EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 24 June 2019  
on the ownership structure of Banca d’Italia and the ownership  of gold reserves  
(CON/ 2019/ 23) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 2 May  2019 the European Centr al Bank (ECB)  received a request from the President of the lower 
chamber of the Italian Parliament ( Camera dei Deputati ) for an opinion on a draft law on the transfer of 
the ownership of the Banca d’Italia to the Ministry for Economy and Finance (hereinafter the ‘draft law  on 
Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure’ ). By the same letter the President of the lower chamber  transmitted 
another draft law concerning an authentic interpretation of A rticle 4 of the Italian Consolidated law on 
foreign exchange on the management of official reserves  (hereinafter the ‘draft law on the ownership of 
gold reserves’ , together with the ‘ draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure’, the ‘draft laws’ ). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is  based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the third indent  of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC1, as the draft laws  relate to Banca d’Italia ’s governance and the basic task to be carried out 
through the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to hold and manage  the official foreign reserves 
of the Member States  pursuant to the third indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty . In accordance with the 
first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 
Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law s 
1.1 The draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure provides that the capital shares  of Banca 
d’Italia currently held by private sector entities shall be purchased by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance  at a nominal value of 1000 lire as set by specified provisions of Italian law  dating from the 
1930s2. The draft law  further provides that , after such transfer , the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance may transfer its shareholding, or part of it,  only to public sector entities. A governmental 
delegated r egulation to be enacted within three months from the entry into force of the draft law  will 
regulate the procedures  for transfer ring the shares . 
1.2 The draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure repeals certain existing provisions  of Italian 
                                                 
1 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2 This nominal price is set by A rticle 20 of the R oyal Decree 375/1936 as converted into law by Law 141/1938.  
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2 legislation  concern ing the ownership and governance of Banca d’Italia3. In particular, the draft law 
repeals , inter alia,  articles  providing that:  (1) the Banca d’Italia, a public -law institution, is the central 
bank of the Italian Republic, is an integral part of the ESCB and is the competent national authority 
in the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) referred to in Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/20 13; (2) the Banca d’Italia is independent in the exercise of its powers and in the 
management of its finances; (3) the Banca d’Italia is authorised to increase its capital through the 
use of statutory reserves  to the sum of €7.500.000.000; (4) Banca d’Italia shareholders may 
receive annual dividends up to an amount not exceeding 6% of the capital; (5) shares in the capital 
of Banca d’Italia may only be held by  banks , insurance and reinsurance companies with registered 
and head offices  in Italy, foundations4, social security and insurance bodies with registered offices 
in Italy,  and pension funds5; (6) each shareholder in Banca d’Italia may not own, directly or 
indirectly, a share of the capital exceeding 3%, and voting rights may not be exercised with respect 
to excess shares , and the relevant dividends are allocated to reserves of the Banca d’Italia; (7) the 
Banca d’Italia may temporarily acquire its own shares  under certain conditions ; (8) the Banca 
d’Italia may demateriali se the shareholdings in its own capital; (9) the Banca d’Italia s hareholders’ 
meeting and board of d irectors shall not interfere in matters pertaining to the exercise of the public 
functions entrusted by the Treaty, the Statut e of the ESCB  and of the ECB , by European law and 
by law to the Banca d’Italia or to the Governor for the pursuit of the Banca d’Italia’s institutional 
purposes; (10) the Banca d’ Italia board of directors is composed of the Governor and 13 directors 
appointed by local shareholders ’ general meetings in the manner prescribed by the Statute of 
Banca d’Italia among candidates designated by a specific internal committee within the board of 
directors ; and (11) the Minister  of Economy and Finance  does  not have the power  (formerly 
provided for under a law dating from 1910) to suspend and annul the resolutions of the Banca 
d’Italia board of directors when the Minister  deems  such resolutions to be contrary to laws, 
regulations and statutes .6 The draft law also repeals a number of technical legal provisions 
ensuring the consistency of the legal framework governing the Banca d’Italia and establishing a 
specific timeframe for the adaptation of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia to relevant provis ions of 
Italian law.7 
1.3 The explanatory note prepared by the proponents of  the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership 
structure states that the draft law is designed to transfer the capital of the Banca d’Italia to 
exclusive public ownership,  also by restoring previous provisions of Italian law8 that were never 
implemented and were subsequently repealed9. The explanatory note states that the Banca d’Italia 
should be a public ly owned  company  par excellence, given that the activities of regulation, 
                                                 
3 Article 2 of the draft law repeals A rticles 4, 5 and 6 of the L aw Decree 133/2013 as convert ed into law with 
modifications by L aw 5/2014 (hereinafter the “ Law Decree 133/2013”) . 
4 As referred to in A rticle 27 of L egislative Decree 153/1999.  
5 As established in accordance with the provisions of A rticle 4.1 of  Legislative Decree 252/2005.  
6 See Article 114 of Royal Decree 204/1910.  
7 Adapting the Statute of the Banca d’Italia to L aw Decree 133/2013.  
8 See Article 19.10 of L aw 262/ 2005.  
9 See Law Decree 133/2013.  
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3 super vision and monetary policy require the central bank to have maximum independence in 
relation to regulated entities.  
1.4 The draft law on the ownership of gold reserves provides an authentic interpretation of Article 4.2 of 
the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 no.148 concerning the management of reserves , 
which provides that Banca d’Italia manages the official reserves within the framework establ ished 
by Article 31 of the Statute  of the ESCB10. In particular, the draft law  provides that this article shal l 
be construed as meaning that the Banca d’Italia manages  the official gold reserves exclusively as a 
depositary, without prejudice to the property of such gold reserves of the Italian State , including 
reserves held abroad.  
1.5 The explanatory note prepared by the proponents of the draft law on the ownership of gold 
reserves notes that Article 127(2) of the Treaty establishes that the tasks to be carried out through 
the ESCB include holding and managing the official foreign reser ves of the Member States, and 
that Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB r efers to the foreign reserve assets remaining with the 
national central banks ( NCB s) after the transfers to the ECB. The explanatory note states that, 
without prejudice to compliance with international obligations deriving from the Treat ies, spelling 
out explicitly that the ownership of the gold reserves remains with the Italian State seems 
necessary  in light of the hybrid nature acquired by Banca d’Italia over time due to several 
legislative interventions. The reference to the hybrid nature of Banca d’Italia seems to refer to the 
Banca d’Italia’s nature as a public law institution predominantly owned by pri vate sector entities.  
 
2. Observations  regarding the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s  ownership structure  
2.1 The ECB recalls that it has issued two opinions on a similar Italian draft legislative proposal11 which 
was subsequently enacted into law in 200512, but which never entered into operation13 and was 
subsequently repealed14. 
Central bank independence  
2.2 The Treaty is silent on the ownership structure of NCBs in the ESCB, which is therefore left to each 
Member State’s autonom ous determination, insofar as this structure fully respects , and poses no 
risks to,  the principle of central bank indepe ndence established in Article 130 of the Treaty and the 
other Treaty provisions governing the ESCB or Eurosystem -related tasks15. 
2.3 The principle of institutional independence referred to in Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of 
the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB (the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) prohibit s the NCBs and 
members of their decision- making bodies , when exercising their  ESCB- related tasks, from seeking 
or taking instructions from EU institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or  
                                                 
10 See A rticle 4.2 of the Italian Presidential Decree 31 March 1988 n o.148 concerning the management of reserves, 
introduced by article 7 of Legislative Decree 43/1998.  
11 See Opinions  CON/2005/34 and CON/2005/58. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB ’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu . 
12 See Law 262/ 2005.  
13 See Article 19.10 of Law 262/2005, mentioned in paragraph 1.3 above.  
14 See Law Decree 133/2013.  
15 See paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2005/34.  
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4 from any other body. In addition,  EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and the governments 
of the Member States are prohibited from seeking to influence those members of the NCBs’ 
decision -making bodies whose decisions may affect the fulfilment of the NCBs’ ESCB- related 
tasks. Whether an NCB is organised as a state- owned body, a special public law body or simply a 
public limited company, there is a risk that influence may be exerted by the owner on its decision-
making in relation to ESCB -related t asks by virtue of such ownership. Such influence, whether 
exercised through shareholders’ rights or otherwise, may affect an NCB’s independence and 
should therefore be limited by law16. This entails the absence both of shareholders’ influence on 
decision -making in these fields and of a conflict of interest17. 
2.4 The draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure18 would repeal Article 5.1 of L aw Decree 
133/2013, which prevents the Banca d’Italia shareholders’ meeting and board of directors from 
interfering in the exercise of the ESCB- related  functions of the Banca d’Italia or its Governor. 
Moreover the draft law would also repeal Article 5.2 of Law Decree 133/2013, according to which 
the Banca d’Italia board of directors is composed of the Governor and 13 directors appointed in the 
manner prescribed by the Statute of Banca d’Italia, among candidates who meet the requirements 
of independence, integrity and professional experience laid down therein and are designated by a 
specific internal committee wit hin the board of directors.  These provision s being repealed are also 
mirrored in the Statute of the Banca d’Italia19. The ECB notes that it is legally unclear whether , as a 
result of the draft law, a previously repealed provision of Italian law20 would be reinstated. 
According to such provision the Ba nca d’Italia board of directors  is prevented from interfering with 
the institutional tasks , which the ECB understands include the ESCB -related tasks,  of the Banca 
d’Italia. In this respect, the ECB notes that even if the first provision is deemed to be reinstated it 
would, however,  not apply to prevent such interference by the shareholders ’ meeting.   
2.5 The principle of institutional independence refers to the decision- making bodies exercising the 
ESCB- related tas ks. In the case of Banca d’Italia, it is the governing board which is responsible for 
the performance of the Banca d’Italia’s ESCB -related tasks21 and therefore qualifies as a decision-
making body within the meaning of Article 130 of the Treaty. In contrast , the Banca d’Italia’s 
shareholders’ meeting and board of directors do not intervene in the performance of ESCB -related 
tasks nor in the decisions concerning those tasks, and they therefore cannot be considered as 
decision -making bodies within the meaning of Article 130 of the Treaty. Based on this internal 
structure of Banca d’Italia, the shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors are prohibited from 
seeking to influence the governing board as the Banca d’Italia’s decision- making body responsible 
for the performance of the Banca d’Italia’s ESCB tasks22. Therefore, t he ECB considers it important 
that Article s 5.1 and 5.2 of Law Decree 133/2013 are not repealed.  
                                                 
16 See ECB Convergence Report (May 2018), p. 21.  
17 See paragraph 9 of Opinion CON/2005/34.  
18 Article 2 of the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure.  
19 See Articles 6.2 and 19.2 of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia.  
20 See Article 5.1 of L egislative Decree of the Temporary Head of Italian State 691/1947, which was repealed by L aw 
Decree 133/2013.  
21 See Article 22 of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia.  
22 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/12.  
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5 2.6 The draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure would also repeal  a provision that the Minister 
of Economy and Finance does not have the power (formerly provided for under a law dating from 
1910) to suspend and annul the resolutions of the Banca d’Italia board of directors when the 
Minister deems such resolutions to be contrary to laws, regulations and statutes23. The ECB 
requests that the repeal of this provision be clarified.  As a general observation, the ECB calls on 
the Italian authorities to carefully consider the possible unintended direct or indirect effect s of the 
draft law on Banc a d’Italia’s ownership structure on the independence of the Banca d’Italia, as 
established in Article 130 of the Treaty . 
2.7 The draft law would also repeal Article 4.1 of Law Decree 133/2013, according to which the Banca 
d’Italia is independent in the management of its finances. The ECB understands that the repeal of 
this provision was unintended, having regard to the relevance of financial independence as part of 
the principle of central bank independence under Article 130 of the Treaty. It is therefor e 
recommended that Article 4.1 be reinstated.  
Legal uncertainties  
2.8 The ECB highlights a number of legal uncertainties which stem from the draft law as a result  of the 
repeal of existing provisions of Italian law affecting the Banca d’Italia and the unclear interaction 
between the draft law and the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, as further elaborated in paragraphs  
2.10-2.13 below . 
2.9 The ECB understands that a number of the existing provisions of Italian law that are repealed by 
the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s  ownership structure are mirrored in other provisions of Italian 
legislation , and that these corresponding provisions in other provisions of Italian law  continue to 
apply and are not affected by the draft law . This is the case, for example, with respect to the 
repealed articles providing that (1) the Banca d’Italia, a public -law institution, is the central bank of 
the Italian Republic  and is an integral part of the ESCB; and (2) the Banca d’Italia is independent in 
the exercise of its powers24.  
2.10 As noted in paragraph 2.7 above, t he draft law would also repeal Article 4.1 of Law Decree 
133/2013, according to which the Banca d’Italia is the national competent authority in the SSM. The 
ECB understands that the repeal of this provision was unintended, in the absence of any proposal 
of reform of the national supervisory authorities25. For the sake of legal certainty, it is suggested 
that Article 4.1 be reinstated.  
2.11 A number  of existing provisions of Italian law that are repealed by the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s  
ownership structure are mirrored in the Statute of the Banca d’Italia. Some of the corresponding 
provisions in the Statute of the Banca d’Italia are directly and potentially conflicting with the 
provisions of the draft law. In particular, the Statute of t he Banca d’Italia provides, inter alia, that  (1) 
shares may only be held by banks, insurance and reinsurance companies with registered and head 
                                                 
23 See Article 114 of Royal Decree 204/1910.  
24 See Article 19 of L aw 262/2005 and Article 2 of L egislative Decree 43/1998.  
25  The role of the Banca d’Italia as national supervisory authority in the SSM is also presupposed by the relevant 
provisions of the Italian Banking Law, the Legislative Decree 1 September 1993, n. 385 (see Articles 6, paragraph 3, 
and 6- bis). 
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6 offices in Italy, foundations social security and insurance bodies with registered offices in Italy, and 
pension funds26; (2) no shareholder may hold, directly or indirectly, a share of the capital exceeding 
3%, and voting rights may not be exercised with respect to excess shares27; and ( 3) the Banca 
d’Italia may temporarily acquire its own shares under certain conditions28. However, it would seem 
that the pro visions of the draft law relating to the purchase by the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
of the capital shares of Banca d’Italia currently held by private sector entities and providing that, 
after such transf er, the Ministry may transfer its shareholding, or part of it, only to public sector 
entities, would directly conflict with the provision of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia under point (1) 
above, and would potentially also contradict the provisions of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia under 
points ( 2) and (3) above. The draft law is silent on the possible criteria to solve this conflict, which 
should be contemplated in the draft law. The Italian authorities are invited to address these direct 
and potential conflicts for the sake of legal certainty, in order to prevent negative impacts on the 
smooth functioning of the Banca d’Italia.  
2.12 Since certain existing provisions of Italian law that are repealed by the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s 
ownership structure s et out general criteria to be mirrored in a more extensive manner in the 
Statute of the Banca d’Italia, it would seem that the relevant provisions of the Statute of the Banca 
d’Italia would continue to apply. For example, the Statute of the Banca d’Italia provides, inter alia, 
that the net profit of Banca d’Italia shall be distributed to the ordinary reserves, up to a maximum of 
20% of net profit, and after that to shareholders up to a maximum of 6% of the capital , and that  the 
ordinary reserve, if reduced to offset losses, must be reconstituted entirely before proceeding to 
any profit distributions. The ECB understands that this particular provision of the Statute of the 
Banca d’Italia is not affected by the draft law.  On a general note, the Statute of the Banca d’Italia 
needs to contain provisions to ensure that irrespective of discretionary decisions of the board of 
directors and of the shareholders’ meeting, a sufficient amount of ordinary reserves and, if needed, 
extraordinary reserves, can be constituted to ensure that the Banca d’Italia has the financial means 
to perform its statutory tasks29. In the same vein, it is understood that Article 39 paragraph 2 of the 
Statute on provisions for general risks would continue to apply notwithstanding the draft law 
repeals Article 6.5 lett. a) of Law Decree 133/2013 which requires the Statute to adopt financial 
buffers adequate to the riskiness consistent with the ESCB guidelines.  
2.13 It would need to be clarified whether certain existing provisions of Italian law that are repealed by 
the draft law on Banca d’I talia’s ownership structure, but which are mirrored in the Statute of the 
Banca d’Italia,  would continue to apply. In particular, the Statute of the Banca d’Italia provides,  inter 
alia, that the capital of the Banca d’Italia shall be €7.500.000.000 and shall be divided into 300,000 
registered shares the nominal value of which shall be €25.000 each30, and that the shares of 
Banca d’Italia shall be dematerialised and entered int o the central depository system provided for 
by Legislative Decree 58/1998. In this respect, the ECB understands that the Banca d’Italia’s 
                                                 
26 Article 3(3) of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, reflecting Article 4.4 of L aw Decree 133/2013.  
27 Article 3(4) of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, reflecting Article 4.5 of L aw Decree 133/2013.  
28 Article 3(6) of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia, reflecting Article 4.6 of L aw Decree 133/2013.  
29 See paragraph 10 of Opinion CON/2005/34.  
30 Article 3(1) of the Statute of the Banca d’Italia.  
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7 capital has already been called up . The draft law would also repeal Article 6 of Law Decree 
133/2013 that reordered and repealed,  for the sake of clarity , a number of provisions of Italian 
legislation dealing with the ownership structure and governance of the Banca d’Italia. It is legally 
unclear whether the repeal of Article 6 would reinstate all the formerly repealed provisions, to the 
extent not expressly incompatible with the draft law.  The Italian authorities are invited to address 
these uncertainties.  
2.14 At present the governmental delegated regulation mentioned in the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s 
ownership structure  would only deal with the modalities for the transfer of the shareholdings in the 
capital of the Banca d’Italia. No provision is envisaged to be enacted in relation to the compatibility 
between the current governance of the Banca d’Italia and the proposed changes in its ownership 
structure.  Finally, by way of general observation, former Italian laws dealing with the ownership and 
the governance of the Banca d’Italia contained provisions to ensure, for legal certainty purposes,  
that the Statute of the Banca d’Italia was adapted to the new provisions in accordance with a 
defined timeline. The draft law contains no rule in this respect, which constitutes an element of 
legal uncertainty that could be usefully  address ed in the draft  law. 
Further consultation of the ECB  
2.15 The ECB expects to be consulted pursuant to Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on any 
further draft legislative, regulatory or statutory amendments to the Banca d’Italia’s ownership and 
governance structure, incl uding, but not limited to, the governmental delegated regulation provided 
for in the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure as well as any amendment of the 
governance structure and the Statute of Banca d’Italia that might result from the change in the 
ownership structure.  
Impact on ECB supervised credit institutions ; right to property  
2.16 From a financial perspective, t he ECB understands that, under the draft law on Banca d’Italia’s  
ownership structure, each share of Banca d’Italia currently held by private sector entities would be 
purchased by the Ministry of Economy and Finance at a nominal value of 1000 lire, equal to 51.64 
euro cents31, in lieu of the nominal value of €25.000 spec ified under the Statute of the Banca 
d’Italia.  As a result, c redit institutions may be affected to different degrees  to the extent that they 
own shares of Banca d’Italia for a nominal  amount equal to the nominal value currently indicated in 
the Statute of the Banca d’Italia. Therefore, the implementation of the draft law is expected to have 
a negative impact on the  capitalisation of the Italian banking sector , which, in principle, may 
deserve some attention.  
2.17 It is for the Italian authorities to assess whether the draft law complies with Italian legal and 
constitutional principles32. However, the ECB notes that the abovementioned purchase price of the 
shares of Banca d’Italia may deserve attention by the Italian authorities from the point of view of the 
right to property.  
                                                 
31   See Council Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 of 31 December 1998 on the conversion rates between the euro and the 
currencies of the Member States adopting the euro ( OJ L 359,  31.12.1998, p.1) . 
32 See, e.g., paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2015/32.  
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8  
3. Observations regarding draft law on  the ownership of gold reserves  
3.1 The ques tion of the legal ownership and the competences of the ESCB with regard to the gold 
reserves of Member States ultimately relate to the competences of the ESCB  under the Treaty . 
The basic points of reference are Articles  127(2) and 130 of the Treaty . Article 127(2) of the Treaty, 
which is contained in Chapter 2 (Monetary Policy) of Title VIII of the Treaty, sets out the basic tasks 
to be carried out through the ESCB. In this respect, it is noted that under Article 3(1)(c) of the 
Treaty, the Union has exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Member States 
whose currency is the euro. Article 127(2), third indent, of the Treaty provides , in partic ular, that 
one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is to hold and manage the official foreign 
reserves of the Member States . Article 130 of the Treaty  guarantees the independence of the 
NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia,  and the EC B in p erforming their ESCB  tasks.  
3.2 The Treaty does not determine ESCB and ECB competences with respect to official reserves by 
using the concept of ownership. Rather, the Treaty  only deals with the dimension of exclusive 
holding and management of the reserves . 
3.3 On the basis of Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB, operations in foreign reserve assets 
remaining with the NCBs , including the Banca d’Italia,  after the transfers to the ECB referred to in 
Article 3033, and Member States’ transactions with their foreign exchange working balances , are, 
above a certain limit established within the framework of guidelines issued by the ECB with a view 
to facilitating such operations, subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with 
the exchange rate and monetary policies  of the Union.  
3.4 In accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty, when carrying out the task of holding and managing 
gold reserves , neither the ECB, nor an  NCB, including the Banca d’Italia, nor any member of their 
decision -making bodies , shall seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any government of a 
Member State. The governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not 
to seek to influence the members of the decision- making bodies of the ECB or the NCBs, inc luding 
the Banca d’Italia,  in the performance of their tasks . 
3.5 In view of these  provisions, the ESCB task of holding and managing foreign reserves includes all 
actions necessary for its effective performance of the Eurosystem’s mandate. For instance, for 
reserve assets to accomplish their function in foreign reserve management  operations, the aspect 
of full effective control by the central bank is essential. This implies the  ability of NCBs to take 
                                                 
33    Article 30 requires all NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, to transfer a defined amount of foreign reserves, including 
gold, to the ECB, in proportion to their share in the capital of the ECB. For the purpose of regulating the transfer of 
foreign reserve assets by N CBs to the ECB pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB adopted 
Guideline ECB/2000/15, which included gold among the foreign reserves which had to be transferred by the NCBs, 
including the Banca d’Italia, to the ECB upon the start of Stage 3 of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and 
subsequently upon joining the euro. The ECB may effect further calls of foreign reserve assets, including gold, from 
the NCBs, including the Banca d’Italia, in case of need for such foreign reserve assets. See G uideline of the 
European Central Bank of 3 November 1998 as amended by the Guideline of 16 November 2000 on the 
composition, valuation and modalities for the initial transfer of foreign- reserve assets, and the denomination and 
remuneration of equivalent claims (ECB/2000/15)  (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 114) ; Article 30.4 of the Statute of the 
ESCB; and Articles 1 and 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1010/2000 of 8 May 2000 concerning further calls of 
foreign reserve assets by the European Central Bank ( OJ L 283, 31.10.2003, p. 81) .  
ECB -PUBLIC  
9 decisions, in complete autonomy, relating to the holding, retention, disposal, negotiation and daily, 
as well as long- term, management of the foreign reserves.  
3.6 In this regard, it must be noted that t he reference in the draft law to the Banca d’Italia acting 
“exclusively” as a depositary could be read as  limiting  (or even excluding) Banca d’Italia’s  power to 
independently take decisions related to holding and managing the official reserves that are 
necessary to accomplish its tasks under the Treaties. Such restriction would be incompatible with 
Articles 127(2) and 130 of the Treaty , as explained above. The ECB would, therefore, suggest 
deleting the reference in the draft law to the Banca d’Italia holding and managing the gold reserves 
in terms of an ‘exclusive title of deposit ’. In addition, consistent with the expl anatory note 
accompanying the draft law, an explicit reference in the draft law to the provisions of Articles 127(2) 
and 130 of the Treaty  and, additionally , to Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB may be useful: it 
will clarify further the scope of the law, even if these Treaty provisions apply in any case. The 
independent  holding and manag emen t of the official foreign reserves (including gold reserves ) also 
specifically means that the official foreign reserves (including the gold reserves) must be  recorded 
on the balance sheets of the NCB s or of the ECB . A transfer of the foreign reserves (including gold 
reserves ) off the balance sheet of Banca d’Italia to the State would circumvent  the prohibition of 
monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits central bank financing of the 
public sector  and would be also against the principle of financial i ndependence under Article 130 of 
the Treaty .  
3.7 Consistent ly with the principle of financial independence under Article 130 of the Treaty, any 
income accruing to the Banca d’Italia as a result of the management of such official foreign 
reserves can only be distributed to shareholders through the normal process for the distribution of 
profits as set out in the relevant legislative and statutory provisions , and after a sufficient amount of 
reserves has been constituted to ensure that Banca d’Italia has the fin ancial means to 
independently perform its tasks.  
3.8 The ECB notes that if the Italian authorities consider it necessary to clarify the interpretation of the 
existing legislation as to the legal ownership of gold reserves, then Banca d’Italia shall be consulted 
in order to ensure that the Treaty requirements and in particular the independence of Banca d’Italia 
established in Article 130 of the Treaty will continue to be fully respected.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 24 June 2019.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI