EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 15 February  2019   
on the licensing and supervision of providers of micro credit  
(CON/20 19/7) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 18 December 2018  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry  of 
Finance  for an opinion on a draft Law on the provision of micro credit  (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece (BoG) and to the tasks  conferred upon the ECB  concerning 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty . In ac cordance with 
the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 
Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The aim of the draft law is to lay down rules for the taking up, pursuit, and supervision of the activity 
of microcredit  provision and to regulate certain rights and obligations of both providers and 
recipients of microcredit. The draft law defines microcredit as the provision of non- bank, unsecured 
loans not exceeding EUR 25,000 t o individuals, socially vulnerable groups, and very small legal 
entities and/or ‘entities for the social and solidary economy’, to be used as working or investment 
capital, for educational purposes, or for social integration purposes.  
1.2 The draft law designates the BoG as the competent authority to license and supervise entities 
providing microcredit  in Greece. In particular, the BoG is empowered to: (a) assess licence 
applications, further specify the documentation required, and grant and withdraw, subject t o certain 
conditions, the relevant licence; (b) conduct fit -and-proper assessments of natural or legal persons 
aiming to acquire qualifying holdings (or increase such holdings) in microcredit entities; (c) specify 
the detailed requirements concerning subsc ription to the initial capital of microcredit entities and set 
own funds requirements if deemed necessary; (d) maintain a register listing the microcredit entities 
licensed, or with passporting rights, to operate in Greece; (e) supervise microcredit entiti es in a way 
that is adequate, proportionate and responsive to their risk exposure, and issue decisions related to 
the levying of an annual supervision fee payable by each microcredit entity; and (f) impose 
penalties on microcredit entities in the event of infringement of the provisions of the draft law.  
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
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2 1.3 The draft law also stipulates that credit institutions  within the meaning of Article 4(1)(1) of 
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council2, and financial 
institutions,  within  the meaning of Article 4(1)(26) of that Regulation,  may also provide microcredit  
the same conditions as licensed microcredit entities . It is noted that Parts 3 and 4 thereof (Articles 
18-31) are to apply to credit institutions within the meaning of Union law. Accordingly the ECB 
understands that the provisions on licensing, acquisition of a qualifying holding in a microcredit 
institution, and withdrawal of a licence (see Articles 6- 11 of the draft law) do not apply to credit 
institutions.  
1.4 Moreover, the draft law confers on the General Secretariat of C ommerce and Consumer Protection 
at the Ministry of Economy and Development the task of ensuring and monitoring effective 
compliance with several provisions of the draft law applicable to credit institutions  (relating to 
consumer protection issues ).3 
1.5 Finally, the draft law provides that, with a decision by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Economy and Development (and any other competent Minister, as applicable) , it is possible to set 
up microcredit  provision programm es as established in the draft  law, co -investing resources from 
micro credit institutions and the national or co- financed leg of the Programme of Public Investments. 
The same decision shall specify the potential beneficiaries, the kinds and the purpose of the 
provided microcredit  products, the specific programme implementation terms, the procedure for the 
recovery of sums wrongly paid, as well as any other necessary implementation details.  
 
2. General observations   
2.1 By way of introduction, the ECB notes that the great majority of Member States do not have a 
dedicated regime for the regulation of the provision of microcredit. In these Member States, the 
provision of credit, including credit under terms similar to microcredit within the meaning of  the draft 
law, is subject only to the regulatory regime governing the institutions that provide it (either credit 
institutions or non- bank entities). Unlike in the case of credit institutions, which are subject to the 
harmonised EU banking rules when prov iding credit for their own account, the regulatory approach 
to the provision of microcredit by non- banks differs across Member States. Absent a harmonised, 
EU-wide regime to govern the provision of microcredit by non- banks, the European Commission 
has established a European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision (the ‘Code’). The 
purpose of the Code is to lay down a set of standards in terms of management, governance, risk 
management, reporting, consumer and investor relations that are common to the EU microcredit 
sector, rather than to replace existing regulations applicable to microcredit providers, where such 
regulations exist.4 The Code is primarily designed to cover non- bank microcredit providers 
providing loans of up to EUR 25,000 to micro- entrepreneurs. The draft law contains several 
references to the Code, which appears to inform some of its provisions, including the proposed 
                                                 
2  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 
27.6.2013, p. 1).  
3  See Article 27 of the draft law.  
4  See European Commission, European Code of Good C onduct for Microcredit Provision (2013), p. 10, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/thefunds/doc/code_bonne_conduite_en.pdf .  
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3 statutory ceiling for microcredit loans . 
2.2 The focus of the Code on non- bank microcredit providers is justified by the fundamental differences 
between them and credit institutions, as providers of credit. These differences can be summarised 
as follows. First, the acceptance of deposits or other repayable funds from the public, and the 
granting of loans on the basis of such deposits and funds, is a regulated activity under Union law 
and is reserved to credit institutions. This particular characteristic accounts for both the particular 
systemic importance of credit institutions and the application to them of the stringent prudential 
supervisory standards laid down by applicable Union law, including Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 
and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council5. Second, despite the fact 
that in the EU there are other examples of special -purpos e lenders which are – in some respects –  
treated as credit institutions, the sources of their funding typically differ from those of non- bank 
microcredit lenders, and they typically lend to different groups of borrowers.6 These fundamental 
differences are also countenanced by the draft law. Indeed, under the draft law, microcredit 
institutions do not fund their operations through the collection of deposits or other contributions akin 
to deposits and the terms of credit and categories of beneficiaries provided for in the draft law also 
differ fundamentally from those applicable in the case of credit institutions.  Significantly, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has contemplated the provision of microcredit by legal 
entities or individuals enga ged primarily in its extension, including ‘banks specialised in offering 
microcredit’.7 However, the ECB notes that the BCBS’s definition of ‘traditional microlending’ differs 
qualitatively from the draft law’s understanding of ‘microcredit’, in particular  through the 
requirement for the beneficiaries of microlending to provide collateral.8  
2.3 The draft law opts to include credit institutions in its scope of application in a manner that  might 
lead to unwelcome ambiguities in terms of its fundamental policy go als. If the primary aim of the 
draft law is to promote the development of the Greek microcredit sector by standardising the 
regulatory expectations placed on non- bank microcredit providers and introducing socially -
motivated terms of credit and categories of beneficiaries aligned with microcredit’s social mission,9 
it is difficult to see how the licensing and, a fortiori , the prudential supervision of such non- bank 
microcredit providers can be conducted on the basis of rules that could resemble those applicable 
to credit institutions.  
                                                 
5  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of 
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directi ves 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).  
6  The reference is, for example, to Irish and Lithuanian credit unions, Latvian cooperative undertakings, and Polish 
cooperative savings and credit unions which, despite falling outside the scope of Directive 2013/36/EU on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms ( CRD IV) for 
prudential supervision purposes, are nonetheless deemed to fulfil the functional criteria of credit institutions and are 
to be treated as credit institutions, for example for the purposes of minimum reserves requirements (see, for 
example, ECB Opinion CON/2009/60, paragraph. 2.2.). Significantly, these lending institutions tend to fund their 
operations through the contributions of their members, who are, typically, the recipients of the loans granted, and 
their mission differs from that of microcredit providers which are vehicles through which to combat poverty and social 
or financial exclusion (see the Code, p. 22 (Introduction)). All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu . 
7  BCBS, ‘Guidance on the application of the core principles for effective banki ng supervision to the regulation and 
supervision of institutions relevant to financial inclusion’, September 2016, available at: 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d383.pdf .   
8        Ibid., Annex E.  
9  The Code understands the ‘mission’ of microcredit providers as one to ‘combat poverty and social and financial 
exclusion’ (see the Code, p. 22 (Introduction)).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 2.4 The fundamental differences between the economic role of credit institutions  and microcredit 
provider s, as defined in the draft law,  the different risks to which each is exposed, and the different 
sources of funding for their ac tivities, all militate in favour of a different regulatory and, in particular, 
supervisory treatment to take into account their specific characteristics. Moreover, the equal 
treatment , on a regulatory and/or supervisory footing, of non- bank and bank lending activities is 
inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the Code, which was drafted with non -bank microcredit 
providers and their social mission in mind.10 The ECB would, therefore, in the context of the draft 
law, strongly advise against the inclusi on of credit institutions within its scope of application, in 
order to avoid confusion about the draft law’s policy objectives and legal uncertainty in respect of 
which set of rules the fundamentally different activities of these entities would be subject to in 
Greece under the draft law . 
2.5 On a separate note, par agraph 4 of this opinion assesses the proposed conferral , on the BoG, of 
the new tasks of licensing and supervision of microcredit institutions against the criteria for 
determining what constitutes a government task from the perspective of the monetary financing 
prohibition laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty .  
 
3. Prudential supervisory and financial stability considerations  
3.1 The draft law defines a microcredit institution as a legal entity that has obtained authorisation, in 
accordance with Article 9, to provide microcredit  in Greece (Article 2(2) of the draft law). Credit 
institutions, therefore, do not appear to fall within the definition of microc redit institution, given that 
Article 9 is included in Part 2 of the draft law, which does not apply to credit institutions. 
Consequently, it is understood that credit institutions could provide microcredit  under their existing 
banking licence.  
3.2 The draft law sets out the definitions of microcredit  and busi ness microcredit . Microcredit  is defined 
as credits of funds of up to twenty -five thousand euros (EUR 25,000) that do not constitute a bank 
loan and are provided exclusively in accordance with the provisions of the present law (Article 2 of 
the draft law).  However, business microcredit  is defined to include all forms of credit up to the limit 
of twenty -five thousand euros (EUR 25,000) which are provided either in order to cover investment 
needs or as working capital.11 On the basis of this definition it appears that a loan granted by a 
credit institution, within the limits and on the conditions set out in the draft law, would qualify as a 
form of business microcredit  and would be subject to the draft law. In this respect, it is also noted 
that the definition of business microcredit  contains an open- ended list of activities that qualify  as 
business microcredit ; this creates legal uncertainty as to whether a loan granted by a credit 
institution would qualify as business microcredit  and fall within the ambit of t he draft law .  
3.3 The draft law confers wide -ranging powers on the BoG with regard to microcredit institutions (see 
paragraph 1.2 of this opinion). However, the ECB notes that the draft law is silent on the details of 
the supervisory framework in which microc redit institutions would be expected to pursue their 
activities, as it merely refers to ‘adequate, proportionate, and responsive’ controls that the BoG, as 
                                                 
10  Ιt is noted that of the limited number of Member States in which the provision of microcredit constitutes a regulated 
activity, only one has included credit institutions in the scope of the applicable national regime.  
11  See Article 18(1)(a) of the draft l aw. 
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5 the competent authority, would be expected to exercise at a future point in time.12 Moreover, in the 
absence of an express provision in the draft law, it is unclear whether the BoG would be 
empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon it with regard to the activity of business 
microcredit , where this activity is exercised by credit institutions.  
3.4 Furthermore, the ECB notes that Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201313 confers exclusive tasks 
on the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions with a view to contributing to 
their safety and soundness and in order to protect the stability of the financial system of the Union 
and each Member State. The ECB is responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and exercises oversight over the SSM’s functioning, based 
on a distribution of respons ibilities between the ECB and the national competent authorities , 
including the BoG. In this respect, it is of the utmost importance that t he conferral of tasks on the 
BoG and the Ministry of Economy and Development with regard to microcredit institutions and/or 
the activity of providing business microfinance should be without prejudice to the tasks that the 
ECB and the BoG exercise for the purposes of the prudential supervision of credit institutions. By 
removing credit institutions from the scope of appli cation of the draft law, legal certainty can be 
ensured concerning the distribution of competences between the NCA s and the ECB with regard to 
the supervision of credit institutions providing business microcredit .14 
3.5 By explicitly excluding from supervision other business activities that ‘microcredit institutions’ may 
pursue, in addition to the provision of microcredit,15 the draft law risks undermining the efficiency of 
the future supervision of microcredit institutions. In particular, by precluding the super visor from 
monitoring the full range of the activities pursued by entities engaging in the provision of 
microcredits, and from detecting possible risks to the financial position of those entities arising from 
their other activities, the draft law falls short of creating an environment conducive to the protection 
of financial stability, while at the same time exposing the supervisor to risks  of supervisory failure 
and to the attendant reputational risks . 
3.6 The ECB also notes its concern that if credit institut ions are included in the scope of application of 
the draft law, Article 3016 could seriously interfere with their lending activity  and capital adequacy ,17 
since it could result in impos ing pressure on credit institutions to extend microcredit  on terms 
dictat ed by the Minister of Economy and Development or by any other minister, rather than on the 
regular terms subject to which supervised credit institutions conduct their lending operations.   
                                                 
12  See Article 15(1) of the draft law.  
13  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).  
14  The proposed approach would also protect the ECB and SSM from any reputational risks arising from obstruction in 
the exercise of their supervisory mandate over credit institutions that extend credit up to the statutory limit of EUR 
25,000.  
15  See Article 5(2) of the draft law.  
16  Article 30(1) of the draft law states that ‘[W]ith a decision by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy and 
Development and any other competent Minister, as applicable, it is possible to set up microf inance provision 
programmes as established by the present law, co- investing resources from microcredit institutions and the national 
or co- financed leg of the Programme of Public Investments. The same decision shall specify the potential 
beneficiaries, the types and the purpose of the microfinance products provided, the specific programme 
implementation terms, the procedure for the recovery of sums wrongly paid, and any other necessary 
implementation details’.  
17  This is all the more so, considering the abs ence of capital provisions corresponding to microcredit as well as the 
possibility of such loans becoming non- performing within a short period of time.  
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6  
4. New tasks of the BoG  
4.1 The draft law designates the BoG as the authority responsible for both licensing and supervising 
entities that provide microcredit  loans in Greece.18 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of 
new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
must be assess ed against the criteria for determining what constitutes a government task from the 
perspective of the monetary financing prohibition laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty.  
4.2 For the purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Council Regulation ( EC) No 3603/9319 
defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -
à-vis third parties’.  To determine what constitutes ‘financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-
vis third parties’ – which can be interpreted as financing provided by an NCB outside the scope of 
its central bank tasks –  it is necessary to assess whether a new task to be undertaken by that NCB 
is a government task.  
4.3 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down 
by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards in the form of criteria for 
determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the 
meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes a 
government task as follows:  
 First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been 
conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are 
mainly defined  in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 
and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
 Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new 
tasks that are not relat ed to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs are not 
precluded per se. However, new tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sect or 
entities should be considered government tasks.  
 Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector 
entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that 
NCB.  
 In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  
(a) whether the performance of the new task would create conflicts of interest with exist ing 
central bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily 
complement those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 
                                                 
18  See Article 5(1) of the draft law.  
19  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifyi ng definitions for the application of the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
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7 and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The 
complementarity between a new task and the existing central bank tasks should be 
interpreted narrowly, so as to avoid leading to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 
tasks. Such complementarity should also be examined in relation to t he financing of those 
tasks;  
(b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 
to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the 
capacity to properly perform the existing centr al bank tasks;  
(c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the 
light of central bank independence and accountability considerations;  
(d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks;  
(e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision- making 
bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their 
personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
4.4 On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new task s 
conferred upon the BoG constitute government task s in the context of  the monetary financing 
prohibition.  
4.4.1  New tasks and the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of 
the ESCB  
The licensing and supervision of ‘microcredit  institutions’ is not expressly mentioned among any of 
the basic central banking tasks listed in Article  127(2)  and (5) of the Treaty or otherwise conferred 
upon the NCBs by the Statute of the ESCB. Under Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the Council may 
confer specific tasks upon the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions  and other financial institutions . In this respect , the Council has conferred tasks on 
the ECB relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, but these tasks do not expressly 
include the authorisation and supervision of microcredit  institut ions. To the extent that the draft law 
purports to regulate non- bank lending activities, this new task is not directly related to tasks 
conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB.  
4.4.2  Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks  
The ECB notes that the great majority of Member States  do not have a dedicated regime for the 
regulation of the provision of microcredit . However, there are three Member States where there is a 
dedicated regime for the regulation of th is activity20. In all three Member States the national 
authority responsible for the supervision of credit institutions – in two of these Member States the 
NCB – has been designated as the competent national authority for the licensing and supervision 
                                                 
20  France: Article L. 511- 6 (5) and Articles R. 518- 57 to R. 518- 62 of the Monetary and Financial Code and the Decree 
of 18 July 2012 on associations and foundations authorised to grants certain loans and adopted pursuant to Articles 
R. 518- 59 and R. 518- 62 of the Monetary and Financial Code; Italy: Articles 111 and 113 of Legislative decree no. 
385/1993 (the Italian banking law); Portugal: Decree- Law No. 12/2010 of 19 February 2010 on microcredit financial 
companies; Order 1315/2010, of 28 December 2010 and Order 59/2011, of 31 January 2011.  
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8 of microcredit institutions21. In a fourth Member State,  while there is no regulatory regime catering 
specifically for the provision of microcredit, financial institutions providing microc redit are regulated 
subject to the licensing and supervision of the national authority responsible for the supervision of 
credit institutions22. It follows that the new task s proposed to be conferred on the BoG  in relation to 
the licensing and supervision of microcredit  institutions  is not atypical for a central bank in those 
Member States which have ch osen to establish a dedicated regime for the regulation of the 
provision of microcredit.  
4.4.3  Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government  
The ECB understands that the licensing and supervision of micro credit institution s is a necessary 
component of a scheme which aims to facilitate the access of beneficiaries to working or 
investment capital, or capital for educational/social integration purposes . Despite the fact that this 
particular financing scheme has a social orient ation, these tasks need not necessarily be 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government .  
4.4.4  Extent to which performance of the new task s creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 
tasks 
The new tasks of licensing and supervisi on of micro credit  institutions do not , in general terms, 
create conflicts of interest with existing central banking tasks . That said, the inherent ly social 
purpose of microcredit , namely , to help combat poverty and social and financial exclusion,23 
militates in favour of  a more accommodative regulatory and supervisory regime than that  appli cable 
to credit institutions or other non- bank lenders  and could become a source of tension between, on 
the one hand,  the new tasks that the draft law entrusts to the BoG and on the other,  the BoG’s 
existing supervisory tasks in respect of credit  institutions  and other categories of financial 
institutions, where the emphasis of the BoG’s supervis ion is on the financial soundness of those 
institutions and its impact  on the overall stability of the financial system. Therefore, the possibility 
cannot be excluded that the performance of these new tasks may lead to conflicts of interest with 
the existing tasks of the BoG.  
4.4.5  Extent to which performance of the new task s is disproportionate to the financial or organisational 
capacity of the BoG  
The principle of financial independence requires that Member States may not put their NCBs in a 
position where they have insufficient resources to carry out both their ESCB -related tas ks and their 
national tasks from an operational and financial perspective. While the draft law requires that 
microcredit institutions reimburse the BoG for the costs incurred in the performance of its new 
tasks,24 it does not clearly address the financial i mpact of these new tasks on the BoG , specific ally 
                                                 
21  France: the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution is entrusted wit h the granting and withdrawal of the 
authorisation to exercise microcredit activities by non- profit associations and foundations that are recognized as 
being of public utility, and allowed, under certain conditions, to grant credits without having been aut horised as a 
credit institution; Italy: the Banca d’Italia maintains the register of microcredit providers and supervises their 
compliance with applicable requirements; Portugal: Banco de Portugal is the national authority entrusted with the 
authorisation and supervision of microcredit financial companies.  
22  Malta: Financial Institutions Act (Chapter 376 of the Laws of Malta). The Malta Financial Services Authority assumes 
the authorisation and supervision of these microcredit providers.  
23    See the Code, p. 22 (Introduction).  
24  See Article 15(3) of the draft law.  
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9 with regard to the envisaged provision of microcredit by credit institutions . Nor does the draft law 
consider  the overall impact of those tasks on the BoG’s organisational capacity ; this can be 
significant,  given  the broad base of small lenders in Greece and the envisaged maximum amount 
of lending per lender , which is not immaterial by Greek standards . The ECB invites the consulting 
authority to consider appropriate arrangements so that the reimbursement of the BoG by the 
microcredit institutions is commensurate with the financial impact of the new tasks  on the BoG .      
4.4.6  Extent  to which performance of the new task s fits into the institutional set -up of the BoG, in the light 
of central bank independence and ac countability considerations  
The tasks conferred on the BoG  under the draft law  do not , on their face,  appear to be incompatible 
with the BoG’s overall institutional set -up. However, it should be noted that the BoG generally 
performs its existing tasks under a clear legal framework. Insofar as the draft law contains many 
legal uncertainties, particularly from the prudential supervisory and financial stability perspectives 
(see paragraph 3 above), it is not guaranteed that the new tasks will fit smoothly into the 
institutional set -up of the BoG.  The absence of clarity surrounding the precise scope and nature of 
the tasks proposed to be conferred on the BoG may raise accountability issues for the BoG if it 
should come to discharge these tasks.  
4.4.7  Extent to which t he performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
The draft law does not contain any specific provision on liability in relation to the exercise of the 
BoG’s tasks under the draft law. The BoG could, thus, potentially be held liable for damages in 
accordance with the rules of Greek law on liability applicable to the BoG.  
4.4.8   Extent to which performance of the new task s exposes members of the decision- making bodies of 
the BoG to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independ ence  
Taking into account the social purpose of microcredit lending and the challenges to which the 
implementation of the draft law may give rise, the possibility cannot be excluded that the BoG’s 
competent decision- making bodies will see their political ex posure increase as a result of the BoG’s 
involvement in the licensing and supervision of microcredit providers.  
4.5 Conclusion  
While the new task s which the draft law seeks to confer  on the BoG regarding the licensing and 
supervision of microcredit institutio ns are not among the tasks conferred on the ECB and the NCBs 
by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, they are  not atypical of the tasks  of NCBs  in those 
Member States which have chosen to regulate the activities of microcredit  institutions.  Moreover,  
as they need not necessarily be discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the 
government, the BoG’s new supervisory tasks in relation to microcredit  institutions do not constitute 
government tasks. Nonetheless, the ECB notes that the performance of these new tasks may lead 
to conflicts of interest with the existing tasks of the BoG. Moreover, the ECB invites the consulting 
authority to consider appropriate arrangements so that the reimbursement of the BoG by 
micro credit institutions  as envisaged in the draft law  is commensurate with the financial impact of 
the new tasks  on the BoG . Furthermore, the absence of clarity surrounding the precise scope and 
nature of the tasks proposed to be conferred on the BoG may make it challenging for the BoG to 
integrate these tasks into its existing institutional set -up.     
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10  
5. Conclusions  
Τhe ECB advises the consulting authority to take into account the points raised in this Opinion when 
deciding whether to include credit institutions within the scope of applicati on of the draft law, and whether 
to confer on the BoG the proposed new tasks with regard to microcredit providers . 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 February  2019 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGH I