EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 21 January  2019   
on the Central Bank of Malta’s supervision of credit reference agencies  
and its oversight of payment services  
(CON/20 19/2) 
 
Introduction and legal basis   
On 7 November 2018 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Central Bank of 
Malta (CBM) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Central Bank of Malta Act ( the ‘draft law 
amending the CBM Act’) and on a draft d irective  No 15 on the supervision of credit reference agencies 
(the ‘draft directive on c redit reference agencies ’). The CBM also informed the ECB that it intends  to 
amend Directive No 14 on the Central Credit Register  (the ‘draft amendments to the Directive on the 
Central Credit Register ’), together with the draft law amending the CBM  Act and the draft d irective on 
credit reference agencies , collectively referred to as  the ‘draft law’. On 23 November 2018,  the ECB 
received a revised version of the draft law.  
The ECB’s competence to deliver this  opinion is based on Articles  127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the second, third and fourth indents  of Article  2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC1, as the draft law relates to means of payment, the CBM,  the collection, compilation 
and distri bution of financial and balance of payment s tatistics  and the ECB’s tasks concerning the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty . 
In accordance with the first sentence of Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The draft law has three main purposes. First, it extends  the oversight powers of the CBM with 
regard to the provision of payment services by credit  institutions  and financial institutions2. Second,  
it confers on the CBM new supervisory powers with respect to credit reference agencies . Third , it 
extends access to the Central Credit Register  operated by the CBM to credit reference agencies 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  The CBM Act defines the term ‘financi al institution’ as having the same meaning as that assigned to it by A rticle 2 of 
the Financial Institutions Act ( Act XXII of 1994,  Chapter 376 of the Laws of Malta), and including any branch in Malta 
of an institution not incorporated in Malta. A ‘financi al institution’ as defined in the Financial Institutions Act means 
any person who regularly or habitually acquires holdings or undertakes the carrying out of any activity listed in First 
Schedule to the said Act, for the account and at the risk of the pers on carrying out the activity,  and includes payment 
institutions within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as well 
as electronic money institutions within the meaning of Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council . 
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2 and to other ins titutions  to wh ich the CBM decides to grant access . 
1.2 Oversight of payment services  
1.2.1  The CBM Act currently  authorises the CBM to issue, amend or revoke directives on the provision of 
payment services in order to promote the stable and sustainable deve lopment and provision of 
payment instruments3. The draft law amending the CBM Act extends  (i) the scope of the CBM’s 
activity  to cover the provision of payment services, payment applications, payment card schemes 
and payment transactions by credit and fina ncial institutions ; and (ii)  the CBM’s oversight and 
regulatory powers  in this regard (see paragraph 1.2.2 below) . For this purpose,  a payment service 
is defined in accordance with Directive (EU)  2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council4. A payment application is defined as computer software or equivalent, loaded on a device 
enabling payment transactions to be initiated and allowing the payer to issue payment orders . A 
payment card scheme is defined as a single set of rules, practices, standards and/or 
implementation guidelines for the execution of card- based payment transactions.  Finally, a 
payment transaction is defined as an act,  initiated by the payer or on his behalf or by the payee, of 
placing,  transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespec tive of any underlying obligations between the 
payer and the payee . 
1.2.2  Pursuant to  the draft law  amending the CBM Act , no credit or financial  institution may provide a 
payment service in Mal ta unless it notifies the CBM . The CBM would have the power to review  the 
rules and procedures  of any payment service, payment application, payment card scheme and 
payment transact ion in Malta . It would be authorised to make an order restraining a credit or 
financial institution  from engaging in activities which it deems  to go against the stable and 
sustainable development of the payments landscape in Malta. T he CBM would also be authorised 
to suspend the provision of any payment service, payment application, payment card scheme or  
payment transaction where the credit or financial institution fails to comply with a lawful or der or 
requirement of the CBM.  Finally, it  would be empowered to publicise non- compliance with its order 
or requirements and to impose administrative penalties.  
1.2.3  Pursuant to the draft law amending the CBM A ct, the CBM would be required to discuss with 
the competent authority the promotion of the stable and sustainable development of the payments 
landscape in Malta.  A competent authority is defined as any authority or authorities nominated to 
regulate the bus iness of credit institutions, financial institutions or financial services institutions 
under any law listed in the Schedule to the CBM Act. In the context of the provision of payment 
services by credit or financial institutions , the competent authority under the Banking Act5 and the 
Financial Institutions Act is  the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) . 
1.3 Supervision of c redit reference agencies   
1.3.1  Under the draft law amending the CBM Act, the CBM is designated as the supervisory authority of 
                                                 
3  See Article 34A(1) of the CBM Act . 
4  Directive (EU)  2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25  November 2015 on payment services 
in the internal market , amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010,  and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC  (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p.35).  In particular, a payment service is 
defined as any business activity set out in Annex I thereof.  
5  Banking Act, Act XV of 1994,  Chapter 371 of the Laws of Malta.    
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3 credit refer ence agencies  solely for the purpose of overseeing and regulating the task of issuing a 
credit score, defined as a measure of creditworthiness derived from credit information which must , 
under pain of nullity , include data derived from the Central Credit R egister  operated by the CBM.  A 
credit reference agency is defined for this purpose as an undertaking licenced by the Trade 
Licensing Unit6 the main business of which is to prepare, assemble and evaluate credit information 
and related credit and risk management services on legal and natural persons for the purpose of 
issuing credit scores to be furnished to third parties, provided that a credit reference agency is not 
precluded from c arrying out other related tasks.  
1.3.2  Under Legal Notice 213 of 20187, on which the ECB was not consulted , further provision is made 
for the application for a trading licence to the Trade Licensing Unit in order to carry out the 
business of a credit reference agency . The assessment and determination of such applications is 
made by th e Trade Licensing Unit in consultation with the CBM, whereby the CBM is required to 
give its recommendation for the issue of such a licence to the Trade L icensing Unit . Such a licence  
may be suspended or cancell ed by the Trade Licens ing Unit on the recommendation of the CBM . 
Any director, manager, administrator, trustee or principal officer  of a credit reference agency may 
be removed by the Trade Licencing Unit on the recommendation of the CBM . Any other restrictions 
may be imposed on a credit reference agency  by the Trade Licensing Unit as the CBM,  as the 
supervisory authority, may stipulate.  
1.3.3  Under  the draft law amending the CBM Act, the CBM is entrusted with levying supervision fees on 
licensed credit reference agencies. As part of its supervisory duties,  the CBM may conduct on- site 
and off -site inspections.  
1.3.4  The draft law amending the CBM Act empowers the CBM to issue directives  for the carrying into 
effect of its supervisory duties  in relation to credit reference agencies. In this context, the draft 
directive on credit reference agencies lays down detailed rules concerning the supervision of 
licensed credit reference agencies . In particular, it establishes  specific obligations of credit 
reference agencies with regard to the issue of credit scores , notifica tion requirements , the 
obligation to establish a complaints  resolut ion u nit, maximum periods of retention of central credit 
register  data and credit scores , and obligations with regard to conflicts of interest and 
confidentiality. The rules set out in the draft directive  on credit reference agencies also relate to the 
powers of the CBM as supervisor of credit reference agencies . In particular , they provide for the 
imposition of an annual supervisory fee,  powers relating to the CBM’s  on-site and off -site 
inspections , powers in relation to access ing documentation held by the agencies , powers with 
respect to the governance of the agencies and the power to impose penalties on agencies .  
1.4 Access to C entral Credit Register   
1.4.1  The draft amend ment s to the Directive on the Central Credit Register  predominantly cater for the 
modalities of access to the C entral Credit Register  by the  main  parties involved, notably  credit 
institutions, natural or legal persons whose credit is being rated and credit reference agencies . The 
                                                 
6  See Part VIIA, Regulations  47A to 47H  of the Trading Licenc es Regulations , Legal Notice 420 of 2016.   
7  Trading Licences (Amendment) Regulations, 2018,  which added Part VIIA to the Trading Licences Regulations.  
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4 draft amendments also regulate the modalities of acces s to the R egister  by the Malta Development 
Bank and by other institutions to wh ich the CBM grants access.  
1.4.2  The existing provisions  of the CBM Act provide that the CBM may grant access to the C entral 
Credit Register  on the basis of reciprocity arrangements to central banks and other institutions of 
Member States of the European Union that create databases comparable to the Register8. The 
draft law amending the CBM Act amends this provision by laying down that access to the R egister  
will be extended to:  (i) Union institutions that create databases comparable to the R egister  and 
which conclude reciprocity arrangements with the CBM; ( ii) the Listing Authority ; (iii) the Malta 
Stock Exchange;  and (iv ) any other institution as the CBM may consider necessary.  
1.4.3  Furthermore, the draft law amending the CBM Act introduces a  new provis ion to cater for instances 
where the carrying out of the CBM’s statistical functions under the CBM Act necessitates  the 
transfer of statis tical and other information by the CBM to any person in general or any entity which 
is licensed, authori sed or registered by a competent authority.  
 
2. Scope of the opinion  
This opinion focuses  on the following areas of the draft law of i nterest to the ECB: the oversight of 
payment services by the CBM  (Section  3); the CBM’s new  supervisory powers with respect to credit 
reference agencies  (Section 4);  and access to the C entral Credit Register  (Section 5 ). Finally the opinion 
examines the new tasks conferred on the CBM against  the prohibition of monetary financing ( Section  6). 
This opinion does not address the question of whether the draft law, if adopted as proposed, would 
represent an effective means of implementing D irective (EU) 2015/2366 or other relevant U nion legal acts 
in Malta.  
 
3. Oversight of payment services provided by credit and financial institutions  
3.1 The oversight of payment services provided by  credit and financial institutions is already carried out  
by the CBM  under the provisions of the CBM Act9.  
3.2 In Malta,  the CBM  and the MFSA  are both competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 . 
The MFSA is, with a few exceptions, largely responsible for Title II (Payment service providers) 
thereof, whereas the CBM is , with a few exceptions, largely responsible for Titles III (Transparency 
of conditions and information requirements for payment services) and IV (Rights and obligations in 
relation to the provision and use of payment services). Furthermore, some provisions of D irective 
(EU) 2015/2366, such as  those relating to incident reporting, as well as more general provisions 
such as those on, inter alia, data protection and penalties, fall within the remit of both the CBM and 
the MFSA. In practical terms, the MFSA is, under the D irective , responsible for  the granting and 
withdrawal of authorisation of payment institutions,  the supervision of payment institutions and 
issues relating to, inter alia, shareholding, own funds, safeguarding requirements and 
                                                 
8  See Article 24(4)  of the CBM Act . 
9  See Article 34A of the CBM Act . 
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5 governance10. On the other hand, the CBM, as the overs eer and regulator of the operation of, and 
participation in, domestic payment systems, is responsible for, inter alia, the D irective’s  provisions 
on the authorisation and execution of payment transactions, authentication, framework contracts, 
information r equirements and applicable charges in relation to, inter alia, credit institutions and 
payment institutions11.  
3.3 The ECB notes that the draft law proposes  to extend the CBM’s existing oversight  and regulatory  
powers in relation to payment services  providers , including credit  and financial institutions . Under the 
draft law the CBM is required to discuss with the ‘competent authority ’ the promotion of the stable 
and sustainable development of the payments landscape in Malta. The definition of ‘ competent 
authori ty’ under the CBM Act does not , however,  include the ECB.  Furthermore, it should be noted 
that, with regard to the oversight of international payment card schemes that provide services on the 
Maltese market, there is no reference in the draft law to the di stribution of oversight responsibilities 
within the Eurosystem.  
3.4 Pursuant to relevant Union law12 the ECB is competent to carry out specific tasks for the purpose of 
prudential supervision of credit institutions established in the Member States.  In view of i ts 
competence in this area, the ECB considers that the CBM should inform the ECB and the MFSA, 
within their respective fields of competence for the prudential supervision of credit institutions, on an 
ex ante basis, whenever the exercise of the CBM’s overs ight and regulatory powers in relation to 
payment service provider s which are credit institutions  could risk pre- empting the powers that the 
ECB and the MFSA may have for the purposes of carrying out the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, inc luding the power to restrict or limit their business and operations . Furthermore, t he 
ECB understands that any powers  exercised by the CBM in this regard are without prejudice to such 
powers of the ECB and the MFSA13. Similarly, the ECB wishes to recall the pre -agreed distribution of 
oversight responsibilities within the Eurosystem  with regard to payment  schemes14, and that the 
extended powers of the CBM should not affect in any way the powers that the ECB or the other 
Eurosystem central banks have as overseers  of payment card schemes.  
 
4. Supervisory powers with respect to credit reference agencies  
4.1 The definition of credit reference agencies pursuant t o the draft law falls  outside the scope of 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/ 2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 particularly 
because this regulation does not apply to credit scores, credit scoring systems or similar 
assessments related to obligations arising from consumer, commercial or industrial relationships16.  
                                                 
10  See the Financial Institutions Act . 
11  See Central Bank of Malta Directive No 1 on the p rovision and use of p ayment services, available at : 
www.centralbank malta.org .  
12  In particular, Article 127(6) of the Treaty concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank  concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions  (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63) . 
13  See Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  
14  See Eurosystem oversight policy framework,  July 2016, section 5.2 ‘ Allocation of roles within the Eurosystem ’. 
15  Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September  2009 on credit rating  
agencies  (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p.1) .  
16  Article 2(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.  
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6 As credit reference agencies fall outside the s cope of this regulation, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority would not have supervisory powers over such entities.  
4.2 In the vast majority of Member States , credit reference agencies remain unregulated except for 
data protection aspect s17. As the subject s of data protection are normally only natural , and not 
legal , persons18, this  implies  that in most  Member States  credit reference agencies remain entirely 
unregulated so far as  the credit scoring of  legal persons is concerned. Moreover, it  seems that i t is 
only in a few Member States that credit reference agencies  are regulated with regard to the way 
their credit scoring is made19.  
4.3 Credit reference agencies are currently one of the four accepted credit assessment sources on 
which the Eurosystem bases it s eligibility assessment of assets eligible as collateral for 
Eurosystem credit operations. Credit reference agencies accepted as credit assessment systems 
are referred to as third- party rating tool providers and their acceptance and monitoring follows the  
applicable provisions of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60)20. The use of third -party rating 
tools’ credit assessments in Eurosystem monetary policy operations is however  very limited, 
particularly when compared to the other three accepted credit assess ment sources.  
 
5. Access to the Central Credit Register  and to other information held by the CBM  
5.1 The ECB welcomes the provisions of the draft law extending access to the Central Credit Register 
to (i) Union institutions that create databases comparable to  the Register and wh ich conclude 
reciprocity arrangements with the CBM;  and (ii)  any other institution as the CBM may consider 
necessary.  
5.2 As previously noted by the ECB21, as the ECB does not currently have a comparable register, it 
cannot be provided with information in the Register on the basis of reciprocity . The draft law does 
not contain an explicit provision allowing the information on the Register to be accessed by the 
ECB or the  MFSA , even though the ECB has previously identified channels through  which it or the 
MFSA could obtain access to data contained in  the Central Credit Register22.  
5.3 The ECB welcomes  that the draft law  provides that the CBM  may provide access to the information 
held in the C entral Credit Register  to any other institutions as the CBM may consider necessary. 
                                                 
17  A January 2011 report of the European Credit Research Institute indicates  that the principal national regulators of 
credit bureaus in many U nion Member States are the national data protection offices . See M . Rothemund and M . 
Gerhardt, European Credit Research Institute, The European Credit Information Landscape: An analysis of a survey 
of credit bureaus in Europe,  January 2011, p. 7.  
18  See the definition of ‘personal data’ in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 119, 4.5. 2016, p. 1) , which is confined to natural 
persons.  
19   In the UK the Financial Conduct Authority is designated as  the competent authority in this respect . See Briefing 
Paper Number 04070, House of Commons Library, of 17 March 2014 on c redit reference agencies , pp. 5-6. In 
Hungary, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank is designated as the competent national authority for the supervision of financial 
institutions, inter alia credit reference agencies . See Act CXXII of 2011 on the Central Credit Information System . 
20  Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central bank of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the 
Eurosystem monetary policy framework (ECB/2014/60)  (OJ L 91 2.4.2015, p. 3) . 
21  See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2015/20.  
22  See paragraphs  3.1 to 3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/20.  
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7 The ECB considers that, if necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks, this provision could give t he 
ECB an additional  legal basis for accessing the R egister . 
 
6. New tasks conferred on the CBM   
6.1 In relation to the oversight of  the provision of  payment services  by credit and financial institutions, 
the ECB notes that the draft law  does not confer genuinely new tasks on the CBM, but rather  
extends the CBM’s powers to  facilitate the exercise of a task already assigned to it. By cont rast, the 
supervision of credit reference agencies is a new task entrusted to the CBM by the draft law  as 
currently the CBM does not perform the function of supervisory authority for the purpose of 
overseeing and regulating the issuing of credit scores by  credit reference agencie s. 
6.2 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) of  the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) must be assessed against the criteria for determining 
what constitutes a government task from the perspective of the monetary financing prohibition laid 
down in Article 123 of the Treaty.  
6.3 For the purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/9323 
defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -
à-vis third parties’. To determine what might be assimilated with the financing of the public sector’s 
obligations vis -à-vis third parties, which can be interpreted as the financing provided by an NCB  
outsid e the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to assess whether the  new task to be 
undertaken by that NCB is a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the  public 
sector of  Member States , rather than a central bank task . In other words, adequate safeguards 
against  circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a sound 
budgetary policy of Member States must be put in place.   
6.4 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Arti cle 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the 
Treaty, the Governing Council has end orsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for 
determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the 
meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes a 
government task as follows:  
First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been 
conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are 
mainly defined in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 and 25.1 
of the Statute of the ESCB.  
Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new 
tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferr ed on the ECB and the NCBs are not 
precluded per se. However, new tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly 
                                                 
23  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the applic ation of the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
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8 discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector 
entities should be considered gov ernment tasks.  
Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector 
entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that 
NCB.  
In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  
(i) whether the performance of the new task would create conflicts of interest with existing 
central bank tasks which are not a dequately addressed and does not necessarily 
complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 
and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The 
complementarity between a ne w task and the existing central bank tasks should be 
interpreted narrowly , so as to avoid  leading to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 
tasks. Such complementarity should be examined also in relation to the financing of those 
tasks;  
(ii) whether w ithout new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 
to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the 
capacity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks;  
(iii) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the 
light of central bank independence and accountability considerations;  
(iv) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks;  
(v) whether the performance of the new tas k exposes the members of the NCB decision- making 
bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their 
personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in 
Article  14.2 of the Statute o f the ESCB.  
6.5 On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new task  
conferred upon the CBM constitutes a government task in the context of  the monetary financing 
prohibition.  
6.5.1  New t asks related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB  
The supervision of credit reference agencies  is not among the basic tasks listed in Article  127(2) 
and (5) of the Treaty or otherwise conferred upon the NCBs by the Statute of the ESCB. 
Furthermore, while the proper operation of credit reference agencies may be valuable for credit 
institutions as they would be able to make a better assessment of the financial situation of the 
natural or legal persons to whom they are lending, this new tas k is not relate d to the  specific tasks 
conferred upon the ECB on the basis of Article  127(6) of the Treaty  concerning policies relating to 
the prudential  supervision of credit institutions within the context of the single supervisory 
mechanism .  
 
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9 6.5.2  Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks  
The ECB notes  that i n the vast majority of Member States, credit reference agencies remain 
unregulated except for data protection aspect s24. However , there are also Member States  in which 
either the NCB is designated as the competent national authority responsible for the supervision of 
credit reference agencies25 or in which  the systems for the exchange of data concerning 
creditworthiness is a matter regulated by the NCB26. In addition, a number of NCB s have functions  
in relation to the collection and use of credit risk data, including in connection with the operation of 
central credit register s27. Furthermore, c redit reference agencies may play a role in the 
Eurosystem ’s credit operations, as they are one of the four sources which may be accepted for the 
eligibility assessment of assets eligible as collateral . Consequently , although the direct supervision 
of credit reference agencie s by NCB s as such remains  rare among Member States , it is common 
for NCB s to be involved in activities  relating to the management of credit risk.  It follows that the 
new task proposed to be conferred on the CBM in relation  to the supervision of credit reference 
agencies is not atypical for a central bank  in those Member States wh ich have chosen to regulate  
and supervise credit reference agencies with respect to their credit scoring .  
6.5.3  Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government  
The ECB understands  that the s upervision of credit reference agencies in Malta is being introduced  
on the one hand to protect the interests of the legal and natural persons being scored to ensure 
that their credit scoring is fair  and transparent  and, on the other, to ensure that credit reference 
agencies rely on correct data, particularly data contained in the Central Credit Register , to ensure 
that the ir scoring is fair and reliable.  In view of the credit risk -related activities of central banks , 
including in the operation of central credit registers,  the new task proposed to be conferred on the 
CBM does not appear as a task clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the 
government . 
 
                                                 
24  A January 2011 report of the European Credit Research Institute indicated that the principal national regulators of 
credit bureaus in many EU M ember States are the national data protection offices  See M . Rothemund and M . 
Gerhardt, European Credit Research Institute, The European Credit Information Landscape: An analysis of a survey 
of credit bureaus in Europe,  January 2011, p. 7.  
25   In Hungary t he Magyar Nemzeti Bank is responsible for the supervision of financial institutions, inter alia credit 
reference agencies under Act CXXII of 2011 on the Central Credit Information System as regards the authori sation 
for the setting up and operation of a fi nancial enterprise operating the central credit information system, the 
supervision and withdrawal of authori sation, the obligation of confidentiality concerning trade secrets, banking and 
payment secrets and any exemptions  from the obligation of confident iality imposed by Act CCXXXVII of 2013  on 
credit institutions.   
26  In Cyprus the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) is assigned with the task of supervising such systems with a view to 
ensur ing the proper management of the data they possess (section 28(E)  of Law 66(I)/1997 on the business of credit 
institutions ).The CBC is empowered to issue secondary legislation to regulate the conditions  and processes for the 
functioning of such systems , and may impose sanctions on the operators of such systems  (sections 28(E) , 41(6) and 
42(3) of Law 66(I)/1997) . This concept is closer to the notion of a credit register than to that of credit bureaus, in the 
sense that it presupposes the participation of credit institutions and some other categories of  institutions (mainly 
credit providers)  and no other persons are allowed to participate or  benefit from its services except for the CBC.  
27  See, e.g., Opinion CON/2011/20 (Belgium), Opinion CON/2011/47 (Latvia), Opinion CON/2012/74 (Ireland), Opinion 
CON/2013/29 (France), Opinion CON/2016/42 (Slovenia)  and Opinion CON/2016/57 (Bulgaria). Central credit 
registers are operated by NCB s in other Member States, including, e.g., Italy.   
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10 6.5.4  Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 
tasks 
The new task of  supervisin g credit reference agencies does not create any conflicts of interest with 
existing central banking tasks performed by the CBM. On the contrary, it appears to be  rather  
complementary to the existing task of maintaining a central credit register .  
6.5.5  Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational 
capacity of the CBM  
With regard to t he principle that Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they 
have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only  their ESCB -related but also their national 
tasks , the ECB understands that the new task would not require  the allocation of significant 
resources . However, as the ECB understands that the annual supervisory fees  to be levied on 
credit reference agencies would not  entirely cover the  CBM ’s expenditure for carrying out its  new 
task, the CBM should take the necessary measures to ensure it has sufficient resources for the 
performance of this  task. 
6.5.6  Extent  to which performance of the new task fits into the instit utional set -up of the CBM, in the light 
of central bank independence and accountability considerations  
As already noted, the new task conferred on the CBM appears to be complementary to its task of 
maintaining a central credit register. The performance of this task would therefore appear to fit into 
the existing institutional set -up of the CBM.  
6.5.7  Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
The ECB notes that the performance of this new task would not entail substantial financ ial risks for 
the CBM or its officials. Th us, pursuant to Article 15 of the CBM Act, the CBM, its directors , officers 
and servants may not be liable in damages for anything done or omitted to be done in the 
discharge or purported discharge of its functions  unless the act or omission is shown to have been 
done or omitted to be done in bad faith. Furthermore, in relation to the supervision of credit 
reference agencies, paragraph 4(1) of Directive No 14 on the Central Credit Register provides that 
the CBM is not responsible for the integrity and correctness of data that a credit institution provides 
to the Register. Moreover , credit reference agencies are fully responsible in respect of the public 
and non- public credit information that they possess, other than data in the Central Credit Register.  
6.5.8  Extent to which performance of the new task exposes members of the decision -making bodies of  
the CBM to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence  
The new supervisory task in relation t o credit reference agencies does not appear to expose the 
members of the decision- making bodies of the CBM to disproportionate political risks, or to 
otherwise have an impact on their personal independence.  
6.6 Conclusion  
While the new task conferred on the CBM regarding the supervision of credit reference agencies  is 
not among the tasks  conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the 
ESCB, this task is  not atypical of  NCB tasks in those Member States which  have chosen to 
regulate and supervise credit reference agencies with respect to their credit scoring.  Moreover it  is 
common for NCB s to be involved in activities relating to the management of credit risk. As the 
ECB -PUBLIC  
11 CBM’s new task is furthermore not  discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the 
government,  the CBM’s new supervisory  task in relation to credit reference agencies  does not 
constitute a government task . 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done in Frankfurt am Main, 21 January 2019 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The Presi dent of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI