Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on climate change - the EU approach for Kyoto` (98/C 19/23)

On 6 October 1997 the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned communication.

The Economic and Social Committee decided to appoint Mr Pellarini as rapporteur-general. At its 349th plenary session (meeting of 29 October 1997), the Committee adopted the following opinion by 79 votes to 25, with 19 abstentions.

1. Foreword

1.1. The 1992 earth summit in Rio succeeded in raising world public awareness and secured commitments for safeguarding the future of the planet. The third conference of the parties to the framework convention on climate change, which is being held in Kyoto in December, should now mark the legislative and practical enshrinement of the commitments entered into by the parties.

1.1.1. The Rio convention on climate change, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, marked the start of international cooperation on sustainable development. The convention aimed at the 'stabilization of greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system` (). However, the progress which has been made towards this objective has been largely due to other factors (economic recession and the ensuing reduction in energy consumption, use of nuclear power, conversion of power stations to natural gas, closure of coal mines, etc.) rather than to the pursuit of a coherent conversion policy.

1.1.2. Significant reductions are being achieved in CFC, thanks to the pilot role played by the EU and the binding commitments made in the Montreal protocol. However, the picture as regards CO2 emissions is quite different. Despite the improvement in energy efficiency, total energy consumption and hence also emissions of this very important greenhouse gas have continued to rise, particularly in the transport sector, and emissions have not been stabilized at their 1990 levels.

1.2. In the light of the generally unsatisfactory results, the first conference in Berlin in March 1995 gave a mandate to the developed countries (listed in Annex 1 to the convention) to adopt quantified commitments for the limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for after the year 2000 and to bind these commitments in a protocol or other legal instrument. This mandate excludes new commitments for countries not listed in Annex 1, pointing out that most emissions originate in the developed countries (led by the United States) and that per capita emissions in the developing countries are still relatively low.

1.3. The Berlin mandate was underscored in early 1996 by the second assessment report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The report states that the 'balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible anthropogenic influence on the global climate` (). The precautionary principle which underpinned the first expert report and the Rio convention is thus even more justified, making resolute, concerted action to prevent future damage all the more urgent.

1.4. However, in the run-up to the Kyoto conference which is to put the Berlin mandate into practice, the EU is the only party to have taken practical steps to demonstrate the feasibility of a reduction target of 15 % by the year 2010, with an intermediate target of 7,5 % for the year 2005, for a basket of three greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O), substantiating its negotiating position with a detailed working paper on the economic and technological aspects of the proposed measures. Whilst not yet reaching a definitive position, countries such as Japan, the United States and Australia oppose the EU position in principle, and are tending towards much less ambitious reduction targets, if not a non-binding stabilization. A group of 77 countries, which includes China and has appointed Tanzania as its spokesman, has however supported the reduction targets proposed by the EU and has added a target of 35 % for the year 2020. The group has also asked that a fund be set up to finance the reduction efforts of the developing countries, using resources provided by the Annex I countries (developed countries) which fail to meet the stipulated commitments.

1.5. The EU's commitments are conditional on the decisions taken in Kyoto, thus ruling out the possibility of a unilateral initiative. This might weaken its position in the negotiations and, if they fail, could mean that no action is taken at all. There is a danger that, just as political decisions in the EU in recent years have failed to live up to statements of principle about 'sustainable development`, the measures to counteract climate change will continue to be postponed in the name of competitiveness and globalization.

2. General comments

2.1. The Commission communication responds to the mandate given by the Council of Ministers in March and June 1997. The effort to substantiate the EU's negotiating position by demonstrating the feasibility of ecologically compatible development is to be welcomed. The communication has already achieved one positive result: other key players, such as the United States and Japan, have been obliged to adopt an official position on the issue, thus paving the way for more specific and binding discussions in Kyoto.

2.1.1. At the same time, the Committee notes that the failure to envisage any unilateral commitment on the part of the EU introduces an element of political weakness which only the Council meeting of 16 October could have remedied. Furthermore, the hypotheses put forward follow two lines of reasoning - ecological and economic - that do not always intermesh. This is the result of the hesitancy surrounding the decision to pursue the sustainable development enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty, which remains logically flawed.

2.1.2. The Council confirmed its desire to see 'an effective Protocol containing legally-binding targets` () adopted at Kyoto, and regretted the 'absence of concrete negotiating proposals from important industrialized countries, or their inadequacy`, but was very vague about the possibility of formulating and implementing the Community policies and measures needed to achieve such objectives.

2.2. Scientists' concerns are underpinned by a host of incontrovertible scientific data. If these concerns - and especially the second IPCC assessment report - are taken seriously, the precautionary principle brings a need for urgent, decisive action, as the costs of future damage could be incalculable.

2.2.1. The Commission states that economic calculations of the costs of conversion act as a deterrent to robust measures, because decisions are based on short-term competitiveness in a global market. However, this overlooks the vast amount of documentation on the economic advantages of many of the reduction measures, which can help and support the Commission's proposals, as well as the data showing that the longer conversion measures are put off, the more they will cost.

2.3. Globalization must not be seen solely in terms of financial markets and competitiveness; it also means globalizing risks and responsibilities for the future of the planet. The challenge posed by climate change is undoubtedly a global one, and it brings a need to redefine international cooperation, which cannot be dictated by financial markets and lobbies.

2.3.1. In this context, greater attention should be paid to statistics on greenhouse gas emissions by the three main sectors, namely industry, energy and transport. These unequivocally indicate a significant drop in the levels generated by industry and energy production, and a steady and appreciable rise in CO2 emissions in the transport sector.

2.4. With this in mind, and assuming that the Kyoto conference results in a concrete commitment, the distribution of the burden must be carefully calibrated and should fall mainly on the industrialized countries, as they are responsible for the bulk of emissions and are technologically equipped to tackle the challenge and disseminate technological advances. Europe can give a lead here, given its experience of a shared economic and political venture that has included a commitment to sustainable development.

2.5. As well as discussing the measures already taken at European level, and the proposals on which the Committee is issuing opinions at the present plenary session (Schmitz opinion on the taxation of energy products and Boisseree opinion on the energy dimension of climate change), the Commission also suggests a number of decisions which could be taken up by the other industrialized countries as a common platform.

2.6. This platform can help to make the Kyoto conference a success, and to counter the scaled-down decisions for which support seems to be emerging in the United States and Japan. Only by assuming a practical, coherent commitment can the developed countries open the way to greater involvement of the developing countries, whose energy consumption is bound to increase. The United States wishes to make the Kyoto negotiations conditional on agreements on emission trading and joint implementation between the developed and developing countries; but these steps represent a further stage which can only be reached if the developed countries work in concert to reduce their emissions.

3. Conclusions

3.1. The Committee welcomes the Commission communication in the firm belief that the EU's negotiating position can help to make the Kyoto conference a success. However, it reserves the right to return to this subject after the conference in order to evaluate the concrete measures proposed, and their distribution within the EU.

Brussels, 29 October 1997.

The President of the Economic and Social Committee

Tom JENKINS

() Article 2 of the Rio Convention.

() IPCC Second Assessment Report.

() Conclusions of the Environment Council of 16 October.