EN    EN EN 
 
EN 1   EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 29.10.2009 
SEC(2009) 1478 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
accompanying the  
 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
  
on investigation and prevention of a ccidents and incidents in civil aviation 
 
SUMMARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
  
{COM(2009) 611 final} 
{SEC(2009) 1477} 
 
EN 2   EN 1. BACKGROUND  
This Impact Assessment (IA) analyses different policy options to assist the 
Commission in the revision of Council Directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 19941 
and Directive 2003/42/EC2. 
It results from the recommendations of the "Group of Experts to advise the 
Commission on a strategy to d eal with accidents in the transport sector" (Group of 
Experts)3, studies and reports, consultations  with Member States (MS) and 
stakeholders, as well as recommendations  on the "Action Programme for Reducing 
Administrative Burdens"4.  
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. Current regulatory framework 
Civil aviation has well established traditions  in accident inves tigation and occurrence 
reporting. The obligation to investigate acc idents is enshrined in the Chicago 
Convention of 1944. 
Recognising the importance of accident investigation, the EU adopted Directive 
94/56/EC while Directive 2003/42/EC on occu rrence reporting was adopted in 2003. 
They significantly contributed to  harmonisation accident prevention. 
2.2. Need for change 
The current Community system functions below optimum. Directive 94/56/EC, now 
15 years old, no longer meets the requi rements of the EU and of the MS: 
(1) There is more divergence in the investigating capacity of the MS than in 
1994, notably due to the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007; 
(2) Aircraft are becoming increasingly complex and accident investigation 
requires more expertise and resources; 
(3) The EU common aviation market grew both in size and complexity in the last 
decade; 
(4) This increase in the complexity of the single aviation market also called for 
increased responsibilit y of the Community in  aviation safety and 
establishment of EASA;  
(5) The EU and its MS gained significant  practical experien ces since 1994, which 
should be used to strengt hen the current system; 
2.3. Specific problems 
Lack of a uniform investigating capacity  
                                                 
1 OJ L 319, 12.12.1994, p.14. 
2 OJ L 167, 4.7.2003, p.23. 
3 Final report of the Group of expert s to advise the Commission on a stra tegy to deal with accidents in the 
transport sector, Brussels 3.7.2006; it was established on the basis of the Commission Decision EC/425/2003, OJ L 144, 12.06.2003, p. 10-11. 
4 The programme was launched in January 2007 as part of the Better Regulation Strategy of the 
Commission. 
 
EN 3   EN Although the EU as a whole has enough i nvestigating capacity, the resources 
available are not used efficiently. Smaller MS lack appropriate resources and the experience and qualifications of inve stigators and of the National Safety 
Investigation Authorities (NSI As) is also not uniform. 
Tensions between safety investigations and other proceedings 
Although the principle of independent sa fety investigations is accepted and 
recognised in principle, ther e are tensions between the NS IAs and judicial authorities 
and the independent status of the invest igation and the protection of collected 
sensitive information cannot be always guaranteed. 
Unclear role of the Community in safety investigations 
An issue of fundamental importance is the role of the Community in accident 
investigation. EASA, which ca rries out on behalf of the MS the functions and tasks 
of the State of Design, Manuf acture and Registry when related to design approval 
was established in 2002. This increased signif icantly the role and responsibilities of 
the Community in aviation safety. 
These changes affect the division of responsibilities between the MS and the 
Community, but their consequences were  not reflected so far in the way 
investigations are organised. As confirmed by  a recent audit of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation of EASA, this creates unacceptable safety risks, in particular 
since the Agency is responsible for certifying aircraft. 
Weaknesses in implementati on of safety recommendations 
There is still no consistent approach in the EU to the processing and implementation 
of safety recommendations resulting from  investigations. There is no common 
requirement for recording the responses and monitoring the pr ogress of the action 
taken in response to a safety recommendation. 
Assistance to the families of the vict ims of air accidents and their families 
While air crashes in commercial aviation are relatively rare, once they occur a large 
umber of victims may be involved. The victims and their families should receive appropriate assistance. Therefore, planning is necessary to ensure that the needed 
assistance does not overwhelm the available resources. 
In addition if proper procedures are not im plemented and regularly tested, it may be 
difficult to ensure rapid availability of lists of "all souls on board", essential in facilitating search and rescue, identifi cation and notification of the families. 
3. A
NALYSIS OF SUBSIDIARITY  
The Community competence to regulate ac cident investigation and occurrence 
reporting was established by Directiv es 94/56/EC and 2003/42/EC. Further 
intervention would be jus tified only if the proposed act ion could not be achieved 
sufficiently by the MS.  
Community action is both n ecessary and justified to: 
– Ensure the necessary uniformity of action needed in aviation safety; 
– Allow to address the institutional inefficiencies, i.e. clarification of the role of 
EASA and the Commission in accident investigation; 
 
EN 4   EN 3.1. The added value of th e Community Action 
Community action would bri ng additional benefits by: 
– Increasing the investigat ion capacity of the EU; 
– Reducing tensions between the authorit ies involved in th e investigation; 
– Updating the regulatory fram ework for investigation; 
– Strengthening uniform implementation of safety recommendations; 
– Strengthening the protection of the rights of victims and their families; 
3.2. The proportionality of the Community action 
Any Community intervention should be proportionate and addressing only the 
problems which cannot be adequately solved by the MS.  
Given the limitations in the investigating capacity of NSIAs, both Community and 
national resources should focu s on investigation of even ts from which the biggest 
safety benefits can be obtained. 
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE INITIATIVE  
The objective of the presente d policy options is the enhancement of aviation safety, 
in line with the strategic goals set out in the Mid-te rm review of the EC’s 2001 
Transport White Paper. 
Accident investigation also requires lega l certainty. When an accident happens the 
roles and rights and obligation of all the par ties have to be known in advance. One of 
the important objectives of the Community s hould be thus to strengthen the required 
legal certainty. 
To reveal all circumstances of an accident , the NSIA must be objective, impartial and 
able to withstand polit ical or other interf erence or pressure. It s only objective should 
be the enhancement of safety, and the inve stigation should be independent from any 
other proceedings which could conflict with this objective. Thus, it is important that 
the principle of independence of investigations is fully respected by all the options 
analysed in this IA. 
5. POLICY OPTIONS  
The Impact Assessment analyses four possible options: 
Option 1 "Baseline Scenario - Do Nothing" 
This option is a reference scenario, wher eby no new actions w ould be taken beyond 
the already ongoing initiatives. . Based on th e evidence available, such a scenario 
would not allow to meet any of the polic y objectives and would not be acceptable 
from the public safety point of view. 
Option 2 "Promotion of voluntary cooperation" 
Under this option the Community would promote voluntary cooperation between the 
NSIAs. This would not involve new legislative action. 
It is based on the resources of the MS and the experiences of the informal grouping 
of the NSIA (“the Council of European Avia tion Safety Investigation Authorities”). 
The Commission would engage in a dialogue with this gr ouping. Specific support of 
 
EN 5   EN the Commission could be provided through an  annual grant to manage a number of 
central functions, e.g. a mechanism for sh aring of resources or coordination of 
training. 
Option 3 "European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities" 
This option, similarly to th e previous one, would be ba sed on promotion of voluntary 
cooperation and resources available in the MS . However, in this case the mandate of 
the grouping of the NSIAs, transformed in to a European Network of Civil Aviation 
Safety Investigation Authorities ("the Ne twork"), would be embedded in a legally 
binding framework.  
"The Network" would contribu te to greater uniformity and better implementation of 
the Community accident investigation legi slation. It would reta in an independent 
status and its mandate, strictly describe d in the Regulation, would be limited to 
advisory and coordination tasks.  
"The Network", would constitute a body pursuing an aim of general European 
interest, allowing the Community to support its activities with an annual grant awarded subject to an annual work pr ogramme agreed w ith the Commission. 
This option would allow addressing the drawbacks of a solution based solely on 
voluntary cooperation, and notably  the lack of legal certainty. This would better 
protect sensitive safety information, define  the mutual rights and obligations of 
NSIAs and EASA and establish uniform requi rements for the processing of safety 
recommendations. 
Option 4 “European Civil Aviation Safety Board" 
The last option to address the issues identi fied in 2 above would be to establish a 
European Civil Aviation Safety Board ("the ESB"). 
The ESB would be established as a Community agency for accident investigation, 
similar to the U.S. National Transportati on Safety Board. It would actually conduct 
investigations in the EU a nd participate in investiga tions in third countries. 
Under this option the NSIAs would be either replaced by the ESB or the NSIAs 
would be responsible only for investigation of smaller accidents of private aircraft, 
and acting as national offices of the ESB, thus providing a link w ith local authorities. 
6. A
SSESSMENT OF IMPACTS  
Option 2 "Promotion of voluntary cooperation" 
This option relies on the existing coope ration between the NS IAs. It does not 
establish new Community structures and builds on the available resources. The implementation risks and admini strative burden of this optio n is thus expected to be 
negligible. The mechanism for sharing of resources, or coordination of training on 
specific issues is expected to bring savings and economies of scale and reduce the overall costs of NSIAs without involving additional costs or administrative burden 
for the industry. 
Option 3"European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities" 
Similarly to the previous op tion, the establishment of “t he Network”, although in this 
case enshrined in law, would not necessita te establishment of new structures or 
significant additional administrative burde n for the Community, NSIAs or industry. 
 
EN 6   EN It would be based on the existing informal  cooperation and resources of the MS. The 
main cost for the Community budget would be the annual gran t to support "the 
Network". 
Although some additional costs and admini strative burdens are expected as 
compared to the previous option, its impl ementation option should result in overall 
net savings for the MS thanks to the establishment of a central mechanism for sharing of resources, coordination of traini ng and closer cooperation and exchange of 
data. This option would also provide more le gal certainty in issues  such as support of 
MS in accident inves tigation, access to information and responsibilities of the parties 
involved in the investigation.  
Compared with the previous option, the establishment of “the Network” would 
provide for additional benefits, by enshrining a number of important principles in a 
legally binding framework and giving a clear mandate to “the Network”. 
Option 4“European Civil Aviation Safety Board" 
This scenario would involve the most sign ificant overhaul of th e existing system. 
Investigation of all major accidents woul d be performed by a single, independent, 
specialised body. However, it is also char acterised by the highest implementation 
risks and cost for the Community budget. It  would necessitate a substantial overhaul 
of the regulatory framework and estab lishment of a new Community Agency. 
The administrative burden associated with this option would be also substantially 
higher than for the previous options (obligation to fulfil all the requirements of the 
EU law related to financial issues, staffing policy, internal audit, procurement policy etc). This option would however offe r the biggest savings for the MS. 
It is difficult to assess if implementation of this option would not be hampered by the 
fact that the ESB would have  to operate in 27 different jurisdictions, having in mind 
the close link between judicial procedures and accident investigations and the need 
for the investigators to work in close cooperation with the local law enforcement 
authorities. 
These risks could be mitigated by having the ESB assisted by NSIAs which would 
act as its regional offices. This would how ever increase the costs of this option. 
7. C
OMPARISON OF OPTIONS  
7.1. Overview 
Option 2 offers moderate safety benefits  at a reasonable cost  for the Community 
budget, while offering savings for th e MS. The administrative burden of 
implementation of this option is negligible . It also does not impose additional costs 
on the industry. 
Option 3 offers additional safety benefits  as compared to promotion of voluntary 
cooperation. However it is also characteri sed by additional implementation risks. The 
costs of implementation for the Community  budget are comparable to "Promotion of 
Voluntary Cooperation". The ad ministrative burden and the costs for the MS may be 
however higher than for the previous scenario. 
The last option offers the highest safety benefits as compared to the other two 
options. However, it is characterised by the risks and costs for the Community 
 
EN 7   EN budget. Although the administrativ e burden involved in this option is expected to be 
the highest, it is also envisaged that it would bring the biggest savings for the MS. 
 
 "Voluntary cooperation" "the Network" "ESB" 
Safety benefits √ (4) √√ (8) √√√ (12) 
Implementation risks 0 - √√ (-4) - √√√√  (-8) 
Economic, social and 
environmental impacts  √ (1) √√ (2) √√√ (3) 
Impact on fundamental 
rights √ (1) √√ (2) √√√ (3) 
Annual costs for the 
Community 600.000€ (small) 600.000€ (small) around 40 million € 
(high) 
Annual costs for the MS Expenditures up to 
600.000€ for all the MS 
(co-financing of the grant) 
√ (net savings) Expenditures up 
to 600.000€ for 
all the MS (co-
financing of the 
grant) 
√ (net savings) √√ to √√√ (net savings) 
Costs for the industry 0 0 0 
Administrative burden 0 (negligible) √ (small) √√ (moderate) 
7.2. Option with the biggest added value 
Option 3, "Establishment of the Europ ean Network of Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation Authorities" has the biggest added value for the Community. It is the 
most proportional option, fully respecting the principle of  independence of safety 
investigations and allowing, without esta blishing new Community structures, to 
enhance the efficiency of accident investigation in the EU. 
This option addresses the problem areas identified, without going beyond what is 
strictly necessary. It can be  implemented with relatively low cost for the Community, 
and is expected to reduce the costs of the MS while resulting in little additional administrative burden. 
By lending supporting to the existing volunt ary cooperation between NSIAs, it is 
also expected to have support from the stakeholders and MS . The regulatory 
elements of this option, enshrined in the Regulation, were also supported in the 
public consultations and by the "Group of Experts". Criteria Weighting Criteria Weighting 
Safety impacts √ = 4 points Economic, social and environmental impacts √ = 1 point 
Implementation 
Risks -√ = - 2 points Impact on fundamental rights √ = 1 point 
 
EN 8   EN There are limited implementation risks, not ably when compared to option 4, not 
expected to jeopardise the envisaged policy objectives. 
This option, by relying on co-regulation and support fo r voluntary cooperation, is 
also in line with the EU object ives of "Better Regulation". . 
8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
Indicators and methods allowing to measur e progress towards the achievement of the 
desired objectives under the preferred option will need to be established including 
indicators such as the leve l of support provided by the central mechanism for sharing 
of resources or the number of safety recommendations registered/closed in the 
central database. 
The administrative burden associated with th ese reporting obligations is not expected 
to be high. MS already provide to the Comm ission most of the information, including 
occurrence reports and final reports from the investigations.