21. 4. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 105/9 
new cytotoxic drugs than from the improvement of existing 
drugs and their more precise targeting to prevent damage 
due to the therapy. 
5.4. The ESC is particularly pleased to see that a 
separate section has been devoted to AIDS research, 
although it would be better to use the heading 'HIV 
infection research'. The main emphasis here should, 
however, be on coordinating and promoting research in the 
social and behavioural sciences. 
5.4.1. It is primarily the results of such research which 
will determine whether in the next few years we shall be 
able to halt the dramatic spread of HIV infections. Social 
science research must provide the basis for large-scale and 
effective programmes for educating the public and 
promoting behavioural changes without which it will be 
impossible to slow the advance of the epidemic. 
5.4.2. If we are to develop programmes for promoting 
behavioural change we need more information on actual 
sexual behaviour in the Community, on the distribution 
and frequency of high-risk sexual pratices, and on factors affecting behaviour and how they develop. Programmes for 
informing and educating the public and promoting changes 
in behaviour should be tested and examined on a 
comparative basis in the Community. 
5.4.3. In the section of the programme dealing with HIV 
infections a further project should be included under the 
heading 'Disease control and prevention', viz. studies on 
the spread of the infection, the latent period between 
infection and appearance of the disease and the factors 
contributing to the appearance of AIDS after infection. 
5.4.4. On the other hand, the time would not yet seem to 
be ripe for the 'Development of multi-centre clinical trials 
in AIDS'. 
6. The ESC once again stresses its support for the 
coordination programme in the field of medical and health 
research. In future programmes of this kind provision could 
be made for contractual research to fill any gaps in specific 
areas where insufficient research is at present being carried 
out in the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 25 February 1987. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alfons MARGOT 
Opinion on the draft proposal for a Council Decision on a Community System of Rapid 
Exchange of Information in Cases of Unusually High Levels of Radioactivity or of a Nuclear 
Accident 
(87/C 105/06) 
On 3 September 1986 the Commission of the European Communities decided to consult the 
Economic and Social Committee, under the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 31 thereof, on the abovementioned proposal. 
The Section for Energy, Nuclear Questions and Research, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 6 February 1987 in the light of Mr Saiu's 
report. 
At its 244th Plenary Session (meeting of 25 Feburary 1987) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion unanimously less 1 abstention: 
No C 105/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 21. 4. 87 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Chapter III of the Euratom treaty, the Directives 
laying down basic standards for the protection of the health 
of the general public and workers against the dangers 
arising from ionizing radiation, and the bilateral agree­
ments concluded by some Member States on information, 
coordination and mutual assistance in the case of nuclear 
accidents, have all failed to ensure an adequate Community 
response to a major accident such as Chernobyl. 
1.2. Information emanating from the Member States 
has been uncoordinated, varying in presentation and often 
piecemeal in character, with the result that even its 
reliability has been called into question. This situation has 
been made even worse by the development of trans-frontier 
communications. 
1.3. The Chernobyl nuclear accident has therefore not 
only demonstrated the Community's inability to coordi­
nate its response to a major accident, but it has also shown 
that the Commission has been prevented from shouldering 
the responsibilities vested in it under Article 38 of the 
Euratom Treaty. 
1.4. The result has been reactions on an unprecedented 
scale leading, in particular, to an unquestionable loss of 
confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants situated in 
the Member States, and attacks on the reliability of existing 
safety procedures and arrangements. Such reactions also 
end up by placing a question mark against the future of 
nuclear energy itself, which on average accounts at the 
moment for 35 % of the European Community's total 
electricity production (but up to 60 % in Belgium and 65 % 
in France). 
1.5. For the above reasons urgent measures are required 
to restore and rebuild public confidence in the field of 
information. However, this should not mean denigrating 
the scale and value of the efforts which have so far enabled 
the European nuclear industry to achieve a very high level 
of technical safety. The aim should rather be to draw on the 
lessons of Chernobyl to improve existing Community 
procedures and arrangements, or even introduce new ones 
where necessary. 
2. General comments 
2.1. The introduction of a Community system for the 
rapid exchange of information in cases of unusually high 
levels of radioactivity or of a nuclear accident is dictated by 
the aforementioned need to restore public confidence. 2.2. The Committee accordingly approves the principle 
of such a Community system, but considers that the 
Commission's draft proposal for a Decision should be 
substantially amended in line with the proposals and 
suggestions set out in Point 3 of this Opinion. The aim 
would be to supplement existing arrangements and make 
them more effective. 
2.3. The Committee considers that the Community's 
system for the rapid exchange of information should come 
into operation as quickly as possible. This would show that 
the Member States do not underestimate the risk that a 
similar accident, or an accident on a comparable scale, may 
occur in the Community. It would also show that the 
Member States do not overestimate the capacity of existing 
mechanisms to respond to a nuclear accident, and have the 
determination to respond quickly to public concerns. 
2.4. The Committee would emphasize that such a 
system would only be a first step. In-depth discussions 
should be held and, if necessary, initiatives or decisions 
taken to make the system considerably more effective, 
particulary in the following areas: 
— the increase in the volume of information, 
— the standardization of information and the methods 
used for its collection and presentation, 
— improvements in the handling of information, 
— the trans-frontier communication of information, and 
its repercussions, particularly in Member States without 
a nuclear industry, 
— the public dissemination of information and, in 
particular, the provision of information which is readily 
understood by the general public; to this end Member 
States should be encouraged to provide the public with 
standardized, comprehensible information about nu­
clear installations, their characteristics and the safety 
control measures taken; information would be pro­
vided by the appropriate authorities (including regional 
and local authorities) accountable to the Member 
States, 
— training and informing people on how to behave, 
particularly in a post-Chernobyl-type situation. 
2.5. The Committee also considers that a Community 
system for the rapid exchange of information should be 
supplemented without delay by a scheme for mutual 
assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency. The roles and responsibilities of the Commis­
sion, the Member States and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) should be clearly defined here. 
2.6. The Committee further considers that it is essential 
to strive for improvements in the way in which the 
provisions of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty are 
implemented. This can be done through encouraging active 
21. 4. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 105/11 
participation and, whenever necessary, adapting the basic 
standards to technical progress in the light of the various 
types of people likely to be affected by ionizing radiation, 
particularly children. 
3. Specific comments 
3.1. Generally speaking the Committee considers that, 
without calling into question the essence of the proposed 
Community system for the rapid exchange of information, 
the provisions should where possible be brought closer into 
line with the provisions of the Convention on early 
notification of a nuclear accident already drawn up and 
adopted by the IAEA. 
3.2. The Committee also invites the Commission to take 
into account the following comments and suggestions in its 
final proposal. 
3.2.1. The meaning of 'unusually high levels of 
radioactivity in the environment' is itself open to 
interpretation and this could lead to Member States 
applying the provisions to the Decision differently. 
However, the Committee is aware of the difficulty of fixing 
uniform criteria and reference levels which would clarify 
the meaning. 
The Committee asks that the Member States notify the 
Commission without delay of the criteria they apply or 
intend to apply so that discussions can get under way with 
the Commission on the standardization, where necessary, 
of such criteria. 
3.2.2. The proposed interval at which the information 
required under the Decision is to be transmitted to the 
Commission should be highly flexible so that the latter can 
be informed without delay of any change in the situation. 
3.2.3. The list of information to be provided by the 
Member States should be in line with the list in the IAEA 
Convention. 
Done at Brussels, 25 February 1987. The Committee also considers that the list should include 
information about radioactivity checks on foodstuffs and 
drinking water and on measures taken or planned to inform 
workers and the public. 
The Member States should also be required to forward 'all 
other information on the development of the emergency 
situation and its foreseeable or actual termination' not 
already explicitly referred to in the list. 
To avoid any delays, such information should be 
forwarded as and when it becomes available. 
3.2.4. Irrespective of the legal obligations which will be 
incumbent on the Member States as a result of this 
Decision, it is essential for the Member States to be 
encouraged to volunteer the fullest possible information to 
the Commission. 
The Committee would therefore propose that the Decision 
allow the Member States to make unrestricted use of the 
information sent to them, except where such information is 
provided in confidence. In the latter case the Commission 
could hold consultations with the Member State which has 
demanded that information be treated as confidential, 
either on the initiative of the Commission or any other 
Member State. The aim would be to assess whether the 
confidentiality is justified and, where necessary, to 
determine the period during which the information remains 
confidential. 
3.2.5. Without prejudice to the powers which the 
Commission and the Member States possess under the 
Euratom Treaty, and in particular Articles 38,141 and 142 
thereof, the Commission should have the legal means to be 
able to take swifter action against a Member State which 
fails to fulfil its obligations under the Decision. 
3.3. The Committee accordingly proposes the Draft 
Decision appended to this Opinion. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alfons MARGOT 
No C 105/12 Official Journal of the European Communities 21. 4. 87 
APPENDIX 
Article 1 
1. Whenever any Member State measures unusually high levels of radioactivity in the environment or 
whenever an accident or other event occurs on the territory of a Member State involving any facility or activity 
of that Member State or of persons or legal institutions under its jurisdiction, and there is the potential for or 
actual occurrence of a release of radioactive materials, the Member State shall: 
a) forthwith notify the Commission, and the other Member States which are or may be affected, of the levels of 
radioactivity measured, the nature, time of occurrence and exact location of the accident or event; 
b) rapidly provide the Commission with the information set out in Article 2; 
c) continue to inform the Commission during a period deemed by the latter to be necessary, and at all events at 
no more than daily intervals, of the levels of radioactivity measured. 
Article 2 
1. The information to be provided pursuant to Article 1(b) shall include the following: 
a) the nature of the accident or the event; 
b) the facility or activity involved; 
c) the time of its occurrence and its exact location; 
d) the assumed or established cause and the foreseeable development of the accident or event relevant to the 
release of the radioactive materials; 
e) the general characteristics of the radioactive release, including, as far as is practicable and appropriate, the 
nature, probable physical and chemical form and the quantity, composition and effective height of the 
radioactive release; 
f) information on current and forecast meteorological and hydrological conditions, necessary for forecasting 
the dispersion of the radioactive release; 
g) the results of environmental monitoring; 
h) the results of radioactivity checks on foodstuffs and drinking water; 
i) the measures and means taken or planned, of protecting the health and ensuring the safety of workers and 
the public; 
j) the measures taken, or planned, to inform the public; 
k) the predicted or foreseeable behaviour over time of the radioactive release; 
1) all other information on the development of the emergency situation and its foreseeable or actual 
termination. 
2. The information set out above must be forwarded as and when it becomes available. 
Article 3 
After receipt of the information referred to in Article 1, any Member State must: 
a) rapidly inform the Commission of the measures taken or planned, and the recommendations issued, 
following the receipt of such information, particularly where relevant to the protection of public health and 
safety; 
b) continue to inform the Commission during a period deemed by the latter to be necessary, and at all events at 
no more than daily intervals, of the levels of radioactivity measured, particularly in foodstuffs, drinking 
water and the environment. 
Article 4 
1. Upon receipt of the information referred to in Articles 1 and 3, the Commission shall immediately forward 
it to the competent national authorities of all the other Member States. 
2. Information received pursuant to paragraph 1 may be used without restriction, except when such 
information is forwarded in confidence by the Member State concerned. The Member State in question must 
justify the demand that the information be treated confidentially and must specify the nature of the information. 
In such cases the Commission shall: 
a) immediately inform the competent national authorities of all the other Member States of the confidentality 
of the information which has been forwarded to them; 
21. 4. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 105/13 
b) set in motion a consultation procedure with the competent national authorities of the Member State in 
question, either on its own initiative or at the request of the competent national authorities of any other 
Member State, with the aim of evaluating whether the restrictions on the use of the information are justified 
and determining, where necessary, the period during which such restrictions shall be maintained. 
Article 5 
1. The Member States shall notify the Commission of the criteria which they apply and intend to apply in 
order to implement Article 1. The Commission shall make an inventory of such criteria. 
2. In the light of this inventory the Commission shall, where necessary, join with the competent national 
authorities in standardizing such criteria. 
The Economic and Social Committee shall be informed of the work undertaken in pursuance of this Article. 
Article 6 
Each Member State shall indicate to the Commission the competent national authorities and points of contact 
designated to forward or receive the information referred to in Articles 1,3 and 4. The Commission shall in turn 
communicate this to the competent authorities of the other Member States. 
Such points of contact and the designated Commission service shall be available on a 24 hour basis. 
Article 7 
Detailed procedures for the transmission of the information referred to in Articles 1,3 and 4 shall be determined 
by the Commission in consultation with the competent authorities of the Member States and tested at regular 
intervals. 
The Economic and Social Committee shall be informed to these detailed procedures. 
Article 8 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this present Directive, it 
shall immediately enjoin this Member State, given the emergency situation referred to in Article 1, to take by a 
fixed period all the measures necessary to implement the said Decision, without prejudice to the powers which 
the Commission and the Member States possess under the Euratom Treaty, and in particular Articles 38, 141 
and 142 thereof. 
Article 9 
The Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with this decision within one month of the date 
of notification. 
Article 10 
This Decision is addressed to the Member States. 
Own-initiative Opinion on Stocktaking and Prospects for a Community Rail Policy 
(87/C 105/07) 
On 25 November 1986 the Economic and Social Committe, acting under the fourth paragraph of 
Article 20 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Opinion on Stocktaking and Prospects 
for a Community Rail Policy. 
The Section for Transport and Communications, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 11 February 1987 in the light of the 
Report by Mr Campbell, Rapporteur, Mr Bleser and Mr Haas, Co-Rapporteurs. 
At its 244th Plenary Session (meeting of 25 February 1987) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion with no votes against and twenty abstentions: