Special Report Maritime transport in the 
EU: in troubled waters —  
much ineffective and 
unsustainable investmentEN 2016  NO 23
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Maritime transport in the 
EU: in troubled waters —  
much ineffective and 
unsustainable investment
(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)Special ReportEN 2016  NO 23
02
 Audit team
The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political 
and public interest.
This performance audit was produced by Audit Chamber II — headed by ECA Member Henri Grethen — which 
specialises in investment for cohesion, growth and inclusion spending areas. The audit was led by the Reporting 
Member Oskar Herics, supported by Thomas Obermayr, Attaché of private office; Pietro Puricella, Principal Manager; 
Luc T’Joen, Head of Task; Kurt Bungartz, Luis de la Fuente Layos, Rafal Gorajski, Enrico Grassi, Di Hai, Aleksandra Kliś-
Lemieszonek, Afonso Malheiro de Castro and Christian Wieser, Auditors.
From left to right:  T. Obermayr, E. Grassi, C. Wieser, P . Puricella, A. Malheiro de Castro, 
A. Kliś-Lemieszonek, O. Herics, L. T’Joen, R. Gorajski, D. Hai.
03
 Contents
Paragraph
 Glossary
I-IV Executive summary
1-25  Introduction
1-7 Main characteristics of port services in Europe
8-9 Services offered by port operators
10-16  Main policy and legislative initiatives in relation to ports
17-24  Funding of port infrastructure
25 Previous special report by the European Court of Auditors on ports
26-30  Audit scope and approach
31-101  Observations
31-49  EU and national port strategies: absence of timely and coordinated implementation of 
well‑planned extra port capacity was a key weakness
33-37  All five Member States visited had developed national port development strategies, but robust 
implementation plans and coordination were an issue
38-49  EU strategy on ports developed over time, but robust information on capacity planning still lacking
50-81  EU‑funded port infrastructures: unused or underused infrastructures, delays and cost overruns, 
and unsustainable investments because of funding of similar infrastructures in neighbouring ports
52-55  EU‑funded investments resulting in many unused or underused infrastructures
56-61  Delays and cost overruns in a number of projects
62-65  Poor value for money of the EU funding
66-73  Funding of similar infrastructures increasing the risk of unsustainable investments
74-81  Ineffective coordination between the Commission and the EIB on the funding of port infrastructure
04 Contents 
82-101  Creating a level playing field between ports: a need to better ensure that common rules such as 
state aid and customs controls are applied consistently
83-87  Need to better enforce state aid rules for ports at Member State and Commission level
88-92  A more proactive Commission role on state aid to ports necessary
93-99  Commission’s monitoring of Member States’ customs control practices does not cover key information
100-101  Blue Belt, or how maritime transport mode is at a disadvantage against road transport
102-114  Conclusions and recommendations
 Annex I — Spending of EU funds for maritime transport projects (2000 ‑2013 period)
 Annex II — Overview of projects examined per Member State
 Annex III  — Overview of non‑completed projects
 Annex IV —  Main characteristics of Member States’ port systems, and overview of EU and EIB 
support for the audited port areas (2000 ‑2013 period)
 Annex V — Overview of user‑specific superstructures co‑funded with EU funding
 Annex VI  — Overview of state aid decisions since 2007
 Reply of the Commission
05
 Glossary
Blue Belt : The policy framework for the Blue Belt environment consisted of two measures: further simplification 
of the Regular Shipping Service scheme, which applies from March 2014, and the development of an electronic 
manifest (the ‘customs goods manifest’), making it possible to distinguish between EU and non -EU cargo on board 
a vessel, with the intention of facilitating the transport of EU goods. This new manifest will be a tool (amongst 
others) at the disposal of the issuer to declare the EU status of the goods. This measure applies as of 1 May 2016 for 
authorised issuers; non -authorised issuers will have the possibility to register proofs of EU status in a new central 
database managed by customs, expected to be fully functional as of October 2019. An e -manifest pilot project has 
been set up to harmonise the cargo manifest requested by national authorities when vessels arrive in or leave EU 
ports. The submission and exchange of this e -manifest will be done through the European Maritime Single Window 
prototype, developed by the EMSA.
Cohesion Fund (CF) : The Cohesion Fund is aimed at strengthening economic and social cohesion within the 
European Union by financing environmental and transport projects in Member States with a per capita GNP of less 
than 90 % of the EU average.
Cohesion policy : Cohesion policy is one of the largest policy areas in EU spending. Its aim is to reduce development 
disparities between different regions by restructuring declining industrial areas and diversifying rural areas, and 
to encourage cross -border, transnational and interregional cooperation. It is financed from the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF).
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) : The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) has, since 2014, provided financial aid to 
three sectors: energy, transport and information and communication technology (ICT). In these three areas, the 
CEF identifies investment priorities to be implemented in the coming decade, such as electricity and gas corridors, 
use of renewable energy, interconnected transport corridors and cleaner transport modes, high -speed broadband 
connections and digital networks.
Core ports : Core ports are those EU seaports which are considered to be of strategic interest. The Commission set 
out a list of 104 such core ports in 2013. Member States are required to ensure that an appropriate connection exists 
between these ports and the rail, inland waterway and road networks by 2030.
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) : The European Regional Development Fund is aimed at reinforcing 
economic and social cohesion within the European Union by redressing the main regional imbalances. This is 
achieved through financial support for the creation of infrastructure and productive job -creating investment, 
mainly for businesses.
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) : The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) cover 
five separate funds that aim to reduce regional imbalances across the EU, with policy frameworks set for the 7 -year 
MFF budgetary period. The funds include: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); European Social Fund 
(ESF); Cohesion Fund (CF); European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and the European Maritime & 
Fisheries Fund (EMFF).
Ex ante  conditionalities : Ex ante  conditionalities are conditions, based on predefined criteria established in 
partnership agreements, which are regarded as necessary prerequisites for the effective and efficient use of the EU 
funding covered by those agreements. When preparing ERDF, CF and ESF OPs under the 2014-2020 programming 
period, Member States have to assess whether these conditions have been fulfilled. If they have not been fulfilled, 
action plans need to be prepared to ensure that they are fulfilled by 31 December 2016.
06 Glossary 
Financial corrections : Financial corrections are aimed at protecting the EU budget from the burden of erroneous 
or irregular expenditure. For expenditure that is subject to shared management, recovering incorrectly made 
payments is the primary responsibility of Member States. Financial corrections can be made by withdrawing 
irregular expenditure from Member States’ expenditure declarations or through recoveries from beneficiaries. 
Financial corrections can also be imposed by the Commission.
Gateway ports : Gateway ports are ports which serve the economic and industrial needs of their area of influence 
(hinterland). Mixed ports serve both gateway and transhipment traffic.
Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) : The Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) is 
the successor of the Trans -European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN -T EA), which was created by the 
European Commission in 2006 to manage the technical and financial implementation of its TEN -T programme. On 
1 January 2014, INEA officially started working to implement parts of the following EU programmes: Connecting 
Europe Facility (CEF), Horizon 2020, and legacy programmes (TEN -T and Marco Polo 2007-2013).
Motorways of the Seas : ‘Motorways of the Seas’ is the term used to refer to the maritime part of the 
Trans -European Transport Network (TEN -T). It provides funding for: (a) maritime links between ports within the 
comprehensive network, or between a port within the comprehensive network and a third -country port where 
such links are of strategic importance to the EU; (b) port facilities, freight terminals, logistics platforms and freight 
villages located outside the port area but associated with the port’s operations, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) such as electronic logistics management systems, and safety and security and administrative 
and customs procedures in at least one Member State; (c) infrastructure for direct land and sea access, (d) activities 
which have wider benefits and are not linked to specific ports, such as services and actions to support the mobility 
of persons and goods, activities for improving environmental performance, such as the provision of shore -side 
electricity that would help ships to reduce their emissions, making available facilities for ice -breaking, activities 
ensuring year -round navigability, dredging operations, and alternative fuelling facilities, as well as the optimisation 
of processes, procedures and the human element, ICT platforms and information systems, including traffic 
management and electronic reporting systems.
Operational programme (OP) : An operational programme (OP) sets out a Member State’s priorities and specific 
objectives, and how the funding (EU and national public and private co -financing) will be used to finance projects 
during a given period (generally 7 years). These projects must help to achieve a certain number of objectives 
specified in the OP’s priority axis. OPs may receive funding from the ERDF, the CF and/or the ESF. An OP is prepared 
by the relevant Member State and has to be approved by the Commission before any payments can be made from 
the EU budget. OPs can only be modified during the period covered if both parties agree.
Port infrastructures : The infrastructure resulting from work to ensure that vessels can be berthed and moored 
safely (e.g. quays, dykes, breakwaters), make possible the transit of vessels between areas of water located at 
different levels (locks), or create facilities for vessel construction and repair (e.g. dry -docks).
Port superstructures : Fixed assets (e.g. sheds, warehouses, office buildings) built on port infrastructures, as well as 
fixed and mobile equipment (e.g. cranes) used in the port areas.
State aid : State aid is any form of direct or indirect financial support provided by public authorities to private sector 
undertakings. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) generally prohibits state aid within 
the common market unless it is duly justified. The EU’s state aid rules specify where such support does not distort 
(or threaten to distort) competition. The European Commission has the exclusive power to assess whether state 
aid granted by Member States complies with these rules. Procedural decisions and actions taken by the European 
Commission are subject to review by the General Court and the European Court of Justice.
07 Glossary 
Trans‑European Transport Networks (TEN‑T) : The Trans -European Transport Networks (TEN -T) are a planned 
set of road, rail, air and water transport networks in Europe. The TEN -T networks are part of a wider system of 
Trans -European Networks (TENs), including a telecommunications network (eTEN) and a proposed energy network 
(TEN -E). The development of infrastructure within the TEN -T is closely linked with the implementation and further 
advancement of EU transport policy.
Transhipment port : Transhipment ports are ports where goods are loaded onto another vessel or, sometimes, onto 
another mode of transportation for transfer to a final destination.
Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) : Measurement unit of cargo capacity used to indicate the capacity of container 
ships and container terminals. This is based on the volume of a 20-foot -long intermodal container, used between 
different modes of transportation, such as ships, trains and trucks.
08
 Executive summary
I
Seaports are economically very important in the European Union (EU). There are more than 1 200 commercial 
seaports in 23 of the EU’s 28 Member States. They are the key nodes in the global trade network, since they handle 
around three quarters of the EU’s cargo trade with non -member countries and more than a third of intra -EU freight 
transport. In 2013, the European shipping industry is estimated to have contributed around 1 % to the EU’s GDP and 
supported employment for around 2.2 million people.
II
Investments in port infrastructures are eligible for EU co -financing through the European Regional Developments 
Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) under shared management, but also through the Trans -European Net -
works -Transport (TEN -T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) under the direct management of the European 
Commission. Overall, between 2000  and  2013, around 6.8  billion  euros of funding was provided from the EU budget 
for investments in ports. In addition to funding from the EU budget, the European Investment Bank (EIB) financed 
port investments in the form of loans amounting to around 10.1 billion euros.
III
We assessed the Commission’s and Member States’ EU maritime freight transport strategies and the value for money 
delivered by EU -funded investments in ports, where we examined 37 new projects and five reassessed projects. 
Overall, our audit found that:
— The long -term port development strategies put in place by the Member States and the Commission did not pro -
vide a robust and coherent basis for planning the capacity needed in EU ports and for identifying the necessary 
EU and national public funding for port infrastructures;
— Funding in similar port infrastructures and superstructures in neighbouring ports has led to ineffective 
and unsustainable investments: based on the 30 of 37 projects examined and already completed between 
2000 and 2013, one in every three euros (corresponding to 194 million euros for 12 projects) has been spent 
ineffectively so far. Around half of this funding (97 million euros of EU funding for nine projects) was invested 
in infrastructures which were not used or were heavily underused for more than 3 years after the works ended. 
This highlights shortcomings in the ex ante  needs assessment and indicates a high risk of the amounts invested 
being wasted;
— This observation also applies to the five reassessed ports already examined in 2010. This reassessment did 
indicate poor value for money overall: the use of the EU -funded capacity for these ports was still inadequate 
after almost a decade of operations. The port areas in four ports were still at a very low level or empty. Overall, 
292 million euros of the investments was considered to have been spent ineffectively;
— Cost overruns and delays are further illustrations of inefficiencies in the examined investments in port infra -
structures. Overall, the EU -funded projects examined had cost overruns of 139 million euros. Moreover, 19 of 
the 30 completed projects faced delays, out of which 12 were delayed by more than 20 % of the planned project 
duration. Relative to the initially planned duration, the delays were of up to 136 %. Of the seven projects (corre -
sponding to 524 million euros of EU funding) not yet completed at the time of the audit, six were also delayed;
09 Executive summary 
— Many missing and inadequate links to hinterlands, such as missing road and rail connections, will need further 
public funding to make the initial port investments work properly;
— Both the internal coordination within the Commission and the procedure in place between the EIB and the 
Commission to assess proposed EIB loans for port infrastructures have not been functioning properly as the EIB 
does not share all relevant information with the Commission. Moreover, for some loan proposals, critical prob -
lems were highlighted internally within the Commission, but not signalled to the EIB in the form of a negative 
opinion by the Commission; and
— The Commission did not take the necessary actions in the area of state aid and customs procedures to enable 
ports to compete on a level playing field. The Commission’s state aid control could have been more proactive 
and more effective by monitoring ex post  whether the conditions under which earlier decisions (e.g. for conces -
sions) were taken, remained unchanged or by refusing support to user -specific superstructures.
For example, projects which included superstructures used by private operators had been co -financed with 
around 92.5 million euros from the EU budget.
IV
In our report, we make the following recommendations:
— Put in place a monitoring of core port capacity, taking account of the Member States’ plans for implementing 
their long -term strategies;
— Revise the current number of 104 ‘core ports’ which are necessary to maintain an adequate level of accessibility 
for the EU as a whole;
— Set out an EU -wide port development plan for core ports, maritime waterways and canals;
— Work with the Member States to reduce the administrative burden and delays in project selection and imple -
mentation by promoting the principle of a national ‘one -stop-shop’ for the issuing, or refusal, of all permits 
and authorisations for port infrastructure-related investments. Moreover, a ‘tacit agreement’ principle (e.g. of 
2 years) should be implemented as soon as possible;
— Strictly apply the ESIF Common Provisions Regulation and the CEF Regulation on financial corrections due to 
underperforming investments for the 2014-2020 period;
— Assess the possibility of excluding EU funding for port infrastructure for container transhipment and storage 
(e.g. construction of quays, docks and storage capacities) during the 2014-2020 period. In addition, superstruc -
tures which are not within the public remit should be excluded from EU funding, as these should be considered 
a commercial environment;
— Prioritise EU co -financing from both CEF and ESIF spending to core ports to improve their connections to their 
hinterlands;
10 Executive summary 
— Fund port infrastructures other than connections to hinterlands only on the condition that there is a clearly 
established need, where EU added value is demonstrated and where there is a sufficiently large private invest -
ment component secured in the overall investment envelope;
— Ensure that all necessary loan information on proposed EIB loans is shared between the EIB and the Commission 
to facilitate robust assessments;
— Internally clarify, and consistently implement, the procedure for determining whether critical remarks should 
lead to a negative opinion on a proposed EIB loan;
— Issue state aid guidelines for seaports;
— Ensure consistency in the treatment of user -specific port superstructures;
— Increase the number of desk -based state aid investigations on ports and follow -up of earlier state aid decisions 
to ensure that the conditions present at the outset remain;
— Member States should systematically notify the Commission of all public financial support to ports in accord -
ance with EU state aid rules;
— Ask Member States to periodically provide specific information on the type and number of customs procedures 
at individual core ports in order to assess whether ports are being treated equally;
— Improve the competitive position of maritime transport compared to other transport modes by further simplify -
ing maritime transport and customs formalities, in particular by moving towards an EU ‘single window’.
11
 Introduction
Main characteristics of port services in Europe
More than 1 200 commercial seaports in the EU
01 
Ports are economically very important in the European Union (EU). There are 
more than 1 200 commercial seaports in 23 of the EU’s 28 Member States. They 
are the key nodes in the global trade network: they handle around three quar -
ters of the EU’s cargo trade with non -member countries and more than a third 
of intra -EU freight transport. Liquid bulk accounted for 37 % of all cargo passing 
through EU seaports in 2014, followed by dry bulk (23 %) and containers (21 %). 
Moreover, there are around 400 million passengers per year using these ports1.
02 
In 2013, the European shipping industry is estimated to have contributed up 
to 147 billion euros (or around 1 %) to the EU’s GDP2. It also supported employ -
ment for an estimated 2.2 million people. Of these, some 1.5 million people were 
directly employed by ports in the EU3. Ports also play an important role in linking 
islands and peripheral areas with the mainland.
03 
The ports sector is a very heterogeneous one, with ports differing significantly in 
their size, type, organisation and in how they are connected to their hinterlands. 
Efficiency and productivity vary greatly between EU ports, and these differences 
have even increased in recent years4. Some 96 % of all freight and 93 % of all pas -
sengers transiting through EU ports do so through the 329 key seaports identi -
fied as essential to the functioning of the internal market in the EU Guidelines on 
the Trans -European Transport Network (TEN -T)5.
04 
There are considerable differences even between these key ports: in 2012, the 
three largest EU ports (Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp) alone accounted for 
about a fifth of cargo movements, partly due to their proximity to major produc -
tion and consumption markets in north -western Europe. In contrast, the com -
bined activity of the nine largest Mediterranean ports in the EU Member States 
comprised less than 15 % of total cargo movements6.1 Eurostat maritime transport 
and business statistics data.
2 Oxford Economics, ‘The 
economic value of the EU 
shipping industry  — update: 
a report for the European 
Community Ship Owners’ 
Association (ECSA)’, February 
2015.
3 European Commission 
’Europe’s Seaports 2030: 
Challenges Ahead’, 
Memo/13/448 of 23.5.2013.
4 SWD(2013) 181 final of 
23 May 2013 ‘Impact 
assessment accompanying the 
document Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council 
establishing a framework on 
market access to port services 
and financial transparency of 
ports’.
5 Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
11 December 2013 on Union 
guidelines for the 
development of the 
trans -European transport 
network and repealing 
Decision No 661/2010/EU (OJ 
L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 1).
6 European Parliament Research 
Service (EPRS), ‘Briefing EU 
Legislation in Progress — The 
liberalisation of EU port 
services’, 7.12.2015; p. 3.
12 Introduction 
Size of ships increasing
05 
In an attempt by global players to lower costs, increase operational efficiencies 
and improve the environmental footprint of maritime transport, ship sizes for all 
segments (e.g. tankers, container carriers) have continuously increased in recent 
years (see Picture  1).Picture 1Evolution of sizes in shipping: an example for container carriers
Source:  © 1998-2015, Dr Jean -Paul Rodrigue, Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra University.
Early Containerships (1956-)
      500 - 800 TEU
Fully Cellular (1970-)
      1,000 - 2,500 TEU137x17x9   (LOA - Beam - Draft)      meters
4 containers high below deck5
4106
84
46 containers across
4 containers high on deck
200x20x9
215x20x10A
BPanamax (1980-)
      3,000 - 3,400 TEU
Panamax Max (1985-)
      3,400 - 4,500 TEU250x32x12.5
290x32x12.556
68
CPost Panamax (1988-)
      4,000 - 5,000 TEU
Post Panamax Plus (2000-)
      6,000 - 8,000 TEU59
9
6285x40x13
300x43x14.5
366x49x15.2DNew-Panamax (2014-)
      12,500 TEU10
Post New Panamax (2006-)
      15,000 TEU
Triple E (2013-)
      18,000 TEUE
400x59x15.5397x56x15.5 ; 22-10-8 (not shown)
81017
23206151313
13 Introduction 
06 
To give an indication of how large these vessels really are: a ‘Triple E’ vessel is 
400 metres long (the equivalent of two football pitches, two ice hockey rinks 
and two basketball fields combined) and carries 18 000 TEU (more recently up 
to 22 000 TEU). If the same load were to be put onto lorries, these lorries would 
occupy an entire lane of the motorway from Amsterdam to Paris with a ‘wall of 
trucks’ (see Picture  2).Picture 2Example of the load carried by a ‘Triple E’ vessel
Source:  ECA.ZagrebBerlinCopenhagen
Amsterdam
LjubljanaPrague
ViennaParisFrankfurt
am MainBrussels
LuxembourgLondon
© iSt ock.com/t cly
© iSt ock.com/k adm y
14 Introduction 
07 
Larger vessels result in lower transport costs for shipping. There is a cascade ef -
fect: ships that have become redundant because of the newly built mega vessels 
are deployed on other trade lanes, replacing other vessels, which in turn replace 
others and so forth, ultimately putting the smallest ships out of operation. Finally, 
deploying larger ships requires new infrastructure and also has an impact on 
competition between port authorities and port operators.
Services offered by port operators
08 
The port sector brings together a broad range of industries, such as the petro -
chemical, steel, automotive, manufacturing and energy distribution industries.
09 
Port services include the provision of:
— general transport infrastructure (e.g. maritime access channels, quays) and 
ancillary infrastructure equipment (e.g. dredging, ice -breakers);
— technical nautical services: pilotage, towing and mooring (usually commercial 
services)7;
— operational infrastructure and ‘superstructures’ (e.g. berths and cranes) 
which are usually provided by terminal operators; and
— passenger -handling and cargo -handling services.
Main policy and legislative initiatives in relation to 
ports
Port services and investments in infrastructure
10 
In 2013, the Commission issued a communication, including an action plan8, 
identifying a number of recent maritime transport trends, which often require 
significant upgrades of existing port infrastructure. These concern
— the increase in the size and complexity of seagoing vessels requiring greater 
peak capacities when unloading cargo or embarking a higher number of 
passengers;7 ‘Pilotage’ is the guiding of 
a vessel into and out of the 
port (compulsory following 
international safety 
requirements); ‘towage’ is 
assisting a vessel in 
manoeuvring in and out of 
a port using a tug boat, while 
‘mooring’ concerns the 
operations for connecting the 
ship to the quay.
8 COM(2013) 295 final of 
23 May 2013 — ‘Ports: an 
engine for growth’.
15 Introduction 
— the substitution of oil and refined products with gas and alternative fuels, 
such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), leading to large gasification facilities and 
shore -side electricity supply9, and
— port security aspects, as ports can also serve as access point for drugs, weap -
ons, contraband goods and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
materials10.
11 
Furthermore, the Commission presented a legislative initiative11 aimed at making 
the port services market more easily accessible and establishing common rules 
on financial transparency and on the charges to be applied by managing bodies 
or providers of port services.
12 
While two previous proposals to regulate these issues in 2004 and 2006 had been 
rejected by the European Parliament, or significantly modified and subsequently 
withdrawn by the Commission, the Council adopted a provisional position in Oc -
tober 2015, and the Parliament also adopted a provisional position on this 2013 
proposal for a regulation in March 2016, thus paving the way for an agreement in 
the discussions between the legislative bodies.
‘Blue Belt’ initiative and customs procedures
13 
Compared to other transport modes, shipping is disadvantaged by the fact that 
ships leaving a Member State’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles from shore) 
are considered as moving out of the EU customs territory, which means that 
goods have to go through customs formalities both on departure and arrival at 
EU ports, resulting in delays and higher costs. This problem of distortion between 
transport modes has existed since 1992, and in 2013, the Commission issued 
a communication on measures to simplify administrative and customs formalities 
(the ‘Blue Belt’ initiative)12 which led to changes in customs legislation. Work to 
set up national centralised points for reporting data (‘national single windows’) is 
ongoing for transport reporting formalities (complying with the requirements of 
the Reporting Formalities Directive (RFD))13, the objective of which is to simplify 
and harmonise the administrative procedures for maritime transport by making 
the electronic transmission of information standard and by reducing reporting 
formalities. In parallel, electronic customs systems are being developed over 
a transitional period lasting until 2020, in order to gradually adapt to the new, 
modernised Union Customs Code requirements.9 Directive 2014/94/EU of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 October 2014 
on the deployment of 
alternative fuels infrastructure 
(OJ L 307, 28.10.2014, p. 1) 
requires all seaports on the 
TEN -T core network to be 
equipped with LNG refuelling 
points and shore -side 
electricity supply by the end 
of 2025.
10 Directive 2005/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 
26 October 2005 on 
enhancing port security (OJ 
L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 28) and 
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
31 March 2004 on enhancing 
ship and port facility security 
(OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6) 
require the Commission to 
carry out inspections together 
with the competent national 
authorities to ensure that the 
relevant security measures are 
applied in EU ports.
11 COM(2013) 296 final of 
23 May 2013 ‘Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council 
establishing a framework on 
market access to port services 
and financial transparency of 
ports’.
12 COM(2013) 510 final of 
8 July 2013 ‘Blue Belt, a Single 
Transport Area for shipping’.
13 Directive 2010/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 October 2010 
on reporting formalities for 
ships arriving in and/or 
departing from ports of the 
Member States and repealing 
Directive 2002/6/EC (OJ L 283, 
29.10.2010, p. 1).
16 Introduction 
14 
As regards customs controls, a new modernised Union Customs Code has been 
adopted14, replacing the 1992 Customs Code15. This lays down the overall frame -
work governing the work of the Member States’ customs authorities.
State aid
15 
The funding of infrastructure that is not to be economically exploited does not 
constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty. Such fund -
ing therefore cannot be checked by the Commission. State aid does not include, 
for example, the funding of infrastructure that is used for activities that the state 
normally performs in the exercise of its public powers (for instance lighthouses 
and other equipment for the needs of general navigation including on inland 
waterways, flood protection and low water management in the public interest, 
police and customs). Furthermore, the funding of infrastructure that is not used 
for offering goods or services on a market (for instance roads made available for 
free public use) does not constitute state aid. However, the funding of infrastruc -
ture that is to be exploited economically, such as port infrastructures, falls under 
state aid rules. Public funding of port infrastructures and/or financial support 
granted to port authorities may distort competition between ports, since it may 
allow them to charge shipping companies lower prices in order to attract traffic. 
This may also be true of indirect aid to these economic operators (i.e. terminal 
operators) and users if they do not pay market price for port infrastructure. Any 
state aid needs to be reported to the Commission so that its compatibility with 
the internal market can be assessed.
16 
The new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)16, which came into effect 
in July 2014, defines cases when state aid can be granted to companies without 
notifying the Commission in advance. The Commission is currently considering 
defining non -problematic investments in ports in the GBER (i.e. the categories of 
port investments which do not need to be notified).14 Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
9 October 2013 laying down 
the Union Customs Code (OJ 
L 269. 10.10.2013, p. 1). The 
main provisions will apply 
with effect from 1 May 2016.
15 Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community 
Customs Code (OJ L 302, 
19.10.1992, p. 1).
16 Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 
declaring certain categories of 
aid compatible with the 
internal market in application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, 
p. 1).
17 Introduction 
Funding of port infrastructure
Current main trends in shipping
17 
The vast majority of port authorities in Europe are publicly owned. The port 
authority owns the basic infrastructure and leases it out to port operators, usu -
ally by means of a concession, while retaining all regulatory functions (‘landlord’ 
model). Port operations are run by private companies, which provide and main -
tain their own superstructure, including buildings and cargo -handling equip -
ment at the terminals. In the UK, some of the larger ports (such as Felixstowe, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Immingham and Southampton) are fully privatised.
18 
Port authorities generally have limited autonomy in setting port charges (which 
are usually defined by the governments), but they nonetheless bear a significant 
share of the investment responsibilities17.
19 
In the major European ports, at least, a key factor contributing to the need for ad -
ditional capacity and new port infrastructure and superstructures is the increase 
in vessel size. In addition to specific investment needs in order to adapt ports, 
mega -ships also create other challenges for ports: their significantly larger cargo 
volume leads to peaks in port activity, and creates the risk of congestion in port 
areas and the transportation links with economic hinterlands. These may be 
costly to mitigate. Moreover, due to peak loads, ports will need more land. Since 
mega -ships can only be profitable if they are handled very quickly in ports, there 
will also be an increasing trend towards automation. Finally, mega -ships increase 
the risk of unsustainable port infrastructure investments as significant numbers 
of containers and large volumes of cargo can be shifted from one port to anoth -
er, thereby increasing the pressure on ports to offer attractive landing fees.17 Source:  ESPO, ‘European Port 
Governance, Report of an 
enquiry into the current 
governance of European 
seaports‘, 2010, p. 7 to 11.
18 Introduction 
EU funding through ERDF/CF, TEN‑T and CEF
20 
Investments in port infrastructure have been co -financed from the EU budget 
through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion 
fund (CF) under shared management, but also through the Trans -European 
Networks -Transport (TEN -T) programme and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
under direct management.
21 
Overall, between 2000 to 2013, around 6.8 billion euros of funding was provided 
from the EU budget for investments in seaports: 3 billion euros during the 2000-
2006 programming period and 3.8 billion euros during the 2007-2013 period. In 
both periods, the bulk of the EU funding (around 91 %) came from the ERDF/CF, 
provided through Operational Programmes (see an overview per Member State 
in Annex I ).
22 
However, there is no complete information available on the total public and 
private investments in ports made in the Member States which are not EU 
co-funded.
23 
For the 2014-2020 programming period, EU funding will remain important: the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) has an indicative amount of 24 billion euros 
to co -fund transport investments (all modes of transport) either under direct 
management or using financial instruments (delegated to the EIB). Maritime 
transport projects, including investments in port infrastructure and in Motor -
ways of the Seas (MoS), are eligible for this funding. Up to 900 million euros have 
been earmarked for MoS projects, while projects for the comprehensive network 
and projects for freight transport services will have respective budgets of up to 
1 billion euros and 200 million euros at their disposal. For the first CEF call for 
proposals (2014), applications were submitted for 7.1 billion euros of co -funding 
for ports, and grants have been approved for a total of 907 million euros, mainly 
for 104 core ports (see paragraph 41) and MoS projects. In addition, around 2 bil -
lion euros in EU funding via the ERDF/CF has been earmarked for seaports: 1.5 bil -
lion euros for major (TEN -T) seaports and 0.5 billion euros for smaller seaports 
(see Figure  1).
19 Introduction 
18 Article 309 of the TFEU.
19 Article 18 of the EIB Statute.Figure 1EU funding for port infrastructure in 2000 ‑2006, 2007 ‑2013  and  2014 ‑2020 
programming periods (in million euros)
Note:  The amount stated for direct management for the 2014-2020 period is an estimate based on the data gathered from the first call for pro -
posals for CEF funding.
Source:  ECA based on date provided by DG Regional and Urban Policy and INEA.ERDF/CF (shared management) - 
only funding from EU budgetCEF/TEN-T (direct management)
2014-2020 2007-2013 2000-20064 500
4 000
3 500
3 000
2 500
2 000
1 500
1 000
 500
 0
Financial support from the EIB
24 
According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the task of the European Investment Bank (EIB) is ’to contribute, by having 
recourse to the capital market and utilising its own resources, to the balanced 
and steady development of the internal market in the interest of the Union’18. 
In carrying out its task, the Bank shall ‘facilitate the financing of investment 
programmes in conjunction with assistance from the Structural Funds and 
other Union Financial Instruments’. Moreover, according to the EIB Statute, 
the EIB shall ensure that its funds are employed as rationally as possible in 
the interest of the Union. It may grant loans or guarantees only ‘… where the 
execution of the investment contributes to an increase in economic produc -
tivity in general and promotes the attainment of the internal market’19. In 
addition to funding from the EU budget, the EIB has financed investments 
in port infrastructures and superstructures in the EU and neighbouring 
countries in the Mediterranean (Morocco and Egypt) in the form of loans for 
around 10.1 billion euros between 2000 and 2013.
20 Introduction 
Previous special report by the European Court of 
Auditors on ports
25 
In 2012, in a previous special report, the European Court of Auditors identified 
problems in the planning and allocation of EU and national ERDF/CF funding for 
port infrastructure by examining 27 randomly sampled port projects in 2010. In 
particular, our report found that many of the projects had not been completed, 
some were not in use and others needed considerable further investment before 
they could be put into effective use20.20 Special Report No 4/2012 
‘Using structural and cohesion 
funds to co -finance transport 
infrastructures in seaports: an 
effective investment?’ ( http://
eca.europa.eu ).
21
 Audit scope and approach
26 
In this audit, the Court assessed the Commission’s and Member States’ EU mari -
time freight transport strategy and the value for money delivered by EU -funded 
investments in port services. In particular, our audit examined whether:
— the Member States and the Commission had put in place coherent strategies 
for developing port services for maritime freight transport, developed robust 
capacity planning and identified the EU and national public funding required 
for port infrastructures;
— EU-funded port infrastructure projects (selected between 2000 and 2013) had 
been completed within budget and on time, and implemented effectively to 
improve port services for maritime freight and the transport of goods to the 
port’s hinterland; and
— the Commission had taken the necessary action as regards state aid and cus -
toms procedures to enable seaports to compete on a level playing field.
27 
The audit consisted of a documentary review (including EU and national strate -
gies for maritime transport, development plans for ports, and port master plans); 
interviews at the Commission and with representatives of regional and port 
authorities in Member States, and on -the -spot checks of ports and port projects. 
Interviews and a survey were also carried out with representatives of federations 
of port authorities, port operators, ship owners and logistics companies (key 
stakeholders)21. In addition, external experts from the OECD and the Free Univer -
sity of Brussels (VUB) provided us with an analysis of port capacities and projec -
tions of freight volumes.
28 
The audit work was carried out between February 2015 and April 2016 both at 
the Commission (involving the Directorates -General for Mobility and Transport, 
Regional and Urban Policy, Competition, Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation 
and Customs Union and Budget) and in five Member States: Germany, Spain, Italy, 
Poland and Sweden. These countries account for 60 % of all EU funds allocated 
to port infrastructure investments between 2000 and 2013 and, according to 
Eurostat, around 40 % (by value) of the shipped goods that passed through all EU 
ports in 2013.21 The Federations consulted 
were the European Sea Ports 
Organisation (ESPO), The 
European Ship Owner’s 
Association (ECSA), the 
Federation of European 
Private Port Operators 
(FEPORT), and the European 
Association for forwarding, 
transport, logistics and 
customs services (Clecat).
22 Audit scope and approach 
22 Four ports in Spain (Algeciras, 
Cartagena, Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife and Vigo), three ports 
each in Poland (Gdańsk, 
Gdynia and Szczecin-
Świnoujście) and Germany 
(Brake, Cuxhaven and 
Wilhelmshaven) and two ports 
each in Italy (Salerno and 
Taranto) and Sweden 
(Karlskrona and Norrköping). 
The ports of Arinaga, 
Campamento, Ferrol and 
Langosteira (Spain), and 
Augusta (Italy) were 
reassessed (these were 
audited already in 2010).29 
In the five Member States covered in this report, our audit included:
— Audit visits to 19 seaports to examine the results of EU -funded investments 
in port infrastructure22. These ports were selected based on their location 
(i.e. their proximity to ports offering similar services), the overall amount of 
EU funding they received and the extent to which infrastructure had been 
built there for a specific private operator. We also selected ports identified in 
our previous report in 2012 as having infrastructure that was either empty or 
poorly connected to their hinterlands;
— Specific case studies on neighbouring ports on the north-west coast in Italy 
(Genova, La Spezia, Livorno and Savona) and on the Adriatic Sea in Italy, 
Slovenia and Croatia (North Adriatic Ports Association (NAPA) ports: Venice, 
Trieste, Koper and Rijeka) to assess the potential for, and the advantages of, 
inter -port collaboration, as well as a case study in Germany on the Nord -Ost-
see-Kanal (NOK).
30 
Our examination covered investments in port infrastructures which had received 
1.4 billion euros of EU funding between 2000 and 2013 (around 20 % of the total 
EU co -financing). This is split between 1.076 million euros (37 newly examined 
projects), and 329 million euros (five reassessments of the results of projects 
already examined in 2010). Most of the projects examined were about increasing 
capacity: 24 of the 42 projects examined, representing 55 % of the EU funding 
(774 million euros) in our sample, involved constructing or extending quays and 
breakwaters. The second category was about improving port connections (road 
and rail: 17 projects, representing around 600  million  euros in EU funding), while 
one acquisition of superstructures (e.g. cranes) accounts for the remainder of the 
expenditure examined. Picture  3 provides an overview of the ports visited during 
this audit.
23 Audit scope and approach Picture 3EU ports and Member States visited during this audit
Source:  ECA. 
 
ϭ 
  
 
 Nord-Ostsee-Kanal
Brake
WilhelmshavenCuxhavenNorrköping
KarlskronaGdyniaGdańskSzczecin – Świnoujście
Venice
Trieste
KoperRijekaSalernoTarantoAugusta
GenovaSavonaLa SpeziaLivornoCartagenaCampamentoAlgecirasSanta Cruz de TenerifeArinagaLangosteiraFerrol
Vigo
Legend
Audit visits
Ports examined
Ports examined already for SR No 4/2012Ports/channels included in case studies
24
 Observations
EU and national port strategies: absence of timely and 
coordinated implementation of well‑planned extra 
port capacity was a key weakness
31 
Investments in port infrastructure and superstructures are very costly and require 
long -term planning to ensure that they are profitable. This is why Member States 
should put in place a robust and coherent long -term strategy for developing 
their ports. Since 2013, the TEN -T Regulation has provided for EU -wide infrastruc -
ture planning by establishing a core and comprehensive network, along with 
technical standards and implementation deadlines. For investments in ports to 
be supported using EU funding during the 2014-2020 period, there is even a legal 
obligation to make these investments part of a wider, more general strategic 
port development plan (the ‘ ex ante conditionality’ rules23). This plan should 
improve the potential for increased effectiveness of future port infrastructure 
investments, because such a strategy should include the identification of already 
existing port capacity and the need for additional capacity, assess current and 
plausible future market demand, and explore port collaboration, synergies and 
specialisation.
32 
We assessed whether the five Member States covered in this audit had put 
in place such a strategy in relation to port development and infrastructure 
planning.
All five Member States visited had developed national port 
development strategies, but robust implementation plans 
and coordination were an issue
33 
Our audit found that all five Member States visited had put in place a long -term 
port strategy by the end of 2015. Spain had started drawing up documents sup -
porting its strategy as far back as 1998 and 2000, and had completed these in 
2005 and 2013 respectively. Poland had had a plan since 2007, Germany since 
2009, Sweden since 2010 and Italy only since 2015. In Germany, this strategy 
had been revised in 2016, while Sweden’s strategy was updated regularly (see 
Table  1).23 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
17 December 2013 laying 
down common provisions on 
the European Regional 
Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the 
Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development and the 
European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and laying 
down general provisions on 
the European Regional 
Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the 
Cohesion Fund and the 
European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 
1083/2006 (OJ L 347, 
20.12.2013, p. 320); Annex XI 
— Ex ante  conditionalities 7.1 
and 7. 3.
25 Observations 
24 Cuxhaven, Brake, Salerno, 
Gdansk, Vigo, Ferrol and 
Karlskrona.
25 Wilhelmshaven, Taranto, 
Gdynia, Swinoujscie -Sczeczin, 
Cartagena, SC Tenerife and 
Norrköping.
26 Algeciras and Augusta (which 
is empty).Table 1Port strategies adopted by Member States visited during this audit
Member State Name of port strategy Year adopted
GermanyGemeinsame Plattform des Bundes und der Küstenländer zur Deutschen 
Seehafenpolitik
Nationales Hafenkonzept für die See- und Binnenhäfen
Nationales Hafenkonzept für die See- und Binnenhäfen 2015 1999
2009
2016
SpainMarco Estratégico del Sistema Portuario de Titularidad Estatal (MESPTE);
Plan de Infraestructuras 2000-2007 (PIT); 
Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte (2005-2020) (PEIT); 
Plan de Infraestructuras, Transporte y Vivienda (2012-2024)’(PITVI)1998
2000
2005
2013
Italy Piano Strategico Nazionale della Portualità e della logistica 2015
Poland Strategia rozwoju portów morskich do 2015 roku 2007
Sweden Nationell plan för transportsystemet för perioden 2010–2021 2010, 4-yearly updates
34 
Our analysis of these national strategies indicated that the mere existence of 
a strategy did not necessarily mean successful implementation of sustainable 
investments. Information about the national strategies is provided in Box 1 .
Data reported by port authorities incomplete and not always 
reliable
35 
For the sample of ports covered by this report, we tested the reliability of the 
data on container transhipment capacity reported by port authorities (i.e. how 
much container traffic, in TEU, can be handled annually). Our analysis found that 
the port authorities of seven of the 16 ports covered in this report which had 
container transhipment activities did not report any aggregated capacity data24. 
For seven of the remaining nine ports which had compiled capacity data for 
containers, their actual available capacity is higher than that reported by the port 
authorities25. For two ports, the reported figure is higher than the one calculated 
by us26. This illustrates that even where port authorities do report capacity data, 
doubts remain as to the robustness of this data. This raises questions as to the ba -
sis on which decisions are taken for major investments in port infrastructure.
26 Observations 
Member States’ long ‑term strategies: an overview
 οGermany  had a long-term national port strategy, but the Federal States (Bundesländer) decided on the 
main port infrastructure investments. There was no effective coordination between regional and federal 
authorities. The Federal state (Bund) has no responsibility in port planning, which is done at local and 
regional level. The direct involvement of the Bund in port planning at local level is neither sufficient nor 
sufficiently timely. However, the Bund is responsible for hinterland connections and the dredging of access 
channels.
 οSpain  had a comprehensive strategy in place, with a central body linked to the national Ministry of Public 
Works and Transport assessing and monitoring the need for port investments for the entire country on an 
ongoing basis. Although weaknesses were noted in some of the documents (e.g. no hinterland analysis 
and no search for synergies between neighbouring ports because of free competition), there was generally 
sufficient technical support for launching projects;
 οItaly  had also adopted a national strategy with a lot of elements able to serve as a basis for making good 
port investments, but this strategy had been adopted in 2015, and was not yet accompanied by an imple -
mentation plan. The first action implementing this strategy was to put in place a new port governance sys -
tem, which led to the decision to merge various existing ports, thus reducing the number of port authori -
ties and increasing the potential for coordination and cost savings;
 οPoland  had adopted a national strategy with many elements able to serve as a basis for making good port 
investments, but this strategy had neither been accompanied by an implementation plan nor properly 
monitored. As a result, the projects selected had not always been of the highest priority or sufficiently 
well -developed. Moreover, in some cases, non -maritime projects (e.g. typical city roads, quays with tourist 
attractions) had been financed from the allocation dedicated to maritime transport;
 οAlthough providing sufficient capacity in its ports is a key objective for Sweden’s  government, it is the 
municipalities that decide on investments in infrastructure for the country’s 52 main ports. The national 
government is responsible only for fairways (access to ports) and land connections to ports. This arrange -
ment is reflected in the strategy, and only limited information on investments in port infrastructure was 
available at national Ministry level;Box 1
36 
The situation is similar for data on job creation. Our audit showed that port 
authorities were generally unable to provide data on employment including the 
jobs created by their concession holders and external service providers. There -
fore, the Commission’s information and data on job creation by ports is also very 
limited.
27 Observations 
37 
In 2013, the Commission launched a research project (‘Portopia’) under which 
ports data are gathered on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, few Member States 
and port authorities provided such data, and methodological differences in ana -
lysing job creation effects were noted.
EU strategy on ports developed over time, but robust 
information on capacity planning still lacking
Commission adopted its long‑term strategy on ports in 2013
38 
For more than two decades, particularly since the Commission’s first White Paper 
on transport in 199227, the EU has had in place a policy to support the develop -
ment of ports and their infrastructures as a way to improve mobility. Since then, 
investments in port infrastructure, multi -modal terminals and interoperability 
have been considered key to increasing sustainable mobility in Europe.
39 
In 1997, the Commission issued a Green paper on ports and maritime infrastruc -
ture28. In 2007, it adopted a communication highlighting the need to improve the 
main ports’ connections with their economic hinterlands, and to achieve a more 
balanced mix of transport modes within the EU29.
40 
In 2013, the Commission issued a new communication in which it further de -
veloped its strategy for port development in the EU30. In this document, it 
established the link, for the first time, between the proposed infrastructure 
investments and the EU funding available under CEF during the 2014-2020 
programming period. This was a significant improvement on its previous 2007 
communication.
41 
In addition, the Commission defined 329 ports as EU key ports, of which 104 were 
considered ‘core’ ports based on a set of predefined criteria31. The Commission 
aims to have these core ports connected to their hinterlands by 2030, while the 
deadline for the remaining 225 ports on the comprehensive network is 205032. 
This has given core ports de facto priority status as regards access to EU funding 
for these connections.27 (COM(92) 494 final of 
2 December 1992 ‘White Paper 
1992. The Future 
Development of the Common 
Transport Policy — A Global 
Approach to the Construction 
of a Community Framework 
for Sustainable Mobility’.
28 COM (97) 678 final of 
10 December 1997 ‘Green 
Paper on sea ports and 
maritime infrastructure’.
29 COM(2007) 616 final of 
18October 2007 
‘Communication on 
a European ports policy’.
30 COM(2013) 940 final of 
7 January 2014 ‘Building the 
Transport Core Network 
Corridors and Connecting 
Europe Facility’.
31 SWD(2013) 542 final of 
7January 2014. For example for 
‘volume -based ports’: if 1 % of 
the EU transport volume 
passes via this port, it is 
considered a core port; if 0.1 % 
of transport volume, than the 
port is on the comprehensive 
network; other criteria apply 
for ‘cohesion -based ports’ 
(which are ports with low 
volumes but with a wide 
hinterland area to serve), or 
island ports.
32 Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013.
28 Observations 
42 
During our audit, some stakeholder organisations pointed out that the Commis -
sion strategy designated too many ports as core ports. Initially, the Commission 
had proposed 94 core ports, but additional proposals had been made during 
the legislative procedure33. However, even the Commission’s initial proposal had 
already been significantly higher than the 50 core ports considered necessary to 
maintain an adequate level of accessibility for the EU as a whole34.
Weaknesses in the Commission’s capacity planning
Commission and OECD expect port traffic to grow
43 
Although the global economic crisis had a temporary negative effect on the 
overall volumes transported between 2007 and 2009, port traffic has been grow -
ing over the past 15 years (see Figure  2). This trend is expected to continue: in 
2013, the Commission forecasted a growth in port traffic of 50 % for EU ports by 
2030. Also, the OECD expects a further increase in port traffic, but at a slightly 
lower level. The projected growth rates vary according to cargo type and ship 
type. Relatively slower growth rates are foreseen for the container sector. The 
expected growth in this sector for EU ports is 38 % for the period to 2030, while 
the growth is estimated to be higher in the other market segments: 46 % for 
liquid bulk, 50 % for dry bulk and 58 % for RORO. Moreover, this expected growth 
is not distributed equally worldwide: South Asia will have the fastest growth and 
Europe the slowest35.Figure 2Overview of volumes (in gross weight in million tonnes) 
transported by sea (2000 ‑2014)
Source: Eurostat, ‘Maritime ports freight and passenger statistics’, January 2016.2 8003 0003 2003 4003 6003 8004 0004 200
200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014
EU-28 EU-1533 Annex II of COM(2011) 650 final 
of 19 October 2011.
34 European Commission, ‘Ports 
and their connections within 
the TEN -T’, 29.6.2010. Study 
undertaken by NEA, TNO and 
the University of Leeds.
35 OECD and ITF. (2015), ITF 
Transport Outlook 2015 , OECD 
Publishing, Paris ( http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789282107782-
en).
29 Observations 
The Commission does not monitor the capacity of core ports
44 
Our audit showed that the Commission did not receive detailed and up -to-date 
data from the Member States on their available capacity, the capacity they actu -
ally used or their future capacity needs. As a result, there was no EU -wide moni -
toring of the capacity of the EU’s 104 core and overall 329 key ports. In the ab -
sence of such information, the Commission has to date not been in a position to 
put forward an EU -wide port development plan. As nobody (neither at EU nor at 
Member State level) had a strategic overview of which ports needed funding and 
for what, many neighbouring ports invested simultaneously in similar container 
transhipment infrastructure and superstructures.
Risk that Commission’s projection of required port capacity is 
overestimated
45 
Based on updated traffic projections36 and comparison with other studies and 
reports which included forecasts37, the Commission estimated in 2013 that the 
average capacity utilisation of all ports in the EU was around 90 %, and that there 
was a risk of port congestion in the years to come38.
46 
By contrast, the OECD, which provided us with an assessment of future port ca -
pacity needs, estimated that:
— the EU port utilisation rate for containers is generally far below the global 
level of 67 %;
— there is significant variation of port capacity use between Europe’s regions: 
50 % in Scandinavian and Baltic ports; 56 % in north -west Europe, 61 % in the 
eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea; 62 % in the western Mediterranean Sea; 
and
— the expected capacity use is forecasted to be decreasing in several regions. 
For example, from 50 % to 30 % in Scandinavian and Baltic ports, and from 
61 % to 50 % in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.36 SWD(2013) 181 final, Volume 1, 
Point 3.
37 ISL Port Traffic forecasts up to 
2025; Port of Rotterdam, port 
vision 2025; Optimar, HIS 
Fairplay, ‘Benchmarking 
Strategic Options for 
European Shipping and for the 
European Maritime transport 
System in the Horizon 
2008-2018’, 2010 Update.
38 SWD(2013) 181 final, Volume 2, 
Annex VII.
30 Observations 
47 
There is therefore a risk that the Commission overestimated the need for ad -
ditional port capacity. This is particularly true for the specific regions indicated 
above.
48 
In this context, we also noted a mismatch between the EU funding set out in 
the strategy and the trade flows: most goods from outside the EU enter the EU 
via the ports in the Hamburg -Le Havre range. However, more than 90 % of the 
EU funding for ports during the 2000-2013 period is provided under the ERDF/
CF, and most of it is allocated to Mediterranean and Polish ports (see amounts 
allocated per Member State in Annex I ). The Member States and regional authori -
ties decide which projects are to be funded from the ERDF/CF, except for major 
projects, which must be approved by the Commission.
49 
An important waterway, the Nord -Ostsee -Kanal (NOK), was identified as a section 
of the Core Network in the CEF Regulation. However, the NOK was not part of the 
Core Network Corridors and was not selected for funding (see  Box 2 ).
Nord‑Ostsee‑Kanal (NOK)
The NOK is the most heavily used artificial canal in the world, with 32 000 freight vessels passing per year. It is 
a strategic waterway for maintaining the competitiveness of the Baltic Sea states, of which Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are members of the EU. It links the ports of Brunsbüttel and Kiel 
in northern Germany (see  Picture 4 ).
There is an urgent need to improve the existing infrastructure, both at the eastern entrance to the canal, 
where some locks are in poor condition, and at the western entrance. The additional cost of sailing around 
Jutland compared to passing through the NOK is around 70 000 euros. In addition, there are time gains to 
consider: sailing around Jutland takes 10 to 14 hours. According to an industry estimate, up to 2.2 billion euros 
could potentially be saved each year by making this infrastructure safe and reliable. In 2015, an application 
for a grant of 161 million euros in EU co -funding via the CEF to build a fifth lock chamber in Brunsbüttel was 
not selected. Despite the fact that this channel is part of the TEN -T Core Network, it was not a priority for CEF 
funding in 2015.Box 2
31 Observations 
Nord‑Ostsee‑Kanal (NOK)Picture 4
Note:  The ports with red circles were those visited by our auditors.
Source:  ECA. 
  
Lübeck 
Hamburg  Kiel Flensburg KoldingCopenhagenMalmö 
Cuxhaven  
Wilhelmshaven  
Hafen Brake Brunsbüttel 
32 Observations 
EU‑funded port infrastructures: unused and 
underused infrastructures, delays and cost overruns, 
and unsustainable investments because of funding of 
similar infrastructures in neighbouring ports
50 
Given the weaknesses in capacity planning for port infrastructure at national and 
EU level, there is a significant risk of EU funding resulting in unsustainable invest -
ments, since the additional capacity created is not actually needed. For this audit, 
we visited 19 ports in five Member States to examine a total of 42 EU -funded 
projects, of which:
— 37 projects concerned newly examined projects; and
— five projects were being followed up, having originally been examined in 
2010 (see Special Report No 4/2012).
51 
In particular, we assessed whether:
— the additional port capacity created through investments had been fully 
used;
— the projects had been completed within time and budget;
— EU funding had been allocated to neighbouring ports for similar investments, 
and
— the coordination between the Commission and the EIB functioned properly.
EU‑funded investments resulting in many unused or 
underused infrastructures
52 
Investments in port infrastructure need some time to show results and, by their 
very nature, port projects are about building capacity for the long -term future 
(meaning that, in most cases, the return on investments is low and slow). The 
timeliness of investments is often crucial to their effectiveness, particularly in 
a very competitive environment such as maritime transport.
33 Observations 
53 
Our analysis of the 37 newly examined projects showed that 30 projects with 
553 million euros of EU funding had been completed by mid-2015. Out of these 
30 projects:
— 18 projects were being used as initially intended, representing EU funding of 
359 million  euros; and
— 12 projects were either not being used (empty) or were heavily underused, 
representing EU funding of 194 million euros — meaning that one in every 
three euros has been spent ineffectively so far39. Around half of this funding 
(97 million euros of EU funding for nine projects40) was invested in infrastruc -
tures which were not used or were heavily underused for more than 3 years 
after the works ended41. This highlights shortcomings in the ex ante  needs 
assessment, and indicates high risks of waste of the amounts invested. This 
observation also applies to the five reassessed ports which have been in 
operation for almost a decade (see paragraph 63).
54 
The remaining seven projects in our sample (524 million euros of EU funding, 
mainly in Italy) were not yet completed at the time of the audit. These seven pro -
jects were therefore not included in our analysis of their actual use.
55 
Detailed information on the ports and the projects examined can be found in An-
nex II . Box 3  below provides two examples of well used infrastructures and two 
examples of empty or underused EU -funded port infrastructure projects. Further 
examples of unused and underused infrastructures can also be found in Box 4 , 
Box 6  and Box 8 ).39 Methodology applied: this 
amount has been determined 
taking into account the 
detailed assessment of the use 
of the port infrastructures 
audited at the time of the 
audit visit. If a port was 
considered to have been 
empty or heavily underused 
applying internationally 
accepted criteria, the project 
expenditure was calculated in 
accordance with the degree of 
underuse.
40 This concerns the three 
projects audited in Cuxhaven, 
two projects in 
Wilhelmshaven, and one of 
the projects audited in 
Taranto, Cartagena, Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife, and Karlskrona: 
only Poland did not have 
projects which were unused 
or heavily underused more 
than 3 years.
41 This refers to the ‘Results 
Measurement (ReM) 
Framework’ introduced by the 
EIB. On this basis, the EIB 
systematically uses two 
periods to assess the quality 
and soundness of its lending 
operations: one at project 
completion, and another one 
at project completion + 
3 years (see http://www.eib.
org/projects/cycle/
monitoring/rem.
htm?lang=en ).
34 Observations 
Examples of well‑used port infrastructure:
1. Port of Norrköping: widening and deepening of the fairway access and reinforcement of existing 
berths
This project contributed to safer navigation, in accordance with international norms. Existing restrictions for 
darkness, visibility and wind were reduced and this allowed 24-hour access to the port, 7 days a week, for 
vessels of a much larger size. Also the ability for vessels to meet in the fairway, achieving time savings and 
security gains was enhanced, and positive environmental impacts in terms of an increased filling factor of 
larger vessels were also achieved.  The EU co -funded this project with 3.5 million euros out of a total cost of 
35.3  million  euros.
2. Szczecin road connection to the port
The construction of the stretch of 2.63 km of road was completed in 2009, and the road infrastructure is being 
used. The main project outcome was improved road access to the port of Szczecin (see Picture 5 ) avoiding the 
former road with many traffic lights. Although there are critical last mile connection problems, the improve -
ment of the road access to the hinterland is visible, reducing the road congestion to and from the port, and 
improving the safety of the inhabitants. The EU co -funded this project with 23 million euros out of a total cost 
of 28 million euros.
Picture 5 — The new Struga street leading to the portBox 3
© Szczecin City Hall.
Examples of empty or heavily underused port infrastructure:
1. Taranto container terminal (Italy)
The Taranto Container Terminal entered into operation in 2002. The project resulted in considerable traffic 
volumes soon after the terminal commenced its activities. However, volumes decreased from 2006 onwards. 
The shipping line calling at the port of Taranto gradually stopped serving the port, and the terminal’s operat -
ing company joined a group based in a competing neighbouring port (Pireaus), and ceased activities in Ta -
ranto in June 2015 (see Picture 6 ). The concession agreement between the terminal operator and the Taranto 
port authority had provided that that the port authority should undertake additional infrastructure work, 
such as dredging. However, this work was never carried out. In the port of Taranto, 38 million euros in EU 
funding has been invested in a transhipment terminal and its hinterland connections during the 2000-2006 
programming period. The terminal is currently unused.
35 Observations 
Picture 6 — Unused transshipment capacity in the port of Taranto
Source:  ECA.
2. Multi‑purpose terminal in the port of Cartagena (Spain)
In February 2013, the port of Cartagena finished building a 575-metre long dock, an adjacent area of 4.5 hec -
tares and a storage space of 20 hectares for operations related to a future multifunctional terminal. The total 
combined cost of the two projects reached 62.8 million euros, and 29.7 million euros was paid. Currently, 
part of the area is used for dry bulk, scrap, and storing by -products from the nearby refinery. The other part 
(20 hectares) has not yet been paved and remains unused (see Picture 7 ). EU funding worth 10.4 million euros 
from the ERDF had been allocated to this particular project.
Picture 7 — Empty area for a multifunctional terminal in the port of Cartagena
Source: ECA.Box 3
36 Observations 
Delays and cost overruns in a number of projects
Delays in project implementation for 19 of the 30 completed 
projects
56 
We had already observed and reported on significant delays in the implementa -
tion of port projects in our 2012 report resulting from administrative arrange -
ments in place: 33 authorisations had been needed for building and operating 
a marina in Italy, and it took 22 years to obtain the necessary authorisations to 
start port constructions in Greece42. This indicated structural problems related to 
the issuing of permits and authorisations.
57 
Our analysis of the 30 newly examined projects that had already been completed 
showed that 11 projects finished on time, but also that 19 projects did not finish 
on time. For those 19 projects, the average delay was almost 13 months, with 
delays varying between 3 months (provision of RORO terminal equipment in the 
port of Vigo, Spain) and 33 months (Jade -Weser -Port in Wilhelmshaven, Ger -
many). Twelve of the 19 projects were delayed by more than 20 % of the planned 
project duration. Relative to the initially planned duration, the delays were of up 
to 136 % in the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (Spain).
58 
Figure 3  provides details on the 19 (completed) projects concerned.42 Special Report No 4/2012 on 
seaports infrastructures.
37 Observations 
Overview of delays in the 19 completed projectsFigure 3
Source: ECA.11201824233817276097122935334445486678
15923711532915163491771833114
136 %45 %128 %29 %48 %13 %18 %107 %25 %16 %25 %14 %26 %52 %16 %40 %69 %17 %5 %
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90100110120130140Construction of new land area adjacent to the existing breakwaterConstruction to increase the capacity of the container terminalsConstruction to increase the capacity of the container terminalsLand /f_illing of a storage areaConstruction of a dock and an adjacent areaConstruction of a new breakwater and a new basinConstruction of a silo for the storage of vehiclesEnlarging the existing docks to the east and to the northConstruction of a new dockCreation of new land areas reclaimed from the seaConstruction of a new port quayConstruction of a new port quayExtension of port area and construction of a new quayExtension of port area and construction of a new quayRehablitation of a quay-wallConstruction to increase port capacityConstruction of a new port area and container terminalUpgrade of an infrastructureUpgrade of the Port ChannelSC Tenerife Cartagena Vigo AlgecirasCuxhavenHafen
Brake Wilhelmshaven GdyniaSpain Germany Poland
MonthsOriginal project implementation 
period
Delay in months compared to the 
initial planning
Delay as a  % compared to planning
38 Observations 
Administrative procedures can contribute to delays in project 
implementation: the case of Italy
59 
As mentioned above, seven of the 37 newly audited projects had not yet been 
completed at the time of the audit, mainly because of administrative burden. 
These projects had been allocated almost half of the expenditure audited 
(524 million euros in EU funding). Six of these seven incomplete projects had also 
experienced delays, ranging from 13 months for dredging works to a minimum 
of 36 months for connections within the port of Salerno. National and regional 
administrative procedures can contribute significantly to delays in completing 
port infrastructure projects. Our audit showed that, in Italy alone, five of the six 
projects examined had been delayed, mainly due to problems related to the issu -
ing of permits and authorisations, which highlights issues related to coordinating 
the various bodies involved. Detailed information on the incomplete projects can 
be found in Annex III .
60 
In addition, in several Member States, the procedure for adopting a port master 
plan (needed before infrastructure works can take place) involves a lot of inter -
mediate bodies. For example, for the port of Taranto, a proposal for a port master 
plan submitted in 2006, involving the port committee, the High Council for 
Public Works, the Regional Authority for Environmental Protection, the Region 
concerned and the local municipality, had still not yet been adopted at the time 
of the audit visit (end of 2015).
Cost overruns for 16 of the 30 completed projects
61 
On top of that, our audit also showed that only 14 of the projects examined did 
not have any cost overruns, meaning that 16 of the 30 completed projects had 
experienced cost overruns of 139 million euros in total. This applied mainly to 
seaports in Germany and Spain (the Italian projects have not yet been complet -
ed, so a final assessment cannot be made at this stage). The average cost overrun 
was around 8.7 million euros, with overruns varying between 0.2 million euros 
for an inspection building in the port of Vigo (Spain) and 67 million euros for 
transhipment infrastructure in the port of Algeciras (Spain). In comparison to the 
initially planned costs43, the overruns were up to 38 % (for the construction of 
a new port quay in Cuxhaven). Table 2  gives an overview of the cost overruns for 
the 16 projects in seven different ports.43 This cost overrun applies only 
to the eligible costs at project 
level and not to the entire port 
investment cost, where cost 
overruns might be much 
higher.
39 Observations 
Overview of the cost overruns in the 16 completed projects
Member 
StatePort Project to examineProject costs  
(in euros)1EU funding  
(in euros)2Cost overruns  
(in euros)2% of total 
cost
GermanyCuxhaven Herstellung Offshore Basishafen Cuxhaven 
Liegeplatz 831 945 019 15 942 509 3 300  000 10.3
Östliche Erweitung Offshore Basis Cuxhaven 
Liegeplatz 941 436 573 18 800  000 15 600  000 37.7
Offshore Basis Cuxhaven Errichtung der 
Hafensohle Liegeplatz 83 400 649 1 250 000 1 000  000 29.4
Wilhelmshaven Ertüchtigung der Niedersachsenbrücke 16 456 421 6 704 346 305 000 1.9
Großprojekt ‘Jade-Weser-Port’ 146 856 096 32 930 149 17 000  000 11.6
Hafen Brake Norderweiterung Hafen Brake - 
2. Ausbaustufe)14 803 596 5 924 021 400  000 2.7
SpainCartagenaAmpliación Dársena de Escombreras. 
Fase 1116 492 375 46 035 682
22 461 000 12.5Terminal Polivalente de Graneles 34 454 637 19 275 477
Relleno y Urbanizacion Terminal Polivalente 28 314 601 10 440 783
AlgecirasInfraestructuras Portuarias Y Auxiliares En 
Isla Verde (3ª Fase) En Algeciras511 460 000 127 314 481
67 045 000 9.9Muelle Y Explanada Exterior Al Dique, Junto 
A Isla Verde168 576  557 52 199 106
VigoMejora De La Operatividad De Los Muelles 
Comerciales (1ª Fase)48 249 668 27 973 501 5 449 000 11.3
Ampliación Del Puesto De Inspección 
Fronteriza Arenal2 188 957 750 884 236 000 10.88
SC TenerifeNva. Base de Contenedores en la Dársena 
del Este del Pto. SC. Tenerife17 770  802 7 860 602 4 301 000 24.2
Nueva Base De Contenedores En La Dársena 
Del Este, 2ª Fase15 605 808 6 387 113 1 153 000 7.4
Tramo 1º Fase2ª Def. rellenos D. Este: 
quiebro 1º y 2ª alineación Espigón Cueva 
Bermeja5 673  967 2 809 113 562 000 9.9
Total31 203 685 726 382 597 768 138 812 000
1 This concerns the total eligible costs at project level, not the entire port investment cost.
2 Cost overruns are relative to the total eligible cost for the project in question, not the entire port investment cost.
3 Excluding reassessed projects.
Source: ECA.Table 2
40 Observations 
Poor value for money from EU funding
Reassessment of the results for five ports examined in 2010: poor 
value for money, even 5 years later 
62 
In 2012, we reported44 that a high proportion (82 %) of the EU funding spent on 
a randomly selected sample of 27 port projects had been used ineffectively. 
In this audit, we reassessed five ports (Augusta in Italy, and the Spanish ports 
of Arinaga, Campamento, Ferrol and Langosteira) which had been particularly 
problematic in 2010 as the constructions had not been in use, and the EU -funded 
infrastructure had been empty or poorly connected. These ports had received 
329 million euros in EU funding during the 2000-2006 period to build these 
infrastructures.
63 
The key findings of this reassessment were as follows:
(i) Overall, effectiveness was very low: only around 5 % (representing 18 mil -
lion euros of EU funding invested) of the overall capacity created was 
being used as initially planned after almost a decade of operations45. The 
fact that no significant level of port activity had taken place on average 
after almost a decade after completion of the works46 highlights that 
there was no need to spend EU funding on these infrastructures, and that 
there was neither a sound business case, nor a proper analysis of costs 
and benefits up front. In total, we consider that 292 million euros of the 
EU-funded investments made are still ineffective in 2015. As indicated in 
our earlier report47, Member States focus on absorbing EU funds rather 
than on the effectiveness of the investments in additional port capacity;
(ii) Three of the four Spanish ports (Arinaga, Ferrol and Langosteira) demon -
strated a modest increase in their operations compared to 2010, but were 
still significantly below the maximum capacity of the EU -funded infra -
structure (around 10 % for Arinaga and Langosteira, and around 25 % for 
Ferrol). The commercial port of Augusta has no activity in the EU -funded 
container terminal or the RORO -berth.
While the initial EU -funded investments in container storage areas in Cam -
pamento remain largely unused, ship repair activities do take place (see 
Picture  8 ).44 See Special Report No 4/2012.
45 Methodology applied: this 
amount has been determined 
taking into account the 
detailed reassessment of the 
use of the port infrastructures 
audited already a first time in 
2010. If a port was considered 
to have been empty or heavily 
underused applying 
internationally agreed criteria, 
the expenditure was 
calculated in accordance with 
the degree of underuse.
46 The works were completed in 
Arinaga in 2008, in 
Campamento in 2004, in 
Ferrol in 2005, in Langosteira 
in 2011 and in Augusta in 
2006.
47 Special Report No 4/2012, 
paragraph 22.
41 Observations 
(iii) Since 2012, the Commission has followed up on three of these five ports 
by making a visit on the spot, or discussing the way forward at a central 
level. For example:
— For Arinaga, phase 3 of the port extension has been postponed by 
the Spanish authorities until there is sufficient activity;
— For the commercial port of Augusta, additional investment funding 
has been allocated by the Italian authorities to complete the works 
during the 2014-2020 period. The estimated cost of the outstanding 
works is 145 million euros, and the EU will co -finance this with 67 mil -
lion  euros from the ERDF (a Commission decision concerning the 
major project was issued on 27.3.2013). The recently adopted new na -
tional general strategic ports framework in Italy has led to a merger 
with the nearby port of Catania, and this could provide synergies with 
Augusta on RORO traffic, cruise traffic and bulk cargo. The outstand -
ing works and the allocated EU funding should therefore be revised 
in light of the recent merger to increase the potential for greater 
effectiveness.
Unused port capacity created in 2004 in the port of 
Campamento: 16.5  million  euros was invested in this 
infrastructure
Source:  ECA.Picture 8
42 Observations 
Many missing and inadequate links will need further public 
funding to make the initial port investments work properly
64 
In the 14 ports examined, connections to the network were either missing (in 
Italy and Spain) or inadequate (in Germany and Poland). In Italy (Salerno and 
Taranto), Spain (Algeciras, Ferrol and partially Langosteira), Germany (Jade -Wes -
er-Port) and Poland (Szczecin -Świnoujście, Gdańsk and Gdynia), road and rail con -
nections were either absent, delayed, or had not yet been planned, or they had 
experienced critical ’last mile’ problems. This includes the Gdynia -Karlskrona MoS 
project between Poland and Sweden, where the construction of a ferry terminal 
needed to link the two ports has been postponed until 2019 (see Box 6 ).
65 
Significant additional public funding will be needed so that the projects con -
cerned can work properly. For example, the additional cost of building rail con -
nections to the Spanish ports of Algeciras, Ferrol and Langosteira is estimated at 
around 183 million euros. In Poland, an additional 350 million euros will need to 
be invested to increase to – 12.5 m the water depth of the 65 km access channel 
to the port of Szczecin, so that the bigger vessels for which the infrastructure was 
upgraded will be able to enter the port.
Funding of similar infrastructures increasing the risk of 
unsustainable investments
Shift in traffic between neighbouring ports
66 
As Europe is only a small part of the globe in geographical terms, ports are di -
vided into ‘port ranges’ For example there is the Hamburg-Le Havre range, or the 
Mediterranean range with an East and West Med range (see Picture  9).
67 
Ports within the same range compete against each other, while competition also 
exists between port ranges. During our audit, we examined the traffic volumes 
of the 171 largest EU container ports over the 2005 to 2014 period, i.e. ports with 
a container volume of at least 200 000 TEUs in 2005.
43 Observations 
Mediterranean range, with an East and West Med rangePicture 9
Source: ECA.
68 
Our analysis showed that activity at six of these 171 container ports had declined 
by more than 50 % compared to 2005: Savona and Taranto (Italy, see Box  3), Med -
way and Thames port (UK), Rouen (France) and Malaga (Spain, see Box 5 ). The 
decline of one port was related to the growth of a nearby, often larger port.
69 
Moreover, we also identified noticeable shifts in traffic between other neigh -
bouring ports covered by this report: between Salerno and Naples (Italy) and be -
tween Gdańsk and Gdynia (Poland). As soon as additional infrastructure became 
operational in one port, it had a negative impact on the volumes passing through 
the neighbouring port.
44 Observations 
Funding of similar infrastructure, mostly aimed at increasing 
capacity
70 
All projects examined involved work to increase the depth of access channels, 
enlarge turning basins, berths and storage areas, improve port connections and 
provide adequate cranes and yard equipment to efficiently handle the larger 
cargo volumes forecasted.
71 
Our analysis identified 14 cases where similar investments had been made in 
neighbouring ports within the same range: several port authorities and port 
operators had invested simultaneously in additional capacity for transhipment in -
frastructure and superstructures despite the fact that unused capacity had been 
available in neighbouring ports. These similar investments had even been made 
in ports serving the same hinterlands located in the same Member State, indicat -
ing a lack of coordination in capacity planning at national level.
72 
Such investments were considered unsustainable (see examples in Box 4 ).
Examples of similar investment plans in neighbouring ports
(a) Ports on the Italian North West coast (Genova, La Spezia, Livorno and Savona) in Italy
In Italy, all four ports on the North West coast (Genova, La Spezia, Livorno and Savona) have ongoing or 
planned investments to increase their current combined capacity of 3 730 000 TEUs by 50 % (or an additional 
1 800 000 TEUs). These ports all compete for the same hinterland: in recent years, Savona has clearly lost mar -
ket share to Genoa, as has Livorno, but to a more limited extent. Moreover, the current capacity is not being 
fully used: in 2014, container terminal utilisation rates were approximately 20 % in Savona, 65 % in Livorno, 
74 % in La Spezia and 77 % in Genoa. There is no expectation that traffic will significantly increase in the years 
to come.
(b) Polish ports (Gdańsk and Gdynia)
In Poland, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development simultaneously approved a significant extension of 
container terminals in Gdańsk and dredging in the port of Gdynia, both aimed at the same container business, 
having similar hinterlands, and without considering the extent to which the available existing capacity was 
being used.Box 4
45 Observations 
(c) Spanish ports (Cartagena, Algeciras and Ferrol)
In Spain, the ports of Cartagena, Algeciras and Ferrol all included in their growth strategy the capture of more 
traffic destined for/originating from the Madrid region, which is also a traditional market for other large ports 
(Valencia in particular). The capacity increases were undertaken without assessing whether there was enough 
traffic to cover the same hinterland.
(d) NAPA ports in Italy, Slovenia and Croatia (Venice, Trieste, Koper and Rijeka)
All NAPA ports (Venice, Trieste, Koper and Rijeka) aimed to attract more traffic and bigger vessels, but 
there was no strategy for increasing synergies among them once a ship had decided to call at a port in the 
North -Adriatic range. An obstacle to enhanced cooperation is the fact that these ports are located in three 
different Member States, with different governance systems both nationally and in individual ports, and with 
differing co -funding rates under the cohesion policy and CEF Regulations, which may lead to individual con -
siderations prevailing over more collective ones.
73 
A simultaneous increase in port capacity in neighbouring ports also carries the 
risk of additional price competition between these ports in order to attract the 
required additional traffic volumes. As a result, unless the overall traffic volume 
increases, capacity in all ports will remain unused or underused while, at the 
same time, the ports’ profitability will decrease. In the case of transhipment 
ports, this risk is particularly high since shipping companies can decide to change 
ports of call in line with their own network approach.
Ineffective coordination between the Commission and the 
EIB on the funding of port infrastructure
74 
According to the Treaty on the European Union, the task of the European Invest -
ment Bank (EIB) is to contribute, by having recourse to the capital market and 
utilising its own resources, to the balanced and steady development of the inter -
nal market in the interest of the Union. In addition to the 6.8 billion euros in EU 
funding (i.e. through ERDF/CF or CEF), several of the ports examined in the course 
of this audit also received a loan from the EIB, amounting to a total of 10.1 bil -
lion euros between 2000 and 2013. Box 4
46 Observations 
75 
Annex IV  provides detailed information on the main characteristics of the Mem -
ber States’ port systems, and an overview of the EU and EIB funding support for 
the audited ports areas (2000-2013).
76 
Before the EIB grants a loan, the Commission and the Member State concerned 
have to provide an opinion on whether the investments to be financed from 
the EIB’s resources comply with the relevant EU legislation and policies48. The 
procedure for coordination between the Commission and the EIB is governed by 
a Memorandum of Understanding49. For the ports examined for this report, such 
consultation had taken place in four cases: Algeciras (Spain), Tanger -Med (Mo -
rocco), Taranto (Italy) and Jade -Weser -Port (Germany).
77 
Our analysis found that only limited information was shared between the EIB and 
the Commission. For example, no loan amount was indicated, the beneficiary 
was not specified, the EIB’s technical and financial appraisal and its assessment 
of risks to the effectiveness of Cohesion policy were not shared with the Com -
mission. The information provided by the EIB limits the Commission’s capacity to 
assess a case properly.
78 
Moreover, the Commission does not have the power to block a loan proposal if it 
disagrees. As it happens, the Commission has never given a negative opinion on 
an EIB loan proposal, although there have been some highly controversial cases. 
The absence of a proper Commission response to EIB -proposed loans to support 
neighbouring ports outside the EU undermined the effectiveness of EU fund -
ing invested in EU ports. The example in Box  5 for ports in the West Med range 
indicates that there was a lack of adequate coordination within the Commission 
services, and no signal of problems by the Commission to the EIB, and this led to 
overcapacity of transhipment infrastructures and unsustainable investments, as 
some of the ports lost significant volumes handled previously.48 Article 19 of the Statute of the 
European Investment Bank 
(EIB).
49 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) 
between the Commission of 
the European Communities 
and the European Investment 
Bank concerning working 
procedures for consulting the 
Commission on Global Loans, 
Mid-Caps Loans, Framework 
Loans, and Investment Loans 
under Article 21 of the EIB 
statute (13 June 2006); last 
amended on 
13 December 2010.  
The MoU is currently being 
revised with the latest draft 
version dated September 
2015.
47 Observations Box 5Simultaneous funding of port infrastructure in neighbouring ports by EIB and from 
the EU budget led to unsustainable investments and EU ports losing significant 
volumes handled previously: the example of Tanger‑Med port (Morocco) and ports 
in Spain and Portugal
Since 2000, more than 500 million euros from the ERDF/CF and 229 million euros in EIB loans has been pro -
vided to support infrastructure in several ports in Spain (Andalusia) and Portugal. The port of Algeciras (Spain) 
alone has received EU funding of around 248 million euros. In addition, the EIB provided a loan of around 
129 million euros to increase capacity.
In 2008 and 2010, two EIB loans for a total of 240 million euros were provided with EU guarantees for the port 
of Tanger -Med (Morocco) to build additional capacity for handling container traffic of 8 million TEU. This port 
is in direct proximity to the port of Algeciras on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Both ports specialise 
in transhipment, and are in direct competition with each other and with neighbouring transhipment activities 
(e.g. Cadiz, Malaga and Sines, see Picture  10).
Picture 10 — Overview of port capacity publicly funded in the West Med range
EU: 40.4 million euroAlicante
EIB: 100 million euroEU: 67.3 million euroSevilla
EU: 32.7 million euroHuelvaEU: 89 million euroCartagena
EU: 41,4 million euroAlmeriaEU: 22.7 million euroMotril
EU: 34,6 million euroMalaga
EIB: 60 million euroEU: 76.3 million euroCadizEU: 0.8 million euroSines
EIB: 240 million euroTangier
EIB: 16 million euroCeutaEIB: 128.9 million euroEU: 247.9 million euroAlgeciras 
Source:  ECA.
Although a new terminal operator started operations in the newly built container transhipment terminal of 
the port of Algeciras (Spain), 30 hectares of transhipment area (representing 58 % of the EU funding of 144 mil -
lion euros) was unused at the time of the audit, and the effectiveness of the EU investment in this port will 
depend on the capacity of the port authority to attract additional operators.
This, however, may negatively impact on the traffic volumes of neighbouring ports.
In addition, the neighbouring Spanish ports of Cádiz and Malaga experienced considerable reductions in con -
tainer traffic between 2007 and 2015: by 53 % in Cádiz and by 92 % in Malaga.
48 Observations 
79 
Finally, the Commission does not obtain information on the EIB’s final decisions 
on loan applications, nor a signed copy of the loan contract, with or without 
a guarantee provided by the EU. Nor is any final report submitted on the relevant 
project’s implementation or on how the loan provided has been spent, or any 
other relevant information on whether or not a loan has been fully repaid.
EU funding at project level tied to outputs, but not to results 
during the 2000 ‑2006 and 2007 ‑2013 periods
80 
During the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming periods, the EU funding at 
project level needed to be linked to outputs, but not to results (i.e. outcomes 
or impacts). Even though some of the EU-funded investments were not actually 
in use (they were empty, heavily underused, or did not produce the intended 
objectives, results and impacts), their costs were therefore still eligible for EU 
co-financing under both the ERDF/CF and TEN -T programmes.
81 
Box 6  provides one of the many examples where the project output had been 
achieved, but not the intended result.
Project outputs achieved, but not producing the intended result — example of the 
Gdynia‑Karlskrona Motorway of the Seas (MoS) project (ferry link between Poland 
and Sweden)
This MoS project, managed directly by the Commission’s executive agency INEA, involved linking two ports: 
one in Poland (Gdynia), and one in Sweden (Karlskrona). It was aimed at reducing the amount of freight trans -
ported on roads, increasing the intermodal share on the corridor from 3 % in 2008 to 10 % in 2015 and 36 % 
in 2025). Key performance indicators (KPIs) were agreed, with dedicated monitoring to indicate the progress 
made each year towards the expected results.
The road and rail connections in the port of Gdynia were built, and the railway tracks were modernised in 
Sweden by the end of 2013. However, none of the intended project objectives (outcomes) were achieved be -
cause a vital element was missing to make it work: the ferry terminal in the port of Gdynia, which was a pre -
requisite for fully implementing the project, and which was essential to achieve its expected benefits, has 
not been built. Having originally been scheduled for completion during the 2007-2013 period, the terminal 
was postponed until 2016 as early as the application stage because the traffic volumes originally anticipated 
had been revised downwards by the port of Gdynia. Construction of the building has therefore been further 
postponed until the end of 2018 at the earliest. This means that the MoS as initially planned will at best, only 
become operational in 2019 (at least 6 years after completion of the examined project).Box 6
49 Observations 
Creating a level playing field between ports: need to better 
ensure that common rules such as state aid and customs 
controls are applied consistently
82 
Competition between ports can be quite intense if ports serve the same hinter -
land or types of goods and traffic. Granting public support to port authorities 
may however distort the market. The absence of state aid guidelines for seaports 
and differences in customs control practices between Member States can make 
one port more attractive than others for global shipping lines. We therefore re -
viewed whether the Commission had taken the necessary action as regards state 
aid and customs procedures to enable ports to compete on a level playing field.The EU nevertheless paid 34.4 million euros for the outputs without being able to expect any real outcomes 
or impacts in the coming years: 17.3 million euros in EU funds from the ERDF on the Polish side for road and 
rail accesses (see Picture 11 ), and 17.1 million euros from TEN -T on the Swedish side to modernise rail tracks. 
This was due to incorrect information from the beneficiary, insufficient monitoring by the INEA agency of the 
agreed KPIs, and inadequate grant agreement texts which allowed payments without results. Had the termi -
nal not been included in the project application, the Swedish authorities would only have been able to apply 
for the usual TEN -T investment financing of 10 %, while in this case 20 % was co -funded because it was consid -
ered a MoS project.
Picture 11 — Road and rail connections in the port of Gdynia without a ferry 
terminal building to make the link to the port of KarlskronaBox 6
Source: ECA.
50 Observations 
Need to better enforce state aid rules for ports at Member 
State and Commission level
Risks of distorting competition through state aid identified in 
several cases
83 
As far back as 2000, the General Court of the European Union clarified that the 
operation of publicly owned infrastructure, such as of an airport, may constitute 
an economic activity50; this principle was confirmed and further developed in the 
Leipzig Halle judgement in 201151.
Lack of clarity as regards port superstructures
84 
However, our audit identified certain significant risks of distorting competition in 
the ports sector. For example, concession holders are responsible for financing 
the superstructures they use on their terminals (e.g. cranes, loading and unload -
ing equipment and warehouses). This is why the Commission made a distinction 
between public (general) and user -specific infrastructure in its 2001 communica -
tion on ports52. Public financing of superstructures open to all users on a non -dis-
criminatory basis was not to be considered state aid, while the co -funding of 
such equipment, either with a particular user in mind or for the benefit of a par -
ticular company that already had the concession53, was to be considered state 
aid as it provided an advantage to that undertaking and may therefore affect 
competition.
85 
We found a lack of clarity concerning the public funding of superstructures for 
ports: in principle, the terms of the 2014 call for proposals for CEF considered 
the funding of superstructures for ports to be ineligible expenditure. There 
were however two exceptions to this: superstructures could be funded under 
the multimodal part and (subject to certain conditions) under the ‘Motorways 
of the Seas’ part of the same call for proposals. As a result, several ports applied 
for EU funding for such equipment under the latter parts of the call for propos -
als. Moreover, the terms of the ESIF do not, in principle, consider the funding of 
superstructures for ports to be ineligible expenditure.50 CJEU Judgment T-128/98 on 
‘Aéroports de Paris’.
51 Joint Cases T-455/08 
Flughafen Leipzig -Halle Gmbh 
and Mitteldeutsche Flughafen 
AG versus Commission and 
T-443/08 Freistaat Sachsen 
and Land Sachsen Anhalt 
versus Commission, dated 
24. 3. 2011.
52 COM(2001) 35 final of 
13 February  2001 ‘Reinforcing 
quality service in seaports: 
a key for European transport’, 
p. 11.
53 Unless the terms of the tender 
included this particular 
advantage for the winner, 
which would then provide an 
equal advantage to all bidders.
51 Observations 
86 
Overall, we identified 10 cases of user -specific superstructures being supported 
with EU funding in the ports examined, mainly in Poland (in the three examined 
ports Szczecin -Świnoujście, Gdańsk and Gdynia) and Spain (port of Algeciras). 
Projects which included cranes and transhipment equipment used by private op -
erators had been co -financed with around 92.5 million euros from the EU budget. 
The Commission, which was notified of these cases by the Member States con -
cerned in 2005 (Poland) and 2010 (Spain), authorised them without raising any 
objection to their financing. Box 7  provides an example, and the full list can be 
found in Annex V .Box 7Public funding of user‑specific superstructures in Spain
In the Spanish port of Algeciras, 22 million euros of EU funds were invested for the purchase of eight dock 
(‘ship to shore’) cranes for a particular private terminal operator (see Picture  12).
Picture 12 — EU‑co‑funded superstructures in the port of Algeciras
Source:  ECA.
Follow‑up of previous state aid decisions in the event of 
substantial changes
87 
The EU system of state aid control is based on an ex ante  assessment by the Com -
mission and effective cooperation between the Commission and the Member 
States. Problems can arise where the conditions of notified aid have been sub -
stantially changed after the Commission decision, and there is no follow -up by 
the Commission to assess whether these changed circumstances result in a dis -
tortion of competition (see an example in Box 8 ).
52 Observations Box 8Lack of formal notification in the event of significant changes — Jade‑Weser‑Port 
in Germany
In Germany, between 2008 and 2012, a new container terminal, the ‘Jade -Weser -Port’ (JWP) with a 2.7 million 
TEU capacity, was built in the direct vicinity of the deepwater port of Wilhelmshaven (one of the 104 ‘core 
ports’). The terminal’s basic infrastructure was built by the State of Lower Saxony with the help of a grant. 
Along with national and private funding, the EU provided 33 million euros worth of funding. In addition, the 
EIB provided two loans totalling 325 million euros to finance the building of infrastructure.
In December 2008, the Commission decided not to raise any objection to the measures for which notice had 
been given (concession agreement with an international company for 40 years) because it did not consider 
these to be state aid54.
However, the conditions communicated with the notification were substantially amended after the decision 
was made: two significant amendments to the concession agreement (signed in 2006), made in 2010 (even 
before the terminal had started operations) and 2014 respectively, significantly altered the initial conditions of 
the public tender. These amendments also had an impact on external shipping companies’ ship -side charg -
es55. On the whole, this had a negative financial impact of around 15 million euros as of October 2015 (less 
income, more expenses for interest rates) for the public entity granting the concession agreement with the 
private company. The German authorities did not notify these amendments to the Commission, even though 
it would have been appropriate to do so for the sake of establishing legal certainty, and the Commission itself 
did not follow up on the original decision to see whether the amended conditions distorted competition.
Although the publicly owned entity granting the concession was expected to operate at a profit to secure the 
loan that it took, it in fact made losses as Jade -Weser -Port is heavily underused: since the port opened in Sep -
tember 2012, container volumes, although increasing from 76 000 TEU (2013) to 429 000 TEU (2015), are only at 
around 16 % of the ultimate capacity of 2.7 million TEU that will exist once all works have been completed and 
the port becomes fully operational in the medium term (see Figure 4 and  Picture  13).
Due to the amendments of the concession agreement and the losses of the public granting entity amounting 
to 21.5 million euros at the end of 2014, both Lower Saxony and Bremen, joint owners of the entity, planned to 
provide 3 million euros (2015) and 5.5 million euros in 2016 for this entity.
54 Because the concession would provide for market conditions: the German authorities would not be able to provide discretionary subsidies and 
advantages to the concession holder; the port infrastructure would be open to all port users on a non -discriminatory basis, and a price charged 
for cargo -handling would be based on market conditions.
55 These concerned the postponement of concession fee payment and a change to guarantees for ship -side charges in favour of the company. 
They also reduced ship -side charges for a certain period in favour of external shipping companies.
53 Observations 
Use of capacity created in the Jade‑Weser‑PortFigure 4
0500 0001 000 0001 500 0002 000 0002 500 0003 000 000
start in
9/20122013 2014 2015 2016 2017number of TEUannual capacity 
2 700 000 TEU in 
medium term (at 
full operation and 
after /f_inal completion of the works)Picture 13Heavily underused transshipment port capacity in Jade‑Weser‑Port
Source:  ECA.

54 Observations 
A more proactive Commission role on state aid to ports 
necessary
Few cases of state aid notifications by Member States and a low 
number of complaints submitted to the Commission
88 
Our audit showed that Member States had notified very few cases of state aid to 
ports in recent years:
— before 2007, the Commission had collected no data on port state aid 
notifications;
— between 2007 and 2010, in total only four cases of state aid for port infra -
structure had been notified by Member States; and
— between 2011 and 2015, there were 27 state aid notifications (see Annex VI ).
89 
Our audit showed that the Commission had received very few complaints:
— before 2007, no data had been available on complaints;
— between 2007 and 2011, there had only been one formal Commission deci -
sion in a complaint case, while all other complaint -based cases had been 
closed without a formal Commission decision (i.e. the cases had been closed 
following a preliminary assessment letter to which the complainant had not 
responded, or due to a withdrawal of the complaint); and
— between 2011 and 2015, only three individual complaint cases had been 
brought to the Commission.
Commission monitoring of state aid to ports is limited to aid 
schemes
90 
The Commission undertook very few desk -based investigations of public fund -
ing of port infrastructure.56 Moreover, in accordance with the legal provisions, 
the Commission’s annual state aid monitoring exercise only partially covers ports 
since it is limited to aid schemes rather than individual aid notifications57.56 These investigations 
concerned the assessment of 
the annual investments made 
using public funds in the 
accounts of two German 
ports, Hamburg and Bremen, 
and one case in Belgium.
57 Council Regulation (EU) 
2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 
laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Article 108 
of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European 
Union (OJ L 248, 24.9.2015).
55 Observations 
91 
Given the significant number of key ports (329) and the large amount of public 
funding invested in these ports, we consider the current number of aid notifica -
tions to be unrealistically low. We also noted the absence of such aid notifications 
during several of our financial and compliance audits of ERDF/CF- funded projects 
in ports. For example, our 2012 Annual Report identified a lack of notifications 
in relation to ERDF support for the construction of facilities in the ports of Patras 
(Greece) and Rostock (Germany)58.
Need for additional Commission guidance
92 
During the audit, a number of stakeholders (i.e. port authorities, port operators, 
ship owners and logistics companies) indicated that Commission guidelines 
on state aid to ports were needed in order to clarify which investments came 
under the definition of state aid, and which investments needed to be reported. 
However, despite having already been announced several times by the Commis -
sion, there are currently no state aid guidelines for investments in the seaports 
sector59. The Commission has included the task of issuing such guidelines in its 
actions for 2014-201960.
Commission’s monitoring of Member States’ customs control 
practices does not cover key information
Member States’ customs control practices in ports are a major 
aspect of a port’s attractiveness
93 
We also assessed whether differences in the organisation, quality and speed of 
customs control resulted in some ports being more ’attractive’ than others for 
global shipping lines. We noted that the EU’s customs legislation provides for the 
possibility of local clearance procedures and simplifications for processing goods 
upon arrival and before admission for free circulation, for example:
— carrying out a risk analysis before the arrival of goods (or before their load -
ing), primarily for security and safety risks, based on the entry summary 
declaration. This should be complemented, for the same consignments, by 
another layer of risk analysis, primarily for financial risks, based on the cus -
toms declarations;
— collecting information on additional requirements related to the goods in 
advance (e.g. certificates); and58 ECA, Annual Report 
concerning the financial year 
2012, box 5.4 (OJ C 331, 
14.11. 2013).
59 Not to be confused with 
maritime state aid guidelines, 
which deal with tonnage tax 
systems and seafarer -related 
measures. Source:  C(2004) 43 
— Community guidelines on 
State aid to maritime transport 
(OJ C 13, 17.1.2004, p. 3).
60 European Commission: 
Chapter 2: Single European 
transport Area — point 2.5 
Internal market, Seaports, 
paragraph 3.3.
56 Observations 
— speeding up the release of the cargo after arrival and the final confirmation 
that the goods match the declaration lodged before arriving.
94 
All customs controls are based on Article 13 of the Customs Code, which provides 
that each Member State may carry out all checks they deem necessary. Customs 
inspections are based on risk analysis. The customs authority can decide to use 
simplified procedures, under certain conditions and after assessing the opera -
tor’s reliability. In 2014, the EU adopted a common risk management system 
for customs61, but the Commission has not yet put in place a risk management 
system for Member State customs authorities: a detailed roadmap should lead to 
implementation by 2020.
95 
Each customs authority had its own arrangements. Moreover, there were dif -
ferent ways of simplifying procedures and differences in the speed, quality and 
impact of customs control procedures. This made some ports more attractive 
than others for global shipping lines. For example, several Member States such 
as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands the UK, Finland or Sweden were system -
atically waiving the obligation to notify customs authorities of the arrival of the 
goods, or of the intention to release them. However, this should be done only on 
a case -by-case basis, after a thorough risk analysis. Doing so means that customs 
authorities cannot carry out risk -based checks62.
96 
In a previous audit, we also found evidence of differences in customs control 
practices, resulting in goods being delivered to their final destination via an unu -
sual route: goods were being unloaded in Hamburg (Germany) and transported 
to Rotterdam (the Netherlands), where they were cleared for free circulation and 
transported to their final destination in Poland63. In other words, the import -
ers were seeking clearance in a Member State other than the one importing the 
goods, either to reduce the likelihood of being subject to checks or to complicate 
any potential recovery procedure.
97 
The Commission’s own resources inspection at the customs office of the port of 
Rotterdam in 2013 found that checks of the correctness of the EU status were car -
ried out only at random, and that, in some cases, customs supervision was being 
terminated without verifying all information. Of the 200 bills of lading received 
daily, only 15 to 20 were subject to normal customs declarations, and in the case 
of local clearance procedures for warehousing or free circulation, there were 
no checks, electronic or otherwise, to ensure that the summary declaration for 
temporary storage was consistent with the subsequent declaration for a customs 
procedure before terminating customs supervision.61 COM(2014) 527 final of 
21 August 2014 on the EU 
Strategy and Action Plan for 
customs risk management: 
Tackling risks, strengthening 
supply chain security and 
facilitating trade.
62 European Commission’s 
thematic report of the 
inspections carried out in 
Member States in 2011 on the 
Local Clearance Procedure.
63 Annual Report concerning the 
financial year 2013, box 2.1 last 
case indicated (OJ C 398, 
12.11.2014).
57 Observations 
98 
We also assessed data available within the Commission from own resources 
inspections on ex post  clearance checks, and compared data for the Netherlands 
with data for neighbouring and other countries. This indicated that the number 
of customs staff involved in ex post  clearance checks in the Netherlands is signifi -
cantly lower than in other EU Member States, and their numbers have decreased 
in recent years (from 164 full -time equivalents (FTE) in 2007 to 141 FTE in 2013). To 
compare this with the data for some main port countries’ customs organisations: 
Belgium has twice the number of customs staff involved in ex post  clearance 
(292 FTE); Germany has 50 times as many customs officers conducting ex post  
clearance checks (7 222 FTE); the UK has 1 033 customs staff conducting ex post  
checks, Poland has 794, France 491 and Spain 41364.
Weaknesses in Commission’s monitoring of Member States’ 
customs control practices
99 
While the Customs Code provides a framework for all authorities to decide 
whether or not to simplify their practices, customs procedures in the EU must be 
uniformly implemented. In other words, the lack of a single EU customs authority 
should not result in economic operators being treated differently. Although there 
is a high risk of distortion, there is no system in place for monitoring possible dif -
ferences. For example, our audit showed that:
— Member States are not required to provide information on the number of 
specific customs checks to the Commission at individual core port level. Such 
information is however essential in order to identify differences in how cus -
toms authorities treat economic operators;
— a ‘Customs 2013’ programme had been launched, which included action to 
harmonise or streamline customs control practices. The Commission’s ex post 
evaluation65 indicated that, although progress had been made towards 
realising the key programme objective of having all customs authorities act 
in unison, there remained considerable diversity in the execution of import 
processes in the EU, while each Member State still had its own automated 
import system;
— there are good practices regarding the assessment of controls which could be 
shared: for example, the port authority of Santa Cruz de Tenerife built within 
its port zone a dedicated building to regroup all inspection bodies (customs, 
phytosanitary, veterinary and health border inspection control bodies). This 
means that only one single integrated inspection is done, which makes it 
possible to measure the time needed for the inspection, and improves the 
quality and speed of inspections over time.64 Analysis of the Commission’s 
own resources inspections 
pursuant to Article 18 of 
Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 1150/2000 of 
22 May 2000 implementing 
Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom 
on the system of the 
Communities’ own resources 
(OJ L 130, 31.5.2000, p. 1) and 
Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 1026/1999 of 
10 May 1999 determining the 
powers and obligations of 
agents authorised by the 
Commission to carry out 
controls and inspections of 
the Communities’ own 
resources (OJ L 126, 20.5.1999, 
p. 1), and of the Member 
States’ activity reports on 
traditional own resources 
(2013).
65 Final evaluation of the 
Customs 2013 Programme 
— Final Report (see http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/resources/
documents/common/
publications/studies/
customs_2013_final_
evaluation_report.pdf).
58 Observations 
Blue Belt, or how maritime transport is at a disadvantage 
against road transport
100  
Under the current conditions, road transport is still the dominant way to send 
freight from one point to another in the EU, as it has the advantages of flexibility, 
low cost and smooth, quick door -to-door delivery. Intra -EU maritime transport 
will only become competitive if it is made quicker and more reliable. One of the 
main problems facing maritime transport is the fact that the internal market is 
still not fully realised in the maritime sector. Vessels leaving the territorial waters 
of a Member State (12-nautical -mile zone) are considered to be outside the EU 
customs territory and have to go through customs formalities upon arriving in 
the next EU port, even if they only carry EU goods and have not called at a third 
country port. By comparison, a truck driving from Tallinn (Estonia) to Lisbon 
(Portugal) can cross the EU without fulfilling any additional formalities at intra -EU 
borders.
101  
The lack of a level playing field between maritime transport and other transport 
modes has been apparent since the opening of the internal borders in 1992. 
In 1995, the Commission indicated66 that not all transport modes were treated 
equally and that maritime transport was disadvantaged. Despite the importance 
of this issue, progress has been particularly slow:
— Based on a ‘Blue Belt’ action plan aimed at creating a ‘European maritime 
space without barriers’ for shipping, a new scheme entered into force in 
March 2014, facilitating intra -Union shipping through quicker registration 
and the possibility of waiving customs checks67 for ‘regular shipping services’ 
(RSS) which have to be pre -authorised by the customs authorities. However, 
only 10 to 15 % of vessels can use the RSS, and all others must still undergo 
full customs formalities;
— Directive 2010/65/EU on maritime transport reporting formalities (an ‘e -Mari -
time initiative’) promoting the use of information technologies in the mari -
time transport sector was adopted to simplify and harmonise the administra -
tive procedures applied to maritime transport. Work to simplify the electronic 
reporting of goods on board vessels is ongoing, but this work relates only to 
creating a ‘national single window’ for reporting. This means that all Member 
States will keep their national systems for reporting, while a single EU win -
dow for reporting formalities is yet to be put in place. In parallel, electronic 
customs systems are being developed during a transitional period lasting 
until 2020, in order to gradually adapt to the new modernised Union Customs 
Code requirements. This means that almost three decades after the problem 
first became apparent, the issue will still not have been resolved.66 COM(95) 317 final of 
5 July 1995 ’The Development 
of Short Sea Shipping in 
Europe: Prospects and 
Challenges’.
67 This entails shortening the 
consultation period between 
Member States from 45 days 
at present to 15 days, and 
making it possible to extend 
the scheme to future port calls 
in a quicker and more 
straightforward manner.
59
 Conclusions and 
recommendations
102  
Our audit of the Commission’s and Member States’ strategies on EU maritime 
freight transport and of the value for money delivered by EU -funded investments 
in ports, in which we examined 37 new projects and five reassessed projects, 
points to significant problems. Overall, we found that:
— The long -term port development strategies put in place by the Member 
States and the Commission did not provide a robust and coherent basis for 
planning the capacity needed in EU ports and for identifying the EU and 
national public funding required for port infrastructures;
— Funding in similar port infrastructures and superstructures in neighbouring 
ports has led to ineffective and unsustainable investments: based on the 30 
of 37 projects examined and already completed between 2000 and 2013, one 
in every three euros (corresponding to 194 million euros for 12 projects) has 
been spent ineffectively so far. Around half of this funding (97 million euros 
of EU funding for nine projects) was invested in infrastructures which were 
not used or were heavily underused for more than 3 years after the works 
ended. This highlights shortcomings in the ex ante  needs assessment and 
indicates a high risk of the amounts invested being wasted;
— This observation also applies to the five reassessed ports already examined 
in 2010. This reassessment did indicate poor value for money overall: the use 
of the EU -funded capacity for these ports was still inadequate after almost 
a decade of operations. The port areas in four ports were still at a very low 
level or empty. Overall, 292 million euros of the investments was considered 
to have been spent ineffectively;
— Cost overruns and delays are further illustrations of inefficiencies in the 
examined investments in port infrastructures. Overall, the EU -funded pro -
jects examined had cost overruns of 139 million euros. Moreover, 19 of the 30 
completed projects faced delays, out of which 12 were delayed by more than 
20 % of the planned project duration. Relative to the initially planned dur-  
ation, the delays were of up to 136 %. Of the seven projects (corresponding to 
524 million euros of EU funding) not yet completed at the time of the audit, 
six were also delayed;
— Many missing and inadequate links to hinterlands, such as missing road and 
rail connections, will need further public funding to make the initial port 
investments work properly;
— Both the internal coordination within the Commission and the procedure in 
place between the EIB and the Commission to assess proposed EIB loans for 
port infrastructures have not been functioning properly as the EIB does not 
share all relevant information with the Commission. Moreover, for some loan 
proposals, critical problems were highlighted internally within the Commis -
sion services, but not signalled to the EIB in the form of a negative opinion by 
the Commission; and
60 Conclusions and recommendations 
— The Commission did not take the necessary actions in the area of state aid 
and customs procedures to enable ports to compete on a level playing field. 
The Commission’s state aid control could have been more proactive and 
more effective by monitoring ex post whether the conditions under which 
earlier decisions (e.g. for concessions) were taken, remained unchanged or by 
refusing support to user -specific superstructures.
For example, projects which included superstructures used by private operators 
had been co -financed with around 92.5 million euros from the EU budget.
Long‑term port development strategies at Member State and 
Commission level should focus on creating the necessary links to 
the network
103  
All five Member States visited (Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, Sweden) had put in 
place long -term port development strategies by 2015, due in part to the intro -
duction of an ex ante  conditionality for EU funding. Weaknesses were found in 
how collaboration between ports was explored, in terms of synergies between 
ports and the potential for specialisation, and in how these strategies were trans -
lated into timely and well -coordinated port investment.
104  
At EU level, the Commission’s strategy on ports has developed over time, but 
robust information on capacity planning is still lacking. Moreover, there are too 
many ‘core ports’ (104 in total, to which the majority of the EU funding is to be 
allocated). This prevents EU funding from targeting the most important ports. On 
the other hand, some important waterways in need of funding are not included 
in the Commission’s strategy.
105  
Moreover, the Commission has little information about the actual situation of 
these core ports: in particular, the Commission does not receive data on their 
available capacity, the capacity they are actually using or their future capac -
ity needs, nor on the Member States’ public investments in these ports. In the 
absence of such monitoring information, there is no EU -wide overview to pro -
vide the basis for better coordination of the core ports’ capacity planning. The 
Commission’s lack of robust information on available port capacity, together with 
overestimated future traffic growth has contributed to the overestimation of the 
additional port capacity needed within the EU, at least for certain regions (see 
paragraphs 31 to 49).
61 Conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendation 1
We recommend that the Commission should:
(a) put in place a monitoring of core port capacity, taking account of the Mem -
ber States’ plans for implementing their long -term strategies;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(b) revise the current number of 104 ‘core ports’ which are necessary to maintain 
an adequate level of accessibility for the EU as a whole;
Target implementation date: by 2023.
(c) set out an EU -wide port development plan for core ports and maritime wa -
terways and canals;
Target implementation date: by 2020.
EU‑funded investments in port infrastructures should become 
more effective and efficient
106  
Investments in port infrastructures need some time to show results and, by their 
very nature, port projects are about building capacity for the long -term future. 
The timeliness of investments is often crucial to their effectiveness, particularly in 
a very competitive environment such as maritime transport. Many projects exam -
ined were unused (empty) or heavily underused at the time of the audit. Based 
on the examined and already completed 30 projects between 2000 and 2013, 
one in every three euros (corresponding to 194 million euros for 12 projects) has 
been spent ineffectively so far. Around half of this funding (97 million euros of EU 
funding for nine projects) was invested in infrastructures which were not used or 
were heavily underused for more than 3 years after the works ended. This high -
lights shortcomings in the ex ante  needs assessment and indicates high risk of the 
amounts invested being wasted.
62 Conclusions and recommendations 
107  
As in our previous special report on seaports, we found a significant number of 
projects being delayed, due in part to cumbersome administrative procedures. 
The average delay was almost 13 months, with delays varying between 3 months 
and 33 months. Relative to the initially planned duration, the delays were of up to 
136 %. We also observed cost overruns of 139 million euros, or 8.7 million euros 
on average (without the projects that had not yet been completed). In addition, 
there were many missing and inadequate links to hinterlands (i.e. roads and rail -
ways) which will need further public funding to make the initial port investments 
work properly.
108  
The reassessment of the five projects examined in 2010 indicated poor value for 
money overall: the use of the EU -funded capacity for these ports was still inad -
equate after almost a decade of operations. The port areas in four ports were 
still at a very low level or empty, while another one did not have any operations. 
Overall, 292 million euros of the investments (around 89 % of 329 million euros in 
total) was considered to have been spent ineffectively.
109  
Many port authorities across Europe invested simultaneously (and plan to further 
invest) in similar port infrastructure and superstructures to improve their com -
petitive situation. This entails significant risks to the projects’ effectiveness and 
sustainability.
110  
Both the internal coordination within the Commission and the procedure in 
place between the EIB and the Commission to assess proposed EIB loans for port 
infrastructure have not been functioning properly as the EIB does not share all 
relevant information with the Commission. Moreover, for some loan proposals, 
critical problems were highlighted internally within the Commission, but not 
signalled to the EIB in the form of a negative opinion by the Commission (see 
paragraphs 50 to 81).
63 Conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendation 2
We recommend that the Commission should:
(a) work with the Member States to reduce administrative burden and delays in 
project selection and implementation by promoting the principle of a nation -
al ‘one -stop-shop’ for the issuing, or refusal, of all permits and authorisations 
for port infrastructure -related investments. Moreover, a ‘tacit agreement’ 
principle (e.g. of 2 years) should be implemented as soon as possible;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(b) strictly apply the ESIF Common Provisions Regulation and the CEF Regulation 
on financial corrections due to underperforming investments for the 2014-
2020 period;
Target implementation date: immediately.
(c) assess the possibility of excluding EU funding for port infrastructure for 
container transhipment and storage (e.g. construction of quays, docks and 
storage capacities) during the 2014-2020 period. In addition, superstructures 
which are not within the public remit should be excluded from EU funding, as 
these should be considered a commercial environment;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2018.
Recommendation 3
We recommend that the Commission and the Member States should:
(a) prioritise EU co -financing from both CEF and ESIF spending to core ports to 
improve their connections to their hinterlands;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2016.
(b) fund port infrastructures other than connections to hinterlands only on the 
condition that there is a clearly established need, where EU added value is 
demonstrated and where there is a sufficiently large private investment com -
ponent secured in the overall investment envelope;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2016.
64 Conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendation 4
We recommend that the Commission should:
(a) ensure that all necessary loan information on proposed EIB loans is shared 
between the EIB and the Commission to facilitate robust assessments;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(b) internally clarify, and consistently implement, the procedure for determining 
whether critical remarks should lead to a negative opinion on a proposed EIB 
loan;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2016.
State aid rules and customs controls: more needs to be done to 
ensure a level playing field
111 
Different interpretation of state aid rules in the port sector, and differences in 
how the Union’s customs procedures are applied can contribute to a market dis -
tortion and undermine fair competition between ports. In both areas, the Com -
mission has not yet taken sufficient action to create a level playing field between 
ports.
112  
The Commission has examined potential state aid to ports only sporadically since 
2010, despite significant public spending by Member States on port infrastruc -
ture. Moreover, seaport -specific state aid guidelines have not been presented yet 
despite being promised years ago.
113  
Our audit indicated that differences in customs controls can affect a port’s com -
petitiveness, and that the Commission’s monitoring of customs control practices 
between ports in the different Member States is inadequate for the purpose of 
detecting practices which may create unfair competitive advantages.
65 Conclusions and recommendations 
114  
Moreover, customs rules penalise intra -EU maritime transport, as vessels leaving 
the territorial waters of a Member State have to go through customs formalities 
upon arrival in the next EU port, even if they are only carrying EU goods and have 
not called at a third -country port (see paragraphs 82 to 101).
Recommendation 5
We recommend that the Commission should:
(a) issue state aid guidelines for seaports;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(b) ensure consistency in the treatment of user -specific port superstructures;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(c) increase the number of desk -based state aid investigations on ports and its 
follow -up of earlier state aid decisions to ensure that the conditions present 
at the outset remain;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
Recommendation 6
We recommend that Member States should systematically notify the Commission 
of all public financial support to ports in accordance with EU state aid rules;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
66 Conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendation 7
We recommend that the Commission should:
(a) ask Member States to periodically provide specific information on the type 
and number of specific customs procedures at individual core ports in order 
to assess whether ports are being treated equally;
Target implementation date: by the end of 2017.
(b) improve the competitive position of maritime transport compared to other 
transport modes by further simplifying maritime transport and custom for -
malities, in particular by moving towards an EU maritime ‘single window’;
Target implementation date: by end of 2017.
This report was adopted by Chamber II, headed by Mr Henri GRETHEN, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 20 July 2016.
 For the Court of Auditors
 Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
 President
67
 Annexes
Spending of EU funds for maritime transport projects 2000 ‑2013 period
Spain 2 610 322 428 38.51 %
Italy 837 719 751 12.36 %
Greece 588 742 943 8.69 %
Poland1564 232 876 8.33 %
France 341 726  711 5.04 %
Portugal 314 324 344 4.64 %
Latvia 173 729  139 2.56 %
Germany 143 786 488 2.12 %
The Netherlands 91 333  779 1.35 %
Romania 83 148 025 1.23 %
Estonia 80 303 497 1.18 %
United Kingdom 78 033 155 1.15 %
Lithuania 54 675 005 0.81 %
Belgium 52 685 257 0.78 %
Malta 46 945 423 0.69 %
Sweden 38 982 443 0.58 %
Austria226 910 589 0.40 %
Cyprus 22 085 473 0.33 %
Slovenia 13 330 356 0.20 %
Hungary212 275 556 0.18 %
Finland 6 515 269 0.10 %
Czech Republic24 203 737 0.06 %
Ireland 1 842 000 0.03 %
Bulgaria 1 200  000 0.02 %
Cross-border projects 109 561 318 1.62 %
Interreg 24 290 310 0.36 %
Other EU projects 454 519 870 6.71 %
Total 6 777 425 742 100.00  %
1 Refers only to Programming Period 2007-2013.
2 While these countries do not have seaports, they reported ERDF/CF infrastructure expenditure for ports, probably by mistake. Annex I
68
Annexes
Spain: 38.51 %
Italy: 12.36 % Greece: 8.69 %Poland (only OP 2007-13): 8.33 %United Kingdom: 1.15 %Sweden: 0.58 %
Malta: 0.69 %Belgium: 0.78 %Lithuania: 0.81 %
Estonia: 1.18 %
Romania: 1.23 %The Netherlands: 1.35 %
Germany: 2.12 %
Latvia: 2.56 %
Portugal: 4.64 %
France: 5.04 %Other: 10.27 %Annex I
69
Annexes
Overview of projects examined per Member StateAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMem -
ber 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1Output 
completed 
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed 
and  
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
Newly audited projects
1
GermanyCuxhaven Herstellung Offshore 
Basishafen Cuxhaven 
Liegeplatz 831 945 019 15 942 509Construction of a new 
port quay15 942 509 X 7 971 255
2Östliche Erweitung 
Offshore Basis Cuxhaven 
Liegeplatz 941 436 573 18 800 000Construction of a new 
port quay18 800 000 X 18 800 000
3Offshore Basis Cuxhaven 
Errichtung der Hafensohle 
Liegeplatz 83 400 649 1 250 000Construction of 
a port quay bottom 
accomodation for 
‘jack-up’-vessels1 250 000 X 1 250 000
4
Wilhelms-
haven Sanierung ‘Alter Vorhafen’ 
Wilhelmshaven2 175 813 761 534Rehabilitation of 
a quay-wall761 534 X 761 354
5Ertüchtigung der 
Niedersachsenbrücke16 456 421 6 704 346Construction to 
increase port capacity6 704 346 X
6Großprojekt 
‘Jade-Weser-Port’ 146 856 096 32 930 149Construction of 
a new port area and 
container terminal32 930 149 X 26 344 119
7
Hafen 
Brake Norderweiterung Hafen 
Brake - Sandaufspülung 
und Errichtung Kaianlage 24 600 000 8 610 000Extension of port area 
and construction of 
a new quay.8 610 000 X
8Norderweiterung Hafen 
Brake - 
2. Ausbaustufe)14 803 596 5 924 021Extension of port area 
and construction of 
a new quay.5 924 021 X
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
70
AnnexesNo of 
pro -
jectsMem-
ber StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed 
and  
used as 
planned1Output 
completed 
and  
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
9
ItalySalernoLogistica e porti. Sis -
tema integrato portuale 
Salerno73 000 000 53 262 2971) Expanding port en -
trance (imboccatura)
2) Stabilising the dock
3) Dredging26 631 149 26 631 149 X
10Collegamenti ferroviari 
e stradali. Sistema dei 
trasporti Salerno Porta 
Ovest. 1st lot146 600 000 115 245 000Road and rail connec -
tions to the port
115 245 000X
11Collegamenti ferroviari 
e stradali. Sistema dei 
trasporti Salerno Porta 
Ovest. 2nd lotRoad and rail connec -
tions to the portX
12
TarantoCollegamento ferroviario 
del complesso del porto 
di Taranto con la rete 
nazionale25 500 000 1 875 000Rail connection to 
the port 1 875 000 X
13Dragaggio e cassa di 
colmata83 000 000 15 000 000Dredging and deep -
ening the sea bed15 000 000 X
14Terminal area con -
tainer porto di Taranto 
(2000-2006)41 100 000 11 250 000Expanding an existing 
terminal 11 250 000 11 250 000Annex II
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
71
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMem -
ber 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output  
completed  
and  
used as 
planned1Output 
completed 
and  
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
15
PolandGdańskPołączenie Portu 
Lotniczego z Portem 
Morskim Gdańsk - Trasa 
Słowackiego337 572 017 273 634 889Construction of a   
10.4 km long road273 634 889 X
16Modernizacja wejścia 
do portu wewnętrznego 
(w Gdańsku). Etap I - 
przebudowa falochronu 
wschodniego12 550 797 10 644 987Upgrade of an 
existing breakwa -
ter, widening and 
dredging of the entry 
fairway5 322 493.50 5 322 493.50 X
17Modernizacja wejścia do 
portu wewnętrznego (w 
Gdańsku). Etap II - prze -
budowa szlaku wodnego 
na Motławie6 705 529 5 676 090Reconstruction of 
a tourist quay (city 
centre)5 676 090 X
18
GdyniaRozbudowa infrastruk -
tury portowej do obsługi 
statków ro-ro z dostępem 
drogowym i kolejowym 
w Porcie Gdynia29 070 083 10 968 299Upgrade of an infra -
structure needed to 
extend the capacity 
forhandling
ro-ro vessels: ramp, 
road and rail access10 968 299 X 5 484 149
19Przebudowa Kanału Por -
towego w Porcie Gdynia22 129 659 14 691 975Upgrade of the Port 
Channel via dredging14 691 975 X
20Infrastruktura dostępu 
drogowego i kolejowego 
do wschodniej części 
Portu Gdynia27 474 031 17 731 050Reconstruction/
construction of 2.12 
km of roads and 2.85 
km of rails17 731 050 X 17 731 050
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
72
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMember 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed  
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed  
and 
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
21
PolandSzczecin 
- ŚwinoujścieModernizacja toru 
wodnego Świnoujście 
- Szczecin (Kanał 
Piastowski 
i Mieliński) - etap II, 
strona wschodnia 
i zachodnia77 825 375 65 264 553Reconstruction of the 
fairway between the 
two ports65 264 553 X
22Modernizacja 
dostępu drogowego 
do Portu w Szczecinie28 534 045 23 002 547Reconstruction of 
a section of a Street 
to connect the port23 002 547 X
23Przebudowa 
falochronu wschod -
niego w Świnoujściu 10 318 058 8 422 871Reconstruction of 
1.47km of breakwater8 422 871 X
24
SwedenNorrköping2008-SE-92606-P 
(Norrköping inter -
modal infrastructure 
package improve -
ment of access 
fairway) 35 300 000 3 528 000Widening and deep -
ening of the access 
fairway3 528 000 X
25 Karlskrona2009-EU-21010-P‘ 
(Motorways 
of the Seas-
project: Baltic Link 
Gdynia-Karlskrona85 400 000 17 090 800Infrastructure 
works to connect 
the two ports to 
create a seamless 
intermodal rail and 
sea transport chain17 090 800 X 17 090 800
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
73
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMember 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed  
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed  
and 
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
26
SpainCartagenaAmpliación Dársena de 
Escombreras. Fase 1116 492 375 46 035 682Construction of a new 
breakwater and 
a new basin46 035 682 X
27Terminal Polivalente de 
Graneles34 454 637 19 275 477Construction of a 575 
metre long dock and 
an adjacent area of 
4.5 ha19 275 477 X
28Relleno y Urbanizacion 
Terminal Polivalente28 314 601 10 440 783Land filling of 
a storage area of ap -
proximately 20 ha10 440 783 X 10 440 783
29
AlgecirasInfraestructuras 
Portuarias Y Auxiliares 
En Isla Verde (3ª Fase) En 
Algeciras511 460 000 127 314 481Creation of 125 ha 
of new land areas 
reclaimed from the 
sea127 314 481 X 73 842 399
30Muelle Y Explanada 
Exterior Al Dique, Junto 
A Isla Verde168 576 557 52 199 106Construction of a new 
dock.52 199 106 X
31Terminal Pública de Con -
tenedores TTI Algeciras168 950 665 22 226 148Acquisition of 
superstructures for 
a container terminal22 226 148 X
32
VigoMejora De La Op -
eratividad De Los Muelles 
Comerciales (1ª Fase)48 249 668 27 973 501Enlarging the existing 
docks to the east and 
to the north27 973 501 X
33Almacenamiento 
De Coches En Altura 
En La Terminal De 
Transbordadores20 054 823 15 143 049Construction of a silo 
for the storage of 
vehicles at the RO-RO 
terminal.15 143 049 X
34Ampliación Del Puesto 
De Inspección Fronteriza 
Arenal2 188 957 750 884Construction of a new 
building for the 
sanitary inspection 
of goods 750 884 X
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
74
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMember 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed  
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed  
and 
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
35
SpainSC 
TenerifeNva. Base de Contene -
dores en la Dársena del 
Este del Pto. SC. Tenerife17 770 802 7 860 602Construction to 
increase the capacity 
of the container ter -
minals and improving 
the operability.7 860 602 X
36Nueva Base De Contene -
dores En La Dársena Del 
Este, 2ª Fase15 605 808 6 387 113Construction to 
increase the capacity 
of the container ter -
minals and improving 
the operability.6 387 113 X
37Tramo 1º Fase2ª Def. 
rellenos D. Este: quiebro 
1º y 2ª alineación Espigón 
Cueva Bermeja5 673 967 2 809 113Construction of new 
land area adjacent to 
the existing break -
water, to support 
operations on the 
dock for liquid and 
dry bulk.2 809 113 X 2 809 113
sum 1 (excluding re-audit 
projects)2 461 546 621 1 076 626 856Total of the newly 
audited projects per 
category:447 553 574 599 658 626 29 414 656 7 18 12 193 775 022
Grand total of the 
newly audited 
projects:1 076 626 856
Grand total of the 
newly audited pro -
jects in % of total:41.57 55.70 2.73
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
75
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMem -
ber 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed  
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed  
and 
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
Re-audited projects
38 Italy Augusta Port of Augusta 15 493 707 3 839 328Construction of 
buildings, quays, 
RO-RO berths, 
pavements, barriers, 
external systems for 
the completion of the 
commercial port of 
Augusta. 1 919 664 1 919 664 X 3 839 328
39
SpainCampa -
mento San 
Roque Infrastructuras portuarias 
en las instalaciones de 
Campamento, San Roque37 688 436 16 582 912Rehabilitation of 
a quay and the con -
struction of 33.2 ha 
of terminal space, of 
which 17.6 ha newly 
created16 582 912 X 16 582 912
40Punta Lan -
gosteira (La 
Coruña)Nuevas instalaciones 
portuarias en Punta 
Langosteira (La Coruña) 
- 1a Fase’ – Beneficiary: 
Autoridad Portuaria de 
A Coruña590 172 648 257 539 720Construction of an 
outside port neigh -
bouring the existing 
port257 539 720 X 244 662 734
41 FerrolAmpliación del Puerto de 
Ferrol (puerto exterior)‘ 
- Beneficiary: Autoridad 
Portuaria de Ferrol – San 
Cibrao (‘re-audit’)110 860 209 39 065 500Construction of an 
outer port comple -
menting the existing 
port39 065 500 X 35 158 950
42Arinaga - 
Las PalmasPuerto de Arinaga – 
Muelle de Agüimes 1ª fase 
A‘ Beneficiary: Autoridad 
Portuaria de Las Palmas23 480 152 11 750 152Construction of a new 
port to decongest Las 
Palmas11 750 152 X 10 692 638
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
76
AnnexesAnnex II
No of 
pro -
jectsMember 
StatePort Project examinedProject 
costs in 
eurosEU-funding 
in eurosProject contents CapacityConnec -
tionOthersUncom -
pleted 
output1 Output 
completed  
and 
used as 
planned1Output 
completed  
and 
unused 
or heavily 
underused% of amount 
of unused 
or heavily 
underused 
EU funding 
spent or to 
be spent2
sum 2 (only 
re-audit-projects)777 695 152 328 777 612Total of the re-
audited projects per 
category:326 857 948 1 919 664 0 0 5 310 936 562
sum 3 (Re-audit + 
audited projects)3 239 241 773 1 405 404 468Total of all audited 
projects per category:774 411 522 601 578 290 29 414 656 7 18 17
Grand total of all 
audited projects:1 405 404 468
Grand total of all 
audited projects in % 
of total:55.10 42.80 2.09
Infrastructure 
related to increasing 
the potential for 
transhipment:943 805 903
1 Finding at the time of the audit visit.
2 Only for the completed projects.
77 Annexes Annex IIIOverview of non ‑completed projects
Member 
StatePort 
concernedNon-completed projectWhen was the project 
expected to end (initial 
date in the contract)?How important is the 
delay compared to the 
initial set target (in 
months, as known now)?EU-amount concerned
(euros)
ItalySalernoLogistics and ports. Inte -
grated port Salerno 31.12.2015 13 months 53 262 297
Road and rail connections 
of the port of Salerno West 
Gate, 1st lot30.6.2014 Minimum 36 months 115 245 000Road and rail connections 
of the port of Salerno West 
Gate, 2nd lot
TarantoRail connection of the port 
of Taranto to the national rail 
network 31.12.2015 Minimum 24 months 1 875 000
Dredging and reclaiming 
of land31.12.2014 Minimum 26 months 15 000 000
PolandGdańskPołączenie Portu Lotniczego 
z Portem Morskim Gdańsk - 
Trasa Słowackiego 30.9.2015 Minimum 16 months 273 634 889
Szczecin 
- ŚwinoujścieModernisation of the fairway 
Świnoujście - Szczecin (Kanał 
Piastowski i Mieliński) - 
phase II, from east to west 30.9.2015 No delay 65 264 553
Total minimum delay in 
months already known at 
time of the audit: 115524 281 739
78 Annexes Annex IV
Administrativeboundaries :©EuroGeographic s©EEA Cartography: Euros tat-GISCO, 04/2016Helgoland: EU: 11.3
Norddeich:
EU: 1.6
Emden:
EU: 1.2Wilhelmshaven:
EU: 40.4
EIB: 325Bensersiel:
EU: 0.2Bremerhaven:EU: 20.8EIB: 375.5
Brake:
EU: 22.5Kreis Nordfriesland: EU: 0.3
Hooge: EU: 0.8
Rendsburg:
EU: 1.2
Cuxhaven: EU: 37.6Sassnitz: EU: 19
Lubmin: EU: 34.3Stadt Barth:
EU: 2
Stralsund:
EU: 20.8 Rostock:
EU: 88.2Wismar:EU: 23.7Lübeck:EU: 22.7Kiel: EU: 6.5
Stade-Bütz/f_leth:
EU: 4.2Hamburg:
EU: 6.3
EIB: 225Flensburg: EU: 0.7
0 100 kmAmrum: EU: 0.3Main characteristics of Member States’ port systems, and overview of EU and EIB 
support for the audited port areas (2000 ‑2013 period) 1
1. Germany
Germany has about 21 seaports and about 250 inland ports. There is a division of responsibilities between 
Federal Government, the Federal States (Länder) and local authorities and other main port stakeholders (e.g. in -
dustry, trade unions) which makes it difficult to identify common goals and strategies. The Federal Government 
is essentially responsible for establishing the regulatory transport framework plan and providing infrastructure 
links to and from seaports and inland ports (hinterland-connection), whereas the Federal States (and local 
authorities) are mainly responsible for the port infrastructure and industry and trade unions ensure port opera -
tions. The following main investments (structural funds) have been identified:
1 Source:  ECA compilation of Commission data and EIB publicly available data (website).million euros
79 Annexes Annex IV2. Spain
Spain has one of the longest coastlines in Europe (8 000 km). Its geographical location, being closest to the 
axis of one of the world’s major maritime routes, also strengthens its position as a strategic area in interna -
tional shipping and a logistics platform in southern Europe. The State-owned Spanish Port System includes 46 
ports of general interest, managed by 28 Port Authorities, whose investments; coordination and efficiency are 
monitored and managed by a government agency Puertos del Estado, a body depending on the Ministry of 
Public Works which is responsible for implementing the government’s port policy. Spain is the country that has 
invested most of the EU-money in its ports (almost 40 % of the entire EU amount). The following main invest -
ments were noted:
Mahón: EU: 10.5Other ﬁnancing in various posts:
Accessability ports infrastructure: EIB: 105
Spanish state ports FL: EIB: 50
Administrativeboundaries :©EuroGeographic s©EEA Cartography: Euros tat-GISCO, 04/2016Palma de Mallorca: 
EU: 14.5
0 150 km0100 kmSanta Cruz de Teneriﬀe: EU: 114Canarias
Las Palmas: EU: 169EIB: 80
Gobierno de Canarias: EU: 64.8
Melilla: EU: 34.5 mio €Ceuta: EU: 16Malaga:EU: 34.6
Tangier: EIB: 240Algeciras: EU: 247.9, EIB: 128.9Motril: EU: 22.7Almeria: EU: 41.4Sevilla: EU: 67.3, EIB: 100Junta de Andalucia: EU: 37.3
Huelva: EU: 32.7
Cadiz: EU: 76.3, EIB: 60Sines: EU: 0.8
Cartagena: EU: 89Alicante: EU: 40.5Valencia: 
EU: 159.4, EIB: 548.5Sagunto: EIB: 45Castellon: EU: 53Tarragona: EU: 22.6, EIB: 60Barcelona: EU: 278.6, EIB: 640Gobierno Vasco: EU: 5.6
Bilbao: EU: 38.5, EIB: 187
Santander: EU: 9.6
Vigo: EU: 56.7Ferrol: EU: 68
Gijon: EU: 264, EIB: 250
Aviles: EU: 50.9Principado de Asturias: EU: 29.4
Langosteira: EU: 301, EIB: 130
Xunta/portos de Galicia: EU: 14.8Pontevedra: EU: 29.4Villagarcia: EU: 29Pasajes: EU: 7.9million euros
80 Annexes Annex IV3. Italy
The Italian ports system is fragmented. It consists of a multitude of small ports characterised by scale inefficien -
cy and limited market power vis-à-vis global terminal operators. The Italian government has recently adopted 
a new law for port reform, amongst others, to merge ports located close to each other and their port authorities 
to rationalise the ports system, improve coordination, attract additional cargo and investments, and provide 
more financial autonomy. Investments in the Southern part of the country were mainly from the cohesion policy 
funds, whereas the northern part was focusing on both EIB and TEN-T money. The following investments were 
noted.
Administrativeboundaries :©EuroGeographic s©EEA Cartography: Euros tat-GISCO, 04/2016Malta: EU: 4.20 100 kmCatania: EU: 34.1
Augusta: EU: 50.3Messina: EU: 5Gioia Tauro: EU: 61.3Brindisi: EU: 25
Taranto: EU: 29Civitavecchia: EU: 0.6 
Marina di Pisciotta: EU: 0.5Acciaroli: EU: 3.6Salerno: EU: 167.4
Torre del Greco: EU: 0.7Livorno: EU: 0.7Savona: EIB: 109.7 €Genova: 
EU: 12.3EIB: 100Venezia: EU: 6.5
Ravenna: EU: 3.1EIB: 30
NAPA ports cooperation: Rieka, Venezia, Trieste, Koper:EU: 18.4
Procida: EU: 0.4 Napoli: EU: 115.7
Port of Ischia: EU: 0.001Port of Baia/Bacoli: EU: 0.2million euros
81 Annexes Annex IV4. Poland
The 2007 ‘National Strategy on development of Polish ports by 2015’ had the objectives of improving the com -
petitiveness of Polish ports, increasing their contribution to the socioeconomic development of the country and 
strengthening their significance within the international transport network. Three ports were considered key 
for the functioning of the national economy: Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin-Świnoujście. The bulk of the public 
investments therefore are concentrated on these three ports, and their connections to the international corri -
dors, as follows:
Elblag: EU: 7.4 mio € Gdansk: EU: 342.2Gdynia: EU: 80.5
Further investments called:
“Polish sea”: EU: 47.9Szczecin: EU: 163.9Kołobrzeg: EU: 26.9Darlowo: EU: 4.95 
Administrativeboundaries :©EuroGeographic s©EEA Cartography: Euros tat-GISCO, 04/20160 500 kmmillion euros
82 Annexes Annex IV5. Sweden
The Swedish law provides to the central state the management and financial responsibilities for the fairways 
outside, but leading to, the ports, and for the connections to the hinterland whereas the area within the port 
zone is the responsibility of the local or regional authority. Since 2010, there is a global national investment 
plan for infrastructure projects for all transport modes in Sweden. The plan covers the period 2010 to 2021, is 
updated every 4 years, and includes maritime transport, ports and fairways. For port infrastructure investments 
the port authorities, belonging to the local communes, decide and the state has no say in this because of the 
regional and local autonomy; whereas the dues for the fairways, managed by the Swedish Maritime Administra -
tion (SMA), are State responsibility. The following main EU and EIB investments were noted since 2000:
Administrativeboundaries :©EuroGeographic s©EEA Cartography: Euros tat-GISCO, 04/20160 700 km
Lulea: EU: 3.7
Göteborg: 
EU: 5.6EIB: 79
Karlskrona: EU: 17
Malmö: EU: 6.9
Trelleborg: EU: 1.5, EIB: 48Norrköping: EU: 3.5Södertälje: EU: 0.6Lake Malaren: EU: 2.8
Stockholm: EU: 14million euros
83 Annexes Annex VOverview of user ‑specific superstructures co ‑funded with EU funding
Member 
StateBeneficiary Project nameTotal cost in 
eurosEU funding in 
eurosProject scope
PolandGCT GdyniaPhase III of building GCT 
container terminal in Gdynia50 007 971 15 195 631Extension of infrastructure (e.g. track bed for 
gantry cranes, container storage yards and 
purchase of equipment (e.g. gantry cranes, 
terminal tractors, container semi-trailers)
BCT GdyniaModernisation of BCT Termi -
nal in Gdynia49 666 124 13 469 631Extension/reconstruction of infrastructure 
(np. road surface of thoroughfares) and 
purchase of equipment and IT solutions (e.g. 
machines and equipment used in the process 
of container handling)
Gdynia Port 
AuthorityReconstruction of intermodal 
rail terminal in the Port of 
Gdynia24 108 770 9 773 125Extension/reconstruction of infrastructure 
including crane tracks, road system
DCT Gdańsk Phase III of DCT Gdańsk 23 942 459 8 339 326Building infrastructure (e.g. container 
storage yards, modernisation of track beds 
for gantry cranes) and purchase of equip -
ment (e.g. gantry cranes, terminal tractors, 
container semi-trailers)
DCT Gdańsk Phase II of DCT Gdańsk 40 845 816 6 710 647Extension/reconstruction of infrastructure 
(e.g. railway sliding, container storage 
yards) and purchase of equipment (e.g. 
gantry cranes, terminal tractors, container 
semi-trailers)
GCT GdyniaPhase II of building GCT 
container terminal in Gdynia45 660 580 5 251 613Extension/reconstruction of infrastruc -
ture (e.g. warehouses, container storage 
yards, car parks, electrical installation) and 
purchase of equipment (e.g. gantry cranes, 
terminal tractors, container semi-trailers)
DB SzczecinContainer Terminal in the 
Port of Szczecin — stage 
I phase I14 161 270 4 887 595Building infrastructure of the container 
terminal and purchase of equipment (e.g. 
gantry cranes)
BCT GdyniaPurchase of quayside crane to 
increase intermodal volumes 
at BCT Gdynia terminal16 275 975 3 969 750 Purchase of equipment (e.g. gantry cranes)
Gdańsk Port 
AuthorityExpansion of the intermodal 
container terminal at the 
Port of Gdańsk’s Szczecińskie 
Quay6 724 173 2 704 222Reconstruction of container storage and 
handling yards, underground utility installa -
tions and car parks
Spain Port of Algeciras Terminal Publica de Contene -
dores TTI Algeciras168 950 665 22 226 148 Purchase of 8 dock (‘Ship-to-shore’) cranes
Total EU money for 
superstructures:92 527 688
84
AnnexesAnnex VI
State aid 
cases in 
sea portsYear CountrySeaport 
concernedType of good covered, infrastructure (l) and/or 
superstructure (S)Planned 
investment 
costs 
(in euros)Aid intensityAid
(in euros)Decision 
numberBeneficiary
1 2007 Estonia Muuga The Eastern Extension of Muuga Harbour 92 976 699 81 % no aid N 507/06Majandus- ja Kommunikat -
siooniministeerium, Harju 
11; EE-15072 Tallinn
2 2007 Netherlands RotterdamExtension of the port of Rotterdam (Contribution to 
the financing of public infrastructure and stake hold -
ing in the Port Authority of Rotterdam)934 000 000571 million 
euro for public 
infrastructure 
and 500 million 
euro for stake 
holdingno State Aid N60/06Project Mainportontwik -
keling Rotterdam
3 2008 GermanyJade-Wes -
er-Port 
Wilhelms -
havena) design and construction of port infrastructure (370 
million euros); b) design and construction of terminal-
related infrastructure (240.2 million euros); c) design 
and construction of container terminal and related 
buildings960 000 000 no State Aid N 110/08JadeWeserPort Infrastruk -
tur und Beteiligungen 
GmbH 
4 2009 Greece Pireausa) loading and unloading equipment in the Container 
Terminal (Case C 169/08) is excluded from this case; 
b) construction of a jetty pier (C 168/08) (see also SA. 
28876 - allegations)159 768 000 less then 50  % 35 000 000 C21/09 Port Authority of Piraeus
none 2010  nono port 
projectno port project
5 2011 Latvia Ventspilsa) construction of a dry cargo terminal; b) construction 
of berths c) construction of breakwater; d) dredging; 
e) construction of railroads; f) renovation of mooring 
jetties; g) fortification of the coast of the channelUnknown, for 
confidential -
ity reasons 
no figures 
provided62.86 % 31 400 000C39/09 (ex. 
358/09)Ventspils Port Authority
6 2011 Latvia Krievu SalaRelocation of freeport Rigo from the city centre to the 
currently unused port area named Kirevu Sala allow -
ing the expansion of the City of Riga195 380 916 61.10 % 119 387 658 N 44/2010 Riga Freeport Authority
7 2011 Netherlands RotterdamCreation of a multimodal container hub 60 km from 
Rotterdam Sea terminal.46 300 000 17.90 % 8 300 000 SA 32224Ablasserdam container 
transferiumOverview of state aid decisions since 2007
85
AnnexesAnnex VI
State aid 
cases in 
sea portsYear CountrySeaport 
concernedType of good covered, infrastructure (l) and/or 
superstructure (S)Planned 
investment 
costs 
(in euros)Aid intensityAid
(in euros)Decision 
numberBeneficiary
8 2012 Italy Augustaa) expanding existing port (82 000 m2 for Container 
Storage and solid bulk (28.3 million euros); b) in -
stalling two gantry cranes for container handling 
(21.7 million euros) and strenghtening of a part of 
the existing dock (17 million euros); c) construction 
of a new dock and an adjonining yard (45 000m2) 
(25.83 million euros); d) construction of a new dock 
(410 m and 116 000 m2) (52.5 million euros)145 330 000 68.87 % 100 088 771 SA 34940 Port Authority of Augusta
9 2012 Lithuania KlaipedaConstruction of Infrastructure for a new passenger 
and Cargo Ferries Terminal in Klaipeda: a) investments 
in constructions by port authority 27 825 million 
euros; b) investments in cargo warehouses, control 
and inspection point, security related investments by 
private terminal operator (KKIKT) 21 335 million euros) 49 200 000 64  % 17 900 000SA30742  
(N 137/10)Port Authority of Klaipeda 
(SE KSSA) and Klaipedos 
keleiviu ir kroiniu terminals 
(KKIKT)
10 2013 Spain Cadiza) construction of a new container-terminal with 
breakwater access roads (with tunnel) dredging 
(108.4 million euros); b) refurbishment of cruise ship 
station (1 million euros); c) refurbishment of existing 
port facilities (17.53 million euros deducting 8.4 mil -
lion euros for value of surface of 9.8 ha) 118 538 678 50.70 % 60 099 110 SA.36953Port Authority of Baiha de 
Cadiz
11 2013 Greece Pireausa) construction of breakwater and land area; b) net -
works (drainage, optic fibres, electricity-water supply)120 000 000 95 % 113 900 000 SA.35418Pireaeus Port Authority 
S.A. (PPA)
86 Annexes Annex VI
State aid 
cases in 
sea portsYear CountrySeaport 
concernedType of good covered, infrastructure (l) and/or 
superstructure (S)Planned 
investment 
costs 
(in euros)Aid intensityAid
(in euros)Decision 
numberBeneficiary
12 2013 Greece Katakoloa) Extension of windward pier (160 m); b) extension 
of existing quay in front of restaurants (63 m); c) addi -
tional works on existing pier (extension); d) construc -
tion of passenger reception building; e) extension/
renovation old warehouse; f) construction of an open 
air-theatre; g) reconstruction of surrounding areas 
and public spaces; h) construction of port traffic and 
passport-control building12 265 965 91.23  % 11 190 240 SA.35738Pygros Municipal Port Fund 
(PMPF)
13 2013 SpainSanta Cruz 
de Tenerifea) works for sheltering the harbour (protection and 
reinforcement of northern side of th quay and external 
breakwater (128 million euros); b) counter breakwater 
to protect southern side of the quay (27.8 million 
euros); c) commercial areas for storage solid bulk and 
containers (86.8 million euros); d) restauration of the 
nearby natural reserve (phase 1) (0.6 million euros)243 800 000 27.48 % 67 000 000 SA.36223Port of Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife and Ley de Puertos 
del Estado y de la Marina 
Mercante (LEPEYMM)
14 2013 PolandPolish 
ports 
super -
structuresModification of the aid scheme N 546/2008 -  
Investment aid for the development of intermodal 
transport under Infrastructure and Environmental 
Operational Programme (budget increase from 
111 million to approx. 170 million euros) due to the 
substantial need for modernising and investing in in -
termodal infrastructure in Poland. (port infrastructure 
will be especially targeted). a) intermodal transport: 
construction of logistic centres and container termi -
nals, storage and handling facilities, internal roads 
and railways, water supply, electronic equipment; 
b) internal transport network within ports (roads, 
railways, underground passages, parking lots, storage 
yards; telecommunication systems.170 000 00050 % for port and 
intermodal infra -
structure; 30 % 
for information 
and communica -
tion equipmentSA.36485Aid is available to enter -
prises from EU Member 
States who perform or in -
tend to perform intermodal 
transportation operations 
in Poland - such as opera -
tors of container terminals 
and logistics centres - with 
the exclusion of undertak -
ings in financial difficulties 
and undertakings from 
whom the Commission has 
ordered the recovery of aid, 
as long as the aid has not 
been fully recovered.
15 2013 ItalyCapo 
d’OrlandoBreakwater dock, dredging, mooring, touristic 
infrastructure48.71 % 20 020 000 SA.36621
87 Annexes Annex VI
State aid 
cases in 
sea portsYear CountrySeaport 
concernedType of good covered, infrastructure (l) and/or 
superstructure (S)Planned 
investment 
costs 
(in euros)Aid intensityAid
(in euros)Decision 
numberBeneficiary
16 2014 Latvia VentspilsImprovement of soil stability of the embankment of 
the Venta River channel behind berth 2 and 3 - first 
decision6 150 000 38.60 % 3 775 918 SA.38771Port Authority of the Free 
Port of Ventspils
17 2014 Greece Patrasa) upgrading of the port of Patras (5th pier); b) road 
and rainwater drain works; c) Terminal building 1;  
d) Terminal building 2; e) Auxiliary building, 52 247 600 100 % 52 247 600 SA.38048Patras Port Authority S.A. 
(OLPa)
18 2014 Italy Salernoa) Expanding Port Entrance; b) Stabilising the dock,  
c) Dredging73 000 000 97.28 % 71 016 396 SA.38302Port Authority of Salerno 
(PAS) via Ministro deglo 
Affari esteri P .le della 
Farnesina 1 I-00194 Roma
19 2014 Latvia Ventspils Soil stabilisation 2 300 000 SA.38771
20 2015 Latvia VentspilsImprovement of soil stability of the embankment of 
the Venta River channel behind berth 2 and 3 - second 
decision (see also SA.38771)6150000 (see 
first decision 
in 2014)increase aid from 
38.6 % to 85 %updated 
figure: from 
3 775 918 
euro up to 
5 227 500 
euroSA. 40838Port Authority of the Free 
Port of Ventspils
21 2015 Germany SassnitzExtension of the port by constructing a new berth (No 
10) to optimise the use of berths 8 and 95 100 000 88.68 % 4 523 000 SA.41865 Fährhafen Sassnitz GmbH 
22 2015 France CalaisExpansion of the Port of Calais and build a new cross 
Channel terminal to allow better operation of cross-
Channel sea transport services887 500 000 30.40 % 270 000 000 SA.39688 Port de Calais
23 2015 Italy TarantoDredging and disposal of dredging materials due 
to inadequacy of the infrastructure to accomodate 
increasingly larger container ships83 000 000 54 % 38 158 587 SA.39542 Port Authority of Taranto
88
AnnexesAnnex VI
State aid 
cases in 
sea portsYear CountrySeaport 
concernedType of good covered, infrastructure (l) and/or 
superstructure (S)Planned 
investment 
costs 
(in euros)Aid intensityAid
(in euros)Decision 
numberBeneficiary
24 2015 Germany WismarIncrease port capacity for wood handling by: a) 
extension of the wharfage; b) dredging and land 
reclamation; c) terminal for liquid goods; d) terminal 
for cooling water; e) environmental compensatory 
measures37 141 615 65.98 % 24 506 881 SA.39608Port Authority of the 
Seaport Wismar
25 2015 Germany WismarExtension and upgrade of the existing cruise ship 
terminal by: a) extension the berth length by 240 
m; b) building for Customs and Police; ISPS security 
fence; c) dredging; d) road construction; e) fresh/
waste water facility; f) supply area for cruising ships; 
g) parking for buses33 899 000 8.19 %2 776 300 
euros (the 
construction 
of a build -
ing for 
Police and 
Customs 
does not 
constitute 
state aid 
and is 
therefore 
not included 
in this 
amountSA.39637Port Authority of the 
Seaport Wismar
26 2015 NetherlandsLauwer -
soogEliminating a bottleneck in the port which will be 
done by extending the fishing quay by 200 m 4 161 300 No aid No aid SA.39403Exploitatiemaatschappij 
Havencomplex Lauwersoog
27 2015 GermanyPort of 
MaasholmFisher boat, refurbishment of the quay No aid No aid SA.42219
28 2015 PortugalPort of 
LeixoesCruise terminal, marina (no effect on trade) No aid No aid SA.43250
29 2015 Latvia Port of 
LepajaDredging 75 % 32 300 000 SA.41734
30 2015 GreecePort of 
MykonosPassenger transport infrastructure, some touristic 
infrastructure (regional aid)10 718 252 100 % 10 600 000 SA.39232Municipal Port Manage -
ment Organisation (MPMO) 
of Mykonos
31 2015 GermanyPort of 
RostockSeveral investments, dry cargo without bulk goods 7 182 900 80 % 5 600 000 SA.43376Rostocker Fracht- und 
Fischereihafen GmbH
89 Reply of the Commission
Executive summary
III First indent
The Commission notes that the TEN -T Regulation and the Core Network Corridor Work Plans foresee the developing 
of strategies at EU level so as to ensure that European priorities are taken into consideration for port developments.
The TEN -T Regulation provides for an EU -wide infrastructure planning since 2013 by establishing a Core and Com -
prehensive networks associated with technical standards and implementation deadlines. This regulation results 
from the analysis of the traffic volumes of EU seaports.
The implementation of the TEN -T Core and Comprehensive networks is supported by governance tools such as the 
Corridor Work Plans, the support of the European Coordinators, the Corridor Fora that help better monitoring TEN -T 
implementation and identifying the projects pipeline.
The Commission also develops a long -term strategy for port activities aiming at increasing the efficiency of port 
services and the transparency of public funding. In this context, the Commission has put forward a draft regulation1 
which is currently being examined by co -legislators. It also monitors the respect of Article 49 TFEU on the freedom 
of establishment. This should contribute to achieving a better use of the infrastructure capacity in ports and to 
a better management of both EU and national public funding.
In the framework of regional policy, regarding the programming period 2014-2020, the requirement for long -term 
infrastructure development is one of the ex ante  conditionalities in the area of transport (Thematic Objective 7). 
Amongst other requirements, Member States are obliged to approve Comprehensive Transport Plans, which 
includes developing long-term strategies for ports.
III Second indent
The Commission considers that port infrastructure is planned and designed with a long -term lookout (10 to 
20 years) after its completion. Investments in ports can therefore not be assessed with a relatively short -term 
perspective.
The Commission considers that after 3 years of the conclusion of the works, it is premature to conclude that invest -
ments in underused ports are ineffective and a waste of money.
The financial crisis in 2008/2009 has led to a decrease in demand, which has resulted in underused capacity in 
almost all transport sectors, not only in sea transport. This would have affected the needs assessment.
The 2014-2020 Cohesion policy has introduced a performance framework to review each operational programme. 
Amongst other things, this framework includes the possibility of suspending payments or applying financial correc -
tions, in case of underperformance.
1 COM (2013) 296: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework on market access to 
port services and financial transparency of ports.
Reply of the Commission 90
III Third indent
Regarding newly audited projects, the Commission acknowledges the delays and cost overruns but notes that these 
risks are inherent in infrastructure investments. Maritime infrastructure ventures are complex and lengthy. Such 
projects are prone to design and budget changes. In particular, the Commission acknowledges the complexity of 
administrative authorisation procedures and is examining possible ways to streamline the regulatory environment, 
for instance through the set -up of a one-stop-shop as recommended by the Court of Auditors.
It considers that the Managing Authorities should be in a position to select from different mature project applica -
tions in order to fund those projects that would better achieve the programme objectives. However, competition 
between major infrastructure projects is often limited, either because there are not many projects ready to be 
implemented or because they are not in line with the objectives set in the programme.
III Fourth indent
On the basis of information received from the Spanish authorities the Commission notes that the used capacity for 
most of the ports examined by the Court has been increasing. The Commission underlines that the Courts’ findings 
should be interpreted in the context of an adequately long-term perspective (10-20 years) of ports investments. 
Moreover, the effects of the financial crisis in maritime transport should also be taken into consideration.
III Fifth indent
The Commission notes that port connections with the hinterland are analysed and taken into consideration in the 
Corridor Works Plans.
Infrastructure investments are ‘building blocks’ creating and improving the overall transport network. Individual 
projects selected for funding by the Commission are therefore always part of a larger ‘global project’ encompassing 
various individual projects.
However, not all investments can be made at the same time and must therefore be prioritised to match the needs in 
the best possible way while taking into account the resources available.
III Sixth indent
The Commission considers that the consultation arrangements for proposed EIB loans are in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Article 19 of the EIB Statute which applies to all investments to be financed from the EIB’s own 
resources. The role of the Commission is to provide an opinion on the conformity of the investments financed from 
the EIB’s own resources with all the relevant EU legislation and policies.
The Commission’s opinion is formulated on the basis of the information provided by the EIB in the framework of the 
Article 19 Procedure.
It can issue a negative opinion if the Commission does not receive sufficient information to be able to assess the 
conformity with EU legislation and policies.
Reply of the Commission 91
III Seventh indent
The Commission has been working on establishing a level playing field for European ports in several ways: ever 
since the judgment in Leipzig Halle in 2011, the Commission has examined numerous individual cases which were 
either notified to the Commission or in which competitors lodged a complaint with the Commission. This case prac -
tice contributed to ensuring that ports compete on a level playing field.
Further facilitations of maritime transport reporting formalities expected with the eManifest project, the European 
Maritime Single Window initiative as well as with the implementation evaluation and revision of the reporting for -
malities directive.
As regards superstructures, the Commission underlines the following: if funding of superstructures constitutes state 
aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, this does not necessarily prohibit Member States from financ -
ing such superstructures. The Commission can declare it compatible with the Treaty. State aid to ports is governed 
by Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty.
As regards monitoring, the Commission underlines that the system of state aid control is based on an ex ante  assess -
ment and loyal cooperation of the Member States. Given the Commission’s resources it is not feasible to systemati -
cally check all individual decisions ex post . However, all decisions are published and allow interested parties to file 
a complaint in case they consider that breaches have occurred. In this regard the Commission considers that there 
are sufficient instruments both at national and EU level to safeguard a proper conduct of national authorities as 
regards the awarding of concessions and allowing unsuccessful bidders to pursue possible irregularities.
IV First indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation to monitor the core port capacity and to reassess the develop -
ment plans of Member States. The Commission will study the macroeconomic impacts of completion of the TEN -T 
network.
IV Second indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
IV Third indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation. A development plan for port sector will be achieved notably by the 
Detailed Implementation Plan for the Motorways of the Seas programme and the key waterways are included in the 
respective work plans for core network corridors.
IV Fourth indent
The Commission notes that this recommendation is partly addressed to the Member States.
Insofar as it is concerned by it, the Commission accepts to implement this recommendation as described below and 
considers it partially implemented.
Reply of the Commission 92
The Commission has launched a study to identify ways of streamlining the administrative procedures for TEN -T 
projects. The key problems have already been mapped and currently the possible solutions are being analysed. The 
Commission will specifically examine the possibility to create a ‘one -stop -shop’ for project promoters to streamline 
and accelerate the permitting procedures for TEN -T projects, along with other streamlining measures. It will also 
envisage the design of a single authorisation framework for EU relevant TEN -T projects. As a next step, the Commis -
sion intends to carry out an impact assessment in 2017 to consider putting forward a legislative proposal.
The Commission has already announced these initiatives in the Communication of 1 June 2016: Europe investing 
again Taking stock of the Investment Plan for Europe and next steps[1]: ‘(…) the Commission will explore the pos -
sibility to design a single EU authorisation framework that would directly apply to large projects with a cross -border 
dimension or major Investment Platforms that involve national co -financing replacing a broad range of authorisa -
tion procedures at EU and national level.’
IV Fifth indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation but points out that it can only apply financial corrections when there 
is a breach of the legal conditions.
IV Sixth indent
The Commission partially accepts the recommendation. It will reassess the need for further support in these two 
areas.
However, investments in containers, transhipment and storage are eligible for EU co -funding, if equal and non -dis-
criminatory access for all operators can be guaranteed, also taking into account, where necessary, the dual function 
of certain infrastructure for transhipment and gateway.
Regarding superstructures not within the public remit, the Commission notes that these are excluded for funding 
in the framework of CEF, as long as they are not linked to environmental and energy policy goals, and of objective 7 
(transport) of the ERDF. Superstructures may be allowed under other areas of the ERDF for example as a productive 
investment.
IV Seventh indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation as far as CEF is concerned, and in so far as no further congestion of 
the hinterland connection is created by magnifying the concentration of maritime flows to a few ports.
Reply of the Commission 93
IV Eight indent
The Commission partially accepts the recommendation with regards to the EU -added value and, where applicable, 
the private investment component -related conditionalities as explained below. However, regarding the specific 
cases of maritime accesses to ports (such as dredging), as well ports located in peripheral regions (islands), securing 
private investment components is not always achievable.
The award criteria for projects applying in the CEF calls for proposals already include the demonstration of ‘EU 
added value’ and, where applicable, the need to have the potential of stimulating public and private investment, as 
referred to part V of Annex I of the CEF Regulation. CEF calls require as of 2015 systematic submission of cost–ben -
efit analyses demonstrating the amount of required EU support and highlighting the project impacts.
IV Ninth indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation but points out that changes to the Memorandum of Understanding 
cannot be imposed unilaterally.
IV Tenth indent
The Commission does not accept the recommendation. The Commission services participating in the inter -service 
consultation of the Article 19 procedure already have the possibility to provide a negative opinion on a project 
where they have critical remarks. As long as such a negative opinion is maintained by the service concerned, 
the Commissioner in charge of the economic and financial affairs will not approve a positive opinion through an 
empowerment procedure.
IV Eleventh indent
The Commission does not accept the recommendation. It has been working on providing guidance on the appli -
cable state aid rules in the ports sector through the development of its case practice, the publication of Analyti -
cal Grids for Infrastructure projects and the adoption of the Notice on the Notion of State aid. The Commission is, 
furthermore, currently working on an extension of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) to port infra -
structure funding, which will provide further guidance. Issuing port specific state aid guidelines, in addition to the 
measures mentioned above, is, at this stage, not planned.
In the view of the Commission, the issue can be re -examined once the GBER extension is in place and sufficient case 
practice has been developed.
IV Twelfth indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation and will strive to continue to ensure a consistent analysis of user -spe-
cific superstructures in its assessment of individual state aid cases. The Commission, furthermore, intends to provide 
further guidance as regards user -specific superstructures in the GBER.
IV Thirteenth indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
It already increased the number of ex officio  investigations. Following the adoption of the GBER further resources 
will be available for such investigations. The adoption of the GBER is currently foreseen for the first half of 2017.
Reply of the Commission 94
IV Fourteenth indent
The Commission notes that this recommendation is addressed to the Member States.
Member States are already obliged, under Article 108 TFEU, to notify systematically any public financial support for 
port infrastructure projects which constitute an economic activity. The Commission observes that it does not have 
any competence to demand that Member States inform it of any public financial support which does not constitute 
state aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
IV Fifteenth indent
The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it would introduce an additional reporting requirement 
and thus increase the administrative burden for EU Member States administrations without clearly leading to pro -
portionate benefits.
IV Sixteenth indent
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
The Commission acknowledges that further simplification efforts are needed to reduce administrative burden in the 
field of maritime transport.
It notes that actions are already ongoing on maritime transport reporting formalities through the launch of the 
e-Manifest pilot project with a focus on the ‘reporting once’ principle for the industry as well as through the devel -
opment, together with EMSA, of a European Maritime Single Window service through which all ships could report in 
a standardised manner.
Furthermore, the Commission is currently conducting an evaluation of the directive on maritime reporting formali -
ties which may possibly lead to its revision.
Introduction
04
The concentration of traffic in certain ports is due to their proximity to the major shipping routes and their role as 
transhipment facilities for feeder connections. It results from historic and geographic development of ports. The 
Commission considers that this is not a negative phenomenon per se.
13
The Commission considers that customs formalities for Union goods moving between EU ports have been reduced 
to the minimum possible and are much lighter than for goods that come from other countries. In essence, such for -
malities for Union goods only involve a simple proof of the Union status at re -entrance into the EU. Even that proof 
is not needed when the goods are moved by an authorised ‘Regular Shipping Service’. Another advantage is that 
non -Union goods moving between EU ports do not need to be placed under a custom transit procedure unless they 
are moved together with Union goods and transported by an authorised ‘Regular Shipping Service’. In that case, 
a rather simplified transit procedure applies which is based on the maritime manifest and includes a waiver from 
a financial guarantee.
Reply of the Commission 95
The ‘Blue Belt’ initiative was launched to create this level playing field by simplifying customs procedures, and 
through the establishment, by 1 June 2015, of the national maritime single windows to smoothen the submission of 
maritime transport formalities, as required by legislation.
The new customs legislation (Union Customs Code) entered into force on 1 May 2016 for which a transitional period 
applies up to 2020, notably for the establishment and/or enhancement of electronic systems for the reporting of 
customs data.
23
Port investments will only receive rather modest support from EU sources of co -financing: Cohesion Fund/ERDF 
support is only provided in limited cases where the strategic importance of the investment is established (e.g. in 
a comprehensive transport plan), and would only to cover the funding gap. This means that Cohesion Funds/ERDF 
would not displace private investments, rather support them where necessary.
25
The Commission notes that by January 2012, 25 of the 27 projects had been completed. Twenty-two out of them 
were in use even though four projects needed complementary investments to make an effective link to the hinter -
land. For three projects their effectiveness and use had to be further improved.
Observations
31
The Commission’s infrastructure policy (TEN -T planning) relies on a thorough and transparent methodology which 
is based on traffic volumes of EU ports to determine their inclusion in the core or the comprehensive network.
Any cost–benefit assessment for a given investment makes assumptions on the future traffic flows, taking into 
account the historical data, traffic simulations but also expert judgement on how a new investment can increase the 
number of units handled, or how it will contribute to operate the units more efficiently.
Long-term traffic forecasts may vary significantly in real terms due to changing market conditions in global econo -
mies, technology shifts and other factors influencing this forecast.
34
The Commission notes that the TEN -T Regulation and the Core Network Corridor Work Plans foresee the developing 
of strategies at EU level so as to ensure that European priorities are taken into consideration for port developments.
Moreover, as far as ESIF are concerned, the Commission ensures the existence and implementation of national trans -
port plans in the framework of the ex ante conditionality assessment for the programming period 2014-2020.
Reply of the Commission 96
Box 1 — Third indent
Italy’s national plan was only recently put in place. As such, its implementation will generate new port investment 
plans for the so -called Autorità di Sistema Portuale (Piano regolatore di sistema portuale) over the coming years.
The Commission is withholding ERDF programme for non -fulfilment of Ex Ante  Conditionality 7.3 (in line with the 
Country Specific Recommendations expressed in 2014  and  2015) pending the full implementation on the port’s 
planning and reform, including a comprehensive dredging plan, the set -up of new ‘port basin’ authorities grouping 
ports in the same areas, cutting the red tape (national maritime single window), etc.
Box 1 — Fourth indent
In 2014 the Implementation Document to the Transport Development Strategy was adopted by the Council of 
Ministers.
In the previous years, many urgently needed investments were planned and properly implemented despite the fact 
that the then existing strategy was not well monitored. The turnover in Polish ports has been increasing every year 
and ESIF from different periods have assisted and will continue to assist this process by providing funding to impor -
tant infrastructural investments.
The non -maritime projects were complementary to investments in ports and there is only a single case where the 
modernisation of quays was done together with its conversion into walking area.
35
The Commission notes that the calculation of transport capacity is a complex task where many factors must 
be taken into consideration and the calculation methods may vary between countries, types of ports or goods 
transported.
Moreover, the total capacity is not the only or the main measure of efficiency, and it should be viewed with the 
long-term perspective applied when designing the ports.
Furthermore, transhipment traffic has in the last decade become extremely volatile and is linked to market options 
of large private investors.
36
The Commission notes that job and growth induced by ports should not be considered only within ports. Ports are 
the transit point for 75 % of external trade and 40 % of internal trade, where the maritime is the most competitive 
(and less energy -intensive) mode. Moreover, infrastructure works do not create jobs only through the construction 
works, but also on a longer term effect sectors which benefit indirectly from it, such as tourism and logistics.
Impact on growth and job ought to be established through an evaluation process, including the enhanced competi -
tiveness due to reduced logistics and transport costs for the area affected.
Reply of the Commission 97
The Commission assessed the economic impact of the implementation of the TEN -T policy, including its port com -
ponent2. The Commission intends to make an analysis of overall impacts on jobs and growth in 2017 of completing 
the Trans -European Transport Network projects at European scale, building on the preliminary findings and results 
of the ongoing Mid-Term Evaluation of the Connecting Europe Facility programme.
In the framework of Regional Policy, data on job creation was collected through the relevant core indicator at the 
level of Operational Programmes (OPs), taking into consideration that reporting on these was not obligatory in the 
2007-2013 programming period. For the 2014-2020 period, use of the relevant common indicator is obligatory where 
relevant, still at OP level (see paragraph 79 on setting indicators set at OP level).
40
The Commission also develops a long -term strategy for port activities aiming at increasing the efficiency of port 
services and the transparency of public funding. In this context, the Commission has put forward a draft regulation3 
which is currently being examined by co -legislators. It also monitors the respect of Article 49 TFEU on the freedom 
of establishment. This should contribute to achieving a better use of the infrastructure capacity in ports and to 
a better management of both EU and national public funding.
The Commission is expected to report on this strategy in 2018.
41
All ports are connected to their hinterland, at least by road. The Commission notes that the objective it pursues is to 
have these ports connected with rail and, whenever geographically possible with inland waterways.
42
The Commission recalls that the TEN -T Regulation currently in force results from the agreement between the Euro -
pean co -legislators following the ordinary legislative procedure.
The Commission proposal for the TEN -T Regulation4 port was based on the objective methodology that had been 
widely consulted before with the stakeholders and Member States and published alongside the legislative proposal. 
The methodology, prepared by an expert group, included volume -based criteria as well as other criteria, in order to 
ensure the necessary geographical coverage.
The number of core ports was subsequently extended by co -legislators to include ports located on islands5.
The Commission notes that apart from volume -based criteria, the selection took into account the need for cohesion 
of the EU territory. This avoided that some Member States, like Romania or Bulgaria, would have been left without 
any core port. For details, please see point 2.1(b) of the Planning Methodology.
2 Study on the cost of non -completion of the TEN -T: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/studies/doc/2015-06-fraunhofer -cost -of-n
on-completion -of-the -ten -t.pdf
3 COM (2013) 296: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework on market access to 
port services and financial transparency of ports. 
4 COM 2011(650).
5 Heraklion, Huelva, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Augusta, Cagliari, Moerdijk, Galaţi, Milford Haven. The Commission proposal did not include 
the Croatian port of Rijeka.
Reply of the Commission 98
44
The Commission monitors the evolution of the yearly traffic volumes of the ports, but does not monitor their capac -
ity. The Commission believes that traffic volumes are a more relevant indicator for policy decisions.
In accordance with Article 49(4) of the TEN -T Regulation, this information is used to include or exclude ports from 
the TEN -T comprehensive network. This exercise is based on objective and comparable data from Eurostat.
48
The Commission considers that the objective of the funding is not only to promote the best performing ports in 
Europe but also to promote short sea shipping and, in case of cohesion policy, to enhance economic growth in 
peripheral and less developed regions of the EU. Concentrating of public funding in best performing ports would 
further deteriorate the situation of smaller ports and increase the pressure on overland connections to the North 
Sea Ports.
Furthermore, the increasing volumes of transhipment in the North Sea Ports result in a development of feeder 
services to other sea basins. This has to be effectively addressed to minimise the amount of deep sea cargo coming 
to Europe via the North Sea Ports and continuing its way overland, using in many cases road transport. Therefore, 
development of port facilities in smaller ports aims at increasing attractiveness of short sea shipping services as well 
as attracting direct oceanic calls to other ports than the North Sea, what was exactly the case in Gdańsk for instance.
49
The call for proposals for CEF grants launched in 2014 has been almost three times oversubscribed for the funding 
objective for which this project had applied.
In the selection and award process, the Commission had to make priorities and considered that other projects dem -
onstrated higher EU added value, relevance, maturity and quality of applications.
Box 2 — Second alinea
The Commission would like to point out that the Nord -Ostsee -Kanal (NOK) is included in the core network and is 
thus considered a priority. Moreover, even if it is not officially included in any of the Core Network Corridor, it may 
use CEF financing being listed in Part III of Annex I to the CEF Regulation.
The CEF financing targets in particular projects which cannot be financed in any other way then through grant 
funding. This is done in order to reduce deadweight effect of EU funds. All the projects which have clear revenue 
streams are directed towards financial instruments, including CEF instruments as well as the newly created EFSI.
50
Infrastructure investments require long-term planning and must meet long-term needs. Therefore, they will nor -
mally not be used in full in the short term. Ports infrastructure is typically intended for the 10-20 years following 
their construction. Port investment cannot be analysed with a short -term perspective.
The financial crisis in 2008/2009 resulted in a decrease of traffic and slowed down the use of additional capacity. It 
also led to the change, delay or cancellation of many investment plans.
Reply of the Commission 99
Delays and cost overruns are inherent risks to infrastructure investments and reasonable variations are part of risk 
management.
53
See Commission reply to paragraph 50.
53 Second indent
The Commission considers that port infrastructure is planned and designed with a long -term lookout (10 to 
20 years) after its completion. Investments in ports therefore cannot be assessed with a relatively short -term 
perspective.
The Commission considers that after 3 years of the conclusion of the works, it is premature to conclude that invest -
ments in underused ports are ineffective and a waste of money.
ESIF Funds can support only those major investment projects which can clearly demonstrate, by a thorough cost– 
benefit analysis (CBA), that they are desirable from an economic point of view and that they are financially viable. 
For the majority of these projects, the data and information used in the CBAs originated from before the crisis.
Regarding CEF Funding, the Commission notes that financial support is prioritised towards projects which con -
tribute to port accessibility, multi -modality, hinterland connections rather than capacity increase. Moreover, each 
project submitted is subject to a cost–benefit analysis (CBA), verified by independent experts, in order to reduce the 
risk of ineffective investments. These CBAs are supported by estimated traffic volumes.
The financial crisis in 2008/2009 has led to a decrease in demand resulting in underused capacity in almost all trans -
port sectors, not only in sea transport. This would have affected the needs assessment.
The 2014-2020 Cohesion policy has introduced a performance framework to review each operational programme. 
Amongst other things, this framework includes the possibility of suspending payments or applying financial correc -
tions, in case of underperformance.
56
The Commission acknowledges the complex regulatory framework in Member States for the authorisation of trans -
port projects and notes that there is ongoing work on addressing this issue for projects of EU relevance.
57
The Commission acknowledges the issue of delays in the construction of major infrastructure. It has raised it regu -
larly in monitoring committees, bilateral meetings and in formal letters to Member States.
The responsibility of determining powers of authorisations lies with national authorities. However, the Commission 
has repeatedly advised the Member States’ authorities of the need to simplify decision -making procedures and has 
recommended not placing any additional burden on the administration of EU funds.
Reply of the Commission 100
59
The Commission stresses that during the negotiations on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, the Com -
mission has tackled these issues by requiring both a new plan for ports and logistics, which has now materialised, 
and new public procurement rules (under the ex ante  conditionality for the period 2014-2020).
More specifically, the national ports’ plan was also part of the CSR 2015, issued by the Council following the Com -
mission’s proposals.
Furthermore, the Commission launched a study to identify the main regulatory and administrative obstacles for 
TEN -T projects (including ports) and envisage possible ways of addressing these issues. Amongst the possible 
options being analysed are the creation of a ‘one -stop -shop’ for project promoters to streamline and accelerate the 
permitting procedures for TEN -T projects and the design of a single EU authorisation framework. As a next step, the 
Commission intends to carry out an impact assessment in 2017 to consider putting forward a legislative proposal.
60
The Commission notes that the new port plan in Italy will entail a series of simplification measures in the adoption 
of port master plans. This should reduce the time for adoption.
61
Maritime infrastructure represents complex and lengthy works. Such projects are prone to design and budget 
changes. This is recognised in national and EU procurement rules by allowing for certain levels of flexibility.
In the case of Spain, the Commission notes furthermore that the Member State does not declare cost overruns as 
part of statement of expenditure to the Commission. As a result, these cost overruns are not co -financed by the EU 
budget.
See also Commission reply to paragraph 53.
62
The aim of ERDF programmes relates primarily to regional and local development. Therefore, the projects must 
comply with cohesion policy objectives and with the objectives laid down in each specific programme. These have 
been fulfilled.
The Commission recalls the impact of the 2007 economic crisis (with a very strong reduction of GDP growth) on the 
EU sea maritime traffic and the fact that the activity recorded in the EU-28 in 2014 has not yet reached the previous 
level of activity of 2007.
Regarding the Spanish ports, the Managing Authority informed the Commission that the investment has been 
completed according to the plans foreseen and that the ports are operational and in a development phase. There 
is activity in all of them and the port authorities are planning complementary investments to further develop the 
activity in these ports.
The activity has been increasing since the last audit of the Court. In addition, certain rail and road connections (e.g. 
Ferrol and Langosteira) have been approved, which will boost their activity.
As for Augusta in Italy, the Commission notes that only around EUR 1 million have been provided from the EU 
budget.
Reply of the Commission 101
63(i)
Port construction projects consist of major engineering works that require a long period of planning and construc -
tion, with many factors that can influence progress. Ports are not designed for a capacity within 5 years, but are 
instead planned for the foreseen capacity in 20 or more years.
See Commission reply to paragraph 53.
63(ii)
As regards the long -term planning horizon, a full use of capacity by 2010 was not expected. In view of the ongoing 
economic crisis and the reduced demand for transport capacity, an increase in use between 2010 and 2015 was not 
to be expected.
See Commission reply to paragraph 62.
64
The Commission notes that infrastructure investments are building blocks creating and improving a network. 
Individual projects are therefore always part of a larger global project. All investments cannot be made at the same 
time but will have to be prioritised to match the needs in the best possible way while taking into account availabil -
ity of the necessary resources.
It notes that in the period 2014-2020 both ERDF and CEF have given greater emphasis to connecting ports to the 
transport network (and not just port infrastructure).
The Member States should ensure that the best use is made of limited EU funds. Investments in ports need comple -
mentary investments in road/motorway and railways in order to ensure their effectiveness. Some of these invest -
ments are being financed under EU programmes or by national funds.
Regarding CEF projects, the Commission notes that port connections with the hinterland are taken into considera -
tion in the Corridor Works Plans.
This will be prioritised when funding decisions are made.
65
The Commission notes that it is not unusual that, within a global project, different actions are carried out subse -
quently according to the technical and financial capacity of the project promoter.
For instance, the ports of Langosteira and Ferrol were initially connected to the transport network by road. Rail 
access to the port of Ferrol has been approved by the Port Accesibility Financial Fund as mentioned in the Annual 
Plan of 2016. Concerning the rail access to Langosteira the project design will be finished by 2017 and the works will 
end before 2021.
67
Maritime transport is a competitive industry and the Commission considers that competition is, overall, positive. It 
acknowledges that increased capacity in one port may temporarily have an impact on other ports.
Reply of the Commission 102
68
The Commission considers that the impact of an activity decline due to a cannibalisation effect in 6 out of 171 ports 
remains limited. See Commission reply to Box 5.
69
Regarding the two neighbouring ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia in Poland, the Commission recalls that the two ports 
are complementary and they both enjoy growth in the number of operations. For example, Gdańsk has a large liq -
uid bulk terminal, which Gdynia does not. There is room for deepening the cooperation between the two ports and 
for exploring further ways of promoting the complementarity between the two ports. This is what the Commission 
is trying to promote via the Motorways of the Sea programme as well as activities of the European Coordinator for 
the Baltic Adriatic Core Network Corridor. These initiatives shall enable the better streamlining of available funds for 
the benefit of this port cluster in the Bay of Gdańsk.
Furthermore, the Partnership Agreement signed for the period 2014-2020 specifically requires that ESIF-financed 
investments in the two neighbouring ports be based on cooperation and complementarity.
As for Italy, the new Italian port plan should address this issue by merging two or more contiguous ports. According 
to the plan, this will be the case of Salerno and Napoli.
76
The Commission considers the consultation arrangements for proposed EIB Loans are in accordance with the proce -
dure set out in Article 19 of the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which applies to all investments to be 
financed from the EIB’s own resources. The role of the Commission is to provide an opinion on the conformity of the 
investments financed from the EIB’s own resources with all the relevant EU legislation and policies.
The Commission opinion is formulated on the basis of the information provided by the EIB in the framework of the 
Article 19 Procedure. It can issue a negative opinion, if the Commission does not receive sufficient information to be 
able to assess the conformity with EU legislation and policies.
77
The technical and financial appraisal of a project is not within the scope of the Article 19 Procedure. See also Com -
mission reply to paragraph 76.
78
During the preparation of the Commission’s formal opinion, the Commission services participating in the EIB 
Interservice Group can provide the following opinions on a project:
• Favourable opinion,
• Favourable opinion with comments,
• Negative opinion.
Reply of the Commission 103
In case of an unfavourable opinion by the Commission, an approval of the project by the Board of Directors of the 
EIB requires an unanimous approval and the Commission abstaining.
In the Commission internal consultation process there are some cases every year where a Commission service pro -
vides a negative opinion on a project. In such a case, the EIB either provides satisfactory replies on the issues raised 
by the relevant service for it to be able to lift its negative opinion or withdraws the project and does not present it 
to its Board of Directors.
Box 5 — Fourth alinea
The Commission notes that the ports of Cadiz and Malaga are mixed -used ports (import, export and passengers). 
Freight traffic loss in these ports may also be attributed to the effects of the financial crisis. In the case of Cadiz, this 
has been compensated by a substantial increase in passenger traffic.
79
The Article 19 procedure concerns an ex ante  check of loan applications for investments to be financed on EIB own 
resources in view of their compliance with EU legislation and policies. It does not concern monitoring of such loans 
by the Commission which is the sole responsibility of the EIB.
However, the Commission does receive information from the EIB on projects where an EU guarantee is provided.
80
Already, in previous periods, the Commission has assessed expected results of projects in the context of the CBA. 
However, it was unable to make financial corrections based on under performance. This has changed in the 2014- 
2020 period, where financial corrections are possible under the performance framework.
Under the 2014-2020 period, CBA has been introduced as a pre -requirement of CEF funding in order to make the 
instrument more result -oriented than the TEN -T programme.
Box 6
The Commission notes that the ferry terminal in Gdynia was not part of the Commission decision granting support 
to the Motorway of the Seas (MoS) project. It was understood that the terminal itself will be completed by 2016, 
which was considered a reasonable delay for infrastructure projects of similar dimension, especially in a period of 
economic crisis and reduced traffic demands.
The Commission notes that the MoS Gdynia -Karlskrona project followed a double pre -selection process at the time 
and was proposed after reaching support of the Baltic Task Force involving Transport Authorities from 7 Member 
States, who not only accepted ownership but recognised the quality of this individual project as well. The project 
followed the applicable procedure and was subject to both internal and external evaluation.
Reply of the Commission 104
EU support is given based on the planned outcome, i.e. the planned works/studies. Traffic forecasts and other indi -
cators, e.g. the referred key performance indicator (KPIs) are used in the selection of proposals but are not the basis 
for paying EU support.
The Commission considers that the project cannot produce all the expected results until the investments in Gdynia 
have been completed but some results can still be produced based on the investments completed.
82
The Commission does not agree that the absence of state aid guidelines on ports and differences in customs control 
practices can make a port more attractive than others for global shipping lines (see Commission replies to para -
graphs 92 and 93).
83
The Commission considers that, following the Aéroport de Paris  judgment, the case practice on this matter devel -
oped only gradually, which is the main reason why before the Leipzig Halle  judgment Member States, which under 
the Treaty were responsible for notifying any aid, considered that the construction of general port infrastructure 
would typically be non -economic in nature, meaning that its public financing would not fall under state aid control 
and not require a notification. The very few notifications the Commission nevertheless received during this period 
were primarily made for reasons of legal certainty and in most cases resulted in the finding of the Commission that 
the measure did not constitute state aid.
Following the clarifications given in the Leipzig Halle  judgment in 2011, the number of notifications increased sig -
nificantly. In the period from 2011 until the end of 2015 the Commission issued 27 state aid decisions concerning 
funding of port infrastructure.
85
The Commission attaches certain conditions to co -funding superstructures under multimodality and MoS, in 
particular that it must be open to any user on a non -discriminatory basis. Moreover, the following conditions are 
applied: the investment needs to be correlated to the upgrade of maritime link, justified by increased ship handling 
capacity and should serve the purpose of the action for at least 5 years after its completion.
Nonetheless, the Commission services will reassess the need for further support in these two areas for the subse -
quent calls.
86
The Commission underlines the following: if funding of superstructures constitutes state aid in the meaning of Arti -
cle 107(1) of the Treaty, this does not necessarily prohibit Member States to finance such superstructures. The Com -
mission can declare it compatible with the Treaty. State aid to ports is governed by Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty, 
according to which aid might be considered compatible if such aid ‘facilitates the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas’ and ‘does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest’.
Reply of the Commission 105
Box 7
The Spanish port investment co -financed from ERDF did not qualify as a major project. The expenditure was certi -
fied by the MS which accepted it as eligible.
By reference to information currently available, it appears that the investment was accepted on the grounds that it 
was considered a ‘productive investment’, as allowed by the regulations.
87
The Commission notes that the system of state aid control is based on an ex ante  assessment and loyal cooperation 
of the Member States. Given the Commission’s resources it is not feasible to systematically check each individual 
decision ex post . However, all decisions are published and allow interested parties to file a complaint in case they 
consider that breaches have occurred. In this regard the Commission considers that there are sufficient instruments 
both at national and EU level to safeguard a proper conduct of national authorities as regards the awarding of con -
cessions and allowing unsuccessful bidders to pursue possible irregularities.
Box 8
On the basis of the information received from the Court of Auditors, the Commission will investigate the issue men -
tioned under Box 8 and assess whether potential state aid issues are present.
88
Under the Treaty Member States are obliged to notify any state aid to the Commission before granting it.
Before 2007, Member States could legitimately consider that public financing for port infrastructure projects does 
not constitute State aid and were, therefore, not obliged to notify such projects.
During 2007-2010 there was considerable uncertainty as to whether funding for such projects would constitute 
state aid and it was generally presumed that it does not.
Since the Leipzig Halle  judgment in 2011, the number of notifications has increased significantly. See Commission 
reply to paragraph 83.
89
The Commission notes that the number of complaints it receives, depends on, inter alia, the market and the degree 
of competition between different market actors. In this regard, a low number of complaints could point towards 
either a low amount of (potential) infringements of state aid rules or to a rather limited degree of competition 
between different market operators in a given sector.
91
The Commission observes that the obligation to notify any plans to grant state aid stems directly from Article 108 of 
the Treaty. Member States are, therefore, obliged to notify any projects involving state aid. In cases where the Com -
mission becomes aware of aid having been granted without a previous notification it may, under Article 12 of the 
Procedural Regulation 2015/1589, initiate an investigation. In addition to this, the Commission regularly investigates 
cases of potential aid on the basis of complaints it receives from competitors.
Reply of the Commission 106
92
The Commission may adopt port specific state aid guidelines, but it is not obliged to do so, as it has a wide margin 
of discretion under Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty (see also Commission replies to paragraphs III and IV). The fact that 
no further guidelines or documents exist cannot be seen as creating legal uncertainty since the Treaty provisions 
constitute an exhaustive legal framework. Also for other sectors (e.g. until very recently, culture) no further guid -
ance existed other than individual state aid decisions.
Notwithstanding the existing legal framework, the Commission has been working on providing guidance on the 
applicable state aid rules in the ports sector through the development of case practice, which has clarified numer -
ous points (such as eligible costs, aid intensities, compatibility criteria), the publication of Analytical Grids for Infra -
structure projects in September 2015 and the adoption of the Notice on the Notion of State aid in May 2016. The 
Commission is, furthermore, currently working on an extension of the GBER to port infrastructure funding. These 
measures taken together have already provided specific guidance on the applicable state aid rules to the sector and 
will continue to do so.
Finally, the Commission is always available to provide guidance on individual cases in the course of a pre -notifica -
tion procedure. This opportunity is routinely used by Member States in order to prepare a notification.
In light of this the Commission, at this stage, is not convinced that the issuing of port specific state aid guidelines, 
in addition to the measures mentioned above, is useful and necessary. This question can be revisited once the GBER 
extension to port infrastructure funding is in place and the Commission has developed sufficient case practice.
93
Customs controls are based on automatic risk analysis. If a particular routing or certain operators present at the port 
constitute higher risks, this will lead to more (and more thorough) controls. In such cases, the differences in customs 
control practices may be justified and appropriate with regard to harmonised implementation of the Custom Union.
The Commission considers in this context that customs controls are not — and should not be — an aspect of the 
port’s attractiveness.
94
In 2013, the Commission evaluated the customs risk management framework already in place (see Commission 
Communication COM(2013)793). In 2014, the Communication defining the Customs Risk Management Strategy and 
Action Plan (COM(2014)527) aiming at an improved risk management framework has been endorsed by the Council 
and is being implemented.
Simplified customs procedures are based on authorisations issued after an examination of the economic opera -
tor and its reliability, assessed against strict criteria laid down in the Union Customs Code. All customs controls are 
based on a risk analysis and it is therefore not necessary and not in line with Union legislation to require a certain 
number of controls.
95
Under the Union Customs Code, all Member States have to provide, under equal circumstances, the same simplifica -
tions; there should be the same treatment and therefore no advantage to choose one over the other port or trans -
port route based on the likelihood for controls or availability of simplifications. If a port is more efficient and provid -
ing better logistical service, it will continue attracting more trade and transport, but not based on the likelihood of 
controls or availability of simplifications.
Reply of the Commission 107
96
A port that is efficient and in which reliable companies operate might face fewer controls (the latter being based on 
risk analysis) and might indeed have a competitive advantage.
Subsequently to the case referred to by the Court, in 2014 the Commission identified the actions needed to 
strengthen the controls of importers as set out under Objective 4 of the Customs Risk Management Strategy and 
Action Plan (COM(2014)527) to ‘strengthen capacities to secure equivalence in effective implementation of the Com -
mon Risk Management Framework (CRMF) and to increase responsiveness to newly identified risks’.
97
The Commission’s inspection did find weaknesses in the Dutch customs procedures. The Dutch authorities have 
confirmed subsequent to the inspection that from July 2015 the EU status of all shipments will always be verified. 
The Commission’s inspection report indicated that of the 200 bills of lading not fully discharged daily on the expiry 
of the 45 days limit for discharge, only 15 to 20 are further examined by the Dutch authorities. In the case of local 
clearance procedures there were no checks, electronic or other, carried out to ensure that the summary declara -
tion for temporary storage of the goods was consistent with the subsequent declaration of the goods for a customs 
procedure before the ending of customs supervision. The Commission services’ follow -up of all these points with 
the Dutch authorities is ongoing.
98
The data referred to by the Court is provided by the Member States themselves and may not be entirely comparable 
across Member States, notably due to the way controls are defined and the same staff is notionally assigned to dif -
ferent tasks. Moreover, a large number of declarations presented in the Netherlands relate to imports by importers 
established in other Member States and checks of these importers can only be carried out by their respective cus -
toms authorities. This being said, judging by the data provided by the Member States themselves the Netherlands 
operates with relatively low customs staff intensity.
99
The Commission carries out inspections of the customs practices and procedures in the Member States to ensure 
that these practices and procedures comply with EU customs legislation and that that legislation is applied con -
sistently across the Member States. When they occur, the Commission acts vigorously against breaches of the EU 
customs legislation by launching infringement procedures.
The legislation stipulates that customs controls shall be performed within a common risk management framework, 
which goes well beyond the controls as it aims to ensure the capacity to detect and mitigate risks in an equivalent 
way throughout the EU.
99 First indent
In the framework of the customs union, the Commission deals with national customs authorities, to ensure that the 
financial interests of the Union are protected, that national customs practices comply with EU customs legislation 
and that EU customs legislation is applied consistently across the Member States.
Reply of the Commission 108
99 Second indent
The new Union Customs Code applies since 1 May 2016 and streamlines all processes and procedures, limiting the 
possibility for divergent application and execution of procedures. In addition, the IT systems will be streamlined and 
in some cases put at Union level, which will contribute to the harmonisation of customs procedures.
101 First indent
As far as the Blue Belt initiative is concerned, the Commission notes that the two measures referred to in the Com -
munication — i.e. the facilitation of the Regular Shipping Services and the establishment of a means to prove the 
Union status of goods on -board vessels that call also in third country ports — have been put in place through 
amendments in the customs legislation.
101 Second indent
The Commission agrees that there were benefits brought about by a European single window for maritime trans -
port reporting formalities and notes that evolution towards an EU Maritime Single Window is already ongoing, 
through:
(a) the launch of the eManifest pilot project with a focus on the ‘reporting once’ principle for the industry
(b) the development, together with EMSA, of a European Maritime Single Window service through which all ships 
could report in a standardised manner.
Conclusions and recommendations
102 First indent
The Commissions’ policy (Communication: ‘ports: an engine for growth’) aims at increasing the efficiency of port 
services and the transparency of public funding. The Ports Regulation agreed on 27 June 2016 will in particular con -
tribute to a better use of port capacity and management of public funding in ports.
Since 2013 the TEN -T Regulation provides for an EU -wide infrastructure planning by establishing a Core and Com -
prehensive network associated with technical standards and implementation deadlines. This planning exercise is 
based on an analysis of traffic volumes of EU ports which determines their inclusion in the Core or the Comprehen -
sive networks.
New governance tools have been introduced for the implementation of the TEN -T core network to monitor the 
TEN -T implementation and to identify the project pipeline that serves the EU policy objectives, among which port 
development takes a central part.
The 104 core ports in the TEN -T Regulation identified by the co -legislators gave a solid basis for allocating CEF fund -
ing to those ports which provide the highest EU added value.
In the framework of regional policy, regarding the programming period 2014-2020, the requirement for long -term 
infrastructure development is one of the ex ante  conditionalities in the area of transport (Thematic Objective 
7). Amongst other requirements, Member States are obliged to approve Comprehensive Transport Plans, which 
includes developing long-term strategies for ports.
Reply of the Commission 109
102 Second indent
The Commission considers that ports infrastructure is planned and designed with a long -term lookout (10 to 
20 years) after its completion. Investments in ports cannot therefore be assessed with a relatively short -term 
perspective.
The Commission considers that after 3 years of the conclusion of the works, it is premature to conclude that invest -
ments in underused ports are ineffective and a waste of money.
The ESIF Funds can support only those major investment projects which can clearly demonstrate, by performing 
a thorough cost–benefit analysis (CBA), that they are desirable from the economic point of view and that they are 
financially viable. For the majority of these projects, the CBAs were carried out with information or data from before 
the crisis.
Regarding CEF Funding, the Commission notes that financial support is prioritised towards projects which con -
tribute to port accessibility, multi -modality, hinterland connections rather than capacity increase. Moreover, each 
project submitted is subject to a cost–benefit analysis (CBA), verified by independent experts, in order to reduce the 
risk of ineffective investments. These CBAs are supported by estimated traffic volumes.
The financial crisis in 2008/2009, has led to a decrease in demand, which has resulted in underused capacity in 
almost all transport sectors, not only in the sea transport. This would have affected the needs assessment.
The 2014-2020 Cohesion policy has introduced a performance framework to review each operational programme. 
Amongst other things, this framework includes the possibility of suspending payments or applying financial correc -
tions, in case of underperformance.
102 Third indent
Regarding newly audited projects, the Commission acknowledges the delays and cost overruns but notes that these 
risks are inherent in infrastructure investments. Maritime infrastructure ventures are complex and lengthy. Such 
projects are prone to design and budget changes. In particular, the Commission acknowledges the complexity of 
administrative authorisation procedures and is examining possible ways to streamline the regulatory environment, 
for instance through the set -up of a one-stop-shop as recommended by the Court of Auditors.
It considers that the Managing Authorities should be in a position to select from different mature project applica -
tions in order to fund those projects that would better achieve the programme’s objectives. However, competition 
between major infrastructure projects is often limited, either because there are not many projects ready to be 
implemented or because they are not in line with the objectives set in the programme.
102 Fourth indent
On the basis of information received from the Spanish authorities the Commission notes that the used capacity for 
most of the ports examined by the Court has been increasing. The Commission underlines that the Courts’ find -
ings should be interpreted in the context of an adequately long-term perspective (10-20 years) of port investments. 
Moreover, the effects of the financial crisis in maritime transport should also be taken into consideration.
Reply of the Commission 110
102 Fifth indent
The Commission notes that port connections with the hinterland are analysed and taken into consideration in the 
Corridor Works Plans.
Infrastructure investments are building blocks creating and improving a network. Individual projects are therefore 
always part of a larger global project.
Member States are compelled to make choices in order to ensure that the best use is made of limited EU funds. 
Investment in ports needs complementary investments in road/motorway and railway networks in order to ensure 
their effectiveness.
All investments cannot be made at the same time but will have to be prioritised to match the needs the best pos -
sible way while taking into account the resources available. Some of these investments are being financed by EU 
funds or with national funds.
102 Sixth indent
The Commission considers that the consultation arrangements for proposed EIB Loans are in accordance with 
the procedure set out in Article 19 of the EIB Statute (Article 19 Procedure) which applies to all investments to be 
financed from the EIB’s own resources. The role of the Commission is to provide an opinion on the conformity of the 
investments to be financed from the EIB’s own resources with the relevant EU legislation and policies. The Commis -
sion opinion is formulated on the basis of the information provided by the EIB in the framework of the Article 19 
Procedure.
102 Seventh indent
Ever since the judgment in Leipzig Halle in 2011, which clarified that the funding of infrastructure projects which are 
to be exploited economically falls under the rules on state aid, the Commission has examined numerous individual 
cases which were either notified to the Commission or in which competitors lodged a complaint with the Commis -
sion. This case practice contributed to ensuring that ports compete on a level playing field.
The Commission underlines the following: if funding of superstructures constitutes state aid in the meaning of Arti -
cle 107(1) of the Treaty, this does not necessarily prohibit Member States to finance such superstructures. The Com -
mission can declare it compatible with the Treaty. State aid to ports is governed by Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty.
As regards monitoring, the Commission underlines that the system of state aid control is based on an ex ante  assess -
ment and loyal cooperation of the Member States. Given the Commission’s resources it is not feasible to systemati -
cally check all individual decisions ex post . However, all decisions are published and allow interested parties to file 
a complaint in case they consider that breaches have occurred. In this regard the Commission considers that there 
are sufficient instruments both at national and EU level to safeguard a proper conduct of national authorities as 
regards the awarding of concessions and allowing unsuccessful bidders to pursue possible irregularities.
Customs procedures at ports have been already facilitated to a considerable extent. Further facilitations of maritime 
transport reporting formalities expected with the eManifest project, the European Maritime Single Window initia -
tive as well as with the implementation evaluation and revision of the reporting formalities Directive.
Reply of the Commission 111
103
The Commission considers that the cooperation between ports as well as their successful integration into the 
respective core network corridors is an important part of the role of the European Coordinators — both for the 
Coordinator for the MoS programme and for the Coordinators for Core Network Corridors.
104
The selection of 104 core ports was made in order to identify the key traffic generators in the EU but also in order to 
ensure the appropriate territorial cohesion and accessibility.
The Commission considers that the European ports’ policy which aims at achieving financial transparency and more 
efficient port services contributes to better infrastructure planning.
105
The Commission refers to its ongoing efforts to significantly develop its TENtec database in order to enable it to 
accommodate very detailed port -related data which is gathered as part of the relevant ongoing studies to update 
corridor work plans and prepare the Detailed Implementation Plan for MoS. The hinterland connections are 
included in the studies and work plans for the respective land -based multimodal core network corridors.
Recommendation 1(a)
The Commission accepts the recommendation to monitor the core port capacity and to reassess the development 
plans of Member States.
The Commission will study the macroeconomic impacts of completion of the TEN -T network.
Recommendation 1(b)
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
Recommendation 1(c)
The Commission accepts the recommendation. A development plan for port sector will be achieved, notably by the 
Detailed Implementation Plan for MoS programme and the key waterways are included in the respective work plans 
for core network corridors.
106
The Commission considers that infrastructure investments require long-term planning, as these must meet long- 
term needs.
Maritime infrastructure developments should therefore be assessed with a relatively long -term perspective. The 
financial crisis has led to a decrease in demand that resulted in unused capacity in almost all transport sectors.
As indicated in the Commission reply to the second indent of paragraph 102, the 2014-2020 Cohesion policy has 
introduced a performance framework. This includes the possibility of suspending payments or to apply financial 
corrections in case of underperformance.
Reply of the Commission 112
107
The Commission acknowledges the issue of delays in the construction of major infrastructure. As far as ERDF and 
cohesion fund supported projects are concerned, it has raised it regularly in monitoring committees, bilateral meet -
ings and correspondence with Member States.
The Commission has repeatedly reminded the Member States’ authorities to simplify their respective national/
regional decision -making procedures and administration of EU funds.
Moreover, the Commission launched a study on identification of key regulatory and administrative obstacles for 
TEN -T projects (including ports) and identification of possible ways of addressing these issues.
See also Commission reply to the second indent of paragraph 102.
108
On the basis of information received from the Spanish authorities the Commission notes that the used capacity for 
most of the ports examined by the Court has been increasing. The Commission underlines that the Courts’ findings 
should be interpreted in the context of an adequately long-term perspective (10-20 years) of ports investments. 
Moreover, the effects of the financial crisis in maritime transport should also be taken into consideration.
109
The Commission is aware of the competitive nature of the port market. In order to reduce the risk of ineffective pro -
jects, it encourages port development strategies. Moreover, it safeguards the application of state aid and competi -
tion rules.
110
The Commission considers that the consultation arrangements for proposed EIB loans are in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Article 19 of the EIB Statute which applies to all investments to be financed from the EIB’s own 
resources. The role of the Commission is to provide an opinion on the conformity of the investments financed from 
the EIB’s own resources with all the relevant EU legislation and policies.
The Commission’s opinion is formulated on the basis of the information provided by the EIB in the framework of the 
Article 19 Procedure.
It can issue a negative opinion if the Commission does not receive sufficient information to be able to assess the 
conformity with EU legislation and policies.
Recommendation 2(a)
The Commission notes that this recommendation is partly addressed to the Member States.
Insofar as it is concerned by it, the Commission accepts to implement this recommendation as described below and 
considers it partially implemented.
Reply of the Commission 113
The Commission has launched a study to identify ways of streamlining the administrative procedures for TEN -T 
projects. The key problems have already been mapped and currently the possible solutions are being analysed. The 
Commission will specifically examine the possibility to create a ‘one -stop -shop’ for project promoters to streamline 
and accelerate the permitting procedures for TEN -T projects, along with other streamlining measures. It will also 
envisage the design of a single authorisation framework for EU relevant TEN -T projects. As a next step, the Commis -
sion intends to carry out an impact assessment in 2017 to consider putting forward a legislative proposal.
The Commission has already announced these initiatives in the Communication of 1 June 2016: Europe investing 
again Taking stock of the Investment Plan for Europe and next steps[1]: ‘(…) the Commission will explore the pos -
sibility to design a single EU authorisation framework that would directly apply to large projects with a cross -border 
dimension or major Investment Platforms that involve national co -financing replacing a broad range of authorisa -
tion procedures at EU and national level.’
Recommendation 2(b)
The Commission accepts the recommendation but points out that it can only apply financial corrections when there 
is a breach of the legal conditions.
Recommendation 2(c)
The Commission partially accepts the recommendation. It will reassess the need for further support in these two 
areas.
However, investments in containers, transhipment and storage are eligible for EU co -funding, if equal and non -dis-
criminatory access of all operators can be guaranteed, also taking into account, where necessary, the dual function 
of certain infrastructure for transhipment and gateway.
Regarding superstructures not within the public remit, the Commission notes that these are excluded for funding 
in the framework of CEF, as long they are not linked to environmental and energy policy goals, and of objective 7 
(transport) of the ERDF. Superstructures may be allowed under other areas of the ERDF for example as a productive 
investment.
Recommendation 3
The Commission notes that this recommendation is partly addressed to Members States. Under ESIF, the selection of 
individual projects is the responsibility of the Member States and the Commission direct responsibility is limited to 
major projects.
Recommendation 3(a)
The Commission accepts the recommendation as far as CEF is concerned, and in so far as no further congestion of 
the hinterland connection is created by magnifying the concentration of maritime flows to a few ports.
Reply of the Commission 114
Recommendation 3(b)
The Commission partially accepts the recommendation with regards to the EU -added value and, where applicable, 
the private investment component -related conditionalities as explained below. However, regarding the specific 
cases of maritime accesses to ports (such as dredging), as well ports located in peripheral regions (islands), securing 
private investment components is not always achievable.
The award criteria for projects applying in the CEF calls for proposals already include the demonstration of ‘EU 
added value6’ and, where applicable, the need to have the potential of stimulating public and private investment, as 
referred to part V of Annex I of the CEF Regulation. CEF calls require as of 2015 systematic submission of Cost–Ben -
efit Analyses demonstrating the amount of required EU support and highlighting the project impacts.
Recommendation 4(a)
The Commission accepts the recommendation but points out that changes to the Memorandum of Understanding 
cannot be imposed unilaterally.
Recommendation 4(b)
The Commission does not accept the recommendation. The Commission services participating in the inter -service 
consultation of the Article 19 procedure already have the possibility to provide a negative opinion on a project 
where they have critical remarks. As long as such a negative opinion is maintained by the service concerned, 
the Commissioner in charge of the economic and financial affairs will not approve a positive opinion through an 
empowerment procedure.
111
The Commission has been working on providing guidance on the applicable state aid rules in the ports sector 
with the aim to ensure a level playing field for port in Europe in numerous ways: through the development of case 
practice, the publication of Analytical Grids for Infrastructure projects and the adoption of the Notice on the Notion 
of state aid. The Commission is, furthermore, currently working on an extension of the GBER to port infrastructure 
funding. These measures, taken together, have already provided specific guidance on the applicable state aid rules 
to the sector and will continue to do so.
6 The EU value added as defined in Article 3(d) of the TEN -T Guidelines 1315/2013 refers to, in addition to the project’s value for a Member State 
alone, leads to significant improvements of transport connections and transport flows between the Member States in terms of efficiency, 
sustainability, competitiveness and cohesion  further developed in the TEN -T Guidelines
Reply of the Commission 115
112
Since 2011 the Commission has dealt with an ever increasing number of cases of potential state aid to ports. In 
addition, it has been working on providing guidance on the applicable state aid rules in the ports sector through 
the publication of Analytical Grids for Infrastructure projects and the adoption of the Notice on the Notion of State 
aid. The Commission is, furthermore, currently working on an extension of the GBER to port infrastructure funding 
which will provide further guidance. These measures taken together have already provided specific guidance on the 
applicable state aid rules to the sector and will continue to do so.
The issuance of port specific state aid guidelines, in addition to the measures mentioned above, is, at this stage, not 
planned.
This question can be revisited once the GBER extension to port infrastructure funding is in place and the Commis -
sion has developed sufficient case practice.
113
The Commission considers that its monitoring of Member States’ customs control practices is adequate for the 
purpose of detecting practices which may create unfair competitive advantages. The objective of the Commis -
sion’s inspections of Member States’ customs control practices is to ensure that the financial interests of the Union 
are protected, that these practices comply with EU customs legislation and that EU customs legislation is applied 
consistently across the Member States. These controls limit to a large extent unfair competition between Member 
States based on different quality of controls infringing the EU customs legislation. However the EU customs legisla -
tive framework still leaves a margin for competition between Member States.
The Commission furthermore notes that the UCC sets a framework of uniform rules and procedures and should 
therefore lead to a close alignment of controls.
114
The introduction of the Customs Goods Manifest and the Proof of Union System under the UCC are expected to 
provide a solution to the issue raised by the Court.
Recommendation 5(a)
The Commission does not accept the recommendation. It has been working on providing guidance on the appli -
cable state aid rules in the ports sector through the development of its case practice, the publication of Analytical 
Grids for Infrastructure projects and the adoption of the Notice on the Notion of State aid. The Commission is, fur -
thermore, currently working on an extension of the GBER to port infrastructure funding, which will provide further 
guidance. Issuing port specific state aid guidelines, in addition to the measures mentioned above, is, at this stage, 
not planned.
In the view of the Commission, the issue can be re -examined once the GBER extension is in place and sufficient case 
practice has been developed.
Reply of the Commission 116
Recommendation 5(b)
The Commission accepts the recommendation and will strive to continue to ensure a consistent analysis of user -spe-
cific port superstructures in its assessment of individual state aid cases. The Commission, furthermore, intends to 
provide further guidance as regards user -specific port superstructures in the GBER.
Recommendation 5(c)
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
It already increased the number of ex officio  investigations. Following the adoption of the GBER further resources 
will be available for such investigations. The adoption of the GBER is currently foreseen for the first half of 2017.
Recommendation 6
The Commission notes that this recommendation is addressed to the Member States.
Member States are already obliged, under Article 108 TFEU, to notify systematically any public financial support for 
port infrastructure projects which constitute an economic activity. The Commission observes that it does not have 
any competence to demand that Member States inform it of any public financial support which does not constitute 
state aid in the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
Recommendation 7(a)
The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it would introduce an additional reporting requirement 
and thus increase the administrative burden for EU Member States administrations without leading to proportion -
ate benefits.
Recommendation 7(b)
The Commission accepts the recommendation.
The Commission acknowledges that further simplification efforts are needed to reduce administrative burden in the 
field of maritime transport.
It notes that actions are already ongoing on maritime transport reporting formalities through the launch of the 
e-Manifest pilot project with a focus on the ‘reporting once’ principle for the industry as well as through the devel -
opment, together with EMSA, of a European Maritime Single Window service through which all ships could report in 
a standardised manner.
Furthermore, the Commission is currently conducting an evaluation of the directive on maritime reporting formali -
ties, which might possibly lead to a revision of this directive.
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Event Date
Adoption of the Audit Planning Memorandum/Start of audit 18.12.2014
Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 25.5.2016
Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 20.7.2016
Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages 31.8.2016
Seaports are a key part of the EU’s trade network. Between 
2000 and 2013, the EU invested 6.8 billion euros in ports. We 
found that the port development strategies put in place by 
the Member States and the Commission did not provide 
enough information to allow effective capacity planning to 
be carried out. This had led to EU co-financed investments 
in port infrastructure being ineffective and unsustainable, 
with a high risk of around 400 million euros invested being 
wasted. Road and rail connections to port hinterlands were 
often missing or inadequate, meaning that further public 
funding will be needed to make the initial port investments 
work well. We also found that the Commission had not 
taken the necessary action in the area of state aid and 
customs procedures to allow ports to compete on a level 
playing field.
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS