EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 20.7.2010 
SEC(2010) 949 
  
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the 
 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIA MENT AND THE COUNCIL 
 
On Progress in Romania under the Co-op eration and Verification Mechanism 
   
ROMANIA: Technical Update  
{COM(2010) 401 final} 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Benchmark 1: Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process notably by 
enhancing the capacity and accountability of  the Superior Council of Magistracy. 
Report and monitor the impact of the ne w civil and penal procedures codes.............. 3 
• Implement any necessary measures, including those provided for in the rel evant Action Plan of the 
Superior Council of the Magistracy adopted in June 2006, that ensure a consistent interpretation and application of the law at all levels of court throughout the country following adequate 
consultation with practising judges, prosecutor s and lawyers; monitor the impact of recently-
adopted legislative and administrative measures  
• Design and implement a rational and realistic staffing model for the justice system on the basis of 
the ongoing needs assessment 
• Develop and implement a plan to restructure th e Public Ministry that addresses the existing 
managerial shortcomings and human resources issues 
• Monitor the impact that the newly-adopted amendments to the Civil and Criminal Procedure 
Codes have on the justice system so that any neces sary corrective measures can be incorporated in 
the planned new Codes 
• Report and monitor on the progress made, as regards adopting the new Codes including adequate 
consultations and the impact it will have on the justice system 
• Enhance the capacity of the Superior Council of Magistracy to perform its core responsibilities as 
well as its accountability. In particular, address the potential conflicts of interest and unethical 
actions by individual Council members. Recruit judicial inspectors, according to the newly-
adopted objective criteria, who should also have a greater regional representation 
2. Benchmark 2: Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for 
verifying assets, incompatibilities and potenti al conflicts of interest, and for issuing 
mandatory decisions on the basis of whic h dissuasive sanctions can be taken ........... 8 
• Adopt legislation establishing an effective and independent integrity agency with responsibilities 
for verifying assets, potential incompatibilities and conflicts of interest, as well as issuing 
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken 
• Establish such a National Integrity Agency; ensure it has the necessary human and financial 
resources to fulfil its mandate 
3. Benchmark 3: Building on pr ogress already made, continue to conduct professional, 
non- partisan investigations into alle gations of high- level corruption...................... 10 
• Continue to provide a track record of profession al and non-partisan inves tigations into high-level 
corruption cases 
• Ensure the legal and institutional stability of th e anti-corruption framework, in particular by 
maintaining the current nomination and revocation procedure for the General Prosecutor of 
Romania, the Chief Prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate and other leading 
positions in the general prosecutor's office 
4. Benchmark 4: Take further measures to  prevent and fight against corruption, in 
particular within the local government ...................................................................... 13 
• Assess the results of the recently-concluded aw areness-raising campaigns and, if necessary, 
propose follow-up activities that focus on the sectors with a high risk of corruption 
• Report on the use of measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to make local 
government more transparent, as well as on the sanctions taken against public officials, in 
particular those in local government  
Note: 
Under each of the four benchmarks, several issues of particular concern were mutually agreed when the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was created in  December 2006. These issues are listed above under 
each benchmark and have been addresse d as far as progress has been report ed. You may consult previous reports  
at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/index_en.htm  
EN 3   EN 1. B ENCHMARK 1: ENSURE A MORE TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT JUDICIAL PROCESS 
NOTABLY BY ENHANCING THE CAPA CITY AND ACCOUNTAB ILITY OF THE SUPERIOR 
COUNCIL OF MAGISTRACY . REPORT AND MONITOR THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CIVIL 
AND PENAL PROCEDURES CODES  
Codes After a standstill between Oc tober 2009 and January 2010, Parliamentary discussions 
on the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes advanced and the Codes were adopted by 
Parliament on 22 June and promulgated by the President on 30 June. Representatives 
of stakeholders and civil society were i nvited to participate in Committee sessions. 
The Commission's recommendation to adopt th e Procedure Codes has therefore been 
achieved.  
The entering into force of the four new codes is foreseen for late 2011. Implementing 
legislation for all four codes, which woul d determine the necessary amendments to 
related legislation, has not yet been finali sed. A draft of the implementing law for the 
Criminal Code was published for public consultation on 21 June. Drafts of the implementing laws for the Criminal Code and the Civil Code were approved by the Government on 7 July and will be sent to Parliament for debate. Implementing laws 
for the Procedure Codes will now be prep ared following the adoption of the actual 
Procedure Codes. Further work is ther efore required to fulfil the Commission 
recommendation to facilitate th e swift entry into force of  the four codes through the 
adoption of an implementing law that will render the legislative framework coherent.  
In May 2009, in the ambit of the inte r-institutional worki ng group set up by the 
Ministry of Justice for the impact assessment of the new codes, a questionnaire was 
sent to Courts and Prosecutors’ Offices . The answers submitted by 219 courts and 
the General Prosecutor's Office have been co mpiled and analysed. The results will be 
fed into the overall impact assessment of the new Codes to be carried out by 
consultants financed as part of a Worl d Bank loan to support judicial reform. 
However, selection of the consultants has been delayed due to procurement issues. 
Overall, progress on the Commission's reco mmendation in its report of July 22, 2009 
- to carry out a thorough assessment of  the impact of the four codes on the 
functioning of the judicial system and or ganisation of the courts and prosecutors' 
offices and to quantify the budgetary means needed to implement them – has been 
minimal. 
In order to advance the implementation of  some important reforms included in the 
procedural codes, the government has pr epared a draft of the so-called "small 
reforms law" which should enter Parlia mentary discussion soon. The initiative 
advances certain elements of the procedur al codes which target the acceleration of 
the trials, such as the simplifying of the summoning procedures, restricting the right 
of appeal for some case categories and creating the possibility for a defendant to admit guilt in criminal trials. Other elements target the reduction of workload: the competence of the High Court of Cassation a nd Justice (HCCJ) to try cases in first 
instance would be reduced so it would be able  to focus on its role as a real cassation 
court, while introducing the principle of  opportunity would reduce the caseload of 
the prosecution.  
EN 4   EN Another initiative launched by the government  is a consultation on a "Strategy for the 
development of Justice as a Public Serv ice". The Strategy addresses many issues 
including the implementation of the codes and improving the legislative, institutional 
and financial framework of the judiciary. Whilst the proposal for such a strategy is 
broadly welcomed, many professionals note th at the value of the strategy cannot be 
judged without a detailed and time-bound action plan.  
Jurisprudence 
One of the main instruments of unification of jurisprudence rema ined the appeal in 
the interest of the law. The previous back log of appeals has been eliminated by the 
HCCJ. Following a recommendation by the Commission, a streamlined procedure, 
according to which the relevant section of  the court prepares a report on the case 
before having the plenum decide on it, is  generally applicable to all sections now. 
The draft Small Reforms Law foresees a substantial change of the existing practice 
for appeals in the interest of the law. Th e scope of persons with legal standing to 
initiate the procedure will be extended to the Ombudsman and th e leading boards of 
the HCCJ. In addition, competence to determin e these appeals is transferred from the 
joint sections of the HCCJ (requiring at leas t two-thirds of all HCCJ judges to attend) 
to a special 25 judge panel.  "Rapporteur judges" will draft a report on the case 
mentioning the different possible solutions of the legal matter, specialist opinions, 
relevant jurisprudence and doctrine. Dead lines for trying the appeal and publishing 
the decision and its reasoning will be introduced. These suggestions follow the 
Commission's recommendation to streamline th e procedure for appeal s in the interest 
of the law and ensure at the same time that  expertise in all relevant areas of law is 
provided.  
While the future changes are welcome, it shou ld be recalled that the appeal in the 
interest of the law is not the exclus ive method of unification and it remedies 
conflicting jurisprudence only once such lega l practice already exists. Once the Civil 
Procedure Code is in force, the High Court will act increasingly as a Cassation Court judging appeals on points of law. The cour t will also be in charge of unifying 
jurisprudence in areas of law which presen tly are not under its ju risdiction - such as 
family or bankruptcy law. Consideration s hould therefore be gi ven already under the 
current legal framework to the internal organisation a nd working methods of the 
HCCJ, in order to ensure it wi ll be in a position to fulfil its future work. In this 
regard, the project developed by the HCCJ  and supported by the Superior Council of 
Magistracy (SCM) in the ambit of  a Transition Facility project
1 could serve as a good 
starting point to improve the working methods in order to achieve a proactive and comprehensive system to promote a st able and unified jurisprudence.  
The publication of a selection of relevant  court decisions by the HCCJ and other 
courts has continued, with various hard copy cassation collections produced as well 
as some decisions being published online.
2 However, significant delays have arisen 
in populating a national portal (Jurindex) fo r the publication of the full motivations 
of all court decisions. Recent commitments  by the SCM of renewed support for the 
further development of this portal, includ ing financial and logistical support, are 
                                                 
1 RO/2007-IB/JH/01 
2 From January 2010, the HCCJ’s quarterly cassation bulletin is being published on a monthly basis. 
EN 5   EN timely. The national portal is a key project to  ensure that the full jurisprudence and 
motivated decisions of courts are published and accessible to all, increasing transparency in the act of justice. 
Staffing 
Human resourcing continues to remain a major challenge. The Commission’s report 
of 22 July 2009, called upon the SCM to adopt a flexible priority-d riven approach to 
human resourcing.  
The Human Resources Strategy adopted in  2008 was premised on a significantly 
lower number of retirements than materia lised. This exacerba ted already existing 
resourcing problems. Since summer 2009 th e SCM has reacted to these trends by 
increasing the intake of ma gistrates. As a result in the year to June 2009 more 
magistrates were recruited than left the magistracy which resulted in a small fall in the number of vacancies. However, this in creased recruitment may have come at a 
cost. The majority of the new recruits are now entering the magistracy through the 
extraordinary direct entry exam for legal pr ofessionals with five years experience, as 
opposed to graduating from the National Inst itute of Magistracy (NIM). Wh ilst this 
may have been necessary to address rapidl y the large numbers of exits and address 
widespread vacancies including at courts and prosecutors’ offices with the highest 
workloads, these candidates do not receive the same training as the candidates who 
graduate from the NIM. This has raised que stions as to the quality and preparedness 
of the direct entrants in particular as, c ontrary to the new magistrates coming from 
the NIM, they are not subjected to the same  capacity exam. With a view to a medium 
term solution, the SCM increased the inta ke to NIM for 2009 but even this rise 
would appear insufficient to minimise use of the extraordinary direct entry 
competitions. More substantial reflections are required on increasing capacity at the 
NIM as well as training and recruitment arrangements.  
To accompany other emergency measur es, the Commission’s recommendation 
advocated transferring vacant positions to wher e they are needed most. In short, this 
means to start correlating the personnel scheme with workloads in order to allow new recruits or transferred or promoted pers onnel to be directed towards courts and 
prosecutors’ offices with the highest wo rkload. Whilst the SCM has continued to 
redistribute the vacant positions identified in spring 2009, no additional positions 
have been identified and any further identification of positions for horizontal redistribution has been postponed, despite su itable vacant positions for reallocation 
exist. In addition, as in previous periods, vacancies have been filled in the last 12 
months at courts and prosecutors’ offices with low workload that could have been 
redistributed. As in 2009, the possibility  of undertaking meaningful vertical 
redistribution has been quashed by the or ganisation of promoti on contests to fill 
vacant positions at higher courts and prosecutors offices. The number of magistrates seconded to other institutions has reduced slightly since last summer and the vast 
majority of the remaining secondments are to institutions connected to the judicial 
system.  
Looking to the medium and long term, th e Commission’s recommendation of 22 July 
called upon the Romanian authorities to progress structural reforms, such as transferring administrative  tasks to auxiliary personne l, and to re-dimension the 
personnel scheme to allocate personnel ac cording to workloads and therefore to 
EN 6   EN maximise efficiency of existing personnel. Since last summer the SCM has identified 
the attributions to be tran sferred and the requ ired qualifications and competences of 
the auxiliary personnel who will take on this work, and prepared the necessary 
legislative amendments. The SCM has also  proposed legislative amendments to 
introduce court managers. In addition, an EU -financed technical assistance project is 
assisting the SCM in reviewing its huma n resources strategy and management. In 
December 2009 the SCM began piloting a provisional system which imposes an optimal, maximum workload per judge.  
Work was also commenced to identify cour ts and prosecutors offices with a small 
workload,
3 for possible closure and reallocation of  their resources. However, from an 
initial 41 courts and prosecutors’ offices , the working group has now narrowed its 
considerations to nine loca tions which do not operate at  all and six other locations 
with small workloads, although final recomm endations will be made on a case by 
case basis. The project also considers alteri ng territorial circumscriptions with a view 
to ensuring viable workloads in those locations not earmarked for closure but 
currently with a disproportionately low work load per judge or prosecutor. Five courts 
and associated prosecutors’ offices are fore seen to receive an increased territorial 
circumscription. 
In accordance with a recommendation by the Commission and in  the context of 
implementing the new codes, the geogra phic distribution of personnel must be 
reviewed as a priority. It is striking that at courts of the same tier of jurisdiction workload per judge or prosecutor can vary  dramatically irresp ective of vacancies. 
In addition, the possibility of a certain leve l of specialisation of  judges, both at the 
level of the HCCJ and at lower courts should be examined, keeping in mind the 
importance of preserving effective random cas e distribution. This would at the same 
time increase the speed of resolution of certain types of cases and improve the 
general consistency of jurisprudence. Propos als from the HCCJ in this regard have 
been endorsed by the SCM and transmitted to the Ministry of Justice.  
Public Ministry 
The General Prosecutor was reappointed fo r a new term of office in October 2009. 
Steps taken to continue the reform of th e Public Ministry since July 2009 include 
implementation of an integrated financial management system. Measures are being taken to strengthen asset recovery. These in clude the preparation of a manual of best 
practice and introducing asset recovery as an  indicator in evalua ting performance of 
prosecution offices. Work is also underway to assess possibilities to hire specialists 
in local prosecutors’ offices, as well as tr ansferring administrative control of the 
judicial police from the Mi nistry of Administration an d Interior to the Public 
Ministry. A more fundamental reform of  the Public Ministry including the 
redistribution of positions and the closure of offices remains necessary. The General Prosecutor continued to make proposals to the Ministry of Justice and the SCM to 
address these deficiencies.  
Superior Council of Magistracy 
                                                
 
3 Below 2000 files per annum. 
EN 7   EN The Commission’s report of 22 July 2009 called upon the SCM to strengthen its 
transparency and accountability, specifically  in relation to human resourcing 
decisions and disciplinary measures but al so more generally to ensure all SCM 
decisions are published in a clear and accessible format.  
Since last summer the SCM has rectified a gap in terms of the publication of their 
decisions, by ensuring all disciplinary deci sions including their motivations will now 
be published online at the point of issu e. To accompany online publication the SCM 
has also published a jurisp rudence collection of their disciplinary decisions 2006-
2009. Complete agendas for meetings ar e now routinely published, although 
accompanying documents are often not available.  
Concerns continue to be rais ed as to the transparency and accountability of the SCM 
in certain fields of its comp etence. Particular concerns ha ve been raised as to the 
thoroughness, objectivity and transparency of the interviews the SCM undertakes to 
select judges for promotion to the HCCJ. This  was one of the specific issues raised in 
a petition for “Integrity and Dignity” signe d by hundreds of magistrates in March this 
year, which arose in the light  of controversial appointment s to the HCCJ and in light 
of a major corruption investigation by the National Anti-Corr uption Directorate 
(DNA) involving HCCJ judges. The absence of a substantive wr itten motivation of 
the promotion decisions to the HCCJ taken by the SCM, contrasted to the more thorough exposition of the merits contai ned in the written motivations of 
secondments and transfer decisions, has raised questions am ongst other observers. 
The SCM is modifying its guidance for hand ling these promotion contests including 
revising the selection criteria candidate s are to be assessed against during the 
interview. However, magistrates’ represen tatives have proposed more far reaching 
measures to ensure a more objec tive and transparent procedure. 
Concerns have also been raised as to th e apparent passive appr oach of the SCM in 
handling alleged breaches of discipline or of the deontol ogical code, as well as 
towards corruption within the magistracy. St atistics show that between 1 July 2009 
and 1 March 2010 the Judicial Inspection r eceived 2727 notifications or complaints. 
Although the vast majority did not con cern disciplinary issues, the volume of 
complaints created a substantial workload for the inspectorate in terms of effective filtering and follow-up. During the same peri od the Judicial Inspection submitted 253 
cases to the discipline commissions and co mmenced 36 ex officio investigations. As 
a result, the Sections for Judges and Prosecutors of the SCM imposed 5 sanctions upon judges and 2 sanctions upon prosecutors. The sanctions included one exclusion 
from the magistracy, five reductions of sa lary and one warning. The average duration 
of the proceedings from point of notifica tion of the judicial inspection to final 
decision by the Sections was under 5 months  for prosecutors and under 6 months for 
judges. However, there are also disc iplinary decisions pending since 2008.  
Disciplinary decisions reached by the Sections of Judges and Prosecutors are 
appealable to the High Court, in cluding by the Judicial Inspection.
4 For the calendar 
year 2009, 14 disciplinary decisions re ached by the Secti ons of Judges and 
Prosecutors were appealed, of which 5 de cisions were upheld, 4 were overturned and 
6 were pending as of April 2010. The 4 decisions which were overturned related to 
                                                 
4 The Judicial Inspection has reportedly begun to ex ercise this power in cases where they do not agree 
with decision of the Sections of Judges or Prosecutors. 
EN 8   EN cases in which exclusions from the ma gistracy were imposed due to gross 
negligence. Questions have been raised as to the adequacy of the range of disciplinary penalties that can  be applied, and the consis tency and proportionality of 
application. The SCM is considering the po ssibility of proposing categorisation of 
disciplinary offences with appropriate penalties to address consistency and 
proportionality. An important issue as to th e preventive effect a nd enforceability of 
results of disciplinary proceedings is the possibility of the magistrate to be granted retirement which puts an end to any di sciplinary investigation. To grant such 
retirement requests appears standard practice of the SCM.
5 The SCM has also 
granted retirement to suspended magistrate s who are under arrest or have been 
indicted for criminal offences, incl uding alleged corruption in office.  
Separate to disciplinary investigations, th e Judicial Inspection has continued various 
planned inspections. These inspections included country-wide assessments of thematic issues (such as the random alloca tion of cases) as well as location specific 
controls on managerial efficiency, each producing recommendations either for particular courts or pr osecutors’ offices or for general application.
6  
New guidelines for the Judicial Inspecti on have been produced with a view to 
encouraging consistent working methods by inspectors and periodic meetings to 
discuss practices held. This remains an im portant objective with continued reports of 
inconsistent practices and jurisprudence. R ecruitment of judicial inspectors according 
to new rules adopted in summer 2009 has continued The procedure for recruitment has been the subject of a legal challenge  by the General Prosecutor who questioned 
its legality and expressed concern that it is insufficiently objective and transparent 
which as a result compromises the independe nce of inspectors. There is no activity-
specific, periodic evaluation of the perfor mance of the Judicial Inspection or its 
inspectors. The capacity of the inspectorate to fulfil its functions, with 31 posts filled 
and 20 vacancies can be considered as insufficient. 
2. B
ENCHMARK 2: ESTABLISH , AS FORESEEN , AN INTEGRITY AGENCY WITH 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR VERIFYING ASSETS , INCOMPATIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST , AND FOR ISSUING MANDATORY DECISIONS ON THE BASIS 
OF WHICH DISSUASIVE SANCTIONS CAN BE TAKEN . 
Legal Framework On 14 April 2010 the Constitutional Court found substantial and significant parts of 
Law 144/2007, the Law on the National In tegrity Agency, unconstitutional.
7 In 
considering an exception raised in one of the Agency’s first major confiscation trials, a 3.5 million euro confiscation case concerning a former Member of Parliament, the Court found that: 
                                                
 
5 During 2009 20 investigations were closed on this basis, as the disciplinary investigation lost its subject. 
6 A thematic control of random allocation of files undertaken in 2009 identified various irregularities of 
practices but reportedly did not find deliberate manipulations, though it is acknowledged that the ability 
to detect deliberate manipulations from the control undertaken was limited. Proposals arose to amend the court computer system and the internal regulatio ns of the court. These pr oposals are still pending.  
7 Chapters 1 (Articles 1-9 – General Provisions) the entire Chapter 6 (Articles 45-50 on Verification 
Procedures) and Articles 11(e), (f), (g), 12(2), 42 (2), (3), (4), 14(c), (d), (e ) and (f) .  
EN 9   EN • the power of the National Integrity Agency (ANI) to verify assets, conflicts of 
interest and incompatibilities of holders of public office, and to issue 
administrative documents detailing their findings, breached the Constitutional separation of powers in granting ANI what  the Court considered to be quasi-
judicial powers and that certain activities  carried out by ANI’s integrity inspectors 
had jurisdictional nature;  
• the power of ANI to ask courts to conf irm and confiscate significant unjustified 
differences between the income and acqui red assets of a public official or 
dignitary breached the Constitutional presumption of, and prohibition on 
confiscating, legally acquired property, as  well as the presumption of innocence;
 
• the obligation to publish asset and interest  declarations on the webpage of their 
employer and their transmission to ANI for publication on ANI’s webpage was a 
breach of the Constitutional duty upon public au thorities to respect and protect the 
intimate, family and private lives of persons.  
The decision of the Court was not unanimous  and in a dissenting opinion three of the 
nine Court judges expresse d their disagreement with  the majority decision, 
suggesting that neither ANI’s powers of ve rification and finding, nor the confiscation 
of significant unjustified differences be tween income and assets breached the 
Constitution.8  
In reaction to the Constitutional Court’s j udgment the Government submitted a draft 
law amending the ANI law to Parliament, which was debated and adopted on 12 May. This new law was widely criticised by practitioners and civil society. On 2 
June the President therefore decided not to  promulgate the new law and returned the 
law to Parliament for re-examination. Howe ver, on 30 June the Parliament adopted 
the new law once again with only minor im provements. The control of assets, a 
fundamental element of ANI’s original competences, has been lost. ANI is now 
deprived of the ability it previously possesse d to send cases of significant unjustified 
differences between income and accumulated assets to court for determination and sanctioning. In its place, ANI will only be able to refer such cases to prosecutors or 
tax authorities, neither of whom is legally competent to sanction unjustified 
discrepancies arising from the verification of  assets and income. In the past, in cases 
where no criminal offence could be proven or assets seized c ould not be clearly 
linked to an offence for which a conviction was achieved, ANI had played an important complementary role to law enforcement in providing for the follow up of significant discrepancies between the in come and accumulated assets of public 
officials and seeking confiscation through its procedures. The majority of ANI’s 
confiscation cases so far derive from such  co-operation. An important deterrent and 
sanction for corruption has therefore been lost.  
                                                
 
8 The three judges’ separate opinion concluded that ANI did not have quasi-judicial / jurisdictional 
powers, given ANI did not deliver judgments, but undertook research and investigation and notifies 
courts or other competent institutions in order to take steps provided by the law. As regards confiscation 
of unjustified assets, the separate opinion concluded that the ANI law did not reverse the presumption of licit acquisition of property (as it was for ANI to present their findings as regards the discrepancies 
between income and assets) nor the presumption of innocence. They also felt confiscation constitutional 
as the Constitution allowed the legislator to institute the forfeiture in all cases of illicitly acquired assets. 
EN 10   EN As a result, under the new law follow-up or  sanctioning of discrepancies between 
assets and income identified, and therefor e meaningful control of dignitaries’ and 
officials’ accumulation of wealth whilst in public office w ill no longer occur. 
Amendments which sought to keep aliv e the possibility of  sanctioning such 
unjustified discrepancies, utilising arrang ements in another law allowing for the 
confiscation of unjustified assets, wh ich the Constitutional Court has found 
constitutional as recently as 2007, were rejected by the Romanian Senate on 30 
June.9 
The new law as adopted by Parliament also includes a host of other amendments that 
weaken the effectiveness of ANI’s lega l framework in areas unrelated to the 
Constitutional Court decision: establishing a short prescription period of one year for completion of ANI’s verificati ons after a public official le aves office; limitation of 
the period for which the public  asset and interest declaration will remain accessible 
online and limitation on the period for wh ich a state of incompatibility can be 
sanctioned; reducing the content of the ac tual declaration forms undermining their 
effectiveness as a tool for transparency or investigation; and significantly reducing fines for persons or institutions who do not supply information requested by ANI. 
Following the publication of the Constitutional Court decision on 5 May, ANI 
suspended all ongoing verification activities.  
Institutional Developments and track-record 
Up until the Constitutional Court decision, ANI had been continuing to consolidate 
its institutional base. ANI had taken step s to implement the detailed, technical 
recommendations supplied in the first a nnual independent external audit undertaken 
in late 2009 and was now beginning to impl ement the recommendations arising from 
the second annual independent external aud it undertaken ea rlier this year. Significant 
improvements to the software systems were made increasing ANI’s potential 
efficiency.  
Consolidation was also the focus as re gards staffing. The number of ANI personnel 
had reduced slightly sin ce summer 2009, with 113 employees in post as of May 
2010, of which 55 are integrity in spectors. However, the majority of vacant positions 
(74 of the 87) are not budgeted (including the position of Vice President) and the 
focus of ANI’s management had therefore been on enhancing efficiency and results 
with the existing personnel: introduction of new software systems, appropriate 
training under extern ally financed projects (though opportunities for comprehensive 
ongoing training arrangements, underpinne d by a learning needs analysis, were 
constrained by budgetary issues). ANI had also prepared and adopted a Code of 
Ethics and Professional Conduct for its pers onnel. The National Integrity Council’s 
(CNI) Evaluation Commission concluded its inquiries into allegations made in 
February 2009 against ANI’s senior manage ment. In a report issued in February 
2010 the Evaluation Commission concluded th at the allegations  against the ANI 
President were in each instance either unf ounded or not confirmed. A similar finding 
had been reached in October 2009 agai nst the ANI Secretary General and in 
February 2010 the ANI President was also exonerated in a separate report into his 
                                                
 
9 Law 115/1996 on declaring and control of the wealth of dignitaries, magistrates, civil servants and 
certain persons with management positions  
EN 11   EN relations with the media.10 Ambiguities within the law on ANI regarding the role of 
the National Integrity Council (CNI) have come to surface since July 2009. As a 
result, the CNI has not been able to act as an interface between ANI and politics and 
was not able to shield the agency fr om political accusations and promote its 
development.  
Consolidation in terms of the institution ha d also been mirrored in ANI’s operational 
track record, in line with the recommendation contained within the Commission’s report of 22 July 2009. From 301 completed investigations as  of 22 May 2009, by 1 
May 2010 ANI had completed 1576 investigations (since the commencement of activities by the Agency). From 68 files sent to competent institutions for sanctions to be applied or for criminal investigat ion, as of 1 May 2010 ANI had sent 291 files 
to competent institutions. One hundred and seve nty five of these files have been sent 
to prosecutors’ offices (to investigate possibl e criminal offences – 169 cases for false 
statements and 6 cases for conflicts of inte rest); six files to courts (to confiscate 
unjustified wealth); and 110 files to discip linary committees (to apply disciplinary 
sanctions for incompatibilities or conflicts of interest).
11 As of 1 May investigations 
were underway in 3534 files.  
Further to a recommendation by the Co mmission, ANI had also taken steps to 
monitor the timely follow up by judicial and disciplinary bodies to cases they submit. 
Case management processes within ANI were  reviewed and strengthened, to ensure 
regular and routine follow up by ANI insp ectors to files forwarded to other 
competent institutions. As of 1 May 2010: 
• 2 findings of unjustified wealth had been confirmed by the Courts in first instance 
decisions and the confiscation of signif icant assets ordere d, though both decisions 
were being appealed.12 Four further confiscation cas es were pending before the 
courts for a first instance decision 
• 1 finding of an administrative conflict of  interest had been irrevocably confirmed 
by the High Court of Cassation and Justice,  and a second case was pending a final 
decision of the High Court. In th e first case ANI had commenced legal 
proceedings to obtain the annulment of  legal and administrative documents 
concluded by the official in question, as well as to seek th e recovery of any 
prejudice  
                                                 
10 In the light of the experience of the Eval uation Commission, the CNI amended the Evaluation 
Commission’s regulations such that members of the Evaluation Commission who do not attend its 
working meetings without justified reasons are excluded from the Evaluation Commission. Such 
amendments were adopted with a view to optimising the efficiency of the func tioning of the Evaluation 
Commission and addressing criticisms as to the dura tion of the inquiries. Questions remain as to 
whether the Evaluation Commission can transparently, promptly and thoroughly investigate allegations, 
ensuring wrong-doing is sanctioned and that closure is brought to unfounded allegations, or whether it 
creates potential for political interference. 
11 Of which between August 2009 and May 2010 ANI sent 131 files to prosecutors’ offices, 90 files to 
disciplinary committees and 2 files to courts for the confiscation of unjustified wealth. 
12 In the first case the Court ordered the confiscation of 458,805EUR, 1580USD and 29,345RON. In the 
second case the court ordered the confiscation of 9,750EUR and 913,591RON. 
EN 12   EN • 5513 findings of incompatibility (from 110) had become final and thirteen 
disciplinary solutions had been orde red as a result by disciplinary bodies14  
• Prosecutors had issued one indictment (c oncerning a city mayor) arising from an 
ANI notification and have initiated criminal pursuit in three further cases which are ongoing. Fifteen further cases have been closed by prosecutors after the 
initiation of the criminal pursuit – alt hough in ten of these cases prosecutors 
acknowledged the existence of the offence, but decided to apply an administrative 
fine – and forty-four case s were closed by prosecuto rs without initiating the 
criminal pursuit.
15 One hundred and twelve further cases are pending, the majority 
concerning false statements, but with five cas es of alleged conflicts of interest in 
breach of the Criminal Code.  
In terms of follow up, questions remained as to the promptitude of action by 
disciplinary bodies and regarding the leni ency of certain di sciplinary sanctions 
applied. Questions also remained as to the celerity of proceedings before prosecutors. 
Given that ANI’s administrati ve verifications are suspe nded until the prosecutors’ 
investigations are complete, delays in reso lving criminal files have a consequential 
effect on the efficiency of administrative verifications.16 However, all these 
developments towards ensuring a fully ope rational and effective ANI – and their 
track record – are now placed in quest ion by inadequacies in the new legal 
framework. 
3. B ENCHMARK 3: BUILDING ON PROGRESS ALREADY MADE , CONTINUE TO CONDUCT 
PROFESSIONAL , NON -PARTISAN INVESTIGATIONS INTO ALLEGATIONS OF HIGH -
LEVEL CORRUPTION  
The National Anti-corruption Directorate (DNA) has maintained its stable and 
convincing track record of i nvestigations into allegations of high-level corruption 
and a significant number of cases were sent to court. In the nine months between 1 
June 2009 and 1 March 2010, DNA opened 233 i nvestigations and ha s sent to trial 
126 cases regarding 414 defendants. In the same period at court level 53 cases resulted in final convictions against 89 defendants, while 74 conviction decisions 
against 144 defendants were also reached but  are subject to appeal. Sustaining the 
                                                
 
13 These include final determinations of incompatibility against two mayors, one vice mayor, seven county 
counsellors and seventeen local counsellors, as well as against the former President of the Competition 
Council. 
14 These varied from revocations from public office  (2 cases) and the termination of county/local 
counsellors’ mandates (4 cases), to the reduction in salary (1 case) and verbal  warnings (3 cases). A 
further 29 cases are pending with disciplinary bodies, 3 cases are on trial in the courts despite being 
appealed outside of the legal term and in a furthe r 9 cases the relevant official has already vacated 
public office. 
15 Figures supplied by ANI. Comparative figures supplied by the Public Ministry cover the period January 
2008 – February 2010. Of 146 notif ications received from ANI, prosecu tors had issued solutions in 40 
cases. In 8 cases prosecutors had imposed administrative fines, 5 further cases were closed with non 
indictment solutions after the start of the formal  criminal investigation, and in 27 further cases 
prosecutors issued non-indictment solutions without commencing the formal crim inal investigation. In 
one of the cases where an administrative fine wa s imposed, this was successfully challenged by ANI 
and the defendant is now on trial. 
16 In one case, concerning a Member of Parliament, it took the case prosec utor 520 days from the point of 
ANI’s notification to decide not to initiate the criminal pursuit for alleged false statements. 
EN 13   EN solidity of the cases prepared by DNA,  during the same period only 8 cases 
concerning 27 defendants resulted in acqui ttals, one of which, concerning four 
defendants, was the result of the decriminalis ation of the relevant offence. The cases 
sent to court include files concerning one  former minister and current deputy, one 
deputy, one judge and 7 mayors. The nature and number of the cas es support further 
the evidence of the effectiveness of the specialized antic orruption prosecution. 
In line with the Commission's recommenda tion, the efficiency of the judiciary 
system in trials of high-level corruption was monitored during the last twelve months. Out of the 53 cases resulting in final convictions, 16 cases resulted in 
penalties of prison sentences executable in detention with an average sentence of 2 
years and 9 months. All other sentences we re suspended. Overall on court level, the 
trend appears to be the i ssuing of more severe and a fewer number of suspended 
sentences at first instance level, however, this tendency is not yet reflected at the 
level of final judgements, where the tendency to issue lower and/or suspended penalties based on mitigating circumstances  remains. However, the overall number 
of decisions issued by courts  shows a significant increase.
17 
The celerity of the trial phase of high-le vel corruption cases remains problematic. 
The 53 trials resulting in final convicti on decisions during the period under review 
took an average of two and a half years and 25 hearings to reach this stage. 
Comparative data of the previous reporti ng period shows that, while the number of 
hearings per trial stayed approximately th e same, the duration of trials has gown by 
one quarter.18 In six of the cases resulting in fi nal convictions, the indictments date 
back to 2006, four cases were indicted in 2005, five in 2004 and two even back in 2003. In the same cases, the investigations  by DNA took on average 7 months. As of 
5 May, 2010, out of the 30 cases of current and former members of Parliament and 
Government sent to trial since 2005 only tw o have reached a fi nal decision and only 
five further cases have reached a first in stance decision with the vast majority of 
cases still therefore yet to reach any decision in court.
19  
The cooperation between DNA and ot her relevant institutions is considered effective. 
Out of the 1063 files registered by the DNA, 765 result from notific ations from other 
prosecution services including the Director ate for Organised Crime and Terrorism 
(DIICOT), 151 from the Anti-corruption Ge neral Directorate (DGA), and the rest 
divided between other author ities. A significant number of  DNA files sent to court 
result of ex-officio investigations.  
Since July 2009, the Parliament swiftly  approved the opening of criminal 
investigations in one case of a Parliament arian who is a former Minister. The request 
was approved in 4 days. However, an other request concerning the same 
                                                 
17 131 with final conviction decisions in 2009, compared to 97 convicted persons in 2008 
18 26 hearings per trial and 2 years duration on average between 1 August 2008 and 24 April 2009 
19 These include a case against a former Vice Prime Mi nister who was indicted in June 2006 and remains 
on trial without a decision having yet been reached in first instance. This trial has been suspended twice 
following the defence invoking exceptions of unconstitutionality. The DNA investigation in this case 
lasted less than one year from the point of notifica tion to indictment. Other cases include a trial against 
a former Member of Parliament, indicted in July  2006 and still on trial pending a decision in first 
instance. The DNA investigation in this case also la sted less than one year. Further cases include the 
trial of a former State Secretary, indicted in Se ptember 2006, and the trial of a current Member of 
Parliament, indicted in July 2007. These cases are also pending decisions in first instance.  
EN 14   EN Parliamentarian is pending since 16 February  and a separate search request, lodged 
on 10 February, concerning this Parliamentar ian is also still pending Parliament’s 
approval. One case concerning a former  prime minister is now considered 
permanently blocked by Parliament’s refusal to allow the opening of criminal investigations. Overall, the Commission's recommendation of July 2009, to apply the 
procedure for allowing criminal investigations of Parliamentarians who are former and current members of government in a sw ift and uniform manner has only partially 
been fulfilled. 
In a significant corruption case concerning a Member of Parliament investigated by 
the DNA, in March 2010 the Senate promptly approved the request of the Minister of 
Justice (at the instig ation of DNA) for the preventiv e arrest. A HCCJ judge also 
stood accused of complicity in the trafficking in influence. In addition to Parliament 
approving the arrest of the Parliamentarian, the SCM also approved the arrest of the 
Judge. The Parliamentarian, the Judge a nd the two businessmen were therefore 
placed under preventive detention and subse quently were indicted on 21 May. While 
the Parliamentarian remains in preventive arrest, the Judge and the two businessmen 
were released after four days under arre st, a decision motivated by the HCCJ as 
arising from low social danger.  
During the period under review, exceptions of  unconstitutionality continued to delay 
all 14 high-level cases pending at the HCCJ . At the same time, a legal amendment to 
remove the suspensive effect of uncons titutionality exceptions remains pending in 
Parliament. The Commission's recommendation in this respect is therefore still not 
addressed. 
Though the majority of the recommendations in the report of a joint working group 
on the individualisation of pena lties for corruption offences  are being addressed, only 
two of those actions can be considered to be accomplished.  
• Court meetings on non-unitary practice have reportedly discussed penalty 
individualisation and executi on in corruption cases;  
• The new Criminal Procedure Code provid es that corruption cases are tried at 
Tribunal level as first instance;  
Other recommendations are being addressed: 
• The National Institute of the Magistracy (NIM) has scheduled 16 training actions 
to address the recommendation to increa se the number of in-service training 
courses on fighting corruption;  
• Proposals to allow the criminal court to resolve illegal ity exceptions and to limit 
the application of suspended sentences are included in the draft Small Reforms 
Law, although concerns have been raised  as to whether the specific approach 
adopted to limiting suspended sentences in the draft law is the most appropriate.  
Guidelines on penalties for corruption offences  drafted by the HCCJ at the end of 
2009 are still in their draft form, they have not been substantially amended based on the feedback from practitioners and are still considered not sufficiently operational by magistrates. As an interesting parallel development, a group of  magistrates at the 
EN 15   EN Bucharest Court of Appeal drafted a set of alternative guidelines for a range of 
offences, including specific guidelines for certain corruption o ffences, which propose 
a host of detailed criteria for esta blishing appropriate, proportionate and 
individualised penalties. Th ese guidelines are reportedly being used for training by 
several institutions and indi cate possibilities for revisi ng the HCCJ’s guidelines.  
Whilst Romania has taken some steps, further work is required to meet the 
recommendation of the Commission to pr ovide an appropriate follow up to the 
recommendations of the working group on the individualisation of penalties for 
corruption. 
In the last twelve months, the anti-c orruption legal framework – Law 78/2000 on 
preventing, discovering and sa nctioning corruption acts as  well as the Government 
Emergency Ordinance 43/2002 on the Nati onal Anti-Corruption Directorate – 
remained intact as separate pieces of criminal legislation and the status and 
competences of DNA are unchanged. In addition, as all exceptions of unconstitutionality related to DNA's basic legislation
 have been rejected by the 
Constitutional Court to date, its constitutio nality can be considered confirmed 
through constant jurisprudence. It is imperative that the efficiency of the 
investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption is safeguarded and the stability 
of the legal (specifically Law 78/2000 and G.E.O. 43/2002) and institutional anti-
corruption framework maintained in the c ontext of the implementation of the new 
Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes. 
4. B ENCHMARK 4: TAKE FURTHER MEASURES TO PREVENT AND FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION , IN PARTICULAR WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
The Romanian authorities have taken some steps to strengthen co-ordination of the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy for Vuln erable Sectors and for Local Public 
Administration, reacting to the recommenda tion in the Commission’s report of 22 
July 2009. The Strategy is now in its final months. The Monitoring Committee 
tasked with overseeing the Strategy has me t more frequently; and an expert level 
working group has been establishe d to support the Committee’s work.20 The working 
group has prepared a new methodology for reporting developments under the Action 
Plans. Sub-working groups in certain sector s have also reviewed  their existing action 
plans; revised action plans concerning the Ministry of Administration and Interior 
(MAI), Ministry of Health and for local  public administrati on should be adopted 
shortly. Revisions are predominantly minor, eliminating measures no longer 
considered appropriate, readjusting deadlines to reflect delays and clarifying implementing steps and responsible bodies. However, despite a few additional measures proposed, the enhanced co-ordination does not so far appear to have developed to the stage of de livering better identification of vulnerable activities or 
corruption risks, nor mitigating actions.  
Overall, individual actions have been comp leted but a full assessment of progress is 
still missing and real impacts remain uncl ear. This makes it difficult to determine 
                                                
 
20 The Monitoring Committee has me t four times since July 2009, co mpared to twice in the preceding 
twelve months. The expert level working group has met five times since its creation in August 2009. 
EN 16   EN where efforts should be focused in the fu ture and what measures are actually 
working.  
Some efforts have been taken to step up prevention measures in certain sectors, a 
first step towards responding to the Co mmission’s recommendation of 22 July 2009. 
Within the MAI, the Anti-Corruption Gene ral Directorate (DGA) has developed a 
new methodology which provides a framework for corruption risk identification and 
assessment. As a first stage in applyi ng this methodology officials in each MAI 
structure have been designated and are being trained. DGA has also delivered two 
awareness raising campaigns with EU funds which appear to have delivered positive 
results. In addition, DGA continued pr eventive trainings for MAI personnel, 
including targeting personnel in high-risk positions (suc h as the traffic police); 
signed a co-operation protocol with th e National Agency for Regulating and 
Monitoring Public Procurement to provide  training for MAI personnel involved in 
public procurement; and continued dissemi nating anti-corruption material to MAI 
personnel and prepared audio- visual material for tran smission in the media. 
In the wider public administ ration, under the auspices of  another EU project, the 
Central Unit of Public Administration Re form (CUPAR) of the MAI has developed a 
guide on simplification of procedures and f acilitated external expertise to identify 
procedures for simplification in the National Agency of Cadastre and Land Registration, the Romanian Agency for Immigration, the SAPARD Agency and in the urbanism field. Some of their recommen dations have already been implemented, 
but others require legislation or follow up is outstanding. Wo rk to prepare an 
Administrative Code is ongoing.  
Various tools to promote transparency and integrity in public administration have 
been developed, piloted and are now being promoted. Whether these tools are used 
by public institutions and their impact can  however not be assessed. Work to 
strengthen the legislative a nd institutional framework govern ing ethics counsellors is 
ongoing. The National Agency of Civil Serv ants (NACS) has also continued its 
efforts to monitor the implementation of ethical standards and disciplinary 
procedures in public institutions. The information it was able to collect for 2009, indicates similar results to 2008 in terms of disciplinary cases resolved, sanctions 
imposed and referrals to criminal investigation authorities.
21 It is estimated that 
breaches of conduct are higher than those ac tually recorded. Few complaints (11%) 
are received by disciplinary bodies from memb ers of the public. Work is progressing 
to establish a single, corruption repor ting telephone hotline but it is not yet 
operational. Within institutions potentially more use could also be made of whistle 
blowing but few steps appear to have  been taken to strengthen practical 
implementation and awareness of whistle blowing policies.22  
                                                 
21 According to data obtained by NACS during 2009 disciplinary bodies solved 1072 complaints, 
imposing 571sanctions. The majority of sanctions we re written warnings, but th ere were 51 dismissals. 
However, reportedly 80% of sanctions were can celled by the courts. Disciplinary bodies made 
notifications to criminal investigation bodies concerning 50 civil servants on suspicions ranging from 
fraud to receiving undue bene fits and abuse of office. 
22 Transparency International Romania’s National Corruption Report 2009 concluded implementation of 
the legal provisions regarding the protection of wh istleblowers is “greatly deficient”, with poor 
harmonisation of internal regulations and inadequate information to personnel. 
EN 17   EN Aside from the MAI, information on and pr eventive measures in other risk areas is 
more limited but some measures are bei ng taken. The Ministry  of Education in 
particular, having identified a systemic  weakness arising from specific corruption 
cases, is procuring an information syst em which should assist with reducing 
corruption in the diploma system. Howe ver, overall across public institutions 
prevention measures still need to be inte nsified.. One recent civil society report 
identified major deficiencies in public ad ministration, vulnerabili ties to corruption in 
the education system and the need for pub lic policies to prevent corruption in the 
health system.23 Another recent survey on corruption in the health system found that 
91% of respondents consider co rruption within the health system as a critical issue 
which directly impacts on patients. Two thir ds of respondents said  that they have 
offered money to medical personnel, wi th 81% saying that they believe such 
payments played an extremely influen tial role in how they were treated.24  
To assist with stepping up efforts to prevent corruption, the MAI has secured 
financing for the National Integrity Centre which has begun to consolidate and 
intensify its contribu tion to the anti-corruption effort s. Its network of county anti-
corruption action groups offer the possibility for practitioners at the local level to 
identify risks and possible mitigating actions, which in turn the Centre can scrutinise and develop into policy proposals for c onsideration by competent institutions. A 
number of proposals have already been id entified and are under consideration by the 
Centre. These include measures to reduce corruption in the traffic police, public 
procurement, health and fiscal sector s. Six proposals have  been endorsed by 
competent institutions and will now be implemented. Ot her civil society 
organisations could also be useful partners for institutions at central and local level in identifying, taking forward and monitoring the impact of prev ention initiatives.
25  
Steps by the General Prosecu tor to strengthen the appr oach of county prosecution 
offices to combating petty and medium-lev el corruption seem to be beginning to 
deliver results. In response to the Co mmission’s recommendation, implementation of 
the county prosecution strategies has continue d. Indications are that the number of 
investigations has increas ed, including investigatio ns commenced ex-officio 
indicating a more pro-active approach of the prosecution, and that these 
investigations are predominantly focused on the priority sect ors identified by the 
strategies. In parallel to an increased numbe r of investigations, more indictments are 
resulting.26 Furthermore, more of these i ndictments concern bribe taking and 
                                                 
23 Transparency International Romania’s National Corruption Report 2009 
24 Association for Implementing Democracy study undertaken by IMAS in April 2010. 
25 For example NACS has recently commenced a project with a non-governmental organisation seeking to 
create partnerships between local authorities and civil society in identifying anti-corruption measures and monitoring implementation of anti-corruption policies. 
26 In the second half of 2009 Prosecutors’ Offices a ttached to Tribunals and C ourts of Appeal issued 
indictments in 101 cases compared to 56 in the first half of 2009. Twenty two of the indictments in the 
second half of 2009 followed investigations commenced ex officio, compared to 13 in the first half of 
2009 (or 5 in the first eight months of 2008). Approximately half of all investigations opened are 
commenced ex officio and there wa s a 45% increase in the number of investigations commenced ex 
officio in the second half of 2009 compared to the first half of 2009. In the first three months of 2010 
Prosecutors’ Offices attached to Tri bunals and Courts of Appeal indicted 67 people. This contrasts to 44 
persons during the first three months of 2009. Data on the number of cases indicted so far in 2010 is not 
yet available, as well as further data on the nature of cases. When this is available it will be possible to 
assess whether the trends observed in 2009 have continued 
EN 18   EN corruption-related offences, suggesting a greater emphasis on fighting corruption 
among public officials as well as a focus on more complex investigations.27 It is too 
soon, however, to see whether these trends co ntinue and for these trends to translate 
into final court decisions.28 
To date, over 90% of corruption indictme nts by Prosecutors’ Offices attached to 
Tribunals and Courts of Appeal result from  information supplied by or worked with 
the judicial police of DGA. Recent results by DGA indicate an intens ification of their 
work. The high proportion of indictments whic h involve their par ticipation indicates 
the effectiveness of co-operation betw een DGA and prosecutors, and appears to 
reflect DGA’s specialisation in  terms of personnel and lo gistics and exclusive focus 
on corruption. In certain instances prosecu tors have also delegated DGA judicial 
police officers to work on corruption investigations outside of DGA’s institutional competence. This flexible approach has reportedly been confirmed by the courts when challenged. The General Prosecutor an d DGA have jointly taken steps to build 
upon the existing co-operation, holding a se ries of regional meetings involving 
prosecutors and DGA police officers to di scuss their co-operation, how it can be 
enhanced and to exchange best practices through presentations of recent cases. This should assist with unifying practices. A protocol is envisaged, which will clarify 
arrangements for co-operation, including no tification procedures and information 
exchange, joint assessment indicators and joint training. A best  practices guide on 
deployment of undercover investigators is also foreseen.  
However, these results also indicate the n eed to strengthen co-operation between the 
Fraud Investigation Service of the Romani an Police and prosec utors in corruption 
cases. Statistical data indicates the Fr aud Investigation Service supplies the 
prosecution with signifi cant volumes of informati on on suspected corruption 
offences, but it would appear not to be leading to indictments.
29 Work to strengthen 
co-operation could therefore focus on identif ying how this co-operation can lead to 
more tangible outcomes, possibly by focu sing on the quality of information supplied 
by the police, feedback from prosecutors  to focus information gathering, common 
performance indicators focused on indictme nts and convictions, or on specialisation 
and resourcing of investigative capacity. Prosecutors would like to see the Fraud 
Investigation Service designate specialise d police officers to work exclusively on 
corruption cases.  
Public procurement in Romania shows a number of weaknesse s in practice and 
institutional structure which lead to seri ous shortcomings in the protection against 
                                                 
27 In the first three months of 2010, 21indictments concerned bribe taking (compared to 6 during the first 
three months of 2009). Twenty-two indictments concerned corruption related offences prescribed by Law 78/2000 (compared to 17 during the first three months of 2009). In the second half of 2009 
indictments were issued in nine complex cases comp ared to three complex cases in the first half of 
2009. 
28 Although twelve final court decisions – all convictions – were reported during 2009 concerning petty 
and medium level corruption cases prosecuted by th e Prosecutors’ Offices a ttached to Tribunals and 
Courts of Appeal. 
29 Between 1 August 2009 and 1 May 2010 the Romanian Police passed to prosecution offices 
information on 4269 suspected corruption offences involving 3244 persons. Of these reports 748 concerned bribe taking, 1349 bribe giving, 431 traffic in influence, and 1639 other corruption related 
offences. These files concern acts of corruption in  public administration, health, transportation, 
agriculture and forestry, education and labour and social protection.  
EN 19   EN conflict of interest, fraud, corruption and othe r serious irregularities. In the context of 
the implementation of EU funds, services of the Commission have pointed to those 
weaknesses on several occasions and transm itted a number of concrete suggestions 
for corrective action. The Commission has mapp ed the main current shortcomings in 
Romania as follows: 
The protection against conflict of interest in the law is not sufficiently effective. 
Several laws address different aspects of c onflicts of interest and are not sufficiently 
harmonised. This leads to confusion regard ing the attribution of responsibilities 
among competent authorities. The procurement law contains rules to avoid conflict of interest situations,
30 but until recently this was limited to persons taking direct part 
in the process of verification and evaluation of the tenders, while in practice, indirect 
influence is also a significant risk. Amendm ents to the public procurement legislation 
have improved the legal protection agains t conflicts of inte rest in June 201031. It is 
important that the most freque nt cases of conflict of in terest which are related to 
business interests of local politicians and their family are addressed in an effective way in the implementation of the law.  The Administrative Transparency Law
32 could 
in principle apply to cases not covered by the scope of the Public Procurement Law. 
However public procurement authorities, such as the competent authority for 
complaints, the National Council for Solving Complaints (CNSC), can only operate on the basis of the legal framework for public procurement. Apart from remedy measures applicable during the procurement procedure such as fines or a re-evaluation of offers, sanctions can be eith er based on the Criminal Code, or on the 
Transparency Law, which provides for admini strative sanctions such as interdiction 
of the right to fulfil public duties. However, in practice the application of these laws shows several shortcomings due to varying definitions of conflict of interest depending on the status of the person c oncerned. The Transparency Law introduces 
for instance stricter rules regarding conflict of  interest for ordinary civil servants than 
for high public officials such as ministers or mayors.  
Competent authorities demonstrate only li mited activity aimed at preventing and 
detecting conflict of interest.
33 The Commission could only es tablish very few cases 
where conflicts of interest were detected  by administrative authorities and sanctions 
were taken. 
Cooperation among administrative authorities in order to design effective prevention 
strategies and control proce dures is missing. Furthermore, as few cases are detected, 
few signals are transmitted to the judicial authorities. 
In addition to these specific shortcomi ngs, a number of more general weaknesses 
have been noted: Legislation in the area of public procurement has been subject to 
frequent amendments and too little assistan ce is provided to cont racting authorities 
                                                 
30 Chapter II Section 8 of GEO 34/2006 
31 Government Emergency Ordnance 76/2010 adopted on 30 June 2010. 
32 Law 161/2003 regarding some measures for ensuring transparency in the fulfilment of public duties and 
in the business sector, and for preventing and sanctioning corruption 
33 In 2009, the National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement (ANRMAP), 
identified 6 violations of public procurement linked to conflict of interest through complaints or through ex-officio investigations. In 20 10, ANRMAP had no such cases. It received some signals concerning 
conflict of interests (links between decision making persons and winners of bids) but these signals were 
not falling under Ordinance 34/2006. CNSC had only 5 cases out of the 9700 solved in 2009. 
EN 20   EN for the correct application of the existing legal framework. Too often, these legal 
amendments aim to address in a symptomatic way weaknesses of the public procurement process without engaging a comprehensive strategic analysis of 
underlying causes. Together with insuffi cient expertise and capacity of local 
contracting authorities, the re sult is often insecurity how laws and procedures should 
be applied. This insecurity results in turn  in a high number of complaints and works 
against an effective prevention of irregularities. 
This picture of insufficient and complex legislation on conflict of interest together 
with a low sensitivity towards risks am ong administrative authorities and a weak 
track record in prevention and control cont rasts sharply with th e important risk of 
conflict of interest in public procurement which is confirmed by competent authorities and may also be  ascertained through data pr ovided by other sources. The 
majority of conflict of interest cases transmitted by the National Integrity Agency to the judicial authorities for decision relate to public procurement. A number of high-
level cases of corruption also relate to public procurement.