19. 12. 83 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 341/21 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision adopting new provisions relating to 
Chapter VI 'Supplies' of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community 
The text referred to the Committee has been published in Official Journal of the Euro­
pean Communities No C 330 of 16 December 1982, page 4. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 20 December 1982 the Council referred the abovementioned proposal to the 
Economic and Social Committee in accordance with Article 170 of the Treaty estab­
lishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 
B. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The Economic and Social Committee prepared its opinion on the above matter at its 
210th plenary session held in Brussels on 28 and 29 September 1983. 
The full text of the opinion is as follows: 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 1. Introduction 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Euro­
pean Atomic Energy Community, and in particular 
Article 170 thereof, 
Having regard to the request made by the Council 
of the European Communities on 20 December 
1982 for an opinion on the proposal for a Council 
Decision adopting new provisions relating to Chap­
ter VI 'Supplies' of the Treaty establishing the Euro­
pean Atomic Energy Community ('), 
Having regard to the decision taken by its Bureau 
on 14 December 1982, instructing the Section for 
Energy and Nuclear Questions to draw up an opin­
ion on the matter, 
Having regard to the opinion adopted by the above-
mentioned Section at its 82nd meeting on 9 September 
1983, 
Having regard to the oral report made by the rap­
porteur Mr von der Decken, 
Having regard to the proceedings at its 210th plen­
ary session held on 28 and 29 September 1983 
(meeting of 28 September), 
HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION 
with 69 votes in favour, five votes against and 
12 abstentions: 
(•) OJ No C 330, 16. 12. 1982, p. 4. 1.1. Article 76 of the Euratom Treaty makes pro­
vision for changes to be made to Chapter VI after a 
period of seven years has elapsed, i.e. from 1964 
onwards. The Commission has already made two 
proposals for changes to the chapter (in 1964 and in 
1970). Neither proposal was accepted. 
1.2. The current version of Chapter VI gives the 
Euratom Commission a monopoly in the trade in 
nuclear fuels as shortages of supply were possible at 
the time when the provisions were drawn up. In 
practice, however, things have turned out com­
pletely differently. This state of affairs is due in 
particular to the fact that the initially expected 
shortage, particularly of natural uranium, did not 
occur. 
1.3. As a result, the supply agency responsible for 
exercising the rights and carrying out the duties of 
this Commission has introduced a simplified proce­
dure which virtually implies in practice that, to a 
certain extent, the agency gives its signature to con­
tracts but is generally not involved in negotiating 
them. In many cases, nuclear fuels are only regis­
tered by the agency. 
1.4. Chapter VI does not give the supply agency a 
monopoly for processing contracts (Article 75). A 
point of dispute in the past was whether enrichment 
contracts were processing contracts. Consequently 
No C 341/22 Official Journal of the European Communities 19.12.83 
some Member States and undertakings did not sub­
mit contracts to the supply agency in the past. 
1.5. For the reasons mentioned above and for var­
ious other reasons the Commission has now submit­
ted a new proposal for amending the provisions of 
Chapter VI. This new proposal completely abolishes 
the present monopoly but puts all processing con­
tracts on an equal footing with purchasing and sales 
contracts, clearly lays down the principle of the mar­
ket economy and the unity of the Community mar­
ket and confirms the important new role of the Sup­
ply Agency based on the practical situation. 
2. General comments 
2.1. The Committee considers that the aim of any 
revision of Chapter VI should be to draw up special 
provisions for nuclear fuels, as compared with other 
fuels, only in cases where such provisions are abso­
lutely necessary, given the special considerations 
involved in nuclear technology. As the particular 
issues of surveillance and safety are dealt with in 
Chapter VII, Chapter VI can only deal and should 
only deal with the provision of supplies, the market 
economy and the unity of the market. 
2.2. The Committee fully endorses the general aim 
of the new provisions. A number of additional pow­
ers are however sought which were not contained in 
the original text of the Treaty. The Committee pro­
poses to deal with these points and a number of spe­
cific amendments individually below. 
2.3. The Committee hopes that it will soon be pos­
sible to reach agreement between all the parties con­
cerned, taking into account its specific comments 
set out below, so that a new version of Chapter VI 
of the Euratom Treaty can be adopted. 
3. Specific comments 
3.1. Article 52 
This Article takes into account the fact that some 
Member States possess nuclear weapons and makes 
it clear that the role of the Community does not 
cover supplies for military or explosive purposes. 
The Committee does not see any possibility of 
resolving this problem by a different proposal. It 
would however stress that all materials for civil, non-
explosive purposes must be subject to the same rules 
in all the Member States; otherwise there would be 
unacceptable discrimination. 3.2. Article 53 
The Committee welcomes the explicit confirmation 
of the unity of the Community market given in 
Article 53 (1). It does, however, recognize that this 
applies only to the civil part of the market. 
The Committee is unable to take a definitive stand 
on the second paragraph of Article 53 until an offi­
cial version of such a Regulation is available. It con­
sequently requests that the text of this Regulation be 
submitted to it for an opinion. 
3.3. Article 57 
The Committee wonders whether it would not be 
sufficient, rather than requiring express authoriza­
tion for exports, for the supply agency simply to 
take note of export contracts. In the Commission's 
view it is anyway only in very rare exceptional cases 
that export authorization would be refused. It 
should therefore be sufficient for the supply agency 
to check whether a particular contract is not con­
trary to the interests of the Community, rather than 
considering whether it is in conformity with the gen­
eral interests of the Community. 
3.4. All forms of contract processing must, in the 
Committee's view, at all events be expressly 
excluded as this type of work does not affect the 
supply situation of the Community. 
3.5. Article 58 
The Committee considers that the wording of this 
Article is too vague. The intention, stated in the 
explanations given by the Commission, that only 
investments involving international participation 
are to be covered is not clear from the text of 
Article 58. The Committee is also unable to see why 
an enterprise involving international participation 
should in general be dealt with differently from 
purely national undertakings. Proposed large-scale 
investments in the field of enrichment and repro­
cessing will anyway be well known throughout the 
Community. The Committee therefore considers 
that the whole of Article 58 is superfluous, particu­
larly as investors are not to be obliged to work 
together and indeed could not be so obliged. 
3.6. Article 60 
The Committee holds the view that the establish­
ment of stocks should primarily be considered in the 
case of natural uranium as it is only in respect of 
supplies of this product that the Community is 
19.12.83 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 341/23 
necessarily dependent on non-EC countries. Even 
in the case of this product, however, the Committee 
is unable to see any practical reason for the estab­
lishment of such stocks by the Commission in the 
foreseeable future. 
3.7. Article 61 
The Committee sees a fundamental contradiction in 
endeavouring, on the one hand, to implement the 
principle of the market economy — based as it is on 
the free interplay between supply and demand — 
and in introducing, on the other hand, measures to 
bring about an enforced balance. Furthermore, it is 
hardly possible to give a sufficiently clear definition 
of what is meant by an imbalance between supply 
and demand. 
3.8. For the abovementioned reasons the Com­
mittee proposes that the proposed version of 
Article 61 be deleted and replaced by the following 
provision which only applies in the event of crisis: 
'Article 61 
In the event of serious threat of crisis the Com­
mission shall make all appropriate recommen­
dations to the Member States, persons and 
undertakings on ways of overcoming such a 
crisis.' 
3.9. Article 62 3.10. Articles 63 to 71 inclusive 
In the past the supply agency has earned a high 
reputation, particularly because of the fact that it 
has seen its basic role as one of giving support to 
industry. The Committee therefore considers that 
the agency should continue to be strengthened as 
far as possible. One way in which its role should be 
consolidated is by making express provision for 
export contracts to be included in its field of respon­
sibility. The very fact that export contracts affect the 
supply situation of the Community justifies their 
notification to the Commission. The powers of the 
supply agency should be adjusted accordingly. In 
the Commitee's view it is absolutely essential to lay 
down clear provisions in this matter. 
3.11. Article 72 
Provided that Article 57 is amended to specify that 
it also covers export contracts, since they affect sup­
plies, the Committee has no objections to Article 72. 
It hopes that its provisions will not prove too 
unwieldy in practice. 
3.12. Article 73 
The Committee is unable to see the need for further 
measures of surveillance, over and above those set 
out in Chapter VII, 'Safeguards', and elsewhere. 
In the Committee's view it cannot be disputed that 
the Council must have the right to adopt, by unani­
mous decision and acting on a proposal from the 
Commission, any appropriate measures to deal with 
crisis situations. 3.13. Article 75 
Contract processing should be expressly excluded as 
it does not affect the supply situation in the Com­
munity. 
Done at Brussels, 28 September 1983. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Francois CEYRAC 
APPENDIX 
to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
Rejected amendments 
The following amendments, tabled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, were rejected by 
the Committee during the debate. 
No C 341/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 12. 83 
Page 4, Item 3.1, Article 52 
Delete the text of this item and replace by the following: 
"The phrase "for civil and non-explosive purposes" in the first sentence of Article 52 should 
be deleted.' 
Reasons 
Uniform conditions of supply for the 'materials' and a ban on all forms of discrimination, irres­
pective of the use to be made of the 'materials' (civil or military), are cornerstones of the Euratom 
Treaty. These basic requirements must be maintained, given the need to afford the same treat­
ment to all markets in the Community. Some Member States have introduced de facto discrimina­
tion in the application of the rules set out in the Treaty by refusing to accept the unity of the 
supply market and refusing to apply the control measures laid down in the Treaty to a considera­
ble number of their installations and/or those of their nationals. We must therefore avoid a situa­
tion whereby a new legal instrument legalizes a case of de facto discrimination. 
The unity of the supply market is also confirmed in Chapter VII (Safeguards) where Article 84 
states that 'in the application of the safeguards, no discrimination shall be made on grounds of 
the use for which ores, source materials and special fissile materials are intended' and indicates in 
its last paragraph that application of the safeguards ceases only when the materials are being spe­
cially processed for defence requirements or after such processing. 
It is inadmissible for the Community to accept in its laws discrimination contrary to the unity of 
the market as a result of the fact that certain 'materials' are 'non-allocated' either to civilian or 
military programmes. This is particularly the case with regard to France which classifies over 80 % 
of its materials as 'non-allocated' as a result of which they are not covered by the Euratom Treaty. 
With a few exceptions the 'materials' of all the installations are thus regarded as having 'no fixed 
utilization'. These are the 'materials' which are currently used to produce almost half — and it 
will soon be more than half — of the total electricity produced in France. These 'materials', 
which are obviously of considerable significance to Community energy production, are therefore 
not covered by the provisions of the Euratom Treaty. The legalization of such a situation by the 
proposed text is unacceptable and, furthermore, by no means necessary as is demonstrated by the 
case of the United Kingdom, which is also a country which has nuclear arms but which has 
agreed to deal with materials classified as military materials in accordance with both the spirit 
and tlje letter of the abovementioned Article 84. 
The application of sanctions (Article 74 of the new provisions) becomes an additional discrimi­
natory measure if all Member States are not subject to the same conditions. 
Voting 
For: 12, against: 49, abstentions: 19. 
Page 9 
Insert a paragraph on Article 74: 
'The Committee feels that to give the Commission regulatory powers in this area is a particu­
larly delicate matter, especially as the new provisions would cover breaches of international 
agreements. These powers should be vested in the Council'. 
Reasons 
This recognizes the importance of the fact that the application of sanctions or penalties is an 
essential part of Chapter VI. 
Voting 
For: 7, against: 51, abstentions: 18.