EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 3.12.2008 
SEC(2008) 2982 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
Accompanying the  
 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
concerning the establishment of  'Eurodac' for the comparis on of fingerprints for the 
effective application of Regu lation (EC) No […/…] [establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person] 
 
Summary of the Impact Assessment  
{COM(2008) 825 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2981}  
EN 2   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
The Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation 343/2003/EC of 18 February 2003) aims at 
establishing a clear and workable mechanism for determining responsibility for asylum 
applications lodged in the EU MS  and, in an area without controls  at the internal borders. It 
was conceived to address the phenomenon of asylum shopping,  by preventing abuse of 
asylum procedures in the form of multiple ap plications for asylum submitted simultaneously 
or successively by the same person in several Member States. It also aims to avoid the 
phenomenon of refugees in orbit  (ie. a situation where all MS claim not being responsible for 
examining an asylum application). 
Thus, Council Regulation 2725/2000/EC of 11 December 2000 for the establishment of 
‘EURODAC’ (hereinafter: EURODAC Regulatio n) came into force on 15 December 2000 
and the Community-wide information tec hnology system for the comparison of the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers, started operations on 15 January 2003.  
The Dublin acquis  is implemented by all MSs of the EU , as well as by Norw ay and Iceland. 
International agreements on the accession of Sw itzerland and Liechtenstein to the Dublin 
acquis were signed on 28 February 2008, and will ente r into force as soon as they start 
applying the Schengen acquis . (In the present IA, the term "Member States" is used to cover 
all states applying the Dublin acquis .) 
The Commission services conducted a comprehe nsive evaluation of the Dublin system 
(hereinafter: Evaluation Report), covering the first 3 years of its operation of the EURODAC 
central system (2003-2005). The report has acknowledged the positive elements of the 
operation of the Dublin system, while at the same time has pointed out shortcomings and 
problems in transposition. 
Beyond the Evaluation Report, a number of ot her reports fed into the IA. A technical 
evaluation of DubliNet was car ried out in 2005. The European  Data Protection Supervisor 
(hereinafter: EDPS) has been inspecting the ap plication of the EURODAC Regulation from a 
data protection point of view and issu ed an inspection report in July 20071 as well as an 
Activity Report coveri ng the period 2005-2007.2 Additional input was received from Member 
States during and as a follow up to the m eeting of the EURODAC expert committee 4-5 
October 2007.  
The Commission's Impact Assessment Board (I AB) was consulted on the draft final Impact 
Assessment report and issued its opinion on 26.09.2008. The recommendations of the IAB 
were duly taken into account. 
                                                 
1 Eurodac Supervision Coordination Group, Report of the first coordinated inspection, Brussels, 17 July 
2007.  
2 Coordinated Supervision of Eurodac – Activity Report 2005-2007, 21 April 2008.  
EN 3   EN 2. PROBLEM  DEFINITION 
In accordance with the Policy Plan on Asylum – an integrated approach to protection across 
the EU3 the present Impact Assessme nt (IA) deals with the following problems identified in 
the Evaluation Report.  
2.1. Continuing late transm ission of fingerprints 
The Regulation in force only provides a ve ry vague deadline for the transmission of 
fingerprints to the CU: MS are required to "p romptly take the fingerprints" and "promptly 
transmit them". In practice, in the absence of a strict deadline, and with out any sanction as to 
the non-respect of the already vague deadline, de lay of fingerprints r eached 30 days in some 
MSs in the past, while in 2007 th e longest delay was almost 12 da ys. In some Member States, 
little progress has been observed since the installation of EURODA C, despite regular 
reminders by the Commission se rvices through the annua l activity reports and the meetings of 
the EURODAC expert committee. A delay in transm issions may lead to results contrary to the 
responsibility principles laid down in the Dublin Regulation (" wrong hits" and "missed hits", 
explained in the annual reports on the act ivities of the EURODAC Central Unit).  
2.2. Impossibility to filter asylum claims by  persons already enjoying international 
protection in a MS 
Under the Regulation in force, Member States have to request the Central Unit to block the 
data of persons who are recognised as refugees. If a hit occurs against data of a person who 
was fingerprinted as an asylum seeker but w hose data was later on blocked by a MS because 
it recognised her/him as a refug ee, the Central Unit records the hit for statistical purposes but 
sends a "no-hit" reply to th e Member State of origin.  
The Regulation in force stipulates however, that  five years after EURODAC starts operations, 
a decision would be taken in accordance with th e relevant provisions of the Treaty, as to 
whether the data relating to pe rsons who have been recognised and admitted as refugees in a 
Member State should be stored and compared against CAT1 or should be erased in advance once they were recognised as refugees.  
Statistics gathered by the EURODAC CU reveal  that since the start of its activities (until 
31.12.2007), 24.464 out of 1.005.323 data of asylum s eekers (2,4%) was blocked. 414 out of 
the 24.464 have produced hits with  blocked data. This means th at 414 recognised refugees 
lodged a second asylum application, in the same  Member State as the one which granted the 
refugee status or in another Member State.
4 This phenomenon goes against the underlying 
principles of the Dublin system , since without being able to s ee the hits against the presently 
blocked cases, a new asylum procedure might start in another (or indeed the same) MS 
consuming additional resources concerning a person who has already received protection 
from a MS. The information that MS can obtain  with the unblocking of these cases can of 
course be decisive in an asylum procedure.  
                                                 
3 COM(2008) 360.  
4 From the point of view of the asylum-seeker or refugee, asylum shopping could in theory have the 
advantage of multiplying his/her chances of getting a certain level of protection. It has to be underlined 
though, that nevertheless, moving from one Member State to another entails financial costs for the asylum-seeker, as well as distress and uncertainty. Th e actual deterring effect of the Dublin system from 
asylum shopping is largely dependent on the quality  and level of information asylum-seekers are 
provided with.  
EN 4   EN 2.3. Inefficient management of deletions of data  
Under the Regulation in force, deletion of data is automatic from the database after 10 
(CAT1) or 2 years (CAT2) respectively. Advance erasure  of data by the Member State of 
origin (i.e. the Member State which entered the data of an asylum seeker or of a person 
apprehended when irregularly crossing an external border in the EURODAC Central 
database) is obligatory as soon as they become aware that a data subject has acquired 
citizenship  of any Member State (both CAT1 and CAT2) and as soon as they become aware 
that the person has left the territory  of the Member States or that he/she has been issued a 
residence permit (CAT2). 
Another concern relates to the fact that Member States of origin are often not aware that 
another MS of origin deleted data  which corresponded to the fingerprint data it also entered 
into EURODAC at some point, an d therefore should be subject to  advance data erasure by all 
MSs of origin . This is a serious breach of data protection principles, which require data to be 
deleted when their storage is no longer nece ssary, and raises doubts about the compliance of 
MSs with data protection obligations. 
2.4. Unclear specification of national auth orities having access to EURODAC which 
hinders the monitoring role of  the Commission and the EDPS 
The EURODAC Regulation requests that Member  States communicate to the Commission the 
list of authorities  having access to data recorded in the EURODAC central database , for 
the purposes laid down in the EURODAC Regula tion. From a data protection point of view, 
the relevant provisions in force can be cons idered too vague, since Member States may 
communicate an indefinite list of "authorities" without any de tail on the exact nature of the 
authority's national competences and on the re levant departments. The Commission can only 
take note of the notifications a nd administer the list of author ities but cannot properly exercise 
its monitoring role.  
This issue was raised on several occasions by the EDPS and national data protection 
authorities (DPAs) which rightly fear they ca nnot correctly assess whether all data protection 
rules are correctly applied in the context of  the EURODAC Regulation, as they do not know 
who exactly is accessing data  in each Member State.  
EN 5   EN 3. POLICY  OBJECTIVES 
3.1. General objectives 
3.1.1.  Enabling more efficient determination of  the Member State responsible for the 
assessment of asylum  applications  
3.1.2.  Better addressing data protection concerns  
3.2. Specific objectives 
3.2.1.  Ensuring truly prompt tr ansmission of fingerprints 
3.2.2.  To prevent asylum shopping by avoiding pro cessing of asylum claims of refugees 
3.2.3.  Improving the compulsory deletion of data 
3.2.4.  Enabling effective monitoring by the Commission, the EDPS and national data 
protection authorities of management of access to data in EURODAC by national 
authorities designated for the implem entation of the EURODAC Regulation 
3.3. Fundamental rights 
Positive and negative impacts on relevant fundame ntal rights have also been considered. 
The EURODAC Regulation being a technical instrument providing for the effective 
implementation of some criteria of the Dub lin Regulation, impacts on fundamental rights 
have been assessed as regards the right to  asylum and protection of personal data.  
4. THE  PREFERRED  POLICY  OPTION 
Given the level of complexity of the proposed policy sub-options, this summary is limited to 
an enumeration of the main elements compos ing the preferred polic y option. The preferred 
policy option is made both of legislative options  and of options focused on fostering 
practical cooperation between Member States. 
4.1. Problem 1: Continuing late tr ansmission of fingerprints  
Option C) Legislation – specifying a clearer deadline in the Regulation  
Drawing upon the consultation of MSs in the framework of the EURODAC expert committee 
on 4-5 October 2007, the possible solution could be to keep the time-lim it somewhat flexible 
but at the same time strike an  end date. Proposing a wording re ferring to the obligation to 
send data as soon as possible, but not later than a certain number of days (the exact number of 
which is to be determined) could accommodate the need to find a final deadline but at the 
same time ensure that MSs which are currentl y sending data in a shor ter period than the 
number of days which would be  agreed upon as a deadline w ould still keep up their good 
performances.  
EN 6   EN 4.2. Problem 2: Impossibility to filter asyl um claims by persons already enjoying 
international protection in a MS  
Option Bb) Store and attribute a mark to data previously submitted as CAT1 
Upon action of the MS having granted interna tional protection to a third country national 
whose data has been stored in EURODAC as a CAT1, the CU could attribute a mark meaning 
that the person was recognised as elig ible for international protection.  
4.3. Problem 3: Inefficient manage ment of deletions of data 
Option C) Automated information provided by the CU 
When a MS deletes fingerprints (along with th e other data recorded with it) which produce 
hits with the fingerprints that were introduced  to EURODAC by the othe r MSs of origin, an 
automated message could be se nt to these latter MSs.  
4.4. Problem 4: Unclear specification of na tional authorities having access to 
EURODAC which hinders the monitoring  role of the Commission and the 
EDPS 
Option A) Legislation on obli gation to notify relevant details  on the designated authority 
to the Commission 
Legislation granting the Commission the chance to monitor the designation of authorities by 
requiring MSs to provide in their official not ification details on the exact nature of the 
authority's national competences and on the relevant departments within the authority which deal with the application of the EURODAC Regulations. 
A combination of policy options 1C, 2Bb, 3C, 4A has been identified as the preferred policy 
option through the comparative analysis.  
Preferred option: combination of po licy options 1C, 2Bb, 3C and 4A 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Relevance  
Ensuring truly prompt transmission of 
fingerprints   √√√ With a precise deadline established by the Regulation, MSs shall 
better conform to their obligations to take and transmit fingerprints 
in time in order to allow appr opriate determination of the MS 
responsible. Since the deadline would be clear and objective, the Commission would have the possi bility to follow-up on eventual 
mass delays by MS by launching infringement procedures.  
To prevent asylum shopping by avoiding 
processing of asylum claims of refugees  √√√ Knowing that a person is already enjoying international protection 
in a MS is decisive for national asylum authorities, which can therefore spare time and resources on the assessment of these claims. . 
EN 7   EN Preferred option: combination of po licy options 1C, 2Bb, 3C and 4A 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Motivation of the rating and aspects of the policy option 
necessary to achieve the impact 
Improving the compulsory deletion of 
data 
 √√√ When a MS deletes fingerprints (along with the other data recorded 
with it) which produce hits with  the fingerprints that were 
introduced to EURODAC by th e other MSs of origin, an 
automated message would be sent to these latter MSs. This way it 
is expected to ensure that the da ta to be deleted is effectively 
deleted by MSs, therefore no data  would be kept longer in the 
database than justified.  
Enabling effective monitoring by the Commission, the EDPS and national 
data protection authorities of management of access to data in 
EURODAC by national authorities 
designated for the implementation of the EURODAC Regulation  √√√ Specification by MSs in their offici al notification of the details on 
the exact nature of the authority's  national competences and of the 
relevant departments within the authority which deals with the 
application of the EURODAC Re gulations would enable proper 
monitoring of MSs activities concerning EURODAC. 
Transposition feasibility  
- Under existing treaty √√√ No difficulties or risks are fores een regarding the combination of 
the preferred suboptions. 
- Under new treaty  √√√ No difficulties or risks are fores een regarding the combination of 
the preferred suboptions. 
Implementation costs √√√ C.f. Annex 2. 
5.  MONITORING  AND  EVALUATION 
The monitoring of the fulfilmen t of operational objectives as described in 3.3.1. (avoiding 
"wrong hits" and "missed hits"), 3.3.2. (ensuring th at asylum applications of refugees are not 
processed) and 3.3.3. (ensuring de letion of data in circumstan ces foreseen by the current 
EURODAC Regulation) is to be  performed by the statistics  drawn up by the EURODAC CU. 
Concerning the first two points, re levant statistics are already be ing produced at present as a 
well-established practi ce, every month. Concerning 3.3.3., the preferred solution consists of 
action by the CU, therefore monitoring of the automated provision of information will be equally unproblematic. 
The fulfilment of operational objective 3.3.4. (enabling the Commi ssion and EDPS to know 
who exactly is accessing data in each Member  State) will be regularly monitored by the 
Commission. 
Moreover, in order to monitor if the revised Regulation is effectively followed by Member 
States, regular evaluation within  the framework of the overall assessment of the Dublin 
system is suggested. With a view to enhance th e effects of the combin ation of the preferred 
suboptions, organisation of further regular EURODAC expert meetings are foreseen.