Table of Contents

Introduction 3

Chapter 1: an analysis of responses to questionnaire for the survey on the added value of macro-regional strategies 4

Chapter 2: independent assessments of external experts 9

2.1 Added value of macro regional strategies: a governance perspective 9

2.2 The added value of macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning 24

2.3 Assessing the added value of macro-regional strategies – Environment Discussion paper 45

2.4 Do macro-regional strategies boost innovation and competitiveness? 54

Chapter 3: list of literature used by Commission 63

Chapter 4: key messages of literature review 63

Chapter 5: fact sheets of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR 63

5.1 The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 63

5.2 The EU Strategy for the Danube Region 63

Chapter 6: questionnaire for a survey on the added value of macro-regional strategies (the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and EU Strategy for the Danube Region) 63

Introduction

This document comes in support of report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the added value of two existing macro-regional strategies (the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) and the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)), adopted in June 2013.

It aims at providing more detailed information concerning the evaluation of added value of macro-regional strategies. It collects the contributions the Commission has received from the key stakeholders of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR, independent external experts, as well as the relevant academic and policy-development literature.

More information on the Strategies can be found on the EUSBSR and the EUSDR websites:

http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/

http://www.danube-region.eu/

Chapter 1: an analysis of responses to questionnaire for the survey on the added value of macro-regional strategies

Questionnaires in total: 104

EUSBSR: 52

EUSDR 52

Rationale

Received the highest response rate in the both surveys

1a)

83% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR correctly addressed the main challenges faced by respective region. 11 % were neutral on this statement and only 2% disagreed.

When we examine the responses, we find that the EUSDR respondents are more in agreement than the EUSBSR respondents (3 percentage points difference).

1b)

60 % of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the number of priority areas/horizontal actions was reasonable in macro-regional strategies, even though 27% were neutral and 14% disagreed or disagreed strongly.

However, taking into account the difference of 13 percentage points, EUSDR respondents (70% agreed or agreed strongly) were more positive on this statement than the EUSBSR respondents (only 48 % agreed or agreed strongly, while 21% disagreed or strongly disagreed.)

1c)

54 % of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that some priority areas were more important than others. However, 18 % disagreed or disagreed strongly and 27 % were neutral.

We find after examination of the results that this agreement is stronger in the EUSBSR case (62% agreed or strongly agreed) than in the EUSDR (46% agreed or strongly agreed; 17 percentage points difference).

1d)

38% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the political statements towards the macro regional strategies in participating countries were high. However, a nearly equal 30% agreed or agreed strongly and 32% were neutral.

Given the difference of 33%, we find that the opinions of the respondents of the two existing strategies differ in that case. While 54% of the EUSDR respondents agreed or fully agreed with the statement, EUSBSR respondents are less positive (21% agreed or strongly agreed).

The EUSBRS insider respondents were 43% neutral, while 38% rather disagreed and 19% rather or strongly agreed. Of the status categories the PAC respondents represented the most negative response and the managing authorities of EU programmes represented the most positive. The EUSBRS outsider respondents were 46% neutral, 27% rather or strongly agreed and 27% rather or strongly disagreed. The pan-regional and regional organizations represented the most positive response. The national institutions represented the most negative.

The EUSDR insider respondents were 46% rather or strongly agreed, 22% neutral and 32% rather disagreed. Of the status categories the NCP respondents represented the most positive response, while the PACs represented the most negatives response. The EUSDR outsider respondents were 77% rather or strongly agreed and of the majority were national institution respondents.

1e)

63% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that if implemented effectively, the macro-regional strategies were contributing to social, economic and territorial cohesion. 28 % were neutral on this statement and 9% disagreed or disagreed strongly.

When we examine the responses, we find that the EUSDR respondents are more in agreement than the EUSBSR respondents (9 percentage points difference).

2. Governance

2a)

51% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the internal administrative, technical and institutional organisations in all participating countries were still not effective enough to implement the EUSBSR/EUSDR. However, 29% were neutral.

The EUSBSR respondents are more positive than the EUSDR respondents (7 percentage points difference).

The EUSBRS insider respondents were 55% rather or strongly disagreed, 19% neutral and 26% rather agreed. Of the status categories the managing authorities on EU programmes respondents represented the most negative response, while the PACs represented the most positive. The EUSBRS outsider respondents were 46% rather or strongly disagreed and 36% neutral. There are no outstanding groups in both response categories.

The EUSDR insider respondents were 49% rather or strongly disagreed, 37% neutral, 14% rather or strongly agreed. Of the status categories the PAC respondents represented the most negative response, the NCPs the most positive. The EUSDR outsider respondents were 50% rather or strongly disagree, split of 25% for neutral and rather agree. There were no majority status groups as most positive respondents; yet, the national institution respondents were most negative.

2b)

35% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed on the statement that the key stakeholders of the macro-regional strategy (NCP, PAC) effectively coordinated their activities with other stakeholders. However, 16 % disagreed or disagreed strongly and 50 % were neutral.

The EUSBSR respondents are less positive (23 % of the disagreed or strongly disagree with this statement) than the EUSDR respondents (46% agreed or strongly agreed), given the difference of 22percentages points.

2c)

31 % of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the multilevel governance dimension was fully taken into account in the actions and decisions taken for implementing projects, actions or policies at Member States level/at project level.

The stakeholders of the EUSBSR are less positive than the EUSDR (17 percentage points difference).

31% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that there is clear evidence that national, regional and EU governance systems have improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR. However, 26 % agreed or strongly agreed and 43% were neutral.

The EUSDR respondents are less positive (44% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement) than the EUSBSR respondents (33% agreed or strongly agreed).

3. Funding

3a)

50 % of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the alignment of national, regional and EU policies and funding with the objectives of the EUSBSR/EUSDR had been successfully achieved.

When we examine the responses, we find that the EUBSR respondents were more in agreement than the EUDSR respondents (14 percentage points difference),

3b)

54.8% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that technical assistance provided by European Commission facilitated the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR. 36% though were neutral.

The EUSDR respondents (62% agreed or strongly agreed) were more positive than the EUDSR respondents (14% difference), among whom 48% agreed or strongly agreed.

3c)

46% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that macro-regional strategies could contribute in mobilizing the existing funding, to use it in more efficient and coordinated manner.

When we examine the responses, we find that the EUBSR respondents were more in agreement than the EUDSR respondents (23 percentage points difference: while 56% of the EUSBSR stakeholder agreed or strongly agreed, only 33% of the Danube respondents are of one of these opinions).

3 d)

According to 61% of the respondents (agreed or strongly agreed) there is a need for additional funding only for the project preparation stage and networking.

This is especially in case in the EUSDR: while 79% of the Danube respondents agreed or strongly agreed, 43% of the EUSBSR did so. This fact corresponds to a difference of 37 percentage points.

4. Cooperation

4a)

37 % of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that at the absence of additional money favoured the reinforcement of cooperation among partners and the main core partners (NCP, PAC, HAL, and Commission). However, a nearly equal 33% agreed or agreed strongly and 30% were neutral.

4b)

64% agreed or strongly agreed that the cooperation mechanisms had improved thanks to the EUSBSR/EUSDR.

4c)

77% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR strengthened the existing cooperation among and within participating countries, in particular among ministries.

4d)

54% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the cooperation between EU Member States with neighbouring non-EU countries expanded and improved thanks to the relevant macro-regional strategy.

However, the EUSDR respondents are more positive than the EUSBSR respondents, taking into account the difference of 37%. 79% among the Danube respondents agreed or fully agreed with the statement. In comparison to that, only 36% of the Baltic respondents agreed or fully agreed (25% disagreement or strong disagreement).

4e)

27% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that cooperation had led yet a tangible effect on national policies such as those on environment, energy and etc. However, a nearly equal 28% agreed or agreed strongly and 44.9% were neutral.

When we examine the responses, we find that the EUDSR respondents are less positive than the EUDSR respondents (8 percentage points difference regarding disagreement)

5. Policy orientations

5a)

60% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the implementation of the EUSBSR/EUSDR helped to move from a sectoral approach to a multi-sectoral, integrated one.

EUSDR respondents are more positive than the EUSBSR respondents (23 percentage points difference).

5b)

50% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that many successful projects and actions would not be implemented if the EUSBSR/EUSDR would not have been endorsed. However, 24% disagreed or disagreed strongly and nearly equal 25% were neutral.

EUSBSR respondents are in more agreement than the EUSDR respondents (24.2 percentage points difference).

5c)

62% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the macro-regional strategy helped to mobilize the existing policies and create more synergies.

EUSBSR respondents are in more positive than the EUSDR respondents (10 percentage points difference).

5d)

20% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that macro-regional strategies could lead changes in policy developments in several areas in respective country. However, 32% disagreed or disagreed strongly and 48% were neutral.

5e)

Only 14% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the statement new policy developments had improved the situation in the areas concerned, and that this improvement would be measurable or could be described. However, 30.2% disagreed or disagreed strongly and more than the half, that is 56%, were neutral.

6. Next programming period

6a)

94% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that the objectives of the macro-regional strategy must be firmly embedded in the 2014–2020 policy framework at EU, national and regional level (high agreement among both groups: EUSBSR as well as EUSDR respondents).

6b)

88% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the EUSBSR/EUSDR core partners (NCP, PAC, HAL) should be consulted in/associated to the discussions of the next programmes in their respective countries (high agreement among both groups: EUSBSR as well as EUSDR respondents).

The EUSBRS insider respondents were 89% rather or strongly agreed and the EUSBRS outsider respondents were 84% rather or strongly disagreed.

The EUSDR insider respondents were 92% rather or strongly agreed and the EUSDR outsider respondents were 100% rather or strongly agreed.

6c)

75% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that relevant, actions or projects of the macro-regional strategy should be clearly identified in the draft programmes submitted to the European Commission.

EUSDR respondents are more positive than the EUSBSR respondents (18 percentage points difference).

6d)

64% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that that for each priority area/horizontal action, a cooperation platform (where PAC/HAL, programmes authorities, projects managers, NGOs, etc. can exchange) and a Steering Committee should be set up.

EUSDR respondents are more positive than the EUSBSR respondents (20 percentage points difference).

Chapter 2: independent assessments of external experts 2.1 Added value of macro regional strategies: a governance perspective

by Kai Böhme (Spatial Foresight GmbH)

08.03.2013

Some selected key findings deriving from this paper

§ Too young. Macro regional strategies are still rather new and have not been around long enough to allow for solid conclusions about their actual added value.

§ Transnationality. Macro regional strategies offer a new governance framework for approaching development challenges and potentials, which cannot be solved by the states (independently from each other) and are too specific for the macro region to be approached at EU level. However, there is a risk that the focus on issues specific for a macro region is weakened by an increasing attention to more general policy priorities.

§ Multi-sector. Macro regional strategies offer a new governance framework for brining together various relevant sector policies to approach joint challenges or potentials. Bringing together resources (financial and non-financial) of relevant sectors can contribute to more efficiently approach development challenges and potentials. However, there is a risk that the focus is rather on contributions in terms of funding single projects that can be linked (vaguely) to the macro regional challenges or potentials.

§ Complexity. The governance frameworks set up for macro regional strategies are rather complex and rely on a wide range of stakeholders. The challenge is to keep all stakeholders committed and motivated in the long-run.

§ Political backing. The high political profile and backing of macro regional incl. attention at Council Level is an important asset with regard to their standing as a platform bringing together different policy sectors and levels.

§ Action. Various flagship projects have been linked to macro regional strategies. Whereas some exist independently from the strategy, others show that stakeholders develop new activities inspired by macro regional strategies. A lot of the actual added value of macro regional strategies will be generated by their projects and their ability to stimulate projects which would not have come about otherwise.

A governance perspective

Macro regional strategies are integrated frameworks, which allow the EU and Member States to identify needs and match them to available resources through coordination of appropriate policies. The strategies shall contribute to better governance of large territories confronted with similar problems. The basic principle of macro regional strategies is therefore to rationalise existing resources and use them more efficiently.

The general objective of the strategies is to address macro regional challenges. The specific objective is to develop a framework for the individual challenges and address deficiencies in governance structures to ensure that a range of strategic actions to deal with the challenges are implemented in the most efficient, effective and coherent way. (see COM 2009/REGIO/02)

3 No’s as framework conditions. From the beginning, three No’s have been spelled out clearly (COM (2009) 0248 final), partly to avoid the risk of a high-spending, ineffective and ‘vast contraption’ once the first enthusiasm over a new strategy has faded:

No new EU legislation. The driving moments are Action Plans which also underline developments and regular updates and adaptations to new developments. No additional new legislation is envisaged for developing and implementing macro regional strategies.

No new EU funds. There is no own budget for macro-regional strategies. “Though this aspect maybe seen as a weakness, it seems to constitute an innovative factor, given that all actors are stimulated towards a greater degree of coordination and synergies of the various financial resources available at different levels.” (Stocchiero 2010) The aim is to use existing funds more effectively and in a more coordinated way.

No additional EU formal structures. Instead of creating new institutions, the macro regional strategies are to be supported by a multi-level and multi-actor governance approach.

These three No’s are however not uncontested, and there are even proposals for a ‘three yeses rule’: more complementary funding, more institutional coordination and more new projects. (European Parliament, Committee on Regional Development 2011)

Integrated approach as potential. The added value of the macro regional strategies is often seen in the integrated approach, i.e. a collective action that strives towards a common objective, providing a platform for bringing together various actors, policies and financial resources. Consequently, the potential to mobilise a broad range of stakeholders and create a broad and shared ownership is a key strength of macro regional strategies.

It is argued that macro regional strategies offer a new pragmatic approach to finding more efficient policy modalities and better coordination among existing institutions and resources. Macro regional strategies aim at providing integrated governance approaches addressing a pressing issue of policy making in Europe: the need for better policy coordination in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of policy making.

Potential to reduce the costs of non-coordination? Robert et. al (2001) pointed at the costs of non-coordination of European policies. The question whether the integrated governance approach used for the macro regional strategies can reduce these costs would need to be subject to a specific study. This could investigate whether the costs of non-coordination could be reduced and what are the costs of the coordination procedures introduced by macro regional studies.

Macro regional strategies often are considered as an example of integrated (territorial) governance, even advocating the idea of place based policy making. The governance structures for drafting and also implementing the strategies are rather complex and involve a wide range of different stakeholders. The review of existing documents shows, that macro regional strategies have good potentials to improve policy coordination in three different ways, i.e. transnational (coordination between countries), multi-sector (coordination between sectors), multi-level (coordination between levels). However, there are also a number of obstacles, which suggest that these potentials are not fully realised.

Transnational coordination

Broaden geographical perspective of sector policies. Many development challenges and potentials cut across administrative boundaries and call therefore for joint approaches. There is an increasing demand for shared implementation mechanisms. Macro regional strategies stress the need to approach development challenges and potentials in a wider geographical context, as appropriate responses require joint approaches across national boundaries. This line of thought can enrich European and national policy developments and there are indications that the strategies function as ambassadors and manage to inspire other policy developments to transnational approaches. A few examples are mentioned in the below textbox as well as in other textboxes throughout this paper.

Examples: Strengthening transnational solutions

The vision of the Clean Water project is to create a vital Baltic Sea Region Clean Water Cluster, a cooperation platform of different clusters for interaction of all triple helix sectors in the BSR. The purpose of this platform is to develop water protection with new and innovative technologies, products and services. The cluster combines competences of BSR countries’ innovation milieus, clusters and SME-networks around water protection (wastewater treatment, hazardous chemical substitution), to bring business opportunities and boost competitiveness of the Baltic Sea Region. (Source: http://www.bsrstars.se/project/clean-water/)

“Develop and improve coordination and cooperation among Member States and stakeholders” on fisheries management in the Baltic Sea. A forum called Baltfish has been established to enhance collaboration among Baltic Sea Member States as a first step towards further regionalisation of fisheries management. The forum will elaborate with relevant Baltic Sea organisations including the BS RAC and HELCOM how integration of concerned stakeholders in fisheries management and policy implementation can be strengthened and the forum be developed further in this regard. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2)

Dubois et al. (2009) go even one step further and suggest that macro regional strategies may help avoiding cannibalistic competition between regions, and rather foster competition on the basis of complementarities. To what degree this happens is hard to tell at present.

Despite the positive examples, one needs to remember that transnational and cross-border cooperation is not entirely new. Cooperation across national borders (not only in the meaning of Interreg) has been promoted for a long time in Europe and a range of institutions and platforms have been established during the past decades. In parts these sub-regional cooperation groups do also facilitate processes of European integration. In that sense macro regional strategies are nothing new, but rather offer a platform for improved cooperation between existing sub-regional groups or (as e.g. in the Alpine case) are perceived as giving new stimulus or momentum to existing cooperation areas.

Contributing to working-level links with Third Countries. With regard to cross-border coordination, the integration of Third countries is of particular interest (at least for macro regions going beyond the EU). Macro regional strategies are a flexible framework complementing existing EU and national policies. With relation to Third countries, they can be seen as a tool for bridging European Neighbourhood Policies and territorial development policies. The involvement of non-EU partners in macro regional strategies may facilitate (a) the collaboration between institutions and governments in and outside the EU, and (b) a gradually economic integration and make EU’s external borders less of an obstacle to the flow of goods, services, capital and persons within a macro-region. (see Dubois et al. 2009).

Examples: Cooperation with Third countries

“Implement fully the EU – Russia Energy Efficiency Initiative”, particularly the annual work programmes of the Joint EU – Russia Thematic Group on Energy Efficiency of the EU – Russia Energy Dialogue, to be implemented jointly by the EU and Russian side.

“Assessment of regional nutrient pollution load and identification of priority projects to reduce nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea”, in particular in the context of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. The aim of this project is to reduce the nutrient inputs from Belarus to the Baltic Sea in the context of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, with particular consideration given to such key sectors and areas as agriculture, municipal waste water, industry, and the production and use of detergents containing phosphorus. So far, the terms of reference for an assessment and identification study have been developed by the Central Research Institute for Complex Use of Water Resources, the Ministry of the Environment, Finland, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and HELCOM, and agreed with the Belarusian Ministries of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Housing and Communal Services. (Source: SEC(2011) 1071 final)

“Monitor implementation of the priorities of the EU-Russia Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation” for ensuring trade facilitation and the protection of citizens, and combating fraud. The Strategic Framework is based on three broad priorities: a) Safe and fluid trade lanes; b) Risk management and fight against fraud; c) Investment in customs modernisation. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2)

At the same time, the Baltic Sea Strategy has been developed with focus on internal dynamics of EU integration and only little attention has been paid to external relations. Although Russia is an important player for various development in the Baltic Sea Region it is not part of the Strategy. The involvement of Russia runs via the involvement of Russian partners in flagship projects and existing frameworks such as the Northern Dimension. This imbalanced involvement of EU and non-EU Member State may weaken the Baltic Sea Strategy (see Dühr 2009 and Borg 2009). The situation is somewhat different in the case of the Danube Strategy. Also here non EU Member States are not part of the strategy, but play a larger role in the implementation activities, e.g. as priority coordinators and by involving funding sources targeting non-EU areas, e.g. WBIF[1] and ENPI CBC[2].

Overall, macro regional strategies seem to increase the transnational dimension in various policy sectors. They contribute to a better integration of countries covered by a macro region as well as on developing joint approaches which are more efficient than approaches taken by single countries independently.

With regard to the involvement of Third countries, there are a series of flagship projects that address Third countries. The exact success is however hard to tell from available information. In any case, approaches to integrating Third countries in the work on macro regional strategies need to be detached from sensitive diplomatic issues.

Cross-sector coordination

Platform for stakeholders from different EU and national policy sectors. Macro regional strategies aim at bringing together a wide range of different policy sectors and underline the necessity that different policy sectors need to cooperate in order to firstly define the most pressing issues for a macro region and thereafter develop and implement a suitable strategy. In that sense macro regional strategies are a valuable platform.

To a certain degree this approach has been successful as it has brought new stakeholders to the table and made them thinking about the development of the macro region outside their usual institutional context. Indeed, both at EU level and in some Member States, the elaboration of the macro-regional strategies implied major efforts of bringing together representatives from a wide range of different policy sectors. For the Baltic Sea Strategy, DG Regio coordinated the input of about 20 other DGs just at EU level, let alone the wide range of national ministries involved in various consultations.

However, it would be naïve to believe that this goes without any conflicts between different policy sectors and their ambitions to be the integrating or coordinating body. Borg (2009) points at the challenge of how to achieve more efficient cooperation in the case of overlapping policy agendas. One example from the Baltic Sea Strategy is the Integrated Maritime Policy, which – similar to macro regional strategies – aims at a better coordination of different policy areas, albeit with focus on a more coherent approach to maritime issues. Another example from the Danube Strategy concerns the work towards a more integrated approach to the Danube river taking into account both the Danube as transport axis and the environmental concerns related to the Danube river.

Overall, the multi-facetted policy platform provided by macro regional strategies facilitates dialogue and mutual influence between different policy sector policies. In the ideal case this may even go beyond their respective contribution to the development and implementation of a strategy and even result in mutual learning or dialogue with regard to other policy developments.

Next to the wide governance arrangements used to develop and implement macro regional strategies, also the non-existence of specific funds may play a crucial role for keeping different sectors on board and in dialogue with each other in order to continuously work on the implementation of the strategies.

Macro regional projects funded by a large number of sector instruments. Macro regional strategies have been successful in bringing on board other sector policies. This been illustrated e.g. with regard to the funding sources used financing flagship projects of the strategies. The Action Plans provide examples of different financing sources that are used, and illustrates the potential of the strategies to contribute to a better coordination and alignment of funding. Next to ERDF[3] programmes a wide range of other funding sources from other European sector policies as well as non EU sources contribute to funding flagship projects of macro regional strategies, e.g. ESF[4], CPFI[5], EIB[6] & EIF[7], TEN-T[8], JRC[9], FP7[10] as well as national, regional and Nordic sources fund projects. The below box provides some examples on project funded via schemes from different EU sector policies. This shows that a wide range of different EU sector policies contribute with their respective funding instruments to implementing the macro regional strategy.

At the same time, experience form the Baltic Sea Strategy also shows that the contribution of the different financing sources differs widely. SWECO (2011) underlines, that there is a concentration to a few of over 100 (theoretically) available funding opportunities: “The five most mentioned sources of funding were the following, starting with the most mentioned; Baltic Sea Region Programme, South Baltic Programme, TEN-T (different schemes), Central Baltic Programme, Nordic Council of Ministers (different schemes).“ (SWECO 2011, p. 12).

Examples: Sector policies strengthening macro regional approach

ESF. The Managing Authority for the European Social Fund (ESF) in Sweden, will the coming years strengthen the transnational cooperation between projects funded by the ESF in the Member States. A particular focus will be on the cooperation between projects and stakeholders in the Member States in the Baltic Sea Region. The Baltic Sea Network ESF project will serve that purpose, for Sweden as well as for the other Member States concerned. The intention is also to analyse the relation and linkage between the ESF and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Subsequently actions will be taken to encourage projects to be better prepared to support the implementation of the social dimension in the EUSBSR. A network of the Managing Authorities for the ESF between the Member States concerned – Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany - has been consolidated and a number of joint activities will be carried out: conferences, partner search forums and learning seminars in Sweden as well as in the other Member States. (Source: http://www.inclusiveeurope.se)

CPFI. The project 14.3 is financed with support from the European Commission through the EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument. The project aims to develop scenarios and identify gaps for all main hazards and the potential of such hazards in the Baltic Sea Region, in order to anticipate disasters, thus enabling a rapid and effective EU response through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. The work will reinforce disaster prevention and response capacity as well as coherence and coordination between different institutions. (Source: http://www.14point3.eu)

TEN-T. The flagship project conducted a feasibility study on LNG infrastructure for short sea shipping was financed via TEN-T. The purpose of the project was to develop recommendations for how to establish an infrastructure facilitating the use of LNG as a ships’ fuel. However, other important areas have also been identified. The project’s recommendations concentrate on five main areas: Bunkering of ships with LNG, Economic and financial conditions, Safety, Technical and operational conditions and finally Permits for an infrastructure ashore. (Source: SEC (2009) 712/2 – status February 2013).

JRC. The Joint Research Centre has launched an initiative to provide scientific support to the Danube Strategy, in cooperation with key partners from the Region. Work has already started on the setting-up of Danube-wide reference scientific data sets, which will allow policy makers and other stakeholders to access comparable and harmonised data on common challenges, such as water and soil quality, or landscapes.

FP7. The 7th Framework Programme for Research, has launched three calls specifically addressing Danube Region challenges.

Regional Example. The state of Baden Württemberg has set aside funds to support the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, with a special focus on providing support for the initial phase of projects with an explicit macro-regional impact.

Whereas the strategies as such are multi-sectoral the implement projects usually focus on a specific issue within a specific policy sector in order to make progress on concrete implementation tasks. To what degree single projects influence other sectors than their own is hard to tell. In that sense one may conclude that although the strategies set out to integrate different (sector) processes, their orientation (in terms of projects) tends to remain rather sectoral. More attention could be paid to sector-integrating or cross-cutting tools and instruments. Nevertheless, going beyond single projects, macro regional strategies provide a platform where resources from different sectors are used to achieve common macro regional objectives.

Multi-level coordination

European and national level key players. Macro regional strategies aim also at bringing together stakeholders from different policies levels. The work with macro regional strategies relies on the capacity to bring together different policy levels and funds from different policy levels in a transnational approach. When it comes to strategy development, mainly the European level and the Member States are involved. Overall, closer and better coordinated action at various levels of governance is seen as a positive step towards further deepening of EU integration process. (see Katsarova 2009, and Cugusi & Stocchiero 2010).

“Bottom-up” development of priorities. One important aspect of the multi-level coordination is the development of thematic orientations of a macro regional strategy. Macro regional strategies focus on themes identified in a “bottom-up” process, were various consultations process and in particular national representatives play an important role. The basic idea is that, macro regional strategies work on themes which are perceived as common and important to the participating countries.

The “bottom-up” approach may generate thematic orientations which are not (as highly ranked) on European or national policy agendas, but which address actual challenges of the region. It might even offer opportunities to become more concrete and address pressing issues (incl. conflicts of interest) which in EU-wide strategies might be covered by rhetoric because of the diversity of the EU. (see Böhme & Zillmer 2010)

Regional and local level important implementers. There is a certain criticism that the local and regional level is not sufficiently taken on board when it comes to the development of the strategies. At the same time stakeholders from the local and regional level can play a substantial role when it comes to the implementation of the strategies, although not all are interested. On the one hand regional stakeholders are e.g. involved in the implementation structures of macro regional strategies, e.g. by taking on responsibilities as priority area coordinators. On the other hand, a regional stakeholders are involved in concrete projects. A wide range of projects bridges local or regional action/responses with national policies in the countries involved and development challenges or potentials at macro-regional level or even EU wide policy approaches.

Facilitating the implementation of EU policies. Macro regional strategies comprise among others flagship projects with a focus on improving or furthering the implementation of EU policies in the countries or regions covered by the strategy. There are e.g. projects linked to the EU chemicals regulation REACH (1907/2006/EC), European Transport Networks (TEN-T), the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EG), as well as to the agreements within the Helsinki Convention on the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP).

Informing European, national and regional policy processes. A wide range of projects also aim at providing new evidence relevant for improving policy making at various levels of decision making. Examples can be found with regard to many different policy fields and the envisaged actions roughly be grouped in three categories (a) providing new information through studies or monitoring exercise, (b) informing relevant stakeholder, and (c) setting up transnational networks for increasing information flows and efficiency by sharing resources.

Examples: Implementing and improving EU policies

The project “Reduce the Use of the Substances of Very High Concern in the Baltic Sea Region” aims at including substances relevant for the environment in the Baltic Sea region, such as the recommendations made through the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), to the REACH candidate list. Selected substances will be assessed to see whether they fulfil the REACH criteria of SVHCs. If that is the case, the substances will be incorporated into an extended SIN-list and work for their later inclusion in the candidate list will be carried out. (Source: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu)

The project “Implementing European space for maritime transport without barriers in the Baltic Sea Region” addresses several legislative measures, including a proposal aimed at simplifying administrative formalities based on Community regulations and recommendations to the Member States for reducing the administrative burden imposed on shipping companies. (Source: SEC(2009) 712/2)

The project “Complement the agreed priority transport infrastructure” addresses a number of TEN-T priority projects in the Baltic Sea Region. To the target group to be addressed by the project belong national long-term infrastructures planners in the Baltic Sea region, national, regional and local politicians, governments and governmental agencies, public and private stakeholders in the transport sector and transport networks in the Baltic Sea Region (Sources: SEC(2009) 712/2 and http://www.baltictransportoutlook.eu)

Overall, macro regional strategies strengthen multi-level coordination in different ways. When it comes to strategy development a key aspect is the interaction between the European and national level and potential to identify genuine priority areas that require transnational cooperation but are not suitable for EU-wide policies. Looking at single project, there is a large variety of specific project activities focusing on multi-level aspects of policy design and implementation in different policy areas. At this stage also the regional and local level is included.

Specific & focused or broad & inclusive?

There are a number of aspects which may hamper a clearer added value of macro regional strategies. Overall, macro regional strategies have a tendency to focus very broadly at a better coordination between sectors, levels and across countries. This integrated approach to providing a new governance platform for better policy coordination comes at a cost: complexity.

Complex structures and risks of fading ownership. Given the broad nature of the strategies and the absence of single institutions for their implementation, they develop rather complex implementation mechanisms. These rely on a wide range of organisations that take over responsibilities and carry through coordination tasks. The multiplicity of actors brings the risk that a strategy could lose (a) focus and (b) the ownership and responsibility felt by the single stakeholders. If the feeling of ownership and subsequently commitment and responsibility towards the strategy declines, the entire strategy is weakened. This leads ultimately to the question whether the complexity needed for the elaboration and in particular for the implementation of the strategies is too high to actually being able to make use of the manifold potentials for better coordination offered by them.

Potential stronger links between macro regional strategies and ETC or EGTC

Both cases are rather risky. Many involved stakeholders may see them as opportunities to be freed from their responsibility and obligations to contribute to the (implementation of) macro regional strategies. Consequently macro regional strategies would be downgraded to the level of the spatial strategies which where elaborated as guiding documents of transnational cooperation 10 to 15 years ago. (see also Zilmer et al. 2012)

“Interreg solution”. The transnational dimension of macro regional strategies implies that transnational cooperation programmes often are seen as the most natural funding opportunity. Such a development risks, that many other funding actors will reduce (their partially already low) engagement / contribution to implementing macro regional strategies and leave it all for transnational cooperation programmes. This in turn will weaken the cross-sector coordination dimension of the strategies as the implementation will be dominated by the Interreg Community. Furthermore, territorial cooperation programmes might not be financially strong enough to support all kinds of activities (e.g. infrastructure investments) needed to achieve the aims of the strategies, nor is it guaranteed that all themes of the macro regional strategies are eligible for territorial cooperation. Instead of giving the impression that transnational programmes will be the main implementer of macro regional strategies, efforts are needed to increase the ownership and contribution of other sectors and their funding sources (incl. other Structural Funds programmes). (see also Zillmer et al. 2012)

“EGTC solution”. The idea to set up an EGTC for implementing a macro regional strategy has been aired in some informal discussions. Indeed, it may have the charm that there would be finally a clear responsible for driving the processes and could possibly keep the momentum in the implementation. However, this would be a clear deviation from the announced “No” to new institutions. Furthermore, it would bring about multiple questions as concerns the financing of such an EGTC, as well as the membership and its implications for the broad governance approach on which the strategies are currently based.

There are signs that the commitment is not always as high as might be desirable or needed. SWECO (2011) points for the Baltic Sea case towards the need for increased support and commitment by the Member States including a strengthening of their National Contact Points and the Priority Area Coordinator. Along a similar line stakeholders involved in the Danube case point out that they need further political support from the European Commission to activate relevant national or regional stakeholders (see e.g. Summary of the 3rhd meeting of the EUSDR Contact Points and Area Coordinators, or EUSDR Report June 2012 Priority Area 10 Institutional capacity and cooperation).

High-level political backing. In comparison to other policy fields, macro regional strategies can refer to a strong political backing. They are not just agreed and dealt with at informal ministerial meetings, or meetings of transnational monitoring and steering committees. They do have the attention and backing at the level of the European General Affairs Council. This is an important asset with regard to their standing as a platform bringing together different policy sectors and levels. What ever is to be done in future, it should be ensured that this high-level political backing remains and is not downgraded.

Between unique focus and collecting pond. There is a constant criticism that the strategies are thematically too broad and not focused enough. Whereas a broad thematic approach is seen as an advantage with regard to the possibility to involve a wide range of different sectors, it may also be a hinder when it comes to actually developing into a powerful tool. As outlined above, one strength of the strategies is seen in the fact that they manage to point towards real development challenges (which require joint action) in the respective geographical area. At the same time there are also expectations that these strategies reflect better the Europe 2020 aims and targets and cover most aspects which are perceived as policy relevant. The question is to what degree this suits a clear focus of the strategies on specific needs of the region.

Overall, the governance approach used for macro regional strategies focuses on a broad involvement. This comes with a number of challenges and not all of them seem to be solved at present. However, a quick fix and simple solution to solving these governance challenges risks to become the beginning of the end of macro regional strategies.

Conclusions

The task of this paper was to provide input to a discussion on the added value of macro regional strategies from a governance perspective. The following will shortly summarise some key points.

Main achievements. Macro regional strategies have the potential to contribute to improved coordination between different policy sectors and policy levels and they also do allow for increasing the efficiency of policy implementation by strengthening transnational solutions.

Whereas macro regional strategies have potential at the level of the strategy itself the main contributions are made at project level. As the strategies are still rather young it is too early for counter factual assessments. At present it is difficult to tell to what degree various projects would have been implemented even without the existence of macro regional strategies.

Dubois et al. 2009 argue even that macro regional strategies may also be used to accelerate the ‘catching up’ phase between the “new” and “old” Member States.

To further strengthen the role of macro regional strategies, it is necessary to continue encouraging all EU funding sources in their geographical areas to contribute to them. Otherwise, there is a risk that it will be mainly EU Cohesion Policy and in particular territorial cooperation programmes that take the strategies on board. This would certainly weaken the potential to contribute to a better coordination of different policy sectors.

Influence on EU and national policy development. Macro regional strategies have a potential to influence both EU and national policies. EU policies could be influenced e.g. by the macro regional themes which are identified bottom-up and therefore could also inform EU policy making with fresh ideas. At the same time various flagship projects of the strategies focus on EU policies and on informing policy design or improving policy implementation.

As for national policies it seems the main power of influence comes with the various flagship projects which inform and improve policy development and implementation in the countries and regions involved. This is done using different types of funding. Furthermore, the strategies encourage stakeholders in sector policies which usually operate at national or regional scale to consider a transnational approach and investigate whether there are efficiency gains by cooperating transnationally (see examples in textbox).

Examples: Influencing national policy making

The MIMIC project has comprehensive, holistic approach to risks related to maritime oil transportation in the Baltic Sea. The final task of this project will be carried out in order to consider, how the scientific findings of the other WP’s and tasks could be implemented, in practise, in the society. Possible new elements to legislation or international agreements are recommended. Also the potential improvements of both safety and security related monitoring systems (hard data, interviews, etc.) are suggested. In practice, a comprehensive seminar for all managing organisations will be held during the project. In addition, workshops will be organised: possible improvements to risk communication will be discussed between managers. The risk model will also be discussed in a workshop with the related actors (e.g. universities, Finnish Environment Institute, Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Transport and Communications, and maritime safety authorities). (Source: http://www.merikotka.fi)

BRISK, a flagship project under Priority Area Major Emergencies and co-financed by the Baltic Sea Region programme, made headlines in both leading newspapers and TV news programs in Denmark in late September. The project findings addressed the lack of response capacity in case of, for instance, oil spills in the Baltic Sea. In this respect, the Danish Defense Minister Nick Hækkerup has promised that this topic gets top priority in discussions on the future Danish defense. (Source: EUBSR News November 2012)

Coordination between different actors. Macro regional strategies stress and support increased cooperation between different stakeholders in order to increase the efficiency of public policy making. In some cases this makes use of existing cooperation patterns and ways, and in others new cooperation patterns emerge. Again, the strategies are too young to engage in a counterfactual debate allowing to pinpoint details.

With regard to Third countries, macro regional strategies offer platforms for increasing cooperation and reducing barriers at working level.

Improving governance structures. Given the high complexity it also appears that the governance approach for macro regional strategies does not necessarily serve as role model for integrated policy making. At the same time, macro regional strategies are a first step to improving the coordination of policy development and implementation and may in the long-run also contribute to developing improved governance structures going beyond single projects.

There are a range of projects that for concrete purposes and tasks work on establishing joint solution across countries (and sometimes even across sectors). Some of them may result in stable new governance structures.

Main drivers. At the level of the strategy the main driver – next to the need to collaborate at macro-regional level in order to solve certain challenges – seems the enthusiasm for something new, at least in the beginning. In the long-run however, it appears that the main drivers are the European Commission and a few stakeholders in some Member States. There is a risk that the interest and engagement of many national and regional stakeholders declines over time.

The projects create added value driven by single project partners. At large, three different types of projects can be identified (a) strategic policy development projects with rather broad and intangible impacts, (b) explorative pilot projects often focusing on developing and testing new approaches and tools, and (c) policy implementation projects e.g. focusing no how EU policies can be better implemented in EU Member States.

Overall, challenges that only can be solved jointly at macro regional level are the key driver.

Recommendations

Contributing to EU2020 objectives as part of the hierarchy of policies

Following the above, macro regional strategies can work as a catalyst for improving the implementation of European policies, directives and regulations in an area. This can certainly also be true with regard to the Europe 2020 Strategy.

However, at the same time the text argues for a stronger focus of macro regional strategies towards issues that require cooperation at macro regional level, as they cannot be solved by each Member State individually and are too specific to be solved by a EU-wide approach. Putting too much emphasis on macro regional strategies as an instrument for achieving the Europe 2020 objectives might contradict the need for a stronger focus.

Building blocks in reaching European objectives

Macro regional strategies can fill a vacuum between the Member State level and the European level which is perceived by some people as the EU has grown large and distant with its soon 28 Member States.

There are various different ways in which macro regional strategies can function as building blocks in reaching European objectives:

- Macro regional strategies can be important platforms for solving challenges and utilising developing potentials more effectively than could be done individually by each Member State or at EU level.

- Macro regional strategies can function for increasing European integration, by increasing the number of stakeholders and policy sectors that work at a geographically wider scale than their usual national ore regional level.

- Macro regional strategies can also facilitate the implementation of European policies, directives and regulations in the Member States.

Levels of intensity in macro regional cooperation

The overall question is whether different levels of intensity in macro regional cooperation are a problem, or not. Given the broad and inclusive character of macro regional strategies and their implementation work there will always be variations as concerns intensity and commitment.

This becomes problematic if the intensity and commitment for important parts of a strategy decline to a degree that the implementation is at risk. To minimize this risk, a stronger leadership and/or a stronger focus of the strategies may help. A stronger leadership can help to keep a minimum of intensity and commitment for all parts of a strategy, while a stronger focus may help to reduce the complexity of the implementation mechanisms (as less it might require the involvement of fewer stakeholders).

Leadership question and improving resilience

To increase leadership and reduce the fragility of the currently complex implementation structures of macro regional strategies, two different options can be imagined:

- Parametric Governance Power. Keeping the wide range of themes and stakeholders involved it seems necessary to point out one “coordinating organisation” which gets a clear mandate to push stakeholders that have taken over responsibilities where necessary. To do this a clear and simple monitoring system would be needed at two levels:

o Priority area level. For all priority areas targets and related indicators need to be developed into realistic and easily measurable targets (e.g. comparable to the Europe 2020 headline targets or ERDF programme indicators). The indicators presently used are only partially suitable as clear measures on what progress has been made. The development with regard to these targets needs to be monitored on annual basis and the results need to be presented to the general public in an easily understandable and communicative way.

o Stakeholder level. To strengthen the leadership and individual responsibility of every stakeholder involved, there should be clear and measurable targets what each stakeholder should achieve in each reporting period (e.g. year). These targets have to be agreed upon with the stakeholders and should be developed based on each stakeholder’s specific role in the implementation process (see e.g. document such as one on rules and responsibilities developed for the Baltic Sea Strategy).

For both monitoring levels, the “coordinating organisation” should regularly collect information on the progress made to achieving the set targets, and remind or encourage stakeholders to work towards their targets. By regularly publishing the progress made on the website and pin pointing who has made good progress and who not (naming, shaming and blaming), there would be a certain pressure / incentive for everybody to try to work towards their targets. One may even consider particular actions /penalties for stakeholders who have not achieved their targets. This approach would follow the idea of parametric governance or the open method of coordination.

- Exclusivity Driver. Alternatively, one might consider to reduce the number of stakeholders included in the implementation, and make it a rather exclusive club. The rationale behind this would be that if it is difficult and exclusive (honourable) to become part of the club of stakeholders directly working with the implementation, this might motivate as well as ensure commitment and efforts in the long-run.

Recommendations for future work

Overall, there are three main recommendations for future work that can arrive from the above:

- Focus. As mentioned several times, it might be wise to focus the strategies towards issues where there is a genuine need or added value to cooperation at macro regional level (instead of any other level). If it is necessary for political reasons to also include other, broader policy fields, efforts should be undertaken to identify within these policy fields particular actions with a clear macro regional rationale.

- Coordination & monitoring. Given the complex implementation mechanisms, it might be wise to appoint for each strategy one stakeholder with a stronger coordination and monitoring responsibility and the necessary resources, i.e. a “coordination organisation”. The monitoring should also involve the activities carried out by the various stakeholders, and the “coordinating organisation” need to have the standing to publicly present which stakeholders have achieved a lot and which did not.

- Political backing. The high political profile and backing of macro regional incl. attention at Council Level is an important asset with regard to their standing as a platform bringing together different policy sectors and levels. The high level political backing should be maintained.

Literature

Bengtsson, R. (2009) An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Comples Challenges. In: European Policy Analysis Issue 9-2009.

Böhme, K. & S. Zillmer (2010) Die Territoriale Agenda der EU und ihr Aktionsprogramm: zwischen europäischen Obstkörben und Papiertigern. In: Informationen zur Raumentwicklung 2010 (8).

COM (2009) Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Draft Impact Assessment Report. 2009/REGIO/002.

COM (2010) Commission Staff Working Document concerning the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region Impact Assessment Report. SEC(2010) XXX

COM (2010) Commission Staff Working Paper. Action Plan. European Union Strategy for the Danube Region. SEC(2010) 1489 final.

COM (2011) Commission Staff Working Paper on the implementation of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2011) 1071 final.

COM (2011) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUBSR). COM(2011) 381 final.

COM (2013) Commission Staff Working Paper concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. SEC(2009) 712/2. Version of February 2013.

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2.2 The added value of macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning

Stefanie Dühr

Nijmegen School of Management

Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands

Background and introduction

This discussion paper was prepared as an input for the assessment of the added-value of European Union (EU) macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning. The European Council (Council 2011a) has invited the European Commission to ‘clarify the concept of macro-regional strategies, to evaluate their value added and submit the outcomes to the Council and the European Parliament by June 2013’. The assessment of existing macro-regional strategies should provide information on their effects to date and provide input for the further development of the macro-regional strategies.

Since its inception, there has been considerable interest in the concept of EU macro-regional strategies. The first macro-regional strategy – the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) - was adopted in 2009 (CEC 2009a, 2010a, b), followed by the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) in 2011 (CEC 2010c, d). Others are under discussion, e.g. for the Adriatic – Ionian region. Of a somewhat different status, but relevant in a discussion on EU macro-regional strategies, are other integrated policy frameworks of a transnational dimension, such as the existing EU policy frameworks for the Northern Dimension[11] and the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy[12].

The focus of macro-regional strategies has from the beginning been on making more effective use of existing funds, institutions / structures, and policies (local, regional, national, EU). No new funding, legislation or institutions were supposed to be created. A macro-regional strategy has been described as ‘an integrated framework’ (Samecki 2009: para 2.1), which is expected to allow ‘the European Union and Member States to identify needs and match them to the available resources through co-ordination of appropriate policies’ (CEC 2010a: 2). This formulation places the spotlight on the key ingredients of the EU macro-regional approach: the key actors (primarily the EU institutions and the EU member states, as EU decisions don’t cover other countries), a joint approach to identifying issues that require transnational cooperation, and the role of the strategy as a framework for coordinating policies and resources (including its governance arrangements for implementation).

Although EU macro-regional strategies have not been presented as spatial planning instruments (or as integrated spatial development frameworks), reflecting the long-standing debate over an EU competence in this field, their coordination objective and spatially-relevant goals and actions warrant this paper’s focus on their added-value from the perspective of spatial planning. The argument for considering whether macro-regional strategies offer added-value for spatial planning in the Baltic Sea Region and Danube Region derives from the core of their rationale, i.e. that large-scale landscape features (the Baltic Sea, the Danube corridor), which each have their own very specific characteristics and challenges, require a coordinated approach. Coordination for such large-scale functional regions that cut across administrative boundaries implies considerable political and governance challenges, however, because of the great number of actors involved and because each issue addressed at this level of scale may have a different functional ‘reach’ and therefore the boundaries of the macro-regions should be flexible in response to the issue addressed. From a spatial planning perspective, and respecting the principle of subsidiarity, this implies on the one hand that macro-regional strategies should focus on ‘transnational issues’ only, i.e. issues that countries or regions cannot address satisfactorily by acting alone. On the other hand, it means that numerous actors at different levels of scale will be involved in transnational spatial planning initiatives, and in different geographical compositions depending on the issue considered. This implies great complexity for governance arrangements in any policy area, but especially for an area such as spatial planning which is in many countries not strongly institutionalized at national level and where the argument for ‘upscaling’ a spatial planning perspective to the transnational level may therefore not gain much support. As this paper will show, indeed progress on injecting a spatial planning perspective into the macro-regional strategies has been modest to date, and the actual and potential added-value of macro-regional strategies for spatial planning therefore requires further discussion.

Objective of study and approach

The objective of this study is to assess the added value of macro regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning. This is done through a review of publicly available documents such as action plans, communications from the European Council and the European Commission as well as other documents available on the EUSBSR and the EUSDR websites. The assessment also refers to the impact assessments that were completed prior to the launch of the two strategies.

The questions addressed in this paper are the following:

· What are the main achievements in implementing the macro-regional strategies and what contribution have they made to EU policies and targets; national, regional, sectoral policies? The question of the relevance of macro-regional strategies to EU Cohesion Policy[13] and Europe 2020 Strategy objectives[14] particularly should be addressed;

· What concrete progress has been made in the priority areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects?

· Do Macro regional strategies have the potential to influence EU and national policy developments, e.g. through mobilization of existing funding, and alignment of funding and policies with EU 2020 priorities and programmes, and what evidence supports this?

· What is the added value of macro regional strategies in terms of coordination of activities between different actors; for example via cooperation between EU Member States and Third countries, through improved cooperation structures, development of new ways of cooperation or strengthening existing ones?

· What is the added value of the macro regional strategies in terms of improving governance structures for the achievement of overall objectives including interaction/links with other EU initiatives (such as the Northern Dimension, Eastern Partnership, etc.)?

· What are the main drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies for spatial planning in their establishment and in their implementation?

The approach to this assessment requires setting out a few provisos. First, macro-regional strategies are still very young and therefore ‘work in progress’. The progress that has been made so far should be seen in this context, especially considering the complexity of the task. Cooperation structures need time to mature, so any assessment after a relatively short period of time can only attempt to point out areas which may require further attention in future, rather than allowing a comprehensive evaluation. Second, this study relies on published sources (action plans, reports etc) that were prepared by actors involved in the macro-regional strategies. While some critical issues come to the fore in these papers, they are nonetheless by definition to a certain extent self-referential and not based on external evaluation. Moreover, macro-regional strategies were not presented as spatial strategies, so the assessment of their added-value for spatial planning remains somewhat hypothetical as evidence is scarce (and indeed there are relatively few explicit references to spatial planning in the documents analysed).

Definitions and conceptual framework

For a discussion of the added value of EU macro-regional strategies from the perspective of spatial planning, it is important to provide some definitions and a conceptual framework. The traditionally land-based focus of spatial planning of EU member states has over the past years been complemented by EU initiatives in the field of maritime spatial planning (CEC 2008a). Maritime spatial planning is defined as ‘planning and regulating all human uses of the sea, while protecting marine ecosystems. It focuses on marine waters under national jurisdiction and is concerned only with planning activities at sea’ (DG Mare website), thus it does not cover management of coastal zones or spatial planning of sea-land interface. While ‘maritime spatial planning remains a prerogative of individual EU countries’ (ibid.), agreement at EU level should help to ensure that national, regional and local maritime spatial plans are compatible and that conflicts can be avoided and cross-border cooperation and investments are better coordinated. While EU competences for maritime spatial planning are as weak as for land-based spatial planning, the EU policy field has developed quickly and with considerable support from the member states. In contrast to the fierce debates over an EU involvement in land-based spatial planning since the end of the 1990s, seen as violating the sovereignty of nation-states and the subsidiarity principle, the interest of EU member states and regions in coordinated approaches to maritime spatial planning may at least be partly explained by the novelty of this approach and the fact that domestic institutions had not been well established (thus that resistance to change, as can be found in established policy communities, is low).

Reflecting the discussions about the role of the EU in land-based spatial planning, in the academic literature a distinction is now made between spatial planning at the supra-national scale (e.g. for transnational spaces) and spatial planning within nation-states, mirroring the distinction made between ‘spatial planning for Europe’, and ‘spatial planning in Europe’ (Böhme and Waterhout 2008). Spatial planning at a scale above the nation-state relies on different mechanisms for achieving its goals than spatial planning within countries and regions. Within nation-states, spatial planning is a sector of government activity alongside others such as transport, agriculture and environment, and seeks to manage and regulate spatial development and land uses in pursuit of agreed objectives. At European level, spatial planning refers to creating strategies and policies for the development of (parts of) the European territory. What has been called the ‘European spatial planning approach’ concentrates ‘on establishing better co-ordination of spatial policy: horizontally across different sectors; vertically among different levels of government; and geographically across administrative boundaries’ (Dühr et al. 2010: 32). As there is no explicit competence for spatial planning in the EU Treaties, and reflecting the subsidiarity principle, spatial planning for Europe focuses on the strategic dimension of spatial planning (as opposed to detailed land use planning), and has relied on intergovernmental cooperation and unanimous support of the participating governments for agreement on policy objectives and to achieve the common goals.

Spatial strategies for the EU (such as the ESDP, TAEU or TA2020) or for transnational territories (such as INTERREG IIC/IIIB transnational spatial visions) are thus by definition very different instruments than ‘spatial plans’ prepared within the established governance systems of sovereign nation-states. The scale, scope and range of interests involved are much more diverse at the transnational level than for the preparation of plans and strategies within member states. There is no law or guidance that specifies the characteristics or content of transnational strategies, nor are there clearly defined processes that would ensure their implementation. Given their usually non-binding nature, transnational spatial strategies are thus understood to function by ‘framing’ the understanding of actors involved (e.g. sectoral actors who may have much stronger powers of implementation) to particular problems and possible approaches, rather than prescribing solutions. Such a shared understanding about the need for collective action should then provide a lasting basis to ensure that the strategy and its principles are applied in policy- and decision-making processes (Dühr et al. 2010).

Given the lack of strong instruments, the communicative potential of transnational spatial strategies requires particular attention. To ensure their continuing support and use, transnational spatial strategies need to provide a vision ‘so powerful and attractive that all those whose support is needed willingly range up behind it’ (Needham et al. 1997). Given the multitude of actors and interests involved and the consensus-led process of preparing spatial development frameworks for the European territory, this implies that spatial concepts are needed which are ‘capable of papering over the cracks between the various views prevailing’ (Faludi 2002: 904).

Identifying issues for cooperation at the supra-national scale inevitably involves struggles about the prioritising of interests, rights and claims for policy attention. Yet the filtering is a crucial process, because if strategies are to inspire and motivate a range of actors over a long period of time, they need to be more than merely an aggregation of issues. Moreover, the experience with the transnational INTERREG programmes has shown that broad frameworks with largely generic funding priorities rarely result in projects of real significance for the transnational region (Panteia et al. 2010). It is therefore important that policy priorities and actions are specific to the macro-region, and not merely replicate EU policy objectives. Two types of truly transnational issues can be identified, which offer real value for an ‘upscaling’ of policy responses:

· Issues that are currently not dealt with appropriately within a country and by nation-states acting alone, and

· Issues that may in future not be dealt with satisfactorily by nation-states acting alone as a consequence of changing framework conditions (political, economic, environmental, social, or else).

There are likely considerably fewer issues that are usefully addressed at transnational level than the long lists of actions and projects in the Baltic Sea or the Danube Region strategies would suggest. At present, both the action plans for the Baltic Sea Region and for the Danube Region list several issues that are of common concern or are not specific to the region.

The need for cooperation among countries to achieve effective coordination of all sea-related as well as land-based spatial planning policies at the different decision-making levels when preparing comprehensive and integrated plans is evident, and so is the link to the activities of EU macro-regional strategies. While EU involvement in spatial planning – certainly for the land-based component – has been critically viewed by some member states, the inclusion of the objective of territorial cohesion as a shared competence in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 has generally been interpreted as providing an alternative approach to bringing the spatial dimension into sectoral policy. However, there is to date no clear or politically agreed definition of the objective of territorial cohesion which would allow an assessment of whether the concept will be interpreted as a form of European spatial planning (in the meaning presented above) in EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 (cf. CEC 2008b).

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) and spatial planning

Littoral countries of the Baltic Sea are eight EU member states (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Belarus and Russia. Since the 1990s, the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea have been cooperating at the transnational level. Besides the political forum of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS, also involving Norway and Iceland next to the littoral states), there are other well-established forums of cooperation with influence on policy- and decision-making, such as HELCOM[15] in the field of environmental policy and VASAB[16] for transnational spatial planning. Indeed, the ‘model’ for transnational spatial visions prepared in the context of the transnational INTERREG IIC and IIIB Community Initiative is commonly acknowledged to be the ‘Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010’ (VASAB2010 1994) document (Dühr 2011b). It was prepared by the ministries for spatial planning and development of countries around the Baltic Sea Region even before the INTERREG IIC initiative (which envisaged the preparation of ‘transnational spatial visions’) was launched. The VASAB vision sought to address shared concerns over environmental pollution of the shallow sea and to consider policy responses for the somewhat peripheral transnational region after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. An action programme, entitled ‘From vision to action’ (VASAB2010 1996) proposed measures for the application of the spatial vision. In 1997, INTERREG funding supported the process of updating of the VASAB 2010 strategy (VASAB2010+ 2001). In 2009, the ‘VASAB Long-term perspective for the Territorial Development of the Baltic Sea Region’ (VASAB LTP 2009) was adopted and is intended to provide strategic direction until 2030.

Main achievements of the EUSBSR and contribution to EU, national and regional policies

It seems widely accepted that the EU macro-regional strategy has at least partly succeeded in overcoming the ‘stalemate’ of intergovernmental cooperation, given the high political profile and EU involvement in many activities covered by the EUSBSR (CEC 2010f). A report by the Commission (CEC 2011a: 1) identified ‘commitment of partners at national, regional, and civil society levels’. It further noted as main achievements that ‘the Strategy has led to concrete action, with a more streamlined use of resources. New working methods and networks have been established, and many initiatives developed’, including the setting up of new projects (such as the designation of marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea) and providing new momentum to existing projects. The Commission report further finds that ‘the Strategy … provides a common reference point for the many organisations in the Baltic Sea Region’. Examples given to support this observation are the new framework for the maritime community, which has brought together actors and initiatives around the EUSBSR; and that ‘transport ministries in the Region now plan infrastructure investments in a coordinated way’ (CEC 2011a).

Despite such positive signs, the Commission (CEC 2011a, b; CEC 2012a) highlights areas for improvement, including: the need to reinforce the integrated nature of the Strategy through closer alignment with the themes and flagships of Europe 2020; to assure the European nature of the Strategy through regular discussions of the Strategy at policy Councils; to establish targets to make the Strategy more focused; to maximise efforts to align Cohesion Policy and other funding sources in the Region with the objectives of the Strategy; to strengthen implementation structures both financially and in terms of staff; and to develop a “Communication initiative” to ensure broader participation in the Strategy, as well as understanding of its overall achievements.

A review of the Action Plan was published in late February 2013. The horizontal action on spatial planning (‘HA Spatial’) was maintained, although with a more explicit focus on maritime spatial planning. In comparison to the previous version, the new Action Plan has been broadened to include more actions that are not directly spatial in focus, nor specific for the macro-region. This implies a risk of watering down the initial intentions of the macro-regional approach, and will certainly present further challenges to applying a more explicit spatial planning perspective to the strategy, should this be envisaged in future.

Progress on the priority areas/horizontal actions/actions and flagship projects

While most of the priority areas in the Action Plan are not explicitly spatial in focus, many can be expected to either have direct, or at least indirect, spatial effects. There are isolated examples where a reference to spatial planning is being made under individual actions or flagship projects (e.g. Flagship project 2.1. (Fast Track) “Create marine protected areas” (Lead: Germany)’) (CEC 2012b: 14). To date, progress on land-based spatial planning within the EUSBSR in particular has been very slow, however. The implementation report (CEC 2011b) refers to the LTP process and ministerial and stakeholder meetings, and some relevant INTERREG IVB projects such as BaltSeaPlan, Eco-Region, New Bridges, Baltmet Promo, TransBaltic and Rail Baltica Growth Corridor. There is no clear evidence that these actions would not have taken place also without the EUSBSR, and the current added-value of the EUSBSR for land-based spatial planning is therefore doubtful. Furthermore, the question could be asked whether such largely ‘soft measures’ will be sufficient to achieve the ambition of providing horizontal coordination for the EUSBSR priority actions and projects through spatial planning. There has been some progress in the field of maritime spatial planning, with some projects (e.g. projects ‘Plan Bothnia’, ‘BaltSeaPlan Vision 2030’) completed, although only involving EU member countries besides some international and transnational organisations (CEC 2010f; CEC 2011b; Gee et al. 2011). The emphasis is on sharing data, establishing joint principles and setting cooperation platforms, and on supporting progress on national and regional maritime spatial plans.

In the most recent action plan (February 2013), the 17 priority areas (PAs) and 6 horizontal areas (HAs) are shown as contributing (in various degrees) to achieving the three objectives (‘ to save the sea’, ‘to connect the region’, ‘to increase prosperity’) with related sub-objectives, thus seeking to communicate the integrated approach. Indeed, Annex II of the Action Plan (CEC 2013: 191) shows that most priority areas that are presented as contributing to achieving the defined sub-objectives are either explicitly or indirectly spatial in focus (e.g. PA Ship, PA Transport, PA Energy, PA Nutri). This would suggest that the HA on spatial planning would receive a more prominent role in coordinating these PA’s and thus contributing to the objectives of the EUSBSR. On the contrary, however, ‘HA Spatial’ is only shown to contribute directly to sub-objective ‘Connecting People’ and to a lesser degree to the sub-objectives of ‘Rich and healthy wildlife’ and ‘better cooperation’. In terms of contributing to the EU2020 strategy, almost all PA’s and HA’s are shown to have a relation. A notable exception is ‘HA Spatial’ which is not envisaged to make a contribution to any sub-objectives of objective 3 to ‘Increase Prosperity’, including the EU2020 strategy.

In comparison to the previous version of the Action Plan, which sought to give equal attention to maritime and land-based spatial planning, the ‘HA Spatial’ in the Action Plan of February 2013 almost exclusively focuses on maritime spatial planning. Land-based spatial planning is mentioned in relation to the work of VASAB, noting that ‘the VASAB Long Term Perspective for the Territorial Development of the Baltic Sea Region (LTP) … should be taken into account by the coordinators of other priority areas when they address spatial objectives, conditions and impacts of their actions’ (CEC 2013: 170). It is doubtful that this reference will have the desired effect of better coordinating land-based spatial planning around the Baltic Sea, nor that it will achieve the overall goal of the horizontal action, stated as ‘to achieve territorial cohesion perspective in the BSR by 2030, i.e. the region is a well-integrated and coherent macro-region, and it has overcome the socio-economic development divides between its individual parts and turned the global challenges into assets‘ (CEC 2013: 171). In the new Action Plan, targets are only defined for the drawing up of maritime spatial plans, whereas there are no indicators for land-based spatial planning. Accordingly, only one flagship project is identified, ‘PartiSEApate – Multi-level Governance in MSP (Maritime Spatial Planning) throughout the Baltic Sea Region’, led by the Maritime Institute in Gdańsk, Poland.

The updated action plan seems to illustrate a trend of marginalizing spatial planning further, rather than giving it a more prominent role by identifying the added-value for the macro-regional strategy by seeking also spatial coordination. This may be a flaw in the architecture, with allocating spatial planning to a ‘horizontal action’, which seems added-on to the main priority areas rather than being integrated throughout (something which would seem important to achieve the HA’s ambitious goals). It may also be a problem of leadership and prioritisation, despite the existence of VASAB in the BSR, which prevents considering the role of transnational spatial planning for the BSR more explicitly, and especially so for the land-based dimension.

Evidence of the potential of the EUSBSR to influence EU and national policy developments

In terms of policy development and coherence in areas of relevance to this paper, the Commission report (CEC 2011a) takes positive notice of the link between the regional implementation of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy, and the progress on integration of maritime surveillance systems which has been made in the BSR. There is no evidence that the macro-regional strategy to date has provided any impetus for the review and coordination of land-based spatial plans in the countries and regions around the BSR, as it has for the development of maritime spatial plans. Indeed, the EUSBSR does not seem to have made any substantial contribution to the ongoing work of VASAB, nor does it seem to have revived the discussion on the role and objectives for transnational spatial planning in the BSR.

The need for a better alignment of funding remains a key concern, and this is also of relevance to the HA on spatial planning which may have fewer dedicated funding sources to draw on, given the integrated nature of spatial planning and the increasingly thematic orientation of many EU funding programmes (in pursuit of the EU’s Growth and Jobs agenda). A recent study of ‘needs for financial instruments in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’ (Savbäck et al. 2011: 3) concluded that ‘the implementation of the EUSBSR is perceived as a major undertaking by the stakeholders. The development of partnerships and projects is time demanding and real implementation requires financial resources. There is still a certain hesitation regarding how the implementation is structured. Many activities are in the start-up or early implementation phase and have a preparatory or planning character rather than “real” implementation. However, the implementation differs considerably between sectors as there are differences of maturity in transnational cooperation. Currently, more than 20 different funding instruments are used as sources of financing, not including national and regional co-financing sources. The implementation of most Priority Areas is to a large extent dependent on EU Structural Funds… Despite the large amount of available instruments it is clear that various financial and non-financial needs are not sufficiently met.’

The European territorial cooperation programmes, and especially the INTERREG IVB Baltic Sea Region programme, are of particular relevance for the EUSBSR. The transnational Baltic Sea Region Programme (INTERREG IVB) has contributed EUR 88 million to Flagship Projects, and targeted its fourth call specifically to promoting the Strategy (CEC 2011a). Yet, ‘when moving beyond projects covered by ETC programmes, all other available instruments are perceived as difficult and non-accommodating for transnational activities. This problem of funding is mainly related to structural challenges, as many programmes (EU-funded, national and regional alike) have difficulties to support transnational activities‘ (Savbäck et al. 2011: 4)

In the Commission report (2011a), several improvements to better align funding to the EUSBSR are mentioned, including new selection criteria for several ERDF programmes in the BSR. The recent review of the strategy has clarified the availability of financial instruments for the main objectives (available as overview table on the EUSBSR website). The main focus is on Cohesion Policy programmes, but ‘other programmes, funds and institutions’ are also listed. The ‘fit’ of financial instruments with the EUSBSR has only been assessed in this table for the main priority areas, however, and not for the horizontal actions which have the most explicit focus on spatial planning. Yet, achieving spatial coordination through a horizontal action as in the EUSBSR would clearly benefit from some transparency about available funding.

Added value of macro regional strategies in terms of coordination of activities between different actors and links with other EU initiatives

Perhaps inevitably given its ambition, the EUSBSR is characterized by a complex governance structure, and in earlier reviews this prompted calls for an improved organization structure. Recently, the roles and responsibilities of the different actors have been clarified (Council 2012), and an overview made available on the website of the EUSBSR. However, the focus has been on listing contacts for (thematic) priority actions and flagship projects, rather than the cross-cutting, ‘horizontal’, actions, where arguably a stronger lead and visibility would be desirable.

Moreover, the governance arrangements are EU-centred, with scope for involving non-EU members and other EU initiatives at the operational level (programmes, Flagship project leaders) and the coordination level (Priority Area Coordinators, Priority Area Focal Points, Horizontal Action Leaders), but not at the policy level (Council, Commission, High Level Group). As an EU initiative, the Strategy does not commit non-Member States. Existing transnational bodies in the BSR, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Nordic Council of Ministers or the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) or VASAB, have well-established (intergovernmental) forms of cooperation between EU and non-EU countries. The fact that the macro-regions are strategies of the European Union has from the beginning put much weight on the need to establish constructive cooperation with the external partners in the region, and in particular Russia (CEC 2012b). The Northern Dimension, a common policy of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, provides the basis for these external aspects of the strategy. However, Russia continues to seem to have limited involvement in the implementation of the Strategy, either through specific projects or existing regional frameworks such as the Northern Dimension.

The implementation of the Strategy through actions and projects is predominantly the task of national ministries, national public agencies or transnational bodies, as Annexe 1 shows. The Commission report notes efforts to involve more sub-national actors and existing cooperative structures in the EUSBSR (CEC 2011a). Moreover, differences in the level of ambition (and achievements) across the priority areas, depending on existing networks and the maturity of cooperation arrangements on which the implementation could draw, has been noted before (CEC 2010f). This may at least partly explain the differences in achievements in relation to maritime spatial planning on the one hand, and land-based spatial planning on the other.

Main drivers to increase the added value of macro-regional strategies in their establishment and in their implementation

The Commission Communication (CEC 2012a, later adopted by Council (2012)) proposed the following key areas for improvement:

· Improvements to the strategic focus, by defining three key objectives for the EUSBSR and by aligning the Strategy more clearly to the Europe 2020 objectives.

· Alignment of policies and funding, with a better coordination through the Common Strategic Framework 2014-2020. ‘There must be a stronger transnational dimension to national and regional programmes, as relying on territorial cooperation programmes alone will not suffice…. When developing partnership contracts and operational programmes, at the regional, national, cross-border and transnational levels, macro-regional objectives and priorities must be present’ (CEC 2012a).

· Clarification of responsibilities of different actors and improved governance arrangements. The Strategy should be included on the agenda of the Council of Ministers in its different formations as appropriate. Strategy considerations should be reflected in budget and other discussions. Regional and municipal actors must be more involved. Political commitment must be translated into administrative commitment, with sufficient staffing and continuity of personnel. Involvement of other stakeholders, including the private sector, and of third countries should be improved.

· Better communication by promoting awareness of the Strategy and its results. Setting indicators and targets and evaluating progress will be given increasing attention.

While all of these suggestions are sensible, they will arguably do little to strengthen the coordination role of the horizontal action on spatial planning, given the apparent focus on the main priority areas in clarifying the governance arrangements and aligning funding. A closer connection to the EU2020 objectives, which are very thematic and largely non-spatial, will provide further challenges for making sure the horizontal action on spatial planning can live up to its stated goals.

Overall, the added-value of macro-regional strategies for spatial planning has been modest and variable to date. An added-value is apparent for the area of maritime spatial planning: as a new policy field both at EU level and in most countries, and with a clear transnational focus on the maritime environment of the Baltic Sea, the EUSBSR appears to have supported a constructive and cooperative process for joint databases and cooperation on maritime spatial plans. These may not be groundbreaking results yet, and have mostly been agreed between EU member states only, but given the novelty of the EUSBSR they are a promising start. This is especially so given what appears wide support by many actors in the region (even if at present mostly from the EU), which may provide a lasting basis for future (and more far-reaching) action. The same cannot be said for land-based spatial planning, however. Indeed, the EUSBSR so far does not seem to have brought any added-value to the work of VASAB. Given the EU-focus of macro-regional strategies on the one hand and lack of EU competence for spatial planning on the other, an intergovernmental approach such as pursued by VASAB may seem more appropriate than a macro-regional strategy focused on spatial planning. However, there are strong arguments for reconciling the maritime spatial planning approach and the land-based dimension to a more comprehensive and integrated approach, and the current trends in the BSR suggest that there may be a danger of their lasting separation into different policy communities. Spatial planning should be given a much more central role in the EUSBSR if such cross-sectoral and multi-level governance coordination is to be achieved. The coordination ambitions of the EUSBSR would make a case for more closely involvi