COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
COM(92) 82 final 
Brussels, 10 March 1992 
APPLICATION OF THE INTER INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT OF 29 JUNE 1988 
ON BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURE 
PROPOSALS FOR RENEWAL 
Report presented by the Commission 
under point 19 of the Agreement 
I 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
I. APPLICATION OF THE INTERINSTITUT IONAL AGREEMENT: 
EXPERIENCE TO DATE 2 
1. Changes in the financial perspective framework 2 
2. Objectives pursued 3 
3. Actual implementation of the Agreement 5 
II. GUIDELINES FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE INTERINSTITUT IONAL 
AGREEMENT 11 
1. Features to be retained 11 
2. Creation of a reserve for exceptional or unforeseen 
expenditure 13 
3. Revision of the financial perspective 15 
4. The privileged status of certain categories 
of expenditure and adjustments in line with conditions 
of implementation 17 
5. Duration and renewal of the Agreement 17 
ANNEX: Development of the financial perspective framework 
and of the budget 
INTRODUCTION 
Point 19 of the Interinstitutional Agreement concluded in 1988 requires 
the Commission to present a report before the end of 1991 on the 
application of the Agreement and on the amendments which need to be made in 
the light of experience. 
The Agreement can be said so far to have produced generally positive 
results In attaining the declared objectives of budgetary discipline and 
improving the budgetary procedure. The Commission proposes that the 
Agreement be renewed, with various amendments being made to take account of 
past experience and to clarify certain implementing rules. 
This report deals with the details of the Agreement itself and the design 
of the financial perspective framework, which is an integral part of it. 
The Commission presents also a communication entitled "The Community's 
Finances Between Now and 1997" concerning. In particular, the headings of 
the financial perspective and the corresponding financial allocations. In 
the light of the outcome of the discussions the Commission will produce a 
proposal for the draft of a new interinstitutional agreement comprising the 
framework for the financial perspective 1993-1997. 
The solutions to the various problems arising must accommodate financial 
and budgetary implications which emerge from the conclusions of the 
Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and Economic and Monetary 
Union. There must also be continued coherence between the various 
components of the package of decisions taken in 1988 with the 
Interinstitutional Agreement as the centrepiece: the system of own 
resources, which will be reviewed at the same time as the Agreement, and 
the rules governing certain major categories of expenditure, in particular 
the Decision on budgetary discipline and the basic Regulation on the 
structural Funds. 
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I. APPLICATION OF THE INTER INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT: EXPERIENCE TO DATE 
1. Changes In the financial perspective framework1 
J.I Revisions or amendments of the Initial financial frauework 
(a) Apart from the technical adjustments and the adjustments to take 
account of implementing conditions, the financial framework laid down 
in 1988 has so far been revised or amended four times*. 
The first two-stage revision in December 1989 and June 1990 was to 
permit implementation of the policy of cooperation with Central 
and Eastern Europe, step up policies towards developing countries 
in the Mediterranean area, Asia and Latin America and strengthen 
internal policies in connection with the application of the 
Single Act. Heading 5 was adjusted to accommodate a smoother 
growth path for the margin available for administrative 
expenditure in 1991 and 1992. 
In December 1990 the three institutions agreed to amend the 
financial perspective to take account of the financial impact of 
German unification and to allow financial assistance to be entered 
in the budget for the countries most affected by the Gulf crisis. 
A readjustment was also made between headings 3 and 4 to 
accommodate within heading 4 a new instrument for the environment 
(LIFE) and operations in 1991 for remote regions with fragile 
economies. The additional requirements resulting from 
reassessment of repayments to Spain and Portugal were included in 
the decision. 
The financial framework was again adjusted in May 1991 to 
accommodate the Community's measures to implement a number of 
external operations (technical assistance to the USSR, financial 
assistance to Israel and the occupied territories, aid to refugees 
of Kurdish origin, additional food aid for Africa). 
In February 1992, a revision was arranged for the year 1992 in 
order to enable: the follow-up of technical assistance to the 
C.I.S; a supplementary grant for the structural funds to 
compensate for the application in earlier years of inflation rates 
which were lower than those actually suffered; a net 
reinforcement of actions in favour of tropical forests and an 
adjustment of the total available for administrative expenditure; 
and reimbursements to certain Member States. Following a 
reduction in the ceiling of the heading "Policies with multiannual 
allocations" and of the line "Stock disposal", the total of 
commitment and payment appropriations remained unchanged. 
The changes In the financial perspective are shown in the Annex, 
together with the development of the budget within this framework. 
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(b) The revisions and amendments have raised the overall ceiling of the 
financial perspective in terms of commitment appropriations by a total 
of 0.9% in 1990, by 5.7% for 1991 and by 4.3% for 1992 compared with 
the amount originally laid down. The adjustments mainly affected 
heading 4 (Other policies), for which the ceiling was raised by 18% 
for 1990, 83% for 1991 and 65% for 1992. They focused on external 
policies, which account for 65% of heading 4 in 1991 and 1992. 
However, expenditure on other internal policies covered by this 
heading grew by an average of 18% a year in real terms from 1988 
to 1991. 
1.2 Margin available within the own resources celling 
By reference to the figures and forecasts used for the technical 
adjustment of the financial perspective for 1992, the real GNP growth 
rate over the period 1988-92 averaged 2.7% whereas the financial 
perspective had initially assumed an average growth rate of 2.3%. In 
addition the GNP level was reviewed upwards at the start of the period 
and then rose further following German unification2 . 
Payment appropriations remained for the whole period significantly 
below the original forecast, expressed as a percentage of GNP. 
Despite the revisions and adjustments made to date the margin 
available between the own resources ceiling and the total payment 
appropriations required is still 0.06% of GNP in 1991 and 0.05% in 
1992. 
T.3 Development of the budget within the financial perspective framework 
As only certain headings had to have their ceilings raised as a result 
of the revisions and adjustments, and as a margin remained available 
under the ceiling of heading 1 (EAGGF Guarantee) or heading 5 (Stock 
disposal), the total volume of payment appropriations entered in the 
budget, expressed as a percentage of GNP, was below the ceiling set in 
the financial perspective. The gap was 0.12% of GNP in 1990, but as 
of 1991 it narrowed and the budget executed at a level which 
approached the ceiling of the financial perspective. Moreover, the 
budget adopted for 1992, following amendment by the draft preliminary, 
supplementary and rectifying budget, is set at the ceiling of the 
financial perspective. 
2. Objectives pursued 
2.1 General object Ives 
The general objectives pursued when the Interinstitutional Agreement was 
concluded fall into three main categories. 
(a) The Community had to be given the financial resources needed to carry 
out the tasks assigned to it up to 1992, in particular implementation 
of the Single European Act. 
2 Taking account of German unification. tHe average rate of annual 
increase is 3,1% for the period, tg»7-92. 
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(b) At the same time, the Agreement was to serve as the instrument for 
giving effect to the conclusions of the Brussels European Council on 
budgetary discipline. An overall limit was set on the increase in 
total Community expenditure over this period in line with the ceiling 
of own resources granted to the Community. The establishment of 
ceilings for broad categories of expenditure was intended to ensure 
orderly growth in the structure of expenditure in accordance with the 
priorities agreed by the institutions. 
In particular, a fresh balance was to be struck between agricultural 
expenditure, the growth of which was to be contained by the 
agricultural guideline, the funds allocated to research and 
technological development policy, the financial outlay on the 
structural operations designed to achieve greater coherence and the 
development of other internal policies in connection with the 
completion of the internal market. 
The setting of ceilings by heading ensured that agricultural spending 
was contained; spending commitments on certain community policies 
such as structural funds, research, IMPs, and PEDIP were thereby 
guaranteed to be carried out; and a margin for manoeuvre was also 
maintained for other policies within the limits of own resources. 
(c) The establishment of this financial framework was intended to limit 
the risk of future conflict between the two arms of the budgetary 
authority during the period of application and to ensure that the 
annual budgetary procedures ran smoothly. 
The development of new policies not provided for at the outset could 
not be covered by the budget unless there was a prior decision on the 
political objectives to be aimed at and an assessment of the financial 
imp Iicat ions. 
2.2 The more specific concerns of the Inst itutIons party to the Agreement 
(a) It was certainly important for the Council to be able to rely on 
controlled development of Community expenditure under which new 
operations introduced could be identified and their financial 
implications evaluated within the limit of certain ceilings. 
(b) Parliament was given a guarantee that the limits imposed on the 
increase in compulsory expenditure - notably on agriculture - would 
leave sufficient funds available for non-compulsory expenditure on 
structural operations, research and the development of new policies in 
connection with the completion of the internal market. 
In addition, pursuant to the Agreement and in particular when the 
financial perspective was being revised, decisions with a major 
political impact had to be taken outside the budgetary procedure. 
This substantially widened the scope of Joint decision-making between 
Parliament and the Council. 
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(c) The Commission received a guarantee that, for the establishment and 
implementation of the various Community policies, the financial 
aspects would be more predictable and the budgetary procedure would be 
less prone to dispute. Although it was a party to the Agreement, the 
Commission, apart from making the annual technical adjustments, has 
had no more to do In implementing the Agreement than proposing, 
subject to certain limits and in the event of unforeseen occurrences, 
a revision of the original financial framework. 
3. Actual Implementation of the Agreement 
By and large, the 1988 Agreement has achieved its objectives. This 
generally favourable Judgment must, however, be tempered by two 
considerations: the favourable circumstances surrounding application of 
the Agreement, and the difficulties which arose when the initial financial 
framework was revised. Furthermore, the privileged status of certain 
categories of expenditure has made the financial framework more rigid and 
raised various problems of interpretation. 
3.1 Compliance with the basic principles of the Agreement 
In relation to the objectives of improving the budgetary procedure and 
imposing budgetary discipline, the operation of the Agreement may be 
considered generally satisfactory. 
(a) For each of the financial years covered by the Agreement, the budget 
has been adopted on schedule. 
(b) The budgetary discipline arrangements introduced in 1988 have been 
accepted by the various parties to the Agreement. 
- Every budget adopted since the Agreement entered into force has 
respected the ceilings set by the financial perspective. On a 
number of occasions, however, the completion of the procedure for 
revising the financial perspective has coincided with the end of 
the budgetary procedure, thereby detracting from the medium-term 
framework role which the instrument was intended to perform. 
- The classification of individual budget items by heading of the 
financial perspective as originally determined on the basis of the 
1988 budget has not changed, except for the transfer of certain 
appropriations from Part A of the budget (heading 5 of the 
financial perspective) to Part B (heading 4) during the 1991 
budgetary procedure. 
- The financial framework has also been respected in the utilization 
of appropriations, with the sole exception of food aid, for which 
the budgetary authority agreed, in a revision of the financial 
perspective, to allow transfers between headings 1 and 4. This 
"pipeline" arrangement could be enshrined in the new Agreement. 
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Although the financial perspective has been revised frequently -
mainly because of the accumulation of exceptional events over a 
short period - revision has always taken the form prescribed in 
the Agreement (point 12 or point 4). 
(c) The framework imposed by the financial perspective has had the effect 
of better positioning budgetary choices in the broader context of the 
Community's finances In the medium term. This has certainly been the 
effect on the Commission in its preparation of the preliminary draft 
budget. The constraints of fixed ceilings have probably resulted in a 
more rational approach to the preparation of the budget. 
3.2 Favourable clrcumstances 
(a) During the first three years in which the Agreement was applied, the 
volume of agricultural expenditure remained more or less constant and 
well below the limit fixed by the guideline. This situation is due 
less to a deep-seated reform of the structural conditions of the 
Community agricultural markets than to favourable conditions on the 
world market (world prices and ecu/dollar parity). The additional 
costs in agriculture resulting from German unification were covered 
without the existing ceiling having to be raised. 
However, the tide began to turn in 1990 and the budgetary impact has 
become apparent in 1991. Moreover, the budget adopted for 1992 fixed 
spending on agriculture at the ceiling set by the agricultural 
gu i de Ii ne. 
(b) Real GNP was higher than initially assumed. The margin actually 
available between the own resources ceiling and the total payment 
appropriations required according to the financial perspective was 
therefore far bigger than at first expected. If this had not been the 
case, the increases in the ceilings for the various categories of 
expenditure would have pushed the total up against the own resources 
ceiling from 1991. If the rate of economic growth had been lower than 
the rate originally assumed, the technical adjustments to the 
financial perspective in line with inflation and the adjustments to 
take account of implementing conditions would have eaten into the 
margin for unforeseen expenditure. If the margin had been used up, it 
would have been necessary to agree on criteria for reducing the 
ceilings of the various headings in order to respect the limit on own 
resources. 
(c) Even though the probability was extremely slight, the Community did 
not have to cover any major default by its debtors under its borrowing 
and lending operations or loan guarantees. 
The lending operations guaranteed by the Community totalled 
ECU 11.5 billion and annual repayments of capital and interest for the 
years ahead come to around ECU 2.5 billion. However, since these 
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guarantees are only given a token entry in the budget, they are not 
taken into consideration in the ceilings set by the financial 
perspective. The risk of default by a debtor is increasing with the 
extension of this type of operation to non-member countries. Unless a 
suitable mechanism is available, the activation of the guarantees 
above a certain amount would entail either a revision of the financial 
perspective - which experience shows to be a lengthy procedure - or a 
drastic reduction in other items of expenditure. 
The favourable circumstances which have accompanied the application of the 
Agreement certainly restrict the range of experience gained and the lessons 
which may be drawn for the future. However, the Commission does not feel 
that this is a reason for doubting whether this instrument could operate 
effectively in different circumstances. On the contrary, this shows the 
importance of giving due consideration to various situations which could 
occur and of taking the necessary measures to respond to them when the 
Agreement is renewed. 
3.3 Difficulties encountered during the revision of the financial 
perspective 
The revisions made have revealed several types of problem: 
(a) At the time of the first revision exercise in 1990, the question was 
raised about the kind of reasons which could Justify the revision in 
application of point 12 of the Agreement. One of the interpretations 
put forward was that a revision (under qualified majority voting of 
the Council) was only possible to enable the financing of new actions 
made necessary by unforeseen circumstances. Such an interpretation, 
if it had prevailed, would have meant that any reinforcement of 
existing policies and all commitments for new actions not linked to 
unforeseen circumstances (with the difficulty of defining the notion 
of the unforeseen) is in fact subordinated, for its financial 
implementation, to a decision taken under unanimous voting even in the 
areas where majority voting is the rule. The Commission's position is 
thus that the possibility of proceeding to a revision should not be 
limited a priori to particular circumstances and that revision should 
take place by qualified majority decision of the Council. 
(b) The revision (under point 12) and amendment (under point 4) procedures 
have in each instance proved to be difficult and lengthy (three months 
on average) quite apart from the time required to implement these 
changes in the budgetary procedure itself. As a result, there is a 
risk that the Community's capacity for initiative might lose some 
credibiIity. 
(c) The inability to respond quickly to unforeseen events without going 
through the revision procedure, even where the effects on the budget 
are limited to a single financial year, tends paradoxically to 
undermine the medium-term framework role originally assigned to the 
financial perspective. There is a danger that revision might become a 
normal stage in every budgetary procedure. 
(d) This situation, coupled with the length of the procedure for revising 
or amending the financial perspective, tends to merge revision and 
budgetary procedures into a single negotiation. Each institution 
tends to look for bargaining 
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counters In one of the procedures in order to secure an advantage in 
the negotiations on the other procedure, resulting in a stalemate or, 
at the very least, a lack of clarity and rationality in the debate. 
(e) In heading 4 (Other policies), the budgetary authority - and above all 
the Council - has generally sought to ensure not only that the 
additional requirements catered for by the revision are defined in 
detail in terms of the operations concerned but also that the 
corresponding allocations continue to be distinguished from other 
expenditure in the heading when the budget is drawn up for subsequent 
years. When this identification and prior allocation of expenditure 
proved difficult to achieve to any degree of detail, although the 
probability that it would be incurred was high, the budgetary 
authority has preferred to limit the revision to the current financial 
year, and then if necessary make successive revisions in subsequent 
years. 
This understandable concern can be explained by the heterogeneous 
nature of heading 4, which covers both the Community's external 
actions and a wide range of internal policies. The Commission 
therefore proposed dividing heading 4 into internal policies and 
external policies. Having failed to secure the agreement of the other 
institutions, it therefore considered it logical in the revision 
exercises that any additional allocations for external policies should 
be identified and earmarked for this purpose. 
However, apart from this consideration, the Commission feels that 
systematically allocating in advance the amount provided by the 
revision of an individual ceiling would be inconsistent with the 
object of the financial perspective. This approach could lead to a 
growing fragmentation during the period of application of the 
financial framework and to more rigidity in budgetary management. It 
lends credit to the idea that any additional amount resulting from 
revision must be entered in the budget; this is not consistent with 
the idea of a ceiling. Since new requirements are not considered as 
being pooled together with the other expenditure covered by the 
heading, it is more difficult to examine the possibility of 
redeploying the appropriations. 
(f) On a number of occasions, the changes which had to be made to the 
financial perspective were the result of political decisions taken by 
the Council in matters of external relations. During the revision 
procedure, Parliament thus had very little margin of manoeuvre to 
discuss the principle and the financial implications of these 
decisions. A more general revision, with use of the additional margin 
being decided Jointly on a case-by-case basis, would have produced a 
more even distribution of decision-making powers in applying the 
Agreement. 
The last revision of the financial perspective, which was only brought 
to a close in February 1992 after a particularly long procedure, 
suffered from an accumulation of most of these problems. This 
experience serves to underline more than ever the need for the 
introduction of more flexible arrangements into the new agreement, to 
confront in an effective way unforeseen circumstances, without calling 
into question the rigour of budgetary discipline. 
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3.4. The effects of the prIvlleged status accorded to certain categorles of 
expend Iture 
Legislative decisions taken in 1988 fixed allocations for certain 
categories of operations in terms of expenditure objectives. 
As a result, the two arms of the budgetary authority undertook - in 
point 17 of the Inter Institutional Agreement - to respect the allocations 
of commitment appropriations provided in the financial perspective for the 
structural Funds, PEDIP. the IMPs and the RTD framework programme. In this 
context, the Commission proposed that unused budget allocations for these 
programmes be transferred to subsequent years and the transfers were duly 
authorized by the budgetary authority under point 11 of the Agreement. 
These transfers reduce the margin available under the own resources 
ceiling, which may be needed to cover new requirements in the year in 
question. If growth is lower than expected initially, incomplete 
implementation of programmes with multiannual allocations could, as a 
result of transfers, Jeopardize the agreed development of other policies. 
For these categories of expenditure, the financial perspective ceases to be 
a medium-term framework. Not Just the expenditure concerned, but also the 
ceiling of the heading in the financial perspective which includes these 
categories, tends to be regarded as being privileged. By extension, the 
heading 4 ceiling has come to be regarded as an objective, especially as 
the subceiling for non-compulsbry expenditure under this heading was one of 
the only areas in which Parliament had any real margin of decision. 
3.5. Problems of Interpretation 
The institutions have differing views on the extent of possible revisions 
of the financial perspective under point 12 of the Agreement. The Council 
feels that the margin for unforeseen expenditure of 0.03% of GNP referred 
to in point 12 is gradually used up by successive revisions. In any case, 
a revision which is limited to a modification of ceilings by heading, 
without affecting the overall ceiling of the financial perspective, remains 
possible. On the other hand, Parliament and the Commission take the view 
that the margin for unforeseen expenditure can be reconstituted within the 
limit of the ceiling on own resources. This difference in interpretation 
has only been overcome by using point 4 (requiring a unanimous decision of 
the Council) as an alternative basis for revisions or by omitting any 
reference to specific provisions of the Agreement in the revision decision. 
As regards the technical adjustments to the financial perspective under 
point 9 of the Agreement, the Commission has adopted the following method: 
the ceilings for year n are adjusted in February of year n-1 on the 
basis of the forecast rate of inflation for the two years concerned 
and the actual rate of inflation in previous years. The calculation 
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is therefore based on the latest figures and forecasts available; 
only the agricultural guideline is adjusted to the growth of GNP -
this Is done by the method of calculation set out in Article 6 of the 
Decision on budgetary discipline. 
This method of adjustment has not met with any formal opposition by the 
other institutions but has come in for some criticism. 
- It has been argued that the ceilings of all the headings should be 
adjusted in line with real GNP growth, which would mean in practice 
that the ceilings were considered to have been set as a percentage of 
GNP and not as an absolute figure. 
Parliament and some Member States believe that there should be an 
ex post adjustment to take into account any divergence between the 
rate of inflation used ahead of the budgetary procedure and the actual 
rates measured later. This subsequent correction is held to be 
particularly necessary for allocations to the structural Funds to 
ensure that their resources show a linear progression in real terms. 
The Commission considers that this ex post correction cannot be made as 
part of the technical adjustment under point 9 of the Agreement. It takes 
the view that the correction relates only to the allocation for the 
structural Funds in connection with the doubling of appropriations planned 
between 1987 and 1993. This question should be dealt with either during 
the revision or, at all events, at the end of the procedure. 
It takes the view that in future no ex post adjustment should be allowed. 
On a number of occasions the Commission has pointed out that the breakdown 
of the overall ceilings for commitment and payment appropriations into 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure is purely indicative and can be 
adjusted by the budget decisions provided that the ceilings for each 
heading are respected. Any other interpretation would make the financial 
perspective too restrictive. 
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II. GUIDELINES FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE INTER INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT 
1. Features to be retained 
1.1. The objectives assigned to the Inter InstitutionaI Agreement in 1988 
are still valid. The Commission believes that the Agreement should be 
renewed and that Its three guiding principles should be retained: 
(a) A financial framework for the medium term is agreed on by the three 
institutions, setting annual ceilings for broad categories of 
Community expenditure. 
(b) The content and ceiling of each heading are determined on the basis of 
priorities adopted by the Community in order to ensure the orderly 
progression of expenditure. 
(c) Each year the overall expenditure ceiling remains within the limits of 
the Community's own resources. 
1.2 Setting the ceilings 
(a) The ceiling for the various headings (in commitment appropriations) 
and the overall ceiling of the financial perspective (in commitment 
appropriations and in payment appropriations) should continue to be 
set in constant ecus. 
The establishment of a financial framework in absolute figures and 
not, for example, as a proportion of GNP is in fact more consistent 
with the logic of budgetary discipline. The maximum level of 
Community expenditure, its structure and its growth profile depend 
primarily on requirements, bearing in mind the responsibilities 
assigned to the Community, and not directly on the growth in Community 
prosperity. 
The establishment of the financial framework in current ecus would 
have to be based on an inflation forecast for the whole of the period. 
An explicit forecast of this type over such a long term would 
inevitably be very uncertain and adjustments during the period of 
application would be hard to avoid. 
(b) As regards EAGGF Guarantee expenditure (heading 1), in view of the 
amounts involved, the retention of a limit on the increase in 
agricultural spending is a basic factor in budgetary discipline and an 
essential precondition for the political balance to be achieved 
between the Member States and between the institutions in the 
establishment of a new financial framework. 
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The Commission therefore proposes that the principle of the 
agricultural guideline laid down in the Decision on budgetary 
discipline should be maintained. 
(c) As at present, the ceiling on the payment appropriations required 
should be set for the total of the financial perspective, on the basis 
of a relationship with total commitment appropriations for each major 
category of expenditure determined in such a way as to ensure an 
orderly development of the balance of outstanding commitments. 
(d) Unlike the expenditure ceilings, the own resources ceiling has to be 
set as a percentage of GNP. While the level of expenditure is 
determined by the nature and volume of budgetary operations considered 
necessary, the level of revenue corresponds to an "ability to pay", 
which depends mainly on economic activity. 
The level of the ceilings must be set in the financial perspective in 
such a way that a margin is left between the own resources ceiling and 
the total payment appropriations required. Changes in the level of 
own resources available in line with actual GNP growth would be added 
to or subtracted from this margin, which would determine the extent of 
possible revisions of expenditure ceilings each year. It would also 
be worth specifying in the Agreement that, if there was a risk that 
this safety margin would be exhausted as a result of a downturn in 
economic activity, the Commission would examine, with the other 
insitut ions concerned, the changes made necessary to the financial 
framework and would present proposals as appropriate. 
(e) The Commission would continue to make an annual technical adjustment 
before the budgetary procedure begins. However, it should be made 
quite clear that 
the adjustment in line with real GNP growth is applied only for 
determining the agricultural guideline, in accordance with the method 
of calculation prescribed elsewhere, and the actual amount of the 
ceiling on available own resources; 
the ceilings of the various headings (except for the agricultural 
monetary reserve) are adjusted in line with price increases for the 
year of the preliminary draft budget on the basis of the rates of 
inflation available at the time and cannot be corrected subsequently. 
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This approach is the only one consistent with the nature of the budget, 
which Is an act of authorization based on forecasts. 
2. Creation of a reserve for exceptional or unforeseen expenditure 
A specific heading should be reserved for expenditure of a non-permanent 
nature which may be incurred in particular circumstances and subject to 
compliance with certain pre-established criteria. 
Apart from the existing monetary reserve, two other categories of 
expenditure of this type may be envisaged: 
- a reserve for unforeseen expenditure in the field of external actions 
by means of crisis situations such as urgent humanitarian aid or 
financial assistance to a particular third country can be met for a 
financial year without having to revise the financial perspective; 
- a reserve to guarantee borrowing and lending operations with 
non-member countries so that the appropriations required could be 
entered in the budget should the Community guarantee need to be 
act ivated. 
2.1 Creation of a reserve for unforeseen expenditure In the field of 
external actions 
(a) Purpose of the reserve 
The aim would be to enable the Community budget to be adjusted quickly, for 
one year, to cater for exceptional or unforeseen circumstances, without the 
need for a revision of the financial perspective. The revision procedure 
should be reserved for cases where changes need to be made in the planned 
development or structure of Community expenditure during the application of 
the Agreement and extending beyond the current financial year. 
The reserve would be drawn upon, within the limits of the amount fixed, to 
allow the ceiling of a particular heading to be exceeded for one year. For 
a given financial year the reserve would be available only in the time 
between the presentation of the preliminary draft budget and the end of the 
financial year. It would only be drawn on to cover emergency humanitarian 
aid or financial assistance to non-member countries in case of crisis. 
(b) Dovetailing with the budget 
The reserve would be drawn on following a Commission proposal after the 
possibilities of financing the additional requirements by redeploying 
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expenditure within the heading have been fully examined; it might even be 
possible to agree on a rule prescribing the minimum amount of redeployment 
(a kind of "excess"). 
In order that recourse to the reserve does not upset the balance of the 
financial framework agreed between the institutions, calls on the reserve 
would be agreed Jointly by the two arms of the budgetary authority. 
Budgetary cover would, as a rule, be provided by the normal procedures: 
if the reserve were mobilized between the date when the preliminary 
draft was presented and the beginning of the financial year, a letter 
of amendment would have to be drawn up for the proposed additional 
appropriations in excess of the ceiling for the heading concerned. 
if the reserve were mobilized during the execution of the budget, 
there would be two possible courses of action: 
* consideration would be given to the possibility of transferring 
appropriations within the budget as adopted, depending on the 
stage reached in the financial year and the present and 
foreseeable conditions of implementation; 
* otherwise budget cover for the operation concerned would have to 
be provided by a supplementary and amending budget. 
In cases where speed is of the essence, provision should be made so that a 
decision can be taken, for example in a trialogue and on a majority vote, 
to adopt the necessary supplementary and amending budget by expedited 
procedure (a single reading and shortened timetable of no more than one 
month). 
2.2 Guarantee for borrowing and lending operations 
(a) As lending operations in non-Community countries have increased, 
Parliament has repeatedly demanded the establishment of a reserve for 
the guarantees linked to these instruments. The Commission is also 
aware that loans to non-Community countries now represent very 
significant amounts and considers that it would be useful to have a 
mechanism which would, if necessary allow the Community guarantee to 
be activated in total clarity; it made a statement to this effect 
when the decision was taken to extend EIB loans to a number of 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It also stated on this 
occasion that it would be presenting a proposal to this effect when 
the InterinstitutionaI Agreement was renewed. The Council shared the 
Commission's concern and stated that it would examine these proposals 
when they were presented. 
(b) The Commission considers that the mechanism to be introduced under the 
new financial framework should be designed to provide rapid budgetary 
cover for any activation of the guarantee, which would be charged 
initially to cash resources, in accordance with Article 12 of 
Regulation No 1552/89 on the application of the own resources system. 
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As the Community continues to back all its guarantees with the entire 
budget, the size of the reserve would not automatically limit the 
volume of loans or guarantees that could be granted. 
(c) For the mobilisation of this reserve, a mechanism inspired by the 
Monetary reserve could be envisaged. The reserve would be included 
each year in the budget: the implementation of the guarantee would 
operate through a transfer from this reserve to the budget line 
concerned (with a token entry (p.m.)). In this case, the amount of 
the reserve for guarantees would have to be distinguished from the 
contingency reserve proposed above, each having its own sub-heading. 
Another formula, more flexible, would be to only budgétise if the 
reserve is used, for the necessary amount and by way of a 
supplementary and amending budget. In this case the two types of 
reserve could stay combined under one heading. However, the 
Commission, as part of the yearly technical adjustment exercise, would 
determine what proportion of that reserve should be allocated to the 
guaranteeing of borrowing and lending operations. The proportion would 
be set at a predetermined percentage (20% for example) of the payments 
in interest and capital on such operations falling due in the 
following financial year. 
(d) If, on the other hand, it was decided to set up a Guarantee Fund for 
external loans outside the budget, the reserve entered in the 
financial perspective would be drawn on during the year to provide the 
Fund with amounts corresponding to the newly granted loans. 
3. Revision of the financial perspective 
3.7. Joint decision by the three InstItutions 
Since the Agreement is between the three institutions, it would be logical 
for all three (i.e. the Commission included) to decide Jointly on revisions 
of the financial perspective. The majority voting rule would apply to any 
revision of expenditure ceilings (overall or for individual headings), 
provided that the limits on own resources are respected. 
The revision decision would have to be taken within a given time limit (two 
months, say). A trialogue meeting would be arranged in the month following 
the Commission's proposal. If no decision could be agreed within the time 
limit, the Commission's proposal would be deemed to be rejected. 
- 16 -
3.2. Uargtn available for revision 
It should be made clear that the margin available for one or more revisions 
for each year covered by the financial perspective is the difference 
between: 
the overall ceiling for payment appropriations as originally set by 
the financial perspective and after annual adjustments, and 
the own resources ceiling. 
3.3 Conditions and frequency of revision 
It should be possible to initiate a revision procedure not only to deal 
with unforeseen circumstances - a situation which, initially and up to a 
certain amount, could be covered by the reserve set up for this purpose -
but also to implement the Community's policy decisions involving new 
operations or a resetting of priorities. 
Any revision of the financial perspective should therefore take place 
before the beginning of the budgetary procedure for the financial year 
concerned. It could be stated in the Agreement that, before the budgetary 
procedure begins, the Commission must indicate whether it proposes to 
maintain or revise the existing financial perspective. 
3.4. Rules on redeployment 
So that decisions on new budget expenditure will not, where possible, cause 
the overall ceilings of the financial perspective to be raised up to the 
limit of available own resources, the institutions should undertake to 
abide by certain rules: 
as with the decision to draw on the reserve for exceptional or 
unforeseen expenditure, a decision to raise the ceiling of a 
particular heading should be taken only after the possibilities of 
financing the additional requirements by redeploying expenditure 
within the heading have been fully examined; it might even be 
possible to agree on a rule prescribing the minimum amount of 
redeployment ; 
- the possibility of lowering the ceiling of one heading to offset the 
raising of the ceiling of another should be investigated wherever it 
seems both possible and desirable to establish a new and lasting 
balance between the headings concerned; 
- on a more permanent basis, the institutions should ensure that safety 
margins are preserved below the ceilings of the various headings when 
the budget is being established and adopted. 
- 17 -
4. The privileged status of certain categories of expenditure and 
adjustments In line with the conditions of Implementation 
If the allocations for certain operations and instruments (in particular 
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund) are to continue to be treated 
as expenditure objectives in the basic legal instruments, provisions 
similar to point 17 of the Agreement would have to be retained. The 
privileged status given to certain categories should, however, remain the 
exception, since the rule is that the ceilings are upper limits which must 
not be exceeded and that the actual budget allocations should normally come 
within these Iimits. 
Even if some categories of expenditure are fixed as objectives, the 
institutions should not necessarily be obliged to transfer to later years 
appropriations earmarked for these operations which remain unused during a 
given financial year. Point 11 of the Agreement might therefore be 
dropped, since in practice it may compromise the implementation of other 
expenditure within the ceiling of the financial perspective. 
5. Duration and renewal of the Agreement 
The Inter institutionaI Agreement could be concluded for indefinite 
duration, the unanimous agreement of the three institutions being required 
for any changes to the rules. 
The financial perspective framework, on the other hand, would be 
established for five years (1993-97). 
The definition of the financial perspective by a more continuous process 
would guarantee that when it expires there is already a further reference 
framework for assessing the future implications of newly introduced 
measures. However, a "rolling-plan" financial perspective would cease to 
be a framework foi medium-term political choices and commitments. If the 
financial perspective were extended each year by the addition of an extra 
final year, this would either give rise to difficult discussions or become 
a mechanical exercise in projection which would be contrary to the nature 
of the financial perspective. 
A better solution would be to stipulate in the new Agreement that from the 
third year of its application the Commission can propose a new five-year 
framework. 
ANNEX 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE FRAMEWORK AND OF THE BUDGET1 
I. FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE FRAMEWORK: CHANGES MADE 
1. Financial perspective 1988 
2. Current financial perspective 
3. Macroeconomic figures and forecasts used for the technical adjustments 
of the financial perspective (point 9) 
4. Adjustments of the financial perspective in line with the conditions 
of implementation (points 10 and 11) 
5. Revisions and amendments of the financial perspective 
6. Comparison between initial and current financial perspective 
7. Margin available between ceiling for payment appropriations required 
in financial perspective and own resources ceiling 
8. Breakdown by financial perspective heading 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY BUDGET WITHIN FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
1. Community budget 1980-92 
Commitment and payment appropriations. ECU billion, 1980 prices 
2. Community budget 1980-92 
Total expenditure (payment appropriations) as % of GNP 
3. Total commitment appropriations (current prices) in relation to 
financial perspective 
4. Total payment appropriations (% of GNP) in relation to own resources 
ce iIi ng 
5. Commitment appropriations (current prices) in relation to ceilings for 
individual headings of financial perspective 
1 THe actual framework of the financial perspective is tHe one in force in 
Feburary 1992 after the revision. 
i% 
1-1 
FIKAKCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
(ECO Billion at 1988 prices) 
Appropriations for coamitaents 
1. EAGGP Guarantee 
2. Structural operations 
3. Policies with lultiannual allocations (1) 
4. Other policies 
of which : non conpulsory 
5. Repayients and adiinistration 
of which : stock disposal 
6. Monetary reserve (2) 
TOTAL 
of which : (3) 
coipulsory 
non conpulsory 
Appropriations for payments required 
of which : (3) 
conpulsory 
non compulsory 
Appropriations for payaents required as \ of GHP 
Margin for unforeseen eipenditure 
Mn resources required as \ of GHP 1988 
27500 
7790 
1210 
2103 
1646 
5700 
1240 
1000 
45303 
33698 
11605 
43779 
33640 
10139 
1.12 
0.03 
1.15 1989 
27700 
9200 
1650 
2385 
1801 
4950 
1400 
1000 
46885 
32607 
14278 
45300 
32604 
12696 
1.14 
0.03 
1.17 1990 
28400 
10600 
1900 
2500 
i860 
4500 
1400 
1000 
48900 
32810 
16090 
46900 
32740 
14160 
1.15 
0.03 
1.18 1991 
29000 
12100 
2150 
2700 
1910 
4000 
1400 
1000 
50950 
32980 
17970 
48600 
32910 
15690 
1.16 
0.03 
1.19 1992 
29600 
13450 
2400 
2800 
1970 
3550 
1400 
1000 
52800 
33400 
19400 
50100 
33110 
16990 
1.17 
0.03 
1.20 
(2) Chapter P on budget estiaates of the European Council indicates a figure of ECO 2400 million (1988 prices) 
for policies with miltiannual allocations in 1992. The policies in question are research and 
technological developaent and integrated Mediterranean prograaaes. Only expenditure for which a legal basis 
exists aay be financed under this itea. The present franevork programe provides a legal basis 
for research expenditure of ECO 863 Billion (current prices) for 1992. The regulation on integrated 
Mediterranean programmes pvides a legal basis for an estiaated aaount of ECO 300 million (current prices) in 1992. 
The two aras of the budgetary authority undertake to respect the principle that further budget appropriations 
within this ceiling for 1990, 1991 and 1992 will require a revision of the existing fraaework profane, or, 
before the end of 1991, a decision on a new fraaework prograaae based on a proposal froa the Coaaission in 
accordance with the legislative provisions in Aticle 130 Q of the European Econoaic Coaaunity Treaty. 
(3) At current prices. 
(4) Based on the classification in the 1989 preliainary draft budget. Modifications resulting froa 
decisions by the budgetary authority on changes of classification will be implemented as a technical 
adjustment, according to point 9 of the Interinstitutional Agreeaent. 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
(ECU million. Current 
XIX/A/1 dn Lotus\pf\pf.wk3 tabe 1.2 
prices) 
Appropriations for commitments 
09-Mar-92 
1. EAGGF Guarantee (1) 
2. Structural operations 
3. Policies with multiannual allocations (2) 
4. Other policies (1) 
of which : non compulsory 
5. Repayments and administration 
of which : stock disposal 
6. Monetary reserve (3) 
TOTAL 
of which : (4) 
compulsory 
non compulsory 
Appropriations for payments required 
of which : (4) 
compulsory 
non compulsory 
Appropriations for payments required as \ of GNP 1988 
27500 
7790 
1210 
2103 
1646 
5700 
1240 
1000 
45303 
33698 
11605 
43779 
33640 
10139 
1.12 1989 
28613 
9522 
1708 
2468 
1864 
5153 
1449 
1000 
48464 
33764 
14700 
46885 
33745 
13140 
1.07 1990 
30700 
11555 
2071 
3229 
2523 
4930 
1523 
1000 
53485 
35454 
18031 
51291 
35372 
15919 
1.08 1991 
33000 
14804 
2466 
5648 
4738 
4559 
1375 
1000 
61477 
37199 
24278 
58458 
37195 
21263 
1.14 1992 
35039 
18109 
2915 
5636 
4704 
3893 
810 
1000 
66592 
38260 
28332 
63241 
38200 
25041 
1.15 
(1) In accordance with the joint statement made by the three institutions when the revision of the Financial 
Regulation was adopted and in order to ensure the proper financing of food aid without having to 
revise the financial perspective, compliance with the ceilings for Items 1 and 4 will not rule out 
the possibility of a transfer between the headings in Chapter Bl-33 (refunds in connection with 
Community food aid) and Chapter B7-20 (food aid) . This means that the amounts of these transfers 
will not counts towards the totals of appropriations to be taken into consideration for the purpose 
of ensuring compliance with the ceilings in the financial perspective. The criteria for the examination 
of these transfers are those agreed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission in their statement 
of 12 February 1990. 
(2) Chapter F on budget estimates of the European Council indicates a figure of ECO 2400 million (1988 prices) 
for policies with multiannual allocations in 1992. The policies in question are research and 
technological development and integrated Mediterranean programmes. Only expenditure for which a legal basis 
exists may be financed under this item. The present framework programme provides a legal basis 
for research expenditure of ECU 863 million (current prices) for 1992. The regulation on integrated 
Mediterranean programmes provides a legal basis for an estimated amount of ECU 300 million (current prices) in 1992. 
The two arms of the budgetary authority undertake to respect the principle that further budget appropriations 
within this ceiling for 1990, 1991 and 1992 will require a revision of the existing framework programme, or, 
before the end of 1991, a decision on a new framework programme based on a proposal from the Commission in 
accordance with the legislative provisions in Aticle 130 Q of the European Economic Community Treaty. 
(3) At current prices. 
(4) Based on the classification in the 1991 budget and the 1992 supplementary and amending preliminary draft budget. 
*-© 
1.3 
MACROECONOMIC FIGURES AND FORECASTS USED FOR THE TECHNICAL ADJUSTEMENTS 
OF THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE (Point 9 of the Interinstitutional Agreement) 
Real GNP growth rate ( % per year ) 
Adjustment for 1989 H n ig9o 
ii ii 1991 
M " 1992 (excluding former GDR) 
(including former GDR) 
GNP deflator ( % per year ) 
Adjustment for 1989 it ii 1990 
II it 1991 
II n 1992 
GNP (current prices) according to figures 
and forecasts used for adjustment 
for 1992 ( ECU billion ) 
- Excluding former GDR 
- Including former GDR 
GNP (current prices) according to figures 
and forecasts available on 18.11.1991 
Including former GDR from 1991. 1989 
3.0 
3.0 
3.4 
3.3 
3.5 
4.6 
5.3 
5.2 
4372 
4399 1990 
3.0 
3.1 
2.8 
4.0 
4.3 
4.9 
4711 
4737 1991 
3.1 
2.2 
3.9 
5.4 
5074 
5163 
5123 1992 
2.5 
2.5 
4.6 
5440 
5536 
5493 
1.4 
ADJUSTMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE IN LINE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION ( Points 10 and 11 of the Interinstitutional Agreement) 
ECU million 
Heading 2 
Total 
Heading 3 
Total 
Heading 4 
Total 
Commit. TOTAL 
Total 
Paym. TOTAL 
Total Adjustment ahead of the 
budgetary procedure for 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1990 
1991 
1992 1990 
24 
24 
4 
4 
9 
9 
37 
37 
19 
19 1991 
157 
157 
63 
63 
220 
220 
466 
466 1992 
250 
350 
600 
80 
115 
195 
330 
465 
795 
758 
758 
REVISION AND AMENDMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
( Commitment appropriations, ECU million, current prices 1.5 
Heading 2 
Heading 4 
(non-comp.) 
Heading 5 
Stock disposal 
Administration 
Commit. TOTAL 
Paym. TOTAL 1. JUNE 1990 
Underestimation inflation 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Other external policies 
and internal policies 
Margin available 
Growth adjustment 1990 
(1)500 
500 
500 
500 1991 
90 
1175 
820 
355 
-40 
-40 
1225 
1225 1992 
1628 
970 
658 
-150 
-450 
300 
1478 
1478 
(1) Including ECU 300 million in December 1989 revisions decision 
at same time as adoption of 1990 budget. 
Heading 2 
Heading 3 
Heading 4 
Comp. 
Non-comp. 
Heading 5 
Stock disposal 
Repaym.Sp.Port 
Administration 
Commit. TOTAL 
Paym. TOTAL 
Heading 4 
(non-comp.) 
Heading 5 
Stock disposal 
Repaym.Sp.Port 
Commit. TOTAL 
Paym. TOTAL 
Heading 2 
Heading 3 
Heading 4 
Comp. 
Non-comp. 
Heading 5 
Stock disposal 
Repaym.Sp.Port 
Administration 
PAY./COM.TOTAL 2. DECEMBER 1990 
German unification 
Unused margin 
German unification 
German unification 
Internal policies 
Gulf crisis 
Margin available 
Reassessment 
German unification new tasks 
3. MAY 1991 
URSS. Technical assisance 
Israel and occupied territories 
Kurdish refugees 
Famine in Africa 
Margin available 
Reassessment 
4. FEBRUAR 1992 
Underestimation inflation 
Research : carrying-over 1991 
Margin available 
CIS : Technical assistance 
Tropical forests 
Margin available 
Reassessment 
Commission ( external obligations i 750 
-50 
665 
10 
90 
35 
530 
0 
-220 
180 
40 
1365 
1085 
728 
400 
88 
100 
140 
0 
-3 
3 
728 
423 1000 
110 
10 
100 
0 
-40 
40 
1110 
910 
180 
100 
-200 
412 
-88 
450 
50 
-312 
-381 
30 
40 
0 
1.6 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
( Initial fraaework after technical adjustment in line with conditions of iapleaentation, revision ) 
( Coaaitaent appropriations, ECO Million, current prices ) 
1-EAGGF GUARANTEE 
2-STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS 
3-POLICIES WITH HULTIANNUAL ALLOCATIONS 
4-0THER POLICIES 
of which : non-coap. 
5-REPAYHENTS AND ADMINISTRATION 
of which : Stock disposal 
6-HONETARY RESERVE 
COHHITHENT APPROPRIATIONS - TOTAL 
PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS - TOTAL 1988 
27500 
7790 
1210 
2103 
1646 
5700 
1240 
1000 
45303 
43820 1989 
INIT. 
28613 
9522 
1708 
2468 
1864 
5153 
1449 
1000 
48464 
46885 ADJ. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 REV. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 NEW 
28613 
9522 
1708 
2468 
1864 
5153 
1449 
1000 
48464 
46885 1990 
INIT. 
30700 
11531 
2067 
2720 
2023 
4930 
1523 
1000 
52948 
50772 ADJ. 
0 
24 
4 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 
19 REV. 
0 
0 
0 
500 
500 
0 
0 
0 
500 
500 NEW 
30700 
11555 
2071 
3229 
2523 
4930 
1523 
1000 
53485 
51291 
1-EAGGF GUARANTEE 
2-STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS 
3-POLICIES WITH HULTIANNUAL ALLOCATIONS 
4-OTHER POLICIES 
of which : non-coap. 
5-REPAYHENTS AND ADMINISTRATION 
of which : Stock disposal 
6-HONETARY RESERVE 
COHHITHENT APPROPRIATIONS - TOTAL 
PAYHENT APPROPRIATIONS - TOTAL 1991 
INIT. 
33000 
13807 
2453 
3080 
2180 
4599 
1598 
1000 
57939 
55259 ADJ. 
0 
157 
63 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
220 
466 REV. 
0 
840 
-50 
2568 
2558 
-40 
-223 
0 
3318 
2733 NEW 
33000 
14804 
2466 
5648 
4738 
4559 
1375 
1000 
61477 
58458 1992 
INIT. 
35039 
16363 
2920 
3406 
2397 
4362 
1703 
1000 
63090 
59805 ADJ. 
0 
600 
195 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
795 
758 REV. 
0 
1146 
-200 
2230 
2307 
-469 
-893 
0 
2707 
2678 NEW 
35039 
18109 
2915 
5636 
4704 
3893 
810 
1000 
66592 
63241 
1.7 
MARGIN AVAILABLE BETWEEN CEILING FOR PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS REQUIRED 
IN FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE AND OWN RESOURCES CEILING (1) 
% or ECU million (Current prices) 
1-OWN RESOURCES CEILING 
-ECU Million 
-% of GNP 
2-PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS REQUIRED 
ACCORDING TO INITIAL FIN.PERSP.(3) 
-ECU Million 
-% of GNP 
3-PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS REQUIRED 
ACCORDING TO FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
AFTER ADJUSTMENT AND REVISION 
-ECU Million 
-% of GNP 
4-MARGIN ( 1-2 ) 
-ECU Million 
-% of GNP 
5-MARGIN ( 1-3 ) 
-ECU Million 
-% of GNP 1988 
(2) 
44952 
1.15 
43779 
1.12 
43779 
1.12 
1173 
0.03 
1173 
0.03 1989 
51468 
1.17 
46885 
1.07 
46885 
1.07 
4583 
0.10 
4583 
0.10 1990 
55897 
1.18 
50772 
1.08 
51291 
1.09 
5125 
0.11 
4606 
0.10 1991 
60968 
1.19 
55259 
1.08 
58458 
1.13 
5709 
0.11 
2510 
0.05 1992 
65916 
1.20 
59805 
1.09 
63241 
1.15 
6111 
0.11 
2675 
0.05 
(1) 1989 - 1992 : On the basis of the figures and forecasts for GNP 
in money terms as used since 18.11.1991. 
Including the former GDR from 1991 onwards. 
(2) Initial financial perspective. 
(3) After technical adjustment. 
ZS 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
Breakdown by Heading 
Commitment appropriations (ECU million, current prices) 
1. Agriculture 
2. Structural operations 
3. Multiannual policies 
4. Other policies 
5. Repayments, administration 
6. Monetary Reserve 
i 
00 
1988 
1992 
TOTAL COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE 
ECU bi I lion, 1980 prices 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
nPayment appropriations £J55?| c°mm"itment appropriations 
a> a. aa aa aa aa mm •• aa aa aa a. aa aa mm aa mm aa aa aa iS'S^lA aa aa aa aa aa a. • aw aa aa aa _ aa aa aa a. aa an a» a. 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE FROM C 0 M M U N I T Y ' B U D G. E T 
in relation to GDP 
Payment appropriations 
1,20 
1.00 4 
0,80 i 
0,60 i 
0,40 i 
0,20 4 
0,00 I 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
TOTAL COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 
ECU billion, Current Prices 
TOTAL PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS 
as % of GNP 
II-5 
HEADING 1 
E A G G F 
soft-
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:•: 
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:'•:• 
:£ II 
i F==|J 
'•:• •• 
«M 1M1 
HEADING 3 
Multiannual Policies 
HEADING 5 
Repayments and Administration HEADING 2 
Structural Operations 
tfiftH 
«A 
XOft 
HEADING 4 
Other Policies 
it- E3a- E3*-
1- BUDGET 
2-INITIAL FINANCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
^ REVISION ADJUSTMEN 
FINANCIAL PERSPECT V E 
KM «M* «MO «Ml 
^ 

ISSN 0254-1475 
COM (92) 82 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN oi 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-92-099-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-41854-0 
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