EN 
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 16 July 2009 
on the legal framework for cooperative savings and credit unions 
(CON/2009/60) 
 Introduction and legal basis
 
On 4 May 2009 the European Central Bank (ECB) r eceived a request from the Marshall of the Polish 
Parliament for an opinion on a draft law on coopera tive savings and credit unions and on amendments to 
certain other laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’)1.  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Ce ntral Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions2, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and to rules applicable to 
financial institutions insofar as they materially influe nce the stability of financial institutions and markets. 
In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 1.1 The draft law will regulate credit unions active in Poland, i.e. SKOK credit unions (spó łdzielcze 
kasy oszcz ędnościowo-kredytowe). For this purpose, the draft law will replace the current Law on 
SKOK credit unions of 14 December 1995 (hereinafter the ‘current Law on credit unions’)
3. SKOK 
credit unions form a distinct segment of the Polish financial sector. They are entitled to offer similar consumer banking services to those o ffered by ordinary credit institutions (banks
4), with 
exception of certain types of mortgage credit5. However, under the current Law on credit unions, 
SKOK credit unions are not regulated and supervis ed by the Financial Supervision Commission 
                                                 
1  Parliamentary Print No 1876 of 19 March 2009. 
2  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
3  Dziennik Ustaw  (Dz. U.) of 4 January 1996 No 1, Item 2. 
4  Credit institutions registered in Poland are legally referred to as ‘banks’ (this legal term  does not cover SKOK credit 
unions). The term ‘credit institutions’ under Polish law only rela tes to European Economic Area  (EEA) credit institutions 
from outside Poland. Non-EEA credit in stitutions are referred to under Polish  law as ‘foreign banks’ (Article 2, 
Article 4(3) and Article 4(1)(17) to (20) of the Law on ba nking of 29 August 1997 (consolidat ed text: Dz. U. of 12 June 
2002 No 72, Item 665, hereinaf ter, the ‘Law on banking’)). 
5  See Article 21 of the current Law on credit unions; cf. j udgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 24 March 2009 
(Case No K53/07). 
2 (FSC), the Polish financial superv isory authority, but instead by a statutory central association of 
individual SKOK credit unions, the National SKOK6. The draft law will substantially modify these 
arrangements by giving the FSC powers to regulate and supervise the SKOK system. The FSC will exercise its new powers in relation to the SKOK system, inter alia  by: (i) issuing prudential 
regulations for the SKOK system; (ii) li censing new individual SKOK credit unions and 
conducting on-site inspections of them
7; and (iii) supervising the National SKOK, in particular as 
regards the operation of ‘stabilisation fund’ wh ich insures the deposits held with the SKOK 
system8. The National SKOK will retain certain regulato ry powers in relation to individual SKOK 
credit unions, in particular as regards making pr udential recommendations and exercising control 
competences in this respect9. Nevertheless, the FSC will be exclusively competent to enforce 
binding corrective measures and to institute rehab ilitation or liquidation procedures in relation to 
individual SKOK credit unions on its own initiativ e or at the request of the National SKOK10. The 
FSC will also have powers to suspend the govern ing bodies of the National SKOK if they fail to 
comply with the FSC’s recommendations11. Further substantial changes introduced by the draft law 
relate to the conversion of credit unions into re gular banks, which will be obligatory for credit 
unions exceeding a specified amount of own funds,  introduction of rules regarding the voting 
power of individual SKOK credit unions in the Na tional SKOK, limitations on the activities of the 
National SKOK, etc.12 
1.2 The draft law also amends certain other la ws, including the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski of 
29 August 199713 (hereinafter, the ‘Law on NBP’). In particular, the proposed amendment to 
Article 42 of the Law on NBP provides that SKOK credit unions will be eligible to obtain 
refinancing credit from NBP under the same conditi ons as regular credit institutions established in 
Poland14.  
 2. ECB comments 2.1 Obligation to maintain minimum reserves with the central bank 
The draft law maintains the current arrangement s under which SKOK credit unions are not subject 
to the obligation to hold minimum reserves with  NBP. The ECB makes the following observations 
in this respect. 
                                                 
6 See Articles 34, 35(5)-(6) and (9), 36 and 39-43 of the current Law on credit unions.  
7 See Articles 58 and 59(1) and Ar ticles 6-8, 19, 37, 60, 65, 67, and 78(1) of the draft law.  
8 See Articles 58 and 59(2) and Arti cles 47, 49(3)-(4), 53, 66-67, 76(1)-(2) and 78(2) of the draft law.  
9 See Articles 40-42, 61-64, 67-68 of the draft law.  
10 See Articles 68(2) and 69-75 of the draft law.  
11 See Articles 76(3) and 77 of the draft law.  
12 See Articles 9-10, 41, 46(2) and 54 of the draft law.  
13 Consolidated text: Dz. U. of 1 April 2005 No 1, item 2.  
14 See amendments introduced by Ar ticle 85(4) of the draft law.  
3 2.2 In past opinions adopted at the request of other Member States15, the ECB has consistently 
maintained that the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves obligations apply, inter alia , to credit unions 
that fulfil the functional criteria of a ‘credit institution’ as defined in the Recast Banking 
Directive16. This definition, which is recalled in the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves rules17, 
specifies that credit institutions are undertakings  whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant cred it for their own account. The ECB is aware that 
specified types of credit unions are exempt, for prudential supervision purposes, from the scope of 
application of the Recast Banking Directive18 and that the national law provisions of the Member 
States may establish special regulatory regimes in relation to such credit unions, separate from the 
general regulation of  banking activities19. However, such exclusions or variations introduced in the 
area of prudential supervision do not automatically  exclude any entities which fulfil the functional 
criteria of a ‘credit institution’ from the Eurosystem ’s reserve requirements, which, in line with the 
Article 19.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, constitute a monetary policy instrument and hence have a different function than prudential 
supervision
20. Consequently, exemptions provided for as part of the Eurosystem’s minimum 
reserves regime21 do not follow the same pattern as exemptions from the prudential rules 
introduced by the Recast Banking Directive ( one element of such exemptions from the 
Eurosystem’s minimum reserves regime is a lump-s um allowance benefiting, in particular, small 
credit institutions, irrespective of their legal form22). 
2.3 In this context, the ECB notes that SKOK cr edit unions fulfil the abovementioned functional 
criteria of a ‘credit institution’ (a nd will continue to fulfil them under the draft law), namely that 
they: (i) receive deposits ‘from the public’ within th e meaning of the Recast Banking Directive, i.e. 
receive deposits from natural or legal persons23; and (ii) grant credit for their own account24. 
Consequently, in line with its pervious opinions25, the ECB considers that SKOK credit unions will 
be subject to the Eurosystem’s minimum reserv es requirements when Poland adopts the euro. Such 
                                                 
15 See paragraphs 10-14 of ECB Opini on CON/2005/8 (Lithuania), paragraph 3.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/4 (Cyprus) 
and paragraphs 10-17 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/11 (Latvia) (All ECB opinions ar e available on the ECB website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/o pinions/html/index.en.html.) 
16 See Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 2006/48/EC  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1).  
17 See Article 2(1) of Regulation ECB/ 2003/9 of 12 September 2003 on the applicat ion of minimum reserves (OJ L 250, 
2.10.2003, p. 10). 
18 See Article 2 of the Recast Banking Directive.  
19 The current Law on SKOK credit unions is an example of su ch a special regulatory regime (which will generally be 
maintained by the draft law).  
20 Such as contributing to the stabilisati on of the money market interest rates a nd the enlargement of the banking system’s 
structural liquidity shortage (cf. paragraph 14 of the ECB Opinion CON/2006/11). 
21 See Article 2.2 of Regulation ECB/2003/9.  
22 See Article 5.2 of Regulation ECB/2003/9. 
23 As opposed to inter-bank deposits. A statutory condition requi ring members of individual S KOK credit unions to have a 
‘professional or organisational’ relation with  each other (Article 6 of the current Law on credit unions; Article 11 of the 
draft law) does not constitute an impediment in this respec t; cf. paragraph 16 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/11.  
24 See Article 3.1 of the current Law on credit unions and Article 3 of the draft law.  
25 See paragraph 14 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/8 and pa ragraphs 10 and 17 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/11. 
4 requirements, and the sa nctions related to them26, will apply directly by the operation of 
Community law. 
2.4 Irrespective of the above, the earlier imposition of the minimum reserves requirements on SKOK 
credit unions under national law may enable the harm onisation of Polish law with the Eurosystem’s 
requirements in this respect, which would facilitate  the introduction of euro in Poland. The earlier 
inclusion of SKOK credit unions in NBP’s mini mum reserves regime would seem advisable in 
particular in connection with the draft law’s pr oposal to treat SKOK credit unions as eligible for 
accessing central bank liquidity (as discussed in paragraph 2.6). Extension to the SKOK credit 
unions of one of the central bank’s monetary policy instruments, i.e. the liquidity support provided by way of refinancing credit, should be accompanied by the application of the minimum reserves obligations, as a complementary monetary policy instru ment that is structurally linked to liquidity 
providing operations
27.  
2.5 In view of the above considerations, the ECB would welcome the harmonisation of the Polish legal 
system with the Eurosystem’s minimum reserves requirements by the inclusion of SKOK credit unions in the NBP’s mi nimum reserves regime
28. At the same time, the ECB considers that both the 
holding of minimum reserves and access to the re financing credit may be organised for SKOK 
credit unions on the basis of a collective transfer  mechanism administered by the National SKOK29. 
2.6 Central bank refinancing credit and complian ce with the monetary financing prohibition 
Amendments to Article 42 of the Law on NBP introduced by the draft law provide that SKOK 
credit unions will be eligible to receive refi nancing credit from NBP in the same manner as 
ordinary credit institutions (banks). The ECB w ould like to make the following general comment 
on the current wording of this article of the La w on NBP, as it may apply to both SKOK credit 
unions and regular credit institutions. In the past ECB’s Convergence Reports the ECB has 
expressed concerns that certain elements of the Ar ticle 42 of the Law on NBP,  taken together with 
the relevant provisions of the Law on banking, mi ght suggest that NBP refinancing credit may be 
available to insolvent credit institutions30. The ECB considers such case s of central bank solvency 
                                                 
26 See Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the application of minimum 
reserves by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11 .1998, p. 1) and Regulation ECB/1999/4 of 23 September 1999 
on the powers of the European Central Bank to  impose sanctions (OJ L 264, 12.10.1999, p. 21). 
27 Systemic liquidity shortage enlarged by minimum reserves obligations contributes to incr easing the demand for central 
bank refinancing which, in turn, makes it easier for the cen tral bank to steer money ma rket rates through liquidity-
providing operations (cf. ‘The m onetary policy of the ECB’, 2nd edn. 2004, p. 79, publishe d on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.int.) 
28 See paragraph 3.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/4, as well as, in  relation to different matter, paragraph 2 of ECB Opinion 
CON/2007/28 (Poland) and paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/53 (Poland).  
29 See Article 38.3 of the Law on NBP allowing collectiv e holding of minimum reserves by cooperative banks. 
30 See the ECB’s Convergence Report of May 2008, p. 244, and the ECB’s Convergence Report of December 2006, p. 228, 
which in particular refers to: (i) Article 70(2) of the La w on banking together with Article 42(7) of the Law on NBP 
(conditions under which NBP may extend refinancing credit to an uncreditworthy borrower); (ii) Article 142(1) of the 
Law on banking together with Article 42(3) of the La w on NBP (conditions under which NBP may grant refinancing 
credit for the purpose of implementing a programme of bank rehabilitation); and (iii) Article 42(6) of the Law on NBP 
(conditions for possible termination of NBP’ s refinancing facility in the event of the worsening of the financial situation 
of the recipient). 
5 support to be incompatible with the safeguards laid  down in the Treaty regarding a central bank’s 
capacity to perform its tasks, as expressed in Artic le 101(1) of the Treaty and in the implementing 
secondary legislation31. As already noted in the ECB’s Conve rgence Reports, clearer safeguards are 
needed in Article 42 of the Law on NBP to excl ude expressly any solvency support to financial 
institutions and to avoid any incompatibility of  this Article with the monetary financing 
prohibition. The ECB reiterates this recommendation in the present opinion. 
2.7 Supervisory framework and central bank powers to collect information 
The ECB welcomes the new supervisory framework  introduced in relation to the SKOK system, 
which attributes supervisory and regulatory r esponsibilities for SKOK credit unions to the FSC. 
This should help to maintain fair competition betw een different participants in the Polish financial 
market as well as to complement the safety net of the SKOK system, including elements to be provided for through implementing acts issued under  the draft law (e.g. in the area of deposit 
insurance). As regards the competences to be exercised by the National SKOK
32, the ECB 
recommends that any overlap with the competen ces allocated to the FSC should be avoided.  
2.8  Moreover, with respect to the tasks to be as signed to NBP as regards regulation of the liquidity 
situation and refinancing of the SKOK credit union s, creating conditions for their development,  
assessing their operation and opining on legislation re lated to them (in parallel to similar tasks 
assigned to NBP in relation to regular credit institutions)33, the ECB considers that any such 
assignment of new NBP tasks should be based on the assessment that NBP has resources commensurate with such new tasks. In pa rticular, in line with its earlier opinion
34, the ECB 
recommends that, in view of the new liquidity re gulation task which NBP is to exercise vis-à-vis 
SKOK credit unions, NBP should be given comme nsurate powers to obtain all relevant 
information, if need be by way of direct SKOK reporting to NBP. 
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 July 2009. 
[signed] 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET 
                                                 
31 See in particular Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Council Regula tion (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions 
for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Ar ticles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1), 
which prohibits central bank financing of  public sector obligations vis-à-vis th ird parties; see the ECB’s Convergence 
Report of May 2008, p. 24, and the ECB’s Convergence Report of December 2006, p. 30. 
32 See, e.g., Articles 64-65 of the draft law. 
33 See amendments introduced in Article 3(2) points (5)-(6), Article 17(4)(5) and Article 21(4) of the Law on NBP by 
Article 85(1)-(3) of the draft law. 
34 See paragraph 3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/53.