EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 14.11.2008 
SEC(2008) 2761 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
accompanying the 
Proposal for a 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION 
 
establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy 
  
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
{COM(2008) 721 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2760} 
 
EN 2   EN SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
In preparing its proposal for reform of the co ntrol regime under the cu rrent Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP), the Commission has carried out this in-depth Impact Assessment with the aim of analysing the possible consequences of severa l options to address the current shortcomings 
in the EU fisheries control regime. The CFP cont rol system currently suffers from substantial 
failures, identified by both the European Commission
1 and the European Court of Auditors 
(CoA)2, and it is not as efficient or as effective as it could be. It is therefore important to 
establish a coherent and effective control syst em to secure full implementation of and proper 
compliance with the CFP rules in order to ensure  the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic 
resources. 
The Commission has consequently proposed  a number of changes to bring about 
improvement, and this report is an assessment of the probable impacts of those changes upon 
the effectiveness and efficiency of control and compliance and the likelihood of ensuring 
optimum benefits from existing and future invest ment, particularly in stock recovery, in order 
to preserve a sustainable industry. 
In order to gain the information necessary to  properly develop and analyse different options, 
and in order to allow all stakeholders to contribu te to the discussion at an early stage, a wide 
consultation involving Member Stat es, the fishing sector, and all interested parties was held. 
Moreover, the Commission made use of extern al expertise for a case study based on seven 
stocks, most of which are subject to recovery pl ans, to support some of the arguments in the 
present report. 
In this report, the following options were considered: 
- Option 1: No policy change. Continue cu rrent policy and focus on implementation 
and enforcement of existing framework 
 Sub-option 1: No policy change, con tinuation of the current situation 
 The main assumption for this sub-option is that current control policy is sufficient to 
ensure compliant behaviour in line with th e objectives of the CFP, and that the core 
issue is poor implementation of the exis ting regulatory requirements by Member 
States. On numerous occasions , the Commission has raised se rious concerns as to the 
lack of sufficient action by Member States to this end3. In order to address these 
concerns, the emphasis could be put on bette r implementation of the already existing 
legislation. However, the subs tantial shortcomings of the existing system, such as the 
complexity of the legal framework, the ab sence of common inspec tion standards, the 
lack of a harmonised and sufficiently dete rrent sanctions system or the limited 
capacities of the Commission, could not be  addressed under this option and the 
situation is unlikely to improve. 
 Sub-option 2: Implementation and enfor cement of existing framework through 
implementation regulations 
 The main assumption for this sub-option, as an alternative to the simple continuation 
of the current situation, is that the emphasis could be put on the adoption of 
                                                 
1 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the monitoring of Member 
States’ implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2003-2005 - COM(2007) 167, 10.4.2007. 
2 Special Report No 7/2007 of the Court of Auditors on the control, inspection and sanction systems 
relating to the rules on conservation of Community fisheries resources. 
3 COM(2007) 167. 
 
EN 3   EN outstanding implementing legislation. The f act that many implementation regulations 
have not been adopted clearl y prevents the initial contro l regulation from having its 
full impact. However, this approach means additional layers of rules being added in 
an uncoordinated manner to the existing web of complexity in response to isolated 
political demands or emergency situations in fisheries. Even if all implementation 
regulations were to be adopt ed, this would not allow a ne w approach to control and 
inspection to be developed. Additional pr ovisions would instead exacerbate the 
fragmentation of the current rules and lead to an even more complex legal 
framework. The vicious circle of poor data  not allowing reliable scientific advice, 
leading to unsustainable management decisi ons and resulting in over-exploitation of 
stocks, would continue. Apart from possibly a couple of recovery stocks subject to 
specific conditions, the downward trend in  quotas would generally continue. The 
capacities of the Commission and its inspectors would remain limited. This incapacity of the Commission would cont inue to be matched by the continued 
leniency of national legal systems toward s infringements, unsatisfactory follow-up 
for legal or procedural reasons and incomplete information on sanctions and previous non-compliance. 
- Option 2: Recast of the Control Regula tion, combined with a Code of conduct 
 The development of an approach in which reform is implemented through a 
consolidated legal framework in combinati on with a steering instrument, such as a 
‘Code of Conduct’ or ‘Best Practice Guidance’, could cont ribute to a certain extent 
to improving the current control system. As this approach would build on initiatives 
developed by Member States over the y ears, the coordination of inspection and 
surveillance activities by national author ities at Community level would be 
improved, based on the adoption of inspection and surveillance strategies by the Commission and the pooling of national insp ection resources for joint deployment. 
National inspection resources w ould thus be used as rationa lly and as effectively as 
possible. Some fisheries might recover as a result of unilateral action in a segment of the fleet or groups of fleet segments, but, overall, this approach does not change the 
content of the current provisions or add a ny new legal instruments, and relies too 
heavily on voluntary implementa tion by the Member States. Ev en with a recast of the 
existing provisions, Member States would still need a new legal framework that provides new, mandatory tools to ensure effective application of the CFP rules. 
Consequently, a combination of consolid ation and steering measures would be 
insufficient. 
- Option 3: Regulatory instrument in the form of a new binding regulation 
 The third option presented for assessment is the implementation of the reform 
package through a regulatory instrument binding at EU level. This approach aims to 
create a level playing field in the EU , a goal strongly demanded by the Member 
States and in particular by the sector itself.  It would ensure uniform application of the 
CFP rules across the EU and non- discrimi natory treatment of all fishermen. The 
regulatory instrument would meet the objec tives of a truly global and integrated 
control policy, as it would encompass all leve ls of control, from ‘net to plate’. The 
implementation of adequate control measures  would also bring about some necessary 
structural adjustments to the fleet. On th e one hand, effective and reinforced control 
of effort regimes would reduce current ove rfishing, which artificially maintains the 
profitability of the fleet and hence creates an incentiv e for-non compliance with the 
rules. On the other hand, overcapacity would be addressed by the introduction of 
 
EN 4   EN effective tools to better control the capaci ty of fishing vessels. The establishment of 
common control and inspection standard s would provide a common basis and 
thereby help bring about a level playing fi eld. Harmonised sanctions would also help 
to achieve a level playing fi eld by establishing  penalties proportionate to the gain 
from illegal activities and comparable in all Member States. A mandatory regulatory framework would enable the Commission to ensure effective application of the CFP 
rules. First, the capacity of the Comm ission to respond proportionately to non-
compliance by Member States would be improved. Strengthened competences for Commission inspectors would make it more  difficult for Member States to hide 
shortcomings in the implementation of C FP rules. Second, the strengthened capacity 
of the Commission would in pa rticular enable it to ensu re better management of 
fishing possibilities and make it easier for it to close down fisheries in real time on its 
own initiative to avoid overfishing. 
 Indicative qualitative and quantitative an alyses show that, while some of the 
proposed elements of the package are more  significant than others, the package is 
most likely to be effective in achieving a high level of compliance when implemented in full with a binding rather than a voluntary instrument similar, for 
example, to the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. 
 If the proposals are implemented by a bindi ng regulation and if Member States apply 
this regulation alongside existing multiannual recovery plans, then the incremental 
net benefits to the industry as a result of recovered and better pr otected stocks can be 
in the order of EUR 10 billi on over 10 years. Such economic benefits are likely to be 
accompanied by net increases in employment of up to 4 000 new jobs across all sub-
sectors. Increased fish production can be a significant factor in creating new jobs on 
a sectoral and regional basis. 
 With a fully binding regulation, catches fr om all stocks could increase by some 
270 000 tonnes of high-value species. This would go a long way to securing market supplies and a sustainable industry. 
 Underlying the catch increases will be th e considerable environmental benefits of 
improved fish stocks, particularly under re covery plans — these alone are likely to 
yield an increase of 830 000 tonnes in the ‘spawning stock biomass’ over the period analysed. Moreover, the analysis has demons trated that this increase in the biomass 
of key species would reverse th e current trend of decline in the ecosystem as a result 
of ‘fishing down the food chain’. 
- Option 4: Centralisation of CFP contro l policy at EU level, with increased 
competences for the Commission and the Co mmunity Fisheries Control Agency 
(CFCA) 
 The Commission and the CFCA would concen trate the inspection resources of the 
Member States, and develop universally a ccepted standards with  the long-term goal 
of setting up some kind of European coast guard system. This would ensure uniform 
application of the CFP rules and non-discrimi natory treatment of all fishermen across 
the EU. The Commission would have policing and enforcement powers, which would also facilitate the collection of information on possible infringements, and 
therefore enhance the overall efficiency of the system. This  would require a 
substantial increase in human and techni cal resources at the Commission and the 
Agency and massive financial investment.  
 
EN 5   EN  This option had to be discarded at an ear ly stage, however, for several reasons. In 
particular, the reallocation of tasks betw een the Commission and the Member States 
would exceed what is provided for in  the Treaty. The Comm ission would itself 
implement and enforce the rules it lays dow n. That would also entail the Commission 
exercising jurisdiction over Community fishin g vessels. Moreover, it is difficult to 
conceive that Member States would s uddenly accept giving up such powers to a 
supranational body. In addition, the approach might even go against the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Finally, such an option would have a dramatic 
impact on the EU budget in terms of staff and operational deployment costs, which would be impossible to afford. 
Conclusions 
The report recommends that, since the reform p ackage can be shown to be likely to deliver 
high compliance, with resulting benefits across the industry, particularly from recovering 
stocks, it is best implemented with a binding re gulation, since the analysis of more voluntary, 
non-regulatory options suggests th at they would ineffective. 
The Impact Assessment has shown that no sign ificant improvements can be expected under 
option 1, since one of the major s hortcomings of the current syst em, namely the complexity of 
the legal framework, which is spread over se veral regulations and has undergone various 
amendments during the last year, would not  be addressed under this option, while the 
additional implementing provisions considered unde r sub-option 2 are likely to exacerbate the 
fragmentation of the current rules. 
Option 2  would provide a simplified legal framework and bring about partial improvements to 
the control system in some Member States. However, since shortcomings in the current legal provisions would not be elimin ated and since improvements w ould rely mainly on voluntary 
action by the Member States, this  option would neither lead to a global approach to control 
nor create a level playing field for all stakeholders. 
A complete reform of the current fisheries control regime based on a binding Regulation as 
considered under option 3 would not only conso lidate and simplify the existing legislation, 
currently spread over a number of  different regulations. It would also allow us to develop a 
new, harmonised approach to in spection and control covering all aspects from ‘net to plate’, 
to develop a common culture of compliance and to ensure the effectiv e application of CFP 
rules. The outcome would be a truly global and in tegrated control system able to restore the 
confidence of stakeholders in the CFP.