EUROPEAN COMMISSION Luxembourg, 13.7.2022 SWD(2022) 517 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report















Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report

















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Abstract As regards judicial independence, concerns expressed in the context of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament, as well as in previous Rule of Law Reports, remain unaddressed. This is also the case for the relevant recommendation made under the European Semester. These concerns relate in particular to the challenges faced by the independent National Judicial Council in counter-balancing the powers of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, the rules on electing the President of the Supreme Court, and the possibility of discretionary decisions as regards judicial appointments and promotions, case allocation as well as bonuses to judges and court executives. Following the Supreme Court decision declaring unlawful a request for preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice ruled that such decision is contrary to EU law. As regards efficiency and quality, the justice system performs well in terms of the length of proceedings and has an overall high level of digitalisation. The gradual increase of salaries of judges and prosecutors continues. The implementation of most measures under the 2020-2022 anti-corruption strategy was postponed and no new strategy has been announced. Shortcomings persist as regards lobbying, revolving doors as well as political party and campaign financing. Independent control mechanisms remain insufficient to detect corruption. Concerns remain regarding the lack of systematic checks and insufficient oversight of asset declarations as well as the lack of conflict of interest rules for the public interest trusts. The lack of a robust track record of investigations of corruption allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains a serious concern, although some new high-level corruption cases have been opened. The lack of judicial review of decisions not to investigate and prosecute corruption remains a cause of concern, in particular in an environment where risks of clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration remain unaddressed. The Commission sent Hungary a written notification under the Regulation on a general regime of conditionality to protect the EU budget in case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law. The functional independence of the Media Authority needs to be strengthened. The continued channelling of significant amounts of state advertising to pro-government media creates an unlevel playing field in the media landscape. Public service media operates in a complex institutional system, amid concerns over its editorial and financial independence. Media professionals continue to face challenges in exercising their activities, including with the surveillance of investigative journalists. Access to public information continued to be hindered under the state of danger. As regards the system of checks and balances, the transparency and quality of the legislative process remain a source of concern. The Government has been using its emergency powers extensively, also in areas not related to the COVID-19 pandemic as initially invoked. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights has gained more competences, but his accreditation was downgraded following concerns regarding his independence. The ineffective implementation by state organs of judgments of European and national courts is a source of concern. Pressure continues on civil society organisations, whilst the public-interest trusts receiving significant public funding and managed by board members close to the Government have become operational.

Recommendations In addition to recalling the obligation to comply with the rule of law-related rulings of the ECJ and the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in the country chapter, the concerns raised under the conditionality regulation, the relevant concerns raised in the Article 7 TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament, and recalling the relevant country-specific recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Hungary to: ·Strengthen the role of the National Judicial Council, while safeguarding its independence, to effectively counter-balance the powers of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary. ·Adapt the rules related to the Kúria to remove judicial appointments outside the normal procedure, to strengthen eligibility criteria for the Kúria President, and to strengthen control by judicial bodies over the Kúria President, taking into account European standards, and to remove the possibility of reviewing the necessity of preliminary references, in line with EU law requirements. ·Adopt comprehensive reforms on lobbying and revolving doors, and strengthen the system of asset declarations, providing for effective oversight and enforcement. ·Establish a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments for high-level corruption cases. ·Introduce mechanisms to enhance the functional independence of the media regulatory authority taking into account European standards on the independence of media regulators. ·Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public service media. ·Adopt legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by the state and state-owned companies. ·Remove obstacles affecting civil society organisations.



I.Justice System Hungary has a four-tier ordinary court system. 113 district courts operate at first instance, while 20 regional courts hear appeals against district court decisions and decide on certain cases at first instance. Five regional appeal courts decide on appeals against decisions of the regional courts. The main role of the Supreme Court (Kúria) is to guarantee the uniform application of the law. The Fundamental Law tasks the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ), elected by Parliament, with the central administration of the courts. The National Judicial Council is an independent body, which, under the Fundamental Law, supervises the NOJ President and participates in the administration of the courts. Judges are appointed by the President of the Republic following a recommendation of the NOJ President based on a ranking of candidates established by the local judicial councils (composed of judges elected by their peers). The NOJ President cannot deviate from this ranking without the prior consent of the National Judicial Council. The Constitutional Court is not part of the ordinary court system and reviews the constitutionality of laws and judicial decisions. The prosecution service is an independent institution vested with powers to investigate and prosecute crime. The Hungarian Bar Association and the regional bar associations are autonomous self-governing public bodies. Independence

Perceived judicial independence continues to be average among the general public and low among companies. The level of perceived judicial independence by the general public remains average, marking a slight increase from 40% in 2021 to 43% in 2022 . According to data in the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, perceived judicial independence by companies remains low, 34% of companies perceive judicial independence as ‘fairly or very good’, an increase compared to the 32% in 2021 . As regards the general public, the five-year negative trend in perceptions turned in 2022; as regards companies, after a significant drop in 2019, perceptions continue to improve. There have been no legislative steps to address concerns related to the lack of checks and balances in the administration of courts. On 23 May 2022, in the context of the European Semester, the Commission proposed to the Council to address to Hungary a recommendation to strengthen judicial independence, noting that the National Judicial Council continues to face difficulties in counter-balancing the powers of the NOJ President as regards the management of the courts . Although there have been some positive developments regarding the NOJ President’s cooperation with the National Judicial Council , the powers of the National Judicial Council have not been extended to ensure effective oversight over the NOJ President , and further guarantees against possible arbitrary decisions by the NOJ President are necessary . In its Opinion of 16 October 2021, the Venice Commission recalled its previous consideration that the powers of the NOJ President remain very extensive when wielded by a single person and their effective supervision remains difficult. The absence of effective control over the NOJ President increases the possibility of arbitrary decisions as regards the career of judges. Judges’ first appointments are limited to three years, at the end of which the court president assesses their suitability for judicial tenure and may, if they are found suitable, request the NOJ President to recommend the President of the Republic to appoint them for an unlimited period of time . On 4 November 2021, the second-instance service court attached to the Kúria ruled that judges who, after their initial appointment, are found unsuitable for tenure by the court president, cannot challenge the assessment report itself, but only have a remedy when proceedings are brought against them by the court president with a view to establishing their professional incompetence . There is no possibility to grant interim relief to prevent an interruption of the judicial career during the review of the evaluation. Stakeholders have underlined that this raises concerns as regards effective judicial protection of the judges concerned, affecting their independence . After consulting the National Judicial Council, the NOJ President has prepared a draft legislative proposal to amend the rules, which was subsequently agreed by the Council. In another set of proceedings, on 2 June 2021, the Kúria ruled that there is no judicial remedy available against decisions of the NOJ President annulling a call for applications. Stakeholders report that the NOJ President does not publish calls for applications for all vacated judicial posts . Although there is an appointment and promotion procedure in place, the NOJ President has extensively used the exceptions allowed by the law to fill a vacancy without a call for applications. In 2021, the reassignment of judges after the end of their secondment to other state bodies outside the judiciary was added to the list of exceptions . As observed by the Venice Commission in its Opinion of 16 October 2021, this system should not be used to institute a practice of bypassing the ordinary processes of promoting judges, noting that there are no criteria established for the NOJ President to assign a judge to a higher position. The courts hearing administrative cases have been reorganised and the possibility of discretionary termination of judges’ assignment raises concerns. As of 1 March 2022, an ‘omnibus’ law reorganised the judicial review of administrative decisions . The Budapest Regional Appeal Court now hears appeals against first-instance decisions of the eight regional courts with an administrative department. The Kúria hears petitions for review and uniformity complaints limited to points of law. Exceptionally, in cases related to elections, referenda and freedom of assembly the Kúria proceeds as a first and last instance court . The Kúria reviews the legality of municipal decrees. Since there is no separate administrative courts system, judges are specifically assigned, with their consent, to hear administrative cases. In the Kúria, judges dealing with administrative cases are assigned by the Kúria President; in other courts, they are assigned by the NOJ President upon proposal of the court president . Neither the criteria nor the terms of an assignment or the termination thereof are set out by law. In the absence of such criteria, such assignments can be terminated on a discretionary basis, without the consent of the judge concerned. Judicial review is available against these decisions . In the absence of criteria for the termination of the assignment, there are doubts as regards the effectiveness of such judicial review. This possibility of a discretionary removal from the pool of judges hearing administrative cases raises concerns as regards judicial independence, given that it could exert undue pressure on the judges concerned. According to European standards, individual judges must be free not only from undue influences outside the judiciary, but also from within, such as from those who have administrative responsibilities in the court . Appointments to and the case allocation in the Kúria have raised concerns. As of 1 March 2022, as a rule, administrative cases are heard in the Kúria by panels of five judges ; in cases related to elections and referenda, the bench is composed of three judges . The Kúria’s case allocation scheme assigns judges to chambers organised in civil, criminal and administrative departments. The scheme for the allocation of cases between chambers does not determine the composition of the judicial panel . The key elements of the case allocation scheme are regulated by law. The case allocation scheme is established by the Kúria President; the Kúria’s judicial council and the competent department give a non-binding opinion and have limited powers . Litigants can consult the case allocation scheme and obtain information about the number of chambers and their composition on the Kúria’s website. The Venice Commission Opinion of 16 October 2021 analysed the Kúria’s case allocation scheme and made proposals to the authorities . Stakeholders complained that the Kúria’s case allocation scheme does not allow the parties to verify on the basis of which criteria the composition of the bench has been determined . European standards require that the allocation of cases within a court follow objective, pre-established criteria in order to safeguard the right to an independent and impartial judge. As regards the appointments to the Kúria, the concerns on the rules on electing its President, expressed in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, have not been addressed . The number of judicial posts in the Kúria is not set by statute but by a decision of the NOJ President . New judicial posts have been opened in the Kúria, mainly in the administrative department . According to stakeholders, due to the points system applied for the assessment of applications, candidates with little judicial experience or coming from a political career without judicial experience have also been appointed . Stakeholders report that the practice of secondment extends far beyond its legal objectives and may be used to circumvent the guarantees of judicial appointments in regular application procedures . The Court of Justice issued a ruling precluding the Kúria from declaring a request for preliminary ruling unlawful. Following a decision of 10 September 2019 in which the Kúria had considered a preliminary reference by a Hungarian court to the Court of Justice unlawful, the Court of Justice ruled on 23 November 2021 that EU law precludes a national supreme court, following an appeal in the interests of the law brought by the Prosecutor General, from declaring a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a lower court unlawful on the ground that the questions referred are not relevant and necessary for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. The Court of Justice also found that EU law precludes disciplinary proceedings from being brought against a national judge on the ground that the judge has made a preliminary reference . On the same day, the Kúria issued a statement confirming that until it decides otherwise, its decision is final and its interpretation of the law binding. The procedural rules allowing to challenge before the Kúria the necessity of a preliminary reference have not been amended. The Court of Justice has made clear that a decision by the Kúria considering a preliminary reference unlawful is liable to weaken both the authority of the answers that the Court is to provide to the referring judge and the decision that the latter will give in the light of those answers . The rules on the uniformity procedure have been amended. In response to the 16 October 2021 Opinion of the Venice Commission , as of 1 January 2022, Parliament amended the rules of the uniformity procedure conducted by the Kúria. The legislative amendment assimilated the rules of the uniformity procedure to those of the uniformity complaint procedure which may be initiated by parties to proceedings . Judicial salaries continued to increase, while the discretionary award of bonuses by court managers continues to raise concerns. Judicial salaries have been increased over a period of three years . In the third phase, as of 2022, the salary base for judges and prosecutors was further increased by 13%. As regards bonuses, there is no statutory list or definition of the types and forms of bonuses that the NOJ President and court presidents can distribute among judges, nor are there clear criteria as to what serves as the basis of such decisions . According to stakeholders, this wide discretion can lead to self-censorship by judges . The NOJ President’s refusal to provide the National Judicial Council with anonymised data regarding the award of bonuses further adds to a lack of transparency. According to the interpretation of the NOJ President, this issue is not covered by the supervisory powers of the National Judicial Council. According to the Council of Europe, the principal rules of the system of remuneration for professional judges should be laid down by law and systems making judges’ core remuneration dependent on performance should be avoided as they could create difficulties for the independence of judges . The rules on the removal of the Prosecutor General have been amended, while GRECO recommendations remain to be fully addressed. Certain elements of the legal framework led GRECO to issue recommendations to review the rules for appointment of the Prosecutor General in order to safeguard the office from political influence . As of 18 November 2021, an amendment to a cardinal law introduced the requirement of two-thirds majority of all members of Parliament when voting on the removal of the Prosecutor General from office. This rule applies to the incumbent Prosecutor General, elected in 2019 for a period of nine years . The recommendation of GRECO to remove the possibility to maintain the Prosecutor General in office after the expiry of his/her mandate remains unaddressed . Stakeholders have expressed concerns as regards the discretionary powers of the prosecution service to decide on the investigation and prosecution of cases, which are further amplified by the strictly hierarchical architecture of the prosecution service enabling the Prosecutor General and other senior prosecutors to instruct subordinate prosecutors and to reallocate cases assigned to them . Quality The digitalisation of the justice system continues to be overall high . Hungary ranks very high when it comes to digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases and online access to published judgments by the general public. It also ranks high as regards the use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services, and the existence of digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases . Moreover, Hungary has very good results as regards the promotion of and incentives for using alternative dispute resolution methods. Efficiency The efficiency in civil and administrative cases remains high . Hungary performs very well as regards the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court instances, to resolve administrative cases at first instance and at all court instances; the number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases, and pending administrative cases . In January 2022, a new law on pecuniary compensation for delay in civil proceedings entered into force. This law provides for compensation in the form of pecuniary satisfaction in case of violation of the fundamental right to have civil proceedings completed within a reasonable time. Administrative and criminal proceedings are not affected by this law . II.Anti-Corruption Framework The Ministry of Interior is responsible for the overall coordination of the anti-corruption policy and oversight over the National Protection Service. As a law enforcement agency, the National Protection Service is in charge of crime detection within the police, law enforcement and other government agencies, including lifestyle monitoring and integrity tests of public officials. A smaller division in the National Protection Service is also entrusted with corruption prevention tasks, including intra-governmental cooperation and evaluation of the anti-corruption strategy and action plans. The police can investigate private sector corruption and corruption-related economic crimes. However, the investigation and prosecution of corruption in the public sector fall under the exclusive competence of the Investigation Division of the Central Chief Prosecution Office of Investigation and its five regional offices. The prosecution service is supported by the investigative forces of the police and the National Protection Service; it oversees investigations carried out by other investigative entities, including the National Tax and Customs Administration. The State Audit Office contributes to corruption prevention with its competences for the control of the financial management of public funds, the monitoring of state-owned companies’ compliance with statutory public disclosure obligations, as well as political party finance and campaign finance audits. The perception of public sector corruption among experts and the business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains high. In the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Hungary scores 43/100 and ranks 26th in the European Union and 73rd globally . This perception is relatively stable over the past five years . The 2022 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 91% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 68%) and 27% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%) . As regards businesses, 75% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 45% consider that that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 34%) . Furthermore, 37% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 34%) , while 17% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 29%) . The implementation period of the 2020-2022 Anti-Corruption Strategy and of the related Action Plan has been extended. In December 2021, the Government Resolution adopting the mid-term strategy and action plan was amended to postpone the deadlines for the majority of the measures until the end of 2022 or the first semester of 2023. Most of the strategy tasks are delegated to the Ministry of Interior, while the National Protection Service is tasked with the overall coordination of the implementation of the strategy. Little information is, however, publicly available on their activities to implement the strategy, which reduces possibilities for public monitoring and oversight . Among the non-implemented measures are those with the potential to contribute to a more effective detection and prosecution of corruption in public institutions and state-owned enterprises as well as the strategy implementation report . More generally and as previously noted, the scope of the anti-corruption strategy is limited to fostering integrity in the public administration . Strategic policy coordination in relevant anti-corruption areas, such as lobbying, ‘revolving doors’, asset disclosure and political party financing, does not take place under the strategy, as they remain outside its scope . Although an evaluation of the past ten years of Hungary’s fight against corruption was reported to have taken place, there is no public information about the preparation of a new strategic anti-corruption framework and action plan beyond 2022 . Despite amendments to the Criminal Code to address foreign bribery, there is still an absence of enforcement. The relevant anti-corruption offences are criminalised, including bribery and foreign bribery . As reported last year, an amendment to the Criminal Code, which entered into force on 1 January 2021, modified the definition of ‘foreign public official’ by clarifying that it includes officials of foreign public enterprises, and introduced stricter sanction levels for facilitation payments . There are concerns about the continued absence of enforcement efforts as no new investigations into foreign bribery have started despite OECD-recorded allegations and the presence of significant foreign bribery risk factors, notably related to multinational enterprises exporting from Hungary in a number of high-risk sectors . Regarding detection of foreign bribery, Hungary has yet to develop and implement a dedicated strategy . Notably, criminal sanctions can be reduced or even be dispensed by judges if the suspect confesses corruption, surrenders the illegally obtained advantage, and discloses the circumstances of the criminal act to the authorities before they become aware of the commission of the offence . Integrity tests and ‘lifestyle monitoring’ continue to be the main tool to deter and detect corruption in the public sector, while oversight could benefit from more independence. The prosecution service considers the National Protection Service to be the main and indispensable source for evidence-gathering to initiate corruption investigations and prosecutions , in particular of petty corruption, such as gratuity payments in the healthcare sector. The possibility of conducting covert surveillance of public officials through ‘integrity tests’ to establish whether they commit corruption has to be approved by the public prosecutor and, in case a suspected crime is detected, reported to the competent agency . The ‘lifestyle monitoring’ is conducted at the request of the responsible head of the public institution and related findings can be a ground for dismissal of the public official . Other detection tools, including asset declarations, whistleblower disclosures and registries, play a relatively minor role in corruption investigations . State bodies with supervisory functions have seen political appointments raising questions as to their impartiality in detecting corruption . Deficient independent oversight mechanisms and close interconnections between politics and certain national businesses are conducive to corruption . Some measures to improve corruption investigations involving EU funds have been taken. Concerns exist regarding the frequent practice of the Hungarian authorities to withdraw EU-funded projects in case of financial recommendations issued by the EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or the opening of OLAF investigations, while amounts due are not systematically recovered from the economic operator who committed the irregularity or fraud . Similarly, the refusal of economic operators to cooperate during on-the-spot checks conducted by OLAF have been in focus. In order to better protect the EU funds from potential fraud and corruption, the Prosecutor General’s Office and OLAF have signed a cooperation agreement in February 2022, which commits both parties to closer cooperation. However, as it was recently signed, the effectiveness of the cooperation agreement will still have to be seen in practice. The recent allegations regarding the existence of a corruption ring in management authorities linked to national and EU funds raise concerns as to the lack of systemic oversight .

Despite good inter-institutional cooperation and adequate levels of resources, challenges remain in establishing a track-record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments in high-level corruption cases. The prosecution service reports adequate levels of human and financial resources, and of specialisation to carry out their tasks , and the legal framework provides the conditions for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption. Cooperation between the relevant anti-corruption entities, including the prosecution service, police, tax and custom authorities, and the National Protection Service, is considered good . To facilitate more effective investigations, including in corruption cases, new IT systems for the prosecution service are under development . The planned IT cooperation system for the handling and sharing of sensitive data among investigative authorities aims at addressing by 1 December 2024 the persisting challenges in evidence-gathering, particularly with regard to obtaining relevant financial data from the currently numerous separate state registries . Moreover, a new case management system is planned to take up operations in support of prosecutorial investigations by 1 July 2026. The number of registered criminal procedures initiated for corruption crimes increased in 2021 . The overall increase is reportedly due to the increase in the number of criminal proceedings opened for private sector corruption cases, including primarily petty corruption . Furthermore, the increase in the number of proceedings for public sector corruption significantly fluctuated over the years . The indictment rates for corruption are reported to be overall high . Some new high-level cases involving politicians were investigated in 2021 . However, serious concerns remain regarding the absence of a robust track record of investigations of corruption allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle . This poses a risk of low accountability, in view of the lack of judicial review for prosecutorial decisions not to investigate and prosecute corruption allegations . Risks of clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration remain unaddressed . The full implementation of the GRECO recommendations as regards the effective functioning of the prosecution would further strengthen the anti-corruption framework . Hungary’s integrity rules on asset declaration and conflicts of interest require more effective oversight and enforcement. Hungary has an extensive asset disclosure system in place, that requires members of Parliament, Government officials and public officials to declare their assets and interests . Concerns have been raised in particular regarding the asset declarations’ content of members of Parliament last submitted in February 2021 . Asset declarations are verified only upon notification of suspicions, and potential follow-up is left to the discretion of the public official’s employer or, in case of members of Parliament and other high-ranking officials, to the Parliamentary Committee on Immunity . Any incompatibility of conflicts of interest of members of Parliament must be declared to the Speaker , following which, they are subject to certain restrictions pending the resolution of the situation . However, neither declarations of interests nor information about any follow-up are publicly available. Despite long-standing calls, no reform efforts have been initiated to make the supervision, verification and enforcement of rules of conduct, conflicts of interest and asset declarations for members of Parliament more effective . The government proposal introducing amendments to the asset declarations rules for members of Parliament with an indicative timeline for adoption on 27 July 2022 does not aim to address these calls to strengthen the data verification, oversight or sanctions in case of failure to comply with the rules. In addition, the Government plans to introduce new rules on conflicts of interest, on gifts and similar benefits for parliamentarians. Until then, conflicts of interest rules are not applicable to members of Parliament, state secretaries and other public officials of the government who serve, at the same time, as board members of ‘public interest trusts’, despite the fact that these trusts receive significant public funding, entailing increased risks of corruption . Since such trusts may receive funding not only from the Hungarian state but also from the private sector and foreign states, the trustees may engage in fundraising and lobbying activities. The legal framework has been challenged before the Constitutional Court due to concerns regarding the separation of powers, as trustees are not prevented from holding high ranking positions, such as Minister and member of Parliament, at the same time. The absence of codes of ethics for members of the Government, state secretaries, or members of Parliament represents another integrity gap. Verification procedures by the National Tax and Customs Authority upon suspicions of unjustified wealth can only be initiated if investigative authorities have also opened criminal inquiries, thus significantly limiting the possibility for such verifications . Lobbying rules remain incomplete with no systematic follow up in case of non-compliance. Hungary has no comprehensive lobby regulation, transparency register or legislative footprint in place to disclose contacts with interest representatives . According to a 2013 Government Decree, employees of state administration bodies need to document meetings and may only meet interest representatives in relation to their work after informing their superiors, who may prohibit the meeting . However, there is no obligation to make the encounters or the content public, nor are there any sanctions provided in the Decree in case of failure to comply. No steps have been taken to establish a clear set of rules for contacts between members of Parliament and lobbyists to address concerns regarding the level of transparency in the decision-making process . Comprehensive lobbying rules would be of particular importance with regard to the increasing number of ‘investments of major national economic interests’ , as they are exempted from regular requirements and safeguards in order to simplify and accelerate investment procedures. This exemption applies regardless of whether such investments are of private or public nature. Post-employment rules and cooling-off periods are fragmented and apply only to a small group of public officials. Overall ‘revolving doors’ are scarcely regulated with rules existing only for a few institutions, such as the State Audit Office and the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, while confidentiality clauses are contained in Hungary’s labour code as well as in some specific legislation applicable to public officials . In practice, however, these rules are not effectively enforced, as the Government is still to specify the sectors and public officials’ positions to which cooling-off time restriction will apply with regard to business careers of public officials in the area, in which they were active beforehand . A code of conduct for members of Parliament that would include post-employment guidelines is neither in place nor planned . The regulatory framework on whistleblowers requires further steps to enhance their protection in practice. Amendments to the current law have not yet been proposed to transpose the EU Directive . Various state agencies operate online reporting channels, including the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights , the Hungarian Competition Authority , the Public Procurement Authority and the Prime Minister’s Office. The latter can receive disclosures related to the misuse of EU funds . No steps have been taken yet to address the major operational deficiencies in the whistleblower regime, including the limited protection against retaliation and the risks of disclosure of the whistleblowers’ identity . Challenges remain with regard to political party and campaign financing . The State Audit Office is responsible to oversee the use of public funds and to control the legality of political parties’ financial management. However, political advertising on the social media platform Facebook, including by financed third parties, is not considered to fall within the legal definition of political advertising under the Electoral Procedure Act and has therefore not been audited so far by the State Audit Office , even if recent elections have shown that most of the political party campaigning is taking place on this communication tool . While some measures have been taken to ensure that political party financial registries are transparent and up-to-date to clarify party income sources and campaign periods as well as to ensure a more in-depth monitoring, overall concerns remain as regards the transparency of party financing . The trend of heightened COVID-19 related corruption risks in public procurement persists , including for public interest trusts. There is some transparency in public procurement and monitoring by the Public Procurement Authority reportedly increased in 2021 . Yet specific data on beneficiaries and overall amounts on exempted, pandemic-related procurements is not publicly available despite hightened risks of corruption . At the same time, the share of contracts awarded with a single-bidder, and thus without competition, increased from 2020 to 2021 . A Government Decree introduced measures to reduce this high share of single bids targeting, however, only public procurements above the EU public procurement thresholds, thus relating only to a limited number of procurements, while no concrete timeline is in place . According to the Public Procurement Authority, fewer but much larger investments have been procured . Furthermore, as reported previously , the 2021 law repealed a specific requirement of the public procurement law taking trusts established by the state as well as legal persons managed by them, out of the scope of application of procurement rules in respect of procurements financed by European Union funds . This carries the potential to increase corruption risks in a procurement market that is already vulnerable to corruption . On 27 April 2022, the Commission sent a written notification to Hungary under the budget conditionality Regulation . The Commission has serious concerns about the use of the EU budget in Hungary. The concerns relate to breaches of the principles of the rule of law in relation to the use of public procurement and the functioning of the authorities implementing the budget, financial control, audit, monitoring, accountability process, transparency, prevention of fraud, corruption and other breaches of EU law, and the constant failure to implement the recommendations addressed to the authorities for several years. This is demonstrated by an exceptionally high level of financial corrections over the years, documented by audit work and contradictory procedures. In the written notification, the Commission also referred to possible breaches in connection to public procurement, such as the limits to investigation and independent prosecution, as well as the lack of an effective anti-corruption framework. Hungary replied to the written notification on 27 June 2022 and the Commission is assessing the information and observations provided in the reply. III.Media Pluralism and media freedom Hungary’s Fundamental Law and sectoral legislation provide the legal framework for the protection of media freedom and pluralism and for the right to access information held by public authorities . The Media Act provides the legislative framework for both the Hungarian media regulator as well as for the regulation of public service media. Hungary transposed the AVMS Directive in 2019 . The functional independence of the Hungarian media regulator needs to be strengthened . While the Media Act provides for a detailed legal framework for the establishment and operation of the Media Authority and while the authority is endowed with sufficient funding for the accomplishment of its tasks, concerns persist over the Authority’s functional independence. The decision-making body of the Authority - the Media Council - remains composed of members all nominated by the ruling party . The Media Council’s refusal to renew the broadcasting license of independent radio station Klubrádió, based on the station’s failure to comply with certain administrative obligations, and which resulted in the radio being taken off air, remains the subject of an ongoing Commission infringement procedure against Hungary . On 14 April 2022, the Media Council refused to renew the licence of another independent radio station, Tilos Rádió, based on the radio’s media service provider having violated legal requirements on the use of inappropriate language four times during a seven-year period . The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor confirms its previous assessment that while the rules governing eligibility and incompatibility of the Media Authority’s board members are specified in the Media Act, they do not ensure objective and transparent procedures in practice. It therefore, once more registers medium risk for Hungary in terms of the independence and effectiveness of the Media Authority . The channelling of significant state resources to pro-government media continues to create an unlevel playing field in the Hungarian media landscape . The majority of CSOs and media experts concur that there has been an increase in the number of government-critical outlets over the past decade but point out that the manner in which the significant volumes of state resources are channelled to pro-government media outlets and other relevant structures continues to create an unlevel playing field. Furthermore, there appears to be no transparency in the distribution of these resources . An analysis of the impact of the establishment of the ‘KESMA’ media conglomerate in November 2018 found that the latter has had a significant negative impact on the market for daily regional newspapers and on the distribution and printing market and an impact on radio, with far less or negligible impact on the television and national newspaper markets . The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor explains that in the sectors identified as having witnessed a significant impact, one can observe ‘political’ or ‘ideological’ concentration in which outlets ‘on paper independent from each other, follow the same political interests and share the same narratives’ . For these reasons, the 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor confirms the previous year’s high risk scores with regard to both news media concentration and state advertising in the country respectively . There are no plans to introduce legislation to enhance transparency of media ownership . The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor continues to rate transparency of media ownership at high risk, finding that ‘the legal provisions and the Media Council itself fall short in guaranteeing effective transparency for all media, as well as effective and easy access to the relevant information by the public, particularly for the disclosure of ultimate and beneficial owners of media outlets’ . Nonetheless, stakeholders do not consider this to be a major concern given that most data can be found in the generic company register and that offshore incorporation and registration in this field is rare . Public service media operates within a complex institutional system amid concerns over its financial and editorial independence. The Media Act provides the legal framework for public service media via the establishment of a Public Service Foundation and a Public Service Board, both of which exercise supervision over the Duna Media Service Nonprofit Private Limited Company, the public service media provider with editorial responsibility for the broadcast content . The Media Act provides for societal control over public service media via the Public Service Board, composed of representatives of fifteen public bodies and organisations . Under the Media Act, another entity, the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA) is responsible for content acquisition and show production and is, in effect, the employer of public service media journalists. The Fund’s substantial annual budget is subject to parliamentary approval , but concerns exist as to the absence of effective oversight over its spending . The 2022 Media Monitor considers this to be a high risk area given that there is ‘a lack of transparency, civil control and oversight over the budget of the Fund’ and that supervision is carried out by MTVA, which is, in turn, managed by the Media Council . Concerns persist as to public service media’s editorial independence and stakeholders have pointed out its role in amplifying disinformation by third actors . Journalists and media outlets continued to face diverse challenges in Hungary. Some journalists have continued to face difficulties when attempting to access members of the Government and are barred from attending certain events, while court proceedings targetting certain journalistic investigations have been launched on data protection grounds . The uncovered secret surveillance of journalists and the Tilos Rádió case constitute the two new alerts registered on the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists concerning Hungary since July 2021. Access to public information continues to be hindered. Access to public information has been hindered under the ‘state of danger’: deadlines for public authorities to process such requests were extended from 15 to 45 days (renewable once), also allowing them to charge fees where the fulfilment of the access to public information request would endanger or hinder the public authority in carrying out its task related to fighting the pandemic . Stakeholders report that transparency of public-interest funds is inadequate, in particular due to the limited scope of the disclosure obligations , and the lack of effective enforcement of judicial decisions ordering the disclosure of data concerning public funds . IV.Other Institutional Issues related to Checks and Balances Hungary is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral Parliament (National Assembly). Parliament that, among other functions, adopts and amends the Fundamental Law of Hungary, legislates, including cardinal laws , elects the Prime Minister, and elects – by a two-thirds majority – the top rank public officials of the country. The President of the Republic is elected by Parliament. There are a number of institutions tasked with counter-balancing the powers of the legislature and the executive and entrusted with guaranteeing the respect of the constitutional order, including the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the Ombudsperson (‘Commissioner for Fundamental Rights’). In addition to the Government, the President of the Republic and every parliamentary committee, any member of Parliament may table a bill. The lack of public consultation coupled with an accelerated legislative process has further weakened the quality of the regulatory environment . Whilst the Government has organised ‘national consultations’ on certain topics, the absence of effective public consultation on draft laws raises questions as regards legal certainty and the quality of legislation . CSOs report that decisions are made without the genuine involvement of relevant stakeholders . The Government has been almost systematically failing to comply with its legal obligation of publishing online draft laws for public consultations . Government policies often circumvent existing consultation mechanisms by submitting significant bills through individual members of Parliament or by using extraordinary or urgent procedure . For business stakeholders, the quality of law-making is an important factor for investor confidence and a reason for concern about effectiveness of investment protection for nearly a quarter of companies in Hungary . The Government has used its emergency powers extensively. As of 1 June 2022, the Government terminated the second ‘state of danger’ it declared in January 2021 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the reporting period, Parliament authorised the Government to further extend the applicability of the Government’s emergency measures until the end of the pandemic-related ‘state of danger’. The Government went beyond the Parliament’s authorisation when it issued emergency measures to regulate matters unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic. It also used its emergency powers to overrule judicial decisions, thereby limiting the right to strike and media freedom . Several emergency measures have been challenged before the Constitutional Court, but most applications were found inadmissible, or proceedings were discontinued on the ground that the challenged rules were no longer in force. When deciding cases on the merits, the Constitutional Court confirmed the ban on assemblies , the extension of the statutory deadline for addressing access to documents requests , the rules related to COVID-19 immunity certificates and the cancellation of a semester in higher education . On 24 May 2022, Parliament adopted the Tenth Amendment, allowing the Government to declare a ‘state of danger’ in case of an armed conflict, war or a humanitarian catastrophe in a neighbouring country. On 25 May 2022, the Government declared another ‘state of danger’ under the amended Article 53(1) of the Fundamental Law, in view of the armed conflict and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine and with a view to averting their impact on Hungary. On 8 June 2022, Parliament adopted Act VI of 2022, authorising the Government to extend the applicability of emergency measures until 1 November 2022.

Investigations have been initiated following allegations related to the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware surveillance software against lawyers and journalists, while there are concerns due to the absence of effective judicial supervision as regards the use of secret surveillance measures outside criminal proceedings. The national data protection authority carried out an investigation following allegations that at least ten Hungarian lawyers, including the President of the Hungarian Bar Association, and at least five Hungarian journalists , had been targeted by the Pegasus spyware . The report by the data protection authority published on 31 January 2022 confirmed that the Hungarian authorities had used the Pegasus spyware for covert surveillance of information systems and premises, and that information gathering subject to authorisation was carried out with respect to several persons identified in the press. The report concluded that the spyware had been used in accordance with the relevant legal regulations. On 15 June 2022, the prosecution service closed its investigation finding that there had been no unauthorised covert information gathering or illegal use of covert means. Stakeholders also report that the rules of secret information gathering are so loose in Hungary that lawyers, like any citizen, may legally become surveillance targets and that the Minister of Justice has discretion in allowing the secret surveillance for reasons of national security without any meaningful oversight and control over the decision taken . Already in its judgment Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary , the European Court of Human Rights found that authorisation and application of secret surveillance measures lacked judicial supervision. The execution of the judgment is still ongoing, and Hungary remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The absence of guarantees, including effective judicial oversight, in case of secret surveillance of lawyers on grounds of national security, raises serious concerns because it weakens their independence, undermining the confidentiality of client-lawyer communication. Concerns as regards the independence of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights have been aggravated by the takeover of the responsibilities of the Equal Treatment Authority by the Commissioner. In March 2022, the UN Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) confirmed its earlier recommendation that the Hungarian national human rights institution be downgraded to B-status. The SCA found that the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights ‘has not effectively engaged on […] all human rights issues, including in relation to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, LGBTI, refugees and migrants as well as constitutional court cases deemed political and institutional, media pluralism, civic space and judicial independence’ . As of January 2021, through new legislation, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights took over all the responsibilities and functions of the Equal Treatment Authority. In its 18 October 2021 Opinion , the Venice Commission criticised that the law was ‘adopted during the state of emergency, in a rushed manner, apparently without consultation with civil society and other stakeholders’. The Venice Commission concluded that as a result of the merger, ‘the new system of protection against discrimination is overall more complicated and thus has the potential to be less effective than the previous one’ and that this is a risk ‘that may undermine the effectiveness of the work in the field of promoting equality and combating discrimination’. According to stakeholders, the number of discrimination complaints has significantly dropped after the merger . The Constitutional Court continues to review final judicial decisions, including upon request of public authorities . The new possibility to review final judicial decisions upon request of public authorities raises questions in particular as regards legal certainty . Although it is not part of the court system, the Constitutional Court adjudicating on the merits of the case has been characterised as ‘a court of fourth instance’ . According to stakeholders, in 2021, the Constitutional Court continued to overrule Kúria decisions in politically sensitive cases . This role of the Constitutional Court, composed of members elected by Parliament without the involvement of the judiciary, in reviewing judgments of the ordinary courts, has also been raised by the Commission in the context of the 2022 European Semester . As regards the constitutional control of the legislative and the executive, in 2021, the Constitutional Court annulled six legal acts and in 11 cases it did not annul the acts but formulated requirements for their application. The Government’s stance conditioning compliance with a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union upon a ruling of the Constitutional Court raises concerns. On 17 December 2020, the Court of Justice ruled that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law in the area of procedures for granting international protection and returning illegally staying third-country nationals. On 26 February 2021, the Government submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court seeking an interpretation of the Fundamental Law, arguing that the implementation of this judgment raised a constitutional problem. In its reply, on 7 December 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that as long as the EU institutions do not take the measures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the joint exercise of competences, Hungary is entitled to exercise the relevant non-exclusive field of competence of the EU . On 12 November 2021, the Commission decided to refer Hungary to the Court of Justice over its failure to comply with this judgment of the Court of Justice. On 1 January 2022, Hungary had 47 leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights pending implementation. Hungary’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that remain pending is at 71%, and the average time that the judgments have been pending implementation is over 6 years and three months . The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation for 13 years, concerns the violation of the right to freedom of assembly . On 1 July 2022, the number of leading judgments pending implementation has decreased to 45. There are cases where state bodies refuse to execute decisions of the domestic courts; several of these concern access to documents . Independent civil society remains under pressure. Although legislation governing the registration and operation of CSOs remained essentially unchanged in 2021, and conforms with international standards , civic space in Hungary continues to be rated as ‘obstructed’ . On 16 November 2021, the Court of Justice held that Hungary breached Union law by criminalising the organisation of activities carried out with a view to assisting the initiation of applications for international protection that do not fulfil the national criteria for granting that protection . Hungary’s failure to implement this judgment maintains the pressure on CSOs active in the field of asylum. The implementation of new rules giving the State Audit Office the power of carrying out legality checks on the accounts of CSOs with an annual balance sheet total exceeding a certain amount has been scheduled for the first semester of 2022. Independent CSOs are often being labelled as ‘political’, thus not truly civic, and as ‘agents’ not serving the ‘national interest’ . Organisations representing the LGBTIQ community complain of being targeted by Government’s smear campaigns . After the referendum related to the ‘Child-protection Law’ , the National Election Commission fined the CSOs that had called for invalid votes be cast . The Kúria overturned most of these administrative decisions . CSOs have also reported difficulties as regards access to justice, in particular growing obstacles in challenging environmental permitting processes . The State’s role in financing civil society raises questions. According to stakeholders, the Government has centralised the distribution of funding through the National Cooperation Fund and favours the financing of so-called GONGOs . Almost 40% of civil society’s resources come from public funding ; stakeholders report that such funding is uneven, lacks transparency and is politically biased against independent organisations . In July 2021, the failure to agree on an independent grant operator in charge of distributing funds to civil society, led to Hungary losing funds from the European Economic Area and Norway Grants Scheme, of which approximately EUR 9.6 million were earmarked for civil society . The number of public-interest trusts has increased to 35. Twenty-one trusts are in charge of operating formerly state-run higher education institutions that cover two-thirds of the students in Hungarian higher education. Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* * The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-consultation_en . Amnesty International Hungary (2021), Status of the Hungarian judiciary https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR2736232021ENGLISH.pdf . Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Policy Institute (EKINT), Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation (Ökotárs), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, K-Monitor, Mertek Media Monitor, Political Capital, Transparency International Hungary (2022), Contribution for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Artistic Freedom Initiative (2022), Contribution from the Artistic Freedom Initiative for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Átlátszó (2020), ‘The Government has abused the pandemic multiple times according to K-Monitor and HCLU’ (‘A K-Monitor és a TASZ szerint többszörösen visszaélt a kormány a vírushelyzettel’) https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2020/10/28/a-k-monitor-es-a-tasz-szerint-tobbszorosen-visszaelt-a-kormany-a-virushelyzettel/ . Átlátszó (2021), ‘Botched investigations: 20 important cases that got stuck with prosecutors’ (‘Elszabotált nyomozások: 20 fontos ügy, ami megakadt az ügyészségen’) https://atlatszo.hu/kozpenz/2021/09/16/elszabotalt-nyomozasok-20-fontos-ugy-ami-megakadt-az-ugyeszsegen/ . Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022), Transformation Index: Hungary Country Report https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HUN . BIRN (2022), Hungary election: virtual smear tactics alive and well on Facebook https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/30/hungary-election-virtual-smear-tactics-alive-and-well-on-facebook/ . Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021), Media pluralism monitor 2021 – country report on Hungary https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/71949/hungary_results_mpm_2021_cmpf.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y . Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022), Media pluralism monitor 2022 – country report on Hungary. CIVICUS, Monitor tracking civic space – Hungary https://monitor.civicus.org/country/hungary/ . CIVICUS (2022), Contribution from CIVICUS for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.

Civil Society Europe (2022) Contribution from Civil Society Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Civitas Institute/Transparency International (2022), Black Book II – Corruption and State Capture in Hungary https://en.civitasintezet.hu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Black_Book_II.pdf . Conference of European Constitutional Courts (2022) Contribution from the Conference of European Constitutional Courts for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Corruption Research Center Budapest (2021), Two tendencies in the Hungarian public procurement https://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2022_research_notes_01_220209_01.pdf . Corruption Research Center Budapest (2021), Political Favoritism in Public Tenders in Hungary: Analysis of the odds of winning https://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925 . Corruption Research Center Budapest (2022), Contribution from Corruption Research Center Budapest for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Corruption Research Center Budapest (2022), Corruption risk and the crony system in Hungary: A brief analysis of EU funded contracts in Hungarian public procurement 2005-2021 https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3095 . Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (2021), Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (2022), Contribution from the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2010), Report on the Independence of the Judicial System. Part I: The Independence of Judges (CDL-AD(2010)004). Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2012), Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CDL-AD(2012)009). Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2021), Opinion on the amendments to the Act on Equal Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities and to the Act on the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights as adopted by the Hungarian parliament in December 2020 (CDL-AD(2021)034). Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2021), Opinion on the amendments to the Act on the organisation and administration of the Courts and the Act on the legal status and remuneration of judges adopted by the Hungarian parliament in December 2020 (CDL-AD(2021)036). Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2021), Opinion on the compatibility with international human rights standards of Act LXXIX amending certain Acts for the protection of children (CDL-AD(2021)050). Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C-564/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:218. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 14 May 2020, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság, C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2020:367. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-808/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary, C-821/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:930.

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 23 November 2021, IS, C-564/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:949. Directorate-General for Communication (2019), Flash Eurobarometer 482: businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU. Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption. Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Flash Eurobarometer 507: businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU. Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption. Direkt36 (2021), ‘President of the Hungarian Bar Association and several other lawyers have been targeted by Pegasus’ https://www.direkt36.hu/en/banati-janos-az-ugyvedi-kamara-elnoke-es-tobb-masik-ugyved-is-az-izraeli-kemszoftver-celpontja-lett/ . Direkt36 (2022), ‘Pegasus's defense attorney becomes a target as he turns around in one of Hungary's most notorious murder cases’ (‘Pegasus-célponttá vált a védőügyvéd, amikor fordulat állt be Magyarország egyik leghírhedtebb gyilkossági ügyében’) https://www.direkt36.hu/pegasus-celpontta-valt-a-vedougyved-amikor-fordulat-allt-be-magyarorszag-egyik-leghirhedtebb-gyilkossagi-ugyeben/ . Domány, Andras (2021), ‘For nine years, a former Fidesz secretary of state took over the new concession authority’ (‘Kilenc évre egy fideszes exállamtitkár került az új koncessziós hatóság élére’) https://hvg.hu/itthon/20211001_biro_marcell_szabalyozott_tevekenysegek_felugyeleti_hatosaga . Euractiv (2022), ‘Orban’s influencers shower cash, become largest social media spenders’ https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/orbans-influencers-shower-cash-become-largest-social-media-spenders/ . European Association of Judges (2022), Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. European Commission (2022), EU Justice Scoreboard. European Commission (2022), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2022 National Reform Programme of Hungary and delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Hungary (COM(2022) 614 final). European Commission (2022), 2022 European Semester, Country Report on Hungary. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 October 2008, Patyi and Others v. Hungary, 5529/05. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 22 December 2009, Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia, 24810/06. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 12 January 2016, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 37138/14. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 2 May 2019, Pasquini v. San Marino, 50956/16. European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.

European Transport Workers’ Federation (2022), Contribution from the European Transport Workers’ Federation for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Freedom House, Freedom in the World – Hungary Country Report https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2022 . Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) (2021), Report and Recommendations of the Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-24 June 2021 https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN-SCA-Report-June-2021.pdf . Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) (2022): Report and Recommendations of the Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-25 March 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/SCA-Report-March-2022_E.pdf . GRECO (2015), Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Hungary on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round – Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Hungary on incriminations and transparency of party funding. GRECO (2020), Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report on Hungary on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) (2022), Contribution from the Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Hungarian Bar Association (2022), Contribution from the Hungarian Bar Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Hungarian Competition Authority (2021), Press release: A decade for integrity, committed to eliminating corruption https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press-releases-2021/a-decade-for-integrity-committed-to-eliminating-corruption . Hungarian Government, Medium-term National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2020-2022 https://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/download/f/ff/92000/STRAT%C3%89GIA%20k%C3%B6zz%C3%A9tett.pdf . Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2021), Non-Execution of Domestic and International Court Judgments in Hungary https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/12/HHC_Non-Execution_of_Court_Judgments_2021.pdf . Hungarian National Media and Infocommunications Authority (2022), Contribution from the Hungarian National Media and Infocommunications Authority for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Hungarian Parliament (2021), Parliamentary report of the Prosecutor General on the activities of the Prosecution Service in 2020 http://ugyeszseg.hu/wp-content/uploads/jaskupeter/2021/10/ogy_beszamolo_2020.pdf . Hungarian Spectrum (2021), ‘Mol’s CEO Zsolt Hernádi won’t be gallivanting around the globe any time soon’ https://hungarianspectrum.org/2021/10/25/mols-ceo-zsolt-hernadi-wont-be-gallivanting-around-the-globe-any-time-soon/ . Hungary Today (2021), ‘MPs’ Asset Declarations Yet Again Raise Concerns, Causing Calls for Stricter Rules’ https://hungarytoday.hu/mps-asset-declarations-concern-stricter-orban-rogan-corruption/ . Hungary Today (2021), ‘Croatia Top Court Affirms Prison Sentence for MOL Chief Hernádi’ https://hungarytoday.hu/hernadi-croatia-sentence-court-mol-leader/. Hungary Today (2022), ‘Asset Declaration: Hungary’s Politicians Hardly Have Any Savings’ https://hungarytoday.hu/asset-declaration-hungarys-politicians-hardly-have-any-savings/ . Hungary Today (2022), ‘Political Parties Spent HUF 3 Billion during Campaign Period on Facebook Alone’ https://hungarytoday.hu/political-parties-campaign-facebook-opposition-fidesz-dominance-election/ . ILGA-Europe (2022), Contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2022), Contribution from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. International Press Institute (2022), Contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. International Press Institute (2022), ‘Hungary: Fidesz Media Council moves to silence independent station Tilos Rádió’ https://ipi.media/hungary-fidesz-media-council-moves-to-silence-independent-station-tilos-radio/ . K-Monitor (2021), Court of Auditors vs. Reality (Számvevőszék vs. Valóság - Reakciónk az ÁSZ Elnökére) https://k.blog.hu/2021/03/23/szamvevoszek_vs_valosag . K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary (2022), Contribution for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Kúria (2019), Statement: ‘Criminal proceedings may only be stayed with a view to delivering a lawful and well-founded decision on the merits’ (‘A büntetőeljárás menetének megakasztása a jogszerű és alapos érdemi döntés meghozatalának előmozdítása érdekében történhet’) https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/buntetoeljaras-menetenek-megakasztasa-jogszeru-es-alapos-erdemi-dontes-meghozatalanak . Kúria (2021), Statement regarding the opinion of the Advocate General delivered in case C-564/19 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (A Kúria közleménye az Európai Unió Bírósága C-564/19. számú ügyében kifejtett főtanácsnoki indítványról) https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-kozlemenye-az-europai-unio-birosaga-c-56419-szamu-ugyeben-kifejtett-fotanacsnoki . Kúria (2021), Contribution from the Kúria President for the 2021 Rule of Law Report. Kúria (2021), Statement regarding the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-564/19 (A Kúria közleménye az Európai Unió Bírósága C-564/19. számú ügyben hozott ítélete vonatkozásában) https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-kozlemenye-az-europai-unio-birosaga-c-56419-szamu-ugyben-hozott-itelete-vonatkozasaban . Liberties (2022), Contribution from Liberties for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (2022), Findings of the investigation of the Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság (Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information) launched ex officio concerning the application of the “Pegasus” spyware in Hungary https://naih.hu/data-protection/data-protection-reports/file/492-findings-of-the-investigation-of-the-nemzeti-adatvedelmi-es-informacioszabadsag-hatosag-hungarian-national-authority-for-data-protection-and-freedom-of-information-launched-ex-officio-concerning-the-application-of-the-pegasus-spyware-in-hungary . National Media and Infocommunications Authority (2022), Contribution from the National Media and Infocomunications Authority for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 two-year follow-up report on Hungary. OECD (2021), Economic Survey: Hungary https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Hungary-2021-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf . OLAF (2021), The OLAF report 2020 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/system/files/2021-12/olaf_report_2020_en.pdf . OLAF (2022), The OLAF report 2021 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/system/files/2022-06/olaf-report-2021_en_4.pdf . OLAF (2022), Contribution from OLAF for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Ökotárs (2022) - Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (2022), Contribution from the Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Philea (2022), Contribution from Philea for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.

Political Capital (2022), Russian Disinformation in Hungarian Public Broadcast Media: Complaint to the European Commission https://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=2982 President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ) (2021), 2020 Annual Report (Az Országos Bírósági Hivatal Elnökének 2020. évi beszámolója) https://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/2022-01/obhe_2020_eves_beszamolo.pdf . Prosecutor General’s Office (2021), Prosecutor General’s Report on Activities of the Prosecution Service 2020 http://ugyeszseg.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/jaskupeter/2021/10/ogy_beszamolo_2020.pdf . Prosecutor General’s Office (2021), Press release: ‘The Central Chief Prosecution Office of Investigation has interrogated MP Dr. Pál Völner’ (‘A Központi Nyomozó Főügyészség gyanúsítottként hallgatta ki dr. Völner Pál országgyűlési képviselőt’) http://ugyeszseg.hu/a-kozponti-nyomozo-fougyeszseg-gyanusitottkent-hallgatta-ki-dr-volner-pal-orszaggyulesi-kepviselot/ . Prosecutor General’s Office (2022), Press release: ‘Grants obtained through corruption’ (‘Korrupció útján szereztek pályázati támogatásokat - fotókkal - a Központi Nyomozó Főügyészség sajtóközleménye’) http://ugyeszseg.hu/korrupcio-utjan-szereztek-palyazati-tamogatasokat-fotokkal-a-kozponti-nyomozo-fougyeszseg-sajtokozlemenye/ . Public Procurement Authority (2021), Flash report – Hungarian public procurements in numbers https://kozbeszerzes.hu/media/documents/FLASH_REPORT-2021.pdf . Reporters without Borders – Hungary https://rsf.org/en/country/hungary . State Audit Office (2021), Press release: The President of the SAO has asked Dr. Mónika Karas to be Vice-President (Az ÁSZ elnöke alelnöknek kérte fel Dr. Karas Monikát) https://www.asz.hu/hu/sajtokozlemenyek/az-asz-elnoke-alelnoknek-kerte-fel-dr-karas-monikat-2021-10-29-12-00-00 . State Audit Office (2021), Press release: Elections: Handbook prepared to support election regularity (Választások: Kézikönyv készült a választások szabályszerűségének támogatása érdekében) https://www.asz.hu/hu/sajtokozlemenyek/valasztasok-kezikonyv-keszult-a-valasztasok-szabalyszerusegenek-tamogatasa-erdekeben . Telex (2022), ‘18 people questioned over bribery in Finance Ministry case’ (‘Tizennyolc embert hallgattak ki vesztegetés miatt a Pénzügyminisztériumot érintő ügyben’) https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/04/21/tizennyolc-embert-hallgattak-ki-unios-palyazatokkal-kapcsolatos-vesztegetes-miatt . Telex (2022), ‘Five arrested, one placed under criminal supervision in corruption case involving Finance Ministry’ (‘Öt embert letartóztattak, egyet bűnügyi felügyelet alá helyeztek a Pénzügyminisztériumot érintő korrupciós ügyben’) https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/04/22/ot-embert-letartoztattak-egyet-bunugyi-felugyelet-ala-helyeztek-a-penzugyminiszteriumot-erinto-korrupcios-ugyben . Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. Transparency International Hungary (2022), Contribution from Transparency International Hungary for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. Annex II: Country visit to Hungary The Commission services held virtual meetings in February and March 2022 with: ·Alapjogokért Központ ·Amnesty International Hungary ·Corruption Research Center Budapest ·Editors-in-Chief’s Forum (Főszerkesztők Fóruma)

·Eötvös Károly Policy Institute ·Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) ·Hungarian Bar Association ·Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) ·Hungarian Helsinki Committee ·K-Monitor ·Kúria (the Supreme Court) ·Mathias Corvinus Collegium ·Mérték Media Monitor ·National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information ·National Judicial Council ·National Media and Infocommunications Authority ·National Office for the Judiciary ·Nézőpont ·Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights ·Office of the Constitutional Court ·Prosecution Service of Hungary ·Res Iudicata Association ·State Audit Office (Állami Számvevőszék) ·Századvég

·Transparency International Hungary * The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings: ·Amnesty International ·Article 19 ·Civil Liberties Union for Europe ·Civil Society Europe ·European Centre for Press and Media Freedom ·European Civic Forum ·European Federation of Journalists ·European Partnership for Democracy ·European Youth Forum ·Free Press Unlimited ·Human Rights Watch ·ILGA Europe ·International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) ·International Press Institute ·Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) ·Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa ·Philea