EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Brussels, 10.9.2009 
SEC(2009) 936 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
Accompanying document to the 
Amended proposal for a  
 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
concerning the establishment of 'EURODAC' fo r the comparison of fingerprints for the 
effective application of Regu lation (EC) No […/…] [establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person] 
 
(Recast version) 
 
and to the 
 
Proposal for a 
 
COUNCIL DECISION 
 
on requesting comparisons with EURODAC data by Member States' law enforcement 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes 
   
IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
   
{COM(2009) 342 final} 
{COM(2009) 344 final} 
{SEC(2009) 937} 
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties.............................................. 3 
2. Problem definition........................................................................................................ 5 2.1. The context............................................................................................................... .... 5 
2.2. Description of the problem .......................................................................................... 7 2.3. EU right to act and s ubsidiary principle..................................................................... 13 
2.4. How would the problem evolve , all things being equal?........................................... 14 
3. Policy objectives ........................................................................................................ 15 3.1. Objectives................................................................................................................ ... 15 
3.2. Respect of Fundamental rights................................................................................... 15 4. Policy options............................................................................................................. 1 7 
4.1. Refraining from addressing the issue on an  EU level – Maintaining the status quo 
(Policy Option A)....................................................................................................... 17 
4.2. Regulating the access to 'Eurodac' for la w enforcement purposes (Policy Option B)17 
4.3. Regulating the access to ‘Eurodac’ for la w enforcement purposes as well as the 
exchange of supplementary information on asylum seekers (Policy Option C)........ 18 
4.4. Regulating access to national data about  asylum seekers for law enforcement 
purposes (Policy Option D)........................................................................................ 18 
5. Analysis of impacts of the policy options.................................................................. 20 5.1. Policy option A .......................................................................................................... 2 0 
5.2. Policy Option B.......................................................................................................... 2 3 
5.3. Policy Option C.......................................................................................................... 3 0 
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................. 33 7. The preferred policy option........................................................................................ 36 8. Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 39 
Annex 1: ....................................................................................................................... ............ 40 
Annex 2 ........................................................................................................................ ............ 50 
Annex 3 ........................................................................................................................ ............ 58 
 
EN 3   EN  
PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTA TION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
Impact Assessment Board 
On 18 March 2009, the Impact Assessment Board of the European Comm ission delivered an 
opinion regarding a preliminary version of this  Impact Assessment report. According to the 
IA Board the IA report provid es a clear overview of the po ssibilities and limitations of 
existing EU instruments which permit consultati on of fingerprints and other law enforcement 
data held in another Member State. In their opi nion the IAB in brief stated also that the report 
should be further improved by better illustra ting the necessity and proportionality the 
proposed measures.  
It further stated that: 
– The access to other databases by law enfo rcement should be better explained.  
– The potential relationship with the Pr üm Council Decision should be further 
examined.  
– The impacts on national data protection pr ovisions should be further clarified.   
The present version of the Impact Assessment re port has been significantly redrafted, with a 
view to taking these recommendations fully  into account. Additional information and 
modifications have been introduced to  this end in many of its sections. 
 
Consultation and expertise 
For the purpose of the preparation of this report, the Commission sent out a questionnaire in 
July 2007 to the States applying the Dublin acquis , i.e. the Member States, Iceland, Norway 
and Switzerland (for the purposes of this Impact  Assessment all these States will be referred 
to jointly as ‘the States that implement the Dublin acquis ’), as well as to Europol. The 
questionnaire aimed at examining the necessit y, possible modalities and conditions to consult 
‘Eurodac’.  
In addition, the Commission organised thr ee meetings with different categories of 
stakeholders in order to discuss the issue further. 
First, the Commission invited representatives of the States that implement the Dublin acquis 
and Europol to an expert meeting in Bru ssels on 25-26 September 2007, during which the 
experts had the opportunity to clarify the repl ies to the questionnaire and express further 
views. 
Secondly, the Commission consulted the follo wing intergovernmental organisations, non-
governmental organisations and other scientific e xperts working in th e area of asylum 
 
EN 4   EN law/policy, fundamental rights a nd protection of personal data during a meeting in Brussels 
on 8 October 2007:  
– Amnesty International  
– Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
– Centre for Migration Law 
– Council of Europe 
– European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 
– European Liberty Security Organisation (ELISE) 
– European Policy Centre (EPC) 
– Human Rights Centre, University of Essex  
– International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
– International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
– Privacy International 
– Standing Committee of expert s on international immigrati on, refugee and criminal 
law, Netherlands  
– The Odysseus Academic Network of Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum 
in Europe, represented by Mr Jens Vedste d-Hansen, co-editor of European Journal 
of Migration and Law. 
Representatives of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, mo re particularly Jean-
Marie Cavada, Ewa Klamt and Baroness Sarah Ludf ord also participated at the same meeting. 
Finally, the Commission c onsulted representatives of the na tional data protection authorities 
of the States that implement the Dublin acquis , as well as the Joint Supervisory Body of 
Europol and the European Data Protection Superv isor during a meeting held in Brussels on 11 
October 2007. 
A steering group has been set-up for the specific  purposes of this repor t. The group consisted 
of officials from the various Directorates of  DG JLS, DG RELEX, SG and SJ it met once on 
30.01.2009 to discuss the issue and further comments where prov ided in writing. A steering 
group was also convened at an  earlier stage to consider wider matters arising from the 
'Eurodac' Regulation, some of which were elaborated within  the context of  the Impact 
Assessment on the revision of the 'Eurodac' Regulation1. with the participation of DG 
RELEX, SANCO and EAC and met on 20.06.2008. 
                                                 
1  SEC(2008)2981 
 
EN 5   EN On 20 October 2008 an additional questionnaire wa s sent out to the Member States. This was 
aimed at receiving updates to th e replies to the initial questionna ire and at clarifying issues 
that were not raised in the in itial questionnaire but were raised during th e expert meetings. 
Annex 1 contains a compila tion of the replies to the questionna ires and Annex 2 is a report of 
the observations made by the experts in the all the above expert meetings that were convened 
in 2007. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION  
The context  
The Hague Programme2 stated that the exchange of inform ation to strengthen security should 
be improved. One of the ideas contained in the Programme is to make full use of new 
technology, inter alia - where appropriate – by direct ( on-line) access for law enforcement 
authorities, including for Europol, to existing central EU databases.  
The conclusions of the Mixed Committee of th e JHA Council of 12-13 June 2007 considered 
that, in order to fully achieve the aim of impr oving security and to en hance the fight against 
terrorism, access under certain conditions to ‘Eurodac’ should be granted to Member States' police and law enforcement authorities, as well as  Europol, in the course of their duties in 
relation to the prevention, detection and investig ation of terrorist offences and other serious 
criminal offences. It therefore invited the Commission to present as soon as possible the 
necessary proposals to achieve this aim. 
The absence of the possibility for law enforcem ent authorities to access ‘Eurodac’ to combat 
terrorism and other serious crime was also reported as a shortcom ing in the Commission 
Communication to the Council and the European  Parliament on improved effectiveness, 
enhanced interoperability and synergies among Eu ropean databases in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs of 24 November 2005
3.  
Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 established ‘Eurodac’ for the 
comparison of fingerprints fo r the effective application of the Dublin Convention4 (the 
‘Eurodac’ Regulation). On 3 December 2008 th e Commission adopted a proposal to amend 
the ‘Eurodac’ regulation, which is accompanied by an impact assessment5. That proposal is 
aimed at making the 'Eurodac' system more efficient. 
‘Eurodac’ is a Community-wide system for the comparison of the fing erprints of asylum 
applicants. It was established by the ‘Euroda c’ Regulation which came into force on 15 
December 2000 and which serves all the States that implement the Dublin acquis . The 
Community-wide information tec hnology system for the compar ison of the fingerprints of 
asylum seekers started operations on 15 January 2003.  
                                                 
2 OJ C 53, 3.3.2005 p.7/8.  
3 COM(2005) 597, p. 6.  
4 OJ L 316/1 of 15 12 2000 
5 COM(2008) 825 final and SEC(2008) 2981 respectively. 
 
EN 6   EN The purpose of ‘Eurodac’ is to facilitate the application of the Dublin Regulation6, which is 
aimed at establishing a clear and workable mechanism for determining responsibility for 
asylum applications, to prevent asylum shopping and to guarantee effect ive access to relevant 
procedures. This purpose is achie ved by a system of fingerprint identification of  third country 
nationals who fall under the scop e of the Regulation under stri ctly defined and harmonised 
rules in relation to the storage, comparison and deletion of fingerprints. Strict data protection 
rules are also laid down in orde r to protect the fundamental right  to the protection of personal 
data. 
The ‘Eurodac’ Regula tion established a Central Unit  managed by the European Commission 
containing an Automated Fingerprint Identificat ion System (AFIS), which receives data and 
transmits “hit – no hit” replies, i.e. replies which indicate whether in fact the 'Eurodac' 
database contains the specific fingerprint, to the national Units in each Member State. The 
Central Unit processes the fingerprints of the following types of data on individuals over the 
age of 14 as follows: 
Category 1 (CAT1): data of asyl um applicants are sent for comparison  against fingerprints of 
other asylum applicants who have previously  lodged their application in another Member 
State. The same data will also be compared against the “category 2” data. This data will be stored
 for 10 years; 
Category 2 (CAT2): data of aliens apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of 
an external border and who were not turned back. These data will be sent for storage only , in 
order to be compared against  data of asylum applicants subm itted subsequently to the Central 
Unit. This data will be kept for two years; 
Category 3 (CAT3): While the storage of the two a bove is compulsory under the Regulation, 
the Member States themselves can decide (i.e. transmission is optional ), whether they wish to 
use the facility of the CAT3 comparison (transmit fingerprints taken from aliens found 
illegally present in a Member State) to determin e whether the person in question is in fact an 
asylum seeker in one of the Member States. CA T3 data are not stored, but are only searched 
against the data of CAT1 stor ed in the central database.  
For those categories that are st ored, the database contains onl y the following information:  
– the fingerprints, 
– the Member State of origin,  
– place and date of application for asylum, 
– sex,  
– the reference number used in the Member State of origin,  
– the date on which fingerprints were taken, and 
– the date on which they were submitted to the Central Unit.  
                                                 
6 OJ L 050, 25.02.2003, p.1 
 
EN 7   EN On 31 December 2008, ‘Eurodac’ contained 1.221.208 se ts of fingerprints of asylum seekers 
and 102.155 data sets of persons apprehended in connection with an irre gular crossing of the 
external border. The ‘Eurodac’ system was de signed to be capable of storing 800.000 full ten 
print images and is currently capable of st oring 1.600.000 ten print images. This shows that it 
has not yet reached the upper limit of its storage capacity.  
The total of successful transactions sent to  the Central Unit in 2008 totalled 357.421, i.e. an 
average of 979 per day. The system is designe d to process 3.750 transactions per day. The 
number of transactions of data of as ylum seekers (CAT1) was 219.557. In addition, 61.945 
transactions were sent in as CAT2. 
Description of the problem  
Information about citizens of EU  Member States and about third country nationals is available 
in many forms and systems in the Member Stat es and at EU level. National and European 
instruments lay down the rules and conditions under which law enforcement authorities can 
have access to this information in orde r to carry out their lawful tasks. 
Fingerprint data is especially useful info rmation for law enforcement purposes, as it 
constitutes an important element in establishi ng the exact identity of a person. The usefulness 
of fingerprint databases in fighting crime is a fact that has been repeatedly acknowledged. 
The European Union has adopted several legisl ative instruments under wh ich fingerprint data 
may be consulted by law enforcement authorities of Member States. These systems provide law enforcement officials either with detailed information about an in dividual and visa data 
related to him/her (the Visa Information System ), or with an indica tion for which reason an 
individual is wanted by a nationa l authority and the action to be taken in a concrete case (the 
Schengen Information System), or with a “hi t/no-hit” signal, indicating whether further 
information is available about that person in a given Member State (the information exchange system set up under the Prüm Council Decision).  
Fingerprint data of asylum seekers are collected  and stored in the Member State in which the 
asylum application was filed, as well as in 'E urodac'. The obligation to collect the fingerprints 
and other data of asylum seeker and to store th em in Eurodac stems from the 'Eurodac' and the 
Dublin Regulations.  
Replies to the second questionnaire (Annex 1) we re received by 13 States that implement the 
Dublin acquis , 11 of which are Member States.  Thes e replies showed that the 6  Member 
States and 2 other States that implement the Dublin acquis  keep asylum seekers fingerprints 
in their general fingerprint databases (AFIS), wh ile 3 Member States keep such fingerprints in 
databases that contain fingerprints of all aliens , and 2 Member States keep them in special 
asylum seekers' databases. In all but one Stat es that replied to this questionnaire, the law 
enforcement authorities had direct access to their national databases that contain the 
fingerprints of asylum seeker s. In one Member States law enforcement authorities had 
indirect access to such national database, i.e.  access following a judicial authorisation. The 
replies to this questionnaire indicate that law enforcement authorities use asylum seekers 
fingerprints in the fight against crime as a matte r of course and that the use of such data 
domestically is conceptually established.  
During the consultation of experts it became cl ear that those national law enforcement 
authorities that consult national databases co ntaining fingerprints of asylum seekers for 
 
EN 8   EN criminal investigations consider the hit rate significant. Only a few Member States keep 
statistics on the use of the data or the hit rate of such consultations, , while the majority does 
not hold such statistics. Those Member States th at keep statistics were able to report the 
following: 
– German law enforcement authorities claimed that the comparison of fingerprints against 
national databases containing finge rprints of asylum seekers cont ained a substantial hit rate 
up to 40%. According to statisti cal data of the German Federa l Police 19,4% of the crimes 
in Germany in 2006 were committed by non-na tionals. 8,5% of the non-nationals were 
asylum seekers. 28% of all types of cr imes committed by non-nationals related to 
manslaughter and homicide. Asylum seekers co mmitted less than 14% of this proportion.  
– According to the Dutch Ministry of Just ice, between September 2004 and January 2006 
consultations of the Dutch data filing system  containing fingerpri nts of aliens, which 
includes the fingerprints of asylum seekers,  produced a hit rate of more than 44%.  
– Austrian statistical data on 2006 demonstrate that over 19% of the cr ime suspects recorded 
were asylum seekers. This figure gives however no indication on the success rate of 
comparing fingerprint data against fingerp rints recorded of asylum seekers.  
– In the United Kingdom, between 2007 and 2008 consultations of the Immigration and 
Asylum Fingerprint System, which includes the fingerprints of aliens and asylum seekers, 
produced a hit rate of 7% on counter terrorism [statistics on serious crime have not been 
provided]. 
It should be noted that the types of crimes fo r which access to fingerprints of asylum seekers 
is permitted and the modalities of such access di ffer among Member States. As a result, the 
statistics provided by the above Me mber States cannot be compared. 
However, while law enforcement authorities of  Member States successfully consult asylum 
seekers fingerprints on a national level, it seems that access to  asylum seekers fingerprint 
databases of other Member Stat es is more problematic. The problem is therefore identified, 
not in the use of asylum seekers fingerprints for law enforcement purposes, but, contrary to 
other forms of law enforcement information, in  the lack of effectiv e possibilities for law 
enforcement authorities to cooperate in exchanging such fingerprints.  
Structural information and verification gap 
There are currently some EU instruments that  permit consultation of fingerprints and other 
law enforcement data held by one Memb er State by another Member State.  
The first instrument that is lik ely to be used for consultations  regarding fingerprints is Council 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cr oss-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime (Prüm Decision) which will be implemented by Member States by June 2011. On th e basis of this Council Deci sion the Member States' grant 
each other automated access inter alia  to national Automated Fingerprint Identification 
Systems (AFIS) on the basis of a hit/no hit re quest. If a query on the basis of the Prüm 
Decision produces a hit, supplem entary information, including pe rsonal data, can be obtained 
 
EN 9   EN in the Member State that recorded the fingerp rint in its national AF IS using national law7, 
including mutual legal assistance.  
While this procedure might be su ccessful for those Member Stat es that store fingerprints of 
asylum seekers together with ot her fingerprints collected by law enforcement authorities in a 
national AFIS, it will be unsuccessful for those Me mber States that do not store fingerprints 
of asylum seekers in their national AF IS unless they are related to crime. 
Another instrument that could be used for c onsultations regarding fi ngerprints is Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange  of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities (FWD 2006/960). This  instrument facilitates the exchange of 
information (the fingerprint as well as the supplementary information) that is held or is 
available to law enforcement authorities in Memb er States. This instrument is operational as 
from 18 December 2008. 
The use of this instrument is subject to conditions and safeguard s. First, information can be 
requested from a Member State only if there are factual reasons to  believe that the information 
is actually available in that Member State. Th erefore, if the requesti ng Member State does not 
know which other Member State might hold data  on a person, either because it just has a 
latent8 from a crime scene or an uncooperative suspect , then it would be im possible to use this 
instrument failing such factual information. Als o, it cannot be envisage d that a Member State 
sends the same request for information to all ot her Member States, as it would be impossible 
to factually justify all such requests. 
Second, in some Member States fingerprints of  asylum seekers may only be accessed by a law 
enforcement authority with the ag reement or authorisat ion of a judicial authority. In such a 
case, the requested law enforcement authority will be obliged to ask the judicial authority for 
an agreement or authorisation to access and ex change the information sought. In such a case 
the requested Member State must  reply to the request within  14 days, which is still a 
reasonable timeframe.  
Furthermore, it is also possible that in some Member States that have not replied to the second 
questionnaire national asylum data  are not at all available to la w enforcement authorities, in 
which case this instrument could not be used.  
The last instrument that Member States coul d use is mutual legal assistance under which the 
judicial authorities of the Member States can seek access to criminal and non-criminal 
fingerprint collections, including on asylum seekers on the basis of the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters9. The request should be addresse d to all Member States that 
are believed to have the relevant information (potentially all other Member States). The execution of a request for mutual legal assistance (also known as a rogatory commission) is 
                                                
 
7 Such national law could be the national implementing legislation of the Framework Decision 2006/960 
on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities 
(FWD 2006/960) 
8 Latents, are fingerprint images left on a surface of  an object that was touche d by an individual at a 
crime scene. 
9 Council Act of 29 may 2000 establis hing in accordance with article 34  of the treaty on European Union 
the convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters between the member states of the European 
union 
(OJ 2000/C 197/01 of 12.7.2000) 
 
EN 10   EN onerous and time consuming especially if it cannot be determined beforehand that the person 
who is the subject of a criminal investigation or who is victim of a serious crime is an asylum 
seeker. In that case dutifully  answering a request for mutu al legal assistance requires 
searching all potentially re levant national databases. 
Although currently most Members States do not keep statistics on how  many times they had 
received a request from another Member Stat e using any of the a bove mentioned existing 
instruments on whether or not in formation on a fingerprint was available, those that keep 
statistics provided replies ranging from 3000 to respectively 3529, 3763 and 6292 requests on 
an annual basis. It should be noted that these figures were pr ovided by Member States that 
previously participated in the Prüm Treaty and that used the cooperation mechanisms of that 
Treaty (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Be lgium, Luxembourg, France and Spain). It 
would be impossible to follow-up such a high numb er of requests on the basis of mutual legal 
assistance instrument, bearing in mind the lengthy nature of this process. 
It should be noted at this point that the Sc hengen Information System (SIS) and the Visa 
Information System (VIS) do not contain finger prints of asylum seekers, unless s/he has 
applied for a Schengen visa and is therefore stored  in the VIS as a visa applicant, or s/he is 
wanted for arrest or an alert has been issued for the purpose of refusing entry, in which case 
s/he will be in SIS. If the data  of an asylum seeker are alread y in VIS or SIS, law enforcement 
authorities will have acce ss to them under current legal instrume nts. In all other cases the data 
of an asylum seeker are only in 'Eurodac'.  
On the basis of the above, it seems that the curre nt EU instruments are insufficient to facilitate 
the cross-border consultation of  fingerprint data of asylum seekers, and the situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the natio nal data is not always held in  the same type of databases, 
while national law does not always and under th e same conditions authorise access to such 
data for law enforcement purposes. Identification is essential for law enforcement authorities 
to assist them in their mission to prevent and combat terrorism and other serious crime 
involving third country na tionals, as well as to protect a thir d country national who is a victim 
of such a crime. 
When information is available from different databases but this information cannot be linked 
to the person who is the subj ect of the law enforcement acti on, fingerprint comparison is a 
reliable means to remove that uncertainty. In par ticular with regard to asylum seekers, with or 
without official documents, confusion can exist with regard to the exact spelling of a name 
and date of birth because of lacking or impr ecise registers. Further, in case a person has 
several names, changed names or is known under nicknames or pseudonyms, the need exists 
to determine that the fi ngerprints relate to one and the same person.  
The structural information and verification gap is  identified in the fact that, even though it is 
lawful for Member States to c ooperate in obtaining data on asyl um seekers,  from a practical 
point of view, currently no single system ex ists that is accessible to law enforcement 
authorities which enables to determine the Memb er State that has information on an asylum 
seeker and therefore from which Member Stat e the information should be requested. If a 
query of a national AFIS using th e Prüm Decision does not result in a “hit”, it is not certain 
that no information is available in a Member State. Therefore, law enforcement authorities 
will not only remain ignorant about whether or no t information is availabl e at all and in which 
Member State, but often also  whether this information re lates to the same person. Law 
enforcement officials will only know whether information is available in a database of 
 
EN 11   EN another Member State if their judicial authori ties issue a request for mutual legal assistance 
requesting the other Member State to query thei r databases and send the relevant information. 
It should also be noted that the identified st ructural information a nd verification gap is a 
problem which is specifically relevant to data of  asylum seekers. Data on EU citizens exists in 
many different databases in Member States whic h are in general available to law enforcement 
authorities. Such information that is accessibl e to the law enforcement authorities of a 
Member State is, as a rule under current EU laws, accessible to the law enforcement 
authorities of other Member States. Further, la w enforcement authorities of all Member States 
already have access to the VIS which contains data on all visa applicants. On the other hand, 
data on asylum seekers exist only in one single database in each Member State, for which the 
above identified practical cooperation problem exists. It is therefore obvious that, for all 
categories of people, other than asylum seekers, information exists in ways that it is accessible 
to law enforcement. In this respect, providing  a way of making cooperati on in the exchange of 
such data possible, will correct an  imbalance that exist in relati on to data of asylum seekers. 
Information is not available in a timely and the least burdensome manner 
In addition to the structural information an d verification gap, coope ration between Member 
States in the form of exchange of asylum seek ers fingerprint data, is further hampered by the 
fact that current instruments do not make it possible to exchange  such information in a timely 
and non-burdensome manner. If a Prüm search does not produce a hit, the only available 
choice for a Member State is to issue mutual legal assistance requests to all other Member 
States, which is a very time-consuming, burdensom e and costly procedure. It involves months 
of work for both the requesting and the requested  Member State, while it involves substantial 
costs in respect of th e staff involved throughout these months , translations, court appearances 
etc. Without efficient means to determine whethe r or not information is available in another 
Member State the action of public authoritie s becomes prohibitively expensive, is time 
consuming and hence seriously jeopardises the a pplication of the law. Timely availability of 
information is particularly releva nt to avert harm to persons or  goods, or to prevent damage to 
critical infrastructures. Rapid access is also nece ssary to forestall destruction of evidence of a 
serious crime or attempt to commit a serious crime. Moreover, a fast check of the exact 
identity of a detained suspect is  required if there are serious grounds to believe that (s)he is a 
member of a criminal organisation that is about to carry out a serious crime. Precise 
information about the identity of  the detained suspect increase s the chances to identify the 
other members of the organisation. Such informati on is also necessary to ensure that criminal 
investigation focuses on the right person. 
Examples 
Some examples that have been presented by the consulted national law enforcement 
authorities that indicate the iden tified problems are the following: 
- A third country national is arrested at the border of a Member State because of 
suspicion of involvement in a serious crime. In the interview the suspect provides a false identity or generally refuses to provide an identity. Comparison of his fingerprints against 
national databases and the national AFIS of othe r Member States using the Prüm Decision are 
without result. It is not possible to find any in formation on this person. Mutual legal Assistance 
requests to all other Member St ates would not be a practical  and proportionate measure. 
Access to asylum data of other Member Stat es would have provided and identity and have 
 
EN 12   EN opened leads for investigation. This would have been beneficial for the investigation and for 
the prevention of crimes.  
- At a crime scene the dead body of a pers on is found. Investiga tion shows that the 
person could have been a third country national. Latents recovered at the crime scene could be 
those of the murderer. They are compared agai nst national databases and the national AFIS of 
other Member States using the Prüm Decision  but without success. The police is of the 
opinion that enquiring asylum data  on the basis of latents would have been relevant, because 
both victim and possible murd erer could be identified. 
- The body of a person is found in a city in a Member State and investigation brings to 
light that the cause of death wa s unnatural and probably of crim inal origin. No identification 
papers are found. Ten prints are taken to estab lish the identity. Consu ltation of the national 
databases and the national AFIS of other Memb er States using the Pr üm Decision are without 
result. The Member State does not  have any realistic option to establish the identity of the 
person. Mutual legal Assistance requests to all other Member States would not be a practical 
and proportionate measure.  
Multiplication of personal data processing 
Because currently no single system exists allo wing law enforcement authorities to determine 
the Member State that holds information on an asylum seeker, the only way to find out is to 
issue a request for mutual legal assistance to each of the other Members States. This inevitable leads to a multiplication of the proces sing of the personal data of the same person, 
since a multitude of Member States are asked to  query their databases and reply back to the 
requesting Member State. This in itself is detrimental to the protection of such data. 
If Member States are left to legislate data  protection independently, a harmonised level of 
safeguards will be much more difficult to achieve, which may hamper cross-border cooperation between law enforcem ent authorities as well as cr eate different treatment of 
personal data because of diverging levels of da ta protection between Member States. During 
the discussions in Council on a framework decisi on on data protection fo r police and judicial 
cooperation, it became apparent that on some issues Member States have very different standards and definitions, as for example the case of what is an appropriate data retention period, how far the obligation to inform the data  subject applies, i.e.  the cooperation between 
Member States would be hampered when the re quested Member State did not inform the data 
subject of the processing of the data, while th e requesting Member Stat e would be obliged to 
do so. By regulating at an EU level, data pr otection rules and safeguards can be harmonised, 
as regards the data that will be made available on the basis of the EU measures. This, in itself, will be a major contribution of action by the EU in this filed. 
Europol 
The structural information and verification gap as well as the difficulty to obtain information 
allowing identification in a timely and less burde nsome fashion applies to Europol as well. 
Europol has been mandated to play a horizontal ro le within the European  Union in relation to 
the fight against cross-border organised crime. In  this respect Europol is expected to provide 
national law enforcement authorities with th e necessary tools to exchange information 
between them, such as exchange of informati on using the Europol Nati onal Units. It follows 
from the replies of Europol and the Member Stat es to the questionnaire that the exchange of 
 
EN 13   EN information between those units would benefit if  information exchanged in relation to asylum 
seekers' fingerprints could form part of the info rmation exchanged to them via Europol as part 
of a concrete file related to cross-border organised crime. Since Europol currently cannot 
access information on asylum seekers, it cannot en sure that this inform ation be part of its 
analysis and investigation tasks. 
In addition, it should be noted that Article 28 TEU specifically mentions the cooperation 
between law enforcement authorities with Europol  as one of the main ways to achieve the 
objectives of police and judicial  cooperation in the EU. On this  basis, Europol has already 
been given access to other EU databases, like th e VIS and the SIS, while it can also request 
data which is stored in Me mber States' national AFIS. 
EU right to act and subsidiary principle 
The right of the EU to act in this field is en shrined in Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Crim inal Matters. On the basis of the above 
analysis, the current EU instruments on police and judicial cooperation are insufficient to 
facilitate cooperation between Member States in  exchanging fingerprints of asylum seekers. 
Without appropriate measures at an EU level, law enforcement au thorities will not be able to 
overcome the existing structural in formation and verification gap.  
Cross-border crime is increasing and presents one of the most serious threats to our society as 
reported by Europol. Without adequate and e fficient cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities of Member States, including access to  relevant information held in other Member 
States, it will be very difficult,  if not impossible, for these au thorities to perform their duties 
in relation to the prevention, detection and in vestigation of terrorist s offences and other 
serious criminal offences and hence to fight such cross-border crime effectively. Because of 
the very nature of these crimes, instruments on an EU level are required to set the ground for 
cooperation between Member States. 
In addition, action at the EU le vel will help to ensure harm onised provisions on safeguarding 
data protection, whereas if Memb er States are left to legislate indepe ndently, a harmonised 
level of safeguards will be difficult to achieve . Furthermore, absence of action at EU level 
would be detrimental for data pr otection as it compels law enfo rcement authorities to process 
much more data than is require d if they had access to a centra l index of available data. In 
addition, as the safeguards would not be harmonis ed at EU level, the level of protection of 
individuals with regard to the protection of their personal data  could vary sensibly between 
Member States. The reason for this is that they have to resort to reque sts for the data to all 
Member States, rather than a single request to the relevant Member State. All these requests 
ultimately lead to the processing of much more  data, which itself is detrimental to data 
protection. 
Even though the potential number of asylum seekers that might  be involved in cross-border 
terrorist offences or other serious criminal offen ces might not be very large, the mere fact of 
the gravity of such offences and their impact on society an d every day life should provide 
adequate justification for action on an EU level. 
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that the EU is both entitled to act and better 
placed to do so than the Member States. Such an action should not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve its objectives.  
 
EN 14   EN How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? 
As already mentioned under se ction 2.2., the existing instrume nts do not allow to timely 
determine with sufficient certainty whether a Memb er State actually holds fingerprint data of 
an asylum seeker. This means that without any action at an EU level, law enforcement 
authorities will continue to rema in ignorant about whether or not information on a fingerprint 
is available at all, in which Member State in formation is available, and whether information 
relates to the same person. Without efficient a nd reliable means to determine whether or not 
information is available in another Member State the action of public authorities either becomes prohibitively expensive or seriously je opardises the application of the law because 
no further efficient and reasonabl e action to determine a person's identity can be taken. The 
reason for this is that the FWD 2006/960 cannot  be used in cases where the requesting 
Member State does not know which other Me mber State might hold data regarding a 
particular fingerprint.  
Furthermore, there is not a hi gh likelihood that Member States would use the instrument of 
mutual legal assistance as a way to find out a bout whether or not info rmation on a fingerprint 
is available at all in another Member State. In addition, launching 29 requests for mutual legal 
assistance with the aim of disc overing which, if any, Member Stat e holds data in relation to a 
fingerprint, is a hypothetical process, which inevitab ly will lead to at least 28 negative replies. 
The engaging of all the States that apply the Dublin acquis in  such a lengthy and burdensome 
process, which in 28 cases will result in a nega tive reply, is not an effective way of dealing 
with the exchange of law enforcement inform ation. Mutual legal assistance was not designed 
to be used on the basis of hypotheses, but for exchanging data where there is at least a 
certainty that the requesting Memb er State holds such information. 
 
EN 15   EN POLICY OBJECTIVES  
3.1. Objectives 
One of the fundamental goals of the European  Union is the development of a genuinely 
European area of justice, freedom and securi ty. Such an area aims to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of its citizen s, such as life, phys ical integrity, securi ty and the protection 
of citizens' personal data and privacy, are guaranteed.   
The general objectives are:  
• The increasing security in the EU by facili tating cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities of Member States and Europol in  exchanging information for the prevention, 
detection and investigation of te rrorism and other serious crime. 
• The protection of victims of terro rism and other serious crime. 
Such general issues translate into the fo llowing specific/operati onal policy objectives: 
• Increasing security in the EU by: 
• facilitating the verification of  the identity of certain categories of third country 
nationals and closing the st ructural information gap; 
• ensuring timely and less burdensome procedures  for verification of the identity of 
such persons. 
• Facilitating the identification of victims using the same means. 
The above policy objectives should be pursued  while ensuring that fundamental rights are 
always protected, especially the right to asylum and the right to protection of personal data, 
by imposing conditions and safeguards for the access. 
 
3.2. Respect of Fundamental rights 
The Commission recalls that its legislative proposal s in this field have to be compatible with 
the Charter of Fundamental Right s of the European Union (Chart er) and that Member States 
must respect these rights, when implementing or applying European Union law. 
While access to information systems assists law en forcement authorities to prevent, detect or 
investigate such criminal offe nces, the collection and processi ng of fingerprint data must 
respect other fundamental rights too and mu st not go beyond what is necessary and 
proportionate. 
The key rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights that are engaged here are 
Article 8 regarding the right to the protection of personal data and Ar ticle 18 guaranteeing the 
right to asylum. The proposed measure would ai m to prevent and combat terrorism and serious 
crime, a legitimate aim that, subject to the prin ciple of proportionality, can justify limitations on 
 
EN 16   EN the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charte r, provided they are foreseen by law which 
contain, and respect, the essence of those rights. 
The proposed actions would involve a serious inte rference with th e right to the protection of 
personal data as protected by Article 8 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. The right to data protec tion may however be interfered with, provided interference is 
done "in accordance with the law", it is formulated with sufficient precision to allow individuals 
to adjust their conduct and it protects individu als against arbitrariness and indicates with 
sufficient clarity the scope of discretion c onferred on the competent authorities and the 
manner of its exercise. It is also necessary that this interference is "necessary in a democratic 
society to attain a legitimate and proportionate interest. The jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights has decide d in various cases that actions aimed at combating terrorism 
and serious crime, under the umbrella of the ex ceptions, provided that they are proportionate, 
and are "in accordance with the law" and  "necessary in a democratic society".  
The conditions for access to the data woul d come under the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in  criminal matters. This Framework Decision 
contains an explicit reference to the Council of  Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automa tic Processing of Personal Data. Therefore the 
measure should comply with th e rules on purpose limitation and security of transmissions as 
well as the other fundamental pr inciples for the lawfulness of data processing activities. The 
impact on data protection could be reduced by a ppropriate adherence to the established data 
protection principles and guarantees. Access sh ould be limited to designated authorities and 
only on a case-by-case basis. Individuals should be given adequate righ ts of access, correction 
and redress in particular the right to a judi cial remedy, and supervision of processing 
operations by public independent au thorities should be ensured.  
The proposed actions might also interfere with the right to asylum as protected by Art.18 of 
the Charter. Asylum seekers may be discouraged  from applying for asylum as they may know 
that their personal data may be processed by law enforcement authorities of EU Member 
States. They could perceive that this could be de trimental to their status or security that, in 
consequence, could undermine the exercise of their right to asylum. Also, potential asylum 
seekers may be discouraged from requesting asyl um if access to their data is allowed for law 
enforcement purposes because of fear that such information could end up in the hands of authorities of their country of origin. If such would happen, it could expose relatives or 
friends of the applicant, or the applicant him or herself to repressions, including the risk of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Furthermore, if no a lternative destination would be 
available, it could lead to an increase of  undocumented migrants. The measures should 
therefore include strong guarant ees to avoid an interference with the right to asylum, for 
example by prohibiting the exchange of  such data with third countries. 
Asylum seekers databases might contain fingerp rint data from persons as young as 14 years, 
but not in all Member States children of this  age are criminally responsible. Member States 
have to ensure that the data of children they  retrieve by consulting such databases and which 
according to their national law cannot be held crim inally responsible are treated in a legal and 
non-discriminatory manner (in comparison to the data from children who are citizens of the 
concerned Member State) while respecting the pr inciple of the best interests of the child. 
 
EN 17   EN POLICY OPTIONS  
Under sections 3, 4 and 5 general policy options  are presented, assessed and compared. After 
choosing the preferred policy options, sub-op tions on more specific provisions will be 
analysed. 
Refraining from addressing the issue on an EU level – Maintaining the status quo 
(Policy Option A) 
This policy option entails no action to be taken by the EU. In effect this means that no access 
to 'Eurodac' will be allowed and the information gap will not be filled. The identification and verification processes would therefore remain lengthy; the procedures for identification and 
verification involving other Memb er States would remain disproportionally burdensome and 
their outcome would remain un certain. No EU intervention means that law enforcement 
authorities can not swiftly and appropriately identify a person or  verify his identity if the 
Member State that holds these data is not known before a request for information is issued.  
Regulating the access to 'Eurodac' for la w enforcement purposes (Policy Option B) 
This policy option establishes the basis for conditional access by Member States' law 
enforcement authorities as well as Europol to ‘Eurodac’ on the basis of an amendment of the 
'Eurodac' Regulation and by regulating the actual access and use of the personal data held in 
'Eurodac' in an accompanying proposal fo r a Council Decision. A hit reply would be 
accompanied with the types of data that are st ored in ‘Eurodac’. Requests for supplementary 
information following a hit woul d not be regulated in the proposed Council Decision but 
rather be covered by existi ng instruments, like the Prüm Decision, FWD 2006/960 and mutual 
legal assistance. In general, FWD 2006/960 require s that the provision of information shall be 
limited to what is deem ed relevant and necessary for the successful detection, prevention or 
investigation of the crime or criminal activ ity in question. To the extent that the FWD 
2006/960 cannot be used (i.e. in the case where on e of the exceptions of the instrument might 
apply), then a request for such data could be made using mutu al legal assistance. Under the 
FWD 2006/960, information may be withhold if there are factual reasons to assume that the provision of the information woul d harm essential national securi ty interests of the requested 
Member State, jeopardise the success of an inves tigation or the safety of  individuals or clearly 
be disproportionate or irreleva nt with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested. 
The competent law enforcement authority ma y also refuse to provide the requested 
information where the request pertains to an o ffence punishable by a term of imprisonment of 
one year or less under the law of the requested  Member State. The proposals should contain 
adequate safeguards to justify the interference wi th the right to protection of personal data and 
to guarantee the non-interference with the ri ght to asylum, for example by prohibiting the 
transfer of such data to any third country. 
Access to 'Eurodac' is essential in order to identify the national database that contains 
additional biographical data of such third country  nationals. When 'Eurod ac’ is searched with 
fingerprints, it returns, in case the reference se t matches a recorded set of ten fingerprints, a 
hit-reply confirming the match, as well as some additional data. Among the additional data is 
the reference number that links the fingerprint da ta with a record held in a separate national 
database in the Member State that recorded the fingerprint data in ‘Eurodac’. The separate file 
contains further biographical data of the asylum applicant. Access to such additional data is very important for law enforcement purposes. This information usually includes personal 
 
EN 18   EN details, identity and travel papers, the members of his family, his former name(s), present and 
former nationalities, date and place of birth an d other information necessary to establishing 
the identity of an asylum seeker. This additiona l data should be made available from national 
files in the case of a hit-reply from ‘Eurodac’ using existing in struments, as they are usually 
the only source of biographical informa tion available about asylum seekers. 
Based on the analysis in  section 3.2, the option should incl ude strong guarantees to avoid an 
interference with the right to asylum, for example by prohibiting th e transfer of the data of an 
asylum seeker by a Member State to third count ries. The policy option will provide appropriate 
safeguards to ensure the protection of personal data. 
There are 2 possible sub-options: (i) to provide search possibilitie s of 'Eurodac' merely on the 
basis of fingerprints, or (ii) on the basis of fi ngerprints and latents. Currently, 'Eurodac' does not 
provide the possibility of searching on the basis of  latents and this feature would have to be 
added on the 'Eurodac' system. However, search ing on the basis of latents is a fundamental 
function for law enforcement cases, where in cr ime scenes there is usually only the possibility 
to recover latents. 
Regulating the access to ‘Eurodac’ for law en forcement purposes as well as the exchange 
of supplementary information on as ylum seekers (Policy Option C) 
This policy option establishes the basis for conditional access by Member States' law 
enforcement authorities as well as Europol to ‘Eurodac’ on the basis of an amendment of the 
'Eurodac' Regulation and by regulating the actual access and use of the personal data held in 
'Eurodac' in an accompanying proposal fo r a Council Decision. A hit reply would be 
accompanied with the available types of additiona l personal data that are stored in ‘Eurodac’. 
The proposal for a Council Decision would also  establish a process whereby, following a hit, 
the requesting Member State can request supplem entary information from the Member State 
of origin about the asylum seeker to whom th e fingerprint belong, rather that making such a 
request using existing instruments as in the case of Policy Option B. The measures should 
provide the possibility of sear ching ‘Eurodac’ on the basis of  latents. The proposals should 
contain adequate safeguards to justify the lawf ulness of the interferen ce with the right to 
protection of personal data and to guarantee the non-interference with the right to asylum. 
There are 2 possible sub-options: (i) to provide search possibilitie s of 'Eurodac' merely on the 
basis of fingerprints, or (ii) on the basis of fi ngerprints and latents. Currently, 'Eurodac' does not 
provide the possibility of searching on the basis of  latents and this feature would have to be 
added on the 'Eurodac' system. However, search ing on the basis of latents is a fundamental 
function for law enforcement cases, where in cr ime scenes there is usually only the possibility 
to recover latents. 
Regulating access to national data about as ylum seekers for law enforcement purposes 
(Policy Option D) 
This policy option could have two sub-options: 
The first sub-option  would create a decentralis ed network mechanism that would allow each 
Member State to search the national asylum seekers databases of all the other Member States in an automated manner . To realize this, Member States sh ould provide for separate national 
databases which would be used only for law enforcement, as well as for a separate mechanism to network the databases of all the Member States together, thus allowing the searches to 
 
EN 19   EN happen.  This new network would model the content of th e data that is recorded in 'Eurodac' as 
well as the functions of 'Eurodac' itself. This model would be similar to the search hit/no hit 
model that was established by the Prüm D ecision. Access to supplementary information 
would be achieved by special  provisions in the Eurodac Decision or  by using existing 
instruments.  
The costs of this sub-option would be dispropor tional. It would entail the creation of special 
databases in each Member State and the setting up of a complicated network that would connect these databases of all Member Stat es together. It woul d seem unnecessary and 
inappropriate to create an entirely new, comp licated technical architecture for the only reason 
to enable law enforcement authorities to search  for information already held in an existing 
database, in particular when a more technically straightforward solution exists, in the form of 
permitting access to 'Eurodac'. For these reasons, this sub-option is not considered proportionate and is dism issed at this point. 
The second sub-option would involve a Recomme ndation from the EU to the Member States 
that the Member States should tr ansfer all their asylum seekers'  fingerprints in their national 
AFIS. In this way, Member States would be able to use the Prüm Decision in order to consult 
the national AFIS of other Member States in orde r to identify which one holds data relating to 
a particular fingerprint or latent. Currently, it is  at the discretion of Member States to decide 
in what type of database they will store data on asylum seekers, as well as which authorities 
might have access to such databases and in wh at ways. Such a choice usually reflects the 
national traditions and struct ures of Member States.  
In case that the EU makes a Recommendation to Me mber States as to where they should store 
the fingerprints of asylum seekers, it would be interfering unnecessarily with the discretion of 
Member States on how to set up  their national systems. It s hould be noted that neither the 
Prüm Decision  nor any other in strument harmonise in any way the content of national AFIS. 
In addition, the transfer of national fingerprint data to AFIS will be a burdensome and costly 
exercise which will require changes in national la ws as well as modifications of national AFIS 
to reach new capacity levels and to co nnect them to the 'Eurodac' system. 
This option seems disproportionally complicated and costly and interfer es unnecessarily with 
national systems. For these reasons, this sub- option is not considered  proportionate and is 
dismissed at this point. 
 
 
EN 20   EN 5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS  
Table of symbols 
small negative impact or small costs -√ 
medium negative impact/costs -√√ 
Negative impact/costs -√√√ 
no impact 0 
small positive impact/minor savings √ 
medium positive impact/savings √√ 
significant impact/savings √√√ 
 
5.1. Policy option A 
Policy Option A: Maintaining the status quo 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and as pects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by facilitating the verification of the identity of certain categories of third country nationals and closing the structural 
information gap  0 Maintaining the status quo would mean that law enforcement 
authorities will continue to re main ignorant about whether or 
not information on a fingerprint is  available at all, in which 
Member State information is available, and whether information relates to the same person. The option does not contribute to increase of security  in EU. Maintaining the status 
quo would imply that the identity of  a victim of terrorism or of 
other serious criminal offence who happens to be an asylum seeker cannot be established.  
 
EN 21   EN Policy Option A: Maintaining the status quo 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and as pects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by ensuring timely and less burdensome procedures for verification of the identity  0 Without efficient means to determine whether or not 
information is available in anot her Member State the action of 
public authorities becomes pr ohibitively expensive and 
seriously jeopardises the application of the law. It would imply initiating potentially 29 requests for mutual legal assistance 
(i.e. to all other States that implement the Dublin acquis ), even 
though the Member State does not even know if another Member State holds or not any data on the fingerprint.  
Fundamental 
rights impacts   
Right to Asylum 0 This Policy Option would not authorise any additional law 
enforcement access to asylum data. However, maintaining the status quo would mean that la w enforcement access to asylum 
data would continue to differ in  Member States. Therefore, the 
direct access to asylum seekers data by law enforcement authorities in some Member States would continue. 
Protection of personal data 0 This Policy Option would not have any impact on the 
protection of personal data of as ylum seekers since the current 
situation would remain. 
 
EN 22   EN Policy Option A: Maintaining the status quo 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and as pects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Implementation 
costs for Member States' administrations 0 Maintaining the status quo has no direct financial impact. If the 
status quo is maintained, then the Member States would be 
unlikely to take steps to seek the relevant information by launching hypothetical requests fo r mutual legal assistance. 
This scenario is considered as the baseline for comparison with other options. 
The reasons for which Member States are unlikely to resort to 
mutual legal assistance requests are the complexity and burdensome procedure which ultimately leads to excessive costs. In case that Member Stat es chose to start using mutual 
legal assistance is all cases , the costs would cover the 
preparation of a request for mutual legal assistance, the 
registration and monitoring thereof,  the possible translations of 
the request into the languages of each requested Member State 
and the registration and the monito ring of the receipt of a reply 
from the requested Member State and the follow up. The absence of an indication of which Member State should be 
addressed triggers multiple requests in a single case. According to the replies of the Member States to the questionnaire, the costs could be roughly estimated at three 
FTE per Member State per year  and would be based on the 
added value of law enforcement officers qualified to process formal requests and law enforcement officers qualified to translate formal requests into the language of the requested 
Member State and to translate the reply. Based on a estimated 
hourly wage (average employme nt costs + 50% overheads) of 
25 EUR and 1760 working hours per year (8 hours * 20 days * 11 months) the total yearly personnel costs for all Member States would be 3.828.000 EUR fo r all Member States. This 
rough estimation is based on the current level of processing requests per year, and does not take on board any increase in such consultations.  
EU budget  0 No impact. 
 
EN 23   EN Policy Option A: Maintaining the status quo 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and as pects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Stakeholders 
views: Member States/law enforcement 0 Member States expressed consensus that consultation should 
be allowed for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorism and other serious crim e. Maintaining the status quo 
does not contribute to enable this, since it would imply that the identity of a victim of terrori sm or of another serious crime 
offence who happens to be an asyl um seeker or of a suspect of 
such a crime cannot be established. 
Law enforcement stakeholders ar e of the opinion that access to 
'Eurodac' is necessary to achieve an adequate level of efficiency in the prevention, de tection and investigation of 
terrorism and other serious crime. The information contained in Eurodac is required in order to identify which Member State holds information on a fingerprint  of an asylum seeker and 
hence, to establish the identity  of a suspect or of a victim. 
Maintaining the status quo does not contribute to enable this, since it would imply that the identi ty of a victim of terrorism or 
of another serious crime offence who happens to be an asylum seeker cannot be established. 
 
Stakeholders 
views: civil society and data protection 0 Civil society representatives a nd data protection authorities 
expressed themselves against granting law enforcement access to 'Eurodac' since such an access in their view would infringe the purpose limitation (asylum and immigration) and change 'Eurodac' into a criminal investigation tool. Maintaining the status quo would not affect the purpose limitation. 
 
 
Policy Option B 
Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
 
EN 24   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by facilitating the verification of the identity of certain categories of third country nationals and closing the structural information gap  Sub-
option 
(i)√/√√ 
Sub-
option 
(ii)√√/ 
√√√ Fingerprint information about thir d country nationals that are not 
resident, did not apply for a Sche ngen Visa and whose data are not 
for other reasons stored in the Sc hengen Information System of a 
Member State is likely only to be found in ‘Eurodac’ and the national asylum databases. Fingerprint comparison via ‘Eurodac’ may thus be the only way to esta blish the identity of such a third 
country national about whom no othe r reliable information exists. 
Fingerprint comparison via ‘Eurod ac’ may be the only way to 
uniquely identify such a third country national about whom no other reliable information exists. This is essential for law enforcement authorities in order to prevent and combat terrorism 
and other serious crime involving third country nati onals, as well 
as to protect a third country national who is a victim of terrorism or other serious crime. Access to  ‘Eurodac’ will make it possible 
to establish the identity of an as ylum seeker who is a victim of a 
terrorist or other serious criminal offence. 
The establishment of a system of access to 'Eurodac' is also 
essential in order to identify the national database that contains additional biographical data of such third country nationals. 
Eurodac’ is searched with fingerprints and returns, in case the reference set matches a recorded se t of ten fingerprints, a hit-reply 
confirming the match, as well as some additional data. Among the additional data is the reference nu mber that links the fingerprint 
data with a record held in a separate national database in the Member State that recorded the fingerprint data in ‘Eurodac’. The separate file contains further biographical data of the asylum 
applicant. Access to such additiona l data is very important for law 
enforcement purposes. 
This additional data from national files should be made available 
in the case of a hit-re ply from ‘Eurodac’, as they are usually the 
only source of biographical info rmation available about third 
country nationals. Existing instru ments and channels at national 
level could be used to make this information available on the basis 
of European legislation aimed at  facilitating the use of those 
channels. However, this legisl ation only became operational by the 
end of 2008, contains some exceptions and the procedures to be used at national level following a hit are only partially harmonised. 
The search possibility with latent s will have a bigger impact since 
very often it is only possible to r ecover latents from a crime scene. 
 
EN 25   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by ensuring timely and less burdensome procedures for verification of the identity  √√ Consultation of ‘Eurodac’ would allow law enforcement 
authorities to check in minutes  where the person involved has 
applied for asylum.  
Consulting ‘Eurodac’ would replace  the preparation of individual 
requests for mutual cooperation and or the querying of 29 databases. The identification of th e national database that contains 
the additional biographical data is especially im portant since, 
when law enforcement authorities need to establish the exact identity of a person under invest igation, time is a critical factor . In 
law enforcement what counts is that relevant information is available in a timely, legitimate, secure and cost-efficient manner to assist law enforcement aut horities to prevent and combat 
terrorism and other serious crime as well as to enable them to deal with the victims of such serious crime.  
The additional biographical inform ation should be made available 
using existing instruments and ch annels. Following this procedure 
for obtaining the additional biogra phical information would mean 
not achieving the maximum possi ble positive impact on security 
because the exchange of the additi onal data would still be subject 
to exceptions. However, currently there are no indicat ions that the 
main instrument to exchange the supplementary information, FWD 2006/960, would not be a sufficient in strument for the exchange of 
such information, this instrument  being operational only as from 
18 December 2008. 
Fundamental rights impacts   
 
EN 26   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Right to Asylum 
 -√ Asylum seekers may be discouraged from applying for asylum as 
they may know that their persona l data may be processed by law 
enforcement authorities of EU Me mber States and may perceive 
that this could be detrimental to their status or security which in consequence could undermine the exer cise of their right to asylum. 
Also, potential asylum seekers may be discouraged from 
requesting asylum if access to ‘Eurodac’ is allowed for law 
enforcement purposes because of fear that such information could end up in the hands of authorities of  their country of origin. If such 
would happen, it could expose relati ves or friends of  the applicant, 
or the applicant him or herself to the risk of inhuman treatment. Furthermore, if no alternative destination would be available and other conditions would be fulfilled, it could lead to an increase of undocumented migrants. Legislation can counterbalance the risk of 
such information ending up in th e hands of authorities of the 
applicants home country by prohibiti ng the transfer of the data of 
an asylum seeker by a Member state or Europol to third countries. Moreover, rules regarding data security could provide further 
guarantees against a possible misuse of the data to avoid the data 
ending up accidently with third countries. 
 
 
EN 27   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Protection of 
personal data -√√√ The proposed actions would constitu te a serious inte rference with 
the right to the protection of  personal data since the law 
enforcement authority would ha ve the possibility to obtain 
additional biographical data connect ed to the fingerprint. The right 
to data protection however may be interfered with, provided interference is done "in accordance with the law" and is "necessary 
in a democratic society to protect a legitimate public interest and the law is formulated with sufficient precision and is proportionate. As the proposed actions aim to comb at terrorism and serious crime, 
they would clearly come under the umbrella of the exceptions. The 
proposed measure would have to ensure that any such interference would be proportionate, "in acco rdance with the law" and 
"necessary in a democratic society", and must comply with adequate safeguards such as purpose limitatio n and security of transmissions.  
It should be noted that even th ough the proposed measures would 
not oblige any collection of new personal data, since the data is already collected under the 'Eur odac' Regulation, it would imply a 
new processing activity for a different incompatible purpose to that for which they have been initially  processed. The measures would 
only be regulating the access to su ch data. Although such measures 
should provide for adequate safeguard s to mitigate the impact of the 
interference with the right  to the protection of personal data, the fact 
that personal data will be used as such is already sufficient to be 
considered as a serious interference with the right to the protection of personal data according to th e jurisprudence of  the European 
Court of Human Rights  
 
EN 28   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Implementation 
costs for Member States' administrations -√√ The following types of costs could be identified.  
First, the costs related to set up a secure communication channel to 
transmit the requests for consultation between authorities to consult ‘Eurodac’. It is estimated that the costs related to the adjustment of the hardware in the Member States is in the range of 2,7 million EUR (27 x 100.000 EUR)
10.  
Second, the costs related to the trai ning of the staff authorised to 
consult ‘Eurodac’ and after a hit reply to consu lt the additional 
biographical data and the actual use of the staff. Member States have indicted in their replies to the questionnaire that specialised 
staff is necessary to perform a cons ultation of 'Eurodac' and that an 
additional one to two staff may be required. On this basis the costs 
are estimated on roughly 1,5 FTE. Based on an estimated hourly wage in EUR (average employment  costs + 50% overheads) of 25 
EUR and 1760 working hours per year (8 hours * 20 days * 11 months) the total yearly personnel costs for all MS would be 1.914.000 EUR for all Member States.  
Compared to policy option A, the costs related to an individual 
consultation would be lower becau se the consultation in policy 
option B would be based on the consultation of one database instead of the consultation of a law enforcement authority in another Member State on the basis of mutual legal assistance. 
                                                 
10 The cost is estimated on the basis of the connection costs of the VIS system which is expected to be 
comparable. 
 
EN 29   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
EU budget  Sub-
option 
(i)-√ 
Sub-
option 
(ii)-√√ The costs related to set up a secure communication channel, a 
virtual private network to transport the data between the authorities concerned should be less than 1 million EUR. 
The costs related to the monito ring and evaluation of access to 
‘Eurodac’ by law enforcement authorities are estimated at 500.000 EUR. 
Sub-option (ii) will generate ad ditional costs at European level 
because the search functions of ‘E urodac’ should be modified and 
the number of requests is likely to increase. The current system 
must also be adapted to allow se arching ‘Eurodac’ with latents.  
This is not foreseen in the curr ent contracts related to ‘Eurodac’. 
The current project for a Biometric Matching System (BMS) contains a scenario for the integration of ‘Eurodac’. The total costs for building and implementing the BMS will be divided over the three systems (SIS II, VIS, ‘Eurod ac’) that it will serve. The share 
of the costs for the 'Eurodac' part cannot be exactly estimated but are around 2 million EUR, including a latent search capacity (with limited number of searches) and a ssuming that ‘Eurodac’ is hosted 
together with the BMS/VIS system.  
The total costs for the EU budge t are estimated at around 2.5 
million EUR for sub-option (ii) and 1.5 million EUR for sub-option (i).  
Stakeholders 
views: Member States/law enforcement √√  
    Member States expressed consen sus that consultation should be 
allowed for the prevention, detectio n and investigation of terrorism 
and other serious crime. This op tion would contribu te to enable 
this, since it would allow for the establishment of the identity of a victim of terrorism or of a nother serious cr ime offence who 
happens to be an asylum seeker or of a suspect of such a crime. 
Law enforcement stakeholders ar e of the opinion that access to 
'Eurodac' is necessary to achieve an adequate level of efficiency in the prevention, detection and invest igation of terrorism and other 
serious crime. The information cont ained in 'Eurodac' is required 
to establish the identity of a su spect or of a victim. This option 
would contribute to enable this , since it would allow for the 
establishment of the identity of a victim of terrorism or of another serious crime offence who happens to be an asylum seeker or of a suspect of such a crime. 
 
EN 30   EN Policy Option B: Access to ‘Eurodac’  
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Stakeholders 
views: civil society and data protection -√√ Civil society representatives and data protection authorities 
expressed themselves against granting law enforcement access to Eurodac since such an access in their view would infringe the purpose limitation (asylum and immi gration) and change 'Eurodac' 
into a criminal investigation t ool. This option would grant law 
enforcement authorities the right to access Eurodac for the specific purpose of identifying the Member St ate that holds information on 
asylum seekers enabling the establishment of the identity of a victim of terrorism or of a nother serious cr ime offence who 
happens to be an asylum seeker or  of a suspect of such a crime, 
hence would add another purpose to  the initial purpose for which 
'Eurodac' was established.  
 
Policy Option C 
Policy Option C: Access to ‘Eurodac’ and to additional biographical data 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by facilitating the 
verification of the 
identity of certain categories of third country nationals and closing the structural information gap  Sub-
option 
(i)√√ 
Sub-
option 
(ii)√√√ Same as Policy Option B. 
In addition, this option aims at regulating that the supplementary 
data should be made available in the case of a hit-reply from ‘Eurodac’, under a specific obligat ion in the proposed measure, 
instead of using existing instruments to gain access to such data. This would lead to further harm onisation at EU level of the 
national procedures foll owing a hit in Eurodac,  since that would be 
the best guarantee from a security angle that such additional information is always made ava ilable, including cases in which 
access to such information might have to be refused under existing instruments.  
The search possibility with latent s will have a bigger impact since 
very often it is only possible to r ecover latents from a crime scene. 
 
EN 31   EN Policy Option C: Access to ‘Eurodac’ and to additional biographical data 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Increasing 
security in the EU and facilitating the identification of victims by ensuring timely and less burdensome procedures for verification of the identity  √√√ Same as Policy Option B. 
However, instead of using existing instruments for the exchange of 
the additional data following a 'hit' in 'Eurodac', the Eurodac framework decision would explicitly  regulate that the data should 
be swiftly made available under a specific obligation in the proposed measure, while using ex isting communication channels. 
This would guarantee that such additional information would be 
made available in a timely and non-burdensome manner, also in 
cases in which access to such inform ation might have to be refused 
under existing instruments, which contain some exceptions.  
 
Fundamental 
rights impacts   
Right to Asylum -√ Same as Policy Option B. The interference with the right to 
asylum is effected by granting access  to 'Eurodac'. The impact will 
not be greater if the proposed  measures also govern the 
cooperation on additional information.  
Protection of personal data -√√√ Same as Policy Option B. The interference with the right to data 
protection is effected by granting access to 'Eurodac'. The impact 
will not be greater if the proposed measures also govern the cooperation on additional informa tion. The same guarantees on 
data protection will exist for both Policy Options B and C. 
Implementation costs for Member States' administrations -√√√ Same as Policy Option B as regards the access to 'Eurodac'  
However, there would be additi onal costs for creating a new 
administrative and technical archit ecture for the exchange of the 
supplementary information . . The creation of a special procedure 
for the exchange of supplementary information will require an investment in each Member State  for setting up this new procedure and training officers to use it. However, even though this matter was addressed in the questionnaire, Member States were not in a position to give an indication of possible costs.   
 
EN 32   EN Policy Option C: Access to ‘Eurodac’ and to additional biographical data 
Assessment 
Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
EU budget  Sub-
option 
(i)-√ 
Sub-
option 
(ii)-√√ Same as Policy Option B.  
Stakeholders 
views: Member States/law enforcement √√√  Same as Policy Option B.  
In addition, Member States law enforcement authorities were 
strongly in favour of making speci al provision for exchanging the 
supplementary information following a 'hit' in 'Eurodac'. This would facilitate the exchange of  information between them and 
potentially by-pass the exceptions of the current instruments. It should be noted that the replies to  the questionnaire were delivered 
by the Member States before the FWD 2006/960 becoming operational (i.e. before December 2008). 
Stakeholders views: civil society and data protection -√√√ Same as Policy Option B.  
In addition, civil society experts were not in favour of regulating 
access to supplementary information on the basis of the proposed measures. They considered that it would be sufficient if Member States used existing instrument s to obtain such information. 
 
EN 33   EN COMPARING  THE  OPTIONS 
The "no action" policy option does not improve secu rity in the EU. Maintaining the status quo 
would mean that law enforcement authorities wi ll continue to remain ignorant about whether 
or not information on a fingerprint  is available at all, in which Member State information is 
available, and whether information relates to the same person, and will remain unable to obtain such data. The alternativ e of requesting hypothetical mutu al legal assistance from all 
Member States is too timely and too burdensome to present a realistic option. The costs of 
such an alternative will be considerable for Me mber States. In addition, the current situation 
where different access rights to asylum seeker s data by law enforcement in Member States 
exist, will continue. 
The Policy Options B and C on introducing th e necessary proposals to allow access to 
'Eurodac' by law enforcement authorities poss ess a clear advantage in that it assists on 
increasing security in the EU, by facilitating th e verification of the identity of certain third 
country nationals and closing the structural information gap, ensuring timely and less 
burdensome procedures for veri fication of the identity of such persons and ensuring the 
possibility to search 'Eurodac' on the basis of latents. These opti ons also possess clear 
advantages in rendering the identifica tion of victims of crime possible.  
There is no similar centralised database cont aining data of EU citizens. As regards the 
possible discriminatory effect of consulting ‘Eurodac’ for law enforcement purposes in the 
light of Article 21 of the Charter, it must be noted that, in relation to the Visa Information 
System, which also contains data of only thos e third-country nationals  which applied for a 
Schengen visa, similar mechanisms are in place. In addition, in most Member States access by 
law enforcement authorities to the national ‘Eur odac’ files is already possible. In none of 
these contexts has such access been cons idered discriminatory or illegal.  
The negative impacts of Policy Options B and C could be reversed or at least reduced. The 
potential negative impact on the right to asylum could be reversed by ad equate guarantees to 
guard against the possibility that law enforcement would divulge any information on the asylum seeker to his state of origin.  
The impact on data protection could be reduced  by appropriate adherence to the established 
data protection principles and guarantees. A ccess to 'Eurodac' should be permitted only for 
specific and limited purposes. Access should be limited to some designated authorities and 
only on a case-by-case basis, following a reasoned request and filtered by central access 
points that should be responsible for ensuring  strict compliance wi th the conditions and 
procedures for access. The processing activity  should be in full compliance with data 
protection principles and the ri ghts of the data s ubjects. Accordingly, i ndividuals should be 
given appropriate information and adequate ri ghts of access, correction and redress (both 
administrative and judicial redr ess) and supervisi on by public independent authorities should 
be ensured. 
Therefore between the "no action" policy and the legislative proposal polic ies, the legislative 
proposal policies present clear advantages. Access of law enforcement authorities to 
‘Eurodac’ is the only timely, accurate, secure and cost-efficient way to identify whether and if 
so where data about asylum seekers are avai lable in the Member States. No reasonable 
efficient alternative exists to ‘Eurodac’ to estab lish or verify the exact identity of an asylum 
 
EN 34   EN seeker that allows law enforcement authorit ies to obtain the same  result. This unique 
identification is essential for law enforcement authorities in order to prevent and combat terrorism and serious crime involving third countr y nationals, as well as to protect victims of 
terrorism or serious crime. A ccess to 'Eurodac' cannot be cons idered disproportionate to the 
aims to be achieved. However, in order to a void wrong identifications, it is important that the 
results of the comparison via 'Eurodac' are immediately checked by the Member State of origin that will be the only one respon sible for making the final identification. 
Between the two options involving legislative me asures, both Policy Opti ons present the same 
negative impacts on fundamental rights. Po licy Option C would make supplementary 
information on the asylum seeker available between Member States through a special 
procedure where such is requested, while Poli cy Option B would use the existing instruments 
to facilitate access to such supplementary information. Even though the achievement of the 
objectives would be more effective under Polic y Option C than Policy Option B, it is 
considered that the costs of implementing Po licy Option C would be higher in relation to 
Option B. 
In addition, currently there ar e no indications that FWD 2006/ 960 would not be a sufficient 
instrument for the exchange of supplementary  information. The exceptions and conditions on 
the exchange of data under FWD 2006/960, especial ly as regards coercively obtained data and 
data access which can be authorised only by a judge, are not such that would prevent the 
exchange of data where there is a legitimat e reason to exchange the data. FWD 2006/960 has 
only been implemented as from December 2008 a nd until the time of drafting this report no 
problems on its functioning have been reported. In  case that the functioning of this framework 
decision presents problems in the future, those can be addressed if and when they arise, taking 
into account additional costs. 
In relation to the 2 sub-options regarding la tents, even though the po ssibility to search 
'Eurodac' on the basis of latents is more expens ive, its contribution to the achievement of the 
objectives is fundamental and therefore would outweigh the impact on costs on the EU 
budget. 
 Policy Option A Policy Option B  Policy Option C 
Increasing security in the EU 
and facilitating the identification of victims by facilitating the verification of the identity of certain categories of third country nationals and closing the structural information gap  0 Sub-option 
(i)√/√√ 
Sub-option (ii) √√/ 
√√√ Sub-option (i) √√ 
Sub-option 
(ii)√√√ 
Increasing security in the EU 
and facilitating the identification of victims by ensuring timely and less burdensome procedures for verification of the identity  0 √√ √√√ 
 
EN 35   EN Fundamental rights impacts    
Right to Asylum  0 - √ - √ 
Protection of personal data 0 - √√√ - √√√ 
Implementation costs for 
Member States' administrations 0 - √√ - √√√ 
EU budget 
0 Sub-option (i)- √ 
Sub-option (ii)- √√ Sub-option (i)- √ 
Sub-option (ii)- √√
Stakeholders views: Member 
State/law enforcement authorities 0 √√ √√√ 
Stakeholders views: civil 
society and data protection authorities 0 - √√ - √√√ 
 
EN 36   EN THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION  
On the basis of the above, the adoption of legislative measures to ensure that law enforcement 
authorities have access to 'Eurodac' is the best po licy option. It will ensure that the structural 
information and verification gap which exists in  the EU as regards the exchange of asylum 
seekers data is closed, while ensuring that the access to such information can be provided in a 
straightforward and timely manner. At the same  time, the preferred option does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve its objectives and only focuses on the essential aspects of the 
cooperation. Therefore the pref erred policy option only focuses on providing the right for law 
enforcement authorities to request a comparison with 'Eurodac' data, while not regulating the 
ensuing exchange of supplementary information in case of successful comparison. Policy 
Option B would still render the ex change of supplementary information possible and simple, 
while respecting the exceptions and conditions th at are in place about the general exchange of 
law enforcement information. There are currently  in force instruments that regulate the 
exchange of law enforcement information betw een Member States, and there seems to be no 
reason to create special rules to  regulate the exchange of in formation on asylum seekers. 
Access to asylum seekers’ data by law enfo rcement should not be more favourable than 
access to any other data. Furthermore, there s eems to be no reason for which a new costly 
organisational and technical architecture is esta blished for the exchange  of the supplementary 
information, when current systems are ade quate and appropriate for this purpose. 
Under Policy Option B, when a law enforcement authority is investigat ing a crime, it would 
have the following options: it co uld search its national databases on the basis of the 
fingerprint of its suspect. If it  does not find informati on, it may try to search the national AFIS 
of other Member States using the Prüm Decision. If this is also unsuccessful, then it can 
search 'Eurodac'. If the 'Eurodac' consultation produces a hit, then the law enforcement authority could make a request to the Member State that introduced the information in 'Eurodac' under FWD 2006/960 in order to obtai n supplementary information on the person to 
whom the fingerprint belongs. In the very rare  cases where it cannot obtain the information 
using FWD 2006/960 (i.e. where the information is not available to the po lice with or without 
a judicial authorisation, or where the nati onal law of the requested Member State would 
prohibit such an exchange of data), then the requesting Member State can try to obtain the 
information using mutual legal assistance. 
The authorisation to search the fingerprint data  contained in ‘Eurodac’ for the purposes of the 
prevention, detection and investig ation of terrorism and other se rious crime must be laid down 
in EU instruments. Because of the pillar structure of the EU, the authorisation for access and regulation of access to 'Eurodac' for law en forcement purposes would require two legal 
instruments. First, it would require an amendmen t of the 'Eurodac' Regulation in order to add 
a secondary purpose permitting the use of 'Eurodac' for law enforcement purposes by a "bridging clause". Second, it would require a ne w instrument under Title VI TEU that would 
regulate the modalities of such access by law enfo rcement authorities. Additionally, as the 
Title VI instrument would not  apply to Iceland, Norway a nd Switzerland that are bound by 
the 'Eurodac' Regulation, these countries would have to give their consent to the amendment 
to that Regulation.  
A proposal for an amendment to the 'Eurodac'  Regulation in order to permit the use of 
‘Eurodac’ for law enforcement purposes can only institutionally be presented by the 
Commission. Therefore, the objective of obtai ning access to 'Eurodac' for law enforcement 
 
EN 37   EN purposes can only be achieved by EU action. As a result, the Commission is better placed to 
also present the accompanying proposal for a Co uncil decision under Title VI TEU regulating 
the actual access and use of the data held in ‘Eurodac’ by law enforcement authorities. 
This policy option could have several sub-opti ons. The choice between these sub-options is 
not made in this impact assessment and is  left to the politic al decision makers.  
One such sub-option relates to the scope of the instrument. The scope would be limited to the 
prevention, detection and investigat ion of terrorist and other seri ous criminal offences. It is 
being suggested that the term “ser ious criminal offences” could refe r: (i) to the list of serious 
criminal offences as described in the Europ ean Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, as per 
the option of the Member States, (ii) it could be  a more limited list of offences which would 
be adopted specifically for this instrument a nd which would exclude any kind of crime which 
might be specifically relevant to asylum seeker s, like illegal entry, as per the opinion of the 
civil liberties experts, or (iii) it could be the li st of crimes of the Eu ropean Arrest Warrant 
with some special guarantees for crimes specifica lly relevant to asylum seekers. The reference 
to a definition of serious crime as already used  in an existing instrument, i.e. the European 
Arrest Warrant Framework Decision presents ma ny advantages from a legal certainty point of 
view. The reason is that, as Member States co -operate in a variety of areas and exchange 
various different types of information, it is very important that there is certainty and 
consistency on which areas they can in fact coop erate. In addition, this definition is one that 
has been agreed by Member States and whic h has been a point of  reference in other 
instruments on police co-operati on. However, it is understandable  that asylum seekers should 
not be penalised for crimes that might have be en committed in their effort to flee from the 
state of origin, for example ente ring illegally in the territory of  the Member State where they 
seek protection. Sub-option (iii) would be a co mpromise between the other two sub-options, 
whereby legal certainty is maintained, wh ile taking into consideration the special 
requirements of asylum seekers.  
Another sub-option could relate to the type of public authorities that co uld have access to the 
‘Eurodac’ data. Such authorities should be authorities responsible for the prevention, 
detection and investigation of terrorist offen ces and serious crime. The designation of such 
authorities could be (i) totally at the discretion of the Member States, or (ii) subject to the 
approval by the Commission. In  the latter case the Member  States should inform the 
Commission. In view of the huge differences in the way in which Member States have 
organised their law enforcemen t authorities in terms of co mpetences and organisation, sub-
option (ii) would require trem endous efforts in terms of comparing the different law 
enforcement agencies of the Member States, whereas the issues for which access to Eurodac is being sought are not directly related to th e manner in which Member States have organised 
their law enforcement agencies. Hence such an approach would not present any added value in terms of the issues for which access to Eurodac is being sought compared to sub-option (i) in which it would be left to the Member St ates to determine the competent authorities. 
A third set of sub-options relates to the du ration of the instrument. The core difference 
between the three sub-options is  whether or not they include  a time-limit and, if so, the 
duration of that limit.  
(i) A sunset clause could be in troduced in the bridging clause in  the Regulation. Such a clause 
would be a provision repealing the bridging cl ause at a specified time period, unless its 
application is expressis verbis  extended by the Council, based on an evaluation report drawn 
 
EN 38   EN up by the Commission. To facilita te this process, and hence a possible extension of the 
application of the bridging clause , specific and well-defi ned indicators can be included in the 
sunset clause. The sunset clause can be tri ggered independent from the fact whether the 
structural information and verificati on gap continues to exist or not.  
(ii) The sunset clause would repel the Regulati on only in case that it has been established on 
the basis of the Commission evaluation that the measure has not proven to be effective and 
necessary. 
(iii) A regular evaluation mechanism can be foreseen without a sunset clause in the 
Regulation, also including specifi c and well-defined indicators. In this scenario no time limit 
would apply. However the evaluation could recommend changing or abandoning the 
instrument..   
To sum up, depending on the policy sub-option chosen: 
- the instrument would not be  applied after a cer tain time unless the Council, after the 
evaluation by the Commission, decides otherwise 
- the instrument would not apply after a certain  time unless the evaluation by the Commission 
proves it is necessary 
- the instrument would continue  to apply unless the evaluati on of the Commission proves that 
it should be amended or abandoned.  
 The various consultations that have been undert aken for the purpose of preparing this impact 
assessment, including the replies of the Member States to the questionnaire, have shown that 
an option of access to ‘Eurodac’ should have the following parameters: 
– Each individual request for consultation shoul d be duly reasoned, which means that it 
should justify why in a specific case access is legitimate, necessary, appropriate, adequate 
and proportional;  
– The database could only be consulted on a cas e-by-case basis. Access on the basis of mass 
comparisons would be explicitly prohibited. 
– Public independent authorities would carry out oversight.  
– Onward transmission to any third count ry should be strictly prohibited.  
– There should be special provi sions on data security. 
– There should be specific provisions to ensure compliance of processing activities with data 
protection principles and the rights of the data subjects. 
– In view of the role of Europol in the fi ght against cross-border organised crime, in 
particular by providing the necessary coor dination tools to national law enforcement 
authorities, it should have the same access rights as the designated law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States. 
 
EN 39   EN MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
It is important that the consultation of ‘E urodac’ would be subject to monitoring and 
evaluation. Such arrangements could be: 
An in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of consulting ‘Eurodac’, containing information 
on the exact purpose of the access for consultati on, the volume of consultations, the number 
of cases which have ended in su ccessful identifications and ve rifications and the number of 
cases on which access was denied and the reas ons for the denial, a nd report on number of 
cases on redress related to data protection an d their outcome. Member States and Europol 
should communicate such reports to the Co mmission. The evaluation provisions in the 
Regulation would include a sunset clause, de pending on the sub-opti on which is finally 
chosen.  
The Commission could review the operation of the access to Eurodac the latest within three 
years from its entry into force and submit a report to the Council. This should monitor 
whether access to 'Eurodac' has met its objectiv es and whether Member States have complied 
with their obligations. The review should also examine whether the system has been successful and justify its conclusi ons with statistics. The review  should also take into account 
the annual reports of the Member States and Eu ropol and consider all matters arising there 
from. 
Depending on the sub-option chosen, the evaluation could result in: 
- providing a basis for a possible deci sion to trigger the sunset clause 
- application of the sunset clause if the evaluation of the Commis sion proves that the 
instrument is not necessary 
- leaving the instrument in place/ proposing amendments/ withdrawing it depending on the 
findings of the evaluation. 
 
 
EN 40   EN Annex 1:  
COMPILATION OF THE REPLIES TO  THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF THE 27 EU 
MEMBER STATES , ICELAND , NORWAY AND SWITZERLAND AS WELL SENT TO 
EUROPOL  
INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Commission received 25 replies to the questionnaire. 
PART I: ACCESS AND CONSULTATI ON TO THE ‘EURODAC’ SYSTEM 
For which purpose(s) in relation to terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences, 
should police and other law enforcement auth orities be allowed to consult the ‘Eurodac’ 
system?  
The consensus was that consultation should be  allowed for the prevention, detection: and 
investigation of terrorism and other serious crime. 
More and more law enforcement authorities are confronted with the problem of individuals 
travelling without identification pape rs or falsified papers that refuse to give out who they are 
or assist the police in finding out who they ar e. The information in ‘Eurodac’ could be in 
some circumstances the only available info rmation to identify a person. Access for law 
enforcement authorities to ‘Eur odac’ could help to establish the identity of the person. One 
argument brought up in favour of allowing access to consult ‘Eurodac’ for the three purposes 
mentioned above was that that timely detection  and investigation of criminal offences can be 
instrumental to prevent other crim es, including terrorist offences.  
Most respondents suggested allowing searches for the offences referred to in Article 2 (2) of 
the European Arrest Warrant Framework Deci sion. One respondent refe rred to the definition 
applied in the VIS Council Decision. 
One respondent suggested to allow searches to establish whether asylum applicants abuse the 
European asylum system  to elude justice, as perpetrati on of certain seri ous crimes would 
jeopardise the right to obtain asylum; in that  respect both migration authorities and police 
authorities should have the possi bility to exchange knowledge about a person to maintain and 
protect public order, which is an aim of the Geneva Conventi on, with due respect however of 
fundamental rights obligations  incumbent on Member States; respondent concerned observed 
that the current strict separa tion between asylum processes an d the domain of the maintenance 
of public order presents a risk.  
Europol replied that its access should be ba sed on Article 2 of the Europol Convention. A 
respondent considered the c oncept "detecti on" unclear. 
Referring to Article 5 and 8 of the ‘Eurodac’ Regulation, which one of the data contained 
in the ‘Eurodac’ system, should be made available in case of a hit? 
The vast majority of respondents noted that a ll the data of Articles 5 and 8 should be made 
available in case of a hit. It is especially im portant to receive the fi ngerprints from 'Eurodac' 
because of the need to compare to crime s cenes and identify suspects at the earliest 
 
EN 41   EN opportunity. The Member State making the enqui ry may only possess latents and requires a 
set of fingerprints for comparison purposes, the Member State making the enquiry may not 
possess a full set of fingerprints  and may wish to conduct furthe r fingerprint searches which 
relate to the original enquiry and therefore ac cess to the ‘Eurodac’ set may be helpful, the 
Member State making the enquiry may not posse ss a good quality set of fingerprints and may 
wish to conduct further fingerpri nt searches which relate to th e original enquiry and therefore 
access to the ‘Eurodac’ set may be helpful. 
Should consultation of the ‘Eurodac’ syst em by police and other law enforcement 
authorities be allowed on the basis of ten fingerpr ints only or also on the basis of latents?  
23 respondents thought that consultation of th e ‘Eurodac’ system by police and other law 
enforcement authorities should be allowed on the basis of ten prints and also on the basis of 
latents. However, access to ‘Eurodac’, even only on the basis of ten finger prints would be of 
great use for police, even if it was not po ssible to include the check of latents.  
It was that latents help to detect the perpetra tor of an unsolved crim e and to cont ribute to 
accurate identification. One res pondent clarified that comparis on of latents to immigration 
databases demonstrated a significant hit rate. Some respondent s stated that the consultation of 
latents should only be permitted as a last resort, i.e. if the identity of a perpetrator can not be 
established in any other way. Two respondents were  of the opinion that the different technical 
possibilities of the ‘Eurodac’ system  should be looked into first.  
In case data of persons apprehended when ille gally staying on the EU territory would be 
stored in ‘Eurodac’, should those data be ac cessible for consultation by police and other 
law enforcement authorities? Please state the reasons for your answer. 
All replies were affirmative. The fingerprint data of persons apprehended when illegally 
staying on the EU territory (CAT3) may be useful  for police investigations in the same way as 
fingerprint data as for CATs 1 and 2. Moreover, the fact, for example, that a person was 
apprehended in different Member States may be  of particular importance to reveal cross 
border crime. 
Referring to the data listed under question 2 (above), should other search criteria than 
fingerprints be allowed? 
Eight respondents replied affirmatively, while th irteen respondents replied negatively. Two of 
those which replied affirmative suggested ad ditional search criter ia, including photographs, 
name and date of birth.  
Please indicate which authorities in your country should be allowed to consult the 
‘Eurodac’ system. Please state the reasons for your answer. 
The authorities which were mentioned are central investigation services with fingerprint 
experts, the same categories of authorities th at have access to CATs 2 and 3 data of the 
‘Eurodac’ Regulation, security an d intelligence services, immigr ation and nationality services, 
the department of the Public Prosecutor and authorities subordinate it, police and other law 
enforcement authorities, border guard authorit ies and fire brigades . One reply suggested 
regulating the issue of the nature of authori ties on the basis of the VIS Council Decision. 
 
EN 42   EN How should the ‘Eurodac’ system be consulted by police and possibly by other law 
enforcement authorities? Please st ate the reasons for your answer.  
The majority of respondents ( 16) believed that consultations should take place via a single 
national central access point, wh ile others (5) believed that th ere should be di rect access. 6 
respondents believed that cons ultation should take place via more than one national central 
access point. One respondent referred to the exis ting national contact points for ‘Eurodac’. A 
respondent was of the opinion that the numbe r of access points should be left to the 
discretionary power of the Member States. The re plies reflected that the concept of a national 
access point was not understood as the national existing access points to ‘Eurodac’ but was as 
new access points, front offices to the national access points of ‘Eurodac’.  
What do you consider to be the appropriate t ime frame within which an answer to the 
request for consultation of the ‘Eurodac’ system  should be available to the police or other 
law enforcement authority that is at the origin  of the consultation? Please state the reasons 
for your answer. 
The replies varied. The respondent s noted as the appropriate time frame: as soon as possible, 
within one hour, within 24 hours,  within 24 hours for exceptional cases of urgency and within 
72 hours for ordinary cases, not more than 5 days. Other responde nts noted that the 
timeframes should be the same as for the 'Eurod ac' Regulation or the Prüm Decision or the 
FWD 2006/960. 
It was stressed that there is a difference be tween consulting ‘Eurodac’ on the basis of ten 
fingerprints and latents, whic h would require more response time. Further, it would be 
unrealistic to provide results for law enforcemen t in less time than they are provided for 
Dublin users. To do so could affect the service to current users. 
For which occasion or occurrence should cons ultation of the ‘Eurodac’ system be allowed? 
Please state the reasons for your answer. 
in a specific case : 11 
in every case related to the prev ention, detection or investigation of a terrorist offence or of 
another serious criminal offence : 15 
on the basis of mass comparison, for instance co mparing a certain numbe r of unsolved latents 
(UL) or Fingerprints (TP) related to terroris t offences or serious criminal offences to 
fingerprints (TP) stored in the ‘Eurodac’ system : 10 
on a case-by-case basis & Prüm did not lead to results : 1 
Some respondents referred to  the system applied in the VIS Council Decision  that is based on 
access only in a specific case. Those respondents , which were in favour of access in every 
case explained at the expert meeting that the ticking of the criminal offence, as listed in 
Article 2 (2) would be sufficiently speci fic. One of the respondents supporting mass 
comparison referred to comparing a certain numbe r of unsolved latents or  fingerprints related 
to terrorist offences or serious criminal offences to fingerprints stored in the ‘Eurodac’ system. 
 
EN 43   EN In case you marked "in a specific case" in yo ur reply to question 9, which aspects should 
be examined prior to allowing consultatio n of the ‘Eurodac’ system? Please state the 
reasons for your answer. 
The replies referred to the seriousness of th e specific terrorist offence or other serious 
criminal offence, the necessity  to consult the ‘Eurodac’ syst em, the proportionality of the 
request, when the consultation will substantially  contribute to the pr evention, detection or 
investigation of the offence, and prior consul tation of the national AFIS via Prüm channel. 
Several respondents considered all aspects relevant. One respondent supported the model 
applied in the VIS Council Decision. At the e xpert meeting some experts considered the 
examination no comparable to the examinati on provided in the VIS Council Decision, since 
the only possible output by ‘E urodac’ is a hit-reply.  
In which form should consultation to the ‘Eurodac’ system be allowed? Please state the 
reasons for your answer. 
The respondents believed that consultation should be allowed on the basis of a reasoned 
written request (5 replies), on the basis of a reasoned electroni c request (13 replies), on the 
basis of a written request (1 reply), or on th e basis of a electronic request (11 replies). 
A reasoned written request  could be used in exceptional circumstances, like technical 
problems that prevent the electron ic transmission of a request.  
The majority of respondents identified consul tation on the basis of a reasoned electronic 
request because it is the speediest, it is th e easiest to implement, it would prevent 
unauthorised access and it would provide an audit trail.  
Several respondents preferred an electronic request because the hit/no hit answer of 
‘Eurodac’ does not demand prior justification of the request, while a check on the reason 
underlying the request should be checke d at the level of the end-user. 
One respondent clarified that the access should be  as it its, through one national contact point 
without independent control authority. The personnel worki ng on the ‘Eurodac’ system 
should, just like the staff of for instance th e Interpol office or SIRENE, check if the 
requirements are met before consulting ‘Eur odac’. Consultations should be logged. If access 
is facilitated through a single national contac t point, the office responsible for transmitting 
fingerprints through ‘Eurodac’ would verify that  the conditions for transmission are met and 
then send the fingerprints (or latents) through ‘Eurodac’ on basis of electronic request. 
Several respondents stated that only a further  request after the hit-repl y should be subject to a 
reasoned written request.  
Should the consultation procedure (questions 7, 8, 9, and 10) differ depending on the 
urgency of the case? Please state the reasons for your answer . 
11 respondents thought that the proc edure should be different in case of urgency, while 12 did 
not think so. One of the arguments raised agai nst a different consulta tion procedure in the 
case of urgency was that the system would become too complicate d. One respondent thought 
the request should be processed by the requested authority on the basis of Interpol standards, 
i.e. in exceptional cases of urgency as soon as  possible, at least w ithin twelve hours.  
 
EN 44   EN PART II: ACCESS TO FURTHER PERSONAL DATA  
Should access to further personal data linked to  the data recorded in the ‘Eurodac’ system, 
such as name, place and date of  birth of the data su bject, be covered by the legislative 
proposal? Please state the reas ons for your answer. Altern atively, specify the legal 
instrument by which means such further pers onal data should be obtained (for instance 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA,  Mutual Legal Assistance, su i generis instrument to be 
created, other).  
14 replies suggested that further data to be covered and 6 that they should not be covered. The 
respondents against the regulation of further access within the framework of the proposed 
legislation thought that the existing legislat ion is sufficient for police and other law 
enforcement authorities to get acc ess to further personal data.  
The respondents which replied that the furt her data should be covered by the proposal 
suggested that access to such data could be achieved by: a sui generis legal instrument, the 
establishment of a DubliN et-like network, access on th e basis of FWD 2006/960/JHA, 
additional first pillar legisla tion, access via Mutual legal assistance, regulation in the 
‘Eurodac’ Regulation an d ‘Eurodac’ Decision 
If the answer to the previous question is th at access to further personal data should be 
covered by the legislative proposal, or that a sui generis instrument should be created:  
Which further personal data should be covered?  
The following data categories were identified: a ll personal data held in ‘Eurodac’, data 
gathered along with the fingerprinting, includi ng the time and reason for fingerprints, the 
country which fingerprinted an d the reference number, the na me and surname (at birth and 
later surnames) of the data subject, earlier name s, alias, the place, coun try and date of birth, 
the particulars of used documents, including the identity card or passport (number, period of validity, date of issue, issuing authority, place of issue, etc.), present and / or previous nationality, first names of parent s, a description of the person's characteristics, e.g. height, 
colour of hair and eyes, known arrest and wh ereabouts search requests,  place of residence, 
known whereabouts and routes travel led, previous criminal offences, expulsion or deportation 
from EU states, sex, all other pe rsonal data useful for detecti on or investigation, and the data 
categories identified in Article 21 (2) of Regulation (EC) 343/2003. 
Within which timeframe should further personal data be obtained?  
The current accepted timeframe in the Dublin sy stem (up to two months) was considered as 
absolutely unworkable for law enforcement purposes. Replies referred to response times 
provided for in Framework Decision 2006/960/J HA and the Interpol response time. Other 
replies referred to timeframes of immediat ely, one hour, 24 hours and one or two weeks. 
How should this access take place (for instan ce direct contact between  authorities entitled 
to consult the ‘Eurodac’ system, via contact point(s), other)? 
Europol thought this should be  organised via the Europol National Units . Other respondents 
indicated via a national point of contact or by direct contact between the law enforcement 
authorities or between the authorised users of  the ‘Eurodac’ system. One respondent was in 
 
EN 45   EN favour of inserting those personal da ta in the NIST file, so that the data c ould be forwarded in 
the hit message. 
Which communication channels should be used for the exchange of information?  
The replies indicated that communication co uld take place via electronic channels, the 
Interpol channel, direct contac t between the authorities competent to consult ‘Eurodac’, or via 
the DubliNET. 
Under which conditions should this access take place? 
In one reply it was stated that this should be organised on the basis of an existing national 
legal base and existing or furthe r bilateral or multilateral international agreements. Regarding 
storage in the NIST file (sta ndard encoding of fingerprints), access should be able as an 
attachment to the ancillary data delivered next  to the hit reply or via a national access point 
and the law enforcement authorities, directly between the authorities which are entitled to 
consult the ‘Eurodac’ system.  
Access should be subject princi ples of proportionality, data sa fety and security and via the 
national access points. One respon dent replied that as a rule the migration authorities should 
be informed on any request in the case of a hit-reply. One respondent thought that persons 
entitled to access ‘Eurodac’ should have a written authorisation.  
For how much time should data obtained under  the legislative proposal be retained? 
12 replies suggested that  the data should be retained fo r a fixed period of time, while 9 
indicated that the data should be retained for a period to be  determined by the national law of 
the requesting Country. Two respondents thought that  data should be retained for as long as it 
is being used for law enforcement purposes. A nother respondent clarified that national law 
should apply.  
Should there be an obligation for the Centra l Unit of ‘Eurodac’ to notify the competent 
authority that consulted the ‘E urodac’ system on the basis of the legislative proposal that 
the further personal data regarding the data subject have been blocked or erased in ‘Eurodac’? 
11 respondents replies affirmativ ely while 9 replied negative ly. Among the arguments in 
support of a negative response, it was stated that  the Central Unit has no power in relation to 
the additional biographical da ta. One respondent though t that the existing ‘Eurodac’ rules in 
this respect should remain unchanged. 
Generally, it would be difficult to accept that ‘Eurodac’ would be able to block the passing of 
personal data or that data has been erased unless stipulated by Me mber State of origin. 
PART III DATA SECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION 
Which data security
 rules should apply to the consultation of the ‘Eurodac’ system? Please 
state the reasons for your answer 
Most replies supported the existing data secur ity requirements applicable to ‘Eurodac’. A 
minority of respondents referred to the Fr amework Decision on Data Protection. One 
 
EN 46   EN respondent favoured a strong audit trail to be ap plied to periodically mo nitor the requests to 
the consultation of the ‘Eurodac’ system. Europol stated that the data security requirements in 
the Europol Convention will be applicable.  
Which data protection  rules should apply to the cons ultation of the ‘Eurodac’ system? 
Should the Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters apply? Please state the 
reasons for your answer.  
Several respondents supported the application of the Framework Decision on Data 
Protection . Europol made clear that the Framewor k Decision on Data Protection will not be 
applicable but the data protec tion requirements in the Europol Convention will be applicable. 
One respondent was of the opinion that the processing of personal data retrieved under a 
future ‘Eurodac’ Council Decision should be subj ect to a data protectio n level in its national 
law which at least corresponds to that resulting from the Council of Europe Convention of 
28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individua ls with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data  and the Additional Protocol  of 8 November 2001 to that Convention, and 
shall take into account Recommendation No R (87) 15 of 17 September 1987  of the 
Committee of Ministers of the C ouncil of Europe Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the 
Police Sector. 
Another respondent expressed itself against onward processing of ‘Eurodac’ data to third 
countries  or international organisations and against any contact with the country of origin, to 
prevent frustration on the asylum procedure and to  prevent that the coun try of origin of the 
asylum seeker will find out the request for asyl um. Another considered transfer of ‘Eurodac’ 
data to a third country acceptable on the basis of an adequacy finding.  
In one reply the respondent made a distinction be tween a query in ‘Euroda c’ that only leads to 
hit / no-hit-reply and a request to further personal data, requiring a reasoned request.  
How should the supervision
 of the consultation  of the ‘Eurodac’ system be organised and - 
where relevant - of the processing of the further personal data ? Please state reasons for 
your answer and make a distinction between  ex-ante control and ex post control.  
The replies suggested that ex-ant e control could be  carried out by  an internal check on a 
request to consult the ‘Eurodac’  system, while only one respondent  thought that there should 
be an independent internal check on a request  to consult the ‘Eurodac’ system. It was 
considered that the internal check was justif ied by the considered moderate impact on data 
protection of the data subject. A hit-reply doe s not reveal any identification. Only access to 
further personal data would justify a more intense ex-ante control. 
According to the respondents,  ex post control should be carried out by national Data 
Protection Authorities. Ex post verification an d auditing in conjunction with data logging of 
data processing operations by the national data  protection authoritie s was only preferred by 
two respondents. According to a respondent there must be an independent check carried out 
on all law enforcement requests to ensure that  the system is not abused. Reasoned written 
/electronic requests for each search will assist in ensuring that access to ‘Eurodac’ is not 
abused. 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
EN 47   EN The Commission received 13 replies to the questionnaire. 
A. The number of actual consultati ons on asylum seekers’ fingerprints 
How many consultations of your national data  filing system containing the fingerprints 
from asylum seekers do law enforcement au thorities carry out each year for the 
purposes of prevention, detection and inve stigation of terroris t and other serious 
criminal offences? This refers both to direct consultations as well as the consultations 
via contact point or the thir d party of asylum seekers. 
The law enforcement authorities of all 13 Memb er States had direct or indirect access to 
fingerprints of asylum seekers. While three Me mber States keep the fingerprints of asylum 
seekers in the same database as  those of other thir d country nationals, si x Member States and 
two Dublin States keep them in their general fingerprints database (AFIS). The majority of 
Member States do not keep statistics and were unable to provide further data. 
How many requests do your law enforcement au thorities issue per year to consult the 
data filing system mentioned under question 1 of other Member States for the purposes 
mentioned? In how many cases per year is a single request issu ed to several Member 
States because no information is available about the Member States that could have 
processed an asylum request? Only four Member States were able to provide such statistics. 
One Member State mentioned approxim ately 5000 requests while another around 60. 
Provided such data is available: In how ma ny cases of the situations covered by 
questions 1 and 2 has the consultation of data  filing systems containing fingerprints of 
asylum seekers were helpful in the prevention, detection or investigation (prosecution) of 
terrorist offences and other serious offences? If  no such data is available, please provide 
some (real life) examples. 
The majority of Member States were unable to  provide such statistics. One Member States 
mentioned 850 hits on criminals. Member States th at keep fingerprints of asylum seekers with 
other fingerprints, mentioned a 7% hit rate, 10% hit rate, and 9000 yearly hits. 
How many times per year are the responsible  authorities of your country recipient of a 
request mentioned under question 2 i ssued by another Member State? 
The majority of Member States do not keep  statistics. Some Member States mentioned 
statistics relating to mixed fingerprint queries, including 3529 re quests, 3763, 3000 and 6292 
requests. 
In general, have there been ca ses or incidents in which the consultation of your national 
data filing systems containi ng fingerprints from asylum seekers have been considered 
unlawful? If yes, please specify. 
Member States reported that ther e have been no such instances. 
What control mechanisms are in place to p revent the misuse/abuse of the possibility for 
law enforcement purposes to consult national da ta filing systems containing fingerprints 
from asylum seekers? 
 
EN 48   EN Several control mechanisms were mentioned, including a reasoned request for access, 
consultations done through a single point of access that checks all requests, auditing, checks by the data protection authorities, a nd other guarantees under national law. 
Based on the current number of the requests ( question 2 above), do you expect that the 
number of requests would change if ‘Eurodac ’ can be consulted? Would the number of 
the requests increase, e.g. because of the cons ultations will become less burdensome, or 
decrease, e.g. because ‘Eurodac’ will increase ef ficiencies by indicating whether and if 
so: in which Member States further personal data about the asylum seeker can be obtained. Please provide an estimation  of future number of consultations. 
The majority of Member States expected the number of requests to decrease, while 
consultation of ‘Eurodac’ to increase. 
B. Financial part 
Referring to question 1 of section A, what ar e the relative and/or absolute cost elements 
of a consultation of national database on th e basis of a national request in particular 
manpower (number of staff involved) and in frastructure? How many working hours are 
involved in average in processing a consultation and costs per hour? 
The questions varied from 15 minut es to one day, but all agreed  that specialised staff is 
required to perform the consultation.  
Referring to question 2 of section A, what a re the relative and/or absolute cost elements 
of a consultation of national database on th e basis of an ongoing request in particular 
manpower (number of staff involved) and in frastructure? How many working hours are 
involved in average in processing a consultation and costs per hour? 
Referring to question 2 of section A, what a re the relative and/or absolute cost elements 
of a consultation of national database on th e basis of an incoming request in particular 
manpower (number of staff involved) and in frastructure? How many working hours are 
involved in average in processing a consultation and costs per hour? 
The questions varied from 15 minutes to 2 hours. 
‘Eurodac’ could only provide a ‘hit rep ly’, which means that law enforcement 
authorities should obtain additional data re lated to the matching fingerprints to take 
law enforcement action. What are the relative  and/or absolute cost elements of the 
processing of an incoming request to provi de additional data in particular manpower 
(number of staff involved) and infrastructu re? How many working hours are involved in 
average in processing a cons ultation and costs per hour? 
The replies varied from 30 minutes to 8 hours.  
How would the access to ‘Eurodac’ change the costs referred to in questions no. 1, 2 and 
3 of this section? What type of saving s (e.g. increased efficiency) or additional 
expenditure (establishing access points for ‘Eurodac’)? 
The Member States generally fi nd it difficult to estimate b ecause they cannot predict the 
number of hits and the number  of requests for supplementary information. The majority of 
 
EN 49   EN Member States do not believe that they would re quire additional staff a nd investment in case 
that access to ‘Eurodac’ is permitted, while other believe that an additional 1-2 trained staff might be required. 
C. Types of criminal offences 
Referring to your replies to the question unde r section A, please indicate the crimes for 
which your national law allows consultation of  the national (fingerprint) data of asylum 
seekers for the purpose of preventi on, detection and investigation. 
The majority of Member States have access to asylum seekers fingerprints for all the 
prevention, detection and investig ation of all crimes, while some Member States limit such 
access to crimes that are puni shable with imprisonment. 
Does your national law also cons ultation to prevent, detect or  investigate inciting, aiding, 
abetting and attempting of the criminal offe nces referred to in your reply to the question 
1 of this section? 
All Member States permit such consultations. 
 
EN 50   EN Annex 2  
OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE EXPERTS 
For the purpose of the prepara tion of this Impact Assessment report, the Commission services 
consulted the following stakeholders: 
Law enforcement stakeholders of the Member  States, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland as 
well as Europol on 25 and 26 September 2007 
Stakeholders representing civil society on 8 October 2007 Representatives of the national data protectio n authorities of the Member States, and of 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland as well of the Joint Supervisory Body of Europol and of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor on 11 October 2007. 
1. The purposes for consultation of ‘Eurodac’  
Law enforcement stakeholders confirm that access to ‘Eurodac’ by  the enforcement is 
necessary to achieve an adequate level of efficiency in the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorism and other serious crim e. In their view, the information contained in 
‘Eurodac’ is required for two reasons: to identif y a person suspected of committing or having 
committed such offence or of a victim thereof, and to verify the identity of a suspect or a 
victim if there are serious doubts about his id entity. Access to ‘Eur odac’ should only be 
permitted if there are well founded grounds to believe that consultation can assist the 
identification or verification. 
Law enforcement authorities pointed out that th e obligation of asylum applicant to provide 
fingerprints is a feature of the Dublin system and is considered necessary and proportionate, 
and does not jeopardise the right to asylum . Access to such data by law enforcement 
authorities for the purpose of prevention and fight against crime is also necessary and 
proportionate and will not interfer e with the right to asylum.  
The legislation providing law enforcem ent authorities with access to the VIS
11 shows that 
access of law enforcement to a non-law enforcemen t information system is possible. It shows 
that it is possible to strike a fair balanc e between security needs and data protection 
safeguards by imposing conditions incumbent on th e law enforcement users of the first pillar 
information system. However, civil society argues that the position of 'Eurodac' is not comparable to the position in VIS. The position of  an asylum seeker would be very different 
from that of a third-country national tourist, who would always have the choice to decide 
                                                
 
11 The Visa Information System is a sy stem that contains personal data related to visa applicants by third 
country nationals. The Council Decision regulates the access for consultation of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the 
prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences. An applicant for a short stay visa who happens to have the nationality of a third State subject to a visa 
obligation is obliged - in the same way as an asylum applicant, to provide fingerprint data as well as 
other personal data to the visa issuing authority. If th is person does not respect the visa obligations and 
is subsequently apprehended when illegally crossing the border or is illegally residing on the territory of 
the EU, (s) he can be coerced to provide fingerprints to allow chec ks against the ‘Eurodac’ system.  
 
EN 51   EN whether or not to apply for a visa taking on board  that law enforcement authorities may in the 
future access the VIS under certain conditions.  
Experts representing civil society are afraid that  potential asylum seekers will be discouraged 
from requesting asylum if access to ‘Eurodac’ is allowed for law enforcement purposes. It 
would be exacerbated by the fear that access by  police and other law enforcement authorities 
in the Member States and by Eu ropol to information about the asylum seeker could end up in 
the hands of authorities of their country of  origin. If such would happen, it could expose 
relatives or friends of the applicant, or the ap plicant him or herself to  the risk of inhuman 
treatment. Law enforcement stakeholders agree that legislation should provide for guarantees 
to prevent misuse of personal da ta on the asylum seekers. Strict  rules regarding data security 
and the transmission channels should be enshrined in law. 
Data protection authorities and re presentatives of civil society c onsider that the further use of 
‘Eurodac’ is unacceptable because such access would infringe the purpose limitation principle and change ‘Eurodac’ into a crim inal investigation tool . This would be cont rary to the specific 
purpose of ‘Eurodac’ that is based on an asyl um and immigration legal basis of the EC 
Treaty.  
Civil society experts believe that it is discri minatory that asylum seekers fingerprints are 
taken and accessible to law enforcement authorities and fingerprints of normal citizens not. One expert considered that therefore the fingerp rints should be taken of all citizens. Asylum 
seekers will have a bigger chance to be subjec t to law enforcement thanks to fingerprint 
identification compared to normal citizens. They  were of the opinion th at it will therefore 
stigmatise asylum seekers. 
2. The necessity of consultation of ‘Eurodac’ 
The experts presented examples and scenario s supporting the need to access ‘Eurodac’ to 
tackle crime could otherwise not be solved or on ly in an inefficient manner. They highlighted 
that ‘Eurodac’ contains information that is not readily available from ot her sources or through 
other information channels. The need for access was corroborated by the following 
observations. 
Efficient law enforcement requires that suspects are uniquely identified as soon as possible 
and that alleged identities are verified. Only  fingerprint-based information makes this 
possible. 
Fingerprint comparison via ‘Eurodac’ maybe th e only manner to uniquely identify a third 
country national about who no reliable, stable  or coherent biographical information is 
available. In some cases ‘Eurodac’ is the onl y information available about an individual who 
is no resident of or does not have the nationality  of one of the signatory  states of the Dublin 
Regulation. Further, in most cases it is the onl y fingerprint informati on available about third 
country nationals. 
Access to data recorded in ‘Eurodac’ avoids th at a law enforcement authority has to request 
access to personal national asylum data fr om each Member State individually. The 
identification of the Member State that entered the fingerprint data into ‘Eurodac’ will save 
considerable time to obtain the further biographical data of the asylum seeker that that Member States recorded. 
 
EN 52   EN Rapid resolution of identitie s through ‘Eurodac’ allows sa ving considerable time and 
manpower whilst achieving higher  levels of law enforcement. Timely detection and 
investigation can lead to successful prevention of  terrorist offences or other serious crimes. 
Data protection authorities considered access to ‘Eurodac’ not only unnecessary but also 
disproportional and against the prin ciple of fairness. Some experts were of the opinion that , if 
access to ‘Eurodac’ under conditions should be a llowed after all, every Member State should 
separately demonstrate that it is legally and practically prepared to manage access ‘Eurodac’ for law enforcement purposes. This could be organised by peer evaluations.  
3. The scope  
Access to fingerprint data contained in ‘Eurod ac’ might often be nece ssary to assist law 
enforcement authorities in their task to prevent, detect and investigate criminal offences. ‘Eurodac’ is searched with fingerprints only an d returns, in case the reference set matches a 
recorded set of ten fingerprints, a hit-reply confirming the match, as well as some additional data, including the reference number that links th e fingerprint data with a record held in a 
separate national database in the Member State th at recorded the fingerprint data in ‘Eurodac’. 
The separate file contains further biographical data of the asylum applicant. Law enforcement stakeholders insist that access to data record ed in ‘Eurodac’ is more efficient unless the 
further biographical data of the asylum applicant are not readily accessible. These additional data should be swiftly made  available in the case of a hit-reply from ‘Eurodac’.  
Some experts of civil society are of the opinion that the Council conclusions of 12-13 June 
2007 should be interpreted as inviting the Commissi on only to prepare le gislation to regulate 
access to the data recorded in ‘Eurodac’. They  also object to access by Europol to ‘Eurodac’ 
because it is not comparable to the law enfor cement authorities of the Member States. Some 
data protection stakeholders share that view.  
4. The types of crime for which access is justified   
Law enforcement stakeholders are of the opinion  that the prevention of and fight against the 
criminal offences listed in  Article 2 (2) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant
12 ( EAW Framework Decision) justify access to consult 
‘Eurodac’ data.  
Civil society stakeholders and da ta protection authorities are of  the opinion that the scope of 
the crimes listed in Article 2 (2) of the EA W Framework Decision is too wide and should be 
restricted to specific extremely serious offences . Some experts stated that access for reasons 
of crime prevention should be treated differently from consulting ‘Eurodac’ for investigation. The concept of prevention would be too vague and lead to using ‘Eurodac’ for unrelated 
purposes, i.e. allowing fishing expeditions. Th e range of crimes allowing access to consult 
‘Eurodac’ for crime prevention should be restrict ed, for instance only to terrorist offences, and 
only in case of a concrete and imminent danger of a terrorist attack which would cause great 
bodily harm and if the risk is  based on concrete facts.  
                                                
 
12 OJ L 190, 18.07.2002, p.1. 
 
EN 53   EN Law enforcement stakeholders recognize the da ta protection, but were of the opinion that 
these could be catered for by providing for acce ss on a reasoned case-by-case basis related to 
a specific criminal offence in an agreed list of offences.  
5. The types of data recorded in ‘Eurodac ’ to be consulted other than fingerprints 
Law enforcement stakeholders stated that it is  vital that they receive with each hit in 
‘Eurodac’, the reference number of the fingerpri nt record allocated by the Member State of 
origin as well as the indication of that Member State. Furthermore when necessary and proportional, a law enforcement authority may re quest, in case of a hit, access to the other 
data recorded in ‘Eurodac’ in conjunction with the fingerprint. 
6. The access to additional supplementary information   
The categories of supplementary information that  each Member State records in addition to 
the fingerprint data in ‘Eurodac’ are laid dow n in Article 21(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an  asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-coun try national (the Dublin II Regulation). Law enforcement 
authorities stated that access to  these data is in general appropriate, relevant and non-
excessive, as well as necessary to take law enforcement action. As was set out above, access 
to the fingerprint data without the possibility to promptly consult the additional biographical 
data related to the person whose fingerprints are recorded would not be efficient from a law 
enforcement perspective. 
For example, when consultation of ‘Eurodac’ informs the police authorities of a Member 
State that the fingerprint data of a person arrested on the suspicion of having committed a 
serious crime are stored in ‘Eur odac’, ‘Eurodac’ always provides the fingerprint print data, the 
gender of the person involved, the date on which the fingerprints  were taken, the date on 
which the data were transmitted to the Centra l Unit of ‘Eurodac’ and the reference number 
used by the Member State of origin and the iden tity of that Member State. Police authorities 
must know the name of the person involved as we ll as other biographical data to prosecute the 
arrested person.  
Two EU legal instruments could be used to  obtain those biographi cal data. Framework 
Decision 2006/960 if the police in the requested Member State has access to the data, and the 
national law of that State does not consider that these data were obtained by means of coercive measures. If that instrument cannot be used, Member States can use mutual legal 
assistance. This situation leads to different po ssibilities to obtain data across the EU and does 
not create a level playing fiel d for law enforcement authorities. Member States have very 
different ways to manage addi tional biographical data: in some police collects, stores and 
accesses these data, whereas in other they are in the remit of immigration authorities.  
A majority of law enforcement stakeholders that  addressed the issue hold that the legislative 
proposal providing for access to ‘Eurodac’ shoul d also contain rules and procedures to access 
further biographical data. Civil society stakeholders consider ed that any possible future 
legislation should be restricted  to regulating access to ‘Eurod ac’. It is sufficient that the 
requesting law enforcement authority know in  which direction he should go to obtain 
additional data.  
 
EN 54   EN 7. The categories of authorities authorised  to access ‘Eurodac’ for law enforcement 
purposes 
All law enforcement stakeholders hold that po lice and other law enforcement authorities such 
as customs should have access. Some stated that access should also be granted to border 
control authorities and immigration aut horities for law enforcement purposes.  
A minority maintained that intelligence and s ecurity services should be entitled to access 
‘Eurodac’. National data protect ion authorities and civil society stakeholders however oppose 
such access. The Commission observed that Article 33 TEU and 64(1)  TEC exclude national 
security and the maintenance of public order fr om the scope of competence of the European 
Union. It can therefore not be substance of EU legislation. 
8. The conditions and modalities for search ing and accessing ‘Eurodac’ in normal 
circumstances as well as in ex ceptional cases of urgency  
This Impact Assessment identifies different  situations under which ‘Eurodac’ can be 
consulted. In an exceptional case of urgency conditions for consultation may have to be 
adjusted to save time.  
8.1. The conditions for searching and acce ssing ‘Eurodac’ in normal circumstances  
Law enforcement stakeholders consider the seri ousness of an offence as the most relevant 
condition justifying access to ‘Eurodac’. Moreover  they stated that first the national AFIS 
should be consulted, and subsequently the fing erprint data available on the basis of the 
proposal for the Prüm Decision. Consulting ‘Eur odac’ by law enforcement authorities is 
conceived as a means to identify or to verify  the identity of a person after other means of 
identification have failed or have  proven not to be appropriate.  
Stakeholders are divided as to whet her access should be on a case-by-case  basis only or 
should also be allowed in general for each case  related to a crime listed in Article 2(2) of the 
EAW Framework Decision. Consu ltation on a case-by-case basi s demands to reason each 
request whereas in the latter case  it would be sufficient to make  reference to a crime listed in 
the EAW Framework Decision. The law enforcemen t stakeholders who e xpressed themselves 
in favour of access on a generalised access stated that consultation for a particular crime of 
the EAW Framework Decision is sufficiently speci fic and that therefore justification of the 
request is not necessary. Moreover, they argue that the reply to a consultation only informs 
about the availability of a matching fingerprint and is not suffic ient to establish the identity of 
a person or to take law enforcement action. Law enforcement stakeholders in favour of a case-
by-case approach referred to the VIS Council Deci sion that is based on a similar approach. In 
their view, each request should jus tify the reasons for consultation.  
A number of law enforcement stakeholders expl icitly requested to allow for mass comparison 
of fingerprints and unsolved la tents against the fingerprints contained in the ‘Eurodac’ 
database. This would mean that a multitude of latents or fingerprints are forwarded to ‘Eurodac’ for comparison, for instance because a law enforcement authority wants to check 
all fingerprints of the unsolved cases of the last twelve months against the most recent data in ‘Eurodac’. One of the arguments against bulk ch ecks is that it consumes a lot of processing 
power of the system and could a dversely affect the service to th e current users of ‘Eurodac’. It 
would require additional matching capacity and even  more so when fast are urgently needed. 
Alternatively, limited comparison possibilities in pe riods of low-traffic could be considered.  
 
EN 55   EN 8.2. Access in exceptional cases of urgency  
The current response time of the ‘Eurodac’ syst em is sufficient in th e eyes of most law 
enforcement stakeholders. Nonetheless, the expected raise of number of requests could 
negatively affect the technical capability of ‘Eurodac’ to re spond quickly. For this reason 
‘Eurodac’ should be capable to guarantee priority  treatment of requests flagged as “urgent".  
Moreover, to ensure the prompt handling of these exceptional cases of urgency from the 
moment of introducing a request for consultation until the moment  that the reply is provided, 
law enforcement stakeholders support the view that ex ante  verification of the individual 
request should be replaced by a verificati on immediately after the reply was provided ( ex 
post) similar to the approach in the VIS Council Decision.  
8.3. Ex ante verification 
A number of law enforcement authorities acknowl edge the need for a prior independent check 
on the lawfulness  of the consultation of ‘Eurodac’. They favour an independent internal  
legality check because they consider that consu ltation of data recorded in ‘Eurodac’ has no or 
if any, only a small impact on the privacy of the person involved, because the reply does not 
reveal the identity of a person. Among data prot ection authorities the issu e was raised that ex 
ante verification should be regulated  at the level of the judiciary.  
8.4 Ex post data protection oversight 
Law enforcement stakeholders generally acknowle dge the need for data protection oversight 
of law enforcement access to ‘Eurodac’ by the na tional data protection au thorities. Some of 
them stated that consultation of ‘Eurodac’ shoul d be logged, to verify the legality later on.  
Data protection authoritie s mentioned that their ex post  data protection oversight is hampered by 
the lack of human resources an d financial means which would mo reover have an impact on the 
independence of these authorities.  
8.5 The communication modes of re questing access to ‘Eurodac’ 
A majority of law enforcement stakeholders ho ld the view that consultation of ‘Eurodac’ 
should be based on an electronic re quest addressed to a central acc ess point. Some stated that 
access based on a written request should be allo wed as fallback option in case electronic 
communication is impossible.  
Stakeholders seem to agree that each Member State should designate an  authority as National 
Central Access Point (hereafter referred to as NC AP) that would be the intermediary between 
the Member States' competent law enforcement authorities, authorised to consult ‘Eurodac’ 
and the Central Unit of ‘Eurodac’ that will carr y out the consultation on their behalf. Such a 
national access point could be the existing national access points that functions as 
intermediary to ‘Eurodac’. The NCAP would be a centralising contact point that would 
upload the fingerprints transmitted with the re quest for consultation in ‘Eurodac’, and it 
would be independent from existi ng contact points such as asylum or immigr ation authorities. 
One law enforcement stakeholder stated that the latter author ities should process the requests 
for consultation since they alr eady have a secure network inte rface. Access via the existing 
‘Eurodac’ national access points would have the practical advantage that connections are 
"ready to go" in terms of set up and security  interface. Establishing law enforcement NCAPs 
 
EN 56   EN would not affect the search modalities provid ed for in the ‘Eurodac’ Regulation. Some law 
enforcement stakeholders favour direct  access to ‘Eurodac’ by competent law enforcement 
authorities. Alternatively the existing national ‘Eurodac’ authorities could transmit requests to 
the Central Unit of ‘Eurodac’ on behalf of the law enforcement authorities and forward the 
replies to the requesting la w enforcement authority.  
9. The response times 
The response time of ‘Eurodac’ to law enforcement consultations should be similar to that of 
requests from asylum authorities. The NCAP  should communicate the reply immediately to 
the competent law enforcement authority. With  regard to the time to obtain further 
biographical data in relation to  a ‘Eurodac’ reply, law enfor cement stakeholders mentioned 
this should be as short as possible, and not  exceed 24 hours in normal circumstances and 8 
hours in exceptional cases of urgency.  
The current response time to a request to provide further biographical data is considered to be 
totally inadequate . Article 21 (5) of the Dublin II Re gulation stipulates that the requested 
Member State shall be obliged  to reply within six weeks . The time constraints to process an 
asylum request differ completely from those to respond effectively to crime and crime threats. 
Besides, law enforcement needs require that a special procedure with short response times 
would exist to deal with emergencies. 
10. The data retention period 
Data protection authorities consid er that law enforcement author ities should specify (in each 
case) the period during which they want to retain the data. They consider that the current time limits in the ‘Eurodac’ Regulati on are disproportional in  relation to the purpose for which law 
enforcement authority envisage to use ‘Eurodac’  data and that the legislation should set the 
appropriate retention period.  
Most law enforcement representatives prefer th at the national law of the requesting Member 
State determines th e retention period. 
11. The onward processing to third States 
Law enforcement stakeholders want to be ab le to transfer under certain conditions data 
retrieved from ‘Eurodac’ to third States beca use effective law enforcement sometimes calls 
for international cooperation. 
Civil society stakeholders and national data protection authorities ar e strongly opposed to 
onward processing data to third Stat es, in order to avoid that the data of an asylum seeker are 
transmitted to the State from which he fled. Th e opinion was raised that not only the issue of 
transfer of ‘Eurodac’ data and a dditional data to third States (i ncluding the State of origin of 
the asylum seeker) should be carefully looke d into but also the onward processing in a 
domestic context.  
12. Data security 
Law enforcement stakeholders consider that the current data security requirements in the 
‘Eurodac’ Regulation are adequate  and sufficient. Nonetheless, a considerable number of 
them want to supplement these requirements w ith the relevant prov isos of the Council 
 
EN 57   EN Framework Decision on the protection of persona l data processed in the framework of police 
and judicial cooperation in crimin al matters. Some consider that the data security requirements 
in the VIS Council Decision are an attractive alternative  
Data protection authorities stated that unauthorise d access to ‘Eurodac’ and abuse of fingerprint 
data, but in particular of the further biographi cal data, should be prevented and be subject to 
sanctions.  
13. Fundamental Rights 
Civil society expressed serious concerns about the stigmatising effect that law enforcement 
access to ‘Eurodac’ would have. They  fear that with this form of extended use of ‘Eurodac’, 
all asylum seekers will be automatically considered as potential crime suspects which would 
influence the way this (vulnerabl e) group of persons will be trea ted by society. As fingerprints 
are not available from all citizens in the same manner as from asylum se ekers, the latter have 
an increased chance that they can be linked to and condemned for a crime on the basis of fingerprints via ‘Eurodac’ search es. Representatives of civil society emphasized the very 
vulnerable position of asylum seekers and the ob ligation to prevent that the State of origin 
would obtain or access information on the asylum applicant.  
Law enforcement authorities however, pointed out that residents or citizens of Member States 
are more likely to have stable or known identi ties and are recorded in numerous databases. 
They refute that accessing fingerprint data  of asylum seekers by them is causing 
stigmatisation since that it would be rather th e consequence of the existence of the Dublin 
system itself. The fact that asylum seekers as a specific category of indi viduals are recorded in 
‘Eurodac’ are setting them apart, not the fact  that law enforcement would access these data. 
For that reason law enforcement consultatio n as such could not cause discrimination. 
Moreover, such consultation would not be dispro portional or unduly interfere with the right to 
privacy if genuine law enforcement interests exist.  
Some law enforcement stakeholders observed th at ‘Eurodac’ is based on the consideration 
that each and every asylum seeker can potentially apply for asylum in different signatory States of the Dublin Regulation and that this assumption is sufficient gr ound to consider that 
it is necessary, proportional, and not excessi ve to coerce the taking of fingerprints. 
However, not allowing or curtailing law enfo rcement access to ‘Eurod ac’ heralds the view 
that inefficient data access l eads to better protecti on of fundamental rights. Law enforcement 
stakeholders countered this point of view by pointing out that this leads to more crimes 
remaining unsolved and more expensive crime resolution. Paradoxically, inefficient crime 
resolution requires that law enforcement authorities access more personal data or more persons to establish whether or not relevant data exist. This causes a higher risk of 
infringement of privacy than efficient and st raightforward access to databases would cause. 
Moreover, inefficient access demands more man power of the law enforcement authorities and 
is more expensive. Furthermore, it was inferred that acceptance of the implicit argument that inefficient data access leads to better data  protection is equally unfounded, unproven or 
unwarranted as claiming that acce ss to all data should be free.  
 
EN 58   EN Annex 3  
Administrative costs  
Policy Option B:  
 
     Tariff 
(€ per hour)    Time  (hour) 
  Price (per action or equip) Freq  
(per year) Nbr  
of  entities Total nbr
of  actions Total  
cost Regulat
ory origin (%) 
      
  
                                        
No. Ass. Art. Orig. 
Art. Type of 
obligation Description of 
required action(s) Target 
group i e i e           Int EU Nat Reg   
                                        
1     notification notification of 
the identity of 
the designated competent 
authorities level 
to the Commission.  
 Member 
States  
25   5,00   125,00 1,00 27 27 3375,00   100%     
  
2   notification notification of 
the national 
central access 
point (NCAP) to the 
Commission. Member 
States  
25  5,00  125,00 1,00 27 27 3375,00  100%     
3     listing listing of the 
specialized 
units within the designated 
competent 
authorities at national level.  Member 
States  
25   5,00   125,00 1,00 27 27 3375,00   100%      noti f
 
EN 59   EN  
4     Annual 
reporting 
 Annual reporting by the national data 
protection 
authorities 
 Member 
States 
25  30,00  750,00 1,00 27 27 20250,00  100%     
The assumption is that there are 1760 working hours per year per person (8 hours * 20 days * 11 months).  
Average employment costs in the EU-27 public administration: Eu rostat: Average hourly labour costs, defined as total labour cos ts divided by the corresponding number of hours worked (€20,35 in 2005). The 
2005 figure has been rounded upwards, based on the assumption of economic growth and pattern over the preceding years and overh eads of 10% have been added. 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ portal/page?_pageid=19 96,39140985&_dad=portal&_sch ema=PORTAL&screen=deta ilref&language=en&prod uct=Yearlies_new_population&root=Y 
 
EN 60   EN