EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 3.7.2009 
SEC(2009) 914 final 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
Consultation Document:  
Possible initiatives to enhance the res ilience of OTC Derivatives Markets  
{COM(2009) 332 final} 
{SEC(2009) 905 final} 
 
EN 2   EN 1. I NTRODUCTION  
The Commission's Communication1 on ensuring the efficiency, safety and soundness of 
derivatives markets (herein after the Commi ssion Communication) and the accompanying 
Staff Working Paper2 (herein after the Staff Working Paper) concluded that the way 
derivatives markets work needs to be improve d in order to safeguard  financial stability. 
Overall, the end-goal of financial stability can be achieved by targeting two intermediate 
objectives, namely by (i) strengthening counterpart y credit risk mitigation and (ii) increasing 
transparency. In order to achieve these objectives , a number of tools are available that can be 
applied depending on each market segment's level of maturity: 
(1) promoting further standardisation; 
(2) strengthening the bilateral collateral management for non-CCP eligible contracts 
(3) enhancing the use of cent ral data repositories;  
(4) moving clearing of standardised OTC derivatives to CCPs;  
(5) increasing transparency of prices, transactions and positions; and 
(6) moving (part or all of) trad ing to public trading venues3. 
While the Communication briefly outlined the main rationale for each tool as well as the 
general issues that will guide the consultation,  this paper provides a more detailed outline of 
each of the tools as well as detail ed questions to stakeholders. In this context it has to be noted 
that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisi on is currently review ing the treatment of 
counterparty credit risk, which might have an im pact on several issues touched upon in this 
document and might result in further actio ns of the Commission in this field. 
This consultation is open till 31 August 2009. Responses can be addressed to markt-g2-
consultations@ec.europa.eu . The Commission services will publish all responses received on 
the Commission website unless confiden tiality is specifically requested.  
The issues addressed in this document will also  be discussed at a high-level conference in 
Brussels, on 25 September. 
2. P ROMOTING FURTHER STANDARDISATION  
Standardisation has two dimensions: standard isation of the contractual parameters and 
standardisation of the contracts themselves to support market infr astructure. The nature of the 
OTC market so to be tailored made to fit the exact risk faced  by users is not compromised by 
a contractual standardisa tion that facilitate the use of electronic means4. On the other end, if 
the parameters of the contracts are standardised (e.g. coupons, strike prices, maturities, etc.), 
the flexibility toward users' need may be impacted.  
By facilitating automatic proc essing, standardisation would increase efficiency and reduce 
operational risks by e.g. encourag ing electronic affirmation and confirmation services, central 
                                                 
1 C(2009) XXX final 
2 SEC(2009) XXX final 
3 The term "public trading venues" generally refers to regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities 
subject to public disclosure requirements. 
4 Interest Rates Swaps and Credit Default Swaps re presents good examples where electronic systems 
have been developed to reduce the operational risks in these markets, without impacting on the 
contracts flexibility. 
 
EN 3   EN storage, automation of payments and collateral management processes. In this regard, 
standardisation is a necessa ry prerequisite for the ot her policy options. However, 
standardisation requires costly investments a nd, therefore, additional measures might be 
considered necessary to provide  the adequate incentives to promote it, in the spirit of G20 
declaration5.  
Depending on the level of standardisation a nd on the risk mitigation tools employed, the 
operational risks a market partic ipant faces might be higher or  lower. More specifically, a 
contract, which is electronically affirmed, confir med, recorded in a central data repository and 
where payments arising from it are settled in  an automated manner, incurs less operational 
risks than a contract that doe s not employ these systems.  
Operational risks are specifically dealt with in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and 
they also include legal risks, which may e.g. ar ise in case of disputes toward the terms of a 
contract if electronic systems are not used. Cons iderations might be given on whether specific 
requirements pertaining to operatio nal risk provide adequate incen tives toward standardisation 
of contracts and use of market infrastructu res (e.g. use of electronic systems and central 
repositories). 
Questions 
(1) What would be a valid reason not to use electronic means as a tool for contracts 
standardisation?  
(2) Should contracts standardisation be measur ed by the level of process automation? 
What other indicators can be used? 
(3) Should non-standardised contra cts face higher capital charges for operational risk?  
(4) What other incentives toward standardisati on could be used, especially for non-credit 
institutions? 
3. S TRENGTHENING BILATERAL COLLATERAL MANAGEMENT FOR NON -CCP  ELIGIBLE 
OTC  DERIVATIVES  
For those OTC derivative contracts that remain  beyond the reach of CCP  clearing irrespective 
of further standardisation, it is important to strengthen the bilatera l clearing model. The 
following actions might be foreseen: 
• Improve timeliness: ensure more timely mark -to-market of positions (daily valuation 
should be the end goal); 
• Improve coverage: the share of credit exposur e covered by collateral has stagnated in 
recent years. According to the late st issue of the ISDA Margin Survey6, one third of overall 
credit exposures remain uncollateralized. Impr ove the coverage rate by encouraging market 
participants to enter into appropriate colla teral arrangements and by encouraging second 
tier institutions and non-financial firms to provide collateral. 
• Strengthen the collateral management pro cess, by further promoting more frequent 
portfolio reconciliation (possibly on a multilatera l basis) and ensure more timely exchange 
of collateral (daily portfolio reconciliation and daily  exchange of collateral should be the 
goal).  
                                                 
5 G20 (2009). Declaration on strengthening the financial system – London summit , 2 April 2009, 
http://www.londonsummit.gov. uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm 
6 ISDA (2009b). Margin Survey 2009 , http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/ISDA-Margin-Survey-2009.pdf  
 
EN 4   EN • Reduce the size of outstanding derivatives posi tions and facilitate the management of a 
potential default by promoting increased recour se to multilateral portfolio compression (i.e. 
multilateral netting of positions). This would also increase the operational efficiency (less 
contracts to process) even  in a CCP environment.  
Questions 
(5) How could the coverage of collateralis ed credit exposures be improved?  
(6) Are there markets where daily valuation, exchange of collate ral and portfolio 
reconciliation cannot be th e goal? Please justify. 
(7) How frequently should multilateral netting be used? 
(8) Should bilateral collateral management be left  to self-regulatory in itiatives or does it 
need to be incentivised by appropr iate legislative instruments? 
4. CENTRAL DATA REPOSITORIES  
As mentioned above and detailed in the Sta ff Working Paper, centr al data repositories 
improve operational efficiency of OTC mark ets by facilitating payment and settlement 
instructions and by central proc essing of corporate events. 
By their nature, central data repositories ar e also essential sources of information and 
therefore substantially c ontribute to improving market transp arency, especially for the market 
segments not covered by CCPs. The contribution to transparency is both toward regulators 
and to the public. The former should be granted full and unimpeded access to central data repositories to perform their supervisory func tions. The latter can access aggregate market 
information. 
In view of the broad interest for central data repositories, th eir usage could be extended to 
market segments other than credit default sw aps (CDS) and specific regulatory requirements 
(including transparency requirements) may be  foreseen. It is the Commission services' 
understanding that CESR is currently analysing th is issue with the respect  to the establishment 
of a central data repository in the EU. 
Questions  
(9) Are there market segments for which a centr al data repository is  not necessary or 
desirable? 
(10) Which regulatory requirements should centr al data repositories be subject to? 
(11) What information should be disclosed to the public? 
5. M
OVE CLEARING OF STANDARDIZED OTC  DERIVATIVES TO CCP S 
In view of the broad desirabi lity of CCP clearing for OTC de rivatives, it is  necessary to 
ensure that it is used to the greatest extent possible. This section look s at the different tools 
that might be considered. 
5.1. Defining CCP eligible contracts 
The first prerequisite for CCP clearing concerns clarity about eligibility of contracts. Whether 
a contract is CCP eligible shoul d ultimately be decided by the CCP that is assuming the risk 
associated with the contract. 
There may be a trade-off, howe ver. Requiring a product to be cleared by a CCP might alter 
the margin calculations in comparison with that product being clea red bilaterally. Under 
 
EN 5   EN bilateral clearing, margins are ap plied to the portfolio of a ll products with a particular 
counterparty. In contrast, the CCP applies ma rgin multilaterally per product range cleared. 
Moving to a CCP may thus imply higher margins.  This margin difference may be especially 
pronounced for illiquid products. However, this incr ease in required margin needs is there to 
pay for the benefits that the introduction of a CCP  brings in terms of systemic risk reduction. 
Some have argued that this may prompt the CCP  to clear all products (including the illiquid 
ones), benefiting from clearing fees but not consid ering the cost due to the increase in margin 
described above. 
However, CCPs do not have an incentive to cl ear illiquid products that they cannot manage. 
In addition, the users of a CCP can affect th e decisions concerning wh ich products a CCP will 
clear given that they are member s of the risk committees (i.e. the bodies in charge of such 
decisions). Therefore, leaving the CCP to decide  on the eligibility criteria appear to be 
appropriate, and hence if a contract is cleare d by at least one author ised CCP it should be 
considered eligible for policy purposes. 
Questions 
(12) Do you agree that the eligibility of c ontracts should be left to CCPs? Which 
governance arrangements might be necessary fo r this decision to be left to the CCPs' 
risk committees?  
5.2. Incentives to use CCP clearing  
The considerable reduction of  counterparty risk associated  with CCP clearing already 
provides an incentive to use it.  Using a CCP becomes more valu able for each participant as 
the number of participants increases, since this  maximises the potential for multilateral netting 
of claims and obligations. Because of this network externality and in view of the systemic risk 
reduction provided by CCPs, provi ding incentives to market participants is economically 
viable and justified from a public policy perspective.  
5.2.1. Business incentives 
The presence of a CCP in a market brings with it a number of bene fits to its participants. First, 
and most obviously, a CCP allows  for risk mutualisation thus  providing a vital function in 
preventing contagion in case of failure of a ma rket participant. Sec ond, from a day-to-day 
business point of view, it facilitates risk mana gement and position valuation of its users. Next, 
it reduces operational risk through, for exampl e, process standardis ation and legal risk 
reduction. Finally, a CCP may facilitate reporting of  specific information to public authorities. 
As a CCP is a natural data re pository of the contracts it clears, regulators may be able to 
obtain participant-specific information directly  from it without having to go to the individual 
participants, thus exempting the la tter from the burden of reporting. 
Questions 
(13) What additional benefits should the CCP pr ovide to secure a broader use of its 
services? 
5.2.2. Regulatory capital incentiv es - zero-risk weighting 
Under Directive 2006/48/EC (Capital Requirement Directive, CRD), a zer o-risk weighting is 
attributed to counterparty cred it risk exposures on derivatives contracts that are outstanding 
with a CCP, provided that the CCP fully collateralises its exposures with all participants on a 
 
EN 6   EN daily basis7. Although beneficial for certain market se gments, e.g. interest rates swaps, this 
incentive has proved to be insufficient to grant the necessary shift toward a broad use of CCP 
clearing in OTC derivatives mark ets. Therefore, considerati on might be given for further 
regulatory capital incentiv es (see section 5.2.3.). The provis ions related to  the zero-risk 
weighting capital treatment are currently under revision in the context of the Basel Committee 
of Banking Supervision and duly considera tion is to be given to this work. 
Furthermore, the regulatory capita l relief may not be available fo r all market participants, as 
not all users of derivatives are able or willing to meet the re quirements to become a direct 
participant in a CCP. This is particularly the case for insurance companies, investment and 
hedge funds and smaller banks. Such users will get CCP access indirectly through a direct participant (general clearing member). Dependi ng on how the indirect access is granted, the 
indirect participant of a CCP is more or less exposed to the default of its general clearing 
member. This issue may be addressed by appropr iately segregating the collateral of the 
indirect participant at CCP level.  
Questions 
(14) Is the zero-risk weighting a sufficiently  effective incentive for using CCPs across 
different market segments?  
(15) Should additional requirements, such as  appropriate account segregation, be 
introduced to apply the zero-risk we ighting to indirect participants? 
5.2.3. Further regulatory capital incentives 
When a product is CCP-eligible, it could become  a general principle for it to be cleared 
through a CCP. Therefore, dealers and other mark et participants might be subject to an 
additional regulatory cost if they continue to clear CCP-eligible contracts on a bilateral basis. 
However, in some cases, there may be legitimat e reasons for not following this principle. In 
that case, an approval mechanism would need to be introduced. 
The rules on credit risk mitigation under the CRD might offer a possible avenue of doing this 
for credit derivatives. According to the CRD, cred it default swaps are reco gnised as credit risk 
mitigation instruments only if certain conditions  are met. Consideration might be given on 
whether different degree of r ecognition might be given to CCP -eligible CDS that are not 
cleared through an authorised CCP. The overall impact of all the above  capital requirements 
should duly be taken into account. 
Questions 
(16) Should bilateral clearing of CCP-eligible CDS be penalised and, if so, to what extent? 
Is there a need to extend regulatory in centives to clear through a CCP to other 
derivatives products? 
(17) Under which conditions should exem ptions be granted and by whom? 
5.2.4. Monitoring  
In order to verify that CCP-eligible contra cts are indeed cleare d by a CCP, continuous 
monitoring becomes necessary. Mark et infrastructures, and in particular trade repositories, 
will play an important role in this respect. Cent ral data repositories may, in principle, contain 
information on all outstanding contracts and their characteristics (including whether they have 
been cleared by a CCP or not). This should enab le supervisors to obtai n all necessary data on 
                                                
 
7 Annex III, part 2, point 6 Directive 2006/48/EC 
 
EN 7   EN the number of total, eligible and CCP-cleared c ontracts (the latter should be cross-checked 
with the information on the open interest presen t in the CCP for consis tency purposes). It is 
also important to ensure that contracts are not  defined in such a way so as to become non-
CCP-eligible. 
For the CDS market, as outlined in the Commission Communication, the Derivatives 
Working Group established by th e European Commission has pr oved to be effective in 
addressing the issues related to the standardis ation of European CDS contracts for the purpose 
of facilitating CCP clearing, though some technical issues still need to be solved. Therefore, 
once these new standards will be in place, a large portion of European CDS will likely 
become eligible for CCP clearing. How much of th e eligible contracts wi ll actually be cleared 
is too early to say. The ten de alers having signed the letter of  commitment to the European 
Commission8 cover roughly 80 per cent of the market , the rest being essentially covered by 
other credit institutions associated with ba nking federations, which also share the same 
objective. 
Questions 
(18) What is the minimum acceptable ratio of CCP cleared/eligible cont ract? What is the 
maximum acceptable number of non-eligible contracts? 
(19) What statistics need to be provided to re gulators to make sure they have all the 
information necessary to perform their duties?  
5.3. Ensuring the safety and soundness of CCPs 
The use of a CCP per se  does not guarantee any increase in safety if the CCP is not properly 
structured, organised, supervised  and ensures even with its eventual outsourcing arrangements 
easy accessibility, timely execu tion, redundancy, business conti nuity and effective risk 
management.  
The ESCB and CESR are in the process of adopting common recommendations for central 
counterparties, which take into account the spec ific risks related to OTC derivatives. These 
recommendations, although not binding, may form the basis for such set of requirements. 
However, common harmonised rules need to be enforceable and therefore non-binding recommendations may be insufficient. Furthermor e, i) to ensure that CCPs continue to be 
considered a zero risk counterparty even when d ealing with much complex instruments; ii) to 
grant the necessary level of transparency and access to regulatory information; iii) to 
guarantee that even indirect participants may benefit from the enhanced safety granted by 
CCPs; and iv) to establish common authorisatio n regimes, these requirements may be further 
developed.  
Questions  
(20) How could European legislation help ensu ring safety, soundness and a level playing 
field between CCPs?  
6. I
NCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF PRICES , TRANSACTIONS AND POSITIONS  
This section considers transparency of trading, transaction as well as position reporting of 
derivatives and other complex products. These issues will be further developed in the context of the upcoming MiFID review with more specific questions. 
                                                
 
8 Letter of commitment from major dealer banks to clear European-referenced credit default swaps on 
one or more European CCPs, signed on 17 February 2009. 
 
EN 8   EN 6.1. Transparency of trading 
Extensive analysis and consultation have been  carried out in recent years on whether more 
transparency of trading activity in non-equity  markets is required. Market participants, 
infrastructure providers and regulators agree that an adequate picture of ongoing and past-
trading activity is necessary but disagree on th e adequacy of existing arrangements and the 
need for regulatory intervention.  
In the present environment there are neverthele ss valid reasons to re-examine the need for 
more transparency. First, more transparency of trading activity could help instil better due diligence, and ultimately more efficiency in these markets. Second, a growing number of 
regulators, policy-makers, and market participan ts, mainly from the buy-side, have pointed to 
recent experience as being symptomatic of a ma rket failure which more  transparency could 
partially help undo. Finally, MiFID favours th e development of a harmonised regulatory 
framework for trading in financia l instruments. It can be argued  that the present patchwork of 
national transparency regimes for EU non-equity  markets is hindering  efficiency and the 
development of a pan-European level of serv ice provision and access in these instruments. A 
more harmonised transparency approach beyond equities may therefore be necessary in order to strengthen investor prot ection and supervision.  
Questions  
(21) Should MiFID-type pre- and post-trade transp arency rules be extended to non-equities 
products? Are there other mean s to ensure transparency? 
6.2. Transaction reporting of OTC derivatives  
Article 25 of MiFID requires inve stment firms to report all tr ansactions in any financial 
instruments admitted to trading on a regulated ma rket to the competent authority (including 
exchange-traded derivatives and li sted structured products), wher ever these transactions take 
place (regulated market, MTF or OTC). This mean s that transactions in OTC derivatives and 
other complex products if these are not admitted to trading on a regulated market are exempt 
from these requirements.  
CESR has recently mandated a Task Force to analyse the possibility to both collect and 
exchange reports in some OTC derivatives (e.g. options, warrants, contract for difference and 
CDS) with the objective to help detect cases  of market abuse. Based on the preliminary 
analysis carried out
9, there may be a need to extend the scope of Article 25 to include OTC 
derivative instruments whose underlying financ ial instrument is admitted to trading on a 
regulated market (including corre sponding depositary receipts) to ensure that the collection of 
transaction reports in these OTC deri vative instruments is made mandatory.10 Most Member 
States appear to support this. 
Questions 
(22) How should transaction reporti ng of OTC derivatives to competent authorities be 
envisaged? Should it be extended to all contra cts or to certain categories? If so, which 
ones? Are there other means to ensure th at the competent authorities receive the 
relevant information on OTC derivatives transactions? 
                                                 
9 Call for Evidence on the Technical Standards to Identify and Classify OTC Derivative Instruments for 
TREM, CESR's Transaction Reporting Exchange Mechanism, 2 February 2009. 
10 Currently, recital 45 of MiFID allows (but does not require) Member States to apply transaction 
reporting obligations to financial instruments that are not admitted to trading on a regulated market. 
 
EN 9   EN 6.3. Position reporting to Competent Authorities 
A periodic position reporting oblig ation to supervisors could complement the transaction 
reporting obligation. The benefits of such a m easure might be twofold. From a prudential 
perspective, it would make Competent Authoriti es aware about firms' exposures, and from a 
market surveillance perspective it could improve  market oversight and a ssist in the detection 
of potentially abusive positions. 
The scope of such a reporting obligation would have to be carefully  defined taking into 
account the specificities of each market (OTC versus exchange-t raded derivatives, structured 
credit products, etc) and the risk that a lack of transparency in such a market could pose. 
Consideration will also need to be given to the level of granularity and costs for firms associated with reporting. In th is respect the greater use of  CCPs and of central data 
repositories can actually reduce the burden on single reporting in stitutions and achieve the 
same level of regulatory information. 
Market regulators would need to put in place arrangements to be able to easily exchange 
information. The positions reported to the national Competent Authorities might have to be aggregated at the level of CESR  in order to have an overview of the European market at all 
times.  
Questions 
(23) How should position reporting of derivatives to competent authorities be envisaged? 
Should it be extended to all contracts or to certain categories? If so, which ones? Are 
there other means to ensure that the co mpetent authorities receive the relevant 
information on the exposures to particular contracts? 
7. M
OVE TRADING TO MORE PUBLIC TRADING VENUES  
In principle, for standardised derivatives that are cleared by  a CCP, the next logical step 
would be for trading of these contracts to ta ke place on an organise d trading venue where 
prices and other trade-related in formation are publicly displaye d, such as a regulated market 
(i.e. derivatives exchange) or a multilateral trading facility (MTF) subject to transparency 
requirements. This would improve price tran sparency and strengthen risk management. 
However, the type of standardised contracts th at are typically traded on public venues may not 
cater for the full range of derivative users' risk  management needs. Most market participants 
have a commercial preference for trading OTC. However, the importance for financial stability of the existence of transparent and ope rationally efficient markets must be the main 
consideration. There is a societ al preference for transparent trading venues, as public and 
standardised as possible for the purpose of  risk assessment and price determination.  
A system based on competition between different trading venues (OTC, exchanges and 
MTFs), is also advantageous in terms of market  efficiency as long as it subjects all venues to 
adequate transparency and organisational requirements that ensure fair competition. This choice for transparent and organised trading is something not unknown for other financial 
markets. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) abolished the rule whereby 
trades should be carried out on regulated mark ets (the so-called "con centration rule"), but 
subjected other trading venues (MTFs, systematic  internalisers) to appropriate transparency 
requirements. Accordingly, for cash equities, competition between trading venues takes place under the umbrella of common transparency a nd organisational rules. However, MiFID's 
transparency regime currently does not cover derivatives and transac tion reporting does not 
apply to financial instruments that are not admitted to trading on a regulated market.  
 
EN 10   EN The US administration has recently announced le gislative measures that may encourage the 
greater use of public trading venues for th e execution of deriva tives transactions.11 
Questions 
(24) How can further trade flow be channelled through transparent a nd efficient trading 
venues? What would be the appropriate leve l of transparency (price, transaction, 
position) for the different derivatives markets?  
8. N EXT STEPS  
This document  marks the beginning of a nine-week consultation pe riod ending on August XX 
during which the Commission services invites comments on this communication from all interested parties. Responses can be addressed to
 markt-g2-consultations@ec.europa.eu . The 
Commission services will publish all responses  received on the Commission website unless 
confidentiality is specifically requested.  
The issues addressed in this document will also  be discussed at a high-level conference in 
Brussels, on 25 September. 
                                                 
11 The US intends to encourage tr ade execution on "regulated exch anges and regulated transparent 
electronic trade execution systems for OTC derivativ es" (US Treasury Financial Regulatory Reform, 17 
June 2009). 
 
EN 11   EN  A NNEX – LIST OF QUESTIONS  
Standardisation 
(1) What would be a valid reason not to use electronic means as a tool for contracts 
standardisation?  
(2) Should contracts standardisation be measur ed by the level of process automation? 
What other indicators can be used? 
(3) Should non-standardised contra cts face higher capital charges for operational risk?  
(4) What other incentives toward standardisati on could be used, especially for non-credit 
institutions? 
Strengthening bilateral collateral management 
(5) How could the coverage of collateralis ed credit exposures be improved?  
(6) Are there markets where daily valuation, exchange of collate ral and portfolio 
reconciliation cannot be th e goal? Please justify. 
(7) How frequently should multilateral netting be used? 
(8) Should bilateral collateral management be left  to self-regulatory in itiatives or does it 
need to be incentivised by appropr iate legislative instruments? 
Central data repository 
(9) Are there market segments for which a centr al data repository is  not necessary or 
desirable? 
(10) Which regulatory requirements should centr al data repositories be subject to? 
(11) What information should be disclosed to the public? 
CCP clearing 
(12) Do you agree that the eligibility of c ontracts should be left to CCPs? Which 
governance arrangements might be necessary fo r this decision to be left to the CCPs' 
risk committees?  
(13) What additional benefits should the CCP pr ovide to secure a broader use of its 
services? 
(14) Is the zero-risk weighting a sufficiently effective incentive for using CCPs across 
different market segments?  
(15) Should additional requirements, such as  appropriate account segregation, be 
introduced to apply the zero-risk we ighting to indirect participants? 
(16) Should bilateral clearing of CCP-eligible CDS be penalised and, if so, to what extent? 
Is there a need to extend regulatory in centives to clear through a CCP to other 
derivatives products? 
(17) Under which conditions should exem ptions be granted and by whom? 
(18) What is the minimum acceptable ratio of CCP cleared/eligible cont ract? What is the 
maximum acceptable number of non-eligible contracts? 
(19) What statistics need to be provided to re gulators to make sure they have all the 
information necessary to perform their duties?  
 
EN 12   EN (20) How could European legislation help ensu ring safety, soundness and a level playing 
field between CCPs?  
Transparency requirements 
(21) Should MiFID-type pre- and post-trade transp arency rules be extended to non-equities 
products? Are there other mean s to ensure transparency? 
(22) How should transaction reporti ng of OTC derivatives to competent authorities be 
envisaged? Should it be extended to all contra cts or to certain categories? If so, which 
ones? Are there other means to ensure th at the competent authorities receive the 
relevant information on OTC derivatives transactions? 
(23) How should position reporting of derivatives to competent authorities be envisaged? 
Should it be extended to all contracts or to certain categories? If so, which ones? Are 
there other means to ensure that the co mpetent authorities receive the relevant 
information on the exposures to particular contracts? 
Public trading venues 
(24) How can further trade flow be channelled through transparent a nd efficient trading 
venues? What would be the appropriate leve l of transparency (price, transaction, 
position) for the different derivatives markets?