COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 19.07.1995 
COM(95) 368 final 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
concerning the activities of the Commission's 
body of specific officials for controls in the wine 
sector for the period running from 1 May 1992 
to 31 December 1994 inclusive 
pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council Regulation EEC N# 
2048/89 

SUMMARY 
The attached report on the activities of the body of officials responsible for controls in the 
wine sector that the Commission is to present to the Council and to the European Parliament 
covers the period between 1 May 1992 and 31 December 1994. 
The work of Commission inspectors has covered several major areas: permanent 
abandonment, control of harvest and production declarations, and the yield per hectare of 
quality wines psr, to cite only the most important. 
The report sets out in detail the inspectors' observations on the application of these measures. 
Their main conclusions are summarized below. 
The main observations with regard to the control of permanent abandonment established 
by the Member States were that, when checks are made outside the vines' growing period, 
the productive capacity of the vines cannot be assessed; the yields of grubbed-up parcels are 
often purposely overestimated; annual declarations are often ignored and grubbing operations 
are often incomplete (stocks not completely removed). 
The control of harvest and production declarations revealed the following major problems: 
derogations from the requirement to submit a harvest declaration when the harvester supplies 
the whole of the harvest' to a wine maker, allowing changes to the areas concerned and 
therefore to the yields; the negligence to cover intermediate harvesting centres in the 
regulations meaning that they do not need to draw up declarations; the lack of a vineyard 
register indicating the actual composition of vineyards (cadastral parcels) from which the 
products are harvested. 
The measures adopted by the Member States to restrict yields of quality wines psr 
undermine in several ways the principle according to which an overrun of the maximum per-
hectare yield results in the loss of the appellation for the whole harvest, the principal being: 
fixing high maximum yields, irrespective of yields over the previous ten years; systematic 
recourse to "exceptional" years, from the point of view of climatic conditions, to justify 
increasing yields; the lack of uniformity between Member States as regards the legal uses of 
production above the thresholds. 
The other conclusion that can be drawn from the enquiries carried out is that the 
control procedures set up by the Member States to ensure correct application of 
Community rules are inadequate. 
This results from the lack of human and material resources devoted to controls and to their 
dispersal around several organizations, the coordination of which is limited and, in certain 
cases, non-existent. 
It must be recognized that the legislation adopted since the establishment of the common 
organization of the market (COM) in wine, and the complementary national legislation, is 
extremely complex, reflecting the complexity of the sector itself. 
The use of certain instruments, e.g. the vineyard register, designed to provide the 
information necessary to improve the effectiveness of controls, on which work has still not 
been completed or, in certain cases, even begun, remains limited, for reasons which the 
Commission has decided to investigate in the conning weeks by means of a full audit. 
a. 
In its-proposal for a Regulation on the reform of the common organization of the market in 
wine, the Commission stressed that effective Community control of compliance with the 
rules and commitments made was a necessary condition for the success of the reform. It also 
emphasized that implementation of the reform had to be accompanied by the drawing up of 
a simplified vineyard register allowing to control the accuracy of declarations of area devoted 
to wine growing (COM (94) 117 final, Titles IX and X). 
The importance of establishing a Community control structure is also recognized by the 
European Parliament1 which, after examining the Commission's first report (to the Council 
and to Parliament) on the activities of the body of officials responsible for controls in the 
wine sector, approved without reservation the Commission's conclusions and stated that: 
"the Commission's body of specific officials must be strengthened by making provision 
for more specialists within the wine sector"; 
"the body should be set up on a permanent footing with a proper status which will 
guarantee its officials a long-term career" ; 
"the body must be given the technical resources (reference laboratories) and funds 
which will directly help to reduce EAGGF expenditure by cutting back on unlawful 
premiums, aids and interventions". 
Despite the efforts of the Directorate-General for Agriculture to develop the body of officials 
for controls in the wine sector, set up by Regulation (EEC) No 2048/89, the current situation 
is far from satisfying the demands of the European Parliament, the difficulties being linked 
essentially to the precarious status of the personnel and, above all, to the lack of posts 
allocated to the body. The control body has been maintained, with two officials only, by 
allocating to it the posts of two permanent officials normally allocated to the EAGGF for 
other control work. 
Given the limited staff and resources available, the control body is unable to carry out the 
tasks currently assigned to it by the Council. 
The reform of the COM cannot be implemented without a reinforcement of Community 
controls on the smooth and uniform application of measures adopted to correct the current 
imbalance in the sector. 
The Commission is convinced of this, and Parliament, in its resolution2 on the Commission 
communication to the Council on the development and future of wine sector policy (COM 
(93) 380 final), reiterates its point of view, stressing that "in order to guarantee the success 
of the reform and to ensure that wine-sector regulations are enforced in a consistent way, it 
is essential for controls to be placed on a systematic basis by setting up a central Community 
arbitration laboratory and strengthening the Community's body of control officers so that, 
equipped with the necessary human and material resources, they will be able to work 
together with national and regional authorities, carrying out operations related to the 
*OJ No C 20, 24.1.1994, p. 511. 
2OJNoC91, 28.3.1994, p. 55. 
inspection and the suppression and punishment of fraud." Parliament also added that an 
operative viticultural land register should be introduced and the change in the areas under 
vines monitored by means of aerial photographic surveying. Hence the importance of the 
Commission's proposal on the vineyard register. 

TABLE OF CONTENT 
TABLE OF CONTENT 1 
PREFACE . 3 
1. INTRODUCTION 4 
1.1. Regulations and Control 4 
1.2. Improving Controls 5 
2. THE COMMUNITY CONTROL BODY 6 
2.1. Tasks 6 
2.2. Staff 6 
2.3. Investigative powers 7 
2.4. Working methods . . 8 
2.5. Missions undertaken 8 
2.6. Cooperation 9 
3. THE NATIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURES ......' 9 
3.1. The types of authorities . . 9 
3.2. Operation 11 
3.3. Activities (general aspects) 12 
4. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 13 
4.1. The regulatory framework 13 
4.1.1. Mutual assistance 13 
4.1.2. Information to be exchanged 13 
4.1.3. Sampling . 14 
4.1.4. Methods of Analysis . . . 14 
4.1.5. The Community test laboratory 14 
4.1.6. The use and disposal of products not complying 
with wine-sector rules 15 
4.2. Matters of contention 16 
4.3. Remarks 16 
5. CONCLUSIONS 18 
ANNEX I 20 
List of missions conducted by the Community control body during the 
period covered by the report 20 
ANNEX II 24 
Subjects, covered by the Community control body during the period 
covered by the report 24 
1. VERIFICATION OF PERMANENT ABANDONMENT OF GRAPE VINES 24 
1.1. The Community framework 24 
1.2. Remarks 25 
1 
2. VERIFICATION OF HARVEST AND PRODUCTION DECLARATIONS 27 
2.1. The Community framework 27 
2.2. Remarks 27 
3. QUALITY WINE PSR YIELDS PER HECTARE . 31 
3.1. The Community framework . 31 
3.2. Remarks . . . 31 
4. CONTROLS ON ENRICHMENT 34 
4.1. The Community framework 34 
4.2. Remarks . 34 
5. VINEYARD YIELD ESTIMATION 38 
5.1. Introduction . 38 
5.2. The yield estimation methods used 38 
5.2.1. The "Beaujolais method" . 38 
5.2.2. The "Swiss method" 38 
5.3. Remarks . 39 
5.4. Conclusions 40 
PREFACE 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 of 19 June 1989 laying down general rules on 
controls in the wine sector1 instituted a Community control body and laid down the 
requisite legal foundations for its activity. This Community control body was actually set 
up within the EAGGF, as the latter is responsible for all agricultural inspections, in May 
1991. 
Its members were recruited from specialized officials working in the national 
inspectorates. The turn-over of the Community control body's staff over its 
two-and-a-half years of operation has been considerable, due to their precarious status 
(auxiliaries) and the one-year limit on their contracts imposed by the Commission. The 
very small number of staff assigned to this body and their precarious status has 
considerably weakened the Community control body's role. Nevertheless, many of the 
controls called for in the Regulation's appendix have been carried out. 
In compliance with the provisions of Article 17(2) of the Regulation, the Commission 
submitted to the Council and European Parliament a first annual report on the 
Community control body's activities covering its first year of operation, i.e., from 1 
May 1991 to 30 April 1992 inclusive.2 
This document met with a generally very favourable reception in the Council and 
Parliament, both of which agreed on the need to continue and improve the control body's 
activities, notably by bolstering its administrative structure and staff number and 
improving exchange of information with the relevant national inspectorates. The 
conclusions of the report met general agreement, especially as regards the need for 
greater uniformity in the way the Member States carry out their controls. 
This report was also analyzed in depth by the Management Committee for Wine, as part 
of the periodic examination of progress made in checking wine sector activities laid down 
in Article 17(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89. Several more detailed reports on the 
activities examined by the control body were presented to the national delegations at the 
Committee's meeting. 
The present report describes the Community control body's activities for the period of 
operation from 1 May 1992 to 31 December 1994 inclusive. 
1OJNoL202, 14.7.1989, p. 32. 
2Document SEC(92) 2014 final, 5.11.1992. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Regulations and Control 
1. The wine sector can be singled out from the rest of the agrifood 
sectors as requiring complex organization by the national 
administrations to manage and control compliance with the battery 
of viti- and vinicultural measures currently in existence. Quite 
logically, this need is most acute in the wine-producing countries. 
This situation is directly related to the scope and complexity of 
Community vineyard and wine-making regulations and national 
implementing regulations. Thus, several dozen Community sectoral 
regulations - both basic legislation and amendments - were in force 
in 1994. 
Community regulations cover almost all of the areas affecting the 
sector, whether the vineyard per se (land suitable for growing 
wine, wine varieties, growing practices, and changes in production 
potential) wine-making (harvesting and production, processing, 
storage and circulation of the products, qualitative characteristics, 
labelling, etc.), intervention measures (structural measures, market 
measures), trading, pricing, etc. The result is a huge tangle of 
interlocking regulations which operators have to comply with 
however difficult it may be. If the regulations are to be simplified, 
this is definitely an area ripe for such change. Indeed, the 
proposed reform of the Common Organization of the Market 
(COM) has just such an aim in mind. 
The vulnerability of the wine regulations to fraud is consequently 
great, not only because of the particular nature of the products 
involved, which are easily adulterated or substituted, but also 
because of the complexity of the regulations themselves, which 
makes detection of such frauds more difficult. Indeed, the more 
complicated a regulation, the harder it is to check compliance. 
Moreover, the sector's operators enounter major difficulties in 
complying with all of the provisions in effect, including the 
provisions creating obligations to declare and register winery 
operations. Indeed, many operators find themselves in a situation 
in which they 'have unwittingly infringed these provisions. 
1.2. Improving Controls 
1. To cover all of the fronts on which infringements may occur, the 
national authorities need to spread their efforts using sufficient 
investigative means (e.g. specialized personnel and technical 
back-up) and targeting the areas, aspects and operations for control 
on the basis of a risk analysis. 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 established the bases for improving 
compliance with wine-sector rules. In short, this regulation: 
pinpointed the areas of control that were considered 
especially sensitive and on which the authorities responsible 
for carrying out controls had to concentrate their efforts; 
established that if controls were not conducted 
systematically they had to be representative; 
called for the authorities responsible for carrying out 
controls to be given the staff needed to perform inspections 
efficaciously; 
stipulated the powers that inspectors must have to do their 
jobs well; 
laid down rules for mutual assistance between thé Member 
States' various authorities; and finally, 
created a Community control structure, attached to the 
Commission, that was responsible for ensuring that the 
wine regulations were applied uniformly in the Member 
States. 
2. Today, more than five years after the Regulation's entry into 
force, some improvements have occurred, but they are of limited 
scope and their effects have barely been felt. 
Thus, the Community control body has been set up and its 
activities in all the Member States, especially in the producer 
countries, have helped to dynamize the national authorities. In 
addition, the Community control body's findings have brought to 
light some cases of fraud and led to the correction of some 
weaknesses in the regulations. 
The creation of liaison authorities in the various Member States 
has somewhat improved interdepartmental coordination as well as 
mutual cooperation between the authorities of different Member 
States. Still, the lack of means of inspection, the restricted powers 
of certain departments' inspectors, the lack of specialization in the 
wine sector characterizing some of the authorities responsible for 
control and the low degree of coordination achieved so far 
considerably limit the scope and efficacy of controls. 
2. THE COMMUNITY CONTROL BODY 
2.1. Tasks 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 laying down general rules for controls in 
the wine sector created within the Commission a community control 
body of specific officials to ensure the uniform application by the 
Member States of the rules in the wine sector. 
This body's tasks cover all areas of the COM in wine, especially the 
following aims: 
collaborating with the competent authorities of the Member States 
in controls scheduled by the national bodies or conducted at the 
Commission's request; 
evaluating the established control arrangements, inspection 
procedures and findings, in order to contribute to the 
harmonization of controls throughout the European Union; and 
promoting cooperation and information exchange between the 
authorities of the various Member States in order to contribute to 
the uniform application of the wine rules and facilitate the 
circulation of wine-sector products. 
2.2. Staff 
1. As the Council decided when approving Regulation (EEC) No. 
2048/89, once the Community control body was set up (in 1991) 
its members were taken on as auxiliary staff under the EEC Staff 
Regulations. While this arrangement has the advantage of making 
it possible to recruit people with experience in conducting 
inspections, auxiliary staff may not remain under contract for more 
than a year. 
Major problems have developed as a result of this situation, i.e.: 
The staff did not have enough time to hone their experience 
and expertise over such a short period of time. By the time 
they had been trained they had to leave the Commission. 
It was difficult to recruit highly qualified, experienced 
persons for such short-term contracts. 
The Community control body's staff had to be changed 
annually. This meant a break in continuity and additionally 
wasted time for the EAGGF, which was also responsible 
for recruitement. 
However, in 1993 the Community control body was given two 
permanent staff positions and all the existing auxiliary posts were 
eliminated. The Community control body is thus currently staffed 
by only two people. 
2. We can hope that this precarious situation will disappear. Indeed, 
in its Communication to the Council of 22.7.1993 on the reform 
of the COM in wine the Commission stressed the need to step up 
controls in all areas of the proposed reform and to implement 
scrupulously the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89. 
This necessarily means increasing the Community control body's 
staff. 
In its examination of this Communication in 1993 the European 
Parliament supported the activities carried out by the Community 
control body and called upon the Commission to ensure the body's 
perpetuation by increasing its staff considerably and giving them 
a stable employment status. The Parliament considered that 36 
officials were required. 
2.3. Investigative powers 
On paper, the Commission's specific officials have the same rights and 
( powers to carry out their work as their national counterparts, with a few 
restrictions. Thus, 
according to the rules, the Commission's officials do not have 
autonomous powers, but collaborate in the controls organized by 
the national authorities, which are also responsible for conducting 
the surveillance. As in most cases the Community inspectors may 
choose, or even propose, the operations in which they would like 
to participate and have access to the premises and documents that 
are useful for inspections on an equal footing with the national 
inspectors, this limitation does not necessarily curtail their 
investigative powers, provided, however, that the national officials 
are willing to cooperate. 
when samples are deemed necessary, the Community inspectors 
must ask their national counterparts to take the samples. Once the 
samples are collected, they remain at the disposal of the 
Community officials. It is up to the latter to decide which 
laboratory will analyze the samples and what tests must be 
performed. Since the Commission officials are free to choose what 
samples must be collected, this is merely a formal restriction. 
another restriction results from the application of the principle of 
the secrecy of preliminary inquiries in courts of law ("secret 
d'instruction"), which exists in many Member States' legal 
systems. This principle can limit Community officials' 
investigative powers if it is invoked arbitrarily by a Member State 
to block Community inspectors when controls might reveal some 
criminal violations. Since virtually any infringement of the 
provisions for which the Community officials are responsible can 
trigger a preliminary inquiry by the courts, such an attitude 
renders the Community structure totally ineffective. 
2.4. Working methods 
1. An annual programme of work specifying the areas for control and 
missions to be undertaken is drawn up. The period in which the 
controls are to take place is chosen for each specific area of 
activity so as to dovetail with the national inspection services' 
normal activities. The missions are divided up amongst the 
countries according to each country's importance with regard to 
the management of the market and the merits of the subject being 
covered. 
Special unscheduled missions may be carried out within the 
framework of mutual assistance between control authorities when 
serious differences arise between Member States concerning 
batches that fail to meet standards or when motivated suspicions 
of wide-scale irregularities exist. 
2. The findings of each mission are sent to the Member State's 
liaison authority with a request that its remarks be sent on to the 
Commission. 
Some cases come in for special internal follow-up, notably when 
infringement of Community rules, frauds impinging on the 
Community's budget or weaknesses or loopholes in the regulations 
themselves are detected. 
2.5. Missions undertaken 
In the period covered by this report the Commission officials conducted 
a total of 73 missions in the Member States as listed in Annex I. Most of 
the missions were planned under the Community control body's annual 
programme of work; others were triggered by investigations launched by 
the Community control body in response to information about purported 
frauds received by the Commission; still others concerned bilateral 
disputes that arose as a result of the detection of products that did not 
conform to wine-sector rules. The Community control body also 
contributed ideas on the reform of the COM. 
Annex II to this report lists the findings and results by subject. How 
mutual assistance between the various national control authorities 
functioned and the Community control body's main activities in this area 
are analyzed in Chapter 4. 
2.6. Cooperation 
The Community control body worked harmoniously and productively with 
practically all of the Member States' control bodies. The national 
authorities were willing to cooperate with the Community control body 
and saw in the latter's creation and operation an opportunity to promote 
and improve controls of the wine sector. 
The Community inspectors also met with a favourable welcome from the 
producers and their trade organizations. All parties seemed to recognize 
the need for objective Community controls to protect the sector and, by 
extension, defend their interests. Of course, contrary reactions were also 
seen, notably from producers who were found to be perpetrating frauds. 
3. THE NATIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURES 
3.1. The types of authorities 
1. National wine-sector control authorities and their powers differ 
considerably from one Member State to the next, in line notably 
with whether or not the Member State is a wine-producing country 
and the countries' different internal administrative and political 
structures. 
2. In the wine-producing countries, up to seven authorities (or their 
homologous services in the regions) are engaged in the 
administrative management and control of the wine sector. 
Despite the diversity within this group of Member States, their 
relevant national authorities can be put into the following 
categories overall: 
a) offices in charge of vineyards: sometimes specialized but 
usually responsible for all the other agricultural sectors as 
well, these bodies manage and inspect the vineyards' 
potentials, monitor any possible modifications (grubbing 
up, replanting, new planting), implement structural 
intervention measures (grubbing up with premiums, 
vineyard restructuring) and sometimes check harvest 
declarations as well. 
b) offices responsible for carrying out controls on wines: 
Sometimes specialized in wines or including specialized 
sections, but usually having oversight over all agrifood 
products, these bodies are responsible for preventing and 
suppressing agrifood fraud in general and wine-sector fraud 
in particular. They check the product in the various stages 
of its production and wholesaling. They are responsible in 
particular for checking the annual production and storage 
declarations, the movement of goods, the proper keeping 
of registers, oenological practices, wine quality and 
labelling. 
c) offices in charge of quality wines: These bodies check 
designated wines; they sometimes have oversight over table 
wines with indications of their places of origin and local 
wines. They inspect both vineyards and wineries, checking 
agricultural practices (vine varieties, growing methods, 
yields per hectare, harvesting), production processes 
(pressing, ageing, and bottling) and wine quality 
(approval). 
d) offices responsible for consumer protection: These bodies 
check produce and foodstuffs for hygiene and freedom 
from disease. The inspections of wine are carried out 
primarily at the market stage and focus on product quality 
and labelling. 
e) agricultural intervention agencies: These agencies, which 
are sometimes specialized in wine, are responsible for 
implementing Community intervention measures and paying 
out the corresponding aid. The inspections in connection 
with the granting of aid are carried out by the intervention 
agencies themselves, the vineyard authorities (structural 
measures), or the offices or departments responsible for 
carrying out controls (market measures). 
f) miscellaneous specialized offices: These include offices 
that monitor distilleries and the authorities responsible for 
controling the commericialisation of vinous alcohol. 
g) Customs: Customs inspections of wine are primarily 
administrative (conformity of transport documents); 
samples are occasionally taken. 
The vineyard register offers a striking example of the different 
bodies that are responsible for this instrument for verifying and 
managing the wine-production potentials in the different Member 
States: 
10 
in Germany: the vineyard register comes under the 
jurisdiction of the Lander (Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate) or 
regions (Unterfranken, Baden, Wurttemberg), with 
responsibility being delegated to research institutes (Baden 
and Wurttemberg), vineyard offices (Hessen), a local 
administration (Unterfranken), and a chamber of 
agriculture (Rhineland-Palatinate). 
in France: the vineyard register comes under national 
jurisdiction and is the responsibility of the Finance 
Ministry (Customs). 
in Luxembourg: the Vine and Wine Institute manages the 
register. 
in Italy: the vineyard register comes under national 
jurisdiction (EIMA - an intervention agency) but its 
constitution and management have been contracted out to 
a private consortium. 
in Spain: responsibility for the vineyard register has just 
been shifted from the national institute for wines of 
designated origin, INDO, to Spain's Autonomous 
Communities, but the actual realisation has been entrusted 
to a private consortium. 
in Portugal: the vineyard register comes under national 
jurisdiction (Vine and Wine Institute). 
in Greece: the vineyard register comes under national 
jurisdiction (Ministry of Agriculture), but does not actually 
exist. 
3. The non-producing Member States have as a rule a total of three 
different authorities that carry out almost all of the wine-sector 
inspections. These entities are similar to those described under 
2(b), (d) and (g). 
3.2. Operation 
The foregoing review shows that diversity is the rule when it comes to the 
authorities that are responsible for controls in the wine sector in the 
Member States, with managerial and inspection powers shared and, alas, 
sometimes overlapping. What is more, apart from a few rare exceptions, 
the authorities in charge of the inspections are not specialized in the wine 
sector, but handle many areas of activity and are responsible for verifying 
operations in other sectors as well (e.g., agriculture, food, and consumer 
goods). Finally, the inspectors' powers vary according to the body to 
which they belong. Indeed, some offices act more like advisors to 
producers, whereas others take a are more punitive line. 
Each Member State also has a contact body that is responsible for liaising 
between the Member State's various control services and the Commission. 
In practice, however, inter-departmental coordination must clear major 
hurdles resulting notably from the fact that the offices are supervised by 
11 
various administrations (central, regional, and various ministerial 
departments) and guided by different priorities of action. 
Given these objective difficulties, satisfactory levels of inspection will be 
achieved only if specific national bodies specialized in wine-sector control 
are set up and endowed with broad investigative powers encompassing all 
the areas covered by the regulation and sufficient powers and means to 
carry out their tasks. This could be accomplished by bolstering one or the 
other of the authorities that already exist, especially in the wine-producing 
Member States. 
3.3. Activities (general aspects) 
1. Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 states the principles 
for improving wine-sector controls in the Member States, i.e. the 
circumscription of the areas to be controled - more particularly, 
ensuring that inspections are carried out according to criteria of 
representativeness - and the need to have sufficient staff to carry 
out the inspections efficaciously. 
During its various missions the Community control body collected, 
more or less systematically, general documentation about the 
national inspectorates' activities, working procedures and field 
staff. 
It is clear that, for a given area, the inspections carried out by the 
Member States' national authorities are far from uniform; the type, 
intensity, and efficacy of the tests are not always the same. 
2. In 1992, the Commission asked the liaison authorities in the 
Twelve Member States to provide statistics on the inspections 
carried out in 1991 and the programmes of work scheduled for 
1992, by type of verification, the aim being to be able to assess 
the distribution and intensity, of the controls conducted in the 
European Community. The Member States' responses concerning 
their control statistics revealed that: 
the preciseness of the information furnished varied 
considerably from one Member State to the next. Whilst 
some countries provided detailed statistics broken down by 
competent department and type of verification, others kept 
their responses brief. 
it was extremely difficult to compare the statistics provided 
by the various national authorities, especially given the 
vagueness of the types of inspections carried out and the 
methods or procedures. 
In general, the information about the national authorities' agendas 
that was submitted to the Commission was limited to an outline of 
the priority areas in which inspections were planned. Rough 
12 
schedules were sometimes attached, but they did not contain any 
specific references to the criteria of representativeness that were 
to be met. 
3. Achieving true Community-wide harmonization of wine-sector 
control requires in-depth evaluation of the COM's control 
requirements by specific area, a systematic inventory of all the 
control procedures used by the various national services and, 
finally, detailed knowledge of the staff assigned to carrying out 
wine-sector inspections by department and by area. If the EAGGF 
has the funds to call upon outside experts' services, it will 
commission the relevant in-depth study in 1995. Moreover, the 
national inspectorates' annual activity reports and programmes 
should be transmitted to the Commission's departments annually, 
as the Commission suggested in its COM reform proposal. 
Last but not least, all the Member States are amiss in that they 
either have no working vineyard register, which is supposed to 
cover all vineyard operations in compliance with Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2392/86 of 24 July 19861 and Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 649/87 of 3 March 19872, or, where such 
a register does exist, rarely use it for control purposes. 
4. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
4.1. The regulatory framework 
4.1.1. Mutual assistance 
Title IV of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 lays down how the competent 
authorities in the various Member States are to assist each other. Two 
types of procedures are established, one for 'assistance on request' 
(Article 8), the other for 'spontaneous assistance' (Article 9). The 
Commission's role is to foster information exchange. To this end, it must 
be informed of all the cases in which the marketing of a product may be 
of specific interest to other Member States or a product fails to conform 
to wine-sector rules ((Article 8(1) and Article 9(2)). 
4.1.2. Information to be exchanged 
According to Article 10 of the Regulation, when a Member State finds 
that a product imported from another Member State does not comply with 
wine-sector rules, the competent authorities shall provide each other with 
information about the disputed product's composition and organoleptic 
1OJNoL208, 31.7.1986, p. 1, 
2OJNoL62, 5.3.1987, p. 10. 
13 
characteristics, its designation and presentation, and how far it complies 
with the rules laid down for its production and marketing. Moreover, this 
information shall be accompanied by documents or other evidence and 
details of any administrative measures or legal action relating thereto. 
The authorities involved must subsequently inform each other without 
delay of the progress of the investigations and any administrative or legal 
action taken subsequent to the operations concerned. 
4.1.3. Sampling 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2347/91 of 29 July 19911 lays down 
officiai rules for taking samples as part of the cooperation between the 
Member States' competent authorities. The aim is to ensure that officiai 
analyses are representative and their results verifiable throughout the 
European Community (see the first recital). 
4.1.4. Methods of Analysis 
Article 74(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822/87 requires the adoption of 
methods of analysis to determine the composition of wine products and 
rules for ascertaining whether the products have undergone processes 
contrary to authorized oenological practice. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2676/90 of 17 September 19902 lays 
down the Community test methods applying to the wine sector. In 
addition, this Regulation specifies that, inasmuch as the Community has 
not yet laid down maximum levels for substances whose presence 
indicates that certain oenological practices have been used and has not yet 
adopted tables enabling analysis data to be compared, the Member States 
are authorized to set these limits themselves (see the second recital). 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 74(2) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822/87, 
when methods of analysis or Community rules do not exist, 
IWO-recognized or ISO-recommended methods shall apply. If neither of 
the latter exist, an analytical method allowed by the Member State 
concerned may be used or, if necessary, any other appropriate test 
method, that is, a method that is accurate, repeatable and reproducible. 
4.1.5. The Community test laboratory 
Article 16 of Regulation (EEC) No, 2048/89 stipulates that the 
Commission shall set up an analytical data bank for wine-sector products 
at the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra. Commission Regulation 
1OJNoL214, 2.8.1991, p. 32. 
2OJNoL272, 3.10.1990, p. 1. 
14 
(EEC) No. 2347/91 of 29 July 19911 lays down the rules for sampling 
wine-sector products either within the framework of Member State 
cooperation or for analysis by nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), 
including for the Community data bank. Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No. 2348/91 of 29 July 19912 sets out how the data bank for NMR test 
results is to be set up and operated. 
To meet these regulatory requirements the Commission has set up within 
the JRC s Institute for the Environment a special section, the European 
Office for Wine, Alcohol and Spirit Drinks (BEVABS), the main purpose 
of which is to carry out the scientific and technical tasks that the 
Commission requires to ensure that Community wine-sector legislation is 
implemented and observed correctly. The BEVABS's creation was delayed 
somewhat because of administrative problems (hiring of qualified staff) 
and technical problems (divergent results of analyses conducted in the 
Member States and checks performed at the JRC, notably due to the 
calibration of instruments, different alcohol distillation systems, internal 
reference standards, and failure to comply with the technical protocol). 
Most of these difficulties have been overcome and the data for the 1991 
and 1992 wine years have just been validated by the scientific 
subcommittee. 
BEVABS has also participated in a study to detect the watering down of 
wines by mass spectrometry (MS) analysis of the wine's 180/160 isotope 
ratio and will supplement the existing NMR data bank with the isotope 
ratios measured in the same samples. 
The Office may also create a data bank containing the results of these 
isotope distribution analyses, if need be. 
Similarly, it is prepared to conduct most of the conventionar analyses of 
wines and spirits. This ability might lead to its arbitrating over litigious 
analyses, if the Member States accept such a role for it. 
4.1.6. Jlie use and disposal of products not complying with wine-sector 
rules 
Article 73(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 822/87 states that wine-sector 
products that have been subjected to oenological practices not allowed by 
Community regulations or, in their absence, national regulations, 'may not 
be offered or disposed of for direct human consumption'. The same 
applies to products that are not of sound and fair merchantable quality and 
products that do not meet Community definitions. 
Article 73(2) lays down the adoption of Community rules governing the 
holding, transport, and use of products that do not comply with the 
Regulation's provisions and criteria to avoid excessive hardship in 
individual cases. No Community legislation to implement these provisions 
has been adopted to date, despite the bilateral disputes that have arisen in 
this area. 
1OJNoL214, 2.8.1991, p. 32. 
2OJ No L 214, 2.8.1991, p. 39. 
15 
Given the fact that, since 1 January 1993 customs procedures to turn back 
goods can no longer be applied, the use or disposal of unauthorized 
products is still not covered by binding rules. If a dispute arises, it is 
always possible to ask for a counter-appraisal by laboratories that, until 
now, had to be national. To ensure that justice is meted out more fairly, 
it would be useful to use the BEVABS as a Community arbitration 
laboratory. 
4.2. Matters of contention 
Since its creation the Community control body has acted as a clearing 
house for the bilateral disputes sent to the Commission by national 
authorities. The bulk of cases of which the Commission has been 
informed concerned wine-sector products that were presumed to have 
undergone illicit oenological practices in a Member State other than the 
one that filed the complaint. Less frequently seen were " irregular 
presentations of wine. 
Most of the files were opened by the German control authorities, followed 
by the French. Most of the contested products come from Italy, followed 
by Spain and France. 
The Community control body has examined all the files and carried out 
investigations of some suspect operators in order to verify on site the 
conditions under which the consignments were bottled, manufactured, etc. 
In addition, it contacted the national laboratories in order to shed light on 
the interpretation of specific analytical results. 
4.3. Remarks 
Information exchange among the authorities of the various Member States 
and between such authorities and the European Commission when 
defective products are detected in a Member State other than the State of 
production continues to be plagued by practical problems. The following 
problems may be quoted: 
a) The information does not always contain all the elements stipulated 
in Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89. What is more, it 
is often not accompanied by documents or other useful pieces of 
evidence that would enable the recipient control authorities to 
follow up matters more effectively; 
b) When products that do not conform to Community rules are sent 
back to the Member State of origin, the official notification of this 
delivery often reaches the national inspection service after the 
products have been unloaded.. It is thus impossible to guarantee 
that their destination has been that which had been intended. 
16 
c) The authorities receiving a request for information sometimes fail 
to inform the applicant authorities of inspections and the action 
taken in their wake, or else do so late or incompletely. 
d) The instructions for collecting official samples and sending them 
to the requesting Member States within the framework of 
cooperation between competent authorities provided for in 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2347/91 are not always followed. 
Exchanges of samples are often delayed because requests are not 
sufficiently precise or are not duly justified. 
e) The procedures for information exchange between the liaison 
authority and control authorities of the same country are not 
properly defined in some of the Member States. This gives rise to 
additional administrative delays in the settlement of bilateral 
disputes. 
f) The Commission services do not always receive copies of the 
national authorities' correspondence with each other under mutual 
assistance. 
g) The possibility of having national inspectors participate in 
verifications in other Member States has never been used because 
of linguistic, financial and/or administrative barriers (for example, 
in the reporting of violations). 
In respect to methods of analysis, it has to be said that the method for 
detecting the watering down of wines by determination of the oxygen 
isotope ratio by mass spectrometry (SMRI) is still in an experimental 
phase. At present, its results can be interpreted differently by the Member 
States because of the absence of an EU- or internationally-approved 
official method and the limited number of reference values obtained for 
genuine products. 
It is urgent that the Commission and Member States concerned take steps 
to adopt common rules on the method of analysis and interpretation of 
results so as to avoid technical barriers to the free movement of 
wine-sector products. 
Indeed, in those cases where official analytical methods have been 
established to determine the presence of specific substances in wines but 
maximum allowed levels have not been set or comparative tables of the 
analytical data have not been compiled by either Community legislation 
or the International Vine and Wine Office (IWO), it has come about that 
the same test results have been given significantly different interpretations 
by the control authorities of different Member States. This is the case for 
most of the disputes mentioned in this document. 
Consequently, the same wine-sector product may be considered legal in 
one Member State and illegal in another Member State even though the 
17 
two Member States' inspection services apply the same assay method and 
obtain the same results. 
The explanation for such a situation lies in the provisions of Article 74 of 
Regulation (EEC) No. 822/87 authorizing the Member States to apply 
their own methods of analysis for substances characteristic of specific 
oenological practices if such methods have not been established by the 
Community. 
The Community has yet to set such criteria. In the interim, in order to 
avoid contradictory situations, the Management Committee for Wines has 
approved a declaration urging the control authorities to take a 'position of 
prudence' in such situations and to consult scientists with competence in 
the area. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The wine sector is characterized by a complex structure that is governed 
by very detailed regulations covering all facets of the sector (vineyards, 
wine-making, intervention measures, markteing of goods, etc.). These 
regulations are based on the Member States' traditional practices. The way 
the sector has been organized administratively in each wine-producing 
Member State reflects this complexity. 
2. The wine-sector rules are particularly vulnerable to irregularities because 
of the complexity of the sector and the regulations themselves as well as 
the special nature of the products. The result of this regulatory maze is 
that efficacious verification of compliance is hard to achieve. 
3. The Community body of specific officials for controls in the wine-sector 
that was instituted by Regulation (EEC) No. 2048/89 has not met the 
Council's objectives. The difficulties it has encountered are linked to the 
precarious status of its personnel and the small number of officials 
assigned. This situation was admittedly improved by a decision to assign 
permanent staff to the Community control body (to the detriment of the 
other activities of the EAGGF). In any case, the number of officials was 
reduced to two. 
Seventy-three missions were carried out during the period covered by this 
report. The main subjects of investigation were the permanent 
abandonment of vineyards, harvest and production declarations, hectare 
yields of quality wines psr, enrichment, and estimates of production 
yields. These missions revealed loopholes in certain regulations, possible 
flaws in the inspections organized by certain Member States, and 
irregularities. 
Cooperation with the Member States' control authorities was generally 
harmonious and productive. 
18 
4. National wine-sector control structures differ considerably from one 
Member State to the next. Usually, a variety of authorities is the rule, 
with managerial and investigative powers being shared, sometimes 
overlapping. Only rarely are the authorities specialized in the wine sector. 
5. Practical problems continue to dog cooperation between the national 
authorities responsible for conducting controls as well as between the 
national authorities and the Commission. These problems basically have 
to do with the lack of precision in communications and information 
requests, in the case of the return of products that do not conform to 
Community wine-sector rules the failure to follow sample collection 
procedures, the slowness of information exchange between the liaison 
authority and the control authorities, and the assay methods themselves, 
as the interpretation of their results gives rise to diverging conclusions 
resulting from a lack of bilaterally- and/or Community-approved reference 
values. 
6. The Member States, on the other hand, have been extremely slow about 
rendering their vineyard registers fully operational. One Member State has 
not even begun to set up its register. What is more, where the vineyard 
register is available, even if only partially, it is not used enough to 
improve the reliability of controls. The EAGGF will commission in 1995, 
using external staff (provided that funds are available), a complete, 
detailed audit of the progress made in implementing the vineyard register 
in all the Member States. 
7. Finally, the regulatory framework must be simplified, for it is obvious 
that the less complicated the regulations, the more effective controls will 
be. That was the position taken by the Commission in its 22 July 1993 
communication to the Council about the reform of the COM in wine. 
19 

ANNEX I 
LIST OF MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COMMUNITY CONTROL 
BODY DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT 
1/5/1992 - 31/12/1992 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 DATE 
5/5/92 
7/5/92 
11-15/5 
11-15/5 
18-22/5 
18-22/5 
21/5 
1-5/6 
2-5/6 
8-12/6 
18-20/6 
29/6-3/7 
14-17/7 
20-23/7 
24/7 
31/8-4/9 
31/8-6/9 
14-18/9 
14-18/9 
20-30/9 
5-8/10 COUNTRY/REGION 
BELGIUM/BRUSSELS 
BELGIUM/BRUSSELS 
SPAIN/RIOJA 
PORTUGAL/LISBON 
FRANCE/VAUCLUSE-
DROME 
UNITED-KINGDOM/LONDON 
BELGIUM 
ITALY/SICILY 
GERMANY/RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
PORTUGAL/LISBON 
LUXEMBOURG 
SPAIN/RIOJA 
ITALY/TUSCANY 
IRELAND/DUBLIN 
UNITED 
KINGDOM/LONDON 
FRANCE/DROME 
ITALY/EMILIA-ROMAGNA 
GREECE/CRETE 
SPAIN/JEREZ 
ITALY/SICILY 
PORTUGAL/DOURO PURPOSE 
Labelling of wines 
Labelling of wines 
Illicit plantings 
Permanent abandonment 
Registers, illicit plantings 
Labelling of wines 
Labelling of wines 
Illicit plantings 
Distillation 
Distillation 
Permanent abandonment 
' Illicit plantings 
Permanent abandonment 
Registers, labelling of wines 
Registers, labelling of wines 
Illicit plantings 
Presumed watered-down wines 
Harvest inspections 
Harvest inspections 
Harvest inspections 
Harvest inspections 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
, 29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 19-23/10 
20-22/10 
26-30/10 
16/11. 
16-20/11 
23/11 
25-26/11 
30/11-4/12 
2/12 
7/12 
9-11/12 
14-18/12 
14-18/12 FRANCE/ALSACE 
GERMANY/AHR-
MIDDLERHINE 
SPAIN/BARCELONA 
ITALY/ASTI 
FRANCE/BEAUJOLAIS 
BELGIUM 
LUXEMBOURG 
GERMANY/HESSEN 
NETHERLANDS/ 
EINDHOVEN 
ITALY/APULIA 
DENMARK/SVENDBORG 
SPAIN/LA MANCHA 
FRANCE/CHARENTES Harvest inspections 
Harvest inspections 
Enrichment 
Wine laboratory visit 
Harvest inspections 
Labelling of wines 
Accompanying documents, registres 
Registers 
Accompanying documents, labelling 
of wines 
Distillation 
Registers, Labelling of wines 
Distillation 
Article 36 wines 
1/1/1993 - 31/12/1993 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 DATE 
11-15/1 
1-5/2 
8-11/2 
8-12/2 
22-26/2 
23-26/2 
1-5/3 
1-5/3 COUNTRY/REGION 
GERMANY/RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
SPAIN/LA MANCHA 
FRANCE/LANGUEDOC 
PORTUGAL/RIBATEJO 
GREECE/ATTIKA 
FRANCE/PROVENCE 
ITALY/EMILIA-
ROMAGNA 
GERMANY/SAXONY-
SACHSEN-ANHALT PURPOSE 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. -
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
21 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 15-19/3 
16-19/3 
24/3 
21-23/3 
3-7/5 
17/5 
23-28/5 
21-25/6 
28/6-2/7 
19-23/7 
6-10/9 
7-9/9 
16-17/9 
20-24/9 
27/9-1/10 
10-15/10 
15-19/11 SPAIN/PENEDES 
ITALY/VENETIA 
BELGIUM 
NETHERLANDS/THE 
HAGUE-AMSTERDAM 
GERMANY/SARRE-
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
NETHERLANDS/THE 
HAGUE-AMSTERDAM 
SPAIN/VALENCIA 
PORTUGAL/BEIRA 
FRANCE/LANGUEDOC 
GREECE/CORINTH 
FRANCE/GARD 
GERMANY/ 
WÙRZBURG 
ITALY/NAPLES 
PORTUGAL/RIBATEJO 
ITALY/EMILIA-
ROMAGNA-VENETIA 
GREECE/CHALKIS-
CORINTH 
ITALY/CALABRIA Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Declarations (Reg. (EEC) No. 
3929/87) 
Wine laboratory visit 
Registers, labelling of wines 
Accompanying documents, 
labelling of wines, vineyard 
register 
Reimportation of alcohol 
Permanent abandonment 
Permanent abandonment 
Permanent abandonment 
Permanent abandonment 
Stock declarations, storage aids 
German inspectors' annual meeting 
Utilization of alcohol 
Stock declarations, storage aids 
Stock declarations, storage aids 
Enrichment 
Permanent abandonment 
1/1/1994 - 31/12/1994 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 DATE 
21-25/2 
14-18/3 
21-25/3 
27-29/4 COUNTRY/REGION 
ITALY/TUSCANY 
ITALY/ABRUZZI 
SPAIN/ 
CASTILLA LEON 
FRANCE/ 
SUZE-LA-ROUSSE PURPOSE 
Accompanying documents 
Inspection of a cooperative 
Accompanying documents 
Seminar: 'Vine and Wine Law' 
22 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 30/4-3/5 
8-9/8 
16-19/8 
22-26/8 
19-23/9 
10-14/10 
14-18/11 
22-23/11 
16/12 
19-20/12 PORTUGAL/MADEIRA 
ITALY/ISPRA 
FRANCE/BEAUJOLAIS 
PORTUGAL/DAO 
ITALY/PIEDMONT 
ITALY/EMILIA-
ROMAGNA 
GRECE/BEOTIA 
GERMANY/BREMEN 
ITALY/ISPRA 
ITALY/ROME Accompanying documents 
NMR data bank 
Yield estimates 
Yield estimates 
Yield estimates 
Enrichment 
Grubbing up & replanting 
German inspectors' anual meeting 
Assessment of pollen spread-based 
yield estimate method 
Vineyard register 
23 
ANNEX II 
SUBJECTS COVERED BY THE COMMUNITY CONTROL BODY 
DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE REPORT 
1. VERIFICATION OF PERMANENT ABANDONMENT OF GRAPE VINES 
1.1. The Community framework 
1. The major structural imbalance in the wine-sector market has made 
the adoption of measures to bring production down in line with 
demand essential. To this end, a policy to reduce the wine-making 
potential was set up. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1442/88 of 24 
May 19881 and Commission Regulation (EEC) 2729/88 of 31 
August 19882 set up a permanent abandonment premium scheme 
in respect of vineyards for the 1988/89 to 1995/96 wine years 
inclusive. The vineyard owners who benefit from this premium 
give up their right to replant grape vines following .their 
grubbing-up and had the possibility of benefiting, until the 1992/93 
wine year, from a preferential scheme of compulsory distillation 
of table wines as of the wine year following the one in which their 
vines were grubbed up. 
2. Vineyards of all categories are eligible for the permanent 
abandonment premiums. Exclusions were adopted for certain size 
categories because of their small size, a history of infringements, 
planting dates or their state of neglect. In addition, the Member 
States are free to exclude from the scope of the measure specific 
'protected areas'. 
3. The amount of the permanent abandonment premium per hectare 
varies according to the type of production, the productivity of the 
grubbed land, and the Member State.3 Up to and including the 
1992/93 wine year the premium was increased if the land 
abandoned permanently accounted for the farmer's total vineyard 
acreage. Starting with the 1993/94 wine year the premium is 
supplemented if the grubbing-up is part of a vineyard restructuring 
programme. 
'OJNoL 132, 28.5.1988, p. 3. 
2OJNoL241, 1.9.1988, p. 108. 
3The premiums are lower in Portugal. 
24 
1.2. Remarks 
1. The limited availability of the means of control seems to be the 
greatest obstacle to the correct application of the permanent 
abandonment programme. The material difficulties of setting up 
far-reaching, systematic checks before and after grubbing are such 
that the conditions for granting the premiums are not verified 
strictly. The Court of Auditors has drawn attention to this in its 
annual reports. The Member States must give this problem serious 
consideration if it is to be solved. 
2. The national arrangements made to manage and control the 
scheme's application do not meet all of the Community's 
requirements. Sharing knowledge of the various measures taken in 
the Member States may help the national officials to improve their 
own measures. 
3. Inspections of the plots scheduled for grubbing should be 
conducted preferably during the vine's vegetative growth period or 
at least before the vines are pruned so as to gauge better the crop's 
vigour and thus its potential yield. 
4. In Spain, Italy and Portugal the acreages or yields per hectare of 
the plots scheduled for grubbing were wittingly overestimated. 
Additional guarantees had to be introduced to avoid this risk. The 
figures in the wine-growers' annual harvest and production 
declarations had to be taken into account by the inspection services 
in all cases. The regulation was amended accordingly in 1993.1 
5. The time limit for the completion of grubbing (15 May) led to 
delays in dealing with demands and with payment. In addition, 
official confirmation of grubbing within two months of notification 
proved impossible in regions where large areas were grubbed up 
under the premium scheme, due to shortage of control staff. The 
time limit for grubbing and the two month confirmation period had 
to be extended. In 1993 the regulation was amended to take acount 
of the second point1. 
6. In France, Greece and Italy some cases of grubbing up that have 
been certified as complying with the rules have not always led to 
the complete elimination of the vine stocks due to the failure to 
pull up main roots and wood left lying around on the plots. The 
definition of grubbing-up given in the Regulation was clarified in 
19931. 
7. Eligibility for an additional premium if the applicant's entire 
vineyard is grubbed up is very difficult to check. The lack of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1990/93 of 19 July 1993 (OJ No L 182, 
24.7.1993, p. 7). 
25 
sufficient information about the farms does not permit the 
competent services to be certain that the abandonment is total. 
Under these conditions, granting an additional premium for total 
abandonment is not justified. This additional premium was 
discontinued in 1993.* 
8. Setting up a full, computerized vineyard register would allow to 
correct a large portion of the current failings. Using such a tool 
would make it possible, amongst other things, to improve the 
management and preventive inspection of requests, check vineyard 
composition and manage wine-growers' replanting rights. In the 
interim, the inspection services should use the vineyard files and 
the viticultural land registers - even where incomplete - that exist 
in some regions. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1990/93 of 19 July 1993 (OJ No L 182, 
24.7.1993, p. 7). 
26 
2. VERIFICATION OF HARVEST AND PRODUCTION DECLARATIONS 
2.1. The Community framework 
1. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3929/87 of 17 December 
19871 provides for annual declarations of harvests, production and 
stocks in the wine sector. These provisions may be considered the 
basic instrument for managing and monitoring the wine sector 
given the importance of the information they provide, including 
particulars of each individual operator and information about the 
sector as a whole. 
The importance of these provisions as a basic legal instrument 
prompted the legislator to provide for Community sanctions 
(Article 11 of the Regulation) against operators who do not submit 
their declarations or fill them in incorrectly. These sanctions 
consist in exclusion from all voluntary market measures for two 
wine years. 
2. Concerning table wine market management, the Member States 
calculate each operator's rights and distillation obligations from the 
production figures, the wine-growing areas where the products 
come from, and yields per hectare declared annually. What is 
more, the annual harvest and production declarations are the 
quality wines psr's 'birth certificates' and indispensable tools to 
ensure that the operators comply with national and Community 
provisions regarding quality wines. 
2.2. Remarks 
1. According to the Community control body's findings, Regulation 
(EEC) No. 3929/87 as currently drafted is a weak basis for 
collecting reliable information about the areas in production and 
yields per hectare of table wines and quality wines psr obtained by 
the operators. Gaps and vague wording in the text have had as a 
consequence that each Member State set up its own system of 
declarations, sometimes correcting some of the deficiencies in the 
Community regulation. The Regulation is full of inadequacies. 
2. The difficulties surrounding grape harvest declarations stem mainly 
from the following: 
a) The lack of precise criteria for defining the vineyards that 
are subject to the rights and obligations entailed by the 
COM. Consequently, wherever the vineyard register is not 
!OJ No L 369, 29.12.1987, p. 59. 
27 
yet operational, the inspection services are not in a position 
to know all of the wine growers that are required to 
declare their grape harvests and thus to enforce this 
obligation. 
b) Derogations from the requirement to submit harvest 
declarations, especially the exemption for the members of 
wine cooperatives and members of groups of wine 
producers. In the absence of individual harvest 
declarations, the wine-makers for whom the grapes are 
intended can easily change the surface areas of origin and 
thus the yields of the various categories or types of wines. 
c) The regulation's omission of harvesting centres that buy 
grapes from harvesters and resell the must to wine-makers 
before 15, December. Since these intermediaries are not 
bound to make any declaration, they form a screen between 
the harvesters and wine-makers and can manipulate, that is, 
lower, the yield figures at will when delivering must to the 
wine-makers. 
d) The non-obligation to declare the registered plots from 
which the grapes are harvested. In the absence of a 
vineyard register giving a true picture of the composition 
of the growers' vineyards, this omission prevents 
verification of the total area declared under vines and thus 
of actual yields. 
e) The obligation, which has since been abolished1, to declare 
harvested yields in equivalent volumes of wine 
(hectolitres/hectare) instead of by ] weight of grapes 
(quintals/hectare). There was no way for harvesters who 
did not make their own wine to know the grape-to-wine 
transformation coefficients attained by the wine-makers to 
whom they delivered their grapes. It thus followed that the 
yield figures that the harvesters supplied with their 
deliveries to the wineries were always rough figures and 
when the wine-makers deduced from these figures the 
acreages corresponding to the grapes, those figures were 
likewise inaccurate. 
Wine production declaration problems arise when the weighted 
average yields of the grapes being vinified has to be determined, 
which, by definition, must correspond to the average yield of the 
wine-maker who makes wine out of his own grape harvest or 
purchased grapes. The wine-maker must take into consideration 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1991/94, 27 July 1994 (OJ No L 200, 
3.8.1994, p. 10). 
28 ' 
and declare as many weighted average yields as the different 
categories of products he produces (table wines, quality wines psr, 
and other wines). 
The difficulties stem from the following: 
a) To be able to calculate the weighted average yield, the 
wine-maker must know the exact figures of both the 
quantities of the various batches of grapes or must he uses 
and the acreages from which they originate. 
If the winery is not a grape producer as well, it is 
completely dependent on its suppliers' stated yields per 
hectare to calculate the acreages corresponding to its 
deliveries. 
The difficulties mentioned in Item 2 above often lead to 
inaccuracies in the surface areas under production and thus 
the non-compliance of the wine production declaration, for 
an error in the acreage attributed to one of the deliveries is 
enough to make the winery's weighted average yield 
wrong, too. 
b) According to the wine production declaration given in 
Table B of Annex I of Regulation (EEC) No. 3929/87, the 
weighted average yield concerns all of the products 
upstream from the wine (grapes and must) used by the 
producer. These include the products that have been 
vinified since the start of the wine year as well as those 
present in the winery's holdings at the date of the 
declaration, even if the latter have not been vinified. 
What is more, pursuant to the provisions of Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 441/88 of 17 February 1988 laying 
down the rules for the application of the compulsory 
distillation of table wines1, the producer's distillation 
obligation is calculated from his weighted average yield of 
products upstream from the table wine. Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2587/94 of 25 October 19942 
stipulates that in the case of vinification of purchased 
products, only the batches that have actually been made 
into wine are included in the calculation of the average 
yield. 
3. Quality wines psr declaration 
Knowing and controling harvesters and wine-makers' harvests and 
production of quality wines psr on the basis of their declarations 
1OJNoL45, 18.2.1988, p. 15. 
2OJ No L 274, 26.10.1994, p. 2. 
29 
alone is difficult, for the Community system of declarations makes 
no allowance for the specific properties of these products. 
Thus, the total harvest and production figures - all designations 
and products taken together - are supposed to be declared, with an 
indication of the average yield per hectare. In fact, no place is 
even provided for the name(s) of the designated wine(s) the 
declarer may claim to harvest/produce. 
Managing and verifying the quality wine sector requires that the 
harvest/production be broken down by designation of origin and 
even within a given designation by type of product, according to 
the colour, vine variety or production subzone that is claimed. 
Splitting the amounts into those for which the designation of origin 
is claimed and those that the declarer has downgraded to table 
wines is necessary because different production rules, such as 
ceilings on yields per hectare or grape-to-wine transformation 
coefficients, apply to the various designations and products. 
Lacking the above detailed information, the Community harvest 
and production declarations are not useful tools for managing and 
monitoring quality wines. At the limit, the overall figures that are 
declared are of statistical value only. 
Aware of this limitation, some Member States have adopted 
different harvest/production declaration systems from that of the 
Community. Their approaches have been either to adapt the 
declarations to the needs of quality wines psr (France) or to design 
additional declarations for the services responsible for checking 
quality wines (Spain, Italy) so that the producers can put forward 
their claims of quality and the competent services can check 
observance of the conditions for producing and marketing quality 
wines psr. Still, the existence of separate national declarations for 
quality wines psr is a duplication of the Community declarations, 
which.sjiould suffice as a means of meeting the COM's declaration 
needs. Moreover, the two sets of declarations do not always take 
the same administrative path and not all the services responsible 
for controls get copies. 
For the sake of simplicity and efficacy, the Community 
declarations should be adapted to allow for the particular needs of 
the quality wine psr sector. 
30 
3. QUALITY WINE PSR YIELDS PER HECTARE 
3.1. The Community framework 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 823/87 of 16 March 19871 contains the 
rules governing quality wines psr. Its fifteenth recital reads, 'Whereas, in 
order to maintain the quality standard of the wines in question and to 
avoid excessive yields liable to disrupt the Market, Member States should 
fix a maximum yield per hectare for each quality wine psr;...'. 
Consequently, Article 11(1) states, 'A yield per hectare expression in 
quantities of grapes, of grape must or of wine shall be fixed for each 
quality wine psr by the Member State concerned' and paragraph 2 
specifies 'Use of the designation claimed shall be prohibited for the entire 
harvest if the yield referred to in paragraph 1 is exceeded, save where 
derogations are provided for, on a general or individual basis, by Member 
States under conditions which they shall lay down, if appropriate, 
according to wine-growing area; these conditions shall relate in particular 
to the use to which the wines or products in question are to be put.' 
The Court of Justice, responding to a request of interpretation2, ruled that 
said Article 11 had to be interpreted to the effect that, in any event, no 
wine above the yield per hectare set by the Member State might be sold 
as a quality wine produced in a specified region (quality wine psr). 
3.2. Remarks 
All the producer Member States have taken steps to limit the yields per 
hectare of quality wines psr. The maximum yields are as a rule set for 
each production zone and, within these areas, broken down by type of 
wine or vine variety. The yield thresholds are set in hl/ha or ql/ha, as 
maximum grape-to-wine transformation coefficients have also been set. 
However, some national provisions tend to water down the principle 
according to which exceeding the maximum yield per hectare results in 
the loss of the designation of origin for the entire harvest. Thus, 
a) in a number of Member States (Germany, Spain, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal) the maximum yields per hectare 
for certain designations have been set at high levels. These levels 
most likely were not set on the basis of the previous ten years' 
yields, but in order to avoid exceeding the maximum yields and 
thus the undesirable consequences of such a situation. 
1OJNoL84, 27.3.1987, p. 59. 
Judgement of the European Court of Justice of 2.8.1993 in Case C-
289/91. 
31 
b) in some Member States (France and Italy) the maximum yield of 
each designated wine may be raised (this is usually the case) or 
lowered annually to allow for the particular conditions affecting 
each harvest, especially climatic variations. The result is that the 
maximum yields are regularly exceeded, as weather conditions are 
invoked, sometimes abusively, as reasons for calling the year 
'exceptional'. 
c) in some Member States (France and Italy) the maximum yield per 
hectare may be raised by a certain percentage (20 or 25%) and 
if the harvest is such that the vineyard/winery's yield 
exceeds the maximum yield but remains below the 
above-mentioned additional margin only the overshoot 
between the two thresholds loses the right to the 
designation of origin. 
if, ort the contrary, the maximum yield increased by the 
above-mentioned additional margin is exceeded, the 
operator's entire harvest theoretically becomes ineligible 
for the quality wine psr label. 
d) There are differences between the Member States as to the 
authorized uses for the products that exceed the fixed maximum 
yields for quality wines psr. Thus, 
in Spain, Greece and Portugal either the excess quantities 
or the entire harvest must be downgraded to table wine, 
in France the excess production must be delivered for 
distillation if the production below the cut-off point is to 
' keep the right to the designation of origin, 
in Italy, if an operator's harvest is between the maximum 
yield and the maximum yield increased by the 
above-mentioned percentage, the excess production may be 
downgraded to table wines, but up to a general maximum 
yield set for the vines that produce the table wines. All 
other surpluses must be delivered for distillation if the right 
to claim the designation of origin for the amount that does 
not exceed the maximum yield is to be retained, 
finally, in the other producer Member States (Germany and 
Luxembourg) the amounts that exceed the maximum yields 
may be used for other purposes (production of fortified 
wines, wine vinegar, grape juice, sparkling wines, etc.) or 
carried over to the next wine year as a quality wine psr, 
provided that the following year's yield is below the 
allowed maximum. 
e) The wine cooperatives and other organizations that produce quality 
wines psr have special privileges concerning limits on yields 
because all of their suppliers' vineyards are added together in 
32 
calculating the average yields per hectare (weighted average yields) 
of the quality wines psr produced by the cooperative or 
organization. Consequently, the high yields registered by some 
harvesters may be offset by the poorer yields of other harvesters, 
thereby making quantitative production limits on each harvester's 
holding inoperative. 
f) Finally, in several regions of Germany, both vineyard land that is 
not actually planted in vines and vineyards that have not reached 
full production may enter into the calculation of yields per hectare 
of quality wines psr. 
The above situation is complicated by other practical problems, of which 
we can mention the following: 
a) the unsuitability of annual harvest and production declarations for 
quality wine psr management and control. 
b) the control services' ignorance of each grower's holding, given the 
vague definition of the vineyard and the unavailability of the 
vineyard register data, even in countries where this tool has been 
set up. 
c) the almost total absence of field inspections of the declared 
acreages. 
d) the non-existence of physical verification of the grape yields 
obtained in the harvester's vineyards. Although in some 
grape-producing regions in the Member States the vintages are 
officially weighted as they arrive at the wine cooperative, this does 
not guarantee that the delivered grapes come solely and entirely 
from the vineyards tended by each of the operators. 
e) the limited number of staff available for inspections during the 
grape-picking period. 
33 
4. CONTROLS ON ENRICHMENT 
4.1. The Community framework 
1. Enrichment and the limits placed on it have been addressed by 
several Community regulations. The basic provisions for all wines 
are laid down in Articles 18 to 20 inclusive of Regulation (EEC) 
No. 822/87. Special provisions for quality wines psr are contained 
in Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No. 823/87. 
The rules for declaring, performing and verifying enrichment 
operations are laid down in Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 
2240/891 of 25 July 1989. 
2. The rules for granting aid for the utilization of concentrated grape 
must (CM) and rectified concentrated must (RCM) to enrich wines 
are given in Article 45 of Regulation (EEC) No. 822/87 and 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2640/882 of 25 August 1988. 
These aids are intended to smooth over the disparities in the costs 
of the different enrichment products (sucrose versus CM or RCM) 
and are granted to the users of CM or RCM according to the 
amounts they use. 
4.2. Remarks 
1. Enriching wines by adding either sucrose (chaptalization) or CM 
or RCM is a widespread practice in most of the Community's 
wine-producing Member States, i.e. Germany, France, Greece, 
Italy and Luxembourg. 
The practice was originally a means of improving the quality of 
wines where production conditions were unfavourable so as to 
meet the mean level of quality demanded by consumers. 
Chaptalization is often necessary on the northern borders of the 
grape-growing area. 
Although the regulations consider it a practice that is supposed to 
remain the exception to the rule, it is actually the rule in many 
vineyard regions in the Community. This spread of enrichment has 
been both the cause and the result of the high yields per hectare 
registered in many regions, the corollary of which has been a 
considerable drop in the grapes' natural sugar content. 
1OJNoL215, 26.7.1989, p. 16. 
2OJ No L 236, 26.8.1988, p. 20. 
34 
In addition, a side-effect of the aid granted for the use of CM or 
RCM has been to encourage enrichment in regions that formerly 
did not resort to this practice. 
2. Chaptalization is banned in the Community's southern Member 
States (Greece, Italy and Portugal) and the south of France. In 
these countries, still wines may be enriched only by the addition 
of CM or RCM. Spain is the exception to the rule, in that any 
artificial augmentation of a wine's natural alcoholic strength, 
whether by chaptalization or the addition of CM or RCM, is 
prohibited. 
In contrast, chaptalization is virtually the only accepted enrichment 
procedure in the Community's northern wine-producing countries 
(Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) and the north 
of France and is widely used by operators in these areas, who cite 
historical or cultural reasons for the practice. 
Authorized subtractive enrichment methods, such as concentration 
by cooling, are barely used, for they reduce the volume of wine. 
3. Most of the wine-making Member States have taken national 
measures to supervise enrichment operations through 
administrative verifications, physical inspections or laboratory 
analyses. They basically aim to guarantee that: 
the operation has been duly declared and entered in the 
accounting documents in advance; 
the enriched product has the required minimum natural 
alcoholic strength; 
the enrichment does not exceed the imposed limits; 
only authorized enrichment processes are used; 
the operation is performed only once in the course of the 
fermentation; and 
when subsidized CM or RCM is used, the rules governing 
this procedure are observed. 
4. In Germany, inspections focus primarily on the superior quality 
wines psr ('mit Pradikat'), for which enrichment is prohibited. In 
contrast, the other quality wines psr and table wines alike undergo 
few inspections in the course of their chaptalization. 
The absence of advance notification of enrichment has been found 
in many German regions, as well as irregular records of inputs and 
the utilization of sugar for enrichment. The national authorities 
feel that advance notification would create unnecessary problems 
for operators and is of little use to the inspection services, since 
practically all of the country's wineries resort to enrichment in the 
35 
post-harvesting period. In addition, the authorities accept the 
enrichment operations to be entered in the wineries' registers after 
15 December instead of prior to this date, as required by law. 
5. In Spain, all enrichment operations are prohibited. However, only 
few ad hoc inspections to discover possible illicit enrichment are 
conducted. The inspection services tolerate enrichment operations 
to a certain extent when unusual weather conditions adversely 
affect the harvest, making enrichment necessary. 
In France, where both enrichment methods are practised, 
depending on the region, random and targeted physical 
spot-controls of wine-making operations are carried out by three 
inspection services. However, given the large number of producers 
who resort to enrichment, the inspectors manage to check only a 
very small fraction of all the operations. 
The obligations to provide advance notification of and register 
enrichment operations seem to be met by French operators. Still, 
producers' organizations in a number of regions have called for 
relaxation of the rules governing chaptalization, for instance, the 
obligation to submit advance notification prior to each input of 
sugar and the ban on fractionated enrichment. Many operators 
have followed the organizations' orders and make only one 
comprehensive enrichment declaration for the entire wine-year 
prior to the first enrichment operation. Fractionated enrichment, 
for its part, is practised widely in one French region. 
The national authorities are opposed to allowing a single total 
enrichment declaration at the start of the wine year but have 
welcomed the idea of careful examination of the possibility of 
implementing fractionated enrichment because of its oenological 
merits, the ultimate aim being to have a suitable regulatory 
framework. 
7. In Greece, physical inspections of enrichment during wine-making 
operations are conducted systematically by two inspection services. 
The operation may not be performed without an inspector present. 
Samples of the must to be enriched, the concentrated must or 
rectified concentrated must that is used and the wine after 
fermentation are collected systematically. Both advance 
declarations of enrichment and official laboratory reports 
concerning all the operations are required for the payment of aid 
for the utilization of concentrated grape must or rectified 
concentrated must. 
36 
8. In Italy, random and targeted spot checks of enrichment during 
operations are performed by two inspection services. The national 
provisions conform to Community provisions in this area. 
37 
5. VINEYARD YIELD ESTIMATION 
5.1. Introduction 
The reform of the COM in wine that is currently being discussed by the 
Council attaches considerable importance to the problem of controlling 
production yields. Lowering the yields per hectare, with compensation for 
the loss of income resulting from the drop in production (Aspect A of the 
future regional viticultural adaptation programmes), is one of the methods 
foreseen to achieve this aim. 
Three missions to evaluate on site a method for estimating the yields of 
individual plots and the entire region several weeks before harvesting 
were carried out, one in the Beaujolais region (France), one in Dao 
(Portugal), and one in Piedmont (Italy). 
The regions in which the methods were tested were chosen because of 
their diverse characteristics (vine varieties, designations, experience in 
vintage forecasting, vineyard layout, etc.) and various degrees of 
availability of statistics (vineyard register) so as to have a selection of 
regions presenting different problems for the evaluation exercise. 
5.2. The yield estimation methods used 
According to the information available at the time of the missions, two 
methods for estimating yields are used routinely. 
5.2.1. Tire "Beaujolais method" 
The yield estimation method used in the Beaujolais region is based on the 
sampling of bunches of grapes in the vineyard. 
The plot's estimated yield is extrapolated from the samples' weights and 
the number of bunches counted for each vine that is sampled. 
5.2.2. Vie "Swiss method" 
This method was developed by the Changins Federal Agricultural 
Research Station (Nyons) and is likewise based on grape sampling. 
It consists in determining first the average number of bunches for five 
groups of 10 consecutive vines, then the number of set grapes in an 
average bunch for 10 vine stocks taken at random. 
38 
5.3. Remarks 
The counts made during these missions likewise showed up a certain 
number of difficulties inherent in making such an estimate. 
The first problem concerns weather conditions, which are always 
unpredictable and can have a major impact on forecasts. For example, a 
hail storm can destroy a vineyard's entire crop between the date of 
estimation and harvesting. 
Inversely, rain can inflate the estimate, if rainfall is heavy at the time of 
sampling, or the harvest, if rainfall is heavy at grape-picking time. 
Actual production can also be modified if the grower decides not to pick 
all of the grapes on the plot, but sort the vintage according to specific 
criteria of quality. However, this practice is still little used. 
Choosing which plots are representative of a region is a difficult task. 
The situation, size, cropping method, vine maintenance, vine age, 
grower's concern for quality, etc., are all factors that must be given 
careful consideration to avoid giving too much weight to any one factor 
and putting the subsequent extrapolation for the entire region out of 
balance. 
Experienced field personnel and a complete, up-to-date vineyard register 
are indispensable for this. However, most of the time the region does not 
have a network of representative plots suitable as a basis for estimating 
regional production or even the production of a designated area. 
Setting up such a network has proved difficult because of the great many 
designations that exist in some regions. 
The bunch counts per vine stock are also sources of error, especially if 
the operators have little training in sampling techniques. The bunches' 
lack of uniformity can result in different figures, depending on the 
technician who does the counting. 
In taking one bunch per vine one often tends unconsciously to select a 
bountiful, shapely bunch, which also tends to result in overestimation of 
the plot's potential. 
The Swiss method proved too fastidious for routine use, as too much time 
is required to count the individual grapes. On the other hand, counting the 
number of bunches in a sample of 50 vine stocks seems to be necessary 
to allow for the diversity that characterizes most vineyards. The remarks 
about bunch counts and selection that were made with respect to the 
Beaujolais method apply here, too. 
Knowledge of the factor of growth corresponding to the lapse of time 
between the moment of estimation and.harvesting is another source of 
error. However, even estimates made close to the harvest period were no 
better than the others. 
39 
Plot sampling has often been hampered by inaccuracies in the statistics. 
For example, the plots had sometimes been cleared or the vineyard's 
actual composition was different from the reported composition. In 
addition, statistics concerning the number of missing vines were seldom 
updated. 
Given all these complications, the estimates made during the missions and 
actual production were found to diverge greatly. If the actual harvest 
figures supplied to the Commission are reliable, most of the estimates are 
off by more than 20% (both under- and overestimation). 
5.4. Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the exercise conducted 
during the previous wine year: 
The plot estimates tend to be higher than the yields actually measured at 
harvest time. 
As a rule of thumb, the margin of error in the estimated yield of a 
homogeneous plot is in the 10- to 30-percent range. 
It is difficult to estimate a grower's entire yield if his vineyards do not 
consist of similar, homogeneous plots. 
In theory, such estimates require estimation of the yields of all the land 
under cultivation. This is not feasible for most operations, which consist 
of various plots that are usually characterized by different conditions 
(exposure, vine age, vine variety, designation, slope, etc.). 
However, the inaccuracies of the individual estimates for each plot make 
total vineyard estimates even less reliable. 
When it comes to an entire region, estimates will be strongly dependent 
on the representativeness of the plots that are selected. 
The JRC in Ispra is currently working on a yield-forecasting method 
based on a pollen count. The principle is to predict yields on the basis of 
a pollen count at flowering and a historical relationship between the 
amount of pollen released at flowering and the actual yield at harvesting. 
The amount of pollen that is disseminated during flowering is greatly 
influenced by weather conditions during flowering; it also depends on 
such additional factors as the size of the vineyard and the number of 
inflorescences at flowering, which can be greatly reduced by events prior 
to flowering, such as adverse weather conditions (spring frosts or hail) or 
infestation by parasites. 
This method also suffers from some financial and technical drawbacks that 
will make it difficult to apply Community-wide. 
At this stage we can already conclude that verifying the estimated losses 
of income that would result from voluntary reductions in production yields 
such as proposed in the draft reform of the COM in wine would be 
difficult. 
40 
If such a measure is maintained in the new COM in wine, we recommend 
making it verifiable. This could be done, for example, by making it more 
Draconian, that is to say, by subsidizing only a total reduction in a plot's 
output1 based on the region's historical average yield (or the average yield 
of the vineyard operation, based on its harvest declarations). 
It would then "suffice" simply to check for the absence of a production 
on the plot or plots that the operator agreed not to use for production. We 
must, however, admit that this measure runs counter to a certain peasant 
mentality that is averse to wasting the fruit of the vine. 
Another disadvantage of this all-or-nothing measure concerns the 
producers, who, being mindful of the quality of their wines and having 
already resorted to (partial) green cropping to increase the sugar 
concentrations in the bunches that remain on the vine, would not be 
eligible to subsidies, since the thinning would not be total. However, the 
amount of this loss would probably be insignificant compared with the 
price of the quality wine that would be produced. 
On the other hand, this measure does have the additional advantage of 
keeping plant cover in vine-growing areas such as La Mancha that are 
vulnerable to the risk of erosion. 
For the sake of completeness, we must point out that intermediate 
measures, such as weighing a partial green crop, limiting the number of 
bunches per vine stock, etc., may be considered. 
Whilst such measures appear possible in theory, in practice they pose once 
again the problem of effective control. 
*This means practising total green cropping, that is, harvesting the entire 
plot before the grapes ripen so that they cannot be vinified fraudently. 
With regard to the compensation for the commensurate loss of income that 
is currently being considered in the draft reform, this measure will likely 
interest cheap table-wine producers only, that is to say, precisely those 
wine-makers who are responsible for the surpluses that the Community is 
trying to eliminate. 
41 

ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(95) 368 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 03 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-95-393-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-92098-X 
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