EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 8.4.2009 
SEC(2009) 443 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
 
accompanying the 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMI TTEE OF THE REGIONS 
 
Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis 
 
Aid Effectiveness after Accra 
 
Where does the EU stand and What more do we need to do? 
 
 
{COM(2009) 160 final} 
{SEC(2009) 442} {SEC(2009) 444} {SEC(2009) 445}
 
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................ .. 3 
2. Reducing Fragmentation of Aid: Division of Labour.................................................. 6 
2.1. In-country Division of Labour ..................................................................................... 6 2.2. Cross-country Division of Labour ............................................................................... 9 2.3. Impediments to Division of Labour ........................................................................... 11 3. Strengthening Country Ownership- Use of Country Systems ................................... 12 4. Changing the Nature of Conditionality...................................................................... 14 
4.1. Transparency and Conditionality ............................................................................... 16 4.2. Frequency of Conditionality Reviews........................................................................ 16 5. Increasing the Predictability of Aid ........................................................................... 16 6. More Value for Money- Untying of Aid.................................................................... 18 7. Strengthening Country Leadership  and Mutual Accountability ................................ 18 
8. Training and Staff Incentives..................................................................................... 19 9. Managing for Development Results........................................................................... 20 9.1. Measures to Strengthen Part ner Countries' Data Gathering and Publishing Capacity
............................................................................................................................... ..... 20 
10. Capacity Development............................................................................................... 21 11. Global Initiatives and Vertical Funds ........................................................................ 22 12. Conclusions................................................................................................................ 23 
 
EN 3   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
Today, more than ever, there is a need for eff ective aid. We have an obligation to the world's 
poor to make the most of every cent spent on development. That obli gation is particularly 
pressing in times like these, when multiple cris es are hitting the globe. We also have an 
obligation to our own citizens, the taxpayers, to ensu re that their money is accountable and 
used transparently. When society demands efficiency and effectiv eness in all other matters of 
economy and finance, how could developm ent cooperation remain on the sideline? 
After the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiven ess, held in Accra, Ghana, in September 
2008, which built on the commitments made at the First and Second High Level Forums in 
Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) respectively, th e international agenda for improving aid 
effectiveness is in place. What is ne eded now is determined implementation. 
Implementation is a formidable task. Today the aid effectiveness agenda is wider and more 
challenging than ever before: following the adoption of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)1 
there are now, in addition to the 12 indica tors agreed to in the Paris Declaration2, 48 new or 
strengthened commitments for the developmen t community as a whole of which 34 for the 
donors to implement. The EU has four additi onal targets from 2005, confirmed in the 
European Consensus3 and now partly reflected in th e AAA. The Accra High Level Forum 
deepened the international ai d effectiveness agenda. It br ought together 130 countries, 40 
international organisations, ove r 80 civil society or ganisations and representatives from the 
private sector and academia. In Accra, the deve loping countries exerted much more influence 
in the process than in the previous forums. A number of new issues , such as South-South 
cooperation, the role of civil soci ety organisations and situations of fragility now form part of 
the agenda and must be dealt with.  
The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration4 showed that progress has been made, 
but too little and too slow. Efforts need to be stepped up dramatically if we are to achieve the 
Paris targets, and the four additional EU ones,  in 2010, just one year away. Responsibilities, 
however, go beyond meeting the Paris targets. Deve lopment cooperation is starting to be in its 
late middle age, in its respectable 50s. It is time to show that the world is learning from past 
experience, from successes and mistakes. It is  high time to prove that the development 
community and the EU can reform. 
This paper cannot and does not aim to cover the whole aid effectiveness agenda. Neither is the 
aim to duplicate the Paris Survey. It focuses on the four key areas to which the EU committed 
itself in the Council conclusions of May 2008 and in  the EU Guidelines for Accra: division of 
labour, use of country systems, predictability of aid and mutual accountability for results, 
including less conditionality. 
                                                 
1 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEX T/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-
SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf 
2 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 
3 Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives  of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy:  "The European Consensus"; Brussels 22 November 2005; OJ C 46, 24.2.2006); paragraph 32 
4 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring/survey  (Survey in 54 developing countries covering 
year 2007) 
 
EN 4   EN The question addressed in this paper is: how we ll is the EU implementing the Paris and Accra 
commitments? The responses to the Commission's recent questionnaire "From Monterrey to Doha- EU Progress on Financing for Development"
5, which included a section on aid 
effectiveness, shed some light on this questio n and are an opportunity to take stock and re-
engage. 
Monitoring the Paris Declaration: EU  status on some of the key targets6 
Paris Indicators EU (Member 
States and EC) EC 2010 Target 
3. Aid flows are recorded in countries' 
budgets 44% 57% 85% 
4. Technical assistance is aligned and 
coordinated 53% 43% 100% (EU target; Paris 
target is 50%)) 
5a. Donors use Country Systems for public financial management 47% 35% 50-80 (EU and now 
Accra global target is 
50%, targets for each individual partner 
country depends on 
performance) 
5b. Donors use country procurement systems 54% 34% 50-80 (EU and now 
Accra global target is 
50%, targets for each 
individual partner 
country depends on 
performance) 
6a. Donors reduce stock of parallel PIUs with 
two-third 780 
(Per Member 
State: 56)  
203 Indicative EU: 118 
Indicative EC: 68 
7. Aid is more predictable 43% 53% 71% 
8. Aid is untied 94% N.A. Indicative: 100% 
9. Donors use coordinated mechanisms for 
aid delivery (through programme-based 
approaches) 46% 44% 66% 
10a. Donors coordinate their missions 33% 33% 66% (EU target; Paris 
target is 40%) 
10b. Donors coordinate their 
(country)studies and analytical work 62% 72% 66%  
                                                 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU-progress-on-financing-for-development-and-
MDGsQuestionnaire11-12-2008.pdf 
6 Aggregate data from the 14 Member States (Austr ia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom) and the 
Commission, that participated in the Paris survey; based on the Survey on Monitoring the Paris 
Declaration 2008  
 
EN 5   EN Explanatory note on the table : It should be noted that concerning indicator 4 and 10a the EU set itself 
more ambitious targets than the global target. The same applies to the use of country systems, but with the 
Accra Agenda for Action the EU target of 50 % has b een adopted internationally. In the table the average 
performance of the EU (Member States and the Euro pean Commission together) is compared to the 
performance of the European Commission only. On alignment the European Commission is stronger than 
the EU average with regard to aid predictability, wh ile the EU on average shows stronger performance on 
the use of country systems, including alignment of tech nical assistance and the relatively restricted use of 
parallel Project Implementation Units. On harmonisation  the EU average and the European Commission 
are at equal with respect to use of  programme based approaches and coor dination of in-country missions, 
while the European Commission is more advanced in coordinating studies and analytical work. 
 
EN 6   EN 2. REDUCING FRAGMENTATION OF AID: DIVISION OF LABOUR  
The EU Guidelines for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness state that donors 
should apply division of labour by "reducing the number of sector s where they are active" and 
by "reviewing their own aid procedures wh ich hinder in-country division of labour 
processes"7. In the AAA the development community ag reed to a set of measures to reduce 
the costly fragmentation of aid. The EU has promoted division of  labour especially by 
adopting the EU Code of Conduct on Co mplementarity and Division of labour8. The Fast 
Track Initiative (FTI, see information box), co -led by Germany and the Commission, was set 
up to speed up division of labour by facilitatin g the process at the country level. The FTI 
operates in tandem with the Commission' s initiative on delegated cooperation (see 
information box). An EU Toolkit has also been developed to support the process on the ground. 
"Ownership of aid and division of labour", Bamako, Mali 20 November 2008 
At the initiative of France, a high-level meeting was organised between donors and the government of 
Mali to discuss how to concretely promote aid effect iveness and division of la bour. The government took 
leadership of the event and was rep resented through several ministri es. The government emphasised the 
need for the donors to align themselves to the countr y's budgetary processes and policies and also to the 
need for donors to have a harmonis ed approach. The do nors agreed to coordinate their approaches within 
a joint assistance strategy (the "Stratégie Commune d' Assistance Pays- SCAP") a nd assured that division 
of labour will not lead to less funding. 
2.1. In-country division of labour 
The responses to the Monterrey survey show that EU donors are taking division of labour 
seriously. When it comes to sector concentration, at least five EU donors have translated the 
commitment of the EU Code of Conduct to re duce the sectors of involvement into their 
bilateral development policy documents. Almost all use the concept of comparative advantage 
as a guiding criteria, though often linked to  historical presen ce on the ground and not 
necessarily to an analysis of current streng ths and weaknesses as a donor. One Member State 
indicated that sector concentration is difficult precisel y because of historical ties and 
expectations for continued multi-sectoral engagement. 
Almost all Member States (20) are interested  in engaging in joint donor responses and looking 
for more complementarity and division of labour, whether in the framework of their 
multiannual programming by withdrawing from or entering into a sector or entering into 
delegated cooperation arrangements. For two this is already standard po licy. The interest in 
joint responses concentrates natura lly on existing priority countries. 
Five Member States however are not yet read y for division of labour. The reasons given are 
capacity constraints or prohibitive cu rrent policies and/or legislation.  
Most Member States report that they already c oncentrate their aid in three sectors or less, 
although six indicated concentratio n on more than three sectors in  most of the countries they 
                                                 
7 Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-III)-Accra, Ghana, 2-4 September 2008. Guidelines 
for the participation of the European Union, 11 July 2008 
8 Council Conclusions on the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of labour in 
Development Policy, 15 May 2007 (9558/07);   
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09558.en07.pdf 
 
EN 7   EN were involved in. Smaller donors have a natural tendency to focu s on fewer sectors than those 
with high aid volumes.  
According to the answers to the questionnaire  there are more than three times as many 
developing countries where EU-donors practise inte nsive sector concentration than there are 
with a wide range of sectors. A quic k comparison with the EU Donor Atlas 20089 however 
suggests that there may be a positive bias in th e questionnaire findings perhaps owing to lack 
of clarity on sector definition (OECD/DAC de finition, the donors own definition or partner 
countries' definitions). 
For the Commission, the Guidelines for Countr y Programming call for more concentration, 
division of labour and complementarity10. Following the sector definitions laid down in the 
European Consensus, the curr ent average for country progra mmes stands at 2.9 sectors in 
Latin America, 3.3 in Asia, 5.6. in ACP and 6.2 in the Neighbourhood countries. Generally 
speaking, while activities in Latin America and Asia fulfil the concentration requirement, 
assistance in ACP countries is less  concentrated, in part icular in post conflict /fragile situations 
in order to respond to the needs in the context of "Linking Relief Rehabilitation and 
Development". In the case of the pre-accession candidates a nd potential candidates and the 
countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, assistance is often driven by 
acquis-related rather than development cons iderations. The ensuin g broader political 
framework may call for a more multi-sectoral approach with less sector concentration.  
As regards delegated cooperation , one modality for division of labour, the majority of 
Member States (18) are managing or preparin g to manage funds from each other or the 
Commission, or vice versa. Findi ngs on the Fast Track Initiativ e (see also information box) 
indicated that several d onors still had impediments in their rules and procedures to use this 
modality. Seven Member States were not involved  in these exercises, but two were in the 
process of changing their legislation in or der to make delegated cooperation possible. 
The Commission's initiative on delegated cooperation 
In May 2008, the Commission identified a number of countries and sectors with potential for delegated 
cooperation. These concerned country programs under the 10th EDF 2008-2013 and the Budget 2007-2013. 
This initiative acts in tandem with other donor processes at the country level for fast tracking division of 
labour. The combined efforts have so far led to a total of around 51 proposals11: (i) 37 for delegation by 
the Commission to a Member State in a sector, for a value of around €162 million, (ii) 14 concrete 
proposals for delegation from a Member State to the Commission for a total value of around €90 million . 
For example: in Bangladesh the Co mmission is planning to delegate €2.3 million to Germany for a project 
on labour law. In Sierra Leone the Commission is p reparing to delegate €6 million to the UK for civil 
society capacity building. In Haiti,  France is planning to delegate to  the Commission the implementation 
of a road project. 
The current financial rules and regulations c overing delegated coopera tion make delegation 
possible from a Member State to  the Commission and vice versa12. Delegation from the 
Commission to a Member State re quires the Member State financ ial systems to be audited by 
the Commission to test their capability to mana ge EC/EDF funds. Six Member States or their 
                                                 
9 http://development.donoratlas.eu/ 
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Increasing the 
impact of EU aid : a common framework for draf ting country strategy papers and joint multiannual 
programming (COM (2006) 88 of 2.3.2006)  
11 As per 24th March 2009 
12 Council Regulation (EC) 617/2007 of 14.05.07 on the implementation of the 10th European Fund under 
the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (OJ L 152, 13.6. 2007) 
 
EN 8   EN agencies have gone through this audit and six mo re audits have been or are about to be 
launched13. One Member State will request the audit as soon as legal obstacles are removed. 
As part of the joint programming process, most Me mber States (22) plan to participate in joint 
reviews (annual and mid term re views of Country Strategy Pape rs) in their priority partner 
countries. One Member State regarded this as possible and two do not ye t participate in joint 
programming. Capacity constraints limit the sc ope for some EU donors to join on a regular 
basis. Some Member States showed an interest  in building on existing joint approaches, such 
as the one in South Africa. 
There is a large interest, as shown above, in the second step of the joint programming process 
–joint donor response, looking at  opportunities for more comp lementarity and division of 
labour. It is important to keep in mind that designing and agreeing on the modalities is not an 
end in itself. The focus should remain on the overall goal of increase d aid effectiveness, 
which calls for simplifying and rationalising the way we work. 
As part of the Mid Term Review of country and thematical programmes, which started in 
2009 with the review of the DCI and ENPI and w ill continue into 2010 with that of the EDF, 
the Commission delegations are encouraged to  deepen the joint programming progress in 
order to achieve further divi sion of labour through full c oncentration and/or delegated 
cooperation. This opportunity for closer coopera tion with the Member States and other donors 
must not be missed. 
                                                 
13 Finalised audits: AFD, GTZ, SONA (N etherlands Antilles), BTC-CTB, ADA, KfW 
 
EN 9   EN  
Fast-track initiative on Division of Labour: progress and obstacles 
The Fast Track Initiative seeks to speed up divisi on of labour, with the Commission or a Member State 
playing a facilitating role on the ground in a number of selected countries. On the basis of a brief 
questionnaire sent out in November 2008 fifteen fa cilitators provided responses that show that 
Some progress has been made on: 
- Donor mapping: carried ou t in 11 of 15 countries 
- Lead donor arrangements: established in 9 countries covering most sectors 
- Assessments of comparative advant age: carried out in 6 countries 
But there are also some obstacles: 
- in many cases, the rather limited leadin g or active role of the partner country 
- Reluctance of donors to limit th eir involvement in certain sectors 
- Unclear definitions of "lead" , "active" and "silent" donors 
- Lack of information of the overa ll picture of aid flows per (sub)s ector (who does what and where) 
- Legal and administrative barriers on the donor side 
2.2. Cross-country division of labour 
The EU Guidelines for Accra sought to make  operational commitments on cross-country 
complementarity, and as a result of a determined effort by the EU, the Third High Level Forum decided to launch an international dial ogue on division of labour and cross country 
approaches. 
According to the OECD-DAC study on aid fragmentation,
14 which looked at the situation in 
153 developing countries, 63 partne r countries (41 % of the total) are supported by more than 
20 donors. A further 49 partner countries (33 %)  are supported by 11-20 donors. On average 
each partner country has 17 donors with a country program. 
The responses to the Monterrey questionnaire show that the num ber of partner countries to 
which a Member State directs government-to-g overnment ODA varies greatly. Four Member 
States provide no govern ment-to-government ODA15, while five Member States provide it to 
70 countries or more16, with the highest figure being 132. B ecause of its mandate the EC is by 
design present in most (144) developing countries. 
The number of priority countries varied between  2 and 57 per Member State, most often there 
were 8-12 priority countries. The number usua lly correlates closely with ODA-levels, but on 
the whole low-level ODA-donors also have  many priority partner countries. 
                                                 
14 www.oecd.org/dac/scalingup ; The scope of donors in this study encompasses 34 donors, 23 bilateral 
OECD-DAC donors (including 15 Member States), the EC and 10 multilateral donors 
15 CY, MT, PL, SK 
16 DE, FI, FR, PT, SE 
 
EN 10   EN The most common priority partner countries for Member States are Mozambique, Vietnam 
(12 Member States named them as priority coun tries), followed by the Palestinian territories, 
Moldova, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Tanzania (10) and Uganda, Mali, Zambia, Yemen and 
Ukraine, Angola Georgia and DRC (7-9). Nine teen developing countries are regarded as 
priority countries by two, 23 by one and 39 countr ies were prioritised by  3-6 Member States. 
The choice of priority country normally stems from donor government policy, in at least one 
case the priority countries are stipulated by law and in another the parliament establishes the 
criteria. 
Estimation of the share of ODA that goes to priority countries can help to measure the success 
of concentration, though obviously  the percentage can be high if the number of priority 
countries is also high. The responses to the Mo nterrey questionnaire show ed that for Ireland 
and Belgium nearly all their bilateral aid commitm ents is allocated to th eir priority countries, 
while six more Member States estimate  the share to be around 80 % or more17. Altogether 18 
Member States estimate that more than half of  their ODA goes to priority countries, while in 
two cases the percentage was ar ound 45. For many Member States, particularly with small aid 
volumes, the share of bilateral aid was negligib le when compared to other means of funding. 
Conscious efforts have been made to concentrat e a larger share of ODA to priority partner 
countries (Spain has a target of 85%). 
According to the OECD/DAC study, in 2005-2006 38 partner countries had 25 or more DAC 
and multilateral donors. In 24 of these countries  15 or more donors provided less than 10 % of 
that country's total aid. This s hows that there clearly  is plenty of room  for donors to further 
concentrate their aid. Donors with higher volum es of ODA tend to spread it over a higher 
number of partner countries, while donors with smaller volumes seem to add to fragmentation 
disproportionately to their size. While fully respecting the princi ples of ownership and partner 
country leadership, the EU should exert its in fluence to reduce aid fragmentation by stepping 
up division of labour. 
Six Member States have made an overall assessment of their comparative advantage  as a 
donor and 13 have made such assessments at c ountry level, in some cases linked to Joint 
Assistance Strategy exercises. Two Member Stat es will soon make an overall assessment and 
one will update its assessment when it renews its overall development strategy. At least two 
Member States regularly update country-level  self-assessments. Do nor self-assessments 
clearly need to be discussed during the dialogue  on cross-country divisi on of labour under the 
aegis of the OECD/DAC Worki ng Party on Aid Effectiveness. 
Several EU donors have been working to reduce  their number of prior ity countries: Belgium 
reduced the number of priority  countries in 2003 from 25 to 18, the Czech Republic in 2005 
from 40-50 to 8, Germany in 2001 from approxi mately 118 to 70 and again in 2007 from 70 
to 57, and Sweden decided in 2007 to limit  the number of priority countries to 33. 
Luxembourg has withdrawn from two and is planning to withdraw from a further six 
countries and The Netherlands will be phasing out from seven countries. At least one more 
Member State is consider ing further concentration. 
These voluntary and independent processes must  include tough prioriti sation and courageous 
political decisions. Still, they are taking place without an EU-dialogue. There is a need to 
initiate such a dialogue, as called for in the Council Conclusions on the Code of Conduct, in 
                                                 
17 EE, LV, LT, NL, PL, UK 
 
EN 11   EN order to work towards a common EU position for the upcoming discussions on international 
division of labour. 
2.3. Impediments to Division of Labour 
In the answers to the ques tionnaire the EU donors reporte d several impediments to 
coordinated programmes and multi-donor arrangements. Most issues centred on "bureaucracy" and different donor  priorities, procedures and programming calendars, as well 
as limited delegation of powers to country-lev el. The report on the Fast Track Initiative 
revealed reluctance by donors for sector concen tration: headquarters sometimes pushed field 
offices to remain or get engage d in "politically attractive" s ectors. On a more positive note, 
two Member States reported no major impediment s and three regard join t work as standard 
practice. 
Several responses to the questionnaire indi cated that coordinati on was seen as time-
consuming and not at all cost-effective for sma ll-scale interventions. This seems to reveal a 
"donor fatigue": the impression that work on division of labour  and complementarity creates 
an additional burden whilst the dividends for partner countries and for donors that should logically follow from division of labour are not yet apparent. The multitude of different donor 
coordinating mechanisms at various levels in pa rtner countries, particularly in "donor darling 
countries" show that ra tionalisation is needed. 
One challenge to division of labour is the la ck of overview of what different donors exactly 
are doing in a given country or region. The EU Donor Atlas, launc hed in 2004, was designed 
and has been further developed to address this issue. Another promising initiative is the EC 
web-based TR-AID (Transparent Aid) system which, with apt data in cluded from different 
donors' systems, can help to show which donors are active in which countries, and for which 
sectors. 
On the other hand some EU-donors, particul arly those with smaller aid volumes, are 
concerned about the lack of visibility when entering into delegated cooperation. This is 
especially valid when new aid programmes or agencies are being set up and there is a need to boost domestic support for increased ODA. 
Division of labour is particular ly important in the context of scaling up of aid. Delivering and 
managing aid has to become less labour intensive. Focus needs to be put on wh ere it belongs: 
on achieving concrete development results. The additional work load caused by the preparation process of division  of labour is only temporary a nd should start to pay off very 
quickly by a reduced workload for partner count ries and donors alike once division of labour 
is in place. Some specific arrangements, such  as joint cooperation including a "traditional" 
donor and a donor with possibly less  experience can be used to overcome some of the issues 
concerning volume, visibility and capacity. 
A more serious challenge to the division of labour agenda is probably the perceived 
hesitations of partner countries. In the responses to the questi onnaire partner country attitudes 
were described sometimes with terms such  as "weak ownership", "suspicion" and 
"reluctance". Partner countries may be apprehensive for a numbe r of reasons: other priorities, 
such as alignment, fear of donors "ganging up"  and thus imposition of donor views leading to 
reduction of flexibility and increased conditionali ty, perceived advantages  or disadvantages at 
central and decentralised government levels, su ch as loss of interface with individual donors, 
the capacity required to lead a division of labour pro cess, and the risk of  loss of aid for the 
country or a particular sector . These perceptions are confir med by observations on the ground, 
such as in the context of the Fast Track Initiative. 
 
EN 12   EN The EU Code of Conduct is clear on this issu e: the first principle states that primary 
leadership and ownership of in-country division  of labour should first and foremost lie with 
the partner country government. There is a need to  dispel the fear that division of labour will 
be imposed by donors, regardless of partner countr y opinion. Guarantees need to be given that 
partner countries' areas of development priori ty will not become underf unded. If partners are 
concerned about "losing" donors,  delegated cooperation and s ilent partnerships can be 
considered instead of complete withdrawal. 
3. STRENGTHENING COUNTRY OWNERSHIP - USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS  
The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Report rev ealed that, although clea r progress had been 
made in the quality of developing countries' pub lic financial management systems, there was 
no corresponding increase in donors' use of those systems. In the EU Guidelines for Accra it 
was recognised that "the use of country system s will lead to strength ening those systems and 
this progress should be supported by donors. The choice of aid modalities should reduce 
transaction costs and stre ngthen country ownership." 
Despite the 2005 Paris and EU commitments on the use of country systems and programme-
based approaches, which were renewed and stre ngthened in Accra, project aid and technical 
assistance remain by far the most widely used  method by EU donors to deliver aid. Six EU-
donors deliver practically all their bilateral ODA through proj ect aid and technical assistance. 
Altogether the share of project aid and techni cal assistance varies between 16 and 100% of 
bilateral aid. 
Six EU donors18 provide a quarter or more of th eir ODA support through programme-based 
approaches. For three this consists mainly of budget-support. Ireland de livered (in 2007) 42% 
of its aid through programme-based approach es, excluding budget support, for the UK the 
combined percentage for budget support and ot her programme-based approaches was 38. The 
Netherlands provided 25% of its bilateral aid through budget support (g eneral budget support 
15% and sectoral budget support 10 %). As far as the EC is co ncerned, for non-ACP-countries 
28% of total budget funds will be provided as budget support, whilst for the ACP-countries 
46% indicative amounts of the Nationa l Indicative Programmes of the 10th EDF are 
programmed as budget support (30% general bud get support and 16 % sector budget support). 
For a number of reasons several EU-donors were unable to give a breakdown of budget 
support by general and sector budget s upport. For those that could, five donors19 reported 
using more general budget support and five20 more sector budget s upport. The reasons for 
preferring the sector approach are its professe d suitability for smaller donors and comparative 
advantage resulting from  sector-expertise. 
The take up of country public financial or procurement systems was obviously low for donors 
that did not use programme based approaches. The percentages reported in the questionnaire 
were quoted from the OECD/D AC Paris Declaration monito ring survey and many EU-donors 
were unable to answer du e to lack of data.  
                                                 
18 EC, DE, IE, LU, NL,UK 
19 DE, DK, IT, NL, PT 
20 AT, BE, ES, FI, IE 
 
EN 13   EN For the eleven EU-donors that answered, the take up of PFM systems for the government 
sector varied between 0 and 79%, with eight EU-donors21 exceeding the 50% EU target and 
AAA benchmark. The use of country procuremen t systems varied between 0 and 88%, with 
seven EU-donors22 above the Paris Declaration 61% target. 
The reasons given why some Member States' use of country systems remains under the 50 % 
target corresponded to the reasons why progra mme-based approaches were not used. For 
certain donors it is a question of legislatio n: the arrangements making programme-based 
approaches are simply not in place. Two countri es were reviewing thei r legislation to make 
new methods of delivering aid possible. 
For most EU donors, the situation at country level,  the local context, quite naturally guides the 
choice of modalities being used. General budget support is still seen to have the highest 
political risk as a resu lt of potentially poor public financ ial management, high fiduciary risks 
and insufficient leadership. Few responses look ed at the risks under a fragmented project 
approach. 
Technical cooperation because of its very nature  is for many donors difficult to reconcile with 
the use of country systems. These issues are ho wever starting to be addressed (see Chapter 10 
on Capacity Development). For some donors, th e preference of projects is a question of 
capacity. When a large share of ODA is channelled through NGOs and multilateral 
organisations the ratio of the use of country systems falls. 
Similarly, in situations of fragility the use of country systems is seen as problematic. At the 
same time the international community agrees th at the building of resilient and legitimate 
states should be the central objective of external intervention. The newly founded OECD 
International Network on Conflict and Fragil ity (INCAF) is working on this issue. The 
European Commission is currently, follo wing up on the 2007 Comm ission Communication 
and Council Conclusion "Towards an EU respon se to fragile situati ons", working towards a 
common approach on the use of budget support in situat ions of fragility with the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the African Devel opment Bank. Efforts to come to a more strategic and coherent 
EU response is also ongoing in six pilot countrie s. Both exercises will , together with other 
elements, feed into the EU Implementation Plan  for fragile situations which the Commission 
will present in the second half of 2009 The Commi ssion services also foresee this year the 
development, in cooperation with the Council Secr etariat, of an EU Action Plan on the Nexus 
between Security and Development. The aim of the plan will be to en sure a coherent and 
coordinated response when contributing to the global efforts supporting sustainable 
development and peace.  
More strikingly, however, in certain cases the pa rtner countries themselves were reported to 
favour the use of donors' systems as national systems were perceived as slow and/or 
inefficient. 
Plans to promote programme-based approaches and use of country systems were put in place 
by five Member States. The Comm ission is applying a strategy on the use of country systems, 
with the aim of reaching the Paris Declara tion, Accra and EU commitments. EU donors' 
internal guidance concentrated on training a nd programming guidelines. One Member State 
has integrated the Paris targets in  its own performance frameworks. 
                                                 
21 DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, NL, SE, UK 
22 DE , DK, FI, FR, IE, NL, UK 
 
EN 14   EN An important issue concerning ai d effectiveness in general and the use of country systems in 
particular is the role of the "control institutio ns", which some respondents regarded as highly 
conservative when it comes to applying aid eff ectiveness principles, postulating that these 
principles will weaken the existing control mechanisms. 
It is important to have the institutions that decide, control and audit the use of finances on 
board in the aid effectiveness debate, both in donor and partner countries. The Commission 
and the Member States need to remain activ ely engaged with national parliaments and the 
European Parliament. At least one Member  State holds frequent discussions on aid 
effectiveness with its control institutions. Th e Commission does the same, also at a very 
practical level: for example the European Cour t of Auditors increasingly participates in 
Commission-organised traini ng on aid effectiveness. 
It is clear that the use of country systems remains a ch allenge for EU donors. However, some 
have been able to reconcile risk management and control to a much larger extent with the 
commitments on aid effectiveness. This is ye t another clear example where EU donors should 
learn from each others' practices. 
4. CHANGING THE NATURE OF CONDITIONALITY  
An important international discussion on how donors should apply conditionality has been 
going on for the past decade, especially on c onditions linked to macroeconomic governance. 
Significant steps to address the proliferation of conditions have been taken by individual 
institutions, but much remains to be done, as in dicated by the EU Guidel ines for Accra: "The 
EU is convinced that conditionality must be re formed in order to give partner countries the 
necessary sovereignty on their development st rategies. Donors and partner countries should 
work together in a partnership. Im posed conditions should be avoided." 
In the answers to the questionnaire practica lly no EU donor reported  having issues with 
conditionality, as only two Member States st ate that they apply conditions that are not 
mutually agreed with partner countries and based on national development strategies. The 
responses to the questionnaire al so suggest that Member Stat es are relatively split on the 
process to reduce the number of conditionalities : five Member States replied that they are 
actively reducing conditionalities , while thirteen were not. 
As recognised in the EU Guidelines for Accra, there are some fundamental principles for each 
development agreement, such as human rights, democracy and rule of law, which should not 
be interpreted as conditions. Environmental su stainability and gender equality are also key 
objectives. Mutually agreed de velopment goals and performance targets are the basis for 
planning, implementation and monitoring of joint efforts as well as for mutual and domestic 
accountability. There are also measures that  can be necessary for good governance and 
effective management, such as the lapse of commitments if agreements are not signed, or 
conformity of agreements to international law. To fulfil the commitments made in Accra, it is 
necessary, however, to have a serious look, t ogether with our partner countries, at how 
conditionalities are applied and also how EU donors' internal requirements are applied to 
cooperation with developing countries. Where necessary, the donors' own systems should be 
addressed. 
 
EN 15   EN Some of the EU donors that provide budget support23 use Performance Assessment 
Frameworks (PAF) jointly agr eed with partner governments as  instruments for monitoring 
and for presenting expected resu lts (conditions) and also as the basis for the policy dialogue 
with the partner country government.  
In Mozambique, for example, the government and the donors have agreed on a multi annual 
Performance Assessment Framework that is base d on the targets of the PARPA, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy of Mozambique. The PAF cove rs issues such as macro-economics and 
poverty, governance, economic development, human  capital and cross cutting issues like HIV, 
gender, rural development and environment. Du ring joint reviews the Government and the 19 
donors that provide general budget support discuss progress against the jointly agreed targets 
(the conditionalities), up date targets and confirm disburseme nts for the next period. This joint 
review links in with similar, more detailed, jo int reviews at the sector level. Thus donors and 
partner countries work in partnership and unilaterally set conditions are avoided. 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Acc ountability (PEFA) Performance Measurement 
Framework, based on a program me jointly financed by the World Bank, the Commission, the 
UK, Switzerland, Norway, France a nd the IMF has establis hed itself as a su ccessful tool to 
provide a common pool of information for donors a nd partner countries. PEFA helps deliver a 
common measure and shared unders tanding of the status of public financial management 
(PFM), greatly facilitating agreement on th e appropriate responses  thus reducing and 
harmonising PFM conditions at the country level. 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountab ility (PEFA) Performanc e Measurement Framework 
The PEFA Framework is a standardised tool to asse ss a country's Public Financial Management (PFM) 
performance with regard to achievin g of fiscal discipline, efficient delivery of services and strategic 
allocation of resources. By using a detailed set of high-level performa nce indicators, the PEFA assessment 
delivers reliable and consistent results giving a syst ematic method of monitoring progress over time. By 
identifying PFM weaknesses rather th an providing concrete reform reco mmendations it enables countries 
to formulate their own reform strategies, thereby en hancing local ownership and policy alignment. As a 
widely accepted multi-donor approac h the PEFA Framework provides fo r a single diagnostic tool, which 
reduces transaction costs and allows donors' action s being more harmonized. Around 90 countries have 
used the PEFA assessment so far and the re have been some repeated assessments. 
The discussion around conditionality, also in responses to the Monterrey questionnaire, 
revolves almost entirely around budget support. Th e conditions for budget support are at least 
easily identifiable. The application of conditiona lity in project-based approaches is probably 
more difficult to detect. In any case, the projec t-approach limits the room of manoeuvre of the 
partner countries to a much larger extent pe r intervention than programme based approaches. 
Project approaches pose a more serious chal lenge for harmonisation and require increased 
attention. 
As pointed out by one response to the questionn aire, the application of  conditions should be 
clarified in the light of th e Paris Declaration and the A ccra Agenda for Action. EU donors 
need to make assessments of their own app lication of conditionali ties and to engage 
proactively in the forthcoming internationa l dialogue on good practices in conditionality 
within the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. 
                                                 
23 AT, BE , DE, DK, EC, ES, FI, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK 
 
EN 16   EN 4.1. Making Conditionalities transparent 
The responses to the questionnai re reveal that in several cas es conditions are already public, 
and annual reports/reviews and the use of intern et are the most common way of informing the 
general public. For some EU donors, the lack of technical  capacity poses a challenge to 
widespread publication. In many cases, repo rts are discussed by na tional parliaments, a 
practice very much to be encourag ed to boost domestic accountability. 
Many EU donors (14) do not yet however make public their conditions, according to the 
replies given to the Monterrey questionnaire. A major reason for this is that conditions- in 
their most easily identifiable sense- are ofte n embedded in financing agreements or policy 
matrices related to general budget support. These agreements are not automatically made public; they might even be a priori confidential. Disclosure of the terms of these agreements would require the consent of the part ner country or partner in question. 
One way of addressing this issue could be to reach a global consent to publicise these 
agreements. A standard clause could be drafte d to be inserted in agreements. This way 
transparency would be the norm and an explicit veto would be needed to keep conditions secret. 
4.2. Frequency of conditionality reviews 
The survey revealed little overall enthusiasm to move to less frequent reviews of conditions, 
with 13 Member States replying that they do not intend to move in this  direction. Most EU 
donors would stick to annual assessments. The main  reason given for this is domestic control, 
linked to annual budget cycles. Di sbursements are made on an annual basis and eligibility 
criteria are verified before disbursement s are made. Only two Member States check 
conditions less often than annually, while  two others intend to follow suit. 
Many respondents also referred to the need to have  the assessments as an essential part of the 
policy dialogue with partner countries, which also usually follows annual cycles. 
It can be argued that th e criteria for disbursements need not themselves be subject to change 
even if the fulfilment of criteria is checked  annually. Conditionality is closely linked to 
predictability: financing obvious ly cannot be predictable if the conditions ar e subject to 
frequent change. 
5. I
NCREASING THE PREDICTABILITY OF AID 
In the EU Guidelines for Accra it was recogni sed that "greater pred ictability in aid flow 
programming, commitment and disbursement is  needed to support the more effective 
absorption and expenditure of aid. This is urgently  needed to facilitate the short-, medium and 
long term planning, budgeting as well as the exec ution of expenditure by  partner countries." 
The EU also called for developing a measurab le target to enhan ce predictability of 
programmable aid flows for a period of a leas t three years in advanc e, based on indicative 
forecasts and on a rolling basis. 
Most EU donors either already make multiannual commitments or intend to do so. For many 
Member States, however, domestic legislation or the need to strictly respect annual budget 
cycles still present constraints. Some Member St ates have either taken or are about to take 
 
EN 17   EN legislative initiatives in order to allow fo r multiannual programming. As for the Commission, 
programmable aid is predictable within the timeframe of the Financial Perspectives and the European Development Fund. 
Several Member States have moved to multiannual programming through multiannual 
cooperation partnerships with developing countries
24. Under these partnerships multiannual 
commitments, or at least indicative informa tion on future financing, are now possible. 
Although Member States differ on whether an d how much these multiannual commitments 
are subject to annual budgetary processes, EU donors can clearly learn from each others' 
experiences here. 
Commitments of fixed duration remain the nor m, both for the Commission and the Member 
States. A number of Member States are, howe ver, making an effort to move to rolling 
forecasts, for example under their forthcoming plans to implement the AAA. 
The "MDG contract" is a new approach being so far implemented under the 10th EDF which 
aims to improve the effectiveness of budget support in accelerating progress towards MDGs 
by increasing its predictability and focusing on results. Perhaps reflecting that the MDG Contract is still early in its implementation, most Member Stat es reported that they were still 
considering whether they wished to co-finance or  apply the principles of  the MDG Contract to 
their own budget support programmes. However,  provided some regional differences are 
accounted for, Member States were supportive of an MDG Contract approach being used 
beyond the ACP countries by the European Commission. The Commi ssion continues to 
explore with Member States options  for co-financing MDG- Contracts. 
The MDG Contract 
Predictability of aid helps a country more effectiv ely plan and manage its development. This is 
particularly important with respect to the social sectors which are char acterised by the high level long 
term recurrent costs. In 2008, recognising the benefi ts of greater aid predic tability, the Commission 
launched a new form of budget support for ACP countr ies - the MDG Contract. It features a six year 
timeframe and a strong focus on results related to the MDGs. The Commission has finalised proposals for 
MDG-Contracts in 7 countries (Burkina Faso, Ghan a, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia) 
and is considering Tanzania. Collectively these account  for about €1.8bn, represen ting 50% of all General 
Budget support. The first MDG Contract was signed with the Government of the Republic of Zambia in 
early March 2009. The UK and Belg ium have already indicated an in terest in co-financing the MDG 
Contracts. 
                                                 
24 In one way or another this is practised at least by FI, FR, IE and UK, but the list is not exclusive 
 
EN 18   EN 6. MORE VALUE FOR MONEY - UNTYING OF AID  
In general, EU donors ar e well beyond the DAC-recommendations on untying25 aid. Seven 
Member States were able to report that their aid was fully untied, while six have untied their 
ODA to all developing countries . Most EU-donors have no pr oblems with implementing the 
DAC recommendations. Five would be ready to  expand the recommendation to other groups 
of developing countries and four to types of  development aid not yet covered by the DAC-
recommendations. There is the political will to  further untie food ai d, but untying technical 
assistance was seen to cause le gal and administrative problems. 
Seven Member States have inst ruments that are voluntarily tied in one way or another. These 
include technical assistance and scholarships as well as concessional loans, mixed grants, debt 
swaps and support to national NGOs . Two Member States are in the progress of untying aid 
further through legislative reforms, either  by making new aid modalities possible or by 
renewing laws on concessional loans. 
Almost all Member States procurement rule s on bilateral ODA guarantee access to other 
Member States. The few exceptions to this rule  include aid tied to de veloping countries in 
specific programmes. Three Member States' na tional legislation do not, however, provide 
access and the impact of EC Directives on this was being studied. 
The level of untying of Commu nity aid is based on the re gulations of the financing 
instruments. A decision was taken on 24 March to grant access to Australia to EC external aid 
contracts in Asia (except, as yet, in Indone sia). This follows a request by Australia and a 
decision by the Australian government to untie th eir aid in this region. Untying will therefore 
take place on a reciprocal basis - as fores een in the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
As concerns the rules on public procurement in the Cotonou Agreement which apply to the 
10th EDF, the European Commissi on will propose to the ACP-count ries the alignment of EDF 
rules to those of the DCI in th e context of the revision of th e Cotonou Agreement. This would 
be a major step forward in untyi ng aid administered by the Commission. 
The EU remains in the forefront in the debate on  untying. It must continue to lead by example 
to get both traditional and emerging donors on bo ard and get the best value out of aid money. 
7. STRENGTHENING COUNTRY LEADERSHIP AND MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
Partner country leadership  has been a clearly stated guiding principle for the EU. It is 
reflected in EU donor policies and at least two Member Stat es have introduced a reporting 
requirement on how this principle of leadersh ip has been taken into account in their 
cooperation. As a major obstacl e, many respondents cited the la ck of capacity of partner 
countries to exert leadership. The development policies of partner coun tries were also often 
regarded as too general to provide guid ance and not focused on achieving the MDG's. 
Many EU-donors referred to regular consultati ve processes and di alogue with partner 
countries, resulting in jointly agreed memoranda , as mechanisms for mutual accountability. 
However, the Paris Declaration Monitoring Su rvey revealed that only 13 out of the 53 
                                                 
25 DCD/DAC(2007)41/REV1 & DCD/DAC/M(2008)5  www.oecd.org/dac/untiedaid 
 
EN 19   EN surveyed partner countries had functioning mutual accountability mechanisms between 
partner governments and donors. 
There were a few concrete cases of mutual account ability reviews, such as in Mozambique, in 
which many EU-donors participated. PEFA-assessm ents, which also include indicators on 
donor-behaviour, were also quoted as examples . Germany has set itself a target of being 
involved in at least five country-level  mutual accountability assessments by 2011. 
The EU needs to continue to promote mutual accountability both at international and country 
level. One important forum for this is the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (see information box). In its joint comments on the new mandate and structure of the Working 
Party, the EU emphasised the need to safeguard the role of the partne r countries, including 
through guaranteeing co-chairmanship positions to partner countries. 
The Working Party on Aid effectiveness 
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), su pported by the OECD/DAC secretariat, is the main 
body for international dialogue on Aid Effectivene ss. The WP-EFF and its sub-bodies are responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of aid effectiveness and also for preparing the High Level Forums. 
The Working Party is currently being restructured and it s mandate is being renewed. The plan is to base 
further work on 4 to 5 thematic cl usters. Germany and South Africa have been leading the work on 
forming the cluster "Transparent an d Responsible Aid", while The Neth erlands and Ghana have had the 
lead on the cluster "Country systems". WP-EFF has included DAC-donors, multilateral donors and 
partner countries. The aim of the restructuring is al so to ensure that the WP-EFF will be a representative 
body for the whole donor community. This will mean st epping up participation by the partner countries 
and including other actors, such as emer ging donors and the civil society. 
8. TRAINING AND STAFF INCENTIVES  
In the Guidelines for Accra, the EU-donors co mmitted themselves to "streamlining processes 
and to encouraging staff to systematically integrate aid effectiveness into their work programmes, structures and reporting mechanisms  in order to promote the importance of aid 
effectiveness as the way of working for development." 
EU donors provide staff guidance and organise training on aid effectiveness, for example 
training on multiannual programming. There are as of yet few concrete examples on staff 
incentives to promote aid effectiveness. Th e good practice guidance on incentives for aid 
effectiveness and self-assessment tool presen ted by the UK and the World Bank to the OECD 
Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results remains the most promising initiative on incentives. The UK, The Netherlands and IFAD are piloting the self assessment tool to 
identify existing barriers to aid effectiveness. 
Donor behaviour is apparently to  a large extent guided by tradit ional, rather input-oriented 
incentives, like those related to disbursement le vels. There is a need to balance that approach 
with more focus on aid effectiveness and develo pment results. Training and staff incentives 
are clearly areas where the EU could benef it from a closer cooperation and "cross-
fertilisation". 
 
EN 20   EN 9. MANAGING FOR DEVELOPMENT RESULTS  
Before Accra, in the Guidelines, the EU ca lled for "a stronger culture and incentives for 
Managing for Development Results (MfDR)". Th e answers in the Monterrey questionnaire on 
this subject centred on training and providing sta ff guidance. In addition, four EU donors have 
recently embarked on strengthening their coun try offices, four more on reviewing their 
administrative processes and on e has gone through an organisational cha nge to increase 
coherence in development cooperation.  
At least five EU-donors26 have renewed the methodology or in dicators used to monitor aid to 
apply more successfully a results-based approac h. In one case this was expected to lead to 
organisational changes. 
The Commission is increasingly putting more focu s on development results in its monitoring 
of projects, programmes and overall country programmes, amongst others through the mid-
term review. 
9.1. Measures to strengthen partner countries' data gathering and publishing 
capacity 
In 2004 the second roundtable on Measuring for Development Results agreed on the 
Marrakech Action Plan to improve the availabilit y and quality of statistics to support the goals 
and measure the results of aid. Amongst other tasks this is done by mainstreaming the 
strategic planning of statisti cal systems and the preparati on of national strategies to 
development of statistics (NSDS) for all low-income countries, increasing financing for statistical capacity building a nd urgent improvement in mon itoring Millennium Development 
Goals. 
According to the responses to the Monterrey questionnaire, th e Paris 21 Consortium, which 
aims to build the systems and capacity of the partner countries to measure their own 
development, remains a main vehicle fo r EU donors to support the development and 
implementation of statistical strategies in de veloping countries. The Pa ris 21 secretariat has 
developed a Partner Report on Su pport to Statistics, which ai ms to increase knowledge on 
what development partners are doing to support statistical development; make available this 
information to improve donor harmonisation and collaboration on statis tics with the aim of 
ensuring greater coherence at country level and minimising duplicatio n of efforts and to 
increase visibility of statistical support an d identify countries or statistical areas where 
additional support is needed. 
One Member State was no longer  financing Paris 21 in vi ew of other donors' active 
involvement and is refocusing on bilateral sup port. A new Statistics for Results Facility, 
housed by the World Bank and working through c ountry partnerships, is supported by the UK 
and the Netherlands. 
One EU donor channels support through a national statistical office, four have projects at 
country level and two integrate statistical capacity building as part of other support 
programmes. For the European Community, Euro stat provides important technical support for 
capacity building. Eurostat's primary focus is on ACP regional organisations, with support at 
national level provided on a case by case basis. Eurostat has prepar ed a Guide to Statistics in 
                                                
 
26 DE, FR, NL, SE, UK 
 
EN 21   EN EC Development Co-operation in conjunction w ith other Commission services in order to 
provide support to delegations and to the EC's ex ternal service generally about using statistics 
and identifying and preparing statistics acti ons. Eurostat is also developing the DISC 
(Database for International Sta tistical Cooperation) which aims to collect and publish "under 
one roof" summarised details on the statis tical projects undertaken by the European 
Commission and ideally also its partners, on the one hand, and, on the other, redistribute and 
publish material on which the statistical capacity of potential partner countries can be measured to judge more clearly the potential ar eas of need and benef its of statistical aid. 
10. C
APACITY DEVELOPMENT  
A few EU donors regard most of their support, excluding debt-r elief, as capacity building. 
Many EU-donors provide this support through joint work, such as through UNDP, while 
some run only bilateral projects. 
The respondents to th e questionnaire recogni sed non-existing or non- prioritised national 
strategies by partner countries  as major obstacles to capacity  building. It was also observed 
that there were not enough incentives on the gr ound to change the behaviour of development 
actors, including the donors an d their consultants and advisors, to focus more on capacity 
building. 
The rules applicable to techni cal cooperation vary from donor to donor much more than the 
rules on programme-based approaches. This work s against effective coordination, which leads 
to a fragmented approach, particularly when  the donors are under time pressure to deliver 
results. 
The EU Guidelines for Accra st ressed that "the donors should assure that th eir support to 
capacity development of partne r countries, including technical cooperation, is needs based 
and/or demand driven and integrated in the national strategies and programs". In July 2008 
the Commission adopted a Backbone Strategy  for Reforming Technical Cooperation and 
Project Implementation Units for External Aid"27 to provide guidance for a more needs-based, 
harmonised and aligned approach. Member States were involved in preparing the strategy and 
a dialogue on guidelines on tech nical cooperation ensued. At least one Member State, 
according to the survey, uses the strategy as gui dance. The strategy and the continued work on 
the follow-up, including training sessions, could provide  a basis for a joint European approach 
on capacity building and technical cooperation. 
                                                 
27 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/delivering-aid/ aid-effectiveness/documents/backbone_strategy_on_tc-
pius_final_en.pdf 
 
EN 22   EN 11. GLOBAL INITIATIVES AND VERTICAL FUNDS  
Global Vertical Programmes (GVP)28 are issue based, multi-count ry programmes allowing a 
group of development partners to address speci fic urgent issues of relevance to a wide 
public29, representing around 6% of total ODA30. While there is no cons olidated recording of 
EU funds spent on GVP – as thes e register as multilateral aid in line with DAC requirements 
– anecdotal information available at EU level shows that some Member States spend up to 
10% of their aid on GVP and th e amounts allocated have steadil y risen over the last years. 
The increasing importance is shown by the fact that in some countries the Global Fund, for 
example, has become one of the four larg est donors, ahead of many bilateral donors. 
Despite the increasing support, the multiplicati on of GVP schemes in the recent past has 
raised criticism. The European Consensu s on Development in 2005 recognised the positive 
aspects of GVP but indicated that  "the added value of global initi atives and funds will have to 
be assessed on a case by case basis". More  recently, the May 2008 GAERC Council 
Conclusions "call on the Commission and the Memb er States to consider financing through 
existing financing mechanisms before creatin g new vertical funds". The Community is 
therefore encouraged to engage in Global Pr ogrammes only when GVPs are seen as an 
adequate response to the issue considered, and with due respect for the overarching 
"subsidiarity" principle and the preference given to geographic approaches which facilitate the 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda . Finally, in the conclusions of November 
2008, the EU "agreed to work on guidelines on gl obal initiatives and vertical funds to assess 
their added value, and to avoid their prolif eration and the increasing transaction costs 
associated."  This work must be taken forward in or der to tackle the fragmentation of the 
global aid architecture while ta king advantage on the emerging good practice in some of the 
vertical funds. 
The Monterrey questionnaire did not produce co mprehensive information on the situation at 
EU level, with only four Member States provi ding analysable information on past trends and 
forecasts. Responding to the European Consensus for Development proposal to " draw up 
criteria for Community participation in global funds and contributions to them " would 
therefore require an active involvement of both the European Commission and Member States 
to gather relevant data and analysis. Figuring out the EU e ngagement in details and its 
perspective would be a first step toward a ha rmonised and coordinate d approach to supporting 
key global public goods in the future. 
                                                 
28 "Global Vertical Programs  are multi-country programs that contain a significant element of earmarked 
funding for specific objectives with thematic, sectoral or sub-sectoral breadth . The global  nature refers to 
the multi-country and multi-regional level of the prog ram. These programs are generally structured as 
“partnerships” involving shared decision-making by several different organizations or partners. The 
vertical nature refers to the significant level of earmarking of the program; funds are earmarked to a specific issue (with thematic, sector , or sub-sector breadth)". Source: "Global Vertical Programs at 
Country Level: What have we learned?", The Global Programs and Partnership Group, Concessional 
Finance and Global Partnerships Vice presidency, WB, July 2008. 
29 Education For All – Fast Track Initiative, Global Fund for AIDS, T uberculosis and Malaria, Cities 
Alliance, Business Link Challenge Fund, Public Privat e Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunisation, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, Special 
Climate Change Fund… 
30 Source WB, May 2008. Estimates varying from 3% of ODA in 2005 (source IDA 2007) to 10% of 
Country Programmable Aid between 2003-2006 (Source OECD-World Bank 2008). 
 
EN 23   EN  
Education FTI as a "good practice example" of global initiatives promoting country leadership 
The Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI ) is a global partnership to help ensure accelerated 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. The FTI is 
founded on the principle of collect ive support for a single country-led  process towards the development 
and implementation of an Education Sector Plan (ESP).  Partner Countries take the lead in designing and 
implementing ESPs through broad- based consultation. The Local Donor Group and Civil Society 
Organisations work together with government to su pport the development, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of the ESP. Donors commit to align and harmonise additional support around the ESP. At 
the same time partner governments are expected to increase domestic expenditure on education. The FTI 
explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to partner countries' policy performance 
and accountability for results. The FTI has recently issued guidelines- FTI Country Level Process Guide- 
to further strengthen the country-led and –based process (available at: http://www.education-fast-
track.org/). 
12. CONCLUSIONS  
The EU has a collective obligation to meet th e aid effectiveness commitments and targets. 
The overall view emerging from the Monterrey qu estionnaire exercise is mixed. On the whole 
the responses to the questionnaire are encourag ing and show a genuine willingness of EU-
donors to move towards further aid effectivenes s. On the other hand, several other monitoring 
exercises have shown that th e international and EU commit ments will not be met without 
stepping up investments in the aid effectiv eness agenda. At present there are too many 
contradictions between aid effectiveness and othe r priorities. Aid effectiveness should not be 
seen as a residual task but as the core agenda. The EU needs to put aid effectiveness on top of 
its priority list and ensure that all its institut ions, political processes, and policies, instruments 
and procedures support aid effectiveness. Work  is also needed on the "soft side" of the 
equation to ascertain that the mind sets and beha viour of staff working in headquarters and in 
the field offices are oriented  towards aid effectiveness. To address these issues the 
Commission adopted an operationa l action plan in January 2009 including strategies for use 
of country systems, technical  cooperation and implementatio n arrangements, division of 
labour and outreach to staff in  headquarters and delegations. 
Some EU donors are more advanced on aid effect iveness than others. Experience and capacity 
seem to be some of the contributing factor s, but each donor has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Some small volume donors for ex ample coordinate all their donor missions, 
simply because they never in itiate missions alone. On th e other hand a high volume donor 
acknowledged that its system of cooperation is complex and results in significant internal 
transaction costs. Whilst certain EU donors w ill more likely face bigger challenges than 
others, it is clear that all EU  donors have considerable work to do to achieve the agreed 
international and EU commitments on aid effectiveness. 
Experience or capacity cannot replace the will to act. Neither are lack of experience or 
capacity excuses to renege on our commitments. Th ere is an urgent need  to move forward. In 
order to learn, we have to do. Determination is  the prerequisite for implementing what is 
already feasible and for addre ssing impediments to process. 
Some EU donors have sophisticat ed policies and good practices on aid effectiveness, gathered 
through years of experience. Not all need to go through the same learning cycle, but all need 
to exchange information and learn from each othe r: take advantage of the successes and avoid 
the mistakes and so leap frog ahead in making EU aid more effective. More joint European 
 
EN 24   EN efforts are needed to make the fulfilling of individual commitments easier. The responses to 
the questionnaire show several cases where EU donors could learn from each other, such as 
aligning and harmonising technical assistance,  promoting programme based approaches and 
use of country systems or moving to multiannua l programming and commitments to increase 
predictability. 
The issues touched upon in  this report merit further discu ssion with EU Member States. There 
is a growing need to furthe r identify specific issues whic h would merit being worked upon 
together, to formulate joint approaches and to  promote honest, self-critical donor action plans 
to implement the aid effectiveness commitments. 
There is forward momentum but more speed is needed. The right issues  are being addressed, 
but more effort is needed, with just one year left to reach the targets before the upcoming 
evaluation cycle of the Paris D eclaration in 2010 and after that the moment of truth at the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. 
 
EN 25   EN Annex I: Member State Priority Countries (for four or more Member States) 31 
Mozambique BE  DK IE  FI DE  IT    NL PT   ES UK SE FR    12 
Vietnam BE CZ DK IE  FI DE    LU HU NL    ES UK  FR    12 
Palestine T BE      DE GR IT   HU NL    ES   FR  CY PL 10 
Moldova  CZ   EE   GR  LV  HU NL  RO    SE  LT  PL 10 
Afghanistan  CZ   EE  DE GR     NL    ES UK SE  LT  PL 10 
Ethiopia    IE  FI DE GR    HU NL    ES UK SE FR    10 
Tanzania BE  DK IE  FI DE      NL     UK SE FR   PL 10 
Mali BE  DK    DE    LU  NL    ES  SE FR  CY  9 
Zambia  CZ DK IE  FI DE      NL     UK SE     8 
Uganda BE  DK IE   DE      NL     UK SE FR    8 
Yemen  CZ     DE  IT   HU NL     UK  FR  CY  8 
Ukraine     EE  DE GR  LV  HU       SE  LT  PL 8 
Angola  CZ     DE  IT     PT   ES   FR   PL 7 
Georgia     EE   GR  LV   NL      SE  LT  PL 7 
DRC BE      DE      NL    ES UK SE FR    7 
Senegal BE      DE    LU  NL    ES   FR    6 
Bangladesh   DK    DE      NL    ES UK SE     6 
Bolivia BE  DK    DE      NL    ES  SE     6 
Burkina Faso   DK    DE    LU  NL      SE FR    6 
Cambodia       DE     HU     ES UK SE FR    6 
Egypt   DK    DE GR IT    NL         CY  6 
Nicaragua   DK   FI DE    LU  NL    ES       6 
Kenya   DK   FI DE      NL     UK SE FR    6 
Sudan       DE      NL    ES UK  FR    5 
Rwanda BE      DE      NL     UK  FR    5 
Iraq  CZ      GR         ES  SE  LT   5 
Bosnia-H  CZ     DE     HU NL      SE     5 
Benin BE  DK    DE      NL       FR    5 
Burundi BE      DE      NL      SE FR    5 
Cap Vert           LU  NL PT   ES   FR    5 
Ghana   DK    DE      NL     UK  FR    5 
Kosovo       DE  IT    NL      SE     5 
Niger BE      DE    LU      ES   FR    5 
Serbia  CZ     DE     HU   RO    SE     5 
Lebanon        GR IT        ES   FR  CY  5 
Morocco BE      DE  IT        ES   FR    5 
Algeria BE        IT        ES   FR    4 
Colombia       DE      NL    ES  SE     4 
FYROM            HU NL   SI   SE     4 
Guatemala       DE      NL    ES  SE     4 
Laos       DE    LU HU        FR    4 
Mauritania       DE  IT        ES   FR    4 
Mongolia  CZ     DE     HU NL           4 
Nepal   DK   FI DE           UK      4 
South-Africa BE      DE      NL       FR    4 
Belarus          LV         SE  LT  PL 4 
Ecuador BE      DE  IT        ES       4 
 
                                                 
31 Based on the responses by Member States to the Monterrey Questionnaire: « How many countries would 
you classify as priority countries (of countries wh ere you provided bilateral government-to-government 
ODA in 2007)? Cyprus, Poland, Malta and Slovakia reported however not to have a provided government 
to government ODA. For Ireland an d Poland situation as in 2008.