31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/151 
Opinion on the final stage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/Uruguay 
Round negotiations 
(90/C 332/41) 
On 30 January 1990 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the fourth paragraph 
of Article 20 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to deliver an Opinion on the final stage of 
the GATT/Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy, which was responsible 
for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 3 September 
1990. The Rapporteur was Mr Romoli and the Co-Rapporteur Mr Droulin. 
The supplementary Opinion of the Section for Agriculture and Fisheries (*) is appended to 
this Opinion, in accordance with Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure. 
At its 279th plenary session (meeting of 20 September 1990), the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion by a substantial majority, with one abstention. 
THE EC POSITION IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE 
GATT/URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 
1. Introduction 
This Opinion, which follows up the information report 
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)/Uruguay Round negotiations, adopted at the 
ESC plenary session held on 25 April 1990, reflects the 
Committee's comments and views on the EC position 
and the prospects for a successful outcome to the nego­
tiations in the run-up to the December 1990 deadline. 
2. The final months 
2.1. At the time of this Opinion's adoption the 
December 1990 dead-line is only a few weeks away and 
there is little prospect of a successful conclusion to the 
negotiations. 
2.2. In particular, differences on agricultural issues 
still seem to remain unresolved. 
2.3. Sharp differences in the negotiating positions of 
the less developed countries (LDC) and the industrial­
ized countries also persist in many traditional issues 
(tariffs, non-tariff barriers, market access, safeguards, 
textiles). There are also major differences on new issues 
(protection of intellectual property, investments and 
non-agricultural services). 
2.4. Before we address this complex set of problems, 
it should be pointed out that, at this conclusive stage 
of negotiations, political issues are increasingly taking 
(J) CES 411/90 fin. precedence over attempts to solve purely technical mat­
ters (which in most cases have already been studied in 
depth). The time has now come to take final decisions 
and to identify key points which can determine the 
success or failure of five years' hard work by representa­
tives of the 99 GATT contracting parties (^). 
2.5. The disagreement between the USA and the EC 
is clearly at the heart of the problem. If agreement can 
be reached between the two largest world trade powers, 
it will be easier to settle the remaining points of conten­
tion with the LDC. Failing this, a very stormy, tense 
period will lie ahead for the multilateral international 
trade system, with the danger of a general reversion 
to bilateralism, unilateral decisions and direct clashes 
between national interests. 
(2) Following the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meeting 
on 23-26 July 1990, the following timetable was drawn up: 
— 27 August: the negotiating groups start on the final round 
of meetings. — 1 October: deadline for countries to submit 
their lists to the negotiating group on agriculture. — 8 Octob­
er: TNC meeting to examine the state of progress: from then 
on the TNC assumes responsibility for all negotiations. — 
15 October: deadline for submission of offers in all sectors. 
The negotiations enter a permanent phase. — 5 November: 
in accordance with the Punta del Este Declaration, the nego­
tiation group on goods must assess the impact of the Uruguay 
Round on LDC. — 23 November: end of the Geneva nego­
tiations. The texts must be ready for examination by the 
Ministers. — 3-7 December: ministerial meeting in Brussels. 
Winding-up of the negotiations. 
No C 332/152 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
3. US trade strategy 
3.1. The EC-US dispute focusses primarily on agri­
culture. While this sector is sensitive, a closer scrutiny 
reveals other, far deeper and more complex, causes of 
discord. Here it should be remembered that, in 1985, 
prompted by concern over the unsatisfactory trend of 
the US balance of trade, the Reagan administration 
proposed a new round of GATT negotiations: the Uru­
guay Round. At that time there was a widespread 
conviction that the US economy would reap substantial 
benefits from a more regulated international trade sys­
tem involving the extension of GATT rules to services, 
a tighter discipline of agricultural trade and new rules 
to protect intellectual property and investments in third 
countries. 
3.2. However, as the negotiations progressed, this 
strategy underwent a significant change. At the insti­
gation of the US Congress, which the US Constitution 
empowers to regulate trade with third countries, new 
trade legislation strengthening the many existing trade 
laws was drafted and adopted. The legislation intro­
duced new safeguards and curbs against 'unfair' 
imports from third countries and new programmes to 
bolster US exports and producers. This 'Omnibus Tra­
de Competitiveness Act of 1988' encountered only mild 
resistance from the Reagan administration—though the 
administration did point out that the act was protec­
tionist and breached the 'standstill' undertaking given 
at the start of the Uruguay Round. 
3.3. In particular, the 1988 Trade Act, by reinforcing 
Section 301 of the 1974 act, was a powerful weapon 
against third countries which the US administration 
considered to have adopted 'unjustified, unreasonable 
and discriminatory' trade practices potentially damag­
ing to the access rights of US goods, services and invest­
ments to foreign markets. Section 301 provides for 
mandatory unilateral retaliation measures after an 
attempt has been made to persuade the offending coun­
try to remove the contested barriers. 
3.4. The GATT secretariat report of 16 November 
1989, stated that by introducing the act the US govern­
ment had reinforced its discretionary powers and 
assumed the right to interpret GATT rules so as to impress 'solutions' that were not provided for or were 
in clear breach of the multilateral provisions. 
3.5. From 1988 onwards, US trade strategy therefore 
entered a new phase, which persists to this day. 
Officially the USA continues, for instance in repeated 
declarations by its president, to endorse undertakings 
to improve the GATT framework of multilateral rules 
and regulations, viz. in the Uruguay Round's main 
objective. Yet simultaneously, outside GATT, the US 
administration is pursuing a series of unilateral moves 
and pushing through bilateral agreements designed to 
promote its own trade interests. The most recent 
instance was when Japan was forced to agree to open 
up its public procurement market to US manufacturers 
of supercomputers and commercial satellites as well as 
to US forestry products. 
3.6. The new priority for 'opening up markets' to 
US exports will necessitate deployment of a variety of 
instruments: either GATT's multilateral regulations or, 
whenever it seems more expedient, the unilateral pro­
visions of the 1988 Trade Act. 
3.7. Against the background of this actively unilat­
eral application of its domestic trade legislation, the US 
is now embarking on the final stage of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 
4. Japan's position: bilateral agreements and multilat­
eral undertakings under GATT 
4.1. Japan is the third world trade power after the 
EC and USA. 
The dramatic surge in Japanese exports during the past 
decades has triggered grave concern in all countries, 
and particularly in the USA and EC. There has been 
repeated condemnation of Japan's aggressive trade 
practices, which sometimes only just respect legal limits 
and involve dumping and targeted onslaughts on spec­
ific market sectors, designed to exclude all other com­
petitors. 
4.2. These practices have inevitably triggered a 
defensive response in many countries and Japanese 
trade policy over the past ten years has undoubtedly 
slowed down the process of dismantling quantitative 
restrictions and barriers to which GATT is committed. 
4.3. In the USA, the Japanese onslaught has exacer­
bated protectionist trends and led to calls for voluntary 
restraints in practical terms, forced through by threat 
31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/153 
of unilateral retaliation. Japan has not opposed such 
demands and has concluded 'grey area' bilateral agree­
ments with the USA for an impressive list of products 
(virtually two-thirds of total trade between the two 
parties, ranging from textiles to iron and steel, semi­
conductors to electronics) (x). 
4.4. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, Japan 
has played an active role in the talks on tariff reduction 
and the dismantling of non-tariff barriers, anti-dumping 
rules and all matters affecting the removal of obstacles 
to its own exports. 
Japan has also taken a keen interest in the protection 
of intellectual property, investment and liberalization 
of services. 
4.5. However, Japan has not been able to avoid 
growing pressure for substantially improved access to 
its domestic markets, which have been sealed off from 
international trade for far too long. 
Many countries, first and foremost those of the EC, 
have called on Japan to dismantle import restrictions 
and modify procedural obstacles, rules and administrat­
ive formalities which have limited market access for 
goods and services from third countries, thereby aggra­
vating the accumulation of sizeable trade surpluses. 
European undertakings in the services sector would like 
to be able to operate in Japan free of discrimination. 
Thus, for example, European banks should be able to 
offer a savings deposit collection service like Japanese 
banks in Japan (and in the EC). 
4.6. In recent months there have been various signs 
that the Tokyo government has realized the need to 
make substantial concessions in order to facilitate 
greater transparency and access on fair terms to Japan's 
domestic market. 
4.7. It is to be hoped that the final stage of the 
Uruguay Round will give Japan an opportunity to make 
a major contribution towards the negotiations' success 
and strengthening the GATT multilateral system. 
5. Relations with the LDC 
5.1. The Uruguay Round prospects as regards 
relations between the industrialized countries and the 
LDC are still far from promising. 
(*) See the statement made by Mr Dunkel, Director-General of 
GATT, in Tokyo on 1 June 1990. 5.2. This is also due to the rather ambiguous stance 
taken by the LDC. 
On the one hand, many LDC are aware that it is 
important to take positive action to integrate their 
economies into the new international economic order 
currently taking shape on the basis of GATT rules. 
However, they are failing to contribute constructively 
during the negotiations to attempts to work out more 
satisfactory solutions. 
On the other, a very dynamic group of more advanced 
LDC, which have emerged as leaders, have decided to 
pursue delaying tactics in the negotiations and to 
indulge in brinkmanship before accepting compromise 
solutions in the hope of extracting maximum advan­
tage. 
5.3. But time has now virtually run out: the general 
outline and most of the details of the final agreement 
to be signed in December in Brussels have to be drafted 
by October. A major effort is needed if this deadline is 
to be met. 
5.4. In recent months many informal meetings have 
taken place between representatives of the industrial­
ized countries and the LDC but no significant progress 
has emerged. On the contrary, positions have hardened 
in several cases. 
5.5. The cause of the underlying disagreement is 
well-known: the LDC largely wish to secure the greatest 
possible benefits from this Round of GATT without 
giving any undertakings or quids pro quo. 
5.6. The talks on textiles are a good example. The 
LDC have insisted solely on the prompt dismantling of 
the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) and ignored pro­
posals by the EC and other countries for reintegrating 
the MFA into the GATT multilateral arrangements 
while concurrently tightening up multilateral rules and 
provisions in this sector. 
5.7. The LDC were particularly displeased that the 
EC's generous offer to open up its markets completely 
to non-Community imports was conditional on the 
beneficiary countries (a) accepting a precise code of 
conduct in respect of fair trade practices, dumping, 
counterfeiting and export subsidies, (b) giving an under­
taking to open up their own markets, albeit gradually, 
in line with each country's level of economic develop­
ment. Here it should be remembered that India, Brazil, 
many countries of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) etc. comprise substantial consummer 
markets (tens of millions) which have a fairly high 
per capita Gross Domestic Product and are potential 
purchasers of high quality textiles and clothing from 
the developed countries, particularly the EC. 
No C 332/154 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
5.8. The total sealing-off of the markets of these 
wealthier LDC is therefore an anomaly that cannot 
persist ad infinitum. The current scenario in the textiles 
sector is repeated in many other sectors; to date the 
LDC have failed even to submit proposals for tariff 
reductions and the dismantling of non-tariff barriers; 
this is further evidence of their reluctance to help liberal­
ize trade and establish a system of effective and fair 
rules and disciplines—the Uruguay Round's main goal. 
5.9. Such reluctance is particularly glaring in the 
key areas of protection of intellectual property and 
investment safeguards. In the services sector too there 
are few signs of readiness to adhere to a framework 
agreement laying down the general principles of an 
international system rooted in greater freedom of trade 
(the details to be defined in subsequent negotiations). 
Whatever its stage of development, every country could 
benefit from being integrated into international trade 
and pursuing its economic and social development on 
the basis of a good balance between production of 
goods and services and international competition. 
5.10. Given the LDC unsatisfactory attitude in this 
final stage of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
Committee wishes once again to remind the Com­
munity negotiators of the general principles already 
expressed in previous ESC Opinions on the subject (J). 
5.11. The Committee considers that the EC, along 
with the other industrialized countries, must stand firm 
by the principle that all LDC which have attained 
high levels of growth, production, consumption and 
financial viability [the Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NIC)] are obliged to shoulder their share of the duties 
and responsibility, viz. gradually to open up their dom­
estic markets in line with the benefits they already 
derive—and will derive in the future—from increased 
international trade. 
5.12. Accordingly, resolute action is needed to build 
a strong, coherent and fair GATT multilateral system, 
undeterred by the possibility that some LDC could 
decide to opt out and refuse to accept the joint rules 
needed to regulate the international trade system in the 
decades ahead. 
(!) See the ESC Opinion of 29 September 1988, pp. 10 and 11. 
OJ No C 318, 12. 12.1988. 5.13. That would be most unfortunate but it would 
be the free choice of these countries, showing a distrust 
of the multilateral system and a preference for bilateral 
trade relations with the industrialized countries. 
5.14. The EC has repeatedly stated that, in addition 
to continuation of the specific aid programmes from 
which they benefit, the most disadvantaged LDC and 
those contending with particularly acute problems will 
have to receive preferential treatment and be given 
more time to comply with joint rules. Obviously these 
countries must show that they respect human rights 
and the relevant international conventions. 
5.15. The Committee reiterates its disappointment 
over the Uruguay Round negotiators' inability or reluc­
tance to tackle the issue of 'social clauses'; in many 
LDC local workers are deprived of the most basic 
human rights, safeguards and protection. 
5.16. However, it should be borne in mind that there 
have recently been signs of dissent within the LDC 
ranks. 
Some countries [e.g. Latin America, the African, Carib­
bean and Pacific States (ACP) and ASEAN] have 
expressed grave fears that the EC will turn away from 
them as a result of the upheavals in Eastern Europe. 
5.17. The EC should calm the anxieties of these 
countries since it has no intention of scaling down its 
commitment to them. However, the EC could usefully 
impress on them that it would appreciate a more con­
structive attitude in the joint drive to strengthen the 
GATT multilateral system. 
In particular, it would be in the interests of the LDC 
themselves to suggest which sets of international rules 
would best integrate them in world economic growth 
and what timetable they wish to follow in strengthening 
the GATT multilateral system. 
Obviously the more countries sign the agreements being 
negotiated under the GATT, the greater benefit will 
accrue from them to their signatories. 
5.18. The Committee would praise the positive atti­
tude of various Eastern European countries and the 
USSR, which regard the GATT system as a reference 
frame for opening up their economies to the inter­
national market. 
But one wonders when the Eastern European countries 
will grant national treatment to other members of 
GATT, particularly as regards the provision of services 
by foreign nationals. 
31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/155 
6. EC and US responsibilities 
6.1. As the largest trade power in the world, the EC 
has attached great importance to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
6.2. The Commission, whose brief has been to rep­
resent the EC on behalf of the Member States as a 
whole, has consistently displayed diligence and skill in 
performing its task of directing and conducting the 
negotiations in progress in Geneva. Indeed the EC is 
playing a key role in framing the new international 
trade order which is taking shape. 
However, it was clearly not enough to concentrate 
solely on technical matters since the key points under 
discussion were essentially political and required top-
level EC decisions. At the beginning of this year the 
Irish Presidency of the Council convened a meeting of 
the ministers of the Twelve responsible for GATT 
matters. In its declaration of 3 March 1990, after reiter­
ating the Community's commitment to ensure that the 
Uruguay Round yielded tangible, balanced results, the 
Council broached (albeit indirectly) the basic problem 
of relations with the USA. The Council stated that, 
once the Uruguay Round was concluded, steps would 
have to be taken to scrap any recent unilateral measures, 
by any country, in breach of 'standstill' undertakings 
and contrary to the multilateral approach. 
63. In mid-June another Council of Ministers dis­
cussed the future outlook for the Uruguay Round in 
depth and confirmed its political commitment to achiev­
ing a constructive agreement establishing a coherent, 
effective multilateral system vested with clearcut rules 
and equal rights and duties for all contracting parties. 
6.4. In the past few months, talks between the Com­
munity and the USA have increasingly shown that spec­
ific technical aspects (inter alia agricultural subsidies) 
are only partially responsible for the difficulties and 
disputes. There is a more important factor: the US 
administration is finding it genuinely hard to persuade 
Congress to abandon a trade strategy founded on 
national legislation, independent of GATT, which has 
recently operated satisfactorily (e.g. the successful 
pressure on Japan to open up markets to US exports). 
6.5. This approach has the direct backing of the 
US Congress, well-known for its strong protectionist 
streak. However, the same line is taken by several of the responsible officials in the US administration, viz. 
those attached to the Agriculture Department and the 
US Trade Representative who coined the 'crowbar' 
slogan to describe the trade policy which the USA 
intends to pursue on world markets (and not just with 
respect to Japan). 
6.6. However, a much broader and farsighted politi­
cal vision of US-EC relations prevails elsewhere in the 
US administration (in the offices of the Secretary of 
State and the President). In December 1989, referring 
to political developments in Eastern Europe, US Sec­
retary of State James Baker, called for closer insitutional 
and consultative ties between the USA and EC enabling 
Washington and Brussels to view the creation of a new 
political order in Europe as a joint task. 
6.7. Against this background disagreements between 
EC and US negotiators on the specific issue of agri­
culture in the Uruguay Round are put into perspective 
and become less threatening. They should not compro­
mise fundamental political relations between the two 
parties, which are—and will remain—excellent. Non­
etheless this question was discussed at the G 7 Summit 
in Houston. 
7. Conclusions: call for resolute EC action during the 
final stage of the GATT negotiations 
7.1. The Committee would draw the following con­
clusions, based on an in-depth study of the current 
progress and future prospects for success of the Uruguay 
Round, to the attention of the Council, Commission, 
and other Community institutions. 
7.2. The Community must reiterate energetically its 
conviction that the GATT system is the cornerstone of 
the international trade order. The EC acknowledges 
that the GATT system has hitherto been so weak and 
ineffective that some countries have been prompted to 
adopt unilateral trade legislation outside the multilat­
eral system. Steps must therefore be taken to substan­
tially strengthen GATT and enhance its 'status', inter 
alia on the institutional level. The original plan to 
change the current provisional General Agreement into 
an 'International Trade Organization', on a par with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank, should be revived (x). The Uruguay Round must 
work towards this end, which can be attained provided 
that the large industrialized countries manage to reach 
a consensus, agree on a common purpose and endorse 
the rights and duties inherent in the renewed multilat­
eral system. 
(l) See point 3.6 of the ESC Opinion of 25 April 1990: Function­
ing of the GATT system (FOGs). CES 1415/89 fin. + app. 
No C 332/156 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
7.3. The Community should therefore request the 
USA, once the negotiations have achieved the desired 
aim, viz. satisfactory reinforcement of the GATT sys­
tem, to take all the requisite steps to amend the 1988 
Trade Act with a view to scrapping provisions incom­
patible with its multilateral commitments (with specific 
reference to Section 301). Such a declaration is an urgent 
prerequisite for improving the atmosphere during the 
final stage of the negotiations, as constructive compro­
mises cannot be discussed and explored under threat of 
future unilateral retaliation. 
7.4. More specifically, the Committee recommends 
that Community negotiators should give special atten­
tion to the dispute settlement procedure which— 
although an improvement on the previous, totally 
unsatisfactory, situation—still lacks a number of vital 
components: for instance, a second-level appeals pro­
cedure and sufficiently strong machinery for ensuring 
that all contracting parties comply with decisions. A 
stronger dispute settlement procedure could also defuse 
arguments by some transatlantic conservationist groups 
that bilateral agreements and unilateral action are 
necessary precisely because GATT is too weak and 
slow in dealing with economic disputes that may arise 
between the contracting partners. 
7.5. In particular the key issue of agriculture needs 
to be examined. 
The Committee would particularly confirm its own 
support for the Community's overall strategy which 
has the twofold aim of (a) improving the balance on 
world agricultural markets, in line with the duty of all 
countries to take concerted action to reduce their sup­
port measures, and (b) ensuring efficient operation of 
the machinery of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (1). In the Committee's view, these two aims are 
compatible. 
Attention should also be paid to the competitiveness 
of the agricultural processing industry, without which 
neither farmers nor consumers can survive. 
7.5.1. The US negotiators' tactic is to insist on a 
substantial reduction in agricultural export aids in the 
full knowledge that they are asking the EC to do the 
impossible, i.e. to dismantle the CAP bit by bit. The 
motive is obvious: to keep the Community under press­
ure so as to secure as many concessions as possible, or 
alternatively, when the USA so wishes, to trigger the 
collapse of the negotiations and laying the responsibility 
for this at the Community's door. 
(*) See the supplementary Opinion on agricultural aspects of the 
GATT-Uruguay Round negotiations, adopted by the ESC 
Section for Agriculture and Fisheries on 13 June 1990. Doc. 
CES 411/90 fin. 7.5.2. The Community has already given its reply: it 
stands by the proposal and reiterates its readiness to 
consider mutual, balanced concessions that would 
improve the international agricultural trade system. 
7.5.3. A second factor lies behind many of the points 
of discord between the EC and the USA: their conflict­
ing views on a number of key principles, and first 
and foremost on whether at international level the 
agricultural sector should be regulated solely by market 
forces. The Community recognizes the need to take 
account of other considerations and priorities (e.g. 
social aspects, environmental factors, regional develop­
ment, security of food supplies and other requirements) 
that are reflected both in the aims of the CAP and in 
the policies of many other developed and developing 
countries. 
7.5.4. This key problem concerns other sectors as 
well as agriculture and calls for detailed clarification. 
Otherwise the current misunderstandings and incom­
prehension dividing certain countries will persist. 
7.5.5. It is unfortunate that such a vital issue was 
not broached at the start of the Uruguay Round nego­
tiations. In this final stage, the time and calm necessary 
for a cool, objective in-depth appraisal are in short 
supply. The EC should, however, find a way to discuss 
and clarify these key points with the USA, in the first 
instance, and with the other contracting parties. 
7.6. At the present stage of the talks in Geneva on 
market access, the offers submitted by certain major 
partners are disappointing. The Committee feels that 
the Community has already made substantial initial 
offers on this point. It should therefore obtain genuine, 
consolidated access to the markets of non-EC countries, 
this means the continuation of a coordinated approach 
to tariff and non-tariff matters. If this objective cannot 
be achieved, the EC should review its initial offer. 
7.7. Finally, the Committee would express its convic­
tion that the ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations are 
extremely important—even more so than previous 
GATT negotiations—because their task is to devise 
the general framework for international trade relations 
over the coming decades. Like the EC, all contracting 
parties will have to contribute to their success by using 
the short time still available to tackle and resolve, in a 
spirit of constructive compromise, the many problems 
that remain unsolved. Clearly, however, the EC (like 
31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/157 
the other contracting parties) must not be forced to 
sacrifice its own vital interests. That would be incom­
patible with the Uruguay Round's guiding principle, 
1. Introductory remarks 
1.1. With more people than ever enjoying more leis­
ure, the prodigious boom in tourism is changing the 
nature of tourism dramatically, and not always for the 
better. The European Year of Tourism is the moment 
to take stock so as to develop a Common Policy for 
Tourism and prepare for furhter large increases in the 
number of tourists. 
1.2. The Committee has judged that its contribution 
to this assessment of the situation and of policy to 
influence developments should take the form of a seri­
ous examination of the future of tourism and its contri­
bution to regional development in its widest sense, 
including town and country planning where relevant. 
Policy at Community level for tourism has so far been 
rather limited, concentrating on consumer protection 
(see report). The Committee is in favour of a more 
comprehensive policy, taking as its starting point the 
avowed aim of Article 2 of the Council Decision on an 
action programme for the European Year of Tourism [l) 
f1) OJ No L 17, 21. 1. 1989. laid down at Punta del Este in 1986, namely the achieve­
ment of conditions striking a balance between the con­
tracting parties' advantages and obligations. 
namely the need to 'stress the economic and social 
importance of the tourism sector inter alia in regional 
policy and job creation'. 
1.3. Tourism has developed into an economic 
activity, offering a variety of service in response to 
consumer demand. Over the past thirty years in particu­
lar, there has been constant growth of the tourist indus­
try in Europe. 
1.4. As an economic activity, tourism has become 
increasingly dependent on a number of different Com­
munity policies. Tourism is not an isolated sector on 
its own. Many fields—transport, environment, social 
and rural development, agriculture, services, etc.—af­
fect tourism and are affected by it. Policies dealing with 
these fields must, therefore, also take full regard of 
tourist developments. Done at Brussels, 20 September 1990. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
Opinion on tourism and regional development 
(90/C 332/42) 
At its meeting on 19 October 1990 the Economic and Social Committee decided to entrust 
the Section for Regional Development and Town & Country Planning with the preparation 
of an own-initiative Opinion (Article 20, paragraph 4 of the Rules of Procedure) and report 
on the subject of tourism and regional development. 
The Section for Regional Development and Town and Country Planning, which was respon­
sible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 19 July 
1990. The Rapporteur was Mr Vassilaras. 
At its 279th plenary session (meeting of 20 September 1990) the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion with no votes against and one abstention.