EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1478 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide 
{COM(2011) 844 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1479 final}  
 
EN 2   EN 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Organisation and timing 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU  external action instruments for the period 
2014-2020, including this document1, has been coordinated by a Task Force  composed by 
services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams , 
appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and 
studies mentioned in Section 2 and have liaised  with other Commission services to ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Fo rce has met with the drafting team in charge 
of this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 30 June, 14 July and 2 and 4 August 2011 for 
organisational and quality-check purposes. 
An Impact Assessment Steering Group,  composed by the members of the Task Force and 
representatives of interested Directorates Ge neral and the Secretariat General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011 It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. DG DE VCO, BUDG, SG, LS, 
EAC, FPI and EEAS were particularly involved. 
This review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board  is scheduled on 14 
September 2011. 
In line with article 27 of the Fi nancial Regulation (Council Regulation  (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing ru les of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment is the ex-ante 
evaluation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).  
1.2. Consultation and expertis e (public and internal) 
The Commission held a public consultation on futu re funding for EU external action between 
26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This pro cess was based on an online questionnaire 
accompanied by a background paper 'What fundi ng for EU external action after 2013?'  
prepared by Commission and EEAS services involved . The 220 contributions received to the 
public consultation reflect a broa d and diverse spectrum representi ng the variety of structures, 
views and traditions characterising the external action community. 
A majority of the respondents (around 70%) confirms that EU financial intervention provides 
a substantial added value  in the main policy areas supported through EU financial 
instruments for external action2. The criterion of EU added value is put forward by many 
respondents as the main driver for the future: the EU should exploit it s comparative advantage 
                                                 
1 The instruments are the following: Internal Agreement for the 11th European Development Fund, Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Instrument fo r Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument 
for Stability, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation,  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Partnership Instrument and the instruments for the EU-Greenland Part nership. The Macro-Financial Assistance 
instrument, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian aid instrument  and the Civil Protection 
mechanism are not part of this joint exercise.  
2 i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid,  investing in stability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood countries, tackling global ch allenges, promoting EU and intern ational standards and values, and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad  
 
EN 3   EN linked to its global field presence , its wide-ranging expertise, its supranational nature, its role 
as facilitator of coordination, and to the economies of scale. 
Nearly all respondents (92%) support a more differentiated approach,  tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary count ry, based on sound criteria and e fficient data collection, to be 
used as a way to increase the imp act of EU financial instruments. 
Over two thirds of respondents believe that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account 
in its external action , and that the latter  should be based to a larger extent on EU values and 
principles, and on development objectives of the partner countries. Inversely, a minority 
considers that EU external action should concen trate more on EU's own interests in the global 
economy, particularly towards emerging economies. 
Regarding simplification of instruments , as concerns the balance between geographic and 
thematic instruments , opinions are mixed regarding a review of EU thematic programmes 
and a possible reduction in number; many fear that  this could imply a decrease in the overall 
amount available for thematic action, and rath er call for a simplification of the rules 
governing access and implementation of thema tic funding. Several thematic issues are 
highlighted as important such as the reinforcem ent of the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights, climate financing or the current DCI thematic programmes. Increased 
flexibility of the geographic limits of EU instruments is supported by a significant majority 
of respondents as a way to res pond to interregional challenges. 
A majority of respondents agree that joint programming and co-financing with Member 
States  can increase the impact and the coherence of  EU external action, simplify the delivery 
of aid and reduce overall  transaction costs. 
Regarding like-mindedness and conditionality , there is wide support among respondents for 
exploring conditionality based on the benefi ciary country's respect for human rights, 
minorities, good governance and diversity of cultura l expressions (78%), or on the quality of 
its policies and of its ability and willingness to implement sound policies (63%). However, a 
majority of respondents is critical towards basing external coopera tion on the EU's own 
interests.  
A vast majority of responde nts support a stronger focus on  monitoring and evaluations 
systems  in the future instruments and in projects/programmes implementation. 
As concerns the means to enhance the visibility of EU external funding , a majority of 
stakeholders support increasing efforts for information and communication activities, in 
particular in beneficiary count ries; however EU visibility app ears to be better served by 
effective policies, strategies and presence in third countries, than by additional spending for 
communication. The ideas of reinforcing EU's coordinating role  among other donors and of 
ensuring that implementing partners give more vi sibility to EU funding also obtain a strong 
support from stakeholders. 
Various stakeholders consultations on the futu re pre-accession financ ial instrument beyond 
2013 conducted in early 2011, in particular with Me mbers of the European Parliament's DROI 
Committee, the five related key networks of NGOs (i.e. HRDN, EPLO, ENOP, ETUC and 
 
EN 4   EN CONCORD) confirmed support for continuity with  the current structure of instruments 
for EU external action , but with simplified implementing rules, more flexibility and 
enhanced strategic orientation in the alloca tion of assistance and generalised multiannual 
programming. 
Regarding EU external action on human rights and democracy , all respondents highlighted 
the need to further promote and support these objectives wo rldwide both by mainstreaming 
them within all EU policies and actions and by upholding them in a dedicated, separate but 
complementary, financial instrument. The Euro pean Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights is highly valued and all stakeholders asked the EU to enhance its potential, safeguard 
its added value and further deve lop its speed of delivery, in particular for the most difficult 
and urgent cases 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board 
The Impact Assessment Board (IAB) met on the 14 September 2011 a nd requested further 
clarifications, references and evidences s upporting the various analysis and options put 
forward to the decision makers. These additions have been added to the Impact Assessment. 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
“Humanity will not enjoy security without de velopment, it will not enjoy development 
without security, and it will not enjoy e ither without respect for human rights”3. 
2.1. The problem requiring action and the sc ope of the instrument regulation 
Definition 
Human rights are universal and in divisible. The European Uni on therefore actively promotes 
and defends them both within its borders and in its relations with thir d countries, living up to 
its commitments under the EU Fundamental Right s Charter and the Univ ersal Declaration of 
Human Rights4. Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union5 explicitly states that “the 
Union's action on the international scene shall be  guided by the principles  which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world: democracy, the rule of law, the univers ality and indivisibility  of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignit y, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and respect for the principles of the Unite d Nations Charter and international law.” 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the comprehe nsive package of EU instruments dedicated to 
the implementation of the Union’ external action6 has always comprised a specific financing 
instrument to support the EU’s ambition and interest in advocating universal respect for and observance of human rights and f undamental freedoms worldwide.  
                                                
 
3 UN report « in larger freedom », by UNSG K. Annan 21 March 2005 
4 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 
5 Title V / Chapter 1 - General provisions on the Union’s external action.-  
6 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (1996-2000)(2000-2006), European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (2007-2013) 
 
EN 5   EN In following up its predecessor, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 
launched in 2006, the European Instrument fo r Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a 
unique expression of this strong EU commitment  to democracy and human rights reflecting its 
own core  values and founding principles, as well as  those underlying the international legal 
order. 
The EIDHR inserts itself in, a nd operationally complements,  the wide-ranging EU box of 
tools supporting and promoting democracy a nd human rights worldwide, including through 
diplomatic dialogues and consultations, multilate ral action in the UN, the Council of Europe 
or OSCE, public statements and declarations, Council guidelines  on human rights, restrictive 
and other legal measures, or human rights clau ses in agreements with third countries.  
Evolution of the context 
While in recent years a number of countries have moved towards more open societies, fairer 
electoral processes and greater commitment to respect for human rights, multiple challenges 
remain. Many countries are still autocracies or de facto dictatorships where basic rights and 
freedoms are systematically violated and repr essed. Elsewhere, despite electoral processes 
and some political competition, power holders re vert to repression of dissent and opposition 
voices and legal and administrative restrictions  are being incrementally used to reduce the 
space for democracy and civil society in a wo rrying manner. Furthermore, certain regimes 
violate the rights to freedom of expression by arb itrarily depriving or di srupting their citizen's 
access to IT means of communi cation for political purposes. 
Challenges to freedom of expression and media pluralism are still very frequent and include: 
political interference, economic challenges including issues of ownership and competition, 
harassment, including violence against journa lists, considering defamation as a criminal 
offence. 
Moreover, the existence in many continents of l ong-standing internal or  cross-border conflicts 
or of structurally failed states continues to generate serious human ri ghts violations. Foremost, 
however, the need and interest to back up emergi ng democracies, in particular in the wake of 
the Arab Spring, makes comprehensive support to  democracy and human rights an essential 
part of the EU’s response to the inte rnational challenges in the period 2014-2020. 
The European Consensus on Development7 also reaffirms that promotion of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms is a comm on value in the EU vision of development. 
It stipulates that the prom otion of democracy, human right s, good governance and respect for 
international law, with special attention given to transparency and anti -corruption, is a clear 
added value and a comparative advantage for the EU. 
The recent review of the European Neighbou rhood Policy underlines that a functioning 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule  of law are fundamental pillars of the EU 
partnership with its neighbours. It confirms the EU’s commitm ent to provide greater support 
to partners engaged in building deep and sust ainable democracy – the kind that lasts because 
partner governments are committed to holding regul ar democratic elections and to guarantee 
                                                 
7 Joint Declaration by the Council and the representa tives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament  and the Commission on the development policy of 
the European union entitled " The European Consensus" – Official Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006. 
 
EN 6   EN the freedoms of association, assembly and expr ession, including free medi a, and the rights to 
receive impartial justice from independent judges, security fr om democratically accountable 
police and armed forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service — and other 
fundamental rights such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief8. 
Scope of the Instrument 
Democracy and Human Rights are inextricably  linked. The fundamental freedoms of 
expression and association are the preconditions for political pluralism and true democratic 
process, whereas democratic control and separa tion of powers are essential to sustain an 
independent judiciary and the rule of law, whic h in turn are required for effective protection 
of human rights9. Only in a democracy can individuals fully realize their human rights; only 
when human rights are respect ed can democracy flourish10. 
It is therefore deemed essential that the futu re instrument keeps a large scope encompassing 
the existing wide array of activ ities of advocacy, core support and field operations supporting 
all fundamental rights inherent in democracy and other human rights. It is a guarantee for 
policy rationality, comprehensiven ess of approach, coherence of operations and economies of 
scale. 
The scope of the EIDHR covers five objectives since 2007:  
• Enhancing respect for human rights and f undamental freedoms in countries where 
they are most at risk; 
• Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic 
reform, in supporting the peaceful conc iliation of group interests and, in 
consolidating political partic ipation and representation; 
• Supporting actions on human ri ghts and democracy issues in areas covered by EU 
Guidelines, including on human rights di alogues, on human rights defenders, on the 
death penalty, on torture, on children and arme d conflict, on the rights of the child, 
on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination 
against them, on International Humanitarian  Law and on possible future guidelines; 
• Supporting and strengthening th e international and regi onal framework for the 
protection and promotion of hu man rights, justice, the rule  of law and the promotion 
of democracy; 
• Building confidence in and enha ncing the reliability and tr ansparency of democratic 
electoral processes, in partic ular through election observation. 
                                                 
8 Communication “A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood” of 25/05/2011, COM(2011) 303 
9 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on 
establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide - 
OJEU L 386/1- Whereas (8) 
10 EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations, adopted as annex of the 
Council conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations, 17 November 2009 
 
EN 7   EN The response strategy11 under the EIDHR builds on working predominantly with and through 
civil society organizations, aimed at defendi ng the fundamental freedoms which form the 
basis for all democratic processes and helping ci vil society to become an effective force for 
political reform and defense of human rights. In  this way, it complements the new generation 
of geographical programmes, which increasingl y mainstream democracy and human rights, 
though focusing primarily on publ ic institution-building. 
A growing number of project s and requests for more 
In total, between 2007 and 2011, mo re than 1600 EIDHR projects have been launched and are 
presently operating on the ground. The Instrument is encountering an ever growing interest 
and demand. 
In 2010 only, 512 contracts opening projects in the field were signed . The country based 
support scheme has increased from € 31 millio n in 2007 to € 67 million in 2010 and from 
being used by 45 delegations in 2007 to 81 delegations in 2011. Since 2007, 162 calls for 
proposals have been launched and concluded. 3012 concept notes were analyzed, including 
1279 for the sole objective of addressing the countries and situations most at risk. 
Since 2007, 41 EU Election Observation Missions  (EU EOM) were deployed in nearly all 
continents and more than fifty election relate d missions have taken place, including technical 
assessment missions. Indeed, the EU received more invitations to observe elections than it had 
the means to accept and carry out and therefore wa s unable to observe all elections that could 
have merited observation. 
EIDHR Partners are 90 % Civil Society Or ganisations (CSOs) a nd 10% International 
Organisations. In 2009-2010 more than 900 CSOs we re awarded projects for more than € 240 
million. 
A sample of projects and results are descri bed in annex of this Impact Assessment. 
2.2. Review of evaluation reports 
There was no evaluation of the Instrument as a whole. Nevertheless, se veral evaluations were 
conducted to assess the global a nd local impact of the EIDHR. They form a good basis for an 
aggregated evaluation of most  the EIDHR's components. Eval uations took stock of core 
thematic activities of the EIDHR such as human right defenders12, prevention of torture and 
support for torture rehabilitation centres13 or support to the Intern ational Criminal Court14, as 
well as EIDHR country based activities such as in Ukraine15, Angola16 or Sri Lanka17. Three 
additional important ev aluations are ongoing related to the impacts of the EU’s overall human 
rights policy, the EIDHR Country Based Suppor t Scheme, and the operations related to 
countries and situati ons most at risk. 
                                                 
11 Commission Communication of 25 January 2006 
12 Evaluation on Human Rights Defender HRD, May 2010 - available at www.eidhr.eu  
13 Evaluation on anti-torture activities, June 2008 – available at www.eidhr.eu   
14 Evaluation on the support to the I CC, December 2008 - available at www.eidhr.eu  
15 Evaluation on EIDHR support in Ukraine, August 2006 – available at www.eidhr.eu   
16 Evaluation of EIDHR support in Angola, March 2010 - available at www.eidhr.eu  
17 Mid Term evaluation of EIDRH micro-programme in Sri Lanka 
 
EN 8   EN While largely positive, these evaluations have led to the identification of necessary 
improvements that are proposed below. 
The mid-term review of the instrument was co mpleted in 2010. It was a stocktaking exercise 
of delivery with more than 100 local and centr al calls for proposals 400 worldwide projects, 
representing more than 300 local civil society projects in 70 th ird countries, 40 projects in 
countries and regions where human rights and fundamental freedoms are most at risk, 13 
projects on the fight against death penalty, 32 pr ojects on the fight against torture, 11 large-
scale projects with emergency support mechan isms to support human rights defenders, 5 
projects regarding global civ il society campaigns in support of the ICC, 20 targeted actions 
with key international strategic partners (e.g. Council of Europe or UN) , support to the Master 
programme of the European In ter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation 
(EIUC) and four regional Mast er programmes on human rights and democratisation in South 
East Europe, Latin America/Caribbean, Africa and Asia-Pacific. 
The review led to the adoption of the second18 EIDHR strategy paper for 2011-201319. 
Several lessons learnt have led to the identifi cation of various improve ments that are proposed 
below 
It is suggested that the future EIDHR regulat ion entails a dedicated new Article committing to 
an evaluation report (by 2017) to assess the achi evement of the objectives of the measures 
adopted on the basis of this Regulation, the effici ency of the use of reso urces and its European 
added value, in view of a decision on the renewal, modification or suspension of the 
measures. 
2.3. Review of lessons learnt 
Reviews and evaluations unde rlined several strengths 
The EIDHR offers independence of action, allowing working without the need for 
government consent , which is a critical feat ure especially in the sens itive areas of democracy 
and human rights. Thus, the instrument supports de mocratic education e.g. at graduate level of 
future young Belarusian leaders abroad or tries to mitigate unfair criminalization of 
democratic activists imprisoned for being in the opposition. The defenders of the victims, 
such as lawyers, have in tu rn to be defended (through the Hu man Right Defender system) as 
they risk imprisonment for taking up the cases of  pro-democracy activists or rights defenders. 
The EIDHR offers more flexibility and capacity to respond  to changing circumstances, 
contrasting with the long-term programming appr oach of the geographical programmes. Thus, 
in the context of the evolving Arab Spring, an immediate assistance was made available to the 
reform committee in Tunisia to design the ro admap for transition and help civil society 
contribute to the process. The EIDHR will also provide democracy training for political party activists, support free press and i ndependent pluralistic media- bot h traditional and ICT-based, 
including censorship-free and undisrupted electronic communi cations technologies- and 
support civic education on democracy in Tunisi a. The EIDHR might also be available for 
strengthening the production capaci ties of media and training of th e journalists. In view of the 
                                                
 
18 First strategy covered 2007-2010 
19 EIDHR Strategy paper 2011-2013, COM(2010)2432 of the 21.04.2010 
 
EN 9   EN upcoming elections, it is providi ng training to thous ands of local observers and will fund the 
envisaged EU Election Observation Mission. 
The EIDHR also works in the most difficult environments  where basic rights and freedoms 
are most at risk. In order to pr otect the physical safety  of activists and others whose lives may 
be seriously endangered, the details of such projects cannot be made public. The European 
Commission reports on these projects to authoriz ed persons in the Council, the Parliament and 
the EEAS on a “need to know” basis and may onl y commend the courage of such dedicated 
activists. 
These difficult cases represent about 20 % of EIDHR activities. Since 2007, the EIDHR 
supported more than 100 such projects (€ 60 million worth). In particular, supported by its network of Human Rights Defe nders (HRD), the EIDHR backed 19 HRD projects (€ 13.5 
million worth) in more than 45 countries. 
In those contexts, the EIDHR acts as a breath of fresh air  with most projects focusing on 
helping the survival of weakened or shattere d civil society and medi a, thereby opening the 
door to dialogue and change. It offers the chan ce for democratic education of students and 
vulnerable groups, often based abroad. It helps the advocacy of civil society and diasporas 
abroad. Sometimes it simply tries to protect an d, if needed, to bring victims of repression out 
of the country into safety. 
The “Jasmine revolution” means that the EIDHR  may now reveal its in volvement in Tunisia 
in 2010 where, prior to transition, it supported activities of the Tunisian League of Human 
Rights (LTDH), the Association of Democrat ic Women (AFTD), Trade Unions (UGTT), 
Judges’ and Lawyers’ Associati ons and others, which at the tim e was not authorized in the 
country. Lack of publicity concerning its involvem ent at the time could have been interpreted 
as a lack of responsiveness; in fact, the EIDHR was very active. 
Reviews and evaluations have also hi ghlighted four blocks of questions 
First, broadly defined objectives and strategi es have caused a certain fragmentation of 
approaches and some lack of
 legibility of the Instrument, creating risks of duplication, 
difficulties in measuring the impact of the activities and a certain weakening of the 
complementarity. 
Second, while in the most difficult countries th e official project desc ription has often been 
disguised in more traditional development activi ties terms to protect the project from a hostile 
environment, this has sometimes led to EIDHR re sources being devoted to “soft” issues, such 
as health or sanitation, and not the most pressing priorities, th ereby creating a risk of being 
used for non-priority activ ities in terms of the scope of the instrument. Therefore qualitative 
supports were established 
Third, there is a clear need to increase the flexibility  of the instrument. This is particularly 
true for the limited part of the instrument addressing th e toughest situations  in terms of human 
rights violations and urgency of cases, for whic h a system of open calls seems inadequate. 
Fourth, the budget of the EIDHR is too limited  given its vast geog raphical and thematic 
scope. The EIDHR is the smallest of the existi ng EU instruments and only represents 1% of 
the overall EU Official Development Assistance . The qualitatively acceptable, yet unsatisfied 
requests received represent 2-3 times more than  the current funding capac ities allow to cover, 
 
EN 10   EN proving a high relevant absorp tion potential. Similarly, more  EU Election Observation 
Missions could be carried out if  more funding were available. 
2.4. The underlying drivers of the problem 
It is essential that the EIDHR keeps its dual capac ity (i) on the one hand,  to support long term 
and in depth comprehensive efforts to promot e democracy and human rights and (ii) on the 
other hand, to quickly respond to urgent cases of violati ons, often in very difficult 
environments 
The European Commission’s proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework, tabled in 
June, foresees already to mitigate the issue of the currently tight resources for the EIDHR. It 
proposes a somewhat increased bud get allowing to enhance the EU response and to bring it 
closer to the level of  the requests. The potential absorpti on capacity and the level of good 
project submissions correspond ap proximately to 3 times the cu rrent available budget (€ 150 
million a year). However, a budget increase to  such a level (€ 450 million a year) is not 
deemed feasible in times of austerity. The current Commissi on proposal aims at reaching a 
reasonable benchmark of around € 200 million a year for a total instrument budget of € 1,400 
million over the period 2014-2020 (2011 current prices). This corresponds to a realistic increase (20%)
. The EIDHR will have conducted an estim ated total of 2500 projects between 2007-
2013. Such an increase would allow for an estimat ed of 3000 additional key projects between 2014-
2020.  
First driver: lack of focus Broadly defined EIDHR objectives and strategies have caused some degree of fragmentation 
of approaches and some lack of legibility of the Instrument crea ting risks of duplication, 
difficulties in measuring its impact and a certain weakening of the complementarity. Some delegations have also used the flexibility of the instrument to  deliver developmental projects 
with only a partial human right component, t hough sometimes to “disgui se” the project in 
countries with difficult political environments. 
While the scope of activities covered by the EI DHR needs to stay large and open, the broad 
definition of objectives in the current EIDHR re gulation allows for a dispersion of efforts and 
strategies. The effectiveness of the instrument has been negatively affected as a result of not 
being enough of an enabling tool focused around the main types of activities to be conducted 
and their enabling environment. 
Second driver: red tape 
While the results achieved and the important role played by the existing flexibilities is to be 
commended, one also needs to note that at time s the EIDHR’s reactivity has been either too 
slow or achieved at high transact ion costs due to red tape. It is  therefore important to further 
increase the flexibility of the instrument in  order to enhance its reactivity for though and 
urgent situations. The length of  calls for proposals, from the launch of the call, to the 
contractualisation of selected beneficiaries of grant, imposed by the steps foreseen in the 
Financial Regulation, is incompatible with fast  delivery. It can indeed take up to 12 months. 
While the majority of the activit ies should remain demand-driven to  ensure their feasibility, to 
avoid “white elephants” and to ensure owne rship by the actors, this approach can be 
sometimes impossible to implement in the most difficult situations. Indeed, as an example, 
 
EN 11   EN one cannot expect threatened and frightened ci vil society actors that live under immediate 
pressure to answer public and publicised calls for proposals, which might jeopardise their own 
safety. As an example, a public call for propos al aiming at the sele ction of projects to 
strengthen Human Rights in North Korea cannot take place without serious  political risks and 
risks for the potential beneficiaries. Therefore, the issue of how to bri ng EIDHR action to bear 
effectively in the most difficult cases is cer tainly an area that would justify additional 
flexibility measures. 
The implementation of some procedures, such  as call for proposals, also represents 
transaction costs and administrative burden th at should be limited when not necessary or 
counterproductive to the achievement of  the objectives of the instruments. 
2.5. Legal base for EU action 
The legal bases for the instrument are Article 209.1 TFEU (ex 179 EC) and Article 212.2 (ex 
181a EC). 
In addition, the policy proposed is based on Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union 
which provides that “the Union's action on th e international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundament al freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law." 
2.6. EU added value 
On the background of its own accomplishments in conflict solution, peace building and 
prosperity creation, the EU would seem to be in  an excellent position to deliver on external 
action, on behalf of and with its Member Stat es, generally enjoying high credibility in the 
countries where it works in. It is well placed to ta ke on the role of a global leader on behalf of 
its citizens, in particular in its support and promotion of democracy and human rights. Yet, 
European added value cannot be reduced to a balance sheet: contributing to peace building 
worldwide, assisting the world's poorest pe ople and supporting demo cratisation and human 
rights respect are indisputable demonstrations of how  the EU adds value through its work 
every day. This is precisely where the priori ties of the next financial instruments on EU 
external action will lie. 
With 27 Member States acting within the fram ework of common policies and strategies, the 
EU has the critical weight to respond to globa l challenges, such as fostering the universality 
of human rights for all people. The EIDHR is actually the only sizable  EU instrument to 
address specifically human rights, and most  Member States only have limited funds, in 
comparison, supporting human rights a nd democracy related activities. 
Due to its large scale the EU can deliver help in the world's most remote areas, where most 
Member States have little strategic interest, on ly limited presence and reduced capacity to act. 
Thanks to EU action in, for example, Fiji,  Vanuatu or Timor Leste where recently new 
funding for stable democracy and sustainabl e development was provided, aid reaches the 
people that need it most, but who ot herwise would remain without it. 
 
EN 12   EN At a time of budgetary restrictions, when severa l MS are compelled to exit entire sectors and 
countries, the EU continues to be able to play  an active role in prom oting peace, democracy, 
solidarity, stability, prosperity and poverty reduction in our immediate neighbourhood and 
worldwide. In this context, it makes more sens e than ever from a purely economic perspective 
to invest money at EU level where a real di fference can be made. In fact, acting through the 
EU can actually save money for MS. Certain aid e ffectiveness reforms, especially in terms of 
division of labour, could add up to potential savings of between 3 and 6 billion a year, 
according to a recent independent study ( The Benefits of a European Approach, by HTSPE ). 
Working with the EU is also cheaper. Administrative costs – es timated at 5.4% on the basis of 
2009 data - are lower than the average administra tive costs of the principal donors for bilateral 
aid. The administrative rules that apply are intend ed to make sure that EU taxpayers' money is 
properly spent, using strict cr iteria, which can be monitored. 
In addition, the European Commi ssion is one of the most transparent aid bodies in the world. 
Such transparency is in itself an important t ool to ensuring effective value for money. This 
has been recognised by the or ganisation "Publish what you F und" which ranked the European 
Commission in 4th position (out of  30) in it is first Aid transp arency Assessment of donors in 
February this year. Further improve ments are continuing to be made. 
In a recent Green Paper consul tation carried out to find out views from stakeholders on our 
development policy, all those who responded agreed on the positive role that the EU played in 
supporting good governance (including participation of civil society), security, human rights 
and gender equality. 
As an example, for the Arab Spring, and in particular the Libyan crisis, the complementary 
activities of ECHO, IfS and EIDHR have formed the core of the exemplary civilian pillar of 
the EU response to humanita rian need (i.e. Echo), crisis (i .e. IfS) and support to democratic 
transition (i.e. EIDHR). 
3. OBJECTIVES  
3.1. General objectives of the instrument 
The goal pursued by the EIDHR is to contribute  to the development and consolidation of 
democracy and the rule of law and to promot ing respect for fundamental freedoms and all 
human rights, within the overall framework of  the EU’s policy on development cooperation 
and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, and consistent with 
the EU’s foreign policy and exte rnal action as a whole. This objective is to be maintained. 
3.2. Specific objectives of the revision 
First, it is important to note upf ront that this proposal for the revision of the EIDHR is based 
on the premise of keeping the existing efficient principles  that are key to ensure the reality of 
the EIDHR mandate and its added value:  
• To maintain a separate, stand-alone instrument that acts in complementarity with 
other instruments which mainstream hu man rights (i.e. focus on human rights 
defenders and most difficult environments) 
 
EN 13   EN • To work autonomously, without host countr y government consent (i.e. partial EU 
restricted) 
• To maintain a worldwide coverage (i.e . also active in the US or Japan) 
• To maintain existing procedural flexibilitie s (i.e. re-granting, informal partnerships, 
small grant) 
• To keep a strong focus on local activities and CSOs 
Indeed, complementarity is the basis for human rights mainstreaming and the EIDHR’s 
leverage effect, working without host country co nsent is a guarantee to avoid censorship and 
undue interference in sensitive an d difficult environments, worldw ide coverage is a reflection 
of the universalism of human rights and the existing flexibilities are ensuring a minimum 
potential of reactivity. These principles have  been recognised and commended by all stake 
holders in various consultations and ther efore should not be subject to change 
The specific objectives of the EIDHR’s re vision are twofold and pursue the aim to build a 
better enabling regulation  
On one hand, to focus on enabling working axis  serving a scope of activ ities that stays broad 
and even enlarged in th e currently too weak area of econom ic and social rights. The future 
EIDHR would aim at a more operational definiti on of the objectives of the regulation along 
four axes of work, representing focused proces s oriented categories of activities described 
hereafter in section 3.5 (i.e. geographical/thematic coverage 
On the other hand, to increase the flexibility of the instrument  by applying a full untying of 
EIDHR funding to restrictive rule s of nationality and origin, a condition consistent with its 
worldwide mandate, and by applying, when appropria te, the procedures of the Instrument for 
Stability (i.e. direct grants based on concept notes) within  a limited funding envelope under 
the instrument dedicated to the most diffi cult cases and to emergencies (+/- 20%). 
3.3. Consistency with external action priorities 
Advocacy and support of democracy and for the respect of human rights are enshrined as 
primary guiding principles of the EU’s external  action in Articles 2 V and 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union. They are also enshrined as  a key overarching element in the European 
Consensus for Development, the new Neighbourhood Policy and in all EU partnerships, the DCI and the EDF. It is also a key criterion for the enlargement process 
3.4. Consistency with other EU policies 
As a consequence of this clear-cut Treaty ma ndate, promotion and support of democracy and 
human rights is to be integrated a nd mainstreamed in all EU policies 
The EIDHR is part of the architecture of di fferent external action financial instruments 
proposed jointly by the Europ ean Commission and the High Re presentative for CFSP. It 
complements long term instruments by focussing on CSO activities in the field of democracy 
and human rights, addressing the most difficult situations, financing EU  Election Observation 
Missions and supporting local, regional and worldwide campaigns on key human rights 
issues. It is an essen tial part of the wider external action toolbox to  promote and safeguard 
human rights respect. It also complements the toolbox of crisis management and prevention 
 
EN 14   EN alongside with humanitarian aid, CFSP operati ons and the Instrument for Stability by 
providing rapid support in cases of urgent human rights violations . It also acts as a link to 
relief, rehabilitation and development activit ies by offering the possibility for providing 
physical and mental rehabilitation and reinsertion to vi ctim of abuses or assist human rights 
defenders in urgent protection need. As an exam ple, in Libya, the EIDHR will help bring back 
to schools children that were sheltered by ECHO, offering a democratic curriculum and 
specific psychological rehabilitations. Later on, th e ENPI, will follow and help with more in-
depth reforms of the education system 
It has been essential to ensure on the ground, in a pragmatic manner, the coordination with 
and a proper division of labour between the EI DHR and other interac ting instruments, in 
particular in the needs assessments phase  of cases. Indeed, the EIDHR complements 
humanitarian aid operations, as refugees and be neficiaries of humanitarian relief are often 
victims of human rights vi olations that need to  be documented, registered and treated. Strong 
synergies and mutual reinforcement exist with th e Instrument for Stability (e.g. in case of 
emergencies), Non State Actor line (e.g. support to CSOs), Investing in People Line (e.g. 
gender and disenfranchised groups) and in th e future the new Neighbourhood Civil Society 
Facility. As an example, in Haiti, in resp ect of the 2010 general el ections, while the IfS 
provided support to the organi sation of elections  and the NSA suppor ted civil society 
capacity, the EIDHR provided EU observation mi ssions, local domestic ob servation as well as 
protection against human rights Abuses. 
3.5. Geographical/thematic coverage 
The EIDHR should continue to have a worldwid e geographical coverage, outside of the EU, 
and be able to act potentially  in any region or country of the world. While the thematic 
coverage of the future EIDHR should remain  wide, it would focus on four enabling axis 
thematic campaigns, mixing advocacy and field ope rations for major issues (e.g. international 
justice) and addressing serious vi olations of rights (e.g. torture,  death penalty, discrimination, 
etc..), as well as providin g core support to key actors and related civic education;  
targeted support to the development of thriving  civil societies, empowering it in its quest for 
and defence of democracy and human rights an d to their specific role as actors for positive 
change;  
reinforced capacity for the EU to be able to react quickly to human rights urgencies and 
establishment of a comprehensive EU Human Rights Defender mechanism;  
strengthened and better integrated appro ach to democratic cycles, through election 
observation and other types of support to  democratic and el ectoral processes;  
Further details, sub-objectives and targets (i.e. which funding envelope for which major issue) 
will be determined in the multi-annual strategies  and/or annual action plans. They will also 
take account of the priority setting under the Human Rights Country Strategies currently 
under elaboration and validation. 
The case of the EU Election Observation Miss ions (EU EOMs) is peculiar in terms of 
geographical coverage. Indeed, EU EOMs do not take place in the countries of the OSCE 
membership (including the EU’s own Member Stat es). This is a measure of division of labour 
and sound financial approach, as the OSCE is already organizing its ow n election observation 
 
EN 15   EN missions, with a methodology compatible with that for EU EOMs (the OSCE has endorsed 
the same Declaration of Principles for Internat ional Election Observation as the EU) and with 
the financial support of EU Member  States. That is why it is not  envisaged at this stage to 
change this peculiar geogra phical coverage of EU EOMs. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS  
While the comparative advantage of the EIDHR as  such does not seem controversial at EU 
level, it is essential to base the future instrument on lessons learnt. This implies, on the one hand, to keep the proven added value and recogni sed working principles and specificities of 
the EIDHR. It also implies, on the other hand, to introduce amendments and changes to the 
delivery mechanisms of the instrument, in orde r to further improve its reactivity, flexibility 
and impact on the ground. 
4.1. Option 0 – No regulation 
One could envisage cancelling the EIDHR and d ecide either not to address democracy and 
human rights or to mainstream relevant  activities within other instruments. 
4.2. Option 1 - No change to the existing regulation 
The EIDHR would remain the same in terms of its geographical and thematic scope, its 
objectives and its operational pr inciples. The proposed increase of the budget allocation will 
allow to catch up with inflation since 2007 (14%) and to conduct more operations. 
4.3. Option 2 - Building a bett er enabling regulation 
While the option to table an entirely new in strument is not propose d, the second option put 
forward is to aim at an amended EIDHR regula tion reflecting lessons l earnt and the various 
changes proposed. This revision would target th e establishment of a be tter enabling and more 
process oriented regulation, entailin g 5 sub-options to be discussed. 
Sub-option 1 – Focussing on enabling working tools axis 
Built as a better enabling regulation, the questio n is whether the approach should be to keep 
the existing regulation and introduc e change in strategies and pr actices or whether to revise 
the instrument and introduce changes to he lp focus it on its four  different windows: 
• thematic campaigns, mixing advocacy a nd field operations for major issues(e.g. 
international justice) and addressing seriou s violations of right s (e.g. torture, death 
penalty, discrimination, etc ..), as well as providing core  support to key actors and 
related civic education;  
• targeted support to the development of th riving civil societies empowering it in its 
quest for and defence of democracy and human  rights and to their specific role as 
actors for positive change;  
• reinforced capacity for the EU to be able  to react quickly to human rights urgencies 
and establishment of a comprehensive EU Human Rights Defender mechanism;  
 
EN 16   EN • strengthened and better inte grated approach to democr atic cycles, through election 
observation and other types of support to  democratic and el ectoral processes;  
Sub-option 2 – Maintaining the insertion of EU  Elections Observati on Missions (EOMs) 
EU Election Observation Missions  have always formed a releva nt and important part of the 
EIDHR activities. The question has been raised  about their potential insertion into the 
Instrument for Stability or in geographical instruments and relevant country financial 
envelopes. 
Sub-option 3 – Maintaining t he exclusion of political parties 
The direct funding of political parties is prohi bited in the current regulation. Regular requests 
by political parties and/or affiliated bodies to  lift this prohibition have been received. 
Sub-option 4 – Further untying 
The instrument applies the common level of untying for EU instruments. The question has 
been raised whether it is coherent  with the EIDHR worldwide mandate Sub-option 5 - Add 
new flexibilities for most diff icult countries/situations. 
The question has arisen whether a limited (in terms of amount) use of the direct award of 
grants as practiced by the IfS could be ap plied, if appropriate, to the most difficult 
countries/situations a nd cases of urgency. 
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  
5.1. Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options 
The promotion of democracy and human ri ghts has a direct ec onomic, social and 
environmental impact, which is extremely di fficult to quantify. Neve rtheless, improvements 
of an individual’s situation in  terms of human rights and demo cratic participation certainly 
have a direct impact on his/her economic and so cial life, as well as on the likelihood of better 
environmental protection measures being taken. 
Indeed, supporting activists or human rights de fenders involved in the defence of economic, 
social or environmental rights ha s a strong impact local ly and also generate s political pressure 
on governments to observe the commitments ma de by a given countr y in these areas, 
therefore tending to improve the situation in this regard. 
The various options have diffe rent qualitative impacts. 
One can expect that many stakeholders would view option 0 (n o regulation) as a 
renouncement by the EU of promoting its own core values and relevant international 
standards. It will certainly have a very negativ e impact in terms of the EU’s image both at 
home and on the inte rnational scene. 
While option 1 (no change) will allow for the existing economies of scale of a self-standing 
instrument, it will miss those resulting from th e proposed rationalisation of the process and its 
improved rapidity through additional flexibility (option 2). Indeed, a faster and more reactive 
 
EN 17   EN mechanism can make a difference when saving the life of a victim is a question of days or 
even hours. 
5.2. Include impacts on external action, in  particular on Policy Coherence for 
Development 
The integration of democracy a nd human rights activities within other instruments (option 0) 
will allow a direct integration with other policie s. However, it will certainly reduce the profile 
of the EU’s human rights and democracy support, as  well as risk to cr eate incoherencies of 
action between regions and thematic areas a nd lead to diverging or double standards. 
A revision limited to an increased EIDHR budget  (option 1) will allo w to respond better to 
requests, in particular those emerging from EU delegations in the field that are well placed to 
assess the field reality and cohe rence on the ground. It will not allow benefiting from other 
possible improvements. 
An improved EIDHR (option 2) will allow to better impact on the other policies. It will help 
further ensure the Policy Coherence for Deve lopment as there is no development without 
rights and no rights without development. 
5.3. Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities 
An increased EIDHR budget will impose additio nal managerial constraints if it is not 
accompanied by additional flexibility. A part of the financial envelope will have to be 
earmarked for support expenditure which should  follow the percentage of the operational 
credit increase. 
An improved EIDHR and/or faster  and more flexible implemen ting modalities as proposed in 
4.2 (option 2) will allow reduci ng transaction costs of implem entation while increasing the 
impact and therefore the instrument’s value for m oney. It will also allow for faster delivery in 
an area where often, timing is of the essence for a positive result. 
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS  
6.1. Weighting of positive and negative impacts per option 
6.1.1.  Option 0 (No regulation) 
Not having a specific regulation on democracy and human rights will imply either that the EU 
will not undertake the activities previously con ducted within the scope of the instrument, or 
that these activities will have to be ma instreamed within other instruments. 
Cancelling existing activities out of the EU portfolio will greatly endanger the EU’s standing 
and leadership in the field of  human rights and democracy a nd its capacity to underpin its 
policy dialogues with concrete operations. Moreove r, it will result in thousands of persons 
across the world, either human rights activists or  victims of abuses, being without means and 
protection while often in preca rious situations or even sometimes in lethal danger. 
The inclusion of democracy and human rights ac tivities within other instruments (EFF, ENPI 
or DCI) could be seen as a positive sign of ma instreaming. Nevertheless, the suppression of a 
 
EN 18   EN self standing instrument will lead to the aboli tion of the specific, valuable working principles, 
such as the absence of consent of the host country or targeting civil society actors. Therefore 
this option will impede most activities and redu ce the delivery to the easiest or show case 
activities. It will lower efficiency of opera tional delivery (e.g. reduced geographical scope, 
lower economies of scales, higher cost) and crea te certainly a strong loss of visibility and 
positive reputation (i.e. secondary rather than complementary). 
6.1.2.  Option 1 (No change) 
The option of no change would result in activities  remaining strictly in the framework of the 
existing EIDHR Regulation.  
This option would ensure the continuity of  the instrument, as well as an improved 
understanding (through an effect of repetition) of its  activities. It woul d maintain the good 
principles of the existing EDIHR.  It would also maintain the EU as one of the biggest donors 
in the field of human rights and democracy. 
While this option would allow maintaining th e performing existing instrument, it would not 
allow facing new challenges adequately, co rrecting lessons learnt and answering new 
demands. 
6.1.3.  Option 2 (Revised regulation) 
Sub-option 1 - Focussing on enabling working tools axis 
Built as a better enabling regulation, the revised instrument set up as a process oriented tool 
would focus on the four different windows set out under point 4.3.  
The four categories discussed above correspond roughly to the type of activities that are 
delivered by the current EIDHR. However, adap ting the delivery mechanisms will allow for 
improved efficiency and impact on the ground.  Two major changes are needed. First the 
update of several artic les to insert in the regulation various  enhanced flexibil ities developed in 
the new Financial Regulation, as well as seve ral modalities allowing, in accordance with the 
EU commitment on aid effectiveness, to impr ove joint activities and programming with the 
Member States and other donors. Second, to adapt specific flexibilities for the most difficult 
cases as described in sub-option 5. Due to the hi ghly sensitive nature of  the issue (i.e. most 
difficult countries are high on the EU diplomatic agenda) this additional enabling flexibility is 
presented as an independent option. 
Sub-option 2 – Maintaining the insertion of EU  Elections Observati on Missions (EOMs) 
The coherence between EOMs, diplomatic agenda s and long term engagement with partner 
countries might benefit from the insertion of  EOMs in the concerned country's envelope 
within geographical instrument. 
The insertion of EOMs within the Instrument  for Stability could allow enhancing the 
deployment of EOM in post-conflict  or quasi conflict situation and its link as a tool to address 
crisis agendas or negotiations for transition. 
Nevertheless, EOMs are a flagship of the EU external action and their current methodology 
and the independence of the EIDHR as the fi nancing basis guarantee in turn the EOM’s 
 
EN 19   EN independence and their high degree  of credibility. This makes them an important tool in 
bbuilding confidence in and enhanc ing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral 
processes, detached from any political agenda (i.e. almost an evaluation of the electoral situation and related democratic processes). 
It is proposed to maintain the existing insertion of the EOMs as  an important pillar of the 
EIDHR. The question has been also been disc ussed in the IfS Impact Assessment and the 
potential options for its revision, with similar co nclusions and reasoning. 
Sub-option 3 - The exclusion of political parties 
Political parties are essential actors of the democr atic cycle and real actors of change and of a 
grass root democracy. The direct  funding of political parties, de spite their role as important 
actors of the civil society is currently prohibite d by the existing instrument. Allowing them as 
potential beneficiaries of the EIDHR would incl ude a key category of actor that is excluded 
and might meet the agreement of parts of the Members of the European Parliament. However, 
this exclusion was carefully thought through and agreed by the EU as a guarantee for the non–
partisan approach pursued by the Union under th e EIDHR. Until this approach is not changed, 
the insertion of political partie s as direct beneficiar ies would be in contradiction with this 
principle. 
The recent announcement of the envisaged set up  of a European Endowment for Democracy 
potentially focussing precisely on political partie s, society and actors, detached from the non 
partisan principle under which the EIDHR works, also calls for not duplicating in this direction. 
It is recommended for this exclusion to be mainta ined. It is important to note that this does not 
exclude activities targ eting political parties in a non-partisan manne r (such as democracy 
related training), but direct pa rty funding should be excluded. By  contrast, the eligibility of 
independent political foundations would remain unaffected by this exclusion, in line with the 
current regulation. 
Sub-option 4 – Further untying 
The proposal for the Future Basic Acts aims at a further gradual untying of aid to  the rules of 
origin and /or nationality corresponding to the EU  political commitments made at this point in 
time. The worldwide nature of the EIDHR calls a full untying of aid, as was the case already 
for the preceding European Initiative on Demo cracy and Human Rights. It has imposed a 
constant use of the derogation measures allowe d in the regulation to further untie the EIDHR 
resources. Cases are recurrent such as campai gns against death penalty in USA or Japan, use 
of Switzerland based internati onal NGOs, or projects by diaspor a groups that fled highly 
repressive countries to non EU countries. 
Therefore, regular activities impose derogations to the existing rules on rule of origin and 
nationality. The adoption or not  of the complete untying of the regulation does not have a 
direct impact on the derogation possibilities that  exit and are regularly used. It would have an 
impact on the administrative cost of projects a nd allow reducing red tape, representing a direct 
gain of resources. While the previous European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights 
was already fully untied, this would represen t a precedent for the entire EU assistance. 
 
EN 20   EN In accordance with the aim of the two EU regulations on the untying of aid, it is 
recommended that the future EIDHR is fully un tied and the eligibility of project exclusively 
based on the balance between their relevance, quality and price. 
Sub-option 5 - Add new flexibilities for mo st difficult countries/situations. 
The necessity to increase the flexibility of th e instrument is important in order to gain 
additional reactivity in th e toughest cases and in situations of urgency. Indeed, the possibility 
to award direct grants on th e basis of needs assessment missi ons and practical concept notes 
as the basis for an informed decision, without  using a formal tenderi ng process or call for 
proposals for amounts up to 2 millions € (i.e. IfS procedures), would lead to a real capacity 
gain of fast reactivity in relevant cases of  human rights urgencies. It would also allow 
mitigating the situation of the most difficult  countries where open calls for proposals are 
incompatible with the repre ssive nature of the regime. 
On the other hand, such a facility could underm ine the demand driven nature and NGO owned 
aspect of the projects. It could also create tension on the non competitive nature of the award and favour certain types of NGOs. 
It is therefore proposed that only a limited pa rt of the EIDHR funds, dedicated to most 
difficult situations/countri es and/or human rights defenders in urgent protection need, would 
benefit from the possibility to award direct  grants in a non-public ised manner applying a 
similar methodology as that used for the Instru ment for Stability. This would represent +/-
20% of the EIDHR activities. 
6.2. Highlight trade-offs and synergie s associated with the options 
The zero option (no regulation) will integr ate Human Rights activities within other 
instruments as a positive sign of mainstreaming. Ne vertheless, the abolition of a self standing 
instrument will suppress specific working princi ples, such as the absence of host country 
consent, thereby impeding most activities and reducing the delivery to easiest or show case 
activities. It will lower efficiency of opera tional delivery (e.g. reduced geographical scope, 
lower economies of scales, higher cost) and crea te certainly a strong visibility issue (i.e. 
secondary rather than complementary). 
The first option (no change) maintains the key elements of an EIDHR added value i.e. its 
working principles. It will allow benefiting from a rolling experience and helping outreach 
through a cumulative identification over the year. It will avoid cost of reform and focus on 
day to day improvements. On the other hand it w ill not allow addressing the identified drivers 
of problem in a structural manner. 
The second option (enabling re gulation), while keeping the ex isting added values, will allow 
for a faster reaction and reactivity, in particular to  important crisis and cases of violations. It is 
nevertheless important that the Instrument remains involved in long term support and in depth 
activities that have grass root level impact and a lasting effect  and does not focus exclusively 
on day to day crisis management. Increased co ordination with humanita rian aid operations 
and the Instrument for Stability will have to be set up. 
6.3. Preferred option 
 
EN 21   EN It is proposed to build on the solid foundations that have been developed and recognised and 
to maintain the core principles of the inst rument while amending its priorities, simplifying 
procedures and delivery and furt her strengthening its efficien cy and reactivity. The positive 
adoption of the second option is therefore proposed  with the application of its 5 sub options. 
7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives 
The EIDHR is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for the 
EU intervention. The exact actions are defi ned, first, through the Strategy Papers and 
subsequently through the annual action programmes detailing the activities to be carried out by the EU, including the objectives pursued by  the actions in question and the expected 
results. Specific indicators are fixed at that moment, having in mind the particularities of the 
action in question.  
The implementation of these actions comp lies with performance-based management. 
Performance based management serves several purposes:  
- making the most of limited resources;  
- improving decision making processes and decisions;  
- achieving transparency and accountability.  
However, the field of human rights and democracy is complex. What matters about 
performance in this field cannot be captured in one or even a dozen performance measures. 
Yet these are important tools de signed to bolster improvements in planning, risk management 
and accountability. Good quality information en ables people to participate in programmes, 
and equips managers to drive improvement. 
The objective of identifying indicators for democr acy and human rights projects is to improve 
the management of projects by measuring their im pact and the extent to which the impact of 
specific projects can be linked to overall cha nges in the situation of Democracy and Human 
Rights in a country. 
Indicators are an important tool for signposting objectives and measuring their attainment in 
all parts of project management. They describe the project’s objectives in terms of quantity, 
quality, target group(s), time, and place. They are the operational description of the overall 
objectives of a project, its specific objective,  and its results, activities and resources. 
An indicator is a measure that helps ‘answer the question of how muc h, or whether, progress 
is being made toward a certain objective’. It measures the performance of a specific program 
by comparing actual results with  expected results. It does not  answer the que stion of why 
progress is or is not being ma de. A good indicator should relate closely to a desirable change 
defined as an objective, of which it is a manife station; be verifiable within acceptable costs; 
be linked to a timeframe, target group, and geographical or institutional. 
Intended results 
 
EN 22   EN To support tangible results in the promotion and support of democracy  and human rights 
worldwide. 
Main expenditure related outputs 
Timely launch of project, including fast reactio n mechanism for urgent cases of violation and 
human rights defenders. Timely follo w-up, addendum, payment and closing. 
Indicators of results 
The structure of the EIDHR into four axes of  work, each with specific objectives, has been 
described above. Each project implementing these campaigns will fine-tune indicators such as 
the following: 
(1) Number of campaigns launched, includi ng number of advocacies, number of 
international conventions ratification, numb er of specific field operations Number of 
citizens, professionals  and students trained, 
(2) Number of key actors supported, 
(3) Number of civil society project conducted, at global and at local level, 
(4) Number of Human Rights Defender cases followed, 
(5) Number of projects in most di fficult countries and situations, 
(6) Number of electoral pro cess and democratic cycles supported, observed, and 
followed. 
7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements 
The European Commission's Monitoring and Eval uation systems are increasingly focussed on 
results. They involve internal sta ff as well as external expertise. 
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarter s continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects and programmes in various ways, incl uding wherever possibl e through field visits. 
Monitoring provides valuable information on progr ess; it helps managers to identify actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the perfor mance of EU external actions 
through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the improvement of ongoing interventions; they also dr aw lessons from past experience to inform 
future policies and actions. The tools all us e the internationally-recognised OECD-DAC 
evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 
Firstly, at the project level, the Headquarters-managed Results  Oriented Monitoring (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of th e quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly structured, standardised methodology, i ndependent ROM experts attribute grades 
which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and give recommendations on 
how to improve effectiveness. 
 
EN 23   EN Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegatio n in charge of the project, 
deliver a more detailed, in depth analysis and help project managers to improve ongoing 
interventions and prepare futu re ones. External, independent  experts with thematic and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the an alysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 
The Commission also conducts st rategic evaluations of its po licies, from programming and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education etc), in a country or region, or  of a specific instrument. Thes e evaluations are an important 
input to the formulation of policies and the desi gn of instruments and projects. These 
evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is 
included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament.