ARCHIVESHISTORIQUES
DELACOMMISSION
COLLECTION RELIEE DES
DOCUMENTS "COM"
COM (78)283
Vol.1978/0105

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COMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(78)283 final.
Brussels,16June1978
Commission communication totheCouncil
ontheimprovement oftheconditionsfor
negotiating international customsconventions
COM(78)283final

Commission communication totheCouncil
ontheimprovementoftheconditionsfornegotiatinginternational
customsconventions
ForseveralyearsnowtheMemberStatesandtheCommissionhavejointlybeen
makinggreatereffortstoputforwardacommonoratleastconcertedview­
pointintheinternational forumsdealingwithmattersaffectingthecustoms
union.Theessentialaimhasbeentoextendwhathasbeentheacceptedpractice
sincethebeginningofthesixtiesinthecontextoftheGATTtariffnegotia­
tions,tothewholebodyofcustomslaw;wherenecessary,specialrulesof
procedurehavealsobeenapplied.
Anadhocnegotiating procedurewasinfactdefinedbythePermanent
Representatives Committee,afterlongdiscussions,atitsmeetingof
23-25January1974.Thisprocedureisannexedtodocument R/243/74(COMER49)
(ECO32)(JUR13). !
Theprocedureisasfollows:
WithoutprejudicetothelegalpositionsoftheCommission andtheMember
States:
1.Problemsarisingatthenegotiation ofcustomsconventionswillbeexamined
atcoordination meetingschairedbyarepresentative oftheMemberState
holdingthepresidency oftheCouncil(assistedbyrepresentatives ofthe
GeneralSecretariat andbringingtogetherrepresentatives fromtheMember
StatesandfromtheCommission .Thesemeetingswilldealwithanymatter ,
relatingtocustomsconventions,withtheexceptionofquestionsofcompe­
tence.Theywillaimatreachingacommonpositioninlinewiththeobjec­
tivesandpoliciesoftheCommunity.Anymajordisagreement shouldbe
notifiedtothePermanentRepresentatives Committeeand,ifnecessary,
totheCouncil.
2.Thecommonpositionwillbestatedbyasinglespokesman;thespokesman
willnormallybetheCommission'srepresentative ,exceptwherethenature
ofthemattersdealtwithissuchthattheCommission'srepresentatives
1 * •••/•■•
1

andtherepresentatives oftheMemberStateswouldarriveatdifferent
conclusions .Thedesignation ofasinglespokesmandoesnotpreventthe
MemberStates'representatives frommakingindividual statements,provided
thattheypaydueregardforthecommonlineadoptedonsubstantive and
procedural questions.
3.Ifavoteistaken,theMemberStates'representati veswillvotein
accordancewiththeoverallpackageofcommonguidelines adopted.
Thisprocedure hasbeenusedforthreeyearsnowandcanbesaidtohave
effectively enabledtheCommunity assuchtoparticipate inthevarious
international organizations dealingwithcustomsmattersand,inmost
cases,toexpresscommonpositionsinthoseforums.
However,itisundeniablethattheadhocprocedureisoftenconsidered
extremely cumbersomeinviewoftheconditions underwhichithashitherto
operated.
Therearetwomainreasonswhytheprocedureissocumbersome :
(a)First,,sincetheterm"customsconvention"isnotdefinedintheproce­
dureitself,theMemberStateshaveinsistedrightfromthestartthat
theprocedurecouldonlybeusediftheCouncilfirstacknowledged
thataparticularproposalofaninternational organization actually
comesunderthatheadandthereforefallswithinCommunityjurisdiction .
Forthisreason,theCommissionhassofaralwaysmadearecommendation
totheCouncilthatitbeauthorizedtonegotiatewheneverithaslearnt
ofworkinaninternational organization whichmightaffecttheoperation
ofthecustomsunion.
ExceptwheretheCommissionhasalreadybeenableatthisstageof
developments toassesstheCommunity'sneedsintheparticularcontext
inquestion(forexample,theneedtoinsertacustomsunionclausein
adraftconvention),therecommendation hasneverincludedanyproposal

3
fornegotiatingdirectives;forsuchproposalscannotnormallybedrafted
untilaftertheMemberStates'positionshavebeencoordinated and
accounthasbeentakenofthetrendofdiscussions intheinternational
organization concerned.
Theauthorization givenbytheCounciltonegotiateisthereforelargely
amatterofformandwithoutgreatpracticalscope,sinceinmostcases
theCouncilmerelyinstructstheCommissiontoarriveattheconclusion
ofanagreement(theAnnexestotheKyotoConvention ontheSimplification
andHarmonization ofCustomsProcedures beingacaseinpoint).Italso
causesfairlyconsiderable lossesoftimebecausetheCouncil'sEconomic
QuestionsGroupispronetodisallowing anycommonpositionuntilthis
formality hasbeencompleted.
(b)Councilauthorization isnecessaryonlyfortheopeningofactual
negotiations .TheTerm"negotiation"hasnotbeendefinedbytheadhoc
procedure.Infact,eversincetheprocedure wasfirstapplied,the
tendencyhasbeentoconsiderthistermascoveringallworkthatcan
derivefromthedraftsproducedbyinternational organizations .Conse­
quently,sincethemeetingsthataretraditionally "chairedbyare­
presentative oftheMemberStateholdingthepresidency oftheCouncil
(assistedbyrepresentatives oftheGeneralsecretariat )andbringing
togetherrepresentatives fromtheMemberStatesandfromtheCommission"
arethesamemeetingswhichtakeplaceintheCounciIitself,the
Council'sEconomicQuestionsGrouphasfromtheoutsetbeenconsidered
theappropriate bodyfordiscussingallmattersarisingfromthedrafts .
inquestion,irrespective ofthepointworkhasreachedinaparticular
fieldinaninternational organization .However,inordertoavoid
excessively longdiscussions intheEconomicQuestionsGroup,ithas ■
beenagreedthat"technical"prexcoordination meetingsorganizedand
chairedbytheCommissionshouldnormallytakeplacebeforetheGroup
adoptsitsposition.Thus,whateverpointworkhasreachedinthe
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international organization concerned/andevenifthisworkisonly
exploratory,theEconomicQuestionsGrouphas,inpractice,toarrive
atacommonpositionwhichcanbepresentedanddefendedbythe
Commissionrepresentative .
However,theworkinvolvedinpreparing adraftconventiongenerally
differsgreatlyfromphasetophase:
-Afirstphase,whichcanbetermedthe"preparatory phase",mainly
involvesexchangesofviewsbetweenexperts.Itisonthebasisof
theseexchangesthattheinternational organizationwillindue
courseproduceitsdraftconvention.Whateverthecircumstances ,the
Councilcouldhardlyissueprecisedirectives onthebasisofthese
discussions sincetheyrelatetoafluidsubjectwheresubstantial
changesmaybemadeinthelightoftheviewsexpressed.Consequently ,
the"commonpositions"adoptedatthisstageintheEconomicQuestions
Grouparepractically valueless,andfinalizing themissimplytime-
wasting.
-Inasecondphase,whichconsistsofthenegotiations properand
whichcanbetermedthe"finalphase",therepresentatives ofthe
membercountriesoftheinternational organization concernedhaveto
finalizeadrafttextforadoptionbythecontracting countries.At
thispointtheCommunityrepresentatives mustbeabletopresentand
defendacommonpositionsothatCommunityinterestsaretakeninto
consideration inthedraftfinallyadoptedbytheinternational
organization .
!,
Thedurationandimportanceofeachofthesetwophasesobviously
varyaccordingtothecaseandtheworkingmethodsoftheinternational
organization inquestion,butadistinction canalwaysbemadebetween
them.

International organizations caneveninitiateworkwhichnevergoes
beyondthe"preparatoryphase"(forexample,wherethediscussions
revealthattoofewcountriesareinterestedforaconventiontobe
concludedinagivenfield).Theycanalsoinitiateworknotintended
toleadtoadraftconvention,butrelatingonlytotheadministration
ofexistingconventions .
Itwouldthereforebehighlydesirabletomakedistinctions baseson
thenatureoftheworkundertaken byinternational organizations and
thestagereachedinthatwork.However,theadhocprocedurehas
beenhithertosoappliedastopreventthemakingofsuchdistinctions .
Consequently,theCouncil'sEconomicQuestionsGroupispointlessly
beingburdenedwithanincreasingvolumeofcoordination work,to
thedetrimentoftheexamination ofCommissionproposalsforCommunity
provisionsvitalforcompletingthecustomsunion.
Moreover,thefactthatthereexistsan"appealbody"atthelevelof
theCouncil'sEconomicQuestions Groupmeansthat,wheredifferences
ofopinionoccurinpre-coordination meetingsorganizedbytheCommission,
MemberStates'representatives tendtobringtheproblemsbeforethat
bodyratherthantrytoworkoutacompromiseinthepre-coordination
meetingitself.ThisplacesafurtherburdenontheEconomicQuestions
Group.
Itwouldtherefore seemvitaltoreconsider howtheadhocnegotiating
procedureoperatessothatitcanbesimplified asfaraspossibleand
usedjudiciously,thoughthisbynomeansimpliescallingintoquestion
thescopeoftheprocedure.Onthebasisofthelastthreeyears'
experience,theCommissionproposeshenceforthtobeguidedbythe
followingprinciples : i
10

-6-
(a)Asregardsthescopeoftheadhocprocedure ,,thenotioncustoms
convention"shouldbeconsideredascoveringanymultilateral
international actcontainingprovisionswhichcouldhaveconsequences
fortheoperationofthecustomsunion,ifappliedbytheCommunity,
Thesemaybeactssetupandadoptedeitherbyinternational orga­
nizationsspecialising incustomsmatters(CustomsCooperation
Council)orbyinternational organizations dealingincidentally
withcustomsmattersinthefieldswhichthe'ycover(Economic
CommissionforEurope,CouncilofEurope,UNESCO,etc.).Suchacts
mayrelatesolelytooneareaofcustomslawormerelycontain
oneormorecustomsprovisions amongmeasuresrelatingtoother
matters.
(b)Furthermore,theCouncilshouldnotberequiredtoauthorize
negitiationsattooearlyastage.Aspointedoutabove,premature
authorization ispointlessandisamajorcauseofdelay.Assoon,
astheyareinformedthataninternational organization intends
todrawupamultilateralinternational actcontainingprovisions
whichcouldhaveconsequencesfortheoperationofthecustoms
union,theCommission'sandtheMemberStatesrepresentatives
shouldimmediatelybeabletotakepartintheworkofthatorgani­
zation.Theirparticipation couldinnowaycommittheCommunity
sincetheywouldbeinvolvedinthe"preparatoryphase"described
above.
(c)Asregardstheactualoperationoftheadhocnegotiatingprocedure,
moreaccountshouldbetakenofthepointreachedintheinter­
nationalorganization'sworkinaparticularfield:
-duringthe"preparatoryphase",whichinpracticecoversall
discussionsbeforetheinternationalorganizationactuallydraws
upthedrafttobeformallysubmittedtotheorganization's
member*countriesforapproval,acommonpositionshouldbesought
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7-
atconsultation meetingsorganizedbytheCommission.Anycommon
positionarrivedat,shouldbestatedsimilarlybytheCommission's
representative andtheMemberStatesrepresentatives .Inthe
eventofadifferenceofopiniononsomepoint,theCommission's
representative andthoseoftheMemberStatesshoulddisplay
theutmostdiscretionintheirstatements andevenrefrain
fromtakingupapositionincertaincases.
-Uponcompletionofthe"preparatory phase"(i.e.once,onthe
basisofthepreliminary discussions,theinternational organi­
zationconcernedhasdrawnup,adraftactonwhichtheorganization 's
membercountrieswillhavetovote),theCommission shouldmakea
recommendation totheCouncilthatitbeauthoritzed tonegotiate.
Thisrecommendation wouldincludeproposeddirectivesforthe
negotiations .Examination oftherecommendation bytheCouncil
wouldfollowtheusualpattern(viz.EconomicQuestions Group,
PermanentRepresentatives Committee,Council).Theresulting
decisionswouldconstitute thecommonposition .whichtheCommission
representative wouldhavetopresentanddefend,asprescribed by
theadhocnegotiating procedure,whenthedraftwasbeingexamined
intheinternational organization concerned.Anyadditional coordi­
nationmeetingsnecessarywould,inaccordancewiththeprocedure,
>
beheldonthespot.
Naturally,theCommission couldifnecessarybringimportant
mattersbeforetheCouncilevenduringthe"preparatory phase",
ifitconsideredtheyrequiredacommonposition.However,in
viewoftheconditionsunderwhichinternational organizations
normallywork,thisshouldonlyoccurexceptionally .
•(d)Theproceduredescribedaboveregardingthe"preparatory phase"
shouldnormallysufficesofarasprovisionslimitedtothe
asministration ofexistingconventions (notes,interpretative
provisions)areconcerned.Tf«finternationalorganizationwould
beinformeddirectbytheCommission,actingonbehalfoftheTne
3•••/••I

CommunityandtheMemberStates,ofthecommonpositiondefined
ataCommissionmeeting.However,ifnoagreementcouldbereached
ataCommissionmeeting,thematterwouldgotoarbitration
beforetheCouncil(EconomicQuestionsGroupand,possibly,the
PermanentRepresentatives Committee).Sincesuchprovisionsare
generallyunimportant,arbitration shouldbeveryinfrequent.
TheCommissionconsidersthatthisapproachcannotinanywaydetract
fromtheCouncil'spowersasregardsthenegotiation ofcustomscon­
ventions,fortheCommunitypositioninthefinalstageofnegotiations
isdecidedbytheCouncilalone.Thisapproachisinfactfully
comparabletotheusualprocedurefornegotiatinginternational
conventionsintheotherareaswithinCommunityjurisdiction .Moreover,
itfullypreservestherespectiveresponsibilities oftheCommission
andtheCouncilinthepreparationofCommunitydecisionsandspares
theCouncilfromhavingtoactonCommissionrecommendations containing
nopreciseproposals.
ThemainadvantageofthisapproachisthattheEconomicQuestions
Groupwillnolongerhavetoexamineminorproblems,andwillbespared
fromhavingtotakeuntimelydecisionson'provisionswhich,depending
onthestagereached,mightbeconsiderablychangedinthelightof
ongoingworkintheinternational organization concerned.Thiswill
meanthattheexaminationofvariousCommissionproposalsforCouncil
regulationsordirectivesinareaswhichareofcrucialimportance
fortheactualachievementofthecustomsunioncanberesumedunder
suitableconditions.
Inconclusion,theCouncilisrequestedtoapproyetheCommission's
positiononstreamliningtheadhocnegotiatingprocedure:
~considering"customsconvention"tomeananymultilateralinter­
nationalactcontainingprovisionswhichcouldhaveconsequences
fortheoperationofthecustomsunion,ifappliedbytheCommunity;

bydistinguishing /forthepurposesoftheadhocnegotiatingpro­
cedure/betweenthe"preparatoryphase"andthe"finalphase"/with
thelatteraloneinvolvingaCouncildecisionbasedonaCommission
recommendation .
ItshouldbenotedthatthisCommunication ontheoperationofthe
adhocprocedureonlyconcernscustomsprovisionsinareasother
thancustomsvaluationandthetariffnomenclature .Otherproposals
willbemadeinduecourseregardingthesetwoareas.
10
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