EN Official Journal of the European Union C 299/17

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Need for a European defence industry: industrial, innovative and social aspects’ (own-initiative opinion)

2012/C 299/04

Rapporteur: Mr VAN IERSEL

Co-rapporteur: Ms HRUSECKÁ

On 19 January 2012, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on the

Need for a European defence industry: industrial, innovative and social aspects.

The Consultative Commission on Industrial Change, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 11 June 2012.

At its 482nd plenary session, held on 11 and 12 July 2012 (meeting of 11 July), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by132 votes to 1 with 9 abstentions.

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1 The world is subject to rapid geopolitical change. The dominant position of the Western world is being challenged both economically and politically. While defence budgets across the European Union are being cut, defence spending in China, India, Brazil, Russia and others is going up. Therefore the EESC calls on the Council and the Commission to make an overall evaluation of determining aspects of the EU's position and role in the world, to result in a convincing update of European foreign, security and defence policies.

1.2 Defence policy is shaped by countries' strategic interests, perceived threats and political objectives, which in Europe are mainly defined in national terms. Obsolete approaches visibly lead to increasing fragmentation, gaps, overcapacity and a lack of interoperability in European defence capabilities. The arguments for improvement are overwhelming; it is a matter of political will. This was already argued convincingly back in 1986! (1) The situation is now much more pressing in political, economic and defence terms. The EESC calls on the Council to work seriously on an EU defence umbrella.

1.3 Security and defence policy should boost the EU and Member States' self-confidence. It should inspire confidence in society and the general public, properly equipped soldiers, business and the sector's workforce. EU citizens have a right to be adequately protected. Adequate future-proof European armaments are increasingly needed. To that end current isolated practices of Member States are completely insufficient as well as wasting taxpayer’s money.

1.4 In line with policies and current practices in the US and other (emerging) world actors as well as given the exclusive responsibility of governments to protect citizens and to ensure security, the EESC underlines the need of defining European strategic interests in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (2). In the end the triangle of foreign affairs and security, defence, and industrial capability is indivisible, supporting Europe’s position in the world, her economic and political interests as well as values (human rights, democracy). The European External Action Service (EEAS) should be directly involved.

1.5 The EESC emphasises that, should Europe wish to maintain a sound security and defence industry in creating a critical mass for effectiveness and cost efficiency, a radical change in mindset and policies is needed. These must produce a stable and predictable future for armed forces befitting Europe's economic and technological weight. Given big differences between Member States a primary responsibility in this regard falls to the main producing Member States.

1.6 In the EESC’s view, there are strong arguments to strengthen European planning and committed coordination: — the sector is complicated and knowledge-intensive; it requires long-term planning — despite privatisation governments have a large stake in defence industry as customer, regulator and as providers of export licenses — shortcomings in the current structure and (severe) budget constraints require orderly readjustments instead of on-going piecemeal approaches that undermine internal and external credibility — effective coordination between the main producing countries and the less or non-producing countries should be ensured to promote armaments purchases in Europe, and to make use of all available knowledge, and of big companies and SMEs across the continent — finally a successful output of European industry worldwide will depend on the development of a stable home market in Europe.

1.7 In addition to actions of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Defence Package of 2007 (3) the EESC calls for a well-designed European industrial policy for the defence sector with its specific characteristics of government requirements and public funding. In the framework of Europe 2020, this industrial policy must be based on shared national and EU competences – with EDA and Commission as full partners - as well as consultations with the defence industry and other stakeholders, among them social partners and the need of a well-organised social dialogue.

1.8 EU policies and funding should link EU level and national investments leading to reducing fragmentation and duplication of public expenditure, enhancing quality and interoperability.

1.9 State-of-the-art R&D is crucial for the development of "new generation" armaments which are badly needed. Such R&D can never be an exclusive matter for industry alone. The main responsibility falls to governments. Consequently, it is very vulnerable to current budget cutbacks. The Council and stakeholders should identify urgently and launch as soon as possible research programmes that would help European industry to address undesirable dependencies from elsewhere. "Dual use" technology is a necessity. The EU’s R&D programme should be supportive. It should ensure effective cross-border R&D cooperation.

1.10 Further strengthening of the technological and industrial basis of European defence must be planned as much as possible. To that end satisfactory measures at EU-level are necessary (4).

1.11 Closer coordination between the Commission, EDA, and other relevant EU stakeholders is needed. The renewed commitment of President Barroso (5), Vice-President Tajani and Commissioner Barnier as well as the establishment of the Task Force on Defence is very timely. The EESC also welcomes last December’s forward-looking EP Resolution on European Defence and the broad spectrum of issues at stake (6).

1.12 In the same spirit and in view of strengthening the initiative of the EC Task Force on Defence, the EESC urges the Commission to publicly raise these issues. The Commission should also consider to provide elements of answers as appropriate to the findings that result from the differences in industrial and technological capabilities between Member States as well as differences in the levels of investment in research and defence in general.

2. Introduction

2.1 Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union states that the common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. Article 42(3) adds that Member States shall make military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of that policy. Since 2005 the European Defence Agency (EDA) has worked to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and provide better equipment for soldiers. Progress, however, is very limited.

2.2 Completing the internal market as well as effective financial coordination are high priorities now. The Europe 2020 strategy is giving strong support to both objectives. This leap forward should also inspire new steps in European defence.

2.3 Yet there is no similar development in the defence sector. The military pact between France and the United Kingdom in 1998 looked set to mark a new mindset and a new start. The same spirit of closer defence cooperation was reflected in the foundation of the European Defence and Space Company, EADS, in 2003. This, however, was not followed by further consolidation. It is significant that the LoI-countries (the group of countries with major production capacity, i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Sweden) have, contrary to previous intentions, not yet come up with any viable proposal for rationalisation or consolidation.

2.4 Stagnation has led to national approaches and emphasis on national production. There is a certain renationalisation. Europe-based industrial companies are all focusing on export markets. There is no common strategic concept, neither among governments nor among industrial partners.

2.5 Meanwhile new challenges will increasingly affect potential markets. A huge challenge is the development of armaments in emerging economies. China, Russia, India and Brazil (the BRICs), followed by some smaller countries, are on their way. The Chinese defence budget is expected to rise from EUR 120 billion now to EUR 250 billion by 2015. Russia has announced a huge increase in its defence budget up to 2015. The US spends more than double the total European budget: EUR 450 bn. versus EUR 204 bn. in 2007 and the European budget is shrinking ever more. The overall European R&D budget is at the most 20 % of the American one. 50 % of the European defence budget goes on manpower against 25 % in the US. Europe has more people under arms, but they are far less equipped. World conditions will never be what they were before. Time is not on our side.

2.6 Over the last decades, many studies have advocated adapting the defence industry to the global market. All underline lasting shortcomings, as defence markets prove very imperfect, with most states continuing to support their "own" industry. Attempts to improve markets, such as the EU Defence Package of 2007, intend to overcome some market deficiencies and diverging national practices.

2.7 The issues at stake are complex, partly due to the very long time lags from the design phase to bringing products into operation. Therefore the EESC considers that a broad approach from a technological, economic and social perspective would be a more suitable way to discuss this area than just looking at it from the defence perspective.

2.8 A key point is the divergence of strategic concepts between countries with a considerable armaments industry, in particular as regards the definition of "essential national security interest", and the relation between national security and export markets. Some smaller countries have a reasonably well-developed industry, while others have practically no production sites at all. Clearly, the approaches of all countries differ according to their needs and potential. The outcome is fragmentation and a patchwork vision of defence industry. Operations like in Libya make increasing gaps in available weapon systems painfully clear. The consequences should be clearly acknowledged and evaluated.

2.9 These developments concern both investments and employment. The defence industry is a high technology sector that directly employs 600 000 qualified people and, indirectly, another two million. There are worrying pressures for further cuts. Often production sites have a strong regional concentration which could become centres of excellence but which, adversely, run the risk of being hit by financial cuts. These sites will suffer greatly if reorganisation and cuts take place in an unplanned and unstructured way.

2.10 Current employment is, of course, a primary worry for individual governments as well. In its turn, it may well hamper the development of a common vision which is needed to address properly the social consequences of a declining defence industry, including the loss of know-how and its effects on human capital. By contrast, a common vision will favour a balanced job creation and avoid the risk of losing researchers and highly-specialised senior technicians and scientists to third countries, contrary to the goals that the EU is seeking to achieve with the EU 2020 strategy.

2.11 EU approaches and the intergovernmental framework can and should work in the same perspective. As long as national sovereignty prevails, the output of any common framework will bear limited fruit, with few improvements to overcapacity, overlap and fragmentation. The contradictions between the philosophy of national sovereignty on the one hand and financial, technological, economic and social needs on the other are manifest.

2.12 It is thus worrying that the objective of "pooling and sharing", i.e. the organisation of European interdependence, has not been put in terms of a common strategy. In spite of a broadly-felt awareness of the changed international context the pressure from outside is apparently not yet strong enough for the promotion of common approaches and solutions. Remarkably enough, by contrast, European countries are still willing to remain dependent on the US in the area of defence procurement instead of purchasing in Europe.

2.13 If Europe wishes to maintain a sound security and defence industry, capable of developing and producing cutting edge systems, and thereby ensuring its own security, a radical change in mindset and policies is needed. Waiting any longer would hasten a downsizing of capabilities below levels from which the EU could climb back to the top in essential areas. This would be still more difficult as cuts in R&D spending would directly affect a generation of researchers and qualified employees. If Europe does not succeed, industries may disappear, jobs will be lost and know-how will evaporate, leaving Europe at the mercy of others. A sense of urgency and action is needed among those who care for Europe and European security.

3. Political context

3.1 The Treaty on European Union rightly underlines the inextricable link between foreign, security and defence policy. An effective foreign policy has to be built on convincing defence capabilities. Adequate defence capabilities, in their turn, must be designed and developed in the light of perceived threats and agreed objectives in a very complicated and fragile international context.

3.2 The core factor is the EU's position and role in tomorrow's world, taking into account the rapidly changing geopolitical realities in which an increasing number of world players emerge. From that perspective, the EESC considers that it is high time for a concerted drive in Europe. Past and recent experience proves that continuing traditional approaches risks sidelining Europe and the Member States.

3.3 The EESC calls for a stable and predictable future for European armed forces befitting Europe's current economic and technological weight. The huge time lags from the design of systems to bringing them on line reinforces the need to make decisions as of this year.

3.4 From a social and political point of view, the EESC highlights four important aspects regarding the need for effective European defence capabilities: — protecting the populace — the need for properly equipped soldiers — stable and predictable jobs — well-designed European humanitarian and military actions in the world.

3.5 There is an ongoing debate over the future of the CSDP, although it is rarely put in such terms. Many topics such as the use of Battle groups, the controversy over the development of a single operational HQ, funding of EU CSDP missions, finding contributions to those missions and calls for a review of Europe Security Strategy, amount to a discussion on the CSDP in all but name. It would be a step forward to approach it in that way. Moreover, in all deliberations concerning these important issues the industrial implications of decisions (or non-decisions) should also be considered. It will also prove the strong connection between industrial capabilities and the implementation of a CSDP. The prime responsibility is with governments.

3.6 The Trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO are of critical importance. For a long time, Americans have severely criticised the way Europeans look after their defence obligations within the Alliance. There is a continuous call on both sides of the Atlantic for a "European pillar" in NATO. Until now the opposite has been happening.

3.7 The lack of a proper "European pillar" has deep political roots. There still is insufficient political will in Europe to define European "strategic" interests or common key military capabilities. By contrast, the US and other countries use the concept of strategic activities, encompassing all research and industries which contribute to the global security of their citizens, be it civil or military.

3.8 Against this backdrop the EESC considers that building a "European pillar", the exaggerated dependence of European military capabilities on the US, should be replaced by a more balanced relationship. Parallel to a badly needed discussion on common European strategic interests which is an exclusive responsibility of governments, orderly planning through cooperation between the European institutions, the Member States and defence industries as well as a progressive review of Member States' habits of buying automatically "off the shelf" in the US, should start as soon as possible.

3.9 Improving conditions for industrial cooperation with US industries on a more equal footing will be beneficial from both an industrial and financial perspective.

4. European defence industry

4.1 There is a close relationship between foreign and defence/security policies and defence industries. Despite privatisation governments have a large stake in defence industry as customer, as regulator and as providers of export licenses.

4.2 Defence industries have considerable room for manoeuvre in export markets. This is partly due to privatisation, partly to encouragement by governments: the economic crisis is turning some defence ministers into explicitly stated export promoters. Anyway, the crisis is forcing the defence sector to consider exports as a central feature of their business models. On average, 2011 was a very profitable year for European industries. Companies are also fairly successful in developing "dual use" production.

4.3 World players like China, India and Brazil, have their own foreign political ambitions, culminating in rising defence budgets. At the moment this creates perceived opportunities for European exports. How long will this last? Industry is still doing reasonably well, but its performances are largely based on investments of some 20 to 25 years ago. Further dropping or stagnating investments at this very moment would already have irreversible consequences in the near future.

4.4 Moreover, it is realistic to expect that emerging powers will start to build up their industry independently of Western industries, and, subsequently, that they, as Europe’s future competitors in third-country markets, will increasingly block imports from Western countries or link these to conditions.

4.5 At the moment, there are no new major programmes in Europe about to start and this will undoubtedly affect future export success. Moreover, it has been some time since any major emerging country has required a significant level of technology transfer and production in their countries.

4.6 One-time export contracts will in all likelihood be used to copy technology from Western industries. For these an alternative to blocking imports could be to set up production (and development) facilities in the countries concerned. At the moment it is largely a matter of speculation to what extent such development will affect facilities and labour opportunities in Europe. In the longer term, it is likely that the position of European industry will be undermined by emerging giants. Enhanced technology and production in these countries will also affect European (potential) export markets in other third countries. Competition in products as well as prices will become fiercer.

4.7 Due to long time lags in development and production as well as technological investments and continuous innovation, Europe needs targeted coordination to ensure an up-to-date self-reliant defence industry. As long as market size is predominantly determined by national borders, it is almost automatically below critical mass, even in large Member States. Export to third countries may alleviate this to some extent, but the future is uncertain, while market conditions are often far from stable.

4.8 Persisting declining budgets, which under present circumstances imply considerable limitations, should be a wake-up call. They affect budgets for investment and procurement, certainly when operational and maintenance costs remain at the same level or increase as a result of ongoing military operations (Afghanistan, Libya, anti-piracy operations, to name a few).

4.9 This results in postponing or even cancelling investments that are essential for industry to ensure the upkeep and renewal of production and development capabilities. Moreover, in difficult times industry itself will be less prepared to invest in such upkeep or new activities. Only by working together in a coherent fashion can the needed investments be ensured.

4.10 The EESC advocates a well-designed European industrial policy for the defence sector, from the designing of systems to the operational phase. This is a matter of specific industrial policy. It is by its very nature a public market: R&D must be financed beyond seed money due to unprofitable margins at the start and to specific governmental requirements. It is necessary to identify European key industrial capabilities as well as investment policies to promote robust European production. As no single country has sufficient resources available to fund "new generation" armaments, it is necessary to mix national and European goals as well as national and European resources, financially as well as industrially. Governance should be based on shared EU and national competences according to the agreed Europe 2020 strategy. This is also an effective label to optimise coordination between the European institutions and within the Commission which still functions far below its potential. In this respect the Task Force which will start shortly as a platform – Commission, EDA, EEAS - to discuss priorities, capabilities and gaps, can provide valuable support.

4.11 R&D is a central theme. The defence industry is a high technology, knowledge-intensive industrial activity, which would also be needed for full-fledged prototype development. R&D is almost never an exclusive matter for industry alone. Development and system lifecycles are simply too long, and the financial impact too big for industry to carry all financial risks. History proves that all successful programmes are carried out jointly by governments and industry.

4.12 A very high percentage of defence R&D in the world comes from governments either directly or indirectly through purchases. Not surprisingly, defence industries are on average avoiding too much financial risk given the nature of the products. Defence R&D is particularly vulnerable to government cutbacks.

4.13 Consequently, besides industrial consolidation, sufficient funding and pooling agreed among the Member States, the Commission and industry is needed for research, technology and development. Defence investments require a high degree of funding for R&D and technological projects. In addition, access to critical technologies must be ensured. If critical technologies for development and production were no longer accessible due to restrictions on exports imposed by others, serious problems to achieving European security goals would arise.

4.14 R&D performed outside defence organisations plays an increasingly important role due to progress in independent science and technology in many areas. Often it is only in the last phases of development that the ultimate application determines whether the R&D can be identified as "defence" or "civil" R&D. "Dual-use" R&D is of growing importance for defence applications, see for instance IT. It is thus of primary importance for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) to stimulate "dual-use" R&D, in particular as it enables funding from outside the defence communities.

4.15 Public R&D funding at EU level should be agreed among the Member States. It can be carried out via the upcoming Framework Programme 8 (FP8) or via a separate fund, preferably via packages of advanced research areas, for example nanotechnology and artificial intelligence. Special procedures must be planned given the relationship between the defence industry and the public sector.

4.16 The EDA and the Commission should have a prominent role as foreseen in the European Framework Cooperation, also to avoid day-to-day political interference. EDA should be given the opportunity to play its full role as provided in the Lisbon Treaty (7).

4.17 An appropriate workforce with up-to-date skills is crucial for an industrial and R&D programme for defence (8). This is another firm argument for a stable framework for R&D and industry instead of disorderly restructuring. It has to be kept in mind that defence workforces are the cement on which the future of defence capabilities is built. Consultation of and communication with industry, R&D institutes, higher education, military organisations and interested trade unions must help ensure that both ongoing restructuring and forward-looking production of armaments in Europe will be organised properly.

4.18 Budget constraints make it necessary to tackle overlaps and ineffectiveness. Controlled consolidation is not necessarily equivalent to building big companies. It means building sufficient critical mass and quality by international standards which ensure a competitive position in home markets and third countries. Coordinating the planning of projects at European level by governments, relevant EU players and industry is increasingly necessary.

4.19 Differences in size and output of industries are a fact. Member States differ greatly in industrial importance. Part of an agreement among participating countries should be to ensure that industries in non-LoI countries (=main producers) will be connected to relevant projects. This approach is not only politically desirable, it also promotes a fruitful relationship between big and smaller companies as well as research institutes. As suppliers, SMEs should successfully add to smart specialisation chains.

4.20 Specific attention is required for a perceived vulnerability in countries of Central Europe due to their exposed geographical position. In view of both the need to make citizens in these countries feel well protected as well as the desirability to make full use of specific technical knowledge in the field of defence, the EESC underlines the need of appropriate integration of available knowledge and competences in countries in Central Europe in ongoing and future defence projects.

4.21 An integrated European market for defence products would create a more stable home market. Besides combining existing national markets, a European market would encourage harmonisation or even standardisation of requirements and procurement rules between the various Member States. More harmonisation or standardisation would improve financial and economic conditions enhancing the competitiveness of European companies in a global market.

4.22 A European defence market would have critical mass. Against that backdrop, the EESC points to damaging consequences when the Member States continue to buy "off the shelf" abroad, particularly in the US. First, it undermines the advantages of a European market for industry; consequently prices for such defence products would rise for their European customers, if industry were prevented from selling in third-country markets where (state) competition will definitely become increasingly fierce. Second, European countries that buy "off the shelf" in the US pay for American technological costs which are included in the price of those products.

4.23 Given the financial and international political prospects, a fundamental European debate and operational conclusions are indispensable. If not all Member States are willing to participate in a common framework, the principle of "Enhanced cooperation" should prevail. More integration and a positive attitude to buying European will turn out to be the only way in which market sizes comparable to those in the US can be approximated. Without an effective home market there are grounds for serious doubts as to whether European industry has any hope of competing at global level.

5. Some specific issues

5.1 The industrial landscape between the various armed forces - land, sea, air - differs significantly from country to country. In a number of areas no country can any longer be considered to be able to develop on its own new generations of armaments.

5.2 In the land sector only a limited number of large system integrating companies is able to develop and produce Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and lighter military vehicles. Main European producers are in France, Germany and the UK. There is a large spectrum of subsystem manufacturers and third tier suppliers with an under-representation from Central Europe.

5.3 Many countries develop their "own" naval industry, and build naval vessels with a great variety of size and complexity from country to country. The LoI nations and the Netherlands are leading, also in the area of concept design and complex naval research facilities which are quite different from developing civil ship building. Here again there is a broad spectrum of subsystem manufacturers and third tier suppliers.

5.4 Military aircraft are only developed and produced in a few countries. The industry is concentrated in a small number of largely multinational companies, operating at European level and beyond. The industry is primarily concentrated in EADS, BEA-Systems, Dassault and Saab-Aircraft. Advanced aerodynamic research is limited to a few countries.

5.5 The Electronics sector, including Command, Communication and Control, is of increasing importance for defence with major industrial players such as Thales, "BAE Systems" and "Finmeccanica". For the largest European electronics industry groups Philips and Siemens, defence is less important. For these, the production volume for cost-effective mass production of specific electronic components such as integrated circuits for defence is too small anyway. Engaging these large industrial groups, however, underlines the importance of dual use in this field.

5.6 As regards ammunition and explosives, the number of industries has gradually declined over the last decades partly due to environmental constraints. Public safety forces such industries either to move older production sites or simply to close them down.

5.7 Access to critical technologies is essential, and should be supported in the framework of a CSDP. The same goes for certain materials such as carbon fibres or materials for electronic components.

5.8 The Defence Package of 2007, adopted in 2009, can be very supportive. The Member States should have transposed the directives in the summer of 2011. It is still too early to be positive or sceptical about their knock-on effects for creating one internal market. The process is not yet finalised and the implementation of the goal of inter-Community transfer of defence products as well as of notions such as essential national security interests remains to be seen.

5.9 Article TFEU 346 provides a derogation from EU procurement laws for the protection of essential national security interests. This broad formulation may prevent proper market developments, particularly in desirable supply chains. The EESC advocates a more specific interpretation of Article 346 that opens sufficient opportunities for European solutions and optimal European supply chains, fostering security of supply, available specialties in Member States, and value for money.

5.10 National security of information causes similar problems as those mentioned in point 5.9 and has to be reviewed as well. It is also an important and sensitive issue in the involvement of European industries in defence projects in the US.

5.11 "Sharing and pooling", including common training programmes, should be a forward-looking programme. A basic condition is that lip service is replaced by concrete planning and a targeted approach with clearly identified steps. However, as long as there is no agreement on defence doctrines it will be very difficult to carry out "sharing and pooling" in a feasible way.

Brussels, 11 July 2012. The President of the European Economic and Social Committee Staffan NILSSON

(1) See "Towards a Stronger Europe", a report by an Independent Study Team established by Defence Ministers of Nations of the Independent European Programme Group to make proposals to improve the competitiveness of Europe’s defence equipment industry.

(2) Common security and defence policy as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy, Treaty on European Union (TEU), art. 42 and the following. OJ C 115, 09.05.2008.

(3) Directives 2009/43EC (OJ L 146, 10.06.2009) and 2009/81/EC (OJ L 216, 20.08.2009). The Defence Package was adopted by the Council and the EP in 2009. It should have been transposed by the Members States during the summer of 2011. The Defence Package also contained a Communication "Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry", COM(2007) 764, 05.12.2007.

(4) The European Funds should be involved in this process: the upcoming FP8, European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund.

(5) EU State of the Union, November 2011.

(6) EP Resolution of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States (2011/2177(INI)).

(7) See Art. 45, par. 1 and Art. 42, par. 3 TEU, OJ C 115, 09/05/2008.

(8) See A comprehensive analysis of emerging competences and skill needs for optimal preparation and management of change in the EU defence industry, Final report, May 2009, a report by Eurostrategies for the European Commission.