EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 15.12.2017 SWD(2017) 602 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Mid-term review report of the External Financing Instruments {COM(2017) 720 final}

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Contents Executive summary Purpose of the evaluation Scope of the evaluation 2. Background of the initiative Description of ENI and its objectives Baseline 3. Method 4. Implementation state of play 5. Answers to the evaluation questions 6. Conclusions Annex 1. Evaluation Questions Annex 2. Procedural information Annex 2bis Response to the opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board Opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board Title: Evaluation / European Neighbourhood Instrument Overall opinion: 1st submission: NEGATIVE 2nd submission: 28/09/2017 - POSITIVE Annex 3. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation

Consultation strategy Stakeholder mapping Stakeholder consultation strategy Stakeholder consultation framework Timeframe Stakeholder statistics Open Public Consultation (07/02/17 - 05/05/17) Annex 4. Acronyms Annex 5. External evaluators' report, including its annexes and methods and analytical models used Executive summary This Staff Working Document evaluates the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) at its mid-term, covering the period January 2014 to June 2017. With a budget of EUR 15.4 billion, the ENI is the largest financing instrument within the EU budget supporting the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the 16 Neighbourhood countries. Its overall objective is to advance further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness by developing a special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for the human rights. The main findings are as follows: The ENI remains relevant and fit for purpose. It has allowed the EU to implement the reviewed Neighbourhood Policy. It has proven its flexibility, in line with the impact assessment, by reacting to the multiple crises and new challenges in the Neighbourhood, in particular in Ukraine, Tunisia and in relation to the migration crises. The implementation of the principle of differentiation has allowed the EU to adapt its support to partner countries’ needs and ambitions (e.g. by more than doubling EU assistance to Tunisia), as envisaged in the ENI impact assessment. However, the response capacity of the instrument has been stretched to its limits. As regards effectiveness, ENI presents a mixed picture. In the field of human rights, democracy and governance, the political context in many countries has made it difficult to pursue comprehensive support strategies and impeded the achievement of significant results. However, EU support in the area of economic governance and trade has contributed to the improved business environment in several countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but also Morocco, as well as to the increased trade potential between the Neighbourhood countries and the EU. Budget support under the ENI has contributed to macroeconomic stabilisation in important EU partners such as Jordan, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine. The incentive-based approach has been only partly successful in promoting deep and sustainable democracy; it has been more effective in supporting those partners committed to reforms (in particular Georgia, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine). Overall, the prospects for ensuring the sustainability of reforms are limited in several countries because of the unfavourable political environment. Within the Commission, the ENI is delivering aid efficiently in terms of procedures, processes and the ratio of administrative costs, with an adequate organisational set-up and quality in-house expertise (although concentrated in only some key priority areas). The ENI has a clear EU added-value resulting from its ability to provide substantial funding in the form of grants, its capacity to mobilise other EU instruments and loans from financial institutions, its capacity to mobilise EU Member States' expertise and its policy leverage through dialogue with national authorities and civil society. It offers a unique portfolio of aid modalities which can be used in a coherent way and adjusted to the partner country’s needs and capacity. None of these features can be achieved individually by EU Member States. Significant efforts are made to coordinate ENI and other external financing instruments programmes, although there is scope to increase the coordination between country and regional programmes. Coordination with the Member States has increased, in particular through the development of joint programming approaches (e.g. in Moldova and Palestine). The blending of ENI grants with loans from other financial institutions (in particular those of European Financial Institutions), attracted significant additional resources to achieve ENI objectives. Policy dialogue and cooperation leveraged the implementation of agreed reforms in a number of countries (e.g. public administration reform in Ukraine). This leverage is stronger when budget support is used as implementing modality, because of the greater depth of policy dialogue with the beneficiary throughout the life of the operation. 1. Introduction Purpose of the evaluation This document sets out the results of a mid-term evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2020 (ENI). The evaluation assesses whether the ENI is fit for purpose, based on its performance to-date, to deliver on its objectives of advancing further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness by developing a special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Its purpose is to inform future work on the instrument and its actions. In particular, this evaluation, which is part of a set of ten evaluations covering all the EU external financing instruments , informs the Mid-Term Review Report , which draws conclusions across these instruments. This document is largely based on an external evaluation carried out by independent consultants, presented in Annex 5, complemented by internal assessments, other evaluations and a broad consultation process. Scope of the evaluation This evaluation covers the period from 1 January 2014 to 1 June 2017. However, due to the length of the implementation cycle of the ENI, the availability of data and results are limited. Therefore the evaluation also looks at the previous instrument for the Neighbourhood (ENPI, 2007-2013) for some of the evaluation criteria (e.g. efficiency and effectiveness). When using the previous instrument as a source of data, it is important to note that the overall objective of the ENI has broadly remained the same as for the former instrument. Consistent with the requirements of the Common Implementing Regulation, and in view to usefully feed into the Mid-Term Review Report, the evaluation is set at instrument level. As a consequence, it focuses, to the extent possible, on the elements contained in the ENI Regulation (e.g. on its principles, scope, flexibility and complementarity with other instruments) rather than on the projects that have been put in place on the basis of the instrument. However, some information on programming has also been included to show progress on how the instrument has been implemented (see section 4). The countries covered by the evaluation are those eligible under the ENI Regulation (see annex 1 of the Regulation). In accordance with the EU Better Regulation Agenda and the Common Implementing Regulation, the following evaluation criteria are used: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies, and leverage. 2. Background of the initiative The External Financing Instruments make up a major part of the Multiannual Financial Framework's Heading IV "Global Europe" which provides the EU with the tools necessary to reinforce its role on the world stage and to ensure that it is able to live up to its ambitions in promoting its interests and universal values and principles such as democracy, human rights, peace, solidarity, stability and poverty reduction and to help safeguard global public goods. Adopted in early 2014, the External Financing Instruments were designed to facilitate and support policy implementation, with the intention of remaining relevant for the entire duration of the Multi-annual Financial Framework, thereby enabling the EU to implement external action policy as needed within the defined principles and objectives. Description of ENI and its objectives The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main financing instrument to support the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was conceived in 2003 to develop closer relations between the enlarged EU and its neighbouring countries. The ENP was substantially reviewed in 2011, notably in the context of the EU's response to the events of the Arab Spring. It was further reviewed in 2015 to take account of the significant political developments in the neighbourhood. The ENI Regulation, consistent with Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), aims to advance further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness involving the Union and the Neighbourhood countries and territories by developing a special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for the human rights (see the Intervention Logic below). The EU provides its support to partner countries in the Neighbourhood region mainly through the ENI, with its initial envelop of over EUR 15.4 billion for 2014-2020, replenished on a number of occasions since 2014. The ENI replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which covered the period 2007-2013. It covers the same countries with the exception of Russia, which is only eligible to multi-country and Cross-Border Cooperation programmes under the ENI with a particular focus on people to people contacts and with the principle of co-financing by EU and Russia. Union support under the ENI Regulation is used for the benefit of partner countries and the areas involved in cross-border cooperation, as well as for the common benefit of the Union and partner countries. It is programmed through: bilateral, multi-country and Cross-Border Cooperation programmes. The main objectives for assistance under the ENI are the promotion of human rights, good governance and the rule of law and the strengthening of civil society, market access and free trade areas, the management of migration, sustainable and inclusive development, environment and climate change, security and prevention and management of conflicts as well as regional and cross-border cooperation. The reconstructed ENI Intervention Logic (IL) was designed based on the ENI Regulation and the evolution of the ENI strategic documents, notably the revised ENP of November 2015. The ENI is not the only instrument in place to implement the ENP. In addition to other contributing instruments (such us the DCI, EIDHR and IcSP) and EU's external crisis response tools (such us Macro-Financial Assistance and Humanitarian assistance) the EU also conducts policy dialogue promotes participation of partner countries in EU programmes and sectoral policies (agreements on trade, aviation, Research and Development, SMEs, migration and mobility etc.). These activities contribute to the achievements of ENI objectives, but are not part of this evaluation. Their contributions to ENI objectives cannot be disentangled form contributions of ENI programmes. Baseline As this is a mid-term evaluation, the baseline has been set at January 2014 when the ENI 2014-2020 entered into force. Therefore the evaluation compares, to the extent possible, the current situation with that of January 2014. For some evaluation criteria, where data is unavailable for this reference date, earlier baselines have been used, as described in the document (see Evaluation questions on effectiveness and efficiency), considering that the overall objectives of ENI are in line with the ones of the ENPI. The ENI Regulation doesn't include indicators at instrument level. Indicators are defined for each country at sector level in multi-annual programming documents and specific programmes. Indicators are linked to specific country situations and reform objectives and progress can only be assessed in these sectors at country level. Therefore aggregation at instrument level is often not possible, in particular in sectors such as public administration reforms, judiciary reform or public finance management reforms. This means that progress and impact cannot be assessed at the level of the instrument; assessment of progress is made at country or regional level for the different sectors.

The ENI has been implemented in all countries, despite the difficult and often worsening political, social, and economic situation in many of them in 2014, because non-engagement was not an option for the EU, given the close relationship with these countries and the immediate impact on the EU itself of major crises at its borders. Supporting the sometimes difficult political and economic transition processes in these countries was an imperative for the EU. Supporting partner countries which have embarked on ambitious agreements with the EU, the most advanced ones being the Association Agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA) with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine is one of the key objectives of the ENI. To that end capacity development is a major component of reforms programmes under the ENI. Figure 1 – Reconstructed Intervention Logic Positive incentives and reward for progress in democratic reforms were introduced in the aftermath of the Arab Spring ("more for more" approach). This has been formally translated in the ENI Regulation with the introduction of the incentive-based approach (with the so-called "umbrella programmes"), with financial incentives decided on an annual basis for partner countries committed to achieve progress towards deep and sustainable democracy and implementation of agreed reform objectives contributing to the attainment of that goal. Progress is assessed on the basis of the country annual progress reports and other relevant documents. The Regulation also provides for a higher degree of differentiation among partners, including in the definition of country allocations. The objectives of the instrument have also been streamlined with a focus on policy priorities and a more limited number of specific objectives. A better link with relevant internal polices and instruments was promoted, in particular with the extension of the possibility for countries to participate in some EU programmes and in the work of EU agencies. In line with the EU commitments in Busan to increase the coherence, complementarity and effectiveness of EU action abroad, the ENI Regulation encourages moves towards joint programming. 3. Method This evaluation is supported by an external evaluation carried out from August 2016 to May 2017. The external evaluation of the ENI was managed by the Inter-Service Group through the following steps: an inception report (which explained how the evaluation design would deliver the information required); a desk report (providing initial responses to evaluation questions); visits to Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Tunisia and Ukraine to meet key interlocutors to obtain first-hand view in-country; a survey to EU delegations covering all instruments; an Open Public Consultation on the draft report which comprised of a 12 week online survey and targeted meetings with Member States in March 2017; and a final report. Overall, the quality of the collected evidence (data, documentation, interviews and survey results) for this evaluation can be assessed as good, within the limitations mentioned below. Beside the limited amount of information available on implementation, there was a limited feedback from the Open Public Consultation and the Commission services had to provide substantial comments and revisions to the text provided by the external evaluators in order to address some shortcomings, notably related to the understanding of the policy framework and articulation of the different financing instruments. This Staff Working Document largely concurs with the findings and conclusions of the external evaluation. Organisation As part of a wider set of evaluations covering the eight External Financing Instruments, the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR), all the evaluations were carried out in an interlinked and co-ordinated manner. To ensure coherence of the different evaluations, relevant Commission services have worked closely together from the beginning of the process in June 2015. The external contractor delivered its final report at the end of June 2017. All reports prepared by the external contractor were discussed, reviewed and approved by the dedicated Inter Service Group set up by the Commission for the ENI evaluation. The draft final report prepared by the external contractor was placed, with the other instruments draft reports, on the web for the open public consultation (OPC) from 7 February to 3 May 2017. Forty four contributions were received. During that period targeted face to face meetings were organised with representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), EU Member States and the European Parliament. Evaluation Design The intervention logic (IL) forms the backbone of the analytical framework. It is visualised in an IL diagram, which brings together the most relevant elements (from inputs to impacts, but also assumptions) in a single framework. To take into account the revised ENP policy of 2015 that put a focus on the stabilisation and the ability of responding to emergencies in the neighbourhood, a reconstructed IL was prepared by the external consultants. Covering the different levels of the IL, the evaluation questions (EQ) structure the analysis to gather evidence. Each question was structured into judgement criteria (JC) and indicators required to provide an answer based on a synthesis of evidences. Methodology and data The EU evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and added value, complemented by impact, sustainability, consistency, complementarity and synergies and leverage) were applied as an underlying basis. The evaluation questions gave rise to a number of judgement criteria and associated indicators. The external evaluation used a mixed methods approach blending quantitative and qualitative methods, with a focus on the latter. The main analytical tools consisted of rigorous assessment of documentation and consultation of stakeholders (semi-structured interviews, group consultations), and the Open Public Consultation; key issues were also addressed by a survey of beneficiaries and stakeholders organised by the Commission. For all EQs, data collection included a mixture of desk review of documents, semi-structured interviews in Brussels by phone or face-to-face, as well as four field missions that took place to Egypt, Georgia, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Challenges and limitations

The process of this evaluation is robust and the evidence reasonably solid. However, external evaluators were faced with four main challenges: - the implementation of ENI was still in its early stages when the collection of evidence took place. Therefore, effectiveness/sustainability/impact criteria could not be assessed based on outputs and outcomes at this stage; - the timeframe in which the evaluation took place was tight given the requirements imposed by the Common Implementing Regulation. This resulted in difficulties related to access to data, documentation and availability of key respondents; - the ENI impact assessment had not provided an estimation of the expected impact in quantitative terms; - The ENPI is still under implementation, and there is no ex-post evaluation yet at this stage and it was not possible to build on that. The multiple rounds of commenting also mean that facts were verified and this facilitated the cross verification of data from multiple sources. The evaluators were provided access to all relevant information and colleagues within the Commission services and in EU Delegations. The Commission services also ensured that the evaluators would have access to representatives of the beneficiaries. As indicated by the Intervention Logic, the ENI instrument can only be seen as a contributing factor towards any results achieved, especially in the context of the geo-political changes in the Neighbourhood regions. Many factors, both internal and external, affect developments in the beneficiaries. The reform agenda for stabilising the neighbourhood, economic integration of partners in the EU market and political association is highly demanding and requires a strong political commitment from partners. Ultimately, it is for the countries to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies for ensuring that they can reap the benefits of economic integration and political association. 4. Implementation state of play Specific objectives and priorities and indicative financial allocations for EU support are set in multi-annual programming documents, whose duration is adapted to the situation prevailing in each country or region (from two to four years) and which are developed through a wide consultation process, involving the authorities, civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders and the Member States. These priorities at country or regional level are then translated into annual action programmes detailing the different actions. The vast majority of funding is channelled through bilateral programmes, tailored to the needs of each partner country, in line with the principles of differentiation and ownership of the Neighbourhood policy. In addition, the ENI also supports multi-country and Cross Border Cooperation programmes (15 ENI-CBC programmes adopted for the period 2014-2020, totalling around EUR 1 billion). The ENI also contributes to the Erasmus+ programme with a planned amount of more than EUR 700 million for 2014-2020. In response to the recent developments in the Neighbourhood and in order to implement the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 and the ENP Review of 2015, some multi-annual programming documents were revised by anticipation in 2017 instead of 2018. Joint programming is developing in the neighbourhood and a full-fledged joint programming document will be adopted in the course of 2017 for Palestine, covering the period 2017-2020, which will replace a Single Support Framework. Under the ENI, the EU continued to increase its support to civil society, through mainstreaming but also through specific complementary allocations to support the development of their capacities, helping them become more professional and reliable partners in the policy-making and reform processes. Cooperation under the ENI is implemented through a range of modalities. Support to large reforms is often implemented through sector budget support programmes, when conditions in the country allow, or sector programmes. Technical assistance is provided to accompany reform programmes and support partner countries in the implementation of Association Agreements, including by sharing expertise from Member States through TAIEX, Twinnings and the SIGMA programme. Under the ENI, the blending approach has been further developed with the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) which leverages loans from European Financial Institutions to finance investments in sustainable energy, transport infrastructure, environment and private sector development, targeting small and medium-sized enterprises. The ENI incentive-based mechanism ("Umbrella Programme") is providing, on an annual basis, additional funding to countries demonstrating progress in building deep and sustainable democracy for an amount of around 10% of the annual ENI budget (average amount of EUR 200 million a year). The main beneficiaries from 2014 to 2016 were Tunisia, Ukraine and Georgia (see table below). Since the adoption of the ENI, the EU has been faced with the need to respond to the multiple crises and unforeseen events which unfold in its neighbourhood (see the following table, pointing out the main negative events affecting several countries, with related impact. Table 1 - Major events having negatively affected some ENI beneficiary countries and related impact Country Major events affecting the country Impact Neighbourhood East Armenia In 2015 Armenia officially joins the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union, having decided against signing an EU Association Agreement. Reduced willingness to comply with the EU agenda Ukraine (59% of the population and 51% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood East before the crisis) Maidan event in 2014 Annexation of Crimea by Russia Conflict in eastern Ukraine Political instability (Indicator on Political stability and absence of violence (WB) from 45.5 in 2010 to 5.71 in 2014) Losses of human lives (about 10,000 reported killed since the start of the crisis) Substantial interference of Russia in national politics and security Substantial losses in economic terms (growth rate from 5.5% in 2010 to -6.6% in 2104 and -9.8% in 2015) Macroeconomic imbalances (Fiscal balance -4.14% of GDP in 2014; public debt 70% in 2014, as opposed to a 40% of GDP the year before) Neighbourhood South Egypt (38% of the population and 17% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Revolution (2011) and political unrest (2013). Terrorism Deteriorated macroeconomic environment and macroeconomic imbalances (fiscal balance -12.9% in 2014 of GDP; public debt around 90%) Worsening conditions of Rule of law (RoL indicator (WB) down from 49.76 in 2010 to 31.25 in 2015) Increased insecurity (Indicators on Political Stability and absence of violence (WB) from 19.43 in 2010 to 8.57 in 2015) No budget support payments since 2012. Jordan (3.3% of the population and 2.5% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Civil war in Syria Terrorism Major inflow of refugees from Syria (at least 660,000) Macroeconomic imbalances (Fiscal balance at least -11% of GDP during the last years; public debt around 90% of GDP) Lebanon (4% of the population and 3.6% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Civil war in Syria Terrorism Major inflow of refugees from Syria (about 1.1 million) Macroeconomic imbalances (fiscal balance at – 7.5% of GDP in 2015; public debt around 140% of GDP) Libya (3% of the population and 9% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Fall of the Kaddafi regime in 2011 following the Arab Spring Terrorism Deep political instability and deteriorated security (Indicator on Political stability and absence of violence (WB) from 47.39 in 2010 to 3.35 in 2015 Collapsing economy (IMF estimates a growth rate of -53% of DGP in 2014; a fiscal balance of – 73% of GDP in the same year) Syria (10% of the population and 5.3% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Civil war following the Arab Spring Creation of ISIL in 2014 Military interventions of NATO and Russia Major political disruption (Indicator on Political stability and absence of violence (WB) from 22.27 in 2010 to 0 in the last years) Major macroeconomic crisis (no data available) Losses of human lives (estimates vary, but go up to a level of 475,000) More than 5 millions of people escaping About 6.5 million internally displaced Tunisia (5.3% of the population and 5.6% of the total GDP of Neighbourhood South in the last year for which statistics are available for all countries - 2006) Revolution and political instability following the Arab Spring. Three major terrorist attacks in 2015. Macroeconomic imbalances (Fiscal balance -5.2% of GDP in 2015; public debt above 57% in the same year) Negative impact, in terms of security and attractiveness for investments and tourism due the deteriorated situation in Libya (Indicator on Political stability and absence of violence from 43.60 in 2010 to 18.47 in 2014, and still deteriorating) Social unrest

The flexibility of the instrument has been stretched to the limit. The initial budged proved to be insufficient, which was partially addressed through transfers from other external instruments. Faced with the illegal annexation of Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation and the conflict in the eastern Ukraine when the negotiation of the ENI Regulation had just been finalised, the Commission mobilised all the possibilities of the external cooperation regulations tool box and adopted in April 2014 a major State Building Contract of EUR 355 million to support the political and economic stabilisation of Ukraine, the largest bilateral programme ever for Ukraine. This was also the first large programme adopted under the new ENI Regulation, showing its flexibility to respond to major crises. It was accompanied by a EUR 10 million programme in favour of civil society to help civil society organisations (CSOs) monitor national reforms. The same year, the scale of the Syrian crisis and its enormous impact on neighbouring countries led the Commission to establish EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the "Madad" fund). This Trust Fund brings a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis and primarily addresses longer term economic, educational and social needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, as well as helping overstretched host communities and their administrations. As of end of June 2017, contributions from the EU budget to the Madad fund amounted to EUR 956.20 million, of which EUR 523.5 million from ENI for a total amount of around EUR 1300 million. The establishment of the Madad fund aimed at responding to the challenges around the Syria crisis in a more integrated and coherent way and leveraging additional funds from the Member States, alleviating EU budget constraints. The ENI also contributed to the EU emergency trust fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa for a total of EUR 194 million since 2015, in order to address the root causes of migration and the different aspects of migration management in the five beneficiary countries of the North Africa window (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). A number of special measures has also been used to ensure quicker reaction to evolving needs. Since 2014, the initial ENI budget set at EUR 15.4 billion in 2014 has been substantially increased (by EUR 1.1 billion) through reinforcements from Heading IV margin, redeployments in Heading IV and reinforcement from Contingency Margin in support of UNRWA and in response to the consequences of Syrian Crisis. In total, until June 2017, EUR 7.0 billion have been committed, and EUR 5.3 billion disbursed. Out of the first amount, EUR 4.4 billion were committed to the partners in the South (63 %), and EUR 2.0 billion to the East (28 %), with EUR 3.3 billion and EUR 1.5 billion disbursed so far. The implementation of ENI assistance is continuously monitored, in particular through Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) of projects and programmes, internal monitoring implemented by EU Delegation staff and evaluations at policy, thematic, as well as at country or regional level. No systemic monitoring of ENI at instrument level is taking place, also in the absence of a specific monitoring system set out at instrument level. Results reporting has so far taken place in the framework of the end of project results reporting exercise, put in place by DEVCO based on the EU Results Framework, but focused so far only on projects related to the previous Multi-annual Financing Framework (MFF). Table 2 -ENI 2014-2017commitments(as of July 2017) ENI + ENPI 2014-2016 payments Country/ Programme 2014 of which umbrella 2015 of which umbrella 2016 of which umbrella 2017 indicative Country/ Programme 2014 2015 2016 South Algeria 26,3 25,0 25,0 30,0 Algeria 33,0 33,2 42,2 Egypt 115,0 105,0 105,0 100,0 Egypt 91,1 64,6 93,2 Israel - 2,0 1,8 1,8 Israel 4,4 6,6 4,2 Jordan 174,5 15,0 100,0 80,0 88,0 Jordan 56,3 101,3 148,4 Lebanon 143,3 15,0 40,0 40,0 44,0 Lebanon 78,2 100,3 66,9 Libya 8,0 3,0 10,0 12,5 Libya 11,0 7,7 6,2 Morocco 218,0 20,0 210,0 30,0 190,0 189,5 Morocco 76,2 134,5 224,0 Palestine 307,5 325,3 290,0 310,0 Palestine 303,2 317,5 330,6 Syrian crisis * 61,3 409,0 170,0 201,0 Syrian crisis*** 2,0 35,1 78,6 Tunisia 169,0 50,0 186,8 71,8 213,5 80,5 300,0 Tunisia 178,5 142,0 108,2 Reg. & other multi-country 229,1 196,4 126,0 181,0 Reg. & other multi-country 92,8 118,9 173,9 Africa TF ** 55,0 139,0 30 Total ENI South 1.452,0 100 1.602,5 101,8 1.306,3 80,5 1.596,8 Total ENI South 926,8 1.061,8 1.306,4 EAST Armenia 34,0 30,0 28,0 28,0 Armenia 23,2 36,7 49,2 Azerbaijan* 21,0 14,5 13,5 19,1 Azerbaijan 6,8 22,1 21,5 Belarus 19,0 14,5 29,0 29,0 Belarus 22,3 17,9 23,7 Georgia 131,0 30,0 100,0 10,0 110,0 21,0 110,0 Georgia 41,1 71,9 96,4 Moldova 131,0 30,0 90,0 89,0 89,0 Moldova 93,7 42,2 82,8 Ukraine 242,0 40,0 200,0 90,0 200,0 92,0 200,0 Ukraine 314,1 80,0 206,2 Reg. & other multi-country 152,4 150,1 144,5 144,5 Reg. & other multi-country 47,0 88,8 111,0 Total ENI East 730,4 100 599,1 100 614,0 113 619,6 Total ENI East 548,1 359,6 590,8 TOTAL ENI 2182.4 200 2201,6 201,8 1920,3 193,5 2189,4 1.623,2 1.573,2 2078,00 * including ENI contribution to the EU Madad fund ** ENI contribution to the EU Africa TF ***excluding TF payments 5. Answers to the evaluation questions Evaluation Question 1: Relevance To what extent do the overall and the specific objectives and the design of the ENI respond to: (i) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the instrument was adopted (2014)?; (ii) Current EU priorities, in particular emerging from the 2015 ENP Review such as stabilisation, and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)? Overall, the ENI instrument appeared fit for purpose at the moment it was set out, properly addressing the most significant needs identified, in line with the policy framework set out by the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and as such it ensured credibility to the EU's intention to deepen political cooperation and pursue gradual economic integration with its neighbours. The relevance of the ENI instrument remains rooted in the existence of an EU policy for its neighbourhood. This is reflected in the Treaty (Article 8: "The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries") which calls for a special relation with the neighbours, and in the strong political will of EU member States to have a dedicated policy for the European Neighbourhood and related instruments. The Council conclusions on the ENP of 2015 are quite clear in that respect ("Underlining the importance of a special relationship with the EU's neighbours, the stabilisation of the neighbourhood in political, economic and security terms will be the main political priority for the EU in the next years"). During the public consultation launched in 2015 on the occasion of the review of the ENP, many stakeholders reaffirmed that the EU must have a special and more effective relationship with its neighbours with dedicated tools. Most ENP partners with only a few exceptions – and not taking into account those countries that are at war like Syria – want to build special relations with the European Union. On its part, the EU has very strong interest to engage in special relations with neighbours also in order to promote and defend EU values and common interests. This is key for building resilience in the neighbourhood. The ENI is only part of a wider set of tools to ensure that the EU delivers on the commitment of Article 8 of the Treaty. The EU priorities with regard to the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) stem from its policy framework, as defined in Article 3(1), and are not set out in a single specific document but rather in a set of bilateral agreements, Communications, conclusions and declarations of EU institutions (European Parliament and Council). Though the strategic framework is complex and defined by a plurality of documents (as pointed out by the external evaluators, who consider that this complex set somewhat hinders (its) clear understanding and visibility), the Commission services consider that the strategic framework for the implementation of the ENI is clearly set out in the recently adopted Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (and its predecessor, the 2003 EU Security Strategy) and the 2015 Joint Communication on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, what is somewhat missing is a clear description about how the EU intends to mobilise its various instruments in complement of the ENI. Though the articulation between geographic and thematic instruments makes sense in principle, the lack of clear, operational document explaining the articulation of all EU instruments makes it complicated for beneficiaries and external stakeholders to easily grasp it. That being said, the ENI is the main financial instrument to support partners in the region with grants, and the existence of other much smaller instruments provides a broader range of available tools, allows for greater flexibility and is thus serving the principle of differentiation, as also acknowledged by the external evaluators, though several interventions for human rights actions, for security, for the promotion of EU interests were also funded from ENI, from which the large majority of financial resources was coming. The objectives (Article 1) and thematic priorities (Article 2) of the ENI Regulation are congruent with the six core pillars of the ENP as laid out in the 2011 Joint Communication on the ENP “A new response to a Changing Neighbourhood”. The latter is the main policy document that framed the preparation of the ENI Regulation. Even after the adoption of the ENP Review in November 2015, the broad and comprehensive nature of priorities listed in the ENI Regulation, as well as the framework for programming and implementation, has allowed the EU to respond to new priorities. As a result, the Regulation ensures the responsiveness of the ENI to the challenges of the Neighbourhood in line with ENP priorities, which has been a proof of flexibility.

The EU has responded to considerable challenges in the neighbourhood since 2014, in particular to the consequences of the Syrian Crisis, the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, civil war in Libya, the emergence of the Islamic State, and high youth unemployment in most partner countries fuelling resentment, disenfranchisement and pressures to migrate towards Europe. The response capacity, budget and flexibility of the ENI instrument has been stretched to its limits. In fact, external evaluators and a few stakeholders have considered that the response brought under the ENI has not been proportionate to the needs and challenges. Commission services agree that facing the challenges in the neighbourhood now and in the future (e.g. reconstruction of war-torn regions in Ukraine and Syria, state building in Libya, tackling rising inequalities in most countries, pressing demographics in Egypt and Palestine, boosting sustainable and inclusive growth in the partner countries) requires increased EU political and financial investment as well as leveraging additional funding, including by further enhancing cooperation with major Financial Institutions and participation of the private sector though blending facility and guarantees. Despite the numerous efforts to adapt to circumstances, the ENI instrument was not specifically conceived to contribute to crisis prevention, thus enhancing broad EU interests (as pointed out by external evaluators). This would require that strategy and programming documents, which do not usually include a risk assessment analysis that goes beyond projects or sectors, include geostrategic analyses (both conflict analysis and early warning) aiming at identifying and anticipating possible discontinuities, social/political changes and risk of conflict, better assessing the potential for violent and radical changes in the neighbourhood countries and ensuring early and coherent EU action. Currently, these documents which are shared with the partner governments broadly reflect the political status quo. In countries where budget support is deployed, a detailed country risk assessment is compiled and updated every year based on a list of pre-defined criteria which allow comparison to be made over the years for a particular country and also among different countries. The Commission services acknowledge that interventions on the ground shall be based on good anticipation of possible developments. Nevertheless, some of the changes in the neighbourhood in 2011-2015 were radical and violent, and challenging for all development actors present on the ground. In such difficult circumstances the implementation of the instrument was flexible and the Commission adjusted the financial allocations in accordance with the scope of the challenges. Nevertheless, the Commission services acknowledge that linkages between the political and geopolitical risk analysis already conducted within the EU institutions (notably in the EEAS) and the services in charge of programming financial assistance under ENI were not adequate. An integrated, comprehensive approach was not in place and human rights and gender are crucial in this context as well. Moreover the analysis of agents and factors of changes in programming documents was not adequately developed. The Commission services do not consider that there is a need however to set a specific component on crisis prevention under the ENI, nor to create dedicated structures to crisis-stricken countries. Many of the existing interventions by ENI and other instruments (in particular the IcSP) are already contributing to crisis prevention (e.g. providing budget support and macro financial assistance to Tunisia in 2014-15 helped prevent macroeconomic crisis). Rather, flexibility, though present, was probably not sufficient, and the necessary synergies with the instrument contributing to peace and stability which works on crisis prevention were not sufficiently developed. The ENI Regulation sets out solid foundations for enhanced alignment with EU and partners’ needs and priorities, which was emphasised by the ENP Review in 2015. In comparison to ENPI, the ENI strengthened the principle of differentiation and the focus on country ownership and civil society. As evidenced by face to face consultations, partners value this principle. With the exception of the magnitude, the ENI interventions look in general well in line with on-going challenges, emerging needs and limited capacities/political will for reform in most of the ENI partner countries. Policy dialogue is an inherent feature of the ENI framework that is implemented, thus ensuring that strategy and programming documents as well as ENI programmes are aligned to the priorities of partner countries’ governments and their citizens' needs (especially through the inclusion of civil society representatives). Evaluation Question 2: Effectiveness, impact, sustainability To what extent does the ENI deliver results against the instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities? It is still too early to assess with absolute certainty the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the instrument given the short period of implementation. Only some strategic, high level indicators can give an initial evidence of whether or not the countries are moving in the expected direction, knowing that the EU can only indirectly influence their evolution. However, considering the continuity of interventions from the previous instrument, and despite the negative impact of exogenous factors (Arab Spring, wars, refugee crisis, economic slowdown in Europe), significant reforms were accompanied and progress was registered in those countries that were willing to engage in a reform process and in those areas where there was ownership by the national authorities and the external conditions were conducive. For example, there has been a clear trend of improved business environment in some Neighbourhood East partners such as Georgia; Jordan has demonstrated economic resilience despite the huge strains from the Iraq war and refuges crisis, notably through budget support grants provided by the ENI and loans under the EU macro-financial assistance; important public administration reform programmes in Georgia, Morocco and Ukraine supported by the EU have allowed improved service delivery and public financial management; Tunisia has made progress in its democratic transition with hugely improved press freedom and voice and accountability. This can be shown by some international indicators in the table below (in green cases of significant improvement; in red cases of significant deterioration). Table 3 – Evolution of selected indicators in some countries Indicators Region/Country 2010 2013 2016 Distance to frontier (WB) (range 1-100) N East 59.73 67.19 72.10 Georgia 76.61 82.09 80.20 Moldova 59.21 32.26 72.75 Ukraine 44.21 58.14 63.90 N South 58.64 56.97 54.69 Morocco 60.04 64.38 67.50 Jordan 57.17 57.88 57.30 World Competitiveness Index (WEF) (range 1-7) N East 4 4.1 4.2 Georgia 3.8 4.1 4.32 N South 4.1 4.2 4.1 Morocco 4.1 4.1 4.2 Corruption perception index (Transparency International) (range 1-100) N East 2.8* 33.7 36.8 Georgia 3.8* 49 57 N South 3.5* 34.7 34.8 Regulatory Quality (WB) (range 1-100) N East 43.04 43.30 48.48 Georgia 65.05 73.68 81.25 N South 44.50 36.04 32.59 Press Freedom (Reporters without Borders (range 100-1)$ N East 39 38.7 38.5 N South 50.2 37.4 46.1 Tunisia 72.5 39.93 31.6 Voice and Accountability (WB) (range 1-100) N East 29.94 30.49 32.51 Georgia 42.18 54.50 53.69 N South 22.96 29.02 29.50 Tunisia 9.95 44.08 56.65 *: For this year the range was 1-10. $: For this indicator a decrease in the score means an improvement. Recent reports from the European Court of Auditors for the operations in Tunisia and Ukraine have demonstrated that EU actions under ENI and its predecessor ENPI were effective. On the economic governance side, also the recently-concluded evaluation is rather positive regarding interventions in Georgia and Morocco notably on Public Financial Management. The strategic evaluation on Azerbaijan, currently in its final stage, tends to conclude in very positive terms about the role played by EU assistance in enabling the country to approximate the EU acquis, especially thanks to the twinning and TAIEX instruments. This is also one of the conclusions of the strategic evaluation on Jordan, which also notes that the EU, together with other actors, instigated, through its policy dialogue, significant reforms in the energy and social protection sector. Overall, many of the above-mentioned evaluations point to the distinct EU contribution on institutional strengthening. Also, Cross Border Cooperation programmes have had a positive impact on people to people contract and good neighbourly relations between EU regions and those of neighbourhood countries, although they have had less impact on stability and security at the border. However, in countries where there is no strong political commitment to comprehensive reforms or the willingness to have closer relations with the EU, the effectiveness of the ENPI and the ENI has been less strong. Since 2014, progress of the Neighbourhood countries regarding respect of EU fundamental values has been uneven. In the field of human rights, democracy and governance, the Commission has targeted activities that are relevant and important, but the countries and regional contexts have made it difficult to pursue comprehensive support strategies and hence impeded the achievement of significant results. While the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Annual report (2014) on the ENI estimates that actions under the ENI and the ENPI have effectively delivered well targeted outputs of good technical quality in the field of rule of law and good governance (e.g. by strengthening civil society in various countries), the prospects for sustainability are limited in several countries. The unfavourable political environment (look at the previous table) in most Neighbourhood countries remains the main cause. Nevertheless, limited improvements and success stories exist in specific contexts or areas. For example, Ukraine made significant steps forwards with reforms in the areas of anti-corruption, public procurement and public administration. In the context of the EU efforts at promoting deep and sustainable democracy (one of the objective of the ENI), the incentive-based approach has been partly successful. Indeed, first of all, it is already the case that those partners most keen to establish a close relation with the EU are offered more developed incentives (e.g. Association Agreement - AA/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement - DCFTA) for three partners in the East and two in the South, access to EU programmes, visa facilitation or liberalisation agreements in place, etc. Second, the existing mechanism has been effective in supporting partners that had committed to reforms, most notably Ukraine, Tunisia, and Georgia. This has allowed for example to double the annual allocation to Tunisia at a critical moment to support the transition of the country and to substantially increase the support to Ukraine’s political and economic reforms after the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the conflict in the eastern part of the country (in line with the expectations of the impact assessment on the greater need for flexibility). This support has allowed effective macroeconomic stabilisation in these partners and/or avoiding economic recessions. For example, after the large recession in 2014-2015 in Ukraine, growth rebounded to more than 2% in 2016 and international reserves doubled thanks in particular to the large EU and international support package (including ENI grants and loans from the macro-financial assistance instrument). Thirdly, the existing provisions of the incentives-based approach (the umbrella programmes and the ranges mechanism) ensure that EU interests and values are taken into consideration in the allocation mechanism. However, it should be noted that the incentive in form of additional umbrella funds has limited impact on reform processes in partner countries, and that providing indicative allocations in form of ranges is perceived as misleading by some partner countries. As mentioned in the external evaluation report, "the mechanism has allowed extending the scope of reforms already agreed but hardly incentivised partner countries for more or deeper reforms". The results of ENI sector programmes and associated policy dialogue considerably differ between countries and within countries. Good preparation, political and sectoral commitment to reforms, administrative capacities and the mobilisation of national resources are key factors of success; when these conditions are not met, the ENI programmes cannot reach intended objectives. This also explains why the mix of implementation modalities has been adjusted to the absorption capacity, Public Financial Management discipline and sector priorities of each country. The choice of implementation modalities is strongly linked to the EU response to partners' needs and priorities. On the positive side, ENI actions have been readily available to support the dialogue and identified reforms with the Eastern partnership framework, leading, among others, to the identification of 20 very concrete deliverables to be achieved by 2020 in the four priority areas identified at the Riga Summit. Few ENI programmes have already been implemented on the ground. Most programmes launched so far inevitably do not yet fully address the latest EU priorities (as stated by the ENP Review of late 2015) and still focus mainly on addressing the long-term root causes of migration and poverty, although there are notable exceptions (e.g. the large budget support operations for Ukraine and Tunisia that were targeted at the stabilisation of the economic situation of these two important partners). Newly designed ENI programmes (but not yet implemented) focus more on the new orientations of the revised ENP. The most recent project formulations address ‘EU policy priorities’ adopted by the 2015 ENP Review, recent communications on security, migration, resilience and the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy inter alia through the integrated approach in order to address crises. To note, the adopted Partnership Priorities for Lebanon and Jordan, and those in preparation for Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Egypt indicate the new way forward. Addressing the refugee crisis through the flexible use of resources coming from the ENI, other EU instruments (such as the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and Humanitarian Aid), and EU Member States by means of their contributions to the Trust Funds has had a positive impact in reducing the flow of refugees in Europe and the associated tensions with unmanaged flows. The continuous flow of refugees on the central Mediterranean migration route demonstrates however that the scale of the EU response so far does not match the scale of the problem in countries of transit or origin.

The preparation and implementation of ENPI/ENI programmes is extensively used to sustain a strong policy dialogue. According to the external evaluators, the comparative advantage of the EU in this field is fully acknowledged by the partner countries, EU Member States and other donors. The degree of leadership of the partner country in the dialogue varies and depends on the expertise and the coordination capacity of the governmental body in charge of international cooperation. Reported progress is of different quality in each country and even across sectors in a single country. In this context, chronic political instability, tensions in the relations with the EU and weakening administrative capacity in some partner countries since 2011 have hampered the likelihood of ENI programmes to reach their objectives. This has been for example the case in countries such as Moldova and Egypt. Though several countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood have significantly improved their performance recently including through strong EU support and conditionality, the ENI countries remain among those with a relatively poor business environment, in particular in the South, Over the last decade, and through support provided by the ENPI and ENI, the EU has contributed to a significant extent to increased trade potential within the Southern Neighbourhood, and between the Neighbourhood countries and the EU, though increase in trade flows within each sub region has been limited in both Neighbourhood regions. In both regions, limited available information as well as the parallel support of many donors does not permit for explicitly linking EU financed projects to economic progress or resilience. Moreover, as most of them are middle-income countries, the specific contribution of the ENI actions is difficult to measure against national public policies. However, as shown in the table 3 , it is likely that, in the absence of particular shocks, the continuous financial support provided under the ENPI and now the ENI, associated with the ongoing policy dialogue have contributed to improve the enabling environment and to some significant results in some partner countries (e.g. Georgia, Tunisia, and Morocco). EU cross cutting priorities (including fundamental rights, gender equality, climate change) have been unevenly implemented, with difficulties where they are not seen as priorities by the partners (although there are exceptions such as the continuous work in Morocco on Gender or on democracy building in Tunisia). Evaluation Question 3: Efficiency To what extent is the ENI delivering efficiently? The ENI is delivering aid efficiently in terms of procedures, processes and the ratio of administrative costs. Financial control systems are in place and are effective at all levels, and monitoring and evaluation systems at project and at country level provide the required feedback on implementation. Financial management procedures have been largely kept identical to the ENPI, reducing the disruption and loss of efficiency associated to major changes. Often ENI programmes continue directly on the achievements made by the ENPI, for example the ENI Cross Border Cooperation programmes. One additional step that has been introduced in the multi-annual programming process, is the strategic dialogue with the European Parliament before the finalisation of multi-annual programming documents, which adds several weeks to the programming process. This represents a step forward in terms of transparency and inclusiveness, but clearly negatively impacts on efficiency. The features of the ENI Regulation and the CIR have allowed flexibility – something in line with the impact assessment and valued both by the external evaluators and the stakeholders consulted, though with diverging views - and offered new opportunities to achieve the policy objectives. However, the EU Budget Financial Regulation, the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) and the Commission administrative procedures and practices have prevailed over simplification efforts, leaving the regulatory burden unchanged; this has undermined reaching one of the objectives of the ENI impact assessment. The cumbersome administrative procedures make it difficult for smaller civil society organisations and social partner organisations (trade unions and employers' organisations) to get involved in project implementation or may distract from the core business of the association. In the case of cross border cooperation (CBC), the simplification of implementation rules was an important objective; a recent survey of programmes authorities managing CBC operations show that the ENI rules have brought an improvement compared to the previous ENPI rules, as expected by the impact assessment. Under the ENI Regulation no significant changes occurred in the time span required to finalise a decision (the benchmark is set to 47 weeks for multi-annual programming, despite the four weeks added by the Strategic Dialogue with the European Parliament before finalisation of the programming documents) and for the various steps of implementation (formulation, financial agreement, contracting). ). However, some partner countries still complain that the process is too long and bureaucratic and that it is difficult to see a link between a programming mission, when consultations with partner countries authorities take place, and beginning of implementation. However, EU Delegations indicated that the time span for decision-making is improving, as expected under the Impact Assessment. Special measures made possible by the Financing Regulation and the CIR are contributing to the ENI’s efficiency in delivery by accelerating the implementation process for unforeseen needs. The recourse to special measures (used notably in the case of Ukraine to respond to the 2014 event) does provide flexibility to the EU response and can help accelerate the programme preparation process. The external evaluation found that the ENI exhibits an adequate organisational set-up and high quality in-house expertise which are considered key factors of efficiency in general and of cost-efficiency in particular. In the present setting, cost-efficiency of ENI management is confirmed by an administrative cost ratio of 2.0% on 2015 commitments (2.5% in 2014). However, in the absence of special arrangements (like with the Support Group for Ukraine, or the Madad fund to address the refugee crisis), the Commission faced serious human resources constraints when a strong increase in financial assistance volumes took place (e.g. Tunisia). In-house expertise was strengthened with the creation of Centres of Thematic Expertise (CoTE) which enhance coherence in formulating sector and thematic ENI interventions, allowing drawing on the lessons of past projects and best practices from other countries/regions. The expertise is focused on the most important policy areas but in some cases internal capacities remain weak. This is compensated through closer interaction with line DGs. Budget support operations can contribute to deliver efficiently and rapidly (as evidenced in the swift delivery of large operations to Ukraine in 2014 and Tunisia since 2011). However, the strict eligibility criteria linked to budget support, and the time required for the good preparation of the operations, restrict the use of this modality to only a limited number of countries which have clear strategies and the strong willingness to implement them. As noted by the Court of Auditors' special report on EU assistance to Moldova, when the Commission's programmes are not fully aligned to the national strategies, and when conditionality is not interpreted strictly, they reduce the Commission's leverage. The setting of +/-10% range in the multi-annual indicative budget is another mechanism used – even if not intended –to introduce more flexibility in annual allocations among countries. However, given the multiple developments in a series of countries, both positive or negative, and the tight budget, the Commission adjusted the initially planned indicative envelopes beyond the 10% range; there were strong increase in Jordan, Ukraine and Tunisia (not counting umbrella programmes funding) and decrease in Azerbaijan and Algeria for example. This flexibility has been in line with the objectives set out in the impact assessment and proved useful to respond to fast evolving challenges. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for the ENI was not set out at the Regulation level, but rather at corporate level, through the EU Results Framework, and then through the normal programming and planning stage (Single Support Framework or Country Strategy Papers and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes/ Annual Action Documents), but cannot rely on national systems for assessing results, due to the poor quality of statistics, sometimes, and to a still limited culture of monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and reporting systems (including result-oriented monitoring; the Programme Statement; as well as the Authorising Officer by Sub-Delegation and the External Assistance Management Reports) represent an efficient way to inform the Management and steer the work. Projects’ activities are monitored in a robust and systematic way at the level of outputs; in the case of CBC programmes, for example, a number of common output indicators have been defined in order to improve communication on results. This should enable better reporting in the future as well as future evaluation. However, reporting on outcome and long term impact remains embryonic. This is partly due to the lack of relevant indicators, partly to an unclear intervention logic (theory of change). In 2018, after three pilot years, the Commission will be able to start reporting on operational results achieved under the ENI. In addition, a new information management tool under development will also focus more on results reporting and should be gradually rolled out as of 2018. Work has started already at the Commission on defining standardised set of result indicators for specific sector interventions (such as for Public Financial Management or Public administration reform, thanks to SIGMA). Further work is ongoing in the framework of the updating of the EU Results Framework and in the perspective of the implementation of a new IT tool (OPSYS) with a dedicated dimension dedicated to results.. Evaluation Question 4: Added value To what extent do the ENI programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors? As an European Union instrument, the ENI is unique in the sense that it federates the somehow diverging interests of the Member States around the common objectives of the European Neighbourhood policy. This is linked to the closeness of the ENI beneficiaries and their direct influence on domestic issues (through migration, security, trade). Through the ENI, the EU common perception of urgency to work with our Neighbours is more vivid than ever even though differences in means and solutions could be debated on. This dynamism overcomes the traditional EU Member States' vested interests or historical links with beneficiary countries. Seen in a broad context, there is a positive EU added-value in ENI programming and implementation vis-à-vis EU Member States.

The EU added value can be seen through the ENI’s i) ability to provide substantial funding mainly through grants in such cases as the responses to the Syrian Crisis, the stabilisation of Ukraine and Tunisia, or the support to reformers such as Georgia and Morocco, ii) capacity to coordinate with other EU instruments and mobilise EU Member States' parallel funding along commonly agreed objectives to address everything from long-term to short-term and emergency challenges, iii) comparative advantages in mobilising expertise suited for the needs and priorities within a framework consistent with EU and partner countries’ mutual interests, and iv) political influence and policy leverage through dialogue with national authorities and civil society. Moreover, various aid modalities (like Twinning and TAIEX, enabling the mobilisation of key EU public expertise) can be used in a coherent way and adjusted to the partner country’s (absorption) capacity. None of these features can be achieved individually by EU Member States. Moreover, the importance of keeping a specific instrument was emphasised by several contributors to the Open Public Consultation. It is also unique to the EU to actively combine regional, CBC and ENI-wide programmes to promote confidence building and good neighbourly relations among countries on both sides of the EU borders and in some cases with the involvement of the Russian Federation. The combination of intervention types and aid modalities is unique among donors, even more so when the ENI uses innovative instruments like blending and EU Trust Funds to mobilise additional funding and implementation capacities. Trust Funds (the "Madad" fund and the North Africa Window of the EU Emergency trust fund for Africa) are another potential incentive for reducing EU Member States aid fragmentation by using their expertise and implementation capacities. To date the Madad fund has attracted resources from many EU Member States, although the level of these contributions could be higher given the magnitude of the challenges in the region. However, visibility of the EU in such operations is rather limited; more generally, strategic communication and visibility are areas where stakeholders have noted room for improvement. The added value of the EU in enhancing the approximation to its acquis differs according to the ambition of partners in their relations with the EU. Nevertheless, the adoption of EU legislation and norms and standards remains a key objective for many partners and derive from their contractual obligations with the EU (notably those having DCFTAs), but also from the interest to improve export perspectives in third countries. For example, the adoption of EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards is necessary for all countries to export agricultural products to the EU, but can also make the products more tradable in non EU countries. Approximation to the acquis is therefore taking place in the economic area and in technical areas related to Rule of law issues irrespective of the willingness of a country to implement more fundamental and critical reforms. This explains the success of the twinning instruments also in relatively less open minded governments. Evaluation Question 5: Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies To what extent does the ENI facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs? The internal coherence within the ENI programmes is good. The overall good internal coherence is based on the existence of, and compliance with, the programming instructions but also the continuous efforts of the different services to avoid overlaps. This finding is also shared by the external (ROM) monitoring. The ENI bilateral, multi-country and cross-border (CBC) programmes have each been designed with different cooperation areas in mind and the Commission services make full use of this comprehensive toolbox. Coherence is mainly found in relation to the policy framework of the Regulation (e.g. the strategic intent) rather than in operational linkages or synergies. However, the extent to which coherence and complementarity issues are fully exploited during implementation is not always clear from management reporting. Also, some evaluations suggest that the coordination of regional and bilateral programmes is suboptimal. For instance, evaluations have shown that there is little coordination between bilateral programmes, regional programmes and investment facilities in relation to private sector development, an area in which EU aid is intended to come from a combination of bilateral aid, regional private sector development programmes and regional investment facilities. According to another evaluation, Palestine is also an example case of the lack of consistency between the implementation of financial cooperation, the EU's official discourse and actions taken by individual Member States. There is coherence between the ENI Regulation and the actions implemented under ENI in the sense that actions are required to present expected results in line with the specific objectives of the Regulation. A bottom-up process (meaning that actions’ priorities have been based on the needs of partner countries) ensures this coherence. In addition, the quality review process and Quality Support Groups have guaranteed that inconsistencies are spotted and corrected during the programming cycle. Overall consistency between the instruments is good and is ensured through different coordination mechanisms and close dialogue. At the level of the design of the country or regional programmes, there are numerous coordination mechanisms among the Commission services and the EEAS that ensure complementarity. For example, the Commission elaborated a joint humanitarian and development framework for Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, supported by different instruments ENI, emergency assistance and IcSP; since 2011, there have been numerous examples when external financing instruments intervene at different stages of a crisis situation, for example in the case of Libya, Tunisia and Ukraine, with the humanitarian instrument intervening usually first, followed by the IcSP and then the ENI intervention. The same complementarity applies in the case of the Syrian refugees crisis where the humanitarian instrument focuses on life saving actions and the ENI is more geared towards longer term development issues (such as providing support for schooling of children in hosting communities in Jordan and Lebanon). Strong coordination also exists within the Eastern Partnership ensuring prioritisation including for investments in connectivity. Also, country team meetings are an occasion to discuss the interventions of each instrument; for example, the respective activity of all instruments in Ukraine is coordinated by the Support Group for Ukraine the service invites representatives from other services in the quality review process of programming documents and then these programming documents from the ENI go through the formal inter-service consultation process of the Commission. The same process applies for the programming process of other instruments. The fact that the vast majority of funds comes from the ENI also ensures that the ENI strategy documents are considered by other instruments as the main points of reference for their interventions. For example, in 2015, 88% of the total allocation to the ENP countries of North Africa was provided by the ENI instrument and 8.6% by the humanitarian instrument. In the South Caucasus, the ENI provided 85% of total EU funds. Thematic instruments have not had the resources required to match the challenges faced by most neighbourhood countries. There are also instances when resources from the ENI and EU internal programmes are pulled together in a coherent manner. For example, resources from the ENI are transferred to the Erasmus + programme at the beginning of two multi annual periods and put at the disposal of EU national agencies; similarly, the resources from the ENI on CBC are combined with resources from the European Development Fund in a context of one single operational programme. This was one key expectation from the ENI impact assessment. All key aspects for stabilisation and development of partner countries are covered by the set of External Financing Instruments: defenders of human rights, empowerment of civil society, institutional building (of national and local authorities), etc. For most of these aspects, related objectives can be found in the geographic instrument and in related thematic Instruments. Crisis prevention is indicated as an ENI objective. In fact, most actions under ENI encompassing a crisis prevention or tensions alleviation component are related to acute crisis and post-crisis situations and rather contribute to mitigate a potential deepening of the crisis. This is certainly a key aspect for stabilisation, for instance, through short-term (budget) support to Tunisia to help the country maintain its macro-economic stability or the support to host and refugee communities in Lebanon and Jordan. However, the share of ENI resources dedicated to the actual prevention of crisis, acknowledged as being the most cost-effective approach to stabilisation, is rather low. This is not a big limitation per se, as there is a dedicated thematic instrument for crisis response and prevention, the IcSP, which works to complement ENI programmes. However, emerging needs linked to crisis prevention and response are only partly addressed (mainly by the IcSP). Nevertheless, the Commission does not consider, as suggested by the external evaluators that there is a need to establish a dedicated component on crisis prevention within the ENI as this would undermine flexibility. More focus on this aspect of EU interventions is needed in strategic and programming documents. Coherence has not been sufficient between funding channelled through the CBC programmes with other funding provided in the context of various regional cooperation frameworks as well as the implementation of EU's macro-regional strategies. In a different context, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) is a primary instrument for coordination and alignment of European financial institutions, including, but by far not only, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The NIF supports (mainly) infrastructure projects that complement or follow the reform agenda implemented by partner countries and supported by Sector Reform Programmes (including where relevant with budget support). This sequencing is important as it guarantees that instruments are used to the best of their values: grants, also in the form of Budget support for the reform process and the associated legislative agenda (laws, regulations, policies) and loans (through the NIF and in partnership with European and international financing institutions) for the implementation of investments that these reforms have identified as priority and the viability of which is ensured by the reformed institutional and regulatory set up. The trust funds for Syrian Crisis and Africa have been used successfully and so have been other EU instruments outside the ENI, such as Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA). Most coordination efforts between ENI and other instruments are made at the level of the EU Delegations. Programme managers in charge of one particular sector are able to properly sequence and coordinate the various instruments. A telephone survey confirmed that coordination with EU Member States has been strengthened in recent years, also through Joint Programming, even though they are reluctant to further advance programme complementarity and synergies. Most partner countries are now engaged in a way or another in this process, with different levels of ambitions; in the case of Palestine, a full joint programming document has been prepared in 2017, replacing the previous EU programming document. However, evidence from field visits demonstrates that gaining strength in advocacy by joining hands with EU Member States (and beyond with IFIs and other donors) is differentiated between the East and the South. In the East, the EU (including EIB and EBRD) is typically the main (up to 70% of ODA) donor, few EU Member States are active (mainly Germany, Poland and Sweden) and only loans for middle-income countries are available from IMF and the World Bank. In the South, the state of play is more balanced. Besides the EU institutions, EU Member States are more present and IFIs can propose concessional loans. Even if the potential for synergy is higher for consistency in dialogue on policy reforms, it is difficult to materialise due to the weakness of the coordination, notably by lack of leadership by beneficiary governments. Public financial management and sector policy dialogues are mostly fuelled by the EU and the World Bank, the other donors presenting a lower profile. In general, there is room for improvement concerning the communication to the partner countries and the general public on the EU's assistance. Evaluation question 6: Leverage

To what extent has the ENI/ENPI leveraged: further funds and/or political and policy engagement (for example to what extent has the incentive-based approach leveraged progress made by partner countries in building and consolidating deep and sustainable democracy and in implementing agreed political, economic and social reform objectives). Though it is too early to assess the extent to which ENI has improved the leverage of EU resources on the capacity of partners to engage in structural reforms, especially the experience with budget support and blending tends to support a positive contribution of EU interventions. Expected results of committed budget support programmes seem encouraging so far. This corroborates the findings of previous evaluations on budget support operations financed under the ENPI, according to which the experience of many countries demonstrates that budget support can achieve significant results within a diverse and often challenging set of contexts. In particular, it has contributed in important ways to upgrading the capability of these governments to manage their public finances, to deliver services and to regulate economic activity, for the benefit of their citizens. For example, one evaluation noted that the coverage of health services and of secondary and tertiary education had improved in Morocco and Tunisia, and there were significant reductions in income poverty in both countries (although it is difficult to attribute this directly to budget support). This evaluation highlighted the limited scope of reforms addressing governance issues, which remains a current challenge under the ENI. Blending of EU grants with resources (loans and grants) of EU and EU Member States’ financial institutions – and to a lesser extent with IFIs – proved to be an effective way to attract additional resources to achieve ENI objectives through infrastructure projects or by supporting private sector development. Since 2008, ENPI/ENI instruments have contributed EUR 1 678 million to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), leading to a total of close to EUR 15 billion from financial institutions. Also 15 EU Member States have committed a total of EUR 84 million to the NIF Trust Fund, complementing ENPI/EU resources. ENI funds brought into EU trust funds have induced EU Member States to contribute but not at the level proportionate to the challenges. Through policy dialogue and cooperation, the ENI actions leveraged sustainable implementation of agreed reform priorities in a number of countries during the period under review, mainly Morocco, Georgia, Ukraine and Tunisia. Egypt is improving its up-take of ENI-sponsored reforms as well but these are limited to ‘technical’ areas (renewable energy, urban development). In the other countries of the Neighbourhood, many factors which remain beyond the reach of EU action (e.g. political weakness, oil revenues, on-going conflicts, diverging regional alliances etc.) represent stumbling blocks to leverage at present. ENI leverage is stronger in those cases where the budget support modality can be used as the amount of resources invested by the EU is much higher than for traditional technical assistance programmes, there is a stronger policy dialogue and focus on horizontal issues like public financial management, not to mention the possibility to attract other donors to participate in support packages for such reforms (e.g. Morocco and Tunisia). The ENI provided the framework and the resources to mobilise additional funding, either from the pre-existing blending facility - NIF, or from recent initiatives like the EU Trust Funds (for example resources leveraged from EU Member States amount to just over 10% of the contribution from the EU Budget). Financial leverage is sought at project level, either by partnering with EU Member States and International Financial Institutions, or by promoting contributions from the national budgets. There are many successful reported cases of funds’ pooling at a project level. Other types of funds’ pooling, such as public private partnerships or schemes using diaspora remittances, have not been used so far for various reasons (e.g. like the significant sovereign risk or the lack of an appropriate legal framework). It should be also noted that, as appears in the external evaluation, it is difficult to assess to what extent the incentive-based mechanisms under the ENI have leveraged reforms since those countries that implemented more reforms were in general already convinced of their interest (as Georgia, Morocco, Jordan, Ukraine), whilst others did not find the incentive a sufficient reason to embark in new reforms (Egypt, Azerbaijan, among others). 6. Conclusions The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main and by far the largest financial instrument supporting through grants the implementation of the EU policy towards the 16 countries in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU, and Russia for programmes where it is eligible. It is yet difficult to assess the effectiveness of ENI as implementation started only in 2015 and most programmes adopted since then require time to be rolled out, let alone to produce outputs and outcomes. In many instances, actions financed under the previous instrument (ENPI) and ENI, together with other EU instruments, have been effective in supporting stabilisation and building the resilience of important partner countries, notably by allowing a swift recovery of growth in Ukraine after 2015 or by avoiding a recession in Tunisia which could have derailed the smooth transition to democracy. ENPI/ENI funds have also been helpful in the stabilisation of Jordan and Lebanon which have been confronted with the massive influx of Syrian refugees, notably in the efforts made to provide school opportunities for Syrian children. ENPI and ENI interventions have contributed to institutional and administrative strengthening in many partner countries, through the provision of high level of EU expertise. ENPI and ENI funds have also leveraged much higher funds (notably loans) from European and international financial institutions, and strengthened the policy leverage of the EU. The evaluation finds that ENI is overall relevant and fit for purpose. It has allowed the EU to implement the reviewed Neighbourhood Policy. The ENI has also proven its capacity to respond in a flexible manner, in line with the impact assessment, to the multiple crises and new challenges in the Neighbourhood, in particular in Ukraine and Tunisia. This included the mobilisation of funding from other sources (in particular from the margin of heading IV and other external financing instruments), the mobilisation of other instruments, such as Humanitarian Aid and Macro-Financial Assistance, in parallel to ENI interventions, the Special measures to address the Ukrainian crisis, as well as Trust Funds in response to the refugee crisis. The external evaluation, the broad consultation with stakeholders and the internal assessments highlight certain areas to be further considered: ·The current challenges and needs in the Neighbourhood have put serious strains on the ENI budget and human resources, and despite budget reinforcements and use of all flexibility mechanisms, the response capacities of the instrument have been stretched to their limits. ·The large share of programmed assistance has allowed to keep supporting structural reforms but at times limited the scope for adjusting the EU financial response to pressing needs. The lack of a single support framework for Ukraine in the first years of the ENI implementation has not prevented the Commission to provide relevant support. ·The complex political environment in some Neighbourhood countries means that the implementation of the ENI has not been equally effective in all countries, despite increasing differentiation. ·Neighbourhood countries have made varying degrees of progress in political and economic reforms. Nonetheless, both the political and the economic situation remain challenging in many of them, notably because of high unemployment, an unfavourable business climate and high corruption levels. ENI operations are addressing the root causes of these challenges but partner countries' commitment to reform varies greatly and limits the effectiveness of ENI interventions. In addition to partners' political commitment to reforms, their institutional capacity is key for the sustainability of reform and meaningful policy dialogue with the EU. ·The implementation of the incentive-based approach defined in the ENI provided significantly higher financial resources to those partners that have made the strongest progress on political reforms but its impact on leveraging further reforms, in particular in other countries, still needs to be demonstrated. The ENI has not been able to provide sufficient incentives to those countries reluctant to engage in political reforms. ·The overall coherence and complementarity of the different EU instruments has improved but was not always up to the high challenges the EU was confronted with in the Neighbourhood. Existing risk analyses and scenario building tools, already developed by the EEAS, have not been sufficiently used in the framework of joint action by the EEAS and Commission services. ·As it is the case for other external action instruments, reporting at outcome and impact remains embryonic both at the instrument and at country level. Work is ongoing to develop an efficient monitoring system at the Commission and to support data production by partner countries.

Overall, the existence of a dedicated financial instrument for the neighbourhood has been one of the most concrete evidence translating the political importance attached to the region by the EU, and has lent credibility to the EU's intention to deepen political cooperation and pursue gradual economic integration with its neighbours.

Annex 1. Evaluation Questions Relevance 1. To what extent do the overall and the specific objectives (ENI Regulation, Article 1 and 2) and the design of the ENI respond to: (i) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the instrument was adopted (2014)? (ii) Current EU priorities, in particular emerging from the 2015 ENP Review such us stabilisation, and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)? Information sought in this area includes: · A timeline showing congruence/divergence of the instrument against the initial context (e.g. ENP review 2011, negotiations on Association Agreements and DCFTAs) and against the evolving context, including global challenges, and institutional policy changes e.g. to what extent does the ENI support the implementation of the revised ENP, how it responds to new policy/political situations in our partner countries and also respond to the demands of Agenda 2030, including the need to co-operate with emerging countries on implementing the SDGs. Effectiveness, impact, sustainability 2. To what extent does the ENI deliver results against the instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities? Information sought in this area includes: ·To what extent do ENPI/ENI programmes contribute towards shared prosperity and good neighbourliness, and towards the other general and specific objectives listed in the ENI Regulation, Article 1 and 2 ·To what extent have ENI/ENPI programmes supported policy dialogue and implementation of reform objectives agreed with each partner countries? ·To what extent has the ENI/ENPI contributed to the European Union's priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth? ·To what extent has the ENI/ENPI contributed to enhance sub-regional, regional and European Neighbourhood-wide collaboration as well as cross-border cooperation. ·To what extent does the ENI mainstream EU policy priorities (e.g. gender, climate change) and other issues highlighted for mainstreaming in the instrument, and, where relevant, deliver on the commitments including the financial allocations (ENI Regulation preamble, Article 1, 2 and 7) ·To what extent does the ENI/ENPI promote principles of aid effectiveness, such as ownership, joint programming (ENI Regulation, Article 5) ·To what extent are the processes conducive to programming, identification/formulation of effective actions (ENI Regulation, Article 6-17)? ·To what extent has the ENI/ENPI provided differentiated support? ·To what extent does the ENI use the incentive-based approach? (ENI Regulation, Article 4 and 7)

·To what extent is the ENI flexible enough to respond to changing needs? (e.g. in response to the ENP review of 2015, and rapidly evolving contexts in many countries) Efficiency 3. To what extent is the ENI delivering efficiently? Information sought in this area includes: ·What is the ratio of administrative costs (as defined as “ENI Support Expenditure” in the Draft General Budget of the EU) to overall budget? ·How efficient is budget execution in terms of time taken from commitments to payments? ·Have the changes made to ENI 2014 – 2020 from the previous ENPI 2007 – 2013 brought efficiency gains? E.g. to what extent have changes in the programming process contributed to simplification? ·Are there areas, such as administrative/management procedures, where the ENI can be simplified to eliminate unnecessary burden? ·To what extent is the ENI in line with the implementing rules of the CIR? Specifically in terms of: oImplementation §Subject matter and principles §Adoption of action programmes, individual measures and special measures §Support measures oProvisions on the Financing Methods §General financing provisions §Taxes duties and charges §Specific financing provisions §Protection of the financial interests of the Union oRules on nationality and origin for public procurement, grant and other award procedures oClimate action and biodiversity expenditure

oInvolvement of stakeholders of beneficiary countries oCommon rules §Eligibility under the ENI oMonitoring and evaluation of actions ·To what extent are the following in place and functioning: oappropriate monitoring processes and indicators for measurement of the performance of the ENI instrument orelevant strategic and operational indicators to measure results achieved by the ENI? Added value 4. To what extent do the ENI programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors? Information sought in this area includes: ·Where the ENI is operating in the same field as Member States or other key donors, does it offer added value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy? Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies 5. To what extent does the ENI facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs? Information sought in this area includes: ·To what extent are the different ENI programmes coherent/complementing/overlapping with one another, including coherence between bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes? ·To what extent are the different ENI programmes aligned with the evolving ENP policy and, where relevant, the EU development policy? ·To what extent are the programmes consistent with EU external action policies? ·To what extent do the programmes complement/overlap/stimulate synergies with other external action financing instruments? ·To what extent does the ENI complement/overlap with other EU instruments outside of development policy? ·To what extent does the ENI complement/overlap with interventions of other donors?

Leverage 6. To what extent has the ENI/ENPI leveraged üfurther funds and/or üpolitical and policy engagement (for example to what extent has the incentive-based approach leveraged progress made by partner countries in building and consolidating deep and sustainable democracy and in implementing agreed political, economic and social reform objectives). 7. To what extent could the ENI be enhanced to achieve its policy objectives more effectively and efficiently? 8. How can programming and implementation of ENI assistance be enhanced to improve the impact and sustainability of financial assistance? Annex 2. Procedural information Organisation This evaluation assessed the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) ahead of the Mid-Term Review Report, as set out in Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR 2014). It will mainly be used to generate information for the Mid-Term Review Report requested by the CIR due end 2017. The evaluation provides information on relevance, EU added value, coherence and complementarity, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, leverage and impact of the instrument. The Staff working document is based on the independent assessment carried out by an external contractor and complemented by further internal analysis. The lead DG to carry out and manage this evaluation has been the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). But as this evaluation was part of a wider set of evaluations covering the instruments under Heading IV of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 as set out in the CIR, as well as the performance review of the European Development Fund, and in view of ensuring a consistent European external policy, all the evaluations were carried out in an interlinked and co-ordinated manner. To ensure this coherence of the different evaluation from the beginning DG NEAR, DEVCO, FPI and EEAS worked closely together. An Umbrella Inter-service Steering group (ISG) was set up to oversee the mid-term review process of the external instruments. This ISG is chaired by the Directorate General for International Cooperation and development (DEVCO) and is composed of members from relevant Commission services.. In addition ISGs were set up for each individual evaluation. The process started in June 2015 and the Umbrella ISG met formally for the first time on 21 September 2015 and during the following weeks and months agreed on the joint elements which all the different evaluation should use in their specific roadmaps and Terms of reference. The ISG for the ENI evaluation was set up in October 2015, including relevant services of the Commission, and met for the first time on 15 October 2015. The roadmap for ENI was published, like all the other instruments Road Maps, at the end of October 2015; no comments were received. The Terms of reference were approved by the ISG on 15 April 2016. A specific contract was awarded on 9 June 2016 to PARTICIP GmbH, using the framework contract set up for carrying out evaluations in the context of external relations, and the evaluators started their work on 30 June 2016. All foreseen deliverables were discussed in depth by the ISG, under the coordination of the evaluation manager in DG NEAR. During the evaluation process from October 2015 onwards the ISG met 7 times, in addition the members were consulted through email several times on draft and revised draft reports. Following the approval of the Draft Report by the ISG after the meeting of 11 January 2017, this report was then placed, with the other instruments draft reports, on the Commission's website for the web based open public consultation (OPC) on 7 February 2017. The OPC concluded on 3 May 2017. During the OPC period targeted face to face meetings were organised with representatives of CSOs, both from the beneficiary countries and Europe, with representatives of EU member states and European Parliament. Following the closure of the OPC, during which 44 responses were received, a revised report was discussed again by the ISG leading to the issuing of the final report. Evaluation Design Concerning the evaluation design, the intervention logic (IL) forms the backbone of the analytical framework. It is visualised through an overall reconstructed IL diagram, which brings together the most relevant elements (from inputs to impacts, but also assumptions) in a single framework. In accordance with the reconstructed IL for ENI, the evaluation first focused mainly on the additional features and tools introduced with the ENI Regulation. The development of intervention logics for the ENP 2011 and its revised version of 2015 that successively constituted the pivot of the instrument’s policy framework led the consultant to pay additional attention to the ability of DG NEAR and EEAS to respond to emergencies and crises in the Neighb