A4-0193/97

Resolution on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (January to December 1996)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union,

- having regard to Rules 92(4) and 148 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to its resolutions of 18 May 1995 on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (November 1993 - December 1994) ((OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 223.)), 18 July 1996 on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (January - December 1995) ((OJ C 261, 9.9.1996, p. 154.)) and 16 January 1997 on the general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties ((OJ C 33, 3.2.1997, p. 67.)),

- having regard to its resolutions setting out Parliament's attitude on the Intergovernmental Conference now under way,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy (A4-0193/97),

A. whereas, in accordance with Article J.7, second paragraph, of the TEU, Parliament is required to hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy,

B. having regard to the objectives of that policy as set out in Article J.1 of the TEU, to the provisions of Article C relating to the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole, and to the responsibility of the Council and Commission for this broad area,

C. having regard to the use which the European Council and the Council have made of the tools provided in the TEU, especially joint actions and common positions, and the provisions of Article J.4(1) on a future common security policy,

D. whereas important challenges have emerged and new crises have broken out requiring stronger and more effective action by the EU in the field of conflict prevention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts,

E. whereas there is no interinstitutional agreement on the CFSP; whereas the Council pays scant heed to Parliament's assessments and recommendations,

F. whereas Parliament must constantly review its own role and conduct with regard to the CFSP in order to maximize its impact and increase democratic control over the CFSP,

G. whereas the CFSP is not an end in itself, but rather a means of ensuring that the EU can help bring about peace and international security, tolerance, and respect for civil, social, and economic rights and freedoms, and foster and consolidate the European values of democracy, freedom, and solidarity,

H. whereas peace and security policy have not been given the necessary priority; whereas devising and developing non-military means of preventing, containing and settling conflicts will be a task of paramount importance in the years ahead,

I. pointing out, in this respect, that the human rights and democracy clauses which should be included in all the economic agreements with third countries represent a valuable instrument for the protection and support of such values,

J. whereas, in addition to a review of events in 1996 and in anticipation of the forthcoming reform of the TEU, the broad lines along which the CFSP has evolved since its inception in November 1993 should be a further subject of study,

Analysis of the general trends affecting the operation of the CFSP

1. Considers that progress in developing the CFSP while it has been in force has been disappointing as regards improving organization, raising the Union's profile, and enhancing its ability to act; notes accordingly that, among the public at large in the Union, the continuing perception is that the beginnings of the policy have been unimpressive;

2. Considers that, although the appointment of special envoys in specific cases enables the Union to maintain a more visible presence where major conflicts are concerned, the envoys are not sufficient in themselves to ensure that the Union can play a full role;

3. Deplores the fact that, barring rare exceptions, the use of joint actions and common positions was confined to isolated matters and the Union did not venture to employ them to chart long-term comprehensive strategies in relation to key world issues; further deplores the fact that, three years after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, there are so few joint actions and common positions in comparison with the number of declarations, although the former are the real instruments of the CFSP;

4. Deplores the fact that the EU has often been unable to implement the human rights and democracy clauses included in the economic agreements with third countries and has turned a blind eye to the flagrant violations and infringements of international conventions that have taken place in some of them;

5. Notes that the intensive political and diplomatic activity of the Union Presidency and the current troika is not regulated within a solid, coherent institutional framework, thus detracting from the purposefulness and effectiveness of the Union's external measures; believes that the current troika structure should be replaced by a more stable troika consisting of the President of the Council, the Commissioner with special responsibility for foreign policy and the Secretary-General of the Council;

6. Notes that, although the CFSP has been in force for several years, the interests which underlie it are shaped at intergovernmental level; points, in particular, to the Commission's apparent surrender of its right to make proposals, as provided for in Article J.8 of the TEU;

7. Recalls that experience has demonstrated the enhanced political weight carried by joint initiatives by the Union in comparison with those of each Member State individually;

8. Deplores the fact that various Member States regularly violate Article J.1(4) of the Treaty, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the CFSP;

9. Points to the need to set up a study and analysis unit, staffed by Commission officials, Council officials and national officials, to assess risks and threats from a European perspective and bring national diplomatic corps and intelligence services into line with the new aspirations of the CFSP;

10. Requests that it be made possible for Member States to use, in third countries where they have no diplomatic mission, the delegations of the Commission for the purpose of representation of their interests in addition to those of the Union;

11. Deplores the unduly slow progress in establishing a common security policy, pursuing defence policy coordination, and cementing relations between the EU and the WEU;

12. Requests that, when the Union sets out to determine its security interests, the emphasis should no longer be only on security in the primarily military sense, but also on a concept having to do above all with economic and social stability, defusing ethnic tensions and promoting ongoing integration;

13. Reiterates its proposal that in the framework of a common security policy the possibility of establishing a European Civil Peace Corps be taken into account in order to strengthen humanitarian action, promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, prevent the outbreak of new conflicts and provide the necessary confidence-building measures on the basis of existing experiences such as that of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in former Yugoslavia;

14. Regrets that the Council has still not reached agreement on a common, restrictive interpretation of the eight existing criteria for arms supplies adopted at the Council meetings in Luxembourg (June 1991) and Lisbon (June 1992);

15. Notes that the CFSP has not been evolving as provided for in the TEU, and calls on the Member States to make the necessary institutional changes to render the CFSP efficient and coherent;

16. Welcomes the progress made by the idea of integrating the WEU into the EU as proposed by certain Member States;

17. Regrets the Council's failure to make effective use of Article J.3(2), and calls upon the Council to make progress in this area a priority;

18. Regrets that it has proved impossible to reach an interinstitutional agreement on the implementation of Article J.7 of the TEU and that the Council is still failing to furnish regular written reports to Parliament on the development of the CFSP;

19. Believes that the effectiveness and transparency of the CFSP would be greatly enhanced if operational expenditure were normally charged to the Community budget;

20. Stresses that the role of the European Parliament in the CFSP cannot be limited to that of merely receiving information: provision must be made for adequate participation by Parliament in the definition of the guidelines for and political control over the implementation of CFSP measures;

21. Hopes that the Intergovernmental Conference will make structural improvements in the CFSP, in accordance with previous resolutions of the European Parliament, by introducing majority voting, raising the profile of action by the European Union and pursuing defence cooperation;

22. Regrets also that the Council is still neglecting to consult Parliament before common positions and joint actions are adopted, and likewise makes no political response to the recommendations addressed to it; calls in this connection for the latter to be placed formally on the Council's agenda;

23. Asks the Council to accept the inclusion of MEPs in EU delegations during international negotiations at ministerial level;

24. Looks forward to increased cooperation and mutual exchange of information with the committee of chairmen of foreign affairs committees of the parliaments of the Member States, with a view to extending democratic control over the development of the CFSP;

25. Notes the important roles played by the President of Parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee and Parliament's other committees dealing with external relations, the joint parliamentary committees and the interparliamentary delegations in the monitoring of the CFSP, but reaffirms the need to be consulted and fully informed in writing of the development of this policy, including the adoption and application of joint actions and common positions; stresses, in this connection, that its role in the CFSP cannot be limited to that of merely receiving information, and that provision must be made for its adequate participation in the definition of the guidelines and political control over the implementation of CFSP measures;

26. Regrets not having fully used its right to make recommendations to the Council in the field of the CFSP, and expresses its satisfaction at the 113 topical and urgent resolutions concerning human rights and the CFSP adopted during 1996, while stressing the need to ensure coherence between this procedure and the work of Parliament's committees dealing with external relations; considers that Parliament and its appropriate committee should seek ways of improving the effectiveness of and follow-up to its CFSP instruments, and that this should apply to topical and urgent resolutions, recommendations and debates with the Commission and Council in the margins of Council meetings;

27. Insists on the need to maintain the financing of the CFSP as non- compulsory expenditure in order to allow proper parliamentary monitoring;

28. Confirms its attachment to the defence of its existing assent prerogatives in the field of foreign policy, which are a major instrument of democratic control;

Development of the CFSP in 1996

29. Notes that, rather than breaking new ground, the purpose of the joint actions relating to former Yugoslavia was to continue the measures already adopted in 1995; deplores the fact that there is no common position on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the failure to define a common position laying down the conditions under which political and economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could be improved;

30. Calls on the Council to increase diplomatic and economic pressures on the parties to the Dayton agreement in order to ensure the full implementation thereof, notably as regards extradition of indicted war criminals to the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, as well as the location of mass grave sites and the whereabouts of missing persons;

31. Regrets the ineffectiveness of the EU's reaction to the onset of the Albanian crisis and reiterates that a real common foreign and security policy cannot by any means be intended to comprise a sum total of individual geopolitical interests;

32. Observes that Kosovo remains one of those European problem regions which require a lasting solution and deplores the fact that, in 1996 as previously, no effective initiatives were taken to arrange comprehensive talks among all parties concerned, without preconditions;

33. Welcomes the joint action on the appointment and powers of Mr Moratinos as EU special envoy for the Middle East, but regrets the failure to define a more ambitious common position to chart long-term Union policies and provide a reference point for the measures which might be undertaken in the region;

34. Deplores the ineffectualness of Community diplomacy where the events in Cyprus and relations with Turkey are concerned; considers accordingly that a common position should be defined to provide a framework for relations with the latter country, and takes the view that meetings such as the one held recently in Rome between five Member States and Turkey need to involve as many Member States as possible if they are to further the progress of the CFSP and help resolve existing problems;

35. Deplores the total lack of joint actions and common positions on the southern Mediterranean countries in the past two years, and particularly deplores the paralysis with regard to Algeria;

36. Deplores the fact that the EU has been unable to define a common position on the enlargement of NATO, relations with Russia, and the repercussions for the Community enlargement process;

37. Thinks it right that Africa should have been treated as a priority for the CFSP, as evidenced by the declarations, common positions, and joint actions on this subject, but, notwithstanding the undeniable efforts, suspects that the EU's scope for action may not have been exploited to the full;

38. Applauds the joint actions relating to the special envoy for the Great Lakes region and support for transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, but deplores the fact that there is no proper clearly defined common policy towards the African continent;

39. Believes, therefore, that a common position should be defined in order to promote a Great Lakes regional conference aimed at solving the refugee problem, supporting democratization in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Rwanda, achieving equitable power-sharing in the two latter countries, bringing about strict arms control in the region, and providing a basis for EU cooperation to be pursued in the long term;

40. Regrets that the Transatlantic Declaration signed in December 1996 has had no practical consequences whereby the EU and the United States would coordinate their policies on such vital issues as the Middle East peace process;

41. Considers that intensification of the San José dialogue between the EU and Central America is one of the main objectives of the CFSP and calls for an overall action plan for the CFSP in relation to Latin America which should give rise to a genuine 'transatlantic dialogue' between the two regions;

42. Welcomes the stepping-up of joint action by the Union with a view to securing a ban on anti-personnel mines, but hopes that the Council will display a greater commitment to implementing joint action;

43. Deplores strongly the accentuation of divisions within the Union with regard to relations with the People's Republic of China, which were particularly in evidence during the work of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;

44. Stresses that these divisions strengthen the hand of those who advocate 'development without democracy', and warns of the serious consequences which such a model has, and could have, both for the People's Republic of China and other countries in the same region and for developing countries as a whole and the preservation of world peace;

45. Welcomes the Commission's efforts and initiatives for the development of the Union's relations with India, and calls on the Council to continue along this path;

46. Believes that the common positions on Burma (Myanmar) and Cuba are a good example of the manner in which the policy tool in question can be put to effective use, and urges the Council to continue with this way of proceeding, since it helps to clarify the Union's external activities and make them effective;

47. Considers the performance as regards security to have been relatively good in terms of the coordinated approaches worked out for international conferences and the improved working and secretariat-level relations between the EU and the WEU, primarily with a view to the evacuation of EU nationals and possible WEU involvement in the Great Lakes region;

48. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretary-General of the WEU.