors must not be applied to workers according to sex. The opinion agrees with this view of the 
Commission. The author of this amendment is against this approach, for the following reasons: It 
is a fact that men and women differ as regards life expectancy, invalidity and mortality. In many 
spheres occupational schemes take account of these factors in determining members' rights (ben­
efits) and obligations, without any discrimination being intended. Equal treatment of men and 
women in respect of pensions can never be absolute. If the contributions are the same the ben­
efits will be different; if the benefits are the same the contributions will be different. 
An example will clarify this: 
A male and a female worker, both aged 65, are each entitled to a pension of, say, Fl 10 000 per 
year. Viewed statistically, the average life expectancy of men aged 65 is 13,8 years and that of 
women aged 65 is 18 years (Netherlands' mortality tables 1976 to 1980). 
On death the man will thus have received a total of Fl. 138 000 and the women Fl 180 000. 
Conversely: 
If the total amount of pension available for each from the age of 65 is taken to be the same, the 
woman's annual pension will of course be smaller than the man's, since more years have to be 
covered in her case. 
It is therefore impossible to have in one system an obligation regarding equal benefits and equal 
contributions for men and women in combination with the obligation to apply the same actuarial 
bases to men and women. 
Voting on the amendment: 
For: 26. Against: 66. Abstentions: 5. 
Page 6, point 1.8 
Substitute for last sentence: 
'It would seem expedient therefore to exclude the self-employed from the Directive.' 
No C 35/12 Official Journal of the European Communities 9. 2. 84 
Reason: 
It is not clear why the self-employed should be covered to any extent by the Directive. 
Article 119, from which the draft Directive stems, is concerned with wages or salaries which a 
worker receives 'in respect of his employment from his employer'. There is no employer/ 
employee relationship in the case of the self-employed, and therefore their pension arrangements 
should be excluded from this Directive. 
Voting on the amendment: 
For: 38. Against: 63. Abstentions: 4. 
Page 9, point 2.6 
Substitute for second sentence: 
'It is suggested that the implementation date should be not less than five years from its noti­
fication to the Member States.' 
Reason: 
This is in keeping with the timetable for the corresponding Directive relating to statutory schemes 
(Council Directive of 19 December 1978), and is considered the minimum practical timetable for 
necessary full consultation with employee representatives and trustees, and for necessary revision 
of schemes' rules, and approval of changes by supervisory authorities. 
Voting on the amendment: 
For: 42. Against: 62. Abstentions: 8. 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision on the comparability of vocational 
training qualifications between the Member States of the European Community 
(84/C 35/05) 
The text referred to the Committee has been published in Official Journal of the Euro­
pean Communities No C 264 of 4 October 1983, page 5. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 30 September 1983 the Council referred the abovementioned proposal to the 
Economic and Social Committee in accordance with Article 128 of the Treaty estab­
lishing the European Economic Community. 
Procedure 
The Section adopted its opinion by 24 votes to one, with one abstention, at its 166th 
meeting, held on 10 November 1983.