EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 28 March 2012 
on the deposit-guarantee scheme 
(CON/2012/22) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 5 March 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Banka Slovenije for an 
opinion on the draft decision amending the Decision on the deposit-guarantee scheme (hereinafter the 
‘draft decision’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of  the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the draft decision relates to Banka Slovenije and to rules 
applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions 
and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of  Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft decision 
1.1 Slovenian deposit-guarantee scheme 
 The Slovenian deposit-guarantee scheme (DGS) is governed by the Law on banking
2, which was 
the subject of several ECB consultations3. Pursuant to the Law on banking, banks with their head 
offices in Slovenia (hereinafter the ‘member banks ’) guarantee the repayment of deposits up to a 
net deposit of EUR 100 000 held w ith a member bank against which bankruptcy proceedings have 
been initiated. The DGS is funded on an ex-pos t basis. If bankruptcy proceedings are initiated 
against a member bank, Banka Slovenije activates  the DGS by requesting all other member banks 
to contribute their share of the funds necessary to repay guaranteed deposits held with the member 
bank facing bankruptcy. If they are unable to provide sufficient funds in good time, the State, upon Banka Slovenije’s proposal, temporarily provides f unds. Banka Slovenije forwards the funds to the 
designated successor bank charged with the repaym ent of guaranteed deposits. The member banks 
are repaid from the bankruptcy estate in proportion to their respective funds paid in. 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
2  Zakon o ban čništvu  (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia Nos 99/10 – official consolidated version, 9/11, 35/11, 
59/11, 85/11).  
3  See Opinions CON/2010/46, CON/2011/70 and CON/2006/48. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
ECB-PUBLIC 
2 1.2 Draft decision  
 The DGS rules contained in the Law on banking are set out in more detail in the Banka Slovenije 
Decision on the deposit-guarantee scheme4. As stated in the explanatory memorandum, the draft 
decision is intended to improve preparedness in the guaranteed deposits repayment process, 
particularly in view of the shorter repayment pe riod. To this end, the draft decision inserts: (a) 
a new Article 10.a which further defines successo r bank tasks and responsibilities; and (b) a new 
Article 10.b which introduces the notion of potential  successor banks, i.e. member banks appointed 
by Banka Slovenije to be prepared in advance to carry out specific tasks related to the repayment of 
guaranteed deposits. 
 2. General observations 2.1 Operation and financing of the DGS 
 The ECB welcomes that the draft decision is aimed at, inter alia , ensuring a more efficient process 
for repayment of guaranteed deposits and at prep aring for a shorter repayment period. In this 
context, the proposed recast of Directive 94/19/EC
5 (hereinafter the ‘proposed Directive’), 
currently at an advanced stage in the legislativ e process, reduces the repayment period from twenty 
to seven days, implying the need for furthe r adjustments upon the adoption of the proposed 
Directive. Moreover, the proposed Directive introduces funding arrangements for DGSs consisting 
of ex ante contributions provided by the member credit institutions, partly on a risk-weighted basis
6. This implies the need for the introduction of such an ex ante funding arrangement for the 
DGS following adoption of the proposed Directive. 
2.2 The role of Banka Slovenije  
 The ECB supports Banka Slovenije’s monitoring ro le in relation to the repayment of guaranteed 
deposits, in particular as regards a successor bank’s preparedness to carry out this task. Since DGSs 
are a key element of the financial safety net, over seeing their operation falls within the scope of the 
central bank task of contributing to financial stability7.  
 3. Reimbursement of costs incurred by potential successor banks 3.1 According to the new Article 10.b, each potential successor bank shall ensure that it is prepared to 
discharge its successor bank duties. In turn, it is en titled to reimbursement of actual costs related to 
its staffing, organisational preparedness and tec hnical capability. Banka Slovenije, on behalf of the 
member banks, reimburses such costs to potentia l successor banks within 15 days from the 
                                                 
4  Sklep o sistemu jamstva za vloge  (Official Gazette of the Republ ic of Slovenia No 97/10).  
5  See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) 
(COM(2010) 368 final). 
6  See Article 9 of the proposed Directive. 
7  See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2007/26. 
ECB-PUBLIC 
3 confirmation of the cost calculation. The member  banks reimburse this amount to Banka Slovenije 
in equal shares within 15 days from the payment to the potential successor bank. 
3.2 The ECB understands that actual costs incurre d by a potential successor bank are costs connected 
to the operation of the Slovenian DGS. The draft decision therefore implies that Banka Slovenije 
will finance, until it is reimbursed, the costs of  operating the DGS and will make advance payments 
in this context. Such advance payments are inco mpatible with the monetary financing prohibition 
laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty. This provision prohibits central banks from providing overdraft facilities or any other type of credit fa cility to the public sector, including any financing 
of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties
8. Hence, advance payments by national 
central banks in the context of the operation of  the DGS are incompatible with the monetary 
financing prohibition9. The only compatible forms of central bank financing of DGSs are: (a) 
intraday credit in line with the general rules on pr ovision of such credit by the central bank; and (b) 
short-term emergency liquidity  financing under strict conditions established in the ECB’s 
convergence reports, i.e. if such funding is shor t term, to address urgent situations, systemic 
stability aspects are at stake and decisions ar e at the national central bank’s discretion10. These 
conditions need to be listed in national law11 in cases where emergency liquidity financing of the 
DGS is provided for by the national legal system.  
3.3 To ensure compliance with the monetary financing prohibition, any reliance on central bank 
funding needs to be avoided. This implies th at other funding sources should be found for the 
financing of the reimbursed costs to a potentia l successor bank and that the arrangement provided 
for under the draft decision needs to be modified in this respect.  
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 March 2012. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI 
                                                 
8  See Article 1(b)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the 
application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104(b)(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 
9  See e.g. Opinion CON/2011/76. 
10  See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 25.  
11  See paragraphs 2.2 to 2.8 of Opinion CON/2008/5.