Portugal reported several cases concerning the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) which emphasise the methodology of control and cooperation between national entities. An anonymous complaint was addressed to the Tax and Customs Authority (AT) - Ministry of Finance involving a shipbuilding company, providing services to several vessel owners. The AT examined the cash flows of the company providing services (the supplier) and ascertained that the company accounts showed no direct link between the amounts received from customers and those paid into the bank accounts. Additional documents requested from the company were analysed, confirming that the following practice occurred repeatedly with payments received from customers (vessel owners): on the same date that sums were credited to the bank account, the company withdrew the same amount; this was sometimes deposited into the customer's account and in other cases was transferred to the managing partner's personal account or to an unknown beneficiary. As such, the AT informed the Directorate-General for Maritime Policy (DGPM) in the Ministry of the Sea and the DGPM sent the case to the Directorate-General for Natural Resources, Safety and Maritime Services (DGRM), also in the Ministry of the Sea, which referred the case to the PROMAR Managing Authority. The Managing Authority informed the Prosecutor's Office of the facts of the case and the EFF Certifying Authority (IFAP) sent the details of the irregularities to the Inspectorate-General of Finance (IGF), which is the AA and the AFCOS. The IGF entered the communications in the IMS system and sent them to OLAF in the third quarter of 2015.

The established fraud ratio in the Fishery sector is calculated at 12.5% with four Member States reporting the finalisation of the related procedures (United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Estonia).

Irregularities have been detected and reported by 24 Member States; 11 Member States have reported fraudulent irregularities during this period. Spain, Portugal, Poland, the Netherlands and Romania are the countries having reported the highest number of irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent). Italy is the Member State having detected and reported the highest number of fraudulent irregularities and related amounts.

Table NR19 shows the overall results for the whole programming period 2007-13.

Portugal is the Member State having detected and reported the highest number of fraudulent irregularities. The 8 Bulgaria cases represent 42% of the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent. However the two irregularities reported as fraudulent by Romania account for 39% of the related amounts.

18 Member States have detected and reported irregularities related to the EFF; 5 countries have reported some fraudulent cases. In terms of numbers of irregularities, the majority has been detected by the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom.

Table NR18 shows the results of the control activities in the Member States in 2015.

In relation to the irregularities reported as fraudulent, information is missing in 30 cases.

In relation to the methods of detection, the most frequently reported are 'Control of accounts', 'On-the-spot checks' and 'Initial inquiry/control of documents'. Specific information is missing in 134 cases (24%).

In relation to the 55 irregularities reported as fraudulent, there is no real pattern emerging from the reported information, also taking into account that in 27 cases no information has been provided.

The most detected typology is 'Not eligibility for aid of the action/project’, followed ‘control, audit, scrutiny etc. not carried out in accordance with regulations, rules, plan etc.’, ‘other irregularities’, 'Infringements of public procurement rules' and ‘Other infringements concerning the implementation of the project/action’ and 'Documents missing and/or not provided'. These types plus those for which no modus operandi has been indicated cover 79% of the reported irregularities.

This is reflected by the circumstance that of the 553 detected irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent), 147 do not indicate the modus operandi (27% of the total).

The number of irregularities reported in relation to the EFF is limited and to some extent incomplete in relation to the typologies of irregularities detected by national authorities.

Given the limited number of irregularities reported so far, the analysis covers the whole period 2011-15.

The share of irregularities reported as fraudulent on the total is 10% of the cases and 25% of the related amounts in the reference period 2011-2015.

The increase from one year to the other simply reflects the increased level of implementation of the programmes.

Table NR17 shows the overall number of irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent reported by year and the related financial amounts.

Among the most important areas of action of the CFP is the provision of funding and technical support for initiatives that can make the industry more sustainable. These actions are supported by the European Fisheries Fund (EFF).

As the activities of each fishing fleet affect the opportunities of other fleets, the EU countries have decided to manage their fisheries in collaboration, through the common fisheries policy (CFP). This policy brings together a range of measures designed to achieve a thriving and sustainable European fishing industry.

OLAF was notified of a French case regarding payment of aid to promote wine on the markets of third countries, as provided for under the CMO. In particular, the irregularity concerned invoices that were forged in order to collect more than EUR 600 000 of subsidies from France AgriMer, the paying agency, for promoting wine outside the European Union. During the ex-post inspection of the first payment of around EUR 350 000, the inspection body of the Mission COSA (inspection of operations in the agricultural sector) revealed that fake invoices were produced through a financial partner in China who knew that they did not correspond to the services provided. This case was the subject of an accusation made to the Public Prosecutor by the MCOSA inspection body in 2013. The operator was given a suspended prison sentence of 12 months and fined EUR 30 000 for fraud by the Bordeaux criminal court.

Case study: VIGNOBLE XO. Aid to promote wine on the market of third countries

For an in-depth analysis of recovery and financial corrections in the CAP, see section 2.1.1.3.3 of the Annual Activity Report of DG AGRI and the Communication of the Commission to the Parliament on the protection of the EU budget.

A German rural tourism case in which a claimant applied to the granting authority for payment disbursement for a swimming pool project, which had not been put into effect by the end of the implementation period, has also been reported. The amount wrongly applied for was so great that the granting authority, after applying the ensuing reduction / penalty, rejected the payment application in its entirety. The claimant then instituted proceedings at the administrative court for the disbursement of EUR 50 000.00. The case presented suspicion about the source of the money with which the claimant had paid the assigned swimming-pool technology company and also about the lawful taxation of the payments made by the claimant to the swimming pool technology company (acceptance of high cash amounts, partial reimbursement of cash to the claimant without The granting authority therefore additionally informed the central tax investigation authorities of Thuringia at the relevant tax office, by way of a control report on the operation. In light of the foregoing, it can therefore be deduced that the funding management control system in place (in payment procedures), as well as the granting authority's own-initiative investigation (Section 24 of Thüringen Administrative Procedures Act) have prevented fraud in this case.

Table NR16: number of cases of suspected and established fraud and ratio of established fraud – cases reported between 2010-14 in the CAP

Table NR16 provides the same information of table NR15 concerning the number of cases of suspected and established fraud and ratio of established fraud calculated for the years 2010-14. It will be used in the coming reports for comparability.

Table NR15: number of cases of suspected and established fraud and ratio of established fraud – cases reported between 2009-13 in the CAP

If one considers exclusively the “decisions” (established + dismissed), of the 287 decided cases (121 established fraud and 166 dismissals), 42% is the ‘conviction rate’ and 58% the ‘dismissal rate’.

In this respect, the average ratio of established fraud at EU level is 10%, increasing from 7% of 2013. The dismissal ratio is 12%, increasing from the 4% indicated in the previous year’s analysis.

Table NR15 integrates also the ‘Dismissal ratio’, calculated by the differences between the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent published in the corresponding table in the 2013 Report (TOTAL 2013) and the total calculated taking into account the updates received in 2014 and 2015. When the ratio is positive, it means that Member States have classified as ‘suspected’ or ‘established fraud’ irregularities appearing as non-fraudulent in 2013.

Table NR15 shows the ratio between the cases of established fraud and the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent (including suspected and established fraud) in the period 2009-13. Taking into account only cases reported in 2015 would be meaningless, as the criminal proceedings leading to a conviction for fraud may take several years, while using the period 2011-15 would be misleading as it will be impossible to make a sound comparison with figures published in the 2013 and 2014 Reports. However, considering that in the Commission staff working document ‘Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported in 2014’ information concerning the years 2010-14 was published (for reference for the next years) a new update also for that reference period is provided in Table NR16.

Table NR14: number of irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015, amounts involved and fraud detection rate by Member State

In 2015, the highest fraud detection rates are referred to Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia (all above 0.50%), Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and France (above 0.25%).

The fraud detection rate compares the results obtained by Member States in their fight against fraud with the payments received by them in a given financial year. This implies that a single case reported as fraudulent and involving a significant financial amount can produce a higher result than that achieved by the sum of the financial impact of several irregularities affecting lower amounts. For this reason, this indicator should be read in conjunction with the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent and for this reason they are presented together in Table NR14.

During the period under consideration, only Finland did not report any fraudulent irregularity.

Map NR2 shows the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011-15 for both funds of the CAP by Member State.

Romania, Poland and Italy remain the three countries having reported the highest numbers.

Seven (7) Member States have notified no irregularity as fraudulent; fifteen (15) Member States reported between 1 and 15 fraudulent irregularities; two (2) countries reported between 16 and 30; and three (3) Member States more than 30 fraudulent irregularities.

Map NR1 shows the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 for both funds of the CAP by Member State.

The data set used for Table NR13 includes the irregularities reported between 2011 and 2015.

For the irregularities reported between 2011 and 2015, average detection efficiency is 30 months (2 years and 6 months), while reporting efficiency is at 8 months.

Looking at the detection and reporting efficiencies of Member States, Table NR10 provides the average duration (in months) occurring between the time at which the irregularity began or was committed and when it was detected (detection efficiency), the average time gap (in months) between detection and reporting and their sum. The table also details, per Member State, the percentage of the data population which could be used for the calculations (‘usable sample’).

The average duration of those reported as fraudulent is 33 months (i.e. almost 3 years) while that of those not reported as fraudulent is 22 months (i.e. almost 2 years).

The two subsets (irregularities reported as fraudulent and those not reported as fraudulent) have two different patterns.

Taking into account only those irregularities which have been protracted in time, their average duration is of 24 months (i.e. 2 years).

Of the 15 840 detected irregularities reported by Member States between 2011 and 2015, 60% involve infringements that have been protracted during a given span of time. For the irregularities reported as fraudulent this percentage is higher at 65%. The remaining part of the datasets refers to irregularities/breaches which consisted of a single act identifiable on a precise date or for which this information was not provided.

(5)the ratio of cases of established fraud on the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent.

(4)the fraud prevention rate (the ratio between the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent which have been detected before payments were executed);

(3)the fraud detection rate (the ratio between the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and the payments occurred in the financial year 2015);

(2)the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by each Member State (over a five years’ time period);

(1)the time that runs between the beginning of the fraudulent practice and its detection/establishment by the competent authority and reporting to the Commission (Detection / Reporting Efficiency);

The present paragraph aims at examining some aspects linked to the anti-fraud activities and results of Member States. Five elements are taken into account:

Previous paragraphs have examined the trend and main features and characteristics of the irregularities reported as fraudulent.

It is likely that the number of OLAF’s investigations detecting potentially criminal infringements may be underestimated, if Member States did not provide the adequate information to identify them correctly.

Of the 147 cases detected by or following a request from a EU-body, 141 were already reported about in 2014 as resulting from an OLAF investigation in Hungary.

Table NR12: EAFRD - Control methods having identified the irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 and for the period 2011-15

The impact in monetary terms of anti-fraud controls and criminal investigations remain significant and counts for 51% of the total detections in 2015 and 49% for the period 2011-15.

In relation to the EAFRD, over the period 2011-15, about 18% of the fraudulent irregularities has been detected by or following requests from EU-bodies (including OLAF).

In recent years, the role of the administrative bodies has been constantly growing. In 2015, the ‘administrative controls’ have detected the majority of the irregularities reported as fraudulent (52%), showing an increase in comparison to the overall 2011-15 period (44%). Table NR12 shows the types of control having identified the irregularities reported as fraudulent.

Table NR11: EAGF - Control methods having identified the irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 and for the period 2011-15

The impact in monetary terms of anti-fraud controls and criminal investigations remain significant and counts for 67% of the total detections for the period 2010-14.

Over the period 2011-15, the administrative controls detected about 53% of potentially fraudulent infringements.

In recent years, the role of the administrative bodies has been constantly growing. Also in 2015, the ‘administrative controls’ have detected the majority of the irregularities reported as fraudulent. Table NR11 shows the types of control having identified the irregularities reported as fraudulent.

This distinction would allow taking into consideration the different nature of actions and projects financed through the different funds, avoiding that the predominance of one or the other would “hide” specific situations.

For the first time, this section is presented similarly to the previous paragraph, i.e. making a distinction between detection of irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to the EAGF and to the EAFRD.

In 2015, 44 irregularities reported as fraudulent indicated that breaches had occurred in relation to ‘Ethics and Integrity’. In the previous four years this category had been indicated in eleven cases. The remaining detected typologies more frequently are in line with those reported in previous years and relate to the ‘documentary proof (supporting documents provided), the ‘request for aid’, the ‘quality of the beneficiary’, the 'implementation' of the action.

Table NR10 compares the types of irregularity / modi operandi linked to fraudulent cases detected in 2015 with those detected from 2011 to 2015 (included) in relation to the EAFRD.

For 26 of the 180 cases reported (14%), irregularities related to ‘Ethics and Integrity’ were specified. This typology refers to cases of ‘corruption’ and ‘conflict of interest’ in particular. In the previous four years taken into account for the analysis, other 7 cases had been reported, although the amounts involved in such cases were particularly significant. 13% of the EUR 292 million affected by irregularities reported as fraudulent in the period 2011-15 for the EAGF are linked to breaches of ‘Ethics and Integrity’.

The most recurrent modus operandi is related to infringements linked to the documentary proofs requested, and in particular, to the use of 'false or falsified declarations', 'false or falsified documents' and 'false or falsified request for aid', ‘declaration of fictitious product, species and/or land’ in line with what reported in general for the whole period 2011-2015. ‘Quantities outside permitted limits, quotas or thresholds (related, respectively to products, species or land)’ remained a significant reported type of breach.

Table NR9 compares the types of irregularity / modi operandi linked to fraudulent cases detected in 2015 with those detected from 2011 to 2015 (included) in relation to the EAGF.

Table NR8: Financial amounts linked to irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Fund – 2011-15 for the CAP

The irregular financial amounts related to the EAFRD are also progressively increasing since 2011 and in 2015 they represented the highest share.

Unlike fraudulent irregularities the largest share, in terms of numbers, is for the EAFRD since 2013, and in the two last years of the period 2011-15 the number of irregularities linked to this fund have almost been the double of those affecting the EAGF.

Table NR7: Irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Fund – 2011-15 for the CAP

Contrary to the irregularities reported as fraudulent, only 2% of those not reported as fraudulent relates to infringements reported as affecting both funds. This share shrinks to 1% in relation to the financial impact of these irregularities (see Table NR8).

Regarding irregularities not reported as fraudulent, the number of those reported relating to EAFRD has been constantly increasing (see Table NR7), while those related to EAGF has remained relatively stable or record minor variations. Consistently with this trend, also the irregular financial amounts linked to the rural development instrument have been constantly increasing (as highlighted in Table NR8).

The trend analysis about the financial amounts can be misleading as it can be greatly influenced by single observations of significant value. For instance, the 'distance' observed in 2011 between the two funds, finds entire explanation in very few cases involving high amounts linked to the EAGF, which determine the divergence from the trend highlighted in Table NR5. In the period 2011-15, the share of the EAFRD on the total is 20%, in line with the share of the resources allocated to the fund on the total of the CAP resources over the same period.

Table NR6: Financial amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent by Fund –2011-15 for the CAP

Table NR6 provides in the same form of Table NR5 information about the trends linked to the financial amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent, which have increased by 7% in comparison with the previous year and decreased by 30% in comparison with 2011. For the monetary value, the largest share in 2015 is still represented by the EAGF component. The EAFRD becomes relatively predominant, if one bears in mind that it represents between 20% and 30% of the total resources for the CAP and the financial value of the irregularities reported as fraudulent represent 41% of the total amount in 2015. For the period 2011-2015, however, the distribution remains roughly in line with the share of the resources between the funds.

The first ten countries taken together have reported 466 of potential fraudulent cases, which represents almost 92% of the total (in 2013 the first nine together had reported about 94% of the total fraudulent irregularities).

Similar to 2013 and 2014, the irregularities notified by four Member States (Romania, Poland, Hungary and Italy) represent about 74% of the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent.

Despite these contrasting trends, for the second consecutive year in the analysed period, the irregularities reported as fraudulent related to the EAFRD have the highest share on the total (55%) and reaching 47% on the whole reference period 2011-15 (up from 42% in the previous analysis for 2010-14). The share of irregularities committed by beneficiaries of both funds decreases at 7% on the five years analysis (in comparison with 12% highlighted in relation to the period 2010-14).

Table NR5 presents the trend of the irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States for the period 2011-15 in relation to the fund concerned. This shows an overall decrease in comparison to 2014 by 16%. However, while the fraudulent irregularities related to the EAGF have increased by 11%, those linked to the EAFRD have decreased by 31% after three consecutive years of growth.

The trend analysis about the financial amounts can be misleading as it can be greatly influenced by single observations of significant value. For instance, the 'distance' observed in 2011 between the two funds, finds entire explanation in very few cases involving high amounts linked to the EAGF, which determine the divergence from the trend highlighted in Table NR3. The continuous growth of the financial value of irregularities related to the EAFRD is, however, in line with the general trend of irregularities reported showed in Table NR3.

Table NR4: Financial amounts involved in reported irregularities by Fund –2011-15 for the CAP

The impact of the financial amounts involved in irregularities is very different between the two funds, as it is 0.39% for the EAGF and 1.93% for the EAFRD.

Table NR4 provides in the same form of Table NR3 information about the trends linked to the financial amounts involved in cases of reported irregularities, which have increased by 53% in comparison with the previous year. For the monetary value, the largest share in 2015 is still represented by the EAFRD component, which becomes relatively predominant, if one bears in mind that it represents between 20% and 30% of the total resources for the CAP and the financial value of the irregularities reported count for 52% of the total amount in 2015 and 41% for the period 2011-2015.

The irregularities notified by a minority of Member States (Romania, Italy, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Portugal and Lithuania) represent about 69% of the total number of reported irregularities.

It should be noted that the two funds function very differently, with the EAGF following an annual implementation, while programmes financed by the EAFRD have a multiannual logic, which resembles that of the Structural Funds. The trend of irregularities detected and reported further highlights those similarities and therefore appears physiological.

This shows an overall increase between 2014 and 2015 by 26% and 134.1% between 2011 and 2015. However, while the irregularities affecting EAGF have remained stable over time (+6% in comparison with 2014 and 10% with 2011), those related to the EAFRD have been constantly increasing, as showed by the chart below (+35% in comparison with 2014 and +418% in comparison with 2011).

Table NR3 presents the trend of the irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported by Member States for the period 2011-15 in relation to the funds concerned.

Table NR2 shows the financial resources available for the CAP.

The expenditure made by the paying agencies is then reimbursed by the Commission to the Member States, in the case of the EAGF on a monthly basis and in the case of EAFRD on a quarterly basis. Those reimbursements are, however, subject to possible financial corrections which the Commission may make under the clearance of accounts procedures.

The paying agencies are, however, not only responsible for making payments to the beneficiaries. Prior to doing so, they must, either themselves or through delegated bodies, satisfy themselves of the eligibility of the aid applications. The exact checks to be carried out are laid down in the different sectorial regulations of the CAP and vary from one sector to another.

Under the basic rules for the financial management of the CAP, the Commission is responsible for the management of the EAGF and the EAFRD. However, the Commission itself does not make payments to beneficiaries. According to the principle of shared management, this task is delegated to the Member States, who themselves work through national or regional paying agencies. Before these paying agencies can claim any expenditure from the EU-budget, they must be accredited on the basis of a set of criteria laid down by the Commission.

The CAP is financed by two funds, EAGF and EAFRD, which form part of the EU's general budget.

For the last 50 years the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the European Union's (EU) most important common policy. This explains why traditionally it has taken a large part of the EU's budget, although the percentage has steadily declined over recent years.

Table NR1 shows the financial resources available for this policy area.

The EMFF is the successor of the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), for which the full resources have been committed by the end of 2014, but about 25% of commitments still had to be paid out.

EAFRD and EMFF are among the five European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) which complement each other and seek to promote a growth and job based recovery in Europe.

The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) which provides funding and technical support for initiatives that can make the fishery industry more sustainable.

The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) which finances the rural development programmes of the Member States.

The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) which finances direct payments to farmers and measures to respond to market disturbances, such as private or public storage and export refunds.

Success in previous decades in guaranteeing sufficient food production, has led to a shift in emphasis to, producing higher quality food for consumers, increasing farms' profitability, diversifying the rural economy and protecting the natural environment. There is a direct management component but the majority of expenditure is disbursed by Member States under the following shared management funds.

If TOR are not established because of an administrative error by a Member State, the Commission applies the principle of financial liability. Member States have been held financially liable in 2015 for over EUR 8 million, and new cases are being given appropriate follow-up.

Considering the fraud diversion and spreading of specific fraud mechanism, EU-wide and international cooperation in detection of irregular cases is more and more required.

One general conclusion drawn by the Commission from its inspections in Member States in recent years is that their control strategies are increasingly shifting from customs controls at the time of clearance of goods to post-clearance customs controls. The customs controls before or at the time of clearance of goods remain however indispensable for detection of new types or patterns of fraud or irregularities. Therefore, the customs controls strategy should be frequently reviewed taking into account recent detections or new risks.

In its TOR inspections, the Commission has put a special emphasis on Member States’ customs control strategies and closely monitors their actions in relation to the observations made during the inspections. Member States show their willingness to adapt their control strategies and to progressively implement systems that provide for efficient and effective risk analysis to protect the EU’s financial interests. However, budgetary constraints reduce customs agents in charge of control in many Member States and in some Member States trade facilitations and over-simplifications might undermine the control efficiency and thus the protection of the EU financial interest. Also adjustments of the procedures for detection and reporting of irregular cases are applied by Member States with the aim to improve the quality of the information on irregular cases. In 2015, "Tariff suspensions and quotas", "Preferential tariff measures" and "Entry of goods into the EU" were the main inspection themes of the on-the-spot customs inspections by the Commission services in Member States.

Examination of Member States’ diligence in write-off cases constitutes a very effective mechanism for gauging their activity in the field of recovery. It encourages national administrations to step up the regularity, efficiency and effectiveness of their recovery activity, since any lack of diligence leading to failure to recover results in individual Member States having to foot the bill.

In 2015, 19 Member States submitted 130 new write-off reports to the Commission. In 2015, the Commission assessed 255 cases in all totalling EUR 104 million. In 110 of these cases amounting to EUR 28 million, the Commission's view was that the Member States did not demonstrate satisfactorily that the TOR was lost for reasons not imputable to them so they were considered financially responsible for the loss.

Also in the long term, the HRR reveals an equally strong relation as annual recovery rates, showing that recovery in cases reported as fraudulent is generally much less successful than in cases not reported as fraudulent (see table TOR4). Classification of a case as fraudulent is thus a strong indicator for forecasting short- and long-term recovery results.

OWNRES shows that on the cut-off date, on average 38 % (1989-2015) of the initially established amount in relation to cases not reported as fraudulent has been corrected (cancelled) since 1989. The RR for non-fraudulent cases reported for 2015 is 58%. On the cut-off date, the annual RR for the last five years has varied between 51 % and 81 %. The overall RR for all years (1989-2015) for all cases not reported as fraudulent is 70 %.

Over the 1989-2015 period, OWNRES shows that, on average, 15 % of the initially established amount was corrected (cancelled). The recovery rate (RR) for all years (1989-2015) is 34 %. The RR for cases reported as fraudulent and detected in 2015 was 39 % which is slightly above the average rate of 37% for fraudulent cases for the 2011-2015 period. In general, the RR in cases reported as fraudulent is clearly much lower than that for cases not reported as fraudulent.

There are large differences between Member States’ classifications, which may partly depend on their classification practices. This can influence the comparison of the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and as non-fraudulent by Member States. Moreover, individual bigger cases detected in a specific year may affect annual rates significantly. Factors such as the type of traffic, type of trade, the level of compliance of the economic operators, the location of a Member State can influence the rates significantly. Bearing in mind these variable factors, the detection rates can also be affected by the way a Member State’s customs control strategy is set up to target risky imports and to detect TOR-related fraud and irregularities.

The total estimated and established amount affected by irregularities was more than EUR 349 million which indicates an irregularity detection rate of 1.40 %. The highest percentages can be seen in Romania (4.42 %), Malta (3.84 %) and the Netherlands (3.81 %).

In 2015, the total estimated and established amount affected by fraud in the EU was EUR 78 million and the overall fraud detection rate was 0.31 %. For 2015, the highest percentages can be seen in Greece 7.31 % and Latvia 4.08 %.

For 2015, Member States reported 612 cases as fraudulent out a total of 5 104 cases reported via OWNRES, which indicates a Fraud Frequency Level (FFL) of 12 %. The differences between Member States are relatively large. In 2015 most Member States categorised between 10-50 % of all cases reported as fraudulent. However, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden did not categorise any cases reported as fraudulent. Four Member States categorised less than 10 % of cases as fraudulent. Four Member States registered more than 50 % of cases as fraudulent.

The total estimated and established amount in non-fraudulent cases where the amount at stake was above EUR 50 000 amounted to EUR 278 million (80 % of the total estimated and established amount for non-fraudulent cases).

In 2015, the established amount was below EUR 50 000 in 3 481 non-fraudulent cases (77 % of all irregularity cases), whereas it was above EUR 50 000 in 1 011 cases (23 %).

In 2015, 331 cases reported as non-fraudulent concerned different types of vehicles amounting to EUR 32 million. Incorrect value, incorrect documents or incorrect classification were the main pattern of the infringement reported. Estonia, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Luxemburg, Portugal and Slovakia appeared not to be affected by irregularities related to this type of goods. In all, 59 cases totalling EUR 18 million were revealed following a voluntary admission by economic operators. In particular, Germany was affected by voluntary admission of cases of vehicles imported with an incorrect value.

In 2015, solar panels originating in China were especially vulnerable to non-fraudulent irregularities in monetary terms. 27 % of the total amount (EUR 93 million) that was established or estimated in non-fraudulent irregularities was affected by this type of goods. Incorrect country of origin or dispatching country was the main pattern of the infringement reported. In particularly, the Netherlands was affected by this type of goods and infringement. Other 14 Member States reported also cases related to solar panels to a smaller extent. Following Mutual Assistance notices issued by OLAF 72 cases totalling to EUR 82 million were detected. This underlines the importance of investigations conducted by OLAF in this particular field.

In 16 Member States, more than 50 % of all non-fraudulent cases — in amounts — were detected by post-clearance controls. In France, Croatia and Romania more than 50 % of the amounts relating to non-fraudulent cases were detected by anti-fraud services. Significant amounts were reported as non-fraudulent following voluntary admission by Germany (EUR 30 million) and the UK (EUR 15 million). In 13 Member States voluntary admission was keyed in as a method of detection of cases reported as non-fraudulent.

Considering the estimated or established amounts, around 56 % of all irregularity cases registered for 2015 were discovered during a post-clearance control, 15 % were related to voluntary admission 12 % were found during a control at the time of clearance of goods, whereas 10 % related to a tax audit, and 7 % to an inspection by anti-fraud services.

CHART TOR7: Method of detection 2015 – Cases not reported as fraudulent – by number of cases

In 2015, most non-fraudulent cases (54 %) were revealed during post-clearance customs controls. Other methods of detection for non-fraudulent cases that featured frequently were voluntary admission (16 %), clearance controls (13 %), tax audits (10 %) followed by anti-fraud services (5 %).

Of all cases reported as non-fraudulent about 56 % concern such goods as electrical and mechanical machinery, vehicles, articles of iron, steel and aluminium, textiles and plastics. In monetary terms those groups of goods represent about 67 % of all amounts estimated or established for cases reported as non-fraudulent. China, USA, Japan, Cuba Russia, Brazil and India are most frequently reported and most important countries of origin of goods affected by irregularities.

In 2015 most of the estimated and established amounts in OWNRES in the EU-28 (86 %) for cases reported as non-fraudulent related to the customs procedure ‘release for free circulation’. In all, 9 % of all amounts estimated or established in cases not reported as fraudulent in 2015 involved inward processing, 3 % of all amounts estimated or established related to customs warehousing. Other customs procedures are only marginally affected in 2015.

Not all customs procedures are equally susceptible to irregularities; their vulnerability may change in the course of time as certain economic sectors are briefly targeted. The customs procedure ‘release for free circulation’ is the customs procedure mostly affected by irregularities since at the time of release for free circulation the non-compliance in the customs declaration may relate to a large number of irregularities, e.g. to the tariff, CN code, (preferential) origin, incorrect value, etc. On the other hand, in customs suspension regimes (like warehousing, transit, etc. - where the payment of duties is suspended) the sole irregularity that might occur is the subtraction of the goods from customs supervision. Thus it is normal, and indeed to be expected, that most fraud and irregularities be reported in connection with the procedure ‘release for free circulation’.

A breakdown of irregularities by mechanism type shows that most cases of irregularity relate to incorrect declarations (incorrect value, classification, country of origin or use of preferential arrangements) and formal shortcomings (failure to fulfil obligations or commitments).

The total estimated and established amount in cases reported as fraudulent where the amount at stake was above EUR 50 000 amounted to EUR 49 million (62 % of the total estimated and established amount for cases reported as fraudulent).

In 2015, the estimated and established amount was below EUR 50 000 in 468 cases reported as fraudulent (76 % of all fraud cases), whereas it was above EUR 50 000 in 144 cases (24 %).

The evaded duties, according to the reports of 8/9/2015 and 16/9/2015 establishing duties and taxes of the Elefsina Customs Office and the Fifth Customs Office of Piraeus, amount to EUR 2 582 720.28. This amount comprises: anti-dumping duties: EUR 2 114 718.75, countervailing duties: EUR 455 416.98 and VAT: EUR 12 584.55.

The above shows both that the company under investigation knew that the imported photovoltaics had been produced by Chinese companies and were thus of Chinese origin, and that its recourse to special arrangements was designed to mislead the Greek customs authorities into believing that the goods originated in Taiwan, so as to avoid paying the higher rate of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.

2) drawings and technical specifications of the photovoltaics carrying the name of the company under investigation and referring to the direct contract that had been concluded between it and the Chinese company.

The company under investigation paid the Chinese companies by means of transfers via its Greek bank account or its German bank account.

The other pro forma invoice, for the amount of EUR 301 056, was found in a transfer payment to a Chinese company as proof of the transfer order from a Greek bank, which shows that the Chinese company was paid on the basis of the pro forma invoice that the Chinese company had issued.

In particular: one pro forma invoice dated 4 April 2014 for EUR 860 860 was found attached to the contract with the Chinese company, which demonstrates that it basically served the purpose of an invoice, as in each instance the company under investigation made bank transfers of amounts corresponding to the value of the photovoltaics.

1) pro forma invoices issued by Chinese companies to the company under investigation for the same value, quantity and type of photovoltaics as in both the contracts concluded directly between them and in the "triangular" contracts.

In addition to the above, the information obtained by the Attica branch of the ELYT from the company under investigation included:

The above-mentioned direct "sales contracts" bore the same dates and were for the same quantities and values as those on the sales invoices issued by both the Chinese and the Taiwanese companies.

For this reason the company under investigation entered into bilateral contracts directly with both the Taiwanese and the Chinese companies and also trilateral (triangular) contracts that linked the three parties (the company under investigation, the Taiwanese companies and the Chinese companies). Furthermore, it was able to place remittances for the value of the goods in the Chinese companies' bank accounts in China.

The company devised a way of providing the Greek customs authorities with documents accompanying the customs clearance of goods, such as invoices, certificates of origin, bills of lading, etc., issued by companies in Taiwan to make it appear that the imported photovoltaics originated in that customs territory (Taiwan), thereby avoiding being liable for or paying the above duties.

The reason for the false declaration of origin is obvious, as imports from Taiwan are not subject to anti-dumping duties, whilst very high anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties of 53.4 % and 11.5 %, respectively, are imposed on imports from China.

The OLAF data and all the data received by the Attica branch of ELYT from the company under investigation, were examined and then used to cross check, verify and identify the containers on the OLAF lists (obtained, as mentioned above, from the Taiwan customs authorities). The identification revealed that these containers were the subject of (114) import declarations issued to the company under investigation.

The OLAF representatives obtained from the Taiwan customs database lists of the movements-shipments of these containers through the FTZ for all products bearing the code SO 8541 4090 with the PRC as the declared country of origin for the period from June 2013 to April 2015. All the shipments in the lists obtained from the Taiwan customs administration involved Chinese goods that arrived from China, were not imported into or processed in Taiwan, but rather, after being transferred to other containers, were re-exported directly to EU countries, including Greece.

Following an investigation and mission to Taiwan carried out by representatives of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in cooperation with the customs authorities in Taiwan, it emerged that the goods in question (photovoltaics) arrived in containers from the PRC in the Free Trade Zone of Taiwan (FTZ) and were then transferred directly (usually the same day or the following day) to other containers destined for the EU.

At the same time, from June 2013 to April 2014 the company imported photovoltaics from Malaysia and from May 2014 to January 2015 from Taiwan. Imports of photovoltaics into the EU from these countries are not liable to import duties.

From June 2013 to December 2014, a period during which the EU had introduced measures on imports of these goods (anti-dumping and countervailing duties), the company under investigation continued to import photovoltaics from China, but only from companies and for the quantities allowed by the Commission for export to the EU (quotas) and no duties were paid on these imports from the PRC.

The company under investigation started importing photovoltaics into Greece from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in July 2012.

In 2015, 23 cases reported as fraudulent concerned solar panels amounting to EUR 14.9 million. In all, 16 cases totalling EUR 11.8 million were detected following a Mutual Assistance notices issued by OLAF. This underlines the importance of investigations conducted by OLAF in this particular field.

As a definitive result of all the operational - investigative activities carried out by the Bulgarian police authorities on the case which resulted in crossing performed criminal activities, a total of 28.7 million pieces of cigarettes without excise labels were seized totalling 16 136 575 BGN equivalent to more than 8 million Euros which has been prevented from damaging the EU budget. Charges were brought against 32 persons, some of whom are Turkish citizens and 10 persons have been issued with European arrest warrants. A total of 78 people were detained for the period of 24 hours on the case.

A characteristic aspect of this case is that it represents a criminal activity referring to a strictly organized trafficking ring involving persons from other countries, as well as government officials supporting the offenders. The cigarettes have been loaded on trucks with Turkish license plates from cigarette factories and warehouses on the territory of Turkey and after that with activated transit procedure they have entered territory of Bulgaria. Some of the trucks have never been registered in the customs office, while others have declared customs transit misrepresentation - ostensibly carrying glasses, parts for air conditioners, coils, etc. After crossing the border between Turkey and Bulgaria, the trucks have been accompanied by Bulgarian and Turkish citizens to previously secured warehouses all over the territory of Bulgaria. A key contributor to the work on the case has been the excellent cooperation between the national police authorities of Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece, as well as with Interpol and Europol. The joint efforts resulted in establishment and detention of fugitive offenders and has acquired significant information about the case

During a performed specialized police operation on 29th of March 2015, seven offenders were arrested while unloading significant amounts of cigarettes without excise labels in a warehouse located in the city of Plovdiv, Bulgaria. When conducting a search of the cargo compartment of the truck, the Bulgarian police authorities discovered 1420 boxes of cigarettes without excise labels equivalent to 14 200 000 pieces of cigarettes from the brand “Jin Ling”. The estimated value of the consignment amounted to 7 983 950 BGN, which is approximately 4 million Euros. Furthermore, while performing relevant intelligence activities in the framework of the same case, one more truck with a Turkish registration number was detected and detained after entering Bulgarian territory from Turkey. The police authorities conducted a search, the result of which established and seized from the cargo compartment of the truck a total of 1450 boxes of cigarettes without excise labels, equivalent to 14.5 million pieces of cigarettes of the brand “PRESIDENT”. The estimated value of the consignment amounted to 8 152 625 which is approximately 4 million Euros.

No cases were reported by the Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.

The highest number of cases was reported by the UK (39). The highest amount was reported by Greece (EUR 12.9 million).

In 2015, there were 241 cases of smuggled cigarettes registered (CN code 24 02 20 90) involving estimated TOR of around EUR 31 million. In 2014 the number of cases of smuggled cigarettes was 213, totalling around EUR 24 million.

In 13 Member States more than 50 % of all estimated and established amount in fraudulent cases were detected by anti-fraud services. As regards amounts, controls at the time of clearance of goods were the most important method for detecting fraudulent instances in Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia, Finland and the United Kingdom. In Greece 47 % of all estimated and established amounts in fraudulent cases were detected by an inspection by services or bodies other than customs.

In monetary terms, of the EUR 78 million estimated or established in fraudulent cases registered for 2015, around 41 % were discovered during an inspection by anti-fraud services, 24 % during a post-clearance control, 23 % during a customs control at the time of clearance of goods.

In 2015, most fraudulent cases were revealed during a customs control at the time of clearance of goods (35 %) and during an inspection by anti-fraud services (34 %). Other method that featured frequently was post-clearance controls (22 %).

Of all cases reported as fraudulent about 75 % concern such goods as tobacco, electrical machinery and equipment, footwear and textiles, articles of iron and steel, and mineral oils. In monetary terms those groups of goods represent about 88 % of all amounts estimated and established for cases reported as fraudulent. China, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are most frequently reported and are the most important countries of the origin of goods.

In 2015, the customs procedure ‘release for free circulation remained the procedure most vulnerable to fraud (76 % of the number of cases and 74 % of the estimated and established amount). A total of 14 % of all cases reported as fraudulent and 14 % of all estimated and established amounts in OWNRES cases registered as fraudulent for 2015 fall under the category "Other". A total of 6 % of all cases reported as fraudulent and 3 % of all estimated and established amounts in OWNRES cases registered as fraudulent for 2015 involve the transit procedure.

A breakdown of frauds by mechanism type reveals that most fraudulent cases relate to smuggling of goods. Incorrect origin or country of dispatch, incorrect value or classification are frequently mentioned in 2015.

On the cut-off date, the overall RR for all years 1989-2015 was 59 %.

Recovery rates vary among the Member States. The highest recovery rates for 2015 are in Estonia (100%), Slovenia (100%), Sweden (99%), Austria (96 %) and Finland (94%). Differences in recovery results may arise from factors such as the type of fraud or irregularity, or the type of debtor involved. Because recovery is ongoing, it can be expected that the recovery rate for 2015 will also go up in the future.

The overall recovery rate is a correlation between the detection rate, the established amount and the current recovery stage of individual cases (high additional duty claims undergo more frequently long lasting administrative and criminal procedures).

Over the past, five years the annual RR has varied between 46 % and 73 % (see Chart TOR4). The recovery rate for 2015 is currently 56 %. In other words, of every amount over EUR 10 000 of duties established and reported for 2015 in OWNRES, approximately EUR 5 600 has already been paid.

In addition, Member States continued their recovery actions related to the detected cases of previous years. The EU-28 recovered EUR 94 million in 2015 which related to cases detected between 1990 and 2014.

The fraud and irregularity cases detected in 2015 show an established amount of EUR 390 million. EUR 199 million of this was recovered in cases where an irregularity was at stake and EUR 19 million in fraudulent cases. In total EUR 218 million was recovered by all Member States for all cases which were detected in 2015. In absolute numbers, Germany recovered the highest amount in 2015 (EUR 95 million) followed by the United Kingdom (EUR 31 million). This is a starting point for the recovery. Analysis shows that lengthy recovery procedures spread over several years are usually required due to administrative and judicial procedures in complex cases or cases with huge financial impact.

TOR MAP1: Showing the percentage of established and estimated amounts in OWNRES of established TOR for 2015

For the six Member States which established and made available most of the TOR amounts, the percentage of the estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR for 2015 was equal to 1.88 %. In comparison with the previous year, this represents a decrease of 0.43 percentage points.

The total estimated and established amount reported in OWNRES represent 1.71 % of the total established and collected amount of TOR (gross) for 2015. This proportion has decreased compared with 2014 when it was 2.79 %. A percentage of 1.71 % indicates that of every EUR 100 of TOR (gross) established, an amount of EUR 1.71 is registered as irregular (fraudulent or non-fraudulent) in OWNRES. There are differences among the Member States. In 9 Member States, the percentage is above the average of 1.71 %. The highest percentage for 2015 can be seen in Greece, Romania and Latvia with 8.95 %, 5.07 % and 5.04 % respectively. For Germany, the proportion of estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR remained almost stable in 2015 compared to the previous year. For Denmark, Greece, Croatia, the Netherlands and Finland, the proportion of estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR increased in 2015 compared to the previous year.

In 2015, the total established amount of TOR (gross) was EUR 25.4 billion and more than 98 % was recovered without any particular problem and made available to the Commission via the A-account. In comparison with the total estimated and established amount, according to the OWNRES data, around EUR 427 million has been established or estimated by the Member States in connection with cases reported as fraudulent/not fraudulent where the amount at stake exceeds EUR 10 000.

Annex 3 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date for years 2011-2015.

CHART TOR3: OWNRES cases not reported as fraudulent and the related estimated and established amount (2011-2015)

Only Luxemburg did not report any case of irregularity exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000 for 2015.

The total estimated and established amount of TOR (EUR 349 million) was 1 % higher than the average estimated and established amount for the years 2011-2015 (EUR 347 million).

At the same time, the number of cases not reported as fraudulent communicated via OWNRES for 2015 (4 492) was 1 % lower than the average number reported for 2011-2015 (4 515).

Annex 2 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date for years 2011-2015.

On the cut-off date, 12 % of all cases detected in 2015 were classified as fraudulent. The percentage remained quite stable in comparison to 2014.

For 2015, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden did not communicate any fraudulent case exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000.

The total estimated and established amount of TOR involved (EUR 78 million) represents a decrease of 34 % of the average estimated and established amount for the years 2011-2015 (EUR 119 million).

The number of cases reported as fraudulent registered in OWNRES for 2015 (612) is currently 26 % lower than the average number of cases reported for the 2011-2015 period (822).

Annex 1 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date (18 March 2016) for the years 2011-2015.

In 2015, 2 big cases for a total amount of nearly EUR31 million were reported compared to 2014, when 5 big cases with a total amount of about EUR 161 million affected the total estimated and established amount. Luxemburg did not communicate any case exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000.

The number of cases reported via OWNRES for 2015 (5 104) is about 4 % lower than the average number of cases of irregular cases reported as fraudulent and as not fraudulent for the 2011-2015 period (5 338).

The following analysis is based on the data available on the cut-off date (18 March 2016) and aims to provide an overview of the reported cases of fraud and irregularities reported for 2015 together with their financial impact.

For the methodological explanations about data gathering and analysis, see the Commission Staff Working Document ‘Methodology regarding the statistical evaluation of irregularities reported in 2015’, paragraph 1.3.

15 Annexes complement the information and data of this document, providing a global overview of the irregularities reported according to the relevant sector regulations. Annexes from 1 to 10 concern Traditional Own Resources, Annexes 11 and 12 Natural Resources and Annexes from 13 to 15 the Cohesion Policy.

The document is completed by 28 country factsheets, which summarise, for each Member State, the main indicators and information that have been recorded throughout the analyses.

The section dedicated to shared management, covers the natural resources (agriculture, rural development and fisheries) and the cohesion policy. Decentralised management refers to the pre-accession policy, while the centralised management section mainly deals with internal and external policies for which the Commission directly manages the implementation.

The second part, concerning the expenditure part of the budget, is composed of three sections, dedicated, respectively, to shared, decentralised and centralised management modes.

The first part is dedicated to the analysis of irregularities reported in the area of the Traditional Own Resources (Revenue).

The methodology (including the definition of terms and indicators), the data sources and the data capture systems are explained in detail in the Commission Staff Working Document – Methodology for the Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities.

For this reason, this document should be regarded as an analysis of the achievements of Member States.

The document accompanies the Annual Report adopted on the basis of article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to which “The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, shall each year submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the measures taken for the implementation of this article”.

The present document is based on the analysis of the notifications provided by national authorities of cases of irregularities and suspected or established fraud. The reporting is performed in fulfilment of a legal obligation enshrined in sectoral European legislation.

Web application for communication of irregularities in the field of Traditional Own Resources

The fifteen Member States of the EU before the 2004 accession

The twelve Member States having acceded the EU between 2004 and 2007

Case study: VIGNOBLE XO. Aid to promote wine on the market of third countries

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 14.7.2016 SWD(2016) 235 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2015

Own Resources, Natural Resources, Cohesion Policy, Pre-accession and Direct Expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud

2015 Annual Report {COM(2016) 472 final}

{SWD(2016) 234 final}

{SWD(2016) 236 final}

{SWD(2016) 237 final}

{SWD(2016) 238 final}

{SWD(2016) 239 final}



TABLE OF CONTENTS COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2015 Own Resources, Natural Resources, Cohesion Policy, Pre-accession and Direct expenditure 5.Cohesion Policy 5.1.Trend analysis 5.1.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent 5.1.2.Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 5.2.Specific Analysis – Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2007-13 5.2.1.Priorities concerned by the irregularities reported as fraudulent 5.2.2.Priorities concerned by the irregularities not reported as fraudulent 5.2.3.Types of irregularities / modus operandi detected - Irregularities reported as fraudulent 5.2.4.Type of control / method of detection – Irregularities reported as fraudulent 5.2.5.Type of irregularities not reported as fraudulent 5.3.Anti-fraud activities by Member States 5.3.1.Duration of irregularities, Detection and Reporting Efficiency 5.3.2.Detection of irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 by Member State Case study: attempted fraud in an ERDF financed project in Estonia 5.3.3.Fraud detection rate 5.3.4.Ratio of established fraud 2008-2014

Case study: attempted fraud in an ESF financed project in Italy 6.Pre-Accession Policy (Pre-Accession Assistance and Instrument for Pre-Accession I and II) 6.1.The Pre-accession Assistance (PAA), 2000-06 6.2.The Instrument for Pre-accession 2007-13 – IPA I 6.3.The Instrument for Pre-accession 2014-20 – IPA II 6.4.General analysis – Trend analysis 6.4.1.Trend analysis – Pre-accession assistance (PAA) 6.4.2.Trend analysis Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA I) 6.4.3.Reporting efforts 6.5.Specific analysis – Financial year 2015 6.5.1.Pre-Accession Assistance (PAA) 6.5.2.Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) 7.Direct Management 7.1.Introduction 7.2.General analysis 7.2.1.Five year analysis 2011-2015 7.3.Specific analysis 7.3.1.Recoveries according policy areas 7.3.2.Recoveries according to legal entity residence 7.3.3.Method of detection

7.3.4.Types of irregularity 7.3.5.Time delay 7.3.6.Recovery Case study: EDF - International works contract in Côte d’Ivoire COUNTRY FACTSHEETS Belgium - Belgique/België Bulgaria - България Czech Republic - Česká republika Denmark - Danmark Germany - Deutschland Estonia - Eesti Ireland - Éire Greece - Ελλάδα Spain - España France Croatia - Hrvatska Italy - Italia Cyprus - Κύπρος Latvia - Latvija Lithuania - Lietuva

Luxembourg Hungary - Magyarország Malta Netherlands - Nederland Austria - Österreich Poland - Polska Portugal Romania - România Slovenia - Slovenija Slovakia - Slovensko Finland – Suomi-Finland Sweden (Sverige) United Kingdom ANNEXES Cohesion for growth and employment Cohesion for growth and employment’ covers the Structural Funds, i.e. the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF), as well as the Cohesion Fund (CF). It relates essentially to the following policy areas: –regional policy, for the ERDF and the CF, and –employment and social affairs, for the ESF and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI).

The principal objective of cohesion policy is to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions and Member States of the EU by providing additional resources for those regions and countries whose economic development is lagging behind. The Structural Funds also aim at strengthening regions’ competitiveness and attractiveness, as well as employment, and at strengthening cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation. The resources available are concentrated on promoting economic convergence, in particular on sustainable growth, competitiveness and employment in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. These resources are also essential tools to fight financial, economic and social crises. Cohesion policy is promoted using three shared management instruments, with individual EU countries actually distributing funds and managing expenditure. Sustainable growth is also promoted through centralised direct management by the Commission and centralised indirect management where the Commission distributes funds to EU and other agencies (see chapter 6). 5.Cohesion Policy The resources for the Cohesion policy support two main objectives: Investment for Growth and Jobs goal: resources for this goal are allocated among the following three categories of NUTS level 2 regions: a)less developed regions, whose GDP per capita is less than 75 % of the average GDP of the EU-27; b)transition regions, whose GDP per capita is between 75 % and 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27; c)more developed regions, whose GDP per capita is above 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27. The European Territorial Cooperation objective: focuses on development of economic and social cross-border activities; transnational cooperation, and networking and exchange of experiences between regional and local authorities. Four financial instruments are the vehicles to achieve the goals of this policy: –The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is the largest fund and aims to support the development and structural adjustment of less developed regions in all Member States through investments in research, infrastructure, business support or direct financial support to SMEs. –The European Social Fund (ESF) prevents and fights unemployment, by making Europe's workforce and companies better equipped to face new challenges and preventing people losing touch with the labour market. Training programs are the primary method; however advice, coordination and sometimes microfinance are also provided to entrepreneurs and SMEs. –The Cohesion Fund promotes sustainable development in Member states with a GNI per capita below 90% of the EU average. The fund has two components: Transport and Environment. –The Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). Table CP1 shows the financial resources available for the Cohesion Policy under the different financial instruments. The table also shows that, even if there are virtually no more commitments related to the programming period 2000-06, payments linked to it, although limited, are still part of the picture. Table CP1: Financial instruments and 2014 appropriations for the Cohesion Policy by programming period and financial instruments 5.1.Trend analysis In comparison with the other budget sectors, the analysis of the Cohesion policy poses a higher level of complexity, given by the fact that the information received is related to different programming periods, which are regulated by different rules.

As only 2 irregularities have been reported (one fraudulent and one non-fraudulent) in relation to the programming period 2014-20, this will not be analysed in detail in the following paragraphs. Table CP2 offers an overview of the irregularities (both fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported from 2011 to 2015, by programming period. The table also details, for each programming period, the funds to which irregularities were related. Table CP2: trend of the number of irregularities reported between 2011 and 2015 by programming period – Cohesion Policy There is a sudden increase from 2014 to 2015 in the number of reported irregularities, which have almost doubled. Two elements can be pointed out in this respect: 1)The increase is mainly related to the programming period 2007-13. a.This increase is for the greatest part linked to the reporting of irregularities from one Member State (Spain), which covers almost half of the total number of irregularities reported in 2015. b.If the Spanish anomalous increase is excluded, the number of reported irregularities would still be higher than in 2014. However, this increase would follow the natural behaviour of the programming cycle of the funds. Table CP3 analyses the behaviour of the reporting in relation to programming period 2000-06 and, notably between n+3 and n+4 (where n is the last year of the corresponding multiannual financing cycle), it is possible to observe a comparable increase, which anticipates the closure of the programming period. 2)A minor, yet still striking increase of reporting is observed in relation to the irregularities related to the programming period 2000-06, whose numbers have also almost doubled between 2014 and 2015. In this respect, the explanation is much simpler, as the increase depends exclusively on the reporting from a single Member State (Ireland). Table CP3: trend of the number of irregularities reported between 2004 and 2010 for the programming period 2000-06 – Cohesion Policy 5.1.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent 5.1.1.1.Trend by programming period Table CP4 analyses the trend linked to the communication of the irregularities reported as fraudulent in the last five years (2011-2015), making a distinction by Fund involved and the relevant programming period. In the last five years, while the fraudulent irregularities linked to the PP2000-06 have been decreasing, those linked to the PP2007-13 have been constantly increasing with the only exception between 2013 and 2014. These trends are linked to the current implementation of the latter period and the closure of the previous. They also reflect the increasing attention and resources deployed to combat fraud in relation to the programming period 2007-13. One case has been so far notified in relation to the programming period 2014-20 whose implementation and spending on projects will effectively take off only in the coming years. Table CP4: trend of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by programming period – Cohesion Policy

Table CP4 and its associated chart do not include irregularities reported as fraudulent related to previous programming periods, which have been communicated until 2011. Table CP5 provides in the same form of Table CP4 information about the trends linked to the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent, confirming the continuous increase related to the PP2007-13, although, concerning involved amounts, fluctuations can be much more significant as individual cases involving high amounts can easily distort the overall picture. This is clearly the case concerning the years 2011 to 2013, with the intermediate (2012) showing the highest amounts. Table CP5: trend of financial amounts linked to the irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by programming period – Cohesion Policy 5.1.1.2.Trend by Fund The analysis of the same data presented in Table CP6 but focussed on the distribution of the irregularities reported as fraudulent by Fund (Table CP6), highlights the following situations: (1)The continuous increase since 2010 of cases concerning the ERDF, after a stop in 2014, started again in 2015; (2)Also cases related to the ESF have been constantly increasing throughout the analysed period; (3)Potential frauds affecting the Cohesion fund are now reported regularly (since 2010), while only one case has been reported (in 2013) in relation to the whole programming period 2000-2006; (4)Since 2013, no more cases concerning the FIFG have been reported (see chapter 4 on the EFF for the programming period 2007-2014). Table CP6: trend of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by Fund – Cohesion Policy Table CP7 analyses these trends examining the financial amounts linked to the irregularities reported as fraudulent in the reference period. The analysis of the period under consideration shows an interesting distribution of the amounts involved between the ERDF, Cohesion Fund and ESF, which, to a certain extent resemble the distribution of the resources among the funds, with an underrepresentation of ESF and an overrepresentation of the Cohesion fund. As one could expect, similarly to the number of reported fraudulent irregularities, the EAGGF-Guidance is progressively shrinking, while in the last two years no reported cases concerned the FIFG. Table CP7: trend of financial amounts linked to the irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by fund – Cohesion Policy

5.1.1.3.Trend by objective Specific to the Cohesion Policy is that programmes and financial resources available to implement them are closely linked to the geographical dimension, that is to say that the objectives that they pursue depend on the region (and its level of economic development) in which they are implemented. For this reason, the analysis by objective is important. From this point of view, the analysis of irregularities reported as fraudulent in the last five years does not change the trend already highlighted in past reports. As showed in Table CP8, the fraudulent irregularities detected and reported by Member States mainly concern programmes implemented under the Convergence objective (previously Objective 1), linked to the less economically developed regions in Europe. Their notifications have progressed in a linear way until 2013 and their increase has only slowed down in 2014. Nonetheless, the distribution among the various objectives is remarkably similar to the distribution of the resources among the objectives, at least in relation to the overall situation 2011-2015. This parallelism is however lost in relation to the distribution of the involved amounts as showed in Table CP9. Table CP8: trend of irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011-15 by Objective – programming period 2007-13 The analysis by objective presented above is exclusively referred to the programming period 2007-13. Table CP9 analyses the trend in relation to the reported amounts linked to the irregularities showed in Table CP8. The Convergence objective shows an absolute predominance in this respect, as it represents about 87% of the total amounts linked to fraudulent irregularities in the reference period. After the decrease in the involved amounts in 2013, these have been increasing again. Table CP9: trend of amounts related to irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by Objective

The analysis by objective presented above is exclusively referred to the programming period 2007-13. 5.1.2.Irregularities not reported as fraudulent Table CP10 analyses the trend linked to the communication of the irregularities not reported as fraudulent in the last five years (2011-2015), making a distinction by Fund involved and the relevant programming period. The reasons behind the increases related to both periods 2000-06 and 2007-13 have already been explained under paragraph 5.1. Table CP10: trend of the number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by programming period – Cohesion Policy Table CP11 shows the trend related to the amounts linked to the reported non-fraudulent irregularities. Once more, as already mentioned several times in relation to the trends of the financial amounts, fluctuations can happen more often, as they are linked to individual irregularities or group of irregularities of significant value, which produce distortive effects from one year to the other. Table CP11: trend of financial amounts linked to the irregularities not reported as fraudulent between 2011 and 2015 by programming period – Cohesion Policy 5.2.Specific Analysis – Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2007-13 5.1.3.Priorities concerned by the irregularities reported as fraudulent The operational programmes financed by the Cohesion Policy are implemented in relation to the already mentioned objectives, but also along identified Priorities and Themes. The information provided by Member States allows for an analysis of the priority areas in relation to which Member States have identified projects affected by potentially fraudulent practices. Table CP12 shows the number of reported fraudulent irregularities by priority area per reporting year since the beginning of the programming period 2007-13. In terms of numbers, the 'Priorities' most concerned were 'Research and Technological Development (RTD)', 'Improving access to employment and sustainability' and 'Improving human capital'. Table CP12: PP2007-13 - Irregularities reported as fraudulent by Priority

On average, about one third of the irregularities used for this analysis did not provide information about the priority area concerned, decreasing from 44% of last year. However the table shows also how the level of completeness of the information improves over the years. Table CP13 shows the amounts linked to the irregularities reported as fraudulent and their minimum, maximum and average value. From the amounts point of view, the most significant results concern 'Transport', ‘RTD’ and 'Investment in Social Infrastructure'. ‘Transport’ retains also the highest maximum and average values. Table CP13: PP2007-13 – Amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent by Priority The fact that several minimum values show the value ‘0’, indicate that for a number of fraudulent cases the financial impact needs yet to be assessed. 5.1.4.Priorities concerned by the irregularities not reported as fraudulent The same analysis showed in paragraph 1.2.1 for the irregularities reported as fraudulent is presented here for the irregularities not reported as fraudulent in relation to the programming period 2007-13. Table CP14 shows the number of reported fraudulent irregularities per reporting year since the beginning of the programming period 2007-13. Again, ‘Research and Technological Development (RTD)’ is the priority with the highest number of occurrences, followed by ‘Environmental protection and risk prevention’ and ‘Transport’ (all above 1 000 entries). Table CP14: PP2007-13 - Irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Priority Also in relation to the irregularities not reported as fraudulent the constant improvement in the completeness of data is confirmed, although to a lesser extent than for the fraudulent irregularities and with the significant exception of 2015 (probably due to the high number of irregularities reported by Spain). Table CP15 shows the amounts linked to the irregularities not reported as fraudulent and their minimum, maximum and average value. In this case, the category displaying the highest total amount involved and maximum value is that of the irregularities for which no indication has been given as to the priority affected. The highest average amount is linked to the priority ‘Transport’. Table CP15: PP2007-13 – Amounts involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Priority The fact that several minimum values show the value ‘0’, indicate that for a number of fraudulent cases the financial impact needs yet to be assessed. 5.1.5.Types of irregularities / modus operandi detected - Irregularities reported as fraudulent The analysis of the detected practices used in connection with the irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 (Table CP16) reveals a consolidation of existing trends. Detected fraudulent attempts mainly happen during the implementation of a project and are made through falsified documents or declarations (in about 25% of the cases), or by infringing the commitments entered into (through the signature of the financing contract), which implies that the project is not implemented according to what was initially agreed.

Violation of public procurement rules in connection with irregularities reported as fraudulent have been detected in 13% of the cases in 2015 and 9% of the total number of fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to the programming period 2007-13. Irregularities concerning ethics and integrity (within which are included possible cases of corruption and conflict of interest) have recorded a significant increase with the 44 cases reported in 2015 and 2014 (22 per year), considering that, until 2013 included only 15 had been notified to the Commission. The related amounts for this category are particularly significant despite the low number of cases on the total, as showed by the fact that, associated to this category, there is the highest average irregular amount. Table CP16: Programming Period 2007-13 - Types of irregularity/Modus operandi detected in relation to irregularities reported as fraudulent The columns “% on total” (4th and 8th columns) in Table CP16 have been calculated with reference, respectively, to the ‘Total’ values referred to the year ‘2015’ and ‘TOTAL’ in Table CP12. The data population used in this paragraph consists of all irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to the programming period 2007-13 until the end of 2015. The row for totals has been omitted in consideration of the fact that to the same irregularity reported may be associated several typologies of infringements and therefore the total sum of values in Table CP16 would result in multiple counting of the same irregularity notification. The category “Infringement of contract provision / rules” includes all irregularities related to implementation of the contract, i.e. irregularities such as ‘action not implemented’, ‘action not completed’, ‘action not carried out in accordance with rules’, ‘Failure to respect other contract provisions/rules’. The category “Eligibility / Legitimacy of expenditure / measure” refers to all irregularities concerning the eligibility of the project or of the claimed expenditure, such as ‘Not-eligible expenditure’, ‘Expenditure not-legitimate’, ‘Expenditure outside of eligibility period’, The category “Infringements concerning the request” refers to all types of irregularities associated with the request of aid/financing, such as ‘Incorrect request for aid’, ‘Request for aid false or falsified’. The category “Ethics and Integrity” refers to violations like ‘Conflict of interest’, ‘Bribery – active’, ‘Bribery – passive’, ‘Corruption’, ‘Other irregularities concerning integrity and ethics’. The “other irregularities” category is a residual category to be used when all others do not provide an adequate description of the detected irregularity. 5.1.6.Type of control / method of detection – Irregularities reported as fraudulent The analysis of the information concerning the Programming Period 2007-13 shows an important shift in relation to the previous programming period. The number of fraudulent irregularities detected by administrative controls is proportionally significantly higher than what was the case in the previous period, where the administrative verifications, on the spot checks and audit of operations would detect less than 20% of the cases, while in the current period they detect about 64%. Table CP17: Programming Period 2007-13 - Type of checks having detected the irregularities reported as fraudulent

The results of this analysis may be influenced by the accuracy of the information reported by Member States, which may have highlighted the subsequent activity of bodies in charge of the management and control of the funds and neglected the detection activity of the anti-fraud bodies. Another element to be kept into account is that for 41 cases reported until the end of 2015, it was not possible to determine the type of check. The number of cases linked to investigations by EU bodies (including OLAF) is not accurate. 5.1.7.Type of irregularities not reported as fraudulent Table CP18 provides an overview of the types of irregularities detected in relation to non-fraudulent irregularities. It confirms some of the main trends highlighted in previous years, as the infringements most frequently detected (over 38% of the total) and those involving the highest amounts are those concerned with public procurement (over 49% of the total value of the irregularities). Table CP18: Programming period 2007-13 - types of non-fraudulent irregularities The columns “% on total” (4th and 8th columns) in Table CP18 have been calculated with reference, respectively, to the ‘Total’ values referred to the year ‘2015’ and ‘TOTAL’ in Table CP14. The data population used in this paragraph consists of all irregularities not reported as fraudulent in relation to the programming period 2007-13 until the end of 2015. The row for totals has been omitted in consideration of the fact that to the same irregularity reported may be associated several typologies of infringements and therefore the total sum of values in Table CP18 would result in multiple counting of the same irregularity notification. 5.3.Anti-fraud activities by Member States Previous paragraphs have examined the trend and main features and characteristics of the irregularities reported as fraudulent. The present paragraph aims at examining some aspects linked to the anti-fraud activities and results of Member States. Four elements are taken into account: the time that runs between the beginning of the fraudulent practice and its detection/establishment by the competent authority and reporting to the Commission (Detection / Reporting Efficiency); the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by each Member State; the fraud detection rate (the ratio between the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and the payments occurred in the financial year 2015); the ratio of cases of established fraud on the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent.

5.1.8.Duration of irregularities, Detection and Reporting Efficiency Of the 10 692 detected irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported by Member States in 2015, 30% involve infringements that have been protracted during a given span of time. For the 371 irregularities reported as fraudulent this percentage is slightly higher at 60%. The remaining part of the datasets refers to irregularities/breaches which consisted of a single act identifiable on a precise date (15% of the whole dataset and 32% of that represent exclusively by the fraudulent irregularities) or for which no information has been provided (55% of the whole dataset, but only 8% of the irregularities reported as fraudulent). Taking into account only those irregularities which have been protracted in time, their average duration is of 24 months (i.e. almost two years). The two subsets (irregularities reported as fraudulent and those not reported as fraudulent) have very similar patterns, the average duration of those reported as fraudulent being 21 months (i.e. almost 2 years) while that of those not reported as fraudulent is 24 months. Table CP19 shows the average number of months between the moment in which the fraudulent practice begins and when it is detected/established (Detection Efficiency – DetE) and then the average number of months between its establishment and the reporting to the Commission (Reporting Efficiency – RepE). The EU average is about three years and six months (42 months) between the first and the last of those events (DetE + RepE). The duration of the DetE should not be seen as a sign of inefficiency per se. More relevant, in this respect, the RepE, which is about 10 months in average. Table CP19: Cohesion Policy – Detection and Reporting Efficiency Luxembourg has reported no sufficient information to calculate the DetE and the RepE. Table CP20 shows the same information but limited to the irregularities reported in relation to the programming period 2007-13. It shows a good improvement between the two periods on both the detection and reporting efficiency of about three months for each. The overall time gap between the initial moment and reporting (DetE + RepE) is increasing in 2015 in comparison with previously reported information, but this is due to the DetE, as the RepE is mainly stable. This is normal as the programming period implementation goes forward and potential fraud is increasingly detected after payment. Table CP20: Cohesion Policy – Detection and Reporting Efficiency – Irregularities reported between 2011 and 2015 related to the programming period 2007-2013 Luxembourg has reported no fraudulent irregularities during the period taken into consideration. 5.1.9.Detection of irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 by Member State Map CP1 shows the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2015 by Member State in the Cohesion policy area (all programming periods included). Four (4) Member States have notified no irregularity as fraudulent; seventeen (17) Member States reported between 1 and 15 fraudulent irregularities; two (2) countries reported between 16 and 30; and five (5) Member States more than 30 fraudulent irregularities. Poland, Germany and Slovakia are the three countries having reported the highest numbers.

Map CP1: Number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member State in 2015 – Cohesion Policy Map CP2 shows the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member State in relation to the programming period 2007-13 alone. One (1) Member State has notified no irregularity as fraudulent; eighteen (18) Member States reported between 1 and 50 fraudulent irregularities; five (5) countries reported between 50 and 100; two (2) between 100 and 150; and two (2) Member States more than 150 fraudulent irregularities. Poland, Germany and Romania are the three countries having reported the highest numbers. Map CP2: Number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member State in relation to the programming period 2007-13 – Cohesion Policy Case study: attempted fraud in an ERDF financed project in Estonia Using funds from the ERDF, the undertaking acquired a plastic waste cleaning line at a cost of EUR 959 952. An investigation revealed that the components of the equipment were already in the possession of the beneficiary or its associated undertaking prior to acquisition. The documents presented to the second-level intermediate body were fictitious, as the transactions had been performed with an undertaking not engaged in the supply of the equipment concerned. In actual fact, the undertaking bought the equipment from itself and at a price several times higher, with the aim of obtaining more aid funding. The aid was not paid out, so the case was one of attempted fraud. Thus, to avoid similar occurrences in the future, clear provisions on verification of the procurement process, the equal treatment of tenderers, and the transparency of the procurement process will be drawn up, and the provision of detailed information on the equipment in the tenders will be made obligatory. 5.1.10.Fraud detection rate The fraud detection rate compares the results obtained by Member States in their fight against fraud with the related commitment appropriations. Considering the multi-annual nature of the cohesion policy spending programmes, no annual analysis has been prepared, concentrating it for the whole programming period 2007-13, for which commitment appropriations have almost reached 100% and the number of fraudulent irregularities reported by Member States is significant. The highest number of detected fraudulent irregularities for the period 2007-13 originates from Poland, Germany, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Italy. The fraud detection rate (2008-2014) is the highest (>0.3%) for Italy, Slovakia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Romania. Table CP21: number of irregularities reported as fraudulent, amounts involved and fraud detection rate by Member State – Programming Period 2007-13 5.1.11.Ratio of established fraud 2008-2014 Table CP22 shows the ratio between the cases of established fraud and the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent (including suspected and established fraud) in the period 2009-13. Taking into account only cases reported in 2015 would be meaningless, as the criminal proceedings leading to a conviction for fraud may take several years, while using the period 2010-14 would be misleading as it will be impossible to make a sound comparison with figures published in the 2013 and 2014 Report. However information concerning the years 2008-14 is published (for reference for future years) in Table CP23. Table CP22 is integrated with the ‘Dismissal ratio’, calculated by the differences between the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent published in the corresponding table in the 2013 Report (TOTAL 2013) and the total calculated taking into account the updates received in 2014 and 2015. When the ratio is positive, it means that Member States have classified as ‘suspected’ or ‘established fraud’ an irregularity appearing as non-fraudulent in 2013. In this respect, the average ratio of established fraud at EU level is 12%, increasing from 11% of 2013. The dismissal ratio is 4%.

If one considers exclusively the “decisions” (established + dismissed), of the 106 decided cases (77 established fraud and 29 dismissals), 73% is the ‘conviction rate’ and 23% the ‘dismissal rate’. Table CP22: number of cases of suspected and established fraud, ratio of established fraud, dismissal ratio – cases reported until 2013 Table CP23 provides the information concerning the number of cases of suspected and established fraud and ratio of established fraud calculated including all the fraudulent irregularities reported until 2014 included. It will be used in the coming reports for comparability. Table CP23: number of cases of suspected and established fraud and ratio of established fraud – cases reported between 2008-2014 in the Cohesion policy Of the 87 cases of established fraud, 74 (82%) were reported by three Member States: Germany, Poland and Slovenia. Case study: attempted fraud in an ESF financed project in Italy The Guardia di Finanza in Lamezia Terme conducted Operation ‘E Pluribus Unum’, concerning serious fraud in the receipt of European Union money made available to companies in order to increase employment and provide in-company training to new recruits. In particular, following investigation, a criminal organisation was identified, that through the production and subsequent use of various forged documents, enabled a group of companies to collude and unduly benefit from this funding, amounting to approximately EUR 1 million. Some professional practices were also found to be involved in the fraud: they were frequently used by those under investigation in order to prepare the documentation needed to gain access to the funding. In addition, it was established that those responsible had, on several occasions, submitted false surety policies to the Region of Calabria, issued by a complicit foreign insurance company, guaranteeing that the requirements laid down for granting the incentives in question were correctly fulfilled. The investigation resulted in 26 natural persons being reported to the judicial authority for conspiracy and serious fraud with intent to obtain public funds, together with nine legal persons for their administrative liability in the matter. The investigation also established the improper receipt of Community funding from the Structural Funds amounting to around EUR 1 million, for which a preventative seizure was carried out, with a view to equivalent compensation, consisting of movable or immovable assets, money and company shares worth EUR 1.7 million.



Section II - Decentralised Management The EU as a global player / Pre-Accession Policy The goal of the EU as a global player is also promoted through direct management. Pre-Accession Assistance (PAA) is provided through decentralised management where third countries distribute funds but account to the EU for how it is spent. In the last stages new member states manage pre-accession funds under shared management to help them complete the transition. 6.Pre-Accession Policy (Pre-Accession Assistance and Instrument for Pre-Accession I and II)

The assistance in pre-accession is provided on the basis of the European Partnerships of the potential candidates and the Accession Partnerships of the candidate countries. The current candidate countries are Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Potential candidate countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. 6.1.The Pre-accession Assistance (PAA), 2000-06 The old Pre-accession Assistance (PAA), regarding the period 2000-06, was financed by series of European Union programmes and financial instruments for candidate countries or potential candidate countries, namely the programmes for candidate countries, PHARE , SAPARD and ISPA , Phare Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) and Coordination, Pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey, Assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilisation for potential candidate countries ( CARDS ) and Transition facility.This assistance has nearly been closed except for a few payments in CARDS. 6.2.The Instrument for Pre-accession 2007-13 – IPA I The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which covers the period 2007-2013, is delivered through five components. The policy and programming of IPA consists of Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF) on a three year basis, established by country, component and a theme, and Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPDs) per country or per groups of countries (regional and horizontal programmes). The Candidate Countries submit also Strategic Coherence Frameworks (SCF) and Multi-annual Operational Programmes, both regarding IPA Components III and IV. Their principal aim is to prepare beneficiary countries for the future use of the Cohesion policy instruments by imitating closely its strategic documents, National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and Operational Programmes (OP), and management modes. The financing of IPA is provided by the five following different components and DG Enlargement leads in the coordination of the instrument: (5)Component I, Transition Assistance and Institution Building (TAIB), is managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Enlargement ; (6)Component II, Cross-Border Cooperation, is managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Enlargement and part is managed, under shared management with Member States, by European Commission's Directorate General for Regional Policy; (7)Component III, Regional Development, is managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Regional Policy; (8)Component IV, Human Resources Development, is managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs ; and (9)Component V - Rural Development is managed by the European Commission's Directorate General for Agriculture . The pre- and post-accession assistance is implemented through a variety of management modes which take into account different levels of preparedness of the beneficiary countries. The assistance under IPA is designed also to prepare the beneficiary countries to assume full responsibility for the management of financial assistance granted by the EU. The eligibility for IPA components differs depending on the state of preparedness. In the use of funds the IPA beneficiary countries are divided into two categories. Croatia and the EU candidate countries: the Former Yugoslav Republic of FYROM, Serbia and Turkey; are eligible for all five components of IPA. While the new candidate countries, Albania and Montenegro (candidate status awarded in 2010), currently remain outside the scope of intervention of IPA Component III, the regional development. The Potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99) are eligible only for the first two components. Implementation of Components I and II falls under the responsibility of DG Enlargement, which initiates the components under a centralised management mode, with a view to transferring implementation management powers to the beneficiary countries as soon as their administrative capacities are considered sufficiently developed to ensure sound financial manag