EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 14.6.2010 
SEC(2010) 716 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
Accompanying document to the 
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSI ON TO THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EU ROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMI TTEE OF THE REGIONS 
 
Action Plan on Global Navigation Sate llite System (GNSS) Applications 
 
{COM(2010)308} 
{SEC(2010)717} 
 
EN 2   EN 2
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
1. P ROBLEM DEFINITION : WHAT IS PRECISELY THE PROBLEM , WHO IS MOST 
AFFECTED AND WHY IS PUBLIC INTERVENTION NECESSARY ? 
In the year 2000 a new technology was made available to the world, after having been 
restricted for many years to US military us age: satellite-based positioning and timing for 
civilian use, through the provision by the US to  access their GPS signal, free of charge but 
with no guarantee of service. This led to the creation of a new market  of GNSS products and 
services, called downstream  GNSS applications which, in 2008, were worth €124 Bn. 
The market is primarily building upon basic positioning and timing signals but is expected to 
benefit from the planned introduction of auth entication and encryption of signals. Experts 
envisage that 75% of this market be provi ded by products and services linked to mobile 
telecommunications and personal handsets, 20% for intelligent transport systems for road and the remaining 5% for other domains of application. 
As the GPS was offering no guarantee of perfor mance or reliability, EU Member States 
decided in 2001 to launch the EU GNSS proj ect with two systems providing signals 
guaranteed for civilian use: EGNOS and GALILEO. Other countri es (Russia, China, India 
and Japan) have recognised the strategic value of GNSS and declared thei r intention to deploy 
GNSS capabilities for civilian use including the de velopment by their indus try of applications 
based on their own system. 
In spite of Europe's investments in its GNSS in frastructure and the avai lability of EGNOS, the 
share of the European industry in the GNSS app lications market is lo w compared with the 
share that Europe is capable to achieve in other sectors of high-technology, which constitutes a problem since: 
– Applications based on GALILEO and EGNO S would contribute decisively to the 
development of a knowledge-base society and to the creation of high-va lue jobs within the 
EU. Europe is therefore missing a huge opportunity  if it does not take the appropriate share 
of the expected economic benefit resulting from GNSS applications . Also, if GALILEO 
and EGNOS do not become the underlying GNSS standard in Europe, many application 
domains may remain locked with technologies  which prevent them from benefiting from 
the added-value of new advanced services. 
– The limited usage of applications based on EGNOS and GALILEO leads to critical 
dependencies as GNSS are very pervasive, and provide position, navigation, and timing 
information upon which depend a whole range of da ily-life activities and Europe's security 
and social and economic development. By re lying only on GPS-based applications, the EU 
would be exposed to the effects of the un-avai lability of the GPS si gnal, which cannot be 
controlled since its primary objective is to support the military op erations of a third-
country. 
As a consequence, the problem affects the European society overall, and in many ways. 
 
EN 3   EN 3
Meanwhile, uncertainty around the European GNSS has been weaken ing confidence in 
potential downstream business. Growing "compe tition" from third c ountries (US, Russia, 
China, India) has also changed the context fo r the development of GNSS applications to the 
detriment of European players as these systems could enter into operati on at about the same 
time as GALILEO. Furthermore, GNSS cannot be considered as a traditional market as the 
US, Russian and Chinese systems are placed under military control, and their specifications subject to military rath er than commercial considerations: the home-grown industries of these 
countries can directly benefit from the milita ry-funded programs to develop applications and 
services to a sufficient level of maturity before  they are brought into the civilian markets.  
As a consequence, compensating for the absence of such resources is necessary to grasp, in 
Europe, the same overall indir ect benefits resulting from EGNOS and GALILEO as those 
brought, for instance, by GPS in the US. 
Current plans in that respect  are limited to raising awaren ess among the aviation community 
towards adopting EGNOS and GALILEO for safety  of life applications (primarily for en-
route navigation and landing procedures); conducting mark et studies and providing 
information to actors in other segments potential ly interested in using the open signal or the 
commercial service of EGNOS and GALILEO (e .g. agriculture for precision farming, road 
charging, asset tracking, scientific applica tions, oil and gas, surveyi ng, mapping), or the future 
search and rescue service of GALILEO (prima rily for fisheries and maritime transport); 
granting the €38 million left for the funding of research and development in GNSS applications, and monitoring the about €50 million worth of ongoing projects in the area.  
This Impact Assessment demonstrates the need  for a more extensive action plan, through the 
analysis of a series of polic y options envisaged to foster the development of EGNOS and 
GALILEO downstream applications and to e nhance the quickest, deepest, broadest 
development of applications across all domains. 
2. A
NALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY : IS EU ACTION NECESSARY , AND DOES IT ADD VALUE ? 
The EU right to act is based particularly on ar ticle 172 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union, and the subsequent  regulation on GALILEO and EGNOS1. 
The use of EU satellite navigation system s can have wide/deep economic, social and 
environmental impact; the promotion of EU GN SS directly supports EU strategic priorities 
such as the Lisbon Agenda, it is transnational in nature and it does cut across several policy fields necessarily to be coordinated at EU level. 
The adoption of EU GNSS signals in several application domains requires compliance with 
international standards and certification, for inst ance in aviation or maritime transport. Action 
at EU level would then avoid duplication and waste of efforts at Me mber State level.  
The lack of EU action or the undertaking of fragmented or uncoordinated action by Member 
States alone would limit the marketability of the identified applications (e.g. different 
                                                
 
1 Council Regulation No 1321/2004 on the establishment of structures for the management of the 
European satellite radio-navigation programmes and Regulation (EC) No 683/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite 
navigation programmes (EGNOS and GALILEO) 
 
EN 4   EN 4
standards in GNSS-based road charging systems) and create barriers to the free circulation of 
goods and services, or inequality of treatment of the European citizens. 
3. O BJECTIVES OF EU INITIATIVE : WHAT ARE THE MAIN POLICY OBJECTIVES ?  
The objectives of EU actions are to remo ve barriers and obstacles preventing the 
maximisation of the benefits generated by EGNOS and GALILEO for the citizens and the 
industry of the Member States of the European Union by: 
(1) Ensuring that EGNOS and GALILEO technologi es are applied and adopted early in 
transport and non transport domains where they can bring benefits 
(2) Ensuring that the European industry (particu larly SMEs) captures an increasing market 
share of the GNSS downstream appl ication markets (33% at least2) 
4. P OLICY OPTIONS : WHICH OPTIONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND WHICH HAVE 
BEEN ASSESSED IN DETAIL ? 
The following policy options have been assessed: 
Option 1:  No policy change (i.e. the baseline scenario). 
No further activities would be performed by th e Commission beyond what it is already in its 
work-plan and no additional budget or  resources would be required. 
Option 2:  Discontinue existing EU actions (e.g. cut R&D funds). 
The EC could decide to disc ontinue any activity aimed at promoting the development of 
downstream applications. 
Option 3:  Regulate across application domains, making mandatory use of EGNOS or 
GALILEO. 
The EC proposes to the Council and the Parlia ment extensive regulations with the aim to 
make mandatory the use of GNSS in as many key domains of applications as possible. 
Option 4a:  Improve the framework conditions for the market to work through a 
comprehensive Action Plan. 
The EC would undertake the over 70 actions that address all the issues  (across a dozen of 
transport and non transport domains) highlighted during the stakeholder consultation process 
that started with the Green Paper of 2006. 
                                                 
2 The share that Europe is capable to achieve in othe r sectors of high-technology is in the order of one 
third of the global market. In te lecommunication for instance, it reach es 38% (Source: ISTAG Report to 
the EC: "Shaping Europe's Future through ICT", 2006). Such a target is indeed coherent with the Lisbon objective for the EU to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world.  
 
EN 5   EN 5
Option 4b:  Improve the framework conditions for th e market to work through a targeted 
Action Plan  
The EC would select a subset of  the actions envisaged in option 4a. The first st ep leading to 
option 4b would be to limit domain-specific ac tions within a small number of the most 
promising domains, whilst providing suffici ent ground favourable to innovation across 
domains and to the "bottom-up" uptake of GNSS services. EC would pursue 24 actions. 
Option 5:  Adopt a consultative approach (i.e. coordina te and invite all players to deliver the 
necessary actions) 
The EC would involve all relevant pub lic and private stak eholders in an ad hoc  permanent 
consultative body that should follow closel y the roll out of EGNOS and GALILEO 
downstream applications, and tackle the underl ying causes of the key problem to ease the 
functioning of the market forces. 
5. A SSESSMENT OF IMPACTS : WHAT ARE THE MAIN ECONOMIC , ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH IN TERMS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ? 
Pursuing the objectives will result  in significant Economic, Soci al and Environmental impacts 
across EU-27 and beyond. EU GNSS can also become  a reliable tool to enforce internal and 
external policies. 
As demonstrated by several trials, tests a nd R&D projects, using EGNOS or GALILEO can 
generate increase in the efficiency and safety of aviation, rail and maritime transports. It can 
also allow new pricing schemes on road, fully in line with CO2 emission reduction plans, and 
it is the key enabler to new strategies and serv ices to improve road transport. Disabled and 
elderly people will see their mobility improved, and all citizens will benefit from accurate 
location based services like real time information on public transport, available services in the vicinity, or emergency rescue. 
Satellite navigation downstream applications are knowledge-inten sive businesses that enable 
creation of high value added job occupations all along the value chain (i.e. from hardware and 
software manufacturing to the service provis ion). The market size of GNSS downstream 
applications is expected to grow at an annual average 22 % over the next 11 years
3. 
Some applications are infrastructure-enhancin g and generate several economic spill-overs. 
Increasing capacity of existing infrastructure and making a more effici ent use of them will 
also contribute to the reduction of conges tion, pollution and other environmental damages4. 
Policy options will cost between €3 and €50 M per year from 2010 onwards, including R&D 
budget. Neither substantial incremental admi nistrative burden nor compliance costs are 
envisaged at this stage, as the suggested policy option aims at creating better framework 
conditions for the market forces to operate. Over all the effort to be spent in delivering the 
policy is tiny proportion of  the expected benefits. 
                                                 
3 Len Jacobson, based on several sources (2007) 
4 Some examples: Navteq 2009 research proved that car navigators increase fuel efficiency by 12%; 
EGNOS enabled landings reduces fuel burning and noises over inhabited areas, rail track network can 
be optimised 
 
EN 6   EN 6
6. C OMPARISON OF OPTIONS : WHAT IS THE PREFERRED OPTION ON THE BASIS OF 
WHICH CRITERIA OR JUSTIFICATION ?  
Policy option 1  entails no change of what  is currently being performe d. Its main benefit lies in 
the fact of adding neither new tasks and activ ities nor new resources to the EC. Existing 
actions will be carried out (except R&D that will have no funds beyond 2011) but this will not 
be enough to tackle the problem of slow deve lopment of downstream applications. It will 
eventually leave the EU GNSS industry timi d and in the current state of uncertainty. 
The only benefit of Policy option 2  is to marginally cut down on the very few resources 
currently devoted to GNSS downstream applica tion development but it entails, even more 
than policy option 1, a very negative impact on the EU GNSS industry, MS and EU citizen. 
Policy option 3  sends an immediate positive signal to  the EU GNSS industry and may even 
rally enough attention to get applications kick ed off in certain domains, but with strong 
opposition from some Member States and of some  stakeholders who consider regulations 
invasive and inappropriate. The cost of regulating and enforci ng from EC side is also be 
significant. 
Policy option 4a  outreaches extensively across many segm ents and constitutes a balanced mix 
of regulation and supportive actions for the down stream applications market. Nevertheless, 
the human resources required for its implementa tion may simply make it too expensive, with 
a benefit/cost ratio much lower in respect to the next option. This policy could allow to reach 
all our objectives, but would however require a level of re sources far beyond what can be 
granted to the European Commission. 
Policy option 4b  focuses the limited resources available on priority application segments, 
creating a positive momentum in the downstream  industry involved in the most promising 
markets, thus potentially breeding further effort s beyond the scope of the action plan itself. Its 
cost will be largely compensated by the achiev ements expected from the action plan. This 
policy will require fewer resources that option 4a and concentrate th em so as to fulfil most of 
our objectives. It fits quite  well with what was expre ssed during the consultations. 
Policy option 5  may attract some stakeholders in  the EU GNSS programs and therefore 
generate a positive attitude towards EGNOS a nd GALILEO. However, the actual results of 
this policy option are likely to be poor in the absence of further incen tives, and given that the 
lengthy interactions needed to coordinate so  many players would not allow addressing the 
urgency of the problem. It could however ac hieve results in the long term, providing 
improved user requirements for GNSS. 
This Impact Analysis leads the European Co mmission to propose to the Council and to the 
European Parliament to address the problem  cause by the limited, slow development and 
adoption of downstream applications based on EGNOS or GALILEO through the adoption of 
the targeted action plan de scribed in Policy option 4b . 
 
EN 7   EN 7
Table: Pros and cons of the five options, and how they lead to the proposed choice of option: 
 Effectiveness in 
reaching the objectives Efficiency in using 
resources Consistency with 
EU objectives, strategies and priorities 
Option 1 High risk to be 
ineffective:  too 
limited efforts Only uses limited 
resources Consistent 
Option 2  Highly ineffective:  
will send wrong message to GNSS industry and stakeholders Saving of R&D 
money, focus of management on other issues Not consistent 
Option 3 Ineffective , mainly 
because of strong opposition from MS and industry to invasive regulation Limited effort, high 
admin burden on MS/Private sector Not fully consistent 
Option 4a High risk to be 
ineffective  as it is 
spread across too many domains, and requires resources that cannot be made available Extensive effort in 
terms of administration, management, and finances Consistent 
Option 4b Effective: focusing a 
reasonable amount of resources on a limited set of priorities Focused effort in 
terms of admin/management and proportionate financial Consistent 
Option 5 Highly ineffective : 
dispersive, can be easily derailed, at the best timing will not fit the need to act fast in the window of opportunity Time consuming, 
saving of R&D money Consistent 
 
EN 8   EN 8
7. M ONITORING AND EVALUATION : WHAT ARE THE ARRANGEMENTS TO ESTABLISH 
THE ACTUAL COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DESIRED EFFECTS
? 
The time span of the proposed policy goes beyond 2020, but focuses initially on 2010-2013. 
The Action Plan may be revised substantially in  the light of the expl oitation plans of the 
EGNOS and GALILEO systems, to be propo sed by 2010. Actions will be handled by the 
European Commission and related Agencies, w ith the involvement of  national and regional 
authorities in the Members States as appropriate. 
The Commission will monitor the trends on th e markets and will continuously measure the 
impact of the actions undertaken, which may le ad to update some aspects of the Action Plan 
regularly, maybe every year as  in a “rolling programme”. 
As the preferred policy focuses largely on market  development, the main indicator of progress 
to be considered is the share of the market that GALILEO and EGNOS will be able to win, in 
each domain targeted by the Action Plan, as well as the acceleration of GNSS downstream 
markets resulting from GALILEO/EGNOS launch. 
Other indicators will vary according to the domai ns: For instance, in road transport, indicators 
of success will include the measure of the redu ction of casualties or of people injured in 
accidents relevant in the context of the actions  undertaken. In aviation, indicators will include 
the number of EGNOS-equipped aircraft, and the number of airports having adopted and 
certified EGNOS procedures. As for applications dedicated to disabled or elderly people, an 
indicator could be the proportion of Eu ropean citizens using such services. 
Sales, employment, investment and innovativ e activity created by EU GNSS industry in 
absolute and relative terms will be monitored all along the implementation of the Action Plan, 
possibly with the assistance of EUROSTAT, and the development of GNSS downstream 
applications in Europe will be benchmarked against that in other countries through the 
working groups already established in the cont ext of specific GNSS international agreements, 
the monitoring of intern ational competitions such as the Galileo Masters, and the support to 
several information centres in Asia, Latin America, and the Mediterranean countries. 
A macro-econometric model will be available by the end of 2010, to measure several aspects 
of the impact resulting from th e adoption of GNSS applications. It will be used to track the 
effect of this EC policy. A scoreboard will allow for assessing progress in implementation the Action Plan, which will be broadly shared with stakeholders, and reporting will be provided to the Council of the European Uni on and to the European Parliament.