17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/67
OpinionontheMediterranean policyoftheEuropeanCommunity
(92/C40/19)
On23April1991theEconomicandSocialCommittee,actingunderthefourthparagraph
ofArticle20ofitsRulesofProcedure,decidedtodrawupanOpinionontheMediterranean
policyoftheEuropeanCommunity .
TheSectionforExternalRelations,TradeandDevelopmentPolicy,whichwasresponsible
forpreparingtheCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon22October1991.
TheRapporteurwasMrAmato.
Atits291stplenarysession(meetingof27November1991),theEconomicandSocial
CommitteeadoptedthefollowingOpinionbyamajorityvoteinfavourand13votesagainst,
with14abstentions .
1.ESCOpinionsandsubsequentdevelopments in
Mediterranean policy
1.1.On26April1990theCommitteeadoptedan
AdditionalOpinionontheMediterranean policyofthe
EuropeanCommunity I1).TheOpinionsupplemented
theOwn-initiativeOpinionissuedon12July1989(2)
[accompaniedbyaReportdrawnupbytheSectionfor
ExternalRelations,TradeandDevelopmentPolicy(3)].
1.1.1.TheAdditionalOpinionemphasizedtheneed
fortheEuropeanCommunitytoformulateanewMedi­
terraneanpolicy,andassessedtheCommission'sCom­
municationof23November1989entitled'Redirecting
theCommunity'sMediterranean Policy'(4).TheCom­
mitteewasparticularlypleasedthattheCommission
hadrecognizedtheneedforanewMediterranean pol­
icy.WhiletheCommitteewasatpainstohighlight
variouspointsofagreementwithitsownproposals,it
alsostressedtheinadequacyofsomeoftheCommission
proposals.Aboveall,itcritizedtheabsenceofanoverall
strategy.TheOpinionalsomadespecificrecommen­
dationsconcerningindividualpoints.
1.2.DuringthedebateontheAdditionalOpinionat
theplenarysessionof26April1990,Commissioner
Matutesbroadlyendorsedtheguidelinesandcomments
containedintheOpinion[withdifferencesofemphasis
onjustthreepoints:aglobalconventionwiththeMedit­
erraneannations,aregionalfinancialprotocolwiththe
ArabMaghrebUnion(AMU),andtheMediterranean
nations'externaldebt].MrMatutesalsostatedthatthe
AdditionalOpinionwouldbeextremelyusefulwhen
theCommission wasdraftingproposalsonthe
implementation oftherevampedMediterranean policy.
1.2.1.TheCommissionsubsequentlyincorporated
thedefinitiveproposalsinafurtherCommunicationonRedirectingtheCommunity'sMediterranean Policy
(1992-1996),whichitforwardedtotheCouncilon
1June1990(5).
1.3.AfterdiscussingthelatterCommunication ,the
Counciltookapackagedecisiononthevariousaspects
oftherenewedMediterranean policyatitsmeetingof
18-19December1990.TheCouncil:
—fixedthefinancialresourcesfortherenewedMedit­
erraneanpolicyfortheperiod1992-1996 :ECU4405
million,ofwhich2375forthefourthfinancial
protocolswiththeMaghrebandMashreqcountries
andIsrael(Malta,Cyprus,YugoslaviaandTurkey
beingtreatedseparately)and2030forhorizontal
financialcooperation,
—adoptedthedirectivesfornegotiationsontheabove
protocols,
—adoptedaResolutiononhorizontalfinancialcoop­
erationwiththeMediterranean countries,and
guidelinesfortheCommissiontodraftthecorre­
spondingRegulation,
—adoptedaCouncilandCommissionResolutionon
tradewiththeMediterranean countries,
—issuedtwoDeclarations ,onthepromotionof
democracyandonhazardouswaste.
1.4.Inimplementation oftheoverallCouncil
Decision,theCommission :
—openednegotiationswiththeMaghrebandMash­
reqcountriesandwithIsraelontherespectivefinan­
cialprotocols,
—tabledadraftCouncilRegulation(6)on19February
1991onfinancialcooperationinrespectofallthe
Mediterranean non-membercountries,
(1)OJNoC168,10.7.1990,p.22.
(2)OJNoC221,28.8.1989,p.16.
(3)Doc.ESC386/89final. (5)Doc.SEC(90)812final.
(4)Doc.SEC(89)1961. (6)Doc.COM(91)48final.

NoC40/68 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
etc.).Aparticularlyimportantstepinthisdirection,as
suggestedbytheCommittee,wouldhavebeentopro­
posethedrawingupoffinancialprotocolsnotwiththe
individualMaghrebcountries,butonacollectivebasis
withtheArabMaghrebUnion,whileprovidingfor
nationalguidelineprogrammes .Suchastepwould,
ofcourse,requirenormalization ofECrelationswith
Libya,forwhichthetimedoesnotyetseemripe.
However,themostsignificantprogressactuallymade
bytheCommissiontowardsanoverallapproachisits
proposalforfinancialcooperationextendingtoallthe
MNC,asdiscussedbelow.—on3May1991submittedRecommendations for
CouncilDecisions(})ontheconclusionofalready
initialledprotocols,viz.protocolsonfinancialand
technicalcooperationwithEgypt,Algeria,Morocco
andTunisia,andaprotocolonfinancialcooper­
ationwithIsrael,
—on22May1991submittedaCommunication (2)to
theCouncilontheimplementation ofmeasuresin
respectoftradewithintheframeworkofthe
renewedMediterranean policy,accompaniedbya
draftCouncilRegulationamendingtheimport
arrangementsforcertainagriculturalproductsfrom
theMediterranean countries(excludingTurkey).
3.1.3.TheCommunication 'scentralproposalof
establishingcontinuousdialoguebetweentheCom­
munityandtheMNCisanotherpointofmajorpolitical
importance .Discussionwouldbeall-embracing :econ­
omicmatters(general,monetary,financial,agricultural
andindustrial,transport),socialissues(migration,
demographics ,etc.)andculturalaffairs,andpolitical
questionsofcommoninterest.Theproposalforanew
departureforcooperation,informationexchangewith
theMNC,isequallyimportant.TheCommitteewel­
comessuchproposalswhichreflecttheaimsandobjec­
tivesoftheMediterranean Forumithasadvocated,
whichmightconstitutetheorganizational focusforthe
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.2.ObjectivesofthepresentOpinion
2.1.Onthebasisoftheabovedevelopments inCom­
munityMediterranean policy,thepresentOpinion
seeks:
—togaugethefollow-uptotheCommittee'spro­
posals,bothintheCommissionCommunication
andintheCouncilDecisions (alsostressingthe
differencebetweenthetwotexts),
—toundertakeageneralassessmentofthethrustof
thefinancialprotocols,
—toassesstheproposalsforhorizontalfinancialcoop­
erationandtrade,
—tomakeconcreterecommendations onthe
implementation oftherevampedMediterranean
policy.
3.1.4.TheCommission'scommitmenttoaquanti­
tativeleapforwardinfundingofMediterranean policy
isalsotobewelcomed,inspiteoftheconstraints
imposedbytheCommunitybudget.Nevertheless ,the
proposed130%increaseinEECbudgetappropriations ,
comparedwithpreviousprotocols,isnotenoughto
constitutethecriticalmassrequiredtomakeareal
impactonthepaceofMNCdevelopment :indeed,
asCommissioner Matuteshimselfpointsoutinthe
FinancialScheduleaccompanyingtheCommunication ,
theseamountsarelessthanthosesetasideforother
areasofcooperation .ThefundsproposedbytheCom­
missionfortheeightSouthernandEasternMediter­
raneanMNC(SEMexceptforMalta,Cyprus,Yugosla­
viaandTurkey)amounttoECU2,4perinhabitantper
annum,asagainstECU4,7fortheAfrican,Caribbean
andPacificStates(ACP)andECU6,8fortheCentral
andEasternEuropeannations.TheEuropeanInvest­
mentBank(EIB)fundsrequestedforthefinancialproto­
cols(40%higherthanforthepreviousprotocolsfor
theeightSEMcountries)arealsoinadequate.3.Commission Communication 'Redirectingthe
Community'sMediterranean Policy'
3.1.Generalassessment
3.1.1.Whileretainingthesamebasicstructureasthe
earlierCommunication ,thenewCommissionproposal
hasundergoneanumberofmajorimprovements ,partly
reflectingcommentsandproposalsmadebytheCom­
mittee.
3.1.2.Definiteprogresshasbeenmaderegardingthe
overallapproachadvocatedbytheCommittee.While
stillbelievingtheestablishment ofacomprehensive
agreementbetweentheCommunityandalltheMediter­
raneannon-membercountries(MNC)tobepremature,
theCommissiondoesnotopposetheidea:indeed,it
considersthat'itdeservesfurtherconsideration inthe
lightoffuturepoliticalandeconomiceventsinthe
CommunityanditspartnersintheMediterranean '.It
isdisappointingthattheCommissionfails,inthewake
ofthisdeclaration,topursuetheintermediatemeasures
pendinganoverallagreementassuggestedbytheCom­
mittee(Mediterranean CooperationCouncil,Forum,
(1)Doc.SEC(91)814final.
(2)Doc.COM(91)179final.3.1.4.1.TheCommission itselfadmitsthatCom­
munityfinancialsupportaccountedforonly3%of
totalnetofficialaidtotheMNCbetween1979and

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunitiesNoC40/69
1987,butitfailstodrawtheappropriateconclusions .
Aboveall,itdoesnotsharetheaimofincreasingthe
totalamountofCommunity (ECplusMemberStates)
aidtotheMNC[theCommitteerecommendedthat
thisshouldbeincreasedfromthecurrentfigureof
0,14%to0,25%ofECGrossDomesticProduct
(GDP)l.arrangements),atCommunitylevel(possiblesupport
forreforms)andatmultilaterallevel.Suchconsul­
tations,whichwouldbecomplementary toandpre­
cedethemeetingsoftheParisandLondonClubs,
couldberequestedeitherbytheCommissionorby
aMemberState'.Suchmachinery,eventhoughonly
notembodyingalltherelevantCommitteeproposals,
wouldundoubtedlyrepresentsubstantialprogressin
dealingwithMNCdebt.
3.1.4.2.Lastly,itshouldbenotedthattheCom­
missiondoesnotruleouttheideaofaspecifically
Mediterranean financialinstitutiontoensurean
adequateflowoffinancetotheMNC,asadvocatedby
theCommittee,butregardsitasworthyoffurther
study.3.2.1.1.OnthepoliticalapproachtoMNCdebt,
however,theCommissionpersuestheconventionalline
laiddownbytheinternationalfinancialbodies—for
whichithasbeenroundlycriticizedbytheCom­
mittee—failingtotakeaccountofthelatestexperiences
andthinking[theBradyPlan,thenewguidelinesofthe
InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)of23May1989,
asappliedinMexico,theCraxiUNreport,etc.]In
particular,theCommissionhasnotcorrectedits
approachintwomajorrespects,asrequestedbythe
Committee :
—theurgentneedtoreduceindebtednessapplies
equallytocountrieswhichhavehonouredtheir
debtswithoutrescheduling ,whenthecostofdebt
servicingreachesintolerablelevels(e.g.Algeria),3.1.5.However,despitetheseimprovements ,this
Communication ,likethefirst,showsnosignofthe
changeintheunderlyingstrategyofMediterranean
policywhichtheCommitteehasbeenadvocatingfora
numberofyears.WenotewithregretthattheCom­
missionhasnotyettakenonboardthefourkey
elementsforastrategicrevisionasproposedbythe
Committee :
—anewslanttoCommunityMediterranean policyas
aEuro-Mediterranean policyofco-development ,
aimingatcomplementarity asameanstointe­
gration,
—reviewoftheglobalapproach,includingconsider­
ationofproblemsintheCommunity'sMediter­
raneanregionsandtheconsequentneedtoreview
Communitypolicies,
—choiceofdevelopmentagreementsasthebasic
instrumentforco-development ,throughwhichthe
variouscooperationactivitiesshouldbechannelled,
—adoptionbytheCommunityofacoordinatingrole
forbothbilateralandmultilateralMediterranean
cooperationpoliciesimplemented byMember
States.—reductionsshouldcovernotonlydebtservicingbut
alsocapital.
3.2.2.Inthesphereofstructuraladjustmenttoo,
adistinctionneedstobemadebetweenspecific
proposalsandthegeneralpoliticalapproachcovering
them.TheCommissionhas,inlinewithESCcriticism,
madeanumberofcorrectionstotheseproposals.
Mentionisnolongermade,indiscussionofCom­
munityaidtoback-upprogrammesforeconomic
structuralreformcarriedoutbytheMNC,of
measurestocurbtheirsocialimpact;theCommittee's
proposaltoconcentrateonjobcreationprogrammes
hasbeenaccepted.3.2.Foreigndebtandstructuraladjustment
3.2.1.TheCommunication marksamajorstep
forwardonCommunityactionontheMNCforeign
debt,adoptingtheCommittee'sproposalthatthe
CommunitycoordinateMemberStateaction.The
Commissiondoesnotmentioncoordination ,buttalks
of'consultations','intheappropriateCommunity
framework',tobeheldintheeventofMNCdebt
crises.Theseconsultationsshouldtakeplacetodiscuss
'measureswhichcouldbetakenatnationallevel
(maintainingorresumingcommercialbanklending,
reducingthedebtservicingburden,rescheduling3.2.3.Incontrast,theCommission'sgeneralpolitical
approachtothestructuralreformprogrammesignores
thesubstantialcriticismsmadebytheCommittee,i.e.
thattheCommunitymustnotsimplyimplementcomp­
lementarymeasurestooffsetthedamagecausedby
theIMF'sstructuralreformprogrammeswithoutany
genuinediscussionofthethinkingbehindthem,onthe
basisofresultswhichtheCommittee,amongothers,
hasclearlyshowntobenegative.TheCommission

NoC40/70 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
alreadybemadeinvolvingincreasesinquotasorceil­
ings,extendedtimeschedulesandtheinclusionofnew
products.takesnonoteoftheargumentsputforwardinthis
respectbytheAdditionalOpinionofApril1990orthe
alternativeproposalsitcontained;itrepeatsthatthe
MemberStatesmustcontinuetosupporttheactionof
theinternational financialinstitutionsinthisarea.This
stancenotonlyremainsunacceptabletotheCommittee,
butalsodiffersfromthefarmorereasonedposition
adoptedbytheCommission vis-a-vistheBretton
Woodsinstitutionsinrespectofstructuralreformpro­
grammesintheACPStates.3.3.2.1.Onceagain,theCommissionfailstotake
accountoftheCommittee'scriticismoftheimplicit
meaningof'continuanceoftraditionalexportflows',
whichfailstomeettherequirementsoftheMNCand
preservesastateofcompetitionwithECMediterranean
regions.Neitherdoesitmentiontheonlyviablesolution
totheproblem,thatofincorporatingtradepolicyinto
jointdevelopmentpolicy,asadvocatedforsometime
bytheCommittee .
3.3.Tradecooperation
3.3.3.TheCommitteeendorsestheCommission's
commentthat'thetimehascometoincludetextilesin
thefreeaccessarrangementsprovidedforunderthe
cooperationorassociationagreementsconcludedwith
theMNCinthe1970sand1980s'.Itshouldbenoted,
however,thatthisiscontingentonapositiveoutcome
totheUruguayRoundtextilenegotiations :theCom­
missionhasignoredtheCommittee'sproposalfora
Community/MNCagreementpending,orinthe
absenceofaGATTsolution.Ontheotherhand,the
Committeeendorsestheproposaltointroducerules
grantingcumulativeoriginformanufactured goods
(particularlytextiles)togroupsofMNC,soastofoster
synergyandindustrialcomplementarity betweenthem.3.3.1.ItisnotedthattheCommission hasatleast
partlyadoptedtwoCommitteesuggestionsconcerning
generalmeasurestoboostthevolumeofMNCexports:
firstly,toworktowardsmarketaccess—includingthe
EuropeanFreeTradeAssociation (EFTA)andother
Europeancountries—forMNCgoods(althoughwhat
theCommunityshouldactuallydoisnotspeltout:the
Committeehadsuggestedexperimenting withtripartite
EC-MNC-Eastern /CentralEuropeagreements);sec­
ondlytoreducethepressingMNCneedtoearnforeign
currencyfromexports,bysettingupfreetradeareas
betweentheMNC.
3.4.FinancialcooperationconcerningalltheMNC3.3.1.1.TheCommunication doesnot,however,
repeattheCommission'sprevioussuggestionconcern­
ingtechnicalsupportfortheimprovementofMNC
exportcapacity,whichwaswelcomedbytheCom­
mittee.TheCommitteehadproposedsettingupan
agency,managedbytheCommunityandtheMNC,to
promotetradeinallMediterranean products(including
thosefromECMediterranean regions).3.4.1.TheCommitteehasalreadyvoiceditssupport
forastrengtheningofhorizontalcooperationinorder
toadvancetheglobalapproachofCommunitypolicy.
TheCommunication proposesthatsuchcooperation
shouldfocusonanumberofpriorityareas:support
forregionalcooperation,developmentofthebusiness
sectorandpromotionofprivateEuropeaninvestment,
theenvironment ,developmentofhumanresourcesand
EIBinvolvement .
3.4.1.1.Regionalcooperationandtheenvironment
arediscussedbelow,inconnectionwiththeproposed
implementingregulation.3.3.2.TheCommunication merelyrepeatsitscom­
mitmenttocontinuingtraditionalexportflows,inline
withthestagessetoutinthe1987/1988additional
protocolsonaccesstotheECmarketforMNCagricul­
turalproduce.Detailedassessmentofthesituationis
putoffuntil1994,withaviewtonewproposals.The
Commissiondoeshoweveracceptthatattherequest
ofcertainMediterranean partners,somechangescould3.4.2.Inordertodevelopthebusinesssectorand
promoteprivateEuropeaninvestment,theCommission

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/71
proposesincreasing'Cheyssonfacility'budgetallo­
cations,extendingitsscopetoupstreaminvestment
activities(consultancy ,research,contactingpartners,
etc.).TheCommitteehasalreadyendorsedthesepro­
posals:itthereforewelcomestheproposaltousethis
budgetitemtoencourageimmigrantstosetupbusiness­
esintheircountriesoforigin,therebytakingoveran
ideaputforwardinthepastbytheCommittee (1).energy,transport,telecommunications ,tourism.These
sectorsareindeedcoveredbytheproposalonregional
cooperation,butitisrestrictedtosupport,complemen­
taryandEIBoperations;thesearenotaccordedtheir
properimportance,unliketheenvironment ,for
instance.Itshouldalsobepointedoutthatinthetwo
Annexesconcerningenergyandscience/technology,the
Commissionrepeatsitsproposal—alreadyapproved
bytheCommittee—toextendanumberofrelevant
CommunityprogrammestotheMNC,butnottouse
financialresourcesproposedforthenewMediterranean
policy.
3.4.6.Secondly,socialpolicy—andinparticular,the
labourmarket,unemployment andsocialcon­
ditions—shouldbeacentralconcernofhorizontal
cooperation .Migrationpolicyshouldhavereceivedfar
greatattentionthanitdoesinthesectiononhuman
resources .3.4.3.Theproposalstofinancehorizontalcooper­
ationinthedevelopmentofhumanresourcesareof
majorsignificance .Indeed,Communityefforttothis
end,extendingbeyondthefinancialprotocols,seem
tobeadecisivefactorinsuccessfullybacking—with
trainingprogrammes ,know-howtransfer,etc.—the
economicandstructuralreformswhichtheMNCmust
carryout.Proposalsforcooperationonculturaldevel­
opmentareofsimilarimportance,particularlywith
regardtoinformation .TheCommitteehadalready
referredtoallthesepointsinearlierOpinions,and
thereforelendsthemitsfullsupport;itdoeslikewise
forthenew,interestingproposalsonhorizontalcooper­
ationforaudiovisualpolicy.3.4.7.Lastly,horizontalcooperationshouldfinance
jointactionwiththeMNCtodiscussanddefinegeneral
guidelinesforreshapingproductioninallsectors,
throughouttheMediterranean ,soastoprovidesolid
basesforframeworksectoralagreementsbetweenthe
CommunityandtheMNC.
3.4.3.1.TheCommitteewelcomesthespecificpro­
posalsoncooperationinthefieldofdemographicpol­
icy,butrepeatsthatthiscanonlybefullyvalidand
effectiveaspartofajointdevelopmentpolicy.3.5.Guidelinesforrenewingthefinancialprotocols
3.5.1.TheCommitteesupportsthegeneralapproach
ofdistinguishing between'programmable 'portions
(definedunderthetermsofeachbilateralprotocol),
intendedforconventionalformsofcooperation,and
'non-programmable 'portions(definedforallMNC),
reservedforsupportforeconomicreform.
3.5.2.Theproposalontheprogrammable bilateral
financialprotocolsandsupportforeconomicreformin
theSEMwillbediscussedingreaterdetaillater,
togetherwiththeCouncilDirectivesof19-20December
1990andtheprotocolsalreadyinitialled.3.4.4.TheCommitteeagreeswiththeareasear­
markedforEIBinvolvement (environment ,energy,
transport,telecommunications andtheaudiovisualsec­
tor),butstressestheneed—whichdoesnotapplyto
Mediterranean policyalone—toreviewinstitutional
proceduresandinstitutionalcompetencesinselecting
projectstobefinanced,reinforcingcoordination
betweentheCommissionandtheEIB.
3.4.5.Whilegenerallysupportingtheproposalsfor
horizontalfinancialcooperation ,wefeelthatattention
needstobedrawntotheinsufficientnumberofareas
forusingEECbudgetfunds.TheCommitteeisofthe
viewthatfinancialcooperationshouldprimarilybe
directedtoothersectorswherethereisaclearneedfor
aglobalapproach:researchanddevelopment(R&D),4.ThedecisionsoftheEuropeanCouncilof
18-19December1990
4.1.Generalassessment
4.1.1.ThenewMediterranean policy,enshrinedin
theDecember1990CouncilDecisions,fallssignificantly
shortoftheCommission'sproposals:ashasalready
beenseen,thesewerethemselvesdeemedinsufficient,
despitesomeimportantareasofprogress. (!)OJNoC221,28.8.1989,p.16,paragraph9.2.

NoC40/72 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
CommissionCommunication asawhole;noneofthe
moreimportantproposalsareechoedinitsdecisions,
whilethosewhichhavebeenacceptedhavebeencon­
siderablydowngraded .4.1.2.Thefirstshortcomingliesintheleveloffund­
ing.TheoverallamountsetbytheCouncilissome
35%lessthantheCommissionproposal(ECU4405
asopposedtoECU6745million).Thecutbackhits
bothfinancefromtheCommunitybudget,fallingfrom
ECU1845toECU1305million(29%less)andEIB
loans,cutfromECU6745toECU4405million(37%
lessf1).
4.1.5.Thefailuretoheedtheproposaltoestablish
apermanenteconomic,socialandculturaldialogue
(partnership,informationexchange,etc.)istobe
deplored.ThisisapointtowhichtheCommittee
attachesparticularimportance (see3.1.3above).Cer­
taininitiativesofthiskindcouldbeachievedunder
horizontalfinancialcooperation,butthereisnospecific
referenceframework :theCouncil'sunderratingofthe
centralpoliticalimportanceofthisisquiteunaccept­
able.4.1.3.WithintheCouncil,theviewsofthosegovern­
mentswhohavealwaysseenCommunityMediterrane­
anpolicyintermsofopeningupCommunitymarkets
toMNCgoodsprevailed,coupledwithareluctanceto
assumeanyimportantbudgetcommitmentforcooper­
ation.Theopposingposition,heldbyanumberof
governmentswhowishtopreserveasubstantialdegree
ofprotectionism andadvocateapurelyfinancialsol­
ution,failedtomakeanimpact.Untilthesetwopos­
itionsaresupersededbynewthinkingwhichcombines
tradepolicywitheconomicandfinancialpolicy,as
partofajointdevelopmentpolicy—ofmutual,Euro-
Mediterranean interest—theonlycommongroundwill
remainthepurelynegativepositionofnotstrengthening
CommunityMediterranean policy,leavingthebulkof
cooperationworkintheMediterranean Basintothe
MemberStates.4.1.6.AnotherCommissionproposalwhich,while
modest,wasofconsiderablepoliticalsignificance—and
totallyignoredbytheCouncil—concernedtheCom­
munity'sroleinlighteningtheMNCexternaldebt
burden.Thismatterislargelyignored,apartfroma
referencetoitasconstitutinganincentiveandacon­
ditionforsupportforeconomicreform(structural
adjustment).Atatimewheninitiatives,somefrom
MemberStates,toreducetheexternaldebtsofcertain
MNCaremultiplying,theCouncil'sconductcanonly
bedescribedaslackinginpoliticalsensitivityandsignal­
linganintentiontominimizetheCommunity'srole.
4.1.4.ThisCouncil'sminimalistapproachisalso
reflectedintermsofcontent.Ithasnotendorsedthe4.1.7.OnlytwooftheCommission'sinnovativepro­
posalshavebeenacceptedbytheCouncil:horizontal
cooperationandsupportforeconomicreforminthe
MNC—althoughtheyhavebeenwatereddown.
4.2.TheCouncildecisionontheopeningofnego­
tiationsforthenewprotocols(1)Theoverallamountforthefinancialprotocolsis16%downon
theCommissionproposals(ECU2375insteadofECU2825
million),brokendownasfollows:
—aslightreduction(6%)inappropriations underthebilat­
eralfinancialprotocols,fromECU825toECU775million,
—anethalvingofoverallfinanceforsupportforeconomic
reform(structuraladjustment):ECU600toECU300
million,althoughthenegotiatingdirectivesfortheproto­
colsprovidethatrecipientcountriesforthistypeofaction
mayuseamaximumof10%ofprotocolfundstothisend,
—areductionofECU100million(7%)inEIBloans.
TheCouncilcutsintheareaofhorizontalfinancialcooperation
arefarmoreswinging.Theoverallreductionis48%
(ECU3920toECU2030million);asfollows:
—asavagecut(45%)inappropriations ,fallingfromECU420
(320fortheenvironmentandotherhorizontaloperations
plus100forsupportforCommunityinvestment )to
ECU230million,
—avirtualhalving(49%)ofEIBnon-protocolloans,falling
fromECU3500toECU1800million;althoughprovision
ismadeforanextraappropriationofECU200million,if
proposedbytheCouncil.4.2.1.ThisCouncilDecisionauthorizedtheCom­
missiontoopennegotiationswithIsrael,theMaghreb
(Algeria,MoroccoandTunisia)andMashreq
countries (Egypt,Jordan,LebanonandSyria),forthe
newfinancialandtechnicalcooperationprotocols,on
thebasisofthenegotiatingdirectivesappendedto
theDecision.ThesedirectivesreflecttheCommission
proposaltouseanoverallappropriation (forthe
MaghrebandMashreqonly)totopupallocations
undereachofthebilateralprotocols,forsupport
foreconomicreform(structuraladjustement).The
importanceofthedirectivesgoesbeyondthedrafting
oftheprotocoltexts,sincethewholeoperationof

NoC40/7317.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities
theprotocolsistobebasedonthem,beginningwith
theindicativeprogrammes .
4.2.2.Directivesforthebilateralproto­
cols4.2.2.4.Committeecriticismisaimed,inthefirst
instance,atthewaytheprotocolsaretobeimplemented,
basedontheproject-by-project fundingmodelusedby
theWorldBank.Thenegativeimpactofthismethodon
developmenthasbeenamplyillustrated.Moreover,this
approachhasbeendroppedbytheCommunityincon­
nectionwithstructuralfundaid:herefundingforindi­
vidualprojectshasbeenreplacedbypreferablyinte­
grateddevelopmentprogrammes .Ithasbeenacknowl­
edgedthatwhilethistypeofverticalinterventionmay
havesomeimpactinadvanced,dynamiceconomies,itis
totallyineffectiveinbackward,unstructuredeconomies
likethoseinthemoredisadvantaged regions.Ifthisholds
trueforSicilyofAndalusia,thenitappliesallthemore
tothenon-Community countriesoftheMediterranean
Basin.4.2.2.1.HeretheCouncilhasacceptedtheCom­
mission'sproposalswithminoramendments .Ithasto
besaid,however,thattheseproposalsdidnotdisplay
anygreatdegreeofinnovationcomparedwiththeearlier
protocols.TheonlysignificantnoveltyintheCom­
missionproposalwastheinclusionoftheenvironment
amongsectoralpriorities.TheCouncilacceptedthispro­
posal,whichisfullyendorsedbytheCommittee .The
latterhascoupledsupport(atthepartnercountries'
request)fordemographicprogrammestotheenviron­
ment,sincedemographicgrowthhasanadverseimpact
onit.TheCouncilhasthuslentlegitimacy—although
questionablebecauseofitspartiality—toactioninthis
area.Moreover,ithasplacedsupportfordemographic
policieswithintheframeworkofstrictlybilateralcoop­
eration,whereastheCommissionhad,moreappropri­
ately,includeditunderhorizonalcooperation .4.2.2.5.Asecondcriticismconcernstheabsenceof
anysocially-orientated conditions (socialclauses).The
protocolsoughttocontainsafeguardmeasuresdesigned
topreventtheinvestmentgeneratedfromcreatingwork­
ingconditionstantamounttosocialdumpinginrelation
toCommunityemployment ,orfromplacingobstacles
inthepathofimprovedMNCsocialconditions .Tothis
end,theCommitteehadsuggesteddrawingupjoint
arrangementstoguaranteeandmonitortheimplemen­
tationofconventionsoftheInternationalLabourOrgan­
ization(ILO)onworkers'rightsintheMNC.4.2.2.2.Lastly,theCommitteewouldrepeatitsgen­
eralcriticismofthebilateralprotocolsystemwhich,by
establishingapre-setfinancialallocationforeachMNC,
infactprovokespointlessanddamagingcompetition
betweenthem,quiteapartfromthesystem'srigidity—
delayingapplicationoffundswithredtape—whencom­
paredwithasysteminwhichpercountrydistributionis
notdeterminedinadvance.TheCommitteenoteswith
satisfactionthattheCourtofAuditorshasreachedthe
sameconclusioninitsreportof18July1991onfinancial
andtechnicalcooperationwiththeMNC(1).TheCom­
mitteedoesnot,however,believe—asmightbeargued
onthebasisoftheCourt'sreport—thatabolishingpre­
setamountsforeachcountryshouldbeaccompaniedby
abolitionofalladvanceplanningofoperations .Experi­
encewiththeLomeConventionshowsthatthetwoare
notmutuallyincompatible .4.2.2.6.Thirdly,theCommitteenoteswithregretthat
theparticipationofeconomicandsocialinterestgroups
inimplementingtheprotocolshasonceagainbeendisre­
garded.Suchparticipationisnecessarynotonlytopro­
motethedevelopmentofdemocracyintheMNC:as
pointedoutinearlierOpinions,thisconstitutesaprecon­
ditionforthesuccessofdevelopmentinitiatives.More­
over,participationbyMNCeconomicandsocialinterest
groupscouldmoreprofitablybeachievedwiththesup­
portandcooperationoftheCommunitysocialpartners,
withinaEuro-Mediterranean economicandsocialdia­
logue.Theprotocolsmustthereforecontaintheappro­
priatemeasures,beginningwithmandatoryconsultation
ofeconomicandsocialinterestgroups(oftheindividual
MNCinvolvedandoftheCommunity )ontheindicative
programmestoimplementtheprotocols(pendingthe
establishmentofgenuineintegrateddevelopmentpro­
grammes).4.2.2.3.Thisbroaddegreeofcontinuityofapproach
withrespecttothepreviousprotocolsobligestheCom­
mitteetoreiteratethecriticismexpressedinprevious
Opinions.Thisisnotprimarilylevelledatthechoiseof
prioritysectors—althoughtheoil,mineralandagricul­
turalprocessingsectorswerealsosuggested—oratthe
individualtypesofoperationselected(contributionsto
formationofriskcapital,jointventures,smalland
medium-sizedenterprises,training,etc.),whichwehave
alreadyendorsed.
4.2.3.Supportforeconomicreform
(*)SpecialreportNo3/91onfinancialandtechnicalcooperation
withMediterranean non-member countries.4.2.3.1.ThewayinwhichtheCouncilhasadopted
theproposalforanoverallfinancialallocationforstruc­

NoC40/74 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities17.2.92
turaladjustmentinthoseMaghrebandMashreq
countrieswhichrequestitisultimatelydamagingtothe
politicalapproachenshrinedintheCommissionpro­
posal.IthasalreadybeencommentedthattheCom­
missiondraftfailedtotakeasitsnecessarystartingpoint
thecriticismoftheunderlyingphilosophyofIMFand
WorldBankstructuraladjustmentprogrammes .The
Councildirectivesgoevenfurther,makingCommunity
actiondependentuponstructuraladjustement ,as
definedbytheBrettonWoodsbodies.monetarypatternwhichisfrequentlyattherootoftheir
initialproblems:thereasonforthisliesinthesignificant
roleofofficialand,aboveall,privatedebtcollector
graduallybeingassumedbythesebodies.TheCouncil
hasthusexcludedtheprinciplemootedbytheCom­
missionthatCommunityadjustmentsupport'mustbe
providedwithintheframeworkofthepoliticalandecon­
omicmodeladoptedbytheStateconcerned'.Andthe
CouncilhasthusdismissedtheCommissionproposal
which,albeitinvagueterms,embodiedtheCommittee's
suggestionthattechnicalassistanceshouldbeprovided
totheMNCinordertoboosttheirnegotiatingcapacity
withthemaindonors,aspertheprovisionoftheFourth
EEC-ACPConvention .
4.2.3.4.Afurthermajorfailinginthedirectiveson
structuraladjustment—alreadypresentintheCom­
missionproposal—istheabsenceofanyreferencetothe
regionaldimensionofadjustment,towhichtheCom­
munityattacheddecisiveimportanceinLomeIV.
4.2.3.5.Lastly,withregardtotheprojectstobefinan­
ced,theCommitteewouldexpressitsconcern—nottot­
allyabsentintheCounciltext—thatplannedprojects
(importprogrammesandsocialuseofcounterpart
funds)shouldbedesignedtoalleviatesocialcrisesand
notcontributedirectlytotheprocessofstructuraladjust­
mentintheMNC.4.2.3.2.TheCommissionindicatedtheefficiencyof
macro-economic orsectoralreforms,togetherwiththe
nationaleconomicsituation,aseligibilitycriteria,leav­
ingtheCommunitytoassessthem—onlysubsequently
addingthat'countriesundertakingreformprogrammes
supportedbymajormultilateraldonors[...]arecon­
sideredtosatisfytheconditions':theCouncilrestricts
Communityactiontocountrieswhicharetoundertake
reformprogrammesapprovedbytheBrettonWoods
institutionsorrecognizedassimilar,inconsultationwith
thesebodies,butnotnecessarilysupportedbythem,
dependingonthemacro-economic scaleandefficiency
ofthereforms.Theeconomicsituationofthecountry
concernedisseenasanadditionalfactorandsub­
sequentlyselective.Itisclearthatsincetheentireoper­
ationissubjecttothemonetaristapproachoftheinter­
nationalfinancialinstitutions,evenreferencetothesec­
toralefficacyofreformsisinvalidated,leavingonlythe
macro-economic consideration .TheCommitteeregrets
thattheCouncilhasrefrainedfromentrustingtheCom­
munitywithanautonomousroleandarealcapacityto
bargainwiththeBrettonWoodsinstitutions .4.3.TheCouncilResolutionandtheguidelinesfor
horizontalfinancialcooperation
4.3.1.TheCouncil'sacceptanceoftheCommission's
proposaltoreinforcehorizontalfinancialcooperation
isundeniablyofmajorsignificance .Ashasbeensaid,
itrepresentsasignificantsteptowardsaglobalMediter­
raneanapproach,providinganopportunityforaction
whichtheMNC,oftenfacedwithprimaryneeds,can­
notreadilyintegrateintoprogrammesunderthe
financialprotocols.Nevertheless ,itisdisappointing
toseetheCommission'sproposalsscaleddownand
curtailedbytheCouncil.
4.2.3.3.Thisbasicoptiondeterminedthesubsequent
decisionnottoallowthecountriesconcernedanymargin
offreedomtotailorstructuraladjustmenttotheirpar­
ticularsocio-economic situationortodevelopanynego­
tiatingcapacitywiththeinternationalfinancialinsti­
tutions.Thisisinlinewiththefundamentally authori­
tarianapproachofsuchinstitutions ,whichtakesno
accountoftheindividualcircumstances ofthecountries
embarkinguponstructuralreform.Theinternational
financialbodiesthusobligedevelopingcountriesto
tailortheireconomiestoaninternational economicand4.3.2.Thefirstsuchcutbackconcernsfunding,
whichhasbeenvirtuallyhalved,receivingfarmore
savagetreatmentthanthefinancialprotocols(seefoot­
note1,p.72).Theratiobetweenthelevelofthetwo
typesoffundinghasthusbeenunfavourablyaltered.
Appropriations forhorizontalcooperationhaveactu­
allyfallenbelowthosefortheprotocols (46%oftotal
allocations):intheCommissionproposaltheywere
greater(58%ofthetotal),clearlysignallingashift
awayfromthetraditionalbilateralapproach.

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/75
energy,primarilybecausethereisnoacknowledgement
oftheurgentneedtomakeuptheconsiderableaccumu­
lateddelayinscientificandtechnologicalcooperation
withtheMediterranean countries.TheCommission
admittedtothesedelaysinitsrecentcommunication
onscientificandtechnologicalcooperationwiththird
countries(1):amongotherpoints,itstressedthatmore
coherentscientificcooperationpolicywassorelyneeded
intheregionunderreview.4.3.2.1.TheCommitteedoesnot,ofcourse,view
suchashiftasentirelyreplacingthefinancialprotocols
withhorizontalcooperation,whichstillconsistsof
unilateralCommunityactionwiththeMNCnot
sharingindecision-making :itthereforeremainsafar
cryfromapolicyofco-development .Neitherdothe
bilateralcooperationagreements,onthebasisofwhich
theprotocolsaredrawnup,conformtotheco-develop­
mentmodel.This—togetherwiththewell-known
limitationsofthebilateralapproach—iswhythe
cooperationagreementsshouldbereplacedwithacom­
prehensiveco-development convention (ortreaty).
4.3.4.1.Disagreement stemssecondlyfromthefact
thatsectoralcooperationpolicies(research,energy,
etc.)thusremaindivorcedfromMediterranean policy.
Scientificandtechnologicalcooperationpolicycoordi­
nationisaparticularlycomplexmattergiventhatcoop­
erationneedstooperateonvariouslevels:
a)enablingMNCtoparticipateintheresearchpro­
grammesundertheCommunity'sframeworkpro­
gramme,butarrangingforthemnottopaythesame
'subscriptionfee'asindustrializedthirdcountries;4.3.3.TheCommissionproposalhasalsobeen
severelycurtailedbyrestrictingthescopeofhorizontal
cooperation—alreadytoonarrow(see3.4.5above)—
tomeasuresofregionalorenvironmental interest.The
Committeedoesnotaccepttheexclusionfromboth
horizontalcooperationanddecisionsconcerningthe
newMediterranean policyofdevelopmentofhuman
resources,scientificandtechnologicalcooperationand
supportforCommunityenergyinvestment .Theclaim
madeintheCouncilguidelinesthatthesemattersdonot
requiredecisionstobetakenunderthe'Mediterranean '
headingisquitegroundless .b)extendingscientificandtechnologicalcooperation
programmeswiththird—particularlydeveloping
—countriestoalltheMNCandsteppinguptheir
participationinthem,assuggestedbytheCom­
mission;
c)implementing specificscientificandresearchpro­
grammesfortheMediterranean which(i)take
accountoftheregion'sparticularcharacteristics
fromtheuseofresourcesonwards(ii)bringthe
MNCandtheCommunity'sMediterranean regions
togetherinasynergeticmanner,and(iii)break
throughthebarrierrepresentedbylackofcompeti­
tivenessinordertohaveamoreimmediateimpact
oneconomicactivity;4.3.3.1.Forscientificandtechnologicalcooperation ,
energyandinvestment,theCouncilreferstoexamin­
ationoftheCommission'sproposalsonactionand
policieslyingoutsidethescopeofMediterranean policy.
Developmentofhumanresources,however,theimport­
anceofwhichhasalreadybeenunderlined (see3.4.3
above),hasquitesimplybeenremoved.Actioninthe
areaofdemographicpolicyhasbeenincludedinthe
protocols(albeitdroppingtheregionaldimensionto
thequestion)andtrainingandknow-howtransferoper­
ationsmay(atleastinpart)beretainedunderinitiatives
ofregionalorsub-regionalinterest;buttheCouncil
guidelinesmakenomentionofextendingCommunity
training,informationorcultureprogrammestothe
MNC.ThedecisiontodismissentirelytheCom­
mission'sproposalsforcooperationintheaudiovisual
sector,informationandcultureingeneralisparticularly
serious,displayingafailuretocomprehendtheir
importance,particularlyatatimewhencultureis
becomingavitalfactorincopingwithimmigration­
relatedproblems,aswellasinreachingaclearerunder­
standingoftheMediterranean situation.d)implementingcooperationprogrammesfortechno­
logicalinnovationintheMNC,startingwiththe
Commission'ssuggestionforinformationtech­
nology.Programmessuchasthoseoutlinedinc)
abovecannotcomeunderindividualfinancialpro­
tocols.ExperienceshowsthatonlyMNCwhich
alreadypossessarelativelydevelopedproductive
structure(e.g.IsraelorYugoslavia )havebenefitted
fromthistypeofcooperation .Theseprogrammes
mustinsteadberunonahorizontalbasis,witha
strongCommunityimpetus.
4.3.4.TheCommitteelikewisedisagreeswiththe
referencetootherdecision-making authoritiesin
relationtoscientificandtechnologicalcooperationand(!)Doc.CC)M(90)256final.

NoC40/76 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
4.4.TheCouncilandCommissionResolutionontrade
withtheMNC4.3.4.2.Thislisthighlightstheneedtosetupmachin­
erytocoordinatenotonlyactionundertheframework
programmeandthescientificandtechnologicalcooper­
ationprogrammes (generalorspecificallyMediterrane­
an)—astheEuropeanParliamenthasalsoasked(!)—
butmoreparticularlytocoordinate (i)allresearch
activityandthetechnologicalinnovationprogrammes
relatingtothevarioussectoralpolicieswith(ii)the
objectivesandinitiativesofMediterranean policy.4.4.1.TheCommitteewillcommentontheResol­
utionlater,whenexaminingthecommunication and
draftRegulationpresentedbytheCommission in
implementation oftheResolution .
4.5.ThetwoCouncilDeclarations onadopting
decisionsonthenewMediterranean policy
4.3.4.3.TheCommitteethereforeconsidersthata
moreeffectivepolicyofscientificandtechnological
cooperationwithMNCshouldbeseennotasasecond­
ary,oroptionalaspectofdevelopmentpolicy,butas
thefirstlinkinthewealth-creation process.Itshould
nothavebeendissociatedfromdecisionsonthenew
Mediterranean policyand,inparticular,thoseonhori­
zontalcooperation .4.5.1.ThefirstDeclarationreferstorespectfor
humanrightsandthedevelopmentofdemocracyin
Mediterranean thirdcountries.TheCommitteesup­
portstheexpressedaimofembodyingtheseprinciples
intheMediterranean policy,strengtheningCommunity
supportforpoliticalandeconomicreformintheMNC
andfosteringthedevelopmentofhumancapacitiesand
theroleofwomeninthedevelopmentprocess.Tothis
end,theCommitteecallsupontheCounciltotake
appropriatestepsconcerningtheviolationofhuman
rightsincertainMNC,repeatedlycondemnedbyinter­
nationalbodiesandtheEuropeanParliament .
4.5.1.1.TheCommitteenotes,nevertheless ,that
thesedeclarationsofintentmayremainlargelytheoreti­
cal,sincetheensuingconsequences forpolitical
decisionsarenotfullydrawn.Thetimemayindeed
havecomeforcooperationpolicytoincorporatethese
aspects,butthiscannotbedoneunilaterallybythe
Community .Nosignificantprogresscanbemadeinthis
directionwithoutunreservedlyadoptingthemethodof
permanenteconomic,socialandculturaldialoguewith
ourpartners.TheCouncil'sdecisionsonthenewMedi­
terraneanpolicydemonstratethatithasnotunderstood
thispoliticalrequirement .
4.5.1.2.Ontheotherhand,theCommission ,inits
recentcommunication onhumanrights,democracyand
developmentcooperationpolicy(3),statedtheneedfor
theCommunitytofosterpositiveactiontorealizethis
newdimensiontocooperation ,andraisedthequestion
oftherelationshipbetweeneconomicdemocracyand
humanrights.Specialmentionwasmadeoftherole
thateconomicandsocialgroupsandintermediate
associations—withparticularemphasisonwomen—
couldplayindevelopingdemocracy .Thisisacrucial
elementofdevelopmentcooperationpolicy,without
whichthelaudablereferencetothemarketeconomyin
theDeclarationcouldremainpurelysymbolic.4.3.5.TheCommitteenotestheCouncil'sdecision
topostponeapprovaloftheCommission'sproposalto
refinancetheMediterranean partofthe'EC-Inter­
nationalInvestmentPartners'(EC-IIP)financialinstru­
ment(Cheyssonfacility),tothetuneofECU100
million,untilamoregeneralproposalontheentire
instrument (whichalsocoversLatinAmericaandAsia)
isdiscussed.TheCommitteewillcommentonthedraft
Regulation (2),presentedbytheCommissionon
7March1991,andontheadequacyofthefinancial
appropriations fortheMediterranean ,inaseparate
Opinion.Nevertheless ,strongreservationsmustbe
expressedatthisstageastotheseparationofEC­
IIPactionfromtheoverallrunningofMediterranean
policy.Forthesamereasons,theCommitteedoesnot
accepttheauthorityinvestedbytheCouncilintheEIB
todirectECU25millionofbudgetfunds,earmarked
forhorizontalcooperation ,tointerventionidenticalto
thatunderEC-IIP.TheCommitteethereforecallson
thebudgetaryauthoritytoreviewthisdecision.
4.5.1.3.TheCommissionpointstothepromotion
andsupportofthisintermediatesocio-economic
Reportonscientificandtechnologicalcooperationwithnon­
Europeancountriesandorganizations ,bytheEuropeanPar­
liamentCommitteeonEnergy,ResearchandTechnology
(Rapporteur :MsAnnemarieGoedmakers),19.7.1991,and
thesubsequentResolutionadoptedbyParliamentatthefirst
October1991Session.
Doc.CQM(90)575final. (2) (3)Doc.SEC(91)61final,25.3.1991.

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/77
fabricasoneofthemainaimsofcooperation ,partly
inordertoavoidcentralizedandexclusiverelations
withStatestructures.TheCommitteehasconsistently
supportedthisviewandisconfidentthatitcan,if
offeredtheopportunity ,makeameaningfulcontri­
butiontothisend.
4.5.2.ThesecondDeclarationexpressestheinten­
tiontoadoptprovisionsontransportandtheprocessing
ofhazardouswastefortheMediterranean ,andtoask
partnercountriestosign/ratifytheBaleConvention .
TheCommitteeisinfullagreement .consideredassupplementary toCommunityfunding
undertheLomeConvention ,inthesamewayas
Article1ofthedraftRegulationdescribeshorizontal
cooperationassupplementing measuresfinancedunder
thefinancialprotocolswiththeMNC.
5.2.1.2.TheCommitteeconsidersthatthetimeis
ripetoconcludereal,substantiveagreementswith
Albania.Themigratorysurgefromthatcountry
towardstheCommunitymakesitsinclusioninCom­
munityMediterranean policyallthemoreurgent.The
Councilisthereforeinvitedtotakeurgentstepstothis
end.
5.ThedraftCouncilRegulationconcerningfinancial
cooperationinrespectofalltheMediterranean non­
Membercountries
5.1.Generalassessment5.2.2.TheCommitteedisagreeswiththestatement
containedintheCouncilguidelines—althoughnot
repeatedinthedraftRegulation—thatcountriesben­
efitingfromthePhareprogrammeshouldbeexcluded
fromhorizontalcooperation .TheCommitteedoes
sharetheviewthatthenatureandscopeofPhareare
suchthatnooverlappingorduplicationofefforts
shouldoccur,butsincetheCouncilmakesanexception
forenvironmental protectionprojectsintheMediter­
raneanbasin,itishardtoseewhyitdoesnotdoso
forregionalaction—asphereinwhichtheabsenceof
certaincountrieswouldbeequallycounterproductive .
5.2.3.TheCommitteewelcomestheclarification ,
containedintheabovementioned statement,thathori­
zontalfinancialcooperationappliestotheoccupied
Palestinianterritories .5.1.1.TheProposalforaRegulation(*),presented
bytheCommissionon19February1991,bearsthe
negativemarkoftherestrictionsimposedbythe
Councilguidelines,whichspecificallyinstructedthe
Commissiontoadheretothemindraftingtheproposal.
ThecriticismrelatingtotheCouncildecisions(see4.3)
andtotheoriginalCommissionproposal(see3.4.5)
consequentlyappliesequallytothepresentproposal.
5.1.2.TheCommitteeaccordinglycallsonthe
CounciltoadopttheRegulationassoonaspossible,
amendingittotakeaccountofthecommentsand
suggestionsmadeinthepresentOpinion.5.3.Scopeofhorizontalcooperation[Art.2(1)1
5.3.1.Thescopeofhorizontalcooperationis,chiefly
becauseoftherestrictionsimposedbytheCouncil,
limitedtooperationsofregionalorenvironmental
interest.5.2.Criteriaforreceiptoffunding(Art.1)
5.2.1.Theapplicationofhorizontalfinancialcoop­
erationonlyto'countrieswithwhichtheCommunity
hasconcludedassociationorcooperationagreements'
isasevererestrictionuponthesupportthatsuchcoop­
erationisintendedtolendtosubregionalintegration
processesinvolvingothercountrieswhichdonotfit
intothiscategory,asinthecaseoftheArabMaghreb
Union.ThecriterialaiddownwouldexcludetwoAMU
countries—Mauritania (notMediterranean )andLibya
(noagreementswiththeCommunity).
5.2.1.1.TheRegulationshouldexplicitlyprovidefor
Mauritaniatobeeligible,atleastforactionofregional
andsubregionalscope.Thereisnoapparentreason
whysuchactionshouldnot,intheoryorinlaw,be5.3.1.1.TheCommitteethereforeaskstheCouncilto
reviewitspositionandtoamendthedraftRegulation,
reinstating,forthereasonssetoutabove,thefollowing
aspects:
—economic,socialandculturaldialogue(see4.1.5),
withspecifictasksassignedtotheESC,
—developmentofhumanresources(see4.3.3),
—scientificandtechnologicalcooperation (see4.3.4),
energy(see4.3.4),
supportforCommunityinvestment,including
Doc.COM(91)48final. measuresunderEC-IIPwithinMediterranean policy

NoC40/78 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
thepreambulerecitals,whereastheCouncilResol­
utionofDecember1990reiteratedtheimportance
whichtheCommunityattachestotheestablishment
oftheArabMaghrebUnion.Whiletheresultsso
farachievedareclearlynotenough,itshouldbe
acknowledged thattheAMUconstitutestheonly
genuineprocess,ininstitutionalform,towards
regionalintegrationbetweenMNCandconse­
quentlymeritstheCommunity'sclearandenthusi­
asticsupport,
—supportforoperationsofinteresttoallorsomeof
theMNC,(see4.3.5).Inthisrespect,theCommitteecallsupon
theCounciltoaccepttheCommissionproposalto
extendsuchmeasurestoencouragetheestablish­
mentofbusinessesbyimmigrantsintheircountries
oforigin.
5.3.2.Inaddition,thescopeofhorizontalcooper­
ationshouldalsoencompassothermeasures(assetout
in3.4.5):
—restructuringproductionthroughouttheMediter­
ranean,
—othersectorswhereaglobalapproachisessential:
transport,telecommunications ,tourism,
—informingtheMNConthecompletionoftheSingle
Europeanmarketandprovidingtechnicalassistance
fortheup-grandingtheymustcarryoutin
importantareassuchasproductstandards,patents,
movementofgoods,transport,banking,insurance,
etc.,
—socialpolicy:employment ,theemploymentmarket,
socialconditionsandworkers'rights,
—immigrationpolicy.
5.3.3.Extensionofthescopeofhorizontalcooper­
ationclearlyrequiresfinancialresourcessignificantly
largerthanthoseplanned—which,asalreadypointed
out,arealreadyinadequateandshouldbeincreased.
TheCommitteewouldrequesttheCounciltoreview
itsDecisionof18-19December1990inthissense.—supportforoperationsinvolvingoneormoreofthe
MNCandtheCommunity .TheCommunitydraws
specialattentiontotheimportanceofthistypeof
activity,whichmayenablesignificantprogressto
bemadetowardsthegoalofEuro-Mediterranean
complementarity .Priorityshouldbegiventooper­
ationswiththisaiminvolvingoneormoreMNC
andoneormoreMediterranean regionsoftheCom­
munity.
5.4.Operationsofregionalinterest[Art.2(2)] 5.4.3.TheCommitteefeelsthattheimpactofthe
wholehorizontalcooperationsystemisdramatically
reducedbytherestrictionofthespecificoperations—to
befundedfromtheCommunitybudget—inimplemen­
tationofthesupportmeasuresoutlinedin5.4.2to
technicalcooperation,training,seminars,studiesand
missions.AcloserlookrevealsthattheCouncilguide­
lines—and,consequently ,thedraftRegulation—would
restrictregionalcooperationasawholeto,firstly,
technicalcooperationand,secondly,infrastructure
measures.Themostimportantelementofanyregional­
typeintervention—supportforeconomicandpro­
ductiveprogrammesintegratedonaregionalorsubre­
gionalscale,asrepeatedlyproposedbytheCom­
mittee—isentirelylacking.Suchprogrammesshould
seektofurthercomplementarity andintegration
betweentheMNCthemselvesandbetweenthemand
theCommunity :theyshouldassumetheformofinte­
gratedregionalorsectoralprogrammes ,whichnecess­
arilyrequiredifferentkindsofaction.Thiswouldcer­
tainlyincludeinfrastructureandtechnicalcooperation ,
butwouldprimarilymeaninvestmentinagriculture,
industryandservices,coveringthewealthcreationpro­
cess,fromR8cDtotraining.Fundingwouldnotbe
basedexclusivelyonCommunitycontributions ,but
wouldbestimulatedbythem.TheCommitteetherefore
askstheCounciltoincludethistypeofoperationin5.4.1.TheCommitteerepeatsitssatisfactionatthe
reinforcement ofthisareaofhorizontalcooperation .
ThedraftRegulationprovidesfortwotypesofmeasure:
a)supportforregionalcooperationaction;
b)feasibilitystudiesforregionalinfrastructurepro­
jects.
TheCommitteeendorsesthisapproach,subjecttothe
followingcommentsandsuggestedamendments .
5.4.2.Thedescriptionofsupportforregionalcoop­
erationmeasures [Art.2(2),firstindent]isnotsuf­
ficientlyclear.Thereshouldbeamoreexplicitexpla­
nationofthethreetypesofoperationofregionalinter­
est,whichtheCommitteeendorses,asindicatedinthe
Councilguidelines :
—supportforregionalintegrationprocesses,starting
withtheAMU.TheCommitteeissurprisedthatthe
Commission'stextmakesnomentionofit,evenin

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunitiesNoC40/79
theRegulation,atlestintheformofpilotprogrammes,
aspreviouslysuggestedbytheCommittee .possiblywithMemberStates(e.g.betweenGreeceand
Turkey).Amoregeneralcriterionshouldbethatof
extendingEuropeannetworks—developmentofwhich
iscurrentlyunderdiscussionintheCommunityinsti­
tutions(!)—intotheMediterranean basin.TheESChas
issuedanOpiniononthismatter(2).Inthefieldof
transportandtelecommunications ,preferenceshould
begiventoinfrastructuresintendedtostrengthencom­
municationsbothwithinsubregionalintegrationzones
(startingwiththeAMU)andalongtheEast-Westaxis
alongtheMediterranean basin,wheretheyarecurrently
sorelylacking.5.4.4.TheCommitteelendsitsfullsupporttothe
applicationofthebudgetfundsallocatedtohorizontal
cooperationtofeasibilitystudiesforregionalinfrastruc­
tureprogrammeswhichwouldbefundedfromEIB
own-resources ,outsidetheframeworkofthefinancial
protocols.
5.4.5.4.Lastly,wewouldrepeatthatthelevelofthe
EIBloanstobedirectedtoinfrastructure projects
undertheCouncilguidelines,amountingto
ECU1500millionover5years,iswoefullyinadequate .5.4.4.1.However,itneedstobemadeclear,incon­
nectionwiththefeasibilitystudies,thattheEIBshould
becommittedtoexamineprojectswhosefeasibilityhas
beencheckedbytheCommission .Onceagain,the
Committeemustexpressstrongreservationsinrelation
toaprocedurewhichleavestheEIB—oftenmorecon­
cernedwiththefinancialsolvabilityofthecountries
involvedthanwiththewidervalueofprojects—sub­
stantiallyfreetodecideonwhethertoprovidefunds.5.4.6.TheCommitteeconsidersthattheuseofbudg­
etfundstofinance3%interest-ratesubsidiesonEIB
loans—restrictedbythedraftRegulationtoenviron­
ment-orientated investment—shouldbeformally
extendedtoinfrastructure projects,giventhata
Commission/CouncildeclarationontheDecember
1990guidelinessuggestedthis. 5.4.5.AlthoughnotcoveredbytheRegulationunder
discussion (whichrelatesonlytotheuseofCommunity
budgetfunds),theCommitteewouldtakethisoppor­
tunitytocommentonEIBparticipationinfinancing
theinfrastructure projects. 5.5.Cooperationontheenvironment
5.5.1.TheCommitteeendorsestheimportance
assignedtoenvironmental actionwithintheframework
ofhorizontalcooperation ,asexpressedinitiallybythe
Communication fromtheCommissionof1June1990
andthenrepeatedintheCouncilResolutionandguide­
linesand,consequently ,thedraftRegulationunder
examination .5.4.5.1.Whileagreeingwiththepriorityactionareas
indicated(energy,transportandtelecommunications ),
wefeelthatwatershouldbeexplicitlyadded.The
importancefortheMNCoftransnationalwaterinfra­
structuresisunquestionable—whileavoidingfinancial
supportforcostlybutlargelyredundantlarge-scale
prestigeprojects—sincesuchstructuresmustlendthem­
selvestoawiderangeofuse(environmental ,energy,
irrigation,industrialanddomestic)andtointegrated
watermanagement . 5.5.2.SincetheRegulationischieflyconcernedwith
financialquestions,theproposalmakesnomentionof
broaderobjectivesorpriorities.TheCommittee
approvesthedecision,expressedintheCommission
Communication ,toadoptthewell-established multilat­
eralinitiatives(ActionPlanfortheMediterranean ,Blue
Plan,Metap)togetherwiththeguidelinesproducedat
theApril1990NicosiaConference,towhichthe
Counciladdedthoseemergingfromthesubsequent
ConferenceonSecurityandCooperation inEurope
(CSCE)ontheMediterranean heldinPalmadeMallor­
ca,asreferencesforthestrategicobjectivesandpriority5.4.5.2.TheCommitteedoesnot,however,agree
withthesuggestionthatprojectsmustbeofdirector
indirectinteresttotheCommunity :indeed,thisgives
groundforseriousconcern.Suchaformulamight
appearredundant,sinceaccordingtotheunderlying
principlesofMediterraneanpolicyeverythingcontribu­
tingtothedevelopmentoftheMNCisintheCom­
munity'sinterest,butitcouldprovideapretextfor
quiteunjustifieddiscrimination betweenprojectstobe
funded.
5.4.5.3.Turningtotheprioritiesgoverningfunding
ofinfrastructure projects,theCommitteewould,by
wayofexample,pointtotheimportanceofmaking
fulluseofenergyproductionbyupgradingexisting
networks (e.g.theAlgeria-Tunisia gaspipeline)ormax-(i)Doc.CC)M(90)585final,
imizepotentialbyinterconnecting electricitygrids,(2)Doc.ESC1262/91.

NoC40/80 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
theCommunity(*)[seerelevantCommitteeOpinion(2)]
couldconstituteabench-markinthissphere.TheCom­
mitteethereforecallsupontheCounciltoreplace
'Cooperationontheenvironment'with'Cooperation
ontheenvironmentandregionalplanning',together
withtheconcomitant effectontheidentification of
operationsandpriorities.options.ThefieldsforactionlistedbytheCommission
arethereforetobewelcomed :integratedmanagement
ofcoastalareas,particularlynaturalcoastlines,andof
rapidly-expanding urbanareas,natureconservation ,
integratedwatermanagement ,handlingofplant-cover,
wastemanagement ,continuoussurveillanceofecosys­
tems,closermonitoringofmaritimetraffic,energy
management ,andmoreintensiveinterchangeofexperi­
ences.TheCommitteerecommends thatthislistbe
completedwithmeasurestocombatdesertification ,
whichconcernsmanyoftheMNCandcertainCom­
munityregions.Overallprioritymustclearlybegranted
towaterresources(scarcity,pollution,integratedman­
agement).5.5.4.Apartfromthiscalltoincluderegionalplan­
ningwithenvironmental cooperation ,theCommittee
supportstheCommission'sdecisiontouseCommunity
budgetfundsfortwotypesofmeasure:(a)measures
havinga'knockon'effect,suchaspilotordemon­
strationprojectsandtrainingschemes;and(b)3%
interestratesubsidiesonEIBown-resource loansfor
investmentpurposes,grantedoutsidetheframeworkof
thefinancialprotocols.Italsosupportstheproposal
containedintheabovementioned Commission Com­
munication ,andrepeatedintheCouncilguidelines,to
assignresponsibilityforfundingfeasibilitystudiesand
technicalassistanceoperations,includingthe
implementation oflegislative,administrative andsuper­
visoryinstruments ,totheMedspaprogramme,inliai­
sonwithothermultilateralinstruments (e.g.METAP).
TheCommitteerecommendsthatthecommentsonthis
questionmadeinitsOpinionontheMedspapro­
gramme(3)betakenintoaccount.5.5.3.Thesetypesofoperationthemselvespointto
theneedforpreventive,notmerelycurative,environ­
mentalactionintheMediterranean .Itshouldbeborne
inmind,inthisrespect,thatachievementofcompletely
safenuclearenergygenerationandnucleardisarma­
ment(aprocessalreadyunderway)mustbeincluded
amongthemainaimsofecologicalconservationinthe
Mediterranean basin.Mostimportantly ,noeffective
upstreamactiononthemediterranean environment
wouldbecrediblewithoutaddressingthequestionof
developmentplanninginthetwocriticalaspects:the
reshapingofproductionandregionalplanning—both
ofthemfromtheviewpointofsafeguardingand
improvingtheenvironment .5.5.5.EIBloansdonotfigureintheRegulation,but
constitutethesecondaspectofhorizontalcooperation
ontheenvironment .Theresourcesallocated (ECU300
millionoverfiveyears)maybederisory,butthepri­
oritiesforactionsetoutbytheCommissioninits
Communication ofJune1990andrepeatedinthe
Councilguidelinescannotbefaulted:waterpurifi­
cation,recyclingofusedwater,industrialandmunicipal
waste.Thisdownstream actionisbothessentialand
urgentlyneeded.TheCommitteeconsequentlyappeals
totheCounciltoprovidetheEIBwithfargreater
resourcesinordertotakeactionofmoreambitious
scope.5.5.3.1.Inconnectionwithreshapingproduction ,
theCommittee'sinsistenceontheimportanceofestab­
lishinganewintra-regional division/unionoflabour
withintheMediterranean basisiswell-known .This
aimiscloselytiedinwiththeenvironmental one.The
CommitteerecommendsthatMediterranean policybe
implementedinsuchawaythat,firstly,theecological
soundnessofdevelopmentoperationsissystematically
checkedand,secondly,thatecologicalactiontakesdue
accountofprofitableuseofenvironmental resources.5.6.Implementation procedures(Art.4,5and6)
5.6.1.ThedraftRegulationmakestheCommission
responsibleformakingdecisionsonfunding,butits
optionsaresubjecttoaprocedurelargelybasedon
thewell-knownCouncilDecisionof13July1987on
comitology (4).Aswellasrepeatingitsdisapprovalof5.5.3.2.Theimportanceofthesecondaspect,
regionalplanning,asalinkbetweentheenvironment
anddevelopment isunquestionable :asis,consequently ,
theneedfordirectintervention inthisarea.Mediter­
raneanpolicy,interalia,shouldstatethatitsview
ofregionalplanningisbasedontheenvironmental
situationoftheregioninquestion,transferringenviron­
mentalimpactcriteriaascurrentlyappliedtoindividual
projectsontoaregionalscale.Anenormousknow­
howgapexistsintheMNCinthisrespect:horizontal
cooperationcouldfillit.TheCommission'srecent
Communication onthefutureofregionalplanningin(!)Doc.CC)M(90)547final.
(2)Doc.ESC1127/91.
(3)OJNoC332 ,31.12.1990.
(4)OJNoL197,18.7.1987.

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/81
aprocedurewhichessentiallyauthorizesacommittee
ofnationalcivilservantstotakeexecutivepowersaway
fromtheCommissionandgivethemtotheCouncil,
theCommitteeexpressesstrongreservationsconcerning
thelackofrealinvolvementbytheParliamentand
EconomicandSocialCommitteeinthechoicesfor
horizontalfinancialcooperation .offunding,introductionofenvironmental cooperation,
removalofregionalcooperation (transferredtohori­
zontalcooperation )andtheintroductionofanew
articleonsupportforeconomicreformwhichrepro­
ducesthewordingoftheCouncildirectives.Theonly
changetothetextofthethirdprotocolwithIsraelis
intheamountoffundingprovidedthroughEIBloans.
5.6.1.1.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsuchinvolvement
shouldstandinthewayofflexibleandspeedymanage­
mentbytheCommission ,orthatitsexecutivepowers
shouldbefurtherrestricted.Ourdemandissimplythat
theCommunity'sdemocratically representative and
consultativebodiesshouldhaveanofficialparttoplay
indefiningobjectivesandprogrammesforhorizontal
financialcooperation ,whichmakesupnearlyahalfof
allCommunityMediterranean policy.
5.6.1.2.Inadditiontotheinformationwhich,under
Article6ofthedraftRegulation,theCommissionmust
giveannuallytotheEuropeanParliamentandthe
Council—andonwhichweinsisttheCommittee
shouldbeconsulted—theCouncilisthereforeasked
toarrangefortheCommissiontodrawupafive-year
indicativeprogramme,accompaniedbytheappropriate
financialpowers,tobesubmittedtotheParliamentand
theESC.6.3.TheamountofCommunityfinanceearmarked
forthefiveprotocols(3)reflectsthecutbackscontained
intheCouncildecisionsof118-19December1990
(see4.1).Theincreaseoverthe1988protocols,forthe
MaghrebcountriesandEgypttogether,is33%(from
ECU1236to1640million(4).The1988increaseover
thepreviousprotocolsforthesamecountrieswas61%.
Whilethistimetheemphasishasbeenonhorizontal
cooperation ,thepresentincreaseiswithoutdoubt
insufficienteventoretainatpresentlevelspercapita
assistanceinrelationtopopulationgrowth.Aneven
grimmerpictureemergeswhenthis33%increaseis
comparedwiththeincreasesof37%inEIBloans(from
ECU714to978million)and27%inCommunity
budgetfunds(fromECU522to622million).
6.4.Underallocationsviabudgetfundsunderthe
protocolswiththeMaghrebcountriesandEgypt,non­
repayableaidhasonlybeenincreasedby20%(ECU
490to588million),whereascontributionstotheforma­
tionofriskcapitalhaverisenby130%(ECU32to
74million).TheCommittee,inprinciple,agreeswith
steppingupthistypeofoperation,butacriticalforward
assessmentbytheEIBofthisrelativelynewmeasure,
onlyintroducedwiththe1988protocols,wouldhave
beenadvisable.TheCommitteerepeatsitsearlier
requestforthistobedone,andcallsupontheEIBand
theCommissiontosubmitareportontheuseoffunding
forthispurposeanditsimpactonproductioninthe
countriesconcerned .Furthermore ,theCommittee
reiteratesitsproposaltosetuparotatingfundtogrant
andmanagesuchcontributions .6.Therecommendations forCouncildecisionsonthe
conclusionofcertainfinancialprotocols
6.1.On3May1991theCommissionpresentedtwo
recommendations forCouncilDecisions(!),oneonthe
conclusionoftheprotocolsonfinancialandtechnical
cooperationbetweentheEuropeanEconomicCom­
munityandtheArabRepublicofEgypt,thePeople's
DemocraticRepublicofAlgeria,theKingdomof
MoroccoandtheRepublicofTunisia,andtheotheron
theconclusionoftheprotocolonfinancialcooperation
withtheStateofIsrael(2).Thefiveprotocolshave
alreadybeeninitialled .
6.2.Theinitialledprotocolsadherestrictlytothe
directiveslaiddownbytheCouncilon18-19December
1990:thecriticalcommentsmadein4.2.2alsoapply
here.Thetextoftheprotocolsisidenticaltothatof
1988,withonlyafewvariations .Changestotheproto­
colswiththeMaghrebcountriesandEgyptcoverlevel6.5.Adegreeofreadjustmenthasoccurredinthe
distributionoffundsbetweenthefourabovementioned
(')Doc.SEC(91)814final.
(2)TwodistinctDecisionsarerequiredfortheseprotocols,that
withIsraeldifferinginnaturefromtheothers.Asinthepast,
theprotocolwithIsraelprovidesforfinancialcooperation
only,exclusivelythroughEIBloans.Itshouldbepointed
out,however,thattheCommunityhasforsometimebeen
carryingoutsignificantindustrial,technicalandscientific
cooperationactivitieswithIsrael,onthebasisofthe1975
CooperationAgreement,althoughIsraelreceivesnoCom­
munityfundingforthispurpose.()ThetotalamountsinECUmillionsforthefiveprotocolsare
asfollows:Egypt568,Algeria350,Morocco438,Tunisia
284,Israel82.
(4)ForIsrael,theincreaseincomparisonwiththepreceding
protocolis30%.

NoC40/82 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
countriestotheadvantageofAlgeria(*),whichwastoa
degreepenalizedinthepreviousprotocol.Thisrelative
redistribution hasbeeneffected,however,byalarger
increaseincontributionstotheformationofriskcapi­
tal(2)andEIBloans(3)ratherthannon-repayable aid
—forwhich,despiteinflation,thesameamounthas
beensetasideasunderthethirdprotocol(ECU52
million)(4).Ofthefourcountries,Algeriacontinuesto
receivethesmallestshareofCommunitybudgetfunds
(i.e.non-repayable aidpluscontributionstoformation
ofriskcapital)(5).
6.6.TheCommitteewouldtakethisopportunityto
urgethattheprotocolsbeimplemented inamore
timely,flexibleandeffectivemannerthantheirprede­
cessors,reflectingthecriticismmadebytheCourtof
Auditorsinitsabovementioned report.Inparticular,
theCommitteesharestheCourt'sopinionontheinad­
equacyofmonitoringandassessmentofCommission
operations,andcallsupontheCommitteetotakethe
appropriatesteps.Themonitoring,supervisoryand
assessmentarrangements applicabletoaidfromthe
Community'sstructuralfundscanserveasasuitable
model,forinstanceasregardsinvolvementofthesocial
partners.munityofcertainagriculturalproductsoriginatingin
Algeria,Cyprus,Egypt,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Malta,
Morocco,Syria,TunisiaandYugoslaviawasattached
totheCommunication .
7.1.2.TheCommunication embodiesthecontentof
theCouncilandCommissionResolutiononthematter,
adoptedon18-19December1990.Itaddressesthree
questions :
a)theimportofagriculturalproducts,fleshingoutthe
draftRegulation (EEC);
b)theimportoftextileproducts;
c)originrules.
7.2.ThedraftRegulation(EEC)ontheimportof
certainagriculturalproducts
7.2.1.ThepurposeofthedraftRegulation (EEC)is
toimprove,independently ,thepreferentialarrange­
mentsfortheimportofagriculturalproductssetup
underthe1987protocols,whichaccompaniedthe
associationorcooperationagreementswiththeMNC.
Underthetermsoftheabovementioned Resolution,this
improveistobeachievedwithtwotypesofmeasure:
a)thebringingforwardoftariffdismantling,sched­
uledfor31December1995atthelatest,to1January
1993;
b)anincreaseof5%(or3%forcertainsensitive
products)foreachyearbetween1992and1995in
thetariffquotasandreferencequotas.
7.2.1.1.TheproposedmeasuresapplytoallMNC
exceptTurkey,whichalreadybenefitsfromfulltariff
exemption,asthecustomsunionwiththeCommunity
providedforintheadditionalprotocolof23November
1970isalreadyinforce.
7.2.2.TheCommitteenotes,firstly,thatthe
measuresindicatedbytheCouncilgobeyondthepro­
posalscontainedintheCommissioncommunication of
1June1990,whichsimplyreaffirmedtheimportance
attachedtothemaintenanceoftraditionaltradeflows
inaccordancewiththestepssetoutintheadditional
protocolsandstatedthat'TheCommissiondoesnot
consideritadvisabletomakeanynewproposalsinthe
immediatefuture.'Italsoundertooktosubmitadetail­
edassessmentofthemattertotheCouncilbytheend
of1994.TheCommissiondidnotruleoutthepossibility
ofmakinganumberofminorchangesinthemeantime,
butonlyattherequestoftheMNC.
7.2.3.TheCommitteewouldraiseanobjectionof
principletothemeasuresindicatedbytheCouncil,and
formallyproposedbytheCommissioninitsproposal
foraRegulation,emphasizingitsoppositiontoa
Mediterranean policyapproachwhichconcentrateson
theopeningupofCommunitymarketswithouta
seriouseffort,financialandotherwise,toimplement
arealpolicyofco-development .TheCommitteehas
alreadystatedonpreviousoccasionsitsobjectionsto
thetotaldismantlingofbarrierstoimportsofMNC7.TheCommissionCommunication ontradearrange­
mentsandthedraftregulationonimportofcertain
agriculturalproducts
7.1.On22May1991theCommissionpresentedits
Communication totheCouncilontheimplementation
oftradearrangements underthenewMediterranean
policy(6).
7.1.1.TheProposalforaCouncilRegulation (EEC)
amendingthearrangementsforimportintotheCom­
{')Theincreaseintotalfundingunderthefourthprotocolwith
Algeriaisof46%,comparedwith35%forMorocco,27%
forTunisiaand26%forEgypt.However,Algeriastill
receivesalowerleveloffunding(21%ofthetotalforthe
fourcountries)thanEgypt(35%)andMorocco(27%).
(2)ContributionstotheformationofriskcapitalforAlgeria
havemorethanquadrupled ,risingfromECU4to18million.
Itisworthpointingoutthatinthepreviousprotocols,under
thesameitem,TunisiareceivedECU6million(nowupto
15million),MoroccoECU11million(now25)andEgypt
ECU11million(now16).
(3)EgyptandAlgeriacontinuetoreceivethelargestsharesof
EIBloanfunds:EgyptECU568million(representing32%
ofthetotalforthefourcountries),AlgeriaECU280million
(29%),MoroccoECU220million(22%)andTunisiaECU
168million(17%).
(4)WhileTunisiaandMoroccoretainvirtuallyunalteredshares
ofnon-repayable aidforthefourcountries(17%and33%
respectively),Egypt'ssharehasincreased (upfrom39to
41%)andAlgeria'shasfallen(downform11to9%).
(5)Budgetfundsaredistributedasfollows:EgyptECU258
million,AlgeriaECU70million,MoroccoECU218million,
TunisiaECU116million.Thepercentageshareofeachof
thefourcountriesremainsvirtuallythesameasin1988.
(6)Doc.COM(91)179final.

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/83
agriculturalproducts.Thisoppositionisnotprompted
byblindprotectionismbutbytheawarenessthat,with­
outacommitmenttoreshapingagricultureandindustry
onaMediterranean-wide scaleandwithoutparallel
reformoftheCAP,topressaheadwithapurelymech­
anicalpolicyofprogressivelypermittingtheimportof
agriculturalproductsfromtheMNCwillonlyexacer­
batetheexistingcompetitionwiththeCommunity's
Mediterranean regions,whilestillfailingtosatisfyfully
theMNC'sexportdemands.
7.2.4.WhiletheCommittee'sstanceisoneofprin­
ciple,itnotesthattheproposedmeasureswouldin
practicehavelittlesignificanteffectintermsofactual
openingupofCommunitymarkets.Despiteintroducing
afurtherdismantlingofcustomsbarriers,theywould
notsubstantiallychangeexistinglevelsofCommunity
protection.Thisemergesclearlyfromcarefulexamin­
ationofthetwotypesofmeasureproposed.7.2.6.1.1.Thisalsoappliestothemajorityofsensi­
tiveproducts,wheregreaterconcernexistsovercompe­
titionwithCommunityproducts:earlypotatoes,tom­
atoes,mandarines,tangerinesandwine(3).Itiscer­
tainlynottrue,however,oforanges,orangejuiceand
cutflowers,whereimportsoftenexceedtariff
quotas(4).Nevertheless,thetariffquotasfortheseprod­
ucts,calculatedonthebasisof1980-1984imports,are
actuallyquitelow.Fororangesandorangejuice,we
wouldrefertothecommentsmadeinthereporton
Mediterranean policyaccompanying the1989ESC
Opinion(paragraph5.2):theyearstakenasthebasis
fordeterminingthetraditionalexportflowsweremar­
ked,forvariousreasons,byaslowingdownofexports.
Thetariffquotasforflowers,calculatedonthebasisof
1980-1989exports,reflectexportvolumesdetermined
accordingtotheordinarycustomssystem,because
flowerswereonlycoveredbythepreferentialarrange­
mentsfromthe1987/1988additionalprotocols
onwards.
7.2.5.Theaccelerationoftariffdismantlingwillhave
anegligibleimpactonthemarketsituation,fortwo
reasons :
a)thedismantlingprocessalreadyunderway,inparal­
lelwiththatconcerningSpainandPortugal,itself
startedoutfromconsiderabletariffreductions.By
1993,consequently ,tariffquotaswillbesolowas
tobevirtuallymeaningless I1);
b)thecustomssystemisofonlysymbolicimportance
indeterminingtheactualconditionsofentryinto
Communitymarkets.7.2.6.2.Itthusclearlyemergesthattheproposed
measuresshouldnotcauseexcessiveconcernovertheir
impactonsalesofthecorresponding Communityagri­
culturalproduce.Infact,theamountsofMNCagricul­
turalproduceeffectivelyenteringtheCommunityunder
thepreferentialarrangements arenotcurrentlysuch
astorepresentseriouscompetitionforCommunity
Mediterranean agriculturalproduce.Suchconcerns
wouldbebetterdirectedelsewhereinlightofthefact,
forexample,thattheUnitedStatesandBrazilexport
toourmarketsquantitiesoforangesandorangejuice
equivalenttotheCommunity'sentireorangecrop.
7.2.6.Forthesamereasons,thesecondtypeof
measure,increasedtariffquotasandreferencequantiti­
es,cannothaveamajorimpact(2).
7.2.6.3.TheCommitteemust,however,pointout
thattheCommissionhasnotthusfarclearlyandeffect­7.2.6.1.Insupportofthisanalysis,itmaybepointed
outthatthequantitiesofmostoftheproductsin
questionsexportedunderpreferentialarrangementsfall
wellbelowthetariffquotasandreferencequantities.
(')Evenbeforetheadditionalprotocol,theMNCenjoyedsignifi­
canttariffreductions:e.g.80%forcitrusfruitand60%for
tomatoesfromtheMaghrebcountries.Sincetherelevant
Communitytariffs[CommonCustomsTariffs(CCT)]are
20%and11%respectively,dismantlingpertainstoacustoms
tariffof4%forcitrusfruitand4,4%fortomatoes.
(2)ExamplesofMNCagriculturalproduce,theimportofwhich
underthepreferentialarrangement isrestrictedbytariff
quotasandseasonalrestrictions :earlypotatoes,Morocco,
Tunisia,Egypt—1Januaryto31March;tomatoes,
Morocco—1Januaryto30April;carrots,Cyprus—1April
to15May;artichokes,EgyptandCyprus—1Octoberto
31December;kiwis,Morocco,Israel,Cyprus—1Januaryto
30April.(3)Someexamplesofimportsoverthe1988/1989/1990period:
earlypotatoes,Egypt—Tariffquota98000tonnes;imports
47854,53531,86940tonnes.Tomatoes,Morocco—tariff
quota86000tonnes;imports50205,64487,59000tonnes.
Mandarinesandtangerines,Morocco—tariffquota110000;
imports78696,64515,75666tonnes.Bottledwines,Algeria
—tariffquota200000hi;imports(1989)63538hi.Unbottled
wine,Tunisia—tariffquota160000hi;imports(1988)
6961hi.
(4)E.g.oranges,Morocco—tariffquota265000tonnes;imports
912476,337184,251560.Orangejuice,Israel—tariffquota
82700(translator'snote:unitmissing);imports112246,
124542,134397.Flowers,Israel—tariffquota17000tonnes;
imports19723,18666,20786.

NoC40/84 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 17.2.92
8.Conclusions ivelyacknowledged theaimofhelpingfarmersand
industrialists ,togetherwithotherinterestedparties(in
marketing,R&D,etc.),fromCommunityMediter­
raneanregionstobenefitfromthepreferentialarrange­
mentsgrantedtotheMNC,bypromotinginitiatives
designedtoenhanceEuro-Mediterranean comp­
lementarityintheagriculturalandindustrialsectors.
7.2.6.4.Inthelightoftheabovecomments,the
Committee—whilemaintainingitsreservationsasto
theprincipleasexplainedin7.2.3—supporttheadop­
tionofthedraftRegulationunderexamination .8.1.TheCommittee'sconsideration oftheprep­
aration,decisionandlaunchingofthenewMediter­
raneanpolicyfirstlyleadsittodisagreewiththemejthod
appliedinthisprocess.
7.3.Importoftextileproducts8.1.1.Theproposalsforregulationsconstitutingand
implementingthenewMediterranean policy(examined
inparagraphs5,6and7ofthisOpinion)reflectthefact
thattheCommission hashadtofollowtheCouncil's
guidelinestotheletter.Itshouldbestressedthatthese
werenotsimplypolicyframeworkguidelines :whatthe
CouncilactuallydidwastoissuetheCommissionwith
binding,detailedordersontheproposalwhichitwas
topresent.Thiswayofoperatingwouldappeartobe
damagingtotheCommission'sinstitutionalroleas
proposer .7.3.1.TheResolutionof18-19Decemberlaiddown
thatthegradualreturntoafreeaccesssystemfortextile
productsfromMorocco,TunisiaandEgyptwouldhave
tobenegotiatedbytheCommissioninlinewiththe
outcomeoftheUruguayRoundtalks,therebyadopting
theproposalincludedbytheCommissioninitscom­
municationof1June(which,however,concernedall
theMNC).ThepresentCommunication of22May
1991,basingitselfontheResolution,notesthatthe
negotiationsoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsand
Trade(GATT)arenotyetcompleteandconcludesthat
itcannotyetmakeanyrelevantproposals,postponing
anyinitiativetorestorefullaccessuntiltheUruguay
Roundhasbeenconcluded .8.1.2.ItistruethattheseCouncilguidelineswere
negotiateddowntothelastdetailwithintheCouncil's
groupontheMediterranean (inwhichtheCommission
isrepresented),onthebasisoftheCommission'sCom­
municationof1June.Thequestionthenarises,how­
ever,astowhetherthiswayofputtingforwardconcrete
politicalproposalsthroughcommunications ,rather
thandirectlybymeansofproposalsforregulations,
doesnotrestrictdiscussiontotwoinstitutionsonly,the
CouncilandtheCommission ,therebyexcludingthe
democraticrepresentativeandconsultativeorgansrep­
resentedbytheEuropeanParliamentandtheEconomic
andSocialCommittee .Hereliesoursecondreservation
concerningthemethodsemployed :theEuropeanPar­
liamentandtheESChavebeencompletelyleftoutof
theentireprocessofpreparing,finalizinganddeciding
uponMediterranean policy.7.3.2.TheCommitteedoesnotagreewiththis
stance,whichcouldbeinterpretedasafigleaf.These
isinfactnoapparentmajorobstacletonegotiatinga
newimportsystem,independently ofUruguayRound
progress,underwhichaprogressivereturntofullaccess
wouldbecounterbalanced bybindingguaranteesby
theMNCwithregardtodumping,exportcredits,
counterfeiting ,socialdumpingetc.,asproposedbythe
Committeeinits1989Opinion(see9.13)—particularly
sincetheCouncilandtheCommissionpointtoindepen­
dentnegotiationsforTurkey,MaltaandYugoslavia .
7.3.3.TheCommitteethereforeaskstheCom­
missiontolaunchnegotiationswiththeMNCcon­
cernedforaprogressiverestorationoffreeaccessto
theCommunityfortheirtextileproducts.8.1.3.TheCommitteeisobligedtoexpressitsgreat
displeasurethat,despiteitsrepeatedrequeststothe
CommissionandtheCouncil,inearlierOpinions,to
beinvolved,itwasnotconsultedoneithertheCom­
municationfromtheCommissionortheproposalsfor
regulations (EEC)recentlysubmittedtotheCouncil.
HowlongdoestheCouncilintendtocarryonasif
developmentcooperationquestionsinconnectionwith
thirdcountries—particularlythosewhicharetheCom­
munity'sneighbours—havenothingtodowiththe
Community'seconomicandsociallife,andtherefore
canignoretheopinionofthebodywhichrepresents
theCommunity'seconomicandsocialinterestgroups?
WhenwilltheCouncilunderstandthatifitwhishesto
supportthegrowthofdemocracyintheMNC,without
overlookingthequestionofeconomicdemocracy,it
musttakeaccountoftheroleoftheCommunity's
economicandsocialforces—andfirstandforemostthe
institutionwhichgivesvoicetothem.7.4.Originrules
7.4.1.TheCommitteenotestheprogressmadeby
theCommission inimprovingregulationsandpro­
ceduresfororiginrules,andawaitsthefinalresultsof
theexaminationbeingcarriedoutbytheCommission
onthisquestion.

17.2.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC40/85
8.2.ThepresentOpinionmakesmanycriticalcom­
mentsandsuggestionsforchangestothedraftregu­
lationspresentedbytheCommission .TheCommittee
askstheCounciltoacceptthem,makingsubstantial
changestotheCommissionproposals (or,tobemore
precise,theCouncilguidelinesonwhichtheproposals
havebeendrawnup).Withregardtothequestionofofficialcredits—starting
withthosefromMemberStates—theCommitteesup­
portstheproposalmadebytheTunisianGovernment
forreconversionintosocial,environmental andhuman
resourcedevelopmentexpenditure,accompanied by
counterpartfundsinnationalcurrency.Thirdly,the
CommunitycouldextendtoMNCexperiencinggrave
difficultiessomeofthemeasuresalreadytestedinsome
CentralandEastEuropeancountries,consistingof
guaranteedloanstosupportthebalanceofpayments.
Thesearemeasureswhichcouldnotbeappliedacross
theboard,andwhoseimpactontheCommunitybudget
wouldhavetobekeptunderstrictsupervision .8.3.Independently oftherequestedreviewof
Councildecisionsonfundingforhorizontalcooper­
ation,theCommiteecallsuponthebudgetaryauthority
totakeaccountoftheobservations madeinthis
Opinionandtoincreasetheseamountssignificantly
whendecidinguponnon-obligatory expenditureunder
theCommunity'sannualbudget.
8.4.3.Development agreements
8.4.Inadditiontothepointsmadeintheabove
paragraphs,theCommitteewishestohighlightanum­
beroffactorstowhichitattachesparticularimportance
concerningtheimplementation ofthenewMediter­
raneanpolicy.
8.4.1.Structuraladjustment8.4.3.1.TheCommitteeconsidersthatanoppor­
tunitynowexists,regardingboththebilateralprotocols
andhorizontalfinancialcooperation,toconcludea
numberofcooperationagreements—atleastonan
experimentalbasis—alongthelinesproposedforsome
timebytheCommittee .TheCommissionistherefore
invitedtotaketheappropriatesteps.Suchagree­
ments—whichwouldbeconcludedbetweentheCom­
munityandoneormoreMNC,plusotherpublic(Com­
munity,nationalandlocal)andprivatebodiesoneach
side—shouldbedesignedtoimplementactioninthe
frameworkofdevelopmentprogrammesprovidingfor
acoherentseriesofdevelopmentproject(possiblyinte­
grated,extendingtobothMNCandCommunity
countries)ofcommercialandfinancialscope,starting
withtrainingandtechnicalassistance.8.4.1.1.Evenwithinthetightlimitsestablishedby
Article4ofthebilateralfinancialprotocolswiththe
MaghrebandMashreqcountries,theCommitteecon­
sidersthattheCommissioncouldprovidesupportfor
economicreformwhichislessdependentontheBretton
Woodsinstitutions,andcallsuponittodoallitcanin
thisdirection.WithintheCommission ,activitiescould
perhapsbebettercoordinatedandresourcesrational­
izedforoperationsinthisarea;forexamplebysetting
upajointDGIandDGVIIItaskforce,thelatterbeing
moreinvolvedinstructuraladjustmentfortheACP
States.8.4.4.Thesocialdimension
8.4.2.MNCexternaldebt8.4.4.1.TheCommitteestronglyrecommendsthe
Commissiontocommititselftodevelopingthesocial
dimensionofthenewMediterranean policy.Thisaim,
whichcouldbepursuedevenwithinthelimitsof
Mediterranean policyasdescribedinthepresentOpin­
ion,shouldsetoutto:
—placeemploymentatthecentreofeconomicand
productionpolicy,
—emphasizeenhancementofhumanresources,par­
ticularlythroughtraining,
—preventdisparitiesinsocialandworkingconditions
fromexceedingthethresholdsrepresentedbythe
fundamentalsocialrightsofworkers.Tothisend,
theCommissionisaskedtodrawupasocialproto­8.4.2.1.TheCommitteestronglyurgestheCom­
missionandtheCounciltofillthevoidleftbythe
absenceofanyproposalsonthisquestioninthecontext
ofthenewMediterranean policy.Firstly,wewould
repeattheproposalmadeinthe1990ESCAdditional
Opinion,concerninganinternationalplanforreg­
ulatingdebtandstructuraladjustmentintheMNC,to
bediscussedatthevariousinternationalbodies,centred
onanIMFprogrammeandgearedtothespecialneeds
andfeaturesofeachcountry,butbasicallydesignedfor
theMNCingeneral.Secondly,theCommunityshould
coordinatestrategybetweenMemberStatesintheinter­
nationalbodieswherethedebtproblemisdiscussed.

NoC40/86 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities17.2.92
raneanCooperationCouncil(orasimilarbody),the
basisforwhichhasalreadybeenlaiddownbyParlia­
mentinpreviousyears.
8.5.Lastly,theCommitteeisawareoftheneedto
incorporateMediterranean policyappropriatelyintoa
newECexternalpolicytakingaccountofchangeson
theinternationalsceneandthemoredynamicrole
requiredoftheCommunityinthiscontext.However,
itwarnsagainstanystrategythatwoulddownplay
theCommunity'sroleintheMediterranean areaon
accountofitsindisputablenewresponsibilities toCen­
tralandEasternEurope.
8.5.1.ThetransformedsituationinEasternEurope
doesnotdetractfromtheimportanceoftheMediter­
raneanquestionfortheCommunity ,whichhasavital
interestinbalancedeconomicandsocialdevelopment
inthatarea.Firstandforemost,prioritymustbegiven
toensuringpeace,politicalsabilityanddemocracyin
theMediterranean anddispellingtheeconomicand
socialtensionswhichcontinuetomakeitoneofthe
world'smostturbulentregions.
8.5.2.Secondly,theCommunityisasconcernedas
evertoreduceMNCimmigration,whichcannotbe
obscuredbytheequallyheavypressurefromEastern
Europe.
8.5.3.FailuretotakeinstantstepstotackletheMedi­
terraneanproblemcouldresultinthebuild-upofmany
differentproblemsthatwouldimpedetheCommunity
fromplayingapositiveroleinassistingEasternEurope.
8.5.4.Theonlyrealisticapproachtotheproblems
generatedbythenewinternationalsceneisnottoview
theCommunity'scommitmentstotheEastandtothe
Southasincompatiblebuttoframeacomprehensive
strategyenablingtheSouthtocontributetowardsthe
determination ofanewinternational economicorder.
TheMediterranean Basincannotremainapartbutmust
participatefullyintheepicventureonwhichtheCom­
munityisembarkingforthedevelopmentandstabiliz­
ationoftheEasternEuropeancountries.col,applicabletoallMNC,embodyingthesocial
principlesreferredtoin4.2.2.5above,
—viewmigrationfromtheMNCtotheCommunity
asaphenomenonwhichmustbeacceptedfora
considerableperiodoftime,andthereforeto
developappropriatepoliciestothatend.Thetime
seemsripetocallfortheconclusionofanagreement
betweentheCommunityandallMNCsettingout
jointundertakingstocurbmigrationpressureand
regulateandcontrolflows,
—buildupamodernlabourrelationssystemthrough­
outtheMediterranean basin,
—promotetheinvolvementofsocialandeconomic
interestgroupsintheimplementation ofMediter­
raneanpolicyatalllevels:local,regional,national
andCommunity .
8.4.5.Socialandeconomicdialogue
8.4.5.1.Inordertoachievetoobjectivessetoutin
8.4.4aboveandtosupportthecreationofrealeconomic
democracyintheMNC,theCommissionshouldpro­
moteanambitiousactionprogrammetoestablishand
fosterapermanentdialoguebetweenMNCandCom­
munityeconomicandsocialinterestgroups,usingavail­
ablehorizontalcooperationresources.Itshouldalso
makeadeterminedefforttoachievetheobjectiveset
outinitsCommunication of1June1990,toplace
exchangeofinformationanddialogueoneconomic,
social,culturalandpoliticalquestionsofcommoninter­
estatthecentreofcooperationwiththeMNC.Moves
couldalsobemade,inthiscontext,tosetupthe
Mediterranean Forum,longadvocatedbytheCom­
mittee.TheCommitteereaffirmsitswillingnesstoper­
formaleadingpartinestablishingsuchadialogue.
8.4.6.Newinstitutions
8.4.6.1.TheCommittee—renewingitsrequeststo
theCommissionandtheCounciltotakespecificsteps
topreparethewayforanoverallconvention (ortreaty)
withalltheMNC—recommendsthattheEuropean
ParliamenttakeurgentmeasurestosetupaMediter­
DoneatBrussels,27October1991.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
FrancoisSTAEDELIN