COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 28.06.1995 
COM(95) 306 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA 

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The purpose of this Communication is to show that a peaceful and successful transition 
to a market economy and political pluralism in Cuba requires the forging of new 
international and regional bonds, and that, by virtue of its very size, the EU is well 
placed to play a leading part in that process. 
With the collapse of COMECON in 1989 Cuba was cast adrift from its international 
moorings, creating a climate of change that has already seen a number of economic 
reforms adopted, with others in the pipeline. 
Opening up all aspects of Cuban life to the outside world will have a far-reaching, if 
gradual, impact in terms of social change. EU policy, here as elsewhere, must be based 
on the firm conviction that human rights are better understood and better protected in 
societies in which goods, investment, individuals and ideas circulate freely. Provided 
Cuba continues its policy of opening up to the world, the EU should do its best to 
encourage this trend, by fostering dialogue and promoting Cuba's active participation 
in the activities of the international community in all political and economic fields. 
This paper covers the economic and political situation in Cuba, relations between the 
European Union and Cuba and incorporates a Commission proposal for the creation of 
an EU/Cuba dialogue. 
I. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN CUBA 
A. ECONOMIC SITUATION 
a) Developments since 1989 and reforms introduced to date 
With the collapse of COMECON in 1989 Cuba was cast adrift from its 
international moorings, losing at one stroke not only its main supplier but also 
its principal customer. A terrible crisis ensued, and by 1993, Cuba was 
importing and exporting nearly four times less than in 1989. 
However, the Castro regime has confounded widespread expectations by 
surviving the disappearance of its communist bloc allies. 
This can be ascribed to: 
- the fear shared by a large part of the Cuban people of a return to "hardline" 
capitalism via an uncontrolled economic transition dictated by Miami-based 
capital and leading to a loss of sovereignty and even identity; 
- the emergence of a group of reformers who appear to be extending and 
consolidating their position; 
- the adoption, at this group's behest, of a series of economic reforms which, 
although inadequate and incomplete, at least go some way towards 
rationalization, the liberalization of economic ties with the rest of the world 
and the beginnings of a private enterprise culture. Some of these measures, 
such as the liberalization of agricultural markets and the possession of 
foreign currency, seem to be have been adopted to provide a springboard 
for future reforms (the main reforms adopted are listed in annex A). 
This process has already yielded tangible results. For example, the Cuban 
peso, which stood at 130 to one US dollar on the black market in July 1994, 
has now recovered to 30 to the dollar. The latest figures show the Cuban 
economy performing slightly better. 
That said, the crisis unleashed in 1989 has had a profound impact on the social 
security and education systems that Cuba had built up, although the authorities 
give the utmost priority to maintaining the highest possible standards of public 
health and education. 
b) Scheduled economic reforms 
A number of major reforms are planned for this summer: 
- Reform of the law on foreign investment 
The revised legislation will simplify the administrative formalities 
governing foreign investment, allowing foreign investors to take 100% 
control of businesses in most sectors and liberalizing working conditions. 
- Extension of the law on small-scale private enterprise. 
A law passed in July 1993 authorized Cubans to set up "for their own 
account" in around 100 independent professions. The scheduled amendment 
will extend the law to other professions, but more importantly will allow 
graduates, hitherto ineligible, to benefit from the arrangement. 
- Launch of a major business restructuring programme 
This programme will involve privatizing companies that can attract a 
majority foreign capital stake, making most of them "autonomous" and 
closing down those that cannot be made profitable. Top Cuban officials 
have announced that this operation will entail redundancy for 500 000 
workers, who will have to find new employment chiefly by developing 
private initiatives. 
A transition of this kind will require a considerable sacrifice on the part of 
the Cuban people, and may well provoke a degree of social unrest. 
B. THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION 
The Cuban government remains unbound by democratic constraints whether 
institutional, constitutional, or related to the fundamental freedoms (of 
association, speech, expression and opinion). 
Several reports by the Member States' Ambassadors address the issue of 
Cuba's political detainees. At the moment there are several hundred of them; 
they receive the same treatment as normal prisoners, and although there have 
been complaints about psychological pressure and biased and over-expeditious 
trials, cases of physical ill-treatment are extremely rare. 
Aside from the issue of political prisoners, Cuba has not ratified the main 
international conventions on human rights and the Castro regime continues to 
exercise considerable control over the Cuban people, although there are signs 
that it is already waning as a result of the economic reforms. Government 
repression is primarily focused on preventing the emergence of an organized 
opposition. 
During his recent visit to France (15 March), Fidel Castro agreed to allow the 
NGO France-Libertés to conduct a mission to assess the plight of Cuba's 
political prisoners. Senior representatives of France-Libertés, the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Médecins du Monde and Human Rights 
Watch/Americas duly visited Cuba from 28 April to 5 May, during which 
time the team was able to meet 24 political prisoners of its own choosing. 
The team was aggrieved to discover that political prisoners were mixed in with 
criminal offenders, and noted that their sentences were very harsh and trials 
often over-expeditious. On the other hand, none of the prisoners they met had 
been physically ill-treated when being examined, although they did complain 
of psychological pressure tactics, including solitary confinement. 
The team discussed these issues at some length with Fidel Castro, and 
proposed continuing its work in Cuba in collaboration with the authorities. 
Following the mission, a number of political prisoners were freed, including 
Sebastian Arcos, founder of the Comité pro Derechos Humanos de Cuba. In 
view of Mr Arcos' symbolic status, his unconditional release was interpreted 
as indicating that a degree of domestic opposition would be tolerated. 
Another interesting development is the emergence of large numbers of NGOs 
over the past few years in Cuba. 
While many of them are clearly extensions of the administration, and as such 
do not really qualify as NGOs in the European sense, others have nevertheless 
created themselves real room to manoeuvre; these are the first, hesitant signs 
of a civil society finding its voice. 
More recently, Mr Gutierrez Menoyo, the leader of the opposition group 
Cambio Cubano who now lives in exile in Miami after spending 22 years in a 
Cuban jail, visited Havana to take part in a seminar on "participatory 
democracy" with representatives of the Cuban government. After mee/ing 
President Castro, Mr Gutierrez Menoyo said that by holding this seminar in 
Cuba the regime had made a gesture of political openness. 
H. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA 
a) Introduction 
Cuba is now the only Latin American country with which the European Union 
has not concluded a cooperation agreement. However, there are no barriers to 
trade between the two parties, and Cuba benefits from the Community GSP 
scheme. Diplomatic relations are normal: 11 Member States have Embassies in 
Cuba, where the Commission is represented by the head of the Mexico 
Delegation. 
b) The Council 
The Council has debated the Cuba question a number of times over the past three 
years, often in response to reports received from Member States' Ambassadors. 
The position that has emerged from these debates is that relations with Cuba 
should reflect the transition process. 
c) The European Parlignfent 
Parliament has recorded its position on Cuba in two Resolutions. 
The Resolution of 15 September 1993 condemned the Tomcelli law, a piece of 
extraterritorial US legislation approved in 1992 with the aim of reinforcing the 
embargo, and stressed its concern to see greater respect for human rights on the 
island, calling on the European Union and Cuba to step up political, economic 
and cultural dialogue with a view to concluding a cooperation agreement as soon 
as possible. Parliament also called on the Commission to take immediate 
measures to encourage the liberalization of the Cuban economy. 
The Resolution of 29 September 1994, which was adopted against the backdrop 
of the boat people crisis, stressed the need for change in Cuba, welcomed the 
first contacts between the government and Cuban exiles, and called on the United 
States to lift its embargo to prevent social upheaval on the island. 
Parliament also urged the EU to make more provision for Cuba in its regional 
cooperation programmes and to start talks with the Cuban government without 
delay with a view to concluding a framework cooperation agreement. 
From these two Resolutions it is clear that the European Parliament believes that 
a successful, peaceful transition to a market economy and political pluralism in 
Cuba will require the active support of the European Union to help bind the 
island republic back into the international community. 
d) The Member States 
Most Member States maintain strong bilateral economic ties with Cuba and 
actively encourage their companies to establish themselves in the Cuban market 
through measures such as business delegations, agreements on the protection of 
investment and export credits. 
A considerable proportion of the 200 or so joint ventures set up in Cuba over the 
past few years have been created at the initiative of European companies. 
Annex C lists the main international agreements concluded between Cuba and the 
Member States and details recent political or economically inspired visits to the 
island by representatives of the Member States and some private bodies. 
e) Community action: humanitarian aid and ad hoc support for the reforms 
Before 1993 there was virtually no cooperation with Cuba, the sole exception 
being an indirect contribution of food aid via the World Food Programme. 
Starting in 1993, in response to positions adopted by the Member States in the 
context of Political Cooperation and the Parliament Resolutions cited above, the 
Commission introduced a humanitarian aid programme plus a series of ad hoc 
measures tailored to Cuba's specific needs and aimed at supporting the reform 
process. 
Humanitarian aid activities are carried out by the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), with the aim of helping the most vulnerable of the 
Cuban people (women, children, the sick and the elderly). This aid is channelled 
through European NGOs who carry out projects approved by the Commission 
from start to finish. The European Parliament has on a number of occasions 
endorsed these aid activities, the effectiveness of which was recently emphasized 
by the Member States' Ambassadors in Havana when the Commissioner for 
Humanitarian Aid visited Cuba. 
In 1993 ECU 5 million was allocated to humanitarian aid to Cuba, a figure which 
rose to ECU 14 million in 1994. Expert opinion, including that of the Member 
States' Ambassadors to Cuba, is unanimous in calling for the continuation of 
these aid activities in view of the social and economic conditions on the island. 
The amount allocated to humanitarian aid in 1995 should be the same as in 1994. 
Ad hoc cooperation measures have primarily focused on projects implemented 
through European NGOs, whose presence on the ground serves as an example 
that encourages the tentative Cuban grassroots. ECU 2.5 million was allocated to 
these NGO projects in 1994, a level of financing that should be maintained this 
year. 
There have also been isolated economic cooperation projects to support the 
reforms, for example the programme to train business managers in the ways of a 
market economy that starts this October, which will give 120 Cubans a Master's 
degree in the disciplines concerned. Another example is the weekly television 
show Espacio Europa, comprising a European film and a summary of the week's 
European news. The funds allocated to this type of cooperation have progressed 
from ECU 0.5 million in 1994 to around ECU 5 million this year. Furthermore, 
Parliament has created two special budget headings (for Cuban SMEs and Cuban 
NGOs). A pilot structural food aid programme supporting the relaunch certain 
sectors of agriculture may be implemented in the next few months. 
m. CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS 
a) The United States 
Relations between the United States and Cuba are progressing slowly, but 
continue to generate controversy in the US. One school of thought maintains that 
economic emigration can be slowed and the pace of economic reform stepped up 
by adopting a constructive approach. In the other camp, the draft "Cuban Liberty 
and Democracy Solidarity Act of 1995" (also known as the "Helms-Burton" bill) 
advocates a policy of confrontation and isolation. The EU has clearly stated its 
fundamental objection to this bill. 
The US embargo is not smoothing Cuba's path towards a market economy and 
political pluralism. Normal trade with the USA would bring increased daily 
contact and would undoubtedly encourage the transition process. 
The embargo is instead blocking the Cuban reform process, a state of affairs that 
the Helms-Burton bill would only aggravate. The bill is still being assessed, but 
if it were to be adopted, it would have the following repercussions: 
- unilateral internationalization of the embargo (through extra-territorial 
provisions designed to discourage companies from third countries from trading 
with Cuba); 
- Intensification of the dispute between Cuba and the US with regard to the 
expropriation of the property of US nationals and Cuban exiles that have 
acquired US citizenship. 
The current status of this dispute is clearly delineated. To be eligible claims 
had to be submitted following a given procedure before 1972. Some 5 911 
such claims have been endorsed, with 38 companies accounting for around 
86% of the total amount claimed from Cuba. It is the fact that the process is 
closed and the number of claimants fairly limited that renders negotiations 
between the two States possible, and it is worth noting that Cuba has 
concluded compensation agreements with other countries whose nationals 
sustained losses. 
Numerous indicators suggest that the reformers will be unable to achieve a 
decisive qualitative and quantitative breakthrough unless Cuba is offered a 
chance to re-define its international relations in terms of the new world 
situation. 
The current US administration is openly opposed to the Helms-Burton bill, 
favouring a more subtle policy suggested by the recent agreement on 
migration, President Clinton's appointment of a special envoy, and Warren 
Christopher's statements to Congress in which he discerned the first, tentative 
moves towards a market economy in Cuba. 
Moreover, the US press (note the New York Times, 17 May 1995) referred to 
a recent internal Pentagon report on Cuba, a 300-page paper entitled "The 
Military and Transition in Cuba: Reference Guide for Policy and Crisis 
Management".1 The report states that Cuba has entered into an historic 
transitional phase in which Fidel Castro is a key player, and that American 
strategic interests call for support for the economic and political reforms now 
under way rather than punitive sanctions. This analysis would seem to be 
endorsed by the National Security Council. 
US public opinion is also increasingly agreed on the need for a positive 
approach to die Cuban question. Over the last two years, a total of USD 65 
million has been channelled into Cuba through the activities of NGOs, 
churches and other charities. 
b) Mexico 
Cuba enjoys privileged relations with Mexico. There are frequent official visits in 
both directions, and Fidel Castro was present at the investiture of President 
Ernesto Zedillo. Mexico has a strong economic presence in Cuba; by way of 
example, a major Mexican industrial group recently took a 50% stake in 
Telefonica Cubana. Numerous bilateral agreements link the two countries, 
including agreements on oil supplies. 
see The New York Times of 17 May 1995. 
c) Canada 
Canada has been stepping up its relations with Cuba. Ricardo Alarcôn, the 
President of the Cuban National Assembly, and Roberto Robaina, the Foreign 
Minister, recently went on an official trip to Canada, which was reciprocated by 
the Canadian junior foreign affairs minister's visit to Cuba. 
Canada has just reinstated development cooperation with Cuba and is currently 
assessing the first NGO projects. Canadian companies are well represented in 
Cuba, and the two countries have just initialled an agreement on the protection 
and promotion of investment. 
d)ÇAKfÇQM 
In April 1993, despite pressure brought to bear by certain sectors of American 
political opinion, a Cuba/Caricom Joint Committee was set up to debate issues of 
mutual interest and seek common solutions. 
Caricom also strongly supported Cuba's application to become a full member of 
the Association of Caribbean States. 
The Joint Committee has suggested that Cuba might participate as a provider of 
technical assistance in certain regional cooperation projects in the Caribbean 
funded by international donors such as the IDB, the World Bank and the 
European Community. 
IV. CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH THE EU: THE WAY FORWARD 
By virtue of its very size the EU is probably the best placed of Cuba's partners to 
initiate measures to accompany the reforms. If we prepare the ground thoroughly 
with our Cuban partners and their neighbours, the EU could launch a programme 
that would succeed in drawing in other major partners such as Canada, Mexico, 
the Rio Group and Caricom. 
An initiative along these lines would thus have the effect of binding a newly 
pluralist Cuba firmly into the international community, which is essential if there 
is to be a decisive breakthrough in the internal transition process. 
The first step would be to initiate a dialogue, a series of consultations with Cuban 
representatives aimed at establishing an appropriate framework and level for 
EU/Cuba relations, taking account of developments on the economic and 
institutional reform front. 
A dialogue of this kind would provide a forum for a thorough exchange of views 
on the reforms, the development of a civil society, and measures to safeguard and 
extend private initiative and personal freedom. 
Another subject to be debated is the future development of EU/Cuba relations 
and the type of framework that would be appropriate. 
This would enable the parties jointly to examine the nature of the accompanying 
measures from which Cuba would wish to benefit in pursuit of its liberalization 
and reform process. 
If the Council of Ministers endorses this approach, the Commission will start 
exploratory talks to identify the kind of framework that should be given to future 
EU/Cuba relations. 
10 
ABSSZLA 
IHEMAIN REFORMS 
The main economic reforms adopted by Cuba were described as follows in an 
Economist Intelligence Unit publication of December 1994 entitled Cuba: prospects for 
reform, trade and investment (p. 19): 
Chronology of economic change 
February 1982: The Council of State 
approves Legislative Decree No. 50 on 
Economic Associations between Cuban 
and Foreign Entities. This authorises 
foreign investment through joint 
ventures, but very little interest is 
generated. 
April 1987: The tourism corporation 
Cubanacân is established independently 
from the National Tourism Institute 
with a brief to find foreign partners for 
hotel projects. 
December 1989: The Berlin Wall 
comes down. Within a year the trading 
system Cuba built up with the Soviet 
bloc over 30 years is in ruins. 
May 1990: The first joint-venture hotel 
opens in Varadero, owned by the 
Spanish company Sol Meliâ and Cuba's 
Cubanacân. 
1990-92: Measures are introduced to 
decentralise the state trading system, 
with substantial autonomy granted to 
new corporations. Large numbers of 
state bureaucrats are laid off. Plans are 
developed for reforming the currency 
and reducing state subsidies. November 1990: For the first time at a 
trade fair, the Cuban Chamber of 
Commerce publicly promotes foreign 
investment in Cuba. 
October 1991: The Fourth Congress of 
the Cuban Communist Party proposes 
amendments to the Constitution (see 
below) and outlines a new economic 
strategy after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. 
July 1992: The National Assembly 
amends the Cuban constitution to 
protect foreign investment in Cuba; 
modify the concept of property and the 
state's economic role; end the state's 
monopoly of foreign trade; and 
recognise private enterprise when 
carried out by companies and economic 
associations. The Council of Ministers 
or its Executive Committee is given the 
right to transfer ownership of a given 
economic entity if doing so would 
facilitate economic development. 
July 1992: A new wholesale pricing 
system is introduced with the intention 
of reflecting the real cost of external 
production inputs. 
11 
February 1993: Cuba's first 
international oil licensing round is 
launched in Calgary and London. 
July 1993: Fidel Castro announces 
legislation of hard-currency use by 
Cubans and its free circulation in the 
country (Decree Law 140); the 
widening of openings for self-
employment in production and services; 
and the leasing of state land to private 
producers, to be worked by 
cooperatives or families. 
August 1993: In the biggest cabinet 
shake-up in recent Cuban history, the 
ministers of the sugar industry, 
agriculture, finance and 
communications are replaced. May 1994: The National Assembly 
announces a radical fiscal package 
designed to balance the state budget by 
raising prices and cutting subsidies to 
loss-making state enterprises. 
June 1994: The Canadian minerals 
corporation Sherritt and the Cuban state 
enterprise General Nickel Co; agree to 
establish a jointly owned enterprise to 
mine, refine and market nickel. The 
jointly owned assets include nickel-
refining plants in Cuba and Canada, 
and nickel and cobalt concessions in 
Cuba. 
July 1994: The Association of 
Caribbean States is formed, with Cuba 
as a founding member. 
December 1993: The Council of State 
approves the sale of land to the 
Mexican company Cemex as part of an 
agreement to invest in the Mariel 
cement works. August 1994: The National Assembly 
announces the introduction of taxes on 
property and income for the first time 
since 1967, to become effective in early 
1995. 
March 1994: The Netherlands 
Caribbean Bank NV - joint venture 
between ING Bank of the Netherlands 
and Cuba's Acemex Group - is granted 
a licence to open a representative office 
in Havana, the first foreign involvement 
in Cuban since nationalisation in 
1960/61. 
April 1994: Seven new ministries are 
created and others abolished in a major 
reorganisation. A minister for tourism 
is appointed for the first time. September 1994: Defence Minister 
Raul Castro announces that free 
markets in agricultural products will be 
permitted beginning October 1, 
encompassing the entire agricultural 
sector. 
October 1994: The government states 
that scarce manufactures and consumer 
goods may henceforth be sold directly 
to the public by individuals and local 
state industries, with traders, not the 
state, setting prices. As with trade in 
agricultural products, vendors will have 
to pay a tax on sales and the markets 
will operate in Cuban pesos. 
12 
In addition to the above measures, most State-run farms have been turned into 
administratively independent cooperatives called unidodes hâsicas de production 
agricola which are based on the distribution of land ownership rights among the 
cooperative members, who are entitled to sell part of their produce on the free 
agricultural market set up in October 1994. 
In a speech to the Federation de las Mujeres Cubanas in February this year, Fidel 
Castro announced that the market economy measures already introduced were 
permanent, that other such measures would follow and that the Cuban people must 
brace itself for a wave of redundancies (500 000 jobs are set to be axed over the next 
few months) which would be absorbed by increased foreign investment and greater 
freedom for private enterprise. 
In another noteworthy development, the first conference with moderate Cuban exiles 
was held in Havana in April 1994, and a second meeting is set for November this year. 
13 
Annex B 
THK HKLMS-BURTON BILL 
Introduction 
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995 proposed by Senator Jesse 
Helms is currently before Congress, and could become law in July. 
The main provisions 
The proposed law purports to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy by stepping 
up the pressure on Cuba by: 
allowing US citizens to make representations to a special committee claiming 
expropriation of their property without compensation, even if those citizens were 
of Cuban nationality when their property was expropriated; 
allowing citizens making such representations to have any foreign national that has 
benefited, however indirectly, from the expropriated property, indicted for 
damages and interest up to three times the value of the property. By way of 
example, a European hotel company could be ordered to pay damages and interest 
to a Cuban farmer and naturalized American on whose expropriated field the 
Cuban government has built a hotel subsequently leased to the European company; 
refusing US entry visas to representatives of foreign companies (including spouses 
and children) that have "trafficked" (i.e. benefited even very indirectly) with 
expropriated goods; 
banning US banks and their subsidiaries from making loans to those foreign 
nationals; 
reducing US aid to Russia and the newly independent States in proportion to their 
aid to Cuba (including the rent paid by Russia for its use of the Lourdes military 
base and radio surveillance station which, according to the Clinton administration, 
is needed by the Russians to monitor US compliance with disarmament 
agreements); 
reducing US contributions to international financial institutions that lend to Cuba; 
banning US imports of sugar products from countries that import Cuban sugar. 
Some of these provisions overtly contravene established principles of international law 
and the rules of the WTO, and are designed to internationalize the embargo 
unilaterally. 
14 
Initial international response 
Many countries, including Canada, Mexico and a number of EU Member States, have 
officially protested to the US authorities about the Helms bill. To cite two such 
reactions at EU level, on 15 March 1995 Sir Leon Brittan wrote to Warren Christopher 
expressing the Commission's profound objection to the bill, a position which was 
endorsed by a Statement issued by the Presidency on behalf of the Union on 5 April. 
The Clinton administration has responded very vehemently to the bill in a 
memorandum that stresses that its provisions are illegal, would not encourage a 
peaceful transition in Cuba, and (with reference to the measures affecting Russia) could 
well harm the USA's broader security interests. 
15 
Annex C 
International agreements between Cuba and EU Member States 
and politically and economically inspired visits to Cuba bv representatives 
of the Member States and certain private bodies 
Below are listed.by way of an example, some of the most recent political and economic 
visits as well as the most important and/or recently concluded bilateral agreements: 
Visits 
Germany: 
A delegation from the Federal Ministry of Trade to discuss an agreement on the 
protection and promotion of investment (1994). 
Klaus Jurgen Hedrich, State Secretary at the Ministry of Aid and Development 
(1994). 
- Lothar Bisky, PDS President (1994). 
A high-level delegation from the Mercedes-Benz Group (1994). 
Denmark: 
- Lasse Budtz, President of the Social Democratic Party's international relations 
committee (1995). 
Spain: 
- Apolonio Ruiz Ligero, State Secretary for foreign trade (1994). 
José Luis Dicenta, State Secretary for international and Iberian-American 
cooperation (1994). 
- Carmen Alborch, Minister of Culture (1994). 
France: 
- Michel Charasse, Senator and presidential adviser (1994). 
- Jean-Pierre Desgeorges, President of the CNPF International, heading a large 
business delegation (1995). 
- Danielle Mitterand (1995). 
Finland: 
Petri Tuomi Nikula, Chancellory Director of Cultural Affairs (1994). 
Greece: 
Elizabeth Papazoi, Deputy Minister of the Environment (1994). 
16 
Italy: 
Massimo Velloti, President of the Italian Confederation of Farmers (1994). 
- Ludo Rattazzi, President of Air Europe (1994). 
Netherlands: 
Hans Fortuin, divisional head at the Ministry of Economic Affairs (1994). 
Klaas de Jong, director of the trade and industry department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and the Environment (1994). 
Director of the Tourism and Transport Institute (1994). 
Willi van Wout, President Foreign Trade Centre Institute. 
Mr De Vilder, President of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, leading a 35-
strong business delegation (1994). 
United Kingdom: 
Adrian Beamish, Under Secretary at the Foreign Ministry (1994). 
Ian Taylor, Minster of Trade and Technology, leading a large business delegation 
(1994). 
David Jessop, Director of the Caribbean Trade Advisory Group (1994). 
David Suratgar, Vice President of the Board of Morgan Grenfel International, Vice 
President of the West India Committee and President of Caribbean Council for 
Europe (1994). 
Baroness Young, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, leading a 40-strong business 
delegation. 
Sweden: 
Business delegation (1994). 
Pierre Chorri, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary for 
Cooperation (scheduled for June 1995). 
Bilateral treaties 
Austria: 
Debt consolidation agreement (20 February 1987). 
Agreement on air services (11 February 1992). 
Denmark: 
- Agreement on debt renegotiation (18 March 1987). 
17 
Spain: 
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (10 September 1978). 
- Trade Agreement (23 January 1979). 
Agreement on Cooperation on Culture and Education (17 March 1982). 
Agreement on cinematographic cooperation (18 January 1990). 
Agreement on the promotion and protection of investment (27 May 1994). 
France: 
- Agreement on debt consolidation (9 June 1987). 
- Agreement on air transport (13 October 1993). 
- Financial protocol (25 March 1994). 
Agreement on the promotion and protection of investment (currently under 
negotiation). 
Finland: 
Agreement on a cultural cooperation programme (17 March 1994). 
Italy: 
Agreement on restructuring the foreign debt (24 February 1987). 
Agreement on the protection of investments (7 May 1993). 
Netherlands: 
Agreement on air transport (3 February 1993). 
Air agreement between Cuba and the Netherlands Antilles (7 October 1993). 
Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments (currently under 
negotiation). 
Portugal: 
- Trade protocol (31 January 1980). 
Germany: 
Agreement on air transport (18 June 1993). 
- Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments (currently under 
negotiation). 
United Kingdom: 
- Agreement on debt consolidation (24 September 1987). 
Agreement on the promotion and protection of investments (30 January 1995). 
18 
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