EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 11 April  2019  
on lobbying  
(CON/20 19/15) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 28 February 2019 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Minister of Justice of 
the Czech Republic for an opinion on a draft law  on the regulation of lobbying (hereinafter the ’draft law ’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and on the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council  Decision 98/415/EC1, 
as the draft law relates to Česká národní banka (ČNB). In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 
of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law 
1.1. The purpose of the draft law is to regulate lobbying in the Czech Republic. The draft law defines the 
activity of lobbying, the  persons understood to be lobbyists (hereinafter ‘lobbyists’) and the public 
officials exposed to lobbying ( hereinafter  ‘lobbied persons ’). It also defines  the competences of 
public authorities in relation to such activity and the rights and obligations of lobbyists and lobbied 
persons . In addition, t he draft law establishes  the Transparency Register  as a public information 
system to be maintained by the Úřad pro dohled nad hospodařením politických stran a politických 
hnutí  (ÚDHPSH , the Oversight Office for Political Parties and Political Movements ). Lobbyists and 
lobbied persons  must register with the Transparency Register and report on a quarterly basis on 
their lobbying activities and relevant contacts during that period. The Transparency Register and the 
periodic reports are made available to the public on the ÚDHPSH ’s website.  
1.2. A member of the Bank Board of ČNB would be regar ded as a lobbied person according to the draft 
law if he or she is lobbied in order to influence a  decision on the preparation, negotiati on or pass age 
of a draft legislation  or regulation that is within t he competence of Č NB. In that case,  ČNB would be 
required to enter the member’s details as prescribed in the draft law in the Transparency Register, 
and the member would be required to submit quarterly reports with information on his or her 
respective contacts with lobbyists during that period. The reports  are to be submitted electronically  
and are made available to the public  on the ÚDHPSH’s  website .  
1.3. The explanatory memorandum2 accompanying the draft law states that this provision takes into 
account the special status of the members of the Bank Board of ČNB. In this respect , the 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2     https://apps.odok.cz/veklep- detail?pid=KORNB4B9CNQE   
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2 explanatory memorandum notes that, pursuant to Article 98 of the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic3, ČNB's core responsibilities are price stability and monetary policy4. The draft law does 
not interfere with the areas  in which ČNB is completely independent . Such interference is prohibited 
under Law No 6/1993 on ČNB5. Therefore, members of the Bank Board of CNB  only fall within the 
scope of the draft law if they are involved in legal drafting within ČNB’s competence. Members of the 
Bank Board of CNB  that are not involved in lega l drafting within ČNB’s competence are not subject 
to the draft law. The consulting authority has informed the ECB  that the ECB’s opinion from 2005 on 
the Slovak regulation of lobbying has been taken into a ccount  in drafting this provision6. 
 
2. Observations  
2.1 This opinion addresses the provisions of the draft law relating to the members of the Bank Board of 
ČNB.  
2.2 The ECB understands that a draft regulation within ČNB’s competence  with respect to which a 
member  of the Bank Board of ČNB could be lobbied would cover draft legislation on the currency 
and the circulation of money, and draft legislation concerning the status, competence, organisation 
and activities of Č NB (where ČNB  co-submits the draft law, together with the Ministry of Finance, to 
the Government7) as well as draft ČNB decrees issued pursuant to Law  No 6/1993 on ČNB, 
including decrees  on required minimum reserves , and other laws under which Č NB has regulatory 
competences . This  includ es the areas of banking and financial supervision8, market infrastructures9, 
the circulation of banknotes and coins10, consumer credit11 and anti -money laundering12. 
Accordingly , any lobbying of a member of  the Bank Board  of CNB  during a legislative process on 
decisions concer ning a draft legal act  outside the regulatory competence of Č NB would not fall 
under the draft law.  
2.3 Article 130 of the Treaty  requires that, when exercising the powers  and carrying out the tasks and 
duties conferred upon them by the Treaty, the Treaty on European Union and the Statute, neither 
the ECB nor an NCB nor any member of their decision- making bodies shall seek or take instructions 
from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from 
any other body. The aim of A rticle 130 of the Treaty  is to shield central banks  from political pressure 
                                                 
3  Article 98 of Constitutional Law No. 1/ 1993 Coll. Ú stava České republiky.   
4         Article 98(1) of Constitutional  Law No. 1/1993 Coll . Ústava České republiky.  
5 See Article 9 (1) of Law No. 6/1993 Coll . on Česká národní banka (zákon o Česk é národní bance) , as amended.  
6 See ECB Opinion CON/2005/25. All ECB opinions are published on the E CB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
7         See Article 37(1) of the Law No. 6/1993 Coll.  on Česká národní banka,  as amended.  
8 See Law No 21/1992 Coll. on banks  (zákon o bankách ); Law No 277/2009 Coll. on i nsurance (zákon o pojišťovnictví) ; 
Law No 87/1995 Coll. on c redit unions  (zákon o spořitelních a úvěrních družstvech) ; Law No 277/2013 Coll. on 
currency exchange (zákon o  směnárenské činnosti  ); Law No 15/1998 Coll. on s upervision in the capital market area  
(zákon o dohledu v oblasti kapitálového trhu) ; Law No 256/2004 Coll. on capital market undertakings  (zákon o 
podnikání na kapitálovém trhu) ; Law No 190/2004  Coll. on bonds  (zákon o dluhopisech) ; and various laws on pension 
insurance and savings (mainly Laws No. 42/1994 and No.  427/2011 (zákon o penzi jním připojištění se státním 
příspěvkem a zákon o doplňkovém penzijním spoření ). 
9 See Law No 370/2017 Coll. on the payment system  (zákon o platebním styku) . 
10 See Law No 136/2011 Coll. on the circulation of banknotes and coins  (zákon  o oběhu bankovek a mi ncí) and 
provisions on counterfeiting etc. in the Criminal Code, Law  No. 40/2009 Coll.  (trestní zákoník ).  
11 See Law No 257/2016 Coll. on consumer credit (zákon o spotřebitelském úvěru) . 
12 See Law No 253/2008 Coll. on selected measures against legitimisati on of proceeds of crime and financing of 
terrorism  (zákon o některých opatřeních proti legalizaci výnosů z trestné činnosti a financování terorismu) . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 to enable them to effectively pursue the objectives attributed to their tasks through the independent  
exercise of the specific powers conferred on them for that purpose. However, the recognition that 
central banks have such independence does not have the consequence of exempting them from 
every rule of law and to shield them from any kind of legislation13.  
2.4 The ECB considers that regular contacts and interaction with external stakeholders provide relevant 
input and information that help to understand the dynamics of the economy, the financial markets 
and the banking sector, and the broader societal context. Members of the ECB’s decision- making 
bodies and other high level officials are required upon their appointment to sign a declarat ion of 
adherence to the ECB’s Code of Conduct for High Level ECB Officials14, which provides good 
governance safeguards for relations with interest groups and also includes guiding principles 
regarding communication with external parties. The members of high -level ECB bodies commit to 
safeguard confidential information in accordance with their obligations and to avoid any appearance 
that potentially market -sensitive information may not be available to the widest possible public 
audience at the same time. T o enhance transparency and accountability, the y shall, as a general 
rule, include information on their meetings with external parties in their published meeting calendars, 
to the extent such information relates to their role as members of high- level ECB bodi es. 
2.5 In view of the above considerations , the ECB considers that the draft law , including the proposed 
transparency -related obligations for members of the Bank Board of ČNB aimed at combating 
corruption and increasing transparency in the specific context of lobbying during the legislative 
process in the Czech Republic , would  not impair the independent performance of Č NB’s ESCB-
related tasks.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 April 2019.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
13  See judgement of the Court of Justice of 10 July, Commission v ECB, C -11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragr aphs 134 
to 136.  
14  See Code of Conduct for High Level ECB Officials  of December 2018 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_single_code_conduct_for_high_level_ecb_officials_f_sign.pdf