Table of Contents 1.Introduction 1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation 1.2 Methodology applied 2.What was the expected outcome of the intervention? 2.1 Description of the intervention and its objectives 2.2 Point(s) of comparison 3.How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period? 3.1 Evolution of the situation 3.2 Current state of play 4.Evaluation findings (analytical part) 4.1 The European Fund for Strategic Investments (including the EU guarantee) 4.1.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why? 4.1.2 How did the EU intervention make a difference? 4.1.3 Is the intervention still relevant? 4.2 The European Investment Advisory Hub 4.2.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why? 4.2.2 How did the EU intervention make a difference?

4.2.3 Is the intervention still relevant? 4.3 The European Investment Project Portal 4.3.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why? 4.3.2 How did the EU intervention make a difference? 4.3.3 Is the intervention still relevant? 5What are the conclusions and lessons learned 5.1 Conclusions 5.1.1 The European Fund for Strategic Investments and the EU guarantee 5.1.2 The European Investment Advisory Hub 5.1.3 The European Investment Project Portal 5.2 Lessons learned Annex I. Procedural Information Annex II. Methodology and Analytical models used Annex III. Evaluation matrix and details on answers to the evaluation questions (by criterion) Annex IV. Assessment of the EU Guarantee Annex V. Stakeholders consultation - Synopsis report Annex VI. Comparative features of EFSI supported firms Annex VII. Glossary





1.Introduction 1.1Purpose and scope of the evaluation According to the amended EFSI Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/2396, or ‘EFSI 2.0 Regulation’), the Commission has to submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report containing an independent evaluation of the application of the Regulation at the end of the investment period (i.e., end-2022). It includes the functioning of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), the use of the EU guarantee, the activity of the European Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH) as well as of the European Investment Project Portal (EIPP). The evaluation has been performed against the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value and coherence. Moreover, the evaluation also assesses the additionality of EFSI, as defined in the EFSI 2.0 Regulation. The assessment will cover both the Infrastructure and Innovation and the SME Windows (‘IIW’ and ‘SMEW’). The evaluation focuses on the following elements: ·An assessment of the functioning of the EFSI, the use of the EU guarantee and the functioning of the EIAH and of the EIPP; ·An assessment of whether the EFSI consists of a good use of resources of the general budget of the Union, mobilises a sufficient level of private capital, and crowds-in private investment; ·An assessment of whether maintaining a scheme for supporting investment is useful from a macroeconomic point of view; ·An assessment of the application of the specific procedures put in place to support EFSI (as referred in Article 4(2)(a)(v) of the EFSI 2.0 Regulation); and ·An evaluation concerning the use of the scoreboard of indicators used by the Investment Committee to ensure an independent and transparent assessment of the potential and actual use of the EU guarantee, in particular with regard to the consideration of the appropriateness of each pillar and their respective roles in the assessment. The geographic coverage of the evaluation includes the 27 EU Member States and the United Kingdom. It also includes cross-border projects extended to one or more third countries falling within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The conclusions and lessons learned of the evaluation will serve to assess the extent to which the EFSI, the EIAH, and the EIPP are achieving their objectives. The conclusions may also inform future European Commission (EC) legislative proposals related to investment support instruments. The EFSI and the EIAH activities started in 2015, whereas the EIPP was launched in June 2016. The evaluation has taken into consideration data and results through to 31 December 2021. 1.2Methodology applied The evaluation is based – inter alia – on an independent study carried out by an external service provider (ICF SA) and is published as a Staff Working Document on the European Commission website. Primary data was collected from a sample of the portfolio of the EFSI financing and investment operations, the EIAH advisory assignments and the EIPP projects; secondary data was obtained from existing reports, studies, databases and relevant literature, as well as from consultation activities (i.e., open consultation, targeted consultations, and interviews). The analysis of this information was conducted using quantitative and qualitative methodologies, including portfolio analysis, contribution analysis, survey analysis, cost-efficiency assessment, case studies, and an evaluation matrix. The overlaps between these data collection tools and methodologies lend some robustness to the analysis, allowing for horizontal triangulations (e.g., between contribution analysis and interview results) and vertical validations (e.g., between portfolio analysis and case studies’ “deep dives”). Yet, some limitations exist. Firstly, the broad scope of the evaluation relative to the resources and time available, inevitably constrained the depth and breadth of the research that could be undertaken. Secondly, the low response rate to the Open Public Consultation made it less representative for the evaluation outcome. Thirdly, the difficulty in organising large-scale surveys of counterparts and final beneficiaries (due to practical challenges relating to assembly of contact details, obtaining consent and survey fatigue) meant that the targeted consultations had to be based on existing surveys. Finally, confidentiality considerations prevent from disclosing private information on financing characteristics and activities of identifiable entities and projects. 2.What was the expected outcome of the intervention? 2.1Description of the intervention and its objectives Investment expenditure collapsed in Europe in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. In this context by 2013, total investment across the EU had fallen about 20% from its peak in 2008 (Figure 1). In the most crisis-hit countries, investment had fallen by more than 40%. Moreover, during the crisis, the decline of investment in Europe was twice as much as the decline in the US and Japan. Figure 1: Investment levels in the EU

Real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), Baseline vs. historical norm, EU, in 2013 prices, EUR billion. Source: COM(2016) 359 final - Europe investing again. Taking stock of the Investment Plan for Europe and next steps. In addition, the economic weakness lingering from the financial and sovereign debt crises left scars in the financial markets, exacerbating the difficulty to access finance, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Europe had plenty of investment needs and economically viable projects in search of funding. Yet, at the same time, there were significant levels of savings and large amounts of financial liquidity that could be mobilised. The challenge was to put savings and financial liquidity to productive use in order to support sustainable jobs and growth in Europe. To address this challenge, the European Commission, in a partnership with the European Investment Bank Group (EIBG), proposed in November 2014 the Investment Plan for Europe (IPE) also known as the Juncker Plan. The overarching goal was to kick start investment in Europe, and through that contribute to restoring the EU competitiveness and consequently help boost growth and employment. Indeed, upon request from the ECOFIN Council, a Special Task Force had been set up by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, in coordination with Member States, to address the above issues. They called for financial instruments aimed at catalysing private investments in projects/programmes of EU significance, tailored to Member States’ needs, including also possible cooperation with National Promotional Banks and the EIB participation. Past simulations carried out through the RHOMOLO-EIB model projected that, both in the short and in the long run, the EFSI-financed operations approved through the end of 2016 would significantly boost EU GDP and create employment, also via an increase in total factor productivity. The Investment Plan for Europe consists of three pillars. The first pillar is the European Fund for Strategic Investments, initially aimed at mobilising at least EUR 315 billion of additional investment in infrastructure, innovation, and SME financing by mid-2018. This was to be accomplished by endowing the EIB Group with an increased risk-bearing capacity via an EU budgetary guarantee of EUR 16 billion and an EIB Group’s contribution of EUR 5 billion. The second pillar of the Investment Plan for Europe helps to ensure that investment finance reaches the real economy by developing and promoting a robust pipeline of investment projects. It consists of the European Investment Advisory Hub that provides technical and financial advisory services to private and public project promoters, as well as of the European Investment Project Portal, that is an online platform connecting EU-based project promoters and investors from the EU and beyond. In September 2016, the Commission proposed to strengthen the initiatives under the first and the second pillar and an amendment to the EFSI Regulation was adopted in December 2017 (Regulation (EU) 2017/2396 – the “EFSI 2.0 Regulation”). The EFSI 2.0 Regulation extended the EFSI duration, enhanced its additionality, and increased its financial capacity from EUR 21 to 33.5 billion to mobilise EUR 500 billion of investment through end-2020. Moreover, the EFSI 2.0 included also enhancements for the EIAH which was provided a more specific mandate to support the EFSI pipeline development and to contribute to its sectoral and geographical diversification. The EFSI financial structure both before and after EFSI 2.0 is described below: EFSI: doing more with less At the core of EFSI is the principle of “doing more with less”. EFSI was conceived at a time when public finances were highly constrained and the EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) had already been earmarked for a seven-year period (2014-2020). In this context, the Commission had limited budgetary resources to work with. A new type of instrument – based on guarantees - was thus created. As a budgetary guarantee, EFSI was different from a classical EU financial instrument. In the case of the latter, all potential financial liabilities are fully provisioned (i.e., the amount of the EU guarantee cannot exceed the amount of budget available for the financial instrument); whereas in the case of a budgetary guarantee, the EU only covers a portion of the financial liability (actual losses/called amounts) supported by provisions. An EU guarantee thus creates an unfunded financial liability for the EU budget (i.e., a contingent liability) and in doing so, provides greater leverage to the EU budget as shown in the diagram below. Financial structure of EFSI and EFSI 2.0 EFSI was furthermore designed as an irrevocable, unconditional, first demand guarantee to allow the EIB Group to finance higher risk projects (loan grading of D- or below) and provide subordinate or equity/ equity-type financing to projects and companies addressing market failures or sub-optimal investment situations, without jeopardising the Group entities' credit rating. The third pillar aims at supporting the investment eco-system by improving the regulatory environment and eliminating barriers to investment. The activities under the third pillar of the IPE are not subject to the EFSI 2.0 Regulation, are carried out under other legal frameworks and will not be part of the scope of this evaluation. Figure 2 illustrates the Theory of Change for the three components of the EFSI Regulation, underlying the intervention logic of the programme. Figure 2: Intervention logic Source: Wilkinson, C. Under certain assumptions (see box below), the logic of the intervention runs as follows: using financial, technical and institutional resources, the EFSI increases the risk-bearing capacity of the EIB Group, allowing it to engage in new, higher-risk financing support for several sectors (e.g., transport, energy, and R&D) and groups (e.g., SMEs) which are ridden by market failures or suboptimal investment situations. Such financial products – either directly or indirectly through financial intermediaries or special vehicles – fund additional investments by the beneficiary sectors or groups. These investments, flanked by the EIAH advisory and the EIPP investment facilitation, will eventually produce additional goods and services, generating higher economic growth and employment in the EU. There are a number of assumptions underpinning the theory of change outlined above. The extent to which (and the instances and circumstances in which) these assumptions hold true were tested as part of the evaluation. These assumptions are listed in the following box (NB: The assumptions that have been the focus of the evaluation are highlighted in bold below). The theory of change has been tested in subsequent phases of the evaluation, in particular via a number of country case studies (i.e., France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Latvia).

Contribution to Sustainable Development Goals SDG 1 (No Poverty) SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being) SDG 4 (Quality Education) SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) By providing financing support and advisory targeted to micro-entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship, e.g., for social housing projects. By ensuring better healthcare through contribution to the rehabilitation and expansion of health facilities and the support given to medical research. Through support for social entrepreneurship and social infrastructure, with approx. EUR 439.92 million of signed amounts, as of end-2021, mainly dedicated to social infrastructure investment for the purposes of education. Through support to sustainable water management, wastewater treatment and sanitation, ensuring, as of 31 December 2021, around EUR 2.6 billion of total EFSI lending volume signed for projects related to water supply, sewerage and waste management. By providing financing support targeted to energy efficiency, with signed amounts for energy and environment and resource efficiency of approx. EUR 19 billion as of end-2021, mobilising an estimated EUR 94.9 billion of investment for energy capacity building from renewable energy sources, improving energy efficiency and supporting electricity network projects. SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) By ultimately pursuing economic growth and employment, through the provision, as of end-2021, of guarantees worth EUR 2.7 billion to financial intermediaries, unlocking EUR 14.7 billion to finance businesses, including micro- and social enterprises as well as SMEs in the cultural and creative sectors; also, through the direct and indirect effects of IIW project financing. By improving the EU industrial fabric through financing support to firms, particularly SMEs and midcaps; by fostering research, development and innovation through participations in risk capital of start-ups and highly innovative firms; by providing direct and indirect loans for transport, social and digital infrastructure projects. By providing financing support and advisory targeted to social entities and to skills, education and training provision; by providing special guarantees to incentivise banks and other lenders to provide liquidity to European SMEs and small mid-cap companies hit by the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. By supporting dedicated investments in economic and social infrastructure projects promoting resilient and inclusive infrastructure, as well as inclusive and sustainable cities. For example, a better waste treatment was made available for 39.5 million people through the EFSI supported investments. By providing dedicated support to SMEs active in circular economy, those using recyclable materials, and those deploying energy efficiency measures. SDG 13 (Climate Action) SDG 14 (Life Below Water) SDG 15 (Life on Land) By explicitly binding 40% of the projects supported under the Infrastructure and Innovation Window to climate action in line with the Paris Agreement. By providing support to activities related to the sustainable use of marine resources, aquaculture and other elements of the wider bio-economy. One example is the launch of the EUR 75 million BlueInvest Fund to support equity funds investing in innovative European small and medium-sized Blue Economy companies. By supporting investments contributing to sustainable forest management. The IPE is an overarching programme, which provides financing support, advisory services and visibility to projects covering a wide range of sectors (R&D, transport, etc.) and groups (SMEs, unemployed, etc.). As such, even though the programme was launched before their publication, it contributes to several of the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), and particularly to the goals presented in the box above (see also figure 2 above). In addition, the cross-cutting effects of the programme synergically impact several SDGs (e.g., SDG 1 and SDG 10, or SDG 1 and SDG 2-No Hunger). 2.2Point(s) of comparison Whenever possible, this evaluation assesses the results against various points of comparison. This is naturally done in the assessment of effectiveness, but it is also present in the assessment of EU value added and of its additionality. The points of comparison used include: ·Comparison over time (“before-and-after analysis”) – assessment of results in comparison to an earlier period (e.g., evolution over time); ·Comparison across space – assessment of results in comparison to similar situations in the same period (e.g., geographical distribution); and ·Comparison across states of nature (“counterfactual analysis”) – Since a full-fledged micro-econometric analysis in this case was not feasible, a comparison study was performed based on a comparative perspective (see Annex VI). The results of a model-based macro-economic simulation through the RHOMOLO-EIB model are also presented. 3.How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period? 3 3.1Evolution of the situation Following the launch of the EFSI, the fading economic disruptions brought about by the financial and sovereign crises, together with the policy responses at both national and EU level, contributed to a gradual catching up of EU investment with its trend and to a loosening of the financial constraints plaguing EU SMEs and midcaps. Since 2020, however, the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic reversed many of the economic gains of the previous years with a sharp contraction in economic activity and fall in investment levels. The European Fund for Strategic Investments was set up in 2015, together with the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal, under Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015, amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013 (the EFSI Regulation), with the aim of kick-starting investments in the Union through the mobilisation of private (and public) finance. The agreement on the management of the EFSI and on the granting of the EU Guarantee (the EFSI Agreement) was signed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank Group on 22 July 2015. The EFSI Agreement was amended and restated several times: ·The first amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 21 July 2016, adding two further products under the SME Window: the SMEW Equity Product and the EaSI Guarantee Enhancement; ·The second amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 21 November 2017, converting the three guarantee products under the SMEW from a temporary enhancement (frontloading) to a permanent enhancement (top-up) structure and adding a new SMEW product, the Cultural and Creative Sectors Guarantee Facility (CCS GF) Enhancement; In 2017, to accommodate a persistently buoyant demand for investment financing, the EFSI Regulation was amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2396 of the European Parliament and Council of 13 December 2017 amending Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) 2015/1017 as regards the extension of the duration of the EFSI as well as the introduction of technical enhancements for the EFSI and the EIAH (the EFSI 2.0 Regulation). The EFSI 2.0 Regulation increased, inter alia, the size of the EU Guarantee from EUR 16 to 26 billion and adjusted the provisioning target rate (from 50% to 35%) in order to expand the programme’s financing capacity and better reflect the estimated risk profile of the operations deployed under the EFSI. In addition, it enhanced the scoreboard of indicators, a tool for the Investment Committee to ensure an independent and transparent assessment of the potential and actual use of the EU Guarantee in its investment decisions. ·A third amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 9 March 2018 to reflect the EFSI 2.0 Regulation. ·The fourth amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 20 December 2018 to increase the EFSI contribution to existing SMEW products and add two further SMEW products (EFSI Combinations Product and EFSI Private Credit for SMEs Product);

·The fifth amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 27 March 2020 to, inter alia, increase the EFSI contribution to the existing SMEW products and add two new SMEW products (the European Scale-up Action for Risk Capital (ESCALAR) Product and Skills and Education (S&E) Product); ·As a response to contain the economic impact of the Covid-19 virus, the sixth amendment and restatement of the EFSI Agreement was signed on 27 April 2020 to repurpose within EFSI resources from the Infrastructure and Innovation Window Equity Portfolio National Promotional Banks as well as certain existing SMEW products to support working capital lending to companies impacted by Covid-19. In this context, the EU Guarantee allocated to the SMEW product labelled COSME Loan Guarantee Facility (COSME LGF) Enhancement was increased to EUR 1,484 million and the EU Guarantee allocated to the SMEW product labelled InnovFin SMEG Enhancement was increased to EUR 1,400 million. The EIAH Framework Partnership Agreement signed with the EIB in July 2015 was amended in May 2017 and in April 2018 for the second time after the adoption of EFSI 2.0. Yearly Specific Grant Agreements (SGAs) were signed with the EIB. The Commission Implementing Decision on the EIPP adopted in 2015 ((EU) 2015/1214) was amended with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/919 in 2017 to increase its accessibility and user-friendliness: ·The minimum project size was reduced from EUR 10 million to EUR 1 million, providing more opportunities for smaller projects such as those supplied by municipalities, regions, SMEs or start-ups; ·The publication of projects on the EIPP is free of charge for all project promoters (public or private) since May 2017; ·Project promoters can register their project online (previously this was done via a downloadable PDF form); and ·Investors can also register online, receive automatic notifications every time a new project is published on the Portal and also subscribe to tailored project updates according to their interests and preferences. The EFSI commitment period ended on 31 December 2020. Signatures of the already approved EFSI operations may occur until 31 December 2022, whilst operational monitoring will continue until repayment of all financing and investment operations supported by the EU Guarantee (expected until 2080). 3.2Current state of play After six and a half years since its adoption, by end-2021 the EFSI has triggered some EUR 524.3 billion of investments, thus exceeding the target for mobilised investments of EUR 500 billion. This relates to 708 approved Infrastructure and Innovation projects and 805 SME approved operations with financial intermediaries. These SMEW operations are expected to have eased access to finance for some 1,5 million start-ups, SMEs, and mid-cap companies, including micro and social enterprises (through the EaSI Guarantee Facility and Impact Equity pilot) as well as individuals, enterprises and organisations investing in education and training (via the Skills & Education Guarantee Pilot). The transactions approved covered the 27 EU Member States plus the United Kingdom across all general objectives set out in the Article 9(2) of the EFSI 2.0 Regulation (see Figures 3 and 4). This geographical spread is notable, taking into account the demand-driven nature of the EFSI and the different state of Member States’ economies. The share of the EFSI signatures in EU13 has consistently improved since the start of the EFSI in mid-2015, although in absolute figures (e.g., related to investment to population ratio), at the EIB Group level, the EFSI support remains relatively less predominant in this region. In terms of guarantee calls, a total of EUR 162 million was called from the EU guarantee as at the end of 2021. However, due to the current economic and social situation and the continuous pandemic implications, an increase in the number and volume of future guarantee calls can be expected. Figure 3: EIB financing under EFSI IIW Source: EIB (amounts in EUR are based on the exchange rate of the event (approval / signature)) Figure 4: EIF financing under EFSI SMEW

Source: EIB (based on approved operations) As regards the EIAH, as of end-December 2021, more than 2030 requests were received from 27 Member States and the United Kingdom, of which 1715 were project-related and about 58% of them came from the private sector. As of end-2021 1,044 assignments were ongoing or completed. The underlying investment project estimated for the EIAH pipeline represents more than EUR 70 billion. Moreover, 77 EIAH-supported projects entered the EFSI pipeline. In order to ensure broad coverage of advisory services across the whole Union and to establish the cooperation platform as requested in the EFSI Regulation, the EIB and the Commission worked closely with a group of National Promotional Banks or Institutions (NPBIs) and prepared a Memorandum of Understanding for possible cooperation between the EIAH and the NPBIs. In this context, 29 NPBIs from 22 Member States signed Memoranda of Understanding with the EIB. The EIAH, in line with the EFSI Regulation, also established cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), where the EIAH supports EBRD’s “Advice for Small Businesses Programme" in four Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania) in order to enhance SMEs’ access to professional advice and support for their growth. A total of 1,873 projects were submitted to the EIPP since its launch on 1 June 2016 – of which over 1,112 were published as of end-2021 and they spread over 25 high-economic-potential sectors. The total expected investment cost of the published projects amounts to EUR 107.8 billion. Private promoters submitted 94% of these projects. 4.Evaluation findings (analytical part) This section is based primarily on the evaluation reports prepared by the independent consultant, which the EC deems analytically robust and sufficiently evidence based. · · · · 1 2 3 4 4.1The European Fund for Strategic Investments (including the EU guarantee) 4.1.1To what extent was the intervention successful and why? This section assesses the extent to which the EFSI has delivered on its two primary goals: (i) mobilising investment and (ii) enhancing access to finance for SMEs and mid-caps (including micro and social enterprises). It also examines whether the EFSI has contributed to any wider objectives such as institutional change and market development. In assessing the effectiveness of the EFSI, the evaluation takes a critical look at the additionality of EFSI financing, including any evidence of crowding-out effects. Finally, this section examines the efficiency and coherence of the EFSI.

Effectiveness of the EFSI and the EU Guarantee During the implementation of the EFSI, the cyclical investment gap in the EU gradually disappeared and financing conditions for businesses continued to improve until the Covid-19 pandemic. Effectiveness in mobilising investment The EFSI was successful in mobilising a significant volume of private financing and investment across the EU. By the end of 2021, EUR 99.3 billion of EFSI financing had been approved (and 86.6 billion signed), bound to mobilise EUR 524.3 billion of investment across Europe based on approved operations. The EFSI is also on track to achieve its target of mobilising EUR 500 billion of investment based on signatures by the end of 2022. Overall, private financing represents 72% of the investment expected to be mobilised by the EFSI based on signed operations. The EFSI mobilised investment represented roughly 2.7% of the annual investment at EU level, but in some Member States (particularly in Greece but also in Bulgaria and Estonia) it accounted for a significant share of investment. In fact, apart from a few exceptions, EFSI financing was well-aligned with country-level investment gaps. Generally, the proportion of EFSI financing taken up by each Member State was in line with the relative size of its economy, measured by each Member State’s GDP as a share of the total EU27 GDP (Table 1; see also Figures 4 and 5 above). Table 1: Investment gaps and distribution of EFSI-supported investment EFSI Signatures (EUR bn) EFSI signatures as a % total EU level signatures National GDP as % EU27 GDP

(average over the period 2015-2021) Investment mobilised

EUR bn Average annual investment mobilised (2016-2021) EFSI investment mobilised as a % TGFCF

(average 2016-2021) Pre-EFSI Investment Levels (2010-2015)* Historical trend

(1995-2005)** Investment gap*** Austria 1.962 2,3% 2,7% 6.781 1.130 1,2% 22,48% 24,70% -2,22% Belgium 1.708 2,0% 3,3% 8.947 1.491 1,4% 22,62% 21,65% 0,97% Bulgaria 666 0,8% 0,4% 4.394 732 7,0% 21,28% 16,66% 4,62% Croatia 367 0,4% 0,4% 1.379 230 2,2% 19,76% 21,28% -1,52% Cyprus 154 0,2% 0,2% 398 66 1,6% 16,86% 21,57% -4,71% Czechia 891 1,0% 1,5% 6.140 1.023 1,9% 26,18% 31,00% -4,82% Denmark 971 1,1% 2,3% 5.115 853 1,3% 18,68% 20,76% -2,08% Estonia 266 0,3% 0,2% 3.360 560 7,8% 26,00% 29,22% -3,22% Finland 1.802 2,1% 1,7% 12.388 2.065 3,7% 22,30% 21,85% 0,45% France 14.604 16,9% 17,9% 80.400 13.400 2,5% 22,16% 20,76% 1,40% Germany 8.017 9,3% 24,0% 38.206 6.368 0,9% 20,02% 21,61% -1,59% Greece 2.823 3,3% 1,5% 13.732 2.289 11,6% 12,76% 22,96% -10,20% Hungary 526 0,6% 1,0% 4.143 691 2,0% 20,30% 23,96% -3,66% Ireland 1.080 1,2% 2,3% 6.686 1.114 0,9% 18,62% 23,50% -4,88% Italy 12.006 13,9% 13,1% 73.362 12.227 3,9% 18,38% 20,29% -1,91% Latvia 168 0,2% 0,2% 935 156 2,4% 23,04% 23,35% -0,31% Lithuania 251 0,3% 0,3% 1.380 230 2,3% 18,00% 21,59% -3,59% Luxembourg 124 0,1% 0,4% 542 90 0,9% 18,58% 21,03% -2,45% Malta 40 0,0% 0,1% 199 33 1,2% 18,00% 22,05% -4,05% Netherlands 3.056 3,5% 5,8% 14.043 2.341 1,4% 18,92% 21,45% -2,53% Poland 3.259 3,8% 3,9% 19.517 3.253 3,7% 19,78% 20,44% -0,66% Portugal 2.770 3,2% 1,5% 10.735 1.789 4,9% 16,92% 25,42% -8,50% Romania 972 1,1% 1,4% 4.471 745 1,6% 25,66% 21,15% 4,51% Slovakia**** 572 0,7% 0,7% 1.849 308 1,7% 21,12% 28,98% -7,86% Slovenia 197 0,2% 0,3% 1.343 224 2,5% 19,74% 25,64% -5,90% Spain 11.439 13,2% 9,3% 51.966 8.661 3,8% 19,10% 25,05% -5,95% Sweden 3.249 3,8% 3,6% 13.178 2.196 1,9% 22,74% 21,39% 1,35% UK 1.691 2,0% 0,0% 20.354 3.392 0,8% 15,98% 25,05% -9,07% Regional - EU 10.934 12,6% - 85.633 14.272 - 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% Non-EU 302 0,35% 478 Total 86.868 100% 100% 492.058 81.930 2,7% 19,64% 21,10% -1,46%



*The period 2016-2021 is taken due to the small volume of EFSI signatures in 2015 (3% of the total EFSI signatures) ** Calculated as average annual GFCF over the period 2010-2014 ***EU average used for Slovakia and Poland due to absence of data Sources: ICF analysis based on combined IIW and SMEW Operational reports, IIW portfolio bottom-up analysis, SMEW Operational reports, Eurostat In line with Article 9 of the EFSI Regulation, EFSI-backed operations addressed a range of market failures and sub-optimal investment situations, albeit to varying degrees. These include: ·Financial support to entities having up to 3 000 employees; ·Development and deployment of information and communication technologies; ·Development of the energy sector; ·Development of transport infrastructures, and equipment and innovative technologies for transport; ·Environment and resource efficiency; ·Human capital, culture and health;

·Research, development and innovation; and ·Sustainable agriculture, forestry, fishery, aquaculture and other elements of the wider bio-economy. Table 2: EFSI mobilised investment by thematic area *Less-developed and transition regions **Sustainable agriculture, forestry, fishery, aquaculture and wider bio-economy Note: EFSI mobilised investment reflects the overall volume of investment expected to be mobilised by the EFSI over several years by operations signed until the end of 2021. All figures are in EUR billions. Source: EFSI Combined IIW and SMEW Operational Report 2021. Overall, it is hard to judge if EFSI financing was well balanced across all policy objectives / thematic areas (see Table 2), as policy objectives / thematic areas are broadly defined, and hard to be assigned precise weights; yet, overall, EFSI-IIW financing was well targeted to areas where the private sector is less likely to invest on its own. Several examples can be found of this nature, most notably including: ·EFSI financing to support investment in new technologies. For example, the EIB provided EFSI financing to a biopharmaceutical company in Germany to develop a safe and effective vaccine against Covid-19 and its production on the scale necessary to make the vaccine available globally;

·EFSI support to large, complex projects. For example, the EFSI financed a large-scale greenfield urban development project in France; and ·EFSI investments in social objectives and public goods. This includes projects where social return is higher than private return such as network goods (e.g., transport and energy networks), public goods (e.g., health and education facilities) and goods that deliver social objectives (e.g., social housing). By end 2021, 4% of EIB-financed investment and 8% of EIF-financed investment are channelled to social infrastructure. EIB financing under the IIW also offered several features that were not available to project promoters from alternative sources (private or public). These included: ·Scale of financing (financing of a similar scale would not have been possible from alternative sources/ channels) – for instance, among the sample of projects selected for deep-dives, EFSI financing to projects in the ICT, manufacturing, transport and energy sectors (across France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain) averaged around EUR 200 million; ·Lower interest rates / cost compared to prevailing market interest rates; ·Flexibility of financing conditions e.g., floating or fixed rates depending on needs, flexibility of drawdowns, grace period etc.; ·Long-term nature of EIB financing, thereby lowering average financial costs and facilitating repayments; ·Funding diversification for promoters; ·Tailored or innovative financing solutions; ·The “green stamp” for projects in certain sectors, e.g., if the project was selected for the EIB’s Climate Awareness Bond financing; ·EIB’s technical expertise, and technical and legal due diligence; and ·Quality stamp / reputational benefit of the EIB’s involvement. Despite some stakeholder feedback suggesting that EFSI financing under the IIW may have overreached, and crowded-out private or NPBI finance in a few instances, all in all, the weight of the evidence suggests that EFSI played a role in reducing the investment gap in Europe by accelerating and boosting investment in areas characterised by market failures or sub-optimal investment needs. Effectiveness in improving access to finance EFSI financing has supported hundreds of thousands of enterprises across Europe. As of 31 December 2021, the SME window under EFSI had provided EUR 33.5 billion of financing to an estimated 1.5 million SMEs and mid-caps across the EU. Additionally, SMEs and mid-caps were also supported through several intermediated lending operations under the IIW. Beyond the headline numbers, EFSI financing has backed several top start-ups and unicorns (valuation > EUR 1 billion). For example, SMEW equity operations went to several new TOP 100 start-ups in Germany and unicorns, such as Sennder and Isar Aerospace, which are among the list of Top 100 start-ups in Germany. A range of products (debt, equity and quasi-equity / venture debt) were deployed or piloted under the EFSI to meet the diversity of financing needs across segments, sectors and geographies. In its first phase, EFSI financing under the SMEW was used to front-load and top-up existing financial instruments such as COSME and InnovFin. Overtime, as the focus shifted from volume to additionality, a range of new products were piloted or developed under SMEW to meet financing needs in specific segments and thematic areas, e.g.: ·The European Scale-up Action for Risk capital; ·The digitalisation pilot under COSME to provide enhanced access to finance to SMEs undertaking a digital transformation; ·Private credit product, to increase the availability of non-bank financing for businesses from alternative investment funds; ·EFSI combination product, targeted primarily to the agricultural sector by stimulating a greater allocation of European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) funds in Europe;

·Skills & education pilot; ·EFSI pilot on social impact and impact investing; and ·Additional product offering in the fields of blue economy, life sciences, artificial intelligence, and blockchain technologies. Patterns of absorption of the SMEW products vary across countries. In several Member States, a significant share of the SMEW support was channelled through NPBIs and/or counter-guarantee institutions (e.g., Ireland, France, and Italy). The involvement of NPBIs had certain advantages in the form of a higher multiplier effect and complementarity with national promotional products. The product mix also reflected differences in market needs, as well as the structure and sophistication of financial markets. On the other hand, there was limited take up and reach of the SMEW relative to needs in countries such as Croatia, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia (see Table 3). This also reflected semi-structural factors, such as the limited extent of NPBIs and/or counter-guarantee institutions’ involvement, the product mix offered, the average loan amount (the higher the average loan amount, the fewer the number of beneficiaries reached) and the financial intermediaries capacity. Table 3: Financial constraints and distribution of SMEW financing Signatures/EIF financing Member State GDP as share of EU GDP Final Recipients % SMEs declaring they face credit constraints (2019) Number of micro enterprises and SMEs (2019) Share of enterprises supported by EFSI Breakdown of Financing Signed Country Total SMEW Financing

(EUR million) SMEW financing signed as a % total SMEW No of final recipients Amount of financing received (EUR million) % of total number of final recipients % EFSI Financing COSME % EFSI Financing other debt* % EFSI Financing equity Austria 300 1.1% 2.7% 2,741 923 0% 4% 329,937 0.8% 6% 94% 0.0% Belgium 244 0.9% 3.3% 6,620 1,406 1% 6% 672,617 1.0% 23% 70% 7.5% Bulgaria 296 1.1% 0.4% 10,796 1,875 1% 11% 347,971 3.1% 36% 64% 0.0% Croatia 262 1.0% 0.4% 1,624 364 0% 10% 181,989 0.9% 1% 88% 11.7% Cyprus 9 0.0% 0.2% 23 20 0% 8% 57,196 0.0% 0% 100% 0.0% Czechia 739 2.8% 1.5% 22,064 3,095 3% 7% 1,057,113 2.1% 13% 87% 0.0% Denmark 406 1.5% 2.3% 1,438 1,460 0% 6% 227,730 0.6% 3% 97% 0.0% Estonia 50 0.2% 0.2% 4,201 460 1% 10% 82,100 5.1% 63% 7% 29.9% Finland 145 0.5% 1.7% 4,970 1,520 1% 0% 232,141 2.1% 38% 21% 41.1% France 3,029 11.3% 17.9% 190,790 15,548 25% 3% 2,963,416 6.4% 10% 75% 14.9% Germany 1,193 4.4% 24.0% 24,998 6,988 3% 5% 2,580,860 1.0% 9% 62% 28.6% Greece 502 1.9% 1.5% 24,871 3,592 3% 18% 717,154 3.5% 63% 34% 3.0% Hungary 153 0.6% 1.0% 13,770 1,272 2% 10% 646,130 2.1% 30% 70% 0.0% Ireland 331 1.2% 2.3% 6,561 606 1% 8% 265,297 2.5% 9% 57% 33.7% Italy 3,535 13.2% 13.1% 196,475 22,701 26% 6% 3,613,275 5.4% 14% 66% 20.4% Latvia 24 0.1% 0.2% 2,691 163 0% 19% 111,434 2.4% 26% 74% 0.0% Lithuania 18 0.1% 0.3% 3,169 231 0% 15% 219,530 1.4% 23% 77% 0.0% Luxembourg 81 0.3% 0.4% 461 611 0% 5% 35,122 1.3% 2% 98% 0.0% Malta 7 0.0% 0.1% 4 4 0% 8% 31,792 0.0% 74% 26% 0.0% Multi-country (SMEW) 9,860 36.8% - - - - - - - - - - Netherlands 661 2.5% 5.8% 12,913 2,029 2% 5% 1,292,840 1.0% 5% 61% 34.2% Poland 292 1.1% 3.9% 59,201 2,608 8% 14% 2,018,958 2.9% 51% 36% 13.7% Portugal 1,568 5.8% 1.5% 10,740 3,231 1% 5% 929,317 1.2% 5% 92% 3.1% Romania 279 1.0% 1.4% 27,524 1,174 4% 13% 515,051 5.3% 18% 82% 0.0% Slovakia 57 0.2% 0.7% 6,466 342 1% 4% 511,488 1.3% 30% 70% 0.0% Slovenia 44 0.2% 0.3% 3,713 669 0% 10% 148,782 2.5% 49% 39% 11.9% Spain 1,907 7.1% 9.3% 114,082 9,756 15% 6% 2,689,291 4.2% 16% 69% 15.2% Sweden 407 1.5% 3.6% 6,728 2,070 1% 3% 646,376 1.0% 0% 78% 21.8% United Kingdom 427 1.6% - 1,386 3,735 0% 7% 0% 15% 84.5% Total 26,826 100.0% 0.0% 761,084 88,749 100% 8% 22,794,970 3.3% 13% 69% 18.3% *Includes InnovFin, CCS, EaSI, EFSI Combination Product (ECP), Skills & education **Data on financially constrained firms in Finland not available Sources: ICF analysis based on SMEW Operational reports (signed operations), Eurostat, EIBIS In line with its intervention logic, the EFSI resulted in improved availability and conditions of finance for SMEs and mid-caps (including micro and social enterprises). Financial intermediaries interviewed consistently reported that the EFSI support enabled them to: ·Increase lending volumes; ·Target riskier clients / under-served / niche segments; ·Offer better terms and conditions as compared to their normal business practice; ·Enhance their offer; and ·Develop their risk appetite. This was possible thanks to the incentivisation mechanisms built in the SMEW design, such as: 1.Risk reduction, high guarantee coverage (especially on a loan-by-loan basis for COSME and InnovFin top-ups); 2.Zero fee (for COSME top-ups);

3.Design that ensured the State aid consistency of EFSI financing. No further State aid conditions or procedures had to be followed by EIB/beneficiaries (no need of checking limits as in case of de minimis aid/ possibility to target companies that used up their de minimis limits); and 4.Capital relief. Despite inevitable ‘deadweight’, the above results would have been difficult to achieve without EFSI support. For example, in Latvia, the SMEW top-ups for the InnovFin guarantees enabled financial intermediaries to provide loans and leases to innovative SMEs and small mid-caps across various sectors, which would not have otherwise been possible. Likewise, intermediaries reported that EaSI microfinance guarantee programme, topped up under the EFSI SMEW, allowed them to provide loans (of up to EUR 25,000 in value) to financially-excluded self-employed individuals and microenterprises without the need for collateral. The EFSI also contributed to enhancing and diversifying access to finance, by supporting the development of equity and alternative sources of finance, where the EIB Group’s added value is particularly pronounced. Financing climate action EFSI delivered on its target of 40% financing for climate action under the IIW. 59% of the EFSI operations signed until the end of 2021 had a climate action component. This represented 44% of the signed EFSI IIW volumes. Overall, the EFSI supported 392 operations (half of which concentrated in Germany, Spain and France) that had a climate action component with EUR 20.5 billion of financing. The introduction of the climate action target, however, did not have any side effects on the geographical diversification or the risk profile of the EFSI portfolio. Nevertheless, in terms of the composition of the portfolio, the EFSI also financed projects with potential environment externalities, notably when these addressed sub-optimal investment situations in specific regions or countries. Alleviating the impact of Covid-19 pandemic on the European economy By enabling a quick and flexible response, the EFSI proved to be an effective counter-cyclical instrument during the Covid-19 pandemic. The feedback on the Covid-19 response by the EIB Group in general and under the EFSI specifically is very positive: quick response, well-tailored to changing needs, at considerable scale, under both the IIW and SMEW (see box). Summary overview of Covid-19 response under EFSI SMEW Reallocating within the EFSI some EUR 1 billion of available EFSI resources towards existing guarantee products under the SMEW (InnovFin SMEG Enhancement and COSME LGF Enhancement) managed by the EIF to the benefit of the hard-hit SMEs and mid-cap sector in the EU, with a view to mobilise some EUR 8 billion of additional financing. At the time, the majority of their budget resources had been largely absorbed. The calls for expression of interest for the two EFSI SMEW products (the COSME Loan Guarantee Facility Enhancement and InnovFin SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG) Enhancement) were published as early as April 2020, with closing in June 2020. The calls were oversubscribed. Updated terms and conditions. These were made available to new intermediaries through the calls for expression of interest and granted semi-automatically to existing intermediaries (after financial intermediaries submitted their applications through an online form on the EIF’s website). The most important enhancements to the terms offered specifically under the two SMEW products (COSME LGF Enhancement and InnovFin SMEG Enhancement) comprised the following: §Increase the guarantee rate for working capital from 50% to up to 80% for transactions under the COSME LGF and InnovFin SMEG (with retroactive effect from April 2020); §Maximum guarantee cap rate increased from 20% to 25% (COSME); §Minimum financial intermediary risk retention reduced from 20% to 10%; §Postponement, rescheduling or credit holiday period explicitly allowed; §Coverage of accrued or capitalised interest extended to 360 days; §Possibility of increasing the maximum rollover period of revolving credit transactions from five to nine years (COSME LGF) and to six years (InnovFin SMEG); §Possibility of verifying innovation eligibility criteria based on self-declarations by companies rather than independent confirmations (InnovFin SMEG); §Refinancing of existing guaranteed transactions permitted (InnovFin SMEG); §Minimum maturity of bridge financing reduced to six months (InnovFin SMEG); and §Speedier treatment of requests for approval thanks to measures at the level of the EIF Board (streamlining the compliance risk assessment and the request for approval template). The updated terms and conditions were, according to financial intermediaries concerned interviewed as part of EIB EV’s evaluation, very useful for them to maintain their activity throughout the pandemic. Note: enhanced terms and conditions were made available also for other SMEW products: the EaSI GFI and the CCS GF product and the InnovFin Equity facility. Unlike COSME and InnovFin SMEG, these facilities did not however benefit from additional budget reallocation within the EFSI. IIW 41 new EFSI operations approved in 2020 specifically targeting Covid-19 crisis response for an amount of EUR 4.5bn. These included: §A dedicated EUR 2 billion Programme Loan for support to SMEs and Mid-Caps via mezzanine tranches in Asset-Backed Security transactions facilitating up to EUR 10 billion of additional intermediated financing. §A venture debt programme (the European Growth Finance Facility (EGFF)), that targets the early and growth stage highly innovative European companies in sectors such as ICT, energy efficiency, engineering and life science (including innovative biotech or medtech companies/ projects involved in the fight against Covid-19). §Financing to BioNTech for the development and manufacturing of its vaccine candidate which became the first approved vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the EU and saved about 6 million lives only in 2021. §Simplified approval process for specific underlying operations within Covid-19 Envelopes of financing under the IIW, as decided by the Steering Board in April 2020, including for: (I)Sub-operations above the threshold of EUR 50 million under the Covid-19 specific programme loans, which would normally be examined and approved individually, were approved under their respective programme loans; and (II)Top-ups for existing operations and repeat operations with existing clients, to compensate for difficulties in finding new sources of financing. §Accelerating approvals and signatures for EIB Group-financed operations in general, including the EFSI operations. In general EIB Covid-19 operations were more than twice as fast in moving from the launch of the project appraisal to the first disbursement. Sources: 2020 and 2021 EFSI REPORT - From the European Investment Bank to the European Parliament and the Council on EIB Group Financing and Investment Operations under the EFSI EIB EV (2021) Rapid assessment of the EIB Group’s operational response to the Covid-19 crisis, December 2021. EIB EV (2021) Evaluation of the European Fund for Strategic Investments 2021 – Thematic Report Creating jobs and growth The impact of the EFSI-supported operations on the EU economy was estimated through the RHOMOLO-EIB model. Two main channels were taken into consideration: a shorter-term investment effect and a longer-term structural and competitiveness effect. The estimates concluded that investments supported by EFSI (EUR 545 billion as of end-2020 - final number as end-2022 will be slightly lower due to partial or full cancellations of some operations but still above EUR 500 bn) are expected to help the creation of 2.1 million jobs and generate an increase of EU GDP by 2.4% by 2025, thanks to short-term investment effects. While short-term investment effect will by nature fade over time, the EFSI impacts on growth and employment are expected to be still visible in the longer term thanks to the more persistent structural effects (e.g., enhanced production technologies, better private and public infrastructure, and greater labour productivity). In line with the intended logic of the EFSI intervention, the model also concluded that Cohesion regions benefit significantly more than better-developed regions both in the short and long term (twice as high and 10% higher, respectively, when it comes to GDP impact). Similarly, countries hit hardest by the 2008 economic and financial crisis are expected to benefit more from EFSI. Cooperating and collaborating with NPBIs

The EFSI placed a significant emphasis on cooperation and collaboration with NPBIs and indeed high levels of NPBI involvement were achieved under the EFSI. Overall, 20.5% of EFSI financing was implemented in collaboration with NPBIs, with greater collaboration under the SMEW (21% of operations and 28% in terms of volume) as compared to the IIW (12.5% of operations and 17% of IIW financing). 60 investment platforms were set up in 18 Member States reflecting an important outreach effort, but their set-up and implementation was deemed complex and inefficient, due to the large transaction costs and expertise required, making collaboration with NPBIs often challenging. For this reason, investment platforms were more attractive in large Member States with experienced and established NPBIs. Efficiency of the EFSI and the EU Guarantee The evaluation looked at the following aspects of efficiency: (i) the budgetary impact of the first loss piece covered by the EU; (ii) the multiplier effect achieved; (iii) the adequacy of the Guarantee Fund provisioning; and (iv) governance and implementation structure. Budgetary impact of the first loss piece covered by the EU Under the SMEW, resources from the EFSI were combined with resources from other EU sectoral programmes in the following manner: the portfolio’s first loss piece (FLP) from Horizon 2020, COSME, EaSI and CCS would pay for all guarantee calls from the EFSI as well as non-EFSI operations signed under those mandates; the EFSI second loss piece (SLP) would cover guarantee calls with respect to the EFSI. The full scale of losses is yet unknown as the operations are still underway, but the table provides an indication of the potential budgetary impact of the FLP together with EFSI SLP. Later on in this section, the adequacy of provisioning under the EFSI is discussed. Table 4: Budget contribution and investment mobilised *Also known as the IFE Facility for Early Stage. This is a structured financial product with an overall financial envelope of EUR 1,619 million; it combines resources from InnovFin Equity (45%), EFSI (26.5%) and EIF (28.5%). Note: Some fund of funds investments were made in the pan-European FoF programme of IFE, hence the high amount of investment mobilised Source: EFSI SMEW Operational Report 2021 Multiplier effect of the EFSI The EFSI has delivered a high multiplier effect, exceeding initial assumptions. The currently estimated multiplier effect of the EFSI (15.75) is slightly higher than the initial target of 15. The multiplier effect captures the relation between the underlying EFSI support and the amount of total investment that is expected to be generated by such financing (i.e., the total project cost for investment). The total multiplier is made of two components: (i) the internal multiplier which shows the multiple between the underlying EFSI contribution and the amount of EIB/EIF financing and (ii) the external multiplier which shows the multiple between the EIB/EIF financing under the EFSI and the amount of total investment. Neither the EFSI multiplier methodology, nor the EFSI Regulation, make the assumption that all sources of finance flowing into a project are attracted as a result of the EFSI guarantee. As such, the multiplier methodology does not claim attribution or causality. The methodology is used as the best indication of total investment mobilised (irrespective of the actual circumstances underlying the mobilisation) – with some adjustments e.g., with regards to other EU co-financing (e.g., EU grant-financing, EU financial instruments or European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) grants or financial instruments including related national co-financing) are not taken into account in the calculation of the multiplier. Adequacy of the Guarantee Fund provisioning EFSI has two financing components: the maximum guarantee amount from the EU budget of EUR 26 billion and the maximum EIB allocation amount of EUR 7.5 bn. This evaluation considers the EU guarantee and its provisioning of 35%, which was chosen to avoid a ‘pay as you go’ approach. Cumulative budgetary appropriations for EFSI provisioning transferred and paid into the Common Provisioning Fund (CPF) by 2021 amount to EUR 8.769 billion, including the remuneration received according to the EFSI Agreement to the extent transferred to the CPF as internal assigned revenues (EUR 0.731 billion). By 2023 the cumulative appropriations are planned to reach EUR 9.521 billion, including EUR 1.096 billion of internal assigned revenues. The overall EFSI provisioning set at 35% sufficiently protects the EU budget. A model-based analysis conducted as part of this evaluation (see Annex IV) shows that the provisioning rate of 35% is adequate, i.e., it will avoid future burden of the EU budget. In fact, with a conservative approach until the end of 2021 additional (small) buffers were created on top of the budget appropriations (internal assigned revenues, unused guarantee allocations, value adjustments, etc.). The provisioning does not cover the expected loss only; according to a Value at Risk (VaR) approach, it will be sufficient to cover with 95% probability the potential future losses (including unexpected losses) over the programme’s lifetime. Governance and implementation structure The governance structure that had been set-up for the EFSI worked well. Interviewees highlighted several positive aspects of the governance structure: ·The governance structure brought together the market knowledge and banking expertise of the EIB with policy steer from the EC, while ensuring clear separation between the EIB and the EC (between the lender and guarantor); ·Clear role for the Investment Committee (IC) - purely responsible for decisions around the allocation of the EU guarantee and balancing well policy and financial considerations;

·Decisions of the IC being facilitated by the Guarantee Request Form with a strict timetable for the IC to make decisions (10 working days); and ·The Steering Board enabling open and transparent discussions between the EIB and EC. The advantages of a small group were evident in this respect, even if there was some (unsubstantiated) criticism that the Steering Board consisted of the EIB and EC only (plus one observer from the European Parliament). Transparency of the scoreboard was seen as a positive development. Although it is unclear to what extent the scoreboards were widely accessed and used, the publication of scoreboards improved perceptions of transparency and was generally appreciated by a wide range of stakeholders. Overall, there was consensus among stakeholders interviewed as part of the external evaluation that transparency efforts bring added value as long as (i) they do not burden the final beneficiaries, intermediaries, or implementing partners and (ii) they do not negatively impact time to market of the EFSI support. 1. 2. 3. 4. 4.1. 4.1.1. 4.1.1.4. 4.1.1.5. Coherence of the EFSI and the EU Guarantee Internal coherence of the IPE There were limited linkages between the three components of the IPE subject to this evaluation (EFSI, EIAH and EIPP). Expectations as to the Hub’s role in pipeline generation increased with EFSI 2.0 enhancements. It was not the case for the EIPP for which it was not monitored whether EIPP projects get financing from the EFSI given that this was not an objective of the Regulation. Complementarity between the EFSI and other relevant EU interventions (e.g., CEF, Horizon 2020 and ESIF) Following the launch of the EFSI, some of the existing EU financial instruments had to be re-configured to avoid overlaps. In particular: ·Following the launch of the Expansion and Growth Window under the EFSI Equity instrument, the Equity Facility for Growth (EFG) was refocused to prioritise funds investing in COSME third countries participating in the programme; ·The InnovFin Delegation Agreement was amended various times, among other, to provide financing to higher-risk thematic products (on infectious diseases and on energy demonstration projects, as well as investment platforms); and ·The Connecting Europe Facility Debt Instrument (CEF-DI) Delegation Agreement was amended in June 2019 to focus on green innovative investments, ensure complementarity with the EFSI and to allow for the absorption of the NER 300 programme.

The co-existence of existing mandates under the SMEW, each with its own rule book, created operational challenges, particularly for (smaller) financial intermediaries. The combination of the EFSI with the ESIF (structural funds) was a key challenge, as the regulatory environment remained not conducive to such combination. Yet, the EFSI combination product (with the EAFRD) eventually proved successful, despite being utilised only in few cases, as it was introduced with the Omnibus Regulation. It has helped the creation of much larger portfolios of guaranteed loans and the achievement of a very high leverage effect for financial instruments under shared management, such as in France (region Nouvelle-Aquitaine), or has helped the setting up of an instrument in a situation where the demand for financing has been very high, like in Portugal. 4.1.2How did the EU intervention make a difference? EU added value of the EFSI and the EU Guarantee The EU added value of the EFSI was significant and wide-ranging. Apart from the scale of financing made available by the EU guarantee, the following aspects constituted key elements of the EU added value of the EFSI: ·Financing of multi-country operations – such operations received EUR 11 billion of EFSI financing; ·Helping move international cooperation ahead e.g., European Securitisation Initiative; ·Provided a proof of concept for budgetary guarantees as a tool for mobilising private investment efficiently and effectively; ·Contributing to shifting mind-sets at the EU and national levels, e.g., in a more joined-up approach within the Commission with several policy DGs working together, or in changing perspective in favour of investment / SMEs; ·Developing institutional capacities within NPBIs to implement guarantee schemes and investment platforms; and ·Developing niche products such as venture debt and addressing gaps in niche/ under-served segments (e.g., agriculture, micro-finance, leasing). Moreover, as compared to national promotional schemes, the EFSI allowed for more favourable conditions, including: 1.Better pricing conditions (e.g., free guarantees under COSME); 2.More modest co-financing requirements; 3.Higher guarantee rate; 4.Wider / less restrictive eligibility criteria (including e.g., agriculture or leasing, non-bank intermediaries); 5.Design that ensured the State aid consistency of EFSI financing. No further State aid conditions or procedures had to be followed by EIB/beneficiaries (no need of checking limits as in case of de minimis aid/ possibility to target companies that used up their de minimis limits); and 6.Lower administrative requirements. The EFSI support often complemented national promotional schemes. In Poland, for example, the EFSI addressed niches / gaps not covered by national schemes, such as assistance for start-ups, leasing transactions, and the agriculture sector. But there is also evidence of some competition between the EFSI and national promotional schemes. Additionality of the EFSI with respect to other EU financial instruments Additionality with respect to existing EU financial instruments was reverse-engineered, addressing potential overlaps through frontloading (of COSME and InnovFin), topping-up (of guarantee products), developing a bigger equity instrument under the EFSI, and developing deal allocation policies (to manage overlaps with the CEF Debt instrument and with InnovFin Debt products). There were, however, some clear advantages of the EFSI compared to existing EU financial instruments. For example, the EFSI budgetary guarantee freezes less budgetary resources compared to classical financial instruments, as it requires limited provisioning needs compared to the level of financial engagement.

Additionality of the EU Guarantee At portfolio level, the EIBG would not have been able to provide the same volumes of financing targeting higher risk projects ˗ otherwise often unviable ˗ without the EFSI guarantee. The EFSI IIW represents a fundamental shift in the nature of projects financed by the EIB. The EFSI projects are riskier, smaller than a standard EIB project and more complex (often with new clients, sub-investment grade borrowers or using more complex products or in new markets). EFSI operations thus, tend to be costlier to implement (higher costs involved in deal origination, structuring and monitoring), more capital intensive (due to their higher risk profile) and less profitable in terms of revenue generation (due to their smaller size). Factors contributing to the higher risk of the EFSI operations under the IIW On the basis of a sample-based review of the IIW operations, the most common risk factors identified were as follows: (1) financial / credit risk; (2) market risk; and (3) implementation risk. The EIB Evaluation Division’s evaluation of the Group’s Special Activities (70% of which are EFSI backed) further identified the following factors: §Higher risk profile of the borrower. The special activities portfolio has a much higher share of non-investment grade borrowers (68%) in terms of volume as compared to the EIB’s standard operations (13%) and §The unsecured and subordinated structure of the EIB financing. Financial / credit risk Financial / credit risk refers to the promoters’ ability to manage their debt and fulfil their financial obligations (repayment of principal and interest and any other fees and charges). Among the projects reviewed, a few were perceived to carry medium to high financial/ credit risk for various reasons, including uncertainty around cash / revenue flows and, hence, promoters’ ability to make repayments. For example, a social housing project was assessed to be financially risky as repayment of the EIB loan was expected to rely heavily on the cash flows generated from the lease of the units built by the promoters, in turn dependent on: (i) the demand for the new housing units; (ii) the long-term ability of tenants to pay rent; and (iii) the capacity of the promoters to keep construction and operational costs under control. Market risk Market risk is the risk arising from changes in the market to which a promoter / beneficiary organisation has exposure. Market risk was identified in the context of certain operations. It was generally attributed to market dynamics, notably the level of competition/ ease of market entry; demand/ product uptake; and price. For example, the extent of market risk associated with operations in the telecommunications sector was generally considered important (medium/high). Operations aimed at improving broadband access, for example, were exposed to market risk owing to the high degree of uncertainty around future demand/ take-up rates of new broadband solutions (especially among certain target groups – e.g., end-users in rural areas), and rigorous competition in the broadband market, which collectively made it difficult to predict future revenue streams. Implementation risk Implementation risks were identified for certain operations. Risk factors commonly cited were cost overruns and delays. Delays were foreseen in the context of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as road construction, but also ‘green’ investments, such as those directed to the renewable energy sector – as such, the authorisation procedures for Photo-voltaic, solar and onshore wind projects and their effective connection to the grid are currently lengthy. Significant implementation risk was also foreseen in the context of an operation in the ICT sector (involving the rollout of Ultra High Speed fibre). Delays were expected due to the country’s complex and slow permit allocation process, and labour shortage. 4.1.3Is the intervention still relevant? Relevance of the EFSI and the EU Guarantee In the context of the investment gap illustrated in section 2, the overarching objective of the IPE was to bring investment levels in the EU back on track. It aimed at tackling the three major issues that were holding back investment in Europe — reduced capacity of investors to take risk following the financial and economic crises, lack of pipeline of high-quality investment projects and non-financial barriers to investment. The IPE was structured around three pillars that corresponded to these issues, and described in section 2 above. In particular, pillar one consisted of the EFSI, which was designed to mobilise public and private investments. The idea behind the EFSI was to enhance the risk-taking capacity of the EIB Group by providing an EU budgetary guarantee. Despite improving macroeconomic and financing conditions, the EFSI remained relevant throughout 2015-2021 as new policy objectives, investment needs and market gaps emerged. Therefore, in response to these new needs, policy developments and feedback (gathered through evaluations, audits, stakeholder consultations etc.), the EFSI was constantly adapted (chiefly in the passage to EFSI 2.0). Moreover, despite the achievements of EFSI, significant and persistent investment needs ˗ triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine ˗ remain across EU that require further public intervention. The successor EU-level investment programme, the InvestEU, will continue to support investment in the EU where there are market failures or investment gaps, facilitating economic recovery in line with the EU’s green and digital priorities, strengthening resilience, stepping up sustainable investment, innovation and job creation, while ensuring wide geographical coverage of EU support. 4.2The European Investment Advisory Hub The specific mandate of the EIAH, as per Article 14 of the EFSI Regulation, was to: ·Be a single point of entry for advisory activities in the EU; ·Support project promoters in developing their activities; ·Support the development of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), use of financial instruments, combination of EU funds, development of investment platforms and provision of capacity building for the public sector in these areas; and ·Enable peer-to-peer exchanges to a platform, as well as know-how sharing on project development. Demand-driven in nature, the EIAH services covered all stages of the investment cycle and were intended to complement existing services. With the EFSI 2.0 Regulation, the EIAH had a more specific mandate to support the EFSI pipeline and contribute to its sectoral and geographical diversification. 4.2.1To what extent was the intervention successful and why? Effectiveness of the EIAH In previous evaluations (EY, 2016; ICF, 2018), the risk that the EIAH services would potentially crowd out the private sector was noted. There has been no evidence that this has happened. When selecting projects, the EIAH does probe promoters on why EU level advisory is needed. Typically, the EIAH will provide services with EU added value that would not be directly available from the market.

The EIAH as a single entry point for advisory services in the EU The EIAH functioned effectively as an entry point for advisory services. The EIAH website acted as a good access point with 15,000 to 16,000 unique visitors each year, and requests systematically exceeding milestones (Figure 5 and the first evaluations (EY, 2016; EIB EV, 2018)) had concluded that when the EIAH received requests, it systematically assessed whether these could be covered by the EIAH as well as other existing programmes and signposted the beneficiaries to the most appropriate support. Figure 5: Number of projects for which advisory support has been requested Source: ICF based on EFSI Programme Statement (Draft Budget 2023). Note: the target of 200 was defined ex-ante in 2015, by the European Commission, and has not been revised during the EIAH implementation period The EIAH’s impact on investment generation Over time, with the EFSI 2.0 Regulation, the role of the EIAH in pipeline generation for the EFSI increasingly became a key area of focus. However, it is challenging to capture the impacts of certain types of advisory activities, as these occur after a considerable time lag. As of end-2021, the EIAH supported 217 project-specific direct assignments expected to mobilise EUR 30 billion of investment. Moreover the EIAH impact through the Light Projects Advisory (LPA) support, which is by nature very specific and comes late in the investment cycle, is also to be noted. By this indicator, by end-2021, 8% of LPAs had turned into projects entering the EIB or EFSI pipeline. This is not particularly high (compared to a rate of conversion of 60% for the EIAH project-specific direct assignments), but given the LPAs’ overall number of assignments (approx. 1,450 vs 217 EIAH project-specific direct assignments), LPA-related projects represent 40% of the EIAH-supported projects that entered the EIB or EFSI pipeline. Finally, it should also be noted that, according to the EIAH beneficiaries, advisory activities typically improved the quality of supported projects (e.g., by reducing their environmental impact) and/or contributed to smoother implementation. The EIAH’s contribution to supporting the EFSI pipeline as well as sectoral and geographical diversification of the EFSI There were several factors that limited the possibilities for the EIAH to generate a substantial pipeline of projects for EFSI financing. These include the demand-driven nature of the EIAH, the eligibility constraints due to the higher risk profile of EFSI-supported projects, and the need for significant upstream project advisory and capacity building advisory that delivers pipeline building activity over a longer time horizon than the period covered under this evaluation. Despite these limitations, the EIAH was able to ensure that 60% of the project-specific, EIAH direct assignments were successful in obtaining either EFSI or EIB financing (classified as standard lending operations) and are expected to mobilise EUR 72.9 billion of investment. The EIAH’s efforts to widen the geographic coverage of the EFSI have delivered some results, as projects from cohesion countries are comparatively more present in the group of projects supported by the EIAH compared to the EFSI-supported projects in general (44% vs 23%). Geographic outreach of the EIAH services The EIAH provides more value added in Member States where local technical and functional capacity gaps persist, notably in cohesion Member States. Seven cohesion Member States appear in the top ten EIAH beneficiaries. This pattern is to a large extent driven by the high number of small-sized EBRD assignments delivered under the EIAH umbrella in four cohesion countries covered under the “Advice for Small Businesses Programme". Overall, for the assignments managed directly by the EIAH, advisory support was rather well balanced across Europe, with all Member States (MS) being reached and 54% of the assignments taking place in cohesion countries. The geographic distribution of other types of assignments is more mixed. Sectoral outreach of the EIAH services Most of the EIAH assignments (82%) related to the higher priority sectors identified in the 2016 market gap analysis, i.e., SMEs and small mid-caps, environment and resource efficiency, transport and energy; other sectors were less well served. To some extent, this was to be expected, as investments in these other sectors are of a nature that can hardly benefit from advisory services (e.g., ICT investments driven by large corporations that do not require public support to access advisory services). With EFSI 2.0, there was an expectation that the following sectors would be better served by the EIAH: climate change, circular economy, digital and/or cross-border projects. Overall, the data confirms that climate change is a well addressed theme (all ELENA assignments receiving also EIAH support and 31% of the EIAH direct assignments are somehow related to this issue). Awareness-raising activities were completed on circular economy financing options, and more recently, the EIAH, the EIB Group and the European Commission collectively agreed to create the ‘Circular City Centre’, a competence and resource centre within the EIB. On digitalisation, on top of the project-specific support delivered, the Hub also launched a market study on the role of Digital Innovation Hubs and the Digital Innovation and Scale-up Initiative, to the benefit of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Other, more targeted, themes were, however, more marginally addressed by the EIAH, in terms of number of direct assignments completed. For instance, in the social areas, the Hub realised the following services: ·Social Enterprises (FR), developing the business model and investment readiness of a consortium of social enterprises in France.

·Swedish Social Impact Bond (SIB) Assessment Study, preparing a feasibility study for the implementation of a Social Impact Bond scheme for occupational wellness aiming to improve mental health and reduce absenteeism from work. ·Health infrastructure projects (RO), providing both expertise and funding to support the preparation of three health infrastructure projects in underserved areas in Romania. Contribution to developing new partnerships To reach regions where needs are greatest, the EIAH sought to establish partnerships, notably with NPBIs. Furthermore, the EIAH hired a permanent advisor located in Sofia and to some extent relied on cooperation with the EIB Advisory Services which have regional offices (e.g., JASPERS has experts in Bucharest, Vienna, Brussels, Warsaw and Sofia). As part of the cooperation platform with NPBIs, the EIAH supported partner NPBIs’ advisory programmes through funding agreements under an EIAH call for proposals. On the side of the EBRD, the EIAH financed, since 2017, about 70% of the total costs for the implementation of the EBRD Advice for Small Businesses Programme. Overall, cooperation with NPBIs and other International Financial Institutions was initially slow to set up (due to several factors, including legal complexity and NPBIs’ varying willingness and capacity to cooperate), but once established, the cooperation was able to deliver results. Investment platforms As of end-2021, the EIAH had undertaken 35 investment platform-related assignments, in 16 different countries. The country case study from Bulgaria confirms the EIAH involvement was crucial when setting up new Urban Development Funds (UDFs), to adequately design the tendering to enable selection of well-suited financial intermediaries. Efficiency of the EIAH Adequacy of budgetary allocation Over the period under consideration, the deployment of the EIAH activity has not been constrained by budgetary considerations. On the contrary, earlier evaluations highlighted that in its first years, during the ramp up phase, the EIAH underspent its budgetary allocations. One of the identified reasons has been the type of requests received, and the relatively large number of requests with no potential to lead to actual assignments (ECA, 2020). Secondly, contrary to expectations, setting up the EIAH itself and then building an external network of partners was more time intensive than resource intensive (EC replies in ECA, 2020). To adjust to the rather long ramp up phase, the termination date of all SGAs has been pushed back. Over time, with the ramp-up of EIAH’s activity, consumption of resources also picked up: as at 31 December 2021, the actual eligible costs of EIAH attributable to the EU budget for the period 2015-2021 were EUR 73 million, or 69% of the amounts available from the EU budget (vs 26% as at 31 December 2018). Since three SGAs are still running, projections on whether or not the EIAH will spend all the budgetary allocation are only tentative. Pricing policy The EFSI Regulation provided that cost sharing arrangements be put in place, with some exceptions (services provided to public project promoters were meant to be free of charge) and safeguard conditions (SMEs should not be charged more than a third of the cost of the technical assistance provided to them). While the exception for public promoters was key for them to enter into the process of seeking advisory support (as declared in country case interviews), the fee created barriers to access the services for private project promoters (they only represented 6% of Hub beneficiaries as of end-2021). In 2018, the EIAH Coordination Committee however did relax the rules for LPAs: below a certain project size (of EUR 20,000), it became possible to exempt private entities from paying fees for the EIAH services. While no systematic information is available on the characteristics of LPAs’ beneficiaries, interest in LPAs did increase, and the EIAH team confirmed that demand for LPAs largely emanates from the private sector. Governance and reaction time As foreseen in the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) that defines the general terms and conditions that apply to the EIAH Partnership, an EIAH Coordination Committee was established. The Coordination Committee was found to be quite agile, according to both the EC and the EIB. Annual priority areas for EIAH activity and corresponding budget available were defined in the SGAs. The governance model was efficient, in that the speed of response and service when interacting with the EIAH was considered as fast or very fast by 32 out of 37 EIAH beneficiaries that completed a feedback form. Despite the very quick first reaction, signature of the actual assignment contract can take months. However, the EIAH team and the beneficiaries interviewed as part of Country case studies both agree that the time which elapses is also useful to define more precisely the needs and type of support that is required. It also includes the time needed to get approval of legal documents within public beneficiaries. Visibility and communication efforts A lot of effort was made to improve the visibility of the EIAH. Relevant actions included: ·Development and continuous improvements to the EIAH website (with 15,000 to 16,000 unique visitors each year); ·Increased social media presence on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn; ·Organisation of numerous events including the organisation of (i) 8 sessions of the annual EIAH Days to provide for knowledge exchange and networking opportunities for NPBIs, representatives of the EC and the EIB and (ii) several rounds of local EIAH Roadshow events and (iii) physical or online signing ceremonies or launch events e.g., when the Green Eligibility Checker was launched in 2020;

·The publication of promotional videos of assignment case studies (with 28 videos being available online as of mid-2022); and ·Publication of reports and their active promotion (with e.g., short video of EIB Director presenting the 2020 Annual Report being viewed almost 4 000 times). Despite all the effort, the evaluation’s country case studies revealed that there was still insufficient awareness among relevant stakeholders about what the EIAH had to offer. Coherence of the EIAH The EIAH was designed as an entry point with all incoming requests centralised and analysed with a view to ensure complementarity with existing technical assistance and advisory programmes (such as JASPERS, ELENA, etc.) and to avoid duplication of funding and work. Stakeholder interviews confirm that these complementarities were realised in practice. Concretely, once the admissibility of the requests was established, the requests were reviewed during monthly EIAH screening group meetings, aimed to identify any requests that would potentially be addressed simultaneously by different services within the EIB and/or the EC. In addition to cross-referrals, further synergies were realised between the EIAH and other advisory support services. For example, the EIAH intervened either upstream or downstream in the project development compared to other EU advisory initiatives to facilitate the implementation of the same investment plans / projects. More importantly, while partners only engaged in project-specific work, the EIAH also provided non-project specific support (27% of the assignments). This type of assignment related to the production of market studies, capacity building support to administrations (e.g., design of tools and methodologies for assessing project applications), and design of investment platforms. 4.2.2How did the EU intervention make a difference? EU Added Value of the EIAH To deliver its advisory projects, the EIAH often brings together a team of experts including EIB experts and also typically external consultants from the private sector, thereby providing beneficiaries with a unique combination of expertise. Indeed, the EIAH team, like EIB experts in general, are seen as best placed to advise on EU regulatory requirements (such as cost benefit analysis, environmental impact assessments, compliance with EU taxonomy etc.), also due to their pan-EU coverage which enables best practice sharing. Similarly, the level of expertise provided by the EIAH services is highly, or very highly valued by beneficiaries, as testified by their feedback forms. According to interviews conducted as part of this evaluation, other advisory services were available but the same levels of expertise or the same quality were not often readily available from other institutions. 4.2.3Is the intervention still relevant? Relevance of the EIAH The establishment of an Advisory Hub was one of the key actions identified by the Task Force in 2013, to ensure a continuous and effective advisory service. The two-phase market gap analysis studies, launched by the EIAH and carried out by PwC in 2016 and 2017, also confirmed the existence of needs that the EIAH could contribute to address. Indeed, demand for the EIAH services has been satisfactorily high from all Member States, significantly exceeding initial projections every year. The evaluation confirms that the EIAH progressively developed and delivered all expected services and supporting activities, including project specific work, capacity building activities, market analysis, awareness raising activities, development of partnerships. In an effort to deploy more support to specific regions and reach out more effectively to those most in need, the EIAH also developed networks and collaborations. In light of the high number of requests received, supply, as measured by the actual number of assignments performed, was more moderate. This is however also partly an indicator of success as, by design, the EIAH is not meant to cover on its own all the requests received, but rather to function as a single-entry point for promoters seeking advisory and a large part of its work is to redirect requests to other, better suited services. Beyond the high demand / take-up for the services provided, feedback forms confirmed that the support was highly relevant. The relevance of the support for meeting the stated objectives is largely assessed as positive. The EIAH fully met needs of the beneficiaries in 31 cases (out of 37) and all beneficiaries were either satisfied or very satisfied with the support received. 4.3The European Investment Project Portal The EIPP’s main role was to address two key market challenges identified at EU-level at the launch of the IPE: ·The need to improve transparency and visibility of investment opportunities available within the EU to investors worldwide, and relatedly a need for a pipeline of EU investment projects; and ·The need to increase and facilitate the nature of contacts between investors and promoters. The next subsections examine how these challenges were addressed, through the evaluation criteria based on a triangulation of evidence collected via interviews, desk research, EIPP annual surveys and feedback included primarily in the eight country case studies. 4.3.1To what extent was the intervention successful and why? Effectiveness of the EIPP The EIPP has contributed to improving the visibility of available investment projects in the EU among the global investor community. As shown in Figures 6 and 7 below, as of end-2021 the number of projects registered to the EIPP (1,112) exceeded targets (500), and the number of EIPP visitors has continued to grow over time (260,000 in 2021). There is, however, limited awareness of the EIPP beyond policy makers, NPBIs and/or active users, as evidenced by the majority of the case study countries.

Figure 6: Number of projects uploaded to the EIPP against milestones Figure 7: Number of visitors to the EIPP website over time Source: EC EIPP KPIs and KMIs. Week 1: 06.-12.06.2016 - Week 254: 12-18.04.2021. Data based on number of unique visitors for which the cumulative was calculated by the EC. From the investors’ point of view, the projects listed on the EIPP do not always meet their target profile. For instance, several interviewees mentioned that the high proportion of early-stage investments present on the EIPP meant that it was more useful for Venture Capital investors and smaller projects. The EIB and NPBIs on the other hand typically have direct channels of communication with project promoters and hence, the EIPP is of limited use for them as a source of pipeline generation. But some indicative evidence suggests that the EIPP is now starting to deliver in terms of matching projects with investors. In fact, despite the initial difficulties, the number of contacts between investors and projects are growing. The direct users of the Portal are generally satisfied with the user experience, as shown in in all survey rounds. This is also thanks to the matchmaking events, which have witnessed an increasing proportion of investors attending. Efficiency of the EIPP As the benefits slowly start to materialise, the economic justification of the EIPP is improving. The overall budget allocated to EIPP is EUR 2.7 million over 5 years. Budgetary resources funded several key activities performed by the EIPP, including: ·Communication activities, including the delivery of matchmaking and networking events; ·IT development of the EIPP website and platform; and ·Screening of projects submitted for publication to the portal. The EIPP was generally always able to work within its budget allocations, though in some years there was some under-spend. Despite the costly nature of maintaining and animating such a platform, evidence suggests that process efficiency of the EIPP increased over time. The removal of the charge to promoters for publishing projects may have harmed overall efficiency in terms of costs, but increased the relevance of the EIPP, as commented above. Coherence of the EIPP Internal coherence Internal coherence in the context of the EIPP centres around the extent to which there were opportunities for the portal to develop synergies and complement the work of the EFSI and the EIAH. However, as already mentioned, there was no expectation that the EIPP would feed the EFSI pipeline, and the EIPP team did not receive information regarding whether, or the extent to which projects published on the EIPP were supported by the EFSI. External coherence External coherence in the context of the EIPP refers to the extent to which the EIPP was able to identify and develop mutual cooperation agreements with similar EU and national-level initiatives amongst Member States. The 2018 interim evaluation found that where there were initiatives that slightly overlapped with the Portal, these were effectively identified. Cooperation agreements were signed to ensure the exploration of synergies in many cases (e.g., with EuroQuity or the Global Infrastructure Hub), though it was also suggested that synergies could be further explored in others. Evidence collected as part of the external ex-post evaluation suggests that this finding was sustained throughout this evaluation period. 4.3.2How did the EU intervention make a difference? EU Added Value of the EIPP

Given its mandate, the EIPP surpassed expectations in its role of proactively animating the platform, supporting projects in achieving financing, delivering events, and developing partnerships to insert itself more effectively in the investor community. However, there is mixed evidence regarding the comparative advantage of the EIPP relative to other, similar initiatives. Feedback from interviews and case studies highlighted that some benefits of the EIPP, relative to similar initiatives, were related to: ·The vetting of projects; ·The structure and quality of matchmaking and deal flows; ·The EU coverage; ·The neutrality; ·The fact that it is free of charge; ·The fact that it provides the option to participate in online pitching, networking, and matchmaking activities; and ·The EIPP newsletter. Nonetheless, evidence gathered suggested that other, similar initiatives benefitted from comparative advantages relative to the EIPP (for example, EuroQuity or the European Innovation Council (EIC) Community Platform had more functionality compared to the EIPP). In fact, feedback from the country case studies highlighted that there is scope to improve the added value of the EIPP, e.g., by focusing on further animating the EIPP, and ensuring it is well inserted into the ecosystem and connected with similar platforms and networking partners. 4.3.3Is the intervention still relevant? Relevance of the EIPP Shortly after its launch, the EIPP had generated a relatively high number of visits, contacts between promoters and investors, and events across Member States. Since then, interest in the EIPP has grown, as shown by the increasing number of visitors to the EIPP website. Moreover, the progress achieved in terms of the number of projects uploaded to the EIPP had surpassed milestone expectations by 2018, and this trend continues, showing that the EIPP is answering a general need for more transparency of investment opportunities in the EU and is therefore more and more relevant. Indeed, the changes introduced in 2017 (lowering the minimum project size and making publication free of charge to all project promoters) were considered as positive and beneficial to the relevance of the EIPP. In fact, the EIPP has provided a platform on which projects from across all 27 MS and the United Kingdom have been promoted, though relatively more projects were received and published from some Member States (such as Germany, Greece, Spain, France, and Italy) as well as the UK until 2020. Likewise, the EIPP has also served as a platform for projects across a wide range of sectors, the largest being the digital economy sector, followed by social, infrastructure and tourism. User feedback suggests that the EIPP is relatively easy to use, although there is some scope for improvement, in terms of additional information on the projects. 5What are the conclusions and lessons learned 5.1Conclusions 5.1.1The European Fund for Strategic Investments and the EU guarantee The EFSI played an important role in accelerating and incentivising investment in the EU and by doing so, contributed to reducing the investment gap. As of 31 December 2021, EUR 99.3 billion of EFSI financing had been approved, expected to mobilise EUR 524.3 billion of private and public investment over the period 2015-2021 (this investment will actually be spread over a longer period), thereby exceeding the target of unlocking additional investment of at least EUR 500 billion. In terms of sheer volume, EFSI mobilised investment accounted for a significant share of the cyclical investment gap during this period. And although some findings indicate that several EFSI financed operations could have plausibly occurred without the EFSI, the investments would have taken place at a reduced scale, on less favourable conditions and at a slower pace. Hence, in absence of EFSI, it would have taken longer to address EU’s investment gap and the low-investment spell would have been prolonged. The EFSI also supported investment activity indirectly, by shifting the focus of the policy attention and resources on investment at a national level (e.g., in the Italian case). The EFSI was particularly successful in crowding-in private sector financing. 72% of the investment mobilised by the EFSI is expected to come from private sources. Private investment was incentivised by offering features that were not available to project promoters from alternative sources of finance (private or public). These included: higher scale of EIBG financing; lower interest rates / cost compared to prevailing market interest rates; flexible conditions; longer tenors; tailored financing solutions including subordinated positions; technical and legal due diligence; quality stamp / reputational benefits; and stability of financing. According to some stakeholders, the EFSI might have also crowded-out private or NPBI finance in a few instances, but this is difficult to substantiate. The EU guarantee enabled the EIB Group to take more risk. While examples of operations can be found which could have been delivered without the EFSI, the EIB Group would not have been able to finance the entire EFSI portfolio on its balance sheet in absence of the EU guarantee without adversely affecting its credit rating, capital consumption and financial sustainability.

Thanks to the EU guarantee, the EIB Group was able to address a range of market failures and sub-optimal investment situations across geographies and thematic areas. At a geographic level, the distribution of EFSI financing was well aligned with country-level investment gaps. This geographical spread is notable, taking into account the demand-driven nature of EFSI and the different state of Member States’ economies. Generally, countries that received a higher share of EFSI financing relative to their GDP share were also the countries with some of the highest investment gaps (e.g., Spain and Greece) or lower levels of investment relative to other Member States (e.g., Bulgaria). But there are some exceptions. The market-driven nature of the instrument, the dynamism of the respective economies and financing absorption capacity etc., affect the take-up of the instrument. In terms of thematic focus, EFSI financing was well targeted to areas where the private sector is less likely to invest on its own e.g., supporting investment in new/ unproven technologies; financing large, complex projects; and investing in social objectives and public goods. Hundreds of thousands of businesses across Europe have benefitted from EFSI financing. While much of the EFSI support was focused on start-ups, micro enterprises and SMEs in general, EFSI financing was also used to address the financing needs of mid-caps not able to get financing on suitable terms from the market. Additionally, EFSI contributed to addressing the needs of under-served / niche segments such as social enterprises, innovative businesses, and businesses in specific segments such as agriculture and culture and creative industries. The EFSI resulted not only in improved availability of finance for these businesses, but also better conditions (e.g., lower interest rates, lower collateral requirements, longer repayment period and lower down-payments). The EFSI also contributed to diversifying the sources of finance available to businesses by supporting the development of equity, private debt and alternative finance markets. Overall, the macro-economic impact of the EFSI is expected to be significant. By 2025, the EFSI is expected to create 2.1 million jobs and increase EU GDP by 2.4% compared to the baseline scenario. The EFSI will particularly benefit Cohesion regions and crisis-affected countries in terms of job creation and growth. Other key achievements of the EFSI include: ·Supporting Europe’s green transition by financing a range of climate action projects (renewable energy, energy efficiency, low carbon technol