EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 30.9.2020 SWD(2020) 320 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2020 Rule of Law Report







Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report

















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Abstract Poland’s justice reforms since 2015 have been a major source of controversy, both domestically and at EU level, and have raised serious concerns, several of which persist. The reforms, impacting the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, ordinary courts, the National Council for the Judiciary and the prosecution service, have increased the influence of the executive and legislative powers over the justice system and therefore weakened judicial independence. This led the Commission to launch the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU in 2017, which is still under consideration by the Council. In 2019 and 2020, the Commission launched two new infringement procedures to safeguard judicial independence and the Court of Justice of the EU has granted interim measures to suspend the powers of the Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Chamber with regard to disciplinary cases concerning judges. A developed legal and institutional framework exists to prevent corruption and promote transparency. A dedicated government anti-corruption programme focusses on providing training and guidance for officials. However, structural weaknesses have been identified in areas such as the current asset declaration schemes and lobbying regulations. Plans are ongoing for transparency of public life legislation to reorganise key preventive provisions into a single legal act, but concerns exist over repeated delays. Concerns also exist over the independence of the main institutions responsible for preventing and fighting corruption, considering in particular the subordination of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau to the executive and the fact that the Minister of Justice is at the same time the Prosecutor General. The Polish legal framework concerning media pluralism is based both on constitutional safeguards and sectorial legislation. Relevant safeguards for the media regulator, the National Broadcasting Council, appear to be in place, however some concerns regarding its independence have been raised. The role of the regulator has been also reduced by the 2016 reform, which assigned the competences over the management of the Polish public media to a National Media Council (RMN). The legal framework on media ownership transparency is not equally applicable to all media actors. With regard to the protection of journalists, the criminalisation of insulting public officials remains problematic. Other components of the system of checks and balances are also under pressure. Reforms have been adopted through expedited legislative procedures with limited consultation of stakeholders or opportunities for the opposition to play its role in the law-making process. Poland has a vibrant civil society and strong professional associations of judges and prosecutors, which participate in the public debate. Nevertheless, organisations have been subject to unfavourable statements by politicians. Despite the difficult environment, the Ombudsman has continued to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard.



I.Justice System The Polish justice system is separated in two main branches, administrative and ordinary judiciary. The Supreme Administrative Court and 16 administrative courts exercise control over public administration, including the lawfulness of measures of bodies of local government and of territorial organs of government administration. The ordinary judiciary, supervised by the Supreme Court, consists of three levels: 11 appeal courts, 46 regional courts and over 300 district courts. Judges are appointed by the President of the Republic at the request of the National Council for the Judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal, which adjudicates notably on the Constitutionality of legislation, is composed of 15 judges chosen by the Sejm (lower chamber of the Parliament) for a term of office of 9 years. The National Council for the Judiciary is tasked by the Constitution to safeguard judicial independence. A particular characteristic of the prosecution system, which is not part of the independent judiciary, is that the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice are the same person. The Constitution provides that advocates and legal counsellors can self-regulate their practice. Independence The justice reforms started in November 2015 were continued. These reforms were carried out through more than 30 laws relating to the entire structure of the justice system, including the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council for the Judiciary, the Supreme Court, the ordinary courts, administrative courts, and the prosecution service. Various aspects of the justice reform raise serious concerns as regards the rule of law, in particular judicial independence. This is the main focus of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by the European Commission, which is still under consideration by the Council. The European Parliament has also raised concerns regarding the rule of law in Poland. Furthermore, certain aspects of these reforms are subject to infringement proceedings. The safeguarding of judicial independence in Poland was one of the country-specific recommendations addressed in the context of the 2020 European Semester. The perception of judicial independence among the general public and companies is low and has shown a decreasing trend in recent years. Whereas 34% of the general public perceives independence of courts and judges as ‘fairly or very good’ in 2019, 27% of companies shares the same perception. The reason most often invoked for the perceived lack of judicial independence is related to interference or pressure from the Government and politicians. The public debate on the judiciary is marked by strong tensions. In 2019, Polish media reported that high-ranking officials had allegedly been associated with a smear campaign against judges who openly criticised the justice reforms. Court of Justice judgments have confirmed EU law requirements on judicial independence. In 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court of Justice’) issued two rulings confirming that the legislation contested by the Commission in the context of infringement proceedings was in violation of EU law as regards requirements of judicial independence. The Court of Justice ruled against changes to the retirement regime for Supreme Court judges, which resulted in prematurely terminating the mandate of around one third of the judges of that court. Furthermore, the Court of Justice found the Polish legislation concerning the new retirement regime of ordinary court judges to be contrary to EU law, in particular on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient safeguards for judicial independence. Prior to the rulings, the Polish authorities had already amended the national law. The Court of Justice was also seized by Polish courts in more than 10 preliminary ruling procedures as regards the justice reform. Concerns over the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal, raised by the Commission under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure, have so far not been resolved. In 2019, the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court continued to express concerns on the functioning and legitimacy of the Tribunal. Concerns relating to the Constitutional Tribunal have been reiterated by the Venice Commission, and by international organisations and NGOs. Cases concerning politically sensitive issues, in particular those concerning the justice reforms, have been initiated by the Prime Minister, the Marshal of the Sejm, the National Council for the Judiciary and the newly created Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. Certain cases initiated by the Prosecutor General and by the Disciplinary Chamber seek an assessment of the compatibility with the Constitution of EU Treaty provisions. The National Council for the Judiciary is composed mainly of politically appointed members. The 2018 justice reform changed the procedure for the appointment of judges-members of the National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). The judges-members, who constitute the majority of the members of the NCJ, are now directly appointed by the Sejm instead of by their peers as previously. The new composition of the NCJ did not take into account the Council of Europe recommendations and is one of the concerns raised by the Commission in its Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure relating to the rule of law in Poland. On 25 March 2019, upon request of the NCJ, the Constitutional Tribunal declared that the new procedure of appointment of the NCJ’s judges-members complies with the Constitution. On 19 November 2019, upon a preliminary reference of the Supreme Court on the independence and impartiality of the newly created Disciplinary Chamber, the Court of Justice considered that for the participation of a Council for the Judiciary in making the appointment process of judges by the President of the Republic more objective, such body must itself be sufficiently independent of the legislature and executive and of the body to which it gives an opinion. On 23 January 2020, the Supreme Court, referring to this ruling of the Court of Justice, issued a resolution stating that the newly composed NCJ is not independent and asserting that new Supreme Court judges selected by it are not allowed to adjudicate cases. The resolution was subsequently found to be inconsistent with the Constitution and with EU law by the Constitutional Tribunal, adjudicating upon request of the Prime Minister and the Marshal of the Sejm, supported by the President of the Republic and by the Prosecutor General. The Supreme Court, however, has continued to apply its resolution. The NCJ continues to propose candidates for judicial appointments to the President of the Republic. The two new chambers in the Supreme Court, created under the 2018 reform, have been granted new powers in 2019. The Disciplinary Chamber and the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs are composed solely of new judges appointed at the request of the newly composed National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). Following the ruling of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019, the Supreme Court in three rulings found the Disciplinary Chamber not to be an independent court within the meaning of EU and national law. The law of 20 December 2019 granted the new Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs the sole power to decide on issues related to judicial independence. This part of the said law is one of the elements raised in the infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission on 29 April 2020. The new Disciplinary Chamber has also been given the competence to lift the immunity of judges when criminal proceedings are brought against them (a competence previously exercised by disciplinary courts of first instance). These new powers granted to the chambers have been criticised by a number of national institutions and the Venice Commission. The Supreme Court has been subject to new reforms, in particular as regards the procedure for appointing its First President. A few months before the end of the term of office of the Supreme Court’s previous First President, a new law, adopted by the lower house of the Parliament (Sejm) amended the procedure for appointment of the new First President. The law which came into force in February 2020 provides that the President of the Republic can appoint an acting First President to be in charge of organising the procedure for selecting candidates and changes the quorum necessary to vote on a list of candidates to the office. On 1 May 2020, the President of the Republic appointed an acting First President, from among the judges who, according to the aforementioned Supreme Court resolution, are no longer empowered to adjudicate. The selection procedure was subject to controversy, in particular as the acting First President refused to exclude from that procedure members of the Disciplinary Chamber in spite of the lack of guarantees of their independence. On 26 May 2020, the President of the Republic appointed a new First President who is also one of the judges who, according to the aforementioned Supreme Court resolution, are no longer empowered to adjudicate. The disciplinary regime for judges has been amended and is actively used. The disciplinary regime, substantially amended in 2018, has raised concerns that it lacks appropriate safeguards to protect judicial independence, due to the risk that judges may be sanctioned because of the content of judicial decisions, including decisions to request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice. Moreover, concerns remain with regard to the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, which acts as the final instance for disciplinary cases and is composed solely of judges selected by the newly composed NCJ. The Commission decided on 10 October 2019 to refer Poland to the Court of Justice, contesting these new arrangements. The disciplinary regime allows judges to be subject to disciplinary proceedings in view of the content of their judicial decisions or statements they make about the functioning of constitutional bodies in Poland. On 8 April 2020, following a request for interim measures, the Court of Justice ordered Poland to immediately suspend the application of the national provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber with regard to disciplinary cases concerning judges. Following the order, the Disciplinary Chamber referred a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal, contesting the constitutionality of Treaty provisions on which the interim measures order is based. The law of 20 December 2019 further broadened the notion of disciplinary offence and increased the risk to judicial independence. This issue is an element of the new infringement proceedings launched by the Commission on 29 April 2020. The new disciplinary regime and the law of 20 December 2019 have led courts of other Member States, in the context of judicial cooperation within the EU, to question the judicial safeguards of the Polish system.

Judges are subject to numerous new requirements. The law of 20 December 2019 obliges all judges in Poland to disclose personal information, such as their membership in associations, functions in non-profit organisations or their membership and position in political parties prior to 29 December 1989. Such provisions raise concerns as regards the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the General Data Protection Regulation. These new requirements follow other requirements introduced in 2018 relating to the prolongation of the active service of ordinary court judges, which is now decided by the National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). While this change was a response to the infringement proceedings, it has not been sufficient to address the problem regarding the impact on judicial independence, due to the concerns relating to the NCJ. A general prohibition for Polish courts to challenge the powers of courts and tribunals, constitutional organs and law enforcement agencies has been introduced by the law of 20 December 2019. The law prevents Polish judges from ruling on the lawfulness of judicial appointments and on a judge’s power to perform judicial functions. The same prohibition applies to judges assessing the lawfulness of the composition of a hearing bench. These requirements have been challenged in the infringement proceedings launched by the Commission on 29 April 2020. The same law introduced new limits on statements and actions that can be made by judges, courts and other independent bodies, who are now prohibited from challenging the powers of judicial and constitutional bodies as well as law enforcement agencies. The law imposes such a prohibition also as regards statements or actions of bodies of judicial self-governance that challenge judicial appointments. These changes have given rise to concerns of national institutions and the Venice Commission. As regards the court presidents, following a dismissal of over 70 court presidents by the Minister of Justice no means have been proposed to remedy their situation. A case concerning such dismissals has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights. The fact that the Minister of Justice is at the same time the Prosecutor General raises particular concerns regarding the power to issue instructions in individual cases and to transfer prosecutors. Following the reforms carried out in 2016, the position of Prosecutor General and that of Minister of Justice were merged. The Minister of Justice therefore directly wields the powers vested in the highest prosecutorial office, including the authority to issue instructions to prosecutors in specific cases. In 2019, the power of the General Prosecutor, or higher ranking prosecutors, to issue instructions in individual cases (including not to prosecute) was used on several occasions, including in politically relevant cases. This power has been subject to criticism including by the Venice Commission. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General has the authority to decide on the secondment of prosecutors, without their consent and without providing justification, to another post for up to 6 months. Moreover, he can discretionally reattribute cases among prosecutors, which has equally given rise to concerns that political considerations could have an impact on the conduct of criminal proceedings. Quality Funding for the judiciary has seen a gradual increase since 2016. Poland spends around EU average per inhabitant on courts. At the same time, Poland has one of the highest general government expenditures for the justice system (including prosecution and legal aid) as a percentage of GDP. As regards human resources, a number of judicial posts remain vacant. It is noted that prior to the changes in composition of the NCJ in 2018, the Minister of Justice delayed the publication of vacant posts in courts, which is a precondition for any person to apply to such a post. This was raised as an issue by the Ombudsman and by representatives of judicial associations , who argued that understaffed courts remain the main reason for their decreasing efficiency. There is room for improvement as regards digitalisation of the justice system. Compared to previous years, Poland improved the availability of online information about the judicial system for the general public.Although some important progress has been made, the need to introduce IT tools in the context of judicial procedures remains. Calls for further efforts to digitalise courts came from associations of judges, the Ombudsman, and the National Bar Council, who indicate that the lack of digitalisation became a recurrent issue during the time of COVID-19 pandemic. Reforms concerning legal aid, court fees and civil procedure have entered into force in 2019. Free legal aid and free civil advice is available in Poland to any person who cannot afford to receive paid advice and who makes a declaration to that effect. There are also plans to gradually enable free mediation. The National Bar Council expressed concerns over amendments to the code of civil procedure adopted in 2019 which would not contribute to an increase in the pace of judicial proceedings . Efficiency The overall performance of ordinary courts is close to the EU average when it comes to length of proceedings. However, in 2018, there was an increase in the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases, as well as a deterioration of the rate of resolving such cases. Whereas the number of such cases has dropped, the number of pending cases increased. Poland remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the length of civil and criminal proceedings. The performance of administrative courts is above the EU average. A slight decrease is visible in the number of incoming administrative cases and in the estimated time needed to resolve them. The rate of resolving such cases remains above 100%. II.Anti-corruption framework The legal and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption is largely in place. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CAB) is the specialised anti-corruption body. The CAB combines intelligence and police functions and can trigger both administrative and criminal proceeding. The planned Law on the ‘Transparency of Public Life’ aims to reorganise key preventive provisions into a single legal act. As part of this, certain elements, such as the current asset declaration systems and lobbying regulations will be amended. In the latest Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Poland scores 58/100 and ranks 12th in the European Union and 41st globally. Eurobarometer surveys show that the number of Polish respondents who consider corruption to be widespread in their country (59%) is lower than the EU average (71%) while 37% of people feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 26%). As regards businesses, 49% of companies consider corruption as widespread (EU average 63%) and 27% of companies consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 37%). Then, 43% of people find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 36%) while 26% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%). A planned initiative aims to further develop the anti-corruption legal framework. Polish criminal law provides a solid basis for the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences. Poland also has a legal framework for preventing corruption, with several legal acts regulating issues of ethics and integrity in the public sector as well as disclosure obligations for assets and conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, a number of concerns have been raised, in particular as regards conflict of interest and asset disclosure. A new Law on the Transparency of Public Life is currently in an advanced preparatory stage, aiming to reinforce existing anti-corruption mechanisms and incorporate transparency principles into one single act. A further objective of the law is to repeal certain existing acts to standardise the current asset declaration system and rules. The proposal also aims to amend existing rules on lobbying and the law on access to public information, and enhance measures to protect whistleblowers . Changes to the Criminal Code were proposed. A June 2019 draft law amending the Criminal Code was on 14 July 2020 considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal. It proposed changes to the definition of a person performing a public function, and it would have introduced a broader definition of a “person performing a public function” to include, amongst others, a domestic or foreign organisational unit disposing of public funds, board members or representatives of state-owned enterprises, and entities whose share capital is owned by central or local government in excess of 50%. Other proposed changes would have included raising sanctions for active and passive bribery offences connected to high-value assets. Nonetheless, mechanisms such as the “non-punishment” clause would have remained, providing that a person giving a bribe, is not punishable if they voluntarily notify law enforcement authorities of the crime. Concerns about elements of the immunities regime and its impact on the prosecution of corruption-related offences has been raised by Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CAB) is the specialised anti-corruption body. The CAB combines intelligence and police functions and can trigger both administrative and criminal proceedings. The detection of corruption is part of its core functions, and in cases of reasonable suspicion the CAB can conduct criminal investigations. It has the competence to verify asset declarations and control public procurement decisions. It is also charged with monitoring non-compliance with incompatibility rules regarding outside business activity restrictions by public officials and initiating procedures for the return of unfairly obtained benefits. The CAB also has a preventive role and oversees the coordination of the Governmental Anticorruption Programme for 2018-2020 whose general objectives include improving anti-corruption regulations, and enhancing cooperation and coordination between law enforcement authorities. The Head of the Bureau is appointed by the Prime Minister for a term of four years. The CAB works under the authority of the Prime Minister and of a designated ‘Minister-coordinator for special services’. Under the current legal framework, this appointment procedure and the office’s subordination to the executive has raised concerns as regards the CAB’s independence and ultimate independence from executive power. Issues of ethics and integrity in the public sector, and conflicts of interest are currently regulated by several basic acts. The main legal act promoting integrity is the Law on Restrictions on Conduct of Business Activities by Persons Performing Public Functions, which prohibits certain activities, and limits business shareholdings and membership in various boards. The ordinance on the ethical framework for the civil service sets the ethical standards for the public administration, but does not cover top executives, whose conduct is broadly regulated by the constitution. Ministries also address integrity in their ranks to different extents. GRECO has underlined the potential benefits of a more coherent policy and recommended the elaboration of a general integrity plan, the development of a code of conduct with robust supervision and sanctioning mechanisms, and awareness raising on integrity matters. In addition, several other legal texts provide for an obligation to report specific situations of conflicts of interest, but without clear coordination or consolidation into a single framework. Whilst there is no legal definition of conflicts of interest in commonly binding laws, the Code of Administrative Procedures is covering conflicts of interest for public officials. For ministers and other senior officials, these are limited to certain specific situations involving property interests. In 2019, the CAB examined 2477 conflict of interest issues in the Ministries of Health and Defence (4581 in 2018), covering 2187 persons (2110 in 2018) with 3 cases referred to the Prosecutor’s office. There is no unified legislation or centralised submission and monitoring system for asset declarations. Members of Parliament submit asset declarations in accordance with the Law on the discharge of their duties by Sejm deputies and Senators of May 1996. The Law on Restrictions on Conduct of Business Activities by Persons Performing Public Functions prescribes the yearly disclosure of financial and economic activities for top executive functions. However, the legislation is applied in practice to politicians at all levels, concerns exist over the divergent systems and the frameworks to guarantee the publication of declarations. In 2019, the CAB carried out 90 asset declaration controls (69 in 2018), 364 pre-control analyses (330 in 2018) and 341 control cases (320 in 2018). However, amendments to the Law on the Exercise of the Mandate of a Deputy and Senator, meant to extend the catalogue of obliged persons and the scope of information included, are currently being challenged before the Constitutional Tribunal. Whilst welcoming the existence of obligations, GRECO has stated that Poland’s arrangements for asset declarations need to be strengthened and complemented with an independent and effective review mechanism. In this regard, a draft law with a new declaration of assets form is being prepared and the CAB is developing a unified system to address the lack of electronic and automated methods of submitting and controlling declarations . Measures exist to regulate lobbying and ‘revolving doors’ and certain provisions allow for the protection of whistleblowers. The Law on Lobbying Activity in the Law-making Process broadly defines lobbying, establishes a public register, and determines obligations and sanctions for unregistered activities. However, the law’s provisions restrict the concept of lobbying to the process of law making. GRECO has recommended that interactions by parliamentarians with lobbyists be made more transparent, that detailed rules be introduced for interactions with lobbyists, and that sufficient information about the purpose of these contacts be disclosed. ‘Revolving doors’ are regulated by a cooling-off period of one year but this is limited to entities for whom an official issued specific decisions. Whilst plans exist to extend the period, a broadening of the scope of application has also been recommended. Certain legal acts include provisions for whistleblower protection, yet there is no specific legislation on the matter and the need to strengthen protections of reporting persons has been underlined.

III.Media Pluralism The legal framework concerning media pluralism is based both on constitutional safeguards and sectorial legislation. The Constitution guarantees the independence of the national media authority - the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) - and the competences of the regulator are further specified by the 1992 Broadcasting Law. With regard to the framework for journalists’ protection, freedom of expression is constitutionally protected. At the same time, however, the Criminal Code includes offences of insulting State symbols, senior public officials and religion. The Constitution also guarantees the right of citizens to be informed about the activities of public authorities. This right is further specified in the Law of 6 September 2001 on access to public information. The legal framework provides safeguards for the independence of the media regulator. The Constitution gives the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) the role of safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information and the public interest in radio and television broadcasting. Its members are appointed by the Parliament and the President of the Republic. They may not belong to a political party, trade union or perform public activities incompatible with the dignity of their function. The Broadcasting Law includes a specific list of KRRiT’s competences. The revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) sets out a range of specific guarantees for the independence and effectiveness of national media regulators. Poland is currently in the process of transposing the revised AVMSD, during which some further alignments of the national legislation with the EU framework might be proposed and could be adopted in early autumn 2020. The Polish media regulator might still be subject to political influence. The MPM 2020 reported medium risk with regard to the independence and effectiveness of the Polish media regulatory authority, assessing that the appointment procedures for the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) have not effectively limited the risk of political influence over the media. For instance, no electoral monitoring was ordered to analyse media coverage of the 2019 electoral campaigns to European and national Parliaments. Similarly, in the case of the 2020 presidential campaign, as reported by OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the KRRiT did not ensure independent monitoring of the campaign. In addition, as a result of the 2016 reform, some of the competences of KRRiT were taken away and assigned to the newly established National Media Council (RMN), which is now in charge of appointing and removing management and supervisory boards of the Polish Television (TVP), Polish Radio and Polish Press Agency. In December 2016, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal considered the exclusion of KRRiT from the process of appointment of the public media’s management as unconstitutional. The judgment remains to be implemented. The legal framework concerning the transparency of media ownership in Poland is not equally applicable to all media actors. In particular, there are no sector-specific provisions on transparency of news media ownership. Due to this fact, the MPM 2020 has assessed transparency of media ownership in Poland to be at medium risk, noting however, that some specific rules are in place in the broadcasting sector. These refer to disclosure of information to the public body KRRiT. There is a lack of regulatory safeguards limiting political control over media outlets in Poland. Such safeguards concern rules on conflicts of interest between owners of media and the ruling parties, partisan groups or politicians. The CBOS survey from 2019 shows that the perception of political bias in the media is widespread. Nevertheless, as recognised by the MPM 2020, owners of the largest media in Poland have no open affiliation with political parties, and most of the news media, including digital outlets, promote distinct political views. It appears that during the 2020 presidential campaign, the governing coalition referred to possible legislative changes concerning the concentration of foreign-owned media outlets. If such changes were to materialise, they could have implications for media pluralism and for the internal market of the EU. Criminal law provisions may affect certain aspects of the framework for journalists’ protection and activities. The Criminal Code includes offences of insulting State symbols, senior public officials and religion. Imprisonment (of maximum 1 year) is among the possible sanctions for defamation which occurs by means of mass communication. As mentioned by some representatives of journalists, this regime has been subject to the long lasting criticism as the issue of defamation could be sufficiently tackled on the basis of the civil liability framework. In this context, the MPM 2020 also notes that the self-regulatory measures that could contribute to the strengthening of the position of journalists have not been implemented effectively in Poland. On a positive note, the Law on the Press was amended and it no longer obliges journalists to follow the editorial line of a particular title. The Law now gives the possibility to a journalist to reject a binding instruction if it contradicts the principles of fairness, objectivity and professional accuracy. With regard to safety of journalists, the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists published two alerts concerning Poland in 2019 and six in 2020. The alerts have been classified under the category of harassment of journalists and the category of acts having chilling effects on media freedom . As regards digital safety of journalists, the MPM 2020 reports occasional cases where journalists were threatened through surveillance by the police and intelligence services as well as cases of using journalists’ telecom or internet data without prior notification. The current legal framework recognises the right of access to public information. However, there have been recurring cases of refusing such access. The Law of 6 September 2001 on access to public information requires state authorities (and other entities) to make available any information on public matters. Under the Law, the right to public information includes the right to obtain such information containing up-to-date knowledge of public matters without delay. Classified information is excluded from this rule. With regard to application of this right in practice, the MPM 2020 reports cases where access to information has been denied at the local level, especially as regards information about activities of local and regional government or planned investments. Other cases of denial included denying journalists access to debates about educational and judicial reforms. IV.Other Institutional Issues related to Checks and Balances Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral Parliament and a Constitutional Tribunal in charge of constitutional review of laws. The Sejm has the final decision-making power when adopting laws. The President of the Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 deputies, the Council of Ministers and a group of at least 100.000 citizens have the right to propose new legislation. The independent Ombudsman is tasked with safeguarding the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens specified in the Constitution and other normative acts. In the period of 2015-2019, the expedited adoption of legislation was widely used, with important examples including significant structural reforms of the judiciary. As regards the legislation on justice reforms, Parliament spent on average 18 days on each law . In particular, concerns have been raised over the expedited procedure applied by the legislator in December 2019 to adopt controversial changes in the laws on the judiciary, including the way the changes to the initial draft were proposed in the legislative process. The Supreme Court has considered that this violated the rules of good legislation. The Venice Commission and OSCE have on several occasions underlined the importance of thorough deliberations of legislative proposals and amendments, including meaningful consultations with stakeholders, experts and the civil society, and a dialogue with the political opposition. It should be noted that public consultations are mandatory only in case of a legislative proposal lodged by the Council of Ministers, while judicial reforms were initiated by members of Parliament, for which no consultation is necessary. On 20 March 2020, the Government introduced a state of epidemic to face the COVID-19 pandemic. Stakeholders have expressed concerns about the measures imposed in that context in view of their impact on fundamental rights and presidential elections. The state of epidemic is still in force although restrictions are being gradually lifted. Certain measures adopted in order to tackle the state of epidemic adversely affect terms of office of specific state authorities, including the Office of Electronic Communications for which the European Commission launched infringement proceedings. Supreme Court judges appointed under the 2017 reform are empowered to review ordinary courts’ rulings in certain cases dating back 20 years. Under the new extraordinary appeal procedure, the new Chamber of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs is empowered to overturn fully or in part any final judgment delivered by ordinary courts in the past 20 years, subject to some exceptions. The power to lodge the appeal is vested inter alia in the Prosecutor General and the Ombudsman. According to the information available, most of the proceedings so far have been lodged by the Prosecutor General. Concerns have been expressed that this procedure can be used also for what could appear as political motives . More generally, this new extraordinary appeal procedure, based on broad criteria, raises issues as regards the principle of legal certainty and is one of the concerns raised by the Commission in its Reasoned Proposal adopted under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure. New developments adversely affect the civil society space . Poland has a broad and vibrant civil society, consisting of more than 120.000 different NGOs. However, developments have shown that NGOs that are critical towards one or the other policy of the Government are targeted by unfavourable statements of the representatives of the public authorities. A National Institute of Freedom – Centre for Civil Society Development is responsible for the distribution of government funding, as well as nationally attributed EU funding, to NGOs. The organisations’ representatives constitute a minority in the decision-making process under this institute, which is chaired by a member of the Government. The OSCE found that the Government appears to have a decisive influence on the governance and operation of the National Institute of Freedom and made recommendations in that respect. The 2020 update of the CIVICUS report considers that the civic space for NGOs functioning has narrowed. Stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the fact that members of the Government recently proposed legislation which would oblige NGOs to disclose foreign subsidies received and under certain conditions would consider NGOs as ‘foreign founded’. The decision of certain regions to declare themselves to be ‘LGBTI-free zones’ has created serious doubts as to the capacity of the local authorities to fairly distribute EU funds among NGOs. Actions of the government aimed at LGBTI groups, including arresting and detaining some of the groups’ representatives, and smear campaigns conducted against such groups have raised concerns. The Ombudsman plays an important role in defending the rule of law. The Ombudsman was re-accredited with ‘A’ status in November 2017 by the UN Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). GANHRI underlined the need for the provision of adequate funding to enable the Ombudsman to carry out its mandate effectively. The Ombudsman has issued a number of opinions on new legislation, including reforms affecting the functioning of the judiciary, and intervened before Polish courts and the Court of Justice of the EU. The Ombudsman regularly intervenes in support of individuals in cases regarding possible violations of fundamental rights . Other activities of the Ombudsman are focused on promoting judicial independence standards, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. Since 2016, the Ombudsman has been facing a more challenging environment characterised by an inadequate budget (decided upon by the Sejm), criticism from the ruling political majority and personal attacks in certain media outlets.



Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* * The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2020 Rule of Law report can be found at (COM website). Amnesty International (2019), 2019 Report on Poland. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/poland/report-poland/ . Batory Foundation (2018a), Eksperci krytycznie oceniają funkcjonowanie TK. https://www.batory.org.pl/informacje_prasowe/eksperci-krytycznie-oceniaja-funkcjonowanie-tk/ .

Batory Foundation (2019), Pogłębiający się kryzys w Polsce – Kiedy w Europie umiera praworządność. https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Poglebiajacy%20sie%20kryzys%20w%20Polsce.pdf . Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2020), 2020 Media pluralism monitor. https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2020 . CIVICUS, Poland Country Profile. https://monitor.civicus.org/country/poland/ . Civil Space Watch (2019), The 2019 Civic Space Watch. http://civicspacewatch.eu/civic-space-watch-report-2019-%E2%80%A2-success-stories-of-resistance-is-out/ . Constitutional Tribunal (2018), Open letter addressed to the judge exercising the office of the Constitutional Tribunal. https://tvn24.pl/polska/list-sedziow-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-do-julii-przylebskiej-ra851319-2389711 . Constitutional Tribunal (2018), Open letter addressed to the judge exercising the office of the Constitutional Tribunal. https://oko.press/images/2018/12/List-Se%CC%A8dzio%CC%81w-TK_5.12.2018-r..pdf . Constitutional Tribunal (2018), Open letter signed by five judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/wpis-w-debacie/list-pieciorga-sedziow-tk-w-sprawie-istotnych-problemow-wynikajacych-z-dzialalnosci-orzecznictwa-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-w-2017-roku/ . Constitutional Tribunal (2019), Open letter of a person appointed to an already occupied post of the CT judge addressed to the judge exercising the office of the Constitutional Tribunal. https://tvn24.pl/polska/sedzia-tk-jaroslaw-wyrembak-stawia-zarzuty-prezes-julii-przylebskiej-apeluje-o-dymisje-ra986349-2299314 . Constitutional Tribunal (2019), Open letter signed by two retired CT judges. http://monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/archiwa/11447 . Constitutional Tribunal (2020), Open statement of a group of former CT judges. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/oswiadczenie-sedziow-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-w-stanie-spoczynku/0w4enjq . Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of 13 December 2016 in case K 13/16. Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 4 March 2020 in case P 22/19. Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 25 March 2019 in case K 12/18. Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 20 April 2020 in case U 2/20. Constitutional Tribunal, ruling of 21 April 2020 in case Kpt 1/20. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, CM/Del/Dec(2018)1331/H46-19: H46-19 Bąk (Application No. 7870/04), Majewski (Application No. 52690/99), Rutkowski and Others (Application No. 72287/10) and Jan Załuska, Marianna Rogalska and 398 other applications (Application No. 53491/10) v. Poland. https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016808fde36 . Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2016), Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2016), Poland - Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, CDL AD(2016)026-e. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor's office, as amended, CDL-AD(2017)028.

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2017), Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a checklist, CDL-AD(2017)031. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2019), Checklist of 24 June 2019, CDL-AD(2019)015. Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2020), Poland - Joint Urgent Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on amendments to the Law on the Common courts, the Law on the Supreme court and some other Laws, CDL-AD(2020)017. Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights (2020), statement of 8 August 2020. https://twitter.com/CommissionerHR/status/1292007235447656448?s=20 . Council of the European Union (2020), Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020 on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Poland.

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8440-2020-INIT/en/pdf . Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland, C-619/18. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 5 November 2019, Commission v Poland, C-192/18. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K., C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18. Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and others, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18. DoRzeczy (2019), Sejmowa awantura o Bodnara. “Antypolski rzecznik”, “to jest kryminał”. https://pinkosz.dorzeczy.pl/kraj/113540/sejmowa-awantura-o-bodnara-antypolski-rzecznik-to-jest-kryminal.html . European Commission (2017), Information concerning the launching of Article 7(1) TEU procedure against Poland. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367 . European Commission (2019), Information concerning the infringement launched against Poland and referred to the Court of Justice on 10 October 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6033 . European Commission (2020), Country Report Poland, SWD(2020) 520 final.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0520&from=EN . European Commission (2020), Information concerning the infringement launched against Poland on 29 April 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_772 . European Commission (2020), EU Justice Scoreboard. https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en . European Commission (2020), the 2020 July infringement package: key decisions. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 . European Institute for Gender Equality (2020), Country Specific Information: Poland (updated in November 2019). https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/countries/poland . European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (2018), The position paper of the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the National Council for the Judiciary of Poland. https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf . European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (2020), The Position Paper on the Membership of the KRS of the ENCJ setting out the reasons for its proposal to the General Assembly to expel the KRS from the Association. https://www.encj.eu/node/556 . European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2020 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) of the TEU regarding Poland and Hungary.

European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland. European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2017 on the situation of the rule of law and democracy in Poland. Gazeta Prawna (2018), 21 osobistych instrukcji Zbigniewa Ziobry. Nie oznacza to, że nieformalnych nacisków w ogóle nie ma. https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1099148,naciski-zbigniewa-ziobro-na-prokuratorow.html . Gazeta Wyborcza (2019), ’Minister kontroli, nacisków i ręcznego sterowania. Minister Ziobro dzieli i rządzi w resorcie sprawiedliwości’. https://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,24473135,minister-kontroli-naciskow-i-recznego-sterowania-zbigniew.html . Government (2018), Government Anticorruption Programme for 2018-2020. https://cba.gov.pl/pl/antykorupc/rzadowy-program-przeciw/3409,Rzadowy-Program-Przeciwdzialania-Korupcji-na-lata-2018-2020.html . GRECO (2014), EU Anti Corruption Report 2014. GRECO (2012), Third evaluation round – evaluation report on Poland on “Incriminations”, “Transparency of Party Funding” – Evaluation report. GRECO (2013), Fourth evaluation round – evaluation report on Poland on corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. GRECO (2019), Fourth evaluation round – second addendum to the second compliance report including follow-up to the addendum to the evaluation report (Rule 34) on Poland. GRECO (2019), Fifth evaluation round – evaluation report on Poland on preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2017), Smear campaign against courts continues. https://www.hfhr.pl/en/smear-campaign-against-courts-continues-hfhr-issues-statement/ . Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2018), Report on Activities of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2017. https://www.hfhr.pl/trybunal2017 . Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2020), Report, The Time of Trial. How do changes in justice system affect Polish judges?. https://www.hfhr.pl/en/hfhrs-report-the-time-of-trial-how-do-changes-in-justice-system-affect-polish-judges/ . Iustitia (2020), statement of 9 May 2020. https://www.iustitia.pl/83-komunikaty-i-oswiadczenia/3830-rekomendacje-ssp-iustitia-dotyczace-funkcjonowania-sadow-podczas-pandemii-koronawirusa . Lex Super Omnia (2020), Open letter addressed to the Prime Minister on 3 June 2020. http://lexso.org.pl/2020/06/10/list-otwarty-do-pana-mateusza-morawieckiego-prezesa-rady-ministrow/ . Lex Super Omnia (2020), Resolution of 26 April 2020. http://lexso.org.pl/2020/04/26/uchwala-zarzadu-stowarzyszenia-prokuratorow-lex-super-omnia-z-dnia-26-kwietnia-2020-roku-w-sprawie-obrony-niezaleznosci-prokuratorskiej/ . Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Justice, press release of 7 August 2020. https://www.gov.pl/web/srodowisko/nowe-prawo-wzmocni--przejrzystosc-finansowania-organizacji-pozarzadowych . OECD (2015) Poland: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations. https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Poland-Phase-3-Written-Follow-Up-Report-ENG.pdf . Ombudsman (2018), Statement submitted to the Ministry of Justice of 9 October 2018. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/ms-%E2%80%9Ezamrozilo%E2%80%9D-etaty-s%C4%99dziowskie-procesy-przed%C5%82uzaja-sie-kolejne-wyst%C4%85pienie-rpo-do-zbigniewa-ziobry . Ombudsman (2019), Communique regarding the case of prosecutor Krasoń and his secondment carried out without his consent. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-pyta-o-uzasadnienie-naglego-przeniesienia-prokuratora-krasonia .

Ombudsman (2019), Communique regarding the non-implementation of the Supreme Administrative Court ruling regarding the disclosure of list of judges supporting candidate-judges to the NCJ. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-dlaczego-kancelaria-sejmu-nie-wykonuje-wyroku-nsa-ws-list-poparcia-do-krs . Ombudsman (2019), Request to recuse a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-mozna-wnosic-o-wylaczenie-sedziego-z-powodu-jego-wadliwego-powolania . Ombudsman (2020), Communique concerning the lack of implementation of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 2016. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-krrit-nie-upomina-sie-o-wykonanie-wyroku-tk-z-2016-ws-malej-ustawy-medialnej . Ombudsman (2020), Information on the Ombudsman’s activities in 2019. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/informacja-roczna-rpo-2019 . Ombudsman (2020), Letter to the Ministry of Justice of 9 June 2020. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawirus-rpo-elektronizacja-wymiaru-sprawiedliwosci-niezbedna . Ombudsman (2020), Open letter to the President of the Republic and to the First President of the Supreme Court. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-do-premiera-i-sn-ws-kontyunowania-dzialan-izby-dysycyplinarnej-mimo-decyzji-tsue . Ombudsman (2020), Opinion of 7 January 2020 on the law of 20 December 2019 amending the law on ordinary courts Organisation and certain other laws. Ombudsman (2020), Statement of 8 January 2020 on the situation of NGOs in Poland. https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-o-wyzwaniach-dla-ngos . Onet.pl (2019), Onet’s investigation. A farm of trolls in the Ministry of Justice, that is ‘we will not put you down for doing good.

https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/sledztwo-onetu-farma-trolli-w-ministerstwie-sprawiedliwosci-czyli-za-czynienie-dobra/j6hwp7f . OSCE-ODIHR (2020) Urgent Interim Opinion JUD-POL/365/2019 [AlC]. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2020), Report on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Poland of 6 January 2020. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=28330&lang=EN . Prawo.pl (2019), Wakaty uderzają w sądy…szczególnie w okręgowe. https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/wakaty-w-sadach-dane-ms-za-2016-2018-r,494093.html . Prawo.pl (2019), Finansowe zachęty mają motywować do korzystania z mediacji. https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/mediacja-ministerstwo-sprawiedliwosci-pracuje-nad-zmianami,496489.html . President of the Republic (2018), official communique. https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/aktywnosc-ministrow/art,1410,mucha-nsa-nie-jest-wlasciwy-doingerowania- . Press.pl (2019), CBOS: dla większości badanych media nie są bezstronne, najgorzej wypada TVP. https://www.press.pl/tresc/57412,cbos_-dla-wiekszosci-badanych-media-nie-sa-bezstronne_-najgorzej-wypada-tvp . Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/ranking . Reuters (2019), Poland to propose limits on foreign media soon, Kaczynski says. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-media/poland-to-propose-limits-on-foreign-media-soon-kaczynski-says-idUSKCN24K0O1 . Sejm (2016), Official communique of the Sejm published on 7 July 2016. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=D49AF4B1166B6550C1257FE100489A92 . Supreme Court (2019), The Supreme Court’s Opinion of 16 December 2019 and of 23 December 2019 on the law of 20 December 2019 amending the law on ordinary courts Organisation and certain other laws. Supreme Court (2020), a joint resolution of the three Chambers of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020. http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=602-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia .

Supreme Court (2020), Letter of the ‘acting’ First President of the Supreme Court presenting five candidates to the President of the Republic. http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/AllItems/Pismo%20do%20Prezydenta%20RP%20-%20lista%20kandydat%C3%B3w%20na%20stanowisko%20Pierwszego%20Prezesa%20SN.pdf . Supreme Court (2020), Statement of 50 SC judges appointed to the Court prior to the justice reform. http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=666-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia . Supreme Court (2020), Statement of the First President of the Supreme Court lodged in the context of a case contesting the constitutionality of a resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020, implementing the preliminary ruling judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 November 2019 in AK case C-585/18. https://ipo.trybunal.gov.pl/ipo/dok?dok=F880008732%2FKpt_1_20_SN_2020_02_28_ADO.pdf . Supreme Court (2020), The statement of the President of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court following the interim measures order. http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=625-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia . Supreme Court, judgment of 5 December 2019 in case III PO 7/18. Supreme Court, decision of 15 January 2020 in case III PO 8/18. Supreme Court, decision of 15 January 2020 in case III PO 9/18. Supreme Court, decision of 25 June 2020 in case I KZP 1/20. The Bar, resolution of the National Bar Council of 15 June 2019 (No. 61/2019). The Bar, resolution of the Presidium of the National Bar Council of 12 March 2020 (No. 155/20) with appendix. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017), Report of Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on his mission to Poland. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/084/27/PDF/G1808427.pdf?OpenElement . United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2015) Implementation Review Group (cycle 1). Virtual country visit to Poland in the context of the 2020 Rule of Law Report. Wirtualne Media (2020), Lichocka: jesienią Sejm zajmie się dekoncentracją mediów. Czarnecki: trzeba będzie odkupywać je od Niemców. https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/lichocka-jesienia-sejm-zajmie-sie-dekoncentracja-mediow-czarnecki-trzeba-bedzie-odkupywac-je-od-niemcow . Wprost (2019), Krytyka TVP po material o synu Bodnara. ”14-latek groził nożem rówieśnikom”. https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10227621/krytyka-tvp-po-materiale-o-synu-bodnara-14-latek-grozil-nozem-rowiesnikom.html .



Annex II: Country visit to Poland The Commission services held virtual meetings in June and July 2020 with: ·Association of Journalists (Towarzystwa Dziennikarskiego) ·Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich)

·Associations of Judges 'Iustitia' and 'Themis' ·Association of Local and Regional Polish TV Stations ·Association of Prosecutors 'Lex Super Omnia' ·Batory Foundation; ·Chamber of Press Editors ·Civil Development Forum ·Constitutional Tribunal ·Free Courts ·Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights ·Jagiellonian Club ·Local Newspapers Association ·Ministry for Justice ·National Council for the Judiciary ·National Council for the Television and Radio Broadcasting ·National Council of Media ·Office of the Ombudsman ·Polish Media Association ·Supreme Administrative Court ·Supreme Court