Page 1 of 5  ECB-PUBLIC  
 12 March 2015 
 FINAL 
 
Eurosystem Ethics Framework 
Implementation practices 
1. Introduction 
The Governing Council has adopted on 12 March 2015 Guideline ECB/2015/11 laying down the 
principles of a Eurosystem Ethics Framework1. The principles laid down in Guideline ECB/2015/11 should 
be supplemented by a set of best practices on how to implement them. The purpose of these implementation practices is to give orientation to the ECB and the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro (together “Eurosystem central Banks”) and to promote the 
harmonisation of the local rules and practices. Guid eline ECB/2015/11, the current set of implementation 
practices and the internal rules and practices adopted by each Eurosystem central bank form together the Eurosystem Ethics Framework.  
Against this background, the Governing Council has approved the current implementation practices.  
2. General 
 
Implementation practice No 1 concerning the role an d responsibilities of the Eurosystem central banks’ 
decision making bodies  
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to defi ne the role and responsibilities of the relevant 
decision-making bodies as follows: (i) implementing the Eurosystem Ethics framework by adopting local 
rules and practices, (ii) determining the corporate and ethics culture at local level (“tone from the top” and 
“leading by example”) and (iii) ensuring compliance with  the local rules by setting up a proper compliance 
framework at local level.  
 Implementation practice No 2 concerning the role and responsibilities of the operational management 
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to define the role and responsibilities of the operational 
management as follows: (i) applying the local rules within their area of responsibilities, (ii) contributing to 
                                                      
1   OJ L 135, 2.6.2015, p. 23 
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Page 2 of 5 the communication of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework and to the awareness raising and (iii) fostering 
compliance (“leading by example”).  
 
Implementation practice No 3 concerning th e role and responsibilities of staff  
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to specify in  their local rules that staff is responsible for 
making themselves familiar with these rules and for complying with them. In case of doubt, they should proactively seek advice on the interpretation of the rules from the local compliance function. 
 
Implementation practice No 4 concerning the compliance function 
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to define clearly the responsibilities of the local 
compliance function (which may be assigned to a self-standing unit or to different departments). The 
responsibilities of the compliance function co uld include (i) giving advice and guidance on the 
interpretation and application of the local rules, (ii) raising awareness and educating staff, (iii) identifying and assessing compliance risks, (iv) monitoring and checking compliance, (v) reporting of cases of non-compliance and possibly investigations and initiating the disciplinary follow-up, and (vi) steering or 
contributing to the drafting of the local rules and practices. When setting up the compliance function, the 
Eurosystem central banks are recommended to take account of the guiding principles concerning compliance and the compliance function in banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2 and relevant international/European standards. The Eurosystem central banks should 
carefully consider the limits for outsourcing the compliance function taking into account that this is a “core 
risk management activity”.   
 Implementation practice No 5 concerning communication and awareness raising 
For the purpose of raising awareness, the Eurosystem central banks may for example use the following 
tools: (i) induction sessions, (ii) (regular) training sessions, (iii) (regular) online-tests, (iv) communication 
via the intranet and/or brochures, (v) declarations to be signed by staff on a regular basis confirming that 
they are familiar with the applicable rules and willing to  comply with them and (vi) publication of general 
guidelines and the advice given in individual cases.  
 
Implementation practice No 6 concerning compliance monitoring 
For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the rules on the prevention of misuse of inside information, 
the Eurosystem central banks may use different mechanisms, namely a pre-authorisation requirement and/or ex-ante or ex-post reporting requirements. To the extent possible under national law, these 
mechanisms should be supplemented by compliance checks of all private financial transactions made by 
                                                      
2  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf 
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Page 3 of 5 insiders. Such compliance checks should be possible even  if there is no suspicion of non-compliance with 
the rules. The compliance checks may be undertaken on an ad-hoc basis and/or on a regular basis. They 
may focus on specific types of transactions, on a specific group of staff (having access to specific inside-information) or cover a certain percentage of staff determined by lot. The monitoring (including the compliance checks) should be done by the compliance function, possibly with the support of an external 
service provider.  
The compliance checks should cover all relevant accounts which members of bodies or members of staff 
own on their own behalf or together with third parties or for which they have a power of attorney. 
Moreover, the local rules should define precisely which documents (e.g. account statements; purchase 
and sale notes) the persons, who are subject to compliance checks, must keep and for which period of time.  
The conduct of compliance checks should be without prejudice to the possibility to carry out 
investigations/internal administrative inquiries (which include more intrusive measures) in case a person 
is suspect of having breached the applicable framework.  
Compliance checks and investigations are to be carried out within the limits of the applicable data 
protection law and of the applicable rules on banking and professional secrecy.  
 Implementation practice No 7 concerning the reporting of compliance incidents  
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to define clearly how their staff should report cases of 
non-compliance within their organisation. In addition to the regular reporting channels (e.g. via the local 
management to the compliance function), the local ru les of each Eurosystem central bank should allow 
for “whistleblowing”, i.e. the direct reporting to the compliance function or to a third body if the regular reporting channels cannot be used. Moreover, the local ru les should specify that staff shall not suffer any 
prejudicial effects on the part of their employer as a result of having reported a case of non-compliance, 
provided that they acted reasonably and in good faith. Moreover, each Eurosystem central bank should ensure that the name of the reporting member of staff is kept confidential unless it is required by law to 
disclose it. While confidentiality of the person’s identity must be guaranteed, anonymous reporting should 
not be encouraged. 
  
3. Rules on the prevention of misuse of inside information  
Implementation practice No 8 concerning insiders The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to include all persons who have access to inside 
information (as well as information about their status) in a register. The register should be maintained by an organisational function which is independent from the operational units having access to inside 
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Page 4 of 5 information. The register needs to be updated on an on-going basis. To identify the relevant persons, the 
Eurosystem central banks should define carefully which information needs to be classified as inside 
information and the related information flows. The register of insiders should be interlinked with the rights to access electronic documents and the rules on the storage and distribution of hardcopies to ensure that only persons with insider status get access to inside information. The rules should also specify how staff 
is notified of their status in due time.  
The Eurosystem central banks that make all their st aff subject to specific restrictions do not need a 
separate register of insiders but are still required to ensure that inside information is only accessible on a 
“need-to-know basis”.  
 
Implementation practice No 9 concerning restrictions of specific critical private financial transactions For the purpose of restricting critical private financial transactions, the Eurosystem central banks may 
choose one or more of the following mechanisms: Prohibitions (restricted lists), prior authorisation, ex-ante or ex-post reporting or embargo periods. The restrictions should be effective, efficient, proportionate and transparent. For all types of restrictions, de minimis  thresholds may be applied to ensure 
proportionality.  
4. Conflicts of interest 
 
Implementation practice No 10 concerning the checking  of conflicts of interest at the recruitment stage 
In case the Eurosystem central banks recruit candidates with professional experience for specific 
positions they are recommended to establish procedures to examine whether candidates considered for 
appointment may be exposed to a conflict of interest arising from previous occupational activities or 
personal relationships. For that purpose, the Eurosystem central banks are recommended to specify in their rules (i) that the absence of a conflict of interest or appropriate mitigation thereof is a pre-condition for an appointment; (ii) that candidates are obliged to indicate during the application procedure any actual 
or potential conflict of interest that may arise from previous occupational activities or personal 
relationships and (iii) that the selection committee/appointing manager is obliged to assess potential conflicts of interest and to decide, possibly after consultation of the compliance function, on appropriate measures to avoid the conflict.  
 Implementation practice No 11 concerning conflicts of interest arising from occupational activities taken 
up during unpaid leave 
The Eurosystem central banks, which allow their staff to take unpaid leave to take up an occupational 
activity, are recommended to establish a procedure to check potential conflicts of interest before granting 
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Page 5 of 5 unpaid leave. The assessment of conflicts of interest should be consistent with the assessment of 
conflicts of interest arising from post-employment activities. 
 
5. Rules on the acceptance of advantages  
Implementation practice No 12 concerning the reporting of advantages  
The Eurosystem central banks are recommended to adopt internal rules requiring staff to report either to 
their line management or to the compliance function advantages which could not be rejected as well as 
attempts of third parties to offer advantages. The Eurosystem central banks may limit the reporting obligation to advantages exceeding a specific threshold or a symbolic value. The Eurosystem central banks are also recommended to specify the purpose of collecting the data, the related access rights and 
the retention period in accordance with the applicable data protection law.