EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 28 November  2022  
on amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank  
(CON/2022/ 40) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 7 October 2022,  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank1. On 17 November 
2022 the ECB received from the Ministry of Finance an updated version of the draft law  (hereinafter the 
‘draft law’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth indent s of Article  2(1) of  
Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as the draft law concerns means of payment, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
(MNB ), the collection of statistics, payment and settlement systems , and rules applicable to financial 
institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets . In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, 
the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1. The main purpose of the draft law is to modify certain provisions of the Law  on the MNB . 
 
Cash infrastructure network  
1.2. The draft law3 proposes to extend the regulatory and administrative responsibilities of the MNB to 
require it to rate the infrastructure network of credit institutions and post offices used to carry out cash 
transactions -flows in accordance with the regularity and criteria to be set out in a Decree of the MNB 
Governor governing the conditions for cash distribution. The MNB shall, on the basis of this rating, require 
credit institutions and post offices to establish an infrastructure network that meets the requirements 
assigned to the rating.  
1.3. According to the detailed justification accompanying the draft law , these new powers are created for 
the MNB in order to the requirement that, in the development, maintenance and operation of the Hungarian cash infrastructure network , considerations of the security of supply and the optimisation of the network at 
 
1 A Magyar Nemzeti Bankról szóló 2013. évi CXXXIX. törvény . 
2 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29  June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
3 See paragraphs 3 and 10 of the draft law (introducing new Articles 23A and 45(d) of the Law  on the MNB).  
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2 the level of society as a whole must be applied, in addition to the aspects of commercial policy of operators  
of the network .  
 
Statistics  
1.4. In accordance with t he existing  provisions  of the Law on the MNB4, the MNB operates a central bank 
information system in order to perform the MNB’s tasks, including the compilation of statistics . In this context 
the draft law5 provides that the MNB shall process in the central bank information system the personal data 
essential  for the performance of the MNB’s monetary policy, payment and securities settlement system and 
supervisory tasks and that  are necessary for the assessment of creditworthiness, the identification of credit 
risks, related to assets used as security and deposits held with a credit institution or the T reasury, and for 
the purpose of exercising ongoing supervision, with the proviso that the reporting of superv isory data may 
not relate to the natural identity data, special data, identification code or identification document of the 
person concerned.  
1.5. In order to carry out its tasks to collect and publish statistical information in order to fulfil the MNB’s 
statistical reporting obligations towards the ECB under Article of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the E uropean Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’)6, the draft law7 
provides that the MNB shall operate a statistical system as part of the central bank information system, for which it may receive from a  member of the Official Statistical Service, in a manner that is uniquely identified, 
personal data necessary for asses sing creditworthiness, identifying credit risks, and relat ed to assets used 
as security and deposits held with a credit institution or the T reasury, excluding the data subject’s natural 
identity data, special data, identification code or identification doc ument.  
1.6. The draft law
8 provides that in the case of data provision and receipt of personal data , the MNB shall, 
by means of pseudonymisation, separate the data enabling the identification of the natural person 
concerned from other data relating to the dat a subject, and shall provide the data so separated with a 
technical identifier protected in accordance with specified security measures, without which the link between the data provided or received and the natural person concerned can no longer be restored, except  
by the MNB  on a temporary basis for the purpose of achieving the MNB’s tasks as set out above and for 
the necessary period.  
 
Macroprudential policy  
1.7. Under the existing provisions  of the Law on the MNB
9, the MNB Governor may issue  a decree 
pursuant to a decision of the  Hungarian Financial Stability Council specifying measures required to reduce 
the risk of excessive outflows of credit . In such decree the Governor  shall establish rules that relate to, inter 
alia, contracts concluded with natural persons in Hungary in the course of credit and money lending 
activities and govern the maximum coverage ratio for real estate loans, vehicle financing loans and financial 
 
4 See Article 30(1) of the Law on the MNB.  
5 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2) of the Law  on the MNB).  
6 See Article 4(6) of the Law on the MNB.  
7 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2a) of the Law  on the MNB).  
8 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2d) of the Law on the MNB).  
9 Article 32(1)  and (2) of the Law  on the MNB.  
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3 leasing transactions, and the maximum debt -to-income ratio.  
1.8. The draft law10 proposes to extend the MNB Governor’s  regulatory power  with regard to contracts 
concluded with natural persons in the framework of credit  and money lending and financial leasing activities 
in Hungary to include the following macroprudential tool s: (a) a maximum instalment amount in proportion 
to income; and ( b) a maximum permitted loan or lease- related debt amount as a proportion of income.  
1.9. As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, it is appropriate to introduce 
debt-to-income limi ts also in line with the proposal for legal harmonisation and principles set out in the 
European Systemic Risk Board’s Recommendation on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-
prudential policy11.  
 
Oversight and supervision of financial market infrastructures  
1.10.  Under the existing provisions of the Law on the MNB, the MNB shall oversee payment and securities 
settlement systems, including overseeing the operations of the system and of the organi sation performing 
the activity of a central coun terparty, in order to ensure the sound and efficient functioning of these systems 
and the smooth circulation of cash12. Furthermore, under the Law on the MNB, the MNB  shall supervise 
the financial intermediary system13. The Law on the MNB further specifies14 the MNB shall implement 
Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council15 (on cross -border payments 
in the Union)  and Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 (on 
establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro) , and carry 
out the functions and, as the designated national competent authority, perform tasks relating t o the 
implementation of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 (on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories ) and Regulation (EU) No  909/2014 of the  
European Parliament and of the Council 18 (on central securities depositories ).    
1.11.  The draft law19 introduces a technical modification to these provisions  whereby  the specific duties 
and functions relating to the implementation of the aforementioned EU regulations are set out within the 
framework of t he MNB’s supervisory duties only, and no longer within the additional framework of the MNB’s 
oversight duties.  
 
10 See paragraph 7 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 32(2)(a) of the Law  on the MNB).  
11 Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and 
instruments of macro- prudential policy (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1).  
12 See Article 4(5) of the Law on the MNB.  
13 See Article 4(9) of the Law on the MNB.  
14 See Articles 28(4), 28/A, 29, 40(4), 40(8) and 40(16) of the Law  on the MNB.  
15 Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross -border 
payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 ( OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11).  
16 Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and 
business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (OJ L 94, 
30.3.2012, p. 22).  
17 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).  
18 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities 
settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012  (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 1). 
19 See paragraphs 8(1)  to (3) and (4) (introducing new Articles 40(4), 40(8), 40(16) and 40(39) of the Law  on the MNB) and 
30(b)  to (d) of the draft law (repealing Articles 28(4), 28/A and 29 of the Law on the MNB).  
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4  
Remuneration of the MNB Governor, Deputy Governor, members of the Monetary Council and members 
of the Supervisory Board  
1.12.  Under the existing prov isions of the Law on the MNB , the monthly remuneration of the MNB Governor 
is 5 million forints, and the remuneration or honorarium of the Deputy Governor, the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board,  and the members of the Monetary Council and the Supervisory Board is 90%, 70% and 
60%, respectively, of the MNB Governor’s monthly remuneration20. The draft law21 amends those existing 
provisions regarding the MNB Governor  by providing that the MBN Governor’s monthly basic salary shall 
be equal to the monthly salary of the Chairman of the State Audit Office, resulting in  a reference value that  
would be twelve times the national monthly average gross salary for the year preceding the given year , as 
official ly published by the Central Statistical Office22. 
 
Miscellaneous  provisions  
1.13.   The draft law23 contains miscellaneous provisions  that includ e amendments concerning: (a)  the 
administrative procedures of the MNB ; (b) the performance of the MNB’s supervisory tasks ; (c) the 
enforcement of fines and procedural costs ; (d) the extension of the time limit (from 15 to 30 days) for 
opening market surveillance procedures related to the EU short -selling regulation; (e)  changes  to the 
deadline for, and the content of , the notification related to the opening of a market surveillance proc edure;  
and (f) commemorative and collector s’ coins .   
 2. Remuneration of the MNB Governor, Deputy Governor, and members of the Monetary Council  
2.1. The ECB would like to emphasise that, although Member States with a derogation  – such as  Hungary  
– do not yet participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union, they have a legal duty to adapt 
the statutes of their national central banks (NCBs) to ensure compatibility with the Treaty
24 and the Statute 
of the ESCB. Any legislative reform in non-participating Member States should aim to gradually achieve 
consistency with Eurosystem standards25. 
2.2. Article 130 of the Treaty  and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB expressly prohibit the ECB, the 
NCBs, and the members of their decision- making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body, 
on the one hand, and prohibits those Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and any governmen t of 
a Member State from seeking to influence the members of the decision- making bodies of the ECB and the 
NCBs in the performance of their tasks, on the other. The intention of these provisions is to shield the European System of Central Banks  (ESCB)  from all political pressure in order to enable it effectively to 
 
20 See Article 149 of the Law  on the MNB.  
21 See paragraph 21 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 149(1) of the Law  on the MNB).  
22 See Article 20 of the Act LXVI  of 2011 on the State Audit Office  (az Állami Számvevőszékről szóló 2011. évi LXVI. törvény) .  
23 See paragraphs 1, 10, 11, 14 , 15, 16, 17, 25 and 26 of the draft law (introducing new Article [ 86/A(5), 90(6), 91(5) ] of the 
Law on the MNB).  
24  See Article 131 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
25  See, e.g., paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2008/34 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2017/17. All ECB opinions are 
published on EUR -Lex. 
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5 pursue the objectives ascribed to its tasks, through the independent exercise of the specific powers 
conferred on it for that purpose by primary law26. National rules therefore cannot, without infringing Article 
130 of the T reaty  and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, place the NCB concerned in a situation where it 
is potentially exposed to political pressure or which in any way undermines its ability to carry out independently a task falling w ithin the scope of the ESCB
27.  
2.3. With this in mind , the ECB observes that the Member States may not amend legislation affecting the 
remuneration of the members of the NCBs’ decision- making bodies with the purpose of seeking to influence 
them. The ECB understands that the impact of the draft law on the actual r emuneration of the Governor, 
the Deputy Governor, and the members of the Monetary Council will be limited. Against this background, 
and as previously noted by the ECB to other Member States28, the ECB invites the legislator to consider 
applying the new provisions on the determination of such renumeration only to Governors, Deputy 
Governors, and members of the Monetary Council who are appointed after the entry into force of the draft 
law. 
 
3. Cash infrastructure network  
3.1. The ECB understands that  there is growing concern regarding access to cash in Hungary as cash 
in circulation continues to grow and cash demand remains robust while the credit institutions ’ cash 
infrastructure has not been adapting to this evolution. Cash is a well -established means of payment 
providing for immediate settlement of debts and direct control over the payer’s spending. Furthermore, the 
ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use cash rather than other means of payment, or who are unable to use digital 
technology. Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by 
allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way. The E CB notes that cash could play an 
important role in the event of a contingency or crisis
29. 
3.2. Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the 
field of electronic payment instruments30, it also welcomes the core objectives of the draft law, namely to 
facilitate the continuity and security of cash supply and accessibility  to Hungarian society by ensuring an 
adequate level of access to cash services throughout Hungary31. The ECB also welcomes that the MNB 
will be em powered to assess and rate the adequacy of the cash infrastructure and to require credit 
institutions and postal offices to take measures in case of insufficient geographical coverage of cash 
services to the general public.  
 
26  See, e.g., judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 February 2019, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, Joined Cases C -202/18 
and C -238/18, EU:C:2019:139, paragraph 47. 
27 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije , Case C -45/21, EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 97 
and 104.  
28 See paragraph 3.5.2. of Opinion CON/2021/9.  
29 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/21.  
30 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41.  
31 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2020/21.  
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6 3.3. The ECB considers it important that all Member States, including non- euro area Member States, 
take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories 
provide adequate access to cash services, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash32. 
3.4. Finally, the ECB would welcome a clarification regarding the possibilities for interventions and 
sanctions that the home supervisory authority would have if a branch of a foreign EEA credit institution were in breach of the draft law
33. 
 
4. Statisti cs 
4.1. Assisted by the NCBs,  the ECB has the right to collect statistical information within the limits of 
the reference reporting population and of what is necessary to carry out the tasks of the ESCB . This 
reference reporting population may  comprise natural persons as reporting agents , provided that  the other 
relevant conditions which define the relevant reporting population are met . Thus , it is envisaged that the 
ECB and NCBs may in certain circumstances collect personal data directly  from natural persons , based on 
the relevant provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/9834, which applies without prejudice to 
Regulation (EU) 2016/678 of the European Parliament and of the Council35 (hereinafter the ‘General Data 
Protection Regulation’  or ‘GDPR ’) and the equivalent legal act that applies to the EU institutions36.  
4.2. Against this background, the draft law should not apply in a manner that is prejudicial to the 
GDPR. The question of whether the Law  on the MNB is prejudicial to the GDPR falls within the jurisdiction 
of the relevant competent authorities.   
4.3. The Law on the MNB  must ensure that when these data fall under the scope of both statistical 
confidentiality and personal data protection rules, t he authorised users of such  data fulfil the ir respective 
obligations as recipients of personal data and as recipients of confidential statistical information in relation  
to the applicable security rules that are in place at national and/or Union level.  
 
5. Macroprudential policy  
5.1. As a national macroprudential authority, the MNB has conferred  on it macroprudential tasks in order 
to maintain the stability of the banking system. The draft law does not confer new tasks on the MNB in this 
field, but rather specifies certain new macroprudential tools that the MNB may use when discharging its 
macroprudential responsibilit ies37. 
5.2. From a fin ancial stability perspective, the ECB welcomes and supports the extension of the 
macroprudential toolkit of the MNB, as it is aimed at promoting responsible borrowing and lending, and 
increasing the transparency of credit institutions’ activities, thus saf eguarding the stability of the financial 
system as a whole by strengthening its resilience and preventing and mitigating systemic risks . 
 
32 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/21.  
33 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2019/41.  
34 See Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical 
information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).  
35 Regulation (EU) 2016/678 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).  
36 See Art icle 8c of the Regulation (EC) No  2533/98 .  
37  See paragraph 9. 2.1 of Opinion CON/2021/9 . 
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7 5.3. The draft law establishes a legal basis for imposing maximum limits on the amount of loan or lease 
debt as a proportion of income. The i ntroduction of borrower -based measures is in line with the principles 
set out in the European Systemic Risk Board’s Recommendation on intermediate objectives and 
instruments of macro- prudential policy – in particular with regard to the obj ective s of mitigat ing and 
prevent ing excessive credit growth and leverage – as it should contribute to strengthening credit institutions’ 
lending practices, whilst also ensuring consistency in assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness. The ECB 
highlights t he need for constant monitoring and updating of relevant limits, and recommends that they be 
subject ed to a thorough assessment of their appropriateness , as well as to a  regular review to take account 
of changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions . 
 
6. Oversight and supervision of financial market infrastructures  
The ECB welcomes the draft law’s technical clarification regarding the distinction between the oversight 
and supervision responsibilities of the MNB as regards  Union  legislation relating to credit and debit transfers 
in euro, central counterparties and central securities depositories.  
 
This opinion will b e published on EUR -Lex.  
  
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 November 2022.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine  LAGARDE