16.12.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC332/13
2.8.Point1ofAnnexIshouldberewordedtoread:
'ThespecificationsappendedtothisDirective
applytotheburningbehaviour...'willnecessitateamendmentofthebodyoftheDirective
andAnnexI,inparticularpoints7and8,andofthe
impactstatementoncompetitiveness andjobs(position
ofsmallfirms).
DoneatBrussels,22October1992.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN
OpinionontheproposalforaCouncilDirectiveontheCo-ordination ofLaws,Regulations
andAdministrative ProvisionsrelatingtoDeposit-Guarantee Schemes(')
92/C332/07)
On23June1992,theCouncildecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,
underArticle100aoftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,onthe
abovementioned proposal.
TheSectionforIndustry,Commerce,CraftsandServices,whichwasresponsibleforpreparing
theCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon30September1992.The
RapporteurwasMrMeyer-Horn .
Atits300thPlenarySession(meetingof22October)theEconomicandSocialCommittee
unanimouslyadoptedthefollowingOpinion.
effect.Itcanunderminethereputationofanentire
nationalbankingsector.
1.3.Underthesecircumstances ,itisunderstandable
thatthesupervisoryauthoritiesandthecreditinsti­
tutionsthemselvesareconcernedabouttakingpre­
cautionstoprovidedepositorswithacertainprotection.
TheCommission ,too,hasproposedadirectiveonthe
matter.Ittakesintoaccountthefactthatacredit
institutioncanbethevictimofafinancialcrisiseven
whenitissubjecttoverystrictrulesandcarefulsuper­
vision,particularlyascompetitionwillincreasefurther
intheSingleMarketasaresultofCommunity-wide
bankingandthefreedomtofixinterestratesandcon­
ditions.1.Introduction
1.1.Inamarketeconomy,companyfailuresarefar
fromuncommon .Butinthecreditindustrytheypose
particularproblems,sincecreditinstitutionsworklarg­
elywiththeirclients'moneyandarethereforemore
dependentontheircreditors'confidencethanother
enterprises .Asocialmarketeconomycannotaccept
thatthereshouldbenomeasurestooffsettheconse­
quentrisksforthemajorityofsaversandinvestors.If
acreditsectoristobehealthy,thecustomersofcredit
institutions,oratleastprivateindividuals,mustbe
protectedfromdamagestoanextentwhichissocially
justandeconomicallyreasonable .
1.2.Moreover,creditinstitutionsthemselvesare
interestedindepositorshavingmeaningfulprotection
andinprovidingcorresponding clientinformation .For
ifcreditors,andparticularlysavers,sufferdamages
whenabankbecomesinsolvent,thiscanhaveapublic1.4.TheEconomicandSocialCommitteepraisesthe
qualityoftheworkandtheextensivepreparationwhich
theCommission hasundertakeninthisarea.TheESC
attachesgreatimportancetotheCommission'scon­
siderationsandwouldlike,withitsOpinion,tomakea
constructivecontributionwhichreflectsthesuggestions
andconcernsoftheeconomicandsocialorganizations . HOJNoC163,30.6.1992,p.6.

NoC332/14 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 16.12.92
2.Contentoftheproposeddirective mustensurethatdepositorsreceiveuptoECU15000
oftheirtotaldeposits.
2.2.2.ThefigureofECU15000isroughlyequivalent
totheaveragecoverageavailableinMemberStates
whichoperatedeposit-guarantee schemes,withthe
exceptionofGermanyandItalywhichprovideapar­
ticularlyhighlevelofcover.Theuppercoveragelimit
is:(3)SpainECU11700,BelgiumandLuxembourg
ECU11900,IrelandECU13200,theNetherlandsECU
17400,UKECU21400,DenmarkECU31500,France
ECU57500andItalyaboveECU500000.InGermany,
depositorsenjoyvirtuallycompletecover.Thiscan
beupto30%ofabank'sownfundsforindividual
depositors;savingsbanksandcreditcooperativespro­
videinstitutionalcoverage.2.1.Aimoftheproposeddirective
2.1.1.WithaviewtothecreationofaEuropean
singlemarketforcreditinstitutions,severaldirectives
whichareduetocomeintoforcethroughouttheEC
on1January1993,havealreadybeenadopted;these
aretheso-calledSecondBankingDirective,theOwn
FundsDirective,theSolvencyRatioDirectiveandthe
Consolidation Directive(1).Thedraftdirectiveon
deposit-guarantee schemes,whichistobetransposed
intonationallawby1January1994,supplementsthese
instruments .ItwillreplaceCommissionRecommen­
dation87/63/EECof22December1986onthesame
subject(2).
2.1.2.Theproposalhastwoobjectives :
—toprotect,throughdeposit-guarantee schemes
basedonthejointparticipationofcreditinsti­
tutions,depositorsintheeventofafinancialcrisis
inacreditinstitution,particularlythosedepositors
whohaveinsufficientfinancialknowledgetodis­
criminatebetweensoundandunsoundcreditinsti­
tutions;and2.2.3.ThroughouttheCommunity,theminimum
guaranteeofECU15000representstheabsolutelower
limitofcoverforthetotaldepositsofthesamedeposi­
torinasinglecreditinstitutionsubjecttothepossibility
oflimitingtheguaranteeprovidedfortoaspecified
percentageofthedepositsontheunderstandingthatthe
percentageguaranteedmustequal90%oftheaggregate
depositsuntiltheamounttobepaidundertheguaran­
teereachesECU15000.Guaranteeschemeswhichpro­
videgreaterorcompletedamagecompensation maybe
retained.
2.2.4.Theproposeddirectiveisbasedontwoprin­
ciples:
—allauthorizedcreditinstitutionsmustbemembers
ofadeposit-guarantee scheme;and
—branchdepositorswillbecoveredbytheguarantee
schemeofacreditinstitution'shomecountry.—tomaintainpublicconfidenceinthecreditindustry
andprotectitfromtheriskofdepositorswith­
drawingtheirfunds,notonlyfromaninstitutionin
difficulty,butalsofromcreditinstitutionswhich
becomethesubjectofunfoundedrumours.
2.1.3.Infuture,allcreditinstitutionsmustjoina
deposit-guarantee scheme.Guaranteefundsunderpri­
vatelawarerecognizedforthispurpose.Thesetting­
upandorganizationofthedifferentschemesarenot
standardized .Certainguaranteefundsarefinancedby
annualcontributions fromthememberinstitutions ,and
contributionsgenerallyliebetween0,03and0,05%of
thecorresponding institutionalliabilities.Other
guaranteefundsimposeanadmissionlevyoncredit
institutionsand,ifnecessarywhenfacingparticularly
heavyclaims,anadhocchargeonalltheirmembers.
Lastly,someguaranteefundsconfinethemselvestoad
hoccontributions intheeventofclaims.2.2.5.Legallydependentbranchesofcreditinsti­
tutionsfromotherMemberStatesmayvoluntarilyjoin
adeposit-guarantee schemeinthehostMemberState.
Inthisway,theycan,whereappropriate,increasethe
levelofcoverageavailableintheirhomeMemberState
tothatprovidedinthehostcountry.
2.2.6.MemberStatescanexcludecertaindepositors
ordepositsmentionedintheAnnextothedirective,
namelydepositsofinsurancecompanies,pensionand
investmentfundsandprovincial,regional,localor
municipalauthorities .2.2.Thestandardsproposed
2.2.1.Ifaccesstoacreditinstitution'sdepositsisno
longerpossible(seepoint4.1.4),theguaranteeschemes
(!)OJNoL386,30.12.1989,p.1,14;OJNoL75,21.3.1992,(3)Asof1September1992;sincethentheexchangeratesof
certaincurrencieshavechangedwiththeresultthatthe
amountsexpressedinECUhavefalleninsomecases(e.g.
UK,ItalyandSpain)andincreasedinothers(e.g.toECU
12400inBelgiumandLuxembourg).p.48;OJNoL317,16.11.1990,p.60.
(2)OJNoL33,4.2.1987.

16.12.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC332/15
2.2.7.Compensation istobepaidwithinthree
monthsexceptincertainexceptionalcases[listedinthe
AnnexreferredtoinArticle4(2)1.groupbasisbythecreditinstitutions'professionalbodi­
es,whilstothersareprovidedforandregulatedbylaw.
Oncompetitivegrounds,alldeposit-guarantee schemes
shouldbefinancedthroughchargesorcontributions
paidbythecreditinstitutionsconcernedandnotbythe
publicauthorities .
3.Generalcomments
3.2.HomecountryprincipleBearinginmindtheproposeddirective'sgoals,theESC
considersthefollowingpointsimportant :
3.1.MinimumharmonizationTheESCrecognizesthecorrectnessoftheCom­
mission'slogicindecidingtousethe'homecountry
principle',wherebybranchdepositorswillbecovered
bythesupervisoryandguaranteeschemeofaninsti­
tution'sheadoffice,andnot,asthe1986Recommen­
dationstillprescribed,bythatofthehostcountry.
3.1.1.TheESCispleasedthattheproposeddirective
limitsitselftominimumharmonization .
3.2.1.Thehomecountryprinciplenowprovidesthe
basisfortheharmonization ofCommunitylegislation
oncreditinstitutions .Itisparticularlyevidentinthe
SecondBankingDirectiveontheCommunity-wide
authorizationofcreditinstitutionsandsupervisionof
branchesintheinstitutions'homecountry.3.1.2.Asitmerelysetsminimumstandardsandno
upperlimit,theexistingguaranteelevel,onwhich
depositorshavebasedtheirinvestmentdecisionsfor
decadesincertainMemberStates,canberetained.This
isinlinewithArticle100a(3)oftheEECTreaty,which
requirestheCommissiontotakeasabaseahighlevel
ofprotectioninitsconsumerprotectionproposals.3.2.2.Thereisnoreasontodepartfromthishome
countryprincipleinthecaseofdepositguarantees .
Supervisoryandguaranteeschemesmustoperateinthe
sameMemberState.3.1.3.Itcannotbethefunctionoftheproposed
directivetocompelareductionintheexistingguarantee
levelincertainMemberStates.Nor,intheinterestof
bankcustomers,mustanyharmonization ofEC
deposit-guarantee schemesbeallowedtojeopardize
existingschemesintheMemberStateswhicharegeared
toprotectingtheinstitution .3.2.3.Nevertheless ,itseemsdifficulttoreconcilethe
home-country principlewiththeprincipleofunrestric­
tedcompetitionbetweenthebanksofdifferentMember
StatesinthecontextoftheSingleMarket.Thefollow­
ingsolutionshouldthereforebeconsidered .Allthe
MemberStatesshouldbefreetodecidewhetherto
provideforaguaranteelevelabovetheminimum
requirementlaiddowninthedirective;thisguarantee
would,however,applyexclusivelytodepositsheldin
theterritoryoftheMemberStateconcerned;thelevel
ofguaranteeavailabletobranchdepositorsintheterri­
toryofanotherMemberStateunderthehome-country
principleshouldnotexceedthelevelavailableinthat
MemberState(seeSpecificcomments,point4.2with
regardtotheproblemswhicharisewhentheguarantee
levelishigherorlowerinthehostthaninthehome
country).3.1.4.Accordingtotheprinciplewhichhasgoverned
allharmonization projectstodate,i.e.thattheEC
shouldsetonlyuniformminimumstandards,theMem­
berStatescannotbepreventedfromkeepingorintrodu­
cinghigherstandards.Thiscanparticularlybeseenin
Article4(3),whereMemberStatesareallowedtoretain
provisionswhichofferahigherguaranteeceiling.How­
ever,minimumharmonization meansthatschemeswith
asomewhatdifferentguaranteeobjectivewhichalso
fulfilthedirective'sdeposit-guarantee requirements ,
especiallyschemesdesignedtoprotecttheinstitution
asinthecaseofmembersofabankinggroup,must
alsobedeemedtoconformtothedirective.Toincrease
investorconfidence,thedirectiveshouldexpresslystate
thatdeposit-guarantee schemesensuringmorethanthe
minimumlevelofprotectionitrequirescanberetained
insofarastheyprovidefullminimumprotectionin
accordancewiththedirective.3.3.ECU15000coverage
3.1.5.Theproposeddirectivedoesnotcoverfinan­
cingarrangementsforthedifferentdeposit-guarantee
schemes,someofwhichhavebeenestablishedonaTheminimumdepositguaranteeofECU15000is
roughlyequivalent (seepoint2.2)totheaverage
maximumdepositguaranteeofeightMemberStates.

NoC332/16 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 16.12.92
regulationsandadministrative provisionsrelatingto
undertakingsforcollectiveinvestmentsintransferable
securities(UCITSH1).3.3.1.Thefigureisthussomewhatarbitrary.Butit
doesoffertheadvantageofrelativecompatibilitywith
existingrequirements .OnlyfourMemberStateswill
havetoraisetheirminimumdepositguaranteesasa
resultofthenewdirective,whilstsixotherscanretain
theirexisting,morecomprehensive coverage.(Thereis
stillnodeposit-guarantee schemecoveringallcredit
institutionsintwoMemberStates.)4.1.2.Article1(2)excludesobligationstowardsother
creditinstitutionsandsubordinatedloans(coveredby
bindingagreementsprecludingrepaymentuntilafter
liquidation).Theexclusionofinter-bankdepositsis
rightlyjustifiedonthegroundsthatcreditinstitutions
arebetterplacedthanotherdepositorstoevaluatethe
positionofacrisisbank.Thisargumentwouldalso
seemtoapplytootherfinancecompaniesandinsurance
companieswhichmaintainsimilarlyclosebusiness
relationswithcreditinstitutions .Companiescreatedto
providesuchspecialbankingservicesasleasingand
factoringshouldalsobeexpresslyexcluded,together
withtheirparentcompanies.3.3.2.However,thecomparisonwithaverage
depositsmadeinpoint4(fifthtoeighthparagraphs )of
theExplanatoryMemorandum tothedraftdirectiveis
notparticularlyconvincing.Notonlyaretheaverage
amountsquoted(ECU30000fortimedeposits,ECU
2600forcurrentaccountsandECU2150forsavings
accounts)subjecttoconstantchangeasaresultof
transfersbetweenthedifferenttypesofaccount(end
1990:ECU26500,ECU3000andECU2200respect­
ively),theyarealsoaveragefiguressuppliedbythe
EuropeanSavingsBankAssociationfortwelve
countriesandthusinevitablyconcealmajornational
differencesinthe201,4millionsavingsaccounts,
55,5millioncurrentaccountsand2,9milliontime
accountstowhichtheyrelate.Theaveragesavings
depositinPortugal,forexample,isapproximately ECU
1130asagainstECU4300inLuxembourg .Neverthe­
less,aminimumguaranteeofECU15000willcover
thegreatmajorityofinvestors.
3.3.3.Itwouldseemadvisablenottoretainthis
minimumamountindefinitely,buttoadjustitinline
withsubsequentincomegrowthandgenerallyhigher
creditbalancesatfixedintervals.4.1.3.Nationaldeposit-guarantee schemesshould
firstandforemostprotectprivateindividuals,i.e.con­
sumers.'Depositor'isnotdefinedmorepreciselyin
thedirective,withtheresultthatlegalpersonsand,
consequently ,enterprises—especiallySMEs—are
alsocoveredbytheterm.Theexceptionslistedinthe
AnnextothedirectiveandreferredtoinArticle4(2)
mentionneithertheprofessionsnorSMEs.Thedefi­
nitionofthisgroupofdepositorsanddecisionsconcern­
ingtheiradmissiontotheschemesshouldbelefttothe
MemberStates.
4.1.4.'Unavailable deposit'
4.Specificcomments
TheESCwouldliketodrawtheCommission'satten­
tiontoanumberofpointswhichneedtobeclarified
oramended :
4.1.Definitions(Articles1and4)TheCommitteewelcomesthefactthatthedefinition
giveninArticle1(1)hasnotbeenlinkedtotheuncer­
taintiesoftheproceduresforreorganizingandliquidat­
ingacreditinstitutionortothedecisionsofcourts
andadministrative authorities .Foradeposittobe
unavailablewithinthemeaningofthedirective,itis
merelynecessarytoestablishobjectivelythatforten
consecutivedaysadepositorhasbeendeprivedofthe
fundswhichshouldhavebeenrepaidbythecredit
institution .Sosuchapay-outcanalsoresultif,as
areorganization measure,theresponsibleauthorities
suspendallpaymentsofaninstitutionforagiven
period.Itmayalsobeaskedwhetherdepositsarenot
alreadyunavailableif,atthetimeofclearing,acredit
institutioncannotmeetitsobligationsarisingfrom
transferandchequetransactions .4.1.1.'Deposit'and'depositor'
Thisdefinitionisverywide-rangingandincludesclaims
forwhichnegotiablecertificateshavebeenissuedbya
creditinstitution .Butitshouldnotincludesecurities
suchasmortgagebondsandmunicipalbondswhich
alreadybenefitfromspecialguaranteesandforwhich
noadditionalcoverisneeded.Inparticular,thedefi­
nitionshouldautomatically excludedebtsecurities
whichsatisfytheconditionsofArticle22(4)ofCouncil
Directive88/220/EECof22March1988amending,
asregardstheinvestmentpoliciesofcertainUCITS,
Directive85/611/EEConthecoordination oflaws,(i)OJNoL100,19.4.1988,p.31.

16.12.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC332/17
4.2.Additionalcoverforbranchdepositorsinthehost
country[Article2(2)]branchesinanotherMemberStateadepositguarantee
atthelevelandagainstthecontributionapplicablein
thelatter.
4.2.4.Atallevents,abranchofacreditinstitution
registeredinanotherMemberStateshouldbeallowed
tojointahost-countryguaranteeschemeonlyunderthe
generalconditionsgoverningadmissiontothatscheme.
Otherwise,suchbrancheswouldenjoyanadvantage
overcreditinstitutionswishingtojoinaschemeintheir
homecountry.Article2(2)allowsbranchesofcreditinstitutionsfrom
otherMemberStatestojoindeposit-guaranteed
schemesinthehostcountry.Theprovisionmeansthat
branchescanbringtheirexistingcoveruptothehigher
levelavailableinthehostcountry.
4.2.1.Itis,however,notwithoutproblems.Thehost
countryauthoritieswouldfirsthavetodeterminethe
differencebetweenthehome-andhost-countryguaran­
teelimits.Thenthereistheproblemofcalculating
contributions .TheCommissionappearstobeassuming
that'specialconditions'willapplytothiscalculationif
branchesvoluntarilyjointheirhostcountry'sdeposit­
guaranteescheme.Theseconditionswouldtake
accountofthespecialriskcoverprovidedbythehome­
countryscheme.Asaresult,differentcontributions
wouldhavetobecalculatedforbranchesfromdifferent
MemberStates.However,theCommitteeapprovesthe
provisioncontainedinArticle2(2)allowingbranches
ofcreditinstitutionswiththeirheadofficeinanother
MemberStatetojointheschemeofthehostcountry.4.2.5.Thereisanothersidetotheadjustmentof
coverbybranchesregisteredinMemberStateswith
lowerdepositguaranteestothehigherlevelsofahost
countrysince,conversely,thebranchesofcreditinsti­
tutionsregisteredinMemberStateswithhigherdeposit
guaranteesenjoyanadvantageincountrieswhere
guaranteesarelower.Thisadvantageistheresultof
themutualrecognition,tothegreatestpossibleextent,
ofsupervisoryresponsibilities .Similaradvantagescan
beexpectedtoaccruefromtheapplicationbyforeign
branchesoffinancingtechniquesdevelopedintheir
homecountry,theinclusionofcertainbalance-sheet
itemsunderowncapitalorthecalculationofminimum
reserves.Inthecaseofdepositguarantees,nodistortion
ofcompetitionariseswhencreditinstitutionsoftheir
ownaccordforgotheuseofhigherhome-country
depositguarantees .ThedirectiveshouldallowMember
Statestoobligebranchesofcreditinstitutionsfrom
anotherMemberStatetoforgotheuseofhigherhome­
countryguaranteesinthehostcountry.Atallevents,
thedirectiveshouldexpresslyforbidthemtoadvertise
inthehostcountryadvantagesoftheirhigherhome­
countryguaranteelevelsapplyingtotheirbranches(see
point4.7).Thedirectivecouldalsolaydownthatthe
deposit-guarantee schemesinthecreditinstitutions'
homecountryonlyguaranteebranchdepositsinother
countriesuptothelevelofdepositguaranteepertaining
inthehostcountry.4.2.2.Suchaprovisioncouldalsoobligedeposit­
guaranteeschemesprovidingahighlevelofcoverto
paymostofthecompensation duefrombranchesof
foreigninstitutionsthataremerelysubjecttothemini­
mumguaranteelaiddowninthedirective.Thus,credit
institutionsregisteredinthehostcountrywouldhave
toindemnifythedepositorsofbrancheswhichwould,
infuture,besupervisedonlybythehome-country
authorities .However,theproposedsystematicintro­
ductionofthehomecountryprincipleintobanking
supervisorylawwillreducetheopportunitiesforthe
host-countryauthoritiestolookintoandexaminea
branch'sactivities.Asaresult,themembershipofsuch
brancheswouldcreateavirtuallyincalculableriskfor
host-countryguaranteeschemes.4.3.Exclusionfromaguaranteescheme[Article2(3)]
Undercertainconditionsacreditinstitutionmaybe
excludedfromaguaranteescheme.Butinsuchcases
theguaranteehastobemaintainedforaperiodof
twelvemonthsfromthedateofexclusion .IntheESC's
view,itshouldbeself-evidentthatonlyclaimsoutstand­
ingatthedateofexclusionwillbecovered.Thisshould
bemadeclearinthedirective.4.2.3.Thehome-countryconceptcouldalsosystem­
aticallybemadetheunderlyingprinciplewithregard
toadditionalcoverageforbranchesinotherMember
States.Insofarascompetitiveconditionsrendersup­
plementarycoverageindispensableinthehostcountry,
home-country schemescouldberequiredtooffer

NoC332/18 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 16.12.92
4.4.Branchesofcreditinstitutionsfromnon-EC
countries[Article3(1)]toryMemorandum tothedraftdirective,thisabbrevi­
ationiswrittenincapitals(ECU)whereasinthetext
ofthedirective—tenthrecital,Articles4(1)and(4)and
7(5)—itappearsinlowercase.Thisformaldifference
drawsattention—howeverunconsciously —tothe
distinctionbetweentheunitofaccountorbasketof
currenciesandthefuturecommonEuropeancurrency.
Atallevents,directpaymentfromtheguaranteefunds
inecusseemsinconceivable beforethethirdstageof
monetaryunion.Thehomecountryconceptshouldalsoapply,inprin­
ciple,tothelegallydependentbranchesofcreditinsti­
tutionsfromnon-ECcountries .Theadmissionof
branchesfromnon-ECcountrieswouldentailconsider­
ablerisksforCommunitydeposit-guarantee schemes.
Inthiscontext,itshouldbesufficientfordepositorsto
beinformedoftheexistenceornon-existence ofa
guaranteeschemeandtheassociatedconditions .
4.6.Beneficialowner[Article5(3)]
4.4.1.ArulewhichleavesituptotheMemberStates
todecidewhetherornotbranchesofnon-ECcredit
institutionsshouldhavetojoinaguaranteeschemehas
advantagesanddisadvantages .Inpractice,theaccountholderisnotalwaystheben­
eficialownerofadeposit.Itisnot,however,apparent
tothecreditinstitutionwhetherthebeneficialowner
concealedbehindtheaccountholderisoneindividual
orseveral.Theguaranteeshouldnot,therefore,cover
thebeneficialownerbutthepersonwhosename
appearsattheheadoftheaccountand,whereappropri­
ate,notariesinconnectionwithclientaccountsdesig­
natedbythem.ThecoverageofuptoECU15000
shouldaccordinglyapplynottotheaggregatedeposit
buttoeachindividualaccount,insofarasthecredit
institutionwasalreadyawareofthejustifiedclaimsof
theownersoftheindividualaccounts.4.4.1.1.Itwouldbeanadvantageifmembership
werewaivedandthenon-ECcountryrespondedin
kind,asthiswouldavoidcostduplication .Moreover,
theschemewouldnothavetopayoutif,forreasons
overwhichthehostcountryhadnocontrol,thenon­
ECcreditinstitutiondecidedtowithdrawallfunds
fromitsECbranch.
4.4.1.2.However,experiencehasshownthatinsuch
casesitmaybeessentialtocompensatedepositorsin
ordertoavoidascandalwhichcoulddamagetherepu­
tationofthewholecreditindustry.Thiswouldsuggest
aneedforcompulsorymembership ,oratleastthe
provisionofproofthatthehomecountryhadan
adequatesystemforguaranteeingdeposits.4.7.Advertisingban
4.4.1.3.Whentheadvantagesanddisadvantagesare
weighedup,thereisgoodreasonnottoincludebranch­
esofcreditinstitutionsfromthirdcountriesinthescope
ofthedirective,particularlyastheSecondBanking
Directive(!)alsolaysdownnorulesforbranchesof
third-countrycreditinstitutions .Earlierdraftsofthepresentproposalincludedapro­
visionprohibitingtheuseofadvertisinginformation
onguaranteeschemesforthepurposeofattracting
deposits.TheCommitteeregretsthattheCommission
hasdeletedthisprovisionfromthedraft.Thedirective
shouldimposeabindingprohibitionontheadvertising
ofdepositguarantees .Suchanadvertisingbanshould
not,however,restricttheprovisionofinformationto
thecustomersofcreditinstitutionsondepositguaran­
tees(coverage,conditions,repaymentprocedure).
4.5.ECUrepayment
4.8.Exceptions(Annex)
Article7(5)providesforpaymentundertheguarantee
tobeeffectedeitherinthenationalcurrencyofthe
MemberStateinwhichtheguaranteeddepositis
locatedorinecus.IntheFrenchversionoftheExplana­4.8.1.No9shouldpreferablyread:'Non-nominative
depositsofanonymousdepositors,i.e.depositorswhich
thecreditinstitutioncannotidentify'.
4.8.2.Intheannexedlistofoptionalexceptionspro­
videdforbyArticle4(2),expressreferenceshouldbe(i)OJNoL386,30.12.1989,p.1.

16.12.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC332/19
madetoreceivablesintheformoftransferablecertifi-depositcertificates,banker'sdrafts,standbylettersof
catesfromcreditinstitutions,suchasbankacceptances,creditandpromissorynotes.
DoneatBrussels,22October1992.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN
OpiniononthereportonMonitoringImplementation oftheCommonFisheriesPolicy
(92/C332/08)
On2April1992theCouncildecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,under
Article198oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunitiesonthereport
onMonitoringImplementation oftheCommonFisheriesPolicy.
TheSectionforAgricultureandFisheries,whichwasresponsibleforpreparingtheCom­
mittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon1October1992.TheRapporteurwas
MrStrauss.
Atits300thPlenarySession(meetingof22October1992),theEconomicandSocialCommittee
unanimouslyadoptedthefollowingOpinion.
1.General
1.1.TheCommitteesupportsthegeneralthrustof
theCommission'sreport.Efficaciousmonitoringofthe
CommonFisheriesPolicy(CFP)isintheinterestof
individualfishermen,theindustryasawholeandcon­
sumers,whorightlyexpectcontinuityofsupply.At
present,overallcompliancewithcontroloftheCFP
leavesmuchtobedesired.
1.2.Theimportanceofpreservation ,andtheneed
forclearandpracticablerulesgoverningtheCFP,was
raisedbytheCommitteeasrecentlyaslastyear.
1.3.MonitoringtheCFPisfundamentalforthepres­
ervationoffishstocks.Butmonitoringwillonlybe
activelysupportedbyfishermen,processorsanddis­
tributorsiftheyviewtheapplicationoftherulesasfair
andsensible.Inpractice,thisrequirestheCommunity
tobemoreinvolvedandtobegivengreaterpowersto
determinethewayinwhichtheCFPisenforcedsothat
enforcementmethodsbecomebroadlysimilar.Aslong
asthesemethodsdiffersignificantly,fishermenintheseparateMemberStateswillinevitablybelievethatthey
alonearedealtwithseverely.Greatereffortsarealso
necessarytoexplainthereasonsforrestrictiverules
sothatfishermencooperatemorewillinglywiththe
authorities .
1.4.Oncethenecessaryadjustmentshavebeen
secured,theCommitteecanaccepttheprincipleof
relativestabilitybywhichTACsandquotasarerelated
tocatchesinearlieryears.However,forthereasons
outlinedinthepreviousparagraphitbelievesthatit
maybedifficulttoreconcilethepreceptofsubsidiarity,
underwhicheachMemberStatemanagesitsownshare
asitseesfit,withtheneedtoconvincefishermenof
theeven-handedness oftheCFP.
1.5.AsregardstherulesoftheCFP—asopposed
totheirapplication—theyshouldapplyidenticallyto
allCommunityvesselscatchingfishinECwaters.So
far,thedegreeofurgencytoensurethattherulesare
observeddiffersamongstMemberStates,asdothe
monitoringmeansatthedisposaloftheirinspection
departments .GreaterCommunityinvolvement is