EN   EN 
 
 
 EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION   
Strasbourg, 15.2.2022  
COM(2022) 60 final  
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS  
Commission contribution to European defence   
 
1 1. Introduction  
In today’s world, the European Unio n faces increased global instability and geopolitical 
friction , as acknowledged by  the first -ever comprehensive EU Threat Analysis, conducted in 
November 2020 in preparation of the upcoming EU Strategic Compass. Conflicts and crises in 
our neighbourhood and beyond have a direct impact on our own security, while our societies and 
economies  are targeted by sophisticated hybrid threats, including cyber -attacks and 
disinformation campaigns which originate abroad. Meanwhile the climate crisis and biodiversity 
loss are creating challenges for global security in general and for civil -military ope rations in 
particular.   
What is and has been occurring on and around our borders on land , air and at sea , as well in 
cyber space, along important maritime routes and in outer space, all underline the need for us to 
become better prepared, more capable  and more resilient . Against the backdrop of an accelerated 
technological race between the United States and China, the European Union must further build 
and secure its  technological edge.  As geopolitical relations evolve and our environment is 
changing, the Union must evolve similarly , and intensify and accelerate its collective capacities 
to defend and secure its fundamental values and its citizens.  A quantum leap in European 
defence is an integral and indispensable part of securing the Union and its citizen s in the 
years and decades to come.  
Current and past events serve as wake -up calls that Europeans need to work more closely 
together on defence to ensure their own security and become a stronger security provider  for 
others , using the Union’s uniquely bro ad toolbox. The EU is already engaged to address the 
multiple open and frozen conflicts in our Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, as well as in 
different regions across Africa as our neighbouring continent. The recent Russian military 
build -up along the eastern border of Ukraine , in Belarus , and in the Black Sea region , 
together with  Moscow’s attempts to disrupt, divide, and redefine the security architecture in 
Europe , challenge the international rules -based order . It also  remind s us that we need to deli ver 
on a stronger European defence, in close partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation 
(NATO) . The abrupt end of the international military mission in Afghanistan  in August 2021 
taught us that Europe needs to be better prepared to deal with complex stabilisation tasks and 
sudden emergencies by itself. We have seen how instability can become a breeding ground for 
terrorism and uproot people, and how global and regional powers can use such situations to gain 
influence and access to resources. Adding to the complexity is the multiplier effect of climate 
change on the potential for conflicts within and between states.  
At the same time, the EU needs to step up its own preparedness, capability and resilience to 
bette r protect its citizens. Threats to the EU’s security are increasingly not only of a military 
nature. We are facing more damaging cyber -attacks  targeting our critical entities , paralysing 
industrial plants,  energy supply facilities,  city administrations, and hospitals, while  foreign 
information manipulation and interference  also goes to the heart of our democracies. The state -
sponsored hybrid attack by the Lukashenko regime, instrumentalising migrants for political 
purposes, is a cle ar example of the evolving nature of hybrid campaigns that aim to subvert, 
coerce and manipulate us below the threshold of armed aggression. The EU has responded to this 
 
2 situation with humanitarian support, diplomatic outreach to third countries, support t o our 
Member States and sanctions against those responsible.  The COVID -19 pandemic meanwhile 
underlined the need for enhanced resilience as well, with the armed forces providing logistical, 
security and medical assistance to civilian authorities in the ea rly stages in 2020. In this rapidly 
changing environment , the European Union needs to further strengthen its preparedness, 
capabilit ies and resilience, notably by enhancing shock absorption mechanisms and 
build ing its toolbox across all relevant sectors .  
Member States are working to tackle all threats and challenges more robustly thr ough the new 
EU Strategic Compass for security and defence  (‘Strategic Compass’), to be adopted by 
Member States in March 2022. It will set out a common strategic vision for th e next decade and 
outline how the EU will enhance its capacity to act and respond to various crises and challenges; 
secure its interests and protect its citizens; invest and innovate to jointly develop the necessary 
capabilities and technologies; and deepe n partnerships based on EU values and interests. With 
this communication, the European Commission is further contributing to this work.  
The European Union needs to act now to advance its defence capabilities in the present context 
and also equip the EU to face the future battlefields, encompassing a new generation of state-of-
the-art technolog ies capable of addressing threats deriving from cyber, hybrid, space  
collaborative and autonomous systems based on connectivity  and Artificial Intelligence  (AI). At 
the same time, t he industrial ecosystem that defence forms together with the aerospace and the 
security sector constitutes a high -tech industrial ecosystem  that is not only an essential driver 
for Europe’s open strategic autonomy and technological sovereig nty, but also a major contributor 
to growth and innovation. On top of contributing to the security of the European Union’s citizen, 
the Europe an defence sector can contribute to the sustainable economic recovery  following the 
pandemic  and the overall innov ative nature of an ecosystem that has the potential of greatly 
contributing to the green transition and resulting in positive spill -overs for civilian use.  
Achieving our goals is only possible by developing, procuring, and operat ing military 
equipment together. The EU has put in place new tools and instruments1 to reverse the long 
standing  fragmentations that hamper the efficiency of Europe’s defence sector and diminish the 
ability of the EU and its Member States to build the next  generation of defence capabilities that 
will be critical for Europe’s future security and its ability to provide security in its 
neighbourhood and beyond.  
In particular, t he European Defence Fund (EDF)2, with a budget close to EUR 8 billion for 2021 -
27, is already a game -changer for establishing a European defence ecosystem capable of 
delivering state of the art interoperable defence technologies and equipment that will enhance the 
Union’s freedom of action and its technological sovereignty  and competitiveness . 
Against this challenging background, the European Commission will keep work ing closely with 
the High Representative and the Member State s to:  
                                                           
1 Including the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperat ion (PESCO) and the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence  (CARD).  
2 PE/11/2021/INIT  
 
3 o Ensure effective and focused implementation  of the innovative instruments  and initiatives 
that we have put in place, s uch as the EDF  and the Action plan on Military Mobility, 
including through a number of additional measures put forward in this Communication;  
o Support closer defence cooperation between Member States and between industries , 
underpinned by the necessary financial resources and enhanced collaborative spending in 
line with existing commitments, to enhance cost -effectiveness, strengthen interoperability, 
foster innovation and improve industrial competitiveness and res ilience;  
o Strengthen our ability to respond in the face of acute crises , including cyber -attacks and 
hybrid campaigns, as well as longer -term challenges and geopolitical contestations in 
strategic domains , based on a whole -of-government approach and reinfo rcing dual -use and 
civil - military synergies across a  wide variety of Commission -led policies, tools and 
instruments;  
o Maintain and enhance close interaction with NATO , in line with the commitments 
undertaken and the agreed principles  guiding EU -NATO cooperation  under the Joint 
Declarations , as well as with other key international partners such as the United Nations  
(UN)  and like -minded bilateral partners  including the U nited States of America , Norway3  
and Canada . 
In this ever-evolving geopolit ical and technological context, and in  view of the upcoming 
informal Summit in Paris on 10 and 11 March 2022, this Communication outline s concrete, new 
measures and initiatives  in a number of critical areas  and identifies key success factors 
toward s a more competitive and harmonised European defence market , including by :  
- Stepping up investments for defence rese arch and capabilit ies develop ed in EU 
cooperative framework s;  
- Facilitating synergies between civilian and defence research and inn ovation  and 
reducing strategic  dependencies ; 
- Incentivising  the joint  procurement of  defence capabilities developed in a  collaborative 
way within the EU ; 
- Calling upon Member States to continue moving toward s streamlined  and more 
convergent  export control practic es, in particular  for defence capabilities developed in 
an EU framework ; 
- Strengthening the security and defence dimension of space at EU level;  
- Enhancing  European resilience inter alia by stepping  up cybersecurity and countering 
cyber  and any other hybrid threats , enhancing  military mobility and addressing 
climate change challenges for defence . 
Through these building blocks , and drawing on the synergies between internal and external 
policies including those fostered under the 2020 Security Union Strategy,  the Commission will 
continue to actively contribute in the years to come to the process of building a European 
                                                           
3 As a member of the European Economic Area.  
 
4 Defence Union  with targeted initiatives and projects, using the full spectrum of tools at its 
disposal to further counter the fast -changing mult i-layered threats we face.  
2. Stepping up investments for defence research and capabilit ies developed in EU 
cooperative framework s 
The EDF is an ambitious, balanced and inclusive programme  that ensures Member States’ 
strong involvement so that funded projects meet armed forces’ operational needs, paving the way 
to production and procurement. Its eligibility criteria  keep the market open while strengthening 
the competitiveness of the Europea n defence industry  and protecting the EU’s security and 
strategic interests .  
By the end of 2022, the E uropean Commission will have invest ed EUR 1.9 billion in defence 
research and capability development projects answering Member States’ capability needs. It will 
thus kick-start key large -scale collaborative capability development projects  addressing 
critical shortfalls while also stimulating defence innovation , including in particular niche areas . 
It includes smaller projects and open calls that widen the cross -border participation of start -ups 
and S mall and Medium -sized Enterprise s (SMEs) , with up to 8% of its 2021 budget devoted to 
funding d isruptive technologies for defence and around 6% dedicated to open calls for SMEs.  
They represent 48% of the 1100 entities that have submitted proposa ls and 20% of the total 
funding demand4 for EDF 2021 calls5. The Commission will continue to promote  the 
participation of SME s across the EU, including by encouraging  the integration of the most 
innovative and competitive ones within supply chains . 
The first calls for proposals published in 2021 already plan to allocate  around EUR 700 
million to projects  addressing large -scale and complex defence platforms and systems  such 
as next generation fighter systems, ground vehicles fleet, multirole and modular offshore patrol 
vessels, and ballistic missile defence.  
Also through its development precursor programme6, two major capability development 
projects of high strategic importance re ceived a total grant of around EUR 140 million . 
MALE RPAS supports the development of a medium -altitude and long -endurance drone. It 
contributes to building technological sovereign ty in drones, a critical asset for Member States’  
armed forces. The European Secure Software -defined Radio (ESSOR) will boost interoperability 
by creating a European standardi sation for defence secure communication technologies.  Other 
meaningful funded  projects focus, inter alia, on command and control, A I enabled decision -
making, collaborative combat, cyber defence or space -based observation.  
Developing defence capabilities is a long -term process, which requires coordinated and upfront 
planning . Strate gic orientation for the EDF is provided through the defence capability 
                                                           
4 Subcontractors included . 
5 Under the precursor programme, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), i n 2020, for 
which outcomes are available, SMEs represented 35% of the entities and benefited from 30% of the total funding of 
the 26 projects, before taking into account the participation of sub -contractors that are often SMEs.  
6 The European Defence Industr ial Development Programme (EDIDP)  
 
5 priorities commonly agreed by Member States within the framework of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) , and in particular in the context of the Capability 
Development Plan (CDP ) and in  coherence with other EU defence related initiatives such as the  
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence  (CARD) and the  Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) .  
In addition, to provide transparency and predictability especially in view of the pl anning of 
national defence budgets, the Commission has prepared an indicative and flexible  multiannual 
perspective  for the four years ahead, to be reviewed each year  in light of  developments.  It 
ensures consistency of collaborative defence capability projects and coherence of work 
programmes along the duration of the EDF while also providing both transparency and 
predictability.  In this context, t he Commission and Member States will keep strengthening the 
multiannual  annual perspective  taking into account key capabilities  and strategic enablers 
identified as priorities by Member States following the adoption of the Strategic Compass . 
 
Thanks to its catalyst effect, the EDF will thus continue to pave the way for targeted defence 
investments in support of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Bas e (EDTIB)  and 
matching priorities commonly agreed by Member states within the EU.  To better support  the 
development of large -scale defence capability projects, the possibility for multi -annual work 
programmes should be assessed in the context of the EDF’s mid -term review. It is equally 
important to ensure that other horizontal policies , such as initiatives on sustainable finance, 
remain consistent with  the European Union  efforts to  facilitat e the European defence 
industry’s sufficien t access to  finance and investment .  
In or der to further enhance both cooperation  in the framework of the EDF and the integrat ion of 
the internal defence market , the Commission will also continue to work with Member States to 
exploit the possibilities offered by the Directive 2009/43/EC7 on the intra-EU transfer of defence 
related products with a view to facilitate transfers related to  EU-funded collaborative projects.  
By advisin g on the rules and procedures under Directive 2009/43/EC, and working to build 
consensus amongst Member States, the Commission will aim at  simplif ying the transfer of 
defence -related products within the internal market , and notably in the framework of EU -funded 
collaborative projects, and facilitating exchanges of best practices . 
Enhancing the coordination, focus and level of collaborative defence investments is critical to 
improve the overall efficiency of defence expenditures within the EU, while taking i nto account 
as well existing commitments such as those undertaken in the  PESCO context to regularly 
increase defence budgets. The collective delivery of strategic defence capabilities can only be 
achieved through coordinated planning  as well as  EU and nati onal public investments targeting 
common defence research and development priorities .  
Against this background, t he Commission will also develop further incentives to  stimulate 
Member States ’ collaborative investments in defence strategic capabilities , notably  where 
they are developed  and/or procured  with in European Union cooperative framewor ks. The 
                                                           
7 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and 
conditions of transfers of defence related products within the Community.  
 
6 Commission  will include  a ch apter with observations on developments, barriers and 
opportunit ies relative to  multinational defence capabilities projects  in the Annual Single 
Market Report , which is usually published in conjunction with the European Semester Autumn 
Package.  In this context, the Commission could  also consider how to scale up collective efforts 
to secure  and coordinate the co -funding of Memb er States channeled through the EDF with a 
view to securing greater value for money.  
Way forward  
 With  the EDF , the Commission will continue to actively encourage Member States to 
further define strategic defence capabilities priorities and enablers following the adoption 
of the Strategic Compass  through the revised CDP and the  CARD outcomes . It will 
contribute to align defence planning and collective spending to support their 
development . 
 The Commission will develop further additional incentives to stimulate Member States ’ 
collaborative  investments in strategic defence capabilities , notably those that are to be 
developed and/or jointly procured in European Union cooperative framework s, and will 
report on the developments, barriers and opportunities related to multinational defence 
capability projects in the Annual Single Market report.  
 In 2022, the Commission will continue to work with Member States to further facilitate 
the transfer of EU -funded defence p roducts within the internal market, in particular by 
supporting the full exploitation of possibilities offered by the Directive 2009/43/EC.  
 
3. Facilitating synergies between civil ian and defence research and  innovation and 
reducing strategic dependencies  
The Commission  outlines , in its Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence that is 
adopted alongside the present Communication8, a path for boosting research, technology 
development and innovation and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies in critical 
technologies and value chains for security and defence.  
Building on the update  of the ‘2020 New Industrial Strategy : Building a st ronger Single Market 
for Europe’s recovery’9 and the Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space 
industries10, it proposes a way forward for the EU and Member States to:    
 identify technologies being critical for EU security and defence;    
 promote from the outset an EU -wide strategic and coordinated approach for those critical 
technologies by leveraging  research, technology development and innovation  programmes ;  
 reduce strategic dependencies.  
                                                           
8  COM (2022) 61 final  
9  COM  (2021) 350 final 
10 COM  (2021) 70 final  
 
7 This requires greater awareness o f the critica lity of certain technologies , such as semiconductors,  
for the security and defence sector s, a better identification of related strategic dependencies , and 
possible mitigating measures , taking into account the diversity of sources and the prospect that 
operational use of the technology might be compromised or denied11. The Observatory of critical 
technologies12 (‘Observatory’)  will establish a dedicated mechanism to identify such 
assessment s, based on inputs of Member States and the industry . The f inding s of the Observatory 
will be instrumental to boost EU research, technology development and innovation  on those 
technologies , in an EU -wide coordinated approach . This work complements broader efforts to 
address  security of supply of critical civilian goods, in fields such as health and energy13. 
The Commission will also prepare an approach to encourage dual use for research and 
innovation at EU level,  and deploy a Defence Innovation Scheme to support innovation and 
entrepreneurship on critical technologies  in close coordination with the Defence Innovation Hub 
to be established by the European Defence Agency (EDA ).  
Finally, in order to reduce strategic dependencies, the Commission will continue to  
systematically assess security and defence considerations when implementing and reviewing 
existing - or designing new - EU instruments .  
4. Incentivis ing the joint procurement of capabilities developed in a  collaborative way 
within the EU  
Member States’ joint procurement of European defence capabilities substantially increases 
the inter -operability  of European national armed forces and supports the competitiveness of 
the EDTIB , notably through greater economies of scale.  
However, Member  States have yet to meet the long-standing European collaborative equipment 
procurement collective benchmark14 – 35% of defence equipment spending, which they have 
confirmed within the PESCO framework15. According to the EDA, in 2020 Member States16 
have spent around EUR 37 billion in defence equipment procurement expenditu re (i.e. 
procurement of new defence equipment). Of this amount about only 11% (around EUR 4.1 
billion)17, was spent on European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure 
(i.e. procurement of new defence equipment in collaboration with other Me mber States). This 
means that the bulk  of Member States' defence equipment procurement expenditure (around 
89%) was made on a national basis and/or in cooperation with third countries.  
                                                           
11 As regards semiconductors, see the accompanying Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence , 
section 2.2, and the Commission Communication, A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final.  
12 In association with releva nt Commission services and with the European Defence Agency.  
13 In line with Commission proposals COM  (2021) 577 of 16.9.2021 on a framework of measures for ensuring the 
supply of crisis -relevant medical countermeasures in support of a public health emergen cy, COM(2021) 660 of 
13.10.2021 on tacking rising energy prices, and COM  (2021) 350 on updating the new  industrial strategy . 
14 In November 2007, the EDA Ministerial Steering Board approved four collective benchmarks for investment 
including the 35  % of tot al equipment spending for European collaborative equipment procurement.  
15 EUR -Lex - 32021H1117(01) - EN - EUR -Lex (europa.eu)  
16 Except DK  
17 Based on data provided by eleven Member States  
 
8 The year 2020 is not an exception and can even be considered as part of  a trend that has 
worsened in recent years. Indeed, the percentage in European collaborative defence equipment 
procurement has been constantly decreasing since 2016, and the 2020 figure is the lowest since 
such data is being collected (2005).  
Two EU instruments already pave the way to joint procurement . As a condition for financial 
support for development actions, the EDF Regulation  requires that Member States intend to 
procure the final product or use the technology in a coordinated manner.  The Defen ce Public 
Procurement Directive  2009/81/EC provides for a dedicated exclusion from the public 
procurement rules for cooperative projects based on Research and Development ( R&D )18. This 
exclusion applies also to the phases of the life cycle after R&D if the procurement contracts are 
awarded in the framework of the same cooperative project. In 2019, the Commission published a 
Notice19 providing guidance on various possibilities for coo perative procurement offered  under 
the Directive. Further support to Member States will be available , in particular  through the 
Expert Group on Defence and Security Procurement.  
The Commission aims at f urther incentivising Member States’ joint procurement of 
European defence capabilities , including in relation to operations and maintenance . However, 
there are a number of practical financial and fiscal hurdles that need to be tackled to this end . 
The Commission will explore enabling a possible Value Added Tax (VAT)  waiver to support 
the joint procurement and joint ownership of defence capabilities  that are  developed in a 
collaborative way within the EU . These capabilities  will be available for use by Member States 
for missions and operations in the framework  of CSDP20 or within the context of UN, NATO  and 
national activities . Such a measure could especially benefit capabilities developed within 
cooperative EU framework s (EDF and/or PESCO  and/or within the  EDA ). The establishment of 
a legal framework inspired by the European Research Infrastructure Consortium21 that would 
benefit from a VAT waiver  on equipment that  Member States consortia  would buy and own , 
could be considered  in this context . 
Similarly, based on the lessons learned from the interim evaluation of the EDF, the Commission 
will consider reinforcing  the current system of  EDF bonus es, in order to provide a  financial 
incentive on the condition that Member States commit to jointly acquire and/or own the 
defence capabilities under development22. This would provide stronger  incentive s to ensure 
that the collaboration continues beyond the R&D phases , to acquisitions, as well as operations 
and maintenance . 
Furthermore, building on the work of the Expert Group on the Financial Toolbox, new financing 
solutions  could lead to greater use by Member States of already existing joint procurement 
                                                           
18 Article 13 of Directive 2009/81/EC  
19 2019/C 157/01  
20 In line with the multinational forces foreseen by Art 42.3 of the Treaty on European Union  
21 The European Research Infrastructure Consortiu m (ERIC) is a specific legal form that facilitates the establishment 
and operation of Research Infrastructures with European interest.  
22 Beyond the eligibility requirement specified under Article 21(3)  (a) of EDF Regulation  that requires an inten tion 
to procure  the final product or use the technology in a coordinated manner.  
 
9 entities such as t he EDA  or the Organisation for Joint Armament Coopera tion (OCCAR - 
Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement ). In particular, the Commission 
will assess whether the EDF regulation provision s, such as those related to  pre-commercial 
procurement23 may provide for financial support to con tracti ng authorities and joint procurement 
entities to further coordinate their procurement procedures , including by covering 
administrative/transaction costs related to joint procurement of defence research and 
development services . 
Way forward  
 By early 2023, the Commission will make a proposal that would enable a VAT waiver  to 
support the joint procurement  and ownership  of defence capabilities developed in a 
collaborative way within the EU , while ensuring  compliance with World Trade 
Organisation rules.  
 By mid-2023 , the Commission will build on the work of the Expert Group of the 
Financial Toolbox with a view to propose new financing solutions  to facilitate Member 
States’ joint procurement of EU strategic d efence capabilities relying on already available 
expertise.   
 Following  the interim evaluation of the EDF24, the Commission will explore  a possible 
amendment to article 13 of Regulation 2021/697 establishing  the European Defence Fund  
to reinforce  the E DF bonus system  when Member States  commit to jointly acquire 
and/or own  the de fence  capabilities  under development . 
 
5. Calling upon Member States to continue moving toward s streamlined  and more 
converg ent export control practic es 
While Member States are in charge of  issuing export licen ces for military equipment , they assess 
their decisions on the basis of  the Council Common Position25 that defines common criteria  for 
contro lling the  export of military technology and equipment. It also sets up denial notification 
and consultation mechanisms with a view to increas e convergence in the application of their 
export policies  for defence -related products.  
However, as joint defence capabilities development will progressively become the norm in the 
EU rather than the exception, Member States will benefit from increased sharing of best 
practices and  gradually leading to  a more converg ent approach to arms expor ts controls . 
Building upon work that has already been achieved,  and acknowledging that export s are  a key 
success factor for the business model of the European defence industry,  the Commission  is 
support ive of  Member States moving towards gradual enhanced streamlining and further  
                                                           
23 Article 17 of the EDF regulation  
24 The interim evaluation is to be carried out no later than four years (2025) after the start of the implementation 
period of the Fund according  to article 29 of the Regulation establishing the EDF.  
25 Common Position 2008/944/CFSP . 
 
10 convergence of arms export control practices , especially for  those defence capabilities that they 
develop together , in particular under the EDF.   
In this context , the Commission welcomes  the refle ction that has been initiated in the 
Council26 on exportation of capabilities that have been developed in an EU framework  and 
encourages Member States to pursue these discussions  to facilitat e exports control procedures for 
such products . This process could also draw on the experience of bilateral and multilateral 
accords between M ember States for jointly developed capabilities.  
In order not to hamper cooperation, this work  should facilitate the definition of clear  and easy-to-
implement  procedures . Efficient export control measures should be defined to provide  EDF -
funded products with adequate and competitive access to international market s while preserving 
Member States’ sovereign decisions , in full respect  of their relevant legal obligations  and taking 
into account their national security interests . To preserve the attractiveness  of joint defence 
capability projects , the Commission invites M ember State s to seek an a pproach according to 
which , in principle , they would  respectively not restrain each other from  export ing to a 
third country a ny military equipment  and technology  developed in cooperation . This could 
apply to intended exports of equipment or technology incorporating components from another 
Member State exceeding a certain de minimis  threshold . 
Way forward  
 The Commission invite s Member States to explore ways t owards the streamlining and 
gradual further  convergence  of their arms export control practices , especially for  those 
defence capabilities that are jointly developed , in particular  in an  EU framework , thus 
ensuring EDF -funded products will profit from adequate  and competitive  access to 
international market s without prejudice to Member States ’ sovereign decisions . 
 
6. Strengthening the defence dimension of space at EU level  
Space is a strategic area for EU’s freedom of action and security . At the same time, it is an 
increasingly congested and contested area, marked by a growing power competition.  
There is an urgent need to tackle th ese challenges . A new EU space strategy for  security and 
defence , currently under consideration by Member States  in the context of the Strategic 
Compass , should help build ing a common understanding of space -related risks and threats, 
develop appropriate responses to react better and faster to crise s, strengthen our resilience and 
make full use of the benefits and opportunities linked to the space domain . Without prejudice to 
the content of the future joint strategy,  the following actions  will be considered : 
                                                           
26 Within the Conventional  Arms exports subgroup (COARM)  of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports Working 
Party  
 
11 First, EU space assets27 should be further protected to enhance resilience of the EU in and 
from space .  
In the Joint Communication on Space Traffic Management (STM)28, the Commission and the 
High Representative provide concrete orientations on how to increase the protection of EU space 
assets and promote a more sustainable use of space. In particular, the Commission will reinforce 
its space surveillance assets  through enhanced services in Space Surveillance and T racking 
(SST) and the development of related technologies, such as automatic collision avoidance or 
artificial intelligence.   
The Commission will also further support  the development of  projects related to Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) and early warnin g capabilities for defence . Such projects will 
contribute to advanced space command and control (SC2) capabilities, enhanced SSA sensors, 
and early warning system against ballistic missile threats and novel hypersonic threats29. 
Second, the Commission will enhance the security and defence dimension in existing and 
upcoming EU space infrastructures , in cooperation with the High Representative . 
The Galileo public regulated service (PRS)30 offers a navigation service restricted to 
government -authorised users for sensitive applications . These require s a high level of service 
continuity, using strong, encrypted signals  notably in the area of security and defence . The PRS  
is designed to offer unlimited and uninterrupted service worldwi de. It is a clear demonstration 
that a common infrastructure under civilian control can meet defence and security needs.   
The proposal for a regulation establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme  for 
2022 -202731, which is being adopted alongside the present Communication  as part of the space 
package , will enhance the resilience of the EU in connectivity through  secure governmental 
communication. It will include defence requirements in terms of resilience from the outset and 
the L ow Earth Orbit (LE O) constellation will provide an opportunity to take on -board pay -loads 
contributing to other EU space programme components. The system will b uild upon  
GOVSATCOM  and synergies with the European Defence Fund .  
The evolution of Copernicus should also take into account defence requirements  to the 
extent possible, with a special attention given to the required levels of security and performance, 
and underpinned by the right governance based on trust.   
To support the development of the defence dimension of exi sting and upcoming EU space 
infrastructures, the Commission will support the development of space defence capabilities 
                                                           
27 The EU Space Programme has four components: Galileo/E GNOS for positioning, navigation and timing,   
Copernicus for Earth observation, GOVSATCOM for secure governmental satellite communications, and SSA for 
space situational awareness.  
28  JOIN (2022) 4 final  
29 Those projects are supported by the EDF and its precursor programmes.  
30 Decision No 1104/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the rules for 
access to the public regulated service provided by the global navigation sat ellite system established under the 
Galileo programme , OJ L 287, 4.11.2011 . 
31 COM (2022) 57 final   
 
12 through EDF . To date, about EUR 130 million have been allocated to fund space -related actions 
under the EDF and its precursor programmes.   
As the Commission supports the development of collaborative platforms for future defence 
challenges , it also seeks to improve their performance by making the best use of existing and 
future European space assets. For example, the Galileo for EU Defence  (GEODE) project is co -
funded with EUR 44 million32 and aims at developing European standardised military navigation 
receivers that are compatible with the Galileo PRS. More than EUR 22 million will also be 
invested to enhance sensors and Command and Contro l (C2) for an EU military space 
surveillance awareness and develop a space -based early warning capability.  
Under the 2021 EDF work programme, the EDF will be dedicating EUR 50 million to both 
space and ground -based navigation warfare (NAVWAR)  surveillance  and European 
technologies for resilient satellite communications against jamming . 
Third, the Commission will work to reduce related EU strategic dependencies on critical 
technologies , e.g. in the field of chips, quantum and AI. To achieve this, the Commission will 
maximise synergies with space -related initiatives implemented under existing Commission -led 
instruments (including EDF, Horizon Europe33, Space Programme, E uropean Innovation 
Council , and InvestEU ) and will take advantage of the Observatory of critical technologies. The 
Commission will also strengthen the resilience of related European supply chains  to ensure 
the integrity, the security and the operations of space infrastructures.  
Fourth, the Commission , in cooperation with  the High Represent ative , in line with their 
respective mandates , will implement the enlarge ment  of the current  Galileo threat response 
mechanism34 to the systems and services under the other components of the EU Space 
Programme . This will further enhanc e the security governance of EU space infrastructures 
to better reply to threats  and will promote adequate governance to be put in place by relevant 
actors . They  will also improve  situational awareness at EU level through better use of space data, 
in close cooperation with Member States and systematic cooperation between relevant 
agencies/bodies operating EU infrastructures.  
The Commission  and the High Representative  will also contribute to Member States’ efforts to 
further increas e mutual assistance and crisis response mechanisms, including through exercises  
and by boost ing readiness against  threats, foster ing interoperability and support ing a common 
strategic culture.  
 
 
                                                           
32 Under the European Defence Industr ial Development Programme (EDIDP)  
33 The term ‘Horizon Europe’ in this document refers to the Specific programme implement ing Horizon Europe and 
the European Institute of Innovation and Technology; activities carried out under them have an exclusive focus on 
civil applications . 
34 As provided in the EU Space Programme Regulation 2021/696 and by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698  of 30 
April 2021 on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used under the Union Space 
Programme which may affect the security of the Union . 
 
13 Way forward  
 Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass , the Commission  and the High 
Representative  will propose  a Joint EU Space strategy for security and defence.  
 By the end of 2022, the Commission will explore how to further enhance the protection 
of EU space assets , notably through additional SST services, improved performanc e of 
EU SST and by making full use of the potential of the EU industry.  
 As of 2022, the Commission will promote a ‘dual use by design’  approach for EU space 
infrastructures, with a view to offering new resilient services tha t address governmental 
needs . In this context, the Commission encourages the co legislators to swiftly adopt the 
proposa l for a regulation establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for 
2022 -2027 . 
 The Commission will intensify work  toward s reduc ing strategic technological 
dependenc ies and enhanc ing the resilience of space infrastructure related supply chains , 
notably  through EU funding  instruments as well as  the Observatory o f critical 
technologies .  
 The Commission  will set -up adequate governance for EU space infrastructures, in close 
cooperation with Member States, building on the model of the Galileo PRS. It will assess 
the feasibility to develop and deploy a more resilient and secured Copernicus service for 
gover nmental purposes,35 taking into account defence requirements to the extent possible.  
 By the end of 2022, t he Commission  and the High Representative  will explore the 
possibility of activation of solidarity , mutual assistance and crisis response  mechanisms  in 
case of attacks originating from space or threats to space -based assets.  
 
7. Enha ncing European resilience   
Europe needs to enhance its resilience to prevent, protect and withstand future shocks. Due to 
intrinsic links with national security and defence  policies, responsibility for addressing these 
threats lies primarily with Member States. In the meantime, some vulnerabilities are common to 
all Member States, and some threats extend across borders, such as the targeting of cross -border 
networks or infra structures  as well as climate change .  
The EU approach aims at integrating the external and internal dimension in a seamless flow. It 
brings national and EU -wide civilian and military considerations together to promote concrete 
solutions, while facilitatin g increased resilience and continued operational efficiency.  
7.1. Countering hybrid threats  
                                                           
35 Copernicus PRS -like service  
 
14 In 2020, the EU Security Union Strategy36 outlined hybrid threats as one of the priority areas to 
be addressed in order to enhance EU´s security.  The Strategy sets out the basis for a renewed 
approach to these ever -evolving threats covering the full spectrum of action – from early 
detection, analysis, awareness, building resilience and prevention to crisis response and 
consequence management.  
The mapping of measures37 related to enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats 
includes more than two hundred tools and measures at EU level, of which  the vast majority  
of them  are led or supported by the Commission. The Commission proposals in different areas, 
including the Digital Services Act38, the proposal for a Critical Entities resilience directive39 and 
the revised Union Civil Protection Mechanism40, will further contribute to this increasing 
number of available EU tools to counter hybrid th reats .  
Resilience is one of the main pillars for countering hybrid threats. A joint staff working 
document of January 202241 identified 53 resilience baselines42 elements at EU level . This 
identification, announced in the Security Union Strategy, has been a crucial first step to track and 
objectively measure progress in this area.  
In this context, Commission  services ,  the E uropean External Action Service  (EEAS) and the 
General Secretariat of the Council , will conduct the EU Integrated Resolve PACE exercise in 
Novem ber 2022 , inter alia,  to address hybrid threats,  including their cyber dimension. This 
exercise will be conducted under the overall responsibility of the High Representative, with the 
participat ion of Member States and EU Agencies, and in a parallel and coordinated (PACE) 
format with NATO.  
The Commission has also adapted to the rapidly changing nature of threats . Following the 
crisis at the EU border with Belarus, it proposed measures to tackle the instrumentalisation of 
migration , including blacklisting transport operators involved in smuggling or trafficking of 
people into the EU43. 
The COVID -19 pandemic has revealed the need to enhance coordinated EU -level action to 
respond t o health emergencies. At a time , where  Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
threat s could put at risk public health , the European Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Authority (HERA)  is a central element for strengthening EU preparedness and 
response to serious cross -border health threats, by enabling rapid availability, access and 
distribution of needed countermeasures.  Drawing on the lessons from the early stages of the 
pandemic, wo rk will continue to enhance military assistance to civilian authorities in this regard.  
                                                           
36 COM (2020) 605  
37 SWD  (2020) 152 final  
38 COM  (2020) 825 final  
39 COM  (2020) 829 final  
40 Regulation (EU)  2021/836 of the European Parliament an d of the Council of 20  May 2021  
41 SWD (2022) 21 final  
42 Benchmarks, covering situations where this is a point of departure as well as an envisaged target or advice on 
minimum level requirements  
43 COM  (2021) 753 final  
 
15 Way forward  
 By 2023 , the Commission , in cooperati on with the High Representative  and the Member 
States,  will assess the sectoral resilience baselines to identify  gaps and needs  as well as 
steps to address them.  
 Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the Commission will contribute to the 
future EU hybrid toolbox by ensuring that the Member States have a full overview of 
existing internal instruments and measures  to counter hybrid threats affecting the EU and 
its Member States . This will take into account the measures included in the 2020 mapping 
on countering hybrid threats and recent Commission ’s and High Representative ’s 
proposals in areas such as criti cal infrastructure and disinformation.  
 Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the Commission will consider 
identifying experts in relevant policy areas, who could be deployed as part of Hybrid 
Rapid Response Team upon request , in synerg y with the proposed  JCU rapid response 
team s. 
 In parallel  Commission services  and the EEAS  will jointly review the EU Playbook on 
countering hybrid threats.  
 By the end of 2022 , the Commission , in cooperation with the High Representative,  will 
define a comprehensive vision regarding its rapid alert mechanisms and in particular the 
possibility to create a better  situational awareness picture , in coordination and 
complementarity with other EU existing mechanisms. T his will strengthen the Union’s 
capability for monitoring and early detection, prevention and preparedness, including 
resilience, and response  to hybrid threats . 
 Drawing on its expertise and instruments, the Commission will contribute to the EU effort 
to build resilience in partner  countries . 
 
7.2. Enhancing cybersecurity and cyber -defence  
Countering cybersecurity threats is one of the most complex security and defence challenges 
today, especially considering their growing number and impact, and while  state actors have 
developed specif ic sophisticated capabilities.  
The EU  needs to protect critical network and information systems and to play a leading role in 
guaranteeing the security, stability and resilience as well as freedom of the global internet. We  
need to boost  cybersecurity and  cyber defence in Europe by strengthening our cooperation, by 
investing more effectively into advanced capabilities, and by setting appropriate rules that will 
allow for a better linkage  of all the dimensions of cyber. These efforts should focus on 
protect ing citizens, businesses and EU interests, detecting  and deterring  malicious cyber 
activities and defending  ourselves against cyber -attacks , thereby contributing to international 
security and stability and consolidating the EU’s cyber deterrence potential .  
 
16 The Commission and the High Representative  have already set out  ambitious actions 
contributing to these goals in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy of December 202044. A number of 
important instruments are in place  to increase EU resilience , notably the Direc tive on measures 
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union  
(NIS)45, the Cybersecurity Act46, the Directive on attacks against information systems47, and 
the implementation of the EU toolbox on 5G Cybersecurity48, Recommendation on a 
‘Blueprint’ for a coordinated response to large -scale cybersecurity incidents and crises49 
and the EU cyber defence policy framework [2018 updates]50. The Commission has also 
adopted a delegated act51 under the Radio Equipment Directive52 laying down legal requirements 
for cybersecurity safeguards, which manufacturers will have to take into account in the design 
and production of radio equipment . Finally, it released a recommendation for a Joint Cyber 
Unit (JCU)53 and presented a  proposal t o revis e the NIS Directive  in December 202054, which 
is now under consideration  by the co -legislators.  In line with this level of ambition, the 
Commission will shortly present proposals to enhance the cybersecurity and information security 
of the EU institutions, bodies and agencies.  
The 2021 -25 multiannual work programme of the  Digital Europe and of the  Connecting Europe 
Facility ( CEF - Digital sector) will support the deployment of a secure quantum communication 
infrastructure (Euro  QCI) . The CEF will also support  other critical communication infrastructure, 
including certain backbones  between Member States and with third countries,  with the highest 
security standards.  
To complement those instruments and further reduce the attack surface and exposure to risk, the 
security and standardisation of products and services related to information and communication 
technology (ICT) should be strengthened. This applies in particul ar to the security of critical 
hardware and software components. The Commission is therefore preparing new proposals 
laying down horizontal security requirements, that will form the centrepiece of the Cyber 
Resilience Act  announced in the State of the Unio n address55. A defence dimension could be 
considered in this context, in particular as regards the potential development of common or 
hybrid cybersecurity standards.  
                                                           
44 JOIN (2020) 18 final  
45 Directive  (EU) 2016/1148 on security of Network and I nformation Systems (NIS ) 
46 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the 
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity 
certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013  
47 Directive 2013/40/EU (12/08/2013)  
48 COM  (2020) 50 final  
49 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/ 1584 of 13 September 2017 on coordinated response to large -scale 
cybersecurity incidents and crises, C/2017/6100  
50 14413/18 (19/11/2018)  
51 C (2021)  7672  
52 Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisat ion of 
the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment  
53 C (2021) 4520 final  
54 COM (2020 ) 823 final  
55 State of the Union address 2021 - Strengthening the soul of our Union – 15 September 2021  
 
17 To further enhance the technological capabilities of the EU and its cyber defence actors (m ainly 
Member States’ defence forces), more cooperation between relevant actors will be sought in the 
planning of civilian and defence investments for the development of relevant technologies  as 
well as their use . The Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence 
Centre and Network of Coordination Centres  (CCCN)56  will adopt in 2022 its Strategic 
agenda on cyber investments . The agenda could cover possible synergies between civil and 
defence technologies and potential dual -use applications , thus seeking synergies with other EU 
programmes , including Horizon Europe , the Digital Europe programme , and the EDF , in a 
coordinated manner and while respecting relevant governance rules.  
The Commission has already dedicated EUR 38.6 million57 to six cyber defence projects . 
Among others, this budget is supporting the development of a European cyber situational 
awareness platform and a project on technologies for secure and resilient communication.  The 
EDF will continue to support the development of cyber capabilities for defence. In 2021, two 
specific calls were launched under the EDF for a EUR 33.5 million financial envelope.  While all 
defence capability projects entail a cyber -dimension, cyber defence will remain a priority for the 
EDF in the upcoming years.  
To better prepare for potential large -scale inci dents and crises in the Union, enhanced 
coordination is essential to ensure situational awareness, rapidly identify potential response 
needs and resources and to align effective  communication amongst relevant actors at Member 
States’ and EU level, in order to mitigate potential impacts in the Union.  
To step up the detection of malicious cyber activities and enhance situational awareness , the 
Commission is working with Member Stat es towards the establishment of cross -border 
platforms to share cybersecurity threat intelligence (EU SOCs)  while also reinforcing 
capacities of Security Operation Centres (SOCs) at national level across the EU. The objective of 
those cross -border platforms  (‘EU SOCs’) is to enable the exchange of data on cybersecurity 
threats from various sources, as well as tools and capabilities, on a large -scale basis, in a trusted 
environment. They will be equipped with next -generation, ultra -secure tools and infrastruc tures.  
This should allow to improve collective detection capacities and timely warnings to authorities 
and relevant entities.  These actions will benefit from financial support from DEP , notably 
through a joint procurement to develop and operate EU SOCs, in cluding advanced tools and 
infrastructures, as well as a call for grants to support SOCs capac ities in the Member States .As a 
next step, promoting civil  - military cooperation at national level in this area could be also 
considered, together with Member St ates.  
The degree of cybersecurity cooperation between Member States when it comes to incident 
response  should be increased  including  through possible  cooperation among  civilian and 
defence response teams . The Joint Cyber Unit aims at bringing together all relevant 
cybersecurity communities (i.e. diplomatic, civilian, law enforcement and defence)  to ensure 
an EU coordinated response  to large -scale cyber incidents and crises, as well as to 
                                                           
56 PE/28/2021/INIT  
57 Under the EDIDP  
 
18 offer  assistance  in recovering from these attacks.  Therefore, the military could structurally 
cooperate  and coordinate with other cybersecuri ty communities through the JCU.  
Devel oping cyber skills  through joint training and exercise is also key for effective resilience to 
cyberattacks , improv ing cyber capabilities, developing a shared  understanding , and building a 
common response capacity.  If Member States so decide, they could consider enhanced civilian 
military cooperation in cyber training and joint exercises, building on the European Security and 
Defence College and EDA’s cyber education, training and exercises programmes .  
Way forward  
 By the third quarter of 2022, the Commission will propose the Cyber Resilience Act 
which will aim to increase the cybersecurity of products and associated services in the 
internal market.  
 To set up the new ‘EU SOCs’ platforms for sharing of cyber threat i ntelligence and tools, 
by the second quarter of 2022, the Commission will publish a Call for expression of 
interest to select hosting entities for EU SOCs accompanied by dedicated Roadmap . This 
should pave t he way for building an EU strat egic capability fo r detecting and sharing 
information about cyber threats . 
 The Commission will w ork with Member States on stepping up preparedness for large 
scale cyber -incidents through enhanced coordination, including identifying potential 
needs and resources to manage response.  
 In 2022, a Strategic agenda for the Cybersecurity Competence Centre will be proposed, 
including on dual use technology and civil -military synergies to be enshrined in a 
coordinated manner  with relevant actors . 
 The Commission , together with the High Representative,  will continue supporting 
Member States in setting up the JCU, in particular its mutual assistance mechanism , and 
will encourage civilian military cooper ation  to facilitate information exchange s and 
coordination between  defence experts and other communities (i.e. civilian, law 
enforcement and diplomacy).  
 The Commission will request the European Standardisation Organisations to develop 
harmonised standards in support of the recently adopted delegated act of the Radio 
Equipment Directive a s regards cybersecurity and privacy.  
 The Commission will work together with the High Representative  to further develop the  
EU cyber defence policy to be presented to Member States by the end of 2022.  
 The Commission invites Member States to consider joint cyber defence trainings and 
exercises, in cooperation with existing civilian and defence training and exercises 
framework s. 
 
 
19 7.3. Enhancing  military mobility  
Through the t implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility, t he EU is  already taking 
significant steps to enhance the mobility of military personnel, materiel  and equipment within 
and beyond  the EU, thus enhancing our ability to respond swiftly to a crisis or in view of routine 
activities like  exercises.  Military mobility is also a flagship project within EU -NATO 
cooperation.  
With a 2021 - 2027 EU budget of EUR 1.69 billion  to support dual -use transport infrastructure, 
military mobility is a key component of the new Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)58. The 2021 -
2023 Work Programme entails a yearly dedicated budget of EUR 330 million, and  the first calls 
for proposals were launched in September 2021.   
Military  mobility is also a topic of the 2021 EDF Work Programme. The development of a 
digital system for secure and quick exchange of information related to military mobility is one of 
the two topics under the call for proposals on soldier and logistic systems, w ith a EUR 50 million 
indicative budget for the whole call .  
On 14 December 2021, the Commission proposed revising the trans-European transport network 
(TEN -T) Regulation . Among oth er measures, the proposal aims to strengthen standards for 
civilian and mili tary mobility and to expand the TEN -T maps to include new routes important for 
military mobility.  
The Commission will continue its efforts to contribute to military mobility within and beyond  the 
EU, including by considering it in relevant legislative proposals and initiatives, in particular in 
the area of transport and cross -border procedures.   
Way forward  
 By the end of 2022, the Commission , together with the High Representative , will propose 
an update of the joint Action Plan on Military Mobility , which may cover  identifiable 
needs in relation to digitalisation  in transport, cyber resilience of transport infrastructure 
and artificial intelligence . 
 
7.4. Addressing climate change challenges for defence  
Climate change and biodiversity loss poses new threats to security . While maintaining 
operational effectiveness  remains a priority, the defence sector needs to meet the challenge  of 
adapting to the security effects of climate change  including operation under more extreme 
climatic conditions , as well as   contribut e to mitigation under the EU’s climate change policies , 
in particular the European Green deal . Improving energy efficiency , inc reasing  the use of 
renewable energy  where possible , and reduc ing emissions  in this sector , should become an 
                                                           
58 Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the 
Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014  
 
20 integral part of our  collective efforts towards climate neutrality by 2050  as well as the protection 
of biodiversity  and a strengthened circular economy .  
Circular systems can have major benefits for defence industries and procurement, increasing 
resource efficienc y, increasing open strategic autonomy for certain critical materials, and 
prolonging and optimising the utility of defence equipment59. Opportunities to improve design 
for disassembly, component harvesting, repair, refurbishment and remanufacturing of defen ce 
equipment will be identified and supported.  This also goes for opportunities to upgrade defence 
equipment so that it can continue to operate under increasingly harsh environmental conditions 
in operational theatres.  
In this context, the Commission is committed to the implementation of the 2020 Joint EU 
Climate Change and Defence Roadmap60 on which Commission  services will present a first 
annual progress report together with the E EAS  and the EDA in the first half of 2022 . The EDF61 
2021 Work Programme alr eady identifies topics  related to energy management and energy 
efficiency. EUR 133 million have been dedicated to a specific call  to support research and 
development of defence technologies and products addressing these topics .  As similar work is 
being stepped up within NATO, the UN and by the United States and other partners , the EU will 
intensify its staff -to-staff dialogues on the climate -security -defence nexus.  
Way forward  
 In the first half of 2022, Commission services, EEAS and EDA will present the first 
progress report on the implementation of the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap.  
 During 202 2, the Commission will assess climate/defence related initiatives implemented 
under existing Commission -led instruments (including EDF, Horizon Europe, Horizon 
2020, CEF, and LIFE ) in order to enhance potential synergies.  
 By the end of 2022, the Commission will establish a policy framework, drawing on 
climate/defence aspects of Commission -led instruments to contribute to reduced energy 
demand and increasing energy resilience of critical technologies used by civilian security 
actors and armed forces, and deve lop concrete climate resilient solutions  in this context . 
 During 2022 , the Commission will explore the potential of enhancing the impact of 
energy -related directives on military infrastructure (such as offices, headquarters, 
barracks, hospitals, academies) , including the Green Public Procurement options, as part 
of the European Green Deal (i.e. the new energy efficiency action “the Renovation 
Wave”, the revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive.  
 During 202 2, the Commission and the High Representative will increase and intensif y 
                                                           
59 IF CEED (europa.eu) Circular defence - News & insight - Cambridge Judge Business School  
60 12741/20  
61 The EDF regulation states that the “Fund contributes to the mainstreaming of climate actions in Union policies 
and to the achievement of an overall target of 30 % of the Union budget expenditure supporting climate 
objectives”.  
 
21 staff-to-staff work on the climate -security -defence nexus  with NATO, the UN and 
relevant bilateral partners such as the US and Canada . 
 
8. Conclusion s 
In a more complex, contested, competitive and connected world than ever before, the EU must 
further step up its efforts to defend its strategic interests and values. The upcoming EU Strategic 
Compass on Security and Defence will set out ambitious goals for Europe’s long -term security 
and defence, to which this Communication is actively contributing.  
To this end, the Commission has identified the following main new areas to further strengthen 
the competitiveness of the European defence market:  
- explore how to further stimulate Member States investments in key strategic 
capabilities and critical enablers  that are developed and/or procured in European Union 
cooperative framework s; 
- further incentivise the joint procurement of defence capabilities developed in a 
collaborative  way within the EU , including through a VAT waiver  and a  possible 
reinforcement of EDF  bonus es; 
- call upon Member States to continue moving towards streamlined  and more co nvergent  
arms exports control practices , in particular  for defence capabilities developed in  an EU 
cooperative framework.  
The Commission will also implement the initiatives already launched that are key enablers for 
European defence, such as the EDF and military mobility , as well as those that are essential for 
strengthening European resilience, in particular in space, to counter hybrid threats , strengthen 
cybersecurity , and address climate change challenges related to defence . 
The Commission remains ready to consider add itional steps forward in the light of progress 
made and the evolution of the threats and challenges the Union faces in the future.