EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 18 September 2013   
on the establishment of a Financial Stability Board  
and the macro -prudential mandate of national authorities  
(CON/20 13/70) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 27 August  2013 , the European Central Bank  (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the macro -prudential supervision of the financial system  
(hereinafter  the ‘draft law’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4)  and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the  third and sixth  indents of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC of 29  June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legisl ative provisions1, as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and rules applicable to 
financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets.  
In accordance with the first sentence of Article  17.5 of  the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The draft law implement s Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 
22 December 2011 on the macro -prudential mandate of national authorities2 (hereinafter the ‘ESRB 
Recommendation’).  To this end, it provides for the establishment of a Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) , which  will be responsible  for macro -prudential  policy  aimed at preventing and mitigat ing 
systemic risks to financial stability. Macro-prudential policy will be implemented by the FSB 
together with the three independent national  authorities  responsible for  supervising  relevant 
institutions in  their respective segments of the financial syste m: Banka Slovenije , the Securities 
Market Agency and the Insurance Supervision Agency  (hereinafter the ‘supervisory authorities ’)3. 
1.2 The FSB will be composed of eight members : two representatives of each of the three supervisory 
authorit ies, and two rep resentatives of the M inistry of Finance . The supervisory authorities’ 
representatives will have one vote each, but the  Ministry of Finance ’s representatives will  not have 
voting rights . The Governor of Banka Slovenije will be the  FSB’s President and will chair the FSB 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
2  OJ C 41, 14.2.201 2, p.1.  
3  See Articles 1 to 4 of the draft law.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 meetings . The FSB will take decisions at its meetings, which will  be normally convened by the 
FSB’s President four  times a year , but may also be convened on the  initiative of any other FSB 
member. The quorum for decision -making will be met if five members with voting rights are 
present at the meeting. The FSB’s secretariat will be provided by Banka Slovenije and will ensure 
analytical, administrative and logistical support to the FSB. The supervisory authorities will 
cooperate with the secretar iat in preparing and providing the material to be discussed at FSB 
meetings and in performing its other tasks4. 
1.3 The FSB will be empowered to issue  guidance to the supervisory authorities  in the form of non -
binding recommendations, warnings and instruct ions, in the following situations : (a) if it sees a 
need to prevent or mitigate systemic risk to financial stability ; or (b) in order to implement the 
European Systemic Risk Board ’s (ESRB)  warnings and recommendations . More specifically , the 
FSB will issue : (a) recommendations , where a disruption could occur in the financial system which 
may p otential ly lead to  serious negative consequences for the functioning of the financial system 
and the real economy , if voted for by a majority of FSB members present at  the meeting ; (b) 
warnings, where such a disruption in the financial system has already occurred  and could have such 
consequences , if voted for by at least four FSB members ; and (c) instructions , where a disruption 
has already occurred  and has such consequ ences , if voted for by at least five FSB members . The 
FSB’s  guidance  will, in particular, defin e the systemic risk  identified  and the competent 
supervisory authority to which implementation of the guidance will be proposed . If appropriate, the 
FSB will als o propose a particular macro -prudential supervisory measure.  The FSB will decide on 
a case -by-case basis whether the guidance is to be published.  The supervisory authority to wh ich 
the guidance will be  addressed shall, within seven working days of receipt of the guidance, either 
implement it or provide an explanation to the FSB of its reasons for non -implementation5. 
1.4 When implementing macro -prudential policy, the supervisory authorities will be responsible for the 
macro -prudential supervision o f institu tions  which they supervise pursuant to  the Law on Banka 
Slovenije, the Law on banking, the Law on the financial instruments market, the L aw on insurance, 
the Law on investment funds and management companies , and other laws pursuant to which the 
supervisory  authorities carry out  their tasks (hereinafter the ‘sectoral laws ’6). They will implement 
FSB guidance issued to them in accordance with  their competences by applying the available 
supervisory measures . The supervisory authorities will conduct macro -prude ntial supervision o f 
relevant  institutions  by monitoring, collecting and verifying their reports and notifica tions ; by 
inspecting their operations ; and by taking  supervisory measur es pursuant to  the sectoral laws and 
the draft law . The supervisory authorit ies will also, inter alia , assess systemic risks in their field of 
competence , and propose to the FSB a means of  identifying systemically important institutions  and 
the appropriate action  to be taken . Together with the FSB t he supervisory authorities  will 
                                                 
4  See A rticle s 5 to7 and Article 10  of the draft law.  
5  See Article s 9 to  11 and 17(2) of the draft law.  
6  See Article 2 of the draft law.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 participate in ESRB  activities and follow its recommendations , in default of which they shall  
provide an explanation to the FSB of their reasons for  any non-compliance  with such acts7. 
1.5 The draft law lays down the rules for the collection  and exchange of information and the protection 
of confidentiality  in order to achieve the effective application of macro -prudential policy8. It also 
lays down  rules for cross -border cooperation between relevant authorities9. 
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB supports  the effective design of macro -prudential policy frameworks within the Member 
States, in line with the guiding principles expressed in the ESRB Recommendation. Moreover, the 
ECB and national central banks should play a leading role in macro -prudential over sight, given 
their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability10.  
2.2 The draft law suggests that it is the intention of the consulting authorit y to confer such a leading 
role to Banka Slovenije by (a) designating the  Governo r of Banka Slovenije  as President of the 
FSB, entrusted with  conven ing and chairing its regular meetings, and  (b) assigning to Banka 
Slovenije  a competence to provide the FSB Secretariat . In addition, Banka Slovenije will be 
responsible for the macro -prude ntial supervision o f financial institutions  pursuant to sectoral laws , 
as well as leasing firms11. 
2.3 In line with observations  made  in previous  ECB  opinions12, Banka Slovenije ’s mandate  to perform 
macro-prudential tasks should not affect: (a) its instituti onal, functional and financial 
independence; or (b) the performance by the European System of Central Banks  of its tasks under 
the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank . The ECB welcomes Article 12( 2) of the draft law, which explicitly states that neither the 
performance of the tasks under the draft law nor the content of FSB guidance shall interfere with 
the supervisory authorities’ fundamental objectives and independence.  
2.4 The ECB understands th at the FSB guidance provided to supervisory authorities under Article 9(1) 
will be limited to ensuring correct and timely implementation of the ESRB recommendations , 
where the ESRB has adopted recommendations on the same matter, and will be without prejudi ce 
to obligation s on the addressees of  ESRB recommendations , pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 
1092/201013. 
                                                 
7  See Article s 17 to  19 of the draft law.  
8  See Articles 4 (4), 14 to 16 and 21 of the draft law.  
9  See Article 4, Artic le 13(3) and Article 15 of the draft law.  
10  See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/66, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/54, paragraph 2.1 of 
Opinion CON/2013/45 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/30. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s 
website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
11  See Article 17(1) of the draft law.  
12  See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2013/45 and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2013/30.  
13  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union 
macro -prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European System Risk Board, OJ L 331, 
15.12.2010, p. 1.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 2.5 In order to facilitate the FSB’s ability to efficiently coordinate cooperation between supervisory 
authorities and to harmonise the use of macro -prudential supervisory measures applied without 
formal  guidance from the FSB, the draft law may provide that supervisory authorit ies should , in a 
timely and appropriate manner , inform the FSB and other supervisory authorities of the measures 
taken.  
2.6 In lin e with observations  made  in previous ECB opinions14, the consulting authority is invited to 
revis e Article 4 (5) and Article 15(5)  of the draft law  to ensure that the FSB shall also cooperate and 
exchange data and information  with the ECB and the ESRB , in ac cordance with the ESRB 
Recommendation.  
2.7 This opinion is without prejudice to the conclusions of the follow -up assessment of the above  
mentioned ESRB Recommendation, which the ESRB will prepare in accordance with Article 17 of 
Regulation (EU) No 1092/201 0. 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 September 2013 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
 
 
                                                 
14  See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2013/54 .