15.3.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC73/65
OpinionontheTechnological ProblemsofNuclearSafety
(93/C73/12
On27May1992theEconomicandSocialCommittee ,actingunderthefourthparagraph of
Article20ofitsRulesofProcedure ,decidedtodrawupanOpinionontheTechnological
ProblemsofNuclearSafety.
TheSectionforEnergy,NuclearQuestionsandResearch,whichwasresponsible forpreparing
theCommittee 'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon11January1993.TheRapport­
eurwasMrvonderDecken(1).
Atits302ndPlenarySession(meetingof28January1993)theEconomicandSocialCommittee
adoptedthefollowingOpinionunanimously .
1.Introduction
1.1.Nuclearenergy,withashareofabout35%,is
oneofthemostimportant sourcesofelectricpowerin
theCommunity .However ,itisproducedbyonlysix
MemberStatesinwidelydifferingproportions (between
5and75%ofnationalpowergeneration ).
1.2.Thesefiguresrevealdifferences inpolitical
thinkingaboutnuclearenergyandsafety,aswellas
differences inthepublic'sacceptance ofnuclearenergy
intheMemberStates.Inscarcelyanyotherareaare
suchdifferences somuchinevidence .Economic con­
ditionsalsovaryfromoneMemberStatetoanother.
1.3.TheCommunity needstoreachgeneralagree­
mentonthefutureroleofnuclearenergy.Thereare
enoughreasonswhyitshoulddoso,rangingfromthe
completion oftheSingleMarket,particularly inthe
energysector,andthedevelopment ofacommonenergy
andenvironment policy[initsOpiniononEnergyand
theEnvironment (^)theESCcalledamongotherthings
fornuclearenergytobepartofanECstrategytoreduce
C02emissions],toECpolicyvis-a-visthecountries
ofCentralandEasternEuropeandthedeveloping
countries .
1.4.InthisparticularOpinion,however,theCom­
mitteedoesnotwishtodiscussthegeneralaspects
ofnuclearenergy,i.e.thenecessaryandjustifiable
importance ofthenuclearindustryfortheCommunity 's
energybalance,butpreferstoconcentrate ontheurgent
technological aspectsofnuclearsafety,therebyhelping
tocreateanobjectivebasisonwhichtobuildageneral
politicalconsensus .
1.5.Inadditionandirrespective offuturepolitical
thinkingabouttheuseofnuclearenergy,itisnecessary
tostartbyrecognizing thattherearealargenumberof
nuclearplantsintheCommunity todaywhichneedtoberunsafelyformanyyearstocomewhilstthesafety
ofthenuclearfuelcyclemustalsobeguaranteed .
1.6.Theoperationofnuclearpowerstationsinthe
countriesofCentralandEasternEuropelikewisecon­
tinuestoposeenormous safetyproblems .Becauseof
this,Westernindustrialized countries,andinparticular
theEuropeanCommunity ,havebeenaskedtoprovide
technical ,organizational andfinancialassistance .
1.7.Commission reportof23January1992
1.7.1.TheCommission haspresented areporton
thetechnological problemsofnuclearsafety,i.e.onthe
implementation oftheCouncilResolution of22July
1975(1987-1991 )[doc.SEC(92)79final].TheCom­
mitteenoteswithinterestthecontentsofthisreport
andappreciates theworkwhichhasgoneintoit.
1.7.2.TheCommittee nevertheless regretsthatthe
Commission hasmerelygonethroughthemotionsof
fulfillingthetasksetbytheCouncilanddealssolely
withsomeaspectsofnuclearsafety.
TheCommittee would,forexample,criticizethefol­
lowing:
—Thereportisonlyaboutpastworkanddoesnot
containanyassessment ofthepracticaluseofwork
ofresearchanddevelopment (R&D).Nocon­
clusionshavebeenreachedregardingfuturepros­
pectsandplansinthelightofthecurrentsituation .
—Thereportisconcerned almostexclusively with
questionsofreactorsafety,whilstproblemsper­
tainingtothesafetyofthefuelcycle(reprocessing ,
transportandfinaldisposalofradioactive waste)
arenotcoveredatall;yetthistooispartandparcel
ofnuclearsafety.
—Confining thereporttothepurelytechnological
problemsofnuclearsafetywouldseemtobehighly
problematic sincethisneglectstheimpactonsafety
engineering oftheinteraction betweentechnological
safeguards andacceptance andbetweentechnologi­
calsafeguards andeconomicviability .(')TheRapporteur 'sexpertwasProfessorH.Barnert,Institute
forSafetyandReactorTechnology ,JiilichResearchCentre.
(2)OJNoC269,14.10.1992,p.67.

NoC73/66 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 15.3.93
2.1.4.High-riskindustrialtechnology canonlybe
defendedifthesafetyengineering continuestobe
developed aspartofanon-goinglearningprocess.
2.2.International cooperation—TheradicalchangesinCentralandEasternEurope
andtheireffectsonthedramaticdevelopments in
nuclearsafetyareonlymentioned 'inpassing'inthe
report.
—International activities suchastheViennaInter­
nationalAtomicEnergyAgency's'Conference on
theSafetyofNuclearPower'(September 1991),
whichwasactuallyinitiatedbytheEuropeanCom­
munity,havenotbeentakenintoconsideration at
all.
1.8.InitsResolution of17September 1992onthe
safetyofnuclearinstallations intheMemberStatesof
theEuropeanCommunity (*),theEuropeanParliament
calledontheCommission toactinalargenumberof
areas.TheCommittee approvesthedemandsofthe
Parliament .2.2.1.Inthiscontextinternational cooperation inits
presentform(ViennaConference )isofexceptional
importance .Chapter3ofthisOpinionpursuesthe
matteringreaterdetail.Itispreciselybecausesafety
engineering mustandwillremainanationalresponsi­
bilitythatwide-ranging information andcriticaldis­
cussionsatinternational levelareextraordinarily
important andamajorprecondition forthefurther
development ofsafetyengineering .Hereallparties,
includingtheInternational AtomicEnergyAgency
(IAEA),arefocusingtheireffortsontheirsustained
supportforanInternational Framework Convention .
TheESCalreadydrewupaStudyonaCommunity
NuclearSafetyCode(CES484/77)backin1977.2.Basiccomments
2.3.Safetyofnuclearpowerplantsinthecountriesof
CentralandEasternEurope2.1.Justification ofhigh-riskindustrial technology
(necessarypreconditions )
2.1.1.Theengineering neededtoensurethesafety
ofanindustrialtechnology suchasnuclearpowermust
bedeveloped andintroduced handinhandwiththe
technology itself.Itisacontinuous ,never-ending pro­
cess.Theboilerisanexamplefromthepast.Boiler
technology inthe19thcenturyledtothecreationin
GermanyoftheTechnical Inspectorate [Technischer
Oberwachungsverein (Tt)V)].Yetevenaftermorethan
100yearsofindustrialapplication itisstillnotpossible
tosaythatthereisnoroomforfurtherimprovements in
boilersafety.Safety(safetyengineering )isacontinuous
learningprocesswhichwilllastaslongasindustrial
technology isused;thisisparticularly important inthe
caseofatechnology suchasnuclearenergy.
2.1.2.Themostimportantplatformforsuchalearn­
ingprocessisthatallindividuals andorganizations
operating intheirparticular technological fieldmust
beprovidedwithwide-ranging anddetailedtechnical
information aboutallexperiences andfindings (particu­
larlywithregardtoproblemsandfailings).Suchinfor­
mationisvitalifthediscussions whichinevitablyfollow
aretobeopenandinsomecasesheldinpublic,and
aretobesubjecttopermanent criticalscrutiny .
2.1.3.Inthecaseofhigh-riskindustrialtechnology
therearelimitstothetechnologically proven'trialand
error'learningprocess.Thetrialanderrorprinciple
mustbelimitedtosafetyprocedures whichdonothave
disastrousconsequences .Havingsaidthis,itisprecisely
thedetailed information aboutnumerous small
deficiencies whichisofdecisivehelpinavoidingmajor
accidents ;afterall,majoraccidentsalwaysdevelop
fromacombination ofseveralsmallermishaps .2.3.1."Judgingfromwhatwehavelearntinthelast
fewyearsaboutthedevelopment ofnucleartechnology
intheformersocialistcountriesofCentralandEastern
Europe,information aboutnuclearsafetyhasbeensev­
erelyrestrictedandinsomecasesevensystematically
heldback.Criticalandintensivediscussions havenot
beenheldeitheramongexpertsorthegeneralpublic
sothatthecontinuous learningprocessrecommended in
point2.1.1hasnevertakenplace.Thishasundoubtedly
beenamajorfactorintheserioussafetydeficiencies
ofSovietreactors,asdiscussed inChapter4ofthis
Opinion .
2.3.2.Theinvestigation intotheChernobyl nuclear
accidentcarriedoutbytheRussianandUkrainian
authorities alsoshowshowcalamitous itcanbewhen
information isnotpassedon.Vitalexperiences and
information werenotevenexchanged betweenoper­
atorsofthesametypeofreactor,thisbeingoneofthe
decisive,ifnotthedecisive,causeoftheaccident .
2.3.3.TheChernobyl accidentanddramaticpolitical
changeshavenowopeneduptheflowofinformation
andtriggerednationalandinternational discussions .
Theimportance ofthisforsafetycannotberatedtoo
highly.Open,publicdiscussions alonehaveprobably
heightened thesafetyawarenessofallpartiesconsider­
ablyandhavemostlikelybroughtcleargainsinterms
ofsafety,evenifthesestilldonotgobyanymeans
farenough.Furthermore ,theprocessofexchanging
information andholdingdiscussions isthebasisforthe
detectionofsafetydeficiencies andtheplanningand
implementation ofremedialmeasuresatnationaland
international level(seeChapter4). (!)OJNoC284,2.11.1992,p.111.

15.3.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC73/67
—TheIAEAshoulddevelopinternational safetyaims
forwastemanagement andfinaldisposal;
—TheIAEAshouldintroduceallthestepsrequired
foranInternational Framework Convention cover­
ingallaspectsofnuclearsafetyandacceptable to
allgovernments .
3.6.Anumberofrecommendations madeatthe
International Conference onthe'SafetyofNuclear
Power:StrategyfortheFuture'havealreadybeentaken
upbytheIAEA.Theyinclude :
—theestablishment ofsafetyprinciples forfuture
reactors ;
—thedraftingofaroughoutlineforanInternational
Framework Convention onnuclearsafety;
—thedevelopment ofinternational safetyobjectives
forwastemanagement andfinaldisposal .
3.7.TheCommittee regardstheIAEAasoneof
themostimportant international institutions inthe
worldwide drivetoimprovenuclearsafety.TheCom­
mitteecallsontheMemberStatesandtheCommission
tovigorously supportastrengthening oftheIAEA's
institutional machinery ,bothfromthepointofviewof
settingnormsandstandards ,andinrespectofthestatus
ofinspectors .Itisalsourgentlynecessarytoincrease
thefundingoftheIAEA.Onlyinthiswaywillthe
IAEAbeabletoplaythecentralroleincumbent upon
it.3.International cooperation ,conventions andstan­
dards
3.1.Thereisnodoubtthatifnuclearenergyistobe
usedinthefuturetoprovideasecuresourceofenergy
andeaseclimateproblems (thegreenhouse effect),close
international cooperation onnuclear-reactor safetyis
themostimportant requirement .
3.2.InitsResolution of18June1992(1),theCouncil
toostressedtheimportance ofsuchinternational coop­
erationandurgedbothMemberStatesandtheCom­
missiontofurtherinternational effortsinthisdirection .
TheCommittee endorsestheCouncil'scall.
3.3.Keyareasforinternational cooperation are:
wide-ranging anddetailedinformation anddiscussions
onexperiences andfindingsinmattersofnuclearsafety;
thepreparation ofanInternational Framework Con­
ventionandofinternational emergency strategies ;the
morethoroughexamination oftheinternational aspects
ofwasteprocessing andfinaldisposal .Forthis,allthe
knowledge andexperience acquiredbyindividualStates
shouldbedrawnon.
3.4.Finally,atthesuggestion ofECMemberStates,
anInternational Conference onthe'SafetyofNuclear
Power:StrategyfortheFuture'wasorganized bythe
IAEAon2-6September 1991.
3.5.TheCommittee viewsthisconference asan
essentialsteptowardsurgentlyneededinternational
cooperation andfullyendorsestheseriesofdemands
setoutintheconference declaration :
—Responsibility fornuclearsafetyinindividual
countriesandforidentifying olderpowerplants
whichdonotmeetthehighsafetyperformance
requiredshouldlieinnationalhands;
but:
—TheASSETandOSARTservices (ASSET :Assess­
mentofSafetySignificant EventTeams,OSART :
Operational SafetyReviewTeams)providedbythe
IAEAforassessingallnuclearpowerplantscur­
rentlyinoperationshouldbeexpanded ;
—TheIAEAshouldinitiatethedevelopment ofa
commonbasisofminimumrequirements forolder
nuclear-power plantsand,ifnecessary ,provide
assistancewithsafetyreviews;
—TheIAEAshouldpromotetheexchangeofinfor­
mationandexperiences aswellasinformation for
thepublic;
—TheIAEAshouldbegintophaseinacatalogueof
safetycriteriafornewreactors;3.8.TheCommittee wouldpointoutthataslongas
militarynuclearinstallations (ofwhateverkind)are
disregarded ,alleffortsthroughout theworldtoensure
nuclearsafetywillnecessarily remainincomplete .The
riskpotentialofmilitaryinstallations isprobablymuch
higherthanthatofcivilnuclearinstallations .
3.9.Thesafereduction ofnucleararsenals (e.g.,
STARTII)andthesafeandsensibleuseofstocksof
nuclear-weapon materialsforproducing energywill
probablyconstitute aspecialproblem .
4.Situationofthenuclearpowerindustries inthe
countriesofCentralandEasternEurope:present
positionandprospectsforcooperation
4.1.Theimportance ofnuclearenergyinthecountries
ofCentralandEasternEurope
4.1.1.Nuclearenergyisveryimportantforelectricity
generation inthecountriesofCentralandEasternEuro­
pe.Theproportion ofelectricityproducedfromnuclear
energyvariesasfollowsinorderofmagnitude :Hunga­ (!)OJNoC172,8.7.1992.

NoC73/68 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 15.3.93
StrategyfortheFuture',theIAEAwasaskedbythe
formerUSSRtoinvestigate thesafetyofitsRBMK
reactors .
4.2.5.TheWorldAssociation ofNuclearOperators
(WANO)wasfoundedinMoscowthreeyearsago
withtheaimofimproving theoperational safetyand
reliabilityofnuclearpowerstationsthroughout the
worldbymeansofanintensiveexchangeofexperiences
andincreased cooperation betweenalloperators .
WANOhasnowlaunchedaprogramme insupportof
nuclearpowerstationsinoperation inEasternEurope.
4.2.6.Bilateralactionhasalsobeeninitiatedbythe
formerSovietUnionandactiontakeninindividual
countries .
4.2.7.Oneofthemainconclusions oftheInter­
nationalConference onthe'SafetyofNuclearPower:
StrategyfortheFuture'isthat'operatingorganizations
andnationalauthorities shouldidentifyoperating
nuclearpowerplantswhichdonotmeetthehighsafety
performance levelsofthevastmajorityofoperating
plantsandundertake improvements withassistance
fromtheinternational community '.
4.3.Initialfindings:urgentaction,considerable needsry,51%;Bulgaria,36%;CSFR,28%;theformerterri­
toryoftheSovietUnion,12%.Thelowfigureforthe
formerterritoryoftheSovietUniondoesnotreflect
thefactthatnuclearpowerstationsareparticularly
prevalentintheEuropeanpartofthecountry.The
nuclearpowerindustryismoreimportant incertain
regions,i.e.33%inthenorth-west electricitygrid,22%
inthecentralgridand17%intheVolgaregiongrid.
4.1.2.InthecountriesofCentralandEasternEuro­
pe,68nuclearpowerunitsareinoperationand21are
underconstruction .Someunitshavebeenshutdown,
inparticulartheGreifswald 1-4units.(TheGreifswald
5-8projectshavebeenhaltedduringtheconstruction
orcommissioning phase.)EventheChemobyl-4 unit,
whichwascompletely destroyedatthetimeofthe
disaster,isstillposingsafetyproblems .
4.1.3.Bywayofcomparison ,approximately 17%
oftheworld'selectricity isgenerated fromnuclear
energy,withapproximately 424nuclearpowerunitsin
operationthroughout theworldand72unitsunder
construction .
4.2.Differenttypesofactiontoimprovesafety
4.2.1.WhenthepoliticalchangesoccurredinCentral
andEasternEurope,discussions weresteppedupwith
theaimofimprovingthesafetyofnuclearpowerunits
inthatpartofEurope.Anearlierincentivetotake
actionhadcomefromtheChernobyl-4 disasteron
26April1986.
4.2.2.Bodiesresponsible foractiontoimproveinter­
nationalnuclearsafetyincludetheEuropean Com­
munity (EC),theInternational AtomicEnergyAgency
(IAEA)andotherorganizations withoperational func­
tionssuchastheWorldAssociation ofNuclearOper­
ators(WANO).
4.2.3.Actingpartlywithintheframework ofthe
EasternEuropean aidprogramme Phare(Economic
AssistanceandReconstruction inPolandandHungary),
theEChasmadesomeECU45millionavailable in
1990,1991and1992underitsenvironment /energypro­
grammeforstudiestoimprovereactorsafetyinCentral
andEasternEuropecountries .Tocarryoutthese
studiestheEChasreceivedsupportfrompressurized
waterreactoroperators inEasternEuropealongwith
assistance fromWANO .In1991theECalsolaunched
theTacisprogramme (Technical Assistance tothe
Commonwealth ofIndependent States).Thepro­
gramme,whichsupportsimprovements inthesafetyof
nuclearpowerunitsintheformerSovietUnion,hasso
farapprovedexpenditure ofECU54million,including
ECU40millionforimprovements inthesafetyof
operational reactorsandECU14millionintheform
ofassistancetothenuclearregulatory authorities .
4.2.4.Following thechangesinEasternEurope,the
International AtomicEnergyAgency (IAEA)has
receivedcallsfromseveralcountriesaskingittoprovide
assistance inretrofitting nuclearpowerunitsinCentral
andEasternEuropean countries .DuringtheInter­
nationalConference onthe'SafetyofNuclearPower:4.3.1.RBMKreactors (Chernobyl type)
4.3.1.1.Generating unitswithRBMKtypereactors
(RBMK=pressuretubes,water-cooled ,graphite-mod­
eratedreactor)operatesolelyontheterritoryofthe
formerSovietUnion.Allinallthereare16RBMKunits
(notincludingsmallprototypeplants)inoperationat
fivesites:Chernobyl (Ukraine),Ignalina (Lithuania),
Kursk,St.Petersburg andSmolensk .Therearealso
fourunitsunderconstruction .Eachofthetwogenerat­
ingunitsinIgnalinahasa(net)capacityof1380MWe,
whilsttheothersallhavea(net)capacityof925MWe.
4.3.1.2.TheRBMKreactoracquiredaninfamous
reputation on26April1986whenadisasteroccurred
inunit4oftheChernobyl plantintheUkraine.The
manycatastrophic consequences includeddamageto
healthsufferedbyalargenumberofpeopleandthe
radioactive contamination oflargeareasofland.The
causesandconsequences oftheChernobyl disasterare
stillbeinginvestigated .Thelatestevidencesuggeststhat
lossofstabilityledtotwoexplosions andtherelease
ofradioactive materials fromthereactorintothe
environment .Chernobyl unit2wasalsoshutdown
followingafireintheturbinegenerator .TheUkrainian
Parliament hasdecidedtoshutdowntheremainingtwo
unitsinChernobyl in1993.
4.3.1.3.OneofthetasksoftheECTacisprogramme
istoinvestigate whatroleRBMKreactors

15.3.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC73/69
4.3.2.3.Investigations bytheInternational Atomic
EnergyAgencyintothesafetyofSovietreactorsbegan
withtheVVER-440 model230.Acomprehensive report
hasnowbeensubmitted .Altogether about1300spec­
ificsafetyitemshavebeenidentifiedandgroupedtog­
etherinabout100issuesofsafetyconcern,which
arefurthersubdivided intofourseparatecategoriesof
urgency.Theseare:
1)CategoryIV(immediate actionisrequired),where
15issuesofsafetyconcernhavebeenidentified .
2)CategoryIII(immediate correctiveactionisnecess­
ary),where45issuesofsafetyconcernhavebeen
identified .
3)Category II(actionisrequired),where32issuesof
safetyconcernhavebeenidentified .
4)Category I(actiontoresolvehigherpriorityissues),
wherefiveissuesofsafetyconcernhavebeenident­
ified.
4.3.2.4.Alargenumberofissuesofsafetyconcern
inthehighestcategoryIV(immediateactionisrequired )
aretodowithtubingandpipework ,aswellasthe
dangerofanaccidentcausedbythecatastrophic failure
ofthereactorvesselfollowingembrittlement .
4.3.2.5.Thesameconsideration playedaroleinthe
decisiontotaketheGreifswald nuclearpowerunitsin
theformerGDRoutofservice .
4.3.2.6.According toRussiansources (V.A.Sidoren­
ko),measures (heattreatment ,annealment )arebeing
takentoprotectreactorpressurevesselsagainstbrittle
failure.playinoverallelectricitygeneration intheRussian
Federation ,Lithuania andtheUkraine .Thedecom­
missioning oftheRBMKreactortypeisoneofthe
politicaloptionscurrentlyunderconsideration .Astep­
by-stepcheckonRBMKreactorsisalsoplannedwith
theaimofobtaininganindependent assessment ofthe
operational safetyofsuchreactorsinthecountries
mentioned above.
4.3.1.4.Between6and10April1992theInter­
nationalAtomicEnergyAgencyheldaTechnicalCom­
mitteemeetingonthesafetyofRBMKreactors.The
meetingwasattendedbyrepresentatives oftheRussian
Federation ,Lithuania ,theUkraineandsixEuropean
countries ,aswellasbytheECandtheIAEA.Theaim
wastodiscussaninternational projectentitled'The
SafetyofDesignSolutionsandtheOperation ofNPPs
withRBMKReactors'.
4.3.1.5.Thefollowingconclusions werereachedat
themeeting :theactionsoftheIAEA,ECandWorld
Bankaretobecoordinated byacommonsecretariat ,
whilstresponsibility fortheoperational safetyofreac­
torswillcontinuetoliewiththeoperatingcountry.To
startwith,themostimportant taskistocarryouta
comprehensive safetyanalysis .Highpriorityshould
alsobegiventoassistingthesafetyauthorities .The
urgentactioncalledforatthemeetingbythecountries
operatingnuclearpowerstationsmustformthebasis
foraninternational programme aimedatsecuring
improvements inRBMKreactorsafetyasdirectlyas
possible .AnIAEAprojectforRBMKreactorswasalso
calledfor.
4.3.1.6.Bilateralaidprogrammes ,e.g.between
SwedenandLithuania ,havealsobeenstarted.
4.3.1.7.MrV.A.Sidorenko ,FirstDeputyMinister
forAtomicEnergyoftheRussianFederation ,hasin
themeantime announced thatalargenumberof
improvements havebeenmadetoRBMKreactorsin
theRussianFederation .Itisnevertheless notknown
preciselywhichparticular reactorsareinvolvedand
whatactualtechnicalimprovements havebeenmade.
4.3.2.SovietVVERpressurized water
reactors
4.3.2.1.Forty-four SovietVVERpressurized water
reactorsarecurrently inserviceinthecountriesof
CentralandEasternEurope,whilst21high-capacity
unitsareunderconstruction .
4.3.2.2.Ithasbecomecustomary todistinguish
betweenthreedifferenttypesorthreedifferentgener­
ationsofSovietVVERpressurized waterreactors.The
typesandnumbersofunitsbuiltareasfollows:
1)VVER-440 model230:10units
2)VVER-440 model213:16units,and
3)VVER-1000 :18units.4.4.Initialassessment ofinvestment requirements
4.4.1.Thelevelofinvestment neededtoimprovethe
safetyofSovietreactorshasnowbeenestimatedforthe
firsttime;thefindingswerepresentedbytheEuropean
AtomicForum(Foratom )atapressconference inBonn
on17June1992.
4.4.2.Itwasestimated thatthetotalinvestment level
neededtoensurethesafetyofRBMKandVVERreac­
tors(assumingthegradualshutdown oftheolder
RBMKtype)laysomewhere betweenECU6700million
andECU8000million.Thepointwasalsomadethat,
becauseofeconomicandtechnicallimitations ,sumsof
thissizecouldnotberaisedsolelybythecountries
concerned .
4.4.3.Disregarding workdonebythecountries
themselves aswellasshutdown costsandthecosts
arisingoutofidleperiodsandconstruction delays,
thehardcurrencyneededtopayforessentialimports
(especiallymodernWesterncontroltechnology )islikely
toamounttobetween ECU2000millionandECU
2500million .Thiscanbebrokendownto:
—aboutECU1500-1750millionfornuclearplants
alreadyonstreamand

NoC73/70 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 15.3.93
—aboutECU550-750millionforplantsundercon­
struction .
4.4.4.Itwasalsopointedoutthatthenon-repayable
ECU50millionorsocurrentlymadeavailablefroma
varietyofsources,including theEuropean Com­
munity'sPhareandTacisprogrammes ,isnowherenear
enough.Onesolutionwouldbetomakelargeamounts
ofcreditavailableimmediately sothatthenecessary
hardwareinparticularcanbeinstalled .ofnegotiating partners .Heretoo,international political
pressuremaybeneededifthereistobepromptclarifi­
cationofwhoisresponsible fornuclearsafety.
4.5.6.Allaidprogrammes compriseabroadspec­
trumofactivities :
—theprovisionofsupportstafftohelpinthetraining
andbuild-upoflicensingauthorities ;
—improvements inoperational safety,particularly
throughthetrainingofin-plantteams;
—thesafetyassessment ofdifferentreactortypesand
individual reactors;
—specificR&Dworkonupdatingcomputerpro­
grammesandonsafety-related probability assess­
mentsdesignedtodetectweakpointsinreactor
systems;specialfracture-testing methods;
—studiesoftheroleofindividualnuclearpowerplants
incontributing tothesecurityofsuppliesofthe
countryorregionsconcerned ,takingintoaccount
macro-andmicro-economic considerations andthe
possibleavailability ofenergytoreplacethatpro­
ducedbylesssafeplants;
—theretrofitting ofplantsonthebasisofalistof
priorities .
4.5.7.Adequate fundsareessentialifallthese
urgentlyneededaidmeasuresaretobecarriedout.
Despiteallthediscussions anddeclarations ofgood
willatthemeetingsofG24StatesandtheG7summit
inMunich,thequestionoffundingaidprogrammes is
stilllargelyunresolved intheabsenceoffirmcommit­
ments.Thisisanurgentandimportant taskforthe
Westernindustrialized nations,butalsofortheECand
international financialinstitutions .
4.5.8.Inshort,theCommittee welcomes theaid
programmes whichhavebeenlaunched,emphatically
endorsestheircontinuation andcallsfortheirreinforce­
ment.Aboveall,however,itwouldurgethatthese
programmes beimplemented withoutdelay.The
CouncilandtheCommission shouldassumeresponsi­
bilityfororganizing financingfromwhateversource.4.5.Conclusions regardingthestateofnuclearsafety
inthecountriesofCentralandEasternEurope
4.5.1.OneofthemainreasonsfortheSovietreac­
tors'seriouslackofsafetywastheclamp-down on
information aboutreactorsafetyandthepolicyofnot
allowingadetailedcriticaldiscussion eitheramong
nationalandinternational expertsorwiththepublicat
large.
4.5.2.Thissituationhasnowchangedradically
becauseoftheChernobyl accident,butaboveallasa
resultofthepoliticalchangeswhichhaveoccurredin
CentralandEasternEurope.Thewide-ranging flowof
information andthecriticaldiscussions nowunderway
representaconsiderable ,ifstillfarfromadequate,
improvement fromthepointofviewofnuclearsafety.
Firstandforemost,however,theyprovideasoundbasis
forallemergency aidprogrammes inthefuture.
4.5.3.Alargenumberofinternational andbilateral
aidprogrammes havenowbeenlaunchedwiththe
involvement ofinternational organizations suchasthe
EC,IAEAandWANO.Someexcellentworkhassofar
beenachievedwithlimitedmeans.Workofthistypecan
serveasaplatformforbroad-based aidprogrammes ,
althoughithasalreadyhadadirectimpact,especially
inemergencies suchasinBulgaria.Intermsofoverall
needs,however,theworkcarriedoutsofarcanonly
beregardedasafirststep.
4.5.4.Twobasicprinciplesneedtobeobservedin
allaidprogrammes :
—Nuclearsafetyisandwillremaintheresponsibility
oftheindividual countrieswhichoperatenuclear
powerplants.
—Outsidehelpcanandmustbeseenasameansof
encouraging self-help .
Ifnecessary ,international politicalpressuremustbe
exertedtoencourage theimplementation ofthese
measures .
4.5.5.Oneobstacleinthewayofcurrentaidpro­
grammesderivesfromthefactthatitisnotsufficiently
clearwhereresponsibility fornuclearsafetyliesinthe
newly-emerging States.Thisresultsinafrequentchange5.Futurenuclearsafetyrequirements
5.1.Nuclearenergy,bothwithintheCommunity
andworldwide ,isamajorsourceofelectricitygener­
ation(35%intheCommunity and17%worldwide ).
5.2.Worldwide ,nuclearenergyhasreachedacritical
stage.WiththeexceptionofJapanandKorea,practi­

15.3.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC73/71
callynoindustrialnationhasplansfornuclearpower
plantsafter1995.Therearemanyreasonsforthis:
adecisivefactorisundoubtedly thelackofpolitical
acceptance ,particularly asaconsequence oftheCher­
nobyldisasterbutalsobecauseofthesafetyproblems
associated withSovietreactors .
5.3.Ifnuclearenergyistobeabletomakean
important contribution totheprovisionofsecure
energysuppliesandthetacklingofclimaticproblems
(greenhouse effect),itisimportanttoknowwhatsafety
requirements newnuclearpowerplantswillbeasked
tomeet.5.8.Theaimofthesedevelopments shouldbeto
improvesafetytosuchanextentthatmeasureshitherto
includedindisaster-control planssuchassheltering ,
evacuation ,rapidresettlement ,resettlement overaper­
iodofmonths,decontamination andtemporary bans
ontheconsumption oflocalagricultural produce,can
bedropped .
5.9.Onemajortaskforfuturenuclearplanttech­
nologyistosimplifysignificantly theoperation and
maintenance ofplants.Simplification wouldmakean
appreciable contribution tosafetyandwouldhelpsmall
andlessindustrialized countries inparticular toput
togetherteamsofsufficiently qualifiedoperatingand
maintenance staff.
5.10.Although therisksassociated withnuclear
reactorsareamatterofvitalimportance ,fuelcycle
problems,i.e.wastemanagement andfinaldisposal,
alsorequireurgentsolution .Inthisconnection there
areaseriesofquestionscallingforclear-cutanswers
sothatpublicconfidence canbebuiltupsufficiently .
5.11.Allinall,majorR&Deffortsareneededinthe
fieldofnuclearsafety.5.4.Becausereactorsafetyisundergoing constant
improvements ,veryhighsafetystandards havebeen
reachedinthewesternindustrial countries .Neverthe­
less,assetoutinpoints2and3,reactorsafetymust
continuetobedeveloped .
5.5.Moreover ,nuclearenergymustbemadepoliti­
callyacceptable ,i.e.trustinnuclearenergymustbe
established orre-established .Itwillthereforebenecess­
arytodevelopnewdesignsforfuturegenerations of
reactorswhichclearlyreducerisks,andparticularly the
risksstemmingfromamajoraccident,astheCouncil
hasitselfdemanded (cf.point6.5).
5.6.Intrinsicsafetyfeaturesshouldbeincorporated
asfaraspossibleinthesedesigns,theaimbeingto:
—reducetheprobability ofmajordamageand/or
—reducetheimpactofmajordamage .
Appropriate ceilingsshouldbeestablished forbothrisk
categories .6.R&Dactivitiesinthefieldofnuclearsafety
6.1.Chapter2statesthatsafetyisacontinuous
learningprocesswhichwilllastaslongasindustrial
technology isused.Inadditiontowide-ranging and
detailedinformation aboutanddiscussionofallexperi­
encesandfindings,appropriate R&Dactivitiesarea
crucialelementofthislearningprocess.
6.2.Furthermore ,thesafetyrequirements offuture
nuclearreactors—whichhavebeendiscussedinChap­
ter5andarisetosomeextentfromproblemsofaccept­
ance—canonlybemetthroughR&Dactivities .
6.3.Althoughextensiveknow-how inthefieldof
wastemanagement anddisposalalreadyexistsina
numberofStates,furtherknowledge stillneedstobe
acquiredandaboveallsubstantiated byR&Dworkso
astoensurethesafefinaldisposalofwasteinthe
future.
6.4.Lastbutnotleast,agreatdealofresearchstill
needstobecarriedoutinthefieldofradiationprotec­
tion,particularly asregardstheimpactofsmalldoses
ofionizingradiationonhealth.InitsOpiniononthe
ProposalforaCouncilDecisiononaspecificresearch
andtechnological development programme inthefield
ofnuclearfissionsafety(1990-1994 )(*),theCommittee
protestedagainsttheCommission 'sdecisiontodrasti­
callycutbackthisparticularprogramme .Suchresearch5.7.Toachievetheseaims,twoessentialconcepts
arecurrentlybeingdiscussed :
—Drawingonpastexperiences withexistingreactors,
additional safetyfeaturesshouldbebuiltintothese
reactorstominimizetheprobability ofmajordam­
age(e.g.coremeltdown )orofamajorimpacton
thesurrounding environment .
—Usingnewreactordesignswhichalreadyexist,
majorcatastrophes suchascoremeltdown should
beprevented bytheintrinsicsafetyofthedesignin
question .Inthiscasetheimpactofevenmajor
catastrophes mightbelimitedtothenuclearplant's
premises . (')OJNoC69,18.3.1991.

NoC73/72 OfficialJournaloftheEurope»nCommunities 15.3.93
7.Summaryofthemostimportant conclusions afterallalsoformsthebasisoftheworkoftheInter­
nationalCommission onRadiological Protection
(ICRP)andhaspracticalimplications fortheplanning
andimplementation ofmeasuresintheeventofacci­
dents,andfortheapplication ofionizingradiationin
medicineandtechnology .7.1.Nuclearenergyisoneofthemostimportant
sourcesofelectricpowerintheCommunity ,some
MemberStatesbeingevenlargelydependent thereon.
Politicalthinkingaboutnuclearenergy,andnuclear
safetyinparticular ,ishoweversharplydividedinthe
MemberStates.
7.2.Safety(safetyengineering )foranindustrialtech­
nologysuchasnuclearpowerisacontinuous learning
process.Thislearningprocessmustbebasedonwide­
ranging,detailedandopentechnicalinformation and
discussions atbothnationalandinternational levels,
coveringallexperiences andfindings,especiallywhen
thereareproblemsandfailings.Allindividuals and
organizations affectedbythisindustrial technology
mustparticipate inthelearningprocess,asmustthe
generalpublic.6.5.InitsResolution onthetechnological problems
ofnuclearsafetyof18June1992theCouncilsaid
amongotherthingsinPoint3thatit
'REAFFIRMS theimportance oftechnological pro­
gressinrelationtothesafetyofnuclearinstallations
andinthisconnection INVITEStheMemberStates
andtheCommission tocontinueandintensifycon­
certedeffortthroughsignificant jointactionson
keysafetyissues.Thusitunderlines theprimary
importance ofnuclearsafetyresearchandtechno­
logicalinnovation andtheneedtocontinueand
increaseactionundertaken withintheCommunity ,
includingthestudyoffuturegenerations ofreactors.
Thisactionmay,wherepossible,beextendedto
thirdcountries ,notablythoseofCentralandEast­
ernEuropeandtheRepublicsoftheformerSoviet
Union'.7.3.TheCommittee callsontheMemberStatesand
theCommission tovigorously supportastrengthening
oftheinstitutional machineryoftheIAEA,particularly
withaviewtoestablishing normsandstandardsandto
determining thestatusofinspectors .Itisalsourgently
necessarytoincreasethefundingoftheIAEA.Onlyin
thiswaywilltheIAEAbeabletoplaythecentralrole
incumbent uponitintheworldwide drivetoimprove
nuclearsafety.6.6.TheCommittee totallyfailstounderstand why
underthesecircumstances theCommission hasdrasti­
callycutbackitsnuclearsafetyandradiationprotection
R&Dprogrammes inthelastfewyearstocoincide
withthemajorcut-backsinmostnationalprogrammes .
TheCommittee hasspokenoutonthismatteron
severaloccasionsrecently [OpinionsontheResearch
andTechnological Development Programme inthe
FieldofNuclearFissionSafety(1990-1994 )(*)andon
theProgramme ofActivitiesoftheJointResearchCen­
tre(1992-1994 )(2)1.7.4.Thesafetyshortcomings ofnuclearinstallations
inCentralandEasternEuropean countries callfor
urgentactiononalargescale,particularly inthefinan­
cialfield.TheCommission isaskedtoassumeresponsi­
bilityfororganizing thefinancing .
6.7.TheCommittee wouldalsopointoutthatcon­
tinuouslyupdatedknow-how basedonsolidR&Dis
essentialiftheCommunity istohelpindrawingup
international conventions ,normsandstandards (cf.
Chapter3).ThisiswheretheECcanandmustmake
aninternational contribution .7.5.Politicalacceptance ofnuclearenergy,i.e.trust,
canonlybere-established ifnewdesignsforfuture
generations ofreactorsclearlyreducerisks,andparticu­
larlytherisksstemmingfromamajoraccident .This
canonlybeachievedif,bydrawingonexperiences with
existingreactors,additional safetyfeaturesarebuilt
intothesereactorstominimizetheprobability ofmajor
damageorofamajorimpactontheenvironment and
if,byusingnewreactordesignswhichalreadyexist,
majorcatastrophes canbeprevented bytheinherent
safetyofthedesigninquestion .Greatimportance
shouldalsobeattachedtotheproblemofwastepro­
cessingandfinaldisposal;solutionstothisproblem
mustthereforebefoundurgently .Anumberofques­
tionsintheseareasstillcallforclear-cut answersso
thatsufficientpublicconfidence canbebuiltup.6.8.FinallytheCommittee seesadirectconnection
betweentrainingandR&Dactivities .Without
adequateR&Dprogrammes trainingwillsuffer,with
thedangerthattherewillnolongerbeenoughspecial­
iststoensurethatnuclearplantsareoperatedsafely
andthatthemanyinternational commitments aremet.
(1)OJNoC69,18.3.1991,p.33.
(2)OJNoC49,24.2.1992,p.16.7.6.TheCommission 'spolicyofdrastically cutting
backR&Dprogrammes onnuclearsafetyisunaccept­

15.3.93 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC73/73
ableaswellasbeinginconsistent withtheCouncil
Resolution of18June1992.TheCommittee thereforecallsontheCommission toimmediately drawthe
necessaryconclusions .
DoneatBrussels,28January1993.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
SusanneTIEMANN
OpinionontheproposalforaCouncilDecisionforamonitoring mechanism ofCommunity
C02andothergreenhouse-gas emissions
(93/C73/13)
On22June1992theCouncildecidedtoconsulttheEconomic andSocialCommittee ,
underArticle130softheTreatyestablishing theEuropeanEconomic Community ,onthe
abovementioned proposal .
TheSectionforProtection oftheEnvironment ,PublicHealthandConsumer Affairs,which
wasresponsible forpreparingtheCommittee 'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon
5January1993.TheRapporteur wasMrSilva.
Atits302ndPlenarySession (meetingof28January1993),theEconomic andSocial
Committee adoptedthefollowingOpinionwithnovotesagainstand4abstentions .
—inrelation—withdueaccountforitsmorespecific
nature—totheCommission 'sproposedstrategyfor
limitingemissionsandimproving energyefficiency
comprising theSAVEandAltenerprogrammes and
thepossibleadoptionoffiscalmeasures (1).
1.2.TheCommittee hasalwayswelcomedthemajor
workandresearchaccomplished inthisfield,theposi­
tiveexperiences gleaned,thesignificantdataandanaly­
sesthathavebeencompiled,andtheeffortstoovercome
difficulties anddifferences ofopinionandtoagreeon
commonmeasures .Theseriousdelaysareduebothto
thecomplexity oftheproblemandtothecontinuing
disagreements betweenMemberStatesanddifferent
sectorsonthemeasurestobetakenjointlyorindividu­
ally,takingaccountofthedifferingdevelopment and1.Background totheproposal
1.1.Inordertoassessproperlyalltheimplications
ofthepresentproposal,itshouldbeconsidered :
—inrelationtopreviousECactivityinthisarea,and
inparticulartheundertaking madebytheEnergy/
Environment Councilof29October1990tostabil­
izeC02emissionsattheir1990levelsbytheyear
2000;
—inthelightofpresentemissionsandlikelytrendsin
thenextfewyears;
—incloseconnection with(a)theon-goinginter­
nationaldebateonthissubject,(b)theestablishment
andharmonization ofmonitoring andmeasuring
methodsatnational,ECandinternational level,
and(c)thewillingness andcommitment ofthe
MemberStatesandotherinterestedparties,includ­
ingthesocio-economic groupswhoaredirectly
involved ;HDoc.SEC(91)1744final,doc.COM(92 )246final,doc.
COM(92)180,182and226final.