COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION concerning the non-binding guide of good practice for implementing Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres

Article 11 of Directive 1999/92/EC [1] provides that the Commission shall draw up practical guidelines in a guide of good practice of a non-binding nature to assist the Member States, in pursuance of the Directive, in drawing up their national policies for the protection of the health and safety of workers, in particular as regards the topics referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, Annex I and Annex II, Part A. To discharge this duty, the Commission has produced a guide covering explosion prevention and protection, assessment of explosion risks, the employer's duties to safeguard the safety and health of workers, the duty of the employer responsible for the workplace to coordinate all measures where workers of several undertakings are present at the same workplace, zoning of places where explosive atmospheres may occur and the way in which the employer must produce the explosion protection document.

[1] OJ L 23, 28.1.2003.

In producing this guide, the Commission was assisted by the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work, which delivered a favourable opinion on 15 May 2003.

The Advisory Committee considers that the guide deals adequately with the fundamental questions, namely the identification of hazards, risk evaluation and the specific measures to be taken to safeguard the safety and health of workers exposed to explosive atmospheres. It also takes the view that the guide takes due account of the aspects enabling the "explosion protection document" to be drawn up, in particular by SMEs. Finally, it believes that the guide will assist employers responsible for workplaces at risk of the formation of explosive atmospheres in taking the measures needed to implement the necessary coordination where workers of several undertakings are present at the same workplace.

The Commission asks the Member States, in accordance with Article 11 of Directive 1999/92/EC, to take the greatest possible account of the guide in drawing up their national policies for the protection of the health and safety of workers and to ensure that it is distributed as widely as possible in interested circles.

COVER PAGE

Non-binding Guide of Good Practice for implementing of the European Parliament and Council Directive 1999/92/EC on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres

European Commission

DG Employment and Social Affairs

Health, Safety and Hygiene at Work

Final version April 2003

Preface

To create more and better jobs has always been an objective of the European Union. This objective was formally adopted by the Council at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 and it is one of the key elements to enhance the quality of work.

To confront the new challenges to social policy, resulting from the radical transformation of Europe's economy and society, the European Social Policy Agenda, endorsed by the Nice European Council, is based on the need to ensure a positive and dynamic interaction of economic, social and employment policies. The Social Policy Agenda must strengthen the role of social policy and enable it at the same time to be more effective in assuring the protection of individuals, the reduction of inequalities, and social cohesion. The Stockholm European Council addressed quality at work - the desire, not just to defend minimum standards, but to raise them and ensure a more equitable sharing of progress - as a key element in re-gaining full employment. In this context, safety and health at work constitutes one of the social policy issues on which the European Union has concentrated its efforts.

Fortunately, explosions and flash fires accidents are not the most common causes of accidents at work. However, their consequences are spectacular and dramatic in terms of human lives lost and economic costs.

The need to reduce the incidence of explosions and flash fires at work is prompted by both humanitarian and economic considerations and has led to the adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of the ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC. The humanitarian considerations are obvious: explosions and fires can cause hideous injuries and deaths. The economic considerations are contained in every study into the true costs of accidents, which all show that improved risk (health and safety) management can substantially increase company profits. This latter being particularly true where potential explosions are concerned.

Adoption of legislative measures is a part of the commitment to include health and safety of workers at work in the global approach to well-being at work. The European Commission combines a variety of instruments to consolidate a real culture of risk prevention.

This Guide of Good Practice is one of those instruments, and it was mandated by the European Parliament and the Council in Article 11 of the ATEX Directive: that the Commission shall draw up a practical guideline of non-binding nature. It may be used as the base for national guides aimed at helping small and medium enterprises to improve both their safety and their profitability.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to encourage all health and safety actors, and in particular national authorities and employers, to apply with responsibility and firmness this Directive in order to avoid, or at least to reduce to the minimum, the risks arising from explosive atmospheres and to create a good working environment.

Odile Quintin General Director

Contents

1. How to use this Guide

1.1 Relationship with Directive 1999/92/EC

1.2 Scope of the Guide

1.3 Pertinent regulations and further information

1.4 Official and non-official advice centres

2. Assessment of explosion risks

2.1 Methods

2.2 Assessment criteria

2.2.1 Are flammable substances present?

2.2.2 Can sufficient dispersal in air give rise to an explosive atmosphere?

2.2.3 Where can explosive atmospheres occur?

2.2.4 Is the formation of a hazardous explosive atmosphere possible?

2.2.5 Is the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres reliably prevented?

2.2.6 Is the ignition of hazardous explosive atmospheres reliably prevented?

3. Technical measures for explosion protection

3.1 Prevention of hazardous explosive atmospheres

3.1.1 Use of substitutes for flammable substances

3.1.2 Limiting of concentrations

3.1.3 Inerting

3.1.4 Preventing or limiting the formation of explosive atmospheres in the vicinity of plant

3.1.4.1 Removal of dust deposits

3.1.5 Gas alarms

3.2 Avoidance of ignition sources

3.2.1 Zoning of hazardous places

3.2.2 Extent of protective measures

3.2.3 Types of ignition source

3.3 Mitigation of the effects of explosions (mitigation measures)

3.3.1 Explosion resistant equipment

3.3.2 Explosion relief

3.3.3 Explosion suppression

3.3.4 Prevention of explosion propagation (explosion decoupling)

3.4 Application of process control engineering

3.5 Requirements for work equipment

3.5.1 Selection of work equipment

3.5.2 Assembly of work equipment

4. Organisational measures for explosion protection

4.1 Operating instructions

4.2 Worker competence

4.3 Training of workers

4.4 Worker supervision

4.5 Permit-to-work system

4.6 Maintenance

4.7 Inspection and surveillance

4.8 Marking of hazardous places

5. Coordination duties

5.1 Coordination arrangements

5.2 Protective measures to ensure safe cooperation

6 Explosion protection document

6.1 Requirements under Directive 1999/92/EC

6.2 Implementation

6.3 Specimen layout for an explosion protection document

6.3.1 Description of the workplace and working areas

6.3.2 Description of the process steps and/or activities

6.3.3 Description of the substances used / safety parameters

6.3.4 Results of the risk analysis

6.3.5 Explosion protection measures taken

6.3.6 Implementation of the explosion protection measures

6.3.7 Coordination of the explosion protection measures

6.3.8 Annex to the explosion protection document

ANNEXES

A.1 Glossary

A.2 Legislation, standards and sources of further information on explosion protection

A.2.1 European directives and guidelines

A.2.2 EU Member States' national regulations transposing Directive 1999/92/EC (items in italics to be completed by the Commission)

A.2.3 Selected European standards

A.2.4 Further national regulations and literature (to be completed by national authorities)

A.2.5 National advice centres (to be completed by national authorities)

A.3 Specimen forms and checklists

A.3.1 Checklist: Explosion protection inside apparatus

A.3.2 Checklist: Explosion protection around apparatus

A.3.3 Specimen: Permit-to-work form for work involving ignition sources in places with hazardous atmospheres

A.3.4 Checklist: Coordination for on-site explosion protection

A.3.5 Checklist: Tasks of the coordinator for on-site explosion protection

A.3.6 Checklist: Completeness of the explosion protection document

A.4 Text of the Directive in the appropriate language to be inserted by the Commission

INTRODUCTION

EXPLOSION PROTECTION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO SAFETY; SINCE EXPLOSIONS ENDANGER THE LIVES AND HEALTH OF WORKERS AS A RESULT OF THE UNCONTROLLED EFFECTS OF FLAME AND PRESSURE, THE PRESENCE OF NOXIOUS REACTION PRODUCTS, AND CONSUMPTION OF THE OXYGEN IN THE AMBIENT AIR, WHICH WORKERS BREATHE.

FOR THIS REASON, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COHERENT STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF EXPLOSIONS REQUIRES THAT ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES BE TAKEN AT THE WORKPLACE. FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE 89/391/EEC [2] REQUIRES THE EMPLOYER TO IMPLEMENT THE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION OF WORKERS, INCLUDING PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL RISKS, AND PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND TRAINING, AS WELL AS PROVISION OF THE NECESSARY ORGANISATION AND MEANS.

[2] Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989, on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, O.J. No L 183 of 29/06/1989, page 1.

It must be emphasised that compliance with the minimum requirements set out in the Directive does not guarantee compliance with the appropriate national laws. The Directive was adopted under Article 137 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and this Article expressly does not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaty.

1. HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE OF GOOD PRACTICE

Explosion hazards may arise in all undertakings which work with flammable substances. These include many input materials, intermediate products, final products and wastes from the routine work process, as shown in Figure 1.

This Guide of Good Practice should be used in conjunction with Directive 1999/92/EC [3], the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC and Directive 94/9/EC [4].

[3] Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1999, on the minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres, O.J. No L 23 of 28/01/2000, page 57.

[4] Directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, O.J. L100 of 19/04/1994, page 1.

Directive 1999/92/EC lays down the minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres. Article 11 of this Directive requires the Commission to draw up practical guidelines in a guide of good practice of a non-binding nature.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 1: Examples of situations in which explosive atmospheres arise [5]

[5] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

The Guide is primarily intended to assist Member States in drawing up their national policies for the protection of the health and safety of workers.

Its aim is thus to enable the employer, particularly Small and Medium Enterprises (SME's), to perform the following explosion protection functions:

to identify hazards and assess the risks;

to lay down specific measures to safeguard the safety and health of workers at risk from explosive atmospheres;

to ensure a safe working environment and appropriate surveillance during the presence of workers in accordance with the risk assessment;

to take the necessary steps and make the necessary arrangements for coordination when several firms are operating at the same workplace;

to produce an explosion protection document.

Virtually all branches are affected, since hazards from explosive atmospheres arise in a wide range of processes and operations. Examples are given in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Examples of explosion hazards in various branches

>TABLE POSITION>

An explosion occurs if a fuel is present in mixture with air (i.e. sufficient oxygen) within the explosion limits, together with a source of ignition (see Figure 1.2). It is to be noted that the directive has a special definition of "explosion" that includes those fires where combustion spreads to the entire unburnt mixture.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 1.2: Explosion triangle

In the event of an explosion, workers are at risk from uncontrolled flame and pressure effects in the form of heat radiation, flames, pressure waves and flying debris, and from harmful products of reaction and the depletion of the breathable oxygen in the ambient air.

Examples: 1. An explosion occurred during cleaning in a coal-fired boiler. The two workmen suffered fatal burns. The cause was found to be a lamp with a defective supply lead. The short-circuit ignited coal dust that had been raised into suspension.

2. Solvent-impregnated dusts were being blended in a mixer. The workman did not inert the mixer sufficiently before the start of the process. While the dust was being loaded into the mixer, an explosive mixture of solvent vapour and air was formed, and was ignited by electrostatic sparking generated during the filling process. This workman also suffered severe burns.

3. A fire occurred in a mill building. Ceiling penetrations allowed secondary fires to develop, giving rise to a dust explosion. Four workmen were injured and the whole building destroyed. The material damage amounted to EUR 600 000.

This Guide is a non-binding aid to protecting workers' lives and health against the danger of explosion.

1.1 Relationship with Directive 1999/92/EC

In accordance with Article 11 of Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres, this Guide addresses Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and Annexes I and II A of the Directive (see Annex 4). Table 1.2 is a concordance of the sections of this Guide with the Articles of the Directive.

Table 1.2: Match between Articles of the Directive and sections of this Guide (Annex 4 contains the original text of the Articles of the Directive)

>TABLE POSITION>

For ease of use, the order of sections in this Guide diverges from that of the Articles of 1999/92/EC at two points:

1. assessment of explosion risks in section 2 (Article 4 of the Directive) is discussed before explosion protection measures (Articles 3, 5-7 of the Directive);

2. means of preventing the ignition of hazardous explosive atmospheres are discussed in section 3.2 (Article 7, Annex I and II of the Directive) as part of the technical explosion protection measures under section 3 (Article 3 of the Directive).

1.2 Scope of the Guide

This Guide is intended for all undertakings in which working with flammable substances may give rise to hazardous explosive atmospheres and hence explosion hazards. It applies to work under atmospheric conditions. "Working" includes manufacture, treatment, processing, destruction, storage, readying, transhipment and in-house transportation in pipelines or by other means.

Note: In accordance with the legal definition of "explosive atmosphere" in Directive 1999/92/EC, this Guide applies only under atmospheric conditions. The Directive and Guide thus do not apply under non-atmospheric conditions, but the employer is certainly not absolved of his explosion protection duties under such conditions, to which the requirements of the other worker health and safety legislation continue to apply.

The discussion of the aspects of explosion protection addressed in the various sections is particularly geared to small firms. This Guide thus concentrates on conveying basic knowledge and principles, which are illustrated with brief examples. Specimen forms and checklists for firms can be found in Annex 3. Pertinent regulations and further sources of information are listed in Annex 2.

In accordance with Article 1 of Directive 1999/92/EC, this Guide does not apply to:

areas used directly for and during the medical treatment of patients;

the use of appliances burning gaseous fuels in accordance with Directive 90/396/EEC;

work with explosive substances or unstable chemical substances;

mineral-extracting industries covered by Directives 92/91/EEC or 92/104/EEC;

the use of means of transport by land, water and air to which the pertinent provisions of international agreements (e.g. ADNR, ADR, ICAO, IMO, RID), and the Community Directives giving effect to those agreements, apply. Means of transport intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere are not excluded.

Directive 94/9/EC applies to the placing on the market, putting into service and design of equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres.

1.3 Pertinent regulations and further information

Use of this Guide does not in itself ensure compliance with statutory explosion protection requirements in the various EU Member States. The authoritative instruments are the rules of law by which the Member States have transposed Directive 1999/92/EC. These may go beyond the minimum requirements of the Directive, on which this Guide is based.

In carrying out the duties under Article 8 of Directive 1999/92/EC, e.g. designing new equipment according to Directive 94/9/EC, consultation of the ATEX 94/9/EC websites is considered useful:

- http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/atex/ index.htm

- http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/atex/ whatsnew.htm

As a further aid to implementing the regulations by technical and organisational means, there are European standards (EN), which may be obtained from the national standardisation institutions against payment. A list is provided in Annex 2.2.

Further information can be obtained from the national regulations and standards and the pertinent literature. Annex 2.3 contains references to individual publications by the competent Member State authorities which are regarded as helpful and incorporated into the Guide. However, inclusion of a publication in the Annex need not mean that all of its content is entirely consistent with this Guide.

1.4 Official and non-official advice centres

Where this Guide does not answer questions arising on how to fulfil the explosion protection requirements, the national sources should be contacted directly. They include labour inspectorates, accident insurance agencies or associations and chambers of commerce, industry and craft trades.

2. ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION RISKS

Whenever possible, the employer should prevent the occurrence of explosive atmospheres. In order to comply with this highest priority as defined by Article 3 of Directive 1999/92/EC, the first step in assessing explosion risks is to determine whether a hazardous explosive atmosphere can arise under the circumstances obtaining. It must then be established whether it can ignite.

This assessment process must always relate to the individual case and cannot be generalised. The specific considerations according to Article 4 of Directive 1999/92/EC are the likelihood and duration of the occurrence of a hazardous explosive atmosphere, the likelihood that ignition sources will be present and become active and effective, the installations, substances used, processes, and their possible interactions, and the scale of the anticipated effects.

Note: Assessment of explosion risks initially focuses on:

* the likelihood that an explosive atmosphere will occur

and subsequently on

* the likelihood that sources of ignition will be present and become effective.

Consideration of the effects is of secondary importance in the assessment process, since explosions can always be expected to do a great deal of harm, ranging from major material damage to injury and death. Quantitative approaches to risk in explosion protection are secondary to the avoidance of hazardous explosive atmospheres.

The assessment procedure must be carried out for every work or production process and for every operational status and change of status of a plant. Assessment of new or existing plant should be based on the following operational statuses:

normal operating conditions, including maintenance;

commissioning and decommissioning;

malfunctions, foreseeable fault conditions;

misuse which may reasonably be foreseen.

Explosion risks must be assessed overall. Important factors are

the work equipment used;

the building fabric and configuration;

the substances used;

work and process conditions; and

their possible interactions with each other and the working environment.

Places which are or can be connected via openings to places in which explosive atmospheres may occur (hereafter "hazardous places") must also be taken into account in assessing explosion risks.

If an explosive atmosphere contains various flammable gases, vapours, mists or dusts, this must be taken duly into account in assessing the explosion risks. The presence of e.g. hybrid mixtures can considerably increase the effect of the explosion.

Warning: As a general rule, hybrid mixtures of mists or dusts with gases and/or vapours may form an explosive atmosphere when the concentrations of the individual fuels are still below their lower explosion limit.

Additionally the risk that the detection equipment may be adversely affected by one of the phases (e.g. the "poisoning" of catalysts by mists) must be evaluated.

2.1 Methods

Suitable methods for assessing the explosion risks associated with work processes or plant are those which lend themselves to a systematic approach to checking plant and process safety. In this context, "systematic" means that the work is done in a structured manner, on an objective and logical basis. An analysis is made of the existing sources of hazardous explosive atmospheres and the effective sources of ignition which could occur at the same time.

In practice, it is usually sufficient to determine and assess the explosion risk by working systematically through a set of focused questions. A simple procedure is described in section 2.2 below using typical criteria.

Note: Other methods of risk assessment described in the literature, for identifying hazards (e.g. use of checklists, failure mode and effects analysis, operating error analysis, HAZOP analysis) or assessing hazards (e.g. event tree or fault tree analysis), are worthwhile for explosion protection purposes only in exceptional cases, e.g. to determine ignition sources in complex plants.

2.2 Assessment criteria

Assessment of the explosion hazard thus does not depend solely on whether sources of ignition are present or may arise.

The following four conditions must be satisfied simultaneously for explosions with hazardous effects to occur:

a high degree of dispersion of the flammable substances;

concentration of the flammable substances in air within their combined explosion limits;

hazardous quantities of an explosive atmosphere;

an effective source of ignition.

To check whether these conditions are met, explosion risks can in practice be assessed by means of seven questions. Figure 2.1 shows the assessment flowchart, with the questions underlined. The criteria for answering them are explained in the sections indicated. The first four questions are used to determine in principle whether there is an explosion risk and whether explosion protection measures are necessary at all. Only if this is the case should the other three questions be considered to determine whether the proposed protective measures limit the explosion risk to an acceptable level. This step must be performed in conjunction with the choice of protective measures in accordance with section 3 of this Guide and repeated if necessary until an overall solution appropriate to the circumstances is found.

For assessment purposes, it must be borne in mind that explosion protection parameters are generally valid only under atmospheric conditions. Under non-atmospheric conditions, the safety parameters may be significantly different.

Examples: 1. The minimum ignition energy can be greatly reduced at elevated oxygen concentrations or temperatures.

2. Elevated initial pressures give rise to higher maximum explosion pressures and rates of pressure rise.

3. The range between the explosion limits is widened at elevated temperatures and pressures. This means that the lower explosion limit may be lower and the upper explosion limit higher.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 2.1: Assessment flowchart for recognition and prevention of explosion hazards

Figure 2.1 contains questions about "reliable" prevention of the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres. The answer "Yes" can be given only if the technical and organisational measures already taken are such that there is no need to take into account the occurrence of an explosion, having regard to all operating conditions and reasonably foreseeable cases of malfunction.

2.2.1 Are flammable substances present?

An explosion will occur only if flammable substances are present in the working or production process. This means that at least one flammable substance is used as a raw or auxiliary material, arises as a waste, intermediate or final product or can be formed in the event of a common operational malfunction.

Example: Flammable substances may also occur accidentally, e.g. when weak acids or alkalis are stored in metal containers. In such cases hydrogen may be formed by an electro-chemical reaction and accumulate in the gaseous phase.

All substances capable of an exothermic oxidation reaction are to be regarded as flammable. In particular, these include all substances which are already classified and labelled as flammable (R10), highly flammable (F and R11/R15/R17) or extremely flammable (F+ and R12) under the Dangerous Substances Directive 67/548/EEC. However, they also include all other substances and preparations that are not (yet) classified but satisfy the appropriate ignitability criteria or are generally to be regarded as ignitable.

Examples: 1. Flammable gases and gas mixtures, e.g. liquefied gas (butane, butene, propane, propylene), natural gas, combustion gases (e.g. carbon monoxide or methane) or gaseous flammable chemicals (e.g. acetylene, ethylene oxide or vinyl chloride).

2. Flammable liquids, e.g. solvents, fuels, petroleum, heating, lubricating or waste oils, paints, water-insoluble and water-soluble chemicals.

3. Dusts of flammable solids, e.g. coal, wood, food and feedstuffs (e.g. sugar, flour or cereals), plastics, metals or chemicals.

Note: A number of substances are not readily flammable under normal conditions but are explosive when mixed with air if the particle size is particularly small or the ignition energy sufficiently high (e.g. metal dusts, aerosols).

Explosion hazards need be further considered only if flammable substances are present.

2.2.2 Can sufficient dispersal in air give rise to an explosive atmosphere?

Whether an explosive atmosphere can form in the presence of flammable substances depends on the ability to ignite of the mixture formed with air. If the necessary degree of dispersion is attained and if the concentration of the flammable substances in air lies within their explosion limits, an explosive atmosphere is present. By their very nature, gases and vapours have a sufficient degree of dispersion.

To answer the above question, one must take into account the following properties of the substances and their possible processing states.

1. Flammable gases and gas mixtures:

Lower and upper explosion limit

Maximum (sometimes also minimum) concentrations of the flammable substances arising or obtaining during work with them

2. Flammable liquids:

Lower and upper explosion limit of vapours

Lower explosion limit of mists

Flash point

Note: Explosive mixtures are not to be assumed to be present inside containers if the temperature within the container is at all times kept far enough below the flash point (by about 50 C to 150 C - see example in section 3.1.2).

Working or ambient temperatures

Note: If e.g. the maximum working temperature is not far enough below the flash point of the liquid, explosive vapour/air mixtures may be present.

Manner of working with a liquid (e.g. spraying, squirting and dispersal of a jet of liquid, evaporation and condensation)

Note: If liquids are dispersed into droplets, e.g. by spraying, explosive atmospheres may be formed even at temperatures below the flash point.

Use of a liquid at high pressure (e.g. in hydraulic systems)

Note: Where there are leaks in the enclosures of high-pressure flammable liquids, the liquid may, depending on size of leak, overpressure and material stability, squirt out and form explosive mists, which may then become explosive vapours.

Maximum (sometimes also minimum) concentrations of the flammable substances arising or obtaining during work with them (only inside apparatus/installations)

3. Dusts of flammable solids:

Presence or formation of dust/air mixtures or dust deposits

Examples: 1. grinding or screening;

2. conveying, filling or discharging;

3. drying.

Maximum concentrations of the flammable substances arising or obtaining during work with compared to the lower explosive limit.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 2.2: Examples for the formation of dust/air mixtures in filling and transport operations [6]

[6] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

Lower and upper explosion limit

Note: In practice, explosion limits are not as useful for dusts as for gases and vapours. The dust concentration can be greatly changed when deposits are raised into suspension or suspended dust settles. Explosive atmospheres may thus arise when dust is raised into suspension.

Particle size distribution (the < 500 µm fines fraction is of interest), moisture, smouldering point.

2.2.3 Where can explosive atmospheres occur?

If explosive atmospheres can be formed, one must determine where they occur at the workplace or in the plant in order to delimit the potential risk. To this end, the properties of the substances and the plant, process engineering and environmental factors applying must in turn be taken into account:

1. Gases and vapours:

Density ratio to air - the heavier gases and vapours are, the faster they sink, mixing progressively with the available air and accumulating in trenches, conduits and shafts.

- Gases are generally denser than air e.g. propane. Such accumulations tend to sink and spread out, and can also "creep" over long distances and then be ignited.

- Some gases have approximately the same density as air, e.g. acetylene, hydrogen cyanide, ethylene, carbon monoxide. There is little natural tendency for these gases to dissipate, or to sink.

- A few gases are much lighter than air, e.g. hydrogen, methane. These gases have a natural tendency to dissipate into the atmosphere unless they are enclosed..

Even slight air movements (natural draught, people moving about, thermal convection) may considerably speed up mixture with air.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 2.3: Spread of liquefied gases (example) [7]

[7] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

2. Liquids and mists:

Evaporation number, characterising the amount of explosive atmosphere that forms at a particular temperature

Size of evaporation area and working temperature, e.g. when liquids are sprayed or squirted

Overpressure by means of which the sprayed liquids are discharged and form explosive mists.

3. Dusts:

Occurrence of dust raised into suspension, e.g. in filters, during transport in containers, at transfer points or inside dryers

Formation of dust deposits, especially on horizontal or slightly inclined surfaces, and raising of dust into suspension

Grain size.

Other local and operating conditions must also be taken into account:

Manner of working with substances: under gas-, liquid- or dust-tight enclosure or in open apparatus, e.g. charging and discharging

Possible leakage at valves, pipe connections, etc.

Ventilation conditions and other spatial factors

Places which are not ventilated, e.g. unventilated below ground level areas such as trenches, conduits and shafts, are particularly prone to the presence of flammable substances or mixtures.

2.2.4 Is the formation of a hazardous explosive atmosphere possible?

If an explosive atmosphere may occur locally in such quantities as to require special protective measures to maintain the safety and health of the workers concerned, it is described as a hazardous explosive atmosphere and the places in question are classified as hazardous places.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 2.4: Evaporation of even small quantities of flammable liquids (such as liquefied propane) may give rise to large quantities of flammable vapours. Note: 1 litre of liquid propane when transformed into gas and diluted in air to the lower explosive limit would give a 13,000 litre explosive atmosphere. [8]

[8] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

Once the existence of a potential explosive atmosphere has been established, whether it is a hazardous explosive atmosphere depends on its volume and the harmful consequences of any ignition. In general, however, it can initially be assumed that an explosion will cause substantial harm and that a hazardous explosive atmosphere is present.

Exceptions to this rule may apply to work with very small quantities, e.g. in laboratories. In such cases, it has to be decided on the basis of local and operational conditions whether the anticipated amounts of explosive atmosphere are hazardous.

Examples: 1. A continuous volume of over 10 litres of explosive atmosphere in a confined space must always be regarded as a hazardous explosive atmosphere, irrespective of the size of the room.

2. A rough estimate can be made by the rule of thumb that in such rooms explosive atmospheres must be regarded as potentially hazardous if they occupy more than one ten thousandth of the room volume, e.g. only 8 litres in a room of 80 m3. However, this does not mean that the whole room is to be regarded as a hazardous place, but only the part in which the hazardous explosive atmosphere can arise.

3. For most combustible dusts, a deposit less than 1 mm deep evenly distributed over the whole floor area is sufficient, if raised into suspension, to fill completely a room of normal height with an explosive dust/air mixture.

4. Where explosive atmospheres are contained in vessels incapable of withstanding the potential explosion pressure, much smaller volumes than indicated above must be regarded as hazardous because of the danger which may arise, e.g. from flying debris on rupture. No lower limit for this hazard can be indicated.

A further factor to be taken into account in assessing whether a hazardous explosive atmosphere can arise in a particular situation is the effect resulting from the destruction of nearby items of plant.

Note: An explosion may also cause damage in the surrounding area, which in turn causes flammable or other dangerous substances to be released and perhaps ignited.

2.2.5 Is the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres reliably prevented?

If it is possible for a hazardous explosive atmosphere to be formed, explosion protection measures are necessary. An attempt should first be made to avoid the occurrence of explosive atmospheres. Section 3.1 describes possible technical measures to this end, to be considered in conjunction with organisational measures as described in section 4.

The effectiveness of the explosion protection measures taken must be assessed. To this end, all operational statuses and all malfunctions (including rare ones) must be taken into account. Only if the occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres is reliably prevented is it possible to dispense with further measures.

2.2.6 Is the ignition of hazardous explosive atmospheres reliably prevented?

If it cannot be entirely ruled out that hazardous explosive atmospheres may form, measures to avoid effective ignition sources are necessary. Thus the more likely it is that hazardous explosive atmospheres will arise, the more certain must be the avoidance of such sources. Section 3.2 describes possible technical measures, to be considered in conjunction with organisational measures as described in section 4.

If it is not highly improbable that hazardous explosive atmospheres and effective sources of ignition will occur simultaneously, explosion mitigation measures must also be taken as described in section 3.3 in conjunction with organisational measures as described in section 4. Otherwise proportionate mitigation measures must be taken.

3. TECHNICAL MEASURES FOR EXPLOSION PROTECTION

"Explosion protection measures" means all measures that

prevent the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres,

avoid the ignition of hazardous explosive atmospheres or

mitigate the effects of explosions so as to ensure the health and safety of workers.

3.1 Prevention of hazardous explosive atmospheres

According to Article 3 "Prevention of and protection against explosions" of Directive 1999/92/EC, preventing the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres must always be given priority.

3.1.1 Use of substitutes for flammable substances

The formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres can be prevented by avoiding or reducing the use of flammable substances. An example is the replacement of flammable solvents and cleaning agents with aqueous solutions. As regards dusts, it is sometimes possible to increase the particle size of the substances used, so that explosive mixtures cannot be formed. Care must then be taken to ensure that further processing does not reduce particle size, e.g. through abrasion. A further possibility is to moisten the dust or use paste products, so that they can no longer be raised into suspension.

3.1.2 Limiting of concentrations

Gases and dusts are explosive only within certain limits of concentration in air. Under certain operating and ambient conditions, it is possible to remain outside these explosion limits. If these conditions are reliably assured, there is no explosion hazard.

In closed containers and plant, it is usually fairly easy to keep the concentration of gases and vapours of flammable liquids outside the explosion limits.

Example: The concentration in the headspace above flammable liquids can be guaranteed to remain below the lower explosion limit if the temperature at the surface of the liquid is at all times kept far enough below the flash point (a temperature difference of 50 C usually affords adequate safety for pure solvents and 150 C for solvent mixtures). The upper explosion limit is usually exceeded for flammable liquids with a low flash point (e.g. in a car petrol tank).

Where dusts are concerned, it is harder to avoid explosive mixtures by limiting the concentration. If the airborne dust concentration is below the lower explosion limit, dust deposits form by settlement if there is insufficient air movement. These can be raised into suspension, creating explosive mixtures.

Note: Dust particles are separated in filters, where they form accumulations which may have considerable fire and explosion potential.

3.1.3 Inerting

A hazardous explosive atmosphere can also be avoided by diluting the fuel or the atmospheric oxygen inside plant with chemically non-reactive (inert) materials. This is known as "inerting".

To design this measure, it is necessary to know the highest oxygen concentration at which no explosion yet occurs: the limiting oxygen concentration. This is determined experimentally. The maximum permissible oxygen concentration is obtained by deducting a safe concentration margin from the limiting oxygen concentration. If the fuel is diluted with an inert substance, the maximum permissible fuel concentration must be determined in the same way. If the oxygen concentration could vary quickly, or could be very different in different parts of the plant, a large safety margin would be required. Operating mistakes and equipment faults should be considered. A further aspect to be considered is the time required for any protective measures or emergency functions triggered to become effective.

Example: The main inert gases used are nitrogen, carbon dioxide, noble gases, combustion gases and water vapour. Inert dusts include calcium sulphate, ammonium phosphate, sodium hydrogen carbonate, stonedust, etc. In choosing the inert substance, it is important that it should not react with the fuel (aluminium, for example, can react with carbon dioxide).

Note: Dust deposits may give rise to glowing or smouldering fires even at low oxygen or fuel concentrations, well below those which are adequate to ensure reliable avoidance of explosions. A mixture of 95 % wt limestone and 5 % wt coal, for example, can still exhibit a strong exothermal reaction.

Inertisation with gases can generally be practised only in enclosed plant, where it is possible to ensure a fairly low rate of gas replacement. If inert gas is emitted through openings in the plant which are present in normal operation or result from defects, workers may be at risk from oxygen displacement (suffocation). Workers may be poisoned if combustion gases used for inerting are emitted from plant. Openings present in normal operation may, for example, be manual charging ports. If these are opened, it has to be borne in mind that inert gas may be emitted from the plant and atmospheric oxygen may enter it.

3.1.4 Preventing or limiting the formation of explosive atmospheres in the vicinity of plant

Formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres around plant should be prevented as far as possible. This can be achieved by means of enclosed plant. The items of plant must therefore be leakproof. The plant design must be such that no significant leakage occurs under the foreseeable operating conditions. One of the ways of ensuring this is by regular servicing.

If the release of flammable substances cannot be prevented, forming of hazardous explosive atmospheres can often be prevented by ventilation. The following points must be taken into account in judging how effective ventilation is:

Gases, vapours and mists: to design a ventilation system, one must estimate the maximum amount of gases, vapours and mist that might be released (source strength) and know the source location and dispersion conditions.

Dusts: ventilation generally affords adequate protection only if the dust is exhausted at source and hazardous dust deposits are reliably prevented.

In the best case, adequate ventilation can preclude hazardous places. However, because of the limitations mentioned, all that is achieved may be a reduction in the likelihood of hazardous explosive atmospheres or a reduction in the extent of the hazardous places (zones).

It is recommended that spot checks be made of the concentrations arising at different places and times under unfavourable operating conditions.

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Figure 3.1: Example of the correct arrangement of ventilation openings for heavier-than air gases and vapours [9]

[9] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

7.1.5. 3.1.4.1 Removal of dust deposits

Hazardous dust deposits can be avoided by regular cleaning of work and technical rooms. A proven approach is the use of cleaning schedules prescribing the nature, extent and frequency of cleaning and the responsibilities of those concerned. These instructions can be tailored to the specific case. Particular attention should be paid to (e.g. elevated) surfaces which are difficult to inspect or reach, where considerable amounts of dust may be deposited over time. Where appreciable quantities of dust are released as a result of operational malfunctions (e.g. damage to or bursting of containers, leakage) additional steps should be taken to remove the dust deposits with as little delay as possible.

Wet cleaning and exhausting of dust deposits (using central extraction systems or mobile industrial vacuum cleaners containing no ignition sources) has proved to have safety advantages. Cleaning processes in which dust is raised into suspension should be avoided (see Figure 3.2). It should be borne in mind that wet cleaning can create extra problems of disposal. Where light-metal dusts are collected in wet scrubbers, it must be borne in mind that hydrogen may be formed. The practice of blowing away deposited dust should be avoided.

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Figure 3.2: Removal of dust deposits [10]

[10] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

The cleaning arrangements can be laid down as part of operational instructions for working with flammable substances.

Note: Only vacuum cleaners containing no ignition sources may be used for flammable dusts.

3.1.5 Gas alarms

Concentrations in the vicinity of plant can be monitored e.g. by means of gas alarms. Major prerequisites for their use are as follows:

The substances likely to be present, the location of the sources, maximum source strength and dispersion conditions must be adequately known.

The instrument performance must be appropriate to the conditions of use, especially as regards response time, alarm level and cross-sensitivity.

No dangerous conditions may arise on failure of individual functions of gas alarm systems (reliability).

The number and location of measuring points must be so chosen that the anticipated mixtures can be detected quickly and reliably.

It must be known what area is at risk until the protective measures triggered by the instrument become effective. In this immediate area - which depends on the above points - sources of ignition must be avoided.

The protective measures triggered must prevent the occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres outside the immediate area with a sufficient degree of certainty and spurious triggering may not give rise to other hazards.

Gas alarms for use in hazardous places must be approved and suitably marked as safe electrical equipment pursuant to the European Directive 94/9/EC.

Note: Gas alarms for use as safety, controlling and regulating devices in avoiding ignition sources (e.g. to switch off a non-explosionproof item of equipment on the occurrence of a hazardous explosive atmosphere) must undergo individual or type checks/calibration to ensure their suitability for their intended use. The requirements of the European Directive 94/9/EC must be satisfied (see also 3.4 Process control engineering).

3.2 Avoidance of ignition sources

If it is not possible to prevent the formation of a hazardous explosive atmosphere, its ignition must be avoided. This can be achieved by protective measures which avoid or reduce the probability of ignition sources. To lay down effective precautions, one must know the various types of ignition source and the ways in which they operate. The probability that a hazardous explosive atmosphere and a source of ignition will be present at the same time and place is estimated and the extent of the measures required is determined accordingly. This is done on the basis of the zone system described below, from which the necessary precautions are derived.

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Figure 3.3: Examples of the most common potential ignition sources [11]

[11] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

3.2.1 Zoning of hazardous places

A hazardous place is a place in which an explosive atmosphere may occur in such quantities as to require special precautions to protect workers against explosion hazards. Such a quantity is termed a hazardous explosive atmosphere. As a basis for determining the extent of protective measures, any remaining hazardous places must be classified in terms of zones according to the likelihood of occurrence of such atmospheres.

Zone 0: A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is present continuously or for long periods or frequently.

Example: Zone 0 conditions generally arise only inside containers or plant (evaporators, reaction vessels, etc.), but can also occur near vents and other openings.

Zone 1: A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.

Example: This may include:

* the immediate vicinity of zone 0;

* the immediate vicinity of feed openings;

* the immediate area around fragile vessels or pipes made of glass, ceramics, and the like, unless the contents are too small to form a hazardous explosive atmosphere;

* the immediate area around inadequately sealed glands, e.g. at pumps and valves;

* the inside of plant such as evaporators or reaction vessels.

Zone 2: A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.

Example: Zone 2 may include, e.g.

* places surrounding zones 0 or 1.

Note: Places where flammable substances are transported only in pipes which are durably technically leakproof are not hazardous places.

Zone 20: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is present continuously, or for long periods or frequently.

Example: In general, these conditions arise only inside containers, pipes, vessels, etc., i.e. usually only inside plant (mills, dryers, mixers, pipelines, silos, etc.), when explosive dust mixtures in hazardous quantities can form continuously, over long periods or frequently.

Zone 21: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.

Example: This zone can, for example, include places in the immediate vicinity of e.g. powder filling and emptying points and places where dust deposits occur and in normal operation give rise occasionally to an explosive concentration of combustible dust when mixed with air.

Zone 22: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.

Example: This zone can include, e.g.:

* places in the vicinity of plant containing dust, if dust can escape at leaks and form deposits in hazardous quantities.

N.B.

Layers, deposits and heaps of combustible dust must be considered, like any other source which can form a hazardous explosive atmosphere.

"Normal operation" means the situation when installations are used within their design parameters.

Note: Deposited combustible dust has considerable explosion potential. Dust deposits may accumulate on all deposition surfaces in a technical room. A primary explosion may raise deposited dust into suspension and initiate a chain reaction, causing many successive explosions with devastating effects.

3.2.1.1 Example of zoning for hazardous places resulting from flammable gases

Figure 3.4 shows a tank for flammable liquids. The tank is in the open air, is filled and emptied regularly and is connected to the ambient atmosphere by means of a pressure equalising port. The flash point of the flammable liquid is close to the average annual temperature and the density of the resulting vapours is greater than that of air. There is thus a chronic risk of hazardous explosive atmospheres' occurring inside the tank. The inside of the tank is therefore classified as zone 0.

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Figure 3.4: Example of zoning at a tank for flammable liquids

Vapours may occasionally be emitted from the pressure equalising port and may form explosive mixtures. The area around the opening is therefore classified as zone 1. Under infrequent adverse weather conditions, the vapours may run down the outside of the tank wall and form a hazardous explosive atmosphere. An area around the tank is therefore classified as zone 2.

The size of the zones outside the tank depends on the anticipated amount of vapour release. This depends on the properties of the liquid, the size of the aperture and the frequency of filling and emptying, as well as the average change in the liquid level. The size of the hazardous places largely depends on the availability of natural ventilation.

3.2.1.2 Example of zoning for hazardous places resulting from flammable dusts

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Figure 3.5: Example of zoning for flammable dusts

Figure 3.5 shows a mill with a (manually charged) feed hopper, product discharge and filter. A dust forming, flammable product is loaded by hand from a drum into the hopper.

During the loading process, an explosive mixture of dust and air may occasionally form in the area where the drum is emptied into the loading hopper. This area is classified as zone 21. There are dust deposits in an area around the hopper. These may form a hazardous explosive atmosphere when raised into suspension, which occurs infrequently and briefly. This area is classified as zone 22.

In normal operation, there is a cloud of dust in the mill. A dust cloud is also formed at regular intervals by cleaning of the filter bags. The inside of the mill and the filter are therefore classified as zone 20. The ground product is discharged continuously. A dust cloud consisting of an explosive mixture is thus formed in normal operation in the discharge container, which is therefore classified as zone 20. As a result of leakage, there are dust deposits around the discharge. This area is classified as zone 22. The size of zones 21 and 22 depends on the dusting propensity of the product used.

3.2.2 Extent of protective measures

The extent of protective measures depends on the likelihood that hazardous explosive atmospheres will arise (zoning) and should therefore be determined in accordance with Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Extent of protective measures in the various zones

Zoning // Ignition sources*) to be reliably avoided:

0 or 20 // * in normal operation (no malfunction)

* in foreseeable cases of malfunction and

* in the event of rare malfunctions

1 or 21 // * in normal operation (no malfunction) and

* in foreseeable cases of malfunction

2 or 22 // * in normal operation (no malfunction)

*) In zones 20, 21 and 22, the possibility of deposited dust ignition must also be taken into account.

The table applies to all types of ignition source.

3.2.3 Types of ignition source

Standard EN 1127-1 distinguishes thirteen types of ignition source:

hot surfaces

flames and hot gases

mechanically generated sparks

electrical apparatus

stray electrical currents, catrhodic corrosion protection

static electricity

lightning

electromagnetic fields in the frequency range from 9 kHz to 300 GHz

electromagnetic radiation in the frquency range from 300 GHz to 3 x 106 GHz or wavelength range from 1000µm to 0.1 µm (optical spectrum)

ionising radiation

ultrasonics

adiabatic compression, shock waves, gas flows

chemical reactions.

The following sections discuss only ignition sources that are of particular importance in operational practice. Further details on the various types of ignition source and their assessment can be found in EN 1127-1.

3.2.3.1 Hot surfaces

Explosive atmospheres can be ignited by contact with hot surfaces, if the temperature of a surface reaches the atmosphere's ignition temperature.

Example: Surfaces which become hot in normal operation are e.g. heating systems, some electrical equipment and hot pipes. Hot surfaces resulting from malfunction are e.g. moving parts which overheat because of inadequate lubrication.

If hot surfaces can come in contact with explosive atmospheres, a safety margin should be ensured between the maximum surface temperature and the atmosphere's ignition temperature. This margin depends on the zoning and is determined in accordance with EN 1127-1.

Note: Dust deposits have an insulating effect and therefore inhibit dissipation of heat into the surrounding atmosphere. The thicker the layer, the less heat dissipates. This can lead to heat build-up and hence to a further rise in temperature. This process can result in ignition of the dust layer. Equipment which according to Directive 94/9/EC can be operated safely in an explosive gas/air atmosphere is thus not necessarily suitable for operation in places where there is a dust/air explosion hazard.

3.2.3.2 Flames and hot gases

Both flames and incandescent solid particles can ignite explosive atmospheres. Even very small flames are among the most effective sources of ignition and must therefore generally be eliminated from hazardous places belonging to zones 0 and 20. In zones 1, 2, 21 and 22, flames should occur only if they are safely enclosed (see EN 1127-1). Naked flames from welding or smoking must be prevented by organisational measures.

3.2.3.3 Mechanically generated sparks

Friction, impact and abrasion processes, such as grinding, can give rise to sparking. Such sparks can ignite flammable gases and vapours and certain mist/air or dust/air mixtures (especially metal dust/air mixtures). In deposited dust, smouldering can be caused by the sparks, and this can be an ignition source for explosive atmospheres.

Ingress of foreign materials, e.g. stones or tramp metals, into equipment or items of plant must be considered as a cause of sparking.

Note: Friction, impact and abrasion processes involving rust and light metals (e.g. aluminium and magnesium) and their alloys may initiate an aluminothermic (thermite) reaction which can give rise to particularly incendive sparking.

Incendive frictional and impact sparking can be limited by choosing suitable material combinations (e.g. in fans). The combination of light metal and steel (except stainless steel) must always be avoided at places where friction, impact or abrasion can occur in equipment which in normal operation has moving parts.

3.2.3.4 Chemical reactions

Chemical reactions which develop heat (exothermic reactions) can cause substances to heat up and thus become a source of ignition. Such self-heating is possible if the rate of heat generation exceeds the rate of heat loss to the surroundings. If heat dissipation is impeded or the ambient temperature is high (e.g. in storage), the rate of reaction can so increase that the conditions for ignition are attained. Among the decisive parameters are the volume/surface ratio of the reacting system, the ambient temperature and the residence time. The high temperatures developed can lead to the initiation of smouldering and/or burning and also to the ignition of explosive atmospheres. Any flammable substances arising from the reaction (e.g. gases or vapours) can in turn form explosive atmospheres with the surrounding air and thus greatly increase the hazardousness of such systems.

In all zones, substances prone to spontaneous combustion should therefore be avoided as far as possible. When it is necessary to work with such substances, the necessary protective measures must be tailored to each individual case.

Note: Suitable protective measures are, e.g.

1. inerting;

2. stabilisation;

3. improving heat dissipation, e.g. by dividing the substances into smaller portions or providing separating spaces between stored quantities;

4. control of the plant temperature;

5. storage at lowered ambient temperatures;

6. keeping residence times shorter than the time required for dust fires to be initiated.

3.2.3.5 Electrical apparatus

Even at low voltages, electrical sparking and hot surfaces may occur as sources of ignition in electrical apparatus (e.g. on making and breaking circuits and as a result of stray electric currents).

Electrical equipment may therefore be used in hazardous places only if it complies with Annex II to Directive 1999/92/EC. In all zones, new equipment must be selected on the basis of the categories set out in Directive 94/9/EC. In accordance with the explosion protection document the work equipment, including warning devices, must be designed, operated and maintained with due regard for safety.

3.2.3.6 Static electricity

Separation processes involving at least one material with a specific electrical resistance of over 109 Ùm or objects with a surface resistance of over 109 Ù may under certain conditions give rise to incendive discharges of static electricity. Figure 3.1 shows various ways in which electrostatic charges may result from charge separation. The following forms of discharge may occur under normal operating conditions:

Spark discharges: Spark discharges may arise from charge accumulation on unearthed conductive parts.

Brush discharges: Brush discharges may arise on charged parts made of non-conductive materials, which include most plastics.

Propagating brush discharges: "Propagating brush discharges" may occur in fast separation processes, e.g. films moving over rollers, during pneumatic transport in metal pipes or containers with an insulating coating or on drive belts.

Cone discharges: Cone discharges may occur, e.g. during pneumatic filling of silos.

All the above forms of discharge are to be regarded as capable of igniting most gases and solvent vapours. Mist or dust/air mixtures can also be ignited by these forms of discharge, though brush discharges are to be regarded as merely a possible source of ignition for explosible dusts.

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Figure 3.6: Examples of charge separation which can lead to electrostatic charges [12]

[12] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

For the necessary assessment and possible protective measures, see CENELEC Report R044-001 "Guidance and recommendations for the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity".

Examples: Important protective measures to be taken, depending on the zone:

1. earthing conductive objects and installations;

2. wearing suitable footwear at all times on suitable floorings, total person-to-earth resistance not to exceed 108 Ù;

3. avoiding materials and objects of low electrical conductivity;

4. reducing non-conductive surfaces;

5. avoiding the use for dust conveying and filling operations of metallically conducting pipes and containers with an electrically insulating inner coating.

3.3 Mitigation of the effects of explosions (mitigation measures)

In many cases, it is not possible to avoid explosive atmospheres and sources of ignition with a sufficient degree of certainty. Measures must then be taken to limit the effects of an explosion to an acceptable extent. Such measures are

explosion-resistant design;

explosion relief;

explosion suppression;

prevention of flame and explosion propagation.

These measures generally relate to mitigation of the hazardous effects of explosions starting within installations. Equipment and protective systems which comply with Directive 94/9/EC are generally used in mitigation measures. Structural measures, e.g. blast walls, may also be adopted.

3.3.1 Explosion resistant equipment

Items of plant, such as containers, vessels and piping, are so constructed that they can withstand an internal explosion without rupturing. The initial pressure in the item of plant must be taken into account if it differs from normal atmospheric pressure.

In general, a distinction is made between explosion-resistant designs:

for the maximum explosion overpressure;

for the reduced explosion overpressure associated with explosion relief or suppression.

Plant design can be either explosion pressure resistant or explosion pressure shock resistant.

Note: If the inside of plant is divided into subvolumes or two tanks are connected by a pipeline, during an explosion in one of the subvolumes the pressure in the other may be increased and the explosion may thus enter it at an elevated initial pressure. Pressure peaks thus occur which may be higher than the "maximum explosion pressure" determined for atmospheric conditions. If such arrangements cannot be avoided, appropriate measures should be taken, e.g. explosion-resistant design sufficient for the elevated explosion pressure or explosion decoupling.

3.3.1.1 Explosion pressure resistant design

Explosion pressure resistant containers and vessels withstand the expected explosion overpressure without becoming permanently deformed. The design is based on the expected explosion overpressure.

Note: For most gas/air and dust/air mixtures, the maximum explosion overpressure is 8-10 bar, but it may be higher for light-metal dusts.

3.3.1.2 Explosion pressure shock resistant design

Explosion pressure shock resistant containers and vessels are so constructed that, in the event of an internal explosion, they withstand a shock attaining the expected explosion overpressure, but may become permanently deformed.

After explosions, the affected items of plant must be checked for deformation.

3.3.2 Explosion relief

In the broadest sense, "explosion relief" covers everything that contributes to ensuring that, when an explosion is initiated or propagates to some degree, the originally closed plant within which it is taking place is vented in a safe direction, either briefly or for an extended period, if the actuation pressure of an explosion relief device is attained.

The explosion relief device is intended to ensure that the plant/installation is not subjected to explosion stresses exceeding its strength. A reduced explosion overpressure results.

Note: The reduced explosion overpressure is higher than the actuation pressure of the relief devices.

Bursting discs or explosion doors, for example, can be used as relief devices.

Note: Only tested relief devices which comply with Directive 94/9/EC should be used. Self-made relief devices are often not effective and have in the past led to serious accidents. Unlocked container lids and covers, doors etc. that are placed over the vent openings are usually not suitable. If in-house designs which have proved satisfactory in practice are nonetheless used, their suitability for explosion protection purposes must be demonstrated by a risk assessment, and the result recorded in the explosion protection document. The requirements of Directive 94/9/EC must also be satisfied, where this applies.

The safety-related parameters of the mixture must be known in order to calculate the necessary relief areas for plants.

Explosion relief is not permissible if the vented products can endanger persons or cause harm to the environment (e.g. release of toxic substances).

Note: When relief devices are actuated, a great deal of flame and pressure may develop in the direction of discharge. Relief devices must therefore be so installed that the pressure is vented in a safe direction. Venting into workrooms should thus always be avoided. Experience shows that it can be difficult to comply with the necessary safety clearances when retrofitting relief devices in existing plant. Exception: If "Q-Pipe" systems are used, venting into a room is permissible, since the flame and pressure effects are reduced to such a degree that they are not dangerous. However, the possible release of toxic combustion gases must then be taken into account.

Note: If "explosion relief" is used as a means of protection, explosion decoupling from upstream and downstream parts of the plant must be ensured.

3.3.3 Explosion suppression

Explosion suppression systems prevent attainment of the maximum explosion pressure by rapidly injecting extinguishing agents into containers and plant in the event of an explosion. The items so protected need thus be designed to withstand only a reduced explosion pressure.

Unlike explosion relief, this ensures that the effects of an explosion are contained within the plant. Depending on design, the explosion overpressure may be reduced to about 0.2 bar.

Note: New explosion suppression systems should be tested and marked as protective systems in accordance with Directive 94/9/EC.

Note: Explosion suppression may also require explosion decoupling from upstream and downstream parts of the plant.

3.3.4 Prevention of explosion propagation (explosion decoupling)

An explosion occurring in one part of a plant can propagate to upstream and downstream parts, where it may cause further explosions. Acceleration caused by plant fittings or propagation in pipes may intensify the explosion effects. The explosion pressures so developed can be much higher than the maximum explosion pressure under normal conditions and may destroy items of plant even if they are of explosion pressure resistant or explosion pressure shock resistant design. It is therefore important to limit possible explosions to single parts of the plant. This is achieved by explosion decoupling.

Explosion decoupling can be performed e.g. by means of:

rapid-action mechanical isolation;

flame extinction in narrow gaps or by injection of an extinguishing agent;

arresting of flame by high counterflow;

water seals;

rotary valves.

The following aspects are important in practice:

Note: Since the propagation velocities in explosions of mixtures with air of gases, vapours or mists can sometimes be very high (detonations), active isolation or extinguishing systems are often too slow, and preference is then given to passive systems such as flame arresters (e.g. crimped ribbon or water seal arresters).

3.3.4.1 Flame arresters for gases, vapours and mists

Flame arresters can be used to prevent flame transmission in the presence of explosive atmospheres, e.g. through piping, breathers and filling and emptying lines that are not full of liquid at all times. If the formation of a hazardous explosive atmosphere cannot be avoided, e.g. in a non-explosionproof container for flammable liquids, arrangements to arrest flame transmission must be made at permanent openings communicating with places where sources of ignition can be expected to occur and allowing an explosion to be transmitted to the container.

Note: This applies e.g. to ventilation devices and reservoir level gauges and to filling and emptying lines, if they are not full of liquid at all times.

Conversely, equivalent measures must be taken to prevent the emission of flame from a vessel into a hazardous place.

The operation of flame arresters essentially depends on one or more of the following mechanisms:

flame extinction in narrow gaps and channels (e.g. crimped ribbon and sintered metal arresters);

halting a flame front by discharge of the unburned mixtures at an appropriate velocity (high-velocity valves);

halting a flame front by means of a liquid seal.

Note: Flame arresting devices are classified as explosion proof, endurance burning proof or detonation proof. Devices which are not endurance burning proof withstand burning for only a limited time (the fire resistance time) and then lose their flame arresting capacity.

3.3.4.2 Decoupling devices for dusts

Flame arresters for gases, vapours and mists cannot be used for dusts because of the danger of blockage. The following are of proven practical value in preventing the propagation of dust explosions through connecting pipework, conveying equipment, etc. and the emission of flame from plant:

Extinguishing barriers: The explosion is detected by sensors. The extinguishing agent is injected from dispersers into the pipework and the flame quenched. This does not affect the explosion pressure developed upstream of the barrier. Pipework and vessels downstream of the barrier, too, must be designed to withstand the expected pressure. The extinguishing agent must be appropriate for the type of dust in question.

Rapid-action valves or flaps: An explosion travelling through a pipe is detected by sensors. An actuating mechanism closes the valve or flap within milliseconds.

Quick-acting shut-off valves (explosion isolation valves): When a given flow velocity is exceeded, a valve in the pipe closes. The velocity required for actuation is generated either by the blast wave or a sensor-controlled pilot flow (e.g. a jet of nitrogen directed on to the valve cone). The quick-acting shut-off valves so far known may be fitted only in horizontal pipe ranges and are suitable only for pipes with a fairly low dust burden (e.g. the exit side of filter units).

Rotary valves: Rotary valves may be used as "flame traps" only if their non-transmission of an internal ignition and their pressure resistance have been proven under the service conditions obtaining. In the event of an explosion, a sensor must stop the rotor automatically, so that no burning product is discharged.

Explosion diverters: An explosion diverter consists of pipe segments joined by a special fitting. The seal to atmosphere is in the form of a venting device (cover plate or bursting disc; actuation overpressure usually p <= 0.1 bar). The aim is to prevent explosion propagation by diverting the flow through 180 degrees while providing explosion relief on opening of the venting device at the point of flow reversal.

Projection of fragments of the venting device must be prevented, e.g. by means of a wire guard. Venting must always take place in a safe direction, never into working areas or travelling ways. This means of protection may not be used if persons can be endangered or the environment harmed by the discharge.

Explosion diverters do not always reliably prevent the propagation of explosions. However, development of the flame front is so disrupted that a slowly moving explosion is the worst that is to be expected in the downstream pipe run. Where mixtures at explosive concentrations are not to be expected in the piping, e.g. in many dedusting units, it can be assumed that the decoupling effect is adequate.

Product barrier choke: In combination with explosion relief, chokes consisting of an adequate depth of the product being handled (e.g. at a silo discharge) are suitable for decoupling parts of a plant. The amount of material must be monitored by level indicators and must be sufficient to ensure that the explosion pressure cannot cause the flame to penetrate through the product.

Double valves: Product discharges from explosion proof vessels can be protected with a double valve system to prevent flame transmission. The valves must be at least as strong as the vessels. They must be controlled to ensure alternating closure such that there is always one valve closed.

Note: All explosion decoupling systems falling under Directive 94/9/EC should be tested and marked as protective systems in accordance with the Directive's requirements.

3.4 Application of process control engineering

The explosion protection measures so far described can be kept operational, monitored or triggered by safety, controlling and regulating devices (hereafter referred to as process control engineering - PCE). Generally, PCE devices can be used to prevent the occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres or ignition sources or to mitigate the harmful effects of an explosion.

Potential ignition sources, such as a hot surface, can be monitored by PCE devices and controlled to ensure that a safe value is not exceeded. Potential ignition sources can also be switched off when a hazardous explosive atmosphere arises. For example, non-explosionproof electrical equipment can be made dead when a gas alarm is triggered, if this allows the potential ignition sources within the equipment to be de-energised. The occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres can be prevented, e.g. by starting a fan before the maximum permissible gas concentration is reached. The use of such PCE devices can reduce the size of hazardous places (zones), make it less likely that a hazardous explosive atmosphere will arise or prevent it from arising altogether. PCE devices in conjunction with devices for mitigating the harmful effects of an explosion are protective systems (e.g. explosion suppression systems) and are described under mitigation measures in section 3.3. The design and scale of such PCE devices and the measures triggered by them depend on the probability of occurrence of a hazardous explosive atmosphere and of effective ignition sources. The reliability of the PCE devices in conjunction with the technical and organisational measures taken must ensure that the danger of an explosion is limited to an acceptable level, under all operating conditions. In certain cases, it can be useful to combine PCE devices for preventing ignition sources with PCE devices for preventing hazardous explosive atmospheres.

The degree of reliability required of PCE devices depends on the assessment of the explosion risks. Reliability of the safety function of PCE devices and their components is achieved by fault avoidance and fault control (having regard to all operating conditions and the planned servicing and/or maintenance arrangements).

Example: If assessment of the explosion risks and the explosion protection strategy leads to the conclusion that there will be a high risk without PCE devices, e.g. that hazardous explosive atmospheres are present continuously, for long periods or frequently (zone 0, zone 20) and that an operational malfunction is liable to give rise to an effective ignition source, the PCE devices must be so designed that a single PCE fault cannot make the safety arrangements ineffective. This can be achieved e.g. by redundant use of such devices. A comparable result can be achieved if a single PCE device for avoiding hazardous explosive atmospheres is combined with an independent single PCE device for avoiding effective ignition sources.

Table 3.2 shows approaches to using these devices, instead of or in addition to process engineering measures, in order to avoid effective ignition sources under normal operating conditions and for likely and infrequent malfunctions.

Example: A transmission with several bearings is to be operated in zone 1. In normal operation, the temperature of the bearings is reliably below the ignition temperature of the gas/air mixture. In the event of a fault (e.g. resulting from a loss of lubricant), the bearing temperature may reach the ignition temperature if no protective measures are taken. An adequate standard of safety can be achieved by monitoring the temperature of the bearings, the unit being shut down if the maximum permissible surface temperature is reached.

The requirements for PCE devices as shown in Table 3.2 can likewise be applied to the prevention of hazardous explosive atmospheres if the likelihood of potential ignition sources is given and it is necessary to ensure that the area in question meets the criteria for a particular zone.

Example: Solvent-covered workpieces are dried in a drying cabinet. In the event of a malfunction, the surface temperature of the heating unit can reach the ignition temperature. A PCE device linked to a fan has to be used to ensure that the solvent concentration does not exceed the limit value (LEL minus safety margin specific to the plant). This fan-linked device must remain effective in the event of a malfunction (e.g. a power cut).

Note: 1. The PCE measures described can be adopted only if the physical, chemical and process parameters relevant to explosion protection can in fact be regulated or controlled, in an acceptably economical way and within a sufficiently short time. Materials properties, for example, generally cannot be influenced by such devices.

2. New PCE devices used for the avoidance of ignition sources, or of an explosive atmosphere arising (without reliably preventing it) in a hazardous zone must conform to European Directive 94/9/EC. Such PCE devices must always be tested to the same category as the equipment to be protected.

Table 3.2: Use of PCE devices to reduce the probability of effective ignition sources

>TABLE POSITION>

* or an equivalent device tested in accordance with Directive 94/9/EC

3.5 Requirements for work equipment

The employer must ensure that work equipment and all installation materials are suitable for use in hazardous places. In doing so, he must take account of the possible ambient conditions at the workplace in question. The work equipment must be so assembled, installed and operated that it cannot cause an explosion.

3.5.1 Selection of work equipment

Equipment and protective systems in the places where hazardous explosive atmospheres may be present must be chosen in accordance with the categories in Directive 94/9/EC, unless otherwise provided in the explosion protection document on the basis of the risk assessment. Further criteria such as temperature class, type of protection and explosion group must be considered to ensure safe operation of equipment in hazardous places. These criteria depend on the combustion and explosion properties of the substances used.

Work equipment for use in places where explosive atmospheres may occur which is already in use or is made available in the undertaking or establishment for the first time before 30 June 2003 shall comply from that date with the minimum requirements laid down in Annex II, Part A, if no other Community Directive is applicable or is so only partially.

Work equipment for use in places where explosive atmospheres may occur which is made available in the undertaking or establishment for the first time after 30 June 2003 shall comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Annex II, Parts A and B.

Although work equipment not falling under the definition of "equipment" given in Directive 94/9/EC cannot be compliant with this directive, it must nevertheless be compliant with Directive 1999/92/EC.

If the assessment of explosion risks (material properties, processes) indicates that the potential risk to workers and other persons is abnormally high, the equipment and work equipment chosen may have to have a higher degree of protection. If the manner in which mobile work equipment is used may lead to its operation in areas with different hazard potentials (different zoning), it must be selected on the basis of the worst case. If an item of work equipment is used in both zone 1 and zone 2, it must satisfy the requirements for operation in zone 1.

Exceptions are permissible if suitable organisational measures ensure safe operation for the whole period in which the mobile equipment is used in a hazardous place. These measures should be detailed in the Permit to Work, and/or the explosion protection document. Such work equipment may be used only by suitably trained personnel (89/655/EEC).

Table 3.3: Equipment for use in the various zones

>TABLE POSITION>

Note: If equipment is to be used in hybrid mixtures, it must be suitable for such use and tested if appropriate. An item of equipment marked II 2 G/D is thus not necessarily suitable and permissible for use in hybrid mixtures.

3.5.2 Assembly of work equipment

Work equipment and connecting devices (e.g. pipework, electrical connections) must be so assembled that they cannot cause or trigger an explosion. They may be put into service only if the assessment of explosion risks establishes that their operation does not cause ignition of an explosive atmosphere. This also applies to work equipment and associated connecting devices which are not equipment and protective systems within the meaning of Directive 94/9/EC.

In accordance with the European Directive 89/655/EEC (safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work) the employer must ensure that the equipment used is suitable for the actual operating and service conditions. When selecting installation materials, work clothing and personal protective equipment, he must likewise ensure that they are suitable.

4. ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES FOR EXPLOSION PROTECTION

If there is a potential risk of explosion at a workplace, this also implies that the work organisation must meet certain requirements. Organisational measures must be taken where technical measures alone cannot ensure and maintain explosion protection at the workplace. In practice, the work environment can also be made safe by combining technical and organisational measures.

Example: If inert gas is emitted through openings in the plant which are present in normal operation or result from defects, workers may be at risk from oxygen displacement (suffocation). When an item of apparatus has been inerted, for example, it may not be entered until inerting has been discontinued and sufficient atmospheric oxygen supplied, or if proper precautions and breathing apparatus are used.

Organisational measures so arrange the working procedures that workers cannot be harmed by an explosion. Arrangements must also be laid down for inspection, servicing and repair to ensure that technical measures remain operational. Organisational measures must also take account of possible interaction between explosion protection measures and working procedures. These combined explosion protection measures must ensure that workers can perform the work assigned to them without danger to their safety and health or to the safety and health of others.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 4.1: Examples of organisational explosion protection measures [13]

[13] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

The following organisational measures must be carried out:

produce written operating instructions, where required by the explosion protection document;

instruct workers in explosion protection;

ensure workers have adequate competence;

apply a permit-to-work system for dangerous work, where required by the explosion protection document;

carry out maintenance;

carry out inspection and surveillance;

mark hazardous places, where necessary.

The organisational measures taken must be recorded in the explosion protection document (see section 6). A few examples are shown in Figure 4.1.

4.1 Operating instructions

Operating instructions are activity-related binding instructions and rules of conduct issued in writing by the employer to the employees. They describe the workplace-related dangers to human beings and the environment and indicate the protective measures taken or to be observed.

Operating instructions are produced by the employer or a competent person whom he appoints to perform the task and must be observed by workers. They relate to a particular workplace or part of the establishment. Among the matters to be covered by operating instructions for workplaces where there are explosive atmosphere risks are what explosion hazards exist and where, what mobile work equipment may be used and whether special personal protective equipment must be worn.

Example: The operating instructions may include a list of all mobile work equipment permitted for use in the hazardous place in question. They should indicate what personal protective equipment must be worn by persons entering this place.

They must be so worded that all workers can understand and apply them. If the establishment employs workers who do not have an adequate command of the language of the country, the operating instructions must be written in a language that they understand.

It may be appropriate for activity-related sets of operating instructions which describe different hazards or are produced on the basis of different statutory provisions to be combined into a single set of operating instructions, so providing an overall view of the hazards.

It is advisable for the operating instructions in an establishment to have a uniform presentation in order to take advantage of the familiarity effect.

4.2 Worker competence

For every workplace, there should be available a sufficient number of workers with the requisite experience and training to perform the explosion protection tasks assigned to them.

4.3 Training of workers

Employers must provide workers with training which informs them of the explosion hazards at the workplace and the protective measures taken. This training must explain how the explosion hazard arises and in what parts of the workplace it is present. The measures taken should be listed and their operation explained. The correct way of working with the equipment available must be explained. Workers must be instructed in safe work in or near hazardous places. This also involves explaining the meaning of any marking of hazardous places and specifying what mobile work equipment may be used there (see 3.5.1). Workers must also be instructed in what personal protective equipment they must wear at work. The available operating instructions should be covered during the training.

Note: Well-trained workers greatly increase safety at work. Any deviation from the desired process can be detected, and hence corrected, more quickly.

Workers must receive training (89/391/EEC):

on recruitment (before starting work);

in the event of a transfer or a change of job;

when work equipment is introduced for the first time or changed;

when new technology is introduced.

Training of workers must be repeated at suitable intervals, for example once per year. On completion of training, it can be useful to check on what has been learned.

The duty to provide training also applies to the employees of outside contractors. Training must be given by a competent person. Records should be kept in writing of the date and content of training activities and the participants.

4.4 Worker supervision

In working environments where explosive atmospheres may arise in such quantities as to endanger the safety and health of workers, appropriate supervision during the presence of workers must be ensured, in accordance with the risk assessment, by the use of appropriate technical means.

4.5 Permit-to-work system

If work liable to cause an explosion is to be carried out in or near a hazardous place, it must be authorised by the person with responsibility for this function within the establishment. This also applies to activities which may interact with other work to cause hazards. A system of permits to work has proved useful in such cases. This may be implemented by means of a permit-to-work form which all concerned must receive and sign.

Example: The permit-to-work form should indicate at least the following details:

1. where exactly the work is to be carried out;

2. clear identification of the work to be undertaken;

3. hazard identification;

4. precautions necessary, person undertaking the precautions should sign on to show that they have been taken;

5. personal protective equipment needed;

6. when the work will begin and when it is expected to end;

7. acceptance, confirming understanding;

8. extension/shift Hanover procedure;

9. handback, plant ready for testing and recommissioning;

10. cancellation, plant tested and recommissioned;

11. report on any anomaly discovered during the work.

Once the work has been finished, a check must be made to establish whether the plant is still safe or has been made safe again. All concerned must be informed when the work is finished.

4.6 Maintenance

Maintenance comprises repair, servicing and inspection. Before maintenance work begins, all concerned must be informed and the work must be authorised, e.g. by means of a permit-to-work system (see above). It may be carried out only by competent persons.

Experience shows that a high accident risk attaches to servicing work. Before, during and after completion of the work, care must therefore be taken to ensure that all necessary protective measures are taken.

Note: During servicing, items of equipment or plant which could cause an explosion if inadvertently switched on during the work must if possible be mechanically and/or electrically isolated. For example, if open flame operations are carried out in a container, all pipes from which a hazardous explosive atmosphere may be emitted or which are connected to other containers where such an atmosphere could be present must be separated from the container and blinded off or closed by some comparable means.

When maintenance involving a risk of ignition is carried out in a hazardous place, it should be reliably ensured that it will be free of hazardous explosive atmospheres for the duration of the work and if necessary for some time thereafter (e.g. to allow cooling).

Except in exceptional circumstances, when other appropriate and adequate precautions have been taken, the items of plant on which work is to be carried out must as necessary be emptied, depressurised, cleaned, purged and must be free of flammable substances. While work is in progress, such substances must not reach the place where it is being carried out.

Where work may give rise to flying sparks (e.g. welding, flame cutting, grinding), suitable screening should be provided (see Figure 4.2) and a fire sentry posted if necessary.

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 4.2: Example of screening for work giving rise to flying sparks [14]

[14] From the ISSA leaflet "Gas Explosions", International Section for the Prevention of Occupational Risks in the Chemical Industry, International Social Security Association (ISSA), Heidelberg, Germany

Once maintenance has been completed, steps must be taken to ensure that the explosion protection measures required for normal service are again operative before the equipment is restarted. A permit-to-work system (see above) is particularly useful during servicing and maintenance work. It can be useful to use a checklist for the restoration of explosion protection measures.

4.7 Inspection and checking

Before a workplace containing places where hazardous explosive atmospheres may occur is used for the first time, and after any damage or alterations with safety implications, its overall explosion safety must be verified.

The effectiveness of the explosion protection measures taken in a plant must be checked at regular intervals. The frequency of such checks depends on the type of measure. All checks may be carried out by competent persons only.

Competent persons are persons with comprehensive expertise in explosion protection as a result of their professional training, experience and current professional activity.

Example: The performance of gas alarm systems must be verified by a competent person after installation and at suitable intervals, observing any pertinent national regulations and manufacturer's instructions. Where hybrid mixtures could arise the detectors must be suitable for both phases and be calibrated against the possible mixtures.

Example: Ventilation systems intended to prevent hazardous explosive atmospheres and the associated monitoring systems must be checked by a competent person against the intended duty before they are first brought into service and should be examined at regular intervals. Ventilation systems with adjustable items (e.g. regulators, baffles, variable-speed fans) should be examined every time the settings are changed. It is desirable for such items to be locked against interference. Where ventilation systems are adjusted automatically, the examination should cover the entire range of settings.

4.8 Marking of hazardous places

Directive 1999/92/EC stipulates that the points of entry to places where hazardous explosive atmospheres may occur in such quantities as to endanger the health and safety of workers must where necessary be marked by the employer with the following warning sign:

>REFERENCE TO A GRAPHIC>

Figure 4.3: Warning sign for places where explosive atmospheres may occur

Distinctive features:

triangular shape,

black letters on a yellow background with black edging (the yellow part to take up at least 50 % of the area of the sign).

Such marking is required e.g. for rooms or areas in which a hazardous explosive atmosphere may arise (such as rooms or fenced enclosures where flammable liquids are stored). On the other hand, there is no point in marking an item of plant which is fully protected by mitigation measures. If the hazardous place is not the whole space concerned, but only part of it, that part may be marked by yellow/black diagonal stripes e.g. on the floor.

Other details may be added to the warning sign, indicating e.g. the nature and frequency of occurrence of the hazardous explosive atmosphere (substance and zone). It may be desirable to place other warning signs in accordance with 92/58/EEC, for example forbidding smoking, etc.

Workers' attention must be drawn to the sign and its meaning in the course of their training.

5. COORDINATION DUTIES

Where independent persons or teams are working simultaneously and in proximity to one another, they may inadvertently place each other at risk, particularly since those concerned focus primarily on their own tasks, while nothing or not enough is often known about the commencement, nature or extent of the work being done by others nearby.

Examples: Typical results of poor coordination between the employer's and contractor's staff, giving rise to particular explosion risks, are as follows:

1. The contractor is not aware of the environmental hazard at the firm where it is engaged and the implications for its own work.

2 The in-house departments often do not know that outside staff are working in the establishment and/or what potential hazard is being imported as a result of the work carried out.

3. The house management is not told how it and its staff have to conduct themselves in relation to the contrac