Special Report EU pre-accession assistance 
for strengthening 
administrative capacity 
in the Western Balkans: 
A meta-auditEN 2016  NO 21
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EU pre-accession assistance 
for strengthening 
administrative capacity 
in the Western Balkans: 
A meta-audit
(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)Special ReportEN 2016  NO 21
02
 Audit team
The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its performance and compliance audits of specific budgetary areas or 
management topics. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks 
to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and 
public interest.
This performance audit was produced by Chamber III — headed by ECA Member Karel Pinxten — which is responsible 
for external action, security and justice. The audit was led by ECA Member Istvan Szabolcs Fazakas, supported by Márton 
Baranyi, Attaché of his private office, Francis Joret and Sabine Hiernaux-Fritsch, Support and Quality Control; Dennis  
Wernerus, Head of Task; Nicola Berloco, Balazs Kaszap, Alina Milasiute, Thomas Haellstroem and Nikolaos Zompolas, 
Auditors.
From left to right : A. Milasiute, N. Berloco, I. S. Fazakas, M. Baranyi, D. Wernerus, T. Haellstroem.

03
 Contents
Paragraph
 Abbreviations and acronyms
I-XII  Executive summary
1-9 Introduction
10-14  Audit scope and approach
15-64  Observations
15-40  Part I — Did the Commission manage well the IPA in the Western Balkans?
16-19  During IPA I, objectives were not always specific and measurable
20-23  Programmes and projects were based on needs, but some beneficiary assessments showed  
considerable shortcomings
24-26  Absorption process of IPA funding was sometimes hampered by weak administrative capacity
27-29  The Commission did not systematically apply strict conditions
30-37  The Commission was generally effective in monitoring implementation and partly effective in  
following up evaluations
38-40  Despite considerable beneficiary shortcomings, the Commission supported donor  
coordination effectively
41-64  Part II — Did the IPA strengthen administrative capacity in the Western Balkans?
42 The Commission effectively delivered the intended outputs
43-58  IPA for the rule of law and public administration reform was partly sustainable
59-64  The political dialogue addressed administrative capacity
04 Contents 
65-75  Conclusions and recommendations
 Annex I — Key events for understanding EU–Western Balkan relations
 Annex II — Audit sample of IPA I national projects
 Annex III — Audit sample of IPA I regional programmes
 Reply of the Commission
05
 Abbreviations 
and  acronyms
BIRN : Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
ECA : European Court of Auditors
EEAS : European External Action Service
ICJ: International Court of Justice
IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (I: 2007-2013, II: 2014-2020)
MIPD : Multi-annual indicative planning document
RCC : Regional Cooperation Council
ReSPA : Regional School of Public Administration
ROM : Results-oriented monitoring
SAA : Stabilisation and association agreement
SIGMA : Support for improvement in governance and management
UNSCR : United Nations Security Council Resolution
WBIF : Western Balkans Investment Framework
06
 Executive  
summary
I
From 2007 until 2014, EU financial assistance to the Western Balkans through the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) amounted to 5.1 billion euros. It was allocated in the context of national and regional programmes. 
Roughly a quarter of national programme funding went towards strengthening administrative capacity in the key 
sectors of the rule of law and public administration reform. In addition to this, the political dialogue contributed 
towards strengthening administrative capacity in the six Western Balkan countries, the legal and financial benefi -
ciaries of the IPA.
II
We assessed whether the Commission’s management of the IPA in the Western Balkans was effective and whether 
it actually did strengthen administrative capacity in the region. We mainly covered the 2007-2013 programming 
period, but also took developments under the new programming period (2014-2020) into account.
III
A particular feature of this meta-audit was that we mainly assessed data from our previous special reports and Com -
mission evaluations. We assessed the entire IPA programming process (Part I) and examined 52 national projects 
and three regional programmes (Part II).
IV
We concluded that the EU pre-accession assistance was broadly effective and that IPA I partly strengthened admin -
istrative capacity in the region, despite considerable shortcomings inherent to the national authorities in the West -
ern Balkans.
V
With regard to the Commission’s management, IPA I objectives were not always specific and measurable. Pro -
grammes and projects were based on needs but some beneficiaries’ assessments in the rule of law sector showed 
considerable shortcomings. The absorption of IPA I funding was hampered by weak administrative capacity in some 
countries and, in the case of decentralised implementation, strict requirements linked to the management of EU 
funds.
VI
Under IPA I, the Commission did not systematically apply strict conditions and follow up on them. Despite some 
shortcomings in the reporting for its results-oriented monitoring, the Commission was effective in monitoring 
the implementation of IPA projects. It was also partly effective in following up on the conclusions and recommen -
dations of IPA evaluations. Finally, despite considerable beneficiary shortcomings, it was able to support donor 
coordination.
Executive summary 07
VII
With regard to administrative capacity in the Western Balkans, the IPA generally delivered the outputs that were 
contractually planned and its support for the rule of law and public administration reform was partly sustainable.
VIII
In the case of rule of law projects, the Commission did not apply conditionality sufficiently and relatively little 
IPA I funding was provided in key areas of the rule of law, such as media freedom, public prosecution and the fight 
against corruption and organised crime. The beneficiaries’ lack of political will to reform institutions, insufficient 
budget and staffing, as well as poor coordination also affected project sustainability.
IX
In the area of public administration reform, the Commission managed to convert many project outputs into sustain -
able results. Whilst not an explicit IPA objective, it could have encouraged beneficiaries more to use IPA as a learn -
ing tool in the rest of their public administration.
X
Enhancing regional cooperation and strengthening administrative capacity in the region as a whole is of high 
importance and has been encouraged by the Commission, notably through the Western Balkans Investment Frame -
work. However, during the period audited, the Regional Cooperation Council did not have a significant impact 
on the ground. For the Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA), it was too early to establish whether it 
improved administrative capacity in the Western Balkans.
XI
The political dialogue in the Western Balkans had a limited impact on the rule of law in a number of cases. It did 
achieve some progress with regard to public administration reform.
XII
The report sets out a number of measurable concrete recommendations both to improve the setting of objectives 
and the design and implementation of IPA projects in the Western Balkans and encourage greater commitment by 
the six Western Balkans national authorities towards strengthening their administrative capacity.
08
 Introduction
01 
Since the accession of Croatia in 2013, the EU Western Balkan enlargement policy 
has dealt with six countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (see Figure  1).* This designation is without 
prejudice to positions on 
status, and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence.
Political map of the Western Balkans
Source:  European Commission.Figure 1
*This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and
the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 

09 Introduction 
02 
After an economic and political crisis in the 1980s and the rise of nationalism, 
Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s along its republics’ borders, at first into five 
countries, leading in several of these to armed conflict. Later on Montenegro 
(2006) and Kosovo (2008) also declared independence. As for Albania, it was 
a completely isolated communist dictatorship until 1991 and had to build its 
public administration from scratch. Although these six European countries have 
historically been affected by serious ethnic, political and economic conflicts, they 
all aspire to join the EU, where they have a unity of purpose. Indeed, all the six 
Western Balkan countries are candidates  or potential candidates  for joining 
the EU (see Table  1 and Box  1).Table  1 Box 1Status of the Western Balkan countries in view of EU accession
Candidate status  
(since year)Status accession negotiations
Albania 2014 No negotiations
Bosnia and Herzegovina Potential candidate No negotiations
Kosovo Potential candidate No negotiations
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2005 No negotiations
Montenegro 2010 22 chapters opened, two closed
Serbia 2012 Two chapters opened
Source:  European Commission.
Joining the EU
Existing EU principles, policies, laws, practices, obligations and objectives are often referred to in the EU 
institutions as the acquis.  At the heart of accession negotiations, the acquis  consists of 35 different accession 
chapters to be negotiated between the EU and each candidate country. For instance, chapter number 23 cov -
ers judiciary and fundamental rights and chapter number 24 covers justice, freedom and security.
The Intergovernmental Conferences are the bodies that take decisions on opening and provisionally closing 
chapters, in line with a negotiating framework agreed by the Council. From 2012 and 2014, respectively, Mon -
tenegro and Serbia began to meet in these Conferences. There was no decision by the Council on the setting-
up of an accession negotiation framework for Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, so no 
Intergovernmental Conferences started with them.  As potential candidate countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo were not eligible to start accession negotiations.
10 Introduction 
03 
The EU’s aim of incorporating these countries in the EU has been at the core of 
EU–Western Balkan relations since 2000 (see Annex I ). Since 2007, the Commis -
sion has provided them with financial assistance through the Instrument for  
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)1, as shown for IPA I in Figure  2.
04 
Within each IPA programme, the EU supported various sectors, such as the rule 
of law2, public administration reform, the environment, transport, rural develop -
ment and social development. It also supported cross-border and multi-benefi -
ciary programmes for the six Western Balkan countries, as a region.1 Council Regulation (EC) No 
1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 
establishing an Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA I) (OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, 
p. 82) and Regulation (EU) 
No 231/2014 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 
11 March 2014 establishing an 
Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA II) (OJ L 77, 
15.3.2014, p. 11).
2 Fundamental rights, justice 
and home affairs, including 
the fight against corruption 
and organised crime.
IPA I allocations to the Western Balkans (2007-2013)
Note : Percentages rounded up.
Source:  European Commission, 31 December 2015.Figure  2
0 1 000 2 00027 % 1 385
1 150
636615
572529
236Serbia
Multi-beneﬁciary programmes
Kosovo
the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Albania
MontenegroAllocations in million euros23 %
12 %12 %11 %
10 %
5 %
11 Introduction 
05 
IPA support for the rule of law in the beneficiary countries was designed to bring 
a wide range of sensitive state bodies, such as ministries, agencies, police forces 
and the judiciary, closer to the EU’s fundamental rights and the acquis . The IPA 
also contributed towards ensuring that better national legislation was drafted 
and adopted.
06 
IPA support for public administration reform, including public finance manage -
ment, also addressed sensitive areas like merit-based recruitment and quality 
training in the public administration and the full budget cycle, including tax col -
lection, budgeting, procurement, public internal financial control, external audit 
and statistics.
07 
In addition to this, the Commission supported, through the design of regional 
programmes, the activities of regional organisations such as the Regional Coop -
eration Council (RCC), the Regional School for Public Administration (ResPA), as 
well as interventions through the Western Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF). 
Although it was not the WBIF’s main objective to strengthen administrative ca -
pacity in the Western Balkans, it did contribute towards it.
08 
The Commission’s annual progress reports evaluate the candidate and potential 
candidates’ progress towards EU accession. In particular, with regard to the West -
ern Balkans, these reports mentioned the prevalence of corruption and organised 
crime and weaknesses with respect to the independence of the judiciary system3. 
The Commission monitors the situation in each country through monitoring and 
expert visits and political dialogue meetings.
09 
The ‘Political Guidelines for the next European Commission’ stated that no coun -
try will join the EU before 20204. However, with this new timeframe and given 
that the Western Balkan countries are already strategically important partners, 
the Commission has the opportunity to achieve long-term strategic objectives 
and prepare for future EU accession, not only as individual countries, but also as 
a region, in the framework of a harmonised process and a coordinated regional 
approach5.3 See progress reports on 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, 2012-2015.
4 Opening statement by 
candidate President Juncker in 
the European Parliament 
opening session, 15 July 2014, 
paragraph 9.
5 See Council conclusions on 
the enlargement and 
stabilisation and association 
process, 15356/15, 
15 December 2015.
12
 Audit scope  
and approach
10 
Considering the findings of previous special reports, our objective was to as -
sess whether the Commission contributed towards strengthening administrative 
capacity in the Western Balkan region through the IPA programme. We addressed 
two main questions:
(a) Did the Commission manage well the IPA in the Western Balkans?
(b) Did the IPA strengthen administrative capacity in the Western Balkans?
11 
Our scope was the 2007-2013 period (IPA I), but we also took into account the first 
stages of the 2014-2020 period (IPA II). We focused on two sectors relevant to the 
strengthening of administrative capacity in the Western Balkans:
(a) rule of law (fundamental rights, justice and home affairs), with a particular 
emphasis on the fight against corruption and organised crime; and
(b) public administration reform, including public finance management.
12 
As shown in Table  2, out of 902 million euros of rule of law and public adminis -
tration reform projects, we examined 52 projects for a total of 109 million euros 
contracted (12 %)6. Out of a total of 1.16 billion euros in regional programmes, we 
examined three of them for a total of 330 million euros contracted (28 %)7.6 Annex II  contains the full list of 
these audited projects.
7 Annex  III lists these 
programmes.Table  2IPA (2007-2013) to the Western Balkans for administrative capacity
IPA programmes for administrative capacity in  
the western Balkan countriesContracted amountsPercentage  
auditedNumber of projects/  
 programmes 
audited Total Audited
National programmes, rule of law projects 485 60 12 % 29
National programmes, public administration reform projects 417 49 12 % 23
TOTAL 902 109 12 % 52
Regional programmes 1 160 330 28 % 3
GRAND TOTAL 2 062 439 21 %
Note:  Amounts in million euros; percentages rounded up.
Source : ECA based on European Commission data, 30 June 2015.
13 Audit scope and approach  
13 
An important part of our work was assessing what EU programmes and projects 
had achieved in terms of results as defined in the regulation laying down com -
mon rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for 
financing external action8.
14 
As part of our meta-audit approach, we firstly reviewed a series of ECA special re -
ports and the Commission’s evaluation reports relating to the Western Balkan re -
gion (see Table  3). Taking into account the audit scope of the meta-audit and the 
reports reviewed, we then identified audit gaps, which led to substantial addi -
tional audit work performed between March and December 2015. This additional 
audit work included a desk review of Commission progress, monitoring, expert 
and meeting reports and interviews of staff from the Commission, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), EU delegations, relevant national authorities in 
the Western Balkans and the RCC.8 Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 laying down common 
rules and procedures for the 
implementation of the Union’s 
instruments for financing 
external action, 12 th recital in 
the preamble and Article 12 
(OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 95).Table  3Previous audit and evaluation reports used
Sources Document referencesECA SPECIAL REPORTS20/2016 Strengthening administrative capacity in Montenegro: progress but better results needed in many key areas
11/2016 Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: limited progress in a difficult context
19/2014 EU Pre-accession assistance to Serbia
18/2014 EuropeAid’s evaluation and results-oriented monitoring systems
18/2012 European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law
14/2011 Has EU assistance improved Croatia’s capacity to manage post-accession funding?
12/2009 The effectiveness of the Commission’s projects in the area of Justice and Home Affairs for the Western Balkans
5/2007 The Commission’s management of the CARDS programmeEVALUATIONSIPA support for the fight against corruption, August 2015
The principles of public administration, SIGMA baseline measurements (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), April 2015
Meta-evaluation of IPA assistance, September 2013
IPA — Interim evaluation and meta-evaluation of IPA assistance, evaluation of multi-beneficiary programmes, June 2013
Rule of law, judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime in the Western Balkans, February 2013
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
14
 Observations
Part I — Did the Commission manage well the IPA in 
the Western Balkans?
15 
We assessed the Commission’s management of the IPA throughout the instru -
ment’s programming cycle and on the basis of the following audit criteria:
(a) Did the IPA have specific and measurable objectives?
(b) Were programmes and projects based on clear needs?
(c) Was assistance actually paid out (absorption)?
(d) Were strict conditions for assistance applied (conditionality)?
(e) Was implementation monitored and were results evaluated effectively?
(f) Was donor assistance coordinated effectively?
During IPA I, objectives were not always specific and 
measurable
16 
The EU’s Financial Regulation stipulates that specific and measurable objec -
tives must be set for all sectors of activities covered by the budget9. The IPA 
regulations10 and the Commission’s multi-annual indicative planning documents 
(MIPDs) all addressed the importance of the rule of law and public administration 
reform in the Western Balkans.
National programmes often had broad objectives
17 
During IPA I, objectives were so broad in scope that they were often not specific 
and measurable through specific targets11. However, in the case of Montenegro 
and Serbia, whose accession negotiations started in 2012 and 2014 respectively, 
the Commission defined clear and measurable rule of law objectives which, if not 
met, could block enlargement negotiations12.9 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 
No 966/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 October 2012 on the 
financial rules applicable to 
the general budget of the 
Union and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 
26.10.2012, p. 1).
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 
1085/2006 as implemented by 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 
and Regulation (EU) No 
231/2014 as implemented by 
Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 447/2014 
of 2 May 2014.
11 ECA analysis of the European 
partnership agreements, 
SAAs, DG Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations, 
Annual Activity Reports (2013, 
2014). The meta-evaluation of 
IPA assistance 
(September 2013, p. 20) 
mentioned broad objectives 
that ‘did not often contain 
sufficiently measurable 
targets’.
12 Management Plan 2015, 
DG Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations, 
p. 4 and 18; COM(2012) 600 
final of 10 October 2012 
‘Enlargement strategy and 
main challenges 2012-2013’, 
p. 4.
15 Observations 
18 
Moreover, since 2010, the Commission has moved from supporting mostly indi -
vidual projects to a clearer and more measurable sector-based approach13, under 
which programmes and projects clearly fit into sector-based strategies. The Com -
mission planned to fully apply the sector-based approach during the implemen -
tation of IPA II14.
Regional programmes generally had specific and measurable 
objectives
19 
The objectives of the regional programmes that we examined were generally 
specific and included measurable targets. Given the history of conflict among 
the western Balkan countries, regional programmes generally had an explicit 
regional integration objective that matched the IPA’s objectives of supporting 
post-conflict reconciliation, confidence-building and reconstruction15 (see Box  2).
Programmes and projects were based on needs, but some 
beneficiary assessments showed considerable shortcomings
20 
During the programming of IPA I, the Commission drafted planning documents 
(MIPDs), which identified key sectors for IPA support. The national authorities 
produced their own needs assessments, under either their own initiative or en -
couragement from the Commission.13 COM(2011) 666 final of 
12 October 2011 ‘Enlargement 
strategy and main challenges 
2011-2012’, p. 20.
14 Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA II), multi-
country indicative strategy 
paper (30 June 2015) and the 
indicative strategy papers for 
Albania and Montenegro 
(18 August 2014), the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Serbia 
(19 August 2014), Kosovo 
(20 August 2014) and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
(15 December 2014).
15 13 th recital in the preamble 
and Article 2(g) to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006.Box 2The Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF)
The WBIF clearly aimed at providing finance and technical assistance for strategic investments and its objec -
tives were measurable through clear indicators (e.g. number of project applications, technical assistance paid, 
financing granted)16.
16 https://www.wbif.eu
16 Observations 
Needs assessments at Commission level
21 
The MIPDs were usually based on the priorities identified in the progress reports 
and accession partnerships. They were not based on assessments of the benefi -
ciary countries’ baseline for assessing administrative capacity in different sectors 
(e.g. the rule of law) nor did they consider the countries’ actual political will for 
reform. At project level, the examined projects were clearly based on needs iden -
tified by the Commission and agreed with the beneficiary countries.
22 
During the programming of IPA II, at country level, indicative strategy papers 
(2014-2020) replaced the IPA I planning documents. They paid more attention to 
the beneficiaries’ capacity to commit to sector reform at political level and man -
age IPA funding.
Needs assessments at beneficiary level
23 
Whereas all the western Balkan countries had a comprehensive national strategy 
with a needs assessment addressing the public administration reform sector, this 
was not the case for the rule of law in Albania and Kosovo. In Bosnia and Herze -
govina, the justice reform strategy was adopted very late (see Box  3).Box 3The 2014-2018 justice reform strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The adoption of this strategy was part of the EU policy dialogue with the national authorities, notably through 
a structured dialogue on justice. The justice reform strategy was only adopted in 2015, as it was delayed 
by political divergences among the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, Republika Srpska 
(see  Figure 3 ) systematically challenged the needs assessed by the Commission under IPA. This undermined 
the relevance of national needs assessments, particularly in the case of projects which aimed to foster coordi -
nation between anti-corruption activities, police bodies and local public authorities.
17 Observations 
Political map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source : Eurostat.Figure 3



Sarajevo
PodgoricaRepublika SrpskaRepublika Srpska
Federation of Bosnia and HerzegovinaBrčkoCroatia
Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Montenegro
Albania
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics, GADM (Bosnian Inter-entity boundary line
Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 01/2016Brčko District
Banja Luka
0 25 50 75 100 km  Adriatic Sea
Inter-entity boundary line
18 Observations 
Absorption process of IPA funding was sometimes hampered 
by weak administrative capacity
24 
In some western Balkan countries, it was difficult to make payments on con -
tracted amounts under IPA I (see Figure  4), mainly due to weak administrative 
capacities.
Absorption as a percentage of allocations still to be contracted and as a percentage 
of contracted amounts still to be paid, IPA I (2007-2013)
Source : ECA calculation based on Commission data, 31 December 2015.Figure  4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
Albania
Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo
Montenegro%
Allocated and still to be contracted
Contracted and still to be paid
19 Observations 
25 
Based on an examination of different IPA operating structures in the Western Bal -
kans, this can partly be explained by the fact that the Commission decentralised 
significant parts of IPA management to the national authorities17. As we observed 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia (see Box  4) as well as 
in Albania, this required a learning period and a more demanding management 
structure18.17 As of 1 January 2014, the term 
‘decentralised management’ 
has been replaced by ‘indirect 
management by third 
countries’.
18 Among other requirements, 
decentralised management 
implied the accreditation of 
a national authorising officer, 
the establishment of an IPA 
operating structure and an 
audit authority, as well as 
ex ante  control by the EU 
Delegation on all 
decentralised IPA projects. 
See Articles 11 to 31 of 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 
implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 
establishing an instrument for 
pre-accession assistance (IPA) 
(OJ L 170, 29.6.2007, p. 1).Box 4Experience with decentralising management under IPA I
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The Commission decentralised management in compliance with the Financial Regulation19 and the IPA I regu -
lations, but these regulations did not require it to assess whether the national authorities were ready to man -
age the volume and complexity of the funds to be decentralised20. Following decentralisation, the national 
administration struggled to keep deadlines and present contracting documents of adequate quality. In many 
cases, this resulted in the loss of projects designed to fund key reforms, and further losses are expected21.
Serbia
The establishment of an audit authority and the operational body for managing IPA projects was affected by 
longstanding and serious weaknesses identified by the Commission’s own audits. Decentralised management 
was not linked to a preliminary comprehensive assessment of public finance management at country level22, 
but was solely based on the compliance of Serbia’s IPA structures with the internal control requirements set 
out in the Financial Regulation23.
19 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1), as amended from time to time.
20 ECA Special Report 11/2016 ‘Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: limited progress in a difficult 
context’, paragraph 47 ( http://eca.europa.eu ).
21 Ibid., paragraphs 48 and 50.
22 ECA Special Report 19/2014 ‘EU Pre-accession Assistance to Serbia’, paragraph 79 ( http://eca.europa.eu ).
23 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the 
general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.
20 Observations 
26 
Under IPA II (2014-2020), more focus is being put on improving the countries’ 
public financial management systems as a whole. However, IPA II programmes 
were only adopted at the very end of 2014, due to delays in the new IPA legisla -
tive framework and procedures. Contracting and payments were further delayed 
by the beneficiary countries’ ratification procedures. As a result, it was too early 
at the time of the audit to comment on contracted and paid amounts under 
IPA II.
The Commission did not systematically apply strict 
conditions
27 
The Commission’s successive enlargement strategies repeatedly referred to ‘strict 
conditionality’24 but without defining the term specifically. Conditionality is the 
principle of setting certain conditions prior to contracting or payment, whether 
at political, programme or project level. If a beneficiary does not meet these pre-
defined conditions, the Commission can take action such as suspending payment 
for an entire programme, reducing future assistance or cancelling a project.
28 
At programme level, the Commission only applied strict conditions in very few 
cases, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Box  5) and in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia25.24 According to the 
Commission’s enlargement 
strate gy 2011-12,  
‘commitment, conditionality 
and credibility have been 
situated at the core of the 
accession process and its 
success’ (p. 2) and 
conditionality would be 
rigorous, demanding and 
strict (p. 18 and 23). Its 
enlargement strategy 2012-13, 
referred to strict conditionality 
(p. 2, 3, 16 and 22), as well as its 
enlargement strategy 2014 
(p. 2 and 19) and its 
enlargement strategy 2015 
(p. 12).
25 A suspension of payments, as 
envisaged under Article 46, 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 718/20 07.Box 5Strict conditionality at programme level, Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In 2013, the EU integration process in Bosnia and Herzegovina came to a halt. The country’s political repre -
sentatives appeared unable or unwilling to reach the consensus necessary to move forward on the pre-acces -
sion path. This was exemplified by the country’s inability or lack of political will to enforce a European Court of 
Human Rights judgment26. This led the Commission to apply conditionality by reducing the 2013 IPA I alloca -
tion by 45 million euros and imposing further reductions of allocations under IPA II27. When Bosnia and Herze -
govina failed to adopt a new overall justice sector reform strategy endorsed by all four constitutional entities, 
including the Republika Srpska (see map in Figure  3), the Commission suspended ongoing budget support in 
the field of justice.
26 In Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina  (December 2009), the European Court of Human Rights found that Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
violated the plaintiffs’ right to be elected just because they belonged to ethnic minorities.
27 From 2014 until 2017, 165 million euros were allocated to that country, as compared to 331 million euros from 2007 until 2010.
21 Observations 
29 
At project level, the Commission did not systematically apply strict conditions, 
as shown by the examples given in Box  6. Although in 2011 ECA had recom -
mended paying greater attention to ensuring that project proposals in the other 
pre-accession countries were sufficiently mature for implementation28, it was not 
always ensured by the Commission. This affected project performance in several 
countries29.28 ECA Special Report 14/2011 
‘Has EU Assistance improved 
Croatia’s capacity to manage 
post-accession funding?’, 
paragraph 53  
(http://eca.europa.eu ).
29 See the evaluation on the rule 
of law, judicial reform and the 
fight against corruption and 
organised crime in the 
Western Balkans, 
February 2013, p. 240.Box 6Strict conditionality not applied during IPA I
Albania
For seven out of the 15 projects audited, the Commission did not set strict conditions at the contracting 
stage30 and prior to effecting payments. This was not only the case for projects featuring complex objectives 
(such as strengthening anti-corruption measures), but also those aiming at relatively straightforward results, 
like the Tirana Justice Palace project (see Annex II , project 10). For this project, the necessary permits were 
not in place and alleged land ownership irregularities caused further difficulties. After negotiating with the 
Ministry of Justice for 4.5 years, the Commission cancelled the project and reallocated part of the funding to 
measures that were not related to the rule of law sector.
Serbia
The Commission paid inadequate attention to conditionality, sequencing in project design and legal incon -
sistencies. This often threatened the smooth and timely implementation of the projects31. After 2012, project 
proposals were sometimes postponed or downscaled due to missing permits or a failure to submit required 
feasibility studies.
30 See Annex II , Albanian rule of law projects No 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 and public finance management project No 2.
31 Special Report 19/2014 ‘EU Pre-accession Assistance to Serbia’, Box 5 and paragraphs 27 and 31 ( http://eca.europa.eu ).
22 Observations 
The Commission was generally effective in monitoring 
implementation and partly effective in following up 
evaluations
30 
The Commission monitored sector reforms and project implementation both 
directly and through the six EU delegations in the Western Balkans. The highest 
level of monitoring took place at the twice-yearly joint monitoring committee 
meetings and, more regularly, at the sectoral monitoring committees. EU delega -
tions also monitored implementation on the spot.
31 
The Commission conducted sector and thematic evaluations as part of its evalu -
ation cycle. These should not be confused with the annual progress reports on 
candidate and potential candidate countries, which are the Commission’s official 
political assessments of these countries.
Generally, the Commission was effective in monitoring 
implementation
32 
Across sectors, the EU delegations monitored IPA projects effectively through:
(a) legality and regularity checks based on management and information 
systems;
(b) coordination meetings involving contractors and beneficiary administrations, 
including site visits;
(c) the annual Authorising Officer by Sub-Delegation (AOSD) reports;
(d) joint monitoring committee and sectoral monitoring committee meetings;
(e) for riskier projects, internal quarterly monitoring tables.
33 
The Commission monitored the implementation of the IPA and the delivery of 
outputs effectively32. In addition to the above monitoring tools, the results-ori -
ented monitoring (ROM) reports followed a standard Commission methodology 
and mostly tracked the results of ongoing projects. However, the ROM approach 
showed three important shortcomings.32 The audit team gathered 
evidence in this respect from 
the EU delegations in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia.
23 Observations 
34 
Firstly, as a considerable number of the IPA projects that we assessed involved 
contracts with a value of less than 1 million euros, they were below the threshold 
for ROM reports. As a result, not all politically sensitive projects were subject to 
results-oriented monitoring. Secondly, none of the assessed reports measured 
compliance with conditionality. Thirdly, the absence of ex post  project monitor -
ing33 meant that project sustainability could not be measured.
The Commission was partly effective in following up evaluations
35 
With regard to the rule of law, the Commission conducted a comprehensive 
cross-sector evaluation of the IPA in the Western Balkans, as well as two thematic 
evaluations of IPA projects regarding the rule of law and the fight against cor -
ruption respectively34. In close cooperation with the Council of Europe and the 
Venice Commission35, the Commission sponsored a large number of expert visit 
reports on the judiciary, which pointed out, for example, that there was no track 
record for successful criminal convictions yet.
36 
In spite of this, the Commission did not take advantage of its own evaluations or 
expert visit reports to make greater use of conditionality. It did not adjust ROM 
report indicators for rule of law projects, which tended to focus on the output 
indicators for ongoing projects. Indeed, the Commission stated that project 
follow-up in the IPA rule of law sector was often absent.
37 
With regard to public administration reform, the Commission did not conduct 
a comprehensive evaluation of IPA support, but some evaluations did cover a lim -
ited number of IPA projects in that field.33 Thematic evaluation of the 
rule of law, judicial reform and 
the fight against corruption 
and organised crime in the 
Western Balkans — Lot 3, Final 
Main Report, February 2013, 
p. 60.
34 Meta-evaluation of IPA 
assistance and evaluation of 
multi-beneficiary 
programmes, September 2013. 
Thematic evaluation of the 
rule of law, judicial reform and 
the fight against corruption 
and organised crime in the 
Western Balkans — Lot 3, Final 
Main Report, February 2013. 
Thematic evaluation on IPA 
support for the fight against 
corruption, final main report, 
August 2015.
35 The ‘European Commission for 
Democracy through Law’ is 
based in Venice, Italy, and, 
among other activities, 
provides legal advice to 
Council of Europe member 
states, in particular, helping 
them bringing their 
jurisdictions in line with 
European rule of 
law standards  
(http://www.venice.coe.int ).
24 Observations 
Despite considerable beneficiary shortcomings, the 
Commission supported donor coordination effectively
38 
The principle of country-led donors is set out in in the Paris Declaration on Aid Ef -
fectiveness (2005)36. Under this principle, which also applies to IPA funding, each 
beneficiary country should set realistic targets in a small number of sectors and 
avoid overlapping donor aid. Throughout the region, the Commission effectively 
supported the beneficiary countries in their responsibility for leading donor 
coordination.
Donor coordination at regional level
39 
The Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) and the Regional Coopera -
tion Council (RCC) are both funded by IPA regional programmes. Among their 
objectives, they aimed at improving donor coordination between the Western 
Balkan countries (see Box  7).36 COM(2007) 72 final of 
28 February 2007 ‘EU code of 
conduct on the division of 
labour in development policy’.Box 7Regional donor coordination in the Western Balkans
WBIF
In the context of the WBIF infrastructure projects, the single infrastructure project pipeline submitted by all 
the Western Balkan countries in December 2015 facilitated the project appraisal and selection process.
RCC
One of the objectives of the RCC included the provision of a ‘regional perspective’ in donor assistance37. 
Except one meeting held in 2015, the Western Balkan countries did not use the RCC for donor coordination 
purposes.
37 http://rcc.int/pages/2/overview . See RCC statutes.
25 Observations 
Donor coordination at beneficiary level
40 
Donor coordination by the beneficiary country was effective in Serbia, partly ef -
fective in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro and inef -
fective in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (see Box  8). This was due 
to a lack of leadership and administrative capacity within the national structures 
responsible for donor coordination. However, we observed that the Commission 
supported the beneficiaries in ensuring some donor coordination. Box 8Ineffective donor coordination at beneficiary level
Albania
We examined the donor activities of the Department for Development Programming, Financing and Foreign 
Aid. It did not have a clear organisational structure, was understaffed and did not run a donor database. 
Whereas the donor sector working groups had been dormant since 2013, the Commission-driven Donor Tech -
nical Secretariat led to effective complementarity and the division of labour among donors. Based on inter -
views with the donor community (USA, Italy, France), the EU Delegation in Tirana was generally praised for its 
efforts.
Kosovo
Effective donor coordination mechanisms were not operational by the end of 2011 and, in spite of different 
initiatives to coordinate donors within individual sectors ever since, the EU and other international donors 
have been calling for a more active role of Kosovo institutions in leading donor coordination and following it 
up at the technical level38. This is confirmed by recent internal Commission documents.
38 ECA Special Report 18/2012 ‘European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law’, paragraphs 82 and 86 ( http://eca.europa.eu ).
26 Observations 
Part II — Did the IPA strengthen administrative 
capacity in the Western Balkans?
41 
From 2007 onwards, IPA has been the only EU funding instrument established to 
strengthen administrative capacity in the western Balkans. In the sectors of the 
rule of law, on the one hand, and public administration reform, on the other, we 
assessed whether:
(a) the Commission had effectively delivered the intended outputs;
(b) IPA results beyond outputs were sustainable;
(c) the political dialogue effectively addressed the strengthening of administra -
tive capacity.
The Commission effectively delivered the intended outputs
42 
Across sectors, the examined projects under both national and regional pro -
grammes delivered outputs against what was contractually planned39. For in -
stance, the Fier prison in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council information technology system were delivered on time and 
according to contract specifications (see Pictures  1 and 2).39 This observation is based on 
the audit sample assessed in 
2015 (see Annex II ). A similar 
observation was made in the 
Commission’s meta-
evaluation, p. 6 (2013).
27 Observations 
Completed prison cells, prison construction project, in Fier, Albania
The information technology project within the High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Council, which supervises Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary from SarajevoSource:  European Commission (7th interim and final report, p. 33).
©Eriton Hasaj, 2014. ©High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council BiH (HJPC BiH).
Source:  European Commission (project final narrative report, p. 23).Picture  1 Picture 2

28 Observations 
IPA for the rule of law and public administration reform was 
partly sustainable
Rule of law projects were partly sustainable
43 
The Commission only partly managed to convert project outputs into sustain -
able results in the various areas of the rule of law sector that were supported by 
IPA (e.g. law enforcement, public prosecution, courts, anti-corruption agencies). 
Out of the 29 rule of law projects in the audit sample of national projects, 15 were 
unsustainable40. The reasons why results were unsustainable were often found 
to be at beneficiary country level and included insufficient budget and staffing, 
poor coordination and the lack of political will to reform institutions and carry 
out follow up.
44 
For these 15 projects, the Commission did not apply sufficiently relevant condi -
tions prior to authorising contracts. IPA contracts could have included the condi -
tion that better safeguards were introduced in the judiciary reform sector. Failing 
this, the payment of annual IPA allocations could have been suspended until 
further notice.
45 
At regional level, RCC’s ‘South East Europe 2020 Strategy’ prominently included 
justice and the fight against corruption41. Even though RCC was heavily reliant on 
IPA funding42, during the audited period and with regard to the rule of law, we 
did not observe significant activities of this international organisation of Western 
Balkan countries.
The impact of IPA I on the fight against corruption and organised 
crime was limited
46 
Since 1995, Transparency International has ranked countries according to a world -
wide corruption perception index43 — the higher the ranking, the higher the level 
of perceived corruption. Figure  5 shows the rankings of the six Western Balkan 
countries over the past 6 years, which corresponded to the latter part of the IPA I 
implementation period and beyond.40 See Annex II , the rule of law 
projects in Albania (No 2, 3, 4, 
5, 9 and 10), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (No 11 and 14), 
the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (No 21 and 22), 
Montenegro (No 23) and 
Serbia (No 25, 26, 27 and 28).
41 ‘South East Europe 2020 
Strategy’, RCC, p. 31 to 33.
42 For its administrative 
functioning and the 
implementation of its projects, 
RCC relies upon IPA funding 
(14 million euros paid from 
2007 until 2013), as the 
minimum yearly membership 
fees of 50 000 euros per Board 
participant did not cover all its 
costs.
43 Transparency International 
defines corruption as ‘the 
abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain’; see http://www.
transparency.org . The World 
Bank’s governance indicator 
’Control of corruption’ shows 
comparable rankings for the 
six Western Balkan countries; 
see http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi .
29 Observations 
47 
In 2015, the corruption perception index ranked Albania and Kosovo at the 88 th 
and 103 rd position respectively, which put these countries on a par with Egypt 
and Ethiopia. The index ranked the other four Western Balkan countries between 
60th and 80 th from 2010 till 2015.
48 
The annual progress reports, surveys and two thematic evaluations indicated that 
the Commission was aware that political interference in the work of the judiciary 
was widespread in the Western Balkans, as was high-level corruption and organ -
ised crime44 (see Box  9). However, in Montenegro and Serbia, two countries with 
which the EU had opened accession negotiations45, the level of preparedness for 
judiciary reform was better than in the other four countries.44 2012-2015 progress reports. 
Evaluation ‘IPA support to the 
fight against corruption’, 
August 2015. Evaluation ‘Rule 
of law, judicial reform and 
fight against corruption and 
organised crime in the 
Western Balkans’, 
February 2013.
45 2015 progress report, 
Montenegro, p. 14, 15, 18 and 
19. 2015 progress report, 
Serbia, p. 11, 13, 14, 17 and 18.Corruption perception index rankings for the western Balkans
Source:  European Court of Auditors, based on Transparency International’s corruption perception index (2010-2015).Figure  5
020406080100120
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
SerbiaKosovo
Montenegrothe former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia
30 Observations 
49 
For monitoring purposes, the Commission asked each beneficiary country for 
track record tables of effective investigation, prosecution and final convictions 
in judicial cases involving high-level corruption and organised crime. Depending 
on the country, the high-level corruption and organised crime cases included in 
these varied from a few (Serbia) to zero (Kosovo), which does indicate a lack of 
political will. Box 9Political interference, high-level corruption and organised crime in the Western 
Balkans
Albania
The full independence and accountability of judges and prosecutors was not guaranteed. The slow admin -
istration of justice and judicial decisions that were not always enforced led to a negligible number of final 
convictions that effectively dismantled criminal organisations46.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Political commitment was not translated into successful convictions47. For instance, in a 2015 RCC survey, 90 % 
of the respondents surveyed in Bosnia and Herzegovina disagreed with the statement that their government 
was fighting corruption effectively.
Kosovo
Disputed appointments, unclear mandates and a consistent shortage of national funding undermined the 
activities of key rule of law institutions in Kosovo. The investigations into cases of corruption at a high level 
were rare and did not result in final convictions. Furthermore, the involvement of Kosovo citizens in organised 
crime in the region threatened regional inter-ethnic stability48.
46 2015 progress report, Albania, pp. 4 and 51.
47 2015 progress report, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 16.
48 2015 progress report, Kosovo, pp. 12, 15, 16 and 18.
31 Observations 
50 
According to the Commission, the lack of political will was often reflected in the 
insufficient financial and human resources allocated to the relevant institutions, 
which limited the ambition and absorption capacity of IPA I. The two examples 
given in Box  10 show that the impact of IPA I projects on the fight against corrup -
tion and organised crime was only limited.
The Commission used little IPA funding in key rule of law areas
51 
Free media and a strong civil society are key drivers for raising public aware -
ness of corruption and organised crime50; they often encourage anti-corruption 
agencies and the public prosecution to act. These, in turn, contribute directly 
to a track record of effective investigation, prosecution and final convictions in 
judicial cases of high-level corruption and organised crime. In the context of the 
rule of law in the Western Balkans, the pervasive problems with judiciary inde -
pendence and the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and organised 
crime (see paragraphs 46 to 50), combined with the Commission’s own views on 
the importance of the media, civil society, anti-corruption agencies and public 
prosecution51, were sufficient grounds for sustained support in these key areas.50 Transparency International, 
‘Corruption fighters’ Tool kit: 
civil society experiences and 
emerging strategies’, 2002 
(http://www.transparency.
org/whatwedo/publication/
corruption_fighters_toolkit_
civil_society_experiences_
and_emerging_strategi ).
51 For instance, see 
Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 
Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2011-2012, 
COM(2011) 666 final, in 
particular pp. 3, 7, 23, 39, 41, 45, 
54, 58, 60 and 67.Box 10IPA I project results in the fight against corruption
Project against corruption, Albania
The purpose of the ‘Project against corruption in Albania’ was to support the Albanian government in imple -
menting its anti-corruption strategy (2007-2013). Not only did it fail to deliver on measurable targets, but its 
sustainability was also affected by the fact that the national anti-corruption coordinator was not independent 
and coordinated policies at national and local level without adequate budget or staff.
State Commission for Preventing Corruption, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
This project aimed to strengthen the work of the main body responsible for preventing corruption. How -
ever, it did not address the fact that the State Commission for Preventing Corruption was not in a position to 
exercise its mandate effectively in the face of inadequate commitment by the national authorities, a lack of 
independence on the part of its senior management and insufficient resources49.
49 ECA Special Report 11/2016 ‘Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: limited progress in a difficult 
context’, paragraph 28 and Box 3 ( http://eca.europa.eu ). Evaluation ‘IPA support for the fight against corruption’, August 2015, p. 30 and 120.
32 Observations 
52 
However, under IPA I, the Commission allocated relatively little funding to media 
freedom and civil society in the Western Balkans (0.5 % of total allocations)52. For 
instance, Albania received no national allocations for media freedom and civil 
society in the context of the fight against corruption. Likewise, the Commission 
allocated little funding to the fight against corruption and organised crime (2 %) 
and support for public prosecution services (1 %).
Public administration reform projects were generally sustainable
53 
Building and maintaining administrative capacity were particularly challenging, 
mainly because of widespread corruption and constant political interference in 
civil service recruitment and career management. This resulted in high staff turn -
over and a lack of qualified staff in the national authorities53. In this context, the 
Commission managed to convert many project outputs into sustainable results, 
which IPA I had supported (e.g. civil service reform, customs, public procurement, 
public internal financial control, audit).
54 
Out of the 23 projects in the audit sample of national projects, 14 were sustain -
able54. Where they were not, it was mainly because of insufficient budget and 
staffing, poor coordination and, most important of all, the beneficiary’s lack of 
political will to reform institutions and follow up on reform. In some cases, prior 
to authorising contracting, the Commission could have predefined additional 
conditions with regard to legislation and project terms of reference, but had 
failed to do so (see B ox  11).52 ECA analysis, Commission 
data, July 2015.
53 Meta-evaluation of IPA 
assistance, September 2013, 
p. 19. Progress reports 
2012-2015.
54 See Annex II , public 
administration reform projects 
in Albania (No 3, 4 and 5), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(No 6, 7 and 9), the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (No 12 and 14), 
Montenegro (No 17 and 18) 
and Serbia (No 20, 21, 22 
and 23).Box 11IPA and public administrative reform
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In that country, budgets were adopted late and budget coordination and planning remained poor55.  
Furthermore, at the state level, the entities and Brčko District had their own budgets and laws on civil service 
and administration and the public administration remained fragmented. This hampered the sustainability of 
a country-wide administrative coordination project and a public finance statistics project.
55 The SIGMA baseline measurement 2015, Bosnia and Herzegovina (pp. 2, 39, 94 and 95) described this specific context.
33 Observations 
55 
With regard to regional programmes (see Annex  III), the WBIF was designed as 
a blending instrument for infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans56. Be-
tween 2008 and 2014, 2.8 billion euros in project loans were contracted, as com -
pared with 305 million euros in EU funding57. The WBIF was a good instrument 
for improving donor coordination and providing technical support to national 
authorities in charge of infrastructure (e.g. preparing project pipelines, drafting 
project finance documentation), thereby strengthening the beneficiary’s admin -
istrative capacity. We examined a typical example of a WBIF project (see Box  12).
56 
Governed by the six western Balkan countries, the Regional School of Public 
Administration (ReSPA) is an international organisation based in Danilovgrad, 
Montenegro. It received 2.4 million euros in IPA technical assistance, equipment 
and furniture and an annual allocation of 1.2 million euros in IPA funding to sup -
port its operational activities58.56 Blending is the combination of 
loans from financial 
institutions with grants and 
enables the Commission to 
leverage IPA funds by 
attracting loans from financial 
institutions. See ECA Special 
Report 16/2014 ‘The 
effectiveness of blending 
regional investment facility 
grants with financial 
institution loans to support EU 
external policies’  
(http://eca.europa.eu ).
57 WBIF annual and 
monitoring reports  
(https://www.wbif.eu/Library ).
58 Based on contracts signed 
from 2008 to 2014, 
Commission, June 2015.Box 12The Ionian-Adriatic pipeline project
This 3.5  million  euros regional project, sponsored by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
consisted of technical assistance for a feasibility study for a gas interconnection pipeline from Albania to 
Croatia. The project deliverable (a technical report) was completed on time and provided technical expertise 
to the Albanian Ministry of Energy and Industry. It will be used for the gas pipeline’s masterplan and future 
construction.
34 Observations 
57 
Whereas its aim was to contribute to an effective and professional public admin -
istration in the Western Balkan countries, public officials from these countries 
made little use of ReSPA’s training offer59, which was not commensurate with the 
volume of IPA and national funds invested in ReSPA over nearly a decade60. The 
Commission made proposals to improve ReSPA’s results, including by ensuring 
coordination between IPA regional and national assistance61. Although these pro -
posals had been acted upon at the time of the audit, it was too early to establish 
whether ReSPA actually improved administrative capacity in the Western Balkans.
The Commission could have encouraged beneficiaries to use the 
IPA as a learning tool
58 
We found that the Commission’s approach to IPA I was mainly restricted to the 
IPA structures specifically set up for the purpose of managing IPA funds62. It could 
also have actively encouraged the national authorities to use the good practice 
developed in these IPA structures as a learning tool for strengthening other 
parts of the public administration outside these structures63, although this was 
not a specific IPA objective. However, it did not do so, and, as a result, the IPA’s 
contribution towards strengthening administrative capacity remained confined 
to bodies closely associated with IPA public administration reform. Box  13 and 
Box  14 show two high-profile examples where the beneficiaries failed to apply 
good practice that could have been learnt from IPA.59 Based on feedback from 
Albanian authorities to the 
ECA (June 2015), ECA Special 
Report 11/2016, paragraph 37 
(Box 1). ECA Special Report 
20/2016 ‘Strengthening 
administrative capacity in 
Montenegro: progress but 
better results needed in many 
key areas’, paragraph 19 
(Box 2) ( http://eca.europa.eu ).
60 Meta-evaluation/multi 
beneficiary programme 
evaluation, June 2013, p. 19, 
20, 24 and 25.
61 ECA Special Report 20/2016 
‘Strengthening administrative 
capacity in Montenegro: 
progress but better results 
needed in many key areas’, 
paragraph 20 ( http://eca.
europa.eu ).
62 In relation to the IPA 
benefiting the wider public 
administration and not only 
IPA structures, the 
Commission evaluations 
recommended that IPA 
management units should be 
absorbed into the operational 
structure of beneficiaries 
rather than being standalone 
bodies. Meta-evaluation of IPA 
assistance, September 2013. 
This issue was also raised by 
the ECA in 2014 in the context 
of its Special Report 19/2014, 
paragraph VI.
63 See ECA Special Report 11/2016 
‘Strengthening administrative 
capacity in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia: limited 
progress in a difficult context’, 
paragraphs 55 and 72  
(http://eca.europa.eu ).Box 13The ‘Skopje 2014’ project, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
This was announced in 2010 as an 80 million euro project. However, in 2015, total costs were estimated at 
seven times this amount, or 560 million euros. This large-scale urban project in the capital city consisted of 
the erection of buildings and monuments (see Picture 3). It did not benefit from IPA funding. This project did 
not follow EU public procurement rules; there was a lack of transparency during the tender process (e.g. fees 
were paid for artworks that were not specified before the tender) and the alleged irregularities in the tender 
awards had neither been audited externally, nor investigated64.
64 BIRN, ‘True cost of Skopje 2014 Revealed’, 27 July 2015. BIRN, ‘Accountability questions dog authors of Skopje 2014’, 14 August 2015. Progress 
Report 2014, p. 25. Evaluation ‘IPA support to the fight against corruption’, August 2015, p. 40.
35 Observations Box 14The Žeželj Bridge project project, Serbia
In Serbia’s Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, the IPA financed parts of the Žeželj Bridge project costs. The 
new bridge was supposed to be completed by November 2013 in order to replace a heavily congested and 
hazardous rail–road bridge in the city centre of Novi Sad, which was a temporary construction built after the 
previous bridge was bombed during the war against Kosovo. Because of excessive administrative burden and 
weak coordination (e.g. the delegation of key tasks of the Serbian authorities to external parties, the incom -
patibility of Serbian procedures with international engineering procedures, problems with setting project 
milestones), considerable delays were accumulated in 2015 and the Serbian authorities failed to complete 
project phases not funded by the IPA ( Picture  4).Parts of the ‘Skopje 2014’ project: Artworks in the Vardar river and public buildings 
on its embankment
Source:  European Court of Auditors.Picture  3

36 Observations 
The political dialogue addressed administrative capacity
59 
The IPA’s achievements very much depended on the progress achieved by the 
various policy dialogue structures. The political dialogue was either at intergov -
ernmental level or at joint parliamentary level. The intergovernmental level com -
prised the EU Council and Member States, the EEAS, the Commission and the six 
governments of the Western Balkans. The relevant joint parliamentary commit -
tees of the European Parliament and the six parliaments of the Western Balkans 
made up the joint parliamentary level. Table  4 summarises the most important 
political dialogue structures involving the Commission and relevant to this audit.Location of the future Žeželj Bridge to cross the Danube river in Novi Sad
Source:  European Court of Auditors.Picture  4

37 Observations 
60 
These dialogue structures aimed to stimulate the political will to strengthen the 
rule of law, encourage administrative reform and improve public finance man -
agement, especially in the years 2014-2015. Depending on the country’s political 
status with respect to EU membership (potential candidate, candidate or candi -
date with active chapter negotiations), the political dialogue structures gave rise 
to specialised working groups.
The political dialogue on the rule of law had a  limited impact
61 
The Commission effectively set up working groups, notably on the independence 
of the judiciary, weaknesses in public prosecution and corruption in the judiciary 
and the police. Furthermore, in the case of Montenegro and Serbia with which 
the Council approved the opening of accession negotiations (see Table  4), the 
stabilisation and association process, the action plans on Chapters 23 and 24 and 
the IPA have given them a certain level of preparedness towards the reform of 
the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organised crime. Table  4Dialogue structures involving the Commission and the Western Balkans
Political dialogue Start
Albania High-level dialogue on key level priorities 12 November 2013
Bosnia and HerzegovinaHigh-level dialogue on the accession process 27 June 2012
Structured dialogue on justice 6 June 2011
Kosovo Structured dialogue on the rule of law 30 May 2012
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia High-level accession dialogue 29 March 2012
Montenegro Start accession negotiations 29 June 2012
Serbia Start accession negotiations 21 January 2014
All western Balkan countries Stabilisation and association councils Multiple dates
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
38 Observations 
62 
In countries with which accession negotiations had not yet started, the effect of 
the EU–Western Balkan working groups in generating political will to promote 
the rule of law was limited, as shown in Box  15.
The political dialogue on public administration reform achieved 
some progress
63 
The political dialogue on public administration reform took place in the frame -
work of the stabilisation and association agreements (SAAs). In partnership with 
the beneficiary public administrations in the whole Western Balkan region, the 
Commission successfully set up ‘public administration reform special groups’. Box 15Limits of political dialogue regarding the rule of law
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Due to the political and institutional challenges, the political dialogue was partly ineffective. There was some 
progress in establishing functional and sustainable institutions65, but little progress in the area of judicial 
system reform. The judiciary continued to suffer from persistent flaws in terms of independence, political 
interference and inefficiencies66.
Kosovo
Although the rule of law was the top priority in Kosovo67, progress in the fight against corruption and organ -
ised crime suffered from important setbacks, as evidenced by various reports68. The political dialogue had 
so far been ineffective in addressing the prevailing sense of impunity in this country, notably due to a lack of 
judicial independence, as well as limited results in the fight against corruption and organised crime69.
65 Progress report 2015, pp. 9 and 12.
66 Progress report 2015, pp. 12, 15, 16, 17.
67 MIPD 2011-2013, Kosovo.
68 In the 2014 progress report: ‘Particular attention should be paid to improving the rule of law (…) and to intensifying the fight against organised 
crime and corruption’.
69 2015 progress report, pp. 12, 15, 16 and 18. Cover note, 2014 progress report.
39 Observations 
64 
These special groups systematically addressed the strategic framework for public 
administration reform, public service and human resources management, policy 
development and coordination, service delivery to citizens and businesses, ac -
countability of the public administration, as well as public finance management. 
They were established in 2010 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
in 2012 in Albania, in 2013 in Kosovo in 2014 in Montenegro and Serbia and 
in 2015 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
40
 Conclusions and 
recommendations
65 
Based on the findings of previous special reports, Commission evaluations and 
additional audit work performed in 2015, our objective was to assess whether 
the Commission, through the IPA programme, had contributed towards strength -
ening administrative capacity in the Western Balkan region. Our scope was 
IPA I (2007-2013), but we also took into account the first stages of IPA II (2014-
2020). We focused on the key sectors of the rule of law and public administration 
reform.
66 
We concluded that the EU pre-accession assistance was broadly effective and 
that IPA I partly strengthened administrative capacity in the region, despite 
considerable shortcomings inherent to the national authorities in the Western 
Balkans.
67 
With regard to the Commission’s management, IPA I objectives were not always 
specific and measurable. Programmes and projects were based on needs but 
some beneficiaries’ assessments in the rule of law sector showed considerable 
shortcomings (paragraphs 16 to 23).
68 
The absorption of IPA I funding was hampered by weak administrative capacity in 
some countries and, in the case of decentralised implementation, strict require -
ments linked to the management of EU funds (paragraphs 24 to 26).
Recommendation  1 
Objectives. Indirect management
Under IPA II, the Commission should set specific objectives based on ranked pri -
orities and measurable targets.
In order to simplify management requirements, when the Commission identifies 
a weak administrative capacity, it should apply indirect management selectively, 
taking into account the volume of the funds involved and the complexity and 
political sensitivity of projects to be decentralised.
41 Conclusions and recommendations 
69 
Under IPA I, the Commission did not systematically apply strict conditions and 
follow up on them. Despite some shortcomings in its ROM reporting, it was effec -
tive in monitoring the implementation of IPA projects. It was also partly effective 
in following up on the conclusions and recommendations of IPA evaluations. 
Finally, despite considerable beneficiary shortcomings, it was able to support 
donor coordination effectively (paragraphs 27 to 37).
Recommendation  2 
Conditions. Monitoring. Evaluation
The Commission should apply relevant conditions at sector, programme and pro -
ject level and follow up on them. For instance, it could apply, where appropriate, 
a net reduction in future IPA allocations, suspend payments, cancel projects not 
yet contracted and systematically monitor project compliance with predefined 
conditions. The Commission should systematically monitor sensitive programmes 
and projects and carry out external evaluations of interventions in priority sec -
tors in the Western Balkans.
70 
With regard to administrative capacity in the Western Balkans, the IPA gener -
ally delivered the outputs that were contractually planned and its support for 
the rule of law and public administration reform was partly sustainable (para -
graphs 42 to 57).
71 
In the case of rule of law projects, the Commission did not apply conditionality 
sufficiently and relatively little IPA I funding was provided in key areas of the rule 
of law, such as media freedom, public prosecution and the fight against corrup -
tion and organised crime. The beneficiaries’ lack of political will to reform institu -
tions, insufficient budget and staffing, as well as poor coordination also affected 
project sustainability (paragraphs 43 to 52).
72 
In the area of public administration reform, the Commission managed to convert 
many project outputs into sustainable results. Whilst not an explicit IPA objective, 
it could have encouraged beneficiaries more to use IPA as a learning tool in the 
rest of the public administration (paragraphs 53 to 58).
42 Conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendation  3 
Track record. Resources
In the context of the political dialogue and under IPA I and II, the Commission 
should engage the beneficiary countries in stronger political commitment so 
that they establish a convincing track record of effective investigation, prosecu -
tion and final convictions in cases of high-level corruption and organised crime. 
To this end, it should require each of the beneficiaries to build up their track 
records further. This should be done in the framework of the political dialogue 
and should be reflected into future national IPA allocations and other potential 
sources of EU funding.
Furthermore, upon availability of political commitment, and better absorption 
capacity, the Commission should better target  resources in key areas of the rule 
of law where we noted a significant need for support: the fight against corrup -
tion and organised crime (with a particular focus on the public prosecution) and 
media freedom.
73 
Enhancing regional cooperation and strengthening administrative capacity in 
the region as a whole is of high importance and has been encouraged by the 
Commission, notably through the Western Balkans Investment Framework  
(paragraphs 19, 39, and 55).
74 
However, during the period audited, the Regional Cooperation Council did 
not have a significant impact on the ground. For the Regional School of Public 
Administration, it was too early to establish whether it improved administrative 
capacity in the Western Balkans (paragraphs 39, 45 and 57).
Recommendation  4 
Regional cooperation
Under IPA I and II, the Commission should support regional cooperation. In par -
ticular, it should ensure that its financial contributions to the RCC and ReSPA yield 
measurable and sustainable results on the ground.
43 Conclusions and recommendations 
75 
The political dialogue in the Western Balkans had a limited impact on the rule 
of law in a number of cases. It did achieve some progress with regard to public 
administration reform (paragraphs 59 to 64).
Recommendation  5 
Political dialogue
The Commission should use political dialogue to support the delivery of results 
pertaining to the rule of law and public administration reform under the IPA.
This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of 
the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 12 July 2016.
 For the Court of Auditors
 Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA
 President

44
 Annexes
Key events for understanding EU–Western Balkan relations
2000 ο 1 June – The Santa Maria da Feira European Council states that all the countries involved in an SAA process are potential candidates for 
EU membership.
2001 ο 1 April – Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, wanted on charges of war crimes, abuse of power and corruption, is arrested.
 ο 13 August – The Ohrid Framework Agreement seals the peace deal between the government of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and the country’s ethnic Albanian community.
2003  ο 20 June – The Thessaloniki European Council confirms the EU perspective for the Western Balkans.
2004 ο 22 March – The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia applies for EU membership.
 ο 1 April – The SAA with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia enters into force
2005  ο 16 December – The Council confirms the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a candidate country.
2006  ο 3 June  – After a  successful referendum, Montenegro declares its independence.
2007 ο 1 January – IPA I enters into force
 ο 26 February – In Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro, the ICJ rules that the Srebrenica massacre was an act of genocide, 
whilst clearing the respondent for responsibility for the massacre.
2008 ο 17 February – Kosovo declares its independence.
 ο 11 July – At the donors’ conference for Kosovo, the Commission and EU Member States pledge nearly 800 million euros to specifically 
support Kosovo.
 ο 15 December  – Montenegro applies for EU membership.
2009 ο 1 April – The SAA with Albania enters into force.
 ο 24 April – Albania applies for EU membership.
 ο 22 December  – Serbia applies for EU membership.
 ο 22 December – The ECHR condemns Bosnia and Herzegovina for the violation of the democratic rights of citizens of non-majority 
communities.
2010 ο 1 May – The SAA with Montenegro enters into force.
 ο 22 July – The ICJ issues an advisory opinion that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence did not violate any applicable rule 
of international law.
 ο 17 December – The Council confirms Montenegro as a candidate country.
2011  ο 26 May and 20 July – prominent Serb war criminals sought by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are arrested.Annex  I
45 Annexes 
2012 ο 1 March – The European Council confirms Serbia as a candidate country.
 ο 29 June  – Montenegro’s accession negotiations formally start.
2013 ο 19 April – The Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia sign the Brussels Agreement, normalising relations between the two countries.
 ο 1 September – The SAA with Serbia enters into force.
2014 ο 1 January – IPA II enters into force
 ο 21 January – Serbia’s accession negotiations formally start.
 ο 27 June – The Council confirms Albania as a candidate country.
 ο 15 July – Declaration by the incoming President of the Commission that no new accessions will take place before 2020.
 ο 28 August – Western Balkans Summit in Berlin.
2015 ο 1 June – The SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina enters into force.
 ο 20 August – Western Balkans Summit in Vienna.
2016 ο 15 February – Bosnia and Herzegovina applies for EU membership.
 ο 30 March – Western Balkans Summit in Durrës, Albania.
 ο 1 April – The SAA with Kosovo enters into force.
Source : ECA, on the basis of European Commission data.Annex  I
46 Annexes 
Audit sample of IPA I national projects
No Beneficiary ProjectIPA  
decision yearAmount  
(euro)
Rule of law
1
AlbaniaPolice Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania (PAMECA III) 2007 6 768 790
2 Project against Corruption in Albania (PACA) 2008 2 000 000
3 Support for Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crime Investigations Structures 2009 1 500 000
4 Civil Society Facility – Civic Initiatives and Capacity Building 2009 1 500 000
5 Support for Witness Protection 2009 554 199
6 Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania (PAMECA IV) 2009 1 000 000
7 EURALIUS III: Technical Assistance for the Justice System 2009 2 300 000
8 Construction of a  new prison in Fier 2010 9 654 814
9 Case management system for the General Prosecutor Office of Albania 2010 990 396
10 Construction of the Justice Palace in Tirana 2012 0
11
Bosnia and HerzegovinaJoint training of the SIPA Financial Intelligence Unit and Crime Investigation Unit, 
Prosecutors, financial regulatory agencies and institutions2007 392 973
12 Financing of War Crime Chamber (State Court) 2008 2 999 599
13 Assistance to the Directorate for coordination of police bodies 2008 1 200 000
14 Strengthening institutional capacities to prevent and combat corruption 2009 488 048
15 Responsible Journalism’s Watching Eye: Anti-corruption and the Media 2009 102 923
16 Construction of a High Security State Prison in Sarajevo - Phase II 2010 5 150 000
17 High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 2010 1 000 000
18 Twinning assistance to the Directorate for coordination of police bodies 2008 1 200 000
19 Support for law enforcement institutions 2010 6 999 999
20 Enhancing capacity of parliaments in the context of EU accession 2012 3 499 966
21the former Yugoslav 
Republic of  MacedoniaSupport for the drafting of the follow-up strategic documents and corresponding 
action plans for the prevention and repression of corruption and conflict of interest2008 165 968
22Exchange of EU best practices in the area of anticorruption monitoring on 
local  level2009 138 500Annex II
47 Annexes 
No Beneficiary ProjectIPA  
decision yearAmount  
(euro)
Rule of law
23MontenegroSupport to the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and action plan 2012 700 000
24 Corruption in local government – zero tolerance! 2012 190 308
25
SerbiaPolice reform: internal affairs 2007 1 000 000
26 Improvement of efficiency and transparency of the judiciary system (courts) 2007 2 643 064
27 Fight against corruption 2008 2 147 000
28 Improvement of transparency and efficiency (prosecutors and penal system) 2008 1 891 517
29 Support for civil society (I and II)2007
20081 983 458
TOTAL 60 161 522
Public administrative reform
1
AlbaniaSupport for the Albanian Department of Public Administration (DOPA) 2008 958 892
2Support for the Albanian public procurement, concessions and public auctions 
systems2008 899 076
3 Strengthening the Assembly of Albania 2010 1 454 147
4Support for the Albanian Customs
Administration2011 1 424 496
5Implementation of a modern Financial Management and Control System and 
Public Financial Inspection2012 2 500 000
6
Bosnia and HerzegovinaCapacity building of the Office of the Coordinator for Public Administration 
Reform2007 1 824 961
7Development and implementation of a nationwide public internal financial 
control strategy2007 1 105 904
8 Capacity Building of General Government and Public Finance Statistics 2009 1 603 790
9 Curricula for transparency and accountability 2010 445 253
10 Support for coordination and Implementation of Public Administration Reform 2011 476 450Annex II
48 Annexes 
No Beneficiary ProjectIPA  
decision yearAmount  
(euro)
Public administrative reform
11
the former Yugoslav 
Republic of MacedoniaTechnical assistance for the IPA training and support facility 2007 856 280
12Strengthening the capacity of institutions to manage and implement operational 
programmes2008 1 599 710
13 Support for the Public Procurement System 2008 986 442
14Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Information Society and Administration 
and Strengthening the implementation of the National System for Training 
Coordination2009 1 095 000
15
MontenegroFurther development and strengthening of the public procurement system 2009 1 080 017
16 Strengthening the management and control systems for EU financial assistance2009
2010
20132 000 000
17 Strengthening State Audit Institution 2014 751 068
18 Audit Quality control in the State Audit Institution 2014 250 000
19Strengthening the management of EU funds and general administrative 
procedures2014 1 261 500
20
SerbiaMunicipal support programme 2007 22 501 150
21 Support for the Public Procurement Office 2007 116 650
22 Support for the development of Public Internal Financial Control 2008 2 000 000
23Harmonisation of the Customs Enforcement Division with the standards,  
organisation and operational methodology of EU enforcement agencies2008 1 399 641
TOTAL 48 590 427
Source:  ECA on the basis of European Commission data, 30 June 2015.Annex II
49 Annexes 
Audit sample of IPA I regional programmes
No Multi-beneficiary programme in the Western BalkansIPA  
decision yearsContracted amount  
(euro)
1 Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) 2008-2013 18 641 100
2 Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) 2008-2014 305 000 000
3 Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA) 2010-2013 5 900 000
TOTAL: 329 541 100
Source:  ECA on the basis of European Commission data, 30 June 2015. Contracted amounts represent the total contracted amounts for  
all projects in these programmes.Annex III
50 Reply of  
the Commission
Executive summary
VIII
The Commission would like to point out that conditionality has been applied, where appropriate, and at the appro -
priate level, to achieve the maximum possible impact of the enlargement policy objectives, in often difficult politi -
cal contexts.
With regard to funding levels, the Commission would like to point out that the funding provided in the relevant sec -
tors was appropriate, given the relatively limited amount of large-scale investments required and the limits posed 
by the existing absorption capacity. Media freedom, civil society and the fight against corruption and organised 
crime require primarily the provision of expert advice through technical assistance, which was ensured through IPA, 
and not large-scale investment.
X
The Commission would like to stress that the Regional Cooperation Council has primarily been set up by the coun -
tries in the region as a forum to meet and discuss common challenges and that this objective has been met.
Introduction
09
The Commission would like to underline that the enlargement process is a strict but fair process built on established 
criteria and lessons learned from the past. Each country is assessed on the basis of its own merit. The challenges 
faced by the current enlargement countries are such that none will be ready to join the EU during the mandate of 
the current Commission, which will expire towards the end of 2019. The Council in December 2015 reiterated that 
enlargement remains a key policy of the EU and reiterated the EU’s unequivocal commitment to the European per -
spective of the Western Balkans.
Observations
23
The Commission would like to point out that all countries have strategies in the area of the rule of law. However, not 
all may have an overarching or updated strategy in the justice sector.
Box 4  — Experience with decentralising management under IPA I
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The Commission would like to highlight that in order to mitigate the risk of further losses of projects, the proce -
dure for the review of contractual documents has been improved and is more selective in decentralising funds 
under IPA II. The Commission also closely monitors the procurement plans prepared by the national authorities and 
advises on the prioritisation of projects. Moreover, the Commission monitors the implementation of the DIS action 
plan prepared by the national authorities to address any issues related to the implementation of IPA.
Reply of the Commission 51
Box 4  — Experience with decentralising management under IPA I
Serbia
The purpose of the decentralised implementation system (DIS) under IPA I was the management of IPA funds by 
national authorities.
The accreditation process, therefore, did not entail a comprehensive assessment of the public finance management 
at the country level, which was incorporated only in the IPA II legal framework.
It should be noted that in the case of Serbia, the Commission continued to monitor the DIS structures by following 
up any outstanding issues and taking any corrective measures. For instance, in 2015, due to the persistent weak -
nesses in one of the key structures (Audit Authority) the Commission decided to suspend the Conferral, given that 
the system did not guarantee the appropriate use of EU funds.
28
The Commission would like to point out that conditionality has been applied, where appropriate, and at the appro -
priate level, to achieve the maximum possible impact of the enlargement policy objectives, in often difficult politi -
cal contexts.
Box  6 — Strict conditionality not applied during IPA
Serbia
Since IPA 2012 programming, conditionalities are used in a targeted way. They are clearly defined in sector/project 
fiches in a measurable way and are enforced during implementation. This is to ensure that only mature projects 
(actions) are financed. Numerous projects have been postponed in programming, where critical preconditions were 
not in place. 
36
The Commission partially agrees. As a general policy, the Commission systematically follows up on all evaluations, 
notably through a detailed table of recommendations and follow-up actions. The Commission would also like to 
point out that result oriented monitoring (ROM) is based on generic questions which may be used for all countries 
and/or sectors. However, experts with the relevant targeted experience can be used to provide a more balanced 
view.
37
The Commission points out that a comprehensive strategic evaluation of PAR is currently ongoing.
Box  7 — Regional donor coordination in the Western Balkans
RCC
The Commission would like to note that the RCC organised several sector-related discussions at regional level, 
including a dedicated donor coordination meeting. These actions have contributed to providing a regional perspec -
tive in donor assistance.
The RCC has built a donor database (SEEDAD). A beta version was finalised in December 2015 and the database 
was presented to the donor community at the donor coordination meeting held in March 2016  
(http://www.rcc.int/seedad) .
Reply of the Commission 52
40
Despite some shortcomings in the donor coordination process on the part of the national authorities, due to the 
support provided by the Commission and the EU Delegations, this did not have an impact on the correct implemen -
tation of the IPA financial assistance.
Box 8 — Ineffective donor coordination at beneficiary level
Kosovo
The Commission agrees with the observation that the Kosovo Government’s ‘donor coordination mechanisms were 
not fully operational’ by the end of 2011, although it should be noted that progress has been made since and a new 
improved ‘Regulation on Donor Coordination’ has been consulted with donors and adopted in June 2015. The EU 
Office has also provided support to the national authorities.
43
The Commission notes that in the sensitive area of rule of law full and constant political commitment, up to, during 
and beyond the end date of the project, is essential to ensure sustainable results.
44
The Commission would like to point out that, through its policy dialogue, it has systematically encouraged political 
support for reforms in the rule of law area by the beneficiaries. This dialogue, while not directly addressing project- 
related issues, has a direct bearing in ensuring that the political conditions are in place or are being addressed.
Moreover, the Commission would like to highlight the particular challenge in imposing strict conditionalities, whilst 
not excessively curtailing financial support in the area of the rule of law. This requires careful calibration through 
policy dialogue, programming and project implementation.
45
The Commission points out that the RCC set up a Working Group on Justice with the Western Balkans Ministries of 
Justice, which adopted a Regional Action Plan on Justice. They established two regional networks (judicial train -
ing institutions and Associations of Mediators) to work on the implementation of the action plan. The RCC has also 
engaged the European Institute for Public Administration, European Judicial Training Network and the Council of 
Europe on the development of seminars and materials for judges and prosecutors.
49
The Commission would like to highlight that the building up of a track record requires sustained political commit -
ment from the authorities over a long period of time.
In the case of Kosovo, the Commission would like to refer to its recent report on progress by Kosovo in fulfilling the 
requirements of the visa liberalisation roadmap, including on building up a track record in fighting corruption and 
organised crime (COM(2016) 276 final).
Reply of the Commission 53
Box 10 — IPA I project results in the fight against corruption
Project against corruption, Albania
The Commission partially disagrees. The project did not in itself meet targets such as a decrease in perceived levels 
of corruption, or an increase of seizure of assets, which are results of a more long-term nature. However, other 
important objectives of the project were successfully met and have had a positive impact on tacking corruption in 
Albania. The recent thematic evaluation on IPA support in the fight against corruption concluded that the project 
‘contributed to the prevention of corruption in the education sector’ and positively assessed its contribution to the 
implementation of the recommendations by GRECO and Moneyval.
52
The Commission would like to point out that it has continuously supported civil society organisations through 
IPA assistance in all sectors, including democracy and rule of law, including through multi-country programmes.  
It is extremely important that such support takes into account the absorption capacity within civil society.
With regard to funding levels in the other areas mentioned, the Commission would like to point out that the fund -
ing provided was appropriate, given the relatively limited amount of large-scale investments required and the limits 
posed by the existing absorption capacity. These sectors require primarily the provision of expert advice through 
technical assistance, which was ensured through IPA, and not large-scale investment, along with strong political 
commitment.
58
The Commission would like to point out that the structures referred to by the Court, ‘set up for the purpose of 
managing IPA funds’, apply primarily to decentralised management and, hence, only exist in certain countries. The 
Commission also underlines the importance of encouraging the national authorities to, wherever possible, make 
good use of best practices from such structures.
The Commission would like to note that the promotion of good public financial management is not limited to 
the use of IPA I. The new enlargement strategy ‘Fundamentals first’ from October 2013 puts special emphasis on 
all forms of economic governance including public finance management and public procurement in line with EU 
standards. This is closely monitored through the appropriate structures.
Box 14 — The Žeželj Bridge project project, Serbia
The majority of delays have been assessed to be attributable to the contractor. More recently this type of difficulty 
has been addressed through improved links between the policy objectives and programming.
61
The Commission points out that political dialogue can only encourage  reform, but the ownership of the reform 
process lies with the national authorities.
Reply of the Commission 54
Box 15 — Limits of political dialogue regarding the rule of law
Common Commission reply to ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and ‘Kosovo’
The Commission points out that the political dialogue with the Western Balkans countries has been conducted in an 
efficient and result-oriented manner and delivered progress as outlined in the annual Enlargement packages/ pro -
gress reports. However, the complexity of the reforms assessed in this audit means that the process requires time, in 
particular as the Commission applies a quality before speed approach. In addition, the speed of reforms in the coun -
tries concerned is under the responsibility of the national authorities.
Conclusions and recommendations
Recommendation 1 — Objectives. Indirect management
The Commission accepts this recommendation.
Recommendation  2 — Conditions. Monitoring. Evaluation
The Commission accepts this recommendation.
71
The Commission would like to point out that conditionality has been applied, where appropriate, and at the appro -
priate level, to achieve the maximum possible impact of the enlargement policy objectives, in often difficult politi -
cal contexts.
With regard to funding levels, the Commission would like to point out that the funding provided in the relevant sec -
tors was appropriate, given the relatively limited amount of large-scale investments required and the limits posed 
by the existing absorption capacity. Media freedom, civil society and the fight against corruption and organised 
crime require primarily the provision of expert advice through technical assistance, which was ensured through IPA, 
and not large-scale investment.
Recommendation 3 — Track record. Resources
The Commission accepts this recommendation.
74
The Commission would like to stress that the Regional Cooperation Council has primarily been set up by the coun -
tries in the region as a forum to meet and discuss common challenges and that this objective has been met.
Recommendation  4 — Regional cooperation
The Commission accepts this recommendation
Reply of the Commission 55
75
The Commission would like to point out that, where political dialogue has had limited impact on the rule of law, this 
has been primarily due to the lack of political commitment on the part of the national authorities.
Recommendation  5 — Political dialogue
The Commission accepts this recommendation.

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Event Date
Adoption of the audit planning memorandum/Start of audit 10.3.2015
Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 6.6.2016
Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 12.7. 2016
Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages 31.8.2016
The EU Western Balkan enlargement policy has dealt with 
six European countries which have historically been 
affected by serious ethnic, political and economic conflicts 
and aspire to join the EU.
The Court assessed whether the Commission’s management 
of the IPA in the Western Balkans in the key areas of rule of 
law and public administration was effective and whether it 
actually did strengthen administrative capacity in the 
region. In addition, the Court examined the achievements 
of the EU–Western Balkan political dialogue in 
strengthening administrative capacity.
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS