EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 3 August 2005  
at the request of the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic  
on a draft law on lobbying and on amendments to certain laws 
(CON/2005/25) 
 
1. On 24 June 2005 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Ministry of Justice 
of the Slovak Republic for an opinion on a draf t law on lobbying and on amendments to certain 
laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).  
2. The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consulta tion of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the draft law contains provisions concerning a 
national central bank (NCB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Central Bank, th e Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
3. The main purpose of the draft law is to establis h a legal framework to regulate lobbying as a 
business activity in the Slovak Republic, thereby ensuring the transparency and accountability of 
public officials and establishing the areas in which l obbying is and is not permissible. It lays down 
both the obligations of lobbyists and the obligations  and prohibitions to which public officials who 
are exposed to lobbying are subject. In particular, Article 9(3) of the draft law establishes that 
certain public officials have to publish their wo rk programme for the previous month before the 
tenth day of each month. According to Article 9(4) of the draft law, a work programme means a timetable of working meetings at which lobbying contact took place, giving details of the place and 
date of meetings and of the regulation, document or  matter to which the meeting related. Failure to 
comply with the obligations and prohibitions laid  down by the draft law may lead to sanctions 
including dismissal of the public official concerned. 
4. The list of public officials who may be exposed to lobbying contained in Article 2(4) of the draft 
law includes the Governor of Národná banka Slovenska (NBS) and other members of NBS’s 
highest governing body, the Bank Board (hereinafter the ‘Bank Board’). The draft law provides that the Governor of NBS, like some other public officials, will be obliged to publish details of 
their work programme for the previous month on the internet by the tenth day of each month. 
5. The ECB therefore considers that the draft law raises concerns as far as the independence of both 
NBS and its Governor is concerned. Article  108 of the Treaty establishing the European 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
 2Community and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank establish the principle of  institutional independence which prohibits the 
government of a Member State from seeking to influence the members of the decision-making 
bodies of the NCBs whose decisions may have an impact on the fulfilment by the NCBs of their tasks relating to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Under Slovak law, the principle of 
institutional independence is enshrined in relation to NBS in Article 56 of the the Constitution of 
the Slovak Republic No 460/1992 Coll., as last am ended and Article 1(1) of the Act No 566/1992 
Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska, as last amended (hereinafter the ‘NBS Act’). 
6. While the draft law provides for some exclusi ons to the reporting obligation laid down in 
Article 9(3), it cannot be excluded that this oblig ation covers activities of the Governor of NBS 
with regard to ESCB-related tasks. The ECB cons iders that this obligation conflicts with the 
principle of institutional independence establishe d by the Treaty and the Statute and under Slovak 
law. Central banking tasks may also require inform al dialogue between an NCB and third parties. 
The reporting obligation laid down in Article 9(3) of  the draft law therefore comes close to an ex 
ante consultation requirement, which could provide  the Slovak Government with a mechanism to 
influence NBS’s decision-making.  
7. The ECB also considers that Article 9(3) of th e draft law impinges on the personal independence of 
the Governor of NBS. Article 14.2 of the Statute provides for safeguards against arbitrary dismissal 
of the Governors of NCBs stating that they may only be dismissed if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for performance  of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious 
misconduct. Under the draft law the Governor of NBS may be dismissed if they fail to comply with 
the reporting obligation imposed by Article 9(3) of  the draft law, even if the requirements of 
Article 14.2 of the Statute are not fulfilled. 
8. The ECB understands that the intention behind the draf t law is to make NBS subject to principles of 
transparency and accountability while preventing conflicts of interest of members of the Bank Board. However, the ECB considers that current Slovak legislation already provides for sufficient 
safeguards against such conflicts of interest. In particular, Article 7(7) of the NBS Act excludes members of the Bank Board from performing lobbying contact (as defined in Article 2(2) of the 
draft law) as it amounts to an explicit prohibition on  them doing so. Moreover, other provisions of 
Article 7 of the NBS Act support th is view. Article 7(5) of the NBS Act provides that a member of 
the Bank Board must not prefer his personal interest to the public interest and must abstain from anything which might conflict with the performance of the office of a member of the Bank Board. 
Furthermore, Article 7(6) of the NBS Act states that membership of the Bank Board is incompatible with occupying any post or perform ing any activity (be it in the public or private 
domain, remunerated or unremunerate d) which may give rise to a conflict of interest with the duties 
of a member of the Bank Board. Moreover, issues rela ting to conflicts of interest of members of the 
Bank Board are regulated separately under the Constitutional Act No 357/2004 Coll. on protection 
of public interest in the performance of the office of public functionaries (hereinafter the 
 3‘Constitutional Act’) which contains a definition of  public functionaries which covers members of 
the Bank Board. 
9. The ECB takes note that Article 2(3) of the draft law provides for exclusions from the definition of 
a lobbying contact. These include communication between public officials, public authorities and their employees (Article 2(3)(a)), the raising of comments on a draft regulation or document during 
comments proceedings and communication in r espect of such comments in accordance with 
provisions governing comments proceedings (Article  2(3)(e)). Moreover, disclosure of information 
is also excluded if it is contrary to ‘binding le gal acts of the European Communities and European 
Union or an international treaty having binding e ffect on the Slovak Republic’, referring directly to 
Article 38 of the Statute
2. 
10. The ECB considers that the wording of Article 2(3)(a ) and (e) of the draft law is unclear. First, it is 
arguable whether under the draft law, communi cation between public officials and public 
authorities and their employees also includes co mmunication with Community institutions and 
their officials, and in particular the ECB and its employees. In this respect, the ECB observes that 
since NBS became a member of the ESCB on 1 May 2004, the ECB and its employees have communicated regularly with NBS in relation to th e performance of the objectives and tasks of the 
ESCB by the NCBs. Second, the ECB notes that Artic le 2(3)(e) of the draft law, which excludes 
comments proceedings from the scope of lobbying c ontacts, does not clearly refer to the advisory 
functions of the ECB as provided for in the Treaty
3 and in the Statute4. According to the latter 
provisions, which are reiterated in Article 2 of  Council Decision 98/415/EC, national authorities 
must consult the ECB regarding any draft legisla tive provision in its fields of competence and the 
ECB may submit an opinion to the relevant nati onal authorities on matters in its fields of 
competence. The ECB notes that unless its  advisory role is explicitly referred to in the draft law in 
the context of excluding communication in the course of comments proceedings from the scope of lobbying contact, this opinion itself could be rega rded as lobbying contact within the meaning of 
the draft law. The ECB therefore considers that the two exclusions provide d for under Article 2(3) 
of the draft law should be am ended to explicitly refer to communication with Community 
institutions and their officials and to consultations  with Community institutions, e.g. to advisory 
functions performed by the ECB in its fields of competence. 
11. As a separate issue, the ECB welcomes the provi sions of the draft law prohibiting lobbying in 
relation to certain matters
5. In particular, the prohibition on lobb ying in relation to decision-making 
by public authorities when issuing licences, permits , authorisations and other individual legal acts 
will safeguard the independence of decision-maki ng by NBS, which will perform supervision of 
the whole financial market in the Slovak Republic from 1 January 2006. 
                                                 
2  The draft law cross refers to Article 11(1)(f) of Act No  211/2000 Coll. on free access to information and on amendments 
to certain laws, as amended (F reedom of Information Act). 
3  Article 105(4) of the Treaty. 
4  Article 4 of the Statute. 
5  Article 8 of the draft law. 
 412. In conclusion, the ECB considers that the draft law should be amended to exclude from its scope 
any member of NBS’s decision-making bodies, at least to the extent that they are performing ESCB-related tasks. 
13. The ECB would appreciate it if the Slovak authorities kept it informed of any proposed 
amendments to the draft law affecting the issues addressed in this opinion. 
14. This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 
  Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 August 2005. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET