31. 12. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 339/41 
Opinion on the proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on common rules for the allocation 
of slots at Community airports (x) 
(91/C 339/11) 
On 11 February 1991 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 84(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the abovemen-
tioned proposal. 
The Section for Transport and Communications, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 3 September 1991. The Rapporteur 
was Mr Tukker. 
At its 289th plenary session (meeting of 25 September 1991) the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion by 65 votes for, 14 against, with 24 abstentions. 
1. General comments 
1.1. The European Commission's proposal for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports gives rise to 
the following comments. 
1.1.1. Contrary to what is suggested in the proposal, 
the number of airports facing problems of congestion 
is still small, although admittedly the airports concerned 
are important ones. 
The problems, which result from capacity shortfalls, 
are appropriately dealt with by the 'industry guidelines' 
at the airports concerned. This is admitted by the 
Commission in its proposal. 
Although these 'guidelines' have no legal status, they 
are accepted as adequate both by governments and by 
airlines. 
1.2. The question therefore arises as to why the 
Commission has brought out this proposal. The airlines 
will undoubtedly argue for a fundamental discussion 
of the grounds for the Commission proposal; all the 
more so since the Commission, in discussions with users 
and their organizations, has already been told that 
people are in general satisfied with the present system. 
The main questions deserving attention are: 
— How large is the real shortfall in capacity, and what 
influence does this have on competition? 
— What criteria do we use to assess competition? 
— In the allocation of slots, is it wise to involve parties 
other than those who have a direct interest in neutral 
slot allocation? 
(J) OJ No C 43, 19. 2. 1991, p. 3. 2. How large is the real shortfall in capacity, and what 
influence does this have on competition? 
2.1. The airports which are at present full are Lon­
don (Heathrow and Gatwick), Munich, Diisseldorf, 
Frankfurt and Milan (Linate). The Community has 
declared in connection with a number of measures that 
the Member States are free to distribute the traffic 
within an airport system. On the basis of this EC policy, 
London (Heathrow and Gatwick) and Milan (Linate) 
would no longer count as congested destinations since 
London (Stansted) and Malpensa/Bergamo have suf­
ficient capacity. Diisseldorf has not yet reached its 
technical capacity and could be further extended, so 
that only Frankfurt and Munich would be a real prob­
lem at the moment (Munich's second airport is in any 
case almost ready). A number of other airports could 
also expand their capacity. However, the situation at 
London Heathrow is particularly acute as the great 
majority of airlines wish to use this airport in preference 
to London Gatwick or London Stansted because of its 
vastly superior interline connections. 
In some cases capacity is restricted by factors other 
than technical ones, e.g. bans on night flying, and other 
restrictions to prevent noise. 
The Commission's view that the present situation in 
the major airports could lead to paralysis of the system 
is not in the view of the Committee justified by the 
facts. 
3. What criteria do we use to assess competition? 
3.1. For the sake of convenience, the Commission 
assumes in its proposal that competition is enhanced if 
a new entrant appears on a route where there are two 
or fewer operators. A company which has more than 
six slots at one airport might have to give up slots in 
order to make such new access possible. It is perhaps 
No C 339/42 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 91 
interesting to note in this context that in the USA a 
company with only six slots can assert its right to 'new 
entrant status'. The two (or fewer) operators approach 
is unrealistic, since many other factors can influence 
competition on a route, e.g. alternatives using indirect 
routes in the case of somewhat longer distances, other 
modes of transport on shorter distances, the proportion 
of charters and the composition of transport on the 
route (whether it is mainly interline traffic, local busi­
ness traffic or holiday traffic). In certain circumstances 
the Commission itself recognizes that a company start­
ing to operate on a thinly used route may be allowed a 
few years' protection: how does this policy square with 
the 'Code of Conduct'? 
3.2. The Commission completely ignores the pos­
ition of a company which has its home base at a 
congested airport; the special circumstances of such a 
company must be carefully assessed in the allocation 
or any redistribution of slots. 
3.3. In the view of the Committee the Commission's 
approach to competition is very one-sided. It is not a 
question of competition on each route, but above all 
of competition between the networks of the different 
companies and competition which takes place via the 
different airports. Even the existing companies, as a 
result of the progressive liberalization, make a large 
contribution to competition. 
3.4. One specific problem is that British Airways, 
when they ended their Dublin service, kept the relevant 
19 slots at Heathrow, with the result that neither Aer 
Lingus nor other airlines can expand their services 
between Dublin and Heathrow. This is because slots 
are not linked with particular routes, but can be used 
by the relevant companies for other services in their 
network. 
3.5. The Committee can on no account agree with 
the sale or trading of slots which become available or 
are discarded by an airline. Slots which are no longer 
used should revert to the 'pool' controlled by the coordi­
nator or airport authority. 
3.6. The financial results of European carriers are 
likely to be disappointing in the coming years, and there 
seems to be no justification for interfering with the 
companies' networks. The structure of the networks is 
a matter for the airlines themselves to decide. 
3.7. In the light of the above, the Committee wonders 
whether it is desirable for the Commission to submit a 
proposal on the problem of slot allocation. In practice, such problems are settled satisfactorily by the relevant 
bodies. Should not the principle of subsidiarity be 
applied in this case? 
3.8. Neutral slot allocation 
The Commission proposes that airport coordinators 
should be appointed by and solely answerable to 
Government. Bearing in mind the principle of subsidiar­
ity, the Committee would prefer the appointments to 
be made by all airlines having an interest in the use of 
the airport after thorough consultation with airport 
authorities, other users and governments, and with 
their agreement. Coordinators would be responsible for 
applying the allocation criteria set out in the Regulation 
and its annex. 
4. Specific comments 
4.1. Reallocation of slots 
4.1.1. The Committee accepts that provision must 
be made for new entrants to have access to desirable 
slots, on a non-discriminatory basis, but has reser­
vations about the proposed method of compulsory real­
location which could operate in an arbitrary fashion. 
Further, the Committee suggests that every effort 
should be made to increase the supply of slots by: 
— the addition of new slots to the pool through expan­
sion of airport capacity, 
— improvements in air traffic control, 
— improvements to the access/clearing infrastructure 
of new airports, so that they become a more attract­
ive alternative. 
4.1.2. In special cases, governments should be able 
to make availabe more than 50 % of available slots to 
a newcomer {cf. the recent development on the London/ 
Dublin route referred to in point 3.4). 
4.1.3. The Committee feels that the following basic 
principles should underlie the code of conduct for slot 
allocation, and would suggest that these could be 
included as part of the Annex to the Regulation: 
— policies for slot allocation should foster the efficient 
use of airports, 
31. 12. 91 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 339/43 
— there should be not built-in presumption that an 
existing slot can be retained indefinitely. To retain 
use of a slot even in the short term, airlines must 
demonstrate that they are using it effectively. 
4.2. Throughout the Commission proposal mention 
is made of Member States or their governments, where­
as most airports are private law entities incorporated 
under private law. It would be better to replace 'Mem­
ber States' with 'Airport Authorities' or 'Member States 
and/or Airport Authorities'. 
4.3. The policy should also take account of the inter­
est of all aircraft operators. 
5. Comments on individual Articles 
Article 2(c) 
After the word 'where' add 'under normal conditions'. 
Article 4(2) 
After the word 'congestion' add 'under normal con­
ditions'. 
Article 6(1) 
In the first paragraph add after the words 'at least be 
open' the words 'to the home-carrier and'. 
Article 9(1) 
Question: is a carrier ending its services to and from a 
certain airport obliged to give up the 'slots' concerned 
or is it entitled to keep them even if it does not use 
them? The Commission's answer is that it is not entitled 
to keep them. 
Article 9(2) 
If an airline uses a slot less than 65 % of the allocated 
period, will 100% or 35% of the slot be withdrawn? 
Article 9(4)(a) 
What about allocating new entrants slots at other air­
ports within an airport-system? Last sentence: if slots are reclaimed from services which 
are operated with aircraft of less than 200 seats, how 
does the Commission intend to keep up the regional 
services and the important 'feeder-services' to major 
airports? 
Article 9(7) 
The Committee wonders whether three hours is not 
too long a period, given the importance to travellers 
of the timing of departures at the beginning and end 
of the business day. This point also applies to 
Article 10(1). 
Article 9(10) 
Last sentence: delete 'within a period of one month'. 
Article 10(1) 
Why does the article apply only to Community air-
carriers and not to all air-carriers? 
Article 10(7) 
Last sentence: delete 'within a period of one month'. 
Article 11 
Why may EC-countries discriminate and third countries 
not? 
Article 11(4) 
Last sentence: delete 'within a period of one month'. 
Appendix/point 1 
The Committee is of the opinion that slot allocation is 
of particular importance not only to aircraft operators 
but also to the travelling public. 
6. Conclusion 
The question remains whether the Commission is cor­
rect in proposing to replace with a Regulation a system 
which works well. Should the Commission still wish to 
do this, and should the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers adopt the Regulation, then the 
Committee would ask the Commission to avoid dis­
crimination against third countries. The airlines in the 
European Community would not be well served by 
measures which had a 'boomerang effect, elsewhere in 
the world. 
No C 339/44 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 91 
Moreover, the Committee does not feel that it is necess­
ary for airport coordinators to be appointed directly by 
the Member States and answerable only to them, but 
it does support the concept of neutrality and trans­
parency in slot allocation and believes that Member States should be required to ensure the appointment of 
neutral coordinators. 
Know-how and impartiality are of the utmost import­
ance for this task. 
Done at Brussels, 25 September 1991. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Francois STAEDELIN 
Opinion on EC relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(91/C 339/12) 
On 24 April 1990 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the third paragraph of 
Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an additional Opinion on EC 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The Committee's comments on the Community's continuing association negotiations with 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary essentially relate to the position in mid-June 1991. The 
Committee reserves the right to comment separately on the most recent developments in 
Eastern Europe, with particular reference to the Baltic States and the USSR, and to make 
changes, where necessary, to individual passages of the present Opinion. 
The Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy, which was responsible 
for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 12 September 
1991. The Rapporteur was Mr Petersen. 
At its 289th plenary session (meeting of 26 September 1991) the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion unanimously. 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Given the length of this Opinion the Committee believes 
that it would be appropriate to begin by summarizing 
its most important views and recommendations on the 
European Agreements. 
The Committee thinks it imperative to use the present 
historic opportunity to establish closer, more stable 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and to lay the foundations of a Common Euro­
pean House for all European countries. 
The Committee considers that top priority should go 
to removing economic and social imbalances between 
the Western and Eastern halves of Europe. The Committee considers that existing trade and coop­
eration agreements are a possible means of strengthen­
ing inter-State dialogue; they are also likely to provide 
an economic underpinning for the political reforms now 
under way in Eastern Europe. 
The Committee welcomes the idea of Association since 
it is calculated to secure and promote closer political, 
economic and social relations between the European 
Community and its Eastern neighbours. 
The Association Agreements (European Agreements) 
also form an institutional framework for political dia-