Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "Relations between the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean"

(2002/C 94/10)

On 28 February and 1 March 2001 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the third paragraph of Rule 23 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on "Relations between the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean".

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 28 January 2002. The rapporteur was Mr Gafo Fernández.

At its 388th Plenary Session of 20 and 21 February 2002 (meeting of 21 February), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 92 votes to 2 with no abstentions.

1. Introduction: historical background

1.1. Relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean began with the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. They were initially conceived on a predominantly economic, bilateral basis, focusing on trade issues with each Latin American and Caribbean country individually. These early stages were not easy.

1.2. Between 1970 and the early 1990s Europe - meaning the European Union - was preoccupied with digesting its three successive enlargements, which doubled the number of member countries, injected major cultural and economic differences and began to put pressure on the Community's institutions, which had initially been geared to a small number of far more homogeneous countries. Moreover, the energy shocks of 1973 and 1979 forced a process of radical industrial restructuring upon Europe: the massive upsurge in unemployment had to be met with a highly supportive system of social protection which had not originally been designed for such high unemployment levels. As a result, Europe was more inward than outward looking during these years.

1.3. There were however a number of signs of forthcoming change. The first was the signature of the Lomé Convention with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which established a solidarity-based mechanism which, although centred on economic aspects, did comprise an embryonic social dimension. Similarly, the individual EU Member States began to set up trade and cooperation arrangements with a wide range of Latin American and Caribbean nations, boosting Europe's presence in the region - albeit in a piecemeal manner. All these factors resulted in the European Union beginning to shape an outline strategy towards Latin America and the Caribbean, revolving around three core aspects: development cooperation as a key element, together with a number of trade benefits via the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), and a degree of sub-regional harmonisation in the way such action was viewed. Similarly, from 1984 onwards regular official relations began to be forged with the countries of Central America - the "San José dialogue" - and with the Rio Group since 1990, in the wake of the "Rome Declaration". The European Union is beginning to see Latin America and the Caribbean as a potential economic and political partner in a globalised world.

1.4. On the Latin American and Caribbean side, under the economic approach of the 1970s, based on an autarkic import substitution policy, Europe tended to be seen as historically familiar, but economically and politically distant. Next came the "lost decade" of the 1980s, in which the failure of the previous macroeconomic policy coincided with a strong rise in the cost of money. This, together with very high external public debt levels throughout the region in proportion to export income, resulted in international payments moratoria which denied the region access to new public or private funding. At the same time many Latin American and Caribbean countries became locked into a vicious circle of authoritarian rule, civil unrest and, in many cases, the emergence of guerrilla movements. The outcome was a complete breakdown of democratic coexistence, with no opportunity to open a social dialogue which might find some way out of the situation.

1.5. The picture altered radically in the early 1990s. Firstly, Portugal and Spain's entry into the EU in 1986 increased European political awareness of the region. Secondly, the Treaty of Asunción, which set up the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), opened up new prospects for the creation of regional integration machinery which could indirectly reinvigorate similar blocs already in existence - at least on paper - such as the Andean Pact or the Central American Common Market. Thirdly, the success of Argentina's convertibility plan, together with Chile's earlier experiment in liberalisation, shifted the emphasis to macroeconomic stability and opening up to the private sector key areas of the economy, previously reserved exclusively for the public sector. This new economic approach generated major opportunities for European businesses, principally because macroeconomic discipline and economic liberalisation policies were catching on across the region. Fourthly, and of particular importance from the human and social point of view, the consolidation - or return - of democracy in numerous countries and the peace agreements reached with many guerrilla movements marked the end of decades of insurrection and latent civil war. Latin America and the Caribbean, having come to terms with themselves, created an atmosphere in which they could open up to the rest of the world.

1.6. These developments, in which the two sides grew closer together, culminated in the first summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999. A final declaration was adopted establishing a partnership between the two regions, and an action plan was formulated to flesh out this partnership. The action plan is to be reviewed at the second summit to be held in Madrid, in conjunction with the Spanish EU presidency in the first half of 2002. The partnership is based upon the following:

i) greater political dialogue;

ii) sound economic and financial relations based on a comprehensive and balanced liberalisation of trade and capital flows;

iii) dynamic cooperation in key sectors, especially in the educational, social and cultural fields and in scientific and technological development.

1.7. The fact that civil society was associated with the process was a particularly important factor in the success of the Rio summit. The meeting of civil society representatives from the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean, held under ESC auspices in Rio, allowed the views and concerns of civil society to be heard in the course of the summit of Heads of State and Government, and to be adequately reflected in the final declaration. The ESC's own-initiative opinion on relations between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: socio-economic interregional dialogue figured prominently in the discussions held as part of the civil society forum.

1.8. Eleven key priorities, which had been considered in previous years, were subsequently identified at Tuusula during the Finnish EU presidency, leading to expenditure of EUR 1,092 million between 1995 and 1999. No details have been published on the follow-up to the action plan, other than the report in the Commission's Communication on the Follow-up to the First Summit(1), that a bi-regional group of high officials and involving ministerial meetings has been set up. Two such meetings have been held: one in Vilamoura in February 2000 and another in Santiago de Chile in March 2001. Subsequent accounts, especially in the light of the Santiago resolutions, reveal a lack of vigour in pursuing the deeper relations called for in the Rio action plan.

1.9. In its communication, the Commission defined three priority areas for action in preparation for the Madrid summit:

- promotion and protection of human rights;

- promotion of the information society;

- reduction of social imbalances.

The aim in each case is to draw up main conclusions for discussion at the summit, to be held in Spain in 2002.

1.9.1. The Commission document made a number of proposals for action in the first priority area, to include social, economic and political rights, and the establishment of an EU-Latin America/Caribbean discussion forum for this purpose.

1.9.2. In the second area (information society), a proposal was made to introduce a Community programme called @LIS(2), addressed exclusively to the Latin American countries (but not signatories to the Cotonou Agreement), with three aims:

- to stimulate dialogue between governments, institutions, the private sector and users;

- to increase the interconnection capacity between research communities in the two regions;

- to implement the applications produced by demonstration projects in areas such as local governance, distance learning, education, cultural diversity, public health and social integration.

This programme was recently adopted by the European Commission, with a budget of EUR 63 million.

1.9.3. The European Union's action to reduce social imbalances is channelled in two directions:

i) firstly, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme, which seeks coordinated reductions by creditor countries of the high level of external debt of the countries concerned, as this puts a complete brake on their development;

ii) secondly, the "Social Initiative", focusing on updating cooperation action and making it more efficient, allowing experience and best practice to be pooled in order to reduce social imbalances and assist the most vulnerable groups in these countries.

1.10. The decision taken at the beginning of 2001 under the Everything But Arms agreement also confirms that the EU is serious about continuing to open its borders to the least developed countries. However, this by no means goes far enough. A greater impact could have been achieved by allowing access for processed agricultural products. In any case, less than 80 % of trade concessions for developing countries in the form of tariff-free import quotas for unprocessed agricultural products have been used in the past few years (OECD and WTO figures). This puts the EBA agreement somewhat in perspective. The reasons that opportunities for exporting to the EU have not been taken up lie mainly in the ever more rigorous EU food safety requirements. The EU has nevertheless taken concrete steps in the framework of the WTO negotiations to strengthen the negotiating position of developing countries in the WTO. Private sector investment in South America is at the moment also many times greater than government assistance.

1.11. No review of the historical background to relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean would be complete without mentioning five topical issues: (i) recent political and economic developments in the Latin American and Caribbean countries; (ii) the present state of the Enterprise for the Americas initiative and its key element, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); (iii) the related North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (iv) relations between Latin America and the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) countries; and (v) the prospects for relaunching the WTO ministerial conference and the collective role of Latin America and the Caribbean in this regard.

1.12. Circumstances within the Latin American countries, and by extension within the regional integration movements, can only be described as critical. Following a lengthy period of democratic consolidation and growing cooperation between countries, the 1997 Asian economic crisis - which has since spread far around the world - has undermined much of the progress achieved. Populist governments have emerged in some countries, in others elections have been held against a backdrop of acute political and social uncertainty, military confrontations - thankfully brief - have flared up between neighbouring countries. More broadly, social tensions have been exacerbated, or progress to ending armed conflicts in certain countries has become bogged down. Moreover, many countries are struggling with very heavy external debt burdens, dampening their prospects for economic recovery or imposing extremely severe external adjustment programmes. On top of this, Central America has been hit by a series of natural disasters which have wiped out ten years' of economic progress. This has been reflected regional integration terms in the enormous problems facing Mercosur, the slow-down in Central American integration and the recent lack of enthusiasm in pursuing Andean integration. Only the Caribbean countries seem to have escaped this picture of decline in recent years, even though high levels of poverty persist. Latin America and the Caribbean can therefore be described as having reached a milestone in their history: the European Union can play a key role in guiding them towards greater democratisation, growth and further progress with the social improvements launched in the 1990s.

1.13. The development of pan-American relations, the most important aspect of which is the "Enterprise for the Americas" initiative launched in 1994 by the then President Bill Clinton, has been given a major boost in recent months, following the entry into office of President Bush, as demonstrated at the Quebec Summit in March 2001. The most significant result of the initiative is probably the draft FTAA Agreement which, according to the Declaration of Quebec City, should be implemented by 2006 at the latest. It should be noted that the technical work has made remarkable progress since the Miami Summit in 1994 and that, although considerable political suspicion remains - most overtly in Brazil - that a pan-American agreement may make sub-regional integration efforts redundant, the significant political boost given in Quebec, and by the recent adoption by the US Congress of the "presidential executive power" or so-called "fast track" procedure, is very real. The Americas initiative is unarguably political and economic in character, touching only indirectly upon social aspects.

1.14. The recent adoption of the US dollar by a number of Latin American countries (Ecuador and El Salvador, together with Panama, which has used the dollar since gaining national independence at the beginning of the 20th century), along with the dollar's status as a reference currency in Argentina's fixed convertibility system (currency board), means that the dollar is taking on a predominant role in economic relations, punching far above its weight in trade and investment terms. It also means that countries opting for dollarisation are rejecting autonomous-type monetary policy.

1.15. Experience with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may give some indication of the impact of a future FTAA on the region's relations with the European Union: in spite of all the transitional periods and safeguards built into NAFTA, its introduction in 1994 immediately triggered a massive dislocation of trade affecting both EU exports to Mexico (replaced with direct imports or from third countries via the US and Canada) and, less spectacularly but inexorably, European exports to the US and Canada, substituted by the upsurge in labour-intensive manufacturing in Mexico, through the so-called "maquiladora plants" (foreign-owned assembly plants). The signing of the free trade agreement with Mexico, which came into force in 2000, has restored the former state of affairs.

1.16. Prior to the 1997 crisis, many American countries along the Pacific seaboard were fascinated by the economic development model offered by numerous Asian countries. The traumatic experience of the 1997 crash, however, which highlighted the model's economic weaknesses, combined with a total lack of social awareness as understood in western culture, has severely tarnished this model's attractiveness. This is not to say that in the medium term, economic links with the relevant parts of Asia and Oceania may not be reactivated, although not to the extent which seemed likely until 1997.

1.17. The failure of the WTO's Seattle ministerial conference in 1999 brought a two-fold revolt into the limelight: firstly, the small and medium-sized countries in wealth terms, who were not prepared to see a replay of imposed liberalisation timetables and measures, as happened at the Marrakech ministerial conference, and secondly, the emerging civil society platform which, although mixed with corporative interests, called upon political leaders to give greater heed to the reasonable demands of society and make the negotiating process more transparent.

1.18. Civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean clearly lacks an organisational foundation at the present time able to guarantee its place within democratic society and its effectiveness, something which the European Union can help to consolidate. However, the general thrust of the EU's post-Rio strategy is in this direction, and it is to be hoped that civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean will assume a much more active role in the near future. Government positions are underpinned by two central concerns: not to erode the comparative advantages currently enjoyed by many countries under the GSP and GSP-Drugs arrangements, and to launch of a global negotiating round covering all sectors, especially agriculture. Moreover, in a number of cases - again, Brazil in particular - the effect of a multilateral trade liberalisation policy in watering down current regional integration processes is viewed with concern. There is no clear, public government position on the social and environmental aspects which accompany trade liberalisation, but some predict that these aspects could be used to bring about unbalanced protection favouring the markets of the more developed countries.

1.19. The historical background to the relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean might be summarised as follows:

1.19.1. Latin America and the Caribbean are at a turning-point in their political, economic and social development. They are confronted with the need to restate their commitment to democratic values and to combating poverty and social exclusion, to seek ways of reconciling models of sub-regional integration, of pan-American trade integration and of a trade and partnership structure with the European Union, and to fit all these possible models into the multilateral trade liberalisation process under the WTO.

1.19.2. For its part, the European Union must confirm that Latin America and the Caribbean represent a major priority within its global strategy and provide the corresponding resources, establish a genuine partnership with a major economic and commercial dimension but with social and cultural values as a fundamental element and, lastly, integrate this partnership into the broader framework of its relations with the trans-Atlantic dialogue, or with the process of multilateral trade liberalisation.

1.19.3. The European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean must understand that a strategic link between our regions, maximising our potential and minimising our weak points, represents an opportunity to boost our individual roles in the new world economic setting. Together, we will be stronger and less vulnerable.

2. Key elements in the partnership between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean

2.1. The partnership concept must govern all aspects of relations between the two regions. It must embrace concepts such as grassroots proximity, visibility and public acceptability. From this starting point, the partnership must rest upon the following principles:

2.2. A relationship of equals acknowledging the specific features of each country and region, while acknowledging that absolutely equivalent concessions by each side are not a pre-requisite for negotiations.

2.3. Sustainable development, aimed at achieving practical medium- and long-term results.

2.4. A far more ambitious approach than simply pooling production potential or opening up markets, to foster economic competitiveness in the two regions.

2.5. A foundation on organised civil society as a means of associating citizens in the common project. Both sides are considering the human (economic, social, cultural, political) rights of minorities, especially of the indigenous people, as a matter of real concern. After centuries of exclusion the time has come for reconciliation, inclusion and prosperity for all.

2.6. Mutual reinforcement of these regions' potential at world level, representing a contribution to a new, culturally and socially fairer world balance which respects different models of society.

2.7. The aim, while recognising the differences between regions and countries, of creating a real European and Latin American community of nations, which is democratic, socially just and has an efficient economy, which encompasses areas such as migration and culture, and in which civil society has a decisive part to play.

3. The strategic thrust of the EU's action on relations with Latin America and the Caribbean

3.1. General aspects

3.1.1. The first element is the need to have a well-defined, permanent strategy backed up with a practical and specific action plan and timetable, dispelling the aura of impermanence that has surrounded these relations over recent years.

3.1.2. The strategy must be based on the considerations of the Rio action plan, subsequently confirmed at Tuusula during the Finnish EU Presidency, but must be extended, as far as is possible, to other spheres.

3.1.3. It must be based on sub-regional strategies, tailoring the various political, trade and cooperation opportunities offered by the European Union to each specific case.

3.1.4. It must take constant account of the need to achieve sustainable development shared between the two regions, embodying the idea of balanced trade, together with an increasing input of environment-friendly European technologies under socially and economically viable conditions.

3.1.5. It must be based on sharing the core values of the European Union, especially the concept of the European social model, which combines free market aspects with social dialogue and public participation through civil society and is of more ambitious scope than simple trade agreements.

3.1.6. It should support sub-regional integration projects in Latin America in keeping with the EU model, insofar as these go further than the simple trade development which is the primary aim of the FTAA treaty.

3.1.6.1. It must involve strengthening state and public administration institutional structures and operating and monitoring machinery at all levels, and sufficient budgetary resources must be provided for it to be able to fulfil its important role in this process.

3.1.7. Each EU institution or body must play a specific role in building up this partnership. It is the task of the European Economic and Social Committee to offer the benefit of its experience to the creation or reinforcement of similar bodies - such as the Mercosur consultative forum - either already in existence or on the drawing-board, at sub-regional level and within the various individual countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is also vital for the economic and social partners of both regions to participate actively and be involved in pursuing this strategy.

3.1.8. The possibility of setting up a specific body for carrying forward these relations and implementing practical measures should be considered.

3.2. Relations with Mexico

3.2.1. In the economic sphere, the main thrust of the European Union's strategy must clearly be to develop the potential offered by the Free Trade Agreement to its full extent and adjust the Agreement to reflect any changes which may occur regarding either the various trade agreements which Mexico is carrying forward with Central America as a whole, or any modifications which signature of the FTAA treaty may entail for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

3.2.2. In the social sphere, the European Union can clearly help to establish a new framework of social dialogue for relations between workers and employers, in keeping with the domestic and international changes which the country has experienced in recent years.

3.2.3. Turning to civil society as a whole, approaches must be sought which suit Mexican circumstances, a feature of which is the simultaneous presence of large marginalised populations and problems in integrating a number of minorities. The EU, which also shares these problems to some degree, can in turn benefit from Mexico's experience in resolving them.

3.3. Relations with Central America and the Caribbean

3.3.1. From the economic point of view, the current cooperation arrangements must shed their primary focus on very small-scale actions, and shift to a regional strategic approach, implemented in cooperation with socio-economic players, fostering the growth of economically and environmentally sustainable activity, stepping up economic and trade links between the different countries and seeking the support of external regional initiatives, as in the case of the Puebla-Panama Plan.

3.3.2. In social terms, socio-occupational organisations must be given strong backing so that they can, firstly, provide socio-economic guidance to their governments in enabling the fundamental ILO conventions to be fully incorporated into their legislative frameworks and complied with, and secondly, strengthen societies which, especially in Central America, have been scarred by the climate of violence of recent decades, by launching a social dialogue.

3.3.3. Similarly, civil society operators in these countries need to be strengthened so that they can help consolidate a culture of democracy and basic human rights and guide the countries concerned onto a stable path towards economic growth and wealth distribution, alleviating the present high levels of poverty and social exclusion.

3.4. Relations with the countries of the Andean Community of Nations

3.4.1. In the economic sphere, the most obvious need is to seek formulas for macroeconomic stability and free market consolidation, avoiding populist economic approaches returning the region to the failed experiments of the 1970s. It is therefore essential to reinforce public institutions in such a way as to bring transparency to the way they work.

3.4.2. In the social sphere, workers' and employers' associations - many of which have a wealth of tradition - need to be supported and modernised in order to forestall either violence of any kind against their leaders and their families, or the emergence of spurious forms of participation out of keeping with the basic conventions of the ILO: this would stand in the way of a real social dialogue being consolidated. The EU should employ every means at its disposal to help bring an end to such violence and foster full compliance with the relevant international conventions.

3.4.3. Although the position regarding civil society as a whole is different in each of the region's five countries, it is clear that in order to guarantee its future, the climate of armed violence and the breakdown of traditional forms of public participation - or their absence in the first place - must be overcome. Only by organising citizens can the serious problems, which have been holding the entire region back for more than thirty years, be resolved.

3.5. Relations with Mercosur and Chile

3.5.1. In the economic sphere, it is clearly impossible to pursue regional integration schemes in a globalised world without coordinating the basic economic parameters. The most urgent task is therefore to support the Mercosur consolidation process regarding external tariff aspects, progress in building up an internal market, and work to devise a new macroeconomic policy framework capable of absorbing the asymmetric shocks of the last three years. This will also entail work to provide Mercosur with a broader institutional base. At the same time, it is vital to create legal and administrative conditions capable of sustaining the necessary flow of new and productive direct foreign investment.

3.5.2. There is a clear need at social level to involve the socio-occupational partners in the complex process of economic convergence. As part of this process, European businesses established in the region can play a leading role in generating a climate of social dialogue; in tandem with this, the Mercosur Consultative Forum has a crucial role to play at regional level, and employers' and workers' organisations at national level, in effectively consolidating the Mercosur system.

3.5.3. With regard to civil society, the Mercosur idea of course emerged from governing political circles and was accepted by the social partners, but was not properly communicated to the general public. As in Europe in the 1970s, this enthusiasm for a shared future must be communicated to the citizens of each of the countries involved, and this can only be done through society's constituent organisations.

4. The role of EU, Latin American and Caribbean civil society in this process

4.1. The historical background to relations between these regions has of course been dominated by politics, about which the public has not been adequately informed despite the unarguable benefits it has brought to all. As a result, citizens were not involved in the necessary effort and are unable to bring their points of view to bear through their representative bodies. Moreover, overall statistics are lacking in many areas, making it difficult to identify and analyse the impact of EU action on these countries.

4.2. The Economic and Social Committee consequently promoted the first meeting of representatives of civil society organisations in Rio de Janeiro, prior to the 1999 Summit of Heads of State and Government: it plans to repeat the experience between 17 and 19 April 2002, only weeks before the second summit, to be held in Madrid in May of this year.

4.3. An amount of preparatory work will be needed ahead of the second meeting of civil society representatives, to ensure that the discussions, and the conclusions to be submitted to the summit of Heads of State and Government (i) reflect majority public opinion and its priorities, and (ii) in particular, include a work programme for the future which guarantees that the meetings are more than occasional events and are held in accordance with the action plan accompanying the communication.

4.3.1. This should put these meetings on a more official footing, ahead of the summits of Heads of State and Government. Furthermore, it should lead to meetings' agendas reflecting both priority points identified by civil society and the socio-economic issues to be discussed at the summits.

4.4. The ESC therefore believes that the following actions should firstly be broached in information plans, in association with economic and social councils and similar institutions, and in the preparations for the thematic papers, in line with the agenda of the Madrid summit.

4.5. As argued above, the active and informed involvement of civil society, through the full range of economic and social partners, is a crucial element of support in the process of strengthening democracy, civil peace and economic prosperity. Without its contribution, and without a proper social dialogue, it is obvious that none of the advances made in economic and trade integration can be lasting or sustained by the countries themselves.

4.6. Over many decades, Europe has forged the "European social model" on the basis of a concept of shared prosperity and solidarity, a market economy combined with a high level of social protection and accompanied by social dialogue, the existence of services of general interest which are of benefit to all, and a concept of subsidiarity understood not only as the most efficient division of responsibilities between all levels of territorial administration, but also as a division of tasks between the state and private sectors, equally in the interest of efficacy.

4.7. The experience of the European Union and, more particularly, of the "European social model" can make a valuable contribution to the debate on how best to ensure that such relations are sustainable. For their part, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean can offer the European Union the example of their vitality and imagination in difficult circumstances, together with their multiethnic, multicultural wealth and their capacity to build these values into a young society determined to achieve progress and justice.

5. Initial ideas for the preparation of the Declaration of the second meeting of civil society representatives from the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean

The hearing in Santiago de Chile with Latin American and Caribbean representatives allowed a number of themes to be picked out for inclusion in the forthcoming Declaration of the second civil society meeting. They are as follows:

5.1. Representative civil society organisations constitute a key element in the democratic and social consolidation of both regions, and they must play an active and effective part in the political negotiations.

5.2. Latin American and Caribbean economic and social vulnerability is such that means must be found to guarantee sustained economic growth and a fairer distribution of the wealth created, so as to reduce the intolerable levels of poverty and social exclusion.

5.3. A reinforcement of social dialogue, and by extension of civil dialogue, as a key flanking measure for a fairer, more solidarity-based society.

5.4. The need for Latin American and Caribbean countries to choose freely the international economic integration model which best suits their practical interests, and, with regard to reciprocal concessions, to be able to pursue non-symmetrical agreements reflecting their greater economic and social vulnerability.

5.5. The pressing need for the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to pursue active policies in areas such as migration, general education and leadership training, the introduction of sustainable development models, or expanded and enhanced technology transfer flows.

5.6. The need to devise ways of strengthening all types of civil society organisation - without interfering with their freedom of action - and of encouraging the creation of forums for dialogue at national level, which could subsequently be extended to regional and international levels.

5.7. On the basis of this national and regional dialogue, encouraging the establishment of economic and social councils or similar bodies, putting the dialogue on an official, institutional footing so that it can be effectively integrated into legislative and decision-making processes having an impact on civil society.

6. Priority measures for the preparation of the Second meeting of civil society representatives from the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean

6.1. Information actions: establishment of a dedicated web page, with links to all the civil society organisations who attended Rio, and open to comments and suggestions. Consideration might also be given to publishing a two-monthly electronic bulletin. Similarly, the cooperation of the EU delegations should be sought in mobilising other organisations in each of the countries concerned.

6.2. Action through the economic and social councils and similar institutions: both of the EU and those existing at regional or national level. The aim would be ensure that civil society has an organised presence in these countries, and to generate mutual added value for them through their presence at the event.

6.3. Preparation of four thematic papers on key issues of direct importance to civil society on the agenda for the Madrid Summit of Heads of State and Government. A further paper should be added, focusing on sustainable development in our two regions, and the possibility of carrying out joint actions or exchanging best practice in this field.

Brussels, 21 February 2002.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke Frerichs

(1) COM(2000) 670 final.

(2) Alliance for the Information Society.