EN 
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 14 February 2011 
on amendments to the Polish Constitution concerning adoption of the euro 
(CON/2011/9) 
 Introduction and legal basis
 
On 10 December 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Marshal of the 
Polish Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
(hereinafter the ‘draft law’)1. 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and th e third indent of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consul tation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions2, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski 
(NBP). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 1.1 The draft law amends the Constitution
3 in order to address obligations stemming from Poland’s 
membership in the European Union. In particul ar, the draft law: (a) introduces a new Chapter Xa 
that consolidates provisions relating specifically  to Poland’s membership in the Union; 
and (b) amends several existing provisions of the Constitution relating to NBP, by introducing 
‘changes necessary for the full performance of Poland’s obligations in respect of its participation in 
economic and monetary union, allowing for the future introduction of … the euro in Poland’4 
(hereinafter the ‘NBP amendments’). 
1.2 The NBP amendments will: (a) redefine NBP’s institutional status and objectives by introducing 
references to NBP’s membership in the European  System of Central Banks (ESCB), to price 
stability as NBP’s primary objective and to NBP’s independence from other State bodies5; 
(b) repeal the provisions granting NBP the exclusiv e authority to issue money and to formulate and 
implement monetary policy; (c) abolish the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) as one of NBP’s 
                                                 
1  Published on the Parliament’s website at  www.sejm.gov.pl, parliamentary print no 3598. 
2  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
3 Dziennik Ustaw  (Dz. U.) of 1997, No 78, item 483 (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’). 
4 See the explanatory memorandum  to the draft law, p. 4. 
5 See the amendments introduced in Article 227(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
2 decision-making bodies6; (d) modify the scope of the Supreme Audit Office’s (SAO) audit of 
NBP7; and (e) remove the reference to the NBP Pres ident from the list of State officials that are 
accountable before the State Tribunal8.  
1.3 The draft law provides that all NBP amendments enter into force upon Poland’s adoption of the 
euro9. 
 2. General comments 2.1 Since 2004, in its Convergence Reports, the E CB has been assessing the compatibility of Polish 
legislation, including the Constitution, with th e requirements of primary Union law related to 
NBP’s participation in the ESCB and, prospectiv ely, in the Eurosystem. In particular, this 
assessment focuses on: (a) whether national law is compatible with Union law on central bank independence and confidentiality; (b) whether na tional law is compatible with the Union law 
prohibition on monetary financi ng and privileged access; and (c) the NBP’s legal integration into 
the Eurosystem. This Opinion follows the struct ure of the relevant assessments in the ECB’s 
Convergence Reports. 
2.2 The legal provisions identified in the ECB’s Convergence Reports as being incompatible with 
Union requirements are found in the Constitution and in  ordinary legislation, and in particular, in 
the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 29 August 1997
10. This Opinion focuses on the constitutional 
provisions amended by the draft law and also ma kes necessary references to directly related 
provisions of ordinary legislation. The ECB invites the Polish authorities to ensure compatibility with Union requirements at all levels of nationa l legislation within the timeframe provided for 
under Union law. Union law does not prescribe the manner in which national legislation should be 
adapted to achieve compatibility with the releva nt requirements under the TFEU and the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute 
of the ESCB’). This may be achieved by referri ng to the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, by 
incorporating provisions thereof and referring to th eir source, by deleting any incompatibility, or by 
using a combination of these methods
11. Depending on the national legisl ator’s decision, and in line 
with the hierarchical structure of national le gislation, such changes may be introduced in 
constitutional provisions, ordinary legislation, or both. 
 
                                                 
6 See the amendments introduced in Articles 103(1) and 144(3)  and Article 227 (1), (5) and (6) of the Constitution by 
Article 1(2), (3) and (7) of the draft law, together with Article 2 of the draft law. 
7 See the amendments introduced in Articles 203(1) and 204(1)(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(5) and (6) of the draft 
law. 
8 See the amendments introduced in Article 198(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(4) of the draft law. 
9 See Article 3 of the draft law. 
10 Consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2005, No 1, item 2 (hereinaft er the ‘Law on NBP’). 
11 See the ECB’s Convergence Report , May 2010, Section 2.2.2.2, p.17. 
3 3. Central bank independence 
Functional independence 
3.1 The principle of functional independence of a national central bank (NCB) requires that an NCB’s 
primary objective is stated clearly and that it is fully in line with the primary objective of price 
stability pursuant to Article 127(1) TFEU. Curren tly, the Constitution speci fies that NBP ‘shall 
have the exclusive right to issue money as well as to formulate and implement monetary policy’ 
and ‘shall be responsible for th e value of the Polish currency’12. Furthermore, the Law on NBP 
states that ‘The primary objective of the activity of  NBP shall be to maintain price stability, while 
supporting the economic policies of the Government, insofar as this does not constrain the pursuit 
of the primary objective of NBP’13.  
3.2 The draft law introduces a constitutional provision specifying that NBP ‘shall ensure the stability of 
prices and shall perform the tasks and exercise the competences specified in the Treaties that form 
the basis of the European Union and in ordinary legislation14’. The ECB welcomes the inclusion of 
an explicit reference to ‘price stability’ in the C onstitution, as this strengthens NBP’s independence 
and ensures consistency between the Constitution and the Law on NBP. From the perspective of an 
NCB’s functional independence, which is not linke d to the Member State’s adoption of the euro, 
the ECB would welcome the entry into force of th e provision explicitly referring to ‘price stability’ 
as soon as possible, and prior to Poland adopting the euro.  
Institutional independence 
3.3 The principle of institutional independence refe rred to in Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the 
Statute of the ESCB refers to the exercise of cen tral bank powers and the pe rformance of relevant 
tasks and duties which is free from external instructi ons or government influence. In particular, in 
relation to the powers of a State audit office exerci sed vis-à-vis an NCB, the following central bank 
independence safeguards should apply to State audits15: (a) the scope of the audit should be clearly 
defined in the legal framework; (b) the activities of  an NCB’s independent external auditors should 
not be prejudiced; (c) the audit should comply with  the prohibition on giving instructions to the 
NCBs and their decision-making bodies; (d) the au dit should not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB-
related tasks; and (e) the audit should be pe rformed on a non-political, independent and purely 
professional basis. The ECB’s Convergence Report 201016 identifies a few incompatibilities in the 
Polish legislation in the area of institutional inde pendence, which include: (a) Article 203(1) of the 
Constitution on the scope of the SAO’s powers to  audit NBP; and (b) the lack of an express 
prohibition for NBP and members of its decision-ma king bodies to seek or take outside instructions 
and the lack of an express prohibition on the Gove rnment to seek to influence members of NBP’s 
                                                 
12  Second and third sentence of Ar ticle 227(1) of the Constitution. 
13 See Article 3(1) of the Law on NBP. 
14 See the second sentence of Article 227(1) of the Cons titution introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
15  See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 pp. 22 and 253, the ECB’s Convergence Report, Ma y 2006, pp. 66 and 74, and 
paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2006/4. Se e also Opinions CON/2002/22 and CON/2006/50. 
16 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, Section 6.7.2.1, pp. 252 and 253. 
4 decision-making bodies in situations where this ma y have an impact on NBP’s fulfilment of its 
ESCB-related tasks. 
3.4 The draft law introduces two changes to the Constitution related to NBP’s institutional 
independence. First, it introduces an express gene ral principle according to which ‘In performing 
its activities, Narodowy Bank Polski is  independent of other State bodies’17. Second, it modifies the 
SAO’s powers vis-à-vis NBP by limiting such po wers to ‘audit[ing] th e activities of Narodowy 
Bank Polski regarding their legality, economic prud ence, efficiency and diligence, to the extent 
such activities are not related to the performance of  tasks and the exercise of competences specified 
in the Treaties that form the basis of the European Union’18.  
3.5 The general principle of central bank independe nce has already been extensively defined in the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions19, which refer to both the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB, as 
well as to the specific aspects of central bank in dependence. The ECB understands, therefore, that 
in line with those decisions the rule expressed in  the proposed third sentence of Article 227(1) of 
the Constitution will be interpreted with refere nce to all established aspects of central bank 
independence, i.e. functional, institutional, pers onal and financial. More over, the ECB understands 
that this rule refers to all NBP activities, i.e. its  ESCB-related tasks and its other tasks. At the same 
time, the ECB expects that this rule will be el aborated on in the Law on NBP and other relevant 
legislation20. In this respect, the ECB reiterates its  remarks relating to NBP’s institutional 
independence in the ECB’s Convergence Report 201021.  
3.6 As regards the SAO, the proposed wording of  Article 227(2) of the Constitution excludes ESCB-
related tasks and competences performed by NB P from the scope of an SAO audit. The ECB 
considers the joint effect of both this exclusi on and the express introduction into the Constitution of 
the general principle of central bank independence an important enhancement of legal certainty in 
the area of NBP’s institutional independence. This  is subject to the following specific observations: 
(a) in order to achieve full compliance with th e principle of institutional independence, the 
prohibition on giving and taking instructions refe rred to in Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the 
Statute of the ESCB needs to be expressly referred to in Polish legislation so that it specifically 
applies to, inter alia , the SAO22; (b) the scope of the SAO’s audit of NBP should, for reasons of 
legal certainty, be further defined to safeguard NBP’s institutional independence. In particular, 
relevant legislation should ensure that when a uditing NBP, the application by the SAO of the 
                                                 
17 See third sentence of Article 227(1) of the Constitu tion introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
18 See Article 227(2) of the Constitution, as amended by Article  1(7) of the draft law, together with amendments to 
Articles 103(1) and 144(3) of the Constitution introduced by Article 1(2) and (3) of the draft law. 
19 See in particular the following judgements of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal: judgmen t K 25/99 of 28 June 2000, 
(Orzecznictwo Trybuna łu Konstytucyjnego (OTK) ZU No 5/2000, item 141); judgement K 26/03 of 24 November 2003 
(OTK ZU No 9/A/2003, item 95); j udgement U 4/06 of 22 September 2006 (OTK  ZU No 8/A/2006, item 109); and 
judgement Kp 4/08 of 16 July 2009 (OTK ZU No 7/A/2009, item 112).  
20 Compare, for example, solutions adopted in this respect by the Republic of Slov akia: Article 56(1)(1) of the Constitution 
of Republic of Slovakia (general rule of central bank independence) and Article 7( 7) of Law on Národná banka 
Slovenska (prohibition for members of the central bank governing bodies to receive  external instructions).  
21 See Section 6.7.2.1 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010. 
22 See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, Section 6.7.2.1, p. 252. 
5 ‘efficacy criterion’23 does not extend to an evaluation of NBP’s activities related to its primary 
objective of price stability24.  
Personal independence 
3.7 The principle of personal independence covers se curity of tenure and safeguards against arbitrary 
dismissal of members of the NCB’s decision-ma king bodies. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 
identified several provisions of the Law on NBP and of the Law on the State Tribunal25 that are 
incompatible with TFEU requirements in this r espect. In particular, these laws establish grounds 
for the dismissal of NBP’s President and other members of NBP’s decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks which are in addition to the exclusive grounds 
for dismissal specified in Article 14.2 of the St atute of the ESCB. One such additional ground for 
dismissal refers specifically to the NBP President who may be suspended as a result of an indictment by the Parliament before the State Tribunal
26, and may ultimately be removed from 
office by a decision of this Tribunal27. 
3.8 The draft law removes the reference to NBP’ s President from the constitutional provision listing 
State officials that are accountab le before the State Tribunal28. The ECB welcomes this 
constitutional amendment as it eliminates the respec tive incompatibly with Article 14.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB, and understands that it will be  followed by relevant legislative amendments. 
At the same time, the ECB reiterates the remarks made in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 which relate to the grounds for dismissal  of members of NBP’s decision-making bodies
29. 
 4. Legal integration of NBP into the Eurosystem 4.1 Legal integration of NCBs into the Eurosystem  requires that national legislation be adapted to 
allow for the performance of Eurosystem-related tasks and compliance with the ECB’s decisions 
once the Member State concerned has adopted  the euro. The ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 
identifies several legislative provisions that are incompatible with TFEU requirements, in 
particular: (a) the provisions of  the Constitution and of the Law on NBP which provide for NBP’s 
powers with regard to monetary policy and certa in other fields, which do not recognise the ECB’s 
powers in those fields; and (b) the provision of  the Law on NBP which defines NBP’s secondary 
objective in a manner that does not reflect the secondary objective of supporting the general 
economic policies in the Union, in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. 
                                                 
23  See the second sentence of Article 203 of the Constitution. 
24 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, p. 22, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2009/77. 
25 The Law on the State Tribunal of 26 March 1982; consolid ated text published in Dz. U.  of 2002, No 101, item 925. 
26 See Article 9(5) of the Law on NBP, together with the second sentence of Article 11(1) and Article 1(1)(3) of the Law on 
the State Tribunal. 
27 See Article 25(3) together with Article 3 and Article 1(1)(3) of the Law on the State Tribunal. 
28 See the amendments introduced in Article 198(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(4) of the draft law. 
29 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010, Section 6.7.2.2 r ecommending amendments to Articles 9(3), 9(5), 13(5) and 
second sentence of Article 17(2b) of the Law on NBP. 
6 4.2 The draft law: (a) reformulates the descripti on of NBP’s institutional status by introducing a 
reference to NBP’s membership in the ESCB30; (b) defines NBP’s objectives by providing that 
NBP ‘shall ensure the stability of prices and shal l perform the tasks and exercise the competences 
specified in the Treaties which form the basis of the European Union and in ordinary legislation’31; 
(c) removes NBP’s exclusive powers to issue m oney and to formulate and implement monetary 
policy32; and (d) abolishes the MPC, an NBP decision-making body responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of monetary policy33. The ECB welcomes these amendments, with the 
reservation that, for reasons of legal certainty, th e Constitution should also refer in a sufficiently 
precise manner to the secondary objective of th e ESCB specified in Article 127(1) TFEU and 
Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB. Those provisions provide that, without prejudice to the primary objective of price stability, an NCB must  support the general economic policies of the 
Union with a view to contributing to the achieve ment of Union objectives as laid down in Article 3 
of the Treaty on European Union. The ECB unde rstands that the above -mentioned constitutional 
amendments will be followed by the necessary amendments in the Law on NBP, which are 
indicated in the ECB’s Convergence Report 2010
34.  
 5. Entry into force of the NBP amendments  
The draft law provides that all NBP amendments are to enter into force at a later time than the 
remaining amendments introduced in the Constituti on by the draft law, i.e. only when Poland 
adopts the euro. The ECB draws the Polish authorities’  attention to the fact that, to comply with 
Article 131 TFEU requiring compatibility of Polish le gislation with the TFEU and the Statute of 
the ESCB, relevant Polish legislation had to be adjusted by the date of Polish accession to the 
Union, i.e. 1 May 2004. Hence, amendments addressing the outstanding issues identified in the 
ECB’s Convergence Report 2010 concerning cen tral bank independence, confidentiality and 
compliance with the monetary financing prohibition need to be adopted and enter into force as soon 
as possible, irrespective of when Poland adopt s the euro. In relation to the constitutional 
amendments introduced by the draft law, this  applies to the amendments discussed in 
paragraphs 3.3 to 3.8 of this Opinion. Adjustment s necessary to ensure full integration of NBP into 
the Eurosystem, while they should also be adopted  as soon as possible, must enter into force on the 
date Poland adopts the euro. This relates to the constitutional amendments discussed in paragraph 4 
of this Opinion. Specifically, as regards the intr oduction in the Constitution of an express reference 
to price stability discussed in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.2 of this Opinion, the ECB would welcome its 
entering into force before the date Poland adopts  the euro, since it strengthens NBP’s functional 
                                                 
30 See the amendments introduced in Article 227(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
31 See the second sentence of Article 227(1) of the Cons titution introduced by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
32 See the amendments introduced in Artic le 227(2), (5) and (6) of the Constitution by Article 1(7) of the draft law. 
33 See the amendments introduced in Articles 103(1), 144(3) and 227(1) of the Constitution by Article 1(2), (3) and (7) of 
the draft law, together with Article 2 of the draft law. 
34 See the ECB’s Convergence Repo rt 2010, Section 6.7.5, p. 255. 
7 independence. The ECB recommends that Article 3 of the draft law be amended in accordance with 
the above comments.  
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 14 February 2011. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET