No C 232/40 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
governing transfrontier goods transport should in future be 
common to the whole of the Community; Member States 
should not be able to adopt solutions of their own. 
2.6. Article 11 
2.6.1. The authorizations are to be valid for a maximum 
of three years during the Regulation's final phase. Member 
States will thus be able to determine whether adequate use 
has been made of the authorizations. In addition, it will not 
be possible to intervene on the road haulage markets unless a 
system of renewable authorizations is retained. When the 
switch is made to a quota-free regime it will not be possible to 
dispense with authorizations. The Commission should, 
however, examine after a further transitional period whether 
the experiences gained with markets not restricted by quotas 
do not justify a changeover to licensing arrangements. 
2.7. Article 12 
2.1 A. The issuing of authorizations is also conditional on 
the applicant indicating the number of vehicles to be 
deployed together with their registration numbers. The 
flexible deployment of vehicles, and in particular the hiring 
and leasing of commercial vehicles, is made difficult by such a 
restriction. 
2.8. Article 13 2.9. Article 15 
2.9.1. Just as for the transitional period, machinery is to 
be provided for the post-1992 period to deal with crises in 
international road haulage. The comments made above with 
regard to the equivalent procedures for the transitional 
period apply mutatis mutandis. However, the possibilities 
available for withdrawing authorizations have been 
restricted further and apply only to parts of the market. 
2.10. Article 16 
2.10.. The Member States must be obliged to liaise in 
applying and supervising the regulation. It has already been 
pointed out in this connection that, above all, the 
Commission will have to ensure that Community law is 
applied uniformly in the Member States. In addition, 
cooperation should mainly be confined to dealing with 
offences and infringements. It should also be ensured that 
equivalent standards and administrative practices are 
introduced with regard to the rules governing admission to 
the occupation, the technical inspection of commercial 
vehicles and the supervision of drivers' hours. The 
information about infringements will be pointless if the 
supervisory measures differ greatly from one Member State 
to another. To this extent the correct prerequisites must be 
created first of all in the individual Member States. This is a 
matter for which the Commission should bear responsibility 
in the interests of a properly functioning road haulage market 
that provides a high-quality service. 
2.8.1. With regard to the withdrawal of authorization, 
the Committee questions what personal consequences there 
might be for the employees involved irrespective of whether 
withdrawal is the result both in cases of incorrect 
information being supplied or of infringements of the rules 
on driving and rest periods. 2.11. Article 19 
2.11.1. The entry into force of the Regulation should be 
scheduled for 1 January 1988. 
Done at Brussels, 1 July 1987. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alfons MARGOT 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident 
(87/C 232/18) 
On 1 July and 24 October 1986 the Economic and Social Committee decided, in accordance with the 
fourth paragraph of Article 20 of its Rules of Procedure, to draw up an opinion on the consequences of 
the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/41 
The sub-Committee on Chernobyl, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the 
matter, adopted its Opinion on 5 May 1987. The rapporteur was Mr Flum, the co-rapporteur Prof, 
von der Decken. 
At its 247th plenary session (meeting of 1 July 1987) the Committee adopted the following Opinion by 
116 votes to seven with 10 abstentions (vote recorded): 
Preamble 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident has raised once more the 
question of the operation of nuclear power plants and the 
national and international responsibilities that go together 
with it. The possibilitiy of accidents with repercussions up to 
more than 1 000 km away demonstrates more clearly than 
ever before that the Community will have to take a much 
harder look at nuclear safety and draw the appropriate 
conclusions. The place taken by present and future 
generations of nuclear technologies in the European 
Community's energy policy will need to be examined 
carefully, with priority given to protection of the public. 
In past years the Economic and Social Committee has 
repeatedly pointed out the dangers of ionizing radiation to 
the general public as well as to workers in the nuclear power 
industry. It has also expressed its views on proposals to 
encourage the utilization of extra safe, non-polluting sources 
of energy supplies. In examining the consequences of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Committee will take a 
particularly close look at the risk involved in the utilization of 
new technologies. In the view of the Committee it is 
particularly important to objectively weigh up these risks 
against the potential economic and social benefits. 
This approach should lead to a review and, if necessary, 
restructuring of previous energy policy decisions taken in the 
Community. large quantities of graphite (1 500 tonnes) as a moderator. 
The nuclear fission itself takes place in a cylindrical area 
about 7 meters high and 12 meters in diameter. The cylinder 
is filled with graphite and about 1 700 water-cooled metal 
tubes containing fuel elements and control rods. The steam 
from the tubes drives the turbine which in turn spins the 
electricity-producing generator. 
The metal-clad reactor core is encased in thick concrete 
containment boxes. This sets it apart from the 
predominantly dome-shaped containment system to be 
found in Western countries. 
A twin unit is about 130 meters wide, 400 meters long and 
65 meters high. The choice of twin units (two blocks) is 
dictated by economic considerations (certain installations 
can be used in common). 
1.2. Number of reactors 
The nuclear power stations currently in operation in the 
USSR have a total capacity of 28 000 MWe. In 1985 they 
produced some 167 000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity 
(10,8 % of electricity consumption). Nuclear power stations 
are to be found at 20 sites scattered throughout the Soviet 
Union. There are 28 units of the RBMK reactor (Chernobyl) 
in operation at 12 different sites. The USSR is the only 
country to operate RBMK reactors. 
1. The sequence of events at Chernobyl Other Soviet nuclear power stations use pressurized-water 
and fast breeder reactors similar to those found in Western 
power stations. 
On 26 April 1986 a serious nuclear accident took place in the 
atomic power station at Chernobyl, 120 km from Kiev 
(USSR). Only on 28 April 1986 after inexplicably high 
readings of radioactivity had been recorded at the Forsmark 
nuclear power plant in Sweden did information start filtering 
through to the outside world about the extent of the 
catastrophe. 1.3. The sequence of events at Chernobyl 
In August 1986 the USSR submitted detailed documents to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna 
about the sequence of events. Until then there had been a 
period of ignorance, incomplete information and 
misinformation. 
1.1. Description of the reactor 
Four 1 000 MWe RBMK reactor units were in operation at 
the Chernobyl site. Two further units were under 
construction. The water-cooled reactors at Chernobyl use Today it would appear that the accident took roughly the 
following course: 
— On 25 April 1986 the reactor's power was reduced to 
carry out maintenance and conduct an experiment. 
— At 1.23 a.m. local time on 26 April 1986 there were 
several explosions in which two people were killed and 
No C 232/42 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
large quantities of radioactive material hurled into the 
plant and out into the environment. This set off a large 
number of fires. 
— Through contact with the air the reactor's graphite 
ignited and burned for several days. 
— The three neighbouring reactor units were shut down. 
— The evacuation of approximately 130 000 people from 
the danger area (a radius of some 30 km) was completed 
only a week or so after the accident. About 36 000 people 
had been evacuated in the first few days. 
— By 5 June 1986 the death toll had risen to 31. About 300 
people, mostly firefighters and nuclear workers, received 
hospital treatment. 
— The urgent work of sealing off the reactor was successful 
only after a number of planning errors had been made 
and after the problems involved in assembling the 
necessary materials had been solved. 
— The account of how the reactor was eventually contained 
suggests that people were deliberately pushed to their 
limits and beyond even though it is irresponsible and 
inadmissible to send people into areas where even robots 
can no longer operate because of radiation and where 
workers are lauded as heroes because they have handled 
radioactive parts with their bare hands. 
1.4. Effects on the immediate environment 
It is estimated that as much as 50 — 100 % of the inventory 
of radioactive gases (particularly inert gases and iodine) and 
1 — 50 % of long-lived radioactive solids (strontium and 
caesium) escaped into the atmosphere as a result of the 
accident. Taking caesium — 137 as a benchmark, this is 
equivalent to about 1018 Becquerels (Bq). 
Because of the considerable amount of energy generated 
during the accident, radioactive particles were carried high 
into the atmosphere. This meant not only severe fallout in the 
immediate vicinity of the plant but also — on account of 
meteorological conditions — high levels of radiation a long 
way from Chernobyl. 
It is not yet possible to assess the full extent of the damage to 
human health and the Soviet economy: 
— 31 persons have so far died and 203 are suffering from 
acute radiation doses. 130 000 people were exposed to 
high doses of radiation through the tardiness of the 
evacuation. Serious long-term consequences are 
therefore expected. Tests carried out on Western 
European workers employed in the Ukraine 
(approximately 100 km from Chernobyl) at the time of 
the accident reveal significant levels of irradiation (up to 
20 rems). This suggests severe radiation over a large 
area. Obtaining a clear picture of the future pattern of radiation 
damage will be difficult because of the sheer scale of the 
evacuation. 
Medical treatment for those suffering from the effects of 
radiation has proved to be extremely problematic. Western 
doctors also feel that medical facilities for coping with such 
accidents are generally inadequate. 
It is reckoned that some 10 000 people will suffer from the 
long-term effects of radiation. 
— Additional dams will have to be built on the Pripyat river 
and the Kiev Reservoir to guarantee the quality of the 
drinking water. In some areas the topsoil has been carried 
away and buried in concrete. 
— approximately 1 000 km2 of usable farmland will be 
totally or largely useless for many years to come. 
— The social fabric of the region will have been destroyed 
for a long time. 
— The concrete sarcophagus in which the reactor has been 
entombed will have to be kept under permanent 
surveillance. 
Material losses directly connected with the accident, i.e. 
earth moving, reactor sealing material, energy shortfalls, etc. 
have so far been put at over 2 000 million roubles 
(approximately 2 000 million ECU). 
Western experts (e.g. Prof. Lindackers, Technischer 
Uberwachungsverein — TUV Cologne) had earlier 
estimated that the damage caused by a serious, if rare nuclear 
accident, would be somewhere in the region of 30 000 
million ECU. 
1.5. Effects of the accident beyond Soviet borders 
Some of the radioactive materials which escaped on 26 April 
1986 ended up mainly in Northern Europe (Sweden and 
Finland). The fallout reached Poland and the Baltic in the 
first half of 27 April 1986 while Austria, Southern Germany, 
Switzerland, Eastern France, the Benelux countries, Great 
Britain, Denmark and the North Sea were all affected during 
the second half of the day. 
After the plume of radioactivity had been carried in an 
easterly direction for a short time it changed course and for 
one and a half days or so, beginning on 29 April 1986, drifted 
over the Balkans, Italy, Austria, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Spain and Portugal. 
Comprehensive data has been collected in Scandinavia and 
the Member States of the Community on radiation levels in 
the air, soil, plants, animals and foodstuffs, and a detailed 
dossier compiled. 
The following figures give some idea of the range of peak 
radiation levels in May 1986: 
— Radioactivity in soil, Sweden, 170 000 Bq/m2 
(iodine-131), 33 000 Bq/m2 (caesium-137). 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/43 
— Radioactivity in soil, Germany (FRG), 25 000 Bq/m2 
(iodine-131), 10 000 Bq/m2 (caesium-137). 
— Radioactivity in soil, Portugal/Azores, 42 Bq/m2 
(iodine-131), 20 Bq/m2 (caesium-137). 
— The contamination of milk ranged from 340 Bq/1 
(iodine-131) in the Federal Republic of Germany to 1,5 
Bq/1 in the Azores (iodine-131). 
— Radioactivity in sewage plants and air filters came in 
many places to more than 100 000 Bq/kg. 
In the months following the accident radiation levels in meat 
and vegetables reached peaks of several thousand Bq/kg, 
with particularly high levels recorded in wild game, 
mushrooms and nuts. 
The problems posed by this widespread radioactive 
contamination become clear when we remember that some of 
the values were well over the legally established limits 
imposed under radiation protection, even if these limits were 
set with continuous or long-term radiation levels in mind. 
Some of the values were also well over the levels recorded 
after the atmospheric nuclear tests held between 1962 and 
1965 (approximately 30 Bq/m2 (caesium-137) and 10 Bqper 
litre of milk (caesium-137) in the Federal Republic of 
Germany). 
The unit of radioactivity 'Becquerel' (number of radioactive 
disintegrations per second) cannot however be used to 
measure human radiation doses directly. The actual dose can 
only be calculated via a number of physical conversions and 
with the help of various biological weighting factors. The 
dose was earlier expressed in 'rems' but is now measured in 
'Sv' (sieverts). Assessment of a possible health risk is further 
complicated by the varying radiation-sensitivities of different 
groups of the population (foetus, child, woman, man). 
Assuming that the environment and foodstuffs have been 
contaminated to an equal extent, the actual radiation dose 
(measured in 'Sv' and 'rems') remains heavily dependent on 
the living and eating habits of individual human beings, 
which explains the sharp deviations from the mean. 
Allowances must also be made for the complex chemical, 
biochemical and biological processes which occur when 
radioactive substances are inhaled or ingested. Synergetic 
effects may also occur. 
Human beings are continuously exposed to radiation from 
natural sources. Some of this is from cosmic rays; some 
comes from the radioactive substances which are naturally 
contained in practically all matter in the environment; and 
finally some is found naturally in our bodies (especially 
potassium 40). 
However, as in the case of any other toxic substance, a 
comparison between the permanent natural exposure level and the Chernobyl exposure level at least gives us some idea 
of the scale of the problem. 
The annual actual radiation dose of a human being from 
natural sources averages out as follows: 
cosmic radiation approx. 30 mrem (0,3 mSv), 
terrestrial radiation approx. 140 mrem (1,4 mSv), 
internal body radiation approx. 30 mrem (0,3 mSv). 
Conversion factor: 1 mrem = 0,01 mSv. 
To this must be added sources associated with modern 
civilization, i.e. medical treatment (approximately 40 mrem 
per annum) and the home (approximately 1 mrem per 
annum). 
The average annual radiation dose of the population (from 
natural sources and modern life) thus comes to about 240 
mrem (2,4 mSv). 
Various scientific institutes in the Community have grappled 
with the question of how much extra radiation exposure was 
due to the Chernobyl accident. 
Because radioactive fallout was not evenly spread 
throughout the Community, dose exposures varied markedly 
from one country to another. Asked to carry out a survey on 
behalf of the European Commission, the 'National 
Radiological Protection Board' compiled a report containing 
calculations of exposure levels for the countries of the 
Community. (A preliminary assessment of the radiological 
impact of the Chernobyl reactor accident on the population 
of the European Community, M. Morrey et al. National 
Radiological Protection Board, January 1987.) Peaks were 
recorded in the following countries: 
Radiation dose for the average adult 
Southern Germany 
Greece 
Northern Italy 
Wales First Year 
0,38 mSv (38 mrem) 
0,30 mSv (30 mrem) 
0,20 mSv (20 mrem) 
0,19 mSv (19 mrem) Total dose over 50 years 
0,95 mSv (95 mrem) 
0,53 mSv (53 mrem) 
0,40 mSv (40 mrem) 
0,27 mSv (27 mrem) 
It has also been estimated that the radiation dose can be 
reduced by a factor of about 2 by changing eating habits 
slightly. 
In Scandinavia it would seem that because of heavy 
contamination there are going to be considerable long-term 
problems regarding the use of farmland for arable and cattle 
farming. 
All this has given rise to a conflict of interests. On the one 
hand there is a responsibility to protect the health of the 
population but on the other a need to preserve high-value 
goods, particularly foodstuffs, and to protect economic 
goods and economic interests. 
No C 232/44 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
Unfortunately, there are no limit values either at national or 
international level determining what level of contamination 
for foodstuffs and economic goods can be regarded as 
acceptable under the unusual conditions.created by a nuclear 
accident such as Chernobyl. Because of this lacuna, Member 
States have interpreted risks differently and so reacted to the 
accident differently. 
Differences then and now stem from the fact that earlier 
national and international radiological protection standards 
on contamination and radiation exposure levels — though 
incorporating substantial safety margins — were set with 
continuous or long-term radiation in mind. The maximum 
levels set at the time are therefore simply inapplicable when 
exceptional and rare circumstances occur. Binding legal 
standards must therefore be established to cover exceptional 
eventualities. 
This means in future undertaking the responsible and very 
difficult task of establishing rational limit values' for major 
but rare nuclear accidents at the same time taking into 
account all the circumstances and interests at stake. 
Another salient feature in this connection is the fact that 
radioactive contamination is relatively easy to measure and 
the instruments used extremely sensitive. This means that 
even contamination well below the acceptable limits can be 
measured. It is therefore particularly important to have an 
extremely clear, open and objective information policy 
which on the one hand avoids placing individual products at 
an unjustified competitive disadvantage, but on the other 
respects consumers' right of access to information. 
1.6. Socio-political reactions 
Offical reactions and political assessments in the days 
immediately following the announcement of the accident 
were characterized by over-hasty advice, ignorance, conflicts 
of powers and soothing statements. Reactions ranged from 'a 
similar accident cannot happen here because of the high 
quality of our products and the skill of our operatives' to a 
feeling of complete helplessness. 
It was also frequently claimed that safety here took absolute 
precedence over economic considerations. But anyone who 
has had dealings with the practicalities of technology knows 
that a balance always has to be struck between costs and 
safety requirements before technological products can be 
utilized and mastered. 
Such declarations have not been conducive to inspiring total 
confidence in our political leaders. 
Conflicts of interest become clear when we look at the 
following list of demands drawn up by members of consumer 
associations in the Federal Republic of Germany: — it is absolutely necessary to ensure the lowest level of 
contamination — particularly in the case of food and play 
facilities for children, 
— food at or just below maximum radiation limits must be 
available only to adults, 
— fodder made from highly contaminated grass cut at the 
time of the accident must not be allowed into the milk 
production chain since dilution in no way lessens the risk 
of a health hazard when the milk products are fully 
consumed, 
— the importing of, as far as possible, uncontaminated 
products must be encouraged, 
— the origin of products (imported and domestic) must be 
clearly labelled, 
— compensation must be given for any damage caused, 
— priority must be given to the introduction of 
energy-supply systems which operate without any risk of 
large-scale soil contamination. 
This calls not only for maximum radiation limits for 
foodstuffs (which would serve as guidelines) but also 
measures to preserve consumer freedom and protect 
particularly vulnerable groups of the population. 
Since the Chernobyl accident many political, social and 
church groups as well as many ordinary European citizens 
have become increasingly convinced of the need for an 
immediate or gradual abandonment of the use of nuclear 
energy. A minority, particularly ecologically-minded parties, 
is in favour of an immediate abandonment whilst the 
European Trade Union Federation and social 
democratic/ socialist parties are largely in favour of a gradual 
abandonment. Many other social groups and political parties 
consider that nuclear energy is irreplaceable or else envisage 
the possibility of an abandonment only on the long run, if at 
all. 
The spate of accidents in the chemical industry in recent 
years, including the pollution of the Rhine, Seveso and 
Bhopal, has made Europeans even more concerned and 
alarmed about the protection and preservation of the 
environment and health. This major branch of industry has 
likewise shown an increasing awareness of the risks at stake 
and a recognition of the duty to take appropriate remedial 
action. 
The reason for this increasingly critical attitude would 
appear to be nuclear energy's high potential for causing 
damage — a situation which is only acceptable because of the 
low accident probability figures. 
An important task ahead will be to bring scientists, 
industrialists and social groups round the same table to make 
an unemotional analysis of the possibilities of improving the 
energy structure from a technical and social point of view. 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/45 
2. Recapitulation of previous nuclear accidents 
Reactor 
NRX, Canada 
40 MW, D20 
Windscale, UK 
?(») MW, 
air-cooled, 
Graphite 
SL 1,USA 
3 MW, H20 
Lucens., 
Switzerland 
30 MW, 
D20/CO2 
TMI 2, USA 
2 800 MW, H20 
Chernobyl, 
USSR 
3 200 MW, H20 
Graphite Date of accident 
12 December 
1952 
8 October 1957 
3 January 1961 
21 January 1969 
29 March 1979 
26 April 1986 Percentage 
of core 
destroyed 
12% 
150 fuel 
elements out 
of a total 
of several 
hundred) 
20% 
1 fuel 
element 
of the core 
More than 
20% 
More than 
50% Contamination 
of the 
environment 
? 
160 mSv 
thyroid 
(affecting part 
of the body) 
0,1 mSv 
negligible 
0,5 mSv 
500 mSv 
(affecting the 
whole of the 
body) 
(l) Unknown. 
The above list is confined to events which have led to damage 
of the reactor core and where the environment might have 
been affected by high levels of radioactivity. 
The accident at Harrisburg (TM 1-2) has had a particularly 
profound effect on the American nuclear market with 
electricity utilities and banks shrinking back from the 
financing of new plants and even cancelling units already 
under construction. 
In the majority of cases 'human failure' is cited as the cause of 
nuclear accidents. Technical failure is cited less frequently. 
But since any form of technology is planned, constructed, 
operated and tested by human beings, the cause of an 
accident is, stricto sensu, always 'human failure'. On the 
other hand an accident could be wholly attributable to 
'technical failure' when a system is fully automatic. This 
provides a clear illustration of the relative arbitrariness in 
establishing the causes of failure. More intensive research 
must therefore be carried out to find out how to further 
reduce the weak points in the man/machine interface. But 
referring exclusively to the skill level of plant operators is 
clearly not enough. 
3. Comparison between the safety technology used in 
Western reactors with that of Chernobyl 
3.1. General comments on safety technology in reactors 
Whatever the type of reactor, nuclear fission produces large 
amounts of radioactive materials of great potential danger. Since the possibility of major accidents cannot be totally 
ruled out on principle, the question to be asked is whether 
safety measures are adequate to cope with the highly 
dangerous situations that might arise or, in other words, 
whether the probability of a major accident is sufficently 
low. 
Achieving a high level of safety is a technical and economic 
problem. By contrast, the question 'how safe is safe enough' 
is a political question which can only be answered in political 
circles and within the framework of a social consensus. It 
involves weighing up advantages and risks, as well as giving 
consideration to alternative solutions with all their potential 
benefits and dangers. We must insist that our political leaders 
also address themselves to these questions. 
Because of the great potential danger of nuclear reactors, 
reactor safety technology has made great advances over the 
last two decades. Modern safety features, which are designed 
to reduce the probability of accidents, can only be based on 
acceptance of the following postulate: any component can 
fail and any human can make mistakes. 
Only technologies which take fully into account these 
fundamental truths have a chance of achieving an adequate 
level of safety. In other words safety features cannot be based 
on individual components nor can they rely, at critical 
phases, solely on correct handling by individual humans. 
Right from the drawing-board stage, therefore, modern 
safety technology must incorporate a comprehensive and 
overlapping system of fail-safe devices, i.e. a whole series of 
complementary and mutually supportive mechanisms and 
principles, viz.: 
— The concept of a succession of barriers 
— Several different barriers are available (encasement of 
fuel elements, reactor cooling systems, containment 
structures, filters). Only if all barriers fail at the same 
time can a major leak of radioactivity into the 
environment follow. 
— Redundancy, diversity 
— The implies major safety back-up features of varying 
design to reduce the probability of breakdowns. 
— Quality guarantees 
— It is vitally important to monitor and guarantee the 
quality of engineered safety devices. 
— Repeat tests 
— It is essential to systematically and repeatedly monitor 
safety devices. 
— Plant organization and surveillance. 
— Training of plant staff. 
No C 232/46 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
— Man/machine interface; automation 
— This is a very important area. 
— Monitoring of possible areas of damage and reliability 
analyses 
— Safety can be substantially improved through 
systematic, detailed analyses of this kind. 
None of these safety features on their own can guarantee a 
satisfactory level of safety. Only when they operate in 
combination can the high level of safety needed to match the 
potential dangers be achieved, and only then can we say that 
the probability of an accident is remote. At all events the 
safety of different nuclear power stations can only be assessed 
by reference to a list of requirements such as that set out 
above. In Western countries such safety features have by and 
large been incorporated in reactor technology. 
But whether safety levels are pitched at a sufficiently high 
level is another matter and, as was pointed out earlier, one 
that has to be decided at a political level. 
3.2. The purpose of comparing the safety technology used 
in Western reactors with that of Chernobyl 
Considerable problems arise in attempting to assess 
systematically the comparative safety of various types of 
reactor and plant design. There are no internationally 
recognized standards for such a comparison. The main 
reasons for this are political. There is no international body 
authorized to draw up international rules and standards. 
And national safety standards differ from one country to 
another. There are also technical problems which make it 
difficult to establish universally applicable standards. 
Different technologies and circumstances (such as siting of 
reactors) are difficult to compare one with another for the 
purposes of quantifying safety. The various types of reactor 
are particularly difficult to compare. 
What is the purpose of a comparative safety study in relation 
to Chernobyl? 
A comparison of this kind must not be used, as has 
occasionally happened in the past, as an excuse for countries 
to engage in competitive posturing, praising the safety record 
of their own country's reactors, or generally plugging the 
message that modern reactor technology is very safe. The 
object of a comparative study in the wake of Chernobyl must, 
rather, be to answer the following questions: 
(a) Does a comparative technical study of reactors and 
safety technology provide any specific insights into 
weaknesses in Western reactor design or technology? 
(b) Are there any lessons to be learnt from analysis of the 
accident as regards organization, management and the 
man-machine interface? (c) Using our knowledge of the consequences of a major 
nuclear accident like Chernobyl, how can we reduce still 
further the chances of such accidents occurring and 
mitigate their consequences — first as regards existing 
reactors, and secondly as regards the development of 
new ideas for improved reactors? 
3.3. Comparison of safety technology 
A major contributing factor to the occurrence of the 
Chernobyl accident and the subsequent sequence of events 
was a distinctive physical feature of the Russian RBMK 
reactor. Stepping up reactor output leads to increased steam 
formation in the reactor core's water coolant, resulting in a 
further rise in power output. There is in other words a 
feedback effect which in Chernobyl led to an energy 
production overshoot and an explosion. The Soviet 
authorities were aware of this inherent instability in the 
reactor and maintained that they could control it. But 
controlling the reactor required extraordinarily complex 
regulatory techniques and operating procedures which made 
high demands on the staff. The systems used in the European 
Community (pressurized water reactors (PWR), boiling 
water reactors (BWR), gas-cooled reactors (GCR/HTR), 
heavy water reactors (HWR) and fast breeder reactors (FBR)) 
have different core characteristics from the RMBK, so that an 
incident like Chernobyl cannot occur. This does not mean 
however that accidents causing serious damage to the reactor 
core cannot occur in the West. If such an accident did occur, 
the sequence of events would simply be different. Given the 
current state of knowledge, there are no direct lessons to be 
learnt from Chernobyl as regards the physical design of 
Western reactors. 
Another decisive factor contributing to the occurrence and 
nature of the accident was the behaviour of the operating 
staff. Reconstructions of the incident have revealed that 
during the decisive phase the staff made at least seven serious 
errors, most of which involved contravention of specific 
safety regulations. This is primarily a matter of management, 
organization, monitoring and training, although the 
operating staff is said to have been experienced. According to 
reports the reactor staff enjoyed an extraordinary degree of 
administrative and technical autonomy, i.e. they were free to 
carry out procedures with serious safety implications. 
Operators of EC reactors are allowed far less discretion. 
Most importantly, safety systems are designed in such a way 
that such serious operator errors either cannot happen, or 
else are picked up by the system before a major accident 
occurs. But once again this does not mean that accidents can 
be altogether ruled out in Western reactors as a result of 
errors by the team of operators. 
According to the reports the operating staff were clearly 
under a certain amount of pressure. This may explain the 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/47 
large number of errors. We now have to make sure that 
reactor operators in the West are protected from pressure of 
various kinds, as this can have extremely detrimental effects 
on safety. 
One essential difference has been much discussed. Most 
Western reactors are surrounded by a pressure-resistant 
metal and concrete dome (containment vessel). This 
arrangement considerably increases safety. But even if the 
Chernobyl reactor had had a containment vessel of this kind, 
it would probably not have withstood the accident. In other 
words a containment vessel alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee adequate safety because its effectiveness depends 
on the interaction of internal and external factors and may be 
adversely affected by the incorrect operation of essential 
openings in the dome such as ventilator flaps. A containment 
dome remains however an important part of the overall 
safety system. 
It also emerges from the reports that, using as criteria the 
safety principles and measures listed in section 3.1, the safety 
standards of Western reactors (as measured by the 
probability of an accident) are higher than those of the 
Chernobyl reactor. 
We can therefore conclude that the events at Chernobyl are 
only indirectly relevant to reactors in Western countries, as 
very different types of reactor are involved. Although 
indirect, the lessons and experiences of Chernobyl must be 
used however to assess and above all improve the safety 
technology of reactors in the light of this major accident. 
4. General conclusions to be drawn from the accidents 
4.1. Immediate consequences for the improved safety of 
existing reactors 
It is generally accepted that any type of existing reactor can 
release large quantities of radioactive substances — however 
unlikely this may be. 
Serious accidents with reactors in the Community are not 
impossible. 
The following steps, some of which have already been taken 
in certain countries, are necessary for improved reactor 
safety: 
1. The establishment and dissemination of assessment 
criteria and standards in the interests of protecting the 
population and the environment. 
2. The setting up of an inspectorate, the composition of 
which reflects the socio-political dimension of the safety 
issue. 3. Inspection of old and new reactors on the basis of various 
criteria and standards, as well as the scrutiny of plant 
organization and operating methods. 
4. Recommendations for administrative and technical 
improvements and the pinpointing of cases of 
non-compliance with criteria and standards. 
It is to be expected that once the necessary remedial work has 
been properly carried out most of the existing reactors will be 
able to remain in operation. 
4.2. Improving the safety of new reactors and new reactor 
designs 
The Chernobyl accident, with its serious effects on the area 
immediately surrounding the power plant and its wider 
repercussions for the whole of Europe, has, forcibly, 
focussed the public's attention on the significance of major 
nuclear accidents, which whilst unlikely can nevertheless 
occur. It is the discussions sparked off by such exceptional 
accidents which will finally determine the extent to which 
nuclear energy is used in the long term. In order to decide 
whether the use of nuclear energy is socially responsible and 
acceptable we need answers to people's questions as to the 
likelihood of major accidents occurring and their possible 
consequences. 
If nuclear energy is to be further developed it is therefore 
essential that the problem of these rare, but major accidents 
be studied more intensively than hitherto, and that technical 
ways be found of limiting the potential effects of such an 
accident and of reducing still further the likelihood of their 
occurring. 
The public is more interested, however, in being sure that the 
damage resulting from a nuclear accident can be contained 
than in statistical probability, which tells us nothing about 
when a major accident will actually occur. 
In designing the PWRs and BWRs which predominate in the 
Western nuclear power industries more thought must be 
given than hitherto to the possibility of major damage to the 
reactor core — up to and including meltdown. It must be 
ensured that even under these circumstances the containment 
structure remains intact and continues to fulfil its function as 
a protective barrier. And this must be reflected in new 
construction and operating standards. 
The interaction between reactor systems and human 
operators, the 'man-machine interface', is of key importance 
for accident prevention. Although a lot of research has been 
done in this field in recent years, there is still a great deal of 
development potential, and the most important thing is to 
systematically put the newly-acquired knowledge into 
effect. 
In improving reactor safety the principle of inherent safety 
must be exploited to the full. Safety can be guaranteed in two 
No C 232/48 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
ways: through safety systems and inherent safety. For 
example: a railway crossing can be made safe either by means 
of barriers, warning lights, level crossing keepers and so on, 
or by digging a tunnel under the railway line. The first 
approach is based on safety systems and the second on 
inherent safety. In seeking to improve reactor safety one of 
the major objectives should be exploit inherent safety 
characteristics to the maximum possible extent. This can 
help to simplify the safety systems and thus reduce the 
pressure on the operating staff via man-machine interface. 
As well as improving safety technology in the main types of 
reactor currently in operation in the Community (the PWR 
and the BWR), serious thought should also be given to new 
reactor designs with outstanding safety characteristics. One 
example is the high temperature reactor which has a high 
degree of inherent safety, especially at low and medium 
power output levels. Mention should also be made here of A. 
Weinberg's reactor design (continuous withdrawal of fissile 
products) and small heating reactors (based on LWR 
technology). Ways have to be found of marketing reactor 
designs incorporating Weinberg's safety features. This would 
reduce the danger of exclusive reliance on a single reactor 
type. The economic risks of such over-reliance should not be 
underestimated either. 
4.3. International agreements on the harmonization of 
safety and the standardization of safety assessment 
systems 
Various international measures have been announced, 
particularly in the periods following the Harrisburg and 
Chernobyl accidents. 
The investigations and recommendations of the US Senate's 
Kemeny Commission, on which were represented specialists 
not involved in the original inspection of the Harrisburg 
plant, were particularly consequential. Many of the 
Commission's recommendations were actually implemented 
in the USA so the American experience should be taken as a 
model of how to proceed at international level. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna 
has carried out a detailed analysis of the Chernobyl accident 
on the initiative of a number of different countries. The need 
for an international reactor safety assessment system was 
stressed on several occasions in the course of the IAEA's 
work. In practice, however, this idea has not come to fruition 
because of the lack of national criteria on which to build. 
National safety criteria are not the same as the welter of 
detailed technical specifications already in existence. 
In conclusion, we must not allow the call for international 
reactor safety agreements to divert us from the task of first 
establishing or ordering national standards. Only then can we proceed to the second important step of bringing national 
standards together to create an international system. 
5. Present status and future of nuclear power in the EC and 
worldwide 
5.1. Economic potential 
5.1.1. International/worldwide 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) there were 374 nuclear power stations in operation 
worldwide at the end of 1985 (total installed capacity of 248 
gigawatts of electricity). Of these 188 were pressurized water 
reactors, 80 boiling water reactors, 43 gas-cooled reactors, 
and 6 fast breeders. The rest are special technical 
variants. 
A number of economic and structural conclusions can be 
drawn from a comparison of figures showing nuclear 
generated electricity as a percentage of total electricity 
production. 
Nuclear generated electricity as a percentage of total electricity 
production 1985 
Country 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
German Democratic Republic 
Germany Federal Republic 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
South Korea 
Soviet Union 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United Kingdom 
USA As a percentage 
— 
— 
60 
29 
14 
15 
— 
41 
65 
12 
31 
— 
22 
— 
4 
23 
— 
6 
— 
— 
— 
22 
20 
10 
42 
46 
52 
19 
15 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/49 
Data concerning the current costs of producing electricity 
from nuclear energy are incomplete. 
Future cost estimates for electricity production show that 
nuclear energy holds the advantage in the majority of areas. 
Nevertheless, conclusions can vary according to which basic 
assumptions are used in making the comparisons, i.e.: 
— a proper assessment needs to be made of the potential 
inherent in combined heat and power (CHP) and of the 
advantages to be derived from the higher thermal 
efficiency thereof, 
— useful life of over 30 years, 
— waste disposal costs (reprocessing, packaging, 
storage), 
— standby costs in big plants of the same type, 
— growing expenditure on safety features, 
— costs of potential accidents, 
— expenditure on insurance, 
— costs of dismantling nuclear power stations. 
On the other hand the cost and risk implications of using 
fossile fuels, particularly coal, must also be mentioned. 
These burdens, which do not exist in the case of nuclear 
energy, include: 
— costs of desulpherization and the removal of nitrogen 
oxides, 
— waste-disposal of the by-product, gypsum, and another 
compounds, 
— the long-term effects of carbon dioxide. 
World uranium reserves should be sufficient at current 
consumption levels to guarantee energy production in 
thermal reactors for another 100 years or so. This time-span 
would be extended greatly if thorium (high-temperature 
reactors) and plutonium (convertor or fast-breeder) were 
also included. Should it prove impossible for industrial, 
technological and social reasons to exploit this nuclear 
energy potential, a major component of energy supplies 
would be lost and would most certainly have to be replaced 
by new sources. The tapping of new sources (further energy 
savings, solar energy, fusion reactors . . .) will in any case 
need to be encouraged. Irrespective of this effort, however, 
careful thought will have to be given to the possibilities of 
developing nuclear fission reactors with optimal safety 
features. 
5.1.2. Europe 
211 nuclear power stations (138 GWe (*)) are currently in 
service in 16 European countries. Of these, 145 plants (99 
GWe) are to be found in 11 Western European countries. 
0) 1 GW = 1 gigawatt = 1 000 million watts = 109 watts. Since 1982, nuclear energy's share of total electricity output 
in EC Member States has risen from 18 to 30 %. 
According to existing plans, the 35 % mark is expected to be 
reached in 1990. The plan is to largely base the system on 
pressurized water reactors (originally developed by the 
American company, Westinghouse). Other Systems — the 
fast breeder and the development of the high-temperature 
reactor — have not so far been supported by a broad-based 
industrial policy. 
5.2. Ecological benefits and risks 
The practice of weighing up the risks and advantages of 
nuclear power stations from an ecological standpoint and 
from the point of view of health protection for present and 
future generations has gained considerably in importance 
and become a major political issue. Answers to the questions 
raised cannot be left solely to experts; political and social 
circles must also be involved. 
— Assuming trouble-free operation, nuclear power stations 
are considered to be less environmentally harmful than 
plants producing energy from fossile fuels. In the case of 
nuclear energy there is no C02 to contend with. 
— The production of long-lived radioactive materials from 
nuclear fission (1017 Bq/year in the case of 1 000 MWe) 
poses the potential risk of accidents and requires safe 
long-term storage facilities. 
— In looking at whether nuclear energy can partially meet 
the energy needs of Third World countries, we have to 
seriously ask ourselves whether nuclear plants already 
developed in the industrialized countries are relevant to 
the structures and skill profiles to be found in Third 
World countries. 
— Energy storage usually poses considerable ecological 
problems. Underground caverns for storing oil and gas 
are proof of this. But people are frequently unaware of 
the advantages to be derived from storing very highly 
concentrated nuclear fuels in as small an area as 
possible. 
Nuclear fuels sufficient to meet the needs of 10 reactors for 
over a year can, for example, be stored in a cube 4 m 
long. 
5.3. Problems of social acceptance 
The nuclear energy controversy has been going on at varying 
levels of intensity in EC countries for more than a decade 
now. 
A survey of the University of Bielefeld (ASIF Group) on the 
attitude of people in the Community to nuclear energy shows 
that in 1982 56 % of the public supported the use of this 
technology. After the Chernobyl accident more than 50 % of 
No C 232/50 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
those questioned (even as many as 70 % in some countries) 
said they thought there should be an eventual halt to the use 
of nuclear energy. 
The following are among the factors hindering a public 
consensus on the peaceful use of nuclear energy: 
— The importance of a public consensus was recognized 
only late in the day. The approach to winning acceptance 
has not so far been professional enough. 
— Public information in the nuclear field has so far been 
dominated by advocates of the construction of more 
nuclear power stations. Information policy in the future 
must be increasingly geared to the needs of the public 
itself. 
— All parties in the conflict claim to use 'rational arguments' 
whilst their opponents are accused of irrationalism. In the 
process it is forgotten that any assessment of nuclear 
energy touches on many different scientific disciplines. 
— There has traditionally been a heavy emphasis on energy 
production whilst the need for more efficient energy 
utilization has been greatly underestimated. 
To ward off any commercial dangers resulting from social 
conflicts, research and information bodies should in future 
have a balanced composition. 
Efforts must be targeted at achieving a consensus on an 
optimum energy supply structure. 
6. The role of the EC 
The EC institutions have no direct authority in the field of 
nuclear safety. This is still the preserve of the Member 
States. 
Following the Chernobyl nuclear accident the Community 
authorities and particularly the Parliament, Commission and 
ESC have made wide use of their powers to make 
recommendations. 
Fixing maximum permitted radioactivity levels for the 
import and placing on the market of foodstuffs is accordingly 
a highly effective way of contributing to trade 
harmonization. It is urged that such action be continued. 
References: 
— COM — Community action to be taken in response to the 
Chernobyl accident, 6 May 1986. 
— COM — Outline communication from the Commission 
to the Council on the consequences of the Chernobyl 
accident, 12 June 1986. 
— COM — Commission report to the Council and the 
European Parliament, 7 November 1986. — COM — Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1707/86 on the conditions governing imports of 
agricultural products originating in third countries 
following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station and the communication from the Commission to 
the Council on a permanent system establishing limits for 
the radioactive contamination of drinking water and 
agricultural products in the case of a nuclear accident, 23 
January 1987. 
In Commission document wide-ranging action is proposed in 
the following sectors: 
— health protection, 
— plant safety and operational safety, 
— emergency procedures, 
— cooperation with third countries, 
— research in the Community. 
It is to be hoped that the proposed initiatives will concentrate 
not only on secondary areas, i.e. measures to be taken in the 
event of an accident (rapid information, training and 
administrative measures) but also on primary areas (the 
actual installation of safety technologies in nuclear 
plants). 
Worthy of particular attention here are the Council 
resolutions of 15 September 1986 on improving energy 
efficiency in industrial firms in the Member States, and of 16 
September 1986 on the new energy-policy objectives of the 
Community for 1995. As far as the 'nuclear energy' section is 
concerned, the highest possible safety standards are called for 
at the planning, construction and operation stages. 
To achieve this aim the following is needed: 
— more active participation of the European Parliament 
and the ESC in examining safety matters within the 
framework of the European Atomic Energy 
Community, 
— the creation of internationally standardized systems for 
monitoring nuclear energy and the fuel cycle, 
— new ways in which social forces can be involved in 
research and plant safety. 
7. Maintaining and improving the social status of nuclear 
power industry workers 
Studies carried out by trade unions (e.g. the German 
Confederation of Trade Unions) have shown that in the eyes 
of the general public the social prestige of workers in the 
nuclear industry has fallen markedly in the last few years. 
According to the workers themselves this is due to 
emotionalism and is unjustified. Socio-political realities (as 
determined by the opinion of the majority) cannot however 
be simply swept under the carpet. Initial analyses of the 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/51 
causes of this situation would seem to indicate that workers 
in the nuclear industry have a narrower range of political 
leanings than workers in other areas of technology and find 
themselves increasingly left out of the social mainstream. 
The extent to which this can be put down to features inherent 
in the nuclear power industry (length of conflict, safety 
factors, democratic structure . . .) should now be 
investigated. In the interests of the workers concerned an 
investigation of this sort at both Community levels and 
elsewhere is essential if acceptable working conditions are to 
be maintained. 
8. Alternatives to present forms of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes 
Nuclear energy accounts for some 8 % of world electricity 
production. Its share in primary energy production, 
however, is well below 1 %. 
EC countries are currently dependent on nuclear energy for 
their electricity supplies to the tune of between 0 and 
70%. 
These simple figures give some idea of the extent to which EC 
Member States' difficulties, time scales and vested interests 
would differ in the event of an abandonment of civil nuclear 
energy. 
In the political discussion raging about the continuing use of 
nuclear energy, the crucial issues have proved to be the 
prevention of major accidents and ways of solving the waste 
disposal problem. Without trying to deny the specific risks to 
the immediate environment of nuclear plant, considerable 
attention must also be paid to the possibilities of 
trans-frontier repercussions. 
Since the 1973/74 oil crisis the countries of the Community 
have considerably stepped up their efforts in the field of new 
and renewable energy resources. Theoretically, these energy 
resources have very great potential but given the present state 
of applied technologies only a small part of the potential is 
actually being exploited. It is estimated that by the year 2000 
it will be possible to cover, on average, 5 % of the 
Community's primary energy needs from new and renewable 
energy resources (COM(86)). But in regions of the 
Community with particularly favourable climatic 
conditions, new and renewable energy resources may in 
future account for a much higher proportion of energy 
supplies. It is therefore particularly important from an energy 
and structural point of view to provide increased support for 
regional development (COM(85) — Valoren). 
An examination of the existing energy supply structure, and 
the planning of complementary or alternative solutions, 
should therefore be carried out according to the following 
schema: 
(a) assessment of existing nuclear installations from the 
point of view of the possibility of serious accidents; — laying down of measures capable of limiting the 
extent of any damage, 
— determining the length of time a plant can continue to 
operate when technical devices to limit damage can 
only be introduced on a limited scale. 
(b) Scrutiny of the feasibility of introducing new nuclear 
fission systems with extensive inherent safety, a high 
level of efficiency, simplified safety systems and a 
simplified mode of operation. The question of 
non-proliferation should also be examined with great 
care. 
(c) Intensification of efforts to encourage, develop and 
introduce alternative energy sources (and their 
infrastructures), using state-of-the-art technology to 
prevent unacceptable accident damage. In this respect 
particular attention should be paid to the following 
aspects (whilst always remaining aware of the particular 
risks involved): 
— the enormous potential of energy savings, 
— renewable energy sources, particularly solar 
energy, 
— the further development of nuclear fusion. 
Such an approach offers the advantages of economic and 
technological continuity, a high degree of flexibility, a high 
level of job-security, and the vital socio-political consensus 
needed to take successful action in the event of future energy 
supply risks. 
9. Conclusions and recommendations 
A. In past years the ESC has repeatedly pointed out the 
dangers of ionizing radiation to the general public as well as 
to workers and has called for the utilization of extra safe, 
non-polluting sources of energy. The possibility of accidents 
with repercussions up to more than 1 000 km away 
demonstrates more clearly than ever before that the 
Community will have to take a much harder look at nuclear 
safety and draw the appropriate conclusions. The place 
taken by present and future generations of nuclear 
technologies in European Community's energy policy will 
need to be examined carefully, with priority given to 
protection of the public. 
Now the Chernobyl nuclear accident has taken place, the 
ESC calls for a continuation of the discussion about the risks 
and advantages of new nuclear technologies. Such a 
discussion would have to be held at all levels and involve 
social and political forces. 
B. Analyses of the Chernobyl accident and comparisons 
with reactor systems in the West show that: 
— the safety of all nuclear plants depends crucially on the 
systems available being activated; in this respect the 
'human factor' is of critical importance, 
No C 232/52 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
— technical and administrative mechanisms designed to 
prevent accidents are more advanced in Western plants; 
from a technical point of view the probability of accidents 
occuring in the West is thought to be low, 
— the risks of an escape of large amounts of radioactive 
materials cannot be justified just because the technical 
probability of it happening is low; probability statistics 
say nothing about when an accident may actually occur; 
it is also necessary to limit the possible repercussions of an 
accident, 
— the particularly high population density of European 
countries also has to be taken into account. 
C. The Chernobyl accident has led to various problems 
regarding the marketing of foodstuffs in EC countries. 
Difficulties will continue to exist for some time yet even if the 
level of contamination will fall in the next few years. The 
ESC strongly urges the Commission to continue making full 
use of its powers to make recommendations on maximum 
radioactivity levels. These recommendations must 
nevertheless be patterned in such a way that consumers and 
particularly vulernable groups have the possibility of 
obtaining foodstuffs with minimum levels of radiation. 
Steps must also be taken to prevent as far as possible the 
mixing of heavily contaminated with lightly contaminated 
foodstuffs. The resulting dilution is unlikely to lessen the risk 
of radiation if all the foodstuff is consumed. Such practices 
are a danger to public health and are incompatible with the 
legal requirement that radiation be as low as possible. 
The Member States are also called upon to establish the legal 
bases for fixing maximum radioactivity levels and to 
harmonize them with existing legislation. We would refer 
here to the Commission proposals made in document 
COM. 
D. The Chernobyl accident has meant that many 
political, social and church groups have come out 
increasingly in favour of an immediate or gradual 
abandonment of nuclear energy. On the other hand many 
other political and social groups consider that nuclear energy 
is essential and justifiable. The problem would seem to stem 
from the fact that current nuclear design has a high potential 
for causing damage — a situation which is only acceptable 
because of the low accident probability figures. 
An important task ahead will be to examine the possibilities 
of improving the energy structure from a technical and social 
point of view. 
E. Accidents causing serious damage to the reactor core 
make it necessary at the design stage to pay more attention 
than before to the possibility of such serious, if unlikely, 
events occurring. 
In this context efforts must also be made to ensure that 
'safety' assessment is carried out within the framework of 
transparent legal norms. F. Given that serious nuclear accidents cannot be ruled 
out even in the Community (despite higher safety standards 
and hence less probability of accidents in the EC), it would be 
logical to draw appropriate conclusions regarding existing 
plants, viz.: 
— assessment criteria must be laid down and disseminated 
before inspections are carried out, 
— a broad-based nuclear inspectorate is required, 
— both old and new plants need to be inspected on the basis 
of the above assessment criteria; inspections will 
determine whether the standards set have been met or 
not. 
G. The economic and ecological potential of nuclear 
energy is considerable. This potential should not be 
jeopardized by clinging to mono-structures (e.g. identical 
reactor types) or by hampering new developments for 
existing and new nuclear systems. 
H. Great importance is attached to international 
agreements on safety harmonization. This, however, must 
not divert us from the task of first establishing national legal 
standards. 
I. The Community institutions have so far had no direct 
responsibilities in the field of .nuclear safety although they 
have taken a number of valuable initiatives. The way 
forward is to promote: 
— a more active participation of the European Parliament 
and ESC in safety matters, 
— the creation of new monitoring systems, 
— new ways in which social forces can be involved. 
J. The social prestige of workers in the nuclear power 
industry has fallen markedly in some countries of the EC. 
The causes of this need to be thoroughly investigated and 
remedial measures taken if acceptable working conditions 
are to be maintained. 
K. Given the varying levels of dependence on nuclear 
energy in the Member States of the Community, and given 
state-of-the-art technology, it is difficult to predict a 
time-scale for the introduction of alternatives to present 
forms of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
An overall examination of the existing energy supply 
structure should accordingly go hand in hand with the 
planning of complementary or alternative solutions. This 
means: 
(a) Evaluating existing nuclear installations from the point 
of view of the possibility of serious damage resulting 
from an accident: 
— laying down measures capable of limiting the extent 
of the damage, 
— determining the length of time a plant can continue 
to operate when technical devices to limit damage 
can only be introduced on a limited scale. 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/53 
— renewable energy sources, particularly solar 
energy, 
— the further development of nuclear fusion, 
— a review and reassessment of the Community's 
energy-policy objectives, paying particular attention 
to the need to develop and conserve domestic energy 
sources. 
This approach offers the advantages of economic and 
technological continuity, a high degree of flexibility, a high 
level of job-security, and finally the requisite socio-political 
consensus. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alfons MARGOT 
APPENDIX I 
10. References 
1. Activities of the Swedish authorities following the fallout from the Soviet Chernobyl reactor accident 
(National Institute of Radiation Protection, Stockholm, 14 May 1986). 
2. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and its consequences (USSR State Committee on the 
Utilization of Atomic Energy, IAEA Meeting, Vienna, 25 — 29 August 1986). 
3. Report on the reactor accident in Chernobyl, its consequences and the measures taken or to be taken 
(German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Protection of Nature and Reactor Safety, Bonn, 18 June 
1986). 
4. The consequences of Chernobyl (The Minister for Social Affairs of the Land of Hessen, ISBN 
3-89277-100-6, Wiesbaden 9/86). 
5. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident (Reactor Safety Association, Cologne, GRS S 39, June 1986); 
recent facts which have come to light about the Chernobyl accident (GRS, October 1986). 
6. After Chernobyl — current position and future proposals of the atomic energy policy of the communist 
countries (Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Bonn, July 1986). 
7. 'Community action to be taken in response to the Chernobyl accident' Doc. (COM), Brussels, 6 May 
1986. 
8. 'Outline communication from the Commission to the Council on the consequences of the Chernobyl 
accident', Doc. (COM), 13 June 1986. 
9. The use of nuclear power in the aftermath of Chernobyl (B. Plettner, KWU — Erlangen, August 
1986). 
10. Nuclear Power in Western Europe (Status Report, FORATOM, London). 
11. Chernobyl and its consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany (DGB — German Trade Union 
Federation, Dusseldorf, July 1986). 
12. Resolution on energy-, environmental-, and radiation protection policy (European Trade Union 
Confederation, Brussels, October 1986). 
13. Radiological impact of the Chernobyl Accident, (National Laboratory of Industrial Technology and 
Engineering, DPSR, Portugal, 18 July 1986). 
14. Working conditions in nuclear reprocessing plants (BMFT/DGB project, Dusseldorf). (b) Scrutinizing the feasibility of introducing new nuclear 
fission systems with extensive inherent safety, a high 
degree of efficiency, simplified safety systems and a 
simplified mode of operation. The question of 
non-proliferation must also be examined with great 
care. 
(c) Intensifying efforts to encourage, develop and introduce 
alternative energy supply sources (and their 
infrastructures) using state-of-the-art technology to 
prevent unacceptable accident damage. In this respect 
particular attention should be paid to the following. 
— the enormous potential of energy savings, 
Done at Brussels, 1 July 1987. 
No C 232/54 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 8. 87 
15. Consequences of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, paper by H. Audland, DG XVII (CES — 1986). 
16. 'Safety, future prospects, nuclear energy in the EC and in third countries; funds for research in the EC (ESC 
— 1986). 
17. The Chernobyl Accident, CEA, October 1986. 
18. A preliminary assessment of the radiological impact, National Radiological Protection Board, UK. 
19. The development of Community measures for the application of Chapter HI of the Euratom Treaty (Health 
and Safety) (COM, 20 August 1986). 
20. Commission report to the Council and European Parliament 'The accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station and its consequences in the EC, October 1986 (COM, 7 November 1986). 
21. Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC)... on the conditions governing imports of agricultural products 
and the communication from the Commission to the Council establishing limits for the radioactive contamination 
of drinking water and agricultural products in the case of a nuclear accident (COM, 23 January 1987). 
22. Technological problems of nuclear safety — report on the implementation of the Council resolution of 27 
July 1975, (COM, 6 April 1987). 
APPENDIX II 
Economic and Social Committee 
Sub-Committee on 'Chernobyl' 
Mr Noordwal (Chairman), Mr Flum (Rapporteur), Mr von der Decken (Co-Rapporteur), Mr Aparicio Bravo, Mr 
Bazianas, Mr Bleser, Mr Boddy, Mr Campbell (from 17 April 1987), Mr Ceballo Herrero, Mr Delourme, Mr 
Droulin, Mr Fresi (until 17 April 1987), Mrs Heuser, Mr Laca Martin, Mr Low, Mr de Normann, Mr Pearson, Mr 
Perrin-Pelletier, Mr Proenca, Mr Proumens, Mr Romoli, Mr Roseingrave, Mr Rouzier, Mr Serra Carraciolo, Mr 
Spijkers,,Mr Strauss, Mr Vercellino, Mr Williams 
Experts 
Mr H. W. Gabriel Dip. Eng. Weinheim, Dr. Ing. Paolo Fornaciari, Chairman of Unipede Post Chernobyl Group, 
National Electricity Generating Board (ENEL), Mr Ettore Masucci, European Confederation of Trade Unions, 
Mr T. G. Potma, Director of the Institute for Energy Savings 
APPENDIX III 
Outcome of the voting on the opinion 
The following members, present or represented, voted for the opinion: 
Mr Alexopoulos, Mr Aparicio Bravo, Mr Arena, Mr Arets, Mr Aspinall, Mr Ataide, Mr Bagliano, Mr Beltrami, 
Mr Black, Mr Bleser, Mr Boddy, Mr Boisseree, Mrs Bredima, Mr Brigand, Mr Broicher, Mr Campbell, Mr 
Carroll, Mr Cashman, Mr Cavazzutti, Mr Ceballo Herrero, Mr Ceyrac, Mr Clavel, Mr Christie, Mr Collas, Mr 
Alves Conde, Mr Corell Ayora, Mr Coyle, Mr van Dam, Mr Dassis, Mr von der Decken, Mr Delhomenie, Mr De 
Tavernier, Miss Dodd, Mr Donck, Mr Dos Santos, Mr Drilleaud, Mr Droulin, Mr Elstner, Mr Etty, Mr Eulen, Mr 
Flum, Mr Gardner, Mr Geuenich, Mr Giacomelli, Mr Glesener, Mr Gomez Martinez, Mr Goris, Mr Green, Mr 
van Greunsven, Mr Haas, Mr Hagen, Mr Hammond, Mr Hancock, Mr Houthuys, Mr Horsken, Mr Jaschick, Mr 
Jenkins, Mr Kazazis, Mr Kenna, Mr Kroger, Mr Landaburu, Mr Laur, Mr Lojewski, Mr Lopez de la Puerta, Mr 
Low, Mr Machado von Tschusi, Miss Maddocks, Mr Mainetti, Mr Margalef Masia, Mr Martin Almendro, Mr 
31. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 232/55 
Martin Castella, Mr Masprone, Mr Moreland, Mr Morselli, Mr Mourgues, Mr Muhr, Mr Muller, Mr Murphy, 
Mr Nielsen P., Mr Nierhaus, Mr Nieuwenhuize, Mr Noordwal, Mr de Normann, Mr Pardon, Mr Pearson, Mr 
Pelletier, Mr Petersen, Mr Petropoulos, Mr Poeton, Mr Proenca, Mr Proumens, Mr Quevedo Rojo, Mr Riera 
Marsa, Mr Robinson, Mr Rolao Goncalves, Mr Roseingrave, Mr Rouzier, Mr Sai'u, Mr Santillan Cabeza, Mr 
Schmitz, Mr Schnitker, Mr Solari, Mr Spiers, Mr Spijkers, Mr Springborn, Mr Staedelin, Mr Storie-Pugh, Mr 
Tamlin, Mr Termes Carrero, Mr Tukker, Mr Vassilaras, Mr Wagner, Mrs Williams, Mr Whitworth, Mr 
Yverneau, Mr Zufiaur Narvaiza 
The following members, present or represented, voted against the opinion: 
Mr Lobo Brandao R. Cal, Mr Drago, Mr Orsi, Mr Silva, Mr Vallejo Calderon, Mr Velasco Mancebo, Mr 
Vercellino 
The following members, present or represented, abstained: 
Mr Beretta, Mr Calvet Chambon, Mr Delia Croce, Mr Dunet, Mr Frandi, Mr Forjas, Mr Laka Martin, Mr Muniz 
Guardado, Mr Salomone, Mr Tixier. 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council Regulation concerning 
export from and import into the Community of certain dangerous chemicals (J) 
(87/C 232/19) 
On 15 July 1986 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Socal Committee, under Article 
198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the abovementioned 
proposal. 
The Section for Protection of the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Affairs, which was 
responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 2 June 1987 in 
the light of the report by Mr de Normann. 
At its 247th plenary session (meeting of 1 July 1987) the Economic and Social Committee 
• unanimously adopted the following opinion: 
1. General comments 
1.1. The Committee attaches great importance to the 
control of dangerous chemicals exported to third countries 
and stresses that Member States of the Community have a 
responsibility to inform and protect the recipients of 
dangerous chemicals. 
1.2. Hence the Committee supports the principles and 
objective of the proposed Council Regulation. 
1.3. The Committee recommends to the Council that in 
approving an appropriate Regulation it should take into 
consideration the following criteria: 
(a) The recipient nation should have access to no less relevant 
information than the Member States of the Community in 
order to be in a position to avoid uncontrolled and 
uninformed use. 
(b) The Community should support the OECD and UNEP 
initiatives and should urge Member States to agree to 
them as quickly as possible. A concerted move forward on 
(») OJ No C 177, 17. 5. 1986, pp. 5 to 8. an agreed basis by as many nations as possible will be in the 
best interests of all, as a point of departure for action in this 
field. 
(c) The Committee considers that Community measures 
which help encourage a closer alignment are in keeping 
with progress towards completing the internal market 
and the Community itself acquiring a legitimate role as an 
economic unit. The Community as such will thus be able 
to support OECD and UNEP. initiatives more 
effectively. 
(d) The Committee reminds the Council that many third 
countries are in a position to be able to decide for 
themselves about their imports. Such countries will wish 
to be told the situation in the Community and would 
appreciate the provision of logistic support but the 
Council should ensure that the Commission proposal 
does not appear to be paternalistic. This applies especially 
to requests for tender by governments of third 
countries. 
(e) The Committee recognizes that there is intense 
international competition in the chemical and chemical 
process industries. It therefore considers that (i) a 
common procedure binding on all Member States is