EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 20.9.2010 
SEC(2010) 1040 final  
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Accompanying document to the 
 
 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL   
 
on the marketing and use of explosives precursors  
 
COM(2010) 473 
 SEC(2010) 1041 
 
EN 2   EN  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________4  
2. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties ___________________________4  
2.1. Organisation a nd timing _____________________________________________________ 4  
2.2. Consultation  process ________________________________________________________ 5  
2.2.1. Standing Committee on Precursors ____________________________________________________ 5  
2.2.2. Consultation with other stakeholders __________________________________________________ 6  
3. Problem definition _________________________________________________________6  
3.1. Context: home made explosives as the pref erred means for perpetrating attacks ______ 6  
3.2. The problem _______________________________________________________________ 7  
3.2.1. Chemical precursors to explos ives of highest concern _____________________________________ 8  
3.2.2. Insufficient security and awar eness of the su pply chain ____________________________________ 9  
3.2.3. No EU level pl aying field __________________________________________________________ 10  
3.3. The baseline scenario_______________________________________________________ 13  
3.4. Why the EU is better placed to take action: subsidiarity and proportionality principles 14  
4. Policy Objectives__________________________________________________________15  
5. Policy options and their Assessment __________________________________________16  
5.1. Definition s used ___________________________________________________________ 17  
5.2. Assessment of the policy options______________________________________________ 17  
5.2.1. Assessment of policy optio n 0: Status Quo_____________________________________________ 18  
5.2.2. Assessment of policy option 1: A total ban on sale s of the substances to members of the general 
public, irrespective of concentration levels ____________________________________________________ 18  
5.2.3. Assessment of policy option 2: A ban on sales of th e substances in all concentrations and quantities 
over the internet_________________________________________________________________________ 19  
5.2.4. Assessment of policy option 3: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a specific 
concentration limit_______________________________________________________________________ 19  
5.2.5. Assessment of policy option 4a: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with a ban on sales to minors ________________________________________ 20  
5.2.6. Assessment of policy option 4b: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with sales of higher concentra tions through a system of licensing either the retail 
distribution or the use of the precursors ______________________________________________________ 20  
5.2.7. Assessment of policy option 4c: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions ______________ 21  
5.2.8. Assessment of policy option 4d: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a 
specific concentration limit with a scheme for labelling precursors with a code specifying that the purchase 
may be subject to registration and developing a system for recording the identity of the buyer (including internet sales), with records to be made ava ilable to competent law en forcement authorities _____________ 22
 
5.2.9. Assessment of policy option 5: Taking measures to  enhance the surveillance of professional use, 
including sub-options such as promoting codes of conduct, education and training, raising staff awareness or 
addressing in particular medium / small users__________________________________________________ 23  
EN 3   EN 6. The preferred policy option _________________________________________________24  
6.1. The reasons for the regul atory response proposed _______________________________ 25  
6.2. Main advantages of the p referred policy  option _________________________________ 26  
6.3. Detailed assessment of the preferred polic y option_______________________________ 27  
6.3.1. Assessment of achievement of  the policy objectives _____________________________________ 27  
6.3.2. Assessment of econo mic impacts ____________________________________________________ 28  
6.3.3. Assessment of fundamen tal rights impacts _____________________________________________ 32  
Article 8 Protection of personal data _______________________________________________________ 32  
Article 16: Freedom to conduct a business __________________________________________________ 32  
6.3.4. Assessment of soci al impacts _______________________________________________________ 33  
6.3.5. Assessment of environm ental impacts: 0 ______________________________________________ 33  
6.3.6. Considerations on feasib ility and subs idiarity___________________________________________ 34  
6.4. Assessment and consideration  of proportionality ________________________________ 38  
7. Monitoring and evaluation _________________________________________________39  
Annex 1: recommendations of the standing co mmittee on precursors in its annual report for 
2008________________________________________________________________________40  
Annex 2: NOTE FROM THE LAST M EETING OF THE INTERSERVICE GROUP ON 
EXPLOSIVES ISSUES ________________________________________________________42  
Annex 3: List of private sector stakeholde rs in the standing committee on precursors ______43  
Annex 4: overview of recent terro rist attack and intended attack s with explosives in europe _45  
Annex 5: overview of the main househol d and other downstream use of precursors________51  
Annex 6: Overview of the main findings of th e "mystery shopping" exercise conducted in the 
course of the preparatory study informin g the impact assessment (per precursor) _________53  
Annex 7: Calculation of the loss to consumers,  businesses and of the administrative costs  - 
methodology _________________________________________________________________54  
ANNEX 8: ESTIMATES A ND BACKGROUND CALCULATIONS  FOR THE ECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT _______________________________________________________________65  
ANNEX 9: DETAILED ASSESSMENT TABL ES FOR EACH POLICY OPTION: GENERAL 
ASSESSMENT _______________________________________________________________84  
ANNEX 10: GLOSSARY ______________________________________________________113  
 
EN 4   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Action Plan on Enhancing the Security  of Explosives, approved by the Council on 
18 April 20081, called on the Commission to:  
"establish a Standing Committee to consider measures and prepare 
recommendations concerning the regulati on of explosives precursors available 
on the market taking into account  their cost-benefit effects ."  
Based on the recommendations of the Standi ng Committee (listed in Annex 1) and an 
extensive impact assessment study, the Commi ssion intends to adopt measures to deal 
with the marketing and use of explosives precursors in the 3rd quarter of 2010. 
The overall objectives of the measures ar e to establish harmonised measures for 
restricting the marketing and us e of certain substances, which are frequently used for the 
illicit manufacture of explosives, with a view to preventing their diversion and misuse.   
These measures are intended to constitute a tangible deliverable within the "prevent" 
strand of the EU Counter-terrorism Strate gy adopted by the JHA Council on 1 December 
2005.2 
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTA TION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
2.1. Organisation and timing 
This impact assessment is based on an extens ive "Preparatory Study to  Inform an Impact 
Assessment of Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives" (Preparatory study),  prepared by an exte rnal contractor, GHK. 
The study assessed the impacts of the recommendations made by the Standing 
Committee on Precursors in its Annual Report 2008, as well as a number of other policy 
options. The work on the study lasted for 9 months, and included an extensive consultation with the Standing Committee on Precursors. The reports submitted in the course of the work on the study were also discussed regularly in  the Interservice Group 
on explosives issues. The group's last meeting was 20 January (note at Annex 2).  The IA 
Board scrutinised the IA on 28 April 2010. In  line with the Board's comments, the 
following changes have been made to this IA: 
- strengthening the explanation of how th e preferred policy option would make a 
contribution to the preventi on of terrorist attacks; 
- strengthening of methodologi cal explanations (in the main body of the Impact 
Assessment as well as in the relevant annexe s), including the explanation of why the EU 
Standard Cost model could not be used; 
                                                
 
1  8109/09, ENFOPOL 69 
2 15708/03. 
EN 5   EN - enhanced explanation of the expected co sts to public authorities and businesses and 
linking these to the relevant annexes, wh ich provide background st atistical data and 
methodology;  
- enhanced justifica tion of EU action;  
- strengthened justification for the sel ection of the prefer red policy option;  
- provision of more information about stak eholder views, including an overview of 
private sector stakeholders consulted;  
- adding a table of contents , glossary, and annexes on the recommendations of the 
Standing Committee on Precursors.  
Adoption of the legislative instrument by the European Commission, most likely in the 
form of a Regulation on the basis of Artic le 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, is scheduled for the 3rd quarter of 2010.    
2.2. Consultation process 
2.2.1.  Standing Committee on Precursors  
The proposed policy builds on the work and the recommendations of the Standing 
Committee on Precursors (SCP). This Comm ittee is an ad hoc advisory Committee 
composed of experts from the EU Member St ate authorities and re presentatives of the 
private sector (major EU level chemical  and fertiliser produc ers and distributors 
associations, listed in Annex 3), and is ch aired by the Commission. The objective of the 
Standing Committee is to make recommendati ons to the European Commission with 
regard to possible measures to  enhance the security of precu rsors to explosives with the 
aim of preventing the fabrication of Impr ovised Explosive Devices (IEDs) serving 
criminal or terrorist purposes. The Co mmittee started its work in January 2008.  
On 13 February 2009, the SCP adopted its annual report for 2008 which contained 
concrete recommendations on enhancing the security of precursors. These 
recommendations served as a basis for the impact assessment study performed by GHK. The SCP was closely involved in the developm ent of this study – its members (both from 
the public and the private sector) were consul ted on a regular basis. Three SCP meetings 
were devoted to discussing th e outputs in the c ourse of the work on the study – on 8 
September 2009, 11 January 2010 and 10 March 2010.  
In addition to this, the contra ctor organised a business survey
3 and two stakeholder 
workshops on 3 and 4 December 2009 (with repr esentatives of Member State authorities 
and with the private sector, respectively) to validate the assessment of the policy options 
proposed in the draft study.  
                                                 
3  The businesses for the survey were identified through European and national industrial 
representative bodies, through a "mystery shoppin g" exercise and through an internet search 
aimed at identifying businesses in  the chemical sector in each Member State, for each precursor 
addressed by the study. The re sponses received covered variou s supply chain stakeholders, 
ranging from producers and manufacturers to distributors and wholesalers of chemical substances and products. In addition to this, several specia list end sellers and retailers also responded. 
EN 6   EN The consultations in the course of the devel opment of the Preparatory study also included 
consultation of some SMEs, which would be  most affected by possible measures on 
precursors, in particular on hexamine.  
This broad consultation process, together w ith the results of the impact assessment study, 
form the basis for this Impact Assessment. Th is consultation process resulted in a high 
level of consensus on the preferred policy option.  
2.2.2.  Consultation with other stakeholders  
Work on the issue of security of explosives  has been developed by Directorate General 
for Justice, Freedom and Security since 2006. Over that period, inte rnal consultations 
with other Commission Services have focu ssed on those directorat es, which are most 
directly involved with this issue – Direct orate General for Enterprise and Industry, 
because of its responsibility for regulating chemicals, including commercial explosives 
and pyrotechnics, and Director ate General for Transport a nd Energy  (now Directorate 
General for Mobility and Transport) for issu es related to transpor t of dangerous goods. 
The Secretariat General had been involved in  the interservice meetings as well. Other 
services have been consu lted through the normal interser vice procedures (including 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer s and Directorate General for Agriculture), 
and have not raised issue with this in the past.  
 
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
3.1. Context: home made explosives as the preferred means for perpetrating 
attacks  
The direct and indirect social and economic costs of a terrorist attack are tremendous, 
especially when such attack takes place in a major centre of economic activity (e.g. 
financial and commercial centres) or when  major transport node s (public transport 
networks, airports, seaports, et c) are targeted. Incidents alwa ys involve substantial direct 
costs to handle the crisis, including first responders, specialists to manage the crisis, emergency medical care, forensic investigations, etc. However, the main costs associated with major incidents are usually: 
• the value of loss of life and te mporary or persistent health  conditions leading to lower 
employability and a lower quality of life; 
• effects of the disruption of  economic activities and destruction of infrastructure; 
• social disruption and an overa ll public perception of bein g unsafe, that also has an 
effect on overall public  health and wellbeing. 
The arbitrary and apparently irrational nature of terrorism means that its threat and 
consequences are difficult to predict.  
In recent years, the EU and EEA countries have collectivel y experienced a high number 
of terrorist and criminal attacks using e xplosives, homemade expl osives (HMEs) and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as an even higher number of attacks which 
EN 7   EN were prevented or attempts, wh ich failed. The 2009 TE-SAT report4 prepared by Europol 
states that in 2008, a total of 515 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks 
were reported by just seven Member States. The report confirms that HMEs, fabricated 
from chemical precursors, are the means most frequently used to carry out attacks. To 
illustrate this point further, Annex 4 provide s a more detailed overview of some of the 
terrorist attacks and in tended attacks in Europe since 2004. The table documents that this 
phenomenon is far from extinct, and affects a variety of Member Stat es, not just a few. 
Although frequently detailed indi cation of the explosive invo lved is not provided for 
reasons of confidentiality or unavailability, it is clear that  the means which are readily 
available, i.e. also home made explosives pr oduced from chemical precursors, are most 
popular.  
The threats stemming from the misuse of th e precursor chemicals used to produce these 
HMEs were also documented at the meetings of the SCP. Worldwide,  the growing threat 
from fundamentalist terrorism, focusing on cau sing mass casualties, contributes to the 
increased lethality of terrorist incidents. The popularity of home made explosives for 
carrying out terrorist attacks is , besides the availability of chemical precursors, also 
underpinned by the wide availability of info rmation on how to fabricate HMEs and IEDs 
on the internet.  
Whilst several legislative and non-legislative measures exist at international, EU and 
national level, these are either not specifica lly focused on the security risks associated 
with certain chemicals or do not cover the entire EU. This implies that precursors which 
may be restricted or controlled in one c ountry can be easily obtained in another. In 
addition to the consequences for security, it means that there are market distortions which 
prevent a level EU playing field in this area. 
There have been indications that terrorist groups take the different approaches in 
different Member States into considerati on. The clearest cases have related to ETA, 
which has hidden large quantities of precurs ors to explosives outside of Spain, in 
particular in France and Portugal. At the same time, there is no clear evidence to date that 
terrorists have changed their purchasing be haviour on the basis of differences in 
regulation in the different Member States. The la ck of such indications may also relate to 
the fact that currently these chemicals are still easily available across most of the 
Member States.  
3.2. The problem   
Table 1 provides an overview of the main probl ems, the key issues and the drivers of the 
problem identified.  
Table 1: Synthesis of the main problems, key issues and drivers 
 
Main problems Key issues and drivers of the problem 
The costs to society, in terms of 
human lives, social unrest and 
material damages, caused by Wide availability and easy acces s by the general public to 
precursors on the market 
At present, a wide variety of prec ursors is easily available to the 
                                                 
4  EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol, 2009.  
EN 8   EN general public. The internet is an easy channel to buy precursors 
too. 
Even greater quantities of precursors can be obtained by or 
through commercial or otherwise legitimate end users 
High ‘potency’ of precursors 
The concentration levels of precursors in certain products, 
available to the general public and to legitimate end users, are in 
many cases sufficient to produce an explosive. 
Insufficient security and awareness of the supply chain 
The supply chain for precursors, and in particular the last segment 
(e.g. end users), is overall insu fficiently aware of the risks of 
terrorists and criminals attempting to obtain precursors. They are 
also insufficiently aware of their own vulnerabilities. 
Some supply chain actors, in particular at the end of the chain, 
have sold precursors to terrorists or other criminals in quantities 
which should have raised suspicion. 
In some cases, this is due to insufficient awareness of which 
transactions in precursors are suspicious and should require 
increased attention, or to th e lack of a ‘consequence’ or 
‘repercussion’, when selling pr ecursors to possibly dubious 
parties without checking. terrorists using explosives are 
substantial. 
Terrorists and other criminals have 
often made use of chemicals to 
produce homemade explosives and improvised explosive devices. 
Earlier attacks and prevented 
attacks show that so far, access to such precursors has been relatively 
easy. 
The chemical market in the EU is 
large and diversified, with multiple 
end-users. Additionally some of the 
precursors have substantial markets 
in their own right (e.g. Nitrate fertilizers and acids) 
No EU level playing field 
While several legislative and non-legislative measures exist at 
international, EU and national level, these are either not 
specifically focused on the security  risks associated with certain 
chemicals or do not cover the entire EU. This means that 
precursors which may be restricted or controlled in one country can be easily obtained in another. 
 
3.2.1.  Chemical precursors to explosives of highest concern  
The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) di scussed and confirmed the five priority 
groups of precursors shown in Table 2 as t hose requiring the most urgent attention.  
 
Table 2: SCP identified precursor groups 
 
Precursor group Chemical Main associated use 
Ammonium nitrate 
Potassium nitrate 
Sodium nitrate 
Nitrates / Nitrogenous 
fertilizers 
Calcium nitrate Ammonium nitrate (mixed  with a fuel e.g. 
diesel oil (ANFO) or sugar (ANIS) is one of 
the most common ingredients in large scale IEDs. Other nitrates can also be used as 
oxidiser ingredients in IEDs. 
Hydrogen peroxide Hydrogen peroxide and 
acetone Acetone (propanone) Used by various terrorist groupings to produce 
Triacetone triperoxide (TATP). 
Nitromethane Nitro-methane and 
hexamine Hexamine 
(methenamine) Nitromethane: Used by ETA and possibly 
other groupings. Explosive in combination 
with ammonium nitrate or nitric acid. 
Hexamine: Used to produce explosives in 
combination with hydrogen peroxide. 
Strong acids Nitric acid Nitric acid is used in the synthesis of HME 

EN 9   EN Precursor group Chemical Main associated use 
Hydrochloric acid 
Sulphuric acid such as urea nitrate. 
Sodium chlorate 
Sodium perchlorate 
Potassium chlorate 
Chlorates and perchlorates 
Potassium perchlorate Used as oxidisers / oxygen generators to 
produce HMEs. A mixture of chlorates can be 
an HME in itself without need for a detonator / booster. Chlorates can also serve as a 
booster. 
 
In many investigated cases, te rrorists obtained these chemicals legally or at least without 
having to resort to any form of  physical theft (some form of id entity theft or the use of a 
fake identity may have occurred). The chemical  market in the EU is large and diversified, 
with multiple end-users using the precursors concerned. While they are mostly consumed by industry, household use of the chemicals is , in most cases, also wide and varied. 
Annex 5 provides an overview of the main  household and other downstream use of the 
precursors discussed in this Impact Assessment.  
The concentration levels of precursors in certain products currently available to the 
general public and to legitima te end users are in many cas es sufficient to produce an 
explosive. There is an overall concern that the concentration levels of many precursors 
available to the general public for hous ehold use are high, even when a lower 
concentration level might be adequate for the same purposes. This applies in particular to 
hydrogen peroxide, liquid nitrom ethane, and most strong acids. Research undertaken 
(including "mystery shopping" cond ucted in eight EU Member States
5) confirms that it is 
relatively easy to purchase the chemicals them selves or mixtures containing them in high 
concentration levels. Th ese levels are in many cases suffi cient to produce an HME with a 
relatively low quantity of the chemical. 
The "mystery shopping" exercise also demonstr ated that in some Member States, it was 
possible to buy potent chemical s in a quantity which is su fficient to build an HME 
without any questions asked, while in othe r Member States, such products are not 
available to the general public. It is important to take into account that persons intending 
to produce an HME can easily cross the border when they encounter difficulties in obtaining certain chemicals in one country. Annex 6 provides an overview of the main 
findings of the "mystery shopping" exercise per precursor. 
3.2.2.  Insufficient security and awar eness of the supply chain  
The supply chain for precursors, and in part icular its last segment (i.e. downstream 
stakeholders such as retailers and end users), is overall insufficiently aware of the risks of 
terrorists and criminals attempting to obtain pr ecursors. In some cases, this is due to 
insufficient awareness of which transactions  in precursors are suspicious and should 
require increased attention. In ot her cases, the reasons relate to opportunistic sales or to a 
lack of a consequence or repercussion when selling precursors to possibly dubious parties 
without checking.  
Especially at the end of the supply chai n, retailers and other businesses have sold 
                                                
 
5  Denmark, Belgium, France, Italy, Pola nd, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK. 
EN 10   EN precursors to terrorists or other criminal s in quantities which should have raised 
suspicion. Examples include the 21/7 (fai led) London bombings, with 400 litres of 
peroxide purchased from 3-4 retailers, and the discovery of 600 kg of ammonium nitrate 
fertiliser in a public self-s torage facility, purchased by an individual from a single 
agricultural supplier. Anothe r case worth mentioning is the Sauerland group, which 
bought huge quantities of hydrogen peroxide  of 35% (more than 750 litres were 
discovered) after they realised that higher concentrati ons could only be ordered with a 
specific permit. The results from the "mys tery shopping" confir med relatively low 
awareness levels of some of the retailers  and other downstream  sellers that were 
approached. At least two businesses actua lly suggested an "alt ernative" when the 
potential buyer turned out not to belong to a registered co mpany (e.g. by suggesting to 
purchase the products through a th ird, professional party). Othe rs actively encouraged the 
purchases of very high quantities by offering discounts. 
Only a few countries have recording and re porting mechanisms in place for identifying 
and notifying suspicious trans actions of precursors and in most cases, these notification 
mechanisms are part of voluntary agreements  and initiatives set up by industry bodies. 
This means that there are no consequences  for non-compliance. Another limitation of 
many existing notification/reporting mechanisms is that public authorities often fail to provide adequate feedback to those businesses who not ified them. Finally, where 
legislation or voluntary measures are in place,  particularly retailers and other downstream 
supply chain stakeholders are often not aware of such restrictions, or at least not aware of 
their "raison d’être", consid ering them just another administrative burden. Smaller 
businesses often do not have sufficient means to fully comply with voluntary measures, 
as these require some investment (e.g. nomi nating a security offi cer, attending training, 
etc). High competition in a period of tremendou s financial uncertainty may also lead to 
some smaller players lowering their security standards in order to  keep up their sales 
figures. 
3.2.3.  No EU level playing field  
While some legislative and non-legislative (voluntary) measures  on explosives and 
chemicals exist at international, EU and national level, these are either not specifically focused on reducing the danger of misuse of  these chemicals for the production of home 
made explosives, do not cover the most high risk chemicals comprehensively or do not 
cover the entire EU. This implies that precursor s which may be restrict ed or controlled in 
one country can be easily obtained in another. 
Measures adopted at the international level  mainly focus on the security of explosives or 
chemicals used for weapons or drugs. Examples include the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction’ and The United Na tions Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs’. 
Voluntary programmes set up at  international level and dealing with the issue of 
chemicals include the Res ponsible Care® programme. 
At EU level , legislative and non-legislative measures  primarily focus on chemical safety, 
explosives for civilian use, pyrotechnics, fertilisers and drug precursors. Examples 
EN 11   EN include REACH6, the fertiliser regulations7, explosives and pyrotechnics directives8 and 
the drug precursors regulations9. EU non-legislative measures  include the ‘Guidance for 
safe and secure storage of fe rtilisers on farms’ of the European Fertiliser Manufacturers 
Association (EFMA).   
At national level , a detailed assessment of existing measures in the impact assessment 
study10 has shown that Member States have vari ous approaches to the issue of precursors 
and their security. While some Member Stat es have encouraged the development of 
various legislative and/or vol untary measures (e.g. Denmar k, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the UK, Spain), other Member St ates have set up very few or  no measures to deal with 
the security of precursors (e.g. Slovenia, Aust ria, the Czech Republic). There is hence a 
real risk that terrorists and criminals may s eek to obtain access to precursors in countries 
which have relatively lowe r security standards.  
This is a consideration based on logical reasoning and on inst ances of seizures of bomb-
making materials in hide-outs, for example in  Spain, Portugal and France. However, in 
the current system, it is practically impossibl e to credibly trace the origin of these 
materials. Where such information does exist, as a result of criminal investigations, it was not available for reasons of confidentiality. What the seizures and the terrorist incidents listed in Annex 4 ha ve shown, though, is that it is  possible to obtain these 
materials, likely at a number of sellers, without raising suspic ion or leaving records of the 
transaction.    
The measures set up by Member States to addres s the security of precursors to explosives 
vary in nature, coverage and pur pose. The main differences are: 
• Nature or type of instruments : while some countries mainly  rely on "soft" measures 
such as voluntary agreements, industry-back ed guidelines and codes of conduct (e.g. 
the Netherlands, the UK), other Member St ates (e.g. Germany Denmark, Ireland) have 
taken a more regulatory approach. Neverthe less, even in Member States with a 
regulatory framework, existing legislativ e measures are often backed up and 
complemented by voluntary measures; 
• Coverage of measures : while some countries have adopted far-reaching measures 
covering a wide array of precursors of inte rest, other Member States have instead 
developed measures focusing on  a specific group of chemical substances;  
• Purpose of measures : the purpose of existing measur es varies significantly. While 
existing measures in some Member States spec ifically aim at restri cting or controlling 
access of the general public to the precursor s of interest, other Member States have 
                                                
 
 6  Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. 
 7  Commission Regulation (EC) No 552/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, Regulation 
 (EC) No 2003/2003 and Decision 1348/2008/EC, amending Council Directive 76/769/EEC 
 8  Directive 93/15/EEC, Directive 2 008/43/EC and Directive 2007/23/EC. 
 9  Regulation (EC) 273/2004, Regulation (EC) 111/2005 and Regulation (EC) 1277/2005. 
10  A detailed overview of these  is provided in Annex 5 and 6 to the Preparatory Study to Inform an 
Impact Assessment of Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical 
Precursors to Explosives. Given their size, it was not possible to include them into this Impact Assessment, which only contains the main conclusions from these Annexes.  
EN 12   EN focused on increasing the security of precu rsors within the wider supply chain (e.g. 
secure handling, storage, transport). 
Several types of non-legislative measures  have been identified, including: 
• Training measures for staff, law enfor cement personnel and first responders. These 
include the UK ‘Know your chemical’ booklet , a similar booklet launched in 2008 in 
Sweden and a training programme targ eting police officers in Germany; 
• Awareness raising campaigns targeting suppl y chain actors and notably retailers, 
including the UK’s Self-stora ge initiative and the UK C ode of Conduct on Chemical 
Trade Controls; 
• Notification of suspicious transactions  mechanisms for supply chain operators, 
notably retailers. These include th e UK "Know your customer" campaign; 
• National plans, strategies and other measures  to map precursors of interest, including 
the Danish Anti-Terrorism Action Plan adopted in 2005 and the Dutch "Handbook on 
Precursors for Home-made Explosives"; 
• Research into precursors carried out by Me mber States (e.g. Denmark, France and 
Sweden); 
• Safety measures also used with a securi ty purpose: as confirmed by several Member 
States, existing safety legislation and voluntar y initiatives, while targeting the safety 
of consumers and supply chain operators, also take into account se curity concerns. In 
the German law on dangerous explosive substances for example, safety aspects are closely linked to security considerations. 
Existing national measures covering specific pr ecursors have been identified and mapped 
for a certain number of Member States : Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
Overall, precursor-specific measures cover: 
• Measures to restrict access by the general public (e.g. bans or c oncentration levels): 
five Member States (e.g. Denmark, Germ any, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland) have 
adopted legislation or voluntary agreements  to implement this type of measures; 
• Notification of suspicious transactions: in several Member States, voluntary measures 
require the notification of suspicious activi ties/customers to relevant authorities (e.g. 
the Netherlands, the UK);  
• Measures aiming at enhancing the security  within supply chain operators: the 
measures adopted by some Member States  (e.g. Denmark, Spain, the UK) are both 
legislative and voluntary. They focus for ex ample on storage, handling and transport 
security;  
• Awareness campaigns: voluntary m easures have been devel oped by several countries 
(e.g. Denmark, the UK). Some have a cl ear focus on end-user professionals; 
• Training programmes for police officers in Germany (planned – see generic measures 
above);  
EN 13   EN • Security related research: sp ecific research into groups of  precursors has been carried 
out by France, Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  
The experience of these Member States with these measures, which are to a large extent, 
also the measures proposed in the preferred policy options, has been positive according to the research and interviews conducted for the Preparatory st udy and presentations 
made in the Standing Committee on Precursors.  
Third countries  such as the US and Canada have al so developed measur es dealing with 
the security of chemicals. These measures range from policy and legislative measures, including strategies, priority lists and specifi c security programmes, to "soft" measures 
such as awareness programmes and trainings. 
3.3. The baseline scenario    
Under the status quo , there would continue to be no coherent EU approach towards 
preventing the misuse of chemical precursor s to fabricate home made explosives for 
terrorist purposes.  
It is likely that terrorist attacks would con tinue, possibly also targeting Member States 
that so far have little experience with such in cidents. Terrorists will continue to make use 
of chemicals to produce home made explosiv es and improvised explosive devices. The 
use of chemicals to produce such devices may further increase, especially when 
considering that legal or illicit access to civil explosives is likely to become even further restricted and controlled.  
In as far as one can speak of a trend, it is likely that the use of chemicals to produce such 
devices may further increase, especially when considering that legal or illicit access to 
civil explosives is likely to become even fu rther restricted and controlled. As mentioned 
earlier, in the past few years a number of attacks were carried out, failed or were 
prevented from happening.  
In the current scenario, the general public will continue to have access to precursors, 
even in high concentrations. On the other hand, several Member St ates have indicated 
their intentions to put measures  in place to (furthe r) restrict or control access to chemicals 
which can be used to fabricate HMEs. In a number of countries access will therefore be reduced. New measures are likely to spec ifically target produc ts containing high 
concentrations of the substances. The new me asures may thus to some extent have a 
deterrent effect, by making it more difficult to  purchase certain chemicals. In addition, 
further voluntary action by industry, both at national and international level, may also 
contribute to reducing the risk of misuse of the chemicals of concern. 
Similarly, in the current scenario, the lack of awareness and insufficient security in 
particular at the level of the downstream suppl y chain will continue to exist. Retailers and 
other supply chain actors, such as wholesalers,  specialist end user sellers, etc., may still 
sell to persons purchasing with malicious intent. Again, the fact that several Member States (e.g. Spain, Poland) are intending to develop new legislativ e or non-legislative 
measures will contribute to improved awareness and better  security standards in a 
number of countries. Voluntary industrial action will also have some positive effect. 
It is equally important to ta ke into account that further de velopments in EU policy, for 
example as part of the Action Plan on the Secu rity of Explosives and the recently adopted 
EN 14   EN EU Action Plan to strengthen Chemical, Biol ogical, Radiological and Nuclear Security in 
the European Union - both part of the wider EU strategy to combat terrorism - will 
certainly have an impact on preventing, dete cting and responding to  terrorist activity. 
However, without creating an EU level playing field in te rms of specific measures to 
control and restrict access to precursors, there is a great risk that terrorists and criminals 
will simply seek to obtain precursors maliciously  in those countries in which the security 
standards are lower. In addition, the current situation and the conti nuation of the current 
trends may have adverse effects on the smooth functioning of the In ternal Market as a 
result of the different national measures.  
3.4. Why the EU is better placed to take ac tion: subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles 
The current differences among the regimes applied to chemical precursors to explosives 
not only have a negative effect on security but also distort the functi oning of the Internal 
Market. They negatively affect the cross-bo rder trade and other economic activities of 
producers and other supply chain stakeholders active in more than one country. Action at 
EU level would help eliminate these ne gative effects. The Member States are 
increasingly accepting the need for EU action to support their efforts in combating terrorism, as especially in an area without borders this has become a problem which 
requires EU-wide action. With regard to th e security of explosives and explosive 
substances in particular, with the approval of the Action Plan on Enhancing the Security 
of Explosives by the Justice and Home Affa irs Council in April 2008, the Member States 
have formally signed up to the implementation of a package of actions. These include as a priority the establishment of the SCP to identify "the risks associated with various 
precursors and recommending appropriate ac tions to the Commission". Recent attacks 
and failed or prevented attacks have shown that terrorism is going beyond affecting the 
Member States which have traditionally suffered from terrorist attacks (e.g., Spain, the UK, France) and is spreading to other EU co untries. The nature of these incidents or 
prevented incidents also shows that terrorists may prepare in one count ry for an attack in 
another.  
The EU can only be as secure as its weakest lin k. In this sense, activities at EU level and 
an EU co-ordinated approach are needed and beneficial to all relevant stakeholders. The subsidiarity principle is thus satisfied as the goals to be achieve d through measures on 
explosives precursors cannot be achieved by any single EU Member State, and must 
therefore be addressed at EU level.  
The Member States, by way of their repr esentatives in the Standing Committee on 
Precursors, have indicated that they prefer an EU approach to this issue in order to create 
a level playing field. This approach is al so supported by the EU associations of the 
chemical industry, which have been extensivel y consulted in the cont ext of the SCP work 
and the work on the Impact Assessment. Some Member States indicated that they have 
not yet taken action because they are waiting for the EU initiative. 
The Stockholm Programme, adopted by the European Council in December 2009
11, 
                                                 
11 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09.   
EN 15   EN indicates that a legislative framework to address the dangers associated with precursors 
should be developed. 
Moreover, EU regulation also ha s an Internal Market rationale , whereby the current 
situation, which imposes different regulatory regimes on chemical industry, distorts the 
market and imposes additional costs of adjustment on the private sector. The chemical industry and retail support the level-playing field argument. For the chemical industry, a 
divergence of applicable measur es would mean that they w ould have to produce different 
concentration levels of the different substanc es for different parts of the EU market. For 
traders, different security measures and sta ndards also pose certain barriers. It can be 
assumed that without an EU approach, the divergence among the Member States in the 
regulation of this area would grow, and these detrimental effects on the Internal Market 
would be growing too.  
In these circumstances EU regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 
is proportionate. Th e EU right to act
 in this area is stipul ated by the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union which in Article 4, paragraph 2 states that shared 
competence between the Union and the Member  States applies with regard to "(b) 
internal market" and "(j) area of freedom, security and justice". The legal basis for 
regulating the marketing and use of explosives  precursors is likely to  be found mainly in 
the Internal Market artic le (Article 114 TFEU). 
4. POLICY OBJECTIVES  
As a reflection of the problems identified,  the policy objectives deriving from the 
problem definition are pres ented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: General, specific and operational objectives 
 
General 
objectives Specific objectives Operational objectives 
1.1.1 To reduce the availability of certain precursors on the EU 
consumer market to the general 
public 1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by the general public 1.1.2 To reduce certain types of 
supply channels / ways of access to 
precursors 
1.2.1 To develop suitable additives 
and promote the use of these 
additives to prevent their use in 
explosives 1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components manufactured for malicious 
or criminal purposes 1.2.2 To reduce concentrations of 
certain precursors available to the 
general public 
1.3.1 To increase control and surveillance over transactions and 
sales of certain precursors To reduce the number and 
potency of terrorist 
and other criminal 
incidents in the EU using explosives, 
by deterring 
terrorists and other criminals from 
using precursors to 
building explosives 
and inhibiting their 
access to precursors. 
 
1.3 To enhance the security and 
awareness of the entire supply chain of 
precursors 
1.3.2 To increase control and 
surveillance over transport, 
distribution, import / export, etc 
EN 16   EN 1.3.3 To raise the awareness of 
supply chain actors on the risks in 
general and on suspicious transactions. 
1.4 To prevent terrorists and other criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some countries. 1.4.1 To establish common measures 
at EU / international level 
The policy objectives are fully in line with the EU counter -terrorism strategy, with the 
EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives and with the Stockholm 
programme12, which stipulates that a " legislative framework to address the dangers 
associated with precursors should be developed ".  
5. POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT  
 
The policy options considered are presented in Table 4. Policy options 0 – 4 only concern 
sales to the general public  (definitions used are explai ned in section 5.1), and will 
therefore not directly affect any professional use. Those who use the identified precursors 
professionally may be indirectly affected, be cause sometimes they make use of general 
retail channels, which under th e policy options may become the subject of certain 
restrictions. Only policy option 5 covers a wider spectrum of supply chain stakeholders. 
 
Table 4: Overview of policy options 
 
Policy option 0 - 
Status Quo No action. This implies that no changes are made to the 
current situation. All actions included are already underway 
or are planned to happen in the absence of the Policy options. The baseline is a comb ination of existing policies, 
legislative acquis, voluntary measures and other relevant activity. 
Policy option 1  A total ban on sales of the substances to members of the 
general public, irrespective of concentration levels. 
Policy option 2 A ban on sales of the substances in all concentrations and 
quantities over the internet. 
Policy option 3 A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above 
a specific concentration level.  
Policy option 4 Option 3 plus additional measures: 
      Policy option 4a A ban on sales to minors. 
      Policy option 4b Sales of the substances in higher concentrations than those 
allowed under option 3 to the general public th rough a trader 
or consumer licensing system. 
      Policy option 4c Introducing a system of reporti ng suspicious transactions. 
      Policy option 4d A scheme for labelling precursors with a code specifying 
                                                 
12  17024/09 
EN 17   EN that the purchase may be subjec t to registration, developing 
a system for recording the iden tity of the buyer (including 
internet sales). Records s hould be made available to 
competent law enforcement authorities. 
Policy option 5 Taking measures to enhance the surveillance of legitimate 
and professional use, incl uding sub-options such as: 
- Promoting Codes of conduct 
- Education and training 
- Raising staff awareness 
- Addressing in particular medium / small users 
 
5.1. Definitions used  
The following definitions apply to the policy options under assessment.  
• For the choice of chemicals and chemical  products to be covered by the policy 
options, it is emphasised that these only include substances and mixtures of the 
chemicals  and not articles as defined in the REACH regulation ((EC) No 1907/2006): 
"Article : means an object which during prod uction is given a special shape, 
surface or design which determines its f unction to a greater degree than does its 
chemical composition." 
The above also implies that pyrotechni c articles under the scope of Directive 
2007/23/EC on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles and SOLAS (Safety 
Of Life At Sea) articles covered by Directive 96/98/EC  on marine equipment are not 
included in the policy options. 
• General public : Households/consumers who buy chemicals for household purposes 
(e.g. cleaning, gardening, beauty care) or  hobby activities. In lin e with the proposed 
Consumer Rights Directive13, the definition of consumer could be used: any natural 
person who, is acting for purposes which are out side his trade, busin ess or profession. 
5.2. Assessment of the policy options 
The assessment of the impacts of policy options  was performed in two steps. They were 
assessed in general terms against the following criteria:  
• The effects of the policy option on the achievement of the specific policy 
objectives ;  
• The economic, social and environmental impacts  of the policy option, including 
potential effects on fundamental rights. Fu ll details on sources, estimates and 
calculations made are included in Annex 4; 
• Aspects of feasibility and subsidiarity , including the EU added value and 
rationale ;  
                                                 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/Directive_final_EN.pdf 
EN 18   EN • Key risks, uncertainties, political an d technical feasibility and necessary 
preconditions;  
• The need for changes in Community legislation and; 
• Issues raised by stakeholders. 
Detailed assessment tables for each policy option are presented in Annex 9. The 
Preparatory study also contains detailed assessment tables for each option and each 
precursor, which have not been presented in this Impact Assessment but which are 
available.   
An assessment against the set of criteria was performed for each individual precursor 
group. This was considered necessary given the different nature, use and market structure 
of the individual chemical substances to be  covered by the policy options. The specific 
character of the chemicals of concern in the remaining relevant policy options is taken on 
board in the general assessment tables.14  
For the purpose of clarity and focus, the following subsections will only include the 
main conclusions of the assessment of a ll policy options, including the options, 
which were discarded at an early stage.  The assessment of the preferred policy option, 
composed of some of these individual options , is presented separately and in full in 
section 6.2. The associated costs and the calcu lation of economic impacts can be found in 
Annex 7 for the methodology of the calculation of costs to consumers, businesses and 
administrations, and Annex 8, containing th e background statistical data for the 
assessment of these costs. 
5.2.1.  Assessment of policy opt ion 0: Status Quo  
The policy option implies no changes to the cu rrent situation. Under the Status Quo, the 
risk of terrorist attacks using IEDs/HMEs will continue to exist, with the likelihood of 
such incidents increasing in frequency and/ or lethality. The level of awareness and 
security of the chemical supply chain may slig htly increase as a result of current and 
upcoming international, EU and national measur es, but terrorists would continue to make 
use of lower restrictions and control standa rds in other countries. The Status Quo will 
have no economic effects other than those al ready occurring. Social effects could be 
negative, as a result of casualties caused by terrorist incidents and an increased perception of insecurity. The Status Quo was not supported by the stakeholders 
consulted as part of the study.  In fact, most considered th at there was a strong rationale 
for action at EU level and agreed on the need to control and restrict  access to precursors. 
5.2.2.  Assessment of policy option 1:  A total ban on sales of th e substances to members 
of the general public, irrespect ive of concentration levels 
This policy option would imply that all selected precursors, either in their pure form or in 
a mixture, would no longer be available to the general public  (i.e. consumers, household 
users) and their possession would also be fo rbidden. Manufacturing of certain products 
                                                
 
14  A more detailed assessment of the different optio ns for each of the separate precursors can be 
found in the Preparatory study. 
EN 19   EN for the consumer market and sales of the substances to the general public would no 
longer be allowed. The policy option has the highest rating on achieving the policy 
objectives, but its feasibility and acceptability ar e among the lowest levels, also 
because of its disproportionate negative effects on consumers and businesses . In 
addition, some negative social effects and pote ntial tension with funda mental rights have 
been identified; it is questionable, in part icular, whether a total ban on sales to members 
of the general public could be consider ed compatible with the principle of 
proportionality.  
5.2.3.  Assessment of policy option 2: A ban on sales of the substances in all 
concentrations and quantitie s over the internet 
The policy option would ban all sales to th e general public made  over the internet. 
Internet sales are relative ly common for some chemical  products (e.g. fertilisers, 
hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hexamine fuel tabl ets, etc). Overall e-commerce statistics 
show that it is a sales channel which is increasing in volume ev ery year. However, 
regarding the chemicals concerned, only about 0.5% of the goods in question is sold to 
the general public online. This share would be banned under this policy option.  
The assessment has shown that banning the sa les of the precursor groups via one sales 
channel only does not strongly contribute to th e achievement of the policy objectives, as 
the products would still be av ailable through other sales cha nnels and from third country 
internet sellers. The implemen tation of this policy option may face difficulties in terms of 
feasibility for the wide range of products (given it applies to all concentrations). This 
option, in its own right, was discarded.  
5.2.4.  Assessment of policy option 3: A ban on sales to the gene ral public if the 
substance is above a specif ic concentration limit  
Under this policy option the general public wo uld no longer have access to the selected 
precursors (or mixtures containing these precu rsors) above a pre-defined concentration 
level (including sales via the internet). For the purpose of this impact assessment, the following concentration levels were used as a starting point:  ammonium nitrate: 16% N 
(mass); alkali nitrates: 8%N (mass); hydr ogen peroxide: 12% (volume); acetone: no 
threshold; nitromethane: 30% (volume); he xamine: no threshold; nitric acid: 30% 
(volume); sulphuric acid: 50% (volume); hydrochloric acid: 20% (volume); chlorates and 
perchlorates: 40% (mass)
15.  
The technical and political feasibility of this policy option is overall high, while it 
achieves a fairly good rating with regard to the achievement of the policy objectives. It 
may be less feasible for some selected pr ecursors, which are only effective in high 
concentrations (e.g. hexamine) or which are wi dely used in high con centrations in some 
popular products (e.g. hydrogen peroxide in hair-dyeing products). Their ban would 
possibly cause a high level of in convenience among the public.   
                                                 
15  X% by mass refers to the relation of the weight of the precursor substances to the other substances 
 in the mixture (at least on the earth's surface). X% by volume is easier to measure when mixing 
 liquid.  
EN 20   EN In terms of economic impacts, the ban would re sult in small overall drop in the market of 
chemicals as non-professional use only account s for about 1-5% of total EU consumption 
for the chemicals concerned. The value of chem icals sold to the gene ral public above the 
thresholds (for all precursors assessed) is estimated at about €450-1,150 million. The loss of profit overall from this policy option is estimated to be €130-330 million per annum 
for the whole of the chemical sector within the EU.  
More significant consequences might be e xperienced by manufact urers of consumer 
products and SMEs. A very small number of producers for whose products reduced 
concentration levels are not a feasible option might leave th e market or would have to 
diversify. Indirectly, certain manufactured pr oducts which use the restricted products 
(e.g. model steam engines using hexamine fu el tablets) will be rendered useless. 
However, the overall retail sales of products to general public will not change 
considerably for most consumer products, as eith er alternatives will replace the restricted 
products, or more of diluted chemicals will be bought to compensate for lower 
concentration levels.  
This option would impose additional administ rative costs for business (estimated in the 
order of €6-16 million euro per annum, and a one-off cost of €40-63 million), and for the national authorities.  
5.2.5.  Assessment of policy opti on 4a: A ban on sale s to the general public if the 
substance is above a specific concentra tion limit with a ban on sales to minors 
Policy option 4a includes the measures proposed  in Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction 
of threshold concentration levels) and proposes  a ban on sales to minors. The results of 
the assessment of this option indicated negligible added-value in achieving the policy objectives and the fight against terrorism. Its main benefit is increased safety for minors 
(and possibly other individuals). This  is why the option was discarded.  
5.2.6.  Assessment of policy opti on 4b: A ban on sale s to the general public if the 
substance is above a specific concentration limit with sales of higher concentrations through a system of licensi ng either the retail distribution or the 
use of the precursors 
Policy option 4b includes the measures propos ed as part of policy option 3 (i.e. the 
introduction of threshold concentration levels for sales to the general public) and proposes that sales of higher co ncentrations are e ither made through i)  a licensing system 
of retailers or ii)  licensing consumers for legitimate use.  
i) With a licensing system for retailers, retail ers would need to apply for a license, which 
would involve the checking of th eir ‘reliability’ and an obliga tion to record all sales of 
higher concentrations. A similar system is curre ntly in place in Germany as a part of the 
Chemical Ordinance for nine chemical substances.  
ii) With a licensing system for consumer s, all retailers could still sell higher 
concentrations, but consumers would need to  apply for a license with the competent 
authorities (the police or local  authorities) to purchase these products. A similar system is 
in place in Denmark and Ireland. The licen se provided could st ate the use and the 
quantity required, and could have a limited duration. Any possession  of the respective 
EN 21   EN chemical substance or a mixture exceeding th e stated concentration without a license 
would be illegal. 
The policy option overall received higher scores  than policy option 3, given that it still 
provides access to the entire spectrum of chemical substances and products, however, 
these sales (above the concentra tion thresholds) would occur in a controlled environment.  
The loss of profit for businesses will be lower than under policy option 3, and is estimated at €65-155 million per annum. This op tion would in particular be effective in 
meeting the policy objectives for those chemical substances and products which would become harmless in a concentration below th e set threshold (i.e some hydrogen peroxide 
and acid applications, nitromethane, hexamine and chlorates and perchlorates). It also 
received high stakeholders support. 
The development of a system of licensed cons umers seems to be less costly than the 
licensing system for retailers and also the mo st effective in preventing terrorists from 
accessing higher concentrated chemicals.  
It is estimated that public authorities main taining the scheme for licensed consumers will 
incur an additional cost of  only about €1.8 million per annum. The scheme for licensed 
consumers would strictly limit the sales of hi gher concentrated chemicals to a marginal 
number of consumers, who genuinely need th ose chemicals. It is expected that the 
monitoring of these consumers by competent aut horities would also be  easier, given their 
limited number. Any licensing scheme develope d at EU level would need to ensure a 
harmonised implementation across the EU – a lthough the details of the licensing scheme 
should be left to the Member States. The requirements for busine sses under option 4bi 
(retailers licence) and the cr iteria for granting licenses und er scenario 4bii (consumers 
licence) would need to be clea rly defined as part of impl ementation by Member States. 
One of the caveats is that the licensed consum er system may pose an issue with internet 
and distance sellers who would need to en sure a proper processing and checking of the 
licenses displayed by consumers. 
As part of the implementation, Member States would be requir ed to pay special attention 
to ensuring compliance with national and EU da ta protection law, given that a licensing 
scheme would require the processing of personal da ta of the licensees.   
The political feasibility of this policy opti on is high, as several Member States have 
similar provisions in place. Moreover, this policy option seems desirable and politically acceptable, as an overwhelming majority of  Member States experts and industry 
representatives have expressed their support for such measures.  
5.2.7.  Assessment of policy option 4c: A ban on sales to the general public if the 
substance is above a specific concentratio n limit with introducing a system of 
reporting suspicious transactions  
Policy option 4c includes the measures propos ed as part of policy option 3 (i.e. the 
introduction of threshold con centration levels) and proposes the introduction of a system 
of reporting suspicious transactions. The policy option will require sellers to assess whether a certain order or tr ansaction is suspicious and to take responsibility for 
notifying the competent authorit ies (e.g. their respective retail /sector association or law 
enforcement agencies). At least 4 Member St ates have already introduced systems for 
EN 22   EN reporting suspicious transactions. At EU  level, the drug precursor regulation16 has 
introduced a requirement to report suspicious transactions, which also covers the explosive precursor substances acetone, sul phuric acid and hydrochloric acid (but this 
would relate only to larger quantit ies traded business-to-business). 
Estimated total costs to businesses of this option represent an additional €16 million per 
year. Public authorities will have to maintain  a central hotline or decentralised contacts, 
as well as organise training, awareness raising campaigns, et c. National authorities may 
incur an additional cost of about €0.34 m illion per year. Companies selling over the 
Internet would also need to develop ne w procedures and possibly buy new software 
detecting suspicious transactions. As part of implementation, Member States will be 
required to pay due regard to compliance w ith the protection of personal data and non-
discrimination provisions.  
This policy option would be esp ecially useful with respect to  precursors that keep their 
dangerous characteristics even at lower co ncentrations or could be re-concentrated 
(notably hydrogen peroxide) or for those precursors wher e limiting the concentration 
level is not an option (e.g. acetone , hexamine in fuel tablets).  
The policy option received higher scores than policy option 3, given that it adds a higher 
level of security to the sales of chemical substances and products. The feasibility of the 
policy option is high as already several Member  States have similar measures in place. 
Stakeholders consulted were overall  in favour of this policy option. 
5.2.8.  Assessment of policy opti on 4d: A ban on sale s to the general public if the 
substance is above a specific concentratio n limit with a scheme for labelling 
precursors with a code specifying that  the purchase may be subject to 
registration and developing a system for recording th e identity of the buyer 
(including internet sales), with records to be made available to competent law 
enforcement authorities  
Policy option 4d includes the measures proposed  as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the 
introduction of threshold concentration levels for sales to the general public) and proposes the introduction of a labelling scheme  and a registration system for recording 
the identity of the buyer. The labelling scheme would focus on warning household users 
that the purchase may be subject to registra tion. The records of the registration system 
would need to be made available to competent law enforcement authorities. 
While this option received high scores on ach ieving the policy objectives, its evaluation 
was rather negative from th e perspective of economic im pacts and feasibility. The 
majority of Member States and other stake holders did not consider  Policy option 4d a 
feasible option for such a wide range of precursors, covering a multitude of different 
products sold by a variety of retailers and other downstream seller s. For some products, 
given their very small size, labelling will be difficult and the warning may go unnoticed when the indications are too small. Instead of  labelling, the barcode on products could be 
adapted to alert sellers to the need to register. This is also very expensive. 
                                                
 
16  Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 
on drug precursors.  
EN 23   EN The amounts of data that would need to be en tered in the registrati on system at national 
level would be enormous with a risk of crashes and losses of information. Such a registration system, to be effective, woul d need to be deemed acceptable by the wider 
public in terms of proportionality. The registra tion system would also require a specific 
mechanism to review whether a product should  be subject to labe lling and registration 
requirements or not. 
In addition to this, there is a risk that the labelling of products, especially when hinting at 
the fact that they may pose a security risk, would attrac t the wrong kind of attention. 
Finally, using a registration system for preventive purposes will be close to impossible given the amounts of records that will be cr eated every day. Only a highly sophisticated 
online database may allow for direct identifi cation of transactions which are suspicious 
of for cross-references (e.g. many small purch ases made by the same purpose in different 
locations). The registration scheme would th erefore only be useful for investigative 
purposes after a terrorist event. 
5.2.9.  Assessment of policy option 5: Taking me asures to enhance th e surveillance of 
professional use, including sub-options such as promoting codes of conduct, 
education and training, raising staff awareness or address ing in particular 
medium / small users  
This policy option would entail the intr oduction non-legislative measures aiming at 
enhancing the control of the precursors mark et among all supply chain actors. Examples 
of means to this end include  the adoption of Codes of C onduct, education and training 
measures and campaigns to increase awaren ess among supply chain operators. Several 
Member States (e.g. Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) have 
developed similar measures with various purposes.  
This policy option has a positive contribution to the achievement of the policy objectives 
and does not cause excessive compliance costs. However, one of the key risks associated 
with this policy option is the voluntary natu re of the measures, meaning that businesses 
may choose not to comply with the requirements. It can take up to several years before a voluntary measure has a wide coverage an d 100% market coverage often remains 
difficult to achieve.  
Overall, there seems to be a clear support for developing some, if not all measures 
proposed under this policy option. There was a consensu s among Member States and 
industry stakeholders that the proposed measures coul d be highly beneficial and 
achievable at relatively low costs. It is expected that all major players (members of the relevant trade associations of producers, chem ical distributors, the retail sector) who will 
voluntarily comply with the relevant codes of  conduct, will train their staff accordingly, 
and will employ other necessary tools and me thods to raise awareness amongst staff (and 
business partners). This will incur a yearly  cost of around €64 million. The costs incurred 
to public authorities (e.g. to offer traini ng and guidance, conduct awareness raising 
campaigns etc.) are also estimated at around €64 million per year (f or all EU Member 
States in aggregate and for all precursors).  
This policy option can help achieve a greater level of awareness and control within the 
supply chain while its economic costs and impacts are limited. Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of this policy option across all EU Member Stat es depends on active 
EN 24   EN cooperation and commitment of stakeholders in all EU Member States, which is very 
difficult to achieve in the case of solely voluntary measures.  
For companies marketing hexamine fuel ta blets a ban on sales to the general public 
above a certain concentration limit would effectively be a total ban, because a 
concentration limit is not technically feasible . This could be alleviated by way of the 
licensing scheme (policy option 4b), although a licensing scheme fo r products such as 
fuel tablets for camping or ot her recreational purposes would be difficult to implement. 
Therefore, in this case, option 5 linked to a mandatory repor ting of suspicious 
transactions could be a mo re proportionate measure. 
6. THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION  
 
Based on the general as well as precursor-s pecific assessment of the individual policy 
options, the preferred policy option is a combination of policy option 4b (general ban 
on sales of precursors to the general public  if the substance is above a specific 
concentration level with the possibility of sales of higher concentrations through a 
licensing system) , 4c (reporting on susp icious transactions)  and 5 (different 
voluntary measures).   
 
The preferred policy option can be formulated as follows: 
 
Setting concentration thresholds for the sa les of precursors to the general public, 
with a system to report on suspicio us transactions for certain precursors. 
Developing a licensed consumer system to allow for sales of higher concentrations. 
Adding voluntary measures to support the reporting of suspicious transactions and 
the implementation of  the licensed consumer system, as  well as other relevant action 
to raise awareness in the supply chain.  
 
The policy option consists of four different  elements. First, it sets concentration 
thresholds on precursors that can be sold fr eely to the general public. However, through a 
system of reporting on suspicious transactions  it still requires sellers to monitor and 
notify purchases, which, because of for example the quantity bought, the combination of precursors bought or the frequency of the pur chases by the same buye r, are suspicious. 
Reporting suspicious transacti ons is essential also for th ose precursors for which no 
concentration limit could be set. In additi on, purchase of higher concentrations of 
precursors will only be allowed through a licensed consumer system managed by the competent authorities, which could, for exampl e, be the police, specific departments in 
local authorities or other agencies. The licen se will only be provide d for legitimate use, 
possibly including the quantity that can be  purchased and the period during which the 
purchase can be made. Possession of the chem ical substances without such a license 
would be illegal. Finally, a series of voluntary measures will be aimed at further supporting the development and implementation of the policy option, using specific education, training, awareness raising and su pport to medium and small supply chain 
stakeholders. The preferred policy option woul d include elements of measures put in 
place in Denmark, Ireland, Germany,  the Netherlands and the UK. 
 
EN 25   EN 6.1. The reasons for the regulatory response proposed 
 
The regulatory measures proposed in the pref erred policy option fulfil the need to find a 
realistic balance - for each precursor - betwee n the need to reduce the risk of misuse of 
the chemical substance, and the effort to minimise the actual impacts on the consumers 
and businesses of these measures. This logi c drove the proposal of the concentration 
threshold levels. For those precursors where se tting a concentration th reshold is relevant, 
the concentration thresholds proposed are based on consultations with the authorities of 
the Member States, as well as in depth cons ideration of these precursors by the Standing 
Committee on Precursors during 2008. This was done  on the basis of data related to the 
substance used in terrorist attacks, recipe s for IEDs available over the internet, and 
(mostly classified) research undertaken by the in telligence services of the Member States.  
At the same time, it is acknowledged that no  concentration level will ever provide a 
complete certainty that public ly available chemicals can no longer be used for producing 
home made explosives or that the contro l system cannot be circumvented. What the 
proposed measures aim to achieve  is that it will become mu ch more difficult to produce 
home made explosives, extending the timef rame needed to prepare the improvised 
explosive devices, and thus ma king detection and intervention  by public authorities more 
likely.  
This is also why the practicality and ensuri ng the least negative effect on consumers and 
businesses possible was strongly taken into cons ideration. For all thes e chemicals, factors 
relating to their usage, the si ze of the market and the associ ated compliance costs have 
been presented in the Preparatory study. The concentration thresholds are set at such 
levels to ensure that there is a very limited use of these substances or mixtures by the general public. Moreover, the wide use or the nature of some precu rsors excluded setting 
a concentration limit at all, for example for hexamine fuel tablets
17 or for acetone (which 
further demonstrates the indivi dual approach taken to the assessment of each precursor). 
The proposed measures in such case fores ee a solution in the form of a regime of 
reporting suspicious transactions.  
In order to further reduce any possible in convenience to consumers from the general 
public who have a legitimate use for the give n chemical above the stated concentration 
threshold, and where no other a lternative can be use d, the preferred optio n also includes a 
consumer licensing system. This is also an effective system from the perspective of 
security since it allows a pe rsonal appreciation of the securi ty risks involved. A consumer 
licensing system limits the administrative costs on businesses as opposed to a licensing 
system for retail, as the assessment showed. The experience of the Member States, where 
this system is already in place shows that there are only very few consumers who really 
need to purchase such products. Therefore, the amount of consumers requesting a license 
was very low.  
                                                 
17  A general restriction of the sale of hexamine fuel tablets to the general public with a license for 
legitimate use would result in a situation where owners of model steam engines or persons owning 
a hexamine fuel tablet powered camping stove would have to obtain a license. This would be 
difficult to implement. It is also technically not possible to set a useful concentration limit for the substance, as hexamine fuel tablets contain more than 90% pure hexamine. 
EN 26   EN 6.2. Main advantages of the preferred policy option  
Before listing the individual advantages, it needs to be stressed that assessing the security 
benefits of any preven tive measure, particularly when co mbating terrorism is concerned, 
is very difficult. The approach chosen in this  Impact Assessment aims to ensure that all 
relevant elements that could have an impact on security in the EU ar e considered, also in 
relation to their economic impact. However, no hard data can be collected which would 
demonstrate that any particular measure w ould have prevented (a certain number of) 
terrorist attacks. The aim is adopt the measur es, of which one can reasonably expect that 
they will make it much more difficult for terrorists to produce home made explosives, 
giving national authorities a better chance of preventing terrorist attacks. The preferred 
policy option proposed those measures – ba sed on a long and wi de discussion with 
relevant stakeholders – whic h are believed to offer the best result set against the 
associated costs. 
More specifically, the preferred policy optio n presents some important advantages and 
benefits:   
• Restricting and controlling, but not prohibi ting access to precursors by the general 
public. The preferred policy option reduces ge neral access to highly concentrated 
precursors by the general public by setting c oncentration thresholds  for sales through 
open channels while introducing a licensing system for consumers for legitimate, 
justified use. This will ensure that such  chemical substances and products are not 
excluded from the market, even t hough their trade may be reduced; 
• Reducing the reliabili ty and ‘potency’ of homemade explosives.  Precursors in lower 
concentrations make it more difficult to produce reliable and potent homemade 
explosives. In most cases, this would re quire substantial additional processes to 
increase their purity or concentration le vel. High concentrations would only be 
available in a controlled environment, with  a deterrent effect on buyers with potential 
criminal intentions. The system of reporting on suspicious transactions will ensure that even "dubious" purchases of lower concentr ations can be identified and notified;  
• Enhancing security, awareness and capacity. The package of measures included in the 
preferred policy option will improve overall  awareness levels throughout the supply 
chain. The voluntary action will  help to properly implemen t and ‘operationalise’ the 
measures, providing guidance, educati on, training and awareness-raising; 
• Creating an EU level playing field.  The preferred policy option envisages a common 
EU approach, which will help to both avoi d distortion of the Internal Market and 
prevent terrorists and other criminals from  making use of lower standards in other 
Member States. 
• Maintaining proportionality  By introducing specific measures for ensuring the 
reporting of suspicious transa ctions for substances for which no technically useful 
concentration level can be se t, the preferred policy option ensures that the negative 
consequences of a mandatory substance re striction for the companies concerned can 
be avoided while it creates a higher le vel of security at the same time. 
 
EN 27   EN 6.3. Detailed assessment of the preferred policy option18  
In this section, where appropriate a rating is given which represents the detailed 
assessment of the anticipated im pacts – the scoring is from -3  (very negative) to +3 (very 
positive). It is stressed that these ratings compare the policy options between each other 
and against the Status Quo and are primarily used to quickly reflect the full assessment and to facilitate comparisons. 
6.3.1.  Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
Objective 1.1. - To restrict access to certa in precursors by the general public: +2 
Positive impact. Consumers would have ope n access to chemical substances below a 
certain concentration level. Access to higher  concentrations woul d not be banned, but 
restricted and controlled. This would be pa rticularly important to ensure access to 
chemical substances which in lower concentra tion levels would be ineffective, such as 
hydrogen peroxide and acids, as well as nitr omethane. In most cases, however, it is 
anticipated that consumers would use products with lower concentrations, as they may be 
discouraged from applying for a license. While  the chances of "opportunistic sales" are 
reduced to a minimum, it may still be possibl e to obtain the chemical substances from 
third countries, or in EU countries under false pretences or th rough other illegal 
approaches such as theft. However, possessi on of high concentrations would be illegal. 
Objective 1.2 To reduce the reliability an d potency of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components manufactured for malici ous or criminal purposes: +1.5 
Positive impact. Setting concentration thre sholds would as a minimum make it more 
difficult to produce reliable and potent home made explosives. The notification of 
suspicious transactions and licensing system  will both have a deterrent effect and 
improve the chances terrorists and other crim inals being caught before they can fabricate 
homemade explosives. There is a potential displacement effect towards chemicals which would not be covered by the policy option but still represent a security risk. These would 
remain openly available. 
Objective 1.3. To enhance the security an d awareness of the entire supply chain of 
precursors: +3 
Very positive impact. The cumulative effects of the different elements included in the 
policy option would have a strong positive impa ct on the security and awareness of the 
entire supply chain handling the precursors.  Unlike existing EU and national measures, 
the preferred option emphasises the connectio n between control of precursors and the 
security of the EU. 
Objective 1.4 To prevent terrorists and other criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on chemicals in some countries: +2 
                                                
 
18  An assessment of the main advantages and disadvantages of the preferred policy option for each 
precursors is included in the  for each precursor, as included in the Preparat ory Study to Inform an 
Impact Assessment of Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives. The Impact Asse ssment presents the main conclusions.  
EN 28   EN Positive impact. The cumulative effects of lowering concentration levels in open sales 
channels, combined with a system of reporting suspicious transactions and controlled sales of higher concentration levels will create an EU level playing field, both preventing internal market distortions and preventing persons with malevolent purposes from taking 
advantage of lower standards in other Member States. There may still be a displacement effect of such persons attempting to ma ke purchases of the precursors in higher 
concentrations in third countries, although possession within the EU would be illegal 
under the preferred option. 
6.3.2.  Assessment of economic impacts 
 
Impacts on administrati ve costs for business: -2
19 
The preferred policy option involves a wide rang e of administrative costs to businesses. 
Traders are likely – depending on national impl ementation – to be obliged to provide 
information for their prospective buyers on the restrictions concerning concentration 
levels in their standard terms and in addi tional information material. They might also 
have to submit reports to publ ic authorities on how they ar e complying with the legal 
requirements. Producers, importe rs and wholesalers will probably have to monitor their 
distributors/retail partners' compliance with th e new rules. All businesses will need to 
allow public inspection. In aggregate, the administrative costs imposed upon businesses 
are likely to be around €20-54 million per a nnum, and a one-off cost of €40-63 million.  
The calculation of these costs as well as th e compliance costs in the section below is 
based on a simplified estimation model, and th erefore not on the Standard Cost Model – 
the method chosen was one relati ng to the turnover to  businesses from th e turnover of the 
products concerned. The reason fo r not using the Standard Cost Model is that the number 
of traders who will sell substances that can be subject to the new legislation is very difficult to estimate. No useful data was available or found during the work on the 
Preparatory study. This made the completio n of a Standard Co st model close to 
impossible.  
The methodology for the calculation and the ba ckground statistical data  are presented in 
Annexes 7 and 8. The estimates are actually rath er on the high end of the scale, and could 
in reality be significantly le ss than the estimated amount. Th e total estimated costs also 
have to be divided over the 27 Member States , and thus over all companies in Europe – 
the actual impact on the businesses concerned will therefore be marginal. 
 
Compliance costs for business and authorities: -2.5   
Generally, no compliance cost will incur to  producers of the base chemicals and 
importers (who are not selling to the gene ral public) under the pr eferred policy option. 
Producers of products sold to the general pub lic in places and ways where a verification 
of licenses is not viable will have to redu ce the concentration level. Otherwise, if 
                                                
 
19  Please note that the scores related to the ec onomic impact are based on a comparison between the 
different policy options, and are therefore not ca librated to be compared within the preferred 
policy option on the basis of the actual monetary value of the impact. 
EN 29   EN complying with the requirements of the licensi ng scheme, they will be able to continue 
selling higher concentrations. Retail traders wi ll have to verify that products above the 
thresholds are bought for professional c onsumption only (checking e.g. company 
documents, registration number) or for a le gitimate purpose by the general public, which 
may be proven by a license issued by a public authority. They will ne ed to verify which 
products are concerned. The cost estimate is  €9-24 million per year. An additional one-
off cost of €80-126 million is also exp ected. The methodology and the background 
statistical data are presen ted in Annexes 7 and 8.  
Public authorities will also incur certain im plementation costs, including initial guidance 
and training, as well as inspections. Also, they  will have to issue personal licenses. This 
will involve costs of verification. Some add itional compliance costs in connection with 
developing and adopting proced ures and rules with deali ng with exemptions of an 
estimated €10-30 million in total is also expected. Furthermore, public authorities maintaining the licensing scheme will incur an additional cost of about €1.8 million/year. 
Reporting suspicious transactions will impos e an additional compliance cost for the 
private sector of about €16 million per ye ar, and public authorities will incur an 
additional cost of about €0.34 million per year. Those Member States (e.g. United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands), which have such  measures in place on a voluntary basis, 
reported that these measures did not re present any significant costs to them.  
The voluntary measures included in the prefer red policy option will be associated with 
cost to businesses of around €64 million per year, bearing in mind that actions disproportionately increasing th e cost of sale are unlikely to be taken by business. An 
additional annual €64 million is calculate d as costs to public authorities.  
The total costs of the preferred policy option thus may add up to about €100 – 140 
million per year, out of which about €65 million is to be borne by publ ic authorities, and 
an additional €80 – 126 million one-off cost.  
 
Economic impacts on producers, merchants (importers, wholesal ers and retailers), 
professional users (agriculture and indust ry), consumers from the general public, 
SMEs, and on export and import, and intr a-Community transport/commerce: -1.5 
The value of goods currently sold yearly to  the general public above the concentration 
thresholds set is estimated at about €450-1.150 million. However, about half of these will 
still be sold and bought through the acquisition of personal licen ces. As a total ban is not 
envisaged, and the overall non-professional consumption of the precursors only 
accounts to about 1.5% of total EU co nsumption for the chemicals concerned , the 
impact on the producers of base chemicals will  be very limited. Consequences on sales 
volumes might be experienced by ma nufacturers of consumer products: 
• Ammonium nitrate and alkali  nitrates: commercial fert ilisers, food preservatives; 
• Hydrogen peroxide and acetone: hair, t ooth and textile bleaches, detergents, 
disinfectants (incl. pool clean ers), thinners and solvents (incl. nail polish removers; 
• Nitromethane and hexamine: fuel for racing ca rs, boats and amateur rockets, solid fuel 
tablets (and indirectly: e quipment based on this); 
EN 30   EN • Strong acids: solvents, de tergents, pH adjuster; 
• Chlorates and perchlorates: amateur rocket propellants. 
A number of companies producing consumer pr oducts (mixtures, solutions etc.) over the 
concentration threshold levels may feel inc lined to lower the concentration level they 
offer to the general public, fearing a loss of reve nues as a result of the fact that a part of 
the consumers buying their products may consider  it too burdensome to request a license. 
Producers of retail fertilis ers and household solvents ma y be especially affected. 
Consequently, they will need to adjust the production processes and packaging of products intended for non-professional use.  
Some traders may consider that selling the pr oducts containing a substance or its mixture 
above the respective concentra tion threshold is too burdensom e too, as it requires them to 
ask for and verify licenses. It is estimated th at this will affect about half of the current 
sales volume above thresholds. This may represent a loss of about €65-155 million per 
year for all companies EU-wide. This is, how ever, very likely an overestimation, because 
the calculation included also substances for which no conc entration threshold can be 
applied and the sales of which will not be subject to these effects. Products for which 
reduced concentration levels are not a f easible option (e.g. food preservatives or 
hexamine fuel tablets, will have to comply  with the requirement to report suspicious 
transactions (see compliance costs). However,  sales to the general public will not be 
limited. In addition to that, the assessment of the financial impacts on business did not 
take into account that consum ers will still need to buy alte rnative products to the ones 
which might no longer be available (or only available with a license). This further 
increases the likelihood that  the numerical estimates are at the maximum limit of 
potential negative economic impacts for businesses.  
Overall, the detrimental effects will be re latively small for business; but they may be, 
proportionally, somewhat higher for SMEs, given their smaller sales volumes and 
relative concentration in retail. The administ rative and compliance costs relative to their 
turnover will be higher and SMEs will be more  likely to be affected by loss of business. 
Yet even taking this consideration into account, the ad ministrative burden for SMEs will 
be relatively light – limited onl y to reporting suspicious tran sactions and verifying that 
purchases of higher concentration levels ar e by professional or licensed users only. These 
have been estimated to be 16 million euro a year for all businesses across the entire EU 
(see in the section above). In practice this m eans that the costs will be negligible for 
SMEs. 
Given the scope of the measures proposed there are only very limited options for 
providing flexibility to SMEs in the implem entation of the proposal. There should be no 
diversity in the concentration limits, nor in the requirements to report suspicious 
transactions just for SMEs – this would create loopholes. 
Any effect on exports is lik ely to be negligible.  
As regards the effect on consumers, they w ill incur a certain amount of consumer surplus 
loss as certain products might no longer be (easily) accessible to them. The amount of 
this loss was calculated for the scenario that all substances of concern in this context 
EN 31   EN would not be accessible at all to  the general public above certain concentration thresholds 
or in any concentration (where setting such threshold is not possible, e.g. for acetone or 
hexamine). The substitution effect (availabil ity of alternative products) was incorporated, 
albeit relatively roughly, into the calculations  by way of the price elasticity assumptions. 
As a result, an estimate of  a maximum potential loss to  consumers amounts to €115-280 
million/year. The methodology for the calculation of consumer surplus loss is explained 
in Annex 7. 
However, this effect will be mitigated by  a) the diversification of the regimes for the precursors of concern. Several chemicals 
(e.g., notably, the widely used acetone) are not in tended to be subject to any sales bans at 
all  (but will be subject to ti ghter control by means of reportin g suspicious transactions).  
b) substances (or mixtures thereof), the sa les of which would be generally banned above 
a certain concentration thresh old, would still be accessible to  the general public if the 
consumer obtains a license from  the respective national author ity, and presents it to the 
seller. The consumer might incur some ad ministrative costs (fees for obtaining the 
license) in this situation but will be able to continue purchasing the desired products.  
Consumers will in general be able to access diluted versions or – if these are not a 
feasible option – suitable alternatives. The data and background calculations available, 
however, do not enable to spec ify convincingly and sp ecifically how far this substitution 
is possible for each product (the usage of which is mostly already relatively minor).      
Overall, the monetised loss is estimated to be around €180-435 million for businesses 
and consumers per year (sums are aggregated fo r the whole EU). It has to be added that 
the calculations were made on rather higher-co st assumptions, and so the figures may be 
biased upwards (overestimate the costs). The ranges for some of the costs reflect the difficulty to estimate them and the variety of  factors, which cannot be assumed at the 
moment (for example the establishment of the licensing schemes), which will be laid down by the Member States individually. Th e figure indicated for the ongoing costs for 
public authorities for reporting suspicious tran sactions (reacting to calls from sellers) and 
voluntary measures represents an upper limit of  the costs and are likely to be lower.  
 
Table 5: Summary of estimated costs of the preferred option for businesses  
 Administrative Compliance Reporting 
suspicious 
transactions Voluntary 
measures Loss of 
sales 
revenue Total 
Set up 40-63m 80-126m    120m-
189m 
Ongoing 
(p.a.) 20-54m 35-75m 16m 64m 65-155m 200-
364m 
 
Table 6: Summary of estimated costs of the preferred option for public authorities  
 Compliance including Reporting suspicious 
transactions Voluntary 
measures Total 
EN 32   EN licensing system 
Set up 10-30m   10-30m 
Ongoing 
(p.a.) 1.8m 0.34m 64m 66.12m 
 
6.3.3.  Assessment of fundamen tal rights impacts 
Article 8 Protection of personal data 
The preferred policy option requires the proc essing of personal data and their further 
disclosure to third parties (association or  law enforcement authorities) in case of 
suspicious transactions. This implies a potenti ally serious interference with private life 
and the right to the protection of  personal data. For this interf erence to be lawful it must 
comply with the conditions re quired by the ECHR case law and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, be "in accordance with the law" and "necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate pub lic interest and the la w is formulated with 
sufficient precision and is proportionate". The processing of personal data must always be 
carried out in accordance with national data  protection laws implementing EU data 
protection law, particularly Directive 95/46/EC. The processing of data is also subject to 
the requirements set out in the Directive incl uding a clear and strict purpose limitation and 
security of transmissions, the conditions for th e transmission by sellers to law enforcement 
authorities and precise obligations of controllers with regard to their processing activities, the personal data that law en forcement authorities may retain from reported suspected 
transactions, clear retention periods for pers onal data stored, based on necessity to 
achieve the purpose, and the ri ghts granted to data subjects  for the protection of their 
personal data, including access and rectificatio n rights. The processing of personal data 
in the EU will always be s ubject to supervision by public independent data protection 
authorities. Normally all these safeguards are provided under nati onal data protection 
legislation. Under these condi tions, the processing of data for the purposes of the 
preferred policy option would be both legitimate and proportionate. 
 Article 16: Freedom to conduct a business 
Businesses would still be able to trade al l precursors, even though some limitations may 
apply as they would need to set up a ne w reporting system and carry out additional 
checks of exemption permits. It must be en sured that the additional requirements are 
designed in a way that will allow all businesse s, independent of their size, to implement 
and apply them. 
Article 17 Right to property 
The right to property would not  be affected, as businesses and members of the general 
public would continue to be able to us e their lawfully acquired possessions.  
Article 21 Non-discrimination   
Since parts of the preferred policy option are built on a risk assessment of transactions 
performed by sellers, the proposal will estab lish guidelines relating to the criteria and 
elements that sellers should follow in orde r to assess the suspicious nature of a 
EN 33   EN transaction. The system of reporting suspicious transac tions should not lead to 
overzealous discriminatory reactions from  businesses, for example based on physical 
features or foreign accents. This would be ne cessary to avoid a broad interpretation of 
this concept which would result in a general reporting of transactions and transmissions 
of personal data to law enforcement author ities and discriminatory practices, which 
would imply a breach of necessity and proportionality principles. Accompanying measures, including the voluntary actions incl uded in the preferred policy option, could 
help to avoid such practices through e ducation, training and awareness-raising.  
6.3.4.  Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour market: 0  
In principle, businesses will still be allowed to trade the chemicals in all concentration 
levels and producers and othe r supply chain stakeholders can also continue their 
activities. It is however anticipated that the sales of higher concentrations will be reduced 
overall and that the set up and implementati on of the reporting and licensing systems will 
require investments from both businesses and public authorities. No significant impacts 
on the labour market are expected. 
Impacts on public health: +1 
Some positive effect. While higher concentrati ons would still be available, albeit in a 
controlled environment in the EU, and these ma y still represent a risk of being misused 
for making homemade explosives, the possibi lities of detection and prevention would 
greatly improve as result of the package of  measures included in the preferred policy 
option. In addition, as a result of the measures , it is also likely that the general public’s 
perception of security will increase. 
Other impacts (e.g. inconvenie nce, discrimination): -1 
Minor negative impact. In relation to inconve nience, consumers would still be able to 
access precursors in higher concentrations, but the requirement to apply for a license will 
cause some level of inconvenien ce. As mentioned earlier, there is also a limited risk that 
sellers would too quickly consider a transac tion as suspicious and refuse the purchase. 
The latter could be offset by clea r guidance, education and training. 
In relation to the internal ma rket and the free movement of goods, there is a risk that 
competent authorities may deci de not to accept licenses from  persons who are not legally 
residing in the country in which they would like to make the purch ase, as they do not 
have access to possibly relevant information on the person. In order not to restrict the 
free movement of goods and services and people , Member States shoul d consider, as part 
of implementation, a harmonised approach to  granting licenses and ensuring that any 
license issued in any Member State would be  valid for purchases in any other Member 
State.  
6.3.5.  Assessment of environmental impacts: 0 
Neutral, with a minor risk of consumers opting for the use of products with lower 
concentration levels (which require higher qua ntities to be as effective as the higher 
EN 34   EN concentrations) and possible incr eased use of paper / transport, etc to develop and deliver 
education and training, awareness raising campaigns, etc. 
6.3.6.  Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, uncertainties, political and techni cal feasibility and necessary preconditions 
to achieve impact 
There are several preconditions which need to be met to ensure the feasibility of the 
policy option and to mitigate some of the potential negative effects that have been identified: 
• With regard to the licensing system, it will be essential to clearly define "legitimate 
use", e.g. by providing criter ia or guidance on when to grant a license and when to 
reject a request by a consumer . This could be done both at national and at EU level. In 
addition, Member States will have to appo int competent authorities to manage the 
licensing system, ensuring that these have  the appropriate e xpertise and human 
resources to deal with consumer requests. In  order to help sellers in recognising when 
a chemical substance requires a license, suppor t measures such as a specific indication 
in the barcode could be considered, even though this may be costly. The policy option 
should also allow distance sellers (i.e. t hose who will not "phys ically" receive the 
license or certificate) to still process th e licenses and sell highe r concentrations of 
precursors. The receipt of licenses by fa x or in a scanned version will however 
heighten the risk of falsif ication. Finally, options for ensuring a harmonised licensing 
system across the EU should be carefully st udied in order to a void any distortion of 
the internal market and discrimination of  consumers wishing to purchase chemical 
products in countries other than their own. 
• In general, the preferred policy option ta kes existing national and EU approaches, 
which are similar in nature and scope, into  consideration. The pol icy option also needs 
to be accompanied by measures supporting education, training, awareness raising, 
operational implementation and enforcement. Re search also needs to be continued to 
find ways of making the precursors less pot ent and effective for malevolent use. 
There are some additional important issues  which will require careful consideration 
during implementation: 
• The policy option will be applied to a rela tively high number of chemical substances 
and their mixtures and to a large number of different pr oducts. None of the Member 
State measures have a similar coverage. It s implementation is therefore expected to 
require investments in terms of financia l and human resources, especially in the 
starting phase, and can meet some resistance from authorities and business representations. 
• In addition, some precursors, such as hexa mine, remain highly reactive even in small 
doses. They therefore represen t a relatively higher risk.  
Ultimately, there are some concerns: 
• The policy option could have a displacement ef fect towards other chemical substances 
which would still be freely available but wh ich equally present a s ecurity risk. It will 
EN 35   EN therefore be important to ensure a regular  review of the polic y option, e.g. through a 
Comitology procedure, to assess whether a ny precursors need to be added or dropped 
from the current list. 
EU added value and rationale 
The EU added value and rationale for introdu cing concentration threshold and requiring 
systems for reporting of suspicio us transactions and for gran ting exemptions for access to 
higher concentrations of chemical substan ces and products are hi gh. Firstly, the current 
differences in national approaches may affect  the functioning of the internal market and 
may lead to terrorists and other criminals ma king use of lower standa rds in other Member 
States. 
Secondly, the system of reporting suspicious transactions stre ngthens the EU focus on the 
security of precursors, as past terrorist att acks and attempts to gain access to chemical 
substances and products could have been prev ented if the seller had realised that the 
transaction was dubious. In a ddition, several Member States  already have notification 
systems in place which the policy option s hould take into account. At EU level, 
important lessons can be learned from for example notification re quirements included in 
the drug precursors legislation. 
Thirdly, there is clear added value in applying higher contro l levels on highly 
concentrated chemical substances and produc ts, as historically terrorists and other 
criminals have most often sought to gain access to the purest forms possible. Three Member States have similar approaches in place. 
Fourthly, the voluntary measures, to be de veloped where possible EU wide, or in a 
harmonised manner, will help to increase awareness among both supply chain actors and 
consumers. Education and training will suppo rt the implementation and operations of the 
two systems. Research will help to re nder precursors less harmful. A common EU 
approach towards the development and impl ementation of such measures will allow 
Member States to exchange experiences and information. 
Stakeholder views 
Member State experts, even though not e xpressing any formal political position, were 
overall in favour of the combination of meas ures included in the preferred policy option. 
They considered that the policy option broadl y followed measures that were already in 
place in several Member States, which had proven to be successful or were recently created in response to a perceive d need to increase the security of prec ursors. All agreed 
that an EU wide approach would favour an EU level playing field. 
Some expressed their concerns (reflected a bove) as to the consumer licensing system and 
the possible effects on cross-border shopping . Most emphasised the need for clear 
guidance, education, training and awarenes s-raising to support the development and 
implementation of the policy option in all its as pects. Some countries indicated that they 
would have preferred voluntary measures only, but agreed that ensuring their EU 
coverage and full participation of all relevant supply chain stakeholders would be very 
difficult. 
Industrial stakeholders, while stressing an overall preferen ce for voluntary measures, also 
supported the combination of measures incl uded in the policy option. Their concerns 
EN 36   EN mainly related to the possible burden whic h would be placed on businesses to implement 
the various systems and the need  to vary carefully consider the concentration thresholds. 
With regard to the consumer licensing system, they drew attention to the possible disadvantaged position of distan ce sellers. A list of industria l stakeholders, participating 
on the Standing Committee on Precursor s, is presented in Annex 3.  
The overall the effects of the policy under this point was estimated at: +1,5 
 
Table 7 presents an overview of the scores of the options included in the preferred policy 
option. The scores rank from -3 (very negative  impact) to +3 (very positive impact). The 
ratings in the table compare the policy options  between each other a nd against the Status 
Quo. The column in grey represents an ag gregate assessment of the respective policy 
option, while the five columns that follow it (e.g. PO4B 1, PO4B 2 etc.) represent the assessment of the effects of the policy opti on on the individual groups of precursors.
20  
The scores related to the economic impact  are based on a comparison between all the 
different policy options, and are therefore not  calibrated to be compared within the 
preferred policy option on the basis of the actua l monetary value of the impact. The total 
scores show that for some precursor groups, certain measures within  the preferred policy 
option may be slightly more appropriate and for other slightly less. The latter does not 
mean, however, that this option should be disregarded but rather that some 
accompanying measures may need to be put in place to ensure success.  
 
                                                 
20  1: Nitrate-based fertilisers and nitrates; 2: Hy drogen peroxide and aceton e; 3: Nitromethane and 
hexamine; 4: Strong acids; 5: Chlorates and perchlorates.  
EN 37   EN Table 7: Scoring of the policy options included in the pr eferred policy option 
 
Assessment criteria PO 4B PO4B .
1PO4
B.2PO4
B.3PO4
B.4PO4
B.5PO4
CPO4C
.1PO4
C.2PO4
C.3PO4
C.4PO4
C.5PO5 PO5.1 PO5.
2PO5.3 PO5.
4PO5.
5
Assessment of achievement of the policy 
objectives6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.5 7 . 5 7777 4.5 44 54 5
1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by 
the general public2 2 222222 21 . 5 21 . 5 1 . 5 1 1 2 1 2
1.2 To reduce the reliability and potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or components manufactured for malicious or criminal purposes1 1 111133 33330 0 0 0 0 0
1.3 To enhance the security and aw areness of 
the entire supply chain of precursors2 2 22221 . 5 1 . 5 11 . 5 11 . 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
1.4 To prevent terrorists and other criminals from 
making use of low er control levels and few er restrictions on chem icals in som e countries1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Assessment of economic impacts -5 -4.5 -6 -5.5 -6 -2.5 -6 -6 -6.5 -6 -6.5 -2.5 0 00 00 0
Impacts on administrative costs for business and 
authorities-1.5 -1.5 -2 -1.5 -2 -1 -1.5 -2 -2 -1.5 -2 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compliance costs for business and authorities -2 -2 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic impacts -1.5 -1 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 -2 -1.5 -2 -2 -2 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assessment of soci a l  i mpa cts 1 10 . 5 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 11 11 1
Impacts on labour market 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1
Impacts on public health 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Other im pacts -0.5 -0.5 -1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Assessment of environmental impacts 0 0 0000 0 0 0000 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Considerations on feasibility and 
subsidiarity2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -1 0- 2 - 1 - 1 0
Key risks, uncertainties, political and technical 
feasibility and necessary preconditions to achieve 
im pacts.2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -1 0 -2 -1 -1 0
Total scores 5 5.5 3.5 4.5 4 7.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3 2.5 6.5 3.5 4 2 4 3 5
 
 
Explanatory notes  
 
PO4B: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a specific concentration limit with sales of higher concentrations through a system of licensing either the retail distribution or the use of the 
precursors 
PO4B 1: Nitrate-based fe rtilisers and nitrates  
PO4B 2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO4B 3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO4B 4: Strong acids PO4B 5: Chlorates and perchlorates 
 
PO4 C: A ban on sales to the general public if the substance is above a specific concentration limit with introducing a system of reporting suspicious transactions 
PO4C 1: Nitrate-based fe rtilisers and nitrates  
PO4 C 2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO4 C 3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO4 C 4: Strong acids PO4 C 5: Chlorates and perchlorates 
 
PO5: Taking measures to enhance the surveillance of  professional use, including sub-options such as 
promoting codes of conduct, education and training, raising staff awareness or addressing in particular 
medium / small users   
PO5 1: Nitrate-based fe rtilisers and nitrates 
PO5  2: Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
PO5  3: Nitromethane and hexamine 
PO5  4: Strong acids PO5  5: Chlorates and perchlorates  
 
EN 38   EN 6.4. Assessment and consideration of proportionality  
The preferred policy option consis ts of a package of measures which will pose, especially 
during the set-up phase, a relatively high burde n on both the supply chai n - in particular 
downstream supply chain sellers but also on some upstream stakeholders - and on public 
authorities. Most costs incurred wi ll be administrative in nature or relate to the need to 
comply with the new requirements, e.g. maki ng a clear distincti on between chemical 
substances and products with low and high concentrations, repor ting of suspicious 
transactions, providing exemptions, etc. There is a likelihood of some longer-term 
negative effects. 
In order to mitigate some of these negative e ffects, the introduction of  the regulation will 
foresee a transitional phase for implementation. This is necessary in order to allow businesses and consumers to still use their old supplies of the targeted chemicals in order 
to minimise their economic loss, but also to allow national authorities to put in place the 
licensing scheme which forms part  of the preferred policy opti on. The actual time limit is 
likely to be in the region of 2 years. 
On the other hand, the expected benefits th at can be accrued by the preferred policy 
option are strong, as it would effectively reduce illegitimate access to precursors and 
place their sales in a controlled environment. This will have a strong deterrent effect on 
persons with malevolent intentions, but will no t fully remove the risks associated with 
the precursors. Nor will the preferred option reduce the ri sk of displacement effects 
towards other chemical substances or towards illegal access/purchases in third countries. 
Such displacement effects could be counter ed through creating a flexible system to 
extend the scope of the meas ure to other precursors. 
As identified in the assessment of the pref erred policy option, ther e are some important 
conditions to be met and some important issues  to be considered before its development 
and implementation, in order to ensure the fu ll proportionality of th e policy package. In 
particular, the preferred option raises some c oncerns with regard to the respect of the 
fundamental rights to private life and the protection of person al data. It wi ll be necessary 
to ensure that such interference is "in accordan ce with the law" and demonstrates that it is 
"necessary in a democratic society and proporti onate". This means that the processing of 
personal data must be always carried out in  accordance with national data protection laws 
implementing EU data protection law.  
In conclusion, the potential negative effect s of terrorist attack s using (homemade) 
explosives can be enormous, in terms of di rect financial losses, longer-term economic 
consequences and social disr uption. In addition , fear induced by terrorism can result 
indirectly in damage to wellbeing beyond the direct costs of loss of life, injury or 
property.  It is therefore important to at l east make a first step towards the development 
of a policy which addresses those precursors which have proven to represent the highest 
security risk, leaving the possibility (and the flexibility) for this policy to be adapted and 
expanded in the future.   
EN 39   EN 7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
 
It is foreseen that the effect s of the proposal will be evalua ted within three years after the 
end of the implementation period. Core indica tors for possible monitoring and evaluation 
include:  Impacts:  
- Reduced number of terrorist and other criminal incidents using explosives 
(distinguishing attacks with ‘conventional’ explosives from those with HMEs and 
IEDs) and related casualties 
- Increased EU harmonisation and co operation between Member States 
 Outcomes:  
- Increased number of suspici ous transactions identified 
- Increased number of incidents detected  and prevented (dis tinguishing potential 
attacks with ‘conventional’ explosives  from those with HMEs and IEDs) 
- Increased number of terrorists and other criminals apprehended 
- Increased number of ‘failed’ attacks ( due to reduced potency and reliability) 
 Outputs:  
- Reduction of household consumption of precu rsors in high con centrations (above 
the threshold), in volume, value and as a percentage of total consumption (below 
and above threshold). 
- Increased household consumption of al ternative chemicals (not presenting a 
security risk or presenting a reduced security risk) 
- Increased availability of phlegmatised pr ecursors or precursors with additives for 
household consumption 
- Increased number of retailers and other supply chain stakeholders reached 
through awareness-raising campaigns , education and training, etc. 
- Increased number of Codes of Conduct deve loped at EU and na tional levels (and 
increased numbers of businesses sign ing up to these Codes of Conduct) 
 Monitoring and evaluation could make use of:  
- National statistics on chemical production 
- Reporting by business associations on household consumption of chemical 
substances, voluntary measures implemented, etc. 
- Eurobarometers (scoping perception of security) 
- EU and Member State reporting on criminal  investigations, prosecution, terrorist 
incidents (e.g. TE-SAT reports) etc. 
- EU and Member State reporting on implement ation of the legislative instrument 
- Research and studies (e .g. on phlegmatisation). 
EN 40   EN ANNEX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STANDING CO MMITTEE ON PRECURSORS IN ITS ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR 2008   
1. The SCP recommends elaborati on of a voluntary agreement with private-sector partners at 
the European level with a view to increasing the security of the supply chain. This agreement 
would: 
• increase awareness and training among the me mbers of the supply-chain for security 
concerns; 
• envisage joint vulnerability assessments with in the supply chain and devise measures 
to address these vulnerabilities; 
• increase information-exchange and coope ration of retailers and law-enforcement 
authorities on suspicious transactions. 
2. The SCP recommends that the following EU-wide (regulatory) measures should be 
considered without delay: 
Extend the control of nitrogenous fertilisers to alkali nitrat e based fertilisers for sales 
to the general public  by imposing the obligation:  
• on the buyer  to identify himself and demonstrate a legitimate use (i.e. farming or 
gardening.) 
• on the seller:  
o not to sell to unidentified buyers;  
o to place internet sales under better control; 
o not to sell to minors; 
o to keep records of customers to whom the substance has been sold for 
traceability purposes; 
o to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities. 
3. The SCP recommends: 
• holding a meeting of the stakeholders of the supply chain of fertilisers; 
• examining the possibility to establish an EU-wide security and registration 
system for the above-mentioned nitrogenous fertilisers; 
• conducting campaigns on raising end-user s’ awareness about the security 
implications of transport and stor age of the above-mentioned nitrogenous 
fertilisers by extending on-going efforts by EFMA. 
4. The SCP recommends the adoption of the fo llowing (regulatory) EU-wide measures as 
soon as possible: 
Î prohibit the sale of highly concentrated  hydrogen-peroxide (>12 %) to the general 
public, providing for exemptions in case of pr oof of legitimate use. In the case of 
exemptions, the following control measures should be examined:   
• on the buyer to identify himself and dem onstrate a legitimate use (e.g. pool-
cleaning etc.); 
• on the seller: 
o  not to sell to unidentified buyers,  
o to place internet sales un der better control,   
o not to sell to minors, 
EN 41   EN o to keep records about customers to whom the substance has been sold  
for traceability purposes, 
o to report suspicious transactions to law-enforcement authorities. 
Î put professional use under closer  surv eillance (with a view  of enhancing the 
security of the supply chain).   
The SCP also recommends further research into additives that may inhibit the re-
concentration and/or use in synthesis of prim ary explosives of hydroge n peroxide solutions. 
Research should also be conducted on ways to prevent the misuse of acetone.  
5. The SCP recommends adopting the following (regulatory) EU-wide measures as soon as 
possible: 
Î prohibit the sale of highly concentrated  nitromethane to the general public  
Î improve control of sales of diluted ni tro-methane (< 30 %)  by imposing the 
obligation  
• on the buyer  to identify himself and demonstrate a legitimate use (e.g. 
membership in an aeroplane modelling club etc.); 
• on the seller:  
o  not to sell to unidentified buyers,  
o to place internet sales un der better control,   
o not to sell to minors, 
o to keep records about customers to whom the substance has been sold  
for traceability purposes, 
o to report suspicious transactions to law-enforcement authorities. 
Î put professional use under closer  surv eillance (with a view  of enhancing the 
security of the supply chain). 
6. After consultation with  the affected downstream user indus tries, the SCP will consider  
proposing the following short-te rm (regulatory) measures: 
Î prohibit the sale of highly concentrated hexamine to th e general public and place 
professional use under closer surveillance. 
7. The SCP recommends that the Commission considers to propose:  
• prohibiting the sale of nitric acid to the general public and placi ng professional use 
under closer surveillance; 
• further examining the role of other str ong acids in producing IEDs as well as the 
distribution channels of strong acids to the general public; and 
• determining concentration limits which can help to make misuse more difficult. 
8. The SCP recommends adopting the following s hort-term measures as soon as possible: 
Î restrict the sale of chlorates and perchlor ates as substances or  preparations to the 
general public and place professiona l use under closer surveillance; 
Î examine the role of pyrotechnics in producing IEDs. 
EN 42   EN ANNEX 2: NOTE  FROM  THE  LAST  MEETING  OF THE  INTERSERVICE  GROUP  ON 
EXPLOSIVES  ISSUES   
The meeting took place on 20 January 2010 with th e presence of representatives of DG JLS, 
DG ENTR and the contractor, GHK.  DG AGRI, SG and the Legal Service were absent on the 
ground that they did not have any comments to make. The purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss the draft final report of the "Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact Assessment of 
Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restri ctions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives", 
and comments submitted on the draft report from  the Member State and private sector 
stakeholders.  
The participants at the meeting raised the following points:  
 - Methodology and reliability of the numerical estimates in the draft report. This was taken 
on board by the consultant who provided a more  detailed explanation of the methodology and 
inputs into their calculations in an annex to th e report. It was also ag reed that intervals are 
used for the costs, rather then one number as an estimate.  
- Scoring of individual options against especia lly qualitative criteria  (fundamental rights, 
subsidiarity and proportionality). It was agre ed that a qualitative assessment instead of 
numerical scoring for these categories will be  provided. Also, consis tency of scoring was 
addressed.  
- Regulation of hexamine fuel tablets: DG EN TR underlined that sett ing concentration limit 
on hexamine fuel tablets would have consider able negative effects on the SME producing it, 
as well as on other SMEs producing model stea m engines and toys  us ing these tablets as a 
fuel. It was agreed that a propor tional solution needs to be found.  
- Issues related to impacts on fundamental rights,  esp. considerations and assessments of right 
to property, correct representation of terrorist attacks, and considerations related to licensing schemes. These comments were taken on board by the contractor for the finalisation of the 
report.  
After the meeting, comments were also received from the Data protection unit of DG JLS and 
were also incorporated into the final ve rsion of the impact assessment report.  
Next steps:  
- submission of final report by th e contractor on 22 February 2010 
- preparation of the impact assessment by 25 March 2010  - submission of the impact assessment on 28 March 2010 - IAB 28 April 2010  - Meeting of the Stranding Committee on Prec ursors on 10 March 2010 (to share research 
results and discuss concentration limits)  
EN 43   EN  
ANNEX 3: LIST OF PRIVATE SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS IN THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
PRECURSORS  
Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) 
ARKEMA 
Carrefour 
Chemical Business Association 
Downstream Users of Chemicals Co-ordination Group (DUCC) 
ESBIT Compagnie GmbH 
EuroCommerce 
Euromines 
European Aerosol Federation (FEA) 
European Association of Ch emical Distributors (FECC) 
European Association of Mining Industries (Euromines) 
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 
European DIY-Retail Association (EDRA) 
European Fertilizer Blen ders Association (EFBA) 
European Fertilizer Manuf acturers Association (EFMA) 
Federation of European Expl osives Manufacturers (FEEM) 
Haifa Chemicals 
EN 44   EN Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI) 
Wilhelm Schroeder GmbH + Co. KG 
WilmerHale 
Yara International 
 
EN 45   EN ANNEX 4: OVERVIEW OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACK AND INTENDED ATTACKS WITH 
EXPLOSIVES IN EUROPE  
 
Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
2004 
Onwards Revolutionary 
Struggle-
Extreme Left Greece: Various, 
predominantly banks, 
police stations and 
Government buildings Not public Achieved: Over the years Revolutionary 
Struggle, or Epanastati kos Agonas, has launched 
various attacks with IEDs against banks, police 
stations and Government buildings. These 
extreme left elements are believed to have 
emerged from remnants of the N 17 terrorist 
organisation. 
January 2004 AQ-‘Chechen’ 
Network based 
around 
Benchallali 
Family France: Russian 
Embassy Paris  Not public Planned: Arrest of Islamist extremists linked to 
Benchallali Family, who we re planning to utilise 
IED’s and non-conventional weapons to attack 
the Russian Embassy in Paris.  
February 2004 AQ Network Italy: Milan Subway 
& Church in Cremona Not public Planned: Arrest of Islamist extremists planning 
bomb attacks against the Milan Subway and a 
historic church in Cremona. 
February- 
March 2004 AQ Network 
(Operation Crevice) United Kingdom: 
Ministry of Sound nightclub, London 
and Bluewater 
Shopping Complex, 
Kent ANFO: ammonium 
nitrate and Fuel Oil  
(ANFO) combined to 
create a powerful 
‘shifting’ explosive. Planned: A cell of extremists with contacts to 
the LeT, were arrested in possession of half a 
ton of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which they 
had purchased from an ag ricultural supplier, and 
kept in a storage unit in West London. The 
group were also in possession of aluminium 
powder to help facilitate an effective explosive, 
and some had received training in Malakand on 
the Pakistani-Afghan border.   
11 March 
2004 GICM – AQ 
Network  Spain: Rail trains 
around Atocha 
Station, Madrid Goma 2 Echo 
commercial quarrying 
explosive  Achieved: A group of extremists exploded ten 
bombs, comprising Goma 2 Echo commercial 
quarrying explosive initia ted by mobile phones, 
on commuter trains coming into Madrid’s 
Atocha station during the morning rush hour. 
This killed 191 people and wounding around 
1,841, but it is believed the plan was for the 
bombs to explode simultaneously inside the 
Station itself, which would have led to far higher 
losses. The attack was timed days before the 
Spanish election, and contributed to the 
withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq, 
following the election of the Socialist Party. 
April 2004 ETA- Basque 
Nationalist Spain: Madrid, 
Campo de Naciones  Not public Attempted: A lorr y bomb was stopped travelling 
into Madrid, and its drivers arrested. It was 
believed it was planned by ETA to target the 
Campo de Naciones to disrupt Spain’s 2012 
Olympics bid.    
June/ July 
2004  Hofstad Group- 
AQ Network Netherlands: Schipol 
Airport, AIVD HQ, 
The Hague, Not public Planned: The arre st of a group of Islamist 
extremists, linked to  the Hofstad Group, 
uncovered a conspiracy to target venues in the 
Netherlands. One of the group’s members, 
Mohammed Bouyeri, later killed Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Though later 
released due to lack of evidence, a number were 
EN 46   EN Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
re-arrested in October 2005 for a further 
conspiracy to bomb targets in Holland. 
August 
2004 AQ  Network 
(Operation 
Rhyme) United Kingdom and 
United States Not public Planned: Following the arrest of an AQ member 
in Pakistan, information was obtained regarding 
a conspiracy in the UK to construct and use 
IEDs and non-conventional attacks. A series of 
arrests followed in London, Luton and the North 
of England. 
September 2004  AQ Network Spain: Barcelona, the 
Mapfre Tower and 
nearby Hotel Arts  Not public Planned: Ten extr emists from Barcelona were 
found to be in possession of false papers, drugs, 
and what appeared to be a reconnaissance video 
of their potential target. 
November 
2004 Hofstad Group- 
AQ Network Netherlands Not public Planned: The arrest of members of the group 
linked to the murder of Theo van Gogh 
uncovered preparations for multiple bomb 
attacks and assassinations across Holland. 
July 2005 Hofstad Group- 
AQ Network Netherlands Not public Planned: A young Anglo-Dutch national linked 
to the Hofstad Group was arrested in possession 
of home-made explosives.   
7 July 2005 AQ Network 
(Operation 
Theseus) United Kingdom: 
Three Underground 
Carriages at Aldgate, 
Kings Cross, and 
Edgeware Road, and a 
bus in Tavistock 
Square TATP: Triacetone 
triperoxide created 
from crystals collected 
following the 
evaporation of 
concentrated 
hydrogen peroxide, 
acetone and sulphuric 
acid Achieved: A cell of three extremists and another 
extremist with links to Kashmiri separatist 
groups, exploded four TATP  bombs contained in 
their rucksacks, three aboard tube trains and the 
fourth on a bus. The attacks were timed to 
coincide with the morning rush hour and 
consequently, 52 people were killed and 
hundreds injured.  
21 July 
2005 AQ Network 
(Operation 
Vivace)  United Kingdom: 
London Tube and Bus 
transport networks Suspected TATP: 
Triacetone triperoxide Attempted: A group of extremists attempted to 
launch a copycat of the 7/7 attacks, but while 
their detonators worked, they failed to initiate 
the main charges, injuring only themselves. All 
four were convicted and given lengthy 
sentences.  
26 
September 
2005 GIA-GSPC-AQ 
Network France: DST HQ, 
Orly Airport, Paris 
Metro Not public Planned: Arrest of  nine Islamist extremists 
linked to the GSPC, who were preparing to 
attacks on the DST headquarters, Orly Airport 
and the Paris Metro.  
October 2005 AQ –‘Bosnian’ 
Network Denmark: Various 
‘Western’ Targets. Not public Planned: Arrest of multi-national group of 
extremists, with links to Bosnia. At Bosnian end, 
arrests recovered explosiv es, a suicide vest and 
weaponry. Group known to have links with 
other extremists in Denmark and Bosnia. 
November 
2005 GSPC-AQ 
Network Italy & Abroad Not public Planned: Arre st of extremists believed to have 
been planning attacks in Italy and abroad, 
possibly against a Synagogue in Oslo, Norway.  
April 2006 AQ Network Italy: Milan Subway 
& Church in Bologna Not public Planned: Islamist extremists were arrested 
and/or deported as they were believed to be 
planning attacks near the time of the 
forthcoming Ital ian elections.  
EN 47   EN Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
July 2006 Fatah al Islam Germany: Dortmund 
& Koblenz Trains Propane21: Use of 
Propane Gas canister 
with Primary 
fragmentation/ Lethality 
enhanced by nails-
shrapnel. Attempted: Two students associated with Fatah 
al Islam, an affiliate group of AQ attempted to 
detonate bombs on passe nger trains between 
Dortmund and Koblenz, which failed to detonate 
due to poor construction.  
August 
2006 AQ Network 
(Operation 
Overt)  United Kingdom: 
Multiple trans-
Atlantic aircraft Peroxide based 
explosive  in liquid-gel 
format, which was to be smuggled on board the 
targeted jet aircraft 
disguised as bottles of 
soft drink. Planned: Arrests of a number of Islamist 
extremists for involvement in a conspiracy to 
bring down ten trans-Atlantic airliners with homemade IEDs. These were  to be constructed 
with explosive gel/ liquid explosives, which they 
intended to smuggle aboard. Associated searches 
led to the recovery of bomb making chemicals 
and martyrdom videos.  
September 
2006 AQ Network Denmark 1. ANFO: ammonium 
nitrate and Fuel Oil 
(ANFO). 
 
2. TATP: Triacetone 
triperoxide.  Planned: Subsequent s earches following arrests 
of the cell recovered Home Made Explosive 
(HME) with both ANFO and TATP. 
September 2006 AQ Network Norway: Oslo 
Synagogue and US and Israeli Embassies 
(Not a Member State) Not public Planned: Four extr emists were arrested while 
conspiring to launch IED attacks against a synagogue and embassies in Oslo. 
30 December 
2006 ETA- Basque 
Nationalist  Spain: Barajas 
Airport, Madrid Not public Achieved: Although formally under a ceasefire, 
ETA placed a large car bomb in a car park at the 
airport, killing two Ecuadorian workers and 
causing significant damage.  
2007 PCC – Extreme 
Left Italy  Not public Achieved: Two attacks were completed due to 
Italy’s ‘imperialism and contribution to the 
NATO strategy’.  
5 March 2007  Revolutionary 
Front for 
Communism- 
Extreme Left  Italy: Milan Police 
station Not public Attempted: An IE D discovered outside a Milan 
police station, was claimed by the Revolutionary 
Front due to arrests of  fellow activists.  
29 -30 June 
2007 AQ Network 
(Operation 
Segram) United Kingdom: 
London nightclubs & 
Glasgow Airport Propane22: Use of 
Propane Gas canister 
with Primary 
fragmentation/ Lethality 
enhanced by nails-
shrapnel. These were to 
be triggered by mobile 
phone/detonators. 
 Attempted: Seven Islamists arrested, with a 
further linked arrest in Australia.  A group of 
predominantly Iraqi medically trained extremists 
(seven doctors and a medical technician), 
attempted to car bomb  ‘Tiger-Tiger’ nightclub, 
Haymarket  in Central London on 29th June, 
with another  VBIED in Cockspur Street. 
However, these failed to explode. The following 
day, as police investigated the attacks and began closing in on the cell, they launched a vehicle 
borne suicide attack of Glasgow airport, again 
using propane gas canisters and nails. Although 
                                                 
21  Whilst this does not fall within the scope of precursors, it illustrates the use of ‘household’ substances 
for terrorist attacks. 
22  Ibidem. 
EN 48   EN Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
the vehicle caught fire, fatally burning one of the 
attackers, and causing minor injuries to airport 
and fire staff, these de vices failed to explode. 
July 2007 GICM-AQ 
Network Italy: Fiumicino 
Airport, Rome and 
targets in Milan TATP: Triacetone 
triperoxide Planned: Three Islamist extremists were arrested 
in Perugia, involved in a ‘training school’ 
leading to the recovery of precursors and 
equipment associated with the construction of 
IEDs. Reconnaissance material suggested 
possible targets included Rome airport and 
locations in Milan. 
4 September 2007 AQ Network 
(Glasvej Case)  Denmark TATP: Triacetone 
triperoxide Planned: Following the arrest of a cell of eight 
Islamist extremists, a quantity of precursors 
suitable for the fabrication of TATP were 
recovered (hydrogen peroxide & Acetone). One 
of those arrested had previously received 
training on the Pakistan-Afghan border.  
4 September 
2007 Uzbeck IJU Germany: Frankfurt 
Airport, Ramstein  
Airbase, and US 
military venues  TATP: Triacetone 
triperoxide Planned: Arrest of three extremists in 
Oberschledorn, linked to the IJU an affiliate 
group of AQ. Found in possession of around 
750kg of hydrogen peroxide, a key precursor for 
TATP construction. 
October 2007 Extreme Right 
Wing United Kingdom: 
Local Mosques. Homemade nail bombs, 
believed black powder: 
In many such extreme 
right cases, the 
individual is acting 
alone, or as part of a 
small conspiracy 
without a coordinated 
organisation, 
nevertheless there is 
increasing concern at 
the number or extreme 
right activists involved 
in construction of 
home-made explosives/ 
IEDs. Planned: Following the arrest and search of the 
home address of a known right wing extremist, a 
quantity of nail bombs were recovered. 
Paperwork at the location indicated that he 
intended to attack local mosques with these  
November 
2007 Animal Rights 
Extremist – 
Single Issue United Kingdom: 
Oxford University Incendiary bombs: 
Designed to burn 
fiercely rather than 
explode.  Achieved: incendiary devices destroyed the cars 
of two Oxford University Professors, involved in 
research using animals, while a third device 
failed to ignite. 
December 
2007 AQ Network Belgium Not public Planned: A group of fourteen Islamists were 
arrested planning to launch a prison jailbreak for 
Nizar Trabelsi, an AQ member imprisoned for a 
conspiracy to launch a VBIED attack on the 
NATO airbase at Kleine Brogel. 
2007-8 FLNC-Corsican 
Nationalist France: Corsica, 
predominantly 
targeted at buildings 
and property Not public Achieved: During the course of the year, around 
123 IED explosions occurred on the Island of 
Corsica, a decrease from the previous year. Most 
of these consist of small devices aimed at 
causing damage to buildings symbolic of French 
authority, such as Gendarmerie bases, town 
halls, post offices etc. Many are timed to 
explode in the middle of the night, to minimise 
the risk of casualties.  
EN 49   EN Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
2008 Revolutionary 
Struggle- 
Extreme Left Greece: Various  Not public Achieved: Throughout the course of the year, 
Revolutionary Struggle committed three terrorist 
attacks against a police station an international 
oil company building and a police bus.   
January 
2008 AQ Network Spain: Barcelona & 
International Not public Planned: The Spanish authorities arrested 
fourteen Islamist extremists in Barcelona, who 
were believed to be planning suicide bomb 
attacks in both their own ci ty and other cities in 
Europe.  
May 2008 ETA-Basque 
Nationalist Spain: Guardia Civil 
Barracks, Legutiano, 
Alava Province Not public Achieved: ETA activis ts used a VBIED to attack 
a barracks, killing one officer and causing 
serious damage. 
May 2008 AQ / 
Radicalised 
Individual 
Convert  United Kingdom: 
Restaurant in 
shopping centre, 
Exeter. Homemade IED: 
Caustic soda, drain 
cleaner and kerosene, 
with nails added to 
enhance fragmentation/ 
lethality Attempted: While preparing the devices, the 
individual, a mentally vulnerable convert to 
Islam, detonated one of his own devices. 
Consequently only succeeding in injuring 
himself before being arrested.  
2008-9 Criminals/ 
Dissident 
Republicans Ireland: Various cross 
border incidents  (e.g. 
certain urban drug 
related crime 
incidents) Criminal gangs use 
improvised pipe bombs 
both directly and as 
UVIEDs. These bombs 
mainly use black 
powder from fireworks 
and/or shotgun 
propellant as filling, and 
firework fuses for 
initiators. 
Dissident Republicans 
still have the capability 
to manufacture large 
scale IEDS such as car 
bombs and culvert 
mines using PIRA 
methods and precursors 
based mainly on 
ammonium nitrate 
fertilisers and sugar Attempted / achieved: Following the PIRA 
ceasefire of 1997 and "Good Friday" agreement 
of 1998, some Dissident Republicans in CIRA, 
RIRA and INLA may have been involved in 
selling technical bomb making expertise to 
increasingly violent city based drug gangs. 
A small number of Dissident Republican large 
scale IED attacks have been attempted in 
Northern Ireland since the ceasefire. 
31 July 
2009 ETA-Basque 
Nationalist  Spain: Palma, 
Mallorca – Guardia 
Civil Officers Not public Achieved: A UVIED placed under their vehicle 
killed two Guardia Civil officers in the tourist 
area of Palma, Mallorca. 
9 August  
2009  ETA- Basque 
Nationalist  Spain: Palma, 
Mallorca – Tourist 
Bars Not public Achieved: Three small bombs exploded in 
tourist café /Bars in Palma, Mallorca, following 
telephone warnings from ETA. These appear 
part of the organisation’s annual summer 
campaign to disrupt the Sp anish tourist industry. 
2 September 
2009 Revolutionary 
Struggle- 
Extreme Left Greece: Athens Stock 
Exchange & Ministry 
for Macedonia & 
Thrace Not public Achieved: Two bombs exploded on the same 
day, both preceded by warning phone calls. The 
first outside the Athens’ Stock Exchange injured 
a woman and caused seri ous damage, while the 
second was placed in a telephone kiosk outside 
the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace in 
Thessaloniki, again causi ng extensive damage. 
EN 50   EN Date/ Year Organisation/ 
Perpetrators Country/ Target 
Location Explosives/ Precursors 
Utilised  Planned/ Attempted / Achieved  
10 
September 
2009 Experimental 
behaviour by an 
individual, 
target unknown Poland: a small town 
called Zbaszynek Triacetone triperoxide, 
Hexamethylenetriperoxi
dediamine and others Achieved: explosion in garden allotments, 
causing the death of a 50 year old man who 
produced and tested several explosives in his 
garden. Forensics discovered about 2 kg HMTD 
and approximately 5 kg TATP as well as 10 kg 
of a mixture of TNT, RDX and hexolite. 
Abbreviations used: 
1. AQ: al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
2. CIRA: Continuation Irish Republican Army = Dissident Iris h Republican terrorist group which emerged following the 
2nd PIRA ceasefire of 1997 and the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ agreement. 
3. DST: Direction du Surveillance du Territoire = French Domestic Intelligence agency, now part of DCRI.  
4. ETA: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna. Basque Fatherland and Freedom = Basque separatist terrorist organisation. 
5. FLNC: Frontu di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu. National Front for the Liberation of Corsica = Original Corsican 
Nationalist separatist terrorist group, from wh ich numerous splinter groups have emerged. 
6. GIA: Groupe Islamique Arme. Islamic Army Group = Algerian Islamist terrorist organisation. 
7. GICM: Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain. Morocc an Islamic Combat Group= Moroccan and North African 
Islamist terrorist organisation with links to the AQ network.  
8. GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Co mbat. Salafist Group for Prayer & Combat, now Al-Qaida au 
Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) = Algerian & North African Isla mist terrorist organisation which emerged from the GIA 
and is part of the AQ network. 
9. IED: Improvised Explosive Device. 
10. INLA: Irish National Liberation Army = Irish Republican terro rist organisation which emerged from extreme elements 
within the Official Iris h Republican Army (OIRA). 
11. IJU: Islamic Jihad Union. Uzbek splinter group from the Is lamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), believed an affiliate to 
the al-Qaeda terrorist network.  
12. LeT: Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Army of the Righteous = Kashmi ri Islamist terrorist group linked to the AQ network. 
13. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
14. PIRA: Provisional Republican Army = Mainstre am Irish Republican terrorist organisation. 
15. PCC: Partito Comunista Combatente (PCC). Communist Combatant Party = Extreme Left Italian organisation. 
16. RIRA: Real Irish Republican Army = Dissident Irish Re publican terrorist group which emerged following the 2nd PIRA 
ceasefire of 1997 and the 1998 ‘Good Friday’ agreement. 
17. UVIED: Under-Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device. 
18. VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device.  
 
EN 51   EN ANNEX 5: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN HOUSEHOLD AND OTHER DOWNSTREAM USE OF 
PRECURSORS  
 
Precursor 
group Chemical Main household use low 
concentrations Main household use high 
concentrations 
Ammonium 
nitrate Fertiliser mixtures 
Biological testing kits Printing ink cartridges Fertiliser mixtures 
Potassium nitrate Fertiliser mixtures 
Toothpastes 
Herbicides 
Disinfectants 
Corrosion inhibitors Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation 
Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Gun powder 
Fireworks Signal flares 
Photographic printing 
Sodium nitrate Fertiliser mixtures Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Signal flares 
Nitrates / Nitrogenous fertilizers 
Calcium nitrate Fertiliser mixtures Fertiliser mixtures 
Food preservation 
Tree stump remover, component 
of rodenticides 
Hydrogen peroxide Hair bleaching, dying or fixing of 
hair perm 
Tooth bleaching 
Cleaning (toilet cleaners and dishwashing detergents) 
Textile bleaching (an additive for 
washing) 
Disinfection of wounds, mouth 
and eye contact lenses Dermatological treatments 
Hydroponics gardening Hair bleaching, dying or fixing 
of hair perm 
Disinfection of wounds, mouth 
and eye contact lenses Propellant for amateur rockets 
Hydrogen peroxide and 
acetone 
Acetone 
(propanone) Domestic solvent (superglue 
remover, nail polish remover, 
household cleaner) Thinning fibreglass resins, 
epoxies, polyester resins, vinyl & 
adhesives Degreaser 
Surface aging product Domestic solvent (superglue 
remover, nail polish remover, 
household cleaner)  
Nitromethane Building and construction 
products Carpet cleaner Fuel and fuel additive for racing 
cars, boats, amateur rockets and models 
Superglue remover 
Special solvent 
Nitro-methane and hexamine 
Hexamine 
(methenamine) Fungicides 
Turbidity standard 
Shampoo / hair product Solid fuel tablets for camping 
stoves, toys and models 
Strong acids Nitric acid Hobby metalworking 
Nitrating agent for home pyrotechnics, cleaning, etc.  
 Tin stripper 
Disinfectant Pool cleaning 
Specialist cleaning 

EN 52   EN Precursor 
group Chemical Main household use low 
concentrations Main household use high 
concentrations 
Hydrochloric acid Brick, drain & toilet cleaners 
Building and construction 
products  Brick, drain & toilet cleaners 
Specialist cleaning 
Swimming pool and fish tank pH adjuster 
Cleaning products / descalants 
Sulphuric acid Cleaner for drains, toilets, bricks 
& metals Cleaner for drains, toilets, bricks 
& metals 
Battery acid Car and other lead acid batteries 
Rust remover 
Swimming pool and fish tank pH 
adjuster 
Sodium chlorate Bleacher 
Cleaning products Pesticide / herbicide 
Metal treatment 
Sodium perchlorate Bleacher Fireworks 
Signal flares Smoke flares 
Gun powder 
Potassium 
chlorate Insecticide smoke   
Chlorates and 
perchlorates 
Potassium 
perchlorate  Bird chaser 

EN 53   EN ANNEX 6: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE "MYSTERY SHOPPING " EXERCISE 
CONDUCTED IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY STUDY INFORMING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
(PER PRECURSOR )  
 
Precursor group Chemical  
Ammonium nitrate 
Potassium nitrate 
Sodium nitrate 
Nitrates / 
Nitrogenous fertilizers 
 Calcium nitrate 
Urea In nearly all Member States, purchas es of high concentration levels 
can only be made by a non-household or professional user. Only in Romania, Poland and Belgium it was possible to purchase nitrates 
with a high concentration level as a household user. In one 
additional case it was possible to purchase as a consumer by 
providing the details of a third party’s company (this was openly 
mentioned and accepted). 
When placing the order, it was in all cases compulsory to provide 
details of the company / individua l purchasing the product. The level 
of detail to be provided however varied, from the requirement to 
formally prove the company’s registration with a professional 
business registrar to simply providing the company’s tax (VAT) 
code. 
Hydrogen peroxide In most Member States, hydrogen peroxide can be purchased in an 
unlimited quantity up to a concentration level of 35% through retail 
channels. In a number of cases, it was sold in units containing a 
high quantity, i.e. from 1 to 5 lit res. Other downstream sellers often 
required some form of identificat ion, even though this could be 
circumvented. Hydrogen peroxide and acetone 
Acetone 
(propanone) Acetone is also widely available from retail channels in nearly all 
countries. The average unit quantity available varies but seems to 
go up to 1 litre. In some Member States, some proof of identification 
is required for purchasing high quant ities, While in at least two 
others it was possible to order up to 100% concentration level in 
unlimited quantities. 
Nitromethane High concentration levels of nitromethane were not easy to find on 
retail. In one Member State it was possible to order an unlimited 
quantity of superglue breaker and in  another country it was possible 
to obtain an unlimited quantit y of model engine fuel. Nitro-methane and 
hexamine 
Hexamine 
(methenamine) Hexamine fuel tablets could be ordered in a practically unlimited 
quantity, upon provision of contac t details. Pure hexamine was only 
sold upon provision of company details / tax code. 
Nitric acid 
Hydrochloric acid Strong acids 
Sulphuric acid Access to high concentration levels of strong acids was possible in 
all countries from retailers, as well as from wholesalers and 
specialist end user sellers. Strong acids with high concentrations are 
openly on sale in garden centres and hardware / DIY shops, as 
drain cleaner, metal treatment product, etc While in some Member 
States, non-retail sellers asked for contact details and tax codes, it 
was relatively easy to circumvent these or negotiate the use of the 
details of a third professional party.  
Sodium chlorate 
Sodium perchlorate 
Potassium chlorate 
Chlorates and 
perchlorates 
Potassium 
perchlorate Chlorates and perchlorates are far less available to the general 
public in retail. Wholesalers, distributors and specialist end user 
sellers in the countries addressed only sold to registered companies 
and not to individuals. In one country, it was possible to purchase an 
unlimited quantity of weed killer in one garden centre with 60% 
sodium chlorate, While several other shops had indicated that such 
product was banned. In another Member State it was possible to 
order an unlimited quantity of pure potassium perchlorate, upon the 
provision of contact details. 

EN 54   EN ANNEX 7: CALCULATION OF THE LOSS TO CONSUMERS , BUSINESSES AND OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS  - METHODOLOGY  
Introductory comment on the assumpti ons underlying the cost estimates  
The assumptions for the theoretical model to ca lculate the loss to c onsumers are based on 
standard economic theory. In order to be  able to dimension the problem, certain 
simplifications were necessary, notably an  assumption of a linear  demand curve. The 
baseline data concerning the quantity bought a ssumed that the price elasticity was related 
to that specific quantity and assumed a linear demand curve. 
The estimation models for the calculation of  the loss to consumers, businesses and 
administrative costs had to take into account th at the data needed for the calculation in an 
ideal case (e.g. reliable, up-to-date and comp rehensive on the number of traders selling 
the substances of concern in the respective c oncentrations, or data on the basis of which 
administrative costs would be more precisely specified), are not available or even do not 
exist. Notwithstanding this fact, the estima tions followed existing approaches taken from 
comparable assessments (e.g. in the case of th e estimate of administrative costs) and 
worked with the best available data, coll ected from respected databases (notably 
Prodcom) or obtained directly from relevant pr ivate sector stakeholders and associations. 
The empirical assumptions and calculations were  available for review and discussions to 
the public authority- as well as private sector  stakeholders (as explained in the main body 
of the impact assessment), and corrections suggested by these were incorporated. No 
objections or critique were raised to th e final version of the calculations.   
Annex 7 explains the steps undertaken to estimate the respective costs.  
Annex 8 provides yet more details on the nu merical assumptions and inputs into the 
estimation models.   
Calculation of the loss to consumers (consumer surplus) 
To monetise the costs to consumers from th e general public from not being able to buy 
anymore the products they preferred, we first need to outline the total ’consumer surplus’ 
associated with the products in question. To tal consumer surplus is the aggregate of 
individual consumer surpluses, i.e. th e difference between the maximum price a 
consumer who has bought a specific product would have been willing to pay for the 
given quantity and the actual price he had to pay. If this difference were small, the loss to 
the consumer in case the product were not av ailable anymore – bei ng about indifferent 
whether to spend the given amount on mone y on the product in question or on others – 
would be similarly small. If the difference were big, a huge consumer surplus would be 
lost in case of a full or partial ban. 
EN 55   EN In graphical 
representation, the total consumer surplus equals the area below the demand curve between zero and actual consumption (Q
0) 
minus the area of the rectangle between the origin and the intersection of actual consumption and price (Q
0, P 0), which 
equals the total consumption expenditure spent on the product (see 
Error! Reference source 
not found. ). 
However, market data only provides historic  consumer expenditure, and not the shape of 
the demand function. By the purchasing de cision they have taken consumers were 
’revealing’ their preference for a given quantit y of the product at the given price, but not 
what they would have been willing to pay otherwise. 
Therefore, we have constructed simple linear  demand curves for the product categories in 
question for certain groups of consumer pr oducts. Our choice of a linear demand curve is 
arbitrary. Error! Reference source not found.  also depicts two alternative demand 
curves. The first is a constant price elasticity demand curve ( ε = const.). The second, 
proposed by Kimball  (1995) is one with a price elasti city which is a function of the 
relative price level itself. The ratio of current and baseline actual demand is expressed in the two models as follows: 
  
;   Constant elasticity model: 
 .   Kimball: 
  (1) 
These demand curves are often used and analysed in economic literature, but they – 
rather counter-intuitively – do not intersect with the Y-axis, i.e. demand will not sink to zero at any given price. Because of this, a nd for reasons of simplicity, we opted for the 
use of a linear demand curve. 
The estimations of the demand curve are based on a typical price elasticity ranges, 
obtained from economic studies, taking into account the ease of substituting them with alternatives (e.g. strong acids as household detergents can be relatively easily replaced) 
and their eventual ’complemen tary product’ nature (e.g. relatively cheap hexamine solid 
fuel tablets complement more valuable mode l steam engines or tracking kits, the price 
sensitivity of consumers is assumed therefore to be rela tively low). For a practical 
example, when the price elasticity is assumed to be 2, this means in simple terms that a 
1% increase in price would yield a 2% d ecrease in sales. Correspondingly, for a 100% 
decrease of sales (the intersection point with  the Y-axis), a 50% pr ice increase would be 
necessary. The total consumer surplus (the ar ea of the triangle) would in this case be Figure 4.1 The demand cu rve and consumer surplus 
Demand 
curve (linear)
Qma xConsumer 
surplus
Q0P0Pmax
Total  expenditure
(total sales)
Quantity bought/soldPrice
D emand curve 3 
(Kimball’s)
Demand curv e 2 
(constant price 
elasticity)
 
EN 56   EN simply calculated by multiplying the total sales volume of the chemical (in the baseline 
period) by 50%, and dividing this result by two. 
Typical price elasticity ranges for consum er products vary widely between products, 
depending on the nature of the product. Generally, products which do not have 
satisfactory alternatives concerning the speci fic use they are bought for, and they are 
relatively important for the consumer, tend to have a low price elasticity. Such products – 
for example – may be subject to habitual c onsumption with high bra nd loyalty (specialty 
food), have an addictive character (cigar ettes), may be complementary products of 
something more valuable (fuel, batteries),  or be otherwise high-involvement products 
(healthcare, persona l care products).  
Tellis (1988), analysing market studies on 220 different branded consumer products, 
found a typical range of about 1 to 3, with sli ght variations acro ss product categories.23 In 
Dossche  et al (2006) macroeconomic study estimates ranging from 3 to 20 are collected. 
For cigarettes, an addictive and habitual pr oduct, the World Bank in its meta-analysis has 
reported price elasticities of between 0.4 and 1.24 For gasoline, a fully complementary 
product (of motor vehicles, that is) with bare ly any good alternative, the average estimate 
for long-run price elasticity is 0.64, as  assessed by Goodwin et al (2004). 
Our assumptions for the price elasticity range s concerning the most frequent uses of the 
precursors by the general public are summarised in the following table. 
Table 7.1 Price elasticity assumptions (most significant product categories) 
 
Product category Assumed price 
elasticity Comments 
Nitrate-based retail fertilisers and other consumer products 
Ammonium nitrate based 
fertilisers 2 – 4 Alternatives generally exist (e.g. urea, other 
straight-nitrogen fertilisers). 
Alkali nitrate fertilisers 2 – 4 Widely available alternatives. 
Alkali nitrate food preservatives 1 – 2 Alternatives are available. 
Hydrogen peroxide products 
Hair and tooth bleaching produc ts 0.5 – 1.5 Some alternatives exist to hydrogen peroxide but 
are not yet widely used. Personal care products are 
normally high-involvement goods. 
Household cleaning products (drain cleaner, dishwashing 
detergents) 2 – 4 Widely available alternatives. 
Textile bleaching products 2 – 4 Widely available alternatives. 
Pool and fish tank disinfectants 0.5 – 1.5 Alte rnatives (chlorine-based products) exist but are 
not traditionally used in certain countries (France). 
                                                 
23  The main product categories and their typi cal price elasticity were: pharmaceuticals (1.12), 
toiletries (1.38), food (1.65), durable goods (2.03), detergents (2.77). 
24  http://www1.worldbank.org/tobacco/book/html/chapter4.htm  
EN 57   EN Product category Assumed price 
elasticity Comments 
Pharmaceutical products, creams 
and antiseptic solutions 0.5 – 1.5 Suitable alternat ives are less available. 
Acetone products 
Nail polish removers, cosmetic 
solvents 0.5 – 1.5 Limited number of alternatives. Personal care 
products are normally high-involvement goods. 
Household cleaning products, superglue remover 1 – 2 Alternatives are available (e.g. ethyl acetate). 
Nitromethane 
Fuel and fuel additive for racing 
cars, boats, amateur rockets and 
models 0.3 – 0.7 Complementary product (‘top fuel’ for nitro-engines). 
No alternatives can produce similar combustion 
characteristics. Any alternative need to be a nitrogen-based fuel of an explosive nature. 
Hexamine 
Hexamine fuel tablets 0.3 – 0.7 Comp lementary product. Some imperfect 
alternatives exists for use in camping gear but not 
for use in toy models. 
Strong acids 
Domestic solvents, household detergents (included in drain 
cleaners etc.) 1 – 2  Available alternatives, even though some of these 
could be less effective. 
Battery acid (sulphuric acid) N/A Price elasticity  is virtually infinite as it is an essential 
component in car and other motor vehicles batteries. 
Chlorates and perchlorates 
Specialty products N/A Only a very lim ited market exists for the products in 
question. 
 
  Table 7.2 Estimated loss to consumers (consumer surplus lost) if products were not available any more (by thresholds) 
The baseline data, i.e. concerning the quantity  bought, assume that the price elasticity 
was related to that specific quantity and assu med a linear demand curve. On that basis the 
consumer surplus was calculated. It is potential ly contestable, as it is perhaps simplistic, 
but it was the only way to dimension this pr oblem. The particular approach taken is 
based on standard macro-economic theory. 
 
Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold 
%) 
Most significant 
consumer products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
Ammonium nitrate 
(fertiliser) (16% N from 
AN) 380-530 26-59 350-480 63-89 4-10 58-80 
EN 58   EN Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold 
%) 
Most significant 
consumer products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
High-concentration AN-
fertilisers 13-26 13-26 - 2-4 2-4 - 
Component in mixtures 52-1 60 10-33 38-132 9-27 2-6 6-22 
Component in retail 
fertilisers: tablets or 
similar 310-350 - 310-350 52-58 - 52-58 
Sodium nitrate (8% N 
from nitrate) 6-18 2-5.5 4-12 1- 4 0.5-1.5 1-2 
Component in mixtures 5-14 0.9-2 4-12 0.8-2.3 0.2-0.3 0.7-2 
Food preservative 
(100%) 1-3.5 1-3.5 - 0. 3-1.2 0.3-1.2 - 
Potassium nitrate (8% 
N from nitrate) 30-83 6-15 23-70 5-14 1-3 4-12 
Component in mixtures 29-79 5-11 23-70 5-13 0.8-1.8 4-12 
Food preservative 
(100%) 1-3.5 1-3.5 - 0. 3-1.2 0.3-1.2 - 
Calcium nitrate (8% N 
from nitrate) 31-85 5-12 25-75 5-14 1-2 4-13 
Component in mixtures 
and CN AN double salt 31-85 5-12 25-75 5-14 0.8-2 4.2-12.5 
Hydrogen peroxide  
(12% H 2O2) 1,750-
2,900 130-250 1,650-
2,700 710-1,170 29-70 680-1,100 
Hair and tooth bleaching 
products 1,085-
1,720 13-53 1,070-
1,680 543-860 7-27 535-840 
Household textile 
bleaching products 86-114 86-114 - 14-19 14-19 - 
Household cleaning 
products (drain cleaner, 
dishwashing detergents 
etc.) 442-743 17-58 400-720 74-124 3-10 67-120 
Pool and fish tank 
disinfectants 10-30 10-30 - 5-15 5-15 - 
Pharmaceutical 
products, creams and 
antiseptic solutions 150-300 - 150-300 75-150 - 75-150 
Acetone Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 
Nail polish removers, 
cosmetic solvents, 
household cleaning 
products, solvents 
(superglue remover) and 
other consumer products Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 
Nitromethane (30%)  55-110 33-88 22-55 55-110 33-88 22-55 
EN 59   EN Estimated value of consumer 
products (€ million) Estimated consumer surplus (lost) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold 
%) 
Most significant 
consumer products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
Racing car fuel (‘top fuel’ 
for nitro-engines)  55-110 33-88 22-55 55-110 33-88 22-55 
Hexamine 3-9 
(110-220) 3-9 
(110-220) - 3-9 
(110-220) 3-9 
(110-220) - 
Solid fuel tablets 
(consumer market), with 
linked products 3-9 
(110-220) 3-9 
(110-220) - 3-9 
(110-220) 3-9 
(110-220) - 
Nitric acid (30%) 550-800 38-130 500-730 183-267 13-43 167-243 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish tanks 550-800 38-130 500-730 183-267 13-43 167-243 
Sulphuric acid (50%) 1,680-
2,570 90-330 1,580-
2,320 550-833 30-110 517-750 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish tanks 1,650-
2,500 90-330 1,550-
2,250 550-833 30-110 517-750 
Lead-acid batteries 35-70 - 35-70 - - - 
Hydrochloric acid 
(20%) 350-520 16-37 330-500 117-173 5-12 110-167 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish tanks 350-520 16-37 330-500 117-173 5-12 110-167 
Chlorates and 
perchlorates (40%) Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Specialty products Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal 
TOTAL 5,000-
7,800  450-1,150 4,500-
7,000 1,800-
2,900 230-560 1,600-
2,400 
* A minor overlap is possible between different precurso rs (fertilisers, household cleani ng products, personal care 
products etc.) 
 
Calculation of the loss to businesses (profit foregone) 
Looking at ‘producer surplus’ to establish what the potentia l loss for businesses would be 
in case of a restriction of the products in question would not fully  grasp the aggregate 
losses accruing to a multi-tiered system of suppliers along the value chain. Rather, one 
should best estimate the aggregate profit on th e product accruing to EU businesses in the 
entire supply chain. 
EN 60   EN Eurostat in its Structural Business Statistics section provides EU-wide data on average 
profit margins. The ‘gross operating surp lus / turnover’ indicator is 12.9% for 
manufacturers of chemicals and chemical products (DG24), 5.2% for wholesale (G51) 
and 7.0% for retail trade (G52) . The products generally sold to the general public usually 
have a value chain comprising of more than  more than one producer  (producer of base 
chemical, producer of formulated produc t or mixture), and eventually more 
wholesalers/repackager s or distributors. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that on average, the extra-EU import share for the 
end-user products (i.e. not the base chem icals) vary between 10 and 90%. We also 
assume that European business combined loses profits correspond ing to 33% of the 
consumer price for products fully manufactured  in the EU (wholesal e 5.2%, retail 6.6%, 
producers 21.2% in total) and wholesalers25 and retailers lose profit corresponding to 
11.8% of the consumer price for the im ported share (wholesale 5.2%, retail 6.6%). 
Table 7.3 Estimated loss to businesses if products were not available any more (by 
thresholds) 
 
Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold %) 
Most significant 
cons. products 
Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. 
Ammonium nitrate 
(fertiliser) (16% N) 380-
530 26-59 350-
480  116-166 7-18 107-149 
High-concentration AN-
fertilisers 13-26 13-26 - 10% 4-8 4-8 - 
Component in mixtures 52-160 10- 33 38-132 10% 16-49 3-10 12-41 
Component in retail 
fertilisers: tablets or similar 310-
350 - 310-
350 10% 96-108 - 96-108 
Sodium nitrate (5% N) 6-18 2-5.5 4-12  1.2-4 0.4-1. 1 0.8-2.4 
Component in mixtures 5-14 0.9-2 4-12 60% 1-3 0.2-0.4 0.8-2.4 
Food preservative (100%) 1-3.5 1-3.5 - 60% 0.2- 0.7 0.2-0.7 - 
Potassium nitrate (5% N) 30-83 6-15 23-70  4-11 1-2 3-10 
Component in mixtures 29-79 5-11 23-70 90% 4-11 0.7-1.5 3-10 
Food preservative (100%) 1-3.5 1-3.5 - 90% 0.1- 0.5 0.1-0.5 - 
Calcium nitrate (5% N) 31-85 5-12 25-75  6-17 1-2.4 5-15 
Component in mixtures 
and CN AN double salt 31-85 5-12 25-75 60% 6-17 1-2.4 5-15 
Hydrogen peroxide  
(12% H 2O2) 1,750-
2,900 130-
250 1,650-
2,700  550-900 39-79 500-834 
Hair and tooth bleaching 
products 1,085-
1,720 13-53 1,070-
1,680 10% 335-531 4-16 330-519 
                                                 
25  These might be producers.  
EN 61   EN Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold %) 
Most significant 
cons. products 
Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. 
Household textile 
bleaching products 86-114 86-114 - 10% 27-35 27-35 - 
Household cleaning 
products (drain cleaner, 
dishwashing detergents 
etc.) 442-
743 17-58 400-
720 10% 136-229 5-18 124-222 
Pool and fish tank 
disinfectants 10-30 10-30 -  3-10 3-10 - 
Pharmaceutical products, 
creams and antiseptic 
solutions 150-
300 - 150-
300 10% 46-93 - 46-93 
Acetone Multipl
e 
billion 
euros Multipl
e 
billion 
euros Multipl
e 
billion 
euros  Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 
Nail polish removers, 
cosmetic solvents, 
household cleaning 
products, solvents 
(superglue remover) and 
other consumer products Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 10% Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 
Nitromethane (30%)  55-110 33-88 22-55  11-22 7-18 4-11 
Racing car fuel (‘top fuel’ 
for nitro-engines)  55-110 33-88 22-55 60% 11-22 7-18 4-11 
Hexamine 3-9 
(110-
220) 3-9 
(110-
220) -  0.8-2.4 
(4-12 
per 
annum) 0.8-2.4 
(4-12) - 
Solid fuel tablets  
(consumer market) 3-9 
(110-
220) 3-9 
(110-
220) - 30% 0.8-2.4 
(4-12) 0.8-2.4 
(4-12) - 
Nitric acid (30%) 550-
800 38-130 500-
730  170-247 12-40 154-225 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 550-
800 38-130 500-
730 10% 170-247 12-40 154-225 
Sulphuric acid (50%) 1,680-
2,570 90-330 1,580-
2,320  521-795 28-102 490-718 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 1,650-
2,500 90-330 1,550-
2,250 10% 510-772 28-102 479-695 
Lead-acid batteries 35-70 - 35-70 30% 12-23 - 12-23 
EN 62   EN Estimated volume of 
consumer products (€ 
million) Estimated volume of losses 
to business (profit foregone) 
(€ million) Precursor (threshold %) 
Most significant 
cons. products 
Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. Assumed 
import 
share (end-
user 
products) Total Above 
thresh. Below 
thresh. 
Hydrochloric acid (20%) 350-
520 16-37 330-
500  108-161 5-11 102-154 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 350-
520 16-37 330-
500 10% 108-161 5-11 102-154 
Chlorates and 
perchlorates (40%) Minima
l Minima
l Minima
l  Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Specialty products Minimal Minimal Minimal 90% Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Grand total* 5,000-
7,800  450-
1,150 4,500-
7,000  1,500-
2,400 130-330 1,400-
2,100 
* A minor overlap is possible between different precurso rs (fertilisers, household cleani ng products, personal care 
products etc.) 
 
Administrative and substantive compliance costs 
Cost to businesses Given the complexity of the topic, the variety of products , sales channels and traders 
covered (as well as unavailability of data),  calculations were based on a simplified 
estimation model. This simple method of  approximating the administrative and 
substantive compliance costs occurring to bus inesses relates it to the turnover from the 
products concerned (i.e. not following th e Standard Cost Model for assessing 
administrative costs). 
As it is mostly retail that is  directly concerned by the pr eferred policy option, we focus 
on the costs of retail businesses.  Eurostat reports a cost share for the retail s ector for 2006 
of about 26% relative to  its turnover. The pr ofit margin was 6.6%. The share of personnel 
cost (which is normally affected by any administrative task) was 32% of the total 
production value of the sector (this roughly equates to the cost of sales figure above). 
We estimate that the additional administrative cost to businesses will range between 5-
20% percentage of the personnel cost of the totality of traders w ho sell the products in 
question, depending on the policy option (i.e. 0.4 2-1.67% of the total sales volume of the 
products). This is to be understood as an ongoing cost, although a one-off cost in 
connection with studying legislation, prep aring for implementation and informing 
customers and business partners will also be  involved (assumed to equal to about 10% of 
the relevant labour cost value). 
We also assume that annual compliance co sts (checking invent ories etc.) will be 
proportionate to the turnover of traders. Thes e will for most policy options also include a 
EN 63   EN significance one-off part and could be in the range of 10-30% of the sales-related 
personnel cost (i.e. 0.84-2.5% of the total sales volume of the products) for the traders of 
the product categories concerned (note that mo st obligations – main taining control over 
inventories, checks of customer s etc. – will need to be done for most of the options). A 
one-off cost of ca. 20% of the related staff cost will additionally occur: this involves 
initial checking of inventorie s, clients and procedures. 
Cost to public authorities 
As for the upkeep (compliance) costs of li censing and registration schemes incurred by 
public authorities, the figures are based on the estimates provided in the “Ad Hoc Study 
to be used in the Evaluation of the Commun ity Legislation on Drug Precursors” prepared 
by RPA for the Commission in February 2009. Th e key cost element in this regard was 
staffing cost. Data has been obtai ned from five Member States.  
Table 7.4 Staffing costs of the national  Competent Authority associated with 
licensing and registration (annually, in euro) 
 
Belgium Ireland Hungary Slovakia Sweden Average 
130,810 28,852 54,518 38,315 80,360 66,571 
Source: RPA Ad Hoc Study 
It is assumed for the purpose of this draft estimate that the rem uneration of the public 
administration staff and the overall staffing co sts in the public administrations (as the 
implementation of the measures will be by existing staff within existing national 
structures)is independent from the size of th e national market. It may be also largely 
independent from the exact number of subs tances to steward (the drug precursors 
legislation covers 23 "sche duled" substances and a furthe r 17 "non-scheduled" ones). 
Consequently, the total cost to  EU national authorities are approximated as 27 times the 
average value of the five national estima tes above, i.e. about €1.80 million annually. 
The same report provides some estimates fo r the cost incurring to public authorities 
processing notifications of suspicious transa ctions. The number of notifications in the 
case of drug precursors was relatively low,  about 300 annually, Total costs (staff and 
non-staff included) to national Competent Au thorities was estimat ed to be around 
€340,000 only. 
References 
Dossche, M.; Heylen, F.; Van den Poel, D (2006), The Kinked Demand Curve and Price 
Rigidity: Evidence from Scanner Data, Nati onal Bank of Belgium and SHERPPA, Ghent 
University. Available at: 
http://www.feb.ugent.be/soceco/sherppa/m embers/maarten/documents/paper3.pdf  
EN 64   EN Goodwin P., Dargay J., Hanly M. (2004), Elasticities of Road Traffic and Fuel 
Consumption with Respect to Price and Inco me: A Review. Transport Reviews, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 275–292, May 2004. Available at: 
http://www2.cege.ucl.ac.uk/ct s/tsu/papers/transprev243.pdf   
Tellis, G. (1988), "The Price Elasticity of  Selective Demand: A Meta-Analysis of 
Econometric Models of Sale s", XXV Journ. Marketing Res earch 331 at 337. Available 
at: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~tellis/pricesensitivity.pdf
 
EN 65   ENANNEX 8: ESTIMATES AND BACKGROUND CALCUL ATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT  
Table 8.1: Estimated EU market size of th e chemical precursors (base chemicals)  
The table was prepared by the company GHK, contractor of the preparatory study for the impact assessment.  
PRODCOM data (2008) Precursor 
 PRODCOM 
code Production 
volume Sold volume Value of 
sold volume Unit price Other sources, comments 
Ammonium nitrate 
(excluding in tablets or similar 
forms or in packages of a 
weight of <= 10 kg) 20153300 4,253 kt N 2,496 kt N €1,629 
million 653 €/t N Around 2,000-2,200 kt N of ammonium nitrate is 
sold (more is produced for own consumption) and 
used annually in European agriculture as a straight 
nitrogen fertiliser, according to EFMA estimates. In 
2006, this corresponded to about 19% of the total 
estimated consumption of 10,636 kt N of 
nitrogenous fertilisers. A small fraction of sales of 
AN goes to the mining and construction industries 
to be used as an explosive. 
Fertiliser mixtures including 
ammonium nitrate 20153400 
20153930 
20153960 1,753 kt N 1,652 kt N € 1,169 
million 708 €/t N AN is also often a component in fertiliser mixtures; 
overall, about 50-60% of the N content in these 
categories is estimated be come from ammonium 
nitrate. (CAN has been excluded from the analysis 
due to the desensitising effect of calcium 
carbonate. 
Total annual estimated consumption of AN as 
straight nitrogen fertiliser  is 2,020 kt N (€1,320 
million), and an additional 1, 000-1,200 kt N (€2,310 
million) is estimated to be used in commercial 
fertiliser mixtures, including an estimated 10% 
(around 20 kt; 6.7 kt N; €16  million) of the category 
‘Fertilizers in tablets or similar forms or in packages 
of a gross weight of <= 10 kg)’ (20157930), most 
easily available to the general public. In total, 
annual consumption of AN as fertiliser is estimated 
at 3,020-3,220 kt N ( €1,970-2,100 million).  
Sodium nitrate 20156000 12 kt N 38.6 kt N € 23 million 601 €/t Based on ComExt export and import data, net 
 
EN 66   ENPRODCOM data (2008) Precursor 
 PRODCOM 
code Production 
volume Sold volume Value of 
sold volume Unit price Other sources, comments 
import amounted to about 21.86 kt N in 2008, in a 
value of about €8.5 million euro.  
EFMA, in its submission to the SCP estimates the 
annual consumption of sodium nitrate as solid 
product (not only as fertiliser) in the EU at 30 kt N, 
PNA at 94 kt N (the average of estimates is 62 kt 
N, corresponding to ca. 37 million euro). 
Potassium nitrate 20157600 1.4 kt N 1.8 kt N* € 6 million* 3,399 €/t N*† Net import (ComExt) is about 345 kt N in a value of 
231.9 million euro. EFMA estimates consumption 
at 355 kt N, PNA at 346 kt N (average: 350 kt N; 
245 million euro). 
Calcium nitrate 20153400 44 kt N 39.9 kt N € 32 million 802 €/t N This PRODCOM code also includes the physical 
blend of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate, 
which is not known to be used as solid fertiliser. 
The net import in this product category was about 
115.28 kt N in a value of 24.0 million euro. 
The double salt of calcium nitrate and ammonium 
nitrate usually contains about 90% calcium nitrate 
and 10% ammonium nitrate. EFMA estimates the 
annual use of calcium nitr ate at 290 kt N, PNA at 
min. 274 kt N (average: 282 kt N, 226 million euro). 
Hydrogen peroxide 20136300 1,185 kt H 2O2 1,182 kt H 2O2 €490 million 414 €/t H 2O2 ComExt reports a net ex port of about 110 kt H 2O2 
(27.1 million euro). The H 2O2 sector group of 
CEFIC counts with about 1,000 kt H 2O2. The SCP 
annual report sets the market volume in the EU27 
at 930 kt H 2O2 (JRC estimates based on CEFIC 
figures set the consumption level at 670 kt for 1995 
for the EU15). The unit price in 2009 varies 
between 510-980 €/t H 2O2, according to Harriman 
Chemconsult. 
We use the sector group’s volume estimate and an 
average price of 700 €/t H 2O2, which corresponds 
to a value of about 700 million euro.  
 
EN 67   ENPRODCOM data (2008) Precursor 
 PRODCOM 
code Production 
volume Sold volume Value of 
sold volume Unit price Other sources, comments 
Acetone 20146211 1,581 kt  1,529 kt €1,093 
million 715 €/t Europe was a net exporter of acetone in 2008, in 
the magnitude of cca. 186 kt, in a value of 111.8 
million euro. We estimate on the basis of these 
data that the annual cons umption is around 1,350 
kt, in a value of 965 million euro. 
Nitromethane - - - - - In the US, production of nitromethane was 
estimated to be around 7.3 kt in 2001, which was 
supplemented by strong imports.26 We assume an 
annual EU consumption in the magnitude of 100 kt. 
The price for bulk racing fuel nitromethane 
currently moves around 3-4,000 €/t (can go up to 
10,000 €/t for retail products). Correspondingly, the 
total market size is estimated to be at around 350 
million euro. 
Hexamine - - - - - A JRC report estimated EU production for 2005 to 
be around 30 kt.27 The Scientific Committee on 
Health and Environmenta l Risks of DG SANCO set 
production at about 39 kt.’28 The net import of 
hexamine is estimated on the basis of ComExt 
data at about 3-4 kt. We estimate total 
consumption in Europe to be around 40 kt per 
annum. Chinese suppliers offer hexamine (FOB 
China) over the Internet for 1,000-1,500 USD per 
ton (ca. 700-1,100 €/t on), While the ComExt 
database signal unit prices of €835 and €1,038 per 
ton for 2008. Based on the above, we set the 
market size at 36 million euro.  
                                                 
26  Report on Carcinogens, Eleventh Edition, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Toxico logy Program January 
31, 2005. Available at: http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/eleventh/profiles/s123zntm.pdf   
27  http://ecb.jrc.it/classlab/1705a3_D_methenamine_RAR.doc  
28  http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scher/docs/scher_o_054.pdf  
 
EN 68   ENPRODCOM data (2008) Precursor 
 PRODCOM 
code Production 
volume Sold volume Value of 
sold volume Unit price Other sources, comments 
Nitric acid 20151050 6,074 kt N 
 917 kt N 
 €330 million 
 360 €/t N 
 PRODCOM data includes sulphonitric acids. Net 
export of nitric acid amounted to 109 kt N (5.9 m 
euro) in 2008. Total consumption, excluding own 
consumption, is estimated at 800 kt N in a value of 
288 million euro. 
Sulphuric acid 28070010 17,818 kt SO 2 9,580 kt SO 2 €687 million 72 €/t SO 2 According to ComExt, the European net export of 
sulphuric acid in 2008 was 2,416 kt SO 2, 
corresponding to 106.3 million euro. The European 
market size (excluding own consumption) is 
assumed to amount to ca. 7,150 kt SO 2, in a value 
of 515 million euro. 
Hydrochloric acid 20132413 6,014 kt HCl 3,051 kt HCl €253 million 83 €/t HCl Net export of hydrochloric acid was about 301 kt 
HCl in 2008, in a value of 12.9 million euro. EU 
consumption (excl. own c onsumption) is estimated 
at 2,750 kt HCl (228 million euro). 
Chlorates and perchlorates - - - - - The broader category ‘Chlorates and perchlorates; 
bromates and perbromates; iodates and 
periodates’ (PRODCOM code: 20133250), also 
including apart from sodium and potassium 
chlorates and perchlorates e.g. ammonium and 
barium perchlorate (these are also produced in 
significant amounts), added up to a quantity 555 kt 
in 2008. The total value of production was 266.7 
million euro. 
Total use of potassium chlorate and perchlorate is 
estimated in total at 30 kt per annum, consumption 
of sodium chlorate at 100 kt and of sodium 
perchlorate at 5 kt. The combined value of these 
four precursors may amount to about 65 million 
euro (at a unit price of ca. 480 €/t). 
* Data for 2007. † Unreliable estimate; ComExt data suggests a unit price of about 700 €/t N 
 
EN 69   ENTable 8.2: Assumptions to calculate the volume and value of products sold to the general public 
 
Estimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
Ammonium nitrate 
(fertiliser), excl. CAN 3,030-
3,230 kt N €1,970-
2,100 
million  44-100 kt N €380-530 
million  
High-concentration AN-
fertilisers (>=16% N from 
nitrates, see REACH 
regulation) 2,020 kt N €1,320 
million 1-2% 20-40 kt N €13-26 
million Estimated market size of base chemical based on 
EFMA data. 
The general public includes small subsistence and 
second-incom farmers and garden owners (used 
e.g. to fertilise lawns). The concentration levels 
they access are all above 16% but below or at 
around 28% (higher concentrations are not 
available to non-professional users).  
EFMA has confirmed the estimate given in the 
SCP annual report. The proportion is higher in 
some Member States and almost zero in others. 
Component in mixtures (e.g. 
UAN) 1,000-
1,200 kt N €650-780 
million  19-54 kt N €52-160 
million The overall estimate is based on Prodcom and 
EFMA data (on mixtures containing AN). The mixtures may contain 50% and up to 80% AN. 
Fertiliser blends >=16% N (from AN) 500-840 kt 
N €325-546 
million 1-2% 5-17 kt N €10-33 
million 
Fertiliser blends <16% N 300-600 kt  €195-390 4-7% 12-42 kt N €38-132 We assume products above the 16% threshold 
account for 50-70% of the total market of AN in 
fertiliser mixtures (in N-equivalent weight). 
                                                 
29  Average wholesale and retail margins are both assumed to be in the 30-40% range, so the retail  price will be 2-2.8x the produc er price. 
 
 
EN 70   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
N million million 
Component in retail 
fertilisers: tablets or similar 
(<16% N) 6.7 kt N €16 million 80% 164-185 kt 
(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) €310-350 
million Total volume of various commercial fertilisers 
containing AN sold was 205 kt in 2008, in a value 
of 161 million euro, according to the Prodcom 
database. It is assumed that ca. 80-90% of this is 
purchased by the general public. 
Sodium nitrate 62 kt N €37.3 
million  1.5-4 kt N €6-18 million  
Component in mixtures 53 kt N €31 million  1.5-4 kt N €5-14 million About 85% of the alkali nitrates are used as 
fertilisers, according to PNA. Ceramic, metal and 
photovoltaic industries together account for cca. 
10% of total consumption. 
Fertiliser blends >=8% N 37-42 kt N €22-25 
million 1-2% 0.4-0.8 kt N €0.9-2 million 
Fertiliser blends <8% N 11-16 kt N €6-9 million 10-20% 1-3 kt N €4-12 million We assume that about 70-80% of SN fertiliser 
blends sold are above the threshold. The 
remaining ingredients in the mix are assumed to 
have the same unit value by weight. Blends above 
the threshold are assumed to have an average 
concentration level of 10% N (about 61% SN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 36% SN).  
Food preservative (100%) 0.5 kt  N €0.3 million 3-5% 0.015-0.025 
kt N €1-3.5 million Maximum 1 kt N of SN and PN combined is used 
as food preservative (PNA data). It is assumed that 
SN counts for half of it and that 3% or maximum 
5% is sold to the general public. 
Retail prices may vary from €10 to 25 per kg of 
100% SN (0.165 kg N). 
Potassium nitrate 350 kt N €245 
million  8-22 kt N €30-83 
million Net import (ComExt) is about 345 kt N in a value of 
231.9 million euro. EFMA estimates consumption 
at 355 kt N, PNA at 346 kt N. 
Component in mixtures 298 kt N €208 million  8-22 kt N €29-79 
million About 85% of the PN is used as fertiliser (PNA 
estimate). Ceramic, metal and photovoltaic 
 
EN 71   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
industries together accoun t for cca. 10% of total 
consumption. 
Fertiliser blends >=8% N 238 kt N €166 million 1-2% 2-5 kt N €5-11 million 
Fertiliser blends <8% N 60 kt N €42 million 10-20% 6-18 kt N €23-70 
million We assume that ca. 70-80% of PN fertiliser blends 
sold are above the threshold. The remaining 
ingredients in the mix are assumed to have the 
same unit value by weight. Blends above the 
threshold are assumed to have an average 
concentration level of 10% N (about 72% PN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 43% PN). 
Food preservative (100%) 0.5 kt  N €0.4 million 3-5% 0.015-0.025 
kt N €1-3.5 million Maximum 1 kt N of SN and PN combined is used 
as food preservative (PNA data). It is assumed that 
PN counts for half of it and that 3% or maximum 
5% is sold to the general public. 
Retail prices may vary from €10 to 25 per kg of 
100% PN (0.139 kg N). 
Calcium nitrate 282 kt N € 226 
million  6-17 kt N €31-85 
million  
Component in mixtures 225 kt N €181 million  6-17 kt N €31-85 
million Based on Prodcom data. We assume that 80% of 
calcium nitrate is used as fertiliser.  This does not 
contain the double salt of calcium nitrate and 
ammonium nitrate. 
 
Fertiliser blends >=8% N 158-180 kt 
N €127-145 
million 1-2% 2-4 kt N €5-12 million 
Fertiliser blends <8% N 45-68 kt N €36-54 
million 10-20% 4-14 kt N €25-75 
million We assume that about 70-80% of CN fertiliser 
blends sold are above the threshold. The 
remaining ingredients in the mix are assumed to 
have the same unit value by weight. Blends above 
the threshold are assumed to have an average 
concentration level of 10% N (about 59% CN), 
blends below the threshold 6% N (about 35% CN). 
Hydrogen peroxide 1,000 kt €70 0  11-18 kt €1,750-2,900 Volume based on SCP report estimate and 
 
EN 72   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
H2O2 million H 2O2 million PRODCOM unit value data. This figure includes 
about 30% captive use (i.e. own consumption in 
chemical industry). The H 2O2 sector group 
estimates that from the remaining 70% of 
consumption, 50% go to pulp bleaching, 10% to 
manufacturing of chemical products. 2.5% is used 
in professional textile bleaching, 2.5% in waste 
water treatment and similar, and 5% miscellaneous 
(bleaching in food industry, manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, personal and household 
disinfectants, cleaning and bleaching products, 
drain and greenhouse pipe cleaners, aseptic 
packaging). 
Hair and tooth bleaching 
products 10 kt H 2O2 €7 million  55-85  kt 
(4-7 kt H 2O2) €1,085-1,720 
million According to information from the sector group, 
hair bleaching product constitute a significant part 
of the miscellaneous category. We estimate it to be 
around 1% of total use. 
>=12% H 2O2 1-2 kt H 2O2 €0.7-1.4 
million 10-20% 0.7-2.7 kt 
(0.1-0.4 kt 
H2O2) €13-53 
million 
<12% H 2O2 8-9 kt H 2O2 €5.6-6.3 
million 50-70% 53-84 kt 
(4-6 kt H 2O2) €1,070-1,680 
million Hair dying consumer products are normally sold in 
concentrations of 5-10% but there are some which 
are above this threshold. We estimate 80-90% are 
below threshold, with average concentration level 
of 7.5% and 10-20% above with average 
concentration level of 15%.  
We assume the majority (80-90%) of the higher 
concentration products are bought by professional 
hairdressers and 30-50% of the lower 
concentration products. The "mystery shopping" 
exercise identified unit prices of €10-40/kg (not 
conditional to concentration level). We calculate 
with an average of €20/kg. 
For comparison, under PRODCOM code 
20421700, sales from domestic production of ‘Hair 
 
EN 73   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
preparations (excluding shampoos, permanent 
waving and hair straightening preparations, 
lacquers)' sum up to €2,385 million (wider group 
and at producer price). 
Household textile bleaching 
products ( >=12% H2O2) 5 kt H 2O2 €3.5 million 60-80% 9-11 kt 
(3-4 kt H 2O2) €86-114 
million These concern products intended for household (or 
small-scale professional) use and are normally 
strong, up to 35% concentra tion level. Estimated at 
0.5% of total H 2O2 consumption. We assume 
households consume 60-80% of it. The unit price is 
estimated at €10/kg. 
Household cleaning products 
(drain cleaner, dishwashing 
detergents etc.) 5 kt H 2O2 €3.5 million  44-74 kt 
(3-4 kt H 2O2) €442-743 
million We estimate use to be around 0.5% of total H 2O2 
consumption. 
>=12% H 2O2 1-2.5 kt 
H2O2 €0.7-1.8 
million 50-70% 2-6 kt 
(0.5-2 kt 
H2O2) €17-58 
million 
<12% H 2O2 2.5-4 kt 
H2O2 €1.8-2.8 
million 80-90% 40-72 kt 
(2-4 kt H 2O2) €400-720 
million Many of these strong de tergents (ca. 20-50%) are 
above the 12% threshold. Average concentration 
level is estimated to be ca. 30% above and 5% 
below threshold. We assume 50-70% of above- 
and 80-90% of the below-thr eshold products is 
bought by households (the re st by caterers etc.). 
We assume an average product price of €10/kg, 
based on "mystery shopping". 
Pool and fish tank 
disinfectants ( >=12% H2O2) 5 kt H 2O2 €3.5 million 10-30% 1.5-4 kt 
(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) €10-30 
million Estimated at 0.5% of total H 2O2 consumption. 
These products are normally sold in concentrations 
of 35% (but can be more). It is not widely used in 
the EU by households (but popular e.g. in France). 
We estimate use by general public at 10-30% and 
unit price (based on "mystery shopping" results) at 
7 €/kg. 
Pharmaceutical products, 
creams and antiseptic 
solutions ( <12% H2O2) 10 kt H 2O2 €7 million 5-10% 10-20 kt 
(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) €150-300 
million Antiseptic solutions inclu de mouth, wound, contact 
lens disinfectants. Esti mated at 1% of total H 2O2 
consumption. Concentrations are low, usually 
around 3-7% (assumed average 5%). Most 
 
EN 74   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
pharma products are formulated but the general 
public can have access to diluted HP as wound, 
mouth or contact lens disinfectant. This may 
account to one tenth of use in this category. Based 
on our price review the es timated average price is 
set at €15/kg. 
Acetone 1,350 kt €965 
million   Multiple 
billion euros A notable proportion (5-10%) of acetone consumed 
in the EU is available to household users through a 
wide variety of products (although only low 
concentrations in some). Most significant of these 
are probably nail polish removers and other 
cosmetic solvents, as well as household cleaning 
products and solvents. 
Nail polish removers, 
cosmetic solvents, household 
cleaning products, solvents 
(superglue remover) and 
other consumer products 101 kt €72 million    It is not possible to dimension the volume and 
value of consumer produc ts that contain acetone. 
The products in question have huge, multi-billion 
markets and the concentr ation level of acetone 
contained in them strongly varies. We assume 5-
10% of all acetone in the EU is sold to general 
households directly or used to produce consumer 
products. 
Nitromethane 100 kt €350 
million  5-10 kt € 55-110 
million  
Racing car fuel (‘top fuel’ for 
nitro-engines)    5-10 kt € 55-110 
million It is estimated that only about 5-10 kt nitromethane 
is consumed by the general public, predominantly 
as racing fuel (another, more restricted use is as 
amateur rocket propellant).  
Some of the fuel is sold as additive (e.g. to add to 
methanol), some already in a ready-to-use mixture. 
Internet search pointed to price ranges for retail 
nitromethane fuel between 7-12 €/kg (in the 
"mystery shopping" exercise, we identified a 
 
EN 75   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
product for 11 €/kg – taken as an average price).  
>=30%    3-8 kt €33-88 
million 
<30%    1.5-5 kt €22-55 
million No information is available on the breakdown by 
concentration level. We assume 50-80% 
nitromethane is sold above the proposed 30/40% 
threshold (we have found products in 50-70% 
concentration, and often the pure form as an 
additive). 
Hexamine 40 kt €36 million  0.1-0.3 kt €3-9 million 
(€110-220 
mn)  
Solid fuel tablets 0.4-0.8 kt €0.36-0.72 
million 25-40% 0.1-0.3 kt €3-9 million 
(with linked 
products: 
€110-220 
mn) Around 1-2% of hexamine is sold as solid fuel 
tablets (measured in volume), the majority of which 
is sold to military and international organisations as 
field ration. Less than 1% of hexamine is available 
to the general public, nearly exclusively in the form 
of solid fuel tablets (Esbit is thte market leader in 
Europe with an estimated sales of 0.03-0.04 kt to 
the general public). The overall volume was 
estimated at 0.1-0.3 kt. 
Our "mystery shopping" exercise has identified 
cheaper products for about €10/kg and more 
expensive ones for €30-50/kg. We calculate with 
an average retail price of €30/kg. 
A range of consumer products depend on 
hexamine fuel tablets which can not or not easily 
substituted with other fuels (e.g. paraffin). Annual 
sales of stoves, coffe-makers and other outdoor 
equipment may account for an additional €3-9 
million. The value of model engines at households 
and schools rendered useless may reach the 
range of ca. €100-200 mn. 
 
EN 76   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
Nitric acid 800 kt N €288 
million  110-150 kt 
(3.5-3.7 kt N) €550-800 
million  
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 4 kt N €1.4 million  110-150 kt 
(3.5-3.7 kt N) €550-800 
million Nitric acid is very widely used in industry, 
household use in comparison is very low, below 
1%. We assume a share of 0.5%. 
>=30% 0.4-1.2 kt 
N €0.1-0.4 
million 70-80% 2.5-9 kt 
(0.3-1 kt N) €38-130 
million 
<30% 2.8-3.6 kt 
N €1-1.3 
million 80-90% 100-146 kt 
(2-3 kt N) €500-730 
million In the "mystery shopping" exercise we found that 
household cleaning products above the proposed 
30% concentration threshold – some in near pure 
form – are widely available (average concentration 
level: 50%). We assume they account for ca. 10-
30% of all household sale of nitric acid. In the 
majority of consumer and hobby goods NA is only 
a less significant component and has an average 
concentration of about 10% . The conversion factor 
between kt and kt N is 0.2233. 
We assume that 70-80-90% of these products is 
bought by the general public. 
We identified a price range of about 6-22 €/kg 
(average: 15 €/kg) for the concentrated products. 
General domestic cleaning products may cost less, 
about €5/kg. 
Sulphuric acid 7,150 kt 
SO 2 € 515 
million  30 kt SO 2 €1,680-2,570 
million We estimate that about 0.5% of sulphuric acid is 
used in households as stro ng solvents/detergents. 
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 36 kt N €2.63 million  330-460 kt 
(28-32 kt 
SO 2) €1,650-2,500 
million Household use of SA is estimated to be below 1%. 
We assume a share of 0.5%. 
 
EN 77   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
>=50% 4-11 kt N €0.3-0.8 
million 70-80% 6-22 kt 
(2.5-9 kt SO 2) €90-330 
million 
<50% 25-32 kt N €1.8-2.4 
million 80-90% 310-450 kt 
(20-29 kt 
SO 2) €1,550-2,250 
million The mystery shoppers found many products above 
the proposed 50% concentration threshold 
(average concentration level set at 60%). These 
are estimated to account to ca. 10-30% of sales to 
the general public. SA below the threshold 
(cleaning products) has an average concentration 
level of ca. 10%. The conversion factor between kt 
and kt N is 0.6532. 
We assume that 70-80-90% of these products is 
bought by the general public. 
We identified a price range of about 5-25 €/kg 
(average: 15 €/kg) for the concentrated products. 
General domestic cleaning products may cost less, 
about €5/kg. 
Lead-acid batteries - - - 5-10 kt 
(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO 2) €35-70 
million Lead-acid batteries are widely used in vehicles and 
industrial facilities. The general public uses them 
mostly in private cars and other motor vehicles 
(there are other rare household applications as well). These batteries normally contain somewhere 
around 2 to 4 litres (average: 3) of electrolyte 
solution (often a mix of 33.5% sulphuric acid and 
distilled water, about 4 kg). 
Eurostat reports that the number of cars in the 
EU27 was 466 per 1,000 in 2006 (about 233 
million in total). If all of these cars were private and 
all had SA-containing batteries, this would effect an 
existing stock of about 930 kt electrolyte, and 325 
kt SA (corresponding to ca. 231 kt SO
2 (conversion 
factor 0.6532).  
However, this has to be rarely replaced and if so, 
then in a car mechanic workshop by professionals. 
 
EN 78   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
We calculate with an annual general public 
consumption of 5-10 kt of electrolyte. Prices for 
refill battery acid are in the magnitude of 5-10 €/kg 
(assumption: 7 €/kg). 
Hydrochloric acid 2,750 kt 
HCl € 228 
million  79-107 kt 
(10-12 kt 
HCl) €350-520 
million  
Domestic solvents, 
household detergents 
(included in drain cleaners 
etc.), pH adjusters for fish 
tanks 13.8 kt HCl € 1.14 
million  79-107 kt 
(10-12 kt 
HCl) €350-520 
million The use of hydrochloric acid in households has 
been estimated to be around 0.5% of total EU 
consumption. 
>=20% 2.8-5.5 kt 
HCl €0.2-0.5 
million 70-80% 6-15 kt 
(2-4 kt HCl) €16-37 
million 
<20% 8-11 kt HCl €0.7-0.9 
million 80-90% 66-99 kt 
(7-10 kt HCl) €330-500 
million A wide range of products above the proposed 20% 
concentration threshold – or in pure form – are 
available for the general public (average 
concentration level: 30%). They may account for 
ca. 20-40% of all household sale of HCl acid. 
Below the threshold, the average concentration is 
set at 10%. 
We assume that 70-80-90% of these products is 
bought by the general public. 
The normal price range for HCl acid is between 1-4 
€/kg (average: 2.5 €/kg) for concentrated products. 
General domestic cleaning products may cost on 
average about €5/kg. 
Chlorates and perchlorates PC+PPC 
30 kt 
SC 100 kt 
SPC 5 kt €65 million  Minimal Minimal Pyrotechnics have been identified as the only 
significant household use for chlorates and 
perchlorates (sodium chlorate is now banned as a 
pesticide). This product group has however been 
omitted from the scope of the measures envisaged 
 
EN 79   ENEstimated market size of 
base chemical Precursor 
Most significant 
consumer products Volume Value 
(producer 
price) Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public Estimated 
volume of 
consumer 
products Estimated 
value of 
consumer 
products29 Comments 
as access by the general public is already 
regulated. 
Specialty products Minimal Minimal  Minimal Minimal Only a very little mark et seems to exist for 
specialty products, such as home-made model 
rocket propellants.  
 
 
EN 80   EN Table 8.3 Estimated volume and value of pr oducts sold to the general public (by 
thresholds) 
 
Estimated volume of consumer 
products Estimated value of consumer products Precursor 
(threshold %) 
Most 
significant 
consumer 
products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
Ammonium 
nitrate (fertiliser) 
(16% N from AN) 44-100 kt 
N 25-57 kt N 17-48 kt N €380-530 
million €26-59 
million €350-480 
million 
High-
concentration AN-
fertilisers 20-40 kt N  20-40 kt N  - €13-26 
million €13-26 
million - 
Component in 
mixtures 19-54 kt N 5-17 kt N  12-42 kt N €52-160 
million €10-33 
million  €38-132 
million  
Component in 
retail fertilisers: 
tablets or similar 164-185 kt 
(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) - 164-185 kt 
(5.4-6 kt N 
from AN) €310-350 
million - €310-350 
million 
Sodium nitrate 
(8% N from 
nitrate) 1.5-4 kt N 0.4-0.8 kt  N 1-3 kt N €6-18 
million €2-5.5 
million €4-12 
million 
Component in 
mixtures 1.5-4 kt N 0.4-0.8 kt N  1-3 kt N €5-14 
million €0.9-2 
million €4-12 
million 
Food preservative 
(100%) 0.015-
0.025 kt N 0.015-0.025 
kt N  €1-3.5 
million €1-3.5 
million  
Potassium 
nitrate (8% N 
from nitrate) 8-22 kt N 2-5 kt N 6-18 kt N €30-83 
million €6-15 
million €23-70 
million 
Component in 
mixtures 8-22 kt N 2-5 kt N 6-18 kt N €29-79 
million €5-11 
million €23-70 
million 
Food preservative (100%) 0.015-
0.025 kt N 0.015-0.025 
kt N  €1-3.5 
million €1-3.5 
million  
Calcium nitrate 
(8% N from 
nitrate) 6-17 kt N 2-4 kt N 4-14 kt N €31-85 
million €5-12 
million €25-75 
million 
Component in 
mixtures and CN 
AN double salt 6-17 kt N 2-4 kt N 4-14 kt N €31-85 
million €5-12 
million €25-75 
million 
Hydrogen 
peroxide  
(12% H 2O2) 11-18 kt 
H2O2 4-8 kt H 2O2 6-11 kt 
H2O2 €1,750-
2,900 
million €130-250 
million €1,650-
2,700 
million 
Hair and tooth 
bleaching 
products 55-85  kt 
(4-7 kt 
H2O2) 0.7-2.7 kt 
(0.1-0.4 kt 
H2O2) 53-84 kt 
(4-6 kt 
H2O2) €1,085-
1,720 
million €13-53 
million €1,070-
1,680 
million 
Household textile 
bleaching 
products 9-11 kt 
(3-4 kt 9-11 kt 
(3-4 kt - €86-114 
million €86-114 
million - 
 
EN 81   EN Estimated volume of consumer 
products Estimated value of consumer products Precursor 
(threshold %) 
Most 
significant 
consumer 
products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
H2O2) H 2O2) 
Household 
cleaning products 
(drain cleaner, 
dishwashing 
detergents etc.) 44-74 kt 
(3-4 kt 
H2O2) 2-6 kt 
(0.5-2 kt 
H2O2) 40-72 kt 
(2-4 kt 
H2O2) €442-743 
million €17-58 
million €400-720 
million 
Pool and fish tank 
disinfectants 1.5-4 kt 
(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) 1.5-4 kt 
(0.5-1.5 kt 
H2O2) - €10-30 
million €10-30 
million - 
Pharmaceutical 
products, creams 
and antiseptic 
solutions 10-20 kt 
(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) - 10-20 kt 
(0.5-1 kt 
H2O2) €150-300 
million - €150-300 
million 
Acetone N/A N/A N/A Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros Multiple 
billion 
euros 
Nail polish 
removers, 
cosmetic solvents, 
household 
cleaning products, 
solvents 
(superglue 
remover) and 
other consumer 
products N/A N/A N/A Multiple 
billion euros Multiple 
billion euros Multiple 
billion euros 
Nitromethane (30%) 5-10 kt 3-8 kt 1.5-5 kt € 55-110 
million €33-88 
million €22-55 
million 
Racing car fuel 
(‘top fuel’ for nitro-
engines) 5-10 kt 3-8 kt 1.5-5 kt € 55-110 
million €33-88 
million €22-55 
million 
Hexamine 0.1-0.3 kt 0. 1-0.3 kt - €3-9 million 
(with linked 
products: 
€110-220 
mn) €3-9 
million 
(€110-220 
mn) - 
Solid fuel tablets  
(consumer 
market) 0.1-0.3 kt 0.1-0.3 kt - €3-9 million 
(with linked 
products: 
€110-220 
mn) €3-9 million 
(€110-220 
mn) - 
Nitric acid (30%) 110-150 
kt 
(3.5-3.7 kt 
N) 2.5-9 kt 
(0.3-1 kt N) 100-146 kt 
(2-3 kt N) €550-800 
million €38-130 
million €500-730 
million 
Domestic 
solvents, 110-150 kt 2.5-9 kt 100-146 kt €550-800 €38-130 €500-730 
 
EN 82   EN Estimated volume of consumer 
products Estimated value of consumer products Precursor 
(threshold %) 
Most 
significant 
consumer 
products Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold Total Above 
threshold Below 
threshold 
household 
detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish 
tanks (3.5-3.7 kt 
N) (0.3-1 kt N) (2-3 kt N) million million million 
Sulphuric acid 
(50%) 30 kt SO 2 6-22 kt 
(2.5-9 kt 
SO 2) 315-460 kt 
(21-31 kt 
SO 2) €1,680-
2,570 
million €90-330 
million €1,580-
2,320 
million 
Domestic 
solvents, 
household 
detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish 
tanks 330-460 kt 
(28-32 kt 
SO 2) 6-22 kt 
(2.5-9 kt 
SO 2) 310-450 kt 
(20-29 kt 
SO 2) €1,650-
2,500 
million €90-330 
million €1,550-
2,250 
million 
Lead-acid batteries 5-10 kt 
(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO
2) - 5-10 kt 
(1.2-2.4 kt 
SO 2) €35-70 
million - €35-70 
million 
Hydrochloric 
acid (20%) 79-107 kt 
(10-12 kt 
HCl) 6-15 kt 
(2-4 kt HCl) 66-99 kt 
(7-10 kt 
HCl) €350-520 
million €16-37 
million €330-500 
million 
Domestic 
solvents, 
household 
detergents 
(included in drain 
cleaners etc.), pH 
adjusters for fish 
tanks 79-107 kt 
(10-12 kt 
HCl) 6-15 kt 
(2-4 kt HCl) 66-99 kt 
(7-10 kt 
HCl) €350-520 
million €16-37 
million €330-500 
million 
Chlorates and 
perchlorates 
(40%) Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Specialty products Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal 
TOTAL - - - €5,000-
7,800 
million €450-1,150 
million €4,500-
7,000 
million 
 
 
EN 83   EN 
 
EN 84   EN ANNEX 9: DETAILED ASSESSMENT TAB LES FOR EACH POLICY OPTION: 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT  
 
In the tables below, several of the assessmen t criteria are accompanied by a ‘rating’, which 
‘scores’ the policy options from -3 (very nega tive impact) to +3 (very positive impact). The 
explanations for the ratings ar e elaborated in the respective  assessment of each criterion. 
These ratings compare the policy options with the status quo option.   
 
 
POLICY OPTION 0 – 
STATUS QUO Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectivenes
s  General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
No changes to the current situation will be made. All effects have been rated as ‘0’. The problems that have 
been identified in section 2 will continue to exist. Give n that the effects identified are highly similar for all 
precursor groups, no precursor-specific assessments have been provided. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by 
the general public 0 The general public will continue to have access to precursors. In at 
least five Member States such access is either restricted or 
controlled through legislative measures (DK, DE, IE, NL, UK). 
Voluntary industrial action will also continue 
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and potency 
of ‘home made’ 
explosives or 
components manufactured for 
malicious or criminal 
purposes 0 The general public will continue to have access to high 
concentrations of precursors. Terr orists will continue to make use 
of chemicals to produce homemade explosives and improvised 
explosive devices. In the past fe w years nearly 50 attacks were 
carried out, failed or were prevented from happening. 
1.3 To enhance the 
security and awareness 
of the entire supply 
chain of precursors 0 Little changes will occur. Existing EU and national measures will 
make a further contribution to awareness and security levels. 
However, such measures will by no means cover all precursors or 
all industrial stakeholders. 
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower control 
levels and fewer 
restrictions on 
chemicals in some 
countries 0 Under the Status Quo, all current differences in the restriction and 
control levels in the EU will continue to exist. This means that 
terrorists, to obtain higher quantities or higher concentrations of a certain precursors, can ‘select’ the countries in which such 
purchases are least likely to raise any suspicions. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on administrative costs for 
business and authorities 0 No impacts on administrative costs for businesses and authorities 
other than those already occurring. 
Compliance costs for business and authorities 0 No compliance costs for businesses and authorities other than 
those in Member State which already have, in particular 
legislative, measures in place. 
Economic impacts 0 No additional economic impacts. The current economic crisis is 
likely to negative affect the en tire chemical supply chain. 
Article 16 Freedom to No change to the existing situation. 
 
EN 85   EN conduct a business 
Article 17 Right to 
property No change to the existing situation. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market 0 No effects, other than those al ready occurring as a result of 
relevant measures in place in some Member States and those 
generated by the economic crisis overall. 
Impacts on public health 0 Terrorist attacks will contribute to casualties and to the perception 
of insecurity by the general public. Other EU developments may 
help to prevent, detect and respond to terrorist attacks. 
Other impacts 0 No change to the existing situation. 
Article 8 Protection of 
personal data No change to the existing situation. 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination No change to the existing situation. 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 No change to the existing situation. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, political 
and technical feasibility 
and necessary 
preconditions to 
achieve impacts. 0 No change to the existing situation. 
EU added value  Further developments in EU policy, for example as part of the Action Plan on the 
Security of Explosives, both part of the wider EU strategy to combat terrorism will 
be taken forward. 
Need for changes in Community legislation No need for changes to Community legislation. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and 
stakeholders  Stakeholder consultation has shown that there is overall consensus on the need to 
restrict and control access to pr ecursors. Most were hence not  in favour of the Status 
Quo. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Under the Status Quo, the risk of terrorist attacks using IEDs / HMEs will continue to exist, with the likelihood 
of such incidents increasing in frequency and / or letha lity. The level of awareness and security of the chemical 
supply chain may slightly increase as a result of current and upcoming international, EU and national 
measures, but terrorists would continue to make use of lower restrictions and control standards in other countries. The Status Quo will have no economic effect s other than those already occurring. Social effects 
could be negative, as a result of casualties caused by terrorist incidents and an increased perception of 
insecurity. The Status Quo was not supported by the stakeholders consulted as part of the study. In fact, most 
considered that there was a st rong rationale for action at EU level and ag reed on the need to control and restrict 
access to precursors. 
  
POLICY OPTION 1 
– A total ban on 
sales of the 
substances to 
members of the 
general public, 
irrespective of 
concentration 
levels. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
The policy option would imply that all selected precursors, either in their pure form or in any products, would 
 
EN 86   EN POLICY OPTION 1 
– A total ban on 
sales of the 
substances to 
members of the 
general public, 
irrespective of 
concentration 
levels. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
no longer be available to the general public (i.e. consumers, household users). Manufacturing of certain 
products for the consumer market and sales of the substa nces to the general public will no longer be allowed. 
Possibly the possession of the substances by the general public could also be forbidden. It would require a 
judgement as to when a product should be banned. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by the general public +3 It will be impossible for the general public to purchase certain 
precursors through retail (and other downstream) channels in the EU. It may still be possible to obtain the chemical substances 
through downstream seller channels  (e.g. under false pretences as 
a company or “opportunistic” sales by the latter) or through other illegal approaches (e.g. theft). 
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and 
potency of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal 
purposes +2 The policy option would make it very difficult for persons to 
access the precursors most often used for making HMEs or IEDs. 
There is a potential displacement e ffect (e.g. greater attention to 
other chemicals that can also serve to produce improvised 
explosive devices and which are still available on the consumer 
market). 
1.3 To enhance the security and awareness of the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors +1 The ban, which will raise a high level of attention, is likely to 
make other supply chain stakeholde rs also aware of the potential 
risks when trading such chemical s between professional users. 
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on chemicals in some 
countries +2 The ban would be EU wide, meaning that terrorist and other 
criminals would no longer be ab le to purchase the chemical 
substances through retail and other downstream channels in the EU. If possession of the substan ce is not rendered illegal, then 
precursors could also be purchased from sellers in third countries 
(also through the internet). 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on 
administrative costs 
for business and authorities -3 Given the importance of comp liance, implementation of the 
restrictions will involve administ rative costs to businesses. These 
are estimated to range from €8 0-126 million per annum; and a 
one-off cost of €40-63. They cover providing information for their 
prospective buyers, providing proof of legitimate professional use, 
registry keeping, collecting and checking reports. 
Compliance costs for business and 
authorities -3 Compliance costs to business are estimated to be between 120-189 
million euro per annum, and a one-off cost of 80-126 million euro. 
A ban would involve a sophisticated mechanism identifying the 
products to be restricted, exemptions, the circle of economic actors affected, control of imports and related market surveillance 
activities etc. 
Economic impacts -3 Overall, consumer prod ucts with an estimated total value ranging 
from 5,000 to 7,800 milli on euros (not counting acetone-
containing products, themselves worth an additional several 
billion euros) will be banned from the market. Businesses selling 
to the general public will have to withdraw products intended for 
 
EN 87   EN POLICY OPTION 1 
– A total ban on 
sales of the 
substances to 
members of the 
general public, 
irrespective of 
concentration 
levels. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
non-professional consumers from  the market (restricting their 
business), replacing the precursors w ith alternatives It is estimated 
that the consumer surplus lost will amount to some €1,800-2,900 
million per year and businesses will lose profit of about €1,500-2,400 million per year. 
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business Businesses which highly depend on the production and sale of the precursors to the 
general public will suffer and may need to cease activities or downscale. The ban 
therefore could therefore, to some extent, restrict the freedom to conduct a business. 
In order to alleviate these effects, a ‘phasing out’ period could be established. 
Article 17 Right to 
property As highlighted above, the policy option would leave companies with a large stock of 
produced goods which would need to be destroyed, dependant on possible transitional 
measures. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour market -1 The ban would effectively remove a myriad of products from the 
consumer market. This may lead to some businesses, e.g. retailers having to cease their activities and the related loss of jobs. Some 
(mainly short-term) new employment opportunities within pubic 
authorities, control and enforcement agencies, etc. 
Impacts on public health +1 Some increased perception of safety and possibly a reduction in 
loss of lives. 
Other impacts -2 A high level of inco nvenience and some social unrest, as 
consumers would no longer have access to a range of products. 
Article 8 Protection 
of personal data No effect 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination No effect 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 Neutral effect. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, political and technical 
feasibility and 
necessary preconditions to 
achieve impacts. -2 While a ban on the precursors is technically feasible for all 
chemicals, for most of them such measure would have serious negative consequences, both in terms of economic and social 
effects, as most chemicals are widely used and many cannot be 
fully replaced. 
EU added value and rationale The introduction of a ban in one or more Member States would only lead to distortion 
of the internal market and persons still purchasing the chemicals in other countries. The political feasibility of this Policy option is very low. None of the Member States 
have similar measures in place at present an d most were strongly against any kind of 
ban. 
Need for changes in Community 
legislation A ban would require a legislative instrument, as well as a mechanism or and process, 
similar to what already happens in the health and environmental safety areas (for 
example, the authorisation system part of REACH and its annexes), to select those 
products that should be banned and those which should be exempted from such 
restrictions. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and stakeholders  None of the Member States and industrial st akeholders consulted as part of the study 
considered this an acceptable  Policy option. The businesses  which took part in the 
survey considered policy option 1 the most ‘negative’ measure. 
 
EN 88   EN POLICY OPTION 1 
– A total ban on 
sales of the 
substances to 
members of the 
general public, 
irrespective of 
concentration 
levels. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The Policy option has the highest scor e on achieving the policy objectives , but its feasibility and acceptability 
are among the lowest levels. In addition, some negative social effects and potentia l tension with fundamental 
rights have been identified; it is questionable, in pa rticular, whether a total ban on sales to members of the 
general public could be considered compat ible with the principle of proportionality 
 
 
POLICY OPTION 2 
– A ban on sales 
of the substances 
in all 
concentrations 
and quantities 
over the internet Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
The Policy option would ban all sales to the general public  made over the internet. Th e share of internet sales 
(against sales on business premises, i.e. physical shops) of the precursor groups is relatively common for some chemical products (e.g. fertilisers, hydr ogen peroxide, acetone, hexamine fuel tablets, etc); While internet sales 
of others are less frequent (e.g. chlorates and perchlorates ). Overall e-commerce statistics show that it is a sales 
channel which is increasing in volum e every year. From 2006 to 2008, the share of all EU consumers who 
have bought at least one item over the internet has increased significantly (from 27% to 33%) While cross 
border e-commerce is stable (6% to 7%)
30. The share of internet sales in the retail sector varies greatly by type 
of seller. DYI shops, for example, who sell large shares of the precursor groups addressed by the Policy 
option, are still behind other types of sellers when it comes to offering products online (even though this sales channel is on the rise). Overall, It is assumed that on average, only about 0.5% of the goods in question is sold 
online when sales to the general public is concerned. Th is share would be banned under this policy option. As 
for Policy option 1 which proposes a ban on all sales, Policy option 2 also entails a judgement as to when a product should be banned from internet sales. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access to certain precursors by the general public +1 One sales channel would be restricted to the general public, but all 
other sales channels would still be open. For some chemical substances, the ban on internet sales would hamper access more 
(e.g. beauty products including hydrogen peroxide or acetone) 
than for others. 
1.2 To reduce the reliability and 
potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or components 
manufactured for 
malicious or criminal purposes 0 While the ban on internet sales may have a slightly deterrent 
effect, terrorists and other criminal s determined to by the chemical 
substances will simply turn to other sales channels. 
1.3 To enhance the security and 
awareness of the +1 A total ban of internet sales would at least raise awareness of 
online retailers and other downstream sellers on security issues in 
relation to the products they trade in.  
                                                 
30  Special Eurobarometer 298, October 2008 
 
EN 89   EN POLICY OPTION 2 
– A ban on sales 
of the substances 
in all 
concentrations 
and quantities 
over the internet Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
entire supply chain of 
precursors 
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other criminals from 
making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some 
countries 0 to +1 An EU level playing field would be created for internet sales of 
the precursor groups, while leaving business premise and other distance sales unaffected. This m eans that terrorists and other 
criminals can still benefit from lower control levels and fewer 
restrictions in some countries. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on administrative costs for business and 
authorities -1 Internet retailers will face a ra nge of administrative costs. 
Depending on national implementation, they will be most probably obliged to provide information for visitors/prospective 
buyers on the restrictions in their standard terms and elsewhere on 
the website. Estimated cost to business: €20-32 million per annum and an additional €40-63 million one-off cost. 
Public authorities might have to keep a register of specialised 
Internet sellers and collect and compile reports from vendors. 
Compliance costs for business and 
authorities -1 Businesses with Internet retail activities (including producers, 
general and specialist retailers) will have to cease selling all 
restricted products B2C. This might affect a huge range of 
products. Estimated cost to business: €40-63 million per annum, and an additional €40-63 million one-off cost. 
Economic impacts -1 It is estimated that about 24-38 million euro million euro worth of 
consumer products currently sold online will be affected. Merchants (and eventually producers) engaged in Internet sales to 
the general public will lose part of their revenues. Businesses 
might expect a loss of profit of only about €12-38 million altogether. Consumer surplu s of about €8-13 million. 
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business Those who exclusively sell online or those who depend to a high extent on internet 
sales are significantly affected. Their spec ific freedom to conduct that type of 
business / to use that type of sales channe l would be affected. This effect could be 
partly remediated by a ‘phasing out’ period. 
Article 17 Right to 
property The policy option would close one sales channel. Companies depending on this 
channel will have to deal with their stock. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour market -1 The ban would effectively remove a myriad of products from the 
online consumer market. This may lead to some online retailers 
having to cease their activities and th e related loss of jobs. Public 
authorities may need, initially, need more human resources to 
prepare for the internet ban, but th is would be a short-term effect. 
Impacts on public 
health 0 No effect. 
Other impacts -1 Some negative impact as for a range of products, consumers will 
have to travel to business premises. This causes high 
inconvenience for less mobile consumers and those living in 
remote areas. 
Article 8 Protection of personal data Enforcement agencies will need to control transactions (as well as the details of 
buyers and sellers) in order to enforce the in ternet ban. This would necessarily imply 
the collection and processing of personal data. To be lawful, this processing shall 
comply with national data protection laws implementing EU data protection law. (e.g. 
 
EN 90   EN POLICY OPTION 2 
– A ban on sales 
of the substances 
in all 
concentrations 
and quantities 
over the internet Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Directive 95/46/EC). 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination Less mobile consumers and those living in remote locations would suffer higher 
levels of inconvenience. 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 Neutral effect. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, political and technical 
feasibility and 
necessary preconditions to 
achieve impacts. -3 The implementation of a ban on internet sales would be 
technically unfeasible, especially because the products could still 
be purchased through other sales channels or in third countries. 
EU added value and rationale The Policy option only bans a very specific sales channel, leaving it up to the Member 
States to regulate all other sales channels in line with existing EU legislation and their 
own priorities. This could still lead to internal market issues. Measures restricting 
internet transactions are impossible to implement without continuous monitoring and control. There is also a potential grey zone as to what constitutes an internet sales 
transaction. 
Need for changes in 
Community legislation A ban would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a regulation or 
directive. More importantly, a ban will require the creation of a mechanism and 
(continuous) process to select those products which would need to be banned and 
those which should be exempted from such restrictions. In addition, the ban on online 
sales would also require changes to existing EU legislation. 
Issues raised by Member States and 
stakeholders  While the majority of Member States consider ed a ban on internet sales desirable or at 
least potentially useful and effective, all co untries consulted agreed that such a ban 
was technically unfeasible, would entail very high costs and would potentially have 
negative social consequences. Stakeholders during the workshop considered that if 
such a ban was applied, it would need to cover all forms of distance selling (e.g. mail 
orders) and not just the internet. Several mentioned that the internet was the only 
channel with a minimum form of control and hence far less likely to be used by terrorists to purchase precursors. Nearly a quarter (24%) of the respondents to the 
business survey considered that the policy option would lead to a reduction of sales. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Banning the sales of the precursor groups via one sales channel only does not strongly contribute to the 
achievement of the policy objectives, as the products w ould still be available through other sales channels and 
from third country internet sellers. The ban on internet sales would overall have negative economic and social 
effects. The EU rationale for this type of measure is not very high. The Policy option is also deemed technically unfeasible, with many preconditions. 
  
POLICY OPTION 3 
– A ban on sales 
to the general 
public if the 
substance is 
above a specific 
concentration 
level. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
 
EN 91   EN POLICY OPTION 3 
– A ban on sales 
to the general 
public if the 
substance is 
above a specific 
concentration 
level. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
This Policy option would impl y that the general public would not ha ve access any longer to the selected 
precursors (or mixtures containing these precursors) above a pre-defined concentration level. ammonium nitrate: 16% N; alkali nitrates: 8%N; hydrogen peroxide: 12%; acetone : no threshold; nitromethane: 30%; 
hexamine: no threshold; nitric acid: 30%; sulphuric acid: 50%; hydrochloric acid: 20%; chlorates and 
perchlorates: 40%.
31  
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +2 The Policy option entail that the general public would still be able 
to buy the selected precursors (or products) with a lower 
concentration or at very similar but slightly lower concentration. 
However, an important number of products which are widely used and popular among consumers will no longer be accessible. While 
several of them can be replaced by alternatives, others require a 
high concentration of the selected precursors in order to keep their 
essential properties. 
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and 
potency of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal 
purposes +1.5 The risk of terrorists accessing th e selected precursors in high 
concentrations would be reduced, thus lowering the potency and 
reliability of HMEs and IEDs. it It would not make it impossible, as some lower concentrated precursors (e.g. ammonium nitrate) 
can still be used for bomb-making. 
1.3 To enhance the 
security and 
awareness of the 
entire supply chain of precursors +1 The policy option could increase the awareness and control level 
among supply chain actors. While some of the precursors are 
covered by the EU drug-precursor legislation, others are covered 
by health and safety legislation and/or other national measures set up at Member State level. It may cause some cause confusion 
among  some supply chain actors (e.g. retailers) which sell a 
variety of chemical products simultaneously. 
1.4 To prevent +1.5 As the ban above certain thresholds would be EU-wide, terrorists 
                                                 
31  The thresholds selected for the indi vidual precursors were the following: 
- ammonium nitrate : 16% N from ammonium nitrate  (the sale to the general public is already 
banned by Commission Regulation 552/2009, effective from 27 June 2010) 
- alkali nitrates : 8% N from nitrate (this is the concentration level more or less corresponding to 
the 16% N threshold for ammonium nitrate) 
- hydrogen peroxide : 12% (recommended by the SCP in its 2008 Annual Report, examples for 
national restrictions: DK, DE) - acetone
: no threshold 
- nitromethane : 30% (recommended by SCP in its 2008 Annual Report, existing threshold in the 
Netherlands) 
- hexamine : no threshold 
- nitric acid : 30% (recommendation emerged from m eetings with SCP members in 2009, 
existing threshold in Denmark) 
- sulphuric acid : 50% (recommendation emerged from meetings with SCP members in 2009, 
existing threshold in Denmark) 
- hydrochloric acid : 20% (recommendation emerged from meetings with SCP members in 2009) 
-    chlorates and perchlorates: 40% (recommendati on emerged from meetings with SCP members in 
2009, existing threshold in Denmark). 
 
EN 92   EN POLICY OPTION 3 
– A ban on sales 
to the general 
public if the 
substance is 
above a specific 
concentration 
level. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on chemicals in some 
countries would no longer be able to purchase highly concentrated 
precursors in the EU. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on 
administrative costs 
for business and authorities -1 Traders will be likely – depending on national implementation – to 
be obliged to provide information to their prospective buyers on 
the restrictions concerning concentration levels in their standard terms and in additional information material. They might also 
have to submit reports to public authorities on how they are 
complying with the legal requirements.  
It is estimated that the administrative burden would be in the order 
of €6-16 million euro per annum, and a one-off cost of €40-63 
million. Administrative costs will be imposed also on public 
authorities. 
Compliance costs for business and authorities -2 Producers of products sold to the general public will have to 
reduce the concentration level. This may not be viable in certain cases (e.g. hexamine fuel tablets, car battery acid) and alternatives 
will have to be used. Retail traders will have to verify that 
products above threshold are bought for professional consumption 
only. Public authorities will also incur certain implementation 
costs. The cost estimate is 9-24 million euro. An additional one-off cost 
of €80-126 million is also expected. 
Economic impacts -2 The value of goods sold to the general public above the thresholds 
is estimated at about €450-1,150 million. The overall consumption of the precursors may not change dramatically; non-professional 
use only accounts to about 1-5% of total EU consumption for the 
chemicals concerned. More significant consequences might be experienced by manufacturers of consumer products, as they will 
need to adjust the production pr ocesses and packaging of products 
intended for non-professional use. Some producers where reduced concentration levels are not a feasible option might leave the 
market or have to diversify. Indirectly, certain manufactured 
products which use the restricted products (e.g. model steam engines using Hexamine fuel tablets) will be rendered useless. The 
overall retail sales of products to general public will not change 
considerably for most consumer pr oducts, as either alternatives 
will replace the restricted products , or more of diluted chemicals 
will be bought to compensate for lower concentration levels. The 
detrimental effects will be relatively higher for SMEs. 
The loss of profit overall is estimated to be €130-330 million per 
year. 
Consumers will in general be able to access diluted versions or – if 
these are not a feasible option – suitable alternatives (save for a 
few products such as Hexamine fuel tablets), however, these might 
be less effective or more expensive. 
 
EN 93   EN POLICY OPTION 3 
– A ban on sales 
to the general 
public if the 
substance is 
above a specific 
concentration 
level. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall, the consumer surplus lo st will amount to an estimated 
€230-560 million per year. 
Article 16 Freedom to conduct a business While some businesses could still trade in products with lower concentrations, other 
businesses would not be able to produce or trade in alternative lower concentrated 
products with the same desired qualities. In order to alleviate these effects, a ‘phasing 
out’ period could be established. 
Article 17 Right to property The policy option would leave companies with a stock of produced goods with high 
concentration levels which would need to be destroyed or sold to professional users. 
Certain production processes would have to be stopped – this would render certain 
machinery and related infrastructure useless.  Setting concentration levels would also 
mean that certain products would no longer be available on the market, which would 
make it difficult for the general public to  access certain consumer goods and thus 
properly use their possessions. Measures to mitigate these negative effects should be 
considered, such as a ‘phasing out’ period. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market -0.5 The ban on precursors above pre-defined thresholds would remove 
a certain number of widely us ed products from the consumer 
market. Some manufacturers producing for the general public as 
well as distributors and retailers may have to reduce their activity and downsize their staff. The preparation of the ban would require 
public authorities to allocate additional staff, however this would 
be only in the short-term. 
Impacts on public 
health +1 A ban according to pre-define d thresholds would reduce the 
potency of HMEs and IEDs, as the latter would be less powerful 
or become much more difficult to make. Consumer safety would also be improved. 
Other impacts -1 A ban above certain thresholds would lead to some inconvenience 
for consumers.  
Article 8 Protection 
of personal data No effect.  
Article 21 Non-
discrimination No effect.  
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 In some cases, consumers would have to use greater quantities of 
the same product in lower concentration in order to obtain the 
desired effect. However, this wo uld be mitigated by decreased 
consumption (and pollution) of highly concentrated precursors. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, 
political and technical feasibility and 
necessary 
preconditions to achieve impacts. +2 The proposed ban is technically feasible for an important number 
of precursors. It may be less feasib le for some selected precursors, 
which are only effective in high concentrations (e.g. hexamine) or which are widely used in high concentrations in some popular 
products (e.g. hydrogen peroxide in hair-dyeing products). Their 
ban would possibly cause a high level of inconvenience among the public. This policy option achieves a fair score with regard to its 
political feasibility of, as several Member States have similar 
provisions in place or have expr essed their interest in such 
measures. However none of the Member States consulted have 
measures covering all the selected precursors 
EU added value and rationale The rationale for applying a ban above certain thresholds is strong. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of the ban (i.e. preventing terrorists from taking advantage of lower 
 
EN 94   EN POLICY OPTION 3 
– A ban on sales 
to the general 
public if the 
substance is 
above a specific 
concentration 
level. Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
control levels) can only be achieved if the latter is applied across all Member States 
and in a uniform fashion (i.e. same thresholds). 
Need for changes in Community 
legislation The ban above certain thresholds would require a legislative initiative (e.g. 
Regulation, Directive). This would also  require a mechanism for selecting the 
products that should be banned and those that can be marketed for consumers. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and stakeholders  This policy option was deemed overall acceptable by most Member States and 
stakeholders. Although its deterrent effect  was acknowledged, some Member States 
(notably with an important history of terrorist attacks) noted that concentration thresholds would only raise the bar for terrorists but would not prevent the making of 
HMEs and IEDs. Some niche industries/businesses would be severely impacted 
though, as some products cannot offer the same properties and effectiveness based on lower concentrations. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The technical and political feasibility of this policy option is overall high, while it achieves a fairly good rating with regard to the achievement of the policy objectives. It should be noted that this policy option only lowers the risk of terrorists accessing highly  concentrated precursors and devising HMEs and IEDs, however it does 
not address the issue of HMEs and IEDs made with low-concentrated precursors (or precursors which have 
been re-concentrated). 
  
POLICY OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
A ban on sales to 
minors Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4a includes the measures proposed in Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes a ban on sales to minors. More specifically, the SCP has recommended that 
nitrates/nitrogenous fer tilisers and nitromethane should not be sold to minors.  Several Member States have 
adopted measures banning the sales of certain precursors to minors (e.g. DE).  
Policy option 4a makes sense in a safety rather than a security perspective. It should be noted that all 
assessments start with the rating and assessment of Policy option 3 as a minimum and assess whether the 
cumulative effect of Policy option 4a further improves or deteriorates the situation. Policy options 4a - d 
should therefore be read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Given that the effects of Policy op tion 4a are identical for all precursor  groups, only the general assessment 
sheet has been completed for this Policy option. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +2 The policy option would completely ban access to the selected 
precursors by minors. Existing legislation in some Member States 
already bans the sale of some precursors (e.g. chlorates and perchlorates) to minors from a safety perspective. Adults (who 
account for a larger share of the EU  population) would still be able 
to access the precursors below the defined threshold.  
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and 
potency of ‘home made’ explosives or +1.5 As minors would not be able to access these precursors, unless via 
illicit means, there is a reduced risk of minors making highly 
potent and reliable IEDs. However, this policy option does not adequately address the issue of “terrorist” purpose.  
 
EN 95   EN POLICY OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
A ban on sales to 
minors Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
components 
manufactured for 
malicious or criminal 
purposes 
1.3 To enhance the security and 
awareness of the 
entire supply chain of precursors +1 This policy option would increase the level of awareness among 
supply chain actors and notably retailers with regard to minors 
using precursors with a criminal purpose.  
1.4 To prevent terrorists and other 
criminals from making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some 
countries +1.5 The policy option would potentially prevent minors having 
criminal intentions from smuggling the selected precursors from 
other Member States were restrictions may be laxer. However, minors with criminal or ‘experimental’ intentions often operate in 
the domestic market. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on administrative costs 
for business and authorities -2 Slightly higher administrative costs than under Policy option 3. 
Young buyers will have to provide  identification of their age. 
Compliance costs for 
business and 
authorities -2 Retailers will have to ask for identification of young buyers of the 
products of question (irrespective of concentration level). This 
may be very onerous in most retail outlets and not feasible for 
certain product categories (e.g. cosmetics containing acetone or 
HP). Shops might de-list most of the products concerned to avoid compliance requirements. Internet re tailers also need to verify the 
buyers’ age, which will be a complex process. 
Economic impacts -2 Producers and retailers of certain products that are often bought by 
minors (e.g. cosmetics containing acetone or HP) may lose a share 
of their business. Minors as c onsumers will not have access to 
products such as cosmetics. 
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business Little effect, as the share of sales to minors is  estimated to be small, thus not affecting 
businesses in their activities. 
Article 17 Right to property No effect. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market -0.5 Public authorities carry out information campaigns and other 
information activities vis-à-vis retailers and sellers and would 
need to categorise those products which should be banned for 
minors. This could potentially require some additional resources. 
Impacts on public health +1 Positive effect. Each year, Member States record cases of minors 
attempting to make IEDs and other pyrotechnics, which often 
result in serious injuries or even life losses. By banning access to 
the selected precursors, this policy option would increase the safety of minors (and possibly other individuals). Nonetheless, this 
policy option will not decrease the potency and reliability of 
HMEs and IEDs made by terrorists with the intention to carry out deadly attacks. 
Other impacts -1 The negative impact under this policy option would mainly relate 
to the fact that minors would no longer access the selected 
 
EN 96   EN POLICY OPTION 
4a – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
A ban on sales to 
minors Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
precursors. The inconvenience could be somehow important 
among farmers’ families, where the division of labour assigns 
young people with the task of  picking up fertilisers on their 
parents’ behalf.  However, in many Member States, the sale of some of the 
precursors is already banned for minors (e.g. strong acids are 
considered as poisonous substan ces under the health and safety 
legislation), therefore the impact will remain limited.  
Article 8 Protection 
of personal data No effect. 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination This policy ban would de facto provide for a difference of treatment between adults 
and minors. However, many legislative measures often make such a distinction based on valid grounds (e.g. safety perspective for individuals who are not yet fully 
responsible). 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 No effect. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, 
political and technical feasibility and 
necessary 
preconditions to achieve impacts. +2 Member States such as the Netherlands and France have 
highlighted that accidents involv ing minors using precursors to 
make IEDs and other pyrotechnics are an important safety issue. However, this problem does not seem to bear a link with terrorism 
as such..  
EU added value There is a rationale for introducing an EU-wide ban as some countries have 
introduced bans on selected precursors 
Need for changes in 
Community legislation New Community legislation would need to include a special provision related to the 
sale to minors. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and 
stakeholders  There is a consensus among Member States an d industry stakeholders that this policy 
option is out of the scope of this impact  assessment. Member States have already 
implemented various awareness campaigns to prevent the sale to minors, and this policy option addresses safety concerns but not security concerns.   
Moreover, Member States have varying definitions and age limits for defining minors, 
and this policy option may prove impossible to implement.    
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
This policy option does not provide any added-value to the achievement of the policy objectives. Its main benefit is increased safety for minors (and possibly other individuals), but it has no impact on the policy objectives and the issue of terrorism. 
  
 
EN 97   EN POLICY OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Sales of higher 
concentrations than 
those allowed under 
option 3, through 
either a system 
which licences 
retailers, or through 
a system which 
licences 
consumers.  Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4b includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes that sales of higher concentrations are either made through a system which 
either licenses retailers, or through a system which licenses consumers for ‘justified’ use.  
 Under scenario 1, i.e. the licensing  system for retailers, retailers would need to apply for a license, which 
would involve the checking of their ‘reliability’ and an obl igation to record all sales of higher concentrations. 
The general public needs therefore would not need to regi ster and the seller should as certain that there appear 
to be no grounds for suspecting unauthori sed use or resale. A similar system is  currently in place in DE as part 
of the Chemical Ordinance for nine chemical substances.  
 Under scenario 2, all retailers could still sell higher c oncentrations, but consumers would need to apply for an 
license with the competent au thorities (the police or local authorities), similar to what is in place in DK and IE. 
The license provided states the use, the quantity required and has a limited duration. Any possession without a license would be illegal. 
 
It is noted that all assessments start with the rating and assessment of Policy option 3 as a minimum and subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4b further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy optio ns 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +1.5 / +2 Under this policy option, consumers would not be deprived from 
obtaining chemicals in higher concentrations for legitimate use. As 
a result, there is a higher pr obability that consumers will access 
these precursors, notably those in higher concentrations. The 
Policy option would therefore be particularly relevant for the 
precursor groups containing chemical substances which, in low concentration levels, would be ineffective in products, such as 
some hydrogen peroxide and acid applications, nitromethane, 
hexamine and chlorates and perchlorates, 
Restrictions under scenario 1 would still provide easier access than 
under scenario 2. Under scenario 1, retailers selling the concentrations would be better mon itored but it would be up to the 
seller to determine whether a buyer has legitimate reasons. Under 
scenario 2, the legitimacy of  access for each single consumer 
would be checked by competent authorities. This may have a 
deterrent and thus more restrictive effect. 
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or 
components manufactured for 
malicious or criminal 
purposes +0.5 / +1 The impacts are the same as de scribed under Policy option 3. 
However, as higher concentrations would still be available, there is a slightly higher chance that terrorists and other criminals will 
access these. The licensing system for retailers under scenario 1 
will act as a deterrent, but it will not be fully fraud-proof. The 
licensing system for consumers u nder scenario 2 will exercise a 
higher level of control and may be more difficult to circumvent. 
1.3 To enhance the +2 / +2 Under both scenarios, the level of awareness and security among 
 
EN 98   EN POLICY OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Sales of higher 
concentrations than 
those allowed under 
option 3, through 
either a system 
which licences 
retailers, or through 
a system which 
licences 
consumers.  Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
security and 
awareness of the 
entire supply chain of precursors all supply chain operators will be increased. Sellers and their staff 
would pay increased attention to their customers, and could even 
‘voluntary’ notify the police in case of suspicious transactions, as they would be more informed of the potential risks. 
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other 
criminals from 
making use of lower 
control levels and fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some 
countries +1.5 / +1.5 The lowering of concentration levels in open sales channels and 
controlled sales of higher concentration levels will create an EU 
level playing field, both preventing internal market distortion and 
avoiding that persons can make use of lower standards in other EU 
Member States. A necessary pre-condition for ensuring a level playing field within the EU is that the licensing system 
implemented in the EU for higher concentrations be harmonised 
across all EU Member States. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on 
administrative costs 
for business and authorities -1.5 Additional administrative cost for businesses and government 
authorities (applying for permits and keeping registers under 
scenario 1 or verifying consumer licences under scenario 2) of about €10-30 million above Policy option 3. 
Compliance costs for 
business and 
authorities -2 Additional compliance costs in connection with developing and 
adopting procedures and rules with dealing with licences  of an 
estimated €10-30 million in total. 
 
Public authorities maintaining the licensing and reporting scheme will incur an additional cost of about €1.80 million per year. 
Economic impacts -1.5 Loss of profit for businesses – on the assumption that half of the 
goods previously sold above threshold will continue to be sold to 
registered/legitimate buyers from the general public - will be lower than under option 3, estimated to be at €65-155 million per 
year. Consumer surplus lost w ill amount to only an estimated 
€115-280 million annually. Scenario 2 requires a common EU-wide scheme, setting down common requirements for obtaining 
such licenses and ensuring that an y license issued in any Member 
State would be valid for purchases in any other Member State. 
Article 16 Freedom to conduct a business The requirements linked to the licensi ng system might possibly restrict the 
possibilities to conduct a business, as they may exclude those with insufficient means 
to run a similar system. The requirements would therefore need to be designed in a 
way to allow that any business, independent of its size, to be able to obtain a public license. Under scenario 2, the freedom to conduct a business will not be affected. 
Article 17 Right to 
property No effect. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market +0.5 / +1 The potential negative effects described as part of Policy option 3 
would be in part offset by allowing businesses to still trade higher 
concentrated chemical substances. Producers and other supply chain stakeholders manufacturing highly concentrated products 
(and related items) can continue their activities, albeit to a lesser 
 
EN 99   EN POLICY OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Sales of higher 
concentrations than 
those allowed under 
option 3, through 
either a system 
which licences 
retailers, or through 
a system which 
licences 
consumers.  Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
extent. Scenario 1 could potentially have a more negative effect on 
the labour market, as the burden related to obtaining a license and 
recording sales may be considered too high (e.g. staff training, IT 
resources for recording sales, processing costs).  
 
Under scenario 2, no significant impact on the labour market is expected. Under both scenarios, competent authorities would need 
more human resources for setting up, running and enforcing the 
licensing system. 
Impacts on public 
health +0.5 / +0.5 While the Policy option would reduce the possibility of terrorist 
attacks involving HMEs and IEDs based on the precursors, the 
fact that higher concentrations would still be available in a controlled environment could somewhat increase the chances of 
them being used.  
Other impacts 0 / -0.5 Neutral to minor negative impact.  
The inconvenience experienced by  some consumers due to the 
unavailability of chemical products with higher concentrations 
would to a large extent be addressed by making these available 
through the licensing system. This would be particularly useful for products which would be ineffective in lower concentrations.  
Under both scenario 1 and 2, the licensing system would need to 
ensure the proper protection of personal data, thus avoiding the mishandling by sellers (e.g. sale to third parties, loss of data) or 
public authorities (e.g. use of personal data for other purposes).  
Under scenario 2, consumers would face a certain level of inconvenience, as they would have to apply and obtain a license 
from the competent authorities. It is particularly important that the 
criteria for granting licenses be explicit and non-discriminatory 
(e.g. not based on ethnicity or other similar considerations). In 
addition, scenario 2 requires a common EU-wide scheme. 
Article 8 Protection of personal data This licensing systems imply processing of personal data and have to comply with 
national DP law implementing EU DP law. Any instrument proposing either two of 
these systems should therefor e provide with specific rules setting out the specific and 
explicit purpose for the processing, the retention periods or the personal data to be processed so as to comply with the necessity and proportionality, and other data 
protection principles. 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination Both systems considered could potentially give rise to discriminatory practices, when 
determining whether a consumer should be allowed to make a purchase. 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 The potential negative consequences outlined under Policy option 
3 would in part be reduced by the availability of higher concentrations of the chemical products. However, it is still 
expected that consumers would, fo r the sake of simplicity, make 
more use of products with lower concentrations (as they are available through all sales channels). 
 
EN 100   EN POLICY OPTION 
4b – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Sales of higher 
concentrations than 
those allowed under 
option 3, through 
either a system 
which licences 
retailers, or through 
a system which 
licences 
consumers.  Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, 
uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility and necessary 
preconditions to 
achieve impacts. +3 The political feasibility of this policy option is high, as several 
Member States have similar provi sions in place. Moreover, this 
policy option seems desirable and politically acceptable, as an 
overwhelming majority of Member States and industry representatives have expressed their interest in such measures.  
Any licensing scheme developed at EU level would need to ensure 
even implementation across th e EU. The requirements for 
businesses under scenario 1 and the criteria for granting licenses to 
consumers under scenario 2 would need to be clearly defined. One 
of the caveats is that the licen sing system for consumers may pose 
an issue with internet and distance sellers, which would need to 
ensure a proper processing and checking of the licenses displayed 
by consumers. 
EU added value  The EU rationale for introducing thresholds on concentration levels for open sales and 
restricting and controlling sales on higher concentrations is high, as differences in 
national approaches would lead to mark et distortion and di splacement effects. 
Scenario 2 may be problematic with regard to cross-border sales, unless Member 
States authorities issue EU -wide recognised licenses. 
Need for changes in 
Community legislation The policy option would require a legislative decision (a directive or regulation) and a 
mechanism for selecting the products that can be openly sold and those subject to 
restrictions. The policy option would also require the creation of an EU-wide 
licensing system. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and stakeholders  The overwhelming majority of Member Stat es as well as a substantial share of 
industry representatives expressed their support for this policy option.  Industry representatives emphasised that scen ario 1 (i.e. licensing system for retailers) 
may be more cumbersome for businesses th an a system which licenses consumers. 
Under scenario 2, Member States raised  the question of background checks for 
consumers applying for a license. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The Policy option overall receives higher scores than Po licy option 3, given that it still provides access to the 
entire spectrum of chemical substances and products by proposing a controlled environment for the sales of 
those with high concentration levels. For some precursor  groups, the Policy option is certainly more attractive 
than for others. It would in particular be effective for those chemical substances and products which would become ineffective as a result of the thresholds on concen tration levels set as part of Policy option 3. It also 
received high stakeholders support. 
Ultimately, the development of an licensing system for consumers seems to be less costly than the licensing system for retailers, and also the most effective in preventing terrorists  from accessing higher concentrated 
chemicals. The licensing system for co nsumers would strictly limit the sales of higher concentrated chemicals 
to a marginal number of consumers, who genuinely need those chemicals. It is exp ected that the monitoring of 
these consumers by competent authorities would also be easier, given their limited number. 
 
 
 
EN 101   EN POLICY OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Introducing a 
system of 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4C includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes the introduction of a system of reporting transactions. The Policy option 
will require sellers to assess whether a certain order or tr ansaction is suspicious and to take responsibility for 
notifying the competent authorities (e.g. their respec tive retail / sector association or law enforcement 
agencies). At least 4 Member States have introduced systems for reporting suspicious transactions. At EU 
level, the drug precursor regulation has introduced a re quirement to report suspicious transactions in acetone, 
sulphuric and hydrochloric acid (but the parameters are different). 
It is noted that all assessments start with the rating and assessment of Policy option 3 as a minimum and subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4c further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy optio ns 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +2 There is a chance that sellers of chemical substances and products 
may refuse orders / transactions which they consider suspicious, 
for ‘fear’ of possible repercussions, but this is not within the scope of the Policy option 
1.2 To reduce the 
reliability and 
potency of ‘home made’ explosives or 
components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal 
purposes +3 Very positive impact. In addition to placing thresholds on 
concentration levels, this Policy option would in addition request 
sellers to notify suspicious transactions. This will have both a deterrent effect and improve the chances that terrorists and other 
criminals are caught before they  can fabricate HMEs and IEDs. 
1.3 To enhance the 
security and awareness of the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors +1.5 The positive impact already accrued as part of Policy option 3 will 
be further strengthened, as a result of the notification system. Retailers and other downstream sellers will be informed of the 
need to report on suspicious transactions and hence their 
awareness levels and se curity will improve. 
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other 
criminals from 
making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on chemicals in some 
countries +1 The lowering of concentration levels in open sales channels in 
combination with a system of re porting suspicious transactions 
will create an EU level playing field, both preventing internal 
market distortion and avoiding that persons can make use of lower 
standards in other EU Member States. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on 
administrative costs 
for business and 
authorities -1.5 In addition to policy option 3, businesses will also have provide 
information on the new legal provisions to the general public (see 
“non labelling information for third parties”. The number of 
expected notifications is however likely to be low. The magnitude of costs is estimated to amount to  about an additional 4-8 million 
euro for businesses. 
Compliance costs for 
business and 
authorities -2.5 Especially larger retailers and producers also selling to consumers 
will need to adopt new policies and tools to identify suspicious 
transactions (including automated Internet sales), train their staff 
and survey correct implementation. It will need considerable effort in both time and money to achieve a level of satisfactory 
 
EN 102   EN POLICY OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Introducing a 
system of 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
compliance. Small shops will probably not invest in training, and 
they normally don’t have codified business practices which they 
needed to amend. 
Companies selling over the Internet also need to develop new procedures and possibly buying new software detecting suspicious 
transactions. 
Estimated total costs to businesses represent an additional €16 million per year . 
Public authorities will have to maintain a central hotline or 
decentralised contacts, as well as organise training, awareness raising campaigns, etc. National authorities may incur an 
additional cost of about €0.34 million per year. 
Economic impacts -2 Wider economic impacts (additional to policy option 3) on retail 
traders are likely to remain very low: some retailers, especially 
those from whom the products in question only represent a 
negligible share of sales, might opt for de-listing the products in question rather than complying with the burdensome provisions. 
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business Some minor additional limitations may apply as businesses would have to implement 
the system, which may pose a burden on their capacity. It must, therefore, be ensured 
that the system is designed in order to allo w all businesses, independent of their size, 
to implement and apply it. 
Article 17 Right to 
property No additional effects other those identified under policy option 3. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market +0.5 The potential negative effects on the labour market as described as 
part of Policy option 3 may be in part offset by employment 
created as a result of the require ment to report on suspicious 
transactions and the need for national authorities to prepare for the 
new measure. 
Impacts on public 
health +1 In addition to the positive effects identified under Policy option 3, 
the system for reporting suspicious transactions would further increase the possibility of detecting and preventing terrorist 
attacks involving HMEs and IEDs. 
Other impacts 0 Some inconvenience given that some products will no longer be 
available on the EU market (as they will be ineffective with low concentration levels). 
Article 8 Protection 
of personal data Setting up a system of reporting suspicious transactions requires the processing of 
personal data by sellers and to carry on an  assessment of customers for the disclosure 
of data to third parties who will also proc ess. The assessment carried out by sellers 
risks to be inappropriate if customers person al data will be disclosed to third parties, 
e.g. associations or law enforcement authorities (risk of blacklisting). This may imply 
a serious interference with pr ivate life. If this option is to be followed it will be 
necessary to demonstrate the necessity an d proportionality of this processing and 
provide particular rules relating to the speci fic and explicit purpose of the processing. 
Article 21 Non-
discrimination The system of reporting suspicious trans actions should not lead to overzealous, 
discriminatory reactions from businesses when identifying persons who in their view 
have the ‘physiognomy’ of a terrorist, rather than identifying persons buying 
extraordinary quantities or showing clearly suspicious behaviour. 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 
EN 103   EN POLICY OPTION 
4c – Option 3 plus 
additional 
measures: 
Introducing a 
system of 
reporting 
suspicious 
transactions Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
 0 The impacts on the environment would be the same as under 
policy option 3. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility and necessary 
preconditions to 
achieve impacts. +1.5 Important feasibility issues to be addressed relate to the potential 
overload of the system due to very high numbers of notifications 
and the operational setup. In order to ensure that the system would 
not affect privacy or trigger discrimination, it should be important for it to be ‘passive’, hence not requiring any level of 
investigation, surveillance or monitoring of customers. 
EU added value and 
rationale The EU rationale for introducing thresholds on concentration levels and a system for 
reporting suspicious transactions is high. The addition of the system strengthens the 
EU focus on security, as in some cases terro rist attacks or attempts to gain access to 
chemical substances and products could have been prevented if the seller had realised that the transaction was suspicious. As at least four Member States have similar 
measures in place. The policy option may be  more difficult for those products for 
which only relatively small quantities are needed to build an HME or IED. 
Need for changes in Community 
legislation The Policy option would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a 
regulation or directive, which would as a minimum set out the minimum operational 
requirements and suggestions for criteria to determine whether a transaction is 
suspicious. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and 
stakeholders  The majority of Member States and other stakeholders consulted were in favour of 
this Policy option. Many however were perhaps more in favour of a non-legislative 
measure, for example a programme either led by the State or based on self-regulation 
by industry, but were also willing to  consider a legislative instrument. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The Policy option overall receives higher scores than Policy option 3, given that it adds a higher level of 
security to the sales of chemical substances and product s. The feasibility of the Policy option is high as already 
several Member States have similar m easures in place. Stakeholders consulte d were indeed overall in favour of 
the Policy option. 
For some precursor groups, the Policy option is more useful than for others. With the reduced concentration levels, some chemical substances, such as strong acids , will have become less ‘reliable’ for making HMEs and 
IEDs. For these, establishing a system of reporting suspicious transactions may not be necessary. Others keep 
their dangerous characteristics or could be re-concent rated. For these, the proposed system is useful. 
 
 
 
EN 104   EN POLICY OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors with a 
code specifying 
that the purchase 
may be subject to 
registration, 
developing a 
system for 
recording the 
identity of the 
buyer (including 
internet sales). 
Records should 
be made available 
to competent law 
enforcement 
authorities Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
Policy option 4d includes the measures proposed as part of Policy option 3 (i.e. the introduction of threshold 
concentration levels) and proposes the introduction of a labelling scheme and a registration system for 
recording the identity of the buyer. The labelling scheme would focus on warning household users that the 
purchase may be subject to registration. The records of the registration system would need to be made available to competent law enforcement authorities. 
A labelling scheme is passive. It should not draw attention to the reasons why registration may occur, in order 
to avoid ‘experimenting’ by for example young curious people. A registration system for low chemical substances and products with low concentrations does not  seem to be fully justified. It may make more sense 
to register sales of high concentrations (as alread y happens in Member States such as Germany). This 
assessment however focuses on registering low concentra tions, as Policy option 4d is an ‘add-on’ to Policy 
option 3. Finally, using a registra tion system for preventive purposes will be close to impossible given the 
amounts of records that will be created every day. Only  a highly sophisticated on line database may allow for 
direct identification of transactions which are suspicious of for cross-references (e.g. many small purchases 
made by the same purpose in different locations). The registration scheme will therefore be mainly useful for 
investigative purposes after a terrorist event. It is noted that all assessments start with the rating and assessment of Policy option 3 as a minimum and 
subsequently determine whether the cumulative effect of Policy option 4d further improves or deteriorates the 
situation. It is therefore important that Policy optio ns 4a-d are read in conjunction with Policy option 3. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +3 The policy option would put in  place accompanying measures to 
control access. There is a chance th at, for chemical substances and 
products for which good alternatives are available, consumers will 
not want to register, as they consider it too much effort, but rather 
purchase the alternative. 
1.2 To reduce the reliability and 
potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or components 
manufactured for 
malicious or criminal purposes +3 In addition to placing thresholds on concentration levels, this 
Policy option would in addition label the chemical substances and 
products and request sellers to record all sales. The registration 
system will have a strong deterrent effect and improve the chances that terrorists and other criminals are caught when having 
undertaken an attack with HMEs  and IEDs. The benefits of the 
labelling scheme are less evident. 
1.3 To enhance the 
security and 
awareness of the entire supply chain of 
precursors +2 The entire supply chain is likely to become aware, as 
manufacturers will need to place the labels and retailer and other 
downstream sellers will need to record their sales. Hence awareness levels and security w ill improve. Awareness levels of 
other supply chain stakeholders are already reasonable as a result 
of other EU legislation. 
1.4 To prevent +1 The lowering of concentration levels in open sales channels in 
 
EN 105   EN POLICY OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors with a 
code specifying 
that the purchase 
may be subject to 
registration, 
developing a 
system for 
recording the 
identity of the 
buyer (including 
internet sales). 
Records should 
be made available 
to competent law 
enforcement 
authorities Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
terrorists and other 
criminals from 
making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on chemicals in some 
countries combination with a labelling scheme and registration system will 
create a strong EU level playi ng field both preventing market 
distortion and avoiding that persons can make use of lower 
standards in other EU Member States. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on 
administrative costs 
for business and 
authorities -3 Significant administrative costs. Retail will have to keep records 
of the identity of all clients of the products in question and submit 
them on request to public administration. Recording the identity of 
clients may qualify as normal business practice in chemical 
wholesale/specialised distribution, but not in retail.  
The public labelling provisions will need to be monitored by public authorities at a relatively large cost. 
Compliance costs for 
business and 
authorities - 3 Producers / packagers of consumer products will need to change 
the labels. Retailers will need to amend their procedures 
accordingly to accommodate the labelling and registry scheme for both online and business premises  transactions. They also will 
have to procure appropriate IT tools (covering their automated 
Internet sales as well) and train their staff. 
Economic impacts -3 Integrating a procedure of checking buyers’ identity and the 
validity of their registration will require considerable time and 
financial investment. A large proportion of retailers might find the 
registry system too onerous and will not sell the relevant substances to the general public. 
Consumers might be able to access certain high-
concentration chemicals after registration. Also, the time and effort needed to join the registration scheme will be 
substantial and could discourage them from buying the 
preferred chemicals.  
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business For some businesses, the implementation and management of the registration system 
would pose an additional burden which may make it difficult for them to conduct 
their business. It must, therefore, be ensure d that the system is designed in order to 
allow all businesses, independent of their size, to implement and apply. 
Article 17 Right to 
property No additional effects. 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour -1 Policy option 4d would worsen the negative effects of policy 
 
EN 106   EN POLICY OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors with a 
code specifying 
that the purchase 
may be subject to 
registration, 
developing a 
system for 
recording the 
identity of the 
buyer (including 
internet sales). 
Records should 
be made available 
to competent law 
enforcement 
authorities Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
market option3, as some retailers and other downstream sellers would not 
be able to afford running the registration system. If their business 
highly depended on the sales of the precursors, they would suffer 
economic losses and possibly redund ancies as a result. On the 
other hand, the development of a labelling scheme may create some new employment at the level of producers. Some retailers 
and downstream sellers could hire new staff to manage the system. 
Public authorities may need, initially, need more human resources to prepare for the new measure. Control and enfor cement agencies 
will also require additional human resources to check and follow 
up entries in the registration system. 
Impacts on public health +1 The labelling scheme and registration system would have a 
deterrent effect, thus reducing the possibility of detecting and 
preventing terrorist attacks involving HMEs and IEDs based on 
the precursors. 
Other impacts -2 Consumers may experien ce higher inconvenience levels when 
having to register for every (small) purchase of chemical 
substances or products. They may consider this very burdensome, 
especially as the system would apply to low concentration levels.  
Article 8 Protection of personal data This option will imply a processing of personal data for the further transmission to 
law enforcement authorities. This processing shall be in compliance with national DP 
laws implementing EU DP law.  This requires clear rules relating to the conditions for 
law enforcement authorities to access person al data, strict requirements on the 
specific and explicit purpose for the processing by buyers and law enforcement 
authorities, retention periods and other safeguards.. 
Article 21 Non-discrimination The registration system should only serve to record personal details, without any 
assessment or investigative action from the side of the seller as to whether the 
transaction is valid  or justified. 
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 Neutral impact. The impacts on the environment would be the 
same as under Policy 3.  
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, uncertainties, 
political and technical 
feasibility and necessary 
preconditions to 
achieve impacts. -1 There is a risk that the labe lling of products especially when 
hinting at the fact that they may pose a security risk, would attract 
the wrong attention from young ‘experimenters’, for example. For 
some products, given their very small size, labelling will be difficult and the warning may go unnoticed when the indications 
are too small. The true effectiven ess of adding a notice or warning 
that the purchase of the product co uld be subject to registration is 
somewhat questionable. Instead of labelling, the barcode on 
 
EN 107   EN POLICY OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors with a 
code specifying 
that the purchase 
may be subject to 
registration, 
developing a 
system for 
recording the 
identity of the 
buyer (including 
internet sales). 
Records should 
be made available 
to competent law 
enforcement 
authorities Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
products could be adapt to alert selle rs to the need to register. This 
is also very expensive. 
with regard to the registration system, there are several risks, 
uncertainties and preconditions. Firstly, the usefulness of a 
registration system for chemical substances and products in low concentrations may pose a too heavy burden on both businesses 
and household users. The amounts of data that will be entered in 
the system at national level will be enormous with a risk of crashes and losses of information. It will be important to consider 
whether the registration system would be deemed acceptable by 
the wider public, and whether it is proportional. The registration system would also require a speci fic mechanism to review whether 
a product should be subject to labelling and registration 
requirements or not. 
EU added value and rationale Differences in national appro aches would lead to market  distortion and displacement 
effects. In addition, the registration system strengthens the EU focus on security, 
increasing the chances to identify and catch te rrorists and other criminals. With regard 
to proportionality, the EU rationale is considered to be low. 
Need for changes in Community 
legislation The Policy option would require a legislative decision, for example in the form of a 
regulation or directive. This would also need to cover the labelling. A more operational framework or guidance would need to be developed on the minimum 
requirements of the registration system, what should be recorded, how this should be 
controlled, etc. 
Issues raised by Member States and 
stakeholders  The majority of Member States and other stakeholders did not consider Policy option 
4d a feasible option for such a wide range of precursors, covering a multitude of 
different products sold by a variety of retailers and other downstream sellers. 
Labelling could attract the wrong attention. A barcode was considered possibly more appropriate. Most were concerned that it would be very expensive to apply to all 
products available on the market. Possibly it should only apply to products with 
concentration levels above the thresholds set. Business stakeholders considered that the option would add a significant burden. 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
The policy option would help in achieving the policy objectives, but is scores low in terms of feasibility and stakeholder support. The main weaknesses relate to its  costs, the burden posed on businesses and consumers 
and its effectiveness. Such a ‘heavy’ system would not be justified, especially in the eyes of the general public, 
if its main purpose was limited to facilitating investigatio ns only once an attack has taken place. It is therefore 
questionable whether the policy option is proportional. 
For some precursor groups, the Policy option is potentially more useful than for others. With the reduced 
concentration levels, some chemical substances, such as  strong acids, will have become much less ‘reliable’ 
for making HMEs and IEDs. For these, establishing a labelling scheme and registration system would not be 
 
EN 108   EN POLICY OPTION 
4d – A scheme for 
labelling 
precursors with a 
code specifying 
that the purchase 
may be subject to 
registration, 
developing a 
system for 
recording the 
identity of the 
buyer (including 
internet sales). 
Records should 
be made available 
to competent law 
enforcement 
authorities Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
necessary. Others, such as nitromethane and, depending on its concentration level, hydrogen peroxide, keep 
their dangerous characteristics or could be re-concentrated. For these, the proposed system may be useful. 
 
 
POLICY OPTION 
5– Policy option 5: 
Taking measure to 
enhance the 
surveillance of 
professional use, 
including sub-
options such as: 
- 5.a Promoting 
Codes of 
conduct 
- 5.b Education 
and training 
- 5.c Raising 
staff awareness 
- 5.d Addressing 
in particular 
medium / small 
users Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
Overall considerations to dimension the Policy option 
This policy option would entail the introduction of one  or several non-legislative measures aiming at 
enhancing the control and surveillance of the precursors market among all supply chain actors. To this end, the 
SCP has recommended the possible adoption of Codes of Conduct, education and training measures and 
campaigns to increase awareness among supply chain operators. The proposed measures would need to 
address the specific concern of small and medium end-us ers. Several Member States (e.g. Germany, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden and UK) have developed similar meas ures with various purposes. It should be noted that 
the majority of voluntary measures adopted by Member States generally cover several groups of precursors, with only a few specifically dedi cated to specific precursors. 
Assessment of achievement of the policy objectives 
1.1 To restrict access 
to certain precursors 
by the general public +1.5 Positive effect. As a result of enhanced awareness among supply 
chain operators and notably retailers and end-user sellers, 
businesses may be encouraged not to sell the selected precursors 
to members of the public.  
 
EN 109   EN POLICY OPTION 
5– Policy option 5: 
Taking measure to 
enhance the 
surveillance of 
professional use, 
including sub-
options such as: 
- 5.a Promoting 
Codes of 
conduct 
- 5.b Education 
and training 
- 5.c Raising 
staff awareness 
- 5.d Addressing 
in particular 
medium / small 
users Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
In addition, as the proposed meas ures are voluntary, businesses are 
free not to comply with the requir ements, as there is no “hard” 
sanction for non-compliance.  
1.2 To reduce the reliability and 
potency of ‘home 
made’ explosives or 
components 
manufactured for malicious or criminal 
purposes 0 This policy option would not reduce the potency and reliability of 
HMEs or IEDs, as it would still be  possible to access the selected 
precursors in high concentrations by determined terrorists, 
especially at the retail level.  
1.3 To enhance the security and awareness of the 
entire supply chain of 
precursors +2 The proposed measures are the most likely to e ffectively increase 
the level of awareness among supply chain actors. Awareness campaigns similar to the UK “Know your customer” have 
significantly enhanced the awareness among businesses on the 
possible criminal/terrorist use of certain precursors. Moreover, existing awareness campaigns are often accompanied by 
notification/reporting mechanisms in case of thefts, losses or 
suspicious transactions. Codes of Conduct and related guidelines have also proved effective in raisin g security at all stages of the 
supply chain, notably during storage and transport.   
1.4 To prevent 
terrorists and other criminals from 
making use of lower 
control levels and 
fewer restrictions on 
chemicals in some countries +1 This policy option will not completely prevent terrorists from 
taking advantage of lower control levels, as the proposed measures are in essence voluntary and their effectiveness depends on 
businesses’ willingness to comply with them. While businesses in 
some Member States may have strong incentives to comply with 
the requirements (i.e. as there is already a strong culture and 
consensus around this type of meas ures), this may not be the case 
in other Member States. 
Assessment of economic impacts 
Impacts on administrative costs for business and 
authorities 0 This option does not impose admini strative costs upon businesses 
as it does not involve legal obligations. 
Compliance costs for business and authorities -0.5 This option does not impose compliance costs upon businesses: no 
requirements to comply with certain legislation, However, it is expected that all major players (members of the relevant trade 
associations of producers, chemi cal distributors, the retail sector) 
 
EN 110   EN POLICY OPTION 
5– Policy option 5: 
Taking measure to 
enhance the 
surveillance of 
professional use, 
including sub-
options such as: 
- 5.a Promoting 
Codes of 
conduct 
- 5.b Education 
and training 
- 5.c Raising 
staff awareness 
- 5.d Addressing 
in particular 
medium / small 
users Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
who will voluntarily comply with the relevant codes of conduct, 
will train their staff accordingly, and will employ other necessary 
tools and methods to raise awar eness among staff (and business 
partners). These costs are estimated  to be around €64 million per 
year, bearing in mind that actions disproportionately increasing the 
cost of sale are unlikely to be taken by businesses. 
Also, various public authorities will have to incur costs, to offer 
training and guidance. It is estimated that costs will about match the expenditure incurring to business, i.e. €64 million per year 
(this includes awareness raising cam paigns at an average cost of 
€1-2 million per Member State, some form of training given to thousands of retailers). 
These costs are an aggregate and no t specific to certain precursors 
(except some differences in the retail target group). 
Economic impacts  Lacking legal restrictions, the precursors and products based upon 
them will be still eligible for sale to the general public (at least this 
will not impose additional restrictions, if understood as an add-on 
Policy option).  
Article 16 Freedom 
to conduct a business No effect 
Article 17 Right to 
property No effect 
Assessment of social impacts 
Impacts on labour 
market +1 Sales to the general public would still continue, provided that there 
are no grounds for suspicion.  Businesses may refuse a few 
transactions, but this is not expected to lead to a significant loss in 
activity or job losses.  
Considering that a multitude of initiatives and measures would need to be developed by businesses, trade associations and public 
authorities, this policy option may lead to job creation.  
Impacts on public 
health +1 Although members of the general public could feel safer as a 
consequence of retailers and other supply chain actors enforcing stricter controls, this policy options would not completely prevent 
terrorists from accessing the selected precursors (e.g. using fake 
ID), and hence the potency and reliability of HMEs and IEDs would remain high.  
Voluntary measures supporting research, testing and detection 
 
EN 111   EN POLICY OPTION 
5– Policy option 5: 
Taking measure to 
enhance the 
surveillance of 
professional use, 
including sub-
options such as: 
- 5.a Promoting 
Codes of 
conduct 
- 5.b Education 
and training 
- 5.c Raising 
staff awareness 
- 5.d Addressing 
in particular 
medium / small 
users Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
lead to increased use of additives, phlegmatisation, substitutes, 
taggants and effective detection techniques. This may ultimately 
decrease the potency and reliability  of HMEs and IEDs, and hence 
reduce the number of casualties/life losses. 
Other impacts 0 Very little inconvenience to consumers, possibly some increased 
concerns if the voluntary measures are to ‘evident’ (e.g. warnings, 
posters, notices, etc).  
Article 8 Protection 
of personal data If the proposed awareness measures also encourage businesses to check the 
credentials of their customers in order to  identify suspicious transactions, clear 
guidelines related to the obligation to comply with national DP law implementing EU DP law will need to be set out, to avoid a lack of protection of personal data.  
Article 21 Non-
discrimination The proposed measure should explicitly define objective and non-discriminatory 
criteria for identifying suspicious customers/transactions, to avoid potential. 
discriminatory behaviour.  
Assessment of environmental impacts 
 0 Possibly some increased use of paper (and other hardcopy support 
requiring the use of chemicals) for awareness initiatives, guidance 
material, training material (e.g. leaflets, posters, booklets), etc. 
Considerations on feasibility and subsidiarity 
Key risks, uncertainties, political and technical 
feasibility and 
necessary preconditions to 
achieve impacts. -1 One of the key risks associated with this policy option is the 
voluntary nature of the measures, meaning that businesses may choose not to comply with the requirements. Awareness 
campaigns need to reach a significant share of the retail market 
and of professional end-users, requiring a tremendous effort from public authorities and trade associations. Such campaigns also 
require frequent “updat es” and follow-ups.  
The degree of professional organisation within the EU precursors market (i.e. to what extent the market is organised and well-
represented by trade bodies), greatly varies among Member States, 
which is not equally developed among the Member States. The 
existence of a good working relationship between industry and 
government is also essential. There may be some ‘cultural’ difficulties in some countries. 
It can take up to several years before a voluntary measure has a 
wide coverage and 100% market coverage often remains difficult to achieve.  
With regard to the notification of suspicious transactions, the 
simpler and more transparent the mechanism (i.e. do stakeholders 
 
EN 112   EN POLICY OPTION 
5– Policy option 5: 
Taking measure to 
enhance the 
surveillance of 
professional use, 
including sub-
options such as: 
- 5.a Promoting 
Codes of 
conduct 
- 5.b Education 
and training 
- 5.c Raising 
staff awareness 
- 5.d Addressing 
in particular 
medium / small 
users Rating of 
Anticipated 
impact 
effectiveness   General assessment 
 
Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve positive impacts 
need to call one single national hotline or several authorities at 
different levels and has this been clearly explained to them?), the 
more efficient and effectiv e such mechanisms are.. 
EU added value and 
rationale Overall, there would be a rationale in developing the proposed measures on an EU-
wide scale, as this would ensure an equal level of awareness among supply chain 
actors, and notably retailers. EU-wide actions have already been developed at EU-
level by EFMA (i.e. guidance for the secure  and safe storage of fertilisers on farms 
premises) or are under way (i.e. European Code supported by the Commission and 
targeting the entire supply chain). 
Need for changes in Community 
legislation No changes required. 
Issues raised by 
Member States and stakeholders  This policy option enjoys a very strong support among Member States and industry 
stakeholders, as the proposed measures ar e deemed highly desirable. In the Member 
States where such measures have been impl emented, it has been noted that the level 
of awareness among the supply chain has increased. Industry stakeholders pointed 
that it remains difficult to ensure that the proposed measures will be evenly applied across all Member States. With regard to research, several Member States agreed that 
increased research is needed into phlegmat isation, which could ultimately facilitate 
any (future) restrictions on the sale of pr ecursors above certain concentration levels 
Summary of main strengths and weaknesses 
Overall, there seems to be a clear support for developing some, if not, all measures proposed under this policy 
option. There was a consensus among Me mber States and industry stakehol ders that the proposed measures 
could be highly beneficial. This policy option can help indeed achieve a greater level of awareness and control 
within the supply chain, while its economic costs and impacts are close to  neutral. The fact that several 
Member States have developed similar measures in place,  seems to suggest that this type of measures work 
and are overall effective. Nonethele ss, the effectiveness of this policy option across all EU Member States 
depends on a certain number of pre-requisites. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
EN 113   EN   
ANNEX 10: GLOSSARY  
ADR International Carriage of  Dangerous Goods by Road 
Regulations (Accord européen relatif au transport international des marchandises dangereuses par route) 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CEFIC European Chemical Industry Council DG ENTR Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry of the 
European Commission 
DG JLS Directorate-General for Justi ce, Freedom and Security of the 
European Commission 
DG MOVE Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
DG SANCO Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs 
HME Home Made Explosive  HP  Hydrogen Peroxide  IED  Improvised Explosive Device REACH European Union Regulati on on Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and rest riction of Chemicals 
SCP  Standing Committee on Precursors