EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 20.7.2021 SWD(2021) 722 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report















Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report















The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2021) 700 final} - {SWD(2021) 701 final} - {SWD(2021) 702 final} - {SWD(2021) 703 final} - {SWD(2021) 704 final} - {SWD(2021) 705 final} - {SWD(2021) 706 final} - {SWD(2021) 707 final} - {SWD(2021) 708 final} - {SWD(2021) 709 final} - {SWD(2021) 710 final} - {SWD(2021) 711 final} - {SWD(2021) 712 final} - {SWD(2021) 713 final} - {SWD(2021) 714 final} - {SWD(2021) 715 final} - {SWD(2021) 716 final} - {SWD(2021) 717 final} - {SWD(2021) 718 final} - {SWD(2021) 719 final} - {SWD(2021) 720 final} - {SWD(2021) 721 final} - {SWD(2021) 723 final} - {SWD(2021) 724 final} - {SWD(2021) 725 final} - {SWD(2021) 726 final} - {SWD(2021) 727 final}



Abstract The reforms of the Polish justice system, including new developments, continue to be a source of serious concerns as referred to in 2020. Reforms carried out since 2015 increased the influence of the executive and legislative powers over the justice system to the detriment of judicial independence and led the Commission to launch the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU, which is still ongoing. In April 2021, the Commission referred Poland to the Court of Justice in view of a law on the judiciary which undermines the independence of judges and is incompatible with EU law. In July 2021, the Court ordered interim measures in that case. On the same day, the Constitutional Tribunal held that interim measures ordered by the Court of Justice in the area of the judiciary are inconsistent with the Polish constitution. Also in July 2021, the Court of Justice found that the disciplinary regime for judges in Poland is not compatible with EU law. The National Council for the Judiciary continues to operate despite its contested independence and the functioning of the Supreme Court was further affected, including by changes in legislation. In May 2021, the European Court of Human Rights found irregularities in an appointment procedure to the Constitutional Tribunal. The legal and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption is largely in place. Yet, there are risks as regards the effectiveness of the fight against high-level corruption, including a risk of undue influence on corruption prosecutions for political purposes. In this context, concerns remain over the independence of the main institutions responsible for the prevention and fight against corruption, considering in particular the subordination of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau to the executive and the fact that the Minister of Justice is also the Prosecutor-General. The dedicated government anti-corruption programme was implemented in the years 2018-2020, yet key legislative tasks remain unfinished. Structural weaknesses continue to exist as regards the asset declaration system and lobbying. Regarding media freedom and pluralism, the Government is expected to adopt legislation to transpose the Audiovisual Media Service Directive to strengthen the independence of media regulators. The Polish media market has been so far considered diverse, but stakeholders fear negative impacts of the acquisition of Polska Press by the state-owned company Orlen. While the competition authority (UOKiK) approved the transaction, the Polish Ombudsperson challenged this decision considering that this authority did not examine whether the acquisition would result in restricting press freedom. Concerns were also raised about a draft tax legislation targeting some media groups, in an environment considered as increasingly unwelcoming towards foreign-owned media outlets. Since 2020, journalists’ professional environment has deteriorated, with use of intimidating judicial proceedings, growing failure to protect journalists and violent actions during protests, including from police forces. The system of checks and balances continues to be under considerable pressure. The expedited adoption of legislation continues to be used, also beyond issues linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, including for structural reforms of the judiciary, with no or limited consultation of stakeholders. Some measures introduced by the Government in 2020 to address the COVID-19 pandemic have been considered unlawful by courts in individual cases. The Ombudsperson continues to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard. Following a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, the continued exercise of core powers by the outgoing Ombudsperson ended in July 2021. Parliamentary proceedings now point to an appointment of a new Ombudsperson with cross-party support. The civil society space is still vibrant but has been affected further by general problems concerning women’s rights, and by attacks on LGBTI groups. I.Justice System The Polish justice system is separated in two main branches, administrative and ordinary judiciary. The Supreme Administrative Court and 16 administrative courts exercise control over public administration, including the lawfulness of measures of bodies of local government and of territorial organs of government administration. The ordinary judiciary, supervised by the Supreme Court, consists of three levels: 11 appeal courts, 46 regional courts and 318 district courts. Judges are appointed by the President of the Republic at the request of the National Council for the Judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal, which adjudicates notably on the constitutionality of legislation, is composed of 15 judges chosen by the Sejm (lower chamber of the Parliament) for a term of office of 9 years. The National Council for the Judiciary is tasked by the Constitution to safeguard judicial independence. A particular characteristic of the prosecution system, which is not part of the independent judiciary, is that the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice are the same person. The Constitution provides that advocates and legal counsellors can self-regulate their practice. Independence The perception of judicial independence among the general public and companies is low and continues to decrease. Whereas in 2021 29% of the general public perceives independence of courts and judges as ‘fairly or very good’, only 18% of companies share the same perception. The perception of independence has steadily decreased for both the general public and companies during the last five years. As last year, the public debate on the judiciary continues to be marked by strong tensions. As regards the smear campaign conducted in 2019 against judges who openly criticised the justice reforms, so far no judicial decisions have been taken. The justice reforms initiated in November 2015 continue to be implemented on the ground. These reforms were carried out through more than 30 laws relating to the entire structure of the justice system, including the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council for the Judiciary, the Supreme Court, the ordinary courts, administrative courts, and the prosecution service. Multiple aspects of the justice reform raise serious concerns as regards the rule of law, in particular judicial independence. This is the main focus of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by the Commission, which remains under consideration by the Council. Also the European Parliament reiterated its concerns regarding the situation of the rule of law in Poland in a resolution. The safeguarding of judicial independence in Poland is one of the country-specific recommendations addressed in the context of the 2020 European Semester, which remains to be addressed. Meanwhile, the Polish Government has openly defied the binding nature of an interim measures order issued by the Court of Justice on 21 May 2021 in a case lodged against Poland for breach of EU environmental law. The Court of Justice further clarified EU law requirements relating to judicial independence in the Polish context. On 2 March 2021, the Court of Justice issued a judgment in a preliminary ruling procedure, clarifying the requirements of EU law with respect to judicial appointments to the Supreme Court that took place in 2018. The Court of Justice, while leaving the definitive assessment to the referring court, held that successive amendments to the Polish Law on the National Council of the Judiciary which had the effect of removing effective judicial review of that Council’s decisions proposing to the President of the Republic candidates for the office of judge at the Supreme Court are liable to infringe EU law. In that respect, the Court noted that given the decisive role of the National Council for the Judiciary in the procedure of appointment of judges in Poland its degree of independence is relevant for ensuring judicial independence, indicating that the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary is open to doubt. On 6 May 2021, the Supreme Administrative Court implemented the above judgment of the Court of Justice, ruling that the current National Council for the Judiciary, in the procedure for appointing judges, does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence from the executive and the legislature and that, consequently, the Council’s resolutions giving rise to appointments to the Criminal and Civil Chambers of the Supreme Court in 2018 are annulled. A number of additional requests for preliminary rulings by various Polish Courts relating to the justice reforms of 2017 and 2018 are still pending before the Court of Justice. On 15 July 2021, in the context of an infringement procedure launched by the Commission, the Court of Justice found that the disciplinary regime for judges in Poland is not compatible with EU law. Notably, the Court of Justice found that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court does not provide all the guarantees of impartiality and independence and is not protected from the direct or indirect influence of the Polish legislature and executive. The Commission decided on 31 March 2021 to refer Poland to the Court of Justice in view of concerns related to the law on the judiciary of December 2019. The Commission considers that the contested Polish legislation undermines the independence of Polish judges in breach of Article 19(1) TEU and the primacy of EU law. The law prevents Polish courts, including by threatening with disciplinary proceedings, from directly applying EU law protecting judicial independence as well as from referring questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary rulings. Moreover, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court – the independence of which is not guaranteed – continues to take decisions which have a direct impact on judges and the way they exercise their function. This includes cases of the lifting of immunity of judges to allow criminal proceedings against them or to detain them, and the consequent temporary suspension from office and reduction of their salary. The mere prospect of having to face proceedings before a body whose independence is not guaranteed creates a ‘chilling effect’ for judges and can affect their own independence. This seriously undermines judicial independence in Poland, effective judicial protection for citizens in Poland and the EU legal order as a whole. The Polish Government considers that the Commission is exceeding its competences under the Treaty and rejects the position the Commission has taken in this infringement procedure. The Commission has asked the Court of Justice to issue interim measures to suspend judicial activities of the Disciplinary Chamber with regard to judges, in particular concerning the lifting of judicial immunity, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to judicial independence and the EU legal order. On 14 July 2021, the Vice-President of the Court issued an Order for interim measures in case C-204/21 R, granting in full the Commission’s request. The European Court of Human Rights, seized in a number of cases related to the functioning of the Polish justice system, held that a 2015 appointment to the Constitutional Tribunal led to a breach of the requirement of ‘a tribunal established by law’. In February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights communicated that there are currently 27 cases pending before it which raise various issues relating to the justice reforms of 2017 and 2018. So far, in 21 of the cases lodged, notice has been given to the Polish Government. On 7 May 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a bench including a judge appointed to a judicial post that had already been filled in by the legislature of 2011-2015 did not constitute a ‘tribunal established by law’. These irregularities in the appointment procedure of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal have been raised as a serious concern in the Reasoned Proposal adopted by the Commission under Article 7(1) TEU procedure. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that this judgement is ‘non-existent’. On 29 June 2021, the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling concerning the premature removal by the Minister of Justice of judges from their post as vice-presidents of ordinary courts. The Court emphasised the importance of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and respect for procedural fairness in cases concerning the careers of judges, and held that, as their premature removal as vice-president of the court had not been reasoned nor examined either by an ordinary court or by another body exercising judicial duties, without there being any serious reason for the lack of judicial review, Poland had infringed the right of access to a court. Concerns over the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal, raised by the Commission under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure, have still not been resolved. This is also illustrated by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 May 2021. In 2020, the Ombudsperson continued to express concerns about the functioning and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal, including as regards changes made to already designated hearing panels and dismissals of requests for recusal of judges in view of their alleged lack of impartiality or contested status. Also the Council of Europe expressed similar concerns. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Tribunal continues to be seized on cases concerning the justice reforms not only by the Prime Minister, the Marshal of the Sejm, the National Council for the Judiciary and the newly created Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, but also by other (newly appointed) Supreme Court judges and the newly appointed First President of the Supreme Court. Three cases initiated at the Constitutional Tribunal by the Prosecutor General, the Prime Minister, and a group of members of the Sejm seek an assessment of the compatibility with the Constitution of EU Treaty provisions and a declaration of the precedence of the Polish Constitution over EU law. The Commission expressed its concerns about the motion lodged by the Prime Minister as it contests the fundamental principles of EU law, in particular the primacy of EU law. Despite clear case law of the Court of Justice, the Constitutional Tribunal already indicated in an obiter dictum that the Court of Justice lacks competence to issue rulings as regards the justice systems of the Member States. In spite of the concerns referred to above, the Constitutional Tribunal delivered decisions with a significant impact both on individuals and the institutional framework. In particular, on 22 October 2020 and on 15 April 2021 respectively, the Constitutional Tribunal issued decisions regarding the right to abortion and the situation of the Ombudsperson. These decisions sparked strong criticism within Poland and beyond. Moreover, on 14 July 2021 – following the issuance of an interim measures order by the Vice-President of the Court of Justice – the Constitutional Tribunal held that Article 4(3) second subparagraph TEU read in connection with Article 279 TFEU are unconstitutional to the extent that they oblige Poland to abide by interim measures orders issued by the Court of Justice that affect the organisation and functioning of Polish courts and the procedure before such courts. In a public statement, the Commission expressed its deep concern about this decision of the Constitutional Tribunal. The National Council for the Judiciary continues to be composed mainly of politically appointed members. It is recalled that the 2018 justice reform changed the procedure for the appointment of judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). In its judgment of 2 March 2021, upon a preliminary reference of the Supreme Court, the Court of Justice reiterated that for the participation of a Council for the Judiciary in making the appointment process of judges by political organs more objective, such body must itself be sufficiently independent of the legislature and executive and of the body to which it gives an opinion. On 6 May 2021, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the current NCJ does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence from the executive and the legislature in the procedure for appointing judges. Despite the serious concerns also expressed by a number of other Polish courts pointing to its lack of independence, the NCJ continues to propose candidates for judicial appointments to the President of the Republic which are systematically appointed. Throughout 2020 and 2021, the NCJ has issued one resolution to protect the independence of a Polish judge, namely to express support to a member of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, while refusing to express similar support to judges targeted by criminal investigations carried out by the prosecution services in the same period. The NCJ also provided statements in support of certain aspects of the justice reforms criticised by the Commission. The Supreme Court, following changes in 2020, was subject to further reforms regarding its functioning. On 1 April 2021, the President of the Republic signed into law the bill of 30 March 2021 amending the law on the Supreme Court. The new law lowers the quorum requirements for judges to select candidates to the post of President of a Chamber and allows the President of the Republic to appoint an ‘acting’ President of the Chamber if such requirements are not met. Moreover, the law grants the First President of the Supreme Court control over sittings of joined Chambers gathered to settle legal issues, convened either by the First President on her own motion or at the request of i.a. the Prosecutor General or the Ombudsperson. The new law also changes the rules governing the extraordinary appeal procedure by prolonging by 2 years the period to make extraordinary appeals against all rulings of all Polish courts that became final after 17 October 1997. The Ombudsperson and the National Bar Council expressed critical views on the new law, underlining that it would further affect the independence of the Supreme Court. The current First President of the Supreme Court, appointed as reported last year following a contested procedure, has taken decisions giving rise to concerns, in particular seizing the Constitutional Tribunal on controversial issues, including to limit the right to access to documents and requesting to shield newly appointed Supreme Court judges - including herself - from having their status contested in cases pending before the Supreme Court. The First President also seized the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs to recuse certain Supreme Court judges from cases in which they had already made a preliminary ruling request to the Court of Justice. On 16 July 2021, the First President of the Supreme Court issued a statement which refers to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 14 July 2021 and, considering that EU law does not cover matters regarding the organisation and functioning of the Member States’ judiciary, informs about the repeal of the instruction for the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court suspending its activity in disciplinary proceedings against judges. Several judges are suspended and cannot adjudicate cases following the decisions of the Disciplinary Chamber to lift their immunity. The disciplinary regime, substantially amended in 2018, has given rise to concerns and the Commission contested its violation of EU law in infringement proceedings. On 8 April 2020, following a request for interim measures, the Court of Justice ordered Poland to immediately suspend the application of the national provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court with regard to disciplinary cases concerning judges. Following the suspension of the disciplinary cases from its remit, the Disciplinary Chamber has begun to actively exercise its new powers to decide on motions of the prosecution service to lift the immunity of judges alleged to have committed a criminal offence. Since 14 February 2020, the date of entry into force of the new law on the judiciary, until 15 March 2021, the Disciplinary Chamber examined over 40 such motions already, and in more than 10 such cases the judges concerned have been suspended in office and their salary reduced. Several motions remain pending before the Disciplinary Chamber, including as regards judges of the Supreme Court. In the context of the infringement proceedings in case C-204/21, the Commission asked the Court of Justice to suspend all activities of the Disciplinary Chamber as regards cases concerning judges, including decisions to lift the immunity of judges. On 14 July 2021, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice granted, in full, the request of the Commission and suspended all activities of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court as regards judges – different from disciplinary cases concerning judges. On 15 July 2021, the Court of Justice issued a final ruling in the infringement case brought by the Commission, finding that the disciplinary regime for judges in Poland is not compatible with EU law . Judges continue to be subject to intrusive requirements. The new law on the judiciary of 20 December 2019 obliges all judges in Poland to disclose personal information, such as their membership in associations, functions in non-profit organisations and their membership and position in political parties prior to 29 December 1989. Disciplinary proceedings against judges who refused to comply with this requirement continue to be pending. In the context of the infringement proceedings in case C-204/21, the Commission considers that this requirement is inconsistent with EU law as regards the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the General Data Protection Regulation. A general prohibition for Polish courts to challenge the powers of courts and tribunals, constitutional organs and law enforcement agencies continues to exert its effects. The new law on the judiciary prevents Polish judges from ruling on the lawfulness of judicial appointments and on a judge’s power to perform judicial functions. The same prohibition applies to judges assessing the lawfulness of the composition of a hearing bench. At the same time, the law granted the new Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs the sole power to decide on issues related to judicial independence. The Commission decided on 31 March 2021 to challenge these prohibitions of the law on the judiciary in infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice. On 14 July 2021, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice issued an Order for interim measures in case C-204/21 R, suspending the application of the provisions concerned. In certain cases in which ordinary courts challenged the legality of rulings delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal and by the Disciplinary Chamber, judges have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings.

Concerns persist regarding the fact that the offices of Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General are held by the same person. As already set out in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, following the merging in the context of the reforms in 2016 of the positions of Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice, the Minister of Justice directly wields the powers vested in the highest prosecutorial office, including the authority to issue instructions to prosecutors in specific cases and to transfer prosecutors. This power has been subject to criticism including by the Venice Commission and by the Commission in its Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure relating to the rule of law in Poland. Recently, the National Prosecutor has actively exercised the power to transfer prosecutors, without their consent and without providing justification, to another post for up to 6 months. This power is reported to be used in practice as a tool against prosecutors who express critical views about the functioning of the prosecution service. Judges seized in disputes in which such secondments are challenged have been called by the prosecution services to testify in the context of criminal investigations. Moreover, concerns are raised that the exercise by the Prosecutor General and the National Prosecutor of their power to discretionally reattribute cases among prosecutors may be influenced by political considerations in order to impact on the conduct of criminal proceedings, including in cases of allegations of financial embezzlement. According to the National Bar Council, the prosecution services have recently also been targeting defence lawyers acting in politically sensitive cases, thereby posing a threat to the right to professional secrecy. This is aggravated by the fact that prosecutors have the power to suspend a lawyer’s licence without prior consent of the court. Quality As regards human resources, similarly to 2020, a significant number of judicial posts remain vacant. According to the official data published by the Ministry of Justice, in 2020 there were 1048 vacant posts in ordinary courts. This being said, Poland’s expenses on courts are at the level of the EU average per inhabitant and Poland continues to have one of the highest general government expenditures for the justice system (including prosecution and legal aid) as a percentage of GDP. Important progress has been made but there is room for improvement in the digitalisation of the justice system. There is still a need to introduce more IT tools in the context of judicial procedures, and stakeholders have called for further efforts to digitalise courts. There is also a need to revise those IT tools which the Supreme Audit Office found to be prone to abuse, in particular the system of allocation of cases in courts. This year, the Sejm adopted amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure aimed at a further digitalisation of the civil procedure. The reform will introduce electronic auctions concerning properties to be used by bailiffs in the context of execution of court rulings. Moreover, notwithstanding critical views expressed by representatives of legal professions, the reforms seek to introduce a system of electronic submission of documents through a comprehensive IT system for ordinary courts, where a document would be presumed to have been duly delivered 14 days following its submission. Further reforms concerning criminal and civil procedural law have been adopted. In order to respond to challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic, recently adopted provisions introduce an obligation to hold court sittings in camera, in case online connection with parties to civil proceedings is not possible. Accordingly, during the state of epidemics, civil cases would be mostly examined by single-judge benches only and the modalities applicable to specific procedures would be suspended. Furthermore, these changes would also prohibit courts and tribunals in Poland from convening general assemblies. Also as regards the criminal procedural law, the Sejm adopted a set of amendments. The changes would, among others, limit access to the casefiles of closed preliminary investigations, and would introduce obligations on telecom operators to secure data immediately following a request of a court or a prosecutor without any provision limiting this power. Specific changes to modalities applicable to the composition of hearing benches would also be introduced. Some of these changes have given rise to criticism. Efficiency The overall performance of ordinary courts is close to the EU average when it comes to the length of proceedings. In 2019, there was a slight decrease in the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases, and the rate of resolving such cases improved. Whereas the number of such cases in 2019 dropped, the number of pending cases remained the same. As regards the overall performance of ordinary courts, according to data published by the Ministry of Justice in 2021, between 2015 and 2020 the average length of proceedings increased from 4.2 months to 7 months. Poland remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the length of civil and criminal proceedings. The performance of administrative courts is above the EU average. A slight increase is visible in the number of incoming administrative cases, whilst the estimated time needed to resolve them continues to decrease. The rate of resolving such cases dropped below 100%. II.Anti-corruption framework The legal and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption is largely in place. In Poland, several authorities are responsible for anti-corruption, including the Minister of Justice, who is also the Prosecutor-General, and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration who is in charge of prevention aspects, such as the lobby register for public officials. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is the specialised law enforcement body combating corruption in the public and the private sector alongside the Central Police Investigation Bureau and the regular police, the Internal Security Agency and the Prosecution Service. It combines intelligence and police functions and can trigger both administrative and criminal proceedings. More recently, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau has also been tasked with policy coordination and corruption prevention, including educational awareness-raising activities against corruption and an e-learning platform. The Supreme Audit Office (NIK) has a preventive role monitoring the public spending of the government administration bodies, including the National Bank of Poland and state legal persons among others. The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains relatively high. In the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Poland scores 56/100 and ranks 13th in the European Union and 45th globally . This perception has significantly deteriorated over the past five years . At the central level, Poland had a developed strategic anti-corruption framework in place for the years 2018-2020 but no subsequent plan has yet been published. According to the Government, preparatory work is under way for a new national strategy to prevent and combat corruption for the years to come, which should take into account the recommendations of the EU, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the OECD, and the UN . In addition to its primary tasks as an enforcement agency, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is also the coordinating body for the Government Programme for Counteracting Corruption for the years 2018-2020 and the accompanying Action Plan , and as such mandated to propose legislation and undertake policymaking. The March 2021 implementation report of the Programme, which will be audited by the Supreme Audit Office in 2021, sets out the progress achieved in 2020. As part of the programme implementation, two sets of anti-corruption guidelines were published in the course of 2020 to standardise and unify the anti-corruption rules applicable to ministries and local government administrations . Doubts exist as to the implementation of the key legislative tasks described in the Programme, in particular with regards to the continuation of the Act on Transparency of Public Life, the publication of the draft law newly regulating asset declarations, and on lobbying . High-risk sectors for corruption are specified in the Programme and include the defence, energy and construction sector, healthcare, environment, and public administration, as well as public procurement . The budget for the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau increased , but the activities of the Programme still need to be specifically budgeted for . The Polish Criminal Code broadly criminalises corruption. The key offence penalised by the Criminal Code is bribery of public officials in its passive (accepting a bribe) and active (offering a bribe) forms . In order to tackle collusion between the giver and the recipient of a bribe, the Criminal Code allows the perpetrators of bribery to avoid legal sanctions if they notify the responsible authorities about the crime and disclose all circumstances before the authorities learn about it. The OECD has called on Poland to remove this provision, as it leads to impunity . Deficiencies have also been highlighted with regard to the effective enforcement to tackle bribery abroad . A private company can only be held criminally liable for foreign bribery after the individual who committed the bribe was convicted in the final instance. The level of sanctions are not considered effective, proportionate or dissuasive. Concerns exist as regards the effectiveness of the fight against high-level corruption. The police initiated 2 544 corruption-related investigations in 2020 (compared to 3 129 in 2019) . Since 2006, there is a steady decline in police investigations into corruption (from 6 388 police investigations in 2006 to 2 544 in 2020) . The 2020 report of the Supreme Audit Office notes overall a considerable decline in corruption risk across areas that concern the functioning of the state, as for instance in the tax administration, emphasising however serious corruption risks relating to the use of advisory and expert services by public institutions . Petty corruption has further declined. Regarding high-level corruption cases, concerns exist as to rising institutionalised corruption, immunities and impunity caused by a disparity in the treatment of corruption cases for political purposes. In this context, the fact that the Minister of Justice functions at the same time as Prosecutor-General adds to other concerns that have also been raised over the independence of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau from the executive power . The increase in supervising powers of the Prosecutor-General who can take over cases by his subordinate prosecutors provides avenues to influence anti-corruption prosecutions politically. The cooperation in practice between the relevant institutions to fight corruption in Poland at times faces some legal and organisational constraints. In particular, the restrictions to access financial data present an obstacle for the detection and prosecution of corruption . According to the government, the resources and the level of specialisation and digitalisation of the services involved are also not always sufficient to carry out their tasks in repressing corruption effectively. This concern relates specifically to the shortage of anti-corruption staff, insufficient technological resources and capacities, and effective evidence gathering to meet the standards of proof, which have prolonged procedures and obstructed official duties especially during the COVID-19 pandemic . A practical guide on conflicts of interest for public officials accompanies the relevant lobbying legislation. A guide entitled ‘Conflict of Interest – What is it and how to avoid it?’ is for Government employees to assist them in the practical implementation of the rules laid down in the Law on Lobbying Activity in the Law-Making Process . In 2020, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau examined 2 353 conflict of interest issues in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of National Defence (compared to 2 477 in 2019), covering 1 949 persons (compared to 2 187 in 2019) with no reported cases referred to the Prosecutor’s office . There are three lobby registers in place, one for the Government (based on the lobbying act), one for the lower chamber of the Parliament (Sejm), and one covering its higher chamber (Senate) . The Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration is the supervisory body over lobby activities vis-à-vis the government . For lobbying activities towards parliamentarians, the two chambers of the Parliament (Sejm and Senate) have supervisory tasks . Concerns exist as to the effectiveness of the registers. Reportedly, only one interest representative participated in a single parliamentary committee session in 2020, while a total of 508 entities are registered in the registry of the Parliament’s lower chamber . Overall, the number of lobbyists registering continues to decline, oversight is not systematic and no information exists on whether sanctions have been applied to unregistered lobbyists . Post-employment (‘revolving doors’) rules are applicable only to top-level officials (excluding members of the parliament) and limited to entities for whom a public official issued specific decisions . Technical work towards a standardised asset declaration system has been undertaken. The level of digitalisation of politicians’ asset declarations is low and a centralised submission and monitoring system is lacking . Most declarations are still filled out by hand, with various declaration forms being in use . The scope of data to disclose is similar but not identical for every obliged public official. In 2020, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau carried out 81 asset declaration controls (compared to 90 in 2019), of which 45 concerned suspected crime , and 385 pre-control analyses concerning asset declarations and compliance with anti-corruption provisions (compared to 364 in 2019). In two cases, material was provided for pending proceedings and, in two additional cases, the Prosecutor’s Office was provided with findings of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau’s inspections. A dedicated government hotline exists for whistleblowers to report corruption and corruption-related crimes. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau can receive open and anonymous reports by citizens . Until amendments are introduced to the current whistleblower provisions provided for in different legal acts, the calls to strengthen protection of reporting persons remain valid . Exemptions to public procurement rules introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic have raised concerns about possible corruption risks. This relates in particular to the exemption from criminal and disciplinary liability of officials who manage public funds or purchase equipment, services and other resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic . However, a new Public Procurement Law also entered into force in the beginning of 2021 , which anti-corruption stakeholders largely valued as good practice going into the right direction . The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is in charge of anti-corruption related aspects of the Government Anti-Crisis Shield providing financial support to micro, small and medium-size and large enterprises to combat the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. III.Media Pluralism and Media Freedom

Journalists’ protection is based on Constitutional principles and specified in sectorial legislation. The Broadcasting Act and the Press Law provide, respectively, a legal framework for the media regulator - the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) and safeguards for journalistic independence. The Broadcasting Act is expected to be amended as a result of the ongoing transposition of the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive. The upcoming changes in the legal framework will aim to strengthen the statutory safeguards for the independence of the media regulator. According to the Constitution, the members of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) are appointed by the Sejm, Senate, and the President of the Republic. They may not belong to a political party, trade union or perform public activities incompatible with their function. Poland is still working on the transposition of the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). According to the Polish authorities, the upcoming amendments of the Law on Broadcasting are expected to make the procedure for dismissing KRRiT members more rigid. Currently, the rejection of the annual report of the KRRiT by the Sejm and the Senate results in the automatic expiry of the mandate of all its members (Article 12 of the Broadcating Act). The new act will introduce additional formal requirements for this rejection procedure. In particular, it will require the President of the Republic to confirm the expiry of the KRRiT members’ term of office, following a negative vote by the Sejm and of the Senate. Both the resolutions of the Sejm and of the Senate, as well as any confirmation by the President, will need to be reasoned. Also, the list of responsibilities of the media regulator will be widened to align it with the revised AVMSD. Neither the KRRiT nor the National Media Council (RMN) - the public service media governing body - deals with the public service media news programmes. This was raised as problematic in the context of the coverage of the 2020 presidential campaign. However, the KRRiT cooperates with the Public Discourse Monitoring Centre, which provides reports on the radio and TV appearances of politicians and experts, in particular in stations and journalistic programmes. Recent developments on the Polish media market risk reducing media pluralism. Concerns have been raised regarding plans for legislative changes allowing not to grant broadcasting concessions to operators directly or indirectly controlled by persons registered outside the EEA. Stakeholders have already raised concerns about the future of TVN24 channel whose license has not yet been renewed since the application was filed in February 2020. The potential acquisition of the German-owned Polska Press by the state-controlled oil company PKN Orlen has also raised concerns as a potential threat to media market pluralism. The transaction was approved by Poland’s competition authority (UOKiK). The approval was subsequently challenged by the Polish Ombudsperson, who argued that the transaction should be reversed as it threatens the press freedom. Pending the examination of the Ombudsperson’s appeal on merits, the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection ordered interim relief temporarily suspending the UOKiK’s decision. The competition authority has three months to submit its appeal. PKN Orlen declared, however, that it considered the acquisition of shares as completed already before the court’s decision and it proceeded with various managerial decisions, including changes of personnel in the editorial teams of the Polska Press’ newspapers. According to Reporters Without Borders, such decisions should be considered as confirmation that the acquisition affects the media group’s independence, and the Ombudsperson stated that the actions of PKN Orlen have demonstrated a “blatant disregard” to the Court’s decision. In addition, the International Press Institute raised concerns that the decision of the competition authority could result in weakening media companies perceived as opponents to the ruling party. The media ownership transparency obligations are expected to be strengthened. As part of the amendments of the Broadcasting Act transposing the revised AVMSD, the Polish authorities intend to expand the scope of the transparency obligations for media service providers. This will include providing the information on beneficial owners by referring to the registration in the KRS (National Judicial Register) and the Central Register of Beneficial Owners. The amendments are expected to be enacted in the third quarter of 2021. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor reported medium risk with regards to the transparency of media ownership and high risk of news media concentration . State advertising appears to be directed mostly to the media outlets considered as government-friendly. Stakeholders report that state authorities and companies owned by the State Treasury place their announcements and advertising spots only in media considered favourable to the Government. While public media are reported to be the main beneficiaries of the state support, a recent study confirmed the growing share of the pro-Government private media. The International Press Institute has warned that instrumentalisation of public advertising affects negatively the market dynamics and could lead to a deterioration in journalistic standards.Similarly, the 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor pointed out that certain forms of state support, including grants, loans or state advertising remain fragmented and non-transparent . In addition, in March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government activated a horizontal COVID-19 “Anti-crisis shield” offering various measures of support (both financial and legislative) for all companies. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor reports that not all media groups applied for funds to cover employees’ salaries during the lockdowns. Within the framework of the “Anti-crisis shield”, the Government introduced an additional levy on local revenues of video-on-demand platforms operating in Poland. According to the representatives of the Government, the new levy was introduced in order to compensate the financial losses of cinemas and support the Polish Film Institute. The Polish legal framework recognises the right of access to public information, however proliferating limitations inhibit its implementation in practice. Stakeholders report cases of limiting access to information without explanation, cancellation or denying of journalists’ accreditation or blocking entry to certain events. Exercising the right of access to public information risks being further limited as a result of the ongoing constitutional challenge. The International Press Institute points out that the situation has deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, the 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor reports that the legal provisions adopted as a part of the COVID-19 “Anti-crisis shield”, enabled the authorities to suspend deadlines stipulated by administrative law, thereby limiting or delaying access to public information. Consequently, the 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor notes higher risks in relation to the access to information in Poland in comparison to the last year’s edition. The professional environment for journalists is deteriorating in Poland. While the safeguards of journalistic independence are included in the Broadcasting Act and the Press Law, the provisions aimed at limiting political control over media outlets are missing (for instance, limits on control of media by politicians) . As a result of political interference (both in private and public media), there were cases where journalists decided to establish new media outlets online, relying on crowdfunding business models. The violent actions of the police forces during protests and demonstrations affected also journalists reporting from such events. The 2021 World Press Freedom Index reported that Polish police force have repeatedly failed to protect journalists during protests and instead used violence and arbitrary arrests. During the lockdown period, journalists were qualified as one of the privileged professional groups allowed to stay in a hotel during work-related travel. The news media community has observed an increase in lawsuits against journalists with intimidating effects warning letters addressed to journalists and newsrooms in order to postpone or stop critical reporting concerning companies or public institutions. Such a trend appears to particularly affect smaller news outlets and freelancers that are at high risk of self-censorship due to the fear of legal consequences. While the majority of such lawsuits tend to be unsuccessful, they are reported to be still widely used to harass Government critics. The Council of Europe platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists registered 10 alerts concerning Poland in 2020, and two in 2021. The nature of the alerts confirms the trend of using intimidating legal actions against journalists. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor assesses the risks related to the journalistic profession, standards and protection at medium level. IV.Other Institutional Issues related to Checks and Balances Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral Parliament and a Constitutional Tribunal in charge of constitutional review of laws. The Sejm has the final decision-making power when adopting laws. The President of the Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 deputies, the Council of Ministers and a group of at least 100 000 citizens have the right to propose new legislation. The independent Ombudsperson is tasked with safeguarding the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens specified in the Constitution and other normative acts. The expedited adoption of legislation continues to be used for significant structural reforms of the judiciary or of other independent authorities. The recent amendments to the law on the Supreme Court were adopted in third reading by the Sejm within 24 hours from being tabled. It is recalled that ensuring effective public consultations and involvement of social partners in the policy-making process in Poland was one of the country-specific recommendations issued in the context of the 2020 European Semester. The Venice Commission and OSCE have on several occasions underlined the importance of thorough deliberations of legislative proposals and amendments, including meaningful consultations with stakeholders, experts and the civil society, and a dialogue with the political opposition. The state of epidemics introduced by the Government in March 2020 is still in force. On 20 March 2020, the Minister of Health introduced a country-wide state of epidemics in order to counter the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The state of epidemics is based on statutory legislation and allows the Minister of Health and other members of the Council of Ministers to introduce limitations on constitutional freedoms and impose obligations on the citizens and business owners. The state of epidemics has been imposed without time-limitation and will remain in place as long as the Health Minister does not revoke it by means of an ordinance. The state of epidemics and the measures it allows to be introduced through governmental ordinances have raised questions as to their constitutionality, with reference to the fact that the Polish constitution explicitly provides that any curtailment of fundamental rights and freedoms can be imposed only under the state of emergency. That position has also been taken by courts seized in individual cases concerning the imposition of sanctions due to violations of anti-COVID measures. Measures introduced in 2020 to face the COVID-19 pandemic by the Government continue to be considered unlawful by courts. Upon introduction of the state of epidemics, stakeholders have expressed concerns about the measures imposed in that context in view of their impact on fundamental rights. Following the imposition of fines by state authorities such as the Police and the Sanitary Inspection due to breaches of anti-COVID measures, ordinary and administrative courts are reported to have on a large scale rejected those fines, considering them inconsistent with the Polish constitution, including as regards the prohibition of public gatherings. A request lodged by the Prime Minister with the Constitutional Tribunal, which is still pending, seeks to prevent the Polish State from being obliged to cover damages resulting from anti-COVID measures. The Supreme Court continues to review rulings of ordinary courts in certain cases dating back 20 years. Under the new extraordinary appeal procedure, the new Chamber of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs is empowered to overturn fully or in part any final judgment delivered by ordinary courts in the past 20 years, subject to some exceptions. This new extraordinary appeal procedure, based on broad criteria, raises issues as regards the principle of legal certainty and is one of the concerns raised by the Commission in its Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure. According to the information available, most of the proceedings so far have been lodged by the Prosecutor General. Civil society space continues to be adversely affected . Poland has a broad and vibrant civil society, consisting of more than 120 000 different NGOs. However, the 2020 update of the CIVICUS report considers that the civic space for NGOs’ functioning has narrowed. The access to public funding of NGOs remains an issue. The ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 October 2020, leading to a de facto ban on abortion, sparked nation-wide protests held amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, with concerns being raised over intimidation, violence and detention of peaceful protesters. Increasing threats against women activists continue being reported allegedly with no apparent reaction from the public authorities. The Council of Europe expressed concerns as regards the harassment and intimidation of the LGBTI community in Poland, rendering the functioning of LGBTI NGOs particularly difficult, including as regards the access to funding. The Ombudsperson challenged the decision of certain regions to declare themselves to be ‘LGBTI ideology-free zones’ before the Supreme Administrative Court. The Ombudsperson, due to a ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, is obliged to end his functions while a successor has not been elected. Throughout 2020 and 2021, the Ombudsperson has continued to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard. Pursuant to the law on the Ombudsperson – who is an equality body under EU law – the incumbent Ombudsperson remains in office, pending the appointment of a new office-holder. The appointment, made by the Sejm, requires consent of the Senate, where opposition parties hold the majority. Following the expiry of the term of office of the Ombudsperson in September 2020, which the Constitution prescribes to be of five years, representatives of the governing coalition seized the Constitutional Tribunal requesting it to declare the unconstitutionality of the above statutory transitional provision. On 15 April 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal issued a ruling asserting that, if no new Ombudsperson is elected, the outgoing Ombudsperson is to cease exercising core powers three months after the publication of the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision (i.e. on 16 July 2021). Parliamentary proceedings now point to an appointment of a new Ombudsperson with cross-party support.In spite of the increased workload, public authorities further restricted the budget allocated to the Ombudsperson’s office in 2021, following the trend observed since 2016. Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* * The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2021 Rule of Law report can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism/2021-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation . Antyweb.pl ‘Raport UW: Spółki Skarbu Państwa reklamują się głównie w mediach sprzyjających władzy’, 17 February 2021 ( https://antyweb.pl/raport-uw-spolki-skarbu-panstwa-reklamuja-sie-glownie-w-mediach-sprzyjajacych-wladzy/ ). Batory Foundation, ‘Stanowisko Zespołu Ekspertów Prawnych w sprawie rozstrzygnięcia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego dotyczącego aborcji’, 26 October 2020 ( https://www.batory.org.pl/oswiadczenie/stanowisko-zespolu-ekspertow-prawnych-w-sprawie-rozstrzygniecia-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-dotyczacego-aborcji/ ).

Bezprawnik.pl, ‘Sądy uchylają mandaty, a także umarzają postępowania w związku z nienoszeniem maseczek. A co z karami administracyjnymi?’, 11 October 2020 ( https://bezprawnik.pl/uchylenie-kary-administracyjnej-za-brak-maseczki/ ). Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Information about business results in 2020 ( https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty_pdf/informacja_2020_.pdf ). Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021), Media pluralism monitor 2021. Chief Bar Council, Resolution of 12 March 2020 ( http://www.nra.pl/admin/wgrane_dokumenty/uchwala-nr-1552020covid19obiegowo.pdf ). Chief Bar Council, Statement of 16 October 2020 ( http://www.nra.pl/szukaj-dokumenty/dokument/690/?page=1&dataod=2020&datado=2021&organ=15&sort=2 ). Chief Bar Council, Opinion of 12 February 2021 ( https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki9ka.nsf/0/7643D6B48A81923CC125867D00459CA6/%24File/867-008.pdf ). Chief Bar Council, Opinion of 9 March 2021 ( http://www.nra.pl/szukaj-dokumenty/dokument/699/?page=1&dataod=2020&datado=2021&organ=15&sort=2 ). Civicus, Monitor Tracking Civic Space ( https://monitor.civicus.org/ ). Civicus, Monitor Watch List, 18 February 2021 ( https://monitor.civicus.org/watch-list/ ). Civicus, Statement of 31 March 2021 ( http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/5017-poland-escalating-threats-to-women-activists ). Committee to Protect Journalists, Polish riot police attack journalists covering demonstrations, 16 November 2020 ( https://cpj.org/2020/11/polish-riot-police-attack-journalists-covering-demonstrations/ ). Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2010) Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. Council of Europe: Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Current Affairs Committee (2020), Report on a fact-finding mission to Poland of November 2020 ( https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/new-reports-show-increasing-discrimination-and-attacks-on-lgbti-people-in-poland-and-europe-as-a-whole ). Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2021), Interim Resolution of 12 March 2021 (CM/ResDH(2021)44). Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, press releases 066(2021) and 140(2021). Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2021), Judges in Poland and in the Republic of Moldova must remain independent – Resolution 2359(2021), 6 January 2021. Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists ( https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom ). Council of Europe, Secretary General of the Council of Europe: Open letter to the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland, 30 June 2021 ( https://rm.coe.int/zbigniew-moj-poland-30-06-21/1680a30491 ). Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2016), Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal (CDL AD(2016)026-e), 14 October 2016. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s office as Amended (CDL-AD(2017)028), 11 December 2017.

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2019), Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a Checklist (CDL-AD(2019)015), 24 June 2019. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2020), Joint Urgent Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on Amendments to the law on the Common Courts, the Law on the supreme Court, and some other laws (CDL-AD(2020)017), 22 June 2020. Council of the European Union (2020), Recommendation on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Poland (OJ C 282/21), 20 July 2020. Court Watch Polska (2020), Sądy dostępne przez Internet – Szanse i Zagrożenia, ( https://courtwatch.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FCWP_raport_sady_dostepne_przez_internet_szanse_i_zagrozenia.pdf ). Directorate-General for Communication (2019), Flash Eurobarometer 482: Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU ( https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2248_482_eng?locale=fr ). Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: Corruption ( https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2247_92_4_502_eng?locale=en ). Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court Judges, Deputy Disciplinary Officer’s press communique of 22 July 2020 ( http://rzecznik.gov.pl/2020/07/komunikat-zastepcy-rzecznika-dyscyplinarnego-sedziego-przemyslawa-radzika-w-sprawie-wszczecia-postepowan-dyscyplinarnych-przeciwko-14-sedziom/ ). Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court Judges, Deputy Disciplinary Officer’s press communique of 4 August 2020 ( http://rzecznik.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/KOMUNIKAT04082020.pdf ). doRzeczy.pl, ‘NIK przygląda się sprawie Obajtka. Analizowane są dokumenty’, 22 March 2021 ( https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/176701/dworek-obajtka-i-wysoka-dotacja-z-ministerstwa-nik-analizuje-dokumenty.html ). doRzeczy.pl ‘Przyłębska o wyroku ETPCz. Padły mocne słowa’, 7 May 2021 ( https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/183919/etpcz-wydal-wyrok-ws-tk-jest-komentarz-przylebskiej.html ). EURACTIV.com, Poland’s PKN Orlen says media takeover unchanged by court decisions’, 14 April 2021 ( https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/polands-pkn-orlen-says-media-takeover-unchanged-by-court-decision/ ). European Commission (2017, 2019, 2021), press releases IP/17/5367, IP/19/6033, IP/21/1524. European Commission (2017), Reasoned Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM/2017/0835 final - 2017/0360 (NLE)). European Commission (2020), Country Report Poland 2020 SWD(2020) 520 final. European Commission (2021), EU Justice Scoreboard. European Parliament (2017), Resolution of 15 November 2017 on the situation of the rule of law and democracy in Poland. European Parliament (2018), Resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland. European Parliament (2020a), Resolution of 16 January 2020 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) of the TEU regarding Poland and Hungary. European Parliament (2020b), Resolution of 17 September 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law. European Parliament (2021), Resolution of 3 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

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·Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Tribunal); ·Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju (Civil Development Forum); ·Fundacja – Instytut Prawa Ustrojowego (Institute of Constitutional Law Foundation); ·Fundacja Bona Notitia (Bona Notitia Foundation); ·Fundacja Mamy i Taty (Mother and Father Foundation); ·Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka (Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights); ·Instytut Prawa i Społeczeństwa (Institute of Law and Society); ·Instytut Sobieskiego (Sobieski Institute); ·Izba Wydawców Prasy (Chamber of Press Editors); ·Klub Jagielloński (Jagielloński Club); ·Ministerstwo Kultury (Ministry of Culture); ·Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council for the Judiciary); ·Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National Council for the Television and Radio Broadcasting); ·Krajowa Rada Radców Prawnych (National Council of Legal Councillors); ·Rada Mediów Narodowych (National Council of Media); ·Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Ombudsperson); ·Fundacja – Instytut na rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris (Foundation – Institute for legal culture Ordo Iuris); ·Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów (Polish Media Association); ·Stowarzyszenie Polskie Telewizje Lokalne i Regionalne (Association of Polish Local and Regional Television); ·Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court);

·Naczelna Rada Adwokacka (Chief Bar Council); ·Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court); ·Stowarzyszenie prokuratorów ‘Lex Super Omnia’ (association of prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’); ·Stowarzyszenie sędziów ‘Iustitia’ (association of judges ‘Iustitia’); ·Stowarzyszenie sędziów ‘Themis’ (association of judges ‘Themis’); ·Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie (Journalists Association); ·Towarzystwo Dziennikarzy Polskich (Polish Journalists Association); ·Watchdog Polska. * The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings: ·Amnesty International ·Center for Reproductive Rights ·CIVICUS ·Civil Liberties Union for Europe ·Civil Society Europe ·Conference of European Churches ·EuroCommerce ·European Center for Not-for-Profit Law ·European Centre for Press and Media Freedom ·European Civic Forum ·European Federation of Journalists