EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 13.10.2011 
SEC(2011) 1172 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
accompanying the 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Angeda for Change 
{COM(2011) 637 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1173 final}  
 
 Impact Assessment 
Communication: EU Development Policy  
"Increasing the Impact of EU Develo pment Policy: An Agenda for Change" 
 
Disclaimer:  This report commits only the Commission's services invo lved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form 
of any decision to be ta ken by the Commission. 
 
  
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ .......... 2  
1.1 Timing ..................................................................................................................... ......... 8 
1.2 Consultation ............................................................................................................... ...... 9 
2. Problem definition.......................................................................................................... .... 10  
2.1. Context of the problem.................................................................................................. 11  
2.2. Drivers of the problem .................................................................................................. 15  
2.2.1. Aid fragmentation .................................................................................................. 15 2.2.2. High cost coordination efforts, lack of division of labour ..................................... 18 
2.2.3. Fragmentation of Comm ission-managed aid ......................................................... 20 
2.2.4. Other key drivers of the problem ........................................................................... 23 
3. Scope of the Communication............................................................................................. 26  
4. Analysis of subsidiarity.................................................................................................... .. 26 
5. Objectives of EU initiative................................................................................................. 27 
6. Policy options.............................................................................................................. ........ 28  
Option 1 Status quo............................................................................................................ .. 29 
Option 2 Sectoral focus........................................................................................................ 29 
Option 3 Geographical focus................................................................................................ 30 Option 4 Sectoral and geographical focus............................................................................ 31 
7. Assessment of impacts....................................................................................................... .3 2 
Option 1....................................................................................................................... ......... 32 
Option 2....................................................................................................................... ......... 33 
Option 3....................................................................................................................... ......... 34 
Option 4....................................................................................................................... ......... 36 
8. Comparison of options....................................................................................................... 38 
8.1. Risks..................................................................................................................... ......... 40 
8.2. Monitoring and evaluation ............................................................................................ 41 
9. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. ......... 41  
Annex 1: List of acronyms and glossary .............................................................................. 43  
Annex 2: Summary of the public consultation .................................................................... 48  
Annex 3: EU country aid allocations (2007-2013)............................................................... 53  
 
  
 
 21. Introduction 
 
 
Overall Policy Context 
The European Consensus on Development1, which is the cornerstone of EU development 
policy, defines as its primary objective " the eradication of poverty in the context of 
sustainable development, in cluding pursuit of the MDGs ". This objective was thereafter 
legally enshrined in Article 21 of the Treaty of  European Union. The EU is fully committed to 
international goals and object ives, notably the internationally-agreed Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and th e principles on aid effectiven ess (Paris Declaration, Accra 
Agenda for Action).  The European Consensus has been reflecte d in various instruments and geographic 
strategies.
2. A set of specific legal instruments provide the means for implementing EU 
development policy. Comprehensive relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries are governed by the Cotonou Agreement3, with the European  Development Fund 
(EDF) providing the resources to implement development polic y. In other regions,  EU 
development policy is implemented via: th e Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
which covers country programmes with develo ping countries grouping Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East, Central Asia and South Africa and thematic programmes with all developing 
countries, including the ACP group; the Eur opean Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) which covers countries on the southern a nd eastern borders of the EU (principally in 
North Africa and Eastern Europe); and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which 
provides support to Candidate Countries for EU membership. The framework is completed by 
thematic instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Stability and the Nu clear Safety Cooperation Instrument. 
 Development is a shared  competency. The EU act s as a donor (the "28
th donor") alongside the 
Member States, implementing 20% of collective EU  aid, but also has a role as a coordinator, 
convener and policy-maker to foster better inte grated European policies in the development 
field. The Member States have "parallel" power s with the EU (Article 4 TEU) and have their 
own aid programmes and policies, but should en sure that these complement and reinforce 
those of other Member States and the EU (Art icle 208 TFEU). The EU is mandated to take 
initiatives to promote such c oordination (Article 210 TFEU). 
 
                                                 
1 The European Consensus on Development (2005) is a policy statement jointly adopted by the Council, EU 
Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament .  It reflects the EU willingness to make a decisive 
contribution to the eradication of poverty in the contex t of sustainable development, including pursuit of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf   
2 See e.g. Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf ;  
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/memo_africa_eu_relations.pdf .); EU-Latin America 
strategy  (Communication on “The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership”, 30 September 2009); EU-Pacific strategy (Communication COM(2006) 248, 29 may.2006).  To these must be 
added the European Neighbourhood Policy ( http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf
)  
as well as the EU pre-accession strategy. 
3"Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part ", signed in Cotonou, Bénin, on 23 
June 2000. http://ec.europa.eu/europeai d/where/acp/overview/cot onou-agreement/index_en.htm .  
 
 3In the international platform, the EU has been instrumental in the achievement of ambitious 
global agreements (e.g. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005). Common EU 
positions have also been adopted ahead of the relevant High Level meetings within the UN 
(e.g. High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs  in 2010 and LDC IV Conference in 2011) in 
order to contribute to both the quality and qua ntity of aid. The EU and several of its Member 
States are members of the OECD Developmen t Assistance Committee (DAC) and of the G20, 
including its development working group.      Over the last ten years, the EU and its Member  States have maintained  strong commitments to 
increase volumes of aid and improve aid effectiveness
4. However, the implementation of such 
commitments has proved more problematic than anticipated5.  
 The EU has been the leader in formulating th e concept of Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD)
6 aimed at strengthening synergies between non-aid policies and development 
objectives. First reflected in th e Council Conclusions of May 20057 and the European 
Consensus, this commitment to PCD has therea fter been codified in the Treaty of Lisbon.8 
The EU has elaborated a PCD work programme for the period 2010-2013, identifying the priority issues and outlining how the EU, through all its instruments and processes, can 
contribute to development objectives. 
 
Current challenges and the need for change  
There is wide consensus among development partne rs that accelerated action is needed if all 
the MDGs are to be achieved in less than five years' time
9. The EU and its Member States 
have already made a strong c ontribution, but there is potenti al for even greater impact. 
 In looking at the impact of EU development policy, one must consider the multidimensional 
nature of policy implementation – policy is implemented not just through aid projects and 
programmes at country level, but also, for ex ample, via PCD efforts, political dialogue, 
influence in internationa l institutions, etc..  
 In its Practical Guide for evaluating EU activities
10, the Commission distinguishes several 
levels in the so-called "chain of results": the output (a pro duct under direct control of the 
manager – e.g. a road); the result/outcome (immedi ate or initial effect of an intervention – e.g. 
travel time and cost are reduced by the exis tence of the road); a nd the impact (longer-term 
effect of an intervention – e.g. access to markets).  
                                                
 
4 More information on http://ec.europa.eu/ development/how/aid_effectiveness_en.cfm 
5 Most recent data shows that over the period 2004-2009, the EU and its Member States accounted for 58% of 
net ODA to developing countries from all DAC donors, and for 65% of the global EUR 21.4 billion increase in 
ODA during this period. In 2010, the EU and its Member States missed their collective 2010 target of 0.56% by 
a wide margin (by almost EUR15 billion , but the positiv e trend continued and the EU and its Member States 
together reached the highest ODA/GNI ratio of the last tw enty years, i.e. 0.43% ). EU Accountability Report 
2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its Member States.   
6 http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/policy_coherence_en.cfm 
7 May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD. 
8 The latter states that " the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies " (Article 21 of Treaty of the European Union), and that the " Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development  cooperation in the policies that it im plements which are likely to affect 
developing countries " (Article 208 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union). 
9 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank, 2011.  
10 See " Evaluating EU activities – A practical guide for the Commission services ", DG BUDGET, Evaluation 
unit, July 2004  
 
 4The higher up we go in the chain of results (impact level), the more complex is the 
attribution/contribution linka ge between a given EU in tervention and the impact. 
 At output and outcome level, the attribution link with an EU intervention can relatively easily 
be made. However, at impact level, numerous other interacting factors (other actors, other 
policies or changes in the context) must be taken into account, not least the leadership role of 
the partner country in defining their own refo rms and policies and raising their own revenues 
for development, for example through taxation.  An EU intervention can, at best, contribute  to 
impact.  When talking about the impact of EU development policy, we must therefore pay attention 
not only to the impact of EU aid programmes and projects, but also to th e other aspects of EU 
development policy (such as policy and political  dialogue, the international influencing 
agenda, norms setting, policy coherence for development).  Furthermore, it must be noted  that although the EU is an important development player and 
the world's largest aid donor, it remains none theless only one actor among a multitude of 
others, and provides only a part of the overall financial flows for development.  
 
Development assistance will continue to require long-term financial commitment. Demonstrating this increased impact will have the additional benefit of  helping to maintain 
political and public support for development.  In many donor countries, both within the EU 
and internationally, the legitimacy of aid is in creasingly open to challenge, as the general 
public and politicians question the value of de velopment expenditure at a time of austerity 
measures at home; visibility, transparency, accountability, value for money and results have 
become as central to the arguments for Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) as moral 
obligations were in less austere times. EU deve lopment aid not only has to  be spent wisely in 
order to ensure best value for money, but the EU and its Member States need to demonstrate the impact it has had.  Moreover, additional new challenges are comp licating an already difficult situation. The 
succession of recent crises (fin ancial and economic crises, f ood price rises, fuel price 
volatility) has deeply affected developing countr ies. Added to this are issues of climate 
change and energy, security and fragility, instab ility and poor resilience to shocks, and food 
insecurity. There has been a growing recognition that, in an interconnected world, the EU will 
not achieve its own aims on issues like securit y, job creation, migration and climate change in 
isolation
11. Together, these additional challenges have created a new backdrop for 
development policy.   In this context, the question then becomes how to ensure that the development policy of the 
EU and its Member States has the greatest pos sible impact on development outcomes – i.e. 
how to maximise our contribution to the achievement of the MDGs by 2015, and to the 
eradication of poverty after 2015.  With a view to exploring the ways and means to further increase the impact of our development policy, the Commissi on published a Green paper on " EU development policy 
in support of inclusive growth  and sustainable development - Increasing the impact of 
EU development policy"  in November 2010. The aim was to launch a public debate on how 
                                                
 
11 "Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", COM(2010) 2020 final.  
 
 5the EU could best support developing countries in mobilising their economic, natural and 
human resources in support of poverty reduction strategies.  
 In parallel, two other public consultations ha ve also been held: on the Green Paper on "The 
future of EU budget support to third countries"
12 and on "What funding for EU external action 
after 2013?"13. 
 Having analysed the results of these consulta tions, the Commission is planning to present a 
Communication on EU developmen t policy in the third quarte r of 2011. This Communication 
will be accompanied by a Communicatio n on Budget Support and will follow the 
Commission proposals for financing external act ion post- 2013 (June 2011). The latter set out 
broad budgetary orientations fo r the post-2013 period together  with proposals for the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework. Key polic y options currently discussed on these 
Communications have informed the present assessment. Proposals for legal instruments to govern external expenditure will issue later in 20 11 and have been subject to their own Impact 
Assessment processes.  The Communication on EU develo pment policy must also be s een in conjunction with two 
other major Commission policy initiatives: 
 - First, the preparation of a common EU position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (Busan, November 2011), which will look at how to take forward the core aid 
effectiveness principles and comm itments. A Commission Communication
14 will help to 
define a common EU position for Busan. - Second, the preparation of a consistent EU  position for the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (R io de Janeiro, June 2012)
15 aiming at an ambitious outcome with 
concrete policies and actions for greening the economy.  Considering the global nature of the policy content of this Communication, the policy 
options can only be considered in the broadest terms . While development policy is only 
partly about aid, other modaliti es of development cooperation (such as loans or technical 
cooperation) and policies (such as trade or fisheries policies) have  an equally impor tant part to 
play in the overall policy for promoting global development. This Impact Assessment focuses 
on Commission-managed aid as the main measur able indicator. Strengthened PCD, improved 
EU coordination, choice of ai d modalities and the overall leve ls of finance available for 
development are all factors which will also have  an impact on the EU's success at meeting its 
development objectives, but these will be constant s relevant to each of the options analysed 
and therefore these elements are not considered as part of the assessment of impact. 
 
Description of EU aid 
The EU collectively is th e world's largest aid donor
16 and is willing to play  its full part on the 
global effort to reduce poverty. In addition, the EU is (and will remain) an important global player, notably through its partic ipation in world trade and thr ough its leadership in the area 
of global climate change action. 
                                                
 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf   
13 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf   
14 Title to be confirmed; expected to issue in September 2011 
15 "Rio+20: Towards the green economy and better governance", COM(2011) 363 final. 
16 EU Accountability Report 2011 on financing for Developm ent - Review of progress of the EU and its Member 
States.  
 
 6 
Table 1 – ODA/GNI and ODA per capita of EU  Member States and Non-EU DAC Members  
(at 2008 prices) 
ODA volumes 
(EUR billion) ODA per 
capita (EUR)ODA/GNI 
(%) Country 
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
EU 25/27 36.8 53.5 75 107 0.34 0.43 
EU 15  36.4 52.6 95 134 0.35 0.46 
EU 10/12  0.3 0.8 3 8 0.07 0.09 
USA  15.3 20.4 52 66 0.17 0.21 
Japan  6.2 6.6 49 52 0.19 0.20 
Canada  2.5 3.4 77 99 0.27 0.33 
DAC Non EU Members  29.6 38.6 58 69 0.19 0.23 
DAC Members  66.0 91.2 71 96 0.25 0.32 
Source: OECD DAC  
 
The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) foresees Euro 108 billion for external assistance for the period 2007-2013.  The various financial instruments have been shaped around 2 main concepts: "policy-driven" geog raphical instruments supporting directly EU 
external policies and "thematic instruments" addressing crises/security and cross-cutting 
issues.   Instruments
17 such as the European Neighbouring Part nership Instrument (ENPI - Euro 11.2 
billion), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI - Euro 16.9 billion) and the European Development Fund (EDF - Euro 22.7 billion) offer a specific geographical coverage, while 
the thematic component of DCI (Euro 6.8 billio n), the European Instrument for Human Rights 
and Democracy (EIDHR – Euro 1.1 billion) and the Instrument for Stability (IFS – Euro 2.1 
billion) have global coverage.   The full scope of EU collec tive financing for development can be found in the 2011 EU 
Accountability Report on Financing for Development.   The European Commission  has reported EUR 14.95 billion as ODA net disbursements for 
2010. The amount includes EUR 5.15 billion of c oncessional EIB loans of which 4.8 billion 
were financed through own resources; the rec ognition of this type of loans as ODA is 
currently being discussed with the OECD. Until th is is solved, the EU institutions' recognised 
ODA is EUR 9.8 billion.  Beyond being an important donor, th e Commission also plays the im portant role of aspiring to 
bring together the EU a nd its Member States to form a single collective EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing th e political role that the provid er of more than 50% of global 
ODA should have.  Commission-managed aid is delivered through  both geographical (country, regional) and 
thematic programmes.  
 
1) Sectoral distri bution of EU aid 
The Commission's focus is primarily on support for social infrastructure, in areas like 
education and health, water, government and civil society. 
                                                
 
17 ICI (Instruments for Industria lised Countries) and the IPA (Pre-accession) are not considered. .  
 
 7 
  
Clockwise : social infrastructures; economic infrastructures; production; multisector/crosscutting; budget support, 
food aid; humanitarian aid; other/unallocated . 
Source : "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010.  
 
 2) Geographic distribution of EU aid 
Currently EU aid (i.e. aid administered direc tly by the Commission) is provided to about 145 
countries
18. But low-income countries, including the least developed, remain the biggest 
beneficiaries. Geographically, the bulk goes to Africa and to Europe's neighbours.  
 
                                                 
18 As a matter of comparison, the World Bank –IDAs has 79 eligible countries.  
 
 8
 
Clockwise : Europe; Africa (North of Sahara); Africa (South of  Sahara); Asia (Middle East); Asia (South & 
Central, far East); America; Oceania; Bilateral unallocated; Multilateral aid. 
Source : "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010.  
 
1.1 Timing 
All relevant Commission services were invite d to participate in the Impact Assessment 
Steering Group (IASG), with meetings scheduled as follows:   
2 March 2011 – introduction and initial discussions  
25 March 2011 – intermediate discussion of draft IA report 8 April 2011 – final meeting before submission to IA board  
 The draft Impact assessment was then submitte d to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 15 
April 2011, in view of the IAB meeting on 18 Ma y. The first opinion issued by the IAB made 
several recommendations in view  of improving the report, insi sting notably on the need to 
further explain the problem definition and objectives  of the initiative, as well as to describe 
better the various policy options and foreseen impact for each of them. 
 A revised draft was submitted to the IAB on 20 June taking into account these suggestions and aiming in particular at providing deep er explanation on the problem, objectives and 
envisaged options.  
 
 9Following the second opinion of the IAB on 12 July, a revised draft was resubmitted with a 
view to providing further analysis of the probl em and the policy contex t, a better explanation 
of the options and their impact as well as more  information on different stakeholder's views. 
 
 
1.2 Consultation   
 
The public consultation requirement s have been covered by a seri es of extensive debates that 
have taken place in the framework of the recen tly launched public cons ultations, respectively 
on the Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"
19, the Green Paper on "The 
future of EU budget suppor t to third countries"20 and the public consultation on "What 
funding for EU external action after 2013?"21. 
 EU Member States were consulted, both in writ ing and in various meetin gs and discussions at 
different levels (present ation at CODEV on 11 Novemb er 2010; EU DGs meeting 19 
November; Foreign Affairs Council 9 December ; MS Experts meeting 9-10 February 2011; 
Informal Development Ministers meeting 22 February 2011).  The European Parliament was also included in  the consultation, throug h the presentation of 
the Green paper in the DEVE Committee (9 November 2010).  In addition, the Green Paper was presented and discussed with different categories of 
stakeholders at a series of events, includi ng a High Level Panel on “New Policy Challenges” 
during the European Development Days (6 D ecember 2010), a discussion and exchange of 
views with the Committee of the Regions (1 4 December 2010), a seminar with non-state 
actors and the European Economic and Social Committee (11 January 2011). 
 Partner countries were consulted on the issues raised in the Green  paper, both directly and via 
EU delegations
22. 
 
The results of the public c onsultation on the Green Paper on "EU Development Policy in 
support of inclusive growth and sustainable de velopment – Increasing the impact of EU 
development policy" have been published23 (see executive summary in annex). Overall, most 
commentators noted the considerable strengths of  the EU's development policy and practice to 
date, while also identifying sc ope for improvements. The need  for increased sectoral and 
geographic focus was promoted by a large number of commentators.   In addition to the public consultation on the Gr een Paper, relevant external reviews and 
literature on the Commission's performance have also been consulted in the preparation of 
this Impact Assessment. Notably, the UK carri ed out an extensive Mu ltilateral Aid Review
24 
in 2010, which assessed the performance of the EU alongside other intern ational organisations 
(UN agencies, World Bank, GAVI, etc.).  The UK gave a favourable assessment of both the 
                                                 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm   
20 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf   
21 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU_external_action_2013_background_paper.pdf   
22 30 EU delegations in partner countries have provided comments to the Green paper consultation 
23 Link to the full report of the public consultation on the Green Paper: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-
consultations/5241_en.htm   
24 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID /Who-we-work-with/Multilateral-ag encies/Multilateral-Aid-Review/ 
 
 10EDF and the EU budget instruments (DCI, ENPI , IPA, EIDHR, Stability Instrument); the 
EDF scored slightly higher th an the budget instruments due to  its stronger poverty focus – the 
budget instruments cover a broader range of countries, including large numbers of Middle 
Income Countries in particular in Latin America and the Neighbourhood, as well as the pre-accession countries, and have wider-ranging object ives than poverty elimination. From the 
perspective of the UK taxpayer, it was conclu ded that the EDF provides "very good value for 
money" and the budget instruments "adequate va lue for money." It was recommended that the 
geographic focus of some budget instruments (not ably the DCI) be tightened to better support 
poverty reduction, and that management for resu lts be strengthened in both instruments.  
 Views from important stakeholder NGOs also  support the position that the Commission's 
development programme to date has been strong  and effective, although there is always scope 
to increase impact and results. For example, BOND has stated that ‘from the recipient’s point 
of view, aid given through the Commission is ge nerally considered to be more effective and 
efficient than that given bilaterally from a number  of different Member St ates,’ especially as it 
helps to reduce administrative burdens
25. Likewise, Oxfam has emphasised that Commission 
aid is ‘some of the best multilateral aid in the world’ and that ‘the EU’s global presence, promotion of policy coherence for development,  specific competence and expertise, right of 
initiative at community level, facilita tion of coordination and harmonisation, and 
supranational character’ make it a unique actor
26. 
 The OECD-DAC are in the process of carrying out a Peer Review
27 of EU development 
policies and programmes. Unfortunately, however, the results of this Review will not be 
known before mid-2012.    
2. Problem definition 
  EU development policy is at cro ssroads. Against the backdrop of  key internati onal challenges 
(financial crisis, climate cha nge, energy access, food insecurit y, migration pressures, state 
fragility, regional conflicts and intern ational security, emergence of new 
powers/investors/donors), the legiti macy of aid discussion (enhan ced by fiscal austerity and 
competition for scarce resources at home) and th e new contextual settings both at EU (post-
Lisbon external action framework) and internatio nal level (G20, IFIs, UN), there is a need for 
change to “ increase the impact of EU development policy .” The aim is to make the EU's 
development policy fit to meet the challenges of the coming decade, and to help partner 
countries bring about the changes needs to accelerate their own progress towards poverty 
reduction and the MDGs.  The Commission will play its part in this ende avour by striving to increase the impact of the 
aid that it manages (i.e. for the period to 2013, aid allocated  under Heading 4 of the EU 
Budget and from the 10
th EDF; beyond 2013, aid allocated under the Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework).  
                                                 
25 BOND European Group submission to DFID's  Multilateral Aid Review (see footnote above). 
26 Oxfam submission to DFID's Multilatera l Aid Review (see footnote above).  
27 Peer Reviews are carried out on a rotating basis on all 24 DAC member s. Peer Reviews provide in-depth 
examinations of development systems and policies, including lessons learned. The Commission was last 
reviewed in 2007. http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_34603_46582825_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
 11 
 
2.1. Context of the problem 
 
The recent dynamic of global cris es (volatility of energy a nd food prices, financial and 
economic crisis) has strongly affected developing  countries and among them the poorest ones.   
 While in the past decade economic growth has been robust in many part s of the world, a great 
deal still remains to be done and many developi ng countries risk lagging  behind in recovering 
from the negative impacts of the global economi c and financial crisis. In many of the LDCs, 
resilience in the f ace of the current economic crisis ha s been fragile, with GDP in these 
countries generally declining in 2009.   There is wide consensus among development partne rs that accelerated action is needed if all 
the MDGs are to be achieved by 2015
28. The number of poor pe ople remains high and is 
estimated by the World Bank at around 2 billion29. Some 48 countries, of about 880 million 
people, of whom 75 per cent are classified as poor, still belong to th e UN category of LDCs. 
Moreover, there has been very little progress in the MDGs related to maternal and child 
mortality and quality of education, and pros pects for access to sanitation are worrying30. 
Furthermore progress has varied greatly between regions and in some cases the benefits of 
growth have not been felt by the wider population even in c ountries where economic growth 
is robust.    The UN MDG report 2011 recently published acknowledges that significant progress has been made towards some MDGs, due notably to continued economic growth in some developing countries, targeted interventions in  critical areas and incr eased funding from many 
sources, but alerts that in several areas there is  still long way to go, and achievement of MDGs 
is at risk. Concerns are particularly on the empowerment of women and girls, the promotion 
of sustainable development and the protection of the most vulnerable. 
 
The EU and its Member States have already ma de a strong contribution to the achievement of 
the MDGs.
31 For example, close to 80% of projects in Africa deliver 'significant impact'.32 
There is, however, always scope to increa se performance and impact. Furthermore, 
demonstrating this increased impact will have the additional benefit of helping to maintain political and public support for development. 
 
The changing global context offers new oppor tunities for more effective and impactful 
development efforts. New development actors have emerged on the global scene.   
                                                
 
28 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank 2011.  
29 Data on poverty are taken from World Bank. Social Indicators 2010. Two poverty lines are considered  
defined as average level  
30 "Progress made on the Millennium Development Goals and key challenges for the road ahead", Commission 
Staff Working Document, SEC(2010) 418 final; "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010", United Nations, 2010. 
31 See notably "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals – Some key results from European 
Commission programmes", 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/188a_mdg_en.pdf
  
32 EuropeAid Annual Report 2010, page 205 
 
 12BRICS estimated development assistance 200833,  
 
Traditional donors still clearly dominate the global share of ODA flows. Among them the EU 
and its Member States account for nearly 60% of net ODA from all OECD DAC donors. The 
Commission manages some 20% of the EU total.   However the share of emerging partners is growing fast. According to the OECD
34, all 
emerging partners together represented 5.6% of all ODA-equivalent flows to Africa in 2000-
2004, while this share has nearly doubled to 10.2% during the 2005-2010 period. Countries 
like China, India and Brazil are increa singly active in development cooperation. 
                                                 
33 Source: "Beyond the DAC: The welcome role of other providers of Development Cooperation", OECD / DCD 
Issues Brief, May 2010, http://www.oec d.org/dataoecd/58/24/45361474.pdf  
34 OECD, African Economic Outlook 2011 - DRAFT BRICS development assistance 2008
Brazil, 437
China, 2400India, 610Russia, 200S. Africa, 109
 
 13Overall Development Assistance (ODA ), Other Official Fl ows (OOF), Outward Fo reign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and trade volumes with developing countries 
 ODA35 OOF36 Outward FDI37 Merchandise 
Export volume 
to developing 
economies in 
200938 Merchandise 
Import volume 
from developing 
economies in 
200939 
Brazil $1-1,275 bn 
(2010)40 n/a $0.15 bn (2007) $87.3 bn $61 bn 
India $ 0.61 bn  (2009) $2 bn (2010)41 $2.95 bn (2005) 
 
 [Africa $2.7 bn 
in 2008] $104 bn $164 bn 
China42 $1.9-3 bn (2008) $10bn (2009)  
[Africa $6 bn in 
2009] 43  
$13.26 bn (2009 
 
[Africa $7.8 bn in 
2008] $556 bn $545 bn 
Saudi Arabia $2.01 bn (2006) 
$2.01 bn (2007) 
$5.5 bn (2008) n/a n/a $141 bn $38 bn 
DAC members $120 bn (2009) $22 bn (2009) 
[$2.9 bn to 
Africa] 
 $158.9 bn (2009) $2002 bn $2536 bn 
EU $67 bn (2009)44 $3.5 bn (2009)45 $94 bn (2009) $717 bn $816 bn 
Multilateral 
Institutions (DAC ODA 
includes 
multilateral 
contributions) $53.8 bn (2009) 
[$6.1 bn to 
Africa] n/a n/a n/a 
                                                 
35 Net ODA. All data from OECD (2010a). Estimate s for non-OECD countries from OECD (2010b), unless 
otherwise indicated 
36 Gross OOF, DAC, EU and Multilateral Institution data  from OECD 2010a. Estimates for non-OECD countries 
from OECD 2010b; loans are in many cases tie d to goods and services of the lending EME 
37 UNCTAD (2010) and OECD (2010a). UNCTAD FDI data is collected for TNCs only. Data on DAC/EU is by 
OECD (2010a) and also includes SMEs 
38 UNCTAD 2010 
39 UNCTAD 2010 
40 Lower estimate by Overseas Development Institute (2010), upper estimate by German Development Institute 
(2010) 
41 Estimate by Indian officials at meeting with EU Delegation 
42 Note that Hong Kong SAR had TNC FDI of $5.3 bn into Africa in 2008 and account for $219 bn in 
merchandise export and $289 bn in merchandise import volume to and from developing countries. It is not 
possible to separate mainland Chinese TNCs that might have subsidiaries in HK from other TNCs. 
43 Estimate by Deborah Brautigam, mostly market rate loans from state banks 
44 EU OECD Member States 
45 EU OECD Member States 
 
 14 
Alongside emerging countries, non-governmental  actors, such as NGOs, foundations and 
private corporations, are also responsible for a significant am ount of funds for development 
and are playing a growing foreign policy role. It is estimated that private philanthropy 
foundations, from both develope d and developing countries, may account for about US $ 60 
billion annually46. While these funds are of a distinct nature and managed differently from 
ODA, together they could, if harnessed to comp lement ODA, better meet the need to foster 
development and tackle global challenges.  The EU and its Member States already have a sophisticated policy framework in place to guide their joint work in helping their partner countries out of poverty, bu t a lot remains to be 
done.   In addition, it must be noted that success of de velopment endeavours is also a matter of shared 
objectives between the donors and the recipients  of development aid. Recognising that its 
partner countries bear primary responsibility for defi ning their own deve lopment strategies 
while emphasising the key role of good governance, the EU  and its Member States have 
moved from a donor-benefic iary type of relations hip to a partnership
47, involving contractual 
approaches, based on policy dial ogue and linking results to sp ecific cooperation programmes 
or instruments.  Similar to other global challenges, in developm ent, the EU as a whole has both an economic 
and a political role. These two aspects of EU development action are complementary. Politically, the EU conducts political dialogue both at the bilateral and at the multilateral 
levels. The EU institutions are also actively participating in devel opment policy discussions 
with other donors in multilateral fora (UN, OECD , G20, IFIs). Bilaterally, the EU institutions 
support key sectors and help deve loping countries set governance systems and policies as well 
as build capacities to create conditions for in clusive growth and sustainable development.  
 The Lisbon Treaty and the new institutional setti ng for the EU's common foreign and security 
policy has opened the door for a sharpened, mo re strategic development policy in the wider 
framework of more effective EU external action. The European External Action Service 
(EEAS) allows for better co-ordinated EU and Member State policies, programmes and 
delivery.  The new institutional setting, as well as ne w competences in areas of interest for 
development
48, also provides opportunities for increas ed coherence between external policy 
objectives and development. Through article 208 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty has indeed given 
an important role to the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) agenda, which should also 
contribute to improve the real results of  our development cooperation by reducing 
inconsistencies and promoting synergies betw een the objectives of internal policies and 
development objectives.   With this new institutional set-up for EU external action in place, and a Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) to be agreed for the period after 2013, it is particularly opportune 
                                                
 
46 Wolfgang Fengler, blogs.worldbank.org 1/10/2010.  
47 In recent years, the EU has established various partnership agreements that govern its relations with 
developing and emerging countries such as the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, the revised Cotonou Agreement with ACP States, EU strategic partnerships with emerging  and transition economies or the Central Asia Strategy. 
48 such as investment, migration 
 
 15to examine the development policy framewor k within which the new external spending 
instruments will be developed49. 
 
 
2.2. Drivers of the problem 
 
Current research50 shows that since 2005, when the Pari s Declaration was a dopted, global aid 
allocation patterns have deteriorat ed. In general, aid fragmentati on has increased in parallel to 
ODA increases. There is a trend to deliver assist ance in smaller parcels. At the same time, 
donor proliferation has increased: globally, donors are operating in more countries and, within 
these countries, in more sectors.  
 
 
2.2.1. Aid fragmentation  
 The Paris Declaration noted that  "excessive fragmentation of ai d at the global, country or 
sector level impairs aid effecti veness. It called for increase d donor complementarity through 
delegated authority to improve division of l abour and reduce transaction costs. Division of 
labour needs to be pursued bot h in-country and cross-country". 
 
Several studies point to the unde rmining effects of aid fragme ntation and donor proliferation 
on the value for money and impact of aid. Fr agmentation is consider ed to be a problem 
because its costs have been shown to be very large for recipients, to the point that it significantly reduces aid effici ency. Having to deal with a plethora of donor missions, 
reporting requirements and consulta nts considerably reduces the va lue of aid for recipients. It 
forces the use of a great deal of administrativ e resources in countries  where these are often 
scarce and would be better employed elsewhere.  Analysis of OECD/DAC statis tics of 2008 and the sector policies of EU donors in three 
countries (Ethiopia, Vietnam and Zambia) s how that EU donors are slowly reducing aid 
fragmentation through increased sp ecialisation and division of labour. In all three countries 
EU donors intend to limit themse lves to four sectors on aver age, close to the aim of a 
maximum of three sectors as laid down in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. 
 The Commission itself has committed to limit its engagement to two sectors per country, but 
this rule has not been uniformly applied. While there is a general consistency of approach in 
ACP countries, in non-ACP countries the EU country programme comm only either involves a 
large number of sectors, exceeding the two-sector  limit, or those two sectors are so broadly 
defined (e.g. as "human development," "rural  development") as to in practice mean 
engagement in a very large number of sectors.   A 2009 study on the 'Benefits of a European Approach'
51 shows that applying the aid 
effectiveness principles can result in consider ably better value for money. The study states 
                                                 
49 See results of the public consultation on "What funding for EU external action after 2013?" 
50 "Trends of In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation: An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation 
Patterns between 2005 and 2009", Report on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of Labour and 
Complementarity, First Draft – 24 March 2011, final version forthcoming 
51 "Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a Euro pean Approach", HTPSE Limited, October 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf   
 
 16that if improvements were made in terms of increased predictability, reduced donor 
proliferation and a further untying of aid, the po tential benefits from a European approach 
towards aid effectiveness could, with a full caveat  for the paucity and uncertainty of actual 
data, be estimated to be in the magnitude of 3 to 6 billion Euro per ye ar or 15 to 30 billion 
Euro over the period of 2010 to 2015. Of this amount between € 1 and 1.6 billion of efficiency gains could be achieved by a reduction in aid fragmentation. 
 Other studies, for instance by the OECD/DAC
52, also point to huge potential gains of 
reducing aid fragmentation. The OECD/DAC calculated that the traditional bilateral DAC donors established 3700 aid relations hips in the world, leading to unmanageable numbers of 
donors in countries and across sectors. Not counted ar e the remaining 246 multilateral 
organisations, emerging donors and other no n-DAC donors. The average number of 
"partners" per donor is 68, while the average numb er of donors that each  partner has to deal 
with is 20 (10 bilaterals and 10 multilaterals).  
Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009)
53 
 
 
 It is widely accepted that these inefficienci es are no longer sustai nable. Tackling this 
proliferation and fragmentation is made even mo re urgent by the fact that additional actors, 
such as emerging donors and private founda tions, have entered the aid arena.  
 
                                                
 
52 2010 Report on Division of Labour "Addressing cross-country fragmentation and aid orphans", OECD, Paris  
53 Idem 
 
 17Graph indicating the decrease in project size and the increase in the number of projects 
between 1995 and 2008  54 
 
 
 
To address the problem of aid fragmentati on, the EU Council adopt ed a Code of Conduct 
(2007) and an Operational Framework (2009) on Division of Labour (DoL) which provide a 
comprehensive approach to reducing donor pr oliferation and aid fr agmentation through 
increased donor specialisation at EU level.  After almost four years of DoL processes, and in view of the High Level Event on aid 
effectiveness in Busan, the EU is at crossroads on this issue. While the EU remains the most 
advanced donor community on DoL, progress has been too slow
55. There are some success 
stories, but these are rather the exceptions a nd mostly due to occasional leadership and local 
initiatives. 
 
Sectoral fragmentation  
At the sector level proliferati on is also rife: fort y-one percent of all sectors in recipient 
countries had recorded disbursements from more than three EU donors in 2007. Forty-five 
percent of all EU donor sector programmes account  for only twelve percent of total spending, 
implying that there are considerable economies of  scale to be gained from rationalisation of 
projects and programmes.56 
 
In particular, a reduction in th e fragmentation of aid from a la rge number of smaller projects 
into consolidated, longer term programmes, coul d increase this level of  savings considerably. 
If, hypothetically, these fragmentation costs were  reduced to 500 million Euro a year (for a 
consolidation into some 750 pr ogrammes), the additional savings, above and beyond the 3 to 
6 billion amount, would be in th e magnitude of 1.4 to 2.5 billion Euro a year. While it is not 
possible to operate with precise fi gures, it is possible to establis h that the potenti al savings are 
substantial and to infer that the link between aid fragmentation and DoL needs to be tackled 
further.57 
 
Existing agreements between the EU and Member  States to reduce in-country fragmentation 
of their aid through DoL have not (yet) yielded the expected results for a number of reasons: 
                                                 
54  Fengler Wolfgang and Kharas Homi, "Delivering Aid Differently - Lessons from the Field", Brookings 
Institution Press 2010 c. 286pp. 
55 For more detailed information, refer to the three publis hed Monitoring Reports on EU Fast Track Initiative on 
Division of Labour and Complementarity, January 2009, November 2009 and April 2011. 
56 "Aid effectiveness agenda: Benefits of the European Approach," European Commission, October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf   
57 idem  
 
 181. Neither the EU nor all Member States limit their aid in all partner countries to a 
maximum of three sectors of intervention, as agreed in the EU C ode of Conduct. This 
may be due to political priori ties, bilateral interests, visi bility considerations, partner 
country requests or other reasons. 
2. Member States and EU may define their sectors of intervention too broadly (e.g. 
"human and social development" in th e EU programme in Bangladesh), which 
actually allows them to work in a very large number of traditional sectors (human and social development encompasses health, education, water and sanitation, etc.) 
3. Vertical funds and faciliti es often finance projects outside agreed sectors of 
intervention and hence contribu te to fragmentation of aid. 
4. While the advantages of reduced fragment ation through DoL may be obvious (e.g. the 
savings in transaction costs), they may not be easily quantifiable or immediately 
observable. On the other hand, more effici ent DoL requires increas ed coordination and 
cooperation by donors, which is initially time consuming and labour intensive and thus 
can be considered a disadvantage. 
5. While lack of political direction (incl uding appropriate communication of existing 
commitments to partner country level) may be one reason, the resi stance to change by 
national administrations, implementing agencies  and other interest groups that benefit 
from maintaining the status quo also plays an important role. 
6. Some partner country governments seem reluctant to support DoL processes for fear 
of losing funding. 
  
2.2.2. High cost coordination effo rts, lack of division of labour 
 
In the current setting, th ere is a high prolifera tion of donor – partner co untry relationships. At 
country level, this results in high coordinatio n efforts which burden first and foremost the 
partner countries, but also donor representatives in the field. In addition to these traditional 
relationships, there are new ones emerging, such as South-South relationships or big private 
foundations. While the EU donors are partly respons ible for a high level of fragmentation, the 
appetite for fragmentation seems to have levell ed off: their contribution to the increase in 
fragmentation is less than the global donor average.  There are substantive global and EU-specific co mmitments to increase complementarity and 
enhance division of labour (DoL) among donors, as in the Paris Declaration (2005), the EU 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (2007) , and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). 
Better DoL between EU donors will increase tr ansparency, reduce duplication and diminish 
the risk of corruption, and th erefore would have a positive impact on development results.  
 Specifically, EU donors set themselves an ambitious Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in 2007. In 2008, the EU Fast Trac k Initiative on Division of La bour was created, focusing on 
30 countries with often very high fragmentation levels in order to improve DoL. The latest 
monitoring report of the Fast Track Initiative
58 showed mixed results. In many countries of 
the FTI, the technical prepar ations have been concluded in order to facilitate good, 
measurable re-organisation of labour among  EU donors. There is widespread use and 
institutionalisation of donor mapping as an aid management tool and there is more agreement 
on sector definitions, lead donor arrangements  etc. Also the perceived partner country 
                                                 
58 Third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU  Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour, Annex 5 
of the "EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its 
Member States", Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2011) 502 final 
 
 19commitment to DoL processes seems to be improving. However, substantial measurable 
changes to donor behaviour are ra re as a result of these preparations. It is a demanding 
approach that takes time to  yield measurable results.  
 There is a natural time lag between policy co mmitments and their vi sible effects on aid 
fragmentation statistics. Usually, if and when donors deci de to exit a country or a sector in a 
country, they organise a careful exit phase that takes 3-5 years.  That means the full effect of 
policy decisions taken on the basis of aid eff ectiveness commitments, or on the basis of the 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour of 2007, ar e likely to show more clearly when aid 
data for 2010 or 2011 becomes available.  However, the trend seems to point to the fact th at progress has been too slow, even if the EU 
remains the most advanced donor community on DoL. There are some success stories, but 
these are rather the exceptions and mostly due  to occasional partner country leadership. 
Technical approaches for pilot DoL exercises might  have reached their limits, both in the field 
and headquarters. An agenda for change whic h emphasises greater EU  coordination, including 
improved DoL, seems to be called for.  
 
Duplication of effort
 
There is strong evidence of dup lication of effort with other donors both inside and beyond the 
EU. Taking Bangladesh as an example, all 10 EU donors present in Bangladesh are active in 
the education sector. In Ethi opia, 11 of the 15 EU donors pr esent crowd the health sector59. 
Individual donors' allocation d ecisions are based on a great di versity of criteria, often 
determined at headquarters' level and resulting in  earmarking of funds at country level. This 
means that exits and entries from countries and se ctors are hard to coordinate at country level 
and in partnership with the recipient government s. In many of these cases, information about 
each other's activities is abundant and coordi nation a daily fact. However, behavioural 
changes as a result of this information are scarce. 
 
This can lead to duplications, where the same sect or and type of projects  is invested in by 
several donors, leading to a co mpetition locally that hinders any conditionality and does not 
necessarily lead to an improvement in quality. More importantly, it can also lead to sudden 
gaps in geographic/sector coverage , with costs in terms of lack of continuity and risks to the 
sustainability of achieved advances in certain sectors. Moreover, this lack of coordination 
added to the proliferation of in terventions and donors create an atmosphere of uncertainty for 
partner countries and the main beneficiaries in these countries, very often including the most 
vulnerable groups.   This complex and uncoordinated nature of ai d allocation patterns no t only creates overlaps 
and duplication in terms of too many donors contributing to o little at country  level, it also 
creates gaps in terms of overall  supply of aid at country leve l (issue of under-a ided countries, 
also known as "aid orphans").  
                                                
 
59 According to OECD DAC Fragmentation tables, based on disbursement data of 2009 
 
 20Donor orphans  
Lack of proper coordination among donors, both at EU and globa l level, leads to 
unsatisfactory patterns of aid di stribution. These trends are visi ble both at sect or and country 
levels60. The resulting geographical and sectoral gaps are commonly called "aid orphans". 
 
The OECD61 indicated that such patter ns generate inefficiency and inequities and can entail 
considerable global cost in delivering aid to the extent that the aid community as a whole fails 
to invest systematically where aid is expected to have the highest impact.  
 
This asymmetry is recognised in the Accra Agenda for Action and donors have committed " to 
start dialogue on division of labour across count ries and work to address the issues of 
countries that rece ive insufficient aid "62. 
 
In the current climate of budgetary  austerity in OECD countries,  it is unlikely that the donor 
community can solve the problem  of under-aided countries sole ly by providing aid resources 
that are additional to what would otherwise have been provided. Therefore, meeting aid 
orphans' needs from scaled-up re sources will be difficult. F ragmentation can be improved by 
reducing non-significant aid relations. This would also free up re sources that could be used 
towards aid orphans (assuming that there is an  ex ante agreement on which countries are aid 
orphans). In this way, re-allocating resource s could not only reduce aid fragmentation and 
transaction costs in partner countries where donor relations are non-si gnificant, but at the 
same time provide more aid to aid orphans.  As regards cross-country DoL, which aims at  reducing the proliferat ion of aid donors in 
partner countries, there are also a number of reasons that have  prevented progress: 
1. Many Member States consider their deci sions on partner country selection as a 
sovereign act, which does not require EU c oordination; equally pa rtner countries see 
their relations with bilateral donors as a national prerogative. 
2. Selection of partner countries and count ry allocations is seen by many Member 
States as a national fo reign policy instrument. 
3. A substantial number of partner country  governments fear losing funding and are 
hence not supportive of cross-country DoL. 
 
2.2.3. Fragmentation of Commission-managed aid 
 For the assessment of the fragmentation of the EC aid portfolio, the ai d statistics of the 
OECD/DAC provide a useful input. The DAC distinguishes 11 sectors
63 at the aggregate level 
(including multi sector), and General Budget Support (GBS) as a 12th element. 
 Furthermore, to identify fragmentation the DAC uses the concept of  Country Programmable 
Aid (CPA), which only includes ODA which is  programmed by the dono r and excludes ODA 
which: 
                                                
 
60 "Will countries that receive insufficient aid pleas e stand up"? Robert Utz, World Bank, 2009.   
61 OECD Development Brief, January 2009.  
62 Accra Agenda for Action, point 17 letter c) and d). September 2008 
63 Education; Health; Population policies and reproductive health; Water supply and sanitation; Other social 
infrastructure; Economic infrastructure; Agriculture; Other production sectors (e.g. forestry, fishing, industry, mining, trade policy and tourism); Environment; Government and civil society; Multisector; General budget 
support. 
 
 21• is unpredictable by nature (human itarian aid and debt relief); 
• entails no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion 
of development awareness, and resear ch and refugees in donor countries); 
• does not form part of co-operation agreem ents between governments (food aid and aid 
from local governments); and 
• is not country programmable by the donor (e.g. core funding of NGOs). 
 With regard to the Commission portfolio, the intention had been to reduce fragmentation 
through the limitation of the number of focal sect ors in the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). 
DAC 2009 data on aid flows show that EC aid is still fragme nted by spreading the funding 
over many sectors. On average, the EC is spreading its aid over 10 sectors (GBS not 
included), as illustrated in the 30 partner countries
64 which are participating in the fast track 
approach for division of labour. The range is between 5 sectors (Mongol ia) and 11 sectors (9 
countries). This is clearly much  higher than the maximum of 3 focal sectors the EU Code of 
Conduct for Division of Labour called for in  May 2007. Of these 10 s ectors, the Commission 
provides a relatively large cont ribution to 6 sectors on averag e, which indicates that the 
Commission needs to spread ou t its human capacity and financial resources to manage the 
programmes in these sectors.   
Fragmentation at country level
 
 
In some countries and regions, focal sectors ar e defined in a very open way, which often leads 
to very scattered interventions . Indeed, there are cases where the two focal sectors may be 
defined as "rural development"  and "urban development", or as "economic integration" and 
"political integration". This of ten leads to programmes covering many subsectors in fields that 
are as different as health, education, culture, in frastructures, environment, trade, etc., with a 
wide variety of specialised human resour ces needed for the implementation of the 
programmes and numerous interlocutors. 
 
For example, in a northern African country the two focal sectors of EU development 
cooperation are "sustainable development and culture" and "ec onomic growth and 
employment". In practice, projects approved and implemented cover all the following sub-
sectors: "culture and he ritage", "transport" , "f isheries", "trade", "e nvironment" and "socio-
economic development", all requiring very di fferent expertises an d dialogues with six 
different ministries. 
 
Another country, further south in Africa, is in the same type a situation: 3 focal sectors but 
numerous sub-sectors, with not less than 22 ongoing projects. 
 
Examples of lack of concentration can also be  found in other continen ts, like in one Middle 
Eastern country with "administr ative reforms", "economic reforms" and "social reforms" as 
focal sectors. In practice, this leads to programmes being implemented in "health", 
"education", "justice", "social protection", "vocational training" , "support to civil society", 
"support to private sector", "banking reform", "trade", and "administrative reforms". In a 
Central Asian country, EU development aid gave ri se to not less than 383  service contracts in 
a 6 year period. 
                                                 
64 Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam and 
Zambia. 
 
 22 
Further breakdown of EU65 presence shows that the EU is highly significant66 in 3.5 sectors 
(58% of funding) and reasonably si gnificant in 2.5 sect ors (12%). The EU is  insignificant in 4 
sectors (5%). This means that the EU is significant in a total of 6 sectors, while being insignificant in 3.5 sectors. A little more than half of the countries receive General Budget 
Support, which accounts for the remaining 25% of  the total funding, and which is significant 
across the board.  
 
Comparison of DAC statistics with Country Strategy Papers
 
 
Additional analysis consists of a comparison be tween the actual presence in sectors according 
to the 2009 DAC data and the se ctors as laid down in Country  Strategy Papers (CSPs). In 
general, CSP sectors are broadly defined, so in some cases they overlap with more than one 
sector in the DAC definition (f or instance, a CSP refers to "social sector" which involves 
Education and Health in the DAC sector definiti on). In most CSPs (25 out of 30) a distinction 
has been made between focal and non-focal sector s. In terms of share of the total funding it 
should be noted that the 3 focal sectors only account for 42%, while activities in non-focal 
sectors and other areas of inte rvention outside the CSPs amount  a considerable 33% spread 
over 7 sectors on average. This seems to be an unbalanced situation. In the implementation 
phase of the CSPs more discipline is needed to keep spending focused on the defined (focal) 
sectors and resist the tendency to spread  funding to other areas of intervention.  
 
There is thus considerable opportunity to further downsize the number of sectors by limiting or even abolishing the non-focal  sectors in the country program ming process. Furthermore, a 
more strict approach for defini ng focal sectors could be applied. 
 
Geographic dispersion of aid
 
Commission-managed aid could be more targeted at those countri es that need it most. For 
instance, the DCI covers a wide range of count ries falling under the OECD DAC definition of 
ODA recipients, from the LDCs to Upper Middl e Income Countries. Hence, a certain amount 
of aid is being delivered to countries that ha ve strong financing capacity (such as China and 
Turkey). In the case of Angola for example, a ll aid represents less than 1% of the national 
budget. 67 For these countries, the bene fit of EU development aid is likely to be minimal.  
 Given the very different development needs, performance and interests of each country, the 
DCI does not allow sufficient differentiation be tween the partners. The rise of several 
developing countries as donors, the economic and social disparities amongst the partner 
countries and the development of new objectiv es beyond pure development assistance call for 
an enhanced flexibility in terms of object ives and cooperation modalities within the DCI
68.  
 Such fragmentation does not allo w a critical mass to be obtaine d and so prevents large-scale 
projects in some countries wh ere such projects would be the most appropriate. For example, 
                                                
 
65 In this context, "EU" refers to "Commission-managed aid." 
66 The DAC distinguishes between "significant" and "non-significant" contributions to a sector. Highly 
significant  means that the donor has a relative large financial contribution to the sector both from the donor and 
the partner country perspective. Reasonably significant  means either a large financial contribution from the 
donor or from the partner country perspective. Non-significant  means that the financial contribution is relatively 
small from both perspectives.  
67 See Annex. 
68 Report of the Working Group – Multiannual Financial Framework, 'What works and what doesn't?' March 
2011, not published. 
 
 23in the Pacific region, while the EU  strategy was relevant and in line with the national requests 
and needs, EU support was dispersed over too ma ny sectors and islands and therefore impact 
and visibility were diluted.  In 2007, the DAC Peer Review
69 urged the Commission to work with the EU Member States 
to differentiate better their respective roles in co untries and to prioritise  the sectors it targets 
for assistance and slim downwards the num ber of countries to which it provides ODA. 
 
Lack of prioritisation   
The reasons for a lack of prioritisation are at  least partly political, given that many Member 
States see the Commission as the donor of last resort, filling the gaps and ensuring the EU 
global presence.   A study on legal instrume nts for external action
70 examining 57 evaluations published 
between 2006 and 2010, found 130 results and impact s that were linked to  the DCI; 40% of 
these were judged to be relevant though ineff ective (e.g. project-level results in terms of 
gender equality not translating into societal ch ange; increases in school enrolment while the 
quality of education remains too low to expect literacy rates to change), or were too small 
scale in terms of coverage or investment to really make a difference (roughly one third of the 
evidence).   
2.2.4. Other key dri vers of the problem 
Other ways/tools/drivers to improve EU aid impact 
 
 
 
External factors  
EU development aid does not operate in an isol ated environment. Other factors influence the 
final results and the capacity of EU developmen t aid to generate real results in terms of 
poverty eradication. Among these f actors, many are outside of th e EU's and/or Commission's 
direct control or influence. Most obvious woul d be natural or man-made disasters which can 
set developing countries back.  
 
Policy Coherence for Development  
In terms of other factors, one of the most significant is the seeming inconsistencies and 
incoherencies between the eff ects (and side effects) of no n-development policies and the 
objective of development policy. Policy cohere nce for development (P CD) approaches, which 
are EU's main response to th is weakness, are not new. L ooking for synergies and avoiding 
negative impacts of non-development policies on development objectives is a long term 
process and continuous activity for the EU (Com mission and Member States alike) that is 
based on the Treaty. Furthermore, the ‘European Consensus on Development’ reaffirms the EU’s commitment to promoting PCD, based on the principle of ensuring that the EU shall 
take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policie s that it implements 
which are likely to affect developing countri es, and that these policies support development 
objectives. This approach is to be  encouraged and will have to be  part of any final policy mix, 
no matter which future Option is selected. 
                                                
 
69 DAC Peer Review of the European Community 2007, p. 18, 39, 40, 43 
70 DCI, ENPI, EIDHR, INSC, Ifs and ICI 
 
 24 
Country ownership  
Country ownership and good governance are key el ements for success. Experience has shown 
that without them, aid programmes will not pro duce their highest impact. Partner countries 
bear the primary responsibility for defini ng their own development strategies. Limited 
progress in the past can, to a certain extent, be attributed to a lack of  ownership and mutual 
accountability.  As regards division of labour, an important lesson is that c oncrete progress is only possible 
with country ownership and flexibility (i.e. avoid blueprint approaches). However, most 
partner countries lack in centives because of fear  of losing overall fundi ng or reduced room for 
manoeuvre if donors work collectively.  In order to increase the impact of its deve lopment policy, the EU and its partner countries 
must therefore strengthen their partnershi ps, focusing on results and ensuring mutual 
accountability. In doing so, the EU can better leve rage policy reforms, notably in terms of 
good governance. Again, these improvements would apply across the board, and not solely in 
relation to one or two of the Options consid ered in this Impact Assessment process.  
 Other financial resources
 
EU effort may leverage additi onal finance for development. A growing number of actors are 
playing an increasingly important role in de velopment cooperation and are responsible for a 
significant amount of funds for development71. While these funds are of  a distinct nature and 
managed differently from ODA, together they could, if harnessed to complement ODA, better 
meet the need to foster development and tackle global challeng es. For example, the 
Commission will consider deve loping blending mechanisms to  boost financial resources for 
development. Certain Options may allow for gr eater resource mobilisation than others, as 
explained below.   
Partnerships with emerging donors 
 
The most important missed opportunity from  our lack of cooperation with emerging 
economies (EMEs) in other developing countries (especially a lack of cooperation with China 
in Africa) is the chan ce to support the key to Africa's futu re growth – regional integration72 – 
through strategic trilateral cooperation to mob ilise European excellence in the creation of a 
single market and China's comparative advant age in the fast construction of low-cost 
infrastructure. In that regard, the EU will notably explore how to strengthen strategic 
partnerships with emerging economies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 For example, global remittances from migrants were expected to amount to around EUR  237 billion in 2010, 
private charities are by some calculations estimated to  provide about EUR 35 billion annually; global Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flows are about equal to ODA. 
72 The November 2010 communication on the future of EU-Africa relations reiterated the importance of regional 
integration in EU policies 
 
 25Problem and its main drivers 
 
 
 
  
Policy focus : 
EU aid is too 
sectorally 
dispersed  
Differentiation : 
EU aid too 
geographically 
dispersed  
 
 
Implementation o f 
PCD Agenda 
 
Leveraging 
additional 
financial 
resources   
 
Country 
ownership  
 
Partnerships with 
other actors / 
donors  
 
Aid modalities + 
instruments  
Aid effectiveness: 
Weak EU 
coordination & 
DoL with EU MS 
 
PROBLEM : 
Need to 
increase impact 
of COM 
mana ged aid
 
 263. Scope of the Communication 
 
Development policy is only partly about aid; other non-aid aspects (such as trade policy, loans 
and other financial flows) have an equally im portant part to play in the overall policy for 
promoting global development. This Impact Assessment however focuses on the Commission-managed aid as the main measur able indicator and the area where most 
significant change, as compared w ith the status quo, is proposed.  
 The Impact Assessment thus deals with issues relating to EU institutions' aid, which are under 
Commission competence, and through which th e Communication can have the most direct 
impact.   The Communication addresses specific dr ivers, based on the following criteria: 
1) Those on which Commission has an immediate and direct influence; 
2) Those that are not dealt with in other policy initiatives (e.g. governance, PCD) or in 
forthcoming proposals (e.g. financial instru ments, coordination & joint programming); 
3) Those that do not concern th e implementation of policies. 
 
As these are the areas of significant cha nge proposed in the Co mmunication, the Impact 
Assessment focuses on the following two drivers: 
- Policy focus : sectoral concentration of aid 
- Differentiation : geographical conc entration of aid 
 
This focus of the Impact Assessment notwithst anding, all drivers of the problems should also 
be taken into consideration and acted upon in order to improve EU development policy and 
make it deliver improved results in terms of MDGs. In particular, non-development policies 
also have a strong bearing on the impact of aid.    
4. Analysis of subsidiarity 
 Development policy is a shared, "parallel" competence
 (Article 4 TFEU), implying that the 
Member States have parallel powers with the EU, have their own aid programmes and 
policies and exercise their powers, while ensuri ng that these complement and reinforce those 
of other Member States and the EU (Article 208 TFEU).  
 
EU necessity to act: 
The Treaty states that development policy is  a shared, parallel competence between the 
Commission and Member States ; it reserves a specific role for the Commission in 
development policy. Commission-managed aid has to  be spent in accordance w ith the Treaty development 
objectives (i.e. poverty reduction, cf. Art 21 TEU and 208 TFEU).  
  EU action is necessary as action by the Member  States alone cannot sufficiently fulfil this 
function. Given the Treaty call for complementarity  between the EU and its  Member States in 
development cooperation, the EU and Member  States are committed to donor coordination 
and the EU is mandated to take initiatives to promote such coordination (Art.210 TFEU).  
 
 27 
EU added value:  
The EU provides added value: 
 through its global network of delegations, wh ich gives it a political presence where 
Member States may not;  
 by championing PCD (especially given its exclusive competence in trade); 
 by promoting best development practice; 
 by facilitating coordination and harmonisation; 
 by acting as a delivery agent, particularly  where size/critical  mass are important; 
 by promoting certain values and princi ples (e.g. democracy, human rights, good 
governance, including transpar ency and anti-corruption); 
 by promoting and facilitating civil society participation and North-South solidarity. 
 Coordinated action by the EU as a whole has an  added value that, in  terms of policy and 
financial leverage, is bigger than the sum of  individual action of 27 Member States and the 
Commission.
73 Beyond being itself an important donor, the EU also plays the important role 
of federating actions of the EU and its Member States towards a unified EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing th e political role that the provid er of more than 50% of global 
ODA should have. The EU monitors progress and proposes possible actions to Member 
States. The Commission has a key role in  coordinating EU action, proposing common 
positions for international events74 and driving forward common approaches to, for example, 
aid effectiveness and divisi on of labour, including thr ough the proposals it makes for 
development policy via regular Comm unications to the Council.    
 In similar vein, a recent study found that the Eu ropean Consensus has a greater value as a 
single document than the sum of its individual elements, precisely due to its role in bringing 
Member States and the Commi ssion together behind a single ag enda and in giving the EU's 
development policy external visibility
75.  
 In order to maximise this added value, grea ter specialisation and be tter division of labour 
could lead to greater efficiency, economies of scale and lower tr ansaction costs whose 
benefits could be used to further reinforce the financial resources availa ble and to enhance the 
EU's negotiating/ bargaining power , thus ensuring that the EU is better placed to play a 
leading role at global level.  
5. Objectives of EU initiative 
 
As stated by the Treaty, the main objective of EU development policy is poverty reduction in 
the context of sustainable development. The in ternationally-recognised targets under this 
objective, subscribed to by the EU, are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).Given 
                                                 
73 As demonstrated above with referenc e to the study on the aid effectivene ss agenda: benefits of the European 
Approach  from October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf   
74EU positions have helped to achieve ambitious global agreements (e.g. Paris Declaration in 2005; Accra 
Agenda for Action in 2008; Doha Financing for Development Conference in 2008). Common EU positions were 
also adopted ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs in 2010 and the 
LDC IV Conference in 2011. 
75 Feasibility Study for the Future Evaluation of the Implementation of Part II of the  
European Consensus on Development, ECDPM for the European Commission, November 2010.  
 
 28the effort still needed if the MDGs are to be reached by 2015, the EU needs to rapidly 
increase the impact of its aid on poverty reduction. Beyond 2015, the EU will need to continue to support the global effort until povert y is eliminated completely. The objective of 
the proposed change programme is therefore to ensure that ever y euro of EU development aid 
generates the greatest possible impact on pove rty in developing count ries, in order to 
maximise the contribution made by the EU to the MDGs and l onger-term poverty elimination.  
One way of doing so is by sharpening the sector al and/or geographical focus of EU aid. By 
focusing EU aid more strategically and concentr ating on certain sectors and/or countries, the 
Commission will contribute to reducing the sectoral fragmentation and geographical 
dispersion of EU aid, hence increasing impact.      
 Objectives table  
General objective Poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development  is the 
primary aim of EU development policy (Art 21 TEU, Art 208 TFEU). The MDGs constitute the most comprehensive set of internationally agreed benchmarks for development progress.  
Intermediate objective(s) Maximised impact of EU developm ent aid on poverty reduction, 
MDGs achievement and sustainable development by 2015 and beyond (2020)  
Specific objectives Sharpened development policy focus for better results 
 
Operational 
objectives a) Direct Commission-managed aid wh ere it is most needed and 
where it has the greatest impact on poverty reduction  
b) Use Commission's comparative advantage to focus Commission 
managed development aid 
c) Increase the capacity of Commi ssion managed aid to leverage 
financial resources for development. 
d) Increase the capacity of Commi ssion managed aid to leverage 
policy change. 
e) Improve EU development policy coordination and division of 
labour 
f) Strengthen legitimacy, credibility, visibility, relevance and public 
support for development aid (need to recognise the complexities of showing results of aid) 
g) Improve results-monitoring and reporting to demonstrate 
achievements and constantly learn and improve development interventions for further improved results 
 
6. Policy options 
 
 As previously stated, the policy options asse ssed in this IA focus on Commission-managed 
aid, as it is here that the most significant ch anges are proposed and which are at the core of 
the problematic. Whichever option is chosen, an d in line with existing EU commitments, the 
main objective of EU development policy woul d remain poverty eradication, with the MDGs 
 
 29as the main benchmarks against which to meas ure progress. PCD continues to be a necessary 
complement to reinforce EU development policy and aid effectiveness. Given that actions to 
improve PCD and aid effectiveness and the choice of aid modalities  are equally applicable to 
all options, the impact of changes in  these areas is not assessed here. 
 
 
Option 1 Status quo  
The aid allocation and implementation proce sses would not change from the current 
portfolio. The Commission would continue to allo cate grant aid to, and intervene in, a great 
variety of sectors and all countries. In ot her words, the EU would continue to do 
"everything everywhere". 
 
Commission-managed aid programmes are aimed at the achievement of MDGs, and in line 
with the European Consensus on Development, cover a wide array of sectors76 (e.g. health, 
education, environment, agriculture,  infrastructure, etc.).  In addition to the 9 sectors listed in 
the European Consensus, the EU's offer depe nds on the demand expressed in the dialogue 
with each developing country.  Commission-managed aid would continue to be  allocated to all ODA-eligible countries
77, 
including Middle Income Countri es (MICs) and emerging donors. 
 In such a scenario, there would be no geogra phical differentiation of aid and the Commission 
would continue to act as a donor of last resort, maintaining a global EU development presence 
and providing development aid where other donors (including Member States) do not. 
 
 
Option 2 Sectoral focus 
In order to reduce the sectoral dispersion of EU aid, the Commission would focus mainly 
on a limited number of sectors,  but would continue to provid e aid to all countries ranging 
from the LDCs to BRICS.  
In order to move towards sharpened sector al concentration and specialisation, Commission-
managed aid would be focused on a limited number  of sectors (i.e. the "offer" is reduced). 
 The EU would use its comparative advantage wher ever possible in the context of country-led 
dialogues, in line with th e principle of ownership. 
 Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green Paper on EU development policy 
insisted on the need for a more focused EU ai d and a consolidation of the more than 45,000 
projects funded by EU donors, combined with further division of labour among EU donors. Furthermore, the public consultation on future funding for EU external action has underlined 
that the EU should exploit its comparative adva ntage linked to its glob al field presence, its 
wide-ranging expertise, its supran ational nature, its role as facilitator of coordination, and to 
the economies of scale. 
                                                
 
76 The European Consensus states for example that the Community will concentrate its activities in the following 
areas: trade and regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; 
infrastructures; water and energy; rural development, agriculture, and food secur ity; governance, democracy, 
human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; prevention of conflicts and of state fragility;  human development; and social cohesion and employment but the list of sectors is not exhaustive 
77 As per the DAC definition of ODA recipients 
 
 30 
In that regard, areas of speci alisation for policy focus could be determined by the following 
criteria: 
- Where the EU has a good track record : focusing on sectors where the 
Commission has acquired sound experien ce and knowledge and where EU action 
has produced good and sustainable resu lts (e.g. governance, education). 
- Where the EU has gained significant expertise internally : focusing on sectors 
where the EU can provide useful suppor t based on its own su ccessful experience 
(e.g. regional integration) 
- Where the EU wants to be active : focusing on sectors which are considered 
priorities for the EU (e.g. food security; climate change) 
- Where MS alone cannot make the difference : focusing on sectors where there is 
clear added value for EU coordinated ac tion in terms of policy and financial 
leverage (e.g. support to larg e-scale sectoral programmes) 
- Demand by partner countries : focusing on priority sector s as determined in the 
context of country-led dialogues. 
- Growth generating sectors : focusing on sectors whic h can induce strong and 
sustained inclusive growth (e.g. agriculture; energy) 
 
In order to be effective and avoid any "orp han sectors", the Commission's limited sectoral 
offer will need to be complemented by othe r donors or other instruments. This implies 
reinforced coordination and division of labour between the Commission and the Member 
States so as to ensure that demand and needs of partner countries are satisfied.  
 Under this option, no geographical differentiation would be made in terms of aid recipients: 
Commission-managed development aid would con tinue to be allocated to all developing 
countries.   
Option 3 Geographical focus  
In order to reduce the geographical dispersion  of EU aid, the Commission would target its 
grant aid towards on a limited number of countri es (depending on their needs, capacities, 
and commitments and potential impact), but wo uld continue to have a wide sectoral 
coverage.  
 
The Commission would apply a di fferentiated approach to aid allocation and partnerships, 
based on a comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all part ner countries through 
which the EU will define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and 
objective decisions on the most ef fective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid 
arrangements.  A vast majority of respondents to the public consultati on on future funding for 
EU external action s upport the need for a more differentiated approach,  tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary count ry, based on sound criteria and e fficient data collection, to be 
used as a way to increase the imp act of EU financial Instruments. 
 Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green paper on EU development policy 
have stressed that traditional ODA should be primarily reserved for the poorest countries.  
 In that regard, EU development aid could be  allocated according to needs, capacities and 
performance and to potential EU impact. 
 
 31- Country needs  will be assessed on the ba sis of several indicators, taking into account, 
inter alia , their economic and social/human development and growth path, so as to 
distinguish between those al ready on a strong and sustai ned path and those yet to 
reach such a stage. The EU will also pay speci al attention to vulnerability and fragility 
indicators. 
- Capacities and resources  will be assessed according to a country's ability to generate 
sufficient financial resources , notably domestic resources , and its access to other 
sources of finance, such as  international markets, private investments or natural 
resources. 
- Country commitments and performance: aid allocations will be adapted to reward 
investment in education and health, progre ss on the environment, democracy and State 
effectiveness, sound economic and fiscal  policies and absorption capacities. 
- Potential EU impact  will be measured through two horizontal objectives: 1) 
Increasing the extent to which the EU's cooperation promotes and supports economic, social and environmental policy reforms in  partner countries; 2) Increasing the 
leveraging effect that EU aid can have on ot her sources of finance for development, in 
particular private investment. 
 
Through comprehensive political and policy dialogue  with all partner countries, the EU would 
define the most appropriate form of cooperati on, leading to informed and objective decisions 
on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid arrangements. 
 For some countries (notably emerging econom ies and a number of upper middle-income 
countries), this may result in the cessation or lowering of EU development assistance, and the 
pursuit of a different cooperation relationship ba sed on loans, technical cooperation or support 
for trilateral cooperation, as well as on a shared agenda around common interests and for 
global public goods (e.g. climate change, migra tion), while supporting them as they become 
donors themselves.  In such a scenario, the Commi ssion no longer provides aid as a ga p-filler in countries where 
there are no other donors  (no longer donor of last resort/d efault donor), and no longer ensures 
a global EU aid presence.  Commission-managed development aid would st ill cover a wide array of sectors depending 
on the demand as established by the di alogue with each developing country. 
  
Option 4 Sectoral and geographical focus  
The EU would focus both sectorally and geogr aphically (combination of Options 2 and 3) 
 
Under this final Option, Commission-managed  aid not only would be focused on a limited 
number of sectors but would also  be targeted to a limited number of countries. 
 The choice of sectors would be made as under Option 2.  The choice of countries to receive gran t aid would be made as under Option 3.  
 A basic assumption of this option is that Co mmission-managed aid would be complemented 
by other donors or other instrume nts. This implies reinforced  coordination and division of 
labour among the Commission, Memb er States and other donors to  ensure that the demands 
 
 32and needs of partner countries are met. Such reinforced coordination would also be required 
under Options 2 and 3, but the picture will be  more complex, and the importance greater, in 
the case of Option 4, where both sectoral and ge ographic portfolios need to be considered; 
this implies not just in-country DoL but al so cross country DoL and well-informed and 
coordinated exit and entry strategies.  
  
7. Assessment of impacts 
 
Each of the four options is assessed against the following appraisal criteria : 
- EU presence and influence; - EU expertise/specialisation; - Dispersion and fragmentation of EU aid (sectorally and/ or geographically); 
- Validity of current policy framework and agreements; - Potential leverage effect of  EU aid / EU critical mass; 
- EU visibility, reputatio n, credibility and legitimacy; 
- EU commitments (ODA, aid effectiveness, MDGs).  
 
Option 1  – Status quo option 
 
Under the status quo  option, Commission-managed aid woul d continue to be delivered to a 
wide range of sectors and be neficiary countries. The Comm ission would thus maintain a 
global and cross-sectoral presen ce potentially giving it influen ce across the board and possible 
leverage effect in all countries. This s tatus quo  option does not tackle the problem of aid 
dispersion and fragmentation, th ereby increasing the risks of inefficiency. Moreover, scarce 
aid resources continue to be spread too thinly, resulting in reduced impact and a missed 
opportunity to increase the relevance, le gitimacy and visibility of EU aid.  
 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Global EU development presence is 
maintained (political visibility) Fragmentation and disp ersion of aid is not 
tackled (missed opportunity) 
Global presence allows access & potential influence in all countries, and possible leverage effect on non-aid issues Scarce resources spread too thinly (no critical 
mass), resulting in low impact.  
Commission continues to be donor of last 
resort, reassuring for developing countries Aid continues to be allocated to countries that 
either do not need or deserve it, thus encouraging moral hazard (beneficiary countries assume they will all receive aid, creating less incentive for reform) 
Global presence allows flexibility and capacity to react to crises on the ground everywhere Impact of aid in certain countries  remains 
negligible (waste of resources + reputational 
risk)  
European Consensus  remains valid Poor articulation of countries' specific needs  
No need for change in current agreements (e.g. Cotonou Agreement) High risks of inefficiency, affects COM/EU 
reputation COM expertise spread too thinly  
Division of labour & donor coordination made more complex leading to administrative 
 
 33STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
burden & high transaction costs (both for EU 
and partner countries) Risk of aid dependency Difficulty in meeting the EU's commitments for Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs as aid is spread too thinly  Inability to do large-scale projects as funds per country are too small In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and legitimacy because of lack of impact 
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners
: BRICS & Middle Income developing count ries (who continue to receive aid); 
Member States (who can still count on the Commission to fill gaps);  
 Losers
: poorest and fragile countries  (from whom aid is being di verted); EU taxpayers (sub-
optimal value for money) 
  
Option 2  – Sectoral focus  
 
Sectoral concentration runs the risk of  creating a possible mismatch between the 
Commission's limited offer and demand from partner countries. This could result in 
difficulties in spending all resources. In addition, a top-down approach to sectoral 
concentration would undermine country ownership (a key ingredient for aid effectiveness and 
overall success of developmen t). This said, the Commissi on would maintain its global 
development presence, thus allowing it to ma intain its potential influence and possible 
leverage effect in all countries.  Sharpened sectoral focus would however cont ribute to higher impact of EU aid by 
concentrating resources on a limited number of s ectors, thus increasing the EU's critical mass. 
This could also increase specialised expertise, vi sibility and reputation of the EU in a number 
of sectors where it has recognise d comparative advantage. With  proper division of labour at 
country level, the problem of mismatch with country needs is likely to be mitigated.  
 This option would likely require a significant reorganisation of huma n resources in both 
DEVCO headquarters and in delegations, to ensure  sufficient skills in the focal sectors and to 
reallocate staff away from non-focal sectors. Significan t capacity-building/training 
programmes are likely to be required. The succ essful implementation of this Option would 
rest on rapid redeployment of sta ff and appropriate up-skilling.  
 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Critical mass through concentration of 
resources on limited number of sectors (potential for much greater impact) Aid still goes to countries that don't need it 
and/or don't deserve it (w aste of resources + 
reputational risk) 
Concentration of aid and better division of labour among donors reduces aid fragmentation and transaction costs of both Danger of aid dependency and lowered 
incentive for reform (every country automatically receives aid) 
 
 34STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
the Commission and partner countries, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of aid Global presence allows flexibility and capacity to react to crises on the ground everywhere Scarce resources & COM expertise continue 
to be spread too thinly  geographically (waste 
of resources, potential for impact self-limiting) 
Increased visibility a nd reputation in certain 
key sectors Possible mismatch between EU's limited offer 
and demand from developing countries, which could ultimately make global presence impossible (notably from countries whose needs don't match EU offer) 
In the long-run, specia lised expertise and 
staff (leads to more efficiency), could enhance reputation Top-down approach undermines aid 
effectiveness principles (+knock-on negative effect on EU reputation) 
No a priori  reduction in global presence  In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and 
legitimacy + risk of losing credibility in representing the EU at large on EU 
development policy (loss of intellectual 
leadership) 
Easier to monitor impact/results Could undermine MDG commitments 
(notably in those sectors where EU will no longer be present and especially without adequate DoL which could see Member States concentrate on those sectors where the EU can no longer be active) Risk of losing market share by specialising too much (vis-à-vis other donors, notably BRICS) Problem of spending all resources (may lead to an inflation of vertical funds and programmes + competition with vertical funds)  
European Consensus  would need revision (if 
Commission chooses to focus its offer on certain sectors exclusively) 
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners
: Developing countries whose demand fits EU  offer; Member States who can focus 
on other sectors (complementarity); NGOs who implement programmes in the EU's priority 
sectors.  Losers
: Developing countries whose demand doesn' t match EU offer; NGOs who received 
money until now but whose sectors of inte rvention no longer match EU sectors of 
concentration/priority; Member States who re ly on the Commission to act in sectors where 
they cannot act themselves , but which they consider important for the MDGs 
 
 
Option 3  – Geographical focus 
 
 35 
Geographical focus might run the risk of weak ening EU influence and leverage effect in 
certain countries and regions where it no longer delivers grant aid. This problem will likely be 
mitigated by strategies of gradual exit and the continuation of non-aid development 
relationships with those countri es where the EU ceases to have a grant aid programme (e.g. 
loans, trilateral cooperation, know ledge transfer). Member States  may also take over the aid 
programme in countries wher e the Commission can no longer act, thus maintaining EU 
presence and influence.  This said, in the absence of enhanced coor dination and division of labour between EU and 
Member States, this Option risks wideni ng the gap between donor  darlings and donor 
orphans, especially at a time when an incr easing number of EU don ors are reducing their 
portfolio and exiting from a numb er of developing countries. Improved information exchange, 
active coordination and phased exits and entries, with flexibility offered by the EU and MS if 
required, should mitigate against this problem.   The greatest advantage of a sharpened geographi cal focus is that is would target limited 
resources to those countries where they are ne eded most and where they have the greatest 
impact, thus avoiding wastage of taxpayers' mo ney and allowing critical mass to build up in 
certain of the most needy or vulnerable c ountries, including donor orphans.  The Commission 
would in turn likely receive a boost to its reputation as a strategic player focused on 
eliminating poverty and not shying away from working in the poorest,  most vulnerable and 
most difficult countries. It coul d enhance its global reputation as a donor with the specialised 
knowledge and skills to work in specific countries or regions. 
 As with Option 2, this Option will require significant reorganisatio n of human resources 
within DEVCO and delegations.   
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Targeted aid to those countries which need it 
the most and where the impact will be greatest, giving greater value for money and reduced wastage In absence of efficient division of labour and 
donor coordination, risk  of creating more 
donor orphans and donor darlings 
Opportunity for more modern relationships 
with wealthier developing countries, including spin-offs in terms of positive impacts on global public goods Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 
Increased critical mass in certain countries CO M resources still dispersed in many sectors
Reinforces the role of the COM as coordinator for DoL Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challe nges (if the EU has a 
patchy country coverage in a region) 
EU more likely to meet its commitments for Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs Uncertainty of criteri a for differentiation 
(higher risk of real or perceived politicisation/polar isation of aid) 
Strengthened legitimacy in policy debates on countries where COM is present (intellectual leadership) Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and strategic role as donor (less open to criticism)
Over time, COM will strengthen its  
  
 
 36STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
knowledge and understanding of specific 
focal countries/regions, thereby improving the appropriateness of its work, its local relationships and influence, and ultimately development results.  
 
Winners/losers  
Winners
: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocat ion increasing; NGOs in relevant focal 
countries  Losers
: Mostly MICs who may see their aid allo cation declining; poten tially, segments of 
poor people in wealthier MICs if their government s prove unwilling or unable to support them 
in lieu of donor resources; NGOs focused on these countries and regions and which will no 
longer receive financing; Member States who rely  on the EU to deliver "t heir" aid in countries 
where they no longer operate themselves.  
 
 
Option 4  – Sectoral and geographical focus 
 
This Option combines the benefits of Options  2 and 3. By concentrating its resources on a 
limited number of sectors and by targeting resour ces to those countries where they are most 
needed and where they have greatest impact, the Commission could ensure a more strategic 
use and allocation of scarce aid resources, which is more in t une with the global context and 
the needs of both partner countries and the EU itself, as well as ensuring improved value for 
money for the European taxpayer.    Several of the limitations of Op tions 2 and 3 stemmed from the fact that they were partial 
options, tackling only one aspect of the problem, rather than the problem  of fragmentation and 
proliferation as a whole; some elements of a partial option co uld also prove unworkable (e.g. 
Option 2: if the principle of ownership were to be fully respected, but the EU's sectoral offer 
limited to only a few sectors, there may be c ountries where there is no match between the 
EU's offer and the country's demand, thus ma king an aid programme impossible and a global 
presence therefore unachievable).  
 
Option 4, by combining sectoral with geogra phic focus in a strategic decision-making 
process, would lead to  a streamlined and coherent alloca tion of EU resour ces in favour of 
enhanced results and impact. The EU's grant ai d footprint would be reduced and aid resources 
concentrated on a limited number of significan t country programmes, but the EU's overall 
global footprint would be maintained via non- aid development relationships with those 
countries where the grant aid programme ceases. The overall impact on the EU's reputation as a global development player is likely to be enhanced by this more focused and modern 
approach.  Ensuring close coordination and effective di vision of labour between the Commission and 
Member States is a sine qua non  condition for such this option. By leading by example, the 
Commission can increase the visibility and legitimacy of its own aid and encourage EU 
Member States to do likewise. This would stre ngthen the Commission's role of convener and 
coordinator.  
 
 37 
As with Options 2 and 3, Option 4 would have implications for the distribution of human 
resources. This impact is likely to be greater th an in the case of the partial options due to the 
double-focusing process. Those de legations where the aid program me is significantly reduced 
or stopped would need skills in managing exit strategies and then in forging new non-aid 
relationships with the partner government (e.g. based on trilateral  cooperation or loans); this 
will require a significantly different skill set from the implementation of grant aid 
programmes. Those delegations where the ai d programme is ste pped up, but where the 
sectoral focus is tightened, may need new sector al skills. All delegations will need enhanced 
skills in coordination.   
 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Increased critical mass in certain countries, 
ability to do larger-scal e projects, value for 
money In the short to medium term, higher 
transaction costs for Member States and for COM (transfer and training of staff) 
In the long-run, lower transaction costs for the Commission and partner countries (no 
need to negotiate in how many sectors we 
intervene) May create more gaps (orphans – countries 
and sectors) when offer doesn't match the 
demand of countries 
Strengthened role for COM in initiating and 
coordinating DoL Loss of COM expertise and competence in 
certain sectors 
Opportunity for more advanced and meaningful relationships with wealthier developing countries, with benefits for the EU (global public goods) as well as for the partner country Reputational risk, reduced credibility for the 
COM to represent the EU in all sectors globally 
Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and 
strategic role as donor (less open to criticism)Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 
Reinforces the role of the COM as coordinator for DoL  Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challenges 
 Increased visibility a nd reputation in certain 
areas More likely to meet the commitments for SSA and LDCs  Easier to monitor impact/ results Higher risk of real or  perceived politicisation 
of aid (uncertainty of criteria for differentiation)  
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners
: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocat ion increasing; Member States who can 
focus on other sectors and countries (complemen tarity); NGOs operating in focal sectors and 
countries  Losers
: Developing countries that lose a significant part (most/all) of aid; some poor people in 
wealthier MICs; NGOs who received money until now but whose sectors and/or regions of 
intervention no longer match Commission priorities   
 
 
 388. Comparison of options   
 
Objective/ 
Criteria Option 1 – 
Status Quo Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 
Maximise the 
impact of EU 
development 
aid on 
poverty 
reduction   
(-)  
(+)  
(+)  
(+) 
 
Sharpen 
development 
policy focus 
for better 
results  
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources on 
limited number 
of sectors 
(leading to 
increased 
impact)  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources 
spread on 
limited number 
of sectors and 
limited number 
of countries 
Direct 
Commission 
managed aid 
where it is 
most needed 
and where it 
has the 
greatest 
impact on 
poverty 
reduction   
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 
  
(-) 
Aid still goes 
to countries 
that don't need 
it   
(+) 
Targeted aid to 
those countries 
that need it the 
most  
  
(+)  
Strengthened 
focus on main 
priority 
countries and 
sectors. 
Use 
Commission's 
comparative 
advantage to 
focus 
Commission 
managed 
development 
aid  
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact  
(+) 
Specialised 
expertise and 
staff, leading to 
more 
efficiency 
  
(-) 
Commission 
resources still 
dispersed in 
many sectors 
  
(+) 
Strengthened 
focus on 
sectors where 
Commission 
has expertise 
(cf. results of 
consultation) 
 
 39Objective/ 
Criteria Option 1 – 
Status Quo Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 
Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
financial 
resources for 
development  
(-) 
Lost 
opportunities 
in forging 
partnerships 
with other 
actors 
(including 
private sector, 
emerging 
economies) 
  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
  
(-) 
Possible loss of 
EU influence 
in certain 
regions and 
countries  
(+) 
Commission 
acting as a 
convener to 
catalyse 
significant 
resources for 
development 
Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
policy change  
(-) 
Moral hazard: 
less incentive 
for reform  
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries  
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
Improve EU 
development 
policy 
coordination 
and Division 
of Labour  
(-) 
Aid 
fragmentation 
and donor 
coordination 
aren't tackled 
  
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL   
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL   
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  
Strengthen 
legitimacy, 
credibility, 
visibility, 
relevance and 
public support 
for 
development 
aid  
(-) 
In the long run, 
EU aid loses 
relevance and 
legitimacy 
because of lack 
of impact  
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues  
(+) 
Strengthened 
legitimacy in 
policy debates 
on countries 
where 
Commission is 
present 
(intellectual 
leadership)  
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain sectors 
and countries 
 
The above analysis and this comparison table indicate that the prefe rred option is Option 4 .  
 
 40 
8.1. Risks 
 
Human resources : Implementation of any of  the Options 2, 3 or 4 will require significant 
shifts in the pattern of human resources (p ersonnel and skills) in DEVCO headquarters and 
delegations. If these changes ar e not implemented smoothly, or take too long, then there will 
be a mismatch between country programmes and staffing to implement them – i.e. the wrong 
people, with the wrong skills, will be in the wrong places.   Reputation
: The reputational risks of not making a change outweigh the risks of making a 
change. For the Commission to continue to be seen as a cutting-edge development actor, and 
for the EU to maintain its reputation not just for the quantity, but also the quality of its aid, 
change is required to make the EU developm ent effort fit for the current decade and beyond. 
Failure to secure value for mone y for the European taxpayer, failu re to be visible to the public 
in developing countries and internationally, an d failure to monitor re sults and continually 
learn lessons and improve the EU's programming and impact would all lead to reputational 
losses.  Political risks
: The proposed agenda for change will require political agreement by the 
Member States in Council (Council Conclusions  are foreseen for early 2012). Policy changes 
will be reflected in the new financial and legal instruments for the post-2013 Multi-Annual 
Financial Perspective; these instruments will require the ag reement of the Council, EEAS, 
Parliament and Commission. Political priorities , particularly the ge ographic interests of 
certain Member States and Parliamentarians, may limit the scope to implement objective decisions vis-à-vis sectoral specialis ation and geographic differentiation.  
 Implementation risks
:  The changes proposed by Options 2, 3 and 4 require effective EU 
and wider donor coordination, strong informati on bases and networks (including on who is 
doing what and where, and who pl ans to change their aid portfolios and when), and successful 
implementation of division of labour, which has to  date been weak. Real  political will on the 
part of Member States will be needed to overcome current limitations in this area; the Commission must take forward, and be allowed to take forward, its enhanced coordinating 
role as mandated in the Lisbon Treaty.  Financial risks
: The timing of these proposals is sensit ive, given the nego tiations on the MFF 
taking place in 2011.   Impacts at partner country level
: While partner country owners hip will be central to the 
EU's decisions on re-profiling it s portfolio, there remains a risk of mismatch, at least in 
certain countries, between the EU's sectoral offer and the de mand/needs of partner countries. 
EU joint programming will go a long way towards mitigating against this risk, but certain 
sectors may no longer be supported by the EU (sector orphans).   None of these risks are "killer" risks , but the design of the proposed agenda  for change (as 
set out in the Communication and subsequently in the legal instruments and regulations for 
the post-2013 MFF), as well as the implementati on of an internal change programme (human 
resources) will be critical.   
 
 41Additionally, further studies  may be useful to help iden tify appropriate mitigation 
strategies :  
 Firstly, as regards sector focus, analysis of th e risks of certain sector s no longer being directly 
supported (sector orphans) by Commission-managed aid. This analysis should notably take 
into consideration the extent to which such  an approach could po tentially affect the 
comprehensiveness of EU development policy (multidimensional poverty) and the reputation 
of the EU. Secondly, as regards differentiation, analysis of  the risks of some poor population groups in 
several countries (such as MICs) no longer be ing targeted by Commission-managed aid. This 
analysis should take into consideration the extent  to which such an approach could potentially 
affect EU global presence and l ead to a loss of influence in certain countrie s and regions. 
 Thirdly, an analysis from a legal, economic and fiduciary risk point of view, of the types of 
cooperation and partnership frameworks that  the EU should establish with other key 
stakeholders such as emerging economies and donors, large internati onal private foundations 
and the business sector.  
8.2. Monitoring and evaluation  
 
The Commission already has regular monitoring and evaluation systems in place, covering the breadth of its aid programme. The information gathered enables the regular assessment of 
progress towards objectives and results to be achieved, ai ming to improve the quality, 
effectiveness and consistency of implementation.  National monitoring systems as well as joint monitoring systems with partner countries, Member States, interna tional organisations or 
other bodies are particularly considered.   The Commission currently evaluates country and thematic strategies, individual programmes 
and projects. Larger evaluation exercises assess  the complementarity and synergy between the 
different legislative in struments, including non-spending acti vities. Complex evaluations may 
also cover overarching political objectives as la id down in relevant political processes as well 
as address cross-cutting and transversal issues relevant to all or several legislative instruments.  As far as possible, the Commission associates all relevant stakeholders in the evaluation phase 
of the EU assistance, in cluding joint evaluations.  
 The Communication will be implemented via the legal instruments for the post-2013 MFF (e.g. future equivalents of the DCI, EDF10, ENPI , etc). These instruments would be expected 
to include a mid-point or similar review or evaluation.    
9. Conclusion 
 
The Impact Assessment concludes that a sharpene d focus, both sectoral and geographical, is 
the best option in view of increasing the impact of Commission-managed aid.  
 Increased specialisation and better division of  labour should lead to greater efficiency, 
economies of scale and lower transaction costs whose benefits could be used to further 
 
 42reinforce the financial resources available and to enhance the EU's negotiating/bargaining 
power. In doing so, the Commission will remain a key global actor on development issues, while concentrating its aid on those sectors and countries where impact is the highest, 
assuring EU visibili ty and reputation. 
 . 
 
 43Annex 1:  List of acronyms and glossary 
 
 
Acronyms : 
 BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CODEV: Working Party on Development Cooperation 
CSP: Country Strategy Paper   
DAC: Development Assistance Committee DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument DEVE: Committee on Developmen t (European Parliament) 
DoL: Division of Labour EDF: European Development Fund 
EEAS: European External Action Service 
EIDHR: European Instrument fo r Human Rights and Democracy 
EMEs: Emerging Economies ENPI: European Neighbouring and Partnership Instrument 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment FTI: Fast Track Initiative  GDP: Gross Domestic Product GNI: Gross National Income  IAB: Impact Assessment Board IFIs: International Financial Institutions IFS: Instrument for Stability LDCs: Least Developed Countries LICs: Low Income Countries MDGs: Millennium Development Goals  MFF: Multi-Annual Financial Framework ODA: Official Development Assistance OOF: Other Official Flows PCD: Policy Coherence for Development  SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries TNCs: Transnational Corporations 
 
 
 44Glossary:  
 
Accra Agenda for Action : (2008) Designed to strengthen a nd deepen implementation of the 
Paris Declaration, it takes stoc k of progress and sets the agen da for accelerated advancement 
towards the Paris targets. It proposes three main areas for improvement, i.e. ownership, 
inclusive partnerships and delivering results78. 
 
Aid Fragmentation : the report considers mainly fragment ation of aid across countries. It is 
different from fragmentation of  aid within countries, usually measured by donor spread across 
sectors at country level and sma ll project size. An associate con cept is that of proliferation, 
i.e. number of Donors providing ODA to a given beneficiary country in  specific sectors. 
Fragmentation is also associated with the numbe r of aid activities (i.e. number of projects'). 
 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and th e Division of Labour in Development 
Policy : (2007)  With a view to improving the perf ormance of European Union (EU) 
cooperation policy, the Commissi on is proposing a voluntary Code  of Conduct for better DoL 
among the EU donors in developing countries. Th e Code is based on eleven principles 
designed to reduce the administrative formalitie s, to use the funds where they are most 
needed, to pool aid and to share the work  to deliver more, better and faster aid79. 
 OECD DAC members : Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxe mbourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Commission.  Development effectiveness : The term development effectiven ess is meant to describe the 
level of achievement of overall development goals  which are affected by a host of different 
factors. By adding the notion of effectiveness to the term development, the idea is to assess 
cooperation against official, long term and quant ifiable development goals (e.g. the MDGs or 
national goals).  
 
DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument) : (2007) instrument which replaces a wide 
range of geographic and thematic ones. Under this instrument, the EU finances measures 
aimed at supporting geographic and thematic cooperation with developing countries (as 
included in the list of aid recipients comp lied by the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC). It covers three 
components: 1)geographic programmes
 supporting cooperation with  47 developing countries 
in Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, th e Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South 
Africa; 2)thematic programmes  benefiting all developing count ries and supporting actions in 
the fields of investing in people, environm ent and sustainable management of natural 
resources including energy; non- state actors and local author ities in development, food 
security, migration and asylum; 3) programme of accompanying measures for the 18 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) Sugar Protocol countries , in order to help them adjust following 
the reform of the EU sugar regime.  The budget allocated under the DCI for the period 2007-
2013 is €16.9 billion80. 
 
                                                 
78 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,e n_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html#Paris 
79 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm 
80 http://ec.europa.eu/europeai d/how/finance/dci_en.htm 
 
 45EIDHR (European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy) : (2007) instrument 
used to provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU 
countries. For the period 2007-2013 the EIDHR has a budget of €1.104 billion81 
 EDF (European Development Fund) : (1959) it is the main instrument for providing 
Community development aid in the African, Caribbean and Paci fic (ACP) countries and the 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The 10th EDF (2008-2013) has a budget of €22 682 
million
82.  
 ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument):  is the main source of 
funding for the 17 partner countrie s (10 Mediterranean and 6 Easter n European countries, plus 
Russia), replacing the co-operation programmes TA CIS (for the Eastern European countries) 
and MEDA (for the Mediterranean countries).  The ENPI has a financial envelope of €11.2 
billion for the period 2007-2013
83. 
 EU Development Policy: refers to the total of collective and individual development policies 
of EU and its Member States, with the same scope as the current European Consensus on 
Development.  
 
Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour : (2008) the purpose of the FTI DoL is to help 
implement the EU Code of Conduct on Di vision of Labour adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in May 2007. It intends to support a selected group of partner countries in the 
process of implementing in-country DoL
84. 
 Country in situation of Fragility : State fragility is here defi ned as a lack of capacity to 
perform basic state functions, where “capacity” encompasses (a) organisational, institutional 
and financial capacity to carry out basic functions of governin g a population and territory, and 
(b) the state’s ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society 
(OECD 2010). 
 
Green paper  "EU development policy in support of  inclusive growth and sustainable 
development - Increasing the im pact of EU development policy": The objective of this Green 
Paper was to launch a debate on how the EU can improve the impact of its development policy, and how it can best support poorest count ries' efforts in promoting inclusive and 
sustainable growth, including by leveraging new opportunities to speed up progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to reduce poverty
85. 
 Impact : the end-result of an analytical evidence-based process by which the effect of aid 
activities is quantified, where possible. Impact  may refer to programme targeting: how to 
reach the poorest and most vulnerable, to programme scaling. 
 
Inclusive and sustainable Growth : the meaning is generally referred to the labour intensity 
of growth, its geographical or distributional impact  or its sectoral patter n. It supports the case 
that growth associated with progressive distributional changes will have greater impact in 
                                                
 
81 http://ec.europa.eu/europeai d/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm 
82 http://ec.europa.eu/europeai d/how/finance/edf_en.htm 
83 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/enpi_en.htm 
84 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/35/46836584.pdf 
85 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm 
 
 46reducing poverty86. The concept of sustainability implie s the idea that growth needed to 
satisfy present needs should not compromise the ability of future gene rations to meet their 
own needs.  IFS: (2007) The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a strategic tool designed to address a number 
of global security and development challenges  in complement to geographic instruments
87.  
 Least Developed Countries : they represent the poorest countr ies as identified periodically by 
the UN on the basis of established criteria (low income, weak human assets, economic 
vulnerability). The current list of LDCs includes 48 countries; 33 in Africa, 14 in Asia and the 
Pacific and one in Latin America
88.  
 MDGs : Adopted by world leaders in the year 2000 and set to be achieved by 2015, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provi de concrete, numerical benchmarks for 
tackling extreme poverty in its many dimensions. They also provide a framework for the entire international community to work toge ther towards a common end – making sure that 
human development reaches everyone, everywhere
89.  
 
ODA : Flows of official financing administer ed with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countri es as the main object ive, and which are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (u sing a fixed 10 percent 
rate of discount)90. 
 Paris Declaration : (2005) it lays out a pr actical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the 
quality of aid and its impact on developm ent. It puts in place a series of specific 
implementation measures and establishes a mon itoring system to assess progress and ensure 
that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris 
Declaration outlines five fundame ntal principles for making aid more effective which are:  
1) Ownership
: Partner countries exercise effectiv e leadership over their development 
policies and strategies  and co-ordinate development actions  
2) Alignment : Donors base their ove rall support on partner countries' national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures  3) Harmonisation
: Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively 
effective  4) Managing for Results
: Managing resources and im proving decision-making for 
results  5) Mutual Accountability
: Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results91. 
 Policy Coherence for Development : The EU seeks to build synergies between policies other 
than development cooperation that have a st rong impact on developing countries, for the 
benefit of overseas development. In 2005, the EU agreed to apply the Policy Coherence for 
Development approach in 12 po licy areas (trade, environment and climate change, security, 
                                                
 
86 Many factors affect the distribution of income or consumption, and there is no clear link between economic 
growth and changes in income distribution.  World Bank Social Indicators Report 2010.  
87 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm 
88 http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ 
89 http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml 
90 www.oecd.org 
91 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
 47agriculture, bilateral fisheries agreements, social pol icies, migration, research/innovation, 
information technologies, transport and energy) that could accelerate progress towards the Millennium development goals for development
92. 
 
                                                 
92 http://ec.europa.eu/europeai d/what/development-policies/policy-coherence/index_en.htm 
 
 48Annex 2: Summary of the public consultation  
 
Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"93 
 
There was a rich and healthy participation in  the public consultation on the Green Paper “EU 
Development Policy in support of inclusive grow th and sustainable development – Increasing 
the impact of EU development policy.” The public consultation was launched after the 
publication of the Green paper on the Europa website and ran for the period 15 November 
2010 – 17 January 2011. In addition to the questi onnaire contained in the Green Paper itself, 
several events were organised in  parallel to present and discuss the Green Paper with different 
categories of stakeholders.   240 written responses were receiv ed. The total documentation of responses amounted to more 
than 2,000 pages. All contributions have b een made publicly available on the Commission 
EuropeAid website
94. The following table lists the number of responses by each category of 
respondent. 
 
CATEGORIES # responses 
MEMBER STATES  
  CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS/MINISTRIES 22 
  NATIONAL AGENCIES 3 
LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES 17 
PARLIAMENTS 6 
NON-EU DONORS 3 
NON-STATE ACTORS  
   NGOs 97 
   TRADE UNIONS / PROFESSIONAL BODIES 7 
   PRIVATE SECTOR / BUSINESS 24 
   THINK TANKS/ ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 16 
INTERNATIONAL/REGIO NAL ORGANISATIONS 8 
PARTNER COUNTRIES  
   GOVERNMENTS/MINISTRIES 8 
   LOCAL/REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 3 
INDIVIDUALS  
   EU 14 
   NON-EU 5 
OTHER/UNSPECIFIED 7 
Total 240 
 
                                                 
93 The full report is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm   
94 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm   
 
 49The Green Paper contained 26 open questions re lating to a set of f our main concerns: 
• How to ensure high EU impact development policy; 
• How to facilitate more, and more inclusive, growth in developing countries; 
• How to promote sustainable developm ent as a driver for progress; and 
• How to achieve durable results in the a rea of agriculture and food security 
 
The following report summarises the main  issues raised in the responses. 
 
General comments/cross-cutting issues 
 
The EU is the world’s largest provider of O fficial Development Assistance (ODA), totalling 
almost € 54 billion in 2010. It is also the world’s largest economic bloc with 501 million 
inhabitants and a total GDP of over € 12 tr illion in 2009; its annual imports from third 
countries exceed € 1.3 trill ion (Euro zone only).  
 Most respondents welcomed the Green Paper as a very timely initiation of a broader 
reflection and debate on EU development policy , especially against th e backdrop of recent 
geopolitical and institutional as reflected, inter alia , in the setting up of the G20 and the 
creation of the new European External Action Serv ice. The consultation also tied in with the 
discussions that precede the next  EU financial framework 2014-2020.  
 Respondents recognised that the cu rrent financial and economic crisis creates additional need 
to ensure that ODA funds, since they deri ve from donor governments’ budgets, are used with 
the aim of maximizing the impact on poverty. This will be necessary to secure continued 
support from taxpayers for future increases in development aid.  
 Most respondents therefore endorsed the increased emphasis on inclusive economic 
development, growth and employment creation  for which ODA plays a catalytic part, since 
it mobilises additional domestic and internatio nal funding needed to achieve the MDGs and 
the ultimate goal of elim inating poverty. This was, however, contested by some respondents, 
especially from the NGO community, who pointed out that there is little evidence to suggest 
that economic growth without active redistribut ive policies and social protection systems 
has had an impact on poverty in the past . 
 A number of respondents stated that the Green Paper provided in sufficient analysis and 
evaluation of the impa ct of current policies . Many of the terms used in the Green Paper 
needed definition and further clarificati on, including “high impact”, “added value” and 
“inclusive growth”, none of which appear in  current EU developmen t policy legislation.  
 
Several responde nts therefore called for current policies to rem ain in place as outlined in 
the Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus on Development. These define the 
eradication of poverty as the ove rarching objective for the use of EU ODA. Policy coherence 
should be assessed against this goal alone, it was argued. In addition, some contributions 
recalled that, while the Treaty calls for the EU and Member States development policy to complement and reinforce each other, developmen t is not, unlike trade and climate change, an 
EU responsibility.  Furthermore, it was argued that the EU is a value-based organisation  and that its 
development policies should be based on promo tion of democracy, fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, including those of women, children, disabled people and minorities. 
 
 50 
Most of the Member States underscored in thei r contributions that they  saw the Green Paper, 
together with the consultations on the fundi ng of EU external action after 2013 and on EU 
budget support, as the starting points of a longe r process of elaborating and agreeing a new 
EU development policy. Development research institutions call for the EU to take the 
intellectual leadership  in this process. 
 
1. High Impact development policy 
 
Many respondents underlined that ODA constitutes only a fraction of funding for 
development , and needs to be seen as a complement  to domestically mobilised resources, 
foreign investments, trade and remittances. At the same time, in low-income and/or fragile countries ODA can provide up to half of deve lopment resources availa ble. These respondents 
therefore called for traditional ODA development programmes to be primarily reserved 
for the Least Developed Countries  (LDCs). However, they also  called for an overhaul and 
redefinition of the classification of countries that are eligible to receive ODA, as it is defined 
by the OECD-DAC.  
Consistent with the call for reserving ODA for the LDCs was the demand for greater 
coherence in EU development policy  especially with regards to  MICs. The establishment of 
the EEAS provides an opportunity for a more holistic approach to external action , 
including all aspects of EU action: trade, commerce, agriculture, fisheries, intellectual 
property, security, clim ate change etc.  
 Many answers  endorsed the notion of more focused aid  and a consolidation of the currently 
more than 45,000 projects funded by EU donors, co mbined with further cross-country and in-
country division of labour among EU donors. Aid should be consolidated into multi-donor, 
sector/thematic sector wide approaches (SWA p) with long-term, predictable and reliable 
funding commitments  based on strengthened PEFA and other assessment systems. Apart 
from education and health, energy infrastructure , agriculture/food security and aid for trade 
are identified as focus areas.  While joint EU country programming  of assistance was endorsed in principle, it should be 
introduced gradually starting with countries wher e it would yield demonstrable added value. 
Conflict analysis should be a mandatory part of the joint assessments that precede country 
programming exercises.  A number of contributions underlined that development cooperation must be a reciprocal 
partnership . In exchange for long-term EU commitme nts, partner countries need to commit 
to allocating a sufficient part of their budgets to priority areas such as social sector reform, 
health and education.   Many respondents called for increased direct involvement  by elected parliamentary 
assemblies  at national, regional and local  levels in both EU and part ner countries as  part of a 
broadened partnership between democratic inst itutions. There were equally-strong calls for 
broader involvement of civil society  organisations – North and South – including private 
sector organisations, in th e programming, monitoring and evaluation of assistance. 
 
 
 512. Inclusive and sustainable growth 
 
While most respondents recognised economic growth as a necessary condition for 
development, many also pointed out that growth alone is not sufficient . International 
agreements on transparency, decent work and envi ronmental standards, as well as effective, 
transparent monitoring of actua l behaviour combined with e ffective sanctions should form 
part of EU development policy, as outlined for example in the Initiative on Extractive Industries.  However, there was almost universal support for active  promotion of local SMEs , 
especially in the agricultural sector, by suppor ting necessary infrastructure in transport, 
energy and communications (ICT). Even more impor tant, is the strengthening of the legal and 
financial frameworks that are necessary to entice  the informal sector into the official economy 
and to broaden the development resource base.  A case was made for reinvigorating the creation of cooperative enterprises , especially 
producer-cooperatives in the agricultural and fisher ies sectors, as a stakeholder alternative to 
the shareholder company model currently predomin ant in the West. It was pointed out that the 
democratic structure of cooperatives brings with  it in-built training in participatory democracy 
and governance.  Many respondents called for increased ODA support for direct funding of social 
protection systems , especially targeted to the poor. 
 
3. Sustainable development 
 
Some respondents sugg ested that the term “green development”  should replace “sustainable 
development” because it has greater universal recognition. 
 Climate change adaptation was seen as a priority  and the work of OECD/DAC in 
developing guidelines and accounti ng rules for assistance to clim ate change was considered of 
particular relevance to promote c oherence and to leverage financing. 
 It was suggested that the EU should conform to the Natural Resource Charter  when 
providing development assist ance. Equally, the EU should support the goal of the CBD 
Nagoya Strategic Plan towards stopping global deforestation by 2020.  There were diverging views on how to strike the right balance between  support for mitigation 
and adaptation measures in th e area of climate change.  Programmes need to be designed 
for different circumstances  in different countries . However, countries’ exposure to natural 
hazards is generally not underlined to the extent  it should be in Country Strategy Papers, with 
disaster risk reduction – or pr evention - measures rarely included in agreed programmes. 
 Support to sustainable energy canno t be seen apart from the EU  strategy on climate change 
and development. There are Council Conclusi ons (May 2009) and an Energy Facility, which 
should be implemented.   It was pointed out that reliable, sustainable,  and renewable sources of energy are among the 
necessary conditions for enhanc ing economic activities and reduc tion of poverty. The priority 
of the EU’s efforts should therefore be support for accessible source s of energy at the local 
 
 52level , energy self-sufficiency, with emphasis on th e diversification of energy sources, clean 
technologies, emission reduction, know-how exch anges in the sphere of energy efficiency, 
and the sustainable use of wate r and soil, including minerals. 
 Many respondents, especially NGOs, advocated that all actions relating to Climate Change 
measures should be funded separately from ODA  and not counted under ODA. 
 
4. Agriculture and Food Security 
 
Most respondents strongl y endorsed incorporating sustainable agriculture and food 
security in the priority areas  for EU development policy. St rategic areas should encompass 
support for smallholders, including land tenur e rights and provision of knowledge, supplies 
and equipment.   It was pointed out that the EU possesses extensiv e expertise relating to sustainable agriculture 
under changing conditions, which it should use to support initiatives in poor countries with 
the aim of optimising use of agricultural production means, integr ated plant protection, 
improved land and water resource management a nd the introduction of resistant species. 
 
EU countries have broad experience when it comes to carrying out systemic and 
economic transformations , also in the agricultural sector s. In developing countries, such 
experience should be used to promote ownership relations and the right to use land for rural 
populations. These are pre-requis ites for greater efficiency. 
 Support for agro-ecological solutions, applied research and capacity building for extension 
services were emphasised as priority areas. Support to sm allholder farmers was widely 
endorsed as well as the special targeting of women farmers.  
 
5. Missing areas 
 
Many respondents pointed out that the Green Paper did not pay sufficient attention to 
fundamental issues, such as democracy and human rights, the impo rtant role of women 
in development, or to the rights of children, minorities, indigenous peoples or the 
disabled . Similarly, it was felt that issues related to HIV/AIDS, pervasive corruption and lack 
of transparency were inadequa tely covered in the Paper. 
 
 
 53Annex 3:  EU country aid allocations (2007-2013) 
 
 
  Country Pop GNI Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita %GNI Ranking Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
ACP               
1 Angola 18,5 $3.490 239 $12,92 0,4 LHD 173,0 € 
2 Antigua e Barbuda 0,1 $12.070 6 $60,00 0,6 n.a. 3,4 € 
3 Bahamas 0,3 $21.390 n.a.     HHD 4,7 € 
4 Barbados 0,3 $9.140 12 $40,00   HHD 9,8 € 
5 Belize 0,3 $3.740 28 $93,33 2,0 HHD 9,8 € 
6 Bénin 8,9 $750 683 $76,74 10,3 LHD 267,0 € 
7 Botswana 1,9 $6.240 290 $152,63 2,5 MHD 56,0 € 
8 Burkina Faso 15,8 $510 1084 $68,61 13,5 LHD 423,0 € 
9 Burundi 8,3 $150 549 $66,14 41,2 LHD 150,5 € 
10 Cameroun 19,5 $1.170 649 $33,28 3,0 LHD 190,8 € 
11 Cap Vert 0,5 $3.010 196 $392,00 13,1 MHD 38,4 € 
12 République Centrafricaine 4,4 $450 237 $53,86 11,9 LHD 109,0 € 
13 Tchad 11,2 $610 561 $50,09 9,2 LHD 299,0 € 
14 Comores 0,7 $870 51 $72,86 9,2 LHD 45,0 € 
15 RDC 66 $160 2354 $35,67 23,5 LHD 514,0 € 
16 Congo 3,7 $1.830 283 $76,49 4,7 MHD 85,0 € 
17 Cook (islands) n.a. n.a. n.a.   8,0 n.a. 3,0 € 
18 Cote d Ivoire 21,1 $1.060 2366 $112,13 10,7 LHD 218,0 € 
19 Cuba 11,2 n.a 116 $10,36 n.a n.a  
20 Djibouti 0,9 $1.280 162 $180,00 14,5 LHD 40,5 € 
21 Dominica 0,1 $4.870 36 $360,00 10,1 n.a. 5,7 € 
22 République Dominicaine 10,1 $4.510 120 $11,88 0,3 MHD 179,0 € 
23 East Timor 1,1 n.a. 217 $197,27 n.a. MHD 63,0 € 
24 Guinée Equatoriale 0,7 $12.420 32 $45,71 0,5 MHD 12,5 € 
25 Eritrea 5,1 n.a. 145 $28,43 n.a. n.a. 122,4 € 
26 Ethiopia 82,8 $330 3825 $46,20 13,4 LHD 644,0 € 
27 Fiji 0,8 $3.950 71 $88,75 2,3 MHD ?? 
28 Gabon 1,5 $7.370 78 $52,00 0,8 MHD 40,8 € 
29 Gambia 1,7 $440 128 $75,29 18,5 LHD 63,2 € 
30 Ghana 23,8 $700 1586 $66,64 10,4 LHD 282,0 € 
31 Grenada 0,1 $5.550 48 $480,00 8,3 n.a. 6,0 € 
32 Guinea 10,1 n.a. 215 $21,29 n.a. LHD 189,6 € 
33 Guinea-Bissau 1,6 n.a. 146 $91,25 n.a. LHD 77,0 € 
34 Guyana 0,8 n.a. 173 $216,25 n.a. MHD 40,8 € 
35 Haiti 10 n.a. 1121 $112,10 n.a. LHD 291,0 € 
36 Jamaica 2,7 $4.490 150 $55,56 1,1 HHD 110,0 € 
37 Kenya 39,8 $770 1788 $44,92 5,9 LHD 306,0 € 
38 Kiribati 0,1 $1.890 27 $270,00 115,4 n.a. 10,6 € 
39 Lesotho 2,1 $1.030 123 $58,57 5,8 LHD 108,8 € 
40 Liberia 4 $160 505 $126,25 78,3 LHD 119,6 € 
41 Madagascar 19,6 n.a. 445 $22,70 n.a. LHD 462,0 € 
42 Malawi 15,3 $280 778 $50,85 17,6 LHD 349,0 € 
43 Mali 13 $680 988 $76,00 11,0 LHD 426,5 € 
44 Marshall Island 0,1 $3.060 59 $590,00 32,1 n.a. 4,5 € 
45 Mauritania 3,3 $960 287 $86,97 9,4 LHD 124,8 € 
 
 54  Country Pop GNI Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita %GNI Ranking Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
46 Mauritius 1,3 $7.240 156 $120,00 1,8 HID 39,6 € 
47 Micronesia 0,1 $2.220 121 $1.210,00 44,7 MHD ?? 
48 Mozambique 22,9 $440 2013 $87,90 20,8 LHD 482,0 € 
49 Namibia 2,2 $4.290 326 $148,18 3,5 MHD 82,6 € 
50 Nauru n.a. n.a. 24   n.a. n.a. 2,2 € 
51 Niger 15,3 $340 470 $30,72 8,9 LHD 366,0 € 
52 Nigeria 154,7 $1.140 1680 $10,86 1,1 LHD 677,0 € 
53 Niue n.a. n.a. 9   n.a. n.a. 2,4 € 
54 Palau n.a. $8.940 35   18,3 n.a. 2,4 € 
55 Papua New Guinea 6,7 $1.180 414 $61,79 5,3 LHD 108,0 € 
56 Rwanda 10 $460   $0,00 18,7 LHD 290,0 € 
57 St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. $10.100 6   1,1 n.a. 4,5 € 
58 St. Lucia 0,2 $5.170 41 $205,00 4,7 n.a. 8,1 € 
59 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 0,1 $5.110 31 $310,00 5,5 n.a. 7,8 € 
60 Samoa 0,2 $2.840 77 $385,00 16,1 n.a. 30,0 € 
61 Sao Tome and Principe 0,2 $1.140 31 $155,00 15,7 MHD 17,1 € 
62 Senegal  12,5 $1.030 1022 $81,76 7,9 LHD 288,0 € 
63 Seychelles 0,1 $8.480 23 $230,00 3,5 n.a. 5,9 € 
64 Sierra Leone 5,7 $340 437 $76,67 23,0 LHD 242,0 € 
65 Solomon Island 0,5 $910 206 $412,00 42,8 MHD 13,2 € 
66 Somalia 9,1 n.a. 662 $72,75 n.a. LHD 212,0 € 
67 South Africa 49,3 $5.770 1078 $21,87 0,4 MHD 980,0 € 
68 Sudan 42,3 $1.220 2289 $54,11 4,6 LHD 258,0 € 
69 Suriname 0,5 n.a. 157 $314,00 n.a. MHD 19,8 € 
70 Swaziland 1,2 $2.350 58 $48,33 2,1 MHD 63,0 € 
71 Tanzania 43,7 $500 2936 $67,19 13,6 LHD 555,0 € 
72 Togo 6,6 $440 499 $75,61 17,5 LHD 123,0 € 
73 Tonga 0,1 $3.260 40 $400,00 12,4 HHD 5,9 € 
74 Trinidad and Tobago 1,3 $16.490 7 $5,38 0,0 HHD 25,5 € 
75 Tuvalu n.a. n.a. 18   n.a. n.a. 5,0 € 
76 Uganda 32,7 $460 1786 $54,62 11,6 LHD 439,0 € 
77 Vanuatu 0,2 $2.620 103 $515,00 16,4 n.a 21,6 € 
78 Zambia 12,9 $970 1272 $98,60 11,2 LHD 475,0 € 
79 Zimbabwe 12,5 n.a. 737 $58,96 n.a. LHD 129,6 € 
                 
ENPI               
1 Algeria 34,9 $4.420 319 $9,14 0,2 HHD 392,0 € 
2 Armenia 3,1 $3.100 528 $170,32 5,9 HHD 255,4 € 
3 Azerbaijan 8,8 $4.840 232 $26,36 0,6 HHD 214,5 € 
4 Belarus 9,7 $5.540 98 $10,10 0,2 HHD 84,2 € 
5 Egypt 83 $2.070 925 $11,14 0,5 MHD 1.007,0 € 
6 Georgia 4,3 $2.530 908 $211,16 8,6 HHD 300,7 € 
7 Israel n.. n.a n.a   n.a VHHD 20,0 € 
8 Jordan 6 $3.740 761 $126,83 3,3 HHD 488,0 € 
9 Lebanon 4,2 $7.970 641 $152,62 1,8   337,0 € 
10 Libya 6,4 $12.020 39 $6,09 0,1 HHD 60,0 € 
11 Moldova 3,6 $1.590 245 $68,06 4,2 MHD 482,8 € 
12 Morocco 32 $2.790 912 $28,50 1,0 MHD 1.234,5 € 
13 Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 4 n.a. 3026 $756,50 n.a. n.a. ??? 
14 Syria 21,1 $2.410 245 $11,61 0,5 MHD 259,0 € 
 
 55  Country Pop GNI Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita %GNI Ranking Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
15 Tunisia 10,4 $3.720 474 $45,58 1,3 HHD 540,0 € 
16 Ukraine 46 $2.800 668 $14,52 0,6 HHD 964,1 € 
                 
DCI                
1 Argentina G20 40,3 $7.570 128 $3,18 0,0 HHD 65,0 € 
2 Bolivia 9,9 $1.620 726 $73,33 4,4 MHD 249,0 € 
3 Brazil G20 193,7 $8.040 338 $1,74 0,0 HHD 61,0 € 
4 Chile 17 $9.420 80 $4,71 0,1 HHD 41,0 € 
5 Colombia 45,7 $4.930 1060 $23,19 0,5 HHD 160,0 € 
6 Costa Rica 4,6 $6.230 109 $23,70 0,4 HHD 34,0 € 
7 Cuba 11,2 n.a. 116 $10,36 n.a. n.a. 20,0 € 
8 Ecuador 13,6 $3.920 209 $15,37 0,4 HHD 137,0 € 
9 El Salvador 6,2 $3.370 277 $44,68 1,3 MHD 121,0 € 
10 Guatemala 14 $2.620 376 $26,86 1,1 MHD 135,0 € 
11 Honduras 7,5 $1.820 457 $60,93 3,2 MHD 223,0 € 
12 Mexico 107,4 $8.920 185 $1,72 0,0 HHD 55,0 € 
13 Nicaragua 5,7 $1.000 774 $135,79 13,3 MHD 214,0 € 
14 Panama 3,5 $6.710 66 $18,86 0,3 HHD 38,0 € 
15 Paraguay 6,3 $2.270 148 $23,49 1,0 MHD 117,0 € 
16 Peru 29,2 $4.150 444 $15,21 0,4 HHD 132,0 € 
17 Uruguay 3,3 $9.360 51 $15,45 0,1 HHD 31,0 € 
18 Venezuela 28,4 $10.150 67 $2,36 0,0 HHD 40,0 € 
19 Afghanistan 29,8 n.a 6070 $203,69 n.a LHD 1.030,0 € 
20 Bangladesh 162,2 $590 1240 $7,64 1,2 LHD 403,0 € 
21 Bhutan 0,7 $2.020 125 $178,57 9,5 n.a. 14,0 € 
22 Cambodia 14,8 $650 722 $48,78 7,5 MHD 152,0 € 
23 China G20 1331,5 $3.590 1153 $0,87 0,0 MHD 173,0 € 
24 India G20 1155,3 $1.180 2453 $2,12 0,2 MHD 470,0 € 
25 Indonesia G20 230 $2.230 1050 $4,57 0,2 MHD 494,0 € 
26 Korea Dem People 23,9 n.a. 67 $2,80 n.a. VHHD n.a. 
27 Laos 6,3 $880 420 $66,67 7,2 MHD 41,0 € 
28 Malaysia 27,5 $7.230 144 $5,24 0,1 HHD 17,0 € 
29 Maldives 0,3 $3.870 33 $110,00 2,6 MHD 10,0 € 
30 Mongolia 2,7 $1.630 372 $137,78 9,4 MHD 29,0 € 
31 Myanmar/Burma 50 n.a. 357 $7,14 n.a. LHD 65,0 € 
32 Nepal 29,3 $440 855 $29,18 6,7 LHD 120,0 € 
33 Pakistan 169,7 $1.020 2816 $16,59 1,6 MHD 398,0 € 
34 Philippines 92 $1.790 310 $3,37 0,2 MHD 130,0 € 
35 Sri Lanka 20,3 $1.990 704 $34,68 1,7 MHD 112,0 € 
36 Thailand 67,8 $3.760 -77 -$1,14 0,0 MHD 17,0 € 
37 Vietnam 87,3 $1.010 3744 $42,89 4,2 MHD 304,0 € 
38 Kazakhstan 15,9 $6.740 298 $18,74 0,3 HHD 74,0 € 
39 Kyrgyz Republic 5,3 $870 315 $59,43 7,1 MHD 106,0 € 
40 Tajikistan 7 $700 409 $58,43 8,3 MHD 128,0 € 
41 Turkmenistan  5,1 $3.420 40 $7,84 0,2 MHD 53,0 € 
42 Uzbekistan 27,8 $1.100 190 $6,83 0,6 MHD 74,8 € 
43 Iran  72,9 $4.530 93 $1,28 0,0 HHD n.a. 
44 Iraq 31,5 $2.210 2791 $88,60 4,5 n.a. 58,7 € 
45 Oman 2,8 n.a. 212 $75,71 n.a. n.a. ??? 
46 Saudi Arabia G20 n.a. n.a. n.a.   n.a. HHD ??? 
 
 56  Country Pop GNI Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita %GNI Ranking Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
47 Yemen 23,6 $1.060 500 $21,19 20,0 LHD 130,0 € 
48 South Africa 49,3 $5.770 1078 $21,87 0,4 MHD 980,0 € 
         
         
         
         
CSPs for Libya, Cuba, Iraq cover only the years 2011-2013