EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 11 January 2021  
on the implementation of the recommendations of the convergence reports  into the Law on 
Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank)  
(CON/20 21/2) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 10 December 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Minister 
for Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on credit institutions and other laws (hereinafter 
the ‘draft law’)1. 
The ECB’s competence to deli ver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as 
the draft law relates to Българска народна банка ( BNB, Bulgarian National B ank). In accordance with the 
first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 
has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
 As explained in the consultation letter, the draft law aims to address certain issues identified in the 
2020 Convergence Reports of the ECB and the European Commission with regard to the 
independence of BNB and the prohibition of monetary financing under A rticle 123 of the Treaty . In 
this respect, t he draft law proposes to amend the Law on credit institutions3, the Law on BNB4 and 
the Law on counter -corruption and unlawfully acquired assets forfeiture (hereinafter the ‘Law on 
counter -corruption’)5 in respec t of, inter alia,  the matters  set out below .  
1.1 Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest   
The draft law proposes to amend Article 80(1) of the Law on counter -corruption in order to provide 
that t he ascertainment of a conflict of interest in accordance with that L aw will be a ground for removal 
from office, unless otherwise provided for in the  Constitution or the Treaties of the European Union 
and their protocols.  
 
1  Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за кредитните институции.  
2  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29  June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions ( OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
3  Law on credit institutions (Закон за кредитните институции, обн. ДВ, бр. 59  от 21.07.2006 г.).  
4  Law on BNB (Закон Българската народна банка, обн. ДВ, 46 от 10.06.1997 г.).  
5  Law on counter -corruption and unlawfully acquire d assets forfeiture (Закон за противодействие на корупцията и за 
отнемане на незаконно придобитото имущество, обн. ДВ, бр. 7 от 19.01.2018 г.).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 1.2 BNB liability in relation to the central credit  register  and the bank account register  
The draft law proposes to specify in the Law on credit institutions that BNB will  not be liable for 
damages relating to the information stored in the central credit register6 and the bank account 
register7. 
1.3 Cooperation between BNB and the Council of Ministers  
The draft law proposes to repeal the provision of Article 3 of the Law on BNB which currently provides 
that in the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary policy, BNB and the Council of Ministers 
shall inform each other.  
1.4 Independence of the members of the BNB Governing Council   
The draft law proposes that  Article 13(1) of the Law on BNB  be amended to provide that the oath to 
be taken by the Governor, the Deputy Governors and the other three members of the Governing 
Council  when entering into office should refer to the ir contribution to the ‘independent’ performance 
of the BNB functions.  
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB welcomes the draft law ’s efforts to achieve the required level of legal convergence by 
reference to the recommendations for Bulgaria contained in the 2020 Convergence Reports of the  
ECB and the Commission . 
2.2 The ECB notes that the compatibility of Bu lgarian legislation  – including the Law on BNB and the 
Law on counter -corruption – with the Treaties and the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) will be assessed in 
the EC B’s next c onvergence report , as required by Article 131 of the Treaty . 
 
3. Specific o bservations  
3.1 Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest  
In accordance with Article 12 of the Law on BNB, the Governor and the three Deputy Governors are 
appointed by the National Assembly, while the other three members of BNB’s Governing Council are 
appointed by the President of the Republic. Article 14(1) of t he Law on BNB provides that the 
appointing authority may remove a member of the Governing Council from office if one of the grounds 
it lists for removal from office is established. The ECB therefore understands that the competence to 
take a decision to remove a member of BNB’s Governing Council from office is vested solely in the 
appointing authority : either the National Assembly or  the President of the Republic. In accordance 
with A rticle 14(1) of the Law on BNB the grounds for removal are met where: (i)  the member no 
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or (ii)  he has been found guilty 
of serious misconduct.  
 
6  Article 56 of the Law on credit institutions.  
7  Article 56a of the Law on credit institutions.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 However , the Law on counter -corruption also applies  to the Governor, the Deputy Governor s and 
the other members of the Governing Council of BNB  as senior public office holders8. This Law on 
counter -corruption provides that the Counter -Corruption and Unlawfully Acquired Assets Forfeiture 
Commission may establish by means of a decision the existence of a conflict of interest with regard 
to senior public office holders9. As a consequence of such a decision10, the respective senior public 
office holder may be removed from office in accordance with Article 80(1) of the Law  on counter -
corruption.  Against this background,  the Law on counter -corruption establishes a ground for relieving 
from office that is in addition to the two grounds contained in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 
Therefore, the ECB has noted in its Convergence Report that the Law on counter -corruption is 
incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and needs to be brought into line with 
them11. According to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB , a G overnor may only be relieved from 
office on either of  the two grounds contained in that Article12. As regards the other members of the 
decision -making bodies of national central banks (NCBs), the same rules for the security of tenure 
and grounds for relieving Governors from office also apply, safeguarding  the personal independence 
of those persons. The provisions of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB are not restricted to the 
security of tenure of Governors, and Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB 
refer to ‘ members of the decision- making bodies ’ of NCBs rather than to Governors specifically. This 
is legally required,  in particular , when a Governor is a ‘ first among equals ’ with colleagues with 
equivalent voting rights or where such other members are involved in the performance of ESCB -
related tasks13.  
Against this backdrop, the ECB understands that the intention of the proposed amendment to Article 
80(1) of the Law on counter -corruption is to ensure that th e ascertainment of a conflict of interest in 
accordance with that Law  would not be a ground for removal from office of the Governor and the 
other members of the Governing Council of BNB , because this would be contrary to the Treaty and 
the Statute  of the ESCB . However , for the sake of ensuring legal certainty and transparency, it is 
suggested to explic itly clarify that the provision of Article 80(1) of the Law on counter -corruption shall 
not apply to the Governor , the Deputy Governors  and the other members of the Governing Council 
of BNB, instead of implicitly reaching this result by means of a general cross- reference to the EU 
Treaties and their protocols . 
3.2 BNB liability in relation to the central credit register and the bank account register  
The ECB welcomes the waiver of liability for BNB in relation to the operation of the central credit 
register and the bank account register. The ECB understands that , instead of BNB, the State would 
be liable for damages resulting from the operation of the two registers in accordance with the general 
regime for State liability.  
3.3 Cooperation between BNB and the Council of Ministers  
 
8  Point 12 of Article 6(1) of the Law on counter -corruption.  
9  Article 74 of the Law on counter -corruption.  
10  See Chapter 8, Sect ion VI of  Law on counter -corruption , titled ‘Consequences upon Conflict of Interest Ascertainment’ . 
11  ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 7.1.2.  
12  This was confirmed by the Court of Justice in  its judgment of 26  February 2019, Rimšēvičs v Latvia, joined cases 
C-202/18 and C -238/18, ECLI: EU:C:2019:139, paragraphs 88 and 89. 
13  ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.2.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 The ECB notes that the consulting authority proposes to repea l the provision of Article 3 of the Law 
on BNB , which currently provides that in the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary 
policy, BNB and the Council of Ministers shall inform each other . The ECB understands that this 
proposal aims to implem ent the recommendations of the Commission’s Convergence Report with 
regard to central bank independence14. For its part, however, the ECB would not object  to 
maintaining Article 3 of the Law on BNB  even if in a revised form,  in order to implement the necessary 
safeguards for central bank independence.  Dialogue between an NCB and third parties  including the 
Government,  even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, 
is indeed compatible with  central bank independence, provided that ( i) this does not result in 
interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision- making bodies; ( ii) the 
special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision -making bodi es is 
fully respected; and ( iii) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB are 
respected15. 
3.4 Independence of the members of the BNB Governing Council  
The ECB understands that the proposed amendment to Article 13(1) of the Law on BNB aims to 
implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Convergence Report with regard to central 
bank independence, henceforth requiring that the oath to be sworn by the Governor , Deputy 
Governors and other members of the Governing Council  of BNB be fore the National Assembly  and 
the President would make reference to their contribution to the independent performance of BNB’s 
functions16. The ECB welcomes this clarification.   
 
This opinion will b e published on EUR -Lex. 
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 January 2021.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine  LAGARDE  
 
14  Commission ’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.1.2.  
15  ECB’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.2. 3. 
16  Commission ’s Convergence Report 2020, paragraph 2.1.2.