EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 24.2.2021 SWD(2021) 25 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT



IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT

Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Forging a climate-resilient Europe - The new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change {COM(2021) 82 final} - {SEC(2021) 89 final} - {SWD(2021) 26 final}



Table of Contents Table of Contents Index of Tables and Boxes Index of Figures Abbreviations 1.INTRODUCTION European Union political and legal context International political and legal context Impacts of COVID-19 on EU adaptation policies: resilient recovery 2.PROBLEM DEFINITION Problems for the new EU Adaptation Strategy and their evolution What are the problem drivers? 3.WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? Legal basis Subsidiarity: Necessity and Added Value of EU action 4.OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? General objective Specific objectives 5.WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?

What is the baseline against which the options are assessed? Option 1: Deepening of existing actions of the 2013 Strategy Option 2: Deepening of existing actions and addition of novel actions to Strategy Options discarded at an early stage 6.WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? Summary of impacts Economic impacts Social impacts Environmental impacts Cross-cutting impacts 7.HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence Added Value Proportionality 8.PREFERRED OPTION 9.HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? Annex 1: Procedural information Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

Organisation and timing Consultation of the RSB Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation – consultation synopsis Annex 3: Who is affected and how? Annex 4: Analytical methods Economic modelling GINFORS-E: Short model description Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis Detailed modelling results References Annex 5: Impact screening Annex 6: Non-exhaustive list of measures to be developed under the new EU Adaptation Strategy Annex 7: Mini–Assessments ACTION 1: Closing further gaps in adaptation-relevant knowledge, through systematic data collection and sharing, and working with key public and private partners. ACTION 2: Further developing Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation information in Europe. ACTION 3: Strengthening the evaluation, monitoring, reporting and implementation of adaptation strategies at national and subnational levels, including in cities, cross-border, and in the Outermost Regions. (including through the Climate Law via Climate-ADAPT). ACTION 4: Prioritising nature-based adaptation, including coastal protection and green and blue infrastructure. ACTION 5: Stepping-up efforts to build resilience in cities and empower local action. ACTION 6: Further mainstreaming and integrating adaptation in EU legislation and instruments ACTION 7: Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and beyond.

ACTION 8: Narrowing the Climate Protection Gap—Micro-economic policy ACTION 9: Supporting partner countries in their efforts on climate change, disaster preparedness, and comprehensive risk management approaches ACTION 10: Scaling up international adaptation finance and disaster risk financing, including by unlocking innovative finance and mobilising the private sector. ACTION 11: Strengthening EU engagement globally and learning from adaptation frontrunners. ACTION 12: Adaptation Solutions / Horizon Europe Mission on adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation Action 13: Closing the Climate Protection Gap - Macroeconomic aspects of adaptation to climate change. ACTION 14: Ensuring the availability of fresh water. Annex 8: Legal basis for EU action in climate change adaptation Annex 9: Climate change and its impacts Annex 10: Glossary



1.INTRODUCTION Global warming is happening and is already affecting Europeans – its impacts are here and now and they are a daily confirmation of the case for urgent action that science has provided for some time. Temperatures continue to break records and climate-related extreme events are more frequent and more intense. Europeans continue to call for stronger climate action even in the current health and economic crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. This means higher ambition on both mitigation and on adaptation to climate change. The impacts on people, planet and prosperity are already pervasive but unevenly distributed across the globe. In 2018, most of the natural hazards affecting nearly 62 million people globally were associated with extreme weather and climate events. Out of 17.2 million new displacements associated with disasters in 2018, 16.1 million were weather related . Between 2000 and 2016, the number of people exposed to heatwaves globally increased by around 125 million . Climate-related disasters doubled compared to the previous 20 years. At the global level, least developed countries and small island states are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have the lowest adaptive capacity, while at the same time contributing the least to greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change also impacts disproportionately the most vulnerable parts of our society, thus exacerbating inequalities further. The changing climate has reduced oxygen levels in the ocean by ~1-2 % since the middle of the last century , while increasing ocean temperatures have resulted in habitat shifts for species and coral bleaching (causing worldwide reef degradation). Moreover, even stopping all greenhouse gas emissions would not stop the climate impacts that are already occurring, and which, due to the concentration of these gases in the atmosphere, are likely to continue for decades. Temporary decreases of greenhouse gas emissions, like those caused by the 2008 financial crisis or the current economic disruption from the Covid-19 pandemic, have little effect on the evolution of the planetary climate (and emissions can bounce back quickly). The global temperature averages (already 1.2°C above pre-industrial levels) hide even more extreme regional impacts. An average of 3°C or 4°C global rise in temperature means temperature increases above 5°C or 6°C for some regions (and Europe warms faster than the average). This ranges from unprecedented forest fires and heatwaves above the Arctic Circle to increasingly devastating droughts in Western Europe and the Mediterranean region; and from accelerating coastal erosion on the Atlantic coast to more severe flooding and decimated forests in Central and Eastern Europe. Without drastic emission abatement measures (at a global scale, matching the EU goal on climate neutrality by 2050 and increased ambition by 2030), continued climate change will increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible consequences such as the decline or collapse of natural ecosystems (e.g. Arctic or Alpine ecosystems), the erosion of global food security, or displacement of people. Extreme sea level events and floods will occur more frequently, with severe damages to Europe’s coastal communities. Climate change and its impact is interrelated with other environmental crisis (biodiversity loss, natural resources depletion, pollution); their effects are cumulative – but solutions are also common. European Union political and legal context The 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy was evaluated in November 2018. The Evaluation found that the strategy had delivered on its objectives, with progress recorded against each of its eight individual actions. Nevertheless, several areas of societal vulnerability were identified for improvement, drawing on lessons learnt from implementation, and in the light of international developments since its adoption (such as the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction).

The European Green Deal sets out the Commission’s commitment to tackling climate and environmental-related challenges and introduces the green oath to “do no harm”. It is essential as a roadmap and a growth strategy towards a prosperous, resilient and healthy future, made more necessary in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on our health and economic well-being. Unprecedented near term investments will be needed to overcome the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on jobs, incomes and businesses. The political choices we make today will define the future for the next generations. A new, more ambitious Adaptation Strategy was announced in the European Green Deal Communication, and subsequently as part of the Commission Work Programme 2021. An extensive Blueprint informed the public debate with citizens and stakeholders on the new Strategy. Recent calls to raise the ambition of the EU strategic approach to climate change adaptation build on earlier progress. These take place against a background of increasing public visibility of climate change impacts (both current and projected – see section 2) and other environmental problems that has also led to direct calls for action from citizens and civil society. There has been a corresponding increase in attention from EU Institutions: European Council conclusions repeatedly stress the need for further action on adaptation, the European Parliament Resolution on the new EU Strategy considers it as an opportunity to show the EU global leadership on adaptation. Over the next decade, the implementation of the European Green Deal would further deliver on European climate change adaptation ambitions, with adaptation to address climate change impacts as a key priority, as impacts will continue to create significant stress despite mitigation efforts. The Commission proposal for a European Climate Law Regulation, establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality in the EU and at the heart of the Green Deal, recognises adaptation as a key component of the long-term global response to climate change. It requires Member States and the Union to enhance their adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. It also introduces a requirement for the implementation of national strategies and regular progress assessments as part of the overall EU governance on climate action. The new Strategy will step-up the ongoing drive to mainstream adaptation considerations in EU legislation and instruments, as adaptation affects almost the entire spectrum of EU policy. Climate change adaptation is being mainstreamed in new initiatives under the European Green Deal, including the EU Biodiversity Strategy, the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Renovation Wave, the Forest Strategy the Urban Agenda for the EU and the Habitat III new Urban Agenda,the Sustainable Development 2030 Agenda, and the Zero Pollution ambition. Other channels for mainstreaming of adaptation in EU policy include the implementation of the EU’s Strategic partnership with the EU's outermost regions and cooperation with the European Standardisation Organisations. Most recently, the implementing regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action stipulates the structure, format, submission processes and review of adaptation information reported by Member States. This reporting also supports national energy and climate plans (NECPs), e.g. by protecting the security of the Union's energy supply against climate impacts. The European Commission has been instrumental in taking forward the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) through its Communication setting out initial views on shaping the post-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action. In November 2017, a communication from the Commission highlighted the need for Strengthening EU Disaster Management through “rescEU - Solidarity with Responsibility” and in 2019 the revised Union Civil Protection Mechanism was published. The mechanism promotes more robust and comprehensive EU disaster management through the contribution of all the Union’s policies and instruments to reinforce the capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters, including climate-driven natural disasters. Local engagement was identified as an area for improvement in the evaluation of the 2013 Strategy, which called for more ambition in the adoption, implementation and monitoring of national, regional and local adaptation strategies. As part of the European Green Deal, the Commission [will] launch a European Climate Pact to give actors at all levels a voice and space to design new climate actions, share information, launch grassroots activities, and highlight solutions that others can follow, including on adaptation. At the local level, the Covenant of Mayors is one of the EU’s key initiatives for responding to the climate emergency and for steering local and regional authorities (LRAs) in the transition towards climate neutrality and climate change adaptation. Today bringing together more than 10,400 signatories in Europe, the Covenant, alongside other regional and local institutions and institutions, represents a key complement to the involvement of local and regional authorities in drawing up NECPs. The new Adaptation strategy anticipates the demands created by other initiatives in supplying a larger array of solutions and information on adaptation. The European Green Deal Investment Plan is the investment pillar of the European Green Deal and is intended to mobilise at least EUR 1 trillion of private and public sustainable investments over the upcoming decade, including climate action, and climate resilience will be an important beneficiary of the delivery of this ambition. To further help direct and mobilise sustainable investments, the Commission committed to review Directive 2014/95/EU on Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD). The NFRD requires companies to report on non-financial issues annually, including the environment, social and employee issues and human rights. In particular, the Taxonomy Regulation (2019/2088) requires companies under the scope of the NFRD to disclose certain indicators of the proportion of their activities that are classified as sustainable. Moreover, the Delegated Act on the Sustainable Finance Taxonomy further specifies technical screening criteria for making a significant contribution to adaptation. Together, these developments are expected to encourage reporting firms to invest in sustainable activities, including activities that build climate resilience. Overall, this will also create a wider pool of sustainable investment projects available for adaptation action, as well as increase demand for the adaptation solutions, tools and knowledge to be developed by the Strategy. International political and legal context There is increasing prominence of adaptation needs in the international public agenda. The World Economic Forum listed extreme weather and climate-change policy failures as the gravest threats for several years in a row. Moreover, international actors like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are responding to the growing attention to climate risks and the need for adaptation. In 2010, the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties established the Cancun Adaptation Framework to strengthen adaptation action in developing countries through international cooperation. The Conference also established an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of stronger adaptation action, provide technical support and guidance to countries, strengthen knowledge sharing and promote synergy between stakeholders. These decisions paved the way for the adoption in 2015 of the Paris Agreement, the new global framework for renewed ambition in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and in implementing adaptation measures. Among its milestone objectives, the Paris Agreement enshrines the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change. The Paris Agreement set up a Global Stocktake to review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation, and the Paris Decision provides the Adaptation Committee with a comprehensive mandate to support the work and substantiate the consideration of progress towards the global goal of adaptation. At EU level, the implementing regulation for the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action also asks Member States to share information on the provision of financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries. It thus facilitates the implementation of the Union's commitments under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. The European Union launched the “Global Climate Change Alliance” (GCCA) flagship initiative in 2007. Its second iteration (GCCA+) had amongst its priority areas to support the formulation and implementation of concrete and integrated sector-based climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies in Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries. The new EU Development Cooperation programme for 2021-2027 (under preparation) brings opportunities for enhanced support and partnerships - the new Strategy will help by giving a greater focus to adaptation. The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) lay down the specific objective to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” (Goal 13). Progress towards the SDGs is likely to increase resilience to climate change (e.g. SDGs on hunger, water, health, and ecosystems) or address some of the fundamental causes of climate change (e.g. by SDGs on energy, infrastructure, cities, and consumption and production). Additionally, the Union supports cities to exchange solutions and jointly tackle adaptation challenges, thereby making a direct contribution to the UN-Habitat New Urban Agenda and SDGs. Impacts of COVID-19 on EU adaptation policies: resilient recovery Climate change hazards are compounding the COVID-19 outbreak and its economic effects, e.g. cardiovascular and chronic pulmonary disease — recognized risk factors for severe Covid-19 — are closely linked to climate change, through effects including extreme heat, ground-level ozone, wildfire smoke, and increased pollen counts over longer seasons (i.e. ‘compound risk’). Although the final impacts of COVID-19 cannot yet be determined, there is recognition of a lack of preparation for potentially compounding crises, such as the incidence of extreme wildfires and heatwaves, together with the current health crisis. Examples of the added complexity of such compound problems include the difficulty of respecting social distancing during a crisis like wildfires or flooding, or enforcing confinement policies during heatwaves. The European Union has argued that fighting climate change should be central to Europe’s economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, including in its Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Renovation Wave and other initiatives. Similar calls for adaptation measures and investments to play a key role in the recovery are echoed by the IMF. Similarities exist between the problem drivers of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change adaptation: in both cases, decision-makers and societies are subjected to a ‘normality bias’, which leads people to underestimate the likelihood of a disaster. The onset of the pandemic also led to triggering the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and extending its scope on stockpiling of medical equipment for instance. The inclusion of pandemics as risks that the EU may face emphasises the links with other forms of disasters. While climate change is relatively slow-onset compared to the pandemic’s spread, for both the lag between measures and effects, and the trade-offs between immediate economic costs and long-term health benefits make it difficult for political leaders to take immediate bold action. Lastly, the link between climate change and health impacts in Europe was further reinforced by a recent European Environment Agency (EEA) analysis, e.g. with the latest evidence that climate change, together with air pollution, noise, chemicals, contributes to the burden of cardiovascular disease, while noise, chemicals and climate change all drive neuropsychiatric disorders.





2.PROBLEM DEFINITION This chapter discusses the problem tree that must be addressed by the new Strategy, stemming from the fact that the EU is still underprepared for current and projected climate change impacts. This problem tree builds on the problem analysis of the 2013 Strategy and its Evaluation, extensive foresight into projected climate impacts carried out by the Joint Research Centre (hereafter referred to as PESETA), assessments by the EEA (both at national and local/regional level) and contributions from stakeholders. Figure 1 provides an overview of the problem definition; drivers and problems are described in detail in following sections. Drivers are numbered (D1-D9), as are the Problems (P1-P4) and (in chapter 4) Objectives (O1-O4). These numbers are used later in this report as a guide to the development of policy options. The figure can be read as a flow in columns, whilst noting that the problems and drivers are mutually reinforcing and/or overlapping. Problems for the new EU Adaptation Strategy and their evolution P1: Insufficient knowledge to support decision making There is a lack of relevant indicators and meaningful data for informing, and assessing national and local adaptation action. Data and knowledge gaps cut across all drivers and problems in various ways: from knowledge or data that is not available to knowledge that is not reaching the necessary audiences and decision makers; and from data that is not available at the level, or in a form to be useful to the lack of skills/knowledge to understand the data and make adequate decisions. Data is needed to enable stakeholders to validate their progress in implementing adaptation actions; to enable policy makers to maintain, simplify, and strengthen climate policies, and to enable researchers and innovators to explore novel adaptation solutions. When available, climate data and projections to anticipate impacts are frequently not available at the local level, where many critical decisions need to be taken. Similarly, adaptation solutions are often either not customised for the local specificities or not yet tested on a large enough scale to facilitate replication elsewhere. Integrating climate change adaptation in local governance frameworks has been raised in prior studies as a limiting factor for effective adaptation action. An analysis of 885 European cities sought to investigate the extent to which a mainstreaming approach was used in local climate planning as compared with a dedicated approach, i.e. dedicated stand-alone climate policy documents. The results highlighted the importance of choosing either a "dual-track approach" in which municipalities develop and adopt the dedicated and mainstreaming plan simultaneously, or first focus on a dedicated approach and later mainstream local climate issues. This would encourage effective implementation of tangible climate actions as well as subsequent diffusion of climate issues into other local sector policies. There is a lack of appropriate methodologies and indicators to integrate climate change adaptation with disaster risk reduction strategies. Climate-related disaster loss and risk data are important not only for crafting and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAP) and Strategies (NAS), but also for disaster risk assessment and management, risk monitoring, risk modelling, loss accounting, economic and social policy, accessing the EU Solidarity Fund, local authority planning, and the provision of green investments. Despite the usefulness of these types of data, they are currently not widely available to public authorities, research institutions, and other stakeholders. The available data is often incongruous, inconsistent over time, lacking the granularity and standardisation required to draw comparisons across regions and Member States. The data is also often incomplete: for certain perils there is only information on the number of people affected (insured and uninsured), the economic losses (indirect and direct), and the affected area. Moreover, non-economic losses (e.g. environmental degradation of ecosystems, reduction in biodiversity, destruction of items of cultural significance, emotional and psychological damages) are entirely absent from existing datasets. P2: Weaknesses in implementing, monitoring and reporting of adaptation action There is currently only limited agreement on principles, requirements and guidelines for adaptation. This results in the lack of a common method for systematic monitoring and evaluating the implementation of adaptation policies. For public investment, The Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (to be replaced by the provisions of the Energy Union Governance Regulation from 2021 onwards) requires Member States to report to the Commission on their adaptation activities. The regulation does not prescribe a definition for adaptation activities nor a methodology to track adaptation activities, so it continues to be a challenge to compare progress between Member States or to track horizontal progress on the Strategy’s objectives. For private investment, a problem identified in the Strategy's Evaluation is the tracking of private finance flows for adaptation action in Europe, which would allow for a clear understanding of how investments needs are being met by the private sector. Indicators that are more relevant are needed to accurately monitor private sector commitments to adaptation. In this regard, the EU Taxonomy on Sustainable Finance provides a possible common metric for the EU for the development of associated incentives and verification measures. The lack of effective mechanisms to monitor and report on the implementation of national and local strategies hinders progress. The recent policy developments and increased public awareness highlight the need for a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system to effectively measure progress. New tools that allow assessment not only of preparedness (as in the 2013 Strategy), but also of resilience, and which monitor it over time, would need to be complemented by relevant and comparable indicators among EU countries. The 2018 Evaluation concluded that more should be done in this area, particularly for the transport, construction, and energy sectors. Other work has pointed to deficiencies in EU level monitoring and reporting of adaptation spending., The 2018 Evaluation also concluded that Member States’ monitoring and reporting on their NAS and/or NAP is not yet robust and there is a need to develop stakeholder involvement (including at subnational levels) in their assessment, evaluation and review. The evolution from the EU Greenhouse Gas Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) to the Energy Union Governance Regulation from 2021 onwards for Member State reporting on adaptation activities is an opportunity to redefine the role for adaptation preparedness scoreboards. Similarly, at city level, although the pledges by cities are increasing, it is unclear to what extent these are turned to action, indicating more should be done to track progress at the local level. The unevenness of progress in the development of climate change adaptation agendas across Europe is reflected in the adoption of the NAS and NAP, which are published on the Climate-ADAPT platform. By April 2020, all 27 EU Member States had adopted a NAP and/or NAS. Nonetheless, many are not yet in the implementation stage. For example, Italy, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, and Poland have not yet adopted NAPs, while many more have yet to establish monitoring indicators and methodologies. Cross-boundary effects of climate impacts within the EU are also not sufficiently considered. The 2018 Evaluation of the Adaptation Strategy indicated that transboundary cooperation within the EU remains relatively weak. The strong cross-border dimension of many climate change impacts stresses the need for enhanced cooperation to advance towards effective cross border climate change adaptation strategies as well. Nonetheless, the unevenness of climate change adaptation agendas is also seen in the approaches implemented by countries across Europe to comprehensively reduce and adapt to climate-related risks. Opportunities for transboundary cooperation should be more systematically considered, e.g. in the fields of freshwater, wildfires, transport infrastructure, telecommunication, energy infrastructure and other types of 'critical infrastructure'. Climate hazard impacts to critical infrastructures and EU regional investments may rise strongly in Europe: modelling predicted that damages could already triple by the 2020s, could increase six-fold by mid-century, and could increase by more than ten-fold by the end of the century compared to a 1981-2010 baseline. The EU Sendai Action Plan promotes resilient investments in critical infrastructure across EU countries, although the transboundary aspect could be strengthened. P3: Adaptation action is not taken quickly enough Mainstreaming of adaptation in relevant policies is progressing, but at a suboptimal pace in light of the increasing frequency and intensity of the impacts. Although the increase in ambition for climate mainstreaming of 30% in the new Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) is likely to benefit adaptation action, the EU's tracking system for climate action does not differentiate between how much is spent on climate change mitigation and on adaptation. Another issue is that economic models and financial decision-making tools used to underpin investments still do not include the damage costs and benefits of investments in resilience (climate risk assessments). Guidance for mainstreaming has been provided in some policy areas, but its effectiveness is unclear. The 2018 Evaluation noted that there is still a need to better understand how the guidance documents are being used by Member States. In its remarks on the new MFF 2021-2027, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) repeated its concerns regarding the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) link to climate and environmental objectives, including adaptation, as this is not tracked in expenditure. The Commission replied to ECA that a clear-cut separation between adaptation and mitigation, as well as for other environmental objective, is often not possible in agriculture and forestry. Given the importance of the CAP and Cohesion Policy in the total EU budget, these will remain crucial areas to address.

(Un-)insured losses and risks are inadequately reported and acted upon. The 2018 Evaluation identified the role of insurance and financial products in involving the private sector in adaptation and in mitigation of disaster risks as a key priority. A related issue is that the approach to insurance of climate risks varies widely across Member States. In a first step, it would be helpful to gather information on the approach adopted in each Member State in relation to public versus private insurance mechanisms, to assess where private insurance can make a significant contribution. A prerequisite for private insurance for climate risks is the sufficiency and robustness of data to put insurers in a position to build projections on the climate and to allow accurate assessment and pricing of those risks. However, even where insurers have sufficient data, the insurance industry may not be willing or able to provide insurance against these risks at an affordable price where risk become too high. The may lead to mismatches between insurers’ premium and clients’ ability to pay. Moreover, not acting upon risks urgently will lead to distributional consequences, because regions will be affected differently based on their location, climate, population, legal system and geography. There is a clear north-south divide in the regional distribution of welfare losses, southern regions having aggregated welfare losses several times larger compared to those in the north of Europe, and thus climate change may increase future intra-regional disparities. Key economic sectors in regions will also be affected, such as tourism, agriculture and low-carbon energy, which could further exacerbate existing inequalities. Climate change can also heavily affect communities dependent on natural resources for traditional practices. Assessments of the role of socio-economic status and age also show higher exposures and vulnerabilities to climate health hazards, with concentrations in Southern Europe, due to higher proportions of elderly, rural and low-income people, who are particularly vulnerable. The varying effects of climate change on women and men and how climate impacts internationally may amplify gender inequalities (e.g. social responsibilities, practices) have also shown to be essential to any adaptation effort., P4: Climate impacts from outside the EU are not addressed The EU strategic approach to adaptation and international developments need to be better aligned. The European Green Deal reaffirms that the global challenges of climate change and environmental degradation require a global response. While the EU has pursued adaptation priorities internationally, particularly through its development cooperation activities, the Evaluation identified only limited integration of international activities into the broader climate change adaptation strategy. The current Strategy, nevertheless, does refer to transboundary issues in its guidance on the development of NASs, as well as in the priorities of the LIFE programme for adaptation flagship projects that address trans-regional issues. At the same time, international policy developments such as the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and many others demonstrate that international climate change adaptation issues require further consideration by the EU in the new Strategy. The international angle is not only relevant from a climate and environmental policy perspective, but also to address foreign and security policy, e.g. effects in Europe from global climate change impacts on international stability and security, or on population displacement . Moreover, the spillover effects matter from an economic perspective: global and EU supply chains (e.g. for EU agriculture and manufacturing) are already being disrupted, and increasingly so. The implications of such transboundary effects of climate impacts in 3rd countries are not yet integrated in the EU adaptation policy, even if climate impacts in developing countries are already given considerable attention in the EU development policy. There is an increasing need for the EU to conduct further research and review existing evidence to inform guidance to Member States on how to tackle likely impacts from international spillover effects. The EU, due to its geo-political, security, and trade ties with other countries, as well as its proximity to countries that are likely to be less able to adapt to climate change, is highly vulnerable to international spillover effects. Thus, thorough assessments of the EU's exposure to international spillover effects, including of the EU's key global interdependencies and their related climate risks, are necessary. Furthermore, EU support to developing countries’ own adaptation efforts is in line with the EU’s vision of global solidarity in facing climate change. In 2019, the EIB provided €3.2 billion in lending to support climate action. The European Commission provided €2.5 billion in finance to developing countries in 2019. While the global public finance flows in adaptation, with significant contribution from the EU and its Member States, is consistent and substantial, it urgently needs to be scaled up. Examples include pledges to multilateral climate funds (the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund); support channelled through the GCCA+ targeted at Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States; and the mobilisation of innovative financial instruments through the support to the preparation and financing of bankable climate-relevant development projects. EU Member States provided €4.8 billion in climate adaptation financing in 2019 and €6.7bn to cross cutting projects addressing both mitigation and adaptation, totalling over half of total Member States’ Climate Finance. Stakeholder views : In all consultation work streams, stakeholders expressed an interest in the EU providing consistent guidelines and indicators for monitoring and reporting on adaptation. For interviewees and workshop participants representing national and local authorities, civil society businesses and international organisations, the EU should play a key role in facilitating knowledge sharing at all levels of governance, between countries and within them. The lack of effective mechanisms to support mainstreaming of ecosystem-based approaches was also mentioned multiple times by civil society representatives as well as some national authorities, international organisations, EU institutions and businesses. These stakeholders agreed that the EU should promote the development of standard methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of ecosystem-based approaches, in order to help with the implementation of solutions. Other needs for guidance mentioned by businesses, international organisations and other stakeholders include guidance on adaptation planning, financing (investments), and monitoring. Overall, the role of the EU in providing consistent guidance was reported by all stakeholder groups. In the stakeholder workshops and targeted interviews, Member State “inertia” towards adaptation was identified as a general barrier, particularly among international organisations and civil society representatives, though it was also reported by some national authorities, EU institutions and businesses representatives. As one representative of a European Business Association mentioned: “the Member States tend to be barriers to making progress on the issue themselves.” More specifically, workshop participants and interviewees explained this inertia with the lack of formal (legal) commitments for adaptation and clear political targets (especially in comparison to mitigation), the lack of mechanisms and indicators to monitor and report implementation, and the lack of alignment of standard practices. The lack of funding was also identified by several stakeholders (representing business organisations, civil society, EU institutions, local authorities, national authorities and international organisations) as a barrier to adaptation in the EU, though it was highlighted that this is most likely not caused by a lack of availability, but rather differing priorities and commitments. What are the problem drivers? The adaptation gap is already large, as identified in global and European assessment reports, and getting larger. This is due to impacts being increasingly prevalent and because science is pushing our understanding of impacts (e.g. on cascading impacts). Multiple reports highlight the global state of unpreparedness (IPCC more broadly, but more specifically the United Nations Environment Programme report series of Adaptation Gap reports). Most worrying is the lack of preparation for possible tipping points in the climate dynamics. At EU level, the European Environment Agency has continually highlighted this issue in its adaptation reporting, most recently on urban adaptation. Continued construction on floodplains, the increased covering of soil surfaces by concrete or asphalt, the small amount of green spaces, and urban sprawl encroaching on wildfire and landslide prone areas are making European cities much more vulnerable to climate change. The EEA’s latest report (October 2020, quoted in the Impact Assessment) gives the latest state of play on European climate change adaptation planning and action efforts at local level. While many local authorities have realised the importance of becoming resilient to climate change, progress in adaptation planning remains slow. Implementation of adaptation measures and the monitoring of the success of these actions are even slower. Measures currently put in place mostly focus on developing knowledge, awareness raising or policy developments. Implementation of actual physical or transformative adaptation solutions is far behind — such as developing more green spaces to reduce the impacts of heatwaves or adjusting sewerage systems to cope with flash flooding. D1: Accelerating pace of climate change impacts With record high temperatures in 2020 globally and across much of Europe, and with a clear message from climate models that temperatures will continue to increase, the urgency to adapt seems undeniable. , Although climate change mitigation may reduce, or even avoid, some impacts of climate change in the EU, stopping all greenhouse gas emissions in the EU would not stop the climate impacts that are already occurring, and which are projected to continue to increase for decades (see Annex 9). This reflects the message of the IPCC Special report that even in a best-case scenario of sustained emission limitations, and global warming limited to 1.5°C, there will be severe (and unequally distributed) stress on agri-food systems, infrastructure, ecosystems, natural capital and human health., There are heavy economic, social, and environmental costs associated with inaction. The PESETA IV study found that “exposing the present economy to global warming of 3°C would result in an annual welfare loss of at least €175 billion” in Europe. A recent Horizon 2020 COACCH project study estimated costs of inaction in Europe in 2050 to be close to €200 billion per year in a 4°C pathway, and more than €100 billion per year in a 2°C pathway, and the COACCH study generally estimate higher costs than PESETA as they also include socio-economic changes. Moreover, conditions for vital ecosystems, which provide critical services for mitigation (e.g. carbon sinks) and adaptation (e.g. protection against floods, desertification, water and air purification) are worsening. Box 2 summarises the climate impacts for the EU in a scenario without additional climate change mitigation (warming of 3°C or more above pre-industrial temperature) and without additional adaptation measures: People: ·An additional 15 million Europeans living in the proximity of woodland would be exposed to high-to extreme fire danger for at least 10 days/year. ·Each year nearly 300 million people would be exposed to deadly heatwaves, resulting in a 30-fold rise in deaths from extreme heat (90,000 annual deaths compared to around 3,000 each year today). ·Water resources availability would drop by up to 40% in southern regions of Europe and droughts would happen more frequently in most of southern and western Europe. ·Water scarcity and drought would increasingly affect agriculture, energy production and water supply in regions that already suffer from water stress. Planet: ·The alpine tundra domain would contract by 84% and practically disappear in the Pyrenees. The natural climatic tree line would shift vertically up by up to 8 m/year. ·Ecological domains would shift northwards, resulting in severe changes of the current ecosystems in Europe (e.g. Alpine, Boreal), and the development of Tropical ones. ·Wildfire and pest outbreaks in forests would become more frequent and severe, increasing biomass loss and carbon release. Prosperity: ·In the absence of international market adjustments, with current crops and practices, yields would decline by more than 10% in southern Europe. ·Total drought losses would increase to nearly 45 €billion/year with 3°C warming in 2100 compared to 9 €billion/year at present. ·Almost half a million people would be exposed to river flooding each year, or nearly three times the number at present, and river flood losses would rise 6-fold in magnitude, reaching nearly 50 €billion/year with 3°C in 2100. ·Coastal flood losses would grow by two orders of magnitude and climb to 250 €billion/year in 2100, while 2.2 million people would be exposed per year to coastal inundation compared to 100,000 at present ·If 3°C global warming occurred in today’s economy, annual welfare loss could represent approximately 0.5% of EU GDP, when considering only a limited set of climate impacts (river and coastal flooding, agriculture, droughts, energy supply, and windstorms). Furthermore, mortality from temperature extremes would also cause significant additional economic losses in the range of EUR 122 billion. Source: JRC PESETA IV final report (2020)

D2: Knowledge gaps on climate change adaptation Uncertainty about climate change pathways is itself a barrier to adaptation action. If we can better understand climate change impacts, and make that information widely available, people will take wise decisions and adapt. would need to mobilise additional support for e.g. the development of better economic models for the impacts of climate change, sectoral interlinkages, and their (economic and non-economic) cost, a deeper understanding of health and environmental impacts, including on ecosystem services, and foster innovative uses of climate data. There remain large knowledge gaps that would still need to be bridged, such as on economic losses from climate change, cascading effects from simultaneous or sequential climate impacts, spill-over effects from outside Europe on the EU, or tipping points beyond which the human and natural ecosystems would not recover. Moreover, the diverse information sources on climate impacts in Europe (e.g. European Forest Fires Information System, European Drought Observatory) and internationally need to be better federated to increase visibility and coverage, and to ensure compatibility of information. There is increasing demand for translating the existing wealth of climate data and information into customised tools and products i.e. solutions. These tools are part of the backbone of the transition to a climate-resilient and low-carbon society, as they are needed to help decision-makers take informed decisions to boost resilience and adaptation capacity of their communities. More actions are needed to scale up local adaptation solutions through national and EU funding for regional development and innovation. The uncertainty of losses and climate damage estimates, and the absence of sufficiently reliable predictive models, have impacts on the accurate pricing of insurance products; this creates a major barrier for private sector investments. This lack of knowledge also contributes to decision makers not taking decisions that place due value on climate resilience. Such tools exist (e.g. Figure 2 illustrates one developed by the EEA to improve knowledge of forest fire risks), but they are not precise enough to serve local administrations or private insurers. Source: EEA Story maps http://discomap.eea.europa.eu/climate D3: Low public engagement and professional awareness All levels of government, including cities and regions, need a sound understanding of the climate risks and vulnerabilities on their territory to guide their decision-making and policy shaping. Therefore, in the implementation of the 2013 Strategy, efforts have been made towards a better understanding of risks and vulnerabilities throughout Europe. Public awareness is on the rise from directed policies (e.g. local awareness campaigns) and from daily news of climate-change related impacts such as extreme weather and forest fires. Seven in ten respondents to a 2019 special Eurobarometer agreed that adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change could have positive outcomes for citizens in the EU. There has been a significant increase in the knowledge base for vulnerability assessments since 2014, boosted by a number of EU-funded research (e.g. ESPON, PESETA); however, the assessments still vary significantly; and thus, so does the level of understanding of adaptation options to reduce vulnerability and risks. To illustrate this, the 2018 EEA report on National climate change vulnerability and risk assessment provided a review of national climate change impact, vulnerability, and risk assessments (CCIV) across Europe. The evaluation showed that almost all EEA member countries have conducted at least one national CCIV, which was then used as a key information source for the development of national adaptation policies. The analysis, however, also noted challenges related to gaps in data, integration of quantitative and qualitative information, and cross-sector comparisons. The European Green Deal mentions that involvement and commitment of the public and of all stakeholders is crucial to its success. For adaptation in particular, the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the European institutions, the Member States’ governments, regional and local authorities, citizens and the private sector remains unclear. This is partly due to the cross-sectoral nature of adaptation. Moreover, there are different approaches to stakeholder engagement in EU countries and different approaches to stakeholder engagement throughout the policy cycle: in the process of setting climate change adaptation goals, some countries engage stakeholders via consultation processes, whereas others provide on the ground technical adaptation support. To differing extents in different countries, involving stakeholders in the process of developing adaptation strategies has increased awareness and acceptance, which ultimately helps successful implementation of a strategy. This is also closely related to the need for a multi-disciplinary understanding of climate change adaptation, which is recognised by local authorities and stakeholders as a way to avoid maladaptation. This often means fixing one single problem that creates bigger ones elsewhere e.g. the over-reliance on irrigation to continue growing crops no longer suited for the new local climate thereby exacerbating water shortages for other users. Likewise, some economic practices are no longer suitable under changing climate change conditions, like the exploitation of monoculture plantations of trees prone to fire (e.g. eucalyptus in Portugal or Spain). Despite these examples, the use of cross-sectoral approaches remains limited. D4: Insufficient priority given to adaptation in some Member States and regions Adapting to climate change is first about building resilience and anticipating the impacts, and ultimately reacting and managing impacts if/once they arrive. The Paris Agreement calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation; however, in the EU adaptation investment tends to have a lower priority than mitigation. At the local level, cities have mostly dealt with mitigation and adaptation as two separate strategies. Local authorities that participate in networks are more likely to have started the adaptation process; being a member of multiple networks is associated with higher levels of adaptation planning, sharing of best practices, and receiving support in developing their Strategy. Policy tends to give greater priority to climate change mitigation, but this behaviour is also more widespread for the private and public sector, and citizens, constituting a significant obstacle to adaptation. On the side of the private sector, we see that financial markets for adaptation are less developed than for mitigation. This preference might be motivated by other perceived benefits of climate change mitigation measures. These include economic savings and improved energy security; or by a belief that mitigation action is a common good better suited to public policy, while the benefits of climate change adaptation are largely related to private goods (e.g. climate proofing supply chains, flood protection for private residences), or that in some sectors a clear-cut separation between adaptation and mitigation is not evident. In addition, the actual impact of adaptation measures is more difficult to measure than the effect of mitigation (i.e. GHG emissions reduction). Adaptation actions are most successful when there are no damages, and therefore less visible and attributable. Choosing between adaptation and mitigation is, however, a false choice—we must do both. Sustained emission limitations will decrease the medium-to-long term severity of climate impacts. An integrated approach of both mitigation and adaptation action, is therefore warranted. Moreover, adaptation requires as much attention as mitigation because even the most successful mitigation action (i.e. achieving globally a limited temperature increase of just 1.5°C) still comes with severe impacts to which we must adapt. One example of synergies between adaptation and mitigation is the implementation of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) – these can contribute to climate change mitigation through both storing and sequestering carbon and reducing energy demand (e.g. by improving thermal comfort in cities) and increasing water retention thus reducing the risk of flooding and recharging groundwater(see Annex 9), amongst other adaptation benefits. In addition, prevention of climate related disasters, and reduction of their impacts as far as possible is more cost effective than dealing with the unmitigated consequence, for instance in terms of emergency response. D5: Slow adoption and implementation of local adaptation strategies The Evaluation found that progress on local adaptation strategies has been slower than envisaged in 2013. This is evident in the relatively low number of cities working on adaptation compared to those committed to mitigation, for example based on the actions submitted to the Covenant of Mayors as of 2020, only 2% (almost 4,000 out of 175,120) are adaptation focused, the remaining being related to climate change mitigation. Reasons for this slow up take include, among others, the lack of human and financial resources, especially in Southern Europe, whereas, in Northern Europe, uncertainty on climate change scenarios is seen as an important barrier. For Eastern Europe, both the limited capacity in policy, practitioners and research communities and lack of political commitment were noteworthy. Research has shown that how societies respond and adapt to climate change is influenced by culture, historical memory and identity , each of which can either improve awareness and sense of urgency for specific climate-related risks, or shift attention away from others. D6: Insufficient public and private sector adaptation investment

Financial support for adaptation is not sufficient for the challenges we are facing. Based on estimates of the investment needed to meet adaptation needs, it can be assumed that there is a sizeable unmet finance need for climate resilient investments in Europe,. Competing policy and spending priorities, such as currently the COVID-19 response, and the unevenly distributed impacts of climate change and means to adjust across Member States, place a burden on the role of policy interventions and public finance to bridge the adaptation-finance gap. Investments being mobilised for the COVID-19 recovery through the Next Generation EU Fund and a reinforced long-term budget for the European Union provide an opportunity for investments in adaptation and resilience to be upgraded. Moreover, the further strengthening in the next MFF of the EU's social dimension and European Social Fund (ESF+) may give more support to the protection of the most vulnerable. Within the EU, the aim from the 2014-2020 MFF that at least 20% of European budget expenditure is climate-related, has been increased to 30% in the 2021-2027 MFF adopted in December 2020. The European Green Deal emphasises the role of private investment alongside public investment, and reaffirms the importance of access to data and the development of instruments for investors, insurers and business to integrate climate change into their risk analyses. Moreover, the Paris Agreement (Article 2.1(c)) establishes the core objective of "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development". In order to meet international climate goals, there is a collective challenge to "shift the trillions" in capital to help drive the transition to a zero carbon, climate-resilient economy. Public sources of finance will not be able to meet this demand on their own. More and more Europeans are finding that solidarity is needed in the face of unpredictable disasters (both distinct and slow-onset), and governments are more suited for this than markets. Public funds continue to play the major role in prevention and resilience; however, private capital is required to mainstream resilience in private investment, including through climate proofing, and through risk pooling via private insurance. Several general barriers exist for private sector financing of adaptation projects. Firstly, adaptation does not typically generate a revenue stream and is therefore less attractive for private finance. Secondly, adaptation includes a range of wider benefits to society (in addition to the direct, private benefits of avoided damages, such as the recreational values for restored floodplains meant to protect private farms, biodiversity gains from green roofs meant to cool individual buildings etc.) that are not necessarily captured by the private financial return on investments (public good problem). Thirdly, many financial markets are characterised by a shortage of the longer-term credit that is necessary for long-term adaptation investments. Finally, reliable information on climate impacts on the economy is often unavailable or unequally distributed among different actors, who are often unaware. This disempowers actors from making informed decisions and investing accordingly. D7: Lack of customised and cost-effective adaptation solutions The 2018 evaluation concluded that there is a need to climate-proof investments supported by research and innovation. This need is reaffirmed by the Mission on “Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation”; this is proposed under Horizon Europe, and employs innovation as a way to catalyse systemic change. The proposed Mission would test integrated solutions to address the complex, multi-faceted nature of the transformation needed. Moreover, recent research shows the importance of a focus on innovation. The share of climate change adaptation inventions in 2015 was roughly the same as in 1995, and this stagnation stands in sharp contrast to the trend for climate change mitigation technologies, whose share in total innovation (including non-climate-related) nearly doubled during the same period. Moreover, few adaptation inventions are transferred across borders, and there is virtually no transfer of patented knowledge to low-income countries. In particular, effective mechanisms to support mainstreaming of NbS are missing. Despite the fact that NbS have proved to be cost-efficient policy approaches to address climate change adaptation, they are yet not used on a large enough scale. Reasons for this relatively low uptake are multiple (e.g. cultural perceptions, knowledge and awareness gaps, lack of guidance), and have driven to, among others, unevenness of climate change adaptation action across Member States. In addition to this, even though interest in the NbS concept is increasing in different areas, it has mainly been applied in the agriculture and forestry sectors, for which NbS are at the same time also contributing to mitigation. Experts continue to advocate for supporting legislation that enables its systematic mainstreaming into urban planning, i.e., incorporating its principles (e.g. multi-benefit, sustainability) into relevant policies and planning tools across sectors. Finally, the lack of accurate models, data and knowledge on damages and losses means that climate impacts are not being priced in private decision making, particularly by SMEs as they often lack the capacity to do so. Currently, climate-related events such as drought, hail, and extreme heat are often not insurable. The insurance policies that are available cannot adequately cover the increasing risks SMEs face. This affects the availability of cost-effective solutions and skills. D8: International policy developments Several important international agreements were adopted after the 2013 Strategy, including the Paris Agreement, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (in particular SDG 13 on climate action, SDG 11 on sustainable and resilient cities, but also others), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the EU Sendai Action plan. These developments in international policy increased the need to harmonise and closely integrate the EU strategy with international climate change adaptation issues. D9: Climate impacts increasingly generate spillover effects across the globe The 2013 Strategy does not sufficiently recognise and address the EU's vulnerabilities to international spillover effects from climate change impacts outside Europe. Globally, climate change has the potential to affect trade, food security, stability and security, and biodiversity. In terms of trade, risks extend along supply chains. What occurs outside Europe due to a changing climate will affect the production and transport of raw materials and intermediate goods. In fact, indirect impact of effects of climate change internationally could be as large as the direct impacts within Europe. Imports from non-EU regions could decline by 2% by 2050, while exports to non-EU regions could also decline by up to 0.3%. An EEA 2016 report details Europe's vulnerabilities from international spillover effects related to food production and supply, including economic effects through climate-induced price volatilities, and disruptions to transport networks and changes to shipping routes. The COACCH project found that the EU - due to the single market and stronger export orientation – receives more supply chains shocks from abroad than the USA. The effects are largest for manufacturing and agriculture. Stakeholder views: Impacts: Most of the respondents to the open public consultation (OPC) considered that the growing speed of climate impacts is a “very important” driver for the new EU Adaptation Strategy (75.5%). An important difference between OPC respondents’ reports of most-experienced events and those of contributors to other consultation activities was their appreciation of water-related events. While OPC respondents seem to have experienced these climate-related events less than other events, the majority of workshop participants and interviewees from all stakeholder groups (including civil society, national authorities, EU institutions and international organisations) referred to coastal erosion, flooding, saltwater intrusion and lack of water availability as some of the most important slow-onset changes caused by climate change in Europe. This was due to the substantial proportion of the EU population which is coastal (including in the outermost regions), and the importance of water availability for agriculture. River flooding was mentioned by workshop participants representing national authorities and interviewees representing civil society organisations as another important security concern for the large share of the population living close to rivers. They also highlighted strong differences in vulnerabilities across Europe. Southern Europe and Mediterranean regions were reported as the most vulnerable regions by the majority of respondents across all stakeholder groups, though Central and Eastern Europe were considered increasingly vulnerable. Problem drivers: OPC respondents identified the following factors as important for the design of the new Strategy: a lack of interest in climate impacts in some Member States or regions (57.7%); insufficient public finance for adaptation to climate change (55.2%); insufficient public awareness of the need to adapt to climate change (51.4%); and low private sector investment and action on adaptation (44.4%). In both the OPC, stakeholder workshops and interviews, the lack of knowledge and awareness was reported as key problem driver by all stakeholder groups. According to them, at the policy-making level, the lack of knowledge and awareness on climate change adaptation most likely stems from a lack of access to available and usable knowledge and data. Stakeholders from EU institutions, government authorities and international organisations have highlighted the difference between access and usability of data as a problem driver as opposed to lack of data, pointing that sufficient data currently exists. In the stakeholder workshops, several participants across various stakeholder groups agreed on the lack of awareness at the citizens’ level, which manifests itself as a lack of information on the cost of inaction and unpreparedness and prevents a necessary behavioural change. 3.WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? Legal basis The various legal bases for the Adaptation Strategy are addressed in the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy and include at the highest level the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU Articles 191 and 192(1)). The Commission proposal for a European Climate Law Regulation also contains provisions on adaptation to climate change. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement constitutes an additional international legal basis on which the Union can anchor its efforts in climate change adaptation. A full overview of the legal base is in Annex 8. Subsidiarity: Necessity and Added Value of EU action According to the principle of subsidiarity, the new EU Adaptation Strategy must be necessary, and bring added value in comparison to individual actions from the Member States alone. The EU was an early actor on adaptation, and the European Commission was recognised by the Global Commission on Adaptation , as a pioneer in integrating considerations of climate risk into decision-making. An ambitious and more proactive EU-level intervention is warranted. The consultation undertaken as part of the 2018 Evaluation indicated that, although governments at different levels would have independently worked on adaptation, progress would have been much less significant in the absence of the EU Strategy. Moreover, the current Strategy brings EU added value by, e.g. encouraging the identification and bridging of knowledge gaps in research, supporting regional cooperation, and by integrating adaptation in its own policies. The EEA has demonstrated the added value of adaptation action at EU level with the example of Climate-ADAPT.

As much as individual cities and regions must take action to become more resilient to global warming, the Union as a whole must take steps to prepare itself better. For optimal adaptation in the Union, all levels of government have to contribute, including EU, national, regional and local. Moreover, there is increasing clarity that civil society and individuals have an important role to play, and EU level action can help empower them in their actions (e.g. through the Climate Pact). EU action also can significantly enhance local and regional adaptation action, for instance through geospatial information and modelling (e.g. the EU Copernicus programme) or EU and international exchanges of best practices, e.g. via the European and Global Covenants of Mayors. Even if adaptation challenges are often local and specific (a strong argument for local-level adaptation policy), solutions are just as often widely applicable on a regional, national or transnational scale. Moreover, there are also EU-specific impacts (e.g. threats to the Single Market, effects on EU budget, on trade deals, additional pressure on migratory flows, the spread of infectious diseases and plant pests) or regions with specific vulnerabilities (e.g. EU’s nine outermost regions in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans as well as Mediterranean countries). The compatibility and added value of the EU Adaptation strategy with the principle of subsidiarity are underpinned by: ·Shared vulnerable assets: The Strategy addresses areas of shared competence, including challenges that pertain to transnational governance such as the management of water catchments, civil protection, biodiversity, and marine and terrestrial ecosystems-based services (COM (2020)/2509310). ·Transboundary impacts: Climate change impacts occur irrespective of administrative boundaries. There is a strong cross-border dimension of many climate change impacts (EU macro-regions sharing common climate risks, e.g. seas and river basins and Alpine mountainous areas). Lack of preparedness in one Member States may have negative consequences for the other Member States. The Covid-19 outbreak, which started in a region to later escalate into a global crisis, illustrates the economic and social interconnectedness between countries, demonstrating the benefits of coordinated action at EU level. ·Shared solutions: The EU can identify and promote transboundary solutions through its existing instruments, actions and policies in transnational sectors and regions at risk, such as the CAP, the Biodiversity Strategy etc. It can also identify regional knowledge gaps, harmonise tools and facilitate science-policy interactions to foster mutual learning across the Member States and systematise information for decision-makers. Finally, solidarity and convergence across and within the Member States and ensuring a just transition (as well as a just resilience to climate change), have a key role to play for adaptation as highlighted in the European Green Deal and the Commission proposal for a European Climate Law. 4.OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? General objective Adaptation is about understanding, planning and acting to prevent the impacts in the first place, minimise their effects, and address their consequences. Against all the gloom of climate impacts and the inevitability of certain shocks, the benefits of adaptation actions extend beyond the avoided human, natural and material losses. They have many positive and significant socio-economic effects, with high cost-benefit ratios: ·environmental and social benefits accompany many adaptation actions (e.g. nature-based solutions for flooding that also clean the air and waters and restore habitats to support biodiversity); ·reducing climate impacts on vulnerable groups and countries enhances social cohesion; ·adaptation actions targeting better management of natural resources can reduce tensions between communities and support conflict prevention efforts; ·effective adaptation helps secure EU strategic autonomy (as it provides the stability required to progress on emission reductions, security, migration, sustainability); ·enhanced financial and budgetary stability, and economic growth (as it reduces vulnerability to climate-related macroeconomic shocks and pay-outs after disasters); ·avert, minimise and address population displacement associated with the adverse effects of climate change; ·competitiveness in the growing global adaptation industry (a market worth ~EUR 280 billion in 2016, growing at ~6% per year); ·increased resilience and sustainability in EU firms’ operations and supply chains; ·a sense of empowerment to citizens, by demonstrating that preventing and managing climate impacts can be achieved, and that they can be engaged in it. In order to tackle the problems identified in Section 2, it is important to clarify the objectives of EU action in the field of climate change adaptation. Therefore, this section presents the overarching objective of the new EU Adaptation Strategy: “By 2050, the Union will be a climate-resilient society, fully adapted to the unavoidable impacts of climate change, with reinforced adaptive capacity and minimal vulnerability, and that contributes to achieving the Paris Agreement global goal on adaptation.”

This objective builds on the 2013 Strategy’s objective, which is “to contribute to a more climate-resilient Europe” by enhancing the preparedness and capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change at the local, regional, national and EU levels, developing a coherent approach and improving coordination. It is fully aligned with the Commission proposal for a Climate Law, which sets Europe on a path towards the global adaptation goal (Article 7 of the Paris Agreement). The current objective is more ambitious than the 2013 objective, as it sets out a vision for Europe towards 2050 to become a climate-resilient society and goes beyond a contribution to resilience. Moreover, it includes a strengthened international dimension, as per the problem definition. The specific objectives also incorporate a novel, mainstreamed citizen-dimension, similarly identified in, and supported by, the stakeholder consultation. Specific objectives In order to achieve this general objective, four specific objectives are identified which correspond to each of the problems discussed in section 2.1. The relationship between the objectives and problems is presented in Figure 3 . Objectives 1 to 3 aim to help actors at all levels to improve their knowledge of climate impacts, reinforce planning and climate risk management and to accelerate adaptation action. Objective 4 targets an increase in the EU’s contribution to global climate resilience. Objective 1 (O1) - Improve knowledge of climate impacts and development of solutions: The new Strategy will aim to increase awareness, education and access to knowledge and fit-for purpose data on individual and collective climate risks, it will seek to develop innovative solutions, and the dissemination of good practice to improve decision making. O1 addresses the need for investment in frameworks, models and tools to support decision making within uncertainty. Efforts to do so are reflected in the ongoing study of the European Commission (DG CLIMA) on adaptation modelling. Adaptation modelling aims ultimately to act as a tool to guide innovation of adaptation solutions within the new Strategy. The objective aims to step up ambition on improving knowledge and to invest in an (updated) EU risk and vulnerability assessment, including in the outermost regions. This action is in line with the 2018 Evaluation, which concludes that the knowledge gaps remain. The objective also increases ambition through the establishment of valuation methodologies for climate change adaptation benefits and effectiveness of measures, with a focus on NbS. The objective increases the focus on newly identified knowledge gaps related to interdependencies, synergies with other relevant goals (e.g. biodiversity, mitigation). It will also focus on research and innovation-inspired activities to help deliver large-scale solutions for climate change adaptation as foreseen under the Mission on “Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation” (and similarly in the Soil, Starfish 2030, and Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities missions), which is part of the upcoming EU Research and Innovation Framework Programme, Horizon Europe (2021-2027). The Strategy will guide research under Horizon Europe (including in relevant Partnerships) with the aim to encourage greater uptake of innovation, and achieve positive economic impact and job creation for the pandemic recovery. Copernicus Climate Change Services will also continue to play a key role. Objective 2 (O2) – Reinforce planning, implementation, and climate risk management: through risk assessments and management, and through helping to close the climate protection gap via risk-transfer mechanisms. There is a continued need to strengthen mainstreaming of climate change adaptation across all sectors at EU level. The Strategy will therefore focus on increased mainstreaming within EU funds, research and innovation, and key vulnerable sectors, such as coastal protection, energy infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, spatial planning, transport and communication, urban development, public health, and water. Moreover, it will focus on strengthening synergies and coherence with policies that share similar or interrelated objectives, like disaster risk reduction and civil protection. The Strategy will also include a reinforced focus on resilience of insurance and financial markets. Even though the 2013 Strategy aimed to improve the market penetration of natural disaster insurance and to unleash insurance pricing for risk awareness prevention, measures need to be scaled up. Another important aspect of risk management includes closing the climate protection gap, which has been defined as the difference between the insured losses and the total economic losses caused by an extreme weather or climate-related event. Regarding financial markets in a broader sense, the new Strategy will increase efforts to ‘build the business case for adaptation’. This includes EU project finance and support to the development of methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of resilient investments, and to facilitate integrating climate risk management in the full policy cycle. Objective 3 (O3) – Accelerate adaptation action: with a focus on solutions (in addition to understanding), by deploying innovation (in addition to research), implementation (in addition to planning) and prevention (in addition to ex-post solutions). The new Strategy needs to focus particularly on accelerating action at the local level. The continuing need for this remains clear in light of recent evidence that the impacts of climate change are already being felt across cities and rural areas in Europe. The European Green Deal emphasises that, under the new EU Adaptation Strategy, cities and regions should be able to access data and to develop instruments to integrate climate change into their risk management practices. There is a need for strengthened support of knowledge sharing and capacity building as well as (access to) financial support, tailored to the local level. The role of peer-to-peer learning and the access to usable data for local governments are important elements of strengthening local action under the Strategy. The local capacity building anchored in latest science and innovation, and based on user-friendly, fit for purpose tools, services and solutions will also be a the centre of the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, including Societal Transformation. The need to adapt (critical) infrastructure to the impacts of climate change will have increased attention in the new Strategy, e.g. through Nature-based Solutions and digital technology. Objective 4 (O4) – Strengthen global action for climate change adaptation and resilience: strengthening cooperation on enhancing action on climate change adaptation is necessary in order to make progress towards the global goal on adaptation enshrined in the Paris Agreement, and in line with other international commitments including the SDGs. This will be achieved by assisting partner countries in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, promoting comprehensive risk management approaches, scaling up and enhancing the effectiveness of support, and sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learnt (e.g. through Climate-ADAPT). The new Strategy will provide a framework to support the EU’s partner countries in stepping up climate change adaptation and resilience. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have the least capacity to adapt. Additional and better-targeted financial resources for climate change adaptation are thus urgently needed, both from domestic and international public sources, as well as from the private sector and innovative sources of finance. The new Strategy will also address shared challenges of interconnected economies (e.g. supply chains, or risk assessing cascading climate impacts). At the same time, the EU can learn from others: many of the EU’s international partners have long been on the frontlines of climate change and have valuable experiences that could help European communities become more resilient, for example on the topic of early warning systems and preparedness.

In addition, the objective contributes to: ·Improved governance: alignment and integration of regional, national and sub-national policy frameworks, with a specific focus on local authorities. ·Gender-responsive planning, implementation, and leveraging on local and indigenous knowledge and expertise. Stakeholders views on specific objectives: According to expert interviewees and the majority of workshop participants from all stakeholder groups (including international organisation, civil society, businesses and one EU institution), the better use of data was considered an important objective of the new Strategy. Stakeholders explained that, even though a lot of data is available, this could be perceived as an overload by Member States and local governments. This echoes respondents’ identification of problems and drivers in the OPC, according to which knowledge and solutions are already available to adapt to climate change, and that the focus should move from planning to action and addressing issues such as the need for financing. Stakeholders also agreed that, in addition to funding support, the EU should promote the development of standard methodologies to quantify the costs and benefits of ecosystem-based approaches, in order to help with the implementation of solutions. This was particularly mentioned across Member States and business representatives, but also reported by a few experts from civil society. Stakeholders from most stakeholder groups (EU institutions, national authorities, local authorities, international organisations and civil society) also suggested the Strategy could support a dedicated mechanism to provide tailored adaptation guidance and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing for local public authorities and non-state actors. Moreover, they mentioned a need for the Strategy to encourage cross-sector cooperation for the best solutions. Although planning needs to be reinforced, most participants of the OPC strongly agreed that an increased focus on implementation (in addition to planning) is needed (74.9%). Respondents of the OPC strongly agreed that the EU should support Member State level action on adaptation (59.3%). EU support at the local level also received strong support from all stakeholders. In the stakeholder consultations, there was an endorsement of continued support for action at Member State level, with a focus on supporting and ensuring proper implementation of national strategies. This was endorsed by national authorities, EU institutions representatives, international organisations and civil society organisations alike. In addition, in the stakeholder workshops and interviews, the majority of participants highlighted the importance of supporting adaptation at the local level, including by local authorities. This was emphasised by all stakeholder groups but particularly among civil society organisations and several Member States’ representatives. As one stakeholder from a national government institution explained, support at the national and local level should go beyond EU leaflets. The majority of stakeholders also agreed in the workshops on faster deployment of solutions. One Member State representative suggested that this needs to come not only via Horizon Europe, but action should be scaled up at all levels. Overall, the lack of an international dimension of the 2013 Strategy was identified as a deficiency in all stakeholder consultations. According to OPC respondents, it is most important for the new Strategy to be aligned with the global goal on adaptation as expressed in the Paris Agreement (71.8%). This was most highlighted by international organisations, Member States’ representatives, academic and research institutions, non-governmental organisations and EU institutions, and less so by citizens and business representatives. The importance of Paris Agreement alignment has also been mentioned throughout the stakeholder workshops and interviews. 5.WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? This section describes policy options, and the corresponding actions and measures, considered for inclusion in the new Strategy. The two policy options under consideration represent an umbrella for various actions and measures and form the main level at which the Impact Assessment will take place. The actions represent the main activities that would potentially take place under each option and are based on the structure of the 2013 Strategy and its eight actions (see Table 5 below). While Option 1 expands on the actions of the 2013 Strategy, new ones are proposed under Option 2. The measures are the specific, tangible steps that will be put in place to implement the actions. They are the measure of the choices for this Impact assessment in terms of ambition. While many of the measures are not of a legislative nature, several notable examples will be pursued with separate legislative action. Climate proofing should be integrated in the Strategic Environmental Assessment. The collection of climate-related loss data from (re)insurers would be explored also in a legislative context (through the possible revision of the legal base of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority Regulation and/or the Solvency 2 directive). In order to be able to count on a truly EU climate insurance pool, the integration of a “build back better” requirement in the Solidarity Fund would require a revision of its legal base. In addition, several upcoming reviews (e.g. Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive) could see adaptation mainstreaming reinforced. For other processes, legislative follow up was not deemed necessary at this stage (e.g. there will be no revision of the Water Framework Directive following its fitness check, so climate change adaptation will be reinforced via guidance for the Common Implementation Strategy). Further work will require a pre-legislative follow up, such as white papers or blueprints, but also pilots of initiative (e.g. trying out with the Digital Europe Programme a pilot on loss data collection before rolling it out in legislation). Ultimate success of the Strategy would mean a succession of positive assessments of progress towards increased climate resilience at Union level. The Paris Agreement global goal on adaptation is similarly a dynamic one (i.e. enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change). Dealing with climate impacts means dealing with complexity, uncertainty, tipping points, cascading risk – adaptation to these impacts therefore requires a dynamic implementation (i.e. not just one script to follow but multiple). As for any policy of disaster risk management (e.g. pandemics, earthquakes), success of adaptation action is often invisible because it constitutes averted damage (a counterfactual is difficult to construct). Actions and measures were identified from a variety of sources; the 2018 Evaluation of the Strategy was nevertheless a key source, as it provided a detailed set of recommendations for measures in a revised Strategy. In addition, desk review, feedback from stakeholders through the Open Public Consultation, expert interviews and stakeholder workshops were all considered and contributed to the list of actions and measures proposed. The new strategy will indicate a vision for EU climate resilience and pursue it both directly, through the identified measures, and indirectly, through the principles it puts forward. This increased attention and strategic guidance will help bring existing instruments in line with the new reality of climate impacts (and add further justification for some instruments). It will also guide EU funding instruments (e.g. in the context of the 37% target for Recovery and Resilience Facility, or in programming for NDICI, CAP, Horizon Europe etc.) in terms of highlighting adaptation vs other policy priorities. In this regard, the strategy comes at an opportune moment because of priority setting and programming for the next MFF. Moreover, adaptation is most effective when it builds on the multiple benefits it can deliver (e.g. flood plain restoration as an opportunity to decrease flood impacts but also add recreation value, help biodiversity, reduce pollution etc.). In this section we present, for each policy option, a selection of measures for which more detailed mini-assessments are carried out. Detailed descriptions of the measures can also be found in the annexes: Annex 7 for the measures selected for the mini-assessments contributing to the Impact Assessment in chapter 6, and Annex 6 for the other measures. The selection of measures for mini-assessment was made in order to concentrate on the measures with the highest estimated direct impact relevant for Better Regulation (i.e. economic, social and environmental). The selection was based on a screening which considered the types of impacts each measure could have, the measurability of those impacts and the availability of evidence on them, whether the measures would impose significant costs on stakeholders, and the balance of measures across the actions. In this way a broad range of measures that are likely to provide the most relevant and assessable economic, social and environmental impacts were selected, with particular attention to those which may impose costs on stakeholders, raise political problems or encounter resistance in implementation. What is the baseline against which the options are assessed? Consistent with the Better Regulation Toolbox (#12, #17), the baseline option represents a ‘no policy change’ scenario (i.e. a policy baseline). This is taken as a continuation of the 2013 Adaptation Strategy in its current form, the 8 actions of which are presented in Table 5 below – a full assessment of this baseline option is available in the Evaluation of the 2013 Strategy. The Union could continue with the current strategy, as its evaluation was positive, including on continue relevance, but would operate in an increasingly changing context (see Section 1) to which it is not equipped to respond. Changes in the international and EU context would continue to erode the relevance of the few actions not yet concluded in their original ambition. Climate change impacts, and our understanding of them, have themselves evolved since the 2013 Strategy; the updated starting point and understanding of the impacts is an important part of the baseline, which draws on various IPCC reports and other authoritative source as well as recent research, including PESETA IV, Horizon 2020 COACCH project and the Study on Adaptation Modelling. Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis is having very significant impacts across the EU, and therefore both the crisis, and the policy response to it, will have impacts on the baseline scenario. There are two main ways in which this occurs: (1) the Recovery Fund will bring a large new source of EU investment, with a number of priorities announced that can influence adaptation, including through Horizon Europe and actions on climate change mitigation, which should reduce future climate impacts; and, (2) it increases attention on resilience, particularly in the area of health, but also more broadly, which should give the actions of the 2013 Strategy more traction. These changes will also be considered in the baseline to the extent possible, but it should be noted that, as many details remain to be finalised through the legislative process, and the proposals are quite recent, there is limited information, particularly quantitative information, on which to base an assessment. ACTION 1. Encourage all Member States to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies 2. Provide LIFE funding to support capacity building and step up adaptation action in Europe (2014-2020) 3. Introduce adaptation in the Covenant of Mayors framework (2013/2014) 4. Bridge the knowledge gap 5. Further develop Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation information in Europe 6. Facilitate the climate proofing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy and Common Fisheries Policy 7. Ensuring more resilient infrastructure 8. Promote insurance and other financial products for resilient investment and business decisions

Option 1: Deepening of existing actions of the 2013 Strategy Based on the thorough Evaluation and extensive stakeholder feedback both as part of that Evaluation and in the design of the new Strategy, this option proposes ambitious changes to both the form and nature of the eight actions of the 2013 Strategy. It also provides a wide range of new measures to deepen their impact. Table 6 lists the selected measures for which more detailed mini-assessments have been carried out (Annex 7). The full list of measures included in this option is presented in Annex 6. This option represents a clear step up in ambition, with commensurate increases in visibility and effectiveness for EU-level action while remaining well within the policy space of the 2013 Strategy. The relevance at action level is much increased compared to the baseline option, ensuring that the new Strategy would be adequately equipped to deal with the many of the domestic and international developments since 2013. It also proposes novel measures, which raise ambition compared to those in the baseline. This option could also help meet (albeit to a limited extent) the international objective (O4). ACTION MEASURE LINKING TO* 1.Closing further gaps in adaptation-relevant knowledge, through systematic data collection and sharing, and working with key public and private partners. 1.5: Close the climate disaster loss and risk data gap through (1) facilitating the recording, collecting and sharing of loss data from public and private sources through standards (2) establishing a climate risk data governance framework and ensuring open access to data, (3) collecting data on direct economic losses, non-economic losses and slow-onset events, and aligning existing programmes and data sources. D2, D3, D4, D6 P1, P3 O1, O3 2.Further developing Climate-ADAPT as the ‘first-stop shop’ for adaptation information in Europe. 2.1: Establish an EU Observatory for climate change and health. D2, D3, D4, D6 P1, P2 O1, O2, O3 3.Strengthening the evaluation, monitoring, reporting and implementation of adaptation strategies No mini-assessment D4, D5 P1, P2 O1, O2, O3, 4.Prioritising nature-based adaptation, including coastal protection and green and blue infrastructure. 4.1: Building inter alia on relevant provisions under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the new IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions*, promote the deployment of robust and effective nature-based solutions (NBS) for adaptation to climate change, notably by stepping up and scaling up their implementation and by further developing methods and tools to a) assess the vulnerability and expected resilience of planned NBS to projected climate change; b) determine their cost-efficiency and effectiveness with regards to their expected adaptation functions; c) quantify their wider economic, social and environmental co-benefits. D1, D4, D5 P2, P3 O2, O3 5.Stepping-up efforts to build resilience in cities and empower local action. 5.4: Launch a climate change adaptation Policy Support Facility / Technical Assistance project supporting local climate change adaptation action through the Covenant of Mayors. D2, D3, D5, D6 P1, P2, P3 O1, O2, O3 5.6: Support vulnerable groups and enterprises through education, social security policy and reskilling initiatives for green jobs and new business models, including through the European Skills Agenda and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), with a particular focus on adaptation and resilience. D2, D3, D4 P2, P3 O2 6.Further mainstreaming and integrating adaptation in EU legislation and instruments No mini-assessment D3, D4, D5, D9 P1, P2, P4 O1, O2, O4 7.Climate Proofing of Infrastructure and Disaster Risk Management 7.2: Climate proofing of guidelines and standards to ensure the adaptive capacity and climate resilience of new infrastructures in Europe and abroad. D4, D5, D7, D9 P2, P3, P4 O3 8.Closing the Climate Protection gap - microeconomic aspects of adaptation to climate change. 8.2: Funding instruments: mainstreaming of resilience, adaptation and climate risk management concerns in the design of calls and of project selection criteria and the identification of “EU interest” resilience upgrades required for interconnected critical infrastructure. D2, D3, D6, D7 P1, P3, P4 O1, O3, O4 9. 8.3: EU policy used to further influence private finance. Focus on the importance of adaptation ambition in the revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive and of prudential rules. D2, D3, D6 P2, P3 O3 * Please refer to chapter 2 (drivers and problems) and chapter 4 (objectives) Option 2: Deepening of existing actions and addition of novel actions to Strategy In addition to the measures listed in Option 1 (which are also included in option 2), Option 2 adds new actions to the Strategy, each of which includes a number of novel and innovative measures. The following Table 7 lists the measures for which more detailed mini-assessments to contribute to the IA have been carried out (see Annex 7 for these assessments). The full list of measures included in this option is presented in Annex 6. This option is one of greater political ambition in EU adaptation policy, on par with international commitments. It expands into thematic areas of prime importance (e.g. ecosystems, innovation, freshwater) and broadens the approach to other national relevant processes (e.g. fiscal frameworks. See Box 2 below). By seeking to add greater policy coherence to the Union’s actions on adaptation, including internationally, it sets itself apart from the baseline. Most importantly, it brings full thrust to the achievement of the international objective (O4). NOVELTY ACTION MEASURE LINKING TO* 9.Supporting partner countries and regions in their efforts on climate change adaptation and disaster management 9.1: Support upgrade and implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and NAPs by providing technical and financial assistance dedicated to: building capacity at national and sub-national level, developing adaptation plans in line with national priorities and vulnerabilities; supporting climate-proof structural governance reforms; implementing monitoring and evaluation schemes to assess progress towards climate change resilience; enhancing coherence with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies and environmental sustainability strategies; promoting nature-based solutions, especially in coastal areas. D4, D5, D8, D9 P1, P2, P3, P4 O1, O2, O3, O4 9.4: Work with leading institutions in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific and Asia sub-regions to promote and support climate change adaptation and disaster risk management approaches, and develop regional adaptation plans and action: Propose regional programmes in Africa (e.g. with AU or regional economic communities) to develop regional adaptation and DRR strategies. D2, D5, D9 P2, P4 O2, O4 10.Scaling up international adaptation finance and disaster risk financing, unlocking innovative sources of finance, and mobilising private finance 10.3: Use the External Investment Plan and the European Fund for Sustainable Development to leverage private sector finance for c