Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Communication from the Commission on The nuclear industries in the European Union (An illustrative nuclear programme according to Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty)` (97/C 206/17)

On 27 September 1996, the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 40 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, on the above-mentioned communication.

The Section for Energy, Nuclear Questions and Research which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 2 April 1997. The rapporteur was Mr Lyons.

At its 345th Plenary Session (meeting of 24 April 1997), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 101 votes in favour, 18 against and 11 abstentions.

1. Introduction

1.1. Under the provisions of Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission, after having obtained the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 'shall periodically publish illustrative programmes indicating in particular nuclear energy production targets and all the types of investment required for their attainment`.

1.2. Since the Euratom Treaty was adopted, three illustrative programmes have been published by the Commission in 1966, 1972 and 1985 (updated 1990). At the time of this update the Commission considered that the 1985 guidelines for the future development of the nuclear industry were mostly still valid, but should be adapted to take account of the prospects opened up by the single market and the measures to be taken to complete it in this sector, with due regard for the specific characteristics of the nuclear market and the problems faced by the companies concerned.

1.3. These priority measures concerned the market in equipment and components for which, according to the Commission, the creation of a genuine common market was necessary to reduce investment costs and improve the competitiveness of the nuclear industry.

1.4. It was not until eleven years later, in connection with the White Paper on an Energy Policy for the European Union (), and against the background of a much changed energy situation and organization of the energy market in the EU, that the Commission has again carried out a fundamental review of the role of nuclear energy. In its document, the Commission considers its role against the three objectives it had set out in its white paper - i.e. global competitiveness, security of supply, and protection of the environment.

2. The Commission's communication

2.1. The Commission's communication reviews the state of the nuclear industry within the European Union in the mid 1990s. More than 140 nuclear reactors are operating in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. They provide approximately one-third of the electricity generated within the European Union. They are part of a well established nuclear industry covering the entirety of the fuel cycle, with its own technological base and, on the industry's figures, employing more than 400 000 mainly highly qualified staff.

2.2. Nevertheless, nuclear generated electricity creates a significant level of public concern. There is thus an acceptability problem, and it derives particularly from concerns on nuclear safety, about the transport and disposal of nuclear waste, and about nuclear proliferation.

2.3. The Commission's communication examines the operation of the nuclear industry across the range of activities in which it is involved. It considers its production costs, including its decommissioning, fuel, waste disposal and storage costs, and estimates the extent to which it is competitive with other sources of electricity production. It refers to its contribution to exports, to qualified indigenous employment within the EU, and to innovation and technical development. It notes that its investments are inherently long term.

2.4. The document goes on to discuss security of supply and the contribution nuclear power can make to this. It deals with the protection of the population and the environment, and has a special section on the nuclear safety problems of central and eastern Europe and of the CIS. However, the Commission does not feel confident about making predictions about the amount of electricity which will be generated by nuclear power beyond the year 2000.

2.5. The Commission's communication goes on to examine the business opportunities available to the European industry, the conditions of nuclear fuel supply, the technological challenges of nuclear safety, and questions relating to spent fuel, nuclear waste and decommissioning, to the transport of radioactive materials, the use of plutonium, and the future of nuclear technology, research and development.

2.6. In reaching its conclusions, the Commission proposes that the following principles should be adopted by the European Union to provide a framework for a continuing contribution by nuclear energy to the supply of electricity:

- the right to decide to develop or not the peaceful use of nuclear energy, belongs to each Member State;

- the choice made by each Member State has to be respected;

- Member States having chosen to use nuclear energy need, in parallel, to ensure a high degree of nuclear safety, respect non-proliferation requirements as provided for in relevant international agreements, as well as high level of human health protection;

- while it is individual Member States who are responsible for setting safety standards and licensing nuclear installations, and national operators who are responsible for their safe operation, both share the collective responsibility towards all European citizens for ensuring nuclear safety.

3. Comments on the Commission's document

3.1. The Committee welcomes the publication of the Commission's Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme (). For several years, despite the fact that nuclear generation produces one third of the EU's electricity, and avoids annually the emission into the atmosphere of 700 million tonnes of CO2, the Commission has had little to say, either about its potential or its problems. This document opens up the debate about the industry's future which is so badly overdue. The Committee hopes that this opinion will serve to stimulate that debate.

3.2. Given the widely different views about nuclear generated electricity among the Member States, the Committee is pleased that the Commission has succeeded in producing a balanced and qualified document which reflects the complexity of the issues involved. Two features in particular of the Commission's document may be noted at this point. First, while not hostile to the utilization of nuclear energy, the Commission discusses its merits and demerits from different viewpoints without taking up a definitive position. Second, the Commission has taken, as its basic premise, that each Member State has to be free to make its own choices about the fuels employed in the production of electricity on its territory.

3.3. One outcome of the Commission's approach, therefore, may well be to encourage a better informed, and perhaps less ideological, discussion about the pros and cons of nuclear energy among the citizens of the European Union. If so, that will be a valuable benefit.

3.4. Article 1 of the Euratom Treaty, signed in 1957, states:

'It shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member States and to the development of relations with the other countries by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries.`

3.4.1. How greatly the economic and political environment has changed since 1957 is exemplified by the quite different language used in the Commission's document today. Thus, nuclear energy will have to be judged according to the aims of 'overall economic competitiveness, security of supply and environmental protection` (Chapter II, page 4); Further, 'nuclear energy will have to compete in the same framework and under the same conditions as all other energy sources` (II 1(b), page 7); and again, 'the Union's objective today is to let market rules play their role` (IV 2, page 18). Thus, the context in which nuclear energy has to be considered in 1997 is altogether different from that in which it was first considered forty years' ago.

3.5. Turning to the detail of the Commission's document, the pages dealing with the economics of nuclear energy in Chapter II 1(a), pages 5 and 6, are disappointing. Clearly, the Commission has been handicapped by the absence of relevant up-to-date published information. The dates to which different figures quoted in the document relate vary adventitiously between 1990 and 1993. Fuel prices have changed absolutely and relatively in the years since, while exchange rates as well have varied. It is unfortunate, but Table 3, which offers generalized comparisons between the costs of electricity production from coal, gas and nuclear generation, cannot offer a useful guide to the economic choices actually facing electricity generators currently considering investment options.

3.6. In places, the Commission would have done better to have imparted more information. For example, under Chapter II 1(d), on pages 11 and 12, it lists the different things that were agreed in consequence of the 1992 'New Partnership Approach`, but fails to indicate any single concrete improvement which has followed from it. At Chapter II 3(e), on pages 15 and 16, and at Chapter V 3, on page 20, the Commission writes of the technological problems of nuclear safety. The intentions of relevant past agreements are stated, but no indication is offered as to whether any specific progress has actually been made in any one of the areas referred to.

3.7. It would have been particularly valuable to have been given more information about the treatment of radioactive waste, an area of activity about which the public continues to sustain misgivings. The Commission (II 3(d), on page 15) refers positively to a strategy it adopted in 1994 and it lists the main issues which it believes most interest the public. But it says nothing about what is happening, or may be expected to happen, having adopted its strategy. On the related subject of the transport of radioactive materials, however, the Commission rightly draws attention to the safety with which this activity has consistently been accompanied (V 5, page 22).

3.8. The Commission's approach is more forthcoming in other parts of the document. For example, where the assistance made available to central and eastern Europe and to the CIS is discussed (Chapter III, on pages 16 and 17), the Commission gives at least an indication of the actions being taken as a consequence of the EU's financial assistance to the nuclear industries in these countries. Even so, some indication of the scale of the problems being tackled (so that the dimensions of the EU's financial assistance can be seen in context) would have been a relevant improvement.

3.9. The general point is this: it is important to demonstrate to the EU's population not only that relevant resolutions, agreements, Treaties, etc. are adopted in key areas of nuclear energy activities, but that identifiable measures are worked out and put into practice in consequence - as indeed, in reality, they are. It does the Commission a good deal less than justice for it to leave the impression that important agreements in principle have no practical impact which can be described.

3.10. Chapter V is perhaps the most positive in the Commission's document. It is here that the Commission urges the nuclear industry to seek markets overseas for civil nuclear energy ventures while emphasizing, at the same time, the importance of spreading the safety culture which has been established within the Union.

3.11. On the key matter of safety, the Commission welcomes the international convention on nuclear safety drawn up within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This has now been formally ratified by enough signatories to give it full international legal status (). The Commission supports IAEA plans to draw up an international convention on the management of radioactive waste. In this latter connection the Commission also records its support for cooperation programmes for the safe storage of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, its peaceful use and its safe and secure transportation. The Commission records its commitment of ECU 555 million for projects in the central and eastern European countries (CEEC) and the CIS between 1991 and 1995, and its intention to allocate similar average annual budgets for similar purposes over the period 1996-1999. The Commission must be applauded for putting its weight behind these major safety related activities, as well as others not here identified individually.

3.12. There are two areas of information missing in the Commission's document which the Committee would like to see addressed in the final version of the Illustrative Nuclear Programme. These are information: (i) as to where responsibilities are placed as between the EU and Member States for the operation of the different aspects of nuclear generation and its related activities; and, (ii) about any significant technological or organizational developments in recent years in the handling and disposal of nuclear waste.

3.13. In its concluding section (VI), the Commission hints at the possibility of further things. There 'may be` a future 'review of nuclear energy alongside other alternatives`; there 'will be` future discussions about the role of nuclear energy if 'circumstances confirm .... an ever increasing dependency .... on fossil fuel imports`. Such suggestions only beg the question as to why these matters were not properly addressed in this review, since the relevant information is already available from the Commission's own sources. The principles set out at the end recognize the status quo and must represent the most that can be agreed to at present. The Committee supports them.

4. Does nuclear generation have a future in the EU?

4.1. The Commission's document opens up a number of issues of wide, indeed critical, significance for the future energy supply of the European Union. For the nuclear industry itself, the document raises clearly the question of whether it has an operational future within the Union much beyond the lifetime of the existing plants. It is not by accident that the Commission offers no forecasts for nuclear generation beyond the year 2000.

4.2. It may seem strange to express such a doubt. The Commission reports the industry's assessment that it is the direct and indirect employer of 400 000 mostly well qualified people. The industry produces economically 33 % of the Union's electricity () (). To do so it consumes a fuel that has no other peaceful utilization, thus saving other fuels which have valuable actual or potential alternative uses (). Each and every year it saves Europe as a whole the emission of some 700 million tonnes of CO2 in comparison with the same output of electricity produced from a mix of fossil fuels (). It is a fuel which has the potential capability, provided that fast reactor technology can finally be mastered on a commercial basis, to reproduce itself and thus extend its utility to society indefinitely into the future.

4.3. Notwithstanding these considerations, however, the future of the nuclear industry within the Union is in doubt and for three principal reasons.

4.4. First, the industry suffers from the handicap of widespread public unease, not excluding outright hostility. The chief explanation for this is almost certainly a fear of another Chernobyl scale reactor disaster. This spewed into the world's atmosphere large quantities of radiation, and rekindled a latent deep-seated concern about the nature of radiation which many people have. But anxieties exist also because of the continuing inability of the industry to find a solution to the problem of the treatment and disposal of nuclear waste, particularly high level waste, which the public at large would find acceptable. This background of public unease has a pervasive influence on decisions in the energy field directly or indirectly affecting the nuclear industry, and can be strongly inhibitive in its effect.

4.5. The second and third reasons for doubt about the industry's future are respectively, the adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of the Directive () laying down that henceforward the generation of electricity is to be opened up to the operation of market forces, and the arrival on the market during the last few years of competitively generated gas in increasingly large quantities.

4.6. Opening generation up to market forces is a key development. In the greater part of the EU, the generation of electricity has taken place up to now in the context of guaranteed access to defined national and/or regional markets (). This has facilitated capital intensive, and therefore long term investment. It will take more than a few years for electricity markets to be opened up completely (), but from now on no generating company will be able to plan its investment in new plant on the assumption that it has a secure protected market for its output on a long term basis. Power companies will have to be competitive without any market privileges or direct or indirect support.

4.7. Attitudes to investment in the different generating technologies, including of course coal, are bound to be affected by this major change in circumstances. It is, however, on the nuclear industry that the new market dimension will have the most striking effect, for it is by some margin the most capital intensive of the major generating technologies ().

4.8. An enlarged market must, of course, be seen for what it is, as an opportunity, not a restriction. However, before the fruits of an open EU-wide high voltage market become readily available, it will be necessary to develop enlarged interconnections between most Member States, as well as a genuine EU high voltage grid into which generators can sell in large quantities over time. There is likely to be a transitional period, therefore, of some considerable length, perhaps to be measured in decades rather than years.

4.9. The third reason is the arrival on the scene in recent years not only of increasing quantities of natural gas, the price of which, overall, has been falling, but additionally and crucially, also of modern CCGT gas generation technology (). The advantages of CCGT technology were well explained in an analysis by the OECD, which reported that 'CCGT technology enjoys low capital costs, short construction times, low requirements in terms of land use and high modularity - that is, economies of scale are not significant above a certain level and generating capacity can be expanded in relatively small tranches` ().

4.10. CCGT generated gas may or may not produce lower priced electricity than nuclear generation, though in general it is expected to do so during the next few years. It will depend, of course, on numerous factors, and will differ in different countries and at different times. But when it comes to investing in new generation in a market context, then, for the reasons stated above, where gas is available and its price remains competitive () it will have a decisive advantage over nuclear power - and probably over all other fuels and/or technologies also (). Public opinion will support the choice of gas as against nuclear generation, and even against other alternatives ().

4.10.1. It is not possible to forecast how long this conjunction of circumstances is likely to last. It seems reasonable to assume that it will form the predominant pattern in the next 10 to 15 years but beyond that it is difficult to see. That, of course, is a prime reason for the EU maintaining flexibility of fuel availability, and for having a security of supply policy.

4.11. For the nuclear industry, the crunch will come in only a few years' time, when utility management and public authorities have to consider, and then begin to plan, their replacement strategy for plants due to be decommissioned in the years from about 2005-2010 onwards. It is difficult to see in which countries other than France, or possibly Finland, new nuclear plants might be built to replace retiring plants. Even in France doubts have been expressed as to whether new nuclear plant will be the favoured option after 2010 ().

4.12. If, from now on, only market principles are relevant, then unless there is a major change in relative prices, or in nuclear construction costs, or in public opinion, or possibly all three, the answer to the question at the beginning of this chapter is that, on current information, 'it is highly unlikely` ().

4.13. The Commission appears to have drawn the same conclusion. Hence its decision to offer no forecasts beyond 2000, and its encouragement to the industry to seek markets, but to do so overseas. However, this modest encouragement is of limited value. Without an active market at home, securing export growth is only too likely to become a fruitless exercise.

4.14. Such a major change in the balance of fuels utilized in electricity generation has implications that go well beyond the boundaries of the industries themselves. In particular, they raise questions about the security of the EU's fuel supplies, and about its environment policy, where market forces alone are unlikely to solve the problems. These are strategic issues and they are addressed below.

5. Strategic issues

5.1. An ever increasing dependency?

5.1.1. The above question is to be found in the Commission' conclusion to its document (Section VI, p. 25):

'Future discussions as to the role of nuclear energy will be affected by whether circumstances confirm an ever increasing dependency of the Community on fossil fuels imports to meet future energy supplies.`

5.1.2. It is a curious question because it is known that the answer is 'yes`. The authority is the Commission itself as e.g. at II 2(a) on page 9 of its document, where it is stated that 'Europe will significantly increase its dependence on imported energy`. The further background on the world scene at II 2(b), pages 10 and 11 of its document, underpins this judgement.

5.1.3. Future projections of the energy scene are treated much more fully in another Commission publication 'European Energy to 2020` (hereafter referred to as EE 2020), published earlier in 1996. Extracts from its conclusions relevant to the question of future dependency are given in the Annex. On the central question of fuel imports, EE 2020 sums up its analysis by commenting that imports of gas, currently at 40 % of the EU's consumption, could reach 75 % by 2020; and that imports of coal, currently at 37 % of EU consumption, could be nearer 80 % by 2020 ().

5.1.4. It was doubtless with this kind of scenario in mind that the Commission stressed the importance of fuel diversity in its White Paper on Energy Policy. The Commission's view, it wrote, is that 'at the sectoral level an important contribution to diversification can be made by ensuring that there is a diverse domestic fuel base, particularly for electricity production`. It refers to the 'increasing import dependency of the Community` and argues that 'in the interest of security of supply there is a strong case for keeping open all possible economic options` ().

5.1.5. The Commission's opinion, quoted in 5.1.1, that consideration of the problem posed by this ever increasing dependency, and the role of nuclear generation in relation to it, can be safely delayed is inconsistent with its own evidence as well as with the position it takes in its Green Paper on renewables, as already instanced in footnote 3, p. 93.

5.2. Security of supply ()

5.2.1. The point is that, due to its growing dependency on imported fuels for its generation of electricity, the EU as a whole has a prospective security of supply problem on its hands. (The position differs for, and as between, individual Member States). It is not a problem requiring a knee-jerk reaction, but it is one which is clearly foreseeable. It should certainly be addressed positively in this review of the role of nuclear generation.

5.2.2. In terms of prospective growth in imports, the two key fuels are coal and gas. EE 2020 estimates of future import growth of each have been given above. However, the significance of these forecasts to future security of supply differs sharply. About coal imports, the Commission stated in its White Paper () that 'the characteristics of the world coal market and the large diversity of suppliers mean that the risk of persistent interruption of supply, even in the long term, is minimal`.

5.2.3. The importation of gas is another matter. In Europe, gas is transported mainly by pipeline, which is a particularly vulnerable means of supply. In addition, a steadily increasing fraction of the EU's future supplies will be drawn from more distant geographical areas. The EU will continue to receive supplies from the North Sea, the Netherlands and from Norway for many years to come but as EE 2020 observes:

'Incremental supplies will come substantially from the former Soviet Union and North Africa, although by 2020 it is possible that additional supplies may be available from Nigeria, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, either by pipeline or in the form of LNG.` ()

5.2.4. It is the steadily increasing fraction of the EU's future supplies which will be drawn unavoidably from geographical areas which are, or in future could become, politically unstable which gives rise to the prospective security of supply problem.

5.2.5. This issue is relevant to the consideration of the Commission's Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme for three reasons: (i) gas fired generation is likely to be widely available to most Member States in the years after 2005, coinciding with the years in which much of the existing nuclear capacity will start to come up for replacement; (ii) nuclear generation has no comparable problems with the supply of its own fuel () and (iii) by virtue of producing 33 % of the EU's electricity, it has the potential to act as a major strategic stabilizing factor, and cannot be replaced in that role in the foreseeable future.

5.2.6. If, in the absence of the emergence of new technological or economic factors, nuclear generation is steadily replaced by gas fired generation from about 2005-2010 onwards, then the security of supply problem could start to assume major proportions, with possible implications for both the overall economy and even foreign relations.

5.3. CO2 emissions

5.3.1. CO2 emissions are first of all an environmental issue, but for the energy industries they are also a strategic issue, for some of them emit a lot of CO2. Nuclear generation, like renewables, does not emit other than a minute amount of CO2 into the atmosphere, and its disappearance from electricity generation would make a very big difference.

5.3.2. At II 3(b), on page 13, of the Commission's document, CO2 pollution is described as 'a serious threat`. At paragraph 4.1, on page 19, of its recently published green paper on renewable energy sources, the Commission writes that 'A significant limitation of the use of fossil fuels is required to ensure that the Community can meet its CO2 targets contemplated in the Climate Change Convention.` () The green paper goes on to propose a doubling (from 6 to 12 per cent) of the contribution of renewables by 2010 ().

5.3.3. The green paper predicts 'a reduction in CO2 emissions of 386 million tonnes by the year 2010` as the outcome of adopting the above target, though a figure of 300 million tonnes is more apposite (). The latter figure itself would be a sizeable and welcome energy output without accompanying CO2 emissions, but it has to be doubted how much of a saving it would actually make to the current production of CO2 from conventional sources of power output, coal and gas. This is for the two reasons that (i) much the greater proportion of the proposed new programme on renewables would provide additional, not replacement energy (), and (ii) a considerable proportion of the additional electricity may not be suitable for feeding into the grid ().

5.3.4. These figures bring out the importance of nuclear generation to the campaign for CO2 reduction. For it would require no more than about 30 % of the present nuclear capacity to have been closed by - say - 2015 (an entirely credible possibility) for the entire CO2 reduction programme of the Commission's green paper on renewables, assuming it to be wholly successful, to be counteracted (). It seems not too much to say that if nuclear generation largely disappears, as has been argued above that it will, then there is no chance that the EU can meet its international CO2 targets, either now or in the foreseeable future.

5.4. The Commission's responsibilities

5.4.1. From the evidence adduced in the paragraphs above, it is clear that the EU has to anticipate a security of supply problem developing in the first decade of the next century. The EU already has a CO2 problem. The loss of all or most of its nuclear generating capacity to gas generation in the years following 2005-2010 (see Section 4 above) would unavoidably magnify the already foreseeable security of supply weakness the EU will then have. And it would place a crippling handicap on the EU's efforts to reduce its CO2 emissions. The Commission should, as a matter of urgency, initiate a debate on alternatives to this scenario, involving the economic players concerned and the Member States.

5.4.2. The Commission's document fails to make these issues clear, and it should have done. The subjects are discussed - e.g. security of supply at II 2(a) and in the Conclusion, and CO2 emissions at II 3(b) - and allusion is made to the nuclear contribution in each case, but neither its central importance to the consideration of either problem, nor its importance to the EU's energy policy, is brought out.

5.4.3. To be specific, having, at II 2(a) on page 9 of its document, pointed out that Europe will significantly increase its dependence on imported energy, the Commission's comment is merely that nuclear energy 'would be particularly useful if....supply diversification deteriorates`. There is no hint here of the size or the nature of the problem which actually lies ahead, nor of the importance of nuclear generation in seeking to deal with the problem, whether in a positive or a negative sense.

5.4.4. It is the same with the Commission's treatment of CO2. Few people could glean from the terse wording of II 3(b) alone what the consequences will be for the EU's CO2 reduction programme when the EU no longer contains a sizeable nuclear generating capacity.

5.4.5. Almost certainly the Commission's equivocation on these two key points is due to its perception of the nuclear industry's public acceptability problem; and to its need to arrive at a consensus view. But the Commission's failure to confront these two issues plainly is nevertheless a serious omission.

5.4.6. It is true that the Commission - indeed, the EU - has only limited powers to ensure or even promote security of supply. But Member States are better equipped. They now have the ability to invoke powers under the new Directive introducing common rules for the internal market in electricity (see footnote 5, p. 91). The primary intent and effect of this Directive is to open the electricity market to competition. But in addition Article 3(2) states inter alia that:

'Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and to environmental protection.`

5.4.7. Such public service obligations have to 'be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable`, and must be published. In addition, Member States who wish to do so may introduce long term planning as a means of carrying out their public service obligations. The outcome is that Member States now have the right to safeguard security of supply (among other things), if they think it necessary, subject of course to the appropriate procedures. The Commission is able to offer advice, and doubtless on strategic energy policy issues it will do so.

5.4.8. As regards CO2 emissions, the Commission has the power to propose and the Council has the power to act, should they believe there to be a need. as e.g. under the terms of Article 130s of the Treaty ().

5.4.9. When it comes to review its Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme, the Commission needs to reach a clear decision, in each case, as to whether safeguarding security of supply, and reducing CO2 emissions are still key policy objectives. If the Commission decides that they are (its public position up to now), then it has the duty to state clearly in each case what the implications for the success of the policy are: a) if a large nuclear generating component remains available to the Union, and b) if it does not.

5.4.10. On the basis of its conclusions, whatever they might be, the Commission will then be in a position to give clear guidance to all the major actors involved, and not least to the public at large, about the realities of the choices ahead, and of the extent to which it may or may not be desirable to seek to influence the course of events which, on present knowledge, are to be expected.

6. Nuclear safety in the central and eastern European countries (CEEC) and in the States of the former Soviet Union (FSU)

6.1. The Commission comments on the potentially dangerous parts of the nuclear industries in the CEEC and FSU States in Chapters III and V of its document. It describes briefly the main types of technical assistance that have been made available by western countries, including the assistance provided under the Phare and Tacis programmes.

6.2. There should not be any doubt that were there to be another major nuclear accident, the effect on public attitudes to the continuing activity of the EU's nuclear industry would be deeply damaging. It might even trigger political decisions to phase out the EU's own nuclear industry as soon as practicable, irrespective of any other considerations, with all the costs and economic dislocation which would be involved. A particularly acute problem is the unstable state of the Unit 4 Sarcophagus at Chernobyl, which is reported to need urgent attention.

6.3. Nor are the dangers limited to the civil nuclear industry in these countries. Public alarm could as easily be engendered by an event in the military nuclear arsenal of some of the States which were part of the former Soviet Union. It has been widely reported that, in places, inspection and maintenance standards have declined dramatically.

The Tacis and Phare programmes require priority review.

6.4. The Phare and Tacis programmes do not touch these latter issues, and though the sums spent on the conventional nuclear safety issues seem large viewed in the abstract, in relation to what is required they are small. The programmes which have been put in place have undoubtedly done good work but they are now the subject of growing criticism as to their real effectiveness. They have been what their title describes - i.e. programmes of technical assistance - much more than they have been anything else. They have been concerned primarily with such things as technical advice, training, writing manuals, advice on setting up systems, etc... Very little hardware has been provided.

6.5. There have been entirely understandable reasons for the lack of hardware support but it has nevertheless been a deficiency, and it is highly desirable that it should begin to be remedied, if at all possible. It needs to be fully appreciated, however, that the derelict economies of some of the countries involved have been a huge handicap to the provision of adequate external assistance.

6.6. An important factor underlying criticism of the various technical assistance programmes is that, so far as the Committee is aware, the Commission has not yet undertaken a serious evaluation of the programmes. What has been achieved, how much safety has actually been improved, how well have the political, financial and administrative arrangements worked, and what should be the future priorities? These are the kind of questions which need to be asked.

6.7. There is no doubt that making such evaluations on an objective basis is very difficult. The Committee believes nevertheless that the technical assistance programmes will continue to lack public credibility until a serious study of their impact has been undertaken. The Committee strongly urges the Commission to undertake just such a study as a matter of priority, and then to publish the results.

6.8. The Committee also asks the Commission to consider whether assistance can be offered to some of the dangerous military installations, since a serious nuclear accident at any of those could have just as serious consequences for the Member States and people of the EU as one anywhere else.

6.9. The Committee would draw the Commission's attention to the particular significance to the EU of the work to improve the safety of nuclear plants in central and eastern Europe, and in the New Independent States of the FSU. While this is a matter for the international community generally, it should be noted that a number of nuclear plants have been built in the immediate vicinity of EU Member States. Some of these nuclear plants will become EU plants if and when the first central and east European countries join the EU early in the new century.

6.10. The implications of this development will need to be considered in the course of the bilateral accession negotiations. Negotiations should start without delay about bringing these plants up to EU safety standards.

6.10.1. There is a further point. The process of assimilation could lead to the establishment of agreed norms or standards for Soviet built plants in the territories of the new Members of the EU. If so, this could affect the public perception of the safety or otherwise of plants in other countries which are not expected to become Members of the EU, and which might not consider it necessary to adopt the same EU agreed standards.

6.11. Finally, the Committee believes that securing the safety of nuclear installations in the CEEC and the FSU States, is so important that it should form, in a suitable wording, one of the principles which should be added to those listed by the Commission in the conclusions to the final version of the Illustrative Nuclear Programme.

7. Next steps

7.1. The Commission will have to decide comparatively soon whether to recommend strategic interventions relating to nuclear generation if the EU is to implement its policies in relation to security of supply and reducing CO2 emissions. It is already considering such steps, on behalf of these same two policies, in relation to renewable sources of generation (), so no issue of principle would appear to be involved.

7.2. The Commission will doubtless give thought to finding if there is a way, possibly by means of some financial or other mechanism, to enable long term investment in power station capacity still to take place even in a market context. It recognized that this would be a problem at II 1(d), on page 8 of its document, where it comments that in implementing the internal electricity market 'Member States may take due consideration of the long term planning needs of the nuclear industry .... etc.`

7.3. But such measures, should they amount to anything, may be of little avail if public opinion retains its present degree of concern about the activities of the nuclear industry. Since the Chernobyl disaster, this has become a powerful political force in its own right. To that political force has now been added the challenge of natural gas, the most formidable competitive challenge that the industry has met.

7.4. Within the industry, questions of efficiency and cost will need to be reviewed from top to bottom, with a determination to increase the first and cut the latter. The technical and commercial possibilities of smaller reactors in the 200-500 MW range should be urgently examined once more. Research activities, particularly those related to safety issues, may well need further resources.

7.5. The choice that some Member States may make to replace obsolete power stations by new ones will therefore mean a sustained research effort by the nuclear industry to design a new generation of reactors which are both permanently safer and more competitive. The Committee thinks that this research effort must be encouraged and supported by the EU through the nuclear fission research programme. The scale of the investment required means that it is particularly important to coordinate national and Community programmes.

7.6. Safety standards have to be rigorously and scrupulously maintained as always. Within the Member States of the EU, the industry's safety record has been outstanding over several decades. Together with the competent authorities, the industry is entitled to due recognition for this. But it is not a reason merely for self congratulation. The safety record as well must be subject to meticulous review to ensure that the established standards do not drop because they have become routine, or because corner cutting practices may have crept in in some places. It is of crucial importance that the public is kept fully informed about the safety practices of the industry and how they are maintained and developed to still higher standards.

7.7. Handling and disposal of radioactive waste

7.7.1. Above all, the nuclear industry has to address the question of its overall acceptability to the public. There is perhaps nothing that can be done to erase the images and the reality of the Chernobyl disaster. But it would make a big difference if public opinion could be satisfied about the transport and long term disposal of radioactive waste. It is instructive that spent fuel and other radioactive materials have for years been safely transported within the EU by both road and rail; nevertheless, to many people this activity is still as much a source of worry as it ever was.

7.7.2. It is possible that the industry needs to rethink its public presentation of the subject of radioactivity. It seems only to talk about radioactivity in situations in which it is engaged with it in a potentially dangerous way. It might consider if it is possible, independently of its own activities, for an open and ongoing discussion to be developed with the public at large, via the modern media, about the nature of radioactivity, and about when it is dangerous, when it is perfectly safe, and when it is beneficial.

7.7.3. Probably the most intractable problem the industry faces relates to the disposal of medium and high level nuclear waste, in which dangerous radioactivity subsists for exceptionally long periods of time. The industry, supported by the weight of specialist scientific opinion, has long favoured final deep disposal below secure geological strata, where it can be reliably contained, undisturbed, indefinitely into the future. Public opinion consistently opposes this solution on the grounds that no one can be so sure that nothing can go wrong. Public opinion not only wants long lived (indeed all) radioactive materials to be disposed of safely, but it wants this done in such a way that it is both retrievable and, if at all possible, observable.

7.7.4. It is the Committee's view that the nuclear industry could not do anything that would be more likely to allay public unease about its activities than to meet the public's wishes about the handling of long term waste, which it is both practicable and affordable to do. The Commission should assist Member States and the nuclear industry to achieve this end. In addition, it should go beyond this to develop a comprehensive nuclear waste disposal policy for the EU as a whole.

7.8. Industry contribution to nuclear safety in the CEEC and the FSU

7.8.1. Finally, the industry should step up its technical, financial and political support for activities directed at ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities (not excluding military facilities) in the CEEC and the FSU. It should also give itself a very much higher public profile in carrying out such activities, whether carried out as part of the Tacis and Phare and other programmes, or independently. These are activities which the public will support, provided that it is told about them. The public is very aware of the dangers to which poorly designed and inadequately maintained nuclear facilities can give rise, and looks to 'its own` nuclear industry to help to put things right. Here is a golden opportunity for the industry to kill two birds with one stone, and it should take it.

8. Summary

8.1. The publication of the Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme is welcomed. It provides a basis for a wide debate in the EU, but more detailed information is needed. The proposed principles should be supported.

8.2. Nuclear power currently produces one third of the EU's electricity, and has important environmental advantages over fossil fuels in the generation of electricity, as e.g. saving CO2 emissions. However, it requires extensive arrangements to ensure its safe operation. Despite the excellent safety record of the industry within the EU, there continues to be widespread public concern as to the extent to which these arrangements can be relied upon. Not only did the Chernobyl disaster rekindle deep-seated fears about radiation, but public anxieties about the industry's treatment and disposal of nuclear waste remain unabated.

8.3. The extent of public concern, the deregulation and opening up of (in most Member States) a hitherto secure market which has been conducive to long term capital intensive investments, plus the arrival of competitively priced natural gas used in smaller, more efficient and cheaper generation plants, are crucial factors which, on current information, make it highly unlikely that nuclear generation will be continued in most Member States when existing plants come to the end of their operating lives in the years after 2005-2010.

8.4. The prospect of such a development must raise serious strategic questions for EU energy policy. For, the loss of most of its nuclear generation would not only compromise the EU's ability to ensure satisfactory security of supply conditions in respect to the future import of fuel for electricity generation, it would also powerfully counteract the EU's efforts to reduce its CO2 emissions.

8.5. It is a serious omission that the Commission's document fails to bring out the importance of the above strategic issues, or to assess adequately their likely impact on the EU's energy policy. The Commission is called upon to address these issues specifically in its final version of the Illustrative Nuclear Programme, to reach clear conclusions, and to give guidance to the parties involved, as well as to the public, about the realities ahead.

8.6. Regarding the dangers which may arise from nuclear facilities in the CEEC and the FSU, there should not be any doubt as to the deeply damaging effect on public attitudes if there were to be another major nuclear accident. The Phare and Tacis programmes have been valuable, but they are coming under increasing criticism. Insofar as these programmes deal with nuclear safety, the Commission is urged to review them as a matter of urgency, and then to publish the results. The Commission's attention is drawn to the implications of Soviet designed reactors being brought within the boundaries of the EU when enlargement takes place.

8.7. The Commission is also asked to consider including attention to dangerous nuclear military installations within the scope of its activities.

It is proposed that action to alleviate concerns about nuclear safety in the east is added to the Commission's proposed set of principles.

8.8. Nuclear generation in the EU faces major challenges, not least to its future existence. Apart from the need to review its efficiency and its reactor designs, and vigilantly to sustain and improve its existing high standards of safety, the industry has to address the question of its overall acceptability to the public. Finding a way to satisfy the public about the transport, handling and disposal of radioactive waste is seen as the key issue. Public opinion does not accept the industry's concept of final disposal. It wants waste disposed of retrievably and observably, and the industry could not do anything better than to meet the public's wishes on this key matter. The Commission should assist Member States and the industry to achieve this end.

Brussels, 24 April 1997.

The President of the Economic and Social Committee

Tom JENKINS

() COM(95) 682 final of 13 December 1996.

() Referred to in subsequent text as the Commission's 'document`.

() On the subject of the IAEA's convention, the Committee noted in its opinion on the Energy Charter Treaty of 26 October 1995 (OJ No C 18, 22. 1. 1996, p. 146) that the convention does not cover the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (or the safeguards of nuclear material related to this), or the physical protection of nuclear material, or civil liability for nuclear damage on an international scale, or the safe transport of radioactive materials and waste. It had been the intention of the architects of the Energy Charter Treaty to provide legally binding rules covering those aspects of nuclear activity in the Charter itself, but when this turned out to be impracticable, the Committee urged that these additional aspects of nuclear safety should in time be incorporated in the IAEA's convention (see par. 2.2.5.5 of the opinion). The Committee looks to the Commission to give active support to this proposal.

() This is equivalent to approximately 14 % of the EU's total energy demand (see par. 104, on page 51, of the 1995 Commission Green Paper - For a European Union Energy Policy - COM(94) 659 final).

() Nuclear energy provides one third of the EU's electricity, but is produced in only eight of the fifteen Member States - viz. (in descending order of nuclear megawatt capacity: France, Germany, UK, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands). However, it is supplied to all Member States with high voltage interconnections with other Member States.

() 1 kg of firewood produces about 1 kWh of electricity, 1 kg of coal about 3 kWh, 1 kg of oil about 4 kWh, 1 kg of natural uranium about 50 000 kWh, and 1 kg of plutonium about 6 000 000 kWh - Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, speaking at the Second Philippine Nuclear Conference in Manila on 10 December 1996.

() II 3(b), p. 13, of the Commission's document. In 1995, energy related CO2 emissions in the EU totalled 2 950 million tonnes, of which solid fuels accounted for 874 million tonnes, oil for 1 455 million tonnes, and natural gas for 621 million tonnes. (from 'Energy in Europe: 1996 Annual Energy Review`, published by the Commission in September 1996). Slight discrepancies occur due to the rounding of the published figures to the nearest million tonnes.

() Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity - OJ No L 27, 30. 1. 1997, p. 20.

() This has not been so in Finland, where nuclear power plants have been built and operated in open markets. This has been facilitated by long term agreements between the two nuclear generating companies and process industries. The UK began to open up its electricity markets to competition in 1991 and the process is due to be completed in 1998.

() In the Directive referred to at footnote 5, p. 91, the share of the electricity market which will be opened up initially to competition will be that part of it in which individual consumers consume more than 40 Gigawatt hours of electricity (GWh) a year. Over a six year period the size of the competitive market will be increased so that all are embraced who consume 9 GWh or more. In due time, the possibility of a further opening of the market, to be effective nine years after the Directive entered into force, will be considered.

() See table 3 in the Annex of the Commission's document. Of course, renewable generating technologies are for the most part also highly capital intensive but, hydro power apart, these are not yet established as mainstream generating technologies.

() CCGT stands for Combined Cycle Gas Turbines. These have raised the efficiency (electricity produced per unit of heat) of gas generation to some 60 % compared with percentages in the higher 30s, which are still the norm with existing coal and nuclear generation.

() From 'Projected costs of Generating Electricity - update 1993 (p. 143)`, published by OECD Nuclear Energy Agency/International Energy Agency.

() Natural gas is available in either ample or reasonable quantities to Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, although the extent of its detailed distribution in each of these countries varies considerably. Some gas is available to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and Luxembourg. Greece, Portugal and Sweden are, so far, without gas.

() The situation has recently been summarized as follows: 'To build a 1 000 Mw nuclear power station would cost about £3 billion and take up to 80 months to construct. A gas-fired power station of similar size would cost about £400 million and take less than 24 months to build. Until there is a fundamental shift in prices, the case for nuclear power will not get a hearing` - Simon Holberton, Financial Times (London), 2.12.1996. It should be added, however, that the figure of £3 billion refers to the 'one-off` build of Sizewell B in the UK. While the point of Mr Holberton's comment remains just as valid, nuclear stations built in series in other countries would cost rather less, in some circumstances perhaps even half - see table 8 of 'Projected Costs of Generating Electricity`, 1992 update, published by the OECD.

() For gas to be available to a population there needs to be not only a basic source of sufficient supply but also a modern infrastructure for gas transmission, and in some Member States the investment necessary to create this has yet to be made.

() Laurent Stricker, Deputy Director of EDF's nuclear power plant operations, told a Paris Conference on long term management of EDF's nuclear plants that in the new energy landscape being sketched in Europe today an investor looking to build generating capacity would not choose a nuclear plant since it would not be able to compete with a combined cycle gas fired plant in the generation of baseload power. Mr Stricker made it clear however that this did not apply to existing nuclear plants. Existing plants would be able to compete because the real cost of its generation is composed of operating and fuel charges, and reserves for spent fuel management and reactor dismantling. - (Reported in 'nucleonics week`, 19. 12. 1996).

() In the UK, where liberalization and marketization were introduced in 1990/91, all new power station construction since then has been of the gas/CCGT type, and the coal industry has continued to decline. Nuclear power has held its own up to now, partly due to the capital costs of the older plants already having been written off. New nuclear project which, until recently, had been under consideration have been cancelled for the foreseeable future. In Energy Paper 65, 'Energy projections for the UK, 1995-2020`, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office in 1995, the possibility is projected of CCGT gas generation producing between 38 % and 55 % of the UK's electricity by 2020, depending on which of a number of possible scenarios turns out to be the most realistic.

() Cf. also the Commission's statement at par. 4.2 of its Green Paper 'Energy for the Future: renewable Sources of Energy` (COM(96) 576 final published on 11 November 1996), published shortly after the Draft illustrative Nuclear Programme. Observing that 'renewable sources of energy ... can make a strong contribution to improving security of supply` the Commission continues:

'Moreover, it is important to look beyond the energy needs of the Community. All forecasts show that the energy requirements of the developing world will significantly increase in the future, in particular in Asia. This could obviously affect global energy markets and supply constraints and price increases cannot be ruled out; Renewable energy can cut back some of the requirements for imported fuels`.

() Par. 81 of the Commission White Paper 'An Energy Policy for the European Union` (see footnote 1, p. 88).

() The phrase 'Security of supply` is used in this document in its strategic sense, i.e. in relation to external dependence on energy sources and the degree to which these can be relied upon.

() Ibid. - Par. 78.

() See Annex. Elsewhere, at page 80 of the report, EE 2020 comments that: 'The growing role of natural gas has particular geo-political implications. Increasingly it will be imported natural gas which will meet Europe's needs. The studies point to the need to transport this gas from ever greater distances from the European market, requiring the goodwill of increasing number of transit countries en route.`

() See section V2 of the Commission's document.

() COM(96) 576 final.

() Ibid. - Executive summary, p. 4.

() Ibid - Par. 6.1. on page 31. There is however, an apparent discrepancy between the Commission's green paper figure of 386 million tonnes of CO2 free emissions from 6 % of gross primary energy consumption (g.p.e.c.) contributed by renewables, and the figure of 700 million tonnes of CO2 free emissions used by the Commission in its Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme as being derived from nuclear generation's 14 % contribution to g.p.e.c. Assuming that the figure of 700 million tonnes for nuclear energy is correct, then the contribution of 6 % of CO2 free renewables to g.p.e.c. is 300, not 386, million tonnes. The smaller figure is used as the basis for the comments in 5.3.4.

() Ibid. - section 3 on page 19.

() 'The availability of many of these (renewable) sources is perhaps 2000 hours per year, or 25 % of time` - from EE 2020, par. 2.2.3. of Part 3 on page 82.

() The closure of 30 % of present nuclear capacity would reduce CO2 savings by approximately 210 million tonnes a year. On the conservative assumption that it is replaced by CCGT gas fired generation, which produces the least CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, this would produce an addition to CO2 emissions of approximately 95 million tonnes a year. This latter figure is based on advice to the rapporteur by Fells Associates (Consultants in Energy and Environment Policy) that if the entire nuclear generation capacity of the EU were replaced by CCGT gas fired capacity with a typical efficiency of 52 %, the CO2 impact would be an addition of approximately 323 million tonnes a year.

() Under the terms of Article 130s, par. 2, of the Treaty, (....), 'the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt (....) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.`

() In its recently published Green Paper - see footnote 3, p. 93.

APPENDIX I

Extracts from 'European Energy to 2020 - A scenario approach` ()

1. 'Europe Energy to 2020` (EE 2020) reviews a range of possibilities as to Europe's need for different fuels over the next twenty-three years, and where they will come from. The paragraphs below summarize the main findings of EE 2020 which relate to the EU's electricity requirements.

2. EE 2020 takes the view that the EU's indigenous energy production, other than renewables, will decline 'by perhaps one-fifth by 2020`. 'Inevitably`, energy import dependency will rise. Currently of the order of 48 % of gross consumption, it 'could range from perhaps 53 % to 69 % by 2020`.

3. 'Amongst the fuels, dependence on imported natural gas increases the most .... Imports currently account for 40 % of consumption and this figure could reach 75 % by 2020. Incremental supplies will come substantially from the former Soviet Union and North Africa, although by 2020 it is possible that additional supplies may be available from Nigeria, Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East, either by pipeline or in the form of LNG`. A substantial volume of supplies will continue to come from within Europe (i.e. the North Sea and the Netherlands), including Norway.

4. Commenting specifically on gas as a fuel for electricity generation, the Commission's report states that 'increasingly generated by gas, electricity demand continues to grow` and that 'gas-fired combined cycle plant is forecast to rise to over 30 % of thermal capacity`. In one of its four scenarios it would increase to 50 %.

5. On the related matter of the future of coal (which, like nuclear energy, also generates a third of the EU's electricity) EU 2020 states that dependency on coal imports 'will also increase rapidly as a result of plummeting domestic production. From 29 % in 1990, dependency is already 37 % today and is anticipated to reach nearer 80 % by 2020`.

() Published by the European Commission in Spring 1996 and available in English only. Text in the above, other than that in quotation marks, is by the Rapporteur. The quotations are taken from the text of EE 2020 between pages 10 and 23.

APPENDIX II to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure)

The following proposals for amendments were defeated in the course of the debate:

Proposals for amendments tabled by Mr Zöhrer

Point 3.1

Amend the second sentence as follows:

'As the Commission itself points out, nuclear energy is a highly controversial subject in the Union, although nuclear generation produces a significant part, around one third, of the EU's electricity. But for several years the Commission has had little to say, either about its potential or its problems.`

Reason

This wording expresses the range of the discussion, rather than focusing on one aspect (the CO2 problem).

Result of the vote

For: 18, against: 62, abstentions: 6.

Point 4.2

Delete the first sentence.

Reason

The Commission does not express such a doubt. It merely states that certain developments cannot yet be forecast beyond 2000 and that quantitative production and investment targets cannot thus be established.

Result of the vote

For: 16, against: 65, abstentions: 6.

Point 4.10

Delete the final sentence.

Reason

This sweeping statement is not true. There are no empirical data to support it.

Result of the vote

For: 24, against: 62, abstentions: 4.

Point 5.2.1

Reword the first two sentences as follows:

'The possibility of growing dependency on imported fuels for its generation of electricity could for the EU as a whole lead to problems of long-term security of supply, although the potential problem varies in degree from one Member State to another.`

Reason

Supply problems will not necessarily arise.

Result of the vote

For: 20, against: 75, abstentions: 10.

Point 5.2.5

Reword as follows:

'The issue of security of supply is thus relevant to the consideration of the Commission's Draft Illustrative Nuclear Programme. Above all in those Member States which obtain a high proportion of their electricity from nuclear generation, nuclear power will function as a strategic stabilizing factor, and it is unlikely to be replaced in this role in the foreseeable future.`

Reason

The decision whether to use nuclear energy is left to the Member States. The individual Member States are pursuing different energy-policy strategies, so that it is impossible to make general statements as to (future) security of supply.

Result of the vote

For: 21, against: 82, abstentions: 6.

Point 5.2.6

Delete.

Reason

See reason for amendment to point 5.2.5.

Result of the vote

For: 25, against: 80, abstentions: 7.

Point 5.3.1

Replace the second sentence with the following:

'Efforts to achieve energy savings and to use renewable energy sources should therefore be stepped up. The low CO2 emissions from nuclear generation are one of the reasons why some Member States favour nuclear energy, or are not abandoning it as quickly as planned. A sudden switch from nuclear technology to fossil fuels (which are at present the only alternative) would have serious consequences in this respect.`

Reason

Self-explanatory.

Result of the vote

For: 25, against: 73, abstentions: 10.

Points 5.4.3 to 5.4.5

Delete.

Reason

As the Commission has to respect the decisions of the individual Member States on the use of nuclear energy, it is right to avoid confronting these issues.

Result of the vote

For: 21, against: 82, abstentions: 4.

Point 7.1

Add the following sentence:

'The Committee would however reiterate the principle that the decision on the peaceful use of nuclear energy is to remain a matter for the Member States.`

Reason

Self-explanatory.

Result of the vote

For: 25, against: 67, abstentions: 12.

Point 7.2

Add the following sentence:

'Where options such as these are considered, it is essential to include other capital-intensive investments in power station capacity (for example, hydroelectric power plants). To facilitate this, objective criteria must be drawn up without reference to any specific technology.`

Reason

No one type of energy should be given preferential treatment.

Result of the vote

For: 23, against: 86, abstentions: 7.

Proposal for amendment tabled by Mr Malosse, Mrs Sirkeinen and Mr Gauder

Point 8.3, 4th line

To read as follows:

'smaller, more efficient and cheaper generation plants, are crucial factors which, according to the information currently available and unless subsequent developments change this view, make it highly unlikely that nuclear generation will ....`

Reason

Self-explanatory

Result of the vote

For: 36, against: 51, abstentions: 22.