·The stability of the questionnaires, to ensure that operators are familiar with the data they need to collect and have established standard procedures for collecting them,

Furthermore, the Commission will collaborate closely with BEREC with the view to simplify the process and reduce the administrative burden for operators and NRAs. Elements that could contribute towards this end are:

·The Commission and BEREC may continue the joint on-line survey, using it with parsimony and only when necessary, to avoid increasing administrative burden.

·BEREC will also collect information annually from national regulatory authorities on transparency and comparability of different tariffs offered by operators to their customers.

·BEREC will report regularly on the evolution of pricing and consumption patterns in the Member States both for domestic and roaming services, the evolution of actual wholesale roaming rates for unbalanced traffic between providers of roaming services, and on the relationship between retail prices, wholesale charges and wholesale costs for roaming services. BEREC shall assess how closely those elements relate.

·BEREC will continue to collect data regularly from national regulatory authorities on the developments in the retail and wholesale roaming market, utilizing the Benchmarking questionnaire. .

The monitoring system already in place allows the effective monitoring of the roaming market and is well established, therefore it will not impose any additional burden either on operators or on BEREC and the NRAs. Specifically:

4.Indicators on the functioning of roaming in the context of the M2M market (number of M2M roaming agreements, M2M traffic, revenues and payments);

(b)The extent to which European end-users enjoy a complete roaming experience while travelling, in particular regarding quality of service, access to emergency services and protection against bill shocks.

A well-established monitoring system is already in place. During the functioning of RLAH (from June 2017) the Commission and BEREC have used a wide number of indicators to assess the functioning of the roaming rules. The monitoring system is based on data collected by the NRAs and BEREC, by means of semi-annual international roaming benchmarking questionnaires and an annual transparency and comparability questionnaire. Some indicators were also collected based on an annual joint Commission-BEREC online survey.

Reduced cost for BEREC and NRAs (data collection, preparation and submission of input to the Commission), estimated to 2 person days per member state per year plus two person days.

Operators have not been offering any such services. Still they will not need to maintain any more the systems they have implemented to support the separate sale of roaming data services.

To reduce the regulatory burden for operators, NRAs and BEREC, BEREC proposes to remove the obligation to publish the yearly report on transparency and comparability of roaming tariffs. BEREC is of the view that the required parts of this report could be covered by the international roaming benchmark report.

REFIT Impact: The proposed measure would bring clarity and reduce the administrative burden of operators outside the Eurozone, who are obliged to publish their tariffs twice, when revisions of the roaming surcharges or intra-EU communications tariffs are introduced. Furthermore, it would reduce the monitoring burden for NRAs, which have to monitor the correct application of the revised exchange rates. Positive effects at retail level are expected, with retail prices updated once a year, instead twice as its currently the case, which can considerably reduce information obligation of operators for modified contract conditions.

The rule applied for intra-EU communications in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 sets out that the maximum charges in currencies other than the euro shall be revised annually and apply from 15 May using the average of the reference exchange rates published on 15 January, 15 February and 15 March of the same year. The roaming regulation will be aligned to those provisions defining the same date for revising the surcharge for roaming services (15 May instead of 1 May), and the same method for determination of those currencies.

The Roaming Regulation sets out rules that oblige service providers in Member States outside the Eurozone to annually revise the maximum wholesale charges and retail surcharges for regulated roaming services and intra-EU communications.

REFIT impact: Such a change would reduce the burden on BEREC to provide input to the EC, as BEREC already has extensive reporting and data collection responsibilities pursuant to the Roaming Regulation (see also 8.2.5. on streamlining the monitoring obligations]).

The Roaming Regulation provides for a surcharge on incoming calls based on the weighted average MTRs. The value is defined yearly by the EC in an implementing act based on input from BEREC. With the definition of the Eurorate (the single maximum mobile voice termination rate across Europe) this implementing regulation might be redundant. The Roaming Regulation could refer to the Delegated Act on the single weighted average MTRs directly.

REFIT impact: The systems of providing the possibility for separate sales of data services have already been put in place and operators already sustained the costs for deploying it. The repeal of this obligation may not significantly reduce their economic burden but it may somewhat reduce the maintenance costs, as well as the burden of offering separate sales of data roaming services.

Due to the lack of actual uptake by the market, local data breakout obligations no longer appear to be relevant. The provision obliging operators to provide separate sales of roaming data services at retail level shall be repealed, including the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1203/2012 of 14 December 2012 on the separate sale of regulated retail roaming services within the Union.

The measure would allow to lighten the heavy legislative process for reductions of the wholesale caps (after 2025) via amendments of the Regulation. In a context where the economic space for reductions becomes extremely limited if we respect the cost recovery principle, a standard legislative procedure might not be the most efficient procedure. By setting the parameters of pricing methodology in primary law, regulatory efficiency would be achieved by delegating the power to set the wholesale caps in accordance with this methodology to the Commission and reducing the administrative burden on all subjects involved

Instead of reviewing the whole Roaming Regulation when wholesale caps are revised, a lighter system could be introduced. A delegated act could be issued for the definition of wholesale caps e.g. based on an updated cost model (from 2026 onwards) and/or to possibly give a role to BEREC in the process, similarly to the delegated act for the Eurorate.

As indicated in the Review report, the Roaming Regulation does not face substantial implementation problems as confirmed by overall compliance of mobile operators with the rules, the absence of infringement proceedings, the effective enforcement actions at national level and the small number of complaints (see Review report). As a result, the need for improvements in the current Roaming Regulation is limited, also because many of the costs to implement the monitoring and transparency systems linked to RLAH have been already sustained and only the additional cost of maintaining the system in place are to be considered.

Figure 8 below indicates how the measures included in the preferred option address the problems and objectives of this initiative.

While the administrative burden remains stable and is in fact reduced, thanks to the simplification initiatives, some of the proposed measures introduce additional compliance costs. For a detailed indication of how different operators, consumers, NRAs, BEREC, application providers and verticals are affected by the preferred option see Annex 3, that also includes an overview of cost an benefits of the preferred option. Stakeholders opinion on different measures is summarized in the synopsis report of the public consultation (See Annex 2).

Option 3 considerably improves sustainability results, reducing the number of operators with a negative roaming margin exceeding 3% of their domestic margin. It reduces the need for derogations, allowing an increased number of consumers to fully benefit from RLAH. It seeks to create the preconditions for operators to ensure the same QoS while roaming as domestically and it enables consumers to fully profit from technological development and 5G driven innovation. It seeks to address any lack of clarity on how operators can offer equivalent access to emergency services like at home and delivers useful tools for addressing (wholesale) VAS related misuse. Transparency measures have a positive impact on avoiding consumers’ bill shocks from calls to VAS and end-users awareness on equivalent means of access to emergency services. As a result, it can contribute substantially towards a genuine RLAH experience and have a positive social impact. The measures proposed in Option 4 are considered overly burdensome and disproportionate as explained in Section 7 and are therefore not included in the preferred option. Additional regulatory safeguards of option 4 would not outweigh the complexity in ensuring the implementation of the proposed measures and hence option 3 is considered sufficiently effective in addressing the problem related to ensuring a genuine RLAH experience.

Option 3 is, overall, the most effective, efficient and proportionate/coherent way of achieving the objectives as summarized in Table 4 without exceeding what is necessary. It scores highest on all dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value.

Efficiency scoring: ● Considerable additional costs non-proportionate to the benefits and difficult implementation ●● Neutral or Increase in costs proportionate to the additional benefits ●●● Increase in costs largely outweighed by the benefits.

Proportionality is reinforced for all options, because regulation is provided for a limited period: the Regulation will expire in June 2032. The 10-year duration takes into account that a decade is the typical duration to widely roll out a new generation of mobile communication and develop new business models. In a forward-looking manner, the competition is not expected to change significantly on the market in the next 10 years. The predefined duration is also based on the fact that the rollout of 5G “software-defined networks”, that allow slicing and could potentially have a profound impact on business models, requires the replacement of core network elements and is expected to take more time than the first 5G rollouts. Finally, the 10 year duration aims to ensure certainty in the market and minimize regulatory burden.

Option 4 includes measures that are intrusive and disproportionate. The obligation of MNOs to pass any discounts they get on wholesale roaming rates to MVNOs is intrusive and lacks EU added value. Hosting agreements between MNOs and MVNOs are governed at national level and NRAs have the necessary tools to address any relevant disputes. The measure prohibiting visited operators from deliberately offering lower quality of service for roaming customers, than what can technically be offered in the visited network goes beyond what is needed, as it could enable roamers to get better QoS than domestically. The same applies for the obligation on home operators to request same QoS as at home, for all wholesale agreements. (score ●)

Option 3 contains a set of measures that are neither intrusive nor disproportionate. In particular, the measures proposed are limited to those aspects, which have proved to be insufficiently addressed at national level and for which a harmonised approach is necessary, as explained in detail in the Subsidiarity grid, accompanying the legislative proposal (point 3.2). (score ●●●).

Option 2 is also proportionate, as it does not introduce any intrusive measure that might go beyond what is necessary to address the problems at stake. Like option 1, it fails to ensure a genuine RLAH experience due to derogations to RLAH reducing benefits for consumers and limitations in the access to emergency services as at home and fails to respond to technological and business developments, especially concerning 5G developments. Therefore, like option 1, it lacks sufficient coherence with existing policies, in particular with 5G strategies. (score ●)

Option 1 is proportionate, as it is a simple continuation of the current Regulation in force. However, it fails to ensure access to emergency services as at home and to respond to technological and business developments. Therefore, it lacks sufficient coherence with existing policies, since it fails to complement the Accessibility Act and EECC measures on emergency services to ensure alternative access implementation in a cross border context. (score ●).

Overall Option 4, like option 3, it does not introduce indirect costs and reduces the administrative burden. However, the complexity and costs of the measures are not justified, and the option costs go beyond what is necessary considering the achieved impact (score ●).

Option 4 complements the proposed transparency measures of option 3 with an additional opt-in mechanism for receiving information on available alternative means of access to emergency services. While this feature ensures that end-users that are not interested in alternative means of access are not overburdened with unsolicited information, it might even reduce the impact since also end-users that would need to use alternative means of access to emergency communication might fail to opt-in for this mechanism. Such an opt-in mechanism is more difficult to implement for operators, costly and complex to monitor, thus creating substantial implementation costs for operators without a corresponding increase of the effectiveness of the transparency measure towards end-users.

Option 4 introduces a number of measures that are difficult to implement, costly and complex to monitor, thus creating substantial implementation costs for both operators and NRAs (measures to ensure access to emergency communications as at home, MNO obligation to pass any discounts on wholesale prices to MVNOs, database on VAS number ranges including tariffs and open to the public). The additional measure introducing wholesale level obligation requiring the home operator to request the same QoS as offered at home, for all available networks in the visited country is considered overly burdensome for operators, in particular for smaller operators, both in terms of economic burden and the cumbersome process of setting up wholesale agreements. It would limit bargaining power as well as the possibility of selecting the best wholesale offer. It may lead to a situation where end-users have the option to select a visited network but are not aware of which network has the technical possibility to offer equivalent QoS as at home. For the reasons above, the additional regulatory safeguards of option 4 are not considered efficient.

If the additional measures are implemented those impose new implementation and compliance costs (e.g. measures to ensure access to emergency communications as at home, the VAS database, QoS requirements). Unlike the previous two options, it does not imply indirect costs while also introduces additional simplification measures that further reduce the administrative burden. Overall, its benefits, in terms of reduced sustainability challenges, improved QoS, reduced risks from calls to VAS for both consumers and operators, and unhindered access to emergency communications outweigh the cost (score ●●●).

Option 3 introduces sustainability measures that are based on the continuity of the approach already tested since RLAH introduction in 2017 and strengthen efficiency. They bring important benefits in terms of reduced negative roaming margin overall and reduced cost for derogations requests. It also increases consumer benefits in terms of RLAH (due to fewer derogations and reduced surcharges – see also section 6.3.2). These benefits outweigh the cost of the measure. As explained in section 6.3.1, increase in inbound, wholesale traffic mitigates losses of wholesale revenues (due to the reduction of wholesale caps). Also, the reduction in wholesale costs outweighs the reduction of revenues from surcharges (also due to the reduction in the wholesale caps).

Option 2 introduces a set of rather light measures that are easy to implement and incur a modest compliance cost. Like option 1, it implies a major indirect cost (failing to ensure access to emergency communications while roaming). However, it introduces simplification measures that reduce the administrative burden. Overall costs and benefits are balanced (score ●●).

Option 1 is a simple continuation of the current Regulation. As a result it is straightforward to implement and does not incur any additional implementation costs. However, it also fails to reduce the administrative burden. At the same time, it fails to ensure the same level of access to emergency services while roaming as at home. This could have an indirect cost that cannot be monetized. The inability to access emergency services could have a negative impact to the lives of travellers including possible loss of life (see also section 6.2.1 on the impact of emergency calls to the lives of people) (score ●).

Proposed scoring: ● Considerable additional costs non-proportionate to the benefits and difficult implementation ●● Neutral or Increase in costs proportionate to the additional benefits ●●● Increase in costs largely outweighed by the benefits

Option 4 is equally effective as option 3, as regards objective C. The additional measure prohibiting the visited operators from deliberately offering lower QoS for roaming customers in the visited network than what can technically be offered, would introduce an additional level of safeguards to ensure that end-users are protected from QoS restrictions both from the home and visited operator, but a major limitation of this option is effective monitoring. The roaming end-user has a retail agreement with the home operator. The national regulatory authority of the roaming customer is not competent to monitor if the visited operator ensures any specific QoS level. Similarly, the regulator of the visited operator would not be able to monitor if the QoS offered is equivalent to what the roaming customer is offered by its home operator domestically. The main differences in the proposed measures are not expected to improve its effectiveness, as explained in sections 6.2.2 (additional features of database with VAS number ranges) and 6.2.3 (additional obligation on wholesale roaming agreements) and the option goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective satisfactorily (score ●●●)

Option 3 includes a set of measures that can contribute towards objective C. The proposed European database for VAS number ranges provides operators with a useful tool to combat losses from fraud and bill-shocks from calls to VAS numbers. Operators confirm this need in their responses to the public consultation. Also, according to the joint Commission-BEREC online survey, many operators have in fact sought to obtain information on VAS numbers and support this measure. The access obligation to all network technologies and generations empowers the home operators to seek the appropriate roaming agreements that can ensure the same level of QoS as at home, and the wide use of 5G technologies. The proposed clarification of the possibility to use alternative, non-volume based tariff structures can offer clarity and contribute to the development of the wholesale roaming market for M2M communications and related innovation benefits. However, its effectiveness remains to be proved, because it largely depends on the cooperativeness of operators. The foreseen reporting and monitoring activities on the M2M market will allow NRAs to develop expertise on this emerging market. (score ●●●)

Option 2 cannot effectively contribute towards objective C. The impact of the measure on wholesale roaming agreements depends on the cooperation of operators, as it does not include any obligations on the home operators. Finally, the publication of VAS number ranges will be complex and potentially costly to use, because information on VAS will be dispersed in various sites/databases. As a result, several operators (especially smaller ones) might opt for not using it, which will limit its effectiveness. As also concluded in section 6.1.3, the positive impact of option 2 in this regard is small. (score ●)

Option 1 cannot contribute towards objective C. The relevant challenges under the baseline are described in detail in section 2.1.4. (score ●)

Objective C: Ensure the same QoS as at home and access to all network technologies and generations, facilitate innovation and avoid misuse/fraud

Option 4 is expected to have a similar impact on genuine RLAH experience as option 3 in general. The additional measures are expected to make only a minor difference, as discussed in section 6.3.1. and might go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective satisfactorily (score ●●●)

Option 3 contains additional measures that can contribute towards improving RLAH experience. Thanks to measures under 3A, the risk of subscribers facing sustainability derogation is expected to reduce from 14.8% to 8.6%, while the maximum level of FUP surcharges for data will be reduced by 20% from 1 July 2022 and an additional 25% from 1 January 2025 (as a result of the reduction of the wholesale caps). Consumers are likely to see an improved QoS and have a clear picture about the QoS they should expect when travelling abroad, which can decrease complaints. They will also have better awareness about the risk of calls to VAS, which can reduce bill-shocks and again decrease complaints. Finally, the proposed measures under option 3are more likely to enable operators to offer equivalent access to emergency services like at home, making a measurable impact to the quality of life, as explained in section 6.2.1. (score ●●●)

Option 2 cannot effectively contribute towards objective B. The relevant measures can improve end-user awareness but do not materially improve the RLAH experience and do not address the identified limitations in emergency communications, discussed in section 2. Furthermore, they do not reduce considerably the risk of end-users facing a sustainability derogation surcharge (see section 6.1.1). (score ●●)

Option 4 contributes towards the sustainable provision of RLAH without however, eliminating entirely sustainability challenges, as explained in section 6.3.2. Its impact is slightly better than that of option 3. However, it is based on a measure that is difficult to implement and monitor, which compromises its effectiveness and confirms the need of maintaining the safeguards mechanisms (score ●●●).

Option 3 contributes towards the sustainable provision of RLAH without however entirely eliminating sustainability challenges, as explained in section 6.2.2. This confirms the need of maintaining the safeguards mechanisms already included in the Roaming Regulation (derogations and Fair use policy). Competitive dynamics might however further lower down wholesale prices and sustainability challenges might be smaller than what is indicated by the model. (score ●●●)

Option 1 (the baseline) cannot contribute to ensuring the sustainable provision of RLAH. The sustainability challenges encountered under the baseline are described in detail in section 2.1.2. According to the Commission’s sustainability analysis (see Annex 4A), in 2023 27% of operators are expected to have negative roaming margin exceeding 3% of their roaming margin. This figure is expected to increase to 29% in 2025. (score ●)

Sustainability (A): The proposed measure (MNO obligation to pass discounts on wholesale roaming rates to MVNOs) will introduce complex and burdensome reporting requirements for both operators and NRAs. Its monitoring would require extensive reporting on the wholesale prices paid and the corresponding prices charged to MVNOs, where the linking between the two is not always straightforward. As a result, it can introduce a substantial increase to the administrative burden. Option 4 includes similar simplification gains (REFIT), as option 3.

Calls to VAS (B2 and C2): The development and maintenance of an open access European database with VAS number ranges and tariff information. However, will have a substantial cost for BEREC (responsible for both tasks), especially due to the increased requirements (because of the open access). The inclusion of tariff information introduces a substantial additional cost for the NRAs (responsible to update the database contents) and a high administrative burden for operators that will have to report tariffs, as soon as they change.

Access to emergency communications services while roaming (B3): The proposed measures imply increased implementation costs, mostly linked with the implementation of rights and obligations already defined in the European framework (EECC). Compliance costs relating to the transparency obligation are minor.

Innovation and Quality of Service related measures (B1 and C1): The option of not having a preferred network may be burdensome for the home operators as they would have to negotiate the same wholesale agreements with all operators that can technically fulfill the requested QoS level. It would limit bargaining power as well as the possibility of selecting the best wholesale offer. Overall, the proposed measures introduce a minor implementation cost for operators and a minor enforcement cost for NRAs but do not impact the administrative burden.

Option 4 introduces additional compliance and reporting costs compared Option 3. In terms of administrative burden, it retains the reporting and monitoring mechanism as under the Roaming Regulation in force (see section 9), however following the additional measures envisaged, mainly linked to the open access VAS database, and the additional MVNO measures, it increases considerably the overall reporting burden as explained below.

In any case, the impact of option 4 for enterprises and business users in the Digital Single Market cannot be quantified.

There is a difference, since Option 4 contains an additional obligation on home operators to request same QoS as at home, for all wholesale agreements. This could increase the number of networks in each country that can deliver the desired QoS. It could facilitate end-users to enjoy the expected QoS. However, this is not necessarily a bottleneck, as long as there is at least one network with sufficient coverage and offering the expected QoS.

We expect option 4 to have a similar impact on SMEs and on the Digital Single Market as option 3. It substantially reduces the risks of SME not being able to benefit from RLAH compared to the baseline (with even higher impact than option 3) and has equally positive impacts on innovation and use of innovative mobile services, based on latest technologies.

Concerning emergency communications, option 4 includes an additional transparency measures, with an opt-in mechanism for additional information on available alternative means of access to emergency services. This constitutes a simple facilitation that cannot make a measurable difference, and might even reduce the impact since end-users might fail to opt in for this mechanism.

Concerning VAS, option 4 requires opting-in to use VAS while roaming. The impact is considered similar to option 3. While we could foresee a stronger impact in terms of reduced frustration from bill shocks and complaints, the same measure would also hinder the use of VAS. This is equally likely to create frustration and complaints, reducing the overall impact as well as the benefit for consumers. According to the joint Commission-BEREC on-line survey of 2020, 16.4% of operators have received complaints for blocking calls to VAS. In either case we cannot quantify its impact.

Concerning QoS, option 4 provides an additional measure (prohibiting the visited operator from deliberately offering lower quality of service than what can technically be offered).

Concerning misuse, this option is practically similar to option 3 as both are based on establishing a central database with the VAS number ranges. The only difference (database open to the public under option 4 as opposed to operators and NRAs only under option 3) is unlikely to have an additional impact on misuse.

This difference is reflected in the results of the sustainability analysis (see section 6.1), according to which, in 2023 the provision of RLAH would be unsustainable for 17% of operators (compared to 27% in the baseline). Sustainability improvements could lead to a reduction of the total negative roaming margin, compared to the baseline option by 45% in 2023 and 53% in 2025.However, this improvement might not happen, since it is based on an intrusive measure (MNO obligation to pass discounts on wholesale roaming tariffs to MVNOs). Indeed, hosting agreements can be subject to commercial negotiations or mandated by national decisions (e.g. dispute resolutions, remedies following approval of mergers, or even terms and conditions of procedures to award rights of use for spectrum). As a result, it is difficult to justify and implement. In addition, it will introduce substantial administrative overhead for both operators and member states, to monitor pricing and demonstrate the passing of discounts. Furthermore, it is not transparent and entails complex implementation and supervision resulting in substantially increased burden for market players and member states. Finally, it could have other negative repercussions that could effectively increase the roaming cost of MVNOs negating to some extend the anticipated gains. Examples would be including additional administrative or implementation charges (e.g. for reporting, negotiating wholesale rates, implementing FUP etc.) or requiring (possibly increased) commitments for purchasing wholesale roaming traffic (as is the case in direct negotiations of wholesale rates.

Option 4 will lead to a substantial reduction to wholesale caps as well as to actual wholesale prices, while maintaining cost recovery for the provision of wholesale services. Its only difference with option 3 is the MNO obligation to pass any discounts they get on wholesale rates to MVNOs. This might improve MVNO sustainability (compared to option 3). Its impact on MNO cannot be measured with the available data.

For example, roaming customers will be able to use increasingly new 5G and IoT mobile services connecting vehicles and road infrastructure (Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything or (C-V2X), while travelling through other member States. This could prevent human casualties and increase traffic efficiency, reducing the cost per km of travel in urban areas, fuel costs, CO2 and other air pollution emissions, lower need to repair or recycle wrecked vehicles, with a smaller ecological footprint.

Option 3 will have a similar environmental impact as option 2, with slightly higher positive impact due to reduced derogations and improved consumers capacity to benefit from a genuine RLAH experience (including 5G) that makes it easier for them to use environmentally friendly mobile services and applications while roaming.

On the other hand, it includes horizontal simplification (already analysed under option 2), including on the reporting process, so as to reduce compliance costs and the administrative burden of operators (C3). It also introduces a lighter mechanism (a delegated act instead of a normal legislative procedure) for the potential future revision of wholesale caps. This is a substantial improvement, since by setting the parameters of pricing methodology in primary law, regulatory efficiency would be achieved by delegating the power to set the wholesale caps in accordance with this methodology to the Commission. If compared to a standard legislative procedure a delegated act would reduce excessive administrative burden on all subjects involved.

Access to emergency communications services while roaming (B3): The proposed measures imply implementation costs linked to amending wholesale roaming contracts, mostly linked however with the implementation of rights and obligations already defined in the European framework (EECC). Compliance costs relating to the transparency obligation are minor.

Calls to VAS (B2 and C2): The proposed measures (transparency obligations and European database with VAS number ranges) have a minor impact on compliance costs and no impact on the administrative burden for operators. Also, it does not incur any additional enforcement costs for NRAs. The development and maintenance of the database will have an implementation cost for BEREC (responsible for both tasks) and a modest cost for the NRAs (responsible to update the database contents).

The proposed clarification of the possibility to use alternative, non-volume based tariff structures can offer clarity and contribute to the development of the wholesale roaming market for M2M communications (including agreements that allow permanent roaming) and related innovation benefits. However, its effectiveness remains to be proved, because it largely depends on the cooperativeness of operators. The foreseen reporting and monitoring activities on the M2M market will allow NRAs to develop expertise on this emerging market. The additional administrative burden for market players and member states is minimal, as it does not introduce new reporting and monitoring obligations.

This option might bring additional indirect innovation benefits to developers and end-users of application that require high QoS, especially if those applications and services might operate exclusively on 5G networks. Enjoying the same QoS when travelling as at home could indirectly support the uptake of applications and services, that can function and be used seamlessly across the Internal Market, without cross border interruption. However, the above positive impact for enterprises and business users in the Digital Single Market cannot be quantified.

For application providers and start-ups, including SMEs, this implies an increased possibility for consumers to use applications continuously based on an improved and known QoS, also while travelling, without fearing to incur high costs due to surcharges. This is particularly relevant for applications that offer mobility solution/accommodation/other tourism related services and all the applications that might be particularly interesting while travelling.

The QoS measures are likely to facilitate future needs linked to technology and innovation developments, while ensuring the widest possible use of 5G and minimization of the risk for end-users not being able to use certain applications requiring 5G technology while crossing borders. As such, a non-discrimination obligation would ensure a level playing field for the European mobile operators. Ultimately, the home operators are empowered to ensure that their subscribers enjoy the same QoS while roaming as at home.

Option 3 substantially reduces risks of SME not being able to benefit from RLAH, as it quite effectively alleviates sustainability challenges. This implies a reduced use of sustainability derogations (compared to options 1 or 2), hence a reduced number of end-users that might be subject to (the small) derogation surcharges. This means that under option 3, consumers and business end-users will continue using digital services while roaming and that SME employees will continue to have access to on-line, corporate productivity and collaboration tools without any surcharges while roaming.

As regards social impacts, similarly to option 2, increased awareness about alternative means of access to emergency services can help disabled end-users in emergency situation reducing the baseline risks or not being able to use emergency services while roaming. In comparison to the baseline option and Option 2, this option is more likely to enable operators to offer equivalent access to emergency services like at home, including free of charge access and caller location (including handset based localization) that might be particularly important for e.g. end-users with exhausted pre-paid credit. This can have a major indirect benefit. We cannot give a specific estimation of live saved due to proposed measures, since it is not possible to estimate the number of cases where emergency communication in a roaming environment would be hindered. It is however, possible to give an indication of the average number of lives saved per year for every 100,000 mobile emergency calls. Just by implementing handset based Advanced Mobile Location (AML) average saved life per year is 0.45 and the average number of lives impacted every 100,000 mobile emergency calls is 4.37 (lives impacted are those persons that have a diminished or prevented injury as a consequence of accurate location). Free of charge provision at wholesale level of the caller location transmission and wholesale level transparency, as proposed in option 3, would contribute to enabling of the presented benefits.

Consumers will also have better awareness about the cost of calls to VAS, thus, be less likely to face bill-shocks. This can in turn lead to reduced frustration from bill-shocks and fewer complaints that again cannot be quantified.

As a result of option 3 QoS measures, consumers are likely to see an improved QoS and have a clear picture about the QoS they should expect when travelling abroad. This can result in increased customer satisfaction and reduced complaints. According to the joint Commission/BEREC online survey, 18% of operators have received complaints that at most 3G was available and 22% have received complaints that full 4G speeds were not possible. The number of complaints could be reduced but we cannot quantify the relevant impact.

Those consuming substantial volumes while roaming and being at risk of facing fair use policy surcharges, will see a reduced cost for two reasons. Reduced caps cause thresholds used in the open data bundle and pre-paid fair use limits to drop, which means less amount of consumed data becoming subject to a fair use policy surcharge. The reduction in wholesale caps would imply a 20% reduction of the maximum fair use surcharge for data from 1 July 2022 and an additional 25% reduction from 1 January 2025.

Subscribers of inbounder MNOs and MVNOs are less likely to need sustainability derogation (hence end-users are more likely to enjoy the full benefits of RLAH), thanks to the reduced wholesale prices and the ensuring improved sustainability. For business end-users this means less risk of having to pay for the use of on-line productivity and business tools while roaming. The Commission analysis estimates that in 2025, the percentage of EEA end-users who could be subject to sustainability derogations, hence not enjoy the full RLAH benefits could be reduced from 14.8% to 8.6%.

The expected positive impact on consumers’ and business end-users capacity to benefit from RLAH is considerably improved compared to the baseline. Option 3 strengthens sustainability and contains additional measures at both retail and wholesale level to ensure an adequate RLAH experience and to have a positive social impact.

Furthermore, the proposed solution for the European database for VAS number ranges foreseen in option 3 is expected to reduce losses from fraud and misuse and reduced bill-shocks from calls to VAS numbers. However, it is only a tool and it is up to the operators to use it in a way that can minimize the risk for (wholesale) bill shocks from calls to VAS numbers. Estimating and monetizing the actual impact is difficult. A modest 20% reduction to misuse could save European operators a median of 14,000 € per operator yearly.

According to the sustainability analysis (see section 6.1), in 2023 the provision of RLAH would be unsustainable for 19% of operators (compared to 27% in the baseline). This marks a 22% improvement, compared to the results produced by the model for 2019 and indicates that option 3 can lead to a further decrease in the number of sustainability derogations. . Sustainability improvements could lead to a reduction of the total negative roaming margin, compared to the baseline option by 42% in 2023 and 52% in 2025.These are, however, conservative estimates and competitive dynamics might further lower down wholesale prices and hence the sustainability challenge in reality might be smaller than what is indicated by the model.

However, as a result of the reduction in the caps, operators might see their revenues from authorized roaming surcharges decrease (fair use policy retail revenues). This is due to the fact that rules on Fair Use Policies, are based on the level of wholesale caps and therefore the limitations that operators are authorized to apply in case of particularly advantageous offers (data allowances based on the open data bundles limit) and in case of pre-paid subscriptions are automatically increased with the reduction of the caps. Also the maximum fair use policy surcharge (equal to the wholesale cap) is automatically decreased with the reduction of the cap.

On the other hand, outbounder MNOs and MVNOs will see their negative roaming margin decrease (and in some cases become positive), as a result of the reduced wholesale prices. For an outbound operator, any reduction to the cap will always have a positive effect on the roaming margin if traffic is unchanged, as outbound operators by definition has to purchase more roaming traffic than it can sell from its own network. With an increase in traffic, the outbound operator will on the one hand likely see decreasing caps but will at the same time also need to purchase more roaming-traffic to serve the increased demand from its customers. So while increasing traffic leads to reduced unit costs, there is some uncertainty for the marginal outbound operator as to how this effects sustainability. As operators are not allowed to charge extra for roaming consumption, they do charge for overall consumption, including roaming consumption. Therefore, when the share of roaming traffic to domestic traffic increases, this might also affect how the retail revenue is allocated between roaming and domestic consumption. The outbound operator will therefore always be better off when wholesale caps decreases.

Inbounder MNOs will see their positive roaming margin reduce, as a result of the reduced wholesale prices, due to evolving competition dynamics, also in light of potential emergence of non-discriminatory trading. However, this reduction is in practice balanced, thanks to the anticipated increase in roaming traffic. When the caps set are above the costs, an inbound operator will always have a positive margin. As roaming traffic increases and estimated costs decreases, the caps set based on cost recovery will likely also decrease. Therefore, the margin between costs incurred and the cap set might shrink, but due to the increasing traffic, the inbound operator will balance the reduction of the cap by the increase in traffic.

Option 3 will lead to a substantial reduction to wholesale caps as well as to actual wholesale prices. This will ensure cost recovery for the provision of wholesale services as described in Section 5.2.2, preserving incentives to invest in visited networks and avoiding distortion of domestic competition in visited markets. It will also further affect operators in different ways:

Therefore, we expect option 2 to have a slight positive environmental impact but we are not able to quantify it.

The proposed measures do not have substantial environmental impacts compared to the baseline, thanks to slightly reduced derogations it might only marginally improve roaming customers ability to enjoy full RLAH and use new generation and IoT mobile services while roaming. For example, it could also enable consumers to continue using their “smart home” applications, allowing them to save energy.

On the other hand, option 2 includes a minimum level of horizontal simplification (REFIT), including on the reporting process, so as to reduce compliance costs and the administrative burden of operators without compromising the collected data.

Calls to VAS (B2 and C2): The proposed measures (transparency and publication of VAS number ranges at national level) have a minor impact on compliance costs and no impact on the administrative burden for operators. Also, they do not incur any additional enforcement costs for NRAs. The publication and update of information on VAS number ranges will have a modest cost for the NRAs (responsible for these tasks).

Access to emergency communications services while roaming (B3): The proposed transparency measures imply a minor compliance cost for operators. An additional compliance cost comes from the need to inform subscribers that have opted-out from receiving the Welcome SMS. However, failure to ensure the same level of access to emergency services while roaming as at home could have a considerable indirect cost that cannot be estimated. The inability to access emergency services could have a significant negative impact to the lives of travelers, including possible loss of life (see also section 6.3.1 on the impact of emergency calls to the lives of people).

Quality of Service related measures (B1 and C1): The proposed measures (transparency and clarification on neutral access obligation for wholesale services) introduce a minor additional burden to operators and NRAs. Operators already have systems in place to manage their own customers’ roaming traffic dynamically, to ensure the best QoS, as confirmed in the public consultation. As a result, the compliance cost will be minor. Similarly, NRAs already monitor the QoS offered while roaming, so they will not incur an additional enforcement cost.

Option 2 introduces modest compliance costs, following the additional measures envisaged. In terms of administrative burden, it retains the reporting and monitoring mechanism as under the Roaming Regulation in force (see section 9). This not only saves the burden of new reporting processes but can benefit from the current experience to improve the efficiency, through the REFIT process.

It is likely to partially facilitate the utilization of applications requiring access to certain technologies and associated facilities in the mobile network. It would indirectly support innovation by service and mobile applications providers, especially of those that should function seamlessly across the Single Market.

Option 2 might facilitate innovation and completion on the market, but only to a limited extent. The clarification that the wholesale access obligation is technology neutral, would eliminate the current doubts on the market in this regard. It might facilitate access to 5G networks but it is not coupled with obligations on the home operator to ensure the same level of services as domestically. As a result, its impact largely depends on the cooperativeness of operators.

However, practically unchanged sustainability challenges compared to the baseline, maintain the risk of sustainability derogations, leading to risk for some end-users of not benefit from full RLAH and this would consequently reduce SME benefits.

SMEs and especially start ups developing new applications, benefit from the possibility for consumers of using applications continuously, also while travelling, without fearing to incur high costs. This is particularly relevant e.g. for applications that offer mobility solution/accommodation/other tourism related services and all the applications that might be particularly interesting while travelling.

SMEs are an important group of business end-users for roaming services and benefits from RLAH are maintained (e.g. productivity gains, increased usage of digital services by consumers etc), along with general business end-users benefits.

Overall, the positive social and consumer’s benefits impact remains modest with a high risk or derogations and the RLAH experience limited, with unsolved problems related mainly to QoS and emergency communications.

Increased awareness about alternative means of access to emergency services can help disabled end users that search for the information and pay attention to the “Welcome SMS”. However, it is unlikely to have equal impact on users that do not pay attention to the message or to users that have opted-out and do not receive it. Most important however, the identified limitations in emergency communications will remain (see also section 2.1.3) and continue hindering access to emergency services. As a result, we do not expect a material impact.

Awareness about the risk of bill-shocks from calls to VAS could reduce the risk of these bill-shocks. However, a transparency measure based on information provided only in contracts is likely to attract limited attention.

Option 2 contains additional transparency measures on QoS, emergency services and VAS. As a result of these measures, consumers are likely to see an improved QoS and have a clear picture about the QoS they should expect when travelling abroad. Improving awareness on the expected QoS could help reduce consumer complaints. On the other hand, it cannot improve materially the RLAH experience by itself.

The expected positive impact on end-users capacity to benefit from RLAH is limited since sustainability measures are not expected to have a major impact (as analysed in section 6.1.2). The analysis done by the Commission services estimates that in 2025, the percentage of EEA end-users who could be subject to sustainability derogations, hence not enjoy the full RLAH benefits is expected to remain practically unchanged (14.6% compared to 14.8% in the baseline).

Concerning the risk of fraudulent generation of traffic towards international numbers (see section 2.1.4, problem C2, ‘misuse’), option 2 proposes a simple solution to increase transparency of VAS number ranges. This is intended as a tool that operators could use in a way that can reduce the risk for (wholesale) bill shocks from calls to VAS numbers and mitigate the risks linked to the artificial generation of traffic towards international destinations. However, it will be complex and potentially costly to use, because information on VAS will be dispersed in various sites. As a result, we expect that several operators (especially smaller ones) will be unwilling to use it.

According to the sustainability analysis (see section 6.1), in 2023 the provision of RLAH would be unsustainable for 26% of operators (compared to 27% in the baseline). Sustainability improvements could lead to a reduction of the total negative roaming margin, compared to the baseline option by 23% in 2023 and 22% in 2025.

The analysis also examines the robustness of the forecasts by performing a sensitivity analysis. It specifically examines how sustainability develops under different scenarios leading to improved or deteriorated sustainability results as well as by taking into account the impact of the COVID pandemic (See Annex 4A for details).

Sustainability, as defined in the Commission Implementing Regulation, is the ratio (in percentage) that compares the “Roaming Margin” (the difference between roaming revenues and roaming costs) with the “Domestic Margin” (operator profits from domestic services).

The model utilises data collected by BEREC in the framework of the International Roaming Benchmarking Reports, covering the period Q4 2016 to Q1 2020. The analysis covers a set of 96 operators, 72 MNOs and 24 MVNOs. It produces consumption forecasts for the period 2020-2025, based on the information on outbound and inbound volumes from 2017 Q2 up to 2019 Q4, as well on the EUROSTAT monthly data on “Nights spent at tourist accommodation establishments”. It then utilizes the above forecasts to assess sustainability at operator level over a 6-year horizon.

To assess the impact of the various policy options on the sustainable provision of RLAH (sustainability analysis), the Commission services have designed a model that evaluates the economic impact of RLAH on operators, taking into account the different policy options and the (forecasted) functioning of the roaming market. The analysis seeks to estimate the number of operators for which the provision of RLAH would be unsustainable .

Would access to emergency services be ensured like at home for all end-users? To what extent it meets specific needs of disabled end-users?

What is the impact on consumers? Would the option enable consumers to enjoy a genuine RLAH experience? Would it help to prevent bill shocks?

What is the Impact on SMEs, to what extent does this option foster the completion of the digital single market, enables benefits for the digital economy? To what extent would measures respond to technological and business developments facilitate innovation, 5G and M2M services development in the Single Market?

To what extent would operators be able to limit negative economic impacts from fraud and misuse problems linked to VAS?

What is the economic impact on operators’ retail roaming margin? To what extent do measures ensure sustainability of RLAH and cost recovery at wholesale level, preserving incentives to invest in visited networks and avoiding distortion of domestic competition in visited markets?

This section will assess the social, economic and environmental impacts of the options based on the assessment criteria indicated in Table 2 below.

There seems to be a high level of political consensus to the continuation of the current policy. It would be therefore unrealistic to consider that the policy would come to an end. Consumers have also adapted consumption patterns to RLAH and would risk to incur bill shocks.

The public consultation on the review of the Roaming Regulation confirms that the Roaming Regulation for EU citizens and businesses is still needed, and none of the respondents explicitly proposed to lift the regulation. 96% of the citizens strongly agree (87%) or agree (9%) that they can enjoy the benefits that the Roaming Regulation aims to bring. The benefits include staying connected without having to restrict their usage of roaming, not worrying about having to pay excessive costs for the use of mobile services and continuing to use mobile services like at home . 74% of all respondents consider the regulation significantly relevant, while 10% are neutral and 8% expressed that the relevance is moderate. The 2018 Eurobarometer survey showed that 81% of travelers were aware that roaming charges had ended in the EU/EEA and 69% of all Europeans responded that they, or someone they know, benefit or will benefit. The feedback received by the Commission from consumer associations since June 2017 is overall very positive.

There are 170 million European roaming customers currently enjoying RLAH that would risk to lose consumers benefits as presented in Section 3.2 that includes an estimate of the Consumer surplus as quantified by JRC (see also Annex 4).

The Review report and section 2.2 of this IA both explain why RLAH cannot be sustained absent regulation given the observed market and regulatory failures. RLAH and its sustainable provision by operators have been ensured through the regulation of EU wide wholesale caps. If the Regulation is left to expire and the wholesale market would be left unregulated, there would be a market failure. Prices of “rest of the world roaming” (RoW roaming) demonstrate that without regulation prices would be considerably different.

The Review report has gathered a broad range of data and presents evidence to evaluate how the Roaming Regulation has performed and how the roaming markets are functioning and has confirmed the validity of the current approach. Deregulation is therefore not considered, since it would seriously risk the successful achievements the roaming intervention has brought to consumers and businesses. For additional details on the Review report and evaluation elements see Annex 6.

As underlined in section 5.2.2, more than 70% of respondents expressed their agreement to the development of a database with VAS number ranges and relevant termination rates that is open to the public.

C2. Higher level of transparency on wholesale level for VAS. This an expanded version of option 3. It envisages establishing a centralised European database for VAS numbering ranges, including tariff information, allowing end-users to access information about VAS numbering ranges and charges. The task of establishing and maintaining the database will be assigned to BEREC.

C1: Obligation on the home operator at wholesale level to request the same QoS as offered at home, for all wholesale agreements, i.e. no preferred network. It would ensure that the roaming customers receive equivalent roaming services to the mobile services enjoyed at home, irrespective of the visited network(s) in the same visited country.

This measure had some support by stakeholders participating in the public consultation. Amongst those respondents that expressed their opinion on the relevance of the proposal (52%), 16 found it relevant and 18 did not find it relevant. However, among those who considered the proposal relevant (relevant (11) or very relevant (5)) the European Disability Forum, European Union for Deaf and European Emergency Number Association consider it very relevant.

B3: Opt-in functionality for additional information on available alternative means of access to emergency services. It would enable end-users with disabilities to opt-in to receiving additional information about alternative means of access to emergency services. Information could for example be received through an additional SMS with information specifically about the available means of access to emergency services in the visited Member State.

As regards access to Emergency services, and in addition to the measures proposed in Option 3 and in alternative to the transparency measure in Option 2, this option includes:

BEREC has considered this option as a possible solution, indicating however that its technical feasibility and its implementation costs for the roaming providers would have to be further assessed. In the public consultation, more than half of the respondents (57%) supported this proposal. However, operators were less positive, which reflects its technical complexity.

B2. Increased control regarding VAS via dedicated (opt-in) mechanism. The opt-in mechanism means that customers who want to use VAS also while roaming would need to inform their roaming provider.

78% of all respondents are positive to an obligation on the visited mobile operator at retail and wholesale level, prohibiting deliberately lowering the quality of service while roaming (e.g. limiting access to 3G instead of 4G), compared to the quality of service offered in the home country. The majority of these respondents are citizens and consumer organisations (63%). 96% (91 out of 95) of the citizens and consumer organisations think that such an obligation is relevant.

It is up to the home operator to ensure that access is requested for at least the same level of quality, if technically possible, in the visited network. The visited operator will be prohibited from deliberately lowering the QoS while roaming (e.g. limiting access to 3G instead of 4G or limiting the bandwidth) compared to what can technically be offered in the visited network and what has been agreed between the operators. This obligation would entail additional responsibility on the visited MNO to ensure that roaming customers in the visited network can enjoy the same QoS as at home (depending on what has been agreed in the wholesale agreement), without discrimination.

This measure envisages introducing an explicit obligation on the visited mobile operator. The visited operator shall not deliberately limit access to its network for roaming customers and should not discriminate between their own customers and roaming customers by e.g. throttling the speed for roaming customers.

B1: Visited operators would be prohibited from deliberately offering lower quality of service for roaming customers in the visited network (e.g. limiting access to 3G instead of 4G), than what can technically be offered in the visited network.

As regards QoS and innovation, in addition to the transparency obligation and obligation on prohibiting the home operator from deliberately offering lower QoS while roaming in Option 3, this option foresees also an obligation on the visited operator.

Around 30% of the respondents expressed a positive view on this proposal, another 30% indicated a negative view and around 40% did not reply or had a neutral view. Out of the respondents who expressed a view 16 out of 17 MNOs do not think such an obligation would be relevant, while 7 out 9 MVNO/Es think it is relevant. A limited number of other respondent group replied to this question, however the small number of responding consumer organisations and public authorities in general support this option.

A1. Ensure enhanced sustainability of RLAH and cost recovery at wholesale level. This option is identical to option 3 but with the addition of measures aiming at alleviating the burden on MVNOs. Specifically, it mandates MNOs to pass the discounts they get on the rates for regulated wholesale roaming services to the MVNOs they host. This measure is relevant for those MVNOs that obtain wholesale roaming services through some sort of a resale agreement and not through bilateral negotiations (92% of full MVNOs and all light MVNOs, according to the June 2019 BEREC Opinion).

Further simplification might be introduced in the monitoring process, possibly reducing the burden on operators and NRAs. In the framework of the coordination with BEREC, the Commission services will examine the possibility of merging and streamlining monitoring processes, including the obligation to publish the yearly report on transparency and comparability of roaming tariffs with the international roaming benchmark report and respective questionnaire. However, it is not planned to reduce considerably the data collected, since this would have a negative effect on the Commission’s ability to provide an adequate level of monitoring of the roaming market and analysis in future reviews and impact assessments, especially as regards regulation of wholesale pricing and roaming market dynamics. In its additional input to the Commission BEREC suggests simplifying the monitoring obligations by covering the data collection of the transparency and comparability report within the scope of the international benchmark report.

Such a light procedure would only be used, if the report on the functioning of the roaming market (foreseen for 2025) shows a need for regulatory intervention. Alternatively, the caps could remain unchanged after 2025, if competitive conditions show a well-functioning market. Only if there is a need for more structural changes to the Regulation itself, the Roaming Regulation would be reviewed.

It should introduce a possibility to use a lighter system for any future revision of wholesale caps. A full legislative process to revise the wholesale caps could be considered non-efficient. Regulatory efficiency could be achieved through an empowerment included in the new Regulation, setting the details of the methodology to be applied by the Commission for the revision of caps. Based on an updated cost model from 2026 onwards it would become possible to amend the caps through a delegated act. BEREC should have a role in this process, similarly to the delegated act setting the Union-wide voice termination rates under Art 75 of the EECC.

In addition to measures proposed in Option 2, under Option 3 the following would be included to further simplify the Regulation and reduce administrative burden.

In its opinion BoR(20) 131, BEREC supports this approach. Several operators have also suggested establishing such a database, in their responses to the joint Commission-BEREC online survey of 2020. More than 70% of respondents to the public consultation confirmed the need for introducing measures in the Roaming Regulation against bill-shocks from calls to VAS. The idea of setting up a European database for VAS was generally welcomed by stakeholders (more than 70% from all respondents groups), and in particular by operators and their associations, while 9% of respondents (a few companies and citizens) considered this solution not relevant. All consumer organizations (5) remained neutral.

The task of establishing and maintaining the database can be assigned to BEREC. It is estimated that a maximum of 3 years from the adoption of the Regulation should be sufficient for developing such a database. BEREC has already initiated a similar (though much simpler) project for building a list (xls file) with all number ranges for voice-based Premium Rate Services and directory enquiry services in the EEA.

This measure envisages establishing a centralized European database for VAS numbering ranges but without information on wholesale tariffs (as this would significantly complicate the maintenance process). It is intended as a transparency tool that would enable NRAs and operators to have direct access to information about which numbering ranges can generate higher costs (termination rates) in all Member States. Accessibility will be limited, only to roaming providers and NRAs. The Regulation will not stipulate its usage but rather leave it to the discretion of NRAs and operators. NRAs could use it to confirm if high wholesale rates requested for a call to a specific number is indeed justified. Operators could use it to control calls to VAS, to warn consumers that the call might have increased cost. They could even block calls to certain number ranges, in case of suspicious fraudulent activity.

The Commission will monitor the developments of roaming wholesale services for the M2M market and related commercial agreements (See also Section 9) and assess the situation in the context of the report by the end of 2025.

To address emerging needs of the evolving M2M market, the option will clarify that operators could employ charging schemes other than the volume based tariffs that are typically used (e.g. per SIM card and month) through alternative wholesale tariffs to be applied on voluntary basis. Given the expected market developments, operators are encouraged to accept all reasonable requests for establishing (or amending) roaming agreements for M2M communications services. Commercial agreements where operators explicitly allow permanent roaming for M2M are an expected trend for roaming wholesale agreements. Operators might increasingly agree not to consider caps to such charging schemes nor to any tariffs that apply in cases of permanent roaming and foresee offers that are better adapted to requirements of this market, that is still in its early stage of development.

This option is supported by BEREC and other stakeholders. 75% of all respondents are positive to an obligation MNOs to give access to all network technologies and generations (2G, 3G, 4G, 5G etc.) non-discriminatory access, upon a reasonable wholesale roaming access request. 89% (85 out of 95) of the citizens and consumer organisations think that such an obligation is relevant. 7 out of 25 MNOs have expressed that such an obligation would be relevant, while 8 do not think it is relevant and 6 are neutral. Among the MVNO/Es 7 do think it is relevant while 2 are neutral. Among the other business stakeholders, including SMEs/entrepreneurs/vertical industries/IoT & M2M and industry associations 4 out of 5 think such a measure would be relevant.

The QoS for roaming services shall not be limited or hampered by access restrictions. The principle of access to all network technologies and generations ensures that MNOs do not limit wholesale roaming access seekers from offering retail roaming services to their end-users on any given network. This would allow wholesale roaming operators seeking access to effectively replicate the domestic retail offers, when technically feasible, in a roaming context. It aims to address also innovation and business developments, ensuring the widest use of 5G and modern connected services and to minimize the risk that end-users would not be able to use certain applications requiring 5G technology while crossing borders.

C1: Ensure the same QoS while roaming as at home and respond to technological and business developments by clarifying the obligation on visited MNOs to give access to all network technologies and generations (2G, 3G, 4G, 5G etc.), upon a reasonable wholesale roaming access request. Clarifying the principle of access to all network technologies and generations on will allow all operators (MNOs and MVNOs alike) an equal and fair prospect to access the networks available to offer retail roaming services like at home. It would contribute to more equal terms for competition in the retail market, in particular for MVNOs. Whether or not an operator seeking access can offer reciprocal access in his network should not be a limitation. Furthermore, a reference offer should not be made in such a way that access to a certain technology is made more/less favorable.

B3: Ensure access to emergency services free of charge as at home. Not charging the emergency communications at wholesale level by the visited operator, would enable home operators to replicate the free of charge provision of emergency communication at retail level. As indicated in its additional input to the Commission, BEREC supports a clarification about the provider responsibility for bearing costs at the wholesale level would give more regulatory certainty especially for NRAs. In the public consultation, 26% of the respondents expressed that this measure would be relevant, while it was considered not relevant by 28% of the respondents.

In addition, home operators will have an obligation to inform customers at retail level on the possibility to access emergency services through alternative means.

B3: Ensure access to emergency services in the visited country. It would clarify that, in order to enable the home operator provide free access to emergency services and free of charge provision of caller location information for all roaming end-users, as stipulated in Article 109 of the Electronic Communications Code, the visited operator should provide necessary technical and regulatory information to this effect. A way forward could be adding the necessary provision in the wholesale agreements.

The proposal to introduce an obligation on mobile operators to include in the “Welcome SMS” an alert informing that these types of communications may not be under the RLAH principle was supported by a majority of respondents (85, i.e. 62%) in the public consultation. BEREC in its opinion supported these additional transparency measures regarding VAS.

(b) Provide a dedicated web page warning about the risk of bill shock when using VAS while roaming and detailed information about the types of services (calls and SMS) and the number ranges that may be subject to increased costs or blocking. This is intended to serve as a reference, for any end user who sees the warning in the “Welcome SMS” and wants more information.

(a) Include in the “welcome SMS” a warning about calls to VAS numbers and the risk for bill-shocks, including a link to the web page of point (b).BEREC supports this, as a more targeted solution. In the public consultation, the majority of respondents (62%) supported the proposal to include information on VAS in the “Welcome SMS”.

B2. Increase transparency regarding VAS. Two obligations will be included for all operators, in addition to the one in Option 2:

BEREC in its opinion supported such a measure, suggesting that the Roaming Regulation must make clear that conditions of the domestic offer must not be altered by the home operator during roaming..

73% of all respondents to the public consultation support a measure prohibiting the home operator to deliberately lower the QoS while roaming, compared to the QoS offered in the home country. 60% (86 out of 95) of the citizens and consumer organisations think that such an obligation is relevant. 6 out of 25 MNOs have expressed that such an obligation would be relevant, while 10 do not think it is relevant and 6 are neutral. Among the MVNO/Es 4 do think it is relevant while 3 do not and 1 is neutral. Among the other business stakeholders, including SMEs/entrepreneurs/vertical industries/IoT & M2M and industry associations 4 out of 5 think such a measure would be relevant.

Such an obligation would allow the NRAs of the home operator to monitor the compliance with the rules. It would also ensure that end-users are able to use innovative services over modern technologies such connected devices and 5G services.

B1 – Prohibiting home operators from deliberately offering lower QoS, (e.g. limiting access to 3G instead of 4G in wholesale agreements), compared to the QoS offered in the home country. It foresees an obligation on retail and wholesale level. The QoS that a home operator needs to provide to its end customer while roaming depends on the technically available QoS level that is possible in the visited network, i.e. some networks may not be able to support the same QoS level as the home operator’s network.

Stakeholders seem to have divided views on the level of price caps. Large inbounder network operators (and especially multinational groups) tend to favour maintaining the wholesale caps at the current level. On the other hand, small outbounder network operators and virtual operators seem to support significant lowering of caps. We expect a similar trend to apply also to the views of Member States and public authorities. However, the public consultation did not render a sufficient number of data to present the views. BEREC in its opinion supported a reduction of price caps, as long as it ensures efficient cost recovery by the MNOs.

The majority of respondents in the public consultation agree or strongly agree that the EU intervention had a positive effect in ensuring the sustainability of the wholesale roaming markets for voice, data and SMS, compared to what Member States could achieve acting alone. The majority of M(V)NOs agree (28 out of 52 respondents), as well as the consumer organisations (5 our of 5) and public authorities (5 out of 5). Opposing views do not exceed 15% of respondents. In parallel, almost half of the respondents express the view that retail roaming services are not sustainable with the current wholesale roaming caps, effectively supporting a reduction to wholesale caps. By contrast, only 1 out of 5 respondents support the opposite view. All responding MVNOs (9 out of 9) express that retail roaming services are not sustainable. MNOs are more divided and 11 out of 25 think that retail roaming services are not sustainable with the current wholesale roaming caps, 9 think that they are and 5 remain neutral.

The Commission will monitor pro- competitive developments linked to non-discriminatory trading (as discussed in option 2, see also Section 9) and assess the situation in the context of the report by the end of 2025 and consider additional measures, if deemed necessary.

For further updates of wholesale caps beyond 2026 based on an updated cost model see proposed possibility to amend the caps through a delegated act under the simplification/REFIT measure C3 presented below.

The preparatory work for this initiative has assessed the possibility to present alternative options for the new wholesale caps, however given the analysis presented above and in particular the need to ensure cost recovery leaving also some room for negotiation, those alternatives were not considered relevant for the impact assessment.

Specifically for data, the cap of 2 EUR/GB proposed in 2022 is slightly above the maximum efficient cost of 1.74 EUR/GB estimated for the same year. This cap is proposed to balance the transition to the cost proposed in 2025 of 1.5 EUR/GB and ensure that the operators have sufficient time to negotiate wholesale agreements reflecting the decreasing caps. This cap proposed will ensure a gradual reduction to the cap proposed in 2025 in line with the reductions of data caps seen in the previous years.

A two-step glide path therefore balances the two objectives of ensuring sustainability and allowing recovery of costs for all operators. It also allows for a gradual reduction to the estimated efficient costs of providing the relevant service. Further, for voice roaming service, the two-step glide path takes into account the decreasing costs for termination as set by the delegated act on maximum Union-wide termination rate.

The wholesale cap setting the maximum charge for one SMS while roaming has been constant since the introduction of Roam-Like-at-Home (15 July 2017), at 0.01 EUR/SMS. The cost model estimates a fairly constant cost for delivering this service in the modelled period of just under 0.003 EUR/SMS for the period 2022-2025.Considering the above observations, this option proposes a continuation of the decreasing cap observed since 2017. Specifically, the option proposes to set a two-step glide path for the caps for data, voice and SMS. The intention is to accommodate the decreasing costs observed in the cost model whilst gradually reducing the caps to minimize disruptions for the operators.

Regarding voice roaming services the wholesale cap has been 0.032 EUR/min since 15 June 2017 (and will remain applicable until 30 June 2022). The cost model estimates a decreasing cost from 2022-2025. Taking also into account the forthcoming Eurorate for mobile termination, the highest estimated cost decreases from 0.022 EUR/min in 2022 to 0.0184 EUR/min in 2025.

For data roaming services, from 1 January 2022 until 1 July 2022, the applicable wholesale cap stands at 2.5 EUR/GB. The highest estimated cost from the cost model including transit in 2022 is 1.74 EUR/GB. In Q1 2020, the average wholesale price charged has been 1.53 EUR/GB but ranges in the member states from 1 EUR/GB to more than 2.5 EUR/GB.

This initiative aims to strike a balance between ensuring cost recovery and minimizing sustainability challenges. To reconcile the two objectives this option consists of a two-step reduction of caps, as indicated in Table 1, the proposed caps are derived from the estimated costs from the cost model (see Annex 4C for a description of the model and an outline of the results). Overall, the cost model indicates room for proposing a decrease of the three applicable caps. Across wholesale voice, data and SMS, the current caps are well-above the estimated costs in all Member States and the cost model estimates decreasing costs in 2022-2025 for the provision of wholesale voice and data services.

The caps have been defined considering the estimates of the costs for a hypothetical efficient operator in the highest cost Member States, using a variety of evidence sources such as the cost model developed for the Commission by Axon Partners, assumptions underlying regulated termination rates for voice evidence from domestic and roaming wholesale markets and from domestic retail prices.

EU-wide wholesale roaming caps would be set at lower levels than the caps valid until 30 June 2022 for calls made, SMS messages and data. In line with the policy choice made already in the Roaming Regulation in force, the new levels of the caps would allow recovery of costs of providing wholesale roaming services in all Member States, including a relevant share of joint and common costs. Reducing the caps would also affect elements that are determined based on the level of wholesale caps, as the maximum level of surcharges imposed under the fair use policy mechanism and the sustainability derogations as well as the data allowance of the fair use policy (FUP) on open data bundles and pre-paid limits.

Some additional important enhancements could be considered to allow a genuine RLAH experience for end-users and to respond to technological and business developments (B and C below)

This option would consist of proposing a review and prolongation of the Roaming Regulation (in the form of a recast). It would contain the similar provisions at retail and wholesale level as the Roaming Regulation in force, but with essential provisions to improve sustainability of operators to provide RLAH through reduced caps at wholesale level (A1 below).

C3 – Introduce a minimum level of simplification by removing obligations and repealing acts that have become redundant with RLAH. In addition, the burden on operators outside the Eurozone would decrease by aligning the revision mechanisms for maximum charges linked to the use of currencies other than the Euro that are used for roaming charges and intra-EU communications charges . Measure requested and supported by some authorities outside the Eurozone.

It would further enable home operators to access the same networks generations that they offer domestically and hereby tackle the issue of some M(V)NOs only granted access to 3G services. This measure is supported by BEREC.

C1 – Clarify technology neutral access obligations for wholesale roaming services. The basic principle of neutrality implies that operators should remain neutral towards technology when granting access to their networks. This clarification would imply that the visited operator has to grant access to any requested network generation as long as the request is reasonable and hereby facilitate access to all network generations, including modern technologies. The visited MNO should not refuse an access request or impede the access process to a certain network technology e.g. 4G and instead offer only access to 3G, or 4G instead of 5G.

B3 - Increase transparency regarding access to emergency services: Operators should increase end-user awareness about available means of access to emergency services, by including relevant information in the automated “Welcome SMS”. This transparency measure would require that Member States make relevant information on alternative means of access to emergency services readily available.

B2. - Increase transparency regarding VAS: Operators should increase transparency regarding the risk for bill-shocks from calls to VAS number, e.g. by providing a clear warning in all contracts that include roaming services and explanations about the types of services that may be subject to increased costs.

In the public consultation 63% of the respondents, across the stakeholder groups, replied that it would be very relevant to include a transparency obligation on QoS. It is supported in particular by citizens and consumer organisations, while M(V)NOs are less positive to such an obligation (15 out of 34 do not think it is relevant and 6 are positive). BEREC supports additional transparency measures regarding QoS in roaming.

B1 – Increase transparency regarding QoS: Operators should increase transparency regarding QoS, by providing clear information to the end-user, e.g. in the contract about the QoS that the end-user can reasonably expect, while roaming in the EU.

In addition, it is proposed to complement the price caps by encouraging emerging possibilities for the operators to trade wholesale roaming traffic in a non-discriminatory way. This could prove to improve competition in the roaming wholesale market and is as such welcomed by the Commission, that will keep monitoring these developments and assess the situation in the context of the report by the end of 2025.

A1 – Enhance operators’ capacity to sustain RLAH while respecting cost recovery for network operators offering wholesale roaming access. The level of wholesale caps would remain at the level valid until 30 June 2022 for calls made, SMS messages and data at the respective values of 0.032 € per minute, 0.01 € per SMS, and 2.5 € per GB.

The analysis of alterative measures to the baseline was firstly developed per thematic area, covering sustainability (A), Quality of Service and innovation (B1 and C1), value added services (B2 and C2) and emergency communications (B3), comparing all possible alternative measures to address problems for each thematic area (including measures that were later discarded) and assessing their possible impacts and benefits, considering synergies between measures. Based on this preliminary analysis the aggregated options presented below were identified. The discarded alternative measures per each objective area are presented in Annex 9.

Operators will continue to be uninformed about VAS number ranges subject to higher termination rates. In the absence of measures promoting transparency, operators will continue to face substantial losses. Therefore, they will continue to take unilateral measures, mostly through fragmented efforts to obtain information about VAS number ranges in other EEA countries but also by blocking calls to VAS, which also leads to consumer complaints.

According to the 2020 joint Commission-BEREC online survey, more than 30% of MNOs have incurred extra costs resulting from unexpected wholesale charges for communications related to VAS by their customers while roaming in the EEA. Almost half of the MNOs reported being aware of abusive use of SIM cards in voice and/or SMS roaming communications. More than 40% of these operators report about considerable losses linked to fraud and misuses related to value added services with a median of € 70,000.

Where operators are victims of misuse/fraud linked to VAS, an NRA would still be mandated by the Roaming rules to require immediate cessation of a breach of the obligations set out in this regulation, and to the right of the visited network operator to apply adequate measures in order to combat fraud.

VAS as such fall outside the scope of the Roaming Regulation, only the tariff component corresponding to the connection to such services is subject to the RLAH rule. Operators indicate that VAS are generally excluded from wholesale contract negotiations and that VAS numbering ranges cannot be recognized in all countries in advance, which may lead to unexpected costs at the wholesale level. Some operators report having taken measures to tackle this situation, including negotiation of wholesale agreements, obtaining information about numbering ranges of other EEA countries, and blocking access to VAS to their customers while roaming.

The general provisions in the Roaming Regulation enable the termination of wholesale roaming access agreements, in case of anomalous or abusive usage of roaming services on retail level.

Doubts on applicability of roaming rules to M2M might slow down the conclusion of wholesale agreements addressing the M2M emerging market needs.

The new categories of use cases offered by the 5G technology concern, on the one hand, mission-critical cases such as remote healthcare or remote machine control and, on the other, massive object connectivity to get data from sensors in transport, energy, and environment. These new applications of communication networks are expected to be reflected in future roaming agreements.

Moreover, the 2019 Review report concludes that 5G technologies are likely to change the nature of roaming services in the long term. Among others, it could potentially affect the commercial model applied, e.g. basing pricing on bandwidth as opposed to usage. 5G could also provide options for MNOs and MVNOs to use access agreements as an alternative to traditional roaming, allowing them to enhance their flexibility on service differentiation (latency, security etc), which could prove to be very important for certain vertical use cases.

The baseline scenario might not sufficiently ensure that operators will have access to modern network technologies and be able to offer e.g. 5G services to their end-users when roaming. Stakeholders interpret the wholesale access obligations differently. Many stakeholders, in particular MNOs, consider that the current wholesale access rules are technology neutral. However, in the public consultation MNOs expressed that modern technologies, such as 5G and IoT narrowband do not fall under the scope of the rules because these technologies are not dedicated to assure retail roaming mobile services and are connected with huge investments costs. These doubts may limit the access of these technologies, posing a risk to innovation and competition. Unless access is ensured, operators and service providers will not be able to compete on the market.

While the available data and consultation results indicate that operators in general do not deliberately lower the QoS for their roaming customers, there is evidence that some operators, in particular MVNOs have difficulties in gaining access to 4G networks. These observed difficulties in ensuring access to different network generations (in particular 4G), may continue. For the deployment of commercial 5G services, difficulties in ensuring access presents an even greater risk.

In the Regulation, the wholesale roaming access obligations and wholesale data price cap apply in case such access is sought for the purposes of M2M communications as long as they are charged on a per unit, volume-based, basis like person-to-person communications. Permanent roaming is not prohibited as such by the regulation and can be agreed by two roaming partners in the wholesale roaming contract.

These provision aim to ensure that mobile operators can deliver retail roaming services to their customer when they travel. However, the current rules do not sufficiently ensure that operators should request and be granted access to the technologies that will enable them to provide the roaming services with the same QoS as domestically. There is still a small number of 3G-only wholesale agreements. According to the joint Commission-BEREC online survey 26% of MVNOs have 3G-only roaming available either in certain specified countries in the EU (4%) or in certain networks in certain countries in the EU (14%) or in general in the EU (8%).

Article 3 of the Roaming Regulation obliges mobile network operators to meet all reasonable requests for wholesale roaming access, which shall cover access to all network elements and associated facilities, relevant services, software and information systems necessary for the provision of regulated roaming services to customers. The Roaming Regulation Article 16 (5) stipulates that end-to-end connectivity and interoperability of roaming services has to be ensured.

In view of the fact that IP-based communication, using real-time text and multimedia is expected to be deployed in the medium term (as mandated by the European Accessibility Act), the lack of implementation of these solutions at roaming wholesale level could lead to a lack of access to emergency services (including when a prepaid customer exhausts their credit), lack of caller location and retail charges.

The visited and the home operators do not systematically exchange relevant technical data to ensure proper, free of charge functioning of emergency communication and caller location (handset derived) for the end-user. As a consequence, home operators do not recognize emergency communications traffic and charge end-users.

Alternative means of access are not harmonized , as a consequence, end-users with disabilities are not aware of access means and sometimes do not have access to emergency services while roaming. Disabled end-users are more at risk of not being informed about the means of access and, eventually, not having access to emergency services. The latest data provided by Member States (September 2020) indicate that the visited Member States do not have the jurisdiction or monitoring capability to ensure that the use of the means of access deployed in their jurisdiction is not charged by the home operator.

Caller location is the most important contextual information that allows emergency services to locate end-users and intervene efficiently. Roaming customers are at higher risk than domestic customers to not be able to determine their location when they request the assistance of emergency services. Therefore, the instant provision of accurate caller location information is all the more important in case of roaming end-users.

Provision of caller location is mandated through the Universal Service Directive and the Electronic Communications Code, but there is no obligation in the Roaming Regulation to ensure the exchange of the technical and regulatory information between the roaming partners, ensuring that caller location provision is free of charge for the end-user.

Subject to Article 14 of the Roaming Regulation, end-users shall receive information on access to emergency services by dialing the European emergency number 112 free of charge. The Roaming Regulation does not include an obligation to inform end-users with disabilities about access to alternative emergency communications that are deployed at national level (these alternative means of access are not harmonised at EU level).

If no further action is taken, the difficulties as confirmed by the operators and consumer complaints are to remain or even increase following a general trend of growing use of roaming. The number of related complaints reported by NRAs remains limited but is increasing visibly and calls for measures . (See Annex 5 for details) This can certainly have a negative impact on the end-users’ confidence in the RLAH regime. The lack of transparency at wholesale level in particular cannot be adequately tackled at national level.

Consumer complaints are currently handled on a case-by-case basis in the absence of clear rules with regard to the regulatory treatment of VAS in roaming scenarios.

B2. Transparency on higher prices for value added services. At retail level, VAS can be subject to surcharges while roaming or can be blocked. According to the BEREC, operators indicate that VAS are excluded from wholesale contract negotiations and that the visited operator decides whether to block access to premium services or to impose additional charges for such services. This means for example that when calling a freephone number abroad consumers may incur surcharges. According to operators, VAS numbering ranges cannot be recognized in all countries in advance. This leads to unexpected termination costs and/or customer experience degradation. In addition, the fact that in the roaming situation is the visited operator that decides on the treatment of VAS prevents home operators from giving their customers transparent information on charges, as they do not know the associated wholesale costs.

The fragmented approach among NRAs on QoS monitoring as well as lack of transparency on QoS is expected to continue.

Customers would continue to be uninformed about the expected level of QoS for retail roaming services. Contracts are an important tool for end-users to ensure transparency of information and legal certainty. With the upcoming deployment of 5G retail services, and future technological developments, it is important for roaming customers to be well informed, since the lack of appropriate QoS might hinder the usage of certain applications while roaming (The business side of this issue is further explained in Section 2.1. problem C1).

At wholesale level, i.e. between operators, the regulation simply requires that an operator shall provide all necessary network elements along with roaming access, but does not require that the operator provides certain levels of QoS.

Article 6e (4) of the Roaming Regulation includes an obligation on the roaming provider to ensure that a contract which includes any type of regulated retail roaming service specifies the main characteristics of that service. This transparency obligation does not mention explicitly QoS.

The Roaming Regulation does not explicitly ensure that roaming end-users have access to retail roaming services of the same quality as at home (domestic QoS) even if the QoS is considered as an integral part of the price-regulated product. BEREC reports that 3 out of 30 NRAs have initiated procedures against operators not ensuring same QoS.

The sensitivity analysis (Annex 4) developed some additional scenarios, which seek to examine how a prolonged impact of the COVID pandemic on international travelling could influence the ability of roaming providers to offer RLAH services in a sustainable manner. The analysis reflects that COVID ameliorates the sustainability challenges for outbounder operators and MVNOs in all four COVID-19 scenarios (COVID-19 High impact, COVID-19 Medium impact, COVID-19 Low impact and COVID-19 Minimum impact). In general the COVID-19 scenarios improvements does not surpass the results under the high sustainability scenario presented in Annex 4.

For the 22 other Member States, it has not been shown that roaming customers exerts pressure on the capacity required in the network. Therefore, the networks constructed in the 22 Member States without seasonality are built to meet domestic demand, indicating that declining roaming customers as a result of COVID would equally not impact the estimated costs of providing roaming wholesale services.

As regards the impact from COVID on the roaming wholesale caps and the estimated costs of providing roaming wholesale services, it is recalled that mobile operators do not dimension their networks to solely serve roaming customers but rather dimension to domestic needs. If indeed operators in a Member State would need to take special account of roaming customers in the network dimensioning, this is termed a seasonal Member State, where peak consumption (and needed dimensioning of the network) is, to some degree, driven by roaming customers. If this is the case, the Member State is termed seasonal and this is taken into account in the modelling exercise performed by the consultants. For five Member States (Croatia, France, Greece, Malta and Spain), seasonality has been taken into account, meaning that these Member States have shown a need to further update their networks to facilitate increased consumption from roaming customers. Therefore, operators in these Member States appear to have some constraints coming from roaming customers, which in the case of COVID would imply that a lack of roaming customers could have some effect on network dimensioning. Looking at the estimates from the Axon cost model for these Member States reveals that current costs estimated is well below the maximum caps proposed in both 2022 and 2025, indicating that the caps proposed should also ensure cost recovery in these Member States despite uncertainties for roaming consumption.

On the other hand, we do not have any evidence or indication that telecom operators have changed their business practices (including on wholesale roaming tariffs), because of the COVID crisis. In view of the above, we do not expect a disruptive impact, which would affect the proposed policy options or the assumptions on the p