EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 21.12.2016 SWD(2016) 470 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT



IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 {COM(2016) 825 final}

{SWD(2016) 471 final}



Table of Contents 1. Introduction and background 1.1Genesis of the Cash Control Regulation 1.2 Description of key terminology and the overall legal framework in the area of AML/TF 1.3International context 1.4 The objectives and main provisions of the CCR 1.5 Quantitative data 1.6 Evaluation of the Cash Control Regulation 1.7 Effectiveness of the Cash Control Regulation 1.8 Consultation of stakeholders 2. Problem definitions and the drivers of the problems 2.1Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 2.2Problem 2: Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities 2.3Problem 3: Impossibility for competent authorities to temporarily detain sub-threshold amounts 2.4Problem 4: Imperfect definition of 'cash' 2.5 Problem 5: Divergent penalties 2.6Problem 6: Different implementation levels among Member States

2.7 Problem 7: Divergent national measures to raise awareness 3. EU right to act and subsidiarity 3.1Legal basis in primary law 3.2 Subsidiarity 4. Objectives of the proposal 5. Policy options 5.1 Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 5.2Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities 5.3 Problem 3: Impossibility for competent authorities to temporarily detain sub-threshold amounts 5.4Problem 4: Imperfect definition of 'Cash' 5.5Problem 5: Divergent 'penalties' 5.6Problem 6: Different implementation levels among Member States 5.7Problem 7: Divergent national measures to raise awareness 6. Impacts and option comparison 6.1 Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 6.2Problem 2: Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities 6.3Problem 3: Impossibility for competent authorities to temporarily detain sub-threshold amounts 6.4 Problem 4: Imperfect definition of 'cash' 6.5Problem 5: Divergent 'penalties' 6.6Problem 6: Different implementation levels among Member States

6.7Problem 7: Divergent national measures to raise awareness 6.8 Summary of preferred options 7. Preferred options and cohesion 8. Monitoring and evaluation 8.1 Monitoring arrangements 8.2 Evaluation List of annexes to the Impact Assessment report Annex 1. Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community Annex 2. Evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community Annex 3. Report on the outcome of the Public Consultation on the review of Regulation (EC) Nr. 1889/2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community Annex 4. Procedural information Annex 5. Who is affected by the initiative and how Annex 6. Fundamental rights and exchange of information

1. Introduction and background 1.1 Genesis of the Cash Control Regulation Prior to the introduction of the Cash Control Regulation, the issue of cross-border cash movements in the EU Member States was first examined by Operation "Moneypenny". Moneypenny was an operation which took place from September 1999 to February 2000 between the customs authorities of the –at the time 15- Member States of the European Union. It monitored cash movements across the EU's internal and external borders in excess of EUR 10 000. It examined whether the scale of such movements indicated a threat that the controls applied by financial institutions to prevent money laundering could be circumvented by cross-border movements of cash. Although the final report did not distinguish between intra and extra-EU cash movements and included only limited input from 9 Member States that did not apply specific controls on cash at their borders it nevertheless revealed cross-border cash-movements of 1.35 billion Euro and substantial differences in controls applied by the Member States. In June 2002 the Commission presented to the Council its "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the prevention of money laundering by means of customs co-operation". The Commission proposed that the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) should be complemented by a Regulation introducing controls on large sums of cash crossing the EU's external border. For the controls to be effective, a system would also be needed whereby the Member States could exchange information on suspicious movements with each other and the Commission. The Cash Control Regulation entered into force on 15 December 2005 and is applicable since 15 June 2007. It provides for an EU-wide approach to controlling cash movements into or out of the EU. It was a decisive step in the EU policy aimed at the strengthening of measures to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing and other illegal activities. 1.2 Description of key terminology and the overall legal framework in the area of AML/TF Money laundering concerns activities related to assets which have a criminal or illicit origin. Criminals engaged in money laundering will therefore attempt to conceal or disguise the true nature, source or ownership of the assets in question and transform them into seemingly legitimate proceeds. If dirty money is allowed to flow through the financial system, the stability and reputation of the financial sector can be seriously jeopardised - which in turn could undermine the integrity of the single market. Terrorist financing concerns the provision or collection of funds to carry out any of the offences defined in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. Terrorist activities can be funded through legitimate as well as criminal activities and terrorist organisations engage in revenue-generating activities which in themselves may be, or at least appear to be, legitimate. There is a clear risk to the integrity, proper functioning, reputation and stability of the financial system, and with potentially devastating consequences for the broader society. The EU considers the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework as crucial for ensuring the successful functioning of the single market and safeguarding the security of citizens. The fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism happens at various levels. On a supranational level, the Financial Action Task Force (henceforth: 'FATF') in which the Union is represented through the Commission, establishes recommendations for jurisdictions and describes how to best tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. These recommendations are not directly applicable legal instruments but do carry weight: the FATF members perform mutual evaluations to determine compliance which are closely scrutinized and have great reputational impact. On FATF-level, Recommendation 32 specifically treats the issue of cross-border cash movements. Various legal instruments have been adopted to ensure an effective anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing framework at EU level. The most relevant ones are:

– The Fourth AML Directive , which covers most of the FATF Recommendations; – Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds , which implements FATF SR VII on wire transfers; – Directive 2007/64/EC of 13 December 2007 on payment services in the internal market (Payment Services Directive) which, in combination with the AMLD, implements FATF SR VI on alternative remittance; – Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism which, together with Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 implementing UN Al Qai'da and Taliban sanctions, implements part of FATF SR III on freezing terrorist assets. Broadly describing the interaction between the various instruments, it could be said that as regards the fight against money laundering and terrorist finance, the Anti Money Laundering Directive lays down a framework of rules to be implemented as regards the functioning of the formal financial sector whereas the CCR lays down a framework of rules which is complementary and protects the Union against cross-external border transfers of cash money by money launderers and terrorist financiers who could opt for this mode of transport in order to circumvent the controls on the formal financial system. The Cash Control Regulation was adopted for this purpose and seeks to reconcile the fundamental principle of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital with the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing in the context of the single market. Complementary to the legislation specifically adopted to target anti money laundering and terrorist financing the Community Customs Code and/or national legislation generally apply for the movements of cash in post and freight at the Member States' borders. This means that, in most Member States, cash has to be declared on a customs declaration form for a particular parcel, container etc. However, the information required on the customs declaration form is significantly less comprehensive than the data required on the EU-CDF and does not include the desired level of detail required for AML/CTF purposes (e.g. owner of cash, provenance and intended use of cash). 1.3 International context The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body set up by the G7 Summit held in Paris in 1989 in response to mounting concern over money laundering. The FATF has primary responsibility for developing and promoting global policy standards, both at national and international level, to prevent money laundering and combat terrorist financing. It tries to generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas, and for this purpose it has adopted 40 recommendations. It is important to note that the recommendation concerning cash couriers was developed during the same time period when the Commission was drafting and proposing the Cash Control Regulation ('CCR' or "the Regulation"). Initially the FATF labelled this norm 'Special Recommendation IX', the current Regulation lays down measures which at the time were consistent with this recommendation. In the course of time and after adoption on EU-level of the CCR, FATF Special Recommendation IX was complemented with an interpretative note and was finally renamed 'Recommendation 32'. For reasons of consistency and readability this document will always refer to 'Recommendation 32', even when referring to a point in time where the renaming had not yet taken place. The European Commission is a member of the FATF and is therefore committed to implementing its recommendations. 15 EU Member States are also full members of the FATF in their own right, while the countries that joined the EU from 2004 onwards are represented in the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL), FATF's affiliated regional body. Starting with its own members, the FATF monitors countries' progress in implementing AML/CFT policies by rating their compliance with its recommendations and measuring the effectiveness of their AML/CFT systems via a mutual evaluations procedure and by reviewing anti money laundering and combatting terrorist financing techniques and relevant counter-measures. 1.4 The objectives and main provisions of the CCR

The original objectives of the Cash Control Regulation, as described in the text of the Regulation are presented in the diagram below. The provisions designed to meet these objectives were codified in the Cash Control Regulation in line with the requirements of the FATF's Recommendation 32 on cash couriers, with the view of aligning EU practices with the highest global AML/CFT standards. An outline of those provisions is reproduced below, more detailed information can be obtained in the 2015 evaluation report in Annex 2 of this impact assessment. Definition of cash The definition of cash in the Cash Control Regulation matches the definition used by the FATF for Recommendation 32 on cash couriers and includes: Currency, i.e. banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of exchange. Bearer-negotiable instruments (BNI) As the Cash Control Regulation mirrors the definition of 'cash' used in the supra-national standard (FATF recommendation 32), gold, precious metals or stones, electronic cash cards and casino chips are not included in the definition of cash. The obligation to declare The Cash Control Regulation establishes a uniform EU approach towards cash controls based on a mandatory declaration system. If a natural person entering or leaving the EU (including transiting) transports cash of a value of EUR 10 000 or more, he/she must declare these funds. The EUR 10 000 threshold is considered high enough not to burden the majority of travellers and traders with disproportionate administrative formalities. However, when there are indications of illegal activities linked with movements of cash lower than EUR 10 000, the collecting and recording of information related to these movements is also authorised. This provision was introduced in order to limit the practice of 'smurfing' or 'structuring', the practice of deliberately carrying amounts lower than the threshold with the intention to escape the obligation to declare. This can be achieved either by dividing a large sum of cash between several individuals travelling together, such as a family of 2 adults and 2 young children, each carrying 9500 Euro, or by a single individual who travels multiple times in a short time-span and on each occasion transfers amounts slightly below the declaration threshold. Structuring can be linked to money laundering, terrorist financing, fraud or other financial crimes and should therefore be monitored by the competent authorities. Designation of powers of the competent authorities

In order to ensure compliance with the obligation to declare, the national competent authorities are empowered to: Request, accept, check and certify a cash declaration; Check compliance with the obligation to declare; Carry out controls on natural persons, their baggage and their means of transport Recording and processing of information Member States must record and process all information they obtain through declarations or controls, and make this information available to the national authorities competent for fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. These authorities are designated as national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), central national units responsible for receiving and analysing information and suspicious transactions received from authorities or private sector operators, analysing them and if there are reasons to suspect that illicit activity may be going on, to notify the competent (judicial) authorities. It should be noted that all information obtained through the Cash Control Regulation is confidential. All personal information must be dealt with in accordance with the relevant data protection provisions and respect for fundamental rights. Exchange of information Where there are indications that the sums of cash are related to any illegal activity associated with the movement of cash, exchange of information may take place with competent authorities in other Member States. Information adversely affecting the financial interests of the EU must also be transmitted to the Commission. Under the framework of existing agreements on mutual administrative assistance, information obtained under the Cash Control Regulation may also be communicated to a third country, subject to compliance with relevant national and EU provisions on the transfer of personal data to third countries. Penalties Member States are required to provide for penalties against persons who fail to declare EUR 10 000 or more in cash when crossing EU external borders. The penalties resulting from such proceedings must be effective, dissuasive and proportionate to the offence, so as to have a deterrent effect. 1.5 Quantitative data On average, 100 000 cash control declarations are submitted annually in the EU, representing a total amount declared between 60-70 billion Euro. While amounts of undeclared or incorrectly declared cash which have been detected by authorities are highly variable (240 Mio – 1.5 billion Euro/year), on average approximately 300 Mio Euro per year is detected following controls. Statistics show a sustained, high level of cash declarations over the years and also a significant increase in the number of recordings at the EU border in recent years. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact combination of reasons behind these trends based on the available data.

Possible factors include higher numbers of travellers in general, more frequent controls by customs authorities, cash being used as an alternative means of payment due to increased regulation in the financial sector etc. 1.6 Evaluation of the Cash Control Regulation The existing CCR has been subject to regular monitoring and evaluations. The existing legal framework and the implementation of the Regulation were the subject of an extensive evaluation, performed in 2015 (See annex 2). This evaluation identified several areas that could be considered for amendment and which are now included in the problem definition section. According to the evaluation; the overall performance of the Cash Control Regulation was considered adequate, but consideration should be given to the possibility of more in-depth analysis to improve the following aspects: Consider including cash movements by mail and freight at EU external borders within the scope of the Cash Control Regulation; Consider widening and harmonising the possibilities for information exchange between Member States: a.By including all cash control information (including non-suspicious voluntary declarations); b.By setting clear procedures and providing effective tools for the exchange of information; Consider to explicitly provide for the possibility of using cash declaration information for tax purposes, including the fight against tax fraud and evasion; Consider a level of approximation of cash control penalties applied by Member States at EU external borders. In addition, the Commission is in continuous interaction with Member States' national experts who implement the Regulation. This interaction is both ad hoc and structural, with 2 annual meetings of the 'Cash Controls Working Group' held under the aegis of the Customs 2020 programme. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and taking into account conclusion Nr. 8 of the extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council of 20 November 2015, the Commission published on 2 February 2016 a Communication to the Council and the Parliament on an Action Plan to further step up the fight against the financing of terrorism. The Action Plan builds on existing EU rules to adapt to new threats and aims at updating EU policies in line with international standards. One of the elements of the Action Plan concerns the commitment of the Commission to present – at the latest by Q4 2016 - a legislative proposal to amend the Cash Control Regulation. The Commission Action Plan emphasises the need to speed up the evaluation/revision exercise of the cash control regulation which was already ongoing and specifically identifies a number of key areas on which expeditious action should be undertaken to strengthen the existing framework. The areas in question are: - Cash shipments in post and freight - Allowing authorities to act on amounts of cash below the declaration threshold in case there are indications of suspicious activity associated with the cash. - Examining the possibility to include precious metals and/or other highly liquid stores of value in the definition of cash. While these areas were already under investigation for amendment, the Action Plan, clearly establishes the political priorities assigned by the Commission to the specific topics mentioned. The conclusion from the evaluations and the recommendations from the Commission's Action Plan to further step up the fight against the financing of terrorism resulted in the identification of a number of areas in which the existing CCR could be improved. 1.7 Effectiveness of the Cash Control Regulation The effectiveness of the cash controls regulation has to be considered in the wider framework of supranational EU-measured which seek to tackle money laundering and terrorism finance, such as the AMLD, as described in the previous section.. The CCR is complementary to this. The overall performance of the Cash Control Regulation was considered adequate based on feedback from various sources (national FUI's, law enforcement agencies). The information collected by the authorities via the declaration system allows to achieve the goals set out by the Cash Control Regulation and the utility of this information is judged to be good by authorities involved. An important part of the effectiveness of the CCR is the fact that it implements FATF recommendation 32. The European Commission (Commission) represents the European Union with the FATF and is therefore committed to implementing its recommendations. 15 EU Member States are also full members of the FATF in their own right, while the countries that joined the EU from 2004 onwards are represented in the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL), FATF's affiliated regional body. Through a system of mutual evaluations between members, according to a defined methodology, the FATF monitors countries' progress in implementing AML/CFT policies by rating their compliance with its recommendations and measuring the effectiveness of their AML/CFT systems, techniques and relevant counter-measures. FATF-evaluations of Member States conclude that the existing regime of controls at the external border is largely effective, so does feedback received from Europol and competent authorities. FIUs play a key role in ensuring that the information collected through cash declarations and cash controls is properly analysed and where appropriate, used effectively to investigate suspicions of money laundering and terrorist financing. The information on cash controls obtained by national FIUs results in a significant number of investigations coordinated by the FIUs, as well as in court convictions on money laundering and other criminal activities, as demonstrated by the statistical information and examples presented in Annex 2. It is often difficult to link a conviction for money laundering or terrorist financing to a customs control on cash, due to lack of feedback from law enforcement agencies and/or FIUs to customs authorities that provided the information, as well as the fact that cash controls frequently form only part of the evidence in a particular case and that cases may take years to be decided. In response to a questionnaire sent by the Commission in 2014, only 9 Member States provided examples (not complete statistics) on investigations/convictions that can be attributed to the implementation of the Cash Control Regulation between 2011 and 2013:  Austria – 36 convictions (type of offence not specified);  Bulgaria – 72 convictions for money laundering;  Estonia – 58 convictions for money laundering  France – 176 judicial enquiries for money laundering (69 related to narcotics), out of which customs authorities can confirm 11 convictions (results of most investigations unknown or investigations still on-going);  Germany – 6 convictions for money laundering and 2 for other illegal activities;  Greece – 3 pending court cases on money laundering charges;  Lithuania – 17 convictions for other illegal activities;  Malta – 11 convictions (type of offence not specified);  The Netherlands – 105 cases (2013) of money laundering prosecutions. Other Member States either do not have available statistics, have not recorded any investigations / convictions or have not provided an answer. 1.8 Consultation of stakeholders In parallel with the evaluation of the Regulation in 2015 an open public consultation was held by Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD). This consultation took the form of a questionnaire that sought input on a number of potential policy options that could be envisaged in a revision of the CCR. The consultation was published on the 'My Voice in Europe' site which ensures automatic notification of all registered interest representatives. The consultation document was also accessible via the TAXUD homepage. The scope of the consultation was wide, with private citizens (EU and other), public authorities, private enterprises and interest representatives invited and able to respond. The consultation was accessible from March until June of 2015. Due to the limited number of replies received and the methodology it can in no way be seen as representative for overall public opinion. Nevertheless the responses received provide valuable insight in the way various policy approaches are perceived by the stakeholders. A targeted questionnaire was sent to the fiscal authorities of Member States in 2015 where they were queried about the possibilities of using cash control data for fiscal purposes and the current practice at national level. A total of 24 Member State authorities replied. Another targeted questionnaire was sent in June 2016 to police authorities, FIUs and customs authorities regarding the use of gold a way to circumvent cash controls. A total of 42 replies from 27 Member States were received. In addition, national experts on cash controls were invited to provide technical feedback on policy options under examination and these were discussed during a session of the Cash Controls Working Group. Additionally and given the potential impact that some options could have on specific categories of economic operators (postal services and express couriers), interest representatives for these sectors (as registered in the EU's transparency register) were specifically invited to provide comments In line with Commission policy, TAXUD remains available for any comments regarding the revision initiative even beyond the conclusion of the formal public consultation 2. Problem definitions and the drivers of the problems According to the findings of the evaluation and to the latest developments, a series of problems have been identified. The problem tree below summarises the drivers behind the problems, the main issues and their consequences. The first six drivers and four problems (shaded in light tones) are the ones that are the most important for the current Impact Assessment, but given the holistic approach of the exercise, the remaining three problems, with more limited consequences have been examined as well.

2.1 Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 2.1.1 The problem and its drivers The current Regulation only covers cross external border movements of cash carried by natural persons, its Article 3.1 states: Any natural person entering or leaving the Community and carrying cash of a value of EUR 10 000 or more shall declare that sum to the competent authorities of the Member State through which he is entering or leaving the Community in accordance with this Regulation. The obligation to declare shall not have been fulfilled if the information provided is incorrect or incomplete. The notion 'Carrying cash' is indirectly defined through Article 4.1 of the CCR: In order to check compliance with the obligation to declare laid down in Article 3, officials of the competent authorities shall be empowered, in accordance with the conditions laid down under national legislation, to carry out controls on natural persons, their baggage and their means of transport. Cash above the declaration threshold which is sent through other means (postal consignment, express freight, commercial courier, cargo, unaccompanied luggage….) is not subjected to the full set of control measures imposed under the CCR, which specifies in its Article 3.2 the data elements to be collected (see table 2 below). Apart from the Regulation, the only alternative that potentially allows for the capture of information regarding cross-external border cash movements where the cash is not carried by natural persons but crosses the border in postal consignments, courier shipments or freight is the regular customs declaration.

This is problematic for a number of reasons: - the level of detail captured by a customs declaration falls short of what is required under the CCR, notably because the customs declaration does not contain any information regarding the provenance and intended use of the cash, nor details regarding the identity of the declarant. For the same reasons a regular customs declaration fails to fully meet the objective of FATF Recommendation 32. The table below illustrates, in a simplified manner, the main differences in information required by the two forms. Cash declaration form Customs declaration form Declarant, including full name, date and place of birth and nationality Declarant, including full name, date and place of birth and nationality Owner of the cash Not required Intended recipient of the cash Not required Amount and nature of the cash Amount and nature of the cash Provenance and intended use of the cash Not required Transport route Transport route Means of transport Means of transport - considerable legal uncertainty exists regarding the nature of cash (currency), notably regarding the question whether cash (in the sense of currency in circulation as a means of exchange) is to be considered a good in the sense of the customs legislation. If it were considered that cash is not a good, then the provisions of the Union Customs Code do not apply and cash would not be subject to a customs declaration. It is not easily feasible to obtain detailed, reliable and representative data regarding potentially illegal phenomena. Nevertheless, concerning the problem drivers the FATF remark: '[…] although FATF Recommendation 32 sets standards for the control of physical cross-border transportation of cash by natural persons, cargo and mail, its focus on ‘natural persons’ may help explain why many jurisdictions seem to consider that their obligations under this recommendation to be limited to having in place a disclosure or a declaration system for transportation of cash by natural persons only.' 2.1.2 Consequences and size of the problem These weaknesses are exploited by criminals who perceive the shipping of cash through postal consignments as a means to avoid an obligation to declare and exploit a lower frequency of controls. Example 1. USD 89 000 criminal cash in postal packages Based on a routine check by customs, an investigation by the joint financial investigation group of police and customs forces in Berlin lead to the discovery of USD 89 000 which were forwarded from the US to Berlin. Perpetrators, which were unknown to this time, had sent five packages containing electric devices to various beneficiaries in Berlin by post. The money (solely USD 100 bills) was hidden in these devices. Source: FATF report 'Money Laundering through the Physical Transportation of Cash' , p.71 After an information exchange with US authorities it was possible to assign the funds to a group of criminals, which had acquired at least USD 4 200 000 000 through criminal activities (mainly fraud and cybercrime). The money was seized. Several control operations undertaken by EU Customs authorities where post and freight consignments were specifically targeted for controls on cash at the external border have detected sometimes very large amounts being sent in postal and freight consignments. In many cases no information regarding the economic origin or the destination of the cash was available as this does not need to be provided on the customs declaration.

The size of the problem is hard to quantify as little systematic study has been performed and the available tools do not offer the possibility to reliably extrapolate. The control operations mentioned as well as surveys and studies performed at international level point to a significant regulatory gap which is being exploited. Moreover, as FATF Recommendation 32, its interpretative note and the best practices intend all cross-border transfers to be monitored, irrespective of whether the cash is carried by natural persons or shipped and the customs declaration does not adequately capture shipments of cash, it is doubtful if the EU are complying with FATF Recommendation 32, a norm to which is has committed to. Although the FATF-standards are not directly binding, a periodic mutual evaluation system is in place and a finding of non-compliance may result in significant reputational damage for the EU and individual Member States. 2.2 Problem 2: Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities Under the Regulation, five major theoretical 'information flows' can be identified and should be clearly distinguished and borne in mind for what follows. The figure below captures the 5 flows, the 3 most significant one being represented by larger spheres. The green circles represent the national flows while the blue ones represent external flows of information. a) The making available of information to the FIU: all information collected by the competent authorities (declarations, infractions, indications of illegal activity) is made available to the FIU of that Member State. b) Information collected by competent authorities in one Member State and communicated to other authorities who did not collect it but have a legitimate interest in obtaining access. c) Information collected by competent authorities in one Member State and which is made available to other competent authorities in another Member State. d) Information collected by a competent authority in a Member State which is made available to a third country. e) Information collected by a competent authority in a Member State and which is made available to the Commission. 2.2.1 The problem and its drivers In order for the CCR to be effective in meeting its objectives, the effective sharing of information is of vital importance. All information from declarations as well as from controls which revealed lower than threshold amounts being transported under suspicious circumstances is made available by competent authorities to the FIU of the Member State where the information was collected. While most Member States understand 'make available' as some form of transmission on the initiative of the competent authorities to the FIU using automated means (XLS-sheet or database), in some cases the FIU has to contact the competent authority who collected the information, while in one case, the physical declaration forms were stored in a secured room and thus 'made available'.

The FIU's have access to all cash control declaration information and use it in their analysis. If the FIU detects anomalies they may decide to contact other competent authorities to launch an investigation. In practice, Member States competent authorities regarding cash control indicate that they rarely receive feedback from the FIU and are relegated to the task of 'data-collectors'. Under the CCR, 'competent authorities' are customs authorities or other authorities designated by national legislation to apply the cash control regulation. Within one Member State, all 'competent authorities' usually have access to the declaration information. As a consequence, in some Member States the tax authorities have access to the declaration information, while in in other Member States they do not. Further, it is unclear if and to what extent the tax authorities may use the cash control declaration information in order to investigate fiscal crimes (a recognized predicate offence to money laundering) and use the information to levy taxes on undeclared income. This situation leads to divergent treatment of declarants among Member States. The FATF has repeatedly stated that more attention should be given to the fiscal aspects of Money Laundering / Terrorist Finance. On EU level, the 4th Anti-Money laundering directive specifically introduces and defines the notion 'fiscal crime' and specifies, that whatever action the FIU decides to take, this should not prejudice the possibility to exchange and make use of the information obtained based on the AML/TF legislative framework for fiscal purposes. Cash control information may (facultative) be exchanged between competent authorities of different Member States but only if there are indications of illegal activities as designated in the Anti-Money laundering directive 91/308/EEC (predicate offences to money laundering). Further, the reference in the Regulation to 'the directive' concerns Directive 91/308/EEC - the first iteration of the Anti-Money laundering directive- in which fiscal crimes were not designated as predicate offences. In the current anti-money laundering directive the scope has been considerably enlarged, notably concerning the predicate offences. The mechanisms for the exchange of cash control (declaration) data have been described by Member States as being cumbersome and unclear. 2.2.2 Consequences and size of the problem A 2014 questionnaire which was sent to Member States regarding the exchange of information between customs authorities of one Member State with other Member states resulted in the following answers: Yes No Customs authorities to custom authorities 16 8 Customs authorities to fiscal authorities 3 16 Customs authorities to other type of authorities 5 n/a No direct exchange of information 4 n/a Source: European Commission Questionnaire to Member States 2014 The lack of clarity regarding the modalities for cash declaration data exchange and the lack of flexibility of the tools involved result in practice in very limited sharing of information. Further, the divergent approach by Member States regarding the sharing of cash control declaration information and the treatment thereof raise concerns regarding unequal treatment of declarants between Member States and impediments as to the maintenance of a 'level playing field' regarding the internal market.

Regarding the sharing of cash control declaration for fiscal purposes, the present situation is unclear, with competent authorities in various Member States not in agreement about the question whether this is legally possible, what data can be exchanged, how the data should flow from the collecting authorities to the fiscal authorities in the same or another Member State, which instrument should be used for the exchange of data etc. At the end of 2015, 2 Member States (BE and NL) decided to launch a pilot project in order to examine the potential to use cash control data for purposes of fighting against tax evasion and 'fiscal crime'. The pilot project proceeded under the condition that the data exchanged would not be used for taxation purposes, given the legal uncertainty involved. The result of the pilot project are presented in the box below. Example 2: Fiscal relevance of cash control data For the period 2013-2016 the BE authorities provided cash declaration details to NL about 79 individuals who reside in the NL but entered or exited the Union through BE. It should be noted that the data which was transmitted concerns ALL declarations, not only infractions. The total amount declared was 4.2 Mio EUR. Overall, in 52% of cases the data was found to be relevant for fiscal purposes. Additionally, a number of cases were detected where links could be established to money laundering and criminal activity which had until then not been flagged by the FIU. For the same time period, BE received from the NL 180 cash declarations lodged in NL by individuals who reside in BE for a total amount of 4.3 Mio Euro. Initial investigation by fiscal authorities detected that in 65% of cases the information was relevant for fiscal purposes. Findings include a) 43% of all cash declarations were filed by persons involved in the management of an enterprise, 20% of the category in question were involved in bankruptcy proceedings b) 6% of all declarants were known by the tax authorities (suspicion of fiscal fraud). One person who declared a substantial amount of cash had outstanding tax debts of 1 Mio Euro c) 25% of declarants received pension, unemployment or welfare benefits (which does not per se imply fraud but raises questions regarding the origin of the cash, especially when it is declared as 'income from professional activity') while 16% did not declare any income to the tax authorities for the year in which they filed a declaration relating to a cash movement of > 10 000 Euro. Source: Pilot project between Belgium and the Netherlands The above are clear indications pointing to the relevance of the use of cash control declaration information for fiscal purposes., In the open public consultation, a large majority of respondents favour facilitating the exchange of cash control information between Member States and between various authorities within one Member State, for tax purposes. In the course of further analysis it became apparent that for legal reasons it was not possible to tackle this problem through a modification of the Cash Control Regulation. As the data exchange is intended to take place between customs authorities and fiscal authorities, it was determined that the legal basis in primary law to make this exchange possible resides in Arts. 113 and 115 TFEU. Neither the mechanism for such exchange nor the elaboration of the instrument required are compatible with the legal basis in primary law upon which the CCR is based (Arts. 33 and 114, TFEU) and hence cannot be tackled via this instrument. As a consequence the possibilities of further regulating the sharing of cash control declaration for fiscal purposes will not be further developed here. 2.3 Problem 3: Impossibility for competent authorities to temporarily detain sub-threshold amounts 2.3.1 The problem and its drivers Under the current cash control regulation, natural persons carrying cash on their person, in their means of transport or in their luggage are only subjected to the obligation to declare if they carry cash for a value of 10 000 Euro or more when entering or leaving the EU. This follows from a reading of Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation.

The declaration threshold is evaluated by competent authorities per traveller who physically carries the cash in question. Further, Article 5.2 describes the possibilities for action by competent authorities under the cash control regulation in case they discover amounts of cash lower than the declaration threshold: Where it appears from the controls provided for in Article 4 that a natural person is entering or leaving the Community with sums of cash lower than the threshold fixed in Article 3 and where there are indications of illegal activities associated with the movement of cash, as referred to in Directive 91/308/EEC, that information, the full name, date and place of birth and nationality of that person and details of the means of transport used may also be recorded and processed by the competent authorities of the Member State referred to in Article 3(1) and be made available to the authorities referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 91/308/EEC of that Member State. Temporary detention of the suspicious cash is not possible under the Cash Control Regulation if the amount is lower than the threshold to declare. This results in a notification to the FIU but without any way to temporarily stop the cash in case of suspicion. In this context it should be pointed out that the interpretative note to FATF Recommendation 32 specifies: In the following two cases, competent authorities should be able to stop or restrain cash or BNIs for a reasonable time, in order to ascertain whether evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing may be found: (i) where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or (ii) where there is a false declaration or false disclosure. From the context of the wording it is clear that the possibility to temporarily detain should be considered bearing in mind the criterion of suspicions of money laundering (predicate offenses) or terrorist financing, irrespective of the declaration threshold. It is highly doubtful that the objective should be interpreted in the sense that, regardless of any suspicious circumstances, provided that the declaration threshold were not reached and that hence there was no obligation to declare, the person would be free to enter/leave the EU with the cash while the information made its way to the FIU. Further, in its best practices paper on recommendation 32, the FATF advises: 'When a false declaration or false disclosure occurs, or when there are reasonable grounds for suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, countries are encouraged to consider imposing a reverse burden of proof on the person carrying currency or bearer negotiable instruments (BNI) across borders on the question of the legitimacy of such currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Therefore if, under these circumstances, a person is unable to demonstrate the legitimate origin and destination of the currency or bearer negotiable instruments, those funds may be stopped or restrained.' More than setting up merely a system of declarations, the Cash Control Regulation is part of the EU's AML/CFT framework, its prime objective is to enable authorities to act and trigger investigations in case of suspicion in order to prevent ML/TF In a number of cases, the suspicious circumstances might trigger (temporary) detention of the cash under (national) legislation outside the cash control regulation, such as when lower than threshold amounts are found in luggage containing narcotics.

It is however problematic that in cases of suspicion, there is no 'backstop' in the cash control regulation allowing authorities to temporarily detain the cash in question. It is also doubtful if the objective of FATF Recommendation 32 is fully reached under these circumstances. Example 3: Foreign fighters A number of cases were detected of persons who were travelling to regions neighbouring ISIS-controlled territory. ISIS propaganda calls for fighters to come, bringing the money they can raise through small loans/sales of assets. Typically these individuals were found in possession of sums ranging between 3000-7000 Euro and they were either detected via intelligence information or identified following controls at borders in possession of ISIS propaganda, guidelines on how to reach the ISIS-held territory and below-threshold amounts of cash. Source: Information received from Member States A variant of the problem described above occurs when persons are clearly travelling together (e.g. relatives) with each individual carrying amounts below the threshold while the cumulative amount is higher than the threshold. This is sometimes done with the specific intention to escape the obligation to declare. This type of behaviour is referred to as 'smurfing' or 'structuring' and is regularly mentioned by cash national control experts. Example 4: Smurfing illustration A family of 2 adults and 2 young children (4 and 6 years old) leave the EU. After a control it is determined that every individual is carrying 9500 Euro in cash (500 Euro notes) on their person, carried in the same type of envelope. Additionally, both parents are each carrying approximately 200 Euro in small notes in their wallet, presumably to cover expenses while travelling. They were aware of the regulation, pointed out that they are individually carrying less than the declaration threshold and offer no remotely credible explanation as to what the origin of the cash is and why the children are carrying these amounts. Source: case example received from one Member State, variants of the mechanism were also mentioned by other Member States during meetings between the Commission and national experts but less detail was provided. 2.3.2 Consequences and size of the problem Firstly, it is doubtful if the present situation where no temporary detention of the cash is possible in case of lower than declaration threshold amounts under suspicious circumstances is fully compatible with the spirit of FATF Recommendation 32. Although in many cases a legal basis for (temporary) detention of the cash will be available outside the Cash Control Regulation, the absence of a 'catch-all' clause in the Regulation itself may give rise to compliance issues. For the sake of transparency it should be noted that thus far, the issue has not yet been mentioned by the FATF, to that extent it remains a theoretical vulnerability. Secondly, in the course of expert group meetings, Member States regularly mention cases where competent authorities were powerless to act under circumstances such as mentioned under example 3 and 4 and notified the FIU but otherwise had to let the persons in question travel onward in possession of their cash. Although no concrete cases have been identified in which the lack of possibilities to detain the cash after a control resulted in e.g. the financing of a terrorist attack, it should be noted that the absence of a means provided in regulation itself is a potentially very serious security problem keeping in mind the relatively low amounts carried by foreign fighters or required to finance terrorism. 2.4 Problem 4: Imperfect definition of 'cash' 2.4.1 The problem and its drivers As described previously, the definition of 'cash' as used by the FATF does not include gold, jewels or precious commodities which can also be easily used to transfer value.

The interpretative note to Recommendation 32 states: For the purposes of Recommendation 32, gold, precious metals and precious stones are not included, despite their high liquidity and use in certain situations as a means of exchange or transmitting value. These items may be otherwise covered under customs laws and regulations. Reports from Member States (e.g. France who specifically attracted attention to this phenomenon) and operational information such as the results from operation 'Bingo' which was conducted by French customs and focused on cash and precious commodities shipped in post and freight, have identified shipments of gold which were identified as suspicious. A number of Member States include precious metals in their definition of 'cash' for intra-community control purposes. In addition, the Commission Action Plan on terrorism finance specifically lists the expansion of the definition of 'cash' to include highly liquid, high value commodities as an option to be explored. A customs declaration does not enable competent authorities to obtain all the information which should be collected, notably, there is no obligation to provide information on the provenance or intended use of the goods and in the case of natural persons carrying precious metals and leaving the EU, there is no legal obligation to make a customs declaration on exit. 2.4.2 Consequences and size of the problem Member States indicated that they suspect illicit cash (currency) is converted into precious metal prior to exiting or entering the EU with the intention to escape the obligation to declare and in the knowledge that this can be re-converted into cash at minimal cost.

Illustration of cash being converted into gold Using the rate applicable in June 2016, a person could purchase a Canadian 'Maple Leaf' gold coin for 1167 Euro, paying in cash and staying below the limit above which identity data needs to be recorded in the Member State in question. This operation could be repeated at multiple points of sale. The transaction cost incurred on the sale of such coins would typically not be higher than 4.5% (leaving underlying gold price fluctuations out of consideration). When exiting the EU this individual would not be required to make a customs declaration. Disclaimer: this is a theoretical case, reflecting actual parameters regarding prices, possibilities for anonymous purchases and spreads. It illustrates the mechanism but does not reflect actual events. Even though operations and literatureprovide some indications that criminals may be escaping the obligation to declare by using precious metals as stores of value it has proven to be very hard to quantify this phenomenon. A recent questionnaire which was sent by Commission services to relevant law enforcement authorities, FIU's, customs authorities and Europol indicated however that 67% of all replying authorities had recorded cases where precious commodities where were detected on a person entering or leaving the EU which were identified as suspicious with regard to money laundering, terrorist financing or other illegal activity. In 90% of cases gold was mentioned as the high value commodity which was detected. The frequency of occurrence was described as high or medium in about half of the cases (with 18% of all replying authorities describing it as 'high' ,30% as 'medium' and 52% as 'low'). Some Member States have national provisions similar to the obligation to declare cash as regards other commodities such as precious metals or precious stones. The attractiveness of a commodity for such purpose also depends on the liquidity of the commodity and the ease with which it can be resold without incurring high margin costs. For criminals, the situation becomes much more difficult when other commodities such as diamonds or jewellery are used which are harder to evaluate and carry higher conversion costs. Currently ongoing supranational risk assessments relating to money laundering and terrorism financing and data from law enforcement authorities have shown risks of money laundering with regard to the cross-border movements of anonymous prepaid cards. Europol has specifically pointed out those risks and issued a public call for the revision of the legal framework. From an enforceability perspective, it should be borne in mind that competent authorities need to be able to reasonably quickly determine what is covered in the expanded definition of cash and if so, if the value reaches the threshold for declaration. The technical challenges for doing so and the concern to not cause undue burden to the traveller or the operator involved in the shipment and the legal duty not to infringe the right of free movement and the right to property demands such an expansion be underpinned by clear evidence. As regards prepaid cards, it appears that technical solutions are possible to ensure the enforceability of a rule providing an obligation to declare them, which could help competent authorities to make reasonably quick decisions. In the US, for example, solutions have been developed for law enforcement such as the Electronic Recovery and Access to Data machine (ERAD). Therefore the addition of prepaid cards in the definition of cash would not require an immediate and major shift in the enforcement of the rule, but it would contribute greatly to creating the necessary nexus to the work of competent authorities to better identify and be able to take action against a major source of concern: prepaid instruments loaded with considerable amounts issued in third countries with strategic deficiencies in their money laundering and terrorism financing frameworks. 2.5 Problem 5: Divergent penalties 2.5.1. Context Article 9.1 of the Cash Control Regulation specifies that:

Each Member State shall introduce penalties to apply in the event of failure to comply with the obligation to declare laid down in Article 3. Such penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. It is thus left to the national legislators to specify penalties for non-declaration which respect these criteria. It should be pointed out that the penalty under Article 9.1 of the Cash Control Regulation concerns solely the failure to declare and in no way prejudices the existence of any predicate offence in connection to the cash which was not declared and any penalties which may be imposed for the commission of that predicate offence, which should be the subject of a separate investigation. 2.5.2 The problem and its drivers When examining the penalties specified by Member States, it becomes apparent that wide differences exist in the level of penalty and whether aggravating/mitigating circumstances taken into account or not. For purposes of illustration, the table below presents a partial overview of Article 9.1 penalties in 9 Member States. The information was provided by Member States to the Commission following a questionnaire sent in 2014: Member state Minimum penalty Maximum penalty Mitigating circumstances Aggravating circumstances MS 1 10% Amount undeclared Yes Yes MS 2 500 € 100,000 € Yes Yes MS 3 2-21% 1,000,000 € Yes Yes MS 4 600 € 200% of amount undeclared Yes Yes MS 5 660 € 6,600 € No No MS 6 330 € 3,300 € n/a n/a MS 7 0 € 10,000 € n/a n/a MS 8 0 € 46,000 € n/a n/a Source: European Commission Questionnaire to Member States 2014 The level of certain penalties and the way in which they are imposed in jurisdictions indicates that in some cases, Member States competent authorities seem to: a) Assume the existence of an underlying offense that needs to be penalised, once a failure to declare has been established and/or

b) The payment of the penalty imposed is 'liberatory' and less emphasis is placed on investigating whether an underlying predicate offence is present. The Court of Justice of the European Union remarked in a recent judgment where the proportionality of the penalty for non-declaration was at issue that: 'However, in the light of the nature of the infringement concerned, namely a breach of the obligation to declare laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 1889/2005, a fine equivalent to 60% of the amount of undeclared cash, where that amount is more than EUR 50 000, does not seem to be proportionate. Such a fine goes beyond what is necessary in order to ensure compliance with that obligation and the fulfilment of the objectives pursued by that regulation.' And 'It should also be noted that Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1889/2005 provides for the possibility to detain, by administrative decision in accordance with the conditions laid down under national legislation, cash which has not been declared in accordance with Article 3 of that regulation, in order, inter alia, to allow the competent authorities to carry out the necessary controls and checks relating to the provenance of that cash, its intended use and destination. Therefore, a penalty which consists of a fine of a lower amount, together with a measure to detain cash that has not been declared in accordance with Article 3 thereof, is capable of attaining the objectives pursued by that regulation without going beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In this case, it is apparent from the file submitted to the Court that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not make provision for such a possibility.' 2.5.3 Consequences and size of the problem The wide divergence in penalties and the way in which these are imposed creates several undesirable consequences: a) Unequal treatment of European and third country citizens who fail to declare, depending on the Member State through which they were entering or leaving the EU. While leaving the determination of the penalty for non-declaration to the Member States entails a different approach which is not necessarily discriminatory in itself, the extent to which penalties vary in this specific case raises proportionality questions in respect of these differences. b) As a consequence, the possibility for persons who deliberately fail to declare to engage in 'forum shopping' via the selection of Member States with minimal penalties or who seem to levy a penalty for non-declaration but otherwise take no measures to investigate underlying predicate offences. c) In case of penalties for non-declaration which are clearly disproportionately high taking into account the objective of the measure, the measure may amount to an infringement of the right to property.

Concerning the size of the problem, no precise quantitative data is available regarding the amounts of penalties imposed in Member States. However, in 2015, approximately 11 000 cases of failure to declare were detected, for a total amount of approximately 338 Mio Euro incorrectly declared cash. In all of such cases, Article 9.1 applies. 2.6 Problem 6: Different implementation levels among Member States 2.6.1 The problem and its drivers Further to specific issues relating to the undesired effects of different implementation levels among Member States which were mentioned earlier (e.g. regarding data exchange and level of penalties) a number of specific issues exist. a) Statistical data. Under the current cash control regulation, there exists no obligation for the Member States to periodically provide statistical data regarding controls, declarations, infractions and penalties to the Commission. Having such information available, analysing it and acting upon it is essential in order to verify that the Regulation is applied equally in the Member States. For instance parameters such as the number of infractions detected / number of declarations filed and the number of controls performed could help assess the level of implementation of the Cash Controls Regulation. b) The declaration form Article 3.2 of the Cash Control regulation specifies the data elements which need to be collected and assessed when a declaration is made. Article 3.3 leaves the way in which the data is collected to the Member States and provides for the possibility of requesting an oral declaration, a declaration in writing or an electronic declaration, albeit with the proviso that the declarant has at all times the right to demand a copy in writing. While all Member States opted for a declaration in writing or an electronic declaration, the Regulation does not lay down a specific form or layout which is to be used. c) The penalties The regulation specified that all Member States had to inform the Commission regarding the penalties under national legislation for non-declaration. This had to be done by the 15th of June 2007 but no provision was made to inform the Commission of any subsequent changes.

2.6.2 Consequences and size of the problem Regarding statistical data, the Commission currently has a non-enforceable agreement with Member States to provide data on the number of cash declarations received and the number of infractions. These are communicated on a quarterly basis and analysed/ discussed yearly. Information regarding the penalties imposed is however only provided by about 2/3rd of Member States, leading to difficulties in the assessment of the effectiveness of the measure. Regarding the declaration form, on a voluntary basis the majority of Member States (24 out of 28) use a harmonised form which has been developed by the Member States together with the Commission. This form can to some extent be customised to provide the possibility to include specific national elements (e.g. the flag of the Member State, references to national legislation etc). The use of a harmonised layout has as considerable advantage that travellers benefit from the same 'look and feel' of a declaration regardless of the Member State through which they are entering or leaving the EU and that language problems can be largely avoided, as the fields to be completed match across forms, regardless of the language of the document. Lastly, a harmonised declaration form also facilitates the practical aspects of information exchange. Information regarding penalties for non-declaration is collected periodically by the Commission. The elements mentioned above do not currently present large problems. This fortuitous situation is a result of the voluntary cooperation of all Member States. Considered from the perspective of good administration, transparency, equality and enforceability the possibility of formalisation should be examined. 2.7 Problem 7: Divergent national measures to raise awareness 2.7.1 The problem and its drivers Under the present cash control regulation, there is no obligation for the Member States to provide information to travellers regarding the existence of and their obligations under the Cash Control Regulation. The adage that 'everyone is supposed to know the law' applies. It should however be recognised that in the context of declarants who are largely private persons, coming from different backgrounds, speaking different languages, from a good administration perspective some effort should be made to make easily understandable information available to the public regarding their obligations. At the time of entry into force of the Cash Control Regulation, this was achieved through a promotion campaign sponsored at EU-level, with documentation made available to Member States. Currently, in some Member States points of entry or exit, information is provided but this is not a uniform practice.

The Commission maintains a webpage informing travellers of their obligations under the Cash Control Regulation. This webpage has links to the declaration forms used in Member States. Further, as the obligation to declare cash when entering or leaving the EU is imposed based on EU-legislation, a secondary question arises: could some benefit be derived from presenting the information in a harmonised way in order to achieve the same 'look and feel' regardless of the Member State of entry or exit? 2.7.2 Consequences of the problem and size of the problem The most frequently heard explanation for failure to declare cash is a statement by the traveller expressing ignorance of his/her obligations under the cash control regulation. Regardless of whether such statement reflects reality, it is clear that professing ignorance –and potentially invoking ignorance as a mitigating factor- will be less credible if ample information in easily accessible terms is provided or made available to the traveller. The initial EU-information and awareness-raising campaign was financed by the Commission and consisted of 'cash suitcases' (large suitcases filled with 'paper money' with a transparent lid that were made available to Member States who could circulate them on luggage conveyor belts, flyers and information booklets in multiple languages, as well as an animation that could be shown on airport monitors. It received very good feedback regarding visibility. Subsequently, stocks of material were distributed to Member States, who were given access to design templates with which they could print additional quantities on a national level. Overall, this did not work with reasons cited such as budgetary constraints, administrative difficulties etc. Currently the Commission has obtained budget to start printing and distributing materials again and is taking 'orders' from Member States who wish to use this. It is recalled that on an average year, approximately 100 000 cash control declarations are made for a total amount of between 60 and 70 billion Euro. Over the same time period, approximately 11 000 infractions representing a sum average of approximately 300 Mio Euro are detected. The potential target audience for any awareness-raising initiatives is thus significant. 3. EU right to act and subsidiarity 3.1 Legal basis in primary law The legal basis for the initiative will continue to be Articles 33 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3.2 Subsidiarity Regarding Article 114, TFEU:

The proposal is an element in the EU's Anti-Money laundering / anti-terrorist finance framework. Where the Anti-Money Laundering Directive seeks to provide a harmonised framework of measures with regards to the formal financial sector and certain professions deemed a potential risk, this proposed regulation seeks to address the issue of cash which is being moved, either carried by natural persons or otherwise via freight/parcel/post services, between a Member State of the EU and a third country and vice versa. The organisation of an internal market with free movement of goods, persons, services and capital necessarily involves measures of harmonisation between Member States in order to ensure an appropriate and equal measure of protection and the maintenance of a level playing field where measures or control are deemed necessary in the public interest. It would not be possible to achieve this degree of harmonisation based solely on measures taken under national legislation. Money launderers and terrorist financiers could exploit divergences in approaches under national legislation and attempt to move their cash into or out of the EU through the Member States where controls or penalties are weakest. Taking into account the amounts of cash entering or leaving the EU on a yearly basis, such differences would have a distortive effect on the internal market. Further, following the provisions existing under the existing Cash Control Regulation, the proposal is without prejudice to any national control measures regarding cash movements which may be laid down pursuant to Article 65, TFEU. Regarding Article 33, TFEU: As regards to customs cooperation, the proposal lays down a harmonised approach for customs authorities and other authorities acting as such in the course of controls at the external border to register, process and transfer cash control declarations and perform controls. This approach and its underlying objective are closely related to the internal market principles as noted supra and could not be achieved sufficiently on a national level. 4. Objectives of the proposal 5. Policy options 5.1 Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 5.1.1 Option description 5.1.1.1 Option A BASELINE, no policy change: Do not change the present regulatory system and continue to apply the standard customs declaration system to cash shipped in post and freight. Under the baseline option, the obligation to declare cash above a certain threshold would remain limited to cash carried by natural persons.

5.1.1.2 Option B: Apply the current declaration system for natural persons (obligation for the person to approach authorities and make a declaration) but provide for a disclosure system for cash shipped in post or freight. Persons or enterprises involved in shipments of cash through post, courier or freight (any cross-external border shipment which does not involve a natural person accompanying the consignment) could be requested by competent authorities to disclose particulars of the cash shipment and submit a (disclosure) declaration if, upon checking, amounts of cash higher than the declaration threshold are found and the competent authorities decide to request additional information. 5.1.1.3 Option C: Provide for a mandatory cash declaration system for all types of movement of cash in amounts over the threshold, irrespective of the method (carried by a person or shipped in parcels or freight). Under Option C a cash control declaration would have to be systematically filed by natural persons carrying cash over the threshold value as well as by natural or legal persons sending or receiving unaccompanied cash consignments over the declaration threshold. This declaration would come in addition to any customs declaration filed. 5.1.1.4 Option D: Provide for a mandatory cash declaration system for all types of movement of cash in amounts over the threshold but provide for an exemption for registered financial institutions. This exemption takes into account that those institutions are already covered by AML/CFT rules. However, authorities would have to be able to determine if an exemption applies or not. 5.1.1.5 Option E: Provide for a system which is entirely based on disclosure, both for cash carried by natural persons and for cash sent in post/freight. Option E can be compliant with FATF Recommendation 32 (when paired with adequate control levels).It would not require any systematic declaration to be made, irrespective of the mode of border crossing. Only in case of controls by competent authorities who request disclosure would a natural person carrying cash or the sender / intended recipient of unaccompanied cash consignments be required to make a declaration. The open public consultation did not query stakeholder opinion for option E as this option was only taken into account later in the process, following inter-service discussion. For the other options, the vast majority of respondents favour options B or C, with opinions divided almost equally between both options (14 respondents favouring B and 12 favouring C). 5.2 Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities As the topic of information exchange is highly complex, involves considerations of a legal, practical and technological nature and has an impact on personal data protection and fundamental rights, please refer to Annex 6 for additional information. Given that there are five different possible flows of information (as presented in Figure 2) out of which two flows are significant for the current proposal, it has been decided to treat these important flows individually. Thus, the problem of information exchange has been split into two sub-problems. 5.2.1 Sub-problem 2.1: Exchange of information between competent authorities

5.2.1.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change) Declaration and infraction data may be shared between competent authorities in different Member States only in case of indications of illegal activity. 5.2.1.2 Option B: Provide for an obligation in the regulation to mandatorily exchange information regarding infractions against the obligation to declare or declarations where there are indications of illegal activity between competent authorities of different Member States. 5.2.1.3 Option C: Provide for an obligation in the regulation to mandatorily exchange information regarding infractions against the obligation to declare or declarations where there are indications of illegal activity between competent authorities of different Member States but keep the sharing of regular declaration information optional 5.2.1.4 Option D: Provide for an obligation in the Regulation to mandatorily exchange both infractions, declarations where there are indications of illegal activity and regular declaration information between competent authorities in different Member States. Compared to the baseline scenario in current legislation (A), which obtained support from 4 respondents, there seems to be a majority of 25 respondents in favour of increasing the sharing of information regarding declarations or infractions between Member States. The opinion is almost evenly split between respondents who want to make the sharing of all declaration data mandatory via legislation (13 respondents) and those who only want to impose the sharing of information about infractions but keep the sharing of regular declaration data optional (12 respondents). For the above options, it should be noted that with 'competent authorities' are meant the authorities designated in a Member State to receive declarations and perform controls. In the large majority of cases these will be the customs authorities. 5.2.2 Sub-problem 2.2: Exchange of information between the competent authorities and the FIU 5.2.2.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change) Declaration data has to be made available by the competent authority to the FIU of its Member State, no definition is given of what 'made available' implies and whether it involves active availability (sending the information, providing access to a database) or passive availability (such as storing the paper declarations in a room where they are accessible to the FIU). 5.1.1.2 Option B: Specify that 'making available' means transmission of the data by electronic means or providing the FIU access to a database which contains all the declaration information. As these options concern modalities of the exchange of data between the competent authority and the FIU, the consultation did not solicit feedback regarding this point. 5.3 Problem 3: Impossibility for competent authorities to temporarily detain sub-threshold amounts 5.3.1 Option description 5.3.1.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change): Competent authorities may record, process and make available to the FIU a number of details concerning the person and the cash, provided that there are indications of illegal activities concerning the movement of cash. They do not, however, have the authority to temporarily detain the cash based on the cash control regulation. 5.3.1.2 Option B: Lay down an explicit provision which would allow competent authorities to temporarily detain the cash if they judge that indications of criminal activity (predicate offences to money laundering or terrorist finance) are present.

5.3.1.3 Option C: As in Option B but specify a limited list of objective criteria in (delegated) legislation which, if they are present, would allow authorities to temporarily detain the cash. 5.3.1.4 Option D: As in option B but in addition provide a guideline concerning suspicious activities. This guideline would be a non-legislative 'soft law' option. This option would take the middle ground between Options B and C, providing flexibility and preventing circumvention of the norm while at the same time offering some (albeit non-binding) guidance as to the types of circumstances that could constitute indications of criminal activity Results from the public consultation indicate that a large majority of stakeholders who responded are in favour of 'a' mechanism that enables the authorities to act on in case sub-threshold amounts are detected but there are indications of illegal activity. However, many of those added that some limitation should be provided so as to safeguard against arbitrary temporary detention. 5.4 Problem 4: Imperfect definition of 'Cash' 5.4.1 Option description 5.4.1.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change) Maintain the definition of cash as it is presently worded in the CCR (currency and bearer negotiable instruments) but do not expand the definition to include precious metals / commodities. 5.4.1.2 Option B: Redefine the notion ‘cash’ in the regulation to include the elements under option A and add gold as a main category. Refer to an annex in the regulation, modifiable by delegated act for the specification of the constitutive elements within each of these categories, leaving open the possibility to expand or amend this taking account of the circumstances and evolution of society. 5.4.1.3 Option C: Expand the definition of 'cash' in the regulation including gold and precious metals and specify this in the revised CCR. 5.5 Problem 5: Divergent 'penalties' 5.5.1 Option description 5.5.1.1 Option A (BASELINE, no policy change): Maintain the current provision stating that: "each Member State shall introduce penalties to apply in the event of failure to comply with the obligation to declare […] Such penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive". In this case the Member States determine the penalty for non-declaration which they deem appropriate and specify if/which mitigating or aggravating circumstances should be taken into account.

5.5.1.2 Option B: Specify in the regulation or in a delegated act provisions on the nature and severity of penalties to be applied for failing to declare. 5.5.1.3 Option C: Maintain the current provision stating that 'Each Member State shall introduce penalties to apply in the event of failure to comply with the obligation to declare […] Such penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, in addition, propose –through a Commission recommendation – guidance on penalties to be applied for failure to declare. The Commission should then evaluate if the penalties in a Member State are compatible with the decision by the European Court of Justice and if required initiate proceedings to ensure compliance. There is no majority in favour of establishing harmonised penalties for the failure to declare. It was explicitly mentioned in the questionnaire that these penalties would be intended to deal with the failure to declare only and have no relation with the licit or illicit origin or destination of the cash. Nevertheless, according to the results of the open public consultation, the largest group of respondents (17) is favouring an initiative to harmonise the sanction regime to some extent, with a minority of 9 respondents being opposed to harmonisation initiatives and an equal group holding no strong opinion on the matter. Further to this, following discussions with Member States national experts who discussed the issue of approximation of penalties, approximately half were in favour of a legislative approach toward approximation while the other half were opposed to this and proposed an approach –if any- through a guideline. The single element on which universal agreement was expressed was that whatever system was chosen, it should be transparent and simple to apply in practice. 5.6 Problem 6: Different implementation levels among Member States 5.6.1 Option description 5.6.1.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change): The CCR does not lay down obligations to use a standard declaration form nor to provide any statistical data or performance metrics regarding controls to the Commission, other than the obligation to notify the Commission about the penalties for non-declaration (one time event, no-follow up on modifications). 5.6.1.2 Option B: Make it mandatory for Member States to use a harmonised declaration form, the model of which is to be determined in implementing legislation, lay down an obligation to periodically provide statistical information to the Commission on declarations registered, controls made on cases where a declaration is made, controls made in the absence of declaration and the results of the controls performed. Statistical information should also refer to penalties imposed for non-declaration including any amendments to those penalties. This option is to be split in three parts: a) harmonisation of the declaration form, b) systematic provision of statistical documentation to the Commission and c) informing the Commission of penalties under national legislation for failing to comply with the obligation to declare (or disclose, depending on the path chosen for problem 5.1) and of any modifications in the penalties regime.

Important note: During the open public consultation, stakeholder opinion was only solicited regarding the harmonisation of the cash declaration form, not regarding any provision which would impose an obligation on Member States to provide statistical data and performance metrics to the Commission. A majority of 19 respondents are in favour of using a standardised form, the format of which should be specified in the legislation. Another 10 respondents are in favour of maintaining the present system, where the large majority of Member States use the same form (which can be modified to reflect national elements) but without there being binding legislation to do so. 5.7 Problem 7: Divergent national measures to raise awareness 5.7.1 Option description 5.7.1.1 Option A (BASELINE, no policy change): no legal obligations nor guidelines to raise public awareness. 5.7.1.2 Option B: Provide for an obligation to Member States to raise awareness/inform stakeholders about their obligations, but allow them to determine the most appropriate way to achieve this. 5.7.1.3 Option C: Provide for an obligation to Member States to raise awareness and harmonise the measures as regards to form and content. 5.7.1.4 Option D: Do not lay down harmonised provisions for awareness-raising, but encourage Member States via guidelines to inform stakeholders of their obligations (non-regulatory option). According to the open public consultation, 20 respondents support a policy option where it would be made mandatory for Member States to inform the public about the duty to declare cash movements. An additional 7 consider that an explicit reference should be made about awareness-raising in the legislation by means of a recommendation to the Member States, not an obligation. Maintaining the current framework, where no mention about awareness-raising is made in the legislation, is supported by 5 respondents. Only in case respondents indicated that a reference to awareness-raising should be made the question was asked if this should be harmonised. 20 respondents were in favour of one harmonised approach. 6. Impacts and option comparison This section assesses the options outlined above in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency (focusing on administrative burden/costs) and coherence (with the legislative framework related to fundamental rights and data protection) in reaching the specific objectives, which contribute to the general objectives of promoting a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities throughout the internal market.

The preferred option has been highlighted in green in each summary table, to facilitate reading. From a methodological point of view it makes sense to assign a value of “0” (neutral) to the baseline option, relative to which the other options are weighed. However, a value of “-“ (negative) has sometimes been assigned where the baseline option fails the criterion and is ineffective. 6.1 Problem 1: Imperfect coverage of cross-border cash movements 6.1.1 Option impact analysis. 6.1.1.1 Option A (Baseline option): no policy change As option A is not compliant with an international norm to which the EU has committed itself, to the extent that it does not cover cash shipped via other methods than carried by natural persons, it is considered not to be viable. 6.1.1.2 Option B: Apply the current declaration system for natural persons but provide for a disclosure system for cash shipped in post or freight. Effectiveness: Such approach would maintain the baseline regarding cash carried by natural persons, which has been evaluated as largely satisfactory. A disclosure system is compliant with FATF Recommendation 32, which also allows a disclosure-based approach (when paired with adequate control levels). A disclosure system allows flexibility, as authorities could perform risk-based controls and selectively decide if/when to request additional information which would add to a customs declaration and capture details not present on the customs declaration. The disadvantage of a disclosure system is that no systematic details regarding such shipments would be collected through declarations and would be available for analysis by the Member States Financial Intelligence Units. For cash not carried by natural persons, the effectiveness will –for the disclosure system- depend on the implementation of controls and the evaluation and follow-up. Option B was the option preferred by most stakeholders responding to the public consultation. Administrative burden/ Cost: Concrete estimates are difficult. It is to be expected that authorities will mostly request a disclosure to be made in case of suspicion that a predicate offence to money laundering or terrorist finance may exist, based on risk analysis and an appreciation of elements of the case. The main additional burden for the administrations will likely consist of additional work on risk analysis to try to target the right consignments, some level of extra controls and administration regarding the request for a declaration. It should be borne in mind however that an international norm imposes controls on any type of cross-external border movement. This form of control would be the least intrusive one to comply with the international standard. Compared to option C the administrative burden would be smaller since the amount of declarations that needs to be handled is less extensive. The burden will also be smaller for the consigner/consignee who will only have to make a declaration upon request, not in a systematic way. In addition to the above it should be remarked that most postal/parcel operators expressly prohibit the sending of cash or valuable commodities in their general conditions of carriage. This effectively renders it impossible to ensure such consignments against loss. These disadvantages make that only a very limited number of economic operators (except for large financial institutions who negotiate separate arrangements and are already covered by AMLD provisions) use this channel to send or receive important quantities of cash and the administrative cost for the postal /parcel operators should therefore be small. If a consignment with cash is found the competent authority will keep the consignment while waiting for a disclosure declaration or until it can be sent to its addressee and this will consequently not render any significant administrative burden or cost for the postal/parcel operators. For the purpose of trying to quantify the administrative burden and costs related to the introduction of the 'disclosure declaration' principle for unaccompanied cash, the following overview presents potential EU-wide costs per year. It is important to understand that this estimate makes a number of assumptions which in the opinion of the authors are realistic for scenario 1. However, no verifiable data is available and modification of the variables may have an important impact on total costs. Scenario 2 is intended to illustrate a 'highest-cost' scenario but is deemed unlikely due to the facts mentioned above regarding that most postal/parcel operators expressly prohibit the sending of cash or valuable commodities. Neither scenario takes into account the potential income for the Treasury as a result of penalties imposed for failure to declare.

Assumptions: 1. Average EU-wide hourly labour cost of both persons performing the controls as those completing the declaration is estimated at 25.00 Euros/hour. 2. The average time to complete a declaration is estimated at 10 minutes, filing and sending the document takes another 20 minutes. 3. The average time for an initial control is estimated at 3 minutes/consignment. In case a declaration is requested, follow-up (counting the cash, sending the declaration form accompanied by instructions) is estimated to take another 30 minutes/file. Infractions are estimated to require 2 hours of follow-up per file (on the level of authorities who perform controls and receive declarations). 4. The controls will be performed by competent authorities in the course of their regular duties (controls on parcels). 5. Time for detection: 3 minutes/package. 6. Follow up on the disclosure declarations: 30 minutes/file. 7. In 25% of cases where disclosure is requested, no answer or an incorrect answer would be forthcoming so further enquiries are initiated and these take 2 hours/case. 8. Filing of declaration for operators 30 min/ declaration. Quantification of costs Time for detection Follow up on the disclosure declarations Further enquiries Total cost for authori-ties Total cost for operators who need to complete a declaration Overall total per year Scenario 1: 10 000 detections, disclosure requested in 80% of cases: 30 000 min/ 500 hours at 25 €/h = 12 500 € 8000 cases * 0.5 h * 25 €/h = 100 000 € 2000 cases * 2 h * 25 €/h = 100 000 € 212 500 € 8000 cases * 0.5 h /declaration * 25 €/h = 100 000 € 312 500 € Scenario 2: 50 000 detections, disclosure requested in 100% of cases 150 000 min/2500h at 25 €/h = 62 500 € 50 000 cases * 0.5 h * 25 €/h = 625 000 € 12500 cases * 2 h * 25 €/h = 625 000 € 1 312 500 € 50000 cases * 0.5 h/ declaration * 25 €/h = 625 000 € 1 937 500 € Coherence with data protection/fundamental rights: A provision allowing for obligatory disclosure would interfere with the rights to private life (Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) (henceforth: CFR) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 CFR; any regulation affecting the conduction of business interferes with this right). As this option would involve the collection of personal data, Art. 8 CFR is also impacted. At the same time the justification conditions of Article 51 I CFR would need to be fulfilled. The aim of the restriction of the rights at hand is one recognised by the EU (detect cash movements linked to Money laundering offences or the financing of terrorist activities). Being of less intrusive character compared to an automatic obligatory declaration of all shipments the measure would be proportionate to its objective. The regulation would need to explicitly list the legal basis for the action envisaged. 6.1.1.3 Option C: Provide for a mandatory cash declaration system for all types of movement of cash in amounts over the threshold.

Effectiveness: The benefit of this option is that it captures in principle all cross-external border movements and allows for a great quantity of information to be collected and analysed. This theoretical advantage is however negated to a large extent as the principal targets of the control system (criminals) will likely not declare and ultimate effectiveness would still be dependent on controls. Administrative burden/Cost: The administrative burden for the consigners/consignees would be higher than option B, as a systematic declaration obligation would be imposed on all cross-border movements. This would add to the obligations under a customs declaration which might apply and double declarations would be necessary in some cases. Moreover, as explained above, it is probable that this burden would largely be shouldered by persons and enterprises who seek to comply with the law whereas criminals are not likely to comply. For the administrations there would be an extra burden associated with the handling of declarations but also for performing controls.. Extra resources would need to be allocated. Coherence with data protection/fundamental rights: The impact on the fundamental rights to private life and protection of personal data (Articles 7 and 8 CFR) would be stronger than in option B as a lot of data will be systematically collected. If statistics regarding declarations vs infractions for cash carried by natural persons may be extrapolated, in <10% of the total number of controls would infractions against the obligation to declare be found, while also the 90% of compliant declarants would have to provide personal data and details about the transaction. 6.1.1.4 Option D: Provide for a mandatory cash declaration system for all types of movement of cash in amounts over the threshold but provide for an exemption for cash sent by registered financial institutions. Effectiveness: As it is not always possible to determine in a reasonable time whether a company is indeed a registered financial institution, this would negatively impact effectiveness. Administrative burden/costs: As in option C, with an additional burden on the authorities who need to determine in a short time if an exemption applies. In addition, access to a comprehensive list would need to be provided to competent authorities in the field, which would incur extra costs. Coherence with data protection/fundamental rights: similar to option C. 6.1.1.5 Option E: Provide for an entirely disclosure-based system, both for cash carried by natural persons and cash shipped through post/express courier or freight. Effectiveness: Would be wholly dependent on implementation of controls and evaluation of control measures. The effectiveness would be difficult to evaluate and prone to divergent levels of controls between Member States. Such divergent approach would increase the risk of forum shopping by criminals and therefore diminish the effectiveness of the control regime. Administrative burden / costs: Low as it does not require any systematic declaration to be made. Coherence with data protection / fundamental rights: This option would be least intrusive on the fundamental right to a private life (Article 7 CFR) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 CFR) however it would still negatively impact those rights, albeit to a lesser degree than the other options. 6.1.2 Summary and preferred option selection Objective/Impact Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E Effectiveness - - + + - -- Cost/Burden 0 0 - -- + DP/FR impact 0 - -- - 0 Conclusion -- 0 -- ---- -

Option B (Apply the current declaration system for natural persons but provide for a disclosure system for cash shipped in post or freight.) is the preferred option since it is compliant with FATF Recommendation 32 (when paired with adequate control levels). The benefit compared to option A is that authorities will have the power to demand a cash control declaration which would capture details that cannot be provided on a customs declaration when finding suspicious consignments. The information collected can also be used for future risk analysis purposes and increase the accuracy of the risk assessment regarding these types of consignments. Compared to option C the administrative burden on authorities would be smaller for option B since the amount of declarations that needs to be handled is less extensive. The burden will also be smaller for the consigner/consignee who will only have to make a declaration upon request. Option D is not to be favoured since it imposes an extra burden on the competent authorities who have to make a determination on the legitimacy of exemption requests by purported financial institutions, without adding enough value. Option E could easily give rise to divergent implementation and unequal treatment in various Member States, and is therefore not considered as effective as option B. Most Member States have also indicated not being in favour of option E which they would consider a step backwards where it concerns natural persons. Option B was the option favoured by most stakeholders responding to the public consultation and seems most proportionate, keeping in mind the pursued effectiveness, acceptable level of administrative burden and the lowest impact on fundamental rights and personal data protection. For all these reasons it is the preferred option. 6.2 Problem 2: Difficulties regarding the exchange of information between competent authorities As the topic of information exchange is highly complex, involves considerations of a legal, practical and technological nature and has an impact on personal data protection and fundamental rights please refer to Annex 6 for additional information. 6.2.1 Option impact analysis sub-problem 2.1: Exchange of information between competent authorities 6.2.1.1 Option A: (BASELINE, no policy change) Declaration and infraction data may be shared between competent authorities in different Member States only in case of indications of illegal activity. Effectiveness: As demonstrated in the problem description, the present situation is unclear and leads to little sharing of information and is unequally applied. For this reason it is deemed ineffective. Administrative burden/cost: The instruments to be used for data exchange are unclear and their use burdensome, they require inputting the information repeatedly in a variety of applications. The sharing of data is severely impacted by this lack of clarity and the lack of standards for doing so. Coherence with data prot