EN ECB-PUBLIC   
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 20 March 2014  
on the conflict of interest rules for senio r officials of the Banco de España  
(CON/2014/22) 
 
Introduction and legal basis 
On 14 February 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB)  received a request from the Banco de España for 
an opinion on a draft resolution of the Banco de España’s Governing Counc il amending the Banco de 
España’s Internal Rules of 28 March 2000 as regards the conflict of interest rules for senior officials of 
the Banco de España (hereinafter the ‘draft resolution’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and Article 282(5) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and on the th ird indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC1, as the draft resolution relates to the Banco de  España. In accordance with the first sentence 
of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of th e European Central Bank, the Governing Council has 
adopted this opinion. 
 1. Purpose of the draft resolution 
1.1 The draft resolution amends the Banco de España’s  Internal Rules in order to eliminate the current 
differences between the treatment of the Secretary-General and Directors-General of the Banco de España on the one hand, and senior public sector offi cials on the other, as regards restrictions on 
the exercise of private activities after termination of office.  
1.2 The draft resolution provides for the qualifie d restriction on providing services in private 
companies. More particularly, the two-year rest riction on senior public-sector officials providing 
their services to private companies after termina tion of office laid down in general law will be 
incorporated into the Banco de España’s Internal  Rules and also apply to the Banco de España’s 
Secretary-General and Directors-General. The r estriction is not unqualified but applies only to 
private companies which have had a direct connection to the office held. A direct connection between the company and the office held at the Banco de España is  considered to exist where the 
Secretary-General, Directors-General, the gove rning bodies upon a proposal from the Directors-
General or any officials responsible for bodies whic h report to the former by way of delegation or 
substitution have made decisions regarding such company. The restriction does not apply where 
                                                 
1 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultatio n of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
ECB-PUBLIC  
2 officials have returned to their former employers to engage in activities unrelated to their office at 
the Banco de España. During that two-year peri od, the former Secretary-General or Directors-
General may not themselves, or through third parties or companies in which they have a direct or 
indirect stake above 10 %, enter into agreements to provide technical assistance or other services to 
the Banco de España, be it directly or thr ough contracted or subcontracted companies. 
1.3 The draft resolution also provides for the prohibition on providing services in institutions 
supervised by the Banco de España. The draft reso lution maintains the curren t, absolute six-month 
prohibition on the Secretary-General and Directors-General providing their services to institutions subject to the Banco de España ’s supervision. Moreover, th e Banco de España’s Executive 
Commission will be allowed to extend that period up to a maximum of twelve months should it 
consider it necessary to prevent conflicts of interest. 
1.4 As regards the regime adopted by the ECB, the provisions of the draft resolution are without 
prejudice to any rules and procedures adopted by th e ECB and applicable to the Banco de España’s 
Secretary-General and Directors-General in th e framework of the Eurosystem or the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
 2. General observations 2.1 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft reso lution preserves the Banco de España’s autonomy in 
staff matters, which is an aspect of the principl e of central bank independence enshrined in Article 
130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of th e European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank. The draft resolution shou ld contribute to ensuring the effectiveness and 
independence of the supervision tasks conducted by the Banco de España.  
2.2 Similarly, as provided by Article 31( 3) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013
2, the ECB is in 
the process of establishing comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and preven t possible conflicts of interest arising where 
members of the Supervisory Board and ECB staff members who are engaged in supervisory activities are subsequently employed elsewhere with in a period of two years after termination of 
office.  
2.3 In order to avoid significant differences between the conflict of interest rules and restrictions after 
employment applicable to the members of the joint supervisory teams appointed by the ECB and those appointed by the Banco de España for th e performance of the ECB’ s supervisory tasks, it 
would be advisable for the Banco de  España’s Internal Rules to refe r to a possibility to review the 
                                                 
2 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 c onferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 
ECB-PUBLIC  
3  rules as appropriate, taking into account the ethical  rules, including rules on post-employment, that 
may be developed in the context of the SSM.  
  This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.    Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 March 2014. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI