EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 3.12.2008 
SEC(2008) 2962 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
accompanying the  
Proposal for a  
 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms fo r determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for internationa l protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country nati onal or a stateless person 
 
(recast)  
 
Impact Assessment  
{COM(2008) 820 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2963}
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED 
PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 3 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 6 
2.1. Scope of the problem ................................................................................................... 6 2.2. What is the issue or the probl em that may require action? .......................................... 6 
2.3. How would the problem evolve , all things being equal?........................................... 23 
2.4. Does the EU have the power to act?. ......................................................................... 24 2.5. Consultation of interested parties............................................................................... 25 3. OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................... 26 
3.1. General objectives...................................................................................................... 26  
3.2. Specific objectives ..................................................................................................... 26  
3.3. Operational objectives................................................................................................ 27 4. LIST OF SUB-OPTIONS ........................................................................................ 28 
 Status quo................................................................................................................... 2 8 
4.1. Sub-options for ensuring smooth operation of the procedure.................................... 28 
4.2. Sub-options for ensuring that disputes  are tackled in an efficient way...................... 30 
4.3. Sub-options for preventing further overburdening of Member States....................... 31 
4.4. Sub-options for strengthening the le gal safeguards for asylum-seekers.................... 32 
4.5. Sub-options regarding family  unity and vulnerable groups....................................... 34 
5. Assessment of the sub-options and id entification of th e preferred option .......... 36 
6. Assessment of the preferred option ........................................................................ 54 
7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................. 59 
Annex 1  — Assessment of the status quo................................................................................ 61 
Annex 2  — Summary of the pref erred policy option .............................................................. 63 
Annex 3  — Statistical data ...................................................................................................... 67 
Annex 4  — Glossary................................................................................................................ 77 
Annex 5  — The likely administrative costs of the preferred policy option ............................ 80 
EN 3   EN Lead DG: Justice, Freedom and Security 
1. PROCEDURAL  ISSUES  AND  CONSULTATION  OF INTERESTED  PARTIES 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1.  Policy context 
The Commission’s Work Programme for 20081 included as one of its strategic initiatives the 
adoption of a proposal for amending Council Regul ation (EC) No 343/2003 on the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State re sponsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a thir d-country national (the Dublin Regulation).2 Together 
with the proposal for revising the Reception Conditi ons Directive, this proposal is intended to 
contribute to the second stage of the Common Eur opean Asylum System (C EAS), as called for in 
the Hague Programme of November 2004. A road map has been prepared for this strategic 
initiative.3  
Following the lifting of internal borders between  Member States, a mechanism to determine 
responsibility for asylum applicatio ns lodged in the Member States was needed in order to ensure 
that in an area of free movement  of persons each asylum applica tion is examined by one Member 
State (therefore avoiding the si tuation of ‘asylum-seekers in or bit’, where no Member State is 
willing to accept responsibility fo r examining an application) and to prevent abuse of asylum 
procedures in the form of multiple applications  submitted by the same person in several Member 
States with the sole aim of extending his or her stay.  
Arrangements for determining responsibility for consid ering asylum applications  were initially part 
of the intergovernmental Schengen Convention, and were then repla ced by the Convention 
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum  lodged in one of the 
Member States of the European Communities4 (the Dublin Convention). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which altered the legal basis and pro cedure for asylum, required the 
Dublin Convention to be replac ed with a Community legal instrument. The conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council of October 1999 stated  that a CEAS, based on the full and inclusive 
application of the Geneva Conventi on, should include, in the short term, inter alia , a clear and 
workable method for determining the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application, as part of a fair and efficient asylum procedure.5 
Rules to this end were laid down in the Regula tions comprising what is known as the Dublin 
system: Council Regulation 343/2003/EC of 18 February 20036 (the Dublin Regulation), its 
implementing Commission Regulat ion 1560/2003 of 2 September 20037 (which together replaced 
the Dublin Convention), Council Regul ation 2725/2000/EC of 11 December 20008 (the Eurodac 
                                                 
1 COM(2007) 640. 
2 CLWP reference No: 2008/JLS/022. 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/ clwp2008_roadmap_strategic_initiatives.pdf . 
4 OJ C 254, 19.08.1997, p.1. 
5 Presidency conclusions, Tampere Euro pean Council, paragraphs 14 and 15. 
6 OJ L 50, 25.2.2003, p.1. 
7 OJ L 222, 5.9.2003, p.3. 
8 OJ L 316, 15.12.2000, p.1. 
EN 4   EN Regulation) and its implementing Regul ation 407/2002/EC of 28 February 2002.9 The Dublin 
Regulation was considered the fi rst cornerstone of the CEAS and was based on the same general 
principle as the Dublin Convention, namely that the responsibility for examining an application 
should lie with the Member State that played the greatest part in the a pplicant’s entry into and 
residence within the territory of the Member St ates, apart from exceptions designed to protect 
family unity.  
The Hague Programme further expanded on the Tamp ere objectives and called for the Commission 
to conclude an evaluation of the first stage of the asylum acquis  and to submit the second-stage 
instruments and measures to the Council and the Eu ropean Parliament with a view to their adoption 
before the end of 2010. The Commission Policy Plan  for the CEAS (‘the Poli cy Plan’), adopted on 
17 June 200810, defined a road-map for the coming y ears and listed the measures that the 
Commission intends to propose in order to complete the second stage of the CEAS, including a 
proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation.  
1.1.2.  Organisation and timing, consultation and expertise 
With a view to preparing for the second stage of  asylum legislation, as called for by the Hague 
Programme, the Commission launched an evaluation pr ocess of the results achieved in the first 
stage of the establishment of the CEAS. 
Regarding the Dublin system, the Commission fo llowed a two-track approach to evaluating its 
application.  
Firstly, a comprehensive technical evaluation  was undertaken based on Article 28 of the Dublin 
Regulation and Article 24(5) of the Eurodac Regulation11, which required the Commission to report 
on their application after three ye ars of operation and to propose, where appropriate, the necessary 
amendments. The Evaluation Report issued by the Commission on 6 June 2007 (‘the Evaluation 
Report’) was based on a wide range of contributions  from Member States, including answers to a 
detailed questionnaire sent by the Commission in July 2005, regular di scussions in expert meetings 
and statistics. Contributions from ot her stakeholders were also carefu lly considered, in particular the 
Evaluation Report published by the UNHCR in April 200612 as well as critical reports from civil 
society organisations, such as the report by the ECRE/ELENA network published in March 2006.13 
Secondly, the Commission considered that before  proposing any new initiative, an in-depth 
reflection and debate with all re levant stakeholders on the future  architecture of the CEAS was 
necessary. On 6 June 2007, it therefore presented a Green Paper14 on the future of the CEAS (‘the 
Green Paper’) aiming to identify the possible op tions for shaping the se cond stage of the CEAS. 
While the Evaluation Report served as a technical assessment for the Dublin system, the consultation based on the Green Paper served as a policy evaluation . The response to the public 
                                                
 
9 OJ L 62, 5.3.2002, p.1. 
10 COM(2008) 360, SEC(2008) 2030. 
11 In order to provide a complete picture of the overall functioning of the Dublin system, the Commission 
presented a single evaluation covering the Dublin and the Eurodac Regulations as well as their implementing 
rules. 
12 UNHCR, The Dublin Regulation, a UNHCR discussion paper, April 2006. 
13 ECRE/ELENA, Report on the application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe, March 2006. 
14 COM(2007) 301. 
EN 5   EN consultation included 89 contributions from a wide range of stakeholders,15 including 20 Member 
States, regional and local authorities, the Co mmittee of the Regions, the Economic and Social 
Committee, the UNHCR, academic institutions, politic al parties and a large number of NGOs. The 
issues raised and the suggestions  put forward during the consulta tion provided the main basis for 
the preparation of the Policy Plan and have also been taken into account in the preparation of the 
present proposal. 
Furthermore, several expert meetings  were organised between October 2007 and July 2008 with 
Member States,16 NGOs and the UNHCR,17 lawyers and judges,18 and Members of the European 
Parliament19 in order to seek their opinion on the impr ovements needed to the Dublin Regulation. 
Member States were also consulted on the main i ssues the Commission intended to address in order 
to tackle the shortcomings identified in the appli cation of the Dublin Regul ation at the Immigration 
and Asylum Committee meeting on 5 March 2008.  
The Commission ordered an external  study (‘the external study’) to support the prep aration of the 
Impact Assessment. The problem, objectives a nd policy options assessed were based on the 
Evaluation Report on the Dublin system, an analysis  of the contributions to  the Green Paper, the 
outcome of the expert meetings as well as cont ributions from the contract or. Important data were 
also collected from literature reviews, such as reports by the UNHCR, ECRE and Save the 
Children. The report of the European Parliame nt on the evaluation of  the Dublin system20 has also 
been taken into consideration. 
This report also incorporates  comments submitted during an in ter-service steeri ng group meeting 
attended by representatives of  the RELEX, SANCO, EAC and ELA RG Directorates-General on 20 
June 2008. The Directorates-General  consulted have had also the opportunity to submit their 
comments on the final text of the Commission’s proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation during 
the inter-service consultation procedure. 
1.2. The Impact Assessment Board 
The Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IA B) was consulted on the draft final Impact 
Assessment report and issued its opinion on 7 October 2008.21 The IAB considered that ‘the report 
is generally of good quality and proportionate to the issues it deals with’. The IAB also formulated a 
number of recommendations, which have been ta ken into account in th is report. The main 
recommendations were: (i) Specify the number of Me mber States affected by the various problems 
and the policy options and where possible the number  of asylum-seekers involved; (ii) Clarify the 
modalities of two of the preferred policy options, namely the policy option regarding the suspensive 
                                                 
15 The 89 contributions received are available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/gp_asylum_system/news_contributions_asylum_syst
em_en.htm  . An analysis of the contributions is attached in Annex 1. 
16 Meetings were held within the Dublin contact commi ttee on 19 October 2007, and with a selected number of 
Member States on 12 February 2008. 
17 Meetings organised on 18 February 2008 and 29 April 2008. 
18 The meeting with lawyers took pl ace on 17 March 2008 and the meeting wi th judges took place on 10 July 
2008. A broad range of issues were discussed at these meetings (Asylum Procedures Directive and practical cooperation), including Dublin-related issues. 
19 5 March 2008, this meeting was organised in connection with the Policy Plan, but Du blin-related issues were 
discussed as well. 
20 P6_TA-PROV(2008)0385, 02.9.2008. 
21 The opinion will be available here: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/cia_2008_en.htm . 
EN 6   EN effect of an appeal and the polic y option regarding the suspension of Dublin transfers in limited and 
well-defined circumstances; (iii) Assess the proportiona lity of individual options rather than that of 
the preferred package as a whole. 
2. PROBLEM  DEFINITION 
2.1. Scope of the problem 
From 2006 until the first half of 2007, out of approximately 183 200 as ylum applications (lodged in 
those Member States appl ying the Dublin system at that tim e) Member States  reported having 
received nearly 39 000 Dublin requests  (21.3%) and sending out nearly 46 700 (25.5%).22 Of the 
incoming requests received in that period, aroun d 23 000 requests were accepted (59%) and around 
12 500 of these were transferred to the responsible Member State (54.5%).23 
Although the number of asylum-seekers in the EU-27 has almost halved since 2003 (from a total of 
337 235 to 186 890 in 2007 — -45%), it should be noted  that the figures for 2007 reveal an increase 
in the numbers of those seeking pr otection in Europe. Assuming that this trend continues, the scale 
of the problem would increase as well, since more asylum applican ts could fall under the Dublin 
system. 
As already stated in the Evalua tion Report on the Dublin system, s hortcomings in the availability 
and/or comparability of the existing statistical da ta make comparisons and analysis very difficult. 
Therefore, this report could not provide statis tical data for all of the problems identified. In 
particular, the data on the number of asylum-s eekers potentially affected by these problems are 
limited. However, in particular for the problems re lating to the protection of asylum-seekers (such 
as the detention of asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure or family reunification 
problems), it is important to highlight that, even if the number of potential asylum-seekers affected 
was limited, the policy measures presented would sti ll be justified given that  fundamental rights are 
at stake.  
2.2. What is the issue or the problem that may require action? 
The Evaluation Report concluded that overall, the objectives of the Dublin system, notably to 
establish a clear and workable mechanism for dete rmining responsibility for asylum applications, 
have to a large extent been achieved. Nevertheless,  it also identified a number of deficiencies 
mainly related to the practical application and effectiveness of the system, including issues concerning the protection afforded to asylum seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. 
Problems regarding the current level of protection given to asylum seekers falling under the Dublin 
procedure were also pointed out in the contributions received on th e Green Paper as well as in the 
reports by the UNHCR and various NGOs. At the same time, the report of the European Parliament 
on the evaluation of the Dublin system identifie d a number of problems and made a series of 
recommendations, primarily relating to the need to  strengthen the protection aspect of the Dublin 
instrument. 
                                                
 
22 See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of what is meant by incoming and outgoing requests. A significant 
mismatch is evident between the numbers of incomi ng and outgoing requests submitted under the Dublin 
Regulation. This may be explained by different definitio ns of registration used by Member States or by the 
incompleteness of some of the data provided. 
23 Given the unavailability of data on the number of acc epted and effected outgoing requests, only the incoming 
data could be taken into account in the calculations. For detailed statistical data on this subject see Annex 3. 
EN 7   EN This initiative aims to address those concerns and others that emerged during the consultation 
process.  
2.2.1.  Unclear or inadequate operational prov isions of the Dublin Regulation are 
counterproductive for the efficiency of the system and create hardship for asylum-
seekers  
The Evaluation Report and the consultation process id entified a number of issues that impede the 
fully efficient operation of the system, thus crea ting practical difficulties for Member States in 
implementing it and having a negative impact on asylum-seekers. 
The following main deficiencies have been identified: 
a. Delays in the procedure for determining the Member State responsible, with corresponding 
hardship for the asylum-seeker(s) concerned as a result of delayed access to the asylum procedure.   
The Dublin Regulation sets various time limits fo r the procedure to determine the Member State 
responsible. The overall objective is to ensure that Member States decide quickly on who is 
responsible in order to guarant ee the rapid processing of asylum applications. As found in the 
Evaluation Report and in consultation with stake holders, while most of the time limits under the 
Dublin Regulation are appropriate, there are three instances where the time limits appear to be 
inadequate, leading to delays in  the procedure for determining th e Member State responsible. The 
first concerns requests to take back  an asylum-seeker who has alrea dy filed an application in one 
Member State and then moved to another (Article  16). The second conc erns requests to bring 
together family members and other dependent relatives on humanitarian grounds  (Article 15). 
The third concerns requests for information  needed for the implemen tation of the Regulation 
(Article 21).
24 
Regarding take-back requests , the Regulation does not set time limits for submitting such requests 
to the Member State presumed to be responsi ble but only for replying to such requests. As 
highlighted in the Evaluation Report, the absence of time limits for submitting this type of request is 
seen by several Member States as being detrimen tal to the efficiency of the system. The UNHCR 
mentioned cases where it took more than three m onths from the moment the asylum claim was 
lodged for the authorities to make a request to a nother Member State to ta ke back the individual.25 
For requests on humanitarian grounds , the Regulation does not set any time limits for making 
such requests or for replying to them, leading to different interpretations on the part of the Member 
States: while some consider that th e deadlines for take-charge requests26 should apply, others 
consider it impossible to apply time limits to requests on humanitarian grounds, as the 
circumstances for reuniting family members can be  unpredictable. However,  the impossibility of 
setting a time limit can only apply to the submi ssion of requests on humanitari an grounds and not to 
the reply to such requests. In practice, as stated in the Evaluation Report, mo st Member States that 
apply the humanitarian clause complained that they did not receive any reply at  all to their requests, 
possibly because, among other things, there is no time limit for a reply to be provided. For requests 
for information , the time limit for replying to them is si x months. As information sharing between 
Member States is essential for implementation of  the Regulation, several Member States and the 
                                                 
24 For further explanations of these terms, see glossary in Annex 4. 
25 UNHCR report, p.37. 
26 See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 
EN 8   EN UNHCR argued that the current time limit is too long. Long delays in res ponding to requests for 
information could also in some cases make it impo ssible for the requesting Member State to respect 
the time limit for making a request to take charge  of an asylum-seeker (3 months), therefore 
resulting in it becoming responsible by default fo r examining the applica tion in accordance with 
Article 17(1) of the Regulation. This  is because, before submitting a re quest, Member States have to 
possess clear proof or information indicating that the re quested Member State is responsible.  
In conclusion, as a result of inadequate time lim its, delays occur in the procedure for determining 
responsibility, with a negative im pact on both Member States (for instance the wrong Member 
States could be deemed responsible by default,  as explained above) a nd asylum-seekers (the 
examination of the merits of th eir claims will be delayed, with  the corresponding uncertainty and 
anxiety). 
Although it is not feasible to indi cate the number of Member States where this problem occurs and 
the number of asylum-seekers poten tially affected, as this is a general problem linked with the 
functioning of the system, it possi bly concerns most Member States and most asylum-seekers.  
b. Despite a sizeable increase, th e limited number of implemented transfers remains an important 
flaw of the system, since its efficiency is mainly  based on the timely transf er of asylum-seekers to 
the Member State responsible fo r examining their applications 
The Dublin Regulation lays down several rules rega rding the transfer of asylum-seekers from the 
Member State where they are staying to the Member  State responsible. In pa rticular, transfers have 
to be carried out as soon as practically possibl e, after consultation between the Member States 
involved and within at most six months (which may be extended to one year in the case of 
imprisonment and to 18 months if asylum-seeker s abscond) of the acceptance of a request. A series 
of practical arrangements between Member States  are also set out in the Dublin Implementing 
Regulation, such as on how tran sfers may be carried out (i.e. on voluntary basis, by supervised 
departure or under escort) and on cooperat ion on transfers between Member States. 
However, despite the existing rules, Member St ates often encounter practical difficulties in 
implementing accepted transfers and a large number are not carried out. Between March 2003 and December 2005 (the reference period for the Eval uation Report), implemented transfers represented 
52.28% of outgoing acceptances and 40.04% of incoming acceptances.
27 This represents a 
considerable increase in comparison with the nu mber of transfers under the Dublin Convention, 
where only 27% of outgoing accep tances and 25.62% of incoming acceptances were followed by 
transfers. However, the number of implemented transfers still remains low in comparison with the 
number of acceptances: in 2006, implemented tran sfers represented 61.3% of outgoing acceptances 
and 54.4% of incoming acceptances. This is further c onfirmed by the data for the first half of 2007 
(outgoing transfers were 57.61% of accepted reque sts while incoming transfers accounted for 
53.6% of accepted requests).28 
As illustrated in the Evaluation Re port, all Member States reported a lower number of transfers than 
acceptances. The Evaluation Report showed that L ithuania, Estonia and Malta carried out all 
accepted transfers, but as the numbers were very low they cannot be considered to be of any statistical significance.
29 One group of Member States had outgoi ng transfer rates much higher than 
                                                 
27 See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of the terms. 
28 For further information on transfers, see Tables I, II, III, IV in Annex 3. 
29 The assessment is based on the an alysis of outgoing transfers. 
EN 9   EN the average of 52.28%. The Czech Republic with 91.51% had the highest rate. This was followed 
by a group of Member States with  rates higher than 70%, name ly the United Kingdom (88.43%), 
Iceland (84.61%), Luxembourg (75.65%) and the Ne therlands (73.13%). In three Member States 
the rate was between 50% and 70%, namely in Norway, Germany and Ireland. In Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Slovaki a and Austria the rate was below the average 
(between 15 and 32%). The lowest proportion of eff ected transfers was seen in Austria, where only 
14.9% of all accepted outgoing requests were  followed by effected transfers. 
In 2006, Estonia, Cyprus and Iceland carried out a ll accepted requests, but gi ven the low numbers in 
question these data are not very releva nt from a statistical point of view.30 The United Kingdom had 
the highest transfer rate with 97.06%, followe d by the Czech Republic with 91.10% and Finland 
with 90.59%. The Member States with rates higher than 70% were Luxembourg (83.22%) and 
Denmark (73.72%). In five Member States th e rate was between 50% and 70%, namely in 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Norway. In Austria, Slovenia, Greece and France, the 
rate was between 40% and 48%. In Italy, Hungar y and Slovakia the rate was between 19% and 
26%. Finally, the Member State with the lowest  proportion of effected outgoing transfers was 
Spain, with only 14%. 
The Evaluation Report showed that certain Member  States in particular frequently exchanged 
asylum-seekers between themselves. For instan ce, in the second half  of 2005, Germany accepted 
383 requests from Austria, while Austria acce pted 190 requests from Germany. The Dublin 
Regulation does not provide for Memb er States that frequently exchange asylum-seekers due to 
various factors, such as  their geographical situation, to limit the number of asylum-seekers to be 
transferred by agreeing to ‘cancel’ an equal numb er of transfers so as to carry out a one-way 
transfer of a limited number of persons.  
From the perspective of the sending Member State (the Member State which did not implement the 
transfer), non-effected transfers mean a waste of  the financial and human resources used in the 
procedure for determining respon sibility. On top of this th ere are the costs of assuming 
responsibility by default. However, the receivi ng Member State (the one normally responsible) 
would be relieved of the costs of receiving asylum-seekers and examining their applications. Finally, non-effected transfers are also problematic in  view of the political objectives of the system, 
which is to establish th e responsibility of a Member State for examining an application on the basis 
of objective criteria. From this poi nt of view, if decisions are not followed by transfers, the Dublin 
Regulation could for instance be seen as fail ing to address the phenomenon of secondary 
movements.  
From the standpoint of applicants, if transfers ar e not carried out, they would in principle remain 
within the Member State of their choice, alth ough the period for gaining access to the asylum 
procedure as such might be longer than if they had been transferre d without delay to the responsible 
Member State. However, in certain circumstances, a failed transfer might also be to the 
                                                
 
30 Data submitted by some Member States (in 2006 by Lithuania and Poland) show the number of transfers to be 
higher than the number of accepted requests. The former should normally coincide with the latter or be lower. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that some  Member States might not register requests accepted 
implicitly (in accordance with Articles 18(7) and 20(1)(c) of the Dublin Regulation). Therefore, data provided 
by these Member States, included in Annex 3, should be considered with caution. In the calculation of the 
average rate of effected transfers, the number of transf ers for these Member States has been considered equal 
to the number of accepted requests. 
EN 10   EN disadvantage of asylum-seekers, for instance when  this would prevent them from reuniting with 
members of their family in th e responsible Member State. 
This problem appears to be due to two sets of factors . One concerns insufficient coordination and 
disagreement between Member States on the practical  arrangements for transfer s, due in some cases 
to a lack of detail in the legal text. For instance: Member St ates often choose different days and 
times when asylum-seekers can be transferred; th ey do not always exchange relevant information 
prior to undertaking a transfer; there is a lack of clarity on who is to pay the transportation costs ; 
there are no rules in the Dublin Regulation on the procedure to follow in the event of erroneous 
transfers  (where Member States transfer the wrong person) or in the case of decisions  overturned 
on appeal after the person has been already transferred.  
The second set of factors explai ning the limited number of impleme nted transfers concerns mainly 
the actions of asylum-seekers. The Evaluation Report  mentioned three main ca uses in this regard: 
• Absconding of asylum-seekers after the decision: i.e. where an asylum-seeker decides to 
disappear after announcement of the transfer decisi on, in order to avoid being transferred. This 
appears to be essentially linked to the existence of pull factors in the Me mber State where they 
are, such as positive perception of the asylum system in terms of reception conditions and recognition rates, the fact that a large community of the same origin is living in the same 
Member State, etc. Some Member States point ed out that asylum-seekers are encouraged to 
abscond by a rule of the Dublin Regulation (Articles 19(4) and 20(4)) under which the 
responsibility of a Member State ceases after 18 months in cases where asylum-seekers abscond, 
with the result that they are able to remain  within the Member State of their choice. 
• The suspensive effect of appeals against transfer decisions : i.e. where the transfer is 
suspended and the person can remain in that Member State until a decision is taken on the 
appeal. However, the number of such cases shou ld be limited, given that Member States have a 
low rate of appeal and suspensive effect seem s to be rarely granted (see also section 2.1.4.b). 
• Illness, trauma or voluntary return  of asylum-seekers to their country of origin are other 
causes of non-effected transfers. There are no st atistics on how many tran sfers were not carried 
out because of these reasons.  
c. Non uniform application and divergences between  Member States regardi ng the circumstances 
and procedures for applying certain rules and criter ia of the Dublin Regulation affect the proper 
functioning of the system 
As demonstrated in the Evaluation Report, a number  of rules and criteria established by the Dublin 
Regulation are not clear and/or ar e not applied in a uniform manner by the Member States. This 
mainly concerns the cessation of responsibility  clauses and the discretionary clauses (the 
sovereignty and humanitarian clauses). Disputes ar ising from the non-uniform application of these 
clauses not only affect the efficiency of the system  but are also detrimental to asylum-seekers, since 
they create delay and uncertainty. 
Regarding the cessation of responsibility clauses : the principle is that the responsibility of a 
particular Member State to take charge of or take  back applicants to examine their application for 
asylum, or to return third-country nationals whose applicat ions have been previously rejected, is not 
indefinite. The Dublin Regulation th us contains a series of provisi ons setting out th e circumstances 
where responsibility ceases. As shown in the Eval uation Report, three of th ese instances have been 
EN 11   EN identified as causing particular problems in Member States: Articles 4(5), 16(3) and 16(4),31 which 
state that the responsibility of a Member State ends  if, among other things, it can be proved that the 
applicant has left the territories of the Member Stat es for at least three mont hs or that the applicant 
has been expelled.  
In particular, the following problems have been identified: - from the wording of these Articles, it is not clear which Member State bears the burden of proof , 
i.e. is it the requested Member State  (meaning the responsible Member  State asked to take charge 
or take back an asylum applicant but whic h refuses to do so by invoking a cessation of 
responsibility clause) which has to provide evidence that  the person has effectively  left the country 
or has been expelled or is it the requesting Member State  that has to prove that the person has not 
left the territory or has not been expelled; 
- the consequences of the cessa tion of responsibility  are not clear, i.e. it is not clear what happens if 
a new application is lodged in  the same Member State after the cessation of responsibility; 
- the expressions ‘state in which he may lawfully  travel’ and ‘adopted and actually implemented’ in 
Article 16(4) give rise to diffi culties of interpretation among Member  States. For instance, for some 
Member States (at least three), the notion of ‘state in which he may lawfully travel’  does not include 
the Member States, for others it does not include the Schengen States and for others (at least four) it 
includes all possible countries where a person may legally travel. Regarding the expression 
‘adopted and actually implemented’ it is not clear for instance if it is sufficient to deliver a request  
to leave the country or if  the person actually has to  leave  the country.  
Divergent interpretations have also  been observed in the application of the discretionary clauses, 
which allow Member States to derogate from the criteria for determining responsibility.  
Regarding the sovereignty clause (Article 3(2)): the principle is that  each Member State retains 
the right to examine any asylum application submitted to it, even if it is not the Member State responsible under the criteria la id down in the Regulation. Firs tly, it has emerged from the 
consultation that there is some confusion among the Member States about their obligation to first 
carry out the procedure to determine responsibilit y before applying the sovereignty clause, despite 
the fact that this obligation seems to be  clearly established under the Regulation.
32 
The application of the sovereignty clause w ithout carrying out the procedure to determine 
responsibility could be seen in  certain circumstances as be ing less resource-intensive for Member 
States  than launching the Dublin procedure. However, for asylum-seekers , the application of the 
sovereignty clause without carrying out the pro cedure for determining responsibility could have 
negative consequences, notably when  this would prevent them from rejoining family members in 
another Member State (in cases wh ere as a result of the procedure for determining responsibility, 
the responsible Member State is the one where fam ily members of the asylum-seeker are staying, in 
accordance with the current Articles 6, 7 or 8).  
                                                 
31 See glossary in Annex 4 for further explanation of these Articles. 
32 The obligation to first carry out the procedure to determine responsibility can be inferred from Article 4: ‘The 
process of determining the Member Stat e responsible under this Regulation sha ll start as soon as an application 
for asylum is first lodged with a Member States’ and from the introductory part of Article 3(2): ‘By way of 
derogation from paragraph 1, each Member State may exam ine an application for asyl um lodged with it by a 
third-country national, even if such examination is not its respo nsibility under the crit eria laid down in 
this Regulation.’ The obligation to inform the concerned Member States about the taking of responsibility can 
be read in the last part of Article 3(2).  
EN 12   EN The fact that the Dublin Regulation does not re quire the consent of the asylum-seeker for the 
application of the sovereignty clause33 is another linked problem, since, as mentioned in the 
Evaluation Report, in some cases the asylum-seeker  might not necessarily implicitly consent with 
the application of this clause and would prefer the designa tion criteria to be strictly applied, notably 
when this would allow him or her to rejoin  family members in another Member States. 
Secondly, some confusion exists with regard to th e obligation to inform the other Member States 
about the decision to apply the sovere ignty clause (final part of Article  3(2)). It is also not clear by 
which means such information has to be transmitted. If the Member State making use of this discretionary power does not inform the other Memb er States about the taking of responsibility, 
there is a risk that simultaneous procedures are carried out in several Member States on a single 
application, which is obviously inefficient and res ource-consuming and against the objectives of the 
system. 
Finally, another issue that has pr oved to be problematic in pract ice concerns the circumstances 
under which the sovereignty clause can be used, wh ich are not specified in the Regulation. Member 
States apply it for different reas ons, ranging from humanitarian to  purely practical. For example, 
Austria, Finland and Ireland apply it if there is a risk of viola tion of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Germany and Ital y apply it when processing a claim under an 
accelerated procedure would be le ss resource-intensive than launc hing a transfer request under the 
Dublin procedure. This clause was designed to respond to situ ations which are not explicitly 
provided for in the Regulation, so Member States  have flexibility in applying it. However, 
experience has shown that in some cases the sovereig nty clause has been used against the interest of 
asylum-seekers, in particular when this has b een for practical reasons, as highlighted by the 
UNHCR.
34  
Regarding the humanitarian clause (Article 15) : the principle is that any Member State, even if it 
is not the Member State responsible under th e criteria set out in the Regulation, may, on 
humanitarian grounds, in particular based on family or cultural consid erations, bring together family 
members and other dependent relatives in order to  examine their applications for asylum, at the 
request of another Member State.  
Regarding the procedure for applying the humanitarian clause, Member States have been 
confronted with several difficulties, due  in particular to the fact that: 
- the Regulation is not clear a bout which Member State can ma ke a request on humanitarian 
grounds (i.e. any Member State as outlined in Artic le 15(1) of the Dublin Regulation or, as laid 
down in Article 13(1), the Member State carrying out  the procedure to determine responsibility, or 
the Member State responsible);  
- the Regulation does not contain an  explicit obligation to justify a refusal to accept a request on 
humanitarian grounds;  
- the practical arrangements are not working satis factorily or are not comprehensive enough, e.g. 
there are no clear arrangements fo r obtaining the consent of the pe rsons involved in the procedure; 
- it is difficult to obtain proof of the fa mily link and/or the dependency situation; 
                                                 
33  This obligation figured however in the Dublin Convention. 
34 UNHCR report, p.31. 
EN 13   EN Other problems related to the applic ation of this clause are identif ied and explained in points 2.2.2. 
and 2.2.5.  
As a result of the lack of clarity and comprehens iveness of this provisi on, its application varies 
widely from one Member State to another35, and is subject to disagreements between Member 
States. Those primarily affected are the asylum -seekers themselves, who might be prevented from 
being reunited with family members or dependent re latives for humanitarian reasons (see also point 
2.2.2).  
As the Dublin procedure, with one exception (the sovereignty clause), alwa ys involves at least two 
Member States, it is self-evide nt that non-uniform in terpretation of its pr ovisions may hinder the 
procedure for determining responsibility. 
2.2.2.  Disputes between Member States concerning the application of the Dublin rules are not 
tackled in an efficient way  
Member States often encounter problems in practi ce and have divergent view s on the application of 
the Regulation, as is also highlighted in the Evalua tion Report. In some cases, this seems to be due 
to the lack of clarity of the legal text (see for instance th e point above on the cessation of 
responsibility). In some other cas es, this is linked with the hi gh level of proof Member States 
require for the application of certain provisions (for instance those relating to family unity). Lengthy disputes or disagreements compromise the objective of the system, which is to determine 
the Member State responsible as quickly as possibl e in order to guarantee th e rapid processing of 
asylum applications. In some cases, moreover, Memb er States appear to give up on resolving their 
disputes, which obviously has a detrimental eff ect both on one of the Member States involved 
(which will have to examine the application despite  the fact that the correct implementation of the 
Dublin rules could designate another Member State as responsible) a nd on asylum-seekers (in 
particular if not reunited with  members of their family). 
Based on the significant number of questions Member States regularly raise on the interpretation of 
various provisions of the Regulation (some of wh ich are discussed at informal Dublin experts’ 
meetings), the majority of Member States can be considered to have divergent views on the 
application of certain pr ovisions of the Regulation. 
The Dublin Regulation does not contain a general m echanism for settling disputes or differences of 
opinion between Member States concerning the a pplication of the Regulation. The conciliation 
mechanism in Article 14 of the Implementing Regul ation has a limited scope (as it only applies to 
disputes on the humanitarian clause), and its  decisions are not binding. For these reasons, the 
conciliation mechanism has never been used by Me mber States, despite the fact that they often 
cannot agree on the need to bring family members t ogether or on the place wh ere this should occur. 
The fact that the conciliation mechanism for the hu manitarian clause is not used diminishes the 
chances of relatives to be reunited on humanitari an grounds, which in some cases, as mentioned in 
the Evaluation Report, could amount to a breach of the fundamental right  to family unity as 
enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundame ntal Rights and in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
                                                
 
35 As shown in the Evaluation Report, some (such as Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, 
Iceland) have never made use of it and others (such as Greece, Spain,  Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary) have 
applied it in very few cases, while Poland has based 50% of its requests on this provision. 
EN 14   EN Some of the practical difficulties Member States encounter with the implem entation of the Dublin 
Regulation are discussed during th e informal meetings the Commissi on organises twice a year with 
Dublin experts from all Member St ates and with the participation of the UNHCR. However, there is 
no structured follow-up to these discussions and th e conclusions reached are not binding. Therefore, 
their real impact is questionable.  
2.2.3.  Transfers under the Dublin procedure coul d contribute to further overburdening  
Member States facing particular pressure  
The IA on the Policy Plan showed that the dist ribution of asylum applicants between Member 
States remained substantially unequal in 200 6, so some Member States can undeniably be 
considered to be ‘overburdened’ when the flow of  asylum-seekers they receive is compared to the 
size of their population. Two main reasons have been identified for the overburdening of certain 
Member States: geographical situat ion (this would apply to countri es like Malta, Cyprus, Greece 
and Slovakia) and a ‘positive percep tion’ of the asylum system (for  countries like Sweden, Belgium 
and Austria, with relatively good reception conditions for asylum-seekers and higher recognition rates).  
As regards the impact of the Dublin procedure on national asylum systems, the Evaluation Report 
has demonstrated that the Dublin mechanism di d not increase or decrease the total number of 
asylum-seekers by more than 5%  in most Member States. Howe ver, in the case of Poland, the 
increase was around 20% and, in the case of Slovaki a, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Portugal, 
around 10%. In 2005, the incoming transfers under th e Dublin System were  equally balanced 
between border and non-border Member States
36 and data from 2006 seem to confirm this finding. 
In 2005, the number of incoming transfers to extern al border countries was 3 055, while there were 
5 161 incoming transfers to Member States without  an external border. In 2006, border countries 
received 3 050 incoming tran sfers as against 4 984 rece ived by non-border countries.37 
Based on the available statistical da ta, transfers seem to be mainly towards countries that can be 
considered to be relatively ‘under-burdened’ from  a demographic point of view. There were some 
exceptions for 2006, however: Greece and Malta (c onsidered as ‘overburdened’ from a 
demographic point of view) and the Slovak Republic  (considered as ‘averagely overburdened’). 
Therefore, it can be stated that, overall, the Dub lin system has a redistributive impact on national 
asylum systems, and is not in it self a cause of particular asylum  pressure or overburden on Member 
States. In some cases, however, there is a risk that  Dublin transfers place an  even greater burden on 
Member States that are already faci ng a slight or large overburden. 
As also highlighted in the Evalua tion Report, the Dublin System may de facto  result in additional 
burdens  on Member States that have limited recepti on and absorption capacities and that find 
themselves under particular migratory pressure.  
In cases of pre-existing deficiencies of the asylum systems of some Member States and in 
exceptional situations of particul ar pressure, transfers under the Dublin Regulation, which allocates 
                                                 
36 For assessing the impact of Dublin transfers on th e Member States, the Evaluation Report considered as 
border countries  those countries with sea borders exposed to migration flows (‘Southern border’) and those 
with land borders with third countries (‘Eastern border’). Finland is an ex ception to the principle, as it has 
borders with Russia but is co nsidered a non-border country  because of the lack of migration flows on its border 
with Russia. Non-border countries  are those countries without land bo rders with third countries (except 
borders with Switzerland) and without se a borders exposed to migration flows. 
37 See Table V in Annex 3. 
EN 15   EN in most cases responsibility to the first country of  entry (in accordance with  Article 10(1)), may add 
to the burden of those Member States and in some  cases can result in the concerned Member States 
not being able to guarantee an appropriate standard of protec tion (see also section 2.2.4).  
Another situation where Dublin transfers could create further overburdening for certain Member 
States is where they receive a considerably higher  number of asylum applications than the average, 
as a result of the ‘positive perception’ of their asylum systems by asylum applicants. For instance, 
in Sweden, the number of asylum applications by Iraqi citizens in creased from 2 330 in 2005 to 
8 950 in 2006 and to 18 560 in 2007. 
For the time being, there is no mechanism in the Dub lin Regulation to prevent, in cases of particular 
pressure on certain Member States, Dublin transf ers further adding to th e burden of those Member 
States and possibly creating the risk of breachi ng the protection standards under the EU asylum 
acquis .  
2.2.4.  Transfers under the Dublin procedure could, in exceptional circumstances, result in 
asylum-seekers not receiving an adequate standard of protection  
For the Dublin system to function adequately, a ll Member States have to provide harmonised and 
adequate standards of protection for asylum-seeker s. However, as demonstrated in the IA on the 
Policy Plan, at this stage of the CEAS, there ar e still significant differences between the Member 
States in terms of procedures for granting in ternational protection an d reception conditions for 
asylum-seekers. The asylum system and practice of some Member States is not always adequate, so 
returns under the D ublin procedure could some times result in asylum-seekers not receiving an 
adequate standard of protection.  
The return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the D ublin Regulation is one recent example that can 
be mentioned in this context. As eviden ced by the UNHCR in a report from April 200838, Greece 
seems to face considerable struct ural and qualitative shortcomings  with its asylum system and 
practice, with a substantial number of asylum-seek ers facing serious challenges in accessing and 
enjoying effective protection in Greece. The UNHCR has therefore ad vised the Member States to 
refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece until further notice and to examine themselves those applications (i.e. applying the sovereignty cl ause in Article 3(2)). 
Member States have reacted differently to the uncertain asylum situation in Greece and the calls by 
the UNHCR and various NGOs to suspend Dublin retu rns: one State has susp ended all returns to 
Greece but without taking responsibility for those cas es and examining them, at least three other 
States have suspended the return of only vulnerable groups, while the majority of States appear to 
continue to send asylum-seekers to Greece.  
Under the current Regulation, the Commission does not have concre te tools to provide proper 
assistance in such situations and to propose a unifo rm line to be adopted by all Member States.  
Moreover, besides Greece, reception conditions are of concern in at least three other Member States 
(Austria, France and Spain), which do not apply the Reception Conditions Directive to asylum-
seekers under the Dublin procedure.
39 For the period 2005-2006 the average number of affected 
                                                 
38 UNHCR position on the return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation, 15 April 2008. 
39 Odysseus Academic Network, Comparative Overview of the Implemen tation Directive 2003/9 of 27 January 
2003 laying down Mini mum Standards for the R eception of Asylum Seekers  in the EU Member States . 
EN 16   EN applicants per year in these three Member States was approximately 7 300 (figure based on the 
number of outgoing Dublin requests sent by these Member States during the period). 
Regarding the number of Dublin asylum-seekers pot entially affected by this problem in Greece, 
based on the number of transfers between January 2005 and June 2007, approximately 1 200 
asylum-seekers who were previous ly under the Dublin procedure co uld have been affected by the 
problem of poor reception conditions. 
These data have to be used with  great caution. They just give an indication of the potential number 
of asylum-seekers that could have received an inadequate level of protection in the Member States 
mentioned. There are no statistics available as to the exact number of asylum-seekers in this 
situation.  
2.2.5.  Inadequate information and legal safeguards for asylum-seekers  
Accurate and comprehensive information about the rules and implications of  the Dublin procedure 
as well as adequate legal safeguards are essential fo r the protection of the ri ghts of asylum-seekers 
subject to the Dublin procedure a nd in order to improve the prospect s of them respecting the system 
rather than trying to evade it.  
The Evaluation Report and the consultation proce ss identified the following flaws in the Dublin 
Regulation in this regard: 
a. Often, asylum-seekers are not properly informed  about the Dublin procedure and their rights 
under it  
Article 3(4) of the Dublin Regulation obliges Member States to inform the asylum-seeker ‘ in 
writing in a language he or she may reasonabl y be expected to understand regarding the 
application of [the] Regulation, it s time limits and its effects ’. Despite the existence of this legal 
obligation, the Evaluation Report ha s emphasised the general lack of  awareness of asylum-seekers 
of the procedure for determini ng responsibility and the fact th at, in many cases, they do not 
understand why they are sent to a country other than the one of their choice. The communication 
policy varies widely from one Member State to another, with certain Member States having good 
information tools while others pr oviding only a low level of information and/or in an inadequate 
form.  
As regards the form in which the information has to be provided, although Article 3(4) requires 
Member States to inform applicants in writing, at  least five Member Stat es appear not to do so.40 
Moreover, the fact that the legal text is silent on the need, in some cases, to provide information 
also in other forms than in writing, might lead to practices that do not accommodate the needs of 
persons who might be unable to make us e of a written text. As regards the  language  in which the 
information is provided, data gathered in 2006 indicat e that some Member States (such as Slovakia, 
UK, Norway, Germany, and Austria) make informati on available in more than 15 languages, while 
others provide translations in fewer than 10 languages (such as Lithuania, Latvia and Romania). 
There are also divergent practices regarding the stage of the procedure when  information is 
provided to asylum-seekers, with some Member Stat es informing them at the very beginning of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Concerning the level of reception conditions in the Me mber States, see the IA on the Directive […/.../EC] 
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, SEC (2008) 2944. 
40 UNHCR report, p.13. 
EN 17   EN procedure (or even before receiving an applicati on for asylum, such as Greece), some both at the 
beginning and during the procedure (such as Lithuania and the Neth erlands), some only during the 
interviews (such as Cyprus), a nd some only when there are indica tions that another country might 
be responsible for the asylum application.41 As far as the content is concerned, the too general 
requirement obliging Member States to inform asylum-seekers about ‘ the application of the 
Regulation, its time limits and its effects’ leads to cases where important aspects of the Dublin 
Regulation are not covered. For instance, as hi ghlighted by the UNHCR, some Member States do 
not provide information about family reunif ication possibilities or  about humanitarian 
considerations, or do not explain th e time limits for the procedure.  
It is self-evident that without timely, accurate  and comprehensive information about the Dublin 
procedure, asylum-seekers cannot effectively exer cise their rights. The Evaluation Report also 
showed that the lack of awarenes s of asylum-seekers of the Dublin procedure,  in particular the 
consequences of making a second application in a different Member State,  could be one of the 
reasons why the issue of secondary movements has not been so far adequately tackled.  
b. The effectiveness of the right to remedy for asylum-seekers is not fully guaranteed 
Although the Dublin Regulation has been conceive d as an instrument addressing mainly the 
relationship between Member Stat es and therefore does not contai n general provisions regulating 
the relationship between Memb er States and individuals,42 it does provide some procedural 
safeguards, directly linked to Dublin transfer decisions. For example, Member States have the 
possibility to allow under th eir national le gislation the right to appeal  a transfer decision (Articles 
19(2) and 20(1)(e)) together with the suspensive effect  of an appeal, which suspends the carrying 
out of a transfer until a decisi on on the appeal has been taken.  
However, as pointed out in particular by th e UNHCR and NGOs and also mentioned in the 
Evaluation Report, this right to re medy is not considered effective fo r several reasons, in particular: 
• Although in practice all Member States allow for the possibility to appeal or review  a transfer 
decision, asylum-seekers do not always appear able to make effective use of it. The Evaluation 
Report showed that, apart from Austria and Norw ay, most Member States  have a low rate of 
appeal. This is due in particular to the fact th at transfer decisions ar e communicated to asylum 
applicants only very shortly before the transfer takes place43 and to the fact that asylum 
applicants do not have rapid access to legal ai d. There are also noteworthy differences in the 
form and content of the transfer decisions issued by the Member States, partly due to the lack of 
detail in Articles 19(1), (2) and 20(1)(e), wh ich for instance leave open the procedure for 
informing asylum applicants about the transfer decision (i .e. orally or in writ ing, language to be 
used, etc.) and do not say much ab out the content of transfer deci sions (e.g. they do not explicitly 
require decisions to include informati on on appeal or review possibilities).  
                                                 
41 Based on information provided by Member States within the Dublin Contact Committee, November 2006. 
42 In general, the duties and rights tying Member States and asylum-seekers are addressed by other EU asylum 
instruments, in particular by the Reception Conditions Directive, whic h applies throughout the asylum 
procedure and therefore also throughout the Dublin procedure. 
43 The UNHCR reported that in the C zech Republic, Finland, France, Germ any and Luxembourg, for instance, 
transfers take place on the same day or shortly after when the asylum-seeker is  notified of the transfer decision, 
allowing very little time to prepare an appeal. 
EN 18   EN • As underlined in the Evaluation Report, the suspensive effect of an appeal or review  is rarely 
granted, meaning that in most cases, despite lodgi ng an appeal against th e transfer decision, the 
asylum applicant will be transferred to the Me mber State supposedly res ponsible before a final 
decision has been taken on the appeal. The cond itions under which suspensive effect can be 
granted differ from Member State to Member State, but usually th is happens in cases of serious 
illness or risk of breach of the European C onvention on Human Rights. Although the Regulation 
does not indicate whether any judici al review of transfer decisions  should be limited only to the 
interpretation of the Dublin criteria and the respect of its procedural rules or whether it could be extended to the examination of the legal and f actual situation of the receiving Member State, 
based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
44 Member States have the 
obligation to ensure that Dublin  transfers do not result in a vi olation of inte rnational human 
rights law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement45, as laid down in Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention and in Article 19 of  the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  In view of the 
continued inequalities in the le vel of protection across the EU, a non-suspensive appeal may in 
certain cases lead to asylum-seekers being tran sferred to a place where they do not enjoy the 
same standard of protection. Problems also have been encountered where suspensive effect was 
not granted (and therefore the transfers were enforced), but the decision to transfer was 
overturned on appeal. The Regulation has no rule s on the procedure to be followed in these 
cases. Such situations delay the process a nd create uncertainties for asylum-seekers.  
c. Custodial measures are commonly used by sever al Member States with corresponding hardship 
for the asylum-seekers invol ved, especially where vulnerable groups are concerned 
The Reception Conditions Directive st ates in Article 7(3) that Memb er States may, where necessary 
for example for legal reasons or reasons of public orde r, confine an applicant to a particular place in 
accordance with their national law. According to Ar ticle 18 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
Member States may not hold persons in detention sole ly because they are asylum applicants. If they 
are held in detention, Member States must ensu re the possibility of speedy judicial review. 
However, the Dublin Regulation contains no provi sions specifically conc erning the detention of 
Dublin applicants.  
As pointed out in the Evaluation Report, several Member States commonly detain asylum-seekers 
subject to the Dublin procedure throughout th e process for determining responsibility or 
immediately after announcement of the final d ecision (United Kingdom, Iceland, Luxembourg, and 
Netherlands) in order to avoid possible absc onding. The Czech Republic  usually detains all 
migrants even if they have lodged an applic ation for asylum. Norway and Ireland also apply 
detention but in a more limited way. Detention pendi ng transfer appears in some cases to take place 
even if applicants for asylum indi cate their willingness to return or to be transferred to the Member 
State responsible. For instance, the UNHCR has re ported the case of a family, including at least one 
minor, who despite their agreement to be reunified  with their extended family in another Member 
State, were nevertheless detaine d. In some cases, detention appears to be wrongly used simply to 
accelerate the Dublin procedure unde r Article 17(2), which allows a Member State to claim urgency 
in receiving a reply to its reque st in the case of detention.  
The principle of non-detention, i.e. asylum-seeker s should not be detained solely on account of 
being asylum-seekers, as enshrined in the Asylum Pr ocedures Directive, should be applicable to all 
asylum-seekers, including those coming under the D ublin procedure. The detention of asylum-
                                                 
44 T.I. v UK, application No 43844/98, Admissibility decision of 7 March 2000. 
45 See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 
EN 19   EN seekers per se does not infringe th at principle if used in limited and justified cases. However, given 
that the legal instruments dealing with the issue of detention are not clear about th e grounds, limits 
and procedural guarantees to be respected where asylum-seekers, including those under the Dublin 
procedure, are detained, it is very difficult to a ssess whether the practice of  some Member States on 
this matter, as criticised by the UNHCR, N GOs and the Council of Europe, among others,46 does or 
does not comply with current EU  or international standards.47  
The harsh impact on the individuals concerned is se lf-evident, in particular where persons with 
medical needs, women and children are detained. Fo r Member States, it is evident that detaining 
most Dublin cases puts a strain on their dete ntion capacities and involves considerable costs. 
Regarding the detention of children, the UN Comm ittee on the Rights of the Child has stated that 
‘detention cannot be justified sole ly on the basis of the child bei ng unaccompanied or separated, or 
on their migratory or residen ce status, or lack thereof.’48  
It is not possible to estimate the number of deta ined asylum seekers under the Dublin procedure due 
to the fact that Member States either do not provi de for such data or the available data are not 
comparable since they also include othe r third-country nationals in detention. 
d. The principle of effective acce ss to the asylum procedure once the procedure for determining 
responsibility is completed and asylum-seekers are transferred to the Member State responsible is 
not fully guaranteed  
The Dublin Regulation in its Article 3(1) esta blishes the general prin ciple under which asylum-
seekers subject to a Dublin transfer decision must  have full access to th e asylum procedure once 
transferred to the Member State responsible, mean ing that Member States have to make a full 
assessment of the protection needs of these asylum-s eekers. However, the Regulation is not clear in 
several respects, in particular whether the principle applies to cases both under the first instance 
procedure and under the appeal pro cedure. It is not clear from Artic le 16(1) whether, for example, 
in the case of a withdrawal of th e application in the re sponsible Member State and submission of a 
new application in a different Member State,  the asylum-seeker, upon being returned to the 
responsible Member State under the D ublin rules, should be able to have the examination of his or 
her case completed. The Asylum Procedures Direc tive contains general pr ovisions dealing with 
procedures at first instance and appeal procedures, which genera lly do not tackle the specific 
situation of asylum-seekers subj ect to the Dublin procedure. 
Based on the Evaluation Report as well as reports from the UNHCR and NGOs, it can be stated that 
asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedure ar e in some cases unable to have their asylum 
claims assessed on merits or to lodge an appeal where a negative fi rst-instance deci sion was issued 
in the responsible Member State. For instance , Greece was until April 2006 suspending and closing 
                                                 
46 Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, made the following comments 
about the Dublin system: ‘I am concer ned by the fact that some EU Me mber States detain asylum-seekers 
when their transfers are under way to the Member State responsible for examining their application, in the context of the Dublin II Regulation. The “Dublin II Regulation” should be revised in order to reflect the basic 
principle of non-detention of asylum seekers. An effective EU -wide monitoring system is also necessary so 
that places used for detaining asylum seekers are under constant surveillance by an independent organ. Special 
attention, in this context, should be paid to the widely used detention in airport (transit) areas.’ 
47 For instance Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamenta l Rights, and Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
48 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6 (2005), CRC/GC/2005/6, 
paragraphs 61-63. 
EN 20   EN the claims of those asylum-seekers who left thei r place of residence wit hout authorisation. These 
cases could be re-opened and ex amined on their merits only in very limited circumstances. As a 
consequence, asylum-seekers risked being remove d from Greece to their country of origin without 
any substantive examination of their claim, in possible violation of the principle of non-
refoulement .49 Research by the UNHCR and ECRE also re vealed other cases where other Member 
States appeared to close or reject asylum claims  or presume them withdrawn due to the absence of 
asylum-seekers from their territor ies (such as Ireland and the Neth erlands), or cases where asylum-
seekers did not have the oppor tunity to have their ap plications assess ed in appeal, due to the fact 
that a negative first-instance decision was issued dur ing their absence and they were returned to that 
State under Dublin rules after the time limits for appeal had lapsed (as in Austria, Belgium, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).  
Another problematic aspect is the provision in Article 3(3) whereby Me mber States retain the right, 
under their national law, to send an  asylum applicant to a third state. This provision can be 
interpreted as allowing Member States to apply th e ‘safe third country’ c oncept (now included in 
the Asylum Procedures Directive)  to countries outside the Dublin  system. However, the reason why 
this Article does not include any explicit reference to the ‘safe third country ’ concept but rather 
refers to Member States’ national law is that at the time the Dub lin Regulation was adopted, such a 
concept was not yet part of the EU asylum acquis . However, with the adoption of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, this noti on became part of the EU legislat ive framework governing asylum. If 
Member States continue to apply this provision base d on their national law, there is a clear risk of 
infringing the Asylum Procedures Directive. In concrete terms, problems can arise for example in 
cases where the Member State to which a transfer request is made were to apply the safe third 
country concept where the requesting state would not do so because it did not consider that the third 
country could be regarded as safe for the applican t. This has given rise to concerns about ‘chain 
refoulement ’.50 
2.2.6.  Family unity and the interests of childre n and other vulnerable groups are not 
sufficiently ensured by Member States  
a. Asylum-seekers under the Dublin procedure could in some cases be prevented from  reuniting 
with family members  
Family links play an im portant role in determining the Member  State responsible for examining an 
asylum application. The Regulation contains several binding provisi ons meant to protect the unity 
of a family, namely Articles 7, 8 and 14. Moreover , the discretionary clause s (the sovereignty and 
humanitarian clauses) aim to a void situations where family members not strictly meeting the 
definitions in the binding provisions would be separa ted due to the strict application of the Dublin 
criteria.  
However, in practice, reports from the UNHCR and NGOs as well as the Evaluation Report show 
that asylum-seekers are or could in some cases be  prevented from reuniting with members of 
their families . This obviously creates hardship for the families concerned, and could increase the 
level of secondary movements as asylum-seekers c ould be pushed into illegality. In addition, such 
practices may violate the right to family life and the rights of the child (Articles 7 and 24 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights).  
                                                 
49 The Greek authorities have meanwhile adopted new legi slation guaranteeing respect for the principle of access 
to the asylum procedure. 
50 See glossary in Annex 4 for an explanation of this term. 
EN 21   EN This is due either to restrictive practices on the part of Member States (for exam ple, as indicated in 
the Evaluation Report, the fact that they usually re quire too high a level of pr oof for the family link 
or the fact that they do not apply the discretionary clauses very often) and/or legal gaps (such as the 
fact that the humanitarian clause does not fully oblige Member States to bring together dependent 
relatives or does not provide for the possibility to  bring together relative s who are not necessarily 
dependent). The restrictive definition of ‘family members’  — as the spouse, minor unmarried 
children, the father, mother or guardian when the applicant is a minor and unmarried — as well as 
certain procedural limitations  (such as the fact that asylum -seekers can be reunited with a 
member of their family who has ap plied for asylum in another Member  State only if that member of 
the family has not yet received a first decision regarding the substa nce of his/her application) or 
‘status’ limitations  (such as the fact that as ylum seekers cannot be reun ited with members of their 
family who are legally resident  in other Member States on gr ounds other than that of being 
refugees, such as for instance being beneficiarie s of subsidiary protection), coupled with the non-
application by Member States of  the discretionary provisions, can  result in the separation of 
relatives. The situation of child ren is of particular concern. 
The Dublin Regulation does not apply for the time being to applicants for and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection51, as at the time of  its adoption, the concept of subsidiary protection was not 
yet part of the EU asylum acquis . The concept was incorporated, how ever, with the adoption of the 
Qualification Directive.52 In practice, all Member States have already introduced a single procedure 
for applying for international protection (i.e. without distinguishing between applications for 
asylum and for subsidiary protection), so the fact  that applicants for s ubsidiary protection are 
currently excluded from the scope of the Dublin  Regulation should not create difficulties in 
practice. In other words, concerns that the application of the Dublin Regulation could be 
undermined by those seeking protection being able  to evade its terms by claiming subsidiary 
protection and therefore not coming under the proce dure for determining responsibility could only 
exist if in practice Member States had not alrea dy opted for a single proce dure. However, the fact 
that the beneficiaries of s ubsidiary protection  are excluded from the scope of the Dublin 
Regulation means that asylum-seekers can be ex cluded from some of the family reunification 
provisions (e.g. an asylum-seeker currently cannot be re united with a family member who is a 
beneficiary of subsidiary protec tion in another Member State).G iven that Member States are 
increasingly granting international protection in subsidiary forms,53 the probability of asylum-
seekers being prevented from reuniting with be neficiaries of subsidia ry protection is high. 
b. The needs of vulnerable groups under the Dublin procedure are not sufficiently addressed 
The issue of protecting vulnera ble groups and other persons w ith special needs throughout the 
asylum procedure, thus includi ng the Dublin procedure,  is in principle tackled by the Reception 
Conditions Directive. However, in or der to respond to the particular needs of this gr oup of people in 
                                                 
51 Under the Qualification Directive, a ‘“person eligible for subsidiary protection” means a third country national 
or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a 
stateless person, to his or her countr y of former habitual residence, woul d face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm (…), and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country’ [Article 2 (e)]. 
52 Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as pers ons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004). 
53 Between 2003 and 2006, the proportion of positive d ecisions under the Geneva Convention did not change 
significantly (5.09% vs 7%), but the percentage of positive decisions granting subsidiary forms of protection 
more than tripled (from 4.57% in 2003 to 15.24% in 2006). 
EN 22   EN the context of the Dublin procedure, some elemen ts are also addressed in the Dublin Regulation. 
Several protection gaps have nonetheless emerged, concerning  primarily the treatment of 
unaccompanied minors and other persons with special  needs such as people who are suffering from 
trauma or particular illnesse s or are torture survivors.  
Regarding the treatment of unaccompanied minors  under the Dublin procedure, there are 
concerns that their claims are not always handle d in line with their best interests, meaning in 
particular that in some cases they are prevented from reuniting with their families.54 The Dublin 
Regulation does already include seve ral provisions aiming to guarantee that Member States respect 
the best interests of the child in implementing the Dublin procedure, in accordance with Article 24 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Artic le 3 of the UN Conventi on of the Rights of the 
Child. Under Article 6, when unaccompanied minors apply for asylum, the Member State where a 
member of their family is legally present is respon sible for examining their claim, provided that this 
is in the best interest of the child. If no family member is legally present, the Member State where the asylum application is lodged is responsible. Under Article 15(3) , if the asylum-seeker is an 
unaccompanied minor who has a relative or relatives in another Member State who can take care of 
him or her, Member States must if possible unite the minor with hi s or her relatives, unless this is 
not in the minor’s best interest. While Article 6 obliges  Member States to reunite unaccompanied 
minors with members of their nuclear family , Article 15 only allows  Member States to reunite 
them with their extended family .  
Several legal gaps and divergent interpretations have been identif ied during the evaluation process, 
such as: 
- Article 6 is unclear in respect of the different  types of transfers that an unaccompanied minor 
could be subject to. While the great majority of  Member States appear to consider that an 
unaccompanied minor cannot be subject to a take-c harge procedure for reasons other than family 
reunification, some (such as Greece and Hungary) reported having received frequent requests to 
take charge of unaccompanied minor s on account of irregular border crossing or issuance of a visa. 
Confusion also exists in respec t of the possibility to send back unaccompanied minors to a country 
where they have previously appl ied for asylum, in cases where they cannot be reunited with their 
family. As highlighted in the Evaluation Report, some Member States, such as Norway, refrain 
from making requests to take back unaccompanied minors. 
-Article 6 does not explicitly require a ‘best interest’ determination in all transfers involving minors, 
but limits it only to situations where minor s may be reunited with their families.  
-Because of the semi-compulsory nature of  Article 15(3) (‘Member States shall if possible  unite the 
minor’), Member States might not reunite minors with members of their extended family (as 
opposed to the nuclear family in Arti cle 6) who could take care of th em, even when this would be in 
their best interests.  
The Evaluation Report highlighted shortcomings in th e availability of data regarding the number of 
unaccompanied minors subject to the Dublin procedure,  due to the fact that only few Member States 
provided such data. However, based on the availa ble data (in the Nether lands, during the reporting 
period, out of 654 requests to other Member States  to take charge of an asylum-seeker, 16 
                                                
 
54 UNHCR provides evidence of cases where, for example, a minor was prevented from reuniting with his 
parents based on the fact that he had previously applied in a different Member State and that, despite his age, he was mature enough to be exclud ed from the application of Article 6. In one case this led a minor to 
seriously injure himself while trying to avoi d the transfer and reunite with his parents
. 
EN 23   EN concerned unaccompanied minors, and out of 754 reque sts from other Member States to take charge 
of an asylum-seeker, 10 concerned unaccompanied minors) the Evaluation Report concluded that 
there are a number of unaccompanied minors subject to  the Dublin procedure. Therefore, it can be 
considered that at least these people could have  been affected by the above-mentioned problems. 
Regarding other asylum-seeke rs with special needs, the consultation process revealed that they 
are not adequately protected under the Dublin Re gulation. For instance, people who suffer traumas, 
persons with medical needs, etc. may see themse lves subject to a transfer to a Member State 
responsible for dealing with thei r claims but which cannot provide them with adequate treatment. 
Another issue of concern is the fact that there ar e cases where Member States do not share relevant 
information before a transfer is carried out, notab ly on the medical condition of the person to be 
transferred. The consequences of failure to sh are relevant information can be fatal for the 
individuals concerned, such as  in one case revealed by the UNHC R where the applicant committed 
suicide. The Regulation does not include e xplicit provisions addre ssing these issues.  
2.3. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal 
The existing EU measures do not satisfactor ily address the problem s described above.  
Due to the complexity of the Dublin Regulation, there is still room for improvement and alignment 
of Member States’ practices, on th e basis of the mutual trust a nd cooperation on which the Dublin 
system is founded. However, the past years of imp lementation have shown that the existing forms 
of practical cooperation among Memb er States in order to align th eir interpretation and practical 
understanding of the provi sions of the Regulation are not su fficient to address the problems 
identified with the system in a comprehensive way.  
The fact that the Dublin Regulation, as part of the first stage of the CEAS, was the result of a 
sensitive political compromise, adopted by unanimous vote in the Council, meant that the final text 
contained many ambiguities and legislative gaps. This  explains why there is still much scope for 
improving the existing instrument. Examples of situ ations that would remain problematic under the 
status quo are: 
-The efficient functioning of the mechanism : the absence of adequate tim e limits, the fact that the 
procedures and circumstances for th e application of certain clauses ar e not clear, the fact that there 
is no effective mechanism for tackling disputes be tween Member States, the lack of comprehensive 
rules on transfers, etc., will continue to hinder the system from fully achieving its objectives. 
- Response to situations of particular pressure: the fact that there is no mechanism in the Dublin 
Regulation to suspend transfers to a particular  Member State confronted with an exceptional 
situation of migratory pressure would create a further burden for this Member State, which might 
then not be in the position to provide asylum-seeker s with an adequate sta ndard of protection. Only 
an EU mechanism that all Member States would together apply in circum stances of particular 
pressure can be expected to provide the aff ected Member State with adequate solidarity.  
- Level of protection granted to people  subject to the D ublin procedure: the fact that asylum-seekers 
often are not properly informed about the Dublin pr ocedure, that the effectiveness of the right to 
remedy is not fully guaranteed, that custodial meas ures are increasingly us ed by Member States on 
a systematic basis, that the management of vulne rable groups is not prope rly ensured and that the 
unity of asylum-seekers’ families is not always gua ranteed will continue to have a negative impact 
both on asylum-seekers’ rights and on the effectiven ess of the system, since people will try to avoid 
EN 24   EN the system rather than comply with it . This is therefore likely to c ontribute to an increase in the 
level of ‘asylum shopping’.  
If no action at EU level is taken, the identified problems will continue to persist, since the present 
wording of the Regulation is insufficient to en sure optimum effectiveness of the system and 
protection of people in need of international protection. Member States could de cide to follow 
certain interpretations of their own, which might in terfere with the correct and uniform application 
of the Dublin Regulation, thus resulting in seri ous divergences and creating legal uncertainty.  
2.4. Does the EU have the power to act? 
2.4.1.  EU right to act and subsidiarity  
Title IV of the EC Treaty (‘TEC’) on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons confers cer tain powers on these matters on the European Community. These 
powers must be exercised in accordance with Article 5 TEC, i.e. if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieve d by the Member States and can, therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be bett er achieved by the Community. 
More specifically, the current legal basis for Community action regarding criteria and mechanisms 
for determining which Member State is respon sible for considering an application for asylum 
submitted by a national of a third c ountry in one of the Member States  is established in Article 
63(1)(a) TEC .  
The reasons and need for a common intervention at EU level are clearly expressed in the section 
below. 
2.4.2.  Transnational nature of the problem 
Based on the preferred policy option of the IA on the CEAS, the resu lts of the wide consultations 
conducted on the Green Paper on the CEAS and vari ous expert meetings, a clear need emerges for 
EU joint action to ensure a more ef ficient and protective Dublin system. 
The need for a mechanism to determine responsib ility for asylum applications lodged in the 
Member States resulted directly from the progressive  establishment of an area of free movement for 
persons and in order to prevent the phe nomena of ‘asylum-seekers in orbit’ ( where no country 
accepts responsibility for deciding wh ether to give asylum or not) and ‘asylum shopping’ (where 
asylum-seekers apply for asylum in several Member States in order to extend their stay in the Member States). This mechanism establishes mutual rights and obliga tions mainly between 
Member States. By their very nature, these right s and obligations could not be established by 
Member States acting alone, but only at Community level. 
It is therefore clear th at the problems identified with the app lication of this mechanism are of a 
transnational nature and cannot be tackled by Member States acting in isolation, but only by 
adequate and streamlined coordination at EU le vel. For example: a common procedure could not 
operate without common time-limits clearly identi fied in a Community instrument; the phenomena 
of ‘asylum-seekers in orbit’ and ‘asylum-s hopping’ can be prevented only by coordinated EU 
action; etc. Only action at EU level could gu arantee that the Regulation will be uniformly 
interpreted and applied by Member States, this be ing essential for the adequate functioning of the 
system, which by definition requires the involveme nt of more than one Member State in the 
procedure.  
EN 25   EN Moreover, the competence of the EU must be  also recalled when it comes to solidarity,  given the 
indisputable need for a coordinate d EU approach to tackle situati ons where the appl ication of the 
Dublin system could further overburden Memb er States facing pa rticular pressure.  
The EU actions discussed in this impact assessment will not go beyond what is required in terms of 
adding value at EU level. The pro portionality of the options will be carefully assessed so as to 
determine whether or not they go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives set out in 
section 3. 
2.5. Consultation of interested parties 
The following main findings regarding the improve ments needed to the Dublin system emerged 
from the replies to the Green Paper on the future  CEAS and from the consultations held by the 
Commission with various stakehol ders, as noted in point 1.1.2: 
• Member State governments  generally support the current D ublin system, although they agree 
that improvements are needed on a number of issues, such as: 
– extension of the scope of the Regulation to includ e applicants for and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection; 
– the need to clarify severa l clauses in the Regulation, such as th e cessation of responsibility clause 
and the discretionary clauses; 
– the need to improve the performance of the Dublin mechanism in carrying out transfers; 
– the need for better exchange of information prior to a transfer being carried out, in particular 
medical information; 
– the need to improve the effectiv eness of the conciliation mechan ism, in general by providing a 
handbook on solutions reached in the past within e xpert meetings or bilaterally between Member 
States;  
– some Member States recognise the necessity of, or explicitly request, more measures for burden 
sharing (i.e. through financial solid arity and asylum expert teams); 
– the need to build and strengthe n legal safeguards in the Dublin  Regulation (supported only by a 
limited number of Member States); 
– the need to improve Commission Regulation 1560/2003  implementing the Dublin Regulation. 
• UNHCR and NGOs , while generally agreeing on the need to have a system for allocating 
responsibility, argue for a fundamentally different  approach, based on allocation of responsibility 
according to where the asylum application is made . However, in the absence of a political will 
for such an important change, a number of im provements are proposed for the system in the 
short term, such as: 
– clarifying that Dublin claimants should have acce ss to the asylum procedure in all circumstances; 
– clarifying that the Reception Conditions Directive  fully applies to Dublin cases; 
EN 26   EN – providing detailed and complete  information  to applicants for international protection about the 
Dublin procedure;  
– offering an effective remedy against a D ublin decision, in particular granting suspensive effect 
for appeals  against Dublin transfers; 
– broadening the family unity criteria  (extending the definition of family member; allowing 
reunification at any stage of the asylum pr ocedure; allowing reuni fication not only with 
recognised refugees, but also with beneficiaries of subsid iary protection as well as other legal 
residents such as naturalised refugees); 
– ensuring that the best inte rests of the child are al ways taken into account; 
– restricting to the greatest  extent possible the deten tion of Dublin claimants; 
– reducing time limits  for replies to requests and for transfers; 
– clarifying transfer  conditions and ensuring compliance with human rights; 
– introducing burden sharing measures. 
• The European Parliament  has issued an own-initiative re port in reply to the Commission’s 
Evaluation Report of the Dublin system, in which a number of improvements to the system are 
suggested, most of them similar to  those proposed by the UNHCR and NGOs.  
3. OBJECTIVES  
3.1. General objectives 
The general objectives of Community intervention in the future development of measures to 
determine responsibility in the second  stage of the CEAS are as follows: 
1. To ensure that the needs of applicants fo r international protecti on are comprehensively 
addressed under the mechanism for determining responsibility, and to increase the system’s 
efficiency in order to reduce the time and resources spent by Member States; 
2. To contribute to better address situations of particular pressure on Member States’ reception 
facilities and/or asylum procedural capacities. 
3.2. Specific objectives 
The proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation(s)  should pursue the following specific objectives: 
1. To ensure that the procedure for determ ining responsibility operates smoothly;  
2. To ensure that disputes between Member States are tackled in an efficient way;  
3. To prevent further overburdening of Member Stat es confronted with situations of particular 
pressure and to ensure that asylum-seekers r eceive an adequate sta ndard of protection; 
EN 27   EN 4. To strengthen the legal safeguards for asylum-s eekers and enable them to better defend their 
rights;  
5. To ensure respect for the right to family uni ty and to improve the management of vulnerable 
groups in order to addre ss their special needs. 
3.3. Operational objectives 
A non-exhaustive list of operational objectives is suggested below. 
The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 1: 
1a. To establish adequate time limits for take-b ack requests, for requests for information and 
requests on humanitarian grounds; 
1b. To clarify the practical arrang ements for transfers, such as the issue of who has to pay the 
transportation costs; 
1c. To clarify the circumstances and proce dures for applying the discretionary clauses 
(humanitarian and sovereignty) and th e cessation of responsibility clause. 
The following operational objective will cont ribute to achieving specific objective 2: 
2. To establish an effective di spute settlement mechanism. 
The following operational objective will cont ribute to achieving specific objective 3: 
3. To establish a mechanism to prevent Member States experiencing particular pressure on 
their asylum systems from being further overburde ned because of Dublin transfers and to prevent 
Dublin transfers resulting in asylum-seekers no t receiving an adequate standard of protection. 
The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 4: 
4a. To further specify the information Member St ates have to provide to asylum-seekers and the 
form and timing for doing so and to introduce the obligation to hold a specific Dublin interview;55 
4b. To strengthen several provision s of the Regulation to ensure that the right of remedy is 
effective; 
4c. To clarify several provisions of the Regulation to ensure that in all cases the Member State 
responsible proceeds to the full assessment of the protection needs of the asylum applicant and to 
clarify the exception from the principle of access to the asylum procedure; 
4d. To define clear and limited exceptional ci rcumstances under which as ylum-seekers subject 
to the Dublin procedure can be detained, with due consideration given to the situation of minors, in 
order to comply with the principle that asylum-seek ers may not be detained solely because they are 
asylum-seekers. 
The following operational objectives will contribute to achieving specific objective 5: 
                                                 
55 This operational objective will also contribute towards specific objective 1. 
EN 28   EN 5a. To extend the right to family reunification; 
5b. To further specify the rules applicable to unaccompanied minors, in particular to better 
define the best interests of childre n in accordance with their rights; 
5c. To extend the scope of the humanitarian clau se to allow for reunification with the extended 
family; 
5d. To establish a mechanism for the sharing of relevant information between Member States 
before a transfer is ca rried out, notably on the medical conditi on of the persons to be transferred. 
4. LIST  OF SUB-OPTIONS   
Status Quo  
The existing legal framework would remain uncha nged and ongoing activities in the Member States 
would continue. The Commission would continue monitoring the implementation of the Dublin 
Regulation.  
4.1. Ensuring that the procedure for determ ining responsibility operates smoothly  
1) Legislate:  - Delays in the procedure for dete rmining the Member State responsible 
The following sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives:  
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to: 1) fix a time limit for requesting a Member State to take back 
an asylum-seeker, which should be shorter  than the deadline for requesting to take charge 
(currently 3 months) when the request is ba sed on evidence from the EURODAC database; 2) 
reduce the deadline for responding to requests for information from 6 to 4 weeks and oblige 
Member States to justify any delays in replyi ng — moreover, a Member State not respecting the 
time limit for replying to an information request s hould not be able invoke the expiry of the time 
limit for submitting a take-charge/take-back request as  grounds for refusing such a request if that 
Member State is determined to be  responsible; and 3) make the dead line for replying to requests on 
humanitarian grounds identical  to the deadline for replying to take-charge requests (2 months) and 
set no deadline for submitting a request;  
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to: 1) make the time limit for requesting a Member State to take 
back an asylum-seeker identical to the time limit for take-charge requests (3 months) regardless of 
whether the request is based on eviden ce from EURODAC database or not; 2) keep the current 
deadline of 6 weeks for responding to requests for informa tion, but explicitly stat e that this should 
be a maximum and moreover provide for it to be further shortened by m eans of administrative 
bilateral agreements; and 3) make the deadline for both  making a request and replying to a request 
on humanitarian grounds identical  to that for replying to take-charge requests (2 months); 
- Limited number of implemented transfers 
Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘d’ are complementary. Sub-option ‘c’ is an alternative to the others.  
EN 29   EN a. Amend the Dublin Regulation and Implementing Regulation56 in order to establish in particular 
that the transferring Member State is to bear the tr ansfer costs, and to clarify the consequences in 
the case of erroneous transfers or where a transfer  decision is overturned on appeal after the person 
has already been transferred; 
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to allow Member States to conclude bilateral arrangements for 
‘cancellation’ of the exchange of  equal numbers of asylum-seekers in well-defined circumstances in 
order to simplify and rationalise th e transfer process. To ensure that such arrangements are in 
conformity with the Regulation, they should be approved by the Commission; 
c. Amend the principles of the Dublin Regula tion to replace the curren t system of physically 
transferring asylum-seekers, when not against thei r best interests, with a compensation mechanism 
whereby the Member State responsible for examini ng the application transfers a financial amount to 
the Member State where the applicant is phys ically located. The procedure for determining 
responsibility would still be carri ed out, but instead of asylum-seekers being transferred to the 
responsible Member State, they would remain on the territory of  the Member State where they 
applied for asylum or were found to be illegally st aying, except when the transfer is necessary for 
reasons of family unity or, in the case of children, in th e best interest of the child. The amount to be 
transferred by the responsible Member State woul d be based on a monthly cost per asylum-seeker 
calculated for each Member State; 
d. Amend the Dublin Regulation to abolish the ru le contained in Article s 19(4) and 20(2) under 
which the responsibility of a Member State ceases after a period of 18 months  if an asylum-seeker 
absconds. That means that an asylum-seeker who reappears even after 18 months will still be 
subject to transfer towards th e Member State responsible.  
- Clarify the circumstances and procedure for appl ying the cessation of responsibility clause 
and the discretionary clauses 
The following sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alternatives:  
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to cl arify in particular that for the cessation of responsibility  
clauses it is the requested Member State57 which has to prove that the third-country national left 
the territory of the EU (in the case of Article 16(3)) or has been expelle d (in the case of Article 
16(4)). Regarding the sovereignty clause , it should be clarified that the Member State applying it 
has to inform the other Member States of the app lication of the clause, information which should be 
sent both via the existing bilateral secure ne twork DubliNet and the EURODAC database. The 
circumstances for the application of the soverei gnty clause should be left open, but it should be 
specified that it may be used mainly for huma nitarian reasons. Moreover, the condition of the 
applicant’s consent for the application of th e clause should be reintroduced. Regarding the 
humanitarian clause , the Member State able to make a re quest on humanitarian  grounds should be 
clearly identified in the Regulation,  Member States should be obliged to justify a refusal to accept a 
request on humanitarian grounds, and practical ar rangements for obtaining th e written consent of 
persons to be reunited should be included in th e Implementing Regulation. Other modifications to 
the humanitarian clause ar e included in option 1a) for objectiv e 4.1 (as regards deadlines), options 
1b) for objective 4.5 (vulnerable groups and fa mily unity), and opti on 1b) for objective 4.2. 
                                                 
56 A proposal for amending the Implementing Regulation may be submitted at a later stage. 
57 Meaning the Member State who has been requested to take charge of or take back an asylum applicant but who 
refuses to do so by invoking the cessation of responsibility clause. 
EN 30   EN b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to cl arify in particular that for the cessation of responsibility  
clauses it is the requesting Member State  which has to prove that the third-country national has 
left the territory of the EU (in th e case of Article 16.3) or  has been expelled (in the case of Article 
16(4)). Regarding the sovereignty clause , the Member State that appl ies it should inform only the 
Member States potentially involved in the Dublin procedure of the application of the clause, using 
the existing bilateral secu re network ‘DubliNet’. Under this option, the circumstances for applying 
the sovereignty clause should be exhaustively id entified (limited to humanitarian cases) and the 
consent of the asylum-seeker will not be required. A nother modification to the sovereignty clause is 
included in option 1b) for objective 4.3. Regarding the humanitarian clause , it should be specified 
that any Member State can make a humanitarian request, that there is no obligation to justify a 
refusal on humanitarian grounds an d that the practical arrangemen ts for obtaining written consent 
will be left to the Member States applying the clause to decide on a case-by-case basis.  
2) Practical cooperation: 
The following sub-option ‘a’ is complementary to th e legislative sub-options addressing the issue of 
‘limited number of implemented transfers’. Sub-op tion ‘b’ is complementary to the legislative sub-
options for ‘clarifying the circumstances and pro cedure for applying the ce ssation of responsibility 
clause and the discretionary clauses’.   
a. Identify and disseminate best practices in perf orming transfers of asylum-seekers via meetings of 
experts. Encourage greater practi cal cooperation between Member Stat es, in particular on the days 
and times chosen for transferring asylum-seekers under the Regulation. 
b. Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain 
answers to questions raised by Member States’ e xperts on the application of the Regulations in 
concrete cases. This should be developed by th e Commission in cooperation with the Member 
States during expert meetings. The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases.  
4.2. Ensuring that disputes between Member St ates are tackled in an efficient way  
1) Legislate 
Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘e’ are alternatives . Sub-option ‘d’ is complementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to  create an independent structur e/body with the role of settling 
disputes on all issues regarding the application of the Dublin Re gulation (with its decision to be 
binding) as well as with an  advisory/consultation role; 
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to include a conc iliation mechanism for a ll matters of dispute on 
the application of the Dublin Regulation; 
c. Create the structure referred to under a) with in the future European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). This option would imply givi ng the EASO decision-making powers; 
d. Use the EASO expertise in order to provide su pport for the application of the Dublin Regulation 
(gathering information, support to monitori ng etc), with no decision-making powers; 
e. Amend only the Dublin Implementing Regulation to keep the current conciliation mechanism for 
humanitarian cases but ma ke its decisions binding. 
EN 31   EN 2) Practical cooperation : 
Sub-option ‘a’ is an alternative to ‘b’ but co mplementary to the legislative sub-options.  
a. Create a manual (handbook) on the application of  the Dublin Regulations, which should contain 
answers to questions raised by Member States’ e xperts on the application of the Regulations in 
concrete cases. This should be developed by th e Commission in cooperation with the Member 
States during expert meetings. The handbook shoul d be used as a reference for similar cases; 
b. Use the current informal Dublin expert meetings  to solve disputes between Member States, with 
the Commission proposing a solution and the Member States not in dispute voting, but the results of 
the vote would not be binding.  
4.3. Preventing further overburdening of Member  States confronted with situations of 
particular pressure  
1) Legislate 
Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complementary, while ‘c’ and ‘d’ are alternatives to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish a pr ovision for suspending Dublin  transfers in limited 
and well-defined circumstances in order to respond to two different situations : the first  is the case 
where a Member State is faced with  an exceptional situation of part icular pressure on its asylum 
system and where Dublin transfers, if unde rtaken, would aggravate this situation; the second  
concerns the case where there are concerns that the standards of protection in a certain Member 
State are not in conformity with the EU acquis on asylum, so in order to adequately protect the 
asylum-seekers concerned, Dublin transfers towa rds that particular Member State should be 
suspended. This would be a general mechanism, meaning that all Member States would stop 
transfers to a specific Member St ate and as a result would become responsible for dealing with the 
asylum applications of those persons whose transfers have been suspended.  
Regarding the procedure  for taking such a decision, the affect ed Member State (for the first case) 
and the concerned Member State (for the sec ond case) should send a motivated request to the 
Commission which should include, among other things, relevant info rmation regarding the asylum 
situation in a particular Member State which could justify a suspension of transfers. For the second 
case under discussion, it is importa nt that the Commission keeps th e right to decide to suspend 
transfers even in the absence of a request in that sense from a Member State. Based on a careful 
assessment of the asylum situation in that particul ar Member State, as well as after examining other 
factors such as the potential c onsequences of such a decision for the other Member States, the 
Commission may decide to suspend transfers toward s that Member State, after which it has to 
communicate the decision to the Member States and the Council, in line with the relevant 
comitology rules. In view of th e urgency of the situat ions under discussion, a ny decisions in this 
respect would have to be taken promptly and theref ore very short time limits need to be established. 
The decision to suspend transfers in exceptional cas es of particular pressu re could justify granting 
the special emergency financial support already av ailable under the European Refugee Fund, should 
the Member State facing particular pressure ma ke a request for assistance. The suspension would 
last for 6 months, which could be extended for a fu rther 6 months if the grounds for suspension still 
persist.  
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to allow for an overburdened Member State to request another 
Member State bilaterally to apply the sovereignt y clause and therefore take responsibility for 
EN 32   EN asylum applicants for whom the overburdened Member State would be responsible under the 
Dublin criteria (i.e. thos e asylum-seekers would not be transf erred any longer). The discretionary 
nature of the sovereignty clause would still be retained, meaning that the requested Member State 
would be free to accept such a re quest or not. The Commission should be notified of the use of this 
mechanism in order to ensure adequate monitoring. 
c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to allow an over burdened Member State to unilaterally decide not 
to accept transfers of asylum-seek ers from other Member States in exceptional situations of 
particular pressure. The notion of ‘particular  pressure’ should be clearly defined by the 
Commission. 
d. Define a principle of structur al solidarity based on a financial compensation mechanism regulated 
at EU level (based on a monthly cost per asylum -seeker and applicant for subsidiary protection 
calculated for each Member State) that transfers resources from a fund managed at EU level to 
those Member States suffering an excessive burd en. To this end, the maximum burden that can be 
tolerated by a Member State would n eed to be defined (bas ed on an index to be determined in line 
with the reception capacities  of the Member States);  
2) Practical cooperation : 
This sub-option is partially alterna tive to the legislative sub-options. 
a. Set up asylum expert teams c oordinated at EU level to assist  Member States that would be 
overburdened by the high number of Dublin transfer s. However, this option should apply if there 
has been no decision to suspend returns (under 1a) or where such a decision has been taken for a 
temporary period until the situation is st able in the affected Member States. 
4.4. Strengthening the legal safeguards for as ylum-seekers and enabling them to better 
defend their rights  
- Information  1) Legislate 
Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are alte rnatives, sub-option ‘c’ is co mplementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to further specify  the form (which should be age-appropriate), 
language and content of information and the stage of  the procedure when it should be provided to 
asylum-seekers. The general information  about the Dublin procedure should be given to all 
asylum-seekers upon lodging their applications. Du ring the Dublin procedure, Member States 
should provide further specific information  to those asylum-seekers for which another Member 
State accepted responsibility, such as information on available legal remedi es against a transfer 
decision and entities that may provide legal assistan ce. Moreover, Member States should be obliged 
to hold a specific Dublin interview with asylum-s eekers subject to the D ublin procedure, during 
which, if need be, they should be informed ora lly about the application of the Regulation. The 
interview must be held in good time, as soon as possible after the lodging of an application for 
international protection. 
b. As in option a), amend the Dublin Regulation to further specify the form, language and content of 
information and the stage of the procedure when it should be provided to asylum-seekers. The general information  about the Dublin procedure should be given to all asylum-seekers upon 
EN 33   EN lodging their applications . Unlike with option a), no further specific information  would be 
provided to those asylum-seekers for whom another Member State accepted responsibility and no 
Dublin interview would be held. 
c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to provide for a standard EU-wide multi lingual leaflet about the 
Dublin procedure, to be agreed under the com itology procedure. Based on the different leaflets 
already existing in several Member States on th e Dublin procedure, the Commission would propose 
a standard information leaflet to be discussed an d decided upon in comitology meetings. The leaflet 
would in particular include info rmation on the Dublin rules, the rights of asylum-seekers under the 
Dublin procedure, and the remedies  available. Member States would have to ensure the translation 
of the leaflet (for instance using EU funding) in the languages most  frequently used or understood 
by asylum-seekers entering their territories. The di fferent language versions should be exchanged 
between Member States. Member States may include further details in the leaflet adapted to their 
national contexts. 
2. Practical cooperation: 
This sub-option is an alternative to the legislative sub-option ‘c’. 
a. The same leaflet mentioned under 1c) would be discussed and agreed  at Dublin experts’ 
meetings, rather than in the comitology procedure. 
- Effective right to remedy  
1. Legislate: 
Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’ a nd ‘c’ are alternatives. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish an automatic suspensive right of appeal  against a 
Dublin transfer decision, which entails the right to  remain in the territory until a final decision is 
taken on the appeal. In addition,  clarify the right to legal assistance and further specify the 
procedure for notification of transf er decisions to asylum-seekers, in  particular as regards the time, 
form and content of such notifications;  
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation to es tablish the right to appeal agai nst a Dublin transfer decision 
and the right for an asylum-seeker to request suspensive effect of the appeal  and to remain in the 
territory until a decision is taken on the request for suspensive effect. As in option a), clarify the 
right to legal assistance and further specify th e procedure for notification of the decision, in 
particular as regards the time, form  and content of such notifications; 
c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish the righ t to appeal against a Dublin transfer decision 
and to oblige the courts to examine on their own initiative the need to temporarily suspend 
enforcement of a transfer decision (i.e. whether a pplicants should remain in  the territory pending the 
outcome of their appeal). The cr iteria the courts should use in de ciding on the need to suspend 
enforcement of a transfer decision, pending the outco me of an appeal, will be  left to the Member 
States. In addition, as in option a), clarify the right to legal assistance and further specify the 
procedure for notification of  the transfer decision to  the asylum-seeker, in particular as regards the 
time, form and content of such notifications.  
- Custodial measures  
EN 34   EN Sub-options ‘a’, ‘b’ a nd ‘c’ are alternatives. 
a. Include a provision in the Dublin Regulation to forbid detention of Dublin claimants under all 
circumstances; 
b. Include a provision in the Dublin Regulation to reiterate the principle that asylum-seekers may 
not be detained solely on account of their status as asylum-seekers and to forbid the detention of 
asylum-seekers subject to Dublin procedure except as  an extraordinary measure of final resort, after 
a transfer decision has been no tified to the person concerned a nd where any other non-custodial 
measures are unlikely to achieve satisfactory resu lts, in particular because there are objective 
reasons to believe that there is  a risk of the person concerned absconding. The detention of minors 
should be forbidden unless this is in their best interest, for instance fo r family reasons. Such a 
provision would also clarify that asylum-seekers detained under the Dublin  procedure would enjoy 
the same standards of protection as those laid down in the Asylum Procedures Directive and the 
Reception Conditions Directive.  
c. Amend the Asylum Procedures Directive/the R eception Conditions Directive to include a specific 
provision on the detention of Dublin app licants, with the co ntent of b) above. 
- Principle of effective access to the asylum procedure and its exception  
Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b ’ are alternatives. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation in order to clarify that an asylum-seeker subject to the Dublin 
procedure shall in all circumstances have an effec tive access to the asylum pr ocedure. In particular, 
it would be laid down that Member  States would have to revoke any decision to discontinue the 
examination of an application afte r its withdrawal by the applicant and ensure that the examination 
of the application is completed. Moreover, in view of ensuring c oherence between the Dublin and 
the Asylum Procedures Directive, several issues  regarding the access to appeal procedures for 
asylum-seekers under the Dublin procedure may need to be further clarified in the context of the 
upcoming proposal amending the Asylum Procedures Directive. Regarding th e issue of sending an 
asylum-seeker to a third-country, this right would be retained, but only after careful examination of 
the safe third-country criteria se t out in Article 27 of the As ylum Procedures Directive.  
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation in order to clarif y that an asylum-seeker subject to the Dublin 
procedure must have access to the asylum procedure only in the first instance  without further 
specifications as provided under option a). Retain the right of Member Stat es to send an asylum-
seeker to a third country without modification, i.e.  in accordance with its national law (not with the 
Asylum Procedures Directive) and in compliance with the Geneva Convention. 
4.5. Ensuring respect for family unity and improving the management of vulnerable 
groups in order to address their special needs  
1) Legislate - Vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors and other persons with special needs, such as 
people suffering from trauma, particular illnesses, etc.) 
Sub-option ‘a’ is an alternative to ‘b’. Sub-option ‘c’ is an alternative to ‘d’, but both are 
complementary to ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
EN 35   EN a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish a sepa rate procedure for determining responsibility in 
cases concerning vulnerable groups, notably unaccompanied minors . Such a procedure should in 
particular include shorter deadlines  than those applicable to normal cases, and Member States have 
to designate specific authorities to  deal only with these cases.  
b. Amend the Dublin Regulation and the Dublin Implementing Regulatio n in order to further clarify 
and strengthen the applicabil ity of the Dublin rules to unaccompanied minors  in accordance with 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Th is option would aim, among other things, to: 
clarify the applicability of the principle of the ‘best interests of the child’ in determining the 
responsible Member State; make compulsory th e right of unaccompanied minors to reunite with 
relatives who can take care of them; and include rules on information sharing (such as on age and 
level of education) and on the representation of unaccompanied minors throughout the procedure. 
However, the procedure for determining responsib ility as such would remain unchanged, meaning 
in particular that the same deadlines for maki ng and responding to reque sts would continue to 
apply.  
c. Amend the Dublin Regulation to include ne w criteria under which vul nerable persons should 
never be subject to a Dub lin transfer decision unless this is in  their best interests (such as where a 
person with medical needs has to be transferred to a Member Stat e that has the necessary medical 
treatment facilities). 
d. Amend the Dublin Regulation and the Implementi ng Regulation to include different provisions to 
take better account of the situation of asylum-seek ers with special needs, such as a new provision 
obliging Member States to exchange relevant in formation (such as medical information) before 
carrying out Dublin transf ers (and introducing a standard form fo r the information to be exchanged, 
to be annexed to the Implementing Regulation).  
2) Practical cooperation 
Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complement ary to the legislative sub-options. 
a. Member States to provide staff involved in the procedure for determining responsibility with 
appropriate training , in particular so that they can appropriately hand le cases involving vulnerable 
groups. 
b. Set up a network of Member State experts dealing with minors.  
Legislate: 
- Family reunification   
Sub-options ‘a’ and ‘b ’ are alternatives. 
a. Amend the Dublin Regulation to  extend the right to family reuni fication by including applicants 
for and beneficiaries of subsid iary protection within the scope  of the Regulation. Moreover, the 
current restrictive definiti on of family members sh ould be fully enlarged to encompass, for 
instance, siblings, unmarried coupl es in a genuine and stable rela tionship in accordance with their 
national law, dependants, families set up during f light and in exile etc. The extension of the 
definition would mean that Member States would be obliged to reunite all extended relatives, 
regardless of whether they are dependent or not.  
EN 36   EN b. As in option a), amend the Dublin Regulation to  extend the right to family reunification by 
including applicants for and be neficiaries of subsidiary protection within the scope of the 
Regulation. In addition, the Regulation would extend the right to reunification to dependent 
relatives.  The definition of ‘family member’ would be en larged, but only in or der to ensure respect 
for the principle of the best interests of the ch ild (e.g. the principle would remain that children 
should be unmarried to be consider ed part of the family, but when it is in their best interests, 
married children may be considered to be family members;58 in the case of a child asylum-seeker, 
minor unmarried siblings would be included as members of the family, etc.). Moreover, the 
application of the humanitarian clause would be extended to relatives who are not necessarily 
dependent on one another in a stri ct sense (such as adult siblings could be). As the humanitarian 
clause is a discretionary provision, Member States  would have the possibili ty but not the obligation 
to reunite extended (non-dependent) relatives.  
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY SUB -OPTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE PREFERRED 
OPTION  
For the assessment of the status quo , see Annex I. 
Administrative costs are presented in Annex V. However, this impact assessment does not include 
implementation costs as the data submitted by Member States on the application of the Dublin Regulation do not allow such costs to be identified. 
5.1. Ensuring that the procedure for determ ining responsibility operates smoothly
 
Legislation – Delays in the procedure fo r determining the Member Stat e responsible (because of 
inadequate time limits) 
Regarding the time limits for take-back requests: firstly,  given that  take-back requests will in most 
cases be based on evidence obtained from the EURO DAC database, there shoul d be no difficulty in 
establishing time limits.  This should be feasible both for a take -back request based on a subsequent 
asylum application (made by the same applicant in the requesting Member State) and where an 
applicant was found to be illegally  staying in the requesting Memb er State but wi thout applying 
again for asylum there, given th at in both cases EURODAC database  can be checked (for the first 
case Member States have the obligation to chec k the EURODAC database whereas in the second 
case it is left at Member States’ discretion) in  order to verify whether the person concerned has 
lodged a previous application in a diffe rent Member State. Secondly, regarding the duration of the 
time limit : a deadline shorter than for a take-charge request  is feasible given that, in most cases, the 
requesting Member State will be able to search  and quickly find out in the EURODAC database 
whether the person concerned had previously a pplied for asylum in another Member State. 
However, the deadline should not be too short eith er, in order to accommodate situations where, 
because of the bad quality of fingerprints, the requesting Member State might need to undertake 
additional checks. Where the take-back requests are based on other evidence than EURODAC, the deadline should be longer since it should in principl e take longer in order to identify the Member 
State responsible. In this case, the same deadlin e as for take charge requests could be applied. 
                                                
 
58 For example, a married child may be in a forced marriage or separated from the spouse. 
EN 37   EN Regarding replies to requests for information , a deadline of 4 instead of 6 weeks is more 
reasonable, as replies are often necessary in orde r to allow Member States to identify the Member 
State responsible and submit take -charge requests in pa rticular. Several Member States and the 
UNHCR have indeed argued for shorte ning this deadline. In order to ensure compliance with the set 
time-limit, it is important to oblige Member States  to justify any delays in the reply. Moreover, 
although it is difficult to apply a general sanction for failing to meet the deadline, it is important to lay down a rule to prevent Member States misusing this provision (i.e. delib erately not providing a 
reply to an information request, in order to prevent the requesting Member State from meeting the 
time limit for submitting a request). Although the text of the Regulation is not clear on the 
possibility to conclude bilateral agreements to shorten the time lim its for replying to information 
requests, some Member States have done so and have information requests dealt with within 4 
weeks. This is clear proof that a reduction of th e time limit is feasible. The use of the same time 
limit by all Member States will obviously contribu te to a more efficient procedure, so it is 
preferable to lay down this obligation in the legal text instead of having it  dealt with by bilateral 
agreements.  
In the case of humanitarian requests , the establishment of a time limit for replying to such 
requests will bring certainty for the requesting Member State and asylum-seekers regarding the 
outcome of the procedure. However,  it would not be feasible to fi x a time limit for sending requests 
on humanitarian grounds as well, as the circum stances for reuniting family members under the 
humanitarian clause can  be unpredictable.  
All the above-mentioned deadlines could entail some additional costs in terms of personnel and 
procedures in order to  comply with them.  
Taking into account the above argu ments, the preferred policy meas ure to address the issue of 
delays in the procedure for determin ing the Member State responsible is policy option a) . For 
Member States, it is less time-consuming and pr events disputes. For asylum-seekers, faster 
determination of responsib ility will lead to  quicker examination of thei r claims, therefore reducing 
the uncertainty and anxiety due to delays in th e procedure and potentially easing the integration 
process in the responsible Member State. At the same time, a swifter pro cedure could help prevent 
secondary movements of asylum-seekers who, due to delays in decisi ons and the resulting 
insecurity, could decide to move to another Member  State, for instance to rejoin family members on 
their own. As this option introduces new obligations , it will affect those Me mber States that in 
practice have considerable delays in dealing with requests. Regardi ng requests for information, this 
option will only affect those Member  States that have not concluded bilateral agreements to shorten 
the time limits. 
Policy option a) is proportionate to the set objectiv e, since it is based on the existing time limits 
adapted in order to take into account the specificiti es of each measure. In particular: 1) the time 
limit for requesting an asylum-seeker to be take n back will use as a benchmark the time limit for 
take-charge requests; 2) the implementation im pact of reducing the time limit for requests for 
information (from 6 to 4 weeks) will be insignifi cant; 3) the time limit for replying to a request on 
humanitarian grounds will be the same as the ti me limit already set for take-charge requests. 
– Limited number of im plemented transfers 
The financial compensation mechanism (option c) 
could in principle eliminate the inefficiencies 
linked with carrying out physical tr ansfers (except when transfers are still necessary to ensure 
family unity or if they are in th e best interests of a ch ild applicant), since the physical transfers will 
EN 38   EN be replaced by financial transfers, ensuring a more  streamlined and certain outcome for the Dublin 
procedure. Applicants’ needs and interests would be  further taken into account (they would remain 
in principle in the Member State of their choice, so  their integration would be  in principle facilitated 
and the phenomenon of secondary movements co uld be reduced) and th eir protection would 
improve since many protection related issues ar e linked to physical tr ansfers (information on 
transfers, continuity in the prot ection of vulnerable groups, etc.).  
However, this option has a number of considerable  difficulties and negative impacts. Firstly, it 
would not meet the current politic al objectives of the Dublin syst em and could increase the asylum 
pressure on the most ‘attractive’ Member States, with possible negative financial consequences and 
negative perceptions in society and therefore ne gative impacts on the integration of applicants. 
Legal uncertainties would arise, in particular as fa r as ‘take-back’ cases are concerned, with the risk 
of having applications examined twice (e.g. when an applicant ap plies for asylum in a second 
Member State while his or her prev ious application is still being ex amined in a first Member State, 
in which case the second Member State would keep him or her on its territory instead of returning 
the person to the first Member State for completi ng the examination of his or her application). 
Moreover, such a mechanism could be subject to abuse (for instance, it could be seen as a ‘pull’ factor encouraging movement to a particular st ate for economic reasons and lodging an asylum 
application there in order to ensure non-removal) . For these reasons, this policy measure could also 
be considered as not fully respec ting the principle of proportionality. 
From a financial point of view, additional and unpredictable administrative expenses (beyond the 
financial compensation received) could occur for those Member States having to manage greater 
numbers of people. Moreover, the trade-off between  physical and financial tr ansfers (the financial 
compensation received may be lower than the cost of transferring the app licants and vi ce versa), 
might create implementation difficulties, since so me Member States could for instance end up 
facing higher costs by transferring funds to a nother Member State than if they received and 
managed these people themselves.  
The abolition of the cessation of re sponsibility clause (option d), meaning that an asylum-seeker 
who absconded but reappeared after 18 months would still be subject to tr ansfer to the Member 
State responsible, is not expect ed to bring about a si gnificant increase in  the number of the 
implemented transfers and therefor e make the system more efficien t. Experience with the former 
Dublin Convention, which did not impose such lim its, showed that asylum-seekers can go missing 
even without the existence of such limits. This  option would most likel y lead to a precarious 
situation for asylum-seekers, who could abscond anyway and would only be pushed into illegality. Of the 17 Member States that expressed their view s on this matter, only 6 would like to see this 
change made in the Dublin Regulation. The 11 ot hers as well as the UNHCR were not in favour.  
Under option a), a series of practical arrangements for transfers, e.g. on the issue of costs or the 
consequences of an erroneous transfer or of ove rturning of a decision on a ppeal after the person has 
been already transferred, would be incorporated or further clarified in the Dublin Regulations. This 
would eliminate the doubts or disputes between Me mber States on these issues, so transfers could 
be expected to be more swiftly implemented. In addition, the financial and human resources used in 
the procedure to determine responsibility, which would normally be wasted in the case of non-
implemented transfers, would be used more e fficiently. This option will also greatly benefit 
applicants, ensuring more certainty about the outcome  of the procedure and a bout their rights (e.g. 
in the case of erroneous transfer, applicants would be sent back and the examination of their claims 
would be guaranteed; under no circum stances would they themselves have to bear the cost of 
EN 39   EN transfer, etc.). These clarifications have in ge neral been welcomed both by civil society and by the 
Member States.  
The option regarding the possibility for Member Stat es to conclude bilateral agreements to cancel 
the exchange of equal numbers of asylum-seekers (option b) could have a positive impact both in 
terms of the efficiency of the system and as re gards the protection of a pplicants’ interests. For 
Member States, such agreements would reduce the workload and operating costs of the departments 
responsible for transfers. For asylum-seekers, they  would remain in most cases within the Member 
State of their choice, where they would probably be  more likely to integrat e. Moreover, secondary 
movements after transfers could be further reduced.  
However, this option, already part  of the initial Commission’s propos al for the Dublin Regulation, 
was rejected during the negotiations in the Council,  among other things b ecause of the lack of 
objective criteria for selecting the candidates for act ual transfers and the fact that Member States 
would face too much litigation from asylum-seeker s complaining about legal uncertainty. During 
the consultations for the current proposal, this  idea was generally not welcomed by the Member 
States, for the same reasons as expressed befo re. This option was rejected by the European 
Parliament as well. 
Taking into account the above argume nts, the preferred policy measure to address the issue of the 
limited number of implemented tran sfers is policy option a), which will clarify the practical rules 
Member States have to comply with when implementing transfers. This measure is therefore in line with the principle of proportionality, since it doe s not introduce new obligations for Member States. 
– Clarifying the circumstances and procedure fo r applying the cessation of responsibility 
clause and the discretionary clauses 
Regarding the cessation of responsibility clauses, Member States generally agreed during the 
expert meetings that the requested Member State (the  one asked to take charge of or take back an 
applicant but who refuses to do so by invoking a ce ssation of responsibility clause) bears the burden 
of proof, i.e. has to deliver evidence that the person  concerned has effectively left the territory of the 
EU or has been expelled. This seem s to be the correct legal solution.  
Regarding the procedure for applying the sovereignty clause:  informing via 'DubliNet' the other 
Member States potentially invol ved in a concrete Dublin case of the decision to apply the 
sovereignty clause would avoid pr ocedures relating to the same asylum-seeker being carried out 
simultaneously in several Member States. However, this will still entail the risk of carrying out 
repeated procedures regarding othe r possible applications the same pe rson could lodge in the future 
in other Member States (different from the ones i nvolved in the past). This  would be inefficient, 
resource-consuming and against the political objectives  of the system. It is therefore important that 
once a Member State takes responsibility in acco rdance with this provision, it also uses the 
EURODAC database for the transmissi on of this information, which w ill ensure that all potentially 
involved Member States in  the future will be informed in an efficient manner that another Member 
State already accepted responsibility, eliminatin g therefore the risk of multiple procedures. 
Regarding the circumstances  for applying the sovereignty clau se, providing an exhaustive list 
would not be appropriate, given that  it would be difficult for legislati on to cover all situations that 
can arise in practice. Moreover, the nature of the clause, which is discretionary, would be changed. 
However, it is important to clarify the nature of the provision which has been  conceived in order to 
be used mainly for humanitarian reasons.  
EN 40   EN In addition, reintr oducing the obligati on to obtain the consent  of the asylum-seeker concerned by 
the application of the sovereignty clause would ensure that the clau se will not be applied when it 
goes against the interests and fundamental rights of the person concerned. During the consultation 
process, the European Parliament, the UNHCR and NGOs as well as a minority of Member States 
which expressed their opinion on th is issue (4 out of 19) welcom ed the reintroduction of the 
consent, which was seen as a crucial element ensuri ng that the clause is not used in a manner which 
would undermine the provisions pertaining to family  reunification in particular. The majority of 
Member States consider however that such an obligation would cause a dditional administrative 
burden and legal difficulties sinc e the procedure will become more complicated. Despite this 
opposition, it is first considered that since the fundame ntal rights of asylum-seekers are at stake, the 
need to ensure adequate protecti on for asylum-seekers overrides the practical concerns expressed by 
the majority of Member States. In addition, gi ven that the Regulation already obliges Member 
States to ensure that asylum-seekers give their approval for the application of certain provisions 
related to family unity (e.g. Article 7 and 8), it is considered that introducing this ob ligation also for 
the application of the so vereignty clause should  not create a dispropor tionate burden on Member 
States. Finally, there is no evidence to demonstrate that Member States were indeed confronted with 
practical difficulties in this respect under the Du blin Convention which required the consent of the 
asylum-seeker. 
Regarding the humanitarian clause, specifying that any Member St ate could make humanitarian 
requests and that refusals do not have to be just ified, while leaving the practical arrangements for 
obtaining written consent to be decided by the Member States c oncerned on a case-by-case basis, 
would not satisfactorily address the objectives of making the system operate more smoothly and 
better protecting the rights of the persons concerned to family re unification, as the rules would 
continue to be unclear or not un iformly applied. During the consultation proce ss, experts generally 
agreed that these objectives coul d be achieved better by clearly id entifying those Member States 
that can make a request on humanitarian grounds, by obliging Member States to justify a refusal to 
accept a humanitarian request and by including rule s on obtaining the written consent of the persons 
involved.  
Taking into account the above argu ments, the preferred policy meas ure to address the issue of 
unclear circumstances and procedures for applying the above-mentioned clauses is policy option 
a). The clarifications proposed under this option are expected  to make the procedure for 
determining responsibility run more smoothly. Memb er States will have a better idea of the 
circumstances in which the clauses can be applied a nd the procedure to follow. This will also help 
prevent disputes between Member States, which a ffect the proper functioning of the system. At the 
same time, as delays and uncertainties in the procedure will be reduce d, the rights of asylum-
seekers subject to the Dublin proc edure will be better taken into account, in particular as far as 
family reunification is concerned, under both th e humanitarian and sovereignty clauses. For 
instance, the probability of the hu manitarian clause being applied wi ll increase, since any refusal to 
apply it will have to be duly justified.  
Moreover, the preferred policy option does not go be yond what is necessary to achieve the stated 
objective since: 1) the cl arification regarding the cessation of re sponsibility clauses seems to be in 
line with the interpretation given in most Member States; 2) the application of both the sovereignty 
and humanitarian clauses remains discretionar y, with the proposed ch anges aiming to better 
regulate their application so that  appropriate consideration is gi ven to asylum-seekers’ rights. 
The implementation of this policy measure would in cur some financial and administrative costs, to 
cover in particular the sometimes additional procedures for the discretionary clauses. This is the 
EN 41   EN case, for instance, for the obligation to justify refu sal of a humanitarian reque st, or the procedure to 
obtain the consent of applicants on the application of the sovereignt y and humanitarian clauses. In 
some cases, however, Member States already apply these procedures in practice, in line with the 
spirit of the Regulation, so the cl arifications are not expected to increase costs in all cases. At the 
same time, the costs of disputes or  delays in the appli cation of these clauses or potential duplicated 
procedures would be reduced and thus give rise to savings. Finally, the protection aspect of the 
clarifications overrides the financial considerations.  
Practical cooperation: 
The policy measures coming under practical cooperati on are expected to offe r considerable support 
to Member States in applying th e Regulation in general and in pa rticular in the application of 
difficult clauses such as those mentioned above. Th ey complement the legislative measures set out 
above, which together will adequately tackle the current problems affecting the efficiency of the 
system and the protection of individuals. The creation of a handbook, as an immediately consultable 
reference for Member States, allowing for more uni form and timely application of the Regulation, 
was welcomed by Member States during the consulta tion process. Although so ft-law measures, they 
are expected to greatly contribu te to achieving the objectives, so both policy measures are identified 
as the preferred options. 
5.2. Ensuring disputes between Member Stat es are tackled in an effective way  
Legislation: 
Improving the existing conciliation mechanism set up by the Implementing Regulation only for 
disputes on the humanitarian clau se, by making its decisions binding (policy option e) , is not 
expected to satisfactorily address the objective of ensuring that all disputes are tackled in an effective way and therefore improve the efficiency of the procedure for dete rmining responsibility. 
Indeed, the proposed improvements to the conciliation mechanism would only ensure that disputes 
concerning the application of the humanitarian clau se would be tackled in an effective way, since 
Member States would have to comply with the d ecisions of the conciliation mechanism. However, 
the proposal to make its decisi ons binding might encounter le gal and political difficulties. 
Moreover, the resolution of disputes in other fields  of application of the Regulation would remain at 
the discretion of Member States, with the conseq uence that no effective solution would be ensured. 
This would continue to hinder th e objective of having a speedy Dub lin procedure, in view of a 
quick access to the examination on the merits of applications.  
Policy option b)  would ensure that Member States have the legal possibility to use the existing 
conciliation mechanism for dis putes on any matter related to the application of the current 
Regulation. Member States could therefore be more inclined to make use of this mechanism, given 
that, as stated in the problem definition, one of the reasons for this mechanism never being applied 
so far is its limited scope. However, given that su ch a mechanism will not be binding, its use might 
remain limited. This is because, as stated in th e problem definition, its n on-binding nature may be 
another reason why Member States ha ve not used this mechanism.  
The creation of an independent structure/body with both an advisory/consultati on role and a role in 
settling disputes on all issues c oncerning the application of the Dublin Regulation (with binding 
decisions) (policy options a) and c)) would considerably improve the efficiency of the procedure 
for determining responsibility, by ensuring that all matters of  dispute are settled in an effective 
way by a competent independent body and that it s decisions are complied with by the Member 
EN 42   EN States. Moreover, such a body would play an important advisory/consultation  role, for instance by 
making recommendations on matters relating to the ap plication of the Dublin Regulation with the 
aim of ensuring more uniform application. Regarding the institutional framework  for the 
operation of such a body, while policy option a) pr oposes the creation of a new structure under the 
Dublin Regulation (which could follow, for instan ce, the model of the Article 29 Working Party on 
the protection of individuals with rega rd to the processing of personal data59), policy option c) 
provides for such a structure to be set up with in the future European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). Policy option d) has a more limited role  for the EASO, which wi ll not have decision 
making powers but only a supporting  role (gathering information, support to monitoring etc.). 
Although the creation of an indepe ndent structure/body (a) is exp ected to achieve the general 
objective of improving the efficiency of the pro cedure for determining responsibility and better 
addressing the needs and rights of applicants fo r international protection, it would encounter 
considerable difficulties as far as the feasibility of implementation is concerned, with disagreements 
on the composition and role of the body. Moreover, the proposal to make its decisions binding 
might encounter legal and political difficulties. In addition, there is  a risk of duplication of work 
between this body, the existing committees (the comitology committee set up by Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation) and the informal Dublin C ontact Committee (informal meetings of Dublin 
experts). Moreover, in terms of financial feasib ility, the creation of the new body would require 
additional financial resources.  
As for the role that the EASO could play in order to facilitate application of the Dublin Regulation, 
this will have to be decided in the context of the proposal on the EA SO, which will undergo a 
separate IA. Without prejudging th at decision, it is considered that the EASO could play an 
important supporting role for th e application of the Dublin Regulation (policy option d).  
Given the above arguments, the preferred policy options are b) and d). Although policy option b) 
might have limited use, it a ppears to be the only one that is lega lly and politically feasible at this 
stage. From the consultation proces s, it emerged that se veral Member States we re in favour of this 
option. Moreover, the envisaged measure is in line with the principle of pr oportionality, since it is 
based on an existing mechanism whose scope will merely be extended as stated above. Policy 
option d) would have to be reassessed  in a separate IA, but at this st age it is considered that it could 
support the mechanism to be set up in the Dublin Regulation.  
Practical cooperation : 
Policy option b) , which consists of using th e current informal Dublin experts’ meetings to solve 
disputes between Member States, is  not expected to bring about a ny considerable improvement over 
the status quo. Firstly, using an informal framew ork for solving disputes between Member States 
might be difficult to achieve. Moreover, the solutions reached during those meetings would at best be perceived as a form of political pressure on the Member States in dispute, since decisions would 
not be binding.  
Policy option a) , which envisages the creatio n of a handbook (the same as  that referred to under 
point 1), would increase the efficiency of th e mechanism for determining responsibility by 
providing an immediately consultabl e reference, which would in pr inciple help prevent disputes 
between Member States by ensuring more uniform and timely application of the Regulation, or 
enable disputes to be solved in an efficient manner by the Member Stat es involved. The preferred 
                                                
 
59 Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50. 
EN 43   EN policy option for practical coopera tion is therefore policy option a) . Although, as with policy option 
b), the handbook would be non-binding, it is considered  that it can gain a morally binding character 
by being a permanent reference for Member States.  
5.3. Preventing further overburdening of Mem ber States facing particular pressure  
Legislate: 
Under policy option c) , overburdened Member States subject to  particular asylum pressures could 
unilaterally decide to block inco ming transfers of applicants for which they are responsible. This 
option would benefit the affected Member State, which would no longer have to deal with these 
asylum applications, as well as the applicants, since they would remain within Member States 
capable in principle of dealing with them adequa tely. However, considerab le difficulties would be 
encountered in the application of such a mechanis m. Firstly, providing a comprehensive definition 
of the term ‘particular pressure’ to include all s ituations that could occu r in practice is a cross-
cutting issue, which might be pol itically difficult to deal with it only in the Dublin context. 
Secondly, there are concerns that such a m echanism could be abused by Member States 
‘pretending’ to be overburdened, which would disr upt the proper functioning of the Dublin system. 
Consequently, this policy measure could also be c onsidered as not fully re specting the principle of 
proportionality. Finally, financial an d administrative costs would aris e for those Member States no 
longer able to transfer the asylum -seekers and thus obliged to exam ine their applications, with the 
consequence that they could themselves beco me overburdened. For asylum-seekers, not being 
transferred to overburdened Member States would in principle ensure be tter protection of their 
rights and needs, although they could in some case s be prevented from bei ng reunited with family 
members present in the overburdened countries.  
Under policy option d),  the financial compensation mechanism to be regulated at EU level would 
provide resources to overburdened Member States in order to improve their reception and processing capacities (i.e. more asylum personne l and construction of temporary reception 
structures) for coping with Dublin transfers that could add to the pressure. The definition at EU 
level of an appropriate indicator fo r situations of particular pressure  would facilitate  the application 
of this mechanism. However, this option presents considerable difficulties in terms of implementation and financial feasibility. Firstl y, as also explained for policy option c), the 
definition of ‘particular pressure’ might encount er difficulties. Moreover, Member States (in 
particular those with less than the average EU bur den) are likely to be reluctant to bear additional 
costs to support Member States that have been determined to be res ponsible but are facing 
particular pressure. Moreover, there would be concerns that, given the unpredictable and sudden 
emergence of situations of par ticular pressure, overburdened Memb er States may not be able to 
make the best use of these additional resources w ithin a short period of time, also because their 
physical reception capacities are lim ited. Regarding applicants, they might be negatively perceived 
by the receiving societies, as they will be seen as  adding to already existin g migratory pressures. 
Policy options a) and b)  are complementary as the former sets up a general (compulsory) 
mechanism to suspend Dublin transfers and the latter provides for a bilateral (discretionary) 
mechanism. Suspending transfers as a general mechanism  would avoid further overburdening 
those Member States with limited asylum recepti on facilities and/or procedural capacities, and 
would also guarantee adequate protection for people in need of international protection. Moreover, 
by obliging the Member States suspending transfer s to examine the applications of the asylum-
seekers concerned, the Member St ate under pressure would be bette r able to remedy the exceptional 
asylum situation (as asylum-seekers would no longer be transferred) and th e needs of the people 
EN 44   EN involved would be better addressed since their acce ss to the asylum procedure would not be further 
delayed. The emergency financial support  that could be triggered by the suspension of transfers 
following a request for assist ance from the Member State  under particular pressure  would enable it 
to manage the situation of particular pressure or to improve the level of protection offered to 
asylum-seekers in a more efficient way, and coul d limit the period under which a suspension of 
transfers is needed.  
Given the unpredictability of asyl um flows and possible changes in national asylum contexts, it is 
very difficult to estimate how often such decision s to suspend transfers woul d be taken in practice. 
However, based on past statistical data for certain Member States facing part icular pressure, mainly 
because of their geographic location, a general approximation of the number of suspended transfers 
can be provided. For instance, if transfers of as ylum-seekers to Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus had 
been suspended in 2006, it  can be stated that, based on the nu mber of accepted incoming transfers 
for that year, provided in Annex 3, a total of 2 498 asylum-seekers (1 179 transferred to Greece, 
1 159 to Italy, 33 to Cyprus and 127 to Malta) woul d have remained in the other Member States.  
The procedure envisaged for the suspension of Dublin  transfers would ensure that decisions can be 
taken rapidly, since it will be fo r the Commission to decide whet her it is justified to suspend 
transfers and since very short time limits for ta king such decisions will be set up. A different 
procedure whereby the decision would be taken by the Member States in a committee (such as the regulatory procedure established in Article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468/ EC) or by the Council 
would require much longer time frames and woul d therefore not address the concerned crisis 
situations in a smooth and adequate  way. The fact that any decision to  suspend transfer s will have to 
be reasoned and include, among other things, an a ssessment of the situation in the Member State 
affected and the consequences of suspension for th e other Member States is a guarantee that such 
decisions could not be taken on a systematic basi s, which could endanger the smooth running of the 
Dublin procedure. In ad dition, the procedure established woul d ensure the possibility for Member 
States to contest the Commission's decision. 
The 6 months period of suspension, which coul d be extended with further 6 months when the 
grounds for suspension still persist, is considered to be a reasonable time lim it to allow for a change 
in the circumstances of the Member State conc erned by the suspension. This time limit would also 
prevent major disruptions in the functioning of the system, and would gua rantee that the Dublin 
system will continue to r un smoothly after that period. 
During the consultation process, no clear position was taken by th e Member States. Although this 
measure is considered to have a highly political relevance, it w ould only be applied in limited and 
well-defined circumstances. Therefore, no strong c oncerns are expected on the part of Member 
States. 
Regarding the bilateral mechanism, no major implementation difficulties are foreseen, since its 
application would be left to the complete discretion of Member States. Such a mechanism is less political as it involves only two Member States a nd does not require a decision at EU level, so 
would be easier to implement than the general mechan ism. Member States would be able to apply it 
even if the circumstances pertaining in a given Member State do not give rise to a high level of 
concern, as would be the case for option a). Therefore, the threshol d for applying option b) is lower 
than for applying option a). In practice, option b)  could be applied when a Member State under 
particular pressure were to re ceive a significant number of as ylum-seekers from a particular 
Member State (and only a limited number from the ot her Member States). This mechanism could be 
applied independently of the implementation of po licy option a) (e.g. if a general decision to 
EN 45   EN suspend transfers is take n by the Commission for Member State A,  bilateral agreements could still 
be concluded for other Member States equally unde r pressure but not meeti ng the threshold required 
for a general decision; conversely, if no general decision is taken by the Commission to suspend 
transfers to Member State A, the other Member St ates could still decide to agree bilaterally to 
suspend transfers to A). However, the real imp act of such a mechanism is highly questionable, 
because of its voluntary nature.  
In the case of both options a) and b), financia l and administrative costs would arise for those 
Member States  suspending transfers (in principle less burde ned than those to which the transfers 
will be suspended) and therefore having to bear all the costs of taking on the asylum applications. 
However, if transfers were not susp ended, there is also the risk that  applicants would illegally move 
from the overburdened Member States, so additional costs could still arise to address these irregular 
movements. The originally responsible Member Stat e would make long-term sa vings as it would no 
longer have to incur the costs of  dealing with asylum applicati ons if the other Member States 
suspended the transfers. 
The suspension of transfers would not automatically lead to the granting of assistance from the 
emergency measures fund under the ERF, but would onl y serve as jus tification for such assistance, 
following a request from the Member State facing particular pressure. The budgetary impact for the 
ERF would thus depend on each individual case, ta king into consideration the existence of other 
possible applications for the emer gency fund with a view to ensuri ng the equitable distribution of 
funds. In 2008, the Commission rece ived two applications for the emergency fund, from Italy and 
Malta. Malta applied for approximately €400 000 in order to improve its  reception capacities and 
Italy applied for €19 million to better cope with the surge in asylum flows in 2008. Any decision on 
the allocation of funding would have to accommodate  the needs of both Member States and comply 
with the total amount available for emergency measures under the ERF for 2008, i.e. €10 million. 
Given the above arguments, policy option a) is the preferred legislative polic y option. This option is 
proportionate to the objective of preventing fu rther overburdening of Member States facing 
particular pressure and ensuring  adequate protection for asylum-s eekers, since the circumstances 
under which it can be applied are lim ited and the special procedure fo r deciding to suspend transfers 
will guarantee that this will not happen in unjustified cases.  
Practical cooperation : 
Alongside the preferred legislativ e policy option, the crea tion of asylum expert teams would be 
extremely useful for addressing s ituations of particular pressure, and is therefore identified as the 
preferred practical cooperation option. Asylum expert teams woul d assist existing personnel in 
overburdened Member States to cope with the flows of asylum-seekers, in particular those resulting 
from incoming Dublin transfers. This option would help ensure adequate protection for applicants 
sent to overburdened Member States as well as  the smooth operation of their asylum systems, 
preventing their breakdown due to additional numbers of asylum-seekers.  
The creation of asylum e xpert teams would incur financial and administrative costs in order to 
recruit professionals in this area and provide them  with appropriate training on how to deal with 
situations of particular pressure. There would also be the additional expenses of sending the experts to overburdened Member States  and supporting them there.  
These impacts will be further assessed in the cont ext of the IA for the prop osal on the EASO, which 
will address the issue of setting up asylum expert teams from a wider perspective (not only in the Dublin context). 
EN 46   EN 5.4. Strengthening the legal safeguards for as ylum-seekers and enabling them to better 
defend their rights  
Legislate: – information  
Both policy options a) and b), by pr oviding more accurate and comprehensive general information  
about the Dublin procedure to a ll asylum-seekers upon lodg ing an application, would considerably 
increase their awareness of the procedure for de termining responsibility, which on the one hand 
would allow them to better defend their rights (such as the right to family reunification) and on the 
other hand would encourage a more cooperative att itude on their part and help reduce secondary 
movements. The obligation to hold an interview is not only an additional guarantee for asylum-
seekers under the Dublin procedure, ensuring for instance that they will receive adequate information about the procedure and their rights, but is also expected to cons iderably facilitate the 
procedure for determining the Member State res ponsible. Indeed, Member States will have the 
opportunity to gather all necessary information on the context in  which an asylum-seeker arrived in 
the Member States, essential for determinin g the Member State responsible. Arranging the 
interview in good time will ensure its effectivene ss. At least 5 Member States already hold 
interviews with Dublin asylum-seekers, so at least for those Member States no implementation 
difficulties should arise. 
Unlike option a) , however, option b)  does not call for the provision of specific information  to 
asylum-seekers during the Dublin procedure and does not provide for the obligation to hold 
interviews with asylum-seekers subj ect to the Dublin procedure. As it provides for a lower level of 
information than policy option a) and it does not require Member Stat es to hold Dublin interviews, 
option b) will offer a less adequa te level of protection for asyl um-seekers throughout the Dublin 
procedure and will not facilitate the procedure for determining the Member State responsible. 
In terms of financial feasibility, both options a)  and b) would incur increased costs, as Member 
States would have to adapt their existing informa tion methods to the new legal requirements (as set 
out in the administrative cost assessment in An nex 5). For policy option a), additional costs would 
be incurred to provide further specific informa tion to applicants and to hold Dublin specific 
interviews. However, savings would be made in the long term, as the in formation provided would 
foster a more cooperative and compliant attitude on the part of applicants, which would in turn 
ensure smoother functioning of the procedure. More over, the interviews would also reduce the time 
spent in identifying the responsible  Member State, ensuring theref ore a more efficient procedure. 
Finally, there seems to be general agreement among stakeholders on the need to increase the level 
and quality of information provided to asylum -seekers subject to the Dublin procedure. 
Given the above arguments, the preferred policy option is  policy option a ). This option does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the set objective, given in particular that the 
obligations it provides for ar e already part of the practi ce of several Member States . 
Regarding policy option c), given the fact that it  proposes the same solution as the policy measure 
for practical cooperation, only adopted in a different form, it is considered below. 
Practical cooperation 
As a complementary measure to the preferred legi slative option a), a standard EU-wide multilingual 
leaflet about the Dublin procedure and applicants’ rights under it, which would have to cover at 
EN 47   EN least the requirements of the Regulation, would be an important guarantee that  all applicants will 
receive adequate and similar information in all Me mber States, leading to better protection of their 
rights. In order to ensure that na tional issues are adequately take n into account, Member States may, 
if they so wish, include further details in th e leaflet adapted to their national contexts. 
From an institutional point of view, this informati on tool could be conceived and agreed either in 
the comitology procedure (policy option c)  or in practical cooperation (policy option a) . It would 
in principle take less time to  conceive and adopt it under pr actical cooperation than under 
comitology, which is a formal procedure requiri ng, among other things, co mpliance with certain 
preliminary legal requirements (i.e. the proposal amending the Dublin Regulation — the parent text 
— would have to provide for adopt ing such a leaflet in the comito logy procedure and only after the 
adoption of that proposal in the co-decision proce dure, could the proposed text be agreed in the 
comitology procedure). However, a text adopted in  the comitology procedure has the advantage of 
being binding, which is not the ca se for a measure adopted under practical cooperation. Moreover, 
under practical cooperation, th ere is a risk that some Member St ates might not agree with such an 
initiative or with the content of  the leaflet. Consequently, some Member States could continue to 
inform asylum-seekers inadequately, so the objecti ve of better protecting asylum-seekers would not 
be adequately met by policy option a). In contrast , policy option c) will ach ieve that objective.  
In terms of financial feasibility, both options woul d incur costs to ensure that all Member States 
distribute the leaflet widely. Nationa l adaptations of the leaflet to ta ke account of national contexts 
might incur additional costs. Costs would also arise for the translation of the leaflet, but Member 
States could use EU funding for this purpose. Mo reover, synergies would be achieved if Member 
States exchange among themselves the diffe rent language versions they possess.  
Given the above arguments, the preferred option he re is policy option c). This option does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the set objective. The Regulation in force already provides for a committee to assist the Commission in the impl ementation of certain provisions. The adoption of 
a leaflet under the comitology procedure will ther efore not require the creation of a new committee 
and will fall within the competence of the committee already in place. 
Legislate  
– Effective right to remedy  
Under policy option c),  the right to appeal a transfer deci sion would be legally confirmed, thus 
providing a solid legal safeguard for asylum-seeker s subject to transfer decisions. Moreover, the 
fact that the courts would be obliged to examine on their own initiative the need to temporarily suspend the enforcement of a transfer decision  would provide an important legal guarantee for 
asylum-seekers. In assessing the need to suspend a transfer decision, courts should generally look at 
the nature of the rights at stake and the individual circumstances of each case (e.g. a person’s physical state or mental capacity, risk of violati on of the principle of non-refoulement , risk of 
infringing the right to family re unification, the reception conditions in  the receiving Member State, 
etc.). As also highlighted in the problem definiti on, in the rare cases where suspensive effect is 
currently granted, this is done in the event of seri ous illness of the person to be transferred or where 
there is a risk of breaching the European Conven tion of Human Rights if the transfer goes ahead. 
Given the different situations that could arise in practice in view of  the particular circumstances of 
each individual case, and given that this concerns  the administrative law and practice of Member 
States, it would not be appropriate to specify  in the Regulation the grounds under which courts 
should decide to suspend the enforcement of a transfer decision.  
EN 48   EN This option also has the advantage of adequately  responding to the concern to have a balanced 
procedure in terms of ef ficiency and protection, si nce an appeal will not automatically suspend the 
implementation of the transfer decision (as in policy option a ), but only when the competent courts 
deem it necessary, in a case-by-case assessment.  
Indeed, while policy option a)  offers an absolute guarantee of  protection for asylum-seekers, it 
could have a negative impact on the smooth operation of the system, as all transfers against which 
appeals are lodged will be suspended. This would bring about considerable delays in the procedure and could have negative consequences for the asyl um-seekers themselves, if the examination of the 
merits of their applications is delayed. Moreover, there is a risk that if appeals are automatically 
suspensive, they could be lodged onl y as a stalling tactic (for the sole reason of prolonging the stay 
within the Member State where th e application was lodged), circumve nting the entire system. This 
is also a risk for policy options b) and c), but is  much more limited than in policy option a), as the 
authorities are expected to take quick decisions on the matter. 
Finally, policy option b)  is less protective than policy option c), as the need to suspend the transfer 
of an asylum-seeker will not be examined automatically by the competent courts, but only at the request of asylum-seekers, who might  not necessarily be in the positi on to make such a request (for 
example because they might not have the required legal counselling). 
Therefore, the only option that would guarantee th e effectiveness of the right to remedy, thus 
improving the protection of applicants while also ta king into account the specificities of the Dublin 
procedure, is policy option c) , which is therefore the preferred option. In comparison to the status 
quo, the preliminary procedural guarantees of the right to appeal w ould be clarified and 
strengthened (improved notificat ion procedure, right to legal assistance, etc.), which would 
substantially improve the situation of applicants , who will be provided w ith adequate means in 
order to understand the decision an d possibly exercise their right to  remedy. The efficiency of the 
system would be increased as well, since for inst ance a decision recognising th e suspensive effect of 
an appeal would avoid additional time and resour ces being spent on bringing back the applicant if 
the decision is overturned on appeal and would prevent secondary movements (i.e. the applicant 
returning irregularly while the appeal process is under way). 
Since, as stated in the problem definition, most Me mber States do not seem to effectively safeguard 
the right to remedy, they will have to bring their policies into line with the proposed preferred 
policy option. 
In terms of costs, a legally confirmed right to appeal would not entail a ny further costs since it 
would just confirm the existing practice of Member States. Th e obligation to decide on the 
suspensive effect of an appeal would entail both administrative cost s for the judicial procedure and 
the costs of the prolonged stay in the Member State where the right to appeal is exercised. However, 
as explained above, in the case of suspensive e ffect, savings could arise because the costs of 
returning transferees due to overt urned decisions would be avoide d. Costs would also arise for 
strengthening the preliminary procedural guarant ees (in particular lega l assistance and better 
notification), in particular for those Member States that currently do not provide adequate 
guarantees. The Member States most affected by these costs could be th e non-border countries, 
since they account for the highest  number of outgoing transfers.  
Regarding the number of asylum-seekers who might  have suspensive effect granted for their 
appeals, based on the number of accepted incomi ng Dublin transfers in 2006 (figures given in 
Annex 3), it can be concluded that if all asylum-seekers subject to a transfer decision were to appeal 
EN 49   EN against it and if the courts were to decide in all cases to grant suspensive effect, a maximum of 
14 768 asylum-seekers could have benefited from this measure in all Member States in 2006.  
However, these data have to be used extremel y cautiously due to several factors. Firstly, the 
unpredictability of asylum flows an d changes that could occur in the asylum practices of Member 
States, the unpredictability of the proportion of asylum-seekers falling under the Dublin procedure 
and those likely to appeal a transfer decision, as  well as the particularities of each case, make it 
difficult to provide reliable estima tions. Secondly, given that the Dublin system is based on the 
presumption that all Member States offer an adequa te standard of protecti on, so that transferring 
asylum-seekers should not in principle lead to infringements of their fundamental rights, the 
suspension of transfers for this r eason should in theory be infreque nt (although in reality, as pointed 
out in section 2.2.4., the asylum system and pract ice of some Member States is not always 
adequate). The current practice of Member States, wh ich rarely grant suspensive effect to an appeal, 
would lead to the same conclusion. 
Finally, it is considered that independently of the number of potential asylum-seekers affected, the 
policy measure presented would still be justified give n that their fundamental rights are at stake. It 
is also clear that the measure is proportionate to  the set objective, given that, as demonstrated 
above, it offers a balanced solution between the need  to adequately protect asylum-seekers’ rights 
and the need for a system that operates smoothly.  
Stakeholders’ opinions on these issu es are quite divergent: while mo st Member States are generally 
reluctant to introduce an obligation to examine th e need to temporarily suspend enforcement of a 
transfer decision and to increas e the legal safeguards in genera l in the Dublin  Regulation, the 
UNHCR supports this option, wh ile the EP even calls for the automatic suspension of transfers in 
the event of appeals. 
– Custodial measures  
Prohibiting in general the deten tion of all asylum-seekers subj ect to the Dublin procedure (option a)  
might be unjustified and dispropo rtionate, given that under cert ain circumstances detention is 
needed to ensure that asylum-seekers do not abscond and that they are transferred to the responsible 
Member State (i.e. that the result of the Dublin procedure is implemented).  
Option b)  would adequately achieve the objective of  offering adequate protection to asylum-
seekers, while at the same time ensuring the syst em operates efficiently. This option would ensure 
that the detention of Dublin asylum-seekers is not arbitrary by providing clea r grounds for it as well 
as ensuring that detainees enjoy the same recepti on conditions and procedur al guarantees as other 
detained asylum-seekers not subject to the Dublin pro cedure. The fact that this is a specific form of 
detention only concerning asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin procedur e justifies having it 
regulated in the Dublin Regulation rather than in the Asylum Procedures and the Reception Conditions Directive. While these instruments c ontain general provisions about the conditions and 
grounds for detention of asylum-seekers in genera l and therefore can be considered as ‘lex 
generalis’ for Dublin as well, it  is more reasonable to regul ate the Dublin-re lated grounds for 
detention in the Dublin  Regulation, which will function as  a ‘lex specialis’. Therefore, policy 
option c)  is not adequate. 
Taking into account the above argume nts, the preferred policy measure to address the issue of the 
arbitrary detention of Dublin asylum-seekers is policy option b) . Respect for the rights of asylum-
seekers would be guaranteed and at the same time the system will continue to work efficiently, by 
allowing Member States to detain asylum-seeker s in exceptional circumstances, when there is a 
clear risk of absconding and th us hindering implementation of  the Dublin procedure. The 
EN 50   EN fundamental rights of applicants , in particular the right to freedom of movement, will be 
guaranteed. Moreover, in terms of social impacts,  this measure will limit the possibility of 
applicants being isolated from society through detention, which will also positi vely influence 
society’s perception of them (i.e. they will not be perceived as criminals or illegal immigrants, as 
often currently happens). While this  option would raise certain concerns , in particular on the part of 
those Member States that seem to use detentio n for Dublin cases on a sy stematic basis throughout 
the Dublin procedure, it woul d be welcomed by the European Parliament, the UNHCR and civil 
society, since it is in line with international standards. 
Finally, the preferred policy optio n is in line with the principl e of proportionality, since, as 
demonstrated above, it provides a balanced solu tion between the need to ensure respect for 
fundamental rights and the need for Member States  to have the discretion to use detention where 
justified. 
– The principle of effective access to the asylum procedure and the exception to this principle 
Regarding access to the asylum pr ocedure: clarifying the principle of an effective access to the 
asylum procedure for asylum-seekers under the Dublin  procedure, will guarantee that the merits of 
an asylum-seeker’s claim are always examined in the responsible Member St ate. In particular, by 
explicitly laying down that any deci sion to discontinue the examinati on of an application has to be 
revoked by the responsible Member State when the asyl um-seeker is sent back to that Member State 
pursuant to the Dublin rules, would prevent wrong applications of the Dublin Regulation in this 
respect in the future, as was the case for Greece until April 2006. More over, clarifying the 
application of the principle of access to appeal procedures for asylum-seekers under the Dublin 
procedure in line with the Asylum  Procedures Directive is an equally important and complementary 
safeguard, needed in order to avoid possible negative consequences of incorrect first-instance 
decisions and to ensure compliance with the principle of  non-refoulement. However,  this issue may 
need to be further considered in the larger cont ext of access to appeal procedures for all asylum-
seekers (and not only thos e under the Dublin pr ocedure) and theref ore it may be necessary to assess 
it within the context of  the upcoming proposal amending the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
Regarding the application of the safe third-country criteria: If Member States  were to continue to 
apply their national rules on this issue, they might  infringe the Asylum Pro cedure Directive, which 
sets out clear conditions Member States have to consider when assessing the safe third-country 
criteria. The stipulation that Member States will be able to send asylum-s eekers to a third country 
only after careful examination of the safe third-co untry criteria laid down in the Asylum Procedures 
Directive is in conformity with the asylum acquis  and is an important safeguard in order to prevent 
indirect  refoulement .  
Based on the above arguments, the only option th at would adequately strengthen the legal 
safeguards for asylum-seekers subject to the Dublin  procedure, ensuring that asylum-seekers have 
the right to a full and fair examination of their claims in all circumstances, is option a) . This option 
respects the principle of proportional ity since it only aims to clarify the principle of effective access 
to the asylum procedure and the exception to th is principle, in accor dance with the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, in order to ensure that  equal standards apply to all asylum-seekers.  
This option is expected to be we ll received by some Member States , while possibly raising concerns 
for others, in particular those which currently do not always seem  to guarantee the principle of 
effective access to the asylum procedure, and which might incur additional administrative and 
EN 51   EN financial costs as a result. The European Parlia ment, the UNHCR and civil so ciety are expected to 
welcome this measure. 
5.5. Ensuring respect for family unity and improving the management of vulnerable 
groups in order to address their special needs  
Legislate – Vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors and pe ople with special needs, such as people 
suffering from trauma, particular illnesses, etc.) 
Policy option a)  would ensure that vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied minors, undergo a 
specific, accelerated procedure for determinin g responsibility. The mana gement of vulnerable 
groups would be greatly improved by creating a separate procedure fo r them, with sh orter deadlines 
for determining the Member State responsible and the designation of specific experienced 
authorities to deal only with cases involving vulnerable groups. Th is separate procedure would 
ensure that applicants with special needs do no t suffer additional hardship due to the delays and 
hindrances characterising the current system. Mo reover, the fact that their cases would be 
considered by specific authorities experienced in this area would be  an extra guarantee that their 
special needs are correctly considered during the procedure. However, this option would present 
political difficulties in gaining the approval of  Member States, which would very likely raise 
concerns about possible abuses of such a separate  procedure by applicants who could pretend to be 
vulnerable in order to have their cases addressed more quickly and effectively. Moreover, creating a 
new separate procedure, with shorter deadlin es and dedicated author ities, would require 
considerable restructuring of the current units in  the Member States, with more employees needed 
and therefore significantly increased costs. In so me Member States, given the small Dublin units 
they have because of the modest  number of Dublin cases, such a separation would be moreover 
difficult to implement.  
Policy option b)  would reinforce and streamline the treatment of unaccompanied minors, in 
particular by ensuring that the be st interests of the child are always considered in determining the 
Member State responsible, that thei r right to reunificati on with their enlarged family who could take 
care of them is always guaranteed, that they enj oy the same facilities and protection in the event of 
transfer (through the sharing of relevant informa tion between Member States such as information 
on schooling, etc.) and that they can receive legal representation throughout the procedure. 
Although this option does not require setting up a completely new procedure with new deadlines 
and specific authorities as with policy option a), it is expected to achieve a similar level of 
protection for the asylum-seekers involved. This optio n would incur costs too, but they are expected 
to be lower than for putting in place a completely  new procedure. The main cost driver for policy 
option b) would be the obligation to provide  unaccompanied minors with a representative 
throughout the Dublin procedure, requiring those Member  States which do not  already do so to 
devote resources to providing this additional service to applicants.  
Under policy option c) , the problem of adequately addres sing vulnerable groups’ needs under the 
criteria for determining responsibility (in particular  continuity in protecti on) would be eliminated, 
with exceptions made for cases wher e a transfer decision is in the be st interests of applicants with 
special needs, in which case they would still unde rgo the transfer process. By allowing vulnerable 
groups to remain in the Member State where they lodged their application, unl ess their best interests 
require otherwise, this option prevents possible in fringements of their fundamental rights if they 
were to be sent to a different  Member State. Moreover, they would have immediate access to the 
EN 52   EN asylum procedure. However, as for policy option a) , this option could be abused by applicants in 
order to remain in the Member St ate where they want to stay. More over, leaving the choice of the 
responsible Member State to th e applicant could over burden those Member States perceived as 
being more ‘attractive’ than others, which would th en incur increased costs to provide the additional 
services required to cater for the special needs of such persons.  
Policy option d)  would ensure continuity in  the protection offered to as ylum-seekers (in particular 
those persons with special medi cal conditions), through close coope ration between Member States 
and the exchange of all relevant information before  a transfer is carried out , in particular medical 
information (using a standard EU form). The shar ing of medical information would ensure both the 
efficient transfer of the persons involved and the proper protection of  these persons in the receiving 
Member State. The issue of excha nging medical information is expected to raise some concerns on 
the part of Member States, in pa rticular regarding the confidentiality of medical information, which 
would need to be fully guaranteed. This option is not expected to give rise to significant costs. The 
costs of information exchange would be marginal  (the standard form could be sent through the 
existing secure DubliNet network already used by Member States for exchanging personal data on 
applicants).  
Based on the above arguments, the preferred policy options that would adequately address the needs 
of vulnerable groups are policy option b) (for un accompanied minors) and policy option d) (for all 
persons with special needs). By including new rule s and safeguards or clarif ying the exis ting rules, 
these policy options would ensure that the Dublin pr ocedure is applied to this  category of applicants 
in an adequate, efficient way that would ensu re their protection. The preferred policy options 
comply with the principle of proportionality sinc e: 1) the safeguards proposed for unaccompanied 
minors reflect existing obligations under internati onal law, in particular the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; 2) the mechanism for exchangi ng (medical) information about the person to be 
transferred will not impose a disproportionate burden on Member States since they already collect relevant data at national level and will only have to ensure their transmission to the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum application.  
Practical cooperation 
Policy measure a) would ensure that  staff involved in the Dublin pr ocedure are well tr ained in order 
to adequately handle the cases of vulnerable groups. Along with th e preferred legi slative policy 
measures identified above, this practical cooperati on action would further guara ntee that the special 
needs of this group of persons are carefully considered duri ng the Dublin procedure. The 
implementation of this option requires an increase in the financial and admi nistrative spending by 
Member States on the Dublin procedure. However,  Member States can apply for European funding 
(European Refugee Fund) to support part of the costs involved in training.  
Under policy option b), without having to designate sp ecific authorities to d eal only with minors, 
Member States could create, unde r practical cooperation, a network of experts that could meet 
regularly in order to exchange best practices on  the implementation of the strengthened provisions 
of the Dublin regulation for dealing with minor s. This idea has been already suggested by one 
Member State in the context of the existing informal  meetings of experts a nd should in principle be 
supported by most delegations. In terms of cost , the creation of the network under Eurasil would 
avoid any extra spending. 
EN 53   EN Based on the above arguments, both policy measures for practical cooperation are preferred, as they 
will significantly contribute, together with th e preferred legislative options, to improving the 
management of vulnerable groups  and minors in particular. 
– Family reunification  
Policy option a) , which proposes extending the current rest rictive definition of family members, 
would oblige Member States to re unify extended family members (where at least one is subject to 
the Dublin procedure) in all circumstances, ther eby increasing the protectio n of their rights (in 
particular the right to family unity). Moreover, this could c ontribute to re ducing secondary 
movements of applicants throughout the EU in orde r to reunite with exte nded relatives and could 
have important positive social impacts. However, this option presents considerable political 
difficulties, as it would go against the rest of the asylum and immigration acquis , which has a 
restrictive definition of family members. Moreove r, Member States coul d also invoke practical 
difficulties, such as the difficulty of proving links with the extended family, and the risk of abuse by 
applicants.  
Policy option b)  also enhances the right of family memb ers to be reunited. Ho wever, although it 
covers applicants for and beneficiaries of subsid iary protection, also included in policy option a), it 
is limited to two main groups: children and dependent  relatives (vulnerable gr oups). It is considered 
that the political environment is favourable to such an extension, as the need to substantially 
increase the protection of childre n and other vulnerable groups has been identified as one of the 
essential elements for the second stage of the Common European Asylum System. Moreover, this 
option would also increase the possibility for Memb er States to reunify extended relatives who are 
not dependent on one another strictly speaking. This last aspect w ould be left to the discretion of the 
Member States, so should not raise implementation concerns. This policy option has a considerable 
impact on fundamental rights, as the right to fam ily reunification would be considerably extended. 
The social impacts would be relatively good as well, as  family reunification is  an important factor 
offering a firm basis upon which a pplicants could start their soci al integration process in the 
receiving society. Moreover, by providing increased protection to applicants through family 
reunification, this option could re duce the tendency to resort to se condary movements. In terms of 
financial feasibility, the increased right to family reunification would incur financial and 
administrative costs, as more applicants would meet the criteria of the Regulation.  
The preferred policy option is therefore policy op tion b), which will considerably increase the 
protection of applicants under the Dublin procedure while at the same time remaining feasible. This 
option does not go beyond the objective, which is to ensure family unity. 
EN 54   EN 6. ASSESSMENT OF THE PREFERRED OPTION  
On the basis of the assessment in chapter 5, it is  clear that none of the i ndividual policy sub-options 
completely address the problems or fully achieve th e policy objectives. It is also worth noting that 
not all the policy sub-options are mutually exclus ive, therefore various co mbinations have been 
considered in arriving at the preferred policy op tion. By combining differe nt policy sub-options, a 
higher degree of effectiveness could be achieved.  
A table summarising the individual policy sub-options included in the prefe rred option can be found 
in Annex 2.  
The following rating symbols are used: 
+ represents a positive impact in comparison to the status quo 
- represents a negative impact or difficulty in te rms of feasibility in comparison to the status quo 
0 represents no impact, i.e. the same as the status quo 
Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
Relevance  
To ensure that the needs of applicants 
for international protection are comprehensively addressed under the 
mechanism for determining 
responsibility, and to increase the system’s efficiency in order to reduce 
the time and resources spent by Member 
States + This policy option is  strongly relevant  for ensuring the protection of applicants and 
improving the efficiency of the mech anism for determining responsibility. 
Shorter deadlines  for information requests  (4 weeks) and an adequate deadline for 
take-back requests  (shorter than for take-charge requests when based on 
EURODAC evidence) and for humanitarian requests  (2 months) would make the 
Dublin procedure more efficient and address the needs of applicants in a more timely 
manner. 
The practical transfer arrangements (such as  rules on responsibility for costs) would 
address the need to eliminate possible uncertainties or delays deriving from 
unclear provisions  of the Dublin Regulation. 
By further clarifying the conditions and circumstances for applying the cessation of 
responsibility and discretionary clauses, this policy option will help make the 
mechanism for determining responsibility run more smoothly and provide 
more protection . The manual/handbook would be of considerable support in 
correctly applying the Regulation. 
The extension of the current conciliation m echanism to cover all matters of dispute 
on the application of the Dublin Regulati on could improve the efficiency of the 
procedure for determining responsibility. E fficiency would also be increased by 
using the expertise of the European Asylum Support Office to provide support for 
the application of the Dublin Regul ation and devising a manual/handbook. 
Efficiency would be enhanced by avoiding further overbur dening those Member 
States whose asylum processing a nd reception capacities are under strain  by 
suspending transfers  in limited and well-defined circumstances and adequately 
addressing the protection needs of the applicants concerned since a non-overburdened Member State would take re sponsibility for them. Moreover, asylum 
expert teams would help ensure that Dublin mechanism continues to function 
efficiently and provide protec tion in cases of particular pressure on a certain Member 
State. 
Applicants for international protect ion would be adequately protected  by 
providing them with the necessary info rmation on the functioning of the Dublin 
system as soon as they lodge their appli cations and by arranging Dublin interviews. 
Moreover, by providing further specific information  (e.g.. on the right to appeal a 
transfer decision), applicants would be in a better position to defend their rights and to act in a manner compatible with the principles of the Dublin mechanism, 
which could reduce  the number of secondary movements. The EU leaflet would 
facilitate and support the provisi on of adequate information. 
EN 55   EN Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
The right to appeal  a transfer decision would be confirmed,  the possibility of 
granting suspensive effect to an appeal on a transfer decision would be introduced 
and the preliminary procedural guaran tees would be strengthened (improved 
notification procedure, right to legal assistance), thus substantially improving the 
protection of applicants. Moreover, the possi bility to grant suspen sive effect for an 
appeal could increase the efficiency of th e system by avoiding people being returned 
in the event of decisi ons being overturned. 
The detention  of applicants would be appropriately limited, thus increasing their 
protection. However, in order to ensure th e effectiveness of the Dublin mechanism, 
detention would be allowed but only in well-identified exceptional circumstances 
(where there is a genuine risk of absconding). 
By ensuring effective access to the asylum procedure, the pres ent option guarantees 
the comprehensive protection of applicants  and correct application of the 
principles of the D ublin Regulation. The protection  of applicants would also be 
guaranteed when they are to be sent to a third country . 
This policy option would ensure that the Dublin procedure is applied efficiently and 
in a protective manner in respect of vulnerable groups , especially 
unaccompanied minors and people with special  medical needs. The introduction of 
staff training and expert networks  would help considerably to increase efficiency 
and protection. 
The right to family reunification  would be extended (for applicants and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection), reinforced (for dependent relatives) or 
presented as a possibility to Member Stat es (for non-dependent relatives), thus 
increasing the standard of protection for app licants and helping to reduce the level of 
secondary movements.  
To contribute to better addressing situations of particular pressure on Member States’ reception facilities 
and/or asylum procedural capacities + The present option would be highly relevant  in achieving this objective. 
Suspending Dublin returns in certain circum stances would respond to the flaw in the 
current mechanism for determining res ponsibility. The overburdened responsible 
Member State would not receive additional applicants  until it is capable of doing 
so, once the situation of particular pressure is over. Moreover, overburdened Member States facing particular pressure  would benefit from emergency financial 
support upon request. 
Finally, asylum expert teams  would give essential support to overburdened 
Member States in managing mass inflow s of applicants, in particular those 
coming under Dublin transfers . These teams would ensure that overburdened 
Member States are still able to cope a nd that people’s needs are adequately 
considered in these particular circumstances too. 
Feasibility  
Implementation feasibility  - The present policy option has considerable but manageable implementation 
difficulties . 
Setting time limits for submitting take-back requests, reducing deadlines for 
information requests and setting a deadlin e for replying to requests based on 
humanitarian grounds should not give rise to major concerns on the part of Member 
States. 
No major difficulties are expected for clar ifying the practical rules on transfers. The 
exchange of best practices would be at  the discretion of the Member States. 
Member States could raise some concerns regarding the conditions for the 
application of the  discretionary clauses, in particular with respect to the 
reintroduction of the asylum-seeker's consent. The manual/handbook  would not 
pose any relevant difficulties. 
The broadening of the conciliation mechanism  would not face major 
implementation difficulties, since decisions  will remain non-binding. The same goes 
for the manual/handbook envisaged. 
A mechanism for suspending transfers could raise some political difficulties , but 
they are expected to be overcome by cl early identifying the limited circumstances 
under which the mechanism could be activated . The creation of asylum expert teams 
should not raise major concerns either.  
Member States would have to further commit to providing adequate information  
to applicants, as a basic requirement. An additional commitment  would then be 
required for the further specific information  called for by this option. The EU 
leaflet would possibly reduce the implem entation difficulties. The arranging of 
EN 56   EN Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
Dublin interviews might raise concerns in  those Member States which currently do 
not hold them. 
The possibility for suspensive effect  to be given to an appeal against a transfer 
decision should not constitute a major concern , since judges would be entitled to 
refuse such a request if not justified. Ho wever, this is generally perceived as a 
sensitive political issue, and thus likely to raise some concerns for Member States. 
Moreover, the obligation to provide legal assistance  and the strengthening of other 
preliminary procedural guarantees ( notification procedure)  would require an 
additional commitment  on the part of the Member States and may give rise to some 
contrasting opinions.  
The limitations proposed for detention are expected to raise some concerns 
especially among those Member States that  systematically use detention throughout 
the Dublin procedure. 
The need to ensure effective access to  the asylum procedure may require additional 
commitment from Member States which currently do not entirely comply with 
this obligation. Moreover, the fact that Member St ates would have to conform to 
Article 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive would require them to respect a 
common interpretation that may not correspond to their national 
interpretations . 
Some implementation difficulties may arise especially for those measures designed 
to ensure the adequate protection of unaccompanied minors  under the procedure 
for determining responsibility, whereas other minor difficulties would occur with more general measures for vulnerable groups . Training for staff and expert 
networks would encounter margin al implementation difficulties. 
The extension of the right to family unity  would raise considerable concerns on the 
part of Member States, as they would ha ve to ensure family unity for a larger 
number of applicants. The changes in some cases would be perceived as a limitation 
of their current discretionary power to use certain clauses (such as the possibility to 
reunite dependent relatives under the human itarian clause, which will be transformed 
into an obligation). 
Financial feasibility - The measures increasing the standard of protection would incur increased financial 
and administrative costs, whereas those meas ures that improve the efficiency of the 
Dublin system would generally entail onl y short-term additional costs and possible 
long-term cost reductions or savings. 
Setting time limits  e.g. for submitting take-back requests and reducing those for 
information requests would incur additional administrative costs . However, some 
economies of scale could be achieved in the medium term because of a more 
efficient process. 
For the practical measures concerning transfer s, in particular th e issue of transfer 
costs, the costs would be borne mainly by non-border Member States. The exchange 
of best practices would give rise to  voluntary costs for Member States.  
Some financial and administrative costs would arise for the additional procedures  
to be implemented when the discretionary clauses are applied. Savings would arise  
to the extent that costs related to disputes or delays in the application of the 
cessation or discretionary clauses are reduced , also with the support of the 
manual/handbook, which would in cur low additional costs. 
No financial costs would arise for extendi ng the current conciliation mechanism. The 
manual/handbook would entail limited costs. 
Some Member States would face furth er costs if they suspend outgoing 
transfers  due to situations of particular pressure in the responsible Member State, as 
they would take charge of the people not being transferred. Overall, Member States 
with currently less than the average EU burden would have to bear the major 
part of the costs  in situations of particular pressure. 
Costs would rise where Member States have to adapt their existing information  to 
the form, language and content called fo r by this policy option. Comparable 
additional costs  would be incurred for the further specific information to be 
provided . Savings could arise if the information provided fosters a more 
collaborative and compliant attitude  on the part of applicants under the Dublin 
procedure. The EU leaflet would possibly reduce the overall costs of providing this 
information. Additional costs would also  arise for those Member States which 
currently do not hold Dublin interviews. 
If accepted, the suspensive effect of an appeal against a transfer decision could 
on the one hand incur costs for the Member State where the applicant is to 
remain temporarily. On the other hand,  it could also bring about savings  due to 
EN 57   EN Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
the fact that the costs of possible returns following overturned decisions would be 
avoided . The strengthening of preliminary procedural guarantees would require 
some Member States to increase expenditure  (in particular for the provision of 
legal assistance). The major part of the costs could be borne by non-border Member 
States. 
Reducing the cases where D ublin applicants can be detained  should in principle lead 
to savings , as the strain on Member State dete ntion facilities and the considerable 
costs this implies would be reduced. Th is could apply mainly to the non-border 
Member States. 
Increased financial and administrative costs would arise for those Member States 
which do not always fully guarant ee access to the asylum procedure . Savings 
could occur only to the extent that eff ective access to the asylum procedure would 
reduce irregular movements . 
Costs would increase to deal with unaccompanied minors  (i.e. representation) and 
to exchange medical information regard ing vulnerable transferees. Costs would 
increase for training staff  and setting up an expert network . However, a large 
proportion could also be co-financed by projects under the European Refugee Fund. 
No costs would be required for setting up an  expert network, if this is done under 
Eurasil. 
Financial and administrative co sts would derive from the increased right to family 
reunification,  as more applicants would come under the criteria of the Regulation. 
 
Expected Impacts  
Social impacts at Member State level + The Dublin system has an impact on Memb er State societies by allocating asylum 
seekers throughout the Member States, who then have to integrate within their 
receiving societies while their applica tions are being examined. The longer 
applicants have to wait for their Member State of destination to be decided, the 
worse it is for their integration. Finally,  the more the measures address and reduce 
irregular secondary movements, the better it is for social acceptance and integration 
in the receiving societies.  
Setting time limits for take-back reque sts and reducing those for information 
requests, as well as for requests base d on humanitarian grounds, would address 
situations of delay , which can weigh on receiving communities,  and have a positive 
impact by reducing the incentive to resort to irregular movements,  thereby 
possibly reducing the number of illegal cases in other Member States . 
The measures regarding the discretionary cl auses in particular take full account of 
the interests and needs of  applicants which could smooth their integration within 
their receiving societies . 
By providing adequate information to appli cants for international protection as soon 
as their applications are lodged would ensure that applicants are immediately aware 
of their position and rights within the Member States , providing the basis for 
adequate social integration.  The additional specific information  would enhance 
this impact. 
The possibility to appeal against transfer  decisions reinforces the protection of 
applicants while the suspensive effect of such appeals  may prevent them having to 
be transferred back and forth between Member  States and thus worsening their social 
isolation. 
The limitation of detention would reduce the social isolation this entails and could 
change the negative perception often encount ered in receiving societies, associating 
Dublin cases with criminals or illegal immigrants.  
Full access to the asylum procedure at th e end of the procedure for determining 
responsibility would allow applicants to benefit from rights and facilities to help 
with their social integration in receiving societies  (i.e. access to healthcare). 
Improved measures for v ulnerable groups , in particular unaccompanied minors, 
would address the needs of these people and enable them to better integrate in and 
be less of a burden to receiving societies once the Dublin procedure is concluded. 
Adequately trained staff with a network of  experts behind them would ensure that 
applicants’ social needs are better addressed. 
This policy option would greatly reinforce the right to family unity of applicants for 
international protection, including a pplicants for and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection , thereby providing these people with an extremely important support 
for social integration . 
EN 58   EN Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
Economic impacts at Member State 
level + The Dublin mechanism has an economic impact  in the way it distributes applicants 
(as potential temporary labour force) throughout  the Member States and to the extent 
that it prevents irregular movements that pl ace applicants in irregular situations that 
can feed the informal economy. 
Increased consideration for applicants ’ needs and interests in applying the 
discretionary clauses reduces the  incentive for these people to resort to irregular 
movements.  
The provision of adequate information to a pplicants for international protection as 
soon as they lodge their applications woul d foster a more compliant attitude towards 
the functioning of the procedure for determining responsibility and applicants 
would be less prone to move irregularly.  
The legal safeguards  provided by the right to appeal , possible suspensive effect and 
notification may reduce irregular movements  on the part of applicants. 
By limiting the use of detention, this option could increase the number of 
applicants entering the host Member State’s labour market  during the procedure 
for determining responsibility. 
Ensuring that applicants access the asyl um procedure in the first and second 
instances would allow and encourage them to remain in a legal situation . This 
would increase the chances of applicants legally accessing the labour market,  in 
the receiving Member State. 
The broadened right to family unity  could entail the redistribution of applicants 
throughout the Member States, and therefore a minor or major concentration of 
potential temporary labour  in certain Member States, where they could enter the 
informal economy wherever this redistribution generates an excess on local labour 
markets. However, this measure could reduce secondary movements to achieve 
family unity. 
Impact on third countries + The potential impact of the Dublin system  on third countries depends on the degree 
to which its efficient functioning and its protection are increased and could attract 
further flows of applicants, thereby relieving possible asylum pressures on third 
countries of origin and increasing flows through transit countries. However, this impact will generally be extremely limited,  and mostly result from the extension of 
the right to family unity, which would margin ally increase the number of applicants 
arriving, since they would know that they  would have better chances of reuniting 
with their relatives once they apply in the EU. 
Fundamental rights + The preferred policy option has an impact on fundamental rights in that they will be 
better taken into consideration in the im plementation of the Dublin procedure. 
The change in the time limits will considerably reduce delays  during which 
fundamental rights may not be adequately addressed (e.g. the period of time during 
which family members could be kept  separately would be reduced). 
The confirmation that applicants would not have to bear the transfer costs 
themselves would protect them better, th eir choices would be better taken into 
consideration, and the right to family unity would be guaranteed . 
The clarifications in the discretionary clauses would fully address the right to 
family unity  of applicants for international protection. 
The provision of information to applicants  in a specific form, language and content 
would allow them to learn and understand their status and rights as soon as they 
lodge their applications. This  would provide them with a strong basis for defending 
their fundamental rights . 
The right to appeal, the possible suspensi ve effect and the notification procedure 
provide additional safeguards  to applicants and ensure  that the right to an effective 
remedy is fully respected . 
The right to liberty and free movement would be  reinforced by the limitation of 
detention. 
The principle of an effective access to the asylum procedure  once the Dublin 
procedure is completed, which is part of the right to asylum  would be strengthened. 
Compliance with Article 27 of the Asylum Procedures Directive would ensure that 
applicants’ fundamental rights are also respected if the responsible Member 
State decides to send them to a safe third country . 
The fundamental rights of vulnerable groups , especially unaccompanied minors, 
would be adequately taken into consideration. Trained staff  would guarantee these 
fundamental rights more effectively with the support of a network of experts  to 
EN 59   EN Preferred Option 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of  the policy sub-option needed to achieve 
the impact 
indicate the correct level and method of protection for vulnerable groups. 
The right to family unity  would be considerably reinforced and protected within the 
mechanism for determining responsibility , by extending the scope of family 
reunification under the Dublin procedure. 
 
6.1. Assessment of proportionality and EU added value 
The preferred option is proportion al to the objectives defined in  this impact assessment and 
represents a balanced solution between the benef its achieved (i.e. having a more efficient and a 
more protective system) and the efforts to be  made by Member States to implement them.  
The preferred option will ensure that the Regulati on is more consistently applied by Member States, 
while also improving the consis tency with the EU asylum acquis , in particular the Qualification 
Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive. At  the same time, the Regulation will provide for a 
concrete solidarity mechanism to be activated at EU level in cases of particular pressure on the 
asylum systems of certain Member States.  
7. MONITORING  AND  EVALUATION 
In order to monitor whether the revised Regulati on is being effectively followed by Member States, 
the Commission will carry out regular evaluation and reporting. Regular expert meetings will 
continue to be held to discuss implementatio n problems and exchange best practices between 
Member States.  
The entry into force of the Regulation on Comm unity statistics on migra tion and international 
protection,60 which includes specific references to the Dublin-related statistical data, will contribute 
to ensuring adequate monitoring and evaluation.  
Moreover, as announced in the Policy Plan, in a ddition to evaluation at regular intervals, the 
Commission is committed to re-evaluating the prin ciple on which the Dublin system is based once 
the second stage of the CEAS is in place.  
The following main indicators could be used to  assess the progress and effectiveness of the 
preferred policy option in  achieving the objectives: 
• Implementation by Member States of the amendments proposed to the Dublin Regulation; 
• Resources devoted to implementing the amendm ents proposed to the Dublin Regulation; 
• Number of effected transfers of asylum s eekers in comparison with  the number of accepted 
transfer requests; 
• Number of disputes settled under th e dispute settlement mechanism; 
                                                 
60 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007. 
EN 60   EN • Number of cases where the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses are applied; 
• Resources used to inform and provide legal assist ance to applicants for international protection 
under the Dublin procedure; 
• Number of applicants subject  to the Dublin procedure; 
• Transfers suspended in situati ons of particular pressure; 
• (Distribution of) applic ations for international protection relative to populat ion size (per 1000 
inhabitants) per Member State;  
• Number of asylum expert teams set up and sent to Member States under particular pressure.
EN 61   EN ANNEX 1: Assessment of the status quo  
No EU action 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 
Relevance  
To ensure that the needs of applicants 
for international protection are 
comprehensively addressed under the 
mechanism for determining responsibility, and to increase the 
system’s efficiency in order to reduce 
time and resources spent by Member States 0 The current Dublin system suffers from a series of limitations  that keep it 
from attaining its overall objective.  
The protection  of applicants for international protection is not 
comprehensively addressed throughout  the procedure for determining 
responsibility. The information  provided to applicants does not always allow 
them to understand and defend their cases  during the Dublin procedure, and the 
legal safeguards  currently provided are not adequa te to ensure their effective 
protection. In particular, the right to remedy , i.e. to appeal against a Dublin 
decision, is not always guara nteed, and the principle of effective access to the 
asylum procedure is not ensured. Member States would continue to use 
custodial measures  discretionally with the risk  of infringing applicants’ 
fundamental rights.  
Preserving the status quo also means that vulnerable groups  subject to the 
Dublin procedure woul d continue to receive a low standard of protection. In 
particular, unaccompanied minors would still  run the risk of not having their 
specific situation adequate ly addressed within the procedure. Moreover, the 
right to family unity  within the Dublin procedure would continue to be limited 
(e.g. asylum-seekers would not be allowe d to reunite with beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection; reuniting with  dependent relatives would not be 
obligatory, etc.). 
In terms of efficiency , the main hindrances to the smooth operation of the 
Dublin mechanism are ineffective transfers , inadequate time limits  and non-
uniform application of certain provisions such as the discretionary and 
cessation clauses , together with other secondary factors. Maintaining the status 
quo would therefore leave the issue of inef fective transfers, with its consequent 
waste of time and resources, unaddressed, as would be the case for time limits, 
which, due to their absence (i.e. for take-back requests and requests on 
humanitarian grounds) or their inadequ acy (i.e. information requests), create 
delays in the procedure for determining responsibility . Likewise, 
preserving the status quo in the applica tion of the cessation and discretionary 
clauses would also be inefficient sin ce Member States would continue to 
interpret and apply these clauses in divergent ways, leading to uncertainties in 
the functioning of the Dublin procedure and would moreover continue to 
impact negatively on asylum-seeker's rights . Finally, the current 
conciliation mechanism is ineffective , since it is limited to the application of 
the humanitarian clause and its decisions are not binding. The status quo entails 
preserving a situation where disputes  on problematic areas of application of 
the Dublin mechanism (not only on  the humanitarian clause) would continue 
to cause delays  and inadequate application  of the procedure for determining 
responsibility. 
 
To better address situations of particular 
pressure on Member States’ reception facilities and/or asylum procedural 
capacities 0 If the status quo is maintained, the Dublin mechanism would continue to 
function regardless of the burden  on certain Member States. Therefore, the 
Dublin mechanism can increase , both in real and potential terms, the burden 
on certain Member States and possibly overburden  their asylum systems  if 
they are already facing particular pressure. 
Feasibility  
Implementation feasibility 0 No additional measures would be implem ented, so there are no difficulties or 
risks in this respect. 
Financial feasibility 0 No additional financial and administ rative costs would be incurred in 
preserving the status quo. 
Expected Impacts  
EN 62   EN No EU action 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Justification of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 
Social impacts at Member State level 0 Maintaining the status quo does not have any relevant positive social 
impacts .  
On the contrary, the exclusion of applicants for (and beneficiaries of) 
subsidiary protection from th e Dublin allocation criteria  (i.e. family 
reunification) deprives these people, whose number in Europe is growing, of an 
important factor for social integration. 
The inadequate consideration of issues  of family unity and the special 
needs of vulnerable applicants  can give rise to secondary movements  
driving these people into illegality and causing them to  be negatively perceived 
by host societies. The fact that appli cants may be deprived of family unity 
consequently deprives them of a major factor for social integration . 
The lack of legal safeguards  also deprives applicants for international 
protection of important support for their social integration . Custodial 
measures lead to social isolation  and negative perceptions on the part of the 
host societies, and lack of information  can prevent applicants from fully 
exercising their rights.  
The allocation of applicants  regardless of exceptional situations of particular 
pressure that could arise in certain Member States can also affect the level of 
integration and social perception  of these people in overburdened receiving 
countries. 
Economic impacts at Member State level 0 The economic impacts of the status quo are also not positive . 
The level of secondary movements, which is to a certain  extent caused by the 
inadequate functioning (i.e. on family unity) or ineffective deterrence (i.e. 
information) of the Dublin system, could be seen as a potential source of 
illegal labour  for the informal economy.  
The distribution of asylum seekers  regardless of whether a Member State is 
overburdened could lead to irregular  labour on a saturated labour market. 
Impact on third countries 0 The extremely limited impact  that a responsibility allocation system could 
have on third countries consists in the degree to which its functioning and the protection it offers could attract further flows of applicants, thereby relieving 
possible asylum pressures on third countries of origin and increasing flows 
through transit countries. It could be argued for instance that the uncertainty 
surrounding the possibility of reuniting with family members  once 
applicants arrive in the EU can be a f actor in deterring applicants from coming 
to the EU. Therefore, maintaining the status quo would have little impact 
on third countries . 
Fundamental rights 0 The current system for determining the responsible Member State has an 
impact on fundamental rights to the extent that it imposes conditions on the 
enjoyment of these rights (e.g. right to liberty and security, right to family 
unity). The exclusion of certain categorie s of persons (such as beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection) from the scope of  the Dublin Regulation is a limitation 
on the right to family unity. The systematic recourse to custodial measures  is 
a serious limitation on the right to liberty and freedom of movement , 
whereas inadequate consideration of special needs  can considerably affect 
applicants’ right to security . 
EN 63   EN ANNEX 2: Summary of th e preferred policy option  
Specific Objectives PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 
Ensuring that the 
procedure for 
determining 
responsibility operates 
smoothly Legislate 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to: 1) fix a time limi t for requesting a Member State to take back an 
asylum-seeker, which should be shorter  than the deadline for requesting to take charge (currently 3 
months) when the request is based on evidence from  the EURODAC database; 2) reduce the deadline for 
responding to requests for information from 6 to 4 weeks and oblige Member States to justify any delays 
in replying — moreover, a Member State not respecti ng the time limit for replying to an information 
request should not be able invoke the expiry of th e time limit for submitting a take-charge/take-back 
request as grounds for refusing such a request if that Member State is determined to be responsible; and 3) 
make the deadline for replying to requests on humanitarian grounds identical  to the deadline for replying 
to take-charge requests (2 months) and set no deadline for submitting a request. 
Amend the Dublin Regulation and Impl ementing Regulation in order to es tablish in particular that the 
transferring Member State is to bear the transfer co sts, and to clarify the consequences in the case of 
erroneous transfers or where a tran sfer decision is overturned on appeal  after the person has already been 
transferred. 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to clar ify in particular that for the cessation of responsibility  clauses it is 
the requested Member State61 which has to prove that the third-count ry national left the territory of the 
EU (in the case of Article 16(3)) or has been expe lled (in the case of Article 16(4)). Regarding the 
sovereignty clause , it should be clarified that the Member State applying it has to inform the other 
Member States of the application of the clause, in formation which should be sent both via the existing 
bilateral secure network DubliNet and the EURODAC database. The circumstances for the application of 
the sovereignty clause should be left open, but it should be specified  that it may be used mainly for 
humanitarian reasons. Moreover, the condition of the ap plicant’s consent for the a pplication of the clause 
should be reintroduced. Regarding the humanitarian clause , the Member State able to make a request on 
humanitarian grounds should be clear ly identified in the Regulation, Me mber States should be obliged to 
justify a refusal to accept a request on humanitarian grounds, and practical arrangements for obtaining the 
written consent of persons to be reunited shoul d be included in the Implementing Regulation 
Practical Cooperation 
Identify and disseminate best practices in performing tr ansfers of asylum-seekers via meetings of experts. 
Encourage greater practical cooperation between Memb er States, in particular on the days and times 
chosen for transferring asylum-seekers under the Regulation. 
Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain answers 
to questions raised by Member States’ experts on th e application of the Regulations in concrete cases. 
This should be developed by the Commission in c ooperation with the Member States during expert 
meetings. The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases.   
Ensuring disputes 
between Member 
States are tackled in 
an effective way Legislate 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to include a concilia tion mechanism for all matters of dispute on the 
application of the Dublin Regulation. 
Use the EASO expertise in order to provide supp ort for the application of the Dublin Regulation 
(gathering information, support to monitori ng etc), with no decision-making powers. 
Practical Cooperation 
Create a manual (handbook) on the application of the Dublin Regulations, which should contain answers 
to questions raised by Member States’ experts on th e application of the Regulations in concrete cases. 
This should be developed by the Commission in coopera tion with Member States during expert meetings. 
The handbook should be used as a reference for similar cases.  
                                                 
61 Meaning the Member State who has been requested  to take charge of or take back an asylum applicant but who refuses to do so by 
invoking the cessation of responsibility clause.  
EN 64   EN Specific Objectives PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 
Preventing further 
overburdening of 
Member States facing 
particular pressure Legislate 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to esta blish a provision for suspending Dub lin transfers in limited and well-
defined circumstances in order to respond to two different situations : the first  is the case where a 
Member State is faced with an exceptional situation of  particular pressure on its asylum system and where 
Dublin transfers, if undertaken, would aggravate this situation; the second  concerns the case where there 
are concerns that the standards of protection in a certain Member State are not in conformity with the EU 
acquis on asylum, so in order to adequately protect  the asylum-seekers concerned, Dublin transfers 
towards that particular Member State should be susp ended. This would be a general mechanism, meaning 
that all Member States would stop transfers to a specific Member State and as a result would become 
responsible for dealing with the asylum applicati ons of those persons whose transfers have been 
suspended.  
Practical Cooperation  
Set up asylum expert teams coordinated at EU level to  assist Member States th at would be overburdened 
the high number of Dublin transfers. However, this option should apply if there has been no decision to 
suspend returns or where such a decision has been taken by the Commission, for a temporary period until 
the situation is stable in th e affected Member States.  
EN 65   EN Specific Objectives PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 
Strengthening the legal 
safeguards for asylum-
seekers and enabling 
them to better defend 
their rights 
 Legislate 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to further specify the form (which should be age-appropriate), language 
and content of information and the stage of the pro cedure when it should be provided to asylum-seekers. 
The general information  about the Dublin procedure should be given to all asylum-seekers upon lodging 
their applications. During the Dublin procedure, Member States should provide further specific 
information  to those asylum-seekers for which another Member State accepted responsibility, such as 
information on available legal remedies against a tr ansfer decision and entities that may provide legal 
assistance. Moreover, Member States should be obliged  to hold a specific Dublin interview with asylum-
seekers subject to the Dublin procedure, during which,  if need be, they should be orally informed about 
the application of the Regulation. The interview must  be held in good time, as soon as possible after the 
lodging of an application fo r international protection. 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to provide for a sta ndard EU-wide multilingual leaflet about the Dublin 
procedure, to be agreed under the comitology procedur e. Based on the different leaflets already existing in 
several Member States on the Dublin procedure, the Commission would propose a standard information 
leaflet to be discussed and decided upon in comitol ogy meetings. The leaflet would in particular include 
information on the Dublin rules, the rights of as ylum-seekers under the Dublin procedure, and the 
remedies available. Member States would have to ensu re the translation of the leaflet (for instance using 
EU funding) in the languages most frequently us ed or understood by asylum-seekers entering their 
territories. The different language versions should be  exchanged between Member States. Member States 
may include further details in the leaf let adapted to their national contexts. 
Amend the Dublin Regulation to establish the right to appeal against a Dublin transfer decision, and to 
oblige the courts to examine on their own initiative the need to temporarily suspe nd enforcement of a 
transfer decision (i.e. whether applicants should re main in the territory pending the outcome of their 
appeal). The criteria the courts shou ld use in deciding on the need to suspend enforcement of a transfer 
decision, pending the outcome of an appeal, will be le ft to the Member States. In addition, the right to 
legal assistance will be clarified and the procedure for notification of the transfer decision to the asylum-
seeker, in particular as regards the time, form and c ontent of such notifications will be further specified.   
Include a provision in the Dublin Regulation to reite rate the principle that asylum-seekers may not be 
detained solely on account of their status as asylum-s eekers and to forbid the detention of asylum-seekers 
subject to a transfer decision except as an extraordinary measure of fina l resort, after a transfer decision 
has been notified to the asylum-seeker and where any other non-custodial measures are unlikely to 
achieve satisfactory results, in partic ular because there are objective reasons  to believe that there is a risk 
of the asylum-seeker absconding. The detention of minors  should be forbidden unless this is in their best 
interest, for instance for family reasons. Such a provi sion would also clarify that asylum-seekers detained 
under the Dublin procedure would enjoy the same st andards of protection as those laid down in the 
Asylum Procedures Directive and th e Reception Conditions Directive.  
Amend the Dublin Regulation in order to clarify that  an asylum-seeker subject to the Dublin procedure 
shall in all circumstances have an effective access to th e asylum procedure. In pa rticular, it would be laid 
down that Member States would have to revoke a ny decision to discontinue the examination of an 
application after its withdrawal by the applicant and ensure that the examination of the application is 
completed. Moreover, in view of ensuring coheren ce between the Dublin and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, several issues regarding the access to a ppeal procedures for asyl um-seekers under the Dublin 
procedure may need to be further clarified in the context of the upcoming proposal amending the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. Regarding the issue of sending an asylum-seeker to a third-country, this right would 
be retained, but only after careful examination of the sa fe third-country criteria set out in Article 27 of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive. 
Ensuring respect for 
family unity and 
improving the 
management of 
vulnerable groups in 
order to address their 
special needs Legislate 
Amend the Dublin Regulation and th e Dublin Implementing Regulation in  order to further clarify and 
strengthen the applicability  of the Dublin rules to unaccompanied minors  in accordance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This option would aim, among other things, to: clarify the 
applicability of the principle of th e ‘best interests of the child’ in determining the responsible Member 
State; make compulsory the right of unaccompanied mi nors to reunite with relatives who can take care of 
them; and include rules on information sharing (suc h as on age and level of education) and on the 
representation of unaccompanied minors throughout the pr ocedure. However, the procedure for 
determining responsibility as such would remain un changed, meaning in particular that the same 
deadlines for making and responding to re quests would continue to apply.  
Amend the Dublin Regulation and th e Implementing Regulation to include  different provisions to take 
better account of the situation of asylum-seekers with  special needs, such as a new provision obliging 
Member States to exchange relevant information (such as medical information) before carrying out 
EN 66   EN Specific Objectives PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 
Dublin transfers (and introducing a standard form for the information to be exchanged, to be annexed to 
the Implementing Regulation).  
Amend the Dublin Regulation to extend the right to family reunification by including applicants for and 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection within the sc ope of the Regulation. In addition, the Regulation 
would extend the right to reunification to dependent relatives.  The definition of ‘family member’ would 
be enlarged, but only in order to ensure respect for th e principle of the best inte rests of the child (e.g. the 
principle would remain that children should be unmarried to be considered part of the family, but when it 
is in their best interests, married children may be cons idered to be family members; in the case of a child 
asylum-seeker, minor unmarried siblings would be included as members of the family, etc.). Moreover, 
the application of the humanitarian clause would be extended to relatives who are not necessarily 
dependent on one another in a strict sense (such as adult siblings could be). As the humanitarian clause is 
a discretionary provision, Member States would have the possibility but not the obligation to reunite 
extended (non-dependent) relatives. 
Practical Cooperation 
Member States to provide staff involved in the pro cedure for determining responsibility with appropriate 
training , in particular so that they can appropria tely handle cases involving vulnerable groups. 
Set up a network of Member State experts dealing with minors. 
EN 67   EN ANNEX 3: Statistical data  
Table I: Rate of effective incomi ng transfers per Member State (2006)  
 Number of effected 
incoming requests Number of accepted 
incoming transfers Rate of effective 
incoming transfers  
BE 91 913 9.97% 
CZ 270 534 50.56% 
DK 0 162 0.00% 
DE 2574 3649 70.54% 
EE 1 3 33.33% 
EL 501 1179 42.49% 
ES 174 397 43.83% 
FR 0 1664 0.00% 
IE 65 87 74.71% 
IT 507 1159 43.74% 
CY 6 33 18.18% 
LV 1 2 50.00% 
LT 5 11 45.45% 
LU 54 74 72.97% 
HU 260 451 57.65% 
MT 59 127 46.46% 
NL 603 987 61.09% 
AT 678 1204 56.31% 
PL 1011 2148 47.07% 
PT 7 23 30.43% 
SI 81 196 41.33% 
SK 437 954 45.81% 
FI 66 287 23.00% 
SE 0 1758 0.00% 
EN 68   EN UK 399 752 53.06% 
IS 0 0 n.a. 
NO 341 798 42.73% 
TOTAL 8034 14768 54.40%62 
 
                                                 
62 The overall average percentage of e ffective transfers is based only on thos e Member States for which complete 
data are available (BE, DK, FR, FI and SE  are therefore not included in the total). 
EN 69   EN  
Table II: Rate of effective incoming  transfers per Member State (first half of 2007 — January to June)  
 Number of effected 
incoming requests Number of accepted 
incoming transfers Rate of effective 
incoming transfers  
BE 73 436 16.74% 
BG 7 11 63.64% 
CZ 125 204 61.27% 
DK  n.a 177 n.a. 
DE 1148 1469 78.15% 
EE 1 2 50.00% 
EL 351 1149 30.55% 
ES 55 185 29.73% 
FR 513 886 57.90% 
IE 27 45 60.00% 
IT 474 960 49.38% 
CY 9 25 36.00% 
LV 3 5 60.00% 
LT 9 12 75.00% 
LU 22 34 64.71% 
HU 96 162 59.26% 
MT 30 117 25.64% 
NL 228 275 82.91% 
AT 399 601 66.39% 
PL 257 558 46.06% 
PT 11 28 39.29% 
RO 7 33 21.21% 
SI 37 98 37.76% 
SK 171 308 55.52% 
EN 70   EN FI 50 89 56.18% 
SE  n.a. 329 n.a. 
UK 207 316 65.51% 
IS 1 2 50.00% 
NO 203 405 50.12% 
TOTA
L 4514 8415 53.64%63 
 
                                                 
63 The overall average percentage of e ffective transfers is based only on thos e Member States for which complete 
data are available (DK and SE are th erefore not included in the total). 
EN 71   EN  
Table III: Rate of effective outgoi ng transfers per Member State (2006)  
EU-25 MS 
+IS and NO Number of accepted 
outgoing requests Number of effected 
outgoing transfers Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 
Belgium 1702 n.a. n.a.  
Czech Republic 146 133 91.10% 
Denmark 156 115 73.72% 
Germany 3496 2115 60.50% 
Estonia 2 2 100.00% 
Greece 16 7 43.75% 
Spain 157 22 14.01% 
France 1754 847 48.29% 
Ireland 498 293 58.84% 
Italy 256 49 19.14% 
Cyprus 2 2 100.00% 
Latvia 0 0 0.00%  
Lithuania 3 4 133.33%64 
Luxembourg 143 119 83.22% 
Hungary 38 9 23.68% 
Malta 02 n . a .   
Netherlands 1595 1082 67.84% 
Austria 2337 942 40.31% 
Poland 86 269 312.79%65 
Portugal 28 15 53.57% 
Slovenia 25 11 44.00% 
Slovak Republic 124 33 26.61% 
Finland 829 751 90.59% 
Sweden 1358 n.a. n.a.  
United Kingdom 1531 1486 97.06% 
Iceland 9 9 100.00% 
                                                 
64 Data submitted by this Member State show the number of transfers to be higher than the number of accepted 
requests. These figures should normally coincide or the number of transfers should be lower than the number of acceptances. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that some Member States mi ght not register requests 
that have been accepted implicitly (i n accordance with Articles 18(7) and 20(1)(c) of the Dublin Regulation). 
Therefore, in the calculation of the fi nal average, the number of transfers undertaken by this Member State is 
considered equal to the nu mber of accepted requests. 
65 Idem. 
EN 72   EN EU-25 MS 
+IS and NO Number of accepted 
outgoing requests Number of effected 
outgoing transfers Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 
Norway 829 461 55.61% 
Average 14 060 8595 61.13%66 
Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS 
                                                 
66 The overall average percentage of e ffective transfers is based only on thos e Member States for which complete 
data are available (BE and SE are th erefore not included in the average). For Lithuania and Poland, the number 
of effected transfers is considered equal to the number of accepted reque sts for the reasons explained above. 
EN 73   EN Table IV: Rate of effective outgoing  transfers per Member State (first half of 2007 — January to June)  
EU-27 MS 
+IS and NO Number of accepted 
outgoing requests Number of effected 
outgoing transfers Rate of effective outgoing 
transfers 
Belgium 716 227 31.7% 
Bulgaria 00 -  
Czech Republic 57 62 108.77%67 
Denmark 139 n.a. - 
Germany 1860 1126 60.54% 
Estonia 00 -  
Greece 3 1 33.33% 
Spain 50 16 32% 
France 995 415 41.71% 
Ireland 162 100 61.73% 
Italy 270 49 18.15% 
Cyprus 00 -  
Latvia 00 -  
Lithuania 3 1 33.33% 
Luxembourg 34 26 76.47% 
Hungary 21 8 38.1% 
Malta 00 -  
Netherlands 525 495 94.29% 
Austria 765 399 52.16% 
Poland 34 89 261.76%68 
Portugal 14 2 14.29% 
Romania 6 6 100% 
Slovenia 7 9 128.57%69 
Slovak Republic 34 24 70.59% 
Finland 162 140 86.42% 
Sweden 1462 n.a. - 
United Kingdom 696 573 82.33% 
Iceland 12 6 50% 
Norway 478 266 55.65% 
                                                 
67 See footnote 60. 
68 Idem. 
69 Idem. 
EN 74   EN Average 6904 3978 57.61%70 
Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS 
Table V: Effect of Dublin transfers on the asylum burden of Member States (2006)  
Real terms72 Potential terms73 MS Burden 
(application/ 
population 
ratio)71 Net Dublin 
transfers 
(incoming -
outgoing 
transfers) Influence of 
net Dublin 
transfers on 
first 
applications Net Dublin 
transfers 
(incoming -
outgoing 
transfers)  Influence of 
net Dublin 
transfers on 
first 
applications 
BE 0.8 n.a. n.a. -789 -8.90% 
CZ 0.3 137 5.02% 388 14.21% 
DK 0.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
DE 0.3 459 2.18% 153 0.73% 
EE 0.0 -1 -20.00% 1 20.00% 
EL 1.1 494 4.03% 1163 9.48% 
ES 0.1 152 2.87% 240 4.53% 
FR 0.4 n.a. n.a. -90 -0.34% 
IE 1.0 -228 -5.38% -411 -9.69% 
IT 0.2 458 4.43% 903 8.72% 
CY 5.9 4 0.09% 31 0.68% 
LV 0.0 1 10.00% 2 20.00% 
LT 0.0 1 0.69% 8 5.52% 
LU 1.1 -65 -12.38% -69 -13.14% 
HU 0.2 251 11.87% 413 19.53% 
MT 3.1 57 4.49% 127 10.00% 
                                                 
70 The overall average percentage of e ffective transfers is based only on thos e Member States for which complete 
data are available (DK and SE are th erefore not included in the average). For the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovenia, the number of effected transfers is consid ered equal to the number of accepted requests for the 
reasons explained above. 
71 The average EU burden (applications/population ratio) is 0.4 applications per 1000 inhabitants. 
72 Number of effected transfers. 
73 Number of accepted transfers but not necessarily effected. 
EN 75   EN NL 0.9 -479 -3.31% -608 -4.20% 
AT 1.6 -264 -1.98% -1133 -8.49% 
PL 0.1 742 17.56% 2062 48.80% 
PT 0.0 -8 -6.15% -5 -3.85% 
SI 0.2 70 14.00% 171 34.20% 
SK 0.5 404 14.18% 830 29.12% 
FI 0.4 n.a. n.a. -542 -23.82% 
SE 2.7 n.a. n.a. 400 1.64% 
UK 0.5 -1087 -3.90% -779 -2.80% 
IS 0.1 -9 -22.50% -9 -22.50% 
NO 1.1 -120 -2.26% -31 -0.58% 
 
Net transfers for border an d non-border Member States74 
 Incoming 
transfers Outgoing 
transfers Total Net Transfers (Incoming — Outgoing) 
Total border MS75 3050 425 2625 
Total non-border MS76 4984 6640 -1656 
Source: Ernst &Young elaboration of data provided by DG JLS  
                                                 
74 The totals for border and non-borde r Member States are calculated only for those Member States for which 
data are complete for the first and second halves of 2006. 
75 EE, EL, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI, SK. 
76 BE, CZ, DK, DE, FR, IE, LU, NL, AT, FI, SE, UK, IS, NO. 
EN 76   EN Map 1  
New asylum applications relative to population size (per 1000 inhabitants): distribution of burden between 
Member States in 2006 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Between 0 and 
0,1
Between 0,2 
and 0,4
Between 0,5 
and 1
More than 1.1
EN 77   EN ANNEX 4: ASYLUM GLOSSARY  
Asylum   
Asylum is a form of protection given by a Stat e on its territory based on the principle of ‘ non-
refoulement ’ (see below) and internationall y or nationally recognised refug ee rights. It is granted to 
persons who are unable to seek protection in their country of citizenship and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for reason s of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.  
Chain refoulement  
Refugees who are sent back to another country which then sends them back to th eir home country 
are said to suffer indirect or chain  refoulement , which similarly contrave nes the protection provided 
under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Rela ting to the Status of Refugees.  
Non-refoulement   
This is the key principle of international refuge e law, which requires that no State may return a 
refugee in any manner to a countr y where his/her life or freedom may be endangered. The principle 
also applies to rejection at the frontier. It is set out in Articl e 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and cons titutes the legal basis for the obligation of States to provide 
international protection to those in  need of it. Article 33(1) reads as follows: ‘No Contracting State 
shall expel or return (‘ refouler’ ) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened  on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or politi cal opinion’. Article 3 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in the light of the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Ri ghts, and Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or  Punishment are also considered bases for ‘ non-
refoulement ’ obligations. 
Refugee   
A person who fulfils the requirements of Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention. Article 1(A) 
defines a refugee as any person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of bei ng persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a part icular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owi ng to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such even ts, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it’. 
Refugee status   
This is defined in EU legislation as the status  granted by a Member Stat e to a person who is a 
refugee and admitted as such to the territory of that Member State. In terms of the Geneva Convention, refugee status is defined as the status possessed by a person w ho fulfils the 
requirements of the definition of refug ee as laid down in the Convention.  
EN 78   EN Subsidiary protection 
The EU Qualification Direct ive created subsidiary protection status  in order to give protection to 
certain categories of persecuted people who are not covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
refugees. It grants a lower level of rights th an the status under th e Geneva Convention. 
Unaccompanied minors 
Unaccompanied minors are persons below the age of eighteen who arrive in the territory of the 
Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsib le for them whether by law or by custom, and 
for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person.  They include minors who 
are left unaccompanied after they have entered the territory of Member States. 
Vulnerable persons 
In accordance with the Reception Conditions Direct ive, vulnerable persons refers to minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled persons, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with 
minor children, and persons who have been subjected  to torture, rape of other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence. Under national law and practices  Member States could 
further categorise vulnerable persons. 
Terms/provisions in the Dublin Regulation:  
Take charge  
‘Take charge’ means the procedure under which a Member State takes responsibility for an 
applicant on the basis of the obje ctive and hierarchical criteria la id down in the Regulation (such as 
family reasons, legal or illega l entry, etc.) and consequently ha s to examine the application.  
Take back 
‘Take back’ refers to the situation where the a pplicant leaves the territory of the responsible 
Member State and enters another Member State wher e he or she might apply again for international 
protection or might stay without permission, in which case the res ponsible Member State must at 
the latter’s request take him/her back. 
Requests for information 
For the purpose of applying the Dublin Regulation or examining an application for asylum, any 
Member State can request information from anot her Member State concerning an asylum-seeker. 
This information can cover, among other things, pe rsonal data, such as the personal details of the 
applicant and his/her family members, and identity  or travel documents. Such information is often 
necessary for determining responsibi lity, so it is very important that  Member States reply swiftly to 
such requests. The Regulation sets out detailed data protection rules. 
Incoming requests 
Requests for an asylum seeker to be taken back in  order to complete his/her asylum application, or 
for taking charge of an asylum seeker in order to examine his/ her asylum application, sent by 
another Member State to the reporting Member State. 
Outgoing requests  
EN 79   EN Requests for an asylum seeker to be taken back to complete his/her asylum application, or for 
taking charge of an asylum seek er in order to examine his/her asylum application, sent by the 
reporting Member State to another Member State . 
Cessation of responsibility clauses 
According to Article 4(5) of the Dublin Regul ation, the procedure for determining the Member 
State responsible lies with the Member State where the applicatio n is first lodge d. Consequently, 
that Member State is obliged to take back the a pplicant even if the latter has travelled to another 
Member State during the course of the procedure. However, this obligation ceases if the applicant 
has left the territories of the Member States for at least three months or if another Member State 
grants the asylum-seeker a residence document. 
According to Article 16(3) of the Dublin Regulati on, the responsibility to take charge of or take 
back a person ceases when that person has left the territory of the Member St ates for at least three 
months, unless the Member State responsible ha s issued him/her a valid residence document. 
According to Article 16(4) of th e Dublin Regulation, the obligation to take back a person ceases 
where the responsible Member State has adopted  and actually implemented, following withdrawal 
or rejection of the asylum appli cation, the provisions that are requi red before that person can go to 
his/her country of or igin or to another country to which he may lawfully travel. 
Member States  
Currently, the notion of ‘Member States’ under th e Dublin Regulation mean s all 27 EU Member 
States, as well as the associated countries applying the Dublin acquis , i.e. Norway and Iceland. The 
Dublin system has been further extended to Swit zerland through an internat ional agreement (which 
was signed in October 2004 and entered into force in March 2008, its applicat ion being linked to the 
lifting of internal border controls, expected for December 2008). Liechtenstein is also expected to 
become a member of the Dublin system in the near future (Protocol signed in February 2008).  
However, for the purpose of th e Evaluation report on the Dublin  system, which assessed the 
application of the Dublin and Eur odac Regulations from their respective entry into force dates until 
the end of 2005, ‘Member States’ meant 26 EU Member  States (24 EU Member States — all except 
Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark — plus two associated countries — Iceland and Norway). This is 
because, until 21 February 2006, Denmark did not take  part in the Dublin Regulation and Romania 
and Bulgaria were not yet Member States.  
EN 80   EN  
ANNEX 5: The likely administrative costs of the preferred policy option  
1. Administrative costs of the preferred policy option 
Administrative costs77 have been assessed with regard to obligations to provide information 
associated to: 
• the obligation to provide appli cants with general information about the Dublin procedure, upon 
lodging their applications;  
• the obligation to provide certain applicants with  further specific information during the Dublin 
procedure, in particular information on availabl e legal remedies against a transfer decision and 
entities that may provide legal assistance; 
• the exchange of information between the sending and the receiving Member State before 
carrying out a transfer, in  particular medical information about  the persons to be transferred; 
• the tools for practical cooperation (identif ication and diffusion of best practices,78 handbook on 
the application of the Dublin Regulation)79. 
These are the main elements of the preferred policy option which entail additional administrative 
costs and which are associated with specific types of obligations and required actions listed in the 
table below. 
                                                 
77 According to the EC IA guidelines, ‘ Administrative costs are defined as the costs incurred by enterprises, the 
voluntary sector, public authorities and citizens in meeting legal obligations to provide information on their 
action or production, either to public authorities or to private parties. Information is to be construed in a 
broad sense, i.e. including costs of labelling, repor ting, monitoring and assessment needed to provide the 
information and registration ’. 
78 Identification and diffusion of best practices relates to the policy objectives of ensuring that Dublin system 
operates smoothly, in particular by ameliorating the transfer mechanism. 
79 Administrative costs  have been assessed in accordance with the EU Standard Cost Model Manual. 
EN 81   EN  Table I: Types of obligations and actions required for each individual policy measure 
Policy measure Type of obligation Type of action required 
Familiarising with the 
information obligation 
Training authorities on the information obligations 
Retrieving relevant information from existing data 
Adjusting existing data 
Copying 1. Obligation to provide 
applicants with 
general information 
about the Dublin procedure 
2. Obligation to provide 
certain applicants with further specific 
information about 
Dublin
 Other — Creation of information 
Submitting the information 
Familiarising with the 
information obligation 
Training staff on the information obligations 
Retrieving relevant information from existing data 
Submitting the information Exchange of information between the Member States 
involved about the applicants to 
be transferred, in particular persons with special needs Submission of recurring reports 
Filing the information 
Producing new data 
Identification and diffusion of 
best practices Other — Creation of 
information 
Submitting the information 
Producing new data 
Designing information material Creating a handbook on the 
application of the Dublin Regulation Other — Creation of 
information 
Submitting the information 
 
EN 82   EN Firstly, new information  would have to be created and provided to applicants concerning: 
1. the functioning of the Dublin procedure in general; 
2. specific details, such as on entities that may provide legal assistance. 
This measure would entail familiarising staff with the new obligations and training them in how to 
provide such information. Such information woul d have to be prepared  by retrieving additional 
details on these obligations. This would then be a dded to the existing material already provided to 
applicants and be copied and distributed to these people. 
Secondly, Member States would be obliged to exchange information  before transferring 
applicants, in particular vulnerable persons. This w ould entail familiarising Dublin staff and training 
them to retrieve specific files or reports  and submit information to th e responsible Member State 
where the applicants are to be transferred. A standa rd form for the submission of information is to 
be adopted under the comitology proce dure and used by all Member States. 
Thirdly, the identification and diff usion of best practices  require time. The exchange of best 
practices would be organised at EU level. 
Fourthly, the creation of a handbook  on the application of the Regula tion would require time to be 
produced (by the Commission in cooperation with Memb er States in the course  of expert meetings), 
formatted and subsequently submitted to Member States. 
2. Main assumptions used to assess th e costs of the preferred policy option  
On the basis of the above considerations, the ad ministrative costs have been assessed for two 
scenarios: 
• Scenario ‘t 0’: 1st year of implementation of the preferred policy option 
• Scenario ‘t 0+2’: 3rd year of implementation of the preferred policy option.  
These scenarios have been developed in order to  assess the main administ rative costs of launching 
the new measures and then maintaining them. 
Main assumptions of Scenario ‘ t0’80 
With reference to Table I, the following main assumptions have been made in order to estimate the 
administrative costs of th e preferred policy option: 
• Concerning the costs of familiarising staff with  the obligations and training personnel in the 
Member State Dublin units,81 the following estimations have been made82: 
                                                 
80 It should be noted that the numbering of the assumptions follows the numbering of the cost items in Table II. 
81 The need to familiarise staff with obligations relate s to the following measures: (i) general information by 
Member States to applicants  about the Dublin mechanism, (ii) information for applicants on specific issues 
such as on entities that may provide legal assistance, ( iii) exchange of information between the Member States 
involved about the applicants to be transferred. 
82 The estimates are based on the information contained in  Member State contributions on the application of the 
Dublin system. It should be noted that the information provided on the number of staff working on the 
EN 83   EN 1. an average of 2 senior officials (directors a nd heads of unit) per Member State would be 
familiarised with the obligations for the submission of forms83 and the need to provide 
additional information on certain  aspects of the Dub lin procedure such as on entities that 
may provide legal assistance (assumption: two working days required, with an estimated 
total of 32 working hours per Member State); 
2. an average of 15 officials per Member State would require tr aining on the ob ligations for 
preparing and submitting information84 (assumption: training course lasting two working 
days, with an estimated total of 240 hours per Member State). 
• Concerning implementation costs  for the remaining actions85, the following assumptions, in 
terms of working hours (WH), have been made for the following actions: 
3. 64 WH for each Member State to retrieve detailed information  on the Dublin procedure 
in general and the further specific issues such as entities that may provide legal assistance; 
4. 16 WH for each Member State to adjust the existing information  material to include 
details of the Dublin procedure and further specific issues such as entities that may provide 
legal assistance (assuming that each Member State will have to do this once a year); 
5. 12 WH for each Member State to copy the amended information  material with details of 
the Dublin procedure and furthe r specific issues such as en tities that may provide legal 
assistance (assuming that each Member Stat e will have to do this once a year); 
6. 0.1 WH for each Member State to supply the information  to applicants for international 
protection (based on the average number of applications per Member State in the past 5 years (2003-2007), i.e. 8 920.54
86; 
7. 0.5 WH for each Member State to retrieve information  on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable persons (assuming that files on thes e people already exist). This would be done 
for each vulnerable transferee, with the a nnual number of such people transferred on 
average by each Member State estimated to be 199.5187; 
                                                                                                                                                                  
application of the Dublin mechanism is not always reliable, given that Member States may have given different 
interpretations as to who exactly should  be considered as ‘Dublin personnel’. 
83 The submission of forms is related to the exchange of information between the Member States involved, on the 
applicants to be transferred. 
84 The information relates to: (i) general information to applicants about the Dublin mechanism, (ii) information 
for applicants on specific issues such as on entities that may provide legal assistance, (iii) exchange of 
information between the Member States involve d about the applicants to be transferred. 
85 Submitting the information; Filing the information; Retrieving relevant information from existing data; 
Adjusting existing data; Copying; Producing new data; Designing information material. 
86 It should be noted that this average is based on th e EU-27 Member States plus Norway, since the data for 
Iceland are incomplete. 
87 This assumption is based on an estimate drawn from a study carried out by ICAR (Information Centre about 
Asylum and Refugees) concerning vulnerable groups in the asylum process in the UK, which, as the UK received the highest average number  of applications in the past 5 years (2003-2007 ), constitutes a 
representative sample for estimating the proportion of vulnerable applicants in total applications in the EU 
(Vulnerable groups in the asylum determination process, Thematic Briefing prepared for the Independent Asylum Commission, Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), 2007). An estimate was made 
of the proportion of vulnerable people in the average number of outgoing transfer s per Member State, but 
EN 84   EN 8. 0.1 WH in each Member State for submitting the information  concerning transferees, in 
particular vulnerable persons, to the responsible Member St ate. This would be done for 
each vulnerable transferee, with  the annual number of such people transferred on average 
by each Member State estimated to be 199.51 (assuming that most information will be 
submitted electronically); 
9. 0.5 WH in each Member State to file the information  received on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable persons. This would be done for each vulnerable transferee, and the annual 
number of such people transferred on average by each Member State is estimated to be 199.51. 
10. 350 WH for the Commission’s DG JLS to (i) diffuse the best practices  on the application 
of the policy option, (ii) draft the handbook on the a pplication of the Dublin 
Regulation (submission costs are considered zer o since the information would be 
uploaded on the website or submitted electronically); 
11. 16 WH for DG JLS to design the  handbook on the application of the Dublin 
Regulation  (assuming that DG JLS will already ha ve other handbook formats available). 
• Assumptions for the hourly labour cost s of Member State asylum personnel 
The hourly labour costs of Member State asylum pe rsonnel have been estimated on the basis of the 
EU average hourly labour costs in public admi nistration (NACE L), extr acted from Eurostat. 
Eurostat provides hourly and monthly labour co sts and gross earnings  per economic sector. 
However, for government (NACE section L, public administration and defenc e; compulsory social 
security), we only have information on the New Me mber States. Additional data were required to 
extend our information on labour costs to the entir e EU-27. Eurostat provides a number of possible 
indicators, namely average personnel costs in serv ices in the EU-27 in 2003 (NACE sections G, H, 
I, and K)
88, median gross annual earnings in industr y and services in th e EU-25 in 2002 (the 
outcome of the Structure of Earnings Survey 2002)89, and average hourly labour costs in industry 
and services of full-time empl oyees in enterprises with 10 or more employees in 2002)90. The 
relative differences between Member States in th e level of labour costs according to the various 
sources compare fairly well. OECD data were used  to forecast the level of annual labour costs per 
Member State in 200891. Information on the annual hours wo rked per employ ee in the total 
economy per Member State in 2005 was taken from  the total economy database of the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre92. The end result is an average hour ly labour cost per employee in 
NACE section L (public administration and defence;  compulsory social security) of €24.30 in the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
excluding BG and RO, since the availabl e data are for 2006 and BG and RO were not yet Member States at the 
time. 
88 Eurostat, ‘Main features of th e services sector in the EU’, Statistics in Focus  — Industry, trade and services  
19/2007. 
89 Eurostat, ‘Earnings disparities across European countr ies and regions. A glance at regional results of the 
Structure of Earni ngs Survey 2002’, Statistics in Focus – Population and social conditions  7/2006. 
90 Eurostat, Europe in Figures 2005 , p. 169. 
91 OECD Economic Outlook 81 database. The average increase in labour costs in Poland, Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic and the Czech Republic was used for the New Member States that are not members of the OECD. 
92 Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, January 
2007, http://www.ggdc.net . The average annual number of hours worked in the New Member States was 1 855 
hours per worker, while the Eurostat data on labour costs per hour and per month result in an annual number of 
1 800 hours worked in NACE section L, suggesting that the data match. 
EN 85   EN EU-27 in 2008, and €23.30 excluding Denmark. On the ba sis of this result, the hourly rate for 2009 
has been estimated by applying th e growth rate for average hour ly labour costs in the EU-27 
between 2000 and 2005, thus obtaining a final rate of €23.84 . 
EN 86   EN Main assumptions of Scenario ‘t 0+2’93 
With reference to Table I, the following main assumptions have been made in order to provide an 
estimate of the administrative costs of the preferred policy option: 
• Concerning the costs  of familiarising staff with the obligations and training personnel in the 
Member State Dublin units94, no additional cost would be incurred two years after the initial 
implementation of the preferred option; 
• Concerning implementation costs  for the remaining actions95, assuming that there will be no 
further need to continue to identify and diffuse be st practices and the handbook on the 
application of the Dublin Regulation , the following assumptions, in terms of working hours 
(WH), have been made for the following actions: 
1. 8 WH for each Member State to retrieve updated information  on the Dublin procedure in 
general and on further specific i ssues such as on entities that may provide legal assistance; 
2. 4 WH for each Member State to adjust the existing information  material to include 
details of the Dublin procedur e in general and further specif ic issues such as on entities 
that may provide legal assistance (assuming th at each Member State will have to do this 
once a year); 
3. 12 WH for each Member State to copy the information  material with details of the Dublin 
procedure in general and further specific issu es such on entities that may provide legal 
assistance (assuming that each Member Stat e will have to do this once a year); 
4. 0.1 WH for each Member State to supply the information  to applicants for international 
protection (based on the average number of applications per Member State in the past 5 years (2003-2007), i.e. 8 920.54); 
5. 0.5 WH for each Member State to retrieve information  on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable persons. This would be done for ea ch vulnerable transferee, with the annual 
number of such people transferred on averag e by each Member State estimated to be 
199.51
96 (assuming that files on these people will already exist); 
                                                 
93 It should be noted that the numbering of the assumptions follows the numbering of the cost items in Table III. 
94 The need to familiarise staff with obligations relate s to the following measures: (i) general information by 
Member States to applicants  about the Dublin mechanism, (ii) information for applicants on specific issues 
such as on entities that may provide legal assistance, ( iii) exchange of information between the Member States 
involved on the applicants to be transferred. 
95 Submitting the information; Filing the information; Retrieving relevant information from existing data; 
Adjusting existing data; Copying; Producing new data; Designing information material. 
96 This assumption is based on an estimate drawn from a study carried out by ICAR (Information Centre about 
Asylum and Refugees) concerning vulnerable groups in the asylum process in the UK, which, as the UK 
received the highest average number  of applications in the past 5 years (2003-2007 ), constitutes a 
representative sample for estimating the proportion of vulnerable applicants in total applications in the EU (Vulnerable groups in the asylum determination process, Thematic Briefing prepared for the Independent 
Asylum Commission Information, Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), 2007). An estimate was made 
of the proportion of vulnerable people in the average number of outgoing transfer s per Member State, but 
excluding BG and RO since the available data are for 20 06 and BG and RO were not yet Member States at the 
time. 
EN 87   EN 6. 0.1 WH in each Member State for submitting the information  concerning transferees, in 
particular vulnerable persons, to the responsible Member St ate. This would be done for 
each vulnerable transferee, with  the annual number of such people transferred on average 
by each Member State estimated to be 199.51 (assuming that most information will be 
submitted electronically); 
7. 0.5 WH in each Member State to file the information  received on transferees, in particular 
vulnerable persons. This would be done for ea ch vulnerable transferee, with the annual 
number of such people transferred on averag e by each Member State estimated to be 
199.51. 
• Labour costs:  no significant changes in labour costs (see  Scenario ‘0’) due to the short period 
since ‘Scenario 0’ and expected  inflation rates at EU level'
 
EN 88   EN  
EU Cost Model: Policy Options  Obligations in 'Scenario t 0' 
Proposal on the future devel opment of measures on the criteria and mechanisms to 
determine the Member State responsible fo r assessing asylum applications, based on 
Council Regulation 343/2003/EC 
  Tariff 
(€ per hour)  
Time  
(hour) Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) Freq  
(per year) Nbr 
of 
entit
ies Total nbr
of  
actions Total  
cost Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 
No. Ass. 
Art. Orig. 
Art. Type of obligation Description of required 
action(s) Target group i e i e           Int EU Nat Reg 
1     Submission of 
(recurring) reportsOther Familiarising with the 
information obligation MS Asylum 
Services 23   32,00   745,6 1,00 29 29 21.622   100
%     
2     Submission of 
(recurring) reportsOther Training members and 
employees about the information obligations MS Asylum 
Services 23   
240,00   5.592,0 1,00 29 29 162.168   100
%     
3     Other Retrieving relevant 
information from existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   64,00   1.491,2 1,00 29 29 43.245   100
%     
4     Other Adjusting existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   16,00   372,8 1,00 29 29 10.811   100
%     
5     Other Copying (reproducing 
reports, producing labels or leaflets) MS Asylum 
Services 23   12,00   279,6 1,00 29 29 8.108   100
%     
6     Other Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) MS Asylum 
Services 23   0,10   2, 3 8.920,54 29 258.696 602.761   100
%     
7     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Retrieving relevant 
information from existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   0,50   11,7 199,51 29 5.786 67.404   100
%     
8     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) MS Asylum 
Services 23   0,10   2,3 199,51 29 5.786 13.481   100
%     
 
EN 89   EN  
   Total administrative costs (€) 1.005.533 9     Submission of 
(recurring) reports filling the information MS Asylum 
Services 23   0,50   11,7 199,51 29 5.786 67.404   100
%     
10     Other producing new data EU DG JLS 
Services 23   350,00   8.155,0 1,00 1 1 8.155   100
%     
11     Other Designing information 
material (leaflet conception…) EU DG JLS 
Services 23   16,00   372,8 1,00 1 1 373   100
%     
 
EN 90   EN EU Cost Model: Policy opti on obligations in ‘Scenario 
t0+2' 
Proposal for the future development of th e criteria and mechanisms to determine 
the Member State responsible for assessing asylum applications, based on 
Council Regulation 343/2003/EC 
  Rate 
(€ per 
hour)  
Time  
(hours) Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip.) Freq  
(per 
year) No  
of  
entities Total No 
of  
actions Total  
cost Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 
No Ass. 
Art. Orig. 
Art. Type of obligation Description of required 
action(s) Target group i e i e           Int EU Nat Reg 
1     Other Retrieving relevant 
information from existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   8.00   186.4 1.00 29 29 5 406   100%     
2     Other Adjusting existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   4.00   93.2 1.00 29 29 2 703   100%     
3     Other Copying (reproducing 
reports, producing 
labels or leaflets) MS Asylum 
Services 23   12.00   279.6 1.00 29 29 8 108   100%     
4     Other Submitting the 
information (sending it to the designated 
recipient) MS Asylum 
Services 23   0.10   2.3 8 920.54 29 258 696 602 761   100%     
5     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Retrieving relevant 
information from existing data MS Asylum 
Services 23   0.50   11.7 199.51 29 5 786 67 404   100%     
6     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the 
information (sending it to the designated recipient) MS Asylum 
Services 23   0.10   2.3 199.51 29 5 786 13 481   100%     
7     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Filing the information MS Asylum 
Services 23   0.50   11.7 199.51 29 5 786 67 404   100%     
             Total administrative costs (€) 767 267     
 
EN 91   EN