ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
7.

Notes with satisfaction that the Authority is proactive in identifying opportunities for efficiency and synergies with other agencies, in particular with the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), through the European Supervisory Authorities’ Joint Committee and through joint procurements; welcomes the Authority’s priority to develop common guidance in cooperation with EBA and ESMA on how to integrate anti-money laundering and terrorist financing risks in prudential supervision; strongly encourages the Authority to actively seek further and broader cooperation with all Union agencies; moreover calls on the Authority to explore possible ways of merging its non-expert services, such as ICT, with other Union agencies;
19.

Reiterates its deep concerns about the corporate sponsorship of Member States hosting the Union Presidency and echoes the concerns expressed by Union citizens and Members on the matter; is highly concerned by the possible reputational damage and the risk of loss of trust that this practice might cause the Union, its institutions and especially the Council in the eyes of Union citizens; moreover, strongly recommends the Council to envisage the budgetisation of Presidencies, requests the Council to forward this concern to the Member States, in particular to the current Presidency trio, and calls on the current Presidency trio to take these recommendations into serious consideration and report back to Parliament;
2.

Notes that, according to the Court’s report, the Authority, in accordance with the related fees regulation, charges fees to credit rating agencies and that such fees should only cover the Authority’s expenditure related to the registration, certification and supervision of credit rating agencies; notes that, in 2017, the fees that the Authority charged credit rating agencies exceeded that expenditure by EUR 853 950 and the Authority spent that surplus on other activities, while in 2018, that expenditure exceeded the fees charged to credit rating agencies by EUR 224 664; notes that the cumulated deviation for the period from 2015 to 2018 amounts to EUR 540 412; observes, furthermore, that the Authority charges fees to trade repositories in accordance with the related fees regulation, and that such fees should only cover expenditure related to the registration and supervision of trade repositories; notes that, in 2017, the Authority’s expenditure related to the registration and supervision of trade repositories exceeded the related fees charged by EUR 452 466, and that, in 2018, the Authority’s expenditure in that same field exceeded the related fees charged by EUR 30 882; notes that the cumulated deviation for the period from 2015 to 2018 amounts to EUR 545 735 (or 6 %); observes that, although the Authority followed the guidance provided by the Commission, surpluses and deficits can lead to an annual cross-financing of activities; notes the Authority’s reply that in 2017, it had to reallocate resources to work on a particular risk related to trade repositories, resulting in a gap between the collected fees and the actual expenditure, while always using the Commission’s guidance on the budgeting model for its fees, and that any short-term imbalance has to be offset in the long term; calls on the Authority to continue limiting such cross-financing as long as significant deviations are not recurrent in the Authority’s budget;
6.

Notes that at the end of 2016, the Commission launched a joint evaluation of the Agency and the three other agencies in the employment and social affairs policy field, namely the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) and the European Training Foundation (ETF); in April 2019, the Commission published a staff working document on the evaluation, with a key conclusion that the methods used by the Agency were successful in ensuring that the topics on which it focuses were relevant and that it engaged with the relevant stakeholders, but that some improvements could be made; notes that an action plan has been adopted by the Agency’s management board to ensure that positive aspects are continued and that improvements are implemented where needed;
16.

Notes from the Court’s report that in 2019, the Joint Undertaking’s governing board appointed an ad hoc group to review its reporting system, and that the ad hoc group proposed that a new earned value management (EVM) system should be introduced, as endorsed by the governing board in April 2019; notes with concern, however, that the proposed EVM system does not take into account all the independent experts’ recommendations or provide clear information on what technical progress was achieved against costs incurred to date regarding the total delivery obligations of the Joint Undertaking's for the ITER project; notes from the Court’s report that considering the importance of the new EVM system to track performance, it is crucial, that its effectiveness during the implementation phase is monitored by the Joint Undertaking and that the governing board is informed where significant issues emerge; stresses that the EVM system is in line with the requirements of the Joint Undertaking’s governing board, which is composed of Member States and which assigned a dedicated working group to design the EVM system according to the special characteristics of the Joint Undertaking; notes from the Joint Undertaking’s reply that the EVM is now stable and is the result of extensive interaction with multi-annual planning expert ad-hoc group (the ‘Group’); notes the Group’s recommendation that textbook EVM measures are not recommended because of the special features of the Joint Undertaking and the amount of effort that would require to implement them, and that the EVM measures should be used to monitor the Joint Undertaking’s performance instead; notes, furthermore, that the Joint Undertaking considers that no further action is necessary in that regard, having fully complied with the Group’s decisions; welcomes the Joint Undertaking’s adoption of a more consistent reporting on project performance through the adoption of a project booklet; calls on the Joint Undertaking to broaden the EVM system with the criteria used to analyse the independent experts' recommendations and guarantee public access to the project booklet;
11.

Notes that an external evaluation of the Union agencies under the remit of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), namely Eurofound, Cedefop, ETF and EU-OSHA, was carried out in 2018 on behalf of the Commission, with regard to their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and added value at Union level; notes that the Commission published the main findings of the evaluation that it commissioned, together with the full evaluation report on the four Union agencies referred to, and that the Foundation is implementing actions in response to the recommendations from the Commission and will report on it in its 2020 annual activity report; reminds the Commission to monitor and evaluate that the technical expertise and other potential of agencies under the remit of DG EMPL are consistently used to support policy preparation and implementation;
22.

Regrets that the Authority, in relation to the two-year cooling off period, still includes in its independence policy the obligation to screen experts’ interests only in relation to the mandate of the scientific group to which the expert is applying; disagrees with the Authority’s claims that the current policy is a "robust and sophisticated way to avoid potential conflicts"; calls again for the policy to be updated without delay in order to ensure that experts’ interests are viewed within the context of the Authority’s overall remit, as repeatedly called for by Parliament; reminds the Authority that, in order to maintain the independence of its panels, the Authority can access any expertise it needs by inviting experts to participate in hearings without giving them the right to participate in the panel’s deliberations and drafting conclusions;
A.

whereas, according to its financial statements of revenue and expenditure, the final budget of the Euratom Supply Agency (the ‘Agency’) for the financial year 2019 was EUR 223 000, representing an increase of 81,30 % compared to 2018, due to the implementation of an IT service contracts for which the Agency received an additional contribution from the Commission at the end of 2019; whereas the entire budget of the Agency derives from the Union budget;
M.

whereas the number of passengers carried by Finnair dropped by 76,2 % and its revenue fell by 73,2 % in 2020 compared to 2019, leading the company to accumulate an operating loss of EUR 464,5 million in 2020 (9); whereas in response Finnair had to reduce its costs in order to address this crisis and savings were made in real estate, aircraft leasing, IT (digitalisation and automation of its customer processes), sales and distribution costs, as well as administration costs and compensation structures; whereas this led to the reduction of the workforce by 700 jobs (10) and almost all of the workforce being furloughed for a part of the year, with furloughs continuing in 2021 for a large share of the workforce;
2.

Notes, following the observations of the Court, that the Agency has had a high rate of late payments in the last 4 years, and in 11 % of the payments in 2020; notes that the late payments for 2020 showed an improvement of 7 %, compared to 18 % of late payments in 2019; notes that the late payments’ figure for 2020 still includes the backlog of late payments that was ‘carried over’ from 2019; notes that, without the aforementioned accumulation of late payments, the payments made later than the legal time limits and related to 2020 activities were equal to 3 %; notes that most late payments concerned the reimbursement of travel costs for participants to workshops; acknowledges the Agency’s reply stating that additional staff were added to process payments and to fully clear the 2019 backlog during the course of 2020; notes that the Agency also decided to explore the possibility to outsource the reimbursements of expenses for experts and participants to workshops to the Commission’s Paymaster Office; reiterates the need to address the late payment situation and to mitigate the financial and reputational risk described by the Court;
13.

Observes that in 2020, in order to support the strategy ‘Towards 2024’, the Ombudsman reviewed its organisational chart, a procedure completed in June 2021 with the recruitment of the Director of Administration; calls on the Ombudsman to monitor and report on the outcome of the changes in its organisational structure in the long-term; notes with satisfaction the positive results of the new organisational structure which relies to a large extent on a system based on trusting staff and includes elements such as enhancing the impact and the efficiency of the inquiry process through the elimination of excessive hierarchy; facilitating internal communication, coordination and collaborative work between teams; empowering staff to acquire managerial experience as team leaders; and ensuring a versatile and flexible workforce; believes that the establishment of peer review teams will facilitate consistency and a uniform approach and will improve the quality of case work;
9.

Notes that the FCH2 maintained the position of ‘Service knowledge management’ with constant assignments to interim staff for a period of around 2,5 years due to the request of the FCH2 governing board to enhance the role of knowledge management and that, according to the Commission’s framework contract for interim services the use of interim staff, however, is limited to office work of a one-off or temporary nature, arising from an exceptional increase in workload and/or the performance of a one-off activity, or to fill a vacant post pending the recruitment of a permanent staff member and that that FCH2 practice is against this principle and in fact creates a permanent post, in addition to those foreseen in the staff establishment plans; notes the FCH2’s reply that the interim staff was needed to face the turnover for the post of knowledge management officer between the years 2015 to 2020 and which explains partly the need for interim staff to ensure continuity of the service, and that furthermore, the FCH2 could only ensure the consequent increased workload with interim staff, following the special request of its governing board; emphasises however that the use of interim staff should remain a temporary solution otherwise it could negatively affect the FCH2’s overall performance, such as the retention of key competences, unclear accountability channels, and lower staff efficiency; calls on the FCH2 to report to the discharge authority any development in that regard;
16.

Notes that the Court found that the Agency signed a specific contract for software that was different from the software offered by the contractor in its tender for the associated framework contract; notes that the Agency did not modify the framework contract; notes that, according to the Court’s observation, acquiring a different product that is not included in the price offer, at a different price than the product originally offered, is a deviation from the framework contract; notes the Court’s conclusion that the specific contract is non-compliant with the framework contract as is the associated payment of EUR 10 399 834; notes that the Agency acknowledges the Court’s observations and underlines that following the issuance of the Court’s observation, the Agency responded promptly, signing an amendment to the framework contract in order to rectify the initial omission; notes that the Agency states that the non-compliance did not result in any prejudice to the financial interests of the Agency or the Union as it considers that the expenditure was justified; regrets that the Agency did not follow the appropriate procedures, especially given the substantial amount concerned; notes the extensive considerations that the Agency’s executive director presented in a hearing with Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 29 November 2021, stating that the decision to acquire the software in question was a conscious decision of the Agency’s management with the purpose of reducing the duplication of training and support efforts, ultimately reducing the overall operational costs for the Agency; emphasises that, even though cost-saving opportunities can be assumed, the applicable procurement rules must be followed at all times to ensure that the Union taxpayer gets full value for money through transparent and competitive procurement procedures; calls on the Agency to make sure that procurement rules are respected at all times;
25.

Notes that missions, which are essential to fulfil the role of the Court (i.e. to audit national bodies on the spot or to present the annual report to national parliaments), are limited by the annual budget and have to undergo comprehensive ex ante and ex post controls carried out on monthly samples; welcomes that Court Decision No 59-2017 delegated the role of authorising officer for all missions and expenses of members of the Court to the Secretary-General of the Court, while Court Decision No 61-2017 clarified the rules governing missions, in particular the obligation to demonstrate how the mission relates to the Court’s work, and emphasises that missions must be clearly and unambiguously declared as such; notes that members of the Court also serve as contact points for national audit institutions and for providing information to citizens about the use of Union funds; notes with concern, however, that no limitation or condition applies to the duration or place of missions which potentially creates risks of inefficient time management; believes that particular attention should be paid to missions to third countries with regard to duration, added value and costs; calls on the Court to set appropriate rules to prevent any possible misuse of mission orders which may call into question the integrity, independence and objectivity of its members; points out in particular that members’ missions must in general start or end in Luxembourg in accordance with the explicit residence obligation, except in cases of occasional and justified exceptions; expects that the members of the Court actively take part in audit missions and that their tasks and responsibilities must be specified to avoid any form of potential misconduct;
3.

Observes from the Court’s report that, on 17 December 2019, the Institute signed an amendment to the agreement with the Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations for the provision of EUR 378 950 under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for the implementation of the action entitled ‘Increased capacity of EU candidate countries and potential candidates to measure and monitor the impact of gender equality policies (2018 to 2021)’, and that the amount was received on 27 December 2019 but that information relating to that amount was not included in the budget; remarks that, pursuant to Article 157 of the Financial Regulation, such information must be reported; regrets that the Institute did not publish an amendment to its 2020 budget in order to include the amount cashed and did not include it in the 2020 budget published on 31 March 2021, and that a similar issue was previously reported in 2019; notes that. at the end of 2021, the Institute implemented the Court’s observation on budgetary management in the audit of the 2020 accounts and that the Institute proceeded with the publication of a corrigendum (3) to its 2020 budget regarding the contribution from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; notes that the action is currently under follow-up by the Court; calls on the Institute, as the Courts notes this is indicative of a systemic issue, to provide the discharge authority with an explanation for the reoccurrence of the reporting issue in 2020; calls on the Institute to inform the discharge authority about other measures it has taken to prevent it from happening again;
B4-0033, 0041 and 0082/95

Resolution on the position of independent media in the succession states of the former Yugoslavia

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on the subject, particularly that of 15 December 1994 on the survival of the Belgrade daily paper Borba ((Minutes of that sitting, Part II, Item 13(f).)),

A. concerned at the policy pursued by Mr Milosevic, which is creating an absolute monopoly of opinion in Serbia, since radio and television broadcasting and all other newspapers are already controlled directly or indirectly by the regime,

B. having regard to the underhand tricks, largely fiscal in nature, used in an attempt to undermine the Croatian satirical paper Feral Tribune,

C. conscious of the key role of independent media in informing the people and countering prejudice,

1. Calls once again on the Council and the Commission to use political and financial means to help the independent media at risk in the succession states of the former Yugoslavia to survive and to continue their work;

2. Insists that among the conditions for relaxation of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro the opportunity for independent media to continue in those countries must be explicitly included, but believes that a relaxation of sanctions on newsprint and television equipment, provided such supplies were channelled through NGOs and not through the Milosevic authorities, should be considered;

3. Calls on the editorial staff of the independent media and publishers' and journalists' organizations throughout Europe to express solidarity as a profession towards the independent media in the succession states of the former Yugoslavia, thereby facilitating the two-way flow of information;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the government of the 'Yugoslav Federation', the government of Croatia, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the secretariat of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN committee for monitoring sanctions.
B4-0173, 0194 and 0203/95

Resolution on relocation of businesses in the European Union

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Protocol on Social Policy annexed to the Treaty on European Union and Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees ((OJ L 254, 30.9.1994, p. 64.)),

- having regard to its previous resolutions, in particular that of 10 March 1994 on the closure of the Suzuki factory at Linares in Spain ((OJ C 91, 28.3.1994, p. 215.)),

A. having regard to the decision by several industrial concerns to switch production to other countries, which has resulted in numerous redundancies, particularly in the textile and clothing, electronics, footwear and automotive sectors and even in the service sector,

B. whereas senior management of these companies justify their decisions on grounds of lower wage costs and direct or indirect financial grants from the governments of Member States or the Community,

C. having regard to the most recent case of the threatened closure of the Renault plant which opened in the Setúbal region in 1991 and which is 25% owned by the Portuguese State, employed some 1 300 workers in 1992; having regard to the serious plight of some 500 workers who have just been made redundant by Renault, despite promises by the Portuguese Government,

D. having regard to the drastic effect this shutdown might have, as part of a relocation strategy, not only on the workers employed by Renault in Setúbal but also on hundreds of small local businesses which subcontract to the plant,

1. Expresses its solidarity and sympathy with all workers affected by this strategy and particularly those made redundant or at risk of being made redundant in Setúbal;

2. Calls for companies which engage in relocation with practices akin to social dumping inside and outside the Community to be no longer eligible for employment premiums in the European Union;

3. Considers that where protection measures are not taken, the transfer of production units without consultation of the social partners constitutes a serious threat to economic and social cohesion;

4. Calls on the Commission to carry out a study into relocation in the European Union and to report back to Parliament;

5. Calls on the Commission to make public in this particular case the guarantees which it secured from the Portuguese Government and Renault with a view to approving the plan to set up the factory in Setúbal and to granting Community subsidies;

6. Points out once again the need to apply the measures on transfer of undertaking set out in Directive 94/45/EC referred to above;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government and Assembly of the Republic of Portugal, the Renault trade unions and management in Portugal and France, the European Trade Union Confederation and UNICE.