EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 11 August  2015  
on amendments to  constitutional law and the Law on Česká národní banka  
(CON/ 2015/28) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 6 July 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Czech  Minis ter for Human 
Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation ( hereinafter the ‘Minister’)  for an opinion on a draft 
constitutional law amending Law No. 1/1993 Coll.  on the Constitution (hereinafter the ‘draft constitutional 
law’) and on a draft law amending the Law on Česká národní banka No. 6/1993 Coll. ( hereinafter the 
‘draft law on ČNB’ ; together with the draft law, the ‘draft law s’). The consulting authority  did not specify  a 
time limit for the submission of the ECB’s opinion. The ECB understands that the draft law s have  been 
adop ted by the  Czech Government  and submit ted to Parliament, but that they are not expected to be 
debated by the Lower House of Parliament (in committee) until after the summer recess.  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Artic les 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ( hereinafter the ‘Treaty’) and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC  of 29 June 19981, as the draft law s relate to Česká národní banka (ČNB). In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law s 
The purpose of the draft law s is to amen d a number of provisions of the Constitution of the Czech  
Republic (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’) relating to the powers of the legislative and executive branches of 
the State,  and which  consequently affect certain provisions of the Law on ČNB .  
In parti cular, the draft laws contain provisions which would change the procedure for the appointment of 
ČNB ’s Governor, its two Vice-Gover nors and the other four members of ČNB ’s Board (hereinafter ‘Board 
members’) . Wher eas the Constitution currently stipulates  that the President of  the Czech Republic  
(hereinafter the ‘President’)  appoints and dismisses the Governor, the Vice- Governors and the Board  
members without any further requirement t o obtain the consent of, or consult with,  any third party , the 
draft consti tutional law stipulates  that the President shall appoint the Governor, Vice- Governors and 
Board members following  the consent of the Senate. If the Senate  should fail to reach a decision on the 
President's proposal within 60 days of being presented with the proposal, it will be deemed to have given 
its consent.  The draft law on ČNB reflects this modif ication to the appointment procedure by stipulating 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 that the President shall request the consent of the Senate for the appointment of the Governor, Vice-
Govern ors and  Board member s. The Ministry’s request for an ECB opinion notes that this procedure is 
similar to  the appointment procedure for the Justices of the Czech Constitutional Court and should 
strengthen cooperation between the executive and the legislatur e. The Ministry also notes that the 
independent status of ČNB will be maintained.  
Second, the draft law on ČNB would require ČNB ’s Board to appoint another Board member  to perform in 
full the duties of Vice- Governor ( hereinafter a ‘substitute Vice- Governor ’) until a new Vice- Governor or 
Governor is appointed , in the event that  one of the two office s of Vice -Governor is unoccupied or if a 
Vice-Governor has been appointed to perform the duties of Governor.  Likewise, if the office of Governor 
is unoccupied, ČNB ’s Board will be  required to appoint one of the Vice- Gove rnors (or, if applicable,  
substitute Vice- Governors ) to perform the duties of Governor until a new Governor is appointed.  
The draft laws do not affect t he crit eria for appointment or grounds for dismissal of the Governor, Vice-  
Governor s or other Board me mbers , nor the provisions  guaranteeing their p ersonal independence as 
regards security of tenure.   
Furthermore, pursuant to the transitional provisions of the draft  constitutional  law, appointment s to the  
ČNB ’s Board  by the President  in office at the date of entry into force of the draft constitutional law will be 
governed by the Constitution in force prior to that date. Therefore,  the proposed changes to the 
appointment of Board members would only apply to appointment s made by any President  elected in the 
future and they do not affect the term of office of  Board members that are currently in office.  
 
2. General o bservation s 
As regards the proposed change to the appointment procedure for the Governor , Vice -Governors  and 
other Board members , the ECB notes that the draft laws would strengthen the involvement  of the Senate 
(Upper House of Parliament) in this procedure . In this regard the ECB recalls that Member States are free 
to set the conditions required for the appointment of the members  of the decision- making bodies of the ir 
national central banks (NCBs)2.  
 3.  Specific observations regarding the draft laws  
3.1 The ECB welcomes the proposed amendment to the  draft constitutional law  stipulating that if the 
Sena te fail s to reach a decision on the President's proposal for a new Board member within 
60 days of being presented with the proposal, it will be deemed to have given its consent.  This 
should facilitate the timely appointment of new Board members
3, 
3.2 The ECB w elcomes also the provisions of the draft law s on substitute Board members as these 
provisions should ensur e the continuity of performance of the functions of Governor and Vice-
                                                 
2  See Opinion CON/2009/13,  paragraph 3.4. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu.  
3  Member States have a general duty to take the necessary measures to ensure the timely appointment of a 
successor if a position on one of  the NCB’s decision- making bodies becomes vacant.  See Opinion CON/2013/69, 
paragraph 4.2, Opinion CON/2012/89, para graph 7 and Opinion CON /2009/74, para graph 2.2. See also the ECB’s 
2014 Convergence Report, p. 18.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 Governor . The ECB notes  that one consideration in the context of central bank in dependence is the 
need for a central bank legal framework that provides a stable basis for the central bank’s 
functioning4. In this regard the ECB considers that the draft law on ČNB  should safeguard the 
smooth and continuous  functioning of ČNB ’s Board5. 
3.3 The ECB notes  that clear rules on  the procedure for appointment and dismissal are not only 
necessary for the Governor of an NCB , but also for any person who takes over the duties of the 
Governor  (or a Vice-Governor) . Thus, it must be ensured that any Vice-Governor , or other Board 
member who takes over the duties of the Governor  or Vice -Governor  on an interim  basis , benefit s 
from the same rules that apply to the Governor ( and V ice-Governors ) as regards  security of tenure 
of office,  grounds for  dismissal and conflicts of interest6. This is ensured under the draft law on 
ČNB, which confines the pool of eligible candidates to the Vice- Governors and other Board 
members , all of whom are subject to the same rules on security of tenure of office, grounds for 
dismissal and conflicts of interest.  
3.4 The ECB notes that , should the provisions of the draft laws become subject to further amendments 
in the course of the p arliamentary process  and should these amendments  substantially alter the 
draft laws compared to the version s on which the ECB was consulted, then the ECB would need to 
be reconsulted on these amendments7. 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
  Done at Frankfurt am Main,  11 August 2015.  
 [signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
4  See Opinion CON/2010/91,  paragraph 2.2. 
5  For instance, it should prove useful if the office of Governor or Vice- Governor were to become vacant but the 
constitutional procedure for appointing a successor had not yet been completed. This could arise, for example, if the 
Senate were to withhold its consent before the expiration of the 60- day period mentioned in paragraph 3.1 above, 
which would trigger the need to start a fresh appointment procedure.  
6  See Opinion CON/2010/37 para graph 2.1 and Opinion CON/2010/91 para graph 3.2.  
7  See for example Opinion CON2006/32, paragraph 4.1.