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Vol. 1983/0 014 
  
 
Disclaimer  
Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit 
règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the openi ng to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), this f ile is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februar 198 3 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 vom 27 .9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
erforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in Übereinstimmung mit Artikel 5  
der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.  
COMMISSION OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
COM(83)  36 final 
Brussels,  27th January  1983 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE  COUNCIL 
on the implementation  of the  verification  agreements 
concluded  by Euratom  and its member  states with  the 
International  Atomic Energy Agency 
COM(83)  36 final 

EE PORT ON THE TJ.5HJJMEUTATION  OP TEDS VERIFICATION  AGREEMENTS  CONCLUDED  BY 
SURATOM  AND ITS  MEMBER  STATES WITH THE INTERNATIONAL  ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
Brief commentary 
1* The  crucial  importance  of safeguards  to ensure  that nuolear  materials 
are not unlawfully diverted for  military  purposes  or for the  purpose  of 
manufacturing  explosives was recognized at the  beginning  of the  atomic  era 
and was stressed  once again in the  communication  from the Commission  to the 
Council in  February  1982 entitled  "An energy  strategy for the  Community: 
the nuclear aapects"*o  Emphasis  was placed, in  particular,  on the  fact 
that the  situation  of the  Community  in this field was unique  in that it 
involved the coexistence of two multinational  safeguard  systems,  one on a 
regional and the other- on &  world-wide  scale* 
2· For this reason,  the Commission  undertook  to report to the Council 
on the implementation  of the  Verification  Agreements  concluded  by Euratom 
and its Member  States  •with the International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(hereinafter  called  The Agency)  which provide a  legal basis for  this 
coexistence. 
The attached report  fulfils  that undertaking. 
3» Since the report in question is the  first of its kind to be  produced 
by the Commission,  it is necessary  to furnish  some historical  background. 
This background  hinges  on the following points: 
(a) differences  between  the Euratom  safeguards  system,  set up in 
1958» and that of the  Agency,  with particular  regard to the  scope, 
the ends and the  means; 
(b) the influence on  Euratom  safeguards  of the negotiation and entry 
into force in the early  1970s of the Non-Proliferation Treaty  (NPT); 
(c) the structure and  salient  features of the  Verification  Agreement 
concluded  in April 1973 between  Euratom,  its non-nuclear-weapon 
Member States and the  Agency; 
*COM(82)36  of 9 February  1982. 

2 
(d) differences  between  that Agreement  and those of the  same type 
concluded by the  Agency  with non-Community  countries  that did 
not possess nuclear  weapons  and were signatories  to the NPT, 
and, to a  lesser  degree,  differences  with respect to the 
Agreement  concluded  between  the Agency  and Japan in 1977? 
(e) Verification  Agreements  between  Euratom,  the United  Kingdom  and 
the Agency  and between  Euratom,  Prance and the  Agency,  signed 
in 1976 and 1978  respectively,  which take account of the status 
of those countries as Nuclear  Powers; 
(f) reasons why the 1973  Agreement  could not be  fully applied  before 
1977; 
(g) intensification  of the approach to  non-proliferation  on the 
broadest  international  scale,  particularly  after the Indian 
atomic explosion of 1974 and the new  Agency  requirements concerning 
the procedures for implementing the  Agreement; 
(h) "special  arrangements"  of a provisional  nature  that came into 
effect between  the parties  concerned  between  1977 and 1980. 
4* A  little  over three years has passed since the  last of the 
abovementioned  special  arrangements  was made* 
The Commission  consequently  feels that the Council's  attention  should 
be drawn to findings  as regards the progress  made in the  application 
of the Verification  Agreement  as far as the  non-nuclear-weapon  Member 
States are concerned. 
It would,  however,  be premature  to do likewise  as regards the  Agreements 
concluded with the United  Kingdom  and with Prance,  firstly  because  they 
entered  into force more recently  and secondly  because  the solution  of 
certain problems  that arise in the context of the  first Agreement  . 
(NNWS)*  might have favourable repercussions on the  application  of the 
latter (NWS)*. 
5« First  of all, it should be pointed out  that a great deal has  been 
achieved. 
Almost ^Ofo of the  "facility  attachments"**  have been finalized.  The 
remaining 30%,  most of which relate  to small  quantities  of materials, 
will be so by the end of  this year. 
In addition,  satisfactory  arrangements  have been made with regard to 
two key  points,  namely  the planning of inspections and the information 
which Euratom  is required to  furnish  to the  Agency,,  The Agreement  is 
thus effectively  in operation. 
NNWS: Non-nuclear-weapon  states. 
^NWSs Nuclear-weapon  states. 
By this term is  meant the arrangements  subsidiary  to the  basic 
Agreement  which define the procedures for applying safeguards 
installation  by installation. 

3 
6* Nevertheless,  a number of problems  arose as the  implementation  of 
the Agreement  progressed.  They  are described  in the  report.  Some 
of them were detected  by the  Community  inspectors  themselves,  while 
others were notified  to the  Commission  by the Member  State Governments 
or by the  operators  concerned. 
7» Baring  1982, at the  Commission's  behest,  the work of the  Liaison 
Cocsffiittees  provided for  in the  Agreement  was considerably  speeded  up 
for the very purpose  of obtaining  a better understajiding  of these 
problems  and of  exploring possible solutions. 
8« The  Commission  is indeed aware that some of  these problems  can 
be solved only  through  a protracted  effort  based on a process  of 
continually  adapting  the application  of the  Agreement  to a reality 
which is changing  from both the quantitative  and the  qualitative  point 
of view. 
Furthermore,  it is faced with precise deadlines: for  example,  two of 
the special  arrangements  made during the period  1977-80  expire in 
September  1983; hence the need to activate  the dialogue  not only with 
the Agency  but also with  the Member  States and the  operators  in the 
Community  in order to collect  as much  information  and as many  opinions 
as possible with  a view to proposing  in good time the confirmation  or 
modification  of the  arrangements  in question. 
9» The  fact that the Board of Governors  of the  Agency,  at its next 
meeting in February,  will hold a thorough  discussion  on the  problems 
that arise in the  application  of safeguards,  on the  solutions that 
can be considered  and on the  prospects  of improving  the system,  prompts 
the Commission,  for its part,  to analyse  in greater  detail the 
application  of the  Verification  Agreement  in consultation with  the 
Member States, 
10. The Commission  further believes that  the application  of the 
Verification  Agreement  must be assessed  in a broader context,  account 
being taken  of the  great importance  of the  Agency's  safeguards  system 
to the development  of international  trade in nuclear materials. 
Account must also be taken of the  fact that the relations  between  the 
Community  and the  Agency go far beyond  cooperation  in the  application 
of Verification  Agreements. 
11« The Commission  invites  the Council  to consider  this report.  It 
also calls upon the Member  States to express  their views on the  various 
points raised  therein. 
The views  expressed  will be of  assistance  to the  Commission  in its 
further work in this field as a whole. 

- 4 -
The Commission  further  proposes that  the report be sent to the  Member 
States'  Representatives  to the  Agency,  with the request that they 
bear it  in mind in the  context  of Community  coordination,  particularly 
in view of the  forthcoming  meeting  of the  Board of Governors  on 
22 February  1983. At that meeting,  the Board will discuss,  inter alia, 
the present status  of the  Agency's  safeguards  and ways and means of 
improving  the system. 

Report on the  implementation  of the  Verification  Agreements 
concluded  by Euratom  and its Member  States with  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
I. Introduction 
1. The present report  is a follow-up  of the  communication  "An Energy 
Strategy  for the  Community:  the nuclear aspects", sent  by the 
Commission  to the  Council  in February  1982 (*), in  which the 
Commission  undertook,  inter  alia, to place before  the Council  a 
full report  on the  implementation  of the  three Verification 
Agreements  between  Euratom,  its various  Member  States and the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (hereinafter referred  to as 
the Agency). 
!I. The Euratom  Safeguards  System 
2. Under  Article  2(e) of the  Euratom  Treaty,  the Community  has the  task 
to "make  certain,  by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials 
are not diverted  to purposes  other than those for  which they are 
intended". 
ChapterVII  of the  Treaty provides  a safeguards  system  which enables 
the Community  to discharge  this basic task. 
3. The main features  of this system  may be  outlined  as follows: 
(a) Scop_e  „ 
All nuclear materials, including ores,  are subject  to 
safeguards,  except  for certain materials intended  to meet defence 
requi rements; 
(b) Aims. 
The Community  must ensure,  on the  internal  level,  that safeguarded 
materials  are not  diverted  from their intended  and declared  uses. 
On the  external  level,  the Community  must ensure  the respect  of 
"any particular  safeguarding obligations"  arising  from its 
international  agreements.  In other words,  it must verify  that any 
obligations  contracted  towards  third States,  as to the  uses of 
materials  they supply,  are complied with  in the  Community.  The 
Community  may also co-operate  with external safeguards  authorities: 
Euratom  activities  in this field are thus open to, and may be 
integrated  into, worldwide  developments,  as foreseen  in another  basic 
provision  of the  Treaty,namely  Article  2(h); 
Finally it must ensure  respect  for the  provisisons  of the  Treaty 
relating  to supply. 
/... 
(*) COM (82) 36 Final 

- 2 -
(c) Means. 
Chapiter  VII of the Treaty, besides  setting  out the  Commission's 
safeguards  obligations,  endows  it with appropriate  powers  for 
ensuring  their  fulfilment:  namely  the rights  to obtain  knowledge 
of basic  technical  characteristics  of nuclear  installations;  to 
require  the keeping and production of records permitting accounting 
for nuclear materials;to  make inspections; and to apply sanctions. 
The Treaty  moreover  establishes a  direct  relationship  between  the 
Community  and the operators, at all stages, at the regulatory, 
executive  and judicial  levels:  Euratom  safeguards are thus 
supranational. 
4. The comprehensive  nature of the  Euratom  safeguards system has dispensed 
Member States from the  need to set up  national  systems. And it is 
interesting  to note  that,  prior to the entry  into force of the Non-
Proliferation  Treaty (NPT) , that is to say from  1958 to 1970, all 
third States which concluded co-operation  agreements  with the  Community 
were content to  rely on Euratom  safeguards alone to supervise respect 
of such agreements  within  the Community. 
III. Impact of the NPT on the  Euratom  Safeguards 
5. At the time of the negotiation of the NPT, the  Community  was obliged to 
reflect  as whether  changes  were needed  in its safeguarding system, taking  into 
account, in  particular,  the fact that its  characteristics  differ  very sub­
stantially  from those of the safeguards system of the  International  Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
The Agency's  system: 
(a) is of worldwide, as  opposed  to regional  application; 
(b) is not supranational, being  based  instead on contractual 
relationships  between  the Agency  and each State concerned; 
(c) does not cover ores; 
(d) is aimed at ensuring peaceful use of safeguarded materials, 
and does not deal with  more specific  obligations  such as those 
contained  in the  Community's  agreements  with certain  key supplier 
States. 
Reliance  by the  Community  on the  Agency's  system alone  would have had two 
undesirable  consequences.  First,  it would have given  rise to problems 
concerning the  Community's  agreements  with supplier  States.  Second,  it 
would have led to replacement of an enduring system,  firmly  anchored 
in Community  law, by one  based  on international  agreements  alone. In 
these circumstances, the  Community  took the view that its safe­
guards system should be maintained. 
6. This  decision  made it necessary to organise the coexistence of both 
systems, without prejudice to  their  specific  characters, since  their 
unco-ordinated  application  would have imposed  unacceptable  burdens  on 
Community  operators- It  would also have denied to the  Agency  the 
benefits  of the  Community's  multinational  safeguards system. 

- 3 -
7. The aim of ensuring close co-ordination of the two  systems  in the 
implementation of the NPT was given its  first concrete expression 
in the Agreement  signed by the  Community,  its Non-Nuclear  Weapon 
States (NNWS)  and the  Agency  on 5 April 1973 (the  Verification 
Agreement). 
It flowed naturally  from Article  III of the NPT,  which  reads 
"„.„ Non-Nuclear  Weapon  States Party to the Treaty  shall conclude 
agreements  with the International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  ... either 
individually  or together with other States ' 
IV. The  Verification  Agreement  between  Euratom,  its NNWS and the  Agency, 
and related  documents 
A. Structure 
8. The Agreement  has a complex  structure  which may be  summarised  as follows: 
(a) The main body of the  Agreement  follows, with certain  significant 
exceptions, the general pattern of the  Agency's  NPT Agreements, 
-as lejid down in the Blue  Book (1); 
(b) A Protocol sets out special provisions  relating  to the  particular 
nature of  Euratom  safeguards; 
(c) Subsidiary  Arrangements  (general  part), specify in  terms  of general  appli­ 
cation how the  procedures  laid down in the  Agreemnet  are to Toe applied. 
They include the Rules and  Methods  to be used for the  calculation 
of inspection  efforts  as well as  specific  examples  in this respect; 
-(d) Subsidiary  Arrangements  (Facility  Attachments)  specify, f  aci lity  by  
facili ty, how the  Agreement  is to be applied.  They show,  inter  alia, 
for each  facility,  the inspection  effort  of both Euratom  and the 
Agency; 
<e) A number  of special  implementing  understandings  (Joint  Teams, 
observation  principle,  etc ...)  supplement  the general part of the 
Subsidiary  Arrangements:  they are  however  separate  documents. 
The documents  at (d) and (e)  were negotiated  after  entry  into force of 
the Agreement  in 1977. 
Amendments  to the  documents  at (a) and (b) require, not only approval 
by the Council, and by the  Agency's  Board  of Governors,  but also 
ratification  by Member  States of the  Community. 
Amendments  to the  documents  at (c), while also requiring approval by 
both the Council and  Board,  are not subject to  ratification  by Member 
States.  It should be  noted  that the Rules and  Methods  must be reviewed 
from time to time, to take  into account  new technological  developments 
in the field  of safeguards and experience gained. 
(1) See Agency  Document  iNFCIRC  153, entitled  "Structure and  Content  of 
Agreements  between  the IAEA and States required in connection with 
the NPT". This  document,  approved  by the  Agency's  Board  of Governors 
in May 1971, is generally  known  as "The Blue  Book". 

- A -
The documents  at (d) may be  amended  without involving  the Council  and 
the Board,  following,  however, under  an internal  Community arrangement, 
approval  by the Member  State concerned. 
The documents  at (e) are at  present  of a less enduring character:  in 
particular,  in some of  them it is  expressly provided that  they will 
expire at a fixed date. 
B. Specific Features 
9. The  specific  features  of the  Verification  Agreement  may be  outlined  as 
follows : ; 
- it is  recognised that  Member  States  have assigned  to the  Community 
wide powers which  cover all essential  elements  of safeguards,  and 
that the Community  has the  task of ensuring,  in line with NPT 
provisions,  that nuclear materials  on the  territories  of its NNWS 
are not diverted  to nuclear  weapons  or other nuclear explosive 
devices; 
- the Agency is required  to take account  of the  effectiveness  of Euratom 
safeguards  and to make  full use thereof  so as to  avoid unnecessary 
duplication; 
- the Community  is associated with  the Agency in the  examination  of the 
basic technical characteristics  of the  installations; 
- the Community  has the  task of analysing  the reports transmitted  by 
operators; 
- close co-operation  is contemplated  between  the two  authorities during 
inspections; 
- the number,  intensity  and procedures  of Agency  inspections  are to be 
determined  according  to the  Rules and Methods. These  lay down the 
inspection  efforts  of both Euratom  and the  Agency in respect  of 
specific  examples  of facilities.  These  efforts  were to be  calculated  in such 
a way that the significant  amount  of material  unaccounted for,  to be 
detected  on a timely basis  by the  Agency, would  be about  four times 
that to be  detected  by Euratom.  The clear consequence  of this rule was 
that Agency  activities  should  be very substantially  lower than those 
performed  by the  Euratom  inspectorate,  and also than those performed 
by the Agency in third States;  .. 
- the Agency  inspections  are to be carried  out simultaneously with  the 
inspection  activities  of the  Community,  while certain  of the  Euratom 
inspections  are being performed; 
- the Agency  inspections  are to be performed,  as a general  rule,  through 
the observation  of Euratom  inspections. 
10. These provisions  do not  however  mean that the Agency  should apply  its 
safeguards  only indirectly,  by means of  verification  of the  effectiveness 
of Euratom  safeguards.  The Agreement  provides  for independent  safe­
guarding  measures  by the  Agency,  and for  inspection  activities  carried 
out otherwise  than through  observation  of Euratom  inspectors,  whenever 
this exception  to the  observation  principle  is foreseen  in the 

5 
Subsidiary  Arrangements,  or in exceptional circumstances. The 
Verification  Agreement  has thus  resulted  in a situation  in which the 
Community  is the  most effectively  safeguarded area in the world, 
because  of the concurrent operation of two  multinational  safeguarding 
systems.  However,  the precautions taken in the  Agreement,  and 
referrred  to above,  are intended to  keep the burden  for operators 
within acceptable  limits,  and to be consistent with a prudent  management 
of the available  resources. Furthermore, the  independence  of the 
Euratom  safeguards system is unaffected; the  relations  between  Euratom 
and the  Agency  are of a  "horizontal"  nature, as  between  two multinational 
inspectorates  co-operating with  each other. 
C. Comparison  with NPT  Agreements  concluded by the  Agency  with third States 
11. The Agency  has concluded a large  number  of NPT  Agreements  (74 such 
agreements  were in force on 15  July 1982).  They  are, without exception, 
based on the Blue  Book (1). Under  these agreements.  States are required 
to set up  national  systems  of accounting for and  control  of nuclear 
materials,  whereby  operators carry out  measurements,  take inventories, 
keep records and  send reports to the States.  These  reports  must be 
transmitted  in turn to the  Agency.  These agreements  are not  based  on the  assump 
tion that the States-concerned analyse these reports or  check them through 
inspection  or apply sanctions.  There are thus  radical  differences  between 
the Verification  Agreement  and the  agreements  concluded by the  Agency  with 
third States. 
12. however,  one of the NPT  Agreements  concluded by the  Agency  constitutes 
a special  case. The  Agreement  between  the Agency  and Japan, signed on 
4 March  1977 (INFCIRC  255), departs  significantly  from the Blue  Book 
and presents Less obvious differences from the  Verification  Agreement. 
Contrary to the standard NPT  agreements: 
- Japan  undertakes to operate a complete  national  safeguarding system, 
including  inspections; 
- the main body of the  Agreement  is supplemented  by a Protocol,  which 
follows  clearly  the pattern of the Protocol to the  Verification 
Agreement; 
- this Protocol includes a kind of "most-favoured-nation" clause,  stating 
that the Agency  shall accord to  Japan a treatment "not  less favourable 
than the treatment it accords to other States or a  group of States, 
provided  that the  national  system achieves and maintains a  degree  of 
functional  independence  and technical  effectiveness equivalent to that 
of such States or  group  of States". Nevertheless, the  terms  of this 
Agreement  are not  identical  to those of the  Verification  Agreements. 
(1) With  certain  States not signatory to the NPT, the  Agency 
has concluded safeguards  agreements  of another type,  based on 
Document  INFCIRC  66 Rev. 2.  Some are still in force (with 12 States at 
the end of 1981). Since these  Agreements  do not concern  NNWS parties 
to the NPT, they cannot be  compared  with the  Verification  Agreement. 

- 6 -
The main difference arises  from the basic characters  of the two  systems 
of safeguards;  because  of its thoroughness,  the Japanese  system  could be 
considered  to have a technical effectiveness equivalent  to that of Euratom. 
But it Could not reach the same  degree  of functional  independence  as 
-Euratom,  since  this is based on a transfer  of powers by the Member  States 
to the Community's  supranational  institutions. 
V. Verification  Agreements  between  Euratom,  its NWS and the  Agency 
13. As a  party to the NPT^ and in  order to demonstrate  that its status  as 
a Nuclear  Weapon  State (NWS) did not  give it economic  advantages, 
the United  Kingdom,  in"1967,  made a voluntary  offer to accept Agency 
safeguards;  this resulted  in a Verification  Agreement  with Euratom  and 
the Agency,  which was signed  on 6 September  1976. A key  difference,  as 
compared  with the Verification  Agreement  (NNWS), is  that routine  Agency 
inspections  apply only  to facilities  designated  from time to time for 
this purpose:  all other safeguarding  procedures  (design information, 
accounting, reports,  ad hoc and  special inspections) apply,  however,  to 
all civil  facilities. 
Other differences  are as  follows; 
- the Agreement  applies  to all nuclear materials  in civil applications 
within  faci lities  (material outside  facilities  being  thus excluded); 
- provision  is made to enable the United Kingdom  to withdraw  nuclear 
materials  from the scope of the  Agreement  for national security 
reasons; 
14. Although  not a  party to the NPT,  France  also made a voluntary  offer to 
accept Agency  safeguards;  and a  Verification  Agreement  was signed with 
Euratom and the  Agency on 27  July 1978. Its  scope is limited  to 
materials  specifically  designated  by France.  Otherwise,  its provisions 
follow closely  those of the  United Kingdom  Agreement. 
VI. The implementation  of the  Verification  Agreement  (NNWS) 
15. Much work remained  to be done,  following  the signature  of the  Verification 
Agreement  (NNWS),  before it could be fully implemented. 
Internally,  the Community  had to  revise its safeguarding Regulations 
so as to be in a  position  to fulfil  its obligations  under the Agreement 
concerning basic technical  characteristics,  records  and accounting 
reports (*) . A new  Regulation  (3227/76)  was enacted  at the end of 1976. 
Because  of the  complex  work entailed  in the  preparation  of this 
Regulation (including  the time required  for the  Council  to approve  it), the 
Verification  Agreement  did not  enter into force  until 21 February  1977. 
C*) The  obligations concerning inspections  are directly  implemented  by the 
Commission  on the  basis of Article  81 of the  Euratom  Treaty. 

7 
/ 
Externally,  the Community  had to  negotiate  with the Agency the specific 
parts of the  Subsidiary  Arrangements,  namely  the Facility  Attachments, 
one for each facility  on the  territories  of the Member  States  concerned. 
The Commission  had also to draw up internal  acts  for each 
facility  ("Particular  Safeguarding  Provisions")  to give effect  to its 
international  commitments  deriving  from the Facility  Attachments. 
16„ Following  the entry into force of the  Verification  Agreement,  but prior 
to negotiation  o'f the  Facility  Attachments,  the Agency  encountered 
problems unforeseen  at the  time of negotiation  of the  Agreement. 
As indicated  above,  the general  part of the  Subsidiary  Arrangements 
includes  a section  on the  Rules and Methods  for the  calculation  of 
inspection  efforts,  as well as specific  examples  of their application. 
The Facility  Attachments  were to be drawn up on  this basis. 
However  certain  technical  assumptions  referred  to in  these examples 
were not confirmed  in practice  (1). 
17. At the same  time, an important  political  development supervened. 
Following  the explosion  by India of a nuclear device  in 1974, the 
Agency's Standing Advisory  Group on Safeguards Implementation  (SAGSI) 
considered  quantification  of the  general wording  of paragraph  28 of the 
Blue Book (2), which  refers  to "timely  detection  of significant 
quantities".  It made  recommendations  to the  Agency for "detection  goals" 
of general  application,  corresponding approximately  to the 
quantities  of materials  needed  to produce  one nuclear  weapon,  and to the 
conversion  times from  various  chemical forms  into weapons  usable form. 
These detection  goals were presented  to, and  noted by, the  Agency's Board 
of Governors. Expressed  in absolute terms, without  relation  to the  size 
or type of plant,  these goals  of general  application  are translated  by 
the Agency  using  certain  internal  criteria,  into specific  "inspection 
goals" for individual  plants.  These  plant-specific  goals  largely 
determine  the form and intensity  of the  application  of Agency  safeguards 
as defined  in the  Facility  Attachments. 
18. Finally,  following  the Agency/Japan  Agreement,  it was  felt by the  Agency 
that the way in  which the Verification  Agreement  would be implemented 
would set a  precedent,  not only for the  Japanese  Agreement  itself,  but 
also for any  agreements  with other  States  which might  follow  the 
Japanese  example  and establish  advanced  national  safeguards systems. 
19. These three developments  led the  Agency to press Euratom,  during 
negotiation  of the  Facility  Attachments,  to accept the following 
guidelines  : 
(1) In particular,  it has not yet  proved  possible,  for technical  reasons, 
to put permanent  seals on light-water  reactor  assemblies  or to  install 
sealed storage boxes  for in-put samples  in reprocessing  plants. 
(2) which corresponds  to Article  28 of the  Verification  Agreement. 

- 8 -
(a) the  Agency  effort  should be greater, in  particular  in the  sensitive 
plants,  than that envisaged at the time of  negotiation  of the 
Agreement  ; 
(b) inspection  activities  to be  carried  out otherwise than through 
observation  should  •-.be wider than those  previously  thought; 
(c) Agency  inspectors  should use, to a  large extent,  Agency  surveillance 
and containment devices (eg,  cameras,  seals). 
The Community,  while r«fusing  to consider any  amendment  to the  text of 
the Agreement  or its  Protocol,  or any  move which could jeopardise the 
independence and  integrity  of the  Euratom  safeguards system, re­
affirmed  its support for the  effectiveness  of Agency  safeguards and 
declared  itself  ready to discuss  practical  solutions  to the problems 
raised by the  Agency. 
20. The CommJnity  position  took account in  particular  of the  fact that the 
Verification  Agreement  does not specify  the Agency  inspection  effort  in 
absolute  terms. It  clearly  indicates  that it should be  significantly 
lower than the  effort  required  under Agency  agreements  with other  third 
States,  and also lower than the  Euratom  effort.  But its  actual 
determination  was left to the  Subsidiary  Arrangements. Moreover, the 
provisions  concerning  inspection  efforts  concern the nuclear  plants  of 
the Community  as a whole; they leave  open the possibility  for Agency 
inspection  efforts  to be  substantially  greater for  particular  types of 
facilities. 
VII= The  Euratom/Agency  compromises  on the implementation of the  
Verification  Agreement 
21. Between  1977 and 1980 a  number  of compromises  were worked  out. These  took 
the form of  special  understandings supplementing, in  practice,  the 
general  part of the  Subsidiary  Arrangements. The  latter  was not,  however, 
amended  because  of the  provisional  nature of the  compromises  and the 
need to keep open the possibility  of reverting  later to the  original 
approach. 
22. An understanding concerning  sensitive  installations  (reprocessing  plants, 
installations  for uranium enrichment,  plants  using  significant  quantities 
of plutonium or  highly  enriched uranium, as  well as other  facilities  as 
mutually  agreed  upon in future  (*) was  worked  out in two stages, in 
September  1977 and in  July 1978. The  Community  recognised the  political 
case for  fuller  Agency  inspections,  while the  Agency  agreed to  economise 
in inspection  effort,  and to reduce inconvenience for operators, by forming 
Joint Teams  consisting  of a number  of inspectors  present at the  plant 
whenever  it is in operation. It was provided  that they would  work 
closely  together, and  collect  data in  common,  but make independent 
reports.  It was agreed  that Agency  inspection  effort  in Joint Teams 
would in  most cases be  less than Euratom  effort,  and would normally 
be less than that in a third State. 
The definition  of a Joint Team includes  in particular  the following 
points: 
(*) None has been so agreed. 

9 
/ 
- all inspection  activities  in the  plant are considered  as a task to 
be performed  by the  Joint Team; 
- the purpose  of the  Joint Team is to  enable both inspectorates  to 
achieve  their  safeguards objectives with  a minimum of  duplication 
and intrustion  vis-a-vis  operators; 
- inspection  activities  will be undertaken  in mutual  support  in such a way 
as to give each organisation all information required  to draw its own 
independent  conclusions; 
- if an  activity  is considered  as requiring  more than one inspector, 
inspectors  from both the Agency and Euratom  will be present;  if an 
activity  can be  carried  out by a  single  inspector,  it may be  undei— 
taken by any member of the  team (one job/one  man); 
- as far as  possible, there should  be common  working data  and seals; 
- sampling plans should  be prepared  jointly; 
- no hierarchical  structure  was foreseen  but requests  to the  operator 
would normally  be channelled through  a Euratom  inspector. 
This understanding  was provisional  and subject  to review  after a period of 
2 to 3  years; during that period there should  be an  assessment  at regular 
intervals  of the  possibility  of reducing inspection  effort,  in the  light 
of technical  necessity.  It was,  however,  later agreed that  this 
compromise  would remain  in force  until September  1983,  pending  a final 
decision  in the  light of experience. 
23. Another  series  of understandings  relates  to the  problem  of parti cipation 
of the Agency in Euratom  inspections other than those  in installations 
subject to Joint Team operations  (1). 
24. As to  light water  reactors,  an understanding  was agreed in three stages. 
Its main points  are as  follows: 
- a detailed  inspection  performed  by both authorities  takes place 
approximately  once a year, when the  reactor core  is open for recharging; 
- a "mid-term"  inspection  performed  by both authorities  takes place 
6 months  after the detailed  inspection  to check the surveillance 
equipment  (to be  discontinued  when doubts  about  technical  reliability 
of video recording  system  are reasonably  removed); 
- Euratom  inspectors  will read sealed  cameras  respectively  3 and 9  months 
after the main inspection  (2); 
(1) cf.  Article  14(a) of the  Protocol  to the Verification  Agreement 
stating that Agency inspectors should  be present during  certain 
of the Euratom  inspections. 
(2) A film  is  removed and taken to Luxembourg  to be read by 
both inspectors. 

- 10 -
- Agency  inspectors  could accompany  Euratom  inspectors  during  the said 
inspections  on 50% of the  visits  selected  on a random  basis (1). 
This extra Agency  inspection  should  be discontinued  as soon as 
tampei—proof  optical  surveillance  measures  have been developed. 
This understanding,  like that on Joint Teams,  is expressly  provisional 
(until September  1983). 
25. Another understanding, reached  in March 1979,  relates to low  enriched  
uranium  fuel fabrication  plants . It provides  that: 
- for "large"  plants,  Euratom  should  inspect  at intervals  of between 
two weeks and one  month, and the  participation  of the  Agency  should 
vary from 50% (two-weekly  Euratom  inspections)  to 90%  (one-monthly 
Euratom  inspections); 
- for "small"  plants,  Euratom  should  inspect  at intervals  of between 
one and! three  months  and the  participation  of the  Agency  should  also 
vary from 50% to 90%; 
- inspections  should  be made  less frequently  as soon as equipment  approved 
by both organisations  makes this possible. 
26. A further  understanding  relates  to the  question  of observation  (2). 
In March 1979 it was agreed  that, for item-counting  as well as for 
identification  and examination  of records,  the Agency  inspectors  would 
observe, without repeating these operations,  the items and records which 
were being checked  by the  Euratom  inspector.  However,  where records 
have been examined  in the  absence  of an Agency  inspector,  the latter may 
have access  to these records.  It was  later specified  that the Agency, 
in installations  for which the inspection  frequency  is less than once per 
month, could  verify (on a  samplying  basis for source documents,  and in 
all cases for ledgers' examination)  the part of the  records  previously 
examined  by Euratom  alone.  For other installations,  records 
examinations should  be planned  and carried  out when both inspectorates 
are present. 
27. Furthermore,  in March 1979, two  lists were drawn up concerning  respectively 
the inspection  activities  to be  carried  out "otherwise than through 
observation"C"0TT0  list")  and those to be  carried  out "through observa­
tion" ("TO  list"). 
28. At the  same time, a procedural understanding  was reached  on the  question 
of costs of safeguards  to operators.  Article  15 of the  Verification 
Agreement  provides,  inter  alia,  that the Agency  shall bear the cost of 
any additional  measuring  or sampling  that its inspectors  may request. 
In the view of the  Community,  the word "additional"  refers  to any  extra 
measurements  and samples  the Agency may request,  as opposed  to those made 
or taken by the  operator  in furtherance  of his own  material  accounting,  or 
by Euratom  in furtherance  of its safeguards  responsibilities.  In the  view 
of the Agency,  however,  "additional"  refers  only to actions  by an  operator 
which go beyond  normal safeguards  activities  as specified  in the  Facility 
Attachments.  Because  it had  proved impossible  to settle the substance 
of the question,  it was  agreed  that,  pending  definition  of the  legal 
position  and of  permanent  arrangements,  Facility  Attachments would normally 
refer in general terms,  to Article  15 of the  Agreement. 
(1) The Agency may also perform on these occasions other operations:  eg, 
to verify  materials  in store or to audit records. 
(2) CF. Article 14(b) of the  Protocol to the  Verification  Agreement. 

11 
VIII. Current  situation  in the implementation of the  Verification  Agreement  (NNWS) 
29. It is barely three years since the  last of the  compromise  understandings 
was reached.  Nevertheless, and in spite of the complexity of the  situation, 
a great deal of progress has  been made in applying the  Agreemnet.  In all, 
194 Facility  Attachments  have been finalised;  60 remain  to be completed,  of which 
most relate  to installations  handling very small quantities of nuclear material. 
All outstanding  Facility  Attachments  should be  finished  by the end of 1983. 
30. The outstanding  Facility  Attachments  concern  four categories of 
instal lations: 
- new installations; 
- facilities  with special  problems  (eg, a  mixed  oxide  fabrication 
plant; an on-load  refuelled  reactor); 
- installations  using advanced  enrichment  technology; 
- waste-handling and treatment  installations. 
It should be  noted  that facilities  for which  no Attachment  yet exists  are 
nevertheless subject to "ad hoc" inspections, in  accordance  with 
Article  71(a) of the  Verification  Agreement. 
31. Close co-ordination  between  the respective inspectorates has  been 
achieved.  Euratom  establishes a  six-month  general  programme  for its 
inspections,  enabling the  Agency  to choose  those inspections at  which  it 
wishes to be present. .  Requests  for changes  in the  programme  are 
normally accepted by  Euratom.  Planning  documents  for individual  inspections 
are sent to the  Agency  in advance.  If the  Agency  has not  been present at 
an inspection,  Euratom  subsequently provides it with a  copy of the 
inspection  report. At the end of  each inspection,  Euratom  provides the 
Agency with a  complete  set of  working  papers. 
32. It may therefore be concluded that the  Verification  Agreement  is 
effectively  operational.  However,  its operation has given  rise to a 
number of problems:  these have come to the  Commission's  attention, either 
through  representations  from Governments  or economic  operators of  Member 
States,  or through  observation by its own inspectors. In the  last twelve 
months,  these problems  have been examined  with those  concerned  in the 
Community,  and they are now being discussed with the  Agency  through 
appropriate channels. The important  ones are raised in the  High Level 
Liaison  Committee  (HLLC),  a body operating at senior  official  level;  it 
met three times in 1982 - a  much more intense  rhythm  of meetings  than heretofore. 
More detailed technical questions are looked at in the  Lower  Level 
Liaison  Committee  (LLLC), a  similar  body but meeting  at the technical  level. 
In addition to these two  Committees,  whose  establishment was provided for 
in the Protocol, ad hoc  meetings  between  officials  of the two 
inspectorates are frequent. 
33. A number  of problems  have been  settled  at one or  another  of the 
three levels,  and are not therefore discussed in  this report.  However, 
the Commission  thinks it desirable to inform the Council of the state of 
discussion  with the  Agency  on the following outstanding issues: 

12 
<1) Application of the observation  principle. 
(2) Participation of  Agency  inspectors in  Euratom  inspections. 
C3) Application of the Joint  Team compromise. 
(4) The taking into  account  by the  Agency  of the effectiveness of the 
Euratom  safeguards  system. 
C5) The burden  of inspection  effort  in Member  States resulting  from the 
putting  into force of the  Verification  Agreement. 
(6) The problem  of costs. 
34- As to observation, the  arrangements  made for the application of the general 
principle  laid down in Article  14(b) of the Protocol are in general 
respected,  although  in some cases they lead to  unnecessary  full repetition 
of records  checks.  Moreover,  the Commission  has noted  that Agency 
inspectors rather frequently consider it  necessary  to replace the 
•observation of the  activities  carried out by the  Euratom  inspectors by 
independent  actions (eg,  they use instruments  without  prior consultation 
with Euratom).  Discussions  have taken  place in  HLLC about these matters; 
it has been agreed  that LLLC should look at  them,  case by case,  and 
report back. 
35. As to participation of  Agency  inspectors in  Euratom  inspections, the  compromises 
on light  water  reactors and on low enriched  uranium  fuel fabrication plants 
have worked  satisfactorily.  For the  former,  it has not  been possible so far to 
envisage  a reduction in the  frequency  of Agency  inspections,  because  technical 
equipment,  such as video  systems,  is not yet  sufficiently  reliable.  But the 
Commission  is closely following technological  developments  with a  view to 
taking the  necessary  steps in due  course. 
36. As for  joint Teams,  in a number  of facilities  it has  been possible to 
achieve, as  contemplated  by the relevant  understanding,  their  basic aim 
of allowing  both organisations to  draw their independent  conclusions 
through  mutual  support  with minimum  intrusion and duplication.  However, 
in a number  of other  installations,  difficulties  have arisen,  inter  alia 
on the following points: 
- use of a  common  set of  working  data and instruments; 
~ the one-job-one-man  approach; 
- common  detailed inspection  work-programme^ 
- rules on  communication  of inspectors8 findings to the operators. 
Discussions  have  taken place in  HLLC. Some guidelines  have already  been given. 
LLLC has been instructed to  study these matters  in detail  case by case. 
37. As to the taking into  account  by the  Agency  of the effectiveness of the  Euratom 
safeguards  system,  which  constitutes an obligation  under the Verification  Agree 
ment, the Agency,  in order to be able to consider the  system,  in the  light  of 
Article  32 of the  Agreement,  has requested  more information on how  Euratom 
safeguards  work.  This information is progressively being supplied.  When the 
process  is complete,  the two organisations  will consider the operational 
consequences  to be drawn. 

- 13 -
38. As to the  burden of the  Agency's  inspection  effort  under the Verification 
Agreement,  following  representations  by certain  Member  States that  this 
might be excessive  taking  into account  the Agency's  inspection  effort  in 
third countries,  the Commission  has requested  the Agency to provide 
relevant  information. This  is progressively  being done; when the  process 
is complete,  the Commission  will be able to form a judgment  on this matter. 
39. As to  costs,  although  certain  specific  difficulties  which arose  in one 
installation  have now been solved,  it is  necessary,  in the  light of 
experience,  to arrive at an  agreed  interpretation  of Article  15 of the 
Agreement.  The Commission  will take this matter  up with the Agency. 
The Commission  has also embarked  on a general study  of safeguards costs 
in the Community. 
IX. Current  situation  in the  implementation  of the  Verification  Agreement  
concerning nuclear-weapon  Member  States 
40. The United  Kingdom  Verification  Agreement  has been in force since 
August 1978. Two  facilities  were  designated  to date by the  Agency 
for routine  inspections.  No significant  problems  have been encountered 
in the implementation  of the  Agreement,  apart from  the general  problems 
related to Joint Teams (see  paragraph  36). 
41. The French  Verification  Agreement  entered  into force in September  1981 
However,  as the  Subsidiary  Arrangements  are only now being negotiated, 
no experience  on the  implementation  of the  Agreement  can, as  yet, be 
reported. 
X. Outlook 
42. Implementation  of the  Verification  Agreements  must be a continuing process. 
In an initial  phase,  Euratom  was confronted with  the double task  of 
adjusting  its own safeguarding system  to the  requirements  of the  Verifica­
tion Agreements,  and of  concluding  Facility  Attachments  for each 
installation  concerned  in the  Community.  The former process  has been 
completed,  and the  latter soon  will be. A  phase of consolidation  and 
development  has now  begun. 
43. During  discussion  of the  questions  referred  to in  paragraph  33 above, 
the Commission  has reminded  the Agency  that the various  compromise 
understandings all  have a provisional  character,  and that those which 
relate to Joint Team operations  and to  light water reactors  are specifically 
subject to review by the  Council  in September  1983. The  Commission  has 
also had in  mind that the Rules and Methods  laid down by the  Subsidiary 
Arrangements  (general part)  are subject  to review from time  to time. 
44. As regards  the understandings  to be  reviewed next  September,  the 
Commission  will submit  to the  Council,  before  the end of  next June, 
specific  and concrete suggestions concerning  their  future. 
As to the  other understandings,  as well as to the  problems  which have 
arisen in the  implementation  of the  Agreement,  the Commission  will report 
to the Council  in due  course. 

- 14 -
On all these matters, the  Commission's  thinking  will of course be 
influenced  by the  development  of the ongoing discussions with 
the Agency.  These  discussions  must be seen in a broad  international 
context.  The effective  riiaintenance  of the  Agency's  safeguards  system 
is very important for the  development  of international  trade in 
nuclear materials,  which is a major Community  interest.  In recent years, 
the Agency  has faced  substantial  difficulties.  It is understandable 
that it should consider very  carefully  the implications,  for its 
safeguards  system  as a whole,  of the  specific  arrangements  it makes 
with the Community.  Gut it is also necessary that, in  accordance  with 
the Verification  Agreement, it  should  find ways and means  of taking 
into account, in  applying  safeguards in the  Community,  of the 
effectiveness  of the  Euratom  safeguards  system,  thus avoiding 
unnecessary  duplication. 
45. Clearly,  the problems  of application  of the  Verification  Agreements  do 
not affectj  in any way the  performance  by Euratom  of its other safeguards 
tasks, namely  the following: 
(a) verification  of specific  intended  civil uses, as declared by 
each operator; 
(b) application  of certain  safeguards in the  fuel cycle going  beyond 
those iof the  Agency  system  (mining  activities,  ore concentration,  etc.); 
(c) respect of  international  commitments  entered  into by the  Community  going 
beyond a peaceful use pledge  (arrangements  for retransfers,  conditions 
of use,  etc.); 
(d) respect of provisions of the Treaty  relating  to supply. 
The third  task implies that, for the  Agreements  with main supplier 
States (US, Canada,  Australia),  Euratom  must be in a  position  to 
follow continuously, throughout the  Community,  nuclear materials 
coming from these States. 
46. Finally,  it should be noted that  relations  between  Euratom  and the 
Agency cover matters  which  go far  beyond  the application  of the 
Verification  Agreements. 
In the field of research and  development  of safeguards technology, 
the two  authorities  co-operate  closely,  under  a specific  agreement 
concluded in 1981. The  Community  conducts a  major programme,  drawn 
up after  consultation with the  Agency,  to whom its results  are made 
available.  (This  programme  is in addition to the national  programmes 
of certain  Member  States.) The  Commission  has also  been participating 
actively,  along with the  Agency  and others concerned, in the hexapartite 
9rouP ,  which is developing an  approach  to the  problem  of 
safeguarding centrifuge enrichment plants. The  Commission  believes that, 
because  of its  role as one of the two multinational safeguarding 
authorities,  and because  of its extensive co-operation with the  Agency 
both on operations and on R & D,  Euratom  could make a substantial 
contribution  to the  Agency's  Standing Advisory  Group  on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAGSI): it has expressed  this view to the  Agency's 
Di rector-General. 

- 15 -
The General Co-operation  Agreement  concluded  by Euratom  and the  Agency 
in 1976 provides  a framework  for a wide range of other co-operative 
activities.  These  include  Commission  participation  in the  Agency's 
Committee  on Assurances  of Supply (of nuclear  materials),  and in  its 
group of experts  on International  Plutonium Storage. Technical 
co-operation  has also been developing  for many  years in areas of common  interest, 
notably  nuclear  safety,  waste management,  radiological  protection,  radio­
isotopes,  training  of nuclear  specialists,  and nuclear  fusion. 
XI. Follow-up 
47. The Commission  invites  the Council  to consider  the present report.  It also 
calls upon the Member  States  to express  their  views on the  different  points 
raised therein. 
The views expressed  will be of  value to the  Commission  in its further  work 
in this whole  field. 
The Commission  further  suggests that  the report should  be sent to Member 
States Representatives  to the  Agency,  requesting  them to bear it in  mind 
in the framework  of Community  coordination,  in particular  in view of the 
forthcoming session  of the  Board of Governors  of 22  February  1983.  This 
session  will discuss,  inter  alia, the current status  of the  Agency's  safe­
guards and the  possibilities  of improving  the system.