COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
C0M(91) 334 final 
Brussels, 9 September 1991 
Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) 
collecting definitively the provisional countervailing duty 
on Imports of polyester fibres and polyester 
yarns originating In Turkey 
(presented by the Commission) 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1432/91 Imposed a provisional 
countervailing duty on Imports of polyester fibres and polyester yarns 
originating In Turkey. 
2. The Government of Turkey has offered an undertaking which the 
Commission considered acceptable. 
3. Examination of the facts finally established has shown that imports of 
the subsidized Turkish products have caused material Injury to the 
Community industry. 
4. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 12 (2) of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2423/88, the Commission Is putting before the Council a draft 
Regulation collecting definitively the provisional countervailing duty 
imposed on the above-mentioned products at the level of the net 
countervailing duty established. 
5. The Advisory Committee has been consulted on this proposal and no 
negative comments have been received. 
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Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No. /91 
Of 1991 
collecting definitively the provisional countervailing duty 
on imports of polyester fibres and polyester 
yarns originating In Turkey 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on 
protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Economic Commun Ity<1), and in particular Article 
12 thereof, 
Having regard to the Additional Protocol<2) to the Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey, and In particular Article 46 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission after 
consultation within the Advisory Committee as provided for under the 
above Régulât Ion, 
(1) OJ No L209, 2.8.1988, p.1 
(2) OJ No L 293, 29.12.1972, p.4. 
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Whereas : 
A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE 
1. The Commission, by Regulation (EEC) No 1432/91<2> (hereinafter 
referred to as the Commission Regulation) Imposed a provisional 
countervailing duty on Imports of polyester fibres and polyester 
yarns originating In Turkey. 
2. Following the Imposition of the provisional countervailing duty, the 
Turkish Government, three exporters and one importer made written 
submissions making known their views on the findings. The Turkish 
Government and one exporter who so requested were granted an 
opportunity to be heard by the Commission. 
3. The oral and written submissions and comments of the parties were 
considered and, where appropriate, the Commission's findings were 
modified to take account of them. 
B. LENGTH OF PROCEEDING 
4. The initiation of this proceeding was announced in a notice published 
in the Official Journal of 09.02.89. The Investigation of subsidies 
covered the period 1 July 1987 to 31 December 1988. The investigation 
exceeded the normal time period because of the volume and complexity 
of the data initially gathered and examined. 
(2) OJ No L137, 31.5.91, p.8 
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The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter argued that the 
Commission has exceeded a reasonable period to finalize this 
proceeding and that some data was therefore out of date. 
In this regard the Council has noted that for a considerable period 
of time before the imposition of countervailing duties, the 
Commission had, in vain, discussed with the Turkish authorities the 
possibility of an undertaking. 
The Council confirmed the explanation of the Commission as outlined 
In Recital 6 of the Commission Regulation. 
C. SUBSIDIZATION 
5. The Council considered in this specific case whether it would be 
appropriate to countervail subsidy schemes which were abolished after 
the Investigation period. 
The Council, taking Into account evidence supplied by the Turkish 
Government and being convinced that no further benefits will accrue 
after the abolition of these subsidy schemes and In the understanding 
of the non re-introductIon of these subsidies, considered it 
unnecessary to Impose countervailing duties against such schemes. 
Specific schemes 
6. The Commission Identified eleven subsidy schemes, of which a number 
were considered counterva 11 able. 
Specific arguments were made on the following schemes by the Turkish 
Government and the Turkish exporters. 
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Corporate tax exemption 
7. The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter did not challenge the 
fact that this subsidy is contingent upon export performance, but 
contested the basis on which the Commission had calculated the level 
of counterva I lab 11Ity of this scheme. The Turkish Government 
proposed to use as a basis the exemption rate (14 %) which will apply 
to export earnings In 1992, but will not come Into effect until 1993. 
The corporate tax exemption scheme exempted from corporate taxation 
20% of the export earnings of manufacturing companies In 1989 and 18% 
of export earnings In 1990. This percentage has been lowered to 16 X 
In 1991, but It will not come Into effect until 1992. The Turkish 
Government has further reduced the exemption rate to 14 X of export 
earnings In 1992, which will come Into effect in 1993. The Commission 
considered that, as the present cost to the Turkish Government and 
the benefit to the companies concerned was based on the companies 
1990 export earnings, the 18X exemption rate which is applicable In 
1991, should form the basis for calculating the level of 
counterval IablIIty of this scheme. It would not be justified at this 
stage to anticipate a further reduction In the cost and benefit of 
this scheme in future years. The Council confirmed this finding. 
Low Interest credit for Investment purposes 
8. The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter have stated that this 
scheme was abolished In January 1990. As adequate proof was given 
and considered acceptable by the Council, this scheme was considered 
to be no longer countervail able. 
Incentive premium 
9. The Turkish Government and one exporter have stated that this scheme 
was abolished in November 1989. Leaving aside the fact that the 
Commission had not been informed of this fact when Imposing 
provisional countervailing duties, the actual benefit accruing to the 
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companies which availed of this scheme was negligible and therefore 
did not and will not have any effect on the duties. The Council did 
not take Into account the benefits of this scheme. 
Investment Incentive a Ilowance 
10 The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter alleged that the 
Commission used for this scheme, as well as for the customs 
exemption, a depreciation period which was not representative of the 
normal depreciation period in Turkey. They claimed that the normal 
depreciation period in Turkey is from 8 to 10 years, with companies 
free to choose their own period. 
11 In this respect the Commission based its findings on Information 
obtained during the verification visits which showed the normal 
depreciation period in the industry concerned to be four years. 
12 In addition, one Turkish exporter noted that if the benefit from this 
scheme was calculated on the basis of polyester fibre and yarn 
Investments only, rather than on all Investments, a lower subsidy 
amount would accrue to them. The exporter was unable to quantify 
satisfactorily the amount of subsidy relating solely to Investments 
in polyester fibre and yarns and therefore the Commission's 
calculations have been based on the only reliable evidence provided 
by the company concerned, I.e. on all Its investments benefiting from 
this scheme. 
In these circumstances, the Council confirmed all methods of the 
Commission's basis of calculating the countervaiI able amount of 
subsidy for this scheme. 
customs exemption 
13 The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter have stated that the 
customs duty rate on which exemption is claimed was reduced from 30 X 
to 5 X in November 1989. Satisfactory evidence has been provided to 
that effect. The Council has taken account of this fact In 
calculating the countervaiI able amount of this subsidy. 
Other schemes 
14 The Council confirmed the Commission's findings not to take measures 
against the Resource Utilisation Support Fund (Recital 9 of 
Commission Regulation), the Rebate of Indirect Taxes (Recitals 10 and 
11), because these two schemes ended before the end of the 
Investigation period; against the Support and Price Stabilisation 
Fund (Recital 17) because the products Involved are not eligible for 
payments from this Fund and against the Low Interest Credit for 
Operational Phase (Recital 29), because its benefits were negligible. 
p. SPECIFICITY 
15 The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter have further advanced 
the argument that domestic subsidies can only be countervaiI able if 
they have been provided in a specific manner to the benefiting 
industry. The Turkish Government claimed the domestic subsidies 
which the Commission has found countervaiI able are, however all 
granted under generally available incentive schemes. 
16 The Council noted the way domestic subsidies are granted in Turkey. 
A company must obtain an Incentive certificate from the State 
Planning Organisation (S.P.O.). To assist this decision, the S.P.O. 
has established a list of non-eligible Industries for domestic 
Incentive schemes. In addition the S.P.O. carries out on a case-by-
case basis, an analysis of each investment application which Is 
normally accompanied by a so-called feasibility study, and decides 
subsequently whether and if a company obtains one or any of the 
subsidies under the domestic schemes described. 
Under these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that the 
allocation of the subsidies In question was not carried out In 
accordance with neutral and objective criteria. 
The Commission requested the Turkish authorities to submit conclusive 
evidence as to the general availability of the subsidies In question, 
which however was not supplied. 
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Under these circumstances, the Council shares the Commission's 
conviction that the Turkish system does not entitle the applying 
companies to obtain automatically the subsidies they claim once the 
crIter la are met. 
17 The consequence of these arguments is that the Council cannot accept 
the allegations that these schemes are generally available. 
Consequently the Council considered these schemes to be specifically 
granted. 
18 In addition, even those domestic subsidies which were allocated 
according to the state of development of the region In which the 
benefiting company was located, were found to have been granted 
specifically and In all cases, In the most developed regions of 
Turkey. 
19 Therefore it was clear that there was no effective general 
availability of these subsidies between companies, nor between 
regions where differing eligible percentages have been established 
according to the state of development of the region. The Council 
considered them countervaiI able. 
E. TOTAL AMOUNT OF SUBSIDIES 
20 The total amounts of countervaiI able subsidies determined by the 
Council are as follows : 
SASA 9.99 X 
SONMEZ FILAMENT 9.13 X 
SONMEZ ASF 9.35 X 
SI FAS 9.39 X 
POLYLEN 8.79 X 
POLYTEKS 10.16 X 
The Individual amounts of countervaiI able subsidies found by scheme 
have been notified to each of the companies concerned. For reasons of 
confidentiality they are not published here. 
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F. INJURY 
21 In Its provisional Regulation, the Commission found that four 
products were concerned by these proceedings and that the Community 
Industry was manufacturing like products. As far as the assessment 
of the effect of the subsidized imports was concerned, it was however 
argued that the polyester fibres and yarns exported by the Turkish 
companies and those of the Community producers were not similar 
products since they were of different qualities. These Imports could, 
therefore, not have caused material Injury on the Community 
production of like products. The Commission did not accept these 
arguments in its Regulation since these differences In quality 
between Turkish and Community products, if any, were so minor, that 
no clear product distinction between them could be made. This 
conclusion was further supported by the similarity of the end uses of 
these products. 
22 The Council confirmed that in this case the basic physical 
characteristics of the exported and Community-produced products and 
their uses were Identical. In addition, the end users are the same 
and the only decisive element of distinction between the imported and 
the Community-produced products are the prices. These prices are, 
however, largely Influenced by the subsidization by the Turkish 
Government. In these circumstances, there Is no clear and decisive 
element of distinction between these products. 
23 The Council confirms therefore the Commission findings that the 
Community production has to be considered as like to the Imported 
subsidized products. 
24 In Its provisional findings, the Commission concluded that the 
Community fibres and yarn Industry had experienced material Injury 
due to the subsidized imports from Turkey. 
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25 These Injury findings were based mainly on the following facts : 
As far as the volume of the subsidized Imports was concerned, the 
Commission established In Its Regulation that Imports of yarn 
Increased from 233 T in 1984 to 13.315 T In 1988; an increase in 
market share from 0 X to 5 X, and that that of fibres fluctuated 
around 4 X and was 3.3 X In 1988. In this respect, it has to be 
recalled that in June 1988, provisional antidumping duties were 
Imposed^3), on the imports of most of the products concerned which 
probably had effects on the import volumes. No comments were 
submitted in this respect. 
26 The market share of the Community industry decreased for fibres from 
79 X in 1984 to 75 X in 1988 and for yarns from 81 X In 1984 to 69.8 
X In 1988. As far as prices were concerned between 1985 and the 
investigation period, considerable price depressions from 5 X for 
textured yarn, 12 X for polyester filament yarn, 20 X for fibre and 
26 X for POY were established. 
In addition, it was found that the majority of the Community industry 
suffered heavy losses in 1988, in some Instances up to 26 X for 
fibres and 15 X for yarns. 
27 The Council confirms therefore the findings of the Commission as 
given in recitals 50 to 53 of Its Regulation. 
28 The Commission has further established that during the Investigation 
period the prices In the Community of Turkish Imported products were 
on average lower than the corresponding prices of the Community 
manufactured like products by the following percentages : for fibres 
18 to 22 X; for Turkish polyster filament yarn : 65 X; for Turkish 
POY : 30 X, and for Turkish textured yarn between 25 to 43 X . 
(3) Provisional duty : O.J. no L 151, 17.06.1988, p. 39 and 47 
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29 In this respect, the Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter 
argued that the price undercutting margins were not correct, since no 
adjustments of the Turkish prices have been made in order to take 
account of the alleged differences In physical characteristics 
between the Turkish and the Community products. However, no effect 
on prices of these alleged differences was proven to the satisfaction 
of the Commission, neither by the Turkish Government nor by the 
exporter concerned. Accordingly, this claim was rejected. 
30 In addition, it has to be recalled that, even if the alleged 
differences were to have a certain effect on the prices and thus on 
the price comparability of the products, this effect would never be 
such as to compensate for the huge undercutting margins established 
and verified by the Commission. The Council therefore confirmed the 
price-undercutting analysis of the Commission. 
Conclusion 
31 in the light of the Commission's finding as shown In recital 53 of 
its Regulation and the above-mentioned considerations, the Council 
confirmed that the Turkish exporters had considerably Increased their 
market presence, reverted to price undercutting and that Community 
industry Is suffering material injury. 
G.CAUSALITY 
32 As already shown In recital 54 of the Commission Regulation, the 
markets concerned were highly price-sensitive and transparent. The 
huge price undercutting of the Turkish exports, which to a large 
extent was covered by the substantial subsidy margin, had thus 
clearly an effect on the prices of the Community industry. 
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In this respect, the Turkish Government alleged that with a small 
market share, the Turkish exports could not have an Injurious effect 
on the prices of the Community Industry. However, In this particular 
market, where only a relatively limited number of suppliers exist and 
the price situation Is transparent, low prices charged by exporters 
which have only a relatively small market share can nevertheless have 
a considerably detrimental effect on the general price level, and 
force the Community producers to align their prices to these low-
priced imports at the expense of their profitability. 
33 It was further argued that the price depression, which as such is not 
contested, was mainly caused by falling raw material costs. The 
Council was however of the opinion, that while falling raw material 
prices may have had a decreasing effect on prices, this does not 
explain the fact that the Community Industry was prevented from 
selling at profitable prices. Thus, the price undercutting by the 
subsidized Imports increased the price depressing effect, and forced 
the prices down beyond the normal price development due to cost 
reductIons. 
34 The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter argued that the 
material Injury of the Community Industry had been caused by other 
factors, either by the dumped imports from several countries against 
which ant I-dumping duties are in force, or by low prices of fairly 
priced Imports. 
In this respect, the Council was aware that it had Imposed anti­
dumping duties on imports of three of the investigated products from 
several countries. These measures were supposed to eliminate the 
injury caused by the dumping of these exports. However, apart from 
the fact that the findings In the ant I-dumping cases related to a 
different reference period, the ant I-dumping duties were for most 
Turkish companies and most products based on the dumping margins 
found for Turkey and did not completely eliminate Injury. 
Consequently, the subsidization of Imports had an additional 
injurious impact on the Community industry, which has not been 
eliminated by these anti-dumping measures. 
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Indeed, Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 does not foresee 
that Injury can only be established if subsidization Is the only, or 
the principal cause of the overall injury suffered by an Industry. 
Therefore, Injury caused by subsidization may Justify protective 
measures, even if it Is only a part of a larger Injury due also to 
other factors. In this particular case, the Investigation has indeed 
shown that in spite of the ant I-dumping measures taken the situation 
of the Community Industry is still precarious and that, thus, the 
measures against dumped Imports have not fully remedied the injury 
caused by unfair pricing. 
35 It was further claimed by the Turkish authorities that the 
difficulties encountered by the Community industry were predominantly 
caused by fundamental structural problems. 
36 The Council acknowledged that the Community industry had suffered 
major economic problems In the past. To overcome these problems, the 
Community producers had taken a number of restructuring measures, 
which had Improved their performance. This restructuring of the 
Community Industry has however now been jeopardized by unfair and 
injurious pricing from different imports by a number of countries, as 
evidenced by the profitability figures set out in recital 52 of the 
Commission Regulation. The Council considered it therefore Incorrect 
to blame structural problems for the Injury actually caused by unfair 
pricing. 
37 The Turkish Government argued further, that as the effect of dumped 
Imports from Turkey were considered together with those of dumped 
Imports from five other countries in assessing Injury in these anti­
dumping cases, the Council would - a contrario - not have the 
possibility in this anti-subsidies case to determine whether the 
subsidized imports from Turkey have caused injury. 
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38 However, for the reasons given in recitals 56 - 58 of the Commission 
Regulation and In view of the considerations above, the Council 
confirms that the subsidized Turkish Imports have caused material 
injury to the Community Industry. 
H.COMMUNITY INTEREST 
39 The Commission has stated In recitals 59 to 63 of its Regulation the 
reasons why the interest of the Community called for Intervention to 
prevent Injury during the proceeding. The Council considered these 
reasons to be val id. 
One Turkish exporter and the Turkish Government argued, however, 
that duties would prevent price competition on the Community market, 
which would not be In the Community interest. 
40 In this respect, the Council recalls that countervailing duties are 
Intended to re-establish a fair competitive situation and that it Is 
therefore necessary to eliminate the effect of the subsidy on the 
imports, resulting in the Community industry being further exposed 
to fair competition, also from exports by the Turkish companies, on 
the Community market. Therefore, the Council confirmed the 
Commission findings concerning the Community interest. 
I. THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TQ THE EEC - TURKEY ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
41 The Turkish Government contended that the Commission did not use the 
appropriate Instrument against the Turkish subsidy schemes by 
Imposing duties under Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, as special rules 
exist under the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement of 23 November 1970. 
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42 Article 43 (2) of this Additional Protocol, which allows Turkey to be 
considered as being in a situation specified In Article 92 (3) (a) of 
the EEC Treaty, considers such aid compatible with the proper 
functioning of the Association only If it does not alter the 
conditions of trade to an extent Inconsistent with the mutual 
interest of the contracting parties. 
The Turkish Government was of the opinion that hence it was entitled 
under Article 43 (2) to grant these subsidies. 
43 The Council considered however that the Commission has correctly 
assessed its findings on injury and causality and it further 
confirmed that by the subsidization of the Turkish Imports, the 
conditions of trade have been altered In a manner which is 
Inconsistent with the mutual Interest of the contracting parties. 
44 The Community has, in accordance with Article 45 of the Additional 
Protocol, further submitted to the Association Council for Its 
approval, the countervailing duties which the Community intends to 
collect definitively on Imports of fibres and yarns from Turkey. In 
the absence however of any decision, under Article 45 by the 
Association Council, the Community is further allowed under Article 
46 of the Additional Protocol to take safeguard measures which it 
feels appropriate In order to overcome difficulties due to this 
absence of a decision of the Association Council. 
J. GATT - SUBSIDIES COPE - DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
45 The Turkish Government alleged further that, contrary to recitals 36 
and 37 of the Commission Regulation, the requirements of Article 14 
of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, 
XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Subsidies Code) had been violated. 
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46 Concerning domestic subsidies, the special provisions for developing 
countries (Art. 14 Subsidies Code) however do not restrict the 
possibility for another signatory to apply Its countervaiIing-duty 
laws, in case subsidized exports from a developing country cause 
material Injury to Its domestic industry (Article 14 (7) GATT 
Subsidies Code). 
In addition, insofar as export subsidies are concerned, the Council 
has noted in this respect that Turkey has entered into a commitment 
vis-a-vis the signatories of the GATT Subsidies Code (Article 14 (5) 
and (6) refers)to phase out Its export subsidies at the end of 1989. 
Turkey has not respected this commitment. 
47 The Council considered that the Community is entitled under the 
Subsidies Code to apply countervailing duties. 
K.INJURY THRESHOLD 
48 The Commission has calculated the amount of the duty, necessary to 
remove the Injury by comparing, for each of the four products, the 
prices of the Turkish products in the Community during the 
Investigation period with a target price of the Community industry 
calculated on the average production costs for each product of 
representative Community producers plus a reasonable profit margin (6 
X for fibre and 7 X for yarns). The differences between these two 
prices were considered to constitute the amount by which the prices 
of the Turkish products should be increased at the Community frontier 
in order to remove the Injury caused by the subsidized Imports. 
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The Turkish Government and one Turkish exporter considered that, In 
calculating the injury threshold, a profit margin of 3 X is a more 
realistic margin to apply to Community producers. No basis has been 
provided, however, to justify applying a 3 X profit margin. The 
Council noted that the Commission established the profit margin on 
the basis of the average profit margin of Community producers in 1985 
and 1986 since for most of that period the Injurious impact on 
Community producers of unfairly priced third country imports was 
st111 moderate. 
In these circumstances, the Council confirmed the basis of selecting 
the level of profit margin used in this Instance and thus the 
findings of the Commission under Recitals 64 and 65 of the Commission 
Regulation. 
L. UNDERTAKING 
49 Following the parties being informed of the essential facts and 
considerations on the basis of which It was intended to recommend the 
imposition of definitive duties and the definitive collection of 
amounts secured by way of a provisional duty, the Government of 
Turkey offered an undertaking which Is considered to be acceptable. 
The effect of this undertaking will be to phase out the most 
important export-subsidy (the Corporate Tax Exemption) which will 
remedy the material injury caused by the Turkish subsidies. 
After consultation with the Advisory Committee, this undertaking was 
accepted by Commission Decision 91/.../EEC^3*. The Council has 
further noted that the investigation in this case has been 
terminated. 
(3) See page ... of this Official Journal. 
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50 Since part of these rates of definitive countervailing duties would 
have been suspended In view of the ant I-dumping duties imposed by 
Regulations (EEC) No 3905/88<1> and 3946/99<2>, only net definitive 
countervailing duties would have been Imposed as listed in Article 1 
of this Regulation. 
M. CUMULATION OF ANT I-DUMPING DUTIES 
AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
51 The Commission has set out in recitals 67 to 70 of the Commission 
Regulation, the question as to whether ant I-dumping duties and 
countervailing duties can be cumulated in accordance with Article 13 
(9) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 and Article VI (5) of the GATT. 
52 The Council accepted the Commission reasoning as set out In Recitals 
67 to 70 of the Commission Regulation and it confirmed that Art. 13 
(9) does not preclude that countervailing duties are Imposed in 
addition to ant I-dumping duties against the domestic subsidies found, 
as well as against export subsidies which cannot have influenced the 
anti-dumping duty since the companies concerned first availed of them 
after the anti-dumping duties were Imposed. 
53 While the ant I-dumping duties are in force, that part of the 
countervailing duty which corresponds to the export subsidies which 
will have influenced the dumping margin, should only be Imposed to 
the extent that It exceeds the ant I-dumping duty. 
(1) OJ No L 347, 16.12.1988, p. 10. 
(2) OJ No L 348, 17.12.1988, p. 49. 
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N. COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTIES 
54 in view of the subsidy level definitively established as mentioned 
above and the seriousness of the Injury caused to the Community 
Industry, the Council considered it necessary that amounts collected 
by way of provisional countervailing duties should be definitively 
collected at the level of the net countervailing duty established 
(Article 1 of this Regulation). 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION : 
Article 1 
The amounts collected or secured by way of provisional countervailing 
duty pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 1432/91 shall be collected at the 
following rates of duty. 
(i) Polyester staple fibres - 3.19X 
(TARIC additional code: 8527) 
For the company hereunder, the following rate shall apply: 
Sonmez Filament - 0.58X 
(TARIC additional code: 8526) 
(ii) Polyester textured filament yarn - 1.98X 
(TARIC additional code: 8532) 
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For the companies hereunder, the following rates shall apply: 
SASA - 1.31% 
(TARIC additional code: 8531) 
Sonmez Filament - 0.58X 
(TARIC additional code: 8530) 
Sonmez ASF - 0.58X 
(TARIC additional code: 8529) 
Pôlyteks - 1.48X 
(TARIC additional code: 8528) 
(ill) Polyester filament yarn - 9.99X 
(TARIC additional code: 8534) 
The following company is exempted from this rate: 
Sonmez Filament 
(TARIC additional code: 8533) 
(iv) Partially Oriented Polyester Yarn (POY) - 7.29X 
(TARIC additional code: 8536) 
The following company is exempted from this rate: 
Sonmez ASF 
(TARIC additional code: 8535) 
Amounts provisionally collected or secured which are not covered by the 
above rates shall be released. 
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Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following Its 
publication In the Official Journal of the European Communities 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable 
in a 11 Member States. 
Done at Brussels, September 1991 For the Council, 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(91) 334 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 02 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-91-385-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-75625-X 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
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