2008
THE INSTRUMENT FOR STRUCTURAL
POLICIES FOR PREACCESSION ISPA, 
200006EUROPEAN COURT 
OF AUDITORS
Special Report  No 12
EN

THE INSTRUMENT
FOR STRUCTURAL POLICIESFOR PREACCESSION ISPA, 200006Special Report  No 12   2008
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, of the EC Treaty)
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–062
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
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Special Report  No 12   2008
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009
ISBN 978-92-9207-161-5
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Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–063
CONTENTS
Paragraph
 GLOSSARY
IVI  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
16 INTRODUCTION
12  ASSISTANCE TO EU APPLICANT COUNTRIES
36  ISPA MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
712  AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
1342  AUDIT OBSERVATIONS
1324  WAS THERE A COHERENT STRATEGY AND ADEQUATE PREPARATION SUPPORTING ISPA ACTIONS?
1315 GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA
1619 WELL TARGETED ISPA STRATEGIES
2021 THREE IMPORTANT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE BEGINNING OF ISPA
2224 WEAKNESSES IN FINANCIAL AND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CBA
2536  WERE PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO PLAN?
2526 GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA2732 ALMOST ALL PROJECTS WERE DELAYED
3336 FINANCIAL PLANS NOT IMPLEMENTED AS SCHEDULED
3742   WERE PROJECTS CONTRIBUTING TO BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES’ COMPLIANCE
WITH THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES AND TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF TENT?
3738 GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA
3940 COMPLIANCE WITH EU ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS HAS INCREASED
4142 IMPROVEMENTS IN LINKS TO THE TRANSEUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK
43 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 ANNEX I  ISPA PROJECT MANAGEMENT STAGES AND KEY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES REPLY OF THE COMMISSION
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–065
GLOSSARY
Cohesion Fund : Instrument designed to promote economic and social cohesion by financ-
ing large projects in the fields of the environment and transport in Member States with a per capita GDP of less than 90 % of the Community average. The Cohesion Fund was originally implemented in Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Since 1 January 2004, Ireland has no longer been eligible. After their accession to the EU, the ongoing ISPA projects of the new Member States were converted into Cohesion Fund projects.
Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) : A technique for comparing all the costs and all the benefits 
of an intervention to determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and if so, by what proportion.
Financing memorandum : Agreement defining the budgetary commitments of a project, 
as well as the physical and financial indicators to be used to monitor the performance of the project.
ISPA manual : Manual intended to ensure that ISPA projects programming and imple-
mentation are undertaken according to best practices. It covers the whole project cycle and provides practical guidance of the ISPA and coordination regulations.
National sectoral strategies : Framework for project identification, including criteria to 
select and appraise project proposals in the environment and transport sectors.
Phare : The Programme of Community aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe 
(Phare) was the main financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy for the central and east European countries (CEECs) which have applied for membership of the Euro-pean Union. Although the Phare programme was originally reserved for the countries of central and eastern Europe, it is set to be extended to the applicant countries of the western Balkans.
PRAG : Practical guide providing guidelines for tendering and contracting for Phare and 
ISPA projects.
Project application : Set of documents consisting of a standard form and supporting 
documents (e.g. feasibility study, design, cost/benefit and financial analysis, environmen-tal impact assessment) describing and justifying the proposal. It also includes supervision and quality control mechanisms.
Regulations : There are two main regulations governing ISPA:
Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the appli-
cant countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 68) (‘coordination regulation’).
Council Regulation (EC) No 1267/1999 of 21 June 1999 establishing an Instrument for 
Structural Policies for Pre-accession (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 73); amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 2382/2001 (OJ L 323, 7.12.2001, p. 1) (‘ISPA regulation’).
Sapard : Special accession programme for agriculture and rural development.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–066
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–067
I.
ISPA was one of the instruments to assist the 
candidate countries of central and eastern 
Europe in the preparation for accession in  
the period 2000–2006. Its objectives were to 
help candidate countries to apply EU envi-
ronmental standards and to upgrade and  expand transport networks, including links 
with the trans-European network. It also pro-
vided experience in the management of EU 
funds for large infrastructure projects. The total financial allocation was 7 280 million euro.
II.
The Court reviewed this instrument by ask-ing whether there was a coherent strategy and adequate preparation to support ISPA  
actions, whether projects were implemented according to planning and whether projects 
were contributing to beneficiary countries’ 
compliance with the EU environmental direc-
tives and contributing to the improvement 
of TEN-T.
III.
The Court concludes that there was a coher-
ent strategy, but projects were not always  
adequately prepared. Three important meth-
odological guidance documents were pro-
vided late in relation to the first wave of  applications.EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
IV
Projects were not implemented according  
to planning; there were significant delays  
and considerable changes in the financing 
plans.
V.
The projects audited by the Court increase 
the compliance with the EU standards or  
improve the links to the trans-European  
network.
VI.
The Court recommends that the Commis-
sion make a follow-up of ISPA’s imple-mentation and examine how delays could  be avoided or reduced in the future, when 
implementing a similar instrument. In this  
context, the Commission should make the  guidance documents available before the  
candidate countries start preparing their  
projects and greater attention should be  
devoted to reduce time needed to complete 
procedures.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–068
INTRODUCTION
ASSI STANCE TO EU APPLICANT COUNTRIES
 1.  The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) is one 
of the three financial instruments (with PHARE and Sapard) to assist candidate countries in the preparation for accession. ISPA was set up in 1999 to contribute to the process of preparation for accession to the European Union concerning environment and transport
1 in the 
former candidate countries of central and eastern Europe2, along the 
same lines as the Cohesion Fund model designed for the least pros-perous EU members (see Figure 1 ). It also helped candidate countries 
prepare for the management of EU funds after accession, by providing experience in their use for large infrastructure projects.1 Article 1 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1267/1999.
2 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
ISPA INTERVENTION LOGICFIGURE 1
NEEDS
•  Improvement of the environmental standards•  Improvement of the transport infrastructure
OBJECTIVES
•  Bringing countries up to EU environmental standards•  Extending trans-European networks
INPUTS
•  Commission coordination•  ISPA and national funds•  ISPA strategies, ﬁ  nancing memoranda, Commission decisions
• Staﬀ  
PROCESSES
•  Building and improving infrastructure in the environment
and transport sectors
OUTPUTS
•  New and/or rehabilitated water treatment systems•  Kilometres of new road or rail network or improved network
RESULTS IMPACT
Percentage of households/businesses 
served, time saved, accessibility gainEnvironmental impact; improved
water qualitySmoother traﬃ   c ﬂ ows, improved
road/rail network
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–069
 2.  ISPA operated during the programming period 2000–06. From January 
2007 onwards, similar actions have been financed under the Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)3.
ISPA MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
 3.  Figure 2  shows the framework within which projects are developed and 
approved.
ISPA PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORKFIGURE 23 IPA covers Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244/99.
Programming for the Instrument for Structural policies for Pre-Accession
National ISPA strategy Setting sectoral strategies and the list of priority projects
Prepared by the candidate country
Project application
Containing detailed project description
Appraisal
Followed by two interservice consultations
Commission decision
Financing memorandum
Co-signed by the candidate country•  Council Regulation (EC) No 1267/1999 of 21 June 1999 establishing an Instrument for Structural Policies 
for Pre-Accession
•  Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in 
the framework of the pre-accession strategyAccession partnership
Priority areas of acquis communautairePrepared by the CommissionNational programme
Action plan for preparation for accessionPrepared by candidatecountryNational development plan
development strategy prepared by candidatecountryGuidelines
ISPA manual
CBA guidelinesObligatory opinion
Issued by the ISPA
Management 
CommitteeThe Commission
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0610
 4.  The total allocation for ISPA was 7 280 million euro for the period 2000–06 
(1 040 million euro in 1999 prices per year4), to be distributed among 
the beneficiary countries on the basis of selected criteria. ISPA aimed at using these funds according to an appropriate balance between 
measures in the field of the environment and measures relating to 
transport infrastructure.
 5.  In total, 366 projects were approved for ISPA, of which 201 were in the 
environment sector, 78 in the transport sector and 87 concerned tech-nical assistance. The ISPA budget (in 2006 prices), before amendments and excluding technical assistance was 7 708 million euro
5. The con-
tribution to ISPA projects in the environment sector was 3 804 million 
euro and in the transport sector 3 904 million euro. In the environment 
sector (see Figure 3 ), the majority of the 201 projects (73 %) were in 
the field of wastewater treatment and water supply. In the transport sector, the 78 ISPA projects were mainly (97 %) in the railways and in the roads and motorways sectors (see Figure 4 ).
DISTRIBUTION OF ISPA ENVIRONMENT  PROJECTSFIGURE 34 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1267/1999 and Annex II to 
the interinstitutional agreement 
of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on budgetary 
discipline and improvement of the 
budgetary procedure
(OJ C 172, 18.6.1999).
5 Commission, Regional Policy DG, 
situation at 31.12.2007.
No of projects: 9
Share 4 %No of projects: 46
Share 23 %No of projects: 89
Share 45 %
No of projects: 52
Share 26 %No of projects: 5
Share 2 %Combined sewage networks
and treatment plants
Drinking water supply
Combined wastewater treatment
and drinking water supply
Solid waste management
Other
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0611
 6.  The co-financing rate of ISPA may be up to 75 % of public or equivalent 
expenditure6. The national contribution sometimes took the form of 
loans granted by financial institutions such as the European Invest-ment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD).
DISTRIBUTION OD ISPA TRANSPORT  PROJECTSFIGURE 46 For projects considered 
essential for achieving the general 
objectives of ISPA, this rate can be 
increased up to 85 % according to Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1267/1999.
Roads and motorways
Railway
OtherNo of projects: 2
Share 3 %
No of projects: 37
Share 47 %
No of projects: 39
Share 50 %
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0612
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
 7.  The implementation of ISPA in the candidate countries represented an 
initial exposure to large-scale investments co-financed by the Euro-
pean Union. For this reason, in view of the importance of ISPA for  the accession of the candidate countries and findings of previous  
audits
7, the Court decided to carry out an audit of ISPA to answer the 
following questions.
Was there a coherent strategy and an adequate preparation sup- (a) 
porting ISPA actions?
Were projects implemented according to planning? (b) 
Were projects contributing to beneficiary countries’ compliance (c) 
with the EU environmental directives and to the improvement of 
TEN-T?
 8.  ISPA was programmed for the period 2000–06 and the majority of the 
beneficiary countries acceded to the EU in May 2004. As at 31 Decem-
ber 2007, final reports on only a limited number of the 279 infrastruc-
ture projects were available. As such, the Court could only make a 
preliminary assessment of the performance and achievements of the projects.
 9.  A sample of 32 projects adopted between 2000 and 2003 (16 environment 
and 16 transport) covering six beneficiary countries was examined. 
Sixteen projects were visited on the spot (eight environment and  
eight transport) in the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia and Romania. 
The other 16 projects were subject to a desk-review. They concern 
the abovementioned countries plus Hungary and Bulgaria.
 10.  File reviews and interviews were carried out both at the Commission 
headquarters and Commission delegations. In the candidate countries, 
meetings were held with the Ministries of Environment and Transport, 
regional and local authorities, as well as with final beneficiaries.
 11.  In addition, the Court carried out a survey by sending questionnaires to 155 project managers and bodies responsible for day-to-day manage-ment of projects
8 in the four countries visited, in order to collect opinions 
on the most common problems encountered during ISPA implementa-tion. The Court received 145 answers
9 (93 % response rate).
 12.  Moreover, the Court obtained advice from experts in environment and 
transport projects from international financial institutions.7 The Court’s Special Report 
No 5/2003 concerning Phare and 
ISPA funding of environmental 
projects in the candidate countries (OJ C 167, 17.7.2003, 
p. 1), Special Report No 15/2000 
on the Cohesion Fund (OJ C 279, 
2.1.2000, p. 1) and Special Report 
No 6/2005 on the trans-European network for transport (TEN-T) 
(OJ C 94, 21.4.2006, p. 1).
8 The project managers 
represented 42 % of ISPA projects 
in the environment and transport 
sectors.
9 For technical reasons such 
as incorrect completion of the 
questionnaire or incomplete reply, 
127 replies were usable (82 %).
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0613
AUDIT OBSERVATIONS
WAS THERE A COHERENT STRATEGY AND ADEQUATE 
PREPARATION SUPPORTING ISPA ACTIONS?
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA
 13.  National ISPA strategies for the environment and transport sectors were 
prepared by each beneficiary country at the request of the Commis-
sion. Their purpose was to define the priority objectives by identifying sector and sub-sector priorities and geographical priorities such as 
transport bottlenecks or environmental black spots, and to identify the resources needed. The national ISPA strategies should also pro-vide the framework for project identification and set out the criteria 
to be used to select and appraise proposed projects (see Annex I ).
 14.  Candidate countries submitted an application to the Commission which 
had to contain, inter alia, the following elements10:
the timetable for implementation of the works; (a) 
a cost–benefit analysis; (b) 
the financial plan, including financing sources other than ISPA. (c) 
 15.  The Court analysed the strategy documentation, and the preparation of 
ISPA projects, checking whether:
the national sectoral strategies contained an assessment of sec- (a) 
toral needs in the fields of environment and transport designed to catch up with EU environmental standards and upgrade and  expand links with trans-European transport networks;
the Commission developed on time manuals and guidelines to  (b) 
enable candidate countries to submit proposals containing all  
the relevant information.10 Article 7(3)(a) of and Annex I to 
Regulation (EC) No 1267/1999.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0614
WELL TARGETED ISPA STRATEGIES
 16.  The Commission’s framework documents for the environment and trans-
port sectors proved to be effective in setting out the key criteria for the preparation of national ISPA strategies which included general priorities and identified projects to be implemented with ISPA sup-port (see Textbox 1 ).
 17.  In the cases where shortcomings were identified, the Commission provided 
support in order to address these weaknesses (see Textbox 2 ).
In the case of Latvia, in the environment sector, the main focus for ISPA was to concentrate on projects which 
enabled the country to comply with the requirements of Community environmental law and with the objectives 
of the accession partnership. Th  e strategy identifi  es and selects projects to be proposed for fi  nancing under ISPA 
that are consistent with the abovementioned criteria. Th  e selection of ISPA projects was based on the government 
guidelines, which took into consideration assumptions of environmental policy.TEXTBOX 1
In Romania, the updated 2003 version of the national transport strategy did not receive unreserved consent from 
the Commission due to several shortcomings. In order to address these shortcomings, the Commission decided 
to grant a technical assistance project aimed at draft  ing a general transport master plan.TEXTBOX 2
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0615
Action to protect the environment in the Baltic region was initiated by the Polish government at the beginning of 
the 1990s in cooperation with other countries. Th  e region of Krakow was already identifi  ed in the Helsinki Con-
vention12 as one of the hot spots for the protection of the Baltic Sea, as this area, even though far from the coast, 
contains a high density of industries discharging waste into the Vistula River, which fl  ows into the Baltic Sea. A 
common solution for the whole urban area of Krakow was prepared and included in the national programme for 
purifi  cation of communal wastewater. Th  e project of a sewage treatment plant in Krakow was then included in the 
national ISPA strategy for the environment in 1999, to be implemented as one of the priority projects.TEXTBOX 3
In Latvia the main objectives of the national environment policy plan, which was approved in 1995, were to enable 
the country to comply with the requirements of the Community environmental legal framework and with the 
objectives of the accession partnership. Th  e objectives of this policy plan were taken over in the national ISPA 
strategy for the environment. Th  e selection process for the projects was based on these objectives.TEXTBOX 4 18.  Even though in some cases it was not possible to explain the ranking of 
investment projects11, an examination of the strategies of the four 
countries visited has enabled the Court to conclude that, in general, national sectoral ISPA strategies clearly identified the needs in each 
country, also taking into consideration the existing national planning 
documents (see Textbox 3 ). National ISPA strategies acted as a tool 
in the selection of ISPA projects, linking objectives and priorities to 
specific project proposals.
 19.  In some cases the national ISPA strategies were a development of exist-
ing national strategies that had already taken into consideration the need to adopt the acquis communautaire  in the field of the environ-
ment (see Textbox 4 ).11 This has been pointed out also 
in the Court’s Special Report 
No 5/2003 (shortcomings in 
strategies, paragraphs 18 to 20).
12 Helsinki Convention: convention on the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea area, signed in 1974 and 
revised in 1992 which concerns all the states bordering on the Baltic Sea. The convention covers the whole of the Baltic 
Sea area, including inland waters as well as the water of the sea itself and the sea-bed. Measures are also taken in the whole 
catchment area of the Baltic Sea to reduce land-based pollution.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0616
THREE IMPORTANT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS NOT AVAILABLE 
FROM THE BEGINNING OF ISPA
 20.  Three main guidelines were developed by the Commission and made 
available for project preparation.
An ISPA manual was provided to the beneficiary countries in 2000, (a) 
during the preparation phase of the first project applications.
A second version of the ISPA manual was developed in 2002, clari- (b) 
fying in particular the tendering and contracting procedures.
Updated guidance on cost–benefit analysis was made available (c) 
in 2002, which addressed weaknesses identified in the previous 
version. In particular it gave average rates of return and recom-
mended time horizons for different sectors. However, it did not provide any details or forecasting techniques concerning impacts 
on the environment.
 21.  These methodological guides were developed after the projects audited 
by the Court were submitted to the Commission for approval. This late availability limited their contribution to familiarising the candidate 
countries with the policies, procedures and the funding principles  
of the EU.
WEAKNESSES IN FINANCIAL AND COSTBENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CBA
 22.  Each application for ISPA assistance had to contain a financial and a 
cost–benefit analysis. For some projects these were not available  
or presented weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that, since most of the projects were required to fulfil basic needs 
in the candidate countries, it was not appropriate to hold them up 
because of shortcomings in the cost–benefit analysis.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0617
 23.  The Court’s review of the financial and cost–benefit analyses provided 
for the projects audited identified the following weaknesses13:
some missing information about discount rates used and scenario (a) 
assumptions where a risk analysis was presented;
inconsistencies of CBA and financial analyses figures between  (b) 
different documents for the same project;
unsubstantiated socio-economic benefits and incomplete esti- (c) 
mates of effects in the transport sector.
 24.  In these circumstances, the Commission was unable to confirm from the 
cost–benefit analysis that the projects submitted by the candidate countries represented in relative terms the highest added value.
WERE PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO PLAN?
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA
 25.  After the assessment of project application and approval by the Com-
mission, a financing memorandum was signed defining, in particular, 
the financial resources and planning for implementing the project, including the completion date. After project completion, candidate 
countries had to present a final report.
 26.  The Court assessed to what extent the main conditions set in the financ-
ing memorandum had been respected, that is:
whether projects had been implemented according to initial plan (a) 
and the reasons for any delay;
whether the financial plans for the projects had been respected (b) 
and if not, the reasons why.13 See also Special Report 
No 5/2003 (weaknesses in project 
appraisal, paragraphs 30 to 34) 
and Special Report No 6/2005 (weaknesses in evaluation 
and selection of projects, 
paragraphs 30 to 43).
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0618
ALMOST ALL PROJECTS WERE DELAYED
 27.  If projects are delivered later than expected, the benefits are deferred and 
the problems they are intended to address continue for longer than 
necessary. Delays also create uncertainties, as the socio-economic  
environment may change and may make it difficult to implement  projects as foreseen.
 28.  The 32 projects in the Court’s sample were approved between 2000 
and 2003. The majority of the projects audited should have been  
completed between 2004 and 2006 according to the initial financial 
memoranda. However, only five had been completed by the initial  
expected date14 at the time of the audit (two in the Czech Republic 
and three in Latvia)15. For the other 27 projects, the completion date 
was amended. The delays vary from 2 to 5 years (Poland), 4 to 4.5 years (Bulgaria), 2 to 4.8 years (Romania), 1.5 years (Hungary) and 1 to  3 years (Latvia). In the Czech Republic, there were no major delays.
 29.  In the survey addressed to the project managers in the four audited 
countries, the Court obtained information on the delays in imple-
mentation and the reasons for the delays.
 30.  In the environment sector, the average scheduled duration of the projects 
was 5 years and in the transport sector, 4.2 years. According to the sur-vey, the average delay was 2.5 years in both sectors (see Figure 5 ).
 31.  In the projects audited, the Court found that the main reasons for delays 
were16:
the lack of familiarity of the candidate countries with EU pro- (a) 
cedures and with project preparation and implementation as well as difficulties with procurement procedures (see e.g. Textbox 5 ) 
(84 % of the projects in the sample);
failure of companies that won tenders to carry out the work (see (b) 
e.g. Textbox 6 ) (13 % of the projects in the sample);
unrealistic planning (see e.g. (c) Textbox 7 ) (22 % of the projects in 
the sample);
the change after accession of the ISPA projects into Cohesion  (d) 
Fund projects, which have a different set of rules
17.14 A project is considered 
completed when the infrastructure 
is in use. Candidate countries 
had to submit a final report to 
the Commission at the latest six 
months after the completion of the 
project.
15 Out of 32 projects audited, 
24 faced delays (75 %).
16 Some projects were affected by 
more than one of the problems 
described.
17 E.g. eligibility of durable 
equipment expenditure 
(to be solved on a case-by-case 
basis), modifications of project 
decisions, procedures for the award of public contracts.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0619
AVERAGE DELAYS IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATIONFIGURE 5
In Latvia, in a project for the development of water services, it took three years to launch the tender procedure 
aft er the signature of the fi  nancing memorandum.
In Poland, in a project for sewage treatment, the construction suff  ered an interruption of almost one year dur-
ing the tendering phase. Th  e project was divided into subcontracts, one of which was co-fi  nanced by the EBRD. 
According to the EBRD loan agreement, the bank’s tendering rules should have been applied to the procurement 
of the whole project. Th  e tendering had to be stopped until the appropriate procedures had been agreed between 
the donors.TEXTBOX 5
A project for the rehabilitation of sewage network and wastewater treatment facilities faced delays in implemen-
tation. Th  e tender had to be cancelled and repeated, due to problems with the composition of the evaluation 
committee. In addition, the company which was awarded the contract in the second tender failed to proceed with 
the works in accordance with the timetable and failed to comply with several notices by the supervising engineer. Th e contract therefore had to be terminated. A third tender had to be organised, but at the time of the audit the 
project was at a standstill.TEXTBOX 6
In Latvia, a project to develop water services was delayed because, amongst other reasons, the cost and the time 
needed for the study and design work for the pipelines were underestimated.TEXTBOX 7
Years
Average per country/sector
Average initial duration DelayPL CZ RO LV ENV PL CZ RO LV TRAN TOTAL012348
7
6
59
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0620
 32.  The survey indicates that the main reasons for not respecting the dead-
lines in the implementation of the projects are, on the one hand, the 
length of the procedures and, on the other hand, planning reasons (see Figure 6 )
18.
FINANCIAL PLANS NOT IMPLEMENTED AS SCHEDULED
 33.  In 18 out of 32 projects audited the initial financial plan was not  
respected. In six cases the total cost increased, and in 12 cases the cost decreased. When the cost increased and no additional ISPA  resources were made available, candidate countries had to finance the additional costs from their own resources (see Textbox 8 ).18 Problems in project 
implementation were also pointed 
out by the Court in its Special Report No 5/2003 (insufficient 
management resources, delays, 
difficulties in tendering, 
paragraphs 35 to 39) but also in its 
Special Report No 6/2005 (delays 
in implementation of projects, 
paragraphs 11 to 25).
REASONS FOR DELAYS PROJECT MANAGERSFIGURE 6
What were the reasons for delays?
Procedural reasons Planning reasons
Appeals from bidders
8 %Repetition
of the procedure
15 %Other
11 %Unrealistic planning
15 %
Low quality
of tendering documents
6 % Frequent changes
of PRAG
10 %Time-consuming EU
procedures
26 %Complicated
local law
9 %
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0621
In Latvia, in a railway project, due to price increases, the ISPA grant was not suffi   cient to cover all the elements 
initially foreseen. Th  e remaining work had to be funded from national resources.TEXTBOX 8
In Latvia, in a project to develop water services, the contractor repudiated the contract because he was no longer 
in a position to work at the agreed prices as rapid infl  ation occurred shortly aft  er the start of the works. Th  is led 
to a revision of the contract, with an increased cost.TEXTBOX 9CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL FINANCING PLANS
SURVEY OF PROJECT MANAGERS
RepliesChanges to the original 
ﬁ  nancing planMaintenance of the original 
ﬁ  nancing plan
123 66 % 34 %TABLE 1 34.  As shown in Table 1  the survey of project managers indicates that for 
the majority of ISPA projects changes had been made to the original 
financing plan.
 35.  In five cases out of the 32 projects of the sample this can be explained by 
underestimation of inflation (in 16 % of the cases) (see Textbox 9 ).
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0622
 36.  The replies to the survey of project managers indicated that the reasons 
for cost overruns can be explained mainly by two categories of fac-
tors (see Figure 7 ):
problems in project preparation, such as inadequate cost  (a) 
estimates;
implementation problems, such as weak monitoring or time  (b) 
delays.
COST OVERRUNSFIGURE 7
In case of overruns, what were the main reasons?
Planning-related reasons Implementation-related reasons
Other
19 %Technical
reasons
9 %Inadequate cost
estimates
20 % Weak monitoring
14 %
Time delays
12 %Modiﬁ  cations to
the project
26 %
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0623
WERE PROJECTS CONTRIBUTING TO BENEFICIARY 
COUNTRIES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL 
DIRECTIVES AND TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF TENT?
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA
 37.  The main objective of ISPA was to help the candidate countries reduce 
their structural gap in the environment and transport sectors. In order 
to assess the effectiveness of the projects in terms of concrete con-tributions to improvement of the environment and transport sectors, 
the Court examined:
whether the environmental projects were consistent with EU direc- (a) 
tives in the fields of water supply and wastewater;
whether transport projects contributed to the completion of the (b) 
trans-European transport network.
 38.  As at the time of the audit final reports were available on only a limited 
number of the 279 infrastructure projects co-financed by ISPA, only 
partial conclusions could be drawn.
COMPLIANCE WITH EU ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
HAS INCREASED
 39.  In the environmental sector, out of 16 projects in the sample, only 
three were completed at the time of the audit. The assessment of  these projects shows that, in spite of some shortcomings, they are contributing to compliance with EU environmental standards (see  Textbox 10 ).
In Latvia, the objective of one project was to improve water supply and sewage services, ensuring that drinking 
water and purifi  ed sewage conform to the national legislation and the requirements of the EU directives. Accord-
ing to the fi  nal report, the project has ensured adequate quality of the treated water according to the EU urban 
wastewater treatment directive (91/271/EEC) and of the drinking water.
In Latvia, the objective of one project was to develop drinking water quality and wastewater services. Th  e EU 
standards for drinking water quality have been met. However, for wastewater, full compliance with legal require-
ments had not yet been achieved. Th  e rehabilitation and upgrading of a biological wastewater treatment plant had 
been completed but the nitrogen and phosphorus content in the effl   uent still exceeded the EU and local norms 
at the time of the audit.TEXTBOX 10
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0624
 40.  In spite of some shortcomings, the projects that were not completed 
at the time of the audit, if implemented as planned, are likely to  
contribute to compliance with EU environmental standards (see  Textbox 11 ).
IMPROVEMENTS IN LINKS TO THE TRANSEUROPEAN 
TRANSPORT NETWORK
 41.  In the transport sector out of 16 projects contained in the sample only 
two had been completed at the time of the audit. The assessment of 
these projects shows that they are contributing to the completion/
development of trans-European networks (see Figures 8 and  9 and 
Textboxes 12 and  13).
 42.  The other projects that at the time of the audit were not completed 
are consistent with the TEN-T network (see for example Textbox 11  
and Figure 11 ). For example in Romania, the Bucharest Cernavoda  
project should speed up the traffic between Bucarest and Constanta and is expected to contribute to the development of European  
Transport Corridor No 7, Igumenitsa–Patras–Athens–Sofia–Budapest 
(see Figure 10 ).
In Poland, a wastewater treatment project should increase the percentage of the population of the city of Wrocław 
who are connected to the sewage network to 97 %. Th  is city, with a population of more than 600 000 inhabitants, 
was considered the main polluter of the river Odra.
In Romania, a project consisted of the rehabilitation and upgrading of a wastewater treatment plant, a sewage 
network and a drinking water network. Due to delays concerning the wastewater treatment plant, the risk of pol-
lution of the river remains.TEXTBOX 11
In the Czech Republic the project ‘Modernisation of the line section Zabori–Prelouc’ is in the pan-European 
multimodal corridor IV from Dresden to Bratislava. In Figure 8 , the projects co-fi  nanced by ISPA in the Czech 
Republic are highlighted.TEXTBOX 12
In Latvia, the upgrading of the motorway from Riga to Adazi, which is a section of Via Baltica linking Warsaw 
to Tallinn, improved the traffi   c and pedestrian safety as well as the traffi   c fl uidity by bringing this road section in 
compliance with European road standards and norms (see Figure 9 ).TEXTBOX 13
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0625
ISPA PROJECTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLICFIGURE 8
D8 motorway Prague –
Usti nad Labem – Czech/German border Section 807 Trmice-borderModernisation of the line section
Usti nad Orlici  – Ceska Trebova
Modernisation of the line section 
Zabori–PreloucOptimisation of
Zabreh na Morave –Krasikov railway section
Road R/48
Frydek Mistek – Dobra
Road I/48
Belotin by-pass
Expressway r48
Dobra–Tosanovice–Zukov, Stage I: Dobra–TosanoviceTrans-European transport networkISPA projects
Ceska Republica
TEN railway
TEN road
© EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries
Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 15/5/2008
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0626
ROAD NETWORK IN LATVIAFIGURE 9
© EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries
Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 29/9/2005LATVIJALEITSCHEMA DES TRANSEUROPÄISCHEN VERKEHRSNETZES (Horizont 2020) STRASSEN
TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK OUTLINE PLAN (2020 horizon) ROADSSCHÉMA DU RÉSEAU TRANSEUROPÉEN DE TRANSPORT (horizon 2020) ROUTES
Bestehend
ExistingExistantGeplant
PlannedPlaniﬁ  é
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0627
TENT NEWORKSFIGURE 10
PROJECT No 7
Trans-European transport network 
priority projectsMOTORWAY AXIS
IGOUMENITSA/PATRA–ATHINA–SOFIA–BUDAPEST
© EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries
Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 9/3/2005Existing
PlannedPriority axis No 7
Priority sectionsOther priority axes
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0628
TENT NETWORKFIGURE 11
© EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries
Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 4/6/2008ISPA projects
2004–08 countries
ISPA project
TEN railwayTEN road
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0629
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
 43.  The Court’s main conclusions are as follows.
A coherent strategic framework was in place and national ISPA  (a) 
strategies proved to be a good programming tool clearly identify-ing needs, objectives and resources. Nonetheless, projects were not always adequately prepared by applicants. This was partly  due to the fact that three important guidance documents were provided late in relation to the first wave of applications by the Commission (see paragraphs 16 to 24).
Projects were often not implemented as planned. Financing plans (b) 
had to be adjusted to changed circumstances and almost all the 
projects were experiencing significant delays, mainly related to 
the length of the procedures (at the level of the Commission and 
of the beneficiary countries) and to weaknesses in the planning process (at the level of beneficiary countries) (see paragraphs  
25 to 36).
The Court’s audit included five completed projects and 27 projects (c) 
which are still in progress. Three of the completed projects were 
environmental. The audit shows that they increase the compliance 
with EU environmental directives in the respective beneficiary  states. The other two completed projects were transport related. 
The audit shows that they contribute to the improvement of the 
trans-European network in the respective beneficiary states. Fur-
thermore, the audit suggests that the 27 projects still in progress 
are likely to achieve the objectives if implemented as planned  (see paragraphs 37 to 42).
The Court recommends that the Commission closely follows up the  
implementation of ISPA. The Commission should, in particular, exam-
ine how delays in the implementation of projects could be avoided or reduced in the future, when implementing similar instruments. In the 
Court’s view, this may require more rigorous and realistic planning by 
projects’ applicants/managers and ways to speed up the procedures, 
both at the Commission level and within national administrations of 
beneficiary countries.
  This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its 
meeting of 11 December 2008.
  For the Court of Auditors
Vítor Manuel da Silva Caldeira
President
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0630ISPA PROJECT MANAGEMENT STAGES AND KEY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES1ANNEX I
1 As stated in Council Regulations (EC) No 1267/1999, (EC) No 1266/1999 and (EC) No 2382/2001 and according to the ECA audit cri teria.COMPLETION
•  Review and 
approval of:
→  Final report
→  Closure 
statements
•  Final payment•  Ex post 
evaluationMONITORING
•  Supervision 
of contract implementation
•  Monitoring 
of physical and ﬁ  nancial 
progress through indicators
•  Mid-term 
evaluationTENDERING
•  Review and 
approval of tender dossiers
•  Tender 
evaluations, including mobilisation of necessary expertise
•  Selection of 
winning bids
•  ContractingAPPRAISAL
Activities include:•  appraisal 
missions to applicant country
•  mobilisation 
of expertise required to assess technical content of applications
•  inter-service 
consultation (ISC)
•  formal feedback 
to applicant on content of applicationPREPARATION
Application, 
including the production of:
•  feasibility study
•  cost–beneﬁ  t 
analysis
•  environmental 
impact assessment
•  ﬁ nancing plan
•  timetable for 
implementation
•  general
maintenance planSTRATEGY
Production of 
an ISPA strategy containing:
•  presentation 
of plan for alignment of EU and national policies
•  national needs 
assessment
•  project 
identiﬁ  cation
Key activity:•  formal feedback 
to beneﬁ  ciary 
country on draft ISPA strategy
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0631
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0632
REPLY
OF THE COMMISSION
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0633
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
III.
The poor preparation of some projects was 
due to a large extent to a lack of capacity  and the short time frame in which projects had to be developed. Guidance was also  given through the detailed application forms and existing explanations of procurement  procedures.
IV.
The delays and changes in planning which occurred in many of the early projects were 
hard to avoid given the lack of experience 
in managing major infrastructure projects  and the need for ex ante  control of tender-
ing procedures.
VI.
The Commission agrees with the Court’s rec-ommendation. It will continue to monitor  
ex-ISPA projects and some will be evaluated in the 2000–06 ex post  evaluation exercise, 
paying particular attention to cost overruns 
and delays. The experience with ISPA has  
already led the Commission to take steps to 
offer greater assistance with project prepa-ration, such as the special EIB/Commission technical assistance facility, Jaspers. It will continue and intensify such technical assist-
ance under the new pre-accession instrument 
IPA. The Commission has also discussed the 
problems of delays with Member States.
INTRODUCTION
6.
In practice, the grant rate is often lower than 
75 %. For example, in Romania the average 
rate was 73 %, in Bulgaria 56 % and in Slo-vakia 54 %.AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
9.Most of the Court’s sample was selected from among the older ISPA projects approved in 
the first or early years of use of the instru-
ment. Some had been prepared even ear-
lier. The very short time frame in which ISPA had to be implemented had implications  for project maturity and the readiness of  national authorities.
AUDIT OBSERVATIONS
13.
The Commission secured the national strat-
egies for the transport and environment  
sectors in the candidate countries based on 
national investment plans and programmes, 
despite this not being a regulatory require-
ment. The strategies were also presented  
by the Commission to the ISPA Manage-ment Committee (Member State representa-
tives) before the presentation of individual 
projects.
19.
The Commission actively encouraged  national authorities to build on existing  national plans (for example, to implement  
the urban wastewater treatment directives) 
because of the limited time available.
20.
In addition, guidance was given through  
the detailed application forms which were 
made available in 1999 and procurement  
procedures were explained in the guidance 
developed under previous pre-accession  
instruments.
(c)
The previous version of the ‘Guide to cost–
benefit analysis of investment projects’,  
which explained the main principles of CBA, 
had been available since 1997. The 2002 ver-sion of the guide responded to the changed 
regulatory environment and addressed vari-
ous issues in more depth.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0634
21.
The ISPA regulations were adopted in 1999 
and the first ISPA manual was provided in  2000. The advice given in the ISPA manual 
and through various other channels (see  
reply to 20) had to be developed together  with the candidate countries concerned and to take account of their implementation  
realities which were evolving. In addition to 
formal guidance, a major effort was made to prepare the ground for ISPA in a very limited 
time frame, for example through meetings 
held in all candidate countries from 1998  
onwards with support from Phare to prepare 
project pipelines.
22.
The shortcomings in CBAs and financial ana-
lyses were often due to lack of a consistent 
approach among the many international  
consultants that prepared the majority of  
projects, poor data, or a lack of expertise  within the national administrations. Never-
theless, the Commission ensured that rev-
enue-generating projects all had at least  
a complete financial analysis. It accepted  
non-quantified socio-econmic analyses or  statements in place of a complete CBA for  
environment projects, in view of the absence of a generally accepted methodology for  quantifying environmental benefits and the fact that these projects were in the main  implemented in order to comply with EU  
directives.
23.
(a)
The 2000–01 ISPA projects were the first  ones in which CBA was used.
(b)
Where there were inconsistencies, the Com-
mission routinely asked for clarifications or corrections. These exchanges improved the 
reliability of the analyses.
(c)
The Commission refers to its reply at  point 22.24.
The Commission attempted to ensure that  
beneficiaries justified their projects accord-ing to an economic and financial rationale, 
and by reference to considerations such  
as viability and affordability to the popu-lation served. However, for environmental  projects cost–benefit analysis was of limited 
relevance where there were no alternatives 
and the projects had to be carried out any-way to implement the acquis . In some cases 
a better cost–benefit analysis would have  
delayed the project without adding much  
value.
27.
The Commission made every effort to moni-
tor the projects and help national authori-
ties to mitigate the consequences of delays. 
Specific action plans were prepared in  
some countries for the most problematic  
projects.
28.
By the end of September 2008, a further  
three of the projects in the sample had been 
completed by the original date.
30.
While delays are certainly not uncommon  for large infrastructure projects, in the par-ticular case of ISPA beneficiary countries  
the first ISPA projects were victims of the  
start-up phase of a new instrument in the  candidate countries. There was no experi-
ence with external investment assistance  
programmes on this scale prior to ISPA.  
However the learning curve (both in the  accession countries and in the Commission) improved significantly from the middle of  the programming period onwards.
In general, delayed tendering procedures  
were the main factor. Once works started,  
most projects made good progress. The  
ex ante  control by the EC delegations of  
procurement was mandatory. Delays were  one of the costs of ensuring value for money 
through fair and transparent procurement  
procedures.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0635
31.
(a)
ISPA was intended to provide candidate  countries with experience in this area during 
the pre-accession period, so that they would 
have fewer problems with using the Struc-tural and Cohesion Funds after accession.  Delays due to ex ante  control procedures and 
retendering were one of the costs of ensur-
ing fair and transparent procurement. Other contributory factors were inadequate land 
acquisition procedures and bureaucratic  
building permit processes.
Textbox 5
Procurement procedures in Latvia have  
much improved since the start of ISPA. For 
instance, tenders for Cohesion Fund projects 
approved in 2005 were launched promptly 
and implementation of most projects started 
in 2006.
The importance of a fair and effective ten-
dering procedure must take precedence over 
the risk of delays.
Textbox 6
Retendering protected the Community inter-est in this case. Work has since resumed on this project.
(c)
The Commission refers to its reply at  
point 30.
Textbox 7
For large and complex infrastructure projects 
which are expected to be implemented over the period of several years it is not uncom-mon for certain adjustments to be required to initial plans.(d)
The Commission provided guidance in Janu-
ary 2005 to avoid problems in the transi-tion from ISPA to Cohesion Fund rules in the 
10 new EU Member States after accession.
32.
Delays have mainly been due to ensuring  compliance with procurement rules in order to protect the Communities’ financial inter-est. Such delays and the associated potential cost increases due to late tendering are the price to pay for financial soundness, a fact which the Court has recognised in its previ-ous audits of ISPA, where it has acknowl-edged the beneficial effect of the ex ante  
control by EC delegations (e.g., point 8.42 of 
the Court’s 2003 annual report). In any case, 
faster approval of flawed tender documents 
might well have resulted in higher bids or to 
disputes leading in the end to much higher 
costs.
Delays due to clarification of applications  
and cost–benefit analyses must also be  
accepted.
33.
The failure to keep to initial cost estimates was due to inadequate project preparation, despite the use of international consult-ants, and also to poor cost control during  implementation. Some countries suffered  
high cost inflation in the construction sector due to fast economic growth. As a general 
rule ISPA financing memoranda were not  
amended to allow for cost increases thus  
putting pressure on national authorites to  take action to control these.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0636
35.
The sharp acceleration of inflation in some of 
the new Member States after accession was unexpected and not predicted by the finan-
cial institutions. It was due to rapid price  
increases of specific raw materials on world markets and fast economic growth in the  majority of the new Member States which led 
to a boom in the construction sector result-
ing in above-average price increases in the industry.
36.
Other factors contributing to cost overruns 
included:
projects being submitted to the Com-
• 
mission at a very early stage where no  
detailed technical documentation for the 
best solution existed;
euro/national currency exchange rate  • 
fluctuations, especially in favour of the 
national currencies.
(a)
The underestimation of costs sometimes led 
to no bids being received at the planned  prices.
(b)
Delays often occurred between the award  of the grant and the start of the construc-tion phase.
37.
ISPA also had other objectives, of which the 
main one was to prepare for using the Struc-
tural and Cohesion Funds. The relatively low allocation of ISPA in relation to needs means that it could only begin to close the infra-structure gap.
39.
By the end of September 2008 a further three 
of the projects had been completed.Textbox 10
Second paragraph: While at the time of the 
audit full compliance with EU standards had not been achieved, the Commission expects 
this to be the case after completion of the 
project.
Textbox 11
Second paragraph: The Commission is moni-
toring the implementation of this project in order to accelerate its completion.
41.
By the end of September 2008 a further four 
of the projects had been completed.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
43.
(a)
The inadequate preparation was principally 
due to lack of capacity and in some cases  
to the variable performance of the interna-
tional consultants used, rather than to the availability of guidance documents.
Guidance was also given through the detailed 
application forms which were made available in 1999 and procurement procedures were explained in the guidance developed under 
previous pre-accession instruments.
(b)
Procedures (for example, procurement) are 
necessary to protect the taxpayer. They may be lengthy.
Despite the delays, by the end of Sep-
tember 2008, 80 of the 279 infrastructure  
projects had been physically completed.
Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–0637
(c)
By the end of September 2008 a further  
seven of the 32 projects audited had been completed.
44.
The Commission agrees with the Court’s  recommendation and will continue to moni-tor closely the implementation of ex-ISPA  
projects. Some projects will be evaluated  as part of the 2000–06 ex post  evaluation  
exercise, paying particular attention to cost 
overruns and delays in implementation and 
including recommendations on how risk  
analysis (an important but often weak part of cost–benefit analysis) can be improved.
The new regulations for pre-accession assist-
ance were adopted in 2006 and 2007. The  
new approach is much wider than under  
ISPA with its narrow focus on infrastructure 
projects, and is in fact a mini-Structural  Fund. The regional development component 
of IPA takes up earlier recommendations of 
the Court regarding the adequate prepara-
tion of candidate countries for the Structural 
Funds. The Commission has also discussed the problems of delays with Member States 
in the Funds Coordination Committee, pro-posing solutions.
Besides the technical assistance facility,  
 Jaspers which is available in the new Mem-
ber States, other means of improving project preparation and implementation that the  
Commission is encouraging include starting 
approval procedures early with pre-apprais-
als and advancing tender preparation.

European Court of Auditors
Special Report No 12/2008
The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities2009 — 37 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cmISBN 978-92-9207-161-5doi: 10.2865/55186

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ISPA WAS ONE OF THE INSTRUMENTS TO ASSIST THE CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE PREPARATION FOR ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION. IT SUPPORTED PROJECTS 
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSPORT SECTORS. IN THIS REPORT THE 
COURT ANALYSES WHETHER THERE WAS A COHERENT STRATEGY AND ADEQUATE PREPARATION, WHETHER PROJECTS WERE IMPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WHETHER PROJECTS CONTRIBUTED TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES AND TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF TRANSEUROPEAN NETWORKS. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORSQJ-AB-08-012-EN-C
ISBN 978-92-9207-161-5