EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 10 February 2014  
on the reduction of statutory remuneration for senior officials in the public and semi -public sector  
(CON /2014 /12)  
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 16 December 2013 , the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on standards for 
remuneration for senior officials in the public and semi-public sector1 (hereinafter the ‘draft law ’). 
The ECB’ s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union  and the third  indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions2 as the draft law relates to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). In accordance with the 
first sentence of Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 
Counci l has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The draft law uses the remuneration of a minister as the basis for the calculation of the 
remuneration of senior officials and sets a limit on the salaries for senior officials to a maximum of 
100% of a minister’s salary, rather than the current limit of 130%. Although  the wording  of the 
draft law does not explicitly mention  DNB senior officials , the definition of ‘senior officials’ in the 
draft law makes it clear that the  DNB officials fall unde r the definition of the draft law.  
1.2 The draft law lays down a transitional arrangement that distinguishes between two categories of 
senior officials . The first category consists of  those senior officials whose remuneration on 
1 January 2013 exceeded the  current statutory remuneration maximum of 130% of a minister’s 
salary (€ 228,599).  This remuneration will remain unchanged  for four years, and then it will be 
reduced over a period of three years to 130% . Following this three -year period , their remuneration 
will be reduced over two years to 100% . The second category consists  of senior officials whose 
remuneration was at or below the current statutory remuneration maximum of 130% of a minister’s 
salary, but above the proposed remuneration maximum of 100%. Their remuneration will remain 
unchanged for four years, and will subseq uently be reduced over the following three years to the 
new statutory remuneration maximum of 100%.  
                                                 
1 Wet normering bezoldiging topfunctionarissen publieke en semipublieke sector (‘WNT’).  
2  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
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2 1.3 The Law on standards for remuneration of senior officials in the public and semi-public sector3, 
which the draft law proposes to amend, already introduc ed a limit on the remuneration f or these  
senior officials , with effect from 1 January 2013 . The salary component of the remuneration was 
set at € 187  3404. The ECB was not consulted on this law despite the fact that it also applied to 
DNB officials . 
 
2. General observations  
The ECB understands that, as set out in the explanatory memorandum  attached to the draft law , there is 
an economic and social need for the Dutch government to limit  the maximum remuneration for senior 
officials, taking into account econo mic circumstances in the Netherlands  and internationally, a s well as  
the Dutch Government’s current efforts to s tabilise public finances5. According to the explanatory 
memorandum, the rationale of the draft law is not to reduce salaries, but rather to brin g the remuneration 
of senior officials in the Netherlands to more socially acceptable, balanced and responsible levels.  
The transit ional arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1.2 above allow s the senior  officials affected a 
reasonable time to adjust to the ir new financial situation or to find alternative employment . Since the 
decrease in remuneration may have  significant  financial consequences  for the senior officials , such a  
transitional period is welcome . Respecting the current remuneration system  in place  for four years and 
then reducing it over three years also creates transparency . 
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1. Financial independence  
3.1.1  The ECB Convergence Reports and several ECB opinions6 have elaborated on specific issues 
relevant to central bank autonomy in staff matters . With regard to the financial independence  of a 
national central bank (NCB) , Member States may not impair an NCB’s ability to employ and retain 
the qualified staff necessary  for the NCB to perform independently the task s conferred on  it by the 
Treaty and  the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 
Furthermore, an NCB may not be put into a position where it has  limited or no control over its 
staff, or where the government of a Member State is i n a position to influence the NCB’s policy on 
staff matters.  
3.1.2  Article 7(3) of the draft law introduces a sliding -scale to reduce the remuneration of DNB senior 
officials. To protect DNB’s  autonomy in staff matters, the Dutch authorities should ensure that any 
amendment to the legislative provisions on remuneration for members of DNB’s decision -making 
                                                 
3  Law of 15 November 2012, published in the Staatsblad (Government Gazette) nr. 583 (2012). 
4  This amount is based on the gross salary of a minister multiplied by 130%. The other remuneration components are an 
employer’s share of social premiums, taxable expenses and pension entitlements. 
5   See Opinion CON/2009/47. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
6  See Opinions CON/2008/9, CON/2008/10, CON/2009/45, CON/2009/4 7, CON/2010/42 and CON/2010/51.  
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3 bodies and staff is decided in close and effective cooperation with DNB, taking due account of 
DNB’s views, to ensure the ongoing ability of DNB to indepe ndently carry out its tasks7. 
3.2. Personal independence of the members of DNB’s decision -making bodies  
Article 130 of the Treaty prohibits, inter alia , national governments from influencing the members 
of NCBs’ decision -making bodies in the performance of  their tasks. The draft law will affect not 
only DNB’s senior officials but, more generally, all senior officials in the public and semi -public 
sector. The ECB understands that t he draft law forms part of a broader legislative reform that seeks 
to reduce r emuneration for all employees in the public and semi -public sectors . Additionally, the 
draft law provides for  a transitional period before changes in the remuneration apply.  However , 
Member States may also not seek to influence the members of the NCB’s dec ision -making bodies 
by amending national legislation affecting their remuneration, which, as a matter of principle, 
should not affect the terms under which they have been appointed . Consequently, the draft law 
should specifically provide that such an amend ment should apply only for future appointments8. 
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 February 2014 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
7  See the ECB’s  Convergence Report, 2013, p.27.  
8  See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2013, p. 23 and Opinions CON/2011/104, CON/2011/106, CON/2008/10 and 
CON/2010/42.