Special Report Can the EU’s Centres  
of Excellence initiative 
contribute effectively  
to mitigating chemical, 
biological, radiological 
and nuclear risks from 
outside the EU?EN 2014  NO 17
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014
ISBN 978-92-872-1686-1
doi: 10.2865/31640
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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Luxembourg
Can the EU’s Centres 
of Excellence initiative 
contribute effectively 
to mitigating chemical, 
biological, radiological 
and nuclear risks from 
outside the EU?
(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)Special ReportEN 2014  NO 17
02
 Contents
Paragraph
 Abbreviations
I–XI Executive summary
1–12  Introduction
1–7 Response to challenges to the EU’s security
8–12  The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative
8–9 Objectives
10–12  Overall coordination and structure
13–15  Audit scope and approach
16–49  Observations
16–21  The concept behind the initiative is based on a sound analysis, and fosters cooperation and 
ownership in the regions
22–28  The organisational set–up of the initiative is complex but generally appropriate
29–49  While management systems are set up, there are still shortcomings
29–35  Delays in the implementation plan
36–41  Systems for selecting and implementing projects are in place, but partner countries need to become more 
involved in them
42–45  Bilateral cooperation between decision‑making and implementing bodies takes place, but there is no 
forum for wider strategic cooperation
46–49  A monitoring system has been established
50–53  Conclusions and recommendations
50–51  Conclusions
52–53  Recommendations
03 Contents
 Annex I — The structure of the initiative
 Annex II  — List of regional secretariats
 Annex III  — Individual components of the initiative and bodies involved
 Annex IV  — Implementing bodies for the initiative
 Annex V — List of projects currently implemented by the initiative
 Reply of the EEAS and the Commission
04
 Abbreviations
CBRN : chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (threats, goods)
CoE : Centres of Excellence
EuropeAid : Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation 
JRC : Joint Research Centre
EEAS : European External Action Service
IfS: Instrument for Stability
NFP : national focal point
NT: national team
RS: regional secretariat
TACIS : Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
UNICRI : UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
05
 Executive  
summary
I
Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been active in miti -
gating risks to EU safety primarily through actions 
financed under the TACIS nuclear safety programme.
II
In 2003, the European Council adopted two strat  egies, 
which set the stage for future actions in the area of 
security: the European security strategy and the Euro -
pean strategy against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.
III
One of the instruments developed following the adop -
tion of these strategies was the Instrument for Stabil -
ity, with a budget of 1.820 million euro for the years 
2007–13. It addresses challenges to security in coun -
tries outside the EU and includes both a short -term 
and a long -term component.
IV
The single biggest measure in the long -term compo -
nent is the EU chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence initiative, with 
a budget of 100 million euro for the 2010–13 period. It 
provides regional platforms for tackling comprehen -
sively all aspects of chemical, biological, radiologi -
cal and nuclear risks arising from natural disasters, 
accidental catastrophes and criminal behaviour, by 
involving all the key stakeholders at a very early stage, 
thereby fostering the development of expertise in the 
countries concerned.
V
The initiative is coordinated and managed by the Euro -
pean External Action Service and EuropeAid.VI
The Court’s audit assessed whether the EU CBRN Cen -
tres of Excellence initiative can contribute effectively 
to mitigating risks of this kind from outside the EU.
VII
The Court concludes that the EU CBRN Centres of 
Excellence initiative can contribute effectively to miti -
gating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
risks from outside the EU, but several elements still 
need to be finalised.
VIII
The concept of the initiative is based on a sound 
analysis and addresses deficiencies identified in the 
former TACIS programme. The comprehensive and 
demand -driven approach and the distinct focus on 
regional cooperation provide a long -term response 
to priorities defined in the European security strat -
egy and the EU strategy against the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction that had not been 
addressed until then. The initiative involves all stake -
holders in the partner countries at a very early stage, 
which contributes to the sustainability of the initiative 
and ownership by the partner countries in the many 
regions concerned.
IX
The organisational set -up of the initiative is generally 
appropriate, despite its complexity, but needs some 
adjustments. The choice of the two implementing 
bodies and the regions was well reasoned, and each 
of the bodies involved has a specific role to play. 
However, the regional secretariats lack technical cap -
acity. The EU delegations do not sufficiently use their 
position to enhance political support in the partner 
countries, and liaise with the EU Member States.
Executive summary 06
X
An appropriate management system is in place and 
is becoming operational. However, some elements of 
the initiative were delayed. The initial implementa -
tion plan did not have sufficient regard to the inher -
ent complexity of the initiative. This meant that the 
implementation plan could not be fully applied, as key 
elements, such as the needs assessments, had not yet 
been completed when project selection commenced. 
At the earlier stage of the initiative partner countries 
were not sufficiently involved in the selection of the 
projects. Some projects are in progress and monitor -
ing systems have been set up. The Court noted that 
cooperation between the decision -making bodies 
(EEAS and EuropeAid) on one side and the implement -
ing bodies (the JRC and UNICRI) on the other side 
takes place only on a bilateral basis.
XI
The Court makes a number of recommendations, 
which the EEAS and the Commission should take into 
account to further develop the initiative and ensure its 
sustainability.
07
 Introduction
Response to challenges to 
the EU’s security
01 
The European Union launched its 
chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excel -
lence (CoE) initiative (hereinafter the 
initiative) in May 2010. The initiative 
is designed to strengthen the institu -
tional capacity of non -EU countries 
to mitigate CBRN risks which, if not 
countered, may constitute a threat to 
the EU.
02 
With a budget of 100 million euro 
for the 2010–13 period, the initiative 
is the single biggest measure of the 
long -term component of the Instru -
ment for Stability (IfS)1. The IfS was de -
signed to provide the European Union 
with a new strategic tool to address 
a number of global security and devel -
opment challenges. This included both 
short -term and long -term measures2 
with a budget of 1 820 million euro 
for 2007–13 (73 % for crisis reaction 
and 27 % for crisis prevention). The 
IfS provides non -EU partner countries 
with technical and financial assistance 
for risk mitigation and preparedness 
relating to chemical, biological, radio -
logical and nuclear material or agents. 
According to the European Parliament 
and the Council, the measures adopt -
ed through the IfS should be comple -
mentary and consistent with measures 
adopted in pursuit of the EU’s common 
foreign and security policy.03 
Following the 1986 Chernobyl ac -
cident, the risks presented by Soviet-  
designed nuclear facilities in central 
and eastern Europe caused major 
concern to the international commu -
nity, which increased with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the emer -
gence of 11 newly independent states 
(the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, or CIS).
04 
In 1991, the European Commission 
started the TACIS programme3, de -
signed to help the CIS in their transi -
tion to democratic market -oriented 
economies. This programme ended in 
2006.
05 
In the context of the TACIS pro -
gramme, the EU Member States and 
the Commission agreed to take a col -
lective stance on nuclear safety. They 
launched the TACIS nuclear safety 
programme4 with the aim of providing 
on-site assistance, designing safety 
and regulatory approaches, improv -
ing the management of nuclear waste 
and offering former nuclear weapons 
scientists of the Soviet Union employ -
ment opportunities in the civilian use 
of nuclear energy.1 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 
of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
15 November  2006 
establishing an Instrument for 
Stability (OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, 
p. 1).
2 Example of short -term 
measures: support for the 
establishment of interim 
authorities and democratic 
and pluralistic state 
institutions; example of 
long -term measures: 
development of legal 
frameworks and institutional 
capabilities, for instance 
concerning export controls on 
goods that can be used for 
civilian and/or military or 
criminal purposes ( ‘dual -use 
goods ’).
3 ‘Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) ’.
4 During the 1992–06 period, 
1,3 billion euro was allocated 
to the TACIS nuclear safety 
programme.
08 Introduction
06 
In 2003, as a result of institutional and 
intergovernmental discussions about 
the terrorist attacks in New York and 
the Iraq war, the European Council 
adopted two strategies which set the 
stage for future actions in the area of 
security:
(a) the European security strategy5, 
which set out the EU security en -
vironment and the key challenges 
for the EU, which were:
 ο terrorism;
 ο the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction;
 ο regional conflicts;
 ο state failure;
 ο organised crime.
The Council concluded that the 
EU needed to be more active, 
more coherent and better able to 
address these challenges, in terms 
of crisis reaction as well as crisis 
prevention.
(b) the European strategy against 
the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction6, which provided 
a roadmap for action in this area. 
Its priorities were, in particular:
 ο to support the interna -
tional system for monitoring 
non -proliferation;
 ο to assist non -EU countries through 
capacity building;
 ο the establishment of legislative 
frameworks; and
 ο the creation of response plans to 
enable them to fulfil their obliga -
tions within these frameworks.07 
The concerns expressed by the EU 
were also addressed by a UN Security 
Council resolution of 20047. The con -
tinuing pertinence of these concerns 
has been evidenced by recent events 
in Syria.
The EU CBRN Centres of 
Excellence initiative
Objectives
08 
The main objectives8 of the EU CBRN 
Centres of Excellence initiative are to:
 ο strengthen the long -term national 
and regional capabilities of re -
sponsible authorities and adminis -
trative infrastructure;
 ο support and reinforce short -term 
response capabilities.
09 
Under the initiative, these objectives 
are addressed by:
(a) providing training and assistance 
to countries in the implementation 
of international commitments to 
mitigate CBRN proliferation risks;
(b) supporting national capacity to 
develop and enforce legal, admin -
istrative and technical measures in 
relation to CBRN proliferation risks;5 European security strategy, 
European Council, Brussels, 12 
and 13 December 2003; see 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
csdp/about -csdp/
european -security -strategy/
6 European strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, European 
Council, Brussels, 12 Decem -
ber 2003; see http://eeas.
europa.eu/non -prolifera -
tion -and-disarmament/wmd/
index_en.htm
7 UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 of 
28 April 2004.
8 The Instrument for Stability —
Multiannual indicative 
programme 2009–11, 
European Commission, 8 April 
2009.
09 Introduction
(c) ensuring ownership and sustain -
ability of training and assistance 
activities through an integrated 
regional approach;
(d) providing a complete package of 
training and assistance covering 
CBRN (e.g. export control, illicit 
trafficking, safety and security, 
emergency planning, crisis re -
sponse, redeployment of scientists, 
storage and disposal).
Overall coordination and 
structure
10 
Many bodies play a role in the initiative 
(also see Annex I ):
(a) The European External Action Ser -
vice (EEAS), the body responsible 
for the EU foreign policy, is respon -
sible for the strategic orientation 
of the initiative through the multi -
annual indicative programmes 
of the IfS, of which the initiative 
is part. The EEAS also maintains 
regular contact with other interna -
tional bodies in the area of CBRN 
risk management (for instance 
the International Atomic Energy 
Agency) and discusses the general 
strategy and priorities with them.(b) EuropeAid — the Commission’s de -
partment for development aid — 
is the decision -making body and is 
responsible for implementing the 
initiative’s budget. It prepares the 
annual action programmes of the 
IfS and monitors the work of the 
governance team and the imple -
menting bodies: the Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) and 
the UN Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). 
Since 2012, EuropeAid has also 
been managing the projects run -
ning within the initiative9, includ -
ing project selection, contracting 
of implementing consortia10 and 
monitoring.
(c) A governance team of experts 
from EU non -governmental or -
ganisations supports the initiative 
by advising on governance issues, 
presenting the initiative to part -
ner countries and seeking their 
high -level political support.
(d) The JRC and UNICRI implement 
the initiative. The JRC, which is 
the specialised department within 
the Commission for technical and 
scientific support, assists in the 
drafting of project proposals, the 
selection of projects and the needs 
assessments. It is also responsible 
for establishing and maintain -
ing monitoring mechanisms for 
the projects and the initiative as 
a whole. UNICRI sets up the region -
al secretariats and assists during 
the establishment of structures 
in the partner countries, with the 
drafting of national action plans 
and organising of round-table 
meetings.9 UNICRI manages the projects 
contracted before 2012.
10 For UNICRI those were 
non -profit organisations world 
wide with relevant expertise; 
for EuropeAid those are: 
governmental agencies of EU 
Member States with relevant 
expertise.
10 Introduction
(e) Each partner country —of which 
there are over 40 — appoints 
its national focal point (NFP) to 
coordinate the work done by the 
CBRN stakeholders in their country 
to assist with the establishment of 
national teams (NTs)11, to organise 
meetings and disseminate relevant 
information. Partner countries also 
define their needs with the help 
of a needs assessment toolkit and 
develop national action plans, in 
which they prioritise their needs. 
They then draft tailored project 
proposals, addressing those 
needs. During the further process, 
project proposals are enriched by 
a regional component if not yet 
included, fine -tuned by the JRC 
and then evaluated, ranked and 
selected for funding by EuropeAid. 
After this, project implementation 
consortia are contracted, and the 
implementation begins.
(f) Partner countries cooperate 
through regional secretariats (RSs) 
(see Annex II  for a list). The secre -
tariats comprise two permanent 
staff: a head of secretariat (ap -
pointed by the host country) and 
a regional coordinator (employed 
by UNICRI). They seek to foster 
regional cooperation and give 
a regional dimension to project 
proposals, through:
 ο facilitating information sharing 
and coordination in the region;
 ο helping countries to build their ca -
pacity to assess and address needs 
and identify areas of expertise;
 ο supporting the implementation 
and monitoring of projects, and 
providing feedback on them to the 
implementing bodies; and
 ο promoting regional awareness of 
the initiative.11 
The EU delegation12 in each country 
participating in the initiative is regu -
larly informed about its progress and 
about the related actions being imple -
mented in that country.
12 
Annex III  illustrates the indi -
vidual components of the initia -
tive and the bodies involved for its 
implementation.11 National teams further 
coordinate the work and share 
information in their countries 
among institutions like 
ministries, agencies and 
research and educational 
facilities.
12 The EU is represented through 
139 EU delegations and offices 
around the world. For more 
information, see http://eeas.
europa.eu/delegations/
index_en.htm
11
 Audit scope  
and approach
13 
The Court’s audit aimed to assess 
whether the EU CBRN Centres of 
Excellence initiative can contribute 
effectively to mitigating chemical, bio -
logical, radiological and nuclear risks 
from outside the EU. This overall audit 
question was broken down into the 
following three sub -questions:
 ο Is the initiative based on a sound 
analysis of the situation prior to 
2010?
 ο Is the organisational set -up of the 
initiative appropriate to meet iden -
tified challenges?
 ο Is an appropriate management 
system in place and operational?
14 
As the initiative is quite new (started 
in 2010 with first projects in 2013), the 
Court did not audit its outputs, out -
comes and impact. Rather, it examined 
if the initiative’s approach, strategy 
and management make it likely that it 
would be able to reduce CBRN risks in 
non -EU countries.
15 
The Court carried out the audit be -
tween October 2013 and January 2014. 
The audit work consisted of an ana -
lytical review of relevant documents, 
interviews with the Commission, EEAS, 
UNICRI and governance team staff, 
visits to two regional secretariats 
(Rabat and Amman) and attending 
a workshop carried out under one of 
the projects.
12
 Observations
The concept behind the 
initiative is based on 
a sound analysis, and 
fosters cooperation and 
ownership in the regions
16 
The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence 
initiative is a key response to the Euro -
pean security strategy and the Euro -
pean strategy against the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. The 
concept behind the initiative is based 
on a sound analysis, particularly taking 
into account the following deficiencies 
of the former TACIS programme:
 ο the approach was predominantly 
ad hoc and not all its actions were 
embedded in a long -term strategy;
 ο the implementation of the TACIS 
programme was top -down, with 
a central decision hub at the Com -
mission, thus leaving little room 
for ownership by the non -EU coun -
tries. Therefore, there was a high 
risk that the projects and their 
results would not be maintained 
after the EU funding had ended13.17 
The Centres of Excellence initiative 
presents several innovative features. It 
is intended:
 ο to be comprehensive: to address 
CBRN-related risks and threats, no 
matter if their origin is criminal, ac -
cidental or natural, and to include 
mitigation measures dealing with 
prevention, detection, response 
and governance issues. Box 1  be-
low gives examples of these risks;
 ο to be built on an explicit de -
mand -driven (‘bottom -up’) 
approach: experts in the partner 
countries identify in a systematic 
way the needs specific to their 
country in all CBRN risk areas with 
the help of a needs assessment 
toolkit (i.e. a gap analysis); they 
then prioritise in a national action 
plan the measures that need to be 
taken to address these risks and 
threats; finally they draft tailored 
project proposals to address the 
needs identified and to eliminate 
the gaps in their risk mitigation 
systems;
 ο to have a distinct focus on regional 
cooperation between the part -
ner countries: the expertise and 
cap acity generated through the 
initiative in the partner countries is 
shared at the regional level.
Examples of CBRN risks addressed by the initiative:
— Chemical : illicit trafficking of chemical material which could be used for industrial and/or criminal activities 
(‘dual -use’);
— Biological : epidemics like Avian influenza (bird flu), a highly infectious disease which spreads quickly across 
several countries;
— Radiological : hospital waste such as substances used in radiation therapy;
— Nuclear : Fukushima -type incidents, where radiological material is accidentally released into the environment.Box 113 This is known as 
the ‘sustainability ’ of 
donor-funded measures.
13 Observations
18 
All these new features were designed 
to increase ownership in the part -
ner countries, and thus improve the 
sustainability of the initiative: that is, 
making it more likely that the results of 
measures are maintained when the EU 
funding stops.
19 
Regional cooperation in the area of 
security is a key feature of the initia -
tive. The EEAS and the Commission 
had good reasons to integrate this 
element into the initiative and focus 
on regional cooperation:
(a) the risks addressed have, by their 
nature, a cross -border character; 
the impact of chemical accidents 
and epidemics like bird flu do not 
stop at borders;
(b) the partner countries differ in 
terms of their progress in the area 
of CBRN risk mitigation; regional 
cooperation promotes best 
practices and partner countries 
can benefit from each other’s 
knowledge.
20 
The intended benefits of the initia -
tive are therefore not limited to the 
outputs of projects. The fact that 
neighbouring countries in sensitive 
 geographical locations like North 
Africa and the Middle East meet to 
discuss and implement projects in the 
area of security represents an impor -
tant added value, contributing, on its 
own, to a culture of cooperation and 
safety.21 
The international community has 
welcomed the initiative. It has been 
endorsed by the UN Security Council14, 
the G8 Global Partnership (which es -
tablished a working group on the Cen -
tres of Excellence15) and NATO (where 
the EU is supporting NATO’s CBRN 
centre in Vyskov, Czech Republic16).
The organisational set‑up 
of the initiative is  
complex but generally 
appropriate
22 
The structure of the initiative is com -
plex due to the number of players in -
volved, the decentralised organisation, 
the global scale, the heterogeneity 
of regions and partner countries and 
the joint implementation by EU and 
UN bodies (see paragraphs 10 to 11). 
However, this complexity is inherent 
in the approach chosen for the initia -
tive: comprehensive, bottom -up and 
regional (see paragraph 17).
23 
The choice of the implementing bod -
ies for the initiative, JRC and UNICRI, 
was well reasoned. The JRC, the Com -
mission’s in -house scientific body, 
provides relevant technical expertise, 
while UNICRI can rely on the UN’s 
diplomatic network when approach -
ing potential partner countries and 
convincing them to participate in 
the initiative. Annex IV  sets out the 
background for the choice of each of 
the implementing bodies, their area of 
expertise and the main tasks assigned 
to them.14 United Nation Security Council 
statement supporting the EU 
Centres of Excellence, 
12 April  2012.
15 ‘Global partnership: against 
the spread of materials and 
weapons of mass destruction: 
President’s report for 2013’, 
Foreign and  Commonwealth 
Office, London, December 
2013.
16 See http://www.jcbrncoe.cz/  
for more information
14 Observations
24 
Despite the high number of bodies in -
volved, their roles and responsibilities 
are clearly defined and each body has 
a role to play (see paragraph 10 to 11).
25 
The partner countries choose their na -
tional focal point and create a national 
team themselves, following guidelines 
and recommendations issued by the 
JRC and UNICRI. This autonomy is 
crucial for their acceptance of the ini -
tiative and consistent with its general 
demand -driven approach.
26 
With regard to the designation of the 
regions in which the initiative was to 
run, the EEAS and the Commission, 
understandably, mainly chose regions 
with countries in the neighbourhood 
of the EU and/or EU -associated coun -
tries (see Annex II ). However, there 
are a large number of regions and 
countries involved and therefore the 
demand for funds for useful projects 
may well exceed the limited resources 
available. Prioritisation of projects in 
the areas of most relevance to EU se -
curity may be needed to ensure that 
best use is made of the funds available.
27 
The regional secretariats (see para -
graph 10) currently have limited tech -
nical expertise. This makes it difficult 
for them to fulfil parts of their role, 
like assisting in the development and 
the fine -tuning of project proposals 
and facilitating the implementation of 
projects later on.28 
The EU delegations in partner coun -
tries are regularly informed about the 
initiative but do not yet play a suf -
ficiently active role. They have the 
expertise to support the regional 
secretariats and national focal points. 
More importantly, they have diplo -
matic expertise that could help acquire 
and maintain the high -level political 
support in partner countries as well as 
raise awareness of EU involvement.
While management  
systems are set up, there 
are still some shortcomings
Delays in the implementa ‑
tion plan
29 
The EEAS and EuropeAid did not con -
sider the initiative’s inherent complex -
ity when they drew up its implementa -
tion plan (see Annex III ). It took longer 
than expected to set up structures 
in partner countries. This was due to 
political circumstances and the varying 
extent of high -level national support, 
the heterogeneous nature of the part -
ner countries, their varying previous 
experience in the area of CBRN risk 
mitigation and the different extent to 
which the relevant structures (national 
teams for instance) had already been 
established.
30 
This complexity delayed not only the 
appointment of national focal points 
but also the establishment of national 
teams.
15 Observations
31 
The implementation plan envisaged 
inter alia a series of steps from needs 
assessment, using a specially devel -
oped toolkit, to national action plans 
followed by project proposals to ad -
dress the needs identified.
32 
The purpose of the needs assessment 
toolkit was to identify, in a systematic 
manner, the risks specific to coun -
tries in all CBRN risk areas. The de -
velopment of the toolkit was already 
planned in a 2010 contract between 
EuropeAid and UNICRI. Due to the 
delays in implementing the initiative 
(see paragraphs 29 to 30), EuropeAid 
scheduled it again for its 2012 annual 
action programme.
33 
In EuropeAid’s opinion, UNICRI had not 
sufficiently taken the administrative 
capacities of the partner countries into 
account when developing the toolkit, 
meaning that the end product was too 
complex. It therefore reallocated the 
task in March 2013 to the JRC, which 
delivered a new and simpler version in 
December 2013. After testing in three 
partner countries, it became fully avail -
able at the beginning of 2014. There 
are now two toolkits available which 
should help the partner countries pre -
pare their national action plans.34 
After a needs assessment has been 
performed, national action plans 
should be prepared so as to put 
forward the measures required to ad -
dress the needs identified for disaster 
preparedness, prevention, detection 
and mitigation. By the end of 2013, five 
partner countries had prepared draft 
action plans.
35 
Due to all these delays, the EEAS and 
EuropeAid could not stick to the imple -
mentation plan as designed. Projects 
had started before needs were as -
sessed and national action plans were 
drafted.
Systems for selecting and 
implementing projects are in 
place, but partner  
countries need to become 
more involved in them
36 
Regarding the selection of projects, 
most proposals come from partner 
countries or regional secretariats 
but some are also generated by the 
implementing bodies. While the 
submission of project proposals by the 
implementing bodies may give some 
impetus to the initiative, this is not in 
keeping with the bottom -up approach.
16 Observations
37 
The JRC reviews all the proposals and 
ensures, together with EuropeAid, 
that they include SMART17 objectives 
and indicators. During the first project 
selection exercise EuropeAid, UNICRI 
and the JRC changed the proposals by 
merging some of them and dropping 
others, without always informing the 
originator of the proposals. This jeop -
ardised their ownership and has been 
detrimental to the development of the 
initiative.
38 
From May 2013 onwards, partner coun -
tries involved may propose projects at 
any moment rather than once yearly, 
as was the situation before. EuropeAid 
approves them on a case -by-case basis 
following discussions between partner 
countries, regional secretariats and 
relevant experts. During the discus -
sions, participants ensure that project 
proposals have a regional dimension. 
The partner countries welcomed 
the new approach, as they are more 
involved in the procedures leading to 
the decision that a project proposal 
receives funding. Partner countries 
however are concerned about the 
delay between project proposals and 
project implementation and appreci -
ate any improvement in this regard.
39 
By April 2014, 40 projects (see An-
nex V ) had been selected. The imple -
mentation of the first ones started on 
1 January 2013. Most of them con -
cern awareness raising, networking, 
knowledge transfer, training, capacity 
building and legislative upgrading 
frameworks (see example in Box 2 ).40 
UNICRI was given responsibility for 
managing the first 19 projects of the 
initiative, including selecting and 
contracting project implementers, 
according to UN rules. This meant that 
any non -profit organisation worldwide 
with relevant expertise could partici -
pate. In 2012, EuropeAid took over the 
management of the subsequent pro -
jects to address concerns expressed 
by some EU Member States, which 
wanted their own experts to be more 
involved in the work, and wished to 
highlight the EU’s role as donor.
41 
Since EuropeAid has been organising 
the implementation of the projects, 
the project implementing consortia 
are built around agencies, bodies and 
experts from the EU Member States. 
Only very few agencies, bodies or 
experts from the partner countries 
participate in these consortia, despite 
sometimes having broad experience of 
the topics concerned. This might be an 
obstacle to the ownership of measures 
in the partner countries and affect 
the sustainability of project results. In 
addition, CBRN capabilities in partner 
countries would benefit from a greater 
involvement of their own expertise. 
This was one of the main objectives of 
the initiative.17 SMART = specific, measurable, 
attainable, relevant and 
time -bound.
17 Observations
Example of a project
Title   Project 5: Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on CBRN import/export 
monitoring
Target area  African Atlantic Façade, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa
Implementer  German Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), Germany
Date  1.1.2013–31.12.2014
Budget (euro)  1 440 000
Objectives  1.  Bolster countries’ capabilities in the field of import/export control through the develop -
ment of dedicated procedures and guidelines to deter illegal transboundary shipments of 
hazardous CBRN materials;
 2. Build trust among entities, agencies etc. involved in the field of import/export regulation 
at national and regional levels;
 3. Develop a sustainable knowledge-sharing system applicable to a broad range of coun -
tries and government structures based on freely available packages of tools on CBRN 
import/export;
 4. Improve regional inter -agency cooperation and standardisation with international im -
port/export control procedures and guidelines.Box 2
18 Observations
Bilateral cooperation 
between decision‑making 
and implementing bodies 
takes place, but there is no 
forum for wider strategic 
cooperation
42 
During the initial phase, a coordination 
committee was set up, bringing repre -
sentatives of decision -making bodies 
(the EEAS and EuropeAid) and imple -
menting bodies (the JRC and UNICRI) 
together to discuss the ongoing 
process of settingup the initiative, in -
cluding regional priorities, the choice 
of the projects that would be run by 
UNICRI and more. After the selec -
tion of the UNICRI projects had been 
finalised, this committee ceased to 
exist. Since then, the entities involved 
cooperate mainly bilaterally.
43 
Several of the bodies concerned 
expressed the opinion that coopera -
tion, coordination and communication 
could be improved between them, 
for instance by reviving the coordina -
tion committee as a forum for wider 
stra  tegic cooperation. The commit -
tee would assist in clarifying issues 
and setting priorities in a more time-  
efficient manner, reducing the need 
for numerous bilateral discussions.
44 
Besides the Centres of Excellence 
initiative, other channels exist to fund 
CBRN-related projects e.g. through the 
International Atomic Energy Agency or 
by agencies from EU Member States.45 
The Commission does not have a glo -
bal overview of all projects funded by 
all instruments in the area of security 
policy, as well as CBRN risk mitigation 
funded by other donors.
A monitoring system has 
been established
46 
EuropeAid has established a monitor -
ing system for the initiative, based 
around key performance and key 
impact indicators. It also monitors the 
projects with the assistance of the JRC 
and of UNICRI. EuropeAid’s annual 
activity report also provides informa -
tion on the implementation of the 
initiative.
47 
The JRC has set up a well -developed 
and exhaustive website, which pro -
vides the stakeholders with up -to-date 
information on the project proposals, 
selection and implementation.
48 
In its ‘Six -monthly progress report on 
the implementation of the EU strategy 
against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction’18 the Council reports 
on CBRN risk mitigation and, inter alia, 
on the Centres of Excellence initiative.
49 
Considering that the projects only 
started in 2013 (see paragraph 39), it is 
too early to assess the effectiveness of 
the monitoring system in place.18 The latest such report was 
published in the Official 
Journal C 54 of 25.2.2014.
19
 Conclusions and 
recommendations
Conclusions
50 
On the overall audit question, the 
Court concludes that the EU CBRN 
 Centres of Excellence initiative can 
contribute effectively to mitigating 
chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear risks from outside the EU, 
but several elements still need to be 
finalised.
51 
As for the three sub -questions the 
Court concludes that:
(a) The concept of the initiative is 
based on a sound analysis and 
addresses deficiencies identi -
fied in the former TACIS pro -
gramme. The comprehensive and 
demand -driven approach and the 
distinct focus on regional coopera -
tion provide a long -term response 
to priorities defined in the Euro -
pean security strategy and the EU 
strategy against the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction 
that had not been addressed until 
then. The initiative provides for 
the involvement of all stakeholders 
in the partner countries at a very 
early stage in order to contribute 
to the sustainability of the initia -
tive and ownership by the partner 
countries in the many regions 
concerned.(b) The organisational set -up of the 
initiative is generally appropriate, 
despite its complexity, but needs 
some adjustments. The choice of 
the two implementing bodies and 
the regions was well reasoned, and 
each of the bodies involved has 
a specific role to play. However, the 
regional secretariats lack technical 
capacity. The EU delegations do 
not sufficiently use their position 
to enhance political support in the 
partner countries and liaise with 
the EU Member States.
(c) An appropriate management 
system is in place and is becom -
ing operational. However, some 
elements of the initiative were 
delayed. The initial implementa -
tion plan did not have sufficient 
regard to the inherent complexity 
of the initiative. This meant that 
the implementation plan could not 
be fully applied, as key elements, 
such as the needs assessments, 
had not yet been completed when 
project selection commenced. At 
the earlier stage of the initiative 
partner countries were not suffi -
ciently involved in the selection of 
the projects. Some projects are in 
progress and monitoring systems 
have been set up. The Court noted 
that cooperation between the 
decision -making bodies (EEAS and 
EuropeAid) on one side and the 
implementing bodies (the JRC and 
UNICRI) on the other side takes 
place only on a bilateral basis.
20 Conclusions and recommendations
Recommendations
52 
With regard to the initiative’s structure 
as it is now, the EEAS and the Commis -
sion should:
 ο concentrate EU funding in the 
 areas of most relevance to EU 
security so to get the most direct 
benefit;
 ο increase the capacities of the 
regional secretariats by adding 
technical expertise;
 ο increase the role of the EU delega -
tions, particularly in the countries 
where a regional secretariat has 
been set up.53 
As regards the management of the 
projects, the Commission should:
 ο take measures not only to involve 
partner countries in the initiation 
of projects but also in their imple -
mentation. This would increase 
their ownership of the measures 
and ensure their sustainability;
 ο continue efforts to improve proce -
dures in order to decrease the time 
gap between project proposals 
and project implementation;
 ο improve cooperation between 
decision -making and implement -
ing bodies, for instance by reviving 
the coordination committee.
This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 7 October 2014.
 For the Court of Auditors
 Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA  
 President

21
 Annexes
The structure of the initiative
Regional 
secretariats
National teamsRound
tables
RSRS
NT
NTNTNT
NT
NT NTNTNTNTCouncil Parliament
CBRN MS
contact pointsGovernance teamEEAS
EuropeAid
DG Research
CentreMS agencies
RS
NT NTNTNT
NT
RS
NT NTNTNT
NTStrategy
Management and
coordination
Implementing bodies
and contractorsUNICRIAnnex I
22 Annexes
List of regional secretariats
Abbreviation Region Countries involved
SEA South‑east AsiaBrunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam
AAF African Atlantic Façade Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Togo
NA North Africa Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
SEESouth‑east Europe, southern Caucasus,  
Moldova and UkraineAlbania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo ‑
nia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine
CA Central Asia Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
ME Middle East Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon
ECA Eastern and central AfricaBurundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Uganda, Zambia
In negotiation
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council To be determinedAnnex II
23 Annexes
Individual components of the initiative and bodies involvedAnnex IIIEstablishment of national teams (NT)
and regional secretariats (RS)
Identiﬁcation of capability gaps using the
needs assessment toolkit
Preparation of national action plans
to address the gaps
Identiﬁcation at round tables of the common
regional needs and actions
Fine-tuning and approval of project proposal
Contracting of Member States agencies
Project implementation
Monitoring and quality reviewRSPartner
country UNICRI
NTJRC
NTUNICRI
RS
NT JRC
EuropeAidNT JRC
EuropeAidJRCRS
NT MS 
agencies
EuropeAidJRCUNICRI
24 Annexes Annex IVImplementing bodies for the initiative
JRC UNICRI
Full name Joint Research CentreUnited Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute
Seat Brussels, Belgium; in addition, 7 remote research 
institutesTurin, Italy
Area of operationsScientific research, originally with a special focus on 
nuclear and radiological issuesCrime prevention and criminal justice
Homepage http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=10 http://www.Unicri.it/
Reasons for choice as 
implementing body of the 
initiative— Relevant technical know ‑how
— Successful cooperation in predecessor programmes
—  International recognition as an expert body in the 
area
— Experience in project management— Expertise in crime and justice affairs
— Know ‑how in capacity building in non ‑EU countries
— Previous cooperation with the European Commission
—  A UN body is required, as the initiative touches on 
sensitive issues for partner countries in the area of 
security
Main tasks in the initiative— Provision of technical and scientific support
—  Assistance in the drafting of project proposals, includ ‑
ing the design of the technical specifications
— Support of EuropeAid in the selection of projects
—  Establishment and maintenance of monitoring 
mechanisms for projects and the initiative as a whole 
—  Performance of needs assessments together with 
partner countries— Methodological preparation
—  Establishment of regional secretariats, including the 
provision of permanent staff
—  Assistance during the setting up of structures in part ‑
ner countries (national focal points, national teams)
—  Drafting of national action plans together with 
partner countries
—  Organisation of regional ‘round ‑table’ meetings, 
which ensure regional cooperation and help in the 
generation of project proposals
‑
25 Annexes Annex VList of projects currently implemented by the initiative1
Project 
NumberTitleImplementation
periodBudget 
in euroCountries/regions
(for abbreviations see 
Annex II)
Project 040Strengthening health laboratories to minimise potential biologi ‑
cal risks1.1.2014–31.12.2016 4 495 712 CA, ME, SEE
Project 039Strengthening health security at ports, airports and ground 
crossings2 3.7. 2013–2 2.7. 2015 1 500  000 CA, ME, NA, SEE
Project 038 Export control outreach for dual use items 1.1.2014–31.12.2015 2 500  000 CA, ME
Project 037MEDILABSECURE — Establishment of networks of human and 
animal virology laboratories and of medical entomology6.1.2014–5.1.2018 3 626 410 ME, NA, SEE
Project 036Further development and consolidation of the Mediterranean 
programme for intervention epidemiology training (MediPIET)1.1.2014–31.12.2017 6 400  000 ME, NA, SEE
Project 035 Management of hazardous chemical and biological waste 1.1.2014–30.6.2017 3 871 800 A AF, NA
Project 034 Strengthening capacities in CBRN response and in chemical and 
medical emergency1.1.2014–31.12.2016 3 914 034 ME
Project 033 Strengthening the national CBRN legal framework and provision 
of specialised and technical training to enhance CBRN prepared ‑
ness and response capabilities15.9.2013–14.9.2016 2 699  069 AAF, ECA
Project 032Establishment of a Mediterranean programme for intervention 
epidemiology training (MediPIET)1.1.2013–31.12.2014 440  000 AAF, ME, NA, SEE
Project 031 Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on 
dual‑use concerns of chemical materials1.1.2013–31.12.2014 800  000 International
Project 030 Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in the south ‑east 
Asia region1.1.2013–31.12.2014 600  000 SEA
Project 029 Regional human resource development for nuclear safety, 
se curity, and safeguards management through a university 
master’s programme carried out in Thailand1.1.2013–31.12.2014 340 000 SEA
Project 028 Supporting development of an integrated national security 
system for nuclear and radioactive materials1.1.2013–31.12.2014 1 000  000 SEA
Project 027 Biorisk management 1.1.2013–31.12.2014 480  000 Countries in SEA
Project 026 Prerequisite for strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks 1.1.2013–31.12.2014 300 000 Lebanon, Tunisia
Project 025 Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on 
biosafety/biosecurity/biorisk management1.1.2013–31.12.2014 480  000 ME
Project 024 Development of a methodology for RN materials detection, 
management and protection of the public1.1.2013–31.12.2014 600  000Mauritania, Morocco,
Senegal
Project 023 Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from chemi ‑
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear substances1.1.2013–31.12.2014 500 000Countries in the Balkans,
ME, NA and SEA
1 http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Projects.aspx
26 Annexes
Project 
NumberTitleImplementation
periodBudget 
in euroCountries/regions
(for abbreviations see 
Annex II)
Project 022 Provision of specialised technical training to enhance the first 
responders’ capabilities in case of CBRN incidents1.1.2013–31.12.2014 700 000 AAF , SEA
Project 021 Building regional border control capacity to identify and detect 
CRN materials1.1.2013–31.12.2014 700 000 AAF , SEA
Project 019 Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve 
secure information management systems and data exchange 
mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control3.1.2013–2.1.2015 400  000 International
Project 018 International network of universities and institutes for raising 
awareness on dual‑use concerns in biotechnology1.1.2013–31.12.2014 399 719 International
Project 017 Establishing a national response plan in Ghana and Kenya for 
responding to unauthorised events involving chemical, biologi ‑
cal, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials15.5.2013–14.5.2015 240 000 Ghana and Kenya
Project 016 Supporting development of an integrated national nuclear 
security system1.1.2013–31.12.2014 400  000 NA
Project 015 Strengthening laboratory biosafety and biosecurity through 
development of a laboratory iso‑bank systemTendering ongoing 480  000 Countries in SEA
Project 014 Provision of specialised and technical training to enhance the first 
response capabilities 4.1.2013–3.1.2015 400  000 SEE
Project 013 Capacity building and raising awareness for identifying and 
responding to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear materials in sub ‑Saharan African countries1.1.2013–31.12.2014 319 924 ECA
Project 012 Sharing experience between EU and south ‑east Asian countries 
on the reinforcement of legislation and regulations in the field of 
biosafety and biosecurity, as well as relevant laboratory manage ‑
ment systems through regional centre of excellence — phase 24.1.2013–3.1.2015 320 000 Countries in SEA
Project 011 Promoting good practice and inter‑agency procedures for as ‑
sessing the risks of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
misuse1.1.2013–31.12.2014 1 915 452Countries in NA, the 
Balkans, ME, SEA
Project 010 Development of e‑learning courses for CBRN risk mitigation 1.1.2013–31.12.2014 388 451 International
Project 009 National response plan in Lebanon for CBRN events 1.1.2013–31.12.2014 159 900 Lebanon
Project 008 Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks 1.1.2013–31.12.2014 800  000 Countries in SEA
Project 007 Guidelines, procedures and standardisation on biosafety/
biosecurity1.1.2013–31.12.2014 1 199 576Countries in SEA, in the 
Balkans, Moldova
Project 006 Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on chemi ‑
cal and biological waste management1.1.2013–31.12.2014 480  000 SEA
Project 005 Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on CBRN 
import/export monitoring1.1.2013–31.12.2014 1 440 000 AAF, CA, ME, NAAnnex V
27 Annexes
Project 
NumberTitleImplementation
periodBudget 
in euroCountries/regions
(for abbreviations see 
Annex II)
Project 004 Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on 
inter‑agency CBRN response1.1.2013–31.12.2014 959 675 SEA, SEE
Project 003 Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on 
biosafety/biosecurity/biorisk management1.1.2013–31.12.2014 1 920 000 AAF, NA, SEA, SEE
Project 002 Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from chemi ‑
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear substances1.1.2013–31.12.2014 160 000 Balkan countries
Project 001 Identification and strengthening of forensic capacities in the area 
of prevention of organised crime and illicit trafficking of chemical 
agents, including training and equipment for front line customs 
officers1.1.2013–31.12.2014 640  000 Balkan countries
Pilot 2 Pilot 2 — Reinforcement of legislation and regulations in the 
field of biosafety, biosecurity and laboratory management 
systems1.1.2011–30.11.2012 375 000 Countries in SEA
Pilot 1 Pilot 1 — Capacity building in countering illicit nuclear 
trafficking1.1.2011–30.6.2012 375 000 Countries in SEAAnnex V
28
IX
The Commission and UNICRI bring different but 
complementary programme support to the Initia -
tive. The governance team provides support on 
governance issues as and when required. On-site 
assistance will be provided to a number of regional 
secretariats, especially those active in the acceding, 
candidate and neighbourhood countries.
Now that networks are in place the Commission 
intends to improve technical capacity where this 
can be best absorbed. EU delegations are playing 
an increasing role in supporting the Initiative. Now 
that the bottom-up, voluntary basis for participa -
tion is in place, delegation support can be mobi -
lised without being seen as the driver for regional 
cooperation.
X
The difference in the capacity of partner countries 
to take the Initiative forward has led to a somewhat 
uneven development. 
XI
The Commission and the EEAS thank the Court for 
its recommendations, which will reinforce internal 
efforts to improve the Initiative.Executive summary
VII
The Commission and the EEAS welcome the Court’s 
conclusions and agree that there are elements of 
the Initiative that need to be finalised. Good pro -
gress has been made in implementing an Initiative 
that is based on a voluntary, bottom-up approach 
which will take time to reach a level of maturity 
and which should always be subject to continu -
ing development. All the necessary tools are in 
place, such as the establishment of the necessary 
structures in most regions, the holding of round-
table meetings, a needs assessment questionnaire, 
project funding in different regions, measures to 
monitor project implementation and evaluation, 
as well as various visibility tools. Moreover, regular 
meetings are organised with partner countries, 
implementing agencies and international organisa -
tions, as well as EU Member States’ contact points. 
The first national action plans are being developed 
in five pilot countries. Other efforts are being made 
to invite additional partner countries to partici -
pate in the programme. More than 20 new partner 
countries have expressed an interest in joining the 
programme. With these building blocks and the 
networks that have been created, the Initiative can 
reach an enhanced level in proving better security 
and risk management for the EU and participating 
countries. 
VIII
In addition to meeting the goals of the European 
security strategy and the EU strategy to counter 
criminal activities related to the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Initiative 
reduces the risks from man-made and natural CBRN 
threats. Where WMD risks are present, the Initiative 
reinforces counter-proliferation measures, but look -
ing at the geographic scope of the initiative, sup -
port is also provided where wider CBRN risks arise. Reply of the EEAS  
and the Commission
Reply of the EEAS and the Commission 29
34
All the activities within the Initiative are on a vol -
untary basis. The partner countries decide whether 
they want to develop a national CBRN action plan 
or not. 
35
Project funding per se  is not dependent on the 
carrying out of a needs assessment questionnaire 
and/or the establishment of a national action plan. 
In some cases the Commission takes action on the 
basis of specific requests from partner countries 
for an urgent priority problem related to CBRN risk 
mitigation needs to be solved. 
36
Only during the early stages of the Initiative were 
projects suggested by implementing agencies. This 
occurred when there were urgent and apparent 
needs that could be anticipated while the bottom-
up aspects of the initiative were in their initial 
stages of development.
37
After the first experience, a number of steps have 
been taken to improve the communication with 
partner countries on the quality requirements 
of CBRN-related projects eligible for EU funding. 
The objectives and funding criteria are now dis -
cussed regularly at the round-table meetings in the 
regions, at the meetings with the heads of regional 
secretariats as well as at the meetings with the 
CBRN national focal points. The project propos -
als previously received were often too limited in 
scope and frequently only of a national instead of 
a regional character.  The JRC tracked in detail any 
changes made to project proposals. All the original 
project proposals are on file and can be reviewed at 
any time. Observations
21
The Initiative’s voluntary, bottom-up approach is 
seen as a model for engendering cooperation on 
complex security issues.
26
The choice of the regions was the result of a com -
prehensive approach where the EEAS, the Commis -
sion and countries of the regions were supported 
by the EU Member States which participated in the 
selection through dispatching experts paid for by 
the Commission. 
The logic of prioritising the acceding and candidate 
countries, as well as countries belonging to the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, is evident. The significance 
of risks and threats in other regions should not be 
underestimated, as Fukushima and the recent Ebola 
outbreak and pandemics originating from south-
east Asia have demonstrated. The Initiative has 
an inherent flexibility which allows it to respond 
efficiently to global and emerging threats.
27
On-site assistance will be provided to a number of 
regional secretariats, especially those active in the 
acceding, candidate and neighbourhood countries. 
Steps are being taken to facilitate this process. 
28
This is a priority follow-up action for the EEAS and 
EuropeAid, and we are developing the tools so that 
the delegations and Member State embassies are 
better placed to support the Initiative.
29
The difference in the capacity of partner countries 
to take the Initiative forward has led to a somewhat 
uneven development. Prioritising certain regions, 
based on EU security priorities and the capacity of 
partners, was an approach that responded to this 
specific framework of implementation.
Reply of the EEAS and the Commission 30
Conclusions and recommendations
50
The Commission and the EEAS welcome the Court’s 
report on the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence. 
There is a need for a demand-driven and regional 
approach which is of great usefulness for our 
institutions.
51 (a)
We welcome the Court’s conclusions. There are 
elements of the initiative that need to be finalised. 
Good progress has been made in implementing an 
initiative that is based on a voluntary, bottom-up 
approach which will take time to reach a level of 
maturity and which should always be subject to 
continuing development. All the necessary tools are 
in place, such as the establishment of the necessary 
structures in most regions, the holding of round-
table meetings, a needs assessment questionnaire, 
project funding in different regions, measures to 
monitor project implementation and evaluation, 
as well as various visibility tools. Moreover, regular 
meetings are organised with partner countries, 
implementing agencies and international organisa -
tions, as well as EU Member States’ contact points. 
The first national action plans are being developed 
in five pilot countries. Other efforts are being made 
to invite additional partner countries to partici -
pate in the programme. More than 20 new partner 
countries have expressed an interest in joining the 
programme. With these building blocks and the 
networks that have been created, the Initiative can 
reach an enhanced level in providing better security 
and risk management for the EU and participating 
countries. 38
In comparison to other programmes, the time 
periods are relatively short due to the so-called N+1 
rule that is applicable to the Initiative. On average, 
a project starts 15 months after the Commission 
decision on the annual action programme.
40
Improving the EU visibility of the Initiative remains 
an important priority for the Commission and the 
EEAS.
41
A number of steps have been taken aimed at 
encouraging greater involvement of the partner 
countries in the work, for example by suggesting 
to implementing consortia to incorporate local 
expertise.
Common reply to paragraphs 42 and 43
The reestablishment of a coordination committee 
should facilitate wider cooperation and it should 
focus on strategic directions and implementa -
tion issues. Its format may vary as discussions 
with implementing partners, such as UNICRI, must 
respect the Commission’s financial regulations.
However, bilateral cooperation remains necessary 
in order to discuss in depth certain issues such as 
contractual and financial issues.
45
The Commission makes all the necessary efforts to 
coordinate EU activities in the field of CBRN inside 
and outside of the European Union.
Various forums exist where coordination takes 
place, such as the EU CBRN action plan, various 
working committees at Council level, the G8/G7 
Global Partnership (involving main parties and part -
ners including those of international organisations: 
IAEA; WHO; Committee 1540; OPCW, ISTC and STCU) 
or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terror -
ism (an initiative created by the Russian Federation 
and the United States of America). Thanks to these 
coordination activities, the Commission has a global 
overview to the extent possible.
Reply of the EEAS and the Commission 31
53 First bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. Implementing consortia are encour -
aged to incorporate local expertise when carrying 
out the projects.
53 Second bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. In comparison to other programmes, 
the time periods are relatively short due to the 
so-called N+1 rule that is applicable to the Initia -
tive. On average, a project starts 15 months after 
the Commission Decision on the Annual Action 
Programme. The Commission will seek to reduce 
further the time gap.
53 Third bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. The coordination committee, focus -
ing on strategic and implementation issues will 
be revived. Its format may vary as discussions 
with implementing partners, such as UNICRI must 
respect the Commission’s Financial Regulations.51 (b)
The Commission and UNICRI bring different but 
complementary programme support to the initia -
tive. The governance team provides support on 
governance issues as and when required. On-site 
assistance will be provided to a number of regional 
secretariats, especially those active in the acceding, 
candidate and neighbourhood countries.
Now that networks are in place, the Commission 
intends to improve technical capacity where this 
can be best absorbed. EU delegations play an 
increasing role in supporting the Initiative. Now that 
the bottom-up, voluntary basis for participation is 
in place, delegation support can be mobilised. 
51 (c)
In some respects, variable progress was inevitable, 
but now that the tools are in place, implementation 
of the programme is more even though progress 
across regions will remain variable. Ways of ensur -
ing that the good bilateral cooperation between 
decision-making bodies and the good bilateral 
cooperation between implementing partners 
is extended to cover all four bodies are under 
examination. 
52 First bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. The Initiative has an inherent flexibility 
which allows it to respond efficiently to global and 
emerging threats.
52 Second bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. On-site assistance will be provided to 
a number of regional secretariats, especially those 
active in the accession, candidate and neighbour -
hood countries. Steps are being taken to facilitate 
this process.
52 Third bullet
The Commission and the EEAS accept the recom -
mendation. This is a priority follow-up action for 
the EEAS and the Commission and we are develop -
ing the tools so that the delegations and Member 
State embassies are better placed to support the 
Initiative.

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QJ-AB-14-017-EN-N  ISSN  1977-5679
The European Union launched its chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
Centres of Excellence initiative in May 2010. The 
initiative is designed to strengthen the 
institutional capacity of non-EU countries to 
mitigate CBRN risks which, if not countered, may 
constitute a threat to the EU.
The Court’s audit assessed whether the EU CBRN 
Centres of Excellence initiative can contribute 
effectively to mitigating risks of this kind from 
outside the EU. It concludes that the initiative 
can contribute effectively to mitigating chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear risks from 
outside the EU, but several elements still need to 
be finalised. The Court makes a number of 
recommendations which the EEAS and the 
Commission should take into account to further 
develop the initiative and ensure its 
sustainability.
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS