COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 16.12.1996 
COM(96)690 final 
Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION fEQ 
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed 
(presented by the Commission) 

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
(1) The Commission, by Regulation (EC) No 1465/961, imposed provisional anti­
dumping duties on imports into the Community of certain ring binder mechanisms 
originating in Malaysia and the People's Republic of China. 
(2) Certain interested parties, Community producers, exporters, importers, as well as 
users of the product concerned, submitted comments in writing. Those parties who 
so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard by the Commission. The 
Commission considered all the views expressed before drawing its final 
conclusions. 
(3) After a further evaluation of the facts, it was decided to grant one Chinese 
exporter, namely World Wide Stationery, individual treatment, thereby 
establishing an individual dumping margin and, consequently, an individual anti­
dumping duty. 
(4) Subsequent to the imposition of provisional measures, the Commission further 
examined matters deemed relevant in analysing the issue of Community interest. 
Having examined a wide variety of aspects and the various interests involved, no 
compelling reasons have come into light which would lead to the conclusion that 
the imposition of definitive measures would not be in the interest of the 
Community. 
(5) In the light of the above, the Commission confirmed its provisional conclusions to 
the effect that ring binder mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the People's 
Republic of China were being dumped in the Community and were causing 
material injury to the Community industry, and concluded that it is in the 
Community interest to take protective measures in the form of definitive anti­
dumping duties and to collect definitively the provisional duties at the duty rate 
definitively imposed. 
1 OJ No L 187, 26.7.1996, p. 47. 
(6) The Chinese exporter which had been granted an individual treatment indicated 
beyond the specified time limits its willingness to offer an undertaking. The 
Commission considered that, due to the high number of ring binder mechanisms 
types exported by the company concerned, an undertaking in this case would be 
virtually impossible to set up and to monitor. No formal undertaking offer from 
the part of the exporter was finally received. 
(7) World Wide Stationery being granted individual treatment, the injury elimination 
level specific to that company was established at 32.5%. As a consequence, the 
definitive average injury elimination level for all other companies in China was 
established at 39.4%. 
(8) It was established that the imposition of an ad valorem duty on mechanisms with 
17 or 23 rings, at the same rate as the one applicable to other mechanisms, was 
likely to have non desirable effects due to the difference in price between these 
two categories. In this respect, it was found that the setting up of measures in the 
form of a variable duty based on a minimum price was appropriate. Based on the 
price comparisons which were carried out, a CIF minimum import price of 325 
ECU per 1000 pieces for 17 and 23 ring mechanisms was considered adequate to 
remove the injury caused by the dumped imports. 
(9) In accordance with Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96, the 
Commission therefore proposes that the Council impose definitive anti-dumping 
duties on imports of ring binder mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the 
People's Republic of China. In the light of the extent of the injury, it is also 
recommended that the Council collect the provisional anti-dumping duties to the 
extent of the amount of the definitive duties imposed. 
io 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
of 
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community1, and in particular Articles 9 and 23 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission after consulting the 
Advisory Committee, 
Whereas: 
I. PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
(1) By Commission Regulation (EC) No 1465/962 provisional anti-dumping duties 
were imposed (hereinafter referred to as 'the provisional duty Regulation') on 
imports into the Community of certain ring binder mechanisms falling within CN 
code ex 8305 10 00 and originating in Malaysia and the People's Republic of 
China. 
1 OJ No L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1 
2 OJ No L 187, 26.7.1996, p. 47. 
II. SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE 
(2) Following the imposition of the provisional anti-dumping measures, certain 
interested parties submitted comments in writing. 
(3) Those parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard by the 
Commission. 
(4) The Commission continued to seek and verify all information deemed necessary 
for its definitive findings. 
(5) Parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of 
which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping 
duties and the definitive collection of amounts secured by way of provisional 
duties. They were also granted a period within which to make representations 
subsequent to this disclosure. 
(6) The parties' oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were 
considered, and, where deemed appropriate, taken into account in the 
Commission's definitive findings. 
III. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE PRODUCT 
(7) For the purpose of its preliminary findings, the Commission considered ring 
binder mechanisms (hereinafter referred to as 'RBM') produced and sold in the 
Community, RBM produced and sold in Malaysia, and those exported to the 
Community from Malaysia and the People's Republic of China as 'like products', 
within the meaning of Article 1 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (hereinafter 
referred to as the 'basic anti-dumping Regulation'), because they are either 
identical or have characteristics closely resembling each other. 
(8) One importer, also producer of the downstream product (that is, manufacturer of 
ring binder files and other stationery products) reiterated arguments it had made 
previously, namely that mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings are not like products in 
relation to 'standard' two to four ring mechanisms and should, therefore, be 
excluded from the scope of the proceeding. 
(9) In support of its claim, the importer argued that only mechanisms with 2 to 4 rings 
were mentioned in the complaint, leaving aside 17 and 23 ring mechanisms from 
the list of allegedly dumped products. 
Although it is true that, in the calculations set out in the complaint as prima facie 
evidence of dumping and resulting injury, only models with 2 to 4 rings were used 
as examples, it should also be recalled that, in the product description outlined in 
the complaint, all ring mechanisms, with 2 rings or more, were included. In this 
respect, it should be noted that RBM with e.g. 6, 13 or 16 rings are sold on the 
Community market. 
(10) It has been argued that, in addition to the number of rings, 17 and 23 ring 
mechanisms have distinguishing physical characteristics, in particular higher base 
length and width, which make them more wear resistant than other mechanisms, 
and therefore significantly different. 
Having examined this issue it was found that variations, if any, could be 
considered comparable to the ones already existing among the different models of 
2 or 4 ring mechanisms themselves. Therefore, it is considered that there is no 
other significant physical difference than the number of rings between 17 to 23 
ring mechanisms on the one hand and other ring mechanisms on the other hand. 
(11) It has been further argued that the manufacturing methods used and the costs of 
production of 17 and 23 ring mechanisms differed significantly from those 
relating to other mechanisms. 
It should be noted that the operations and the machinery necessary to manufacture 
the rings, fix them to the blades and assemble the blades into the mechanism's 
cover are essentially the same for all types of RBM. The higher content of raw 
materials and the ring fixing operation which has to be repeated in the case of 17 
and 23 ring mechanisms cause a difference in production costs. However, this 
difference, although significant, is not out of proportion with those observed 
between small and large types of mechanisms with fewer rings. Therefore, the 
particular manufacturing operations, if any, and the resulting costs relating to 17 
and 23 ring mechanisms are not such as to alter their similarity to other 
mechanisms. In any event, with regard to differences in the manufacturing process 
that may have been used, following consistent practice of the Community 
Institutions, all such differences are irrelevant in the analysis of the like product. 
(12) It has also been alleged that mechanisms with 17 or 23 rings were expensive 
enough for them to be considered as belonging to a separate market segment. 
Although a significant price difference between mechanisms with 17 or 23 rings 
and similar mechanisms with fewer rings could be established, it is considered 
that given the similarity in use and customer, substitution effects could take place 
if the products were to experience sufficiently diverging price evolutions. It 
should therefore be concluded the market segment for mechanisms with 17 or 23 
rings does not possess sufficiently separate characteristics to be excluded 
altogether from the scope of the investigation. 
(13) It was argued that differences also arose in the" use of binders with different 
mechanisms. Whereas binders with "standard" mechanisms are allegedly 
primarily aimed at paper where the customer himself punches holes, binders with 
17 and 23 ring mechanisms are used to collect pre-punched paper due both to the 
price of the special hole puncher and the few pages it can punch at a time. 
However, it should be noted that certain types of binders such as organisers or 
catalogues, using ring mechanisms with 2 to 6 rings covered by this proceeding, 
also use pre-punched paper already inserted in the finished product, or pre­
punched additional pages, and that punchers for some of these are not necessarily 
available to the customer. In addition, pre-punched paper for 2 to 4 ring 
mechanisms is available and sold in significant quantities in the Community, in 
particular for school use (which is also the main market for the 17 and 23 ring 
mechanisms). It can therefore be concluded that 17 and 23 ring mechanisms have 
a similar use as other types of mechanisms. 
(14) It was also argued that lever arch mechanisms which fall within the same CN code 
as RBM and are excluded from the scope of this proceeding, are more similar to 2 
ring mechanisms than 17 and 23 ring mechanisms. 
In this respect, the physical characteristics and the market for lever arch 
mechanisms were found to be sufficiently distinct from those of ring mechanisms 
to justify these lever arch mechanisms being excluded from the complaint and 
from the scope of the proceeding. 
(15) Having examined the arguments put forward, it is confirmed that 17 and 23 ring 
binder mechanisms have characteristics closely resembling those of other RBM, 
and are therefore like products to other RBM within the meaning of Article 1 (4) 
of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. Accordingly, the above claim is rejected. 
IV. DUMPING 
A. Market economy third country 
(16) At the time of initiation, one importer had objected to the choice of Malaysia as 
analogue market for the establishment of normal value with respect to the 
People's Republic of China. As his arguments were not substantiated nor any 
alternative country was proposed, the Commission notified this interested party on 
22 November 1995 that his objections had to be rejected. In a letter which reached 
the Commission on 27 November 1995, the same importer proposed to use cost of 
production of an Italian producer, which was not part of the Community industry, 
for the establishment of normal value in the People's Republic of China. Since 
this letter was received 20 days beyond the deadline set out in the Notice of 
Initiation, the suggestion could not be taken into account. After being disclosed 
the essential facts and considerations underlying the imposition of provisional 
measures, the importer repeated his arguments. Although the request was made 
beyond any time limit applicable to the selection of a market economy third 
country, the Commission examined whether a change in methodology would have 
an impact on the level of the duty. For this purpose, and given the fact that the 
cost of production of one single producer could not be considered representative 
for the situation of other Community producers, the Commission interpreted the 
claim as a request to use the Community as analogue market for the establishment 
of normal value for the exports from the People's Republic of China. The 
Commission then compared the target prices established for the Community 
industry (its actual prices being below cost of production) on an average to 
average basis with the Chinese export prices. This dumping calculation showed 
that adopting this methodology would have no impact on the level of the duty 
finally proposed by the Commission since under either method the dumping 
margin found clearly exceeded the injury elimination level finally established. 
Given the above considerations and taking into account thai, in accordance with 
Article 2 (7) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, if appropriate, a market 
economy country subject to the same investigation could be used, the Commission 
concluded that the selection of Malaysia was not unreasonable for the 
establishment of normal value and that there was no reason to change this choice 
of analogue country. 
B. Malaysia 
1. Normal value 
(17) One importer argued that the Malaysian domestic sales, representing 5.8% of 
quantities exported to the Community, were not sufficiently representative for the 
establishment of normal value. In this respect, the Commission applied Article 2 
(2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, according to which a domestic sales 
volume of 5% is considered as a sufficient quantity, for the representativeness of 
the domestic market. 
(18) It was also argued by the same importer that there is only a limited competition on 
the Malaysian market and that consequently domestic prices are higher than they 
would be under normal competitive conditions. The Commission had already 
looked into that matter when selecting Malaysia as an appropriate analogue 
country and addressed the argument in recital 10 of the provisional duty 
Regulation. As no new argument nor evidence was put forward, the Commission 
confirmed that a certain degree of competition on the Malaysian market is 
warranted by the presence of RBM originating in the People's Republic of China. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that Malaysia is a reasonable choice for the 
establishment of normal value in the People's Republic of China. 
2. Dumping margin 
(19) No other arguments having been presented which could lead to a modification of 
the dumping determination; the Commission considers that the methodology of 
the dumping calculation and the provisional findings as described in recitals 18 to 
26 of the provisional duty Regulation are to be confirmed. Consequently, the 
dumping margin for Malaysia is definitively established at 42.8%. 
C. People's Republic of China 
1. Normal value 
(20) Two Chinese exporters claimed an adjustment to normal value, because of 
differences in the cost structure due to low labour costs in the People's Republic 
of China and differences in the technology of the production operations. 
As far as labour costs are concerned, the Commission services note that the reason 
for using a third market economy country is the lack of reliable cost and price 
information in the non-market economy country concerned. Therefore, it is 
groundless to argue that certain costs are lower in the non-market economy 
country than in the analogue country and that adjustments to normal value should 
be made, when applying this normal value to the non-market economy country. 
With respect to the different technology, the Commission services consider that 
the production process employed to manufacture a particular product is irrelevant 
as long as the physical characteristics and use of the product are similar. In this 
case, the alleged differences did not lead to any significant differences in the 
essential physical characteristics of the product concerned. Therefore, in 
accordance with Article 2 (10 (a)) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, the claim 
had to be rejected. 
(21) Two interested parties argued that they were not able to comment on the 
Commission's calculation of normal value, as the absolute figures regarding the 
calculation of normal value established in the analogue country were not disclosed 
to the Chinese exporters, on the grounds of confidentiality. In its disclosure letter 
to these parties, the Commission had attached all calculation sheets relevant for 
these companies and set out in detail the methodology applied by the Commission 
for the establishment of normal value, due regard being given to the protection of 
confidential information, in accordance with Article 20 (4) of the basic anti­
dumping Regulation. The disclosure of the detailed absolute figures would violate 
the legitimate right of an interested party to confidential treatment and was not 
necessary for the understanding of the calculation. Therefore, the argument could 
not be accepted. 
2. Export price 
(22) One exporter claimed that excessive amounts were deducted from the export price 
for deferred rebates found at the related importer's premises. 
The Commission notes that this company, in replying to the Commission's 
questionnaire, had failed to report such rebates, which were found by the 
Commission's officials during the on-spot investigation. Therefore, the 
Commission had to determine the deductions on the basis of the data collected 
8 
there. Moreover, the exporter's claim refers to an estimated figure of such rebates, 
whereas the amounts actually deducted by the Commission were those verified in 
the investigation. 
(23) One exporter claimed that the margin of profit deducted by the Commission was 
too high, in comparison with the actual net profit realised by its related importer. 
Due to the association agreement between the two companies, the Commission 
could not take into account for the construction of a reliable export price the profit 
margin shown in the related importer's accounts. In line with the Commission's 
practice, it was considered reasonable to use actual data of independent companies 
importing the product concerned into the Community. In determining the profit 
margin normally achieved by these companies, only the product concerned was 
taken into account. Therefore, the 7.8% profit margin does not include any profit 
margins achievable on stationery products other than ring binder mechanisms. The 
determination of the profit margin was made on the basis of the independent 
importers' data which were verified at their premises, due account being taken of 
their different sale volumes. 
3. Comparison 
(24) Two interested parties enquired about and partly disputed the level of trade 
adjustment which the Commission took into account, to compare the Malaysian 
Normal Value and Chinese export prices. One party claimed that such allowance 
should have been more substantial. 
The Commission notes that none of the exporters concerned had ever claimed 
such an allowance during the different phases of the investigation and that the 
Commission considered on its own initiative that, in view of a fair comparison, it 
was appropriate to grant it in this case. In the absence of any specific evidence 
provided by any of the exporters concerned, the Commission considered it 
appropriate, in order to determine the amount of such an allowance in a reasonable 
way, to base its calculation on its practice in similar situations. 
4. Individual treatment 
(25) World Wide Stationery (hereinafter referred to as 'WWS'), which had at a very 
early stage applied for individual treatment, reiterated its request after the 
imposition of provisional measures. 
After a further evaluation of the facts, the Commission services concluded, after 
verification in Hong Kong, that individual treatment could be granted to this 
company, in view of the substance and implementing modalities of the production 
agreement between WWS and the representatives of the local authorities in the 
People's Republic of China. According to this agreement, the company based in 
Hong Kong seemed to master the production operations in the People's Republic 
of China, since it only paid to the local Chinese authorities a transformation fee 
per ton for the products exported. The machinery used in the operations in the 
People's Republic of China was owned by WWS and appeared as assets in its 
financial accounts. WWS also seemed to be in control of the supply of raw 
materials as well as of all sales of the product concerned. In these circumstances, 
it was considered appropriate to establish for World Wide Stationery an individual 
dumping margin and to determine an individual anti-dumping duty. 
(26) The related companies Champion Stationery Manufacturing Co. and Sun Kwong 
Metal Manufacturer Co. Ltd, considered by the Commission as one single 
company for the reason explained in recital 5 (b) of the provisional duty 
Regulation, did not reiterate their request of individual treatment and did not 
submit any further argument in this respect after the imposition of provisional 
measures. Therefore, the Commission confirms its provisional findings as 
reported in recitals 37 to 39 of the provisional duty Regulation, by which the 
request of individual treatment had been rejected. 
(27) In its reply to the final disclosure, Bensons criticised in the name of WHS Hong 
Kong that WWS alone should benefit from individual treatment. It alleged that 
WHS would have also fulfilled the conditions set by the Commission for 
individual treatment and would therefore also be eligible for this treatment. The 
Commission, however, notes that WHS did not ask for individual treatment within 
the specified time limits, and only raised the question of individual treatment at a 
very late stage of the investigation. Thus, the Commission was not in a position to 
verify, with regard to WHS, the substantive conditions applicable, in view of the 
statutory deadlines applicable to this proceeding. Consequently, the Commission 
was unable to propose individual treatment for WHS. 
10 
5. Dumping margin 
(28) The Commission considers that the methodology of the dumping calculation and 
the provisional findings as described in recitals 27 to 36 of the provisional duty 
Regulation are to be confirmed. 
World Wide Stationery's individual dumping margin amounts to 96.6%. The 
definitive dumping margin for the other exporters of the People's Republic of 
China as a whole amounts to 129.22%. 
V. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY 
(29) As regards the Community industry, the treatment of imports from Hungary made 
by one EC producer, including the issue of the non-preferential rules of origin, has 
been questioned by several exporters and one importer, without, however, their 
claims in this respect being substantiated. 
As explained in the provisional duty Regulation (recital 43), the Commission 
accepts the fact that a majority of the products in question clearly originate in 
Hungary : this is the case, for instance, when all parts used come from Hungary 
and/or substantial processing takes place there. Accordingly, these products were 
excluded from the Community production, and, consequently, played no role in 
the definition of the Community industry. Sales of these products (which are, in 
fact, made in Hungary) have indeed not been taken into account amongst the sales 
of the Community industry when assessing the injury this industry suffered. 
Conversely, products merely assembled in Hungary from Austrian parts were 
considered part of Community production since the assembly operation which the 
products had undergone in Hungary did not confer Hungarian origin on the 
finished products. This determination was based on the non-preferential rules of 
origin applicable, as it is the Institutions' practice to base in principle their 
conclusions in anti-dumping investigations on these rules. The use of the 
preferential rules of origin set out in Article 1 of protocol IV to the EU-Hungary 
Association Agreement would be neither appropriate nor warranted in the context 
of an anti-dumping proceeding. 
(30) In conclusion, the finding in the provisional duty Regulation that the two 
complainant Community producers constitute the Community industry in 
accordance with Article 4 (1) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation is confirmed. 
11 
VI. INJURY 
A. Preliminary remark 
(31) As regards the methodology used for the establishment of injury, set out in recital 
46 of the provisional duty Regulation, it should be recalled that the Commission 
analysed data relating to the period 1992 to September 1995, and the geographical 
scope of the investigation over this period was the Community as composed at the 
time of the initiation i.e. including all fifteen Member States. 
(32) Several exporters repeated the argument, which the Commission had already 
addressed in recital 46 of the provisional duty Regulation, that, for the purpose of 
determining injury, data relating to the Austrian industry can only be taken into 
account insofar as they relate to the period after 1 January 1995, when Austria 
became a Member of the European Union. One exporter argued that the combined 
provisions of Articles 3(4) and 4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of GATT 1994 would exclude non-members countries from the definition of 
the domestic industry, and several exporters argued that neither Article VI of 
GATT 1994, nor the EEA Agreement, would justify the Commission's decision to 
establish injury relying, in part, on data concerning Austria and relating to the 
period between January 1992 and December 1994. 
In addressing this argument, it should be noted that the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 requires that any imposition of 
measures on a given territory be based on a formal investigation into the effects of 
the alleged dumping within the same territory. Thus, the investigation carried out 
in this case covered all fifteen Member States. This was made possible in 
particular given the integration of the market subject to the analysis prior to the 
enlargement of the Community. 
It is confirmed, therefore, that the Austrian producer has been rightly considered 
as part of the Community industry (as defined in accordance with Article 4 (1) of 
the basic anti-dumping Regulation) and as being entitled to act as complainant. 
For this reason, it is confirmed that, in order to assess the injury suffered, trends 
had to be established for the Community industry as defined at the time of 
initiation of this proceeding, over a number of years. 
12 
B. Community consumption 
(33) On the basis of estimates for the annual per head consumption of binders, one 
importer argued that the consumption of RBM on the Community market was 400 
million units and not 283 million units as stated in the provisional duty 
Regulation. 
It should be recalled that the Commission based its provisional findings on the 
information received from the exporters, importers and Community producers. 
Due to the high level of co-operation in this case, the data for all major companies 
present on the market have been analysed, no party being able to give indications 
on a producer/importer which would have been overlooked during the 
investigation period and whose sales could explain the difference between the 
Commission's evaluation and the different alleged market size. It is therefore 
considered that the data obtained from the companies in this case offer a more 
accurate base for the calculation of the Community consumption than a mere 
estimate based on per-head consumption rates. Therefore, the findings set out in 
recital 47 of the provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
C. Factors and considerations relating to the dumped imports 
(34) One exporter submitted that a quality difference should be taken into account in 
order to ensure a fair comparison between its export sales of the like product in the 
Community and sales by the Community industry. The exporter claimed that it 
produces RBM with a narrower base which are allegedly some 12 to 17.5 % 
cheaper than the wide base mechanisms sold by the complainants. The exporter 
concerned claimed that this should be taken into account in the form of 
adjustments when calculating the degree of price undercutting. 
Having examined the allegation of the exporter, the Commission has verified that 
only models with similar width (within 1 mm difference) were compared, and 
found that, in any event, no consistent price differences could be established 
between mechanisms with different widths. For these reasons, the findings 
outlined in recitals 52 to 54 and the methodology described at recital 84 of the 
provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
13 
D. Situation of the Community industry 
(35) One exporter argued that the Community industry's negative trends on production, 
sales and employment were caused by the progressive relocation of a former 
British producer to the Far East. 
It should be noted that, as the producer in question ceased its manufacturing 
operations in the Community in 1991, it has not been included in the definition of 
the Community industry for the purpose of this proceeding, and the injury 
indicators established in this case do not rely on its data. Consequently, this 
argument was rejected. 
(36) No additional substantiated arguments have been presented in relation to the 
findings set out in recitals 55 to 62 of the provisional duty Regulation. 
E. Conclusion on injury 
(37) In the light of the above and in the absence of other arguments, it is confirmed that 
the Community industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of 
Article 3 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. 
VII. CAUSATION 
(38) One exporter argued that the injury suffered by the Community industry was due 
to the restructuring it had undergone. 
As explained in the provisional duty Regulation, and in particular in its recitals 61 
and 65, the actual situation shows rather that the Community industry has been 
prevented from benefiting from its restructuring since, in the face of the dumped 
imports, it could neither achieve positive financial results nor obtain stability of 
market share. It is therefore considered that the injury suffered has not been 
caused by the Community industry's restructuring, and this argument was, for this 
reason, rejected. 
(39) The same exporter reiterated its argument that the injury suffered by the 
Community industry was caused by the partial shift to Hungary of one of the 
Community producer's operations. 
14 
As no new evidence substantiating this allegation has been submitted, the findings 
set out in recital 71 of the provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
(40) The allegation that the injury suffered is resulting from past anti-competitive 
practices, which had been put forward before the provisional duty Regulation, has 
been reiterated by a number of parties. 
The parties making these allegations did not provide any evidence in this respect, 
and it should be recalled that no complaint has been lodged with any competition 
authority within the Community. For this reason such an allegation could not be 
taken into account. 
(41) In conclusion, as no new arguments were received in connection with the findings 
in recitals 67 to 74 of the provisional duty Regulation, these findings are 
confirmed. 
VIII. COMMUNITY INTEREST 
A. General 
(42) It should be recalled from recitals 75 et seq of the provisional duty Regulation that 
an appreciation of all the various interests, including the interests of the 
Community industry and users was made, and that the Commission provisionally 
concluded that there were no compelling reasons not to take action against the 
imports in question. Subsequently, a further examination of matters deemed 
relevant in analysing the issue of Community interest took place. 
B. Impact on users 
1. Introduction 
(43) Several interested parties reiterated their arguments, presented in recital 77 to 80 
of the provisional duty Regulation, that anti-dumping measures would affect the 
situation of EC binder manufacturers. 
2. Information collection 
(44) The conclusions set out below are based on submissions received from a variety 
of interested users, twenty seven companies overall, the quantitative data existing 
or being meaningful for nine of these which represented 17% of the annual 
15 
apparent Community consumption of RBM. The reliability of this data,-where 
possible, was verified during company visits. 
3. Industrial impact on the downstream industry 
(45) In establishing the size of the downstream industry which could be affected by 
measures on RBM, the part of the stationery companies dealing with office 
products other than binders should be excluded. On the basis of the annual 
Community binder production and of the productivity ratios found in the 
submissions, it is considered that the employment in the Community binder 
industry amounts to 6000 employees. 
(46) A to the structure of the binder industry, the existence of two categories of 
products, standard and custom made, was established. On the basis of the 
productivity level for these two categories, and on the market shares of the users 
concerned, it is considered that the custom-made binder business represents one 
third of the Community binder industry in volume and 50% of its total turnover. 
(47) Some parties argued that anti-dumping measures on RBM would exclude the 
imported RBM from the Community market, so that the sources of supply would 
be reduced to the two Community producers. It has been further argued that, due 
to the large size of one of the two Community producers, the supply market could 
become a monopoly in the near future. It should be noted, however, that the 
difference in size of the two Community producers is limited and not such as to 
lead to the disappearance of one of them being likely. Moreover, no new evidence 
in respect of the first part of this argument was received. The findings set out in 
recital 78 of the provisional duty Regulation are therefore confirmed. 
4. Direct financial impact on the downstream industry 
(48) First, it has been alleged that for certain particular types of binders, the RBM was 
the source of up to 30% of the manufacturing cost of a binder. 
In this respect, it was found that the mechanism is a major component of a 
finished binder, and that the number of rings and size have a strong influence on 
its proportion of the cost of the finished binder. Given this variety, it is considered 
that a meaningful analysis of the cost influence of the RBM could not be based on 
any particular model of binder, but should be done on a global basis for each 
company, taking into account the actual product mix of its sales. 
16 
It was therefore considered that the total cost for the RBM supply for a* given 
company should be examined in the light of the total value of its binder sales. This 
resulted in a weighted average ratio of 10.8% ("cost ratio"), which was fairly 
homogeneous for the companies examined. Although differences existed between 
companies dedicated to the production of standard binders in comparison with 
others dedicated to custom-made production, no company showed, on average, a 
ratio higher than 13%. 
•v 
(49) As far as the possible price impact of the RBM on standard made products is 
concerned, one submission received after the final disclosure refers to a 14.4% 
cost ratio. This is allegedly derived from the fact that the price of a custom made 
binder is twice as high as the one of a standard made binder, and that the cost ratio 
for them should therefore be half of the one for standard made. 
This approach totally neglects the fact that these two categories of binders are not 
necessarily manufactured with the, same mechanisms. Special types of 
mechanisms, in small series, are expensive and used in custom-made binders. This 
means that both terms of the cost ratio are different, and that although the cost 
ratio for standard made binders is higher than the one for custom made binders, it 
is not twice as high. As explained in recital 48 above, no higher cost ratio than 
13% could be found. Furthermore, some companies are exclusively dedicated to 
standard made products. 
(50) Secondly, and partly on the basis of the above-mentioned allegation on the cost 
ratio, it has been alleged that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would have 
a serious adverse impact on the financial situation of the binder manufacturers. 
These allegations concerning the foreseeable impact of measures have been 
examined in detail. As far as selling prices for RBM are concerned, it is likely that 
the Community industry, with a 35% market share, would not be able to increase 
its prices above a certain limited level, (which can be estimated below 10%), 
without risking to strengthen its current downward trend in respect of market 
share. In addition, imports from countries not concerned by this proceeding 
represent 9% of the RBM market, and it is expected that these producers will not 
be willing or able to command price increases. As for the imports from Malaysia, 
it should be recalled that the injury elimination level foreseen for this country is 
considerably lower than for the People's Republic of China. The market share of 
17 
mechanisms with Chinese origin being 45%, it was established that even rf these 
mechanisms were to experience a 20% price increase at resale level and those 
originating in other countries than the People's Republic of China the price 
increases assumed in this paragraph, the average price increase on the market as a 
whole would be an estimated 12%. 
Consequently, in view of the average cost ratio established in recital 48, it is 
considered that the overall impact on the turnover likely to be experienced by the 
binder industry following the imposition of measures would be 12% of 10.8%, i.e. 
1.3%). Even in the unlikely event of a full reflection of the highest anti-dumping 
duty proposed in the RBM resale price , i.e. 39.4% on CIF or 29.9% at RBM 
resale level, an impact of not more than 3.2% on the binder producers' selling 
prices can be foreseen. 
(51) It has also been argued that the increased costs for binders could not be reflected 
in price increases of the final product due to the binder offer exceeding the market 
demand, to the changes in the binder distribution and to the fear of reduction in 
demand. 
In the light of the fact that the average binder price increase which would take 
place at a retail or business customer level would be below 1% (see recital 50 
where ex-factory price increase for binders is estimated at 1.3%), it is considered 
that no significant contraction in demand is likely to be caused and that the 
impact, if any, on the situation of the consumers of the binders will be minimal. In 
addition, it should be noted that substitutes to binders which would be in such a 
competitive situation that they would replace them following the slightest price 
evolution do not appear to exist. Some companies in the binder business have 
even confirmed that no change of the pattern of consumption could be foreseen in 
the next 5 to 10 years. 
It is concluded, therefore, that neither the relatively strong competition amongst 
binder producers nor the emergence of substitute products within the EC are likely 
to prevent the binder producers from increasing their prices in line with their 
costs, in consideration in particular of the limited size of the increase needed to 
reflect the impact of the anti-dumping duties of the magnitude proposed. 
18 
5. Competition from third countries 
(52) Several interested parties reiterated their arguments, outlined in recital 79 of the 
provisional duty Regulation, that anti-dumping measures would affect EC binder 
manufacturers' competitive position vis-à-vis binder producers located in third 
countries. These exporters could benefit from lower mechanism costs and global 
supply policies of certain large standard binder distributors whose influence on the 
market is increasing. It was alleged that this could result in the Community 
downstream industry losing market share and thus being tempted to relocate its 
production in neighbouring countries. In addressing this allegation it should be 
recalled that the binder market can be divided into two segments, namely the 
custom-made and standard made binders. 
(a) custom-made products 
(53) It should be stressed again that, for the part of the market which is business-to-
business oriented, it is fundamental that producers are situated close to the 
customers, and have flexibility in production in order to meet the required demand 
and service. Moreover, for this type of product, the impact of the RBM on the 
final price can be lower than the calculated average established at recital 48. It 
should be stressed, therefore, that the issue of the competitive position for this 
segment of the market is mainly relevant in terms of the existence of imported 
standard products for later customisation. In this context, there are imports of 
finished polypropylene presentation products from the Far East, including the 
smallest binder models. As to the substitutability which could exist between these 
products and the cu"stom made binders, however, it should be stressed that a 
custom made binder is not simply a standard binder with a printed logo. Custom 
made binders indeed rely on a variety of different raw materials and assembling 
techniques used to produce a small number of totally individualised products. For 
public relations purposes, a switch from this particular custom-built product to a 
standard binder after the mere addition of a logo would require such an important 
price difference that such evolution is not likely to be caused by the effect of anti­
dumping measures. 
(b) standard made products 
(54) As far as the standard binder manufacturers in the Community are concerned, it 
has been alleged that their market was driven by the influence of binder 
distribution. This distribution is increasingly marked by large chains of 
19 
superstores running supply policies taking advantage of the world lowest purchase 
price for comparable products, these policies being only limited by the 
transportation costs. In this respect, it was established that road transport costs 
over a normal distance within one Member State or between a neighbouring non-
EC country and the Community would not be below 5% of the value of the 
product. Over a longer distance, between non-EC countries and the EC, if 
maritime transport had to be used, transport costs could reach 10% of the product 
value. 
(55) As a consequence of the maximum cost ratio referred to at recital 49 above, it is 
considered that the foreseeable price impact on the standard made binder industry 
would be limited to 13% (standard made maximum cost ratio) times 12% (average 
price increase), equal to 1.6%. 
On this basis, the analysis should distinguish between competition from Norway, 
the CEEC, and Far Eastern countries. 
(b. 1) Competition from Norway 
(56) It has been alleged that imports from Norway constituted the greatest current 
threat to the EC binder industry, as imports from this country were already 
significant and increasing. 
No complaint or substantiated evidence having been submitted in respect of unfair 
trading practices, it would seem reasonable to consider that the EC-binder industry 
has identical or similar ex-factory costs as their competitors in Norway. The 
Commission consider that the cost increase that the EC binder producers could 
experience would still allow them to be competitive, since the transport costs for 
the EC sales of their Norwegian competitors in this case would be at least three 
times higher (5%) than this foreseeable cost increase (1.6%). 
(b.2) Competition from the CEEC 
(57) The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have been alleged to be in a 
competitive situation to build up a binder industry able to compete on the EC 
market. 
In this respect, it should be noted that until now the size of the binder industry in 
these countries remained small and the import statistics for office products show 
low imports. Nevertheless, neither the growth of this industry nor its comparative 
20 
advantage in terms of labour costs can be denied. The reduction -in the 
manufacturing cost which can be obtained in these countries in comparison to the 
Community outweighs the necessary transportation costs to the Community 
market. 
However, it should be considered that the creation of an export-oriented binder 
industry in neighbouring countries would result from the relocation of EC 
producing operations. Although reference to business plans for a production shift 
to these countries has been made, the elements received by the Commission only 
consisted of the comparison of current labour costs and transportation costs. On 
this basis, even before the introduction of any anti-dumping measure on RBM, 
these comparisons would militate in favour of immediate relocation of the binder 
industry. This shows that, in taking a management decision to relocate production, 
a firm also weighs other important factors. In this context, the cost of shifting 
production facilities in themselves and, above all, the uncertainty linked with 
rapidly expanding countries have to be factored in. 
It is considered that in such decisions to shift production to the CEEC, the 
possible impact of a price increase on RBM, due to its limited amount of 1.6% on 
average, could only play a minor role, if any. Consequently, no compelling 
evidence has been received showing that the imposition of a duty on RBM would 
lead to the relocation of the binder industry in the CEEC and to an important surge 
of imports originating in these countries. 
(b.3) Competition from the Far East 
(58) One exporter submitted information according to which finished binders from the 
Far East could be imported below their Community cost of production. 
Eurostat import statistics show that imports of plastic office products originating 
in these countries are relatively low and stable. Accordingly, nearly all binder 
manufacturers in the Community, small companies as well as important ones, 
minimise the competitive impact of these imports. 
It is therefore considered that the competitive situation between Far Eastern and 
EC binder producers described above is unlikely to be altered by the imposition of 
measures on the Community imports of RBM. 
(c) Conclusion on competition from third countries 
(59) In conclusion, it could not be established that the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures on RBM would be such as to significantly affect the EC binder 
21 
manufacturers* competitive situation vis à vis binder producers located outside the 
Community. This conclusion stands both in respect of custom made and standard 
made binders. 
C. Impact on the Community industry 
(60) Concerning the consequences for the Community industry of an absence of anti­
dumping measures, it was established at the provisional stage (recital 76 of the 
provisional duty Regulation) that this would lead to a further worsening of the 
Community industry's financial situation. The recurrent losses since 1992 would 
continue despite the far-reaching restructuring already carried out. 
It should be added that the heavily depressed net equity situation and the amount 
of short term debt would become unsustainable. From a commercial point of view, 
any reduction in the product range offered by the Community industry in reaction 
to depressed prices would be no solution. Indeed, should Community producers be 
tempted to do so, they would lose one of their competitive advantages and, 
because of a dispersed customer industry, would not be able, to reach the high 
volumes in production and sales necessary in this type of industry. Industrially, 
the investments in automation have been both important and successful, resulting 
in a highly competitive industry at a world level. With the level of automation and 
integration reached, certain equipment such as metal treatment installations being 
unique in each company, it would not be sustainable to abandon certain product 
lines without worsening the situation of the remainder. 
For these reasons, and as a consequence of the unfair competition from the 
dumped imports, production in the Community would, within a short period of 
time, no longer have viable prospects and would cease altogether. 
D. Conclusion 
(61) In the light of the above, the conclusions drawn by the Commission in the 
provisional duty Regulation concerning Community interest are confirmed. 
Indeed, having examined a wide variety of aspects and the various interests 
involved, no compelling reasons have come into light which would lead to the 
conclusion that adopting definitive measures would not be in the interest of the 
Community, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation. 
22 
IX. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
A. General 
(62) It should be recalled that the detailed calculations used to establish the injury 
elimination level at the provisional stage were based on the price level, per 
category of models with the same specific characteristics, (based on a weighted 
average cost of production including profit) of the Community industry's best 
selling models (60% by volume). This was then compared to the resale price of 
the imported products, or where appropriate to the CIF import price adjusted to 
customer delivered level, for each corresponding category. In order to ensure a fair 
comparison, only categories with the same basic characteristics were compared, 
and it was considered that for matching categories the duty should cover the 
difference between the calculated non-injurious price level and the actual selling 
prices of the imports into the Community. The per-category price increase thus 
established was then expressed as a percentage of the free-at-Community frontier 
price of the imported goods for each category. A single injury elimination level 
for each country subject to the proceeding was then established by calculating the 
weighted average of the per-category injury elimination level. 
(63) In this regard, one importer claimed that the Commission, by using for the 
comparison between the dumping margin and the injury elimination level an 
approach based on an average, failed to examine the different situations prevailing 
in the different market segments. It asked the Commission to compare, for each 
segment of the market (e.g. 2-rings mechanisms), the injury elimination level 
found with the dumping margin, and to retain only the lesser margin per segment 
in the calculation of the final average of a single duty for all segments. 
It has to be noted in this respect that the calculation method used in this case 
complies with the requirements of Article 9 (4) of the basic anti-dumping 
Regulation and with previous practice concerning the calculation of a duty lower 
than the dumping margin in cases where such a duty is adequate to remove the 
injury to the Community industry. This approach is justified by the fact that the 
present anti-dumping investigation covers sales of one like product within which 
various categories and models have been found to compete with each other. 
23 
(64) Under these conditions, the injury elimination level methodology as set-out in 
recitals 82 to 84 of the provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
B. Level and form of the duties 
(65) Based on the above conclusions on dumping, injury, causal link and Community 
interest, it was examined what form and level the anti-dumping measures would 
have to take to remove the trade-distorting effects of injurious dumping and to 
restore fair competitive conditions on the Community RBM market. 
(66) Since the level of prices at which the injurious effects of the imports would be 
removed was lower that the dumping margin of both exporting countries 
concerned, the injury elimination level was used in order the determine the level 
of measures. 
(67) The granting of individual treatment to World Wide Stationery was found to affect 
the provisional findings. The methodology described above has been applied to 
calculate the individual injury elimination level of this company, for which a 
32.5% injury elimination level was established. 
(68) The reduced injury elimination level for World Wide Stationery resulted in an 
increase, from 35.4% to 39.4%, of the injury elimination level for all other 
exporters from the People's Republic of China . 
(69) On this basis, definitive anti-dumping duties, in the form of ad valorem duties, 
would be imposed as follows: 
Rate of duty 
- Malaysia: 10,5% 
- People's Republic of China: 
World Wide Stationary: 32.5% 
Residual duty for all other companies: 39.4% 
C. Form of the duty for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings 
(70) It has been however submitted that the imposition of an ad valorem duty on 17 
and 23 ring mechanisms, at the same rate as the one applicable to other 
24 
mechanisms, was inappropriate in the light of the difference in price between 
these two categories. 
In this context, it should be noted that the import price in respect of mechanisms 
with 17 or 23 rings is substantially higher than the average import price for all 
mechanisms. In these circumstances, in the light of the exclusive nature of some 
of the uses of these mechanisms and the ease with which these products can be 
identified, it is considered that, on balance, in calculating the injury elimination 
level, due consideration should be given to the particularly high price of 
mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings and to the intensity of competition between 
certain segments of the market by ensuring that it is not affected by 
disproportionate price discrepancies. This could be achieved by ensuring that 17 
and 23 ring mechanisms are imported above a certain price level adequate, as for 
other RBM, to remove the injury caused by the dumped imports. In these 
circumstances, the setting up of measures in a form different from an ad valorem 
duty was considered appropriate. Based on the price comparisons which were 
carried out (see recital 62) it is considered that, by ensuring that the CIF import 
price for mechanisms with 17 or 23 ring be raised at the minimum of 325 ECU per 
1000 pieces, the requirements mentioned above are fulfilled. 
X. UNDERTAKING 
(71) In accordance with Article 8 (2) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation, the 
deadline for the representations following the final disclosure was also applicable 
to possible undertaking offers. The Chinese exporter which had been granted an 
individual treatment, sent a letter shortly after this deadline indicating its 
willingness to offer an undertaking. 
In this respect, it is considered that, due to the high number of RBM types 
exported by the company concerned, an undertaking in this case would be 
virtually impossible to set up and to monitor. No formal undertaking offer from 
the part of the exporter was finally received. 
XI. COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTIES 
(72) In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found for the exporting 
producers and countries, and in light of the seriousness of the injury caused to the 
25 
Community industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way 
of provisional anti-dumping duties for transactions involving the product 
concerned should be definitively collected at the level of the definitive duties. 
(73) As regards World Wide Stationery, the collection of provisional anti-dumping 
duties should be limited to the rate of duty definitively imposed, i.e. 32.5%. 
(74) Where it could be shown, to the satisfaction of customs authorities, that the 
securities were made in relation to 17 or 23 ring mechanisms, the collection of the 
amounts secured should be limited to the duty definitively imposed for these types 
of RBM, if lower than the one secured, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article I 
1. Definitive anti-dumping duties are hereby imposed on imports of certain ring binder 
mechanisms falling within CN code ex 8305 10 00 originating in Malaysia and the People's 
Republic of China. 
For the purpose of this Regulation, ring binder mechanisms consist of two rectangular steel 
sheets or wires with at least four half rings made of steel wire fixed on it and which are 
kept together by a steel cover. They can be opened either by pulling the half rings or with 
a small steel-made trigger mechanism fixed to the ring binder mechanism. 
2. The rate of duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-frontier price, before duty, 
shall be as follows: 
a) for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings (Taric code: 8305 10 00 20) originating in the 
People's Republic of China and Malaysia, the amount of duty shall be equal to the 
difference between the minimum import price of ECU 325 per 1000 pieces and the free 
at Community-frontier not cleared through customs price. 
b) for mechanisms other than those with 17 or 23 rings (Taric code: 8305 10 00 10) 
Rate of duty Taric additional code 
Malaysia 10.5% 
26 
People's Republic of China: 
World Wide Stationary 
all other companies 32.5% 
39.4% 8934 
8900 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall 
apply. 
Article 2 
1. The amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duty under Regulation 
(EC) No 1465/96 shall be definitively collected: 
a) For the amounts secured for which it can be established, to the satisfaction of the 
customs authorities, that they related to imports of mechanisms with 17 or 23 rings, the 
amount collected shall be equal to the one secured, but limited to an amount calculated in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 1 (2) (a), if lower that the one secured. If it can 
not be established that the amounts secured related to mechanisms with 17 or 23 rings, b) 
shall apply. 
b) For the amounts secured in respect of mechanisms other than those with 17 and 23 rings, 
the collection shall be at the duty rate definitively imposed if lower or equal to the one 
secured. In the other case, the collection shall be limited to the one secured. 
2. Amounts secured in excess of the definitive rate of anti-dumping duty shall be 
released. 
Article 3 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council 

ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(96) 690 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 02 11 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-96-701-EN-C 
ISBN 92-78-13716-2 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
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