EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 28.3.2011 
SEC(2011) 359 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
 
 
Accompanying document to the 
 
 
WHITE PAPER 
 
Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource 
efficient transport system 
  
SEC(2011) 358 final SEC(2011) 391 final 
COM(2011) 144 final 
 
EN 2   EN This document provides the executive summar y of the Impact Assessment Report on the 
Commission’s White Paper on Transport Policy, which lays down a long-term strategy that 
would allow the transport sector to  meet its goals with a 2050 horizon.  
1. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
1. The transport system has provided Europe a high degree of mobility with an ever 
increasing performance in terms of sp eed, comfort, safety and convenience. 
However, an in-depth ex post evaluati on undertaken by the Commission has shown 
that, while several features of the transpor t system have improved in the last decade - 
notably its efficiency, safety and security - there has been no structural change in the 
way the system operates. The in ability of past policies to modify the current transport 
paradigm is one of the main causes of unsustainable trends: growing CO 2 emissions, 
persistent oil dependency1 and mounting congestion. 
2. The Commission has carried out an analysis of possible future developments of these 
problems at unchanged policies. This anal ysis indicates that the share of CO 2 
emissions from transport would continue increasing to almost 50% of total emissions by 2050. Oil products would still re present 89% of the EU transport sector needs in 
2050. Congestion would continue to pose a huge burden on the society. 
3. On the basis of the conclusions of th e ex post evaluation, the Commission has 
identified four main root causes that prevent EU transport system to develop into a sustainable system: 
• Inefficient pricing
: Today, most of the external co sts of transpor t are still not 
internalised. Where existent, internalisa tion schemes are not co-ordinated between 
modes and Member States. Moreover, many taxes and subsidies which have been 
designed without the interna lisation goal in view have  a distorting effect on 
behaviour. 
• Inadequate research policy : In spite of the substantial efforts dedicated to transport 
research policy and the promising results being obtained, a wide variety of market 
and regulatory failures hinder the fast  development and deployment of key 
technologies for sustainable mobility. 
• Inefficiency of transport services : The achievement of a single, integrated and 
efficient transport system is delayed t oday by a number of remaining regulatory 
and market failures such as regulatory barr iers to market entrance or burdensome 
administrative procedures which hamper th e efficiency and the competitiveness of 
multimodal and cross-border transport. Besi des, investments to modernise the rail 
network and the transhipment facilities ha ve been insufficient to address the 
bottlenecks in multimodal transport. Modal networks continue to be poorly integrated. TEN-T policy has lacked financ ial resources and a true European and 
multimodal perspective. 
• Lack of integrated transport planning
: When taking land-use planning or location 
decisions both at local level and at continental level, public authorities and 
                                                 
1 for more than 95% of its needs worldwide and 96% in EU-27. 
 
EN 3   EN companies often do not properly take in to account the consequences of their 
choices on the operation of the transport system as a whole, which typically 
generates inefficiencies. 
2. ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY  
4. Pursuant to Articles 90 and 91 of the TFEU, the Common Transport Policy should 
contribute to the broader objectives of th e Treaties. The prime objectives of the 
Common Transport Policy are to complete the internal market for transport, ensure 
sustainable development, promote a better te rritorial cohesion and integrated spatial 
planning, improve safety and de velop international cooperation. 
5. The issues being addresse d by the White Paper on Tran sport have transnational 
aspects which cannot be dealt with satisfactorily by Member States only. These aspects need to be coordinated at EU le vel. The identified problems have different 
spatial effects and strong variability meaning that impacts across the EU could vary considerably. There is a need to ensure th at solidarity is enshrined in the future 
transport policies. 
6. Due its scale, action at EU level can leverage greater results and magnify the efforts 
in many domains such as capacity building, research, information and data gathering, 
exchange of best practice, development and cooperation. 
3. O
BJECTIVES OF EU INITIATIVE  
7. The general policy objective of this initiativ e is to define a long-term strategy that 
would transform the EU transport system into a sustainable system by 2050. This 
general objective can be translated  into more specific objectives:  
(a) A reduction of GHG emissions  that is consistent with the long-term 
requirements for limiting climate change to 2 °C2 and with the overall target 
for the EU of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to 1990. Transport-related emissions of CO
23 should be reduced by around 60% by 
2050 compared to 19904. 
(b) A drastic decrease in the oil dependency ratio  of transport-related activities by 
2050 as requested by the EU 2020 St rategy for transport calling for 
“decarbonised transport ”.  
(c) Limit the growth of congestion . 
8. The first two objectives overlap to a larg e extent, and should be considered the 
absolute priority in line with the Res ource Efficiency Flagship of the EU 2020 
                                                 
2 The “Low-carbon economy 2050 roadmap” identifies a path for the reduction of the EU GHG 
emissions by 80% by 2050 with respect to 1990 . In the "Effective and widely accepted technology" 
scenario it is foreseen that the transport sector redu ces its emissions by around 60%, industry by around 
80%, the residential sector and services by around 90%, and power generation by over 90%. 
3 The references to transport-related CO 2 emissions relate only to tank-to-wheel emissions.  
4 As most GHG emissions from transport are CO2 emissions, this target can be considered as equivalent 
to the target of reducing GHG emissions by 60%, as expressed in the Impact Assessment on “Low-
carbon economy 2050 roadmap”. 
 
EN 4   EN Strategy. There are, however, also significant synergies with the th ird objective that 
would typically call for a more extens ive use of non-motorised and of public 
transport, which reduces both the use of space and the use of energy. 
9. A the same time, the achievement of the sp ecific policy objectives  identified above 
should ensure that that "current and futu re generations have access to safe, secure, 
reliable and affordable mobility resources to meet their own needs and aspirations"5. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS  
10. On the basis of the ex post evaluati on and stakeholders ’ consultation, the 
Commission has identified se ven policy areas in which concrete policy measures 
could have a key role in s timulating the expected shift of the transport system to 
another paradigm: pricing, taxation, res earch and innovation, e fficiency standards 
and flanking measures, internal market , infrastructure a nd transport planning. 
11. To determine appropriate EU policy ac tion, the Commission ha s considered the 
possible application of isolat ed intervention in either one of the seven policy areas 
identified above. However, it appears that none of the categories of instruments alone 
or in combination would be capable of tack ling at the same time and in a satisfactory 
way all the various problem drivers and all the elements of the specific policy 
objective. 
12. Following the above considerations, in a ddition to the “no new policy” option – 
Policy Option 1, three policy options have been designed to reach the same 60% CO 2 
emissions reduction target, and retained fo r detailed assessment. All three options 
envisage action in all seven policy areas and have in common a certain number of 
initiatives. What distinguishes them is th e intensity of intervention that, depending on 
the option, is higher in some speci fic field and lower in others. 
13. Policy Option 3 is designed to show the eff ect of policies that emphasise the rapid 
deployment of new powertrains, by imposing very stringent CO 2 standards on new 
vehicles and by accompanying them with ap propriate innovation policies putting in 
place the necessary framework conditions. It is  assumed that this approach would be 
the most effective in reducing the costs and the time of introduction of new technologies. 
14. Policy Option 2 is designed to show the effect of policies that rely less on 
performance standards and on active t echnological deployment and more on 
managing mobility and on carbon pricing. It is assumed that the industry will not 
outperform the less stringent CO
2 standards for vehicles and that the necessary 
reduction in emission is achieved – in additi on to the full pricing of externalities and 
to the elimination of tax distortions – by letting the carbon price rise by the necessary 
amount. This could be taken to represent the effect of high carbon taxation or of the introduction of a transport specific cap and trade system. In case of very high carbon 
price, the effect would be equivalent to restrictions in “fossil fuel” mobility and 
forced modal shift to clean modes. 
                                                
 
5 SEC(2010) 1606 final (14 D ecember 2010) Commission Staff Work ing Document, "A European 
Strategy for Clean and Energy Efficient Vehicles - Rolling Plan",  
 
EN 5   EN 15. Policy Option 4 represents an intermediate approach. It has values for CO 2 standards 
and technology deployment in between those of Option 2 and 3. It has full pricing of 
externalities and elimination of tax distor tions as in Option 2, but the additional 
carbon price element is only applied in the urban context in the form of a shadow price acting as a proxy for a wide-range of possible demand management measures. 
5. A
SSESSMENT OF IMPACTS  
16. It is important to note that the assessm ent of impact of the policy options is 
surrounded by a significant degree of uncertain ty, owing to the very long – 40-year – 
time horizon and to the influence of factors that are difficult to predict or quantify: 
the many synergies and trade-offs be tween policy measur es; the long-term 
technological developments; and the role on welfare of mobility and environmental 
amenities. 
17. The table below presents an synoptic pres entation of the different impacts of the 
policy options considered in what concerns other economic, social and 
environmental impacts: 
Summary table of impacts 
 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Economic impacts    
Transport as a business 
Transport activity 
Modal shift 
Unit costs per user  
-- 
++ 
---  
= 
= 
=  
- 
+ 
-- 
Of transport dynamics on: 
Economic growth 
Efficiency of the transport system 
Congestion 
Household transport costs 
Transport-related sectors  
++ 
++ 
++ 
-- 
+  
+ 
+ 
= 
- 
+++  
+++ 
+++ 
+ 
-- 
+++ 
Innovation and Research + +++ ++ 
Reduction of administrative burden + = + 
EU budget = = = 
International relations -- - - 
Social impacts    
Mobility of citizens 
Degree of mobility 
Choice  
--- 
++  
= 
=  
- 
++ 
Accessibility ++ = ++ 
Distributional impacts = - + 
Employment level and conditions ++ ++ +++ 
Safety ++ = + 
 
EN 6   EN Environmental impacts     
Climate change +++ +++ +++ 
Air pollution +++ ++ ++ 
Noise pollution +++ ++ + 
Energy use/energy efficiency +++ ++ +++ 
Renewable energy use + +++ ++ 
Biodiversity + - = 
Legend:  
= baseline or equivalent to Policy Option 1 
+ to +++ low to high improvement compared to Policy Option 1 
- to - - - low to high worsening compared to Policy Option 1 
18. The table above shows that: 
– From an economic point of view, Policy Option 4 seems to  be overall preferable. 
In fact, while achieving the CO 2 target at higher costs th an Policy Option 3, it has 
lower congestion costs and the overall benefi ts of a less distorted pricing system. 
– Also from a social point of view, Polic y Option 4 would be the most desirable. 
Compared to Policy Option 2, it does not aff ect drastically the present lifestyles 
and organisation of society and is therefore expected to have lower social costs of 
adaptation to new circumstances. 
– From an environmental point of view, Policy Option 2 is the most ambitious 
option since it covers the broadest range of environmental impacts. 
6. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS  
19. In terms of effectiveness , Policy Option 2 offers indeed the most appropriate pallet of 
actions to meet the defined objectives. 
20. As regards the resource efficiency objective (CO 2 target and oil dependency), since 
all three Policy Options have been designed to reach the 60% target, they are all effective. However, it must be noted at th is stage that Policy Option 3 is highly 
dependent on the successful uptake on large scale of alternative fuels whereas Policy 
Option 2 is the option which is the least expos ed to technology risk, and hence can be 
considered more reliable in ach ieving the GHG emission target.  
21. Policy Option 2 offers the best possibilities  to limit the growth of congestion thanks 
to its strong focus on policy measures covering demand management and system 
improvement. In Policy Option 3, which ha s a strong technology focus, congestion 
still represents a high cost to the society. 
22. In terms of efficiency
, the model provides an indication of the total costs of transport 
of each Policy Option. These costs includ e: capital costs related to transport 
equipment, infrastructure costs for the ch arging and refuelling of electric propulsion 
 
EN 7   EN vehicles6, fixed operation costs, variable operation  costs (including fu el costs), users’ 
disutility, and external costs of conge stion, air pollution, noise and accidents. 
23. The modelling results indicate that, compared  to Policy Option 1, the total costs of 
transport so defined would be the highest  in Policy Option 2, adding an additional 
1,193 billion € by 2050. Policy Option 4 follows  adding 1,012 billion € and Policy 
Option 3 about 640 billion €.  
24. The calculation of total costs – and theref ore the comparison between options – does 
not include research and development costs and infrastructure costs referred to the 
upgrade and possible extensi on of the network. Moreover , they exclude transfer 
payments to the budget (i.e. excise duties, value added taxes, registration taxes and 
other ownership taxes, charges, payments for CO 2 allowances in aviation under the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme, etc.), which are additional costs for the user, but a 
transfer from the point of view of society.  
25. An estimation of network infrastructure costs will be established by the Commission 
as part of the revision of the TEN-T gui delines and therefore only a rough estimate 
can be offered at this stage. Investment in  the network designed to serve the transport 
system up to 2050 would need to be put in place much earlier. The cost of EU 
infrastructure development to match the demand for transport has been estimated at 
over € 1.5 trillion for 2010-2030. The comple tion of the TEN-T network requires 
about € 550 billion until 2020 out  of which some € 215 billion can be referred to the 
removal of the main bottlenecks. 
26. In terms of coherence , Policy Option 4 offers a more balanced solution to the trade-
offs across the economic, social, and environmental domains.  
7. CONCLUSION  
27. In general terms, the modelling exercise shows that several po licy instruments need 
to be used to put the transport sy stem on a sustainable path, lowering CO 2 emissions, 
oil dependency and congestion.  It also shows that policy action has to be very 
ambitious to reach the objective.  
28. In light of the above, Policy Option 3 is discarded, despite being the less expensive 
option to reach the 60% target. This is b ecause it incorporates a high degree of 
uncertainty associated with  the technological component . It also contemplates 
delayed or weak action on pricing, whic h would compromise the possibility of 
bringing about the structural change that  undistorted price signals can determine. 
Finally, it is not sufficiently effective in re ducing the cost of congestion to the society 
in comparison with Policy Options 2 and 4. 
29. Modelling results do not point to huge di fferences in terms of additional costs 
between Policy Option 2 and Policy Option 4, and indeed the two options have many 
elements in common. The preference is gi ven to Policy Option 4 since it offers the 
advantage of greater balance between system improvement and technological 
                                                 
6 The investment required for develo ping the electric road tr ansport infrastructure is  estimated at roughly 
140 billion € in Policy Option 3, followed by Policy Option 4 with about 120 billion and Policy Option 
2 with about 80 billion.  
 
EN 8   EN development. Policy Option 4 would avoid the creation of a pervasive command and 
control approach to mobility, but it w ould not refrain from  eliminating price 
distortions by internalising external cost  of transport and by introducing smarter 
taxation. 
30. However, Policy Option 2 is not formally discarded. Indeed, as said above, all Policy 
Options include a technology component that  is low in Policy Option 2, moderate in 
Policy Option 4 and high in Policy Option 3. In this respect, if the technology does 
not deliver as it is projected in Policy Option 4, an approach  closer to that in Policy 
Option 2 will be necessary in orde r to achieve the 60% target by 2050. 
8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
31. The Commission will properl y evaluate and review th e White Paper on transport 
policy in line with the evaluation and revi ew of the EU 2020 strategy. In addition, the 
Commission will constantly monitor a set of core transport indicators. 
32.