I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

EU competition policy as a lever of the Single Market: the EU´s main engine for growth

The key aim of EU competition policy is to protect competition so that markets work better for consumers and businesses. In this regard, EU competition policy supports the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In particular, EU competition policy forms is an essential part of and a complement to the EU's key asset: its Single Market, which encompasses over half a billion consumers and some 20 million businesses. Tapping the full potential of the Single Market is therefore essential for the EU to recover from the economic and financial crisis and to launch a new period of growth. During the past year, EU competition policy has made significant contributions in terms of protecting, strengthening and developing the Single Market. Crucially, the enforcement of EU competition policy was not relaxed as a result of the crisis, since that would have been directly harmful to the Single Market and the process of economic recovery.

State aid

The economic and financial crisis entailed greater State involvement in the economy, placing burdens on Member States' budgets with increasingly uneven spending capacities. At the same time, such State aid involvement – given its sheer size - created considerable risks of distortions for the Single Market.

The latest figures on the scale of crisis and non-crisis State aid

The European Commission's 2012 State Aid Scoreboard revealed that the volume of national support to the financial sector actually taken by banks between October 2008 and 31 December 2011 amounted to around EUR 1.6 trillion (13% of EU GDP). The bulk (67%) of that support came in the form of State guarantees on banks' wholesale funding.

Support to the real economy on the basis of temporary crisis rules dropped to EUR 4.8 billion in 2011, a fall of more than 50% compared to 2010, reflecting both a lower uptake by companies and the budgetary constraints of most EU Member States.

Total non-crisis aid decreased and stood at EUR 64.3 billion in 2011, or 0.5% of EU GDP, and continued to re-focus on less distortive horizontal objectives, such as aid for research and innovation, protection of the environment and providing risk capital to SMEs.

The contribution of State aid policy has been crucial throughout the crisis in preserving the integrity of the Single Market. Beyond that, State aid policy can play an important contribution to overcoming the crisis by supporting the Europe 2020 Strategy, for example by favouring a better and more effective use of scarce public resources. In other words, EU State aid policy should facilitate the treatment of aid which is well-designed, targeted at identified market failures and objectives of common interest, and least distortive ("good aid"), while dissuading aid which does not provide real incentives for companies, crowds out private investment, and keeps inefficient and non-viable companies on life support ("bad aid") and harms the Single Market.

1. State Aid Modernisation: an overhaul of the State aid rules to strengthen the Single Market and support growth in a context of scarce public resources

On 8 May 2012 the Commission launched an ambitious State Aid Modernisation programme ("SAM")[1]. SAM aims at orienting scarce public funds towards growth, turning State aid policy into a smart and inexpensive tool to help Member States "achieve more with less".

SAM allows Member States to increase their own level of commitment accordingly. Three key components of the overall objective of SAM – promoting growth in a context of severe budgetary constraints – are outlined below.

Making the Single Market stronger, more dynamic and more competitive to support growth

SAM proposes a framework for assessing whether State aid is compatible with the Single Market which has been tailored to promote efficient and well-designed aid addressing real market failures, directing scarce public resources to common priorities ("good aid"). Priority will be given to, for example, aid for research and development, aid facilitating access to finance for SMEs, aid providing the right incentives for the development of the digital economy, aid that protects the environment, as well as aid that attracts investment to weaker regions.

The review of those rules to ensure compatibility with the Single Market in the context of SAM is based on a coordinated approach rooted in common principles, so as to ensure consistency across the different guidelines and block exemptions.

First of all, in light of the opportunity costs of State aid in terms of the costs of taxation and the potential distortions it can bring about, State aid should be granted only where it adds real value. This is the case when aid is directed towards activities that the market does not adequately support[2]; when aid has an incentive effect and when aid is an appropriate instrument to tackle a market failure or an equity objective compared to other available instruments. Finally, State aid should also be efficient, i.e. reach the desired market outcome at the least cost.

At the same time, SAM envisages that the Commission should step up its analysis of potential negative effects of aid measures. Such negative effects include windfall profits, the crowding out of private investment, public spending when similar projects are undertaken without aid, as well as keeping inefficient and non-viable companies on the market. Taxpayers, companies and public authorities would also benefit from more transparency on expenditures and aid beneficiaries.

The operational aim of SAM is to translate those essential building blocks into revised State aid guidelines, thereby further aligning those guidelines with the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. This past year progress was made, in particular, on the review of the guidelines for regional aid, research & development & innovation aid, environmental aid as well as aid to risk capital. State aid under those instruments accounts for more than two-thirds of all aid granted in the EU.

The Broadband Guidelines: A concrete example of the philosophy underlying SAM

This past year the Commission adopted new Broadband Guidelines, a set of rules which illustrate concretely the philosophy underlying SAM. The new Guidelines were designed to support pro-competitive investments with public funds in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy in general and the Europe 2020 Digital Agenda flagship initiative in particular; for example, through the creation of the additional category of 'ultra-fast networks' in line with the Digital Agenda targets. The Guidelines will also lay down revised conditions so as to foster investments in rural areas and to ease administrative burdens on smaller projects. Under the Guidelines, aid will always be directed to areas of genuine 'market failure' (i.e. where operators do not invest on commercial terms), verified by detailed mapping and public consultation. The aid beneficiary shall always be selected through a competitive tender procedure, so as to ensure that aid is kept to a minimum and that no technology or company receives an undue advantage. The 'open access' required from the beneficiary company ensures competition in the subsidised area to create optimal conditions for better and cheaper broadband services for consumers. All relevant acts and pertinent information about the aid awarded under aid schemes shall be easily accessible on the Internet by the Member States, economic operators, the interested public and the Commission. Finally, an evaluation may be required for aid schemes with large aid budgets, containing novel characteristics or when significant market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen.

Focusing on cases with the biggest impact on the Single Market

The SAM policy objective here is two-fold: to reduce to the minimum the administrative burdens related to smaller amounts of aid or aid with a limited impact on competition and trade in the Single Market, and to focus on aid which does not provide real incentives for companies, crowds out private investment and keeps inefficient and non-viable companies on life support ('bad aid'). The reduction of administrative burdens should go hand in hand with an increased responsibility of the Member States and with increased transparency and effective evaluation at both national and EU level. The exclusive competence of assessing the compatibility of State aid measures will, as set out in the Treaty, remain with the Commission.

In pursuit of that objective, the Commission adopted a draft Enabling Regulation[3] and will subsequently adopt a revised General Block Exemption Regulation with the aim of cutting red tape for small and routine cases. The proposal for a new Enabling Regulation provides for the following new categories of aid to be exempted: aid for innovation, aid for culture and heritage conservation, aid to compensate damages caused by natural disasters, aid to forestry as well as certain types of aid for transport and for broadband infrastructure.

Streamlined and clearer rules and faster decisions

The SAM Communication emphasises the need to clarify and simplify the existing complex legal framework. That challenge will be addressed by providing a better explanation of State aid concepts and a consolidation of horizontal and substantive rules. A key part of the SAM package involves clarifying and better explaining the notion of State aid. The Commission sees a substantial value added for Member States and aid granting authorities by providing guidance on the notion of aid, including the key concepts of "advantage" and "selectivity".

The Commission also proposes measures to make its procedures more efficient. On 5 December 2012 the Commission adopted a draft of the new Procedural Regulation[4] which would allow the Commission to handle complaints in a manner that is more consistent with its priorities and would ensure that the Commission obtains complete and correct information from the market (market information tools and sector inquiries).

Moreover, the objective to strengthen the Single Market and promote growth can only be achieved if the Commission has the ability to prioritise its work. This efficiency objective will be achieved by introducing filters to improve the quality of the information received from the complainants (e.g. mandatory complaints form) and by making the evaluation of the admissibility of a complaint subject to the existence of an interest to act. Furthermore, under SAM, a complaint will be considered withdrawn where the complainant does not provide meaningful information or fails to cooperate.

Another essential feature of the procedural reform is the power to collect the appropriate information on a case within business-relevant deadlines, which will be achieved by empowering the Commission to obtain faster and more reliable information from market participants if the information at its disposal is not sufficient following the formal investigation procedure. The possibility of conducting sector inquiries to reinforce horizontal information will also allow the Commission to focus on the most distortive cases.

Finally, the role of the national courts shall be reinforced: first, by empowering those courts to obtain information from the Commission for the purpose of applying Article 107(1) and 108 TFEU and to ask the Commission for an opinion; and, second, by empowering the Commission to make oral or written submissions to national courts in the Union public interest (amicus curiae).

2. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts Monitoring existing State aid to ensure a level playing field in the Single Market

Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved significantly. Today, more than 87% of aid granted to industry and services is not individually examined by the Commission, but is granted on the basis of previously approved aid schemes or under block exemption. DG Competition monitors the way in which Member States apply existing aid schemes.

To further improve the effectiveness of that control which is relevant to the proper functioning of the Single Market, DG Competition decided, in 2011, to significantly enlarge the scope of the monitoring exercise. Although the investigation of a number of cases is still on-going, there seems to be an overall an increase in the number of problematic cases. More than one third of the cases monitored in 2011/2012 raise problems of varying types and gravity (non-notified modification of schemes, individual aids exceeding the maximum thresholds, compatibility conditions not properly reflected in the national legal basis etc.). Keeping in mind the limited number of cases monitored thus far (compared to the great number of existing aid schemes), the compliance rate seems to vary across Member States and across different types of aid. The Commission will systematically follow-up all irregularities. At the same time, Member States must step-up their efforts to better comply with the State aid rules.

Restoring competition in the Single Market through recovery of State aid granted in contravention of the rules

To ensure the integrity of the Single Market, the Commission possesses the power to require the granting Member State to recover unlawful aid which has been declared incompatible. In 2012, further progress was made to ensure that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately.

Much faster recovery of illegal aid

The most recent figures also show that Member States are also recovering illegal aid much faster, with 75% (around EUR 11.7 billion since December 2004) recovered at the end of December 2012 thanks to the Commission's action and probably facilitated by the pressure to consolidate public finances. This means that the percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered was down to 25% by end-December 2012 having stood at 75% at the end of 2004.

By 31 December 2012, the Commission had adopted twelve decisions ordering the recovery of incompatible aid, thereby ensuring the recovery of over EUR 2.4 billion granted by the Member States. As of the end of December 2012, the Commission had 49 pending active recovery cases pending[5] (compared to 94 cases at the end of 2004).

Recovery decisions adopted in 2012 || 12

Amount recovered in 2012 (in EUR billion) || EUR 2.4 billion

Active recovery cases pending on 31 December 2012 || 49

A concrete example of aid that is incompatible with the State aid rules and which the Commission decided during the past year that should be recovered is the aid granted by Belgium to BPost, as a public service compensation. That compensation exceeded the costs related to the delivery of newspapers and magazines for the period 2006-2010. On 23 January 2012, the Commission ordered Belgium to recover the incompatible aid. The Belgian authorities diligently fulfilled their obligation by the end of May 2012.

As the guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including the launching of infringement procedures. In the first half of 2012, the Court of Justice condemned two Member States pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU (Italy and Greece) and one Member State pursuant to Article 260 TFEU (Spain) for failure to recover illegal State aid.

Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules on the ground

As a follow-up to the 2009 Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts, advocacy efforts by the Commission were intensified. In 2012 the Commission was actively involved in financing training programmes for national judges following an annual call for projects and also sent trainers to teach at such workshops and conferences. In February 2012, a dedicated one-day workshop, covering both antitrust and State aid issues relevant for national courts, was organised by the Commission in cooperation with the Association of European Competition Law Judges.

3. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in the State aid area

In a number of significant judgments, the EU courts clarified certain aspects of key State aid concepts, such as the notion of aid, the private market economy investor principle and the relationship between State aid and infrastructure.

In Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG et al. v Commission (also referred to as the Leipzig Halle airport case), the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 19 December 2012, dismissed an appeal brought by Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig‑Halle GmbH (‘FLH’) against the Leipzig-Halle judgment the General Court[6]. The main issue at stake in the appeal was whether the General Court had erred in law by qualifying the financing of the construction of a new runway for the airport as an economic activity. The Court of Justice fully confirmed the General Court's judgment, finding that the General Court had not erred in law in holding that the Commission had correctly considered the construction of the new southern runway by FLH to constitute an economic activity and that, consequently, the capital contributions, apart to the amount to be deducted in respect of expenses linked to the performance of public duties[7], constituted State aid for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Court of Justice held that the General Court had correctly established that the construction of the runway could not be dissociated from the operation of the airport infrastructure, which constituted an economic activity. It had also correctly found that the construction of the runway was not linked to the exercise of State authority.

In its judgment of 5 June 2012 in Case C-124/10P, Commission v EDF, the Court of Justice dismissed the Commission’s appeal against the EDF judgment of General Court[8], thus confirming the annulment by the General Court of a Commission decision of 2003 on State aid granted by France to EDF. The judgment is important for the interpretation of the market economy investor principle (MEIP). The issue before the Court was whether, in a situation where a Member State is both a fiscal creditor of a public undertaking and its sole shareholder, that State aid can rely on the MEIP where it makes a capital injection in that undertaking by waiving a tax claim, or whether the MEIP is inapplicable (as the Commission had considered in its decision) in view of the fiscal nature of the claim. The Court ruled that the role of the State as shareholder must be distinguished from its role as public authority and the applicability of the MEIP depends on whether the Member State conferred the fiscal advantage on the undertaking in its capacity as shareholder and not in its capacity as a public authority. The Court then clarified that, for a Member State to demonstrate that it acted in its capacity as a shareholder, it must provide objective and verifiable evidence showing clearly that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage, it took the decision to make the investment concerned. Finally, the Court clarified that the MEIP test is not an exception which applies only if a Member State so requests.

On 28 February 2012, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-268/08, Land Burgenland et al v. Commission, concerning a Commission decision in the field of State aid in connection with the privatisation of Bank Burgenland by the Province of Burgenland through a tender procedure. In the final phase of the tender two bids were submitted, one by the Austrian company GRAWE (EUR 100.3 million) and a much higher bid by a Ukrainian Consortium (EUR 155 million). The tender was awarded to GRAWE. The Commission found that the sale constituted State aid for GRAWE because, by not accepting the highest bid, the Province of Burgenland did not behave like a private seller operating in a market economy. In its judgment, the General Court dismissed the actions brought by the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and the purchaser of the bank. The Court confirmed that in the case of a sale of an undertaking by a public authority the market price corresponds to the highest price that a private investor operating in normal competitive conditions would be prepared to pay. When the public authority makes use of an open, transparent and unconditional tender procedure, it can therefore be presumed that the market price corresponds to the highest offer, provided that it is established, firstly, that that offer is binding and credible and, secondly, that the taking into account of economic factors other than the price is not justified, such as the off balance-sheet risks existing between the offers. Therefore, the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the aid element can be assessed from the market price, which itself depends on the offers actually made within the context of the call for tenders.

In Case T-154/10 France v Commission, the General Court, in its judgment of the General Court of 20 September 2012, upheld a Commission decision from 2010 finding that La Poste's status as an EPIC (Établissement Public à caractère Industriel et Commercial) resulted in an advantage to the undertaking in the form of an implicit unlimited guarantee. The Court confirmed the Commission's finding that French law, in general, did not preclude the possibility for the State to grant an implied guarantee to EPICs. The existence of an unlimited State guarantee in favour of EPICs could, in the Court´s view, be derived from the fact that insolvency and bankruptcy procedures under ordinary law do not apply to EPICs. The law applicable to EPIC placed creditors in a more favourable situation as their claims are not cancelled but at the most postponed. Also, the Court found that the Commission was correct in concluding that State liability could be incurred for the debts of an EPIC where a creditor of an EPIC was not able to recover its claim from the undertaking which amounts to an automatic guarantee mechanism. Finally, the principle of continuity of public service requires that the rights and obligations attached to the public service are transferred to the State in the event of a wound-up EPIC which triggers State liability. With regard to the question of whether that unlimited guarantee resulted in an advantage for La Poste, the Court confirmed the Commission's finding that the grant of a guarantee on non-market terms is, as a rule, liable to confer an advantage on the recipient. The Commission was allowed to refer to the findings of rating agencies to establish that La Poste enjoyed more favourable terms of credit and, therefore, a financial advantage.

Antitrust & Cartels

1. Moving towards a formal proposal on private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules

In 2012, the Commission continued preparatory work on a legislative proposal on antitrust damages actions[9]. As stated in the Commission Work Programme 2012 (Annex I, item 7), the objective of this legislative initiative would be to ensure effective damages actions before national courts for breaches of EU antitrust rules and to clarify the relationship between such private actions and public enforcement by the Commission and the national competition authorities, notably as regards the protection of leniency programmes, in order to preserve the central role of public enforcement in the EU[10]. In February 2012, the European Parliament welcomed the initiative and underlined the need for action at European level[11]. Insofar as collective redress is concerned, the European Parliament requested that any Union initiative should be of a horizontal nature, not limited to specific sectors of Union law. However, the Parliament acknowledged the specificity of competition law enforcement and therefore considered that specific rules could be laid down in separate articles or chapters of the horizontal instrument itself or in separate legal instruments in parallel or subsequent to the adoption of the horizontal instrument[12].

On 6 December, Vice President Almunia declared his intention to submit to the College a legislative proposal on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. He stated that such a proposal, once adopted, would give more legal certainty on a number of issues that lie at the crossroads between the public and private enforcement of EU competition law, in particular regarding access to evidence relating to leniency requests. Also, the Vice President took due note of the European Parliament's call for a European initiative on collective redress to ensure appropriate access to justice for all. He declared his willingness to continue to work towards a coherent European policy on collective redress, while drawing attention of the Parliament to the specificities of competition law.

2. Further refining the leniency regime: a core enforcement tool in the fight against secret cartels

Leniency programmes constitute a key driver for the detection of cartels. The European Competition Network (ECN) recently strengthened the Model Leniency Programme (“MLP” around which the ECN competition authorities align their own leniency procedures. Under the refined MLP, agreed in November by the Heads of the competition authorities within the ECN, all leniency applicants applying to the European Commission in cases concerning more than three Member States will now be able to submit a summary application to national competition authorities while in the past only the immunity applicant could do so. Also, the ECN agreed on a standard template for summary applications, which companies will be able to use in all Member States. A number of clarifications are introduced in the MLP, notably in relation to the conditions which applicants must meet in order to qualify for leniency, including on the duty to cooperate. The revised text also clarified that written leniency statements should benefit from the same level of protection against disclosure by the competition authorities as oral statements. Furthermore, the ECN underlined the importance of the leniency programmes in a Resolution endorsed on 23 May, in which the competition authorities took the joint position that leniency materials should be protected against disclosure to the extent necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the leniency programmes[13]. The legislative proposal on antitrust damages actions mentioned above will seek to ensure the effectiveness of the leniency system.

Settlements: an additional tool for the cost-effective resolution of antitrust proceedings

Settlement continues to be a key tool, entailing significant procedural benefits. The fact that the number of settlement decisions decreased in 2012 as compared to 2011 should not be interpreted as a trend, in view of the number of cases where the settlement route is pursued or considered. The Commission's policy is to use this efficiency-enhancing instrument in the future if a case is suitable for settlement in order to free more quickly additional resources to fight other cases including via ex officio proceedings. In 2012, the Commission adopted one such decision, fining producers of water management products EUR 13 million in sixth cartel settlements (Cases COMP/39611 Water Management Products, press release of 27 June 2012).

3. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in the area of antitrust

In MasterCard[14] the General Court dismissed an action brought by MasterCard against a Commission decision of 2007 prohibiting MasterCard's cross-border inter-bank fees. The judgment is important because it confirms the Commission's finding that these fees restrict competition as they inflate the cost of card acceptance by merchants without leading to benefits for consumers. The judgment also confirms that banks, in the framework of a card payment scheme, cannot restrict competition by agreeing on certain charges to the detriment of consumers.

MasterCard's business model includes a mechanism through which banks indirectly determine a minimum price that merchants must pay for accepting the organisation's payment cards. This mechanism comprises a complex network of multilaterally agreed inter-bank fees which industry refers to as "multilateral interchange fees" or MIFs.

In December 2007, the Commission prohibited MasterCard's collectively agreed multilateral interchange fees because they inflate the base on which acquiring banks charge prices to merchants, as the interchange fees account for a large part of the final price merchants pay for accepting MasterCard's payment cards. This restriction of price competition in the form of a decision of an association of undertakings was found to harm businesses and their customers, in breach of Article 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TFEU) that prohibits anticompetitive business practices. There was also no evidence that such fees generated benefits that were passed on to consumers.

In its judgment, the General Court rejected MasterCard's claims and upheld the Commission's finding of an infringement. In particular, the Court endorsed the Commission's view that multilateral interchange fees constitute a restriction of competition as they were found to produce anticompetitive effects and rejected MasterCard's argument that such fees were objectively necessary for the functioning of its system. Also, the Court endorsed the Commission's finding that MasterCard constituted an association of undertakings in the sense of Article 101(1) TFEU, even after the company's listing at the New York Stock Exchange in 2006. The Court also took the view that the Commission did not commit procedural errors and that the prohibition it imposed was proportionate.

MasterCard has appealed the General Court’s judgment to the Court of Justice (Case C-382/12 P pending).

In AstraZeneca[15] the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal brought by AstraZeneca against the judgment by the General Court of 2010 which had upheld – to a very large extent – a Commission's decision from June 2005. The Commission had fined AstraZeneca EUR 60 million for abusing its dominant position relating to its best-selling anti-ulcer medicine Losec.

The judgment concerned two types of misuses of regulatory procedures and systems. It did not concern abuses or misuses of patents or other intellectual property rights. The first abuse upheld by the Court involved the provision by AstraZeneca of misleading information to national patent offices with the aim of preventing or delaying market entry of competing generic products. On the first abuse the Court found that the assessment whether representations made to public authorities for the purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive rights are misleading must be made in concreto and may vary according to the specific circumstances of each case.

The second abuse involved the deregistration by AstraZeneca of its market authorisation for its bestselling ulcer medicine Losec in selected countries with the aim of raising barriers against generic entry and parallel trade. The Court stated that an undertaking which holds a dominant position has a special responsibility under Article 102 and that it cannot therefore use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more difficult entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds relating to the defence of legitimate interests of an undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence of objective justification.

The Court found that the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 is unrelated to the compliance or non-compliance by an undertaking of other legal rules and that, in the majority of cases abuses of dominant positions consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than competition law.

The Court´s judgment also clarifies many issues in relation to the product market definition. The judgment also confirms that IPRs constitute a factor relevant to the determination of dominance. The Court's judgment finds that a dominant position is not prohibited, only its abuse and a finding that an undertaking has such a position is not in itself a criticism of the undertaking concerned.

Cartel judgments: the Courts confirm the Commission´s approach to parental liability

In a number of judgments (e.g. Case T-344/06 Total v Commission, paras 97-109; Case T-347/06 Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Belgium v Commission, paras 30-41, judgments of 27 September 2012.), the Courts confirmed the Commission’s approach to parental liability. For example, the Courts delivered some orders (Case 404/11P Elf Aquitaine v Commission, para 23, order of 2 February 2012; Case C-421/11P Total and Elf Aquitaine v Commission, paras 40-59, order of 7 February 2012; C-493/11P United Technologies v Commission, paras 37-45, order of 15 June 2012.) in which it again made clear that it fully upholds the rebuttable presumption that anti-competitive conduct by a wholly owned or virtually wholly owned subsidiary can be attributed to the parent company unless the parent proves that its subsidiary decides its commercial strategy on the market in full autonomy. The General Court also accepted the application of the rebuttable presumption in case of the ownership by two parents which form part of one group and together hold 100% of the subsidiary’s shares and upheld in two other judgments the imputation of parental liability in a 50/50 joint venture, applying the concept of “single economic entity” to joint venture constellations (Case T-76/08 EI du Pont de Nemours and Others v Commission, paras 59 and 76, judgment of 2 February 2012; Case T-77 Dow Chemicals v Commission, paras 74, 106-112 and 151, judgment of 2 February 2012). The General Court also accepted that the investment company can be liable for the conduct of its portfolio company (Case T-392/09 1.garantovana v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2012).

In the Dutch Bitumen cartel case, the General Court handed down 16 judgments in which it, for the most part, upheld a 2006 Commission decision that a number of petrochemical companies supplying road pavement bitumen and their road building clients had participated in a cartel with regard to the supply of road pavement bitumen in the Netherlands[16]. The General Court also provided guidance on the scope of the obligation of undertakings to cooperate during inspections[17].

In Nexans and Prysmian, it provided guidance on the Commission’s investigatory powers, such as the legal requirements of an inspection decision[18]. It also considered that measures implementing the inspection decision such as taking copies and images of electronic documents and asking questions during an inspection could not be challenged separately but only in the context of an action for annulment of the final decision adopted by the Commission under Article 101(1) TFEU[19].

In Bolloré, the General Court found that in a re-adoption scenario following the annulment of a decision due to a procedural error, the re-imposition of a fine in a new procedure which remedies the error is neither proscribed nor infringes the party’s rights of defence[20].

In Calcium Carbide, the General Court confirmed the Commission's analysis of the parties’ requests for fines reductions because of their alleged inability to pay (ITP) and concluded that the Commission made no error when rejecting all ITP claims based on point 35 of the Fining Guidelines[21].

4. The fight against cartels

The Commission continued its vigorous enforcement of the competition rules against cartels, arguably the form of anticompetitive conduct which harms consumers, the Single Market and the economy to the greatest extent. In 2012, the Commission adopted five cartel decisions imposing fines totalling EUR 1 875 694 000 and concerning products of importance for consumers. The scope of some of the cases was particularly large, with several different infringements dealt with in one decision. The Commission also launched new investigations in a number of sectors, including financial services (derivatives), car parts, the food sector and maritime transport services. Several inspections were carried out to that effect. The Commission furthermore issued three Statements of Objections in cartel cases[22].

The TV and computer monitor tubes case: fines of EUR 1.47 billon imposed for a decade-long international cartel

On 5 December, the European Commission fined seven international groups of companies a total of EUR 1 470 515 000 for participating in either one or both of two distinct cartels in the sector of cathode ray tubes ("CRT"). For almost ten years, between 1996 and 2006, these companies fixed prices, shared markets, allocated customers between themselves and restricted their output. One cartel concerned colour picture tubes used for televisions and the other one colour display tubes used in computer monitors. The cartels operated worldwide. The infringements found by the Commission covered the entire European Economic Area (EEA). Chunghwa, LG Electronics, Philips and Samsung SDI participated in both cartels, while Panasonic, Toshiba, MTPD (currently a Panasonic subsidiary) and Technicolor (formerly Thomson) participated only in the cartel for television tubes. Chunghwa received full immunity from fines under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice for the two cartels, as it was the first to reveal their existence to the Commission. Other companies received reductions of their fines for their cooperation in the investigation under the Commission's leniency programme.

Cathode ray tubes constitute a very important component in the making of television and computer screens, accounting for 50 to 70% of the price. The two cartels are among the most organised cartels that the Commission has investigated. For almost ten years, the cartelists carried out the most harmful anti-competitive practices including price fixing, market sharing, customer allocation, capacity and output coordination and exchanges of commercial sensitive information. The cartelists also monitored the implementation, including auditing compliance with the capacity restrictions by plant visits in the case of the computer monitor tubes cartel.

There are 7 undertakings in TV & Computer Monitor tubes: MTPD and Panasonic (together with Toshiba for the JV period) formed only one undertaking

Case name || Adoption date || Fine imposed || Undertakings concerned || Procedure

Cathode ray tubes || 05/12/2012 || 1 470 515 000 || 7 || Normal

Gas insulated switchgear || 27/06/2012 || 136 260 000 || 2 || Re-adoption (normal)

Water management products || 27/06/2012 || 13 661 000 || 3 || Settlement

Freight forwarding || 28/03/2012 || 169 382 000 || 15 || Normal

Mountings for windows and window doors || 28/03/2012 || 85 876 000 || 9 || Normal

The Water Management Products decision was adopted following the settlement procedure. That brought to six the total number of settlement cases adopted since the procedure was introduced in 2008.

Antitrust and cartel output

5. Effective cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national courts Convergence of antitrust enforcement procedures contributes to a more level playing field in the Single Market

Regulation 1/2003 was a key step in providing a more level playing field for businesses operating cross-border in the Single Market, as all EU competition enforcers including the national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts are able to apply the EU antitrust rules to cases that affect trade between Member States. This has meant that to a large extent the EU antitrust rules have become embedded across the Single Market. The European Commission and the NCAs cooperate closely within the European Competition Network (ECN) to ensure that the EU antitrust rules are applied coherently.

While the NCAs now regularly apply the same substantive competition rules, they do so according to divergent procedures and they may impose a variety of sanctions. Even if competition national procedures are increasingly converging in the way they enforce EU antitrust law, as the 2009 Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003[23] had already found, differences on important aspects still remain which necessitates further examination and reflection.

In the field of leniency, already in 2006 the ECN agreed on the ECN Model Leniency Programme (MLP) which has acted as a major catalyst in encouraging Member States and/or NCAs to introduce and develop their own leniency policies and in promoting convergence between them. In November 2012, the ECN further refined the MLP, as explained above.

In November 2012, Reports by the ECN on investigative and decision-making powers were published, which for the first time provide an overview of the enforcement procedures within the ECN. These Reports demonstrate that national legislators have made clear efforts to make their procedures for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU more convergent. Basic elements of decision-making powers and procedures, such as the power to take prohibition or commitment decisions or to grant interim measures are present in all or in a vast number of jurisdictions. Moreover, procedural steps that are crucial in terms of safeguarding the rights of defence of parties (such as the right to be heard through a statement of objections or equivalent; access to file) are present in all jurisdictions in one form or another.

However, this has not led to uniformity. Divergence subsists on a few fundamental questions such as whether competition authorities have the power to set priorities or the legal framework for conducting interviews, as well as numerous aspects at a more detailed level, including the criteria for adopting interim measures and sanctions for non-compliance with investigatory measures. The Reports are intended to provide a basis for informed debate about the need for further procedural convergence within the ECN. The ECN will continue looking into this matter, in order to further enhance the level playing field for companies operating in the Single Market.

Continuing the close cooperation with national courts

As regards cooperation with national courts, the Commission continued to support the coherent and consistent application of EU competition rules at national level. The Commission now publishes its opinions and amicus curiae observations on its website[24] as soon as it receives the approval for publication by the national court to which the opinion or observation was submitted. In 2012, the Commission submitted three amicus curiae observations under Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 on different matters to courts in Belgium[25], France[26] and Slovakia[27]. The Belgian Constitutional Court followed in its judgment of 20 December 2012 the observations submitted by the Commission, while the two other cases are still pending. In two of the three amicus curiae observations submitted by the Commission in 2011, the receiving courts followed the Commission's observations in judgments handed down in 2012. The first case concerned possible inter partes disclosure of various documents, some of which contained information specifically prepared for the purpose of an application under the Commission's leniency programme[28]. The second case concerned the interpretation of the notion of "appreciable effect on trade between Member States"[29]. In the third case the receiving court submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ[30].

Cooperation with national courts was furthermore supported by the continued funding of a competition-specific training of judges program by the Commission[31].

6. Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy

The globalisation of the economy calls for closer cooperation among competition authorities not only in Europe, but also across the globe. Such cooperation is essential to ensure interoperability between and consistency in the outcome of enforcement activities carried out by different authorities, to enhance the effectiveness of their investigations and to secure a level playing field for EU businesses in world markets. As in the past, and as encouraged by the European Parliament, the Commission has engaged in policy dialogues with the authorities in a number of other jurisdictions, at both multilateral and bilateral level, so as to promote convergence on both substantive and procedural competition rules. The Commission has also continued to cooperate closely with many competition agencies in concrete enforcement activities.

At bilateral level, in 2012 the Commission strove to further strengthen cooperation with non-EU competition authorities, focusing its efforts mainly on the EU's main trading partners (both traditional trading partners and major emerging economies). In this respect, high-level dialogues were held in 2012 with representatives of all the competition agencies with which the EU has concluded a cooperation agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding[32]. Likewise, the Commission engaged in fruitful discussions with the US federal competition authorities with a view to improving cooperation in the area of unilateral conduct, mergers and airline alliances. In the margin of the EU-China Summit on 20 September, DG Competition signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the area of anti-monopoly law with the National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the two Chinese authorities responsible for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law. On 1 June, the Commission recommended to the Council to sign and conclude a "Second Generation" cooperation agreement between the EU and Switzerland.

Negotiations on a similar agreement between the EU and Canada have been progressing well. The European Commission continued negotiating Free Trade Agreements with a large number of third countries which all include competition chapters. The negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore was concluded in 2012 and it contains a substantial chapter not only on antitrust, mergers and SOEs but also on subsidies to services and goods. In addition, the Commission continued to engage in technical cooperation activities with other non-EU competition authorities, in particular with the Chinese and Indian competition authorities.

With respect to the accession negotiations with candidate countries, significant progress was made in 2012 with the opening and the provisional closure of the competition chapter with Iceland. In 2012 the Commission continued to monitor closely the implementation of the provisions of the steel and shipbuilding protocol included in the Accession Treaty for Croatia.

The Commission has also continued its active engagement with international competition related fora such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the International Competition Network and Unctad. In 2012, it took up responsibility as a co-chair of the Mergers Working Group of ICN and moved to a co-chair position of one of the Sub-Groups of the Cartel Working Group. In that same year, the Commission was also given responsibility as project leader (together with US FTC) for the Steering Group projects on investigative processes in competition enforcement activities.

Merger control

1. Deepening cooperation with competition authorities in the Member States and third countries

The EU merger control regime is essential in protecting consumer welfare by preventing market structures that could lead to unjustified price increases or reduction of choice, quality or innovation. It thus continues to be a key instrument for keeping the Single Market open and competitive, particularly in times of economic and financial crisis.

Merger control by the Commission applies to transactions exceeding the significant turnover thresholds set up in the Merger Regulation and which have an impact on the market beyond the national borders of a particular Member State. Such mergers are reviewed exclusively at EU level in application of a ‘one-stop shop’ system. Concentrations not covered by the Merger Regulation fall, in principle, within the remit of the Member States. However, the Merger Regulation leaves scope for re-allocating cases from the national competition authorities (NCA) to the Commission and vice versa in order to ensure that the best placed authority deals with a case. In 2012, based on referral requests by two national competition authorities, the Commission became competent for reviewing a case[33]. Cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs can also become an important element outside the referral system[34].

Cooperation also proved important with non-EU countries. A number of cases[35] involved intense cooperation with various competition authorities around the world. In these cases cooperation was particularly close with the authorities in the United States.

Further, a reflection on a review of the Merger Regulation itself has been launched, in particular in relation to covering the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings.

2. A significant increase in number decisions with commitments from 2011

The number of merger notifications in 2012 remained relatively stable. Overall, 283 cases were notified to the Commission in 2012, which represents about the average of the last four years. The Commission opened ten in-depth (i.e. second phase) investigations covering several sectors such as IT, mobile telephony, air transport, basic industries and music.

The number of decisions by the Commission increased significantly in 2012 compared to 2011, but remains stable compared to the average of the last four years. Whereas the number of prohibition decisions remains unchanged compared to 2011, with one case concluded by prohibition decision in 2012[36], six decisions[37] in second phase were concluded with commitments in 2012 compared to one in 2011. In first phase, the number of clearance decisions which were adopted with commitments almost doubled with nine compared to five in 2011.

As reflected in the increased number of second phase investigations and commitments in second phase decisions the assessment of the notified transactions also became more complex in 2012, a trend already observable in 2011. The review of, in particular, the second phase investigations generally requires sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses involving large amounts of data.

Merger decisions

3. Simplifying merger procedures further

In order to increase efficiency when dealing with unproblematic cases and to make the notification system more business friendly, a simplification exercise was launched in 2012, in particular with respect to transactions that clearly pose no problems to competition. While the current procedures, which also entail referring cases from EU countries to the Commission, work well, there is scope for making them smoother and shorter.

4. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in merger control

In Electrabel[38], the General Court fully dismissed Electrabel's appeal of a Commission decision of June 2009 fining it EUR 20 million for acquiring control over Compagnie Nationale du Rhône without prior approval under the EU Merger Regulation. This was the first time that an EU court rules on a Commission decision to impose a fine for implementing a concentration of EU dimension without prior notification to and approval by the Commission. The GC confirmed that such early implementation constitutes a serious breach of EU merger control law. The Court also makes clear that the Commission is entitled to adopt effective and deterrent sanctions in case of such infringements.

In Editions Odile Jacob and Agrofert[39], the Court of Justice ruled on appeals by the Commission against two judgments of the General Court that had annulled a Commission decision refusing access to documents related to two merger cases. The ECJ confirmed that it is necessary to ensure a coherent application of the Transparanecy Regulation 1049/2001 with other rules of EU Law, in particular regulations designed to ensure respect for professional secrecy. The ECJ held in particular that the Commission can rely on the general presumption that disclosure of the correspondence between the Commission and the parties to merger procedures would undermine the protection of the commercial interests of the parties and the purpose of the Commission's merger investigations, in order to refuse access to such correspondence even after the closure of proceedings.

II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW

This section provides an overview of policy developments and enforcement actions in a number of selected sectors on which the Commission particularly focused in 2012: energy and environment, ICT and media, financial services, manufacturing, the agri-food industry, pharmaceutical and health services, and transport.

1. Energy & Environment

Overview of key challenges in the sector

This past year was a year in which governments and industry worldwide started a complex adjustment process in the wake of momentous events affecting the energy and environment sector in 2011, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. Coupled with the long-term trend of rising fuel prices and the high cost of renewable energy, those events added to the challenges faced by Member States to meet the Europe 2020 Strategy and the EU energy policy objectives. The strengthening and building of partnerships with the EU's key partners is also of strategic interest for secure, safe, sustainable and competitive energy. International cooperation with industrialised and fast growing economies is necessary to maintain Europe's position in energy research and innovation.

The three pilars of the EU energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply

The EU Energy policy is built around three pillars: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is vital to combating climate change. European consumers depend heavily on the secure and reliable provision of energy at competitive prices. Interconnection between European gas and electricity grids need to be substantially improved. The Commission's Communication "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy" Communication calls for action in areas where new challenges are emerging. These areas are energy efficiency, infrastructure, choice and security for consumers, energy technology and the external dimension of the internal energy market. Competition enforcement and advocacy, along with sector-specific legislative proposals, constitute the main tools the Commission has at is disposal to achieve these goals and create a single European energy market by the 2020 target date. Given the strategic importance of the energy sector, the European Parliament, in its Resolution on the 2011 report on competition policy (the Sánchez Presedo report) continued to request that the Commission actively monitors the degree of competition on the market.

EU Competition policy in the energy field aims to ensure a secure flow of energy, in particular electricity and gas, at competitive prices to EU households and businesses. An open and competitive single EU energy market will also guarantee secure provision of energy in the future by sending the necessary signals for investment and making the European market attractive to external suppliers. Such a market should also be open to new energy mixes and play a major role in developing and deploying new environmentally friendly technologies. Prices that reflect costs will help encourage energy efficiency, whilst supporting sustainability and security of supply. However, we are not there yet. The energy services (both gas and electricity) performed below the average in the most recent Consumer Markets Scoreboard, with electricity supply being the 5th worst assessed services market (out of 30)[40]. Both markets have particularly poor scores on choice, comparability and switching suppliers and tariffs, suggesting that consumers do not actively participate in the market and are not making full use of the saving opportunities created by market liberalisation. The Commission´s action in the area of competition policy is therefore consistent with and supports the Commission´s legislative action to integrate the Single Market in electricity and gas (see the Commission´s Communication "Making the internal energy market work").

Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges Enhancing competitiveness across the energy sector

Competition enforcement and advocacy in the field of energy and the environment contribute to the competitiveness of EU industry and the integration of the internal market by opening markets, creating a level playing field between competitors, preventing incumbents from reinforcing their dominant positions, inducing economic restructuring and creating a framework for investment that avoids distortions and ensures the efficient allocation of resources in the Single Market.

Examples of enforcement actions by the Commission in 2012 underpinning those strategic objectives include an investigation into the conduct of power exchanges[41], the opening of formal proceedings to investigate whether Bulgarian Energy Holding may be abusing its dominant market position in the wholesale electricity market in Bulgaria[42], the opening of formal proceedings against the Romanian power exchange Opcom with respect to a suspected abuse of dominance in discriminating against non-Romanian traders[43] and the decision to make binding commitments that reduce the product scope and duration of a non-compete obligation in the sector for nuclear technology (Siemes and Areva[44]). The Commission also fined three European producers of water management products[45] for price coordination in an infringement which lasted from June 2006 to May 2008. Water management products are used in heating, cooling and sanitation systems and comprise pressurisation systems and products for quality assurance. The Commission used the settlement procedure to deal effectively with this case which was concluded on 27 June 2012 with the adoption of a prohibition decision on 27 June 2012 against three undertakings, which were fined a total of EUR 13.6 million.

Moreover, the Commission actively monitored the implementation of remedies in several previous antitrust cases, all aimed at opening up national markets and preventing incumbents from abusing their dominant position in several Member States. The monitoring included the implementation of measures that would remedy competition concerns in the form of foreclosure (ENI[46], E.On gas[47] and GDF[48]), customer tying through long-term contracts for large electricity customers (EDF in France[49]) as well as restrictions on export capacity (SVK[50] in Sweden).

The EU merger rules seek to ensure that mergers harmful to the competitive process are altered so that these effects do not occur or are avoided all together whilst allowing beneficial restructuring. During 2012, the Commission was able to approve a number of mergers, including mergers connected to restructuring of gas and electricity networks[51] induced by liberalisation, as well as mergers linked to reneweable energy sources[52]. While the Commission did not have to intervene in new mergers that would have anti-competitive effects in 2012, it devoted considerable efforts to defending the EU's interests before the General Court[53] and in ensuring that commitments to avoid harmful effects made in earlier merger cases by companies, such as EDF and GDF Suez[54], were effectively complied with and enforced. Strict post-decision enforcement is critical as, otherwise, the anti-competitive effects that the earlier decisions sought to avoid could nevertheless materialise.

Using its powers in the State aid field to preserve the integrity of the Single Market by controlling whether Member States use their public resources in a non-distortive manner, the Commission undertook enforcement action and adopted new rules in the field of energy and the environment. For example, the Commission opened a formal investigation on potential State aid in Romania in the form of privileged tariffs granted by the main electricity supplier to a range of companies[55] and gave conditional approval to the aid component in regulated electricity tariffs in France[56]. The Commission also adopted rules on national support for industry electricity costs in the context of the EU Emission Trading Scheme[57].

Contributing to sustainability

Sustainable development is the long term use of resources to meet human needs for energy, while preserving the environment. Sustainability was at the heart of the measures reviewed under the State aid rules under which the Commission authorised aid that supports renewable energy sources and environmentally friendly businesses. This is justified on the reasoning that State aid can correct market failures caused by so-called negative externalities, i.e. situations where environmental costs for society are not yet reflected in the production costs borne by companies.

State support for renewable energy remains one of the key drivers for its deployment, based on the horizontal rules set out in the Environmental Aid Guidelines[58]. One set of cases concerned energy from renewable sources (e.g. in Ireland[59], the Netherlands[60], Austria[61], the UK[62] and France[63]). Other cases relate to the upgrading of existing energy infrastructure to higher environmental standards (e.g. in Greece[64] and Poland[65]) and the use of environmentally friendly transport vehicles (UK[66]) and waste treatment (UK[67]). Work on the revision of the Environmental Aid Guidelines started in 2012, aiming both at taking stock of the experience of subsidising a range of technologies and at taking account of market developments.

The Commission also approved State aid for the modernisation of electricity generation installations in Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania based on the regime established by Article 10c of the EU Emission Trading Directive[68]. Those Member States will be allowed to grant emission trading allowances free of charge with a view to promoting competition and increasing security of supply. Several other Member States are expected to come forward with similar plans.

Contributing to security of supply

The EU energy sector is characterised by a high dependency on imports, as the EU produces only 48% of its energy needs[69]. Energy dependency differs greatly among Member States. Denmark appears to be the only net energy exporter within the EU27, while the Baltic countries rely on a single source for their gas imports. The EU energy sector is also characterized by a significant need for investments, e.g. in electricity generation infrastructure, given the trend for gas and renewables to contribute more to electricity generation in the EU.

The Commission's antitrust enforcement action in the energy sector can contribute to resolving security of supply issues by facilitating access to the market and encouraging investment. In 2012, the Commission continued its investigation of a possible abuse of dominance on the Czech electricity market through the hindrance of the entry of competitors and assessed commitments from ČEZ in the form of the divestment of lignite fired power plants. The Commission also opened proceedings against Gazprom[70] in Russia to investigate whether it abused its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets in central and eastern European Member States by partitioning market, preventing diversification of supply of gas and/or imposing unfair prices on its customers by linking the price of gas to oil prices.

2. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Media

Overview of key challenges in the sector

As recognised in the Digital Agenda for Europe (the "Digital Agenda")[71] and the Communication on e-commerce and other online services (the “E-commerce Communication”)[72], Information and Communication Technologies ("ICT") play a key enabling role for Europe to achieve its strategic objectives under the Europe 2020 Strategy and, in particular, the objectives under the Digital Agenda flagship initiative. Creative content is also an essential input into the digital economy and a key driver of consumer demand for digital services. There is a very considerable growth potential in these sectors. In mature economies, internet related expenditure and consumption accounted for 21% of GDP growth during the past five years[73].

Furthermore, in light of the rapid technological developments which characterise these sectors, effective competition policy and enforcement are essential to address potential malfunctioning in the ICT and media sectors.

Competition policy also plays an important role in shaping the Commission's legislative proposals in the media sector such as the July 2012 proposal for the Directive on collective rights management. The proposal's objective is to improve transparency and governance of collecting societies as well as facilitate multi-territorial licensing of the rights managed by collecting societies and consequently improve access to online music. In light of the Commission's enforcement experience in competition cases, the proposal contains a number of important competition law safeguards aimed at ensuring compliance with competition law in the collective management of copyright.

Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges

State aid policy is of growing importance in the ICT and media field. After the public consultation on an issues paper in 2011 to prepare the review of the rules for State aid to films and other audiovisual works[74], a new draft Cinema Communication was published for consultation on 14 March. 2012. The review of the Broadband Guidelines[75], which also started with the release of an issues paper in 2011, was pursued with the publication of draft Guidelines on 1 June 2012. Around 100 comments received from stakeholders were published on DG COMP's website in October 2012. The new Guidelines, which mainly refine the previous guidelines, were adopted on 19 December 2012 and align the rules in this area with the targets of the Digital Agenda and accommodate changes in technology.

The Commission has continued to use its enforcement tools to ensure unrestricted competition and growth in the ICT and media sectors to the benefit of consumers and to support the Commission's broader Digital Agenda goals. In this context, State aid has an important role to play in accelerating the deployment of broadband networks in Europe. Pro-competitive aid measures, which complement private investments in areas which are not profitable on commercial terms, are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Digital Agenda. The volume of State aid approved by the Commission in 21 decisions under the Broadband Guidelines in 2012 amounted to EUR 6.555 billion in 2012. This is a steep increase compared with the EUR 1.8 billion budgets approved in 2011 and 2010, notably because more Member States notify framework schemes with correspondingly higher budgets.

Enforcement action against incumbent telecommunicatons operators

In May 2012, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Slovak Telekom and to its parent company, Deutsche Telekom, in which the Commission took the preliminary view that Slovak Telekom may have abused its dominant position on several wholesale broadband markets in Slovakia since May 2004. In particular, Slovak Telekom may have refused to supply unbundled access to its local loops and wholesale services to competitors, and may have imposed a margin squeeze on alternative operators (Slovak Telekom itself would have operated at a loss if its own wholesale prices had applied to it. The Commission also considered on a preliminary basis that Deutsche Telekom may be held liable for the conduct, because of the nature and degree of its links with its subsidiary Slovak Telekom, in which it owns a majority stake of 51%.

The Commission is also examining the observations received on the statement of objections sent to Telefónica and to Portugal Telecom in October 2011, regarding their agreement not to compete on the Iberian telecommunications markets, expressing the preliminary view that this agreement breaches Article 101 TFEU. This is the first case in the sector concerning a cross-border market-sharing agreement, which is of particular importance to avoid that the Single Market continues to be artificially compartmentalised along national borders[76].

Ongoing enforcement in the market for internet search and advertising (Google) as well as injunctions based on standard essential patents (Samsung)

Another case involving an alleged abuse of a dominant position concerns Google. The Commission has expressed concerns that four types of Google business practices may constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, namely: (i) the way in which Google’s vertical search services are displayed within general search results as compared to services of competitors; (ii) the way Google may use and display third party content on its vertical search services; (iii) exclusivity agreements for the delivery of Google search advertisements on other websites; and (iv) restrictions in the portability of AdWords advertising campaigns. Google submitted a detailed commitment text at the end of January 2013. The Commission's services are currently analysing Google's proposal with a view to deciding whether it would allow the Commission to commence the process for the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.

It also opened three proceedings[77] concerning possible abuses by Samsung and Motorola of their standard essential patents, partly in order to provide more clarity in this field where the Commission received numerous complaints during the year. On 21 December 2012, in respect of one of those three proceedings, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Samsung, informing it of the Commission’s preliminary view that Samsung's seeking of injunctions against Apple in various Member States on the basis of its mobile phone standard-essential patents amounts to an abuse of a dominant position[78].

Enforcement linked to digitisation

The Commission has also pursued several actions focusing on the impact of the transition to digital networks on content sectors.

To ensure that the transition from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting and that the resulting digital dividend lead to new entry and broader viewer choice, EU law[79] requires that such dividend is allocated subject to specific conditions (e.g. open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures). Following intervention by the Commission, France assigned frequencies to new operators in 2012, Bulgaria took legislative steps to address the breaches and Italy took steps with a view to assigning new digital frequencies (multiplexes) in 2013.

On 12 December 2012, the Commission also adopted a commitment decision in the e-books sector, another nascent and fast-moving part of the digital economy, that rendered legally binding commitments offered by Apple and four international e-book publishers: Simon & Schuster (CBS Corp.), Harper Collins (News Corp.), Hachette Livre (Lagardère Publishing) and Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck (owner of inter alia Macmillan).

The Commission had opened proceedings in December 2011 against these companies, as well as a fifth international e-book publisher, Penguin (Pearson Group). While the December 2012 decision was not addressed to Penguin as that publisher chose not to offer commitments to the Commission, the Commission is currently engaged in constructive discussions with Penguin on commitments that would allow an early closure of proceedings also against that publisher.

Furthermore, following the Premier League judgment[80], the Commission conducted a fact-finding investigation to examine whether licensing agreements for premium pay-TV content contain absolute territorial protection clauses which may restrict competition, hinder the completion of the Single Market and prevent consumers from cross-border access to premium sports and film content.

ICT in the context of the Merger Regulation

Finally, through the Merger Regulation, the Commission ensures that the ICT and media sectors remain competitive and open for new entrants, and that access to key elements (whether content, technology or interconnection) is not denied. The Commission also aims at ensuring that consumers do not suffer from higher prices, less choice, poorer quality and limited innovation as a result of mergers in that sector.

One example of the Commission taking action under the Merger Regulation to preserve competitiveness and consumer choice in the music sector is the Commission's conditional clearance decision of the proposed acquisition by Universal Music of EMI's recorded music assets. The proposed transaction, as originally notified, would have increased Universal's size in a way that would likely have enabled it to impose higher prices and more onerous licensing terms on digital music providers. This, in turn, would have negatively affected the possibilities for innovative providers to expand or launch new music offerings and would ultimately have reduced consumers' choice for digital music, as well as cultural diversity. To remove the Commission's concerns, Universal committed to divest significant assets, corresponding to around two thirds of EMI's revenues in the EEA, and including eight of the ten EMI top selling artists. Moreover, the commitments provide that at least two thirds of the divested assets will have to be sold to a single purchaser, which will have to have the ability and the resources to operate in the market as a credible competitor. This case also shows that the Commission's merger control activity continued to contribute to the maintenance of market conditions supportive of innovation.

Another example of the Commission intervening under the Merger Regulation to ensure that a proposed merger would not have a negative impact on end consumers in terms of higher prices is the Commission's conditional clearance decision on 12 December of Hutchison's proposed acquisition of Orange in Austria. The proposed transaction would have led to a four to three consolidation on the Austrian mobile telecommunications market. The Commission found that the merger of two mobile network operators, such as Hutchison and Orange, with a particular strength on the data segments, which are of particular importance for the future telecoms markets, on a market with high barriers to entry and absence of buyer power would have led to a significant price increase for end customers of mobile telecommunication services. To address these concerns, the parties submitted commitments, including a wholesale access remedy to improve access possibilities for mobile virtual network operators. The parties also offered the divestiture of spectrum, which, together with spectrum reserved for new entrants by the Austrian regulator in the upcoming auction in 2013, creates the possibility for new mobile network operators to enter the Austrian market.

3. Financial Services

Overview of key challenges in the sector

Financial services play an essential role in the economy in transforming short-term savings into long-term lending and directing capital where it is most needed. In 2012, the instability and difficulties in the financial sector continued.

In 2012 the European Institutions took initiatives to deepen the Single Market in financial services by strengthening the EU financial sector (in line with the EU commitments under the G-20) and the European surveillance of the financial system and public finances.

In December 2012, the European Council agreed on a roadmap for the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union, based on deeper integration and reinforced solidarity[81]. This process will begin with the completion, strengthening and implementation of the new enhanced economic governance, as well as – in relation to the Banking Union - the adoption of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of the new rules on recovery and resolution and on deposit guarantees. It will be completed by the establishment of a single resolution mechanism.

The arrangements related to banking, would allow direct recapitalisation by the European Supervisory Mechanism of individual banks which would break the vicious circle of contagion between banks and their sovereign. Since such measures need to comply with the State aid rules, the European Commission will continue to play a crucial role in the context of the envisaged Banking Union.

Contribution of EU Competition Policy in tackling the challenges

Antitrust enforcement contributes to the well-functioning of financial markets with incentives for market participants to improve efficiency and meet consumer needs. Combined with well-designed regulation, antitrust enforcement should enhance transparency and reduce entry barriers for new technology and new players.

Action in the area of financial derivatives

The European Commission pursued two antitrust investigations in the credit default swaps (CDS) market[82] which were opened in 2011. The Commission continued to analyse, in particular, the cooperation between a number of leading investment banks and an information service provider. The purpose of the investigation is to establish whether those players acted to preserve their stronghold in the profitable Over-The-Counter (OTC) CDS market by hindering the development of alternative CDS trading platforms in a way which infringed EU competition law.

Action to ensure fair access to financial information

Access to reliable information is crucial for the financial markets. On 20 December 2012 the Commission adopted a decision that renders legally binding the commitments offered by Thomson Reuters to create a new licence allowing customers, for a monthly fee, to use Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) for data sourced from Thomson Reuters´ competitors. RICs are codes that identify securities and are used by financial institutions to retrieve data from Thomson Reuters´ real-time datafeeds. To correctly assess investment opportunities, market participants need to access accurate and timely financial data, for example, through consolidated real-time datafeeds. The Commission had concerns that Thomson Reuters might have been abusing its dominant position in the market for such datafeeds. The decision was preceded by several rounds of commitments offered by Thomson Reuters and two market tests. In order to correctly assess investment opportunities, market participants need to access accurate and timely financial data, for example through consolidated real-time datafeeds. The commitments offered by Thomson Reuters and rendered legally binding by the Commission´s decision will enhance competition in this market. Financial institutions that use RICs will be able to switch to alternative providers more easily.

Contributing to seamless, efficient and innovative payment markets

Payment markets are essential for the Single Market. Regulation, self-regulation and competition enforcement must work together to create open, efficient and innovative market structures. In 2012, there have been significant advances in all three areas.

In terms of regulation, the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) End Date Regulation[83] was adopted in February. This obliges all users to move from the previous national credit transfer and direct debit systems to the new SEPA systems established by the European Payments Council by 2014. From a competition perspective, the key element in this regulation is that it provides legal clarity on interchange fees for direct debit. This had been a point of much discussion with the banking sector for several years, and the regulation specified that interchange fees for cross-border transactions are prohibited from November 2012 and for domestic transactions from 2017. In January 2012, a Green Paper on cards, internet and mobile payments was published. It addressed issues such as lack of market access, diverging interchange fees, barriers to cross-border acceptance of card payments, lack of transparency, lack of European technical and security standards and governance of the SEPA process. 300 replies were received and published in June. In October, the Commission announced that in the second quarter of 2013 it would propose a revision of the regulatory framework (in particular the Payment Services Directive) and would propose to regulate multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) for payment card transactions.

In payments self-regulation has played an important role, particularly with the creation of the European Payments Council, which consists of credit and payment institutions, following the introduction of the euro. The SEPA Council was created to represent all stakeholders, but the roles and decision making powers of the EPC and SEPA Council remain controversial. In the SEPA Regulation the Parliament required a review of the governance arrangements. This was included in the Green Paper and it has been much discussed during 2012, including from a competition perspective.

In terms of competition enforcement, in May 2012 the General Court fully upheld[84] the Commission's decision which had found that MasterCard's MIFs for card payments constituted a restriction of Article 101(1) TFEU and that MasterCard had not demonstrated that the MIFs were justified on efficiency grounds under Article 101(3). In July, the Commission issued a supplementary statement of objections to Visa[85] concerning its MIFs for credit card payments and the limitations it imposed on cross-border acquiring where merchants use banks in other countries to benefit from better conditions and in particular lower MIFs. Investigation of the EPC work on standardisation for e-payment systems continued. The EPC announced in July 2012 that it would stop its work on the e-Payments Framework.

Antitrust investigations in the financial sector

In October 2011, the Commission undertook unannounced inspections at the premises of a number of companies active in the sector of interest-rate derivative products linked to the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) in a number of Member States, as it had concerns that these companies may have violated EU antitrust rules. The Commission started investigating these cases as a matter of top priority before the so-called "LIBOR scandal" triggered by Barclays on the LIBOR/EURIBOR rate manipulation by a number of banks and their employees.

In 2012, the Commission continued to investigate a number of cases related to the benchmark rates of LIBOR, EURIBOR, TIBOR – the Tokyo rate – and with regard to a number of banks and brokers. The alleged rate-rigging is a major competition concern as it has to be ensured that competition in financial markets takes place on a level-playing field.

Interbank interest rate benchmarks are systemic benchmarks which are important for the transmission of the euro area’s monetary policy. Besides, the integrity of these benchmarks is critical to the pricing of many financial instruments such as interest rate derivatives, commercial and non-commercial contracts. Any failures may cause losses for investors, distort the real economy and undermine market confidence. The importance of financial derivatives, in particular, is immense. In 2011, interest-rate derivatives had a gross value of many trillions of euros. The products are traded every day on a global basis, involving companies such as banks, pension funds and industrial firms seeking to hedge their exposure. They play a key role in the management of risk in our economy.

These are cases that are dealt with worldwide (US, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, etc.) and on the antitrust, criminal and regulatory law fronts.

Taking action to ensure competitive prices to hedge against investment risk

On 1 February 2012, the Commission prohibited the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse (DB) and New York Stock Exchange Euronext (NYX). The transaction was unproblematic in a broad range of markets, including the markets for listing, trading and clearing of cash instruments. However, it would have eliminated competition and lead to a quasi-monopoly in some derivatives markets, in particular, European single stock and equity index derivatives and European interest rate derivatives, where globally DB and NYX are de facto the only credible players. The markets for exchange trading and clearing of these derivative instruments is characterized by high barriers to entry resulting, in particular, from the closed vertical silo operated by most derivatives exchanges. While the transaction would have given rise to certain efficiencies, it was considered that these would be insufficient to outweigh the significant harm stemming from the creation of a de facto monopoly, namely the loss of actual and potential competition between DB and NYX. The Commission therefore found that the merger was likely to lead to higher prices and less innovation for derivatives customers and that the remedies proposed by DB and NYX were insufficient to address these concerns.

In September 2012, the Commission approved, following an in-depth investigation, a joint venture between three large UK mobile telephone operators[86]. The joint venture will, in particular, develop a mobile commerce platform including a mobile wallet for payments. The investigation revealed that a number of alternatives for mobile payments already existed and that the joint venture was unlikely to hinder the emergence of others in the near future. The joint venture was therefore cleared without conditions.

Resolving the situation of banks that cannot become viable without continuing taxpayer support

In 2012, the extraordinary State aid crisis rules had to be prolonged due to the continuing uncertainties in financial markets. With those rules, State aid control continued to ensure a consistent policy response to the financial crisis throughout the EU and played an important role in limiting distortions of competition in the internal market.

As has been the case throughout the financial crisis, the Commission in 2012 adopted a considerable number of decisions on individual banks in 2012. For example in the case of Dexia on 28 December the Commission approved a resolution plan for Dexia submitted on 28 December 2012 by the French, Belgian and Luxembourgish authorities. Under the plan, as endorsed in the Commission decision, the Luxemburg part was sold and the Belgian lending activities were taken over by Belgium and will be continued as the newly created and restructured retail lender Belfius. The French business is to be wound down with the exception of the lending activities to municipalities and hospitals, which will be continued through a development bank. In the case of BayernLB the Commission approved a plan based on a substantially changed business model and a reduction of assets by 50%. The Commission also required the bank to pay back EUR 5 billion of the rescue aid received earlier, which exceeded the minimum amount required for the restructuring.

In a number of Member States, the Commission authorised the prolongation of existing bank guarantee and recapitalisation schemes. Moreover, the Commission always verified that aid (under schemes or granted on an individual basis) was limited to the minimum necessary and that moral hazard was properly addressed by ensuring that shareholders and subordinated debt holders were not bailed out through such state interventions.

The specific situation of Programme Countries

Extensive financial sector conditionality was included among the policy requirements addressed to the Member States that have received international financial assistance, i.e. the so-called Programme Countries. In that context, DG Competition continued to collaborate with DG ECFIN, the IMF and the ECB regarding the financial sector in programme countries in order to ensure that the massive support necessary to keep a number of such institutions alive in a difficult macro-economic environment will not result in undue distortions of competition. In addition to the existing programmes in Greece, Portugal and Ireland, a programme for the banking sector in Spain was adopted.

As regards Greece, following the 2011 write downs in the Private Sector Involvement the capital of the banks was seriously depleted. To fill the resulting capital needs, an increased budget of EUR 50 billion for aiding banks was agreed. EUR 18 billion of those funds was advanced to the four main Greek banks (National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, Eurobank and Piraeus bank) in May 2012. On 27 July 2012, the Commission temporarily approved the bridge recapitalisations while at the same time initiating formal investigation procedures. Moreover, in 2012, the consolidation of the Greek banking sector started to take shape. The Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) was resolved with a transfer of its good assets and deposits to Piraeus Bank and the previously French-owned banks Emporiki and Geniki were acquired by Alpha and Piraeus bank respectively.

In 2011, the banks in Ireland were recapitalised in the context of the EU/IMF Programme, and a number of actions to restore their viability were identified. In 2012, DG Competition continued to monitor the implementation by Bank of Ireland of its commitments as well as the progress of Allied Irish Banks and Permanent TSB to deleverage their balance sheets.

In 2011 the EU and the IMF agreed to a EUR 78 billion support package for Portugal. To strengthen confidence in the financial sector, the Programme requires banks to achieve high levels of capital. While Banco Espírito Santo managed to raise all the capital it needed from private investors, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Millennium BCP, Banco Português de Investimento and Banif needed public support and their restructuring plans are currently being assessed by the Commission. In March 2012, a decision was taken regarding the restructuring aid granted to Banco Português de Negócios, which entailed its integration into Banco BIC Português.

In July 2012, the EU and the ECB concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for a sector programme for the banking sector in Spain. It made Spanish banks subject to a rigorous stress test over a three-year period. Banks with a capital shortfall that could not be met by mobilising private resources were recapitalised with programme funds and were subject to restructuring under State aid rules. Two groups of banks were involved in that process: the first group was composed of banks already controlled by the Spanish authorities: BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, Nova Caixa Galicia and Banco de Valencia, for which the restructuring plans were approved in November 2012. The second group was composed of other banks that needed State aid following the stress test: Ceiss, Banco Mare Nostrum, Caja 3 and Liberbank. The restructuring plans of these banks were approved in December 2012.

Cyprus and the Cypriot banks lost access to international funding markets and requested external financial assistance in June 2012. The Cypriot banks faced significant capital shortfalls due to their large exposure to Greek sovereign and private sector debt and excess lending to the domestic real estate sector.

4. Basic industries and Manufacturing

Overview of key challenges in the sector

The EU and the Member States shall, in accordance with Article 173 TFEU, ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their actions shall be aimed at, among other things, speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes as well as fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development. The Treaty framework was given more shape in the Communication "An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage" adopted by the Commission in October 2010. Industry accounts for four-fifths of Europe's exports and private sector R&D investment[87].

Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges

During 2012 EU competition policy was applied in the area of manufacturing and basic industry in line with the EU´s industrial policy centred around competitiveness; for example, in the field of State aid, State aid rules were adopted which enable the Member States to support industrial sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage in the context of the third phase of the European Emission´s System (ETS)[88]. The Commission´s actions against cartels and abuses of dominant positions are particularly beneficial to European manufacturing and basic industries since such enforcement actions deters and sanctions anticompetitive conduct resulting in excessive input prices (see for example the Commission´s fining decisions in the Cathode ray tubes cartel case[89] and the Freight Forwarding cartel[90], which entailed surcharges for freight forwarding services by air along key trade lines between Europe and North American and Asian trade lines).

Such considerations also guide the Commission's assessment of mergers. On 7 November 2012, following an in-depth review, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the Finnish firm Outokumpu's acquisition of Inoxum[91], the stainless steel division of ThyssenKrupp of Germany. The approval is conditional upon the divestiture of Inoxum's stainless steel production facility in Terni, Italy. The Commission had concerns that the combination of the two largest suppliers of cold rolled steel products would have given the merged entity the power to raise prices. The commitments offered address those concerns. Stainless steel is a key material for a wide range of products, from household goods to industrial equipment, and an essential input for many European industries. The divestment of the Italian Terni plant ensures that the creation of a new European market leader will not be detrimental to consumers and businesses in Europe.

The Commission's in-depth investigation focused on the production of cold rolled stainless steel products in the European Economic Area (EEA). In that market, the merger will combine the first and the second largest supplier. The transaction, as initially notified, would have created a player three times as big as Aperam of Luxembourg and five times as big as Acerinox of Spain, the closest competitors, and respectively the third and fourth player in the market. The Commission's investigation found that while imports account for an appreciable part of the EEA market, they are insufficient to constrain price increases, because they are generally not considered fully substitutable by final customers. Moreover, despite their level of spare capacity, it is likely that the two main European competitors of the parties, Aperam and Acerinox, would have found it more profitable to follow price increases by the merged entity rather than competing sufficiently aggressively to prevent such increases. Price increases resulting from the transaction, as initially notified, would have likely been much higher than any potential synergies.

Two weeks after the Outokumpu decision, on 22 November 2012, the European Commission cleared under the EU Merger Regulation the proposed acquisition of Xstrata, the world's fifth largest metals and mining group, by Glencore[92], the world's leading metals and thermal coal trader. The clearance was conditional on the termination of Glencore's off-take arrangements for zinc metal in the European Economic Area (EEA) with Nyrstar, the world's largest zinc metal producer, and the divestiture of Glencore's minority shareholding in Nyrstar. The Commission had concerns that the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to raise prices for zinc metal, an important input for many EU industries. The commitments ensure that competition in the European zinc metal market is preserved, so that European customers such as steel galvanisers and car makers can continue to produce valuable consumer goods at low prices and good quality. Without the commitments, the merged entity would have had an even greater ability and incentive to control the level of zinc metal supplies in the EEA, for example by exporting material to LME[93]-certified warehouses outside the EEA or otherwise withholding supplies from the EEA market. The reaction by competitors, including imports, would not have been sufficient to prevent the risk of a significant price increase for zinc metal.

In the area of State aid, on 11 July 2012 the Commission opened a formal investigation on 11 July 2012 into whether notified regional aid in favour of an investment project by German car maker Porsche in Leipzig, Saxony, is in line with EU State aid rules. Given the high market shares of Volkswagen-Porsche and the capacity increase brought about by the investment, the Commission has to undertake an in-depth assessment of the aid. The Commission will check whether the aid is necessary and proportionate to provide an incentive for the investment and whether its contribution to regional development outweighs the distortion of competition and trade. The project aims at manufacturing a new passenger car model. The total investment costs amount to EUR 521.56 million. Germany intends to support the project with EUR 43.67 million in the form of a direct grant and an investment premium. The investment project started in April 2011 and its completion is planned for 2014. Leipzig is eligible for regional aid to further the development of certain economic activities or sectors, pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU.

Sanctioning cartels which raise input costs for European manufacturers

On 28 March 2012[94], the Commission fined nine European producers of mountings for windows a total of EUR 86 million for operating a cartel by which they agreed on common yearly price increases. The collusion lasted from November 1999 to July 2007 and affected European buyers of windows across the whole EEA. For most of the parties to this case, mountings for windows constitute a large fraction of their turnover. For this reason, the fines of nearly all parties would have been capped at 10% of their worldwide turnover. Exceptionally, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of its Guidelines on fines and reduced the fines in a way that takes into account the concentration of the total turnover in the sales of cartelized products as well as differences between the parties in view of their individual participation in the infringement.

On 26 June 2012, the Commission re-imposed fines on Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Toshiba Corporation for their participation in the Gas Insulated Switchgear cartel[95]. The fines originally imposed on two companies by the Commission in January 2007 were annulled by the General Court on account of the Commission´s use of 2001 as refer