9. RepeatstheneedtobringtheEIBunderprudentialsupervision,beitbytheEuropeanCentralBank
orbyanyotherstructuredealingwithbankingsupervisionatEuropeanlevel;recognisesonceagainthatthisneedstobearrangedintheTreaty;CallsthereforeupontheCommissionandMemberStatestocomewithaninitiativeandaskstheEIBactivelytoconsiderpossibilitiesandreportbacktotheParliament;
10. WelcomesthefactthattheEIBhasadoptedtheCommission’sdefinitionofSMEsandsupportsits
attemptstoputitintopractice;
11. StronglycallsagainupontheEIB,theCourtofAuditorsandtheCommissiontoamendthetripar-
titeagreementfollowingitsexpiryon19March2003toauthorisetheCourtofAuditorstoauditboththeguaranteeandtheunderlyingtransaction,incaseswheretheEIBprovidesloans;considersthatfurtherconsiderationshouldbegiventoimprovingthesupervisionoftheEIBandisoftheopinionthattheEuropeanParliamentneedstobeinvolvedinthis;callsonthepartiestofurtheramendthetripartiteagreementsothattheCourtofAuditorshasatleastthesameauditrightswithrespecttotheEIBasithaswithrespecttotheECB,namelytheoperationalefficiencyofthemanagementoftheEIB;
12. SuggeststhattheEIBregularlypublishanevaluationreportonitsfinancialactivities,dealingsepar-
atelywithitsdirectactivities,thoseundertakenbythirdparties(loans,riskcapital,funds,etc.)anditsderivativetransactions;
13. AskstheEIBtoinformtheParliamentaboutcompliancewiththerecommendationsintheAnnual
reportoftheAuditCommitteeandtherecommendationsmadebytheoperationsevaluationdepartment
initssectoralreports;
14. RecommendsthattheEIBalsopublishinformationconcerningfailedprojects,ifany,inorderto
learnfromsuchfailures;
15. AcknowledgestheEIB’scommitmenttogivefullaccesstoinformationnecessaryfortheauditby
theCourtofAuditors(ifnecessaryincludingcommerciallyconfidentialormarket-sensitiveinformation)andforscrutinybyOLAFandtheCourtofJustice;
16. RegretsthattheinformationpresentedbytheEIBonitswebsiteappearsinonlythreecommunity
languages;encouragestheEIBtomaketheinformationpresentedonthewebsiteavailableinmoreCom-munitylanguages;
17. UrgesthenewEuropeanParliamenttoorganiseahearingofexpertsontheEIBannualreport2003
and2004andtoformulateconclusionsfortheLisbonprocessconcerningthepoliciesoftheEIB;
18. AskstheEIBtoannuallyprovidetheEuropeanParliamentandthepublic,togetherwiththepre-
sentationoftheEIB’sAnnualReport,withawrittensummaryoftheactionundertakeninresponsetotheissuesraisedinthepreviousannualreportoftheParliament;
19. InstructsitsPresidenttoforwardthisresolutiontotheCouncil,theCommissionandtheEIB.
P5_TA(2004)0372
Eurostat
EuropeanParliamentresolutiononEurostat
TheEuropeanParliament ,
/dash havingregardtoitsresolutionof4December2003ontheevaluationoftheactivitiesoftheEuropean
Anti-FraudOffice(OLAF)(1)of4December2003,itsresolutionof29January2004ontheaction
takenbytheCommissionontheobservationscontainedintheresolutionaccompanyingthedecision30.4.2004EN C104E/1021 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004
(1) P5_TA(2003)0551.
givingdischargeinrespectoftheimplementationofthegeneralbudgetoftheEuropeanUnionforthe
2001financialyear(1)anditsresolution(2)of21April2004ongrantingdischargetotheCommis-
sioninrespectof2002,
/dash havingregardtotheCommission’sreporttotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilonthefollow-
upto2001discharges(COM(2003)651/dashC5-0536/2003),
/dash havingregardtoArticle276oftheECTreaty,
/dash havingregardtoArticle147oftheFinancialRegulation,
/dash havingregardtoRule37(4)ofitsRulesofProcedure,
A. whereasithighlightedanumberofconcernsregardingfinancialmanagementatEurostatinitsdis-
chargeresolutionof8April2003(3)onthefinancialyear2001,
B. whereas,asaresultofParliament’sinsistenceandseveralpressreportsinthespringof2003,the
CommissionlaunchedaninternalinvestigationintoEurostat,theresultsofwhichwerecommunicatedtoParliamenton8July2003togetherwithanumberofemergencymeasures,includingthesuspen-sionofcontractsandseniormanagementpendingfurtherexamination,
C. whereasthreeparallelinvestigationswerelaunchedbyaninternalCommissiontaskforce,theInternal
AuditServiceandOLAF,whosefindingsweresubmittedtoParliamentattheendofOctober2003,
D. whereasMrProdiannouncedanactionplantoParliamentinDecember2003inthecontextofthe
annualdebateontheCommission’slegislativeprogramme,whichwasfurtherdetailedbyCommis-sionerSolbesinFebruary2004,
E. whereasOLAFhassofarconcludedanumberofinvestigationsintospecificaspectsoftheEurostat
caseandforwardedsomefilestopublicprosecutorsinLuxembourgandFrance,whilstseveralmatters
stillremainunderexamination,
1. Recallstheconclusionsandrecommendationscontainedintheresolutionof29January2004deal-
ingprincipallywiththefollow-uptotheEurostataffair,andinparticularwiththepositiveroleofwhist-leblowersinraisingconcerns,theexistenceofinternalauditreportsdetailingirregularfinancialpracticesandthepoorcommunicationandtreatmentofsuchinformationwithinandacrossCommissiondepart-mentsresultingintheproblem’sremainingunaddressedforseveralyears;
2. Regrets theinadequate responsesofarreceived totheoralquestion(O-0067/03)submittedlast
Octoberandtotheresolutionof29January2004;demandsthattheCommissionmakeafullandcom-
pletewrittenevaluationby31July2004ofthecircumstancesoftheEurostatscandalincludingallOLAFreports,coveringinparticulartheslowresponseofCommissionerstothewarningsignalsandthepoorflowofinformationwithintheCommission;
3. RecognisesthequalityandthoroughnessoftheworkoftheCommission’sInternalAuditServiceas
wellasEurostat’sIAC;finds,however,theextremelylongdelaysandtheresistanceandhesitationoftheCommissioninforwardingthesevitalreportstoParliamentunacceptable;callsontheCommissiontoconsiderthefullpublicationofthesedocuments,oratleastversionswhichhavebeenrenderedanony-mous;
4. NotesthattheFinancialRegulationwasinfringedatEurostatbetween1999and2003andthatthe
managementofEurostatneitherrespondedtothereportsoftheinternalauditunitsbytakingdecisiveaction nor informed those in positions of responsibility within Eurostat unambiguously about abuseswhichhadoccurred;stressesthatalthoughsomerulechangesmaybedesirable,theproblemwasnotthelackofgoodrulesbutthepoorapplicationofexistingrules;
(1) P5_TA(2004)0049.
(2) P5_TA(2004)0337.
(3) OJL148,16.6.2003,p.21.C104E/1022 EN30.4.2004 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004
5. WelcomesinprincipletheEurostatactionplanfor2004andtheCommissionproposalforanew
OLAFRegulation(10January2004);
6. StressesthatthecasehashighlightedseriousproblemsintheworkingmethodsofboththeCommis-
sionandOLAF;considersthattheEurostataffairhashighlightedseriousshortcomingsintheCommis-sion’sinternalcontrolmanagementsystemandthattheCommission’sfailuretocomeupwithaconvinc-ingresponseunderminesthecredibilityofthesystemasawhole;
Commission
7. ConsidersthattheCommissionhasfailedtodrawtheappropriateconclusionsfromtheEurostat
affairandthat,contrarytotheundertakingitmadeatthestartofitstermofoffice,ithasfailedtoacceptitspoliticalresponsibilityforthematter,eithercollectivelyorindividually;
8. NotesthatthereportssofarreceivedabouttheEurostataffairhaverevealedthat:
/dash therewasnoeffectivepoliticalresponsetopublicannouncementsbyOLAFaboutinvestigationsinto
Eurostat(July2002)byeithertheCommissionerresponsibleforEurostatortheCommissionerrespon-
sibleforbudgetarycontrolissues;
/dash no-onemonitoredallthepiecesofevidenceastheyslowlycametolight;
/dash theSecretary-Generaldidnotpassonanyoftheinformation,whichwas,albeit,veryvague,from
OLAFtoanyonewithpoliticalresponsibility;
/dash Commissioners’PrivateOfficesignoredordismissedtheinformationthatdidreachthem;
9. Recognisesthattheproblemsoriginatedpriorto1999,butmaintainsthatactiontoidentifyand
remedythesituationwasnottakenswiftlyenoughbythepresentCommission;
10. Considersthat,despitetheCommission’seffortstoimproverelationsbetweenCommissionersand
departments,theEurostataffairhasmadeitclearthattherewasinadequatetransparencyandcommuni-cationbetweenEurostat’smanagementandtheCommission’scross-sectordepartmentsandbetweenEuros-tatandtheCommissionerresponsible;
11. Believesthatthesefactsdemonstratethatinsufficientconsiderationseemstohavebeengiventothe
systemsandmethodsbywhichtheCommissionersthemselveswouldbeabletoassumetheirpoliticalresponsibilitiesinthefightagainstfraudandmismanagement;
12. Remindsthe Commissionersthat they are responsibleforthe wrongdoingsofofficialsin their
departments(‘CommitteeofIndependentExperts’,1999andtheCodeofConductforCommissioners,1999);considersthatCommissionerscannotberelievedoftheirresponsibilitybecausetheydidnotreceiveenoughinformation;
13. RegretstheabsenceofproposalsforstructuralchangeintherelationsbetweenCommissionersand
Directors-General,andconsidersitvitaltoclarifytheleadingroleofCommissionersaswellastheirpol-iticalresponsibility;notesthattheproposalsoftheCommissionprogressreportontheactionsadoptedundertheMarch2000WhitePaperonadministrativereformdonotgofarenoughinthisregard;
14. Pointsinparticulartotheissuesofpoliticalresponsibilitythatthisraisesinmattersoffinancialand
managerialgovernanceandtheweaknessesofthecontrolenvironmentinsomedepartments;callsontheCommissionto make proposalsfor amending the Code of Conduct of Commissionersand structuralchangesintheirrelationswithDirectorates-GeneralsoastomakethepoliticalresponsibilityofCommis-sionersfortheirdepartmentsameaningfulconcept;considersitessentialthatthePresidentoftheCom-missionhasthemeasuresathis/herdisposaltoensurethatthedisciplineoftheCodecanbeapplied;30.4.2004EN C104E/1023 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004
15. CallsforonememberoftheCollegetotakeresponsibility,asinthepast,forcoordinatingthefight
againstfraudandmismanagement,withspecificresponsibilityinteraliafor:
/dash liaisingwiththeInternalAuditService;
/dash thescrutiny,reviewandoversightofthefollow-upofallinternalauditreportspreparedbytheaudit
capabilitiesofthedirectorates-general,andforevaluationreportsonthemanagementofprogrammes;
/dash theAuditProgressCommittee;/dash relationswithOLAF;
/dash relationswiththeEuropeanCourtofAuditors;
/dash liaisonwithotherCommissionersintheirworkonbudgetarycontrolissues;
16. BelievesthateachindividualCommissionerisaccountablefortheservicesunderhisresponsibility
andmustensurethattheirobjectiveshavebeenachievedonabasisoffullrespectoftheprinciplesofsoundfinancialmanagement;insiststhatallCommissionersprioritisethefightagainstfraudandmisman-agementwithintheDirectorates-Generalforwhichtheyhaveresponsibility;intendstotakeintoconsider-ationthecommitmentofcandidateCommissionerstothisfightduringthehearingsonthenewCommis-sioners;
17. CallsthereforeforoneadviserinallCommissioners’PrivateOfficestobegivenspecificresponsibil-
ity,inadditiontoothertasks,foradvisinghis/herCommissioneronissuesrelatingtobudgetarycontrolwithintheDGsforwhichthatCommissionerhasresponsibilityandliaisingwiththeofficeofthememberoftheCollegeresponsibleforbudgetarycontrolmatters;
18. ReiteratesitsbeliefthatCommissionersmusthaveamoredirectandproactiveroleinoverseeing
theworkoftheirdepartmentsandtakingresponsibilityforthefailingsasmuchasforthesuccesses;intendsthereforetoholdthefutureCommissiontoaccountforitsomissionsaswellasitsactions;
Internalprocedures
19. RecallsthattheadministrativereformhasbeenoneofthemainobjectivesofthepresentCommis-
sion,thattheWhitePaper‘ReformingtheCommission’(COM(2000)200)wasadoptedon1March2000,andthattheCommissionhascommitteditselftoanambitiousprogrammeforstrengtheningindepen-
dence,accountability,efficiency,transparencyandthehigheststandardsofresponsibility;notesthat:
/dash manyverynecessaryandimportantstepsintherightdirectionhavebeentaken;and/dash therearestillpotentialbarrierstoreformwhichhavetobeaddressed;
20. Recallsthatthereformplacesastrongemphasisondecentralisationoffinancialcontrols;believes
thatthisinturnhighlightstheurgentneedtodevelopmoresuitableandaccountableformsofcentralmanagementsupervisionofthecontrolsystemsoperatinginindividualdepartments;
21. TakestheviewthattheEurostatcasehashighlightedtheneedtoreviewtherelationsbetweenthese
differentactorsandbetweentheindividualCommissionersandtheCollegeofCommissioners,aswellasthefunctioningofthechainofaccountability,inordertoensureprogressnotonlyintheareaoffinancialmanagementbutalsointhegovernancestructureoftheCommission;
22. CallsfortheannualactivityreportsdrawnupbytheDirectors-Generaltoreflecttheirresponsibil-
itiesasauthorisingofficers,asprovidedforbytheFinancialRegulation;callsforthesummaryreporttoincludeallthekeyaspectsofthevariousannualactivityreports/statementsofassurance;
23. Maintains,withreferencetothechannelsusedfordisseminatingrequestsfromCommissionersand
therepliesissuedbydepartments,thatsuchreplies(whenrelating totopicsdeemedsensitive)shouldalwaysbeforwardedbytheDirector-GeneraltotherelevantCommissionerhimselfandnotjusttohisheadofoffice;C104E/1024 EN30.4.2004 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004
24. DeplorestheformerpracticeofEurostatandOPOCEofcreating‘financialenvelopes’;callsonthe
CommissiontoactswiftlyandinvestigatethepossibilityofotherCommissiondepartments’havingbeenengagedinsimilarpracticesandtotakeappropriateactiontouncoverthetruthabouttherealextentofthesystemandthefinaluseofthefundsinthese‘financialenvelopes’;
ProgressatEurostat
25. TakesnoteoftheactionstakensofartoremedythesituationinthisCommissiondepartment;
welcomesinparticular:
/dash thethoroughrevisionofallexistingcontractswithandsubsidiestooutsidebodiesandthecancel-
lationofallautomaticcontractrenewals;
/dash thecompleterevisionofexistingrelationsbetweenEurostatandnationalstatisticaloffices,including
grantsthatwerenotproperlyanalysedoverseveralyears;
/dash thedrasticreductioninthenumberofpublications;
/dash theinternalisationpolicy,meaningthatstatisticalworkwillagainbeexecutedin-house,asrecom-
mendedbytheIAC-EurostatreportsanddemandedinParliament’sabove-mentioned2001dischargeresolution;
/dash thefreepublicationofstatisticsviaitsinternetsite;/dash improvedtraininginfinancialmanagement;
26. Takestheviewthatanindependentadministrative andmanagementauditofthenewEurostat
structure shouldbe carried out once OLAF’s investigations are complete, and specifically a follow-upreportshouldbedrawnupduringthepresentCommission’stermofoffice,analysingwhetherpreviousIASandIAC-Eurostatrecommendationswerecompliedwith;
27. Considersthat,inthecaseofEurostat,therewasanexcessivedependencyonexternalagencies;
welcomes,inthisregard,thecommitmenttocarryoutinternallythebulkofEurostat’stasksandtoreviewthenatureofallcontractswithexternalconsultantslinkedtoEurostat;
28. Urges the Commission,in addition,toaddressthe situationofthe smallsub-contracting firms
unintentionallycaughtupintheaffair;
FinancialRegulation
29. CallsontheCommissiontoaddress,eitherbyarevisionoftheimplementingprovisionsorby
specificlegislative/proceduralmeasures,anyweaknessesidentifiedinthenewFinancialRegulationwhich
mayexposetheCommunitybudgettotheriskoffraud;recommendsthatanysuchmeasurebeconsideredinconjunctionwiththeanticipatedrevisionoftheOLAFRegulation;
OLAF
30. Underlines the importance ofa fully-functioningandindependent anti-fraud bodyforhandling
complexandsensitiveinvestigations;reiteratesitspositionthatOLAFmusthaveinstitutionalindepen-dencefromtheCommissionandbeaccompaniedbyabodyprovidingproperlegaloversightofitsoper-ationsandensuringconfidentialityandprotectionofthoseunderinvestigation;
31. StressesthattheCommissionSecretary-GeneralshouldberequireddirectlytoinformtheCommis-
sionerresponsiblefortheDGconcernedofanyinternalinvestigationsofwhichhemaybeawarethroughOLAF,eveniftheinformationprovidedisconcise;theCommissionermustundertakenottodiscloseoutsidetheCollegeofCommissionersanyconfidentialinformationwhichmightbeentrustedtohimorher;30.4.2004EN C104E/1025 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004
Interinstitutionalbodies
32. Considers,asthecaseofOPOCEproves,thatitisparticularlydifficulttoidentifyclearpolitical
responsibilityininterinstitutionalbodies;callsthereforeontheInstitutionstore-examinethelegalprovi-sionsgoverningexistinginterinstitutionalbodies,without,however,callingintoquestiontheprincipleofinterinstitutionalcooperation;
Futureaction
33. AdmitsthattheEurostataffairrepresentsaseriousset-backforpublicappreciationoftheCommis-
sion’sadministrativereformprocess;recognises,nevertheless,thatalmostallofthespecificactionsfromtheabovementionedWhitePaperhavebeenapproved;urgestheCommissiontoensurefullandthoroughimplementationthroughoutitsservices,agenciesandsatellitebodiessothatsimilarcircumstancestothoseatEurostatcanneverberepeated;
34. IntendstoassessthoroughlyallthereportsontheEurostatinvestigation,promisedbyOLAFand
requestedrepeatedlybyParliament,mostrecentlyinitsresolutionof17December2003(
1)whenitcalled
forOLAF‘tosubmititsfinalreportstoParliamentassoonaspossible,andby15Januaryatthelatest’;underlinesthatsofarthesehavenotbeenreceived;reaffirmsitsintentiontocontinuetomonitorandscrutinisefuturedevelopmentsintheongoingEurostatinvestigationsandpotentiallegalactions,withaviewtoproposingfurtherreformsasrequired;
*
**
35. InstructsitsPresidenttoforwardthisresolutiontotheCommission,theCouncilandtheCourtof
Auditors.
(1) P5_TA(2003)0585.
P5_TA(2004)0373
Freedomofexpressionandinformation
EuropeanParliamentresolutionontherisksofviolation,intheEUandespeciallyinItaly,offreedom of expression and information (Article11(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights)
(2003/2237(INI))
TheEuropeanParliament ,
/dash havingregardtothemotionforaresolutionby:SylvianeH.Ainardiand37othersontheriskofa
serious breach of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and of information in Italy(B5-0363/2003),
/dash having regard toArticle10ofthe European ConventiononHumanRights andArticle11ofthe
CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion,
/dash havingregardtoArticles6and7oftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandArticles22,43,49,83,87,95
and151oftheECTreaty,
/dash havingregardtoitsresolutionsof20November2002onmediaconcentration(
1),of13November
2001ontheCommissioncommunicationServices ofGeneral InterestinEurope(2),of4October
2001onthethirdreportoftheCommissiontotheCouncil,theEuropeanParliamentandtheEcon-omicandSocialCommitteeontheapplicationofDirective89/552/EEC(
3)andof4September2003
onthesituationsituationasregardsfundamentalrightsintheEuropeanUnion(2002)(4),
(1) OJC25E,29.1.2004,p.205.
(2) OJC140E,13.6.2002,p.153.
(3) OJC87E,11.4.2002,p.221.
(4) P5_TA(2003)0376.C104E/1026 EN30.4.2004 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion
Thursday22April2004