EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 14.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1575 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Regulation  of the European parliament and of the Council  
on certain measures directed to non-collaborating countries for the purpose of the 
conservation of fish stocks. 
{COM(2011) 888 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1576 final}  
 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro pean parliament and of the Council  
on certain measures directed to non-collabo rating countries for the purpose of the 
conservation of fish stocks. 
1. PROBLEM DEFINITION : WHAT IS PRECISELY THE PROBLEM , WHO IS MOST AFFECTED 
AND WHY IS PUBLIC INTERVENTION NECESSARY ? 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea1 as well as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement2 
require coastal states and states fishing for such stocks on adjacent high seas to cooperate 
in managing responsibly stradd ling and highly migratory fish stocks in order to ensure 
their long-term sustainabilit y, either by direct consultation amongst each other or via the 
appropriate Regional Fisheries Mana gement Organizations (RFMOs). 
It may happen that a third country fails to cooperate on the management of a straddling 
and highly migratory fish stock in which the EU  shares an interest and, more importantly, 
that the attitude of such country, by action or  by omission, poses a risk of overfishing. It 
becomes then imperative to use all possible m eans to convince the c ountry in question to 
abandon that risky attitude. If  the customary consultations and technical exchanges do 
not succeed, a clear option woul d be to implement trade-related restri ctions, but the EU 
does not have a fast mechanism allowing their adoption in useful timeframes. 
At present the EU faces the immediate threat of overexploitation of the stock of mackerel 
due to management measures adopted byIcela nd and Faroe Islands w ithout due regard to 
the rights of other coas tal States and tose of  the EU. The sooner th e EU is enabled to 
react appropriately, the more efficiently these problems and other potential ones would 
be dealt with. 
The problem of overfishing due to non-coopera tion by third countries affects nearly all 
actors within the fisheries domain: 
The fishing industry,  both in the short and long term: competition for the limited market 
and the decrease of yields due to resource de pletion may lead to important economic and 
job loses. 
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  of 10 December 1982. 
2 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 D ecember 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks  (in force as from 11 
December 2001) 
 
EN 3   EN The processing industry  might have an increased availabil ity of supply of raw material at 
low prices in the short term, but would suffer in the medium to long term the 
consequences of the depletion of the stock. 
The consumers  will not likely benefit from the in creased supply in the short term; the 
effects in prices will probably be neutraliz ed by increased earnings  and jobs in the 
processing and distribution industr ies. They will, in turn, f eel the effects of decreased 
supply in the long term by paying higher prices. 
The EU and national administrations  would be seen, both in th e short and long terms, as 
incapable of dealing with the problem. Lack of confidence in public institutions will be 
reflected in opinion polls and this may have important re percussions in other policy 
fields. 
In defence of the long-term interests of th ese actors, public authorities have a primary 
responsibility to act. 
2. Analysis of subsidiarity: Is EU action justified on grounds of subsidiarity 
(Necessity and EU value added)? 
The ultimate purpose of the intended instrume nt is to avoid overe xploitation of certain 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the context of the EU common fisheries 
policy, but the intended instru ment (restriction or prohibiti on of imports) falls under the 
competence of the common commercial policy. Both policies fall under the exclusive 
competence of the EU, and therefore the princi ple of subsidiarity does not apply in this 
case.  
3. Objectives of EU initiative: What are the main policy objectives? 
The underlying general policy ob jective of this in itiative is to c ontribute to the 
conservation of fish resources, which is the main objective of the common fisheries 
policy. The operational objective is to provide the EU with a trade-based instrument to 
contribute to that general objective. 
4. Policy options: Which options have been considered and which have been 
assessed 
The following five options were analysed:  
(1) To take no action; 
(2) to take measures in the form of non-leg islative instruments, such as mechanisms 
of the type "blame and shame", sustainabi lity labels or diplomatic démarches in 
different forms; 
(3) to provide the common fisheries policy wi th a regulatory instrument allowing a 
quick response to the problem by im posing a ban on trade on fish products 
derived from the relevant fish stock a nd that have an orig in in the country 
concerned; 
 
EN 4   EN (4) to impose limited trade restrictions including only easily identifiable fish 
products; 
(5) to issue a regulatory instrument providi ng for "counter-measures" in response to 
an "internationally wrongful act" committed by another State. 
5. Assessment of impacts: What are the main economic, environmental and social 
impacts of each option particularly in terms of (quantified/monetised) benefits and 
costs (including estimates on administrative burden), other compliance costs and 
implementation cost for public administrations? 
In order to better address the environmen tal, economic and social impacts of these 
options, the analysis of these options was done for the mackerel  situation as a case study. 
This case corresponds to the current dispute on the management of  the stock of North-
east Atlantic mackerel, where Iceland and the Faroe Islands have adopted measures 
without due regard to the rights of other coastal States and that  put in jeopardy the 
sustainability of the fishery. The data and information available on this stock allow 
conducting a comparative analysis of the options above mentioned. 
To the extent possible, the analysis included a simulation of the evolution of the fishery 
in the next twelve years, based on the results of the most recent scientific assessment of 
the stock. It also included ad-hoc estima tions of administrative burden and other 
considerations about possible advantages and drawbacks. 
The results of the analysis show that  
– Option 1 (the no-action option) is not acceptable. The EU should act. 
– While non-legislative action (Option 2) may potentially help in some cases, the option 
to take decisive legal action is highly pref erable in most cases. Even if it were 
preferable in few cases, this would jus tify the adoption of the necessary legal 
mechanism so the action could really be implemented in such few cases. 
– A brief summary of the impacts of Options 3, 4 and 5 is given in the table below: 
 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
• Very rapid recovery 
to desired levels 
• No risks of 
depletion(*) 
• MSC certification 
maintained 
• Improved confidence 
in managers 
• Improved wages 
after recovery 
• Better prices for 
consumers 
•  • As Option 3, but 
effect perhaps 
delayed • As Option 3, perhaps 
in a more effective 
manner Environmental, 
economic and social 
effects 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  1 2 1 
 
EN 5   EN  
 
RANK: 
Heavy: very detailed 
legislation (traceability), 
monitoring of many 
products Light: simpler 
legislation, less products 
to monitor Heavier than for Option 
1: more detailed range 
of measures; 
controversial legislation, complex monitoring Administrative burden 
 
 
  
RANK 2 1 3 
• Difficulties related 
to determination of products containing 
the species 
• Prove of respect of 
proportionality and 
equity of measures • No major 
difficulties. Easier to prove respect of 
proportionality and 
equity • As for Option 3, but 
more complex set of measures faces more 
complex difficulties 
of compatibility with law.  Main drawbacks 
  
 
  
 
RANK 2 1 3 
(*) In the case study of mackerel, of SSB falling below the limit value of 1.7miot 
6. Comparison of options: What is the preferred option on the basis of which 
criteria/justification? 
The environmental, economic and social eff ects are very closely interlinked and very 
similar to the three options; the only differe nce is that it is expected Option 4 may 
produce effects a given time later, since the m easures adopted are not as stringent as in 
options 3 and 5. The lesser effectiveness of  Option 4 is however compensated by a much 
easier application both in term s of drafting of legi slation and of actual enforcement. The 
cumulated rankings (5, 4, 7) does not give dramatic results allowing either to select or 
deselect one or another option. 
It is moreover difficult to generalize the analys is made above for mack erel to other future 
cases. There could be situations where Opti on 3 is not applicable in cases where the 
imported goods made from the species in ques tion have undergone substantial processing 
or transformation. In other cases, trade measures  would be inapplicable (for example, if 
the species in question is not subject to tr ade) but there is scope to adopt counter-
measures for which an effective EU legal mechanism is lacking. 
With this in mind, it has been concluded th at the best option would perhaps be one 
sufficiently flexible to absorb the main adva ntages of the 3 options  above and capable to 
minimize their drawbacks and administrative co sts. A possible description of that option 
would be an EU legal instrument with the following characteristics: 
(a) Primarily based on Article 207 TFEU; ot her basis are also conceivable if 
measures envisaged are not trade-related 
 
EN 6   EN (b) Describing its field of application as for this exercise: situations of lack of 
cooperation in fisheries management and adopting measures that go far against 
common international sharing practi ce and threaten sustainability. 
(c) Establishing a list of possible measures to apply, from trade restrictions to 
counter-measures of diverse nature. 
(d) Setting out the main principles and cr iteria upon which these measures should 
apply: effectiveness, proportionality, equity, compatibility with law, etc; 
(e) Giving the Commission implem enting powers to apply the appropriate measures 
to the appropriate solution, in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria; 
(f) Setting out the specific mechanisms for c ontrol by Member States in accordance 
with the new Comitology Regulation;  
(g) Establishing clear rules for the automa tic or very rapid suspension of the 
measures when the non-cooperating Stat e has adopted appropriate corrective 
measures; 
(h) The Commission would also be authoris ed to create, where necessary, new 
monitoring mechanisms whenever the ex isting ones would be insufficient. 
The field of application shoul d clearly exclude the cases co vered by the IUU legislation 
and by other instruments. The list of measures should be su fficiently wide ranging so it 
would not exclude newly conceived effectiv e and uncontroversial measures whenever 
these arise. The principles and criteria under d)  should instead be very  strict so that the 
margin of manoeuvre for the Comm ission is clearly established. 
7. Monitoring and evaluation: What are the arrangements to establish the actual 
costs and benefits and the achievement of the desired effects  
The objective of the whole exercise (see section 3) is to contribute to the conservation of 
fish resources and to bring them to levels  that can produce maxi mum sustainable yield. 
The indicators commonly used to monitor th e status of fish res ources are the spawning 
stock biomass (SSB), i.e., the amount of fi sh that is ready to spawn at the time of 
spawning and the fishing mortality (F), which indicate the rate at which fish is removed 
from the stock by the fishing activity. Other indicators exist that complement these and 
that illustrate the extent to which fishing activ ities do not just have an effect on the stocks 
targeted, but also on other fi sh or marine organisms that are incidentally captured or 
damaged. 
At present there is a highly sophisticated system designe d to guarantee a timely and 
scientifically-based monitoring. The system in cludes the collection of data on the fishing 
activity, sampling and collecti on of biological data, scien tific surveys at sea using 
research vessels and a framework for the intern ational collaboration of  fisheries scientists 
allowing to collate and exch ange data and information, c onducted fish stock assessments 
and provide scientific advice for fisheries management. In the case of the North-east 
Atlantic, most of these activities are coor dinated by the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Similar bodies exist for other fishing areas of EU fishing 
interest. 
 
EN 7   EN The current framework for the collecti on of data for scientific analysis3 and the mandate 
of the Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries also provide a routine basis for 
the production of economic data  useful to monitor the pe rformance of the intended 
measure by indicators such as economic yi elds, turnover of EU  fleets and their 
dependence from one or another fish stock. Follow-up of imports is also routine work. 
There is no reason therefore, for the time bei ng, to create new systems or reinforce any of 
the existing systems to monitor the state of fish resources. 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008  of 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a 
Community framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy