NoC19/90 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 25.1.93
OpinionontheXXIstReportonCompetitionPolicy
(93/C19/24)
On30April1992CommissiondecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,under
Article198oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,ontheXXIst
ReportonCompetitionPolicy
TheSectionforIndustry,Commerce,CraftsandServices,whichwasresponsibleforpreparing
theCommittee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon6November1992.The
RapporteurwasMrMourgues .
Atits301stPlenarySession(meetingof25November1992),theEconomicandSocial
CommitteeadoptedthefollowingOpinionunanimously .
0.PresentationoftheOpinion
0.1.TheinitialdebateconductedbytheCommittee
considerablybroadenedthescopeofitsreflectionson
competitionpolicy:
—firstly,byconfirmingitsdeep-seatedconvictionthat
theCommunity'scompetitionpolicymust,of
necessity,beinseparablefromitsindustrialpolicy;
—secondly,bytakingintoaccounttherepercussions
ofthecurrentpoliticalandeconomicupheavals
takingplacethroughouttheworldingeneral,but
alsoandmoreparticularlyonthecontinentofEuro­
peandtheirimpactonagreementsandtrade.
0.2.Forthisreasonitwasdeemednecessarytosplit
theOpinionintotwoparts:
a)theOpinionontheXXIstReport;
b)someideasastothefuturecourseofcompetition
policywithintheoverallcontextofECpolicy.1.1.2.Theimprovedlayoutandreadabilityofthe
Report,makingforgreatertransparency ,aswellasits
publicationbeforetheendofthefirsthalfofthecurrent
year,aremajorstepsforward.TheCommitteecon­
siders,however,thatthepresentationoftheReport
couldbeimprovedstillfurtherifthetechnicalandlegal
aspectsofitsanalyseswerethoroughlyaired.
1.1.3.TheCommission willthusbeabletoconsult
thecontributionofthepoliticalandsocio-economic
interestgroupsinstitutionalized bytheTreatybeforeit
draftsthenextannualreport.
1.2.Itisinterestingtonotethat,ascalledforbythe
CommitteeinitslastOpinion(!),theXXIstReport
furtheranalyzesCommunitypolicyandthepractical
applicationofthecompetitionrulesinthelightof
theimminentcompletionoftheinternalmarket;itis
accompaniedbyananalysisoftheinitialeffectsofthe
applicationofthemergercontrolRegulation .Under
thesecircumstances 'competitionpolicyhasbeentaking
ongrowingimportanceastheCommunityadvances
towardseconomicandmonetaryunionandnearsthe
completionofthesinglemarket'(2).
1.2.1.Theseaspectsforeshadowandwillfacilitate
theimplementation ofthenewRomeTreatyArticles
130and130ato130pprovidedforintheMaastricht
Treaty.
1.3.Mergercontrol
1.3.1.Thestrengtheningorcreationofdominant
positionssometimesconstitutesanegativeresponseto
theopening-upprocessbroughtaboutbythecom­
pletionoftheinternalmarket.Theseattitudesmustbe
counteredbythecombinedapplicationofTreaty
Article86andRegulation (EEC)No4064/89onmergerA.OPINIONONTHEXXIstREPORT
1.Generalcomments
1.1.TheCommissionhasalwaysrecognizedtherel­
evanceoftheCommittee'sOpinionsandinparticular
thatonthelastReportonCompetitionPolicy.The
Committeewelcomesthis,butregretsthatsomeofits
proposalshavenotbeentakenup.Inpoint4.1,§2,
however,theCommissionstatesthatitsharesmanyof
theCommittee'sbasicconcerns.
1.1.1.TheCommitteeispleasedtonotethatthe
Commission ,initsReport,drawsparticularattention
totheinterestsofconsumers :itisurgedtocontinuein
thisvein.(])OJNoC49,24.2.1992.
(2)XXIstReport,Introduction ,p.1.

25.1.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC19/91
televisionandbankingnetworks.Competitionpolicy
must,however,bewaryoftheeffectsofderegulationin
certaincases;itcanfacilitatetheformationofconsortia
whicharenotbackwardinofferingtariffswhichare
initiallybelowcostpriceandputtheircompetitorsout
ofbusiness,withdramaticsocialconsequences .control.TheCommitteenotestheresultsofthefirst
fullyear'sapplicationofthisRegulationasdescribed
intheXXIstReport.Inparticulartheassessmentof
dominantpositions,potentialcompetitionandthe
growthofconcentrationmustbebasedon(a)anobjec­
tiveevaluationofthefactsand(b)arealisticforecast
oftheimpactoncompetition .Withregardtothis
control,onnoaccountmusttheCommission lean
towardsdecisionsofadirigistenature. 2.2.1.Therulethatproductsandservicesmustnot
besoldbelowcostpricemustbeafundamentalcriterion
forassessingwhethercompetitionishealthy.
1.3.2.However,theexcessivelyhighthresholdat
whichcontrolistriggered (ECU5000million)con­
tinuestoraisemanydoubts.Thisthresholdcannotbe
justifiedoneithereconomicorcompetitiongrounds.
AtalleventstheCommitteecallsontheCommission
totakestockofthismatterinitsXXIIndReportas
regardsboththethresholdanditsreductionandcertain
structuralcontrols.2.3.Whereamonopolyintheuseofnetworksis
unavoidable (railtransport,electricityandgasdistri­
bution,drinkingwater,sanitation,householdwaste),
theyareoperatedbypubliccompanies,privatecom­
panies,orcompaniesboundbylimitedtermcon­
cessions.
1.3.3.TheCommitteenotesthelegalmeansplaced
atthedisposalofthirdparties,employeesinparticular,
undertheprovisionsofArticle18(4)ofRegulation
(EEC)No4064/89onmergercontrol.Itwould,how­
ever,pointoutthatsuchmeanscanonlybeusedif
theemployees'representatives areprovidedwiththe
relevantinformationingoodtimebytheemployers.2.3.1.Inthesecasesthepricespaidbytheconsumer
areapprovedbythegrantoroftheconcessionand
sometimesvaryaccordingtousercategory(largeor
smallconsumers,agebrackets,socialcases,regularuse
ofservice,etc.).
1.4.Theeliminationofdistortionsofcompetition
betweentheMemberStatesisallthemorecrucial
becausethemeasurescontainedintheInternalMarket
WhitePaperhavenowbeenincorporated inCom­
munitylegislationandhavestartedtobetransposed
intonationallaws.Thebehaviournotonlyofeconomic
operatorsbutaboveallofthepublicandpolitical
authoritieswillhavetobewatchedmorecloselysoas
topreventnational,regionalandlocalaidschemes
detrimentaltotheoperationoftheInternalMarket.In
thisrespecttheCommitteewouldliketoseeCom­
munitylegislationandnationallawsalignedmorerap­
idly.2.3.2.Itwouldappeardifficulttoapplythecompe­
titionrulesinthesesectors;consequentlycertainprin­
ciplesshouldberespectediftheabuseofadominant
positionistobeavoided,viz:
a)totaltransparency inpricingbasedonfinancial
statementsandapplicationofauniformsystemof
costaccounting ;
b)anypricereductionsgrantedaspartofasocial
policytobepaidforbytheconcessiongrantor
ratherthantheconcessionaire ;
c)adherencetothetimelimitationsofconcessionsand
obligationtocallfortenderswhentheycomeup
forrenewal;
d)concessionaires toadherescrupulouslytoCom­
munityDirectivesonpubliccontracts.2.Theapplicationofcompetitionpolicyintheregu­
latedsectors
2.3.3.TheCommitteemustdirectitssuggestionsto
thosecasesinapplicationofTreatyArticle90(2)and
thecase-lawderivedtherefrom.TheXXIstReportis
explicitinthisrespect(Part2,ChapterII,§9and10).2.1.Generally,regulatedindustriesprovideapublic
servicewhichmustalwaysbeaccessibleandavailable
toall'user'citizens.Thesesectorshaveadefacto
monopolyinthattheyhaveexclusiveuseofasupply
ordistributionnetwork.Realcompetition ispossible
onlyifseveralsuppliersofserviceshaveaccesstothese
networks,subjecttocertainconditions .2.4.PublicservicesfrequentlybenefitfromStateaid,
especiallyinthetransportsector.TheCommitteewill
followcloselytheintroductionofthe'publicservice
contracts'on1July1992.Itwouldliketoseefuture
annualreportsgiveanaccountoftheireffects.The
CommitteealsoconsidersthattheconceptofEuropean
networksofCommunityinterestisrelevanttothe2.2.Thisisfeasibleinthecaseofair,sea,roadand
inlandwaterwayroutesandoftelecommunications ,

NoC19/92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 25.1.93
futurebalanceoftheinternalmarket.Everyone,intheir
ownsphere(Community,State,regions),willhaveto
acttogethertoensurethatthespecialorexclusiverights
grantedtocompaniesholdingconcessionsevolvein
accordancewiththeEECandEuropeanUnionTreaties.
2.5.Themisgivingsovercertainmonopolies,e.g.
thosegenerating,transportinganddistributingenergy,
mustbecloselystudiedinaccordancewiththepro­
visionsofTreatyArticle37.TheCommitteeisready
toexaminetheDraftDirectivesdrawnupinapplication
ofthisArticle.areakeycomponentofindustrialpolicy.Insofarasthey
arelinkedtospecialization/distributionagreements,a
changeinthecurrentrulesmightgiveaboosttoindus­
trialrecoveryandCommunitycompetitiveness atworld
level.InthisrespecttheCommitteesharestheCom­
mission's'desiretoensureconvergencebetweenspecific
interestsandtheCommunity'sgeneralinterestisat
theheartofallcompetitionpolicy',andapprovesthe
Commission'sDraftRegulations (2).Asregardsthe
blockexemptionRegulationforagreementsinthe
insurancesector,theCommitteecallsforatightpolicy
prohibitingagreementsonpremiumrateswhichare
particularlysensitivefromthepointofviewofcompe­
titionandwouldrefertoitsAdditionalOpinionof
25November1992.(3)
3.2.3.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatanychangesin
theRegulationsonpatentlicensingandknow-how
licensingagreementsmustbeconsistentwitheachother
andcarriedoutinparallel.3.Industrialpolicy—aidandcompetitionpolicy
3.1.Linksbetweenindustrialpolicyandcompetition
policy
3.3.Stateaid3.1.1.TheoutlinesofaCommunityindustrialpolicy
weredefinedin1990.Competitionpolicyisakeypart
ofitatbothinternalandexternallevel.Theprimary
legalinstrumentswhichwillgovernanymeasures
remainTreatyArticles85(3)and90to94andthe
mergercontrolRegulation.
3.1.2.InthisrespecttheCommitteewouldreferto
itsOpinionof27November1991ontheCommission's
Communication entitled'Industrialpolicyinanopen
andcompetitiveenvironment',morespecificallytoits
commentthat'Havingthresholdsinaninitialphase
whicharetoohighwillmakeitmoredifficult,ifnot
impossible,toformulateauniformcompetitionpolicy
forallMemberStates—atanyrateinthekeyareas'(*).
3.2.Blockexemptions3.3.1.TheCommitteestronglyurgestheCom­
missiontocontinueinsistingthatStateaidsbetrans­
parent,temporaryandonadiminishingscale,inline
withtherequirementsofcompetitionpolicy.Theymust
alsobecompatiblewiththeobjectiveofeconomicand
socialcohesion.InthisconnectiontheCommitteewel­
comeswithinterestthethirdreportonStateaidpubli­
shedbytheCommission .
3.3.2.TheCommissionhasatitsdisposalstructural
funds,theEuropeanRegionalDevelopment Fund
(ERDF)inparticular,whichmustbetheprimarycata­
lystforStateaidforthedevelopmentoftheleast
privilegedregions,inlinewiththepriorityobjective
ofeconomicandsocialcohesion.Inthisrespectthe
CommitteesharestheCommission'sconcerntocurb
thegrantingofsignificantaidtonon-eligibleregions.
TheproposedCommunityframeworkbasedoninvest­
mentpercentagesandceilingswouldseemsuitable.
3.3.3.TheCommitteewouldpointoutthattherules
forEconomicandMonetaryUnionlaiddownbythe
MaastrichtTreatywillhavetheeffectofreducing
nationaldebtanddeficitmargins.HenceforthState
expendituremayonlyjustexceedcurrentreceipts,a
classicmethodofbudgetmanagement ,whichshould
meanasignificantreductionindistortionsofcompe­
titionintheCommunity .
3.3.4.Asregardstheconditionsforgrantingaidto
smallandmedium-sizedenterprises (SMEs),including3.2.1.Specialization andfranchiseagreements
deservesustainedattentioninviewoftheimminence
oftheinternalmarket.Aninquiryintothedistribution
andsaleofcars,tobesupplemented byanotherinto
thedistributionandsaleofspareparts,hasrevealed
pricedistortionsbetweenMemberStates.Theperiod
beforetheCommissiondecidesontherenewalofRegu­
lation(EEC)No123/85after30June1995shouldbe
usedforacomprehensive analysisofthetermsofthis
renewalinthelightof(a)newknowledgegainedfrom
theintroductionofthesinglemarketand(b)indispens­
ableconsultations betweentheCommission andthe
relevanttradeorganizationsandconsumers.
3.2.2.Researchanddevelopmentagreementsand
jointventureagreementsforthemarketingofproducts
(')Opiniononindustrialpolicy,OJNoC40,17.2.1992.(2)OJNoC207,14.8.1992.
(3)Seefollowingopinion.

25.1.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC19/93
craftbusinesses,theCommitteeapprovestheproposal
forpositiveactiontostimulateSMEdevelopmentand
theintroduction ofademinimisrule(ECU
50000—threeyears—cf.3.IA,§1,8)(!).competitionistobecomethenormthroughoutthe
world.Foritspart,theCommitteeurgestheUruguay
Roundnegotiatorstocontinuetheireffortsandwon­
derswhetheraprecise,up-to-datedefinitionofinter­
nationalcompetitionpolicymightre-establishgeneral
agreement.ThesecondpartofthisOpinionproposes
aspecificmeasureinthisrespect(cf.below:B,9.1to
9.3). 4.Theinternationaldimensionofcompetition
4.1.Thewelcomeintegrationoftheworld'seconom­
ies,largelyconsequentupontheinternationalgrowth
offreetrade,createsconditionswhichfavourconcen­
trationsoftransnationalandtranscontinental compani­
es;suchcompaniesmayinvolveariskofanti-competi­
tivebehaviour .4.3.5.Finally,thecollapseoftheEuropeancommand
economiesandtheendofthedivisionofthecontinent
betweenliberalandplannedeconomiesundoubtedly
callsfortransitionalmeasures (cf.below:B,10.1to
10.5),sinceunderpresentcircumstances unbridledfree
competitionwouldresultinconsiderablesocialimbal­
ance.
4.3.6.Inthelightofthesereflections,theCommittee
wouldurgetheGATTnegotiators,ontheCom­
mission'sinitiative,toworkfromtheprincipleofa
coordinatedpolicyofeconomicandsocialcohesion
betweentheEuropeanCommunityandtheotherparties
toGATT.4.2.Themeasures,negotiationsandagreements
undertakenbytheECtocountersuchrisksareendorsed
bytheCommittee .Specialmentionshouldbemadeof
theEuropeanEconomicArea,theassociationagree­
mentswiththecountriesofCentralandEasternEurope,
andcontactswiththerelevantJapaneseauthorities.It
goeswithoutsayingthatthesenegotiationsmustbe
undertakenincompliancewiththelegalruleslaiddown
intheTreaty.Thesameappliestotheagreements
alreadyconcluded (cf.theoppositionofsomeMember
StatestotheagreementbetweentheCommissionand
theUSanti-trustauthorities).4.4.Anti-dumping measures
4.3.GATT 4.4.1.Undernocircumstances shouldthesemeasures
leadtheCommunitytoabandonthemeansatitsdis­
posalforcombattingblatantdumping.Forthisreason
acomparativestudyofthemarketvalueandprice
ofproductswouldgreatlyfacilitatethedetectionof
dumping.AnanalysisoftheCommunity'sandMember
States'externaltradestatisticscouldbeitsworking
tool.
4.4.2.Itwouldalsobedesirabletodetectthelinks
between,forinstance,athirdcountryenterpriseand
itssubsidiaries inaMemberState.Suchlinksnot
uncommonlymakeitpossibletochargehigherorlower
pricesdependingonthestrategyofthegroup,whose
privateinterestcouldgolargelyagainstthegeneral
interest.4.3.1.TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade
(GATT),concludedafterthelastworldwarwiththe
purposeofrebuildinganailinginternationaltradesys­
tem,facilitatedandacceleratedthedismantlement of
traditionalcustomsbarriers.NumerousStateswith
convalescentorshakyeconomieshavereplacedthese
nowmarginalcustomsbarrierswithothereffective
measures,suchasexchangecontrolsandquotas.
4.3.2.Theserear-guardactionshad,andstillhave,
theeffectofrevivingbilateralormultilateraltrade
agreements,theproliferationofwhichiscompletely
contrarytothespiritinwhichtheoriginalGATTwas
negotiated .
4.3.3.Furthermore ,intheabsenceofabalance
betweenleviesandrefunds,thepresentnegotiationsare
stalledonfarmsubsidiesandthedifficultyofsquaring
productioncostswithabnormallylowworldprices.
4.3.4.ThesecommentsaproposofGATTarea
measureofthedifficultiestobeovercomeifhealthy4.4.3.Atalleventsifitisassumedthatanti-dumping
measuresarelinkedtotheobjectivesofcompetition
policy,thereisaneedtomakethemmoreconsistent.
Theapplicationofsimultaneous measuresagainst
unfaircompetitionmustbepublishedbytheCom­
missionsoastoensuretotaltransparency .
4.4.4.Inthiscontextitmustbeensuredthattherules
adoptedfortheimplementation oftheanti-dumping
measures—andinparticularthoseconcerningcompari­
sonsbetweenthepriceofgoodswhenplacedonthe
Communitymarketandtheirnormalcostprice—are
applied. (i)OJNoC213,19.8.1992.

NoC19/94 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 25.1.93
5.Specificcomments 5.4.2.Itshouldbenotedthattheruraldevelopment
programmeandaidforenvironmental/landscapepro­
tectionmeasuresbringanewfactorintoplayalongside
theCAP.Thisspecificpolicyislikelytobolsterthe
currentprocessofreform.TheCommitteewouldlike
toseethesenewmeasuresmonitoredbytheannual
reportsoncompetitionpolicy.5.1.TheCommitteeapprovesthestresswhichthe
Commissionplacesonthegeneralineffectiveness of
interventionist sectoralpolicies.Thequestionarises,
however,ofwhetherthefragmentation ofthisaidand
themultiplicityofformswhichitcantakearenotsuch
astolimittheproceduresprovidedforinArticle93(2)
(cf.XXIstReport,3.IA,§5).6.Powersofnationalcourtswithrespecttocompe­
titionlaw
5.2.Thestatedobjectiveofphasingoutaidtoship­
buildingthroughtheconclusionofbilateralagreements
withthevariousshipbuildingnationswouldonthe
faceofitseemdifficulttoachieve.Thedifficultiesare
compoundedbytheneedtoapplyevermorecostly
technicalnavigationandsafetystandards.6.1.ItistruethatArticle85(1)and(2),Article86and
secondarylegislationhavedirecteffect.Consequently
nationalcourtsarecompetenttoapplytheseprovisions.
Incaseofdoubt,moreover,itisalwayspossiblefor
themtoapplyforapreliminaryrulingtotheCom­
munitycourtoffirstinstancesoastoavoidconflicting
interpretations .
6.2.OnlytheCommissioniscompetenttoapply,if
necessary,Article85(3).Thecoursesofactionwhich,
accordingtotheCommission'sreports,areopenifthe
disputedagreementcouldqualifyforexemption,are
debatableinsofarasthenationalcourtwouldhave
toassesstheprobabilityoftheCommissiongivinga
favourabledecisionandgrantinganexemption.
6.3.Furthermore ,itisdifficulttoimaginethata
nationalcourtwouldquestionthenationaloreven
Communityauthorities .Underthesecircumstances
thereissomeriskofinconsistencybetweennational
courts.Thesameapplieswithrespecttodistortionsin
thecostoftheproceedingsinstituted.Thisisyetone
moredrawbackresultingfromthelackofcommon
provisionsondisputesintheECTreaty.TheCom­
mitteeawaitswithinterestthedocumentonthissubject
announcedbytheCommission .5.3.Publishing
5.3.1.Thequestionarisesofwhetherpricecompe­
titionshouldbecurbedinthepublishingsector.
5.3.2.Suchacurbonthecompetitionrules,entailing
pricecontrol,couldonlybejustifiediftherewere
seriousgroundsforsuchactioninthesectorconcerned.
Bookshaveaculturalaswellasacommercialvalue.
5.3.3.Anyapproachtothisproblemwouldhaveto
beexaminedcarefullyanddiscussedbeforehandwith
notonlypublishersanddistributors,butalsocon­
sumers.
5.3.4.Upuntilnowthelatterhavehesitated,insofar
astheFrenchexperiencedoesnotseemtohavehad
anyeffectoneitherthepublishingorthedistribution
ofbooks,itsonlyconsequencebeinganincreaseinthe
pricespaidbyreaders.Underthesecircumstancesthe
Commissionshouldkeepaneyeonhowthisparticular
situationevolves.
5.4.Agriculture7.TheCommission'spowerofassessment
7.1.ThesameappliestotheCommission'sassess­
mentoftheimpactofpublicfinancingonintra-Com­
munitycompetitionwhereaidisgrantedtoenterprises
inasectorwithexcessproductioncapacity(XXIst
Report,Part3,II,§4).
7.2.Ontheotherhand,subsidiarityshouldapplyto
nationalcompetitionlawsconsistentwiththeTreaty,
theinterventionthresholdsformergercontrolandthe
deminimisrulesforSMEaid,thoughitshouldbe
remarkedthatitisuptocitizens,consumers,andtheir
organizationstochallengeanyprovisionswhichmay
goagainstfreecompetition(*).5.4.1.Asfarasagricultureisconcerned,competition
betweenproducersleadstomajordifficultiesboth
withinandbetweenMemberStates[CommonAgricul­
turalPolicy(CAP)]andatworldlevel(cf.above,
GATT,point4.3.3).Underpresentcircumstances a
distinctionmustthereforebemadebetweenagricultural
production,whichiseligibleforCAPsupport,and
othersectors,includingthefoodindustry,whichmust
respectthefreeplayofcompetition .Itisnotimpossible
thatinsomecasesproducers'groupsandconcen­
trationsindistributionmanagetocreateadefacto
situationanalogoustothatofsomeindustrialconcen­
trations.TheCommitteecallsontheCommission to
lookintothesegroupsandtocommentonitsfindings
infutureReports. (!)OJNoC213,19.8.1992.

25.1.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC19/95
B.REFLECTIONS ONTHENEWCONDITIONS
OFCOMPETITIONiesafloat,promotingsocialprogressanddammingthe
flowofemigrantstowealthiercountries.
8.Generalconsiderations 9.2.Suchapolicyofincomestabilizationmustnot,
however,havetheeffectofencouragingtheproduction
ofgoodsinquantitiesoverandabovetherequirements
oftheworldmarket;itmustbebackedbyincentives
todiversityproductionaspartofregionalcooperation
policiesfortheeconomicdevelopmentoftheLDCs.8.1.Thepoliticalandeconomicupheavalstaking
placethroughouttheworldandmorespecificallyon
thecontinentofEuropemeanthatitislikelythatStates
orgroupsofStateswillbeinducedtoconcludeallkinds
ofcooperationagreements .Theseagreementswillvery
probablyhaveaneffectontheconditionsunderwhich
theCommunity'scompetitionpolicyisapplied.Aware
ofjusthowmuchisatstake,theCommitteethinksthat
certainpossiblecoursesofactionshouldbeaired.9.3.Inadditiontotheadvantagesofaregularpay­
mentfortheirlabours,theLDCswillbeabletouse
therevenuetofinancethepurchaseoftheimportsthey
mostrequire.
8.2.TheCommitteenotesfirstofallthatthebuyer/
consumerusuallychoosestheproductwhichheorshe
considersthebestintermsofqualityandprice.Such
soundbehaviourwillautomatically entailrisksunder
certainconditionsofeconomicimbalance,especiallyat
globallevel.Itmaythereforebearguedthatcertain
limitsshouldbeplacedontotallyunrestrainedcompe­
tition.10.ImportsfromtheformerComeconcountries
10.1.Thecombinedimpactoftheeffortsofthe
EasternEuropeancountriestoswitchtoamarketecon­
omyandtheirsubstantialcurrencydevaluationsislead­
ingtodistortionsinproductioncostsbetweentheEuro­
peanEconomicArea(EEA)andtheformerComecon
countries,wheretheintroductionofacompetitionpol­
icyhasbarelygotofftheground.8.3.Thepoliticaldecisionstobemadewillweigh
heavily,involving'strategic'balanceandinternational
solidarity.Inlargemeasurethesefutureguidelineswill
belinkedtotheratificationandimplementation ofthe
MaastrichtTreaty.Theywillmeantheintroductionof
competitionpolicy,includingitsexemptions,withina
carefullythought-outframeworkaimedatcompeti­
tivenessandcooperation ,bothinresearchanddevelop­
ment(R&D)aswellasproductquality,environmental
protectionandsocialguaranteesofadecentincome;in
shorttheiraimwillbeanorderlydevelopmentwithin
theframeworkofanewinternational redistribution of
labour.10.2.Theseexportsatpricessubstantiallybelow
worldlevelsbenefitfromabnormallylowwagecosts,
Stateaidandreducedenergycosts.Besidesaddingto
theexcessivehardshipsofthepeopleoftheformer
Comeconcountries,theyadverselyaffecttheeconomic
equilibriumoftheECandcountriesoftheEuropean
FreeTradeAssociation (EFTA)inthattheytendto
exacerbateunemployment bydistortingcompetition ;
thishasthesameeffectasunfaircompetition .
8.4.Themainfactorsofchangecanbedividedinto
twocategoriesinvolving :
—firstly,thedevelopingcountriesandtheuseoftheir
resources ;
—secondly,traderelationswiththeformerComecon
countries .10.3.Nevertheless ,itisessentialthattheeconomies
ofthesecountriesaresupported;theEuropeanUnion
hasthedutytomakeasubstantialcontributiontothis
andthusenablethemtoinstallademocraticsystemof
governmentandamarketeconomy,includingaconcern
forsocialquestions(cf.ESCOpinionof23September
1992—CES1039/92onenlargement).
9.Theresourcesofthedevelopingcountries10.4.Underthesecircumstances theCommitteefeels
itmustrecommendtheintroductionforalong-term
transitionalperiodofeconomicmeasuresaimedboth
atprotectingitsowneconomicareaandsocialcohesion
andatpromotingrecoveryintheformerComecon
countries.Theassociationagreementswiththe
countriesofCentralandEasternEurope,whichinclude
theintroductionofcompetitiononthebasisofCom­
munityprinciples,pointthewaytohowthiscouldbe
achievedonamoregeneralscale.9.1.Stabilizationoffarmincomesandregulationof
themarketinrawmaterialswhosesaleconstitutesthe
primaryincomeofless-developed countries(LDCs)are
probablythebestwayofkeepingtheirinternaleconom­

NoC19/96 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 25.1.93
10.5.Itiscrucialthattheseconcerns—asregards
bothcompliancewiththeprovisionsandtheconditions
underwhichtheyaredrawnup—betakenintoaccount
whentheassociationagreementsarenegotiated .
C.GENERALCONCLUSIONS—regulatedsectors(points2.3.1to2.3.3)
—specialandexclusiverights(points2.1to2.4)
—blockexemptions,oneofthelinchpinsofindustrial
policy(points3.2.1to3.2.3)
—eligibilityforaid(points3.3.2and3.3.3)
—agriculturalproducts(points4.3.3and5.4.1)
—theGATTnegotiations (point4.3.4)
—theeconomicgrowthofthedevelopingcountries
(points9.1to9.3)
—relationswiththeformerComeconcountries
(points10.1to10.5).
Thislisthighlightsthedifficultieswhichhavestillto
beovercomeifwearetoachievehealthyandeffective
competitioninboththeEuropeanCommunityandthe
world.ThisOpinionontheXXIstReportclearlydemonstrates
thatverycarefulattentionhastopaidtothedevelop­
mentofcompetitionpolicyanditspracticalapplication .
ThisOpinionwasdrawnupagainstabackgroundof
specificpolitical,economicandsocialdevelopments in
theworld.TheCommitteewouldstressthosefactors
whichdefinethelimitsofcompetition ,principally :
DoneatBrussels,25November1992.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN