EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 16.7.2009 
SEC(2009) 978 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a 
 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
concerning measures to safegu ard security of gas supply  
and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC 
  
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF DIRECTIVE 2004/67/EC  
ON SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY  
{COM(2009) 363} 
 
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................ .. 4 
2. Transposition of the Directive 2004/67/EC ................................................................. 5 
3. Major Supply Disruption (Art. 2(1))............................................................................ 6 4. Roles and responsibilities (Art.3)................................................................................. 8 4.1. The overall responsibility............................................................................................. 8 4.2. Specific roles and responsibilities................................................................................ 8 4.2.1. The Ministry............................................................................................................ ..... 8 
4.2.2. Regulator............................................................................................................... ....... 9 
4.2.3. Transmission System Operator (TSO)....................................................................... 10 4.2.4. Distribution System Operator (DSO)......................................................................... 11 4.2.5. Underground Gas Storag e Operator (UGSO) ............................................................ 11 
4.2.6. LNG System Operator (LSO) .................................................................................... 12 4.2.7. Suppliers............................................................................................................... ...... 12 
4.3. Conclusions – differences in the security of gas supply roles of market players ...... 12 
5. Security of supply standards (Art.3/4) ....................................................................... 14 5.1. Security of gas supply standards (for households)..................................................... 14 5.2. Extension of scope of the security of supply standards to other gas customers ........ 19 5.2.1. Guaranteed supplies for SMEs a nd for non-fuel switch customers ........................... 19 
5.2.2. Gas for electricity..................................................................................................... .. 20 
6. Security of gas supply instruments (Annex of 2004/67)............................................ 21 6.1. Gas Storage Facilities................................................................................................. 22 6.2. Production flexibility ................................................................................................. 26 6.3. Long-term supply contracts (Art. 2(1))...................................................................... 27 6.4. Import flexibility ........................................................................................................ 29 
6.5. Interruptible contracts, fuel-switch possibility........................................................... 30 6.6. Cooperation of System Operators .............................................................................. 31 6.7. Cross-border capacities .............................................................................................. 33 6.8. Diversification of gas supplies................................................................................... 35 6.9. Investment support..................................................................................................... 35 
 
EN 3   EN 6.10. Liquid tradable gas markets ....................................................................................... 38 
6.11. Other instruments identified and used by Member States ......................................... 39 6.11.1. Long term planning.................................................................................................... 3 9 
6.11.2. Public Service Obligations......................................................................................... 40 6.12. General Conclusions .................................................................................................. 41 7. Gas Coordination Group (Art.7) ................................................................................ 43 8. Community three step approach................................................................................. 46 9. National emergency measures (Art.8)........................................................................ 48 9.1. Gas emergency scale.................................................................................................. 49 9.2. Definition of crisis situations in gas supply ............................................................... 50 9.3. Emergency measures used by Member States ........................................................... 51 10. Monitoring and reporting (Art. 5/6)........................................................................... 53 10.1. Reporting to the Commission..................................................................................... 53 10.2. Monitoring of security of gas supply ......................................................................... 54 
ANNEX 1: Distribution of responsibility for s ecurity of gas supply in Member States ......... 57 
ANNEX 2: Member States definition of parame ters for security of supply standards............ 58 
ANNEX 3: Member States use of security of gas supply instruments .................................... 59 ANNEX 4: Fuel switch possibility and interruptible contracts................................................ 61 
ANNEX 5: The role of gas in EU and Member States ............................................................ 62 
 
EN 4   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
Dynamic gas market development increased the importance of security of gas supply. The 
European Union has created an internal gas mark et. In order to strengthen the security of gas 
supply in the internal market the Council Di rective 2004/67/EC of 26  April 2004 concerning 
measures to safeguard security of natural gas supplies (thereafter referred to as "the 
Directive") was adopted. This Dir ective is consecutive to in the internal gas market Directive 
2003/55/EC1.  
Objective of the Directive as stipulated in Recita l 19 pursues two main goals, namely " … 
ensuring an adequate level for the se curity of gas supply, in partic ular in the event of a major 
supply disruption," and "contributing to the proper functi oning of the internal gas market…"  
As provided for in the Directive, the Commis sion shall present in 2008 to the European 
Parliament and to the Council the evaluation repo rt on the implementation of the Directive by 
Member States. The presentation of this report has been delayed in order to follow the timing of the Second Strategic Energy Review. 
The Report shall analyse the effectiveness of instruments put in place by Member States, the 
effects of security of gas supply instruments on th e internal gas market, as well as their effect 
on the development of competition on the internal gas market. 
The Directive in particular underlines the impor tance of defining the ro le and responsibility 
for market players. Member St ates shall define roles and re sponsibilities in the area of 
security of gas supply.  
The Directive also defines the minimal securi ty of supply standards, which determine the 
conditions, during which the gas supply for house holds' customers shall be maintained. Scope 
of these standards may be broadened by exte nding the affected customers to Small and 
Medium Enterprises, to customers who cannot switch gas to other fuel and to significant 
power generators from gas.  
The Directive also increases th e scope of the reporting obliga tions for security of supply 
purposes for the internal gas market by Member  States, and requires the monitoring of the 
security of gas supply issues by the Commission.  
A Gas Coordination Group was established according the Directive. Its role  is to facilitate the 
coordination of security of gas supply measures , to provide a forum fo r discussions between 
the Member States and the source of informati on for the industry about the security of gas 
supply in Europe. The important role of this group was confirmed during the gas supply problems in the course of last three years.  The Gas Coordination Gr oup was convened seven 
times for extraordinary meetings.  
                                                
 
1 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC (OJ L 176, 
15.7.2003, p. 57–78) 
 
EN 5   EN 2. TRANSPOSITION OF THE DIRECTIVE 2004/67/EC 
Member States had to communicate to the Co mmission the texts of national legislations 
transposing the Directive and the correlation tables between such legislation and the provisions of the Directiv e by 19.05.2006. Member States ha d to communicate to the 
Commission also their national emergency measures.  
Transposing provisions
 
The provisions transposing the Directive have  been communicated to the Commission by 26 
Member States. Two countries (Malta and Cypr us) are exempted from application of this 
Directive, because they are not using gas in  their energy mix; nevertheless Malta had 
transposed the Directive into  its national legislation.  
5 Member States did not communicate their tr ansposing provisions in time. For 3 Member 
States (Ireland, Luxembourg and Romania) infr ingement procedures for non-communication 
had been opened in 2006 and closed in 2007- 2008 after they notified the related national 
legislation to the Commission.  
Most of the MS have transposed  the security of gas supply provi sions of the Directive as part 
of their internal gas market legislation, ensuri ng the coherence between  internal gas market 
and security of gas supply objectives.  
Correlation table   
Article 10 (1) of the Directive obliged Member  States to communicate to the Commission the 
correlation table between the provisions of the national legislation and the Directive. 13 
Member States did not communicate the correlati on table in time. Two Me mber States (Latvia 
and Luxembourg) are still missing. 
This obligation has shown also a problem of inconsistency of correlation table with the 
transposing provisions of the nati onal legislation. The provisions  of the national legislations 
described by some Member States in the correlation table were not identical with the ones, which transpose the Directive.  
National emergency measures
 
According to Article 8 Member States shall prepare in advance their national emergency 
measures. They should be published and notified to the Commission.  
Member States implemented their national emer gency measures in two steps: first, they 
obliged different market player s to develop the national emerge ncy measures, and after this 
step, the market players have developed the national emergency measures. This approach has 
created a time delay, due to which the Member  States were not able to communicate the 
national emergency measures to the Commi ssion in time. Only 2 Member States 
communicated the national emergency measures on time, 9 Member States communicated such measures to the Commission before the en d of 2007, and 19 Member States in total have 
done so far. 
 
EN 6   EN 3. MAJOR SUPPLY DISRUPTION (ART. 2(1)) 
Major Supply Disruption (referred  to as "MSD") is defined in Article 2 paragraph 2 as a 
situation where the Community w ould risk to lose more than 20 % of its gas supply from third 
countries and the situation at Community level is not likely to be ade quately managed with 
national measures."  
Recital 17 stipulates the foreseeable lengt h of "Major Supply Disruption" to " a significant 
period of time of at least eight weeks ". This Directive should provide rules applicable in the 
event of a major supply disruption;  In case of a gas supply disruption from 3rd countries, it 
assess extent and impact of the gas supply di sruption, and gives right to the Commission to 
apply rules as defined in Ar ticle 9 of the Directive.  
Recital 15 and Article 9 facilitate a coordi nation mechanism to deal with major supply 
disruption at Community level, giving the Comm ission the possibility to convene a special 
meeting of Gas Coordination Group related to the particular gas supply disruption. Recital 15 
also suggests further roles of Gas Coordinati on Group in case of major supply disruption:  
• may assist Member States in coordinati ng measures taken at a national level,  
• should exchange information on security of gas supply on a re gular basis, and  
• should consider aspects relevant in th e context of a major supply disruption.  
The guidance how to handle ma jor supply disruption is in  Recital 18. It describes a 
mechanism based on a three step appr oach, applying rules from Article 9. The first step would 
involve the reactions of the industry to the su pply disruption; if this  were not sufficient, 
Member States should take measures to solve the supply disruption. Only if the measures 
taken at stage one and two have failed should a ppropriate measures be taken at Community 
level.  
The directive currently define s a major supply disruption  as the loss of 20% of gas imports 
from third countries to the Community for at least 8 weeks. It has been accepted that this 
indicator is very high and al ready shortfalls that  do not reach this level might require 
Community response. Comparing to the Janu ary 2009 crisis, disruption of 28% lasted 14 
days. With the increasing import dependency, it becomes more and more unlikely that this 
indicator is reached before Community action is needed. 
On the other hand, the likely risk of reaching the MSD indicator is defined in Article 9(1) as a 
trigger to activate measures at Community le vel. But in reality, 20% of Community gas 
import from 3rd countries is a volume equivalent to half  of Russia or all Norway or all Algeria 
gas imported to EU. The volume of gas import  is increasing, as gas production in EU is 
declining. Thus also 20% threshold will correspond to higher volumes of gas.  
But there is also another possibility to tri gger the Community measures. Any Member State 
can request to the Commission to activate the Community mechanism if it considers that the 
shortfall of its gas supplies cannot be managed adequately at national level, even if the 
shortfall does not reach the MSD. 
 
EN 7   EN The definition of "Major Supply Disruption" was also discussed in  the Gas Coordination 
Group. The Group concluded that with the accessi on of the new Member States in 2004 and 
2007, the 20% disruption from the third countries is very high and alr eady smaller delivery 
disruptions may require Community response, es pecially if this delivery disruption affects 
more than one Member State.  
Conclusions  
Gas supply disruptions in EU have occurred on  several occasions (the most significant in 
January 2006 and 2009 with respect to gas supp lies from Russia through Ukraine). The 20% 
threshold of gas s upply disruption from 3rd countries was reached in 2009, but lasted "only" 
14 days, not 8 weeks. Member States suffered significant gas reduction, which created a base 
to convene at least 3 extraordinary meeti ngs of the Gas Coordi nation Group in 2009. The 
definition of major supply disruption as define d in the present Directive it is now is not 
appropriate to ensure its role as a trigger for actions at the Community level. It was proved in particular during the events in January 2009 th at the 20% of gas supply disruption from 3
rd 
countries is too high, especially after the accession of the EU-12 countries.  
 
EN 8   EN 4. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (ART.3) 
Article 3(1) of the Directive stipulates: "In establishing their general policies with respect to 
ensuring adequate levels of secur ity of gas supply, Member Stat es shall define the roles and 
responsibilities of the differ ent gas market players in ac hieving these policies, […]."   
The importance of defining the clear role and res ponsibility of market play ers is stipulated in 
Recital 3: " Definition of clear roles and responsibiliti es of all market players is therefore 
crucial in safeguarding securi ty of gas supply and the well -functioning of the internal 
market."  
Market player should be "the one who activel y operates on the market". However, for the 
purpose of this Directive, the de finition of market players include s all entities - not only those 
who operate actively on the market, but also those who create the legal framework (the 
Ministry, the Government) and wh o supervises the gas market (the regulator). Roles of the 
Ministry and the regulator for security of gas supply are al so specified in  the national 
legislation of Member States.  
4.1. The overall responsibility  
Member States set the overall responsibility  to guarantee the secure gas supplies at the 
country level, as well as specific responsibilities  for the suppliers, Mini stries and regulators. 
However, the main role of security of gas supply for Transmission System Operators (TSOs), 
Distribution System Operator s (DSOs), LNG System Operators (LSOs), and Underground 
Gas Storage System Operators (UGSOs) is very similar in most Member States.  
Different market players in Member States were  designated to have the central responsibility 
to ensure the security of gas supply. This so called "overall responsibil ity" is always defined 
in the national legislation.  
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Spain identified the relevant Ministry  as the responsible body to guarantee the overall 
security of gas supply for the coun try. This role is given to the TSO  in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Denmark, the Netherlands, to  the regulator  in Ireland, Finland, Malta and Sweden, 
to the suppliers  in Germany, Hungary, Latvia , and Slovenia, and to a special Coordination 
commission in Romania. Greece has stated in its legislation that both the Ministry and the 
regulator are responsible for the security of gas supply . In the UK, the overall responsibility 
to ensure the security of supply is a joint re sponsibility between the Ministry (Secretary of 
State) and the Regulator (Gas and Electricity  Markets Authority). In Austria the overall 
responsibility for security of gas supply is sh ared between the Ministry , Regulator and the so 
called "Control Area Manager".  
4.2. Specific roles and responsibilities  
4.2.1.  The Ministry 
In general, the Ministry for Energy defines the legal framew ork for energy markets. In 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, La tvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, and Spain, the Ministry  takes the overall responsibility to guarantee the security of 
 
EN 9   EN gas supply in the country. Greece and UK defines th e joint overall responsibility for both the 
Ministry and the regulator. Romania defines a special  Coordination commission 
established by the Government.  
In other Member States (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Czech Republic, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden) the Ministry has a security of gas supply ro le. The Ministry in Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain monitor the securi ty of gas supply , as well as a  
coordinating commission in Romania. In Germa ny and Lithuania the Mi nistry prepares the 
internal market report, while  the Slovak Ministry prepares only the part related to the 
security of supply. The Polish Ministry prepares  the security of supply report, which includes 
the internal market report. The Secretary of State in UK has duty to report annually to UK 
Parliament on gas and electricity supplies. Energy Market Outlook Re port discharges this 
duty.  
The planning of the gas network is worked out by the Bulgarian and Spanish Government. 
The Estonian and Finnish Government supervis e and approve the constr uction of cross-border 
gas pipelines.  
In Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal, the Ministry prepares measures for very difficult 
circumstances,  as well as measures to prevent  the natural gas supply disruption. The Ministry 
takes action, if the system is endangered or breaks down. In Bulgaria , Portugal and Slovakia, 
the Ministry declares the emergency s ituation after the advice from TSO. 
In Malta, the Ministry instructs the regulator to ensure the secu rity of gas supply. In Bulgaria 
and Malta, the Ministry shall de fine the minimum security of natural gas supply standards.  
4.2.2.  Regulator 
The regulators in Finland,  Ireland  and Sweden  have the overall resp onsibility to guarantee 
the security of gas supply. In  Ireland, overall ener gy policy is formulated by the Ministry, 
while statutory responsibility for monitoring and ensuring security of gas supply rests with the 
Regulator, including ensuring security of suppl y for non daily metered customers and those 
without the ability to fuel sw itch. In Finland, the regulator supervises the legal provisions, 
monitors gas supply-demand balance, as well as  quality and maintenance of gas network, and 
handles with any deficiency in gas supply. The regulator in Malta  should be instructed by the 
Ministry to ensure the security  of supply and to define secur ity of gas supply standards and 
national measures.  
A close cooperation between minist ry and regulator is applied in Austria  and Greece . The 
regulator prepares recommendati ons, but the final decision is  taken by the ministry. The 
regulator only monitors and controls the security  of gas supply. In Austria the regulator also 
prepares and coordinates measures, defined in th e „Manual to prevent gas crisis”. It includes 
data collection for energy steering measures a nd practice of emergency actions and measures. 
However, the overall responsibility  is given to the ministry. In Greece the regulator examines 
and assesses appropriate measures and make s recommendations for the ministry. The overall 
responsibility is shared both by the ministry and by the regulator.  
The regulator in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary  and Poland  monitors the security of gas 
supply. The regulator in Bulgaria  controls also the complianc e with rules for natural gas 
supply, as well as the quality of services´ standards. In Germany the regulator issues 
 
EN 10   EN obligations on security of ga s supplies and exemptions for specific situation, and is 
responsible for security of supply, if  security of supply is endangered.  
Reporting to the Commission: an  obligation of the regulators 
Most of the regulators prepare na tional reports on the internal energy market. Article 5 of the 
Directive 2003/55/EC2 on internal gas market requires fr om Member States to prepare the 
reports on the functioning of internal ga s markets and their communication to the 
Commission. Article 5 of the Directive 2004/67/EC on the secu rity of gas supply requires 
additional security of gas supply information to be provided to the Commission in these 
reports.  
4.2.3.  Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
Stable and secure functioning of the gas transmission netw orks operated by the TSOs  is 
the main task set by Member States to Transm ission Gas System Operators. In most of the 
Member States this goes hand in hands with the responsibility to ensure the stable and 
reliable gas supplies  and the gas quality suppl ied through the networks.  
Other tasks for TSOs include the management of the country's gas system , long-term 
planning, ensure the gas supply in case of emergency and the development of the gas 
transmission networks . TSO in eight Member States (B ulgaria, Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, the Netherlands and Portugal) manages and ensures the stable and secure functioning 
and development of the gas system at the country level. In Finland the TSOs have the 
technical responsibility for the gas system, but  the regulator by controlling and managing the 
network is responsible to secure  the gas supply in the country.  
In five Member States (Czech Republic, Greece,  Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia), the 
TSOs prepare an emergency plan  and have to send it for approva l to the overall responsible 
body (regulator or Ministry).  
In the Czech Republic the TS O announces the emergency leve l of national gas network 
(including transit), if gas suppl y disruption occurs. The Czech TSO also manages the entire 
national gas network in case of  emergency. In UK the TSO has also a role of a network 
emergency coordinator (NEC), a nd coordinates the entire networ k in case of emergency. In 
Denmark, Germany and France, the TSO ensures the gas supply, if supp lier is not able to 
ensure it. For this purpose, the TSO in Denmark owns the gas storage facility. In Sweden, if 
TSO is not able to supply gas, the ISO orders to reduce the gas supply to specific customers.  
In 13 Member States (Bulgaria, Denmark, Esto nia, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Finlan d), the TSO makes long term planning of the 
entire gas network.  
Cooperation between market players 
Cooperation between TSOs in neighbouring co untries, and cooperation between TSO and 
DSO are defined in the Annex of the Directive as instruments to  enhance the security of gas 
supply. However, this instrument is specified in  the legislation of only few Member States. In 
five Member States (Denma rk, Hungary, Poland, Finland a nd Spain), the TSOs shall 
cooperate with other system operators to secure  the gas supply. All TSOs in Germany have to 
cooperate with each other. TSOs in Estonia ha ve to cooperate with system operators in 
 
EN 11   EN neighbouring countries. TSOs in Sl ovenia have to provide suffi cient transport capacities and 
cooperation with other TSOs and DSOs in case of  emergency. In Estonia, all market players 
are also so called "balance providers", provid ing necessary balance information for system 
operators. 
Dispatch services   
In four Member States (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria), the TSOs established 
a dispatch centre  for the gas transit network  to provide the technical management and to 
balance the gas system. In Austria the same se rvice is provided by the independent market 
players, so called "Control Area Manager". Nati onal Grid's System Control Centre 
continuously monitors and controls the UK ga s network. In five other Member States 
(Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Spain and Sweden), the TSO directly provides th e dispatch services.  
4.2.4.  Distribution System Operator (DSO)  
Stable and secure functioning of  the gas distribution network  is the main task of 
Distribution System Operators ( DSO) in all Member States. In many Member States, the 
DSOs are also responsible to en sure the stable and reliable ga s supplies and the quality of the 
supplied gas.  
DSOs in 3 Member States (Czech Republic, Sl ovakia, and Greece) shall supply the gas to 
households during the emergency stage or dur ing the gas supply disruption. In 14 Member 
States (Bulgaria, Estonia, Denmark, Slovakia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, France, Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, and Finla nd), the gas distribution network shall be 
developed in accordance with the gas consumpti on forecasts. In 6 Member States (Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Greece), the DSOs have to prepare the emergency plans for their territory to cope w ith technical failures and sudden disruptions. 
Cooperation between DSOs and other market players in case of emergency situation 
In 7 Member States (Denmark, Finland, Germa ny, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Slovenia), the 
DSOs shall according to the national legislation cooperate with other market players all 
the time, in particular with LNG operators and gas storage operators connected to their 
distribution and transmission networks .  
In three other Member States (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria), the DSOs have to 
establish the technical control/dispatch centr e for the distribution network. The dispatch 
centre shall control interconnect ed distribution networks duri ng the emergency situation, or 
prevent the situation to go to that level.  
4.2.5.  Underground Gas Storage Operator (UGSO)  
Stable and secure functioning of the gas storage is the main task of Underground gas storage 
Operators (UGSOs) in nearly all Member States. UGSOs ensure the reliability of gas supply 
and maintain the quality of supplied gas. Sloveni a and Denmark did not de fine the security of 
supply role for underground gas storage operators , although both countries use the gas stocks 
as a measure for security of gas supply. Sloveni a has no storage facilitie s on its territory but 
stores gas in neighbouring c ountries (Austria, Croatia). 
 
EN 12   EN UGSOs in 6 Member States (Czech Republic, Fr ance, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary) 
ensure the emergency supply to the gas networ k during the emergency s ituation. In the Czech 
Republic, the UGSOs have to establish a gas st orage dispatch centre. The UGSOs in Slovakia 
develop the emergency plans for underground ga s storages. In 8 Member States (Finland, 
Slovakia, Italy, the Netherlands , Portugal, Spain, Latvia, Denmark), the UGSOs propose the 
Development plan for underground gas storages. 
4.2.6.  LNG System Operator (LSO)  
System Operators are responsible also for stab le and secure functioni ng of the LNG facilities 
and LNG storage facilities in 18 Member States . The use of LNG by system operators is not 
specifically defined in 8 Member States (S lovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia).  
In Poland and the Netherlands, the LSOs guarantee the reliability  of gas supply and maintain 
the quality of gas from LNG. In Denmark and Po rtugal, the LSOs manage their activities with 
the linked system operators. In Denmark a nd the Netherlands, the LSOs prepare the 
Development plans for LNG.  
4.2.7.  Suppliers 
Infour Member States (France, Germ any, Hungary, and Slovenia), the gas suppliers  (defined 
as holders of a supply licence) have the overall responsibility to deliver the gas to their final 
customers. In 13 Member States (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland,  Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and UK), the 
gas suppliers have the obligation to deliver the gas, but overall responsibility for security of 
gas supply is set to other market players (Ministrie s or TSOs).  
In the Netherlands and France, the gas suppliers ensure the gas supply also in difficult 
circumstances, during which they are obliged to deliver the gas to their customers. In 
Luxembourg and Portugal, the suppliers guarantee the gas supplies to households. In Portugal 
and Italy, the supplie rs maintain the minimum security gas stocks defined as a share of their 
supplies. In France, the gas suppliers make a 5 years planning forecast. In the Czech Republic, 
all suppliers are obliged by law to guarantee the security of supply standards and stable gas 
supply. In Hungary and UK, the suppliers´ licence means also an obligation to supply gas.  
In UK, the system operator requires the gas supplie r to contribute to the security of gas supply 
and ensure that the industry can safely isolat e and reconnect the end users in case of supply 
disruption. Some Member States also define the suppliers of last resort, who are responsible 
to supply the final customers under the specific conditions.  
Conclusions – differences in the security of gas supply roles of market players  
Member States have defined the roles for th eir market players in a different way, which 
created a distortion for security of gas supply at  the European internal  gas markets. The big 
difference in roles and responsibilities underlines the actual difference of  national markets. At 
the same time it may mean a difference in the burden on market players which might distort 
competition. There are some common patterns for most (or nearly all) Member States. The main roles given to TSOs, DSOs, LSOs and UGSO s are very similar at the level of Member 
States. Most of the roles of ma rket players are specified only for their activity within the 
national gas markets. Only few market players have mentioned specifically in the national 
 
EN 13   EN legislation the obligation to c ooperate with other countries´ market players (e.g. TSO in 
Estonia). This "national only s upport" contributes to the frag mentation of the internal gas 
market. 
 
EN 14   EN 5. SECURITY OF SUPPLY STANDARDS (ART.3/4) 
The Article 3(1) of the Directive set the obligation for Member States to " …specify adequate 
minimum security of supply standar ds that must be complied w ith by the players on the gas 
market of the Member State in question ".  
The same paragraph also defines how to apply these standards. " The standards shall be 
implemented in a non-discriminatory and tr ansparent way and shall be published ." 
5.1. Security of gas supply standards (for households) 
The Directive defines the secu rity of supply standards. Households are the only category of 
gas customers, where the Directive require s the Member States to ensure the gas 
supplies under specified condition s and inside their territory.   
Important role of security of gas supply standa rds for households is stipulated in Recital 5 of 
the Directive: " In view of the growing gas market in the Community, it is important that the 
security of gas supply is maintained, in  particular as regards household customers. "  
"Security of gas supply standards" define s the Article 4(1) of the Directive: " Member States 
shall ensure that supplies for household custome rs inside their territory  are protected to an 
appropriate extent at leas t in the event of:  
(a) A partial disruption of nationa l gas supplies during a period to be determined by Member 
States taking into account national circumstances; 
(b) Extremely cold temperatures during a nationally determined peak period; 
(c) Periods of exceptionally high gas demand du ring the coldest weather periods statistically 
occurring every 20 years. 
Security of gas supply standards are defined as  critical conditions, at which the secured and 
reliable gas supply shall be still guarant eed for households. These standards create a set of 
operational conditions  to be fulfilled, which  have the essential imp act on gas supplies (e.g. 
no gas disruption, or normal winter).  
Seasonality of gas demand imp lies two indicators – for the strong winter gas demand , and 
for the strong daily peak demand . The third indicator refers to the volume of the gas supply 
disruption .  
From the principal point, these three security of gas supply st andards are correctly defined, 
because they describe the vari ability of gas demand in Member  States in the basic form.  
However, the Member States were given a wide discretion to specify the details and the 
protected customers of these standards. They have the possibility to define  the volume and 
the duration of partial gas suppl y disruption and the duration of peak periods of increased gas 
demand. The variability of  implementation of security of s upply standards related to national 
circumstances in Member Stat es is described in Annex 2. 
 
EN 15   EN Two of these standards take into account climate conditions. They are related to seasonal 
variability of gas demand, because gas is used in many Member States as a primary heating fuel during winter. In the winter period, th e gas demand is higher by around 20-30 %, in 
comparison to the average annual gas dema nd. For some Member States (e.g. France, 
Germany, UK) the difference between summer a nd winter gas demands is more than 100% 
(double gas demand in winter than in summer).  
Gas is also used for power generation, which multiplies the security of supply concern for 
both gas and electricity. Electri city has also higher demand in  winter. Electricity demand for 
air conditioning during summer in southern Eur ope, increases the annual demand and leaves 
less time to prepare for the next winter period (for example to fill the gas stocks for the next winter).  
The summer-winter difference of gas demand show s the variability on an annual basis for 
many national gas markets. For Member States, which use the gas for heating and electricity 
generation, this difference is a precondition for de finition of their security of supply standards 
and national emergency measures. The partial ga s disruption is more critical in winter, 
because of the increased gas supply during this  period. This also describes the clear link 
between the gas supply disruptio n and the weather conditions, both defined by security of 
supply standards.  
Gas consumption variability per MS
050000100000150000200000250000300000350000400000450000500000
Jan-07 Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Nov-07 Jan-08 Mar-08 May-08 Jul-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 Mar-09TJAustria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany 
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sw eden
United Kingdom
 
a) Partial disruption of national gas supp lies during a period determined by Member 
States taking into account national circumstances 
The “partial disruption” is not de fined in the Directive. Some Member States were inspired by 
the definition of “major supply disruption” (Article 2(2) of th e Directive), but both 
"disruptions" differ in purpose. The partial disruption describe s a disruption at MS level, 
while the MSD is set for at EU level.  
 
EN 16   EN Four Member States (Malta, Ireland, Bulgaria , and Luxemburg) have so far only set the 
obligation to define the security of supply standards, but the standards have not been 
communicated to the Commission yet. 
Some Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia,  Malta, Slovenia, and Romania) define the 
partial disruption as a 20% gas supply disruption in the country, and Slovakia as of 30%. 
The time duration for partial disruption rang es from 2 weeks (Slovenia) to 10 weeks 
(Slovakia).  
Finland, France and Lithuania defi ne the partial disruption as a disruption of one supplier 
for the period of 4-6 months (according to the diversification, the disruption of one supplier 
for Finland and Lithuania repres ents 100% of their gas suppl y, but for France it represents 
only around 20-30% of gas supply).  
Some Member States, instead of defining the standards, impose mandatory gas stocks  and 
mandatory use of gas from gas stocks for hous eholds (Hungary - 45 days of gas demand, 
Poland - 30 days of gas import, Port ugal – 15-20 days of gas demand).  
Spain defines security of supply standards in a different way. Partial disr uption is defined as a 
disruption of one entry point  to the gas network by the "N-1  vulnerability criteria". The 
remaining entry capacity must be big enough to ensure the 100% gas demand of a normal 
winter day and at least 90% of all CCGT (gas  turbines) power plants consumption. This 
measure is combined with the mandatory gas stocks of 20 days of gas consumption.  
In addition, 2 Member States (Bul garia, Estonia) set a period of technical gas disruption , 
which lasts 2-3 days.  
If there is a partial disruption of certain shar e of gas imported by pipelines, it may influence 
gas supply not only in one country, but two or  more countries on a pipeline chain. Real 
experience shows that the countries along on e gas pipeline (like Brotherhood, Yamal, 
Western Balkans, as well as Finland and Baltic Countries) ar e affected simultaneously in a 
similar way, only differentiated by the level of abili ty of the previous country in the chain to 
mitigate the supply disruption. Gas supply disrup tion on the Brotherhood pipeline in winter 
2006 showed the following disruption pattern as  reported by MS in the Gas Coordination 
Group: Slovakia (20%), Hungary (30%), Austria (20%), Czech Republic (20%), Italy (15%), 
Poland (10%), Germany (6%) and France (gas pressure drop). In 2009, both Brotherhood and 
Western Balkan pipelines were empty for 14 days. 
Seasonal variability standards  
b) Extremely cold temperatures during a nationally determined peak period  
Nationally determined peak period defines the dur ation of extreme cold temperatures event. 
Member States are given the flexibility to set this duration. However, the duration of peak winter event shows similar patterns within clim ate regions. Therefore, differences in the peak 
duration in neighbouring c ountries within the affected area ar e not justified. The difference in 
determination of the peak period duration by Member States is de scribed in Annex 2. 
According the statistical data, the lo west average annual temperatures - annual peak periods
 
- occur in the same time in calendar in every winter .  
 
EN 17   EN The extreme cold temperature event  does not necessarily occur during the annual peak 
period. According the statistical data, these extreme peak periods  occurred only 3 times 
during last 50 years  in Europe - in February 1956, December 1962 and in January 1985. For 
example in January 1985, the temperature qui ckly dropped by 15-20°C to -20°C and -30°C 
and rested at these very low temperatures for couple of da ys. Heating demand during these 
days was extremely high . This event is usually defined by industry and in some national 
legislation as a 1-in-50 rule and describes the  ability  of gas network to supply extreme high 
volumes of gas during a short period of time - extreme peak demands. Member States can not 
predict when this 1-in-50 event will happen again.  
This event describes how much gas could be delivered by the network during certain time 
period (e.g. Nm3 per one hour or one day). 
c) Periods of exceptionally high gas demand during the coldest weather periods 
statistically occurring every 20 years 
The period of exceptionally high winter demand (1-in-20 rule)  is the coldest winter period, 
which statistically occurs every 20 years. Gas de mand during this winter period is higher than 
during the normal winter period. This defines the ability of gas network to be able to supply 
the higher gas volumes during the all winter period's time.  
For example, all system operators in Spain ha ve to prepare the opera tional plans for every 
winter by the end of October,  and send them to the TSO. These plans predict winter gas 
consumption. Entry Capacity to the Spanish Ga s Systems must be sufficient to ensure the 
annual peak gas demand plus al l the gas turbines power plants' (CCGT)  consumption (1-in-
50), and plus 10% of over-capacity to guarant ee the gas demand in case of annual peak 
demand increases more rapidly than fo reseen in several years (1-in-20). 
High share of gas is used for heating purposes. Gas consumption increases, when the 
temperature drops. This is referred to as seasonal variability  determines the annual demand 
for heating . It depends on daily temperatures (d escribed by heating degree days) . Seasonal 
variability of gas demand is covered by th e security of gas supply standards.  
Heating Degree Days in EU-27
01002003004005006007008009001000
01-2005 07-2005 01-2006 07-2006 01-2007 07-2007 01-2008 07-2008 01-2009D°Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom 
 
EN 18   EN Heating degree days based on the Eurostat me thodology are calculated by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC IPSC/Agrifish Unit/MARS-STAT) at  regional (NUTS 2), na tional and European 
levels. Heating degree days expr ess the severity of cold temper atures in a specific time period, 
taking into account the outdoor temperature a nd the room temperature. To establish a 
common and comparable basis, Eurostat uses  the following method to calculate heating 
degree days:  
D°= (18 °C - T m) x d ……… if T m ≤ 15 °C (heating threshold)  
D° = 0  …………….. if T m > 15 °C  
Where T m = ((T min + T max)/ 2) - outdoor temperature over a period of d days.  
The heating demand differs amongst Member Stat es. Neighbouring countries and countries of 
one region show a similar pattern. Finland has th e highest heating degree  days, and therefore 
the highest demand for heating. Sweden follows the similar pattern with lower values. The 
three Baltic States are very cl ose to each other. Countries w ith the lowest degree days are 
Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal.  
Winter comparison
0100020003000400050006000
Malta
Cyprus
Portugal
Greece
BulgariaSpainItaly
RomaniaFrance
Ireland
Netherlands
Belgium Hungary
United KingdomLuxembourg
Slovenia
Germany Denmark
Czech RepublicPoland Austria
Slovak Republic
LithuaniaLatvia
Estonia
Sweden
FinlandD°2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
 
The winter 2006-7 was the mildest winter in Eu rope ever. It had the lowest heating demand 
for most Member States, but not for Bulgaria , Romania, Cyprus and Greece. The average gas 
demand was about 2% lower than the nominal winter gas demand.  
Cooling degree days are used to calculate dema nd for cooling, especially with regard to 
electricity generation and c ooling in Southern European  countries in summer.  
Conclusions  
Member States have set very heterogene ous security of supply standards. The partial 
disruption  differs in duration ranging from 2 days  to 24 weeks and in volume (20%-30%, 1 
supplier). In some Member States, the defini tion of standards has not been done. These 
differences may create a barrier to solidarity mech anism and to the finalisation of internal gas 
market. Some sort of standardisation is desi rable, at least for regions or along the same 
 
EN 19   EN pipeline. Also in order to a void different burden on market players, hence least distort 
competition. 
The standard "Extremely cold temperatures during a nationally determined peak 
period" is giving the flexibility to Member States for the areas, where the same situation 
happens in most of the Member States in very  similar way. Correlation of this standard at 
least on regional level is appreciated. Transp osition is not very clear and sometimes the 
standards are difficult to recognise. The sta ndards are defined in a very general way, which 
downgrades their importance fo r security of gas supply. Adequate implementation of the 
security of supply standards is  essential to create a proper and well correlated framework. 
Member States took into account their national ci rcumstances, but this created a variation of 
implemented standards to such extent, that the standards are incomparable.  
5.2. Extension of scope of the security of supply standards to other gas customers  
Article 4(2) of the directive allows extending the scope " … in particular to small and 
medium-sized enterprises and other customers that cannot switch their gas consumption to 
other energy sources, including measures for the s ecurity of their national electricity system if 
it depends on gas supplies."  
5.2.1.  Guaranteed supplies for SMEs and for non-fuel switch customers 
Member States may choose and protect ot her vulnerable gas customers – SMEs and 
customers they can not switch fuel. Eight Member States have extended the scope  of the 
protection beyond households.  
Two Member States (Ireland, Malta) have taken the opportunity and guaranteed the gas 
supply for SMEs. Three Member States (Cze ch Republic, the Netherlands, and Portugal) 
extended the coverage of secur ity of gas supply standards to all small customers consuming 
less than 100.000 (PT), 170.000 (NL), or 400.0 00 (CZ) cubic metres per year. 
UK has an intermediate category of non-domes tic "priority gas cons umers" (e.g. boarding 
schools), which includes the issu e of safety (if the life/health  were at risk). They would 
continue to receive gas supplies for as long as possible without jeopardising supplies to 
households.  
Romania extended the scope of guaranteed gas supplies to medical services institutions, 
education units, social assistance institutions for children, for elder persons, or for persons with various degrees of handicap, as well as to public institutions at central and local level, 
cultural and religious institutions and nongovern mental institutions of public interest. 
Further gas customers, which coul d be covered by the security of  gas supply standards, are the 
customers, who have not the fuel switch possibility  and depend uniquely on gas fuel. These 
customers are covered by the se curity of supply standards in Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Ireland, Malta, and Poland. In Estonia the non-fue l switch customers cove red by security of 
supply standards are limited to heat producers fo r households and in Romania to all heating 
producers.  
 
EN 20   EN 5.2.2.  Gas for electricity  
The Directive gives the possibility to extend the security of supply standards to electricity 
production from gas fired power plants, if this production is significant in a Member State. 
Member States did not use this possibility.  
It needs further examination if alterna tive security of supply measures exist ( like fuel switch 
obligation, compulsory stockpiling of alter native fuel or excess non gas-fired electricity 
generation capacities ) in those countries, where gas-fi red power generation is predominant 
and no gas security of supply obligations are foreseen.  
Conclusions for extended scope of significant gas consumers  
Only few Member States use the possibility gi ven by the Directive to include significant gas 
consumers in terms of SMEs, non-fuel switc h possibility and of power generation. The 
importance of these categories is set by Member States itself.  
 
EN 21   EN 6. SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY INSTRUMENTS (ANNEX OF 2004/67) 
The Annex of the Directive presents the non-e xhaustive list of instruments, which should 
enhance the security of ga s supply, as referred to in Article 3(3) and 4(3).  
Instruments mentioned in the Annex consist of: 
• working gas in storage capacity, and withdrawal capacity in gas storage, 
• provision of pipeline capacity  enabling diversion of gas supplies to affected areas, 
• liquid tradable gas markets,  
• system flexibility,  
• development of interruptible demand, 
• use of alternative back-up fuels in industrial and power generation plants, 
• cross-border capacities,  
• cooperation between transmission system opera tors of neighbouring Member States for 
coordinated dispatching, 
• coordinated dispatching activit ies between distribution and tr ansmission system operators,  
• domestic production of gas a nd production flexibility,  
• import flexibility,  
• long term contracts,  
• diversification of sources of gas supply,  
• investments in infrastructure  for gas import via regasifica tion terminals and pipelines. 
Recital 6 to the Directive include s another instrument, which could be used for security of gas 
supply: " A large choice of instruments is availa ble for the industry and, if appropriate, for 
Member States, to comply with  the security of supply obli gations. Bilateral agreements 
between Member States  could be one of the means to c ontribute to the achievement of the 
minimum security of supply standards, havin g due regard to the Treaty and secondary 
legislation, in particular Article  3(2) of Directive 2003/55/EC."   
Annex of the Directive does not provide any furthe r specifications or de tails of the suggested 
instruments, their importance, and any relation between them, their impact on the security of 
gas supply or any preferences towards a particular measure.  
In this chapter, the similar or related instrume nts from Annex are put to gether, and their role 
for the security of supply, as well as their utilisation by Member  States, is shortly described.  
 
EN 22   EN In general, all mentioned instruments in the A nnex of the Directive are used for security of 
gas supply purposes in Member States. The differ ent structure of national gas markets is the 
prerequisite between the uses of in struments as emergency measures.  
6.1. Gas Storage Facilities 
Gas storage is one of the most used instru ments for security of gas supply by Member 
States. This is the only instrument, which is specifically addressed in the Directive. 19 
Member States have together around 100 bcm of gas storage capac ity, which represents 
14% of EU annual gas consumption.  
There are 4 types of gas storages used in Europe: 3 undergro und types - salt cavities, aquifers, 
and empty gas reservoirs, and 1 type on surface - LNG storage type, usually used for "Peak shaving". LNG storage does not require any specific geology; it can be built in every Member State.  
Development of underground gas storage depe nds on geological condi tions. Underground gas 
storage is used in all Member States, who ha ve the geological conditions. 21 Member States 
use gas storage as an instrument to  increase security of gas supply. Two of them store gas 
only in other countries.  
Article 4(4) gives Member States the possibility to use the gas storage facilities " in an 
appropriate degree " to achieve the security  of supply standards. Th is gives the freedom to 
choose, if the gas storage will contri bute to their secu rity of gas supply. Member States, 
having due regard to the geologi cal conditions of their te rritory and the economic and 
technical feasibility, may also take the necessary measures to ensure that gas storage facilities located within their territory contribute to an appr opriate degree to achieving the 
security of supply standards. 
According to the Directive (Article 4(5) and Recital 13), gas storage facilities create a 
possibility to develop solidarity between Memb er States in case of  gas supply reduction. 
Provided that adequate interconnection is avai lable, Member States may, in line with the 
bilateral agreements, take appropriate measures to utilise the gas storage located within other Member State for security of supply purposes . Such measure shall not impede the proper 
functioning of the inte rnal gas market.  
Although the Directive does not mandate any gas st orage targets, it puts a strong emphasis on 
this instrument. It is the only instrument facil itating security of supply, to which the Directive 
refers to greater extent in its operative part (Recital 7 and Article 4(4) to 4(6)). The Directive suggests that indicative minimum targets for gas storage could be set by Member States or by 
the industry. Those indicative ta rgets, if set, shoul d not create any additional investment 
obligations. If such minimum storage target s are imposed, the Directive requires their 
publication for transparency reasons.  
Despite the "soft" approach in the Directive,  the gas storage requirements have spread well 
around Europe. In some Member States this measure is mandatory.  
The Directive creates a possibility for Member St ates to store the gas out side their territory. 
This also means that interconnection capacity between the two countries concerned shall be 
available to use the gas storage, when it is  needed. Utilisation of Latvian gas storage 
 
EN 23   EN Incukalns by all Baltic countries is an exam ple of such solidarity cooperation within the 
whole region. 
Gas storage in Member States  
Legislation 
Some Member States set an obligation to the supp lier to store the gas. Mandatory levels of gas 
stocks for supplier were set in Poland  (30 days of average daily import), Spain  (20 days of 
consumption – 10 days as strategic, and 10 days  as commercial storage), and for stockpiling 
association in Hungary  (45 days). In Portugal  the mandatory gas stocks are at least 15 days 
of the average consumption of non-interruptible  gas for electricity producers and 20 days of 
other non-interruptible cust omers including households.  
France  adopted different approach, where at the be ginning of winter the gas storage has to be 
filled to at least 85%  of its capacity. In Bulgaria , the level of stocks is defined by market 
players themselves. In Romania , the suppliers maintain the ga s stocks, but their levels are 
defined annually by the regulator according th e predictions of gas consumption, weather 
forecasts and level of ex isting storage capacity.  
Czech Republic, France, Italy, Portugal, Roma nia, and Slovakia have obliged UGSOs to 
ensure the emergency supply duri ng the emergency situation.  
In the German legislation is written that th e storage volume in Germany could last for 80 
days, but if suppliers use gas storag e, there is no storage volume required. 
Suppliers in Italy are obliged to keep gas stocks of 10% of  the annual imported gas volume. 
Italy has very strong legislati on for gas storage. It defines va rious types of wi nter according 
the gas demand. It also defines the strategic gas st ocks and their use, if there is a real strong 
winter and not enough gas to cover the country's gas demand. It also set the exact time period 
for gas injection a nd gas withdrawal.  
Gas storage facilities used to e nhance the security of gas supply 
Gas demand fluctuations vary over time, across years, seasons, weeks and days. Gas storage 
is the primary measure to meet these fluctuations.  
The Directive describes gas storage use by two indicators – working gas capacity and 
withdrawal capacity. Working gas capacity  describes the maximum gas volume, which could 
be withdrawn from the gas storage at the nominal parameters to the gas system, representing also the difference between total gas storage ca pacity and cushion gas capacity (gas used to 
operate the gas storage).  
Withdrawal capacity
 of gas from storage describes the ra te at which gas c ould be taken out 
from gas storage for a certain pe riod of time. In other words ho w quickly gas can be taken out 
from the storage. This represents the deliverabil ity of gas storage, or the volume a gas, which 
could be injected into the gas system from the storage over a certain time period. 
Combination of both parameters describes the time period, during which the gas storage could 
supply the gas to the network.  
 
EN 24   EN Strategic gas stocks  refer to the stockpiling of natural gas which is destined to be used 
exclusively in emergency situations, hen ce inaccessible under normal market conditions. 
Stockpiling of natural gas is expensive: the cost  per unit of energy is much higher than for oil 
(approximately 16.7 MEUR per PJ, compared to 3.33 of oil2). Geological cond itions may also 
limit in certain areas the developm ent of gas storage facilities.  
Member States have different levels of e xposure to risks and henc e different gas supply 
security requirements. A country with a di versified gas import or  high share of own 
production, good level of interconnections with neighbours, developed market and high fuel-
switching possibilities (high share of industry or power generation consumption) may be less 
exposed to risks and may develop less expensiv e measures than strategic stocks to deal 
efficiently with supply shortages.  
However, it needs to be recognised that strategi c stocks might be the preferable or only mid-
term solution, particularly for countries with  single-source dependence and high share of 
uninterruptible demand. If a Member State choos es the strategic gas stocks as a national 
measure, the use of strategic stocks has to be carefully regulated to a void market distortions: 
strategic stocks should not be released in non cris is situations to influence the value of storage 
and other flexibility instrume nts that are developed under co mpetitive market conditions. 
Different types of gas storage  
LNG storage  (Peak Shaving) - is used when high de liverability is required with a small 
working volume. This storage is reserved for a few extremely cold winter days. Subsequent 
refilling of LNG tanks may take a half-year or longer. Storage of gas in  liquid form is very 
expensive compared to the storage of the same volume of gas in underground storage. A 
typical LNG storage woul d have a volume of 50 Mm3, an output duration of 100 hours, a 
storage cost of 0.4 €/m3/y and a deliverability cost of 40 €/m3/y3. LNG storage facilities are 
used because of their high send out capacity, maki ng them ideally suited to cover the extreme 
winter peaks. On other hand the LNG Stor age facility is expensive to maintain. 
Gas salt caverns  are facilities created in  salt layers. They have  less working volume than 
depleted field storage f acilities and are mainly used for p eak supply. A typical send out period 
is 10-30 days. Generally, a gas cav ern facility consists of a numb er of individual salt caverns, 
each with a working volume of 30-70 million cubic meters and a send out capacity of about 2-
4 million m3/day. Gas caverns are used to cover the coldest days. Due to their small scale, 
cavern storage facilities require less investment a nd can be built in stages, one after the other, 
with limited incremental costs for each new cavern. 
Depleted oil or gas fields  and aquifer storage  facilities are mainly used for summer-winter 
seasonal balancing. They have large working vo lumes (typically 2.5 bcm) but relatively little 
output capacity. They are filled  in the summer over the curse of typically six months and 
emptied in the winter over a period of two-three months.  
Utilisation of gas storage  
                                                 
2 Study on natural gas storage in the EU, European Commission DG Tren, October 2008 
3 Study on Interoperabiliy of LNG facilities and Interchangeability of gas and advice on the Opportunity to set up an Action Plan  
for the Promotion of LNG Chain Investments , MVV, 2008  
 
EN 25   EN Utilisation of gas storage facilities is di fferent in Europe (see graphs below).  
Gas storage usage per MS
-100000-50000050000100000150000200000
09-2006
12-2006
03-2007
06-2007
09-2007
12-2007
03-2008 06-2008
09-2008
12-2008
03-2009TJAustria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany 
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sw eden
United Kingdom
 
These two graphs show the use of gas storage in Member States. Italy, Germany and France 
use the gas storage as main tool to cover the seasonality of gas demand. Most countries show 
similar use of gas storage - gas withdrawal in winter and gas in jection in summer. It indicates 
that security of gas supply de pends very much on gas storage in these countries during the 
winter period. Especially in Italy, where th e supply - demand balance is very tight. The 
dependency on storage and its flexibility was clearly demonstrated in January 2009, where 
most MS doubled the gas supply from thei r storages in comparison to January 2008. 
Flexibility of gas storage per MS
-30000-20000-10000010000200003000040000500006000070000
01-2006 05-2006 09-2006 01-2007 05-2007 09-2007 01-2008 05-2008 09-2008 01-2009TJAustria
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Hungary
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia
Spain
United Kingdom
Belgium
 January crisis January crisis 
 
EN 26   EN This is the same graph as above , but in a different scale. It shows the similar winter-summer 
patterns of the utilisation of gas storage facilities for other Member States.  
Some Member States have no gas storage on their territory (Sloveni a, Estonia, Finland, 
Sweden, and Luxembourg). Slovenia and Estoni a are storing gas in neighbouring countries 
for their own security of supply purposes. Gree ce stores gas in a LNG terminal, but only to 
balance the demand/supply of the system, a nd not for security of supply purposes.  
Economic and technical feasibility of gas storage  
Cost Comparison of Storage Costs by 
Working Volume  Cost Comparison of Storage Costs by 
Deliverability 
 
 
Source: Study on Interoperabiliy of LNG facilities and In terchangeability of gas an d advice on the Opportunity 
to set up an Action Plan for the Promotion of LNG Chain Investments, DG TREN, 2008 
Conclusions  
The significance of gas storage for security of  supply purposes is clear ly highlighted by the 
use of this measure in all Memb er States where it is possible 
Development of commercial storages should be  encouraged. Beyond thei r role in balancing 
and price hedging, they can enhance market liqui dity and thus increase security of supply. 
While preparing the in-depth analysis of the measures described in chapter 3.1, the 
Commission shall examine whether the current  development of commercial storage is 
sufficient and whether other options on stor age are necessary to support the Community 
action, such as for example the development of  EU Community strate gic stocks or other 
measures to promote investme nt in commercial storage. 
6.2. Production flexibility 
Production flexibility  is used only in Member States wi th gas production, in particular gas 
export countries (The Nether lands, UK and Denmark). They have enough gas reserves to 
develop the flexibility of gas pr oduction, which contribu tes significantly to their security of 
gas supply. Production flexibility is  also one of the instruments indicated in the Annex of the 
Directive. 
The Netherlands as a gas producer has develope d a very flexible gas production from its gas 
fields (especially Groningen), which are used in similar winter-summer patterns as the gas 
storage in other Member States.  
 
EN 27   EN EU gas production flexib ility
050000100000150000200000250000300000350000400000450000
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09TJAustria
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany 
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Spain
United Kingdom
 
Similar pattern is also shown in the UK, howev er during the last two years the gas production 
has fallen, negatively influencing the UK production flexibility as an instrument for security 
of gas supply.  
Other significant producing countries like Germ any, Italy, Romania, and Denmark also use 
their production flexibility to cover (partly) th e seasonality of gas demands. In Germany, the 
production flexibility is not as important as storage or import flexibilities.  
Production flexibility decreases w ith the decline of gas production in EU. Affected Member 
States have to find an alternative. Denmark a nd the Netherlands are pl anning their gas future 
with the reality in domestic production.  
6.3. Long-term supply contracts (Art. 2(1))  
Article 2(1) defines for the purpose of this Directive long-term gas supply contract as "…  a 
gas supply contract with a duration of more than 10 years ."  
The significance of long-term supply contracts in  European gas market is  stipulated in Recital 
11 "Long-term contracts have played a very impor tant role in securing gas supplies for 
Europe and will continue to do so. The current level of long term contracts is adequate on the 
Community level, and it is believed that such contracts will continue to make a significant 
contribution to overall gas supplies as companies continue to include such contracts in their 
overall supply portfolio."  
Definition of long-term supply contracts as of the Directive is used by eight Member States 
(Germany, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Roma nia, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Hungary has 
set the time duration of the contract to 5-10 y ears. Other Member States use the term "long-
term contract" in their legislation, but without definition. Long-term contracts are used both in 
LNG and pipeline gas, however for LNG the usua l length of contract is  shorter as for the 
pipelines.  Mild winter
 
EN 28   EN Long-term contracts are also incl uded in the Annex as an instrume nt to increase the security 
of gas supplies. Many Member States use long-t erm contracts to ensure the gas supplies for a 
certain period in longer time frame (usually 5- 20 years). During the last three years most 
Member States importing gas from Russia prolo nged their long-term contracts to another 10 
to 20 years. Long-term contracts may also infl uence the gas supply forecasts to the market, 
showing the amount of gas, which is contracted for the future, and which will be available for 
the market.  
The impact of long-term contracts on the intern al market is twofold. The positive side is the 
increase of gas supply stability to the market, and at least some guarantee for a longer period 
that the gas will come to the market. The negative  side of the use of long-term contracts is if 
the volumes of transport capacity are only cont racted but not used, wh ich may foreclose the 
market to other suppliers. Usually higher than  normal consumption volumes of gas supplies 
with some flexibility are prescribed in cont racts for longer periods (e.g. month) , due to 
ensuring the gas supply during an exceptionally strong winter or other unpredictable events.  
Further disadvantage is that  existing long-term supply c ontracts between producers and 
dominant player in the market could lead to barrier s to entry by new players into the market 
and potentially could restrict the development of liquid trading hubs. 
Most of the long-term contract s are "take-or-pay" type. The importer is obliged to pay for 
contracted but not actually de livered volumes of gas. Lithua nia and Luxembourg defined in 
their legislation "take-or-pay contract s" but without specific time frame. 
The chart below shows the evolution of long-te rm gas supply contracts (2007 contract level), 
comparing the baseline gas demand scenario. The level of long-term gas supply contracts has 
increasing tendency, and since 199 5 the volume of gas contract ed with the long-term gas 
supply contracts has been higher than the ac tual gas consumption in EU-27. This trend 
continues and the current long-term contracts are of higher volume than the forecast of 2010 
gas consumption in the baseline scenario (withou t any reductions in alternative scenarios, e.g. 
RES, energy efficiency, or 20-20-20 scenarios). 
Long term supply contracts for Europe divi ded to pipeline and LNG, vs. the baseline 
scenario.  
 
EN 29   EN EU-27 LT contracts and demand - total
0100200300400500600700
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030bcm
0100200300400500600700
Pipeline LNG indigenous Supply baseline supply 
Source: Gas Strategies and PRIMES 2005 
Comparing the available transport capacities to contracted volumes could adjust the real flows 
and real volumes in a pipeline system. It also enables to define the free available capacity, and adjust the ratio between the cont racted and imported volumes, as  well as the ratio between the 
long term contract deliveries  and spot deliveries. Accord ing to the LNG study, the ratio 
between spot market and long term market in LNG market shifts towards the spot market, 
however the long-term contracts will still prevail.  
6.4. Import flexibility 
Import flexibility is an important instrument also included in the Annex. Import flexibility 
means the ability of gas supplier to periodically  increase or decrease the gas imports to the 
most appropriate volumes.  
LNG is particularly important for the short term flexibility. Main elements contribute to this 
flexibility: the possibility of LNG transport ship s to be docked in different ports where it is 
mostly needed, and any additional spot LNG ship can bring additional gas to desired destination, if it is needed. L NG terminals are utilised in le ss than 50% of their projected 
annual capacity in the EU.  
Pipelines flexibility
 is the possibility to divert the gas to other pipelines if there are more 
pipelines connected to the market. This also in creases the diversificati on of gas routes, which 
means also the diversification of  sources. Actual available capac ity and the ability to increase 
or decrease the gas volumes in a very short time are important parameters for pipelines. Both 
pipelines and spot LNG cover the seasonal vari ation of gas demand. The seasonal flexibility 
of imported gas volumes is incl uded in the import contracts.  
Gas storage can be the most preferable meas ure during the short term  disruption, as it is 
located closer to the markets or along the pi pelines route. Additional gas from external 
 
EN 30   EN producers could be only delivered within sign ificant time delay depending on the distance 
from the field (1-10 days) or from extra LNG cargo.  
EU gas import
050000100000150000200000250000300000350000400000
01-2007 04-2007 07-2007 10-2007 01-2008 04-2008 07-2008 10-2008 01-2009TJAustria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Es tonia
Finland
France
Germany 
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sw eden
United Kingdom
 
6.5. Interruptible contracts, fuel-switch possibility  
Interruptible contracts  enable to cut-off the gas cust omers under specific circumstances 
(e.g. gas supply disruption), but in  the same time, they can not have any negative impact on 
customers. These contracts are used in industry and power generation, where the gas is not the 
main/important fuel of industrial production,  or industry constructed or maintains the 
alternative fuel stocks.  
Some countries have also in troduced voluntary interruptible contracts with industry. Gas 
supplies are cut off above certain price levels . This practice is adopt ed only by the largest 
market players in France, Germany, a nd UK and depends on daily gas prices.  
Interruptible contracts are used  by industry also in combin ation with the fuel switch 
possibility (e.g. power generation). Support for inte rruptible contracts is given in Italy through 
the legislation creating the incentives for additio nal interruptibility by extra fee. This fee 
depends on the time period during the day in a winter season.  
Romania introduced a voluntary in terruptible contracts used by so called "interruptible 
customers" with only limitation to the secur ity of supply for household consumers in the 
situations represented by  the security of supply standards. Interruptible customer has minimal 
gas consumption 30,000 m3/h in winter and coul d be cut-off for 24 hours without affecting its 
technical security. 
 
EN 31   EN According to the European Gas Flexibility Report 20074, which analysed interruptible 
contracts in 14 Member States, the present use of interruptible contr acts is about 14 bcm of 
industry gas consumption and 25 bcm of power generation in 2005. It represents about 7% of 
the annual gas demand of these 14 Member States. According this report, the trend in Europe 
is to reduce the proportion of interruptible ga s, because of environmental constraints of 
alternative fuel, and because of declining ab ility to maintain th e backup oil systems. 
Fuel switch possibility  is introduced by important gas custom ers. In case of gas disruption, 
company could switch from gas to another fuel and follow operation. As for gas the most used 
alternative fuel is light fuel oil.  
This is used by power producers, which have to  maintain other fuel stocks, or have some 
stocks already constructed (e.g. older gas power plants with fu el oil as a backup fuel). For 
example in Bulgaria, gas fired power generation pl ant has to maintain 5 days of liquid stocks. 
The Commission asked the Member States about their possibility to switch fuel, if a gas 
supply disruption occurs. This in strument is used in a very different way by Member States. 
With regard to the share of gas consumption, Finland has 90% possibility to switch from gas 
to another fuel, Sweden 30-40%, 6 other Me mber States (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia) between 6-18%, 3 Member States (Austria, 
Poland, Slovakia, have not any fuel switch possi bility and 6 MS (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) have not such information. Other 2 MS 
(Greece, and Latvia) did not reply yet. The detailed results are in Annex 4. 
6.6. Cooperation of System Operators 
Coordinated dispatching activities between DSO and TSO  
The coordination of various system operators is defined in the national legislation. The 
coordination of the dispatching activities an  obligation for Czech, Slovak and Bulgarian 
TSOs, through the establishment of dispatch cen tres for the gas transit network. Austria and 
Estonia created independent market players, ca lled regional zone rulers or balance providers. 
Apart from different name, the main role of al l these bodies is the technical management and 
balancing of the gas system. Spanish TSOs are directly responsible for technical management 
of the network to ensure the proper coordi nation. Denmark, Poland, Slovenia and Finland 
TSOs shall cooperate with other system operato rs to secure the gas supply. In Germany all 
TSOs have to cooperate.  
Cooperation between transmission system operators of neighbouring Member States  
In case of a gas supply disruption, Transm ission System Operat ors should cooperate. 
Regional approach allows different levels of market development to be taken into account 
with the common goal of realising the single ma rket. Bilateral and multilateral projects for 
improving cross-border integration have been set up, such as the Regional Initiatives of 
ERGEG, government cooperation within the Pent alateral Forum in North West Europe and 
MIBEL/MIGAS for the Iberian countries. Unli ke other initiatives, the Energy Community 
increases regional cooperation on a legally binding basis. These proj ects play a us eful role in 
the development of best practices.  
                                                 
4 European Gas Flexibility Report, Global Insight, 2007 
 
EN 32   EN 
Storage 
Latvia 
Lithuania Estonia Gas regional Initiative (GRI) 
On 25 April 2006, ERGEG launched a Gas Regional Initiative (GRI), ma de up of three gas 
Regional Energy Markets (REMs). Focusing on more cooperation and harmonisation at cross-
border issues, each regional gas market has defi ned the priority actions in the areas of 
Balancing markets and quality, transparency, interconnections of primary capacity and 
secondary capacity markets, hubs indicating th e market liquidity, inve stments and regulatory 
coordination. The Regional Initiative Groups consists of the Regional Co-ordination 
Committee, together with the Implementation and Stakeholder Groups. A Lead Regulator has 
been appointed for each REM to chair a nd co-ordinate work within the region.  
Overall aim of Gas Regional Initiative is to pus h forward at a practical level, the development 
of regional gas markets in collaboration wi th industry, Member States, the European 
Commission and other stak eholders. At the regional level, the gas REMs tackle barriers to 
competition, such as the lack of market in tegration, transparency and balancing issues, 
highlighted in DG Competiti on’s energy sector inquiry.  
North-West regional gas market  participating countries are Ne therlands, Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Swede n, and Northern Ireland. Norway is an 
observer. The main priorities are transparency  and capacity interconnec tions for cross-border 
trade.  
South South-East regional gas market  participating countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania,  Slovakia and Slovenia. The South South-
East (SSE) REM is co-chaired by E-Contro l (Austria) and AEEG (Italy). This region 
contributes significantly to the se curity of energy supply in the UE since nearly half of the 
European transit capacities are transported th rough the countries of the South-South East 
Region. Monitoring the proper implementation of the European gas regulation, the survey and 
analysis of the regional market and its problems, as well as tr ansparency and interoperability 
issues are the main priorities.  
The South regional gas market is led by the Spanish Ener gy Commission (CNE) and aims 
to integrate Portugal, Southe rn France and Spain into one gas regional market. The South 
REM contributes to both the Euro pean security of energy supply and diversification of energy 
sources. It is one of the main entries for the natural gas coming from the north of Africa, and 
for the LNG coming from a variety of origins.  Interconnection capacity, interoperability and 
transparency issues are the three key priorities.  
Pentalateral Energy Forum 
The energy cooperation framework has been 
established in 2005 between France, Germany, and 
the three Benelux countries. "Pentalateral Energy 
Forum" gathers Governments, regulatory authorities, Transmission System Operators, power exchanges and market part icipants. The goal is to 
ensure the better integration of the energy markets between these countries, which are natural energy trading partners. Better integration of energy 
markets, through "flow-based market coupling", serves to enhance reliabili ty, security of supply, 
 
EN 33   EN and economic efficiency. Resources are pooled  for forecasting and capacity planning. 
Baltic states cooperation during winter period  
Pipeline import from Russia is regularly disrupted every wint er in some of the Baltic 
countries. During this period the gas is suppl ied from the Latvian underground gas storage 
Incukalns (2.3 bcm capacity) to c over the most of the gas demand in Latvia and Estonia, but 
also part of the gas demand in Lithuania, Russi a (Kaliningrad area) and sometimes also in the 
St. Petersburg region. Therefore,  all gas consumed during the year (both summer and winter) 
has to be imported during a period of about si x months in the summer season and stored in 
Latvia. Therefore one of the most significant risk s to gas supplies in the Baltic countries is a 
failure of the Inculkans storage facility 
Summer flows 
Winter flows 
Map: Gas flows in Baltic States in summer and winter periods . 
6.7. Cross-border capacities  
Proper planning of cross-bor der capacities is essen tial for security of ga s supply as well as for 
the internal market. The gas netw ork shall be able to deliver all the gas demanded in Europe. 
It has to withstand very high gas demand duri ng strong winter. Sufficient capacity shall be 
able to deliver enough gas in future, following the consumption patterns in EU. The cross-
border capacity planning shall be done in line with the annual gas demand scenarios for 
winter consumption, both at the country levels and at the EU level, and both from the point of 
gas import and of domestic consumption. 
Entry points to European Union  
Europe has 38 gas entry points.  25 pipelines (from Russia 3 pipelines direct ly, 4 through 
Belarus and 5 through Ukraine, 9 from Norwa y, 1 from Tunisia, 1 from Morocco, 1 from 
Libya, and 1 from Turkey) and 13 LNG terminal s. The entry capacity of gas pipelines is 
around 370 bcm (e.g. 190 bcm from Russia, 38 bcm from Algeria and 127 bcm from Norway) 
and around 100 bcm of existing LNG terminals.  
The main entry point to the EU is at the easte rn border of Slovakia importing the Russian gas 
to Europe through Ukraine. Othe r important entry points of Russian gas to Europe through 
Ukraine are in Romania, Hungary and Poland. Po land and Lithuania imports Russian gas also 
through Belarus. Finland, Estonia, and Latvia have direct gas connections to Russia. New 

 
EN 34   EN pipelines creating additional import capacity for gas from Russia to EU are planned.  
Chart: Annual capacity of pipeline entry points to the EU (bcm)  
Source: GIE, MS reporti ng, European Commission 
Norwegian gas is imported to Europe through ga s pipeline connections to UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France. A new pipeline is planned to connect Sweden and Denmark. Algerian gas is imported by pipelines to Spain and Italy. A new pipeline to Spain is 
under construction and another is pl aned to diversify the route to  Italy. Italy is connected to 
Libya by a pipeline. One new pipe line bringing gas to Europe (M edgas) and one extension of 
import capacity (Algeria-Italy) are already under construction. 
Greece imports gas from Caspian area via Turke y. Several pipelines are planned in the 4
th 
corridor (Caspian / Middle East to the EU): Nabucco, ITGI, Trans-Adriatic pipeline and White Stream. There are also Black-s ea LNG or CNG options on the table. 
Chart: Annual capacity of LN G terminals in EU (bcm)  
 
Source: GIE, MS reporti ng, European Commission  
Spain has the biggest capacity of LNG term inals. Spain operates 6 and France 3 LNG 
terminals. Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Ital y and UK operate LNG terminal. Seven LNG 
terminals of 57bcm capacity in to tal are under construction in f our MS (France, Italy, Spain 
and UK). However, two of them (1 in Italy a nd 1 in UK) are already behind the schedule of 
the construction and the operation start is postponed by couple of years.  
France, Italy, Spain, and UK also plan to ex tend the capacity of existing LNG terminals. 
Other Member States like Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Netherla nds, Poland, Sweden, 
and some Baltic countries plan to construc t new LNG terminals. The Netherlands have 
already started the construction. However, the experience shows, that only some of these 
plans will materialise.  

 
EN 35   EN Conclusions  
There is only one new gas pipeline bringi ng gas to Europe under construction. All other 
pipelines are still only plans, how to bring the gas from Russia,  Norway, Algeria, and through 
the 4th Corridor. The LNG terminals are in a better position in Europe compared to pipeline 
projects. Strong increase of LNG availability in the world mark et has given the potential to 
develop the LNG regasification terminals in Europe. So far 7 new LNG terminals are under 
construction and other 20-30 are planned (inc luding expansion of existing LNG terminals). 
Proper planning of gas demand scenarios is necessary, because the construction of new 
pipelines and LNG terminals takes 2-5 year s. Without enough capacity  at the EU border 
points, it might be impossible to bring suffici ent additional gas to Europe. Enough gas at the 
market is the precondition to running  the internal gas market properly. 
6.8. Diversification of gas supplies  
In Poland, Spain and Portugal th e diversification of gas supply is stipulated in the national 
legislation as an obligati on, maximum 60% of gas supply  can come from one supplier.  
Eight Member States (Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithua nia, Estonia, Bulgaria, and 
Slovakia) fully depend on gas imports from onl y one gas supplier. In addition, Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia and Lithuania have no dome stic gas production. Bulgaria, Ireland and 
Slovakia have only marginal domestic production. Romania has also only one gas supplier, 
but an important domestic produc tion covering more than ha lf of its gas demand. Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Greece, UK, and Italy constructed additional 
pipeline connections, thus diversified their r outes of gas supplies in the last 15 years.  
Portugal and Greece introduced natural gas into th eir energy mix only in the last 15 years, and 
diversified their gas supplies by LNG terminal. Ire land is planning to do so, as well as the 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and Sweden.  
6.9. Investment support 
Investment in infrastructure is  one of the instruments from th e Annex of the Directive. There 
are many projects through Europe to build new or to expand existing pipelines and storage 
facilities, including interconn ections. Investment in infra structure for gas import via 
regasification terminals and pipelines is nece ssary (see explicitly in the Annex of the 
Directive). But it is also necessary to invest in interconnections and dow nstream infrastructure 
to reaching the customers. Investment in infrastr ucture can only help s ecurity of supply if the 
gas is physically availa ble and able to flow. 
EU financial instruments  
Basic financial instrument supporting the European gas infrastructure are Trans-European 
Networks for energy infrastructure  (TEN-E). The EC Treaties of Rome (1957) and 
Maastricht (1993) laid the foundatio n for the creation of the intern al market allowing the free 
movement of people, goods and capital. This includes European internal energy market. 
Article 154 (ex Article 129b) in  the treaty with regards to Trans-European Networks  set out 
the objectives of Community action: " Contributing to the establ ishment and development of 
Trans-European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy 
infrastructures."  
 
EN 36   EN European Community Guidelines for TEN-Energy were adopted for the first time in the year 
1996, comprising the list of projec ts of common interest. Financia l rules specify the financial 
procedures involved. Trans European Energy Netw orks budget line is managed in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 of the Council  amended by Regulati on (EC) No 1655/1999, 
No 788/2004 and No 807/2004. 
Guidelines on Trans European Energy Networks  specify which projects are eligible for 
funding. The list of projects has been revised four times, in 1997, 1999, 2003, and 2006. The last one in Decision No 1364/200 6/EC of the European Parliame nt and of the Council of 6 
September 2006 laying down guidelines for tran s-European energy networks and repealing 
Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC.  
Commission defines in the Guidelines three cate gories of projects - Pr ojects of European 
Interest, Projects of common inte rest, and Priority projects.  
Table of the allocated budget from  TEN-E to gas sector projects 
 Nb of proposals 
funded, of which: Works Studies Total Amount 
allocated 
2002 6 0 6 11.078.300 € 
2003 6 0 6 12.364.700 € 
2004 8 0 8 9.901.590 € 
2005 6 0 6 11.543.140 € 
2006 4 1 3 8.808.900 € 
2007 5 1 4 6.024.500 € 
2008 8 1 7 12.467.183 € 
 
Other EU financial instruments  
There are several European Community financia l instruments which may come into play for 
financing gas infrastructure. 
Structural funds as par t of Cohesion policy 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) c ontributes to the financing of the Trans-
European Energy Networks. Funds have b een allocated from the Community Support 
Frameworks (CSF I and II) and the Commun ity initiatives (REGEN, INTERREG II).  
For the first time in the Financial perspec tive 2007-2013, Structural funds (ERDF) enabled 
direct allocation of budget for gas infrastructure projects. They defined two special categories: 
Category 36 "TEN-E gas" supporting big TE N-E interconnection projects. Category 35 
"Natural gas" supports other projects than TEN-E, like distribution ne tworks or underground 
gas storage facilities. 8 Member  States allocated structural  funds to finance their gas 
infrastructure projects in total. 4 Member Stat es allocated structural funds to the TEN-E gas 
projects.  
Allocated budget from structural funds fo r the period 2007-13 for the gas projects  
Member State Category 35 - Natural gas Category 36 - TEN-E gas 
 
EN 37   EN (EUR) (EUR) 
Bulgaria 51.040.633 0 
Lithuania 26.698.052 0 
Poland 418.188.665 198.900.000 
Romania 21.069.687 47.885.653 
Greece 81.337.500 60.150.000 
Italy 32.044.065 0 
Portugal 18.067.152 0 
Spain 9.835.957 55.012.432 
Cross border cooperation  304.687 0 
Total 658.586.398 361.948.085 
 
European Investment Bank (EIB ) loans and loan guarantees 
The EIB finances, through loans up to 50% of the total cost, many TEN Energy projects, 
particularly in electricity, with the aim of  contributing to the Community's TEN policy. 
Between 1999 and 2007 around 80% of a total of € 32 billion spent by the EIB in the 
energy field went to EU projects , which amounts to an annual bank lending of € 3.25 
billion.  
The main purpose of the EIF (funded 40% by the EIB, 30% by the Commission and the 
remaining 30% by banks and other financial instituti ons) is to make available, subject to fees, 
guarantees for loans concerning TEN projects.  
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
Since its establishment in 1991, EBRD has fina nced 209 projects in the energy sector 
providing total finance of € 6.5 billion and supporting investments of approximately € 22.1 
billion. EBRD focuses on the development of private sector  and finances relatively few gas 
infrastructure projects . Pipeline financing has increased in  the recent year for countries 
outside the EU, in particular Ukraine (3 gas pipeline projects) and Azerbaijan (2 gas pipeline 
projects). 
European Economic Plan for Recovery (EEPR) 
EU adopted in 2009 its European Energy Plan for Recovery of n early € 4 billion to finance 
the development of a fully integrated energy market as well as to cope with the challenges of the security of supply. The amount is divided into three sub-programmes: 
- 2,365M€ is earmarked to gas and electricity in frastructures – also known as interconnections 
 
EN 38   EN - 565M€ to carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
- 1,050M€ to offshore wind energy. 
Cooperation programmes with third countries 
Since 2007 EC assistance to the countries participating in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Russia is provided under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) . The Instrument replaces the assistance previously provided to the 
countries of Eastern Europe, Ru ssia, Southern Caucasus, Centra l Asia and the Mediterranean 
under the TACIS and MEDA programmes and is designed to financially  support the political 
priorities agreed with partne r countries through the ongoing political initiatives. For the 
budgetary period 2007-2013, approximately €12 billion in EC funding is available to support 
the partner countries. Th e Instrument includes  
the ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programme , which could offer some 
possibilities for local infrastructure development.  In the context of the ENPI instrument, the 
EC continues its assistance pr eviously provided under the INOGATE Programme  (Interstate 
Oil and Gas Transport to Europe). INOGATE,  initially aiming at promoting the regional 
integration of the gas and oil pipeline systems and facilitating the transport of oil and gas both 
within the greater NIS region a nd towards the export market of Europe, has been extended to 
cover other energy sectors a nd projects, including  electricity, renewa bles and energy 
efficiency.  
Finally, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility  was established at th e end of 2007 with the 
objective to and support lending to ENP partners. The Commission’s alloca tion to the Facility 
for the period 2007-2013 amounts to €700m and is complemented by Member States’ 
contributions. The Facility is funding projects  of common interest  focussing primarily on 
energy, environment and transport. 
6.10. Liquid tradable gas markets  
Security of supply can be e nhanced by a liquid market. One reason for this is greater 
flexibility in terms of price and volumes avai lable, which enables th e gas supplies to be 
diverted in response to price signals. Flexible use of gas st orage facilities also helps to 
improve the market liquidity. However, the li quid gas markets will help to increase the 
security of supply if the market  will be able to deliver the ga s from one side to other.  
Important pre-condition for a liquid gas market  is adequate infrastructure (pipeline and 
storage facilities, including inte rconnections), in order to ensure  that gas can be traded where 
demand arises across Europe. Other important  precondition is enough gas on the market.  
Market liquidity  is a business, economics or investment term that refers to an asset's ability 
to be easily converted through an act of buying or selling without causing a significant 
movement in the price and with minimum loss of value. It also defines the ability of market 
players to trade a market commodity on a spot market.  
Good possibilities for all market players to buy and sell  even large volumes of gas at any time 
at a competitive market price is a crucial feature of a well functioning internal market for gas. Liquidity will rise, if the number of players active on the market, the volumes traded and the 
numbers of trades that ta ke place will increase.  
 
EN 39   EN Liquidity could be also defined as a ratio between spot gas volumes and long term gas 
volumes. Today almost 90% of the volumes ar e traded on the virtual hubs such as the 
National Balancing Point (NBP) in the UK, th e Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the 
Netherlands and the Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV) in Italy. Spot market might turn around 
between 10 and 15% of total gas traded. 
LNG has increased its share in the EU gas ma rket gaining more than 12% in 2007. Spot LNG 
cargo is flexible to reach any LNG terminal in Europe, if it is needed. However, the global aspect also plays its role, to gain the spot LNG cargo, it is n ecessary to outbid US and Asia 
markets by higher prices. The LNG Study defines the level of the LNG gas spot and short 
term market to 15% of LNG cargos to Europe. This share is expected to increase, shifting 
more towards shorter term and spot contracts. Th is also increases the liquidity and flexibility 
of the gas market. 
It should be noted, that price volatility in liq uid markets can lead to higher prices. This will 
especially apply in cases of s hortfalls of gas or supply disr uptions respectively, when the 
demand for gas will be very high. Thus one of the preconditions is the guarantee to have enough gas on the market.  
Provision of pipeline capacity enabling gas supplies diversion to  affected areas, could mean 
the free available capacity in the existing gas pipelines, which could be used if gas supply 
diversion is necessary. However, it could al so mean the need for more investments and 
construction of gas pipelines and gas interconne ctions inside the inte rnal market. Supporting 
the investment and proper planni ng inside the internal market will help to fulfil this more 
obligation than instrument.  
Conclusion
 
Liquidity in the gas market in creases the security of gas supply in the internal market. 
However, the precondition for a liquid gas market is a definite volume of gas at the market to 
creating the liquidity.  
6.11.  Other instruments identified and used by Member States 
The Directive provides only for a non-exhaustive list of instruments, the Member States have 
the possibility to introduce ot her security of gas supply meas ures. Most of Member States 
defined in their national legislation the secure  gas supplies for some categories of customers 
as a public service obligation. Also the monitori ng of security of suppl y, long term planning 
of the grid development, and network balancing has been defined as other important elements 
increasing the security of gas supplies.  
6.11.1.  Long term planning 
One of the important instruments defined by some  Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, UK) is a planning procedure on a longer te rm basis. Its main objective is to determine 
the gas consumption for a certain time period, us ually 5-10 years with co ncrete main projects 
to develop the gas infrastructu re to meet the gas demand.  
This task is usually centrally coordinated by the body responsible fo r overall security of 
supply. This task is also given to the system operators to make  a planning for the development 
of their own parts of the networ k, and which are in li ne with long-term development plans and 
 
EN 40   EN gas demand. Also the gas suppliers have to  prepare their own supply-demand forecast and 
provide it to the coordinating body.  
For example, France and Denmark have to prep are a multi-annual indicative plan, which will 
ensure the supply-demand balance in gas for next ten years, by de fining the investment 
priorities, long-term contracts and the emer gency measures in a long-term. Ireland's Gas 
Capacity Statement takes 20 years forward for ecast, in addition to regular 7 years.  
The third package on IEM5 has partially addressed this issue by the introduction of the 
TSOs co-operation  in long-term network development planning. 
6.11.2.  Public Service Obligations  
Public Service Obligations are obligations wh ich would not be assumed (or would not be 
assumed to the same extent) by undertak ings operating under ma rket conditions and 
considering their own commercial interests6. Nevertheless, Member States may wish to ensure 
that certain obligations are fulfilled  for the common economic interest.  
The Gas Directive requires only that if custom ers are connected to the gas system, Member 
States should ensure that they are informed about their rights to be supplied with natural gas 
of a specified quality at reasona ble prices. Contrary to the Elect ricity Directive, there are no 
universal service obligations (meaning that th ere is no duty to connect each customer who 
wishes to be supplied with gas). This different  approach results from the significant difference 
between gas and electricity, namely the fact that natural gas is more easily substitutable 
source of energy, whereas there are no r easonable substitutes for electricity.  
Therefore, the imposition of Public Service Obligations on gas undertakings may include 
obligations relating to: 
• Security, including security of supply; 
• Regularity and quality of supplies; 
• Affordability; 
• Environment and climate protection; 
• Long term planning (with regard to security  of supply, energy efficiency, demand-side 
management and for environmental goals). 
Despite the lack of obligation of universal (com plete) territorial coverage for gas networks, 
most Member States impose Public Service Obliga tions in order to ensure  the security of gas 
supply. The security of gas supp ly is the part of Public Service Obligations defined in 11 
Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, 
                                                 
5 Third internal market package 
6 The definition of "public service obligation" is co ntained in Council Regulation 1191/69 (OJ L 156 of 
28 June 1969) on action by member States concerning the obligation inherent in the concept of a public 
service in transport by rail, road and inland wate rway. Regulation 1191/9 has recently been repealed 
Regulation 1370/2007/EC; however the definition of PSO remains very similar 
 
EN 41   EN Luxembourg, Portugal, and Slove nia) in the common interest7. Those obligations are imposed 
to various system operators (TSO, DSO, LS O, UGSO), as well as to the suppliers. 
Furthermore, in most cases the imposed Public  Service Obligations are related to the quality 
of delivered gas, quality of ga s supply service, regularity of ga s deliveries, and to ensure the 
gas supply in case of gas supply disruption or any similar accident. Sometimes the gas supply 
has to be guaranteed for a certain period of time.  
In Belgium the Public Service Obligation is imposed to transit and suppliers to develop 
adequate gas network. In France the Public Serv ice Obligation is imposed to every supplier, 
who has to store the gas of amount of at least 85% of its  gas storage capacity on the 1st of 
November of each year. In Finl and, the obligation is imposed to  System Operator to connect 
customer, storage facility or LNG facility.  
The Ministry (Greece, Lithuania, and Slovakia) or  the regulator (Malta) have got the power to 
impose the Public Service Obligations to ensure  the gas supply. In Ge rmany the regulator has 
power to impose public service obligation only in  a supply crisis. In Bulgaria the Ministry 
shall enlarge the scope of imposed public servi ce obligations related to  the uninterrupted gas 
supply. Czech regulator shall exte nd the scope of imposed public service obligations to prices 
and to define the supplier as a provider of last re sort to provide the gas in the event of supplier 
contract failure. In most countri es (except the Netherlands) Pub lic Service Obligations include 
also tariff regulation.  
6.12. General Conclusions  
The balance of various instrument s is essential to enhancing th e security of gas supply. The 
most frequent measures are gas storages, long term contracts, flexibility of production and 
imports and diversifications of gas supply.  
The list in the Annex is defined as a "non-exhaus tive", thus Member Stat es had the possibility 
to introduce further security of gas supply instru ments. Most of them set long-term planning 
procedures and public service obligation to  guarantee the secur ity of gas supply.  
It is often mentioned that the existence of long term contract s may reduce market liquidity on 
the basis that they do not facilitate gas release to the market for third parties to trade. For 
example, the "liquid tradable gas markets” doe s not interact with the “long term contracts”. 
Both instruments complement one another to  enhancing the securi ty of gas supply.  
Investment support and long-term gas supply cont racts are used by all Member States, but not 
all are mentioned in the legislation. The long- term contracts shall be taken as a tool to 
guarantee that certain amount of  gas will come to the market. In a world of tight 
supply/demand tension long term supply contr acts in the sense of the Directive grant 
guaranteed volumes of gas with a predictable price calculati on method, with less risk of 
volatility. 
Flexibility is very much supported. Production fl exibility is important measure for substantial 
gas producing countries. However, the maximal vol ume of gas produced in  Member States is 
                                                 
7 The role of Public Service Obligation in the internal gas market is defined in the Article 3 of the 
Directive 2003/55/EC on the internal gas market  
 
EN 42   EN decreasing, which also has impact on flexibilit y of gas production. The significance of this 
measure is in slight decrease. Import flexibil ity is used by all importing Member States.  
Both diversifications of routes and of en ergy mix are developed in the same 15 Member 
States. The diversification of suppliers, the cross-border capacity planning, and the long term 
planning of the gas network development are su pported in every Member State, usually given 
to system operators and ove rall responsible bodies. 
Cooperation between TSOs in neighbouring coun tries and regions is well supported; however 
the coordinated dispatch service is not exactly mentioned. Fuel-switch possibility, alternative 
fuels and fuels stocks use, and interruptible cont racts are also used in most of Member States. 
Furthermore, some countries have a very in-d epth assessment (and a good control) of their gas 
supply situation and the effectiveness of thei r mitigation tools, other countries don't.  
Generally we can conclude that the level play ing field within the EU has not been reached. 
 
EN 43   EN 7. GAS COORDINATION GROUP (ART.7) 
In order to monitor th e security of supply situation and provide a coordination mechanism in 
case of a supply crisis, the Di rective establishes a Gas Co ordination Group chaired by the 
European Commission and composed by re presentatives of the Member States, 
representatives of the industry concerned a nd representatives of relevant customers. 
Gas Coordination group was establishe d in line with the Article 7(1):  "A Gas Coordination 
Group is hereby established in order to facil itate the coordination of  security of supply 
measure (the Group) ." by the Commission Decision 2006/791/EC of 7 November 2006 
establishing the composition of the Gas Coor dination Group (Text with EEA relevance).  
The role of the Gas Coordination Group is sti pulated in the Recital 15 of the Directive 
2004/67/EC: "  A Gas Coordination Group should be es tablished, which should facilitate 
coordination of security of supply measures at Community level in the event of a major supply 
disruption, and may also assist me mber States in coordinating measures taken at a national 
level. In addition, it should exchange informati on on security of gas supply on a regular basis, 
and should consider aspects re levant in the context of a major supply disruption." and in 
similarly worded the Recital 7 of  the Commission Decision 2006/791/EC. 
The tasks of the Group are defined in Article 2 of the Commission Decision: "The tasks of the 
Gas Coordination Group shall be: (a) to facil itate coordination of security of supply 
measures at Community level, including in the event of a major supply disruption; (b) to 
examine, and, where appropriate, assist the Member States in  coordinating the measures 
taken at national level to deal with a major supply disruption." 
Composition of the Gas Coordination Group is  defined by Article 1 of the Commission 
Decision in line with the Article 7( 2) of the directive. It is co mposed of "not more than two 
representatives" from each Member State, from  industry represented by industry associations 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), Eurogas, an d the International Asso ciation of the Oil and 
Gas Producers (OGP), and from consumers repr esented by the Intern ational Federation of 
Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC Europe), Eure lectric, and Bureau Européen des Unions 
de Consommateurs (BEUC). The Group is chaired by the Commission.  
The Group is convened to hold regular meeti ngs 3-4 times a year since 2006. The Group is 
convened also for the emergency meetings envisa ged under the Article 9 of  the Directive. In 
fact the first meeting of the Gas Coordinati on Group was an emergency meeting in January 
2006.  
The role of the Group has been discussed also with the members of th e Group. The role of the 
Group its task and its functioning have been  judged satisfactory. The main role is to 
coordinate the security of supply measures, but also to monitor, to predict and to advise 
Member States in setting emergency measures a nd actions. According to Member States it is 
also "a platform  for the Commission, Member States an d industry to discuss the national 
security of supply measures".  
However, it was also mentioned what better or more precise definitions of many terms of the 
Directive is necessary. Preparation of guidelin es for European coordination to mitigate a 
 
EN 44   EN major supply disruption, and the solidarity mech anism in the gas supply are the main tasks of 
the group for the immediate future.  
Conclusions 
Gas Coordination Group enables Member States , industry and Commission to discuss the gas 
security of supply issues in the Community, as well as to de velop and shape the instruments 
and emergency measures for security of gas supply. 
Extraordinary meetings of  Gas Coordination Group  
Article 9(1) of the security of gas supply di rective introduces the mechanism, which enables 
to convene the gas coordination group meetings in an emergency mode "as soon as possible" 
under the consideration of one of these two circumstances: " If an event … is likely to develop 
into a major supply disruption for a significant  period of time, or in the case of an event 
indicated by a Member State according to Article 8(3)… ".  
Article 8(3) defines that "…Member States may indicate to the Chair of the Group events 
which they consider, because of their magni tude and exceptional character, cannot be 
adequately managed with national measures. " 
The Commission has already convoked four ex traordinary meetings of Gas Coordination 
Group since 2008, and three in 2009, closely re lated to the January 2009 gas crisis.  
In January 2006, in the course of gas negotiati ons between Russia and Uk raine, gas supply to 
Ukraine and onwards to the EU was reduced. Th e overall reduction amounted to 20% of gas 
supply through Brotherhood pipeline for period of 2 days. This reduction resulted in a chain 
reaction affecting Hungary by 30% reduction of gas supplies, Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Austria by 20%, Italy by 15%, Po land by 10% and Germany by 6%.  
During March 2008, when Russia announced reduced gas supply to Ukraine by 60 mcm/day 
the Gas Coordination Group run a model scenario showing what could possibly happen if the 
gas transit through Ukraine was reduced by 60 mcm/day.  
These two examples have showed some patte rns how gas supply disruptions from Russian 
through Ukraine affects or could affect Member States. In both cases the 20% threshold of 
supply disruption from 3rd Countries, defined as a major su pply disruption, was not reached, 
but Member States were or could have been affected significantly.  
The January 2009, gas supply crisis confirmed the importance of the emergency meetings 
approach. Commission was able to  provide up-to-date information and analysis of the crisis 
situation in all Member States and in EU, exch anging best practices and measures used among 
Member States and industry, a nd to advise both Member Stat es and industry to take other 
possible measures helping each other.  
Conclusions   
The extraordinary meetings mechanism of Ga s Coordination Group has been proved as a 
successful tool even through ther e was no need yet to set up a nd apply for the next two steps 
of the Community approach. The convocation of  the extraordinary meetings enabled to 
discuss the problem, and helped to re-establish  the normal relations status between export and 
 
EN 45   EN transit countries, to at least th e level, which has not endangered any more the transit of natural 
gas to Europe.  
In the disruption in January 2009, the other two steps in  three step approach of gas emergency 
were not used, but the role of the Group as th e real coordination and central information body 
for European emergency situations has been proven.  
 
EN 46   EN 8. COMMUNITY THREE STEP APPROACH  
Recital 18 of the Directive stipulates the importance of the Community approach to help to 
deal with gas disruption. This mechanism pr ovided by this Directive shall be based "… on a 
three step approach. The first step would invol ve the reactions of the industry to the supply 
disruption; if this were not sufficient, Member  States should take measures to solve the supply 
disruption. Only if the measures taken at st age one and two have faile d should appropriate 
measures be taken at Community level ."  
It is underlined in the Recita l 19 of the Directive,  supportive measures  shall be done in 
accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity as defined in the Article 5 
of the Treaty " Since the objective of this  Directive (…) cannot, in all circumstances, be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, particularly in light of the increasing 
interdependency of the Member States regarding security of gas supply, and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action,  be better achieved at Community level, the 
Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in 
Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that 
Article, this Directive does not go beyond what  is necessary in order to achieve that 
objective."
 
The link between national emergency measures a nd the European/Community level is defined 
in Article 8(3). This article gives the right to Member States to indicate to the Commission 
(Chairman of the Gas Coordination Group) any major gas emergency event in their country, 
which could not be adequately managed by the national emergency measures, because of the 
magnitude or exceptional character of the event.  
The main tasks at the Community level are predefin ed in Article 9 in the three steps approach:  
• First, industry takes measures to deal with a supply shortfall.  
• As second step, Member States' national measures are activated.  
• Only if the measures taken at the first two levels are not sufficient to cope with the 
shortfall or disruption of supply, " the Commission shall convene the [Gas Coordination] 
Group as soon as possible, at the request of  a Member State or on its own initiative ." 
The Commission shall convene an emergency meeting of the Gas Coordination Group. This 
Group shall examine and assist the Member States  in coordinating the m easures taken at the 
national level to deal with th e major supply disruption. Th e Group shall take fully into 
account the measures taken by the gas industr y as a first response to the major supply 
disruption and the measures taken by Member St ates including relevant bilateral agreements.  
Where the measures taken by Member State at the national level referred to the Gas 
Coordination Group are inadequate (…), the Commission may, in consultation with the Group, provide guidance to Member States regar ding further measures to assist those 
Member States particularly affected  by the major supply disruption.  
 
EN 47   EN Where the additional measures taken at na tional level after the advice of the Gas 
Coordination Group are inadequate (…), the Commission may submit a proposal to the Council regarding further necessary measures.  
Any measures at Community level shall cont ain provisions aimed at ensuring fair and 
equitable compensation of the undertakings concerned by the measures to be taken. 
 
EN 48   EN 9. NATIONAL EMERGENCY MEASURES (ART.8) 
Member States shall prepare national emergency measures according to the Article 8(1) of the 
Directive. According to the Article 8(3) Me mber States shall communicate these national 
emergency measures to the Commission and also publish them. The prominent role of these measures is in the preparation of Member States in advance
 to any crisis s ituation. Therefore 
the national emergency measures shall be prepar ed in advance, and updated accordingly if it 
becomes necessary.  
Until the end of April 2009, the Commission ha s received the noti fication of national 
emergency measures only from 12 Member States . 7 other Member States (Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden) provided their national emergency measures 
to the Commission, but these were not comm unicated thorough the official notification 
procedure. Other 6 Member St ates (Belgium, Germany, Latvia , Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Romania) have not yet communicated to  the Commission their national emergency 
measures. Thus the further analysis is not complete, because it is not based on all Member States. However, the most common practi ces are similar in many Member States. 
The national emergency measures shall ensure that market players are given sufficient 
opportunity to provide an initia l response to the emergency situ ation. Member St ates have to 
be ready for that event and have to have in operation all n ecessary provisions and operational 
plans how to deal with the gas supply reduction, or the disruption.  
Member States transposed these provisions in two steps. At first, they obliged different 
market players to develop the national emergency measures in their national legislation, and 
only after this step, the market  players have developed the national emergency measures.  
Member States realised the obligation to im plement the national emergency measures in a 
different way. Some Member States (Austr ia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and UK) have developed a kind of emergency scale
, 
which defines the different emergency stages, as well as enables to decrease the gas demand progressively in a country, without affecting the national economy. The security of supply 
authority (responsible body) set emergency stages according the importance of gas supply disruption. Consequently all mark et players (system operators, s uppliers, etc) have to follow 
the emergency procedures as preset in every emergency stage.  
Some Member States (Austria , Czech Republic, Denmark, Estoni a, Finland, France, Greece, 
Italy, Slovakia, Sweden and UK) went further in the implementation and created so called 
"National Emergency Plans
". After the January 2009 gas disruption Belgium, Ireland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Sloven ia have also introduced emergency plans. 
The plans include preset roles and responsibilitie s of market players, who have to operate in 
case of any emergency level (stage) and created a system for various measures necessary for 
the operation under the difficult or emergency conditions.  
Other aspect taken by Member States is the role of prevention a nd preventive measures . 
Only few Member States have created so called prevention measures (Austria, France, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal) an d defined some of the national emergency 
measures as preventive measures, which also di minish the risk of the gas supply decrease or 
 
EN 49   EN disruption, as well as the imp act to the national economy, if th e gas decrease or disruption 
occurs and emergency level shall be set.  
Conclusion  
Member States took two steps approach to tran spose this Article. At first, they set in the 
national legislation an obligation for some mark et players to create the emergency measures. 
The second step after th e adoption of the legislation has been  up to the defined market players 
to prepare and put in to operation their emergency plans after a certain time period. This 
approach has created a delay in full transposi tion of this Article. It also means, that the 
Commission could assess national emergency measures (national em ergency plans) only of 18 
Member States. Some of them Commission receiv ed only in the last da ys, thus the assessment 
is very general. 
Most of the Member States have defined thei r national emergency measures in a systematic 
way creating the national emergency plans. In  these plans they also included prevention 
mechanisms, nominal level of gas market opera tion, as well as different pre-emergency and 
emergency levels defined by disrupti on volume and by the economic impact.  
9.1. Gas emergency scale  
Member States have developed and defi ned in their national legislation a Gas emergency 
scale. Every National Emergency Plan includes emer gency scale. It contains various very 
precisely defined levels of gas consumption, wh ich have to be followed if the different gas 
consumption level than normal is set. 
The emergency scale of gas suppl y levels/states ranges between Me mber States from 3 to 12 
different levels of predefined gas consumption for different gas customers, but they usually 
follows these three main levels:  
(1) Normal state, normal level of gas consumption  – is defined as the gas 
supply/consumption under normal (nominal ) market conditions and full/normal gas 
supply; 
(2) Limited/exceptional gas consumption level  – pre-emergency or potential emergency 
stage is set by 7 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, 
Spain and UK); 
If different state of gas consumption is declare d, the gas supply shall be limited to the specific 
extent which does not hamper the economy of th e country. This limited level of consumption 
is defined as technological level or exceptional gas supply level.  
• Safety technological minimum level – is lim ited level of gas consumption. The limitation 
of the gas supply is set as the minimal gas su pply which will not hamper the economy of 
the defined customers (usually industry). It depends on gas appliances and gas equipments 
of the company, its possibility to fuel sw itch, different technology for gas is used, and 
flexibility to run the equipment. Some MS ha ve defined different level of gas customers, 
for whom this minimum shall be defined. In CZ the safety technological minimum applies 
to customers with consumption > 400 000 m3/y, or the consumers, which are not covered 
by security of supply standards 
 
EN 50   EN • Exceptional situation - is defined as a situati on of exceptional operation in anticipation that 
the normal condition parameters are not fulfill ed, but the situation does not require the 
declaration of emergency situation. Spain has defined 3 levels (0,1,2) of exceptional 
situation depending on the severity of event. 
(3) Emergency level – Stage of emergency  
If restrictions of pre-emergency levels do not  ensure safe gas supply, Emergency consumption 
levels are declared. Stage of emergency is decl ared if there is a gas supply reduction, which is 
not possible to be managed without  economic impact to the economy. 
The roles and responsibilities of market players are predefined in case of stage of emergency. 
In some Member States, different market players are set as responsible bodies to guarantee the 
gas supply and to manage the gas system (e.g. Su pplier to TSO than to Regulator in Germany, 
Suppliers to TSO in Denmark and France) 
Conclusion  
The definition of emergency status, nominal s upply conditions, etc., defining the emergency 
systems in general, shall be at least comparab le and understandable in all Member States. The 
general patterns are already introduced by Member  States in the way how they implemented 
the provisions of the Directive. Proper understanding of national emergency systems will 
create a base for the European emergency system, mentioned in the Article 8 of the Directive. 
9.2. Definition of crisis si tuations in gas supply 
Major supply disruption, national energy crisis, or any other cris is situation in gas supply is 
defined by Member States in their nati onal legislation in a different way.  
Czech Republic  defines the emergency situation if pa rtial gas supply disruption for the period 
of 8 weeks occurs and the volumes  of 20% of the total daily suppl y contracts set to ensure the 
supply for final customers in the Czech Repub lic, or for auto-supplier, during the winter 
period are lost.  
Hungary  defined a crisis situation in  gas supply as a supply disr uption of natural gas, which 
directly endangers persons, assets, nature, envi ronment and supply of majo rity of customers.  
Latvia  declares national energy crisis when the energy supply is dist urbed in such amount 
that it may threaten the safety, health of inha bitants and activity of other economic sectors, 
and such disturbances cover a territory in wh ich the number of inhabitants exceeds one third 
of the State's population or which covers more than a half of the na tional territo ry. Energy 
crisis is declared when the supply of energy or fuel is threatened or disturbed in such amount 
that energy suppliers can not for ecast and eliminate such threats and disturbances by means of 
economic activity methods.  
Bulgaria  defines the outage regime within the nationa l territory as a tem porary interruption or 
limitation of natural gas generation or supply in cases such as "force majeure"; occurrence, or 
for prevention, and breakdowns of facilities for natural gas production, transmission and 
distribution.  
 
EN 51   EN Romania  defines the urgent situation at the nationa l level if the major supplier lost 20% of 
gas volumes through decreased gas import, or fr om internal production caused by accident.  
Finland  defines the emergency condition as a seri ous threat by hamper ed or interrupted 
import indispensable fuels and other energy. 
UK defines 5 stages of emergency, and categorise into these 5 stages most expected events. 
These events are also classified if the emergenc y stage is related to in sufficient gas supply or 
transportation constraint. The first stage is defined as potential emergency stage. UK has 
defined also a Protocol setti ng the order of demand reduction of different customers.  
Portugal defines the energy crisis situ ation as a difficulty of suppl y or distribution of energy, 
which requires exceptional measures designed for to ensure supplies for citizens' fundamental 
needs, defence, operations of state and of priority sectors of economy. 
9.3. Emergency measures used by Member States 
If different gas consumption level than a normal one is declared, Member States have in their 
legislation predefined specific steps, to be fo llowed by all market players as defined. Some of 
them are similar to the instruments described in the Annex of the Directiv e, but others are of a 
different origin. 
Changing the responsibilities and the roles of market players – the main control  is given 
to the market player, who is capable to de al with gas supply disruption, usually TSO. 
Sometimes his responsibility stay, sometimes it changes according the ability how the market 
player can deal with th e gas supply disruption. It is also pos sible to have different responsible 
bodies for different levels of emergency.  
If the supplier is not able to fully ensure it s gas supply because of changed market conditions 
to other than normal level, syst em operator is declar ed to be responsible for and to take 
adequate measures.  
Reduction of gas demand  is one of the measures used by Member States, who introduced the 
emergency scale and national emergency plans. The reduction of gas consumption is defined 
for every emergency level. This reduction depe nds on the volume of inte rruptible contracts, 
importance of the gas consumption for the industry, economic impact of the cut-off gas, season when disruption happens, fuel-switch possibi lity, volume of gas in  gas storages, etc.  
The order, in which the gas is reduced, defines the order of actio n (levels in emergency scale). 
One of the first steps of the gas demand reduc tion is the cutting of the gas supply to the 
interruptible customers. These are usually industry type customers, who have  interruptible 
contracts of gas supply. In some Member Stat es (UK, Germany, France, Romania), industrial 
market players introduced voluntar y interruptible contracts.  
Specific legislation, protocols,  and guidelines are defined  – Energy Security Act, special 
decrees of national emergency measures, technical  standards to deal with supply disruption, 
emergency protocols, or any other specific docum ents have been adopted by Member States.  
Gas stocks are usually used as one of the first emergency measures to act, also in pre-
emergency levels. Some Member States have defi ned mandatory gas stocks  for suppliers to be 
held. Other Member States connected directly th e available gas stocks with the security of 
 
EN 52   EN supply standards, and these gas stocks shall be primarily used for households in case of 
emergency measure. Gas stocks are used also to  maintain the quality of delivered gas and for 
the balancing of the gas network.  
In case of gas supply disruption or gas reduced supplies in the national system, linepack  of 
the gas system, gas stocks , and maximisation of gas supplies (production) are the measures 
used from the point of maximisation of gas s upply to the network. From the gas demand side, 
the reduction of gas demand is also used according the order of gas demand reduction. If the situation is critical, strate gic gas stocks could be also  used in some countries. 
Changing rules to access the gas network - If the emergency situation is declared, some 
Member States have defined in their national legislation change of the access rules to the gas 
system, in favour of the predefined  categories of gas customers.  
Diversification of gas supplies and routes has been introduced by Spain, which set that no 
more than 60% of total gas im ports will be supplied by the same country and no more than 
70% of total gas demand will be supplied by the same shipper. The similar approach is also in Poland and Portugal. Also other countries has de veloped and diversified their gas supplies and 
gas routes, but the diversification is not direc tly mentioned in the gas market legal framework, 
but only in general in the national energy policies.  
Conclusion
 
Specific and proper analysis of all emergency measures used by Member States is needed. 
Country peer reviews of their emergency meas ures, plans and procedur es could indicate the 
best practices and the most used means, wh ich should be shared in the Gas Coordination 
Group. It would be useful to work out on the European emergency scale, which will define 
nominal, prevention and emergency stages, gi ving indications which measures should be 
used, based on the best practices in national and regional circumstances. All this will help to 
create the European guidelines to deal with emergency in gas supply.  
 
EN 53   EN 10. MONITORING AND REPORTING (ART. 5/6) 
The Directive includes also the monitoring and reporting provisions. The Article 6(3) of the 
Directive 2004/67/EC asks to review the monitoring provisi ons implementation experience 
"By 19 May 2008 the Commission shall submit a r eview report to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the experience gained fr om the application of this Article." 
10.1. Reporting to the Commission 
Article 5 of the Directive obliges Member Stat es to report to the Commission relevant and 
important security of gas supply information, de fined as the additional information to the ones 
set out for the internal market report pursuant to the Article 5 of the gas market directive 
2003/55/EC. According the Article 5 of the ga s market directive 2003/55/EC, the Member 
States have to report on 
• the supply/demand balance on the national market,  
• the level of expected future demand and available supplies,  
• envisaged additional capacity bein g planned or under construction,  
• the quality and level of main tenance of the networks, and 
• measures to cover peak demand and to deal w ith shortfalls of one or more suppliers.  
According the Article 5 of the Directive 2004/67/EC, the Member  States have to report the 
additional information on 
• the competitive impact of the measures taken pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive 
2004/67/EC on all gas market players;  
• the levels of storage capacity;  
• the extent of long-term gas supply contra cts concluded by companies established and 
registered on their territory, and in particular  
• their remaining duration, based on information provided by the companies 
concerned, but excluding commercially sensitive information, and  
• the degree of liquidity of the gas market;  
• the regulatory frameworks to provide adeq uate incentives for new investment in 
exploration and production, storag e, LNG and transport of gas,  taking into account Article 
22 of Directive 2003/55/EC as far as implemented by the Member State. 
The table below shows how Member States pr ovided the necessary information in their 
national internal market reports for the year 2007. 
Quality and details of the information provided  Directive  Provided  Not Provided  
 
EN 54   EN Competitive impact of Security of supply measures  2004/67  8 17 
Storage capacity  2004/67  13 12 
Long-term supply contracts remaining duration  2004/67  4 21 
Degree of liquidity  2004/67  3 22 
Incentive new investments  2004/67  3 22 
Planned additional capacity  2003/55  19 6 
Level of maintenance of the networks  2003/55  6 19 
Supply / demand balance  2003/55  18 7 
Expected future demand and available supplies  2003/55  13 12 
Measures to cover peak demand and supplier shortfalls 2003/55 6 19 
According the Article 5(2) of the Directive 2004/67/EC " This information shall be considered 
by the Commission in the reports that it issues pursuant to Article 31 of  Directive 2003/55/EC 
in the light of the consequences of that Directive for the Community as a whole and the 
overall efficient and secure operati on of the internal gas market .". 
Not all MS have all information in the reports  as mandated by the Directive. The provisions 
mandated by 2004/67/EC Directive are not included in the 2007 reports of  Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sloveni a. This has occurred possibly due to the 
fact that the security of ga s supply has been imposed on the different entities than the ones 
responsible for the reporting re lated to the internal market . The Commission benchmarking 
report8 concluding the 2007 internal  market reports from Member States describes the 
information on security of gas supply. Memb er States provided further information 
concerning the issues to be monitored (long- term contracts and st orage capacity) in the 
framework of the Gas Coordination Gr oup as replies to a questionnaire.  
10.2.  Monitoring of security of gas supply  
According the Article 6(1) of th e Directive, the Commission shall monitor, on the basis of the 
reports referred to in Article 5(1):  
• the degree of new long-term gas supply im port contracts from third countries; 
• the existence of adequate liquidity of gas supplies; 
• the level of working gas and of the withdrawal capacity of gas storage; 
• the level of interconnection of the na tional gas systems of Member States; 
                                                 
8 Benchmarking report 2007, April 2008 
 
EN 55   EN • the foreseeable gas supply situation in func tion of demand, supply autonomy and available 
supply sources at Community level conc erning specific geographic areas in the 
Community. 
Quality and detail of the information provided Provided  Not Provided  
Long term contracts and their remaining duration 21 4 
Adequate liquidity on the market 3 22 
Underground gas storage  20 5 
Import dependency 21 4 
Interconnection level 21 4 
 
To fulfil the monitoring ob ligation (see chapter above), the Commission distributed a 
questionnaire in the Gas Coordination Group, whic h enabled to gather the necessary missing 
information. The table above shows, that not all Member States (Belgium, Latvia, 
Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal) have fulfilled the obligation to provide the necessary 
information. However, Commission's monito ring obligation extends beyond the scope of 
information, which is provided by Member St ates in the internal markets reports.  
How the parameters are monitored 
Degree of new long-term gas supply im port contracts from third countries  shall be 
monitored according the Article 5(1)c of the Directive as " the extent of long-term gas supply 
contracts concluded by companies establis hed and registered on their territory, and in 
particular their remaining duration, based on information provided by the companies concerned, but excluding commercially sensitive information, and the degree of liquidity of 
the gas market ".  
If only the extent of long-term contracts is reported by Member States, it is not clear that it 
includes also volumes of imported gas to be  reported. Thus the Commission asked Member 
States for the additional inform ation on long-term contracts dur ations from third countries. 
The duration of long-term contr acts and their impact to internal  gas market, security of gas 
supply and market liquidity ar e mentioned in Chapter 6.3.  
Adequate liquidity of gas supplies  has also to be monitored, but this information was 
included only in three reports (Belgium, Germany, and the Neth erlands). The reason for this 
lack in the reporting could be the missing defini tions of gas market liquidity and gas supplies 
liquidity or the confus ion with the mandate from the 2003/55 directive to repor t the level of 
gas market liquidity. Market transparency is al so very low, thus the ratio between the spot 
operations and long-term contract based operations is not known.  
Levels of working gas and of the withdraw al capacity of gas storage, as well as level of 
interconnection of the national gas systems are not asked to report by Member States, but 
only monitor by the Commission. These parameters were also asked in the questionnaire.  
 
EN 56   EN Foreseeable gas supply situation in function  of demand, supply autonomy and available 
supply sources at Community level concer ning specific geographic areas in the 
Community  are three separate parameters to monitor.  
Some Member States reported about their future  gas demand scenarios, linked to the projects 
to ensure the gas supply. To have a complete picture, Commission needs more information from Member States.  
Commission monitors some geographic areas from  both availability of supply sources, and 
their supply autonomy in case of supply disrup tion. For example the countries in various 
pipeline chains from Russia were assessed in the Gas Coor dination Group, how the partial 
disruption could affect them. Th e vulnerability of so me regions (Baltic countries, or Western 
Balkans gas route) ha s been identified.  
Conclusions
 
Member States reporting obligations  are set out in two gas Dir ectives. This obligation, even 
if properly reported by Member St ates, does not allow the Commission to monitor the security 
of gas supply (at leas t the parameters pursua nt to the Article 6(1)  of 2004/67/EC) at the 
European internal market. However, Member St ates have not prepared their annual internal 
market report in a proper way and many of the mandated information are not included in these 
reports. As a consequence, the Commission had to prepare additional questionnaires and data 
tables to fulfil its monitoring obligation, which cr eated an additional administrative burden for 
both Commission and Member States.  
The obligation, what to monitor, is not suffici ent to assess neither the current long-term and 
short-term, nor any future security of supply si tuation of the EU and th e effectiveness of the 
mitigation tools. Reporting obligations are limited in frequency and scope (only once a year, mainly focusing on long-term contracts and stor age, no information is provided on mitigating 
tools like the extent of fuel switch/interrup tible contracts, capacity  utilisation, alternative 
routes or supply flexibility in indigenous pr oduction or import contracts). And even these 
reporting obligations are not fu lfilled by all Member States (only three Member States 
provided complete reporting) . A greater transparency  is needed. 
 
EN 57   EN  
ANNEX 1: Distribution of responsibility fo r security of gas supply in Member States   
Member States  Overall responsibility  LNG responsibility 
Austria  Joint (Ministry, Regulator, Dispatch 
centre) system operator 
Belgium  Ministry system operator 
Bulgaria  Ministry not set 
Cyprus  Exempted Exempted 
Czech Republic  TSO not set 
Denmark  TSO system operator 
Estonia  TSO system operator 
Finland  Regulator system operator 
France  Government system operator 
Germany  Supplier (Regulator in crisis) system operator 
Greece  Joint – Ministry and Regulator system operator 
Hungary  Supplier  not set 
Ireland  Regulator system operator 
Italy  Ministry system operator 
Latvia  Ministry not set 
Lithuania  Ministry system operator 
Luxemburg  Ministry not set 
Malta  Ministry to regulator system operator 
Netherlands  TSO system operator 
Poland  Ministry system operator 
Portugal  Ministry system operator 
Romania  Coordination Commission not set (LNG not in use) 
Slovakia  Ministry not set 
Slovenia  Ministry not set 
Spain  Ministry system operator 
Sweden  Regulator system operator 
United Kingdom  Joint - Ministry and Regulator system operator 
 
 
EN 58   EN ANNEX 2: Member States defini tion of parameters for security of supply standards  
Member 
States  Partial /major 
disruption  Time period  Winter period 1-in-20  1-in-50 Peak days 
Austria   During 
emergency      
Belgium        
Bulgaria  Technical 
disruption (partial) / 
to be determined 48 hours To be 
Determined y y To be 
Determined 
Czech 
Republic  20% 8 weeks 1.10-31.3 y y 5 days 
Denmark   60days  Y20 Y20 3 days 
Estonia  Technical 
disruption (partial), 
20% major Max 72 hours 1.10-1.5 y Just deliver the 
gas Just deliver the 
gas 
Finland  miss 1 supplier 4 months 1.10-30.4    
France  miss 1 supplier 6 months   Y50 Y50 3 days 
Germany    Long and cold 
winter (2005-6) y y  
Greece  Load Shedding Plan To be 
Determined To be 
Determined y y To be 
Determined 
Hungary   45 days of 
stocks 1.11-31.3    
Ireland  To be Determined To be 
Determined  To be 
Determined y y To be 
Determined 
Italy    15.11-31.3 y y  
Latvia  1/3 of citizens      
Lithuania  Shortfall of one or 
more suppliers 10 days of 
stocks (to max 60) 1.9- y y  
Luxemburg  To be Determined To be 
Determined To be 
Determined y y To be 
Determined 
Malta  To be Determined  To be 
Determined To be 
Determined y y To be 
Determined 
Netherland
s    y y Set by SO as 
needed 
Poland   30 days of stock  y y  
Portugal  certain certain certain y y certain 
Romania  20% of import, or 
production, or 20% 
higher gas demand Long period 1.10-31.3 Y20 Y20  
Slovakia  30% 10 weeks 1.10-31.3 y y 5 days 
Slovenia  20% 14 days 1.12-28(29).2 y y  
Spain  1 entry point, n-1 
criterion  35 days of 
stocks of strong 
sales, may 
increase to 60 
days  Winter plan y 10% 
over 
capacity  y Estimate in 
winter plan, 
predicted 
Sweden    1.12-28.2 y y 1day 
United 
Kingdom  Obligation for 
sufficient capacity 
during 1-in-20 and 
have enough gas for 
1-in-50 - - y y 1 or more days 
 
 
EN 59   EN ANNEX 3: Member States use of s ecurity of gas supply instruments  
. 
Member States  Storage Diversity 
-source, -mix, 
supplier,  Support 
Investment  LT 
contracts flexibility 
–prod, -import, Interrupt 
contract  Fuel 
switch Cross 
border capacity 
plan Cooperat
ion-TSOs -DSO-
TSO  
Austria y yny y y .y y n y yy 
Belgium y yyy y y .y y y y yy 
Bulgaria y nny y y .y y y y yy 
Czech Republic y yyy y y .y n y y yy 
Denmark n nny y n y. y y y y 
Estonia y nny y y .y  y y y yy 
Finland n nny y y .y  y y y yy 
France y yyy y y .y  y y y y 
Germany y yyy y y yy y y y y 
Greece n yyy y y .y  n y y y 
Hungary y nny y y .y y y y yy 
Ireland y nny y n nn n/a y y y 
Italy y yyy y y yy y y y yy 
Latvia y nny y y .y y y y y 
Lithuania y nny y y .y y y y yy 
Luxemburg n yyy y y .y  y  y yy 
Netherlands y yyy y y y. y  y yy 
Poland y yyy y y yy y n y yy 
Portugal y yyy  n .y    y y 
Romania y yyy y y yy   y yy 
Slovakia y nny y y .y  n n y y 
Slovenia y yyy y y .y  y y y y 
Spain y yyy y n .y y y y yy 
Sweden n nny y y .y y y y y 
 
EN 60   EN United Kingdom y yyy y y yy y y y yy 
 
EN 61   EN ANNEX 4: Fuel switch possibili ty and interruptible contracts  
. 
Country fuel switch Interruptible contracts 
Austria Y (Share not known) Y (Share not known) 
Bulgaria Y  N 
Belgium Y (15% of industry) Y (30%industry) 
Czech Republic Y Y 
Denmark Y (7,5% of consumption) Y ( 50% industry, 40% power generation) 
Estonia Y (heat supply 3 days) Y 
Finland Y (90% of consumption) ? 
France Y (6 % of consumption) Y ( 25% industry, 25% power generation) 
Germany Y (10-15% of consumption) Y (10% industry, 20% power generation) 
Greece Y (35-40% of consumption) N 
Hungary Y (gas power plants >50MW) Y10% industry, 50%power 
Italy Y (9% of consumption) Y1% power, 10% industry 
Ireland Y (all gas fired power plants 
for 5 days) Not required 
Latvia Y (Share not known) Y (Share not known) 
Lithuania Y (all heat and power 
producers with production for public sector for one year) Y (Share not known) 
Luxembourg N Y (Share not known) 
Netherlands ? Y (25% power generation from H-gas) 
Poland N Y (10% industry, all gas power) 
Portugal ? ? 
Romania Y (Share not known) Y (Share not known) 
Slovak Republic N N 
Slovenia Y (18% of consump tion) Y (approx. 10% industry) 
Spain ? Y (5% industry, 25% power generation) 
Sweden Y (30-40% of consumption) ? 
UK Y (power stations - 10mcm 
for 4 days, industry - 1mcm) Y (10% industry, 30% power generation) 
 
EN 62   EN ANNEX 5: The role of gas  in EU and Member States   
All figures are calculated fr om the 2007 Eurostat figures 
• Energy mix  is based on the Gross Inland Cons umption as defined by Eurostat 
• Electricity mix  expresses the sources used for electri city production as defined by Eurostat 
• Role of gas  is based on the total volume of gas (GIC ) divided by all types of use of gas as 
defined by Eurostat. The right column e xpresses the Final Energy Consumption.  
• Source of natural gas means the total volume of gas available on the market, calculated as 
a "total import to the country" plus "indige nous production". Other tw o important figures – 
Stocks change and Tota l Export were not possibl e to incorporate into this chart type, thus 
both are included below the graphic to enab le the calculation of  the Gross Inland 
Consumption.  
– EU-27 chart takes only into account volume of gas imported to the EU (Extra-EU import).  
 
EN 63   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN EU-27 (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
 Renewables
14 1, 0 3
8%
    So lid fuels
331 ,23
18 %    Nuclear
241 ,26
13 %
    Gas
432,41
24%    Oil
656,93
37% ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
39,81
1%Renewables
525,58
16%Coal
988,37
29%
Nuclear
935,28
28%
Gas
760,18
23%Oil
112,48
3%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
26%
Industry
21%Chemical non-
energy use
3%
Transport
0%Services
12%
Others
1%Final Use of Gas
61%Energy sector 
consumption
4%
District Heating
1%
Power 
Generation
32%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (%)(2007) 
Norway; 
3061751; 
15,9%
Nigeria; 
588317; 3,1% Libya; 
383615; 2,0%Qatar; 
275496; 1,4%EU 
indigenous; 
7785401; 
40,4%
Other; 
320733; 1,7%
Egypt; 
221305; 1,1%Russia; 
4685365; 
24,3%
Algeria; 
1943976; 
10,1%
 
St k h 206703 TJ E t ?TJ
Gas Import dependency (%)
-120-100-80-60-40-20020406080100120
BE BG CZDK DE EE IE EL ESFR ITCYLTLV LU HU MT NLATPL PTROSISK FI
SE UKEU27
1990
2007
EU gas import dependency increases from 45% in 1990 to 60% in 2007, peaking in 2006. Gas import 
dependency is around 100 % in 15 Member States, e.g. a ll or nearly all gas is imported. Denmark and the 
Netherlands are the only gas net exporters. Ireland, Greece and Portugal started to import gas after 1990.  
 
 
EN 64   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN AUSTRIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
3,85
12%    
Renewables
8,0425%
    Gas
6,98
21%    Oil
13,89
42%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
2,82
4%Coal
6,26
10%
Renewables
41,87
66%Gas
11,20
18%Oil
1,28
2%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
18%
Industry
35%Chemical 
Industry
3%
Transport
0%Serv ices
7%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
60%Energy sector 
consumption
6%
District Heating
2%
Power 
Generation
29%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Russia
21 641 9
49%Others
10 6 5 14
23%
Indigenous
73899
16 %Norway
56674
12 %
 
Stocks change:-12122TJ, Export=-116704TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN BELGIUM (2006) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Oil
22,63
41 %
    Gas
14 , 9 3
26%    Nuclear
12 , 4 4
22%    Solid fuels
4,61
8%Renewables
1, 7 9
3%ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Oil
0,81
1%
Gas
27,24
31 %
Nuclear
48,23
55%Coal
6,47
7%Renewables
3,99
4%Other
2,08
2%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
22%
Industry
32%Chemical non-
energy use
6%
Transport
0%Serv ices
10%
Others
1%Final Use of Gas
64%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
District Heating
0%
Power 
Generation
28%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Norway
2301 94
33%Alge ria
153 4 3
2%Russia
31 528
5%Nether-  
lands
274535
40%United 
Kingdom
36792
5%Qatar
87502
13%Others
17231
2%
 
Stocks change:1350TJ, Export=0TJ 
  
 
EN 65   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN BULGARIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
Renewables
0,96
5%
    Solid fuels
7,8437%    Nuclear
3,78
18%
    Gas
3,0115%
    Oil
5,07
25%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Othe r
0,37
1%Renewables
2,92
7%
Coal
22,37
51 %Nuclear
14 , 6 4
34%
Gas
2,43
6%Oil
0,57
1%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
1%
Power 
Generation
26%District Heating
7%Energy sector 
consumption
11%
Final Use of Gas
42%
Others
6%Serv ices
3%
Transport
1%Chemical non-
energy use
15%
Industry
30%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Indigenous
1 0966
8%
Russia
1 28088
92% 
Stocks change:991TJ, Export=0TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN CZECH REPUBLIC (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
2,18
5%
    Solid fuels
21,38
45%    Nuclear
6,75
14%
    Gas
7,16
15%
    Oil
10,04
21% ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,43
0,5%Renewables
3,42
3,9%
Coal
53,8061,0%Nuclear
26,17
29,7%
Gas
4,26
4,8%
Oil
0,12
0,1%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
28%
Industry
36%
Transport
0%Serv ices
18%
Others
3%Final Use of Gas
87%Energy sector 
consumption
2%
District Heating
7%
Power 
Generation
6%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Norway
68335
20,5%Indigenous
6524
2,0%
Russia
259008
77,6%
 
Stocks chan ge:14464TJ, Ex port=-15196TJ
  
 
EN 66   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN DENMARK (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
 Solid fuels
4,6523%  
Renew able
3,56
17%
Gas
4,06
20%
Oil
8,32
40%ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Coal
19,90
51%Renewables
11,06
28%
Gas
6,91
18%
Oil
1,11
3%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
15%
Power 
Generation
40%District Heating
3%Energy sector 
consumption
16%
Final Use of Gas
43%
Others
0%Services
7%Industry
19%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Indigeno
us 
384607 
1 00%
 
Stocks change:- 7283TJ, Export=-188377TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN ESTONIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
3,71
59% Renewables
0,60
10%    Gas
0,80
13%
    Oil
1,16
18%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Oil
0,03
0,3%Gas
0,59
4,8%Renewables
0,15
1,2%
Coal
11,42
93,7%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
6%
Industry
15%Chemical non-
energy use
21%
Transport
0%Services
6%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
27%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
District Heating
39%
Power 
Generation
12%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007)  
Russia
37372
100%
 
Stocks chan ge:0TJ , Export=0TJ
  
 
EN 67   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN FINLAND (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
8,5223%    Solid fuels
7,21
20%
    Nuclear
6,04
17%
    Gas
3,72
10%    Oil
11,01
30%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,42
1%
Renewables
24,43
29%Coal
21 ,37
26%
Nuclear
23,42
29%Gas
11, 1314 %Oil
0,47
1%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
1%
Industry
21%Chemical non-
energy use
6%
Transport
0%Serv ices
1%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
23%Energy sector 
consumption
9% District Heating
8%
Power 
Generation
54%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Russia
1 731 66
1 00%
 
Stocks change:0TJ, Export=0TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN  FRANCE (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
Renewables
18,96
7%    Solid fuels
13,39
5%
    Nuclear
113,43
41%
    Gas
38,48
14%    Oil
90,90
33%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
5,48
1%Renewables
68,29
12%Coal
24,45
4%
Nuclear
439,73
77%Gas
25,74
5%Oil
6,16
1%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
15%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
Final Use of Gas
79%
Others
2%Services
21%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
5%
Industry
23%Households
33%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Nether-
lands
324846
18%Algeria
31 2356
18 %Russia
238022
14 %Norway
551 378
32%Nigeria
12 6 113
7%Others
1 64850
9%Indigenous
42586
2%
 
Stocks chan ge:20287TJ , Export=-36192TJ
  
 
EN 68   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN GERMANY (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
28,11
8%    Solid fuels
86,97
26%    Nuclear
36,25
11%
    Gas
76,64
22%
    Oil
112,73
33%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
7,62
1%Renew able
93,77
15%
Coal
299,79
47%Nuclear
140,53
22%
Gas
84,12
13%Oil
11,27
2%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
35%
Industry
23%Chemical non-
energy use
3%
Services
13%
Others
1%Final Use of Gas
73%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
District Heating
1%
Power 
Generation
23%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Others
109134
3%
Russia
1436060
36%Indigenous
598741
15%
Nether-  
lands
737589
19%Norway
104091 1
27%  
Stocks change:93960TJ, Export=-450935TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN  GREECE (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    So lid fuels
10 , 8 4
33%Renewables
1, 6 8
5%    Gas
3,35
10 %
    Oil
17 , 2 4
52%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,81
1%
Coal
34,68
55%Renewables
4,59
7%
Gas
13 , 7 7
22%
Oil
9,64
15 %
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
74%Energy sector 
consumption
1%Final Use of Gas
22%
Others
1%Services
3%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
4%
Industry
12%Households
5%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Algeria
36319
23%Indige-
nous
1026
1%
Russia
118819
76%
 
Stocks chan ge:-336TJ , Export=0TJ
  
 
EN 69   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN  HUNGARY (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
Renewables
1,42
5%     Solid fuels
3,14
12%    Nuclear
3,79
14%
    Gas
10,70
40%    Oil
7,61
29%ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,01
0,0%Renewables
2,025,1 %Coal
7,37
18 , 4 %
Nuclear
14 , 6 8
36,7%
Gas
15 , 3 5
38,4%Oil
0,541, 3 %
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
30%
Industry
12%Chemical non-
energy use
4%
Transport
0%Serv ices
16%
Others
2%Final Use of Gas
59%Energy sec tor 
consumption
1%
District Heating
4%
Power 
Generation
31%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Germany
18 14 4
4%France
14 3 4 0
3%CIS
66357
13 %
Russia
300491
60%Indigenous
93251
19 %Others
6090
1%
 
Stocks change:6650TJ, Export=-7334TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN IRELAND (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
2,29
15%    
Renewables
0,47
3%     Gas
4,28
27%
    Oil
8,7355%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,35
1%
Coal
7,6727%Renewables
2,76
10%
Gas
15,46
55%Oil
1,98
7%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
62%
Final Use of Gas
37%
Others
1%Serv ices
8%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
0%
Industry
15%Households
14%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Indige-
nous
17181
9%
United 
Kingdom
182153
91%
 
Stocks change:-50TJ, Export=0TJ 
  
 
EN 70   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN ITALY (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
16 , 7 9
9%Renewables
12 , 6 9
7%
    Gas
69,53
39%     Oil
80,34
45%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
6,87
2%Coal
44,1 1
14 % Renewables
49,23
16 %
Gas
1 78,27
57%Oil
35,41
11%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
40%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
Final Use of Gas
59%
Others
1%Serv ices
10%
Transport
1%Chemical non-
energy use
1%
Industry
23%Households
23%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Russia
86361 3
27%Nether-  
lands
306248Libya
352082
11%Algeria
936650
28%
Norway
21 2636
7%Others
1 46266
5%Indige-
nous
369799
12 %
 
Stocks change:49873TJ, Export=-2591TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN  LATVIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
0,11
2%    
Renewables
1,41
31%
    Gas
1,36
30%    Oil
1,62
37%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Oil
0,02
0,4%
Renewables
2,83
59,3%Gas
1, 9 2
40,3%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
45%District Heating
15%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
Final Use of Gas
38%
Others
0%Serv ices
10%
Transport
0%Industry
21%Households
8%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Russia
61201
100%
 
Stocks change:2046TJ, Export=0TJ 
  
 
EN 71   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN LITHUANIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
0,81
9%    Solid fuels
0,27
3%
    Nuclear
2,5427%
    Gas
2,89
31%    Oil
2,7630%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,77
5%
Renewables
0,58
4%Coal
0,01
0%
Nuclear
9,83
71%Gas
2,41
17%Oil
0,41
3%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
31%District Heating
10%Energy sector 
consumption
1%
Final Use of Gas
19%
Others
0%Serv ices
4%Chemical non-
energy use
39%
Industry
10%Households
5%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Russia
138425
100%
 
Stocks chan ge:-3907TJ, Ex port=0TJ
THE ROLE OF GAS IN LUXEMBOURG (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
0,08
2%    
Renewables
0,12
3%
    Gas
1,20
28%
    Oil
2,9267%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Gas
2,9073%Other
0,81
20%
Renewables
0,30
7%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
26%
Industry
34%
Serv ices
0%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
59%Power 
Generation
40%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Total 
import 
55948 
100%
 
Stocks change:0TJ, Export=0TJ 
  
 
EN 72   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN THE NETHERLANDS (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Oil
37,1 7
45%    Gas
33,40
40%    Nuclear
1, 0 8
1%    So lid fuels
8,36
10 %    
Renewables
3,02
4%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,1 8
0%Renewables
9,1 5
9%Coal
24,92
24%Nuclear
4,20
4%
Gas
62,58
61 %Oil
2,22
2%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
33%District Heating
1%Energy sector 
consumption
4%
Final Use of Gas
55%
Others
0%Serv ices
19%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
7%
Industry
16%Households
20%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Belgium
1 46823
4%
Indigenous
2547408
75%Germany
71 0891
21 %
 
Stocks change:905TJ, Export=-1855907TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN POLAND (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
55,51
56%Renewables
4,99
5%
    Gas
12,38
13%
    Oil
25,06
26%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,92
1%
Coal
14 5 , 5 7
92%Renewables
5,43
3%Gas
5,1 2
3%
Oil
2,30
1%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
26%
Industry
25%Chemical non-
energy use
15%
Serv ices
13%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
64%Energy sector 
consumption
11%
District Heating
2%
Power 
Generation
8%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Germany
32679
6,04%CIS
66573
12,30%Russia
260533
48,15%Indigenous
181274
33,50%
 
Stocks chan ge:10743TJ , Export=-1677TJ
  
 
EN 73   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN PORTUGAL (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    Solid fuels
2,89
11%    
Renewables
4,58
18%
    Gas
3,81
15%
    Oil
14,05
56%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,36
1%
Coal
12 , 4 0
26%Renewables
16 , 5 0
35%
Gas
13 , 12
28%Oil
4,87
10 %
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
59%Energy sector 
consumption
2%
Final use of Gas
39%
Others
1%Serv ices
5%
Transport
0%Industry
27%Households
6%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Nigeria
115411
66%Algeria
59536
34%
 
Stocks change:2218TJ, Export=0TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN ROMANIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
Renewables
4,75
12%     Solid fuels
10,19
25%    Nuclear
1,99
5%
 Gas
12,98
32%    Oil
10,25
26% ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Renewables
16,01
26%
Coal
25,10
41%
Nuclear
7,71
12%
Gas
11,77
19%Oil
1,10
2% 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
16%
Industry
26%Chemical non-
energy use
7%
Transport
0%Services
9%
Others
5%Final use of Gas
55%Energy sector 
consumption
6%
District Heating
4%
Power 
Generation
27%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
CIS
15 6 7 8
3%
Indigenous
429507
70%Russia
1 641 24
27%
 
Stocks chan ge:-5387TJ , Export=0TJ
  
 
EN 74   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN SLOVAKIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
0,99
6%     Solid fuels
4,01
22%     Nuclear
3,96
22%
 Gas
5,09
28%    Oil
3,85
22%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,22
1%Renewables
4,96
18%Coal
4,80
17%
Nuclear
15,33
54%Gas
2,04
7%Oil
0,71
3%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
9%District Heating
9%Energy sector 
consumption
12%
Final Use of Gas
64%
Others
3%Serv ices
19%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
6%Industry
19%Households
23%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Indigenous 
5056
2%
Russia
238667
98%  
Stocks chan ge:0TJ , Export=-6967TJ
THE ROLE OF GAS IN SLOVENIA (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
Renewables
0,73
10%    Solid fuels
1,61
22%    Nuclear
1,47
20%
    Gas
0,9113%    Oil
2,59
35%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,01
0,1%Renewables
3,38
22,4% Coal
5,48
36,4%
Nuclear
5,70
37,8%Gas
0,45
3,0%Oil
0,03
0,2%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
9%
Industry
61%Chemical non-
energy use
14%
Serv ices
1%
Others
0%Final Use of Gas
72%Energy sector 
consumption
0%
District Heating
5%
Power 
Generation
10%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Others
10 9
0%
Russia
21 657
52%Indige-nous
12 0
0%Au stria
6980
16 %
Alge ria
13 6 6 2
32%
 
Stocks chan ge:0TJ , Export=0TJ
  
 
EN 75   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN SPAIN (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
10,29
7%    Solid fuels
20,15
14%    Nuclear
14,21
10%
    Gas
31,85
22%
    Oil
70,79
47%ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
3,37
1%Renewables
59,42
20%Coal
73,10
24%
Nuclear
55,10
18%
Gas
93,80
31%Oil
18,51
6%
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Power 
Generation
43%Energy sector 
consumption
6%
Final Use of Gas
50%
Others
0%Services
9%
Transport
0%Chemical non-
energy use
1%
Industry
29%Households
12%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Nigeria
346793
24%Qatar
1 78299
12 %Egypt
1 69042
12 %Algeria
546332
37%Trinidad and 
Tobago
87977
6%Norway
88873
6%Indigenous
3744
0%Others
48259
3%
 
Stocks change:12573TJ, Export=0TJ 
THE ROLE OF GAS IN SWEDEN (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
15,64
31%    Solid fuels
2,66
5%
    Nuclear
17,27
34%    Gas
0,91
2%    Oil
13,94
28%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
0,50
0,3%
Renewables
78,17
52,5%Coal
0,65
0,4%
Nuclear
66,97
45,0%Gas
1,48
1,0%Oil
1,08
0,7%
 
ROLE OF GAS (%) 
Households
4%
Industry
39%
Transport
3%Services
13%
Others
9%Final Use of Gas
68%Energy sec tor 
consumption
0%
District Heating
1%
Power 
Generation
31%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Denmark
42358
100%
 
Stocks change:0TJ, Export=0TJ 
  
 
EN 76   EN THE ROLE OF GAS IN UNITED KINGDOM (2007) 
ENERGY MIX (in Mtoe, %) (2007) 
    
Renewables
4,65
2%     Solid fuels
38,71
18 %    Nuclear
16 , 2 6
7%
    Gas
81 ,96
37%    Oil
78,71
36%
 ELECTRICITY MIX (in TWh, %) (2007) 
Other
5,26
1%Renewables
20,37
5%
Coal
136,69
35%Nuclear
63,03
16%
Gas
166,11
42%Oil
4,69
1%
ROLE OF GAS 
Power 
Generation
34%District Heating
2%Energy sector 
consumption
7%
Final Use of Gas
57%
Others
1%Services
9%Chemical non-
energy use
1%
Industry
13%Households
33%SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS (TJ,%)(2007) 
Belgium
74729
2%Algeria
23778
1%
Netherlands
275762
7%Norw ay
812750
19%
Others
29873
1%Indigenous
3019712
70%
 
Stocks change: 19728 TJ Ex port= 443373 TJ