1.  
.   
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 12.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1537 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment 
  
Accompanying the document 
PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 
 
{COM(2011) 873 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1536 final} {SEC(2011) 1538 final} 
 
 
EN 2   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
This impact assessment report has been prep ared by DG HOME to accompany the legislative 
proposal on the establishment of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).  
 EUROSUR can be described as a set of measures enhancing the cooperation and information 
exchange of border control au thorities at national and European level as well as when 
cooperating with neighbour ing third countries, with the resu lt that the situa tional awareness 
and reaction capability of these authorities woul d be considerably increased when combating 
irregular migration and cross-bo rder crime. Hence EUROSUR s hould be seen in the context 
of the progressive establishment of a European  model of integrated border management.  
 The works carried out between 2008 and 2011 for the development, testing and gradual establishment of EUROSUR are based on a roadmap presented in a Commission Communication in 2008.
1 In its conclusions of  June 2011 the European  Council stated that 
EUROSUR "will be further developed as a matter of priority in order to become operational 
by 2013 and allow Member States' authorities carry ing out border surveill ance activities to 
share operational information and improve cooperation."  
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. General problems faced in border surveillance 
Irregular migration 
The EU faces considerable pressure from irregu lar migration at its external borders. During 
the first six months of 2011, 74 300 unauthoris ed border crossings were detected, of 
which over 96 % took place at the external borders of Spain, Ma lta, Italy and Greece. Despite 
the coordination efforts of Frontex Member St ates' border control au thorities often face 
difficulties to agree on a common approach and usually need considerable time to find an 
appropriate operational response. 
Loss of life of migrants at sea 
The use of small unseaworthy boats has increased  dramatically the number of migrants and 
refugees drowning in the Atlantic Ocean betw een Africa and the Canary Islands and in the 
Mediterranean Sea. This tragic deat h toll must be significantly reduced. 
Cross-border crime 
Criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants are often using the same routes and 
methods for cross-border crime activities, such as trafficking in huma n beings and drugs. An 
improved interagency cooperation between bord er control and police authorities should 
contribute significantly to fighting such se rious crimes at the external borders. 
2.2. Specific problems faced in border surveillance 
There are a number of reasons w hy criminal networks are often faster and more flexible in 
changing their routes and met hods for irregular migration and cross-border crime than 
Member States' authorities in reacting to changed situations. 
                                                 
1  COM(2008) 68 final of 13.2.2008 (‘EUROSUR roadmap’). 
 
EN 3   EN Insufficient interagency c ooperation at national level 
In some Member States, up to si x different authorities are directly involved in the surveillance 
of maritime borders. While some Member States have established a single national surveillance system, in other Member States diffe rent authorities have set up parallel systems, 
without clear rules and workflows for coope ration and information exchange among them. 
Insufficient information exc hange between Member States 
In the field of border surveillance there is not on ly a lack of coordination inside some Member 
States, but also in between Member States, due to the absence of proper procedures, networks 
or communication channels to exchange information. 
Insufficient cooperation with neighbouring third countries 
The migration pressure presents considerable challenges also fo r the third countries located on 
the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. It is therefore necessary to cooperate more 
closely with the countries of origin and the c ountries of embarkation of irregular migrants. 
Insufficient situational awar eness in the maritime domain 
The fact that traffickers are currently using small wooden and glass-fibre boats for smuggling 
irregular migrants and illicit drugs poses a major challenge to law enforcement authorities because it is extremely difficult to detect, identi fy and track such small boats on the high seas. 
2.3 Baseline for the EUROSUR legislative proposal 
The EUROSUR project has been on-going sinc e 2008. Significant progress has already been 
made and this development is  expected to continue.  
3. A
NALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY  
3.1. The EU's right to act 
The EUROSUR legislative proposal  would be based on Article 77 (2) (d) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, constituting a development of provisions of the Schengen 
acquis . 
3.5. Subsidiarity 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity , EUROSUR follows a decentralised approach, with 
the national coordination centres forming th e backbone of the EUROSUR cooperation. The 
intention is to make best use of existing system s as well as recent technological developments. 
4. OBJECTIVES  
4.1. General objectives 
By establishing an information exchange and cooperation mechanism, EUROSUR shall 
 1) Contribute to the management of migration flows by reducing the number of irregular 
migrants entering the Schengen area undetected; 
 
EN 4   EN 2) Protect and save lives at the external borders by diminishing considerably the 
unacceptable death toll of migrants at sea; 
3) Increase the internal security of the Eur opean Union by preventing serious crime at the 
external borders of the Schengen area; 
4.2. Specific and operational objectives 
In order to achieve the general obj ectives, EUROSUR shall increase the situational awareness  
and reaction capability  of the Member States' border control authorities and Frontex. 
1) Situational awareness : 
a. Improved interagency cooperation by stream lining structures and interlinking 
systems in the law enforcement domain; 
b. The use of data fusion combined with mode rn technological capabilities for detecting 
and tracking in particular small vessels; 
c. Cross-sectoral information exchange with other actors in the maritime domain, such 
as transport, customs, fish eries control and defence; 
d. Improved information exchange wi th neighbouring third countries. 
2) Reaction capability : 
a. Exchange of data, information and in telligence, thereby moving to a more 
intelligence driven approach based on risk analysis; 
b. Effective management of personnel and resources; 
c. Effect measurement, evaluating the eff ect of border surveillance activities.  
5. POLICY OPTIONS  
The question to be answered in this impact assessment is how the different components of 
EUROSUR should be implemented. To this end, three policy options have been identified, 
following a  
 fully  decentralised  (policy option 1),  
 partly  centralised  (policy option 2) and  
 fully centralised  (policy option 3) approach.  
  
In particular it should be assessed which responsibilit ies could be given to the national 
coordination centres (NCCs), such as: 
 Coordination of the surveillance of land and maritime borders ( Policy Option 1.1 ); 
 Command & control  competencies for the surveillance of land and maritime borders 
(Policy Option 1.2) ; 
 Command & control  competencies for border control2 (Policy Option 1.3).  
  
The different policy options for setting up the EUROSUR network  take into account whether 
the NCCs and Frontex use it for:  
 Decentralised and unclassified  information exchange ( Policy Option 2.1 ); 
 Decentralised and classified  information exchange ( Policy Option 2.2 ); 
 Centralised and classified  information exchange ( Policy Option 2.3 ). 
  
                                                
 
2  Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points. 
 
EN 5   EN Policy Option 2.2 assesses also the impact of co sts for including the information exchange on 
cross-border crime and of providing the Comm on Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP). 
 Furthermore, it is assessed wh ether information between the EUROSUR network and 
neighbouring third countries  could be exchanged via 
 
 National coordination centres,  serving as a 'hub' for regional networks  and bilateral 
information exchange  with neighbouring third countries ( Policy Option 3.1 ); 
 National coordination centres, serving as a 'hub' for regional networks  with 
neighbouring third countries, with a new regional network to be set up in the 
Mediterranean region ( Policy Option 3.2 ); 
 Frontex only ( Policy Option 3.3 ). 
  
Finally it is scrutinized whether the service for the common applications of surveillance 
tools at EU level should be provided by 
 
 External service providers to each concerned NCC directly ( Policy Option 4.1 ); 
 Frontex together with EUSC,
3 EMSA4 and GMES5 (Policy Option 4.2 ); 
 Frontex alone ( Policy Option 4.3 ). 
6. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS  
Each sub-option in the policy options is sc reened according to the following criteria: 
1. Effectiveness:  The extent to which the proposal can be expected to ach ieve the general, 
specific and operational objectives. 
 
2. Consistency:  The extent to which options are c onsistent with the overall EUROSUR 
approach, other EU policies and activities, including their acceptance by Member States. 
 
3. Costs:  The extent to which the general policy obj ectives can be achieved for a given level 
of resources/at the least co st (cost-effectiveness). 
 
4. Impact on fundamental rights , in particular on the pr otection of personal data. 
6.1. Sub-options 1.1 to 1.3 for nati onal coordination centres 
6.1.1. Effectiveness 
Taking into account the multitude of nationa l authorities involved in maritime border 
surveillance, limiting the role of the NCC to coordination  functions - as envisaged in 
Option 1.1  - would be more easily accepted by competing authorities. Giving all NCCs 
command & control  functions – as foreseen under Option 1.2  - would allow for a more rapid 
response to an identified threat. Including air border surveillance  and border checks  as 
proposed in Option 1.3  would have the advantage of giving the NCC a better situational 
awareness  for all aspects of border control.  
                                                 
3  EU Satellite Centre. 
4  European Maritime Safety Agency. 
5  EU programme for Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. 
 
EN 6   EN 6.1.2. Consistency 
Option 1.1  is fully consistent with the overall EUROSUR approach, which aims at 
establishing a cooperation mech anism for all authorities invol ved in border surveillance. 
Giving the NCCs command & control functio ns as envisaged in Options 1.2 and 1.3  could 
undermine this aim. 
6.1.3. Costs 
The financial costs  needed in 2011-2020 for setting up, upgr ading and maintaining the NCCs 
and the Frontex Situation Centre are estim ated to amount to M€ 195,2 for option 1.1, 
M€ 401,4 for option 1.2 and M€ 747,3 for option 1.3. 
6.1.4. Fundamental rights 
The information exchange and cooperation mechanism as envisaged under EUROSUR does 
not involve the handling of personal data . Since it might be difficult to guarantee that the any 
handling of personal data is fu lly excluded, it has to ensured th at the processing of personal 
data is adequate, relevant an d not excessive in relation to purposes for which they are 
collected and processed. 
6.2. Sub-options 2.1 to 2.3 for the EUROSUR network 
6.2.1. Effectiveness 
The limitation to unclassified information exchange in Option 2.1  would exclude the 
information exchange on cross-border crime, which is usually regarded as sensitive 
information. The encryption of the data flow under Option 2.2  would allow the Member 
States to share such sensitive information, wh ich is also a pre-condition for exchanging 
intelligence in the Common Pre-Frontier Intellig ence Picture (CPIP). A centralised system - 
as envisaged under Option 2.3  – would allow a better cont rol of the data flow.  
6.2.2. Consistency 
The disadvantage of Option 2.3 is the lack of consistency: EUROSUR fo llows a decentralised 
federation of systems approach. Furthermore, several Memb er States have difficulties to 
accept to store their information centrally  on a system that they do not manage. 
6.2.3. Costs 
The financial costs  in 2011-2020 for the EUROSUR network in line with Option 2.1  are 
estimated to amount to M€ 42, increasing to M€ 46 for Option 2.2  and to M€ 49 for Option 
2.3. The costs of the analytical layer of th e CPIP, as included under Options 2.2 and 2.3, 
amount to M€ 29. 
6.2.4. Fundamental rights 
The handling of personal data under Option 2.1  is excluded, because the network is 
unclassified. The accreditation process of a pr otected network as envisaged under Options 2.2  
and 2.3  ensures that procedures would be in pl ace not only for the handling of security 
sensitive data, but sensitive data in genera l, such as the handling of personal data.  
6.3. Sub-options 3.1 to 3.3 for cooperation with third countries 
6.3.1. Effectiveness 
Option 3.1  would lead to an improveme nt of the situational awaren ess in the Baltic Sea, the 
Black Sea and in the Atlantic  Ocean around the Ca nary Islands, becaus e the three existing 
 
EN 7   EN regional networks SEAHORSE, CoastNet a nd BSCF would be interlinked with the 
EUROSUR network, with the NCCs serving as  a 'hub' for the information exchange. 
 Option 3.2
 is the preferred option, because it deli vers the capability required for EUROSUR 
to cooperate with third countries  in the Mediterranean region. 
 Under Option 3.3
 Frontex would have to re-negotiate all the agreements already concluded 
between Member States and third countries under the above mentioned regional networks. 
6.3.2. Consistency 
Options 3.1 and 3.2  build largely on existing capabiliti es, allowing Member States and third 
countries to take into account regional  priorities and specificities. Option 3.3  is not in line 
with the EUROSUR approach of making best us e of existing infrastructures and systems. 
6.3.3. Costs 
There is no cost related to Option 3.1 , because a connection from all three regional networks 
to their respective NCCs wa s established before the e nd of 2011. Concerning Option 3.2 , the 
costs for establishing and maintaining the SEAHORSE Me diterraneo in 2011-2020 are 
estimated at M€ 5,37. With regard to Option 3.3 , the costs for replacing the three regional 
networks by the EUROSU R network are around M€ 25,29. 
6.3.4. Fundamental rights 
Cooperating with third countries in order to  prevent irregular migration could have a 
significant negative impact on f undamental rights in case the third country au thorities use 
such information to identify pers ons or groups of pers ons which are likely to be subject to 
torture, inhuman and degrad ing treatment. The legislativ e proposal on EUROSUR must 
therefore provide the appropriate safeguards in order to prevent such a situation.  
 
EN 8   EN 6.4. Sub-options 4.1 to 4.3 for the common application of surveillance tools 
6.4.1. Effectiveness 
Option 4.1  would envisage that Member States use individually ex isting capabilities 
established by the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC)  and the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA). Option 4.2  would be more efficient than Option 4.1, because Frontex would 
coordinate the requests coming from the na tional coordination centres. In Option 4.3  Frontex 
would establish such a servic e on its own, which would be difficult to achieve in the mid-
term. 
6.4.2. Consistency 
Option 4.2 would be more consiste nt with the objective of pr omoting interagency cooperation 
than Options 4.1 and 4.3. Due to its multi-purpose  and cross-sectoral approach, EU funding 
provided by the GMES programme for such a service can be justified.  
6.4.3. Costs 
The total costs in 2012-2020 for Option 4.1 are es timated at M€ 80, with almost similar 
amounts for Option 4.2 (M€ 62,1) and Option 4.3 (M€ 62,3).   
6.4.4. Fundamental rights 
Option 4.1 would have the disadv antage that legal frameworks  may not be established to 
enable commercial operators to monitor activitie s in third countries and store information in 
line with data protection laws. 
7. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND IDENTIFICATION OF PREFERRED POLICY OPTION  
In line with the assessment in section 6, the following options would be the preferred ones: 
 With regard to the establishment of NCCs, Option 1.1
 is the preferred option, because it does 
not require Member States to restructure thei r national administrations and thus could be 
easily implemented.  Following the decentralised approach for set ting up EUROSUR, the preferred policy option 
for the EUROSUR network is Option 2.2
.  
 Taking into account the urgent n eed for enhancing border control in the Mediterra nean region, 
Option 3.2
 provides the best answer on how to pr omote the cooperation with neighbouring 
third countries. However, the willingness of nor thern African countries to cooperate is a pre-
condition for the implementation of Option 3.2.  For the common application of surveillance tools, Option 4.2
 is the option providing most 
added value. 
 
EN 9   EN Costs, responsibility and source of funding for the preferred option  
PO x.1 PO x.2 PO x.3 Preferred option  
Step   
Component Decentralised 
approach Partly 
centralised 
approach Centralised 
approach To be 
set up 
by Funding 
via 
1 NCCs M€ 99,6 M€ 271,6 M€ 610 Member 
States EBF 
1 FSC M€ 95,6 M€ 129,8 M€ 137 Frontex Frontex 
2, 7 Network M€ 42,4 M€ 46,7 M€ 49,3 Frontex Frontex 
6 CPIP (RAU) € 0,0 M€ 29,3 M€ 29,2 Frontex Frontex 
3 3rd countries € 0,0 M€ 5,4 M€ 25,3 Member 
States DCI, 
EBF 
5 Common 
application of 
surveillance tools M€ 80,5 M€ 62,1 M€ 62,3 Frontex 
EUSC 
EMSA Frontex 
and FP7/ 
GMES 
Total M€ 318,1 M€ 544,9 M€ 913 
Preferred Option M€ 338,7   
Combining the preferred options, the co sts of EUROSUR would amount to M€ 338,7. 
8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
Frontex shall ensure that methods are in place to monitor the functioning of EUROSUR 
against the main policy objectiv es. Two years after EUROSUR is  fully operational and every 
year thereafter, Front ex shall submit to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Comission a report on the func tioning of EUROSUR.  
 Moreover three years after the EUROSUR system  would have started all its operations and 
every four years thereafter, the Commissi on shall produce an overall evaluation of 
EUROSUR, accompanied, where necessary, by appropriate proposals to amend the 
Regulation establis hing EUROSUR.