EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 11.1.2010 
SEC(2009) 1735 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
On the report from the Commission to th e Council and the European Parliament 
regarding the application of Regulation (EC) N° 2111/2005 regarding the establishment 
of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community 
and informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and 
repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/EC 
{COM(2009) 710 final} 
 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
On the report from the Commission to th e Council and the European Parliament 
regarding the application of Regulation (EC) N° 2111/2005 regarding the establishment 
of a Community list of air ca rriers subject to an operating ban within the Community 
and informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and 
repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/EC 
1. T HE NEED FOR COMMON RULES  
The need to adopt these rules resulted from weaknesses in the enforcement of the 
internationally agreed safety  standards – those of the 194 4 Chicago Convention (creating 
ICAO - the International Civil Aviation Organisa tion) and its annexes. For this reason, the 
Regulation provided for the imposition of a total or a partial ban where substantiated evidence 
from objective, transparent and quantifiable criteria showed th at ICAO safety standards were 
not being followed by air carriers. 
Over the three years since it came into existe nce, its application has served as a clear 
demonstration of the value-added by the Community  system in the field of air safety. Rather 
than being employed as a punitive instrument, the EC list has proved to be an efficient dissuasive measure, which, a bove all, seeks to identify ex ante,  serious air safety deficiencies 
with potentially disastrous repercussions. It ha s also functioned as a strong incentive to air 
carriers and civil aviatio n authorities to continuously improve safety. 
Where a ban was agreed it was always a tempor ary measure which would last only until the 
air carriers and where appropria te, their regulatory authorities  could prove that they had 
addressed the identified shortc omings and were meeting the relevant safety standards. 
2. A
NALYSIS OF THE COMMON CRITERIA FOR DECIDING THE IMPOSITION OF AN 
OPERATING BAN  
The common criteria are grouped in three areas:  a) objective evidence showing deficiencies 
on the part of the air carrier; b) lack of ability or willingness by an air carrier to address safety deficiencies and c) lack of ability or w illingness of the civil aviation authority with 
responsibility of oversig ht of the air carrier(s) in questi on to address safety deficiencies. 
A. Verified evidence of seri ous safety deficiencies on the part of an air carrier 
Four main verifiable sources of informa tion are used to substantiate evidence: 
1. Reports showing serious safety deficiencies  or persistent failur e by the carrier to 
address deficiencies identified by ramp inspections performed under the EC SAFA 
programme 
Reports of ramp inspections on aircraft of  air carriers conducted under the EC SAFA 
programme (Safety Assessment of Foreign Airc raft) are a primary source of information 
when investigating cases related to the list. As an indication of the scale of the SAFA programme in 2008 alone 10,337 ramp checks of  aircraft were conducted on 1,067 carriers 
from 131 different states; a continuous increas e compared to the ramp checks conducted in 
previous years. 
 
EN 3   EN The conduct, reporting and follow-up of SAFA ramp  inspections are carried out according to 
common procedures established at Co mmunity level by Directive 2004/36/EC1 (the 'SAFA 
Directive').  
As provided under Regulation (E C) 768/2006, the European Aviati on Safety Agency (EASA) 
conducts regular (every four mont hs) in-depth analyses of all reports entered into the SAFA 
database in order to identify as early as po ssible any potential negati ve safety trends and 
advises the Commission accordingly. Additiona lly, since 2007, EASA has been carrying out 
ad-hoc analyses on the performance of air carrier s, which have been subject to investigations 
to ensure close monitoring and timely evaluation of their performance. The results of these 
analyses have, since 2007, been presented by EASA and the Commission to the Air Safety 
Committee and have contributed to steering th e investigations and the decisions of the 
Committee. 
The continuous cooperation with EASA and the Member States in the evaluation of the 
information available in the database has help ed the Commission construct a system which is 
reliable and successful. Given th e increasing importance of the programme as a key source of 
information for investigations related to the EC list, as well as a stand-alone preventive 
instrument, supplementary legislation enacted during 2008 (Commission Directive 
2008/49/EC)2 further harmonised these procedures to gether with training and qualification 
requirements for SAFA inspectors. 
Implementing legislation  (Commission Regulation 351/2008)3 was also enacted to permit the 
prioritisation of ramp inspections ("targeting" ) on aircraft of air carriers suspected to pose 
potential safety hazards in order that a closer snapshot may be obtained of such cases prior to 
proceeding further, possibly leading to inclusion in the list.  
As provided in the "SAFA Directive", apart from  ramp inspections, substantiated information 
related to serious safety deficien cies identified in relation to particular carriers may reach the 
Commission from various other sources, such as collaboration with other non-EU national 
aviation authorities (e.g. the Unite d States Federal Aviation Author ity), or other third parties. 
Finally, cooperation with Eurocontrol has en abled Member States and the Commission in 
many instances to ensure that aircraft and ope rators banned from European Airspace would 
not reach Community airports or fly over the territory of Member States in breach of the ban. 
2. Serious safety deficiencies identified wi thin the framework of the provisions for the 
gathering of information under Article 3 of Directive 2004/36/EC on the safety of third-
country aircraft 
In the course of the application of the common cr iteria the information (provided for in article 
3 of Directive 2004/36) listed be low is correlated with the results and follow-up of ramp 
checks 
(a) important safety information accessible, in particular, through: pilot reports, 
maintenance organisation reports, inci dent reports, other organisations 
independent from the competent authorit ies of the Member States, complaints; 
(b) information on action taken subsequent to a ramp inspection, such as: aircraft 
grounded, corrective action required, contac ts with the operator's competent 
authority; 
                                                 
1 OJ L 143, 30.4.2004, p.76 
2 OJ L 109, 19.4.2008, p. 17 
3 OJ L 109, 19.4.2008, p. 7 
 
EN 4   EN (c) follow-up information concerning the operator, such as: corrective action 
implemented, recurrence of discrepancies. 
The analysis of the results of ramp insp ections and the above mentioned collected 
information, leads to the decision to monitor th e performance of air car riers through targeted 
ramp checks on their aircraft to verify whethe r safety deficiencies are isolated cases or 
whether they are systemic deficiencies re quiring wide-reaching remedial and corrective 
actions.  
Targeted ramp checks are also carried out after the (total or partial) operating ban has been 
removed. This ensures continuous monitoring of an air carrier's performance with a view to 
confirm that previous safety deficiencies do not re-occur, that the air carriers concerned 
maintain a high level of safety of their operations into the Community, and that they continue to comply with the relevant safety standards. 
3. Operating ban imposed on a carrier by a non-EU country because of substantiated 
deficiencies related to international safety standards 
Outside the EU, several other States have in  place mechanisms for imposing operating bans 
on air carriers based on safety grounds. Through closer growing ties of cooperation between 
the Community and non-EU countries, important safety information is exchanged with the 
civil aviation authorities of these countries, su ch as the US and Canada. Exchanges of safety 
information are made possible through bilateral Community safety specific agreements, where 
the respective certification systems have been verified and a high level of mutual trust is 
maintained in each others’ system of  safety oversight and enforcement. 
There is also close cooperation with those civil aviation authorit ies with which the 
Community is negotiating safety specific agreements or comprehensive aviation agreements, to ensure that safety information regarding the performance of air carriers operating to these 
countries and the Community exchanged in a time ly manner in order to allow for informed 
decisions on the continuation of their operations.  
In the event that an operating ban is impos ed by a non-EU country the case is analysed 
closely, and where possible in coll aboration with the relevant regu latory authorities, in order 
to assess whether the circumstances warrant c onsideration of a similar ban in Europe. In 
addition close cooperation with the relevant regulatory author ities is actively pursued to 
ensure that any decisions made by the Commun ity relaxing a ban can be coordinated with 
decisions by the non-EU country.  
4. Substantiated information concerning accident s or serious incidents indicating latent 
systemic safety deficiencies. 
The Commission closely monitor the occurrence, investigation and reporting of air accidents 
and serious incidents. Where substantiated in formation is available and upon the conclusion 
of any formal investigations the information is  considered, together with any other relevant 
safety information, in order to identify any ne gative safety trends or more immediate safety 
hazards requiring urgent action. Pa rticular attention is given to  the implementation of safety 
recommendations made by the relevant accident investigation bodies to ensure that lessons from accidents are applied. To this end particular attention is paid to the performance of the safety management systems and accident prevention and flight safety programme of the air carriers. 
B. Lack of ability and/or willingness of an air carrier to address safety deficiencies 
Two verifiable sources of information are used to substantiate evidence: 
 
EN 5   EN (a) Lack of transparency or adequate an d timely communication on the part of a 
carrier in response to an enquiry by th e civil aviation auth ority of a Member 
State regarding the safety  aspect of its operation. 
(b) Inappropriate or insufficient corrective act ion plan presented in response to an 
identified serious safety deficiency. 
Whenever serious safety deficiencies on the part  of an air carrier are identified by Member 
States or the Commission, the carrier concerned - together with the regulatory authority 
responsible for its safety oversight - is in formed by the Commission and invited to present 
comments as well as any other relevant info rmation (in the form of documented evidence) 
regarding its safety performance. Many cases ar e subsequently resolved at this stage by 
Member States and the Commission being satisf ied, on the basis of docum ented evidence, that 
the carrier has identified the root cause of the safety concerns and taken appropriate remedial and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.  
Accordingly, a proposal for banning may be consid ered in those cases where transparency and 
communication are lacking and/or where inappropriate or insuffi cient corrective actions have 
been taken by the air carrier(s) concerned. In  particular, absence of communication or 
incomplete and untimely communication on the pa rt of the carrier(s) and/or the aviation 
authority with regulatory oversight for the carr ier(s), have led to the imposition of partial or 
total bans as precautionary measures to  ensure that safety is guaranteed. 
C. Lack of ability and/or willin gness of the authorities responsible for the oversight of an 
air carrier to address safety deficiencies  
Three verifiable sources of informati on are used to substantiate evidence: 
1. Lack of cooperation 
Whenever serious safety deficiencies on the part of an air carrier are id entified, the reaction of 
its national authority responsible for its sa fety oversight is equally considered. The 
Commission has therefore requested that air carrie rs under investigation or subject to a partial 
or total ban present remedial and corrective meas ures only after these have been approved by 
the authority responsible for the safety oversight  of the air carrier(s) concerned and after the 
authority has verified implem entation of such measures. 
Also cooperation with the authority responsible fo r the safety oversight of  a State's air carriers 
is even more important in cases where such deficiencies are identified in more than one air carrier certified in the same state. In such cases lack of cooperation and transparency on the 
part of that authority may lead  to a proposal for the banning of several or all air carriers 
certified in that State.  
2. Insufficient ability of the authority 
A number of factors may lead to the conclusion  that the competent authority of a State with 
responsibility for the regulatory oversight of its air carriers is not able to exercise its 
responsibilities to the releva nt international standards: 
a. ICAO regularly conducts audi ts designed to asses its Cont racting States' civil aviation 
authorities’ oversight capabiliti es as part of its comprehensive Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme (USOAP). The Commission as an observer to ICAO, constantly monitors 
the results of these audits a nd in order to provide a met hod of prioritisation of cases 
warranting closer investigation created a dedi cated working group composed of experts from 
the Member States to analyse the results of th e USOAP audits. The result of this analysis is 
used for the following purposes: 
 
EN 6   EN – Launching dedicated technical assistance projects to the countries concerned 
– Launching investigations related to the list 
– The prioritisation of SAFA ramp inspections 
b. Previous refusal of the operating authorisatio n or technical permission of any carrier under 
the oversight of one State by another State is taken into account as possible indications of a weak or flawed safety oversight regime. Such information is obtained through close 
cooperation with, not only the ci vil aviation authorities of non-EU countries which have 
decided to apply the EC list (e.g. the Republic of Korea, Bahrain a nd the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia), but also those with whose States the Community has concluded a safety specific or a 
comprehensive aviation agreement.  
Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention requires that an operator must have its principle place of 
business in the State that issues its Air Operator s Certificate (AOC). That  State is responsible 
for the oversight, both operationa l and airworthiness, of the ope rator unless it has agreed to 
transfer some of the responsibilities under a lease agreement. Where it is found that the 
principle place of business of an operator is not in the State that issued the AOC investigations are immediately launched to ve rify whether the safety oversight of the air 
carrier is being correctly discharged by the State that issued its certificate. This is of particular 
importance since, for obvious logistical and orga nisational reasons, it is generally difficult for 
a certifying State to exercise its ove rsight responsibilities  remotely, particularly if that State is 
already proven to have a w eak safety oversight regime. 
3. Insufficient ability of the comp etent authorities of the State of registry of aircraft to 
oversee those aircraft used by air carriers in  accordance with its obligations under the 
Chicago Convention. 
Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention sets out the standards for the certification of aircraft and 
the issuance and subsequent overs ight of the Certificate of Airworthiness by the State of 
Registry. Where, through the results of ICAO US OAP audits, such States are reported to have 
significant non-compliances in the area of A nnex 8 the Commission, with the unanimous 
support of the Air Safety Committee, has included on the EC list all carriers which have their fleet registered in such States. 
3. C
OOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF REGULATION 
2111/2005 
The EC list has fostered a closer cooperati on between the Community and non-EU countries 
as well as international organisations, in order to verify compliance by air carriers with the 
relevant safety standards and therefore improve in ternational air safety oversight in general.  
In this context, besides its ever growing ties with ICAO Secretariat, the Commission has 
established several lines of communication with a number of States and organisations (e.g. 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iran, Japan, Morocc o, Tunisia, the Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States of America) fo r the exchange of safety-related information. 
Close liaisons are also maintained with the In ternational Air Transpor t Association (IATA) in 
order to ensure a better mutual unde rstanding regarding the EC list. 
Also, the Commission has been actively cont ributing to various ICAO led projects:  
The Commission has been participating in th e following projects – in North Asia (440,000 
Euro for China, North Korea, Mongolia and Korea), in South Asia (350,000 Euro for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pa kistan and Sri Lanka) an d in Central America 
(615,000 Euro for Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvad or, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). The 
 
EN 7   EN Commission is also leading certain projects w ith contribution from the aeronautical industry: 
for instance the EU Russia Aviation Coopera tion project for 800,000 Euros, the Euromed 
Aviation project for 5 million Euro linked to the Commission's Neighbourhood Policy, as well 
as its strategy programme TRACECA towards be neficiary countries in the Caucasus, and in 
Central Asia for 5 million Euros (Armenia, A zerbaijan, Georgia, Ka zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uz bekistan). There are also indi vidual projects, such as the 
one for the Democratic Republic of Congo, for 5 million Euros as well as those for Indonesia 
and Cambodia aiming at strengthening the admini strative and technical capacity of the civil 
aviation authorities to allow them to discharg e correctly their obligations as regulatory and 
oversight authorities.  
Until 2007 the Commission had also  contributed to two Afri ca specific COSCAP project: 
COSCAP –UEMOA (Benin; Burkina Faso; Côte d'Ivoire; Guinea-Bissau; Mali; Mauritania; 
Niger; Senegal; Togo) and CO SCAP –SADEC (Angola; Botswa na; Democratic Republic of 
the Congo; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozam bique; Namibia; Seychelles; South Africa; 
Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe) aiming at resolving regional safety oversight 
issues and harmonization of re gulations in these countries . 
Upholding the Commission's philosophy of enhanc ing the preventive and dissuasive potential 
of the Regulation the European Commission la unched a framework contract on prevention 
and technical assistance in the framewor k of Regulation 2111/2005 EC in 2008. The project 
was awarded to EASA in 2009. This initiative is intended to support positive ex ante 
prevention actions as well as ex post technical c ooperation to assist effort s made by States at 
implementing corrective action plans to addres s identified serious safety deficiencies. 
4. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES  
The application of the EC list has demonstrated, on the one hand, that it is a successful tool to 
contribute to ensuring a high leve l of safety in the Community. On the other hand this tool 
cannot be see as a blanket cove r for the safety performance of airlines. It has twofold 
limitations: 1) inclusion on the EC list depends on available and verifiable information; 2) inclusion on the EC list const itutes an operating ban only to Europe, while banned airlines 
continue to fly to other regions of the world. Th erefore, exchange of verifiable and reliable 
information needs to be promoted and furthe r strengthened at the international level. 
Indeed the application of the EC list over the last three years has shown that the objective of 
establishing and maintaining a hi gh level of safety world-wide  can only be reached if ICAO 
safety standards are actually complied with. Ther efore appropriate actions need to be taken to 
ensure that these standards are effectively respected both at the level of the State and by 
individual air carriers. 
The various areas where the Comm ission intends to further develop its policy both in terms of 
internal and external measures are presented in the Commission's report on the application of 
Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.