EN ECB -PUBL IC 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 22 September 2015  
on the designation of Lietuvos bankas as a resolution authority  
(CON/20 15/33) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 13 August 2015,  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Finance ( hereinafter the ‘consulting authority’ ) for an opinion on a  draft law amending the L aw on Lietuvos 
bankas (hereinafter the ‘draft law’ ).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty  on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of Article  2(1) of Council 
Decision  98/415/EC1, as the draft  law relates to Lietuvos bankas  and rules applicable to financial 
institutions insofar as they materially influence the st ability of financial institutions and markets . For 
elements of the draft law  the exclusive purpose of which is the implementation of Union law, the ECB’s 
competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 25.1 of the Statute of the European System of  
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB ’).  In accordance 
with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the 
Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law   
1.1. The purpose of the draft law is to implement in Lithuanian law  Article 3 (1) of Directive 2014/59/EU  
of the European Parliament and of the Council2 that requires each Member State to designate 
one or, exceptionally, more resolution authorities empowered to apply the resolution tool s and 
exercise the resolution powers  under that Directive . In particular, t he draft law amends the Law 
on Lietuvos bankas3 to provid e that Lietuvos bankas will carry out  the functions assigned to the 
resolution authority  for financial sector entities  subject to Lithuanian law  (including credit 
institutions, the Central Credit Union, certain financial brokerage firms, financial holding 
companies, mixed financial holding companies and mixed activity holding companies, branches 
established in Lithuania by credit institutions and financial brokerage firms established in third 
countries  and certain specific financial institutions ). This does not apply where the Single 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 o n the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/ 2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council ( OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190) . 
3  Nr. IX-205, 2001 03 13, Žin., 2001, Nr. 28- 890 (2001 03 30).   
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 Resolution Board carries out these functions pursuant  to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council4. The draft law also spec ifies that Lietuvos bankas will 
carry out the functions assigned to the national resolution authority under Regulation (EU) 
No 806/2014.  The draft law further provides that, according to the Law on financial sustainability5, 
Lietuvos bankas will make decisions with regard to the resolution of financial sector entities . In 
this respect, the draft law is a part of a package of draft legislation that has been pr epared in 
order to transpose Directive 2014/59/EU  and Directive 2014/49/EU  of the European Parliament 
and of the Council6 into Lithuanian law, as well as to ensure the effective application of 
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and to ratify the intergovernmental  Agreement on the transfer and 
mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. However, the draft Law on financial 
sustainability  which amends the existing law , transposes in detail the provisions of 
Directive  2014/59/EU  and further defines resolution tools, powers and processes, has not been 
submitted for consultation to the ECB.  
1.2. The draft law also states that financial market  supervision and the activities of the resolution 
authority will be financ ed from financial market participants ’ contr ibutions and other Lietuvos 
bankas funds . The bas is for calculating  contributions and the maximum contribution rates are set 
out in annexes to the draft law, while the contribution level for each year will be established by 
Lietuvos bankas after  consultati on with the relevant financial market participants. The draft law 
clarifies that if the sum of contributions paid by financial market participants under supervision 
during a particular year is insufficient to cover the expenses related to financial market 
supervision and the functions of the resolution authority  in relation  to financial sector entities, 
Lietuvos bankas will increase the contributions to be paid the following year by  the necessary 
amount and use part of the contributions to cover  the shortfall from  the previous year.  
 
2. General observations  
2.1. The ECB welcomes the draft law, as it strengthens the tools and procedures available to Lietuvos 
bankas for carrying out effective preventive measures, early intervention and effective resolution 
in line w ith the common framework of intervention powers, rules and procedures laid down in 
Directive 2014/59/EU . The ECB stresses that it s opinion concerns  the provisions of the draft law 
that may  impact  on the role and tasks of Lietuvos bankas as a central bank and member of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  With this in mind , the ECB must also examine the 
provisions related to the new tasks of Lietuvos bankas under  the draft  Law on financial 
sustainability , cross- referenced in the text of the draft law , and approved by the Lithuanian 
Government  on 2 September 2015 for submission to the Lithuanian Parliament . The ECB 
                                                 
4  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of 
a Single Resolution Mechanis m and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 
225, 30.7.2014, p. 1).  
5  Valstybės žinios, 2009, No 93- 3985.  
6  Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes 
(OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 stresses, however, that it s opinion does not constitute an assessment whether Lithuania has  
effectively discharged  its obligations to implement Directive 2014/59/EU  in Lithuanian law .  
2.2. The ECB underlines that, in the context of a proposed conferral of tasks on an ESCB member, it 
is necessary to assess such conferral against the monetary financing prohibition laid down in 
Article 123 of t he Treaty. The ECB has developed guidance, in the form of general and specific 
considerations, on the basis of which it may decide whether a new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for 
the purposes of assessing such conferral against the monetary financing prohibition.  
2.2.1. General considerations  
First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government 
tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part 
of the central banking tasks already assigned to the NCB. In recognition of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, the tasks currently 
discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re- categorised, but may be 
reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance.  
Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not  put 
their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem -related tasks.  
Third , central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed 
in Article 127(2), (5)  and (6) of the Treaty.  
Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, 
should be considered as government tasks. In that context, a distinction should be drawn 
between liquidity and solvency -related tasks of NCBs. While, for purposes of the monetary 
financing prohibition, solvency support is a government task, liquidity -related tasks, the ultimate 
objective of w hich are to finance the economy, are central banking tasks.  
2.2.2. Specific considerations  
Resolution tasks discharged by central banks are considered central banking tasks provided that 
they do not undermine an NCB’s independence in accordance with Articl e 130 of the Treaty  and 
Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB
7. However, the discharge of these tasks by central banks 
may not extend to the financing of resolution funds or other resolution financial arrangements as 
these are government tasks. This is without prejudice to the following: (i) the possibility that 
central banks may provide short -term financing to deposit guarantee schemes under certain 
conditions8 and (ii) the possibility that NCBs may provide emergency liquidity assistance to 
solvent credit i nstitutions.  
An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is therefore the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the 
following should be taken into account.  
                                                 
7  See Opinion CON/2015/22.  All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s  website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
8  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 30.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately 
addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, and does not necessarily 
complement those existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest aris es between existing 
and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation in place to adequately address that conflict. 
Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be interpreted extensively, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. 
Complementarity should also be examined from the point of view of the financing of those tasks.  
Second, it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task i s disproportionate to the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB and may 
negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks.  
Third , it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task does not fit into t he 
institutional set -up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability 
considerations.  
Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial 
financial risks.  
Fifth, it should be assessed whether  the performance of the new task exposes the members of 
the NCB’s decision- making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also 
impact on their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the term of office under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
2.3. Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the 
scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring 
the consistent applicati on of the monetary financing prohibition within the Eurosystem and the 
ESCB.  
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1. Conferral of resolution tasks on Lietuvos bankas  
The draft law designates Lietuvos bankas as the resolution authority, broadening its current 
functions and activities to include placing obliged entities under resolution and tak ing resolution 
measures in respect of such entities.  By virtue of this designation, Lietuvos bankas carries out 
resolution tasks and exercises resolution powers.  
In the light of the guidance set out in paragraph 2. 2, it must be assessed carefully whether 
Lietuvos bankas ’ new tasks and responsibilities in this field could constitute a breach of the 
monetary financing prohibition.  
3.1.1.  New tasks  
Whilst Lietuvos bankas already has a role with r egard to handling distressed financial institutions, 
the draft Law on f inancial sustainability assigns  a new role to Lietuvos bankas and makes specific 
resolution tools  available , such as the bail-in mechanism , which in their proposed form do not 
currently  exist in Lithuanian  law, a nd gives Lietuvos bankas new resolution -related powers. The 
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 draft laws introduce substantial legislative amendments to Lietuvos bankas ’ existing tasks , and 
should therefore be assessed as new tasks in the light of the monetary fi nancing prohibition.  
3.1.2.  Principle of financial independence   
The principle of financial independence requires NCBs to have sufficient means to carry out not 
only their ESCB -related tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but also their 
national  tasks9. In this regard,  the draft law provides for the financing of costs related to Lietuvos 
bankas ’ functions  as a resolution authority from financial market participants’ contributions and 
other Lietuvos bankas funds10. While the ECB understands from the consultat ion request that this 
provision  is only intended to refer to the administrative costs related to the functions of Lietuvos 
bankas as a resolution authority, the wording of the draft law is not limited in this way . Therefore, 
it could be interpreted more widely  to cover the costs related to financing resolution actions. For 
example,  in accordance with Article 43(5) of the draft L aw on f inancial sustainability, Lietuvos 
bankas could  be required to pay the salary and other costs of a special manager  in the event that  
an institution under resolution fails  to pay the special manager on time.  
In order to avoid a wide  interpretation of what is meant by the costs to be financed by the 
financial market participants’ contributions and other Lietuvos bankas  funds , the ECB 
recommends express ly limiting the se contributions to financing Lietuvos bankas’  administrative 
costs as a resolution authority. Any other expenses beyond the scope of administrative costs that  
are related to financing resolution actions can not be financed under any circumstances by 
Lietuvos bankas . The ECB would welcome a clarifying provision to this effect .  
Furthermore, the ECB  understands  that, as a general principle,  all expenses related to the 
fulfilment of the functions of the resoluti on authority by Lietuvos bankas will be fully covered by 
the contributions of financial market participants. T he other funds of Lietuvos bankas will only be 
used to cover  for a limited period any shortfalls  related to expenses  arising during a particular 
year, and Lietuvos bankas will increase the contributions to be paid the following year to  cover 
this indebtedness.   
Finally , the draft Law on financial sustainability requires Lietuvos bankas, acting as a resolution 
authority, to recover any reasonable expenses actually incurred as a result of  resolution action11.  
Against this background,  the new tasks assigned to Lietuvos bankas would not affect the 
resources it currently allocates to the performance of its monetary policy tasks  provided that the 
clarifyin g provision referred to above is introduced.  
3.1.3.  Links to tasks listed in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty  
Administrative resolution tasks are considered tasks related to the tasks referred to in 
Article  127(5) of the Treaty, based on the understand ing that administrative resolution tasks and 
supervisory tasks complement each other, particularly where, as in this case,  an NCB has a 
mandate for the stability of the financial system  and the designated resolution authority already 
                                                 
9  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25.  
10  See Article 4 of the draft law.  
11  Article 42(12) of the draft Law on financial sustainability provides that the resolution authority and the resolution fund 
must seek to recover all reasonable expenses incurred when performing resolution actions in any of the established 
means  
ECB -PUBLIC  
6 carries out certain tasks relating to the supervision of financial markets , including  the supervision 
of credit institutions, payment institutions,  securities and insurance markets .  
3.1.4.  Atypical tasks 
A number of Member States have conferred on their NCBs a significant role in the resolution of 
financial institutions, whether as the resolution authority or as a competent authority in the 
decision -making process for resolution. The ECB has generally welcomed the allocation of such 
tasks to NCBs provided they do not interfere financi ally and operationally with the performance of 
the NCB’s ESCB- related tasks12. The resolution tasks of an NCB can therefore be regarded as 
being tasks not atypical of a central bank, particularly if, as in the case of Lietuvos bankas , it has 
a statutory res ponsibility for maintenance of financial stability  and the reliability of the financial 
system13. 
3.1.5.  Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public 
entities  
Lietuvos bankas is designated as the sole resolutio n authority and takes resolution measures 
acting as an administrative authority in the exercise of public functions in its own name, and not on behalf of any other authority . In line with  Directive 2014/59/EU , Lietuvos bankas is under the 
legal obligation to obtain prior approval f rom the Ministry of Finance before implementing 
decisions that have a direct fiscal impact or systemic implications . There is no indication that in 
discharging its resolution function Lietuvos  bankas  acts exclusively in the interests of the Ministry 
of Finance or another public entity.  
3.1.6.  Extent to which conflicts of interests with existing Lietuvos bankas tasks are addressed 
3.1.6.1.  The ECB has repeatedly noted
14 that, in line with Directive 2014/59/EU15, staff involved in 
carrying out the functions of a resolution authority in accordance with the Directive must be 
structurally separate and subject to separate reporting lines from the staff involved in carrying out 
prudential banking supervision tasks pursuant to the relevant Union legislation16 or with regard to 
the other functions of the relevant authority. The ECB observes that Directive 2014/59/EU  
‘exceptionally’ allows one authority to carry out both resolution and supervisory functions on the condition that adequate structural arrangements are put in place in order to ensure operational 
independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between that authority’s resolution function and its 
other functions.  
                                                 
12  See, e.g., paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2015/25, paragraphs 2.1 and 3.2.4 of Opinion CON/2015/22, 
paragraph 4.1 of Opinion CON/2014/60, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/73, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion 
CON/2011/72, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2011/83, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2011/39, paragraph 2.2.  See 
also in the UK the role of the Bank of England in the Special Resolution Regime under the Banking Act 2009.  
13  Article 8(4) of the Law on Lietuvos bankas . 
14  For example,  see paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2015/2, paragraphs  5.1 and 5 .2 of  Opinion CON/2015/3, and 
paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2014/67.  
15  See the second subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU.  
16  See Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regul ation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 
27.6.2013, p. 1) and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, 
p. 338).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
7 3.1.6.2.  Pursuant to the draft L aw on financial sustainability , Lietuvos bankas is required to ensure the 
operational and organisational independence, including separate reporting lines,  of the unit 
carrying out resolution functions to ensure there is no conflict of interest between the resolution 
tasks and other  tasks assigned by law to Lietuvos bankas17. Furthermore, t he draft L aw on 
financial sustainability requires Lietuvos bankas  to adopt and make public internal rules 
specifying  the separation of these functions , including rules regarding the protection of 
professional secrecy and exchange of inform ation between the different functional areas.  The 
ECB welcomes these provisions, as they appear to adequately address potential conflicts of 
interests between resolution and Lietuvos bankas ’ other tasks and functions. The ECB would 
appreciate being provide d in advance, for information purposes , with the internal rules 
implementing these provisions.  
3.1.7.  Extent to which the performance of tasks is proportionate to Lietuvos bankas  financial and 
operational capacity and its ability to perform its ESCB -related tasks  
As noted above, in order to remain financially independent, NCBs must have sufficient means to 
carry out not only their ESCB -related tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but 
also their national tasks. In this regard,  provided that the necessary amendments clarifying the 
draft law’s intention are introduced, the ECB welcomes the fact that Lietuvos bankas may recover 
administrative expenses incurred in carrying out its resolution tasks from the institutions 
concerned.  
3.1.8.  Extent to which the performance of tasks fits into Lietuvos bankas  institutional set -up in the light 
of central bank independence and accountability considerations  
As noted above, before implementing decisions that have a direct fiscal impact or systemic 
implications , Lietuvos bankas is required to obtain prior approval from  the Ministry of Finance. 
Furthermore, Lietuvos bankas  has a duty to notify, inter alia, the Ministry of Finance when  it 
determines that the conditions for resolution are met and after taking a resolution act ion. The 
ECB considers that the resolution tasks that Lietuvos bankas  is to assume under the draft law will 
involve much closer cooperation with the Ministry of Finance when fiscal funds or systemic 
implications are at stake than for the exercise of its su pervisory or other functions.  
3.1.9.  Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
3.1.9.1.  With regard to the provisions on the liability of Lietuvos bankas , the draft L aw on f inancial 
sustainability does not contain provisions excluding or limiting the liability of Lietuvos bankas as 
resolution authority for any negligent act when applying the resolution tools or exercising 
resolution powers. Instead, t he general liability regime governing Lietuvos bankas applies for any 
damage incurred as  a result of Lietuvos bankas or its staff acting unlawfully in its capacity as  
resolution authority. Lietuvos bankas  will be held liable if the person who has suffered damage 
proves fault on the part of Lietuvos bankas or its staff. This is in marked contr ast to the express 
                                                 
17  See Article 44(2) of the draft Law on f inancial sustainability. See also page 4 of the explanatory memorandum to the 
draft law.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
8 exclusion of liability for publicly -owned resolution vehicles – for example, the bridge institution – 
whos e liability is limited to wilful misconduct and gross negligence18. 
3.1.9.2.  The ECB notes that, under the Lithuanian Civil Code,  the State i s primarily liable for any damage 
caused by an unlawful decision or improper administrative action by a legal entity or person in the 
course of exercising public authority on the State’s behalf19. The carrying out of resolution 
functions clearly constitutes  the exercise of public authority  on the State’s behalf . For this 
purpose the entity or person exercising public authority in this situation is Lietuvos bankas . 
Notwithstanding this provision , the L aw on  Lietuvos bankas  expressly provides that the State 
shall not be liable for the obligations of Lietuvos bankas , and that Lietuvos bankas shall not be 
liable for the State’s obligations20. This would seem to indicate, contrary to the rule established by 
the Civil Code, that Lietuvos bankas would be fully liable in its own right for carrying out  its 
resolution functions. I t is not obvious why Lietuvos bankas should assume the sole burden of 
those potential liabilities when the draft law requires it to obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Finance before impl ementing resolution decisions that have a direct fiscal impact or systemic 
implications.  In this context, the ECB observes that by reason of the monetary financing 
prohibition laid down in the Treaty, national legislation may not require an NCB to finance the 
public sector’s obligations in relation to third parties
21. Given that potential liability issues 
represent substantial financial risks for Lietuvos bankas22, this should be taken into account in 
determining the body that is liable to pay damages to thir d parties and in assessing Lietuvos 
bankas ’ ability to recover its resolution- related expenses. The ECB considers that it would be 
useful to express ly clarify  this point . 
3.1.10.  Conclusion  
The ECB considers that there are grounds for regarding Lietuvos bankas ’ resolution tasks as 
central banking tasks, in the sense that they complement Lietuvos bankas ’ existing supervisory 
functions. The fact that  Lietuvos bankas’  administrative resolution functions  will be financed by 
financial market participants should also impact positively on its financial c apacity to assum e 
those tasks . However, the ECB considers that the draft laws potentially create significant financial 
risks for Lietuvos bankas because they do not limit its liability for negligent acts in its role as resolution authority. Moreover, it is not clear who should pay  damages to third parties in the event 
of Lietuvos bankas or its staff  acting unlawfully . Finally, insofar as Lietuvos bankas would appear 
to be exclusively liable for carrying out  its resolution functions under the Law on Lietuvos bankas,  
there is no obvious reason why Lietuvos bankas should assume the sole burden of those 
potential liabilities when Lietuvos bankas is under the legal obligation to obtain the prior approval 
of the Ministry of Finance  before implementing decisions that have a direct fiscal impact or 
systemic implications.  
                                                 
18  See Article 70 of the draft Law on financial sustainability.  
19  See Article 6.271 of the Civil Code.  
20  See Article 2(4) of the Law on Lietuvos bankas . 
21  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 29.  
22  See paragraph 3.2.9.3 of Opinion CON/2015/22.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
9 3.2. Establishment of bridge institution and asset management vehicles  
With regard to the bridge institution tool and the asset separation tool, the draft Law on financial 
sustainability provides  that the bridge institution or asset management vehicle will be established 
by the resolution authority  or the Government of Lithuania23. Although the State is t he owner of 
such an entity, the resolution authority will in all cases control the entity. In situations where a 
central bank acts as resolution authority, it should be made clear , for the avoidance of doubt,  that 
the central bank will in no circumstances assume or finance any of these entities’ obligations24. A 
central bank’s  role as the founder  of such an entity must remain consistent in all cases  with the 
monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty and supplemented by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/9325. This prohibits any financing by a central bank of the 
public sector’s obligations in relation to third parties. Moreover, this role as founder of such an 
entity must be performed without prejudice to central bank independence, in particular financial 
and institutional independence.  The principle of f inancial independence requires NCBs to have 
sufficient means to carry out not only their ESCB -related tasks from an operational and financial 
point of view, but also their national tasks26. For that reason, it should be ensured that if Lietuvos 
bankas, as r esolution authority, decides to become the  founder of such an entity, it will be  
provided with sufficient financial and human resources to address the associated operational 
burden.  
3.3. No role for Lietuvos bankas to provide liquidity to the Resolution Fund  
The ECB understands, based on the package of draft legislation including the draft law , that 
Lietuvos bankas is not authorised to provide any loan or financing under any circumstances  to 
the Resolution Fund  established under the draft Law on financial sustai nability . The provision of 
such financing to the Resolution Fund would constitute a government task, and any such loan or 
financing by Lietuvos bankas would therefore breach the monetary financing prohibition laid down 
in the Treaty27.  
3.4. Resolution planning  
The draft Law on financial sustainability provides that recovery plans and resolution plans drawn 
up shall not assume any public financial support beyond that granted by the Resolution Fund28. 
However, they shall include, where applicable, a forward- looking  analysis of how and when an 
institution may apply for the use of central bank liquidity in stressed conditions and the collateral 
to be used in those circumstances29. While these provisions appear to be in line with the 
requirements of Directive 2014/59/EU , the ECB emphasises that they do not in any way affect the 
competence of the Eurosystem to decide independently and at its full discretion on the provision 
                                                 
23  See Ar ticles 66(1) and 72 of the draft Law on financial sustainability.  
24  See paragraph 3.4.3 of Opinion CON/2015/25.  
25  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibitions referred to in Article s 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332 , 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
26  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25.  
27  Ibid. 
28  See Articles 5(3) and 13(3) of the draft Law on financial sustainability.  
29  See Articles 5(2)(2) and13(2)(17) of the draft Law on financial sustainability.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
10 of central bank liquidity, based on the existing legal framework and within the limitations imposed 
by the monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty30. 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
  
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 September 2015.  
 [signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
30  See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2012/99, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2014/67 and paragraph 3.4 of Opinion 
CON/2015/22.