EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 18 February 2014  
on the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 
(CON/2014/18) 
 
Introduction and legal basis 
On 13 January 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB ) received a request from the Polish Minister for 
Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the macro-pr udential oversight of the national financial system 
(hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of  the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) and rules 
applicable to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions 
and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of  Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 
1.1 The draft law implements Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board 
of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prude ntial mandate of national authorities
2. 
1.2 To this end, a Systemic Risk Board (hereina fter the ‘Board’) is established as the authority 
responsible for the conduct of macro-prudential oversight. The Board is composed of: (a) the NBP’s President, as Chairman; (b) the Finance Mini ster, as Deputy Chairman; (c) the Chairman of 
the Financial Supervision Authority; and (d) the President of the Bank Guarantee Fund. The Board 
is to pursue the objective of strengthening the natio nal financial system’s resilience to systemic 
risk, thereby contributing to long-term and sustainable economic growth. 
1.3 Specifically, the Board’s tasks include: 
(a) identifying, assessing, monitori ng and mitigating systemic risk; 
(b) applying macro-prudential instruments by adopt ing resolutions that may take the form of: 
(i) opinions; (ii) warnings a nd recommendations addressed to the authorities from which the 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
2 OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1. 
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2 Board draws its members; (iii) warnings addressed to a specific part of or the entire financial 
market; 
(c) monitoring compliance with its recommendations; (d) identifying systemically important fina ncial institutions and recommending specific 
supervisory requirements to be applied to them; 
(e) cooperating with the European Systemic Risk  Board and other Union institutions and bodies 
as well as macro-prudential authorities in other Member States and international 
organisations. 
1.4 Additionally, the draft law amends, inter alia , the following laws: 
(a) the Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski
3, by enabling NBP to provide the 
Board with organisational and administrative support and the information necessary for the 
performance of its macro-prudential mandate and by setting an additional task for NBP 
defined as taking action aimed at mitigating systemic risk; 
(b) the Law of 14 December 1994 on the Bank Guarantee Fund4, by authorising the Bank 
Guarantee Fund to provide to the Board in formation on entities covered by the deposit 
guarantee scheme operated by the Bank Guarantee Fund; 
(c) the Law of 21 July 2006 on supervision of the financial market5, by allowing the Financial 
Supervision Authority to provide the Boar d with the information necessary for the 
performance of its macro-prudential mandate;  
(d) the Law of 7 November 2008 on the Financial Stability Committee6, aiming to ensure that 
the Board’s tasks do not overlap with those of  the Financial Stability Committee, an existing 
body with a financial stability mandate7. 
1.5 The draft law also transposes into Polish legislation that part of Directive 2013/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of  credit institutions and investment firms8, which relates 
to procedures for the imposition of capital buffers. 
 2. General observation The ECB supports the establishment of effective macr o-prudential policy frameworks within the Member 
States that are in line with the guiding principl es expressed in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. Moreover, 
                                                 
3 Consolidated text published in Dz. U. of 2013 item 908. 
4 Dz. U. of 1995 No 4, item 18. 
5 Dz. U. of 2006 No 157, item 1119. 
6 Dz. U. of 2008 No 209, item 1317. 
7 See also Opinion CON/2008/39 and paragraph 3.5 of Op inion CON/2012/58. All ECB opinions are published on the 
ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
8 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338. 
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3 national central banks should play a leading role in macro-prudential oversight, together with the ECB, 
given their expertise and existing respons ibilities in the area of financial stability9. 
 3. Specific observations 3.1 NBP’s role in the performance of the Board’s mandate 
3.1.1 The ECB notes that the draft law grants im portant powers to NBP in the performance of the 
Board’s macro-prudential mandate, in particular: (a) by designating NBP President as Chairman of 
the Board with the right of a casting vote; and (b) by assigning the task of supporting the Board’s activities to NBP, by ensuring its secretariat and preparing its meetings and draft resolutions. However, the ECB notes that, in the event of the NBP President’s absence, Board meetings may be 
chaired by the Finance Minister as Deputy Chairman
10. The ECB considers that having all Board 
meetings chaired by an NBP representative woul d facilitate the effective conduct of the macro-
prudential policy. Replacement arra ngements should ensure that NBP plays a leading role in this 
respect, in line with Recommendation ESRB/2011/311. 
3.1.2 Pursuant to Article 17 of the draft law, the Board may issue recommendations addressed to each of 
the institutions from which the Board draws its  members, including NBP. The ECB understands 
that, if read in conjunction with the definition in Ar ticle 2(3) of the draft law, Article 17 limits the 
subject matter of the Board’s recommendations that are addressed to NBP, as well as NBP’s obligation to provide information on the releva nt implementation measures under Article 30a(2)(3) 
of the draft law, to those NBP activities that may contribute to mitigating systemic risk. It is important that NBP’s involvement in the performance of the Board’s mandate and the 
abovementioned recommendations do not affect: (a ) NBP’s institutional, functional and financial 
independence; or (b) the performance by the Europ ean System of Central Banks of its tasks under 
the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
12. Thus, for legal certainty reasons, the above mentioned limitation, which may be inferred 
from Article 17 in conjunction with Article 2(3) of th e draft law, could be replaced with an explicit 
provision stating that the Board’s recommendations addressed to NBP are without prejudice to the principle of central bank independence re ferred to in Article 130 of the Treaty. 
3.2 Relations with the  Financial Stability Committee 
 In order to avoid an overlap of the Board’s t asks with those of the Financial Stability Committee, 
the draft law discontinues the Committee’s regular m eetings and terminates its analytical function, 
                                                 
9  See, for example, paragr aph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/66, paragraph 2. 1 of Opinion CON/2013/54, paragraph 2.1 of 
Opinion CON/2013/45 and paragra ph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/30. 
10  See Articles 8(2) and 11(4) of the draft law, which add itionally seem to be inconsistent with second sentence of 
Article 6(2) of the draft law. 
11  See recommendation B(3). See also reci tal 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudentia l oversight of the financia l system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Boar d (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). 
12  See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2009/88 and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2012/55. 
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4 thereby transforming it into a body responsible fo r developing and coordina ting crisis management 
procedures and tasks between members of the Co mmittee. This crucial coordination task will 
remain necessary, since the ECB understands that th e Bank Guarantee Fund, one of the institutions 
represented on the Committee, may be designated as a resolution authority as defined in the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parlia ment and of the Council establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms13. However, overlaps in 
the institutional status and powers of the Bo ard and of the Committee, as well as identical 
composition under different chairmanship, could give rise to a lack of clarity  with regard to the 
allocation of responsibilities or to unnecessary duplica tion of tasks. While recognising that crisis 
management coordination might necessitate diffe rent governance arrangements from those of the 
macro-prudential oversight function, a numbe r of responsibilities that are assigned to the 
Committee and the Board in parallel could be mo re uniformly regulated, in particular such 
competences as the exchange of  information between members14 or the establishment of working 
groups15. The ECB encourages the Polish authorities to review this aspect.  
  4. Other issues This opinion is without prejudice to the conclusi ons of the follow-up assessment of Recommendation 
ESRB/2011/3, which the ESRB will prepare in acco rdance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1092/2010. 
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2014. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI 
 
                                                 
13  COM/2012/0280 final, available on the Co mmission’s website at www.europa.eu. 
14  Articles 13 to Article 14a of the draft law, Article 10 of the Law on the Financial Stability Committee. 
15  Article 9 of the draft law, Article 8 of the Law on the Financial Stability Committee.