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COMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
PREPARATION FORTHE
SIXTHSESSION OFTHEUNITEDNATIONS CONFERENCE
ONTRADEANDDEVELOPMENT
(Belgrade,6June-1July1983)
-INITIALGUIDELINES -
(Communication fromtheCommission totheCouncil)COM(82)803final
Brussels,3December1982
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The provisional agenda for the Sixth Session ofthe United Nations
Conference onTrade and Development was adopted atthe 24th meeting of
the Trade and Development Board (TDB )inJuly 1982,despite the
opposition ofthe United States .
The United States Delegation has,however ,stated its readiness ,inthe
OECD North-South Working Party ,tocooperate with its Group Bpartners
inseeking acommon approach tothe problens with which the Conference
will befaced .
With aview tothe establishment ofaCommunity position for the debate ,
initially within Group Band subsequently inthe UNCTAD preparatory
committees ,the Commission isproposing tothe Council the guidelines
sketched out below .Insodoing ,the Commission would like the Community
tobeable toput forward itsposition assoon aspossible ,inparticular
sothat itwill beknown when theministerial meeting ofthe Group of77
isheld inBuenos Aires inMarch 1983 .

CONTENTS
Page
I. Thedangers tobeanticipated i
II.Thebackground toUNCTAD VI 3
III.Themajor issues ofUNCTAD 71 6
3.1 Trade *
3.2 Commodities 9
3.3 Financial aspects (including the
problem oftheLLDCs ) 12
IV.Aplan forUNCTAD 17

I.THEDANGERS TOBEANTICIPATED
UNCTADVIwilltakeplaceinBelgradefrom6Juneto1July1983,some
sixrjionthsaftertheGATTMinisterial Meetingandsomethreemonths
aftertheministerial meetingwhichtheGroupof77planstoholdin
BuenosAiresinMarch.
UNCTADVIwillprobablybetheonymajormeetingof1983atwhichit
willbepossibleformostthemesoftheNcrth-SouthDialoguetobe
examinedcomprehensively byalltiemembersoftheinternational community,
themajoritemsbeinginternational trade,radmaterials,andmonetary
andfinancialquestions (seeagendainAnrexes 1and2).
TheBelgradeConferencewilltakeplaceircircumstances thatwilldiffer
appreciably fromthoseofprevious UNCTADsessionandwillinfluencethe
positions andattitudesofalltheparticipants ,giventhatthecrisis
ishittingalltheparticipants hard,frorrthenorthandthesouthalike,
andisnolongerconsidered apassingpheromenon .Asaresult,this
Conferencewillofferauniqueopportunity atleastpotentially,to
relaunchinternational cooperation which,thojghmorenecessarythanever
today,seemsincreasingly tobeblockedb>thecrisis.
Hence,too,thedangersoverhanging UNCTACVI:disappointed expectations
orincreasedfrustration .Thosedangersereconsiderable .
Becauseoftheseriousness andpersistence ofthecrisisitistobe
expectedthat:
~\
i)thedeveloping countrieswillstepupthsirdemandsandtheir
appealforinternational cooperation ,ifonlytohelpthemto
copewiththemosturgentproblems,whichthreatenthecontinued
development ofsomeandformanyothersnutatrisktheirsocial
stabilityoreventhesurvivialoftheirpopulation ;

-2-
ii)the industrialized countries will restat ?the constraints
standing inthe way ofthe starch for aniAcceptance of
solutions involving substantial new con:essions ,notably
inthe areas ofpublic financing and the opening-up of
their markets .
Against this background ,UNCTAD VIisincang?r itself ofbeing bogged
down inthe same way asthe existing machiner /for international
coordination and the mechanisms being set up.This,atatime when
such coordination ismore necessary than ever .
Sorely tested bythe crisis ,itisbecoming increasingly difficult for
the existing machinery tocope with the stres;es and strains engendered
byit-ineither the North-North orthe NortU-South context .The
preparations for the GATT Ministerial Meeting were anexample ofthis,
and the phenomenon issimilar with regard toinancial and monetary
matters .
Unless this situation isremedied ,itcan onl -set back further those
members ofthe international community that aethe most vulnerable
totheeffects ofthecrisis and have very Iitie possibiHty of
falling back onpurely national solutions toheir difficulties .
The Belgrade meeting runs the risk therefo-e unless appropriate actio
istaken ingood time bythe Community and Gnup B-ofrepresenting
nothing more tothe Group of77than aforum orthe expression and
repetition ofunsatisfied global demands .
The Community and the Group Bcountries will <onsequently have aheavy
responsibility tobear inBelgrade .They can help UNCTAD tosetitself
concrete ,realistic objectives once again ,whchwill bethe subject of
negotiations over the next four orfive years ,tofocus its area of
activities more specifically and toadapt its means ofaction tothe
changed context ofthe 1980s .'set back further those
ethe most vulnerable
tlepossibi 1ityof
heir difficulties .
unless appropriate action
up B-ofrepresenting
orthe expression and

II.THEBACKGROUND TOUNCTADVI
TheUNCTADagendaandthemostrecentdisus;ions within :heTDBshow
thattherearenoclearideasastoUNCTA>'sfuturework.Inaddition,,
thereisnolongeranyrealprojectinth;ppelineonaoarwith
earlierexamplessuchastheGenealizediysiemofPreferences,the
Integrated Programmeorthenegotiations on>hedevelopir jcountries'
debt.
Thislossofdynamismisdoubtless dueI.irg<lytotheprofoundchange;,
thathavetakenplaceintheworMeconomctlimate.Theeisa
widespreadfeelingthatcertainpathsexpor»dinthepas.arenow
blocked,thattheoldrecipeshavelittlele-ttorecommeidthemand
thatcertainapproaches arenowoutofdae.
Whenmakinganypronouncement concerning UNC'AD'sfuturetasksonemust
bearinmindthreemajorchangesthathavi't<kenplaceirtheworld
economy.
1.AtthetimeofthefirstfewJNCTADsssons,whenerorgywas
availableatadecreasing realcost,<on;tantgrowthofworld
tradewastakenforgranted.
Theproblemfacedatthattimewashowt<adaptthes/stemof
international economicrelationstopiovdeamoreia'ourable
frameworkforthegenuineintegration ofthedevelopi .gcountries.
Allthedemandsputforwardb/thedeceitpingcountrisunder
theheadingofthenewinternational <coromicorder;ressedthis
centraltheme.
Althoughtheorganization ofinternaton<Ieconomicrelationsis
farfromsatisfactory atthepresent 1imt,itisthepoliciesof
internaladjustmentthathavebecometheurgentissue,forboth
thedeveloping andtheindustrialized cointries .

-L-
For many developing countries ,the en<?rgy crisis ,increased food
dependence and insome cases repeated debt crises have served as
arevelation ,demonstrating the unsui "ability inmany cases of
domestic policies inthe new internat onal context .
Although entitled "United Nations Conference onTrade and
Development ",UNCTAD isperhaps obliged today togive tothe
development aspect -i.e. the efforts toadapt domestic policies
tothis new context and the support those efforts deserve to
receive from external sources -the importance that was hitherto
given tothe trade aspect inits anal wses and debates .
2.The recession inthe world economy isnot confined toalow rate
ofgrowth inproduction and trade due inter alia tostagnating
consumption inthe industrialized countries .Italso involves
profound changes inthe geographical structure and technology of
production .
This isvery clear inthe industrial :ield,mainly onaccount of
the appearance on the scene ofthe newly industrializing countries
(NICs ),butitisalso apparent inthe commodities field where ,with
afew exceptions ,one can see aneros onofthe market shares of
traditional producers infavour ofmore efficient competitors newly
arrived onthe markets or-inthe case ofmining products -in
favour ofproducer countries outside 1heThird World .
Such changes make itnecessary tosupplement ,toacertain extent ,
the traditional approach oftrade liberalization conceived almost
exclusively interms ofconcessions from the North tothe South
and that ofcommodity market regulation concentrating excessively
onprice stabilization .

3.Lastly ,the scale anddistribution orfinancing requirements and
financial surpluses have themselves undergone profound changes ,to
which the international financial system has endeavoured toreact
instead ofreally adapting ;the development ofofficial funds for
regulating and intervention fund .purposes has not kept pace with
the upsurge ofprivate flows .
Inany event ,the scale and nature of 1heproblems tobetackled -
ofwhich the indebtedness ofmany developing countries constitutes
the most visible manifestation -are such that itisimpossible to
deal with them solely interms ofredistribution ofincome from
the industrialized tothe developing countries ,except for those
countries which are inpractice excluded from the international
financial system precisely because ofiheir poverty and are
obliged tocount onofficial development assistance for some easing
ofthe external constraints onthem .
*
 *
This brief analysis ofthe economic situat on-which should really be
1accompanied byalook atthepolitical situation -can help usto
establish the main chapter headings for aconsideration ofthe guidelines
which UNCTAD VIcould setfor the future work ofthe organization ,it
being understood that their common purpose must betobring about in
concert the manifold internal and external adjustments that are essential
ifaway out ofthecrisis istobefound .
Considering inturn the problems oftrade ,commodities and development
funding ,this Communication sets out topropose the broad guidelines which
the Community could follow inthe preparatory work for UNCTAD VI.These
broad guidelines will then befleshed out ngreater detail inthe
specific working papers further tothis Conmunication asthe preparatory
work advances inthe Council ,inthe OECD 'ramework and within UNCTAD
itself .
Itmust beremembered that thepolitical situation accounts for avery
considerable drain onresources (refugees ,victims ofconflict ,etc.)which
would otherwise beavailable for the economic and social development ofthe
developing countries .

-6-
III . THE MAJOR ISSUES OF UNCTAD VI
3.1 Trade
UNCTAD VI^is^beTng prepared atatime when,forthefirst time since the
thij^t-fes ,there has been adecline inthevalue ofworld trade from one
^eartothenext .Unless therecession gets worse andisprolonged ,with
protectionist pressures increasing ,the major features ofthe world trading
system inthe eighties will bedominated firstly bythe dynamics ofthe
process ofeconomic recovery inthe industrialized countries and bythe way
inwhich the three major trading powers (North America ,Western Europe and
Japan )intend tomanage their economic and trade relations .The emergence
ofthe NICs isanother factor which must also betaken into account .
The maintenance ofanopen multilateral system depends ontheability ofthe
trading powers tocontrol the consequences ofthe recession ,torevive the
world economy and find balanced solutions totheir trade differences .
Although not fundamental ,the North-South aspects ofthis problem are
none the less important .
Inthe seventies the trend oftrade was marked bythe developing countries *
growing participation inworld trade inmanufactures ,which was reflected
in:
i) NICs' dynamism ,expressed through the steady increase intheir exports
and the wider range ofproducts exported ;
ii) the emergence ofanew wave ofexporting developing countries ,inAsia ,
Latin America and the Mediterranean :more than fifty developing
countries today export significant amounts ,against half that figure
inthe sixties ;
iii)the development ofSouth-South trade .

-7-
Another feature was the absence ofmany developing countries ,including
the LLDCs ,from this process ofintegration .
Inthis context ,the approach toNorth-South trade problems adopted inthe
early seventies (non-reciprocity ,non-differentiation between developing
countries ,GSP)must bereconsidered .
Firstly ,because thediversity ofregional situations and the increasingly
differentiated levels ofthe developing countries' economic development
mean that solutions must betailored tospecific situations .
Secondly ,the progress made atthe multilateral level ontariff dismantling
bytheindustrialized countries ,particularly the Community ,mean that
tariff matters are ofrelatively secondary importance today ;the main
issue isthat ofthe conditions governing effective market access .
The North-South trade problems ofthe eighties therefore vary according to
which part ofthe "South "isconcerned :
Forthe most industrialized developing countries the major issue iscomplete
integration inthemultilateral trading system ,with all the attendant
rights andresponsibilities .How can these countries bebrought ,without
interrupting their momentum ,toadopt economic ,industrial and trade
strategies more compatible with the maintenance ofanopen multilateral
trading system (policy onthedivision ofnational revenue between
investment and consumption ,the opening upoftheir markets ,tariff
dismantling ,etc.).
For low-ormiddle-income developing country exporters ,which more often
than not have sizeable domestic orregional markets inneighbouring countries ,
the example ofthe NICs (particularly those inEastern Asia,whose development
wasinitially based onexport strategies aimed attheindustrialized
countries )cannot befollowed without serious dangers .The choice of
appropriate strategies -between development ofdomestic andexternal
markets ,between South-North trade and South-South trade -istherefore
fundamental .

-8-
For countries which are not very well integrated inthe international
trading system ,particularly the LLDCs ,the problem isnot merely one of
North-South trade arrangements .There isalso the important matter of
starting upanindustrial process which isnot only competitive inworld
terms but isalso ,above all,backed upbyareinforced domestic market and
agricultural base .The important thing istherefore toseek international
measures designed topromote the processing oftheir commodities ,the
establishment ofregional common markets ,and soon.
From this analysis ,two key ideas emerge for the Community :
1.Ways must actively besought ofpromoting the development ofSouth-South
trade ,inparticular byputting trade relations between countries in
the South onapreferential basis .
2.Itshould beborne inmind that,inthe period ofintense adjustment
itiscurrently going through ,the Community ,which is,and intends to
remain ,the trading entity most open tocompeting imports from the
developing countries ,has limited room for manoeuvre toachieve further
progress inthe liberalization oftrade atthe multilateral level .
Asemphasized inthe Memorandum onthe Community 'sdevelopment policy ,the
Community must respect the commitments which have been undertaken within
the global agreements reached with anumber ofdeveloping countries ,while
atthe same time endeavouring towiden progressively the network of
liberalized trade toother regions ofthe Third World according tothe
intensity ofthe economic links (existing ortobedeveloped )with the
various developing countries orgroups ofdeveloping countries concerned .

-9-
3.2 Commodities
The commodity agreements concluded sofar,despite unqualified support from
the producer developing countries and the attachment tothem ofmany
industrialized countries ,including the Community ,have not always been
able toattain their principal objective ,namely that ofstabilizing prices .
This in1981 the products covered bysuch agreements -coffee ,cocoa ,rubber ,
tin,sugar -are among those whose prices dropped sharply ,just asthey had
risen dramatically inthe period 1975-79 ,although itshould benoted that
these agreements have helped limit the fluctuations considerably ,despite
often inadequate resources .
Furthermore ,although anew type ofagreement has been signed (jute )and
progress made oncertain other commodities (tea,bananas ,hard fibres ,
tropical woods ),the fact remains that for many agricultural ormineral
products ofimportance toworld trade there ishardly any prospect inthe
medium-term ofinternational agreements being concluded .
Perhaps the time has come,while reaffirming the Community 'sattachment to
the Integrated Programme (conclusion ofcommodity agreements between
producers and consumers ,establishment ofaCommon Fund),tore-examine
the content and machinery ofthese agreements inthe light ofthe experience
gained ,ofthe trends relating tothe geographical distribution of
production and the economy ofthe products ,and also ofthe features
peculiar tothe individual commodity .

-10-
Geographical distribution ofactivities
The seventies were marked byaradical worldwide redistribution ofraw
material production and export activities .
The industrialized countries' growing share ofmineral extraction has
generally been paralleled byadecline intheactivity ofalarge number
ofdeveloping countries inboth the mining sector and most major export
crops .Deterioration ofthe machinery ofproduction ,caused byinadequate
investment ,competition from substitute products and competition from other
Third World producers -all these factors have combined toproduce a
significant decline inthe world market shares oftraditional exporter
countries (often adecline inabsolute terns ).
Inthe case ofthese countries the problem istherefore toreconstitute
their production and export capacities by Jhebest possible combination of
external official (multilateral orbilateral )orprivate financial assistance ,
national development ,agricultural and mining strategies ,and international
agreements enabling them tomaintain orregain asatisfactory share ofthe
world market .

-11-
The commodities
Itisinthe case ofthe major tropical products (coffee ,cocoa ,tea,sugar )
that the outlook for the next decade isgloomiest asregards prices .The
policy ofextending plantations ,which was encouraged bythe high prices in
the period 1975-79 has ledtomedium-term surpluses ofsupply over demand .
Ifthis fundamental imbalance persists ,itisclear that the international
agreements will find itdifficult toprevent prices from falling inreal
terms .
Theinternational community should therefore aim,without interfering with
long-term market trends ,tolimit erratic fluctuations toagreater extent ,
while backing upthe agreements with machinery enabling those countries
which are most dependent onexports ofsuch commodities tocope,ifneed be,
with adrop intheir export earnings and,more generally ,toincrease the
added value oftheir products and diversify their product base .
Inthe case ofmining products ,the basic problem isthe fact that the
developing countries ,particularly those inAfrica ,are lagging behind with
regard toinvestment .The international community should therefore
concentrate mainly onseeking ways ofobtaining adequate financing for mining
investment inthe developing countries .Inthe mutual interest ofthe
partners concerned investments will have tobesafeguarded and areturn on
them assured byreducing theuncertainty surrounding the trend ofprices
for mining products .

-12-
3.3 Financial aspects (including the problem ofthe LLDCs )
More smoothly functioning arrangements forinternational financing and
the recycling ofcapital between surplus anddeficit countries (the latter
being the category into which the bulk ofnon-oil developing countries
fall )are anessential condition for areturn togrowth ,first ofall for
Third World countries and,following from that,for the world economy .
Transfers tothe developing countries must not only besufficiently large
(the volume aspect )but must also make anet contribution tothe countries
concerned interms ofgrowth and development ;the effects ofinflows on
production ,saving and exports must more than compensate for the drain on
internal resources resulting from outflows (interest payments ,
repatriation ofprofits ,etc.). The extent towhich transfers are put
togood use,i.e. facilitate the necessary structural adjustments ,is
crucial inthis respect ,asare thefinancal characteristics oftransfers ,
notably rates ofinterest onloans .
Inthis context adistinction must bemade between the countries mainly
dependant on ODA (low-income countries ,notably the LLDCs )and those for
which financing onmarket tterms plays akeyrole :the problems -andthe
solutions -are different ineach case .
Financing problems ofthe LLDCs (and ofother low-income countries )
These countries suffer from structural deficiencies which limit opportunities
for investment providing aspeedy return .Consequently ,they attract
hardly any private flows and are almost wholly dependent onasingle source
offinancing ,namely ODA.Inpractice ,the volume ofthe latter places a
ceiling ontheir imports ,investment and,indirectly ,their growth rates .

-13-
The LLDCs and other Low-income countries are the first casualties ofthe
current trend toreduce overall aid.Only asubstantial increase of00A
tothese countries (asadvocated ,sofar asthe LLDCs are concerned ,in
the guidelines adopted atthe Paris Conference )can help them toavoid
being reduced toapurely marginal role inthe world economy and give them
achance of"taking off"indue course .Forthis reason the need to
increase the overall amount of ODA and todirect itspecifically tothe
LLDCs istoday more pressing than ever ,contrary tothe current tendency
topay greater attention tocommercial motives inthe choice ofrecipient
countries (mixed credits ).
Ifthe increased aid isnot tobeopen-ended and istobeused tobest
effect ,itmust befocused onthe most serious bottlenecks (training ,
agriculture and energy )and must bedovetailed with appropriate internal
policies geared tostructural adjustment .This isthe approach that is
being followed inthe food strategies operation .
Inthis context ,aleading part must bereserved for themultilateral aid
institutions ,notably IDA,asthelatter not only concentrates onpoor
countries and such priority sectors asagriculture but also can help set
intrain structural adjustment programmes .Forthese reasons ,itisa
matter ofthe utmost priority that IDA'said capacity bestrengthened or,
atthe very least ,maintained .

-14-
Financing problems ofmiddle-income developing countries
Inthe second half ofthe preceding decade these countries more orless
managed tokeep uptheir imports and growth rates byresorting tobank
borrowing onamassive scale ,but today the situation looks quite
different :there isaslowing-down inthe growth ofcredit advanced to
the developing countries ,and this could result ,when allowance ismade
for debt-servicing costs ,inatendency for net banking flows todry up.
This situation isexplained bythree factors which have repercussions on
the indebtedness ofthe developing countries andaffect adversely their
creditworthiness and borrowing capacity :
i) the drop inthe real return oncapital inthe developing countries ,
resulting from inadequate internal adjustment and also from an
unfavourable climate (high oil costs ,low growth andprotectionist
pressures inthe industrialized countries ,and soon);
ii) therestrictive ,anti-inflationary monetary policies pursued bythe
industrialized countries ,especially the United States ,which result
invery high real interest rates ondebts denominated mainly in
dollars ;
iii )the structure ofthe developing countries' debt ,which increasingly
consists ofshort-term commitments ,resulting inexceptionally high
refinancing requirements .
Hence ,any increase innet flows ofbank credit tothe middle-income
developing countries depends on :
i) better prospects for growth and exports inthe countries concerned ,
deriving both from their own structural adjustment efforts and
improved performance ofthe world economy ;
ii) adrop inworld interest rates and animprovement inthe terms of
trade ,which alone can inthe short torm restore tothe countries in
question some scope for manoeuvre infinancial terms ;

-15-
iii)thepossibility ofrescheduling thedeveloping countries' debt,
shifting the burden tolonger-term commitments ;
iv)confidence onthepart ofthebanking community inthecapacity of
the world 'smonetary authorities tomanage any debt crises .
Itisclear ,therefore ,that asatisfactory flow oftransfers ofresources
tothe middle-income developing countries presupposes conditions which to
alarge extent lieoutside the financial sphere proper .There ismuch
that can bedone inthefinancial sphere ,however ,tostrengthen the process
asregards quantity and quality .Possible measures inthis connection to
provide amore secure climate for bank flows and todirect and back them
upwere spelled out inthe Commission staff paper entitled "World economic
imbalances and financial aspects ofNorth-South relations "(SEC(81)509 ).
Briefly ,they boil down tothe general guideline increasingly endorsed by
observers ofthe international financing system :the banks have avery
important part toplay infunding the develooing countries' external
deficit and they must behelped toplay this part,while still shouldering
their specific responsibilities .The fact remains that the relative
importance ofbank flows has grown excessively since 1974 . Abigger role
now needs tobeallotted not only tomore stable forms ofprivate capital
(for example ,direct investment )but also toofficial flows -mainly
multilateral and non-concessionary -for the purpose ofsupporting
structural adjustment policies .
"N
Progress inthis direction isessential :
i) initially ,inorder toavoid arush toindulge insterile and
dangerous deflation ,the inevitable consequence ofinadequate
external resources ;
ii) inthe longer term,inorder tocontribute tohealthy growth ,
uninterrupted inparticular bydebt crises .
 
* *

-16-
Generallyspeaking,althoughitmightbetemptingtobecomeresignedto
seeingaideffortsstagnate,orevencontract,becauseoftherecession,
itisessential onthecontrarytorecognizethatstagnationisitself
asourceoftheappreciable aggravation oftheworldrecession andcould
soonhaveevengraverconsequencesifthetrendisnotspeedilyreversed.

IV.APLANFORUNCTAD
Thequestiontobeansweredconcernsthepurposeofthediscussions and
negotiations tobeheldinBelgradeandoftheirfollow-upwithinthe
UNCTADframework .
Thebasicideabehindthegeneralguidelines proposedaboveisaconviction
thattheworseningoftheeconomicsituationofthedevelopingcountries
andtheincreasingmarginalization ofthepoorestcountriesisdirectly
relatedtothepersistence anddeepeningoftheworldrecession.
Withoutgoingsofarastomaintainthatrecoverywillcomethroughthe
ThirdWorld-sincethewayoutofthecrisisdependsfirstofallonthe
difficult andpainfulstructural adjustments thatareinprogressinthe
industrialized countries-theCommunityshouldendeavourtoconvinceall
itspartnersintheindustrial worldoftheurgentneedtorelaunch
^rth-South cooDerat-ion -inordertopreventthedifficulties oftheSouth
leadingthewor^deconomyintcadeepdepression and,inthelongerterm,
tofindwaysofre-establishing ,tothemutualbenefit,theconditions
thatwillpermitthe•developingcountriestodevelop.
Itisinthisspirit,andthisspiritalone,thatitwouldbepossibleto
makeUNCTADVItheoccasionforajointreflection onthecrisisandon
waysofpullingoutofittogether,andtoadopttherethebroadguidelines
tobefollowedsubsequently,inthevariousbodiessuchasUNCTAD,bythe
North-Southnegotiations withtheaimoffacilitating anewimpetusinthe
development ofproduction andtradeandputtingastoptotheprocessof
marginalization ofthepoorest.

-18-
Inthis context ,and with regard tothe future role ofUNCTAD itself ,it
would beuseful ifapractical work programme could bedrawn upatthe
Sixth Session for the next few years .
InBelgrade ,the industrial world must impress onthe Group of77the need
toberealistic and towork for the mutual interest .Itmust also call on
the Eastern-bloc countries todemonstrate agreater sense oftheir
responsibilities towards the developing countries .Itwould have no
chance ofbeing heard if,against its own interests ,itwere only to
invoke thedifficulties ofthe moment inorder toput off the necessary
efforts until alater date .