A4-0242/99

Resolution on the role of the Union in the world: Implementation of the common foreign and security policy for 1998

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Article 21 (former Article J.11) of the Treaty on European Union,

- having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on provisions regarding financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy ((OJ C 286, 22.9.1997, p. 80.)),

- having regard to Rules 92(4) and 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to its resolution of 28 May 1998 on last year's annual report on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (January 1997 to April 1998) ((OJ C 195, 22.6.1998, p. 35.)),

- having regard to the Council document presented to Parliament on 3 May 1999 on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (7051/99 - C4-0213/99),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A4-0242/99),

A. whereas, in accordance with Article 21 (former Article J. 11), second paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union, Parliament is required to hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy,

B. having regard to the objectives of that policy as set out in Article 11 (former Article J. 1) of the Treaty on European Union, to the provisions of Article 3 relating to the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole, and to the responsibility of the Council and Commission for this broad area,

C. having regard to the use which the European Council and the Council have made of the tools provided in the TEU, especially joint actions and common positions, and the provisions of Article 17(1) (former Article J. 7(1)) on the future common security policy,

D. noting that the real instruments of the CFSP, joint actions and common positions, are increasingly used with regard to conflict areas, which was illustrated by the fact that out of the 22 common positions one third of them introduced sanctions against the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) and half of the 20 joint actions concerned ex-Yugoslavia or Albania,

E. noting with satisfaction that with the introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999 the EU will be a global actor in monetary terms,

F. regretting, however, that, from the point of view of the common foreign, security and defence policy, Europe's role does not match its economic role,

G. recalling the obligation in Article 11 (former Article J. 1) of the Treaty for the external relations of the EU to be consistent with the values on which the EU itself has been founded with a view to consolidating democracy, enhancing respect for human and minority rights and promoting the rule of law,

H. whereas the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam forces at present all three Institutions, Commission, Council and Parliament, to undertake reform efforts to adapt their internal organisation, working methods and decision-making mechanisms to the new treaty,

I. whereas it must constantly review its own role and conduct with regard to the CFSP in order to strengthen its powers of proposal and increase democratic control over the CFSP,

J. whereas the Union should take particular interest in crisis and conflict prevention in developing countries,

K. whereas it will be for the European Parliament, together with the national Parliaments, to ensure the involvement of the European public in increasingly difficult decisions taken by the EU in the event of humanitarian missions, crisis management and the maintenance of peace and to provide for appropriate democratic legitimation of action taken under the foreign and security policy,

Trends in CFSP in 1998/99

1. Considers the creation of an effectively functioning CFSP, in the year which sees the birth of the EURO, as an essential element in the maintenance of both transatlantic and global stability with a view to enhancing the political profile of the EU and increasing its responsibilities in the world;

2. Notes a certain trend that European governments seem to be increasingly willing to shoulder their political responsibility for peace and security on the European continent;

3. Believes that the EU's response last year to the crisis in Russia, to the stalemate in the Middle East peace process and to the conflict in Kosovo was inadequate and calls on the Council to make a concerted effort to adopt clear policies and play a more active role;

4. Welcomes the progress in the enlargement process and the beginning of the accession negotiations with five countries from Central and Eastern Europe and with Cyprus; considers eastward enlargement as part of an overall European approach to maintaining peace by preventing instability beyond the borders of today's EU;

5. Considers that the EU must also develop cooperation, both political and economic, with the Central and Eastern European countries which have not yet applied to join the Union, notably with the countries of South-East Europe;

6. Welcomes, from this point of view, the fact that the Council has finally realised the importance of speeding up the process of integrating the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the European Union and therefore calls on the Council to conclude the association agreement without delay and to remove all obstacles (both formal and informal) to FYROM's full membership of the European Union;

7. Congratulates the Albanian Government under Prime Minister Pandeli Majko on its achievements to date both in stabilising and bringing peace to Albania and in offering shelter to persons expelled from Kosovo; and calls on the Council and Commission immediately to launch a genuine Marshall Plan for Albania and open negotiations with a view to concluding an EU-Albania association agreement;

8. Welcomes in this context the reactivation of Malta's application for membership and the positive response given by the Commission in its updated opinion;

9. Regrets that in 1998 armed conflicts, wars and civil wars broke out, or persisted, in a number of developing countries, negating or hampering the EU's efforts in the development aid sphere in many cases; regrets, therefore, the limited impact of the EU's CFSP;

Strategic Questions

10. Encourages Council to prepare the four Common Strategies on Russia, the Ukraine, the Mediterranean region and the western Balkans - as agreed by the Vienna Council in December 1998 - as soon as possible for adoption by the European Council;

11. Considers the new instrument of Common Strategies as a useful framework to find strategic answers towards the crises in its near neighbourhood, and to increase the Union's efficiency by permitting decisions to be taken by majority voting;

12. Insists on being consulted by Council on the contents of the Common Strategies and proposes that its President present Parliament's recommendations to the European Council;

13. Considers that the Common Strategies must reflect the Union's common interests, be comprehensive by covering pillar II measures as well as those under pillar I and III, and therefore clearly define an added value;

14. Considers with regard to Russia that the Common Strategy should be based on a recognition that the EU has much to gain from stable political conditions, economic growth and improving living conditions in Russia, and much to lose by the fading of the state;

15. Stresses that the Common Strategy must reach beyond the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the TACIS programme by building into the strategic relationship with Russia fundamental values of the Union like democracy and human and minorities rights and the principle of friendly relations with neighbouring countries;

16. Stresses with regard to the western Balkans that a lasting peace settlement for the Kosovo conflict will only be found within the framework of a regional concept that leads to a stability pact within which all the territorial controversies and minority problems can be addressed;

17. Stresses that the establishment of democracy in Serbia is essential if there is to be stability throughout the region;

18. Strongly criticises Council for the lack of any adequate initiative from the European Union on Kosovo before the outbreak of military hostilities in spring 1998 although Parliament had already in January 1998 drawn the attention to the dangerous dimension of the conflict and had pleaded for confidence-building measures under the auspices of the EU, which might have prevented the further escalation of the conflict and the high humanitarian and economic costs which the conflicting parties as well as the EU Member States now have and will have to pay in the future;

19. Acknowledges, however, the recent European efforts at the level of the EU and of the Contact Group to reach a negotiated peace agreement on Kosovo;

20. Regrets the fact that, on account of Milosevic's radical opposition, the political negotiation efforts have not been able to prevent the use of force; considers that military intervention, which was approved by all the EU Member States, was therefore unavoidable as a means of ending the process of ethnic cleansing pursued by Milosevic and of securing the acceptance of a lasting settlement to the conflict;

21. Points out that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown no real improvement and that the role of the UN High Representative is becoming more and more crucial to get institutions functioning properly; underlines the necessity of a more direct presence of the EU;

22. Urges the Commission to press ahead with the establishment and financing of the Democracy Foundation for Bosnia-Herzegovina project as proposed by the European Parliament in order to strengthen civil society, support democratic institutions and enhance the EU profile in the region;

23. Stresses with regard to the Mediterranean region that the strategic relationship which was created by the Barcelona Process can only be further developed if the deadlock of the Middle-East Peace Process is overcome; therefore calls for the EU to play a stronger political role in the search for a settlement and urges the Israeli Government to implement the Wye River Memorandum without adding new unilateral conditions; recognizes the right of the Palestinian Authority (according to the Oslo Agreement) to declare independence but urges it to refrain from unilateral acts that could endanger the continuation of the peace process;

24. Recognises the strategic importance of the relations between the EU and Turkey; deplores the fact, however, that since the European Council of Cardiff in June 1998 and despite the proposals of the Commission on a strategy for the development of the relations between Turkey and the EU, there has been no progress;

25. Believes that recent events in connection with the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan have demonstrated that the Kurdish question in Turkey has an international dimension;

26. Welcomes the forthcoming European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Summit of Heads of State and Government, to be held in Rio in June; calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure that this historic opportunity is used as a means of placing the relations between the two geographical areas in a global perspective and of establishing a bi-regional political agenda which includes a strengthening of the political dialogue, the development and strengthening of a major trade and economic association and greater cooperation in areas such as education, culture, environmental protection, the fight against corruption and organised crime, external debt and the protection of human rights;

27. Calls on Council to link the CFSP to the instruments of development policy in an integrated approach to the benefit of the developing countries;

Human Rights and Democracy Building

28. Believes that in the age of globalisation, human rights have political and economic importance, above and beyond the humanitarian aspect, and that the development of free markets can only endure if it is an integrated part of a wide culture of freedom based on human rights, the separation of powers, the rule of law, democratic parties, independent unions, a free press and a critical public; therefore urges Council to work together with Parliament to strengthening the EU's human rights and democracy profile;

29. Notes that in order to gain maximum strength and credibility, the EU's policy for the promotion of human rights and democracy must be applied in a consistent way to different countries, be they big or small, powerful or weak; calls for human rights clauses in EU agreements with third countries actually to be invoked when there are persistent human rights abuses, as has not been the case in the past;

30. Considers it imperative that the EU, as well as its individual Member States, resist threats by third countries to respond to possible criticisms regarding their human rights record by retaliating against exporters or by raising obstacles to investors and favouring competitors from other states;

31. Considers that the promotion of human rights and democracy, whether pursued by discreet diplomacy or openly, should continuously be reviewed in the light of the results obtained; therefore looks forward to receiving from Council the first annual EU human rights report announced by the German Presidency;

32. Believes, in the light of the resolutions on abolition of the death penalty adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1997 and 1998 and the fact that the number of countries supporting abolition has risen substantially in the last ten years, that the ground has been prepared to an extent sufficient to enable the Union to sponsor an initiative at the next UN General Assembly session with a view to declaring a universal moratorium on capital executions;

33. Applauds the role of the Union and in particular Italy, which hosted the diplomatic conference that set up the International Criminal Court, and calls on the Member States to ratify the Court's Statute as quickly as possible;

34. Calls on the Council and the Commission to prepare, annually, a report on human rights in countries with which the EU has agreements, as suggested in the declaration by the European Council in Vienna on 10 December 1998;

35. Welcomes Council's common position of 25 May 1998 concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa and emphasises in this context its explicit recognition of each country's right to adopt its own constitutional and administrative rules to reflect its history, its culture and its ethnic and social conditions;

Towards a European Security Identity

36. Supports the efforts of the EU to develop its own capabilities for military crisis management in the scope of the Petersberg tasks whenever the EU/WEU see a need for action and the North American partners do not wish to be involved;

37. Urges Council to use the new momentum for the creation of a European Security Identity as given by the British initiative in Pörtschach and the Franco-British declaration of Saint Malo; considers that the future position of the WEU should be clarified quickly;

38. Supports the initiative of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to hold joint meetings with the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly, as it did on 17 March 1999, and encourages to intensify its relations with the North Atlantic Assembly and its Standing Committees;

39. Requests the Council and Commission to produce, before the end of 1999, the feasibility study on the European Civilian Peace Corps which was asked for by Parliament in its Recommendation to Council of 10 February 1999 ((Minutes of that sitting, Part II, Item 7.));

The European Silence

40. Considers it necessary that the CFSP develops from a largely ad hoc cooperation between Member States on specific issues towards a comprehensive foreign and security policy for the Union with strategic objectives, which presupposes that the EU will not be silent when it comes to conflicts that concern European interests and values that the EU is committed to defend;

41. Calls for renewed attempts by the EU to help bring an end to the gruesome conflict in Algeria in connection, in particular, with the ongoing negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean Association agreement;

42. Regrets that the Member States failed to forge a common approach to the crisis caused by Iraq's non-cooperation with the UN weapon inspectors, and invites the Council to define a common position on Iraq;

43. Considers that the EU should respond more actively to the recent successes scored by more moderate forces within the political establishment in Iran and to the increased sense of responsibility with which Iran is already acting on the international scene;

44. Calls for a substantial EU contribution, alongside those already promised by Portugal and Australia, to the attempts at bringing the Indonesian occupation of East Timor to an end without the eruption of further violence, notably through political dialogue and funding for projects geared at facilitating the emergence of a new and viable political, social and economic order in East Timor;

Interinstitutional Relations after Amsterdam

45. Regrets that the Presidency for Council in the second year running failed to present in time to Parliament its annual report on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial consequences for the Communities' budget, as it is committed to do by the Protocol to Article 21 (former Article J. 11) of the Treaty on European Union;

46. Considers it necessary, in view of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam - in particular Articles 12, 17 and 28 (former Articles J. 2, J. 7 and J. 18) of the Treaty on European Union, to reconsider the financing of the CFSP, especially with regard to measures related to the Common Strategies, the Petersberg tasks and the inclusion of the ECMM (European Community Monitoring Mission) into the Community Budget;

47. Notes that while the treaty obligations of Article 21 (former Article J. 11) to keep Parliament fully informed on the development of the Union's foreign and security policy have been fulfilled more or less satisfactorily by the Commission, the same cannot be said about Council and the Presidency which did not make any recognisable effort to build up a fruitful relationship with Parliament on a continuous basis;

48. Hopes that with the appointment of the High Representative of the CFSP the Union's visibility and its ability to take action in the foreign policy field will improve, which presupposes, however, that the person appointed carries political weight and is able to assert himself or herself;

49. Expects that the future High Representative will develop a permanent and structured working relationship with Parliament and will inform it at least on a quarterly basis on topical issues of the CFSP;

50. Insists on a confirmation hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee prior to the take up of formal duties of the High Representative; considers such a hearing as a precondition for developing a close and constructive relationship between Parliament and the High Representative;

51. Considers that with the objective of developing closer links with all foreign policy actors of the executive the same procedure should be applied with regard to the nomination of the Special Envoys of the Union and of important Heads of delegations or EU ambassadors as already done by the Foreign Affairs Committee in the case of the new Head of Delegation in Sarajevo in June 1998;

52. Reiterates its proposal in last year's report to create a genuine common European diplomacy, transforming the Commission representation into proper diplomatic representation of the Union in those countries where the majority of Member States are not fully represented;

53. Suggests in preparation for such a common European diplomacy the establishment of a 'College of Diplomacy¨ of the European Union;

54. Hopes that the newly established 'Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit¨ of Council which is to help identify crises in Europe at an early stage and, where necessary, manage them more resolutely and effectively, will ensure the consistency and coherence of the CFSP as referred to in the Treaty in Article 13 (former Article J. 3);

55. Suggests to Council and its General Secretary/High Representative to create a link between the 'Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit¨ of Council and the 'Conflict Prevention Network¨ (CPN), which will strengthen the independence of CPN's expertise;

56. Acknowledges the useful contribution of the CPN, whose analyses, studies and briefings papers are jointly used by Parliament and the Commission, to increasing Parliament's own analytical and planning capacities;

57. Acknowledges the necessity of a long-term perspective for CPN and recommends the provision of adequate financial means for CPN within the annual budget procedure in order to guarantee the necessary resources to meet the growing demands of Parliament;

58. Intends to make better use of its instrument of recommendations to Council especially in cases of urgency; suggests to this end simplifying its own internal procedures;

59. Recommends that urgencies should also be on the agenda for the plenary sessions in Brussels and not only be dealt with in Strasbourg;

60. Recommends that its Bureau and its General Secretary ensure a closer cooperation between the Foreign Affairs Committee and Parliament's Delegations at political as well as at administrative level;

61. Recommends as well that, with full respect for their mutual independence, the strongest possible communication and cooperation should exist between the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the Committee on Development and Cooperation;

62. Therefore points out that the easiest way to improve such cooperation would be to harmonize the administrations of both committees at the beginning of the next parliamentary term;

63. Recommends the examination of all possibilities for improving the relations between Committee work, Plenary and Topical and Urgent Debates in order to increase Parliament's visibility and its foreign policy profile;

64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission as well as to the Governments and Parliaments of EU Member States.