5. 6. 89 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 139/23 
smoothly, (c) rationalizing the organization of the for­
estry products market, and (d) ensuring the integrated 
development of rural areas, particularly in the uplands. 
5.25.2. There are many possible fields of research 
but priority should be given to: 
— silvicultural techniques, so that woodland can be 
used for a variety of purposes, 
— the genetic improvement of woodland trees and the 
promotion of genetic engineering, 
— techniques for analyzing the woodland environ­
ment, techniques for analyzing and protecting woods 
against pollution, 
plant-health protection, 
protection against fires, 
the economies of the commercial forestry and tim­
ber industry, 
an economic evaluation of the multiple role of 
woods and forests, 
the organization of demand for and supply of for­
estry products, 
forestry mechanization, 
wood technology. 
Done at Brussels, 30 March 1989. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the procurement procedures of entities 
providing water, energy and transport services (!) 
(89/C 139/08) 
On 24 October 1988 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 100 A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
abovementioned proposal. 
The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 1 March 1989. The rapporteur 
was Mr Kaaris. 
At its 264th plenary session (meeting of 31 March 1989), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted by 95 votes in favour, 23 against and 16 abstentions the following Opinion (vote 
recorded). 
The Committee welcomes the proposals submitted by 
the Commission to liberalise public procurement in the 
most significant but hitherto excluded sectors, subject 
to the following remarks. 
1. General comments 
1.1 The Committee is relieved that the Commission, 
after a prolonged period of reflexion and consultation 
with the sectors concerned, has finally tabled its defini­
tive proposals to extend Community regulations to 
(!) OJ No C 319, 12. 12. 1988, p. 2. public purchases of all commodities outside the defence 
area. Public procurement contracts subject to Com­
munity procedures represent about 250 billion ECU. 
The potential savings effect of opening up public con­
tracts are enormous but difficult to quantify. What is 
certain, however, is that the static direct trade effects 
resulting from increased import penetration (based on 
the assumption that public import penetration reaches 
the same level as in the private sector) are less significant 
than the competition effects (reorganisation to elimin­
ate inefficiencies) and the restructuring effects (increas­
ing rates of utilization of production capacity, mergers, 
etc.). The goal of the Commission's proposals is to bring 
about increased competition in this area by creating 
transparency and laying down publishing and infor-
No C 139/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 6. 89 
mation rules as an indispensable framework within 
which economic market forces are set free to act. 
1.2. The Committee, as in its Opinion on the public 
works Directive (!), approves the choice in the proposed 
Directive of a market oriented approach. Whereas the 
legal status of purchasing entities may vary from 
country to country, the relevant criteria for a Com­
munity regulation must be whether the purchasing 
entity is public or is enjoying special or exclusive rights. 
The Committee is, however, aware of the risks, partic-
ulary in the social sphere, that the general opening-up 
of public procurement entails for the suppliers con­
cerned and stresses the need to ensure equal oppor­
tunities for suppliers. 
1.2.1. In this context the Commission should endeav­
our to find a solution should problems arise due to the 
varying degrees of concentration of purchasing entities 
in the different Member States. To give an example, 
the fact that electricity distribution is controlled by 
single companies in both France and Italy might have 
the effect of opening up the market to a very much 
greater extent than will be the case in other Member 
States. 
1.2.2. Exclusion of the secondary activities of the 
purchasing entities would give rise to in justified distor­
tions and should therefore not be stipulated. 
1.2.3. The Directive should, however, apply to enter­
prises which have a de facto monopoly as a result of a 
public service concession although they are not included 
in that concession (for example, electricity production 
in the case of energy distribution concession). 
1.3. The Committee although in favour of a market-
oriented approach finds, however, that the Com­
mission's proposals need tightening up in several 
respects if its stated goals are to be accomplished. 
1.4. Furthermore, the positive impact expected to be 
brought about by the liberalization of public procure­
ment will depend to a considerable degree on the exist­
ence of viable competition between enterprises in the 
sectors concerned. An active competition policy (based 
on the implementation of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty) must be pursued and no time must be lost in 
adopting an effective merger control regulation so as 
to prevent a situation in which individual enterprises 
dominate parts of the market and are in a position to 
charge excessive prices. 
I1) OJ No C 319, 30. 11. 1987. The enterprises concerned must, however, by no means 
by prevented from becoming large enough to ensure 
that they are fully competitive on the world market. 
1.5. The public-sector enterprises covered by the 
draft Directive have infrastructure policy roles set for 
them by the State. The construction, further develop­
ment and servicing of infrastructure projects is also 
a matter of considerable importance from a regional 
political standpoint. In the Committee's view the fulfil­
ment of these political functions must not be under­
mined by the liberalization of public procurement. 
1.6. Many public-sector companies are in compe­
tition (including substitution competition) with private 
enterprises, some of which fall outside the draft Direc­
tives. Steps must be taken to prevent the competitive 
position of public-sector enterprises being impaired by 
the introduction of excessively bureaucratic call-for-
tender procedures. In individual cases the Commission 
should also examine whether public procurement might 
not be more readily liberalized by bringing about real 
transparency in respect of smaller contracts. 
2. Procedures 
2.1. Firm Community rules vigorously enforced and 
excluding preferences are the only possible way of 
permitting economic considerations to be decisive for 
purchasing decisions. 
2.2. The Commission, as in the earlier supplies and 
public works Directives, requires purchasing agencies 
to base the award of contracts on the criteria of most 
economically advantageous tender or lowest price only. 
The Committee agrees with this principle. But equally, 
limiting the use of the negotiated (i.e. non competitive) 
tendering procedure has always been one of the Com­
mission's main goals in combatting the circumvention 
of the EEC's procurement rules. The Committee won­
ders if this principle should not also be applied to the 
hitherto excluded sectors and questions the Com­
mission's justification for allowing a free choice of 
tendering procedures, namely that special 'flexibility' is 
required for the hitherto excluded sectors because of 
their 'particular character' in that they 'differ from the 
essentially administrative organisations typically 
covered by the existing Directives in having economic 
or industrial purposes'. This is a key argument behind 
the Commission proposal because it serves as the justifi­
cation for its 'flexible' approach. The main difference 
between the hitherto excluded sectors and the others 
and the reason they were originally excluded from the 
5. 6. 89 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 139/25 
public procurement Directives is a political one, namely 
that in the Member States' view they were of consider­
ably bigger economic and industrial importance. The 
pretext for not having opened them up, as the Com­
mission itself states was a legal one, i.e. 'that a particular 
activity may be allocated to a 'public' entity in some 
States, to a 'private' entity in others or indeed to both'. 
2.3. EEC legislation on public procurement has had 
relatively little effect on trade because, in the words of 
the Cecchini report, 'there are too many ways to evade 
the rules or influence the choice of suppliers during bid 
evaluation'. So far suppliers have not bothered to enter 
into competitive bidding because they have believed it 
will be unproductive, i.e. too easy for the purchasing 
entity to avoid fair bidding. 
2.4. How the proposed Directive measures up to this 
challenge is of key importance since in the final run it 
is the credibility of the Directive which will decide 
the outcome of the Community's public procurement 
policies. 
2.5. The Committee raises the question of whether 
the tendering procedures of the proposed Directive are 
too 'flexible' to protect purchasing entities from politi­
cal interference in their purchasing decisions and there­
fore may not permit anything like the full public import 
penetration hoped for and mentioned above. The 
reason is simple — contracting entities will according to 
the Directive have a free choice of tendering procedures 
thereby enjoying substantially more flexibility than 
under the public supplies and public works Directives. 
2.6. In the interest of transparency purchasing enti­
ties are required to issue prior calls for competition and 
give prior notice of criteria to be applied in the award 
of contracts. They are also required to keep records 
and furnish statistical reports. Altogether, these do not 
seem to be excessive obligations, especially as the rules 
for prior call for competition are so elastic as to render 
the requirements meaningless. A call for competition, 
for example, can correspond to the periodic indicative 
notice which contracting entities are requested to draw 
up once a year as an indication of their future plans. 
However, one has to bear in mind that these periodic 
notices only have to cover 'envisaged' contracts, a very 
'flexible' concept indeed. 
2.7. Also, where additional projects are developed, 
it is not required that contracts included in a periodic 
notice must be launched during the period covered by that notice, but it is possible to include them in the 
periodic notice of the following year! 
2.8. And on top of this the information to be given 
in the periodic notice is far less detailed than what is 
required for open, restricted or negotiated procedures, 
and does not for example cover the requirements for 
technical specifications or standards! 
2.9. The Committee welcomes the provision where­
by, if tenders are received offering unusually favourable 
terms, it will be possible not just to require a written 
explanation with regard to individual items but also to 
seek information on whether the tendering company 
receives State subsidies. There are, however, grounds 
for doubt as to whether the Commission's information 
on subsidies is complete. 
2.10. The Committee considers that the thresholds 
proposed by the Commission (200 000 ECU in the (base 
of individual supply contracts and 5 million ECU in the 
case of works contracts) should be re-examined. To 
avoid unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, the 
thresholds should be based not on the number of con­
tracts recorded but on the total value of the contracts. 
3. Sanctions 
3.1. The Committee demands that the Community 
Directive, currently before the Council, on the enforce­
ment of Community public procurement regulations be 
applied to the present proposed Directive as soon as 
possible. The establishment of Community regulations 
will remain an irrelevant paper exercise if there are no 
ways to enforce their application. The Committee, as 
stated in its unanimously adopted Opinion on this 
Directive, considers an enforcement Directive an indis­
pensable adjunct for the achievement of a true internal 
market in public procurement and reiterates its 
demands that 
— the Commission, without waiting for adoption of 
the Directive, cooperate with the Member States 
on working out uniform provisions regarding time 
limits, penalty payments and administrative pro­
cedures, and 
— the Commission—as in the case of the competition 
rules [Treaty Article 87(2)]—must have the same 
powers to impose sanctions as those to be given 
to the national authorities under the enforcement 
Directive. 
3.2. The Committee considers at all events that if 
systematic recourse to the highly cumbersome pro­
cedure of the Court of Justice (and no doubt even that 
of its Court of First Instance) is to be avoided, disputes 
No C 139/26 Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 6. 89 
pertaining to the Directives should, subject to the right 
of appeal, be referred to arbitration set up at Com­
munity level. 
4. Exemptions 
4.1. The Committee invites the Commission to limit 
to a minimum the number of derogations from the 
Directive. Exemptions should be the absolute exception 
to the rule for the simple reason that once the Com­
mission gives in to the pressure of one sector, others 
will (quite justifiably) follow suit. And this, as experi­
ence has shown with the former Directives, will mean 
that the Directive loses every hope of becoming 
efficient. 
4.1.1. Although there is indeed a need to limit dero­
gations, it would nonetheless seem advisable to pay 
closer attention to the specific characteristics of individ­
ual sectors. 
The application of a standard procedure to sectors 
which display inherently very different technical and 
administrative characteristics may adversely affect the 
cost and the necessary careful timing of their oper­
ations. 
This is the case with regard to the energy sector, particu­
larly the hydrocarbon sector. In the interests of securing 
the effective liberalization of the markets—which is 
precisely the aim being pursued by the Commission— 
the Committee would call for a specific Directive for 
the energy sector. 
4.2. The Committee is of the opinion that arguments 
used for the proposed exemptions are not always coher­
ent with the general principles for the application of 
the proposals as stated in Article 2. The proposed 
Directive contains a number of exceptions exempting 
contracting entities from the Community's public pro­
curement rules, for example in the areas of purchase of 
water, energy and fuels for the production of energy, 
certain bus transport services, the provision of sea ferry 
services, the transformation, transport and distribution 
of petroleum products, the provision of transport ser­
vices by aircraft etc. These are exemptions of consider­
able economic importance and in some cases their justi­
fication as the Commission itself admits is 'doubtful'. 
4.2.1. Sea ferry services, for example, are excluded 
because 'in general, sea transport is an area in which 
most, but not all companies are private'. Yet according 
to the Commission's approach the private/public own­
ership criterium is no longer relevant, but rather is 
replaced by the criterium of whether the contracting 
entity is public or enjoys special or exclusive rights. 4.2.2. Airlines are excluded though operating in a 
highly regulated environment with limited access to 
routes and depending on state authorization because 
they are 'often in direct, if qualified, competition with 
one another'! 
4.2.3. Such criteria are clearly too vague and unpre-
cise to be useful and the Committee therefore, to avoid 
arbitrary exemptions, invites the Commission to rigor­
ously apply its own stated criteria for defining which 
activities are covered by the Directive, i.e. activities of 
contracting entities which are public or operate on the 
basis of special or exclusive rights. 
4.2.4. The Committee has noted that purchases of 
energy and fuel, which are excluded from the Directive 
under consideration, are to be covered by a further 
Directive. The Committee would underline the import­
ance of this measure. The single market cannot cover 
all products and service with the exception of energy. 
4.3. In order to take account of regional problems 
in the Community, the Committee proposes that prefer­
ential treatment be given to tenders from regions which 
have structural problems. By analogy with the rule 
governing bids from non-EC countries, in the event of 
the same price being quoted preference should given to 
bidders from EC regions classified in group 1 (less-
developed regions) or group 2 (industrial regions experi­
encing problems of readjustment) under the Structural 
Fund regulations. 
5. Transparency 
5.1. The Committee considers transparency to be a 
major objective. In 1986 it voiced its concern that all 
unsuccessful bidders should have the right to know 
which offer was successful and at what price. The 
Committee at that time suggested that the published 
notices of contract awards should include the name of 
a contact person to facilitate access to information of 
interest for potential subcontractors. 
5.2. The Committee demands that the Commission 
redraft Article 15 of the present proposal in order 
to reflect its view of the transparency required for a 
Community Directive. 
5.3. Article 15.2 makes the protection of legitimate 
commercial interests of particular undertakings suf­
ficient reason not to publish either the identity of a 
company that has been awarded a contract or the 
contract price. This is totally unacceptable to the Com­
mittee. It will render publication of award notices 
meaningless. The commercial interests of the successful 
5. 6. 89 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 139/27 
bidders need no protection by secrecy. Transparency is 
a small price to pay for the privilege of a contract. The 
unsuccessful bidders on the other hand have a legitimate 
right to know what is the market price and where to 
address offers for sub-contracts. 
5.4. There is no need for specific phrases in the 
Directive to make it possible to obscure the exact con­
tract price. The model notice in Annex 15 already 
contains the option of publication of the range of prices 
(minimum/maximum) rather than the exact price paid. 
5.5. Article 15.3 which makes it possible to delay the 
dispatch of the award notice for 48 days makes a 
mockery of the publication requirement and is contrary 
to the interests of the subscribers to the Official Journal 
and the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). In the Com­
mittee's opinion there is no reason why the award 
notice should not be dispatched the day after the award 
of the contract. 
5.6. Measures should also be taken to prevent enti­
ties covered by the Directive from endeavouring to 
escape its provisions by entering, without adequate 
reason, into very long term commitments with privi­
leged suppliers before the Directive is published. The 
Directive should stipulate that such commitments 
would be subject to review and curtailment of their 
period of application. 
6. Social dimensions 
6.1. Article 20 of the original supply Directive of 
1976 and Article 23 of the 1971 Directive on works 
contracts list a number of criteria for the exclusion of 
suppliers from participating in a contract, among those 
the non-fulfilment of obligations relating to the pay­
ment of social security contributions or taxes. 
6.2. The Committee would invite the Commission 
to make it clear that similar provisions apply to the 
sectors covered by this Directive and suggests that the 
Directive be reworded in such a way as to ensure that 
social legislation and collective wage agreements are 
complied with at all levels of the undertaking involved 
and that tenders not in accordance with this basic 
requirement are disregarded. 
6.3. The liberalization of public procurement in the 
sectors concerned is an example of the general deregu­
lation approach being followed by the Commission in 
connection with the completion of the Community's 
internal market. Economic liberalization is acceptable 
only if there is a parallel adoption of the necessary 
supporting social and employment policy measures. 6.3.1. The restructuring process should be comp­
lemented by macro-economic measures designed to 
increase the type of growth which promotes employ­
ment. In this context the Committee would refer to the 
Cecchini study which demonstrated that unless all the 
Member States adopted supporting macro-economic 
measures to promote investment, there was likely to be 
only a slight increase in levels of employment and even 
a decrease in the first years. 
6.3.2. A number of sectors (suppliers) have been 
protected by national public procurement procedures 
and have had to face barely any international compe­
tition. This has brought overcapacity and a lack of 
product and manufacturing innovation. There is thus 
a lack of homogenity in the Community in the structure 
of the manufacturing facilities in the telecommunication 
sector. The necessary restructuring must, however, be 
phased in gradually, otherwise it may have unforesee­
able consequences for employment. Some of the old-
established industrial areas in the Community will be 
hard-hit as they are already facing a difficult situation. 
The Commission document refers to the comparatively 
small number of suppliers in the relevant sectors in the 
US, but this cannot be regarded as an example worthy 
of pursuing. 
6.3.3. The liberalization of public procurement in 
the sectors concerned should therefore be accompanied 
by economic and structural measures. In those sectors 
which are particularly concerned by the proposals, 
structural adjustment plans should be worked out by 
European sectoral committees to serve as guidelines. As 
a further development of the social dialogue the sectoral 
committees should comprise representatives of social 
and economic interests and the Commission. 
6.3.4. As regards EC participation, it would appear 
to be self-evident that the Structural Funds may be 
used if serious problems arise with regard to structural 
adjustment. 
7. The external dimension 
The definition of Community origin by means of the 
criterium of value-added is eminently political and tran­
scends the scope of this Directive. 
The Committee is of the opinion, however, that 
Article 24 is of primary importance to the countries of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It invites 
the Commission to start immediate negotiations with 
these countries in order to prevent this measure from 
having unwanted negative effects on wider European 
trade integration. 
The EC is, of course, obliged to respect present and 
future General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) rules in dealing with non-EC suppliers. In areas 
not covered by GATT it is also extremely desirable that 
No C 139/28 Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 6. 89 
the EC negotiate reciprocal agreements (or, at least, 
agreements providing for balanced concessions) on a 
case-by-case basis. 
The Committee broadly endorses the proposed pro­
visions for non-EC States. The rule, specifying 50% 
local content, should, however, be changed to 60%. 
Expenditure on R & D should, moreover, be considered 
separately and should also be subject to the 60 % rule. 
The provision whereby in the event of the same price 
being quoted, preference is given to EC suppliers should 
not apply in the case of tenders submitted by suppliers 
of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP). 
8. Miscellaneous implementing procedures 
8.1. In view of the complexity of the definition of the 
entities subject to the Directives under consideration, it 
would be advisable for the Commission to draw up a 
precise list of the entities involved and the nature of 
the supplies and work covered. The Commission should 
review the list regularly (e.g. once a year). 
8.2. In view of the length of time required by the 
national parliaments to approve the legislation deriving 
Done at Brussels, 31 March 1989.. from the Directives under consideration, the proposed 
date of entry into force (1 March 1990!) would appear 
to be too early. 
The Committee consequently proposes that Article 31 
be redrafted to indicate that the date of entry into force 
should be 12 months after the adoption of the Directive 
by the Council. 
9. Conclusions 
9.1. The Committee wonders whether a Directive 
with the presently proposed tendering procedures, with 
no enforcement Directive to make sure Community 
regulation is respected and with major exemptions, can 
be expected to achieve its objectives. In order to put 
more teeth into the Directive and achieve the goals 
envisaged by the Commission the following changes 
should be made: 
— all public sectors or sectors operating on special or 
exclusive rights should be covered, subject to a 
revision after the Directive has been implemented, 
— the periodic notice as call for tender should be 
cancelled, 
— the sanctions Directive with the Committee's 
amendments should also, after adaptation, apply to 
hitherto excluded sectors. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
5. 6. 89 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 139/29 
APPENDIX 1 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following members, present or represented, voted in favour of the Opinion: 
Mr/Mrs/Miss: Amato, Arets, Bagliano, Beretta, Berger, Bernasconi, Bleser, Boddy, Boisseree, Bredima 
Savopoulou, Breyiannis, Calvet Chambon, Carroll, Ceballo Herrero, Christie, Dassis, Delhomenie, Delia 
Croce, Dodd, Donck, Drilleaud, van Eeckert, Etty, Eulen, Forgas, Freeman, Fresi, Gayetot, Germozzi, 
Geuenich, Giacomelli, Gomez Martinez, Green, Horsken, Houthuys, Jakobsen, Jenkins, Kaaris, Kazazis, 
Kenna, Kirchfeld, Kitsios, Laka Martin, Landaburu, Lappas, Liverani, Luchetti, Maddocks, Margot, Marvier, 
Meyer Horn, Morales, Moreland, Muhr, Muller, Muniz Guardado, Murphy, Nielsen B., Nielsen P., Nierhaus, 
Noordwal, Pardon, Pearson, Pelletier, Petersen, Petropoulos, Poeton, Polyzos, Pronk, Proumens, Quevedo 
Rojo, Raftopoulos, Roseingrave, Saiu, Salmon, Santillan Cabeza, Schade-Poulsen, Schmitz, Schnieders, 
Schnitker, Schoepges, Serra Caracciolo, Smith A. R., Smith L. J., Speirs, Spijkers, Staedelin, StrauG, Tukker, 
Vallejo Calderon, Vanden Broucke, Velasco Mancebo, Vercellino, Whitworth, Zufiaur Narvaiza. 
The following members, present or represented, voted against the Opinion: 
Mr/Mrs/Miss: Arena, Ataide, Beltrami, Ceyrac, Clavel, Collas, Corell Ayora, Coyle, Decaillon, Frandi, 
Gardner, Gredal, Haas, Hagen, Hancock, Mainetti, de Normann, Panizo Arcos, Perrin-Pelletier, Solari, 
Storie-Pugh, Tixier, Wagner. 
The following members, present or represented, abstained: 
Mr/Mrs/Miss: Aparicio Bravo, Aspinall, Bento Goncalves, Lobo Brandao R. Cal, Campbell, Cavazzuti, 
Doornbos, Larsen, Low, Lustenhouwer, Orsi, Proenca, Rangoni-Machiavelli, Ribiere, Riera Marsa, Romoli. 
APPENDIX 2 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following amendments, based on the Section Opinion and tabled in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure, were rejected during the debate: 
Point 4.1 
Add a paragraph 4.1. (a) reading as follows: 
'In the case of the hydrocarbon sector, however, it is necessary to make a distinction. 
Hydrocarbon prospecting, production and transport is a fundamentally international business and decisions 
are nowadays based, by the overwhelming majority of operators, solely on economic, technical and safety 
considerations, so as to guarantee the maximum reliability of materials. Markets and contract procedures 
are therefore firmly based on competition, with a very high degree of specialization. In order to survive, 
companies must meet a specific demand in absolutely every respect and within the time limits required by 
the sector. 
Due account should also be taken of the strategic importance of this sector to the security of Community 
energy supplies and of the international context in which oil and natural gas companies operate (it has to be 
remembered that 80% of world oil reserves are located in the OPEC countries). 
Any distortions which may at present exist in national industrial policies should be resolved by having 
recourse to the provisions of the Treaties on the harmonization of the Member States' economic policies. 
In view of the above considerations, the Committee feels that the Directive on 'excluded sectors' should 
apply to the hydrocarbon sector only in the case of contracts for public services delegated by the public 
authorities (e.g. the supply of gas to households), as they might in practice have some say in the choice of 
supplier.' 
No C 139/30 Official Journal of the European Communities 5. 6. 89 
Reasons 
The specific features of the hydrocarbon sector are outlined in the amendment. They are shaped by technical, 
economic and safety requirements, calling for maximum reliability of materials. They are also connected 
with the international character of the sector, which clearly sets it apart from other 'excluded sectors'. 
Possible distortions in specific national policies—which should be settled as part of the harmonization of 
Member State economic policies—do not undermine the conditions of competition which already prevail for 
most of the Member States. 
Limiting application of the Directive in this way should not conflict with its basic objective. 
Voting 
For: 42, against: 58, abstentions: 29. 
Paragraph 7 
Delete last paragraph and replace by the following: 
'The Section considers that Article 24 of the Commission's proposal should be redrafted, as in its present 
form it would erect barriers around the Community to protect EC suppliers to the water, energy and transport 
services sectors from competition from external suppliers and from suppliers within the EC who source over 
50 % of the value of their tender offer from outside the EC. By the same token it is opposed to Article 24(2) 
which requires that preference is given to EC suppliers if their offer is up to 3 % higher than that of an 
external bidder. 
Furthermore, the Section considers it unwise to introduce in a Directive addressed to public procurement 
any provisions which rightfully belong in other areas of decision, e.g. a GATT negotiating mandate for the 
Council.' 
Reason 
Self-explanatory. 
Voting 
For: 46, against: 71, abstentions: 11.