EN   EN 
 
 
 EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION   
Strasbourg, 15.2.2022  
COM(2022) 61 final  
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  
Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence   
 
1 1. Introduction  
Remaining at the cutting edge of technological development is critical for ensuring Europe's 
prosperity, security and way of life. New technologies are transforming the security and defence 
sectors at a faster pace than ever before  and blurring the dividing line between the civilian and 
military domain . Digital technologies in particular are affecting established balances of pow er 
within the global security landscape. It is thus essential to ensure that Europe’s security and 
defence sectors remain technologically fit for purpose.  
Many critical technologies for security and defence increasingly originate in the civilian domain 
and use critical components of a dual-use nature. To accelerate innovation across domains and 
foster technological sovereignty in the security and defence sec tors, better exchange between 
civilian and defence research and innovation communities is needed. In light of its longstanding 
expertise in civilian technological development and its new defence cooperation instruments1, 
the EU is well placed to take a lea d role. However,  this will require a more efficient use of 
resources and a readiness to explore the opportunities of dual use, while upholding the EU’s 
fundamental values. It also means reducing strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities of the 
value and s upply chains associated with these technologies.  
The fragmentation of Europe’s security and defence capabilities has led to economic 
inefficiencies, reduced operational capacity and increased strategic dependencies. The ongoing 
revolution in security and defence technologies and the new EU defence cooperation instruments 
give the EU an opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the past , to build on its existing capacities  
and preserve its economic prosperity and security. The future European security and defence 
technological  and innovation  landscape should be developed under EU cooperative  
framework s from the outset.  
In her 2021 State of the Union address2, President von der Leyen recognised that while work on 
developing a European defence ecosystem had s tarted, a European Defence Union was needed. 
The EU Strategic Compass for security and defence (‘Strategic Compass’), to be adopted by 
Member States in March 2022, will set out a common strategic vision for the next decade and 
outline how the EU will enhan ce its capacity to act and respond to various crises and challenges ; 
secure its interests and protect its citizens ; invest and innovate to jointly develop the necessary 
capabilities and technologies ; and deepen partnerships based on EU values and interests.  
This roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence responds to a request from the 
European Council of 25 -26 Februa ry 20213 to outline a path for boosting research, technology 
developme nt and  innovation  (RTD&I)  and reducing the EU’s  strategic dependencies in critical 
technologies and value  chains  for security and defence . The roadmap will be presented to the 
informal  summit in Paris  on 10 -11 March 2022 and will feed into the Strategic Compass. The 
                                                           
1  The European Defence Fund  (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation on Defence (PESCO)  
2  2021 State of the Union address of Commission Presid ent von der Leyen  
3  Statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021   
 
2 Roadmap  proposes a way forward  for the EU and Member States to jointly reach the above -
mentioned goal, notably by:  
 identifying technologies critical for EU security and defence, boosting them through 
European (RTD&I) programmes;  
 ensuring that defence considerations are better taken into account in civil ian European 
RTD&I programmes and industrial and trade policies,  as appropriate,  while possible civilian 
uses of technologies are also better  considered  in defence RTD&I programmes;   
 promoting from the outset an EU -wide  strategic and coordinated approach for critical 
technologies for security and defence, to make the best use of EU and Member States’ 
RTD&I programmes , achieve synergies between civilian and defence RTD&I communities  
and mitigat e strategic dependencies from external sources ; and 
 coordinat ing as much as possible with other like -minded partners , such as the United States 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , under mutually beneficial conditions.  
2. Critical  technologies and strategic dependencies for security and defence  
The update of the ‘2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s 
recovery ’ (‘updated industrial strategy’ )4 of May 2021 confirms that technological leadership 
remains an essential driver of the EU’s competitiveness and innovation, in particular for so -
called ‘critical technologies’5. It also underlines  the importance of identifying and mitigating 
strategic dependencies in ‘sensitive ecosystems’, including those of ‘proximity, social economy 
and civil security’ and ‘ aerospace and defence’, to ensure the EU’s resilience.  
The Commission action plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries 
(‘synergies action plan’ )6 of February 2021 recognises the gro wing importance of disruptive and 
enabling technologies originating in the civil ian domain for Europe’s future security and defence  
and the need to promote  cross -fertilisation and synergies between ci vilian and defence 
technologies . It sets out several key actions to encourage the exchange of information and 
cooperation between civilian and defence communities using  EU RTD&I programmes and 
instruments  as a starting point . 
2.1. The specific  features  of the security and defence sector s 
The EU defence industry has a diverse structure, with large multinationals and small to medium -
sized players. Demand comes almost exclusively from  national  governments, which also control 
all acquisition of defence -related products and technologies, as well as their export. Different 
national requirements and national public spending and investment continue to fragment the EU 
defence market , at times risking to  imped e interoperability between Member States’ national 
armed forces . The defence sector th erefore does not follow the conventional rules and business 
models that govern more traditional markets , and  has thus limited room to influence related 
                                                           
4  COM(2021) 350 final  
5  The Commission in the context of its work on the Observatory of critical technologies is in the process of 
defining ‘cri ticality’ for the purposes of space, defence and related civil sectors (including security).  
6  COM(2021) 70 final  
 
3 investments and market choices.  This makes it difficult for  industry  to undertake substantial self -
funde d defence RTD&I projects.  
The EU security industry faces similar challenges , as markets are also predominantly national 
but even more fragmented. Its customers are diverse (e.g. police forces, internal security 
agencies, custom agencies, border authorities, private security services), activities take place at 
different levels (local, regional, national) , and organisation varies  from one Member State to 
another. The Commission will present a study on  the EU security market in 2022  providing 
further insights into this complex sector . In addition,  Commission  services  in the first hal f of 
2022  will summaris e the proposals for fostering the adoption of capability -driven approaches to 
be applied across security sectors. These proposals will strengthen the early and forward -looking 
identification of needs and solutions for security and law enforcement.  
The space and  cyber are strategic ‘enabl ers’ for the  security and defence  sectors . The space 
sector shares many of the ir specific  features , with its small  market volumes and limit ed leverage 
on the private market for components. The resilience of the space programmes and of the space 
value chains are critical for the EU security and defence objectives.  Cyber also plays an 
increasingly important role  across defence capabilities , requi ring attention and investment. With 
fast-increasing cyber -attacks targeting both civil ian and defence assets and networks, and the 
growing role of  the civilian sector in cyber innovation and standardisation , close r links between 
cybersecurity and cyber defence  are needed . The Commission contribution to European defence 
in the context of the Strategic Compass  (‘defence communication’) , which is part of this defence 
package , outlines further  measures for these two sec tors. 
2.2. Mapping c ritical technologies and strategic dependencies for security and defence   
The updated i ndustrial strategy provides a broad -based  mapping and analysis of the EU’s 
strategic dependencies and capacities, based on a first round of in -depth reviews of sensitive 
ecosystems7. While  this work has  provide d a basis for policy action  in support of better EU 
resilience , it also acknowledges that more work is needed  to enhance further our understanding 
of the  EU’s  strategic dependencies, and how they may develop and lead to further vulnerabilities . 
This work  includ es a second round of in -depth reviews  of sensitive ecosystems  and a monitoring 
system  through  the Observatory of critical t echnologies  (‘Observatory’) , see Section 2.3.  
Commission services have started working on in -depth reviews of defence and security 
technology  areas, including in the area of cybersecurity , to support the updated industrial 
strategy and the development of the Observatory . Two preliminary case studies  have been 
carried out so far  on the defence technology areas of autonomous systems and semiconductors , 
which were considered to be  representative sample s, because of their cross -cutting relevance for 
military capabilities in different domains , see Box 1. The aim was to identify common patterns 
between these defence technology areas, in particular as regards the causes of dependencies and 
associated risks , as well as initial avenues to mitigate them.   
                                                           
7  SWD(2021) 352 final  
 
4 The case studies  confirm that the defence sector broadly share s the same strategic dependencies  
and vulnerabilities as other sensitive ecosystems,  notably  as regards  technology gaps, (critical) 
raw materials, skills, low RTD&I investment, and extra -territorial regulations  by non -EU 
countries . They  also indicate that the sector’s  vulnerabilities are generally exacerbated by the 
strategic and sensitive nature of its activities  (e.g. higher standards of security of information and 
security of supply ) and its comparatively mar ginal market size.  
The case studies  further show that some of the EU’s global competitors take more offensive and 
defensive actions to promote  critical technologies  and address strategic dependencies  than the 
EU has done up to now . For example , they tie national defence considerations more 
systematically into civil ian technological development , invest heavily in their indigenous 
RTD&I and industrial capacity, attract  outside investors and at times deploy aggressive takeover 
strategies in third countries.  They also protect their own industrial expertise and influence by 
leveraging interdependencies or using tight extra -territorial regulations to limit third country 
access to technologies.  
While the EU has tools of its own to strengthen its industrial capac ity in compliance with EU 
rules, it is hampered by the still largely fragmented EU defence market demand , its historically 
strict separation of civilian and defence RTD&I  at EU level , and comparative underinvestment  
by Member States  in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).  Indeed, 
the collective spending on defence innovation by Member States (EUR 2.5 billion or 1.2% of 
defence expenditure) continues to lag behind a 15 -year old EDA  target of 2%.  
While market  forces have led to a situation where no single country can  achieve  full 
technological sovereignty in  a technology domain , there is a global race for technological 
leadership and the associated economic and military advantages . This could  exacerbate the EU ’s 
existing strategic dependencies and generate new ones, if it does not take action. A structured 
approach is needed for the EU to stay at the forefront of critical technologies and to identify and 
mitigate strategic  dependencies in the domain of security and defence. This roadmap aims to 
provide such an approach , to be integrated in the EU Strategic Compass.  
Box 1: Case studies – Autonomous   systems and semiconductors for defence  
The Commission’s a nalytical work on autonomous systems for defence , with specific attention 
to artificial intelligence  (AI) and machine learning , identified relevant critical technologies and 
four main areas where the EU is lagging behind , namely : skills, data, hardware, and testing. 
Possible measures to address them would build on the existing EU AI strategy8 and associated 
policy initiatives, as well as Member States ’ national AI strategies. They include RTD&I 
activities (e.g. increased availabil ity of data and AI training, link to the European Processor 
Initiative), infrastructure (e.g. cloud computing capacity for defence purposes, domestic testing 
facilities) and the protection of existing critical assets (e.g. foreign direct investment  
screeni ng). 
The analytical work on semiconductors for defence underlined  the ubiquitous presence of 
semi conductors in defence equipment, and existing and future dependencies caused in 
                                                           
8  COM(2018) 237 final  
 
5 particular by the lack of indigenous EU capacities (foundries) for the most adv anced nodes. 
The Commission has included m itigating measures  in the proposal for a European  Chips Act  
adopted on 8 February 20229, which  aims to create a state -of-the-art European chip ecosystem 
to improve EU capabilities in this area , thereby  also addressing defence needs .  
 
2.3. The Observatory of critical technologies  
Lack of foresight on the future importance of technologies is in part to blame for some of the 
EU’s existing strategic  dependenc ies on third countries  (e.g. remotely piloted systems, 
semiconductors) . The EU needs  more structured foresight and strategic reflection on critical 
technologies for security and defence  in order to  identify priority areas  to boost research and 
innovation , reduce existing strategic dependencies and avoid the emergence of new ones.  
The Observatory of critical technologies , currently being set up by  the Commission  in line with 
the synergies action plan (action 4) , will contribute to this reflection. Its wor king methods will 
take into account other similar initiatives10 to avoid duplication. This will enable the fine -tuning 
of the list of critical technologies from the synergies action plan to reflect the evolving 
technology landscape  and capability needs . 
The Observatory  will identify, monitor and assess critical technologies  for the space, defence and 
related civil sectors , their potential application and related value and supply chains . It will also  
identify , monitor  and analyse existing and predict able technology gaps, root causes of strategic 
dependencies and vulnerabilities.   
It will be essential to agree with Member States on a meaning ful level of detail  to discuss  these 
issues  at EU level and on  the need to share relevant  data among Member States and with the 
Commission. A mechanism will be  establish ed within the Observatory , in the form of a 
dedicated expert group , for exchang ing and discuss ing in a classified environment with  Member 
States . This will  includ e discussions  on the emergence of new and disruptive technologies to 
avoid new dependencies  for the security , defence and space industries . The High Representative 
and his services  will be associated with this process.  
The Commission, based on data of the Observatory , will pre sent to Member States  a classified 
report on critical technologies and risks associated with strategic dependencies affecting security, 
space and defence by end of 2022 and every two years  thereafter . The Commission will prepare 
technology roadmap s based on these reports , which will include mitigating measures to boost 
RTD&I  and reduce strategic dependencies affecting security and defence.  
Once the Observatory’s  operations are well -established, the scope of its work could be extended 
to other industries, as indicated in the updated i ndustrial strategy.  
                                                           
9  COM(2022) 4 5 final 
10  For example, the Advanced Technologies for Industry (ATI) support and tools, the monitoring of critical 
technologies for space, the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), the Technology Building Blocks 
(TBB) and Key Strategic Activities (KSA) of the  European Defence Agency (EDA).  
 
6 Way forward:  
 In 2022, t he Commission will establish  an expert group  to facilitate exchange s with Member 
States on critical technologies, value and supply chains . It will be  part of the Observatory of 
critical technologies for defence, space and related civil industries. The aim would be to:  
 conduct a regular consultation with Member State authorities  to prepare the classified 
report ; 
 ensure appropriate handling of sensitive and classified information that may be 
exchanged in the context of the Observatory of critical technologies , related reports and 
roadmaps.  
 By mid -2022 t he Commission will present a study on the EU security market , which will 
serve  to better understand the specific  features  of the civil security market, to support the 
identification of critical technologies and strategic dependencies, and  to underpin the new 
capability driven approach for security and other RTD&I activities . 
 By mid -2022, Commission services will produce a paper summarising the proposals for 
fostering the adoption of capability -driven approaches to be applied across security sectors.  
 
3. Boosting RTD&I on critical technologies  for security and defence   
The technology roadmaps  that the Commission  will prepar e, based on the  assessments from the  
Observatory , will underpin  activities  ranging from programming RTD&I on critical technologies  
to developing larger flagship initiatives  that will  contribute to  strength ening the EU’s  
competitiveness and resilience in the security and defence sectors . In order to deliver on these 
objectives, a  more efficient use will need to be made of available  financial resources through 
better coordination of  existing EU and national RTD&I programmes and instruments . 
3.1. Overcoming the separation between EU civilian and defence RTD&I  
The Commission under its synergies  action plan (action 2)  committed to enhanc ing by 2022  
internal coordination between EU programmes and instruments , see Box 2,  in order to unlock the 
huge benefits arising from synergies  between civilian and defence RTD&I for economic growth, 
the single market and the security of European citizens.  
While the implementation of  this objective  can be taken further also in 2023 (e.g. through 
improv ed planning and synchronisation, guidance to managing authorities in Member States , 
etc.), some obstacles will  be harder to tackle in the short - and medium term and  may require 
involv ing other stakeholders . This is notably the case where  legal provisions in the basic acts of 
EU programmes and instruments set practical constraints. For example, while dual use activities 
can be funded under  the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and European Structural Investment 
Funds (ESIF), activities carried out under Horizon Europe11 focus on civilian applications ; there 
is no framework for direct support for such activities under  RTD&I programmes and 
                                                           
11  The term ‘Horizon Europe’ in this document refers to the specific programme implementing Horizon Europe and 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology , activities carried out under the se have an exclusive focus 
on civil ian applications.  
 
7 instruments . Similarly, t he European Investment Bank’s lending policy still has restrictions for 
the defence sector.  
In order to facilitate exchanges between civilian and defence communities , especially in the area 
of critical technologies , the Commission  will prepare in 2023 a n approach  for encouraging dual-
use RTD&I at EU level to be fully implemented in the  medium to  long term  across EU 
programmes and instruments . This work will also feed into the mid -term evaluation of relevant 
sectoral programmes, such  as the funds under the Common Provision s Regulation , including 
funds for health emergency preparedness .  
Box 2: EU programmes and instruments supporting RTD&I on critical technologies 
relevant to security and defence and their infrastructure deployment  under the  
Multiannual Financial Programme (2021 -2027)  
- EDF dedicates EUR 8 billion to defence research and development. 4 -8% of the EDF 
research and development budget will be allocated to disruptive technologies, i.e. up to EUR 
100 million per year.  
- Horizon Europe  under pillar II 'Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness'  
allocates  EUR 1.6 billion to civilian security research and innovation under the c luster ‘Civil 
security for society’ , whereas  critical technologies  are supported  under clusters ‘Digital, 
Industry and Space’, ‘Climate, Energy and Mobility’ and 'Food, Bioeconomy, Natural 
Resources, Agriculture and Environment'. Complement ary activities  are funded under pillar I 
‘Excellent Science’, the European Innovation Council (EIC)  and European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) in pillar III 'Innovative Europe' , as well as  European 
partnerships, which pool and mobilis e resources to ensure the EU’s technological leadership 
and open strategic autonomy in critical areas ; 
- the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) will foster deployment activities relevant to critical 
technologies in the priority areas of cybersecurity, AI and supercomputing;  
- the Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and Network of 
Coordination Centres in 2022 will adopt a strategic agenda on cyber investments feeding into 
Horizon Europe and DEP . Synergies between civilian and defence technologies and dual use 
applications may be explored through links to EDF in line with applicable rules.  
- ESIF  (in particular for European Regional Development Fund and the European Social 
Fund+) can be used in support of EDTIB ;  
- other relevant EU programmes, funds and instruments include the Space Programme, CEF, 
InvestEU Programme, the Recovery and Re silience Facility (RRF), LIFE Programme, 
public -private partnerships, blending facilities . 
 
3.2. Linking EU and national programmes and instruments supporting RTD&I on critical 
technologies for security and defence  
While EU programmes and instruments provide significant funding to RTD&I activities for 
security and defence  in the EU , the majority of funding for such activities still lies  with Member 
States , and the fragmentation of security and defence markets remains a serious problem. As a 
consequence , achiev ing technological sovereignty in some critical technology areas and 
mitigat ing strategic dependencies in others  will require  EU-wide  coordination .  
 
8 Member States  are invited  to commit in the Strategic Compass to developing together with 
the Commission an EU -wide strategic coordinated approach for critical technologies 
relevant for security and defence from the outset , in full respect of the variety and complexity 
of the governance of EU and national programmes and instrument s. This approach would also 
take into account other coordinating structures, such as the new EU Innovation Hu b for Internal 
Security chaired by the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security 
(COSI), and the new EU Innovation Hub for  Defence to be set up by the EDA.  
The approach would use t he classified reports on critical technologies  and the technology 
roadmaps  prepared by the Commission  as a starting point for discussion s between Member 
States authorities  and the Commission . The objective would be to identify on the basis of the 
technology roadmaps  those areas  requiring  the most urgent  action  and to mobilis e EU and 
Member States’ programmes, instruments and policies  to address them in a coordinated manner, 
in compliance with EU State aid rules. This would ensure that investments are focused on those 
areas that matter the most to the security of EU citizens. Priorities would be regularly  updated  to 
ensure that they remain relevant and that spending is efficient.  
The Commission will work with Member States to identify the best mechanism for facilitating 
this coordination work (e.g. expert group of the Observatory).  
3.3. Support ing security and de fence  innovation and entrepreneurship  – Creating an EU 
Defence Innovation Scheme   
The EU needs to make  better  use of  the full potential of its innovation community in support of 
security and defence . This will require assisting non -traditional players and existing innovative 
start-ups and small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs)  in the two sectors with overcom ing 
their high technological, administrative,  regulatory and market -entry hurdles , comply ing with the 
high security standards , and accessing financing . The defence market  is often structured around a 
few large players supported by a set of specialised SMEs that have limited direct access to this 
market . As a result , it can be difficult for innovative  defence  SMEs to access finance , which can 
make them more likely  to turn to or be targeted by foreign investors.  The situation is similar for 
innovative security SMEs, which face similar challenges in approaching potential customer s or 
accessing tailored finance12. 
The Commission has been  supporting innovative security start -ups and SMEs under Horizon 
2020, where t he allocated funding and overall success rates under the societal challenge 7 ‘Civil 
security for society’  have been  above average for small innovators . While t his support will 
continue under  Horizon Europe , security start -ups and SMEs will still need additional tailored 
support to accelerate their road to the market. Exploring  new instruments for dual -use innovation 
could boost their production capacity, competitiveness and sustainability.  
                                                           
12 Challenges and opportunities for SMEs and start -ups in EU security R&I , CERIS SSRI virtual event, 30 April 
2021  
 
9 The Commission has started setting up similar activities under EDF  to develop a toolbox on 
defenc e and dual-use innovation  covering technology readiness levels (TRLs)13 1-9. Work is 
ongoing on the following  tools  covering defence, new technologies and dual use : 
a) Defence innovation through EDF  – Specific actions are being explored to better support 
projects on disruptive technologies , and innovative and future -oriented defence solutions , 
encouraging in particular the participation of innovative SMEs , innovative laboratories and 
research and technology organisations  (RTOs) . These actions may take different forms, for 
example business coaching (WP2021); technology challenges (WP2022), hackathons or 
prizes (WP2023 or later). They will also draw on relevant experience from the EIC and may 
link to the new CASSINI for defence.  
b) A defence investment blending  facility under InvestEU – The creation of such a facility would 
allow the Commission to guarantee investments made by financial intermediaries across the 
EU in innovative or strategic defence SMEs. This would ease problems link ed with the 
limited access to finance for SMEs developing promising technologies for European defence, 
while providing trusted capital and avoiding hostile takeovers from third  countries’ entities. 
Enabling a better access to equity funding for innovative defence SMEs and mid -caps would 
support their growth and finally benefit to the innovativeness of the EDTIB.  The 
Commission will also explore the need for further instruments in support of key market 
actors in the value chain.  
c) CASSINI for defence – This in itiative would be inspired by the existing CASSINI initiative to 
support the SMEs and start -ups in the space industry. It would provide them with services 
like: business development and networks (e.g. matchmaking, business accelerator), and 
prizes and comp etitions (including hackathons, mentoring, etc.), complementing the defence 
investment blending facility above.  
d) Innovation incubator  – The Commission will set up in 2022  an innovation incubator to 
support the development of  new technologies and shape dual -use innovation in line with the 
synergies action plan (action 6), which could play an important role in bridging the gap 
between  civilian - and defence -focused  RTD&I  programmes. Following a systematic analysis 
of results  of early stage technology development , the incubator would flag projects  and/or 
technologies  that would exhibit potential security, space or defence applications to relevant 
services in the Commission and Member States for potential uptake. The Commission  would 
assess how these  flagged projects  could  be directed to further funding opportunities , as 
appropriate , such as the Transition funding scheme of the EIC or the EDF.  
e) Support to innovation networks – Cross -border defence innovation networks could play the 
role of innovation brokers and encourage collaborati ve projects to incorporate innovative 
                                                           
13  The EU has widely adopted the use of a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale under its RTD&I programmes 
and instruments since 2014. The scale distinguishes nine levels of technological maturity, ranging from 
fundamental research under TRL 1 to a final product ready for entry into the market under TRL 9. Since the 
application and thus dual use potential of a technology is typically revealed at TRLs 5 -6, it can be considered 
that a technology is ‘neutral’ at TRLs 1 -4. 
 
10 solutions. Technology scouting would detect and identify new innovative solutions and 
technologies with potential benefits for defence applications. Research centres and technical 
test facilities would then test relevanc e of such technologies from the civil domain and 
exchange best practices. EDA would be a core partner of the Commission for the 
implementation of another  part of action  6 under  the synergies action plan .  
The Commission will identify how to link the toolbo x to instruments supporting  innovation in 
the domain s of security  (e.g. Horizon Europe)  or cybersecurity (e.g. the network of National 
Cybersecurity Coordination Centres  in cooperation with  European  Digital Innovation Hubs ). 
The complementary strengths of the Commission and the EDA should be brought together under 
an ‘EU Defence Innovation Scheme’.  Under the scheme, the Commission , based on its 
experience in implementing the EU budget in support of defence, civil and dual -use RTD&I , will 
play a central role in stimulating innovation for the EDTIB. Given its defence expertise, 
including in bringing together emerging and disruptive technologies and military cap ability 
requirements, EDA will  further connect and support Member Stat es efforts through its Defence 
Innovation Hub . By cooperating closely, the Commission and the EDA will in synergy 
accelerate security and defence innovation for the EU and its Member States.   
3.4. Skills  
Lack of skills and work -force shortages , especially of skilled employees with a background in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics,  are major challenges for t he defence and 
security industry , which  rely heavily  on them like many other high -tech industries . As 
technologies and the threat landscape are rapidly evolving, it is important that the industry 
reaches out more to new and young researchers and entrepreneurs , including  women , taking an 
inclusive and accessible approach of all talents, skills and available work force .  
In Nove mber 2020, the Commission launched the Pact for Skills with a first wave of skills 
partnerships in the three key industrial ecosystems of microelectronics , automotive  and the 
aerospace & defence industries.  Pact members (industry, universities and training organisations, 
social partners) committed to ensur ing a continuous and sustainable supply of skills in most 
needed areas by upskilling 200  000 employees and resk illing 300 000 people, with a public and 
private investment of EUR 1 billion by 2030.  
Way forward:  
 The Commission invites Member States to commit in the Strategic Compass to developing 
an EU -wide strategic coordinated approach for critical technologies relevant for security and 
defence from the outset.  
 In 2023 t he Commission will review existing EU instruments and propose further ways to  
encourage  dual-use RTD&I at EU level.  
 The Commission will support innovation and entrepreneurship on critical technologies for 
security and defence  based on the following tools : a) dedicated EDF  actions ; b) a new 
defence investment blending facility under InvestEU;  c) a new CASSINI for defence ; d) a 
new innovation incubator  on new technologies and dual -use innovation  in 2022 ; and e) 
increased support to i nnovation networks . 
 
11  The Commission together with the EDA  and its Defence Innovation Hub  will set up an EU 
Defence Innovation Scheme to accelerate security and defence innovation for the EU and its 
Member States . 
 
4. Reducing strategic dependencies in critical technologies and value chains for security 
and defence  
The EU has several policy tools  beyond its RTD&I programmes and instruments  that can 
contribute  to reduc ing its  strategic dependencies in critical technologies and value chains in t he 
security and defence sectors . These contribute to  strengthen ing the EU’s  industrial capacity , 
competitiveness, technological sovereignty and resilience, but also to  protect ing current and 
future technological developments and capabilities.  
The Commission , based on the work of the Observatory of critical technologies and under the 
updated industrial strategy , will systematically assess security and defence considerations , as 
appropriate,  when implementing and reviewing existing , or designing new , EU industrial and 
trade instruments  to ensure that they are fit for purpose . 
 Industrial alliances – Industrial alliances engage a wide range of partners (e.g. public and 
private players , civil society) in joint action on key EU policy objectives in specific 
industries or value chains. They  are based on the principles of openness, transparency, 
diversity and inclusiveness, and operate in full compliance with competition rules. Industrial 
alliances can include , where appropriate , specific work strands to reduc e strategic 
dependencies for the security and defence sectors. This is being considered in the European 
Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge and Cloud and in the Industrial Alliance on P rocessors and 
Semiconductor Technologies.  
 Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) – IPCEIs are initiated by Member 
States and subject to EU State aid  rules . They are designed to bring together knowledge, 
expertise, financial resources and e conomic players throughout the EU with the aim of 
overcoming market or systemic failures and societal challenges that could not be addressed 
by private actors alone, in particular in the area of breakthrough innovation and key 
infrastructure. IPCEIs can take into account security and defence aspects. This could be the 
case in the upcoming second IPCEI on microelectronics  announced in the Chips Act .  
 EU funding programmes – The EU has always had an open research and innovation policy. It 
is guided by the principle of open strategic autonomy and  aims at ensuring a level playing 
field and reciprocity. The EU’s global approach on research and innovation encourages 
strategic partnerships with like -minded partners in line with the EU’s international 
obligations  (e.g. NATO, United States,  Canada  Japan, South Korea, etc.)14. 
At the same time, it is necessary for Europe to make sure that its strategic interest are 
preserved. For 2021 -2027 the Commission has clarified and harmonised the rules of 
participation for non-EU countries , and eligibility of entities,  across EU programmes and 
                                                           
14  It must be noted, however, that the defence -related research and development  programmes of most of our 
partners are not open to EU companies.  
 
12 instruments. Specific eligibility conditions fo r security sensitive activities  have been 
established for certain programmes (Horizon Europe, DEP, EDF, Space Programme, CEF) 
and further  refined in the relevant work programmes to protect the EU ’s essential security 
interests . The ongoing review of the Commission Financial Regulation will also provide 
more clarity on how to maintain the EU’s open strategic autonomy approach, i.e. fully 
preserving the EU’s essential security interests while respecting its international obligations.  
 Standards  – Under the synergies action plan the Commission is promot ing the use of existing 
hybrid civil/defence standards and the development of new ones by the end of 2022  (action 
5) and the consideration of defence in the Commission’s standardisation policy and actions . 
While the EU strategy on standardisation15 aims to ensure EU leadership in setting civilian 
standards, it will be highly relevant for the def ence sector, since almost 80% of standards 
used in defence com e from civilian sectors. The Commission , together wi th stakeholders 
(e.g. EDA) , will explore the possibility of including defence requirements in the future 
standardisation efforts it supports t o enhance their compatibility with defence needs . 
 Foreign Direct Investment screening  – The EU is one of the world's most open environments 
for foreign investment and one of the main destination s for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the world. However, specific investments can also undermine the EU’s essential security 
interests. To prevent such risks, the EU has put in place a framework for FDI screening that 
has been operational since October 2020. The first annual report on FDI screening confirms 
the importance of effective FDI screening at Member State level and close cooperation at EU 
level , focusing on potential risks for security or public order . Member States are encouraged 
to set up nati onal FDI screening mechanisms; 18 Member States already have one in place 
with another six in the pipeline. The Commission will evaluate the Regulation and present a 
report to the European Parliament and to the Council by October 2023.   
 Critical infrastructures – The increasingly rapid emergence of new and disruptive 
technologies has had a significant impact on security of equipment, infrastructure, services, 
value and supply chains of strategic sectors, including  those of  security and def ence. The EU 
and Member States need to factor in more comprehensively such vulnerabilities in relevant 
risk assessments and monitoring , and implementation of resilience -enhancing measures  
against security  threats , e.g. of a hybrid or cyber nature . EU coord ination will be needed to 
ensure that Member States maintain a future -proof level of resilience and consistent security 
standards at EU level in order to avoid vulnerabilities.  
 Smart and circular use of materials  –The new Circular Economy Action Plan of March 2020 
is one of the main building blocks of the European Green Deal, Europe’s new agenda for 
sustainable growth. Innovation and new business models based on increased resource 
efficiency, development of new materials, promotion of secondary raw materi als and more 
sustainable public procurement , will not only preserve the environment but also secure 
access to materials for the industry . Additive manufacturing techniques , green procurement 
                                                           
15  COM(2022) 31 final  
 
13 and the recycling of materials , if well implemented,  could also contribute to strengthening 
the competitiveness of the EU’s security and defence industries, and the EU’s resilience.  
 Data security – The European strategy for data sets out measures to ensure that individuals 
and companies can stay in control of their data. This will be addressed in the Data Act that 
the Commission will adopt in early 2022.  
As part of the multi -country project on common data infrastructures and services  (bringing 
together the European cloud federation and common European Data Spaces), the 
Commission is facilitating investments (e.g. DEP, CEF, Next Generation EU fund) in cloud -
to-edge capacities that are secure, resilient, energy efficient  and accessible in real  time, and 
that provide quality of service throughout Europe. Ensuring technology transfer in cloud and 
edge technologies between the civil (notably security), defence and space industries would 
enhance technological sovereignty. The European Allian ce for Industrial Data, Edge and 
Cloud provides a possible platform to foster such synergies.  
 Trade policy  –The complexity and vulnerability of global supply chains is an issue not just 
for the EU. Other countries depend on the  EU (‘reverse dependencies’) , and trade  (‘inter-
dependence ’) may contribute to the stability of global value chains . The EU is also ready to 
act assertively and defend itself against unfair trading practices, such as the use of distortive 
foreign subsidies, while acting in accordance with its international commitments. The EU 
will continue to make the most of its toolbox of trade and competition instruments, while 
making sure that the EU tools are efficient and up  to date. The Commission has therefore 
proposed new instruments, such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation16 that addresses 
distortions on the internal market caused by foreign subsidies . 
Further  relevant  policy measures  (e.g. introducing a potential value -added tax (VAT) waiver, 
facilitating the transfer of EU funded defence products ) are listed  in the defence communication . 
Way forward:  
 The Commission is exploring the possibility of adding defence work strands in initiatives 
such as the European Alliance for Industrial Data, Edge and Cloud and the Industrial 
Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies . 
 The Commission together  with Member States will identify and report in 2023 on the need 
for risk -assessing supply chains of  critical infrastructure, in p articular in the digital 
domain , to better protect the EU’s security and defence interests . 
 The Commission encourages  all remaining Member States to set up a national FDI 
screening mechanism.  
 
5. External dimension  
Cooperating with like -minded partners around the world is essential for enhancing the  EU’s 
resilience  and security of supply, while reducing strategic dependencies and increasing mutual 
benefits . The principle of reciprocity plays an important role in this context.  The EU’s traditional 
                                                           
16  COM(2021) 223 final  
 
14 partners in the areas of technology, security and defence include the member s of the European 
Economic Area (in particular Norway), candidate countries, neighbourhood countries, and other 
third countries (e.g. United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea), as well as international 
organisations (e.g. NATO). Recent e xchanges include in particular:  
5.1. EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council  
The EU -U.S. Trade an d Technology Council (TTC) had its first meeting o n 29 September 2021. 
In the joint statement the EU and the US reaffirmed their commitment to ‘focus on advancing 
respective supply chain resilience and security of supply in key sectors for the green and digital 
transition and for securing the protection o f our citizens’ and its aim  to ‘increase transparency of 
supply and demand; map respective existing sectoral capabilities; exchange information on 
policy measures and research and development priorities; and cooperate on strategies to promote 
supply chain resilience and diversification’. Ongoing work in working groups on secure supply 
chains (including on semiconductor s under a specialised track), information communication 
technology security, export controls and investment screening are most relevant for t he present 
roadmap . The recently launched EU -U.S dialogue on security and defence could also serve as a 
forum for discussions on these issues . 
5.2. Partnership with NATO  
At the 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO leaders set out an ambitious agenda on technologies,  in 
particular Emerging and Disruptive Technology (EDTs).17 This provided further guidance to the 
work carried out in accordance with NATO’s implementation strategy on EDTs, endorsed by 
NATO defence ministers in February 2021.  
The Commission and the High Representative will monitor the progress of relevant NATO  
initiatives  in this area  through regular contacts with NATO  at working level  with a view to 
possible mutually  agreeable and beneficial interaction with relevant EU initia tives  in full 
transparency towards Member States , while avoiding creating new or increasing existing 
technological or capability dependencies .  
Way forward:  
 The Commission  and the High Representative  will explore in the context of the EU -U.S. 
TTC and the recently launched EU -U.S. dialogue on security and defence  how to advance 
supply chain resilience and secure the protection of our citizens.  
 The Commission and the High Representative will explore with NATO , in the framework of 
the Joint Declarations on EU -NATO cooperation and in full transparency with Member 
States,  how to promote a  mutually agreeable and beneficial interaction s between their 
respective relevant initiatives.  
 
                                                           
17  This included the decision to launch the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and a 
NATO Innovation Fund . 
 
15 6. Conclusions  
As the global geopolitical situation remains complex and the race for new technologies that are 
relevant for security and defence continues, the EU and its Member States must reinforce 
cooperation on technologies that are critical for  Europe’s  long-term se curity and defence  and 
efforts to reduce  related  strategic dependencies . 
This roadmap proposes to work closely with Member States on identifying critical technologies  
and value chains  for security and defence  – as well as the root causes of associated strategic 
dependencies in the context of the Observatory of critical technologies – to underpin an EU-wide 
strategic coordinated approach for critical technologies relevant for security and defence  that will 
make the most of E U and national RTD&I programmes and instruments.  
To enhance the competitiveness and resilience of the security and defence sectors, the findings 
from the Observatory and related work under the updated industrial strategy will also contribute 
to ensuring that security and defence considerations are better taken into account within EU 
industrial and trade policies,  as appropriate and  in line with  EU competition  rules and the EU’s 
international obligations.  
The proposals contained in this roadmap aim to contr ibute  to the RTD&I dimension  of the 
upcoming EU Strategic Compass , through which Member States will set ambitious , long-term 
goals to substantially enhance Europe’s security and defence .