EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 11.05.2009 
SEC(2009) 616 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying document to the 
 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on aviation 
security charges  
  
IMPACT ASSESSMENT – SUMMARY  
 
{COM(2009) 217 final} 
{SEC(2009) 615} 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying document to the 
 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on aviation 
security charges 
  
IMPACT ASSESSMENT - SUMMARY 
 
{COM(2009) 217 final} 
{SEC(2009) 615} 
Lead DG : TREN 
Other involved services : DG JRC 
Agenda planning or WP reference : 2009/TREN/020 
Executive summary 
The cost of aviation security has increased over recent years. A study for the Commission 
estimated that in 2002 more than 90% of this co st was recovered throug h security charges (or 
taxes) levied on air passengers , airlines and cargo shippers. In 2007 these security charges 
yielded an estimated revenue of €1.6 billion in  the EU, which constitutes approximately 1 
percent of the average air fare. 
Problem 
The rise in aviation security costs has not  gone unnoticed by the industry. Each airline 
therefore tries to minimise its security costs by attempting to influence the structure for security charges. Airlines therefore often try to negotiate lower a lower per passenger security charge. However, it is only the larger airlines that can use their market position to this. The report has not established whether this risk exists in all Member States. 
EU action justified 
As aviation security is a core State responsibil ity, security charges should not be subject to 
commercial decisions between an airport and an airline. Current structures that do 
differentiate security charges mainly benefit the major national airlin es when operating from 
airports in their own Member State. Airlines  from other Member St ates benefit less from 
security charges that are differentiated. 
Objectives 
The main objective is, firstly, to ensure that  security charges do not unduly differentiate 
between airlines, air passengers  or cargo shippers  in the EU. Secondl y, security charges 
should not generate profit or be used to cros s-subsidise between airlines. Revenues from 
EN 3   EN security charges should therefore only be used  to cover the costs to which the security 
services give rise. 
Options 
This impact assessment evaluates four different options. 
Option 1  examines the consequences of no EU ac tion. If no EU action is taken, security 
charges are more likely to discrimi nate among airlines and passengers. 
Option 2  examines self-regulation by the industry ba sed on certain international principles 
that already are endorsed by Member States in ICAO, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation. These principles are: non-disc rimination, consultation with the airlines, 
transparency of security cost and using revenues from security charges only to cover security 
costs.1 
Option 3  makes the ICAO principles of Option 2 legally binding through an EU Directive 
with the possibility for airlines  to appeal against decisions ma de by airports. This increases 
the effectiveness of the transparency obligati on and is estimated to reduce aviation security 
charges by 10 percent. 
Option 4  suggests that Member States should fully finance airport secur ity. This removes any 
security charges. However, this option discourag es a more efficient aviation security service 
because there are no incentives for the security pr oviders to control the costs. In addition, it is 
unlikely to be accepted by the Council as it is vehemently opposed by Member States. 
This impact assessment concludes that opti on 3 best addresses the risks identified. The 
administrative burden for Member States and th e increased cost of business of option 3 are 
negligible as that option builds upon existing Member State policies and the structures established by the Directive on airport charges
2. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
The Commission will continuously monitor the deve lopments in the aviation security sector 
and especially evaluate on a re gular basis the number of air ports publishing details of their 
security charges. 
Section 1: Procedural issues and co nsultation of interested parties 
In the spring of 2008, DG TREN sent a questi onnaire to Member States and organisations 
representing industry and consumers asking fo r information on financing aviation security 
costs. In addition to the ques tionnaires, a consultation meeting was held on 17 July 2008 with 
representatives from Member States, the Eur opean Parliament and industry. No external 
expertise was used for this impact assessment.  However, DG JRC estimated the impact of 
some of the measures. This report was disc ussed with the Impact Assessment Board on 14 
January 2009 which issued its opinions on 20 Ja nuary and 24 February 2009. The opinions of 
the Board listed the following r ecommendations for improvements: 
                                                 
1 ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 9082/7), 2004, point 29. 
2 Directive 2009/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on airport 
charges (OJ L 70, 14.3.2009, p. 11) 
EN 4   EN – To establish more precisely and substantiate the distortions of competition and strengthen 
the case for EU action. Better demonstrate the benefits and disadvantag es of the preferred 
option. 
– To develop the content of the options and expand the available range of alternatives. 
Following these recommendations, the impact a ssessment has been revised along these lines. 
– The economic reasoning has been reinforced across the report. Complaints of 
discriminatory or excessive s ecurity costs have been assesse d. The case for EU action with 
regard to measures imposed by member States that are more stringent than required by EU 
regulation could not be substan tiated due to unavailability of necessary data. The report 
therefore no longer includes any proposal for EU action with regard to these measures. 
– The options are described in more detail and explicitly mention, where appropriate, the 
preferred legal instrument. The option on mandat ory transparency without  the possibility to 
of appealing appeal against security charge s has been replaced by an option on increased 
transparency through self-regulation by the in dustry. This new optio n also covers the 
alternative of non-binding Co mmission guidelines to addre ss the problems identified.  
Section 2: Problem definition 
The rise in aviation security costs has sharpene d the focus on these costs. The increased cost 
of security has given th e airlines stronger incenti ves to minimise these costs. An airline may 
therefore use its bargaining power , where possible, over an airpor t to modify the structure of 
security charges. Sometimes an airline is sufficien tly strong to ensure that it benefits from the 
charges structure. This is us ually done through lo wer charges for dest inations where the 
airline has the highest proportion of the traffic. 
Cross-subsidisation of revenues between these categories is often necessary to balance out 
this differentiation in security charges for different destinations. In a situation where there are few or no contributions from the State, a cross-s ubsidisation means that some airlines will be 
overcharged to compensate for the losses ge nerated by other airlines. This overcharging 
means that security charges are excessive and discriminatory for those airlines. The 
Commission has also found that discriminatory and excessive s ecurity charges can have state-
aid implications.
3 
Section 3: Objectives 
As aviation security is a core state responsib ility, such measures should not discriminate 
between the citizens. Neither should the methods  for funding these measures and the setting 
of security charges be influenced by the commer cial relations airports and airlines. The main 
objective is, firstly, to ensure that securi ty charges do not unduly differentiate between 
airlines, air passengers or car go shippers in the EU. Secondl y, security char ges should not 
generate profit or be used to cross-subsidise between airlines. Revenues from security charges 
should therefore only be used to cover the costs to which the security services give rise. For 
                                                 
3 State aid — Germany — State aid C 29/08 (ex NN  54/07) — Germany — Flughafen Frankfurt Hahn 
and Ryanair — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, (OJ C 12 of 
17.1.2009) 
EN 5   EN the purposes of this impact assessment, security  charges that recover more than the security 
costs are considered as excessive. 
Section 4: Policy options 
This impact assessment evaluates four different options. 
Option 1  analyses current trends  and examines the consequences of no EU action. 
Option 2  examines whether self-regulation by the i ndustry can ensure consumers' interest and 
promote more efficient aviation security serv ices. Such self-regulation could be based on 
certain international principles that alrea dy are endorsed by ICAO. Th ese principles are: 
– non-discrimination, 
– consultation with the airlines, 
– transparency of security costs and 
– revenues from security charge s only cover security costs. 
The objective of consultation is to encourage a dialogue between airlines and airports to look 
for more efficient ways to comply  with security requirements.  
Option 3  is similar to option 2, but makes the pr inciples legally binding through an EU 
Directive. In addition, option 3 establishes an  independent supervisor y authority in every 
Member State to which airlines can appeal  against decisions on security charges.  
Option 4  proposes that Member States should fu lly finance airport security through an 
amendment to the framework Regulation on aviation security.4 The objective is to remove all 
security charges and thereby the discriminatory aspects. 
Section 5: Analysis of impacts 
Option 1.  If no EU action is taken, s ecurity charges are more like ly to discriminate between 
airlines and passengers because the Directive on  airport charges regulates other charges. The 
risks identified in Section 2 ar e expected to be accentuated.  
Option 2.  This option is based on principles th at were published as long ago as 1981 but 
which are still not always followed. Self-regulat ion by the industry is therefore unlikely to 
work now. The effects of option 2 are ther efore similar to the effects of option 1. 
This option does not increase the burden on busi ness or on Member States. The industry does 
not need to develop the guidelines as ICAO r ecommendations already provide sufficient level 
of detail. 
Option 3.  This increases the effectiveness of the consultation and transparency obligation and 
is estimated that it will reduce overall co sts for aviation security by 10 percent.  
                                                 
4 Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation security  and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, (OJ L 
97, 9.4.2008, p. 72) 
EN 6   EN Transparency allows for airlines to scrutini se the cost components serving as a basis for 
determining the level of security charges and to  verify whether security  charges discriminate 
among users. Airlines can then give their view s on how the revenues from airport charges are 
used. By discussing the security measures and as sociated costs, better and more cost-efficient 
solutions may be found. Transparency will also allow the airlines to discover whether costs 
other than those for aviation security are included  in the cost base for security charges. The 
discussions will also allow the airlines' tra ffic forecasts to be taken into account as 
management of security measures depends la rgely on the number of  passengers and their 
destinations. 
The introduction of mandatory tran sparency of security costs is  expected to reduce security 
charges on average by more than  10 percent. This would be passed on to passengers through 
the competitive pressure in the market and translat e into a reduction in the final air fare to the 
air passengers. As security costs constitute 1% of the air fare, the air fare is therefore expected 
to be reduced by 10% of 1% which results in a total reduction of 0.1%. This reduction in the 
average air fare would increase the demand for air travel and the estimates of the quantitative 
analysis show that this increase in demand would increase mainly over shorter distances (500-1000 km) and non-business trips. Regional and smalle r airports that serv e shorter routes are 
more likely to benefit from this increase in de mand than larger airports. Similarly, airlines 
serving these airports, mainly low-cost and re gional airlines, would benefit on average more 
than other airlines. The distribut ion of effects is e xpected to be fairly  uniform among EU-27 
Member States. Among airlines, low-cost and re gional airlines are also able to profit more 
than larger airlines. 
The administrative burden on Member States is increased due to the establishment of a 
national supervisory authority. However, the Directive on airport ch arges already obliges 
Member States to establish such authorities. The additional task of assessing complaints on security charges is expected to be insignificant and in no case more than the cost of one full 
time staff per Member State. 
Consultations would have to be  established at air ports to which the Directive on airport 
charges does not apply. However, the cost of one yearly meeting between airports, airlines 
and the security service provide rs is very low and not possibl e to establish. If the smaller 
airports were exempt from this  option passengers usi ng these airports woul d not benefit from 
the expected cost reductions especially as th ese reductions are expected to be proportionally 
higher at smaller and regional airports than at larger airports. Neither would the low-cost and 
regional airlines operating to smaller airports benefit. 
Option 4  effectively addresses discriminatory and excessive security charges. An obligation 
on Member States to cover all security costs re moves all the security charges. However, this 
option discourages more efficient aviation secu rity because there are no incentives for the 
security providers to ke ep costs under control.  
The costs for Member States would increase by the same amount as security charges yield 
revenue: this means approximate ly €1.6 billion per year. Memb er States would have to 
finance this increase through other revenue s ources. In addition, the administrative burden on 
Member States would increase to administer the payment of the security costs. However, this 
increase in administrative burden is expected to be negligible. 
A reduction in security charges reduces the averag e air fare which as a result stimulates the 
demand for air traffic. This effect is quantifie d and presented in the table below. As in option 
EN 7   EN 3, low-cost and regional airlines that serve regional and smaller airports are more likely to 
benefit from this increase in demand than larger and airlines airports. 
Consequently, option 4 is not expected to have  an impact on competition between airports or 
between airlines. 
Section 6: Comparing the options 
Options 1 and 2 do not attain the objectives, while options 3 and 4 e ffectively address the 
concerns of discriminatory and excessive s ecurity charges. Option 4, however, discourages 
more efficient aviation security services be cause there are no incentives for the security 
providers to control costs. 
The increased administrative burden of option 3 is negligible because the same authority as 
established by the Directive on ai rport charges can be used.  
Consequently, option 3 offers the most efficient overall solution.  
Opting for the form of a directive, rather th an a regulation, would have the advantage of 
allowing Member States to transpose such principles in line with the implications of the various legal and administrative systems and th ereby to keep the admi nistrative burden to a 
minimum. 
The following table summarises the quantitativ e impacts per year of the options studied. 
Options 1 
No EU action 2 
Self-regulation 3 
Mandatory 
transparency, 
cost-relatedness 
and possibility 
to appeal 4 
Full state 
funding 
Impact on traffic 0 0 Increase in 
passenger traffic 
by 0.6 million 
passengers per 
year Increase in 
passenger traffic 
by 6 million 
passengers per 
year 
External costs 0 0 €1 million €10 million 
Financial 
impact on Member States 0 0 0 Increased costs 
by €1.6 billion 
Administrative burden on Member States 0 0 Negligible 
negative impact Negative impact 
EN 8   EN Options 1 
No EU action 2 
Self-regulation 3 
Mandatory 
transparency, 
cost-relatedness 
and possibility 
to appeal 4 
Full state 
funding 
Financial impact on industry and air passengers 0 0 Air passengers 
are expected to 
save €80 million 
and airline 
income is 
expected to 
increase by €60 
million Decreased costs 
by €1.6 billion 
Increased burden of business on industry 0 Negligible 
negative impact 
on airports with 
an annual traffic 
of less than five 
million 
passengers Negligible 
negative impact 
on airports with 
an annual traffic 
of less than five 
million 
passengers 0 
 
Section 7: Monitoring and evaluation 
The Commission will continuously monitor the deve lopments in the aviation security sector 
and evaluate the impact of the proposed legislat ion on a regular basis. More specifically, the 
Commission will observe market developments with regard to the following issues: 
• The impact on consumers and the aviation industry. 
• The level of transparency of security costs. 
• The overall cost of aviation security in Europe. 
The core indicators for progress towards meeting the objectives set for this policy initiative 
are the following: 
(1) The number of airports publis hing their security charges. 
(2) Whether there is a reduction in the le vel of security charges in Europe. 
The conclusions of the impact assessment are based on the current market situation.