2008
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU SUPPORT IN THE 
AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICEFOR BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINEEUROPEAN COURT 
OF AUDITORS
Special Report  No 9
EN

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU 
SUPPORT IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE FOR BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINESpecial Report  No 9   2008
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC)
2
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS
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E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu
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Special Report  No 9    2008
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009
ISBN 978-92-9207-139-4
DOI 10.2865/43014
© European Communities, 2009
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium
CONTENTS
Paragraph 
  ABBREVIATIONS
IV  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
17  INTRODUCTION
810   AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
1162   OBSERVATIONS
1152  TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS,
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
1119  BORDER MANAGEMENT: SATISFACTORY ACHIEVEMENTS
2027  MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: POOR PROGRESS IN A DIFFICULT CONTEXT2844  FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME: MIXED RESULTS
4552  JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MIXED RESULTS
5357  WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?
54  LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT TYPICALLY DUE TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS INVOLVING ALL MAIN PARTIES
5556  SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS
57  SHORTCOMINGS IN MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
5862  TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS 
FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?
6061  NOT ALL POSSIBILITIES EXPLOITED TO COLLECT INFORMATION
62  EXPERIENCE GAINED NOT ALWAYS REFLECTED IN NEW PROJECTS
6373   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
  ANNEX I  MAP  ANNEX II  JHA  PROJECT OVERVIEW COMMITTED UNDER PROGRAMMES 200005
  ANNEX III  OVERVIEW OF AUDITED CONTRACTS
  ANNEX IV  EUBAM’S AREA OF OPERATION
 REPLY OF  THE COMMISSION

ABBREVIATIONS
Aeneas : programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas 
of migration and asylum
BUMAD : drug control multisectoral assistance and institution building in Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus
DG: directorate-general
DG JLS : Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security
ENP : European neighbourhood policy
EUBAM : European Union border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EuropeAid : EuropeAid Cooperation Office
FIU : Financial Intelligence Unit
NGOs : non-governmental organisations
TACIS : technical assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
I.
Following the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, 
the EU became a direct neighbour of Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. The Commission made  considerable EU funds available to these coun-tries (166 million euro in the period 2000–05) 
to improve their capacity in the areas of: bor-der control; migration/asylum management;  
fight against organised crime; and judiciary  
and good governance. The Commission limited 
assistance to Belarus due to a lack of respect for democracy and human rights. The EU has  deployed different instruments, the most sig-nificant being the TACIS programme and the  greater part of the assistance was delivered  through international organisations (see para-graphs 1 to 7). 
II.
The purpose of the Court’s audit was to deter-mine the success of the EU support, to estab-lish reasons for possible underperformance and to see to what extent the Commission had a  process in place to take into account lessons learned for continued assistance in this field. The audit examined 40 contracts with a total value of 100 million euro (see paragraphs 8 to 10 and Annex III ).
III.
The greater part of the audited support  
achieved satisfactory results, particularly in  the area of “Border management”. Progress was largely unsatisfactory in the area of “Migration and asylum”. Mixed results were achieved in  the “Fight against organised crime” and “Judi-ciary and good governance” (see paragraphs 11 to 52). IV.
The limited achievements were typically due  to a combination of factors involving the Com-mission, the international institutions and the various authorities of the three countries.  External factors such as the continued polit-ical instability in Ukraine also diminished the project results. Despite having very competent staff, the Delegation in Kiev was overloaded,  dealing with a rapidly growing policy area with projects not only in Ukraine but also in Bela-rus and Moldova. The Delegation in Moldova, opened in October 2005, took nearly two years to start operational project management. The co-existence of several financing instruments for the same purpose and the lack of coherence between them hampered a quality approach.  There were also certain shortcomings in the  joint management with the international insti-tutions. In general the coordination of the EU support with other donors was not developed enough. Finally the Commission has not fully exploited options to learn lessons, and experi-ence gained was not always reflected in newly-started projects (see paragraphs 53 to 62).
V.
On the basis of these observations, the Court makes detailed recommendations which could help the Commission to increase the effective-ness of the assistance given to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the field of freedom, security  and justice (see paragraphs 63 to 73).
7
INTRODUCTION
 1.  One of the fundamental objectives of the European Union (EU) is to offer its 
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice1. This objective has an 
important external dimension. Following the enlargements of 2004 and 
2007, the EU became a direct neighbour of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, sharing a common border and facing common challenges in the fight  against organised crime, terrorism and other illegal activities (see map 
in Annex I ).
 2.  The EU has been making specific efforts to assist these three countries in 
improving their capacity in the areas of border control, migration/asylum management, the fight against organised crime and judiciary and good governance
2. In the period 2000–05 the Commission financed 89 projects 
with a total EU contribution of 165,7 million euro (see Annex II ). 
 3.  The primary channel for EU support has been the TACIS programme3. Projects 
have been financed through its various arms: national action programmes, regional action programmes and cross-border co-operation programmes. Created in 1991, TACIS’s overall objective was to assist the transition to a free market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the partner states. TACIS was phased out in 2006 but payments will  continue at least until 2010. From 2007 onwards, assistance to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine has been programmed under the new European  neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI)
4.
 4.  In addition to TACIS the EU has used other instruments to assist these three 
countries in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Preparatory action for the cooperation on migration (financed by  (a) 
specific budget line).
Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries (b) 
in the areas of migration and asylum (Aeneas)5.
Rapid reaction mechanism (c) 6.
European initiative for democracy and human rights (d) 7.1 The old name used by the 
Commission for this policy area was “Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)”.
2 Already in 2003, an EU action 
plan on justice and home affairs 
was published for Ukraine (OJ C 77, 29.3.2003). This action plan 
was revised in 2007.
3 Technical assistance programme 
for the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States. 12 countries have benefited from TACIS: Belarus, Moldova, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine 
in Eastern Europe, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in Caucasus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia.
4 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 
of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions establishing a European 
neighbourhood and partnership 
instrument (OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, 
p. 1).
5 Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 1).
6 Council Regulation (EC) 
No 381/2001 (OJ L 57, 27.2.2001, 
p. 5).
7 Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2242/2004 (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, 
p. 21).
8
 5.  Following devolution8 in 2003, the Commission’s Delegation in Kiev was given 
overall responsibility for implementation of EU assistance in all three  countries. A new Delegation was opened in Moldova in October 2005 and became responsible for project implementation in summer 2007. The non-TACIS projects are usually managed by the Commission’s headquarters (EuropeAid and DG JLS).
 6.  The greater part of the assistance in the area of freedom, security and justice 
is delivered through international organisations: United Nations develop-ment programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organisation for Migration (IOM) or the Council of Europe (CoE). On the basis of standard contribution agreements signed with the Commission, these international organisations are in charge of 
certain aspects of project implementation, including procurement and  payment procedures (so-called joint management mode). 
 7.  The situation in Belarus was specific. A partnership and cooperation agree-
ment between Belarus and the EU was signed in 1996 but its ratification was frozen due to a lack of respect for democracy and human rights. Thus, during the period covered by the audit, assistance to Belarus was limited to humanitarian, cross-border and regional cooperation projects, support for the needs of the population, and to projects supporting directly and indirectly democratisation and democratic forces (e.g. support to inde-pendent media; scholarships for youth). The freedom, security and justice 
projects in Belarus are mostly multi-country projects including Moldova 
and Ukraine.8 Giving management responsibility 
to the Commission’s in-country 
Delegations.
9
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
 8.  The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of EU support in the 
area of freedom, security and justice for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The audit addressed three questions.
To what extent has the EU support for freedom, security and justice (a) 
projects in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine been successful?
What are the main reasons for possible underperformance? (b) 
To what extent has the Commission a learning process in place to take (c) 
into account lessons for continued assistance in the area of freedom, security and justice?
 9.  The Court audited 40 contracts, judgementally selected, with a total EU con-
tribution of 99,3 million euro (out of the total of 89 projects9 covering 
165,7 million euro in 2000–05), comprising 24 completed and 16 on-going contracts ( Annex III ). Most of these ongoing contracts followed up earlier 
EU-funded projects, allowing an assessment of the Commission’s learning 
process (main question (c) above). The audit involved an examination of: 
the results of the projects and comparison with the stated objectives;  factors standing in the way of the achievement of the objectives; and  lessons learnt and whether they were taken into account in follow-up  projects or programmes. 
 10.  The 40 contracts examined fell within four sub-areas: 
border management (a) 
migration and asylum (b) 
fight against organised crime (c) 
judiciary and good governance. (d) 
  The audit team examined the projects on the spot during the period Novem-
ber 2006 to July 2007, including visits to implementing international  
organisations and national bodies as well as to monitoring units10.9 A project is implemented through 
one or more contracts .
10 The Commission contracts a 
consortium to carry out regular 
monitoring of the projects.
OBSERVATIONS
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
BORDER MANAGEMENT: SATISFACTORY ACHIEVEMENTS 
 11.  Belarus and Ukraine are facing major problems in border management due to 
the total length of their external borders (about 3 000 km and 7 000 km 
respectively) and the lack of official border demarcation, in particular  with Russia. Hardly any border and customs controls are carried out at the Russian-Belarusian border. This permeability of borders encourages both cross-border criminal activity and illegal migration.
 12.  Border management between Moldova and Ukraine is complicated by the 
existence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria which is not  recognised internationally. The Moldova-Ukraine state border is 1 222 km long of which 472 km on the Moldovan side is under control of the Tran-snistrian authorities. Transnistrian authorities control the region east of the Dniestr River and are acting de facto independently from the rest of Moldova (see Box 1).
BACKGROUND TO THE TRANSNISTRIA CONFLICTBOX 1
In parallel with Moldova’s process of emancipation from the Soviet Union, from 1989 onwards, protest 
movements in the regions with predominantly non-Moldovan populations began to resist Moldova’s 
independence eﬀ  orts. As a response to Moldova’s declaration of sovereignty, a separate Transnistrian 
Moldovan Republic was proclaimed in 1990. Clashes took place and ﬁ  ghting culminated in 1992, caus-
ing several hundreds of deaths and some 100 000 refugees. 
Since 1995 Moldova and Transnistria, assisted by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as international 
mediators, have discussed a possible settlement of the frozen conﬂ  ict. Th  e arrival in power of the admin-
istration of President Yushchenko in Ukraine created a window of opportunity for further progress 
in resolving the conﬂ  ict. Since September 2005, the EU and the US have participated as observers in 
the negotiation process. Th  e EU has been represented by a special representative for Moldova since 
March 2005.
11
 13.  The Commission has substantially helped to improve the border management 
capacities of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Border management is the financially most significant area for freedom, security and justice projects. 63,2 % of the EU support (104,7 million euro) under 2000–05 programmes has been allocated to this field. The Court audited 10 contracts with a  total value of 51,8 million euro. 
 14.  Most of the projects audited achieved satisfactory results (see Annex III ). 
The use of modern equipment and improved technology as well as train-ing for border guards led to enhanced border controls and surveillance (see examples in Box 2). The State Border Guard Committee of Belarus  in particular showed great commitment, using their military structure to implement strictly all contract stipulations . Major problems, however,  
were noted in the works contract for the construction of the Koslovichi II Border Terminal
11 (see Box 3).
EXAMPLE OF SATISFACTORY RESULT: 
USE OF MODERN EQUIPMENT STRENGTHENS BORDER CONTROLBOX 2
Th e projects “Border management improvement Ukraine” (EU contribution of 4,0 million euro) and 
“Strengthening border management in the republic of Belarus” (EU contribution of 13,3 million euro) 
delivered among other things cameras, microscopes, document veriﬁ  cation devices, vehicles, IT equip-
ment including automated telephone exchanges for border units and hardware for checking online, 
e.g., blacklisted persons and stolen vehicles. All investment items checked were in place according to 
the inventory log-book, properly labelled, operational and used for the intended purpose. 11 The Kozlovichi international 
border terminal (located near 
Brest in the Republic of Belarus) is 
the main road crossing for freight vehicles between the Republic of 
Belarus and Poland (Pan-European 
Transport Corridor II).
12
EXAMPLE OF UNSATISFACTORY RESULT: REDUCED SCOPE OF WORK AND DELAYS BOX 3
At the end of 2006, the original completion date, the Koslovichi II Border Terminal (EU contribu-
tion of 14,0 million euro) still resembled a huge construction site where most of the buildings were 
only half-ﬁ  nished and roads, parking areas and pavement still needed to be built. Tax exemption 
problems, together with an under pricing at tender stage, led to an addendum to the contract which 
greatly reduced the scope of works (e.g. some buildings will be left   incomplete, to be ﬁ  nished only as 
shells). Substantial extra funding is needed to complete the international border terminal as originally planned and contracted. 15.  The financially most significant project in the area of freedom, security and 
justice, the European Union border assistance mission to Moldova and  Ukraine
12 (EUBAM, total EU contribution of 19,1 million euro) contributed 
greatly to building capacity in the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and custom services (see map in Annex IV ). For example “EUBAM” aided 
the effective implementation and monitoring of a new customs regime between Moldova and Ukraine, thus helping to combat smuggling and  illegal cross-border activity. As a result significant smuggling involving Transnistria was detected. The illegal evasion of taxes and customs duties 
concerned e.g. vehicles, fruit and vegetables and poultry meat. For poul-
try meat alone, EUBAM calculated losses of up to 43 million euro for the Ukrainian state budget or up to 18 million euro for the Moldovan state budget (period October 2005 to May 2006).12 EUBAM is in place since 
1 December 2005. EUBAM 
operations are based on a 
memorandum of understanding concluded between the European 
Commission and the governments 
of Ukraine and the Republic of 
Moldova. A motivating factor was 
security threats originating from the Transnistria region with its assumed 
high level of cross-border criminal 
activities. EUBAM is implemented 
by the United Nations development 
programme (UNDP). 16 EU Member 
States contribute in kind through 
the secondment of professional personnel to the mission (about 
100 customs and border guards 
officials). EUBAM established its 
operational headquarters in Odessa 
(Ukraine) and has created one field office in Chisinau (Moldova) 
and a further five field offices 
alongside the Ukrainian/Moldovan/
Transnistrian border as well as a 
field office/logistics base in Odessa 
and Illichevsk seaports.
13
 16.  EUBAM detected major difficulties in securing criminal prosecutions for smug-
gling13 (insufficient legislation; inefficient interaction/unclear roles of  
the state customs service, state border guard service, tax police and  security service; poor demarcation of green border). Most cases were not prosecuted as criminal, but only as administrative infringements without obligatory confiscation of the goods involved
14. EUBAM reported also that 
due to the level of corruption in the prosecutor’s offices and judiciary, 
smugglers have been released and the smuggled goods returned to the smugglers. 
 17.  When EUBAM started in November 2005 it was financed for its first six months 
by the rapid reaction mechanism15. The mechanism was applied to respond 
in a rapid and flexible manner to the opportunity which arose in 2005  
for advancing the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict (see Box 1).  The project’s assumption is that improved border and customs controls 
and border surveillance along the whole border are crucial elements to a peaceful resolution. Whether this assumption is valid can only be assessed in the very long run. 
 18.  Subsequently the financing of EUBAM was characterised by the use of several 
short term contracts financed from different TACIS regional action pro-grammes. As a consequence, staff contracts or rental agreements had to be renewed every few months. The Commission had not foreseen such a major long-term project (nearly 1 million euro per month) when program-ming its activities in the region.
 19.  To complement the support delivered by EUBAM, the EU is financing the 
purchase of border equipment under the project “Improvement of border controls at the Moldova-Ukraine border” (Bommoluk project; EU contribu-tion of 9,9 million euro). This additional activity raises a number of chal-lenges to be addressed in the future, such as complex tender processes
16, 
choosing the best physical location for the equipment given the length of 
the borders and ensuring complementarity with the equipment funded by 
other donors17. Also the Governments have to provide sufficient national 
funds for running costs and maintenance.13 Based e.g. on a case of high-value 
alcohol products smuggled from the 
Transnistrian region to Ukraine.
14 Burden of proof — the difficulty of 
securing criminal prosecutions for 
smuggling cases in Ukraine, special 
report by EUBAM.
15 This mechanism may be 
triggered in situations “when in the 
beneficiary countries concerned 
there occur situations of crisis or 
emerging crises, situations posing a 
threat to law and order, the security 
and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed 
conflict or to destabilise the 
country…”.
16 In an earlier project for Ukraine 
field radar equipment and a radio 
communication network (total value of 5,0 million euro) could not 
be procured and delivered due to 
unsuccessful tendering procedures.
17 The US Government has allocated 
28 million dollars to improve the 
fight against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction at the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan state border.
14
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: POOR PROGRESS IN A DIFFICULT CONTEXT
 20.  EU policy aims to assist third countries in their efforts to improve their capac-
ity for migration management and refugee protection, prevent and combat illegal immigration, provide information on legal channels for migra-tion and resolve refugee situations by providing better access to durable solutions.
 21.  Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are situated on the eastern border of the 
enlarged EU. All three are seen as transit countries for large-scale illegal 
migration westwards. Ukraine in particular faces an increase in migratory 
movements of persons (both legal and illegal) entering and crossing its territory. Thousands of illegal migrants traverse the country annually,  
largely via the border with Russia.
 22.  Ukraine is chronically short of accommodation, particularly for longer-term 
illegal migrants. Repatriation requires identification of the persons by  the Ukrainian authorities and cooperation from the relevant embassies or consulates which are not always helpful. Another solution would be readmission, i.e. acceptance of the detained persons by the country from which they illegally entered Ukraine. However, a readmission agreement has not been signed between Ukraine and Russia, the prime source of  Ukraine’s illegal migrants.
 23.  The need for adequate accommodation for illegal migrants has recently 
become more pressing, with the entry into force on 1 January 2008 of  a readmission agreement with the European Community. In 2010, after a transitional period of two years, Ukraine will face the requirement to house hundreds or even thousands of illegal migrants from third coun-
tries, currently being held in the neighbouring EU countries of Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland, who reached the EU illicitly via Ukraine.
15
 24.  The projects in the sub-area of migration and asylum received a total EU-con-
tribution of 16,8 million euro (10,2 % of total support) from 2000–05  programmes. The Court audited 10 contracts with a total EU contribution of 13,8 million euro.
  25.  The project results achieved in this area of migration and asylum were unsat-
isfactory mainly in respect of infrastructure (see Annex III ). A key goal of 
the EU is to help provide accommodation centres meeting international 
humanitarian standards for illegal migrants as well as for asylum seek-ers. In Ukraine, despite the EU support, this objective is far from being achieved:
the detention and accommodation conditions for (a) illegal migrants in 
existing centres were often very far from acceptable — in general  illegal migrants in Ukraine suffer severely from over-crowded living 
conditions, insufficient sanitation and poor diet (see Box 4);
the construction/refurbishment of (b) new facilities for illegal migrants 
did not advance as planned (see Box 5); 
newly constructed temporary accommodation centres for (c) asylum seek-
ers were under utilised or not used at all (see Box 6).
DESPITE ALLEVIATION BY EU SUPPORT, LIVING CONDITIONS FOR ILLEGAL MIGRANTS 
IN EXISTING ACCOMMODATION CENTRE STILL UNACCEPTABLEBOX 4
Th e project “Establishment of migration management system in Zakarpattya, Ukraine”18 (EU contribu-
tion of 2 million euro for two contracts) essentially delivered basic help to the migrants: distribution of 
food and hygiene packages, medical assistance, distribution of clothes, provision of bedding and legal 
advice. Moreover urgent repair, construction works and all kinds of running costs were also ﬁ  nanced. 
Th e project is above all an action of humanitarian aid and not of capacity building as its title might 
suggest.
Aft er nearly a year of operation, the Delegation monitored the project on the spot (April 2005). It 
reported that the conditions of the detention centres in Pavchino and Chop (the old part of the build-
ing) were inhuman and degrading, not meeting the minimum standards set by the Council of Europe, 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-man Treatment. Furthermore the Delegation found evidence that the humanitarian aid delivered by 
the project did not always reach the targeted migrants. Th  is led to corrective action by the Ukrainian 
authorities.
18 The Zakarpattya region borders with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia and is a transit corridor in Ukraine for migrants 
on their way to Western Europe.
16
BOX 4
At the time of the audit in November 2006 the capacity (320) in Pavchino was exceeded by about 
100 people. Th  e local project partners reported that in summer time overcrowding had been far worse 
and reached 700 people with corresponding negative consequences for hygiene and health.
Th e migrants interviewed by the Court hesitated to speak openly. Complaints were still expressed, 
concerning medicine not passed on and the practice of searches by masked persons. It also became clear that the project still did not cover basic needs (e.g. suﬃ   cient heating, suﬃ   cient clean and hot water 
supply, adequate clothing including shoes). Furthermore, there was insuﬃ   cient interpretation available 
in the camps, making communication diﬃ   cult between the migrants and the authorities. 26.  The sustainability of detention and accommodation centres is jeopardised 
in Ukraine by the lack of state funds for running and maintenance costs and because there is an unclear division of responsibilities between the State Border Guard Service and the Ministry of Interior. 
 27.  Difficulties with regard to project registration, tax exemption, land ownership 
and funding were also found in the construction of a temporary accom-modation centre for asylum seekers (25 people) in Belarus
19 . On the other 
hand, in Moldova the situation was better. A temporary accommodation centre in Chisinau was already fully operational in November 2005, offer-ing 160 places. 19 The centre is located in Gomel, 
close to Ukraine where there is 
a thriving community of Afghan 
refugees.
17
POOR PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING NEW ACCOMMODATION CENTRES FOR ILLEGAL MIGRANTSBOX 5
Th e core of the project “Capacity building of migration management-CBMM I, Ukraine” (EU-con-
tribution of 3,8 million euro) was to refurbish and equip two former military sites as migrant accom-
modation centres for 1 260 persons. Th  e project steering committee decided in June 2006 to devote 
project money only to refurbishing one of the sites. By the time of the audit (November 2006) no works 
contracts were concluded and no money had been spent for refurbishment, some three months aft  er the 
project’s original ﬁ  nishing date (1.9.2006). Discussions were still ongoing about fundamental aspects of 
the refurbishment, e.g. how the site would be heated and what solution would be found for waste water. Th e steering committee also decided to limit the numbers to be housed to 250. Th  is means that the EU 
funded capacity would be reduced by around 1 000 places in comparison to the original planning.FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME: MIXED RESULTS
 28.  The general post-communist transition process in the countries of central 
and eastern Europe was accompanied by a considerable rise in organised crime such as trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and money  laundering. 
 29.  Ukraine and Moldova are major source countries for the trafficking of women 
and children for the purpose of forced prostitution in Europe. Recent years have seen also a growth in the trafficking of men, who are compelled, for instance, to work as labourers. The full scale of the practice remains rela-tively unknown, due to the very nature of organised crime, and because few people are willing or able to report what has happened to them to the authorities. This is aggravated by a lack of witness protection measures. Concerning drug trafficking, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are seen as  transit routes towards EU Member States. The banking systems have been increasingly used to launder the proceeds of serious crime.
 30.  The fight against organised crime accounted for 19,2 million euro (11,6 %) 
of the total funds allocated for the area of freedom, security and justice from programmes for the period 2000–05. The Court audited 10 contracts with a total EU contribution of 18,6 million euro.
18
UNDERUTILISATION OF NEWLY CONSTRUCTED CENTRES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERSBOX 6
In Ukraine, at the end of 2006, only some 65 additional persons could be housed in temporary accom-
modation centres (TACs) instead of the planned 350 (EU contribution of 1,6 million euro for “Strength-
ening the asylum systems of Ukraine and Moldova). Th  e main reason was that the centre in Odessa 
was only half-used because of a lack of state-funded running costs, and that the 80-person centre in Mukachevo remained completely unoccupied for more than one year and a half, in fact since its opening in April 2005. Th  is wasteful situation in Mukachevo resulted from the persistent failure to 
transfer ownership of the building from the border guards to the responsible project partner institu-tion. Meanwhile, those asylum seekers lacking private means were living in tents and other short-term facilities run by the border guards. 31.  In spite of several successes, overall progress is still insufficient in the fight 
against organised crime (see Annex III ). The projects to combat trafficking 
in human beings had weak criminalisation and prosecution components20 
(see paragraphs 34 and 35). Overlapping is a major feature, since many 
donors are keen to fund projects in this area (see paragraph 36). Concern-
ing drug control, projects progressed slowly in the areas of legislation and of police intelligence (see paragraph 40). As regards preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, a major challenge is to achieve suc-cessful prosecution (see paragraph 44).
Combating trafficking in human beings
 32.  The Governments of Ukraine and Moldova expressed their commitment to 
combating trafficking in human beings in national policy papers. One  project was audited in Ukraine (EU contribution of 1,9 million euro) and three projects (including a rehabilitation centre for victims of trafficking) in Moldova (total EU-contribution of 1,2 million euro).20 The anti-trafficking projects 
had three standard components: 
protection and reintegration; criminalisation and prosecution; 
and raising awareness. The term 
criminalisation is commonly used in 
the project documentation.
19
 33.  With the help of the projects, large-scale public awareness campaigns were 
carried out in Moldova and Ukraine (e.g. theatre performances, numer-
ous publications, toll-free hotlines), and humanitarian assistance was  delivered to hundreds of victims of trafficking (e.g. legal support, medical 
assistance, housing allowance, transport assistance, vocational training, 
’in-kind’ grants for small business start-up). Thus the aspects of preven-tion and reintegration were well covered by the projects.
 34.  Results were less positive regarding the criminalisation and prosecution 
components, in particular as regards information sharing between law  
enforcement agencies. In Ukraine, the TACIS monitors noted that the State 
Border Guard Service was not cooperating in information exchanging ini-tiatives. The measure to equip border checkpoints with the i24/7 system
21 
failed when the tendering process was cancelled due to the Ukrainian  stakeholders insisting on a supplier whose prices were far higher than  the market rate.
 35.  Getting evidence is a major challenge, since the criminal act often occurs 
outside Moldova or Ukraine. National authorities blamed the slowness  
of other countries to respond to requests for mutual assistance. To help 
circumvent such procedural blockages, the projects paid for networking visits for law enforcement officers to countries of transit and destination of victims. In addition, police officers took part in workshops on investiga-tive techniques and anti-trafficking legislation was reviewed. Weaknesses persist in mutual assistance arrangements. 
 36.  There are concerns relating to efficiency and economy. As many donor organi-
sations are ready to fund the fight against trafficking in persons, it is  a challenge to avoid unnecessary duplication of actions and to ensure  cost effective use of resources. In Moldova, for instance, certain project activities had to be changed, and an unusually high rent was paid for the Rehabilitation Centre’s premises in Chisinau
22. In addition, it is not always 
possible to distinguish clearly the results of the EU support from that of other organisations, making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the EU spending. 21 Interpol global police 
communications system operating 
24 hours a day.
22 The amount budgeted for 
food and lodging was more than 
double the amount budgeted 
for comparable services at the 
equivalent Rehabilitation Centre 
in Kiev.
20
Drug control
 37.  Another significant project in the fight against organised crime is called 
“Drug control multisectoral assistance and institution building in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus” (BUMAD). BUMAD is a multi-annual activity in three 
phases which started in 2003 and is expected to finish at the end of 2008 (overall EU-contribution of 6,5 million euro).
 38.  This programme, covering Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, is the third in a 
series of EU-funded regional programmes designed to filter the traffic of 
heroin flowing westwards from Afghanistan towards the EU23. The over-
all objective is to reduce drug-trafficking from, and through, the three countries towards EU Member States.
 39.  Most of the activities foreseen under the different sub-projects were carried 
out (e.g. legal assistance, seaport control (Ukraine), land border control, police and community prevention). The general picture at the end of  the second phase (January 2007) is that good progress has been made  in setting up national anti-drugs structures, for example the national  
drugs observatories, courses in drugs prevention in the respective police 
academies or training in drugs demand reduction to numerous NGOs in the three countries. 
 40.  Slow progress was noted in the components of legislation and of police 
intelligence. The necessary cooperation between customs, border guards, police and secret services for effective criminal investigations is not yet sufficiently developed in the three countries. Setting up national systems to support the criminal investigation of drug traffickers requires not only appropriate analytical tools, but also a high degree of cooperation among agencies which have not been accustomed to share operational data in a systematic way. Imbalances in investigative powers are a further compli-cation. A particular obstacle in Belarus is the security service’s apparent reluctance to accept foreign analytical software. The Commission, when planning the project, underestimated the time needed to change ways of operational thinking and to overcome rivalry between enforcement  bodies.23 The first programme, CADAP, 
began in Central Asia in 2000, the 
second, SCAD, in the Southern 
Caucasus in 2001.
21
  41.  Up to the completion date of BUMAD 2 (January 2007), heroin and cocaine 
seizures were modest. Only two international attempts to traffic hero-
ine in Ukraine were uncovered, with the help of software delivered by  the project. Seizures of drugs in all three countries concerned mainly  
locally-produced poppy seed and cannabis. However the Ukrainian Secu-
rity Service reported in July 2007 that in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Turkish law enforcement organisations 174 kg of heroin were confiscated in Illichevsk seaport. 
Projects against money laundering/terrorist financing
 42.  The overall objective of the “Project against money laundering in Ukraine” 
(EU-contribution of 1 million euro) was to prevent the use of the financial system to launder the proceeds of serious crime and to enable Ukrainian authorities to cooperate in fighting money laundering. 
 43.  The project helped to achieve Ukraine’s very significant removal from the 
“Non-cooperative countries and territories”24 list in February 2004 and the 
acceptance of Ukraine as a member by the Egmont Group25 in June 2004. 
Furthermore by the end of the project the State Committee for Financial 
Monitoring (SCFM) was functioning as Ukraine’s Financial Intelligence  
Unit (FIU)26. Indeed, over the years until 2006, the number of case refer-
rals, submitted by the SCFM to law enforcement authorities, increased  considerably (18 in 2003; 446 in 2006). 
 44.  Setting up a FIU is only a first important condition for combating money laun-
dering. There is also the need for effectively operating law enforcement agencies and trained judges. A major problem is the lack of successful prosecution. Until the end of 2006 only three verdicts for money laun-dering were made by the courts. The lack of a modern regime of seizure and confiscation of assets was also identified as a serious gap in the anti money laundering system. However Ukraine is more advanced in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing than Moldova, where serious concerns exist regarding the effectiveness of the system in place (e.g. weaknesses in the Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corrup-tion or insufficient use of provisions to seize, freeze and confiscate)
27.24 The Non-cooperative countries 
and territories (NCCT) initiative 
was developed by an inter-governmental financial action task 
force (FATF) to ensure that measures 
for the prevention, detection and 
punishment of money laundering 
according to internationally 
recognised standards are applied.
25 Many countries around the 
world have created specialised 
governmental agencies, known 
as “financial intelligence units” 
(FIU). Recognising the benefits 
inherent in the development of a 
FIU network, in 1995, a group of FIUs at the Egmont Arenberg Palace 
in Brussels decided to establish an 
informal group for the stimulation 
of international cooperation. Now 
known as the Egmont Group, these FIUs meet regularly to find ways to 
cooperate, especially in the areas 
of information exchange, training 
and the sharing of expertise. There 
are around 100 countries with 
recognised operational FIUs.
26 It is the responsibility of a FIU to 
collect and analyse suspicious and 
threshold transactions. Investigative 
powers lie with law enforcement 
agencies.
27 Third Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report on Moldova, 
September 2007, prepared by 
moneyval (Committee of Experts 
on the Evaluation of Anti-money 
Laundering Measures, under the auspices of the Council of Europe).
22
JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: MIXED RESULTS
 45.  EU policy supports reforming the judiciary in order to ensure its independ-
ence, impartiality and efficiency. In addition it aims at strengthening legal 
cooperation with the EU in civil and criminal matters. It also gives support to encourage good governance which refers to the structure, functioning and performance of public authorities/institutions at all levels.
 46.  The projects in the sub-area of judiciary and good governance received a total 
EU-contribution of 24,8 million euro (15,0 % of total support) from pro-
grammes for the period 2000–05. This sub-area concerned only Moldova and Ukraine. The Court audited 10 contracts
28 with a total EU contribution 
of 14,2 million euro. 
 47.  Achievement has been mixed (see Annex III ). Some projects showed satis-
factory overall results, for example improvements in the application of civil and commercial law in Moldova (EU contribution of 2,2 million euro) or better international cooperation in criminal matters in Ukraine (EU  contribution of 1,5 million euro). By contrast, the results achieved in the project “Reform of arbitration courts and support to court administration” (EU contribution of 2,5 million euro) were less satisfactory, in particular regarding the provision of IT equipment. Nothing had been delivered by the original deadline. 
Anti-corruption
 48.  Results achieved to date in projects combating corruption are very modest. 
Corruption is one of the most pressing problems in Moldova and Ukraine threatening the whole sub-area of judiciary and good governance. Both countries are deeply affected, with a considerable impact on society
29. 
The legal and administrative systems are deeply flawed (e.g. lack of public trust, impaired independence of judges, insufficient salaries, high level of perceived corruption)
30.28 Including one contract which 
was finally not signed, see 
paragraph 52(c).
29 Position 111 for Moldova, 
position 118 for Ukraine in the 
2007 corruption perceptions index compiled by Transparency 
International.
30 See e.g. Ukraine Governance 
Assessment, performed in 
February 2007 by SIGMA (Support 
for improvement in governance and management), a joint initiative of 
the OECD and the European Union.
23
 49.  In 1999 and 2002 the Moldovan Government had already adopted ambitious 
national programmes for combating crime and corruption. However suc-
cess was very limited because of insufficient resources and the absence of an efficient control mechanism. In December 2004 the Parliament adopted 
a new anti-corruption strategy together with a new action plan for its  
implementation. At that moment the Commission intervened with its first anti-corruption project in Moldova.
 50.  The EU contribution was a relatively small pilot activity (250 000 euro). As 
its interim results were satisfactory, the Commission decided to fund a 
follow-up project for three years until 2009 (EU contribution of 3 million 
euro31). The new project progressed more slowly than planned and its  
achievement after the first year was very limited. Progress on key issues32 
or in the delivery of equipment had not been achieved. The project gained momentum only after March 2007.
 51.  The United States signed a 25 million dollar agreement to support anti-
corruption initiatives in Moldova33. The World Bank is also planning to  
aid anti-corruption measures. Coordinating the EU efforts with the assist-
ance of other international donors is now a major challenge. There are 
already parallel monitoring structures, undermining the concept of a  single national anti-corruption strategy.
 52.  Numerous donors have been active in the field of anti-corruption in Ukraine. 
The first significant EU financed project in this area (EU contribution of 1,5 million euro) started in 2006. One year into this three-year EU project the number of activities carried out was substantially lower than initially foreseen:
the Ukrainian authorities developed a draft anti-corruption action  (a) 
plan, without using specific drafting support offered by the project34. 
Only at a late stage, in June 2007, did the Ministry of Justice request an expert assessment of the draft. The experts criticised the “lack of transparency of the drafting process” and concluded that the draft action plan was “far from satisfactory”; 31 The project has two components, 
one on anti-corruption and one on 
anti-money laundering/financing of terrorism.
32 Revision of monitoring structure 
for strategy and action plan; 
reduction of the conflict of 
competences among the main 
enforcement bodies in investigation and prosecution; elaboration of risk 
analyses within judiciary, police, tax 
inspectorate, customs and health 
and education institutions.
33 Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) threshold program 
agreement.
34 See second progress report of 26 
June 2007.
24
no activities took place with regard to a monitoring mechanism for (b) 
the future implementation of the action plan. It is not clear which  
institution will have the lead in the anti-corruption fight. The issue of monitoring the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns 
was not tackled. Also a general public opinion survey on corruption 
was not carried out despite extensive preparatory work for this survey (defining a methodology, expert meetings);
while the Commission established the clear need to promote public (c) 
involvement in the anti-corruption effort, it abandoned the plan of developing a grant programme open to non governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and other civil society organisations aimed at promoting 
public involvement in the anti-corruption effort. The alternative solu-
tion, to support the creation of an advocacy and legal advice centre was also not realised due to procedural problems.
25
WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS 
FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?
 53.  While many projects delivered satisfactory results, this section presents rea-
sons for underperformance of those that did not. 
LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT TYPICALLY DUE TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS INVOLVING ALL MAIN PARTIES
 54.  The audit showed that limited achievements are typically due to a combination 
of factors involving all main parties (Commission, national authorities, international institutions). For example, in the anti-corruption project for Ukraine (see paragraph 52):
weak needs assessment by the Commission in a difficult context and (a) 
insufficient coordination with other donors: substantial parts of the project, especially the assistance to drafting legislation, were no  longer really wanted by the Ministry of Justice. Other organisations, particularly American ones, also provide anti-corruption legislative 
assistance;
lack of commitment and of cofinancing by the national authorities (b) : the 
Ministry of Justice failed to provide an adequate office to the project team, thus breaking not only the contract conditions but also its com-mitment expressed in a separate statement of endorsement;
weak management by the contractor (c)  which struggled to set up and 
maintain the project team; 
external factors (d) :  the difficult political situation following the  
2 April 2007 presidential decree on early elections combined with a frequent change of leadership in the Ministry of Justice caused the suspension of all legislative activity surrounding the anti-corruption draft laws.
26
SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS
 55.  Two factors made the Commission’s management more difficult and increased 
the risk of failure:
the majority of the projects lay under the responsibility of the Delega- (a) 
tion in Kiev. This Delegation has been responsible for project manage-ment not only in Ukraine but also in Belarus and Moldova. Staff in the area of freedom, security and justice are very competent, however the Kiev Delegation had too few project managers to deal with a rapidly growing policy area with an increasing number of projects. Although a new Delegation to Moldova was opened in October 2005, it only  started to become operational with regard to project management  in summer 2007;
the co-existence of different sources of financing to support the area (b) 
of freedom, security and justice (see paragraphs 3 and 4). The TACIS instrument proved to be insufficient to meet the growing demand for funding of projects. Different instruments, procedures and Commis-sion services were sometimes used for the same intervention, causing inefficient contract management (see Box 7).
EXAMPLE OF INEFFICIENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
BOX 7
Th e support of phase III in the cross-border co-operation between the western New Independent States 
and the EU (Söderköping process) was artiﬁ  cially divided into two contracts running in parallel with 
the same contractor. One contract is ﬁ  nanced from TACIS and managed by the Delegation in Kiev 
and the other is ﬁ  nanced from Aeneas and managed by Commission’s HQ in Brussels (EuropeAid). 
DG JLS, the previous manager, is no longer involved. 
Th e co-existence of two legal bases with diﬀ  erent rules for the same action is not coherent. For example 
the Aeneas contract ﬁ  xed the maximum allowed co-ﬁ  nancing rate at 80 % whereas the TACIS con-
tract co-ﬁ  nances 90 % of the total eligible costs. In addition the TACIS contract is subject to external 
monitoring whereas the Aeneas contract is not. Th  us the external monitors, who indicated a number 
of deﬁ  ciencies in the intervention logic (e.g. lack of measurable indicators), cannot give a complete 
picture of the action. 
Th e artiﬁ  cial division into two projects is also not eﬃ   cient. Th  e administrative burden is doubled for 
each implementation step on the Commission’s and the contractor’s side (parallel procedures for 
project selection, contracting, cost veriﬁ  cation, payment requests, payments, reporting). Th  e need for 
coordination to avoid double funding is high. 
27
 56.  These two structural problems led to failings in the Commission’s planning 
and implementation procedures. Requirements were not always assessed 
thoroughly enough (see example in paragraph 52(a)) or financing deci-sions were taken without an in-depth analysis of the fulfilment of basic 
preconditions. For example, in the case of two accommodation centres 
for asylum seekers, questions of land allocation or ownership were not clarified (see Box 6 and paragraph 27). The Commission’s supervision of project reporting requirements was not strong enough (see paragraph 60). A major concern is the lack of exchange of information with other donor organisations with regard to their planned projects to avoid unnecessary duplication in programming and later in implementation. With regard to project extensions, a convincing analysis of the need for extra time and, in one case, for extra money was not always made.
SHORTCOMINGS IN MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
 57.  For most of the contracts, the Commission opted for grants awarded directly 
to international organisations, because of their particular competence  in the area of freedom, security and justice and their geographical pres-ence in the countries. As a consequence, the international organisations are in charge of the day-to-day project implementation (so-called joint management, see paragraph 6), although the Commission retains overall responsibility for sound management. Whereas generally the perform-ance of the international organisations was satisfactory, the following  shortcomings were noted in relation to this form of management:
after contract signature, international institutions often faced prob- (a) 
lems in putting a functioning project team in place, delaying the start of the project by several months;
in other cases delays were caused by lengthy procurement processes. (b) 
Contracts with international organisations usually stipulate that the 
procurement of any goods, works or services is carried out by the  organisation in accordance with its own rules and procedures. In one case the contract stated that the procedures applied by the interna-tional organisation should not be less stringent than the EU rules. This clause caused lengthy clarification procedures, hindering an efficient procurement process;
28
in one international organisation dealing with a number of contracts, (c) 
lengthy administrative procedures caused late payments to local  
suppliers;
the possibility of carrying out detailed checks on expenditure in  (d) 
projects implemented by an international organisation is not defined clearly enough. In one instance, the verification clause in the finan-cial and administrative framework agreement (FAFA) with the United Nations was interpreted differently by the Commission and its coun-terparts, hindering controls and a timely closure of the contract;
EU visibility was not achieved in some projects managed by interna- (e) 
tional organisations in Moldova. Beneficiaries are not always aware 
that projects received EU funding. Projects are then perceived only 
as those of the managing international organisations. This is due to their direct implementation role and also to the fact that project web 
pages are usually only to be found under their address.
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING 
PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?
 58.  The Commission’s learning process is of utmost importance in the area of 
freedom, security and justice as a sustainable change can only be expected with a long-term gradual approach. A new project has to build upon the achievement and experience gained in earlier projects and repetition of 
mistakes has to be avoided. Several examples showed that lessons were 
indeed learnt: for example, in the new project “Increased independence, 
transparency and efficiency of the justice system of Moldova” (EU contri-
bution of 3 million euro) the Commission focused on a narrower spectrum of interrelated project purposes, avoiding the dispersion found in the  
forerunner project. 
29
 59.  In line with the needed gradual approach, the Commission has financed 
projects sequentially, e.g. three consecutive projects in the area of drug 
control. The projects fiches prepared by the Commission within new pro-grammes usually have sections “Lessons learnt” into which information 
flows from progress reporting, evaluation and monitoring.
NOT ALL POSSIBILITIES EXPLOITED TO COLLECT INFORMATION
 60.  However in some cases the sections “Lessons learnt” were weak. The Commis-
sion had not sufficiently exploited the possibilities to gather information 
for the learning process because progress reports were late or of a poor 
quality or planned evaluations had not been carried out. These shortcom-ings point to a lack of supervision by the Commission of the respective 
contract stipulations by contractors. 
 61.  It is positive that the Commission has a contract with external consultants 
to monitor projects, including on-the-spot visits and interviews with the different stakeholders. In general the external monitors performed well 
and often corrective action in the daily management took place following 
their remarks. However the Court notes two weaknesses:
some projects were not covered by external monitoring, notably  (a) 
projects comprising works or supply contracts and the non-TACIS  projects managed from Brussels
35. Management from a distance  
already hinders a closer follow up. The absence of monitoring wors-ened the problem. The resulting lack of up to date information led in one case to the Commission retroactively agreeing to a substantial 
budget change as well as to the extension of the contract one month 
after the expiry of the original grant agreement;
the aggregate monitoring scores for some of the audited projects  (b) 
were overly positive. 35 Generally projects below a 
1 million euro threshold were also 
not covered.
30
EXPERIENCE GAINED NOT ALWAYS REFLECTED IN NEW PROJECTS
 62.  In some cases experiences gained in earlier projects were insufficiently 
reflected in new projects. This happened especially when project manage-ment changed from one Commission service to another. As a result new projects faced sometimes the same problems as projects from previous programmes, errors were repeated or there was no continuity between project phases (see Box 8).
EXPERIENCES MADE INSUFFICIENTLY TRANSFERRED INTO NEW PROJECTSBOX 8
Concerning the project “Establishment of migration management system in Zarkapattya” (Ukraine) (a) 
the speciﬁ  c experience of the ﬁ  rst project was not a decisive factor in the Commission’s process of 
evaluating the proposal for the second project. While the proposal brieﬂ  y explained how the action 
was intended to build on the results of the previous action the Commission evaluated it as if it were 
a new action. Th  ey did not assess if the planning documents took into account risks materialised 
in the forerunner project. For example, the role, the conduct and also the budget problems of the 
border guards service in running the centres were not considered. Th  e question as to how the project 
should better build up capacity should have been dealt with in more detail;
the project “Capacity building of migration management-CBMM II” (Ukraine) was prepared with-(b) 
out suﬃ   cient consideration of the experience of the previous project. Although substantial imple-
mentation problems appeared in this ﬁ  rst project, the Commission signed a grant agreement for a 
follow-up project at an early stage. It was not logical to replicate more or less a project which was 
facing severe implementation challenges, especially when the timetable for completion was tight;
Th e Koslovichi II Border Terminal project (see Box 3) revealed diﬃ   culties in obtaining bids within (c) 
tender budgets and obtaining exemption from value added tax. Th  ese two problems had been high-
lighted in a Special Report from the Court of Auditors published in November 200136 concerning 
the TACIS cross-border cooperation programme.
36 Special Report No 11/2001 concerning the TACIS cross-border cooperation programme together with the Commission’s replies 
(OJ C 329, 23.11.2001).
31
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROJECTS IN BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
 63.  The greater part of the audited projects Belarus37, Moldova and Ukraine 
achieved satisfactory results (see Annex III ). However their scope was  
limited compared to the scale of the problems they had to address and success varied, even between components within the same project. In  general progress was slower than expected by the Commission, the great majority of projects being extended by several months, some even by  
over a year.
 64.  The best performance was in the area of “Border management”. The EU sup-
port substantially enhanced the border management capacities of Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. However the long term goal of a modern system of 
border management approximating European good practice is still some 
way off. The key issue is to convert the initial success into sustainable 
operational improvement (see paragraphs 11 to 19).
 65.  The European flagship project in the area of border assistance, EUBAM, per-
formed well. The peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is, how-
ever, a long-term task needing policy measures beyond better border and customs controls and border surveillance (see Box 1). 
 66.  The performance was unsatisfactory in the area of “Migration and asylum”, 
mainly in respect of infrastructure. Progress in providing adequate shelter 
for illegal migrants and asylum seekers respecting international humani-tarian standards has been especially slow in Ukraine. The division of  
responsibilities at national level remains unclear and the Government  allocated insufficient funds for infrastructure and running costs (see para-graphs 20 to 27).
 67.  Mixed results were achieved in the area “Fight against organised crime”. In 
spite of several successes, project achievements have been insufficient in respect of securing effective prosecution and improved cooperation between customs, border guards, police and secret services for effective criminal investigations (see paragraphs 28 to 44).37 Due to a lack of respect for 
democracy and human rights, 
assistance to Belarus was limited 
to humanitarian, cross-border 
and regional cooperation projects (see paragraph 7).
32
 68.  In the area of “Judiciary and good governance” the results are also mixed. 
Despite democratic reforms and improvements brought about by EU sup-
port, Moldova and Ukraine are still deeply affected by corruption (see  footnotes 31 and 32). The Court considers that a fundamental, long term 
change in political will, mentalities, behaviour and attitudes is required to achieve a significant reduction in this high level of corruption (see  paragraphs 45 to 52). 
RECOMMENDATION
The Commission should:
with the aim of achieving sustainable operational improvement in (a) 
border management, seek advice from the European Agency for  
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Bor-
ders (Frontex); with regard to further support for border equip-
ment ensure complementarity with equipment provided by other 
donors; 
before releasing further funds for centres for illegal migrants  (b) 
and asylum seekers, make sure of the recipient government’s  commitment to pay for at least the running costs, thus ensuring  sustainability;
in the fight against organised crime, focus the project activities  (c) 
more on the issue of effective prosecution (including a modern  system of seizure and confiscation of assets) and promote more  systematic information sharing between law enforcement bodies; 
continue to explore possibilities for promoting more public involve-(d) 
ment in the anti-corruption policy by supporting civil society organ-
isations and advice centres.
WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS 
FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE?
 69.  Whereas the Commission has the ultimate responsibility for the projects, the 
audit showed that where limited achievements were found they could be typically attributed to the actions or omissions of all the main parties: the Commission, national authorities in the recipient states and contractors which in this area were often international organisations. External fac-tors such as political instability also diminished the project results (see paragraph 54).
33
 70.  The Commission did not allocate sufficient manpower to the Delegation in Kiev 
to deal with a rapidly growing, labour-intensive policy area in the three 
countries. And it took nearly two years to start operational project manage-ment in the Delegation in Moldova (established in 2005). The co-existence 
of several EU financing instruments for the same purpose, and a lack of consistency between them, hampered a quality approach. Furthermore, the Commission did not take rigorous action whenever it became apparent that the quality of the EU assistance was lowered by shortcomings in the project management of the grant contractors (see paragraphs 55 to 57).
 71.  The recipient governments and the Commission did not sufficiently coordi-
nate EU activities with the massive support given by other donors. The 
uncoordinated flow of funds from different sources causes unnecessary 
duplication of efforts, inconsistent approaches and reduced incentive to 
keep costs low (see paragraphs 36, 51, 54(a)).
 72.  In the recipient countries a lack of commitment at project level was noted 
especially in the sub-areas of migration/asylum and judiciary/good  
governance. The Commission also underestimated the extent to which  
external factors, such as political fragility, discontinuity of government 
structures and, potentially, lack of EU accession perspective could prevent 
the fulfilment of project objectives. These factors lay beyond the Com-mission’s direct responsibility but were not adequately and realistically 
evaluated in its risk assessment (see paragraphs 54(b) and (d)). 
RECOMMENDATION  
The Commission should:
strengthen its personnel in the area of freedom, security and jus-(a) 
tice in the Delegations in Moldova and Ukraine and have sufficient 
expertise for dealing with procurement and works elements;
strive to use the new ENP instrument as a (b) single and flexible tool 
for support to the sector; 
exercise more rigorous control over the international institutions (c) 
acting as contractors in respect of project management procedures, such as mobilisation of personnel, procurement, payments, report-
ing, expenditure control and requirement for EU visibility;
take appropriate steps to encourage and support the recipient coun-(d) 
tries to establish and exercise effective donor coordination;
support the projects where the real interest of recipient countries (e) 
is clear and evidenced by, among other things, national funding; at 
the same time be more realistic in terms of objectives and consider longer implementation periods for individual projects. 
34
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE COMMISSION A LEARNING 
PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS FOR THE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?
 73.  The Commission has not fully exploited options to learn lessons, and experience 
gained was not always reflected in newly-started projects which in some cases led to the repetition of old mistakes (see paragraphs 60 to 62). 
RECOMMENDATION  
When preparing new projects the Commission should take into account more systematically the experiences of earlier projects. “Lessons learnt” sections should be more fully developed in preparatory documents . They should also become a standard element in grant applications from international organisations.
  This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meet-
ing of 19 November 2008.
  For the Court of Auditors
Vítor Manuel da Silva Caldeira
President
35
ANNEX I
Source : European Commission.

36
ANNEX II
JHA  PROJECT OVERVIEW COMMITTED UNDER PROGRAMMES 200005 
Belarus Moldova Ukraine Multi-country Total 
No of 
projectsMillion euroNo of 
projectsMillion
euroNo of 
projectsMillion 
euroNo of 
projectsMillion 
euroNo of 
projects %Million 
euro%
Border management 
(including customs)3 27 300 000 5 2 773 635 16 42 019 884 21 32 593 501 45 50,6 104 687 020 63,2
Migration and asylum 2 940 700 1 794 700 5 8 628 764 9 6 472 354 17 19,1 16 836 518 10,2
Fight against organised 
crime (terrorism, drugs, money laundering, human traﬃ   cking) 1 1 200 000 4 4 207 408 2 6 892 000 4 6 898 012 11 12,3 19 197 420 11,6
Judiciary and good 
governance (including ﬁ  ght against 
corruption)4 6 244 015 7 16 175 935 4 2 382 483 15 16,9 24 802 433 14,9
Other 1 172 000 1 1,1 172 000 0,1
TOTAL 6 29 440 700 14 14 019 758 31 73 888 583 38 48 346 350 89 100,0 165 695 391 100,0
Source:  European Commission.
37
ANNEX III  
OVERVIEW OF AUDITED CONTRACTS 
N Title of the contractEU 
contributionCountryStatus
(July 2007) 1Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancingOverall judgment 
on results2
BORDER MANAGEMENT
1EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM I4 000 000,00 UA, MDcompleted on 
21.5.2006UNDP / Rapid reaction 
mechanism
Satisfactory  2EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM II4 000 000,00 UA, MDcompleted on 
31.10.2006UNDP / RAP 2004
3EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM III2 200 000,00 UA, MDcompleted on 
31.1.2007UNDP / RAP 2003
4EU border assistance mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine EUBAM IV8 885 000,00 UA, MDongoing since 
1.2.2007UNDP / RAP 2006
5Strengthening border management in the 
Republic of Belarus — BOMBEL I4 500 000,00 BLcompleted on 
31.12.2006UNDP / RAP 2001
Satisfactory
6Strengthening border management in the 
Republic of Belarus — BOMBEL II8 800 000,00 BLongoing since 
1.9.2006UNDP / RAP 2003
7 Kozlovichi II Border Terminal — works 14 000 000,00 BLongoing since 
30.12.2004Works contract / CBC 
2000; CBC 2002Unsatisfactory
8Border management improvement, 
Ukraine — Lot 1,22 223 738,00 UAcompleted on 
17.7.2005Supply contracts / 
TACIS NAP 2001Satisfactory
9Border management improvement, 
Ukraine — Lot 51 770 555,00 UAcompleted on 
17.7.2005
10Reform and modernisation of the customs 
in Ukraine1 372 500,00 UAcompleted on 
15.1.2005Service contract / NAP 
2001 (Small projects 
programmes)Satisfactory , however 
underperformance in component 
“New computerised transit system”
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM
11Establishment of migration management 
system in Zakarpattya1 278 186,41 UAcompleted on 
31.12.2006Grant agreement /
Budget line B7-667     Unsatisfactory  with regard 
to capacity building (action 
of humanitarian aid)12Enhancing capacities in the area 
of protection and treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in Zakarpatia699 942,43 UAongoing since 
1.1.2007 Grant agreement /
Aeneas
13Capacity building of migration 
management — CBMM I3 781 505,00 UAongoing since 
1.3.2005International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS NAP 
2003Unsatisfactory  in its core activity 
(MACs); corrective action launched 
after audit visits14Capacity building of migration 
management (Phase II) — CBMM II2 767 000,00 UAongoing since 
22.7.2006
15Strengthening the asylum systems 
of Ukraine and Moldova1 635 000,00 UA, MDcompleted on 
31.12.2006UNHCR / TACIS RAP 
2002Unsatisfactory  in its core activity 
(temporary accommodation 
centres) for Ukraine and Belarus, 
Satisfactory  for Moldova16Strengthening the national asylum system 
in the Republic of Belarus365 000,00 BLcompleted on 
31.12.2006
17The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Secretariat147 479,00 BL, UA, MDcompleted on 
3.5.2004UNHCR / ATA
Satisfactory , however delays. 
Exit strategy to be designed.18The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping I762 488,00 BL, UA, MDcompleted on 
28.2.2006Swedish Migration 
Board / Budget line 
B7-667
19The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping II a1 307 898,00 BL, UA, MDongoing since 
1.3.2006UNHCR (subcontractors 
IOM & Swedish 
Migration Board) / 
Aeneas
20The cross-border cooperation process 
(Söderköping process) — Söderköping II b1 026 000,00 BL, UA, MDongoing since 
1.3.2006UNHCR (subcontractors 
IOM & Swedish 
Migration Board) / RAP 
2004
1 Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2 Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ  cant parts of the speciﬁ  c objectives not achieved (ﬁ  nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).
38
N Title of the contractEU 
contributionCountryStatus
(July 2007)1Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancingOverall judgment 
on results2
FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
21Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 12 000 000,00 BL, UA, MDcompleted on 
30.4.2005UNDP/ RAP 2001
Satisfactory  for setting new 
anti-drug structures, 
Unsatisfactory  for legislation 
and police intelligence22Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 22 500 000,00 BL, UA, MDcompleted on 
21.1.2007UNDP/ RAP 2002 
23Drug control multisectoral assistance 
and institution building in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus — BUMAD 32 000 000,00 BL, UA, MDongoing since 
1.1.2007UNDP/ RAP 2004
24Combating traﬃ   cking in women 
in Moldova599 408,00 MDcompleted on 
23.6.2004International 
Organisation for 
Migration / RAP 2000Satisfactory , however concern 
as to eﬃ   ciency (overlapping 
with other donors)
25Fighting traﬃ   cking in persons 
in the Republic of Moldova300 000,00 MDcompleted on 
18.12.2006International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002
26IOM Rehabilitation Centre for Victims 
of Traﬃ   cking Chisinau, Moldova: recovery, 
rehabilitation and reintegration through comprehensive care308 000,00 MDcompleted on 
3.3.2006International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002Satisfactory , however concern 
as to economy (high rent)
27Combating traﬃ   cking in human beings 
in Ukraine1 892 000,00 UAcompleted on 
18.6.2006International 
Organisation for 
Migration / TACIS RAP 
2002Satisfactory  for protection/ 
reintegration and raising 
awareness. Unsatisfactory  
for criminalisation and prosecution
28Project against money laundering, 
terrorist ﬁ  nancing and corruption 
in Moldova3 000 000,00 MDongoing since 
2.8.2006Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2005Unsatisfactory  start; 
but improvement 
in anti-corruption component
29Project against money laundering 
in Ukraine — MOLI-UA-1974 502,00 UAcompleted on 
1.7.2005Council of Europe / 
RAP 1999
Satisfactory
30Follow-up project against money 
laundering and terrorist ﬁ  nancing 
in Ukraine — MOLI-UA-25 000 000,00 UAongoing since 
1.5.2006Council of Europe / 
NAP 2005ANNEX III  
1 Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2 Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ  cant parts of the speciﬁ  c objectives not achieved (ﬁ  nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).
39
N Title of the contractEU 
contributionCountryStatus
(July 2007)1Contractor / Source 
of ﬁ nancingOverall judgment 
on results2
JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
31Civil and commercial judiciary project 
NIS, Moldova2 194 015,00 MDcompleted on 
29.7.2005GTZ/ NAP 2001 Satisfactory
32Support to the national anti-corruption 
strategy of Moldova (PACO Moldova)250 000,00 MDcompleted on 
14.1.2006Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2003Satisfactory (pilot action)
33Joint programme between the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe for Moldova: Support to continued democratic reforms 2004–06800 000,00 MDcompleted on 
15.12.2006Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2003Satisfactory , however ineﬃ   cient 
design 
34Increased independence, transparency 
and eﬃ   ciency of the justice system 
of the Republic of Moldova 3 000 000,00 MDongoing since 
1.10.2006Council of Europe/ 
NAP 2005Satisfactory , however lack 
of lessons learnt
35Reform of arbitration courts and support 
to court administration2 476 000,00 UAcompleted on 
31.12.2005UNDP/ NAP 2000 Unsatisfactory
36Ukraine international cooperation 
in criminal matters (UPIC)1 500 000,00 UAongoing since 
1.12.2005Council of Europe/
Nap 2004Satisfactory
37Ukraine — Judicial selection and 
appointment procedure, training, disciplinary liability, case management and alternative dispute resolution methods2 000 000,00 UAongoing since 
31.5.2006Council of Europe/
NAP 2003Unsatisfactory  start; more 
satisfactory  since 2007
38Support to good governance: Project 
against corruption in Ukraine (UPAC)1 500 000,00 UAongoing since 
9.6.2006Council of Europe/
NAP 2004Unsatisfactory
39Interpol-assisted international 
cooperation in criminal matters by Ukrainian Law-enforcement989 788,00 UAongoing since 
15.1.2007Interpol/NAP 2004Unsatisfactory  start; more 
satisfactory  since June 2007
40Anti-corruption advocacy and legal advice 
centre in Ukraine (ALAC)500 000,00 UAProject 
prepared, 
however no 
contract signed
NAP 2004 Unsatisfactory, activity cancelled
Total EU contribution 99 306 004,84ANNEX III  
1 Last mission on the spot took place in July 2007.
2 Unsatisfactory: denotes signiﬁ  cant parts of the speciﬁ  c objectives not achieved (ﬁ  nished contracts) or current progress far below expectations (ongoing contracts).
40
ANNEX IV
Source : European Commission.
41
REPLY 
OF THE COMMISSION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. 
The Commission’s assistance had to operate  
in difficult political and institutional contexts 
characterised by Soviet-style administration in need of large scale reforms.
Due to a lack of respect for democracy, human 
rights, and rule of law, Commission assistance to Belarus is limited to 5 million euro per year 
for the period 2007–10. Successive Council  
conclusions state that EU assistance to Bela-
rus will support the needs of the population  and democratisation, notably by humanitar-ian, cross-border and regional cooperation and by projects supporting directly and indirectly democratisation and democratic forces.
III. 
The Commission welcomes the positive appre-ciation of the Court for the projects in the area 
of border management that represents nearly 
two thirds of the projects financial weight. In 
the area of migration and asylum, difficulties were encountered in the work/supply compo-nents of projects, particularly in Ukraine, while the capacity-building components attained sat-isfactory achievements.
IV. 
Political instability in the region has contrib-uted to hindering progress. However, limited achievements were circumscribed to some  projects.
As regards coordination with other donors,  
the Delegation in Ukraine is unanimously con-sidered in the forefront of such an exercise.  The extent to which coordination takes place is heavily reliable upon the willingness of the parties involved to enter such a process (some donors, especially non-EU, are more reluctant than others).
42
The Commission has undertaken to systemati-
cally lead and strengthen donor coordination 
efforts in countries, and hosted a region-wide donor coordination conference in January 2008 
to kick-start this process.
Taking account of the possibility of compar-
ing the technical specificity of projects, les-sons learnt were considered in the design of  subsequent operations.
The EC Delegation in Moldova has now fully  
taken over programme management responsi-
bilities from the Kiev Delegation.
V.
The Commission acknowledges the work of the Court and its contribution to increase the effec-tiveness of the projects. 
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH
13.The Commission acknowledges the positive  appreciation of the Court on the financially  most significant part of the audit.
Box 3 — Example of unsatisfactory result: 
reduced scope of work and delaysIn spite of the difficulties mentioned, the Com-mission took a number of measures in order  to assure the completion of the project. The  progress of work was closely and permanently monitored until completion. Finally, the works contract has been completed with full utilisa-tion of the EC funds. The provisional acceptance certificate for the EC-funded works contract on construction of the Kozlovichi II Border Termi-nal was signed by the Belarusian Customs in  March 2008. The Belarusian Customs took the decision to complete those elements of infra-structure that were excluded after negotiations with their national funding (i.e. parking areas 
and some storage facilities). Respective works 
are ongoing. The new border terminal thus is expected to be made operational in the begin-
ning of 2009. Works were planned allowing the 
old border terminal to continue its function-ing through the construction period of the  new one, and the old terminal will continue  to be used as a part of the entire complex at  Kozlovich.
17. 
The rapid reaction mechanism (RRM) allows the 
mobilisation and rapid deployment of specific financial resources to take urgent action to  help re-establish or safeguard normal condi-tions for the execution of the policies under-taken, in order to preserve their effectiveness. Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 381/2001  clearly indicates that the RRM may finance  actions which under normal circumstances fall within the regular assistance programmes. The 
major purpose of the RRM was to enable the  
Community to react swiftly to crisis situations 
and thus to support the Communities’ external policy. The RRM paved the way for the regu-lar programmes to be used in order to achieve the overall objectives of the intervention. As  mentioned in the EUBAM terms of reference,  it was from the very beginning assumed that  tangible results can only be expected in the  mid- or long-terms. This assumption is fully in line with the intention of the Council Regula-tion establishing the RRM.
43
18. 
The Tacis programme was not flexible enough 
to allow for a quick mobilisation of major funds for a longer implementation period. A window 
of opportunity for such a project occurred in 
June 2005 when the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine signed a joint letter to the Council and the Commission requesting assistance. The  Commission felt it important to react rapidly  to this request. However, due to the political instability in the region at that time (the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine), it was unavoidable to conclude short-term agreements making use of available funds. Meanwhile, the mandate of the mission was extended (up to  end 2009). A factor of predictability was intro-duced with the coming into force of the ENPI, in the frame of the Regional East Indicative  Programme 2007–10. An annual allocation is  foreseen for EUBAM until the end of 2009.
19. 
The Bommoluk projects are based on EUBAM’s 
“Needs assessment and recommendations  
report” which analysed the gaps and needs  of the national border authorities at the  Moldovan-Ukrainian state border. A distinct  advantage is that the lessons learned from ten-der processes in previous projects are being  taken into account. As regards other donors,  complementarity was ensured with the US  whose focus was to provide counter-terrorism assistance. Before having tendered any equip-ment, the beneficiaries have to ensure that  they are able to operate the equipment, and  to cover the running and maintenance costs.  EUBAM is carefully examining the partner serv-ices’ capacity to fulfil their commitments.25.
(a) 
Upon the request of the Ukrainian Government, the Commission decided to support the lat-
ter. The Ukrainian Government showed strong 
commitment in 2004, to improve conditions  for irregular migrants and agreed to financially support the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration to establish two migrant custody centres which meet the standards determined by the European Convention on Human Rights and the recommendations of the CPT.
Box 4 — Despite alleviation by EU support, 
living conditions for illegal migrants in existing accommodation centre still unacceptableDue to the very poor condition of the tempo-rary holding facilities in Pavshino and Chop,  this project finally delivered more humanitar-ian aid than capacity building.
After the EC Delegation’s visit, a serious dis-
cussion was held with representatives of the  
State Border Guard Service (SBGS) which took immediate action and initiated corrective  measures. After the Court’s visit, the Commis-sion recommended the Government of Ukraine closed Pavshino due to the poor human rights standards. Meanwhile the Cabinet of Ministers decided to close Pavshino as soon as other  facilities are available.
Box 5 — Poor progress in establishing 
new accommodation centres for illegal migrantsDelays were encountered in refurbishing the  selected migrant custody centres in Zhuravychi (Volyn oblast) and Rozsudiv (Chernihiv oblast) due to political instability (“Orange Revolu-tion”), change in competent ministry over the period 2004–05 and lack of transfer of commit-ted resources.
44
The decision to reduce the number of accom-
modation places from initially 1 260 to 250 was 
based on European practice by acknowledg-ing that higher capacity negatively affects the 
operation of the centre. In 2007 substantial  
progress was made in refurbishment works.  Meanwhile both migrant custody centres have started operating in accordance with European practices.
Box 6 — Underutilisation of newly 
constructed centres for asylum seekers
At the end of 2006, 250 accommodation places 
for asylum seekers were available in the Odessa Temporary Accommodation Centre (TAC) thanks to the “Strengthening the asylum systems of  Moldova and Ukraine project”. It is true that at the time of the audit only half of the TAC was in use due to a lack of State funding. As far as TAC in Mukachevo is concerned it started becoming operational in November 2007 after the Com-mission convinced the Ukrainian Government 
to transfer the ownership of the land and build-
ing from the SBGS to the State Committee for 
Nationalities and Religion, and to make avail-able State funding for its operation.
26. 
The Commission is pointing to the financial  aspects in its meetings with the Ukrainian  Government. The division of responsibilities  between the SBGS and the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs is legally determined and clear: the SBGS responsibility ends after 10 days (short-term detention), afterwards irregular migrants have to be handed over to the ministry of Inter-nal Affairs. However, since the ministry did not operate any custody centre until recently, the law was not applied and the SBGS held migrants detained up to 6 months, the maximum dura-tion allowed by Ukrainian legislation.27. 
The “Strengthening of the national Belarus  
asylum system project” faced administrative  and legal problems that the EC Delegation  
addressed and solved through contacts with  
the national administration. The TAC for asylum seekers in Gomel in Belarus has been officially opened on 16 January 2008 and is now oper-ated and used.
34. 
In its attempt to assist better information shar-
ing among the Ukrainian law-enforcement,  
the Commission in cooperation with Interpol  has since explored the possibility of extend-ing i24/7 to the SBGS of Ukraine. However, for reasons related to national sovereignty this  extension proved not to be feasible.
35. 
Ukraine has not yet ratified the Council of  Europe convention on data protection which  is a requirement if personal data is transmitted. The Commission is urging Ukraine to ratify the convention in order to enable law enforcement services to cooperate with each other. The non-ratification of the data protection convention is also a reason why no strategic agreement  has yet been signed with Europol.
36. 
The Commission became active in the region in the fight against trafficking in human beings already in 2000. With the involvement of  others donors in anti-trafficking, the Commission  stopped programming such projects under the Tacis bilateral programme. The last project was the one for Belarus under NAP 2005.
40. 
The legislative process was, at least in Ukraine, hampered by frequent changes in the Govern-ment after the Orange Revolution. Generally  speaking legislative processes are slow in the region.
45
41. 
At the time of the Court’s visit seizures were  
indeed modest. However, the results have  improved significantly since then. Ukraine  
seized in 2007 a total of 415 kg heroin and  
19 kg cocaine, and in the first five months  of 2008 214 kg heroin and 41 kg cocaine. In  Moldova, a seizure of 200 kg heroin was made in February 2008. The EC project has certainly contributed to the successful seizures through its capacity-building activities.
47. 
The “Reform of arbitration courts and support to court administration” project has delivered tangible results since it was the first judicial-assistance project of such a scope and magni-tude ever in Ukraine and it intervened in an  institutional context still designed along the  Soviet-style administration profile. Some sig-nificant operational changes suggested by the project were implemented by the State Court 
Administration.
Ensuring that all equipment purchases were  
made in a transparent manner resulted in some cases in tender cancellations which eventually caused delays.
50. 
The follow-up project started in August 2006 and suffered a slow start due to the resigna-tion of the anti-corruption advisor soon after the start-up conference and a new recruitment had to be launched.52. 
The 2006–07 political crisis affected the pace 
of reforms as well as activities surround-ing adoption of new anti-corruption legisla-
tion and the anti-corruption action plan. The 
project received a fresh start at the end of 2007 when the snap parliamentary elections brought pro-presidential political forces to power. The project work plan was revised during the Steer-ing Group (SG) meeting held on 29.11.2007  and a list of priority activities for the period  December 2007 to March 2008 was approved. Part of the activities related to drafting and  adoption of anti-corruption legislation have  been rescheduled for 2008 and 2009.
(a) 
The “Anti-corruption action plan” (ACAP)  started with assistance provided by the project. However, subsequently the Ministry of Justice decided to draft the ACAP alone. As a follow-up measure aimed to support the ACAP implemen-tation, the project assisted in drafting of the 
“anti-corruption package”. The expert assess-
ment provided by the CoE focused on the anti-corruption package containing three draft laws. The expertise by the President of the Group of States against corruption (GRECO) mentioned the high quality of the revised draft laws.
Experts had access to the anti-corruption  
action plan only briefly before it was enacted. Thus, there was not any possibility to suggest changes to the document. Moreover, the draft laws were supposed to be adopted at the same time with the action plan to provide the legal foundation for the anti-corruption fight in  Ukraine. The deployment of the project and  Ukraine’s accession to GRECO served as “cata-lysts” for the action plan’s adoption. Never-theless, it was perceived that by adopting the action plan the Government was intending to “timely report” on the action taken rather than generating a well-orchestrated comprehensive document easy to implement.
46
(b) 
The ACAP was only adopted in August 2007.  
Therefore no ACAP monitoring-related activi-ties could have taken place at the time of the 
audit.
Project support is currently provided through 
the inter-institutional working group on com-bating corruption to which a representative  from the project team has been appointed as a member. Monitoring of ACAP implementa-tion is one of the group’s objectives. The issue of political party financing was first raised at the project Steering Group meeting on 6 March 2007, but it was understated by the Ministry  of Justice.
As to the general public opinion survey on  
corruption, the Ukrainian authorities had sent simultaneous requests to several international donors without ensuring the necessary coordi-nation and dissemination of the information.
54.
(a), (b), (c) The main problem has been indeed the diffi-cult political situation from April 2007 until  the end of the year. The perception by the  Court of the needs assessment in the area of  justice/judiciary/anti-corruption in Ukraine is essentially the result of a particularly difficult and specific context, which is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and dilution  of responsibilities among different executive entities, and by a lack of any form of cross-sectoral coordination.
The project had been designed and developed 
together with prospective beneficiaries (the  Ministry of Justice among them). The local  ownership, therefore, has been ensured from the very outset and confirmed under the cur-rent Government, appointed after the 2007  elections.Regular donor coordination initiatives have  
been put in place by the project team in order to 
share information; to ensure coherence among the different interventions and to avoid over-
lapping. Initial staffing difficulties are over-
come and the issue of office space availability is now solved under the new government.
It has to be stressed that co-financing is not an 
obligation for the recipient country.
55.
(a) 
The EC Delegation in Moldova has now fully  taken over its programme management respon-sibilities from the Kiev Delegation. In general, the Commission agrees with the Court that  adequate staffing, both in terms of number  and skills, represents a challenge.
(b) 
Though creating some administrative complex-ity this mixed fund architecture did not impede the Söderköping project to reach satisfactory results, as acknowledged by the Court.
Box 7 — Example of inefficient 
contract management
The division of the Söderköping phase 3 project between the Aeneas programme and Tacis was done because neither programme had available sufficient funding to allow a comprehensive  
project which was particularly important after EU enlargement in 2004 in order to promote  cross-border cooperation in the area of asy-lum, migration and border management and  to avoid the impression that the EU is build-ing a new curtain along the new EU external  border.
47
56. 
It is correct that the Commission’s implement-
ing partners did not pay adequate attention to the question of land allocation and ownership. 
However, as soon as the Commission learned  
about these problems corrective measures  were immediately initiated.
Donor coordination took place frequently,  
before, during and after programming exer-cises. It became institutionalised after the Paris 
Declaration. Meanwhile, joint programming  
missions took place.
57. 
Despite limited cases of shortcomings, inter-national organisations do usually have a sig-nificant level of know-how in terms of — inter alia — mobilisation of expertise, overseas finan-cial management and efficient procurement in difficult fields. Improvements will be brought in the definition of verification modalities in  
the context of the FAFA through the elabora-
tion of common terms of reference, and visibil-
ity will be enhanced thanks to the issuance of the “Visibility and communication manual for EU external actions” (April 2008) that now also applies to international organisations.
(d) 
“In the specific case, it has been decided to carry out verifications on some UNDP projects and to follow up on the basis of these findings”.
60. 
The Commission follows scrupulously the  
reporting procedure that links reporting with payment to contractors. There are instances  when continuity of action necessitates the  launching of new contracts when the full  reporting procedure has not yet been com-pleted on an existing action, thus giving rise to unavoidable situations when not all informa-tion possibilities are exploited.61.
(a) 
Since the Court’s audit the Commission has  widened the ROM coverage.
(b) 
The ROM two-page summary report, supported by a detailed background conclusion sheet,  includes not only the scoring of the main five monitoring criteria (relevance, efficiency,  effectiveness, impact and sustainability), but also a total of 21 sub-criteria to be analysed, scored and made available for statistics and  further comparisons. The MONIS (monitoring  information system) database allows a detailed and strategic statistical, yet simple to extract and use, analysis for all managers involved  in projects supervision, implementation and  monitoring.
Box 8 — Experiences made insufficiently 
transferred into new projects(a) The follow-up project selected was the best  proposal received under the 2005 Aeneas call for proposals and met the actual needs of the detention centres in the Carpathian region.
(b) 
As regards the timing for the follow-up project, the CBMM 2 project was signed to support the positive resolution of the EC-Ukraine negotia-tions on the readmission agreement. Lessons learned from the CBMM 1 project were taken  into account, particularly with respect to the focus on temporary holding facilities and the issue of land allocation/ownership clarified  upfront with the responsible entity, and to  the additional funds required for the VolynMi-grant Custody Centre and made available under phase II of the project.
48
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
63. 
The Commission acknowledges the overall  
positive appreciation of the Court as regards the audited projects. Their scope was naturally 
limited to avoid dilution of activities and to  
diminish the risk of low effectiveness in terms of outcomes, given the scale of the problems to be tackled in these transition countries. While the capacity-building component of projects  has achieved overall satisfactory results, the  work/supply components have progressed  more slowly due to the tendering procedures involved and the need for the beneficiary  administration to provide adequate logistics.
64. 
The key issue of sustainability is tackled in a  two-fold manner. On the one hand, border man-agement projects are heavily geared towards strengthening the technical and institutional capacities of the beneficiaries. On the other  hand, EUBAM’s assessments and recommenda-
tions have been further transposed at national 
level in Moldova and Ukraine with additional EC 
support in view of ensuring adequate longer-term sustainability.
65. 
The peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian  conflict is, as a matter of fact, tackled primarily at the political level.
67. 
Ultimate responsibility for achievements in  the area of prosecution and improved inter-services cooperation for criminal investigations lies with the national authorities due to mat-ters relating to national sovereignty including security.68. 
The Commission considers that progress is  
gradually undergoing in the area of corruption. GRECO, the group of states against corruption, 
of the CoE, of which Ukraine became a member 
in 2006, adopted its peer review report in March 2007 (published in October 2007). Ukraine  should report back to GRECO by Autumn 2008. The anti-corruption action plan mentioned  above aims at addressing a number of recom-mendations provided by GRECO. Issues to be  tackled include:
setting up a dedicated entity to deal with 
• 
corruption offences;lifting undue immunities and streamlining 
• 
the immunity-granting procedures;making public procurement more  
• 
transparent;criminalising any corruption-related  
• 
offence, many of which still do not fall  
under the criminal jurisdiction.
Recommendation
(a) 
In principle, the Frontex Regulation provides the Agency with a mandate to facilitate oper-ational cooperation between Member States  and third countries. However, the Commission 
agrees to seek its advice. Complementarities  of border equipment were and will be further ensured with the other donors.
(b) 
The Commission agrees with the Court’s recom-mention and would like to underline that in  the context of the Readmission related assist-ance programme (2007), such commitment  has already been confirmed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ukraine.
49
(c) 
The Commission agrees with the Court’s rec-
ommendation. This recommendation is being ensured in the frame of the joint EC–Council of 
Europe project: “Ukraine’s international coop-
eration in criminal matters” (UPIC) since 2006 and currently ongoing.
(d) 
The Commission explored and will continue to explore possibilities for promoting non-state 
actors involvement in the anti-corruption  
policy.
69. 
The difficult political context from April 2007 to the end of the year was the main problem. Despite these events, local ownership was  ensured. Initial staffing difficulties are over-come with a full time CoE staff member placed in Ukraine taking direct supervision/leadership of the project affairs.
70. 
The EC Delegation in Moldova has now fully  taken over programme management responsi-bilities from the Kiev Delegation, which should solve the resources problem.
As regards the co-existence of several EU  
financing instruments for the same purpose,  the use of two financing instruments for sup-porting the Söderköping project was at that  time the solution to adequately respond to the scale of the problem.
71. 
The Commission has undertaken to systemati-cally lead and strengthen donor coordination efforts in Ukraine, and hosted a region-wide  donor coordination conference in January 2008 to kick-start this process.In addition to this, possibilities for joint pro-
gramming are being actively pursued, and one 
joint programming mission in Ukraine, with  Sweden’s SIDA, has been completed.
72. 
The Commission draws the attention to the  importance of the external factors.
Recommendation
The Commission should
(a) 
Adequate staffing, both in terms of number and skills, represents a challenge. However, the EC Delegation in Moldova has now fully taken over programme management responsibilities from the Kiev Delegation. Besides, as regards the  Delegation in Ukraine, an internal reorganisa-tion of the operations’ staff aiming at redistrib-uting the workload, particularly in the area of JLS, is effective since 1.9.2008.
(b) 
While the ENPI does represent a more flexible instrument that its predecessor, there is still  a clear case for a division of labour between  funding instruments, according to the advan-tages and specificities of each. The focus of  ENPI programmes in Ukraine and Moldova is,  for example, on large, sector-wide support  programmes, rather than smaller projects. This is in line with the need to improve the focus  and strategic impact of ENPI funding. Other  instruments however, such as the “Thematic  programme for asylum and migration” have the ability to mobilise smaller pools of funds, in a more rapid and flexible way than large-scale  sector reform programmes.
50
(c) 
The standard contribution agreement reflects 
the requirements of the FR and contains exten-sive requirements as regards the obligations  
of the IO as regards visibility, information on 
contracting arrangements for contracts, as  well as the procurement, the award of grants, the respect of the exclusion criteria an ade-quate ex post publicity of the EC-funded grant and procurement contracts awarded by the  organisation.
(d) 
The Commission has been working with part-ner governments, Member States and other  donors to encourage and support country-owned donor coordination mechanisms, and  will continue its efforts in this direction.
(e) 
The Commission agrees that the recipient  country should clearly express its interests and wishes to underlines that these expressions  are set out in the partnership and coopera-tion agreements and in the ENP action plans. They are further taken into consideration at the project’s identification stage following priori-ties identified in the country strategy paper  and the national indicative programmes in line with the ENP action plans. National participa-tion is envisaged and implemented according to the nature of the project.
In the frame of the regular ROM exercise,  
particular attention will be further given to  the definition of the objectives in line with  the political and institutional capacity of the recipient countries. As regards the length of  the implementation periods, it is defined tak-ing into account the capacity of absorption of the recipient countries, measured in terms of the time needed to pursue sectoral reforms.73.
Recommendation
The Commission shares this preoccupation and would like to underline that it already includes 
at the level of project’s preparation relevant  
information regarding lessons learnt. The iden-tification fiche for project approach is used for the screening by the Quality Support Group.  This is then translated into an action fiche  which is part of the financing decision and  contains a section regarding “lessons learnt”  (section 2.2).
European Court of Auditors
Special Report No 9/2008
The effectiveness of EU support in the area of freedom, security and justice for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities2009 — 50 pp. — 21 X 29.7 cmISBN 978-92-9207-139-4DOI 10.2865/43014

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SPECIAL REPORT “THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU SUPPORT IN THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE FOR BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE”  EXAMINES THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF EU ASSISTANCE AND 
ANALYSES REASONS FOR UNDERPERFORMANCE. IT ALSO LOOKS AT 
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD A PROCESS IN PLACE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LESSONS LEARNED FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN THIS FIELD. THE REPORT CONTAINS DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COULD HELP THE COMMISSION INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE THREE COUNTRIES.
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORSQJ-AB-08-009-EN-C
ISBN 978-92-9207-139-4