EN    EN  
 EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION 
Brussels, 5.5.2014  
COM(2014) 247 final 
  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
on a new EU approach to the detectio n and mitigation of CBRN-E risks 
 
 
2 
 I. CONTEXT  
The EU, its Member States and other key partners have undertaken numerous activities to 
improve the ability to prevent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and 
explosives incidents and protect citizens, institutions and infrastructure against such incidents. 
More needs to be done however. Following the progress reports
1 under the EU CBRN Action 
Plan2 and under the Action Plan on Enhanci ng the Security of Explosives in 20123, extensive 
consultation took place with Member States and other stakeholders on how best to address 
these issues. A new CBRN-E Agenda was set out to  focus on key priorities  to be addressed at 
EU level. 
The Council in its conclusions adopted on 11 D ecember 2012 "underlines the need to identify 
areas with insufficient security arrangements an d to focus on and prioritise further common 
efforts to enhance the security of production, storage,  handling and transpor tation of high-risk 
CBRN and E materials. Furthermore the Council  encourages the Commission "to use the EU 
Chemical, Biological, Radiol ogical and Nuclear Action Pla n, and the Action Plan on 
Enhancing the Security of Explosives, as  a foundation for creating a revised policy."4  
This communication is a first step in impl ementing the new CBRN-E Agenda. It aims to 
bring about progress in the area of detection of CBRN-E threats,  and put effective measures 
in place for detecting and mitigating these threats and risks at EU level.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES  
II.1 A changing threat and risk environment 
Protecting citizens, institutions, infrastructures a nd assets is one of the four key pillars of the 
EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy5.  An EU approach to CBRN-E threats must also take into 
account the EU’s Intern al Security Strategy6,  with detecting and mitigating CBRN-E risks 
among its key objectives. 
Recent developments – as evidenced by reports from INTCEN7 or Interpol – give good 
reasons to believe that the threat from CBRN materials and explosives remains high and 
is evolving . Events such as the terrorist attack s in Madrid, London and Moscow, and the 
bombings during the Boston Marathon last year, as well as recent advice to  jihadists to target 
crowded places8, have shown how innovative and opportuni stic attackers can be and that 
threats to public events and urban security must be better detected. Even though terrorists 
have tended to use commercial or homemade expl osives, CBRN agents such as sarin, ricin or 
                                                            
1 Progress Report on the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan, May 2012 (public version): 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affair s/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/securing-dangerous-
material/docs/eu_cbrn_action_plan_progress_report_en.pdf  
Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Action Plan on enhancing the security of Explosives (public 
version): http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/explosives/docs/progress_report_on_explosives_security_2012_en.pdf  
2 Council document  15505/1/09 REV 1 
3 Council document  Doc. 8109/08 
4 Council document  16980/12 
5 Council document  14469/4/05 REV 4 
6 COM(2010) 673 final 
7 EU Intelligence Analysis Centre 
8 The 12th (Spring 2014) issue of the Al-Q uaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on -line magazine “Inspire” advices 
jihadists to target crowded places such as sports events , tourist hotspots, election rallies, and festivals  using 
vehicle borne improvised explosive devices 
 
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 anthrax also represent a serious threat. Ever since the Tokyo metro chemical agent (sarin) 
attack in 1995 and the biological agent (salmonella) att ack in Oregon in 19849,  terrorist 
groups have attempted to acquire capabilities  to handle and operate CBRN materials. The 
recent use of sarin gas in Syria has also brought this issue to the fore. 
Thefts and misplacements of CBRN materials occur on hundreds of occasions each year. 
Recent seizures of highly enri ched uranium (in Georgia in 2 010 and Moldova in 2011) show 
that the trafficking of radiolog ical and nuclear materials con tinues to be a serious problem. 
More than 150 such cases are reported annually to the Intern ational Atomic Energy Agency’s 
(IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB ). The many examples of illicit trafficking 
cases highlight the need to develop effective countermeasures that are not merely based on 
preventing traffickers from gaini ng access to such materials, but also on effective detection 
strategy.  
Threats can also emanate from highly qualified individuals  who have access to sensitive 
information and materials, such as the senior  bio-defence researcher  carrying out medical 
research for the US military who allegedly perpetrated the 2001 anthrax attacks, or the 
French scientist from CERN10 who was convicted of helping Al-Qaeda carry out attacks in 
France.  
The EU debate on radicalisation recently intensif ied. Latest reports suggest that of particular 
concern are returnees from Syri a. Some of these and other radicalised individuals, having 
access to and working in sensitive areas might use their insider knowledge to strike against 
critical infrastructures, such as a water pu rification plant, or they may disable railways 
electrical power supplies. Such insider threat s may have transnational impacts and therefore 
also pose threats to EU security.  
A recent example of a soft target attack  is the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, where the 
young attackers, utilised an old bomb making me thod. This example as well as the earlier 
metro and rail attacks highlight the need to enhance the detection of threats.  
While work at national level continues to play a vital role in the fight against terrorism, a 
robust, better designed, and proportionat e strategy to anticipate and deter  future 
CBRN-E risks at EU level  is needed, including tackling illegal methods of production, 
handling, concealing and storing these materials.  
It is therefore important to adopt a proactiv e approach and to put effective, proportional 
safeguards in place, including prevention , preparedness and response measures at EU 
level, while respecting fundamental rights. 
 
II.2  Achievements and ongoing work at EU level  
The EU and its Member States have already done a lot to address CBRN-E priorities. For 
instance, the establishment of database tools such as the European Bomb Data System (EBDS) and the Early Warning System (EWS), as well as the activities of the European 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal network (EE ODN). Another example is the new Regulation 
(98/2013) on the marketing and use of Explosives precursors, which aims to restrict access to 
dangerous precursors for members of the public.  
                                                            
9 1984 religious cult Rajneeshee bioterror attack was the largest biological attack in the US history poisoning 
more than 750 persons. 
10 The European Organisation for Nuclear Research 
 
4 
 In addition to research, training and awareness raising, a number of practical activities have 
been carried out to identify and share best pr actices, test and trial new equipment, develop 
guidance for practitioners, etc.  
Progress has been made in all areas, but th e recent evaluations of the two CBRNE action 
plans showed that there is a need to  do more, to prioritise and better focus on key areas of 
EU added value .   
II.3  Need to address CBRN-E risks at EU level  
Several post-attack investigations have show n that explosive materials and precursors to 
make explosives had been purchased in one Member State  and transferred to another  
Member State  where the attacks took place. Interpol ’s monthly CBRN-E intelligence reports 
also show numerous examples of attempts to acquire, smuggle or use CBRN-E materials. 
Attacks using CBRN substances, such as the ca se of the Litvinenko radiological poisoning , 
have shown that CBRN threat substances have  been carried undetected in and out of the 
European Union. Serious radiological or nuclear in cidents, or the intentional dissemination of 
bio-agents (such as SARS, H1N1 or foot-and -mouth disease virus), c ould severely affect 
people and economies across Europe. 
The 2012 EU Gap Analysis on Detection of Explosives , carried out as part of the explosives 
action plan, highlights numerous shortcomings in  the detection of expl osive threats, despite 
technological advances, and pinpoi nting an urgent need to st rengthen the EU’s detection 
capability. The report, based on a review of security measures, equipment and processes 
using state-of-the-art technology, urges further review and stre sses the need to strengthen 
measures in the different areas of public secu rity. On the basis of this gap analysis, the 
Commission also launched in 2013 an EU Gap Analysis on Detecti on of CBRN threat agents .  
CBRN-E threats and risks are common to all EU Member States. The EU is therefore well 
placed to play a central role by helping  to detect and mitigate such threats and by ensuring 
that: i) priority is given to the most seri ous threat areas, ii) these problems are tackled 
collectively, iii) there is no duplication a nd iv) economies of scale and synergies are 
maximised. 
The EU can add value by developing practical and effect ive tools for practitioners, 
ranging from workshops, guidance materials, tr aining and awareness raising to supporting 
research and testing activities. One example is the support provided for the collaboration — 
under the auspices of the ATLAS network — of  the EU police special  intervention forces 
which train and operate together. 
 
III. A  NEW APPROACH TO THE DETECTION AND MITIGATION OF CBRN-E  RISKS  
The objectives  of this Communication are to be tter assess the risks, to develop 
countermeasures, to share knowledge and best practices, test and va lidate new safeguards 
with the ultimate goal of adopti ng new security standards.   
The following issues need to be addressed in any effective mitigation strategy: - The effectiveness and performance of existing equipment and processes; 
- New threat substances ; 
- New modus operandi  for attacks; 
- New concealment methods  to attempt to by-pass security controls; 
 
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 - New attack targets  (soft targets, critical infrastructures, public areas, non-aviation areas)  
The new approach will be put into practice step by step, taking into account each type of 
threat and environment, with the aim  to: 
- improve the detection of risks; - improve the usage of results of re search, testing and validation;   
- promote awareness raising, trai ning sessions a nd exercises; 
- promote Lead Country initiati ves and engage with industry  and other stakeholders in 
security; 
- take into account the extern al dimension, when appropriate. 
Throughout the process it is important to involv e all stakeholders, such as academia, private 
sector or civil protection author ities, in the wo rk and to provide suffici ent financial support to 
ensure that the activities and policies in this  area are properly implemented. Under each of 
the five aspects listed above, actions to whic h work done by the EU w ill add value will be 
identified.   
 
III.1 Better detection  
In the past, our threat preventio n strategy has typically  been based on hist orical data relating 
to attacks. Protection measures have often been  introduced after the perpetration of attacks or 
the discovery of plots, and we have not b een proactive enough in developing an effective 
threat detection and mitigation strategy. 
An effective threat detection strategy can be achieved only if the threat substances and the 
environment (aviation, public sports areas, etc. ) are taken into account during its development 
and review.  
The approaches used in the past , whereby we try to adjust a s ecurity technology or process to 
the specific threat, do not work. S pecific risk-based approaches must be considered for 
each protection mission , including a range of different activities designed to effectively 
detect the different threats. Each environmen t we intend to protect should be carefully 
analysed and the measures considered should no t only take into account historical data, but 
also ways of mitigating emerging threats.  
Any EU detection strategy should build on identi fied gaps such as hi ghlighted in the 2012 EU 
Gap Analysis on the Detection of Explosives. A recent assessment also indicates that, in spite 
of significant progress in recen t years, a lot of work still n eeds to be done to efficiently 
address shortcomings in detection  technology in the differen t areas of public security, 
including transport. The activities need theref ore to tackle the weaknesses identified and 
develop realistic solutions for the risks that we mitigate. 
"Insiders" can pose a specific challenge regarding the CBRN-E threat and more measures 
against insider CBRN threats  are needed. For instance, on e of the actions  under the CBRN 
action plan asks the Commission and Member States to look at how to improve the security 
vetting of personnel.  The proper vetting of personnel involved in the whole life-cycle of 
explosives and CBRN materials is  crucial for addressing the i ssue of insider threats. A study 
has been done on the subject, which recommends taking steps to harmonise vetting procedures for CBRN-E industries, starting w ith adopting best practices for background 
checks and security vetting. Sinc e security check pr ocesses are the competence of Member 
States, the Commission will work closely with them to tackle these issues.  
 
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 The Commission has been working with end-users  such as private entities and the law 
enforcement community to creat e better awareness of technol ogy capacity. It has done so 
through workshop-based activities in which la w enforcement and other officials have 
received classified information about the lim itations of security technology and processes. 
We must however do more to involve the end-us er and practitioners in the detection design 
process in the future. Lessons learned dur ing the UK Olympics and the 2012 European 
football championship in Poland highlighted th is key message from the law enforcement 
community: one detection tool is not always enough, and the combination of tools, such as 
behaviour detection analyses in combination with explosive detection dogs, can make the 
system perform better. The det ection mission needs to dictate what tool to use, and not the 
other way round.  
The Commission, together with practiti oners, is also ca rrying out various practical trials in 
areas which laboratory environments cannot re produce. The aim is to evaluate and test 
technology, products and processe s considering different detec tion objectives in order to 
make detection more effective. An example of such a trial is ‘the testing of CBRN-E detection equipment in conjunc tion with the Polish authorities during the 2012 European 
football championship’. Building on this, the Commission teamed up with the Belgian police 
to test CBRN-E detection equipment during the EU-Africa summit in early April 2014. The 
trial involved detection activitie s on the site of the summit a nd in the Belgian metro, high-
speed train and airport environment. 
The Commission will 
- support further short-term trials for practi tioners in order to improve detection during 
future sport, cultural and ot her large-scale events, such as the 2016 European football 
championship; ultimately leading to creation of an EU approach to public events security 
- review and build on the gap analysis on the detection of explosives  
- carry out a gap analysis on the detection of CBRN materials 
- prepare analytical papers and overviews of  CBRN and explosives threats and risks in 
different areas of public security, including transport to support policy 
- organize and support more actions dealing with  the issue of insider threats, such as 
workshops, awareness-raising activitie s and providing guidance on the subject. 
- include CBRN risks in the 'cross-sectoral overview of natural and man-made risks the 
Union may face' that the Commission must establish and update 
- build on existing EU networks , and explore together with Member States the establishment 
of a civil-military coopera tion group in the areas of a)  detection technologies, and b) 
methods to counter improvised explosive d evices, man-portable air defence systems 
(MANPADs) and other relevant thre ats, such as CBRNE threats11 
 
III. 2 Using better research, testing and validation 
Member States, academia, industry and other stak eholders should work together to pinpoint 
and define the needs  that CBRN-E research should meet. The Commission has funded many 
research activities under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). The results need to be 
                                                            
11 As also stated in COM(2013)542 final; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector 
 
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 better disseminated and turned into useful  commercial products. The new research 
programme Horizon 2020 should respond better to policy needs and the needs of end-users. 
The Commission will play a key role in this regard. 
1. So far, around €  200 million of funding has been allo cated to 60 CBRN-related projects 
under FP7. Apart from that, over €  67 million was allocated to more than 15 projects 
focusing on explosives. Examples of these are PREVAIL ( PRecursors of ExplosiVes: 
Additives to Inhibit their use including Liquids )12 and the large-scale demonstration project 
EDEN13, highly relevant to the policy and practical work on CBRN-E.  
2. The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)  also provides scientific support for 
CBRN-E policy needs. 
For instance, it has long-stand ing experience on nuclear safet y, safeguards and security, has 
participated in many research projects and coll aborated with key partners. For example, in 
cooperation with US partners, it implemented  the ITRAP+10 project (Illicit Trafficking 
Radiation Detection Assessment Programme), which aimed to test and evaluate the 
performance of different radia tion detection equipment. The results could help Member State 
authorities identify detection equipment wh ich best corresponds to their needs. The 
manufacturers have also received recommen dations on how to improve the equipment’s 
performance, reliability and use r-friendliness. This work will continue to be supported by the 
Commission. 
JRC is also implementing a project aiming at improving of the IAEA's Incident and 
Trafficking Database (ITDB). T ogether with Member States, JRC has prepared a set of best 
practices on how to improve the ITDB's repor ting culture and hence the quality of data 
available to the IAEA. Moreover, JRC is devel oping a secure protocol in order to make on-
line reporting to the ITDB possible.  
3. The Commission has also put in place cooperation between several law enforcement 
networks . The aim is for the networks to better articulate their needs for new technology, and 
to see if ENLETS (European Network of La w Enforcement Technology Services) could be 
used as a hub for the law enforcement networks  to inform researchers and industry of them. 
4. To complement FP7 research activities and support certification and standardisation efforts 
in different areas, the Commission has been doing trials and tests  on new equipment. Trials 
with existing state-of-the-art technology are being launched to  find out how it can be best 
adapted to each sector’s needs. Airport expe riences should serve as  examples of best 
practices which could be a pplied to other sectors. 
                                                            
12 PREVAIL, supported by FP7 with an amount of € 4.3 m illion, was the first project in  the 'prevent' strand of 
the EU CBRN Action Plan. It addressed the security proble m posed by chemicals that are available to the public 
because of their everyday legitimate uses, but that can be misuse d towards the manufacturing of home-made 
explosives. A first goal of PREVAIL was to limit the usef ulness of these everyday chemicals as explosives or 
explosives precursors, by identifying inhibitors which can be added to them. A second goal of PREVAIL was to 
improve the detectability of fertiliser-based homemade explosives, by finding markers that can be added to 
fertilisers and developing detectors for those markers.  PREVAIL thus  directly supported EU policy by 
inhibiting the precursor potential of certain everyday chem icals, limiting the availability of explosive precursors, 
and improving their detectability and tracking 
13 The flagship FP7 project on CBRN is the large scale demonstration project EDEN (with 39 partners, € 24 
million EU contribution). The EDEN project will leverage  the added-value of tools and systems from previous 
R&D efforts and improve CBRNE resilience through their adaptation and integration. The concept of the EDEN 
project is to provide a “toolbox of  toolboxes” EDEN Store to give stakeholders access to interoperable 
capabilities they deem important, or affordable, from a cer tified set of applications. It will share the burden of 
development and allows for lessons to be learned and applications to be enhanced. 
 
8 
  The trials focus on setting out in detail how the practitioners should use different equipment 
and processes in different envir onments (transport, public securit y, sports events, etc.). They 
will also give practitioners and Member States  input for further refi ning the tools used to 
detect threats in their countries. 
5. The Commission is also carrying out numerous  activities in this area to ensure the 
harmonised development of standards and testi ng procedures. Appropria te threat- and risk-
based detection standards need to be developed and applied acr oss the EU, so that all its 
citizens have the same level of protection. Su ch standards would also  help the technology 
suppliers to better understand specif ic law enforcement requirements. 
Detection standards for responding to known att acks are well developed. However, military 
technology, practices and experiences should also be considered and adapted – where 
appropriate - to civilian applic ations. Law enforcement should work together with military in 
order to exchange experience and find best solutions to common problems.  
The Commission will 
- continue to ensure that research takes security policy needs into account, and help develop 
the programming so that the research prioriti es reflect law enforcement and other end-user 
needs, as well as policy needs . 
- further support CBRN-E research, testing and  validation activities, and progress towards 
appropriate detection standards adap ted to each type of environm ent, including projects such 
as ERNCIP (European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection)  
- continue to support ITRAP Phase 2, the follow-up project that will for th e first time assess 
the feasibility of inte grating radiological and nuclear ri sks and explosives de tection in the 
same device. It also helps Member States’ labo ratories obtain accredit ation in the detection 
of radiological and nuclear risks, evaluate ne w equipment for detect ing radiological and 
nuclear risks and enabling the definition, in close coll aboration with the various 
standardisation organisations, Europe an or international standards. 
 
III.3. Training, awareness and capacity building 
Effective training and awareness raising amo ng the security community is essential for 
properly implementing security measures. The Commission therefore needs to provide more 
funding for and improve training initiatives  that provide the law enforcement community 
and private industry with the appropriate training support. Below are some examples: 
- support the European Explosives Ordnance Disposal Network  (EEODN) , which offers 
Member States’ explosives experts an operational forum to share best practices and train in the areas of explosives and CBRN threats. 
- Improve training facilities for law enforcement practitioners  in order to help Member States 
deal with CBRN-E risks, for instance through different EU law enforcement networks (Atlas, Airpol, Railpol, Aquapol, etc). 
- to help develop a common approach for dealing with future soft target attacks, such as after 
the Burgas airport attack, the Commission is, together with Member States, developing an 
airport soft target guidance handbook. 
- improve civil-military cooperation, such as the joint European Defence Agency and 
Commission training  (in spring 2014) on man portable air defence systems  (MANPAD) 
 
9 
 vulnerability guidance and assessment methodology, which will take place in the context of 
the airport police network (Airpol).  
- the EU Customs Detection Technology Expert Group  that share information and best 
practices, with the aim of improving detection capability of CBRNE threats and performance 
standards of existing and new detection equipment. 
- training opportunities at the European Nuclear Security Training Centre  (EUSECTRA) in 
the areas of nuclear detection, response and nuc lear forensics. This will complement national 
training and be conducted in cooperation with part ners from Member States and international 
organizations. Training programs will comprise  multi-disciplinary aspects including law 
enforcement, radiation protec tion, and material analysis. 
 Efforts to improve awareness and capacity building  should also be stepped up. It should 
include more work on sharing best practices  and developing guidance. Example sof such 
activities are: 
1) ATLAS, the network of speci al intervention police units , is an excellent example of how the 
EU builds capacity and trust among these units, deployed when other measures fail. Support 
for such networks help the EU build its capacit y to be prepared for crises, create synergies 
and eliminate duplication among Member States in protecting EU citizens. 
2) The explosives detection dogs working group , a forum for practitioners, which has 
successfully promoted the sharing of best pr actices on training, depl oyment and certification 
including guidance materials a nd handbooks. It consists of Co mmission and Member States 
experts, as well as observers  from Canada and the US. 
3) Home-made explosives and the relative ea se with which materials for making bombs can 
be obtained, highlight the need to do more in this area and to swiftly implement the provisions 
of Regulation No 98/2013  on limiting illicit access to explosiv es precursors that can be used 
to make bombs. 
4) The human factor  is also important to consider. Be sides selection a nd basic training, 
processes such as alarm resolution, need to be  optimized and fine-tuned in order to ensure 
that we have skilled operators behind the equi pment, well trained and motivated to enhance 
the person’s performance, while maki ng full use of the technology at hand.  
  5) The recently adopted legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism
14 paves the way 
for the creation of a European Emergency Respons e Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool 
of pre-committed response capacities. This in cludes specific capacities dealing with CBRN 
incidents (e.g. CBRN detection and sampling modules and Urban Search and Rescue teams 
for CBRN conditions). 
                                                                                                                                  
The Commission will 
- further develop training tools, encourage th e sharing of best practices and develop 
guidance materials to support practitione rs with state-of-the-art training , in particular 
helping law enforcement practitioners improve their detection practices, for instance through 
the EEODN activities 
                                                            
14 Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924. 
 
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 - continue to raise awareness of the lim itations of explosives detection equipment 
- publish the EU airport soft target guidan ce handbook in mid-2014, which will be available 
to every police officer at EU airports who is a member of the airport police network, Airpol. 
- develop model quality control programmes for testing the effectiveness of explosives 
detection dogs (e.g. Belgium, Hungary, Italy); 
- provide MANPAD airport assessments training for members of Airpol; 
- help Member States develop explosives detec tion dog certification protocols, recognised as 
top global models; 
- improve its guidelines on impl ementing Regulation No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of 
explosives precursors; 
- address the human factor risks by promoting a programme to ensure that those who operate 
detection equipment are well trained and mo tivated, and improve communication between 
industry, security service providers and Member States through workshops and tools and 
improve the level of security.  
- ensure CBRN risks are taken properly into account in the development of the European 
Emergency Response Capacity 
- Closer links with training and exercises pr ovided in the framework of the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism should be explored 
- expand the portfolio of nuclear security rela ted training courses at the European Nuclear 
Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) 
 
 
III. 4. Promote more lead country in itiatives and work with industry 
The aim of the lead country initiatives  the Commission launched in 2012 is to get the 
Member States to implement the CBRN and explosives action plans more actively. The 
Commission invited them to sign up as lead count ries for actions they considered a priority 
and could coordinate their implem entation at the EU level. So far five initiatives have been 
launched or are about to be launched15.  
Lead country initiatives should be seen as a way of speeding up the st art-up phase of a major 
project. The initiatives cover a wide range of to pics. The first one resulted in a project on the 
security of sales of high-ri sk chemicals for which the Commission provided funding. Others 
tackle issues such as security arrangements in facilities handling and possessing high-risk biological agents and toxins, or bett er spread of research results.  
The Commission will enhance the dialogue with the private sector – such as operators of 
facilities handling CBRN-E materials, equipmen t manufacturers, and security services 
providers – to better understand its need s and concerns. The goal is to create an effective 
public-private dialogue  on CBRN-E threats and risks, simila r to what has been done with 
                                                            
15 Initiatives officially started:  
1. Actions C7 and C11 of the EU CBRN Action Plan; led by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
2. Actions B2 led by France 
3. Action H29 led by the United Kingdom 4. Action H63 led by Sweden in close cooperation with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
 
11 
 regard to explosives precursors, with the setting up the Standing Committee on Precursors. 
This committee includes both Member State authorities and industrial associations. 
 
The Commission will 
- proactively engage with stakeholders and organise meetings with Member States’ 
representatives on CBRN-E affairs to bett er handle prevention, preparedness and response 
measures; 
- set up a platform for the exchange of inform ation between the Commi ssion, Member States 
and other stakeholders, and organise regular work shops on the research needs of end-users; 
- continue to help Member States put forward lead country actions under  one or more of the 
actions in the CBRN or explosives acti on plans. The Commission will in particular 
encourage initiatives that address detection issues. 
 
III. 5. The external dimension 
CBRN-E threats know no borders, as shown by the SARS and bird-flu (H1N1) viruses. 
Although the result of the uninten ded distribution of the virus,  the consequences were of 
global proportions. Threats from commercial and homemade explosives, such as the 2010 
Yemen cargo bombs, are another example of ex ternal threats that go beyond EU borders.  
For this reason, we need to build relationships  with, and support preparedness and detection 
measures, in third countries to ensure th at we can adequately protect the EU.  
The Commission therefore proposes to consolidate the implementati on of the EU CBRN Risk 
Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative16, which currently involves more than 44 countries 
in 8 regions worldwide. This EU initiative pr ovides support and expertise (e.g. assessment of 
national CBRN needs; drafting of national action plans; regional CBRN projects) to partner 
countries based on a voluntary and bottom up approach.  
It is also important to continue to cooperate with  key international partners .  One example is 
the EU-US explosives expert forum, which he ld its fifth EU-US mee ting in November 2013. 
The three working groups on detection, inform ation sharing and trai ning noted good progress 
in these areas. The forum gives Member States ’ experts the opportunity to be involved in 
frequent training exchanges, share inform ation on various bomb-making devices and on 
CBRN agents using existing mechanisms such as Interpol notices, Europol and the US 
TRIP wire system. 
Another example of such cooperation is the thir d countries’ authorities’ interest in the 
explosives detection dogs work ing group and in EU practices and standards for explosives 
detection dogs and their potenti al implementation in Canada. 
The Commission also actively participates in international gatherings of experts such as the 
Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group or the Global Initiative to Combat 
Illicit Trafficking, which serve as a resour ce for developing good practices and guidance 
documents.  
The Commission will: 
                                                            
16 Initiated since 2010 under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and now continued under the new Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP 2014-2020). 
 
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 - work towards deliverables in the EU-US explo sives experts context,  including by sharing 
lessons learned from implemen ting the relevant chemical pr ecursors regulations and other 
control measures; look at ne w ways of sharing informatio n and best practices regarding 
informing members of the public and private sect or of improvised explosive device incident 
indicators and protective measures; 
- organise pilot projects prov iding technical assistance and tr aining in third countries, for 
instance on vulnerability assessments with a vi ew to help build their capacity. The first 
training could build on the EU's Air port Soft Target guidance material.  
- develop explosives detection dog programmes with the US, using th e explosives detection 
dogs working group’s resources; 
- support the sharing of EU best practices and information on explo sives detection dog 
programmes with third countries who are inte rested in such an exchange (Canada, the US 
and others). 
- work with Member States to support the wo rk of international expert groups in Nuclear 
Security  
 
The Commission will also l ook into ways to provide financial support for the activities 
proposed. 
So far, the current Commission funding programme, the Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime programme  (2007–13), has provided more than €  20 million of funding for almost 30 
CBRN projects and more than 20 projects focusi ng on explosives. They cover a wide range 
of activities, from training sessions and act ivities (such as those of the EEODN) and the 
development of new detection screening methods, to IT tools for exchanging information, such as the European Bomb Data System (EBDS). 
The next funding programme — the Internal Security Fund — Police  (2014–20) — is being 
prepared. During the policy dialogues with each Member State, the Commission has 
emphasised the need for better CBRN-E response capacity, the need to use the systems and 
databases currently in place for exch anging information (such as SCEPYLT
17, the Early 
Warning System and the Europol-based EBDS) and the importance of raising awareness of 
the new regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors. 
 
The Commission will better target the use of re sources available under the Internal Security 
Fund and make better use of funding under the new research programme Horizon 2020, so 
that EU-financed activities better respond to us ers’ needs and are more in line with CBRN-E 
policies at EU level.   
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
With the innovation and opportunism shown by te rrorists seeking to inflict damages using 
CBRN-E materials, the EU needs to adopt a mo re proactive approach to detecting CBRN-E 
materials. This new step by step approach includes considering each threat and environment, using better research, testing and validation, promoting awar eness building, training and 
                                                            
17 SCEPYLT - Pan European Information System of Explosives Control to Prevent Fight against Terrorism. The 
system is used for exchange of information on intercommunity transfers of explosives 
 
13 
 exercises while engaging all stakeholders. With this approach, the Commission believes it 
can play an active role at EU level in helpi ng Member States and othe r important actors to 
make Europe a safer place for its citizens. 
Work is now starting on implementing the ini tiatives proposed in this communication, which 
forms the first element of the new CBRN-E Ag enda. The first year will be devoted to 
addressing the most urgent needs with regard to detecting and mitigating CBRN-E risks. At 
the same time, work will conti nue with Member States and stakeholders on all other key 
areas identified in the Agenda. The aim is to pro pose actions in other areas also to effectively 
prevent and respond to CBRN-E th reats and risks at EU level.