**•* * * 
* * 
4 4 
**** COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 05.07.1995 
COM(95) 318 final 
*-:Ëf Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament 
on congestion and crisis in Air Traffic. 

Am TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
CONGESTION AND CRISIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this communication is to review the problem of congestion and crisis situations 
in air traffic. The Commission considers it necessary to analyze the current situation, 
identify its causes and clarify the competences and responsibilities of each stakeholder in 
such a way as to examine to what extent the situation can be further improved on the basis 
of actions already taken by the aviation community. Such a review is essential since 
millions of our citizens will again, at the occasion of the great summer tourist migrations, 
experience long delays in crowded airports and face the frustration of holidays spoiled by 
the irritating problem of congested air space. 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) is a vital element in air safety. Planes must be kept sufficiently 
separated to avoid collisions and given the speeds and flying conditions the crews cannot 
themselves assume this function without the ground assistance provided by air traffic 
controllers. 
The Chicago Convention, signed in 1944, and to which nearly all States in the world are 
parties, makes individual States responsible for such services in their air space. It also 
created an agency, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), whose role it is 
to draw up the necessary standards to assure the inter-operability of the different systems 
established by the individual States so that aircraft can circulate throughout the world. 
To the extent that each State remains the sole judge of the quality and quantity of services 
supplied in its air space, ICAO has also sought to develop mechanisms to adjust the supply 
to user needs. 
Certain European States, aware of the need for closer regional cooperation to improve the 
planning and development of their control systems, as well as their interest to carry out 
certain tasks together, created, in 1960, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (EUROCONTROL) which today groups 17 States, of which only 11 belong to 
the European Union. This organisation, originally founded to supply ATC services in the 
European upper Airspace, has to date only supplied such services for the Benelux countries 
and northern Germany. It is today the only organisation with the required expertise and 
resources to conceive complex programmes to improve air traffic in Europe and ensure their 
implementation. 
It was only during the 1980's that Europe realised that ATC capacity could affect civil 
aviation development while it was always deemed previously that airport capacity and the 
number of runways environmentally sustainable were the sole limiting factors. 
In 1986, European airlines recorded that approximately 12% of their flights suffered a delay 
of more than 15 minutes (from all causes, ATC, weather, company, airport, etc.). This 
figure reached 20% in 1988 and 25% in 1989 attributed mainly to congestion. Several 
studies made during this period evaluate the cost of ATC delay to have been between 1.5 
and 2.5 billion ECU per year. 
This serious deterioration has provoked an immediate reaction from all political bodies 
because it was demonstrating that shortfalls in ATC threatens the liberalisation process 
necessary to complete the single market and proves a major obstacle to the implementation 
of basic liberties layed down in the Treaty, particularly the free movement of citizens. 
Since 1988 the Commission has proposed1 using Treaty provisions and Community 
resources to find a solution to this problem. 
The Parliament has also adopted several resolutions, particularly those of 18 September 
1992 & 27 September 1994, urging Member States for closer cooperation to implement a 
coordinated programme of actions and make use of community mechanisms to guarantee 
its execution. 
The European Council, in Essen, also recalled the priority to be given to the Air Traffic 
Management system. 
Despite these initiatives the Member States have always preferred to work within the 
framework of ECAC and EUROCONTROL. The role of the Community has been largely 
confined to financing initiatives taken by these organisations (EATCHIP2, APATSI3) or to 
legislating the standards adopted by EUROCONTROL. 
To this end the Commission has supported these programmes to the tune of 5 million ECU 
and provided 30 million ECU to finance research into Air Traffic Management (ATM). 
The Community has also, in 1993, adopted a Directive4 on the definition and utilisation of 
compatible technical specifications for the purchase of Air Traffic Management equipment 
and systems. 
i 
2 
4 COM(88) 577end of 16.1989 
European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme 
Airport / Air Traffic Services Interface 
Directive EEC/93/65 - JO n" L 187 of 29.7.1993 
The National Administrations responsible for supplying ATC services have made on their 
side considerable efforts to increase the capacity of their systems within these programmes 
and using the expertise and resources of EUROCONTROL. They have increased their 
investments, hired and trained many more controllers. 
According to figures published for the Ministerial meeting of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference the current level of investment for ATC in the EC AC area is around 1.2 billion 
ECU and the total cost of ATC en route services has increased by 50 % between 1986 and 
1993 (see Annex 1). 
This has produced encouraging results up to 1994, since, according to figures published by 
IATA, the number of flights delayed by more than 15 minutes is back to the 1986 level 
despite a 50 % increase in traffic (see Annex 2). 
Nevertheless the results remain far below the expectation of airspace users, the cost of ATC 
delays being estimated to be still between 1.2 and 2 billion ECU. At the same time the 
ATC element of the total operating cost of intra-European services has increased from 
3,8 % in 1986 to 5,6 % in 1994 according to AEA figures. It may even reach 20 % of the 
total cost for regional services. 
Furthermore the figures available for the last half of 1994 and the first months of 1995 
indicate a break in the previous trend towards reduction of delays and possibly a reverse 
trend (see Annex 3). 
These figures show that despite huge increases in costs, the methods used up to now to 
increase the efficiency of the European air traffic control services are reaching their limits. 
It is therefore necessary to give a new impetus to the whole process of improving the 
European Air Traffic Management system. 
The Commission will prepare, for the end of 1995, a White Paper outlining in detail its 
strategy to create a truly unified ATM system for Europe. The following elements will be 
considered : 
- integration of ATM in the Trans-European Network system in order to raise 
supplementary resources from different Community Funds (Cohesion .Funds, 
Infrastructure Fund, PHARE, ...) to accelerate the necessary standardisation actions and 
upgrading programmes undertaken in the framework of EATCHIP and APATSI and 
encourage regional projects of cooperation such as CEATS5 and the Nordic 
harmonisation programme; 
Central European Air Traffic System 
- utilisation of Community Research and Development Programmes to elaborate, in a 
more coordinated manner, the new EATMS6 concept and techniques required to meet 
the expected increase of demand; 
- consideration of the most appropriate institutional framework to provide ATC services 
to ensure that the European dimension is taken into account, the economic and social 
impact is duly assessed and the provisions of the Treaty and the international obligations 
of the Member States of the Union are respected. 
It will take some time before such a new initiative produces results. In the meantime, the 
reappearance each summer of crisis situations which affect the European travellers and the 
economies of several peripheral European regions7 obliges us to examine in detail the 
methods used to handle air traffic congestion in order to examine how to improve them to 
prevent crises or reduce their impact. 
It is in this spirit that the Commission has widely consulted national administrations, users 
and Unions in order to determine how to build on what exists to make the system more 
efficient without increasing the costs for users or adding new institutional layers. 
The Commission considers that the implementation of the measures described in this paper 
which takes account of these consultations can contribute effectively to the achievement of 
these objectives. 
1- MANAGEMENT OF CONGESTION AND CRISIS 
As early as the seventies the aeronautical community had become aware of the need to 
anticipate the risk of congestion in order to avoid overloads incompatible with the 
maintenance of safety standards. The objective was essentially to keep on the ground aircraft 
which would otherwise have been in a part of the airspace at a time when it would have 
been impossible to handle them safely. A number of national Air Traffic Flow Management 
(ATFM) units were created. 
The crisis at the end af the eighties highlighted the strategic importance of ATFM and in 
particular the necessity to carry it out on as large a scale as possible in order to benefit from 
an overall view and thus make it possible to use the available ATC capacity efficiently. 
European Air Traffic Management System 
The cost of ATC arrival and departure delays at Palma airport for the peak season '94 (May to October) can be evaluated 
at half a billion ECU for the airlines withour mentioning the prejudice to the passengers and the local economy. 
This triggered the States, working with the European and North Atlantic Office of ICAO 
and EUROCONTROL, to agree a centralised concept for Air Traffic Flow Management. 
The creation of the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) was the natural consequence. 
The CFMU operates on behalf of all the 32 States of ECAC i.e. most of the States of 
Western Europe. 
The procedures have been progressively improved in order to warn the Users beforehand 
of the restrictions which will be implemented and to suggest alternative routes. The same 
knowledge may be used to optimise the operation of control centres and to better allocate 
resources to the threatened sectors. 
In the future, air traffic flow management will become an integral part of Air Traffic 
Management because economics tell us that increase in the quality of service beyond a 
certain level, even if technically and environmentally possible, cannot be economically 
justified and that we have therefore to learn to live at certain times with an "acceptable" 
level of undercapacity. It will then be necessary to define and implement rules, means, and 
procedures to make the best use of this capacity and minimise the effects of congestion on 
those peak days or hours when demand exceeds the agreed capacity. The same mechanisms 
will be also available to manage crisis situations when capacity is temporarily reduced for 
unplanned reasons such as strikes, equipment failures, restrictions on the use of certain 
areas of European airspace, etc. 
1.1. The strategic phase 
Strategic ATFM planning comprises all actions taken well in advance. The main 
thrust takes place during the winter months when preparations are made for the 
following summer season. However strategic planning is a continuous process 
leading into the pretactical phase which starts two days ahead of the day of 
operation. This first stage of the process consists of reviewing lessons learnt during 
the previous season and comparing the predicted demand and capacity in order to 
identify potential bottlenecks. 
Previously most of this work was carried out during the ATS/ATFM Co-ordination 
Meetings organised by ICAO in the autumn and spring and at which Providers and 
Users meet to take stock of the past and appraise the future. Since 1991 the CFMU 
has been responsible for co-ordinating strategic planning. It organises regional 
meetings where required and a five day meeting of all European ATS authorities 
shortly before the plan is finalised at the spring ICAO ATS/ATFM Co-ordination 
meeting. In the late seventies and early eighties planning was based on statistics 
provided by some States but it was not possible to have a proper Europe wide view 
of the situation. Since 1985 EUROCONTROL has been collecting data from the 
Users concerning their planned operations for the coming months and this has added 
a new dimension to the planning process. However the data provided, although 
useful, is incomplete because business aviation, air taxi services, air ambulance 
services general aviation and military traffic are unable to plan far ahead and the 
charter operators are often faced with late changes as tourist fashion swings from 
one resort to another. It is currently considered that at this initial stage of the 
evaluation only 80% of the demand is known. 
The ATS authorities provide the CFMU with the capacity values of their sectors. 
Capacity values are obtained by different methods and reduced by varying amounts 
to provide safety margins, which are necessary because the current manual system 
is imprecise and sectors frequently have to work with traffic levels over 50% in 
excess of the declared capacity. The first weeks of CFMU tactical operations 
indicate that its automated system is capable of metering the traffic to much finer 
limits which will ultimately allow the declared capacities to be brought into line with 
the real capacity. 
The main result of this phase is the traffic orientation scheme (T.O.S.) which is a 
set of mandatory itineraries whose object is to spread the traffic geographically 
across the various routes in such a way as to reduce the demand at foreseeable 
bottlenecks. There may also be recommendations aimed at exerting pressure on the 
users to avoid certain areas or certain periods and on the providers to profit from 
the foreknowledge of a problem in order to resolve it. Strategic planning also 
includes co-ordinating arrangements for any events known in advance and which will 
result in increased demand or reduced capacity (major sporting events or the 
running-in period when a control centre starts to use new equipment or systems). 
1.2. The pretactical phase 
In the days which precede each day of operation improved knowledge of the demand 
allows a more precise analysis of the demand/capacity situation. 
The CFMU has effectively carried out this work since 1994 and publishes each day, 
in the name of ECAC States, the ATFM Notification Message (ANM) giving details 
of the restrictions which will affect the traffic of the following day (flows involved, 
periods of the day concerned, acceptable flow rates, etc.) and may recommand 
alternative routes. 
As the use of the recommended alternative routes is not mandatory there is no way 
of knowing in advance if they will be used, how far the traffic will be redistributed 
and how it might move the congestion to other areas. 
1.3. The tactical phase 
This last stage of the ATFM process is the really operational phase. It consists of 
implementing the measures announced in the previous phases in so far as the real 
situation justifies it. 
Any non-exempted or non-priority flight whose flight plan indicates that it will enter 
a "restricted" sector is allocated an "ATC slot", ie. a time of departure leading to 
a specified time of entry to the sector in question. The slot is calculated so that the 
flow through the sector does not exceed the declared capacity. Slots are allocated on 
the basis of "first planned, first served". This in fact establishes virtual queues on 
the basis of the users intentions as announced in their flight plans. 
Flights coming from too far away to respect a slot are exempt from restrictions. 
Flights for humanitarian reasons and flights expressly designated by national 
authorities have priority. 
Until recently this work was carried out by national or regional Flow Management 
Units (FMU). It is gradually being transferred to the CFMU (starting in April 1995 
with the area previously managed by the Paris Flow Management Unit) so that 
tactical flow management for the whole of western Europe will be carried out by the 
CFMU from spring 1996. 
The five Flow Management Units (Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Rome and the 
CFMU) are in permanent contact with ATC through Flow Management Positions 
(FMP) in each control centre so that any event likely to affect the situation can be 
immediately integrated and reflected at the operational level. These might be an 
improvement in the traffic situation or increase in capacity justifying a relaxation or 
the suppression of restrictions but also a deterioration requiring the reinforcement 
of restrictions or the implementation of new ones. 
1.4. Crisis Management 
Following the establishment of an ad-hoc crisis cell to deal with the events of July 
1994 it has been accepted that normal flow management mechanisms may need 
support in handling some crises, due to the requirement for rapid, high level 
decisions e.g. concerning the allocation of resources, which are beyond the 
competence of ATFM experts. 
The EUROCONTROL Member States have accordingly decided to create a Crisis 
Management Group which will meet when necessary in support of the CFMU. 
States are represented by senior officials from their Air Navigation Directorate. 
Those directly involved in any particular crisis will be convened by the CFMU and 
will constitute the cell dealing with that situation. 
2.- AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
The mechanisms which have been described are based on transparency and voluntary action 
by the various actors involved. These consider that the mechanisms are, in general, 
satisfactory and place great hopes in the full implementation of the CFMU to improve their 
operation and efficiency. 
It is, nevertheless, useful to examine these mechanisms to determine whether the 
introduction of a minimum of obligation or of incentive to co-operate, depending on the 
situation, could accelerate and strengthen that improvement. 
2.1. Planning 
As seen from the outside the main weakness of the existing mechanisms dealing with 
air traffic flow management is the lack of certainty. Goodwill is certainly not in 
question, but the willingness of each actor to retain as much flexibility as possible 
hinders serious advance planning. 
The result is that airspace Users do not know by how much they will be penalised 
until the moment when they receive their ATC slots; at the same time they cannot 
really evaluate the benefit they would get by changing their flight plans. As a 
consequence many of them stick to their initial plans and try to negotiate their slot 
in real time contributing to increasing the workload of the flow management 
units.The final victim is the passenger who, in most cases, is waiting in expectation 
of an early departure never confirmed. 
Changing this situation would require great efforts by all actors to better evaluate 
the foreseeable demand and available capacity and to develop through increased 
cooperation mechanisms to adjust them further in order to achieve a balance. 
2.1.1. Capacity 
Everybody agrees that better advanced knowledge of the available capacity would 
be a significant improvement, particularly if figures announced could be binding. 
Today each ATC centre determines its capacity on the basis of the available 
resources and is more inclined to cope with its own internal constraints than with 
other's requirements. It was only in 1995 that a first attempt at global advance 
planning took place in order to satisfy the Spanish request for a better preparation 
of the summer season in order to avoid the reappearance of crisis situations in the 
south west of Europe. 
It would therefore be desirable to develop a standard method and tools to determine 
the available ATC sector capacity and the establishment of procedures for common 
advance planning. The result of such planning should be binding, except in cases 
of unforeseeable disruption, and be used by the airspace Users and airports to better 
plan and organise their own activities. 
In the same spirit Traffic Orientation Schemes (T.O.S.) could be quantified in order 
to give an indication of the flows assigned routes can bear thus giving the operators 
a chance to plan in accordance. 
To carry out this work in good conditions the CFMU should use supplementary 
means to assure co-ordination between the suppliers and could even be given 
sufficient authority to take decisive actions. 
2.1.2. Demand 
It is clear that congestion is to some extent created artificially by the scheduling of 
the Aircraft Operators in response to market demand. This is influenced by several 
factors but the most marked of these is the requirement of tour operators to 
concentrate traffic on certain destination areas on certain days of the week. This, 
coupled with the economic requirement of the Users to plan their first departure as 
soon as the aerodrome curfew is lifted and to return on the last flight of the day just 
before the curfew is applied, leads to a theoretical planning which would generate 
waves of traffic operating to and from the same areas in unison. 
If it is universally recognised that in a commercially competitive environment, 
aircraft operators must have the flexibility to meet their market requirements, it is 
also admitted that a minimum of realism and self control should be introduced in the 
planning of their activities if passengers are to receive the service that they deserve. 
To achieve this goal, both airports and airspace Users should give more 
consideration to ATC restrictions. 
The planning of movements at many aerodromes is carried out by local scheduling 
committees and co-ordinated at global level by I ATA scheduling conferences, using 
rules largely developed by the industry itself, to spread the traffic over the day in 
such a way as to keep traffic and passenger flows within the capacity of the 
aerodrome facilities. The possibility of implementing similar rules, developed co­
operatively, to limit the concentration described above and reduce the difference 
between the demand and the en-route capacity should be examined. 
10 
In order to encourage such co-operation, the authorities may have to create the 
appropriate conditions. On one hand all parties involved in the flight planning 
should be allowed to meet and co-ordinate in order to make a better use of the 
available capacity. As already done for airport slot co-ordination, such activities 
need to be consistent with anti-trust law. On the other hand there should be an 
incitement to agree on and accept common rules. This could be achieved by letting 
the passengers know who is planning realistically and who is not, as it is done in the 
United States for many years where airlines punctuality figures are published 
regularly so that users can compare the quality of the services provided. 
In the same spirit of better adjustment of demand to capacity, airport scheduling 
should consider establishing capacity figures which integrate ATC constraints as is 
currently done, in a limited way, by the scheduling authority of Frankfurt Airport 
for certain flows. What is the use of programming ten departures in a limited time 
frame towards a specified direction when it is known in advance that only half of 
them can really take off ? This is already done for parameters of a similar nature in 
the direct environment of the airport (aircraft parking limitations, check-in facilities, 
capacity of waiting rooms, constraints in neighbouring sectors, the influence of 
arrival and departure procedures, etc.). Integration of the airport slot allocation 
mechanisms and the air traffic flow management process deserves therefore further 
consideration. In such a complex area this necessitates an important in-depth 
analysis. 
2.2. Priority rules. 
In any society in which relations between individuals are not dictated solely by force 
alone, the most equitable way, as a first approximation, to adjust demand to supply 
is the "first come, first served" queue. This is exactly what happens in the final 
phase of air traffic flow management today. One may however ask if, as in 
advanced societies, other means, based on voluntary co-operation and/or laws, might 
not be preferable. 
All phases of the ATFM process involve the application of priority in one form or 
another. Strategic planning results in a routing scheme which permits only specified 
traffic flows to use specified routes. Pretactical planning may involve the application 
of ad-hoc orientations and some traffic may be obliged to fly at uneconomic lower 
levels in order to make use of spare capacity in the lower sectors and reduce the 
demand and delay in upper sectors. While such decisions are taken solely with the 
objective of improving the global use of capacity they inevitably favour some flows 
and penalise others and in that sense are applications of priority. 
11 
In the tactical phase slots are allocated and hence delay is apportioned, in accordance 
with the current rule, "first planned, first served". Whilst this rule has universal 
acceptance among Users and Providers it is only effective if all the potential traffic 
is known before slots are issued. This is often not the case when flights departing 
from aerodromes close to a restricted area are in competition with flights departing 
from aerodromes far away and which therefore file their flight plan and require their 
slot earlier. 
The Flow Management Units sometimes intervene to give a measure of priority to 
individual flights which have specific difficulties or exceptional delay. Used 
circumspectly these initiatives are not questioned. 
It would be useful to consider for each phase of ATFM operations what priority 
rules would lead to the most efficient use of the available capacity and what 
compromises might be necessary in order to make such rules acceptable to all 
concerned. 
The CFMU is responsible for the co-ordination of strategic planning, for carrying 
out pretactical planning and has started to take over the execution of tactical 
operations. As has been shown above the CFMU in the course of this activity is 
called upon to make decisions which have a bearing on priority and the way in 
which the inevitable penalties (uneconomic flight levels, additional mileage or delay) 
are distributed among the users. 
While each State publishes the traffic orientation scheme in the form of a NOT AM 
or AIC8, thus making it obligatory, the same cannot be said of other 
recommendations or procedures. It has been argued that the common agreement that 
the CFMU should publish the ANM is a de facto delegation of responsibility 
however there has been no corresponding transfer of authority to give legal support 
to its actions and decisions. 
Again consideration should be given to the necessity to provide the CFMU with a 
proper legal basis for its work. This must give authority to its decisions whilst at the 
same time defining the framework within which it is empowered to act. 
2.3. The management of crises. 
The EUROCONTROL crisis cell has been established. It will certainly learn by 
experience but must be considered competent to deal with the sole ATM aspects of 
any crisis, i.e. to make the best use of the remaining resources. 
NOTAM : Notice to AirMen 
AIC : Aeronautical Information Circular 
12 
Some situations may however call for action beyond the competence of the ATM 
authorities :-
- it may be necessary under some circumstances to lift aerodrome curfews or to 
make use of military facilities and airspace; 
- if a critical Air Traffic Control Centre was significantly or totally disabled, 
temporary arrangments for the restoration of an acceptable level of service in and 
around the airspace of that Centre would certainly require international co­
operation and agreement. 
It should be considered therefore whether there is a need for the EUROCONTROL 
Crisis Cell to have access to support at a high political level and if so how this could 
best be organised. Bearing in mind that under these circumstances meetings have to 
be arranged in hours and decisions reached and implemented in days, constraining 
powers may be required to enable quick reaction through an international framework 
of contingency planning. 
The common element of all crises is a dramatic reduction of capacity. It may not be 
possible for all of the displaced demand to be absorbed by the very limited spare 
capacity of surrounding sectors. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to 
make painful decisions as to priority. It is therefore proposed that the examination 
of priority rules proposed above should include special rules which might be invoked 
in crisis situations. This would have to be supported by a decision making 
mechanism for authorising the CFMU to apply the modified rule in any given 
circumstances. 
Some States have established minimum service levels which must be provided in case 
of industrial action. It would be useful for planning purposes if there was a common 
standard applied throughout the region. It would be even more useful if the standard 
could be defined in such a way as to limit the interference to international overflying 
traffic. The difficulty of obtaining agreement between unions and management across 
the E.U. is not underestimated nevertheless it is considered that an effort should be 
made to define and apply a commonly agreed minimum service level for ATM 
services. 
3. A EUROPEAN APPROACH 
Although the foregoing analysis has demonstrated that the aeronautical world has not 
neglected the problems posed by the congestion of European airspace, important 
improvements are still necessary and possible provided that they are supported by real 
political will. In this spirit the European Union should define a strategy which addresses the 
following objectives. 
13 
3.1. An organisation with authority 
It is certain that EUROCONTROL and the CFMU have already undertaken many 
tasks in the domain of air traffic flow management but the framework within which 
they carry them out is not well defined and the division of responsibilities remains 
uncertain. On the other hand there remains much to be done in the field of strategic 
flow planning and the integration of ATFM techniques into ATC. To this end, the 
CFMU, could be given, in addition to its operational tasks, the responsibility of 
ensuring better co-ordination and real planning as underlined in the preceding 
Chapter. This could imply that it also has the means to monitor and enforce the 
decisions taken, such as slots allocated, routes assigned, capacities agreed, etc... 
3.2. Equitable rules for giving access to airspace 
Although this is a delicate subject it is not contested that it represents a vast and as 
yet unexplored, area for improvement. In the short term it is necessary to define, 
in conjunction with all concerned, Community standards for a minimum service that 
takes into account the legitimate interests of all involved in the case of a sudden and 
unexpected reduction of capacity whether due to a strike or equipment failure. 
It should also be considered whether new rules on priority and re-routing of traffic 
would permit a more efficient use of airspace and an equitable sharing of the 
available capacity whilst better taking into account the political objectives of the 
Community particularly in the fields of economic and social cohesion. It would then 
be necessary to decide if and how such rules might be implemented bearing in mind 
that any regulation should be limited to the strict minimum consistent with the 
objective to be attained. 
3.3. Reinforced co-operation 
One of the main characteristics of the current situation is that each player acts 
independently of the others although knowing that what is being planned cannot be 
realised. Tour operators sell holidays which concentrate the movement of tourists on 
specific resorts on specific days, the transport companies schedule their flights 
accordingly, airports allocate the corresponding slots, the air traffic control centres 
calculate their capacity on the basis of the resources available, when the day arrives 
the queues are managed as well as possible and the final victim of all this 
improvisation is the passenger. 
While all of this is probably natural in a liberal environment the objective of which 
is to satisfy the client, it unfortunately results in exactly the opposite. Under these 
14 
conditions regulations will not help. Only better co-ordination between the actors, 
more responsible behaviour and respect for the passengers will allow the provision 
of a better service while contributing to the efficiency and competitiveness of 
European air transport operators. 
In addition it would be useful to research ways of ensuring a better co-ordination 
between the allocation of airport slots and the planning of traffic flows using 
available experience to develop new concepts. 
Finally it is important to provide information so that passengers can make an 
informed choice of the services which they buy and the other actors are encouraged 
to do their best to satisfy their needs. This requires knowledge of the performance 
and quality of service which are being offered. This could be achieved by the 
systematic publication of comparable punctuality indicators for airports and airlines. 
3.4. Political crisis management 
Experience has shown that crisis management carried out only at the operational level 
may be insufficient because the solution of some problems which may arise on these 
occasions requires high level political decisions in different domains. 
To correct this deficiency, a group composed of representatives of the Member States 
at a level where all parties concerned would be involved, particularly the internal 
affairs and defence ministers, could augment the crisis unit of EUROCONTROL to 
examine without delay those situations which could not be resolved at its level or to 
ensure the execution of its recommendations. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Much remains to be done to prevent the reappearance of critical situations related to airspace 
congestion and to mitigate the consequences of crisis situations. Even if the outstanding 
problems are complex and not of a nature to be solved by short term actions, a certain 
number of initiatives can be taken in the framework of the existing structures, to support the 
mechanisms and bodies recently established and to improve further their efficiency : 
political support to the Crisis Cell of EUROCONTROL; 
15 
define, in conjunction with all partners involved, the modalities of a common 
minimum service in case of crisis and examination in conjunction with 
EUROCONTROL, the establishment of alternative priority rules for access to 
airspace under both normal and crisis conditions; 
publication of punctuality indicators comparable with airports and airlines; 
better planning of traffic flows and integration of ATC constraints in the allocation 
of airport slots; 
cooperative sharing of available ATC capacity; 
Nevertheless the Commission is conscious that such actions, aiming at more closely 
correlating capacity and demand in order to minimise the inconvenience of congestion for 
the Passengers and the Users, must not in any way lead to a relaxation of the efforts 
deployed to increase the overall capacity of the European Air Traffic Control System. 
16 
EVOLUTION OF THE COST PER KILOMETER FLOWN 
072ECU/Km <fr 
1113 MECU 
1542 MKm C& 3400 MKm à 
ET 
.30% 
20% 
1985 MECU M' 
2776 MKm 2300 MECU 
0.72 ECU/Km N<>v 
•94 '98 
V- -20% 
h -30% t 0.68 ECU/Km 
-g_ Number of Km 
- Actual deflated Costs 
O Actual deflated Cost per Km 
-E3" Forecast based on CRCO'figures 
—(— Forecast based on figures provided by 5 States 
-0-- Forecast on actual deflated Cost per Km > z z m x 
-f Source: EUROCONTROL 
ATC DELAYS 
IATA SURVEY 
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS AND DELAYS ANNEX 2 
80000 
3 OÏ0>O>O>O)0>O>O> 8 8 
IATA SURVEY 
PERCENTAGE OF FLIGHTS DELAYED 
l£ 
ANNEX 2 
IATA SURVEY 
TOTAL DELAYS (MINUTES) 
IATA SURVEY 
AVERAGE TIME LENGTH PER DELAY 
ANNEX 3 
ATFM DELAY SURVEY - MAY 7395 
Total Rights 
440000 j 
420000 •-
400000 --
380000 --
360000 --
340000 •-
320000 -
300000 --
280000 --
260000 •-
240000 H 1-
Jan Fab -H 1 1 1 \ 1 1 1 —1 
Apr May Jne Jly Aug Sep Oct - Nov Dae 
94 1 35 
Percentage of Flights Delayed 
14 -r 
12 + 
10 4-
6 + 
2 4 
H 1 1 h —I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Jan Fab Mar Apr May Jne Jly Aug Sap Oct Nov Dae 
-X 83 94 1 85 
Source: EUROCONTROL lo 
ANNEX 3 
ATFM DELAY SURVEY • MAY 7995 
Total Delay (in minutes) 
1800000 
.1600000 
1400000 
1200000 
1000000 
800000 
600000 
400000 
200000 
0 
Jan Fab Mar Apr May Jne Jly Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Average Delay per Flight 
4 T 
S.5 4-
8 4-
ZJS 4-
2 4-
13 4-
i 4-
0.5 4-
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jne Jiy Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Source: EUROCONTROL 11 

ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(95) 318 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 07 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-95-365-EN-C 
ISBN 92-77-91515-3 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
22