Special Report The EU police mission  
in Afghanistan: mixed 
resultsEN 2015  NO 07
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS  
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi  
1615 Luxembourg  
LUXEMBOURG
Tel. +352 4398-1
E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu  
Internet: http://eca.europa.eu
Twitter: @EUAuditorsECA  
YouTube: EUAuditorsECA
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet ( http://europa.eu ).
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015
Print ISBN 978-92-872-2506-1 ISSN 1831-0834 doi:10.2865/699786 QJ-AB-15-007-EN-C
PDF ISBN 978-92-872-2514-6 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/893461 QJ-AB-15-007-EN-N
EPUB ISBN 978-92-872-2515-3 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/641246 QJ-AB-15-007-EN-E
© European Union, 2015
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
For any use or reproduction of Figure 1, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder.
Printed in Luxembourg
The EU police mission 
in Afghanistan: mixed 
results
(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)Special ReportEN 2015  NO 07
02
 Audit team
The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and 
public interest.
This performance audit was produced by Audit Chamber III — headed by ECA Member Karel Pinxten — which special ‑
ises in external actions spending areas. The audit was led by ECA Member Hans Gustaf Wessberg, supported by Sabine 
Hiernaux‑Fritsch and Fabrice Mercade, heads of unit, Peter Eklund, head of private office of Mr Wessberg, Nikolaos  
Zompolas, team leader, and Emmanuel‑Douglas Hellinakis, attaché in Mr Wessberg’s private office.
From left to right:  F. Mercade, head of unit, ECA Member H. G. Wessberg, 
S. Hiernaux‑Fritsch, head of unit, P . Eklund, head of Mr Wessberg’s private office, 
N. Zompolas, team leader and E. ‑D. Hellinakis, attaché in Mr Wessberg’s private office.

03
 Contents
Paragraph
 Glossary and acronyms
I–X Executive summary
1–6 Introduction
7–9 Audit scope and approach
10–76  Observations
10–21  A relevant mandate, yet a problematic start
11–14  Shaping EUPOL
15–21  Deployment difficulties
22–30  Difficulties with coordinating international efforts
23–27  A European effort, but no overarching European approach
28–30  Despite its efforts, EUPOL has had limited scope for influencing major actors
31–41  Headquarters’ support functions and guidance have improved over time
32–36  Planning and reporting capabilities have improved, but shortcomings remain
37–41  Headquarters’ guidance and support functions: weaknesses are being addressed
42–65  EUPOL ’s footprint: local success but general concerns about sustainability
43–45  Improvements were more notable in two of the three lines of operation
46–60 EUPOL has been largely successful in training-related activities but less in mentoring and advising; projects 
have made little contribution to the mission’s objectives
61–65  The prerequisites for sustaining achievements to date are not yet in place
66–76  EUPOL ’s legacy: phasing -out — what comes next?
67–71  Exit strategy planning is well advanced, but further work is needed
72–76  Liquidation: a coordinated and structured approach is needed
04 Contents
77–88  Conclusions and recommendations
 Annex I — EUPOL timeline
 Annex II — EUPOL commitments and disbursements by budgetary period
 Annex III — EUPOL project and mentoring activity files reviewed
 Annex IV — EUPOL field offices from 2007 to 2014
 Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 
05
 Glossary and acronyms
Advising : Short‑term transfer of knowledge/support to a group, aimed at identifying solutions for specific 
problems and developing projects in a specific timeframe ( source : EUPOL’s Mentoring Handbook, April 2013).
Civcom : Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, an advisory body established by the Council which 
provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to 
the PSC.
CMPD : Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the primary EEAS department responsible for political and 
strategic planning on CSDP . In charge of conducting strategic and advance planning of new CSDP missions and 
conducting strategic reviews of existing CSDP missions.
Conops : Concept of Operations, a planning document that translates political intent into direction and guidance by 
indicating what action is needed to accomplish a mission.
CPCC : Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, an EEAS department that supports the Civilian Operations 
Commander (who is also CPCC Director) in exercising his/her responsibilities relating to the operational planning 
and the conduct of civilian CSDP missions.
CSDP : Common Security and Defence Policy. Formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
it became the CSDP with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
EEAS : European External Action Service.
EGF : European Gendarmerie Force.
EUSR : European Union Special Representative.
FPI: Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, a Commission department reporting directly to the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Among other things, the FPI manages expenditures on actions 
implemented under the Common Foreign and Security Policy — including civilian CSDP missions — and the 
Instrument for Stability.
GPPT : German Police Project Team in Afghanistan.
Headquarters : The EEAS and the Commission services in Brussels.
IPCB : International Police Coordination Board of Afghanistan.
ISAF : International Security Assistance Force, part of the combined international effort that was mandated by 
the United Nations Security Council. It worked to ensure that conditions were in place for the Government of 
Afghanistan to exercise its authority throughout the country.
LOTFA : Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan.
MIP : Mission implementation plan.
Mentoring : Structured transfer of knowledge, ideally based on trust and mutual respect, between a mentor and 
a mentee, aiming at achieving individual and/or organisational changes in accordance with a strategy and/or plan 
established at various levels — strategic, operational and tactical ( source : EUPOL’s Mentoring Handbook, April 2013).
Monitoring : Observing, assessing and reporting on the performance of relevant institutions and their staff ( source : 
EUPOL’s Mentoring Handbook, April 2013).
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
06 Glossary and acronyms
NTM -A: NATO Training Mission  — Afghanistan.
OPLAN : Operation Plan, a document that further elaborates on the operational details necessary for 
implementation of the objectives set out in the Conops.
PSC : Political and Security Committee. According to Article 38 of the Treaty on European Union, the PSC exercises, 
under the responsibility of the Council and the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of 
crisis management operations.
Tashkeel : A document/structure/system detailing all staffing positions and levels.
07
 Executive  
summary
I
Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the 
European Union (EU) and its Member States commit ‑
ted themselves to support the Government of Afghan ‑
istan in establishing a stronger framework of rule of 
law in the country. The EU police mission in Afghani ‑
stan (EUPOL) is a civilian mission developed in 2007 in 
the context of the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) and aimed at contributing to the estab ‑
lishment of a sustainable and effective civilian police 
force under Afghan ownership.
II
The Court assessed whether EUPOL Afghanistan had 
been effective in delivering its mandate. The audit 
focused on whether EUPOL was well planned and 
well coordinated; whether it had received adequate 
operational support and guidance; whether EUPOL 
has contributed to the progress of the Afghan national 
police and, lastly, whether the phasing out of EUPOL 
has been adequately prepared. The audit covered the 
period from EUPOL’s launch until end 2014, with a par ‑
ticular focus on its activities after 2012.
III
The EU has managed to establish a European civilian 
police mission in Afghanistan in a particularly insecure 
and tough environment. After a difficult start, EUPOL 
has gradually gained recognition from other actors 
for its expertise and its significant contribution to the 
ongoing reform of the police sector.
IV
The Court found that EUPOL Afghanistan has been 
partly effective in delivering its mandate. Improve ‑
ments were more notable in two of EUPOL’s three 
main lines of operations. The Court also examined 
EUPOL’s results per type of activity and found that 
EUPOL has been largely successful in training ‑related 
activities but less so in mentoring and advising. Pro ‑
jects have had a limited contribution to the mission’s 
objectives. While external factors may provide some 
of the explanations for this, other shortcomings can be 
attributed to EUPOL itself.
08 Executive summary 
V
Regarding the planning of EUPOL, the Council’s deci ‑
sion to launch the mission was preceded by a thor ‑
ough analysis of Afghan needs. The audit found that 
EUPOL’s objectives add value by focusing on strategic 
level training and advising in the field of policing, with 
linkages to the wider rule of law through the work of 
other international actors. However, EUPOL’s deploy ‑
ment was complicated and it took significant time 
before the mission reached a certain staffing level, 
mainly due to the difficult operational context and to 
recruitment and logistical problems.
VI
As regards coordination, EUPOL did not manage to 
bring together all European actors under a single 
European framework to improve Afghan policing, but 
it has enhanced cooperation with the EU Member 
States on the ground and has genuinely sought to 
promote international cooperation.
VII
With respect to headquarters’ support and guidance, 
the Court found that the EU Member States and the 
EEAS have regularly adjusted EUPOL’s mandate in 
line with changing priorities and the situation on the 
ground. EUPOL’s reporting meets basic accountabil ‑
ity requirements but remains largely descriptive and 
without sufficient focus on the results achieved and 
value added. Support from headquarters has been rel ‑
evant and useful overall but guidance should be more 
detailed in order to meet the specific operational 
needs of the mission. Work is currently being done 
to improve guidance, and the possibility of further 
centralising certain functions is being examined on 
a cost–benefit basis.VIII
Concerning the results achieved and their sustain ‑
ability, EUPOL has helped the Afghan national police 
to gain public trust by supporting the implementation 
of basic principles of civilian policing. Nevertheless, 
the police and justice sectors continue to suffer from 
systemic weaknesses. The long‑term sustainability of 
EUPOL’s outcomes and of the Afghan policing sector in 
general is at risk, as it will largely depend on the will ‑
ingness of the Afghan authorities to take ownership 
of the outcomes, the security situation and on EU and 
other international stakeholder funding.
IX
Lastly, with respect to phasing‑out, EUPOL and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) have drawn 
up a plan for winding down EUPOL’s activities by the 
end of 2016, but some concerns remain on how the EU 
can build upon EUPOL’s achievements and whether 
maximum value will be obtained from the disposal of 
the mission’s assets.
X
Besides being applicable to the EUPOL mission in 
Afghanistan, the Court’s recommendations relate to 
the setting up, deployment and general aspects of 
improving preparatory measures and support func ‑
tions for future CSDP missions. They also include prac ‑
tical measures to improve the effectiveness of each 
type of activity, measures to improve the sustainability 
of CSDP mission outcomes, and the preparation of an 
overall strategy to mitigate the risks inherent in the 
downsizing and closure of missions and the disposal of 
mission assets.
09
 Introduction
01 
Following the overthrow of the Taliban 
regime in 2001, Afghan representatives 
participated in the UN talks held in 
Bonn to decide on a plan for govern ‑
ing the country. These talks led to the 
Bonn Agreement1, which established 
an Afghan Interim Authority to run the 
country, and called for the deployment 
of an international military force2 to as ‑
sist the Authority in the maintenance 
of security in Kabul and the surround ‑
ing areas (see Annex I ).
02 
International donors meeting at the 
G8 conference held in Geneva in April 
20023 adopted a reform programme 
based on a lead nation framework to 
deal with security issues in particular. 
Under the framework, the security sec ‑
tor was divided into five pillars, with 
five lead nations assigned to oversee 
and support reforms for each pillar. 
The five lead nations were Germany 
(responsible for policing), Japan (disar ‑
mament, demilitarisation and reinte ‑
gration), Italy (justice), the United King ‑
dom (combating drugs) and the USA 
(the army). In this context, the German 
Police Project Office commenced its 
work in April 2002. The framework was 
meant to ensure burden sharing, but 
there was no mechanism to provide an 
overarching and coordinated approach 
to the international community’s secu ‑
rity reform efforts.03 
By 2005, the lead nation approach had 
weakened and the International Secu ‑
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) became the 
de facto leader within the international 
community for developing the security 
sector in Afghanistan. In a Joint Decla ‑
ration4, the EU and its Member States 
committed themselves to supporting 
the Government of Afghanistan in es ‑
tablishing a stronger framework of rule 
of law in the country (see Figure 1 ).1 Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending Re‑establishment of 
Permanent Institutions, Bonn, 
5 December 2001.
2 In response, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1386 of 
December 20, 2001, 
authorised the creation of an 
International Security 
Assistance Force. In 2011, 25 
EU Member States had 
deployed about 33 000 troops 
to the ISAF.
3 The G8 is the name of a forum 
for the governments of 
a group of eight leading 
advanced economies (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) and the 
European Commission.
4 EU Joint Declaration 
‘Committing to a new EU 
Afghan Partnership’, 
16 November 2005.
10 Introduction
Map of AfghanistanFigure 1
Qarah Bagh
Khas Uruzgan
Spin Buldak
Chehar 
BorjakDeh ShuKadeshAnar DarrehShindand-OwbehKarokhTowraghondiQeysarTokzarAndkhvoy
DowlatabadKeleft
Jeyretan
ShulgarahKholm KhanabadRostaq
FarkharJorm
EshkashemQala-I-Panjeh
Dowshi
Now ZadDowlat 
Yar
Kajaki
Delaram Jalalabad
SharanGhazni
QalatTirin Kot
KandaharBaghlan
Chaghcharan
Farah
Lashkar GahTaluqanFayzabad
Pul-e-Alam
ZaranjKhost (Matun)Sari PulKunduz
Maydan
Shahr
GardezMehtarlam
Kabul
FARAH
NIMROZHILMAND
KANDAHARZABULPAKTIKAGHAZNI
URUZGANLOGAR
KHOSTTAKHARBADAKHSHAN
BAGHLA NBALKHJAWZJAN
SARI PULFARYAB
BADGHIS
GHORPARWANPANJSHER
KABUL
WARDAK
PAKTYALAGHMAN KUNDUZ
NURISTAN
NANGARHARKAPISA
HiratBamyan
HIRATKUNARBAMYAN
DAY
KUNDI
Zhob
Chaman
QuettaZabol
ZahedanGushgyKiroyaKerki
Dusti KhorughQurghonteppa
(Kurgan-Tyube)
Mary
Mardan
Peshawar
RawalpindiTermiz 
Gilgit
Taybad
TankBannuIslamabadTURKMENISTANTAJIKISTAN
PAKISTANUZBEKISTANINDI AJammu 
and 
KashmirCHINA
ISLAMIC   REPUBLIC   OF  IRANFarah 
Hilmand 
Gowd-e 
ZerehHarut 
  Khash Rowd-e Lurah Arghandab Gushgy Murghob 
Darya-ye Amu Darya 
Tedzhen 
Harirud Indus Pamir 
Tarnak Morghab Murgab 
Helmand Kunar 
Zhob
Chaman
QuettaZabol
ZahedanGushgyKiroyaKerki
Dusti KhorughQurghonteppa
(Kurgan-Tyube)
Mary
Mardan
Peshawar
RawalpindiTermiz 
Gilgit
Taybad
TankBannuQarah Bagh
Khas Uruzgan
Spin Buldak
Chehar 
BorjakDeh ShuKadeshAnar DarrehShindand-OwbehKarokhTowraghondiQeysarTokzarAndkhvoy
DowlatabadKeleft
Jeyretan
ShulgarahKholm KhanabadRostaq
FarkharJorm
EshkashemQala-I-Panjeh
Dowshi
Now ZadDowlat Yar
Kajaki
Delaram Asad Abad
Jalalabad
SharanGhazni
QalatTirin Kot
KandaharNiliAybakBaghlanShiberghan
Maymana
Qala-e-Naw
Chaghcharan
FarahHerat
Lashkar GahBamyanTaloqanFayz Abad
Chaharikar
Pul-e-Alam
ZaranjKhost (Matun)Sari PulMazar-e-SharifKunduz
Poruns 
Maydan
ShahrMahmud-e-
Raqi
GardezMehtarlamBazarak
Kabul
IslamabadHindu  Kush 
Peywar PassKhyber Pass 
FARAH
NIMROZHILMAND
KANDAHARZABULPAKTIKAGHAZNI
URUZGANDAY
KUNDILOGAR
KHOSTTAKHARBADAKHSHAN
BAGHLANBALKHJAWZJAN
SARI PUL
BAMYANFARYAB
BADGHIS
HERAT GHORPARWANPANJSHER
KABUL
WARDAKKUNAR
PAKTYALAGHMAN SAMANGANKUNDUZ
NURISTAN
NANGARHARKAPISATURKMENISTANTAJIKISTAN
PAKISTANUZBEKISTANINDI AJammu 
and 
KashmirCHINA
ISLAMIC  REPUBLIC  OF  IRANAFGHANISTAN
Map No. 3958 Rev. 7   Source: UNITED NATIONS
June 2011Department of Field Support
Cartographic SectionNational capital
Provincial capitalTown, villageAirports
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Main roadSecondary road
Railroad(
00 50 100 150 200 250 km
50 100 150 miThe boundaries and names shown  and the designations 
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control
in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet beenagreed upon by the parties.AFGHANISTAN36° 
34° 
32° 
30° 64° 66° 68° 70° 72° 74° 
36°
34°
32°
30°
62°64°66°68°70°72°74°
11 Introduction
04 
The 2006 Afghanistan Compact, 
launched at the London conference in 
January 2006, provided a new frame ‑
work for cooperation between the 
elected government of Afghanistan 
and the international community. In 
this context, a joint EU assessment mis ‑
sion was carried out in autumn 2006 to 
assess Afghan needs in the rule of law sector. It was followed in November 
2006 by a fact‑finding mission which 
proposed a joint EU intervention 
based around a strategic approach for 
building a functioning national police 
force with a country‑wide remit. This 
proposal was supported by the Afghan 
government, which sent a letter on 
16 May 2007 inviting the EU to launch 
a police mission (see Box 1 ).
5 Council Joint Action 2007/369/
CFSP of 30 May 2007 on 
establishment of the European 
Union Police Mission in 
Afghanistan (EUPOL 
Afghanistan) (OJ L 139, 
31.5.2007, p. 33).CSDP missions
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping 
operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. It is a part of the EU’s compre ‑
hensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.
CSDP missions are of two kinds: civilian missions financed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
budget, and military missions financed by the Member States. Civilian CSDP missions vary in scope (police, 
monitoring, judicial or security sector reform), in nature (executive or non‑executive) and in size.
As at the end of 2014, the EU had deployed a total of 32 CSDP missions, 16 of which had been completed and 
wound up and 16 were still ongoing (11 civilian and five military missions).Box 1
05 
On 30 May 2007, the Council decided 
to establish the EU police mission in 
Afghanistan5 (EUPOL). EUPOL was 
meant to build on the efforts of the 
German Police Project Office and to 
seek to harmonise the approaches and 
efforts of the various partners involved 
in police reform. The aim was to con ‑
tribute to the establishment of sus ‑
tainable and effective civilian policing 
arrangements, under Afghan owner ‑
ship, that would ensure appropriate 
interaction with the wider criminal 
justice system (see Box 2 ).
12 Introduction
06 
The total cost of EUPOL for the period 
May 2007 to December 2014 was close 
to 400 million euro. Security‑related 
costs accounted for almost one third of 
that amount 6 (see also Annex II ).6 This figure includes all 
commitments up to the end of 
2014, thus it does not reflect 
the most recent commitment 
of 57.75 million euro for 2015 
(Council Decision 2014/922/
CFSP of 17 December 2014 
amending and extending 
Decision 2010/279/CFSP on 
the European Union Police 
Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL 
AFGHANISTAN) (OJ L 363, 
18.12.2014, p. 152)). The 
Council has approved 10 
financing decisions (and 
extensions of financing 
decisions) amounting to 
392.4 million euro of 
commitments and respective 
disbursements of 
346.2 million euro. Staff costs 
(for seconded, international 
contracted and about 200 
local staff) represent about 
43 % of the EUPOL budget, 
while the security of personnel 
and premises accounts for 
28 %.EUPOL
EUPOL started operations on 15 June 2007. It is a civilian CSDP mission supporting the reform efforts of the 
Afghan government in building an improved civilian police service operating within the framework of the rule 
of law and respect for human rights.
The Civilian Operation Commander, who is also the Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC), exercises command and control of EUPOL at a strategic level, under the political control and strate ‑
gic direction of the Political and Security Committee. The Head of Mission exercises operational control over 
EUPOL and assumes its day‑to‑day management.
EUPOL Afghanistan activities are principally carried out by police and rule of law experts seconded from EU 
Member States, as well as contracted international experts and local staff. The mission works through training 
and mentoring, advising and monitoring the senior leadership of relevant Afghan institutions (Ministry of the 
Interior, Afghan National Police, Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Office). It has also carried out 
a number of projects.
EUPOL Afghanistan implements its mandate along three lines of operations:
 οLine of Operation 1: Advancing institutional reform of the Ministry of the Interior.
 οLine of Operation 2: Professionalising the national police.
 οLine of Operation 3: Connecting the national police to the wider justice system.
At the time of the audit in late 2014, EUPOL had operations in Kabul, Herat and Mazar‑e Sharif.Box 2
13
 Audit scope and approach
07 
The Court assessed whether EUPOL 
Afghanistan had been effective in de ‑
livering its mandate. The audit focused 
on the following questions:
(a) Was EUPOL well planned and set 
up?
(b) Has EUPOL been well coordinated 
with Member States, other interna ‑
tional stakeholders and the Afghan 
authorities?
(c) Has EUPOL received adequate 
operational support and guidance 
given its mandate?
(d) Has EUPOL contributed to the 
progress of the Afghan National 
Police and are the results likely to 
be sustainable?
(e) Has the phasing out of EUPOL 
been adequately prepared?
08 
The audit covered the period from 
EUPOL’s launch in 2007 until the end of 
2014. It focused in particular on EUPOL 
activities after 2012.
09 
The audit was carried out between 
July and December 2014. The Court 
gathered evidence for its assessment 
through various means:
(a) documentary analysis and litera ‑
ture review;(b) an on‑the‑spot visit to Kabul in 
September 2014 to examine sup ‑
porting documentation, to review 
EUPOL’s procedures and systems 
and finally to interview national 
police officers, staff of the Min ‑
istries of the Interior and Justice, 
EUPOL staff (including trainers and 
mentors), the EU Special Repre ‑
sentative in Afghanistan (EUSR), 
staff at the EU delegation in Kabul, 
ISAF and NATO personnel, the 
International Police Coordination 
Board of Afghanistan (IPCB), the 
United Nations Development Pro ‑
gramme (UNDP) in Kabul and six 
EU representations in Afghanistan7;
(c) interviews with key staff of the 
Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC), the Crisis Man ‑
agement and Planning Directorate 
(CMPD), the Service for Foreign 
Policy Instruments (FPI), the 
geographical desk officers at the 
EEAS and the Commission; inter ‑
views were also held with repre ‑
sentatives of five Member States8 
participating in the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Manage ‑
ment (Civcom) and, finally, NATO 
staff;
(d) review of a sample of six moni ‑
toring, mentoring and advising 
activities and 11 projects which 
were planned and implemented 
between 2011 and 2014 (see  
Annex III ).7 Representations (either 
Ambassadors or Heads of 
Mission) of France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.
8 Representatives of Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, as well as the 
Chairman of Civcom.
14
 Observations
A relevant mandate, yet 
a problematic start
10 
The Court examined whether the set ‑
ting up and deployment of EUPOL was 
preceded by a comprehensive assess ‑
ment of Afghan needs. It also assessed whether operational challenges in con ‑
nection with the deployment of EUPOL 
had been given due attention.
Shaping EUPOL
11 
The Council’s decision to launch EUPOL 
was preceded by a joint EU assessment 
mission which recommended, inter 
alia, that the EU consider contributing further to support the Afghan police 
through a police mission. This was con ‑
firmed by the subsequent fact‑finding 
mission9 in late 2006, which proposed 
that the EU could provide added value 
by contributing to a civilian policing 
mission with linkages to the wider to 
rule of law.9 Council of the European 
Union, Report on the Fact 
Finding Mission on possible 
ESDP Mission to Afghanistan, 
18 December 2006.Photo 1EUPOL ’s offices
Source:  ECA.
15 Observations
12 
The two missions were carried out by 
large and diverse teams of experts in 
the fields of policing and the rule of 
law. This preparatory work leading up 
to the launch of the mission ensured 
that EUPOL’s objectives were aligned 
with the priorities stated in the 2006 
Afghan Compact and with the security 
pillar of the Afghanistan National De ‑
velopment Strategy for 2008–13. Given 
the situation on the ground, security 
was essential for creating the condi ‑
tions for stability, economic growth 
and poverty reduction.
13 
The preferred approach was to foster 
the achievements of the German Police 
Project Office (GPPO), which was al ‑
ready well established on the ground, 
by providing a reinforced and coherent 
European presence in the security sec ‑
tor, in particular in civil policing. The 
German police mission was successful 
in training higher echelons of the hier ‑
archy — through providing strategic 
advice to the Ministry of the Interior 
and the national police and improving 
cooperation with international actors 
rather than training the national police 
rank and file. EUPOL was welcomed by 
Afghans and international actors as it 
provided the building block hitherto 
missing from ongoing international 
efforts as a whole.14 
However, EUPOL faced a laborious task 
in delivering its mandate owing to the 
almost complete lack of a function ‑
ing police force. Other crucial issues 
included illiteracy rates among police 
staff of up to 80 %, meaning that many 
police officers were unable to process 
evidence or read and write reports. 
Pervasive corruption in law enforce ‑
ment and judicial institutions was an 
additional challenge to the effective 
delivery of EUPOL’s mandate.
Deployment difficulties
15 
The EU has managed to set up a civil ‑
ian police mission in a very tough and 
hostile environment. However, at the 
time of EUPOL’s launch in June 2007, 
only 2 months after the Council deci ‑
sion setting it up, it was far from ready 
given the difficult operational context: 
it had only four staff in Kabul at the 
time, and they had no access to the 
Internet and no vehicles. The major ‑
ity of EUPOL staff were in fact hastily 
rebadged seconded police officers 
from missions of individual EU Member 
States10. Few had received instructions 
on how the new ’European’ mission 
differed from their previous bilateral 
arrangements.
16 
The deployment process was further 
hampered by leadership problems 
which seriously affected operations 
during the first phase: within the first 
18 months, EUPOL’s Head of Mission 
changed three times. Logistic prob ‑
lems linked to the procurement of 
equipment or finding accommodation 
for EUPOL staff were other major prac ‑
tical issues that further slowed down 
operations.10 Centre for European Reform, 
Policy Brief, April 2010.
16 Observations
17 
Another factor was the reluctance of 
Member States to second personnel to 
the mission, in part because of the dif ‑
ficult start‑up EUPOL was experiencing 
(see also paragraph 25). The idea was 
for the mission to be fully operational 
and present in Kabul and in specific 
provinces by the end of March 2008. 
However, this was not achieved. Its 
mandated establishment plan, com ‑
prising 200 international staff, was not 
achieved until February 2009 — al ‑
most 2 years after the EU intervention 
began.18 
Although the Council acknowledged 
as early as 2008 that the original staff 
complement should be doubled to 
400, EUPOL had still not reached the 
threshold of 300 staff (75 % of the 
planned capacity) by the end of 2010, 
and it achieved a peak of 350 staff only 
in January 2012 and then declined (see 
Figure 2 ).Figure 2Total international (seconded and contracted) and EU 
seconded staff in EUPOL on 31 December of each year from 
2007  to 2014
Source:  EEAS (CPCC).272296330341
292
235
177
85
64122185214232 238
206
148
Seconded (from EU Member States)Total international staﬀ (Seconded and Contracted)2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007050100150200250300350400
17 Observations
19 
There are a number of reasons why the 
mission did not achieve the planned 
capacity:
(a) EUPOL had difficulties in finding 
volunteers owing to the security 
situation in Afghanistan;
(b) EUPOL was in competition with 
other CSDP missions in recruiting 
seconded (and, to a lesser ex ‑
tent, contractual) experts; in this 
respect, Afghanistan was a less at ‑
tractive option. EUPOL also had to 
compete with other international 
missions, such as the NATO Train ‑
ing Mission in Afghanistan (NTM‑A) 
and United Nations missions;
(c) certain seconded positions, such 
as those requiring knowledge 
of project analysis and report ‑
ing, legal expertise or a rule of 
law background, were difficult 
to fill because of low numbers of 
applicants;
(d) owing to the nature of EUPOL’s 
tasks, some positions required ex ‑
perts with experience in national 
ministries; police mentoring posi ‑
tions seconded to the Ministry of 
the Interior were the most difficult 
to fill.
20 
EUPOL is mandated to address police 
reform at central, regional and provin ‑
cial levels. However, deployment to 
the provinces was problematic owing 
mainly to inadequate security condi ‑
tions, logistical challenges and the lack 
of proper accommodation.21 
In this context, EUPOL deployed field 
offices in 11 provinces11 in 2008 (see 
Annex IV ) and increased the number 
to 16 in 2009. EUPOL was unable to 
deploy throughout specific provinces 
of Afghanistan as planned, because 
the US and Turkey have not signed 
Technical Agreements with EUPOL in 
the provinces where they were pre ‑
sent. In addition, most field offices 
were poorly manned and only two 
of them (in Herat and Mazar‑e Sharif) 
were consistently staffed by more than 
10 persons. This was confirmed by an 
internal EEAS assessment carried out 
by the CPCC in 201112 which concluded 
that delivery of the mission in the 
provinces to that point in time had 
been ‘rather poor and its impact mar ‑
ginal’. The drastic reduction of EUPOL’s 
field offices was finally dictated by 
the de facto closure of the European 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the 
Afghan provinces. By 2013, the number 
of field offices beside Kabul had been 
cut to only two.11 Out of the 34 provinces in all.
12 CPCC 13077/11, EUPOL 
Afghanistan operational 
assessment report, 
11 October 2011.
18 Observations
Difficulties with 
coordinating 
international efforts
22 
The Court examined whether EUPOL 
was well coordinated with other EU ef ‑
forts, other international stakeholders 
and the Afghan authorities.
A European effort, but 
no overarching European 
approach
23 
The report of the fact‑finding mis ‑
sion noted that a crucial factor for the 
mission’s success was that it should 
provide a single framework for the 
Member States by promoting a ‘Eu ‑
ropean’ voice on police reform in Af ‑
ghanistan. Similarly, the Council Joint 
Action establishing EUPOL13 stipulated 
that the mission should, as appropri ‑
ate, coordinate, facilitate and provide 
advice on projects implemented by 
Member States and third states under 
their responsibility. This proved chal ‑
lenging for the following main reasons:
24 
Firstly, coordination between EUPOL, 
the EUSR and the EU delegation was 
initially very weak, although from 2010 
the revised mandate further clarified 
their respective roles and responsi ‑
bilities. An additional reference to the 
responsibility of the Head of Mission 
was included: the HoM was to ‘coor ‑
dinate with other EU actors on the 
ground and […] receive local politi ‑
cal guidance from the EUSR’. Intra‑EU 
coordination further improved with the creation of the EEAS in 2011 which 
provided a structured coordination 
mechanism and led to a ‘double‑hat ‑
ted Ambassador (both EUSR and Head 
of EU Delegation).
25 
The second challenge was the fact 
that EU Member States continued 
their individual actions in parallel to 
contributing seconded staff to EUPOL. 
Member States had their preferred ac ‑
tivities in the police, law enforcement 
and rule of law sectors in Afghanistan. 
Joining EUPOL, rather than maintain ‑
ing bilateral efforts, was sometimes 
seen as losing national influence and 
visibility on the ground.
26 
Over time, EUPOL has made extensive 
efforts to coordinate its activities with 
EU Member States in the context of 
specific projects. One example has 
been close cooperation between 
EUPOL and the German Police Project 
Team (GPPT).
27 
Some Member States14 have also 
participated in parallel joint European 
efforts, such as the European Gendar ‑
merie Force (EGF)15. EU Member States 
with a ’gendarmerie‘ model therefore 
had more in common with the EGF, or 
NATO’s NTM‑A16 approach, than with 
the kind of civil policing that EUPOL 
was trying to achieve. Some EU Mem ‑
ber States interviewed also expressed 
the view that the ‘gendarmerie’ train ‑
ing model was more suitable to the 
Afghan situation on the ground.13 The Joint Action establishing 
the EUPOL mission stipulated 
that: ‘The Council and the 
Commission shall, each in 
accordance with its respective 
powers, ensure consistency 
between the implementation 
of this Joint Action and 
external activities of the 
Community in accordance 
with Article 3 of the Treaty. The 
Council and the Commission 
shall cooperate to this end’.
14 France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Poland and Spain.
15 The European Gendarmerie 
Force (Eurogendfor) is 
a multinational police force 
constituted only by elements 
of police forces with military 
status. The EGF mostly 
focused on training and 
advising. Though its experts 
were part of the national 
missions, they performed their 
tasks under the NTM‑A chain 
of command. The EGF mission 
deployment peaked at about 
400 staff in May 2011 and has 
declined ever since.
16 The NTM‑A delivered 
a large‑scale police training 
initiative which was 
specifically tailored to the 
security situation on the 
ground. At the end of 2011, the 
NTM‑A was operating 
23 training sites in 
Afghanistan, with a staff of 
778 trainers and 
2 825 contractors providing 
support services.
19 Observations
Despite its efforts, EUPOL 
has had limited scope for 
influencing major actors
28 
In terms of EUPOL’s objective to 
improve cohesion and coordination 
among international actors, the mis ‑
sion’s limited size was one restricting 
factor when it came to taking the lead 
in this area. Compared to the NATO‑led 
NTM‑A, EUPOL was a minor player. It 
was difficult for EUPOL to exert much 
influence over this major international 
entity.
29 
Another adverse factor was the largely 
unsuccessful work carried out by 
the International Police Coordina ‑
tion Board of Afghanistan (IPCB) 17. 
Over the past 13 years, more than 37 
different international donors have 
been involved in supporting Afghan 
police development, most of them by 
contributing to the NTM‑A, to EUPOL, 
or to both. To ensure coherence, the 
IPCB was established in 2007 to act 
as the main body for coordinating 
police‑related efforts. Although EUPOL 
has provided significant capacity and 
administrative support to the IPCB, the 
latter has achieved very limited results 
in terms of promoting cooperation 
among the international community. 
International stakeholders have been 
unwilling to be coordinated and have 
perceived the IPCB as an ambitious 
effort on the part of the EU to take the 
lead in the policing sector. Addition ‑
ally, IPCB’s inadequate results were 
definitely linked to poorly designed 
processes which put an additional bur ‑
den on the involved parties without 
much quantifiable outcome.30 
The Court found that cooperation 
with NATO‑led efforts has gradually 
improved over time. Tangible results 
of this cooperation extend to security 
arrangements for EUPOL staff and the 
agreement to jointly set up the Profes ‑
sional Training Board for the devel ‑
opment and accreditation of police 
training curricula.
Headquarters’ support 
functions and guidance 
have improved over time
31 
The Court examined whether EU Mem ‑
ber States and the EEAS have made the 
appropriate adjustments to EUPOL’s 
mandate during the operational phase, 
whether EUPOL reporting gives a fair 
account of its achievements and what 
support and guidance it has received.
Planning and reporting 
capabilities have improved, 
but shortcomings remain
32 
The Court found that EU Member 
States and the EEAS were reasonably 
flexible in adjusting EUPOL’s mandate 
in line with changing priorities and 
conditions on the ground.17 EUPOL has been a major 
contributor to the 
International Police 
Coordination Board of 
Afghanistan (IPCB) for 
example by ensuring the 
functioning of the IPCB 
Secretariat. The IPCB was 
established in 2007 with the 
purpose to act as the main 
international body for 
coordinating police‑related 
international organisations.
20 Observations
33 
Since the Council approval of the first 
Operational Plan (OPLAN) in 2007, 
key planning documents have been 
revised four times:
(a) in 2008, a revision was necessary 
in response to the Council’s new 
commitment to double (to 400) 
the number of international ex ‑
perts assigned to the mission;
(b) in 2010, a revision was mainly the 
consequence of a reprioritisa ‑
tion decided by the new Afghan 
Minister of the Interior and the 
corresponding request to EUPOL, 
leading to some alignment of 
the mission’s focus with Ministry 
priorities18;
(c) the main driver for the 2013 revi ‑
sion was the international com ‑
munity’s pledge to support strong 
anti‑corruption measures and 
strengthen the rule of law. The 
revision included much empha ‑
sis on the professionalisation of 
the Afghan Police in line with the 
‘Ten‑Year Vision’19 document;
(d) most recently, the revision of 
July 2014 was proposed so that 
the necessary operational details 
could be drawn up for the phasing 
out of EUPOL by the end of 2016, 
following the Council Decision of 
23 June 2014.
34 
Regarding the operational planning 
of its activities, EUPOL translates strat ‑ 
egic objectives set by the EU Member 
States in the OPLANs into a mission 
implementation plan (MIP), which lays 
down specific tasks for each objective, 
milestones for each task and objec ‑
tively verifiable indicators for each 
milestone.35 
The Court found that, before 2013, 
each MIP included too many mile ‑
stones (up to 600). This made it impos ‑
sible for the mission’s management to 
use the MIP for steering the mission in 
an efficient manner. The Court ana ‑
lysed the most recent MIPs (covering 
the period 2013 and 2014) and noted 
major improvements compared with 
older plans, including, in particular the 
addition of background information 
on activities, as well as clearer links be ‑
tween objectives, tasks and milestones 
and cross‑references between similar 
activities. In addition, results indica ‑
tors have not been sufficiently based 
upon a thorough needs assessment 
or linked to EUPOL operational mile ‑
stones. Some indicators have focused 
on outputs rather outcomes20.
36 
The Court noted that there have also 
been gradual improvements in the 
accuracy and fairness of EUPOL report ‑
ing. However, by the end of 2014, 
EUPOL did not produce a single and 
comprehensive monitoring table for 
tracking milestones to related activi ‑
ties, state of progress and corrective 
actions21.18 In particular, emphasis was put 
on developing intelligence 
and criminal investigative 
capacity.
19 The ‘Ten‑Year Vision’ is 
a document produced by the 
Afghan Ministry of the Interior 
which set strategic goals and 
describes the desired state of 
the Afghan Police in 10 years.
20 Outputs are the goods and 
services that an activity or 
a project produce, and 
outcomes are the benefit for 
a target group as 
a consequence of the activity’s 
or project’s output.
21 However, this tool is currently 
applied by other CSDP 
missions.
21 Observations
22 For budgetary aspects relating 
to mission implementation.
23 Council Decision 2012/698/
CFSP of 13 November 2012 on 
the establishment of 
a warehouse for civilian crisis 
management missions (OJ 
L 314, 14.11.2012, p. 25) aimed 
at ensuring the rapid 
deployment of equipment to 
existing and future civilian 
crisis management missions, 
strengthening its capabilities, 
in particular by seeking to 
ensure quick and continuous 
access to key assets.Headquarters’ guidance 
and support functions: 
weaknesses are being 
addressed
37 
The EEAS and the Commission22 are 
tasked with producing guidance for 
CSDP missions. This guidance should 
be sufficiently comprehensive and 
detailed in order to assist missions in 
delivering their mandate and ensure 
that personnel with little previous 
experience of mission procedures can 
work efficiently.
38 
While the EEAS has produced about 
50 concept papers and guidelines 
relevant to EUPOL activities, EUPOL 
staff in Kabul expressed concerns that, 
although the documentation pro ‑
vides basic guidance (definitions and 
theoretical aspects), it is not particu ‑
larly helpful for practical purposes. For 
example, the guideline on the im ‑
plementation of benchmarking does 
not discuss in detail how to proceed 
at each stage, e.g. how to carry out 
a proper needs assessment or situation 
analysis. Nor does it give examples 
or templates that would facilitate the 
implementation of the methodology 
proposed.39 
Of particular interest is EUPOL’s men ‑
toring handbook. Despite mentoring 
being one of EUPOL’s key activities, the 
mission had to develop its own men ‑
toring handbook. However, this was 
done only in April 2013, as a compila ‑
tion of existing concepts, methodolo ‑
gies and best practices adapted to the 
realities faced by EUPOL mentors. The 
handbook was later used by the EEAS 
to draft a detailed mentoring guide ‑
line that was distributed to all CSDP 
missions.
40 
The lack of standardised CSDP guid ‑
ance obliged the mission to spend 
time developing guidelines and proce ‑
dures rather than focusing on its core 
activities. The EEAS is now working to 
remedy these shortcomings.
41 
The EEAS and the Commission are also 
considering the potential for obtain ‑
ing greater efficiencies by centralis ‑
ing support functions under a single 
shared service centre. It is also current ‑
ly working on the idea of developing 
centralised and integrated information 
management systems in the areas 
of human resources, IT and logistics 
encompassing all CSDP missions. Deci ‑
sions are also pending on bringing the 
Warehouse for civilian crisis manage ‑
ment missions, which was established 
in 201223, within such a system. This 
has the potential to improve manage ‑
ment of the assets of existing civilian 
missions.
22 Observations
EUPOL ’s footprint: local 
success but general 
concerns about 
sustainability
42 
The Court examined whether EUPOL 
has contributed to the progress made 
by the national police, the Ministry of 
Interior and selected criminal justice 
institutions, under each line of opera ‑
tion, whether monitoring, mentoring, 
training and advising activities have 
produced the intended results24 and 
to what extent those results will be 
sustainable.
Improvements were more 
notable in two of the three 
lines of operation
43 
Improvements were more notable in 
the first two of EUPOL’s three lines 
of operations. With regard to Line of 
Operation 1 (advancing institutional 
reform of the Ministry of the Interior), 
the national police have made signifi ‑
cant steps towards the development 
of civilian policing but they remain 
a highly militaristic organisation. 
While the Ministry of the Interior has 
produced many internal policy state ‑
ments, to date few have been imple ‑
mented countrywide. It has set up 
and maintains an electronic database 
to manage its vast human resources 
(Tashkeel), but it has limited capability 
to fully exploit this tool and the flex ‑
ibility of deployment planning could be further improved. There is a short ‑
age of professional civil servants with 
a relevant administrative background. 
Despite EUPOL’s support, gender and 
human rights concerns have recently 
surfaced as issues within the Ministry 
of the Interior. For example, women 
still account for only 2 % of national 
police officers. Corruption within the 
ministry and the police remains a sig ‑
nificant problem and adversely affects 
public trust.
44 
With regard to Line of Operation 2 
(professionalising the national po ‑
lice), a community policing concept, 
which focuses on police building ties 
and working closely with the citizens, 
has been partially implemented at 
a basic level in some areas and the 
concept is generally accepted as the 
desired model for future policing in 
Afghanistan. Intelligence‑led policing 
has also been accepted as an effective 
tool to professionalise the national 
police but it is not used countrywide. 
Examination of crime data indicates 
that Afghan criminal police investiga ‑
tors have limited capacity to investi ‑
gate and detect crime. The technical 
capacity and leadership ability of the 
criminal investigation department 
remains underdeveloped due to lack 
of information sharing and inadequate 
training records. The relationship be ‑
tween police officers and prosecutors 
is often weak and ineffective. The na ‑
tional police and the Attorney General 
have been encouraged and supported 
by the international community to 
cooperate both institutionally and 24 The criteria used in the 
assessment are based on 
EUPOL’s indicators on 
mandate delivery and, to the 
extent possible, on an existing 
third party survey on the 
public’s perception of the 
Afghan national police.
23 Observations
operationally. Overall, the level of 
cooperation has improved but the 
number of cases referred by the Police 
to the Attorney General remains low. 
The police have shown that they are 
able to carry out large‑scale opera ‑
tions in a professional manner (provid ‑
ing a secure environment to hold the 
recent elections was a great achieve ‑
ment), but further assistance is needed 
with everyday policing, particularly the 
efficiency of response. The existence 
of national police call centres linked 
to operational centres is widely ac ‑
knowledged as a significant milestone 
towards improving police command 
and control. Training capacity, finally, 
is assessed to be effective, but many 
challenges remain in this area, includ ‑
ing that of establishing the recently 
transitioned colleges as specialised 
centres of excellence.
45 
The Line of Operation 3 (connecting 
the national police to justice reform) 
has been the most challenging area 
for EUPOL to show results. However, it 
must be viewed through the prism of 
the limited support received from the 
international community. Although 
the overall capacity of the Ministry of 
Justice and the Office of the Attorney 
General has increased, their institu ‑
tional development is hampered by 
the security situation and insurgent 
attacks25, a lack of professionalism, 
inadequately trained prosecutors and 
corruption. Cooperation between po ‑
lice and prosecutors remains limited, 
and there are many challenges and 
gaps at institutional and individual 
level, especially in connection with the 
prosecution of corruption among high 
ranking officials. It is still difficult to protect and to enforce the rights of de ‑
fendants and suspects in Afghanistan. 
With regard to the drafting, adoption 
and enforcement of criminal legisla ‑
tion, there has been some progress 
but basic international requirements in 
the areas of rule of law, anti‑corruption 
and human rights have still not been 
met.
EUPOL has been largely 
successful in training-
related activities but less so 
in mentoring and advising; 
projects have made little 
contribution to the mission’s 
objectives
46 
EUPOL’s contribution to police training 
has been multifaceted. It has devel ‑
oped a ‘train ‑the ‑trainer’ approach 
and delivered training courses to the 
national police, while also mentoring 
the Afghan Ministry of the Interior 
and national police leadership on 
training issues. Finally, it has initiated 
the Police Staff College, a permanent 
purpose‑built training facility, and 
delivered training curricula26.25 In 2012, 57 prosecutors were 
killed.
26 To the Police Staff College and 
the Crime Management 
College.
24 Observations
47 
In late 2008, EUPOL started to intensify 
and develop the training component 
into what was to become a corner ‑
stone of its activity. By late 2014, it 
had developed and delivered roughly 
1 400 training courses for about 
31 000 trainees. The Court’s visit to 
Kabul provided evidence that EUPOL’s 
training ‑related activities have contrib ‑
uted to the professionalisation of the 
national police. Courses were relevant 
and addressed major educational 
gaps. By targeting higher‑ranking 
police officers, who were not covered 
by other international bodies, EUPOL 
provided real EU added value through 
the embedding of elements of civil ‑
ian policing in the training of national 
police chiefs. Furthermore, the ‘train ‑ 
the‑trainer’ approach has promoted 
Afghan ownership and improved the 
sustainability of training activities.48 
The establishment of the Police Staff 
College was a milestone in the trans ‑
fer of the police education system to 
Afghan leadership. In 2010, EUPOL 
initiated discussions with the Ministry 
of the Interior, in coordination with 
the NTM‑A and GPPT, on the concept 
of a Police Staff College. All those 
concerned agreed that the Police 
Staff College should be established as 
a platform for the delivery of further 
training for police officers at a stra ‑
tegic, operational and tactical level. 
In August 2010, following a feasibility 
study, the EU proposed a coordinated 
action whereby (a) EUPOL, in line with 
its mandate, would develop training 
curricula and courses for the new col ‑
lege, and (b) the EU delegation and the 
FPI would finance the training facilities 
and provide project management un ‑
der the Instrument for Stability regula ‑
tion27. The project was undertaken as 
a matter of urgency, and the College 
was completed in January 2014 at a fi ‑
nal cost of 7.3 million euro. 27 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
15 November 2006 
establishing an Instrument for 
Stability (OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, 
p. 1.)Photo 2EUPOL and Afghan Police
Source:  EUPOL.

25 Observations
49 
On the matter of training curricula, the 
national police trainers were commit ‑
ted to working with the existing cur ‑
ricula and to developing them further. 
Nevertheless, some trainers pointed 
out the need for curricula more closely 
tailored to the Afghan context and 
including such topics as Islamic law 
and local customs, with practical ex ‑
amples from everyday life in Afghani ‑
stan. Some trainers also admitted that 
they skipped certain subjects, such as 
corruption, human rights and gender 
which they described as ‘unnecessary’ 
or ‘sensitive’.50 
EUPOL has not carried out a compre ‑
hensive evaluation of the results ob ‑
tained from its mentoring and advising 
activities. However, the audit found 
evidence that EUPOL’s mentoring and 
advising did contribute to improving 
the professional skills of individuals 
employed at the relevant Afghan insti ‑
tutions (national police, Ministry of the 
Interior and Ministry of Justice). With 
a few exceptions, EUPOL’s coverage of 
positions within the Afghan ministries 
and the national police was found to 
be in line with and relevant to the mis ‑
sion mandate.
51 
Box 3  provides examples of typical EU ‑
POL mentoring, advising and monitor ‑
ing activities.
Examples of mentoring, advising and monitoring activities
Example 1 — EUPOL advising at the Ministry of Justice
In the context of the Line of Operation 3 (connecting the national police to the wider justice system), a EUPOL 
expert provided support to the Head of the Criminal Law Division at the Legislative Department of the Afghan 
Ministry of Justice, in an effort to improve capacity and deliver results in the following areas:
 οlegislative drafting;
 οsupport the mentee’s role in the Secretariat for combating crimes of abduction and human trafficking;
 οanalyse the mentee’s departmental needs and organise trainings and workshops;
 οgive presentations on international laws and comparative studies with foreign legal systems.
Example 2 — EUPOL mentoring at the Police Staff Training College
The management of the Police Staff College, which provides and develops training for the Afghan national 
police, is still highly lacking in management skills. At the time of the Court’s audit, a EUPOL staff member was 
advising and mentoring the Commander of the Police Staff College with a view to improving strategic man ‑
agement and planning skills.Box 3
26 Observations
52 
However, there were also significant 
shortcomings. The selection of men ‑
toring positions was not duly docu ‑
mented in the mentoring files. In none 
of the six files reviewed did the audit 
find a structured explanation giving 
the arguments for selecting the par ‑
ticular mentee. It is therefore difficult 
to establish with any certainty whether 
EUPOL targeted the most relevant 
positions for its mentoring, monitor ‑
ing and advising. Neither was there 
an analysis of the perceived Afghan 
capacity gap or, consequently, a plan 
for addressing specific weaknesses.
53 
Achieving tangible results in mentor ‑
ing and advising is a complex and 
lengthy process that is also shaped by 
external factors — such as the tough 
security situation, the frequent turn ‑ 
over of Afghan officials and the rota ‑
tion of EUPOL mentors28 (see Box 4 ).54 
Despite the regular rotation of EUPOL 
mentors, EUPOL has not put in place, 
on a systematic basis, clear and con ‑
sistent handover procedures to ensure 
the smooth continuation of activity 
and avoidance of gaps and digressions 
that could jeopardise the mentoring 
relationship. The Court found that 
handover depended very much on the 
individual mentor and was often ham ‑
pered by the late arrival of the new 
mentor and the absence of procedural 
consistency.
Typical challenges faced by EUPOL advisors
Example 1  — rotation of national staff
One of EUPOL’s key objectives is the promotion of Afghan efforts to improve criminal investigations tech ‑
niques and procedures. However, the Court’s auditors found sustained efforts to have been seriously com ‑
promised by the rapid turnover of staff in the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) at the Ministry of the 
Interior. At the time of the Court’s audit, EUPOL’s 15 mentees in the Ministry of Interior had been replaced, in 
short succession, for various reasons, including politically motivated staff movements.
Another example is the mentoring provided to Kabul Police District 4 within the framework of the Phoenix 
project, one of EUPOL’s flagship undertakings aimed at promoting Afghan acceptance of civilian policing prin ‑
ciples and practices. In this Police District, the Commanding Officer has been replaced five times in 1.5 years.
Example 2  — keeping the topics of mentoring and advising in line with the mission’s objectives
The audit confirmed the difficulties that EUPOL mentors faced in keeping sessions on track with the MIP 
objectives. While the objectives were properly stated in the individual mentoring plans, mentoring sessions 
frequently strayed off topic owing to the mentee’s workload, personal issues, requests for services or favours, 
complaints about different issues or just lack of interest or time.Box 428 According to EUPOL statistics, 
the average time of 
deployment of a EUPOL 
mentor was 12.5 months 
during the period 2008–13.
27 Observations
Examples of project activities
Example 1
To address the problem of frequent violations of children’s rights and maltreatment by the national police, 
EUPOL initiated the production of a training package on children’s rights and policing, consisting of a booklet 
and an educational video. The aim of the package was to embed the basic principles of human rights with 
practical examples on how to respect and protect children, in the training of national police staff throughout 
the country. The booklet was published in Dari‑Pashto (90 000 copies) and in English‑Dari (10 000 copies). The 
1‑hour video was based around four stories in Afghanistan. The overall cost was 100 000 euro.
Example 2
In January 2014, EUPOL organised a conference and workshops on intelligence‑led policing. The activity tar ‑
geted management staff at district police offices in Kabul city. The topics addressed were chosen in order to 
create awareness and to incorporate intelligence‑led policing strategies into daily police practice. The budget 
for this activity was 12 000 euro.Box 555 
The detailed logging of mentoring 
sessions is one of the main tools for 
ensuring accountability and measur ‑
ing the effectiveness of monitoring, 
mentoring and advising activities. The 
audit found that logbooks had been 
systematically kept by EUPOL mentors, 
but not in a consistent way. Moreover, 
the logbooks were not structured 
around time‑bound milestones which 
would allow a real measurement of 
progress.
56 
In this context, EUPOL’s Mentoring 
Handbook, introduced in April 2013, 
contains provisions which may lead to 
increased transparency, accountability 
and consistency if applied correctly. At 
the time of the audit however, it was 
too early to see any real progress on 
needs assessments and mentee selec ‑
tion, progress reporting, monitoring, 
handovers or evaluation.57 
The projects carried out by EUPOL 
were mostly small‑scale supply and 
refurbishment contracts, conferences 
and workshops. The Court found that 
while most of the projects examined 
were broadly aligned with and in 
principal beneficial to the mission 
mandate, it was common practice for 
individual EUPOL mentors to propose 
projects in a particular field of interest 
without applying an approach based 
on a systematic needs assessment.
58 
However, individual projects contrib ‑
uted in only a small way to the mission 
objectives. When designing projects, 
EUPOL paid insufficient attention to 
the need for a comprehensive ap ‑
proach under which projects would 
contribute to the delivery of the 
mission objectives via a strong link to 
individual MIP milestones. Further ‑
more, EUPOL did not develop projects 
based on the logical framework which 
makes it easy to identify goals, objec ‑
tives, activities, outputs, outcomes and 
impacts (see Box 5 ).
28 Observations
59 
The implementation of projects has 
suffered owing to internal factors, in 
particular fragmentation, cumbersome 
procurement procedures, a lack of pro ‑
ject management expertise, inaccurate 
technical specifications and the rapid 
rotation of EUPOL personnel. External 
factors, such as the unreliability of 
contractors, unstable market condi ‑
tions and a volatile local context and 
security situation, have also detracted 
considerably from the effectiveness of 
projects. As a result, over the period 
2011  to 2014, budget implementa ‑
tion rates were low (around 43 %) and 
many tenders were cancelled because 
of inaccurate technical specifications. 
EUPOL has implemented an average 
of 45 projects each year at a budget 
of around 40 000 euro each. Recently, 
the CPCC and EUPOL have examined 
a number of projects and identified 
lessons to be learned, which has led to 
methodological improvements29.
60 
In order to simplify procurement, 
the FPI authorised the use of flex ‑
ible procedures from 29 January 2013 
onwards. This allows a negotiated 
procedure with one tender only to be 
used as standard30. The change led to 
a marked increase in the percentage 
of procedures brought to contract 
finalisation, which rose from 61 % in 
2012 to 74 % in 2013. Nevertheless, an 
analysis of the procurement statistics 
shows that the percentage of can ‑
celled procedures remained stable at 
24 %, mainly because of cases where 
no tenders were received, the amounts 
bid exceeded the budget or tenders 
were not technically compliant.The prerequisites for 
sustaining achievements to 
date are not yet in place
61 
The national police had made visible 
progress in the period covered by 
the audit. Undoubtedly, part of this 
progress can be credited to EUPOL as 
a major international contributor on 
the ground. However, according to 
the EEAS’s own strategic review31, the 
police and justice sectors continue 
to suffer from systemic weaknesses, 
including inadequate institutional 
development, a partially ineffective 
legal framework and the limited ca ‑
pacity of individual members of staff. 
Political influence, corruption and the 
inevitable focus on counter‑insurgency 
policing to address the bad overall 
security situation, continue to hinder 
further institutional development of 
the criminal justice sector as a whole. 
This can affect the sustainability of the 
progress achieved so far.
62 
Afghanistan’s 2014 budget was about 
7.6 billion USD, with donor grants 
expected to provide about 4.8 bil ‑
lion USD — around 60 % of the total. 
The authorised size of the Afghan 
army and police is 352 000 staff. To 
reduce the cost of sustaining this 
force, NATO plans to cut numbers to 
228 500 by 2017, if security conditions 
permit. However, analysts32 believe 
that ‘in the likely 2015–18 security envi ‑
ronment, the Afghan Army and Police 
will require a total security force of 
about 373 000 personnel’’.29 As the methodological 
changes were introduced 
relatively recently, the Court is 
not yet able to assess their 
effectiveness.
30 In its Special Report 
No 18/2012 ‘EU assistance to 
Kosovo related to the rule of 
law’, the Court recommended 
that the EEAS and the 
Commission review 
procurement procedures to 
ensure that they were 
responsive to the CSDP 
mission’s operational needs 
(http://eca.europa.eu ).
31 EEAS, Strategic review of 
EUPOL Afghanistan, 
13 December  2013.
32 Centre of Naval Analyses, 
Independent Assessment of 
the Afghan National Security 
Forces, Washington, January 
2014.
29 Observations
63 
According to the EEAS33, 86 % of the 
budget of the Ministry of the Interior 
and the national police is provided by 
international donors, which makes the 
sustainability of the whole policing 
sector heavily dependent on support 
from the international community.
64 
Training activities can be expected to 
be sustainable in the medium term, 
provided that local conditions do not 
substantially worsen. EUPOL has made 
a serious effort to involve the Afghan 
leadership progressively in develop ‑
ing training courses and managing the 
police colleges. As a result, although 
EUPOL is still involved in monitoring 
the training provided in the colleges, 
the Afghan authorities have largely 
taken over the planning, conduct and 
follow‑up of training activities. Never ‑
theless, the sustainability of training 
mostly depends on further develop ‑
ing genuine ownership on the part 
of the Afghan authorities. The audit 
found that, unless the administrative 
capacity and financial autonomy of 
the police colleges are reinforced, the 
long‑term sustainability of college 
activities will be jeopardised. Despite 
signing a Memorandum of Under ‑
standing in which it agreed to bear the 
operational costs for running the two 
colleges34, the Ministry of the Interior is 
reluctant to allocate sufficient finan ‑
cial resources, leading to difficulties 
in handling the required logistics and 
running costs.65 
The sustainability of the outcomes 
of EUPOL’s mentoring activities and 
projects is also heavily dependent on 
Afghan ownership, the development 
of synergies among the various activi ‑
ties, and finally follow‑up and evalua ‑
tion efforts. The audit found that these 
issues were not sufficiently accounted 
for in mentoring plans or addressed 
systematically in the early stages of 
activity planning.
EUPOL ’s legacy: 
phasing -out — what 
comes next?
66 
The Court examined whether the EEAS 
and the Commission have adequately 
prepared the phasing out of EUPOL ac ‑
cording to a comprehensive plan that 
firstly, takes into account the overall 
strategy of the EU and of other actors/
donors and secondly, addresses issues 
relating to the liquidation of assets.33 EEAS, Revised Concept of 
Operations for EUPOL 
Afghanistan, June 2014.
34 The Police Staff Training 
College and the Crime 
Management College.
30 Observations
Exit strategy planning is well 
advanced, but further work 
is needed
67 
In June 2013, the EEAS and the Com ‑
mission produced a joint staff working 
document35 in which they presented 
the EU’s activities and the remaining 
related challenges, as well as a num ‑
ber of options to be considered for EU 
support post ‑2014. In December 2013, 
the EEAS issued a strategic review36, 
which was essentially a synthesis of 
the self‑assessment carried out by EU ‑
POL in November 201337. The mission 
assessed that, by the end of 2014, the 
average implementation rate for ob ‑
jectively verifiable indicators could be 
expected to be 60 %38. Regarding the 
progress made by the national police, 
the assessment concluded that some 
of the tasks carried out under EUPOL’s 
three lines of operation could be 
transferred to the Afghan authorities, 
in particular training ‑related activities, 
but most should be taken over or built 
upon by EU bodies or other actors.
68 
In June 2014, the Council undertook39 
to extend the EUPOL mandate until 
the end of 2016. It also reiterated the 
EU’s commitment to a comprehensive 
approach, including an implementa ‑
tion plan to be followed by both the 
EU institutions and the Member States.69 
In this context, on 23 June 2014, the 
Head of the EU delegation in Kabul 
(also EU Special Representative in 
Afghanistan) and the Head of EUPOL 
produced a joint paper40 on reinforc ‑
ing the office of the EU Special Repre ‑
sentative with a view to building upon 
EUPOL’s achievements in the sectors 
of justice and rule of law. The paper 
identified areas in which the office of 
the EU Special Representative could be 
involved after the end of EUPOL’s man ‑
date. The main proposal concerned 
the appointment to the office of 
a number of international and national 
experts with duties limited to the level 
of strategic/political dialogue.
70 
In parallel, in the Multiannual Indica ‑
tive Programme for 2014–20, the EEAS 
and the Commission proposed polic ‑
ing and rule of law as one of four focal 
sectors. The audit highlighted two 
key concerns in relation to this plan ‑
ning document. Firstly, although the 
Multiannual Indicative Programme 
rightly states that ‘… the EU can build 
on groundwork established by the 
CSDP Mission (EUPOL) in the sector…’, 
the proposed result indicators are not 
related to EUPOL’s civilian policing 
outcomes, but instead are mostly influ ‑
enced by external factors (such as the 
security situation and military conflict). 
For example, the indicator ‘number 
of deaths in armed conflict — civil ‑
ian casualties’ is a very generic means 
of measuring the expected result of 
reinforcing the ‘capacity of the Afghan 
police to sustain and maintain security 
in Afghanistan’. It could be argued that 
deaths in armed conflict also result 
every day from mainly military opera ‑
tions which may continue to exist in 
Afghanistan in the future and do not 
constitute an accurate indicator of 
the national police’s civilian policing 
capacity.35 EEAS, EU action to support 
efforts in strengthening 
civilian policing and rule of law 
post 2014, 14 June 2013.
36 EEAS, Strategic review of 
EUPOL Afghanistan, 
13 December  2013.
37 EUPOL, CMPD tasking paper, 
11 November  2013.
38 According to the document, at 
the end of 2014 the 
implementation rate for 
objectives and tasks is 
expected to be on average 
60 % and to range from 31 % 
to 85 %.
39 Council of the European 
Union, Council conclusions on 
Afghanistan, 23 June 2014. The 
EUPOL mandate was official 
extended on 
17 December 2014 by Council 
Decision 2014/922/CFSP.
40 ‘Reinforcement of the EU 
Special Representative Office 
with a view of building upon 
EUPOL Afghanistan 
achievements in the sectors of 
Justice and rule of law ‘, 
23 June 2014.
31 Observations
71 
Secondly, in principle the EEAS has lim ‑
ited alternatives for financing devel ‑
opment assistance to Afghanistan for 
the coming period. On the one hand, 
using the budget support instrument 
cannot be an option for Afghanistan at 
present. On the other hand, the EEAS 
considers the project‑based approach 
to be sub‑optimal owing to difficulties 
in finding beneficiaries and because of 
the significant administrative bur ‑
den of managing projects. The EEAS 
therefore intends to use trust funds, 
predominantly LOTFA41, as a preferred 
instrument in the rule of law sector in 
Afghanistan. However, using LOTFA 
as the main vehicle for financing 
the Afghan rule of law sector would 
entail two shortcomings that have to 
be taken into account: (a) LOTFA has 
been strongly criticised in the past for 
mismanagement of funds and lack of 
transparency by all donors involved 
— including the EU, which decided to 
temporarily suspend its payments to 
the fund; and (b) so far, LOTFA has had 
very limited experience of capacity 
building in the sector. Even though in 
2011, Phase IV of LOTFA included a pil ‑
lar on capacity development of civilian 
policing, throughout its life, the trust 
fund has been used almost exclusively 
as a payroll mechanism. For example, 
in 2013 out of a budget of 524 million 
USD, an amount of 506 million USD 
concerned police salaries. In fact, less 
than 3.5 % has been committed on 
capacity building and other projects. 
Even in the case that, in the future, 
the proportion of capacity building 
budget in LOTFA is increased, the fund 
is still structured around covering the 
running cost of the national police 
rather than building capacity.Liquidation: a coordinated 
and structured approach is 
needed
72 
The EEAS and the Commission have 
developed a procedure and guidelines 
for the closure of CFSP operations. 
According to these guidelines, EUPOL 
does not need to submit closure plans, 
for approval by the Commission, until 
3 months before the mandated end 
of operations. To submit these docu ‑
ments so late entails risks. The period 
between 2014 and the end of 2016 
will be very important for two rea ‑
sons. Firstly, the mission will downsize 
considerably during 2015  and  2016. As 
also pointed out also by the European 
Commission’s Internal Audit Service42, 
downsizing the mission because of the 
phase‑out, entails a higher risk for the 
control environment  — due mainly to 
the reduction of staff in key control 
functions, staff demotivation, loss of 
expertise and pressure to spend the 
remaining procurement budget before 
the end of the mandate. Secondly, 
the value of the assets involved is 
considerable. Thus it is important that 
EUPOL’s liquidation planning should 
be properly coordinated and start well 
in advance43.41 LOTFA is a trust fund 
established by UNDP in 2002. 
It was almost exclusively used 
as mechanism for 
coordinating contributions 
from donors for paying 
salaries of the Afghan national 
police.
42 Internal Audit Service Audit 
Report on FPI — Control 
Strategy 24/07/2014.
43 As early as September 2013, 
EUPOL obtained FPI approval 
to sell two used power 
generators, and it has also 
donated six vehicles to the EU 
delegation and two to the 
office of the Directorate ‑ 
General for Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection in 
Afghanistan.
32 Observations
44 19 cars were bought in 2006, 
1 in 2007, 124 in 2008 and 
10 in 2012.73 
EUPOL uses cash‑based accounting; its 
assets, valued at acquisition price, total 
49.6 million euro. In terms of value, its 
most important assets are armoured 
vehicles (25.2 million euro) and IT 
communications and security equip ‑
ment (15.4 million euro) followed by 
the buildings in the EUPOL compound 
(4.8 million  euro). Obviously, present ‑
ing assets of this type (cars, IT, etc.) at 
acquisition prices does not reflect their 
real value.
74 
According to EUPOL’s inventory data, 
there are 14644 armoured vehicles in 
Afghanistan of which only a few were 
in use. The average mileage of these 
vehicles was 22 700 km. EUPOL’s inven ‑
tory classifies only seven vehicles as 
‘not operational’ and 11 as ‘used’. The 
rest are either ‘in good condition’ or 
‘new’.
75 
EUPOL is responsible for exploring the 
various possibilities for transferring 
vehicles to EU bodies or embassies of 
the Member States, or for donating 
them to other international organisa ‑
tions deployed in Afghanistan. It is 
also responsible for carrying out the 
necessary administrative procedures 
for the export of assets that cannot be 
transferred within Afghanistan. It is es ‑
sential, therefore, that the CPCC work 
closely with the mission — and well 
in advance of the end of the mandate 
— to ensure that assets are disposed 
of smoothly and do not accumulate, in 
a way that entails risks.76 
The audit found that, although there is 
coordination between the relevant EU 
departments (CPCC and FPI), they have 
not agreed on common, proactive 
and comprehensive rules with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities.
33
 Conclusions and 
recommendations
77 
The European Union has managed to 
establish a European civilian police 
mission in Afghanistan in a particularly 
insecure and tough environment. After 
a difficult start, EUPOL has gradually 
gained recognition from other actors 
for its expertise and its significant 
contribution to the ongoing reform of 
the police sector.
78 
The Court found that EUPOL has been 
partly effective in delivering its man ‑
date. Improvements were more nota ‑
ble in two of EUPOL’s three main lines 
of operation. Concerning its activities, 
EUPOL has been largely successful in 
training but less so in mentoring and 
advising. Projects have had a limited 
contribution to the mission’s objec ‑
tives. While external factors may 
provide some explanation for this, 
other shortcomings can be attributed 
to EUPOL itself.
79 
In the area of planning, EUPOL’s man ‑
date was preceded by a thorough as ‑
sessment of Afghan needs. Objectives 
were aligned with the 2006 Afghan 
Compact and the priorities set out in 
the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy.80 
The mandate which was to provide 
strategic advisory services to the 
higher echelons of the police hierarchy 
in the field of policing with linkages 
to the wider rule of law, ensured EU 
added value by providing a building 
block hitherto missing from the ongo ‑
ing international efforts at the time. 
However, EUPOL faced a laborious task 
in delivering its mandate owing to the 
almost complete lack of a functioning 
police force, high illiteracy rates and 
widespread corruption.
81 
Deployment of the mission was beset 
with difficulties and EUPOL suffered 
from inherent limitations relating to 
the recruitment of staff and logistical 
problems. Member States found it hard 
to supply qualified staff in sufficient 
numbers and this led to serious delays 
in reaching the required operational 
strength. Deployment in the provinces 
was equally complicated, mainly due 
to logistical issues and insecurity. In 
most provinces, EUPOL was unable to 
deploy sufficient staff to ensure the 
proper delivery of its mandate (see 
paragraphs 11 to 21).
Recommendation 1
The EEAS should work with the Mem ‑
ber States to ensure that future CSDP 
missions receive sufficient logistic, 
technical and human resources to be 
able to operate at close to full author ‑
ised capacity.
34 Conclusions and recommendations
82 
As regards coordination, EUPOL did 
not manage to bring together all Euro ‑
pean actors under a single European 
framework to improve Afghan polic ‑
ing; it also faced competition from 
other European bilateral missions 
and other European and international 
efforts, such as the EGF. However, 
EUPOL has made a valiant effort and 
played an important role in help ‑
ing to promote cooperation with EU 
Member States and it has genuinely 
sought to promote wider international 
cooperation.
83 
Coordination among the various EU 
bodies was initially poor. Nevertheless, 
in 2011 the Council’s strategy and the 
creation of the EEAS cleared the way 
for improved coordination involving 
the Member States, the EEAS, the Com ‑
mission, the EU Special Representative 
in Afghanistan, the EU delegation in 
Kabul and EUPOL.
84 
EUPOL’s comparatively limited fund ‑
ing and staff numbers meant that it 
was difficult, especially in the early 
stages of the mission, for it to be heard 
among major actors like the NATO‑led 
NTM‑A. International actors were 
unwilling to be coordinated by the 
IPCB, which was supported by EUPOL. 
The IPCB was therefore largely unsuc ‑
cessful in improving coordination 
and oversight in the sector. In the last 
few years, coordination with the main 
international actors has nevertheless 
improved considerably (see para ‑
graphs 23 to 30).85 
In the area of operational support and 
guidance from headquarters, the Court 
found that EU Member States and the 
EEAS were reasonably flexible in pro ‑
posing revisions to EUPOL’s mandate 
and adapting it to the changing situa ‑
tion and needs. Prior to 2013, the op ‑
erational planning arrangements and 
indicators were not entirely suitable 
for steering the mission in an efficient 
way. However, since 2013 these issues 
have been extensively addressed. EU ‑
POL’s reporting meets basic account ‑
ability requirements, although results 
indicators could be further fine‑tuned. 
Guidance from headquarters has 
improved over time. The EEAS and the 
Commission are examining ways of 
centralising certain support functions 
through the establishment of a shared 
service centre, a CSDP warehouse for 
all ongoing missions and a centralised 
IT function (see paragraphs 32 to 41).
35 Conclusions and recommendations
Recommendation 2
The EEAS and the Commission should 
develop support functions to assist 
with the rapid, efficient and consistent 
deployment of CSDP missions. Meas ‑
ures should involve:
(a) pre‑deployment training for 
all staff on EU procedures and 
policies;
(b) comprehensive guidelines on 
operational tasks (such as needs 
assessments, planning and moni ‑
toring of tasks and reporting) and 
guidelines in administrative areas 
(such as information technology, 
finance and asset management 
and human resources) making 
maximum use of the lessons 
learned from previous missions;
(c) setting up, on a cost–benefit basis, 
a shared service centre for all CSDP 
missions, and optimising the use 
of the CSDP warehouse to manage 
the assets of ongoing missions.
86 
As regards the results achieved and 
their potential for sustainability, the 
audit found that the national po ‑
lice have made progress in terms of 
gaining public trust, but systemic 
weaknesses persist. Improvements 
were more notable in the first two of 
EUPOL’s three lines of operation: Line 
of Operation 1 (advancing institutional 
reform of the Ministry of the Interior) 
and Line of Operation 2 (profession ‑
alising the National Police). Line of 
Operation 3 (connecting the National 
Police to the wider justice system) has 
been the most challenging area and 
has seen least progress. The Court also examined EUPOL’s results per type 
of activity and found that EUPOL has 
been largely successful in training ‑
related activities but less so in men ‑
toring and advising. Projects did not 
follow the logical framework structure 
and were not sufficiently linked to 
other activities to create synergies (see 
paragraphs 43 to 60).
Recommendation 3
The EEAS and CSDP missions should 
work together to further improve the 
effectiveness of each activity:
Training
(a) the ‘train ‑the‑trainer’ approach 
has proved its merit and should be 
the preferred mode of training in 
difficult circumstances ensuring 
ownership and sustainability;
(b) while respecting EU values, curric ‑
ula should take greater account of 
local culture, customs and religion 
and include practical examples 
from everyday life in the country.
Monitoring/mentoring/advising
(c) the mission should periodically 
carry out a systematic and compre ‑
hensive evaluation of the results 
obtained from mentoring and 
advising activities;
(d) the mentee selection process 
should be based on a needs as ‑
sessment which is properly docu ‑
mented in the mentoring files. 
Mentoring logbooks should be 
standardised, structured around 
time‑bound milestones and sys ‑
tematically kept by mentors;
36 Conclusions and recommendations
(e) in view of the regular rotation of 
seconded staff, clear and consist ‑
ent handover procedures should 
be established to ensure the 
smooth continuation of activity 
and avoid gaps and digressions 
that could jeopardise the mentor ‑
ing relationship.
Projects
(f) when designing projects, CSDP 
missions should ensure that they 
follow the logical framework, 
create synergies with mentoring 
activities and contribute to the 
delivery of the mission objectives 
via a strong linkage to individual 
MIP milestones.
87 
The sustainability of the security sec ‑
tor in Afghanistan depends on support 
from the international community and 
faces significant challenges. The pre ‑
requisites for a sustainable police force 
are not yet in place. The long‑term 
sustainability of EUPOL’s training and 
mentoring outcomes is therefore at 
risk (see paragraphs 61 to 65).
Recommendation 4
In order to improve the sustainability 
of CSDP mission outcomes, the EEAS 
should ensure that sustainability 
aspects are embedded in the opera ‑
tional planning of all mission activi ‑
ties by systematically assessing the 
local needs and capacity to sustain 
outcomes.88 
EUPOL has prepared a comprehensive 
plan for phasing out its activities by 
the end of 2016. However, there are 
concerns as to whether the arrange ‑
ments in the Multiannual Indicative 
Programme for 2014–20 will allow the 
EU to build upon EUPOL’s achieve ‑
ments after 2016. There is coordination 
between the relevant EU departments, 
but they have not agreed on common 
and comprehensive rules that clearly 
define roles and responsibilities. Given 
the considerable total value of the 
assets concerned, procedures are not 
sufficiently or proactively coordinated 
by headquarters (see paragraphs 67 to 
76).
Recommendation 5
To ensure that the CSDP missions are 
phased out and related assets liqui ‑
dated smoothly:
(a) the EEAS and the Commission 
should work out a common and 
comprehensive strategy defining 
roles and responsibilities for the 
downsizing and closure of CSDP 
missions. The strategy would 
provide for sufficient mission sup ‑
port from headquarters and would 
highlight measures to mitigate 
specific risks inherent in the down ‑
sizing and closure process;
(b) the EEAS and the Commission 
should work closely with CSDP 
missions from well before the end 
of the mandate, to avoid assets 
being accumulated in a way that 
entails financial risks.
37 Conclusions and recommendations
This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of 
the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 19 May 2015.
 For the Court of Auditors
 Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
 President

38
 Annexes
EUPOL timelineAnnex I
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008May 2007
First EUPOL
Operational
Plan
(OPLAN)October 2008
Revised 
OPLAN
May 2008 –The European Council decides to double the
target number of experts working in EUPOL to 400
2008 – Afghan National Development Strategy (2008 –
2013) is Afghanistan’s ﬁrst ﬁve-year strategic
development plan. The strategy is organised around security,governance and economic developmentMay 2007 – European Council establishes  a Common Securityand Defence Policy mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)
May 2007 – Expansion of the ANP to 82 000February 2006 – In the Afghan Compact (the 2006 London Conference) the Afghan
Government commits to achieving benchmarks in areas, such as developing aprofessional national army by the end of 2010
2006 – ANP forces reach target of 62 000October 2006 – EU Joint assessment mission by 23 European oﬃcials
and Rule of Law specialists
December 2006 – EU fact-ﬁnding mission is sent to Afghanistan to identify
policing and rule of law needsNovember 2005
EU Joint Declaration commits
EU and its Member States to 
support a stronger framework
for the establishment of rule of 
law in the countryOctober 2003 – The UN Security Council authorises the expansion of the ISAFmission throughout AfghanistanDecember 2001 – The Bonn Agreement establishes an interim authority for Afghanistanand provides for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist in the transition
September 2001 – Nineteen members of al-Qaeda commit a series of coordinated
suicide attacks in the United States. In total 2 996 people are killed
April 2002 – G8 conference in Geneva adopts the lead nation framework  on the security sector–Germany establishes the German Police Project Oﬃce in Kabul to advise and train the Afghan  National Police
39 Annexes
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2015 – 2016 EEAS to review the multiannual indicative programme 2014-2020 January 2015 – Launch of Operation Resolute SupportDecember 2016
End of EUPOL’s mandateDecember 2015 – EUPOL ceases activities underLine of Operation IIJuly 2014 – Final revised OPLAN 
December 2014 – NATO-led 48-country mission (ISAF) stands downOctober 2014 – NTM-A ceases activityOctober 2014 – The European Commission approves multiannual indicative programme
2014-2020 for Afghanistan , which will provide new development funding of 1.4 billion eurofor the seven-year periodSeptember 2014 – Afghanistan signs a bilateral security agreement with the United States. It also
signs the Agreement for the NATO Resolute Support Mission. Under these agreements  9 800American and at least 2 000 NATO troops are allowed to remain in Afghanistan after31 December  2014 in order to support the development of Afghan security forces and institutionsSeptember 2014 – Ashraf Ghani is inaugurated as Afghanistan’s new President, succeeding Hamid KarzaiJune 2014 – European Council commits to extend EUPOL’s mandate until end 2016. It also
approves a comprehensive EU strategy on Afghanistan for the period 2014-2016April 2013 – Ten-Year Vision, an Afghan Ministry of
the Interior document describing the desired state of the ANP in 10 years
June 2013 – EEAS produces a joint staﬀ working paper on comprehensive
EU action in strengthening civilian policing and rule of law post-2014.
It also presents the principal options for a EUPOL exit strategy
Dec 2013 – EEAS produces strategic review of EUPOL AfghanistanMay 2010 – Revised OPLANJanuary 2013 – Expansion of the ANP to 157 000
January 2013 – Revised OPLANMay 2012 – Chicago Summit Declaration aﬃrms NATO commitment to
support the Afghan National Security Forces beyond the drawdown of internationalmilitary forces in 2014 
July 2012 – Tokyo Conference introduces the Mutual Accountability Framework
which holds Afghanistan and the international community accountablefor steady  ﬁnancing in exchange for stronger anti-corruption measuresand the advancement of the rule of lawDecember 2011 – Bonn Conference initiates discussion on Afghanistan’s’Transformation Decade 2015-2024‘January 2010 – At London Conference the Afghan government and the international community commiton anti-corruption actions and the transition of responsibility for security from ISAF to Afghan forces
November 2010 – At summit in Lisbon, NATO announces plans to withdraw international forces from 
Afghanistan by the end of 2014November 2009 – NATO launches a training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) which aims to provide basic security trainingfor police staﬀ and mentoring to the ANP
40 Annexes
EUPOL commitments and disbursements by budgetary periodAnnex IIBudgetary period Commitments
(euro)Disbursements as at 31.12.2014
(euro)Implementation rate
June 2007–November 2008 43 600  000 43 099 416 99 %
December 2008–May 2010 81 400  000 71 056 597 87 %
June 2010–July 2011 54 600  000 49 274  871 90 %
August 2011–July 2012 60 500  000 51 918 127 86 %
August 2012– May 2013 56 870 000 46 179 558 81 %
June 2013–December 2014 95 433 790 84 645 305 89 %
Totals 392 403 790 346 173 874 88 %
Source:  EUPOL.
41 Annexes Annex IIIEUPOL project and mentoring activity files reviewed
Projects
1 Support to Community Policing — POL-14
2 Project Phoenix Kabul — 1.3.0.0
3 Provision of surveillance system in Kabul Police HQ — POL-13
4 Restructuring the Surveillance unit POL-8
5 A self -sustainable Tashkeel database — 1.2.2.0_26
6 ILP Conference — 2.1.2.0
7 Anti -corruption symposium — ROL-6
8 Coordination of Police and Prosecutor Project (CoPP)
9 Children’s Rights Booklet — ROL-1
10 Rights of Children and Juveniles in Criminal Investigation — PC -09
11 Increase of Police Women in ANP — POL 6
Mentoring
12 MO3 — Head of Criminal Investigations Department, Ministry of the Interior
13 MO1, MO2 — Commander of the Police Staff Training College
14 MO4 — Deputy Minister of Administration of the Ministry of the Interior
15 MO4 — Director of Anti -Corruption Unit (ACU) within the Attorney General’s Office
16 MO5 — Head of Criminal Law Division at the Legislative Department of the Afghan Ministry of 
Justice
17 MO6 — Head of Human Rights, Gender & Children Rights Department
42 Annexes Annex IVEUPOL field offices from 2007 to 2014
2007
2008
2009
20102011
2012
2013
2014
Field oﬃce with staﬀ < 10 (at 31 December)
Field oﬃce with staﬀ > 10 (at 31 December)
EUPOL headquarters in Kabul 
Source:  EUROSTAT.
43
The EEAS in close cooperation with the Commis ‑
sion, responsible for the financial management, and 
EUPOL have been assessing how to get the best 
value of EUPOL’s assets according to the Financial 
Regulation.
Observations
16
As for the leadership problems, indeed the Head 
of Mission had changed three times but this is to 
be considered an exceptional and unfortunate 
circumstance.
28
The EEAS considers that EUPOL’s mandate was lim ‑
ited to certain fields (civilian policing, MoI reform, 
criminal justice); the Mission therefore had no 
mandate for an overall lead on the (coordination of 
the) entire MoI/ANP reform/strengthening support. 
Other actors, such as NTM‑A, also had full legiti ‑
macy to provide support to the Afghan authorities 
within the scope of their respective mandates. The 
IPCB was established to coordinate the overall inter ‑
national support to the Afghan national police and 
Ministry of Interior. Within the remit of its mandate, 
the Mission coordinated its activities with the NATO 
Training Mission‑Afghanistan and other interna ‑
tional actors very well.
36
EUPOL has developed and is using a monitoring 
mechanism to track progress and decide on correc ‑
tive actions if and where needed.
40
CSDP guidance is referred to as ‘guidance on 
horizontal issues’. After identifying these shortcom ‑
ings, the EEAS is actively working to provide CSDP 
missions with clearer horizontal guidance where 
considered needed.Executive summary
IV
The initial context of justice institutions and inter ‑
national support were very weak and limited (com ‑
pared to support provided to the Afghan national 
police and Ministry of Interior).
Providing direct training has been used mainly in 
the first years of the mission’s mandate, as well as 
train‑the‑trainers support, which also significantly 
reduced during the recent years. For several years 
now, EUPOL has mainly implemented its mandate 
by providing advice and mentoring to its Afghan 
counterparts.
The EEAS considers that projects managed by the 
mission’s Project Cell do represent now an impor ‑
tant complementary tool for the mission to achieve 
its objectives comparing to insufficient alignment 
during the first years of the existence of the Project 
Cell.
VI
EUPOL strongly supported the establishment and 
functioning of international coordination structures, 
like the International Police Coordination Board. 
However it was not in its mandate to bring together 
all EU actors under a single European framework.
VII
During the last years, the system of EUPOL’s report ‑
ing has been refined and evolved from a more 
descriptive way to an analytical way. Since 2013, the 
Mission has Objectively Verifiable Indicators both 
for its own progress and Afghan progress.
IX and X
EUPOL’s phasing out plans have been developed 
as much as possible at this moment in time, taking 
into account expected Afghan progresses, interna ‑
tional actors/mechanisms existence and evolution.Reply of the Commission  
and the EEAS
Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 44
52
The Mission has achieved deployment/use of advi ‑
sors/mentors as per its OPLAN and in agreement 
with its Afghan counterparts. Afghan capacity gap 
analysis derived from the OPLAN (which was itself 
based on discussion with the Afghan authorities).
53
One of the most difficult issue is to achieve tangible 
progress/impact on strategic level issues such as 
the development and management of ANP human 
resources or mainstreaming of human rights within 
the ANP (issues which usually require support via 
mentoring/advising). Other external factors could 
also be mentioned, such as reprioritisation on the 
Afghan side.
58
The use of Project Cells is a relatively new feature in 
civilian CSDP . For various reasons, Project Cells do 
not exist in all missions, although considered a very 
useful capacity for civilian CSDP missions to achieve 
their objectives. Thus, civilian CSDP missions had 
little references when the first Project Cells were 
established within their structure. This was the case 
for EUPOL AFG. The Mission has therefore gone 
through a learning process in managing its Project 
Cell. The Project Cell is now well established within 
the Mission, coordination with other Mission’s com ‑
ponents is ensured, as well as internal procedures 
to make sure projects proposed are fully in line with 
the Mission’s objectives. Projects under the Project 
Cell are endorsed by EU Member States (RELEX) in 
the framework of the annual discussion on the Mis ‑
sion’s budget.
59
Even before the introduction of the flexible pro ‑
curement procedures, FPI agreed to most requests 
from the mission to carry out simplified procure ‑
ment procedures (negotiated procedures with 
a single tender) in cases where normal tender pro ‑
cedures would be unsuccessful due to the difficult 
local market situation or for urgent purchases of 
goods and services.45
Indeed, the criminal justice sector has been a tra ‑
ditionally very weak sector, subject of lesser inter ‑
national support than the Afghan national police 
or the Ministry of Interior. Examples of EUPOL’s 
achievements are the development of human rights 
informed policies and legislation (e.g. Penal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code) and the introduction of 
the police/prosecutor cooperation training, already 
running under full Afghan ownership.
48
The establishment of the Police Staff College is 
a good example of the use of the comprehensive 
approach in EU foreign policy (coherence, coordina ‑
tion and complementarity).
EUPOL has been supporting the Afghan training 
institutions covering issues like indeed training cur ‑
ricula development, but also, both, the Police Staff 
College’s and the Crime Management College’s 
management and organisation, including linkages 
with ANP human resources policy/organisation, 
as well as the support to ANP HQ General Training 
Command.
The Police Staff College and the Crime Management 
College are firmly established within the General 
Training Command structure and have become 
extremely effective educational institutions in their 
own right with over 13 000 Afghan national police 
students having graduated from training courses 
since late 2010.
50
EUPOL’s evaluation/assessment process has 
improved since the introduction of the so‑called 
Mid‑Term Reviews (MTR) (renamed as Quarterly 
Reviews (QR) following the introduction of revised 
OPLAN in the beginning of 2015) as well as Monthly 
reviews in the beginning of 2014.
Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 45
The EU acts here in close consultation with the 
international community at large. In line with the 
New Deal for engagement in fragile states, the 
Commission and the EEAS consider a project‑based 
approach as sub‑optimal in terms of aid effective ‑
ness. In due course, budget support may become 
an option covering also the rule of law support if 
the relevant conditions are fulfilled and the political 
and governance risks allow.
72
The EEAS and the Commission are aware of the 
issues raised by the Court regarding downsizing 
and the time needed to prepare for the liquidation 
of assets and closure of the mission and closely 
follows the downsizing process. The downsizing is 
preceded by the preparation of the budget for the 
period when the downsizing will take place and 
this applies to the liquidation phase as well. Whilst 
a formal downsizing or closure plan is not submit ‑
ted at this stage, the main elements, and in par ‑
ticular those with a financial impact, are discussed 
and agreed with the mission during the budget 
preparation.
The EEAS and the Commission are planning to 
develop guidelines on downsizing.
73
The missions are entrusted entities tasked under 
indirect management, therefore whilst recognis ‑
ing that this does not reflect the actual value of the 
assets, the Commission does not require the mis ‑
sions to report this value, only to report the equip ‑
ment purchased and the changes in the inventory.
74
The mission is in the process of transferring and 
disposing of surplus armoured vehicles. Thirteen 
armoured vehicles will be transferred to the CSDP 
mission in Kiev, Ukraine.
The transfer of surplus armoured vehicles could be 
facilitated in the future if the role of the CSDP ware ‑
house would be expanded to include the logistics 
related to taking over, refurbishing and redeploying 
surplus armoured vehicles (and other equipment).60
The introduction of the generalised use of flexible 
procedures simplified and accelerated the use of 
the negotiated procedure with a single tender since 
the mission did not need to obtain prior approval 
anymore from FPI to carry out such procedures.
70
The Commission would like to point out that any 
intervention in the area of support to the Afghan 
police to be financed from the DCI would need to 
demonstrate that the assistance is fully "DACable" 
(following the definition made by Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD) and in line 
with the DCI regulation which puts some restric ‑
tions on the kind of activities to be financed and 
implemented.
In the current political context, the security ‑related 
indicators remain most relevant for our support of 
the Afghan national police (ANP) under the Devel ‑
opment Cooperation Instrument.
Providing durable and lasting security in Afghani ‑
stan is as much the responsibility of the Afghan 
national police (ANP) as the Afghan national army.  
It remains one of the most important objectives 
of EU cooperation, as do the contributions to the 
ANP sustainment and development. In addition, it 
remains a precondition for Afghan authorities to 
put greater emphasis on developing civilian  polic ‑
ing capacities.
Concerning the ANP’s improved capacity as a civil ‑
ian police force under civilian control (over the 
lifetime of the MIP 2014–20), the MIP proposed 
a second, distinct set of two indicators relating to 
Ministry of Interior gender statistics and the share 
of security costs within the national budget (includ ‑
ing salary data).
71
As regards the implementing modalities for the rule 
of law support and the use of the LOTFA trust fund 
for contributions under the Development Coop ‑
eration Instrument, the Commission and the EEAS 
would like to underline that, for the time being, 
the use of the UN ‑managed Law and Order Trust 
Fund remains the preferred option if the necessary 
improvements can be agreed in the current revision 
process. 
Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 46
Recommendation 2(a)
The EEAS and the Commission accept this rec ‑
ommendation. This is already the case for some 
aspects of predeployment. Further work on this 
subject is being processed by the EEAS. How ‑
ever, some legal and financial aspects need to be 
addressed as the costs for predeployment training 
can be eligible under CFSP budget only for staff 
already being Mission members. Otherwise the 
sending state would pay for the seconded, whilst 
there would no possibility to pay for the staff 
recruited but not contracted yet by the Mission.
Recommendation 2(b)
The EEAS and the Commission accept this recom ‑
mendation. This is already the case for some of 
these subjects. Further work on additional subjects 
is being conducted by the EEAS.
Moreover, the lessons learned are a fundamental 
part of the conduct of operations led by the CPCC. 
They are shared with other EEAS services, Commis ‑
sion and Member States, and have already proved 
their added value for the improvement of the 
Missions.
As for the administrative guidelines in place, EEAS 
and Commission are continuing to work on a daily 
basis to make them more useful and responding to 
the concrete needs of the Missions in the field.
The planned shared service centre (mission support 
cell) will, under the supervision of EEAS and the 
Commission, establish comprehensive guidelines 
on finance, accounting and asset management.
Recommendation 2(c)
The EEAS and the Commission accept this 
recommendation.
Following the finalisation of the cost‑benefit analy ‑
sis in 2013 and discussions held in the RELEX work ‑
ing group, a decision on the creation of a shared 
service centre for the benefit of civilian CSDP mis ‑
sions is now expected.76
One of the essential tasks of the planned shared 
service centre (mission support platform) will be the 
elaboration of comprehensive rules and guidelines.
Conclusions and recommendations
78
Mentoring, advising and training are all methods/
tools to implement specific objectives. In the last 
stage of the Mission, the assessment of EUPOL’s 
achievements by separating between ‘training’ 
activities and ‘mentoring/advising’ activities is not 
the most appropriate. Most of the time, all these 
different tools are used in parallel to support local 
counterparts. In the last years of the Mission, mostly 
mentoring and advising were used to provide this 
support, training (in particular direct training) to 
a lesser extent, and during the last years not at all. 
Most achievements under LO1, LO2 and LO3 during 
the last years are due to EUPOL’s mentoring and 
advising activities only.
Even if sometimes limited in size/scope, the projects 
(implemented by the Mission’s Project Cell) have 
constituted important enablers for other mission’s 
activities.
Recommendation 1
EEAS accepts this recommendation. Contributions 
from Member States have a major impact on the 
implementation and continuity of the Mission as 
the current system mainly relies on the force gen ‑
eration provided by Member States.
In this regard, EEAS considers that ways could also 
be explored to enable greater flexibility in the 
advertisement of positions, in particular when it 
refers to seconded/contracted staff.
82
It is not the EEAS understanding that EU Member 
States were expecting EUPOL to bring together all 
EU actors under a single European framework when 
establishing EUPOL AFG. EUPOL however strongly 
supported the establishment and functioning of 
international coordination structures, like the Inter ‑
national Police Coordination Board.
Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 47
Recommendation 3(b)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation.
The EEAS considers that EUPOL’s developed cur ‑
ricula did take into account local culture to the 
greatest extent possible. However on some occa ‑
sions, local counterparts were reluctant to use some 
(aspects of) curricula developed with the support of 
the Mission. These (aspects of) curricula were how ‑
ever rightly considered essential from a Mission/EU 
point of view as they referred to EU essential values 
related to human rights, corruption a.o.
Recommendation 3(c)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation. Such evalu ‑
ation is now carried out by the Mission.
Recommendation 3(d)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation. For EUPOL 
such assessment has been conducted in the frame ‑
work of the last Mission’s mandate revision. Men ‑
toring logbooks have been standardised, better 
structured and updated by the Mission.
Recommendation 3(e)
The EEAS and the Commission accept this recom ‑
mendation. Ways will also be explored to enable 
increased possibilities of handover periods between 
incoming and departing staff.
Recommendation 3(f)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation. For EUPOL 
projects run under the Project Cell are now fully 
integrated in the Mission Implementation Plan, 
following a stricter Mission’s internal procedure 
allowing for a coherence with Mission’s operational 
activities.The management of assets of ongoing missions 
could be facilitated in the future if the role of the 
CSDP warehouse would be expanded to include 
the logistics related to taking over, refurbishing and 
redeploying of surplus equipment. The function ‑
ing and role of the CSDP Warehouse is currently 
under review and one of the possible scenarios is 
an expanded role, which would include handling all 
the logistics for storing and/or redeploying surplus 
equipment from missions that are downsizing or 
closing.
86
Regarding the Mission’s delivery under the Line of 
Operation 3, the EEAS considers that improvements 
can also be noticed. EUPOL’s mandate delivery 
and impact can only be judged in the light of the 
Afghan progress in those fields covered by the Mis ‑
sion’s mandate.
Regarding the assessment of Mission’s delivery/
achievements as per ‘type of activity’ (MMA vs 
‘training’), see EEAS reply to paragraph 78.
Regarding projects run under the Project Cell, while 
deficiencies had indeed been identified in the early 
years of the Mission’s mandate, more structured 
mechanisms are now in place to allow for a stricter 
alignment of projects with Mission’s planned activi ‑
ties and objectives.
Recommendation 3(a)
The EEAS accepts this recommendation.
While the train‑the‑trainers approach is appropriate 
under some circumstances (to create a local initial 
training capacity), it needs to be considered as only 
one (initial) element of the required approach when 
supporting local authorities to establish/profes ‑
sionalise their own training capacity. Only support 
through advising and mentoring on more structural 
aspects of training capacity building (as done by 
EUPOL) could have a possible sustainable impact.
Reply of the Commission and the EEAS 48
Recommendation 4
The EEAS accepts this recommendation.
The EEAS considers that sustainability aspects are 
already embedded in the operational planning of 
the Mission’s activities, in the sense that all Mis ‑
sion’s activities are aiming at reinforcing the local 
counterparts' capacities to a level where they are 
‘good enough’ to further develop themselves in 
a sustainable manner.
Where the Mission’s assessment leads to the conclu ‑
sion that local capacities won’t be strong enough, 
and in the case where the Mission’s mandate is 
coming to an end, the Mission, as per its OPLAN, is 
actively engaging with other (international/local) 
actors in order to identify some which could pro ‑
vide follow‑up support to the local counterparts as 
required, building upon the Mission’s achievements.
Recommendation 5 (a)
EEAS and the Commission accept this recom ‑
mendation. As already done in the past for previ ‑
ous missions, the EEAS and the Commission have 
been working in close coordination with EUPOL 
for 2 years, id est  well in advance to the end of 
mandate, in order to prepare the liquidation phase 
in the most appropriate way, taking into account 
the challenges and the complexity of the Afghan 
scenario. 
The Commission and the EEAS are planning to 
develop guidelines together on downsizing of 
missions.
Concerning closure of missions, the Commission 
already issued instructions on closing missions. 
Recommendation 5 (b)
The EEAS and the Commission accept this recom ‑
mendation. See also reply to recommendation 5(a).
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS
Free publications:
• one copy: 
 via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
•  more than one copy or posters/maps:  
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or  
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
Priced publications:
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).
The Court’s assessment of EUPOL Afghanistan, a civilian 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, found 
that it had been partly effective in delivering its mandate. 
While external factors may provide some explanation for 
this, other shortcomings can be attributed to EUPOL itself.
The Court makes a number of recommendations, applicable 
not only to EUPOL Afghanistan, but also to other CSDP 
missions aiming to improve their effectiveness and the 
sustainability of the outcomes achieved.
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS