EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 20.9.2010 
SEC(2010) 1041 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
Accompanying document to the 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 
  
COM(2010) 473 
 SEC(2010) 1040 
 
 
 
 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
Accompanying document to the 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 
   
 
EN 3   EN 1. B ACKGROUND  
In accordance with the EU Action Plan on Enhanc ing the Security of Explosives, which was 
approved by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in April 2008 and which called on the 
Commission to ‘establish a Standing Committee to consider measures and prepare 
recommendations concerning the regulation of explosives precursors available on the market 
taking into account their cost-b enefit effects’, the Commission in tends to adopt measures to 
deal with the marketing and use of e xplosives precursors in September 2010.  
The overall objective of the measures  is to establish a harmonised  approach to restricting the 
marketing and use of certain substances that ar e frequently used for the illicit manufacture of 
explosives, with a view to prev enting their diversion and misuse . These measures are intended 
to constitute a tangible deliverable under the ‘prevent’ strand of the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy adopted by the JHA Council on 1 December 2005. 
The proposed policy builds on the work and r ecommendations of the Standing Committee on 
Precursors (SCP), an ad hoc advisory committe e composed of experts from the EU Member 
State authorities and representatives of th e private sector, and on a thorough assessment 
entitled ‘Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact  Assessment of Potentia l Legislative and Non-
legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors  to Explosives’, prepared by an external 
contractor. The reports submitted in the course of the work on the study were also discussed 
regularly in the SCP and in a Commission Interservice Group on explosives issues.  
2. P ROBLEM DEFINITION  
In recent years, the EU and EEA countries ha ve collectively experienced a high number of 
terrorist and criminal attacks using expl osives, home-made explosives (HMEs) and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as an even higher number of attacks that were 
prevented, or failed1. HMEs are the means most frequently used to carry out attacks.  
2.1. Assessment of specific problems 
 
Wide availability and easy access by the ge neral public to precursors on the market 
At present, a wide variety of precursors are easily available to the general public. The internet 
is an easy channel to buy precursors too. Even greater quantities of precursors can be obtained 
by or through commercial or otherwise legitimate end users. 
High ‘potency’ of precursors 
The concentration levels of precursors in cert ain products available to the general public and 
to legitimate end users are in many cases sufficient to produce an explosive. 
 
 
                                                 
1 As documented in EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports by Europol. 
 
EN 4   EN  
No EU level playing field 
While several legislative and non- legislative measures exist at international, EU and national 
level, these either do not specifically focus on the security risks associated with certain 
chemicals or do not cover the entir e EU. This implies that precursors that may be restricted or 
controlled in one country can be easily obtained in another. In  addition to the consequences 
for security, such a situation may also give ri se to market distortions, preventing a level EU 
playing field in this area. 
The main groups of precursors requiri ng the most urgent attention are: 
Precursor group Chemical Main associated use 
Ammonium nitrate 
Potassium nitrate 
Sodium nitrate 
Nitrates/ nitrogenous 
fertilisers 
Calcium nitrate Ammonium nitrate (mixed  with a fuel e.g. 
diesel oil (ANFO) or sugar (ANIS) is one of 
the most common ingredients in large-scale 
IEDs Other nitrates can also be used as oxidiser ingredients in IEDs 
Hydrogen peroxide Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
Acetone (propanone) Used by various terrorist groupings to produce 
Triacetone triperoxide (TATP). 
Nitromethane Nitro-methane and 
hexamine 
Hexamine 
(methenamine) Nitromethane: used by ETA and possibly 
other groupings. Explosive in combination 
with ammonium nitrate or nitric acid. 
Hexamine: used to produce explosives in 
combination with hydrogen peroxide. 
Nitric acid 
Hydrochloric acid 
Strong acids 
Sulphuric acid Nitric acid is used in the synthesis of HMEs 
such as urea nitrate. 
Sodium chlorate 
Sodium perchlorate 
Potassium chlorate 
Chlorates and perchlorates 
Potassium perchlorate Used as oxidisers / oxygen generators to 
produce HMEs. A mixture of chlorates can be 
an HME in itself without the need for a detonator / booster. Chlorates can also serve 
as a booster. 
2.2. Subsidiarity and propor tionality principles 
The EU can only be as secure as its weakest link. Consequently, activities at EU level and a 
coordinated EU approach are needed, and w ill benefit all relevant stakeholders. The 
subsidiarity principle  is thus satisfied because the goals to be achieved through measures on 
explosives precursors cannot be achieved by any single EU Member State, and must therefore 
be addressed at EU level.  
 
EN 5   EN The significant numbers of attacks or attemp ted attacks, as documented by Europol, underline 
the extent and urgency of the problem. 
Moreover, EU regulation also has a strong internal market rationale , since the current 
situation, which imposes different regulatory re gimes on the chemical industry, distorts the 
market and imposes additional costs of ad justment on the private sector. In these 
circumstances, EU regulation on the marke ting and use of explos ives precursors is 
proportionate. 
3. O BJECTIVES  
As a reflection of the problems identified, the policy objectives derivi ng from the problem 
definition are presented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: General, specific  and operational objectives 
General 
objective Specific objectives Operational objectives 
1.1.1 To reduce the availability of 
certain precursors on the EU 
consumer market to the general 
public 1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by the general public 
1.1.2 To reduce certain types of 
supply channels / ways of access to 
precursors 
1.2.1 To develop suitable additives and promote the use of these 
additives to prevent the use of 
precursors in explosives 1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency of home-made explosives or components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal 
purposes 1.2.2 To reduce concentrations of 
certain precursors available to the 
general public 
1.3.1 To increase control and 
surveillance over transactions and sales of certain precursors 
1.3.2 To increase control and 
surveillance over transport, 
distribution, import / export, etc. 1.3 To enhance the security and awareness of the entire supply chain of precursors 
1.3.3 To raise awareness among 
supply chain actors of the risks in 
general and suspicious transactions. To reduce the 
number and 
potency of terrorist 
and other criminal 
incidents in the EU 
using explosives, by deterring 
terrorists and other 
criminals from using precursors to 
build explosives 
and inhibiting their access to 
precursors. 
 
1.4 To prevent terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some countries 1.4.1 To establish common measures 
at EU / international level 
 
 
EN 6   EN The policy objectives are fully in  line with the EU counter-ter rorism strategy, with the EU 
Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of E xplosives and with the Stockholm programme2, 
which stipulates that a ‘ legislative framework to addres s the dangers associated with 
precursors should be developed’ .  
4. P OLICY OPTIONS  
The policy options considered are presented in  Table 4. Policy options 0 – 4 only concern 
sales to the general public,  and will therefore not directly affect any professional use. Those 
who use the identified precursors professiona lly may be indirectly affected, because 
sometimes they make use of general retail channels, which under the policy options may 
become the subject of certain restrictions. Only policy option 5 covers a wider spectrum of 
supply chain stakeholders.  
Table 4: Overview of policy options 
Policy option 0 — 
Status Quo No action. This implies that no changes are made to the 
current situation. The baseline is a combination of existing 
policies, legislative acquis , voluntary measures and other 
relevant activity. 
Policy option 1  A total ban on sales of the substances to members of the 
general public, irrespective of concentration levels. 
Policy option 2 A ban on sales of the substances in all concentrations and 
quantities over the internet. 
Policy option 3 A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above 
a specific concentration level.  
Policy option 4 Option 3 plus additional measures: 
Policy option 4a A ban on sales to minors. 
Policy option 4b Sales of the substances in higher concentrations than those 
allowed under option 3 through a trader or consumer licensing system. 
Policy option 4c Introducing a system of reporti ng suspicious transactions. 
Policy option 4d A scheme for labelling precurs ors with a code specifying 
that the purchase may be su bject to registration, with a 
system for recording the iden tity of the buyer (including 
internet sales). Records s hould be made available to 
competent law enforcement authorities. 
Policy option 5 Taking measures to enhance the surveillance of legitimate 
                                                 
2 17024/09. 
 
EN 7   EN and professional use, incl uding sub-options such as: 
Promoting Codes of Conduct Education and training Raising staff awareness Addressing medium / small users in particular 
 
5. P REFERRED OPTION  
The preferred policy option can be formulated as follows: 
Setting concentration thresholds for the sale of  certain precursors to members of the general 
public, with a system to report suspicious tran sactions for certain pr ecursors. Developing a 
consumer licensing system to allow for sale s of higher concentrations. Adding voluntary 
measures to support the reporting of suspicious  transactions and the implementation of the 
consumer licensing system, as we ll as other relevant action to raise awareness in the supply 
chain.  
5.1. Main impacts of the pr eferred policy option 
5.1.1. Financial and economic impacts The value of goods currently sold yearly to the genera l public above the proposed 
concentration thresholds is estimated at about €
 450-1150 million. However, about half of 
these goods will still be so ld and bought through the acquisi tion of personal licences. 
Consumers will also be able to switch to substitute products, which are available. The drop in 
consumer sales is estima ted to be at most €  115-280 million.  
As a total ban is not envisa ged, and the overall non-pro fessional consumption of the 
precursors concerned only amounts to about 1-5  % of total EU consumption of these 
chemicals, the impact on the producers of  base chemicals will be very limited. 
In terms of costs of compliance with the provisions of the preferred policy option by 
businesses and public aut horities, the total maximum cost of  arrangements needed may add up 
to about €  100-140 million per year (around €  65 million of which is to be borne by public 
authorities), plus  an additional €  80-126 million one-off cost. Legitimate users will face some 
administrative costs when required to provide  identification and proof of legitimate use: 
licensing, registration or presen tation of company documents may be requested. However, 
consumers will in general be able to access dilute d versions or — if these are not a feasible 
option — suitable alternatives (save for a few produc ts such as hexamine fuel tablets), if they 
choose not to ask for a licence.  
All cost estimates have been made assuming that the outcomes are at  the upper end of the 
scale, and could in realit y be significantly less.  
 
EN 8   EN 5.1.2. Social impacts 
The measures included in the preferred policy op tion are not expected to have serious social 
effects. Clearly, however, the overall positive so cial effect of successfully countering the 
threat of attacks using home-made explosives is  improved security in terms of a reduction in 
casualties and long-term health problems, reduced  levels of fear and increased perception of 
safety. 
On the other hand, the restrictions can cause some inconvenience to consumers, who would 
still be able to access precursors in higher conc entrations, but will be required to apply for a 
licence. There is also a limited risk that seller s would too quickly cons ider a transaction as 
suspicious and refuse to sell. However, this could be offset by clear guidance, education and 
training. There is also a risk that competent au thorities may decide not to accept licences from 
persons not legally resident in the country wh ere they would like to make the purchase, as 
they do not have access to possibly relevant information on that person. In addition, the system of reporting suspicious transactions shoul d not lead to ‘overzea lous’, discriminatory 
reactions on the part of busine sses, for example based on specific physical features or foreign 
accents. 
5.1.3. Impacts on fundamental rights 
The preferred policy option requires the proc essing of personal data and their further 
disclosure to third parties (e.g. law enforcem ent authorities) in the case of suspicious 
transactions. This implies potentially serious interference with private life and the right to the protection of personal data, a nd thus requires compliance with  international and EU data 
protection law and with national data protection laws implementing EU data protection law.  
Freedom to conduct a business would not be affected  as companies will still be able to trade all 
precursors (with some exceptions like producers of  hexamine fuel tablets), even though some 
limitations may apply as they would need to set up a new reporting system and carry out additional checks of exemption permits. The right  to property would not be affected, as in 
principle the handling, sale and possession of  precursors would still be possible.  
5.2. Benefits of the preferred policy option 
5.2.1. Restricting access to certain precursors by the general public 
Consumers would have open access to chemical  substances below a certain concentration 
level. Access to higher concentrations would not be banned, but restri cted and controlled.  
5.2.2. Reducing the reliability and potency of ‘home-made’ explosives or components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal purposes 
Setting concentration thresholds would as a minimum make it more difficult to produce 
reliable and potent home-made explosives. The no tification of suspicious transactions and a 
licensing system will both have a deterrent effect and improve the chances of terrorists and other criminals being caught before they can fabricate home-made explosives.  
5.2.3. Enhancing the security and awareness of  the entire supply chain of precursors 
The cumulative effects of the different elemen ts included in the polic y option would have a 
strong positive impact on the security and awareness of the entire supply chain handling 
 
EN 9   EN precursors. In comparison to existing EU an d national measures, more focus will be on 
security (as opposed to safety). 
5.2.4. Preventing terrorists and other criminals fr om making use of lower control levels 
and fewer restrictions on chem icals in some countries  
The cumulative effects of lowering concentration le vels in open sales channels combined with 
a system of reporting suspicious transactions  and controlled sales of higher concentration 
levels will create an EU level playing fiel d, both avoiding internal market distortions and 
preventing persons with malevolent aims from  making use of lower standards in other 
Member States. 
5.3. The EU added value 
The purpose of the proposed measures is to develop a holistic approach at EU level, 
minimising the current differences in national a pproaches. This will improve the functioning 
of the internal market and will prevent terrorists and other criminals from making use of lower standards in certain Member St ates. In addition, the measures will strengthen the EU focus on 
the security of precursors (in contrast to solely safety, as has been the case so far) and will 
help to increase awareness among both supply ch ain actors and consumers. Education and 
training will support the implementation of th e measures included in  the preferred policy 
option. Research will help to render precursors le ss harmful. Last but not least, a common EU 
approach towards the development and implemen tation of such measures will allow Member 
States to exchange expe riences and information. 
5.3.1. Expected take-up among relevant stakeholders 
Member State experts, even though not expressi ng any formal political position, were overall 
in favour of the combination of measures included in the prefer red policy option. They 
considered that the policy option was broadly in line with measures that were already in place 
in several Member States, which had proven to be successful or were  recently created in 
response to a perceived need to increase the secu rity of precursors. All agreed that an EU-
wide approach would favour an EU level playing field. 
Industrial stakeholders, while stressing an overall preference for voluntary measures, also 
supported the combination of measur es included in the policy option.