EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1475 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries 
{COM(2011) 843 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1476 final}  
 
EN 2   EN Table of Contents 
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF IN TERESTED P ARTIES .............................. 3  
1.1. ORGANISATION AND TIMING ................................................................................................................. 3  
1.2. CONSULTATION AND EXPERTISE (PUBLIC AND INTERNAL ) .................................................................... 3  
1.3. IMPACT ASSESSMENT BOARD ............................................................................................................... 4  
2. PROBLEM DE FINITI ON............................................................................................................. ............. 5  
2.1. THE PROBLEM REQUIRING ACTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 
INSTRUMENT (ICI) .......................................................................................................................... .................... 5  
2.1.1. Defining th e problem........................................................................................................... ............ 5  
2.1.2. Scope of current Instrument (ICI) .............................................................................................. ..... 6 
2.1.3. How is the mon ey spent today? .................................................................................................. ..... 6 
2.1.4. Evolution of the overall context since th e adoption of the cu rrent Instrument................................ 7  
2.2. REVIEW OF EVALUATION REPORTS AND LESSONS LEARNT .................................................................... 7  
2.3. THE UNDERLYING DRIVERS OF THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................... 9  
2.4. LEGAL BASE FOR EU ACTION .............................................................................................................. 10  
2.5. EU ADDED VALUE ............................................................................................................................. 10  
3. OBJECTIVES..................................................................................................................... ....................... 11  
3.1. POLICY CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................... .1 1 
3.2. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................... ......... 12  
3.3. CONSISTENCY WITH EXTERNAL ACTION PRIORITIES ............................................................................ 13  
3.4. CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER EU POLICIES ............................................................................................ 13  
3.5. GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE AND SCOPE .............................................................................................. 15  
4. OPTIONS........................................................................................................................ ........................... 17  
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS............................................................................................................ ........... 18  
5.1. LIKELY ECONOMIC , SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS .............................................................. 19  
5.2. IMPACT IN TERMS OF MANAGEMENT / IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES ................................................ 23  
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS .......................................................................................................... ..... 23  
7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION.................................................................................................... 24  
7.1. CORE INDICATORS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES .................................................................... 25  
7.2. MONITORING ............................................................................................................................... ....... 26  
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................... ... 28  
 
EN 3   EN 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTA TION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Organisation and timing 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment for the EU  external action instru ments for the period 
2014-2020, including this document1, has been coordinated by a Task Force  composed by 
services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams , 
appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the consultations, reviews and 
studies mentioned in Section 2 and have liaised  with other Commission services to ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Fo rce has met with the drafting team in charge 
of this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 30 June, 14 July and 2 August 2011 for organisational and quality-check purposes. 
An Impact Assessment Steering Group,  composed by the members of the Task Force and 
representatives of interested Directorates Ge neral and the Secretaria t General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011 It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. 
The review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board  is scheduled on 14 
September 2011.  
In line with Art 27 of the Financial regul ation (Council Regulation(EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing ru les of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment is the ex-ante 
evaluation of the Partnership Instrument (PI). 
1.2. Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 
The European Commission held a public consu ltation on future funding for EU external 
action between 26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This process was based on an online 
questionnaire accompanied by a background paper 'W hat funding for EU ex ternal action after 
2013?'  prepared by Commission a nd EEAS services involved . The 220 contributions received 
to the public consultation reflected a broad an d diverse spectrum representing the variety of 
structures, views and traditions charact erising the external action community. 
A majority of the respondents (around 70%) c onfirmed that EU financial intervention 
provided substantial added value  in the main policy areas supported through EU Financial 
Instruments for external action
2. The criterion of EU added value was put forward by many 
respondents as the main driver for the future: th ey considered that the EU should exploit its 
comparative advantage linked to  its global field presence, its  wide-ranging expertise, its 
supranational nature, its role as facilitator of  coordination, and exploit economies of scale.  
                                                 
1  The instruments are the followi ng: Internal Agreement for the 11th European Development Fund, Development Cooperation 
Instrument, Instrument for Pre-Accession a ssistance, European Neighbourhood Instrume nt, Instrument for Stability, Instrument 
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European Instrument for De mocracy and Human Rights, Part nership Instrument and the 
instruments for the EU-Greenland Partnership. The Macro-Fina ncial Assistance instrument, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, the Humanitarian aid instrument and the Civil Pr otection mechanism are not part of this joint exercise. 
2 i.e. peace and security, povert y reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in st ability and growth in enlargement and neighbourho od 
countries, tackling global challenges, pr omoting EU and international standard s and values, and supporting growth and 
competitiveness abroad  
 
EN 4   EN Nearly all respondents (92%) supported a more differentiated approach,  tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary coun try, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, in 
order to increase the impact of  EU financial instruments. 
Opinions were mixed on simplification of the Instruments  and the balance between 
geographic and thematic Instruments . Many feared that possible reduction in the number of 
EU thematic programmes could imply a decrease in the overall amount available for 
thematic action, and instead called for a simp lification of the rules governing access and 
implementation of thematic funding. Increased flexibility of the geographic limits of EU 
Instruments was supported by a significant majority of  respondents as a way to respond to 
interregional challenges.  
When asked to prioritise among different areas of interests , most interested persons and 
stakeholders indicated 'macro-economic and fina ncial stability, economic  growth', 'promotion 
of trade and investments', followed by 'energy, resource efficiency and climate change' and 
'employment and social issues (inc lusive growth and decent work)'. 
A vast majority of respondents also agreed that  private sector is the main engine for economic 
development and thus contributes significantly to sustainable growth. For this reason they 
advocate a more extensive EU engagement with th e business community as a partner in 
the EU and in third countries in order to involve increasingly the private sector – both 
financially and in terms of knowledge gathering - as a driver for sustainable development. 
Many respondents agreed that joint programming and co-financing with Member States  
could increase the impact and the coherence of  EU external action, simplify the delivery of 
aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 
With respect to perf ormance evaluation, a stronger focus on monitoring activities  during 
project and programme implementation as well as greater simplification of the rules  
governing external financing receive a wide approva l of contributors as a means to ensure that 
EU external instruments de liver the expected impact. 
A larger part of stakeholders supported incr easing information and communication activities 
to enhance the visibility of EU external funding,  in particular in beneficiary countries; 
however EU visibility appears to be better served by effective policies, strategies and 
presence in third countries, than by additional spending for communication. The idea of 
reinforcing the EU's coordinating role  among other donors and of ensuring that 
implementing partners give more visibility to EU funding also ha d strong support from 
stakeholders. 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board  
The Partnership Instrument’s draft Impact Assessment was submitted to the Board on 5 
August 2011. The Board issued its opinion on16 September 2011. The Board recommended 
that the Report should be improved in vari ous respects in partic ular as regards:  
1) Strengthen the analysis of the problems  2) Improve the design and the pres entation of the policy options  
3) Analyze better the expected impacts 
 
EN 5   EN 4) Expand the presentation of stakeholders’views 
5) Improve the procedure and presentation The recommendations of the Board have been in corporated into the present version of the 
Report. 
2. P
ROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. The problem requiring action and the scope of the current Industrialised 
Countries Instrument (ICI)  
2.1.1.  Defining the problem 
Through the changes over recent ye ars, the world has seen the emergence of economies  such 
as India, China and Brazil which are playi ng an increasingly important role in the 
international economy and trade, in multilateral fora (UN, G-20) and in addressing challenges 
of global concern. These countries are progres sively graduating from development status. 
The EU has been developing broad binding agr eements with key partners and emerging 
economies – for instance, the Free Trade Agreemen t with Korea in 2011; the Partnership for 
Modernisation with Russia laun ched in 2010; the Strategic Pa rtnership with Brazil in 2007 – 
to address matters of shared responsibility and resolve bilateral issues. It is also defining concrete proposals – as an example the Fr ee Trade Agreement and parallel broad based 
Framework Agreement with Japan – on how to take forward these bilateral dynamic 
relationships encompassing aspects of economic  relations as well as other important 
dimensions of partnership.
 
The financing Instrument for Cooperation with  Industrialised and other high income 
countries and territories (ICI)3, which came into force in 2007, has been the EU’s main 
vehicle for collaboration with highly developed countries . It has a wider scope than its 
predecessor (Council Regulation 382/2001)4 which was limited to 6 countries and covered a 
smaller range of activities. The ICI has constituted an e ffective toolbox in providing a 
differentiated and appropriate response to wide n and deepen the coopera tion with 17 countries 
(industrialised countries and high-income territories in Nort h America, the As ia-Pacific region 
and the Gulf region). However, as it is due to ex pire by end 2013, a new financial instrument 
is needed to cover post-2013 c ooperation with these countries. 
In 2007 and 2008, the EU budgetary authority took a step further by adopting Preparatory 
Actions for cooperation with China, India and with middle-income countries in Latin 
America, Asia and South Africa  in areas such as economic a nd business relations as well as 
in research. These Preparatory Actions are constrained in time  as they are limited to three 
years. A legislative follow-up has been proposed  in 2009 to extend the ICI to these countries 
(ICI+) and it is expected to be adopted by th e Parliament and the Council by the end of 2011. 
                                                 
3 USA, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Kor ea, Australia and New Zealand); certain Asia n industrialised countries and territories 
which are excluded from the DAC list of recipient countries (S ingapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan  and Brunei) as well as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Om an, Qatar, Saudi Arabia a nd the United Arab Emirates) similarly excluded from 
the DAC list of ODA recipients.  
4 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUr iServ.do?uri=CONSLEG: 2001R0382:20051212:EN:HTML   
 
EN 6   EN Although these activities have c onsiderably helped the EU to  pursue its priorities through 
bilateral cooperation and strengthened relati ons, they are limited by th eir geographical scope 
and areas of intervention and financial resources. 
2.1.2.  Scope of current Instrument (ICI) 
The overall aim of the current ICI Instrument is  to strengthen the EU’s relationship with 
highly developed countries  and to promote its place as a ke y player in the global economic 
and political arenas through th e funding of cooperation project s covering areas of mutual 
interests. Given the limited resources available to  the ICI, achievements of the objectives are 
focused on the following areas: public diplomacy and outreach , economic partnership and 
business cooperation, and people-to-people links.  
For more details on the ICI see Annex 1 . 
2.1.3.  How is the money spent today? 
For the period 2007-2013, the budget  of the ICI Instrument am ounts to EUR 172 million (for 
ICI+, the proposal was EUR 176 million ove r 2010-2013, but the Regulation is still under 
discussions). The individual annual funding allo cations are linked to the life cycle of the 
programmes/projects financed under the Instrument.  
Breakdown of the budget per group of countries : 
22.205.000; 18%
80.223.000; 66%7.920.000; 7%10.400.000; 9%
United States
and CanadaJapan, Republic of Korea,Australia and New Zealand Newly industrialisedAsian countries and territories GCC countries
 
Breakdown per group of activities : 
32.060.000; 27%
55.523.162; 45%28.528.838; 24%4.636.000; 4%
Public Diplomacy Business cooperation People to People links Small-scale cooperation projects 
 
EN 7   EN 2.1.4.  Evolution of the overall context since the adoption of the current Instrument 
The fundamental challenge the pr oposed Partnership Instrument a ddresses is a consequence of 
globalisation: the texture of the world economy is  changing, power is sh ifting and prosperity 
is diffusing; new players increa singly shape the international agenda. The G-20 is one symbol 
of this change: the perception that a new international order is slowly replacing the former power structure is very much grounded in re ality, even if the pace of the change may 
sometimes be overstated. 
In particular 
• The EU has developed broad based binding agreements with key partners and emerging 
economies to address bilateral issues and ma tters of global concern. The implementation 
of these agreements requires a toolbox, a dedi cated financing instrument so that the EU 
has the means to promoting its interests worldwide, and to deal with global issues wherever the need arises. 
• The emergence of new powers such as India an d China, or South Af rica and Brazil, has 
changed the international order as these count ries are playing an increasingly important 
role in international economy and trade,  in multilateral fora (UN, G-20) and in 
addressing challenges of global concern. Wh ilst development and poverty alleviation 
remain key concerns, these countries are pr ogressively leaving behind the status of 
developing nations.  
• The current Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised (ICI) countries has a limited 
geographical scope; it covers only 17 countri es and high income territories; whereas the 
Development Cooperation Instrume nt (DCI) covers countries su ch as India, China, South 
Africa and Brazil but only for official  development assistance expenditure. 
• Relations and economic ties between the EU  and Russia have evolved considerably 
underlining the importance of Russia as a strategic partner far beyond development 
cooperation. The need for financial assistance has declined. Russia aspires to a balanced 
relation and is becoming a donor itself. Th e proposed Partnership Instrument would 
become the main instrument for cooperation with Russia.  
2.2. Review of evaluation reports and lessons learnt 
The Mid-Term Review (MTR ) (COM/2009/196)  of the financial Instrument for external 
actions, carried out in 2009, conc luded that the limited scope  of the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI) was impeding th e financing of activit ies which were not 
partner-focused assistance that is the basis of Official Deve lopment Assistance (ODA), but 
were of mutual benefit in th e context of th e globalisation. This limitation was affecting the 
most dynamic regions of the world (e .g. Latin America, Asia, South Africa) and requires 
an adapted enabling Instrument. Indeed, the Instrument for Development Cooperation 
(DCI) is not suitable for addressi ng the problem for two reasons:  
• firstly,  it enables funding only of activities that have the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing c ountries as their main objective, more 
specifically the eradication of  poverty in partner countries and regions in the context 
of sustainable development,  including the pursuit of the Millennium Development 
 
EN 8   EN Goals (DCI Article 1). Moreover, the EU does not dispose of any other means to 
promote its own interests in these countries. 
• secondly, emerging economies are progressi vely being graduated from the DCI 
Instrument, without an instrument to s upport the evolution of the relationships.  
Based on the experience of the Preparatory Actions  (see 2.1 above), the European 
Commission proposed a legislativ e follow up to allow the financ ing of such measures in 
countries falling under the DCI Regulation. The legislative propos al was tabled in April 2009 
(COM/2009/197). The proposal, known as ICI+, aims to extend th e geographical scope of the 
current Industrialised Countries  Instrument (ICI) to developing  countries (including emerging 
economies) of Asia and Latin America, a nd to Iran, Iraq, Yemen and South Africa.  
The Mid-Term Review  (MTR ) also recognised that the IC I, on which the current proposal 
for a new instrument builds on, has provided a fl exible basis to develop cooperation with a 
wider number of industrialised an d high-income territories, alt hough the financial envelope is 
rather limited.  
Even though there has been no st rategic evaluation of the ICI, evaluations of its flagship 
programmes  the “EU Gateway programme for Japan and the Republic of Korea” (financing 
EU pavilions in trade fairs) and the EU Cent res (university consortia delivering "EU studies" 
modules and disseminating key information on the EU to a very broad audience) have been 
carried out in the past year s and were very positive. 
Regarding the Executive Training Programme (ETP) (language and training programmes 
for managers), the eval uation conducted in 20105 has shown that the ETP presents a unique 
offering in terms of programme structure (fam iliarity with Japanese and Korean business 
culture are invaluable attributes) and target audience (both large and small and medium sized 
companies value the programme). It provides an  opportunity to potential participants from 
Member States who offer no similar initiative. Moreover, it provides a go od visibility for the 
EU. The ETP has had a positive impact on EU companies committed to establishing/growing 
their business activities with Japan and Korea in  terms of assisting the EU company to access 
Japanese/Korean markets; bringing sustained imp act on EU companies’ business, rather than 
a short term and temporary effect, and in terms of broadening the busin ess possibilities of EU 
companies in other Asian countries. 
The evaluation, conducted in 20106, on EU Centres  (dedicated to public diplomacy) Initiative 
has shown that “the Centres ar e adding real value and that th e Commission benefits from the 
Initiative to a great extent. The amount of work conducted by the Centres compensates by far 
the costs that the Commission incurs on the programme”. The programme has achieved a 
solid base in those countries that have been pi oneers to the Initiative (USA and Canada) and is 
successfully striving towards higher levels of ma turity in Australia and New Zealand. The EU 
funding has the capacity to act as seed money, mainly by attracting other sources of funding 
that are pulled towards the Initiative to  ensure its long te rm sustainability. 
Further information on these successf ul ICI programmes is detailed in Annex 2 . 
                                                 
5 Ref Evaluation: Intermediate evaluation of the Executive Tr aining Programme in Japan and Korea. February 2010. Deloitte 
consulting.  
6 Ref Evaluation: http://www.eeas.europa. eu/eu-centres/docs/201 0_evaluation_en.pdf  
 
EN 9   EN The evaluation of the results of the Preparatory Actions7 can only be tentative as they were 
set up in the 2007 and 2008 budget procedures . The Preparatory Actions concern four 
domains identified by the EU budgetary authoriti es: economic and business relations (China 
and India), research, and integrative approach to the development and practice of policy for 
EU-Asia. They cover cooperation measures, in middle income countries and other developing 
countries in Asia and Latin Amer ica, which are not fully in line with the stated  objective of 
the DCI (poverty eradication in the context of sustainable deve lopment). On the whole, there 
is no doubt that the actions meet genuine and strategic European need s and it has already 
become obvious that Europe needs to be able to  stay the course over the medium to long term 
to achieve sustainable impact.  
2.3. The underlying drivers of the problem 
• Rise of emerging economies  
Emerging economies are playing an increasin gly important role in international 
economy and trade, in multilateral fora (UN, G-20) as well as in addressing challenges of global concern. 
• Existing instruments’ lack of flexibility  
Current Instruments lack the flexibility to bring forward bilateral agendas with these 
countries in a number of areas where th e EU needs to respond swiftly to new 
situations while promoting its interests worldwide ( Annex 3 ). 
• Evolution of the relationship with Russia  
In recent years relations and economic ties  between the EU and Russia have evolved 
considerably underlining th e importance of Russia as an important strategic 
partner. Given the significant improve ments in Russia’s economy, the need for 
financial assistance has declined. In fact, Ru ssia aspires to a balanced relation and is 
becoming a donor itself. Thus, the ENPI is dated in terms of EU-Russian bilateral 
financial cooperation and is not adapted to meet the objectives defined in the 
roadmaps of the EU-Russia Common Spaces and the Partnership for Modernisation. The main reason for bilateral cooperation w ith Russia to take place on the framework 
of the Partnership Instrument would theref ore be the need to continue cooperation 
with the EU in areas of common interests and support to civil society
  (more on EU-
Russia relations in Annex 3 ). 
• ICI’s limited geographical scope  
The current Instrument for Cooperation w ith Industrialised (ICI) countries has a 
limited geographical scope; it covers only 17 countries and high-income territories  
(industrialised countries and high-income in  North America, the Asia-Pacific region 
and the Gulf region). This does not allo w the EU to engage with other partner 
countries that are interested in fostering a relationship of “equa ls” with the EU. Its 
current scope stems from this geographical limitation and is also limited in terms of areas of intervention and budget. 
• DCI’s limited scope  
The current Instrument for Development C ooperation (DCI) includes countries such 
                                                
 
7 Business and scientific exchanges with I ndia; business and scientific exchanges w ith China; cooperation with middle-income 
group countries in Asia; and c ooperation with middle-income group countries in Latin America.  
 
EN 10   EN as India, China, Brazil, and South Afri ca; however its geographic cooperation can 
only be used for aid that meet s the stated objective of th e DCI (poverty eradication in 
the context of sustainable development) . Therefore its scope is restricted as it does 
not allow engagement with such countri es in programmes beyond the development 
cooperation agenda. 
• Preparatory Actions’ limitations in time  
These Actions were set-up as a response to the limited scope of the DCI. They are, 
however, constrained in time to three years. In 2009, the Commission tabled a legislative proposal, known as the ICI +, extending the geographical scope of the 
current ICI to DCI developing countries (including emerging economies), namely 
Asia, Latin America, and to Ira n, Iraq, Yemen and South Africa. 
2.4. Legal base for EU action  
In the framework of the discussions set-up by the legislative authorit y on the Commission’s 
proposal on the ICI+ (COM/2009/197
8, see Section 2.2 of this Report), and following the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, an  understanding on the us e of Articles 207(2)9 and 
209(1)10 to carry-out such activities in developing countries has been reached between the 
three Institutions. For countries “other th an developing countri es”, Article 212(2)11 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE)12 is used.  
Further to that agreement, the proposed new comprehensive Instrument would therefore be 
based on the combination of the following three articles of th e TFUE: Articles 212(2), 207(2) 
and 209(1). 
2.5. EU Added Value  
The EU has numerous international agreements with partner countries all over the world, not 
matched by individual Member States, which gives th em all influence in virtually all fields of 
international relations. With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, 
only the EU has the critical weig ht to respond to globa l challenges. The EU as a global player 
has the credibility and neutrality which are not available to individual Member States. The EU 
is also in a unique position to promote EU nor ms and turn them into global standards through 
international cooperation.   
The proposed Partnership Instrument will demons trate enhanced added value compared with 
the existing situation as it embraces the Europe 2020 Strategy based on green growth oriented 
cooperation, a stronger emphasis on EU interests in cooperation with emerging and 
industrialised countries and a stronger focu s on improving the climate for business, 
investment, trade and research and innovation. It should develop a proactive agenda of mutual 
interests with partner count ries with a specific focus on EU Strategic Partners. 
                                                 
8  http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/ legislation/2009/ COM2009197text.pdf 
9  Article 207(2) of the TFUE: The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures de fining the framework for implementing the common commercial 
policy. 
10  Article 209(1) of the TFUE: The Europ ean Parliament and the Council, acting in  accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall adopt the measures necessary for the implemen tation of development cooperation policy, which may relate to 
multiannual cooperation programmes with  developing countries or progra mmes with a thematic approach. 
11  The European Parliament and the Council,  acting in accordance with the ordinary le gislative procedure, shall adopt the measur es 
necessary for the implementation of paragraph 1. 
12  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUr iServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF  
 
 
EN 11   EN The new Partnership Instrument would also  better honour the EU’s commitments towards 
third countries with which it has concluded Partnership and Cooperation/Framework 
Agreements. It adds credibility and consiste ncy to the EU external policy of linking the 
promotion of its values and interests with specific cooperation activities. Within the 
framework of the agreements, the Partnership Inst rument could also act as a catalyst for joint 
EU and Member States projects as the EU and Member States are bound by their provisions. 
Finally, it would support the EU’s regional and bilateral policies, as  well as the EU’s 
commitments towards regional and international cooperation processes and bodies such as the 
Arctic Council13. 
The EU’s economic cooperation activities, busin ess dialogues and other forms of external 
economic actions could be a powerful foreign polic y tool. They could cont ribute to project the 
EU’s visibility and influence externally. It may support Europe’s ambition to become a key economic and political actor on the intern ational scene both bi laterally and through 
multilateral bodies such as the G-20. 
Moreover, joint actions with EU Member States and innovative resource mobilization 
modalities may become more frequent and feasible under the Partnership Instrument as 
compared to the current situation under the IC I. More money will be available to support co-
financing operations implemented  in cooperation with EU Memb er States bilateral aid or 
financial bodies or agencies. Multiannual pr ogramming would allow more structured and 
integrated business. Public and private part nerships may be more achievable, involving 
several actors of the European business co mmunity. Blending grants  and loans also may 
become a preferred option whenever relevant.  
3. OBJECTIVES  
3.1. Policy context 
In light of the evergrowing globalisation in  which many challenges of worldwide concern 
have arisen, including the economy, trade, the environment and climate change as well as 
social issues, and in order to live up to its commitments (Europe 2020 Strategy) as well as to 
promote its interests overseas, the EU needs to  equip itself with an  appropriate range of 
financial instruments. 
The Partnership Instrument would build on estab lished frameworks and past activities carried 
out in recent years while embr acing new cooperation activities to  bring forward the bilateral 
agenda and to support the implementation of  bilateral agreements (Partnership and 
Cooperation/Framework Agreements (PCAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Joint Action Plans, Policy Dialogues, Summits and Th ematic Dialogues) with third countries. 
The Instrument should respond to  the need to promote the Eur opean Union's interests globally 
and to strengthen links and to engage further w ith strategic partners on a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral basis in order to create a more favourable and transparent environment for the 
development of relations between the Eur opean Union and its partner countries. 
                                                
 
13  http://www.arctic-council.org/   
 
EN 12   EN 3.2. Objectives 
General objective The overall aim  of the Partnership Instrument is to advance and promote EU and mutual 
interests and to give the Europe 2020 Strategy a global reach , by responding  in an 
effective and flexible manner  to cooperation objectives arising from the Union's bilateral 
relationship  with partner countri es and by addressing challenges of global concern, with a 
specific focus on strategic partners.  
Specific objectives 
The Partnership Instrument will be the main instrument to support the cooperation with 
industrialised countries, Russia, emerging economi es. It will also support ad-hoc cooperation 
with developing countri es within its scope. 
It will pursue the following specific objectives: 
a) implementing the international dimens ion of the “Europe 2020” strategy by 
supporting EU bilateral, regional and in ter-regional cooperation partnership 
strategies, by promoting policy dial ogues and by developing collective 
approaches and responses to ch allenges of global concern;  
b) improving market access and developi ng trade, investment and business 
opportunities  for European companies, in particular SMEs, by means of 
economic partnerships and busin ess and regulatory cooperation; 
c) enhancing widespread understa nding and visibility of th e Union and its role on 
the world scene by  means of public dipl omacy, education/academic cooperation 
and outreach activities to promote Union’s values and interests. 
Operational Objectives as regards th e drivers of the problem (section 2.3) 
• Respond to the rise of emerging economies  by developing cooperative interaction 
with partner countries in order to addr ess challenges of wo rldwide concern and 
manage globalisation by maximising its be nefits in a more sustainable manner. 
• Enhance flexibility compared to the exis ting instruments to be able to respond 
swiftly to new situations in partner countri es and to bring forward bilateral agendas 
while promoting EU interests worldwide. 
• React to the evolution of the relationship with Russia and meet its aspiration to reach 
a harmonious association. 
• Respond to the ICI’s limited geographical scope and areas of intervention by 
enabling full engagement with partner c ountries who are interested in fostering 
balanced relations with the EU. 
• Address the more limited objectives  of the DCI in order to support  bilateral 
cooperation not aimed at development aid. Th is also responds to the challenge of 
advancing EU interest towards countries where development assistance is no longer 
needed and should be reduced or reoriented. 
 
EN 13   EN • Meet the Preparatory Actions’ limitati ons in time by supporting cooperation 
measures in middle income countries and other developing count ries in Asia and 
Latin America which are not priorities for ODA. 
3.3. Consistency with external action priorities 
The Lisbon Treaty sets out common principles and objectives and defines a new institutional 
framework for the Union’s external action (not ably the European External Action Service 
(EEAS)) leading to high expectations in the fiel d of external action both internally within the 
EU and by partners at national and regional level, including in the multilateral context. 
It should also be noted that the Council and th e European Parliament ha ve also clearly called 
for keeping separated ODA mone y from non-ODA money. This has to  be seen in the context 
of the pledge of the Member States and the EU on ODA target.        
The Instrument will be an integrative element in the overall architectur e of external action 
Financial Instruments organise d around four main chapters: a policy-based chapter aiming 
primarily at cooperation with partner countries at the bilateral, regional and international 
level; as well as chapters on working on cross-cutting priorities and values: human rights and democracy, humanitarian assistance and civil protection, crisis management and prevention. 
The Instrument’s main objective is to project  EU policies in support of the EU 2020 agenda, 
addressing major global challenges , developing a proactive agenda of EU and mutual interests 
with industrialised countries and emerging ec onomies, with a specific focus on Strategic 
Partners. 
The proposed PI also allows considering tr iangular cooperation of a kind that no other 
instruments could cater for, and which may well prove  to be a substantial part of future action: 
co-operation between the EU, a country of the traditional industrialised world and a newly 
emerged power. Currently, it is extremely diffi cult for the EU and the US to fund a project 
together involving, for example, the monitoring of climate change in South Africa. Nor could 
we contribute to a centre in Korea that promotes  biodiversity in developi ng countries in Asia. 
Since the DCI cannot apply to countries such as the United States and Japan, and since 
triangular cooperation is increasi ngly a policy option, th e fact that the Part nership Instrument, 
as envisaged, would be truly global in geograp hical scope would be a decisive operational 
advantage. 
3.4. Consistency with other EU policies 
One of the key priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy  is to restore gr owth. The agenda 
recognises that fast-growing emerging economies with an expanding middle class will play a 
critical role in sustaining European export of goods and services in which the EU has a 
comparative advantage. The Partnership Inst rument should be instrumental in supporting 
trade policy
14, in particular as regards the strategi c economic partners. The support to market 
access for European companies will complement  actions financed under the competitiveness 
and SME programme.  
Emerging economies play an increasingly important  role as responsible partners in addressing 
challenges of global concern. Issues such as poverty alleviation, migration, competitiveness 
                                                 
14 "Trade, Growth and World Affairs - TRADE POLICY AS A CORE COMPONENT OF THE EU’S 2020 STRATEGY" 
(COM/2010/612) of 9.11.2010 
 
EN 14   EN and trade liberalisation, environment, climate cha nge, energy, enhancing di gital literacy skills 
and inclusion, pandemics, cyber security, terrori sm and organised crime can only be tackled 
in an international context. Against the backdr op of accelerating globalis ation, it is essential 
that the internal agenda of securing sustaina ble growth and jobs in Europe and the EU's 
internal policies in general are complemented  by an external dimension. This external 
dimension of internal policy should enhance th e consistency and coherence of EU external 
action and should complement it, while  avoiding duplication of efforts. 
The Partnership Instrument will give priority  to supporting the external dimension of EU 
policies on climate change, environment, energy, and information and communication 
technologies : 
The EU has already designed arguably the most  sophisticated set of incentives, rules and 
regulations to facilitate our  own transition to low carbon ec onomy and unilaterally adopted 
ambitious targets. This framework provides co mprehensive and concrete  policy insight that 
could and should be used to facilitate similar ambitions by our key strategic partners. Such 
action would clearly be good for the environmen t while acting as catalyst for broad based 
investment in research and innovation, new gr eener technologies and providing commercial 
openings for EU industry. For the Partnership Instrument, climate mainstreaming and 
climate objectives  will be particularly relevant to activities enabling policy dialogue with 
industrialised and emerging economies. 
Resource efficiency will be cr ucial to ensuring that economi c growth remains sustainable 
within environmental planetary co nstraints. The EU is adopting a Resource Efficiency 
Strategy  as one of the Flagships of the 2020 Strate gy. This will, inter alia, affect EU norms 
and will only be truly effective if resource -efficient practices ar e adopted by all major 
economies. Emerging economies have the opportun ity to leapfrog the polluting unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns so ofte n followed by the EU and other advanced 
economies during our industrialisation and the EU ha s every interest in helping them to do so. 
However, emerging economies especially India and China also have large, absolutely poor 
populations reliant on healthy ecosystems such as  clean water and productive seas and forests 
for their livelihoods while Brazil, South Afri ca, India and China are mega-biodiverse. 
Dialogue and cooperation on the economics of  protecting and sustainable managing 
ecosystems is in the mutual intere st of the EU and its partners.  
Dialogue and practical co-operation with the key global energy producers and consumers is 
essential to address the challenge of ensuring the EU's energy security , particularly as the 
EU becomes more import dependent, as we ll as promoting a global low-carbon agenda, 
sustainable energy policies, transparency a nd predictability on global energy markets and 
technology cooperation. 
States leaving developing country  status request new forms of cooperation in technological 
and innovative areas . To remain a strategic pa rtner in these fields and continue to be a leader 
in the promotion of global standa rds, the EU must be able to  set up cooperation partnerships 
in these areas. 
To sum up, the external projection of the EU's in ternal policies will be fully integrated in the 
programming of the Partnership Instrument th at will also, within its limited financial 
envelope, complement the external dimension of internal policies c onducted under other EU 
programmes (such as action under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation, the Competitiveness and SME Programme including cooperation on Tourism, the  
"Erasmus for all" Programme, the Migration Fund and the Internal Secur ity Fund) in order to 
avoid any duplication. Coherence and comp lementarity with other external action 
geographical instruments, in particular th e Development Cooperation Instrument, will be 
 
EN 15   EN taken into account throughout th e programming stage while inte grating the principles of 
differentiation and concentration. 
 
3.5. Geographical coverage and scope 
The geographical scope of the Instrument should be global , i.e. covering all non-EU countries 
(non-developing and developing)15. This represents an important change compared to the 
existing Industrialised Countries  Instrument (ICI, covering only 17 industrialised and high-
income countries and territories). This will pr ovide the necessary flexibility to respond to the 
fast changing nature of partner countries, to the global nature of key challenges, and to fill the legislative gap identified in the Mid Term  Review of the financial Instruments. 
Even though its reach will be gl obal, the Partnership Instrument  will particularly focus on 
strategic partners, including Russia, and emerging economies . It will be the main vehicle 
for fostering EU relations with the traditiona l big, industrialised ec onomies and new relations 
with emerging economies. It will also cover bilateral cooperation with Russia. Although the 
EU has already established Strate gic Partnerships (SP) with a number of third countries, the 
concept has never been fully developed. The pr ocess started with the European Security 
Strategy (end 2003) indicating the need to devel op strategic partnerships  with Russia, China, 
Canada, India, in addition to the US. To date the EU has designated several Strategic Partners: 
the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Chin a, India, South Africa,  Brazil and Mexico.  
Special and privileged relations hips and partnerships  are recognised between the EU and the 
acceding and neighbourhood countries and some ot her countries (e.g. ACP countries) but not 
as “strategic” partners. Finally, a few regiona l groupings and international organizations are 
qualified as EU Strategic Part ners too (LAC, Africa, NATO , ASEAN, UN bodies). The 
strengthening of the EU's competitiveness and the generation of jobs and growth, as set out in 
the Europe 2020 agenda, is at the core of this exercise. 
Besides these countries - and without prejudice to the priority of development cooperation in 
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DC I) and the European Development Fund - the 
new Instrument should also serve to promote EU interests and values in all developing 
countries where and when necessary. 
In order to achieve a significant impact, c ooperation activities would focus on a limited 
number of priorities in the following categories: 
a) Bilateral cooperation and commo n approaches to challenges 
The Instrument will provide a differentiated and appropriate response to widen and deepen the 
cooperation with partner countries, focusing on emerging powers, supporting the implementation of agreements (such as Partne rship and Cooperation/Framework Agreements, 
Free Trade Agreements, Joint Action Plans,  Policy Dialogues, Summits and Thematic 
Dialogues) and fostering common and more effective appro aches to key international policy 
challenges, including coordination of positions in international a nd regional fora (e.g. climate 
change, biodiversity and sustainable energy, re source efficiency a nd green economy). It 
                                                
 
15 Including Oversea Countries and Territories (OCTs) 
 
EN 16   EN should also support, where necessary, the EU’s commitments to regional and international 
cooperation processes and bodies such as the Arctic Council. 
The Instrument should be able to finance spec ific actions and activi ties tailored to supporting 
political priorities and promoting the bilateral agenda with these countries, including in those 
sectors of particular interest for the EU. Both  quick impact responsive events (e.g. this years 
symposia on aviation and illicit networks) a nd longer term programmes will be needed (e.g.: 
action to promote the effective implementation of the comprehensive civil aviation agreement 
signed in March 2011 with Brazil, or acti ons create a proper policy and regulatory 
environment for electronic communications, to promote the opening up of public procurement 
or a more effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China,  or sustainable energy 
initiatives such as the clean energy centre also in China).  
The focus will be on areas with a clear mutual interest such as (but not limited to): smart 
sustainable and inclusive growth or green economy,  resource efficiency energy, and climate 
change, biodiversity policy, information a nd communication technologies, aviation and 
maritime transport, standardisation, promotion of rule of law and legal cooperation, public 
health, development, medicine.  
b) Economic partnership and business cooperation  
European business interests - exports, investme nt flows and economic partnerships – need to 
be supported within a more strategic approac h. Countries to be covered by the instrument 
represent existing and potential markets for Europ ean products, services and direct investment 
flows. However, certain market s are difficult for European count ries to access for structural 
reasons. The key objectives of the EU trade and investment strategy to be supported by the 
Partnership Instrument are: 
• to facilitate and enhance market access fo r European companies (including relevant 
regulatory support in relation to trade barriers), notably through programmes  
assisting them to overcome obstacles to entering the market and by complementing actions financed under the Comp etitiveness and SME programme; 
• to promote advanced business education and exchanges for European managers 
building up capacity through execu tive training programmes; 
The programmes should deliver concrete oppor tunities for improved business cooperation, 
increased turnover and investment s in target areas and greater trade flows with the partner 
countries. Resources shall be focused on count ries where interventions can increase the 
participation of European companies.  
The programmes will be complementary to and interconnected with existing support measures 
with the Enterprise Europe Network, curren tly providing business and innovation support in 
49 countries, including most of the industrialised countries and emerging economies.  
Activities aimed at achieving these objectives w ould consist of facilitating partnerships and 
joint initiatives between European and pa rtner countries’ companies and business 
management training programmes (see Annex 2 : Executive Training Programme (ETP) and 
EU Gateway Programme both in Japan and Korea).  
c) Public diplomacy, education/academic cooperation and outreach  
 
EN 17   EN Europe’s strong presence in the global economy and its role on the world stage need to be 
matched by a better understanding of the European  Union in partner coun tries. By supporting 
public diplomacy, outreach activities and networks it can respond to the low level of knowledge of the EU in partner co untries and promote its values and interests. The objectives 
here are: 
• to increase mutual understanding through academic and cultural exchanges; 
• to share EU expertise with partners to  promote environmentally sustainable and 
resource efficient development of emerging economies; 
• to promote widespread understandi ng and visibility of the EU;  
• to promote the EU’s views on important policy issues, by positively influencing 
policy debate and encouraging greater enga gement with the EU in support of EU 
policy objectives; 
• to promote reflection and discussion about the EU and its policies, and its relations 
with partner countries; 
• to promote the exchange of best re gulatory practices in key sectors. 
Activities in support of these objectives could c onsist of: the consolidation and expansion of 
existing EU Centres (see Annex 2 ) and the establishment of new centres in other partner 
countries; the development of act ivities that encour age policy, the support to platforms for 
exchange and dialogue between regulators, re search and debate by think tanks and other 
organisations on areas of mutual interest; we ll targeted information campaigns; and, finally, 
“people-to people" contacts among promising young citizens active in cultural spheres. These activities would enhance the knowledge and understanding of th e EU to a wide audience, and 
this, in itself, will have a bene ficial effect on the economic and political relations hips with its 
partners.  
4. 
OPTIONS  
(a) Option 0: “Zero Option” 
A “zero option” implies that assistance under the current ICI instrument would be phased out 
as of 31 December 2013. By then the EU cooper ation/dialogues with 17 advanced countries 
and territories would be terminated and fundi ng would no longer be av ailable to support EU 
dialogues with them. No new EU cooperation woul d be feasible (outside poverty alleviation) 
with other third coun tries around the world.  
(b) Option 1: “No change” Under this option, the ICI Regul ation would cover only tradit ional industrialised and high-
income countries (.i.e. 17 countries) and the DCI Regulation would remain the only financial 
instrument, focused on development cooperation, to  cover cooperation with some countries of 
great importance in terms of economi cs, demographics, and politics.  
(c) Option 2: “Maintain ICI as such and amend DCI” 
 
EN 18   EN This option would maintain the ICI in its cu rrent form and insert a window for economic, 
financial and technical cooperati on of a non developmental nature with third countries within 
the DCI. Under this option, geographical coherence would be ensured under a single 
instrument, but for DCI countries the Regulatio n would include two different objectives: one 
objective of poverty eradication (ODA) and one  objective of fosteri ng EU interests (non-
ODA). 
(d) Option 3: “Table a new Instrument building on ICI/ICI+” This option would build on the ICI and ICI+ proposal to provi de a new Instrument with a 
global reach. This option allows for a clear distinction with Development Cooperation money 
and respects the Commission’s intention to increase coherence and consistency through a 
major simplification of the Instruments. It a llows a response to the underlying drivers of the 
problem as identified under section 2.3. 
The possibility of trade offs between the globa l scope of the Partnership Instrument and the 
potential dilution of funds, will be addresse d at the programming stage by implementing a 
selective and scrupulous objective country/project selection crit eria in accordance with the 
objectives of the Instrument. Approaches and oper ations would be kept flexible and would be 
adapted to specificities of countries, EU policy priorities and changes in the world. 
The table below clearly expresses what differen tiates the ICI, the ICI+ and the Partnership 
Instrument and, by doing so, it highlights the st rengths and possibilities of the latter as 
opposed to the other two’s limitations. 
 
 Regulation No Duration Geographi cal Scope Budget EUR Objective 
ICI  EC 1934/2006 
 2007-2013 17 countries and high 
income territories16 172 million Support economic, financial and 
technical cooperation and other 
forms of cooperation falling within 
its spheres of competence. 
ICI+  COM 2009/197 
(not yet adopted) 
 2011-2013 Same as above + 
countries listed in 
South America, Asia, 
Central Asia, the 
Middle East and South 
Africa17 176 million Same as above. 
PI Drafting ongoing 2014-2020 global 1 billion • Improve market access through 
economic partnerships and business cooperation. 
• Project Europe 2020 Strategy; 
policy support; address global 
challenges. 
• Promote EU values and interests 
through public diplomacy and 
outreach. 
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  
                                                 
16 USA, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Kor ea, Australia and New Zealand); certain Asia n industrialised countries and territories 
which are excluded from the DAC list of recipient countries (S ingapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan  and Brunei) as well as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qata r, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). 
17  See Annex 2 of  COM/2009/197  “List of deve loping countries covered by this Regulation”. 
 
EN 19   EN 5.1. Likely economic, social and environmental impacts  
(a) Option 0: “Zero Option” 
EU dialogue and cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, the GCC countries, etc, would no 
longer be supported by any fi nancial instrument under th e Heading 4 (Global Europe)18 of the 
EU budget and no new EU cooperation with the emer ging economies in the fields of industry, 
business, economy, finance, cultur e, research and innova tion, and so on, would be feasible in 
the foreseeable future. 
Since no new and broader instrument would be introduced as an ICI successor, the scope of 
future EU cooperation with developing countri es (and especially emerging economies) would 
be limited, focusing only on development cooperation. This would be implemented under a new DCI for 2014-2020. 
The disadvantages of such an option could be hi gh and it exposes the EU to five major risks:  
• A political risk, as EU partner countri es would not understand. EU bilateral 
agreements, policies and dial ogues in crucial sectors woul d no longer be supported in 
the context of a medium-term global (and EU ) recovery cycle. By doing so, Europe 
would be perceived as not being able (or determined enough) to defend its external 
and domestic interests.  
• Fragmentation of budgets and instruments to support the external dimension of 
internal policies: this would pose new challenges to the EU in terms of political 
guidance, synergies (optimum use of f unds), coordination and coherence.  
• DCI funds might be used to finance such activities by interpre ting extensively the 
scope of the Development Cooperation Instru ment. These interpre tations could lead 
to challenges by the legislative author ity, thus hampering such cooperation.  
• In the absence of a tailor-made instrument, the Europ ean Parliament and the Council 
might request the Commission to implement additional “ad hoc” preparatory actions, limited in time and with small budgets and impact. Fragmentation and lack of a clear strategy could lead to serious management problems during the implementation 
phase.  
• If a zero option prevailed, it would lead to  the lessening of Europe‘s capacity to 
protect its interests and en tertain mutually advantag eous dialogues with third 
countries in several key sectors or domai ns which are crucial to its external 
“projection” and its ambition to become a global player.  
(b) Option 1: “No change” Under the « no change » option, the EU would continue to engage in policy and business 
dialogues, public diplomacy and other forms of cooperation in research and innovation, 
finance, economy, culture with a restricted  number of advanced partner countries.  
                                                
 
18  establishing a coherent  role for Europe  on the global stage  – inspired by its core values – in the way it assumes its regional 
responsibilities, promotes sustainable development a nd contributes to civilian and strategic security. 
 
EN 20   EN This would certainly be rewarding for Europe as it would c ontinue to project its values and 
protect its interests’ vis-à-vi s this group of advanced countr ies playing a key role in the 
current post-crisis recovery and globalisation pr ocess. However, the major drawback of this 
option is that it does not respond to the underlying drivers of the problem identified under section 2.3. The lack of a “tai lor made” instrument would be an obstacle for Europe in 
supporting the Europe 2020 Strategy and developi ng more strategic relations with the most 
dynamic and fast-growing economies in the wo rld having great weight in terms of 
multilateralism, GDP growth, consumption, in vestment, imports, research and innovation 
capacity, technology, finance, culture/education,  business development, FDI, environmental 
and climate pressures, etc.  
(c) Option 2: “Maintain ICI as such and amend DCI” 
According to option 2, the DCI would have  two different “windows” (and sub-budgets) 
coexisting side-by-side. These two component s (basically ODA and non ODA budgets for the 
sake of simplification) would necessarily have different objectives and follow different modus 
operandi and country allocation criteria which would prove extremely challenging: how to 
create a synergy between objectives which are radically different and, thus, not inherently 
compatible? 
The economic, social and environmental impact of this option is not expected to differ greatly 
compared to option 3. The major drawback would be that the co-existence of these two very 
different financial “windows” could prove mo re difficult than originally foreseen. The 
fundamental differences between  its goals would result in  major problems ranging from 
management and decision-making (on what c ould be financed under each window for 
instance) to implementation, as a paramount issu e that could arise may well be the preference 
given to some objectives to the detriment of others. With regard s to resources, it also concerns 
various areas of expertise and resource mobilisation could be delayed with negative socio- economic environmental and policy impacts and a dverse consequences for dialogues between 
the EU and its main partner countries. 
It should also be kept in mind that the Council and the European Parliame nt have specifically 
called for keeping separate instruments fo r development cooperation and non development 
cooperation.  
(d) Option 3: “Table a new Instrument building on ICI/ICI+” Considering the underlying drivers of the problem  as identified under section 2.3, this option 
would allow an innovative instrument able to support the policies of th e EU in the world. No 
direct, precise impacts can be assessed given the nature of the Instrument, however an 
indicative economic, social a nd environmental impact assessment is provided below.  
Impact on the EU economy and EU economic dialogues w ith partner countries 
The implementation of a new Pa rtnership Instrument would pr ovide the EU with another 
window of opportunity to promote its enterprise s (SMEs in particular) and products. It would 
create the financial possibility  to support EU business in thir d countries, providing incentives 
for EU competitiveness and innovation in a wa y that should remain complementary to the 
actions financed under the Competitiveness and SME programme and under Horizon 2020 
(research and innovation), support EU  international trad e and investment which, in turn, could 
lead to the facilitation of fo reign investment into the EU. Numerous areas of cooperation 
could be pursued including climate change, environment, approximation of technical 
 
EN 21   EN regulations and standardisation, corporate social res ponsibility, intellectual  property rights, 
protection of personal data, best practises in economic, trade and financial matters. Thus, the 
EU’s economic security could be strengthe ned and possibly new jobs created which, 
ultimately, would contribute to economic growth. 
This Instrument could reinforce EU trade rela tions with partner coun tries having a positive 
impact on the EU balance of payments, economi c and trade relations with the rest of the 
world while being consistent with market acce ss/open market principles. As such, it could 
also contribute to lessen the risk of pr otectionism as well as supporting international 
competitiveness and the ongoing globalisation pro cess while making sure that all countries 
benefit in line with the principl es of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
The new Partnership Instrument would also co ntribute to support the EU’s competitiveness 
through targeted human resource development: th e availability of highly skilled people and 
their capacity to innovate is a prer equisite for economic prosperity. 
Economic Impact on partner countries  
The new Instrument could foster well develo ped forms of economic cooperation between the 
EU and partner countries. In this context, it w ould allow the EU to ensu re that environmental, 
sustainable energy, social, employ ment and other welfare values are adequately considered in 
policy programme design and implementation. 
Increased investment by EU companies would al so contribute to economic growth in the 
hosting country. Actions aiming at promoting Cor porate Social Responsibility will improve 
social, labour and environmen tal rules and implementati on in the partner country. 
By contributing technical assistan ce, the Instrument could identif y sustainable paths for fiscal 
consolidation of growth, thus he lping countries in efforts to ga in control of their accounts. It 
could also support initiatives to improve ad ministrative efficiency, the productive use of 
workers’ remittances and to promote new inve stments and transfers of  technology in national 
industrialisation programmes or in frastructural developments in order to promote resource 
efficiency and sustainability, including in the production and use of energy. 
Impact on economic governance 
The Partnership Instrument is also expect ed to have an impact on economic governance . With 
the crisis, hard lessons have been learnt about the limits of markets. It  has called for revisiting 
the role of government, redefining the balance between state and market and searching for 
ways to boost citizens’ trust in both. 
The crisis demonstrated that publ ic policies are the critical an chor of national economies in 
times of economic unrest as governments halt ed financial market freefall and avoided 
financial catastrophe. However, the ensuing fisc al pressures in many countries have increased 
the need to cut public expenditures, which in most cases means streamlining the state. This 
effort calls for reassessing th e role of government intervention to achieve  better and more 
effective governance, sound institutions and effective rules and procedures.  
Another important governance issue refers to an ti-corruption, transparen cy and integrity. The 
new Instrument could be direct ed to improving anti-corrupti on tools and reinforcing their 
implementation. New initiatives could enha nce coordination of anti-corruption and 
 
EN 22   EN transparency actions worldwide as well as  compliance with relevant international 
conventions, “best practices” and guidelines. 
Finally promoting the full engagement of stra tegic partners in global environmental policy 
making and governance especially with regard to Multilateral Environmental Agreements will 
be crucial to promoting sustainable economic change. 
Social impact on the EU economy  
The EU's ambition is to address interlinked social policies and identify strategic orientations 
going beyond growth. This could be enhan ced by economic cooperation with partner 
countries, strengthening national an d international regu latory frameworks and contributing to 
improved national, regional or global economic governance. These strate gies and approaches 
could have a positive impact on EU  employment and social polic ies such as the EU welfare 
model of social protection, the creation of “green” jobs, the “EU 2020” social agenda etc. 
Growing competition from emerging economies coul d also act as a strategic incentive for 
Europe to allocate more res ources to training and re-tra ining, improving the quality of 
teaching and research and to the refo rm of domestic welfare systems.  
Social impact on partner countries 
By harmonising the EU and EU Member Stat es’ financing instruments and by supporting 
joint activities with other bila teral and multilateral donors, the new Instrument could have an 
important impact on the social fabric of emergi ng countries. It could provide support to the 
reform of welfare systems, national employm ent policies, national training and skills’ 
development policies, education, research and innovation programmes as well as the 
strengthening of national safety “nets”. Its contribution to extra “green” jobs creation, 
income-per-capita increases and effective social  cohesion and poverty alle viation strategies at 
national level will be relevant. In this respect it would contribute to the successful implementation of the international social ag enda promoted by the UN  International Labour 
Organisation and G8/G20.  
Environmental impact on EU  and partner countries  
Making “green” growth work, implementing the st rategy and supporting partner countries in 
their policies for a more ecological growth path  will figure among the top strategic priorities 
of the new Instrument for the coming years. 
EU partnerships through the new Instrument will aim at encouraging and supporting growth 
and long-term environmental sustai nability. In this re spect, the new Instrume nt is expected to 
play a key role in providing support for both EU and partner countries’ environmental and 
climate change-related acti ons and policy dialogues. 
The Instrument could support a low-carbon bu siness model by providing incentives to the 
European private sector. Building on the suc cessful results of th e COP-16 United Nations 
Conference on Climate Change in Cancún, it could be used to help EU business to develop 
effective and least-cost policies to achieve environmentally friendly goals in the partner 
countries. It will also help partner countries’ economies to reap the full environmental, ecological and energy-effici ent benefits of innovation. 
The Instrument could allow cooperation to bett er understand the economic and social costs of 
biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradati on in countries of global significance.  
 
EN 23   EN 5.2. Impact in terms of management  / implementation modalities 
Where substantial volume justifies sound  and cost-efficient local management, 
deconcentration (i.e. management in EU Delega tions instead from Headquarters) should apply 
and EU Delegations should be equipped with the necessary human resources for project 
management responsibilities. In any case, EU Delegations will be able to manage, for example, small scale actions within the scope of the Partnership Instrument (e.g.: workshops 
to explain to EU companies based in Korea the implications of the Free Trade Agreement 
concluded with this country). The EU Seoul Delegation is logically better placed than 
Commission services in Brussels  to procure these t ypes of actions (knowledge of the local 
market conditions, familiarity with poten tial bidders, no language barrier, access to 
stakeholders and government authorities, etc). In  view of the above, a part of the financial 
envelope will be set aside for administrative  support expenditure, including human resources 
linked to the implementation of the instrument. 
On programming: 
• multi-annual programming should remain applicable for most components within the 
scope of the Instrument as it is the case with the current IC I. Indeed, activities in the 
fields of business cooperati on, public diplomacy and networ ks (such as EU Centres) 
represent long term investments and operate on cyclical bases which make multi-annual programming essential to ensure sound and efficient management of the 
programmes. 
• non-programmable components need to be fo reseen as the Partnership Instrument 
should provide swift response to changing situations, especially in the area of 
bilateral cooperation and policy dialogues. Such  flexibility is necessa ry to ensure that 
cooperation activities remain fu lly in line and in time with  policies and strategies.  
6. C
OMPARING THE OPTIONS  
The effectiveness of each option is measured in relation to its response to the drivers 
identified above (see section 2.3): 
• the strong emergence of certain countries; 
• the lack of flexibility of current Inst ruments to promote bilateral agendas; 
• the specific relationship with Russia; 
• the confined geographical scope of the ICI; 
• the DCI's limited scope; 
• the 3 year time constraint on Preparatory Action. 
a) Option 0  is not considered a valid one if the EU wants to play its role in the world as 
explained under section 5.1. 
b) Option 1  is not considered worth pursuing given the need to fill the legislative gap. 
Challenges linked to globalisation require an enabling instrument covering the most 
dynamic regions of the world. It would not meet expectations of partner countries 
 
EN 24   EN who want to engage further with the EU in  various areas. It would not allow the EU 
to project its interests and policies abroad. 
c) Option 2 would enhance simplification and ha rmonisation. However, this would 
eliminate the advantages of having policy- driven instruments ensuring the adequate 
mix of objective and principles relevant fo r each policy. After the reshuffle of 2007, 
the structure of the current instruments broa dly reflects EU priorities as well as the 
differential treatment of countries acco rding to common characteristics and 
challenges. This option would not necessarily reflect the institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty in a clear and structured manner and could dilute the 
overall development objective of the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
d) Option 3  is assessed as the best option. There is a large consensus on building on the 
current set of financial instruments, although it  is necessary to reflect the institutional 
changes brought by the Lisbon treaty. Under this option, the current structure of the 
instruments, which has been considered pe rtinent and adequate by stakeholders and 
EU Member States, would remain largely unchanged. However, such new instrument 
with a global reach in scope and focuse d objectives will contribute to adapt 
thoroughly the existing methods  of conceiving, programming  and delivering results. 
It appears clearly as the preferred option.  
This is also indicated in the table below where the options are assessed against three 
criteria of which effectiveness must be taken into account as a necessary condition therefore outweighi ng the other two. 
(i) Coherence  means possibilities to create syne rgies in terms of  programming and 
delivery towards achieving the agreed objectives and to avoid negative 
consequences and overlaps which would a dversely affect the implementation of 
the policies. This is particularly significant when two different instruments have the same geographical coverage.  
(ii)  Effectiveness  means doing the right things, that is setting the right goals and 
objectives and making sure they are accomplished. 
(iii) Efficiency  means doing things right, in othe r words it is getting the most from 
your resources: that encompasses organisa tional aspects and the gains from the 
simplification of the instruments. 
 Option 0 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Coherence - = + + 
Effectiveness - =  ++ ++ 
Efficiency - - + ++ 
7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
The European Commission's Monitoring and Ev aluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal sta ff as well as external expertise.  
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarter s continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects and programmes in various ways, in cluding wherever possibl e through field visits. 
 
EN 25   EN Monitoring provides valuable information on progr ess; it helps managers to identify actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of  EU external actions 
through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the improvement of ongoing interventions; they also dr aw lessons from past experience to inform 
future policies and actions. The tools all use the internationally-recognised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 
Firstly, at the project level, the Headquarters-managed Results  Oriented Monitoring (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of th e quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly structured, standardised methodology, i ndependent ROM experts attribute grades 
which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and give recommendations on 
how to improve effectiveness.  
Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegati on in charge of the project, 
deliver a more detailed, in depth analysis and help project managers to improve ongoing 
interventions and prepare futu re ones. External, independent  experts with thematic and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the anal ysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 
The Commission also conducts st rategic evaluations of its po licies, from programming and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education, 
etc), in a country or region, or of a specific Instrument. These evaluations are an important 
input to the formulation of policies and the desi gn of Instruments and projects. They are all 
published on the Commission's website and a su mmary of the findings is included in the 
Annual Report to the Council an d the European Parliament. Such an evaluation of the 
Partnership Instrument will be launched, no  later than the end of 2017, to formulate 
recommendations with a view to improving futu re operations, programme  design and resource 
allocation with, if appropriate, a legislative proposal introducing the necessary modifications.
 
7.1. Core Indicators of progress towards objectives 
The Partnership Instrument shall be an enabli ng Regulation establishing the essential elements 
and the basis for the EU intervention. The ex act actions are defined through annual action 
programmes detailing the activit ies to be carried out by the EU, including the operational 
objectives and the expected results. Operationa l indicators are fixed at that moment, taking 
into account the particularitie s of the action in question.  
Progress towards the three specific objectives (see section 3.2) will be monitored through core 
indicators covering th e following areas:  
1) Influence of EU policies on policy formula tion in key strategic pa rtner countries covered 
by this instrument. 
2) EU share in world trade as well as in trad e with countries targeted  by actions under this 
instrument.  
3) Perception of EU in key strategic partner countries covered by this instrument. 
Implementation of the actions will comply  with performance-based management.  
 
EN 26   EN Performance based management serves several purposes: 
• making the most of limited resources; 
• improving decision making processes and decisions; 
• achieving transparency and accountability. 
A performance management system involves the setting of objectives, th e decision of how to 
measure progress and the selection of indicators. This implies a three stage process, firstly a 
sound analysis of the policies with a common understa nding – through policy dialogue – of 
the objectives and of the logical linkages betw een the objectives, ac tivities and outcomes. 
Next comes the question of identifying what can be measured in relation to the objectives, 
which of the purposes above it serves and the availability, reliabil ity and precision of 
statistical data, including such questions as the frequency of measurement and the use of 
proxy indicators. Finally the decisions need to be codified to the link between the 
programmes, the methods of calculation, the in terpretive framework and the allocation of 
responsibility for their provision. 
The EU has committed itself to mainstreaming ac tion on climate and biodiversity and for this 
to be meaningful it needs to be accompanied by an obligation to identify relevant programmes 
so that the EU is able to set out clearly how  much of its spending relates to these global 
challenges. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and reporting rules need to be established. 
Expenditure that promotes climate action19 or energy efficiency as well as the protection and 
sustainable management of biodi versity and ecosystems, will be tracked using a system that 
reflects the established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’). 
7.2. Monitoring 
Typical indicators to measure the impact of the Partnership Instrument’s activities will be the 
number of participant enterprises, the ex tent, relevance and sophistication of support 
activities, the degree of coope ration within the European bu siness network and division of 
labour, entrepreneurial user sa tisfaction and achievement of economic targets, i.e. the 
measurable impact on job creation, turnover, fore ign direct investment of EU enterprises and 
overall EU exports to target mark ets. Indicators to measure the impact of these activities, both 
qualitative and quantitative, will be related to the trends in knowledge exchange, the number of participants in programme s, scholarships and joint rese arch and academic projects. 
The results will also be measured by the fre quency and quality of media coverage, the local 
demand for EU sponsored activities, th e participation rate  at EU events. 
                                                
 
19 Regarding instruments under the EU budget, in order to reach the Europe 2020 objectives and to help other parts of the world t o 
step up their efforts to combat climate change, the Commi ssion has stated in the June 2011 Communication on “A Budget for 
Europe 2020” that it intends to increase the proportion of climat e related expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, wi th 
contribution from different policies, s ubject to impact assessment evidence. 
 
EN 27   EN Annex 1 
Description of the existing Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised countries (ICI)  
In the context of the current financial period (2007-2013), the Commission accomplished a 
simplification of the architecture of the legal fr amework for the delivery of EU external action 
objectives. One of the Instruments that resu lted from the rationalisation/simplification 
exercise focuses on the cooperation with industr ialised and other high-income countries and 
territories (ICI)20.  
The ICI provided the legal base both in terms of  targeted countries and fields of cooperation. 
It has a wider scope than the former Instrument  for cooperation with in dustrialised countries 
(Council Regulation 382/2001), which was confined  to 6 countries and covered a more 
limited range of activities. The current ICI has focused on those partner countries with which 
the EU has close political, ec onomic relations who at the sa me time are important trading 
partners as well as major players in the world s cene; and on newly industrialised countries in 
Asia where it is important for the EU to engage further, to reinforce its economic and political links and to exert in creasing influence.  
Cooperation with these countries responded to EU’s  and partner countries shared interest to 
advance their common agenda laid down in th e various agreements, declarations, actions 
plans that govern their bilateral relations. The ICI has constituted an effective toolbox in 
providing a differentiated and appr opriate response to widen a nd deepen the cooperation with 
a number of industrialised countries and high-in come in North America, the Asia-Pacific 
region and the Gulf region, namely: key OECD member countries (USA, Japan, Canada, the 
Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand) ; certain Asian industr ialised countries and 
territories which are excluded from the DAC lis t of recipient countries ( Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Brunei)  as well as Gulf Cooperati on Council countries similarly 
excluded from the DAC list of ODA recipients (Bahrain, Kuwait,  Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates). 
It came into force in 2007 and is due to expi re along with the rest of external actions 
Instruments by the end of current financial period in 2013. 
The overall aim of the current ICI Instrument  is to strengthen th e European Union’s 
relationship with highly develope d countries and to promote its place as a key player in the 
global economic and political arenas through the funding of cooperati on projects covering 
areas of mutual interests. Given the limited resources available to the ICI, achievement of the objectives focused on a limited number of areas  that can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Public diplomacy and outreach 
The key objectives are to enhance the profile of th e EU, and to promote be tter understanding of the 
European Union, its institutions, its history, its  economy, its policies and its positions in partner 
countries. To promote awareness and better understa nding of the EU beyond its borders, the ICI 
supports 29 EU Centres world wide; the EU cent res are all located in Universities in eight 
industrialised countries spanning three continents: ten in  the USA, five in Canada, four in Korea, four 
in Japan, three in Australia and one in New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan. 
                                                 
20 Council Regulation (EC) N° 1934/2006 of 21 December 2006 (OJ) L-405, 30.12.2006, p.41) 
 
EN 28   EN (b) Economic partnership and business cooperation.  
The key objectives are to strengthen the presence of European companies in key markets facilitating 
market access for European compan ies, including small and medium-sized enterprises. To tackle those 
objectives, the ICI Instrument has supported two main programmes: the “EU Gateway programme for 
Japan and the Republic of Korea” and the “Executiv e Training programme in Japan and Korea” (ETP) 
The EU Gateway Programme for Japan and the Repub lic of Korea helps EU companies to understand 
the particularities of the Japanese and Korean market  in view of establishing durable business relations 
with local companies.  
The ETP is an intensive professional human resource s development programme targeted at executives 
from European companies that want to develop busi ness with Japan and Korea, providing them with 
the most insightful knowledge of the Japanese a nd Korean markets. To date, 1006 European 
executives have participated in ETP Japan and 65 in  ETP Korea, creating a European pool of high 
level experts on Japanese, Korean and other Asian markets.  
 
(c) People-to-people links 
The main goals are to enhance mutual understanding  between cultures and facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge. To this end, the ICI has funded initia tives to strengthen cooperation in the field of 
education by funding bilateral cooperation projects to promote mutual understanding, to improve the 
quality of European education and training by st imulating balanced part nerships between higher 
education and training institutions  in Europe and in the partner countries. Still in the field of 
Education,  Erasmus Mundus Partnerships are also bri nging together High Education Institutions 
(HEIs) from Europe on the one hand and from a par ticular region in the world on the other (multi-
lateral partnerships).  
The ICI has also funded initiatives to promote and strengthen civil society dialogues between members 
of EU and a certain number of industrialised countries’  civil society, encouraging the involvement of a 
broad set of stakeholders (non-governmental orga nisations and interest groups, including social 
partners, representing wide constituencies), comple menting the formal policy dialogue existing at 
government level. 
 
EN 29   EN Annex 2 
Examples of successful ICI programmes  
 
Executive Training Programme (ETP) 
The Executive Training Programme in Japan and Korea (ETP)  is an intensive professional human 
resources development programme targeted at exec utives from European companies that want to 
develop business with Japan and Ko rea, providing them with the most insightful knowledge of the 
Japanese and Korean markets. To date, 1006 European  executives have participated in ETP Japan and 
65 in ETP Korea, creating a European pool of high level experts on Japanese, Korean and further on 
Asian markets. The ETP has had a positive impact  on EU companies committed to establishing 
/growing their business activities with Japan and Ko rea in terms of assisting the EU company to 
access Japanese/Korean markets; br inging sustained impact on EU companies’ business, rather than a 
short term and temporary effec t; and in terms of broadening the business possibilities of EU 
companies in other Asian countries. To date, over 80 % of the participants re main involved in business 
activities with Japan and Korea over ten years after completion of the programme, that demonstrate the relevance and the capacity of the programme to train real European experts involved in a long 
term issue with Asia. 
An extensive research carried out in 2010 regard ing potential pan-European or national programmes 
that present similarities with ETP, has concluded th at no similar programme to ETP exists at national 
level. Similar programmes such as the scholarships of  the Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade, or the 
“Language and Practice in Japan” managed by th e German academic exchange service (DAAD) 
target graduates and not executives and fail to pr ovide the cornerstones th at characterise the ETP: 
language training, business training and internship. The European nature of the programme not only 
enhanced the visibility of the EU in Japan and the Republic of Korea, it also ensures the participation 
of executives from all Member States.
 
60% of ETP Alumni come from SMEs. This very si gnificant figure is possible only because the ETP 
finances 100% of the cost of the training and a scholarship. Recent survey on SME perception 
regarding the ETP shows that financial support provided  by the EU is 'vital' regarding the European 
SMEs willingness to penetrate Jap anese or Korean markets. 
On average, companies double their turnover with Jap an within 10 years following ETP. It is obvious 
that this result can be attributed to the sole im pact of ETP but it can logically be deducted that this 
programme had in many cases a boosting effect on business evolution of European companies on this 
market. 
 
EN 30   EN EU Gateway Programme  
The EU Gateway Programme for Japan and the Republic of Korea  aims at helping EU companies to 
understand the particulars of the Japanese and Korean market in view of establishing durable business 
relations with local companies on (one of) these mark ets. It supports a seri es of one week business 
missions that bring carefully selected companies fro m the European Union to Japan or to Korea to 
assist them in observing the market. The missions ar e sector specific. The sectors are fixed for the 
entire programme period 2009-2014; they were define d in those fields where opportunities for EU 
companies have the highest potential for cooperation opportunities.  
The EU Gateway Programme supports almost exclus ively SMEs. The main target group for the EU 
Gateway Programme in the European Union is th e range of Small and Medium sized enterprises 
which have an added value with regard to their product / technology range and who are economically 
fit to enter a remote market. However, SMEs very  often do not have in-house expertise to develop a 
market access strategy for far-away difficult mark ets; neither do they have (sufficient) human and 
financial resources to explore these markets. 
In contrast with business missions or initiatives organi sed by some of the EU Member States, the EU 
Gateway Programme is not a Trade mission but an awareness building programme with a focus on discovering the business potential of a given mark et, getting acquainted with the local business 
culture and practice and learning how to develop a business strategy to access these markets taking 
account of the acquired knowledge fro m a Gateway business mission.  
Probably the most unique feature of the EU Gate way Programme is the individual coaching of EU 
companies by a specialised contractor during the en tire span of their participation in EU Gateway 
business missions, followed by the logistic support provided by the Programme (financing of their 
accommodation during the mission week, logis tic support during the mission week) and the 
individual follow up of the companies after their retu rn from an EU Gateway event in Japan or Korea. 
The EU Gateway Programme is an EU Commissi on initiative embedded in the bilateral relation 
agreements between the EU and respectively Japan  and the Republic of Korea; it is one of the 
business oriented tools to help restoring the trad e imbalance with these countries. Indeed still today 
EU companies (and mainly SMEs) are underrepresente d on the Japanese and Korean markets; this is, 
to a large extent, explained by a lack of unders tanding and knowledge of these markets, despite an 
often existing business potential. 
For the period 2009-2014, there will in total be 33 missions to Japan, thus allowing 1.320 EU 
companies to participate, and 15 missions to Kor ea allowing in total 450 EU companies to participate.
 
 
EN 31   EN EU Centres 
To promote awareness and better understanding of the EU beyond its borders, the ICI supports 29 EU 
Centres world wide; the EU centres are all located  in Universities in eight industrialised countries 
spanning three continents: ten in the USA, five in Ca nada, four in Korea, four in Japan, and three in 
Australia and one in New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan . 
Today the EU Centres receive over 3 million per year. The EU Centres all located in universities have 
created so far over 260 new EU certificates and courses and enabled 42,000 graduates to build up their knowledge of the EU. Moreover, the EU Ce ntres have managed to reach audiences beyond the 
academic circle, i.e.: local organisations and busin esses, government officials and media. EU Centres 
have also offered a platform for high level EU representatives to reach to wider audience. The 29 
existing EU Centres in 8 ICI countries have recently being joined by 3 new EU Centres in Russia.  
Compared to others means of implementation, for example Think Tanks, NGOs or policy research 
institutes, placing EU Centres within higher educati on institutions add value in  attaining the overall 
programme objectives since the Universities are cap able of building on the three pillars: teaching, 
research and outreach.  
The EU Centres have had a considerable impact on the development of curricula on EU studies. The 
number of courses on offer has tended to increase over the successive funding cycles, with more than 
900 courses offered in the aggregate. The level of demand has also increased throughout the years. 
Even though there are no quantitativ e measures to support this finding,  the feedback from many of the 
Centres suggests that the tendency has been towa rds an increase in the number of students and 
beneficiaries participating from the activities of the Centres. 
The EU Centres Initiative across the countries has not only contributed to increase the level of 
understanding and knowledge of the EU  and its policies but it has enhanced beneficiaries’ interest on 
the EU. The majority of stakeholders value the work of the EU Centres. Currently, there are no 
consolidated outcome and impact indicators allo wing for systematic monitoring of objectives on a 
comparative and aggregated fashion, but evaluatio n suggests that the EU is getting a good return on 
its investment for the EU Centr es initiative in terms of enhancing awareness and knowledge of the EU 
in partner countries, and most notably among the academic community.  
 
 
EN 32   EN Annex 3 
Examples of EU bilateral relations with some third countries  
China  
With nearly 4000 years of continuous history, China is one of the world's oldest civilisations. It has 
now re-emerged as the world's third economy, the biggest exporter globally, but also as an 
increasingly important political power. China is the single most important challenge for EU trade 
policy. It is now the EU's biggest source of imports  by far. The EU is also China's biggest trading 
partner. 
EU relations with China were established in  1975 and are governed by the 1985 EU-China Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement . In 2010, in order to deepen their strategic partnership, China and the EU 
decided to upgrade their bilateral relations on a number of areas such as foreign affairs, security 
matters and global challenges including climate ch ange and the recovery of the global economy. 
It is in the interest of both sides to further expa nd trade and investment. Reciprocity and mutual benefit 
should be the guiding principles behind opening ma rkets. Furthermore, the promotion of EU 
commercial and investment interest in China c ould be boosted by the development of areas of 
common pursuits ranging from education to money laundering or also energy efficiency, culture, 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, etc. This type of dialogue is essential to give the EU 
the visibility it needs and to strengthen its advocac y related to both legislative and non-legislative 
measures affecting EU business interests. 
 
USA 
The EU and the US enjoy the most integrated ec onomic relationship in the world, illustrated by 
unrivalled levels of mutual investment stocks, reach ing over 2.1 trillion EUR. Investments are thus the 
real driver of the transatlantic relationship, cont ributing to growth and jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The EU and the US economies account togeth er for about half of the entire world’s GDP. 
The EU and the US established diplomatic relati ons as early as 1953, but it was only in November 
1990 that the cooperation was formalised for the first time with the Transatlantic Declaration . Since 
December 1995, the  New Transatlantic Agenda  has provided the foundation for the relationship. 
In 2010, the EU-US Summit focused on three crucia l areas of cooperation: economic growth, global 
challenges such as climate change, and internationa l development and security, including co-ordinated 
responses to regional challenges (e.g. Middle East, Ira n). Some important tasks need to be developed 
in the future and are taken in charge by different bodies such as The Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) , the EU-US Energy Council  and the EU-US Ministerial Dialogue on Development  
with a highlight on conflict prevention and crisis r esponse. Other issues of growing importance such as 
the fight against terrorism, organised crime, cyber-s ecurity and cyber-crime ar e also addressed in the 
EU-US Dialogue. 
Successful programmes have been implemented in the field of people-to-people links and civil society 
dialogue. The EU Centres of Excellence activiti es which are successful, help provide wide 
geographical outreach for the EU in this large co untry. Coordinated, long-term, public diplomacy 
activities are required to promote the interests and the image of the EU in the US, and taking into 
account the importance of think-tanks and civil so ciety in the North American context. Specific 
actions should be tailored to suppor ting the political priorities outlined above, but also on long-term 
future-oriented policy challenges. Experience shows that most value is added by favouring projects 
highlighting topics of EU interest which lack prof ile in the host country, and by creating sustainable 
transatlantic networks. 
 
EN 33   EN Russia 
Russia is the EU’s third biggest trade partner, w ith Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large 
percentage of Russia’s exports to  Europe. The EU-Russia strategic partnership’s ongoing cooperation is 
based on 4 specific policy areas or “common spac es”: common economic space; common space for 
freedom, security, and justice; common space for external security; and common space for education, 
research and culture. The Partnership for Modernisation  launched in 2010 reinforces mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the common spaces and provi des a framework for join t activities. Russia was 
not interested in being part of the ENP but wanted a relationship between equals  with the EU, reflecting 
its size and importance. 
The EU and Russia cooperate on dealing with a number of challenges, both at international level, as 
well as in our common neighbourhood. These include climate change, Arctic ice melting, sustainable 
energy, drug and human trafficking, organised crime,  crisis management cooperation, North Africa and 
the Middle East Peace Process, and Iran. Regarding the cooperation programme, Russia insists that it 
should no longer be perceived as an EU assistance pr ogramme to Russia. Consequently, Russia presses 
that the programme implementation should be based on equality and partnershi p. By equality, it means 
an approach, in which both sides do not only identify pr ojects jointly, but also obligatorily finance them 
jointly, design, manage and audit/evaluate them jo intly. Russia is an emerging donor itself and it is 
seeking to set up an external aid agency on its own. 
Hence, the problems and limits mentioned above express the need to further develop EU-Russia 
cooperation in areas of EU or common interest such as societal, judicial and economic modernisation as 
developed in the Partnership for Modernisation, energy security, sustainability, research and innovation 
and technology co-operation, intern ational challenges, cross border cooperation, education and support 
to civil society. 
 
India 
The EU-India Strategic Partnership is guided by the Joint Action Plan, adopted in 2005 and revised in 
2008. The EU's priorities in our cooperation with In dia are presently security (CT, counter piracy and 
cyber-security), economic and trade issues (FTA under negotiation and business/economic diplomacy), 
and energy/environment/climate change (efficiency, renewables/solar).  
Other sectoral areas of importance include research and innovation (a total of EUR 1 billion of projects 
are ongoing between EU and MS), transport (maritime  as well as air transport), education and culture 
(MOUs have been signed), migration (a high leve l dialogue was launched in October) and public 
diplomacy.  
Many of these areas could benefit from funding unde r the future Partnership Instrument, which would 
allow the EU and India to grasp opportunities for cooperation offered on both sides, as well as better 
respond to global challenges both partners have to face.  
India has traditionally seen the EU as a primarily co mmercial partner. The Instrument could serve to 
change this perception and to profile the EU as a political partner of substance.  
Funding under this Instrument could be used to s upport the implementation of the Joint Action Plan and 
to underpin specific political priorities. 
 
EN 34   EN Brazil  
Brazil is one of the world’s fastest growing ec onomies and its economic re forms have given it new 
international recognition. The EU and Brazil enjoy historical, cultural, economic and political ties. 
These ties were strengthened by the first EU-Br azil summit in Lisbon in July 2007, where a Strategic 
Partnership  was established. 
A three-year Joint Action Plan has been developed and implemented for the period 2009-2011, 
identifying main priorities for cooperation and earmark ing concrete actions for each priority. Bilateral 
relations are enhanced through sectoral dialogues,  scholarship programmes and European Studies 
Institute. Environment and trade are other importa nt ongoing dialogues which are discussed in the 
yearly summit meetings. 
Other possible areas of cooperation could be develope d, such as counternarcotics, actions to promote 
the effective implementation of the comprehensiv e civil aviation agreement signed in March 2011, 
support EU SMEs, support to the effective impl ementation of the Information Society dialogue, 
culture, public diplomacy. 
 
Japan  
Japan continues to be one of the largest economies in  the world with which the EU has close relations. 
The EU and Japan enjoy a solid relationship en compassing four broad objectives: promoting peace 
and security, strengthening the economic and trad e partnership, managing global and societal 
challenges and bringing together people and cultures.  
Cooperation takes the form of foreign policy dialog ues, regional dialogues (East Asia, Central Asia) 
and thematic dialogues covering a wide spectrum of issues such as environment, energy, research and 
innovation, transport. Annual Summits are held to  discuss current international issues and bring 
forward their bilateral agenda. 
In 2011, the EU-Japan Summit took the political decisi on to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship and 
start preparatory work for possible negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement  and a parallel broad 
based Framework Agreement . In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plants, EU and Japanese 
leaders also decided to enhance cooperation on  nuclear safety and energy more generally.  
 
Republic of Korea (South Korea)  
The EU and the Republic of Korea enjoy substantial trade and investment flows. South Korea is the 
EU's fourth largest trading partner outside  Europe, and the EU is South Korea’s 2nd trading partner 
after China, The EU has been also the largest source of foreign direct investment in South Korea since 
the 1960s whilst South Korea has become a significant investor in Europe since the 1990s. 
The EU and South Korea have strengthened their clo se relationship, with the view to further boosting 
their vibrant economic ties and promoting their comm on interests on many areas such as research and 
innovation and technology, education, environmen t, development assistance and global issues, 
especially climate change. 
The successful negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement  (FTA) provisionally applied from 1 July 
2011and a new Framework Agreement; confirm the dynamism of the bilateral relations now 
considered as a "strategic partnership”. 
The Republic of Korea is also playing an incr easing role in the world scene (within the G-20 
framework, the climate change international nego tiations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and is 
committed to a high level of official devel opment assistance and supporting UN peace operations) 
 
EN 35   EN Canada 
Canada is one of the European Union’s oldest and closest partners. What started out in the 1950s as a 
purely economic relationship has evolved over the year s to become a close partnership. Canada is 
currently the EU's 11th most important trading part ner and the EU is Canada's second most important 
trading partner, after the U.S. 
The EU and Canada work closely together on glob al challenges such as the environment, climate 
change, Arctic ice melting, energy security and regi onal stability throughout the world. In 2010, the 
EU-Canada Summit set clear priorities and ther e is a new political context with the ongoing 
negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement  (CETA), the first of its kind 
with a G8 partner, and the imminent  launch of negotiations on an upgraded Framework Agreement . 
Other policy sectors are also important in the rela tionship: cooperation in ju stice and home affairs, 
education & training, research and innovation, cris is management and election observation to name a 
few. EU and Canada also closely collaborate on a number of regional issues such as Haiti 
reconstruction, and police and rule of law activities in Afghanistan. There will be a need to support the 
implementation of the CETA and Framework Agreements, encompassing events, studies and 
dialogues, with special attention given to supporting SMEs. 
Successful programmes have been implemented in the field of people-to-people links and public 
diplomacy actions. Co-ordinated, long-term, pub lic diplomacy activities are required, focused on 
promoting the interests and the image of the EU in Canada. 
 
South Africa  
South Africa’s political transition from apartheid dur ing the 1990s has served as a model across the 
world. Although the largest African economy, Sout h Africa still faces many development challenges, 
not least in fighting AIDS, poverty and high unemployment. Since 1994, the EU has vested a lot of 
hope and expectations in South Africa's role for the region and the African continent: as a beacon of 
democracy, a pole of stability, and as the region's eco nomic powerhouse, SA has the potential to be an 
EU strategic ally at global level. 
EU-South African relations have flourished sin ce 1994, and both sides entered into a Strategic 
Partnership in May 2007.  In October 1999, South Africa and the EU signed a Trade, Development 
and Cooperation Agreement  (TDCA ) which entered fully into force on 1 May 2004, even if some 
provisions have been applied since 1 January 2000. The TDCA  covers political dialogue, the 
establishment of a free trade area over an asymmetr ical twelve-year period, in development and 
economic cooperation as well as a whole series of other areas. 
With its role increasing as a major international player, South Africa is asserting the link between 
domestic, socio-economic priorities a nd international relations is a central element of the EU-South 
Africa agenda. The EU will continue  to support South Africa's nationa l priorities through dialogues on 
a broad range of policies (employment, health, resear ch and innovation, space, environment, etc.) and 
development programmes and these ties could be comp lemented by activities of mutual interest and 
reciprocal exchanges in a number of areas c overed by public dipl omacy and education.