Text proposed by the Commission Amendments proposed by the ECB (8)

Amendment 1

Recital 3 of the proposed regulation

‘(3) In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and help the Member States affected devise corrective plans before divergences become entrenched. This broadening of the economic surveillance framework should go in parallel with deepening of fiscal surveillance.’ ‘(3) In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and also vulnerabilities and help the Member States affected devise corrective plans before divergences become entrenched. This broadening of the economic surveillance framework should go in parallel with deepening of fiscal surveillance.’

Explanation The preventive nature of the procedure would be enhanced by means of the inclusion of the expression ‘vulnerabilities’ in addition to that of ‘imbalances’, given that there will be a number of situations that a sound macroeconomic governance would need to cover within this procedure but which may not entirely fall within the current understanding of the term ‘imbalances’.

Amendment 2

Recital 4 of the proposed regulation

‘(4) To help address such imbalances a procedure laid down in detail in legislation is necessary.’ ‘(4) To help address such imbalances and vulnerabilities, a procedure laid down in detail in legislation is necessary.’

Explanation See explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 3

Recital 5 of the proposed regulation

‘(5) It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance referred to in Article 121(3) and (4) of the Treaty with specific rules for detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.’ ‘(5) It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance referred to in Article 121(3) and (4) of the Treaty with specific rules for detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. Macroeconomic imbalances are present where a Member State experiences situations such as large current account deficits, significant losses of competitiveness, large and unusual increases in asset prices, high levels of or a significant deterioration in external, public sector or private sector indebtedness or a significant risk thereof. Macroeconomic vulnerabilities are present where a Member State experiences a situation that sound macroeconomic surveillance of economic and monetary union would reasonably cover.’

Explanation The proposed recital should help to clarify the definition of the situations to be covered by the procedure.

Amendment 4

Recital 6 of the proposed regulation

‘(6) This procedure should rely on an alert mechanism for early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances. It should be based on use of an indicative and transparent scoreboard combined with economic judgement.’ ‘(6) This procedure should rely on an alert mechanism for early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities. It should be based on use of an indicative and transparent scoreboard combined with economic judgement.’

Explanation See explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 5

Recital 7 of the proposed regulation

‘(7) The scoreboard should consist of a limited set of economic and financial indicators relevant to detection of macroeconomic imbalances, with corresponding indicative thresholds. The composition of the scoreboard may evolve in time, inter alia due to evolving threats to macroeconomic stability or enhanced availability of relevant statistics.’ ‘(7) The scoreboard should consist of a limited set of economic and financial indicators relevant to detection of macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities, with corresponding indicative thresholds. The composition of the scoreboard may evolve in time, inter alia due to evolving threats to macroeconomic stability or enhanced availability of relevant statistics. The scoreboard of indicators should be differentiated for Member States whose currency is the euro and Member States whose currency is not the euro in order to take into account specific features of monetary union and reflect relevant economic circumstances. Such a differentiation may also be warranted in order to take into account the cases in which all the Member States whose currency is the euro have better or more timely statistics.’

Explanation The recitals should clarify the differentiation between euro area Member States and non-euro area Member States in connection with this procedure.

Amendment 6

Recital 8 of the proposed regulation

‘(8) The crossing of one or more indicative thresholds need not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances are emerging, as economic policymaking should take into account interlinkages between macroeconomic variables. Economic judgement should ensure that all pieces of information, whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis.’ ‘(8) The crossing of one or more indicative thresholds need not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities are emerging, as economic policymaking should take into account interlinkages between macroeconomic variables. Economic judgement should ensure that all pieces of information, whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis.’

Explanation See explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 7

Recital 9 of the proposed regulation

‘(9) Based on the multilateral surveillance procedure and the alert mechanism, the Commission should identify the Member States to be subject to an in-depth review. The in-depth review should encompass a thorough analysis of sources of imbalances in the Member State under review. It should be discussed within the Council and the Euro Group for the Member States whose currency is the euro.’ ‘(9) Based on the multilateral surveillance procedure and the alert mechanism, the Commission should identify the Member States to be subject to an in-depth review. The in-depth review should encompass a thorough analysis of sources of imbalances and vulnerabilities in the Member State under review. It should include a surveillance mission by the Commission to the Member State concerned, in liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate when those missions concern Member States whose currency is the euro or Member States participating in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II). It should be discussed within the Council and the Euro Group for the Member States whose currency is the euro.’

Explanation Given their importance, missions to the Member States should already be mentioned in the recitals.

Amendment 8

Recital 10 of the proposed regulation

‘(10) A procedure to monitor and correct adverse macroeconomic imbalances, with preventive and corrective elements, will require enhanced surveillance tools based on those used in the multilateral surveillance procedure. This may include enhanced surveillance missions by the Commission to Member States and additional reporting by the Member State in case of severe imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union.’ ‘(10) A procedure to monitor and correct adverse macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities, with preventive and corrective elements, will require enhanced surveillance tools based on those used in the multilateral surveillance procedure. This should include enhanced surveillance missions by the Commission to Member States in liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate when those missions concern Member States whose currency is the euro or Member States participating in ERM II and additional reporting by the Member State in case of severe imbalances or vulnerabilities, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union or vulnerabilities that could jeopardise it.’

Explanation The proposed amendment reflects the need for the Commission to liaise with the ECB if it deems it appropriate.

Amendment 9

Recital 11 of the proposed regulation

‘(11) When assessing imbalances, account should be taken of their severity, of the degree to which they may be considered unsustainable and of the potential negative economic and financial spillovers to other Member States. The economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with earlier recommendations issued under this Regulation and other recommendations issued under Article 121 of the Treaty as part of multilateral surveillance, in particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, should also be considered.’ ‘(11) When assessing imbalances and vulnerabilities, account should be taken of their severity, of the degree to which they may be considered unsustainable and of the potential negative economic and financial spillovers to other Member States. Given the imbalances and vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is particularly pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account deficits and large competitiveness losses. The economic adjustment capacity and the track record of the Member State concerned as regards compliance with earlier recommendations issued under this Regulation and other recommendations issued under Article 121 of the Treaty as part of multilateral surveillance, in particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, should also be considered.’

Explanation The recitals should indicate the focus of the procedure and the magnitude of the efforts which would be required in connection with the findings of the procedure.

Amendment 10

Recital 12 of the proposed regulation

‘(12) If macroeconomic imbalances are identified, recommendations should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance on appropriate policy responses. The policy response of the Member State concerned to imbalances should be timely and should use all available policy instruments under the control of public authorities. It should be tailored to the specific environment and circumstances of the Member State concerned and cover the main economic policy areas, potentially including fiscal and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and financial sector regulation.’ ‘(12) If macroeconomic imbalances or vulnerabilities are identified, recommendations should be addressed to the Member State concerned to provide guidance on appropriate policy responses. The policy response of the Member State concerned to imbalances and vulnerabilities should be timely and should use all available policy instruments under the control of public authorities. It should be tailored to the specific environment and circumstances of the Member State concerned and cover the main economic policy areas, potentially including fiscal and wage policies, labour markets, product and services markets and financial sector regulation.’

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 11

New recital 12a of the proposed regulation

No text ‘(12a) Consistency with recommendations and commitments under any other procedures established under Articles 121, 126 or 136 of the Treaty should be ensured. Any application of this Regulation should take due account of the commitments under ERM II agreements.’

Explanation It is essential that the different procedures in the Commission proposals are implemented in a logical, reasonable and consistent manner. In particular, the macroeconomic surveillance procedure should be consistent with the outcomes of the other procedures. The operation of this procedure should take due account of the commitments under the ERM II arrangements.In particular, all elements that are part of the ERM II procedure are subject to secrecy to safeguard the integrity of the process and facilitate consensus-building, and may therefore not form part of the surveillance procedure.

Amendment 12

Recital 13 of the proposed regulation

‘(13) The early warnings and recommendations by the European Systemic Risk Board to Member States or the Union address risks of a macrofinancial nature. These may also warrant appropriate follow-up action in the context of the surveillance of imbalances.’ ‘(13) The warnings and recommendations by the European Systemic Risk Board to Member States or the Union address risks of a macrofinancial nature. These may also warrant appropriate follow-up action in the context of the surveillance of imbalances and vulnerabilities. In taking into account such warnings and recommendations for the purpose of this Regulation the confidentiality regime of the European Systemic Risk Board should be strictly respected.’

Explanation While, certainly, the use of ESRB warnings and recommendations in connection with this proposed regulation should not call into question the independence of the ESRB, it is important to underline that such use can only take place provided that the confidentiality regime of the ESRB is strictly respected This is reflected in the wording of the proposed amendment to Article 5 (see Amendment 20). The ESRB issues ‘warnings’, not ‘early warnings’.

Amendment 13

Recital 14 of the proposed regulation

‘(14) If severe macroeconomic imbalances are identified, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, an excessive imbalance procedure should be initiated that may include issuing recommendations to the Member State, enhanced surveillance and monitoring requirements and in respect of Member States whose currency is the euro, the possibility of enforcement in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/…] (9) in the event of sustained failure to take corrective action. ’ ‘(14) If severe macroeconomic imbalances or vulnerabilities are identified, that jeopardise the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, an excessive imbalance procedure should be initiated that may include issuing recommendations to the Member State, enhanced surveillance and monitoring requirements and in respect of Member States whose currency is the euro, the possibility of enforcement in accordance with Regulation (EU) No […/…] (10) in the event of sustained failure to take corrective action. ’

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1, Jeopardising of economic and monetary union is already part of the definition of imbalances.

Amendment 14

Recital 16 of the proposed regulation

‘(16) Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial interlinkages between Member States and the spillover effect of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives,’ ‘(16) Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial interlinkages between Member States and the spillover effect of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives,’

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 15

Article 1 of the proposed regulation

‘This Regulation sets out detailed rules for the detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances within the Union.’ ‘This Regulation sets out detailed rules for the detection, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities within the Union.’

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 16

Article 2 of the proposed regulation

‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) “imbalances” means macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting or have the potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of economic and monetary union, or of the Union as a whole; (b) “excessive imbalances” means severe imbalances, including imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.’ ‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) “imbalances” means macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting or have the potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of economic and monetary union, or of the Union as a whole because of the emergence of situations such as large current account deficits, significant losses of competitiveness, asset price bubbles, high level of external, public sector or private sector indebtedness, a deterioration of this indebtedness or a significant risk that any of these situations arise; (aa) “vulnerabilities” means situations of possible Member State difficulty that sound macroeconomic surveillance of economic and monetary union would reasonably cover’; (b) “excessive imbalances” means imbalances that jeopardise the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.’

Explanation The inclusion of the actual situations to be covered by the procedure brings clarity and legal certainty to the procedure. The risk that any of these situations may arise should be a triggering factor of the procedure.

Amendment 17

Title of Chapter II of the proposed regulation

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 18

Article 3 of the proposed regulation

‘1. The Commission shall, after consultation with Member States, establish an indicative scoreboard as a tool to facilitate early identification and monitoring of imbalances. 2. The scoreboard shall be made up of an array of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators for Member States. The Commission may set indicative lower or upper thresholds for these indicators to serve as alert levels. The thresholds applicable to Member States whose currency is the euro may be different from those applicable to the other Member States. 3. The list of indicators to be included on the scoreboard and the thresholds for the indicators shall be made public. 4. The Commission shall regularly assess the appropriateness of the scoreboard, including the composition of indicators, the thresholds set and the methodology used, and shall adapt it if necessary to preserve or enhance its capability to detect emerging imbalances and monitor their development. Changes in the underlying methodology and composition of the scoreboard and the associated thresholds shall be made public.’ ‘1. The Commission shall, after consultation with Member States, establish an indicative scoreboard as a tool to facilitate early identification and monitoring of imbalances and vulnerabilities. 2. The scoreboard shall be made up of an array of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators for Member States. The Commission may set indicative thresholds for these indicators to serve as alert levels. The thresholds and the indicators included in the scoreboard applicable to Member States whose currency is the euro may be different from those applicable to the other Member States. 3. The indicators shall be chosen to capture developments in a Member State’s short- and long-term competitiveness and indebtedness situation. The details regarding these indicators, the inclusion of other indicators and the applicable thresholds shall be established in accordance with paragraph 1. The list of indicators to be included on the scoreboard and the thresholds for the indicators shall be made public. 4. The Commission shall regularly assess the appropriateness of the scoreboard, including the composition of indicators, the thresholds set and the methodology used, and shall adapt it if necessary to preserve or enhance its capability to detect emerging imbalances and vulnerabilities and monitor their development. Changes in the underlying methodology and composition of the scoreboard and the associated thresholds shall be made public.’

Explanation This proposed amendment has the dual aim of achieving greater certainty and flexibility.

Amendment 19

Article 4(2) and (3) of the proposed regulation

‘2. The release of the updated scoreboard shall be accompanied by a Commission report containing an economic and financial assessment putting the movement of the indicators into perspective, drawing if necessary on any other economic and financial indicator relevant to detection of imbalances. The report shall also indicate whether the crossing of lower or upper thresholds in one or more Member States signifies the possible emergence of imbalances. 3. The report shall identify Member States that the Commission considers to be affected by, or at risk of, imbalances.’ ‘2. The release of the updated scoreboard shall be accompanied by a Commission report containing an economic and financial assessment putting the movement of the indicators into perspective, drawing if necessary on any other economic and financial indicator relevant to detection of imbalances and vulnerabilities. The report shall also indicate whether the crossing of thresholds in one or more Member States signifies the possible emergence of imbalances and vulnerabilities. 3. The report shall identify Member States that the Commission considers to be affected by, or at risk of, imbalances and vulnerabilities.’

Explanation See the explanation for Amendment 1.

Amendment 20

Article 5 of the proposed regulation

‘1. Taking account of the discussions in the Council and the Euro Group, as provided for in Article 4(4), the Commission shall prepare an in-depth review for each Member State it considers affected by, or at risk of, imbalances. This assessment shall include an evaluation of whether the Member State in question is affected by imbalances, and of whether these imbalances constitute excessive imbalances. 2. The in-depth review shall be made public. It shall take into account, in particular: (a) as appropriate, whether the Member State under review has taken appropriate action in response to Council recommendations or invitations adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation; (b) the policy intentions of the member state under review, as reflected in its stability or convergence programme and national reform programme; (c) any early warnings or recommendations from the European Systemic Risk Board relevant to the Member State under review.’ ‘1. Taking account of the discussions in the Council and the Euro Group, as provided for in Article 4(4), the Commission shall prepare an in-depth review for each Member State it considers affected by, or at risk of, imbalances. This assessment shall include an evaluation of whether the Member State in question is affected by imbalances and vulnerabilities, and of whether these imbalances and vulnerabilities constitute excessive imbalances and vulnerabilities. The in-depth review shall involve a surveillance mission by the Commission to the Member State concerned, in liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate when the Member State concerned is a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State participating in ERM II. 2. The in-depth review shall be made public. It shall take into account, in particular: (a) as appropriate, whether the Member State under review has taken appropriate action in response to Council recommendations or invitations adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation; (b) the policy intentions of the member state under review, as reflected in its stability or convergence programme and national reform programme; (c) any warnings or recommendations from the European Systemic Risk Board on systemic risk addressed or being relevant to the Member State under review provided that the confidentiality regime of the European Systemic Risk Board is respected.’

Explanation The need for actual missions and their composition should be provided for. See the explanation regarding the need for this proposed amendment with respect to the confidentiality regime of the ESRB in Amendment 12. Point (c) should refer to ESRB ‘warnings’, not ‘ early warnings’.

Amendment 21

Article 6(1) and (3) of the proposed regulation

‘1. If, on the basis of its in-depth review referred to in Article 5 of this Regulation, the Commission considers that a Member State is experiencing imbalances, it shall inform the Council accordingly. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 121(2) of the Treaty. […] 3. The Council shall review these recommendations annually and may amend them if appropriate in accordance with paragraph 1.’ ‘1. If, on the basis of its in-depth review referred to in Article 5 of this Regulation, the Commission considers that a Member State is experiencing imbalances or vulnerabilities, it shall inform the Council and, when relevant, the Euro Group accordingly. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 121(2) of the Treaty. The recommendations shall be consistent with the Council recommendations and any applicable commitments of the Member States concerned under other surveillance procedures conducted pursuant to Article 121 and 126 of the Treaty or procedures established under Article 136 of the Treaty. The commitments under ERM II agreements shall be duly taken into account. […] 3. The Council shall review these recommendations at least annually and may amend them if appropriate in accordance with paragraph 1. The review will be based on an in-depth review by the Commission as laid down in Article 5.’

Explanation The procedures in the Commission proposals need to be consistent with each other. The frequency of the missions has to be flexible. An in-depth review of the Commission is necessary for Council revision.

Amendment 22

Article 7 of the proposed regulation

‘1. If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5, the Commission considers that the Member State concerned is affected by excessive imbalances, it shall inform the Council accordingly. 2. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may adopt recommendations in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty declaring the existence of an excessive imbalance and recommending the Member State concerned to take corrective action. Those recommendations shall set out the nature of the imbalances and specify the corrective action to be taken in detail and the deadline within which the Member State concerned must take such corrective action. The Council may, as provided for in Article 121(4) of the Treaty, make its recommendations public.’ ‘1. If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5, the Commission considers that the Member State concerned is affected by excessive imbalances or vulnerabilities, it shall inform the Council and, when relevant, the Euro Group accordingly. 2. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may adopt recommendations in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty declaring the existence of an excessive imbalance and recommending the Member State concerned to take corrective action. Those recommendations shall set out the nature of the imbalances or vulnerabilities and specify the corrective action to be taken in detail and the deadline within which the Member State concerned must take such corrective action. The Council may, as provided for in Article 121(4) of the Treaty, make its recommendations public.’

Explanation See Amendment 1.

Amendment 23

Article 8(1) and (2) of the proposed regulation

‘1. Any Member State for which an excessive imbalance procedure is opened shall submit a corrective action plan to the Council and the Commission within a deadline to be defined in the recommendations in accordance with Article 7. The corrective action plan shall set out the specific and concrete policy actions the Member State concerned has implemented or intends to implement and shall include a timetable for implementation thereof. 2. Within two months after submission of a corrective action plan and on the basis of a Commission report, the Council shall assess the corrective action plan. If considered sufficient, on the basis of a Commission proposal, the Council shall adopt an opinion, endorsing it. If the actions taken or envisaged in the corrective action plan or their timetable for implementation are considered insufficient to implement the recommendations, the Council shall, on the basis of a Commission proposal, invite the Member State to amend its corrective action plan within a new deadline. The amended corrective action plan shall be examined according to the procedure laid down in this paragraph.’ ‘1. Any Member State for which an excessive imbalance procedure is opened shall submit a corrective action plan to the Council and the Commission within a deadline to be defined in the recommendations in accordance with Article 7, but at most within two months after the adoption of the recommendation. The corrective action plan shall set out the specific and concrete policy actions the Member State concerned has implemented or intends to implement and shall include a timetable for implementation thereof. 2. Within two months after submission of a corrective action plan and on the basis of a Commission report, the Council shall assess the corrective action plan. If considered sufficient, on the basis of a Commission proposal, the Council shall adopt an opinion, endorsing it. If the actions taken or envisaged in the corrective action plan or their timetable for implementation are considered insufficient to implement the recommendations, the Council shall, on the basis of a Commission proposal, invite the Member State to amend its corrective action plan within a new deadline, which shall be no longer than two months. The amended corrective action plan shall be examined according to the procedure laid down in this paragraph.’

Explanation While the ECB is aware of the limited time foreseen in the deadline that it proposes, the ECB considers effort to maintain the procedure’s momentum and the continuation of procedures is needed, without impacting on the quality and the feasibility of the measures covered in the action plan which have to be ensured.

Amendment 24

Article 9(3) of the proposed regulation

‘3. The Commission may carry out surveillance missions to the Member State concerned to monitor implementation of the corrective action plan.’ ‘3. The Commission shall carry out surveillance missions to the Member State concerned to monitor implementation of the corrective action plan, in liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate when those missions concern Member States whose currency is the euro or Member States participating in ERM II.’

Explanation The Commission liaison with the ECB if it deems it appropriate needs to be introduced.

Amendment 25

Article 10(4) of the proposed regulation

‘(4) Where it concludes that the Member State has not taken the recommended corrective action, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt revised recommendations in accordance with Article 7, on a recommendation from the Commission, setting another deadline for corrective action by when another assessment in accordance with this Article shall be conducted.’ ‘(4) Where it concludes that the Member State has not taken the recommended corrective action, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt revised recommendations in accordance with Article 7, on a recommendation from the Commission, setting another deadline for corrective action by when another assessment in accordance with this Article shall be conducted. The Council and when relevant the Euro Group shall also address a formal report to the European Council and the European Parliament.’

Explanation These reports will improve the procedure.

Amendment 26

Article 11 of the proposed regulation

‘The excessive imbalance procedure shall be closed once the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, concludes that the Member State is no longer affected by excessive imbalances.’ ‘The excessive imbalance procedure shall be closed once the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, decides that the Member State is no longer affected by excessive imbalances or vulnerabilities.’