EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 15 March  2022   
on limitations to cash payments  
(CON/20 22/9) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 1 February 2019  the European Central Bank ( ECB)  adopted an opinion1 in response to a request from 
the Banco de España, on behalf of the Spanish State Secretary for Finance, for an opinion on a draft law on 
measures for the prevention of and fight against fiscal fraud, transposing Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 
of July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market and Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on tax dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the E uropean Union, and on the amendment of specific tax rules  (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . 
On 9 July 2021 the Spanish Parliament adopted the Law on measures for the prevention of and fight against 
fiscal fraud, transposing Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, of modification of various tax 
and gambling regulations  (hereinafter the ‘Law’)
2, which contains  significant changes  compared to the draft 
law.  
The ECB has decided to deliver an own initiativ e opinion on the L aw. The ECB’s competence to deliver an 
opinion is based on Articles  127(4)  and 282(5)  of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and  
the second indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC3, as the L aw relates to means of payment. 
In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, 
the Governing Council has adopted this  opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the L aw 
1.1 To reinforce  the fight against fiscal  fraud, the draft law  lowered  the cash payment limit set in Law 
7/2012 of 29 October 2012 amending tax and budget rules and adapting financial rules for the 
intensification of action for the prevention of and fight against fraud4 from EUR 2 500 to EUR  1 000 
where a payer  acts in a professional or business capacity. However , to minimise the collateral effects 
 
1  Opinion CON/2019/4.  All ECB opinions are available on EUR -Lex. 
2  Ley 11/2021, de 9 de julio, de medidas de prevención y lucha contra el fraude fiscal, de transposición de la Directiva 
(UE) 2016/1164, del Consejo, de 12 de julio de 2016, por la que se establecen normas contra las prácticas de elusión 
fiscal que inciden directamente en el funcionamiento del mercado interior, de modificación de diversas normas 
tributarias y en materia de regulación del juego, «BOE»  núm. 164, de 10 de julio de 2021, páginas 82584 a 82676 (93 
págs.)  . 
3  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
4  Ley 7/2012, de 29 de octubre, de modificación de la normativa tributaria y presupuestaria y de adecuación de la 
normativa financiera para la intensificación de las actuaciones en la prevención y lucha contra el fraude, «BOE»  
núm.  261, de 30 de octubre de 2 012, páginas 76259 a 76289 (31 págs.) .  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 of this measure on households , the draft law maintained a limit of EUR 2 500 for cash payments made 
by natural persons not acting in a professional or business capacity , who are also tax residents in 
Spain , to parties  acting in a professional or business capacity . Under the draft law, a  limit of 
EUR  10 000 applied to cash payments made by natural persons not acting in a professional or 
business capacity , who are also not tax residents in Spain,  to parties  acting in a professional or 
business capacity . The draft law  applied no limit to cash payments in transactions where none of the 
parties are acting in a professional or business capacity , or to cash payments and deposits made with 
credit institutions.  The draft law al so modified certain procedural aspects of the cash payment 
limitation regime’s sanctioning procedure and, in particular,  included a fine of 25 % of the amount paid.  
1.2 The Law further reinforces  the prevention of and fight against fiscal fraud. It sets  additional  limits on 
the amounts that may be paid in cash in  transactions where at least one of the parties acts  in a 
professional or business capacity. In particular, t he existing cash payment limit s are lowered as 
follows : (1) from EUR 2 500 to EUR 1 000 for transactions where at least one of the parties acts in a 
profess ional or business capacity ; and (2) from EUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 , where the payer is  a 
natural person not having their tax residence in Spain and not act ing in a professional or business 
capacity . For the purpose of calculating the applicable  limits, where payment for the delivery of goods 
or the performance of services that comprise one transaction has been divided into more than one 
transaction or payment, those transactions or payments will be added together . Moreover, it continues  
to be the case that these limit s do not apply to transactions between parties not acting in a professional 
or business capacity, such as payments  made by and to private parties , or to payments and deposits 
made with credit institutions.  These provisions apply to all payments made after the Law’s entry into 
force on 11 July 2021,  including payments that relate to transactions agreed prior to the introduction 
of the limit s.  
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB understands that, under the L aw: (1) a limit  of EUR 1 000 applies to cash payments in 
transactions where one of the parties  acts in a professional or business capacity ; (2) a limit  of 
EUR  10 000 applies to cash payments from natural persons not acting in a professional or business 
capacity , who are also not tax residents in Spain , to parties acting in a professional or bus iness 
capacity5; and (3) no limit  applies to cash payments in transactions where none of the parties are 
acting in a professional or business capacity , or to cash  payments and deposits made with credit 
institutions.  
2.2 The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has the basic task of promoting the smooth operation 
of payment systems6, and the ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes 
within the Union7. The euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro 
area are the only banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area8.  
 
5  It follows from limits a) and b) that cash payments from natural persons not acting in a professional or business capacity 
who are tax residents in Spain to parties acting in a professional or business capacity  are subject to a limit of EUR  1 000. 
6  See the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty and the fourth indent of Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
7  See the f irst sentence of Article 128(1) of the Treaty and first sentence of Article 16 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
8  See the t hird sentence of Article 128(1) of the Treaty and third sentence of Article 16 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 2.3 The Court of Justice of the European Union  has considered the concept of ‘legal tender’ . In particular, 
the Court  of Justice  has referred to point 1 of Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU9, which 
states that, where a payment obligation exists,  the legal tender of euro banknotes and coin should 
imply:  (a) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (b) their acceptance at full face value; 
and (c) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court, this shows that the 
concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and 
coins denominated in euro for payment purposes10. The Court has ruled that the status as legal tender 
calls only for acceptance in principle of banknotes denominated in euro as a means of payment, not 
for absolute acceptance11. 
2.4 According to the Court , it is for the Union  legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the 
status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is 
necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency12. However, t he Union’s  exclusive 
competence does not prevent a Member State, in the exercise of its own powers, such as the 
organisation of its public administration, from adopting a measure that obliges that administration to 
accept cash payments from citizens or introduces, on public interest grounds, a derogation from that 
obligation for statutorily imposed payments, subject to compliance with certain conditions13. 
2.5 The conditions established by the Court for restrictions on the legal tender status of euro banknotes 
in particular require (a) that the legislation does not have the object or effect of establishing legal rules 
governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes; (b) that it does not lead, in law or in fact, to the 
abolition of those banknotes, in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of 
discharging a payment obligation in cash; (c) that it has been adopted for reasons of public interest; 
(d) that the limitation on payments in cash which the legislation entails is appropriate for attaining the 
public interest objective pursued; and (e) that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
achieve that objective.  
2.6 The ECB considers that the L aw’s objective of preventing and combating tax evasion may, in general, 
constitute a ‘public reason’ justifying the establishment of limitations on cash payments.  
2.7 The ECB also notes that other lawful means for the settlement of monetary debts are availabl e in 
Spain14. However, these other means typically have different characteristics compared to cash and 
are not fully equivalent alternatives to cash payments.  
2.8 When limiting the possibility, recognised by Union  law, of generally discharging a payment obligation 
in banknotes and coins denominated in euro, Member States must ensure that any measures taken 
comply with the principle of proportionality, which, in particular,  requires them to be appropriate for 
achieving the legitimate objective( s) pursued by the legislation at issue and  not to go beyond what is 
 
9  Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro 
banknotes and coins ( OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70) . 
10  See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk , joint cases C -422/19 and C -423/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49.  
11  See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk , joint cases C -422/19 and C -423/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 55 and 56.  
12  See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk , joint cases C -422/19 and C-423/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 50 to 52.  
13  See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk , joint cases C -422/19 and C -423/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 56.  
14  See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/33.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 necessary in order to achieve those objectives15. The ECB has provided additional guidance on 
whether limitations are proportionate  in its opinions . In particular, the ECB has noted that the broader 
and more general a limitation is, the stricter should be the interpretation of the requirement for the 
limitation to be proportionate to the objective pursued16. In addition , when considering whether a 
limitation is proportionate, the adverse impac t of the limitation in question and whether alternative 
measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective with a less adverse impact should 
always be considered17.  
2.9 For a limitation to comply with the legal tender status of euro banknotes, it is not only necessary to 
demonstrate that the cash payment limitation would be effective as regards the achievement of the 
public objectives pursued, but there should be clear evi dence that such limitation is likely, in fact, to 
achieve the stated public goal18.  
In view of the fact that the measures set out in the Law affect transactions involving  natural persons 
and payments of  relatively small amounts  in various segments of the economy , any negative impact 
of the limitations must  be carefully weighed against the anticipated public benefits. When considering 
whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question as well as whether alternative measures could be adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective and have a less adverse 
impact  should always be considered
 19. 
2.10 It should be borne in mind that the ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain 
groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other payment instruments. Cash is generally also appreciated as a payment instrument because it is widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Cash  is a means of payment that 
allows citizens to instantly settle a transaction and is the only method of settlement  in central bank 
money and,  at face value , that does not carry the legal possibility of imposing a fee for the use of this 
means of payment. In addition, cash payments are always available as they do not require a functional 
technical infrastructure or related investment . These considerations  would be of particular relevance , 
for example , in the event of a power outage or should  electronic payment  systems  fail. Furthermore, 
cash payments are not subject to daily  or weekly payment limits set by entities providing underlying 
paymen t services. Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the 
economy by allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way
20. Cash is a crucial 
payment method for the elderly, immigrants, the disabled, s ocially vulnerable citizens and anyone with 
limited access to digital services , and, as such,  serves inclusion.  
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1 The EUR 1 000 limit on cash payments  set by the Law  and to which the explanatory memorandum 
 
15  See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk , joint cases C -422/19 and C -423/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 55 and 56 and 67 to 70.  
16  See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2017/8 and paragraph 2.11 of Opinion CON/2021/18.  
17  See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2017/8.  
18  See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2017/27.  
19  See, for example, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2014/4, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2014/37, paragraphs 2.6 and 
2.7 of Opinion CON/2017/8 and paragraphs  2.5 and 2. 6 of Opinion CON/2017/ 18. 
20  See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2017/18, paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2017/20, paragraph 2.8 of Opinion 
CON/2017/27 and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2017/40.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 accompanying the Law refers as ‘the general limit for cash payments ’ should  take into account the 
advantages of having limits on cash payments in place and the potential  inconvenience thereof for 
regular transactions in certain market segments. In this regard, it should be noted that Directive (EU) 
2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council21, while  confirming the vulnerability of large 
cash payments to money laundering and terrorist financing,  requires  persons trading in goods who  
are otherwise not obliged entities  under that Directive  to be classified as obliged entities and to apply 
customer due diligence measures only where payments are made or received in cash in amount s of 
EUR 10 000 or m ore. This implies that the Law should establish a proportionate threshold for limits 
on cash  payments, taking into account the objectives of such limits22. 
3.2 The Law’s explanatory memorandum does not address the social impact and risk of financial exclusion 
that would result from the  substantial lowering of the previously  existing and low limit of EUR  2 500 
for cash payments. The explanatory memorandum does not provide c lear evidence that such a limit 
is, in fact, likely to achieve its stated public goal . Moreover , the Spanish legislator has not indicated  
whether alternative measures could have been adopted that would fulfil the relevant objective and 
have a less adverse impact .  
3.3 The Law’s  cash payment  limit makes it significantly more difficult to settle legitimate transactions using 
cash as a means of payment, thus endangering the concept of legal tender enshrined in the Treaty23. 
Moreover, as experience within the Union  has shown, certain cashless payment instruments may be 
temporarily unavailable as they depend on the underlying technical infrastructure operated by 
payment service provider s. In such contingencies , transactions in cash above the cash payment limits 
may be required.   
3.4 As the Law’s explanatory memorandum indicates, a proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
24 proposes a Union- wide cash payment limit of EUR 10 000. 
In this respect, the ECB notes  that ‘the threshold for the intended prohibition of consumer -to-business 
and business -to-business transactions is to be set sufficiently high to avoid a factual impact leading 
to the abolition of euro banknotes. The de facto abolition of euro banknotes may occur, i nter alia, if 
thresholds were set so low as to threaten the economic viability of cash as a general and widely accepted means of payment and endanger the functioning of the cash cycle, ultimately also affecting 
transactions below the threshold. ’
25  
3.5 Against  this background, the ECB considers the lowering of the limit on cash payments in transactions 
where any of the parties act s in a professional or business capacity to EUR 1 000 to be 
disproportionate.  It will have an adverse and undesired impact on the legal tender status of euro 
banknotes . In addition, this cash payment limit significantly reduces the ability of  payers to use euro 
banknotes  and the freedom of citizens to choose how to pay . 
 
21  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 0 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No  648/2012 
of the European Parliament and of t he Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).  
22  See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/18 and paragraph 2.1 0 of Opinion CON/2017/27.  
23  See pa ragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2017/18 and paragraph 2.9 of Opinion CON/2017/27.  
24  COM(2021) 420 final.  
25  See paragraph 4. 6 of Opinion CON/2022/ 5. 
ECB -PUBLIC  
6 3.6 As previously noted by the ECB r egarding the limit  of EUR 10 000 for cash payments made by natural 
persons not acting in a professional or business capacity , who are also not tax residents in Spain , to 
parties acting in a professional or business capacity , there seems to be no justification as to why a 
different standard should be established for payments  made by non-residents; this discriminates  
against payments made by residents as opposed to those made by non-residents26. 
3.7 The sanctioning regime established by the L aw seems excessive and, in particular, the fine of 25 % 
of the amount paid,  appears to be disproportionately high. The ECB reiterates  that limitations on cash 
payments should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve their objectives , and that any negative 
impact of the limitations should be carefully weighed against the  anticipated public benefits. When 
considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in ques tion 
should always be considered. A sanction that would apply to any  breach, regardless of the underlying 
situation, does not seem to comply with the proportionality requirement27.  
 
This opinion will be published on EUR -Lex.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 March 2022.  
 
[signed]  
 The President of the ECB  
Christine LAGARDE  
 
26  See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2019/4  and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/18.  
27  See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2019/4  and paragraph 3.6 of Opinion CON/2017/18.