EN   EN 
 
 
 EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION   
Brussels, 26.4.2022  
COM(2022) 180 final  
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL  
on the application of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof   
 
1 
 REPORT  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  TO THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  
THE  COUNCIL  
on the application of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereo f 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Article 15(2) of Annex XI to the Staff Regulations (SR) as last amended in 20131 provides 
that, before 31 March 2022, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament 
and the Council having regard to the survey conducted under Article 2 of the same Annex 
and assess ing whether the evolution of purchasing power of remuner ation and pensions of 
Union officials is in accordance with the changes in the purchasing power of salaries in 
national civil services in central governments.  On the basis of this report, if appropriate, the 
Commission shall submit a proposal to amend Anne x XI as well as Article 66a of the SR, on 
the basis of Article 336 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
This report implements the aforementioned provision by assessing the fulfilment of EU 
institutions’ recruitment needs, describing the process and outcome of the implementation of 
the rules for updating remuneration and pensions under Annex XI to the SR (hereinafter the 
"Method") as well as the solidarity levy under Article 66a for the period 2014 -2021.  
2. EU INSTITUTIONS RECR UITMENT NEED S 
2.1. Statutory requi rement to survey recruitment needs  
Article 2 of Annex XI of the SR provide s that the Commission shall regularly survey the 
recruitment needs of the institutions .  
While from an operational point of view recruitment aims at filling vacant positions within 
EU institutions , Article 27 of the SR and Article s 12 and 82 of the Conditions of Employment 
of Other Servants require , on the one hand,  that officials and agents meet the highest 
standards of ability, efficiency and integrity, and, on the other hand, that they are  recruited on 
the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the EU. 
2.2. Observations on recruitment needs  
The European Personnel Selection Office ( EPSO ) is in charge of selecting official s, who 
represent the largest share of EU staff . EU institutions regularly communicate their 
recruitment needs to EPSO, which establishes a yearly plan to run competitions  and defines 
selection methods and procedures , including  marking rules for each compet ition. Together 
with the checks carried out upon  recruitment , this  guarantee s that all recruits meet the highest 
standard of ability, efficiency and integrity , in line with Article 27 of the SR . 
                                                 
1  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2013.  
 
2 
 2.2.1.  Decrease of applications to EU competitions  
By comparing EU  institutions ’ recruitment needs for non-linguistic administrators  (expressed 
in number of laureates sought) with competitions ’ actual outcome , Annex 1  shows that, as a 
general rule, EPSO manage d to select the requested number of laureates.  
This being said , the number s of applicants to AD generalist competitions declined for all 
clusters of  Member  States  (Annex 2) . For  pre-2004  Member States, such a decline started 
after the 2004 reform of the SR, while for post-2004 Member States, the decline started after 
the 2014 reform  of the SR (Annex 3)2. This affected the EU institutions ’ ability to fulfil their 
recruitment needs , as well as to ensure a geographically balanced recruitment.  
2.2.2.  Pragmatic solution implemented by the C ommission to fulfill specific 
recruitment needs  
To address its recruitment needs, the Commission increasingly recruit ed temporary agents on 
permanent posts which are normally  occupied by permanent officials. In the Commission, 
their total number  outside linguistic services grew from 461 in 2013 (of which 118  at 
administrator  level ) to 1672 in 2020 ( of which 825 at administrator level ).  
2.2.3.  A geographically imbalanced recruitment  
The Commission has encounte red difficulties to recruit staff on the broadest pos sible 
geographical basis. In its 2018 report adopted pursuant to Article 27 of the SR3, the 
Commission notably identified the issue of attractiveness , translating in low levels of 
participation in EU competitions when compared to the size of the relevant population  of 
some Member States . As a result, some nationalit ies are not sufficiently represented on EPSO 
lists of laureates.  Annex 4 illustrates how, since 2018, applications to EU competitions  
remained unbalanced4, thereby resulting in geographically un balanced recruitments . In 
particular, the number of significantly under -represented nationalities among junior 
administrators has risen to 13: Austrian, Czech, Estonian,  German, Dan ish, Finn ish, Cypriot, 
Luxembourg ish, Maltese, Dutch, Polish , Slovak and Sw edish5.  
2.3. Correlation between EU institutions’ attractiveness and different 
macroeconomic and socioeconomic factors , including remuneration  
The table hereinafter provides information regarding the level of participation in EU 
competitions for each Member State over the period 2013 -2019.  All Member States were 
included in the analysis except Belgium, the smallest Member States in terms of population 
                                                 
2  Only applications of Greek and Cypriot nationals increased or remained stable.  
3  Commission report to the European Parliament  and the Council of 15 June 2018, as corrected on 24 August 
2018 by COM(2018)377 final/2.  
4  In the framework of the present report, the level of participation for each  Member State is defined by the 
ratio between the share of candidates and the share of EU population over the period 2013 -2019 . A 7-year 
period is used to smooth en data, as EU competitions are held irregularly. Moreover, due to the pandemic 
and its consequences on the organisation of these competitions, 2020 and 2021 are considered atypical 
years and are therefore excluded from the analysis.  
5  Situation at 31 December 2021.  
 
3 
 and those whose level of participation is within the 80 -120% bracket, i.e. close to the ideal 
“target”  participation6. More precisely , excluded Member States are:  
- Belgium  because t he overrepresentation of Belgian  citizens  among EPSO 
candidates is linked to the status of Brussels as the seat of several EU institutions7, 
- Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta , as, in light of their small population size , the 
analysis of the share of candidates in EU competitions compared to the national 
population is not statistically sound , and  
- Hungary, Slovakia and Finland , as their level of participatio n (comparing level of 
participation with percentage of EU population) is between 80% and 120%  
measured over seven  years and therefore close to the target . 
 
In order to assess factors influencing the level of participation in EU competitions for each 
Member State, it is necessary to examine EU institutions’ attractiveness across the EU. As the 
choice to apply to an EU competition remains ultimately a personal one  that can be based on 
various factors , the Commission assessed the e xistence of possible  correlation s between a set 
of macroeconomic and socioeconomic factors and observed  trends in the level of 
participation observed  across Member States  (Annex 5  to 5.7 ). In particular, the Commission 
assessed relative net earnings in Mem bers States  (Annexes 5.1 and 5.2) , unemployment 
levels  (Annex 5.3) , the national employment situation  (Annex 5.4) , the image of the EU  
                                                 
6  As the “target ” (level of participation  of 100%) can never be reached for statistical reasons, the choice was 
made to analyse only Member States where there is a clear imbalance. The cut -off level  was set at +/- 20% 
compared to a 100% participation level. This is in line with the approach taken in the Commission report 
adopted pursuant to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and to Article 12 of the Condition s of 
Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (Geographical balance) – COM(2018) 377 final . 
7  The same phenomenon is observed in the headquarters of other international organisations. For example, 
German staff are overrepresented at the European  Central Bank.  

 
4 
 (Annex 5.5),  personal financial prospects (Annex 5.6), and the OECD better life index  
(Annex 5 .7).  
On the basis of these data, the Commission assessed possible correlations between low 
participation in EU competitions and these socioeconomic and macroeconomic factors. The 
following conclusions could be drawn :  
- participation of EU nationals in EU competitions is fairly correlated with net 
earnings in Member States and the perception of employment prospects at 
national level , 
 
- if the analysis is restricted to the Member States with the highest and lowest 
wages, the level of participation to EU comp etitions and the level of net earnings 
are almost perfectly correlated8. This is particularly true for  the Germany , France,  
the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria. For mid -wage Member States, 
results are however more nuanced and require taking on board other 
socioeconomic factors , 
 
- the level of participation  in EU competitions  is highly correlated with the OECD 
better life index,  
 
- the level of participation is weakly or not correlated with the national 
unemployment level, the image of the EU among citizens and the perception of 
improvement of one’s financial situation in the coming year .  
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 65 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS  
3.1. Principle of paral lelism  
The principle of parallel development  of purchasing power means that the purchasing power 
of EU staff members follows, both upwards and downwards, the evolution of the average 
purchasing power of civil servants in national central government s. Assessing the 
implementation of the principle of paral lelism during the observed period may further clarify 
difficulties observed when it comes to EU institutions’ recruitment needs.  
Under Article 65(1) of the SR, the update of remuneration and pensions reflects th e annual 
evolution between 1 July of the previous year and 1 July of the current year9 of: 
- the real salaries of civil servants in the central governments in a sample of 10 
Member States representing at least 75% of the EU Gross Domestic Product (EU 
GDP) 10. For each of these Member States, the yearly change in real salaries is 
                                                 
8  The United Nations (UN) deals with this issue by applying the so called ‘Noblemaire principle’, i.e. a 
formula which essentially sets the salary level of the UN by reference to the salary level paid by the civil 
service of the Member Stat e which pays the highest (in recent years this has consistently been the United 
States). In consequence, the UN is able to guarantee interest from candidates of all Member States.  
9  The methodology is based on the comparison of a snapshot of a national re muneration system of a Member 
State in the month of July of the current year with the equivalent snapshot in the same Member State in the 
month of July of the previous year.  
10  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland and Sweden. 
Despite the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the sample of 10 Member States 
 
5 
 calculated net of inflation and is called the Specific Indicator. The Global 
Specific Indicator  (GSI)  is the average of all specific indicators weighted by the 
respective GDP of each M ember State.  
- the annual inflation in Brussels and Luxembourg (in the same proportion as the 
distribution of the EU staff between the two cities). This element is called the 
Joint Index .  
The GSI and the Joint Index are multiplied to calculate the value of  the update. The value of 
the update is expressed as a percentage that is applied across -the-board to the net 
remuneration and pensions of all EU staff , with effect on 1 July11.  
In this context, it is important to point out that the Method does not allow ‘double counting ’ 
of inflation, but guarantees the parallel evolution of salaries of EU staff and national civil 
servants, net of inflation. To this end, the GSI is first calculated net of inflation in the sample 
of 10 Member States, and only as a second st ep is  it combined with the Joint Index. Detailed 
information on the evolution of t he GSI and of the Joint Index are  provided in part 3. 
3.2. Specific indicators  
This chapter explores whether the sample of Member States currently used to calculate the 
GSI translates correctly the real changes of purchasing power of all national civil servants 
and whether the general and specific derogations from the principle of paral lelism  inherent to 
the Method have le d to a significant loss of purchasing power by EU civi l servants.  
3.2.1.  Calculation  of the Global Specific Indicator as defined in the 2013 Method  
Under the Method adopted in 2013, the GSI was computed as of 1 July 2015 , using a sample 
of eleven  reference Member States (weighted by GDP): Belgium, Germany, Spain, Fr ance, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
As of 1 January 2021  the United Kingdom  is no longer considered an EU Member State and 
therefore since that date it is not included in the sample for the calculation of the GSI.  Annex 
6 shows that following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, the 
sample still meets the 75% threshold laid down in Article 1(4) of Annex XI to the SR and 
thus does not need to be amended. In implementation of the agreed in ter-institutional 
approach  concerning references to the  United Kingdom in the EU legislation, for the 
purposes of Article 1(4) of Annex XI, Eurostat now uses a sample consisting of the 10 
remaining Member States  aforementioned . 
Annual and cumulative data b y Member State of the applicable sample  
Annex 7 shows the time series of the specific indicators for the applicable sample of eleven 
Member States since 1 July 2015, together with a simple arithmetic mean value for the 
period . Annex  8 shows the same data, re-expressed as a cumulative index (2014=100).  
                                                                                                                                                        
still represents more than 75% of the EU Gross Domestic Product as required under Article 1(4) of Annex 
XI to the SR.  
11  To account for substantial changes in the cost of living in Brussels and Luxembourg, an intermediate update 
may take place as of 1 January, in accordance with Articles 4 to 7 of Annex XI to the SR.  
 
6 
 Global Specific Indicator for the applicable sample  
The cumulative impact of the GSI calculated and the GSI applied since I July 2015 is 
illustrated in Annex 9. The calculated GSI corresponds to the evolution of purchasing power 
of civil servants in the sample of Member States over the period (weighted by G DP expressed 
in Purchasing Power Standards). In accordance with the principle of parallelism (see part 
3.1), the purchasing power of EU staff followed the same evolution as the sample , except 
since 1 July 2020 , as a result of the implementation of the exce ption clause  (see part 3.2.4) . 
Annex 10 shows the time series of the GSI since 1 July 2015, together with the Joint Index 
and the consequent annual update for EU staff. The GSI applied , computed as a simple 
average for the seven  year period is 100.6, the c umulative impact  of the GSI applied  to July 
2014 (2014=100) is 103.4.  
3.2.2.  The Global Specific Indicator as defined under previous Methods  
The current legislativ e solution to use a sample of 10 Member States to calculate the GSI has 
not always been the approac h chosen by the legislator. Prior to 2004 , the GSI was calculated 
by reference to the statistical data for all Member States (e.g. 15 Member States in 2003), 
whereas in the period 2004 -2012 a sample of 8 reference Member States was used.  
The legislator’s decision  to adopt the new Method  was motivated by a retrospective data 
analysis suggesting that developments in that sample would reflect closely the average 
evolution in all Member States. However, it is to be noted that a subsequent analysis showed 
that the actual evolution of purchasi ng power in the selected sample after 2004 was lower 
than the average for all Member States. In 2013, the co -legislator maintained the principle of 
a sample of Member States , while increasing its size from 8 to 11.  
To fulfil the statutory requir ement to an alyse whether the evolution of purchasing power of 
Union officials has been i n accordance with the changes in the purchasing power of civil 
servants  in central governments  from all Member States, this chapter provides simulations of 
the evolution of the GS I in case a sample of EU 8 or in case no sample would have been used 
in the period 2015 - 2021.  
With the sample of eight Member States12, the simple average of the yearly GSI for the 
period 2015 -2021 would be 100.4 and the cumulative impact (2014=100) would be 102.5. 
With all Member States the simple average of the yearly GSI for the period 2015 -2021 would 
be 101.1 and the cumulative impac t (2014=100) would be 106.5 .  
Annex 11 of this report  compares  the evolution of the GSI calculated on the basis of the 
above mentioned alternative samples.  These data show that as a result of the sample of 
Member States defined in 2013  by the co -legislator , the purchasing  power of EU staff only 
reached half of the changes in the purchasing power of salaries in national civil services in 
central governements , which may have resulted in a reduction in perceived attractiveness of 
the EU as an employer.  
                                                 
12  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Ne therlands and United Kingdom.  
 
7 
 3.2.3.  Specifi c Indicator : trends for individual Member States   
Calculations and figures relating to specific indicators  in the Member States  are based on data 
supplied and validated by the responsible statistical authorities of the Member States. To this 
end, a yearly remuneration questionnaire has been developed and updated over time. A set of 
country -specific methodology manuals and assessment reports is also being made public to 
raise the level of transparency13. 
Annex 12 summarises the available data for each Member State for the period 2015 -2021 , 
together with a simple arithmetic average value for the period. Annex 13 shows the same 
data, re -expressed as a cumulative index (2014=100). Among Member States that are part of 
the sample, the highest net increases since 20 15 are observed in Poland (121), Germany 
(109.8), Austria (109.6) and the Netherlands (109). The lower increases are observed in 
Luxembourg (101.6) and Belgium (101.8) and, within the sample, only central civil servants 
in France experienced a decrease of their net purchasing power (97.9).  
Because the evolution of EU staff remuneration is calculated on the basis of the weighted 
average of a sample of  Member States, and as detailed in part 3.2.1, over the same period, the 
remuneration of EU staff increased by 103. 4.  
Among Member States that are not part of the sample, the highest net increases of 
remuneration are observed in Slovakia (186.4), Czechia (167,1), Bulgaria (156.3) and 
Romania (148.1). Annex 14 shows that the vast majority of Member States that a re part of the 
sample and have low participation rates in EU competitions organised by EPSO – as shown 
in part 2  – had specific indicators largely superior to the GSI on the basis of which EU staff 
remuneration has been updated. In other words, relative pu rchasing power attractiveness of 
the EU has declined for those countries.  
3.2.4.  General derogation to the principle of paral lelism: application of the moderation 
and exception clauses  
By derogation to the principle of parallelism of purchasing power evolution, a  moderation 
clause limits high increases in purchasing power , as well as any high loss in  purchasing 
power for a given year. If the calculated increase in purchasing power (GSI) exceeds 2% or if 
the purchasing power decreases by more than 2%, then the chan ge in purchasing power for 
EU staff is limited to 2%. The part of the gain or loss in purchasing power exceeding 2% is 
applied nine months later, from 1 April of the following year.  
A second general derogation is the exception clause, which  limits the gain  in purchasing 
power of EU staff when there is a downturn in the EU economy. If there is a forecast 
decrease in the EU GDP  in real terms  and there is a gain in purchasing power measured by 
the GSI, then depending on the magnitude of the GDP  in real terms  decrease, a part of the 
gain in purchasing power is postponed . If the EU GDP  in real terms  decreased by more than 
3%, then the gain in purchasing power due to the Method is granted when the EU economy 
recovers, i.e. when the EU GDP in real terms  reaches the  pre-downturn level (recovery 
clause). If the final data delivered by the Commission on the EU GDP  in real terms  is 
                                                 
13  The general methodology manual for calculating Specific Indicators is available on Eurostat’s website. In 
addition, 13 country -specific assessments have already published as of late 2018 and work is ongoing with 
other national authorities to increase the n umber of published assessments (see the following link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil -servants -remuneration/specific -indicators/ country -assessments ).  
 
8 
 different from the forecast , to the extent that it affects how the exception  clause was applied, 
then the necessary  corrections, including r etroactive adjustments, either positive or negative, 
are made14. 
Moderation clause : between 2015 and 2021, Eurostat duly verified the figures of the updates 
against the criteria for the moderation and exception clauses , as set out in Articles 10 and 11 
of Anne x XI to the SR. The GSI exceeded the statutory limit of +2% / -2% only in 2020, 
when t he GSI measured (+2.5%)  was above  the threshold required t o trigger the moderation 
clause . Given the concurrent application of th e exception clause in the same year (2020), and 
in line with  Article 10 of Annex XI to the SR, the moderation clause did not apply.  
Exception clause : the annual EU GDP growth forecast available at the time of each yearly 
Eurostat report was positive, excep t in 2020, when, as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic,  
the forecast ed evolution o f the Union GDP in real terms was negative ( -7.4 %)15 . Therefore, 
the exception clause under Article 11(1) of Annex XI to the SR applied in 2020. Since the 
Union GDP decrease was greater than 3%, t he GSI was not used to calculate the value of the 
update of remuneration and pensions. Hence , the whole GSI that would have been factored in 
the annual update for 2020 (+2.5 %) will form the basis of the calculation of a future update 
once the cumulative increase of the Union GDP in real terms  becomes positive, in accordance 
with Artic les 10 and 11(4) of Annex XI to the SR.  
The implementation of statutory general derogations to the principle of paral lelism and , more 
specifically , of the exception clause in 2020 has been implemented strictly , allowing to limit 
the annual update resulting from the Method in times of economic downturns and thus 
providing  net savings for the EU budget. On the other hand, this application of the except ion 
clause impacted the parallel evolution of the purchaising power of EU civil servants , as for 
the same period civil servants in national government s from the sample effectively benefited 
from a higher purch asing power of 2.5% on average , thus resulting in a decline of attractivity 
for the EU since 2020.  
Likewise, the 2020 annual update demonstrated the effectiveness o f the automatic moderation 
clause , which was also introduced in 2014. Should the exception clause not have been 
triggered at the same time,  the moderation clause would have automatically limited the 
increase of the GSI until April 2021.  
Overall , it could be conclude d that the automaticity of the M ethod, (i.e. remuneration updates 
based on statistical data which produce effect s on the basis of  the SR and without the 
intervention of any other legal act) has worked well since 2014 . The automatic M ethod was 
fit for purpose, allowing to take account economic circumstances and purchasing power 
evolutions, while significantly reducing administrative burden compared to the annual 
recourse to ordinary legislative procedure used before 2014.  
                                                 
14  The Working Group on Articles 64 and 65 of the SR decided that the "final data" delivered by the 
Commission on the EU GDP for a given year would be interpreted as the data available by 30 September of 
the following year. This clar ification was deemed to be necessary since GDP data can often be revised 
many years after the reference year.  
15  In 2021, the final figure measured by Eurostat for the 2020 decrease of the EU GDP  in real terms  was -
5.9%.  
 
9 
 3.2.5.  Specific derogation from the general principle of parallelism  
To take account of the particularly difficult economic and social context in the Union at the 
time, as part of the  2014  reform it was also decided that the update of remuneration and 
pensions of all staff of the Union institutions, other bodies and agencies through the Method 
would be suspended in 2013 and 2014, and that the potential advantages for officia ls and 
other servants of the European Union derived from the application of the Method would be 
balanced by the reintroduction as of 1 January 2014 of a solidarity levy deducted from EU 
staff salaries at an increased rate.  
3.2.5.1.  The suspension of salary updates  for two years (2013 -2014)  
As part of the reform of the SR in 2013, the European Council called for the adjustment of 
remuneration and pensions of all staff of the Union institutions through the Method to be 
suspended for two years. Thus , no update of remu neration and pensions took place in 2013 
and 201416, pursuant  to the clear text of the SR. According to the European Court of 
Auditors, this two-year freeze generated 1.5 billion savings over the 2014 -2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework17.   
While the suspension of the update discontinued the application of the principle of 
parallelism for the period 2013 -2014, the correction coefficients continued to be updated to 
ensure equality of purchasing power between the different places of employment.  
3.2.5.2.  The impac t of the EU solidarity levy  
The solidarity levy is a deduction from the remuneration of EU staff that was re -introduced at 
an increased rate as from  1 January 2014. The rate of the solidarity levy, which is applied to 
the base defined in Article 66a(3) of the SR, is 6%. It is increased to 7% for staff in grade AD 
15, step 2, and above. In the draft 2022 budget18, revenues from the solidarity levy are 
expected to reach EUR 106 million. Annex 15 shows the evolution of these revenues since 
2012.  
3.2.5.3.  Assessment of t he specific derogations to the principle of paralelism  
As a result of these specific derogations, EU staff endured a significant loss in terms of real 
purchasing power. EU staff lost around 10.3% of their purchasing power, mainly due to the 
combined effect  of the reforms of the SR in 2004 and in 2013, cuts in salary adjustments and 
the implementation of the exception clause in 2020. Over the same period, civil servants in 
central governments of the Member States gained on average 0.9 %  in terms of purchasin g 
power19. 
                                                 
16  Pursuant to Article 65(4) of th e SR.  
17  European Court o f Auditors, Special report 15/2019, Implementation of the 2014 staff reform package at 
the Commission - Big savings but not without consequences for staff . 
18  Draft  General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2022 , COM (2021) 300.  
19  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council  on data pertaining to the 
budgetary impact of the 2021 annual update of remuneration and pensions of the officials and other servants 
of the European Union and the cor rection coefficients applied thereto  COM(2021) 729.  
 
10 
 3.3. The Joint Index  
The Joint Index measures changes in the cost of living in Belgium and Luxembourg for EU 
staff according to the distribution of staff serving in these two Member States, based on the 
Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) in the case of Belgium and the Consumer 
Prices Index (CPI) in the case of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 1 of Annex XI to 
the SR. Due to the specific consumption weights used for aggregating the Joint Index20, there 
may be differences between its evolu tion and the evolution pattern of the HICP for Belgium 
and the CPI for Luxembourg21 for a given year.  
Annex 16 shows the Joint Index time series (annual increase June -June by reference to 
previous year), together with information for Belgian HICP and Luxembourg CPI. The 
average Joint Index over the period from 2015 to 2021 is 101.4. The cumulative index fo r the 
whole period to June 2021 (base June 2014 = 100) is 110.6. By comparison, the average 
HICP in Belgium over the period is 101.6 and the cumulative total for the period is 111.4.  
The average CPI in Luxembourg over the period was 101.2 and the cumulativ e total for the 
period is 108.8.  
As a result of the intro duction of the Joint Index by the 2014 reform of the SR, part of the 
update corresponding to the inflation measured in Brussels and Luxembourg allowed to 
ensure consistency between adjustments paid t o EU staff and inflations measured in Brussels 
and Luxembourg. Annex 17 shows that in case the Brussels International Index had 
continue d to serve as a basis for the update of remuneration  as was the case under the 
previous Method , the cumulative inflation  measured during the reference period would have 
been almost the same as  the one calculated on the basis of the Joint Index22. The cumulative 
total for the Joint Index is lower than the Belgian HICP and higher than Luxembourg’s CPI.   
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 64 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS  
4.1. Principle of equality of purchasing power among EU staff – correction 
coefficients  
The correction coefficient puts into practice the general principle of equal treatment, which in 
this particular case corresponds to the equa lity of purchasing power between all staff of the 
EU institutions, bodies and agencies regardless of their place of employment. Whereas the 
same salary grids and basic amounts apply to all EU staff, correction coefficients apply to 
staff serving in posts o utside Brussels and Luxembourg, who should neither suffer financially 
from higher living costs in their duty stations nor benefit from lower living costs23. 
Hence the correction coefficient operates as a percentage adjustment to the salary to 
compensate the  difference ( either positive or negative) in the cost of living in each duty 
station. The correction coefficient is applied according to the following formula:  
                                                 
20  As compared with the regular weights used for price statistics, the main difference for aggregating the Joint 
Index is the use of weights for rents that include owner -occupiers (instead of considering  only tenants).  
21  Values shown are for the overall aggregate index; actual calculations are done from detailed level.  
22  Note that during the reference period , inflation rates were historically low for all component sub -indices . 
Note also that the calcul ation is using a consumption pattern for Belgium alone and might give slightly 
different results if combined with a specific consumption pattern for Luxembourg.  
23  For staff members assigned in delegations, under Article 11 of Annex X, staff members have t he possibility 
to request the payment of their remuneration in euros with the weighting applicable in Brussels.  
 
11 
  
 
  
 
Correction coefficients are up dated at least once a year with effect on 1 July24. 
The methodology for calculating correction coefficients is defined and regularly improved by 
Eurostat in cooperation with the national statistical institutes. For the period under 
consideration , it is worth mentioning the following developments:  
- implementa tion of a more developed methodology for comparing healthcare and 
education costs, including fee -paying schools across Member States,  
- data collection work has been adapted in the context of Brexit and of the Covid 
19 pandemic ’s consequences , 
- an increasing number of organisations are willing to cooperate with Eurostat25 
and to use the data issued by Eurostat for different purposes.  
Annex 18 shows correction coefficient values for individual duty stations in the EU26 for the 
period 2013 -2021. From this table it  is apparent that the correction coefficients for different 
locations have followed different trends over time. In 1 5 locations they have decreased over 
the period, whilst they increase d in 16 locations . 
Since the entry into force of the amended Annex XI t o the SR, a new procedure for creating 
or withdrawing correction coefficients outside o f the capital city is in force, in accordance 
with Article 9 thereof27. Following the United Kingdom ’s withdrawal from the European 
                                                 
24  An intermediate update may take place with effect on 1 January in the event of a substantial change in the 
cost of living between June and December.  
25  For instance, the “family budget surveys” conducted to define consumption weights have been fully 
harmonised with the Coordinated Organisations (e.g. OECD, Council of Europe) and the United Nations 
decided in 2015 to use Eurostat source  data o n correction coefficients as input to adjust the salaries of their 
staff working in th e EU (like Eurostat uses UN data for many locations outside the EU)..  
26  In accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of Annex X to the SR, specific weightings (correction coeff icients) 
may also apply to the remuneration of staff posted outside the EU. The updated value of these weightings is 
annexed to the yearly reports adopted by the Commission on data pertaining to the budgetary impact of the 
updates. Eurostat has developed a  specific methodology in cooperation with national statistical authorities.  
27  This procedure involves notably the adoption by the Commission of a delegated act following a formal 
request submitted by the appropriate authorities of the Member States concer ned, the administration of an 
institution of the Union or the representatives of officials of the Union in a given place of employment. For 
staff assigned in Bonn, the German national statistical office stopped providing data for the calculation of 
this co rrection coefficient in Bonn in 2021. In the absence of data provided by the relevant national 
statistical office, and with regards to the very limited number of staff concerned, the correction coefficient 
applicable in Bonn has been suspended and replaced  since 2021 by the correction coefficient applicable in 
Germany.  Salary in 
Brussels   
(in euros)  Exchange rate   
(=1 for euro -countries)  Salary in duty 
station   
(in euros for euro -
countries)  X X = Correction 
coefficient  
(= Economic parity 
/ Exchange rate)  
 
12 
 Union, the correction coefficient appl icable in the United Kindom is calculated in line with 
the methodology applicable to third countries , since 1 February 202028. 
4.2. Issues faced by the Commission with the system of correction coefficients  
4.2.1.  Perception of correction coefficients as impacting negatively purchasing power and 
attractiveness of the EU public service  
As identified in 2018  in the Commission’s interim report  on the implementation of Annex 
XI29, correction coefficients are often mistakenly perceived as the driver of the decrease of 
purchasing power of EU staff. The Commission  services are  often asked by stakeholders, 
including staf f, staff representatives, host S tate representatives about the role of correction 
coefficients and the methodology used for computing them. This issue arises in particular in 
cases involving staff whose place of employment is subject to a correction coefficient below 
100, particularly when this specific coefficient is subject to downward updates30.  
Correction coefficients aim only at maintaining over time the e quivalence of purchasing 
power between staff posted in different Member States and staff members posted in Brussels. 
Conversely, the correction coefficients do not aim at maintaining purchasing power at a given 
level. Hence, as the purchasing power of staf f in Brussels decreased since 2004 (part 3.2.5 ), 
the purchasing power of staff in all places of employment decreased in the same proportion. 
Thus , the correction coefficient s represent only the vehic le through which th e adjustment is 
implemented in places outside Brus sels and Luxembourg.  
At the same time, the above perception of correction coefficients remains an issue related to 
attractiveness of the EU civil service in some Member States. In that regard, a number of EU 
agencies located in Member States wh ere a correction coefficient below 100 applies reported 
to the Commission a visible negative impact on their capacity to recruit and retain highly -
qualified and geographically balanced staff. In  the same manner , agencies located in Member 
States with high correction coefficients also reported similar difficulties, highlighting the 
decrease of EU staff net purchasing power observed in many duty stations, regar dless of the 
applicable correction coefficient.  
In this context, the Commission ensures , at the occa sion of each update of correction 
coefficients , comprehensive information is given to other institutions about the context of the 
update and provides detailed explanations on the fluctuation  of different correction 
coefficients and the evolution  of purchasing power  of staff . 
4.2.2.  Lack of consideration for expenses made outside the place of employment  
Under the SR, Eurostat and national statistical institutes are responsible for determining the 
statistical methodology applied to the calculation of corr ection coefficients and its 
implementation. The existing methodology developed by Eurostat in cooperation with 
                                                 
28  OJ C 211/8 of 25 June 2020  and OJ C 501, 13  December 2021 . 
29  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Annex XI to 
the Staff Regulations and Article 66a thereof, COM (2018) 830.  
30  A regular question received concern the local scope on the basis of which correction coefficients are 
calculated. The correction coefficients are calculated on the basis of a comparison  of the cost of living in 
capital cities of Member States except in cases where local correction coefficients are calculated for some 
Member States  in which case, local costs are reflected (see in that sense case T -618/20, FZ v. Commission ). 
 
13 
 national statistical institutes is based on the assumption that staff member's expenditure is 
entirely incurred in the place of employment. This approach is being analysed , as the overall 
consumption patterns of staff members  also comprises expenditure s outside the place of 
employment  (‘out of area expenditures’) .  
In this regard , Eurostat and national statistical institutes agreed on the need to u pdate family 
budget surveys in order to quantify the impact of ‘out of area expenditure ’ on expatriate EU 
staff consumption. On that basis, experimental results were discussed among statistic ians of 
the Commission and the Member St ates. In particular, Euro stat has started to explore  the 
possibility  to better reflect staff expenditure patterns by including expenses taking place 
outside the place of employment . Annex 19  illustrates  results of this preliminary work and 
notably  the flattening effect resulting f rom the inclusion of ‘out of area expenditures ’ in EU 
staff consumption patterns.  
When it comes to EU staff consumption patterns, the system of correction coefficients is 
focusing on bilateral comparisons between Brussels and the duty station , but it coul d be 
envisaged that it also takes into ac count ‘out of area’ expenditure . It is expected that 
Eurostat ’s current experimental work on ‘out of area expenditure ’ would be mature in the 
coming years  as a statistical measure and could result in an evolution of  the statistical 
methodology applied , pending agreement among statisticians in the Working Group on 
Articles 64 and 65 of the SR. Some of these  changes could , howev er, be implemented under 
the current statutory fram ework.   
4.2.3.  Cost of living in Luxembourg  
On the occasion of the last SR reform in 2014, the co -legislators maintained the established 
legislative solution that no correction coefficient shall be applicable to the remuneration of 
staff in Brussels and Luxembourg, having regard to the special referenti al role of those places 
of employment as principal and original seats of most of the institutions. At the same time, 
the co -legislators decided to take due account of inflation in Luxembourg by creating the 
Joint Index.  
The absence of a correction coefficient in Luxembourg under the SR is being questioned by 
stakeholders and certain staff representatives. In this regard , following  the Commission 
interim report on Annex XI31, this institution  commissioned a study on the cos t of living in 
Luxembourg to assess whether the legislative solution laid down in the SR remained fit for 
purpose. The Commission contracted  AIRINC  to carry out the study.  
According to AIRINC, the accommodation in Luxembourg city in 2019 cost some 53% more  
than in Brussels . Rent has been  the main  driver for the deteriorating purchasing power of staff 
member s working and residing in Luxembourg as compared with staff member s working and 
residing in Brussels.  
However, AIRNC concluded that Luxembourg is in a unique situation in  that it  has thousands 
of European institutions’ staff members residing in bordering regions , where  the cost of 
living is significantly lower than in Brussels . These staff members nonetheless still  resid e at 
no greater distance from what  would be compatible with the prop er performance  of their 
duties32. As a result of this geographical particularity of Luxembourg, the introduction of a 
                                                 
31  COM(2018) 830.  
32  This requirement i s laid down by Article 20 of the SR.  
 
14 
 correction coefficient calculated on the basis of the costs observed in Luxembourg may not 
fully grasp th e particularities of Luxembourg as an EU place of employment33.  
In addition, among 80 headings used by Eurostat to compare the differences between places 
of employment, housing is the main heading where the cost of living in Luxembourg is 
manifestly higher  than that of Brussels34. 
Moreover, some staff members may have acquired their dwellings at a time when the housing 
costs were lower or similar in Luxembourg compared to Brussels  and have potentially 
experienced an asset price movement which sets them apart  from new arrivals/existing staff 
who did not previously own property35.  
Thus , it is considered that introducing a correction coefficient at this stage might not 
contribute to ensure equality of purchasing power among EU staff. In addition, introducing a 
correction coefficient solely on the basis of a divergent price level/trend for a single 
component may introduce an element of instability, if the price level/trend of that single 
component ceases to diverge in future.  
In this regard, together with other in stitutions concerned, the Commission is f assessing 
measures allowing to effectively address high housing costs, to which some of the staff 
residing in Luxembourg is exposed. Such measures would allow to address Luxembourg’s 
specifics and notably the situa tion of EU staff assigned in Luxembourg but residing in 
neighbouring countries.  
A working group of representatives of the administrations of the EU Instit utions with staff in 
Luxembourg is currently discussing the possibilities to address the challenges f aced by most 
vulnerable staff members who are assigned to and reside in Luxembourg36. 
In parallel, the Commission is looking into methodological developments on ‘out of area 
expenditure ’, which could serve as a n additional element in the reflection o n the i ntroduction 
of a correction coefficient for Luxembourg .  
An assess ment of the effects of the targeted social measure on the attractiveness of 
Luxembourg as a place of employment, together  with the ‘out of area expenditure’  statistical 
work , should form par t of the reflection on the opportunity to envisage any evolution in the 
current legal framework with a view of strengthening equality of purchasing power among 
EU staff.  
                                                 
33 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/study_on_th e_cost_of_living_for_eu_staff_posted_in_luxembou
rg_-_final_report_v26 -09-2019_0_0.pdf   
34  As the EU begins to exit a long period of historically low inflation, and the economies of Luxembourg and 
Belgium continue to evolve, differences seem  starting to appear for certain other goods and services such as  
healthcare, education, furnishings , alcoholic beverages and tobacco.   
35  Arguably this may be true in other duty stations but to a much more limited extent as a result of recruitment 
turnover . 
36  A social measure c ould be adopted pursuant to Article 1(e) of the SR and would be limited to lowest grades 
staff while taking due account of their individual situation.  
 
15 
 5. CONCLUSIONS  
Article 15(3) of Annex XI to the SR provides for the continued application of the Method and 
Article 66a of the SR beyond 2023 , as long as the European Parliament and the Council have 
not adopted a regulation on the basis of a Commission proposal.  
Since 2014 , the Commission observed unequa l attractiveness among applicants to EPSO 
generalist competitions  resulting in geographical imbalances among Commission staff. Over 
the same period, the evolution of EU staff remuneration (+3.4) only reached half of the 
change in the purchasing power of sa laries in national civil services in central governments (+ 
6.5).  
At the same time, the automatic Method provided under Annex XI to the SR:  
- put aside inter -institutional tensions and court cases known from the past, while 
remaining under the constant scr utiny of the European Parliament and the 
Council via the annual reports delivered by the Commission.  
- proved its efficiency, including in 2020 , when the automatic implementation of 
the exception clause limited salary increases in a time of economic downturn  and 
generated net savings for the EU budget , 
- resulted in moderated salary increases and prevented – as from 2015 – EU staff 
from further losing purchasing power , by ensuring a cumulative annual update 
(114.3) close to the cumulative annual inflation measu red by the Joint Index i n 
Brussels and Luxembourg (110.6 ), 
- resulted in a decrease of the purchasing power of EU staff by 0.2% in 2021,  
- ensured EU staff ’s continued contribution to the consolidation of public finances 
in the Union  by re -introducing a solidarity levy at an increased rate,  
- withstood legal scrutiny before the European Courts in the few individual cases 
brought against it  and avoided social tensions , as no major strikes took place in 
the Institutions during that period.  
Therefore, a t this stage , the Commission considers it necessary  to further evaluate possible 
methodological improvements to the system of correction coefficients , as well as  to assess the 
opportunity of broadening  the sample of Member States used for the calculation of the GSI, 
before submitting a proposal to amend Annex XI to the SR.  
Consequently, i n line with Article 15(3) of Annex XI to the SR,  the Commission  will rely on 
the provis ional application of the current Method beyond 2023 , whilst ensuring the continued 
annual reporting to the European Parliament and the Council on data pertaining to the 
budgetary impact of remuneration and pensions.  
  
 
16 
  
ANNEXES  
Annex 1: EPSO non-linguistic AD competitions (all profiles) by publication year   
AD' laureates sought  laureates delivered  Fulfilment of needs  
2013  474 457 96% 
2014  340 359 106%  
2015  375 383 102%  
2016  351 361 103%  
2017  290 313 108%  
2018  423 435 103%  
2019  585 591 101%  
 
Annex 2: Number of Participants to AD level Generalists open competitions (Source: EPSO)  
  1998  September 
2005  March 
2010  March 
2014  March 
2015  March 
2017  March 
2018  March 
2019  Avg 
2017 -19 
vs Avg 
1998 -05 Avg 
2014 -15 
vs Avg 
1998 -05 Avg 
2017 -19 
vs Avg  
2014 -15 
AT 755 1162  259 397 453 376 471 373 -58%  -56%  -4% 
BE 2735  3905  1745  2036  2111  1635  1537  1423  -54%  -38%  -26%  
DK 531 1179  130 273 233 153 161 169 -81%  -70%  -36%  
FI 795 538 298 258 265 304 223 330 -57%  -61%  9% 
FR 3647  4745  1696  2015  2176  1668  1643  1623  -61%  -50%  -22%  
DE 2836  3573  1418  1947  2115  1473  1521  1464  -54%  -37%  -27%  
EL 1075  873 1381  1812  2146  2533  2164  1844  124%  103%  10%  
IE 425 279 153 182 172 167 176 191 -49%  -50%  1% 
IT 8918  7212  3676  4608  6982  5071  4712  5331  -38%  -28%  -13%  
LU 106 92 33 42 70 56 54 67 -40%  -43%  5% 
NL 662 750 252 584 530 602 642 622 -12%  -21%  12%  
PT 1098  1746  556 1083  1133  736 629 595 -54%  -22%  -41%  
ES 4335  3397  1786  3602  3818  3108  3050  3356  -18%  -4% -15%  
SE 1314  943 276 248 253 221 208 211 -81%  -78%  -15%  
EUR 14 29232  30394  13659  19087  22457  18103  17191  17599  -41%  -30%  -15%  
CY  189 84 117 157 123 143 143   0% 
CZ  420 319 283 348 214 235 404   -10%  
EE  105 140 234 279 111 92 91   -62%  
HU  667 572 747 673 459 442 380   -40%  
LV  145 247 193 197 128 146 118   -33%  
LT  342 447 377 468 290 302 267   -32%  
MT  174 79 91 100 70 78 74   -23%  
PL  1097  1086  1146  1300  855 838 778   -33%  
SK  378 454 370 391 259 243 274   -32%  
SI  201 209 237 318 201 196 162   -33%  
EUR 10  29232  3718  3637  3795  4231  2710  2715  2691    -33%  
BG   1078  1065  1142  773 734 656   -35%  
RO   2332  2323  2278  1558  1530  1490    -34%  
EUR 2    3410  3388  3420  2331  2264  2146    -34%  
HR    725 713 435 393 372   -44%  
Competition of March 2010 was affected by special circumstances and took place only in 
2013. It is therefore not considered for comparison purposes  
 
 
 Annex 3: Number of Participants to administrator  level generalists open competitions (by 
cluster)  
 
 
 
 15000170001900021000230002500027000290003100033000
1998 2005 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019Pre-2004 Member States
1500200025003000350040004500
2005 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019Post 2004 Member States
EUR 10 EUR 2
300350400450500550600650700750
2014 2015 2017 2018 2019Croatia
 
 Annex 4: Applications to EU competitions  by nationality   
2013 to 2019 
Competitions  Applications  
(number)  Applications 
per M . 
habitants  Applications  
(share)  Population  
(share)  Guiding 
Rate  Applications  
vs 
Population  Applications  
vs  
Guiding 
Rate  
EL 19847  1851  8,7%  2,4%  3,1%  362%  281%  
CY 1278  1459  0,6%  0,2%  0,8%  286%  72% 
BE 16314  1423  7,1%  2,6%  3,1%  279%  229%  
MT 676 1370  0,3%  0,1%  0,6%  268%  46% 
BG 8722  1246  3,8%  1,6%  2,4%  244%  158%  
LT 3235  1158  1,4%  0,6%  1,5%  227%  95% 
HR 4185  1027  1,8%  0,9%  1,6%  201%  116%  
EE 1304  984 0,6%  0,3%  0,8%  193%  71% 
RO 18236  940 8,0%  4,3%  4,5%  184%  177%  
SI 1927  926 0,8%  0,5%  1,0%  181%  88% 
LU 524 856 0,2%  0,1%  0,8%  168%  31% 
LV 1577  821 0,7%  0,4%  1,0%  161%  72% 
PT 8397  817 3,7%  2,3%  3,1%  160%  120%  
IT 47460  777 20,8%  13,6%  11,2%  152%  186%  
ES 29352  625 12,8%  10,5%  8,9%  122%  144%  
SK 2963  544 1,3%  1,2%  1,8%  106%  73% 
HU 4862  498 2,1%  2,2%  3,0%  97% 71% 
FI 2402  436 1,1%  1,2%  1,8%  85% 59% 
AT 3296  373 1,4%  2,0%  2,6%  73% 56% 
IE 1656  338 0,7%  1,1%  1,6%  66% 45% 
FR 17009  254 7,4%  15,0%  11,6%  50% 64% 
DK 1459  252 0,6%  1,3%  1,8%  49% 36% 
NL 4338  249 1,9%  3,9%  3,9%  49% 49% 
CZ 2539  241 1,1%  2,4%  3,1%  47% 36% 
PL 9025  238 3,9%  8,5%  8,2%  47% 48% 
SE 1880  184 0,8%  2,3%  2,7%  36% 30% 
DE 14057  169 6,2%  18,5%  13,8%  33% 45% 
 
 
 
 
 Annex 5: Correlation between EU institutions’ attractiveness and different macroeconomic and socioeconomic factors including remune ration  
The correlation coefficient  is a measure of  linear  correlation  between two sets of data. It is the ratio between th e covariance  of two variables and 
the product of their  standard deviations ; thus , it is essent ially a normalized measurement of the covariance, such that the result always has a 
value betwee n -1 and 1. Any figure between -0.7 and -1 or between 0.7 and 1 is considered – in the framework of this report – as illustrating a 
strong correlation.  
Among Member States included in the analysis, some were excluded , as their inclusion would have jeopardised the statistical soundness of 
correlations for the following reasons . Belgium was excluded because the overrepresentation of Belgian citizens among EPSO ca ndidates is 
linked to the status of Brussels as the seat of several EU institutions. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta were excluded since the analysis of the 
share of candidates to EU competitions compared to the national population is not statistically sound , in light of their small population size. 
Hungary, Slovakia and Finland were excluded as their level of participation (comparing the level of participation with percentage of EU 
population) is between 80% and 120% , measured over seven years and therefore c lose to the target.  
Annex 5.1: Correlation between net earnings and the level of participation to EU competitions  – Eurostat  data base  
Annual net earnings in MS, i.e. the “net pay taken home”, originate  from the Eurostat database and stand for gross earnin gs from which income 
taxes and social contributions are deducted and to which family allowances are added. The analysis looks at annual net earnin gs in 2019 in 
Member States . Net earnings are calculated from four surveys carried out both in the private and  public sector. To remove the effect of 
differences in price levels between Member States , purchasing power parities were used to have earnings expressed in purchasing power 
standards, in compliance with Eurostat standard methodology. Given that the Europe an Institutions strive to attract both single candidates and 
candidates with families , two different datasets reflecting two different situations were considered . First , a single person with no children earning 
167% of an average worker and second,  a two-earner couple with two children, both earning 100% of the average worker earnings.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented  = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
 
 Net earnings in 2019 for a single 
person without children earning 
167% of the average earning (in 
PPS). BG = 1  1 1.33 2.12 2.40 1.36 2.03 1.46 1.81 2.00 1.09 1.64 1.02 1.20 2.49 2.30 1.48 1.28 1.15 1.26 1.98 
Correlation  -0.76 
Net earnings in 2019 for a couple 
with two children, both earning 
100% of the average earning (in 
PPS). BG = 1  1 1.48 2.43 2.80 1.54 2.44 1.76 1.99 2.29 1.29 1.93 1.12 1.32 2.99 2.79 1.69 1.46 1.18 1.44 2.41 
Correlation  -0.76 
 
Annex 5.2: Correlation between net earnings in Member States with the highest and lowest wages and the level of participation to EU 
competitions  – Eurostat  data base  
When  restricting the analysis to the Member States with the highest and lowest wages, the level of participation to EU competition s and the level 
of net earnings are almost perfectly correlated. This is particularly true for Germany, France, the Netherlands, A ustria, Denmark, Ireland, 
Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Bulgaria. For mid -wage Member States, results are however more nuanced 
and require taking on board other socioeconomic factors . 
Member States  BG DK DE IE FR HR LV LT NL AT PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  49% 33% 66% 50% 201%  161%  227%  49% 73% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
 
 Net earnings in 2019 for a single 
person without children earning 
167% of the average earning (in 
PPS). BG = 1  1 2.12 2.40 2.03 2.00 1.09 1.02 1.20 2.49 2.30 1.28 1.15 1.26 1.98 
Correlation  -0.96 
Net earnings in 2019 for a couple 
with two children, both  earning 
100% of the average earning (in 
PPS). BG = 1  1 2.43 2.80 2.44 2.29 1.29 1.12 1.32 2.99 2.79 1.46 1.18 1.44 2.41 
Correlation  -0.96 
 
Annex 5.3: Correlation between unemployment levels and the level of participation to EU competitions  – Eurostat  data base  
In this Annex, it is assessed whether the economic situation in Member States determine s, to some extent , the willingness to work in a foreign 
country and for the European Institutions. A macroeconomic indicator that might influence this choice is the unemployment rate, also provided 
by Eurostat. In order to match the demographics of EPSO candidates, only unemployed persons aged between 25 and 49 in the sec ond quarter of 
2019 were incorporated in the analysis.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Unemployment level  4.3%  1.8%  4.8%  3.2%  4.0%  4.2%  17.6
% 12.7
% 7.5%  6.9%  10.5
% 6.1%  6.0%  2.5%  4.5%  2.9%  5.3%  3.2%  3.9%  5.3%  
 
 Correlation  0.43 
 
Annex 5.4: Correlation between the perception of national employment situation and the level of participation to EU competitions  – 
Eurobarometer  2019)  
Among the more than 200 questions in the Eurobarometer37, one relates to the judgment citizens have on the employment situation in their 
country.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented  = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Percentage of the population who 
thinks that the employment situ ation 
in their country is good  28% 80% 90% 73% 60% 65% 7% 13% 22% 24% 14% 37% 45% 85% 66% 65% 38% 38% 45% 65% 
Correlation  -0.73 
 
  
                                                 
37  The Eurobarometer is a set of surveys that are used by the EU Institutions to monitor public opinion on various topics. In the context of this study, data come from the 
standard Eurobarometer 92 carried out in all EU Member States at the end of 2019.  
 
 Annex 5.5: Correlation between the perception of the EU and the level of participation to EU competitions  – Eurobarometer  2019  
Many questions in the Eurobarometer address the image that citizens have about the European Union as a whole and the EU Insti tutions in 
particular. Even though EPSO candidates may not be necessarily  representative of the EU citizens (in terms of age groups  in particular) , it may 
be posited  that citizens in Member States that subscribe the most to the European project are those more likely to apply to the EU compe titions.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented  = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Percentage of the population who 
have a positive image of the EU  61% 31% 55% 50% 49% 63% 31% 39% 36% 41% 33% 42% 50% 43% 38% 50% 59% 52% 44% 50% 
Correlation  -0.04 
 
Annex 5.6: Correlation between personal financial prospects and the level of p articipation to EU competitions  – Eurobarometer  2019  
In the Eurobarometer, citizens are asked to provide their expectations regarding the financial situation of their household i n the following  year. 
Expectations on the personal financial situation are dependent on global employment prospects, as well as on personal considerations regarding 
expected salary level, job stability, etc.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
 
 Under represented  = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Percentage of the population who 
think that their own financial 
situation will improve in the next 12 
months  26% 24% 21% 17% 31% 18% 23% 20% 24% 29% 23% 31% 25% 15% 16% 23% 27% 31% 20% 27% 
Correlation  -0.56 
 
Annex 5.7: Correlation between the OECD better life index and the level of p articipation to EU competitions  – OECD   
The OECD ’s ‘better life index’ is a set of statistics aiming at comparing well -being across countries. Well -being encompasses material living 
conditions, housing conditions, employment, education, etc. For comparability purposes, the indicator chosen in the context o f the study is the 
overa ll life satisfaction.  
Member States  BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT NL AT PL PT RO SI SE 
Share of candidates vs share of 
population  244%  47% 49% 33% 193%  66% 362%  122%  50% 201%  152%  161%  227%  49% 73% 47% 160%  184%  181%  36% 
Under represented  = -1 
Over represented = 1  1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
OECD better life index   6.7 7.6 7.0 5.7 7.0 5.4 6.3 6.5  6.0 5.9 5.9 7.4 7.1 6.1 5.4  5.9 7.3 
Correlation  -0.84 
 
 
  
Annex 6: Evolution of the sample of Member States and their respective weight  (2014 = 100)  
 
 
  
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PL SE UK
2014 2,6 19,6 8,2 14,1 11,8 0,3 4,5 2,2 5,0 2,4 13,8 84,5
2015 2,6 19,9 8,2 13,9 11,5 0,3 4,3 2,2 5,1 2,4 14,0 84,4
2016 2,6 19,7 8,2 13,8 11,3 0,3 4,3 2,2 5,2 2,4 14,0 84,0
2017 2,6 19,9 8,3 13,7 11,5 0,3 4,2 2,2 5,1 2,4 13,8 84,0
2018 2,6 19,9 8,3 13,5 11,4 0,3 4,3 2,2 5,2 2,4 13,7 83,8
2019 2,6 19,8 8,2 13,5 11,3 0,3 4,3 2,2 5,3 2,4 13,6 83,5
2020 2,6 19,4 8,2 13,8 11,1 0,3 4,3 2,2 5,4 2,4 13,5 83,2
2021 3,0 22,5 9,1 15,7 12,4 0,4 5,2 2,5 6,5 2,8 80,1EU 11
 
 Annex 7: Annual specific indicators of  Member States from the sample (2014 = 100)  
 
Annex 8: Cumulative annual specific indicators of Member States from the sample  (2014 = 100)  
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PL SE UK
2015 99,6 102,9 101,2 100,3 100,4 101,2 100,7 100,7 101,7 101,9 100,5
2016 101,2 100,8 105,9 100,1 100,2 99,2 106,2 104,3 107,7 102,9 100,6
2017 100,5 102,2 99,3 101,5 99,5 102,3 97,5 99,1 101,7 98,6 98,8
2018 99,2 100,7 96,8 97,6 102,4 98,6 101,3 99,6 99,2 100,6 98,7
2019 102,1 101,3 102,3 99,1 99,5 101,5 100,8 100,9 98,5 102,2 100,6
2020 101,6 101,5 102,5 100,1 104,3 102,2 102,3 105,7 107,2 101,2 103,2
2021 97,7 100,1 99,5 99,2 98,7 96,7 100,2 99,1 103,8 100,0 :
simple average 100,3 101,4 101,1 99,7 100,7 100,2 101,3 101,3 102,8 101,1 100,4
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PL SE UK
2015 99,6 102,9 101,2 100,3 100,4 101,2 100,7 100,7 101,7 101,9 100,5
2016 100,8 103,7 107,2 100,4 100,6 100,4 106,9 105,0 109,5 104,9 101,1
2017 101,3 106,0 106,4 101,9 100,1 102,7 104,2 104,1 111,4 103,4 99,9
2018 100,5 106,7 103,0 99,5 102,5 101,3 105,6 103,7 110,5 104,0 98,6
2019 102,6 108,1 105,4 98,6 102,0 102,8 106,4 104,6 108,8 106,3 99,2
2020 104,2 109,7 108,0 98,7 106,4 105,1 108,8 110,6 116,6 107,6 102,4
2021 101,8 109,8 107,5 97,9 105,0 101,6 109,0 109,6 121,0 107,6 :
 
  
Annex 9: Calculated and applied Global S pecific Indicator  
 
Annex 10: Global Specific Indicator, Joint Index and annual update  (2014 = 100)  
  GSI Cumulative  
2014 = 100  Joint 
Index  Cumulative  
2014 = 100  Annual 
update  Cumulative  
2014 =100  
2015  101,2  101,2  101,2  101,2  102,4  102,4  
2016  101,9  103,1  101,4  102,6  103,3  105,8  
2017  100,4  103,5  101,1  103,7  101,5  107,4  
2018  99,6 103,1  102,1  105,9  101,7  109,2  
2019  100,5  103,6  101,5  107,5  102,0  111,4  
2020  102,5  103,6  100,7  108,3  100,7  112,2  
2021  99,8 103,4  102,1  110,6  101,9  114,3  
 
  

 
 Annex 11: Comparison of alternative GSI calculated based  on different samples  
 
Annex 12: Annual specific indicators of all Member States  (2014 = 100)  
 100101102103104105106107
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Comparison of alternative GSI based on 
different samples
EU8 EU11 All MS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28]
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
2015 99,6 101,8 101,2 99,7 102,9 105,4 100,9 101,1 101,2 100,3 99,9 100,4 102,1 108,8 102,4 101,2 100,6 101,1 100,7 100,7 101,7 96,7 104,7 100,8 101,0 100,0 101,9 100,5
2016 101,2 105,9 134,9 100,7 100,8 113,3 103,6 100,0 105,9 100,1 102,3 100,2 102,0 106,3 102,7 99,2 101,9 101,8 106,2 104,3 107,7 101,9 111,9 101,9 108,5 100,3 102,9 100,6
2017 100,5 102,5 106,9 101,0 102,2 98,7 103,7 99,1 99,3 101,5 102,4 99,5 100,3 95,0 99,3 102,3 109,1 101,1 97,5 99,1 101,7 101,0 111,0 100,5 109,2 99,1 98,6 98,8
2018 99,2 117,3 110,7 102,0 100,7 100,5 102,7 98,9 96,8 97,6 108,7 102,4 100,0 103,7 100,2 98,6 100,5 102,2 101,3 99,6 99,2 99,2 109,2 98,6 113,5 99,9 100,6 98,7
2019 102,1 104,3 97,9 100,5 101,3 108,5 99,9 100,1 102,3 99,1 102,5 99,5 101,2 100,7 113,6 101,5 97,4 100,9 100,8 100,9 98,5 99,8 108,3 102,0 112,3 102,7 102,2 100,6
2020 101,6 104,7 99,5 101,7 101,5 102,1 102,2 102,9 102,5 100,1 104,7 104,3 103,2 104,1 107,3 102,2 102,1 102,0 102,3 105,7 107,2 100,2 98,1 105,4 115,0 101,1 101,2 103,2
2021 97,7 110,4 106,2 99,6 100,1 112,5 100,3 99,4 99,5 99,2 102,3 98,7 99,3 100,8 100,7 96,7 101,7 105,0 100,2 99,1 103,8 101,2 98,1 98,9 106,2 100,6 100,0 :
 
  
Annex 13: Cumulative annual specific indicators of all Member States  (2014 = 100)  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28]
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
2015 99,6 101,8 101,2 99,7 102,9 105,4 100,9 101,1 101,2 100,3 99,9 100,4 102,1 108,8 102,4 101,2 100,6 101,1 100,7 100,7 101,7 96,7 104,7 100,8 101,0 100,0 101,9 100,5
2016 100,8 107,8 136,5 100,4 103,7 119,4 104,5 101,1 107,2 100,4 102,2 100,6 104,1 115,7 105,2 100,4 102,5 102,9 106,9 105,0 109,5 98,5 117,2 102,7 109,6 100,3 104,9 101,1
2017 101,3 110,5 145,9 101,4 106,0 117,8 108,4 100,2 106,4 101,9 104,7 100,1 104,4 109,9 104,5 102,7 111,8 104,0 104,2 104,1 111,4 99,5 130,1 103,2 119,7 99,4 103,4 99,9
2018 100,5 129,6 161,5 103,4 106,7 118,4 111,3 99,1 103,0 99,5 113,8 102,5 104,4 114,0 104,7 101,3 112,4 106,3 105,6 103,7 110,5 98,7 142,1 101,8 135,9 99,3 104,0 98,6
2019 102,6 135,2 158,1 103,9 108,1 128,5 111,2 99,2 105,4 98,6 116,6 102,0 105,7 114,8 118,9 102,8 109,5 107,3 106,4 104,6 108,8 98,5 153,9 103,8 152,6 102,0 106,3 99,2
2020 104,2 141,6 157,3 105,7 109,7 131,2 113,6 102,1 108,0 98,7 122,1 106,4 109,1 119,5 127,6 105,1 111,8 109,4 108,8 110,6 116,6 98,7 151,0 109,4 175,5 103,1 107,6 102,4
2021 101,8 156,3 167,1 105,3 109,8 147,6 113,9 101,5 107,5 97,9 124,9 105,0 108,3 120,5 128,5 101,6 113,7 114,9 109,0 109,6 121,0 99,9 148,1 108,2 186,4 103,7 107,6 :
 
 
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111  
Office:  L107 21/007  - Tel. direct line  +32 229 -90515  
 
Commission européenne, 2920 Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG - Tel. +352 43011  
 
Gertrud.Ingestad @ec.europa.eu   
Annex 14: Cumulative specific indicators of Mem ber States from the sample and whose 
participation to EU competition is low  
 
 
Annex 15: Proceeds from the solodarity levy between 2012 and 2022  
 
 
 
 
 95,0100,0105,0110,0115,0120,0125,0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Cumulative GSI of under represented MS from 
the sample
DE NL AT PL SE FR EU
€20.000.000,00 €30.000.000,00 €40.000.000,00 €50.000.000,00 €60.000.000,00 €70.000.000,00 €80.000.000,00 €90.000.000,00 €100.000.000,00 €110.000.000,00 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022Proceeds from the solidarity levy between 2012 and 2022
 
31 Annex 16: Joint Belgium -Luxembourg index, Belgian HICP and L uxembourg CPI  
 
Annex 17: Evolution of the cost of living in Brussels (Brussel international index)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year June t-1 = 100Cumulative 
June 2014 = 100
2015 101,2 101,2
2016 101,4 102,6
2017 101,1 103,7
2018 102,1 105,9
2019 101,5 107,5
2020 100,7 108,3
2021 102,1 110,5Measure for increase in 
 cost-of-living in Brussels*. June t
 
32 Annex 18 : Evolution of correction coefficients  
 
  
GEO/TIME 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
BE/LU 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100 100,0 100,0 100,0
BG 58,4 57,5 55,1 52,1 51,1 53,4 55,2 57,5 59,1 61,7
CZ 80,6 80,0 75,0 73,4 73,2 78,3 83 85,5 85,2 88,1
DK 135,3 134,8 133,0 131,8 133,1 133,9 131,9 129,3 131,3 134,2
DE 95,8 96,8 97,2 96,6 96,1 97,5 99,3 99,4 101,9 101,4
Karlsruhe 93,8 92,8 95,0 93,8 93,0 94,6 96,7 96,5 98,0 96,9
München 106,4 108,2 107,7 106,0 105,5 107,5 110 110,3 113,9 113,4
Bonn 94,1 94,9 94,6 93,4 92,6 93,9 95,6 95,1 95,8
EE 77,6 78,9 78,6 78,0 77,6 80,3 82,2 83,3 82,3 86,3
IE 110,6 113,0 115,9 116,6 118,3 119,8 117,7 119,2 129,0 133,6
EL 90,5 91,2 86,8 79,9 79,3 79,9 81,8 81,8 81,4 85,2
ES 97,1 96,3 94,5 90,2 88,1 88,7 91,7 91,6 94,2 96,3
FR 117,7 117,4 116,8 114,6 113,8 114,8 116,7 117,7 120,5 119,9
HR : 80,0 77,6 74,6 73,5 74,9 76,4 75,9 75,8 78,3
IT 104,2 104,4 100,4 99,4 97,9 97,3 96,5 95,2 95,0 95,2
Varese 93,4 92,8 93,1 92,2 90,4 90,9 90,9 90,0 90,7 91,2
CY 84,1 83,7 81,2 77,3 74,3 74,4 77,9 78,9 78,2 82,2
LV 77,6 76,1 76,5 74,2 73,0 74,9 77,6 78,6 77,5 80,0
LT 71,5 71,9 71,4 69,0 69,7 74,3 73,6 75,1 76,6 80,1
HU 78,3 76,1 71,4 69,0 70,0 74,5 71,9 75,3 71,9 76,1
MT 83,3 84,4 83,4 84,5 85,7 86,5 90,2 92,0 94,7 94,0
NL 105,3 108,9 107,8 107,8 108,0 108,3 109,9 111,5 113,9 111,4
AT 106,4 108,3 107,2 105,9 104,7 106,3 106,3 106,0 107,9 109,6
PL 74,2 73,0 74,1 71,8 66,7 70,6 68,6 71,1 70,9 70,6
PT 83,5 83,1 82,2 79,2 80,6 82,4 85,7 88,6 91,1 91,4
RO 68,8 69,8 69,5 64,8 63,8 63,9 64 65,3 66,6 68,5
SI 85,3 85,4 84,7 81,2 80,7 81,5 84,6 84,6 86,1 84,9
SK 79,7 80,2 79,0 76,4 75,7 77,3 78,5 79,0 80,6 79,9
FI 122,1 123,7 123,0 119,7 118,6 119,9 118,5 118,1 118,4 118,6
SE 131,9 132,9 127,5 127,9 127,4 127,9 122 120,5 124,3 130,3
UK 147,8 139,2 150,7 166,9 141,8 133,5 134,7 132,9
Culham 112,5 107,6 116,7 127,7 107,3 100,5 102,6 102,0
 
33 Annex 19: Effect s of exploratory out of area work by ESTAT  
 Current correction coefficient s 
–  
July 2021  Estimated correction coefficient  
including out of area 
expenditures  Change  
BE 100 100 0.0%  
BG 61.7 64.8 5.0%  
CZ 88.1 89.4 1.5%  
DK 134.2  129.8  -3.3%  
DE 101.4  100.9  -0.5%  
DE Karlsruhe  96.9 96.8 -0.1%  
DE Munich  113.4  111.6  -1.6%  
EE 86.3 87.7 1.6%  
IE  133.6  128.7  -3.7%  
EL 85.2 86.2 1.2%  
ES 96.3 96.4 0.1%  
FR  119.9  117.2  -2.3%  
HR 78.3 80.3 2.6%  
IT 95.2 95.3 0.1%  
IT Varese  91.2 91.8 0.7%  
CY 82.2 83.7 1.8%  
LV 80.0 82.1 2.6%  
LT 80.1 81.8 2.1%  
HU 76.1 78.6 3.3%  
MT 94.0 94.5 0.5%  
NL 111.4  109.6  -1.6%  
AT 109.6  107.3  -2.1%  
PL 70.6 73.7 4.4%  
PT 91.4 91.9 0.5%  
RO 68.5 71.2 3.9%  
SI 84.9 86.1 1.4%  
SK 79.9 81.6 2.1%  
FI 118.6  115.7  -2.4%  
SE  130.3  126.4  -3.0%