A4-0339/96

Resolution on Community merger control: the Commission's Green Paper on the review of the merger regulation (COM(96)0019 - C4-0106/96)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Green Paper on the review of the merger regulation,

(COM(96)0019 - C4-0106/96),

- having regard to the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament regarding the revision of the merger regulation (COM(96)0313 - C4-0536/96),

- having regard to its resolutions of 24 January 1991, 16 March 1995 and 14 February 1996 on the Commission's various reports on competition policy ((OJ C 48, 25.2.1991, p. 168; OJ C 89, 10.4.1995, p. 146; OJ C 65, 4.3.1996, p. 90.)) and its resolution of 10 October 1991 on De Havilland ((OJ C 280, 28.10.1991, p. 140.)),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights (A4-0339/96),

A. whereas competition policy and its instruments must contribute to the achievement of the goals of growth, competitiveness, employment and economic and social cohesion,

B. whereas it is therefore firmly convinced that competition policy cannot be seen in isolation from the Community's other major political objectives, particularly that of improving the competitiveness of Community industry, which, however, calls for a European rather than a national view to be taken and thus for decision-making competence at European level,

C. whereas a significant number of concentrations with cross-border effects fall below the currently applicable thresholds, thus eroding the aim of the merger regulation,

D. whereas cross-border concentrations falling below the thresholds may be market-dominating and thus detrimental to competition and so disturb the common market,

E. whereas mergers exceeding the turnover thresholds but achieving more than two-thirds of their turnover in one and the same Member State may nevertheless have significant cross-border effects, this criterion therefore being unsatisfactory in integration and competition policy terms,

F. whereas the spread of national control systems is resulting in a situation where concentrations that do not reach these thresholds and may therefore qualify for examination by a number of national authorities increase effort, cost and legal uncertainty for the enterprises concerned and possibly lead to conflicting decisions,

G. whereas the distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures and the consequent difference of treatment is questionable in competition policy terms and should therefore be abandoned,

H. whereas the 'referral articles', Articles 9 and 22, as modified, provide sufficient scope for cases to be so shared between the Commission and Member States that procedures are simplified and account is taken of the subsidiarity principle,

I. whereas a number of Member States are sceptical about a review of the merger regulation, at least where the reduction of the thresholds is concerned,

1. Regrets that it is not being consulted on the amendments to the substantive provisions of the merger regulation, i.e. those concerning the reduction of the thresholds and treatment in the case of multiple notifications;

2. Advocates a significant reduction of the thresholds, which determine whether or not the Commission acts as competition authority; advocates a reduction to ECU 2 billion of worldwide turnover and ECU 100 million of Community turnover; calls on the Council to approve at least the figures now proposed of ECU 3 billion of worldwide turnover and ECU 150 million of Community turnover;

3. Advocates a further reduction of the thresholds to ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million respectively where a concentration would have to undergo three or more national merger control procedures;

4. Calls for any joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity to be governed by the merger regulation in the future;

5. Calls on the Commission to review the thresholds critically and, if necessary, to submit proposals for their adjustment;

6. Calls on the Commission similarly to review the two-thirds rule critically and to include detailed comments on its implications in one of its future reports on competition policy;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council.