COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 31.05.1995 
COM(95) 223 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
The European Union and Russia: the future relationship 

A 
The European Union and Russia: the future relationship 
Commission Communication 
CONTENTS 
Introduction Page 1 
Russia: the present situation Page 2 
European Union/Russia: the current state of the relationship Pages 3-5 
European Union/Russia relations: further considerations Pages 5-8 
The European Union's objectives and priorities 
for the future European Union/Russia relationship Pages 8-12 
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Accompanying document: draft Common Position on European Union-Russia relations 
* 
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AnnexA: Economic situation and economic reform in Russia 
Annex B: Cooperation between the European Union and Russia 

A CL 
The European Union and Russia: the future relationship 
Commission Communication 
Introduction 
1.1. The ties that bind Russia and the countries of the European Union are centuries 
old. In matters political, cultural and commercial, the history of Russia is closely 
intertwined with that of her European partners. Cooperation has been a fact long taken 
for granted, yet it has never been fully exploited, for reasons essentially linked to the gulf 
that, in Soviet times, divided the Western democracies from a totalitarian state. 
1.2. In the short space of a decade, Russia has undergone a far-reaching process of 
economic and political transformation. Reforms have been put in place, though their 
integration and acceptance into post-Soviet society present considerable challenges. It will 
take many years for Russia to overcome the Soviet legacy, and no certain prediction can 
be made about the road Russia will follow towards political and economic reform. The 
key question is whether she turns inward upon herself, seeking to implement reform and 
develop her economy with limited input of foreign expertise and investment, or whether 
she takes her place in the world economy in full and responsible partnership with the 
European Union and others. 
1.3. For the European Union, the relationship with Russia is of high significance, 
because: 
(i) Russia is a key player on the world scene, being permanent member of the UN 
Security Council and nuclear power; 
(ii) In addition Russia is a key contributor to stability on the European continent as a 
whole; 
(iii) Russia represents a considerable economic, commercial and scientific potential; 
(iv) Moreover, the European Union is today Russia's main trading partner and, with 
Finland's accession, immediate neighbour. 
1.4. It is time that the European Union and Russia recognized their historical vocation 
as the two principal European powers and, in the common interest, sought to develop the 
close and mutually enriching partnership which will reflect their political, social and 
economic significance, while at the same time demonstrating the responsiveness and 
respect for human rights without which cooperation will remain unfulfilled and void of 
substance. 
In this context the recent events in Chechnya have placed a considerable burden on 
current relations which are being hampered by Russia's insufficient fulfilment of 
frequently discussed conditions seeking to remedy the situation. 
1.5. This Communication, which was announced at the informal meeting of European 
Union Foreign Ministers in Carcassonne on 18-19 March, develops a strategy governing 
European Union/Russia relations for the coming years. Realization of this strategy must 
be achieved in joint endeavour with Russia and in close cooperation with the European 
Union's principal partners, particularly the transatlantic partners, on the basis of the 
following objectives: 
the reinforcement of political, social and economic stability in Russia and the 
countries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
Russia; 
enhanced cooperation in addressing the major regional and global issues of 
concern. 
In this respect the European Union recognizes the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation while supporting its development as a state where minority rights are respected 
in accordance with internationally recognized principles. 
The Communication proposes the adoption of a Common Position (see attached 
document) on relations between the European Union and Russia. 
Russia: the present situation 
2.1. The process of change in Russia over the past decade has been fundamental, but 
a sustainable equilibrium has not yet been achieved. 
2.1.1. On the political side, democratic institutions are being built up, but these are 
fragile and the rule of law is often uncertain; indeed, a tradition of authoritarian, secretive 
rule reminiscent of earlier times seems to have gained ground in recent months. The 
construction of a civic society has begun, but still has far to go as a vital basis necessary 
for the success of political democracy. The military continues, as in Soviet times, to be 
of major importance to Russia's political life and absorbs economic resources out of 
proportion to what Russia can currently afford (an estimated 20-25% of the 1995 budget). 
Organized crime and corruption are rampant, and indeed could undermine democracy and 
economic development if not dealt with effectively. 
As a heritage of the Soviet empire, some 25 million people of Russian origin live outside 
the borders of Russia - a highly sensitive aspect of Russian foreign policy - and some 150 
ethnic groups live within Russia's borders. Central government had made progress in 
improving relations with the diverse peoples of the Russian Federation, but its actions in 
Chechnya have been a serious setback to prospects of the Federation's managing its 
3 
regional and ethnic diversity in a democratic and civilized way. 
Against that background there are some positive elements. The menace of nuclear 
confrontation has been removed, even though tens of thousands of* nuclear weapons still 
remain, often in uncertain conditions of safety and storage, posing the threat of nuclear 
dissemination which would be difficult to control. Political debate is open and lively, and 
an independent press freely criticises government policies. Russian public opinion, now 
able to inform and express itself, is a new and important factor in Russian politics. 
2.1.2. The Russian economy remains in a precarious situation. The new Russia inherited 
from the Soviet Union a decrepit industrial base that has wasted resources and produced 
a string of environmental disasters, and a heavily subsidised and startlingly inefficient 
agricultural system that has failed to meet basic needs. Almost three years after the onset 
of reforms, progress has been achieved in many areas of structural reform, including price 
liberalisation, sustained currency convertibility and privatisation. 
These reforms have changed the economic environment. Market forces are playing a key 
role in significant parts of economic life. The underdeveloped services sector is expanding 
at a rapid pace, which is positive, even if the explosive growth in areas such as banking 
causes concern in view of a lack of regulation and prudential supervision. On the other 
hand, the manufacturing sector has contracted sharply, which causes serious social 
dislocation, but is also an inevitable correction of Russia's bias towards heavy industry. 
Yet, for three years, macroeconomic stabilization has proved elusive. Inflation has 
remained much too high, fuelled by an excessive budget deficit which in turn was caused 
by a collapse in tax revenues and strong spending pressures. Several attempts at 
stabilization failed in a fragmented and divided policy-making environment with many 
competing centres of power. This has led to repeated policy reversals, and to the granting 
of costly privileges to sectoral or regional lobbies. 
The high level of capital flight is evidence of the low level of confidence that Russian 
economic operators have in their own economy and indeed in the economic reform 
process. Foreign investors can scarcely be expected to enter where Russian investors 
themselves fear to tread. 
The immediate and overriding economic policy priority is to end inflation. A virtuous 
circle must be launched, of restored confidence, a return of flight capital, investment and 
restructuring. The recent stabilization programme, supported for the first time by an IMF 
stand-by arrangement, provides a serious chance to achieve this. Yet it will be a 
formidable challenge for the government to remain united and committed to this 
programme as its initial contractionary effects will begin to be felt especially in the run­
up to the end-1995 and mid-1996 elections. (See also Annex A) 
European Union/Russia: the current state of the relationship 
3.1. To date, the European Union has sought to develop its relationship with Russia 
through a wide variety of linkages, instruments and programmes: 
Contractual links 
The 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the USSR, offering MFN treatment for 
tariffs and duties and dialogue through a Joint Committee, still constitutes the formal 
framework for European Community/Russia relations. The Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement signed at Corfu in June 1994 ("the PCA") is much more ambitious in scope, 
covering a wide range of European Community/Russia trade, commercial and economic 
relations, instituting political dialogue at various levels up to that of Heads of 
Government, and placing respect for human rights and the democratic process at the 
centre of the relationship. The human rights clause, to be found in both the Interim 
Agreement and the PCA, is an important instrument. It serves as a reminder of the 
fundamentals on which the relationship between the European Union and Russia is built, 
and, if necessary, enables either party to enforce those principles. Pending ratification of 
the PCA by the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the Member States -
a process now delayed because of the events in Chechnya - it is intended that an Interim 
Agreement would bring the trade provisions of the PCA into force. Signature of the 
Interim Agreement is now also postponed, again in view of the human rights situation in 
Chechnya. 
Further progress with respect to the signing of the Interim Agreement has been made 
conditional on sufficient fulfilment of a number of criteria: conclusion of a cease-fire, 
progress towards a political solution, unhindered access for humanitarian assistance and 
establishment of an OSCE assistance group in Chechnya. 
De facto, even though the contractual framework constituted by the PCA is lacking, the 
political dialogue has been sustained, from the time of the signature of the Political 
Declaration signed by the Presidents of Russia, the European Council and the European 
Commission at Brussels in December 1993. This looked forward to establishment of "a 
permanent political dialogue and a system of regular consultations at different levels on 
the whole spectrum of political, economic and other issues of mutual interest". 
Trade and commerce 
In the economic field, the European Community has become by far the largest trading 
partner of Russia, accounting, in the first half of 1994, for 37% of the total of Russia's 
foreign trade, as compared with 24% for trade with the other CIS states, 6% for trade 
with China, 4% for trade with the USA and 3% for trade with Japan. In 1993 exports 
from Russia to the European Community reached 15.5 billion ECU and imports rose to 
11.5 billion ECU, leaving a balance in Russia's favour of almost 4 billion ECU. However 
there is concern over the low level of the European Community's tariffs on imports from 
Russia (average weighted tariff of less than 1 %) as against the continued increase in 
tariffs imposed on Russia's imports from the European Community (average weighted 
tariff currently estimated at more than 18 %). As the majority of this trade balance is 
energy related, the European Community is already encouraging Russia to implement the 
European Energy Charter Treaty, its purpose being to create a legally binding framework 
to foster trade and to encourage foreign investment in the energy sector. 
The inflow of foreign investment continues to be low (around one billion US Dollars per 
annum) in relation to Russia's size and potential. 
A number of trade issues and commercial issues between the European Community and 
Russia are currently outstanding. These include: anti-dumping, where a systematic 
dialogue between experts has been initiated; procedures for testing and certification, 
where a task force has been set up to propose solutions to problems resulting from 
excessive Russian requirements for testing and certification procedures; the effects of 
enlargement, where the Russian side takes a positive view in principle of the present and 
future European Union enlargement but seeks to alleviate as much as possible the 
negative consequences on their exports to the new Member States; trade in nuclear 
products, although the conclusion of the Energy Charter Treaty in Lisbon on 17 
December 1994 has contributed to solve a long-standing dispute between Russia and the 
European Community over the role of the Supply Agency and the interpretation of the 
Euratom Treaty as regards nuclear trade; Siberia over-flying rights. 
Other forms of cooperation 
European Community/Russia cooperation has been built up through the implementation 
of numerous actions and programmes, including Tacis, Pan-European networks in the 
fields of transport, energy and telecommunications and on other issues, including 
education and training, the environment, energy, humanitarian assistance, industrial 
cooperation, research and development, as summarized in Annex B. 
European Union/Russia relations: further considerations 
Looking to future European Union/Russia relatioas, a number of considerations should 
be borne in mind: 
4.1. Given the uncertainty of predicting, with any degree of reliability, even the mid­
term fortunes of a country such as Russia, it is difficult to define with confidence the 
European Union's medium-term strategy towards this country. An important factor will 
be the identity and persuasion of Russia's government and president after the next 
elections. Making due allowance for the weakness of Russia's democratic structures, it 
seems likely that the tensions will remain between governance in Russia and observance 
of human rights, between the centre and the regions, between maintenance of political 
control and the growth of criminality. 
4.2. In the security, political and economic contexts, this implies an intensification of 
effort on the part of the European Union in order to take greater account of the 
specificities of the European Union/Russia relationship, and to ensure that the Russian 
government and public opinion give due weight to Russia's relationship with the European 
Union. 
4.2.1. Security 
It is important that the European Union's economic strategy towards Russia be 
coordinated with a political strategy that takes account of Russian security interests. 
Now that NATO enlargement in favour of Central and East European countries is clearly 
envisaged, it is necessary to take account of the concerns of the Russian government. If 
NATO enlargement, however, were to lead to Russia's standing opposition and, 
ultimately, to a build-up of her military capabilities, the aim of greater European Union 
stability would clearly not be achieved. There is accordingly a need to intensify the 
dialogue concerning the development of Europe's future security architecture, comprising 
such aspects as NATO enlargement, Partnership for Peace, OSCE strengthening and the 
development of relations between Russia and the Western European Union. 
The OSCE continues to establish itself as an important organ of European security. Its 
comprehensive approach to security, broad membership and high standards make it the 
appropriate forum for managing change and preventing the reemergence of new divisions. 
The ongoing discussions on the "security model" are based on this comprehensive 
definition of security. The European Union should continue to work to strengthen the 
OSCE framework in which the rôle of Russia in European security is recognized. 
4.2.2. Political 
It seems likely that, in the coming months, the European Union's political relationship 
with Russia will be overshadowed by the tragedy of Chechnya, just as Russia's political 
scene is likely to be dominated by Chechnya in the run-up to two crucial events: the 
legislative elections in December 1995 and the presidential elections in June 1996. During 
this period the European Union must strike a balance between giving expression to its 
concern over Russia's breach of human rights in Chechnya, and the need to facilitate the 
process of reform in Russia. 
In order to be able to raise issues of political concern in a timely fashion and in a manner 
which will have due influence, European Union-Russia relations will be best served by 
consolidation of the political dialogue. There is a need for the European Union to 
strengthen its ties with a much wider range of Russian leaders, opinion formers and 
institutions both inside and outside government, both at the centre and in the regions of 
Russia, and to involve a greater number of European Union and national institutions. The 
European Parliament has a special rôle to play, to build up contact with both the Duma 
and the Federal Chamber, and thus to deepen the relationship with national and regional 
politicians. 
The issue of ethnic Russians living outside the borders of the Russian Federation is a 
deeply sensitive matter for Russian public opinion, and one which is easily played upon 
by nationalist politicians. Here the European Union can play a moderating role in the 
resolution of conflict through the exercise of its political influence, as it has in the area 
of Russia-Baltic State relations through its promotion of the Stability Pact, and as it 
continues to do through its declarations and démarches, based on close monitoring of the 
situation. Direct support might also be provided by the European Community and the 
Member States, for example through the financing of language-training to encourage 
integration and the acquisition of nationality. 
The advance towards further European Union enlargement will prompt, with increasing 
urgency in the coming years, questions over the weight and content of the European 
Union's relationship with all the CIS countries, and particularly Russia. As the effects 
of the process leading to enlargement begin to be felt by the Central and East European 
countries, it may be expected that the CIS countries will, for their part, intensify their 
search for closer links with the European Union. Since accession is not, in the European 
Union's view, an option for those countries, the network of Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (currently signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine) must provide the framework which will allow the bridging of the political and 
economic gap between those countries acceding to the European Union and their 
neighbours to the East. Participation in a wider European zone of prosperity can also be 
encouraged through regional organisations such as the Baltic and Barents Sea regional 
bodies. 
4.2.3. Economic 
4.2.3.1. European Union-Russia economic relations: 
The potential for the future growth of European Community/Russia economic relations 
is great. To realize that potential will require the building up of strong mutual confidence, 
so that investment of money and effort in the Russian economy can be seen by both 
European Community and Russian business partners to be worthwhile. Industrial 
cooperation between the European Community and Russia will be increasingly important 
to support the micro-economic pillar of reform. Russia will have to increase its efforts to 
provide stable, transparent and predictable framework conditions for foreign direct 
investors. The Tacis programme facilitates the development of industrial cooperation 
through its contribution to enterprise privatisation, restructuring and modernisation in 
Russia. 
Both for Russia and the European Community, the PCA, once ratified, will be the 
framework within which mutual confidence will be nurtured. As trade grows and 
diversifies from its present narrow base, it is inevitable that differences will arise in the 
way issues are perceived. It will be necessary for both parties to make full use of the 
provisions of the Interim Agreement and the PCA to ensure that problems are addressed 
promptly, in ways which meet the interests of the European Community and Russian 
economies. 
It is worth noting that the two parties to the PCA are due to hold a joint examination in 
1998, to see whether circumstances allow for the beginning of negotiations on the 
establishment of a free trade area. 
As bilateral trade builds up between the European Community on the one side and the 
Central and East European countries and the CIS countries on the other, it will be 
important not to lose sight of the trade potential that exists between the CIS countries 
themselves, and between them and the Central and East European countries. It will be in 
the European Union's interest to encourage the resumption, in a manner appropriate to a 
market economy, of those links ruptured when the Soviet Union collapsed, in particular 
through encouragement of regional and cross-border cooperation. 
4.2.3.2. Russia's participation in the global economic system: 
8 
As regards the institutional framework regulating Russia's international trade links, the 
main challenge facing Russia in the short to medium term is its accession to the WTO, 
a process which is still in its early stages. The European Community has started a 
systematic dialogue with the Russian side to prepare the accession negotiations, which 
will offer an additional opportunity to remove barriers limiting the access of European 
Community goods and services to the Russian market. It is politically committed to the 
process, both as a means of firmly integrating Russia into the world trading system and 
because accession to the WTO will further underpin the domestic reform process. 
Nonetheless, it has to be recognized that the path to membership may be difficult at 
times. A rapid accession may imply Russia being asked to undertake a large number of 
specific obligations as part of the accession package. Over time, and as the reform 
process matures, the need for such specific disciplines will diminish. 
Russia has a cooperation agreement with the OECD, which through its expertise in 
economic and trade matters can do useful work in helping Russia insert itself into the 
world economic system. Full membership could be envisaged once Russia has completed 
the process of accession to the WTO. 
The G7 has been an important forum for discussing Western economics policy towards 
Russia. It has played a useful role, particularly in strengthening coordination between 
bilateral and multilateral donors, especially since the Tokyo Summit. Russia has expressed 
keen interest in taking an increasing part in G7 economic activity. This will however be 
dependent on Russia's achievement in the development of a market economy. 
The European Union's objectives and priorities for the future European Union/Russia 
relationship 
5.1. There is consensus, as was demonstrated at the informal meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the European Union at Carcassonne, that, in the interest of the European 
continent as a whole, the European Union must conduct its relations vis-à-vis Russia so 
as to contribute to its evolution as a democratic and progressive nation. 
To this end, in joint endeavour with Russia and in close cooperation with its principal 
world partners, particularly the transatlantic partners, the European Union should work 
towards achievement of the following interrelated objectives: 
reinforcement of political, social and economic stability in the Russian Federation 
and the countries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
the Russian Federation; 
enhanced cooperation in addressing the major regional and global issues of 
concern. 
These are objectives of which the European Union must not lose sight, in the face of 
shorter-term difficulties in the European Union-Russia relationship. 
5.2. Certain priorities follow from the above objectives : 
the further involvement of the Russian Federation in the development of the 
European security architecture, the overriding aim being to avoid new divisions 
in Europe; 
the further development of democratic norms, institutions and practices, and the 
respect of human rights, individual liberties and the rule of law; 
further progress towards economic reform and encouragement of European 
Community/Russia economic interaction in order to ensure Russia's economic 
liberalisation and establishment of the market economy; and its growing 
participation in a wider European economic zone of prosperity, and the world 
economic system; 
the intensification of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in other fields, inter alia 
justice, home affairs and crime prevention, and crisis prevention and management, 
the extension of open and constructive dialogue at different levels and in various 
fora, covering all matters of common interest, in particular security, support for 
political and economic reform in the Russian Federation and the prevention and 
resolution of crises so that the views of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation are heard in time and at appropriate level; in this context, seek to 
develop the political dialogue with the Russian Federation, pursuant to the 
political declaration signed by the Presidents of Russia, the European Council and 
European Commission in Brussels on 9 December 1993. 
5.3. A number of further steps are put forward as a means of implementing the above 
objectives and priorities in respect of European Union/Russia relations for the coming 
years. 
5.3.1 Security 
The European Union should deepen discussions with Russia concerning the development 
of Europe's future security architecture, comprising such questions as NATO enlargement, 
Partnership for Peace, OSCE strengthening and the development of relations between the 
Russian Federation and the Western European Union. Russian hesitations over ratifying 
START II and implementing the CFE Treaty, indeed any retreat from internationally 
agreed undertakings particularly in the field of disarmament, should be met with a firm 
response. Other actions in the security field include cooperation with Russia against 
nuclear smuggling, greater involvement of Russia in the multilateral regimes on nuclear, 
biological, chemical and ballistic proliferation, as well as its membership of the 'New 
Forum' (post-COCOM regime on export controls). 
Following the discussions at Carcassonne the European Union should work towards 
intensification of the dialogue between Russia and NATO, notably in the context of the 
Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In this context it is 
worth examining further the idea of a specific arrangement between Russia and the 
Atlantic Alliance which would set up regular ad hoc procedures of consultation and 
dialogue. 
10 
5.3.2. Political 
Because of the length of national ratification procedures, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement could not, in the most optimistic of scenarios, come into force before 1997. 
The European Community's short term concern therefore limits itself to the question of 
the Interim Agreement and its signature. The purpose of the Interim Agreement is to 
bring into force the trade provisions of the PCA, in the absence of which the 1989 
Agreement with the Soviet Union continues to apply. It is therefore of fundamental 
importance, as has been made clear on several occasions to the Russian authorities, that 
the conditions for signature of the Interim Agreement should be met; for this, 
responsibility rests squarely with the Russian Government. 
However, in the meantime, the European Community could take the necessary procedural 
steps to ensure that the Interim Agreement can be signed promptly and the European and 
national Parliaments can at once take up formal debate on ratification of the PCA, once 
these conditions have been met. 
In the context of support to the democratic process and the establishment of human rights 
in Russia, the European Commission will continue to refine the implementation of the 
Tacis Democracy Programme (amounting to 11 MECU for 1995, of which 55-60 % will 
be spent on actions in Russia). The programme is of particular importance in the lead up 
to the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In coordination with the 
Member States' own programmes, it will also support cooperation between Russian and 
European opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of governmental and non­
governmental organizations, both at the centre and in the regions. Equally, new 
information actions will be implemented to ensure among Russian opinion-leaders and 
the public a deeper knowledge of the European Union's involvement and concerns. 
The European Union has in the past supported Russian accession to the Council of 
Europe, though at a time and in accordance with criteria to be decided by the Council 
itself. The events of Chechnya have halted the accession procedure. The Council is 
already engaged in assisting Russia in order to improve mechanisms of democracy and 
human rights, in cooperation with the European Union. Once the Chechnya issue has been 
resolved, the European Union should again advocate Russia's accession. 
5.3.3. Economic 
As regards economic issues, Russia has adopted a positive attitude in principle to current 
and future European Union enlargement. For its part, the European Community should 
examine to what extent the increase of certain customs tariffs in the three new Member 
States reduces market access. This should be part of an overall analysis of trade issues 
including those arising from enlargement. One should also bear in mind that the European 
Community is concerned by a number of specific problems, notably the significant 
increase in tariff protection decided in 1994 and 1995 by Russia, the cost of which will 
have to be borne by European Community exporters, as well as by excessive Russian 
requirements in the field of testing and certification which hinder trade. 
11 
Should signature of the Interim Agreement be substantially delayed due to lack of 
progress on the criteria laid down by the European Union, consideration should be given 
to certain deadlines laid down in the PCA : 
the agreement to consider, in the course of 1996, the possibility of granting MFN 
treatment for mobile satellite services; 
negotiations on the stage-by-stage opening of inland waterways for international 
sea-river services should commence by the end of 1996; 
nuclear trade agreement: a specific nuclear trade agreement should be in place by 
1 January 1997, the provisions of the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
continuing to apply in the meantime. 
The Commission will make specific proposals to the Council and the European 
Parliament to meet these contingencies in due time before expiry of the deadlines. 
The new Tacis regulation should be adopted by the end of 1995, in order to give new 
impetus to the programme. For the future, the sectoral and regional priorities of the Tacis 
programme and types of project can be expected to evolve continuously, as experience 
accumulates and Russia's transition progresses. These developments cannot be identified 
in advance with any confidence, but certain trends can already be noted: 
The implantation of the private market economy has taken place relatively quickly, 
with large-scale privatisation. Particular attention must however be paid to the 
establishment of effective social policies mitigating the serious consequences of 
economic restructuring. 
There has been rapid emergence of new enterprises, notably in the banking 
services sector. In many sectors know-how is now required at a higher level of 
sophistication, for example that of financial markets. However the future 
development of the manufacturing sector continues to raise serious concern. 
Within the food and agricultural chain, food distribution has now much improved, 
but the restructuring of the former collective and state farms has hardly begun. 
A continuing priority must be the education and training systems and scientific 
research, which has been gravely weakened by the lack of budgetary resources. 
Also regarding the institutional basis for civic society and democracy there are 
major needs, which are now being identified more clearly. 
Regionally, Tacis is progressively opening up annual programmes in different important 
regions and this approach should be confirmed. There are grounds also to facilitate the 
work of the Baltic and Barents Sea Regional organisations, and the development of 
certain Trans-European Networks. 
Regarding types of project, the emphasis should continue to shift in favour of projects 
leading later to investment or actions that directly benefit Russian citizens, and away from 
surveys and studies that do not have lasting impact. 
Through Tacis assistance the European Community will continue to support Russia in the 
area of economic policy advice, in harmony with the work of the IMF, the EBRD and 
the other International Financial Institutions. 
12 
The reinforcement of cooperation across the new common border between the European 
Union and Russia becomes a priority for Tacis, and will involve joint programming of 
the Tacis and INTERREG programmes, and the promotion of pilot projects for 
cooperation between local and regional authorities of the European Union within the 
framework of an ECOS-Tacis programme. 
Monitoring and evaluation of Tacis projects will be reinforced with a view to improving 
project preparation in the future and, more immediately, to obtain value for money. 
5.3.4. Other forms of cooperation 
The European Community is continuing its cooperation in many sectors with Russia. Such 
forms of cooperation (inter alia, environmental protection and nuclear safety, development 
of human resources, information technology and telecommunications, transport, science 
and research) are of common interest to both parties. Telecommunications networks in 
particular serve as a vital underpinning of Russia's economic relations between the 
European Community and the rest of the world. Such cooperation should continue, as a 
clear signal of support for the ongoing political and economic reform process in Russia. 
Equally, fresh consideration should be given to the question of Russia's eventual access 
to certain of the European Community's financial instruments, particularly in the context 
of the Trans-European Networks. 
Close cooperation between the European Community, the CIS states and Russia in 
particular on energy issues is of prime importance. The European Energy Charter Treaty 
is an important instrument in this respect; all opportunities to make use of Charter 
mechanisms, including resumption of negotiations for the so-called Second Stage of the 
Charter, should be fully utilized in order to ensure the rational and equitable exploitation 
of energy resources. To improve the flows of investment into the vital Russian energy 
sector, all efforts should be made by the European Community to arrive at liberal 
provisions on investment opportunities. 
Equally there is a need for further cooperation between the European Community, the 
Central and East European countries and all the CIS countries, in order to combat the 
growing threat posed by nuclear trafficking and to pursue the fight against organised 
crime and drug smuggling. The European Community's own interests are also involved 
in working with Russia to improve her catastrophic environmental situation, thus to avert 
ecological threat in the event of military or civil accident, and to avoid spillover from 
internal strife and economic deprivation in the form of large-scale emigration. 
Accompanying document: draft Common Position on European Union-Russia relations 
* * 
Annex A: Economic situation and economic reform in Russia 
Annex B: TACIS and other specific instruments 
"13 
Draft Common Position 
on the objectives and priorities of the European Union 
towards the Russian Federation 
The Commission, in forwarding to the Council the Communication on the European 
Union's relations with the Russian Federation, considers it necessary, in parallel, to 
propose that the Council adopt a Common Position by virtue of Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union. 
4y 
Common Position 
defined by the Council on the basis of article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the 
objectives and priorities of the European Union towards the Russian Federation. 
(95/...CFSP) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular article J.2. thereof, 
SETS OUT THIS COMMON POSITION : 
A. The European Union will pursue the following objectives and priorities in its relations 
with the Russian Federation : 
I. Objectives 
1. The European Union will continue to pursue the objective of deepening and 
expanding its relationship with the Russian Federation, with the aim to achieve 
partnership while respecting democratic principles and human rights; 
2. In joint endeavour with the Russian Federation and in close cooperation with its 
principal partners, particularly the transatlantic partners, the European Union will work 
towards: 
reinforcement of political, social and economic stability in the Russian Federation 
and the countries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
the Russian Federation; 
enhanced cooperation in addressing the major regional and global issues of 
concern. 
3. The European Union recognizes thereby the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation while supporting its development as a state where minority rights are respected 
in accordance with internationally recognized principles. 
IL Priorities 
The European Union lays down the following priorities and calls upon the Russian 
Federation to work closely with it to achieve their realization : 
1. the further involvement of the Russian Federation in the development of the 
European security architecture, the overriding aim being to avoid new divisions in 
Europe; 
To this end, it will seek to intensify the dialogue between Russia and NATO, 
notably in the context of Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, and promote OSCE strengthening, and the development 
of relations between the Russian Federation and WEU; and contribute, in this 
context, to the further examination of the idea of a specific arrangement 
between the Russian Federation and the Atlantic Alliance which would set up 
regular ad hoc procedures of consultation and dialogue; 
2. the further development of democratic norms, institutions and practices, and the 
respect of human rights, individual liberties and the rule of law; 
To this end, it will 
- support forms of cooperation at various levels between Russian and European 
opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of governmental and non­
governmental organizations, both at the centre and in the regions; 
- promote and encourage fulfilment of conditions that will allow the Russian 
Federation's accession to the Council of Europe; 
3. further progress towards economic reform and encouragement of European 
Union/Russia economic interaction in order to ensure Russia's economic 
liberalisation and establishment of the market economy, while taking account of the 
need to mitigate the social consequences of economic reform; and its gradual 
participation into a wider European economic zone of prosperity, and the world 
economic system; 
To this end, it will 
- support the Russian Federation in the planning and implementation of its 
agreements with the IMF and the other international financial institutions; on 
the basis of its achievement in macro-economic stabilisation and economic 
reform reassess Russia's membership of international groupings such as G7; 
- support the Russian Federation in its application for membership of 
organizations such as WTO; 
4. the intensification of cooperation in other fields, inter alia the field of crisis 
prevention and management; 
To this end, it will 
- explore the possibility of a moderating rôle for the European Union in the 
resolution of regional conflicts within the framework of the Stability Pact; 
- encourage regional cooperation between Russia and its neighbours, where each 
party freely recognises the mutual benefit of cooperation; 
- try to develop further cooperation with the Russian Federation in matters such 
as the prevention of ecological disasters, and questions relating to migration, 
and the prevention of illegal activities, in particular the fight against organised 
crime, the illegal traffic of nuclear materials and drugs, illegal immigration and 
other offenses; 
- ensure the supply of humanitarian assistance to the population in need through 
the specialist agencies where this is deemed necessary, in addition to 
Community operations in these areas. 
5. the extension of open and constructive dialogue at different levels and in various 
fora, covering all matters of common interest, in particular security, European integration, 
support for political and economic reform in the Russian Federation and the prevention 
and resolution of crises so that the views of the European Union and the Russian 
Federation are heard in due time and at appropriate level; in this context, seek to develop 
the political dialogue with the Russian Federation, pursuant to the political declaration 
signed by the Presidents of Russia, the European Council and European Commission in 
Brussels on 9 December 1993. 
B. The Member States shall ensure that their national policies shall conform to this 
common position. 
C. THE COUNCIL notes that the Community on the basis of the Commission's initiatives 
will contribute to the above objectives and priorities in particular through : 
1. the taking of all necessary steps to ensure, at such time as the criteria laid down by 
the European Union have been substantially fulfilled, the prompt signature of the 
Interim Agreement and early ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement signed at Corfu on 24 June 1994; 
2. the pursuit of its dialogue with the Russian Federation concerning its application for 
membership of international organizations, including the current application to 
WTO; 
3. implemention of programmes in support of the democratic process and 
establishment of human rights in the Russian Federation, on the basis of among 
others the EUs Democracy Programme and in cooperation with the relevant 
programmes of the Member States; and support other forms of cooperation at 
various levels between Russian and European opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and 
^7-
representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations, both at the 
centre and in the regions; 
4. continuing to refine and develop its technical assistance programmes, while working 
towards more effective coordination between donor organisations implementing 
programmes with the Russian Federation, and in particular to ensure that the new 
TACIS regulation is adopted in due time, before the end of 1995; 
5. working with the Russian Federation to promote European cooperation aimed at 
ensuring the rational and equitable exploitation of energy resources, within the 
framework of the European Energy Charter; 
6. reconsidering the question of the Russian Federation's eventual access to certain of 
the European Union's financial instruments, particularly in the context of the Trans-
European Networks; 
7. continuing to provide humanitarian assistance where necessary; 
8. continuing to cooperate with the Russian Federation in the fields of education and 
training, environmental protection and nuclear safety, industrial cooperation, 
information technology and telecommunications, transport, science and research; 
9. implemention of new information actions to ensure among opinion-leaders and 
public in the Russian Federation a deeper knowledge of the European Union and 
its concerns; 
THE COUNCIL will undertake the necessary measures to promote the above-mentioned 
objectives and priorities, where appropriate on the basis of Commission proposals. 
C. This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council. 
The President. 
•H 
The European Union and Russia: the future relationship 
Commission Communication 
ANNEXA 
Economic situation and economic reform in Russia 
During the past three years Russia has undergone major economic changes. Yet it is far 
from certain that it has found a sustainable path to a market economy. Liberalization has 
been only partial, and restructuring has not really started in any coherent sense. The lack 
of a clear division of power among various decision-making centres has led on occasions 
to a reversal of the course of economic policy. The central authorities' grip on Russia's 
regions has also diminished. As a result, the country continues to be affected by serious 
tax revenue shortfalls and waves of excessive inflation. Its social and medical 
infrastructure has deteriorated, life expectancy has decreased, crime and corruption have 
reached alarming proportions, and there is disillusionment with reform. What is needed 
now is an effective macroeconomic stabilization package. Recent policy has made 
substantial progress in this direction, but the challenge is still formidable. 
The fall in output came to an end in 1994. For the year as a whole GDP is estimated to 
have fallen by 15%, compared with a 12% drop in 1993. Five years of overall economic 
decline reduced industrial output below 45% of its 1991 level. However, in the last 
quarter of 1994 and in the first quarter of 1995 monthly GDP is reported to have 
stabilized, although it was still declining with respect to the corresponding periods of the 
previous year. Similarly, on a monthly basis industrial production has remained fairly 
stable since October 1994, which suggests that it may have bottomed out. 
The consequences of the disorder affecting economic decision-making are quite clear if 
one looks at 1994. A relatively lax fiscal policy in the first quarter of the year was 
followed by an attempt to contain the budget deficit by sharp spending cuts, and to 
implement a restrictive monetary policy. As a result, inflation declined markedly, to 
below 5% per month in August. A renewed surge in government spending and higher 
money growth in the summer of 1994, led again to a sharp acceleration of inflation 
during the latter part of the year and the beginning of 1995. It was also a factor behind 
the sharp fall of the rouble in October 1994. 
The current policy stance is again much more restrictive. Monetary policy has been tight 
since the last part of 1994, and the fiscal deficit for the first quarter of 1995 is estimated 
at about 2.4% of GDP, against more than 9% in the first quarter of 1994. This has not 
yet led to a concomitant decline in inflation, which signals that inflation expectations are 
still high and that the government's credibility has been damaged by its performance in 
recent years. Yet a considerable effort is currently being made. The budget for 1995, 
finally approved by the State Duma in mid-March, envisages a deficit reduction that will 
require major adjustments on both the revenue and the expenditure sides. This should lead 
to a very sharp fall of inflation, to 1% per month by the second half of 1995. 
-7 2> 
These measures form part of a wider-ranging economic policy package that should create 
the conditions for the recovery of the Russian economy. It also envisages substantial 
liberalization of the external trade regime, including the abolition of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports, the abolition of the system of special exporters for 
strategic goods, as well as the revision of access to oil pipelines. Tax revenue gained 
from abolishing tariff exemptions and privileges is among the principal means of reducing 
the budget deficit. The IMF has approved in April a stand-by arrangement for Russia 
amounting to SDR 43 billion, about $ 6.5 billion. 
On the external side, in 1994 Russia recorded a large trade surplus, estimated at $19.8bn 
in 1994, compared with a surplus of about $12bn in 1993. Preliminary estimates put the 
trade balance for the first two months of 1995 at $2.9 billion. Those amounts, however, 
may be greatly over-estimated. Compliance of enterprises with reporting requirements is 
poor, and data are affected by a substantial degree of under-recording, especially for im­
ports, in order to escape tax payments. In recent years trade and financial transactions 
have been diverted away from traditional partners - the former CMEA and, even more, 
former soviet republics - and flows have been redirected towards western markets. 
Industrialized countries accounted for 69% of total imports in 1994, compared to 60% in 
1993, while imports from former CMEA countries continued to decline and accounted for 
less than 8.5%. 
The external debt of Russia was estimated at $85bn at the end of 1994. Slightly less than 
90%) of the total consists of debt contracted during the Soviet period, which was taken 
over by Russia in early 1993. Starting in 1991, the USSR and then Russia were no longer 
able to meet all their debt servicing obligations, and started to run up substantial arrears. 
Several temporary rescheduling agreements were reached with creditors, but these have 
now expired. Paris Club talks are about to restart, the IMF loan now being approved. 
The mass privatization programme has been highly successful, at least when judged by 
its own terms. As a consequence of the first stage of privatization, over 15,000 large and 
medium-sized enterprises have been privatized since December 1992. The second stage 
of privatization began in mid-1994. This phase is based on sales of shares for cash. This 
impressive transfer of property rights to private agents did not coincide with substantial 
changes in the behaviour of enterprises. Governance is still inadequate, insiders dominate 
firms, and the budget constraint has not hardened enough. There is so far little evidence 
of enterprise restructuring, as testified, among other things, by the low rate of 
redundancies. There has been no attempt by the authorities to isolate 'bad' firms from 
viable ones, or to develop a strategy for dealing with the worst loss-makers. 
Progress with the creation of a legislative and institutional framework for a market 
economy has been particularly slow and, on the whole, the legal and institutional 
framework remains woefully deficient. Much of the reform effort has been enacted by 
presidential decrees. Implementing legislation has often been lacking as Parliament 
disagreed with the measures, or simply failed to follow them up. The resulting body of 
legislation is neither transparent nor consistent. The long-lasting legal uncertainty, due to 
major gaps in the legislation and controversial interpretations of existing norms, as well 
as to the inability to enforce contractual obligations, heavily constrains economic activity 
and particularly foreign investments. 
The European Union and Russia: the future relationship 
Commission Communication 
ANNEXB 
Cooperation between the European Union and Russia 
European Union-Russia cooperation has been built up through implementation of the 
Tacis programme and numerous other actions and programmes. 
The Tacis Programme 
Since its inception in 1991 Tacis has striven to provide know-how to create the means 
and conditions for accelerating the transition to a democratic market society. It has three 
main objectives : to support the transition towards the market economy and democracy, 
to develop partnerships and foster links and networks at all levels, and to integrate 
recipient countries into the world economy. 
Tacis has as its priority the need to contribute to structural reform and modernisation in 
the areas which play a key role in the transition process. For this purpose, Tacis allocates 
grants to five basic project types: policy advice, institution-building and restructuring, 
design of legal and regulatory frameworks, training and pilot projects. Sectoral 
concentration is, wherever possible, combined with geographical concentration. South­
west Russia and Kaliningrad in 1994, North-West Russia and Baikal in 1995. Tacis has 
concentrated on the following sectors: nuclear safety and energy (30 %); support for 
enterprises including privatisation, military conversion and the financial sector (17 %); 
and human resources development (training, public administration, social policies and 
civic society) (16 %). In addition Tacis has committed significant funds in such sectors 
as transport, telecommunications, agriculture and the environment. Tacis works at every 
level in society, demonstrating new ideas and alternative ways of organisation, providing 
policy advice, advisory and consultancy teams, training and studies, it helps to develop 
new regulatory frameworks, reformed institutions and NGOs, and setting up partnerships 
and networks, twinning, pilot projects and framework programmes. Mention should also 
be made of the Special Privatizations and Restructuring Programme decided at the Tokyo 
Summit. 
Increasingly there is local participation in the design, procedures and implementation of 
Tacis projects. Local Coordinating Units, which are usually attached to a Minister with 
a seat in Cabinet, play a key role in identifying the priority needs of the partner countries, 
the priority sectors and geographical areas for assistance, and subsequently assessing and 
proposing activities to be funded under the annual Action Programmes. Considerable 
efforts have been made in view of giving more and better information on Tacis, in order 
21 
to improve awareness among the recipients and local populations, as well as within the 
EU, as to what Tacis is doing and how it operates. 
In the past Tacis was criticised for the slow rate at which commitments and payments 
were made. The situation changed, thanks to the introduction of multi-annual 
programming and a concerted effort to eliminate the backlog of uncontracted projects 
built up in 1991 and 1992. The table below clearly indicates the progress achieved; the 
fact that the volume of Tacis projects started in 1994 exceeded the annual budget, 
demonstrates that Tacis is catching up past backlogs. Russia's annual share of the above 
total Tacis budget available for national programmes has on average been 60 % (1065 
MECU since 1991). 
Year Budget Contracts signed (MECU) Payments made (MECU) 
1991 396.5 5.3 0.4 
1992 420.0 203.0 32.1 
1993 475.0 348.0 180.3 
1994 460.0 512.0 300.0 
1995 506.85 
It is worth noting that staff levels for implementation of Tacis are far below those of 
other donor organizations. 
During the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers at Carcassonne in March 1995, 
particular emphasis was laid on the importance of certain Tacis sectors, namely nuclear 
safety, the reinforcement of democracy and civil institutions, education and training 
programmes and policy advice. These areas in fact absorb a large share of the Tacis 
national budget for Russia even before taking into account the nuclear safety programme 
which should be more easily implemented now that the memorandum on nuclear liability 
has been agreed. Russia receives the largest share of funds allocated to the Nuclear 
Safety programme (some 65 %> out of a total of 321 MECU) and a large share of the 
Inter-State Programmes (total 1992-1994: 200 MECU) and other non-national Tacis 
programmes. 
Assistance in support of the development of the enterprise sector will continue to be 
necessary in Russia: the ability of the enterprise sector to develop successfully in the 
short to medium term is severely constrained by lack of effective financial intermediaries, 
insufficient management know-how, particularly as regards financial management, and 
lack of an adequate regulatory and accounting and auditing infrastructure. This "systemic" 
problem also discourages the inflows of foreign capital vital for growth prospects. There 
is therefore a continued important role for Tacis assistance, working in close cooperation 
with other donors, in helping to improve and develop the whole business system and 
institutions. In the short to medium term, particular attention also needs to be paid, 
through Tacis and other donor programmes, the establishment of effective social policies 
mitigating the serious consequences of economic restructuring. 
The new Tacis regulation emphasises continuity and reform. While the transfer of 
Western know-how in support of the reform process should remain at the core of Tacis, 
2^ 
proposed innovations include limited support for investment, cross-border infrastructures, 
emphasis on the regions and multi-annual financial and sectoral programming. 
Other actions and programmes 
There are many other actions and programmes where the European Union cooperates with 
Russia, as outlined below: 
Humanitarian assistance 
Russia is eligible to receive support from the European Union's food aid and humanitarian 
assistance programmes, should the need arise. Particularly during the initial phase 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the European Union provided massive food 
aid in the form of grants and loans with the aim of cushioning the adverse effects of the 
economic decline on the Russian population: 353 MECU in the form of free food supplies 
and 999 MECU in the form of credit guarantees and loans for food and medical supplies. 
In addition the EU provided targeted humanitarian assistance through ECHO to 
particularly vulnerable parts of the population. In 1994 this totalled 9.16 MECU plus a 
small amount of a global programme was allocated to relieve the effects of the 
Chernobyl disaster. Equally the fighting in the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya 
created a massive humanitarian need for which the Commission's aid has been the largest 
single form of assistance. To date 20.31 MECU is being provided to those affected in the 
Northern Caucasus and it has been distributed as far as possible irrespective of political 
or ethnic considerations. 
Customs cooperation 
Russia currently benefits from a TACIS-financed programme by which the European 
Commission works with the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation to 
upgrade the Russian customs administration. 
Democracy Programme 
The Democracy Programme, funded from Tacis so far as the CIS countries are concerned, 
is designed to develop democratic practice in three main fields: the acquisition of 
knowledge and techniques of parliamentary practice and organization by politicians and 
parliamentary staff, the strengthening of non-governmental organizations which can 
contribute to the promotion of a pluralist democratic society, and the transfer of expertise 
and skills relating to democratic practice and the rule of law to professional groups and 
associations. The Democracy Programme contributed to one of the first Common Actions 
implemented by the European Union following the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union, namely that relating to the observation of the 1993 elections in Russia. 
Energy and Energy Charter 
Since 1992 the European Union has been cooperating actively in the energy field with 
the Central and East European countries, and the countries of the CIS, including Russia. 
Cooperation has focussed on the promotion of energy technologies and energy saving, 
through programmes such as THERMIE and the funding, under the TACIS programme, 
of Energy Centres, three of which are in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tyumen). The 
^3 
Energy Charter Treaty, concluded at Lisbon in December 1994, sets the framework for 
long-term cooperation in the energy sector among the signatories, including the European 
Union and Russia. Subjects covered by the Charter include the transit of energy, transfer 
of energy-related technology, promotion of investments and removal of trade barriers. 
In the energy sector, the SYNERGY programme is helping Russia to make more effective 
policy decisions, for example in the following areas: advice on energy legislation and 
regulation, with emphasis on the European Energy Charter; support for an ongoing 
dialogue between the EU and Russia on the social and economic regeneration of coal 
mining areas; fostering the development of sustainable institutions to improve energy 
efficiency. 
Interregional Cooperation 
In 1993, along the lines of the scheme to encourage cooperation between local and 
regional authorities of the European Union and those of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Commission extended the ECOS-OUVERTURE cooperation programme to local and 
regional authorities of the CIS states. It will be proposing, within the framework of the 
Tacis Regulation, to render this type of cooperation more effective by allowing the 
financing of the CIS partners taking part. 
Environment 
Environmental issues assume increasing priority in European Union/Russia relations. So 
far three Environmental Centres for Administration and Technology (ECATs) have been 
or are being set up in Russia (Kaliningrad, Moscow and St.Petersburg), the aim of these 
LIFE-financed centres being to provide local government and industry with support in 
their efforts to find environmentally sound solutions to problems in their areas. The 1995 
TACIS Action Programme gives special emphasis to the environmental dimension in the 
areas of regional concentration, notably in the Baikal area in 1995. The LIFE Programme 
supports sustainable development in the Baltic Sea region, through ECATs in St. 
Petersburg and Kaliningrad. 
Nuclear safety 
The European Union/Russia nuclear safety programme, funded by TACIS, focusses on 
four different but complementary topics: assistance on six nuclear sites, by which 
experience is transferred in the operation of nuclear plants; design safety, comprising 
safety studies relating to the appraisal, definition and remedial proposals for WER, 
RBMK or fast breeder reactors; support to regulatory authorities for the development of 
a strong technical and legal basis in fields such as licensing, training and inspections; the 
waste and fuel cycle, providing advice on management of waste and matters such as the 
transport of fuel. A similar approach will apply to nuclear safeguards; 
Human resources 
The Trans-European cooperation scheme for higher education (TEMPUS), which is 
financed from TACIS, is designed to assist the Central and East European countries and 
2V 
the CIS states to restructure their higher education systems. Extended for a second four-
year term, it has been open to Russia since 1993 and is financed under the TACIS 
programme. From 1995, the Youth for Europe III programme finances youth exchanges 
and mobility schemes involving the European Union and third countries, including Russia. 
A meeting of the European Union and Russia Ministers of Education was held in 
September 1994, focussing on Russian educational reform and cooperation activities in 
the field of education and training. 
Industrial Cooperation 
The European Union is seeking to promote industrial cooperation with Russia through 
pilot projects and the provision of sectoral analysis. The pilot projects have aimed at 
building up common experience in the design and implementation of cooperation projects, 
particularly in the electrotechnical sector, and in the enhancement of Russian skills in 
developing cooperation proposals. Sectoral analysis has concentrated on, inter alia, steel, 
aluminium, the wood and paper industry, the aeronautics industry, textiles and 
automobiles. 
Scientific Cooperation 
The European Union also supports reform in Russia through its activities of international 
cooperation in the field of science and technology. 
Urgent action has been taken in recent years: research projects with the participation of 
Russian researchers have been supported by programmes such as COPERNICUS (joint 
projects and scientific networks) and PECO (participation in specific programmes of the 
Framework Programme), and through the International Association for the Promotion of 
Cooperation with Scientists from MS (INTAS) along the lines of a recent communication 
from the Commission to the Council (COM (95) 109). In all, more than 50 MECU has 
been committed during 1993-1994 for cooperation of this type. 
These activities complement the initiatives undertaken by TACIS-fiinded action in support 
of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), by which the European Union 
assists the conversion of military researchers to civil applications. Initiatives supported 
to date have aimed at giving assistance to a wide number of researchers in small/medium 
size projects. 
In the coming years, priority will be given to research projects having high potential 
applications both for industry and the public domaine, which are likely to create nuclei 
for a renewed and reinvigorated RTD culture. 
Statistical Cooperation 
Since 1992 many actions, organized by Eurostat together with the statistical offices of the 
Member States, have been implemented in the field of statistical cooperation. Such 
actions, funded by TACIS, include consultancy, seminars, publications, study visits and 
training courses and the'supply of equipment. 
Transport and Trans-European Networks (TENs) 
In the transport field, the Union is very active in promoting the integration of transport 
networks between the Union and Russia in a Trans-European Network perspective. For 
road and rail transport, these cover important corridors such as that between Berlin and 
Moscow or between Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moscow-Kiev (both identified as priorities 
by the Essen European Council), and the G-24 is coordinating international financial 
assistance to these corridors. In the ports sector, the Union is an active partner to 
regional bodies in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea looking at ports developments in a 
regional context. Furthermore, TACIS has identified air transport and in particular Air 
Traffic Control as priority sectors within the transport sector, and has financed many 
large-scale projects in these fields. 
Information Society 
There are many other areas of activity where the European Union experience is assisting 
Russia to set aside its legacy of the past in order to develop its resources in a sustainable 
manner. Examples include the Information Society where the European Union is 
providing advice to the Russian government on draft laws in the information sector, 
notably as data protection and import/export of informational documents. 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(95) 223 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 11 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-95-263-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-89508-X 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg