Contents

1. Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties. 3

1.1. Organization and timing. 3

1.2. Consultation and expertise. 3

1.2.1. Consultation. 3

1.2.2. External expertise. 4

1.3. Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board. 5

2. Problem definition. 6

2.1. Policy context. 6

2.2. Progress achieved and lessons learned. 7

2.2.1. Trends in energy consumption and energy efficiency. 8

2.2.2. Policy developments. 11

2.2.3. Projections of progress towards the 2020 target. 12

2.2.4. Interactions with other elements of the present energy and climate framework. 14

2.2.5. Current energy efficiency trends compared to the identified cost-effective energy-saving potentials and the EU decarbonisation goals. 16

2.3. What is the problem?. 16

2.3.1. General problem.. 16

2.3.2. Specific problems. 17

2.4. What are the drivers for the problem?. 18

2.5. The Union's right to act, subsidiarity and proportionality. 20

3. Scope and Objectives. 20

3.1. Context and scope. 20

3.2. Objectives. 21

3.2.1. General objective. 21

3.2.2. Specific objectives. 21

3.2.3. Operational objectives. 21

3.3. Consistency with other policies. 22

4. Policy Options. 22

4.1. Options for closing the gap towards the 2020 target. 22

4.2. Analysis of the optimal level of savings for 2030. 22

4.3. Options for the architecture of the energy efficiency framework post-2020. 29

5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS. 30

5.1. Methodology. 30

5.2. Policy options for 2020. 34

5.3. Ambition level 2030. 36

5.3.1. Energy system impacts. 36

5.3.2. Economic impacts in the energy system.. 44

5.3.3. Macro-economic impacts. 51

5.3.4. Environmental impacts. 61

5.3.5. Additional environmental and health impacts. 63

5.3.6. Competitiveness and Affordability of energy. 64

5.4. Architecture of the 2030 energy efficiency policy framework. 65

5.4.1 Overall architecture. 65

5.4.2 Formulation of a 2030 target 67

5.5. The role of financing. 69

6. Conclusions. 71

6.1. Policy options for 2020. 71

6.2. Ambition level 2030. 71

6.2.1 Energy system impacts including security of supply. 71

6.2.3 Social impacts. 73

6.2.4 Environmental impacts. 73

6.3. Architecture of the 2030 policy framework. 74

6.4. Financing. 74

1. Procedural issues and consultation of interested parties 1.1. Organization and timing

The preparation of the Impact Assessment (IA) for the Energy Efficiency Review started in 2012 following the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/EC, 'EED') which requires it. Its scope was broadened by the Communication “A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030” (2030 Communication), and the IA builds on the preparatory work and impact assessment done for that Communication[1].

Interservice meetings at Director level were held on 22 March and 9 April 2014. The energy efficiency interservice group (ISG) discussed the IA 4 times, on 13 March, 28 March, 30 April and 13 May 2014. The lead DG is Energy. The services invited to the ISG were Agriculture and Rural Development; Budget; Communications Networks, Content and Technology; Climate Action; Competition; Economic and Financial Affairs; Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion; Enterprise and Industry; Environment; Eurostat; Health and Consumers; Infrastructure and Logistics in Brussels; Internal Market and Services; Joint Research Centre; Mobility and Transport; Regional and Urban Policy; Research and Innovation; Secretariat-General; Taxation and Customs Union; Legal Service; and the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

1.2. Consultation and expertise 1.2.1. Consultation

Public consultation was conducted between 3 February and 28 April 2014. Stakeholder views were sought on (i) the right approach for addressing the shortfall in progress towards the 2020 target; (ii) the design of a possible future energy efficiency target; (iii) possible additional measures to address the economic saving potentials in different sectors. 733 responses were submitted representing a broad spectrum of stakeholders.[2] The Commission's minimum consultation standards were met. The report of the public consultation is in Annex I.

The review was discussed with Member States in the Energy Efficiency Directive Committee on 14 March 2014. A high-level stakeholder conference was held on 22 May 2014. It provided useful first-hand accounts on the major issues addressed by the consultation and complemented the formal public consultation.

Those Member States that took part in the public consultation (8 Member States), have stated diverging views with two calling for a binding target and 5 being against energy efficiency targets, some of them suggested waiting for clearer results of the impact of the existing measures, and/or pleading for the reinforced implementation of the existing measures.

In addition to the views received to the public consultation, five additional Member states called for a binding energy efficiency target in an open letter to the Commission in view of the EED Review (dated 17 June 2014).

Box 1: Main findings of the public consultation

Many respondents argued that energy efficiency is a sound response to the prevailing energy security issue in Europe and also an effective tool for climate mitigation. It triggers innovation and creates new jobs. A number of replies indicated in particular that there is still untapped potential in manufacturing industry and that more needs to be done in buildings. Most respondents considered that the shortfall in achieving the EU energy efficiency objective for 2020 should be addressed through targets or new policy measures. 108 respondents suggested other means of tightening the gap. Among 312 respondents favouring targets for 2020 and/or 2030, 43% considered that these should be expressed in terms of absolute energy savings; 20% in terms of energy intensity; and 30% as a combination of the two. Respondents favouring targets argued for them at EU (218), national (205) or sectoral (110) level. 221 respondents (70%) favoured legally binding targets while 70 (22%) would prefer indicative targets. 534 respondents saw the need for additional financing instruments and mechanisms at EU level. For many, this should go hand in hand with reducing the market and non-economic barriers and raising awareness of the underlying benefits of energy efficiency. One group of stakeholders stressed the need for the development and uptake of new technologies, while a second emphasised that the necessary solutions are already available and should be promoted through demand side policies and exchange of best practice, awareness raising and information campaigns.

1.2.2. External expertise

The IA is supported by:

- Analysis of security of supply through energy system modelling using the PRIMES partial equilibrium model, developed and used by the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA). The model provided projections of energy consumption and import dependency. A number of energy efficiency scenarios were modelled to analyse their impacts on import dependency;

- Analysis of European competitiveness on the basis of the Communication and assessment of energy prices and costs in Europe[3] and accompanying ECFIN report[4]; macroeconomic modelling using GEM-E3, a general equilibrium model, maintained and used by NTUA; and macroeconomic modelling using E3MG, a macro-econometric model run by Cambridge Econometrics. GEM-E3 and E3MG were used to assess GDP, employment and related impacts of the energy efficiency scenarios;

- Analysis of sustainability aspects through the PRIMES model;

- Analysis of impact on energy prices through the POLES model;

- Analysis of potentials and progress through:

o Bottom-up analysis of the impact of current EU and Member State energy efficiency measures; decomposition analysis of factors contributing to changes in energy consumption in the EU; and bottom-up analysis of sectoral energy-saving potentials by Fraunhofer ISI;

o Analysis of Member States' energy efficiency obligation schemes and alternatives under the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)[5] by CE Delft.

1.3. Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board

The draft IA was submitted to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 14 May and was discussed at the IAB hearing on 4 June 2014, following which the IAB asked for a revised submission. The board asked for clarifying the context of the initiative and the logic behind the impact assessment. This was done by including a clearer description of the link and complementarity of the Energy Efficiency Review with the relevant initiatives, notably the “2030” Communication (section 2.1).

Regarding the analysis of progress towards the 2020 target the board requested more evidence on the basis of which certain assertions are made, in particular the expected size of the gap to the target. The revised impact assessment includes up-to-date and more extensive information .

The board also requested to include an analysis, based on experience with the current framework, of the interactions between different sets of targets (EE, RES, GHG) and, more broadly, pricing/market-based instruments and other types of policies. A dedicated section has been added in section 2.

In line with the request from the board section 2 has been restructured to provide clear information on the baseline should be clarified.

The analysis of options for bridging the gap to 2020 (section 5.2) includes more details on the underlying assumptions and expected impacts.

Regarding the analysis of options for the optimal level of energy efficiency policy for 2030 the board asked to justify the logic behind modelling different levels of ambition rather than different options for achieving 25% savings by 2030, mentioned in the 2030 Communication. This is addressed in section 4 (4.2) and 5 (5.1).

Section 3 (objectives) has been restructured to make clearer links with section 2 (problem definition) and 4 (policy options) and correspond to the IA guidelines.

The board also indicated that the impact analysis of the different levels of ambition for 2030 needs to be strengthened, in particular regarding possible interactions with the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Additional information in this respect was added in section 2.2.4, 3.1 and Annex V.

Finally the board asked to explain how the option of a binding target would be translated into concrete actions and legislative acts (e.g. for the building sector, CO2 reduction targets for cars, and on eco-design), and assess the related according costs and benefits. The scope of the review was clarified in section 4.2.

2. Problem definition 2.1. Policy context

In 2007 the European Council set the target of saving 20% primary energy by 2020 (compared to 2007 projections). The Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) establishes a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency to ensure the achievement of the target. It requires the Commission to assess by June 2014 whether the EU is likely to reach the target and to propose further measures if necessary[6].

Amid concerns over current events in the Ukraine on the one hand, and growing energy costs for EU consumers and businesses on the other, the European Council of 21 March 2014 invited the Commission to consider the role energy efficiency should play in:

- increasing the security of energy supply to the EU market; and

- hedging against energy price increases.

The Council highlighted the timely review of the EED and the development of an energy efficiency framework as elements to reach an early agreement on a new policy framework for energy and climate in the period 2020 to 2030.

The recent European Energy Security Strategy (EESS)[7] highlights moderating energy demand as "one of the most effective tools to reduce the EU's external energy dependency and exposure to price hikes". The strategy primary focus is on short-term measures that can increase the EU energy security and so it does not analyse in a detailed and quantified way the long-term relationship between increased energy efficiency and greater security of supply.

The “2030” communication lays down the broad modalities of the EU climate and energy framework for the period between 2020 and 2030, including proposals for binding targets of 40% greenhouse gas reduction and 27% share of renewable energy in final energy demand by 2030[8]. While the communication states that “A greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 40% would require an increased level of energy savings of approximately 25% in 2030” it indicates that the exact ambition of future energy savings policy and measures necessary to deliver it are to be established in the review of the EED building on the analysis underpinning the 2030 framework and the targets and objectives for greenhouse gas reductions and renewable energy. It also requires the review to consider whether “energy intensity improvements of the economy and economic sectors, or absolute energy savings or a hybrid of the two represents a better benchmark upon which to frame a 2030 objective”. The logic behind this is two-fold:

- A decision on the modalities of the energy efficiency framework beyond 2020 needs to build on the lessons learned from the current framework, including which policies had worked and what were the drivers of energy efficiency developments in recent years. The review under the EED can provide such an ex-post analysis, notably because it benefits from up-to-date information submitted by the Member States as part of reporting obligations under that directive.

- While the impact assessment accompanying the “2030” communication established that a 40% decrease of greenhouse gas emissions matched by 27% renewables and 25% energy savings represent the lowest energy system costs for achieving the 40% GHG reduction, it also indicated that savings going beyond that threshold result, for relatively limited cost (up to a point), in substantial benefits in terms of increased security of supply, health, employment and, under relevant assumptions, economic growth, while remaining consistent with the other targets. The decision on the optimal level of policy ambition in 2030 needs to find the right balance between these elements and would benefit from an analysis of a broader set of scenarios focusing on energy efficiency in the context of this broad set of impacts and taking into account current EU policy priorities..

2.2. Progress achieved and lessons learned

2.2.1. Trends in energy consumption and energy efficiency

The European Union's energy efficiency target for 2020, adopted in 2007, equates to primary energy consumption of no more than 1483 Mtoe.

Having increased from 1618 Mtoe in 2000 to 1721 Mtoe in 2006, primary energy consumption has since decreased to 1584 Mtoe in 2012. As Figure 1 shows 2006 marked a turning in decoupling economic growth from energy consumption. This was a result of increased energy efficiency. Since then this decoupling has accelerated driven both through price signals and a comprehensive set of energy efficiency policies.

Figure 1. Evolution of energy consumption and GDP in the EU 1995-2013

Source: European Commission

While the economic crisis that began in 2008 had a significant impact on energy demand, the effect of efficiency gains (driven by prices and policies) was greater. This can be observed on Figure 2 which compares the developments in primary energy consumption under 2007 Reference projections on which the 2020 target is based (red line) with real developments projected so far, where the impact of energy efficiency (brown line) and economic drivers (green line) has been stripped out[9]. As the graph shows if current trends continue by 2020 roughly 1/3 of reduction in energy consumption compared to the 2007 Reference will stem from lower growth than anticipated, and about 2/3 from increasing energy efficiency improvements.

Figure 2. Comparison of primary energy evolution under 2007 Reference with registered and projected developments (including the impact of energy efficiency and economic/activity factors)

Source: European Commission, PRIMES 2014

At sectoral level as can be seen in Figure 3, the efficiency gains had the biggest impact on reducing energy demand in absolute terms in transport, followed by households and industry. The pace of energy efficiency improvements has also increased, especially in transport. Whereas the efficiency of the power and services sector deteriorated between 2000 and 2008, this trend was reversed in subsequent years.

Figure 3. Absolute reductions in primary energy consumption at sectoral level attributable to increased energy efficiency (2000-2008 and 2008-2012).

Source: European Commission, Fraunhofer (based on the decomposition analysis included in Annex III)

Progress in energy efficiency within the different sectors can be exemplified by the following elements[10]:

- Between 1995 and 2010 the average specific consumption of new cars in the EU was more than 2 litres less than in 1995 (reduction from 7.7 l/100 km to 5.6 l/100 km);

- New dwellings built today consume on average 40% less than dwellings built 20 years ago;

- The share of refrigerators meeting the highest energy efficiency labelling classes (A and above) increased from less than 5% in 1995 to more than 90% 15 years later;

- EU industry improved its energy intensity by almost 19% between 2001 and 2011, compared with 9% in the US[11].

Although it is in general difficult to single out the effect of policies from prices and other factors influencing energy efficiency, the figures and examples above allow concluding that policies work and there is a clear correlation between the roll-out of certain policies in the EU over the last years and energy efficiency trends. For example the increased savings in the transport sector as of 2008 can be to a large extent attributed to the effect of fuel-efficiency standards for passenger cars.

At the same time without lower economic growth than expected the target would probably not be met. The 85 policy measures included in the 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan[12] when the target was proposed were expected to bring 14% savings by 2020. In 2011 the Commission estimated that the EU was on track to reach only 11% of savings and hence proposed the Energy Efficiency Directive which was supposed to bridge the gap to the 2020 target. The directive as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council was however weakened by about 25% compared to the original Commission proposal. Hence it can be concluded that the EU and Member States equipped themselves with the policy tools matching the 2020 target, but only with the lower economic growth taken into account.

2.2.2. Policy developments

The EU policy framework (including an indicative EU target and concrete measures in the fields of buildings, appliances, power generation, transport and industry) seems to have served as an effective framework to support this progress in energy efficiency, while needing to be accompanied by appropriate action in the fields of financing and of policy implementation.

The energy efficiency policy framework has been developed significantly in the last years. The EU target has been clearly defined, providing political momentum, guidance for investors and a benchmark to measure progress. In the areas of buildings and products, including cars, progressive rules have been established although their implementation and enforcement remains an issue in some cases. Despite the economic crisis investment in energy efficiency is growing although it remains below the thresholds necessary to realise the cost-effective efficiency potential of the EU economy (see section 2.2.5). Experience from funding energy efficiency indicates that what is needed is a robust framework enabling better understanding, knowledge, transparency, performance measurement and de-risking at the EU level, accompanied by tailored Financial Instruments at the appropriate level, which will often be closer to final beneficiaries.

At European level, the most effective policy so far have been product efficient standards including ecodesign and energy labelling of products and the cars and CO2 legislation. The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive of 2012 have the potential to drive energy efficiency in the EU provided they are properly implemented by Member States. The long-term potential of the EED is however limited as some of the key provisions stop applying in 2020.

Between 2008 and 2012, primary energy consumption fell in all Member States except Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland. Changes in the level of economic activity played a big part in this, as did changes in the electricity generation mix and changes in industrial structure. In certain countries – especially in Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania – the effect of these factors was countered by changes in the level of consumption (e.g. increasing average size of dwellings). When the effects of these factors and of climatic variation are stripped out, the Member States that made the greatest improvements in final energy consumption per unit of energy service were Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. Details are in Annex III.

At national level, Member States report success with different policy measures. Examples include taxation (e.g. Sweden), voluntary agreements with industry (e.g. Netherlands, Finland), credit for building owners (e.g. Estonia, Germany). Energy efficiency obligations for utilities have been an effective tool in the five Member States – UK, Denmark, Italy, France and Belgium - that have had them in place for some time.

The up-to-date information submitted by Member States in their 2014 National Energy Efficiency Action Plans indicates further strengthening of national policies, including new measures to implement the Energy Efficiency Directive, in many Member States. Energy efficiency obligations for utilities to implement energy-saving measures among their customers, involving actors that have the most direct link to energy consumers and who previously had little or no incentive to limit energy demand, have changed the business model of energy providers and created a stable source of financing for energy efficiency. Following the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Directive the number of Member States applying such schemes is expected to go from five to sixteen. Other countries will strengthen existing schemes: for example in France savings required the ambition level of the current utility obligations scheme will be doubled from 2015. Several Member States' new national building renovation strategies indicate that they are linking a better knowledge of their building stocks with policies to stimulate cost-effective deep renovation of buildings and with suitable financial support[13]. The draft Operational Programmes beginning to be submitted under the European Structural and Investment Funds indicate an increase in sums allocated for the low–carbon economy (in some cases significantly above the minimum requirements for this objective). Financing mechanisms are being diversified, with less focus on grants and greater use of financial instruments (leveraging private capital), such as soft loans or guarantees.

While the overall trend both in terms of energy consumption and efficiency and in terms of the policy framework that aims to foster it is positive, implementation of EU rules is often incomplete and delayed (details are provided in section 2.4).

More details on EU and national policy developments are given in Annex II.

2.2.3. Projections of progress towards the 2020 target

The latest projections using PRIMES are for primary energy consumption of 1539 Mtoe in 2020 - savings of 16.8%. These projections serve as the baseline for this impact assessment. These projections are based on the PRIMES Reference Scenario 2013 "EU Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions – Trends to 2050"[14] ("Reference 2013"), which was also used in the Impact Assessment of the 2030 framework. A reference scenario follows the logic of including only policy measures which have been adopted until a certain cut-off date, without including new policies not yet officially adopted. In the Reference 2013 scenario, the cut-off date was spring 2012 (the EED was therefore included, with strongly conservative assumptions as to its implementation).

In order to have as accurate as possible a review of the effects of possible new energy efficiency measures and their overall level of ambition, it was necessary to update this Reference Scenario 2013 with regard to recently adopted and proposed policies especially with regard to legislation influencing energy consumption. The update of the Reference Scenario 2013 is called the Reference Plus Scenario ("Reference+") and features the policies that were adopted between spring 2012 and January 2014. A detailed description of both scenarios is included in Annex V. The Reference+ scenario projects energy savings in 2020 at 17.0%.

However, the energy consumption estimates referred to in the previous paragraphs are likely to be too high for two reasons:

Member States' latest reports on their national targets and planned measures under the EED suggest that these will deliver significantly more savings in 2020 than assumed in PRIMES[15]. While the national targets notified in 2013 summed up to 17% savings, the latest notifications (submitted at the end of April 2014 therefore already after the cut-off date of new measures included even in the updated baseline) give a more positive picture: 6 Member States are expecting that savings resulting from the measures included in the latest National Energy Efficiency Action Plans will lead to lower energy consumption than the respective national targets. In the case of 3 among them this difference exceeds 10%. If these elements are taken into account the latest notified national targets and accompanying national measures sum up to 18%. PRIMES also made certain conservative assumptions regarding the implementation of relevant legislative provisions. In PRIMES it is assumed that Article 7 obligations will not be fully achieved in any Member State to take into account uncertainties regarding the implementation of this article. In fact it is assumed that the whole EED will lead to a reduction in annual final energy consumption of 39 Mtoe in 2020. By contrast, the targets notified by Member States for the implementation of Article 7 of the Directive alone sum, if fully achieved, to savings of 59 Mtoe in 2020.

The EU economy has recently on aggregate performed less well than assumed in PRIMES Reference scenario – so that at the end of 2013, GDP was 3% lower than assumed. Unless growth accelerates rapidly to make up this shortfall, this will translate into additional energy savings in 2020. Sensitivities accounting for high and low economic growth performed on the PRIMES Reference showed the following impacts:

Table 1. Sensitivies on GDP growth rate for the PRIMES 2013 Reference scenario and according impact on energy consumption.

Growth rate (av. annual 2010-2030) || Savings achieved in 2020 (compared with 2007 Reference)

1.2% (low) || 18%

1.5% (normal) || 17%

1.9% (high) || 15.5%

Source: PRIMES

According to the latest economic forecasts[16], average GDP growth between 2010 and 2015 will be 1%. If the shortfall in economic growth up to 2014 is not made up later in the decade, energy consumption will probably be lowered by 0.5-1%.

It is therefore expected that on current trends, the EU will achieve primary energy savings in 2020 in the range of 18-19%, corresponding to a gap of 20-40 Mtoe relative to the 20% target. This conclusion rests on the assumption that (a) current economic trends will not significantly change in the coming years; and, more importantly, that (b) the energy efficiency plans recently notified by Member States will be realised with reasonable effectiveness. It is important to note that taking into account these notifications does not imply an assumption of full implementation of the current policy framework as important delays and gaps in this implementation as described in Section 2.4 remain and, if not rectified, will lower the chance of meeting the 2020 energy efficiency target.

2.2.4. Interactions with other elements of the present energy and climate framework

In line with the Impact Assessment accompanying the “2030” communication the following interactions between policies aimed at increasing energy efficiency, fostering the development of renewables and abating GHG emissions can be identified:

- As indicated in the Impact Assessment accompanying the 2030 communication the 2020 energy efficiency target has been instrumental in ensuring progress in improving energy efficiency of the EU economy as well as in progressing towards meeting the GHG target. A quantified target has provided a political momentum and guidance for investors. The energy efficiency targets gave a clear mandate for the Commission to come up with specific efficiency measures, which are necessary to correct certain market failures. This was the case for example in 2011 when the Commission proposed the EED because the EU was not on track to meet the target.

- Specific measures promoting energy efficiency and renewables can in some cases lead to higher costs of GHG abatement than the marginal cost of abatement required to reach the cap in the ETS sector. At the same time such measures produce additional benefits, in terms of spurring innovation or synergies with resource efficiency. Energy efficiency measures are often complementary to the ETS since they address non-price barriers such as imperfect information. In addition, energy efficiency targets have most of their effect in the non-ETS sector, where Member States have national targets under the Effort Sharing Decision[17]. EU action to support energy efficiency targets brings down the cost of national action to achieve these targets – for example through harmonised product efficiency standards (ecodesign) and common approaches to the certification of buildings' efficiency.

- By reducing electricity consumption in buildings and products, EE targets have an indirect effect on the demand for electricity, which is part of the ETS sector. Because EE targets reduce the demand for electricity, the ETS has to do "less work". As a result, the price of allowances is lower than it would otherwise be. It should however be pointed out that so far Commission assessments, including the impact assessment of the “2030” communication, have not found evidence of this in the current framework as the decrease in the prices of allowances was primarily driven by lower economic activity and other factors. In the future this might change, although the proposed Market Stability Reserve, by reducing the surplus, would counteract this effect and stabilise the level of emission allowance prices.

- The current low price of allowances is primarily due to low economic activity, and not to spill-over effects of specific energy efficiency measures.

- Policies based on price signals, such as the ETS, are less effective in certain sectors, such as residential due to the fact that consumers are not very price sensitive[18] and the potential of energy efficiency is not realised to a large extent due to barriers that cannot be addressed by price signals alone, such as split incentives between landlords and tenants.

- Energy savings help to ensure progress towards higher shares of renewables, as lower energy consumption means a lower denominator in the ratio between consumption of renewables and gross final energy consumption. Reversely, non-thermal renewable energy typically has much lower transformation losses than conventional energy sources, lowering the primary energy consumption for any given final energy consumption. Higher shares of renewable energy can therefore help to make progress towards the energy savings target, as the target relates to primary energy consumption.

2.2.5. Current energy efficiency trends compared to the identified cost-effective energy-saving potentials and the EU decarbonisation goals

Looking at long-term trends, analyses have shown that current improvements in energy efficiency in the EU are below the cost-effective energy-saving potential and are not sufficient to fully contribute to the EU decarbonisation goals. A study by Fraunhofer ISI[19] concluded that significant cost-effective potentials remain in all sectors at the EU level, notably in buildings. The findings of this study are broadly in line with the analysis of the IEA[20]. According to the IEA, efficiency gains compared to current trends could increase EU GDP by 1.1% in 2035; additional investments required in end-use efficiency are $2.2 trillion over 2012-2035 compared with reduced energy expenditures of $4.9 trillion during that period.

The Impact Assessment accompanying the “2030” communication established that under current trends (the Reference 2013 Scenario) only 21% savings compared to projections would be achieved; whereas 25% savings would be needed to meet the 2030 GHG reduction objectives, with improvements above 25% having positive impacts on employment and the security of supply. The Impact Assessment also made it clear that these savings could not be driven by the EU Emission Trading Scheme alone and more policies will be needed in the non-ETS sectors post 2020[21]. The Reference 2013 Scenario shows that under the current policy setting, the energy efficiency improvements will slow down after 2020.

2.3. What is the problem?

2.3.1. General problem

The general problem is that despite policies which foster energy efficiency being already in place, certain persistent barriers to energy savings still remain and the cost-effective energy-saving potential (both short- and long-term) is not fully realised.

The scale of the problem is smaller within the 2020 perspective as it is now expected that the 2020 target, identified as the cost-effective saving potential, will be missed by 1-2 percentage points only. For 2030 the mismatch between the expected efficiency trends and the underpinning policies, on the one hand, and the efforts required to reach the climate objectives or realise the cost-effective potential mentioned in section 2.2.5 is greater.

Therefore, energy efficiency does not presently and, to a greater extent, is not expected in the future to sufficiently contribute to the EU's energy policy objectives. This has the following consequences:

- In terms of security of supply, high energy demand increases the dependence of the EU on energy imports, notably of gas. (In 2011, energy dependency was already 54% and gas imports were at 394[22] Mtoe.) While international trade, including in commodities, is one of the foundations of the global economy and relatively small indigenous fossil fuel resources in the EU are a geological fact, the overexposure of several Member States to fossil fuel imports from single providers and dependency on single import routes create several risks, including price volatility and sudden disruptions of supply. Reliance on single providers has also negatively affected the EU internal energy market by fragmenting it. The potential savings to be made on fuel import bills could instead be invested in other areas of the EU economy – leading to economic growth and job creation.

- In terms of affordability (for households) and competitiveness (for the EU economy), the unused energy efficiency potential hampers the economy in several ways: it limits productivity and economic output; it negatively affects the trade balance of the EU; it limits employment especially in the current economic environment with significant spare capacity; it creates uncertainty on markets given their exposure to the volatility of energy prices; and it leads to a loss of budget revenue.

- High energy demand for fossil fuels makes the transition to a low-carbon economy more difficult and costly. Insufficient energy efficiency means that the EU will not be on track to reach its long-term climate objectives (and will also be confronted with higher costs linked to health problems). Energy efficiency measures are among the cheapest options for GHG abatement.

2.3.2. Specific problems

This general problem is underpinned by the following specific problems:

1) Despite existing policies the EU energy savings target for 2020 will not be fully met

Significant progress has been made since the analysis carried out in 2010 that showed that the EU was far from reaching its target and needed to double its efforts on energy efficiency. Now the gap is projected to be much smaller also thanks to new policies such as the Energy Efficiency Directive, but still remains at 1-2%. In addition, as shown in section 2.2.1 it is expected that about 1/3 of the progress by 2020 will be attributable to lower growth than expected at the time of setting the target. Consequently, some of the short-term energy efficiency potential of the EU economy remains untapped and will remain so under current trends.

2) The 2020 time horizon is not sufficient to create investment security

In the absence of a clear objective post-2020 there is no signal orienting the market to the outcomes that public policy aims to achieve. This is a particular problem given the long timeframe of investments in some sectors, especially energy generation and buildings. The viability of such investments needs to be weighed against long-term projected energy demand which can be heavily affected by energy efficiency policies. The period up to 2020 is also insufficient for the establishment of business solutions and of markets for energy efficiency and services. A long-term and coherent policy framework is needed to reduce the perceived risk amongst investors and consumers alike.

From a policy perspective in the absence of these long-term determinants, the choice of present policy instruments risks to be driven by short term analysis.

3) Ensuring coherence of different targets and policies

Given the key role of energy efficiency for energy security, competitiveness and GHG reductions, as well as the interactions between GHG, renewables and energy efficiency targets and policies, the future energy efficiency framework needs to be defined in a coherent way with the general 2030 framework. Otherwise there is a risk that different policy instruments within the energy and climate framework will be set up and applied in an incoherent way driving down their effectiveness, undermining the internal market and increasing the overall cost.

2.4. What are the drivers for the problem?

There is a broad body of evidence and theoretical analysis of barriers preventing consumers and investors from adopting cost-effective energy efficiency measures. These have been categorised into economic, behavioural and organisational barriers[23] or alternatively into market and non-market failures[24].

The current policy framework addresses market, regulatory and behavioural failures in several ways. There is however evidence that this framework does not address existing barriers sufficiently. The following elements with respect to this framework can be singled out:

- Incomplete implementation: the principal reason why the 2020 target is expected to be missed is insufficient Member State level implementation of the existing legislative framework. Regarding the EPBD the following main issues arise: (i) there is not enough national supervision and technical capacity for checking at local and/or regional level the compliance of energy performance requirements in building energy codes; (ii) the reliability of Energy Performance Certificates is undermined by a lack of transparency of how they are established for establishing them use underlying calculations which are often not sufficiently transparent for the outcomes to be directly comparable. Regarding Ecodesign the main problem driver is insufficient market surveillance. Only 5 Member States are estimated to have an active policy in that regard and the total amount spent on it is estimated to represent some 0.05% of the value of lost energy savings[25].

- Short-term perspective: some of the key policy tools were designed within a 2020 timeframe and therefore do not provide long-term incentives for investing in energy efficiency. Examples include the fact that Article 7 of the EED, ceases to apply after 2020 and there is no post-2020 overall target.

- Inadequacy: certain existing policy tools need to be revised to address existing barriers more effectively. As an example under the Energy label the A+, A++ and A+++ labelling scales that were introduced during the previous revision of the Directive have been shown to affect consumers' motivation to buy more energy efficient products less effectively than the previous scale. This change has weakened the market transformation impact of the label.

- Incompleteness: Regarding financing, important barriers that hamper further uptake of energy efficiency investments in buildings continue to be in place, including a lack of awareness and expertise regarding energy efficiency financing on the part of all actors; high initial costs, relatively long pay-back periods and (perceived) credit risk associated with energy efficiency investments; and competing priorities for final beneficiaries[26].

An overview of the current status of implementation of the relevant EU provisions is included in Annex IX.

2.5. The Union's right to act, subsidiarity and proportionality

The EU's competence in the area of energy in general and energy efficiency in particular is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 194(1). In acting, the EU needs to respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Member States are at the centre of the realization of energy efficiency policy and EU intervention should be well targeted and supportive to their actions. The EU's role is in:

Establishing a common framework which creates the basis for coherent and mutually reinforcing mechanisms while leaving in being the responsibility of Member States to set, in a transparent and comparable way, the concrete means and modalities to achieve the agreed objectives; Creating a platform for exchanging best practice and stimulating capacity building; Setting minimum requirements in areas where there is a risk of internal market distortions if Member States take individual measures; Using EU instruments to promote energy efficiency, e.g. through financing, and to mainstream it in other policy areas.

3. Scope and Objectives 3.1. Context and scope

EU leaders have set the objective of saving 20% of the EU's energy consumption compared to projections for 2020. This target is recognised as an integral element and essential part of the EU energy policy, with its triple objectives of competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply. In March 2014 EU leaders have reiterated that the 20% energy efficiency target has to be met. As established in section 2 of this Impact Assessment this will not happen under current trends. Specific short-term options for bridging the gap to the target need therefore to be identified and analysed.

The “2030” communication has set the broad framework for the energy and climate policy after 2020. It indicated that the specific level of energy savings aimed at in 2030 needs to be established, while ensuring full coherence with the GHG and RES targets. The GHG target is (40% domestic reduction wrt. 1990 levels, of which the sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) would have to deliver a reduction of 43% in GHG in 2030 compared to 2005, by means of a strengthening of the EU ETS cap and an ETS market stability reserve, for which a legal proposal has been made, which makes the system more robust. Ensured by binding national targets, the non-ETS sector is expected to deliver a reduction of 30% both compared to 2005) and renewable energy target (at least 27% share of renewables in the final energy consumption). Similarly as in the case of the impact assessment underpinning the “2030” communication the aim here within the mid and long-term perspective (i.e. beyond 2020) is to: (i) focus the analysis on the desired level of a possible energy efficiency target from the perspective of the general aims of the EU energy policy and of the interaction of this target with the other elements of the energy and climate policy framework; and (ii) to propose the general direction of policy development in the energy efficiency area, without entering into the details of specific policy options, which will be underpinned by appropriate impact assessments in the future.

3.2. Objectives

In this context the objectives of the initiative are:

3.2.1. General objective

To ensure that energy efficiency contributes to the development of a competitive, sustainable and secure EU energy system.

3.2.2. Specific objectives

· To agree on the measures necessary to achieve the 20% energy efficiency target providing thus the relevant actors with information on the actions that need to be undertaken in the short term;

· To agree on the level and general direction of energy efficiency policy in the long term providing thus Member States and investors with more predictability and certainty.

3.2.3. Operational objectives

Theses general and specific objectives are to be achieved by:

· Proposing actions to bridge the gap to the 2020 target;

· Setting a level of energy efficiency policy ambition for 2030 consistent with the goals of the EU energy policy and coherent with the other headline targets of this policy framework;

· Proposing a long-term energy efficiency policy architecture, including the formulation of a possible target.

3.3. Consistency with other policies

The above objectives are in line with other EU policies. They:

· Promote economic recovery and enhance the competitiveness of EU industries in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy, contributing to the Resource Efficiency flagship initiative and the sustainability layer of Europe 2020;

· Increase security of energy supply as called for in the European Energy Security Strategy create jobs and reduce energy poverty in support of the EU's social agenda.

· Enable further reductions of GHG emissions up to 2020 and thus contribute to reaching the EU's climate objectives.

· Facilitate further commitments on GHG emission reduction after 2020.

4. Policy Options

4.1. Options for closing the gap towards the 2020 target

The following options are considered:

No action.

2. New primary legislation laying down binding national targets or additional binding measures.

Strengthened implementation of current policies.

Option 1 is discarded from further detailed analysis as the 2020 target would not be fully achieved and the benefits associated with meeting it would not be realised.

4.2. Analysis of the optimal level of savings for 2030

Building on the 2030 Communication and its accompanying IA, six scenarios with a stepwise increase in the ambition of energy efficiency efforts (in all sectors targeted by current policy measures) were modelled and the impacts that these efforts would have on security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability were assessed both in 2030 and in 2050 perspective.

The 2030 IA also itself investigated a range of scenarios with energy efficiency policies reaching higher levels of energy savings than the Reference scenario. While the Reference scenario achieves 21% energy savings (in comparison to 2007 PRIMES baseline for 2030[27]), the scenarios presented in the 2030 IA achieve between 23 and 34% savings. The 2030 Communication states that achieving the proposed 2030 GHG (40% reduction) and RES (at least 27% share) targets cost-effectively would require 25% energy savings (which corresponds to GHG40 scenario). At the same time, the 2030 IA indicated that a higher ambition in energy efficiency would have additional benefits in terms of energy security, growth and jobs and lowered imports bill as well as on health – while incurring higher costs within the energy system.

The scenarios included in the IA underpinning the 2030 Communication modelled EE with different approaches (with reference settings or in the context of enabling conditions, with carbon values (in GHG40 scenario) or with concrete (and ambitious) EE policies (in GHG40/EE and GHG40/EE/RES30 scenarios) and the very ambitious EE policies (in GHG40/EE/RES35) scenario).

In the GHG40 scenario, the 25% cost-efficient energy savings were reached without modelling additional energy efficiency policies compared to the References scenario 2013 by 2030. However, more stringent CO2 standards for passenger cars are assumed in the GHG40 scenario after 2030, going down from 95gCO2/km to 25gCO2/km in 2050 (and also for vans – see table below). The level of 25% energy savings in 2030 is achieved in the GHG40 scenario with a) the existing EE legislation in place plus tighter CO2 standards for passenger cars after 2030 and b) with a 40% GHG target triggering energy efficiency mainly through carbon values in the non-ETS sector[28] and c) in the context of the assumption of enabling settings[29]. The GHG40 scenario does not model specific EE policies beyond the ones indicated above. In contrast, this IA proposes scenarios which achieve higher levels of energy savings with concrete EE policies. It should be noted that by construction, the GHG40 scenario, working with carbon values in the non-ETS sector, depicts the lowest possible cost of achieving 40% GHG savings in 2030.

In this IA, a broader range for EE ambition is explored aiming for up to 40% energy savings in 2030 with the aim of analysing energy system cost impact and broader impact in terms of security of supply, job creation and economic growth.

In the present IA, the analysis from 2030 IA is continued in a coherent way, taking into account not only the modelling results but also the progress that Member States are making towards their national targets under the EED and taking into account studies on energy-saving potentials and responses to the public consultation. . Six energy efficiency scenarios were modelled with primary energy reductions in 2030 relative to PRIMES 2007 projection of around 27 %, 28%, 29%, 30%, 35% and 40%. Chapter 5 analyses the energy system impacts of these scenarios, their macro-economic impacts and, in addition, Annex VII shows the results of specific EE policies in their specific fields (e.g. improvement in performance of appliances, rate of renovations, energy savings in industry etc.). The scenarios are based on common assumptions regarding GDP and population growth, imported fossil fuel prices and technology costs as all of them are built on and later on compared to the Reference Scenario 2013 ("Reference") – the same as used in the 2030 IA.

The mix of energy efficiency policies assumed for the scenarios follows the logic of the current set of EE legislation including the EED, EPBD, regulations adopted under ecodesign/energy labelling . Only the overall level of ambition is intensified. In this sense, the IA is conservative – it does not analyse measures or propose new mechanisms (e.g. in EED). For transport, the policy measures put forward in the 2011 White Paper on Transport are assumed to be implemented. For industry the Best Available Technology (BAT) uptake is modelled. At this stage, it is however clear that the main effort will be concentrated on buildings/products reflecting lower GHG abatement potential in the transport sector and the fact that EE in industry is chiefly driven by costs of energy and competitiveness aspects. Different policy mixes and specific policy instruments might be necessary or desired in the future but entering into such considerations goes beyond the scope of the Energy Efficiency Review and could pre-empt future policy choices. Future policy choices will translate - into specific policy or legal proposals which will be accompanied by dedicated IA assessing costs and benefits for specific sectors or economic actors.

In the context of all energy efficiency scenarios analysed here, it is assumed that the EE legislation continues after 2020 and further intensifies in terms of saving obligations. The following policies are assumed to intensify until 2030 and then intensify only moderately beyond 2030:

· EED with annual savings obligation beyond 2020 and intensifying;

· CO2 standards for cars and light commercial vehicles (LCVs) becoming more stringent beyond 2020 and other transport policies leading to energy efficiency savings;

· EPBD with stronger requirements leading to higher and deeper (in terms of EE) renovation rates;

· Eco-design requirements excluding less performing technologies currently still present on the market and stretching to new categories of products leading to a more accelerated uptake of efficient technologies in the demand sectors enabled by lowering perceived cost parameters;

· Measures promoting increased use of CHP and district heating and cooling;

· Measures aimed at higher uptake of BAT in the industry;

· Measures limiting grid losses.

Other transport policy measures, in addition to CO2 standards for light duty vehicles, are in line with the 2011 White Paper on transport and are assumed to be included in all scenarios but their intensity is not varied between scenarios (i.e. measures leading to 1.1% improvements per year in the fuel efficiency of heavy duty vehicles (HDVs), development of infrastructure for alternative power-trains, internalisation of external costs, introduction of a CO2-related element in vehicle taxation, wide deployment of intelligent transport systems and other soft measures like fuel labelling and eco-driving).

The energy efficiency assumptions imply reduced demand for energy by end-users and also reduced demand for electricity. For each scenario the model simulates a new equilibrium in the energy market. This means that the lowered energy demand in each scenario affects, to a different extent, the electricity prices, the fuel mix, the need for new generation capacities, electricity/gas networks or other energy system components. Also the ETS is affected by the reduced demand.

The table below shows the assumptions on energy efficiency measures in the scenarios that have been modelled and for comparability reasons the assumptions of the GHG40.

Table 2. Assumptions of the GHG40 scenario and the policy scenarios assessed in this impact assessment[30] [31]

GHG 40 || Primary energy savings: 25.1% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 40.6% RES share in 2030: 26.5% Energy efficiency policies: ñ Adopted energy efficiency regulations until spring 2012 as in the Reference Scenario 2013; ñ no strengthening of policies before or after 2020 (except for CO2 standards for cars and vans – see below); ñ Carbon values drive some additional energy efficiency in comparison to the Reference. Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run: CO2 standards for passenger cars of 95 gCO2/km in 2030 (25 gCO2/km in 2050) and CO2 standards for LCVs of 147 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

EE28 || Primary energy savings: 28.3% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 40.2% RES share in 2030: 27.7% Energy efficiency policies: ñ Increasing energy efficiency of houses and buildings leading to renovation rates of 1.48% in 2015-2020, 1.84% in 2021-2030 and 1.15% in 2031-3050 which will bring average energy savings after renovation of 21.93% in 2015-2020, 44.55% in 2021-2030 and 45.79% in 2031-3050; ñ Elimination of market failures and imperfections reflected in the reduction of discount rates from 12% in 2020 progressively to 10.2% (by 2050) in the residential sector and from 10% to 9% (by 2050) in the tertiary sector; ñ Increased uptake of advanced technologies (Ecodesign); ñ Increased uptake of BAT in industry; ñ Higher penetration of district heating; assuming that 11% of households will be connected to district heating networks in 2030; ñ Measures limiting grid losses; ñ Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run (e.g. CO2 standard of 75 gCO2/km in 2030 (26 gCO2/km in 2050) for passenger cars and 110 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050) for LCVs). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

EE29 || Primary energy savings: 29.3% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 40.1% RES share in 2030: 27.7% Energy efficiency policies: ñ Increasing energy efficiency of houses and buildings leading to renovation rates of 1.53% in 2015-2020, 2.11% in 2021-2030 and 1.22% in 2031-3050 which will bring average energy savings after renovation of 22.04% in 2015-2020, 45.04% in 2021-2030 and 47.55% in 2031-3050; ñ Elimination of market failures and imperfections reflected in the reduction of discount rates from 12% in 2020 progressively to 10.2% (by 2050) in the residential sector and from 10% to 9% (by 2050) in the tertiary sector; ñ Increased uptake of advanced technologies (Ecodesign); ñ Increased uptake of BAT in industry; ñ Higher penetration of district heating; assuming that 11% of households will be connected to district heating networks in 2030; ñ Measures limiting grid losses; ñ Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run (e.g. CO2 standard of 74 gCO2/km in 2030 (26 gCO2/km in 2050) for passenger cars and 110 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050) for LCVs). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

EE30 || Primary energy savings: 30.7% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 40.1% RES share in 2030: 27.7% Energy efficiency policies: ñ Increasing energy efficiency of houses and buildings leading to renovation rates of 1.61% in 2015-2020, 2.21% in 2021-2030 and 1.26% in 2031-3050 which will bring average energy savings after renovation of 22.08% in 2015-2020, 45.82% in 2021-2030 and 48.48% in 2031-3050; ñ Elimination of market failures and imperfections reflected in the reduction of discount rates from 12% in 2020 progressively to 9% (by 2050) in the residential sector and from 10% to 8.5% (by 2050) in the tertiary sector; ñ Increased uptake of advanced technologies (Ecodesign); ñ Increased uptake of BAT in industry; ñ Higher penetration of district heating; assuming that 12% of households will be connected to district heating networks in 2030; ñ Measures limiting grid losses; ñ Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run (e.g. CO2 standard of 72 gCO2/km in 2030 (25 gCO2/km in 2050) for passenger cars and 110 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050) for LCVs). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

EE35 || Primary energy savings: 35.0% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 41.1% RES share in 2030: 27.4% Energy efficiency policies: ñ Increasing energy efficiency of houses and buildings leading to renovation rates of 1.64% in 2015-2020, 2.39% in 2021-2030 and 1.32% in 2031-3050 which will bring average energy savings after renovation of 22.10% in 2015-2020, 46.19% in 2021-2030 and 48.84% in 2031-3050; ñ Elimination of market failures and imperfections reflected in the reduction of discount rates from 12% in 2020 progressively to 9% (by 2050) in the residential sector and from 10% to 8.5% (by 2050) in the tertiary sector; ñ Increased uptake of advanced technologies (Ecodesign); ñ Increased uptake of BAT in industry; ñ Higher penetration of district heating; assuming that 14% of households will be connected to district heating networks in 2030; ñ Measures limiting grid losses; ñ Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run (e.g. CO2 standard of 70 gCO2/km in 2030 (17 gCO2/km in 2050) for passenger cars and 110 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050) for LCVs). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

EE40 || Primary energy savings: 39.8% GHG reduction in 2030 (wrt. to 1990): 43.9 % RES share in 2030: 27.4 % Energy efficiency policies: ñ Increasing energy efficiency of houses and buildings leading to renovation rates of 1.65% in 2015-2020, 2.42% in 2021-2030 and 1.33% in 2031-3050 which will bring average energy savings after renovation of 22.11% in 2015-2020, 46.18% in 2021-2030 and 48.85% in 2031-3050; ñ Elimination of market failures and imperfections reflected in the reduction of discount rates from 12% in 2020 progressively to 9% (by 2050) in the residential sector and from 10% to 8.5% (by 2050) in the tertiary sector; ñ Increased uptake of advanced technologies (Ecodesign); ñ Increased uptake of BAT in industry; ñ Higher penetration of district heating; assuming that 14% of households will be connected to district heating networks in 2030; ñ Measures limiting grid losses; ñ Measures reducing energy consumption in transport and driving the electrification in the long-run (e.g. CO2 standard of 70 gCO2/km in 2030 (17 gCO2/km in 2050) for passenger cars and 110 gCO2/km in 2030 (60 gCO2/km in 2050) for LCVs). The scenario is set in enabling conditions.

Source: European Commission, PRIMES2014

This IA does not aim at assessing in detail specific policy measures within a 2030 perspective. Neither does it compare the impact of typical policy alternatives (regulation, voluntary agreements, financing, training and awareness) as it is likely that they would all play a role within the long timeframe considered. Rather, the IA aims at identifying the optimum strategic direction, to be complemented by specific IAs in the future.

4.3. Options for the architecture of the energy efficiency framework post-2020

The current, 2020 framework is based on:

- an indicative EU target underpinned by indicative national targets;

- EU legislation for products traded in the internal market;

- EU legislation coupled with administrative support in other areas, such as buildings and combined heat and power, providing general overall provisions while leaving flexibility for the national and local level to implement them in an appropriate way;

- national and local provisions not linked to common EU rules

- financing through European, national and local sources.

This design provides a mutually-reinforcing set of instruments. At the same time it is the result of an ‘organic’ evolution of policies and has not so far been thoroughly compared with alternatives. This analysis with its long-term perspective allows such a comparison.

The following options for the architecture of the framework for 2030 are identified:

No action. This implies that post 2020, any EU target would be abandoned and efforts at European level would be based solely on specific instruments. Indicative EU target, coupled with specific EU measures. This would be a continuation of the current framework. Binding EU target, coupled with specific EU measures. This would replicate the approach proposed by the Commission in the 2030 Communication for RES. Binding MS targets, coupled with EU polices solely in areas linked to the internal market.

In addition, irrespective of the character and level of a possible target, it needs to be considered how it could be formulated. The following options for target formulation are identified:

· Consumption target · Intensity target · Hybrid approach

5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS

5.1. Methodology

This IA follows and is fully consistent with the 2030 Communication and its accompanying IA.

The 2030 Communication proposes two binding targets for 2030: 40% GHG emissions reductions and at least 27% share of renewable energy in final energy consumption. These targets were taken as constraints[32] in modelling of policy scenarios presented in this IA.

The policy scenarios of the 2030 Communication build upon the Reference scenario 2013 which takes into account climate and energy policies adopted up to June 2012. For comparability reasons, the policy scenarios of this IA build on the same Reference 2013.

Given the requirement for the EED review to assess whether or not the EU is on track for its 2020 energy saving objective, it was necessary to update the Reference scenario with recently adopted policies. This is why so–called "Reference+" scenario was also developed taking into account policies adopted (and some important polices proposed by the Commission) up to January 2014. The Reference+ scenario is described in Annex V and assessment of achievement of 2020 target is presented in chapter 2.2.3.It should be noted that this exercise has shown that the differences of the policy scenario including recently adopted policies are minimal to the one without these policies. This is due to the fact that the additional measures (e.g. eco-design measures which were adopted in the last 2 years) are part of the EE policy mix of the policy scenarios in any case which are intensified between the different scenarios to achieve a higher EE level.

The internal logic of scenarios and the key assumptions have not been changed from 2030 modelling exercise (see Table 3 below). The starting point of the present analysis is the GHG40 scenario, whose results are shown in all summary tables for more convenient reference. The policy scenarios presented in this IA are, however, not fully comparable with the GHG40 scenario as they use concrete energy efficiency policies rather than carbon values in the non-ETS sector. All policy scenarios analysed in this IA are in fact similar in structure to the GHG40/EE scenario in the 2030 IA, which featured concrete EE policies. Finally, while the overall energy savings in 2030 amounted to 25% (for GHG40) and 29% (for GHG40/EE), the range of ambition is broader in the policy options analysed here.

Six scenarios were thus quantified, assuming a stepwise increase in the intensity of energy efficiency efforts after 2020 in sectors targeted by current policy measures. The energy saving (calculated against the 2007 PRIMES baseline projections for 2030) achieved by the scenarios is the key metric, which, because of its importance, is used for labelling of scenarios. The scenarios achieve respectively energy savings in 2030 of around 27%, 28%, 29%, 30%, 35% and 40%. Later on they are referred to as EE27, EE28, EE29, EE30, EE35 and EE40 scenarios. As explained in chapter 4, the mix of energy efficiency policies is not altered among the scenarios (it always follows the logic of current legislation) and only the overall level of ambition intensifies. The specific policies are defined in a general manner and the precise assessment of their impacts would have to be done on case-by-case basis and will likely be done alongside specific legislative or other initiatives of the Commission that will follow this proposal.

Table 3: Methodological approach for modelling– consistency with 2030 communication

|| 2030 Communication || 2014 EED review || Notes

Reference scenario || Climate and energy policies adopted up to June 2012 || As "2030" For the purpose of assessment of achieving the 2020 target, Reference+ scenario was elaborated (as “2030”, plus policies adopted up to January 2014)[33] || For the Reference+ modelling results suggest that the 13 ecodesign/ energy labelling regulations adopted since June 2012 have no impact.[34]

GDP growth || 2010-20: 1.5% p.a. 2020-30: 1.6% p.a. || As “2030” ||

Fossil fuel prices (€'10/boe, 2020/30) || Oil 89/93; gas 62/65; coal 23/24 || As “2030” ||

Energy technology progress || Decreasing costs and increasing performances for specific technologies || As “2030” ||

Structure of EU28 economy || Increasing share of services in the gross value added of the economy || As “2030” ||

Population growth || 2010-20: 0.3% p.a; 2020-30: 0.2% p.a. || As “2030” ||

Degree days || Kept constant at 2005 level || As “2030” ||

Policy scenarios: GHG emissions || -40% || As “2030” || Most high-saving scenario: overshooting allowed

Policy scenarios: share of renewable energy || at least 27% || As “2030” ||

Representation of active public policy in energy efficiency and other sectors || “Carbon values”[35], and, post-2030, “enabling settings”[36]. In addition, tighter CO2 standards for cars after 2030. The 2030 IA also included some scenarios with modelling of additional energy efficiency measures[37]. || As "2030” || Carbon values and enabling settings in the case of energy efficiency, replaced by energy efficiency measures[38] .

Discount rates used to depict decision-making by economic actors || 8-17.5%; some energy efficiency measures can lower discount rates || As “2030”[39] ||

System costs || Calculated using standard (un-lowered) private discount rates[40] || As “2030” ||

5.2. Policy options for 2020

On present trends, EU primary energy savings are likely to achieve 18-19% in 2020, a shortfall compared to the target of approximately 20-40 Mtoe (Chapter 2). Chapter 4 identified two options to address the gap:

· New primary legislation laying down binding national targets or additional binding measures

· Strengthened implementation of existing legislation

Based on the precedents of the EED and the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), new primary legislation – whether binding measures or binding targets – would be unlikely, even on an optimistic timetable, to enter into force before 2018.[41] The EU would then need to reduce energy consumption, compared to what it would otherwise have been, by an additional 12 Mtoe in each of the next three years, nearly doubling the rate projected in the modelling. It is unlikely that this could be achieved at such short notice.

The PRIMES modelling in question assumes a level of implementation of the requirements of the EED, EPBD and regulations adopted under ecodesign/energy labelling that falls well short of full compliance.

Regarding the EED, PRIMES assumes that it will lead to a reduction in annual final energy consumption of 39 Mtoe in 2020. By contrast, the targets notified by Member States for the implementation of Article 7 of the EED alone sum, if fully achieved, to savings of 59 Mtoe in 2020, whereas the potential impact of the EED - if fully implemented - calculated at the time when it was adopted was estimated to be above 100 Mtoe. In this impact assessment under a conservative approach, it is concluded on the basis of these numbers that another 20 Mtoe could be saved through proper implementation.

Regarding the EPBD, the impact assessment[42] of that directive estimated its impact to be in the range of 60 Mtoe savings by 2030. A study by Fraunhofer ISI[43] concluded that this potential will not be fully realised, unless it is properly implemented, and that proper implementation which could bring an additional 15 Mtoe savings. The key elements that need to be strengthened are the reliability of energy performance certificates, the effectiveness of certification frameworks in all Member States, and better checks of the compliance of new and renovated buildings with the relevant provisions in building codes.

Regarding Ecodesign and Energy Labelling the combined impact of the 40 or so measures adopted so far, based on engineering-type calculations, is 80 Mtoe. When overlaps and rebound are taken into account it can be conservatively estimated that at least half of these savings will materialise in practice. It is estimated that approximately 10% of the savings could be lost due to poor compliance[44]. This corresponds to additional 4 Mtoe could be saved through stronger enforcement.

This analysis suggests that the approach with the best potential to close the remaining gap to 2020 is strengthened implementation of existing legislation. This conclusion is corroborated by the study by Fraunhofer ISI which collated the expected impact of more than 500 national energy efficiency measures: according to that study assuming that these measures will be implemented as planned and correcting for double-counting the 2020 target could be fully reached[45]. The list of the analysed national measures and their expected impact is included in Annex VIII.

Strengthened implementation could be achieved through:

· Full implementation of EU legislation at national level, with effective monitoring;

· Reinforced resourcing of market surveillance and better cooperation among national market surveillance authorities;

· Strengthening energy performance certificates under the EPBD through benchmarking of the effectiveness of certification frameworks in all Member States, assisting Member States in compliance checks and linking national schemes to reliable EN standards;

· Making wider use of innovative financing in the form of standardised investment products to support energy efficiency financing products;

· Databases on product and building energy performance and indicators for measuring progress.

Accelerating secondary legislation in the products sector could play a supporting role providing additional savings over and above those stemming from improved implementation. Preparatory work is under way for seven new product groups, including windows, servers and data centres, steam boilers and water-related products. Accelerated implementation (in collaboration with stakeholders, Member States and the European Parliament) could bring this legislation into force a year earlier – with adoption dates in 2015/16 rather than 2016/17. It is estimated that this acceleration would increase primary energy savings by a further 5 Mtoe.

Accelerating secondary legislation in the products sector would help achieving the target but is not a condition for achieving it since strengthened implementation of existing rules would be sufficient for that purpose. In order to bridge the gap Member States would not be expected to implement requirements over and above those stemming from existing EU legislation, the cost of which has been already assessed when this legislation was proposed. For example in the case of the EPBD the impact assessments of the proposal estimated that the abolishing the 1000 m2 threshold at which buildings had to meet minimum efficiency standards when undergoing major renovation would lead to €8 billion/year additional capital costs but would trigger €25 billion/year energy cost savings by 2020 and therefore create negative CO2 abatement costs. Key conclusions from the impact assessments of the EPBD and of the EED are included in Annex X.

5.3. Ambition level 2030

5.3.1. Energy system impacts

The main results of PRIMES modelling estimate the impacts of EE on the energy system. All results for the different policy scenarios are compared with the Reference 2013 scenario (later "Reference"). If it were assumed that the European 2020 target on energy efficiency would be fully met (in the light of discussion in chapters above), the baseline scenario would need to be adjusted, also beyond 2020 and the comparisons would be different. As in this IA a conservative approach is taken, the Reference was not adjusted in this manner.

These impacts vary for different levels of ambition of EE as portrayed by the scenarios analysed in this IA. The energy saving (calculated against the 2007 PRIMES baseline projections for 2030) achieved by the scenarios is the key metric, which, because of its importance, is used for labelling of scenarios. The scenarios achieve respectively energy savings in 2030 of 27.4%, 28.3%, 29.3%, 30.7%, 35.0% and 39.8%. Later they are referred to as EE27, EE28, EE29, EE30, EE35 and EE40 scenarios.

For all scenarios presented in this IA, GHG40 scenario from the 2030 IA is the starting point. With an overall increasing energy efficiency ambition, the scenarios become more costly. Still they present additional benefits (notably in security of supply – see below) which should be weighed against the incremental cost increase.

Measured as an absolute value, primary energy consumption[46] is clearly reduced in all scenarios analysed (8 to 24% in 2030 and 13 to 32% in 2050 in comparison to the Reference scenario) despite the steady growth of the EU GDP that is assumed[47]. The reductions are higher for all new scenarios than for the GHG40 scenario as the concrete EE policies have more impact than the carbon values assumed in the GHG40. It should be also noted that some reduction in primary energy consumption is due to the RES target of (at least) 27% present in all new scenarios - thanks to high statistical efficiency of RES in electricity production. This was also the case in GHG40.

As a result of reduced gross inland energy consumption, the energy intensity of the EU economy is reduced under all scenarios. The higher the energy savings, the lower the energy intensity of the EU economy gets. Among the sectors, lowering of the energy intensity is most visible in the residential and tertiary sectors reflecting the fact that the policies proposed for the policy mix in all scenarios affect mostly these two sectors.

The policy scenarios demonstrate also significant differences in terms of the consumption of various primary energy sources. Table 4 below shows both the changes in the relative shares of fuels, as well as the changes in absolute consumption compared to Reference. It has to be borne in mind that all the scenarios achieve decreases in total energy consumption impacting the relative fuel shares.

· As regards solid fuels (notably coal), already in 2030 their consumption in absolute terms declines substantially under all scenarios except EE35 scenario (between 16 and 8% in comparison to the Reference). The EE35 has a high ambition of EE measures and consequently a rather low ETS prices are necessary to achieve the 40% GHG reduction allowing maintaining the same consumption of solids as in the Reference scenario (only 0.7% reduction compared to the Reference). In longer term, only EE30, EE35 and EE40 achieve a reduction of solids consumption (in comparison to Reference).

The share of solids in the fuel mix in 2030 remains largely stable (in comparison to Reference) for EE27, EE28 and EE29 while it grows slightly for all other scenarios.

· For oil, the reduction of consumption in absolute terms is higher the more the energy savings and becomes more substantial with time (in 2030 between 7 to 14% and in 2050 between 59-63% in comparison to the Reference) – closely linked with CO2 standards for light duty vehicles becoming more stringent.

The share of oil in the fuel mix 2030 remains very stable (in comparison to Reference) in EE27, EE28, EE29 and EE30 scenarios at 32-33%, while it grows slightly in EE35 and EE40 scenarios.

· For natural gas, the reduction of consumption in absolute terms is the most pronounced among all the fuels. The reduction is higher the more the energy savings and becomes more substantial with time (in 2030 between 16 to 42% and in 2050 between 30-50% in comparison to the Reference) – closely linked to policies improving the thermal integrity of buildings.

The shares of natural gas decline slightly as the scenarios get more ambitious. In 2030, they go from 25% for Reference to 23% for EE27 and to 19% for EE40.

· The consumption of nuclear in absolute terms decreases in 2030 in all scenarios in comparison to the Reference but in 2050 perspective it grows strongly for EE27, EE28 and EE29 scenarios, slightly for EE30 scenario and declines in EE35 and EE40. The strong EE makes the nuclear less necessary for the achievement of decarbonisation.

The shares of nuclear in 2030 remain very stable (in comparison to Reference) in all scenarios at between 11-13%.

· Finally, the absolute consumption of renewables grows in 2030 for EE27, EE28 and EE29 scenarios (in comparison to Reference) but declines in the scenarios with more energy savings, where by the sheer reduction of energy consumption there is less need for the development of RES in absolute consumption. The main driver of renewables is the RES target which is around 27% for all scenarios. In longer perspective, the consumption of RES grows very strong for all scenarios driven by the decarbonisation and facilitated by enabling conditions. It should be noted that increased share of RES strengthens the effects of EE through increased statistical efficiency in power generation.

The shares of renewables in 2030 are slightly higher (than in Reference) in all scenarios at: between 22-23%.

The changes described above will have some effects on the power generation capacity (growing for RES and declining for other fuels) as well as the necessary investments.

The share of renewables in final energy consumption as specified by the RES target present in all scenarios can be translated into specific shares in electricity, heating & cooling and transport. The scenarios analysed in this IA show very little variation for the shares in these specific sectors.

Table 4. Impacts on gross inland energy consumption in 2030 and 2050

Indicator (figures are presented in a 2030/2050 format) || || Ref || GHG40 || || Decarbonisation Scenarios

|| || EE27 || EE28 || EE29 || EE30 || EE35 || EE40

Gross Inland Energy Consumption (Mtoe) || || 1611 / 1630 || 1534 / 1393 || || 1488 / 1423 || 1470 / 1380 || 1450 / 1338 || 1422 / 1286 || 1337 / 1196 || 1243 / 1129

Primary Energy Consumption (Mtoe)[48] || || 1490 / 1510 || 1413 / 1294 || || 1369 / 1319 || 1352 / 1281 || 1333 / 1239 || 1307 / 1188 || 1227 / 1098 || 1135 / 1031

Energy Savings % in 2030[49] || || 21.0 || 25.1 || || 27.4 || 28.3 || 29.3 || 30.7 || 35.0 || 39.8

Energy Intensity (2010 = 100) (primary energy to GDP) || || 67 / 52 || 64 / 44 || || 62 / 45 || 61 / 44 || 61 / 42 || 59 / 41 || 56 / 38 || 52 / 36

- Industry[50] || || 81 / 68 || 78 / 55 || || 74 / 50 || 74 / 48 || 73 / 48 || 72 / 48 || 68 / 48 || 68 / 48

- Residential[51] || || 72 / 54 || 67 / 40 || || 65 / 44 || 63 / 41 || 61 / 38 || 58 / 35 || 52 / 29 || 43 / 24

- Tertiary[52] || || 65 / 49 || 59 / 34 || || 58 / 42 || 55 / 40 || 52 / 37 || 50 / 34 || 43 / 29 || 33 / 24

- Transport[53] || || 71 / 56 || 70 / 44 || || 68 / 44 || 68 / 44 || 68 / 44 || 68 / 44 || 68 / 43 || 68 / 43

Gross Inland Energy Consumption in Reference and % change compared to Reference || || 1611 / 1630 || -4.8 / -14.5 || || -7.7 / -12.7 || -8.8 / -15.3 || -10 / -17.9 || -11.8 / -21.1 || -17 / -26.6 || -22.8 / -30.8

- Solid fuels || || 174 / 124 || -10.8 / 7.2 || || -15.7 / 8.4 || -12.1 / 5 || -9.5 / 1.3 || -7.5 / -3.7 || -0.7 / -13.1 || -11.6 / -16.5

- Oil || || 520 / 498 || -3.3 / -62.1 || || -7.3 / -59.4 || -8 / -59.9 || -8.8 / -60.2 || -9.7 / -60.4 || -12 / -62.5 || -13.6 / -62.8

- Natural gas || || 397 / 397 || -13.2 / -36.9 || || -15.6 / -30.1 || -18.9 / -33.8 || -21.7 / -37.1 || -24.9 / -40.6 || -35.3 / -44.9 || -42.2 / -49.9

- Nuclear || || 201 / 216 || -0.2 / 17.1 || || -6.2 / 13.1 || -6.6 / 11.2 || -8.1 / 7.8 || -11.7 / 2 || -21.7 / -8.4 || -31.5 / -17.2

- Renewables || || 320 / 398 || 3.5 / 43.6 || || 5 / 42.6 || 2.9 / 38.2 || 1.1 / 34.3 || -1.1 / 29.8 || -8.3 / 22.7 || -14.4 / 16.8

Gross Inland Energy Consumption Share of : || || || || || || || || || ||

- Solid fuels || || 10.8 / 7.6 || 10.1 / 9.5 || || 9.9 / 9.5 || 10.4 / 9.4 || 10.8 / 9.4 || 11.3 / 9.3 || 12.9 / 9 || 12.4 / 9.2

- Oil || || 32.3 / 30.5 || 32.8 / 13.5 || || 32.4 / 14.2 || 32.6 / 14.5 || 32.7 / 14.8 || 33 / 15.3 || 34.2 / 15.6 || 36.2 / 16.4

- Natural gas || || 24.6 / 24.3 || 22.5 / 17.9 || || 22.5 / 19.5 || 21.9 / 19 || 21.5 / 18.6 || 21 / 18.3 || 19.2 / 18.3 || 18.5 / 17.6

- Nuclear || || 12.5 / 13.2 || 13.1 / 18.1 || || 12.7 / 17.2 || 12.8 / 17.4 || 12.7 / 17.4 || 12.5 / 17.1 || 11.8 / 16.5 || 11.1 / 15.8

- Renewables || || 19.9 / 24.4 || 21.6 / 41 || || 22.6 / 39.9 || 22.4 / 39.8 || 22.3 / 39.9 || 22.3 / 40.1 || 22 / 40.8 || 22.1 / 41.2

Renewables Share - Overall || || 24.4 / 28.7 || 26.5 / 51.4 || || 27.8 / 49.9 || 27.7 / 50.1 || 27.7 / 50.4 || 27.7 / 50.56 || 27.4 / 51.8 || 27.4 / 52.3

- Share in electricity, heating & cooling || || 31 / 36.8 || 34.2 / 51.4 || || 36.2 / 50.4 || 36.2 / 50.7 || 36.4 / 51.3 || 36.5 / 51.5 || 36.9 / 53 || 37.8 / 53.9

- Share in heating & cooling || || 23.8 / 26.6 || 25.9 / 49 || || 27.4 / 46.4 || 27.4 / 46.6 || 27.5 / 46.9 || 27.5 / 45.9 || 27.4 / 46.1 || 27 / 46.3

- Share in electricity || || 42.7 / 50.1 || 47.3 / 53.2 || || 49.7 / 53.8 || 49.4 / 54.1 || 49.3 / 54.6 || 49.6 / 55.8 || 50.3 / 58.1 || 52.7 / 59.3

- Share in transport || || 12 / 13.9 || 12.8 / 67.9 || || 13.7 / 65 || 13.7 / 65.2 || 13.9 / 65.5 || 14 / 66 || 14.2 / 68.5 || 14.4 / 68.9

Source: PRIMES 2014

The impacts of EE on overall energy consumption and on the fuel mix have important effects on energy imports. Clearly, the energy efficiency policy can contribute to reducing the demand for imported fuels and thus increasing the security of supply, which is currently a high political priority in the context of events in Ukraine.

In the Table 5 below it is visible that net energy imports decrease significantly for all scenarios already in 2030. While the reduction of net energy imports in 2030 (in comparison the year 2010) is 4% for the Reference, the scenarios achieve between 14 and 26% reductions - the reductions are getting higher, the more is the energy savings. All scenarios achieve higher reduction than the GHG40 scenario presented in the 2030 IA. The trend is even more pronounced in 2050 (where for all scenarios the imports practically halve in comparison to the year 2010). In this longer term perspective, the drivers are both EE policies and higher share of (domestically produced) renewables in the context of decarbonisation.

Looking at specific imported fuels in 2030:

· the imports of solids decrease for all scenarios and up to 41% for EE40 scenario (in comparison to 2010) whereas the Reference achieves only 23% reduction;

· the imports of oil decrease for all scenarios and up to 19% for EE40 (in comparison to 2010) whereas the Reference achieves only 7% reduction;

· the imports of gas decrease for all scenarios and up to 40% for EE 40 scenario (in comparison to 2010) whereas in Reference imports grow by 5%.

Import dependency – if defined as the ratio between fuel imports and total energy consumption - is in the short term only to some extent affected by policy choices and there are little differences between scenarios in 2030 with respect to the Reference and even present levels. In 2050, however, the Reference still has 57% import dependency whereas all other scenarios decrease it to below 40%, due to reduced demand for imported fossil fuels – brought about by the EE policies. In general, the import dependency indicator should be interpreted with caution. As shown in the Table 5, the import dependency values slightly increase from the EE29 to the EE40 scenario. At first glance, this seems to be contrary to the reduced absolute imported fuels. But it has to be also borne in mind that EE reduces global energy consumption in total, which decreases the denominator of the indicator import dependency (imported fuels divided by energy consumption). As both values of this indicator - the imported fuels and the energy consumptions - change with increased EE, it is better to use the absolute numbers for comparability reasons to assess the increase of security of supply.

The key role of EE in increasing security of supply was already acknowledged in the impact assessment underpinning the 2030 Communication and again in the European Energy Security Strategy. In the current context, it is more relevant to look at the impact that EE has on gas imports than overall energy dependency. As well as a risk of severance of energy provision, insecurity in the natural gas market can significantly contribute to increasing prices for industries and households. Approximately 65% of the EU's gas use is for heating buildings, and energy efficiency measures are well attuned to cutting this. Already with 27% energy savings, gas imports would already be 17% lower in 2030 than in the Reference. Every additional 1% in energy savings leads to a further reduction of about 2.6% in gas imports, reaching, for example, a 36% cut in gas imports in EE35(116 bcm) compared with Reference. Above 35% energy savings, the rate of reduction of gas imports from additional energy savings falls off sharply.

Decreasing import dependency under all EE scenarios demonstrates that EE policy reduced energy consumption of imported fuels to a greater extent than consumption of those produced domestically.

Another manner of illustrating the impact of EE on imports is calculation of fossil fuel net imports in monetary value which already in 2030 decreases for all scenarios and most markedly for EE30, EE35 and EE40. In2050 perspective, the value of imports under the Reference would increase taking into account growing fossil fuel prices but it decreases even further in all scenarios analysed reflecting their strong impact on curbing the demand, which even outweighs the effect of growing prices.

Net energy import decreases translate into savings in the energy fossil fuels imports bill (calculated here as a cumulative value over a 20 year period). For the period 2011-2030 cumulative savings range from €285 billion to €549 billion and for the period 2031-2050 from €3349 billion to €4360 billion. These savings indicate that rather than paying for imports, the EU economy can have these resources invested either in technology development and/or new assets and/or education, all of which contribute to job creation and economic growth.

Energy efficiency cannot, of course, constitute an entire energy security strategy on its own. It needs to be part of a broader set of measures, including the diversification of suppliers and supply points, ensuring proper fuel stocks and building interconnectors. With reduced energy demand but without these additional elements countries would be still exposed to sudden disruptions and price shocks. Neither this analysis nor the analysis underpinning the European Energy Security Strategy attempts to quantify the respective role that these different measures can play. It can be however concluded on the basis of this analysis that energy efficiency has the effect of:

- Reducing the scale of impacts that sudden supply disruptions or price hikes can have on the economy thanks to lower absolute consumption of energy, and of imported fuels in particular;

- Changing the relative weight of certain fuels in the energy mix, with a reduced share of gas where the exposure to these risk factors is particularly high and increased share of other fuels where this risk is relatively smaller, either because they are primarily domestically –produced (e.g. renewables) or because they are traded in a much more liquid market than gas (e.g. oil). This is linked to the design on the policies modelled which target buildings in particular, where the share of gas for heating is especially high.

While the potential of energy efficiency in this respect depends on the specific situation of different Member States, it needs to be stressed, as in the European Energy Security Strategy, that the EU's energy system is increasingly integrated, while at the same time Member States are importing from the same supplier countries and it is therefore important to consider energy security from an EU perspective. Choices taken on the level of fuel supply, infrastructure development, energy transformation or consumption lead to spill-over effects on other Member States.

Table 5. Impacts on energy security in 2030 and 2050

Indicator (figures are presented in a 2030/2050 format) || || Ref || GHG40 || || Decarbonisation Scenarios

|| || EE27 || EE28 || EE29 || EE30 || EE35 || EE40

Net Energy Imports Volume (2010=100) || || 96 / 101 || 89 / 56 || || 86 / 59 || 85 / 57 || 83 / 56 || 82 / 54 || 78 / 51 || 74 / 49

- Solid || || 77 / 49 || 68 / 42 || || 61 / 40 || 65 / 38 || 61 / 38 || 62 / 34 || 70 / 30 || 59 / 29

- Oil || || 93 / 96 || 90 / 41 || || 86 / 44 || 85 / 43 || 85 / 43 || 84 / 43 || 82 / 41 || 81 / 41

- Gas || || 105 / 122 || 91 / 74 || || 88 / 82 || 84 / 78 || 81 / 74 || 78 / 69 || 67 / 65 || 60 / 59

- Renewable Energy Forms || || 492 / 601 || 505 / 1043 || || 509 / 1002 || 500 / 972 || 493 / 947 || 482 / 924 || 458 / 875 || 433 / 852

Import Dependency (% net imports to total gross inland energy consumption) || || 55.1 / 56.6 || 53.6 / 36.8 || || 53 / 38.1 || 53 / 38 || 52.6 / 38.2 || 52.8 / 38.3 || 53.5 / 38.6 || 54.4 / 39.1

Value of Fossil Fuel Net Imports (bn €'10) (average annual 2011-30 and 2031-2050) || || 461 / 548 || 452 / 377 || || 447 / 380 || 446 / 373 || 444 / 366 || 441 / 358 || 436 / 340 || 434 / 330

- Oil || || 330 / 390 || 327 / 263 || || 323 / 265 || 323 / 262 || 322 / 259 || 321 / 257 || 319 / 248 || 318 / 245

- Gas || || 115 / 146 || 110 / 104 || || 108 / 107 || 107 / 102 || 106 / 98 || 105 / 93 || 101 / 84 || 100 / 76

- Solid || || 16 / 12 || 15 / 10 || || 15 / 9 || 15 / 9 || 15 / 9 || 15 / 8 || 15 / 8 || 15 / 8

Fossil Fuels Import Bill Savings compared to reference (bn € '10) (cumulative 2011-30 and 2031-2050) || || n.a || -190 / -3404 || || -285 / -3349 || -311 / -3490 || -346 / -3637 || -395 / -3798 || -503 / -4145 || -549 / -4360

Source: PRIMES 2014

The final energy demand is projected to decrease differently in the different sectors. Looking at the specific sectors in detail, the residential and tertiary sectors experience the strongest reduction (in comparison to the Reference) as they are affected by a majority of energy efficiency policies with the biggest changes brought about by improving thermal integrity of buildings – consequently their share in total final energy demand decreases. The share of industry in final energy demand almost does not change from the Reference case demonstrating the countervailing effects of EE policies and ETS prices. Finally, the share of transport grows slightly in EE25 and EE28 and more significantly in the scenarios with more energy savings reflecting relatively smaller potential for GHG abatement in transport.

Gross electricity generation decreases by 2030 for all scenarios in comparison to Reference. In a 2050 perspective, however, it grows (except for EE35 and EE40 scenarios) reflecting increasing demand for electricity from heating, appliances and transport. In electricity generation, for all scenarios the share of gas declines while the share of RES increases. Electricity grid losses remain the same for all scenarios and Reference except for EE35 and EE40 scenarios, in which losses decline slightly.

Among impacts on technologies, a key impact to be observed is the increase of shares of electricity produced from combined heat and power (CHP) up to 17% already in 2030 in EE27, EE28, EE29 and EE30 scenarios (from 16% in the Reference). The increase in 2030 is due to synergies between the RES target and co-generation which mainly uses biomass as a feedstock. In 2050 perspective, however, the CHP indicator declines (in comparison to the Reference) for all scenarios as there is increasing competition for biofuels/biomass feedstocks in transport.

Concerning CCS development, the % of electricity it represents is higher than in Reference in EE27 and EE28 scenarios but its role is lesser than in the Reference in scenarios with more energy savings reflecting low ETS prices.

Energy related CO2 emissions decrease strongly in all scenarios already in 2030 and then even more in 2050 reflecting the declining demand for energy as well as declining carbon intensity of power generation, the latter mostly influenced by ETS and renewables policy.

Table 6. Other energy system impacts

Indicator (figures are presented in a 2030/2050 format) || || Ref || GHG40 || || Decarbonisation Scenarios

|| || EE27 || EE28 || EE29 || EE30 || EE35 || EE40

Final Energy Demand (Mtoe) || || 1126 / 1151 || 1073 / 885 || || 1039 / 904 || 1020 / 876 || 1002 / 848 || 981 / 819 || 920 / 759 || 859 / 712

- Industry share || || 27.3 / 26.8 || 27.5 / 28.3 || || 26.8 / 24.9 || 27.3 / 24.9 || 27.6 / 25.6 || 27.8 / 26.4 || 28.1 / 28.4 || 29.8 / 30.2

-Residential share || || 26.4 / 26.4 || 25.9 / 25.5 || || 26.2 / 27.1 || 25.7 / 26.4 || 25.3 / 25.2 || 24.8 / 23.8 || 23.4 / 21.4 || 21 / 18.8

-Tertiary share || || 14.9 / 15 || 14.2 / 13.4 || || 14.5 / 16.1 || 13.9 / 15.8 || 13.6 / 15.3 || 13.2 / 14.6 || 12 / 13.5 || 10.1 / 11.9

-Transport share || || 31.4 / 31.8 || 32.4 / 32.9 || || 32.5 / 31.9 || 33.1 / 33 || 33.6 / 34 || 34.3 / 35.2 || 36.5 / 36.7 || 39.1 / 39.1

Gross Electricity Generation (TWh) || || 3664 / 4339 || 3532 / 5040 || || 3469 / 5038 || 3461 / 4936 || 3423 / 4796 || 3336 / 4560 || 3080 / 4267 || 2804 / 3969

- Solids Share || || 13 / 8.4 || 11.6 / 10.1 || || 10.9 / 10.8 || 11.9 / 10.7 || 12.5 / 10.5 || 13.4 / 10.1 || 16.6 / 9 || 15.5 / 9

- Oil Share || || 0.6 / 0.5 || 0.5 / 0.1 || || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.5 / 0.1 || 0.5 / 0.1

- Natural Gas Share || || 19.5 / 17.3 || 15.3 / 12.5 || || 14.8 / 12.5 || 14.2 / 12.3 || 13.8 / 11.9 || 13 / 11.2 || 10.2 / 11 || 9.8 / 10.3

- Nuclear share || || 21.8 / 21.3 || 22.6 / 21.6 || || 21.5 / 20.8 || 21.5 / 20.9 || 21.3 / 20.8 || 21 / 20.7 || 20 / 19.8 || 19.1 / 19.1

- Renewables share || || 44.5 / 51.6 || 49.3 / 54.2 || || 51.7 / 54.4 || 51.3 / 54.6 || 51.2 / 55.2 || 51.5 / 56.4 || 52.1 / 58.5 || 54.6 / 59.8

- of which hydro share || || 10.8 / 9.8 || 11.2 / 8.6 || || 11.5 / 8.7 || 11.5 / 8.8 || 11.6 / 9.1 || 11.9 / 9.5 || 12.8 / 10.1 || 13.9 / 10.8

- of which wind share || || 21 / 24.8 || 23.9 / 26.5 || || 24.8 / 27 || 24.5 / 27.1 || 24.4 / 27.2 || 24.4 / 27.3 || 24.2 / 27.8 || 25.2 / 27.6

- of which Solar, tidal, etc share || || 5.8 / 8.4 || 6.4 / 9.5 || || 6.8 / 9.6 || 6.6 / 9.4 || 6.6 / 9.4 || 6.6 / 9.5 || 6.7 / 9.8 || 6.9 / 9.8

- of which Biomass & waste share || || 6.6 / 7.9 || 7.5 / 8.6 || || 8.3 / 8.2 || 8.4 / 8.4 || 8.4 / 8.7 || 8.4 / 9.2 || 8.1 / 9.9 || 8.3 / 10.7

CCS indicator (% of electricity from CCS) (difference in p.p.) || || 0.45 / 6.9 || 0.77 / 14.72 || || 0.65 / 14.53 || 0.58 / 13.67 || 0.41 / 12.98 || 0.27 / 11.83 || 0.29 / 10.65 || 0.3 / 10.19

CHP indicator (% of electricity from CHP) (difference in p.p.) || || 16.1 / 16.2 || 16.4 / 14 || || 17 / 14.9 || 17 / 14.6 || 16.9 / 14.7 || 17 / 15.1 || 16.2 / 15.2 || 16.3 / 15.3

Carbon intensity of power generation (per MWhe+MWhth) || || 17.8 / 7.9 || 15.1 / 0.7 || || 14.4 / 1.1 || 15 / 1.2 || 15.5 / 1.2 || 16.1 / 1.2 || 17.7 / 1.3 || 16.9 / 1.1

Electricity Grid Losses[54] || || 6.4 / 6.7 || 6.3 / 6.4 || || 6.4 / 6.6 || 6.4 / 6.6 || 6.3 / 6.6 || 6.1 / 5.8 || 5.6 / 4.9 || 5.5 / 4.9

Source: PRIMES 2014

5.3.2. Economic impacts in the energy system

The EU Reference scenario 2013 - projecting the consequences of already adopted policies as well as developments largely unrelated to policy (renewal of ageing power generation capacity in Europe, growing international fossil fuel prices) - shows, until 2030, the ratio of total energy system cost to GDP will be increasing from 12.8 % in 2010 to 14.0% in 2030, before decreasing to 12.3 % in 2050. The policy scenarios evaluated in the 2030 IA all showed higher energy system costs up to 2030 and beyond, with costs being the lowest for the GHG40 scenario and highest for the scenarios with the most energy savings.

This chapter revisits the costs estimation and shows the level of cost increase brought by different levels of ambition of EE policies, including the GHG40 scenario presented in the 2030 IA. Looking at differences in average annual costs for the period 2011-2030 across all scenarios, they range between 0.01 and 0.79 percentage points of GDP high