EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 24.6.2009 
SEC(2009) 791 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
Accompanying document to the 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
 
on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the 
European Union – an EU  CRBN Action Plan  
 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
   
{COM(2009) 273 final} 
{SEC(2009) 790} 
EN 2   EN SUMMARY OF THE IM PACT ASSESSMENT  
1. THE  CBRN  POLICY  PACKAGE 
In accordance with the December 2007 Council Conclusions on addressing chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuc lear (CBRN) risks and on bio-preparedness, which invited the 
Commission to continue its work in the CBRN fi eld and agreed with its  intention to propose 
relevant policy measures in 2009, the Commissi on intends to adopt a package of proposals on 
CBRN in June 2009. 
The overall objectives of the CBRN  package are to fight terrorism by complementing relevant 
measures taken at Member State level, to addres s gaps in the field and to promote the sharing 
of information and exchange of best practices between Member St ates. It should also assist in 
identifying measures to reduce the terroris t threat in the chem ical, biological and 
radiological/nuclear fields. 
The package was developed following a long and extensive consultation process. The main 
driving force behind the formulation of the Acti on Plan has been the CBRN Task Force. This 
Task Force, set up in Febr uary 2008, comprised over 200 members representing national 
authorities and organisations. A total of 15 meetings were orga nised over the course of 2008 
to address the different CBRN strands. The Task  Force’s final report was published in January 
2009 and contained 264 separate recommendations, c onfirming not only that there is still a lot 
of work to be done, but also that there is  a strong consensus among experts on how the 
existing issues could best be tackled.  
Furthermore, several Commission services have been actively involved in the work of the 
CBRN Task Force. Among all the DGs involve d in this exercise, DG ENTR, DG SANCO 
and DG TREN, along with the JRC, played a pa rticularly active role  in the chemical, 
biological and radiological/nuc lear fields, respectively. 
2. PROBLEM  DEFINITION 
In order to define the CBRN problem in the EU , a series of variables, including the overall 
level of the CBRN threat and the potential co sts of terrorist or ot her incidents involving 
CBRN material, have to be taken into consideration. 
2.1. Assessment of specific problems 
The CBRN problem assessment focuses on issues  relating to CBRN prevention, detection and 
preparedness/response.  
2.1.1.  Problems relating to CBRN prevention, detection and preparedness/response 
• A wealth of international and EU legisl ation and agreements exists, but there are 
several differences in implementation among the Member States. 
• Gaps and duplications ex ist in current information sharing and cooperation 
initiatives. 
• There are various legal and practical c onstraints to EU cooperation on combating 
CBRN terrorist threats. 
• Standards with regard to personnel secu rity differ between Member States, which 
have different procedures for b ackground checks and personnel vetting. 
• While a lot of research is undertaken in some areas, a number of research needs are 
currently not adequately addressed. 
EN 3   EN • The open-source publication of  scientific findings and re search funding practices do 
not take security issues sufficiently into account. 
2.1.2.  CBRN prevention 
• A lot of CBRN material is relatively easy to obtain and can be weaponised. This 
involves predominantly chemical substances and to a lesser extent biological agents 
and radiological sources. 
• There is insufficient coordinated contro l of the markets for CBRN material, and 
Member States have varying approaches and standards for the monitoring and surveillance of CBRN mate rials and transactions. 
2.1.3.  CBRN detection 
• There are differences in the level of na tional detection capabili ties and preparedness. 
• There are no harmonised minimum detec tion standards on which Member States 
could build and there is as yet no European testing, trialling and certification scheme.  
2.1.4.  CBRN preparedness and response 
• There are significant differences across Member States in the quality of the CBRN 
emergency and response plans of supply chai n actors, high-risk sites or critical 
infrastructure operators. The security as pects are often not explicit or not well 
integrated in the plans. 
• There are significant gaps in the training of  first responders to react to CBRN events 
in Member States. Precautions with re gard to forensic investigation or 
decontamination are too often not covered. 
• The extent and coverage of medical c ountermeasures in place varies between the 
Member States.  
2.2. Subsidiarity and propor tionality principles 
The subsidiarity principle
 is satisfied as the measur es the CBRN package cannot be 
undertaken by any single EU Memb er State and must therefore be addressed at EU level. 
Although security issues are to a large extent a national compet ence, there are several reasons 
why some of them need to be tackled at EU level: 
• The root of the problem is an intern ational phenomenon. Many of the existing 
security initiatives and legislation are international in character. 
• A variety of security measures currently exist in the Member States. Potentially, 
since no internal borders exist, lower sta ndards of security in one Member State 
might allow the malicious use of  CBRN material in another. 
• There are potential economies of scale to be generated through the identification and 
dissemination of good practice at  international and EU leve l. In particular, good 
practice in the implementation and enforcemen t of EU legislation needs to be tackled 
at EU level. 
The EU is well-placed to lead and to act as a catalyst for this cooperation, and the envisaged 
activities in the CBRN field are in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.  
Assessment of the proportionality  of a policy to combat terrorism is extremely difficult. The 
arbitrary and apparently irrational nature of terrorism means that its threat and consequences 
are difficult to predict. On the other hand, the potential negative effects of a terrorist attack 
using CBRN materials are signif icant, in terms of financia l losses, longer-term economic 
EN 4   EN consequences, loss of life and casualties, so cial disruption and overall well-being. Well-
targeted and relevant action in this field to prevent such attacks fr om happening, to identify 
planned attacks and to appropriate ly deal with the consequences of an attack is therefore 
justified. 
3. OBJECTIVES   
Given the problems identified in section 2 above , the CBRN Action Plan aims to achieve the 
general and specific objectiv es set out in Table 3. 
 
EN 5   EN Table 3: CBRN objectives 
General horizontal objective 
1. To improve the EU’s capacity to counter CBRN threats 
Specific horizontal objectives 
1.1 To increase effective 
international cooperation, coordination and dialogue on 
CBRN 1.2 To raise awareness and increase 
knowledge and information sharing on CBRN 1.3 To reduce, where possible, 
judicial, legal and jurisdictional barriers and constraints 1.4 To improve 
personnel security 1.5 To strengthen and 
prioritise research on CBRN 1.6 To increase 
awareness of security implications in funding 
decisions 1.7 To increase awareness 
of security aspects in publishing 
Objectives — Prevention  Objectives — Detection Objectives — Preparedness and response  
General  Specific  General  Specific  General  Specific  
4.1 To improve response and 
emergency planning and 
protocols, also at EU level 2.1 To prevent access to 
legitimately produced and used 
CBRN material by terrorists or 
other criminals  3.1 To improve detection and 
identification capacity and 
capability 
4.2 To develop an EU approach 
towards response and emergency 
planning 
2.2 To improve monitoring and 
control over CBRN materials  4.3 To ensure ongoing information 
flows in the event of CBRN 
emergencies 
4.4 To increase the chances of 
finding and prosecuting terrorist 
and other criminals 2. To increase the security of 
CBRN material and the safety of 
citizens and possible targets   
2.3 To improve overall awareness 
of the potential dangers and risks, 
contributing to a high ‘security 
culture’ 3. To increase the chances of 
detection and identification of 
CBRN materials before and 
after terrorist incidents 
3.2 To develop an EU approach 
towards detection and 
identification 4. To reduce to a minimum the 
effects of terrorist incidents 
involving CBRN materials   
4.5 To enhance national and EU 
countermeasures and on-the-
ground response capacity 
 
 
EN 6   EN 4. POLICY  OPTIONS 
The specific impact assessment approach focuses on two main policy options: 
• assessment of the status quo; • assessment of relevant CBRN actions  for the preferred policy option: 
Altogether, a total of 147 possible actions are identified, of which: 
• 99 actions  are considered uncontroversial; 
• 34 actions  are considered potentially contr oversial and are assessed in detail; 
• 14 actions  are considered unfeasible and are excluded from the preferred policy 
option. 
5. PREFERRED
 OPTION 
Based on the screening and detailed assessment of  the different possible actions, the preferred 
policy option includes a to tal of 133 actions, organised into th e four main strands: Horizontal; 
Prevention; Detection; and Preparedness and Response. 
Table 4: Actions by strand and type 
 Horizontal C B R/N Total 
Prevention 13 17 7 21 58
Detection 10 1 7 2 20
Preparedness and 
response 15  3 6 24
Actions applicable to 
prevention, detection, and preparedness/ response 19 5 6 1 31
Total 57 23 23 30 133
5.1. Main impacts of the pr eferred policy option 
5.1.1.  Financial and economic impacts 
Most of the 133 actions included in the preferred policy option are expected to have low 
financial costs, incurred at both EU and natio nal levels by various stakeholders and over 
several years. Such costs woul d cover, for example, studies, mapping activities, identification 
and dissemination of good practices, participatio n in networks, meetings and other events.  
It is estimated that around 18 actions could have a high financ ial cost, for the funding of new 
research, the establishment of a comprehensiv e early warning system and capacity, putting in 
place security plans/security management system s for facilities and the establishment of EU-
wide testing, trialling and certification scheme s for detection systems and equipment. The 
exact costs are difficult to estimate, as many of  these actions would require further feasibility 
work to provide a more accurate assessment of the costs and benefits.  
The expected costs of implementing the Action Pl an are difficult to assess precisely, as these 
will depend on several factors, e.g. the length of the EU lists. It is worth noting, however, that 
even if the overall cost could run into several te ns of millions of euros, this would be divided 
 
EN 7   EN between different implementation levels (i.e . the Commission, EU ag encies and 27 Member 
States) and spread over several years. While some actions would star t immediately, several 
would only be launched as from 2011. This will provide sufficient time to adequately plan for such costs. The existing fina ncial programmes for the period until 2013, in particular the 
specific programme ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism 
and other Security-Related Ri sks’ and the specific progra mme ‘Prevention of and Fight 
against Crime’, will be able to offer financial support for implementation of the actions.  
5.1.2.  Social impacts 
Most of the actions included in  the preferred policy option are not expected to have serious 
social effects. Clearly, however, the overall pos itive social effect of successfully countering 
CBRN threats is improved public health and security , in terms of a reduc tion in casualties and 
long-term health problems, reduced levels of fear and an increased perception of safety. 
Several actions would also ha ve a positive effect on governa nce, as they would enhance 
institutional cooperation and communication, improve the organi sation of information flows 
or help to establish protocols, etc. 
Around ten of the actions could have negative social impacts.  The possible negative effects 
concern interference with the fundamental rights  to private life and to the protection of 
personal data. However, the content and actual implementation of the actions can be designed 
in such a way as to avoid these effects. 
5.1.3.  Impacts on fundamental rights 
Potential issues in relation to f undamental rights have been identi fied in five of the actions. 
Two of these involve measures to increase secu rity for visiting staff from third countries. 
These could, if not handled with care, negativ ely affect the non-discrimination principle and 
academic freedom. Background checks and vetting requirements can negatively affect the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to enga ge in work. On the other hand, mutual 
recognition of vetting procedures throughout the EU could facilitate taking up work in similar 
areas in other Member States. 
There are also three actions that deal with notifying and reporting susp icious transactions. 
These might involve interference with the priv ate lives of individuals  and their right to 
protection of personal data. Provided that adequa te protection of personal data is ensured, the 
content and actual implementation of  the actions can be designed so  as to avoid these effects. 
5.2. Benefits of the preferred policy option 
5.2.1.  Increasing effective inter national cooperation, coordi nation and dialogue on CBRN 
The preferred policy option will make a positive contribution towards increasing the 
effectiveness of international cooperation, coor dination and dialogue on CBRN. Several of the 
actions would lead to: 
• better mapping of existing international cooperation and coordination mechanisms 
addressing CBRN issues; 
• increased cooperation with relevant agencies  at international, EU and national level; 
• improved identification and exchange of good practices with international, European 
and national partners; 
• improved communication with the public. 
 
EN 8   EN 5.2.2.  Reducing, judicial, legal and jurisd ictional barriers and constraints 
Several actions included in the preferred policy option would c ontribute to improving 
personnel security by: 
• introducing common graduated crite ria for background checks and vetting 
procedures; 
• improving the identification and exchange of  good practices in the area of security 
checks; 
• strengthening management structures in  CBRN facilities, so that personnel are 
adequately and regularly appraised and monitored. 
5.2.3.  Improving monitoring and control over CBRN materials 
The preferred policy option includes a number of  actions to improve monitoring and control 
over CBRN materials in terms of accounting, info rmation exchanges and reporting on threats, 
losses and other incidents, tran sport, and import and export: 
• increased compliance with international obl igations and use of existing monitoring 
and control mechanisms; 
• improved licensing, registration and delivery control to ensure that CBRN substances 
are appropriately recorded and monitored; 
• improved communication and information ex change on threat levels, thefts, losses 
and incidents; 
• enhanced control over the transport of CBRN materials; • increased focus on high-risk CBRN sources. 
5.3. The EU added value 
Terrorism is international in character and the EU has shared borders, allowing terrorists to 
move freely within the EU. The cooperation proposed by the preferred policy option ranges 
from the exchange of experiences and good pract ices in some actions to the exchange of 
information and intelligence with operational si gnificance in others. Th ese actions could all 
help reinforce channels for bilateral and multilateral coopera tion between Member States.  
5.3.1.  Expected take-up among relevant stakeholders 
The expected take-up among relevant stakeholders  is very high, due to the fact that all the 
actors that are to implement the Action Plan pa rticipated actively in its development in the 
course of the wide EU consultation, in  particular in the CBRN Task Force . 
Such an approach has ensured that all releva nt stakeholders have ownership of the actions  to 
be implemented. In order to ensure maximum take -up, the intention is to continue to build on 
the community established by the CBRN Task Force . 
5.3.2.  Holistic / framework approach at EU level 
The purpose of the preferred po licy option is to create an  initial horizontal framework  as the 
starting point for targeted initiatives in the fu ture. The choice of inst rument (133 actions) is 
the result of a 1½ year period of consultation  with experts from the Member States, 
Commission services, academia and industry. 
An additional advantage of the single approach chosen is that it allows for synergies to be 
identified . Many of the actions identified as necessary  by the experts are applicable to all the 
 
EN 9   EN different materials covered — this means that similarities in methodology  can be used to take 
certain actions forward and increase efficiency.