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Vol.1981/0224

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COMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(81)799 final
Brussels .9december 1981
Xv\
I .Α * Ι_»f"TA"w =l
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TOTHECOUNCIL
Général^
ThirdUnitedNations Conference ontheLawoftheSea
Participation bytheCommunity mthefutureConvention
C0M(8T)799final

{
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TOTHE COUNCIL
Subject :Third United Nations Conference onthe Lawofthe Sea .
-Participation bythe Community inthefuture Convention
pleads ofdelegations totheConference ontheLawoftheSea,assembled in
JyOndon on6november ,decided tosubmit totheexamination ofagroup oflegal
»y
^xperts thedraft articles ontheparticipation ofinternational organizations
which President KOH hadputbefore theConference inAugust .
,5
JheCouncil will find below theCommission 'scomments onthedraft andthe
rjewapproach which initsview should guide thecontinuation ofthenegotiation
$*
pnthisimportant matter .
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Itwill berecalled that inMarch onthe eveofthe tenth session ofthe
Conference ,theMember States ofthe Community putbefore theConference
informal draft articles toserve asabasis fordiscussion onthe "clause "
governing theparticipation ofinternational organizations C1).Essentially ,
thetext oftheTenopened theConvention toparticipation byinternational
organizations having competence forthefields itcovered ,giving them ,
within their area ofcompetence ,thesame rights andobligations asStat^party
tothe Convention .
mmmlmmm
(1)
On17February ,theCouncil expressly reserved theright toexamine
attheappropriate time theimplications ofCommunity participation .Insodoing
itwasreferring inparticular tothequestion oftheCommunity 'srepresentation
intheorgans setupbythefuture convention .

2.-
Moreover ,since this would beaConvention involving theparticipation
ofthe Community and allorsome ofitsMember States ,each insofar
asitwasconcerned (1),thedraft resolved thequestion ofrepresentation
*• •
(voting rights iintheorgans )andresponsibility intheevent ofnon­
compliance witijt theundertakings given under theConvention ,avoiding
anycumulatiQp oflegal value .
BRIEF ANALYSIS OFMRKOH'STEXT
Oncertain essential points ,MrKOH'sdraft diverges substantially from
the informal proposal ofthe Ten and the Council must bemade aware ofthe
fact that straightforward acceptance ofthedraft would belikely toaffect
theCommunity 'sfuture activity inmatters ofinternational relations
while laying itopen tocontradictions ofalegal nature forthefollowing
reasons :
*(a) Incontrast totheproposal ofthe Ten (which establishes nosuch
link )MrKOH'sdraft makes participation bythe Community subject to
the requirement that themajority ofthe Community Member States
should themselves beparties totheConvention directly (seeArticle
305 d)and 3§1indraft Annex IXtothe Convention ).
Itisscarcely necessary topoint out here that the Community 's
external commitments areentered into onasufficiently sound
legal basis byapplying theprocedure laid down intheTreaty
ofRome ,which assigns exclusive competence totheinstitutions
(Council ,Commission ,European Parliament ),without theadditional
condition that acertain number ofMember States should participate .
••■/m•m
(1)'Mixed "agreements in'Community parlance .

3.
b)The informal proposal oftheTenstipulated ,with regard tothe
identification oftherespective areas ofcompetence oftheCommunity
andtheMember States ,aflexible andpragmatic information procedure ,
triggered attherequest ofanynon-member state party tothe Convention
andoperating"in connection with anyspecific question which hasarisen ".
Such aprocedure ,when used inthe management of"mixed "agreements
covering complex fields ,makes itpossible todetermine onacase-by-case
basis and attheappropriate time ,theareas ofcompetence and responsi - J
bilities asandwhen practical questions arise andneed toberesolved .
IfMrKoh'stext isfollowed ,international organizat ions will beobliged ,
when they sign ,tomake adeclaration specifying with regard tothe
content ofthe Convention those areas forwhich they arecompetent .The
declaration will have tomention "the nature and extent "ofthe transfers
and thearticles oftheConvention concerned (Annex IX,articles 2,5(1) •
and (6)).Anychange inthedistribution areas ofcompetence will have
tobenotified promptly (Article 5(3));further more ,theMember States will
themselves' have togive notification ,initially and intheevent ofchanges ,
oftransfers ofcompetence (Article 5(2)). Exhaustive andbinding asthey
are,the "declarations ,communications ofinformation ornotifications
referred toinArticle 5"will make itpossible toweigh up,atany moment ,
thedegree ofparticipation oftheinternational organization andassess
theposition tobegiven inthebody envisaged (Article 3(3)).
Because oftheir strict formalism ,such requirements would bebound tolead
toserious disputes ,quite apart from thepractical difficulty oftheir
application inthecase oftheCommunity ,given theessentially evolving
nature oftheressponsibi lities assigned tothelatter bytheTreaty of
Rome .
c)MrKoh'sdraft also stipulates ,inArticle 4(4 )that "aninternational
organization shall not implement theConvention insuch amanner as
tobenefit aState member which isnotparty totheConvention ". Ifthe
mmm/mmm

Member States oftheCommunity didnotallparticipate intheConvention ,
orifoneormore ofthem were towithdraw ,the EECmight find itself
obliged todisregard certain fundamental principles oftheTreaty ofRome
(e.g. non-discrimination andfreedom oftheestablishment inthe
fisheries sector ).This isclearly unacceptable .
1
i
d)Lastly ,thedrpft ,even more soperhaps than thetext oftheTen,
lends uncertainty totheparticipation oftheCommunity assuch asa
F
member oftheinternational Sea-Bed Authority .Anumber ofpartners
would betemptfd toexclude theCommunity ,basing their arguments ont
i
therestrictive provisions referred tounder (b)andontheuncertainty
they attach totheparticipation ofinternational organizations .
PROPOSED APPROACH
a)Theanalysis given above shows that onimportant points theKohdraft
isunacceptable asitstands .The Commission feels that the Community
could subscribe toitonly ifitwere substantially redrafted ,but it
realizes that itwould almost certainly beimpossible toarrive ata
solution ifanexcessively rigid negotiating position were tobe
adopted ,for ithas toberecognized that there isacertain amount of
logic behind theKohdraft ifthenature andscope oftheConvention
are considered .
TheLawoftheSeaConvention will beuniversal inscope ,ofunlimited
duration ,andcalls fortheparticipation ofvirtually thewhole ofthe
international community .^Itcovers everything connected with theuse
ofthe sea,fron thedelimitation ofterritorial waters totheexploitation
ofmarine resources .
Thenon-Community States negotiating attheConference regard the
participation ofinternational organizations with circumspection ,
particularly asthey seebehind theEECtheshadow ofless clearly

defined organizations .Itistherefore notsurprising that adraft aimed
indiscriminately atallinternational organizations concerned inone
wayoranother ^should emphazise theongoing filtering aspect embodied
inthecondition regarding declarations ontherespective areas ofcompe­
tence oforganizations andMember States .
Accordingly Commission proposes anewapproach forthecontinuation of
thenegotiations compared withtheinitial informal draft .Thisapproach ,
which would probably beless difficult tomaintain intheface ofthe
/
Kohproposal ^should make itpossible tocreate conditions ofaccession
that canbeaccepted bythe Community and itsMember States .
This approch would involve theCommunity presenting itself tothe
Convention inthecontext ofajoint andsimultaneous operation
anestablishing organic link between itsownparticipation and that ofall its
Member States .This link would operate attheaccession tothe Convention
stage ;however ,subsequently ,inthe implementation ofthe Convention ,the
Community andtheMember States would act,each insofar asitwas
concerned ,inthe light oftheir respective areas ofcompetence .
This solution would have theadvantage ofrendering unnecessary the
majority participation condition (see 2(a)above )andthe limited
territorial application clause (see 2(c)above ). Itwould ,however ,still
beessential tosecure theabandonment oftheexhaustive andobligatory
declaration arrangements advocated byMrKohandthereturn tothe
pragmatic information system suggested bytheTen .
Such anapproach could involve theinclusion intheConvention ofa
special clause -derogating insofarasnecessary from thecommon law
governing theparticipation ofinternational organizations -forthe
benefit ofthose organizations that became parties totheConvention in
thecontext 0fajoint operation linking them totheir Member States (the
scheme proposed byMrKOHwould continue toapply solely tothose inter­
national organizations notoffering theguarantee oftheabove joint
andsimultaneous operation ).

Thejoint operation scheme presupposes ,however ,that firm gurantees
ofinternal discipline would beestablished ,which implies aprocedure
toensure the cohesion ofthe Community -Member States unit thus
established .Inother words ,theCouncil decision authorizing thesigning
ofthe Convention onbehalf ofthe Community ,itself based onthearticles
establishing theCommunity 'sexternal competence ,would ,onthis basis ,
necessarily beaccompanied byadecision ,based onArticle 116ofthe
Λ
Treaty ,setting out theunanimous commitment oftheMember States to
become parties totheConvention .
Ifthe joint operation solution proposed asthemain position cannot
beadopted thefallback position would bethe idea ofautonomous
Community participation independently oftheparticipation oftheMember
States .Thenegot iatiors should inanyevent aim toachieve the following
adjustments :
i) Arguing onthebasis ofconsiderations relating tothenature
oftheTreaty ofRome (which lays down theobjectives ,principles
andprocedures but not anexhaustive body ofsubstantive rules )
andtheessentially developing division ofresponsibilities between
the institutions and theMember States ,anattempt will bemade first
ofall tonegotiate areturn totheformula proposed bytheTen in
March with regard totheinformation procedure concerning areas of
competence .
n) Thedropping ofthecondition stipulating themajority participation •
oftheMember States should also benegotiated ,reference being made
here toArticle 5and228 (2)oftheTreaty ofRome and totherules
ofprocedure applicable totheconclusion ofthe Community 'sexternal
commitments ;alloftheabove provisions closely associates the
Member States with Community action atinternational level and
should therefore give allnecessary 'guarantees forimplementation
bytheEuropean side .

•7_
ii)Negotiations should also beheld toremove therequirement inthe
draft that aninternational organization should notapply the
Convention tothebenefit ofaState member that isnot party
thereto (seepoint 2<c)above ),assuch aprovision would be
diametrically opposed tooneofthefundamental principles ofthe
Community .