EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 13 November 2015  
on a register  of bank accounts  
(CON/20 15/46) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 7 October 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion o n a draft law amending and supplementing the law on Credit Institutions  
(hereinafter the ‘draft law’ ). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third in dent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law  relates to a national central bank . In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this o pinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
1.1  The purpose of the draft law is  to establish an electronic information system (hereinafter the 
‘register’ ) containing bank account  number s, the names of the account  holders, the names of the 
persons authorised to manage these accounts and the names of  persons with rental contract s for 
bank  safe deposit boxes.  
1.2 The main provisions of the draft law are as follows:  
• The register  will be developed and maintained by Българска народна банка (Bulgarian 
National Bank ) (BNB).  
• Banks must  provide the required information on a monthly basis.  
• Several national law enforcement authorities  and other public authorities will be granted 
access to the register  in connection to the performance of their duties .  
• Right of access to the system will be given to individuals  who manage and represent such 
authorities or to officials authorised by them , on condition that the confidentiality of any 
information obtained from the register  is protected.  
• The scope of reporting, the procedures , the time limits for banks to submit information and 
the procedures for  authorised institutions and individuals to access the register , will be set 
out in a BNB ordinance.  
• In order to access the system, the public authorities wi ll pay a fee based on the costs 
incurred by BNB, the level of such fees will be  set out in a BNB ordinance.  
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions ( OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42) . 
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2 • Natural and legal persons may obtain details of any information regarding them that is held 
in the register by submitting a request to BNB.  
• The collected information will be mainta ined in the register  for a period of five years from the 
date of its receipt by BNB.  
• The register  will be operational  within twelve months  of the entry into force of the draft l aw. 
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB would like to recall that when new tasks are conferred on an ESCB member, it is 
necessary to assess these tasks against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For this purpose and in the light of that basic need, the ECB has developed guidance in 
the form of general  and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether 
the new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibiti on
2. This 
guidance is set out in this paragraph 2.1. The concrete assessment of whether BNB ’s task of 
establishing and operat ing the register  of bank accounts is to be considered a central banking task 
or a government task is then undertaken in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2.  
2.1.1  General considerations  
First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 
the central ba nking tasks already assigned to an NCB. In recognition of the different Member 
States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, the tasks currently 
discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re- categorised,  but may be 
reassessed if their substance is amended.  
Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their 
NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or 
Eurosystem -related tasks.  
Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in 
Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty.  
Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clear ly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, should be considered to be  government tasks  
2.1.2   Specific considerations  
An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is ther efore the impact of the 
task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the 
following issues should be taken into account.  
First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately 
addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, without necessarily 
                                                 
2  See in the first instance paragraph 2 of Opinion CON2015/22.  All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website 
at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
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3 complementing the existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 
and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in pl ace to adequately address that 
conflict. Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, 
however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary 
tasks. The assessment of the complementarity of a new task should also take into account the 
financing of that task.  
Second, it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performance of the 
new task places a disproportionate burden on the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB 
and may negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks.  
Third, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task is aligned with the 
institutional set -up of the NCB, in particular as  regards central bank independence and 
accountability considerations.  
Fourth,  it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial 
risks.  
Fifth,  it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 
NCB’s decision -making bodies to political risks that are disproportionate and could also impact on 
their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the Governor’s term of office under 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 
2.2 Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the 
scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 
consistent application of the monetary financing pro hibition within the Eurosystem and the ESCB.  
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1 Conferral of the task of administering the register  on BNB 
The ECB notes that the draft law would assign to BNB the establishment and the operation of the 
register  of bank accounts . 
3.1.1  New task 
The establishment and operation of a register  of bank accounts is an entirely new task, which no 
public authority in Bulgaria has previously perform ed. In the light of the guidance set out in 
paragraph 2.1 it must therefore be assessed carefully whet her this new task and the associated 
responsibilities for BNB could constitute a breach of the monetary financing prohibition.  
3.1.2  The principle of financial independence  
The principle of financial  independence requires that the Member States may not put their  NCBs in 
a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB related 
tasks, but also their national tasks, both from an operational and financial perspective. In this 
regard the ECB welcomes Article 56a(7)  of the dr aft law, which requires that the public authorities 
pay a fee based on the costs incurred by BNB  as determined by a BNB ordinance. However , the 
draft law does not specify whether  the State would reimburse BNB for the initial costs that BNB 
incurs in setting up the register . 
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4 3.1.3  Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public 
entities  
The ECB has previously opined that tasks entrusted to an ESCB member relating to the 
establishment of a central register of bank account numbers are not central bank tasks nor do they 
facilitate the enforcement of such tasks3. Similarly, the new task of operating a  register  of bank 
accounts  does not relate to banking supervision, the collection of data for statistical purpose or 
other existing BNB tasks whether under the Treaty or under Bulgarian law . The ECB considers this 
new task to be clearly a government task since its purpose is exclusively to further the State’s 
interest in being able to more efficiently locate bank accounts held in Bulgaria which may hold 
proceeds of crime and thereby protect the financial interests and security of the State. It thus 
cannot be regarded in any respect as a central bank task4. 
3.1.4  Complementarity of the new task with existing BNB tasks and extent to which conflicts of interest 
with existing BNB tasks are addressed  
The ECB understands that BNB will be bound by the same secrecy and personal data obligations 
in respect of the data in the register  as apply currently to data reported by credit institutions under 
the banking laws. However, s uch a general condition does not seem adequate  to fully address any 
possible conflicts of interest that might arise between the operation of the register  and other BNB  
tasks . 
Furthermore, t he ECB does not see a clear  indication  in the draft law of  how the register  would 
relate to the already existing credit register5. It is therefore unclear whether  the new task can be 
regarded as complementing BNB’s existing tasks.  
3.1.5  Extent to which the performance of the new task is align ed with the institutional set -up of the NCB  
In view of the fact that operating a register  of bank account s cannot be reg arded as a central bank 
task, it might raise concerns as to how such a task would fit into the institutional set -up of a central 
bank. In this case, the ECB notes that the reporting scheme appears to be legally entirely separate 
from the prudential reporting scheme for credit institutions . However, t here is no indication in the 
draft law as to whether  the data obtained is accessible to ot her BNB departments carrying out 
ESCB or other national tasks.  
3.1.6  Extent to which the performance of the new task  entails substantial financial risks  
The lack of legal clarity regarding the possibility for  the State to reimburse BNB for  the initial costs 
that BNB incurs in setting up the register , suggests that BNB may bear  significant financial risk s in 
taking up this new task. Moreover, in the absen ce of  provisions to the contrary , the ECB 
understands that , in accordance with the general liability regime under  Bulgarian law , BNB will be 
solely responsible for any damage or loss  stemming from an unlawful decision or the use of the 
wrong administrative procedure by BNB when operating  the register . This raises significant 
monetary financing concerns . 
                                                 
3  See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/30.  
4  See paragraph 2.3.1 (general considerations) of  Opinion CON2015/22.  
5  See Article 56 of the Law on credit institutions.  
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5 The fee- based system in the draft law does not address these concerns in a n adequate manner . In 
order to assuage these concerns i t needs to be ensured that BNB will be fully and adequately 
reimbursed for all  costs incurred in performing activities related to the task s entrusted to it in 
connection with the setting up and operation of the register . The reimbursement should be made 
on the basis of ‘ at arm’s length’ commercial terms,  either in advance of costs being incurred or on a 
regular and prompt basis as the costs arise6. 
3.1.7  Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes the members of BNB’s  Governing 
Council  to disproportionate political risks or could impact on their personal independence  
The E CB notes that the draft law provides that the public authorities that have access to the 
register  must  adopt and enforce internal rules for the effective monitoring of the individuals 
authorised to access the information. This should limit the risk of BNB being sued for allowing an 
applicant unauthorised access to the r egister . However, BNB will be obliged to perform the new 
task as any other public function that is assigned to it by law. BNB’s Governing Council  will 
therefore be responsible for the due and proper operation of the register . It cannot be excluded that 
BNB’s Governing Council could be exposed to reputational risks should the data in the register  – 
albeit of a less sensitive nature than some of the other data received from credit institutions when 
performing its supervisory tasks -  be accessed by a non- authorised applicant or otherwise be 
‘leaked’.  The fact that the register will contain sensitive information, such as the basic data on 
accounts of politically exposed persons7, could place BNB’s Governing Council members in a 
difficult position should this inf ormation enter  into the public domain in breach of the draft law. This 
could also entail a negative impact on their personal independence.  
3.2 Conclusion  
BNB’s new task raises significant concerns as regards BNB’s financial and operational 
independence, es pecially in the absence of any clear commitment from the State to reimburse BNB 
for the costs for setting up the register  or for any  damages incurred by BNB as a result of operating 
the register . Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the new tasks would in any way 
complement BNB’s existing ESCB or other national tasks. In view of these other considerations, 
the ECB has a more general concern about the assignment to BNB of this sensitive new task.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s webs ite. 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main,  13 November 2015.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
6  See paragraph 3.1.6 of Opinion CON/2015/36 and paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98.  
7  Under Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of t he Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L141, 5.6.2015, p. 73) , NCB 
Board members are also deemed to be ‘ politically exposed persons’.