ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 23.2.2011 
SEC (2011) 209 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
accompanying the 
   
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 
Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements 
 
EU READMISSION AGREEMENTS: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE OF PLAY 
(February 2011)  
 
{COM(2011) 76 final} 
{SEC(2011)210} 
{SEC(2011)211} 
{SEC(2011)212} 
 
EN 2   EN 1. AGREEMENTS  IN FORCE 
Country Mandate 
received First Round Agreement signed Entry into force Coupled with 
Visa 
Facilitation 
Agreement 
Hong Kong April 2001 October 2001 27 November 2002 1 March 2004 No 
Macao April 2001 October 2001 13 October 2003 1 June 2004 No 
Sri Lanka September 2000 July 2001 4 June 2004 1 May 2005 No 
Albania November 2002 May 2003 14 April 2005 1 May 2006 1 
Russia September 2000 January 2003 25 May 2006 1 June 2007 2 
Ukraine June 2002 18 November 2002 18 June 2007 1 January 2008 3 
 the former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia November 2006 1 December 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 Yes 
Bosnia&Herzegovina November 2006 20 December 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 Yes 
Montenegro November 2006 15 December 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 Yes 
                                                 
1 Visa facilitation was offered to Albania (together with the ot her WBalkan countries) after the readmission agreement had alrea dy entered into force. 
2 Visa facilitation was offered when readmission negotiations had already started but were not progressing. 
3 Visa facilitation was offered when readmission negotiations had already started but were not progressing. 
 
EN 3   EN Serbia November 2006 4 December 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 Yes 
Moldova December 2006 9 February 2007 10 October 2007 1 January 2008 Yes 
Pakistan September 2000 April 2004 26 October 2009 1 December 2010 No 
 
2. AGREEMENTS  SIGNED   
Country Mandate 
received First 
Round  
Agreement 
signed  
Entry into force Coupled with 
Visa Facilitation 
Agreement 
Georgia November 
2008 2 April 
2009  
22 November 2010 
1 March 2011 Yes 
 
3. ONGOING  NEGOTIATIONS  AND  NEGOTIATIONS  NOT  YET  FORMALLY  LAUNCHED 
Country Mandate 
received First Round Last round to date Coupled 
with Visa 
Facilitation 
Agreement 
 
EN 4   EN Morocco September 2000 April 2003 15th formal round on 
10 May 2010  No 
  
Turkey November 2002 May 2005 7th formal round on 
17 May 2010  
Additional meeting 
between the 
negotiators on 
14 January 2011 in 
Ankara No 
Cape 
Verde June 2009 13 July 2009 12 October 2010 Yes 
China November 2002   No 
Algeria November 2002   No
According to Spain, the main elements of the energy and climate change policy should be defined at the EU level first. Only in a second stage, and according to the agreed framework, a national strategy and related policies will be defined.

Spanish efforts are currently directed towards GHG emission reductions in the non-ETS sectors. For these sectors, a Roadmap has been elaborated which will allow the fulfilment of climate objectives in the period 2013- 2020 (covering transport, construction, farming, waste, agriculture). This initiative has been recently extended up to 2030. Spain is also carrying out a reform of the Electricity System.

Spain has not yet defined a detailed and comprehensive long-term climate and energy strategy for the period post 2020. The current Strategy for Climate Change and Clean Energy was adopted in 2007 and is being updated.

Spain is also a member of the High Level Group on the Interconnectivity of the Iberian Peninsula, formalized in consequence of the Madrid Summit which led to the Madrid Declaration, which aims to tackle the existing interconnection issues both for electricity and gas through the adoption of an Action Plan.

Regional cooperation on infrastructure development is necessary to optimise the identification of regional infrastructure priorities and to coordinate cross-border investments. Spain is a member of two Regional Groups which have been established under the TEN-E Regulation: North-South Gas Interconnections in Western Europe and North-South electricity interconnection in Western Europe.
COMPREHENSIVE MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM STRATEGY (post-2020)

FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY Cyprus has not yet finalized a comprehensive post-2020 climate and energy strategy for the medium and long run. An ad-hoc committee has been set up for the detailed revision of the policies and measures already in place, to streamline these into a more detailed strategy for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions relative to the 2030 and 2050 time horizon. Several policies that are currently in place (e.g. energy efficiency and promotion of renewable energies) will continue to contribute with reductions in 2030. A national strategy for renewable energy and energy efficiency for 2030 is being developed with technical assistance. Cyprus is currently estimating the impact of the implemented and planned measures up to 2030, as well as the level of national target for energy efficiency for 2030. With the technical assistance from IRENA and JRC, Cyprus is currently preparing the national renewable energy roadmap aiming to determine the optimum penetration of renewable energy for electricity supply until 2030. Recently, technical assistance was extended to cover the expansion of the roadmap up to 2040 and to include in the calculations not only electricity but also the heating, cooling and transport sectors. Cyprus is preparing a comprehensive post-2020 climate and energy strategy for the post 2020 period: “The Low Carbon Development Strategy of Cyprus”. The strategy sets five principal objectives with respect to climate change which are: a) fulfilment of Cyprus international and European obligations according to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the legal framework of the EU, b) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions with emphasis on reducing the use of fossil fuels, c) increase of carbon sequestration from the atmosphere, d) foster research and innovation in fields related to climate change affairs, and e) invest in raising public awareness for reducing emissions. Cyprus will finalize the post 2020 low carbon strategy in an integrated manner, as soon as the final national contribution (emission reductions) will be decided in the new Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) based on the relevant Council conclusions. The electricity sector has a crucial role to play in the long-term decarbonization of the Cyprus economy as it makes up a significant share of Cyprus emissions. Apart from reducing GHG emissions, the integrated low carbon strategy will be structured appropriately in order to bring further benefits such as less pollution, green jobs and reduced dependence on energy imports.
The Staff Working Document (SWD) assesses the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) on the basis of the five evaluation criteria of the Better Regulation Guidelines. It covers the seven years of FP7 implementation. It cannot present a complete picture of FP7 results and impacts, since more than 50% of the FP7 projects are still on-going.

FP7 contributed to increasing the competitiveness of Europe's industry and had a positive impact on growth and jobs. FP7 only accounts for a small proportion of total public RTD expenditure in Europe. It is estimated that FP7 will increase GDP by approximately 20 billion EUR per year over the next 25 years through its indirect economic effects and create over 130,000 research jobs per year and 160,000 additional jobs per year. The Joint Technology Initiatives and other Public-Private Partnerships boosted industry participation by more than 50%, made it possible to realise strong leverage effects, and contributed to the competitiveness of Europe's industries in areas such as pharmaceuticals, aeronautics and fuel cells and hydrogen. The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility improved access to loan finance with EUR 11.3 billion loan agreements signed. FP7 participants reported innovative product developments, increased turnover, improved productivity and competitiveness. It is, however, too early to make a final assessment of FP7's micro-economic impacts. FP7 was particularly effective in strengthening scientific excellence. FP7 projects have so far generated over 170,000 publications, with an open access rate of over 54% for all scientific peer reviewed publications created during the life time of FP7. In some programmes of FP7 30% of publications rank among the top 5% of highly-cited publications in their disciplines - above the European and US averages. Finished FP7 projects led to more than 1,700 patents and 7,400 commercial exploitations. FP7 promoted ground-breaking research through the European Research Council (ERC). FP7 trained and involved leading international scientific and technological talent. FP7 fostered inter-disciplinary research whilst increasing Europe-wide research and innovation collaboration and networking. FP7 was an open system that funded more than 21,000 new organisations. FP7 helped increase the participation of women researchers and of international researchers. FP7 involved the EU-13 Member States to a significant extent taking into account national R&D capacities. FP7 contributed to increasing the level of research investment. Through short-term leverage effect and long-term multiplier effects each EUR spent by FP7 generated EUR 11 of estimated direct and indirect economic effects. FP7 enhanced the alignment of research activities between Member States.
The preferred option, option 3, could entail administrative costs both for the Commission and for MS At EU level, the first level of ex-ante assessment for each new or renewed IGA submitted to the Commission would probably involve two officers in DG ENER for up to two full working days. The Commission's Legal Service and other relevant DGs would also need to be consulted, and would also need to invest the resources of one to two legal officers for an estimated one to two days. At national level, the main legal assessment and drafting work necessary to conclude an IGA with a third country would be carried out whether or not there were an obligatory ex-ante notification provision. Therefore, the additional costs of this option at a national level would be linked to the submission of documents to the Commission for ex-ante assessment. If issues of non-compliance with EU law were detected, more legal experts would need to be consulted. Depending on the complexity of the IGA, several rounds of consultation with national authorities might be necessary, which would also imply that more officers, at hierarchical levels in the national administration, would need to devote additional hours to the issue during the pre-signature phase.
Preferred option: a stand-alone LULUCF policy pillar would continue to be utilised based on improved and simplified accounting rules. A limited degree of flexibility between LULUCF and the ESR would be enabled, justified on the need derived from the agriculture sector share for each Member State in the ESR. Such a hybrid option (combining elements of the 3 original policy architecture options) would be optimal for incentivizing mitigation action in both agriculture and LULUCF.

2.The need and extent for flexibility towards the Agriculture sector in the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR): four different levels of flexibility, from zero to high flexibility, were assessed.

Since 2008, the LULUCF sector is included in the EU's international climate policy commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Since then, a well-functioning monitoring and accounting system with international oversight has been in place. For the post-Kyoto phase from 2021 onwards, two critical new design issues were assessed:

On policy architecture options: half of respondents had no clear preference. 1/3 of respondents, mostly environmental NGOs and forestry organisations, were in favour of keeping LULUCF as a separate pillar within the climate policy framework, making this the preferred option (excluding blank answers). The option of merging agriculture and LULUCF in a separate pillar outside the ESR received the least support (1/5). National governments showed most preference for a separate LULUCF pillar, possibly with flexibility, or to merging LULUCF into the ESR. On accounting: strong interest of Member States to maintaining only land-based accounting and in continuing with forest reference levels. Interest in building on the current rules, with few improvements and streamlining, by all stakeholders.
There are three clear reasons why the VAT system for cross-border e-ecommerce needs to be reformed. The underlying causes of these problems arise from provisions in the current VAT Directive and therefore Member States cannot address these without action at EU level. Firstly, the complexity of VAT obligations has consistently been identified as one of the key reasons why a business will not engage in cross-border e-commerce, and therefore it means that the single market cannot be accessed by many businesses. It is been estimated that the costs of complying with VAT obligations costs on average EUR 8 000 annually for each Member State which a business supplies to. This is a significant cost for business, in particular SMEs. Secondly, the current system is not neutral as EU businesses are at a clear disadvantage to non-EU businesses which can legitimately and otherwise make VAT free supplies into the EU. Given that VAT rates can be as high as 27%, there is a substantial distortion in favour of non-EU business if VAT is not applied. Thirdly, the complexity of the existing system as well as the current exemption for the importation of small consignments means that Member States lose valuable tax revenues. It is estimated that between VAT foregone and non-compliance from cross-border e-commerce such losses are currently as high as EUR 5 billion annually.
A) Baseline scenario: no policy change.

B) Increased international efforts at the global level aiming for a multilateral legal framework for fair competition in aviation and inclusion of expanded fair competition clauses in Air Service Agreements (ASAs).

C) Major changes to the regime contained in Regulation (EC) No 868/2004 which would be replaced by a new comprehensive and effective EU legal instrument.

D) Replacement of Regulation (EC) No 868/2004 by a new, more effective EU legal instrument combined with increased international efforts at global level and inclusion of fair competition clauses in ASAs (preferred option)
What legislative and non-legislative policy options have been considered? Is there a preferred choice or not? Why?

As the absence of EU legislation has failed to resolve the problem, four policy alternatives were considered, all of them extending the principle of equalising the costs of domestic transactions in the national currency and costs for cross-border transaction: (1) in the national currency; (2) in the national currency and in euro; (3) in euro only; (4) in any currency of EU Member States, regardless of where they take place. Option 3 is efficient as modern infrastructures for cross-border payments in euro are available to all payment services providers also in non-euro countries. The majority of cross-border transactions in non-euro countries are in euro, so option 3 would cover a large share of cross-border transactions. As euro transactions are cheap, there would be a low risk of increased fees for domestic transactions to cross-subsidise expensive cross-border transactions in non-euro currencies. Option 3 is also consistent with the longer-term goal of having the euro as common currency for all Member States. Acceptance of this option by stakeholders would also be higher than for any other option.
While solutions ("models") that are unlikely to result in a standardised product are assessed as inferior, the IA retains the other three models, i.e. granting the regulatory treatment of euro-area sovereign bonds to (1) all SBBS tranches, (2) only SBBS senior tranche, and (3) the basket. The IA does not rank these possible solutions, but highlights the main trade-offs involved. In particular, Models 1 and 2, by virtue of tranching, are better at expanding the supply of euro-denominated low-risk assets. Model 3 is, on the other hand, simpler.

The IA proposes an enabling legislation that equates, in terms of regulatory treatment, (the senior tranche of) SBBS to euro-area sovereign bonds. It identifies three key policy choices: (1) the scope of applicability of the enabling framework (only to SBBS, or to any securitisation of euro-area sovereign bonds, regardless of the portfolio weights); (2) whether to "enable" all tranches or only the senior tranche; and (3) how to ensure compliance with the defined eligibility requirements. In addition, the IA consider the conceptually distinct but related option to provide the same treatment of sovereign bonds to a specific basket without tranching of euro-area central government bonds (i.e., one with weights in line with the ECB key), owing to it being a much simpler structure. Combining these options, the IA considers five possible models for the legislative proposal, and assesses them against the baseline scenario which is the status quo (i.e. no legislative intervention).

Banks (and other investors) would likely prefer Model 1, since this minimises their regulatory costs. The ESRB High Level Task Force (HLTF) on SBBS, which studied the feasibility and merits of SBBS, concluded in favour of Model 2. Debt management officers have expressed general reservations on the SBBS concept, out of concerns that it might displace/disrupt national debt markets. Among the three Models retained, they are likely to prefer Model 2 (which is less enabling) or Model 3 (which introduces the least changes relative to the status quo).
Between 1990 and 2015, CO2 emissions of heavy-duty vehicles (HDV) rose by some 19%. HDV CO2 emissions are currently not regulated within the EU, contrary to car and van emissions.

A large number of readily available cost-effective technologies to improve fuel efficiency are not widely deployed in the market even though their costs are low and they could bring high net savings. This is mainly due to imperfect and asymmetric information in the new vehicle market as it is complex for transport operators, which are mainly SMEs, to access and make full use of the technical information on such technologies.

As a result, the problems identified are:

1)The CO2 emissions from HDVs are set to increase, without further action, by up to 6% between 2015 and 2030.

2)Transport operators and their customers miss out on fuel savings.

3)European HDV manufacturers and component suppliers are at risk of losing their technological innovative leadership as significant markets such as the US, Canada, Japan and China have in recent years implemented emission standards to stimulate innovation and rapidly improve vehicle efficiency.

Parties affected include the general population, freight transport operators and HDV manufacturers.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels,4.6.2018

SWD(2018) 299 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council

COSME - Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs 2014 - 2020

Monitoring Report 2015

{COM(2018) 388 final}



{SWD(2018) 300 final}
The EU Emergency Travel Document (EU ETD) is the most common type of consular assistance provided to unrepresented EU citizens in distress in third countries. Although not issued in great numbers, the help an EU ETD provides to citizens is crucial for their return home and it represents a visible demonstration of the value of EU citizenship and solidarity between Member States. Twenty years after the introduction of the EU ETD, the following problems with its implementation have been identified:

·a lack of enforceability of the pre-Lisbon CFSP Decision 96/409/CFSP;

·legal uncertainty due to discrepancies between the Decision and the more recent Consular Protection Directive;

·EU ETD security features are outdated and negatively impact its use and acceptance;

·coordination and cooperation among Member States could be improved in order to facilitate citizens’ access to the EU ETD.
on the implementation of EU waste legislation, including the early warning report for Member States at risk of missing the 2020 preparation for re-use/recycling target on municipal waste

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

1.Introduction

This early warning report is part of the Commission's overall implementation report and aims to assist Member States at risk of failing to meet the 2020 target of 50 % preparation for re-use/recycling of municipal waste set out in Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 2008/98/EC. It builds on previous support provided by the Commission to help Member States comply with EU law in the area of municipal waste management. This resulted in country-specific roadmaps being drawn up for the relevant Member States.

The assessment underpinning the early warning report is based on a collaborative and transparent process involving the Member States concerned and an in-depth analysis of their most recent policy developments. This also involved extensive consultation with the authorities in charge of waste management.

The possible actions identified during this process are based on the existing best practices and aim to help Member States in meeting the 2020 municipal waste preparation for re-use/recycling target; they therefore focus on policy measures that can be taken forward in the short term. These actions should be seen as complementary to those recommended in the roadmaps that were drawn up as part of the preceding compliance promotion activities and to the recommendations made in the Environmental Implementation Review

2.Key findings

In 2016, Finland’s municipal waste recycling rate (including composting) reported to Eurostat was 42 %. Its incineration rate was 55 %, while its landfilling rate was only 3 %. Based on an analysis of existing and firmly planned policies in the area of waste management, and despite a fairly good performance in the past few years, Finland is still considered at risk of missing the 2020 target of 50 % preparation for re-use/recycling target for municipal waste.

The assessment that underpins the early warning report concludes that, despite the introduction of economic instruments such as a landfill tax, extended producer responsibility (EPR) and a high level of awareness among the public, Finland has been stagnating at a fairly high level but below the 50 % objective. This is considered to be linked to fairly generous flexibilities in the obligation to ensure separate collection of dry recyclables and bio-waste, and to frequent regulatory changes in recent years that have created uncertainty and led to a lack of investment. A degree of inefficiency in the organisation of the EPR schemes also slows down progress.

The table below lists possible actions to support Finland's efforts to improve its performance in waste management.