ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES 
DE LA COMMISSION 
 
 
 
COLLECTION RELIEE DES 
DOCUMENTS "COM" 
 
 
 
 
COM (83) 026 
 
 
 
Vol. 1983/0012 
  
 
Disclaimer  
Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit 
règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Communit y and the European Atom ic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), t his file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februa r 1983 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 v om 27.9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
erforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in Übereinstimmung mit Artikel 5  
der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.  
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(83) 26 final 
Brussels, 28 January 1983
C O M M U N IC A T IO N  F R O M  T H E  C O M M IS S IO N  T O  T H E  C O U N C IL
O N  N E G O T IA T IO N S F O R  A  N E W  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  S U G A R  A G R E E M E N T
C0M(83) 26 final

COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR  
A NEW INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT
1. The International Sugar Council (ISC) met in London on 18/19 November  
and decided to ask UNCTAD to arrange a conference in Geneva next May  
with a view to negotiating a new international sugar agreement to come  
into force on 1  January 1984.
The ISC also decided to entrust the preparations for the forthcoming  
conference to a new Preparatory Committee, on which the European  
Economic Community will sit as a full member.
2. The Council (the EEC Council, that is) asked the Commission on
27 October 1981 to explore with the ISC means of cooperation which  
would enable the Community to become a member of a new, improved sugar  
agreement. Accordingly the Commission announced at the ISC meeting,  
on behalf of the Community, that the EEC wished to take part on an  
equal footing with the other participants in the work of the Preparatory  
Committee and the May negotiations.
3. The draft decision (Annex I) transmitted to the Council herewith gives  
the Commission authorization to participate, with the support of
the Article 113 Committee, in the work being undertaken by the  
International Sugar Organization and in the planned UNCTAD-sponsored  
conference in May with a view to setting up a new international sugar  
agreement which the Community could join.

ANNEX I
RECOMMENDATION FOR A 
COUNCIL DECISION
laying down guidelines for the negotiation of a new international  
sugar agreement
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,  
and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the Recommendation from the Commission,
Whereas the Community should take part in the preparatory work and  
negotiations for a new international sugar agreement to replace the  
International Sugar Agreement of 1977,
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
The Commission is hereby authorized to take part in the preparatory work  
and negotiations for a new international sugar agreement.
Article 2
The Commission shall take part in the negotiations in consultation with the  
Article 113 Committee and in accordance with the guidelines contained in  
the Annex.
For the Council  
The President

ANNEX II
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND NEGOTIATING DIRECTIVES FOR PARTICIPATION BY  
THE EEC IN THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT
1. The decision by the International Sugar Council on 19 November to bring  
forward by a year the renegotiation of the 1977 International Sugar  
Agreement (which theoretically runs until 31 December 1984) is  
essentially due to the critical situation of the market in the last  
two years or so and the inability of the members of the Agreement
to take any radical counter-measures going beyond their actual  
obligations under the Agreement.
2. There is a wild imbalance between supply and demand on the world market  
for sugar; in the 1981/82 and 1982/83 crop years production outstripped  
requirements by 13 m tonnes; stocks stood at 37-38 m tonnes, a level  
not attained since 1945, which is equivalent to almost 40% of world  
consumption (25% is generally regarded as the ideal level).
This serious state of affairs is depressing world prices, now at  
6-7 cents a pound; this is the lowest price in constant dollars  
recorded for over forty years, only half of the minimum price (13 cents  
per pound) set by the Agreement.
3. Given the current and foreseeable state of the world market, it is  
becoming increasingly imperative to establish a new, effective  
international agreement; the present confusion is damaging to  
producers, exporters and importers alike, including the Community.
4. The Community is expected to play a major constructive role in the  
forthcoming negotiations; it is the second largest exporter, after  
Cuba, and has special links with a number of developing-country sugar  
exporters (from which it also imports 1.3 m tonnes under the Sugar  
Protocol annexed to the Lomé Convention), but was not a member of  
the previous Agreements (1968 and 1977), regarding them as

-  2 -
ineffective, and inimical to the interests of its growers and  
consumers.
The Community must therefore go into the negotiations prepared to look  
at the objectives and measures proposed by other participants on their  
merits. However, it should press for the acceptance of a number of  
basic principles which it feels to be essential if the future agreement  
is to be able to regulate the world sugar market more effectively.
Since what is contemplated is a new agreement, rather than a revised  
version of the present Agreement dating from 1977, all possibilities  
may reasonably be considered.
The lessons of the 1977 Agreement
5. The members of the 1977 Agreement voted to start negotiations for a new  
accord a year early because they, like the Community, feel that the  
present system is ineffective and unsatisfactory - largely, indeed,  
precisely because the Community has remained outside it - and therefore  
want a new arrangement in which the EEC would participate.
6. During the lifetime of the present Agreement world prices have rarely  
stayed within the prescribed bracket. From 1  January 1978, when the  
Agreement came into force, to 1  January 1983 - sixty months - prices  
were within the accepted range for twelve months and below (January 1978  
- September 1979 and September 1981 onwards) or above (May 1980 -  
January 1981) for forty-eight. The market has undergone two upheavals:  
in 1980, when prices were up to double the Agreement ceiling of
21 cents per pound, and this year, with prices having slumped to under  
half of the 13 cents per pound regarded as the acceptable minimum.
It is clear that in neither of these extreme situations has the  
machinery of the Agreement functioned as it was meant to; in 1980 the  
release of special stocks proved inadequate to curb rising prices,  
while in 1981/82, it was impossible to cut export quotas enough to  
influence the market and support prices at an acceptable level.
Undeniably, then, the 1977 Agreement has fallen decidedly short of its  
main objective of achieving "stable conditions in the international  
trade in sugar, including avoidance of excessive price fluctuations".

- 3 -
It has not been markedly more successful in achieving its other  
objectives (raising the level of trade and increasing the market shares  
of the developing countries) either.
7. To some extent the failure of the 1977 Agreement was implicit in the  
outcome of the actual negotiations.
Weightier reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Agreement, however,  
are the following.
(i) Inade^uate_£uota_regulation_machinery
(a) the quotas were set too high from the outset as most of the  
members exported flat out in 1976 and 1977 to maximize the past  
performance level on which the quotas were to be based;
(b) there was also a "mistake" in the text of the Agreement which  
meant that the method used for revision of the basic export  
tonnages (BETs) produced levels well above actual world demand,  
or indeed the export capacity of some of the members;
(c) the maximum permitted cut of 15% in BETs proved inadequate to  
remedy matters.
As a result of all these factors, export quotas in 1982, for  
example, totalled 16.5 m tonnes, compared with a demand (global  
quota) level of 12.1 m tonnes.
In the light of this situation, is there any point in opening  
negotiations for a future agreement based on a quota mechanism?
The feeling is that the exporting countries cannot afford to lose  
face with domestic public opinion by giving up "rights" enshrined  
in the 1977 Agreement.
Again, it is reasonable to wonder whether any generalized quota

- 4 -
mechanism, however refined, can cope with the conditions on the  
international sugar market.
(ii) Inadequate stockholding arrangements
The stockholding system was tacked on at the end of the 1977 negotiating  
conference to reinforce the quota mechanism, but it has failed to perform  
the usual functions of a buffer stock in anticipating shortages (1980) or  
supporting prices (1979 and 1981/82), partly because the level of stocks was  
too low (2.5 m tonnes) and the nature of the stocking and destocking trigger  
mechanisms unsuitable (regularity - control) and partly because the United  
States was late in ratifying the Agreement, which delayed the setting up of  
the Stock Financing Fund, thus reducing the real level of the stocks  
(approx. 2 m tonnes) at the time of the 1980 crisis.
(iii) Absence_of_commitments_by_develo£ed_imgorting_members
The developed importing members of the Agreement did undertake to allow  
growing access to their markets for sugar from the developing countries, one  
of the objectives of the Agreement, but in practice the reverse has  
occurred. The three countries mainly concerned (Canada, the United States  
and Japan and the other developed importing countries' have in fact  
considerably cut back on their imports since the Agreement came into force,  
owing to the increase in isoglucose production by the three big importers,  
and this has hit hardest at the developing countries' exports of raw sugar.
(iv) The system of sgecial_arrangements set up to accommodate most of the
centralized economies has also contributed to the instability of the world  
market. The USSR and East Germany, which are importing members, can also  
export on to the free world market a certain quantity controlled by the  
Agreement. Sugar can also be traded without being counted against the  
BETs: Cuba is allowed to export about 4 m tonnes a year to Comecon
countries under this arrangement, and up to 800 000 tonnes to other  
socialist countries (Albania, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Yugoslavia).
'imports (raw value):
1977 1982 (x) Difference
USA
CAN
NZ
JAP
FIN
SWD5 290 751  
1  118 4702 713 000
815 000 
169 000-49% 
-17% 
- 9% 
-23% 
-37% 
-16%184 800 
2 789 413  
190 180 
59 4072 139 000
120 000 
50 000
(x) ISO estimates  
Nov. 1982

- 5 -
The socialist countries in turn can export freely to Comecon countries  
which are not members of the Agreement and are therefore able to re­
export the sugar on to the world market without restriction. Sugar from  
Cuba is thus arriving on the world market via Comecon countries totally  
outside the control of the International Sugar Agreement.
(v) Similarly, the re-exportation_of_sugar_by_importing countries is
hindering the free market. The United States provides an example of the  
sort of abuses that occur: in 1981, it re-exported over a million
tonnes, whereas previously it had never gone over 200 000 tonnes.
(vi) Another problem has been the fact that the EEC is not a member of
the Agreement, both importers and exporters having felt - whether rightly  
or wrongly, that is not the point - that the Community was free to do as  
it liked while they were subject to very rigorous production and  
marketing restrictions.
This has undoubtedly been a factor in tempting the members of the  
Agreement to confine their efforts to the strict letter of their  
obligations, even though the Community's own behaviour in the last two  
years at least has been exemplary.
The world sugar market
World production of and trade in sugar is characterized by three basic features:
i. though a great many countries at totally different levels of development  
are sugar producers, a handful of "majors" in fact account for the bulk  
of the world tradable supply;
ii. the world market has become ever more clearly split into a raw sugar
market and a white sugar market, each with their separate characteristics  
and economic considerations;
iii. world demand is steadily increasing: reduction in certain developed
countries more than compensated for by the increase in the developing  
countries, whereas world production is subjected to annual variations.

-  6 -
(1) Di s t ion_of_woirld_suga^_px;odT; ictxon
Before the Second World War world production was under 30 m tonnes.
It soared in the twenty years after that, and now stands at around 100  
m tonnes (raw value).
There are 114 producing countries in all, 8 of them growing both cane  
and beet (including the United States, China and Spain), 34 growing  
beet alone (European countries and the USSR) and 72 cane alone.
Sugar is thus grown almost everywhere - a well-nigh universal crop.
However, that is a statement which has to be heavily qualified, as in  
fact very few producing countries account for a dominant share of  
world output.
The six leading producers produce almost 55% of the world total; they  
are: EEC (15.7 m tonnes), Brazil (8.2 m tonnes), USSR (6.2 m tonnes),  
Cuba (8.2 m tonnes), India (9.2 m tonnes) and the USA (5.7 m tonnes)  
in 1981-82 (raw value);
Of those six countries three are permanent net exporters with  
structural surpluses: the EEC, Brazil and Cuba.
The USSR and the USA head the list of importers, each with a production  
shortfall against consumption of over 5.5 and 2.5 m tonnes respectively.  
India's production levels are erratic so that although it is normally  
an exporter, there are years in which it becomes an importer.
Eleven countries (if to the six countries mentioned above are added  
Australia (3.5 m t),  South Africa (2m t),  the Philippines (2.4 m t),  
Thailand (1.7 m t) and China (3.5 m t)) produce two-thirds of the  
world's cane and beet sugar. But only six of them (including India)  
are net exporters.
The dominant position of these "sugar superpowers" is reflected within  
the ISO, which- recognizes 44 countries as exporting members of the  
Agreement, 41 of them developing countries.

- 7 -
Of the 44, 15 are "Annex II" countries, i.e. countries exporting under  
70 000 tonnes a year and entitled to produce and export sugar free of  
any restriction up to that limit, which has never been exceeded. Of  
the 15 :
5 countries (Haiti, Indonesia, Uganda, Pakistan, Venezuela)  
are actually net importers;
9 countries are net exporters, but their combined annual exports  
are barely over 300 000 tonnes;
Yugoslavia alone regularly exports about the limit, and would like  
to increase its export entitlement to around 150 000 tonnes.
The 29 other exporting countries, listed in Annex I, are theoretically  
more important suppliers, and their exports on the world market are  
subject to a ceiling or quota set at a level approximating to a  
notional export entitlement known as the basic export tonnage (BET).
Of the 29 countries a mere eight account for 86% of the combined BETs  
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Philippines,  
South Africa, Thailand), but of those eight, again, three alone  
(Australia, Brazil and Cuba) account for 56%.
At the lower end of the scale, 9 of the exporting members of the  
Agreement have been unable to fulfil their quota:
Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius and Jamaica are ACP States covered by  
the Lomé Convention sugar protocol and their exports on the world  
market are negligible;
Mexico (structural reasons) and Peru (structural reasons and climate)  
have a production shortfall equal to their export quotas;
Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador are structurally incapable of  
fulfilling their quotas, and export less than 70 000 tonnes a year;

-  8 -
India, with its erratic production and consumption curves, is a  
special case. In very good years like 1976 and 1982, India can export
up to a million tonnes, but it had to import in 1980.
The above observations point to an important consideration to be taken  
into account in working out a new agreement: the great majority of
sugar producers, and particularly the developing countries, other than  
Cuba, Brazil, India, Philippines and the Dominican Republic, could be  
more or less exempt from the disciplines it would impose without causing  
any real problems.
An agreement between the EEC, India, Australia, Brazil and Cuba, on the  
other hand, would cover 42% of world production and almost 70% of  
international trade and thus have a much stronger influence.
(2) The raw sugar and white sugar markets
Analysis of the world market is usually based on general production and  
consumption figures for sugar as a whole, making no distinction between  
raw and white sugar. On closer examination, however, it can be seen  
that there are in fact two separate markets, increasingly divergent and  
independent of each other:
(a) price movements differ;
(b) the market trends are not the same; the volume of international  
trade in refined sugar has doubled over the last twelve years,  
while the level of trade in raw sugar has remained stable;
(c) the pattern of supply and demand is different; in 1981, 77  
countries were importing white sugar from 17 exporting countries,  
while only 27 countries (four of them accounting for over 60%)  
imported raw sugar.
On the market for white sugar the Community is important if not  
irreplaceable, accounting for 60% of world supplies; other exporters,  
such as Brazil or India, only export white sugar when the price

- 9 -
the price differential makes refining worthwhile.
Suggestions for the negotiation of a new international sugar agreement
One thing is certain, the Community should approach the forthcoming negotiations  
as an exporting country. In this capacity the Community has a strong interest  
in seeing the negotiations culminate in an effective agreement.
Given its actual and potential role on the market, the Community is well  
placed - better than in 1977, in any case, when it became a net exporter for the  
first time^ - to have an influence on the type of agreement worked out,  
particularly since an agreement now without the Community as a member would be  
even more irrelevant than the 1977 one.
(a) Objectives
While the new agreement should set out essentially the same objectives as  
the present one (stability of price and supplies, if possible an expansion  
of trade, priority for developing countries, better coordination of  
marketing policies) the Community should also press for acceptance of the  
following ideas:
i. coverage of substitutes such as isoglucose;
ii. overall market transparency; the special arrangements for Cuba and the  
socialist countries should be just as open as those covering EEC 
imports from ACP countries;
iii. acknowledgement of the existence of two markets, for white and raw  
sugar, with the necessary implications for regulatory and price  
provisions;
iv. greater participation by developed importing countries in the market  
regulatory mechanisms.
Actually, the six-member Community was more or less always a net exporter.  
The reason it appears otherwise is that figures for the Nine are quoted even  
for the period before the first enlargement. And even the nine-member  
Community's gradual transformation from importer to exporter is partly due  
to the decline in UK imports from some former suppliers of the Community.

-  10  -
(b) la2i2_Ê£22°5Î2_§EEaïïSË2Ënt®
Considering both the market situation (particularly as regards the pattern  
of trade flows and the type of disciplines which various countries might  
accept or have imposed on them in the interests of more effective market  
stabilization, the Commission's view is that not all members of a future  
agreement should be subject to the same rules. To some extent, in fact,  
the present Agreement already provides for differential undertakings, as  
regards special stocks, for example (not mandatory for the Annex II minor  
exporters), or quotas.
Generally speaking, the Commission believes that the objectives of the  
agreement should be pursued in different ways depending on the status of the  
particular member:
i. the major exporters and developed importing countries should establish  
a system of nationally-held buffer stocks coordinated at international  
level and backed up if necessary by auxiliary measures to regulate  
supply and demand, to be adopted after consultations;
ii. the middle-rank exporters would have export quotas backed up by a  
limited special stock arrangement;
iii. the other exporting countries would be free to sell their sugar at any  
time, up to a tonnage to be determined (of the order of the 70 000  
tonne limit set in the 1977 Agreement).
The aim would be to see that the market could move freely within a certain  
price bracket; stocking or destocking operations and the introduction or  
removal of quotas, followed if necessary by measures to control supply and  
demand, would be used to deal with crises and ensure a return to stability  
(i.e. prices within the bracket) as soon as possible.
(c) The_different members' undertakings
(1) The major exporters
The countries in question would be Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cuba,  
the Dominican Republic, the EEC, India, Philippines, South Africa and  
Thailand.

-  1 1  -
For these countries, which dominate the market, accounting for  
approximately 80% of trade, there would be a system based on an  
international stockholding policy plus back-up measures to regulate  
production and consumption policies.
(i) Stocking/destocking obligations
The major exporters would undertake collectively to regulate their  
exports, when the state of the market made it necessary, by  
accumulating or releasing national stocks in an internationally-  
coordinated operation.
The aggregate level of stocks held or released under the agreement  
should be of the order of 5-6 m tonnes, apportioned among the  
countries concerned during the negotiations in line with their  
total exports and production. The Community should be in a  
position to announce that it will take about 2 m tonnes.
The machinery for the accumulation, holding and release of stocks,  
which would be linked to the fluctuation of market prices in terms  
of a given price bracket (like the quota and special stock  
arrangements in the present Agreement),  should be as flexible as  
possible while still giving commercial operators a measure of  
security to plan ahead. Thus, when world market prices reached a  
certain level within the bracket, these countries would meet to  
decide whether and to what extent to go ahead collectively with  
national stocking or destocking operations.
To enable the stockholding mechanism to function as efficiently as  
possible, these countries would continue, as under the 1977  
Agreement, to notify the Secretariat periodically of their real  
exportable supplies (including sugar reserved for the controlled  
markets) and, if possible, their export commitments. They would  
also have to notify the Secretariat of the policies being pursued  
on the domestic front to enable them to fulfil their national and  
international stocking obligations and the level of any current  
minimum stocks they hold which are not covered by agreement rules.

-  1 2  -
(i i) Back-u£_measures
If in spice of the buffer stock actions world market prices  
continued towards further predetermined points on the price scale,  
decisions on the complementary measures to be adopted by each  
large exporting and importing country in the field of production  
and consumption policy would be taken by the Council of the  
Agreement. These measures would be entered in a schedule to the  
agreement; they could consist, in the event of a surplus, for  
instance, of a reduction in areas under cultivation, the establishment  
of supplementary reserve stocks entailing orderly marketing of  
exports, measures to promote consumption (use in animal feed) or  
a switch in production in some areas from sugar to gasohol.
(2) Middle-rank exporters
These countries export less than 500 000 tonnes a year; most of them  
are Latin American or Central American developing countries. The vast  
majority of them have consistently favoured an agreement based on a  
system of export quotas, since for financial and administrative reasons  
it is often extremely difficult for them to implement proper stockholding  
policies. A quota mechanism, on the other hand, gives them a degree  
of flexibility over production and also offers them a measure of  
security in implementing their production and export plans, which is  
important for developing countries.
Given these countries' views and general situation, the Commission  
considers they could carry on with a system of export quotas combined  
with a limited undertaking on stocks, as under the present Agreement.  
However, the mechanism calls for two improvements:
(a) the BETs should be set at a realistic level reflecting the
countries' actual share of the world market and the level of real  
demand, i.e. about 20% of the market (incidentally, under the  
present Agreement these countries account for approximately 20% of  
BETs, but the tonnages should be cut down to about 20% of the real  
market);

- 13 -
(b) when there are large surpluses, leading to a slump in prices (e.g.  
last autumn's very low prices), it should be possible to reduce  
quotas not simply to 85% of the BETs, as under the present  
Agreement, but if necessary to 75-80%.
In the Commission's view, these countries should also participate in a  
"special stocks" type of arrangement like that under the present  
Agreement. However, they would have a comparatively minor part to  
play, since most of the onus of maintaining the stocking system would  
be on the "great powers".
(3) Small exporters
These countries' combined exports are no more than about 500 000  
tonnes, and according to the best forecasts their production is not  
expected to increase significantly. The Commission feels they could  
continue to be entitled, as under the present Agreement, to export free  
of restrictions at any time, up to a ceiling of 70 000 tonnes a year,  
or some similar figure to be negotiated.
(4) Importing countries
A major snag with the present Agreement is that it places the whole  
burden of market stabilization on the exporting countries, while the  
importing countries can exploit all the advantages for their own  
production and consumption policies. But it is not only the exporting  
countries which have an interest in the stabilization of the inter­
national sugar market; importing countries too need to be able to  
count on regular supplies at stable prices.
The Commission accordingly considers that the importing countries  
should also give certain undertakings, as they did under the 1968 Sugar  
Agreement.
The developed importing countries (some European countries, Canada,  
Japan, USA, New Zealand) should share in the stocking/destocking of a  
quantity reflecting their importance on the market and also participate  
in the programme of back-up measures to be taken by the exporting  
countries in certain circumstances, not excluding possible action in  
relation to their policies on production and consumption of sweeteners.

- 1 4  -
The developing importing countries, in the event of a shortage, would  
be preferentially supplied by the developed exporting members (partly  
from their stocks), and should give import undertakings similar to  
those in the present Agreement (access undertakings).
The Commission considers that the basic principles and economic provisions  
outlined above, particularly those mentioned on pages 9  arid 10, should enable 
the C om m unity to play an  important positive role in the establishment of a  
new  international sugar agreement.

ANNEX A
Memo(82)3  
(Restricted)
TABLE 1
I.S.A. DAILY PRICE OF SUGAR—^  
f.o.b. & stowed Caribbean Port, in bulk  
MONTHLY AVERAGES: 1976 - 1982
Calendar Years
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
January 14.,028.34 8.77 7.57 17.1627.7812,90
February 13.508.59 8.48 8.2322.7524.0913,08
March 14.798.98 7.74 8.46 19.6421.8111,26
April 14.0510.04 7.59 7.8221.2517.839,58
May 14.548.95 7.33 7.85 30.9415.058,11
June 12.997.87 7.23 8.1430.8016.386,84
July 13.217.39 6.43 8.5227.7016.347,80
August 10.027.61 7.08 8.85 31 .7714.766,77
September 8.137.31 8.17 9.90 34.7411.655,77
October 8.037.09 8.96 1  1  .9440.5512.045,93
November 7.887.07 8.01 13.68 37.811  1.976,52
December 7.558.09 8.00 14.9328.7912.986,31
Average 11 .518.10 7.81 9.6528.6916.83
Daily Quotations:
Highest 15.6510.81 9.30 15.9643.1031.87
Lowest 7.106.1  1 6.03 7.41 14.4310.61
SOURCE: I.S.O. Records
a/ Calculated in accordance with Statistical Rule S-14(2) of the 1973  
International Sugar Agreement for 1975 to October 1977. Following  
the suspension of spot quotations for New York Contract No.11 on 3  
November 1977 prices for the rest of 1977 were calculated according  
to ISC-Decisions-10, item 7(c) and for 1978 and up to October 1979  
were calculated in accordance with Economic Rules 611-2 and 611-3  
under the 1977 International Sugar Agreement. Following a decision  
of the Executive Committee at its 18th meeting, New York Contract No.I I  
spot price quotations which were resumed from 20 August 1979 have been  
used in the calculations of the I.S.A. Daily Price with effect from  
10 October 1979 in accordance with article 61, paragraph 1

ANNEX B  
TABLE 1
SUGAR CONSUMPTION ('000 tonnes)
1975 1_976 1977i2Z§1_979 128012§i
TOTAL WORLD 74438793128262686181898628785087749
of which EEC 9794110271016410855108131097210593
EAST EUROPE 16467168441724917722178951776117884
USA 914210000103619954987693308900
CANADA 1057 96411121099 11251014 941
C. & S. AMERICA 12950133491354114107151291573015449
of which Brazil 4990509150605289600962645871
Mexico 2526267526772934306031523261
ASIA 15332167581909321163233332116021614
of which India 3859401642325212667750425393
Indonesia 1177129114531557 165015001700
China 1700215031503650370036004100
Japan 2796318233002887320029822747
Philippines 853 841 9681087 11591209 1134
Saudi Arabia 158 176 220 260 270 286 320
AFRICA 5100550558896235646468687286
of which Egypt 716 804 817 966 97010501200
Morocco 500 520 580 635 647 664 670
Nigeria 185 250 400 575 575 700 850
South Africa 12151305 1279 110211271291 1303
OCEANIA 10041013 1016 1023 1042 1018 1028
of which Australia 778 781 785 786 798 783 793
Source: ISO

ANNEX B  
TABLE 2
SUGAR:  per capita consumption in kg (raw sugar value)
1977 1981
EUROPE 40.6 40.6
of which EEC 38.1 38.8
CANADA 47.8 38.9
USA 46.8 38.7
CENTRAL AMERICA 40.7 43.7
SOUTH AMERICA 40.9 42.3
of which BRAZIL 44.7 48.1
ASIA 8.3 8.4
of which JAPAN 29.0 23.4
AFRICA 13.9 15.2
OCEANIA 47.3 44.6
of which AUSTRALIA 55.8 53.4
WORLD 20.2 19.6
Source: ISO

ANNEX B
vi-h \ :/
V /  TABLE 3
TREND OF EEC EXPORTS OF WHITE SUGAR TO CERTAIN DEVELOPING AND E. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
!--------------------------------
EEC 
EXPORTS 
(white sugar - tonnes)Sugar consumption  
(raw sugar value) ('000t(jimes)
1977 1980 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Eastern USSR 252872 648623 11 863 12 146 12 209 12 300 12 500
EuropePoland 24780 1  568 1  627 1  676 1  534 1  345
Africa Libya 25871 120 130 130 120 100
Algeria 56616 88253 440 470 490 500 550
Egypt 12919 120961 817 966 970 1  050 1  200
Sudan 5265 65284 339 307 372 370 360
Ghana 2193 17112 55 60 60 50 50
Togo 1  1916 18754 10 13 20 22 25
Nigeria 325502 626965 400 575 575 700 850
Zaire 2416 6966 65 40 65 67 70
Asia Syria 3168 47294 196 229 282 345 300
Iraq 12001 134970 450 470 487 520 520
Iran 153562 615069 1  142 1  400 1  200 1  150 1  000
Jordan 12556 60735 85 90 95 89 90
Saudi Arabia 46178 102893 220 260 270 286 320
Pakistan 29303 716 750 782 773 705
Sri Lanka 2563 19077 130 200 235 205 220
899(Source: 
727 2Nimexe) 
645 942(Source: ISO)
(+ 1  746 215)

ANNEX C
WORLD SUGAR BALANCE SHEET (raw sugar values - millions of tonnes)
ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Initial stocks 27.9 32.1 34.4 40.8 44.8 43.1 39.7 42.1
Production 78.8 82.4 90.4 90.6 89.2 84.6 91.9
Imports 20.5 22.0 27.0 24.9 25.1 26.5 28.0
Availability 127.2 136.5 151.8 156.3 159.1 154.2 159.6
Exports 20.6 22.8 28.4 25.0 25.9 26.7 29.0
Consumption 74.4 79.3 82.6 86.2 89.9 87.9 87.7
Final stocks 32.1 34.4 40.8 44.8 43.1 39.7 42.1
of which in %
of consumption 43.1 43.4 49.4 52.0 47.9 45.2 48.0
Source: ISO

ANNEX D
SUGAR  ('000 tonnes)
— (raw sugar value)
1 9  8 1
Production Exports % of market
I. MAJOR EXPORTERS
of which AUSTRALIA  
CUBA 
BRAZIL 
EEC
PHILIPPINES  
THAILAND  
DOMIN.  REP.  
ARGENTINA  
SOUTH AFRICA44 434
3 509
7 926
8 726 
15 476
2 376 
1  702 
1  108 
1  624 
1  98722 810
2 982 
7 071 
2 670 
5 344 
1  278 
1  155 
864 
709 
73778.8
O)
II. SMALL EXPORTERS (2) 5 621 477 1.6
III. OTHERS 41 877 5 666 19.6
WORLD 91 932 28 953 100
(1) Including 1  364 m t equivalent to sugar imported from ACP countries.
(2) Countries listed in Annex II to the 1977 Agreement.
Source: ISO

FINANCIAL STATEMENT
I  DATE 1 1  !.83
1. BUDGET LINS CONCERNED :  A  .2 9 8 2 C R E D I T  :  P .M .
2. action :  com m ission C om m unication to the Council on negotiations 
International Sugar A greem ent (IS A )for a  n e w
3.  lecal basis !  ^ E C  T reaty, in particular Article 1 1 3
4.  OBJECTIVES :
Authorization for the C om m ission to take part in w o rk  on negotiating a  n e w  IS A
•
5. FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCE
5.0 EXPENDITURE
-CHARGED TO THE EC BUDGET
-CHARGED TO NATIONAL ADMINISTR.FOR THE MARKETING YEAR CURRENT FINANCIAL YEAR 
(  )FOLLOWING FINANCIAL YEAR
300.000 E C U S
-CHARGED TO OTHER NATIONAL CROUPS
5.1 RECEIPTS
-OWN RESOURCES OF THE EC (LEVIES/CUSTOMS DUTIES)
-NATIONAL
YEAR .1385. ........... YE
AR ...1.98Ä ....... Y E
A R  ...1.98.7 _ _T r
5.
0.1 PLURIANNUAL PATTERN OF EXPENDITURE 
5.1.1 PLURI ANNUAL PATTERN OF RECEIPTS300.000 E C U S 300.000 E C U S 300.000 E C U S
5.2 METHOD OF CALCULATION
Calculation based on C o m m u n ity  experience as a  m e m b e r of the International 
W h e a t Council
6.0 FX tW X ÎW X iX «:»»)© :X K C eX Q O T H W X > tX 9 m 9 » X M « 0 iX S M i)iK xx&mx mmmMXM&XX xxxxxxxxxxx% % % & & X X
6.1 WÌC««mX9QX9<»»XXX>rX«*Ì<axe£X^X!XiiBfXa6Xi»X»XàiìWi'Xà(i6èiatX-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX!iitì^(i(:XXXX
6.2 tKmxmmKmmxmxmmmxmxxx  ^ x < x x
6.3 CREDITS TO BE WRITTEN INTO FUTURE BUDGETS ? YES/XÄ
COMMENTS :
T he am ounts show n cover E E C  participation in the administrative budget of the 
A greem ent .
A n y  costs arising from  a  stocking system  will be financed, as far as possible, 
b y  respecting the principle of budgetary neutrality within the sugar regim e 
(Article 4 7  of R e g  .  1785/81) .