COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
C0M(93) 512 final 
Brussels, 20 October 1993 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
FUTURE OF THE ECSC TREATY 
BORROWING/LENDING ACTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION 
In its Communication of 15 March 1991 to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the future of the ECSC Treaty (Doc. SEC (91) 407 final), the Commission came 
out in favour of letting the Treaty expire when it comes to the end of its period of 
validity in 2002, while taking advantage of its flexibility to adapt its application to 
titie two sectors in such a way that: they are gradually incorporated into the EEC 
Treaty. 
On 18 November 1992 the Commission transmitted to the Council a working 
document (Doc. SEC (92) 1889 final) on the financial activities of the ECSC with 
a possible scenario for the phasing-out of budgetary expenditure by 2002. 
With particular reference to ECSC borrowing/lending activity, the conclusions of the 
"Industry" Councils of 24 November 1992 and 4 May 1993, call upon the 
Commission to examine the question in depth, and consider in particular the 
possibility of a total or partial takeover of this activity by other financial bodies, 
such as the EIB. 
As a result of the Council's call, inter-departmental contacts took place between the 
Commission and the EIB aimed at examining the scope for an EIB takeover of 
certain ECSC financial activities. The matter was first discussed by the EIB Board 
of Directors on 20 July 1993. 
This note is to apprise the Council of the prospects and implications of an EIB 
takeover of certain ECSC financial activities, and of the principal options resulting 
from those prospects. 
The note deals, in order, with: 
- the point in the lifetime of a loan at which a transfer might be effected; 
- the various types of ECSC loans and their suitability for transfer, 
- me legal questions which would arise in the event of a transfer, 
- the effects of ECSC lending activity on the ECSC budget and on its reserves; 
- the consequences of such a transfer on the capital markets and on the ECU 
market, 
- the consquences of invoking an EEC guarantee; 
- the prospects for a takeover of this activity by financial bodies other man the EIB; 
- the memorandum of the French delegation of 22 February 1993; 
- the note by the Danish Presidency of 10 June 1993. 
The Commission now calls upon the Council to complete its examination of the loan 
applications still outstanding and to give the opinions requested without delay. To 
this end, an Annex (1) to this note provides further information on ?ad> application. 
The Commission stresses that delay m settling these outstanding cases is damaging 
to the image of the Community both within the Community and abroad and - with 
regard to certain applications under Article 56 (2) (a) prohibits the ECSC from 
making the planned regional grants. 
IL ANALYSIS OF THE STAGE OF 1HE LOANS TQ BE TRANSFERRED 
1. ECSC loans ontstamfing 
As at 31.12.1992 total ECSC loans (from borrowed funds) disbursed and not yet 
reimbursed amounted to 7 724 million ecus. The reserves immobilized against these 
outstandings amount to 261 million ecus. Annex 2 presents the méthode of 
calculation of the ratio ("solvency ratio**) used by the ECSC to calculate the amount 
to be put in reserve. 
The first possibility would be the purely administrative transfer of this portfolio to 
the EIB, This would amount to simple sub-contracting of the monitoring of the 
loans> with no financial repercussions on the accounts of the ECSC or the EIB other 
than an increase in the administrative costs. 
A further possibility is the assignment - in the legal sense of the word - of the 
outstanding ECSC loans to the EIB (Le, a sale of the portfolio to the EIB). This 
would raise complex problems which would require further analysis. Such an 
assignment would» in addition, make sense only if, at the same time, the 
corresponding department for ECSC borrowings were also transferred, which is 
hardly conceivable and would taise another series of legal and financial problems. 
Apart from the aspects mentioned above, negotiations would be needed with the EIB 
on the financial details of the transfer, after an evaluation of the value of each loan. 
This would inevitably involve either a direct guarantee from the Community (EEC) 
or from the ECSC, in which case the latter*s guarantee fund would be unavailable. 
The EIB is not interested in such a takeover. 
ECSC loans signed bnt not vet disbursed and ECSC loans decided noon bnt net vejt 
signed 
ECSC loans falling mto mis category amount to 3 182 million ecus as at 31.7.1993 
(Annex 3, subtotal I). For simplicity, the PECO facility of 200 million ecus has also 
been included in this category, although in mis case the procedure is not yet entirely 
completed, since the Council must give its assent (under Article 95) to each of the 
loans to be granted under the facili*.v -:7 
A transfer of these loans could force the EIB to reexamine the loans and review the 
guarantees. This attitude could be detrimental to the rights acquired by third parties 
and could lead to legal proceedings against the ECSC. 
Talks with the representatives of the EIB show that mere is no interest in such a 
transfer. 
3. Application farlnan* for which mere has already been a Commission deciaen but 
for which mere is still no Council assent 
The applications falling into mis category amount to 213 million ecus as at 
31.7.1993 (Annex 3, subtotal Ha). In the case of these applications me actual 
examination has been completed, and they should be treated as above. No transfer, 
therefore, is recommended The EIB shares this view. 
4. Loan applications winch have not vet been decided up"" ^T fr» Commission 
This category includes: 
- applications for which the examination has begun but has not yet resulted in a 
favourable decision by the Commission; 
- applications submitted to the Commission for which the examination has not yet 
begun; 
The total for the two categories above is 2 168 million ecus (Annex 3, subtotal H 
b). 
The applications submitted to the Commission for which the examination has 
already begun would cause problems. 
For loan applications pending, which have not yet been examined by the 
Commission, a transfer would be possible with the agreement of the client 
For new loan applications, talks with the EEB have shown that, should the 
Commission wish to choose the option to transfer, the clearest solution would be for 
a notice to mis effect to be published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities. The content of such a notice would still have to be discussed in 
detail. 
It is important to note that whenever this present document refers to a possible 
"takeover by the EIBn <in particular when analysing the various types of loan in 
Section HI below) it is making reference only to new applications. 
BO. ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF LOAN 
1* Loans under Article 54 (second paragraph) of die ECSC Treaty 
a) Description 
Article 54 (second paragraph) of the ECSC Treaty authorizes the financing of any 
works and installations which contribute directly and primarily to increasing the 
production, reducing the production costs or facilitating the marketing of ECSC 
products. 
These loans include in particular: 
- "Consumption of Community coal" loans (e.g. the financing of thermal power 
stations); 
- "Consumption of Community steel" loans (e.g. mdustrial projects involving either 
new applications for steel or improved competitiveness for steel vis-à-vis any 
other product, or projects in which steel represents a significant proportion of the 
cost of production. This category of loans also embraces major infcastructure 
projects of general European interest such as railways, harbours, bridges and 
tunnels); 
- "Raw materials" loans to the benefit of Community producers: the ECSC has 
decided to finance mining projects inter alia in Norway. Sweden. Africa, the 
United States, Australia and South America. 
The total outstanding on these loans as at 31.12.1992 was X 682 million ecus. 
The reserves immobilized against these outstandings amount to 41 million ecus. 
Article 54 (second paragraph) loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to 
831 million ecus. These were all Msteel consumption" loans. 
b) Possibility of takeover b> the EIB 
No change would be required in EIB rules or procedures for most new applications 
under article 54.2 (e.g. infrastructure loans). In the case of the other projects not 
falling within these eligibility criteria, it would be necessary for the competent 
Community bodies to manifest the Community's interest in their financing. In non 
EEC countries the EIB could operate only at the Council's invitation and possibly 
whh a budgetary guarantee. 
c) Advantages 
The EIB and the ECSC already have some shared experience in the case of 
"infrastructure" loans, acquired in a number of co-financing operations. 
Such a transfer would be in line with the proposals contained in the French 
Memorandum and the Danish Presidency Note. 
The EIB itself is willing to accept such a transfer. 
The transfer could be implemented very quickly, for example on 1 January 1994. 
The Commission could publish a communication in the Official Journal advising the 
public of this. 
d) Disadvantages 
The EIB is insisting on maintaining its usual lending criteria, in particular in terms 
of quality of investments and promoters, adaptation to market prospects, risks and 
security offered. The Bank wishes to avoid any alteration of its basic policy 
principles, notably non-discrimination about the origin of supplies required to 
complete a project The "consumption of Community steel" clause in the "major 
mfrastractUTe" loans would, doubtless, not be included which would entail the loss 
of the ECSC specificity of these loans-
There are a number of projects under Article 54 (second paragraph) where further 
intervention would be in the interests of the Community and which the EIB is 
empowered to take on but in respect of which ft prefers, for internal operational 
reasons, not to increase its participation. This was the case for the financing of the 
Channel Tunnel, when in 1991 the EIB preferred not to contribute further, and when 
the ECSC, with a credit line of £200 million (265 million ecus) was able to confirm 
the Community^ interest and confidence in this important project The ECSC's 
gesture had the full support of the EIB and made a significant contribution to the 
financing of the project by reassuring the consortium of private-sector banks. This 
additional nature of the financial mstrmnents, and the resulting synergy, would 
disappear with the transfer. Bankers do not calculate the amount they will lend by 
counting the different types of finance for which the project is eligible: they simply 
assess the total risk they are willing to take on. It is therefore unlikely that, in the 
event of the transfer, the EIB will raise the level of its intervention in any given 
project. 
It should also be noted that, from the point of view of the instrument's objective, the 
transfer would as a rule do little to reduce the level of reserves, since major 
infrastructure works are for the most part carried out by public bodies, and this, in 
accordance with the solvency ratio Directive, require no immobilization of reserves. 
Article 54 (second paragraph) loans disbursed in 1992 totaled 831 million ecus, of 
which 765 million ecus was for major infrastrucure projects and 66 million ecus for 
Community steel consumption global loans. Of the "major mfxastructure'* loans a 
total of 625 million ecus required no constitution of reserves. For the remaining 
infrastructure loans, i.e. 140 million ecus, reserves of 15.2 million ecus were 
immobilized. 
e) Variant 
The attraction of these loans has been demonstrated by the fact that, despite the 
existence of EIB infrastructure loans, the promoters of major projects, who are 
mostly public bodies with the highest possible rating, apply regularly to me ECSC. 
The Commission wishes to maintain the potential of the Treaty as well as the 
operational flexibility described above, and proposes to limit the transfer to the EIB 
to those loans under Article 54 (second paragraph) which imply the immobilization 
of reserves (i.e. those not granted to, or guaranteed by. public bodies). At the same 
time, the possibility of ECSC intervention should be maintained for the cases where 
the EIB does not wish to grant the loan requested. 
The Commission would, of course, have to demonstrate this to be the case when 
submitting its request for the assent of the Council. 
Doubtless, the "consumption of community steer clause could not be taken over as 
it is by the EIB. However, that does not exclude the Commission and the EIB from 
taking care that the latter, in the choice of the large infrastructure projects to which 
it wishes to contribute, from taking fully into account their community interest and 
their conformity with the orientaion of community policies, as is the case notably 
for the temporary loans mechanism decided at Edinburgh and confirmed at 
Copenhagen, 
24 Loans nndpi- Artirte 54 (fast paragraph! of the ECSC Tieatv 
a) Description 
Article 54 (first paragraph) of the ECSC Treaty provides for the financing of 
investment programmes in coal and steel undertakings. 
Loans outstanding at 31.12.1992 totalled 2 764 million ecus. 
Reserves immobilized against these outstandings total 127 million ecus. 
Article 54 (first paragraph) loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to 215 million ecus. 
b) Possibility of takeover by the EIB 
As a result of this specific provision in the ECSC Treaty, the EIB has only rarely 
taken action in mis field. Under its current regulations, the EIB can only act if the 
investment is made in a region eligible to benefit from the structural funds. An 
extension of the criteria of eligibility would require a decision by the EIB Board of 
Governors at the request of the Council of the European Communities. 
c) Advantages 
The French Memorandum is in favour of the takeover of this activity by the EIB. 
In its discussions with certain Commission departments, the EIB has said it is in 
favour of this option, while leaving open the question of the timing of the transfer. 
It should be noted that loans under Article 54 (first paragraph) are often backed by 
real security, i.e. neither government guarantees (outlawed under the code on aid 
applicable to ECSC sectors) nor bank guarantees, and therefore tie up significant 
reserves in implementation of the solvency ratio Directive. Thus, in 1992 alone 
21.9 million ecus were put aside for this ratio. 
d) Disadvantages 
The EIB insists that here, as for loans under Article 54 (second paragraph), it 
intends to maintain the customary criteria for granting loans. 
However, the coal and steel sectors are currently undergoing a crisis- Transferring 
financing of these sectors to the EIB would be tantamount to treating them now as 
if it were already the year 2002, i.e. as if the ECSC Treaty no longer existed. 
The Commission is currently looking into the option of assisting the restructuring 
of the ECSC sectors by means of a. major loan linked to an initiative under Article 
53 a of the Treaty (the ECSC legal basis for this action is currently being examined). 
Such an initiative could not be carried out within the framework of the EIB, 
The Note from the Danish Presidency does not envisage die transfer of activities 
under Article 54 (first paragraph). 
e) Variant 
The transfer could be postponed until the restructuring of the sectors is completed 
which would allow the EIB to implement the appropriate preparation measures. 
The ECSC could, in any case, extend its present cooperation with the EIB by 
encouraging the Bank to participate in the financing of incoming Article 54 (first 
paragraph) loan applications, using the Bank's own criteria, e.g. regional criteria. 
3. Loans under Article 56 (1\ (A of the ECSC Treaty 
a) Description 
Article 56 (2) (a) provides for the financing of programmes for the creation of new 
and economically sound activities or the conversion of existing undertakings capable 
of reabsorbing redundant ECSC workers into productive employment These loans 
are known as "conversion loans". They are generally accompanied by an interest 
rebate of 3% for 5 years. 
The main aim of these loans is to combat industrial decline in ECSC employment 
areas affected by the crisis by promoting the setting-up of new economic activities. 
ECSC action takes the form of direct loans for financing major projects and global 
loans for financing mainly SMEs or small projects. 
Loans outstanding at 31.12.1992 totalled 3 034 million ecus. Reserves immobilized 
against these outstandings total 86 million ecus. 
Article 56 (2) loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to 426 million ecus. 
b) Possibility of takeover by the EIB 
The EIB is also involved in most of these regions, where it grants both direct and 
global loans. However, its loans are not accompanied by rebates. Two scenarios are 
conceivable: the takeover of the loans by the EIB without rebates, or with rebates 
financed from the ECSC budget 
The friture of Article 56 loans deseives further examination, particularly in view of 
the implementation of the conclusions of the recent European Council in 
Copenhagen, (in particular the temporary mechanism in favour of SMEs). 
c) Advantages 
The majority of ECSC conversion loans are "global loans". These are granted to 
credit institutions. According to the "solvency ratio" Directive, a weighting of 20% 
is necessary. In 1992, 11.9 million ecus have been put aside for this ratio. In 
addition, the rebates in respect of loans under Article 56(2)a have a considerable 
impact (currently over 100 million ecus per annum) on the ECSC budget 
The EIB has said ft is in favour of the transfer, though it wishes to consider the 
matter further and feels that the transfer should take place at a later date. 
d) Disadvantages 
The Commission has recently made great efforts to place conversion activities more 
squarely in the context of the reform of the structural funds (see new criteria 
published in OJ C 59 of 6.3.1992). These efforts should bear fruit, particularly 
within the CSFs connected with Objective 2 covering the period 1994-96. 
The global contracts between the ECSC and the financial institutions all have a 
duration of at least three years. It would not be advisable to interfere with them 
whilst the agreements are still in force. 
The rebate mechanism for loans under Article 56 (2) (a) is complex, and transferring 
it to the Kinft would give rise to technical difficulties. 
Furthermore, there is some question as to the fate of the ECSC rebates under Article 
56 (2) (a) in the event of transfer. 
While this elimination (as recommended by the French Memorandum) would 
considerably lighten the ECSC budget, it would be unthinkable to enforce the 
current social clauses concerning job creation without granting rebates on the loans. 
The European Council in Copenhagen showed its interest in this type of scheme by 
inviting the ECOFIN Council to look into the possibility of incorporating interest 
rebates linked to job creation, similar to those granted by the ECSC, into EIB loans 
to SMEs under its temporary lending facility. 
Without the rebates, loans under Article 56 (2) (a) would lose much of their 
attraction and impact 
At present, this instrument is additional to the other structural instruments. If it were 
transferred, it would lose this additionality. 
e) Variants 
(i) It is conceivable that the takeover by the EIB of loans under Article 56 (2) 
(a) might take place only from 1997 onwards. 
Obviously, this option (including the question of interest rebates) would have to 
be reexamined in the light of the implementation of recent measures to promote 
conversion (Copenhagen summit and structural funds). 
(ii) Another means of rapidly unlocking the ECSC's reserves would be an EEC 
budget guarantee. This possibility is examined further in Section 7 of this 
Memorandum. 
4. ECSC loans for workers' housing 
a) Description 
The ECSC is empowered to facilitate the construction, purchase or modernization 
of housing for workers in the coal and steel industries. 
Most of these loans are financed from the ECSC's own funds (special reserve and 
part of the former ECSC Pension Fund). The ECSC accounts for the year ending 
31.12.1992 showed the special fund standing at 188 million ecus, and the former 
ECSC Pension Fund at 57 million ecus. The totals of these reserves remain 
unchanged: workers' housing programmes are limited to re-cycling repayments of 
earlier loans, giving an annual disposable sum of around 12 million ecus. These 
loans are very long-term (around 25 years) and, for social reasons, yield token 
interest at the rate of 1%. 
10 
The total outstanding on these loans at 31.12.1992 was 222 million ecus, i.e. 
157 million ecus out of own funds (special reserve plus part of the former Pension 
Fund) and 65 million ecus out of borrowed funds. 
Workers' housing loans out of own funds do not require to be weighted in 
accordance with the solvency ratio, since they already fully immobilize the special 
reserve. 
Workers' housing loans out of borrowed funds obviously immoblize reserves, but the 
amount is négligeable because of the small volume of these loans and their low rate 
of weighting, since they are disbursed mainly to banks. 
Workers' housing loans disbursed in 1992 amounted to 13 million ecus. 
b) Possibility of takeover by me EEB 
Transferring the loans would not really be possible without transferring the 
corresponding reserves. The transfer would consequently not release any resources. 
These loans meet neither the EIB's current criteria for eligibility of operations nor 
its normal banking criteria. 
The taking over of this activity by the EIB is not possible under the present 
conditions. 
c) Variant 
The "workers' housing" loans funded from own resources account for 100% of 
changes in reserves other than the guarantee fund. 
As was pointed out above, a transfer would not solve the problem of the reserves. 
Offering a guarantee from the EEC budget would not be a solution either in the 
case of the workers' housing loans, the provision against reserves is not the result 
of applying the solvency ratio, but simply of the fact that these loans have been 
granted directly from the special reserve and from part of the former Pension FuncL 
The only way in which the funds can gradually become available (as the loans are 
repaid) is to stop granting further loans. 
This, however, should not be done without serious preliminary reflection as these 
loans belong to the old tradition of ECSC financial activity and have an important 
social impact With this instrument, at 31.12.1992 the ECSC had financed more than 
203 000 homes with its 11 programmes of workers' housing. 
11 
s' ECSC facility nf Sftfl million ecns for the comniies of Central and Eastern Einone 
a) Description 
On 5 March 1990 the Community decided to make ECSC loans available for the 
financing of certain investments (displaying an ECSC interest) in Hungary and 
Poland, up to a maximum of 200 million ecus. Since 1991 this decision has also 
been applicable to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. 
A loan of 12.5 million ecus was approved in 1991 for the financing of a project in 
Poland, although no payment had yet been made by 31.12.1992. A second project 
(43.7 million ecus) was approved by the Commission this year (1993) and is now 
before the Council for its assent 
This activity is liable to develop considerably with the conversion of ECSC 
activities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the preparations made 
by these countries for full association with the Community. 
b) Possibility of takeover by the EIB 
The EIB can operate in these countries after a Council decision and with the 
guarantee of the EEC budget 
c) Disadvantages 
This action has received the assent of the Council pursuant to Article 95 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and has been notified 
to the countries concerned. 
The KTR is not interested in taking over this activity without a guarantee from the 
EEC. 
IV. LEGAL ASPECTS 
As regards the cessation of loans made by the Commission on the basis of the ECSC 
treaty, it needs to be pointed out that financing by die Commission is expressly foreseen 
by articles 54 and 56 of the Treaty of Paris and that it constitutes an important political 
responsibility for this mstitution. 
In consequence, even if one can consider that, in the present circumstances, me 
Commission has the right to stop its financing activities, it must be certain that the sectors 
concerned are not deprived of the financial backing which they can expect from the 
commumty institutions. 
12 
To this end, it must be arranged for the EEB, at the invitation of the Council, to integrate 
into its criteria of eHgibilfry the conditions laid down in articles 54 and 56, in step with 
the Commission stopping its financial activities. 
Article 232 § 1 of the EEC treaty which incorporates the rule that the ECSC treaty 
constitutes a lax spacjajis in relation to die EEC treaty, does not appear to put an obstacle 
in the way of such an intervention which does not involve any modification of the powers 
of the ECSC fflstitutions nor the rules laid down by the ECSC treaty. 
In order to guarantee the continuation of financial interventions as well as the 
transparency of the actions of the community institutions it is necessary for the economic 
operators to be informed well in advance of the date from which loan demands have to 
be addressed to hie EIB, with die understanding mat demands lodged with the 
Commission before aie communication of the suspension of its financial activities will 
be able to follow their normal course. 
v- EFFECTS ON THE ECSC BUDGET 
The ECSC's lending activities normally have two effects on the ECSC budget, ie. a direct 
effect through the provision for interest rebates linked to Article 56 loans» and an indirect 
effect through the reserves (part of die guarantee funds) which are to be constituted or 
maintained in accordance with the solvency ratio Directive, which reduce by the same 
amount the budgetary resources. 
1. While the interest rebates have a major effect on the ECSC budget, in that they 
immobilize almost a quarter of its resources, the decision on what action to take on 
them appears to come more from political priorities than from the decision to 
maintain within the Commission the lending activity as such. Accordingly, it is 
sufficient to confine ourselves to two important points, viz,: 
(i) Even for the signed loans which have not been disbursed, the ECSC is 
protected by a clause limiting its obligations to granting rebates only in 
accordance with budgetary resources. While this clause does not cover the 
"moral obligation* to grant rebates on authorized loans, it at least has the 
merit of protecting the Commission from legal proceedings. 
(ii) The Article 56 loans decided upon but not signed and the loans which 
have been signed but not disbursed (cf. Annex 3) totalled 2 141 million 
ecus on 31 July 1993. For direct loans (336 million ecus) the rebates can 
be modulated. For global loans (I 805 million ecus) there is very little 
flexibility, and if these loans were to be disbursed in their entirety, and 
received full rebates, the rebates would in theory total 270.75 million ecus, 
to be spread over five years. 
13 
2. On the other hand, the question of the effect of the lendmg activities on die ECSC 
budget by immobilizing the reserves merits very particular attention. 
The main considerations are as follows. 
(i) Annex 4 gives the potential releases from the guarantee fund 
corresponsding to the repayment schedule of current loans. This annex is 
based on the outstandings as at 31.12.1992, excluding new operations due 
or completed after mat date. 
(ii) Annex 4 gives hie following potential releases for the period 1993-1996: 
1993 31 million ecus 
1994 23 million ecus 
1995 31 million ecus 
1996 S2 million ecus 
Total: 167 million ecus 
Against mis prospect, we must consider 
3 132 million ecus loans signed but not disbursed and loans decided upon 
but not yet signed (cf. Annex 3, subtotal 1 and item 2 on page 2). These 
loans, which cannot be taken over by the EIB, will be disbursed in part 
over the period 1993-1996; 
213 million ecus applications for loans already decided upon by the 
Commission, but which have not yet received the Council's assent (cf. 
Annex 3, subtotal lia and paragraph 3 on page 3); 
2 168 million ecus applications for loans received by the Commission, 
which are at various stages of the procedure, but on which no decision has 
yet been taken (c£ Annex 3, subtotal lib). Not all of these applications 
will be agreed, but normally a fair number would result in loans over the 
period 1994-1996; 
1 000 million ecus new ECSC loans for prefinancing Article 53(a) 
financial mechanisms (see Annex 3, sub-total 111), which could be 
implemented over the period 1993-1994. 
At this stage hie sum total of these "potential loans" is estimated at 6 565 million 
ecus. It is probable that these loans will not be disbursed in their entirety 
although no figures for this can be estimated. Nevertheless, even their partial 
disbursement would require reserves to be immobilized which would no doubt 
offset the release of the above-mentioned 167 milHon ecus. As an indication, the 
167 million ecus released would, if the ECSC's solvency ratio is maintained at its 
present level, enable the following lending transactions to be launched: 
14 
1 193 million ecus loans guaranteed by mortgages; 
- or 5 964 million ecus loans guaranteed by banks; 
* or an undefined sum covered by government guarantees; 
- or a combination of the three; possibilities. 
It needs to be stated that dies 167 million ecus would not permit the guaranteeing 
of all the demands foreseen and that in any case, these reserves will be allocated 
as a priority to covering the loans already decided by the Commission; as well as 
the loans for prefinancing die fianacial mechanism loans in a ccordance with 
article 53 a. It should be remembered that for these last, "adequate guarantees, 
negotiated case by case, shall be offered in each case by all paying companies 
proportional to their exposure and accepted by ECSC before granting any loan. 
This mechanism requires bank guarantees callable on first demand - except in 
those specific cases where the Commission decides to the contrary". 
However, it should be stated that following the recent decisions adopted by the 
Commission concerning the ECSC budget (use of the net balance), any default by 
debtors would mean an immediate call on the guarantee funds. If the crisis in the 
coal and steel industries continues, even an increase in the guarantee funds should 
not be ruled out 
(iii) Annex 4 shows, for the period 1997-2002, potential releases of reserves to 
the tune of 77.7 million ecus. This sum would only become actually 
available i£ in the same period, no new loans were granted or, if they 
were, they did not require the immobilization of reserves. 
However, to this amount can be added the reserves which would be 
released, during this period, following repayment of loans previously 
granted (in 1993-1996). This would bring the maximum release of 
reserves between 1997 and 2002 to 245 million ecus, provided, of course, 
that none of the debtors defaulted and that the problem of guaranteeing 
ECSC engagements going beyond 2002 has been resolved. 
(iv) In any event, an irreducible sum of ECSC reserves of 16.3 million ecus 
should be maintained to cover existing commitments which extend beyond 
2002. 
(v) The above considerations therefore highlight the following points: 
the present level of reserves is necessary to guarantee the proper execution 
of current commitments and those provided for up to 31 December 1996. 
No release of reserves can be countenanced during this period, unless an 
alternative guarantee is provided (e.g. by the EEC, cf. Section VU). 
for the period 1997-2002, a gradual release of reserves, linked with the 
amortizations of loans» up to a maximum of 245 million ecus, could be 
considered. 
15 
with regard to the remaining guarantee fund (168 million ecus to cover the 
ECSC's financial activities other than the outstanding loans), there could 
also be a gradual release, which is a function of the ECSC's global 
activities (loans and the budget) and consequently more difficult to 
quantify at present. 
VL EFFECTS OF A TRANSFER OF THE ECSCS ACnVTnES ON THE CAPITAL 
AND vm MA Hirers 
1. The effect on the capital markets of the transfer of the ECSC activities to the EIB 
will depends on the scale of the transactions concerned. 
It should be noted, however, that the EIB has now become the major world 
borrower on the financial markets, and that the question of saturation and/or a 
"volume premium" could arise. Maintaining the ECSC instrument means that the 
signatures can be diversified, which increases the institutions' capacity to absorb 
paper. 
2. There is no direct effect on the ecu market, other than that the Community deprives 
itself of a potential issuer which is a natural user of this currency. The ecu market 
needs first class issuers in order to develop, and the multiplicity of signatures is a 
positive factor in this matter. 
3. The important rôle played by the ECSC as an investor in the ecu-denominated bond 
market must also be emphasized. The sum administered is approximately 2 000 
million ecus (which represents basically the amount of the guarantee fund and the 
conimitment yet to be disbursed). It is one of the main portfolios in this currency 
and constitutes a significant pillar of both the primary and secondary markets in 
ecus. While this rôle will be reduced as the expiry date of the Treaty approaches, 
in die present context these operations will make a substantial contribution to the 
maturing of the market 
VDL POSSIBILITY OF USING AN EEC GUARANTEE 
A takeover by the EIB of the ECSC loan activities is not the only way of (gradually) 
releasing the reserves. Granting a guarantee from the EEC budget for ECSC loans would 
also lead to the release of these reserves. 
(a) The "guarantee" option appears particularly appropriate for the Article 56 loans. 
This would involve proposing to the Council that the EEC should provide a 
guarantee to cover all ECSC loans corresponding to the loans outstanding under 
Article 56, and plus a global amount (of a size to be determined) for future 
borrowings under this Article. At the same time, the Commission would undertake 
to limit new loans under Article 56 to the ammount guaranteed in this manner. The 
ammount subsequently be raised subject to the Council's approval. 
16 
Since loans under Article 56 are granted mainly to financial institutions, the risk for 
the EEC budget would be very small and similar to that of other borrowings already 
guaranteed by a token entry (e.g. NCI loans). 
This option would have the following advantages: 
- immediate release of a portion of the ECSC's reserves (i.e. 86 million ecus); 
- the future trend in the amount of loans under Article 56 and the related rebates 
would be clear and manageable; 
- it would be possible to continue for a certain period to assist conversion (in line 
with the growth initiative) without changing the existing organization and the 
recently approved procedures; 
- for borrowing and lending activities, there would be a clear separation between 
the field of conversion, now linked to the EEC and having no effect on the 
ECSCs reserves, and the "ECSC industry" field. Apart from the requirements 
relating to outstanding loans under Article 54 (second paragraph), the remaining 
reserves would be clearly devoted to covering loans to industry (loans under 
Article 54 (first paragraph)). 
(b) The "guarantee'* option could also be extended to all ECSC loans. In that case, the 
part of the guarantee fund linked to the loans, Le. 261 million ecus, would become 
available. 
Such a proposal would imply an effort on behalf of the budgetary authority which 
could in essence involve one of the following options: 
(i) to express clearly the intent to cover any actual risk by recourse to the 
ECSC levy (Article 50 of the ECSC Treaty); this, however, goes against 
the wishes expressed by the Council and the industry; 
(ii) to cover die risk by a token entry guarantee "p.m.", as has been the case 
for NCI loans and some EIB loans. In this case, considering the parlous 
state of the industrial sectors concerned, and in view of the fact that the 
existing reserves of the ECSC are deemed to be "adequate" (see report of 
die Court of Auditors on the ECSC 1992 accounts), Member States should 
be aware that the utilisation of the ECSC reserves for budgetary purposes 
will most likely lead to an additional call on Members' resources to cover 
expected defaults if and when they occur. The transfer of die risk from the 
ECSC to the EEC would also have as a consequence that the coal and 
steel sectors would be the sole beneficiaries of the utilisation of the ECSC 
reserves while die burden of the guarantee would fall on the general EEC 
budget; 
(iii) to create, on a similar model to the "guarantee fund'', a specific reserve to 
cover the risks of the ECSC loans. 
17 
As regards the period post-2002, the question will in any case arise in the wider 
framework - as pointed out in the Note of the Danish Presidency - of the guarantee 
for ECSC commitments going beyond the end of the period of validity of the 
Treaty. After 2002, since it will DO longer be possible to resort to the levy, the 
outstanding ECSC bonds will be guaranteed only by the remainder of the "guarantee 
fund" calculated on the basis of the solvency ratio. Such a guarantee is insufficient 
to maintain their AAA rating. The Commission cannot expose itself to the risk of 
a fall in the rating of ECSC bonds after 2002: this would jeopardize the credibility 
of all the European institutions, since the Community would have failed to show its 
support for one of them. The guarantee of the general budget (EEC), or a guarantee 
of an equivalent value, could be one of the possible ways of resolving post-2002 
ECSC commitments which should be studied in detail at a later stage. 
VOL POTENTIAL FORTAKEQVERQFCERTAIN ECSC FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
BY OTHER BODIES 
1. Possible takeover bv the EBRD 
The EBRD was established to assist in finance for the countries of central and 
eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union (PHARE and TACIS countries). 
The fact is that the bulk of ECSC loan activities are targeted at projects within the 
Community. 
The only loans capable of being transferred to the EBRD would be those of the 
CEEC facility under Article 95, totalling 200 million ecus. But, as was pointed out 
in Section IÏÏ.5 above, when considering die possibility of transferring these loans 
to the EEB, the CEEC facility has already been the subject of a general Commission 
Decision with the assent of the Council, and that Decison has been notified to the 
states concerned; a transfer to the EBRD does not therefore appear to be in order. 
2. Possible takeover bv nubile- or nrivate-sector financial insitutions in the Member 
States 
This possibility calls for the following commehts: 
- the ECSC can already call upon a vast network for the finance of SMEs and small 
scale projects in the framework of the global loans under Articles 54 (second 
paragraph) and 56 granted to financial institutions from both the private and the 
public sectors in the Member States/In addition, agency agreements have been 
signed with the leading national development organisations for the purposes of 
ECSC general lending activity; 
- in the event of a mandate or assignment of activities, the problems raised in 
connection with an RTR takeover would apply a fortiori and in an even more 
complex manner, since the activities would be being taken out of the 
18 
Community's institutional framework. The task would not be made easier by the 
large number of candidates who would have to be approached; 
- participation in the financing of coal and steel investment projects is already open 
to the market influences of supply and demand, and any bank whose house rules 
permit it may already participate; 
- the one interesting aspect of such an option is the direct granting of interest 
rebates by the ECSC without going throught die global loans mechanism. But this 
question only concerns ECSC conversion loans (Article 56 (2) (a), and has already 
been considered in examination of the EIB option. 
From a legal standpoint, it remains to be seen whether a distinction can be made 
between ECSC interest rebates and ECSC loans. In practical terms it should not 
be forgotten that the reserves frozen as a consequecne of Article 56 global loans 
are 2.8% of the total amount loaned, whilst the budgetary burden of interest 
rebates is 15%. 
It should be added that in the context of the Memorandum of the French 
Delegation, which advocates abandoning Article 56 rebates, this question does not 
arise. 
Detailed examination of all these possibilities and of the legal aspects inherent in 
each is quite disproportionate to the practical results produced. 
DC COMMENTS ON THE MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH DEI^GATION 
The present note answers generally the points raised in the French Memorandum dealing 
with the ECSC's borrowing and lending activity and its impact on reserves. 
It may nevertheless be worthwhile making the following observations: 
as regards the transfer of activities, the Memorandum appears to address only the 
question of applications; the Commission shares this view entirely; 
as regards the date for an end to ECSC borrowing and lending activity, the 
Memorandum sets 1994 as its target For part of the Article 54 loans the 
Commission shares this aim. For the remaining sectors, prudence would appear to 
dictate a more flexible approach, geared to taking greater account of the EIB's 
effective capacity to take over the activity, and the need to complete work currendy 
in hand; 
die French authorities believe that a Commission policy aimed at continuing to 
launch major issues on the financial markets would be misguided The Commission 
19 
wishes to point out that it has never followed such a policy: the volume of 
borrowings has always reflected the loan applications received and approved. 
The Commission would further point out that from the point of view of the future of the 
ECSC Treaty, the problem is.not the volume of operations still to be dealt with, but rather 
the impact of those operations on reserves. 
Finally, the French Memorandum recommends that the coal and steel sectors should 
be treated on the same footing as other sectors of industry via non-specific 
CorrnTiunity instruments. Since the submission of the Memorandum, and in the light 
of the critical situation in these sectors and in the steel industry in particular, the 
Commission has with the full cooperation of the Council been proposing a number 
of measures based on the potential of the ECSC Treaty. 
X. COMMENTS ON THE NOTE BY THE DANISH PRESIDENCY 
The Commission supports the general principles underlying the guidelines set out in the 
Note of the Danish Presidency of 10 june 1993. 
The information set out in the present note is an illustration of the Commission's desire 
to keep the Council fully mformed of all aspects of the ECSC's borrowing and lending 
activity, and die options proposed are an indication of the Commission's concern to 
continue the pursuit of essentially the same aims. 
The additional information on the loans currentiy under consideration by the Council, 
given in Annex 1, is the direct result of the suggestions set out in Point 6 of the Note by 
th Danish Presidency. 
XL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Commission must carry through to their conclusion operations which are 
already under way. This means that: 
(a) any transfer can concern only new applications; 
(b) there can be no release of reserves before 1997. 
2. The transfer of ECSC activities to the EIB poses legal problems. The only way to 
avoid revision of the Treaty, a long and hazardous procedure, would be for the 
ECSC to abandon unilaterally certain activities and for the EIB to enlarge its 
eligibility criteria to cover the ground left vacant by the ECSC. Even this approach 
is not without legal difficulties. 
20 
3, An examination of ECSC lending activity with a view to the possible takeover of 
this activity by the EIB requires a distinction to be made between three categories 
of operation: 
- activities which can be transferred immediately: essentially, this concerns loans 
under Article 54 (second paragraph) for the consumption of Community coal or 
steel in major infrastructure projects. The Commission reserves, however, the 
possibility of an ECSC intervention in large projects with a specific community 
interest as long as the loans concerned do not imply the immobilisation of 
reserves. 
- activities which can h*> transferred at a later stagg: this concerns loans under 
Article 54 (first paragraph) and loans under Article 56 (2) (a). As regards Article 
54 (first paragraph) loans, we should wait until the crisis is over. In As for 
Article 56 loans, in any event we should await the expiry of the 1994-1996 
Community Support Frameworks under Objective 2; 
- activities wfogh cannot be transferred: this concerns loans for workers' housing, 
certain Article 54 (second paragraph) loans and the Article 95 facility of 
200 million ecus for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which the EIB 
is unwilling or unable to take over without a Community guarantee. 
4. In all events, and in order to maximise the gradual release of ECSC reserves 
between now and 2002, the Commission advocates the following immediate 
measures for the types of loans which can be transferred immediately or later. 
(a) ECSC loans approved from 1.1.94 (other than those not involving the 
freezing of reserves) will not have a life extending beyond 2002; 
(b) ECSC loans granted between 1993 and 1996 should not involve the 
freezing of more reserves than are released during the same period as a 
result of the repayment of current loans; 
(c) The freezing of reserves against ECSC loans to be paid from 1997 should 
not exceed a percentage to be set annually during preparation of the draft 
ECSC budget That percentage will refer to the amount of reserves to be 
released during the accomiting year in question. 
(d) The EIB will be invited to intervene, applying its own criteria, m the 
financing of projects of the Article 54 (first and second paragraph) type. 
Unless the present crisis persists and certain ECSC companies become unable to 
meet their Uabilities, and provided a solution is found to the problem of 
guaranteeing ECSC committments extending beyond 2002 (see Section VIE, final 
21 
paragraph), these measures should permit the release, between now and 2002, of 245 
million ecu from the part of the guarantee fund covering lending activity. 
It is more difficult to determine how much can be released from the part of the 
guarantee fund covering'the off balance sheet items. Assuming that 50% of this 
becomes available (some 80 million ecu), we should arrive at a total of 325 million 
ecu of reserves which can be released before 2002. 
It should be noted that a takeover of certain activities by the ECB (or any other 
body) will do nothing to increase further the reserves which can be released as a 
result of the measures recommended by the Commission. 
22 

ANNEX 1 
INFORMATIONS ON LOAN REQUESTS 
AVATTING THE COUNCILS ASSENT 
'2'/ 
CREDIT NATIONAL 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis FF 300.000.000.-
Reconversion Global Loan - France 
25.01.93 
ECU 1.259.550 l 
5 year tranches, not beyond 2002 
art. 562 ECSC Treaty 
1 monthly ECU rate October 1993 
'1 \ 
BANCAJA 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 1.500 mio PTA 
Reconversion global loan - Spain 
3.11.1992 
Impact on the reserves 
Lengh and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis ECU 272361 > 
7 years tranches, not beyond 2002. 
art. 56.2 ECSC Treaty 
monthly ECU rate October 1993 
U 
BANCO HERRERO 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 1.500 mio PTA 
Reconversion global loan - Spain 
31.03.1993 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis ECU 272361 ' 
7 yeani tranches* not beyond 2002 
art. 56.2 ECSC Treaty 
1 monthly ECU rate October 1993 
çï 
HUTA KATOWICE 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Appbcation 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis US$50Mio 
Continuous casting of blooms n° 1 of the firm Hnta 
Katowice, Poland 
August 1992 
no impact of this lending activity on the ECSC reserves 
before 2002 
art 95 ECSC Treaty 
9? 
E&SB (Suède) 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 975 Mio SKR 
1. 
2. Iron ore mine in Kiruna (Sweden) : new principal 
operating level at a depth of 1045 m 
New mstaliaton for the production of mineral pellets 
at Kiruna (Sweden) 
27.04J992 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis ECU 2.866.139.- l 
Before 2002 
art 54.2 ECSC Treaty 
1 monthly ECU rate October 1993 
n 
DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSBANK 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application 
Impact on the reserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis DM 20 Mio 
Reconversion Global Loan Germany 
28.04.1992 
ECU 293.726- ' 
5 years tranches, not beyond 2002 
art 56,2 ECSC Treaty 
monthly ECU rate October 1993 
9° 
WESTDEinsCHE LANDESBANK EUROPA AG 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application FF60Mio 
Reconversion Global loan - France 
08.12.1992 
Impact on the réserves 
Length and maturity 
of loan 
Legal basis ECU 251.910- ! 
5 years: tranches, not beyond 2002 
art 56.2 ECSC Treaty 
monthly ECU rate October 1993 
v 
MMBERLEy CLARK PLC 
Amount of loan 
Objective & country 
Date of Application GBP 7.5 Mio 
Constraction of a mill to produce disposable diapers 
including finished product warehouse end support facilities -
South Humberside (UK) 
19.03.1992 
Impact on the reserves : 
Length and maturity 
on loan : 
Legal basis : ECU 1341.632 l 
5 yean» 
art. 562 ECSC Treaty 
monthly ECU rate October 1993 
V 
SOUTH YORKSHIRE PASSENGER TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE 
Amount of loan GBP 102 Mio 
Objective & country Develop end operate a system of light rail transit It will use 
electric trams - Sheffield (UK) 
Date of Appltcaton : 27.05.1991 
Impact on the reserves : 1.824.619 
Length and maturity 
of loan : 5 yeare 
Legal basis : art. 54J2 ECSC Treaty 
monthly ECU rate October 1993 
v> 
ANNEX 2 : SOLVENCY RATTO 
The Solvency Ratio was established by the directive 89/647/CEE of the Council dated 18th 
of December 1989. This ratio is meant to improve the monitoring by the respective 
regulatory authorities of the risk management of credit mstirutions. It is calculated as follows: 
Equity 
Solvency ratio = 
(Assets + Off balance sheet items) weighted 
The numerator includes the equity funds of the credit institution; for the ECSC it includes 
only the Guarantee Fund. The other reserves which feature in the ECSC balance sheet cannot 
be considered as available reserves in as much as they are earmarked for ihe financing of long 
term assets (subsidised housing loans). 
The denominator is the sum of the assets weighted in relation to the degree of credit risk 
assumed. Similarly each off balance sheet item (contingent liabilities) is also weighted as a 
function of the potential credit risk it involves. 
In order to determine the specific level at which the ECSC solvency ratio should be 
maintained,, taking into account the specificity of the ECSC's activity and the special situation 
of the coal and steel sectors, the Commission commissioned a study by the firm of 
internationally recognized experts, Coopers & Lybrand, Deioitte. The study concludes that the 
ECSC solvency ratio should be maintained in a bracket of 14 % to 16 % . Since the closing 
of the ECSC accounts at 31/12/1991, the application of the results of this study has led to the 
release of about 50 million ECU to finance the operational budget of the ECSC. Within the 
framework of the approval procedure of the ECSC 1992 accounts, the Commission decided 
to follow this approach. At December 31 1992, the solvency ratio of the ECSC was 14.31%. 
Within this context, one should point out that the ECSC Guarantee Fund at 31/12/1992 stood 
at ECU 429,885,000. The part of the Guarantee Fund attributable to the loan portfolio 
amounts to ECU 261 446 000 (see Annex'*•). while the balance, i.e. ECU 168 439 000, covers 
other assets, as well as off balance sheet items according to the following breakdown: 
- Loans and advances to Credit institutions 1 607 128 
- Bank deposits 18 646 503 
- Portfolio 12 723 762 
- Fixed assets 940 875 
- Other assets 11 083 728 
-Accruals 12 724 616 
- Off balance sheet : swaps 74 507 607 
- Off balance sheet : other 36 204 481 
TOTAL 168 439 000 
11 H 
SITUATfON AS AT 3>t JULY 1993 { MECU) 
GLOBAL LOANS SIGNED, NOT DISBURSEO 
DIRECT LOANS SIGNED, NOT DISBURSED 
GLOBAL LOANS DECIDED, NOT 6IGNED 
DIRECT LOANS DECIOEO, NOT SIGNED 
CCEE FACILITY DECIDED, NOT8IGNED 
Sub-total I 
ll.a. GLOBAL LOANS DECIDED REQUIRING COUNCIL ASSENT 
DIRECT LOANS DECIDED REQUtRJNQ COUNCIL ASSENT 
(Sub-lotat H.a. 213,75) 
JlJb. GLOBAL LOANS AWAITING DECISION 
DIRECT LOANS AWAITING DECISION 
(Subtotal lib 2.168,52) AMOUNT 
1331,14 
504,76 
132,44 
424,50 
200.00 
3.182,83 
68,70 
127,05 
403,65 
1.674,97 INCL. 54.1 
62,92 
168,22 
239,14 INCL. 54.2 
167,87 
378,41 
66,00 
Sub-total II 
til. STEEL RESTRUCTURING LOAN (53.a) 
Totals I • U + 111 2.382L27 32,00 
600,15 
1.000,00 
6.585,10 632,24 
1.000,00 
1.87138 602,28 
117,98 
8,67 
624,66 
1.028,44 ANNEX 3 
tNCL 66.2 
1.673,27 
135,42 
132,44 
200,26 
2.141,41 
1,830,72 ART. 95 
200,00 
200.00 
68,70 
9.07 
375,88 
249,94 
721,59 
2.863, 200,00 
AHNEX4 : Redemption of ECSC k>ans outstanding at Sl/lI^wttacoiresponamgixjtentialteW^ of Guarantee Funds ^ ÇWH5C 
The table below indicates the rate of redemption of ECSC loans outstanding at 31/12/92 in the year. 
1993 until 2018 with the consequential release of 4e reserves. This release is oniv theoretical as the 
table does not take account of the ECSC lending opérations completed after 1/1/93 nor into the future 
which would hare an impact on the reserves. 
YEAR LOANS REDEEMED 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
Tout! 974.417,162 
L124.145.851 
1.042.556.271 
L879.740.374 
1J53.42S.252 
276.553.491 
195.927.478 
102.021.510 
167538.365 
95.425.936 
7.386.475 
7173.407 
6.431.608 
5.634160 
5.329.151 
3.376-528 
88.582.916 
L880.0I3 
1.406762 
59.352.239 
982.832 
500.695 
285.956 
288.816 
120.621.981 RESERVES RELEASED 
3L098.589 
22.694.778 
31.310.705 
82.327.242 
36.604.940 
6.878.365 
6843.132 
3.344.285 
15.630.472 
8A1L972 
222.180 
217.664 
200.865 
178.718 
172.030 
114.155 
76.528 
72.162 
56.083 
322.073 
27.371 
13.945 
8.006 
8.085 
2.816.190 
7.723.8ÔL409 M. 53 6.165 
75.504 
261.446.009 
ANNEX5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RELEASED BETWEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOLLOWING THE MEASURES FORESEEN BY THE COMMISSION 
YEAR 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL THEORETICAL 
RELEASE OF 
RESERVES 
31 098 589 
22 694 778 
31 310 705 
82 327 242 
36 604 940 
6 878 365 
6 843 132 
3 344 285 
15 630 472 
8 41Ï 972 
245 144 480 USAGE 
- 31 098 589 
- 22 694 778 
- 31 310 705 
- 82 327 242 
-167 431314 RECOVERY 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
167 431 314 POTENTIAL 
RELEASE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
64 510 159 
34 783 584 
34 748 351 
31 24-9 504 
43 535 691 
36 317 191 
245 144 480 
REMARKS 
1. Since we start from the hypothesis that the loans having an impact on reserves cannot go 
beyond 2002, all reserves being released according to the first column (maturing of 
outstanding loans) will become available before 2002. 
2. What can change» as a result of the reserves being blocked for the loans between 1993 
and 20027 is the time me reserves are in fact released and made available for budgetary 
requirements (last column). 
- 4 -
-j? 
ANNEX 5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RELEASED BETWEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOLLOWING THE MEASURES FORESEEN BY THE COMMISSION 
YEAR 
1993 
19194 
1995 
1996 
1997 
199* 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL THEORETICAL 
RELEASE OF 
RESERVES 
31 098 589 
22 694 77* 
31 310 705 
82 327 242 
36 604 940 
6 Fît 365 
6 ut m 
3 344 285 
15 630 472 
8 411972 
245 144 480 % 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100 % 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
0% USAGE 
BCU 
-31 098 589 
-22 69477$ 
..31 310 705 
«82 327 242 
-9 151 235 
-1719 591 
-1 710 783 
.836 071 
-3 907 618 
0 
•184 756 613 RECOVERY 
1993 -1996 
27 905 219 
27905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 2t9 1997 • 2002 
167 431 314 27 453 705 
6 9& 021 
7 392 494 
5 338 620 
14 97] 295 
15 568 031 
77 713 166 POTENTIAL 
RELEASE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55 358 924 
34 &4 240 
35 297 713 
33 243 839 
4Z 876 514 
43 473 250 
245 144 430 
YEAR 
1993 
19194 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1599 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL THEORETICAL 
RELEASE OF 
RESERVES 
31 098 589 
22 694 778 
31 310 705 
82 327 242 
36 604 940 
6 878 365 
6 843 132 
3 344 285 
15 630 472 
8 411 972 
245 144 480 % 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
0% USAGE 
—T" ECU 
.31 098 589 
-22 m 778 
-31310 705 
^2 327 242 
-18 302 470 
-3 439 183 
.3 421 566 
-1 672 143 
-7 815 236 
0 
tfMHnnMaaatW «202 081 911 iwniiHwi'iiiimniiimi 
RECOVERY 
1993 - 1996 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 1997*2002 
167 431314 18 302 470 
7 099 677 
7 941 856 
7 332 954 
14 312 119 
22 724 091 POTENTIAL 
RELEASE 
77 713 166 0 
0 
0 
0 
46 207 6S9 
35 004 896 
35 847075 
35 238 173 
42 217 338 
50 629 310 
245 144 480 
-A-
v 
ANNEX 5 
RESERVES ABLE TO BE RELEASED BETWEEN 1997 AND 2002 
FOLLOWING THE MEASURES FORESEEN BY THE COMMISSION 
YEAR 
1993 
19194 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL THEORETICAL 
RELEASE OF 
RESERVES 
31098 589 
22 694 778 
31 310 703 
83 327 242 
36 604 940 
6 878 365 
6 843 132 
3 344 285 
15 630 472 
8 4ÎÎ 972 
345 \44 480 USAGE 
% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
73% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
0% ECU 
•31 098 589 
•22 694 778 
»31 310 705 
••12 327 242 
-27 453 705 
-5 158 774 
-5 132 349 
-2 508214 
»U 722 854 
0 
-219 407210 RECOVERY 
1993 -1996 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 90S 219 
27905 219 
27 905 219 
167 431 314 1997 - 2002 
9 151 235 
7210 332 
8491217 
9 327229 
13 652 942 
29 880 150 
77 713 166 POTENTIAL I 
RELEASE 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 Û56 454 
35 113 551 
36 396 436 
37 232 508 
41 558 161 
57 785 369 
245 144 480 
YEAR 
1993 
19194 
t995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL THEORETICAL 
RELEASE OF 
RESERVES 
31 098 589 
22 694 778 
31 310 705 
82 327 242 
36 604 940 
6 878 365 
6 843 132 
3 344 285 
15 630 472 
8 411 972 
245 144 480 % 
100% 
100 % 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100 % 
100% 
100% 
0% USAGE 
ECU 
-31 098 589 
-22 694 778 
-31 310 705 
42 327242 
-36 604 940 
•6 878 365 
•6 843 132 
-3 344 285 
-15 630472 
0 
»236 732 508 ± ••*••>"•> * — 
RECOVERY 
1993-1996 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 905 219 
27 90S 219 
167 431 314 1997 - 2002 
0 
7320 988 
9 040 579 
11 321 623 
12 993 766 
37 036 210 
77 713 166 POTENTIAL 
RELEASE 
0 
0 
Û 
0 
27 905 219 
35 226 207 
36 945 798 
39 226 842 
40 898 985 
64941429 
245 144480 1 
_ 3 • yi 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(93)512final 
CUMENTS 
EN 12 01 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-93-549-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-59981-2 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
Lr2985 Luxembourg 
1,0