EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 26.10.2010 
SEC(2010) 1243 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
Accompanying document to the 
 
Towards a stronger European disaster resp onse: the role of civil protection and 
humanitarian assistance 
  
COM(2010) 600 
SEC(2010) 1242  
 
 
 
 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
Accompanying document to the 
 
Towards a stronger European disaster re sponse: the role of civil protection and 
humanitarian assistance 
 
EN 3   EN A. Introduction 
The impact assessment report aims to provide the Commission with the information 
necessary in order to develop the Communi cation on EU Disaster Response Capacity 
planned for adoption in November 2010. In particular, the report is intended to inform the Commission of the viability of  a range of policy options that may be 
further explored for developing EU's respons e to disasters inside  and outside the EU. 
The assessment carried out in the report is not intended to be exhaustive. On the 
contrary, the analysis undert aken is proportional to the ends sought. Given that the 
Communication will not propose solutions but  merely present options for further 
developing EU Disaster Response Ca pacity, possibly fla gging the preferred 
alternative, a full impact assessment does not  appear necessary or required at this 
stage. When, and if, concrete legislative proposals are advanced, these will need to be accompanied by a more in-depth impact assessment of the chosen options. The report focuses primarily on those elemen ts of the Communication where specific 
impacts can be identified and which therefor e require an impact assessment, i.e. the 
new policy options and different  ways to organise and st ructure EU civil protection 
cooperation. It should be not ed that the upcoming Communi cation will also deal with 
synergies with Humanitarian assistance but, gi ven that the latter will only result in 
policy statements on the need to reinforce existing EU practice a nd policy, a specific 
impact assessment does not appe ar necessary for these issues. 
B. Problem Definition and Objectives 
i. Problem Definition 
The value of the current EU Civil prot ection Mechanism is widely acknowledged. 
The system has functioned well in practice, carrying out its mandate in full and delivering results which have exceeded e xpectations. That bei ng so, a series of 
external factors have raised concerns as to whether, and how, the system's current 
mandate should be extended in order to face  future challenges in a cost effective 
way, simultaneously ensuring a more effici ent, rapid and predictable coordination. 
The global financial situation and budgetary  constraints, for ex ample, underline the 
necessity for any action taken to be as cost effective as possible. Moreover at EU and at global level we are witnessing an increa se in the frequency of natural and man-
made (i.e. technological and environmental)  disasters, which results in a greater 
number of EU civil protection operations in the framework of the Mechanism. The 
intensity and severity of di sasters is also on the rise and seemingly influenced by 
factors such as climate change, terrorism,  urbanisation and the intensification of 
industrial activity. To avoid a widening gap between needs and capacity it is essential that the EU maximises the effectiv eness of its response , which, according to 
past experience, can be achieved with limited extra resources. 
The key shortcoming inherent in the EU Ci vil Protection Mechanism is that, insofar 
as it has been set up to support and coordinate, and is therefore dependent upon, voluntary and ad hoc  offers of assistance by Member St ates, it is not in a position to 
guarantee the availability of assistance in the event of a major disaster. The ad hoc 
nature of the current system necessarily  implies that the EU civil protection 
Mechanism is of a reactive, rather than a proactive, nature. The impossibility of foreseeing exactly what, and how much, a ssistance will be offered for any given 
emergency means that the MIC is unabl e to develop con tingency plans for 
 
EN 4   EN deployment which inevitably leads to a de gree of improvisation in the immediate 
response phase, negatively affecting overall effectiveness . It also follows that 
decisions on the deployment of key assi stance are sometimes delayed and that 
reaction times are dependent upon those of the Member States, which may or may 
not offer assistance in a timely manner. Opti ons to make the system more predictable 
and capable of better coordina ting Member States' assistan ce would certainly provide 
added value. Over the years it has also become apparent that the system by which Member States 
offer in-kind assistance also leads to an  element of fragmentation. Given that 
Member States propose assistance in response to a given emergency without 
necessarily taking the overall EU response e ffort into account, the offers received 
may lack coherence . In fact, it is not unlikely for the MIC to find that assistance 
provided by Member States caters abundantly for some of  the needs of the State 
requesting assistance whilst overlooking ot hers. A more robust system ensuring a 
coherent EU response and which maximises the synergies between the various actors 
involved would certainly ensure benefits in terms of consistency and cost-effectiveness. 
ii. Objectives 
The overall objective is to develop and re inforce the EU's capacity to respond to 
disasters by building on all av ailable tools, capacities and expertise and maximising 
the synergies and complementarities betw een them. The options proposed aim to 
create a more solid and robust system capab le of ensuring a better protection of 
people, the environment and property in th e immediate aftermat h of emergencies. 
The developments stemming from the Trea ty of Lisbon are also an important 
consideration in this  context. Article 196 of the Treaty on th e functioning of the 
European Union grants the Union an explicit legal basis in the field of civil protection for, inter alia , supporting and complementi ng Member States’ action at 
national, regional and local level in res ponding to natural or man-made disasters 
within the Union. The solidarity clause  enshrined in Artic le 222 TFEU, which 
establishes a legal obligation on Member Stat es to assist each other and on the EU to 
mobilise all assets at its disposal in order to respond to an emergency, further 
underlines the need to strive towards a reinforced disaster  response capacity. 
The overall objective will be achieved by pursuing the following specific objectives: 
• Improving the effectiveness of EU Di saster Response, including cost-
effectiveness 
• Strengthening the coherence of EU Disaster Response 
• Increasing visibility 
Such objectives do not require the creati on of any new mechanisms but, rather, 
presuppose the need to develop and build upon instruments already in place. That 
being so, additional costs, if any, are likely to  be realistic and not disproportionate to 
those incurred at present. 
C. Subsidiarity 
Disaster management is mainly a responsib ility of the Member States. The Union's 
role in the field of civil protection is se t out in Article 196(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, according to which the Union shall, inter alia , support and 
complement Member States' action at nationa l, regional and local level in responding 
 
EN 5   EN to natural or man- made disasters with in the Union and promote consistency in 
international civil-protection work. It fo llows that Civil Protection response to 
disasters appears to be an  area of supporting/compleme ntary competence subject to 
the principle of subsidiarity. In order to solve the problems presented in the impact assessment there is a necessity for EU-based action and coordination. Although the primary responsibility to 
respond to disasters lies with  Member States, past practice under the Mechanism has 
shown there are real possibi lities for national civil protection resources to be 
overwhelmed by the sheer scale of disasters. In such cases, assistance from other Member States is necessary. EU action in  this field clearly involves managing 
situations with a strong tr ans-/multinational component, where there is a need for 
overall coordination and concerte d action above national level. 
Purely domestic action can not guarantee a coherent, efficient and effective EU response to disasters. Improving the predictabi lity, efficiency and visibility of the EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism requires that actio n be taken at EU level, in compliance 
with the aims and legislative procedure enshrined in Article 196 TFEU. Such an 
interpretation is confirmed by the solidar ity clause established by Article 222 TFEU.  
In light of the above, one must conclude th at the subsidiarity pr inciple is respected 
since the policy objectives discussed can not  be achieved by Member States acting 
alone but require the involvement of all Member States via action at EU level. 
D. Options Identified and Options Assessed in Detail 
i. Policy Options identified 
The Commission has identified the following policy options: 
• Option 1: Discontinuing existing policies  
Discontinuing existing policies in the fiel d of EU disaster response would imply 
dismantling the instruments currently in place, simultaneously terminating all connected activities. This option would al so imply having to rethink the future 
approach to be adopted  in this field.  
 
• Option 2: Maintaining the status quo 
Maintaining the status quo implies the conti nuation of current EU policies in the field 
of EU disaster response. The activities and instruments outlined in the impact 
assessment report would continue to exist.  Financing would be guaranteed along the 
lines of the 2007-2013 fina ncial perspectives. 
• Option 3: Developing an EU Disaster Response Capacity based on a 
voluntary pool of Member St ates' standby capacities  (human resources and 
assets) 
Teams and assets would continue to re main under national command and control but 
with a stronger commitment from Member St ates to make them ready and available 
for immediate action in EU civil protection operations upon  request from the MIC. 
The final decision on deployment would rema in with the Member States, who may 
need the resources in order to respond to domestic emergencies. Moreover, it should 
be noted that standby capacities  would not need to be held on reserve or sit idle in-
between EU operations as Member States would have the right to employ them internally. 
 
EN 6   EN The deployment of Member States' standby capacities would form the nucleus of the 
EU civil protection response to disasters inside and outside the EU and would be 
complemented by additional Member State offers provided in the same way as civil protection assistance is curre ntly organised. Moreover, ad ditional efforts could also 
be made to ensure dual visibility (national and
 European) for civi l protection assets 
deployed through the EU Civil Protection M echanism, which was a shortcoming of 
the EU's effort in Haiti. Military relief and transport a ssets, in particular strategi c airlift capability, should be 
included in the pool of availa ble capacities capable of be ing channelled via the MIC 
in accordance with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and international 
(notably Oslo) guidelines. The creation of a voluntary pool of Member State capacities would need to be 
bolstered by the development and continued commitment to joint training, exercises 
and work on lessons learnt. Moreover, ther e would also be a necessity to develop 
contingency plans and scenarios in order to make use of the pool's full potential. 
Reliance on such activities would be essential to guarantee the effectiveness and coherence of the system. 
• Option 4: Developing an EU Disaster Re sponse Capacity with EU-level assets 
Complementary EU-funded assets could be developed  for certain specific needs for 
which there are identified gaps in EU re sponse and for which action at European 
level would be considered more cost-eff ective. Specific consideration should be 
given to assets performing horizontal tasks,  such as assessment (rapid environmental 
impact assessment modules), logistics a nd coordination (in particular Technical 
Assistance and Support Teams (TAST) a nd telecommunications equipment). This 
approach could be further developed in to an all-encompassing EU coordination 
centre in the field, also providing services  for the UN. Similarly, the development of 
complementary EU-funded assets could be considered for speci alised high value 
response assets where common resources and burden-sharing arrangements may 
result in efficiency gains and where na tional resources typically prove to be 
insufficient. Although funded by the Union, EU level ca pacities would be entrusted to the 
interested Member States on a delegated ma nagement basis. Their availability would 
be guaranteed for EU operations but, when not in use, they w ould be accessible to 
managing Member States for national pur poses. The size of th e pool of EU level 
capacities could range from small, i.e. aime d at filling the most important gaps, to 
large, i.e. covering a substa ntial number of assets in ke y areas, thus allowing Member 
States to downscale national capabilities and simultaneously increasing the cost-effectiveness of EU response. 
• Option 5: The development of an EU Civil Protection Force 
The development of an independent European  force with its own capabilities, means, 
strengths and coordination, coupled with preparedness organisation and a pooling of 
existing resources would certa inly ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the 
EU’s response to disasters. A European force based on such principles would need to be mandated to have access to pre-identifie d resources of Member States and should 
also be able to acquire additional resources, regardless of whether any pre-identified gaps in EU response capacity actually exist. The latter would be entrusted to volunteering Member States to  be managed on a delegate d basis along the lines of 
the system explained in Option 4. 
 
EN 7   EN In order to develop a credible prepare dness organisation, the European force would 
also require the setting up of  an operational centre to dr aft scenarios and protocols 
and its own Training Institute for Civil Protection and Humanitarian aid to provide training for staff, for national and regiona l teams making up the European force, and 
for evaluation experts working for the EU. 
ii. Policy Options analysed 
Following a preliminary screening of the op tions, it was concluded that the social, 
economic and political drawbacks stemming from Options 1 and 5 were untenable. 
Moreover, given that Option 2 represents the continuation of existing EU policies 
and therefore mirrors the baseline scenar io against which other options must be 
compared, the proportionate impact an alysis focused on Options 3 and 4. 
E. Main Economic, Social and Environm ental Impacts of the Options Selected 
It should be noted that al l options will require a stre ngthening of the Monitoring and 
Information Centre of the European Commission in terms of coordination and 
analytical capacity. Such a development will occur regardless of the option pursued as it is envisaged that the ECHO and the MIC crisis rooms will, in the near future, be merged into a genuine response centre, operational on a 24 hour basis and 
responsible for the coordination of th e EU's civilian disaster response. 
• Economic impacts 
i. Economic impacts of Option 3 
A shift from the status quo to a voluntary pool model is unlikely to have significant 
impacts on capital costs. In fact, it is safe to assume that Member States will not be inclined to commit assets to the pool unless they are certain that they can still meet 
their own civil protection need s. It follows that the vol untary pool would represent 
only a small part of what already exists. Fu rthermore, if one considers that the terms 
regulating the commitment of assets would expressly allow them to be withdrawn in 
times of domestic need, it is clear that ad ditional equipment costs would not need to 
be incurred by Member States. 
Once fully developed and operational this type of arrangement may reduce the need 
for additional investments in new response capacities at Member State level. Whilst each Member State is responsible for ensuri ng that it is sufficiently equipped to 
respond to predictable or recurrent risks, it may be possible to secure economic gains 
by pooling and sharing additional reserve capacities, complementing each Member State's basic response assets. By keeping such reserve capacities at EU level and 
sharing the overall burden between Member  States, economies of scale could be 
pursued and savings secured. 
It can also be assumed that, as a genera l rule, Option 3 would not create additional 
deployment costs. Although the developmen t of a voluntary pool would certainly 
guarantee availability in the immediate afte rmath of a disaster, this should neither 
affect the cost of moving assets nor of ope rating them on site. To the contrary, there 
may even be opportunities, particularly with regards to transport, for assets to be 
deployed in a more cost efficient manner th an would otherwise have been possible. 
The collective response fac ilitated by the pool arrangemen t and the associated pre-
planning, would guarantee a more rapid identif ication of transport options and would 
 
EN 8   EN enable appropriately located assets to be collected and transported together, reducing 
journey times and costs. Mo reover, allocation of  assets amongst aircraft could be 
made more efficient, maximising the use of airlift capacity a nd reducing marginal 
costs.  
On the contrary, Option 3 may have an imp act on total annual ope rating costs if the 
annual deployment of Member States’ capacities increased by reason of their 
inclusion in the pool. Such a development ma y also have important consequences for 
certain Member States in terms of staffing costs. On a more general level, certain 
Member States with particular organisati onal structures may incur costs in making 
the relevant organisational and le gal transition from the status quo. 
The negative impacts mentioned above are strongly influenced by the way in which 
assets are selected from the pool and th e size of the pool itself. Demand related 
impacts on a given Member State could, for example, be mitigated via a rotating selection policy rather than selection by preference. In addition, a larger pool would 
be likely to result in a lower demand on the capacities “enlisted”.  
Impacts could be further al leviated by ensuring EU f unding for certain predefined 
eligible costs. A new model of burden shar ing would ensue, shifting a part of the 
costs from Member States to the Union. No t only would this allow Member States to 
cover some of the total annua l costs deriving from  involvement in the voluntary pool 
but it would also serve as an incentive fo r smaller Member States to increase their 
involvement in EU disaster response effo rts. The increased EU response capacity 
deriving therefrom would further relieve pr essure on those Member States carrying a 
heavier disaster response bur den, and strengthen the EU's ability to respond to major 
emergencies outside the EU.  
ii. Economic impacts of Option 4 
The most important economic impact of this Option would be the avoidance of 
capital costs by Member States. The pr ocurement of complementary EU funded 
assets and airlift cap acity would in fact guarantee th at Member States could call upon 
substantial collectiv e capacities previously lacki ng at national level, without 
incurring additional investment costs. This guaranteed availability would be a major 
benefit going well beyond the ones which c ould ensue from the implementation of a 
voluntary pool of assets. In particular, one global investment at EU level to purchase 
complementary assets, which could then be shared and used by all Member States, is 
likely to involve a substantially lower investment for the EU as a whole than if each Member State acquired such capacities indivi dually. Similarly, with regard to assets 
for which an increase in capacity is envi saged, this Option would provide vast 
benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness a nd efficiency, reducing the need for Member 
States to invest domestically.  
Another major economic benefit of Option 4 is the potential for more cost-effective 
solutions. EU level assets which can be called upon by all Member States would considerably increase the cost-effectiven ess of disaster response operations by 
reducing mobilisation costs (compared to the commercial leasing of such capacities) and enhancing rapidity and efficiency of re sponse. Significant e fficiency gains could 
also arise from joined-up transportation and logistics as well as other economies of scale. 
 
EN 9   EN Besides the above, the purchasi ng of additional EU  assets to be operated by member 
States would also increase efficacy of  deployment and cost-effectiveness at 
operational level much in the same way as  outlined for Option 3. In addition, all 
standby/deployment costs of the compleme ntary funded assets would be covered by 
the EU, thus guaranteeing the abovementi oned "new model of burden-sharing" and 
allowing all costs to be  shifted to the Union. 
Insofar as costs are concerned, the development of EU-level capacities will require 
some form of tendering and management.  
• Social Impacts 
The options considered in the report did not  trigger social impacts in the traditional 
sense of the word but had im portant societal impacts. 
The possibility of reacting promptly and in cisively via a pool of Member States 
(Option 3) or EU-level a ssets (Option 4) would undoubt edly reduce the number of 
casualties, alleviate suffering and minimise harm to individuals and communities as a 
whole. The positive impacts for societies affected by disasters would thus be 
undeniable.  Moreover, a more coherent and effective re sponse would certainl y increase people’s 
belief in the EU’s capacity to respond to di sasters. The consequences of this would 
be twofold. Firstly, populations affected by disasters would be more willing to 
collaborate with the EU, potentially influe ncing the possibility of further cooperation 
with third countries. Secondly, increased belief in EU disa ster response would help 
to win the support of EU citizens/polity.  It should be noted that the development of  EU assets (Option 4) which would be 
entrusted to Member States on a dele gated management basis would be the 
maximum expression of EU solidarity, in accordance with Article 222 TFEU and the desires and expectations of EU citizens.  
• Environmental Impacts 
Both the voluntary pool of standby assets (Op tion 3) and the EU-lev el assets (Option 
4) would allow the EU to guarantee the av ailability of assistan ce in the immediate 
aftermath of any emergency. The increase d coherence and effectiveness deriving 
from such developments would allow the EU to react more rapidly to emergencies, thus significantly reducing the negative im pacts of disasters on the environment (e.g. 
an immediate and effective response to a fore st fire incident can substantially reduce 
environmental damage). 
F. Comparison of Options 
The following criteria were us ed to compare the options: 
• Effectiveness of the option in relation to the objectives; 
• Cost-effectiveness of the option; 
• Coherence of the option with  overarching EU objectives, strategies and priorities. 
Options were compared against the baseline  scenario (status quo – Option 2). Charts 
and graphs were used to sum up and graphically represent conclusions.  
Compared to the baseline, both Opti ons 3 and 4 showed clear advantages, 
outweighing the disadvantages of the status quo with regard to all criteria. It was 
 
EN 10   EN concluded that these Options should therefor e be preferred to the baseline scenario. 
In particular, the comparison highlighted th e advantages of Opti on 3 with regard to 
its compatibility with the principles of subsidiarity  and proportionality and the 
advantages of Option 4 in terms of effec tiveness and (potentially) cost-effectiveness 
(especially with regard to  EU-level capacities perfor ming horizontal tasks and 
specific high-value assets). The advantag es and disadvantages of the two options 
were balanced amongst themselves with  the aim of designing a system that 
maximises effectiveness and coherence, simultaneously ensuring minimal negative 
impacts and costs. 
In merging the two most attractive options, preference was given to Option 3 insofar 
as it demonstrated the highest degree of compatibility with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. However,  certain elements of Option 4, which 
ensured significant economic gains for the EU as a whole, were also taken into 
account. 
The relative strengths of the options cons idered pointed towards a hybrid system 
comprising the following elements: 
• A voluntary pool of Member States’ assets committed to EU operations . This 
should form the core of the system. The si ze and composition of the pool will be 
determined at a later stage; 
• Complementary ad hoc offers of Member States  along the lines of the current EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism;  
• Supplementary EU-level assets  where cost-efficiency outweighs the political 
disadvantage of not relying on Member States' assets.  
This system could be further reinfor ced by continued support to humanitarian 
organisations that develop and manage the prepositioning of  relief items for 
international humanitarian operations, and backed by  military assets in specific 
cases.