EN    EN  
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 29.11.2011 
SEC(2011) 1408 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of th e European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR) 
 
and 
 
Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of the Council on Online 
Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR) 
{COM(2011) 793 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1409 final}  
 
EN 2   EN Disclaimer 
This IA report commits only the Commission’s serv ices involved in its preparation. The text 
is prepared as a basis for comment and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be 
taken by the Commission 
 
EN 3   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................ ...5 
2. Policy background, stakeholder consu ltation and procedural aspects..........................7 
2.1. Policy Background........................................................................................................7  
2.2. Stakeholder Consultation and research on ADR ..........................................................8 2.3. Procedural Aspects .....................................................................................................11 2.3.1. The Impact Assessment Steering Group.....................................................................11 2.3.2. The Impact Assessment Board ...................................................................................11 2.3.3. Opinion of the IAB .....................................................................................................1 2 
2.3.4. The structure of the IA................................................................................................1 2 
3. The existing national and EU framework on consumer redress and enforcement .....13 
3.1. Judicial Redress .......................................................................................................... 13 
3.2. Enforcement............................................................................................................... .14 
3.3. Consumer ADR ..........................................................................................................15 3.3.1. Development of ADR at EU level ..............................................................................15 3.3.2. ADR in the Member States.........................................................................................16 3.4. Scope of analysis of the IA.........................................................................................19 4. Problem Definition .....................................................................................................19 4.1. Constraints of j udicial redress ....................................................................................19 
4.2. Advantages of ADR....................................................................................................21 4.2.1. Consumers' perceptions on ADR................................................................................22 4.3. Challenges limiting the potential of ADR ..................................................................23 4.3.1. Important gaps in ADR coverage ...............................................................................23 4.3.2. Information on ADR: low awareness .........................................................................24 4.3.3. Quality of ADR schemes and monitoring ..................................................................25 4.3.4. ODR for cross border e- commerce transactions.........................................................25 
4.4. Baseline scenario ........................................................................................................2 9 
5. Subsidiarity and need for EU action...........................................................................29 6. The policy objectives..................................................................................................32 7. The policy options ......................................................................................................35 
 
EN 4   EN 7.1. Policy options for ADR covera ge, information and quality .......................................35 
7.1.1. Analysis of impact ...................................................................................................... 38 
7.2. Policy options for ODR for cross border e-commerce transactions ...........................52 
7.2.1. Analysis of impact ...................................................................................................... 53 
8. The preferred option and its impact............................................................................62 8.1. Comparison of the two sets of policy options (ADR and ODR) ................................62 8.1.1. Cumulative Assessment of Policy Options.................................................................64 8.2. The impact of the preferred option .............................................................................65 8.3. Proportionality of the preferred option .......................................................................69 9. Monitoring and evaluation..........................................................................................70 Annex I: Executive Summary of the study on "the use of ADR in the EU" ............................72 Annex I: Executive Summary of the study on "the use of ADR in the EU" ............................72 Annex II: Calculation method for estimated losses and savings for consumers.......................81 Annex III: Feedback statement of ADR public consultation....................................................85 
Annex IV: Summary report of the summit on A lternative Dispute Reso lution for consumers 
in the internal market ..................................................................................................93 
Annex V: Overview of EU legislat ion containing provisions on ADR....................................99 
Annex VI: Preliminary analysis of ADR coverage, information and quality.........................102 
Annex VII: Detailed methodology for calculating administrative costs for EU businesses...122 
Annex VIII: Impact on fundamental rights.............................................................................142 Annex IX: Overview of costs and benefits of  the policy options in monetary terms.............144 
Annex X: Mapping exercise on existing ADR schemes for four main sectors (energy, 
transport and tourism, telecommunica tions and financial services).........................146 
Annex XI: Time-line for the transpos ition of the preferred option ........................................165 
Annex XII: The cost of non ADR - Benefits for businesses....................................................166 
 
 
EN 5   EN 1. INTRODUCTION  
Consumer protection legislation at EU and Member States’ level has been significantly 
strengthened in the past decades. However, when their rights are violated European 
consumers do not always obt ain effective redress.  
This is because consumers believe court pro ceedings to be expensive, time-consuming and 
burdensome. Cumbersome and ineffective proceedings and their uncertain outcome 
discourage consumers from even trying to seek redress. In addition, consumers are not always 
aware of what their rights entail in concrete  terms and therefore do not seek compensation 
when they are entitled to it. 
The lack of effective redress poses particul ar challenges in cro ss-border transactions. 
Naturally wary of venturing into an unfam iliar commercial environment, consumers are 
especially worried about something going wrong with a purchase made in another Member 
State. They are concerned about differences in  legislation between Me mber States, language 
barriers, potentially higher costs and unfamiliar procedural rules in dispute resolution in another Member State. Consumers often give up their cases simply because they do not know 
where to address their dispute in another Memb er State. Uncertainty about securing redress 
affects consumers' confidence in shopping acro ss borders and dissuades them from taking 
advantage of the Single Market. 
Consumers’ determination to seek redress depe nds largely on the value of the claim. When 
the loss is significant consumers are more likely to take the necessary steps to obtain compensation, including through judicial means. Small consumer claims rarely reach courts
1. 
Estimates based on surveys show that one in five consumers in the EU encounters problems 
when purchasing goods or services. The loss re ported by European consumers due to these 
problems is estimated at 0.4% of Europe's GDP2. Only a small fraction of them seeks and 
obtains effective redress. 
The expansion of certain retail s ectors with an inherent cross- border dimension, such as retail 
travel services or car rentals,  entails a growing potential of cross-border disputes, which are 
more complex to solve for consumers and for businesses than domestic disputes.  
With the development of e-commerce, the scope and size of markets in which business and 
consumers operate has grown significantly and regardless of national borders. Consumers, 
however, perceive it as risky because it may gene rate disputes which are not easily resolved 
due to the virtual char acter of transaction.  
The lack of effective redress resulting from cross-border online transactions has adverse 
consequences not only for consumers but also fo r businesses. In particular, small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) are de terred from acquiring the admi nistrative capacity needed to 
deal with disputes with consumers residing in another Member State. The lack of confidence 
                                                 
1  39% of European consumers did not go to court after a problem they encountered because the sums 
involved were too small or the procedure would be too expensive with respect to the sum involved. Eurobarometer 342, "Consumer Empowerment", TNS Opinion, 2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_en.pdf
  
2 See Annex II for the calculation method of data used in the text. 
 
EN 6   EN among consumers and businesses that they will be able to resolve any problems which occur 
in cross border online transactions has a negative impact on the internal market.  
Concerning judicial redress, a number of in struments have been put in place and some 
initiatives are ongoing to explore th e possibility of future instru ments to enable consumers to 
solve their disputes and obtain compensation (i .e. ongoing work on collective redress, judicial 
mediation and small claims). Other existing or planned EU initiatives aim at promoting the 
interests, health and safety of consumers in th e internal market, such as European Contract 
Law, Consumer Rights, Product Safety. Howe ver, while these instruments govern the 
substantive rights and obligations  of the consumer and trader, they do not encompass means 
of resolving a dispute when this relati onship goes wrong, nor do they aim at providing 
consumers with compensation in an easily acce ssible and inexpensive way. An EU system of 
ADR (alongside an EU system of judicial redr ess) is needed to give full effect to EU 
consumer and contract legisla tion across the internal market. 
In addition to traditional dis pute resolution through judicial means, consumers and businesses 
in some Member States can refe r their claims to the so-called Alternative Dispute 
Resolution  ("ADR" ) schemes. The term alternative disp ute resolution cove rs non-judicial 
procedures, such as conciliation,  mediation, arbitration, complain ts board. For the purposes of 
this Impact Assessment (IA), ADR refers to the resolution of disput es between consumers 
and traders (B2C) linked to the sale of goods  and provision of services by traders. ADR 
schemes aim to settle disputes  arising between par ties through the interven tion of an entity 
(e.g. conciliator, mediator, ombudsman, compla ints board etc). ADR  does not cover the 
resolution of disputes by internal compla int handling systems run by businesses. ADR 
schemes aimed at resolving disputes between consumers and traders via an online procedure 
are called Online Dispute Resolution  schemes ( "ODR" ) and could be an effective tool, 
particularly for solving disputes linked to onlin e transactions. However, ODR is currently not 
sufficiently developed3. 
ADR schemes might have a general competence or cover specific retail market sectors. They 
can be public or financed through private se ctor contributions or both. ADR schemes are 
usually not mandatory for the pa rties and the referral of a di spute to ADR depends on their 
consent. ADR can propose or impose a solution or merely bring the parties together to assist 
them in finding a solution.  
Studies conducted as well as the reported experience of cons umers and businesses 
demonstrate that ADR can offer simple, inexpens ive and swift resolution of disputes between 
consumers and businesses4, in particular when small and medium amounts are at stake.  
However, the diversity and uneven geographi cal and sectoral coverage in ADR/ODR 
schemes prevent consumers and business from fu lly exploiting their potential. ADR schemes 
are not yet developed in some Member States. In a ddition, the existing ADR schemes cover at 
times only part of the territory or are competen t for specific sectors in the retail market. The 
                                                 
3 ODR can also exist for disputes between traders (B2B) which, as ADR, are not covered by this Impact 
Assessment. An example of B2B ODR is a service of the Czech Arbitration Court ( www.adr.eu ) which 
helps brand and trade mark owners, domain name registrants and registration companies all over the 
world to resolve conflicts through an online procedure.  
4 Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, Civic Consulting of the 
Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (CPEC), 2009, 
http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/sg/e valuation/page s/eims_en.htm   (executive summary in Annex I). 
 
EN 7   EN grass root development of ADR schemes in so me Member States has generated complexity, 
which has an adverse impact on their efficiency and use by consumers and businesses. In fact, 
consumers and businesses are often not aware of the possibility of referring their disputes to an existing ADR or they are not certain whether their dispute would be eligible under a given 
ADR scheme. 
The need to improve access to redress for cons umers through alternative dispute resolution 
schemes calls for a reflection at EU level. The divergence in national policies on ADR schemes (or lack thereof) shows that unilatera l action by Member States  does not lead to a 
satisfactory solution to consumer s and businesses.  The lack of  coherent and efficient ADR 
systems in the Member States has also an impa ct on the possibility for consumers to rely on 
these ADR systems in cross-border and onl ine disputes, for which access to ADR/ODR 
procedures remains very limited. The cross-borde r aspects of the identified problems in ADR 
and ODR are directly linked with the nationa l situation. Improving cr oss-border ADR relies 
on improving national ADR.  
Studies have demonstrated that potential sa vings for European consumers are estimated 
around €20 billion if they can refer their dispute to an ADR scheme
5, while businesses can 
save up to €3 billion when using ADR instead of going to court6.  
The purpose of this IA is to analyse possible ways to enhance the availability and 
effectiveness of alternative means of redress in  domestic and cross bo rder disputes, including 
e-commerce, as means to strengthen consumer s and businesses’ confidence in the internal 
market. This analysis will take into account th e various levels of deve lopment of ADR in the 
Member States as well as the different types of ADR schemes th at have been established at 
national level. 
Boosting the confidence of mark et actors, businesses and citizens alike, is essential to 
improve Europe's competitiveness. A well functioning Single Market encompassing 500 
million consumers, whose spending accounts for 56% of EU GDP, and more than 21 million 
businesses is the basis for delivering smart, sust ainable and inclusive grow th, in line with the 
objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy.  
2. POLICY BACKGROUND , STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS  
2.1. Policy Background 
The forthcoming legislative initiative on ADR in the EU is one of the 40 strategic initiatives 
of the Commission Work Programme for 20117. 
An initiative on ADR was identified by the Single Market Act (SMA), adopted in April 2011, 
as one of the twelve le vers to boost growth a nd strengthen confidence8. Its purpose is  “to 
establish simple, fast and a ffordable out-of-court settlemen t procedures for consumers and 
protect relations between businesses and their customers. This action will also include an 
electronic commerce dimension ".  
                                                 
5  See Annex II 
6  See Annex XII 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/p rogrammes/docs/cwp2011_en.pdf   
8 Commission Communication "Single Market Act" COM (2011) 206, p.9. 
 
EN 8   EN The Monti report of 2010 on the new strategy for the internal market9 emphasised the need to 
place consumers and consumer welfare at the cen tre of the next stage of the Single Market, 
notably through enhanced means of redress.  
The flagship initiative "Digital Agenda for Europe"10 announced an EU strategy to improve 
ADR systems and indicated that the Commission will “ propose an EU-wide online redress 
tool for e-commerce ” in order to build up consumers' and businesses' confiden ce in the digital 
market. 
The March 2011 European Council invited the Pa rliament and the Council to adopt, by the 
end of 2012, this first set of pr iority measures to bring a new impetus to the Single Market11. 
Against this background, the Competitiven ess Council highlighted the importance of a well 
functioning electronic commerce […] and agreed  that consumer alternative disputes 
resolution schemes can offer low cost, simp le and quick redress for both consumers and 
traders while at the same time being a useful  tool for maintaining business reputation and 
strengthening consumers' confidence".  12 
In April 2011, the European Par liament adopted three Resolutions on the SMA. In particular, 
it supported " the Commission’s initiatives to further improve the use of  alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) ". The European Parliament also underlined “the importance of a quick 
adoption of the legislative pr oposal expected for end 2011 "13. 
 
2.2. Stakeholder Consultation and research on ADR  
In January 2011, the Commission services launc hed a public consultation on the use of ADR 
as a means to resolve disputes related to co mmercial transactions and practices in the 
European Union14. The consultation paper outlined the state-of-pla y on ADR in the EU and 
raised questions about consumer and busines ses awareness of ADR,  the involvement of 
traders in ADR procedures, ADR/ODR  coverage and funding of ADR. 
More than 200 replies were rece ived from stakeholders and public authorities. The public 
consultation revealed a strong support for ADR sc hemes as an efficient alternative to in-court 
dispute resolution for consumers. Respondents ag reed unanimously on the need to develop 
further ADR schemes and the vast majority of  them also supported action at EU level. 
Contributions generally recognise d the added value of EU action in order to boost consumers' 
trust with regard to the resolution of nati onal and cross-border disputes. The paragraphs 
below explain how the main points raised by stak eholders in the consultation are taken into 
account in this IA. 
• The problem definition (Chapter 4) is shaped to take account the points identified as 
problematic by stakeholders (ADR/ODR coverage, consumers' and businesses' 
awareness and quality of ADR schemes). Sim ilarly, the objectives (Chapter 6) accord 
                                                 
9 "A new Strategy for the Single Market – At the se rvice of Europe's economy and society" – Report to 
the President of the European Commission (9 May 2010). 
10 Europe 2020 flagship initiative: "A Digital Agenda for Europe", COM (2010) 245, p. 13. 
11 Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 March 2011 (EUCO 10/11) 
12 Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council of 30 May 2011 on the priorities for re-launching the 
Single Market (Doc.10993/11) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st10/st10993.en11.pdf   
13 European Parliament resolution of 6 April 2011 on Governance and Partnership in the Single Market 
[2010/2289(INI)]. 
14  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/docs/adr_consultation_paper_18012011_ 
en.pdf   See Feedback Statement from the public consultation in Annex III.  
 
EN 9   EN with respondent's opinions on what should be improved, namely the offer of quality 
ADR schemes particularly for cross-border  disputes and disput es in the digital 
environment.  
• Respondents agreed that consumer ADR c overage should be improved. Stakeholders 
from all categories underlined the importance of taking into account the already 
established ADR, especially in highly regulated sectors (e .g. energy, electronic 
communications and financial services): th e importance of taki ng into account what 
already exists is stressed in both Chapters 7 and 8.Different policy options on how to fill 
in the gaps in ADR coverage are assessed under paragraph 7.2.  
• Many respondents supported the improvement of online dispute resolution schemes for 
ecommerce transactions: different policy opti ons on how to develop ODR are examined 
in paragraph 7.2.  
• Few respondents suggested creating a Europ ean Consumer Ombudsman to deal with 
cross-border complaints: a specific option is  examined (option 4 in paragraph 7.2 and 
option 4 in paragraph 1 of Annex VI) and di scarded for reasons of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
• Many Member States and business representati ves believed that the voluntary nature of 
ADR should be preserved. A number of consum er representatives were more favourable 
to mandatory ADR, but only for traders and es pecially in highly regulated sectors: the 
introduction of paragraph 7.1 explains why mandatory ADR was discarded as a policy 
option.  
• Most respondents underlined that perf orming ADR schemes should be guided by a 
number of common principles, such as inde pendence, impartiality, transparency and 
effectiveness. For consumer associations the principles of consumer ADR should be 
included in a binding instrument: the policy opt ions in paragraph 7.1 as well as those in 
paragraph 3 of Annex VI examined a full range of approaches which would ensure ADR schemes meet quality criteria.  
• According to respondents, ADR funding should be  left to each Member State to decide; 
therefore the IA does not examine the issu e of funding. Respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity, the policy options  leave it to Member States to decide how best to fund 
ADR schemes.  
• Respondents stated that a fundamental pre- condition to the greater use of consumer 
ADR schemes is raising the awareness of consumers and business. A majority of 
respondents, including business representati ves, stressed that businesses should help 
spread information about ADR schemes:  businesses' involvement in providing 
information is examined in paragraph 7.1 as well as in paragraph 2 of Annex VI. 
Additionally, other ways of providing inform ation to both consumers and businesses can 
be found in the policy options of paragraph 7.1. 
• A majority of respondents underlined that it would be difficult to envisage ADR 
schemes dealing simultaneously with both cons umer and SME disputes, since a different 
and separate treatment is required for di sputes of SMEs (B2B): the IA focuses 
exclusively on B2C and ADR and does not address the issue of B2B ADR. 
 
EN 10   EN Moreover, in March 2011, the Commission services  together with the European Parliament 
(IMCO Committee) organised a summit on "Alternative Dispute Resolution for internal market and consumers", which brought together some 200 interested parties. The debate revealed a unanimous support for the develo pment of ADR for consumers, including ODR 
and highlighted the need for EU action
15. The Hungarian Presidency stressed the importance 
of ADR as a complement to in-court litigati on. Members of the Parliament expressed their 
full support for the development of ADR, al so to enhance consumer confidence when 
shopping cross-border. While they agreed that there is no one-s ize-fits-all approach, they 
warned that too many different schemes may co nfuse the consumer and deliver mixed results. 
Many speakers stressed the lack of awaren ess of existing ADR schemes, both on the 
consumer and the business side. Experience s reported from Italy, the Netherlands and 
Denmark showed that companies not only take pa rt in ADR schemes to boost their image, but 
also use the data on solved disp utes to improve their products, services and - as a result - 
consumer satisfaction. However, speakers also stressed that businesses do not always engage 
in ADR proceedings and that some consumer disputes cannot be dealt with through out of court means because ADR schemes in some geogr aphical areas or in some sectors are not 
available. . The Commission was invited to come  forward with a propos al to provide clarity 
on the conditions needed to ensure high quality ADR schemes in all consumer markets, and 
particularly for e-commerce. 
Furthermore, the “ADR study”
16 carried out an in-depth anal ysis of existing ADR schemes 
and their functioning in all Member  States. Its main conclusions highlighted that: i) Gaps in 
the coverage of ADR procedures persist both at  sector-specific and geographical level; ii) 
Lack of awareness and insufficient informati on prevent consumers and businesses from using 
ADR schemes; and iii) there is a significant number of ADR schemes, which are not in line 
with core principles laid down by the two Recommendations17, in particular as regards 
transparency. 
A number of complementary stud ies and inputs informed the preparation of this IA, in 
particular: 
• In 2009, the Commission published a study on consumer redress in the European 
Union18, which examined, through face-to-face in terviews, consumers' perceptions 
and real experiences with different redress mechanisms. 
• In 2009, the Commission published a consultation document on ADR in the area of 
financial services19. 
• In 2010, the Commission published a consulta tion on "the future of electronic 
commerce in the internal market and th e implementation of the Directive on 
                                                 
15 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc .do?pubRef=-//EP//N ONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
462.616+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN . A summary report can be found in Annex IV 
16   Study on the use of Altrenative Dispute resolution in the European Union, CIVIC Consulting, 2009, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf   
17 In 1998 and 2001 the Commission has adopted two Recommendations on consumer ADR (see 
paragraph 3.3 of this document on "Consumer ADR"). 
18 "Consumer redress in the European Union: consumers' experiences, perceptions and opinions", 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/cons_redress_EU_qual_study_report_en.pdf   
19 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices -retail/docs/redress/consultation_summary_en.pdf   
 
EN 11   EN Electronic commerce"20, including a number of questions on online dispute 
resolution.  
• In 2010, the Commission servi ces organised a workshop w ith ADR experts from 16 
Member States to discuss best practices. 
• Between December 2010 and January 2011, the Commission services consulted 335 
companies from all EU Member States  on their experiences and views on ADR, 
through the European Business Test Panel21. In addition, between March and May 
2011, another 927 small and medium size enterprises responded to questions 
regarding ADR through the SME survey platform. 
• In April 2011, a workshop on "ADR: how to make it work better?" was organised 
within the European Consumer Summit22 with 60 stakeholders participating. At the 
Summit the Commission also published the re sults of a major survey on consumer 
empowerment that also examined consumers' willingness to use ADR.  
• The Commission services discussed ADR with various groups set up by the 
Commission such as: FIN-NET, the Financ ial Services User Group, the European 
Consultative Group, the European Consumer s Centre network, the Consumer Policy 
Co-operation Group and the Consumer Policy Network.  
• Finally, the Commissi on is participating in the activities of the Working Group on 
ODR set up in 2010 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)23. 
2.3. Procedural Aspects 
2.3.1.  The Impact Assessment Steering Group 
In October 2010, DG SANCO set up an IA Steer ing Group in which the Directorates General 
for Competition, Enterprise and Industry, Justic e, Information Society and Media, Internal 
Market and Services, Mobility and Transport, Energy as well as the Secretariat General and 
the Legal Service participated. The IA Steering Group met 3 times. 
In addition, DG SANCO consulte d other services of the European Commission within the 
Inter-service Group on Consumer Policy. The Directorates Ge neral for Budget, 
Communication, Competition, Economic and Fi nancial Affairs, Energy, Enterprise, 
Environment, Information Society, Justice, Internal Market, Transport, Regional Policy, 
Research, Education and Culture, the Secretaria t General and the Legal Service participated. 
2.3.2.  The Impact Assessment Board 
A draft IA was submitted to the IA Board (IAB) on 21  June 2011 and discussed at the 
meeting of 19 July 2011. 
                                                 
20 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-
commerce/questionnaire _%20ecommer ce_en.pdf   
21 http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2010/adr/index_en.htm   
22 http://www.european-consumer-s ummit.eu/workshops3_en.asp   
23 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitra l/commission/working_groups/3Online_Dispute_Resolution.html   
 
EN 12   EN 2.3.3.  Opinion of the IAB  
The IAB in its first opinion, asked for a revisi on of the document by taking into account the 
comments submitted by the IAB. In this light,  the following modifications were made: i) the problem definition (Chapter 4) was improved by  strengthening the cross border dimension, 
clarifying the gaps in ADR cove rage and the link between ADR and ODR, ii) the subsidiarity 
and proportionality analysis strengthened by explaining why an EU response addresses the 
problem better than uncoordinated action by Member  States (Chapter 5), iii) the description 
of the policy options was improved to better refl ect their practical implications (paragraphs 
7.1 and 7.2), iv) more detailed explanations were  included as regards the implementation and 
administrative costs by including  costs and by providing specific exampl es (Chapter 7); the 
robustness of the data used was analysed furt her in Annex II, v) the stakeholders' views 
became more prominent throughout the text, part icularly under each option (paragraph 2.2 
and Chapter 7).   The IAB in its second opinion, raised the following main points for review: i) better 
substantiation of the existence and magnitude of the market fa ilures and their relevance for 
the functioning of the internal market, ii) clea rer differentiation between more developed and 
less developed Member States in terms of ADR,  iii) provision of more detailed information 
on what the options will entail in practice fo r different Member States and iv) better 
demonstration of costs and be nefits of the preferred polic y options. The IA was amended 
accordingly. In particular, an annex was added (annex XII) to demonstrate better the cost of 
not having ADR and the subsequent costs to busi nesses. Its main conclusions were added in 
paragraph 4.2. Clusters of Member States regard ing the level of ADR co verage were added in 
paragraph 3.3.2. Examples of costs incurred by existing ADR  schemes were added in 
paragraph 7.1.1.2. The preferred options, espe cially the one of ADR in paragraph 7.1.1.2, 
clarified the effects on Member States, according to  their situation in terms of development of 
ADR, as well as on businesses. A new paragrap h (4.2.1) strengthens the argument that using 
ADR is an attractive alternativ e to consumers. The preferre d option of ODR in paragraph 
7.2.1.2 clarified the impact in terms of  costs for the use of languages. 
 
2.3.4.  The structure of the IA 
This IA analyses in-depth the problems linked to ADR/ODR in the EU (chapter 4) and argues 
why action at EU level is necessary (chapter 5).  The IA presents a set of options which 
addresses the problems identified in relation to ADR (paragraph 7.1)
24and a set of options 
which respond to the problems linked to ODR  in cross-border e-commerce transactions 
(paragraph 7.2). The impact of ea ch option is analysed against a set of criteria related to 
benefits and costs. Finally, an overall analysis of the combined options and of the preferred 
combined option is carried out in light of th e general objectives of the smooth functioning of 
the internal market and consumer protection (cha pter 8). The final chapters of the present IA 
assess the compliance of the preferred option with  the proportionality principle and set out a 
methodology to monitor and evaluate the preferred option. 
                                                 
24   A preliminary analysis of the problems identified in relation to ADR schemes is presented in Annex VI.  
 
EN 13   EN 3. THE EXISTING NATIONAL AND EU FRAMEWORK ON CONSUMER REDRESS AND 
ENFORCEMENT  
This chapter provides a brief overview of the stat e of play in the areas of consumer redress 
and enforcement. 
3.1. Judicial Redress 
Consumers have the ri ght to go to court to resolve di sputes and claim compensation. 
Traditional court proceedings are, however, not always pract ical or cost-efficient for 
consumers or businesses. Often, th e costs (e.g. court, lawyers' a nd experts' fees) and the risks 
attached to litigation make it uneconomic for a consumer to seek compensation, especially for 
small claims. Procedures are sometimes so complex and lengthy that  consumers may find 
themselves entangled without any clear percep tion of when their case will be resolved. For 
example, the average  time for solving disputes  of  civil, commercial and administrative law 
cases in first instance courts can reach 928 days  in Italy, 925 days in Portugal and 408 days in 
Bulgaria25. Lawyers' fees vary per Member State but in most Member States the hourly 
amount paid to a lawyer is between €100 and €300. In a few Member States it can even 
exceed €700. As a result, only 2% of consumer s who had a problem brought their complaint 
to court in 201026 and 25% of consumers would not  go to court for less than €100027. In 
addition, 54% of businesses would prefer to so lve disputes through ADR  rather than court28.  
Simplified court procedures can ease consumers'  access to justice and exist in almost all 
Member States for national cases. The 2007 Regulation on " European Small Claims 
Procedure "29 intended to simplify and speed up litiga tion concerning small claims in cross-
border cases. It is an establis hed procedure, which is also available to consumers as an 
alternative to the procedures  existing under national laws. Th e success of this procedure, 
however, depends on its effective application by th e national courts. In a survey conducted in 
201030, in 47% of courts visited judges were not aware of the European Small Claims 
Procedure. The relevant forms were not made av ailable on the premises or the websites of 
41% of the courts visited. Consumers find it di fficult to fill in the forms on their own, while 
in 41% of cases, assistance in filling in the fo rms and starting the procedure was not available 
to consumers. In 76% of cases examined, the European Small Claims Procedure was not free 
of charge for consumers. Consumers also face language problems (no assistance is foreseen and certified translators are usua lly too expensive). There are also difficulties in determining 
the competent court, as well as with the execution of decisions.  
                                                
 
25 European judicial systems Edition 2010 (data 2008 ): Efficiency and quality of justice, European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), p.159 
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.InstraServl et?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetI
mage=16 4098&SecMode=1&DocId=1653000&Usage=2   
26 Flash Eurobarometer 299 (hereafte r EB 299) on "consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection", The Gallup Organisation 2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_299_en.pdf   
27 EB 342 on consumer empowerment, 2011, TNS opinion and social, p.192 (hereafter EB 342) 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_sum_en.pdf  
28 Flash Eurobarometer 300 on "retailer attitudes towa rds cross-border trade and consumer protection", 
The Gallup Organisation 2010, p.79 -hereafter EB 300. , p. 220. 
29 Regulation (EC) no 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European Small Cl aims Procedure. This Regulation does not apply to Denmark. 
30 Draft ECC-Net Joint Project on the European Small Cl aims Procedure, to be published in the second 
half of 2011. 
 
EN 14   EN A reflection on collective redress continues at EU level. In February 2011, the Commission 
launched a consultation to identify which forms of collective redress could fit into the EU 
legal system and into the legal order of its Member States31. Currently, 14 Member States 
have judicial mechanisms whereby a group of  consumers or a representative entity 
representing the consumer publ ic interest can request compensation for harm caused by an 
illegal practice. Other Member States may s oon introduce such systems (e.g. Belgium). These 
mechanisms are designed for collective claims and can only by used if a number of consumers have been harmed by an illegal practi ce of a trader; but not all consumer disputes 
are collective claims. 
3.2. Enforcement 
Several instruments have been put in place to improve the enforcement of consumer rights 
within the EU. These instruments are complement ary and provide a set of tools that can be 
used to enforce consumer rights depending on the circumstances (e.g. the number of 
consumers involved, the amount or the complexity of the claims). 
Under the Directive on " Injunctions for the Protecti on of Consumers' Interests ", adopted in 
1998 and codified in 2009,
32 consumer organisations or public  enforcement authorities in all 
Member States can take legal ac tion to stop an illegal practice by a trader who has breached a 
consumer protection rule. Th e Commission Report concerning the application of this 
Directive published in 2008 shows that the m echanism created by the Directive which enables 
qualified entities of one Member State to act in  another Member State has clearly not been as 
successful as it was hoped. 33 However, whilst injunctive ac tions are rarely used for cross-
border infringements, several Member States a nd consumer associations  stated that these 
actions are used fairly successfully by consumer associations for national infringements, such as misleading advertising or   unfair contract terms
34.  
For cross-border cases, the “ Consumer Protection Cooperation”  Regulation adopted in 2004 
established a network of consumer enforcement authorities that pursue cross-border breaches 
of consumer acquis35. In certain sectors, such as financial services, transport, 
telecommunications and energy, regulators play an important role in market surveillance36. It 
should be noted though that these mechanisms  often do not foresee compensation for harm 
suffered by consumers. 
                                                 
31 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/collective_redress_consultation_en.htm   
32 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers' interests. 
33 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions fo r the protection of consumers' interest, 2008, 
COM(2008) 756 final http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0756:FIN:EN:PDF   
34 E.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germ any, France, Italy, Latvia, Austri a, Sweden, Slovak ia and the UK. 
35 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p.1. 
36 For example, the recently adopted EU legislation in the energy sector reinforces regulators’ powers and 
duties in monitoring the development of competition and ensuring enhanced customer protection and information. The regulators will have new powers, such as the power to issue binding decisions, carry 
out investigations and impose effective, proportiona te and dissuasive penalties. See Directives No 
2009/72/EC and No 2009/73/EC; OJ L 211, 14.8.2009 p. 55 & 94. 
 
EN 15   EN 3.3. Consumer ADR 
3.3.1.  Development of ADR at EU level 
The Commission has adopted two Recomme ndations on consumer ADR in 1998 and 2001. 
The former37 applies to ADR schemes which either propose or impose a solution to resolve a 
dispute. The latter38 applies to more consensual resoluti on of disputes. A database with the 
national ADR schemes, which according to the Memb er States are in conformity with the two 
Recommendations, and are thus notified to the Commission, is available online39.  
 The Commission Recommendations have brought  limited results due to their non-binding 
character.  40% of the existing ADR schemes are not notified to the European Commission.  
This is either due to the fact that these ADR schemes do not comply with the principles laid 
down in the Recommendations or because some of them are not awar e of the notification 
procedure40. For example, Lithuania has five ADR schemes but only one notified.  
The Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-201341 envisaged reinforced monitoring and enhanced 
use of the existing Recommendations on ADR.  
A number of sectoral EU Directives contain a clause that either obliges or encourages 
Member States to set up ADR schemes42. In particular, EU legisl ation on telecommunications 
and energy43, the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive, the 2007 Payment Services Directive, the 
Directive on the coordination of laws, regulatio ns and administrative provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in transf erable securities (UCITS) and the Regulation 
on cross-border payments  require  that adequate and effective ADR  schemes are put in place. 
The Services Directive requires  service providers that are part of an ADR scheme to inform 
consumers in this regard. In other sectors, EU legislati on (E-commerce directive of 2000, 
Postal Services Directive, Markets in Financial Instrume nts Directive –MiFID- of 2004) 
encourages  Member States to establish ADR sche mes. Finally, the 2008  Directive on “ certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters ” covers cross-border mediation. The 
Directive promotes the amicable settlement  of disputes, including consumer ones, by 
encouraging the use of mediation and by ensu ring a sound relationship between the mediation 
process and judicial proceedings.  
The information available on how the ADR cl auses are implemented is limited for those 
Directives that "encourage" the development of ADR since Member States usually do not 
notify this information. In addition, the Directiv es that "require" the establishment of ADR 
are not always fully implemented yet. For ex ample, less than 20 Member States have 
implemented the ADR clause included in th e Consumer Credit Directive. Even though the 
energy package requires the establishment of ADR schemes, the draft report of the Energy 
Working Group shows that there are still Memb er States with no ADR for energy (e.g. the 
Czech Republic). 
                                                 
37 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for the 
out-of-court settlement of consumer di sputes, OJ L 115, 17.04.1998, p.31. 
38 Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the 
consensual resolution of consumer ADR, OJ L 109, 19.4.2001, p.56. 
39 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm   
40  There is no data available on why each ADR scheme is not notified to the EU. 
41 Commission Communication "EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013", COM(2007)99 final, p. 11 
42 An exhaustive list of the EU Directives re ferring to ADR can be found in Annex V. 
43 Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC; OJ L 211, 14.8.2009 p. 55 & 94 
 
EN 16   EN The Commission has also established two ne tworks dealing with ADR. The European 
Consumer Centre network (ECC-net)44 helps consumers to access the appropriate ADR 
scheme in another Member State in case of cross-border disputes. FIN-NET45 consists of 
ADR schemes that handle cross-border disput es between consumers a nd financial services 
providers.  
3.3.2.  ADR in the Member States 
In Member States, the setting up of ADR sche mes has progressed over the last decade. More 
than 750 consumer ADR sc hemes exist in the EU46. They are highly diverse across the EU 
but also within Member States. ADR schemes may be established by public authorities, by 
industry or be set up in c ooperation between th e public sector, industry and consumer 
organisations. Their funding may be private (e .g. by industry), public or a combination of 
both. In most Member States, the geographical coverage of ADR can be national47 rather than 
decentralised at regional or local level48. Both sector-specific and multi-sectoral ADR 
schemes exist in Member States. The vast ma jority of ADR procedures are based on the 
willingness of the parties to engage in the pr ocess. For 64% of ADR schemes the adherence 
by the industry is not mandatory49. For example, the "Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo" in Spain 
takes binding decisions but the adherence by the trader is voluntary. When participation to the 
ADR procedure is voluntary, the possibility for consumers to solve disputes depends on the 
willingness of the business to engage in ADR. ADR decisions may be taken collegially (e.g. 
by boards) or by individuals (e.g. by a mediator  or ombudsman) and the nature of their 
decisions may vary considerably (e.g. non-bi nding recommendations, decisions binding on 
the trader or on both parties, agreement of the parties). In other words, each ADR scheme is 
virtually unique.  
Some Member States have improved their ADR system in the course of time50.  
For example, in the Netherlands the Foundati on for Consumer Complaints Boards is an 
umbrella scheme, which works fully electr onically and encompasses sector-specific 
complaint boards, has existed since 1970. In the last ten years the num ber of the complaint 
boards has doubled, now amounting to 50, covering sectors from opticians and gardening to 
energy and internet shopping.  
The Financial Services Ombudsman (UK) wa s founded under the Fina ncial Services and 
Market Act 2000, on the basis of se veral separate schemes that had been set up by industry. 
The scheme has national coverage and received almost one million cases in its first decade.  
The Lisbon Arbitration Centre (PT) was co-founde d in 1989 as a pilot ar bitration project by 
the Town Hall of the City of Lisbon, the Port uguese Consumer Associat ion, and the Union of 
                                                 
44 http://ec.europa.eu/cons umers/ecc/index_en.htm   
45 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/f inservices-retail/finnet/index_en.htm   
46 See ADR Study, p.164 to 324 and EU database of ADR schemes 
47 For example, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sloven ia, Czech Republic, Malta , the United Kingdom. 
48 For example, Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
49 ADR study, p.35. 
50 For example, France has recently created a Medi ation Committee to inform about ADR and monitor 
how French ADR schemes function. The Netherland s have created an "umbrella" ADR scheme that 
covers a big number of sectors, where businesses are obliged to participate and fund the system. 
 
EN 17   EN Associations of Traders in the Di strict of Lisbon. It is a cross- sectoral ADR scheme that only 
covers the metropolit an area of Lisbon. 
The Conciliation Body for Long-Distance Trav el (DE) was created in December 2004 to 
conciliate disputes in relation to long-distance travels. It is competent to deal with cases 
concerning travel by rail, air, ferry and bus. Seve n conciliators work for it. It is financed by 
the Ministry of Food, Agricultu re and Consumer Protection.  
With regard to online dispute resolution tools, very few ADR schemes deal specifically with 
internet purchases. In fact, most existing ADR schemes do not make a distinction between the 
purchase of goods or services by distance sel ling methods such as e-commerce or face-to-
face. They deal with all disp utes in their field of comp etence (e.g. financial services, 
telecommunications or travel). Very few ADR schemes (e.g. ECODIR51, Risolvi-online52, 
Der Online Schlichter53) handle the entire proc ess online where consumers, traders and ADR 
schemes communicate during the whole procedure through a web-based system in order to 
resolve disputes54. About half of the existing ADR sche mes, however, provide for an online 
complaint form which can be submitted directly online or sent by post or email55. ODR is 
nevertheless perceived positively; about 60% of businesses56and 64% of consumers state that 
they would be willing to solve di sputes with consumers through ODR57. 
The table below, which is divided in four cl usters, gives an overview of the level of ADR 
coverage58 and is based on the ADR schemes that Member States notified to the European 
Commission.  
As demonstrated, one third of the EU Member St ates already have in place ADR to cover all 
consumer disputes (cluster 4); all but Malta have a cross-sector al ADR, covering virtually all 
consumer disputes. Two Member States have no  notified ADR (cluster 1). It should be noted, 
however, that three ADR scheme s in Slovakia and six in Sl ovenia operate without being 
notified to the Commission59.  
Moreover, eleven Member States (cluster 3)  have several ADR schemes, covering either 
specific sectors or specific regi ons. Similarly, cluster 2 includes five Member States that have 
either few sector-specific or  regional ADR schemes.   
 
                                                 
51 ECODIR stands for "Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution" and is concerned with disputes for 
transactions between businesses and consumers taking place over the Internet. 
http://www.ecodir.org/fr/index.htm   
52 RisolviOnline ( http://www.risolvionline.com/ ) is a service offered by the Milan Mediation Chamber 
that allows the resolution of comm ercial Disputes and can be used be used both by individual 
consumers/users and by enterprises. 
53   The Online Schlichter ( https://www.online-schlichter.de/de/ueber_uns/index.php ) is is competent for 
the handling of e-commerce disputes, i.e. disputes over contracts which were concluded online. 
54 For example, for a brief history and overview of ODR, including at the international level, see Pablo 
Cortes "Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union", Routledge, 2011  
55 ADR study p.100 and 143. 
56 European Business Test Pa nel results available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2010/adr/statistics_en.pdf   
57 Preliminary results on a study on the development of e-commerce in the EU, to be published in the 
second half of 2011. 
58  Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm   
59  ADR study, pp. 89-90 
 
EN 18   EN ADR coverage 
 Member States 
1. No ADR Slovenia, Slovakia 
 
2. Partial coverage 
(few sector-specific or local ADR schemes) Ireland, Italy (few secto r-specific and local), 
Cyprus (one sector-spe cific),  Poland (few 
sector-specific), Romania (one sector-
specific) 
3. Numerous sector-spe cific or local ADR 
schemes Belgium (numerous sector-specific), Bulgaria 
(numerous local), Czech Republic (numerous 
local), Germany (numerous local), Spain 
(numerous local), France (numerous sector-
specific), Luxemburg (numerous sector-
specific), Hungary (numerous local), Austria 
(numerous sector-specific), Portugal 
(numerous local), UK (numerous sector-
specific) 
4. Full coverage Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden 
Furthermore, the table below demonstrates the number of notified and non-notified ADR 
schemes in the Member States, as in 200960, as well as the current number of notified ADR 
schemes61. Between 2009 and 2011, Member States not ified a number of ADR schemes, the 
total number now totalling 49262. In some Member States, a high number of ADR schemes 
are still not notified (e.g. Italy, UK and Poland) .  For example, the Czech Republic notified 22 
schemes between 2009 and 2011. Full coverage is  however not yet achieved and Member 
States continue to have gaps in  the coverage of many sectors. 
 
Member State ADR schemes notified 
to the EC until 2009 Non-notified ADR 
schemes ADR schemes currently 
notified to the EC (2011) 
AT 18 4 18  
BE 24 14 25  
BG 0 3 25  
CY 1 0 1  
CZ 0 5 20  
DE 223 24 203  
                                                 
60  ADR study (Annex I) 
61  According to the Commission database of notified ADR schemes, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm 
62  There are no data available on the number of non-notified ADR schemes after 2009. 
 
EN 19   EN DK 19 2 19  
EE 2 0 2  
ES 74 2 73  
FI 2 1 4  
FR 18 17 20  
GR 3 0 3  
HU 18 2 17  
IE 5 10 5  
IT 4 125 4  
LT 1 4 1  
LU 5 1 5  
LV 1 2 1  
MT 0 5 4  
NL 4 0 4  
PL 3 21 4  
PT 13 0 14  
RO 1 1 1  
SE 1 15 1  
SK 0 3 0  
SL 0 6 0  
UK 22 21 18  
EU 462 288 492  
3.4. Scope of analysis of the IA  
The present IA focuses exclusiv ely on the area of out-of-court di spute resolution. It aims to 
analyse a range of policy options to impr ove consumer redress through ADR and ODR, 
which is of particular significance in strengthe ning consumers and businesses’ confidence in 
the internal market, and which implies a well-d eveloped and coherent se t of efficient national 
ADR systems to function properl y. Other existing instruments enhancing the application of 
consumer rights in the internal market thr ough judicial means and enforcement action (see 
paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2) do not fall w ithin the scope of this IA.   
4. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
4.1. Constraints of judicial redress 
A substantial proportion of European consumers encounter problems  when buying goods and 
services in the intern al market. In 2010, this was the case  for approximately one in five 
European consumers63. Despite a generally high level of  consumer protection guaranteed by 
legislation, problems encountered by consumers ar e often left unresolved. The losses incurred 
                                                 
63 EB 342, p.169. 
 
EN 20   EN by European consumers because of problems with  purchased goods or services are estimated 
at 0.4% of EU GDP64. This includes the detriment suffered by European consumers in 
relation to cross-border shopping, which is estimated between €500million and €1 billion65. 
The reasons why consumers do not pursue their claims are multiple. Consumers are often not 
aware or not certain whet her the problems they encounter quali fy as a violation of their rights. 
Faced with the complexity of legal terms and conditions governing transactions, the consumer 
is often not convinced that pursuing a claim wo uld lead to a successful solution and in most 
cases drops the claim if an initial cont act with the trader proves unsuccessful.  
Another factor is the perceived burden of pursu ing a claim, in partic ular through judicial 
means. Research shows that 46% of consumers w ho complain to a trader  and are not satisfied 
with the way their complaint is dealt with take no further action66. Before brining a case to 
court, consumers estimate the time, money and effort required to obtain redress and compare 
it with the value of the claim. When the value of the claim is modest, it is often not pursued 
by the consumer because the input required is considered excessive. Lengthy and complicated proceedings, high costs linked to judicial proceedings and the uncertain outcome often discourage consumers from seeking judicial redr ess. 78% of European consumers did not take 
their dispute to court because they though t it would be too expensive, lengthy and 
complicated
67.  
Consumers' confidence in obtaining effective redress is even lower in disputes linked to 
cross-border and online transactions. Judicial  proceedings across borders imply a number of 
obstacles that an average consumer is not ready to face, such as diverse national legislation, 
language barriers, potentially high er costs, complex institutiona l and procedural aspects. 57% 
of consumers consider the resolution of problems more difficult when shopping cross-
border68. The existing procedures for cross border clai ms (see Chapter 3) appear to have been 
of limited use and have not solved the problem.  The perception that disputes in cross-border 
situations and in online transactions are particularly difficult to resolve affects consumers' confidence in shopping across borders and on line. The lack of confidence in online 
transactions undermines the growth  of the cross-border online tr ade. In fact, online trade in 
the European Union remains fragmented and larg ely confined to the national markets whereas 
its cross-border dimension is not full y exploited by consumers and businesses.
69  
This lack of confidence also has an impact on the competitiveness of businesses, which do 
seek or are unable to attract clients throu gh cross-border trade. 59% said that an 
                                                 
64 See Annex II for the calculation method. 
65  See Annex II for the calculation method. Assuming that the individual losses are similar for both 
domestic and cross-border purchases, it is estimate d that the detriment suffered by EU consumers, 
related to cross-border shopping, is between €5 00million and €1 billion. This assumption is for 
example also supported by the f act that when comparing the shopp ing experience of domestic and 
cross-border distance shoppers, th ere does not seem to be significant differences in encountered 
problems.  16% of shoppers experienced a delay with a product purchased cross-border in the EU while 
18% of shoppers experienced a delay with a product purchased domestically.   
66 EB 299 p.21. 
67  EB 342, p. 204 
68 EB 299, p.30. 
69  COM(2009) 557 final p.2. 
 
EN 21   EN important/very important obstacle to them selling cross-border is the potentially higher cost 
involved in resolving complain ts and conflicts cross-border  compared to domestically70.   
In conclusion, lack of confid ence in cross border and online tr ansactions and the consequent 
reluctance to engage in them, prevents consumer s and businesses' from reaping the benefits of 
a fully integrated retail market, including it s digital dimension. It should be noted that 
problems identified in the cross-border context are unlikely to be addressed unless they are 
also tackled at the national le vel to thus build consumer conf idence in the Single Market, and 
in effective methods of  redress such as ADR. 
 
4.2. Advantages of ADR 
 
An effective way to improve redress in the internal market consists in improving the 
availability and increasing th e use of out-of-court dispute resolution schemes by consumers 
and businesses. ADR schemes are a low-cost and quick alternative for consumers and businesses seeking to resolve di sputes. The vast majority of the ADR procedures are free of 
charge for the consumer, or of moderate co sts (below €50). Most ADR cases are decided 
within 90 days.
71 . 48% of European consumers think it is easy to resolve disputes through 
arbitration, mediati on or conciliation72. Consumers are more willing to resolve disputes 
through ADR rather than court. On the business es side, 54% of busine sses prefer to solve 
disputes through ADR rather than in court1 and 82% who have already used ADR would use 
it again in the future73. In other words, ADR can offer a number of advantages: proceedings 
are simpler, faster and inexpensive.  
Research carried out in prepara tion of the present IA demonstrates that an estimated amount 
of € 20 billion, which corresponds to 0.17% of EU  GDP, could be saved and used for other 
activities in the internal market if there were  well functioning and transparent ADR systems74. 
In addition to the overa ll losses of 0.17%, the estim ated losses due to th e lack of efficient 
ADR dealing with disputes li nked to cross-border e-commerce  amount to around €2.5 billion, 
corresponding to 0.02% of EU GDP75. The amount of losses due to cross-border disputes, 
including e-commerce, is likely to increase due to further development of the digital retail 
internal market and more competitive markets in the products and services sectors.  
Similarly, evidence shows that ADR benefits EU businesses too. When looking at time and 
cost savings, compared to going to court, the added valued of ADR is undeniable. In 
particular, regarding time, businesses could sa ve up to 258 days if the choose to use ADR76. 
In addition, according to conservative calculations77, the savings for businesses on a yearly 
basis can range from 1.7 billi on to 3 billion if they use ADR  instead of court proceedings. 
                                                 
70  Flash EB "Business attitudes towards cross-border sales and consumer protection", The Gallup 
Organisation,  2008  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_224_en.pdf 
71   See: ADR study, p.8. 
72 EB 299, p.30.  
73  EB 300, p.79This evidence is further reinforced when looking at the satisfaction of businesses; of those 
who used ADR, 76% found it a satisfactory way to settle the dispute European Business Test Panel, 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2010/adr/index_en.htm ). 
74 See Annex II for the calculation method. 
75 See Annex II for the calculation method. 
76  See Annex XII for the calculation method. 
77  See Annex XII for the calculation method. 
 
EN 22   EN Other calculations, according to a study78, show that handling a dome stic dispute in court can 
even cost on average € 25.33779. In that case, the savings for businesses would then vary from 
a minimum of € 3 billion to a maximum of € 13 billion. On the contrary, the costs for 
businesses for handling a domestic dispute via ADR amount to € 47280. 
Recent studies  show that ADR, including ODR, cases in  the EU have increased:  from 
410.000 in 2006 to 530.000 in 2008 81. However, a very low 5% of European consumers took 
their case to an ADR scheme in 201082and only 9% of businesses report having ever actually 
used ADR83. Disputes related to cross-border tran sactions are increa sing. The volume of 
cross-border complaints received by E CC reached 35.000 in 2009, an increase of 55% 
compare with 2005. The share of co mplaints on e-commerce transac tions has been larger than 
55% in 2009 and 2010 and this share has doubled since 200684. In 2009, 38 FIN-NET 
members reported 1542 cases dealt with, wh ile in 2010 32 members reported 1800 cases.  
4.2.1.  Consumers' perceptions on ADR  
A recent study based on focus groups with consumers85, demonstrated that consumers have 
positive experiences with and perceptions of ADR. The most frequently identified benefit of using ADR is that it involve s an ‘unbiased’ third party in  the process. According to 
consumers, using ADR also has the benefit of feeling less aggressive to the supplier, less 
intimidating for the consumer and cheaper than a court action. Where consumers felt the cost 
of the product or service involved in the compla int was relatively low, ADR was felt to be 
ideal.  Most consumers who chose ADR in dealing with their complaint recalled an uncomplicated and transparent process, where much support a nd advice was provided. The fact the entire 
process is handled out of court was seen as a positive benefit. The resultant simple and fast 
process was compared very favourably with the perceived long and slow process that formal 
legal proceedings would entail.   Most of the consumers interviewed believed it  is ‘almost impossible’ to seek redress in 
relation to cross-border purchases. Similar conc erns and beliefs exist around purchases made 
                                                
 
78  The Cost of Non-ADR – Surveying and showing the actual costs of Intra-community Commercial 
Litigation. Funded by the European Union ("specific programme Civil Justice 2007-2013), 
implemented by a consortium led by ADR Center, in collaboration with the European Company Lawyers Association (ECLA) and the European a ssociation of Craft, Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises (UEAPME).  
79  Based on a domestic dispute in the EU for a value of € 200.000. However, in Annex XII a more 
conservative approach regarding th e cost and time-savings is consid ered for the calculations (i.e. € 
7.000). 
80  "Assessment of the compliance co sts, including administrative cost s/burdens on businesses linked to 
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)", 2011, Civic consulting. However, in Annex XII a more 
extreme approach regarding the cost is considered for the calculations (i.e. € 854, which is the cost for 
dealing with ADR for the first time). 
81 ADR  study, p.8  
82 EB 342, p. 184. 
83 EB 300,  p.76  
84  "The European Consumer Centre's Network, 2010 Annual Report", p.12 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/ docs/2010_annual_re port_ecc_en.pdf  
 
85  Consumer redress in the European Union: consumer experiences, perceptions and choices, 2009, TNS 
qual, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/cons_redress_EU_qual_study_report_en.pdf  
 
EN 23   EN on-line, with the situation being most extreme where the two (on-line and cross border) are 
combined. There were many consumers who had ma de purchases either cross border and / or 
online, who had experienced problems with th eir purchases and had not complained to the 
supplier. Even where an initia l complaint had been lodged with  the supplier, consumers had 
not taken the matter further where they had received an unsatisfactory response. When 
pressed to identify the main barriers to seeking cross-border redress, consumers identified three main issues: being unable to have direct  access to the supplier,  language barriers, and 
differences in legislation. A numb er also expressed the concern that they might have to return 
to the country of purchase in  order to seek redress. 
 From the views expressed by consumers during th e discussions some clear patterns emerge 
about what the characteristics of  an ideal consumer redress m echanism would be. In general, 
consumers would prefer mechanisms wh ich (in broad order of importance): 
• Are as low cost as possible • Resolve the issue as quickly as possible • Do not expose them to uncomfortable or distressing experiences • Are simple and straightforward to understand 
• Are demonstrably fair and fully transparent. 
 
However, the challenges described below hinder consumers from seeking and obtaining 
redress through ADR.  
4.3. Challenges limiting the potential of ADR  
In order to provide consumers and busines ses with quality ADR schemes, the main 
shortcomings hindering the effectiveness of ADR need to be tackled at both the national and 
cross border level. Coverage, awareness, qual ity of ADR schemes and ODR for national and 
cross-border e-commerce transactions are the ma in "problematic areas" identified in this IA 
and confirmed by the different studies co nducted and by a number of stakeholders’ 
consultations.  
4.3.1.  Important gaps in ADR coverage  
European consumers do not enjoy the same leve l of access to ADR in the EU. Despite the 
750 existing national ADR schemes gaps still rema in both geographically and in sectors. The 
apparently high number of existing ADR scheme s does not guarantee that there is ADR for 
all consumer disputes
86. For example, in Portugal the six large arbitration boards have their 
premises in major cities. The Lisbon Arbitrati on Centre covers all se ctors but only in the 
metropolitan area of Lisbon. Consumer ADR sc hemes are a recent development in some 
Member States (e.g. Bulgaria) and they are not  developed in all sectors. No notified ADR 
scheme exists in Slovakia and Slovenia while ADR is underdeveloped in Cyprus and Romania, with only one ADR scheme covering postal and e-commerce services. By contrast, 
the Netherlands may have only four ADR sche mes but one covers 50 sectors. Belgium has 
more than 15 ADR schemes, covering more th an 10 sectors. As shown by the “ADR study”, 
in many Member States there are no ADR for basic business sectors, such as transport
87 (e.g. 
UK, Poland, Austria and Ireland). In other sectors,  which are of concrete importance in daily 
life (e.g. food, non-food goods such as electronic and electrical devi ces, clothes), the lack of 
                                                 
86   See also Annex X. 
87 "ADR study", p. 59. 
 
EN 24   EN ADR schemes is even more marked. For example, Belgium and Luxemburg have no ADR for 
non-food goods. Sweden, France and Portugal have no ADR in the food sector. One reason may be that some sectors are not regulated by EU or national legi slation. Another reason 
could be the perceived low value of claims in  these areas. However, some ADR schemes do 
exist in these sectors (e.g. for garages in L uxemburg, for driving schools in Denmark and for 
dry-cleaners in the Netherlands) and there is  demand from businesses for ADR to cover 
disputes in those areas. For exam ple, 24% of businesses were w illing to use ADR for disputes 
on non-food goods but it was not available
88. On the contrary, for regulated sectors (e.g. 
financial services, energy, telecoms) the ADR coverage is much wider, although still not 
complete. Italy and Romania have no ADR for insurance. 
4.3.1.1.  ADR in cross-border disputes 
Those existing ADR schemes, which do deal with  cross-border disputes , usually deal only 
with disputes against traders based in their ow n country and not with di sputes against traders 
located outside their country.  
A significant number of the existing national AD R schemes deal with cross-border disputes 
(62%89). For example, the Financial Services Ombudsman in the UK dealt with more than 
3000 cross-border cases, while the Dutch Consumer Complaints Board with 20090.10% of the 
cases dealt with by the Internet Mediator in  France and 4% dealt with by the Insurance 
Ombudsman in Poland concerned cross-border clai ms. In addition, FIN-Net is also key for 
the resolution of cross-border dis putes related to financial services. 
However, important gaps in the coverage of cross-border disputes remain, not only because 
some ADR schemes are not competent for cross-bor der disputes but also because of the lack 
of ADR in some geographica l areas and sectors. In 2010, less than 9% of around 35.000 
cross-border complaints received by the ECC network were transferred to an ADR scheme91. 
This is due to the fact that the ECC network could not find an ADR scheme in the country of 
the trader to which to submit the dispute. 
Improving ADR cross-border cannot be achie ved without improving ADR domestically. A 
narrow focus on cross-border ADR can have disadva ntages as, for example, it is difficult to 
tackle the existing gaps without addressing the coverage problems within the Member States.  
4.3.2.  Information on ADR: low awareness 
The results of the ADR study and of the public c onsultation showed that awareness levels of 
ADR schemes are low. On average 44% of EU  retailers are not aware of any ADR scheme92.  
Around 30% of those European cons umers who were unable to re solve their problem directly 
with the trader, did not know either how to take  their complaint further or about the existence 
of ADR93. For consumers, the lack of detailed info rmation about ADR pro cedures is also a 
significant barrier to the use of  ADR. Businesses rarely provide consumers with information 
                                                 
88  European Business Test Panel results available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2010/adr/statistics_en.pdf   
 
89 "ADR study", p. 339. 
90  Study on "Cross-Border Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union", 2011 available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/doc uments/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf 
91 "The European Consumer Centre's Network, 2010 Annual Report", 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/ docs/2010_annual_re port_ecc_en.pdf   
92 EB 300, p.76.  
93 EB 342, p.185. 
 
EN 25   EN on the competent ADR that could deal with their dispute, either at the point of sale or post-
sale, unless this is regulated (e.g. in the financial services sector in UK a nd the travel sector in 
Belgium). Websites to guide consumers to the appr opriate scheme to deal with their disputes 
are also lacking94. 
4.3.3.  Quality of ADR schemes and monitoring 
ADR schemes do not always respect core quality principles such as transparency, impartiality 
and effectiveness, as also laid down in th e two Commission Recommendations of 1998 and 
2001. There is thus no guarantee that they  comply with the Recommendations. The 
impartiality of the entity res ponsible for the ADR procedure is essential to ensure a fair 
outcome. This implies the absence of any pressu re that could influence the attitude of the 
entity towards the dispute. This is even more the case when the ADR scheme is financed by one of the parties. In the consultation, some consumer organisations considered that the 
independence and the impartiality of schemes wh en ADR is financed by a company and the 
individual entity is not fully separated from th at company is questionable. The transparency 
of the procedure is also crucial and guarantees th at the parties receive all the information they 
need to take an informed decision before st arting a procedure. Many ADR schemes, however, 
do not have a web-site of their own (22%)
95. Finally, the effectiveness of the procedure 
reassures the parties that the dispute will be solved in a quick and simple manner and allows 
them to see the benefits of ADR, for example if compared to a judicial proceeding. However, 
at the moment almost half of the existing ADR  schemes do not provide online access to the 
procedure.  
Finally, the results of the “ADR study” and of the consultation show that currently data on the 
functioning of ADR schemes are not sufficiently available. Th ere appears to be no regular 
monitoring of use and effectiven ess of ADR by public authoritie s. In 41% of ADR schemes, 
consumers have no information about the us e of, the number of cases and the past 
performance of the ADR scheme96. 
4.3.4.  ODR for cross border e-commerce transactions 
While domestic internet purchases are increasing97, cross-border e-commerce transactions 
remain low level at about 9%98. Consumers currently lose out  by not being able to shop 
online across borders because they miss the opport unity of comparing the costs of products in 
the wider EU market, and therefore buying them  where they are less expensive. A recent 
study on cross-border e-commerce99 showed that goods offered in other countries are often at 
least 10% less expensive than domestic goods. As previously discussed, one of the main 
reasons why consumers often refrain from online cross-border purchases of goods and 
services is the uncertainty about what to do or  to whom to turn to if they experience a 
problem with a trader of another Member State.  
Consumers’ lack of confidence in cross-bor der e-commerce affects in particular the 
development of SMEs that could have benefi ted from a wider market. One of the main 
                                                 
94 "ADR study", p.18. 
95 "ADR study", p.143. 
96 "ADR study", p.18. 
97 For example in the UK, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands, France and the Nordic countries, 45% 
to 65% of internet users buy online. 
98 Eurostat information society statistics 2010 . 
99 "Mystery Shopping Evaluation of Cross-Border E-Commerce in the EU", YouGov-Psychonomics 
(2009), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/EC_e-commerce_Final_Report_201009_en.pdf   
 
EN 26   EN reasons why SMEs are reluctant to sell goods or to provide services online to consumers in 
other Member States is the lack of e fficient means of resolving a dispute.  
For in-court proceedings, EU Regulation 44/20 01 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters100 provides for specific rules on 
determination of jurisdiction in case of disputes concerning contracts concluded by 
consumers. The protective rules apply, in particular in  case of contracts c oncluded on the sale 
of goods financed by a credit and in contracts (other than certain contracts on transport), 
where the trader "directs its activities" to the Member State in which the consumer is 
domiciled. In such cases, the consumer can bring proceedings before the courts of the Member State of his domicile and he can be sued only in that Member State.  
The application of the jurisdic tion rules in in-court dispute re solution have recently been 
clarified when applied to onlin e transactions (joined cases Pammer and Alpenhof
101). The 
rationale behind the in-court jurisdiction rules is that costs of foreign litigation may be more 
easily borne by businesses (who ca n off-set these costs against extended markets) than by 
individual consumers. Neverthele ss, the risk of foreign litigation may be an element which  
discourages some businesses from extending thei r commercial offer to other Member States 
to avoid potential litigation cost s and a number of other difficulties when dealing with court 
procedures in other Member St ates (e.g. language issues, travelling costs, uncertainty about 
the legal procedures). The risk of being sued  in another Member State constitutes a major 
obstacle to trading across borders via internet (especially for SMEs).  59% of traders said that 
an important obstacle to selling cross-border is the potential higher cost involved in resolving 
complaints across borders. This may in turn prevent consumers from enjoying the benefits of 
cross-border competition in terms of choice and low prices. 61% of online orders to another 
EU country failed because the trader refused to serve the consumer’s country or did not offer 
cross-border payment102.  
The important gaps in ADR coverage describe d under 4.1 result in a scat tered and incomplete 
offer of ADR schemes to solve consumer dis putes related to e-commerce transactions. In 
addition, while half of the existing ADR schemes offer c onsumers the possibility of 
submitting their complaint online, very few offe r consumers the possibility of conducting the 
entire procedure online103. Handling the entire process onlin e would produce savings in terms 
of time and ease communication between the partie s. In 2010, more than half of complaints 
(56.3%) received by the ECC-Net were  linked to e-commerce transactions104. However, out 
of the 35.000 cross border comp laints received by ECC network in 2010, 91% could not be 
referred to an ADR scheme in another Member State105. 
                                                 
100 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 Decem ber 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I), OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?idReq=1&page=2   
101 Joint cases C-585/08 and C-144/ 09 of the European C ourt of Justice (Grand Chamber), 7 December 
2010 
102 "Mystery Shopping Evaluation of Cr oss-Border E-Commerce in the EU", 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/EC_e-commerce_Final_Report_201009_en.pdf  
103 FIN-NET members are an excep tion since they can handle cons umer disputes entirely online. 
104 "The European Consumer Centre's Network, 2010 Annual Report", p.12 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/ docs/2010_annual_re port_ecc_en.pdf  
105 "The European Consumer Centre's Network, 2010 Annual Report", 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/ docs/2010_annual_re port_ecc_en.pdf  
 
EN 27   EN The lack of efficient online means of hand ling disputes between consumers and traders 
restricts the access of consumer s and traders to simple and quick ways to resolve their 
disputes.  
 
 
EN 28   EN 
 
 
EN 29   EN 4.4. Baseline scenario  
The baseline scenario assumes no further action at EU level with a view to enhancing the 
potential of dispute resolu tion through ADR and ODR.  
The two Commission Recommenda tions (see paragraph 3.3.1) wi ll continue to provide 
quality principles that ADR sc hemes should respect. Member Stat es will notify on an ad hoc 
basis those ADR schemes that function in accordance with these principles. 
Regarding the sector-specific legislation that  includes provisions on ADR, two developments 
can be foreseen. Firstly, Member States might  set up sectoral ADR schemes as recommended 
by the EU legislation. No Member States have however currently notified such developments. 
In addition, Member States are bound to implement the provisions  of the sectoral Directives 
requiring them to put in place ADR schemes. It should be noted that the majority of existing legislation with ADR clauses conc erns financial services, an al ready highly regulated sector 
where ADR is most commonly found. Furthermor e, Member States with no or limited ADR 
coverage, as described in pa ragraph 3.3.2, might autonomously set up ADR schemes for some 
or all consumer disputes. 
The disputes consumers could refer to ADR schemes will most likely follow an increasing 
trend. An increase of more than 90.000 cases  submitted to national ADR schemes was 
observed between 2006 and 2008. A similar trend is  noticeable for the complaints submitted 
to ECC: they increased by 55% between 2005 and 2009 and those related to e-commerce 
transactions by 50%.  
Under the baseline scenario the developmen t of ADR will be limited to few sectors. 
Consumers and businesses will not be able to re solve all their domestic or cross-border and 
online disputes through quality out-of-court means. This will result in c onsiderable persistent 
detriment for consumers, and an uneven  play ing field for businesses while both businesses 
and consumers will continue to have little tr ust in cross-border a nd online transactions. 
5. S
UBSIDIARITY AND NEED FOR EU ACTION  
Consumer protection belongs to shared compet ences between the EU and the Member States. 
As stipulated in the Article 169 of the TFEU, the EU shall contribute, inter alia , to protecting 
the economic interests of consumers as well as  promoting their right to information and 
education in order to safeguard their interests.  An ADR/ODR initiative based on Article 114 of the TFEU will help to achieve these objecti ves in the context of the proper functioning of 
the internal market. At the same time it will respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
Developing consumer ADR/ODR is crucial to benefit consumers and businesses and to 
improve the functioning of the internal market  (as described in chap ters 3 and 4), as was 
confirmed by all sections of stakeholder opi nion in the public consultation and debates.  
Twelve years after the Co mmission Recommendations on consumer ADR schemes (see 
paragraph 3.3), the analysis of the current situ ation indicates that action taken solely at 
national level has not produced sufficient cove rage of ADR. A number of shortcomings 
(described in paragraph 4.3) still hinder the effectiveness of ADR schemes and well 
functioning and accessible ODR schemes for cro ss-border e-commerce transactions remain 
 
EN 30   EN underdeveloped. European consumers therefore do  not enjoy the same le vel of access to ADR 
schemes across the EU106. Neither is the provision of inform ation to consumers on ADR in all 
retail market sectors guaranteed. If the development of ADR is left to Member States' action alone, quality ADR schemes will continue to be ab sent in some sectors of the retail market 
and in some geographical areas of the EU. Cons umers' and businesses' awareness levels will 
remain low, while the monitoring of nati onal ADR will be done by Member States on a 
voluntary basis. Finally, ther e will be no assurance that  ADR/ODR schemes respect key 
principles guaranteeing their quality. This insufficient and fragmented development of ADR 
in the EU is in contrast with the objectives of the TFEU since it  will undermine or create new 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal ma rket, create unequal consumer protection in the 
EU and variable commercial conditions for business. Moreover w ithout a well-functioning 
system of domestic ADR on which cross-border ADR can be based and anchored,  the development of an efficient and effective ADR for cross-border disputes, will not be 
achieved. 
The lack of efficient ADR/ODR limits the potential of this means of dispute resolution and 
creates imbalances in the effectiveness of ha ndling consumer disputes  in different Member 
States, in particular as rega rds cross-border disputes. This situation affects consumers' 
confidence in shopping across bo rders.  Both businesses
107 and consumers clearly state that 
concerns about potential redress problems in another Member State discourage them from 
selling and buying across borders a nd thus not fully reaping the pot ential benefits of internal 
market108. Particular attention needs to be paid to  generating consumer confidence of in the 
internal market and to ensuri ng a level playing field for busin esses across Member States. 
Furthermore, despite the low level of current cross-border e-commerce tr ansactions, there is a 
rapidly expanding digital retail ma rket within the Member States109. Thus, ensuring simple, 
low-cost and effective means of out-of-court re dress is even more important for consumers 
and traders in order to engage in online transa ctions across border. Action at Member State 
level will not lead to the establishment of an EU-wide online dispute resolution which, as 
indicated in the Digital Agenda, is an e ssential tool in promoting e-commerce.  
The objectives pursued can be better achieved  by measures at EU level by reason of its 
effects and scale. A clear advantage in the de finition of common principles and criteria for 
ADR schemes in all Member States will be an effective and adequate treatment of consumer 
disputes linked both to the domestic and cross- border transactions. It will also ensure that 
ADR/ODR is developing in a more homogenous manner in the EU. 
In particular, it will allow equal access to quality ADR schemes for consumers and businesses 
enabling them to resolve their domestic and cros s-border disputes in a ll sectors across the EU, 
                                                 
106  In some Member States, ADR schemes are not yet developed or cover a limited number of sectors (see 
section 4.3.1). 
107  In particular for SMEs since their limited administrative capacity would not allow them to pursue 
claims through judicial means. The availability of easy dispute resolution such as ADR could address such concerns of small and medium enterprise. 
108  Reportedly, 1 in 20 consumers faced problems with  cross-border purchases of  goods or services, while 
59% of traders said that an important obstacle to them selling cross-border is the potentially higher cost 
in resolving complaints and conflicts cross-border compared to domestically. 
109  Between 2004 and 2010, the percentage of individuals who ordered goods or services over the internet 
in the EU-25 rose significantly, from 22% to 37 %. The development of on-line transactions is 
becoming a wide-spread phenomenon in the UK, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands, France and 
the Nordic countries, where 45% to 65%  of internet users are online buyers. 
 
EN 31   EN including access by electronic means. Consumers will have at their disposal a quick, 
inexpensive and simple means of settling their dis putes with traders irrespective of the market 
sector and the amount at stake. Many consumers do not fully trust the di gital internal market, 
despite the numerous benefits that it offers, su ch as access to a wider choice of products and 
services; in about half of the Member States more than ha lf of the products searched for on 
the internet could only be found online in another country110. Finally, more effective 
ADR/ODR in the internal market will reduce consumer detriment and allow consumers to 
make significant savings, in both off and online transactions, which can be used to purchase extra goods and services. The growth potential of cross-border retail  trade, both off and 
online, identified in the recent years could be significantly strengthened if consumers have 
greater trust in this type of transactions. Mo reover, traders will have similar possibilities in 
dealing with consumer disputes throughout the EU, thus ensuring a level playing field. The 
use of ADR/ODR can also help traders enhance their good reputa tion, as they tend to improve 
after-sale customer services
111 thus enhancing the competitiven ess of their products and the 
services they offer to consumers. This is particularly important in promoting benefits for well-performing enterprises. 
Unilateral actions at Member State level canno t sufficiently provide consumer and traders 
with the benefits mentioned above. Uncoordina ted efforts by Member States are likely to 
result in further fragmentation of ADR, which in  turn will contribute to unequal treatment for 
consumers and traders in the internal market a nd create diverging levels  of consumer redress 
in the EU. Moreover the functioning of an e fficient and effective ADR for cross-border 
disputes presupposes a well-functioning system  of domestic ADR on which the cross-border 
ADR can be based and anchored. Action at EU  level is necessary to provide European 
consumers with the same level of protectio n and promote competitive practices amongst 
businesses, thus increasing offer for and dema nd of products or services across borders and 
online. An initiative at EU level in this field is supported by the vast majority of stakeholders. 
The proportionality aspect will be ad dressed in detail in chapter 8.3.  
 
                                                
 
110 Mystery Shopping Evaluation of Cross-Border E-Commerce in the EU", YouGov-Psychonomics 
(2009), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/EC_e-commerce_Final_Report_201009_en.pdf   
111 For example, in the countries where ADR is al ready well developed (Denmark, Sweden Finland, 
Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Czech Re public) an average of 56% of consumers report 
having obtained a satisfactory redress from traders,  while in the countries with the least developed 
ADR (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Latvia) satisfactory redress was obtained 
only by 23% consumers (EB 342, p.75). 
 
EN 32   EN 6. THE POLICY OBJECTIVES  
The aim of this initiative is to improve the f unctioning of the retail in ternal market, including 
the retail digital internal market, and to ach ieve a high level of consumer protection by 
enabling consumers' and businesses' access to impartial, transparent and effective means to resolve their disputes out-of-court. This will al so contribute to achieving the objectives of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. The objectives of this IA are described in the table below.  
General Objectives 
• To improve the functioning of the retail intern al market, including the retail digital market. 
• To achieve a high level of consumer protection.  
• To enable consumers and traders to resolve their disputes in an effective manner.  
Specific Objectives Operational Objectives 
ADR coverage, information and quality 
To ensure access to ADR schemes to 
facilitate out-of-court dispute resolution for 
consumers in domestic and cross-border disputes with traders.  • To increase the proportion of domestic 
and cross border consumer disputes 
solved by ADR schemes. 
• To reduce the number of unresolved 
consumer problems with purchased 
goods or services at the national level and in cross-border cases.  
To ensure that consumers and businesses are aware of the existence of ADR.  • To ensure that consumers receive 
information about the ADR competent 
to deal with their dispute, in particular in cross-border situations. 
• To ensure that consumers and 
businesses are aware of the general 
information related to ADR schemes and to their use, in particular in cross-border situations.  
 
To ensure that ADR schemes offer a quality 
service to consumers and businesses. • To ensure that ADR schemes provide 
an impartial service to businesses and 
consumers, i.e: to ensure that the entity making the decision is not subject to pressure that co uld influence its 
attitude towards the dispute (e.g.  no conflict of interest with either party). 
• To ensure that ADR schemes provide a 
 
EN 33   EN competent and transparent service to 
businesses and consumers, i.e. to make publicly available information on their functioning and their procedures. 
• To ensure that ADR schemes provide 
an effective service, i.e.:  
• To diminish costs incurred by 
consumers when pursuing their 
claims. 
• To diminish costs incurred by 
business when dealing with consumer claims. 
• To diminish time spent by 
consumers and businesses in solving their disputes. 
• To provide to consumers and 
businesses a simple and easy-to-
use means to solve their disputes 
• To ensure that ADR schemes are 
regularly monitored. 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) for cross border e-commerce transactions 
To ensure that consumers and businesses 
can rely on a mechanism to solve their cross-border, e-commerce disputes online.  • To give consumers and businesses the 
possibility to handle all cross-border e-
commerce disputes online and out-of-court by providing a web-based tool at 
EU level.  
• To develop common criteria upon 
which the web-based system will be based in order to boost its effectiveness.  
 
 
 
EN 34   EN 
 
       
 
EN 35   EN 7. THE POLICY OPTIONS  
Although they are directly interlinked, this Chapter includes se parate sets of policy options for 
ADR and ODR to tackle the problems identified in Chapter 4.  This separate presentation allows analysing in greater detail the options which are more specific and better tailored to 
ADR and ODR (paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2) 
However, to pursue the objectives identified in Chapter 6, the combination of the two sets of 
options on ADR and ODR is needed.  As explaine d further in Chapter 8, this combination will 
improve the functioning of the retail internal market, including the retail digital internal 
market, and achieve a high level of consumer protection. 
7.1. Policy options for ADR coverage, information and quality 
The policy options that follow are the result of a preliminary analysis that is provided in 
Annex VI. That analysis examined the conten t of different policy options under the three 
areas of "ADR coverage", "information on AD R" and "quality and monitoring of ADR". The 
options that are examined under this paragrap h therefore results from the merging of the 
options examined under those three areas.   
From each of the areas analysed in Annex VI th e following specific elements were retained in 
the options that are described in  this paragraph namely: i) the need for making ADR available 
where they do not exist (option 3 under paragr aph 1); ii) the need for information to 
consumers by traders (option 3 under paragraph 2); and iii) the need for ADR schemes to 
respect some core principles (option 2 under paragraph 3).   
Other options were analysed and discarded in Annex VI. This concerns in particular the 
options on sector-specific legislation on ADR (o ption 2 under paragraph 1) and on creating an 
EU Ombudsman for all consumer dis putes (option 4 under paragraph 1). 
Policy options that require ADR to become mand atory are also discarded from the analysis.  
Firstly, imposing a mandatory system of Altern ative Dispute Resolution that would introduce 
an additional step for access to the courts in all Member States could raise serious concerns 
regarding the compliance with the Right to an effective remedy (Article  47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights).  
Secondly, making ADR mandatory for busine sses can be twofold: i) making their 
participation in the ADR scheme obligatory or  ii) making the outcome of the ADR scheme 
binding for them. Either option would run against the voluntary nature of  ADR. In addition, if 
such option is prescribed at EU level, it coul d interfere deeply with the different forms of 
existing ADR schemes, thus affecting their flexible nature.  
In addition, the need to pres erve the voluntary choice of part ies to turn to ADR was also 
highlighted by the majority of stakeholders during the consultation an d the studies conducted. 
All business representatives, as for exampl e Business Europe and MEDEF, support strongly 
that ADR should remain voluntary. In addition, only three of the Member  States that replied 
to the public consultation said that ADR should be made manda tory. A number of consumer 
organisations such as the National Institutes for consumer protection in Spain, France and 
 
EN 36   EN Lithuania supported the same position, while BE UC stressed that ADR should not be made 
mandatory for consumers.  
Therefore none of the policy options below re quires mandatory ADR for businesses but they 
neither prohibit Member States to require it.  
However, the flexibility and voluntary nature of  ADR can however weaken the efficiency of 
ADR for consumers, when businesses refuse to engage in the ADR procedure, leaving 
consumers with their problem unr esolved. It is theref ore important to create incentives for 
businesses to engage in the ADR process. Th ese incentives should be also linked to an 
effective monitoring system, including on trader s refusing to engage in ADR. This system 
exists in some Member States (i.e. De nmark) and has proved to be effective. 
The policy options retained are presented in the table below.   
Option 1 No EU action (baseline scenario) 
Option 2 Non-binding legal instrument to encourage the development of quality ADR 
schemes for all domestic and cross-borde r consumer disputes, to encourage 
businesses to provide consumers w ith information on the ADR scheme 
competent to deal with their dispute and to encourage ADR schemes to participate in existing EU s ector-specific ADR networks.  
Option 3  Binding legal instrument to ensure that consumers can refer all their domestic 
and cross-border disputes to  quality ADR schemes, cove ring also online services; 
that consumers receive information on the ADR scheme competent to deal with their dispute; and that ADR schemes par ticipate in existing EU sector-specific 
ADR networks. 
Option 4 Binding legal instrument to establish an EU model for quality national ADR 
schemes to cover all domestic and cross- border consumer disputes, including in 
relation to online purchases. This legal instrument will also ensure that consumers receive information on the ADR scheme competent to deal with their 
dispute and that EU networks of s ector-specific ADR schemes are created. 
 
Policy Option 1 
No action at EU level will be taken to furthe r promote the development of ADR in the EU. 
According to this baseline scenario, the reso lution of domestic and cross-border consumer 
disputes through ADR will rely on the current status quo  in the EU. The two Commission 
Recommendations will continue to provide in a non-binding way the quality principles that 
ADR schemes should respect. Member States will notify to the European Commission the 
ADR schemes that they consider in conformity with the Recommendations. The ADR provisions included in EU sectoral legislati on will continue to apply and might be better 
implemented by Member States. The ECC network and FIN-NET will continue assisting consumers in cross-border cases. 
 
 
EN 37   EN Policy Option 2 
The second policy option provides for a Recomm endation to encourage the development of 
quality ADR schemes for all domestic and cro ss-border consumer disputes in the Member 
States in the sectors where no ADR scheme exists. In order to promote quality, it will be recommended that the ADR schemes adhere to th e principles of transparency, impartiality 
and effectiveness. In addition, national ADR sche mes will be encouraged to participate in EU 
existing networks of ADR (for example FIN-NET)  to facilitate the resolution of cross-border 
disputes. 
Finally, businesses that sell goods and provide services to consumers will be encouraged 
develop self-regulatory codes of conduct to inform consumers about the competent ADR 
scheme to deal with their disputes. 
Policy Option 3 
The third policy option consists of a framework Di rective. It will require Member States to 
make ADR available for all domes tic and cross-border consumer disputes (covering all retail 
business sectors and territory). This option requires full ADR coverage for all consumer 
complaints but it does not predefine how to fill th e existing gaps. It is up to Member States to 
find the most appropriate way to ensure full coverage. The diversity of existing ADR schemes 
across the EU (regarding the funding structures, the geographical coverage, the sectoral or 
cross-sectoral coverage and the nature of the AD R and its decisions) will be respected.  It will 
be left to Member States to decide how to make ADR available. This could be achieved by 
creating cross-sectoral single ADR schemes (e .g. as the Ombudsman in Greece, the Consumer 
Complaints Board in Sweden or in Estonia), um brella schemes consisting of different sectoral 
boards (e.g. Netherlands) or by creating separa te ADR schemes for each sector. The funding 
of these schemes (public, private or combination of  both) will be also in  the hands of Member 
States to decide. Existing ADR schemes will rema in but in order to ensure quality, they will 
have to respect the principles of transparency , impartiality and effectiveness, as described 
under Chapter 6. They will also have to be able to deal with disputes online. Therefore, the 
existing ADR schemes that do not respect the quality principles or do not offer services online 
and across-borders will have to be adjusted.  
While option 3 does not in terfere with the non mandatory natu re of ADR, incentives will be 
created to encourage businesses to participate in the ADR process. These incentives could 
consist for example in monitoring the leve l of businesses' engagement in the ADR 
proceedings and providing businesses that particip ate in ADR with a trus t-mark.  This will be 
in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular concerni ng protection of personal 
data (Article 8) and respect for private and family life (Article 7)
112. The Commission will 
also monitor the functioning of ADR on the basi s of regular reporting from Member States, 
which will include relevant information on ADR (such as persisting gaps in ADR coverage and data on the number of ADR cases).  
Furthermore, national ADR schemes will be required to become members of existing EU 
ADR networks to facilitate th e resolution of cross-border dis putes (for example FIN-NET)  
                                                
 
112 See Annex VIII 
 
EN 38   EN Finally, all businesses that sell goods and provide serv ices to consumers will be obliged to 
provide consumers with information on the ADR sc heme competent to deal with their dispute. 
Businesses will provide this information in thei r contracts and commercial documents and at 
the point of sale.  
Policy Option 4 
Under the fourth policy option a Directive wi ll establish a standard  EU ADR model for 
national schemes covering all domestic and cross- border consumer disput es, including online. 
According to this model, an entity, designa ted following an agreement between business and 
consumer representatives, will make a recomme ndation on the dispute. The procedure will be 
free of charge for consumers. Businesses will ha ve to participate in th e funding of the scheme 
(e.g. through a levy or a case fee). In the sectors where no ADR exists, ADR schemes will have to be made available according to the model. Existing ADR schemes will have to be adapted to this model. In order to ensure qu ality, this model will also require that ADR 
schemes will have to comply with the principles of transparency, impartiality and effectiveness.  
The Commission will also monitor the functioni ng of ADR on the basis of regular reporting 
from Member States, which will include relevant information on ADR (such as persisting gaps in ADR coverage and data  on the number of ADR cases).  
 In addition, sector-specific networks of ADR schemes will be create d at EU level; national 
ADR schemes will be required to become me mbers of these networks to facilitate the 
resolution of cross-border dis putes in the relevant areas.  
Finally, all businesses that sell goods and provide serv ices to consumers will be obliged to 
provide consumers with information on the ADR sc heme competent to deal with their dispute. 
Businesses will provide this information in thei r contracts and commercial documents and at 
the point of sale.  
7.1.1.  Analysis of impact  
7.1.1.1.  Assessment criteria  
Each policy option is assessed against a set of criteria related to benefits and costs. They are 
explained in more detail below. 
Analysis of benefits 
• Impact on the share of unresolved consumer disputes: this criter ion assesses whether 
more consumer disputes with businesses will  be resolved through ADR as a result of 
each option. 
• Impact on ADR coverage of all retail market sectors and EU territory: this criterion 
assesses the degree of coverage by ADR scheme s for all retail market sectors and all 
EU territory.  
• Impact on consumers' awareness of ADR: this criterion assesses the levels of 
consumers' knowledge about ADR as a result of each given policy option.  
 
EN 39   EN • Impact on adherence to the core princi ples of impartialit y, transparency and 
effectiveness by ADR schemes: this criter ion assesses whether existing and newly 
created ADR schemes will operate in an impartial, independent and effective manner as a result of each policy option.  
• Impact on consumers' and businesses confiden ce in using ADR: this criterion assesses 
whether each policy option will encourage consumers and businesse s to make greater 
use of ADR to solve their disputes.  
• Time needed to achieve the objectives: this criterion assesses how quickly the 
objectives of having quality ADR schemes in all sectors and raising consumers' 
awareness on ADR will be met.  
Analysis of costs 
• Implementation costs: this criterion assesse s the costs required to put in place the 
actions envisaged by each policy option, excl uding costs related to the provision of 
information.  
• Administrative costs: this criterion asse sses the costs that will be incurred by 
businesses and public authoritie s in order to comply with the information obligation 
created by each policy option.  
7.1.1.2.  Assessment of options 
The options are rated according to their impact . Policy option 1(baseline scenario) is set to 
zero and the impacts of the rest of the policy options are expressed as net changes compared 
to it. The symbol (-) is used to rate the costs while the symbol (+) to rate the benefits. They 
are explained as follows:  
• − − − : significantly expensive  
• − −:   expensive 
• −: slightly expensive 
• 0: baseline scenario 
• +: slightly positive effect 
• + +: positive effect 
• + + + significantly positive effect 
 
Policy Option 1 Benefits 
 
EN 40   EN Criteria Effect:  
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Impact on the share 
of unresolved consumer disputes 0 The share of unresolved consumer disputes will remain at the current 
levels. Consumers will not be able to solve all their disputes through ADR and will continue suffering losses in the internal market as a result 
of purchased goods and services. A better implementation of the current 
ADR clauses, included in sector-speci fic legislation, and a wider respect 
of the Commission Recommendations may bring marginal effects. 
Impact on ADR coverage of all business retail 
market sectors and 
EU territory 0  Gaps in the ADR geographical and sectoral coverage will remain.  It will 
not be possible for all consumer disputes to be solved out of court. For some consumer claims, referral to court will remain the only available 
means of redress. The number of ADR cases will not show any 
significant increase.  Differences in the ADR coverage between the retail 
market sectors will continue to exist.  Consumers will not be able to turn 
to an ADR scheme to solve all their disputes but only in a limited 
number of sectors, mainly where there is an obligation by EU (e.g. consumer credit) or national legislation (e.g. financial services in the 
UK).  
Impact on 
consumers awareness of ADR   0 Consumers' awareness about the existence of ADR schemes will remain 
low. They will continue to enjoy diff erent levels of access to information 
regarding ADR schemes due to different obligations on traders and 
different central points of information.  This will not allow consumers to 
learn about ADR and get clear information on the procedures used in order to familiarise themselves with ADR.  
Impact on adherence 
to the core principles 
of impartiality, transparency and 
effectiveness by 
ADR schemes 0  The number of ADR schemes that respect the core principles of 
impartiality, transparency and effectiveness will not change 
substantially. ADR schemes will adhere to these principles on a voluntary basis. The respect of these principles can be particularly 
problematic when ADR is funded by one of the parties (e.g.by 
businesses).  
Impact on 
consumers' and 
businesses confidence in using 
ADR 0  Consumers' and businesses' conf idence in using ADR will not improve.  
Gaps in coverage, low awareness' levels and  potentially  questionable  
methods of functioning will discoura ge them from using it more often.  
Businesses and especially consumers will not trust ADR schemes to 
solve their problems as they might th ink that their decisions are biased 
or that the procedure is  long and complicated.  
Time needed to 
achieve the specific 
objectives   
0 It is unlikely that the objectives will be achieved. The time needed will 
depend on the implementation of ADR clauses included in the sector-
specific legislation or on national developments. Judging by 
developments until now, it is doubtful whether a full coverage of quality ADR schemes and a substantial increas e in awareness' levels will be 
achieved.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly Explanation of impact 
 
EN 41   EN expensive 
Implementation 
costs  0 No implementation costs are expected as a result of this option with the 
exception of those Member States that  decide to set up ADR schemes as 
a result of the existing sector-specific EU legislation.  
Administrative costs  0 No administrative costs will be incurred. 
The first policy option will not have an impact on consumers and businesses.  
The current situation of scattered ADR coverage  will not change and consumers will still face 
difficulties in finding a competent ADR to deal with their dispute either domestically or in cross-border cases. Therefore their problems,  accounting for 0.4% of EU GDP, will remain 
unresolved.  
The situation may progress posit ively for consumers if the ADR clauses included in EU 
legislation are implemented. However, most EU Directives encourage  Member States to 
develop ADR and from those that oblige  them very few are currently implemented. The ECC-
network will continue helping consumers in cr oss-border cases but it will still face difficulties 
in transferring consumer disputes due the lack of ADR schemes.  
In addition, the quality of ADR schemes will not  improve; some ADR schemes will continue 
to function in an unsatisfactory way not always being transparent,  impartial or effective. As a 
result, the time and costs that consumers spend in  order to solve their disputes will not be 
improved and consumers will thus be discourage d from seeking ways to solve their problem 
and be compensated. Furthermor e consumers will not receive th e necessary information they 
need about ADR schemes competent to deal with th e disputes with traders. Thus the levels of 
consumers' awareness will remain low; currentl y almost one third of EU consumers does not 
know who to turn to if they face a probl em with a purchased good or service.  
Businesses will not suffer any costs as a result  of this option. However, the lack of ADR 
schemes will also make it difficult for bus inesses to use ADR. For example, 18% of 
businesses wanted to use ADR  but it was not available
113. In addition, as consumers, 
businesses will be deprived of quick and less expensive procedures to solve their disputes 
with consumers. 
Finally, this option will have no impact  on Member States or on the EU budget. 
Policy Option 2 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
slightly 
positive to 
significantly Explanation of impact 
                                                 
113 European Business Test Panel, 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/consultations/2010/adr/index_en.htm   
 
EN 42   EN positive  
Impact on the share 
of unresolved 
consumer disputes   + / + + The impact on the share of unresolved consumer disputes will be 
limited. The share of these disp utes is not likely to decrease 
substantially. Consumers and businesses will thus be left with their problems unresolved and continue suffering losses to a large extent. 
Impact on ADR 
coverage of all 
business retail market sectors and 
EU territory + / + + Some gaps that currently exist in retail market sectors and geographical 
areas might be filled. Action will be taken on a purely voluntary basis 
and there is therefore no guarantee th at all sectors of the retail market 
economy will be covered Some sectors will still remain without ADR 
schemes in place competent to deal with consumers' disputes. 
Impact on 
consumers' 
awareness of ADR  + / + + Consumer awareness on ADR is not likely to increase.  This largely 
depends on how proactive businesses will be in developing self- 
regulatory codes of conduct to inform consumers about the competent 
ADR schemes to deal with their disputes. 
Impact on adherence to the core principles 
of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness by 
ADR schemes + The situation is unlikely to change substantially as there will be no 
added value to the existing two Recommendations.  
Impact on consumers' and businesses 
confidence in using 
ADR +  Consumers' and businesses' confidence might increase marginally. Due 
to the uncertainty of ADR coverage in the various sectors of the economy and the lack of guidance from Member States as to the 
principles to be followed by ADR schemes, this option will probably not 
have a significant impact on consumer and business confidence  
Time needed to achieve the specific 
objectives   
+ The objectives might be achieved in  the long run. The timing largely 
depends on how proactive Member States or businesses are in setting up 
ADR schemes and on the willingness of traders to develop self-
regulatory codes of conduct to provide information. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs  −/− − − Implementation costs will range from low to significantly 
expensivedepending on whether Member States follow the European 
Commission's Recommendation.  
Administrative costs  − / − − − Some administrative costs will fall on businesses if they decide to 
develop and apply self-regulation for the provision of information to 
consumers. .  
Policy option 2 may have some impact on cons umers as a result of the Recommendation and 
self-regulatory initiatives by businesses. However, this will probably be marginal due to the voluntary nature of the encouragement. Consumers will still face difficulties in finding quality 
ADR schemes competent to deal with their disp utes, either domestica lly or in cross-border 
cases, as gaps in some sectors will rema in. The ECC-network will continue helping 
 
EN 43   EN consumers in cross-border cases but it will still face difficulties in transferring consumer 
disputes due the lack of ADR schemes. The time and costs to solve consumer disputes will 
not be substantially improved. Additionally, th e provision of information to consumers by 
traders will be voluntary.  Theref ore, consumer awareness levels are more likely to remain 
low. Consumers will not be able to profit fr om the potential savings  of €20 billion in the 
internal market.  
Businesses will be affected by this  option only if they decide to  adopt and comply with self-
regulatory codes. In that case, they will have to bear the costs of modifying their commercial 
documents to provide information to consumer s, accounting to about €771 million for all EU 
businesses (€254 per business)114. In addition, businesses will not be able to easily solve their 
disputes with consumers in a cost-efficient manne r that will further help them enhance their 
relationship with their customers. This option will have no impact neither on Member States nor on the EU budget. 
It should be noted that two Recommendati ons on ADR already exist. A third non-binding 
instrument is likely to bring little added valu e to address the current  shortcomings in ADR. 
A significant number of stakeholde rs pointed out that non-binding measures are not effective. 
For example, BEUC clearly stated that the pr inciples of quality c onsumer ADR should be 
included in a binding instrument. In addition, st akeholders supported action at Union level to 
strengthen consumer ADR schemes. Business Europe called for efforts to be devoted to 
further promote and improve ADR for all cons umer disputes throughout the EU territory. 
Finally, this policy option would have a positive impact on Cons umer protection (Article 38 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), if Me mber States introduced  quality ADR schemes 
into legislation or improved the existing ADR schemes in line with the EU Recommendation.
115 
Policy option 3 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Impact on the share 
of unresolved 
consumer disputes  + + + All consumer disputes will potentially be solved. Consumers and 
businesses will be able to turn to quality ADR for their disputes in all 
retail market sectors, find a solu tion and be compensated. Consumers 
will therefore suffer low or no losse s following the purchases of goods 
and services.  
                                                 
114 Study on the "assessment of compliance costs and ad ministrative costs/burdens on businesses linked to 
the use of alternative dispute resolution" (hereafter ADR costs study). See Annex VII for calculation of costs. 
115  See Annex VIII for a detailed assessm ent of impacts on fundamental rights. 
 
EN 44   EN Impact on ADR 
coverage of all 
business retail market sectors and 
EU territory + + + All gaps in ADR sectoral and ge ographical coverage will be filled.  
ADR schemes will be available in all business sectors for problems that 
consumers may face.  As a result, a big part of consum ers' loss will be 
significantly reduced and money re-allocated to growth.  
Impact on consumers' awareness of ADR  + + + Consumer awareness on ADR will significantly increase. Informing 
consumers at the point of sale and on contracts and commercial 
documents about the competent ADR schemes will undoubtedly make 
them more aware of their options. Central information databases will 
also help to that end.  
Impact on adherence to the core principles 
of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness by 
ADR schemes + + + All ADR schemes will be bound to respect the core principles of 
impartiality, transparency and ef fectiveness. This will result in 
enhancing the high quality of ADR schemes across the EU. 
Impact on 
consumers' and 
businesses 
confidence in using ADR + + + The existence of quality ADR schemes in all sectors of the economy will 
make consumers and businesses more confident to use ADR.  The 
information that will be made available concerning ADR schemes will 
have a positive impact on the increase of consumers and businesses that use ADR to solve their disputes. 
Time needed to 
achieve the specific 
objectives   
+ + + The objectives will be achieved once the legislation is implemented. The 
time needed is estimated to about 2 years.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
− − 
 
 Implementation costs will be incurred. Member States or others (e.g. 
businesses) will have to set up or make available ADR schemes in 
sectors of the economy where none exists.  
Administrative costs   
− − − Administrative costs will occur for businesses since they will have to 
include, on their contracts and co mmercial documents, information 
about ADR schemes competent to  resolve consumer disputes. 
Additionally, some administrative costs may be incurred by Member 
States to report on the quality of ADR schemes (if not already done).  
Policy option 3 will have a positive impact on cons umers who will be able to turn to an ADR 
scheme for all domestic or cross-border problem s with purchased goods and services in every 
sector of the economy. In addi tion, participation of national ADR schemes in EU networks 
will further facilitate the resolution of cross- border problems and provide practical assistance 
to consumers in case they want to refer thei r case to the ADR scheme of another Member 
State. For example, if a consumer in one c ountry has a dispute with a financial services 
provider from another country, FIN-NET members will put the c onsumer in touch with the 
relevant out-of court dispute scheme and provide the necessary information about it. 
 
EN 45   EN Consumers will thus be more likely to seek redress through ADR knowing that they can rely 
on the assistance of the network. Similarly, the ECC network will be ab le to transfer all 
consumer cross-border disputes to ADR schemes of another Member State. As a result, more consumer problems will be raised and solved, thus  leading to a reduction in consumers' losses. 
Consumers' savings as a result of quality ADR coverage will be signif icant (estimated to €20 
billion
116). In addition, the savings by EU consumers related only to cross-border shopping is 
between €500 million and €1 billion. These savings can then be reallocated in the internal 
market.  
Even though it is not possible to give representative figure s to provide an indication of 
realised benefits some examples from ex isting ADR schemes clearly demonstrate the 
potential benefits for consumers. For exampl e, through the interven tion of ECC a Belgian 
consumer received compensation from a Spanish company of €1.044. Similarly a Finnish consumer received compensation of €364 from a German trader and an Irish consumer was 
reimbursed €1.766 from a Dutch airline. Regardi ng domestic cases, the average compensation 
to consumers by cases submitted to the Fina ncial Services Ombudsman in the UK is £1000 / 
€1150 per complaint and the total amount is estimated to £165m / €188m for 2010/2011. 
Furthermore, consumers will have all the re quired information regarding competent ADR 
schemes should they choose to re solve their dispute out-of-court, since traders will be obliged 
to provide the necessary information to consum ers at the point of sale and also on their 
commercial documents. Consumer organisatio ns (e.g. BEUC, Altroconsumo in Italy, the 
Consumer Protection Board of Estonia, UFC Que Choisir in France) thou ght that information 
on ADR at the pre-contractual, contractual and post-sales phas e is crucial for consumers.  
Consumers will therefore feel better equipped  and more empowered to turn to an ADR 
scheme. By ensuring the existence of quality ADR schemes they will be reassured that these 
schemes will deal with their dispute quickly, wi th no or low costs and with no complications, 
while the entity taking the decision will be impartial. This will boost their confidence and 
allow them to turn more frequently to ADR  to solve their disputes with traders.  
The monetary impact on businesses linked to th e objective of full coverage of ADR schemes 
depends on how each Member State will decide to fulfil this obligation, in pa rticular the type 
of ADR schemes that will be established, and on the nature its funding.  
The costs of setting up and running
117 an ADR scheme vary depending on its scope of 
application, namely the sector and the size of the territory that it c overs. Some ADR schemes 
function with an annual budget of about €100.000 while others need more than €1 million118. 
This figure is based on the calculations of existin g ADR schemes. It is not possible to provide 
one single, representative figur e for all the ADR schemes of all Member States due to the 
unique character of every ADR. The following exam ples describe the range of costs relating 
                                                 
116  The methodology used to calculate this number (as explained in Annex II) does not allow providing a 
range of benefits instead of the average amount. 
117  The costs related to the setting up and running of ADR schemes includes to a large extent similar 
expenses (salary, rental of offices, etc.); the only difference is the one- off cost incurred for the purchase 
of equipment (office and IT equipment). Most ADR schemes consulted were not able to provide 
separate figures for the costs related to their setting up and their running. Therefore the data provided in the relevant table in this paragraph includes both.  
118 Internal DG SANCO research on the an nual budgets of ADR schemes in the EU. 
 
EN 46   EN to various configurations of ADR schemes (general, sector-specific, local) in different 
Member States.  
 
Name of ADR scheme Disputes covered Geographical coverage Setting up / running costs 
Financial Services 
Ombudsman Financial services 
(165.000 disputes) United Kingdom £6 million (running cost 
for 2010) 
"Médiateur des 
Communications électroniques" Electronic 
communications  
(3,300 disputes in 2010) France € 1 million (running cost 
for 2010) 
Chamber of Commerce 
of Milan All disputes 
(417 disputes in 2010) Italy € 200.000 (estimation of 
running cost for 2010 
including the online 
procedure provided by 
'Risolvionline.com')  
Consumer Complaints Board All disputes 
(3.226 disputes in 2010) Denmark € 3.2 million (running 
costs for 2010) 
Consumers Complain Committee All disputes 
(300 disputes in 2010) Estonia € 87.500 (annual budget 
for 2010) 
Hellenic Ombudsman All disputes Greece € 350.000 (set up costs) 
and € 102.000 (running costs for 2010). 
Der Online Schlichter E-commerce disputes Germany (two regions) € 55.000 (set up costs) 
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (pilot) All disputes Czech Republic €121.000 (running costs) 
 
However, as indicated above, costs for businesses in relation to the oblig ation of full coverage 
are not directly linked to the existing coverage  in ADR in the Member State where they are 
established. Full ADR coverage wi ll not require systematically businesses to create a specific 
ADR scheme in each retail sect or. Member States, in collabor ation with businesses or not, 
may decide instead to create a si ngle or residual cross- sectoral body to 'fill  the gaps' in their 
territory (e.g. Denmark or Greec e). This residual cross-sect oral body could be competent 
when no specific ADR exists. It could be funde d either through public or private funds.  
In addition, businesses may incur costs due to th e adjustment that some of the ADR schemes 
will need to make in order to adhere to the quality principles.  However, the quality ADR principles will substantially reflect the existing framework established by the two 
Commission recommendations an d ADR schemes in the Member States should already 
function in accordance with them. At present, 40% of the existing sche mes are not notified to 
the Commission either because they do not respect the principles set out in the 
 
EN 47   EN Recommendations or because they are not aware of the notification proc edure. According to 
data from the 2009 ADR study (see also table u nder 3.3), some Member States have a bigger 
number of non-notified ADR schemes than others  as Italy (125), Germ any (24) and Poland 
(21). Assuming that none of the non-notifie d ADR schemes respects the principles, a 
maximum of 40% of ADR schemes (288 schemes) wi ll have to make some adjustments to the 
way they function, should they wish to be considered ADR according to EU law. The costs for this update will depend on th e extent to which they have to be modified. For example, 
some of them already meet th e requested standards but have not been notified for various 
possible reasons (e.g. no awareness of the proce dure). Others might need to create a website 
to meet the transparency principle. 
Moreover, businesses will have to comply with the obligation for the provision of information 
to consumers imposed on them by legislation. Some business representatives underlined that 
businesses should contribute to spread informa tion about ADR schemes but it should not be 
an obligation. Other (as MEDEF in France) supported the idea of including information on 
ADR in commercial documents. Many business re presentatives warned on the possible costs 
required by this approach, in particular for sm all companies. However, the costs of amending 
the commercial documents and websites to comply  with the provisions of the legislation are 
one-off and have been calculated to approximately €771 million (€254 per business)
119. This 
sum may vary according to the size of the company, the number of personnel they employ, the number of commercial documents they issu e after a purchase and whether they run a 
website or not. Some large enterprises reported th at the costs are "not significant" while others 
stated that it comes up to a bit more than €1000. Some medium-sized enterprises reported a 
cost of around € 370. For small enterprises it ranged from €455 to € 2000 and for micro 
enterprises around €270. However, in average term s, there seems to be no major differences 
in the costs between SMEs and bigger busi nesses. In fact for some of the SMEs 
interviewed
120 these costs seem to be lower for them than for bigger businesses. It should also 
be considered, as pointed out by some businesses interviewed, that these costs are marginal as 
the majority of businesses changes their commer cial documents  and websites regularly (one 
in six months to up to once  every  two years)  and therefore any changes related to ADR can 
be easily incorporated in the pe riodic changes done by businesses.  
Furthermore, there will be a positive impact on businesses. They will be able to solve any 
consumer dispute via quick, low cost and simp le out-of-court procedures. The savings for 
businesses on a yearly basis, if they use ADR in stead of court proceedings, can range from € 
1.7 billion to € 3 billion, while at the same time saving 258 days. This will encourage them to use ADR in order to find a solution to consum er disputes, thus satis fying their clients and 
building a good business reputation. This also  helps them gain competitive advantage 
compared to other businesses that do not use ADR or, vice versa, not to lose competitive advantage compared to those that already use ADR.  
Member States will also be affected in so fa r as they will need to set up and run the ADR 
schemes. The costs will be as explained above  for businesses. However, the obligation of 
ensuring that all consumer disputes can be re ferred to ADR (i.e. full coverage), does not 
imply that Member States have to set up sepa rate ADR schemes for each market sector. Some 
Member States will be more affected by these implementation costs, as ADR does not exist or 
                                                
 
119 ADR costs study, see Annex VII 
120 22 businesses have been interviewed for the ADR co sts study (Annex VII). 16 were large enterprises, 2 
were medium sized enterprises, 2 were small enterprises and 2 were micro enterprises.  
 
EN 48   EN is underdeveloped (Slovenia, Sl ovakia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus , Poland, Romania).  To meet 
this obligation, they have the possibility to esta blish one ADR covering all consumer disputes 
in all sectors. Those Member States that have  some sector-specific or regional ADR schemes 
(Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, Belg ium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany , 
Spain, France, Luxemburg, Hungary, Austria, Po rtugal, UK), have a nu mber of options to 
ensure full coverage. For example, they can cr eate separate ADR scheme s for the sectors that 
are not already covered; they can create one AD R scheme for the sectors that are not already 
covered; they can create an umbrella ADR scheme, encompassing the existing schemes and 
acting as the ADR for the rest of the uncovered sectors. In addition, the notification of 
existing –but not notified- ADR schemes should be taken into account for the obligation of 
ensuring full coverage of ADR. As a result, the costs incurred by Member States will depend on the way they choose to meet the obligati on of full coverage. Nine Member States 
(Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latv ia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherla nds, Finland and Sweden) seem 
to ensure already full coverage and therefore they will not incur any costs regarding this 
obligation. 
Member States will also be burdened with limited costs for re porting on the development of 
ADR schemes (persisting gaps, data on the nu mber of ADR cases, level of businesses' 
engagement). All Member States already ha ve a structure to notify to the European 
Commission the ADR schemes, which comply with the two Commission Recommendations. 
In addition, some of them already have aut horities to monitor and report on ADR schemes. 
For example in Italy, the Ministry of Jus tice and “Unioncamere” (both public entities) 
monitor the ADR proceedings and collect data. In France, public authorities, such as the sectoral regulator bodies (e.g. on telecoms) and the competition authority have monitoring competences. In the UK, the Financial Services  Authority monitors the relevant Ombudsman. 
The participation of national ADR in EU-wide ADR networks is key for the resolution of 
cross-border disputes. At present the only existi ng network is FIN-Net, which is built on what 
exists in the Member States and does not im pose a specific structure for the national ADR 
system. Thus it does not entail specific costs for ADR schemes. 
This option will have no impact on the EU budg et. Finally, this option would have a positive 
impact on consumer protection (Article 38 of th e Charter of Fundamental Rights)  as it would 
mandate the Member States to provide the consumers with a possibility to refer all their domestic and cross-border disp utes to quality ADR schemes.
121  
Policy Option 4 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive Explanation of impact 
Impact on the share 
of unresolved 
consumer disputes  + + /+ + +  Consumers will be able to turn to quality ADR for their disputes in all 
retail market sectors, find a solution and be compensated. Although all 
consumer disputes could potentially be solved, consumers and 
                                                 
121  See Annex VIII for a detailed assessm ent of impacts on fundamental rights. 
 
EN 49   EN businesses could have, at least during an initial period, difficulties in 
adapting to a new EU ADR model.  Consumers will therefore suffer 
some losses as a result of goods and services they purchased.  
Impact on ADR 
coverage of all 
business retail 
market sectors and EU territory + + + Gaps in ADR coverage will be filled by introducing or making available 
in all sectors new schemes reflecting the EU ADR model.  Quality ADR 
schemes will exist for all sectors and  consumers will be able to turn to 
ADR for all their disputes.  
Impact on 
consumers' 
awareness of ADR  + + + Consumers' awareness about the existence of ADR schemes will 
increase substantially, as described for policy option 3.  
Impact on adherence to the core principles 
of impartiality, transparency and 
effectiveness by 
ADR schemes + + + All ADR schemes will respect the core principles of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness. An obligation to adhere to these three 
principles will be imposed on all ADR schemes. This will result in high quality ADR schemes across the EU. 
Impact on consumers' and 
businesses 
confidence in using ADR + + The introduction of a new EU ADR model to replace well-functioning 
ADR scheme in Member States might decrease consumers’ and 
businesses’ confidence. In cases where well-functioning ADR schemes 
were in place, consumers and busi nesses could have difficulties in 
understanding the reason of the change and adapt to it. This could lead, 
at least during an initial period, to the new schemes being rejected. On 
the other side, consumers and businesses will benefit from the use of ADR, where it did not exist.  
Time needed to 
achieve the specific 
objectives   
++ The objectives will be achieved once the legislation is implemented. The 
time needed is estimated to about 5 years, because of the difficulties of 
dismantling existing systems in order to adjust to the standard model.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
− − − Implementation costs will occur. ADR schemes will have to be created 
or made available in those sectors where they do not exist, as described 
in policy option 3. Moreover, additional costs will be incurred to adapt the existing ADR schemes so as correspond to the standard ADR model. 
Administrative costs   
− − − Administrative costs will occur for all businesses and Member States, as 
described in policy option 3 
The fourth policy option will have a positive impact  on consumers who will be able to turn to 
ADR for domestic or cross-border problems w ith purchased goods and services irrespective 
of the sector of the economy. In addition, pa rticipation of national ADR schemes in EU 
networks will further facilitate the resolution of cross-border problems and provide practical 
assistance to consumers in case they want to re fer their case to an ADR scheme of another 
Member State. Likewise, the ECC network will be  able to transfer all consumer cross-border 
 
EN 50   EN disputes to ADR schemes of another Member St ate. As a result, more consumers' problems 
will be raised and solved via quality ADR, thus  leading to a reduction in consumer losses.  
The monetary impact on businesses will be high. The costs stemming from putting in place 
ADR schemes and providing information will be as described under option 3. Moreover, 
businesses will incur further additi onal costs, as they will be obliged to participate in the 
funding of ADR schemes. In addition, more cost s for them will also occur in those cases 
where they already fund schemes, in order to ad just them substantially to the prescribed EU 
model.  
Member States will be greatly affected since not only they will need to fill the gaps in ADR 
coverage according to the new EU model, but th ey will also need to substantially modify 
existing ADR schemes according to the EU model.  
A possible initial reluctance to use a "new" scheme, where there was already a well-
functioning mechanism should also be taken in to account. This will be the case also for 
businesses that are already part of functioning schemes. Furthermore, this option would be 
clearly opposed by Member States that have stressed both in the replies to the public 
consultation and in bilateral meetings with Commission services the need to preserve well-functioning national systems and to build on what exists.  
This option will have a significant impact on th e EU budget. The EU will need to create ADR 
networks for all retail market sectors. For example, FIN-NET, having 52 members from 20 
EU Member States and 3 EEA countries, has an  annual cost of €35.000 for the organisation of 
four meetings per year together with so me personnel costs from the European public 
administration (about ¼ of an Admini strator and 1/5 of  an Assistant). 
All stakeholders opposed the idea of an EU  model for ADR schemes and favoured the 
versatile nature of ADR. For example, Busine ss Europe said that the "The diversity and 
adaptability of existing ADR systems should be  preserved. A one-size fit all solution would 
be incompatible with the adaptability needed  for the well functioning of an ADR system". 
The need to take into full acc ount the ADR mechanisms already operating in some sectors or 
territories of the EU was under lined by the majority of consumers (e.g. Altroconsumo -IT, the 
Financial Services User Panel -UK). 
Finally, this option would have a positive imp act on consumer protection (Article 38 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights) as it would mandate the Member States to provide the 
consumers with a possibility to refer all their domestic and cross-border  disputes to quality 
ADR schemes, according to the standard EU ADR model.
122  
7.1.1.3.  Comparison of options  
Benefits 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Impact on the share 
of unresolved 0  + / + + + + +  + + /+ + +  
                                                 
122 See Annex VIII for a detailed assessment of impacts on fundamental rights. 
 
EN 51   EN consumer disputes  
Coverage of all 
business sectors by 
ADR 0 + / + + + + + + + + 
Increase in 
consumers' 
awareness on ADR 0 + / + + + + + + + + 
Increase in the 
number of ADR schemes that 
respect the core 
principles of 
impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness 0 + + + + + + + 
Boosting 
consumers' and 
businesses confidence in using 
ADR 0 +  + + + + + 
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives  0 + + + + ++ 
Costs 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Implementation 
costs 0 − /− − − − − 
 
 − − − 
Administrative 
costs 0 − / − − − − − − − − − 
 
Policy option 1 might not have any budgetary impact but it will not reach any of the 
objectives set.  
Similarly, policy option 2 will hardly bring about th e desirable results, due to the nature of the 
non-binding instrument. 
Policy option 3 will achieve cove rage of quality ADR and raise consumers' awareness, while 
decreasing the number of unresolved consumer di sputes and the losses suffered as a result of 
purchased goods and services. It will also imply costs for setting up ADR schemes and for 
businesses to provide information. 
Finally, option 4 can be effective as option 3. However, it can affect negatively consumers’ 
and businesses’ confidence at least for an in itial period, and  will impose higher costs for 
 
EN 52   EN adapting all  national ADR schemes to an EU model and creating EU ADR networks for all 
retail market sectors. 
A table comparing the options in mone tary terms can be found in Annex IX. 
7.2. Policy options for ODR for cross border e-commerce transactions 
In order to ensure that cons umers are more confident in buy ing online from another Member 
State and businesses more confident in selling online in another Member State an online dispute resolution system for cro ss-border transactions  conducted on the intern et is considered 
necessary. This would promote e-commerce and contribute to the achievement of the  Digital 
Agenda. Different policy options related to the onlin e dispute resolution for cross-border e-
commerce transactions are examined.  
Imposing a mandatory system of Online Dis pute Resolution that would introduce an 
additional step for access to the courts in all Member States would raise serious concerns regarding the compliance with the Right to an effective remedy (Article  47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights) and was di scarded from the analysis.  
Option 1 No EU action (baseline scenario) 
Option 2 Non-binding legal instrument to conn ect national ADR schemes dealing with 
cross-border e-commerce disput es online in a EU network.  
Option 3 Binding legal instrument to establish a EU system , consisting of a web-based 
platform directly accessible by consumers, which will be based on national ADR schemes and will be able to deal with  cross-border e-commerce disputes online 
(ODR); and to define common criteria for the functioning of the web-based 
platform. 
Option 4 Binding legal instrument to create a si ngle EU body dealing with all cross-border 
e-commerce disputes online. 
Policy Option 1 
This option entails taking no action at EU le vel for disputes linked to cross-border e-
commerce purchases between a consumer and a trader. This baseline scenario foresees that existing national ADR schemes offering an online procedure will continue to deal with these disputes. Any further development will depend on measures taken at national level, including 
the development of the online dimension of ADR schemes. In case of cross-border purchases, 
the ECC network will continue to refer relate d disputes to competent national ADR schemes 
offering an online procedure, if available. 
Policy Option 2 
This option entails a Recommendation encouragi ng Member States to make available ADR 
schemes offering an online pro cedure to deal with  any consumer dis pute linked to cross-
border e-commerce purchases. Member States can ach ieve that either by setting up specialised 
ADR schemes that deal online with cross-bor der e-commerce disputes or by adjusting 
existing ADR schemes to deal with such disput es online. For these disputes, consumers will 
contact firstly their national ADR scheme.  The la tter will liaise with its counterpart in the 
 
EN 53   EN Member State of the trader.  The contact between national ADR schemes will take place 
through a EU network financed by the EU. 
Policy Option 3 
This option entails a Regulation creating a EU system, which will consist of a web-based 
platform directly accessible by consumers and businesses; they will be able to submit to the EU web-based platform any dispute related to the cross-border e-commerce sale of goods and 
provision of services by traders to consumers. Standard forms will be available on the EU web-based platform for the submission of disputes . The platform will direct electronically the 
dispute to the competent national ADR scheme to deal with it online. National ADR schemes 
will be able to deal online with any cross-bo rder e-commerce dispute that will be transmitted 
to them via the platform.   
This option will establish common criteria that  will have to be applied by the national ADR 
schemes when dealing with the cross-bord er online disputes. The common criteria will 
include: i) " modus operandi " of the web-based platform acce ssible to all EU consumers and 
business (e.g. standard forms, use of languages, technical speci fications for interconnection 
with national ADR schemes, etc.); ii) common rules applying to the competent ADR scheme 
when dealing with the cross-border dispute re lated to e-commerce transactions and received 
via the EU web-based platform (e.g. timing,  eligibility conditions , common procedural 
aspects prevailing on the procedure foreseen fo r consumer disputes re lated to domestic or 
cross-border offline transactions). 
In addition, experts established within the existing structures of the ECC network will 
facilitate the functioning of the system. The whole procedure will be registered in the EU web-based platform, thus allowing for the mo nitoring of the resolution of cross-border e-
commerce disputes. The web-based platform and any required additional resources for the ECC network will be financed by the EU. 
Policy Option 4 
This option entails a Regulation establishing a new single ODR body at EU level to deal with 
disputes related to cross-border e-commerce transactions in all re tail market sectors. It will 
not be linked to national online ADR schemes. This ODR body will be composed of impartial 
experts appointed by the Member States according to certain eligibility criteria set by the EU. 
These experts will make recommendations on  the disputes. Specific rules to handle the 
disputes will be established. The ODR body will work through a web-based platform and will 
be able to operate in all EU languages. When a EU ADR network exists in a specific sector 
(e.g. FIN-NET) the EU ODR bo dy will prevail for cross-border, e-commerce disputes. 
Consumers and traders will be able to acce ss the ODR body directly via the web-based 
platform. The ODR body at EU le vel and the web-based platform  will be financed by the EU. 
7.2.1.  Analysis of impact 
7.2.1.1.  Assessment criteria 
Each policy option is assessed against a set of criteria related to benefits and costs. They are 
explained in more detail below. 
Analysis of benefits 
 
EN 54   EN • Impact on the share of cross border e-commerce consumer disputes dealt with by 
ODR: This criterion assesses whether the number of e-commerce consumer disputes 
with traders submitted to ODR will grow.  
• Impact on the efficiency of handling cross-bo rder e-commerce disputes: This criterion 
assesses the impact of the ODR systems put in place in terms of increasing the 
efficiency of dealing with cross-border e-commerce disputes.  
• Time needed to achieve the objectives: this criterion assesses how quickly the 
objective of an efficient ODR for disputes linked to e-commerce transactions can be 
achieved.  
Analysis of costs 
• Implementation costs: this criterion assesse s the costs required to put in place the 
actions envisaged by each policy option.  
7.2.1.2.  Assessment of options  
The options are rated according to their impact . Policy option 1(baseline scenario) is set to 
zero and the impacts of the rest of the policy options are expressed as net changes compared 
to it. The symbol (-) is used to rate the costs while the symbol (+) to rate the benefits. They 
are explained as follows: 
• − − − : significantly expensive 
• − − : expensive  
• − : slightly expensive 
• 0 : baseline scenario 
• + : slightly positive effect 
• + + : positive effect 
• + + + : significantly positive effect 
Policy Option 1  
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
 
EN 55   EN Impact on the share 
of cross border e-
commerce consumer disputes dealt with 
by ODR 0  The share of cross-border e-commer ce consumer disputes dealt with by 
ODR will rely on the existence of ODR schemes at national level. Most 
cross-border e-commerce disputes w ill not be solved via ADR as there 
are many gaps in the ADR coverage. The problems that consumers face 
will be left unresolved. 
Impact on the 
efficiency of handling cross-
border e-commerce 
disputes  0  The situation will remain largely unchanged. Cross border e-commerce 
disputes will not be handled more efficiently.  
Time needed to achieve the 
objectives   
0 The objectives will not be achieved within a reasonable time frame. In 
light of the current experience, the development of online ADR schemes 
at national level will take time and will vary amongst the Member 
States. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
0 No implementation costs will occur.  
This option will have very little impact on consumers. It will not improve access of 
consumers to online out-of-court dispute resolu tion. The current estimated losses due to the 
lack of efficient ADR dealing with disputes linked with cross-borde r e-commerce, amounting 
to €2,5 billion (0.02% of EU GDP), will remain at the same levels. Consumers will therefore 
remain reluctant to shop online across borders. 
An impact cannot be expected for businesses, in particular SMEs. Their access to online out-
of-court dispute resolution will not improve, hence affecting their willingness to sell goods 
and services online to consumer s in other Member States.  
The economic impact on businesses, public admi nistration and consumer organisations will 
depend on the development of national ADR sc hemes dealing with cross-border e-commerce 
transactions online. However, currently few such schemes exist in Member States (e.g. ECODIR, Risolvi-Online, Der Online Schlichter).  
Finally, this option will have  no impact on the EU budget. 
Policy Option 2 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
 
EN 56   EN Impact on the share 
of cross border e-
commerce consumer disputes dealt with 
by ODR +/+ +  
 The share of cross-border e-commerce consumer disputes dealt with by 
ADR may increase. However, this will be subject to Member States 
providing concrete follow-up to the encouragement to make available ADR schemes offering an online procedure to deal with any consumer 
dispute linked to cross-border e-commerce purchases   
Impact on the 
efficiency of handling cross-
border e-commerce 
disputes   
+/+ +  
 The efficiency may be increased by  the EU network and the similar 
features of the schemes that will be  put in place. However, since the 
legal instrument is not binding, there is no guarantee that Member States 
will make available ADR schemes offering an online procedure and thus 
increasing the efficiency of  handling those disputes. 
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives   
+ The time needed will be substantial, as it can not be foreseen if and 
when Member States will follow the Recommendation. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
 
− −  
 The implementation costs will be high for Member States to adjust 
existing ADR schemes or very high  to create new specialised ADR 
schemes for cross-border e-commer ce disputes. Businesses and 
consumer organisations- depending on their involvement in the development of these specialised ADR schemes- will have to support the 
implementation costs of new schemes. In addition, it will be necessary 
to finance at EU level the network linking the national schemes.  
Consumers will benefit from the availability  of ADR schemes dealing with online cross-
border disputes, as they will be able to di rect and solve all their disputes online. 
Similarly, businesses will have an ADR at their disposal to solve online cross-border disputes 
with consumers. However, they might incur si gnificant costs should th ey be required to fund 
these ADR schemes. The costs will vary accord ing to the size of the Member State and the 
cases received. For example, some ADR schemes dealing with disputes online (e.g. Risolvi-
online in Italy or Der Online Schlichter) ha ve annual running costs of about €100.000 while 
others (e.g. Mediateur du Net in France or th e UK Financial Services Ombudsman) of about 
€1million. 
The economic impact on Member States will be substantial, since they will have to make 
available or set up and run specialised ADR schemes on online cross-border disputes. The 
costs will be similar to the ones described in  the second paragraph. The EU will also suffer 
some costs for putting in place an EU networ k of specialised ADR schemes dealing with 
cross-border, e-commerce transa ctions. The annual costs can be estimated to about €50.000-
100.000 (judging from other simila r networks e.g. FIN-NET). 
This option may fulfil the objectives for cons umers and businesses only if Member States 
provide concrete follow-up to the encouragement to make available ADR schemes offering an online procedure to deal with any consumer dispute linked to cross-border e-commerce 
 
EN 57   EN transactions. It will, imply costs for the EU and Member States, however without the 
guarantee of a successful result. 
Finally, this policy option would have a positive impact on Cons umer protection (Article 38 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), if Member States made available ADR schemes 
offering an online procedure to  deal with consumer disput es linked to cross-border e-
commerce purchases in line with the non-binding legal instrument.123 
Policy Option 3 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Impact on the share 
of cross border e-
commerce consumer 
disputes dealt with by ODR  
+ + + The number of cross-border e-comm erce consumer disputes dealt with 
online will substantially increase thanks to the EU ODR system. The 
platform will be accessible directly to consumers and businesses. The 
full success will rely on the existence of competent ADR schemes that can deal with disputes online at national level.  
Impact on the 
efficiency of 
handling cross-border e-commerce 
disputes   
+ + + The situation will improve substan tially. The EU web-based platform 
will reduce the time needed to hand le cross-border e-commerce disputes 
and to identify the appropriate national ADR scheme. The establishment of common criteria will be instrumental to achieve this objective. In 
addition, experts within the ECC netw ork, who have already experience 
in this field, will further improve the efficient handling of these disputes.  
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives   
+ + + The time needed for the development of the EU web-based platform and 
for national online ADR schemes to be connected to the platform will be 
reasonable, estimated to about 2 years.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
 slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
− − Considering that the web-based platform is based on national schemes, 
the implementation costs at EU level will be reasonable and 
proportionate to the objective. The costs for national ADR schemes will 
be limited to the adjustments needed to be linked to the platform and, for the ECC network, to the ad ditional expertise required.  
Consumers and traders will benefit from this opti on as they will be able to submit to the EU 
web-based platform any dispute related to th e cross-border e-commerce sale of goods and 
provision of services by  traders to consumers. Furthermore, they will be assured that experts 
established within the ECC network will be there to facilitate th e procedure. However, if gaps 
                                                 
123  See Annex VIII for a detailed assessm ent of impacts on fundamental rights. 
 
EN 58   EN in ADR coverage remain at Member State le vel, competent ADR schemes will not be found 
to resolve disputes. Conversely, if these gaps are filled the benefits for consumers will be substantial. 
Businesses will suffer limited costs, for the ad justment of ADR schemes. These adjustments 
would aim at: a) connecting electronically all ADR schemes operating in  the Member States 
to the EU web-based platform (no cost); b) ensuring that all ADR sc hemes apply the common 
rules (e.g. timing) and procedural elements when dealing with the disputes received by the EU 
web-based platform (marginal costs). No co sts will be incurred to overcome language 
barriers, taking into account that the ODR Pl atform will be operational in all official 
languages of the EU. 
Moreover, businesses will be also able to benefit from the web-based platform and solve any 
cross-border e-commerce disputes that arise with  consumers. This will also affect positively 
the online offer of goods and services across borders.  
The EU will bear the costs to develop the EU web-based platform and the expertise required 
within the ECC network. Taking into account existing ADR schemes dealing with online 
disputes as well as similar EU  IT tools (for example IMI, the ECC network IT tool, the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation IT tool and th e SOLVIT tool), the budget needed for the 
set up of the web-based platform can be  estimated at about €2 million and annual 
maintenance costs will amount to about €300.000
124. Some costs will be incurred for 
enhancing the ECC network, which can  be estimated at about €500.000 annually125. 
The costs for Member States will be limited, as  described above for businesses. They would 
have however to finance by 50% the ECC network enhancement, i.e. adding in total approximately €500.000 annually. 
During the public consultations a majority of consumer associations (e.g. Italy's 
Altroconsumo , UK's Financial Services User Panel ) stressed the importance to boost ODR 
while taking into full account the ADR mechan isms already operating in some sectors or 
territories of the EU. 
Some Member States and business representati ves underlined the importance of using the 
existing mechanisms to address specific type of  contracts and sectors.  For instance, Belgium 
informed about its recently established online referral platform ("Belmed"), which transmits 
consumer disputes to existing ADR schemes in the country. 
This option would have a positive impact on Cons umer protection (Article 38 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights) as it w ould mandate the Member States to establish an EU web-based 
                                                
 
124   The cost for the initial deve lopment of the IMI IT system was €1.417.000, while the annual 
maintenance costs are approximately €400.000.  
The cost for the development of the CPC IT-tool was €1.200.000, while its annual costs amount to 
€150.000 .  
The ECC IT-tool costs about €100.000 annually for maintenance, while the SOLVIT one costs €75.000 
annually.  
125  This is an average cost, including all salary rela ted costs (salary, taxes, fees, contributions paid by 
employer or employee) of the entire ECC network ( from Directors to secretaries). The costs will be 
different for each country a nd professional grade (for example the lowest salary of a given grade in a 
given Member State is €7.040/year wh ile the highest is €60.280/year). 
 
EN 59   EN system directly accessible by consumers. This option would be in line with the right to the 
protection of personal data (Artic le 8 of the Charter). All the n ecessary steps will be taken to 
guarantee that personal data, including the ones in the web based platform, will be processed 
in line with the EU data  protection legislation.126 
Policy Option 4 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
positive to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Impact on the share 
of cross border e-
commerce consumer 
disputes dealt with by ODR  
+ + + The number of cross-border e-comm erce consumer disputes dealt with 
online will increase. All cross-bord er e-commerce disputes could be 
handled via a single ODR body at EU level.  
Impact on the 
efficiency of 
handling cross-border e-commerce 
disputes   
+ + Cross-border e-commerce disputes will be handled by a single ODR 
body at EU level. However, problems of coherence with national online 
ADR schemes will emerge; in particular their expertise would not be exploited. In addition, the EU ODR body may seem too "far away" for 
some groups of consumers, especially for the "vulnerable" consumers 
(elderly people, of low education etc), who would encounter problems in  addressing their disputes at this level.  
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives   
++ Time will be needed to develop the single ODR body at EU level, 
estimated to more than 3 years.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:   
slightly 
expensive to 
significantly 
expensive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs   
− − − Implementation costs will be very high for the EU budget that will have 
to bear the costs of setting up and running a completely new dispute 
resolution body with exclusive competence to deal with e-commerce 
cross border disputes of millions of European citizens.  
The fourth policy option would affect positively consumers who will be able to turn to the 
newly created ODR body at EU level for thei r problems with cross-border purchase of goods 
and services on the Internet. As a result, more consumers' problems will be raised and solved via quality ODR, thus leading to a reduction in consumer losses. 
However, this option entails a risk of inc oherence and overlapping with existing national 
ADR schemes which already provide online dis pute resolution services for cross-border e-
                                                
 
126  See Annex VIII for a detailed assessm ent of impacts on fundamental rights. 
 
EN 60   EN commerce transactions. In addition, the specifi c competences acquired within national ADR 
schemes would be lost. It woul d be difficult to develop at EU  level adequate competence to 
deal with a high number of cases that are clos ely related to local r ealities concerning both 
consumers and businesses.  
Some Member States (BG, IT, PT) would be in favour of a centralised ODR in order to 
promote and support out-of-court redress mean s for cross-border e-commerce transactions. 
However, other Member States (PL and EE) as  well as some business representatives (e.g. 
German of Federation Industries , Associations Française des Entreprises Privées ) pointed 
out that a single body dealing with  all disputes could lack the specific competence needed to 
address different types of contracts and sectors.  
The monetary impact on the EU budget will be extremely high. The costs for establishing the 
web-based platform can be estimated to €2million. Considering the experts fees, the technical equipment and personnel costs for the administrativ e tasks the annual running costs of such an 
EU body would not be less than € 3 million. It would be difficult to justify those costs, in 
particular considering that this option w ould entail creating a new EU body, which would 
have competences that are partially covered already by national systems.  
Finally, it should be noted th at this option would have a positive impact on Consumer 
protection (Article 38 of the Ch arter of Fundamental Rights), as it would create a single EU 
body dealing with all cross-borde r e-commerce disputes online. This option would be in line 
with the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter). All the necessary steps will be taken to guarantee that personal data, including the ones in the web based 
platform, will be processed in line wi th the EU data protection legislation
127.  
                                                 
127  See Annex VIII 
 
EN 61   EN  
7.2.1.3.  Comparison of options  
Benefits 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Increase the share of 
cross- border 
consumer e-
commerce disputes dealt with by ODR 0 +/ + +  
  
+ + +  
+ + + 
Increase the efficiency of handling cross-
border e-commerce 
disputes 0 
 +/ + +  
  
+ + +  
+ + 
Time needed to achieve the 
objectives 0  
+  
+ + +  
++ 
Costs 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Implementation 
costs 0 
 − − − − 
 − − − 
 
As shown in the table, policy Option 1 will not incur any costs but it will not meet any of the 
objectives.  
Policy Option 2 could meet the objectives if Member States follow the encouragement to set 
up the new specialised ADR schemes for online cross-border transactions.  
Policy Option 3 will meet fully the objectives if full ADR coverage is achieved, while 
resulting to proportionat e costs. In addition it creates a value added for consumers and 
businesses by providing them with direct access to an online dispute resolution tool for any 
dispute related to the cross-border e-commerce sa le of goods and provis ion of services by 
traders to consumers.  
Policy Option 4 will fully meet the objectives, pr ovided that it reaches the appropriate level of 
expertise and capabilities to deal  with a great amount of disputes  of different nature; however, 
its costs will be disproportionate. 
A table comparing the options in mone tary terms can be found in Annex IX. 
 
EN 62   EN 8. THE PREFERRED OPTION AND ITS IMPACT  
As indicated in Chapter 7, the reason for combining the two sets of policy options goes to the 
very heart of the general objectives. Only th e combination of the two instruments on ADR 
and ODR can enable access to impartial, transp arent and effective mean s to resolve consumer 
disputes out-of-court and as a result improve th e functioning of the internal market, including 
its digital dimension, and achieve a high level of consumer protection.  
ADR and ODR are directly in terlinked and ODR cannot mate rialise without ADR. If ADR 
coverage at national level doe s not improve, it is not possi ble to develop ODR for cross-
border online disputes. The "small sectors" are also crucial in the cross-border and online 
perspective, as consumers tend to engage in low value transactions when buying in another 
Member State and over the internet. For exam ple, in 2010, EU consumers who had ordered 
goods or services via electronic means in othe r EU countries had spent less than €100 on such 
purchases128, while in 2008 most consumers bought online travel and hotel accommodation, 
clothes and sport goods and books129. Action at EU level to esta blish ODR without taking into 
account the ongoing development of ADR in the Member States would be inefficient and 
objected by the vast major ity of stakeholders.  
Hence, there is a need for a combined approach  to the problem identified in this IA through 
the analysis of the two sets of po licy options on ADR and ODR together. 
8.1. Comparison of the two sets of  policy options (ADR and ODR) 
The tables below provide an assessment of th e policy options related to the problem areas 
against the criteria of effectiven ess, efficiency and coherence.  
This assessment is carried out using a scale from  0 (least effective, effi cient and coherent) to 5 
(most effective, efficient and coherent). The co mbination with the high est ranking represents 
the most effective, efficient and coherent combination of options.  
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness Online Dispute Resolution for cross-border e-commerce transactions  
ADR coverage, 
information and 
quality Policy Option 1  Policy Option 2  Policy Option 3  Policy Option 4 
Policy Option 1  0 0 0 2 
Policy Option 2  1 2 1 2 
Policy Option 3  2 3 5 3 
Policy Option 4  2 3 5 5 
                                                 
128  EB 299, p.21 
129  Commission Staff Working Document "Report on  cross-border e-commer ce in the EU", 2009 
 
EN 63   EN The "effectiveness" table shows that the non-bi nding options or a combination of binding and 
non-binding options cannot achieve  the objectives set.  The voluntary nature of these options 
will not result in full quality ADR coverage, an increase in the awareness levels of consumers 
or in a functioning ODR scheme. They are theref ore scored low. The combination of options 
3 and 3, 4 and 4 as well as 3 (ODR) and 4 (A DR) can guarantee that the objectives can be 
fully met and are therefore scored with the highest score.  
Efficiency 
Efficiency Online Dispute Resolution for cross-border e-commerce transactions  
ADR coverage, 
information and 
quality Policy Option 1  Policy Option 2  Policy Option 3  Policy Option 4 
Policy Option 1  0 2 3 2 
Policy Option 2  1 2 2 3 
Policy Option 3  2 3 5 4 
Policy Option 4  3 3 4 3 
The "efficiency" table shows that a combination of the non-binding options could be efficient, 
only as far as the costs involve d are low. However, they cannot  meet the objectives and they 
are therefore scored low. On the other hand, a combination of options 3 and 4 or 4 and 4 are 
not efficient because even though they w ill bring results, th e costs involved are 
disproportionate to the achievement of the objectives. It is the co mbination of options 3 that is 
scored higher since it meets the objectives with  appropriate costs. Further, since option 3 of 
ODR builds on option 3 of ADR their combination is considered proportionate and efficient. 
Coherence 
Coherence Online Dispute Resolution for cross-border e-commerce transactions  
ADR coverage, 
information and 
quality Policy Option 1  Policy Option 2  Policy Option 3  Policy Option 4 
Policy Option 1  0 1 2 3 
Policy Option 2  1 2 3 3 
Policy Option 3  2 3 5 4 
Policy Option 4  3 2 4 4 
The combination of options 1 or 2 would be co herent with the overarching objectives but not 
sufficient to the attainment of these objectives. In contrast, a combination of options 3 and 4 
or 4 and 4 will not be coherent, since they go beyond the desirable outcomes. A combination 
of options 3 is therefore consider ed to be the most consistent a nd coherent to since they meet 
the objectives and build on what exists. 
 
EN 64   EN 8.1.1.  Cumulative Assessment of Policy Options 
The scores of each combined option in each of the tables under 8.1 are added in the 
cumulative table below. The final results show the extent to which each combined option is expected to contribute to the policy objectives and its effect on the f unctioning of the internal 
market and consumer protection.  
Cumulative 
impact 
(effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence) Online Dispute Resolution for cross-border e-commerce transactions  
ADR coverage, 
information and 
quality Policy Option 1  Policy Option 2  Policy Option 3  Policy Option 4 
Policy Option 1  0 3 5 7 
Policy Option 2  3 6 6 8 
Policy Option 3  6 9 15 11 
Policy Option 4  8 8 13 12 
From the rating of the table above it can be co ncluded that the combination of options that 
entails no EU action will preserve the status qu o and therefore the problems that have been 
identified will not be tackled. Consumers will con tinue to suffer losses and their confidence in 
shopping on-line and cross-border will remain low. Although it is the less expensive combination of options it does not meet the set objectives. 
The combination of options that foresees th e adoption of non-binding legal instruments to 
tackle the problems identified is neither efficient nor effective. If this combination of options is followed, quality ADR coverage across th e EU including the e-commerce cross-border 
aspect will be left to voluntary actions a nd therefore cannot be ensured. Consequently, 
consumers' problems will remain unresolved and losses suffered in the internal market unrecovered. An additional Recommendation is not expected to bring an added value to tackle 
the current problems.  
The combination of options that foresees the ad option of binding legal instrument that require 
making ADR schemes, which are also able to deal with disputes online, av ailable in sectors of 
the economy where they do not currently ex ist (option 3 ADR) will ensure full ADR 
coverage. As a consequence of the full ADR coverage, the required framework will be created, on the basis of which a EU web-based system can effectively deal with disputes 
related to cross-border e-commerce transactions (option 3 ODR). This combination of options 
would therefore represent the most effective a nd efficient means to im prove the way domestic 
and cross-border disputes are dealt with.  
The combination of options that entails a high level of harmonisation in the areas of ADR and 
ODR (options 4) would provide for a full c overage but would be di sproportionate to the 
objectives of the overall initiative. This has al so been confirmed by th e replies to the public 
consultation and the bilateral discussions he ld by the Commission services with Member 
 
EN 65   EN States. Bearing in mind that ADR schemes have  been created according to the needs and the 
standards of each individual Member State the fact  that they will have to be adapted in order 
to correspond to the specifications provided by the standard ADR model will be inefficient and objected by stakeholders and public authoriti es. The time needed and the resources that 
will have to be invested are disproportionate to the set objectives and will impose unnecessary 
burden to the Member States. In addition, cr eating a single EU ODR body would make ADR 
schemes that currently exist at national level and deal with disputes  online, redundant. Some 
consumers may be reluctant to use an EU body, which may seem "far-away" to them. Finally, 
such development does not take into account the national situati on and is disproportionate as 
it implies a strong EU "top-down" intervention that  also creates unnecessary costs for the EU.  
In conclusion, the objectives pur sued can be best achieved th rough separate instruments 
which aim, respectively and simultaneously, to a)  address the shortcomings in ADR coverage, 
information and quality services within each  Member State for both domestic and cross-
border disputes and b) estab lish a new EU system for ODR specifically devoted to cross-
border transactions on the internet.  
Therefore, the preferred option is the combin ation of the two policy options as outlined 
below
130: 
(1) A framework Directive to ensure that consumers can refer all their domestic 
and cross-border disputes to qualit y ADR schemes, covering also online 
services; that they receive informati on on the ADR scheme competent to deal 
with their dispute and that ADR schemes participate in existing EU sector-specific ADR networks (Option 3). It w ill be binding to Member States while 
leaving them the choice of form and methods (how to "fill the gaps"); and 
(2) A Regulation to establish a EU system , consisting of a web-based platform 
directly accessible by consumers, wh ich will be based on national ADR 
schemes and will be able to deal with cross-border e-commerce disputes online (ODR); and to define common criteria for the functioning of the web-based 
platform (Option 3). 
The two instruments do not overlap, but are fu lly complementary. Since the EU ODR system 
is based on national ADR schemes, it will not be possible to create it and make it function if 
there is not full coverage of qua lity ADR throughout the EU territory. 
8.2. The impact of the preferred option 
The preferred option will ma ke a real difference for consumers. They will be able to address 
all their disputes to an ADR scheme. They will  be able to do so no matter the business sector, 
the channel of purchase or th e country where the product or service was purchased from.  
Moreover, consumers will be assured that all ADR schemes will be transparent and will deal 
with their dispute effectively and impartially. They will thus feel better equipped and more 
empowered to turn to ADR. As a result, more consumer problems will be raised and solved, thus leading to a reduction in consumer losses. The recovered losses can be then re-used in 
the internal market for the purchase of goo ds and services. Similarly the savings by 
                                                
 
130  A draft implementation and transposition plan of the two instruments can be found in Annex XI. 
 
EN 66   EN introducing quality ADR will be important, accounting for about 0.17% of EU GDP (€20 
billion). 
Furthermore, consumers will get to know about  ADR and how it works. They will receive 
information on which ADR to turn to in case of a dispute with a trader  in all contracts and 
commercial documents (e.g. receipts, invoices). For example a Swedish consumer who opens 
a bank account in a Swedish bank will receive information on the Swedish ADR scheme for 
banking in the contract he signs in order to open the bank account. Similarly, the same 
Swedish consumer who buys a personal computer  in Germany will receive information on the 
German ADR scheme for electronic devices on the receipt he gets from the shop. 
Consequently, ADR will become common know ledge for consumers and the levels of 
awareness will increase substantially. Better knowle dge will inevitably lead to more frequent 
use of ADR for all kinds of problems and will encourage consumers to use ADR. The creation of a consumer-friendly EU web-based pl atform will enable consumers to solve their 
disputes by electronic means a nd consequently increase thei r confidence to buy goods and 
services online and cross-border. 
The overall impact on businesses  will be reasonable. A number of costs will occur for 
businesses, namely: i) Businesses may be require d to set up and fund -partly or totally- ADR 
schemes in the sectors where they do not exist. The related costs will depend on the sector, the disputes received and the country; they  may range from €100.000 to more than €1 million 
per year. These figures are based on concrete ex amples of the costs incurred by existing ADR 
schemes in different Member States. For exampl e, a cross-sectoral ADR scheme in Estonia 
("Consumers Complaint Committee") handled  in 2010 300 disputes with a budget of €87.500. 
A sector-specific ADR scheme ("Médiateur de s Communications électroniques") in France 
handled in 2010 3.300 cases with a budget of €1 million. The Chamber of Commerce in 
Milan (cross-sectoral ADR) handled 600 cases with a budget of €76.500. The Member States 
which will be more affected are those that ha ve a few or no ADR schemes in place, namely 
clusters 1 and 2 in paragraph 3.3.2. However, cost s for businesses in relation to the obligation 
of full coverage are not directly  linked to the existing coverage in ADR in the Member State 
where they are established. Full ADR coverage will not require systematically businesses to 
create a specific ADR scheme in each retail sector. Member States, in collaboration with 
businesses or not, may decide instead to create a single or residual cross-sectoral body to 'fill the gaps' in their territory (e.g. Denmark or Greece) .In addition, it should be noted that 
funding of ADR schemes by businesses is alre ady a common practice in many sectors and 
Member States. It can take many different forms,  such as levies at business sectors, case-by-
case fees or fees proportionate to the cases th ey generate. ii) Businesses will have to adapt 
their contracts and commercial documents to  include information on the relevant ADR 
schemes. This will generate certain costs to  them, which will be one-off and will amount to 
about €771 million EU wide (€254 per business). The study carried out
131 showed that SMEs 
will not be burdened particularly from the information obligations; the ones interviewed stated lower costs for adjusting to information obligations were lower than the ones for big 
businesses (probably because they issue less documents). It has to  be taken into account that 
businesses will have the necessary time to make  these modifications; hence the costs will not 
be excessive since all businesses update their contracts and commercial documents frequently 
(in most cases every one or two years).  
                                                
 
131 See Annex VII  
 
EN 67   EN On the other hand businesses, including SMEs, will save on a yearly basis, if they use ADR 
instead of court proceedings, from € 1.7 billion to € 3 billion, while at the same time saving 258 days. In addition, they will enhance their re putation with consumers and to a significant 
extent address issues of reputational risk, by showing willingness to solve disputes in a non 
expensive and easily accessible way. They will al so have the concrete possibility to solve 
their disputes with consumers out-of-court and to use the feedback received from the ADR 
process to improve their busin ess practices and products. Mo reover the adherence to ADR 
schemes will create a virtuous circle from which businesses which are relu ctant to adhere will 
be excluded and bear a reputa tional risk. Currently a signifi cant number of businesses state 
that even though they would like to use ADR it wa s not always available. Full coverage for all 
online, off-line, domestic and cross-border g oods and services will  therefore enable 
businesses to use ADR. This will allow them to avoid lengthy and costly in-court procedures and maintain their business reputation, while build ing good relations with their clients. As a 
result, businesses, and in particular SMEs, will have incentives to also improve their internal 
complaint handling systems and better competit ion will be secured.  By developing an 
effective system that will enable businesses to  resolve their disputes  with consumers online 
their willingness to offer products and services  via the internet will increase. This is 
particularly important for SMEs that are for the moment reluct ant to offer goods and services 
online and across borders. As a result, consum ers will have access to a wider range of 
products and competition within the in ternal market will increase.  
Similarly, the impact on Member States will be reasonable. Costs will occur for the set up 
and running of new ADR, which Member States may n eed to bear partly or totally (the nature 
of the funding of ADR, either public or finan ced through private sector  contribution or both). 
For example the Swedish and Greek ADR scheme s are financed entirely by public funds. The 
relevant implementation costs wi ll be similar to the ones de scribed above for businesses. 
Member States will have the possibility to meet the obligation of full coverage through 
several options. Member States will also incu r costs for reporting on the development of ADR 
schemes (persisting gaps, data on the number of  ADR cases, level of businesses' engagement). 
However, these costs will be marginal since all Member States already have an authority to 
notify to the European Commission the ADR  schemes, which comply with the two 
Commission recommendations. Some of them also  have structures to monitor and report on 
ADR schemes (e.g. on number of cases, functioning).  
The impact on the  EU budget should also be considered. The EU will bear the costs to 
develop a web-based system for disputes linke d to cross-border e-commerce transactions and 
the expertise required within the ECC network. Taking into account existing ADR schemes dealing with disputes online as well as similar EU tools, th e budget needed for the set up of 
the web-based system can be estimated to about €2 million and annual maintenance and running costs will amount to approximate ly €300.000. Additionally, a more detailed 
monitoring on ADR will require the reallocation of some Eu ropean Commission staff.  
Finally, the preferred option will  have a positive social impact . Simple and effective out-of-
court dispute resolution should allow all cons umers, including the vulnerable ones, to refer 
their disputes and be compensated. The recove red losses can then be reallocated in the 
internal market and contribute to growth. By offering effective means of online dispute 
resolution the willingness of businesses to offer goods and services online will increase. Consequently, consumers will have  access to a wider range of goods and services, which will 
lead to more competitive markets with a likely reduction of prices.  
 
EN 68   EN The assessment of the impact of the current in itiative on the Charter of  Fundamental Rights is 
provided in Annex VIII. The relevant provisions referred to are: consumer protection (article 
38), right to an effectiv e remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), respect for private and family 
life (Article 7) and data protection (Article 8). In particular, it will ensure a high level of 
consumer protection by providing an obligation on behalf of Member States to ensure that 
consumers can refer all their domestic and cross-border disputes to quality ADR/ODR 
schemes. It should be noted that the initiativ e will not affect the right of consumers or 
businesses to an effective remedy and to reso lve their disputes befo re a court, as the 
ADR/ODR will not be a mandatory first step befo re going to court. In addition, the businesses 
and consumers will always be able to turn to court in case their rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by EU law are violated. All the nece ssary steps will be taken to guarantee that 
personal data, including the ones in the web based platform, will be processed in line with the 
EU data protection legislation132. All the necessary steps will be taken to guarantee that 
personal data, including the ones in the web based platform, will be processed in line with the 
EU data protection legislation133.  
In conclusion, the preferred option will tackle  the problems identified, i.e. gaps in ADR 
coverage, low consumers' awareness, quality of ADR schemes and online dispute resolution 
for cross-border e-commerce transactions. It will meet the objectives set in a proportionate 
and adequate way, respecting the flexible and ve rsatile nature of ADR in the EU and without 
resulting to excessive or unnecessary costs.  
Actions included in the preferred option Cost 
Make available ADR schemes where they do 
not exist €100.000 to €1 million annually (depending 
on the sector and the size of the country) 
Creation of an EU web-based platform for e-commerce cross-border transactions. -€2 million for the creation  
-€ 300.000 for the running costs - EU public administration personnel costs 
(2 administrators, 1 assistant) 
Information by businesses about competent ADR schemes to deal with consumer disputes on their contracts and commercial documents.  €771 million for all EU businesses (€254 per 
business) 
Reporting from Member States on ADR (persisting gaps, data on the number of ADR cases and on the level of businesses' engagement in the ADR proceedings). Depending on existing administrative 
structures in Member States 
                                                 
132  See Annex VIII for a detailed assessm ent of impacts on fundamental rights. 
133 See Annex VIII 
 
EN 69   EN 8.3. Proportionality of the preferred option 
The scope of the intervention of the EU is limite d to strictly necessary actions to achieve the 
objectives set. The preferred op tion is the combination of two intertwined and complementary 
legal instruments. A framework Directive on the development of ADR and a Regulation on 
the establishment of an ODR system at EU le vel will provide the most effective means to 
achieve the pursued objectives at the lowest co mparative costs. The action at EU level takes 
account of existing national ADR schemes. 
Since ADR exists in some Member  States and in some sectors, the best instrument to ensure 
full coverage is a framework Directive. This  instrument shall bind on the results to be 
achieved but shall leave to the Member States the choice of means. The framework Directive 
will build on ADR schemes that already exist and will leave Member States  the necessary margins to build on their current situation and to  intervene accordingly. This will also apply to 
the potential financial implications, as Member  States will have th e choice on how to 
intervene to reach the objective of the directive, instead of  implementing a EU model for 
ADR in all sectors. Action at EU level will thus bridge the gaps that exist in different sectors 
across the Member States and encourage consum ers to carry out cross-border transactions. 
This action regarding ADR will create the c onditions to set up the EU ODR system which 
will be based on national ADR schemes and will not function unless there is full coverage of quality ADR throughout the EU territory. 
The preferred option concerning ODR respects in the best wa y proportionality, while meeting 
the ambitious objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe. Instead of creating a completely 
new structure at EU level, the preferred option will be based on the ADR schemes in compliance with EU obligations, thus guarantee ing the full coverage both at sectoral and 
geographical level and ensuring quality ADR services. Therefore, a Regulation will be limited to the set-up of the EU ODR system. 
The burden to businesses and Member States resulting from the preferred option are the most 
proportionate as the objectives will be achieved at the lowest  costs avoiding duplication of 
expenses or unnecessary administ rative burdens (see paragraph 8.2). 
A non binding approach will be probably less e xpensive for businesses and Member States. 
Both the development of ADR and the provision  of information by traders would be done on 
a voluntary basis. However, there will be no gua rantee that ADR schemes are available for all 
types of consumer disputes. This will undermin e the effectiveness of ADR for both domestic 
and cross-border disputes, for both face to face and e-commerce transactions, and will deprive 
consumers and businesses from the possibility to  solve their problems in an easily accessible, 
fast and inexpensive way.  Consumers' and businesses' awareness of ADR will remain low. Consumers and businesses will continue to be reluctant in buying online in another Member State. The value added compared to the exis ting Recommendations, which as described above 
in paragraph 4.3 have not delivered the e xpected results, would be very limited. 
A stronger harmonisation of ADR schemes (i.e . based on a EU model for quality national 
ADR schemes) will lead to high and unnecessary costs for businesses and Member States. It 
will fill the gaps in the ADR coverage but also modify well functioning national ADR schemes.  
 
EN 70   EN Likewise, imposing a completely new ODR scheme at EU level to deal with disputes relating 
to cross-border e-commerce transactions will be less efficient. It will entail a much higher 
monetary impact on the EU budget as well as a risk of incoherence and overlapping with 
existing national ADR schemes, which already provide online ADR serv ices for disputes 
relating to cross-border e-commerce transactions. 
9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
The Regulation on ODR can be fully operational  only when Member States implement the 
provisions of the framework Directive on ADR, in particular regarding the full ADR 
coverage134. The overall system is expected to be fully operational afte r two years from the 
entry into force of the legislative package.  
The proposed legislative initiatives would fore see the obligation of the Commission to publish 
biannual reports, following the adoption of the le gislation. In these reports, the Commission 
will also evaluate the effectiveness of the legisl ation in meeting the objectives. In particular it 
will assess the impact of the in itiatives in the use of ADR and ODR in the EU (consumers and 
traders actually using ADR) and the growth of  cross-border and e-commerce transactions 
(consumers buying and traders selling online) as a result of the existence of ADR and ODR 
solutions. 
 
Monitoring indicators 
Objectives Indicator Source of information 
Increase in the share of 
consumer disputes transferred to 
ADR schemes  • Increase in the number 
of cross-border ADR 
cases 
• Increase in the number 
of consumers and of 
traders buying and selling cross-border and online • Information from the 
competent authorities of 
Member States 
• Information from the 
Commission and national 
databases of ADR schemes 
• Data from ECC-network  
• Data from consumer 
Eurobarometer and other 
surveys 
Raise consumers' awareness on 
ADR  • Increase in the number 
of consumers who know 
about ADR 
• Increase in the number 
of consumers who use • Data from consumer 
Eurobarometer and other 
surveys 
• Data from the competent 
authorities of Member 
                                                 
134   See Annex XI for the time-line for the transposition. 
 
EN 71   EN an ADR scheme to solve 
their dispute States 
Ensure that ADR schemes 
operate according to certain 
principles that allow consumers 
and businesses to trust them • Compliance of the ADR 
schemes with the 
principles established at EU level  • Information from ADR 
schemes 
• Information from the 
competent authorities of Member States 
• Information from the 
Commission and national 
databases of ADR schemes 
• Data from consumer 
Eurobarometer and other 
surveys 
Increase consumers' and 
businesses' trust in the online 
trade • Increase in the number 
of consumers who are willing to buy online from another Member State by 20% in 2020. 
• Increase in the number 
of businesses that are 
willing to sell online in other Member States by 10% in 2020 • Data from consumer 
Eurobarometer and other surveys 
• Data from business 
Eurobarometer and other 
surveys 
• Information from national 
and EU reports on e-
commerce trade 
 
 
EN 72   EN ANNEX I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STUDY ON "THE USE OF ADR  IN THE EU"135 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a term used for a wide variety of mechanisms aimed 
at resolving conflicts without (direct) interv ention of a court. ADR schemes usually use a 
third party such as an arbitr ator, mediator or an ombudsman to help the consumer and the 
trader to reach a solution to their dispute. 
The European Commission has adopted  two Recommendations (98/257/EC and 
2001/310/EC) which have established principles  for ADR schemes. Member States have 
notified to the Commission more than 400 ADR schemes that they deem to be in conformity with the principles set up in the Recomme ndations. Nevertheless, ADR mechanisms have 
been developed unequally acro ss the European Union. The number of ADR bodies, the 
procedures (arbitration, mediation, et c.), the nature of th e initiative (public or private) and the 
status of the decisions adopted by ADR bodies  (recommendation or bi nding decision) differ 
greatly.  
This study provides an overview of existi ng ADR schemes throughout the European Union 
and how they work. Civic Consulting collected qua ntitative and qualitative  data in order to 
identify consumer ADR bodies in the Member St ates, to identify existin g gaps, and to analyse 
whether existing ADR schemes are in conform ity with the Commission Recommendations. 
The report is based on data collected through desk  research, surveys and in-depth interviews 
between January and August 2009. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS AND USE OF ADR SCHEMES 
Number of ADR schemes identified in the EU 
The results of the study show that progress has been made in terms of availability of ADR 
schemes since the Commission database was fi rst compiled. New ADR schemes are available, 
especially in the new Member States (e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary, Ma lta, Slovenia, Poland); some 
of them, although not yet notified, confirm that they meet the requirements for notification 
and plan to file requests in the near fu ture. Non-notified schemes, however, reach a 
considerable number also in some old Me mber States (e.g. Germ any, Austria, Sweden, 
Ireland, Italy). 
750 ADR schemes relevant for business-to-consumer disputes were identified in Member 
States, of which only about 60% are notifie d to the European Commission. Reasons for non-
notification are that schemes are in  an early stage of their activity, that they lack awareness of 
the notification process, that ther e is no perceived benefit of notif ication and that it is unclear 
to them which institution they shoul d file the notification request to. 
                                                
 
135 Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, Civic Consulting of the 
Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (CPEC), 2009, available at: 
http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/sg/e valuation/page s/eims_en.htm  
 
EN 73   EN 
 
Main characteristics of ADR schemes 
ADR mechanisms are highly diverse, not only across the European Union, but also  within 
Member States. There are public and private schemes, as well as schemes  established on basis 
of cooperation between public sector and industry, or consumer  organisations and industry. 
Although there is a high corre lation between the nature of  the scheme and the funding – i.e. 
private schemes are usually financed by the industry  and public schemes by public funds – 
ADR bodies established by public law can also  be financed by the industry (especially in 
highly regulated markets). For the large  majority of the schemes pa rticipation of  the industry 
in the ADR procedure is voluntary.  However, a significant numb er of mandatory schemes 
exist.   
ADR schemes can be also classified accordi ng to the outcome of the procedure. There  are 
schemes that issue a non-binding decisi on (recommendation), and schemes where  the decision 
 
EN 74   EN is binding on the business but not on the consumer, or binding on both  parties. Finally, there 
are mediation-only schemes that try to reach a consensual  agreement. In practice, however, 
many schemes offer a combination of possible  outcomes. Especially when decisions are 
binding on both parties, ADR procedures  often foresee a preliminary formal or informal 
attempt to reach a friendly agreement  between the parties.  The vast majority of the ADR 
procedures are free of charge for the consumer, or of  moderate costs below 50 Euro. A 
majority of ADR cases are decided within a period of  90 days.  
Use of ADR schemes 
Individual ADR cases 
The use of ADR schemes is not evenly dist ributed across Member States. Based on the 
number of reported ADR cases per 1,000 inhabita nts in 2007, the year for which the most 
complete data set is available, ADR is clearly more relevant in Belgium, the UK, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, De nmark, and Malta than in other EU countries. 
The number of ADR cases in the EU has increas ed throughout the last years. For 2006, about 
410,000 cases were reported, for 2007 about  473,000 cases, and the estimated minimum 
number of individual ADR cases in the EU in  2008 was approximately  530,000. This trend is 
confirmed when analysing data from large ADR schemes and national decentralised ADR 
systems for which data is co llected at central level. 
The high number of cases of the Financial Ombudsman Service in the UK (with more than 
100,000 cases per year in several years) is an excep tion and large schemes in the Member 
States typically report between 5,000 and 20,000 cases per year. Large schemes are often 
schemes that deal with B2C disputes in one sect or at national level (e .g. financial services, 
telecommunications, transport). 
Collective ADR cases 
Several types of collective ADR pr ocedures are in use in the EU: collective investigations, as 
conducted e.g. by national advertising standards bodies in case of multiple complaints; representative collective ADR procedures where a single consumer or a consumer association 
can bring a collective case to the scheme on beha lf of a definite number of affected consumers 
and the decision applies to the consumers who have signed up; finally, collective ADR 
procedures of the Scandinavi an type, where the ombudsman ha s been granted the right to 
bring proceedings on behalf of a group of consumers and the cl aim extends automatically to 
all affected consumers. Except for collective investigations, few collective ADR cases have 
been brought so far. 
Outcomes of ADR proceedings 
The number of final decisions as percentage of  the total number of cases greatly differs 
among schemes. Schemes that more often register  percentages equal to or close to 100% are 
schemes that deal with disputes in advertis ing, energy and telecommunications markets, and 
financial services. Large percentages are also ex plained by the fact that  participation of the 
industry to these schemes is often mandatory. Low percentages can be explained looking at 
the role played by friendly settlements: cases solved in an early phase through amicable 
agreements between the parties were not always  included by the schemes in the category of 
cases that led to a final decision. 
 
EN 75   EN Compliance rates of businesses with ADR deci sions in favour of the consumer differ by 
scheme rather than by country. The median compliance rate acr oss all schemes that provided 
relevant data is high: 99%. Th e rate of businesses that complie d with final decisions in favour 
of the consumers appears to depend partly on the nature of the scheme. The median 
compliance rate for schemes issuing a non-binding  recommendation is 90%,  whereas this rate 
is 100% for schemes that can take binding decisions. 
When decisions are not binding, tr aders may comply with decisions  in favour of the consumer 
because they consider the decision to be correc t or acceptable, or because they want to avoid 
damage to their reputation or judicial expenses. 
Coverage and gaps of ADR schemes 
In most EU countries, the geographical cove rage of ADR schemes is national. In some 
countries, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain the system is decentralised with ADR 
schemes providing their services at regional or local level.  
ADR schemes can then be divided into ADR sc hemes that deal with disputes in several 
sectors of industry (cross-sectoral schemes) and ADR schemes that deal with disputes in one 
sector of industry only (sectoral schemes). Both  types of ADR schemes are represented in the 
majority of Member States. 
Gaps in the coverage of ADR procedures ca n be identified both at geographical and at 
sectoral level. In some new Member States ADR schemes are not yet developed, not in all 
sectors at least. However problems regarding the geographical coverage of ADR schemes are 
also encountered in old Member States, wher e ADR procedures are not always available 
homogeneously throughout the territory. ADR scheme s have been more widely set up to solve 
disputes in financial services, package travel /tourism, and telecommunications. This may be 
related to the frequency of occurrence of consum er disputes in these sectors and the size of 
related consumer detriment. ADR schemes ope rating in the financia l sector, travel and 
transport usually also deal wi th cross border disput es, often in close cooperation with the 
European Consumer Centres. 
The results of this study underlin e the fundamental role  of the European C onsumer Centres in 
the use of ADR cross-border. ADR schemes usually  deal with claims against traders based in 
their own country. When consumers have a clai m against a trader base d in another country, 
they can contact the ECC of th eir own country for information on ADR schemes available in 
the other Member States, and sometimes are s upported when registering their claim with the 
relevant scheme. 
II. PROCEDURES AND FUNC TIONING OF ADR SCHEMES 
ADR schemes use a multitude of processes for resolving business to consumer disputes, 
which can be unique according to the culture and jurisdiction of EU  Member States. The 
study has identified ten typical st ages of an ADR procedure and examined in detail how they 
function in practice in different EU countri es on basis of 15 case study ADR schemes. 
Stage 1: Advertising the scheme . ADR schemes give informati on about their competence and 
proceedings on their websites, providing consum ers with a contact address and, occasionally, 
a hotline. Flyers, brochures, paid advertisemen ts in various media, referral systems through 
consumer organisations and other advice bodies  are also used. One problem identified by 
 
EN 76   EN several schemes was the limited funding availabl e for such purposes. A very effective way of 
communication for sectoral industry schemes is to  put an obligation on the relevant traders 
and businesses to inform their customers. 
Stage 2: Registering a claim . All ADR proceedings can be in itiated by individual consumers, 
while only in some cases also traders can submit  claims. Applications must be submitted in 
writing, but messages in e-mail format are usua lly accepted. Online application forms are also 
used and facilitate the introducti on of complaints for consumers. It is not necessary, nor is it 
usual, for consumers to be represented by a lawyer. ADR proceedings are usually free of 
charge for both parties. Some schemes provide for a small fee to initiate the procedure, which 
is reimbursed to the claimant if hi s or her applica tion is successful. 
Stage 3: Decision on admissibility . It is a typical feature of ADR schemes that they have a 
limited scope of activities. Sectoral schemes will only deal with their specific industry sector, 
but even in the case of cross-sectoral schemes, the coverage is not really general as schemes 
have many exceptions in terms of industry s ector covered, time limits within which a 
complaint can be lodged, or of minimum and ma ximum values for the complaints. Consumer 
can be required to complain to the business before lodging an app lication. Anot her common 
restriction is that court proceedings cannot run parallel to ADR proceedings. 
Stage 4: Communicating the case  to business and reaction . In most schemes businesses are 
given the opportunity to give their own side of the story. Usually ADR schemes have no 
power to request complete written documentation from the business in order to investigate the 
complaint. However, in some cases, if the business does not react during a set period of time, the procedure can nevertheless continue and is decided on the evidence submitted by the consumer. 
Stage 5: Taking the evidence . ADR schemes rely on written evidence, and they are general 
flexible in taking and evaluating evidence. Oral  hearings are often c onsidered as too time-
consuming and cumbersome and seldom used; also, ADR schemes usually do not have the 
power to examine witnesses. Nevertheless, ADR schemes can rely on technical expertise 
(internal or external) in  order to assess the cons umer's complaint properly. 
Stage 6: Attempting to reach a friendly settlement . Most ADR schemes first try to solve the 
complaints submitted to them by friendly settlement, which can be a formal part of the procedure aided by personnel of the scheme (secretariat or ombudsmen themselves), or 
informal and possible at any stage of the process. 
Stage 7: Appointing the decision-making body . The way ADR schemes appoint their 
mediators or decision makers varies substa ntially between schemes, and depends on the 
peculiarities of the sector covered, as well as traditions and practices in  particular countries. 
The final decision makers for each case brought to dispute resolution may be just one person, 
such as an ombudsman or mediator, or an adjudicating panel which includes members from consumer associations and from the business side. 
Stage 8: Adopting the decision . ADR schemes usually do not base their decisions only on the 
law and case law, but they focus on the practical solution of the dispute. ADR schemes take into account what is reasonable and fair, good pr actices, term of conditions negotiated ex-ante 
between business associations and consumer unions, or codes of conduct and equity. Many 
ADR schemes simply propose a solution to a conflic t, i.e. they issue a decision that has the 
 
EN 77   EN character of a non-bind ing recommendation. However, a significant number of ADR schemes 
provide some sort of a binding decision, eith er for the business or for both business and 
consumer. 
Stage 9 and 10: Implementing the d ecision and monitoring the outcome . When ADR 
schemes that give non-binding decisions mon itor compliance with their recommendations, 
they communicate directly with the business and/or the consumer. In some cases, the names 
of non-complying businesses are published. Compliance rates by business are directly related 
either to the binding nature of the decision, or to the brand and reputation of the scheme if 
compliance is voluntary. National well-known sc hemes that have a system of naming and 
shaming appear to have relatively high compliance rates. 
In conclusion, most ADR providers use a set of similar procedural stages to take a complaint 
from being registered to fina l resolution. Within these parameters, the same goal can be 
achieved in many different wa ys, though some schemes no doubt  are more successful than 
others, in terms of cases submitted to them as well as percentages of cases resolved and businesses who comply with th eir decisions. The analysis s hows many problems connected 
with court proceedings can be solved by effec tive ADR schemes, such as cost, duration of 
proceedings and formality. 
Functioning of ADR schemes for collective cases 
ADR schemes have limited experience with collective alternative dispute resolution. 
Only a few schemes provide representative co llective procedures. More frequently ADR 
schemes carry out collective investigations, i.e. if many claims against one trader are similar 
they undergo the same investigatio n, or just a sample of them are investigated, then all the 
parties settle individually on th e basis of those decisions. The main concerns related to the 
functioning of ADR schemes for collective cases at  present include: (a) the complexity of the 
procedure and related costs; (b) the nonbinding nature of the decision. 
ADR schemes and cross-border cases 
All the schemes selected for the case studies ta ke up cases of consumer s in other countries 
against traders or serv ices within their juri sdiction. In-country c onsumers bringing cases 
against foreign traders are referred to the ne twork of European Consumer Centres, or for 
financial claims, to FIN-NET. 
The case studies examined for th is study seem to confirm that  although the referral systems 
function reasonably well, the take up by consum ers of cross-border cases is still limited, 
particularly in the financial sector, whereas it is  more widely used in the travel sector. In one 
particular scheme in the travel sector (in Ge rmany) 44% of the tota l cases filed in 2008 at 
were cross-border cases. In cont rast, in other sectors the shar e of cross-border cases remains 
low. 
Difficulties consumers and businesses fa ce in obtaining redress through ADR 
Several barriers for the use of ADR schemes remain, both for consumers and businesses. On 
the consumer side, the most signi ficant barrier is the lack of aw areness which is an essential 
pre-requisite to access. Fragmentation of ADR se rvices in larger count ries, such as Germany 
or the UK can pose particular problems in term s of ensuring consumer awareness. Relevant 
 
EN 78   EN barriers also include non-compliance by busin ess with non-binding decisions of ADR 
schemes and refusal by business to enter the procedure, which can ultimately undermine consumer trust in such schemes, as well as th e absence of ADR schemes in areas or industry 
sectors where they may be needed. Additiona l barriers for cross-border ADR from a 
consumer perspective include in particular finding the right competent scheme and language 
barriers. In the business perspective, the main  reason that prevents businesses from using 
ADR seems to be the lack of available ADR  procedures in some sectors. Business 
associations also point out that businesses ar e sometimes prevented from using ADR schemes 
because only consumers can file claims. 
III. CONFORMITY WITH EC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Adherence to the principles of  the Commission Recommendations 
According to the Civic Consulting survey of ADR schemes, a substantial number of schemes 
are not aware of the Commission Recommendations . Even those schemes that are aware of 
the Commission Recommendations, do not always fully comply with them according to their own assessment. The large percentage of scheme s that did not know whether they comply or 
not with the Recommend ations is notable.  
Notifying authorities in Member States do no t seem to take a proactive approach in 
encouraging schemes to conform. Authorities  also do not seem to carry out periodic 
monitoring of schemes once they  have been notified, and cen tralised websites to guide 
consumers to the appropriate ADR scheme for their complaint are generally lacking at the national level. This makes it difficult overa ll for consumers to know whether schemes they 
are referred to offer fair and effective redress, especially as national standards for ADR 
schemes only exist in some Member States. This  is also a particular issue for cross-border 
referrals through the European Consumer Centres,  as they may need to refer consumers to 
schemes in other countries that are not notified (if there is no  notified scheme operating in a 
particular sector for example).  
The following paragraphs summarise the conclusi ons of the study regardi ng the conformity of 
ADR schemes in the EU with the key pr inciples laid down in the two Commission 
Recommendations. Specific good practices iden tified in the course of the study are 
summarised in the related tables of this report, see Chapter 5. 
The principles of impart iality and independence 
Most ADR schemes throughout Europe appear to  meet the requirement of independence, 
based on their own assessment, and the major ity opinion of all ot her stakeholder groups. 
However, on occasion consumer associations considered that the independence of some 
schemes is questionable where the ADR is a priv ately established scheme , either part of the 
organisational structure of a busin ess association or directly li nked to a particular business, 
and not legally separated from it. There is gr eater risk in such cases perceived by some 
stakeholders that the loyalty of the decision ma kers could be with thei r paymasters and that 
this could prevent reaching a fair judgement, part icularly when other principles, such as full 
transparency, are also not seen to be followed. 
 
 
 
EN 79   EN  
The principle of transparency 
A considerable number of ADR schemes in Eur ope are not in line w ith the principle of 
transparency: neither the consumers nor the au thorities have access to information about the 
use, number, and types of cases and past performance of the schemes. In today's conditions, one appropriate measure to ensure the transp arency of the procedure could be that each 
scheme has its own website where consumers can access the desired information without 
specifically requesting it. This is particularly relevant in cross-border cases where alternative 
means of information are even more difficult and expensive. 
The principle of effectiveness 
Overall ADR schemes seem to meet the prin ciple of effectiveness, which comprises 
requirements as to the accessibility, cost, and du ration of the procedure. The vast majority of 
the ADR procedures are free of charge for the consumer, or of moderate costs, and do not 
require legal representation. Most ADR cases are decided within a period of less than 90 days, 
which appears to be a very reasonable time frame. Despite relying mainly on written evidence, ADR schemes are generally flexible in taking and evaluating the evidence and may 
take the initiative to have an expert opini on prepared. A number of ADR schemes do not 
provide for online access to the procedure. 
The principle of liberty 
The principle of liberty is respected by ADR sc hemes as far as consumers are concerned, to 
the extent that they lead to an agreement betw een the parties on the case, or lead to a prior 
agreement to accept the binding nature of the decision; or require the acceptance of the 
binding nature of the decision when filing the complaint (in cases that the law orders their binding nature). 
As far as businesses are concerne d, in many ADR schemes, the bi nding nature of the decision 
is based on a general agreemen t or decision of the business association running the scheme, 
which is binding on its members. There are also cases in which the law provides directly that 
the decisions adopted by a ce rtain ADR scheme will be bi nding on the business. Mandatory 
schemes where decisions are binding up to a certain threshold regardless of whether the 
business specifically accepts this or not, are ofte n seen by stakeholders as being very effective 
in terms of consumer protection – however, th ey also go beyond the requirements outlined in 
the liberty principle of Recommendation 98/257/EC. 
Finally, from the answers given by ADR scheme s, consumers are able, in most cases, to 
initiate court proceedings if they are unsatis fied with the result of  the ADR procedure. 
Consumers might have no possibility to go to court if they chose to accept, after the dispute 
has arisen, the ADR proce dure as final and binding. 
The principle of legality 
Many ADR schemes restrict themselves to r ecommending a solution to the conflict between 
consumer and seller/service provider, i.e. th e decision has the charac ter of a non-binding 
recommendation. In these cases consumers are free to decide how they wi sh to react. For the 
schemes surveyed consumers can freely choose whether they want to submit to a binding 
ADR, with only a few exceptions. In such a situa tion, consumers cannot be said to have been 
 
EN 80   EN deprived of the protection which they might ha ve otherwise obtained in  the courts. So from 
the available evidence, ADR schemes in Europe responding to the survey appear to comply, 
generally, with the first poi nt of the legality princi ple of Recommendation 98/257/EC136. 
The principle of representation 
The information obtained in the case studies an d from stakeholders gives no indication that 
ADR schemes prohibit parties from being represen ted or assisted by a third party. Some of the 
schemes examined specifically offer the possibi lity of being represented by a lawyer, though 
this happens rarely. 
In conclusion, according to the available evidence, ADR schemes comply, in general, with 
most requirements laid dow n in the two Commission R ecommendations concerning 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, in particular as  regards independence, adversarial principle, 
costs, duration, active role of the decision-making body, manda tory consumer protection, 
reasoned decision, access to th e courts and legal representa tion. Problems persist in some 
areas, such as the transparency of ADR procedures, in that a considerable number of ADR schemes do not have a website of their own. In addition, in many cases consumers do not 
have easy access to information about the use, number, types of cases and past performance 
of ADR schemes. Electronic access to th e procedure is not always possible. 
The results of this study indicate the difficulty  for ADR schemes and other stakeholders in 
understanding which of the two Commission Reco mmendations applies to a specific scheme. 
As many ADR schemes that lead to an arbitrat ion decision also have a mediation stage, the 
division between the two Recomme ndations appear to be artificial  and not helpful in practice. 
A possible solution could be fo r the Commission to update and recast the Recommendations 
concerning Alternative Dispute Resolution or, a lternatively, to publish guidance on how to 
apply them. In both cases, a consolidated, simple  and plain language checklist to (self-) assess 
conformity with the principles would be helpful. 
Many of the schemes investigated apply best procedural practices  that could be  shared with 
others. Such best practices can supplement and benefit the list of principles in the 
Commission Recommendations. Thes e could take the form of EU  wide guidelines or more 
formal industry standards to be developed by an appropriate body an d implemented into 
national guidelines or standards. 
                                                
 
136 The second sentence of principle V, paragraph 1 of Recommendation 98/257/EC stipulates that in the 
case of cross-border disputes, the decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer being 
deprived of the protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying under the law of the Member State in which the consumer is normally resident in the instances provided for under Article 5 of the 
Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations. Because of the lack 
of data and also considering the current limited take up by consumers of cross-border consumer cases it is not possible to conclude whether there are relevant issues regarding conformity of ADR schemes 
with the second sentence of principle V, paragraph 1 of Recommendation 98/257/EC. 
 
EN 81   EN ANNEX II: CALCULATION METHOD FOR ESTIMATED LOSSES AND SAVINGS FOR CONSUMERS  
This Annex explains the calculations thr ough which the Commission services estimated: 
(2) the losses suffered by European consumers due to problems with purchased goods 
and services. 
(3)  the potential savings for consumers if Quality ADR would be in place 
(4) the potential savings for consumers if an efficient cross-border e-commerce ADR 
would be in place 
0.4% of EU GDP: consumer losses due to pr oblems with purchased goods or services.  
The data is from the dataset collected fo r the Eurobarometer on Consumer Empowerment137, 
which includes 53402 observations collected in a ll EU27 countries. The calculation is based on 
the responses to question 27138 which shows the percentage of consumer with a problem and the 
responses to question30 139 which shows the estimated losses.  
Consumer losses due to problems with cross-border purchases of goods or services 
In 2009, cross-border expenditure  amounted to €175 billion in the EU. The amount spent by 
consumers on cross-border internet  shopping is estimated at €30 billion for the same year. In 
total, these expenditures represent 1.75% of EU GDP140. As the total detriment suffered by 
EU consumers, amounts to 0.4% of EU GDP, th e detriment related to  cross border shopping 
(including internet) can be estimated between €500 million and €1 billion. 
 
0.17% of EU GDP: estimated savings for European consumers if quality ADR is 
available. 
The data is from the dataset collected fo r the Eurobarometer on Consumer Empowerment141, 
which includes 53402 observations collected in all EU27 countries. Out of the total sample, 
21% of consumers report that in the last 12 months they have encountered at least one 
                                                 
137 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_sum_en.pdf  
138 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, QA27 In the past 12 months have you 
encountered any problems for which you had legitimate cause for complaint with a good, a service, a 
retailer or a provider? 
139 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, QA30.1 Thinking about the last problem 
you encountered, could you please estimate the total value of any financial losses involved as a result of 
this problem? It doesn’t matter if you are not en tirely sure, we are interested in your estimations. 
140  The figure on cross-border expenditure (175 billion €)is from Eurostat statistics 'spending of EU 
consumers in EU countries other than the one they are resident in, while on holiday, business trip, etc'. 
The figure on cross-border inte rnet shopping (30 billion €) is calculated as follows: 423 million 
consumers in the EU (i.e. population aged over 15, Eurostat) * proportion of EU population engaging in 
cross-border internet shopping (9% as per Special EB 298) * average amount spent by a cross-border 
shopper on these purchases (797€ as per Special EB 298. 
141 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_sum_en.pdf  
 
EN 82   EN problem for which they had legitimate cause to complaint (question 27)142. However, only 5% 
of those who encountered a problem declare to have taken the business concerned to an out-
of-Court dispute settlement mechanism (question 31)143. Among those that decide not to 
proceed, 44% of consumers answered that the ma in reasons for not taking the case to an ADR 
(question 37144) were:  
• it would have taken too much effort 
• it would take too long 
• the consumer did not know how to proceed 
• the procedure would be too expensive 
• the consumer did not know that such things exist 
• these mechanisms were not available 
• the other party was not willi ng to use these mechanisms. 
All these obstacles can be removed by intr oducing quality and public ly known ADR schemes, 
available for all retail market sectors. This means that almost 8% of consumers who suffered 
an average financial loss of 300€145 due to a problem with a g ood or service they purchased 
(question 30)146, would have the opportunity to recur to  an efficient redress mechanism.  
The same magnitude of financial losses is also  mentioned in other studies. For example, a 
study in the UK shows that the detr iment suffered is slightly higher when measured as a share 
of EU GDP147.  
In aggregate terms, potential savings for Eu ropean consumers are estimated roughly around 
€20 billion, which correspond to 0.17% of EU GDP . The aggregate figure is obtained by 
                                                 
142 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, Annexes, p.55: QA27: "In the past 12 
months have you encountered any problems for which you had legitimate cause for complaint with a 
good, service, a retailer or a provider?  
143 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, Annexes, p.62 QA31: "As a consequence 
of the problems you encountered, did you take any of the following actions?  
144 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, Annexes, p. 74 QA37: "Thinking about the 
last time you encountered such a problem but didn't take the business concerned to an out-of-court 
dispute settlement-body (ADR), what are the main reasons for that? 
145   The estimated benefit of €20 billion (0.17% of GDP)is based on: (1) 60 million disputes [425 Mio. 
citizens above 15 years each having each having 1.75 disputes per year among which 8% can be solved 
via ADR] that will successfully be so lved per year resulting in a paym ent of 300€ each to consumers. 
The €300 per case is consumers' estimates about their loss per case. These estimate can be confirmed by other data gathered, which show that he costs of an ADR procedure for the scheme vary from €30 to 
€50 per case. Taking the maximum amount of €50, dealing with 60 million disputes would cost €3 
billion.  
146 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, Annexes, p. 58 QA30 Thinking about the 
last problem encountered, could you please estimate the total value of any financial losses involved as a 
result of this problem? It doesn't matter if you are not entirely sure, we are interested in your 
estimations. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_en.pdf 
147  http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/con sultations/eprotection/oft1252con.pdf 
 
EN 83   EN multiplying the average financial losses (300€)148, the average number of problems per person 
(1.75149 considering the sub-sample of 4102 observ ations), the percen tage of people who 
encountered a problem that can be solved  by well functioning ADR schemes (8%) and the 
EU27 population aged 15 and more (425 million)150. If there were quality ADR schemes 
available for all retail market sectors then a ll these losses could have been averted or 
compensated.  
0.02% of EU GDP: potential savings for Eu ropean consumers if ODR for cross-border 
e-commerce transactions is available. 
The creation of ADR to solve disputes relate d to e-commerce cross-border traders should 
allow European consumers, who were worried a bout redress possibilities  in case of disputes 
with traders, to save money when buying on line and across borders at a lower price.  
As a result of a study with myst ery shoppers conducted by Psychonomics151 on behalf of the 
European Commission, we have estimated that  a European consumer on average can save 
2.37% of the total value of a basket of 100 pr oducts buying these product s on the internet at 
the cheapest price either  domestically or cross-border comp ared to buying the same products 
on the internet only domestically.  
This figure is then combined with the answer s on consumers' attitudes towards cross-border 
purchases in the Flash Eurobarometer 299 on "C onsumer attitudes towa rd cross-border trade 
and consumer protection". In pa rticular, we use the replies to  a sub-question of question 5 
which asks whether the individu al is not interested in ma king a cross-border transaction 
because he is worried that diffi culties could arise if there was a need to resolve problems, 
such as complaints, returns of faulty produc ts, etc. Among those who did not make a cross-
border e-commerce purchase, 59% of  the respondents' answer that they totally agree or tend 
to agree that uncertainty about the resolution mechanism is an obstacle152. Bringing these 
figures together, the calculati on of the potential savings from an efficient cross-border e-
commerce ADR is based on the following formula: total online sales in Europe in 2010 (€171.9 billion according to a Center for Retail Research conducted by industry
153) multiplied 
                                                 
148  The average loss of €300 is calculated based on a filtered sample of respondents who could use ADR. 
The filtered sample excludes those respondents w ho already received a satisfactory reply from the 
trader or already went to ADR. 
149 Special Eurobarometer 342, Consumer Empowerment 2011, p. 11173: QA29: This calculation is an 
average of the answers received to  the following question: "Could you  please tell me how many such 
problems you encountered over the last 12 months? Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_342_en.pdf   
150   The age limit of the population used is a standard methodology of Eurobarometer surveys, as agreed 
with EUROSTAT. It should be noted that the inclusion of the population aged between 15 and 18 may 
lead to an underestimation of the detriment as this age group is more likely not to report the loss suffered. Accordingly, it is nt possible to use the household base as the questions asked in the 
Eurobarometer surveys refer to individuals and not households. 
151 YouGovPsychonomics (2009) "Mystery shopping evaluation of cross-border e-commerce in the EU" 
(2009): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/doc s/EC_e-commerce_Final_Report_201009_en.pdf   
152 Eurobarometer (299): Consumer Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade And Consumer Protection, p. 
30 "Thinking generally about purchasing goods or services from sellers/providers located elsewhere in the European Union, which we refer to as "cross-b order shopping", please tell me to what extent you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
153 This is a prudent estimation given that in 2011, on line sales in Europe are fo recast by CRR to grow by 
18.7% to a new total of € 202.9 billion ( http://www.retailresearch.o rg/onlineretailing.php  ) while the 
IMRG World report expect them to be around € 214 billion (More information available on demand). 
 
EN 84   EN by the percentage that can be saved buying cross border- (2.37%) multiplied by the 
percentage of consumers who indicate as one of  the reasons for not trading cross-border the 
absence of well-functioning redr ess possibilities (59%). The a ggregated figure that results 
from this calculation is €2.5 billion, which approximately corresponds to 0.02% of EU GDP .  
0.19% of EU GDP: total savings for European consumers 
Evidence shows that if quality ADR schemes for all retail market sectors exist, there is a clear 
potential saving for consumers domestically as well as cross-border. Currently, in aggregate 
terms, potential savings for European cons umers are estimated roughly around €20 billion, 
which correspond to 0.17% of EU GDP  while for the latter thes e savings are estimated around 
€2.5 billion, which corresponds ap proximately to 0.02% of EU27 GDP . A total of 0.19% of 
EU GDP  may be therefore saved and used for other activities.  
 
EN 85   EN ANNEX III:  FEEDBACK STATEMENT OF ADR  PUBLIC CONSULTATION154 
I. O VERVIEW OF THE RESPONSES RECEIVED  
The public consultation on the use of Alternat ive Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a means to 
resolve disputes related to commercial transact ions and practices in the EU was launched on 
18 January 2011 and officially ended on 15 March 2011. It aimed at gathering information on 
the use of ADR as a means to resolve disputes with traders, at seeking Member States and 
stakeholders' views on the difficulties identified  and at looking into possible ways in which 
the use of ADR within the European Union (EU) could be improved. 
The Commission received a total of 220 responses  at end of March 2011155. Contributions 
will be published online in accordance with the Commission practice and applicable rules at 
the following web-page: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm#consultation . 
Category Detailed description of respondent Total 
Member States 20 
Public / Local Authorities 8 
Regulators  4  
 
Member States / Public 
Authorities 
 Third countries 1  
 
33 
EU Organizations 2  
Consumer Associations 
 National level organizations 30  
32 
EU  17  
European Consumer 
Centres (ECC) EFTA 1  
18 
EU trade organizations 29 
National trade organizations 50  
 
Business 
 Individual companies  15  
 
94 
Public 8  
ADR Schemes 
 Private  15  
23 
                                                 
154 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/Feedback_Statement_Final.pdf   
155 Replies received after 31 March 2011 could not be ta ken into consideration in this feedback statement. 
 
EN 86   EN Academics 4  
Experts 
 Legal practitioners 10  
14 
Citizens Citizens 6 6 
TOTAL   220 
 
The breakdown of contributions by ca tegory of respondents is as follows: 
Replies by category
 Member
 States/ Publi c
Authorities
 Consumer
Associations
ECC
BusinessADR SchemesExperts Other
 
The analysis of the origin of re plies shows a large and fairly representative participation of all 
Member States and stakeholders from the whole EU. Moreover, almost one out of four replies 
was received from EU level organisations. Finall y, also non-EU stakeholders took part in the 
consultation. 
 
EN 87   EN II. S UMMARY OF THE MAIN TRENDS  
• Respondents from all categories showed a strong support for ADR schemes as an 
efficient alternative to in-court proceedings  for consumer disputes. They underlined 
the importance of developing consumer AD R schemes to benefit both consumers and 
businesses and, overall, to improve the well- functioning of the internal market. Many 
respondents supported the improvement of online dispute resolution schemes for e-
commerce transactions. Most Member States  and stakeholders welcomed EU level 
action to enhance the functioning of cons umer ADR schemes. A future EU action 
should take account of existing national sche mes. It should strengthen coordination 
throughout Europe. 
• Contributions generally stressed that flexibility is an essential element of ADR 
schemes. All respondents agreed that efficiency, speed and low costs of ADR 
schemes are the main incentives for cons umers and businesses to use ADR and to 
comply with its outcomes. 
• The voluntary nature of ADR for busine ss and consumers should be preserved 
according to many Member States and bus iness representatives. Respondents from 
consumers expressed a more favourable  opinion for mandatory ADR, but only for 
traders and especially in highly regulated sectors. 
• Concerning the nature of ADR outcomes many respondents, including some Member 
States and ADR schemes, recalled that it  may depend on the conditions of a specific 
market (e.g. highly regulated sectors). Fo r several consumer representatives ADR 
outcomes should be binding for the trader. Mo st business respondents stressed that the 
parties should agree in advance whethe r or not ADR outcomes should be binding. 
• A fundamental condition to improve the use of consumer ADR schemes is to raise 
awareness of consumers and business. All i nvolved parties should pl ay their role, in 
particular public authorities an d sector regulators. Existing EU  networks (ECC-NET 
and FIN-NET) should continue to facilita te consumers' access to ADR and provide 
guidance on the use of ADR schemes, in particular for cross-border disputes. 
• Most respondents underlined that perf orming ADR schemes should be guided by a 
number of common principles, such as independence, impartiality, transparency and 
effectiveness. For consumer associations the principles of c onsumer ADR should be 
included in a binding instrument. Most rep lies indicated the importance of monitoring 
the functioning of ADR schemes in order to enhance their effectiveness and the use. 
• Most Member States and stakeholders focused mainly on ADR to resolve individual 
consumer complaints. A majority of busin esses are not in favour of ADR dealing 
simultaneously with both consumer and SME co mplaints. They stressed that disputes 
of SMEs require a different treatment, whic h justifies excluding them from consumer 
ADR schemes. Some Member States seem also to favour a separate approach for 
consumer and SMEs complaints. 
• Respondents generally emphasised the importa nce of different sources to fund ADR 
schemes. All agreed that ADR should be low cost or free of charge for the consumer. 
 
EN 88   EN III. Specific replies to the questions 
3.1 Consumer and business awareness of ADR 
In most replies the lack of consumer awarene ss was recognised as a major obstacle to the use 
of ADR schemes. The most efficient ways to promote ADR schemes  among consumers 
mentioned by respondents were: advertising campaigns explaining the main features of ADR 
schemes and the advantages of using them, in cluding examples of best practices and success 
stories; user-friendly, widespread and high quality information provided via different 
channels (websites, various media, brochures , leaflets, etc). Nation al initiatives should 
address consumers in the same country as well as from other Member States. Several replies 
suggested organising pan- European initiatives. 
In general, respondents asserted that the Eu ropean Consumer Centers Network (ECC-NET), 
national authorities and relevant NGOs  have an important role to play to raise consumer and 
business awareness of ADR. Legal practitioners  and businesses stressed that fundamental 
information on the existence and functioning of ADR schemes should be publicised where 
potential users are most likely to look at, na mely public bodies, sector regulators and ECC-
NET. Public authorities, in particular, c ould support national information and education 
campaigns. Many replies from all categories underlined the importance of improving and 
strengthening ECC-NET in its role to inform  and guide consumers to the relevant ADR 
scheme across the EU. 
A majority of respondents, including business representatives, underlined that businesses 
should contribute to spread  information about ADR schemes.  However, businesses pointed 
out that it should not be an obligation. Many business representatives warned on the possible 
costs required by this approach, in particular  for small companies. In the view of other 
respondents traders should be obliged to disclose  to consumers if they are part of an ADR 
scheme through their general conditions, advertis ing, customer relations services and their 
Internet sites. Moreover, targeted information should reach consumers when they need it (e.g. 
at the conclusion of the trader's inte rnal complaint handling procedure).  
It was also largely recognised that inform ation should also be made available by ADR 
schemes in a clear and prominent way . ADR bodies should explain their main features. For 
several respondents, this would include statistics on cases and compliance rates. Information 
should be accessible preferably via the Internet or through inte rmediary actors, such as ECC-
NET, public authorities, consumer  associations or also social services providers. In general, 
ADR bodies should also provide training and or ganise seminars and conferences on their 
activities. Some consumer organisations sugg ested using a common logo, recognisable at EU 
level, to indicate membership by traders to ADR schemes. 
3.2 Involvement of traders and suppliers  
Most business representatives stressed that ADR schemes should be based on the consent of 
the parties . A few businesses, however, indicated th at adherence by traders already is, or 
could be made, mandatory in some sensitive sectors (e.g. for financial services) but under 
specific conditions. 
Consumer representatives generally favoured mandatory adherence only by traders to ADR 
schemes, especially in highly regulated sectors,  in order to counterbala nce consumers' weaker 
 
EN 89   EN position. Some consumer representatives, howev er, recalled the volu ntary nature of the 
participation to the ADR procedure for both cons umers and traders, and supported at the same 
time the binding character of ADR outcomes. 
Many Member States underlined the voluntary nature of ADR schemes. A few of them could 
accept mandatory adherence, at least in some  specific market situations. ADR schemes 
underlined the importance of mandatory adhere nce from business and consumers to ADR in 
specific sectors, such as transport, financia l services, telecommunica tions and utilities. 
According to a large majority of respondents, imposing ADR as mandator y step before court 
may impinge on individual consum er's right to go to court . A few respondents considered that 
parties in judicial proceedings could be encour aged to use ADR for specific cases, notably for 
low-value complaints. 
A majority of business respondents considered that the parties should decide on whether or 
not ADR outcomes should be binding . Many consumer representa tives favoured the binding 
nature of ADR outcomes only for the trader. 
A few Member States would support binding out come of ADR schemes, at least in some 
specific sectors (e.g. public services and utilities)  identified by the legislators. One Member 
State suggested, as an interm ediate approach, that ADR out comes could become binding and 
legally enforceable if the traders do not cont est them within a certain period of time. 
Some ADR schemes referred to the choice of the parties to comply accompanied by the 
requirement for traders of presenting regular reports on ADR compliance. Others were in 
favour of binding decisions, in particular for mandatory ADR schemes. 
Experts and legal practitioners were equally divi ded on this issue. Some recalled the voluntary 
nature of the ADR procedure, including the choice of complying with  its outcome. Others 
stressed the contractual nature  of the ADR outcome, which is thus binding on both parties.  
Most respondents underlined that enhanced awar eness and strengthened trust in the quality 
and transparency of ADR schemes would pers uade consumers and businesses to use ADR 
and comply with their outcome . Efficiency, speed and low costs were mentioned among the 
main incentives for both consumers and trad ers to use an ADR scheme. Most replies 
suggested as concrete actions for ADR schemes to gain trust and esta blish a reputation of 
being objective and competent: i) providing clear, transparent and concise information on the 
main features of the procedure, including sta tistics on past cases and rate of compliance (a 
few Member States pointed out the importan ce of making this information accessible across 
borders); ii) highlighting that ADR is a simple, cheap, fast and accessible means to solve 
disputes; iii) publicising ADR outcomes; iv) ensuring independence and confidentiality of the 
procedure; v) creating central contact points to guide consumers to the appropriate ADR.  
Some consumer representatives advocated for more robust incentives (e.g. freeze of limitation 
period, list of businesses not complying with ADR outcomes, penalties/fee if a low value case 
before the court has not been treated previously by ADR). 
3.3 ADR coverage 
Respondents generally agreed that cons umer ADR coverage should be improved . This would 
stem mainly from the broader recogn ition of ADR's inherent benefits.  
 
EN 90   EN Stakeholders from all categories underlined th e importance of some already established ADR 
in highly regulated sectors (e .g. energy, electronic communications  and financial services). 
However, some Member States as well as c onsumer and business repr esentatives highlighted 
the need for new ADR schemes  in specific sectors to deal  with low value disputes. 
Some contributions suggested creating a Eur opean portal on the cross-border use of ADR. 
Some consumer representatives pleaded for an improved offer of ADR services through a 
general ADR scheme (or, alternatively, one ADR  for each major market sector and a general 
ADR scheme covering those businesses that do not belong to any specific sector). Some 
contributions raised the need to clarify te rminology relating to ADR. It was suggested in 
particular, avoiding unclear definitions, such as “ customer complaint handling mechanisms ” 
or “direct negotiation between parties in order to achieve amicable settlement ”. 
Regarding the feasibility of ADR schemes open for consumer and SME disputes, most 
respondents (including businesse s) argued that business-to- business disputes can cover 
different matters and thus require appropriate pro cedures and legal expertis e. In their view, it 
would prove difficult for ADR schemes to fu lfil the necessary requirements to deal 
simultaneously with both consumer and SME complaints . 
Many contributions supported the improvement of online dispute resolution schemes (ODR) 
for e-commerce transactions . This type of online scheme should apply to cross-border e-
commerce, where there is an increasing number of  complaints especially for low-value cases.  
Some business representatives a nd legal practitioners supported the use of ODR for all cross-
border transactions. Some respondents from these categories argued, howeve r, that relying on 
a specific and centralised scheme for online trad e would raise some difficulties in the sectors 
(e.g. telecommunications, energy and financial services) wh ere high level of competence and 
expertise is required. Moreover, the operation of a centralised system would entail a specific 
approach to language requirements and to di fferent legal framewor ks. A sector-specific 
scheme was considered as being closer  and more suitable to the parties.  
Many consumer representatives indicated that ODR is the most suitable way to deal with 
cross-border disputes. Most consumers  welcomed the possibility of a centralised access to an 
ODR scheme for disputes linked to cross-border  e-commerce transactions. Nonetheless, they 
underlined the need to t ackle the language issue and the need  to provide adequate information 
to the parties on the pr ocess and its outcome. 
ADR bodies acknowledged the importance of im proving means of redr ess in the online 
environment to increase consumer and business confidence. They drew attention to the need 
to build on positive experiences that exist in specific sectors (e.g. financial services). This latter aspect was also underlined by some respondents from other categories. 
A majority of respondents believed that a single  entry point or umbrella organisations could 
be very useful to provide consumers with information on and guidanc e to the appropriate 
ADR scheme at both EU and national level . They can indeed complement the work of EU 
networks and relevant public authorities.  
Some Member States stressed  the important role of a si ngle entry point or umbrella 
organisations to extend ADR coverage to sector s where ADR schemes do not yet exist. Some 
business representatives considered that the a dded value of a single entry point dealing with 
 
EN 91   EN dispute resolution should be carefully assessed given the possible lack of specific competence 
on each specific sector. Moreover, it was recalle d that a single entry point or umbrella 
organisations would not be needed where gene ral cross-sector ADR schemes already exist. 
Other businesses, however, seems to be favourable  to a single entry point, in particular for 
cross-border disputes. 
Most replies referred to the complexity of using ADR for collective claims  compared to 
individual consumer disputes. 
Some respondents from businesses, legal prac titioners and ADR sche mes could accept ADR 
addressing mass claims, but this scheme shoul d respect clearly identified conditions to 
guarantee effectiveness of the procedure. A few contributions emphasised the need to have an 
"opt-in" and confidential procedure. Accord ing to another contri bution, outcomes of ADR 
procedures related to mass claims should be published. Some other bus iness representatives 
considered that using ADR for collective claims  contradicts the quick, simple and low-cost 
nature of ADR schemes. 
Member States and consumer representatives explained that often ADR schemes identify a 
test case to resolve a particular issue and apply the same outcome to identical claims.  
Contributions generally recognise d the added value of EU action in order to boost consumers' 
trust with regard to the reso lution of cross-border disputes . Most respondents stressed the 
need to enhance consumers' awareness (e.g. vi a a European portal informing on ADR in other 
Member States). 
A majority underlined the importa nt role played by EU networks  to raise consumer awareness 
as well as to guide consumers to ADR scheme s in other Member States (ECC-NET and FIN-
NET). According to some businesses the FIN- NET network provides a useful example for 
other sectors. 
Most consumer representatives and some  business representa tives supported the 
establishment of a centralised system aime d at strengthening coordination of national 
frameworks. A few respondents suggested crea ting a European Consumer Ombudsman to 
deal with cross-border complaints. 
3.4 Funding 
Most respondents were of the opinion that th e best way to fund AD R schemes is a mixed 
system , where funds are provided by the national authorities and the business sector.  
A majority of businesses acknowledged their ro le in ADR funding. However, many of them 
also recognised that an efficient scheme s hould not be solely funded by the traders.  
Consumer associations stressed  more clearly that public fundi ng is a more efficient way. In 
their view, it better respects the independence of the ADR scheme. 
Most replies, however, pointed to the need fo r a pragmatic approach. Because of the high 
diversity of ADR schemes in the European Unio n a "one-size-fits-all" solution can hardly be 
considered a realistic option. Many respondent s from all categorie s mentioned various 
possibilities, often drawn from current experiences in the Member States: using funds raised 
by the regulatory authorities for their control ac tivity in the relevant sector, a case-handling 
 
EN 92   EN levy or case fees from the traders covered by the scheme, contribution to running costs 
required from the two parties, applying the "loser pays" fee-shifting approach. 
Independence and impartiality are unanimously  considered the fundamental principles  that 
ADR schemes should respect. Efficiency, tran sparency and interrup tion of prescription 
periods  are considered equally important. 
Independence  of ADR schemes depends on the fulfilment of fundamental principles more 
than on the (total or partial) funding by one of the pa rties. For a large nu mber of respondents 
from all categories, the best ways to achieve independence and impartiality include: appointment of a collegial body where parties are equally represented; strict and transparent 
rules and procedures; fixed and separate annua l budget to be provided beforehand to the ADR 
scheme; remunerations of experts acting within the ADR scheme to be defined in advance and 
not according to results so as to guarant ee an effective and impartial evaluation. 
In some respondents' view (especially busine sses) the current Commission Recommendations 
on ADR provide sufficient elements to define impartiality and indepe ndence of ADR schemes 
which are funded by business. 
For consumer associations the principles of consumer ADR s hould be included in a binding 
instrument. Some consumer representatives me ntioned also the interru ption of prescription 
periods among common principles to be set for ADR. 
Additionally, many contributions pointed out the importance of monitoring ADR schemes
 to 
ensure that they are well adapted to the s ituation in the relevant sectors and operate 
efficiently. For consumer organisations in pa rticular, ADR schemes should be subject to 
regular and effective assessment of complia nce with the common principles underpinning 
ADR as they are defined at EU level. 
ADR schemes should be basically free of char ge or low cost for the consumer/claimant . 
According to some respondents from consumers and businesses an initial administrative fee 
on the consumer would be justified where linked to a required technical expertise or to the 
high value of the dispute in some specific s ectors. This could then  be refunded to the 
consumer if the ADR outcome is in his favor. 
 
EN 93   EN ANNEX IV: SUMMARY REPORT OF THE SUMMIT ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
FOR CONSUMERS IN THE INTERNAL MARKET156 
On 16 March 2011 the European Commissi on, DG SANCO, and the IMCO Committee 
organised a Summit on Alternativ e Dispute Resolution (ADR).  
Key-speakers included Commissioner John Dalli,  Minister Zoltan Cséfalvay from the 
Hungarian Presidency, MEPs from the IMCO and JURI Committee, and consumer and business representatives.  
Commissioner Dalli underlined that the development of ADR - as a cost-effective, flexible 
and successful means for consumer redress - is a key priority in the Single Market Act. He 
announced the publication of a le gislative proposal by end 2011.  
Minister Cséfalvay stressed the importance of ADR as a complement to litigation. The EU 
should accommodate the Member States in deve loping such schemes in partnership with 
business associations.  
Members expressed their full support for the de velopment of ADR, also to enhance consumer 
confidence when shopping cross border. While they  agreed that there is  no one-size-fits-all 
approach, they warned for too many different schemes which may confuse the consumer and 
deliver mixed results. Many speakers stressed  the lack of awareness of existing ADR 
schemes, both on the consumer and the business side.  
Examples given from Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark showed that companies not only 
take part in ADR schemes to boost their image, but also use the data on solved complaints to 
improve their products, services and - as a re sult - consumer satisfaction. However speakers 
also stressed that businesses do not always engage in ADR proceedings and that some 
consumer complaints cannot be dealt with due to the lack of ADR schemes. The Commission 
was urged to come forward with a proposal to provide clarity on the conditions in order to 
ensure high quality ADR schemes in all consumer  markets, and particularly for e-commerce. 
The IMCO Chair Malcolm Harbour  chaired the event, which was well visited with around 
200 participants from 26 Member States, Norway and the USA.  
I. Keynote speeches
 
John Dalli,  the Commissioner for Health and Consumers, stressed that consumers should 
be able to resolve their disputes with a trad er out-of-court in a lo w-cost way. This would 
boost the confidence of consumers and foster de mand for goods and services both off and on-
line. Currently the losses incurred by Europ ean consumers due to problems with purchased 
goods or services are estimated at 0.4% of Eu rope’s GDP. 46% of Consumers do not act when 
something goes wrong.  
There is a clear progress in developing ADR schemes - already more than 700 EU-wide - but 
they have not yet reached their full potenti al. The Public Consultation, which ended on 15 
                                                 
156 A full report of the Summit is available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/e vents.do?language=EN&body=IMCO&product=EOT   
 
EN 94   EN March 2011, identified three main shortcomings that hinder the effectiv eness of ADR in the 
EU: 
• Important gaps, both sector-specific and geogr aphical, persist in most Member States. 
Moreover, only 62% of the consumer ADR schemes deal with claims from consumers 
residing in another Member State, whic h is too little cons idering the growing 
importance of e-commerce. 
• There is very little awarene ss from citizens, and access to ADR is not always easy for 
consumers as there are many different sche mes. Also a recent Eurobarometer survey 
showed that 40% of retail ers were unaware of ADR.  
• Traders are reluctant to sign up for ADR . At present, 64% of ADR schemes are 
voluntary and only 6% of European trad ers are members of such a scheme. 
The Commissioner announced the presentation of a legislative proposal on ADR by end 2011. 
Zoltan Cséfalvay, Junior Minister for Strate gic Affairs at the Mi nistry for National 
Economy,  also highlighted the impressive growth of ADR systems within the EU. He would 
welcome a more cooperative view on ADR in pa rticular to fill the e-commerce gap. This 
would prevent the long, time and resource consumi ng procedures held at the national courts. 
However, he also pointed at autonomy as a key concept for ADR. The EU should therefore 
not regulate, but create a common framework th at would include assistance to existing ADR 
systems by setting common standards and the creati on of a Code of best practices to ensure 
quality and consistency. ADR should be presen ted as beneficial for both consumer and 
business, and more funds should be dedicated to it. He also noted  that the Hungarian 
presidency is committed to raise awareness among traders and consumers.  
Paola Testori Coggi, DG SANCO,  underlined the important issues  that need to be addressed 
in order to increase the confiden ce of Consumers, such as rais ing the awareness of consumers 
(and traders) on ADR, promoting ADR as an alternative step before going to court, and the 
issue of financing ADR systems. 
II. ADR at the service of the Internal Market and Consumers  
Andreas Schwab, MEP (IMCO, EPP, DE) emphasised that  markets are about trust, 
especially in the field of e-commerce. A pr oposal for ADR discussion should focus on its 
main features: non-bureaucratic, flexible, avoidi ng accusative litigation and ability to work in 
cross-border situations. ADR should be low-cost  and quick. A "one size fits all" approach 
should be avoided, however ADR should always be  impartial and the interest of consumers 
should be put first. 
Monique Goyens, Director General of BEUC stressed the need to better understand why 
ADR has not reached its full potential. ADR is  seen as a prominent tool for consumer 
organisations. Consumers are often confused because of the number of different ADR 
schemes. "Médiateurs" provided by customer serv ices of companies also contribute to this 
confusion. It would thus be useful to have  a template for ADR schemes. ADR should be 
promoted as an alternative to court proceedi ngs offering win-win situation for consumers and 
traders. Traders currently do not use ADR and ha ve no real incentives to do so. In general she 
noticed a lack of complianc e by businesses: only few ADR decisions are binding. Its 
 
EN 95   EN effectiveness depends on a company's goodwill, as there is no enforcement mechanism. Ms 
Goyens emphasised that ADR should be an al ternative, and not a replacement of access to 
courts. Therefore, improvement of courts mech anisms also has to be ensured. Furthermore, 
ADR should be articulated in relation to collective redress mechanisms. 
Louis Grech, MEP  (S&D, MT, IMCO) regretted the lo w knowledge that citizens have of 
ADR systems. Mr Grech's report A Single market for consumers and citizens  calls for the EC 
to provide with better mechanisms to review the exercise of consumer rights and the problems they face in cross-border situation. An ideal  ADR system should provide citizens with 
security and confidence, and surpass all the cu rrent cross-border difficulties. Together with 
the proposed ADR package (end 2011), there shoul d be a proposal for an EU-wide collective 
redress system.  
Francis Frizon, mediator and member of FIN-NET, explained that  FIN-NET groups 
several different ADR systems. The main idea was to avoid court proc eedings in financial 
controversies. In mr Frizon's view, the EU  should not harmonize ADR systems, but only 
foster their coordination respecting their flex ibility and voluntary ch aracter. Following these 
principles, 50 members of 22 countries have already joined FIN-NET. The main principles 
that should guide the EC's activities in this fi eld are quality, respect to  the consumer's trust, 
transparency, respect for the legal framewor k, promotion of equity in arrangements and 
conflict resolutions, respect for confidentiality  of the procedure and no (or low) costs.  
Diana Wallis, MEP (JURI, ALDE, UK) highlighted the fact  that she already drafted a report 
on ADR back in 2001. However she welcomed the (renewed) efforts and pointed at the main 
issues to be tackled: i) Awareness- raising:  the EU should offer a coherent roadmap or 
signposting on ADR. Furthermore ADR has to be  properly funded, ii) Businesses should be 
encouraged to participate by pointing at ADR as "good busine ss conduct", iii) The EC should 
acknowledge that proper access to redress in th e internal market requires both ADR and a 
good system of collective redress,  as both are complementary.  
Tiziana Pompei, UnionCamere, Vice-president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce 
presented the state of play in Italy. Mediation/ADR is compulso ry in certain areas such as 
house renting and insurance.  In all, results are sa tisfactory as 50% of queri es are solved within 
2 months, and there is an increased use of vol untary ADR. In her view, ADR should be fast as 
this is a very good incentive for companies to co mply as they otherwise will have great legal 
costs due to lengthy court procedures. Confid entiality and informality during the procedure 
should be ensured.  
Questions and comments were made as regards:  - the use of languages in case of cross-border disputes. - the funding of ADR schemes and, related, the fees for consumers - the idea to introduce ADR as a quality label - the need to make the applicati on of ADR compulsory or voluntary 
- the confidentiality or transparency of the procedure and the decisions - the quality of the decisions a nd whether they should be binding 
 
EN 96   EN - the setting of a benchmark to meas ure the effectiveness of ADR schemes 
- the principle of impartiality of ADR schemes. 
III. Which way forward for the development of ADR in the EU  
Sandra Kalniete, MEP  (IMCO, EPP, LV), Rapporteur for the IMCO report on Governance 
and Partnership in the Single Market , indicated that ADR is one  of the top 5 priorities 
regarding Single Market Governance. Business es should be required to make reasonable 
efforts to inform their consumers when they ar e/are not part of an ADR  scheme. Online tools, 
such as a EU online database, could help the consumer to find the right ADR mechanism. She 
mentioned that a better European Framework for ADR should also be available for small 
enterprises. SMEs often find themselves in th e same position vis-à-vis large suppliers of 
goods or services as individual consumers do. Th e EC should draft a legislative proposal and 
promote its quick adoption.  
Loic Armand, MEDEF, mentioned that mediation is very successful in France. In 2009 a 
practical guide was published by MEDEF and an in ternet portal on mediation procedures was 
launched in October 2010. He underlined that the best way to convince consumers is to 
publicize the benefits of AD R, charging no fee for using ADR schemes and ensuring 
confidentiality for the companies. ADR s hould also be voluntary for companies and 
consumers, and once initiated it should be possibl e to withdraw from it at  any time. Finally he 
stressed that in France businesses are committed to make ADR work. 
Raffaelle Baldassarre, MEP  (Vice-Chair JURI, EPP, IT) stre ssed that, since ADR offers an 
alternative to court proceedings, mediators and re ferees should be carefully chosen, educated 
and monitored. Consumer associations are key pl ayers in raising awareness, especially ECC-
Net, which should have an ADR database. Re garding e-commerce, quick, cheap and online 
"e-DR" could play a key role in enhancing consumer trust. 
Collective redress is the third pillar in guarant eeing a high protection of consumer rights, even 
though it is not yet a reality in  the EU. Amicable conflict resolution should always be 
prioritized via agreements between consumer  associations and companies, especially 
regarding similar or mass cases.  
Peter Fogh Knudsen, Director of the Da nish European Consumer Centre (ECC), said 
that in 2010, ECC-Net received 32000 cross-border cases, 60% of which had to do with e-commerce. 14000 of them were solved thanks to  the cooperation between the ECC centres in 
the country of the consumer and in that of th e traders. 21% of the problems had to do with 
delivery of products, what a ffects consumer trust.  
Nonetheless, ECC centres have no enforcemen t powers, and many problems remain unsolved 
due to lack of commitment from traders. Th e EU should close these gaps; in cross-border 
cases, only 5% of complaints received can be transferred to operative ADR schemes in other 
Member States. As a result consumers get thus frustrated and e-commerce gets bad 
reputation. Similarly, the particip ation to ADR by the traders wh en it comes to cross-boarder 
issues should be compulsory; if the EU rea lly wants to make a difference for consumers, 
voluntary ADR is not an option, according to Mr. Fogh Knudsen. 
Jürgen Creutzmann,  MEP  (IMCO, ALDE, DE), explained that the IMCO Committee has 
commissioned a study on cross-bo arder ADR systems. He propos ed to add a reference to 
 
EN 97   EN ADR schemes in all contracts, both e-contract s and paper ones. Consumers have to know in 
advance where and how to act when they need redress Also the consumers should be able to proceed in his/her own language and should bear no costs for ADR. 
Peter Moerkens,  De Geschillencommissie,  provided a presentation on the organisation of 
ADR in the Netherlands. An umbrella organisa tion has been set up ov erlooking 50 sectoral 
ADR schemes in 3 pillars: cons umer protection, businesses, publ ic authorities.  The schemes 
are self-regulatory and voluntary, but if the consumer chooses ADR  instead of a court, this 
decision is compulsory for the company in question. Everything is internet-based; after 
having submitted the complaint the consumer is able to follow of their case on the internet. 
On average the time for finding a solution is 4 months.  
As regards funding, the government funds the general infrastructure, companies pay the 
procedural costs (so fewer complaints mean minor costs) and consumers pay €25 to €125. If 
the outcome is favourable to the consumer, the fees paid are reimbursed. 
Mr Jorge Pegado Liz, Head of the Consumer Committee of the Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC),  reminded the audience of the communications of the European 
Commission (98/1998 and 91/2001), the Green paper from April 2002, the recommendations 
of the Council and several EJC and ECHR. EU  action is needed, but subsidiarity and 
proportionality are essential principles that mu st be applied. However common parameters for 
all the EU Member States should be set as rega rds: independence, impartiality, transparency, 
efficacy, legality, etcera. At the same time, Memb er States should allocate more resources to 
ADR systems and companies will have to be more involved. 
Questions and comments were made as regards: 
• the important role courts can play a in raising awareness  
• the need of lawyers informing their cl ients of ADR before filing a lawsuit. 
• the costs of ADR and the quality of ADR outcomes 
• the resources required and the explor ation of public/ pr ivate ADR funding  
• the possibility of co-funding ADR schemes by insurers  
• the online dimension of ADR 
• the publication of annual reports on ADR schemes with yearly evaluations  
IV. Closing remarks 
Malcolm Harbour, MEP  (IMCO, ECR, UK) 
The IMCO Chair concluded the Summit by saying that the EU should wo rk on the impressive 
expertise on ADR already available. Any EU initiative should not inte rfere with what is 
already working. The EU should also concentr ate on cross-border controversies and offer 
accessible information, so consumers will know whic h direction to follow when a dispute had 
arisen.  
 
EN 98   EN Business should be encouraged to  participate in good ADR practices , as they created satisfied 
loyal consumers. Confidentiality should be ke pt, but the outcome of the cases should be 
transparent and later used for feedback  and improvement of goods and services. 
 
EN 99   EN ANNEX V: OVERVIEW OF EU LEGISLATION CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON ADR 
DG SECTOR  COMMENTS  
SANCO  Financial 
services • Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers Article 10(2) ; Article 24 
• Directive 2002/65/EC on distance mark eting of financial services: Recita l 28, Article 3(4) (a) and Article 
14 
Financial 
services • Regulation 924/2009/EC on cross border payments: Recital 3, 15, 16 and Articles 10(2), 11 and 12  
• Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prude ntial supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions, Recital 19 and Article 13  
• Directive 2007/64/EC on payment se rvices: Recitals 51 and 52, Articles 42(7) (b), 80 (2) and 83 in 
chapter 5 on out-of-court compla int and redress procedures.  
• Directive 97/5/EC on cross-border credit tran sfers: Recitals 8 and 14 and Article 10 
• Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in fi nancial instruments (MiFID): Reci tal 61, Articles 53 and 58(3) (f)  
• Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, re gulations and administrativ e provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in tran sferable securities (UCITS), Article 100 
• Communication (2009) 204 final concerning packaged re tail investment products  does not contain any 
element on out-of-court procedures, but the FIN-net ne twork is responsible for handling disputes between 
consumers and the financial services  concerned by the Communication.  
Insurance  • Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediati on : Recital 23 and Ar ticles 11, 12(1) (e) MARKT 
Postal services • Directive 2008/6/EC with regard to the full accomplis hment of the Internal Market of Community postal 
 
EN 100   EN services: Recital 42 and Article 19  
Ecommerce • Directive 2000/31/EC on certa in legal aspects of information societ y services, in par ticular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce): Recita ls 51 and 52, and Articles 
1(2) and 17 
Services • Directive 2006/123/EC on services  in the Internal Market: Ar ticles 21, 22(3)e) and 27(4).  
Air Passenger 
rights • Regulation 261/2004/EC establishing co mmon rules on compensation and assi stance to passengers in the 
event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long de lay of flights: Recital 22 and Article 16 refer to a 
national enforcement body which may be an ADR scheme in some countries.  
• Regulation 1107/2006/EC concerning the rights of disabl ed persons and persons with reduced mobility 
when traveling by air, Articles 14 and 15 refer to national enforcement bodies.  
• Communication (2005) 046 streng thening passenger rights within the European Union: Recitals 23 and 40 
Maritime 
Passengers rights • Regulation 1177/2010/EC concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland 
waterway, Recitals 22, 23, 25, Article 25 re fers to National Enforcement Bodies. 
Rail Passengers 
rights • Regulation 1371/2007/EC on rail passengers ’ rights and obligations provides  only for internal complaint 
handling systems by rail companie s, Recital 18 and Article 27 MOVE 
Road 
Passengers 
rights • Communication (2008) 817 final on the ri ghts of passengers in bus and coac h transport, Articles 26, 27(1) 
and 27(3)  
ENER Energy • Directive 2009/72/EC concerning comm on rules for the internal market  in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC: Recitals 42, 54, Articles 3(7), 3(9)c), 3(12), 3(13) and Annex I 1. (a) and (f) 
• Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
 
EN 101   EN Directive 2003/55/EC: Recita l 51, Articles 3(3), 3(9) and Annex I 1. (a) and (f) 
JUST Legal aid • Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum 
common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes: Recitals 11 and 21 as well as Articles 3(2) and 10 
 Transport- 
Passenger rights • Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in  respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-
term holiday product, resale and exchange  contracts: Recital 21 and Article 14 
Telecom 
Package  • Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framew ork for electronic comm unications networks and 
services (Framework Directive): Recita ls 32, 33 and Articles 8(4) (b), 20 and 21 
• Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relatin g to electronic communications 
networks and services (Universal  Service Directive): Recitals 30, 47, 49, Articles 20(1), 20(2)(g) and 34 
and Annex II Nr. 3 
• Directive 2009/140/EC amending Dir ective 2002/21/EC et alia: Recita ls 13 and 50, Articles 1(3) (b) 
inserting a paragraph 3a in Article 3 of Direc tive 2002/21/EC, Articles 1(22) and 1(23) amending 
respectively Articles 20(1) a nd 21 of Directive 2002/21/EC 
• Directive 2009/136/EC amending Direc tive 2002/22/EC et alia: Article 1( 14) g) modifying Article 20.1 g) 
and Article 1(24) modifying Article 34(1), Annex II Nr. 3 
• Regulation 1211/2009/EC establishing the Body of Eur opean Regulators for El ectronic Communications 
and the Office, Article 3(1)g INFSO 
Telephony  • Regulation 717/2007/EC on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and 
amending Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 8(2) 
• Directive 98/10/EC on the application of open network provision  (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal 
service for telecommunications in a competitive environment: Article 26  
 
EN 102   EN ANNEX VI: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ADR  COVERAGE , INFORMATION AND QUALITY  
This Annex forms the basis for paragraph 7.1 of  the IA. It analyses separately the three 
problem areas in relation to ADR: i) ADR coverage, ii) information on ADR and iii) quality of ADR. Based on this preliminary analysis, th ese three areas are merged in paragraph 7.1 and 
assessed together. 
The "no EU action" policy option (baseline scenario) is  not taken into acc ount in this Annex, 
as the analysis below aims at examining the co ntent of the different options. It is, however, 
assessed in detail in paragraph7.1.  
1. ADR coverage 
The options below focus on gaps in the covera ge of ADR schemes, which resolve disputes 
between consumers and traders linked to the sale of goods and provi sion of services.  
Option 1 Encourage interested parties to set up ADR schemes in the sectors where they do 
not exist. 
Option 2 Ensure that ADR schemes will be set up by including ADR clauses in sector-
specific legislation. 
Option 3 Oblige Member States to make ADR scheme s available where they do not exist.  
Option 4 Create an EU Ombudsman to deal with consumer complaints. 
Policy Option 1 
Under the first option the Commission will en courage interested parties (e.g. businesses, 
consumer organisations, public authorities) to set up ADR schemes in specific sectors. 
Policy Option 2 
The second option is based on a sectoral approach. The Commission will include ADR 
clauses in sector-specific legisl ation. These ADR clauses will re quire Member States to make 
ADR schemes available in the sectors where they do not exist.  
Policy Option 3 
Under option 3 Member States will have to make ADR schemes available to deal with 
consumer disputes in the sectors where no ADR  exists. Existing ADR schemes would remain.  
Policy Option 4 
Under Option 4 an Ombudsman at EU level will solve all disputes between consumers and 
traders in all sectors. An i ndependent EU body to receive and examine all consumer disputes 
as well as provide recommendations for resolving the dispute will be established.  
 
 
 
EN 103   EN  
1.1. Analysis of impact 
Assessment criteria  
Each policy option is assessed ag ainst a set of criteria relati ng to the specific problem area. 
They are explained in more detail below.  
Analysis of benefits 
• Coverage of all business sectors by ADR : this criterion assesses whether ADR 
schemes will exist for all sectors. 
• Impact on the number of domestic and cro ss border consumer disputes dealt with by 
ADR: this criterion assesses whether the num ber of consumer disputes with traders 
submitted to ADR will grow.  
• Time needed to achieve the objectives: th is criterion assesses how quickly the full 
coverage of ADR schemes can be achieved.  
Analysis of costs 
• Implementation costs: this criterion assesses the costs required to put in place the 
actions envisaged by each policy option, excl uding costs related to the provision of 
information.  
The options are rated according to their impact. The symbols used to rate them are explained 
as follows:  
• − − − : significantly negative effect 
• − −: negative effect 
• −: slightly negative effect 
• 0: no effect/no cost 
• +: slightly positive effect 
• + +: positive effect 
• + + + significantly positive effect 
Policy option 1 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly positive  Explanation of impact 
 
EN 104   EN Coverage of all 
business sectors 
by ADR  0/+  Some gaps in ADR coverage may be filled as a result of the 
encouragement. However, most likely this will be done in a fragmented 
manner and not all retail market sectors will be covered since this will be voluntary for interested parties. 
Impact on the 
number of 
domestic and cross- border 
consumer disputes 
dealt with by ADR 0/
+  The number of domestic and cross-border consumer disputes dealt with 
by ADR may slightly increase. If AD R schemes are set up as a result of 
the encouragement, consumers will be able to refer their dispute. However, the increase in the number of disputes dealt with by ADR will 
not be satisfactory as the ADR coverage is not expected to increase 
substantially.  
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives  + The objectives may be achieved partially in the long term. The time 
needed will vary significantly between the different retail market sectors 
and can be estimated to no less than 10 years. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs  0/− − Some implementation costs will occur, should interested parties decide 
to set up ADR schemes. These possible implementation costs will need 
to be divided in one-off costs (for the setting up) and recurrent (for the running of the scheme) and even these costs will differ depending on the 
size of the country and the numbe r of complaints received.  
Policy option 1 will have a limite d impact on consumers and only as  far as interested parties 
will decide to set up ADR schemes where they do not exist. As this will be done on a voluntary basis full coverage cannot be guarant eed. As a result consumers will still face 
difficulties in finding an ADR scheme competent to deal with their domestic and cross-border 
complaints some sectors will not be covered by ADR.  
Businesses will be affected if they decide to set up and fund ADR schemes. The costs for 
running an ADR scheme can vary  significantly between sectors and Member States and could 
be between €100.000 to more than €1mn annually (i n very few cases such as the "Financial 
Services Ombudsman" in the UK or the "Media teur des Communications Electroniques" in 
France). This can be done through a levy on busin esses or, most freque ntly, through a case 
fee; i.e. when a complaint is submitted to an ADR scheme against a business, the latter has to 
pay a certain amount to the ADR scheme. This  amount varies between ADR schemes (from 
less than €50 to more than €1000 in extreme cases). Current ly, about one third of ADR 
schemes is funded by the industry
157. On the other hand, the lack of ADR schemes will also 
negatively affect businesses that want to use ADR to solve a consumer dispute (about 70% of 
businesses would prefer to solv e disputes through ADR); for example about 15% wanted to 
use ADR but it was not available158. 
                                                 
157 Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolu tion in the European Union (ADR study), Civic 
Consulting, 2009p.35 
158 EB 278 p.73 
 
EN 105   EN Likewise, Member States will be affected in so  far they decide to set up ADR schemes. This 
will be particularly acute for those Member Stat es that have no or very few ADR schemes, as 
for example Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia. The costs will be similar to the ones described 
in the second paragraph above. 
Policy option 2 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Coverage of all 
business sectors by ADR  +/ + + Some gaps in ADR coverage will be covered in a fragmented manner. 
Depending on the adoption of sector-specific legislation a number of ADR schemes will be set up but in a patchy way. It is most likely that 
not all sectors will be covered. Cons umers will not be able to turn to 
ADR for all their disputes. 
Impact on the number of 
domestic and 
cross border 
consumer disputes 
dealt with by ADR +/+ +  An increase in the consumer disp utes can be expected but this will be 
limited.  Consumers will be able to find an ADR scheme in the sectors 
where legislation exists. The current implementation of EU legislation 
shows, however, that even when the legislation requires the creation of 
ADR schemes this does not always happen in practice. Therefore, the 
increase in the number of disputes  dealt with by ADR will not be 
satisfactory.  
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives  +/ + + The objectives will be achieved in the long run as not all sector specific 
legislation will be adopted and implemented at the same time. The time 
needed can be estimated to about 10 years. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs  − − Implementation costs will be incurred  for the sectors where an 
obligation to set up ADR schemes exists. Member States will have to 
make sure that all concerned business sectors are covered by ADR. This 
means that they will have to create new schemes or expand the existing ones to cover the sectors that do not  yet have an ADR. This will be 
particularly true for Member States that have no or few ADR schemes. 
These costs can be estimated between €100.000 and €1mn on an annual basis for each scheme.  
Policy option 2 may have a limited impact on consumers, as the current situation is not likely 
to  improve considerably. It will be easier fo r consumers to turn to an ADR scheme, where 
EU legislation requires the de velopment of ADR schemes. Howe ver, taking into account the 
implementation of current provisions of ADR the future projection is not very encouraging as 
Member States fall behind in creating ADR schemes even where th is is required by the 
relevant EU legislation. In addition sector-s pecific legislation will lead to a patchy 
 
EN 106   EN development at different timings between the diffe rent sectors. Therefore, consumers will still 
face difficulties in finding the ADR scheme competen t to deal with their complaint as gaps in 
some sectors will remain because  not all sectors will be covere d by legislation (particularly 
the "smaller" ones, such as cl othing or electric devices). 
Businesses will be affected by this option in those cases where they will have the 
responsibility of creating ADR. Should that be  the case, their contribution will be in the 
funding of the ADR scheme. This can be d one through a levy on businesses or, most 
frequently, through a case fee; i.e. when a compla int is submitted to an  ADR scheme against a 
business, the latter has to pay a certain amount  to the ADR scheme. This amount varies 
between ADR schemes (from less than €50 to mo re than €1000 in extreme cases). The costs 
for running an ADR scheme can vary significant ly between sectors and Member States and 
could be between €100.000 to more than €1mn annually. Currently, about  one third of ADR 
schemes is funded by the industry159.  
Similarly, Member States are likely to be aff ected if the creation of ADR schemes becomes 
mandatory. They will have to set up and/or finance the functioning of ADR schemes. The costs will be similar as to the ones described in the second paragraph above. 
Policy option 3 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Coverage of all 
business sectors 
by ADR  + + + All gaps in ADR coverage will be  filled. An ADR scheme will exist for 
problems that consumers may face in  all retail market sectors. Full 
coverage will be guaranteed and cons umers will be able to turn to ADR 
for all their disputes. As a result, a significant part of consumer loss will be reduced.  
Impact on the 
number of 
domestic and cross border 
consumer disputes 
dealt with by ADR + + + Domestic and cross border consum er disputes dealt with by ADR will 
increase significantly. Consumers will be able to submit all their 
disputes to ADR thus there will be a clear impact on the number of cases.  
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives  + + + The objectives will be achieved in a short period of time. The time 
needed will be minimised and is estimated to about 1 to 2 years. 
 
Costs 
                                                 
159 ADR study, p.35 
 
EN 107   EN Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs  − − Implementation costs will be incurred. Member States will have to make 
sure that all business sectors are co vered by ADR. This means that they 
will have to create new schemes or expand the existing ones to cover the 
sectors that do not yet have an ADR. This will be particularly true for 
Member States that have no or fe w ADR schemes, such as Bulgaria, 
Cyprus or Slovenia.  
The third policy option will have a significantly positive impact on consumers who will be 
able to turn to ADR for problem s with purchased goods and servic es irrespective of the sector 
of the economy. As a result, more consumer problems will be raised and solved, thus leading to a reduction in consumer losses.  
There will be a monetary impact on businesses,  should they be required to fund the setting up 
or running of ADR schemes. The costs will va ry depending on the sector  and the size of the 
Member State. Some ADR schemes functi on with an annual budget of about €100.000 while 
others need more than €1mn. But at the same time, the full ADR coverage will also allow businesses to solve disputes with consumers out  of court and save costs and time as well as 
maintain their reputation.  
Member States will also be affected in so fa r as they will need to set up and run the ADR 
schemes. The costs will be similar to the one s explained in the s econd paragraph above. 
Policy Option 4 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Coverage of all 
business sectors by ADR  + + + Coverage of all sectors will be guaranteed. The European Ombudsman 
will deal with all consumer disputes  from all Member States regarding 
all retail market sectors.  
Impact on the 
number of 
domestic and cross border 
consumer disputes 
dealt with by 
ADR + +/+ + + Consumer disputes dealt with  by ADR will increase. Consumers will 
have the possibility to turn to the European Ombudsman for all their 
disputes and an increase in the number of cases can be expected. 
However, the European Ombudsman may seem too "far away" for some 
groups of consumers, especially for the so-called "vulnerable (elderly 
people, of low education etc), who wo uld be reluctant to address their 
problem to an EU body. 
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives  + + The objectives will be achieved in the long run as time will be needed to 
set up a new ADR body at EU level. The time needed is estimated to more than 5 years. 
Costs 
 
EN 108   EN Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of impact 
Implementation 
costs  − − − Implementation costs will be very high for the EU budget. 
The fourth policy option will allow consumers to  turn to the EU Ombudsman for all their 
complaints. They will not face any difficulty in finding the ADR scheme competent to deal with their dispute as the Ombudsman will cover a ll sectors. At the same time, however, an EU 
body might seem too distant and too "for eign" for some consumers to use.  
Businesses will have the same benefits and consequences as consumers under this option. No 
costs will be incurred by Member States. 
Finally, this option will have a vast impact on the EU budget. A new European body will need 
to be created which should be competent to d eal with all consumer complaints in all EU 
languages and with specific knowledge on all bu siness sectors and nati onal situations. This 
would imply costs for the esta blishment of the Ombudsman and personnel costs. Even though 
an accurate amount for the establishment an d running of a European Ombudsman cannot be 
given, a realistic estimate would not be lower than €1 billion annually. 
1.2. Comparison of options  
Benefits 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Coverage of all 
business sectors by 
ADR  0/+  +/ + +  + + + + + + 
Impact on the 
number of domestic 
and cross border 
consumer disputes dealt with by ADR 0/ +  
+/ + +  + + + + +/+ + + 
Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives  + +/ + +  + + + + + 
Costs 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 Policy Option 4 
Implementation 
costs  0/− − − − − − − − − 
 
EN 109   EN Under Option 1 the results are uncer tain and lie on the willingness of the interested parties to 
set up ADR schemes; the full covera ge is thus not guaranteed. In  Option 2 some of the sectors 
will be covered in a fragmented manner and at different timings depending on the sector-
specific legislation. Some retail market sector s will remain with no ADR coverage. Options 3 
and 4 are considered to be equally effective in  terms of filling in the gaps by covering all the 
retail market sectors across the EU, as well as provide consumers with the same possibilities 
to resolve their prob lem out-of-court and receive compen sation. However, under Option 3 the 
time needed to achieve the objectives is si gnificantly shorter than the time needed under 
Option 4 thus leading to  a quicker way to resolve the ADR  coverage problem. Furthermore, 
the costs under Option 4 to establish an d run the EU Ombudsman are very high and 
disproportionate. In contrast, th e costs involved under Option 3 are much lower than Option 4 
and thus proportionate to the objectives.  
2. Information on ADR 
The options below concern the provision of info rmation to consumers in order to raise the 
levels of awareness about ADR and thus encour age them to use ADR in case of a dispute. 
Option 1  Encourage businesses via self-regulati on to inform consumers about the 
competent ADR scheme to deal with their case. 
Option 2 Create an obligation on traders in specific sectors to provide information to 
consumers about the ADR scheme competen t to deal with their disputes and 
ensure that consumers have easy access to information on all ADR schemes that exist in the EU.  
Option 3 Create a general obligation on traders to provide information to consumers about 
the ADR schemes competent to deal wi th their disputes and ensure that 
consumers have easy access to information on all ADR schemes that exist in the EU.  
Policy Option 1 
Under option 1, the Commission will encourage trad ers to inform consumers. Businesses will, 
in collaboration with Member St ates and consumers, develop se lf regulatory codes of conduct 
to further inform consumers about the ADR sche me competent to deal with their disputes. 
Policy Option 2 
Option 2 is based on a sectoral approach. The Commission will include ADR clauses in every 
forthcoming sector-specific legi slation that is relevant for disputes between consumers and 
businesses. These clauses will ob lige traders in these sectors to provide consumers with all the 
necessary information they need in order to  refer their disputes to the competent ADR 
scheme. This information will be provided on commercial documents. This option also 
foresees the creation of a list at Member State and EU level, where consumers will find all the 
necessary information on ADR schemes (e.g. cont act details and website) that fall under the 
sector -specific legislation.  
Policy Option 3 
 
EN 110   EN Under option 3 it will be made mandatory for businesses to provide co nsumers with all the 
necessary information in order to refer their disputes to the competent ADR scheme. This 
information will be provided in contracts and commercial documents. This option also foresees the creation of a list at Member State and EU level, where consumers will find all the 
necessary information on ADR schemes (e.g. contact details and website).  
2.1. Analysis of impact 
Assessment criteria 
Each policy option is assessed ag ainst a set of criteria relati ng to the specific problem area. 
They are explained in more detail below.  
Analysis of benefits 
• Impact on the levels of consumer awarene ss on ADR: this criterion assesses the levels 
of consumers' knowledge about ADR as a result of each given policy option.  
• Impact on the access to general information about ADR, in particular across borders: 
this criterion assesses the availability of  easy-to-find, centralised information on 
ADR.  
• Time needed to achieve the objectives: th is criterion assesses how quickly the full 
coverage of ADR schemes can be achieved. 
Analysis of costs 
• Administrative costs: this criterion a ssesses the costs that will be incurred by 
businesses and public authoritie s in order to comply with the information obligation 
created by each policy option.  
Policy Option 1 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Impact on the levels 
of consumer awareness on ADR 0/+ Consumer awareness on ADR might  slightly increase. This largely 
depends on how proactive businesses will be in developing self- regulatory codes of conduct to further inform consumers about the 
competent ADR schemes to d eal with their disputes. 
Impact on the access 
to general information about 
ADR, in particular 
across borders 0 No change is foreseen if this policy option is adopted. Consumers and 
businesses will continue to face problems accessing information on ADR schemes.  
Time needed to achieve the + The objectives might be achieved in the long run; however, this depends 
to a large degree on the willingness of businesses to provide information 
 
EN 111   EN objectives to consumers and it will be do ne in a fragmented way between sectors 
and Member States. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Administrative costs 0/ − − − Administrative costs may be incurred by businesses if they decide to 
adopt and implement a self regulatory code of conduct. 
Policy option 1 may have some positive impact on  consumers if businesse s decide to engage 
in providing information but it can not be guaranteed that this will be implemented. 
Therefore, unless businesses deve lop self regulatory codes of  conduct to inform consumers 
about competent ADR schemes to deal with th eir disputes consumer awareness levels will 
more likely remain low. Judging from the state of play and the current level of businesses' 
engagement information to consumers will not increase substantially. 
The impact on businesses will depend on whether they will adopt and implement the self 
regulation. In case they do, they will incur some costs to be ab le to provide consumers with 
information. The amount will depend on the means and frequency they will  decide to provide 
this information. For example if they decide to  include information on ADR in their contracts 
and commercial documents, the costs can be estimated to about €797 million (€245 per business). Since this is a vo luntary process the number of businesses that will actually 
undertake this task cannot be accurately calculated.  
Member States will not bear any costs. 
Policy Option 2 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Impact on the levels 
of consumer 
awareness on ADR + + Consumer awareness on ADR will incr ease but this will be limited to 
the sectors where EU legislation impos es an obligation for the provision 
of information. Thus this will be done in a fragmented manner that does not cover all sectors and at very different timings. Moreover, the 
creation of a list of competent ADR schemes (e.g. websites, contact 
details) in Member States will have a positive impact on informing consumers and businesses on what ex ists at EU and Member States' 
level. 
Impact on the access 
to general 
information about 
ADR, in particular across borders + + + Consumers' and businesses' access to information about competent ADR 
schemes will be rendered easier. By  providing a list at Member State 
and EU level information about existing ADR schemes would flow 
easier across the EU benefiting both consumers and businesses who wish to resort to out of court means to resolve their disputes. 
 
EN 112   EN Time needed to 
achieve the 
objectives + + The objectives will be achieved in the long run. Due to the difference 
between the provisions of the sector-specific legislation a concrete and 
common timeline cannot be foreseen. The time for the objectives to be 
reached could be estimated to more than 10 years. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Administrative costs − − Administrative costs will occur for businesses as they will have to 
amend their contracts, commercial documents and websites by adding 
information on ADR schemes. Some administrative costs for Member States and the EU will also occur as they will have to create a list where 
consumers will be able to identify the ADR scheme competent to deal 
with their complaint. 
Policy Option 2 will have a positive impact on consumers since the situation will improve. 
Consumers will have more and better access to information concerning competent ADR 
schemes to deal with their disputes and they  way they function. Cons umers will nevertheless 
continue to face some difficulties in finding information about ADR schemes competent to 
deal with their complaints as not all sectors will be covered by the information obligation.  
This option will have an impact on the businesses of some sectors since they will be vested in 
complying with the obligation imposed by EU le gislation in different  sectors. Depending on 
the documents they issue and whether they run a website or not, admini strative costs between 
businesses may vary. The estimated costs on  businesses in amending their commercial 
documents in including information about co mpetent ADR schemes in their sector was 
estimated at €797 million (€245 per business). 
Member States will also be affected since the option entails the cr eation of a list by the 
Member States where consumers will be able to identify and refer to the ADR scheme 
competent for their case. However these costs will be very low as most Member States 
already have a list of ADR schemes; they would just need to update it and ensure that it is 
publicly available. 
Lastly, this policy option will have a minima l impact on the EU budget since the already 
existing centralised system at EU level whic h provides information on various ADR schemes 
per Member State will simply need to be update d and improved to reflect the new set of data. 
Policy Option 3 
Benefits  
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
 
EN 113   EN Impact on the levels 
of consumer 
awareness on ADR + + + Consumer awareness on ADR will signi ficantly increase. By informing 
consumers at the point of sale and on commercial documents about the 
existence of the competent ADR scheme for all retail market sectors will undoubtedly make them more aware of ADR. 
Impact on the access 
to general 
information about ADR, in particular 
across borders + + + Consumers' and businesses' access to information about competent ADR 
schemes will be rendered easier. By  providing a list at Member State 
and EU level information on the existing ADR schemes would flow easier across the EU benefiting both consumers and businesses who 
wish to resort to alternative m eans to resolve their disputes.  
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives + + +  The time needed to achieve the objectives will be minimised and can be 
estimated to approximately 1-2 years. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Administrative costs − − − Administrative costs will occur for businesses as they will have to incur 
costs in amending their commercial documents and websites by adding 
information on ADR schemes. Some costs for Member States and the 
EU will also occur for creating a list where consumers and businesses 
will be able to identify the ADR scheme competent to deal with their complaint. 
Policy option 3 will have a significantly positive impact on consumers since they will have all 
the required information regarding the competent ADR schemes in all retail market sectors should they choose to resolve their complaint out-of-court. Businesses will be obliged to 
provide the necessary information to consumer s at the point of sale and also on their 
commercial documents. Furthermore, the list that  will exist in each Member States which will 
include all ADR schemes by sector and a centralised list at EU level will increase consumers' 
knowledge about the existence of ADR schemes si gnificantly. Therefore, they will have more 
confidence to carry out transactions in the internal  market rest assured that if a problem arises 
with a purchased good or service they will be able to quickly identify where to direct their 
claim. 
An impact on businesses will occur as they wi ll have to comply with  the obligation for the 
provision of information to consumers imposed on them by legislation. The costs of amending 
the commercial documents and websites to comply  with the provisions of  the legislation have 
been calculated to approximately €797 million (€245 per business). This sum of course will 
vary according to the size of the company, th e number of personnel they employ, the number 
of commercial documents they issue after a pur chase and whether they run a website or not.  
Member States will also be affected since the option entails the cr eation of a list by the 
Member States where consumers will be able to identify and refer to the ADR scheme 
competent for their case. However these costs will be very low as most Member States 
already have a list of ADR schemes; they would just need to update it and ensure that it is 
publicly available. 
 
EN 114   EN Lastly, this policy option will have a minima l impact on the EU budget since the already 
existing centralised system at EU level whic h provides information on various ADR schemes 
per Member State will simply need to be update d and improved to reflect the new set of data. 
 
2.2. Comparison of options  
Benefits 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 
Increase in consumer's 
awareness on ADR 0/+ + + + + + 
Make it easy for 
consumers and businesses 
to have access to 
information concerning ADR schemes, in 
particular across borders 0 + + + + + + 
Time needed to achieve 
the objectives +  + + + + + 
Costs 
Policy Options/
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 
Administrative costs 0/ − −  − − − − − 
Option 1 is not considered to be effective in meeting the set objectives since consumer 
awareness of the existence of ADR schemes will rely on a voluntary action by businesses and 
therefore remain low. Options 2 and 3 are cons idered to be equally effective in terms of 
providing consumers with access to the necessary information and facilitating cross-border trade. However, under Option 2, this will be the case for a limited numbe r of sectors and the 
objectives will be achieved in different time periods depending on each sector specific legislation. On the contrary under Option 3 c onsumers will be able to receive all the 
information needed to refer their dispute to an ADR scheme, thus further enhancing consumer understanding and confidence and reducing consum er detriment. Option 3 is therefore most 
effective in reducing consumer losses and attain ing the objectives more expediently compared 
to Option 2. As far as costs are concerned Options 2 and 3 were found to be on an equal 
footing.  
3. Quality of ADR schemes  
The options that follow examine how ADR scheme s can respect certain qua lity criteria and be 
better monitored in order to boost consumers' and businesses'  confidence to use them.  
Option 1 Develop with stakeholders a manual on ADR quality principles based on best 
practices. 
 
EN 115   EN Option 2 Ensure that all ADR schemes respect some core principles, such as impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness, and m onitor the functioning of ADR schemes. 
Option 3 Design the main features that ADR scheme s shall apply in order to be impartial, 
transparent and effective and monito r the functioning of ADR schemes. 
Policy Option 1 
Under the first option, the Commission will se t up an expert group on ADR. The aim will be 
to exchange best practices and develop a manual containing the principles  that should apply to 
ADR schemes.  
Policy Option 2 
Under option 2 it will be ensured that ADR schemes respect the core principles of 
impartiality, transparency and effectivene ss. This option would oblige ADR schemes to 
adhere to the afore-mentioned principles. Th e impartiality can only be ensured if the third 
party cannot be subject to pressu re that could influence its atti tude towards the dispute. The 
transparency of the procedure guarantees that the parties receive all the information they need to take an informed decision before starting a procedure. The effectiveness of the procedure 
provides that the dispute will be solved in a quick and simple manner. In addition, Member 
States will monitor the development and func tioning of ADR schemes. This would include 
providing information on ADR schemes, on the ga ps in ADR coverage, da ta on the number of 
ADR cases and on the level of businesses' e ngagement in the ADR proceedings. Moreover, 
ADR schemes will have to keep open a permanen t information channel with any (national) 
authority in charge of enforcing the applic ation of the specific EU law (i.e. sanctioning 
bodies) to permit the authority to ha ve an overview over infringements. 
Policy Option 3 
Option 3 requires that all ADR schemes that ex ist in the EU would have to respect the 
principles of impartiality, transparency and e ffectiveness. Specific rules of procedure would 
be common in all EU ADR schemes in order to comply with these principles. For example, 
the funding of ADR schemes (pub lic or private), th e characteristics of the third party 
(individual or collegial body), the nature of th e decision (binding or not), the timing of the 
procedure and the costs for consumers (fixing a specific amount) would need to be prescribed. 
In addition, Member States will monitor the de velopment and functioning of ADR schemes. 
This would include providing information on ADR schemes, on the gaps in ADR coverage, 
./data on the number of ADR cas es and on the level of busine sses' engagement in the ADR 
proceedings. Moreover, ADR schemes will have to keep open a permanent information channel with any (national) aut hority in charge of enforcing th e application of the specific EU 
law (i.e. sanctioning bodies) to permit the author ity to have an overview over infringements. 
3.1. Analysis of impact 
Assessment criteria 
Each policy option is assessed ag ainst a set of criteria relati ng to the specific problem area. 
They are explained in more detail below.  
 
EN 116   EN Analysis of benefits 
• Impact on consumers' and businesses' c onfidence in using ADR: this criterion 
assesses whether each policy option will enc ourage consumers and businesses to use 
ADR to solve their prob lems more regularly.  
• Impact on the number of ADR schemes that respect the core principles of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness: this crit erion assesses whether existing and newly 
created ADR schemes will operate in an impartial, independent and effective manner as a result of each policy option.  
• Impact on the effective monitoring of ADR  development: this criterion assesses 
whether each policy option would improve  the monitoring of ADR in terms of 
development and function.  
• Time needed to achieve the objectives: th is criterion assesses how quickly the full 
coverage of ADR schemes can be achieved.  
Analysis of costs 
• Implementation costs: this criterion assesses the costs required to put in place the 
actions envisaged by each policy option, excl uding costs related to the provision of 
information.  
• Administrative costs: this criterion a ssesses the costs that will be incurred by 
businesses and public authoritie s in order to comply with the information obligation 
created by each policy option.  
Policy Option 1 
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Impact on 
consumers' and 
businesses' 
confidence in using ADR 0/+ Consumers' and businesses' confidence will remain at the same levels. It 
might slightly increase in case th e guidelines have a practical 
application. Should that be the case ADR schemes might be encouraged 
to be more transparent, impartial a nd effective thus boosting consumers' 
and businesses' trust in using them.  
Impact on the 
number of ADR 
schemes that respect the core principles of 
impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness 0/+ The situation might change gradually if the guidelines provided by 
Member States are applied. Apart fr om specific national legislation in 
few Member States (e.g. Financial Services Ombudsman in the UK) or businesses initiatives (e.g. MEDEF in France) no guidelines have been 
developed at Member State level. However, the two Commission 
Recommendations, which could serve as guidelines, did not have a major impact. 
Impact on the 
effective monitoring 0/+ The monitoring of ADR development will remain on low levels since no 
 
EN 117   EN of ADR 
development change is provided for by this option. 
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives + The objectives might be achieved in  the long term. The time needed can 
be estimated at about 10 years (dev elop the guidelines, adopt them and 
implement them). 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Implementation 
costs 0/− Some implementation costs will occur. The EU would have to organise 
meetings and fora with ADR experts to adopt guidelines. Marginal 
implementation costs might occur for businesses in case they fund ADR 
schemes. Should ADR schemes appl y the principles stated in the 
guidelines, this would imply few costs to change some features of their 
structure. 
Administrative costs  0 No administrative costs will occur. 
The first policy option might have some impact  on consumers but this would be marginal. 
Guidelines are not likely to change consumers' behaviour drastically but  if the guidelines are 
applied, a marginal increase in consumers' trust in and use of ADR schemes could be 
observed. 
No major impact is expected on businesses. Only  to the extend that an ADR scheme is funded 
by businesses, changes in its principles as a re sult of guidelines could lead to few costs for 
businesses which would be marginal. The same applies to schemes that are publicly funded; 
few costs might burden Member States.  
Finally, since the EU would have to set up an  expert group to produce guidelines on best 
practices a minimal burden should be fores een. Judging from the practice of other 
Commission expert groups on di fferent subjects, the budget fo r this exercise would not 
exceed €100.000-€150.000. 
Policy Option 2  
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Impact on 
consumers' and 
businesses' 
confidence in using 
ADR + + +  Consumers will feel confident to use ADR. They will be convinced that 
the ADR procedure is trustworthy and they will be confident to turn to 
ADR to solve their disputes. Similarly, businesses' engagement in ADR 
will increase. In addition, since their participation will be monitored 
they will be keen to use ADR. 
 
EN 118   EN Impact on the 
number of ADR 
schemes that respect the core principles 
of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness + + + All ADR schemes will respect the core principles of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness. An obligation to adhere to these three 
principles will be imposed, thus all ADR schemes will have to follow them. 
Impact on the 
effective monitoring 
of ADR development + + + Effective monitoring will be enhanced  as Member States will control the 
development of ADR schemes. This would include providing 
information on ADR schemes, on the gaps in ADR coverage, data on the number of ADR cases and on the level of businesses' engagement in 
the ADR proceedings. 
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives + + +  The objectives will be achieved in the short term. The time needed can 
be estimated at about 1-2 years.  
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Implementation 
costs  − − Certain implementation costs will be incurred by businesses and/or 
Member States. In those ADR sche mes that do not yet respect the 
principles of impartiality, transpar ency and effectiveness modifications 
would need to be made, thus leading to some costs. For example, if an 
ADR scheme does not have a website, it would need to create one. 
Administrative costs  − − Member States will suffer some costs for the reporting on ADR which 
will be limited as structures already exist (for example for notifying 
ADR schemes to Member States under the Recommendations). 
The second policy option will have a great positiv e impact on consumers, who will feel better 
equipped and more empowered to turn to an ADR  scheme. It would be easy for them to find 
information on a specific ADR scheme and at the same time they will be  reassured that this 
scheme will deal with their comp laint quickly and with no comp lications while the third party 
taking the decision will be fair  and impartial. This will boost their confidence and allow them 
to turn to ADR to solve their problems and thus suffer fewer losses as a result of a purchased good or service. 
Businesses will be affected in so far as they  are involved in the funding of an ADR scheme. 
Some of the existing ADR schemes will need to adapt to the new requirements and that will 
possibly lead to some costs for them. These co sts will be one-off a nd not very burdensome. 
However, apart from the possible costs, businesses will benefit from the same positive impact as consumers. That means they could trust that ADR schemes will solve their problem effectively and fairly; they would be more inclin ed as they are currently to use ADR and that 
can have positive effects on their reputation and on keeping their clients. 
Member States will have to make sure that th e principles of independence, transparency and 
impartiality are respected. This implies that if they fund sche mes that do not yet adhere to 
 
EN 119   EN these principles, they would have to modify some of their structur es. In addition, Member 
States will need to f und the monitoring activities.  This will build on existing structures in the 
Member States; for example each Member State ha s an authority to scru tinise the notification 
of ADR schemes to the Commission. Ther efore, the costs will be limited. 
Policy Option 3  
Benefits 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Impact on 
consumers' and businesses' 
confidence in using 
ADR + + + Consumers will feel confident to use ADR. They will be convinced that 
the ADR procedure is trustworthy and they will be confident to turn to 
ADR to solve their disputes. Similarly, businesses' engagement in ADR 
will increase. In addition, since their participation will be monitored 
they will be keen to use ADR. 
Impact on the number of ADR 
schemes that respect 
the core principles 
of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness + + + All ADR schemes will respect the core principles of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness. An obligation to adhere to these three 
principles will be imposed with specific rules of procedure common to 
all EU ADR schemes, thus all ADR schemes will have to follow them. 
Impact on the 
effective monitoring 
of ADR development + + + The effective monitoring of ADR development will be enhanced as 
Member States will monitor ADR schemes. This would include 
providing information on ADR schemes, on the gaps in ADR coverage, data on the number of ADR cases and on the level of businesses' 
engagement in the ADR proceedings. 
Time needed to 
achieve the objectives + +  The objectives will be achieved in the short term but as substantial 
changes will have to be made in the ADR schemes, the time needed can be estimated at about 3-5 years. 
Costs 
Criteria Effect:  
significantly 
negative to 
significantly 
positive  Explanation of rating 
Implementation 
costs  − − − Significant implementation costs will occur. Member States or 
businesses that fund existing ADR schemes will suffer these one-off 
costs. Since all the features and "rul es of procedure" will be prescribed, 
ADR schemes would need to substantially modify the way they operate 
to adhere to the newly imposed features. For example, it could be prescribed that cases shall be solved within 45 days; that means that 
ADR schemes that take longer to deal with case will have to make 
changes. Likewise, changes would be necessary in relation to the decision making body, the nature of the decision etc. New ADR 
schemes are not taken into account since they will have to be designed 
 
EN 120   EN as such from the beginning.  
Administrative costs  − − 
 Member States will suffer some costs for the reporting on ADR which 
will be limited as structures already exist (for example for notifying 
ADR schemes to Member States under the Recommendations). 
The third policy option will have similar impact s as the second one for consumers. Namely, 
the respect of the three principles will boost th eir confidence and allow them to turn to ADR 
to solve their problems; thus they will suffer fewer losses as a result of a purchased good or 
service. 
Businesses will suffer important administrative costs as the ADR schemes that they fund 
would have to change substantia lly the way they operate and a dhere to the three principles. 
Features such as the nature of the decision, the third party and the provision of information 
would have to be modified. Likewise, the possi ble burden for Member St ates will be big; 
however, public ADR schemes usually already accept the three principles. In addition, Member States will need to fund the monitori ng activities of the co mpetent body appointed. 
This will build on existing structures in the Member States; for example each Member State 
has an authority to sc rutinise the noti fication of ADR schemes to  the Commission. Overall the 
costs will be high. 
3.2. Comparison of options  
Benefits 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 
Impact on consumers' and 
businesses' confidence in 
using ADR 0/+ + + +  + + + 
Impact on the number of 
ADR schemes that respect the core principles 
of impartiality, 
transparency and effectiveness 0/+ + + + + + + 
Impact on the effective 
monitoring of ADR 
development 0/+ + + + + + + 
Time needed to achieve 
the objectives +  + + + + + 
 
 Costs 
Policy Options/ 
Criteria Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3 
 
EN 121   EN Implementation costs  0/− − − − − − 
Administrative costs  0 − − − − 
 
Under Option 1 consumers' and businesses' confidence will not increase significantly and the 
number of quality ADR schemes will remain low. Option 2 will result in quality ADR 
schemes with reasonable costs while the mon itoring of ADR will become more effective. 
Therefore, consumer and businesses will be encouraged to use more ADR and their confidence in the procedure will increase su bstantially. The time needed to achieve the 
objectives will be minimised. Finally, Option 3 similarly achieves the objectives of quality 
ADR and monitoring but at the same time it interf eres with the flexibility and the inherent 
nature of ADR while imposing unnecessary costs thus making it disproportionate.
 
EN 122   EN ANNEX VII:  DETAILED METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR 
EU BUSINESSES160 
This Annex presents the methodology that was applied for calculatin g the administrative 
costs to EU businesses as a result of their potential obligation to inform consumers about 
ADR. 
The estimation of the administrative costs to EU  businesses was based on the core equation of 
the Standard Cost Model as defined in Annex 10 of the most recent IA Guidelines of the 
European Commission, and related guidance.161 This Annex specifies how this approach was 
adapted to take into account th e specific purposes of the study. 
This Annex details step-by-step the methodol ogy employed to derive an estimate of the 
administrative and compliance costs incurred  by EU businesses in meeting their legal 
obligations to provide inform ation on ADR to consumers. 
Our methodological approach in cluded the following steps: 
• Delineation of sectors relevant for the study 
• Collection of data on time estimates and professional qualifications  
• Validation of the data collected via interviews with businesses 
• Estimation of the number of EU businesse s affected by the information obligation 
• Collection of data on tariffs 
• Estimation of average one-off costs for EU businesses in each relevant sector 
• Estimation of total costs to EU businesses 
Step 1: Delineation of sectors relevant for the study 
According to the study on the use of alternativ e dispute resolution in the European Union 
conducted by Civic Consulting in 2009, the sectors in which ADR cases are most frequent are 
as follows: 
• Banking; 
• Insurance; 
• Investment/securities; 
• Telecommunications; 
                                                 
160 Chapter extracted from the study on "assessment of compliance costs and administrative costs/burdens 
on businesses linked to the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution"  
161 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 15 January 2009, Annex 10. Relevant 
guidance includes SCM Network: International Standard Cost Model manual – Measuring and reducing 
administrative burden s for businesses. 
 
EN 123   EN • Non-food consumer goods; 
• Transport (and package travel); 
• Postal services; and  
• Energy, water supply, and heating. 
Civic Consulting’s study revealed that these se ctors account for more than 90% of ADR cases 
in the EU. Given the limited timeframe for the current study we focused the data collection effort on these sectors.  
We also reviewed the sector categories used by Eurostat, as data on the total number of EU 
businesses were retrieved from its databases a nd used for extrapolating the results for the 
businesses interviewed to the enti re population of EU businesses. As it appeared that sector 
categories used by Eurostat were not fully in li ne with the categories used in the study on the 
use of alternative dispute resolution in the EU, we decided to combine some sector categories 
used in this study. This was to ensure that our list of sectors is compatible with the 
information published by Eurostat. The final list of  sectors used for the research is as follows:  
• Financial services (inclu ding banking, insurance, investment/securities); 
• Telecommunications and postal services;  
• Non-food consumer goods;  
• Transport and package travel/tourism; and  
• Energy, water supply, and heating. 
Step 2: Collection of data on time es timates and professional qualifications 
In order to collect the data needed for calcu lating recurring and one-off costs, 22 in-depth 
interviews with businesses of  the sectors listed above were conducted according to an 
interview guide. The interviews were primarily  aimed at collecting data on the average time 
spent by businesses on actions conducted in order to meet their legal obligations to provide 
ADR information to consumers. These consist of one-off actions: 
One-off actions 
One-off actions imply one-off costs which are only sustained once  in connection with the 
business adapting to the new information obligati ons and to the obligatio ns resulting from the 
involvement of the business in ADR procedures.  
The collection of data for calculating the one-off costs was based on the assumptions 
described in the table below. 
 
  
 
EN 124   EN  
Table 1: List of one-off actions fo r businesses and related assumptions  
Obligation Required one-off action Assumption 
Information obligations of businesses  
1. Familiarisation with 
the information obligations This action consists of reviewing the 
legislation specifying the information obligations. 
2. Defining information regarding ADR to be presented to consumers  Information to be presented in commercial 
documents would be described in the legislation. For the purposes of the study, we used the following indicative sentence concerning the complaint procedure to allow interviewees to better grasp possible changes: 
‘If you have any cause for complaint, please 
first contact us at: ###address, phone 
number, e-mail address of the relevant 
contact### . If you are still not satisfied with 
the way we have handled your complaint, you may take your complaint to ###name of 
the ADR scheme###  for further advice and 
guidance: ###address, phone number, e-
mail address, website of the scheme###. ’ 
This sentence should be easily readable by 
the consumer. We assume that there would be no requirement specifying this sentence must be in a particular colour.  
This information would also be required to 
appear on the websites of  businesses, e.g. in 
the relevant section regarding consumer queries.  
3. Preparing summary documentation to distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints Relevant information on the information 
obligation to consumers would be summarised (e.g. as a half-page document) and be integrated into existing communication tools usually used to distribute information to employees handling consumer complaints.  Obligation to provide information in relation to ADR to consumers 
4. Adding information on 
ADR to contracts, invoices, receipts, websites, This action would consist of adding the 
sentence on ADR (see above) to relevant commercial documents. 
 
EN 125   EN brochures/leaflets 
5. Reproducing amended 
(templates of) contracts, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets (and possibly printing a notice to be displayed at points of sale) We assume a transition period of at least two 
years for the implementation of the information obligations by businesses (between adopting such legislation at EU level and the actual implementation of the requirement by businesses).  
Transportation tickets are not included.  The size of the notice is  equivalent to an A6 
paper size (105 mm × 148 mm). 
Step 3: Validation of the data coll ected via interviews with businesses 
We carefully reviewed the data provided by businesses on time estimates and levels of 
qualification needed for completing each one-off action. Interviews were often followed up with e-mail exchanges to clarify remaining i ssues. All interviewed business received the 
responses provided during the inte rviews in writing, so they could verify and complete the 
information provided.  
Once the dataset was verified and validated, we  also researched for each action whether 
patterns concerning time estima tes and professional qualificati ons could be identified across 
sectors and business sizes. This process reveal ed that businesses in the financial services 
sector reported homogeneous information on time estimates and levels of qualification 
needed complete the actions. However, inform ation reported by businesse s of different sizes 
in the other sectors (telecomm unications and postal services ; energy, water supply, and 
heating; transport and package travel/tourism; and non-food consumer goods) was very diverse, and no specific groupings according to size or sector c ould be established according 
to the data collected. Therefore we focuse d our analysis of the assessment of the 
administrative costs on businesses in the fi nancial services sect or on one side, and on 
businesses in the other s ectors on the other side.  
Finally, we determined the appropriate time  and level of qualific ation required conducting 
each action in the financial serv ices sector and the other four sectors considered for the 
assessment. In order to reduce the importance of  outliers, we applied the median to the time 
estimates provided by businesses to identify the time needed to complete each action. We also 
carefully reviewed the data re ported by businesses on the prof essional titles of the persons 
completing the different tasks to determine the appropriate qualifications needed for completing each one-off action.  
Step 4: Estimation of the number of EU  businesses affected by the information 
obligation 
To identify the population of EU businesses to which the information obligation would apply, 
we reviewed Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS), which provide information on 
the number of businesses according to the statis tical classification of economic activities in 
 
EN 126   EN the European Community (NACE).162 When reviewing this database, we paid particularly 
attention to select only the businesses that are relevant for consumer ADR.  
Table 2 below presents the number of busine sses identified in the relevant sectors for 
the assessment. 
Sector NACE 
code Sector label Number of businesses 
J6512_J652 Total credit institutions  7,706 
n.a. Insurance (excluding 
reinsurance enterprises ) 4,255 Financial services 
J6602  Pension funding 3,290 (15,251)a 
I641  Post and courier activities 43,393 Telecommunications 
and postal services 
J61  Telecommunications  40,000 83,393 
G4719  Other retail sale in non-
specialised stores 117,433 
G474  Retail sale of information 
and communication 
equipment in specialised 
stores  98,366 
G475  Retail sale of other 
household equipment in 
specialised stores  470,131 
G476  Retail sale of cultural and 
recreation goods in 
specialised stores 216,738 
G477  Retail sale of other goods 
in specialised stores 1,166,622 
G4782  Retail sale via stalls and 
markets of textiles, 
clothing, and footwear  134,456 Non-food consumer 
goods 
G4791  Retail sale via mail- order 
houses or via Internet  59,977 2,263,723
H491  Passenger rail transport, 
interurban 275 
H493  Other passenger land 
transport 325,728 Transport and 
package 
travel/tourism 
H501  Sea and coastal passenger 
water transport 3,546 667,782 
                                                 
162 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/pag e/portal/european_business/introduction . 
 
EN 127   EN H503  Inland passenger water 
transport  3,674 
H511  Passenger air transport  3,218 
I55  Accommodation  247,224 
N79  Travel agency, tour 
operator reservation 
service and related 
activities  84,117 
D3513  Distribution of electricity 2,020 
D3514 Trade of electricity 1,517 
D3522 Distribution of gaseous 
fuels through mains 783 
D3523  Trade of gas through mains 527 
D353  Steam and air conditioning 
supply 4,625 Energy, water 
supply, heating 
E36  Water collection, treatment 
and supply  12,092 21,564 
Source: Eurostat (most recent data ava ilable; i.e. 2008 or earlier data). 
Note: (a) Figure includes only businesses which belong to  the categories ‘credit institutions’, ‘insurance’ and 
‘pension funding’. 
Step 5: Collection of data on tariffs 
Concerning data on tariffs, we used the figur es utilised in the context of the Action 
Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens.163 These estimates were provided by the 
European Commission. As these figures ar e only available for 2006, we applied wage 
development figures to obtain values for 2010.164 
Table 3 presents the EU average labour costs that were used for our calculations. These 
figures include a standard proportion of the so-called overheads costs (i.e. 25%). 
                                                 
163 See : http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise /policies/bette r-regulation/administrative-burdens/index_en.htm . The EU 
database and administrative burden calcu lator provides tariffs for nine profe ssional groups: (1) Legislators, senior 
officials, and managers; (2) Professi onals; (3) Technicians and associate pr ofessionals, (4) Clerks; (5) Service 
workers, and shop and market sales workers; (6) Craft and related trades workers; (7) Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers; (8) Manual workers (agricultural and fisheries); and (9) Elementary occupations. These 
professional groups are based on the categories of the Intern ational Standard Classifications of Occupations. They 
include overhead costs (i.e. 25%) which consist of fixed administration costs such as premises, telephone, heating, 
electricity, and IT equipment. We have used the average tariff in the EU 27.  
164 Wage development figures for the period 2006 – 2010 were calculated on wage data provided by 
Eurostat. See: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tg m/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00014&plugi
n=0.  
 
EN 128   EN Table 3: Average labour costs per hour in the EU (2010) 
Member State Legislators, senior 
officials and 
managers ProfessionalsTechnicians 
and associate 
professionals Clerks 
Belgium 57.33 39.92 30.96 26.47 
Bulgaria 5.02 3.40 2.95 2.16 
Czech Republic 14.67 9.87 8.00 6.13 
Denmark 58.08 50.71 42.90 30.90 
Germany 51.09 47.52 34.27 27.46 
Estonia 9.06 8.76 6.52 4.88 
Ireland 47.26 43.80 31.33 23.81 
Greece 30.69 23.89 17.23 13.89 
Spain 41.22 26.59 20.79 14.32 
France 54.90 50.49 28.77 22.24 
Italy 66.25 63.84 27.01 21.95 
Cyprus 37.96 24.34 18.86 12.30 
Latvia 6.38 6.33 5.84 4.07 
Lithuania 7.99 6.56 4.58 3.75 
Luxembourg 69.37 50.93 42.06 34.06 
Hungary 12.51 8.34 6.57 5.22 
Malta 19.28 15.28 13.17 10.24 
Netherlands 41.54 39.65 31.37 24.72 
Austria 59.10 44.44 33.50 25.62 
Poland 15.52 12.36 6.89 5.98 
Portugal 33.23 20.71 14.93 10.20 
Romania 13.21 8.12 5.84 4.90 
Slovenia 22.30 22.79 14.55 11.84 
 
EN 129   EN Slovakia 12.00 7.96 6.66 4.22 
Finland 50.93 39.54 30.40 23.73 
Sweden 57.37 45.71 35.34 25.82 
United Kingdom 46.18 43.50 31.97 20.72 
EU average per 
hour 34.83 28.35 20.49 15.61 
Source: Estimates by Civic Consulting based on figures provided by the European Commission.  
Note: These tariffs were used as a basis for the calcula tion of administrative costs in the context of the Action 
Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in 2008-2009. They include a standard proportion of the so-called overheads costs (i.e. 25%) linked with individual employees and borne by businesses but not included in 
their salaries: fixed administration costs such as premises, telephone, heating, electricity, and IT equipment. 
Professional groups are defined according to the categorisa tion used by the Internatio nal Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO). 
Step 6: Estimation of one-off costs 
One-off costs are only sustained once by businesse s. They result from two types of one-off 
actions related to providing ADR information to consumers. 
The costs resulting from the obligation to provide ADR information to consumers would be 
incurred by all businesses during th e first year of application of the obligation. As a result, we 
obtain the following equation: 
One-off costs for EU businesses in Year 1 = One- off costs related to the obligation to inform 
consumers on ADR (incurred by all businesses)  
One-off costs for EU businesses resulting from the obligation to provide information in 
relation to ADR to consumers were calculated as follows: 
(1) One-off costs related to the obligat ion to inform consumers on ADR 
for EU businesses O totP Pop×=  
) Tariff Off-One Time Off- (One 
1jm
jj totPop × ×=∑
= 
With:  
Parameter Definition Source of information 
Pop tot  Total population (i.e. total 
number of businesses affected by the information obligation) Eurostat (Structural Business 
Statistics - SBS) 
PO One-off cost related to the 
obligation to inform consumers on ADR See below (One–Off Time
j and 
One–Off Tariff j) 
 
EN 130   EN One–Off 
Time j Time spent on one-off action j 
(i.e. time needed to complete one-off action j related to the obligation to inform consumers on ADR) In-depth interviews 
One–Off 
Tariff j Tariff for one-off action j (i.e. 
wage cost to complete action j plus overhead) Tariffs are obtained from the EU 
database and administrative burden calculator. They include an overhead percentage of 25%.
 
165 
m Number of one-off actions 
related to the obligation to inform consumers on ADR See Table 1 above 
In the area of financial services, the one-o ff costs related to the obligation to inform 
consumers about ADR are likely to be insi gnificant (see step 5 above). The relevant 
population for the calculation of these one-off co sts corresponds to businesses in the other 
four sectors considered for the assessment (t elecommunications and postal services; energy, 
water supply, and heating; transport and p ackage travel/tourism; and non-food consumer 
goods). According to Eurostat, there ar e 3,139,643 businesses in these sectors. 
Step 7: Estimation of total costs to EU businesses 
As a final step, we estimated the administra tive costs incurred by EU businesses in meeting 
their legal obligations to provide inform ation on ADR to consumers, as follows: 
Total cost to EU businesses in Year 1 = Sum of one-off costs related to the obligation to inform consumers about ADR  
(incurred by all businesses) 
Obligations and related actions for EU businesses The obligation relevant for this assessment is  the obligation of EU businesses to provide 
information in relation to ADR to consumers.  
Table 4 provides an overview of the required actions and types of co st. This list has been 
prepared on the basis of the information gathered  via the review of rele vant studies, reports, 
and policy documents; exploratory interviews ; and comments provided by the European 
Commission.  
                                                
 
165 According  to the International Standard Cost Model Manual published by the SCM Network (see: SCM 
Network: International Standard Cost Model Manual – Measuring and reducing administrative burdens for businesses), an overhead percentage of 25% has been applied in most measurements so far. The 
overhead covers costs in connection with fixed administration costs, such as expenses for premises, 
telephone, heating, electricity, and IT equipment. 
 
EN 131   EN  
 Table 4: List of obligations , actions and related costs 
Type of cost Obligation 
 Required action 
 One-off/ 
recurring  Administrative/ 
compliance  
Information obligations of businesses  
1. Familiarisation with the information 
obligations One-off Administrative 
2. Defining information regarding 
ADR to be presented to consumers One-off
  Administrative 
3. Preparing summary documentation 
to distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints One-off Administrative 
4. Adding information on ADR in 
contracts, invoices, receipts, websites, brochures/leaflets  One-off Administrative Obligation to 
provide information in relation to ADR to consumers 
5. Reproducing changed (templates of) 
contracts, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets  One-off Administrative 
Data collection 
The assessment of administrative and compliance costs was mainly informed by in-depth 
interviews with business representatives. In a ddition, complementary data was collected in 
order to extrapolate the data collected during the interviews. 
Interviews  
The interviews primarily aimed to collect data on the time spent by businesses on (1) actions 
conducted in order to meet their legal obligati ons to provide information in relation to ADR 
to consumers, and (2) actions performed as  a result of their involvement in an ADR 
procedure, as well as on th e level of qualification of th e employees performing these 
actions.166 
A total of 27 interviews were conducted167 – 22 with businesses (s ee tables presenting 
interview results in Annex IV),168 4 with ADR schemes, and 1 with a financial services 
authority.  
                                                 
166 Information  on the qualifications of employees was coll ected according to the professional groups 
defined by the International Standard Classifi cation of Occupations (ISCO); i.e. managers, 
professionals, technicians and a ssociate professionals, and clerks. 
167 Of these 27 interviews, 3 were conducted during the preparatory phase of the study. 
 
EN 132   EN The 22 interviews with busin esses involved companies wh ich have used ADR in the 
following sectors:  
• Financial services; 
• Telecommunications and postal services;  
• Non-food consumer goods;  
• Transport and package travel/tourism; and  
• Energy, water supply, and heating. 
Civic Consulting’s study on the use of alterna tive dispute resolution in the European Union 
(Civic Consulting, 2009; ‘2009 study’ hereafter) re vealed that these sect ors account for more 
than 90% of ADR cases in the EU.169 Given the limited timeframe for the cost assessment we 
focused the data collection effort on the five sectors listed above.  
The 4 interviews conducted with ADR schemes aimed to develop better insight into the 
typical burdens imposed on a business by the ADR process and to check the accuracy of the 
time estimates provided by businesses.  
Number of EU businesses relevant for consumer ADR 
To identify the population of EU businesses to which the information obligation would apply, 
we reviewed Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS), which provide information on 
the number of businesses according to the statis tical classification of economic activities in 
the European Community (NACE).170 When reviewing this database, we paid particularly 
attention to select only the businesses that are relevant for consumer ADR.  
Table 5 presents the number of businesses id entified in the relevant sectors for the 
assessment. 
Table 5: Number of businesses in relevant sectors 
Sector Number of businesses 
Financial services (15,251)a 
Telecommunications and postal services 83,393 
Non-food consumer goods 2,263,723b 
Transport and package travel/tourism 667,782 
Energy, water supply, heating 21,564 
Source: Eurostat (most recent data available; i.e. 2 008 or earlier data). See Annex II for more detail. 
                                                                                                                                                        
168 One of these interviews was an e-mail interview. Two additional interviews were conducted with 
businesses but no summary tables could be prepared for these interviews as interviewees could not 
provide time estimates. 
169 Civic Consulting  (2009): Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union 
(available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf). 
170 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/pag e/portal/european_business/introduction . 
 
EN 133   EN Notes: (a) Figure only includes businesses which belong  to the categories ‘credit institutions’, ‘insurance’ and 
‘pension funding’. 
(b) The number of businesses in the non-food consumer goods sector includes the categories ‘retail sale of 
information and communication equipment in specialised stores’, ‘retail sale of other household equipment in 
specialised stores’, ‘retail sale of cu ltural and recreation goods in specialised  stores’, ‘retail sale of other goods 
in specialised stores’, ‘retail sale via stalls and markets of  textiles, clothing, and footwear’, ‘retail sale via mail- 
order houses or via Internet’ and ‘other retail sale in non- specialised stores’. Excluded  are businesses in the area 
of sales, maintenance, and repair of motor vehicles. 
Information on tariffs  
We used the tariffs (hourly labour  costs) utilised in the cont ext of the Action Programme for 
Reducing Administrative Burdens.171 These estimates were provided by the European 
Commission. As these figures are only avai lable for 2006, we applied wage development 
figures to obtain values for 2010.172 
Table 6 presents the EU average labour costs that were used for our calculations. These 
figures include a standard proportion of the so-called overheads costs (i.e. 25%). 
                                                 
171 See : http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise /policies/bette r-regulation/administrative-burdens/index_en.htm . The EU 
database and administrative burden calcu lator provides tariffs for nine profe ssional groups: (1) legislators, senior 
officials, and managers; (2) professi onals; (3) technicians and associate professionals, (4) clerks; (5) service 
workers, and shop and market sales work ers; (6) craft and related trades work ers; (7) plant and machine operators 
and assemblers; (8) manual workers (agricultural and fisheries); and (9) elementary occupations. These 
professional groups are based on the categories of the Intern ational Standard Classifications of Occupations. They 
include overhead costs (i.e. 25%) which consist of fixed administration costs such as premises, telephone, heating, 
electricity, and IT equipment. We have used the average tariff in the EU 27.  
172 Wage development figures for the period 2006 – 2010 were calculated on wage data provided by 
Eurostat. See: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tg m/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00014&plugi
n=0 
 
EN 134   EN Table 6: Average labour costs per hour in the EU (2010) 
Source: 
Estimate
s by 
Civic 
Consulti
ng based 
on 
figures 
provided 
by the 
Europea
n 
Commiss
ion.  Member State Managers ProfessionalsTechnicians 
and 
associate 
professionalsClerks 
Belgium 57.33 39.92 30.96 26.47 
Bulgaria 5.02 3.40 2.95 2.16 
Czech Republic 14.67 9.87 8.00 6.13 
Denmark 58.08 50.71 42.90 30.90 
Germany 51.09 47.52 34.27 27.46 
Estonia 9.06 8.76 6.52 4.88 
Ireland 47.26 43.80 31.33 23.81 
Greece 30.69 23.89 17.23 13.89 
Spain 41.22 26.59 20.79 14.32 
France 54.90 50.49 28.77 22.24 
Italy 66.25 63.84 27.01 21.95 
Cyprus 37.96 24.34 18.86 12.30 
Latvia 6.38 6.33 5.84 4.07 
Lithuania 7.99 6.56 4.58 3.75 
Luxembourg 69.37 50.93 42.06 34.06 
Hungary 12.51 8.34 6.57 5.22 
Malta 19.28 15.28 13.17 10.24 
Netherlands 41.54 39.65 31.37 24.72 
Austria 59.10 44.44 33.50 25.62 
Poland 15.52 12.36 6.89 5.98 
Portugal 33.23 20.71 14.93 10.20 
Romania 13.21 8.12 5.84 4.90 
Slovenia 22.30 22.79 14.55 11.84 
Slovakia 12.00 7.96 6.66 4.22 
Finland 50.93 39.54 30.40 23.73 
Sweden 57.37 45.71 35.34 25.82 
United Kingdom 46.18 43.50 31.97 20.72 
EU average per 
hour 34.83 28.35 20.49 15.61 
 
EN 135   EN Note: These tariffs were used as a basis for the calcula tion of administrative costs in the context of the Action 
Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in 2008-2009. They include a standard proportion of the so-
called overheads costs (i.e. 25%) linked with individual employees and borne by businesses but not included in their salaries: fixed administration costs such as premises, telephone, heating, electricity, and IT equipment. 
Data analysis 
Review of the data collected 
We carefully reviewed the data provided by businesses on time estimates and levels of 
qualification needed for completing each recurr ing and one-off action. Interviews were often 
followed up with e-mail exchanges to clarify remaining issues. All business interviewed received the responses provided during the interviews in writte n form so they could verify 
and complete the information provided.  
Once the dataset was verified and validated, we  also researched for each action whether 
patterns concerning time estima tes and professional qualificati ons could be identified across 
sectors and business sizes. This process reveal ed that businesses in the financial services 
sector reported consistent information on time es timates and levels of qualification needed for 
completing the actions. However, the informati on reported by businesses of different sizes in 
the other sectors (telecommunica tions and postal services; energy, water supply, and heating; 
transport and package travel/tourism; and non -food consumer goods) was very diverse and no 
specific groupings according to size or sector could be esta blished according to the data 
collected. We therefore focused our analysis on the assessment of the administrative and 
compliance costs to businesses in the financial services sector on one side, and businesses in 
the other sectors on the other side.  
We finally determined the appropriate time and level of qualification required to conduct each 
action in the financial services sector and the other sectors considered in the assessment. In 
order to reduce the importance of outliers, we  applied the median to the time estimates 
provided by businesses to identify the time need ed to complete each action. We also carefully 
reviewed the data reported by bus inesses on the professional ti tles of the persons completing 
the different tasks to determine the appropria te qualifications need ed for completing each 
recurring and one-off action.  
Extrapolation of validated data to EU level  
As a last step, we extrapolated the results of the validated data to the EU level by applying the 
core equation of the Standard Cost Model (see Annex II). 
The Standard Cost Model provides that costs to EU businesses are calculated by multiplying 
the average cost of the required action (Price, P)  by the total number of  actions performed per 
year (Quantity, Q). This is expr essed in the following equation: 
Cost to EU businesses = P * Q 
With P being calculated by multiplying a verage tariffs by the time needed  
 required per action; and 
Q being calculated by multiplying the frequency of the action per business by the number of 
relevant businesses in the EU.  
 
EN 136   EN Administrative costs incurred by EU businesses in  meeting their legal ob ligations to provide 
information on ADR to consumers include one-off costs. The core equation of the Standard 
Cost Model has therefore been adapted to suit the purposes of the assignment as described in 
the Terms of Reference for the study and to reflect the difference between one-off and 
recurring costs. In line with the relevant EU  guidance, and because of the limited number of 
Member States covered by the interviews, we performed the extrapolat ion without providing 
specific estimates for each Member State. 
Main findings on administrative costs 
Table 7 below provides an overview of the co sts that would be incurred by EU businesses 
during the first year of implementation of the information obligation.  
Table 7: Total administrative and complia nce costs for EU businesses in Year 1 
Obligation Required action  Frequenc
y of 
action 
(per year) Estimated cost of 
action for all EU 
businessesa 
(in Euro) 
Information obligations of businesses  
1. Familiarisation with the information 
obligations One-off 191,839,351 
2. Defining information regarding ADR to be 
presented to consumers  One-off 95,919,676 
3. Preparing summary documentation to 
distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints One-off 215,819,270 
4. Adding information on ADR in contracts, 
invoices, receipts, webs ites, brochures/leaflets One-off 266,972,022 Obligation 
to provide 
information in relation to ADR to consumers 
5. Reproducing changed (templates of) 
contracts, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets  One-off Not significant
b 
Total one-off costs incurred by all EU business as a result  
of the obligation to inform consumers on ADR: 770,550,319 
One-off costs 
Main findings one-off costs 
One-off costs are only sustained once by businesse s. They result from two sorts of one-off 
actions related to the provision of information in relation to ADR to consumers. 
The costs resulting from the obligation to provide information on ADR to consumers would 
be incurred by all businesses during the firs t year of applicatio n of the obligation,. 
 
EN 137   EN As shown in Table 1 below, the total one-o ff costs for EU businesses would amount to 
€770,550,319. These figures are very likely to overesti mate the ‘true’ value of administrative 
and compliance costs for EU businesses. Also, in line with the IA Guidelines of the European Commission and related guidance,
173 we have assumed full comp liance with the obligations 
of all companies concerned. However, it is po ssible that in practice not all relevant EU 
businesses will, for example, add the information on ADR in their contracts, invoices, and websites during the first year of application of the obligation. It is therefore likely that these costs will be distributed  over several years.  
Table : One-off costs for EU businesses in Year 1 
Obligation Required action  Estimated cost 
of action for all 
EU businessesa
(in Euro) % of 
total  
one-
off 
costs 
Information obligation of businesses  
1. Familiarisation with the information 
obligation 191,839,351 22% 
to 
23% 
2. Defining information regarding ADR to be 
presented to consumers  95,919,676 11% 
to 
12% 
3. Preparing summary documentation to distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints 215,819,270 25% 
to 
26% 
4. Adding information on ADR in contracts, invoices, receipts, websit es, brochures/leaflets  266,972,022 31% 
to 
33% Obligation to provide 
information in 
relation to ADR to consumers 
5. Reproducing changed (templates of) 
contracts, invoices, receip ts, brochures/leaflets  Not significant
b 0% 
Total one-off costs incurred by all EU business in Year 1 as a 
result of the obligation to in form consumers about ADR:  770,550,319 90% 
to 
94% 
One-off costs related to inform ation obligation on consumer ADR 
We assume full compliance of relevant EU bu sinesses with the information obligation, as 
recommended by relevant guidelines. All releva nt EU businesses woul d therefore conduct the 
                                                 
173 See European Commission , Impact Assessment Guidelines, 15 January 2009, Annex 10. Relevant 
guidance includes SCM Network: International Standard Cost Model manual – Measuring and reducing 
administrative burden s for businesses. 
 
EN 138   EN one-off actions related to the obligation to in form consumers on ADR in the first year of 
application of the obligation. 
The completion of these one-off actions by all relevant EU businesses would induce a total 
administrative cost of €771 million (€254 per bus iness). This cost would only be incurred 
once by businesses.  
In the area of financial services, the one-o ff costs related to the obligation to inform 
consumers on ADR are likely to be insignifi cant. This was suggested by all businesses 
interviewed in the financial services sector, which found that the one-off actions conducted as 
a result of the information obligation would not create addi tional efforts for them.  
Table 9 provides the results of the interviews concerning the time estimates and levels of 
qualification needed for completing each one -off action directly resulting from the 
information obligation. It also details the estimated administrative cost for each action per 
business and for all EU relevant businesses. 
Table 9: One-off costs rela ted to the obligation to inform consumers about ADR  
Required action  Professional 
title of 
employee 
conducting 
actiona Staff time 
spent on 
action  
(in 
minutes)b Estimated 
cost of 
action per 
business 
(in Euro) Estimated 
cost of action 
for all EU 
businessesc 
(in Euro) 
1. Familiarisation with the 
information obligations Managers/ 
Professionals
d 120 63 191,839,351 
2. Defining information 
regarding ADR to be presented to consumers  Managers/ 
Professionals
d 60 32 95,919,676 
3. Preparing summary 
documentation to distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints Managers/ 
Professionals
d 135 71 215,819,270 
4. Adding information on ADR 
in contracts, invoices, receipts, websites, brochures/leaflets  Clerks/ 
Professionals
d 240 88 266,972,022 
5. Reproducing changed 
(templates of) contracts, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets   Not 
significant
e Not 
significante Not 
significante 
Total: 555 254 770,550,319 
Source: Civic Consulting. 
 
EN 139   EN Notes: (a) Professional groups and related tariffs are based on th e data utilised in the context 
of the Action Programme for Reduc ing Administrative Burdens. 
(b) Median values of reported time estimates by businesses. 
(c) Relevant businesses include businesses in the sectors of financial services, 
telecommunications and postal services; energy, water supply, and heating; transport and package travel/tourism; and non-food consumer goods. In the area of financial services, the 
one-off costs related to the obligation to in form consumers on ADR are likely to be 
insignificant. 
(d) 50% of each category. (e) Under the assumption of a transition period  of two years for the implementation of the 
information obligation by businesses.  
As shown in the table above, the obligation to  provide information in relation to ADR to 
consumers results in the follo wing actions for businesses: 
• Familiarisation with the information oblig ation (i.e. reviewing the legislation 
specifying the information obligation); 
• Defining information regarding ADR to be  presented to consumers (including the 
identification of the relevant ADR scheme);
174 
• Preparing summary documentation to dist ribute information to employees dealing 
with consumer complaints; 
• Adding information on ADR to contract s, invoices, rece ipts, websites, 
brochures/leaflets; and  
• Reproducing changed (templates of) contract s, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets. 
As a first step, businesses would need to become familiar with the new information obligation 
and review the relevant legisla tion. Interviews with businesses indicate that two hours would 
be needed for a manager or a pr ofessional to complete  this action. This w ould induce a cost of 
63 Euro per business based on average EU labour costs (191 million Euro for all EU businesses). 
As a second step, the business would define the information re garding ADR to be presented 
to consumers. The business would need to identify the competent ADR scheme in order to be able to provide this information to its clients. Interviews with businesses indicate that this action would be the least time-consuming of al l one-off actions (one ho ur per business) and 
also the least costly (32 Euro per business). 
As a third step, employees who deal with cons umers complaints would need to be informed 
about the possibility for consumers to contact  the competent ADR scheme in case of a 
dispute, so that they can provide this information to consumers. For example, the business may provide to relevant employees a shor t document describing the possibility for a 
                                                
 
174 We assume that a central re gistry would be available. 
 
EN 140   EN consumer to contact the competent ADR scheme in case s/he is not satisfied with the way the 
business has handled his/her complaint. The results  of the interviews suggest that this action 
would be completed by a manage r or a professional in slightly  more than two hours. This 
would generate a cost of 71 Euro per business. 
As a fourth step, the business would add the information on ADR  to its contracts, invoices, 
receipts, websites, and brochures/l eaflets. Interviews with businesses indicate that this action 
would be the most time-consuming (four hours) of  all one-off actions related to the obligation 
to inform consumers on ADR. It would also be  the most costly (88 Euro per business). 
Several businesses interviewed were of the opinion that br ochures and leaflets do not 
constitute an adequate means to inform consumers about ADR. They considered these 
documents as marketing materials which primarily  aim to present their products and services. 
Adding information on consumer ADR in a leaf let or brochure would take a half-hour on 
average, according to the information provided by three businesses that  could provide such 
estimates. If we assume that updating leafle ts and brochures would be performed by 
‘technicians and associate professionals’, as s uggested by the data collected, the cost of 
adding information on consumer ADR in leafle ts and brochures would amount on average to 
9 Euro per type of brochure or leaflet.175 One small business indicated that adding a 
paragraph on consumer ADR to the template of  its invoices would be  done by an external 
company, which would charge 70 Euro for completing this task. 
As a final step, the business would need to reproduce the amended templates of contracts, 
invoices, receipts, and brochures /leaflets. All businesses interv iewed reported that templates 
of these documents are printed on demand or  reprinted at least once every two years. 
Reproducing the amended templates of contracts,  invoices, receipts, a nd leaflets/brochures 
therefore would not imply any additional effort  for EU businesses, under the assumption that 
a transition period of at least two years for the implementation of the information obligation 
would be granted to them.176  
We also asked interviewees about the cost of printing a notice to inform consumers about 
ADR to be displayed at points of sale.177 The data collected suggest that the printing cost of a 
notice is very low (about 0.10 Euro per copy or less).178 In addition, interviews with 
businesses revealed that not all EU businesses may incur this cost. For example, some businesses may already display posters that in clude information on ADR in their points of 
sale, as reported by a Roma nian mobile phone operator.
179 In other countries, businesses may 
regularly print posters to comply with their le gal obligations. This is the case for example in 
                                                 
175 This figure may differ significantly across businesses, as some businesses may have to update more 
documents than others. 
176 However, in some cases it may not be possible for businesses to provide updated terms and conditions 
to consumers within this transition period. For example, one business in the sector of mobile telecommunications noted that SIM cards sold for prepaid mobile services are offered in sealed 
packages which contain the terms and conditions of sale. It may be possible that even after the end of 
the transition period, the stock of SIM cards available in a shop would not be fully renewed, and that a consumer would purchase a SIM card without the new ADR information. 
177 It is assumed that the size of the notice would be equivalent to an A6 paper size (105 mm × 148 mm). 
178 This figure is based on the information reported by  a network of travel agen cies which estimated that 
the total cost of printing a notice for each of its 1,800 points of sale would amount to 190 Euro (i.e. 0.10 
Euro per notice). Printing costs for black and white  copies from commercial printers are typically 
lower. 
179 According to this business, Romanian telecommunications companies are obliged by law to display 
posters in their shops which provide information on consumer rights, including ADR.  
 
EN 141   EN Denmark, where banks must display posters in their branches to inform consumers about 
prices of most common products. If inform ation on consumer ADR were added to such 
documents, Danish banks would not incur any a dditional cost, as these posters already must 
be regularly reprinted to upda te the price information. Agai nst this background and the low 
cost of printing a notice, we can conclude th at displaying a small notice on consumer ADR at 
points of sale would not create significant costs for businesses.  This cost therefore has not 
been included in Table 9 above. 
 
EN 142   EN ANNEX VIII:  IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter')180 has become legally binding. All 
legislative proposals of the Commission are subject  to a systematic check to ensure their 
compliance with the Charter181. This annex assesses the imp act on the following relevant 
fundamental rights embodi ed in the Charter: 
 
• Consumer protection (Article 38 of the Charter)182 
The Alternative Dispute Resolution initiative will contribute to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection by providi ng consumers cheap and quick non judicial means to solve 
their disputes with traders bo th for national and cross-border disputes. This initiative will 
make sure that consumers can access quality ADR schemes or schemes that respect certain standards, such as impartiality, transparen cy and effectiveness. These principles will 
guarantee a fair outcome for consumers. They w ill also guarantee that consumers will receive 
all the information they need to take an informed decision before starting the procedure. Finally, the procedure will be free of charge or  of low costs for consumers, quick and simple. 
While all policy options ensure a high level of  consumer protection, as required by Article 38 
of the Charter, as regards the Alternative Dispute Resolution policy options 3 (binding legal instrument providing for the establishment of ADR schemes)  and 4 (a standard EU ADR 
model) and as regards the Online Dispute Re solution policy options 3 (an EU web-based 
system) and 4 (single ODR body at EU level) pr omote this right further, by providing  the 
possibility for  consumers to refer all their domestic and cr oss-border disputes to quality 
ADR/ODR schemes.  
 
• Right to an effective remedy (Article 47 of the Charter) 
All policy options on ADR and on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) respect the right to an 
effective remedy. The policy options on ADR/ODR  do not affect the right of consumers or 
businesses to an effective remedy. None of the policy options deprives consumers and businesses of their right to go to court in case their rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law 
are violated. ADR schemes are not designed to  replace court procedures but to offer 
consumers and businesses a complementary tool to  solve their disputes before going to court, 
if necessary. Recourse to ADR be fore going to court will not be made a mandatory first step. 
In addition, the initiative will set common st andards for ADR/ODR schemes along the lines 
of standards under the right to a fair trial. ADR schemes have to be impartial, disputes shall 
                                                
 
180 OJ 2010 C 83/02, 389 
181  Communication from the Commission Strategy on the effective implementation of the Charter, 
COM(2010) 573 final, available at: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexU riServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0573:FIN:EN:PDF   
182 Union policies must ensure a high level of consum er protection. This right is based on Article 169 
TFEU, according to which "the Unio n shall contribute to protectin g the … economic interests of 
consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information [and] education".  
 
EN 143   EN be dealt with in a short period of time, and the parties should not be prevented from being 
represented or assisted. 
• Protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter) and Respect for private 
and family life (Article 7 of the Charter) 
Article 7 of the Charter guarant ees everyone the right to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home and communications. Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union expressly recognises the fundament al right to the protection of personal data 
of any natural person.   
The initiative foresees the development of an IT platform to deal with disputes between 
consumers and traders related to e-commerce transactions. This platform will process personal data, at this stage- in particular names, addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail 
addresses of the parties. All the necessary step s will be taken to guarantee that personal data 
will be processed in line with the EU data protection legislation
183, in particular fairly and for 
the purpose of dealing with the disputes, and w ill not be made available to the public. The 
parties will in particular be informed and each  party will be able to access its personal data 
and to rectify it. The platform will enable confidential and secure communication under the 
supervision of the European Data Protectio n Supervisor and nati onal data protection 
supervisory authorities.  
As mentioned in paragraph 7.1 of the IA, the flexibility and voluntar y nature of ADR can 
weaken the efficiency of ADR for consumers, due to the lack of involveme nt of the trader in 
the ADR procedure, leaving consumers with their problem unresolved. It is therefore 
important to create incentives for businesses to engage in the ADR process. . One of these incentives may include the publication of yearly statis tics on traders that refuse to take part in 
the ADR process or to comply with an ADR outcome. The publication will always be made 
on the basis of objective criteria, in particular th e fact that the trader is not part of the ADR 
scheme, that the trader, because of the voluntar y nature of ADR, refused to engage in the 
ADR procedure or that the trader did not comply with the ADR outcome. . 
                                                
 
183 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data; OJ L 281 , 23/11/1995, p.31. 
 
EN 144   EN ANNEX IX: OVERVIEW OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TH E POLICY OPTIONS IN MONETARY TERMS  
Tables I and II summarise the costs and benefi ts in monetary terms of each policy op tion, as examined in paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2  
I) ADR coverage, information and quality 
Costs (in million euro)  
Policy Options 
Implementation   Administrative  Total  
Benefits (in billion euro) 
( in terms of consumer savings) 
Policy Option 1 0 0 0 0 
Policy Option 2 0 to depending (€0.1 to more than €1 million 
per scheme) 0 - €771 0 - €1.771.000  0 to €20 billion184 
Policy Option 3 Depending (€0.1 to more than €1 million per 
scheme) up to €771  €1.771.000  €20 billion 
Policy Option 4 Depending (€0.1 to more than €1 million per 
scheme)+ additional costs for adjustment to 
the EU ADR model (it is not possible to quantify these adjustment costs due to lack 
of available relevant data) up to €771  
> €1.771.000  up to €20 billion 
 
  
                                                
 
184  Representing 0.17% of EU GDP  
 
EN 145   EN II) Online Dispute Resolution for cross-border e-commerce transactions 
Costs (in million euro)  
Policy Options 
Implementation   Administrative  Total  
Benefits (in billion euro) 
(in terms of consumer savings) 
Policy Option 1 0 0 0 0 
Policy Option 2 €0.1 for EU budget + costs for Member States for 
making available ADR schemes for cross border e-commerce transactions. These costs can vary 
significantly between Me mber States and they 
cannot be accurately estimate d due to lack of data. 
There are no ADR schemes in Member States 
dealing exclusively with cross-border e-commerce 
transactions. Judging from few examples of 
schemes dealing with either cross-border or online 
cases (e.g. Risolvi Online in Italy or A.M.C.E in France) an average cost for the establishment 
could be about €0.5 million and the running costs 
between €0.05 and €0.3 million. 0 Up to €900.000 0 - €2.5 billion
185 
Policy Option 3 € 2 million for the establishment +  €0.3 million 
for annual running costs +€1million for ECC 
network 0 €3,3million (the first 
year),-€1.3 million 
annually €2.5 billion 
Policy Option 4 € 2 million for the establishment + €3 million 
annually 0 €5 million (the first 
year), €3,5 million 
annually up to €2.5 billion 
 
                                                 
185  Representing 0.17% of EU GDP  
 
EN 146   EN ANNEX X: MAPPING EXERCISE ON EXISTING ADR  SCHEMES FOR FOUR MAIN SECTORS (ENERGY , TRANSPORT AND TOURISM , 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES ) 
 
ENERGY 
 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY COMMENTS 
1 Austria ENERGIE-CONTROL GMBH General - public ADR 
2 Belgium Service de médiation de l'Energie  Sector specific - public ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic ADR platform within the Mini stry of Industry an d Trade  Public ADR 
6 Denmark Energy Supplies Complaint Board  Private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC) General  - public ADR 
8 Finland Consumers Complaints Board (Kuluttajariitalautakunta) General – public ADR 
9 France • Médiateur National de l'Energie 
• Médiation d'Electricité de France (Le médiateur EDF) 
• Médiateur de GDF SUEZ  General – public ADR 
Sector specific – public ADR 
General 
10 Germany  Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband  General- Public ADR 
 
EN 147   EN 11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinig oros tou Katanaloti)   General - public ADR 
12 Hungary Arbitration Boards General  - public ADR 
13 Ireland Commission for Energy Regulation Sector specific – public ADR 
14 Italy  Enel ADR  Sector specific – private ADR 
15 Latvia Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC)  General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania • The State Energy Inspectorate under the Ministry of Economy  
• The National Control Commission for Prices and Energy Public ADR 
Public ADR 
17 Luxembourg   
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands Disputes Committee on Energy and Water works (organised under the Foundation for 
Consumer Complaints Board) 
 Sector specific – private ADR 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY COMMENTS 
20 Poland Ombudsman at the Energy Regulatory Office (disputes with fuel gas and energy suppliers) Sector specific – public ADR 
21 Portugal Entidade Reguladora dos Servicos Energeticos (electricity sector)  
 Sector specific – public ADR 
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
 
EN 148   EN 24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo General – public ADR 
26 Sweden The National Board for Consumer Complaints (ARN) General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom Energy Ombudsman  General – public ADR 
 
TRANSPORT & TOURISM 
 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY - AVIATION COMMENTS 
1 Austria   
2 Belgium Commission des disputes de voyages   Sector specific – private ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bu lgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic   
6 Denmark Travel Industry Complaints  Board Sector specific – private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC)  General – public ADR 
8 Finland The Consumer Complaints Board General – public ADR 
9 France Ombudsman appointed to deal with air passengers' complaints following volcanic ash Sector specific – public ADR 
 
EN 149   EN disruption  
10 Germany  Schlichtungsstelle Mobilitaet (The Conciliation Body for Long-Distance 
Travel) Sector specific – public ADR 
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General – public ADR 
12 Hungary Arbitration Boards  General – public ADR 
13 Ireland   
14 Italy    
15 Latvia  Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre  General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania National Consumer Rights Protection Board   
17 Luxembourg Commission Luxembourgeoise des Litiges  de Voyages Sector specific – private ADR  
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands Aviation Litigation Committee(organise d under the Foundation for Consumer Complaints 
Board) Sector specific – private ADR 
20 Poland   
21 Portugal   
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo  General – public ADR 
 
EN 150   EN 26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom  Association of British Travel Agents ABTA ltd Private ADR 
 
 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY- MARITIME COMMENTS 
1 Austria   
2 Belgium Commission des disputes de voyages Sector specific – private ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic   
6 Denmark Travel Industry Complaints  Board Sector specific – private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC)  General – public ADR 
8 Finland The Consumer Complaints Board General – public ADR 
9 France  
  
10 Germany Schlichtungsstelle Mobilitaet (The Conciliation Body for Long-Distance 
Travel) Sector specific – public ADR 
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General – public ADR 
 
EN 151   EN 12 Hungary Arbitration Boards  General – public ADR 
13 Ireland   
14 Italy    
15 Latvia  Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC) General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania National Consumer Rights Protection Board   
17 Luxembourg Commission Luxembourgeoise des Litiges  de Voyages Sector specific – private ADR 
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands   
20 Poland   
21 Portugal   
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo  General – public ADR 
26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom  Association of British Travel agents ABTA ltd Private ADR 
 
 
 
EN 152   EN No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY-URBAN TRANSPORT COMMENTS 
1 Austria   
2 Belgium Service de médiation auprès de la Société des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles (STIB) Sector specific  
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic   
6 Denmark Complaint Board for Bus, Train and Metro Sector specific – private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC)  General – public ADR 
8 Finland The Consumer Complaints Board General – public ADR 
9 France Le Médiateur de la RATP   
10 Germany • Schlichtungsstelle Öffentlicher Persone nverkehr - Arbitration Board for 
Public Passenger Transport  
• Schlichtungsstelle Nahverkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen Arbitration 
Board for Local Public Transport in North Rhine-Westphalia 
• Schlichtungsstelle Nahverkehr Ost (Schlichtungsstelle 
Nahverkehr Berlin/Brandenburg/Sachsen-Anha lt) - Arbitration Board for Local Public 
Transport East 
• Ombudsstelle Nahverkehr Bayern - Ombudspoint for Local Public Transport 
Bavaria Ombudsstelle Nahverkehr Baden-Württemberg - Ombudspoint for Local Public 
Transport Baden-Württemberg  
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General – public ADR 
 
EN 153   EN 12 Hungary Arbitration Boards   General – public ADR 
13 Ireland   
14 Italy    
15 Latvia Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC) 
 
 
 General – public ADR 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY-URBAN TRANSPORT COMMENTS 
16 Lithuania National Consumer Rights Protection Board   
17 Luxembourg Sector specific – private ADR Sector specific – private ADR 
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands Public Transport Arbitration Board (org anised under the Foundation for Consumer Complaints 
Board)  
20 Poland   
21 Portugal   
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
24 Slovenia   
 
EN 154   EN 25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo General – public ADR 
26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom  Association of British Travel agents ABTA ltd Private ADR 
 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY- RAILWAY  COMMENTS 
1 Austria   
2 Belgium • Rail Ombudsman Service-Service de médiation auprès de la SNCB  
• Commission des disputes de voyages Sector specific – public ADR 
Sector specific – Private ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic   
6 Denmark Travel Industry Complaints  Board Sector specific – private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC)  General – public ADR 
8 Finland The Consumer Complaints Board General – public ADR 
9 France Médiateur de la SNCF   
 Sector specific – public ADR 
10 Germany Schlichtungsstelle Mobilitaet (The Conciliation Body  for Long-Distance Travel) Sector specific – public ADR 
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General  - public ADR 
 
EN 155   EN 12 Hungary Arbitration Boards  General – public ADR 
13 Ireland   
14 Italy    
15 Latvia Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC) General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania National Consumer Rights Protection Board   
17 Luxembourg Commission Luxembourgeoise des Litiges  de Voyages Sector specific – private ADR 
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands Public Transport Arbitration Board (organised under the Foundation for Consumer 
Complaints Board)  
20 Poland   
21 Portugal   
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo  General – public ADR 
26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom  Association of British Travel agents ABTA ltd Private ADR 
 
 
 
EN 156   EN No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY- TOURISM  COMMENTS 
1 Austria   
2 Belgium  Commission des disputes de voyages Sector specific – private ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic   
6 Denmark • Travel Industry Complaint Board 
• Complaint Board for Hotel, Restaurant and Tourism Sector specific – private ADR 
Private ADR 
7 Estonia The Consumer Complaints Committee (CCC)  General – public ADR 
8 Finland The Consumer Complaints Board General – public ADR 
9 France   
10 Germany Reiseschiedsstelle Sector specific – private ADR 
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General  - public ADR 
12 Hungary Arbitration Boards   General – public ADR 
13 Ireland Arbitration scheme for tour operators  
14 Italy    
15 Latvia Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC) General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania National Consumer Rights Protection Board   
 
EN 157   EN 17 Luxembourg Commission Luxembourgeoise des Litiges de Voyages  Sector specific – private ADR 
18 Malta   
19 Netherlands   
20 Poland   
21 Portugal   
22 Romania  National Authority for Consumer Protection  Public ADR 
23 Slovakia   
24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo  General – public ADR 
26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom  Association of British Travel agents ABTA ltd Private ADR 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
  
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY COMMENTS 
1 Austria • Conciliation in the field of telecommunications  
(Schlichtung in Telekommunikationsangelegenheiten) 
• Internet Ombudsman – Austrian Institu te for Applied Telecommunications 
(Osterreichisches Institut für a ngewandte Telekommunikation –OIAT) Sector specific- public ADR 
 
General-private ADR 
 
EN 158   EN 2 Belgium Ombudsman for telecommunication problems 
(Service de médiation pour les télécommunications) Sector specific – public ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus The Commissioner of Electronic Communications and Post Offices General 
5 Czech Republic Czech Telecommunica tion Office General – public ADR  
6 Denmark Telecommunications Complaints Board Private ADR 
7 Estonia Consumer Complaints Committee General – public ADR 
8 Finland Consumer Complaints  Board General – public ADR 
9 France •  Médiateur des Communications électroniques  
•  Médiateur Du Net du Forum des droits sur l'internet Public ADR 
General 
10 Germany Bundesnetzagentur – Schlichtungsstelle Telekommunikation  Sector specific – public ADR 
11 Greece The Hellenic Consumers' Ombudsman (Sinigor os tou Katanaloti)   General – public ADR 
12 Hungary Arbitration Boards  General – public ADR 
13 Ireland   
14 Italy  Conciliation body of Telecom Italia Sector specific – private ADR 
15 Latvia Consumer Complaints handling of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (PTAC) General – public ADR 
16 Lithuania National Consumer rights protection Board   
17 Luxembourg   
 
EN 159   EN 18 Malta   
19 Netherlands Telecommunications Disputes Committee (organised under the Foundation for Consumer 
Complaints Board) Sector specific – private ADR 
20 Poland •  President of the Office of Electronic Communication (mediation) 
• Permanent Consumer Court of Arbitration  
 General – public ADR 
General – public ADR 
 
21 Portugal National Arbitration Centre  General – public ADR 
22 Romania National Authority for management and Regulation in Communications of Romania Public ADR 
23 Slovakia Telecommunications office of the Slovak Republic (Teleoff) Sector specific – public ADR 
24 Slovenia   
25 Spain National Consumer Arbitration Board and Regional Juntas Arbitrales de Consumo General – public ADR 
26 Sweden National Board for Consumer Protection General – public ADR 
27 United Kingdom • OTELO- Office of Telecommunications Ombudsman 
• Communications and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS) Sector specific – Public ADR 
 
 
  
 
 
 
EN 160   EN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
No MEMBER STATE ADR BODY COMMENTS 
1 Austria 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) Joint Conciliation Board of the Austrian Banking (Austrian Banking Ombudsman) Sector specific 
2 Belgium  
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Insurance Ombudsman 
• Mediation Service Banks – Credit – Investments 
• Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission Sector specific  
Sector specific – private ADR 
General – public ADR 
3 Bulgaria Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mediation Centre General – private ADR 
4 Cyprus   
5 Czech Republic (FIN-
NET MEMBER) Financial Arbitrator of the Czech Republic  Public ADR 
6 Denmark 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Complaint Board of Danish Secu rities and Brokering Companies 
• Insurance Complaints Board 
• Danish Complaint Board of Investment Funds 
•  Danish Complaint Board of Banking Services  
• Danish Mortgage Credit Complaint Board Private ADR 
Private ADR 
Private ADR 
Sector specific – private ADR Sector specific – private ADR 
7 Estonia Insurance Court of Arbitration  Sector specific 
 
EN 161   EN 8 Finland 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Finnish Financial Ombudsman Bureau (T he Finnish Insurance, Securities 
and Banking Complaint Boards) 
• Consumer Complaints Board  General  
 
General – public ADR 
9 France 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • AMF Ombudsman (Médiateur de l'Autorité des Marches Financiers) 
• Mediator of the French Association of Specialised Finance 
Companies(ASF) 
• Insurance Mediator Public ADR 
  
Sector specific – private ADR  
10 Germany 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • German Savings Banks Association 
• Ombudsman of German Cooperative Banks 
• Ombudsman of German Public Sector Banks 
• Ombudsman Scheme of the Private Commercial Banks 
• Ombudsman Private Health and Long-term Care Insurance 
• Arbitration Board at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
• Arbitration Board of the Landesbausparkassen (LBS) 
• Association of Private Building Societies – Customer Complaints System 
•  Insurance Ombudsman 
• Department of consumer and investor protection at the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) 
• Arbitration Board at the Baden Savings Banks and Giro Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Wurttemberg Savings Bank And Giro Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Bavari an Savings Bank Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Berlin Savings Bank Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Eat German Savings Bank and Giro Association 
• Complaints management at the Bremen Savings Bank 
• Complaints management at the Bremerhaven city Savings Bank 
• Customer complaints management at the Hamburg Savings Bank 
• Arbitration Board at the Hesse-T huringia Savings Bank and Giro  Sector specific -  
Sector specific – private ADR Sector specific – private ADR 
Sector specific – private ADR 
 
Sector specific – public ADR 
 
sector specific – private only 
 
general – public ADR 
 
 
EN 162   EN Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Lower Saxony Savings Bank and Giro Association 
• Arbitration board at the Westphalia-Lippe Savings Bank and Giro 
Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Rhineland Palatinate savings banks 
• Arbitration Board at the Rhineland-Palatinate Savings Bank and Giro  
Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Saar Sa vings Bank and Giro Association 
• Arbitration Board at the Schleswig-Holstein Savings Bank and Giro  
Association  
 
 
  
 
  
11 Greece 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Hellenic Ombudsman for Banking – Investment Services (H.O.B.I.S.)  
• Insurance Ombudsman General – private ADR 
 
12 Hungary 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) Arbitration Board of Budapest General – public ADR 
13 Ireland 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) Financial Services Ombudsman's Bureau / Biúró an Ombudsman um Sheirbhísí Airgeadais  General – public ADR 
14 Italy  
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • ISVAP – Supervisory body for private insurance 
Conciliatore Bancario Finanziario (Mediation scheme)  
• Conciliatore Bancario Finanziario (Ombudsman scheme) General – private ADR 
 
General – private ADR 
15 Latvia • Ombudsman of the Association of Commercial Banks  
• Ombudsman of the Association of Latvian Insurers   Sector specific – private ADR 
 
EN 163   EN Sector specific – private ADR 
16 Lithuania  
(FIN-NET MEMBER) National Consumer rights protection Board  
17 Luxembourg 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF)  
•  Médiateur en Assurances  - Insurance Mediator General – public ADR 
Sector specific  
18 Malta 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) Consumer Complaints Manager of the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA)  General – public ADR 
19 Netherlands 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening (Kifid)  – Financial Services Complaints 
Institute  General 
 
20 Poland 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Banking Ombudsman 
•  Insurance Ombudsman  
• Arbitration Court at the Polish Financial Supervision Authority General – private ADR 
General – public ADR 
General – public ADR 
21 Portugal 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • CMVM – Portuguese Securities Market Commission  
• Lisbon Arbitration Centre for Consumer Conflicts Sector specific – public ADR 
General – public ADR 
22 Romania National Authority for Consumer Protection Public ADR 
23 Slovakia Permanent Arbitration Court of the Association of Banks at the National Bank of Slovakia General  
24 Slovenia • Insurance Ombudsman of the Slovenian Insurance Association 
• Mediation centre of the Slovenian Insurance Association  
• Arbitration Scheme for insurance claims  at the Triglav Insurance Company  
• Mediation centre of the Bank Association of Slovenia Sector specific – private ADR 
Sector specific – private ADR 
 
EN 164   EN Sector Specific – Private ADR 
Sector specific 
25 Spain 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Investor Assistance Office – Inve stors Division of the CNMV 
• Complaints Service of the Direct orate-General of Insurance and  
Pension Funds (DGSFP) 
•  Complaints Service of the Bank of Spain  
• Complaints service of the Spanish Securities Commission  
 
 
26 Sweden 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) National Board for Consumer Complaints  General – public ADR  
27 United Kingdom 
(FIN-NET MEMBER) • Financial Ombudsman Service  
• Consumer Credit Trade Association 
• Finance and Leasing Association 
• Financial Services Compensation Scheme General – public ADR 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
EN 165   EN  
ANNEX XI: TIME-LINE FOR THE TRANSPOSITION OF THE PREFERRED OPTION  
  
 
    
 
        
2015 2012 2013 2017 2016 2014 2019 2021 2011ADR Directive 
ODR Regulation 
Draft ADR Directive 
Draft ODR Regulation Adoption ADR Directive 
Adoption ODR Regulation Provision of the Regul ation fully applicable 
Commission 
biannual re ports ADR/ODR
Commission 
evaluation re port ADR/ODR Entr y into force
Entr y into forceDeadline for 
implementation MS annual 
implementation report 
Development of the EU platform ADR linked 
to platform 
 
EN 166   EN ANNEX XII:  THE COST OF NON ADR - BENEFITS FOR BUSINESSES  
1. Introduction 
Given the broadness of the subject, the multiplicity of the issues covered, and in view of each 
Member state having its own cont ext, traditions and practices, generalisa tions about ADR is 
not easy to make, nor it is possible to provide comprehensiv e country-to-country 
comparisons. An additional factor is that data collections are rather rudimentary in spite of combined research efforts.
186  
A recent study carried out by Civic187 shows that financial service (64%), telecommunications 
and postal services (22%),  non-food consumer goods (6%), transport and package 
travel/tourism (5%), energy, water supply and hea ting (3%) are those sect ors that account for 
more than 90% of ADR cases in Europe188. Hence, the analysis will focus on these main 
sectors only189. According to the data provided by Eurostat, the total number of EU 
businesses working in these sectors is appr oximately 3.8 million. For the assessment of 
administrative and compliance costs for EU busin esses, the study assumes that the number of 
ADR cases would lie between the most recent number of ADR cases, 506.351 – 1.01 cases 
per 1.000 inhabitants- (current  situation scenario) and 885.742190  cases -1.77 ADR cases per 
1.000 inhabitants (rapid growth scenario)191.  
1.1 Administrative and compliance costs 
The study provides a distinct ion between administrative192 and compliance193 costs and 
estimates for one-off194 and recurring costs195, respectively. In addition, it gives an overview 
of the costs spent during the first year of act ivity and following years. It emerges that EU 
businesses would incur a total cost of €1.035 million during year 1 linked to information 
obligation and use of ADR196 and a total cost of €136 to €238 million in year 2 and 
                                                 
186  Cross-Border Alternative dispute resolution in the European Union p.13  
187  Assessment of the compliance costs, including administrative costs/burdens on businesses linked to use of alternative dispute  
resolution (ADR), 2011, Civic consulting of the consumer Policy evaluation Consortium (CPEC).  
188  Civic study on the assessment of compliance costs.  
189  The number of businesses belonging to each of these sectors are as follows as under lined by the Eurostat structural Business 
statistics, which provide information on the number of busine sses according to the statistical classification of economic activ ities 
(NACE): financial services: 15.521; telecommunications and postal services 83.393; non-food consumer goods 2.366.904; 
transport and package travel/tourism 667.782; energy, water supply, heating 21.564.  
190  (64% of cases would occur in financial services, for a total number of 566.875 case, 22%in telecommunications and postal 
services for a total of 194863 cases, 6% for non-food for a total 53.145 case, trans port and package travel/tourism for a total  of 
44.287 and 3% in the energy, water supply and heating for a total of 26.572 cases).  
191  This estimation has been done extrapolating the number of ADR cases collected from 2002-2008 using a linear regression until 
2013 (assuming a transition period of 2 years). However, it must be noted that the ra te of increase will not follow a linear gr owth 
indefinitely but rather a maximum number at  some point in time (see footnote 5).  
192  Administrative costs on businesses are referred to be those co sts that result from businesses'  legal obligations to provide 
information in relation to ADR to consumers. This includes the costs related to the obligation of  businesses to inform consumer s 
about the existence of general or sector-s pecific ADR schemes in the Member states where they operate ( for example, by 
including information regarding ADR in their commercial practices).  
193  Compliance costs to businesses are consider ed in this assessment to be those costs that result from their involvement in the ADR 
process. This includes, for example, cost s to businesses resulting from handling a co mplaint submitted to an ADR scheme, from 
the moment the trader is aware that a consumer complaint will be taken to ADR.  
194  This kind of costs imply costs that are only sustained once in connection with the business adapting to the new information 
obligations resulting from the involvement of business in ADR procedures.  
195  Recurring actions are actions that must be conducted for each case received by the business from the ADR scheme. They imply 
recurring costs for businesses.  
196  Report on Assessment of the compliance costs including administ rative costs/burdens on businesses linked to the use of ADR, 
2011, Civic Consulting.  
 
EN 167   EN subsequent year. In year 1, this concretely  means, on average, a one-off cost of € 254 per 
business. However, it should be noted that fina ncial companies would not incur such a cost 
because during the two years transition commercia l documents are expected to be updated in 
any case. In year 2 and subsequent years,  the cost would be around €136-€238 million and 
this is lower because the information costs ha ve already been incurre d in Year 1. About a 
third of these costs (€48-€84 million per year) would be one-off costs incurred by businesses 
when involved in an ADR case for the first time. The other two thirds of the costs (€88 – €154 million) incurred in year 2 and subsequent  years would relate o the recurring costs 
resulting from the involvement of businesses in ADR cases. The compliance cost depends on 
the sectors: the data collected  indicates that in order to  handle a complaint through the 
ADR/ODR system financial pr oviders incur a comp liance cost of €221 per case while 
businesses in other sectors of activity  incur a cost of € 93. (See figure 6).  
1.2 One-off costs related to inform ation obligation on consumer ADR 
As defined by the study, one-off costs are only sustained once by businesses. These costs are 
mainly divided in two main categories: actions  related to the provision of information in 
relation to ADR to consumers and actions resu lting from the involvement of businesses in 
ADR cases.  
The total amount incurred would be to €845 – €881 million for the first year of application 
and information obligation, and as said be fore, €48-€84 million for the second year and 
subsequent years. The first year, the average co sts incurred by businesses would therefore be 
around €726  while for the financial services this co st would be slightly higher and be around 
€854 . On the contrary on the s econd year, it would be €472  while for the financial sector 
would be around €600197 (figure 7).  
2. The cost of non ADR  
1st scenario : Court length procedure: 697 days/ Court average cost: € 25337  
ADR length procedure: 90 days/ ADR average cost: € 854 Court + ADR: 787 days/ Costs: €26191  
As already mentioned, the data available do not allow us to have an exact overview of the 
state of play of ADR in each memb er state. That is why in order to have an analysis which is 
closer to our current context, we assume two scenarios: one that is based on a recent survey 
published by the ADR Center on the Cost of Non-ADR – Surveying and showing the actual 
costs of Intra-community Commercial Litigation and the other one is an  internal analysis 
made by the Commission services having in mi nd the first scenario as an extreme ratio. As 
we will see, in the second scenario, we maintain a very conservative estimation.  
 
 
                                                
 
197  It must be noted that, case handling fees and external legal costs are not considered in the estimates provided in the tables . The 
assessment of compliance and administrative costs for EU busine sses is based on data provided by  businesses on time estimates 
and levels of qualification needed for completing each recurring and one-off action.  
 
 
EN 168   EN  
2.1 ADR: benefits for businesses  
According to a recent survey198, over two-thirds of busin esses reported spending a 
considerable amount of their budget to annual le gal costs incurred as a result of cross-border 
disputes. More particularly, a third of the respondents (27%) indicated that they spent 
between €10.000 and €50.000  on legal fees  in relation to cross-bor der legal cases.  In 
addition, a further 18% spent even more than this  to deal with these disputes. In addition to 
legal expenses, almost two thirds  of the retailers claimed they incurred other significant costs 
(opportunity costs, cost of staff time, etc199). 
At the same time, the survey provides also a clear overview on the length and costs of a 
domestic dispute in the EU for a value of € 200.000 : the length of a procedure varies 
accordingly to the Member State, and notably from 246 days (almost one year) in Germany to 2205 days (more than 6 years) in Italy. The averag e length to solve a di spute in the European 
Union is about two years (697 
days).  
Looking at the costs incurred by companies, the most expensive dispute resolution take place 
in Sweden (€ 65.710), followed by Ireland (€ 53.800), Slovakia (€ 51.993) and United Kingdom (€ 51.536). The less expensive are f ound in Cyprus (€6.796), Latvia (€ 6900), 
Slovenia (€ 8087) and Malta (€8100). On average,  on a yearly basis, a domestic litigation 
dispute costs about € 25.337
200.   
According to a study delivered by Civic201, when ADR is successful, disputes are resolved in 
90 days.  Furthermore, taking a very conservativ e range of data, the costs are reduced to €854 
202.  
To evaluate the impact of the ADR/ODR system, we first use a one-step approach as the basis 
of comparison. A one-step approach is when disput ants proceed directly to  the courts to solve 
a dispute. This approach is one-step in the sense that it does not use any ADR scheme to 
                                                 
198  The Cost of Non-ADR – Surveying and showing the actual co sts of Intra-community Commerc ial Litigation. Funded by the 
European Union (EC – funded "specific programme Civil Justi ce 2007-2013), implemented by a consortium led by ADR Center, 
in collaboration with the European Compan y Lawyers Association (ECLA) and the Eur opean association of Craft, Small and 
Medium sized Enterprises (UEAPME). This study was also used to quantify the cost of not using mediation by the European 
Parliament (Directorate General for internal policies, Policy department citizens' rights and constitutional affairs and on a s tudy 
issued by the European Parliament, 2011, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet docs/2009_2014/documents/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf 
It was also used by the policy department on Economic and sc ientific policy of the European parliament on "Cross-border 
Alternative dispute resolution in the European Union", 2011, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documen t/activities/cont/201105/2 0110518ATT19592/20110518ATT19592E N.pdf. It was also 
mentioned by DG Just in cooperation with  the CESS (Center for Strategy and evaluati on services)  to assess the study for an 
impact assessment on a draft legislative pr oposal on the attachment of bank accounts: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ci vil/files/bank_attachments_en.pdf  
199  They are not included in our analysis.  
200  The survey does not provide a detailed, country-by country br eakdown of how the estimates for time and costs were calculated 
but does give an example based on Austria. For this country, for instance, the time estimates were filing and service (30), cou rt 
proceedings (300) and enforcement (210). In  the case of costs, these are estimated as follows: €10,400 (legal fees), €3,780 (co urt 
fees) and €480 (enforcement). For a total of 14.660 €.  
201  Report on Assessment of the compliance costs including administ rative costs/burdens on businesses linked to the use of ADR, 
2011, Civic Consulting.  
202  This is a conservative data: € 854 refers  to the total costs incurred in year one.  
 
EN 169   EN resolve the dispute before going to court. In our case, we assume that disputants recur first to 
ADR (step one), and only if the ADR fails, th e disputants proceed to court (step two)203.  
Using a baseline of 100 disputes, if we c onsider a 60% success rate of ADR (i.e. 60  disputes 
are settled within 90 days ), and the other 40% of the disp utes ADR failed and the disputes 
then proceed to court (i.e. 40 disputes are se ttled in 787 days through ADR and then court): 
per dispute, we estimate a weighted average of 369  days to resolve the disputes and €10.989  
to pay for the disputes using the two-step approach in EU. 204 In terms of savings, this means 
€ 14.349.  
Even with a success rate at 50% savings in te rms of cost and time are strongly in favour of 
using the ADR/ODR system. In EU, if ADR was used and successful 50% of the time, each 
dispute was resolved in 439  days, with a time saving of 258  days while the costs were 
reduced by €11.814.  
2.2 What is the percentage success rate at which ADR is not a financially viable or a 
time-saving option?  
Applying the calculation descri bed above, and using a progressi vely lower success rate of 
ADR to find the break-even point, the data shows th at it is not necessary to achieve even a   
marginally average percentage of compliance for ADR to save time. For the EU, the lowest 
break-even point is at 13%. This could be also considered as the point at which using an ADR 
does not create any time advantage. (Figure 1). This concretely means that the ADR in the 
EU must fail 97% of the time in order to  no create any time savings for businesses.  
Figure 1 - Time savings in EU- the break-even point   
-200,00-100,000,00100,00200,00300,00400,00500,00600,00
0,90 0,75 0,60 0,50 0,25 0,13 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02
Success rate of ADRTime savings (Days)Break-even 
point:13% of 
Success rate
 
                                                 
203  The number of days saved using the two-step approach, are cal culated as a weighted average of the estimated duration of the 
ADR process and the duration of court cases in the disputes wh ere ADR has failed. To calculate the weighted average time it 
takes for EU Member States to resolve a dispute using the tw o-step approach with a certain estimated ADR success rate, the 
formula is the length of time (in days) it takes to use ADR mu ltiplied by the percentage ADR su ccess rate plus the length of ti me 
it takes to use ADR and then proceed to co urt multiplied by the percentage ADR failure  rate. To calculate the weighted average 
expenses it costs for EU Member States to resolve a dispute us ing a certain estimated ADR success rate, the formula is the cost  
(in Euros) to use ADR multiplied by the pe rcentage ADR success rate plus the expens e it costs to take to use ADR and then 
proceed to court multiplied by th e percentage ADR failure rate.  
204  The time average for ADR in EU at a 60% ADR success rate us ing the two-step approach is 3 69 days. Accordingly, there is a 
total time savings of 328 days. The average cost using the ADR/ODR system at 60% ADR success rate would be around €10.862.  
 
EN 170   EN Now, following the same reasoning, we can addre ss the break-even point for cost savings. As 
figure 5 shows, for EU, a 3% ADR success rate is the break-even point in terms of costs, or 
the point at which using ADR doe s not create any financial adva ntage. This means that ADR 
in EU must fail 97% of the time in order to not create any value-adde d (cost-savings) for the 
EU businesses.  
Figure 2 - Cost savings in EU – the break-even point (Referring to going to court paying 
€ 25337 on average)  
-5.000,00 €0,00 €5.000,00 €10.000,00 €15.000,00 €20.000,00 €25.000,00 €
0,90 0,75 0,60 0,50 0,25 0,13 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02
Success rate of ADR Cost savings1st SCENARIO
Break-even 
point: 3% of Success Rate
 
2.3 Second scenario 
Court: length of the procedure: 697 days , Costs of the procedure: 7000 Euro  
ADR: length of the procedure 90 days, costs of the procedure 854 Euro  ADR + Court: 787 days, costs 7854 Euro Since we assume that the average length of the procedure remains the same, there is no 
change in the analysis related to the length of  the procedure. That's means that with a 60% 
success rate (i.e. 60
 disputes are settl ed within 90 days ), the disputes will be solved in 369 
days with a time saving of 328 days . If ADR was used and successful 50% of the time (i.e. 50  
disputes are settled within 90 days ), disputes were resolved in 439  days, with a time saving of 
258 days (See figure 2). 
On the contrary, if we assume that the aver age cost incurred by bus inesses when going to 
court is 7.000 Euro (more then three times less  than what estimated by the Survey on the 
costs of non-ADR), the scenario  still remains strongly in fav our of the ADR/ODR system. In 
fact, for EU a 13% ADR success rate is the break -even point in terms of costs. This means 
that ADR must fail 87% of tim es to not create any added va lue for the EU businesses (See 
figure 3). 
 
  
 
EN 171   EN  
  Figure 3 - Cost savings in EU – the break-even point  
-2.000,00 €-1.000,00 €0,00 €1.000,00 €2.000,00 €3.000,00 €4.000,00 €5.000,00 €6.000,00 €
0,90 0,75 0,60 0,50 0,25 0,13 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02
Succe ss ra teCost savings2nd SCENARIO
Break-even point: 
13% of Success Rate 
 
In terms of costs savings, with a success rate  scenario of 60% the procedure would cost € 
3654  with a total saving of € 3346  per business. This means that if we assume that the number 
of cases will go from 506.351 to 885.742 (see foot note 7), we can assume that businesses 
involved in ADR cases process two cases per year on average205. Consequently according to 
the cases provided, the number of companies that will deal with ADR cases would vary between 253.176 and 442871
206. This means that the total sa vings per each EU business, 
should they deal only with two cases per year, would be in a range of € 1.7 billion to € 3.0 
billion . This is again a very conservative estimati on. If we compare the two scenarios (see 
figure 4), we were able to compare the estimate  cost savings (at different success rates) for 
different costs of ADR  and court litigation. 
Figure 4- Cost savings comparison be tween the two different scenarios  
                                                 
205  According to a recent European Busine ss Test Panel (EBTP), among businesses that reported to have already used ADR, 33% 
have used it more than 10 times, and 48% up to 4. Similarly, a passenger railway company and se veral energy providers reported 
to have been involved in more than 2000 ADR cases each in 2010.  
206  Civic Consulting study on the compliance costs annex II.  
 
EN 172   EN Cost savings comparison
-5.000,00 €0,00 €5.000,00 €10.000,00 €15.000,00 €20.000,00 €25.000,00 €
0,90 0,75 0,60 0,50 0,25 0,13 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02
Success rateCost savings
Cost savings at €25.337(1st SCENARIO) Cost savings at €7.000(2nd SCENARIO)2nd SCENARIO
Break-even point 
at €7000: 13% 
Success rate1st SCENARIO
Break-even point at 
€25337: 3% 
Success rate 
 
As we can see, the success rate break-even point  at € 7000, even if higher compared to the 
first scenario success rate break even point, is  still a low one (13%).  Indeed, assuming a € 
7000 of court litigation cost the ADR in EU must fail 87% of the time to not create any value 
added (cost-savings) for the EU businesses.   
3 Conclusions 
The total savings that EU businesses could ga in if a universal and well-known ADR system 
would be in place may vary, on a yearly  basis, from a minimum of €1.7 billion  (EU 
commission services conservative s cenario) to a maximum of € 7.3 billion (1st scenario) 
dealing with 506.351 cases. Should on the cont rary the cases be around 885.742, the savings 
are more generous going from a minimum of € 3 billion (EU commission services 
conservative scenario) to about € 13 billion  (1st scenario). (See figure 5).  
Figure 5 - Total savings for EU businesses  
2.963.692.732 €
1.694.250.446 €12.709.511.958 €
7.265.630.499 €
0 €2.000.000.000 €4.000.000.000 €6.000.000.000 €8.000.000.000 €10.000.000.000 €12.000.000.000 €14.000.000.000 €
506.351 885.742
min max 
Number of casesTotal saving
Court litigation cost: €7.000. Saving per case: €3.346 Court litigation cost: €25.337. Saving per case: €14.349  
 
EN 173   EN Figure 6 - Total administrative and compliance costs for EU businesses in Year 1 
Obligation  Required action  Frequency 
of action 
(per year) Estimated cost of 
action for all EU 
businesses a 
(in Euro) Average cost per 
Business207 
Information 
obligations of 
businesses   
   
1. Familiarisation with the 
information obligations One-off 198,358,180 € 63 
2. Defining information 
regarding ADR to be presented to consumers  One-off 99,179,090 € 32 
3. Preparing summary 
documentation to distribute information to employees dealing with consumer complaints One-off 223,152,953 € 71 
4. Adding information on ADR 
in contracts, invoices, receipts, 
websites, brochures/leaflets  One-off 276,043,909 € 88 Obligation to 
provide 
information in relation to ADR to consumers 
5. Reproducing changed 
(templates of) contracts, invoices, receipts, brochures/leaflets  One-off    Not significant
b - 
Total one-off costs incurred by all EU business as a result of 
the obligation to inform consumers on ADR  796,734,132  € 254 
 
Obligations of businesses resulting from involvement in ADR process  
1. Familiarisation with the 
obligation to cooperate with the ADR scheme  On
e-off 31,990,599 
to  
55,959,920 € 253 
General 
cooperation with ADR 
scheme(s) 
2. Providing information to 
relevant employees concerning 
the ADR procedure One-
off 15,995,300 
to 
27,979,960 € 126 
 € 379 
Total one-off costs incurred by EU businesses  
involved for the first time in an ADR case in Year 1:  47,985,899 
to 
83,939,880   
1. Processing a complaint 
submitted to the ADR scheme and retrieving information regarding complaint from existing data 
(c)  Recurring  15,865,927 
to 
27,753,687 € 11 (d) 
(Fin. Serv:€ 43) Handling a complaint submitted by a consumer to an ADR scheme 2. Reviewing the statement of 
the ADR scheme Recurring  20,790,889 
to 
36,368,749 €  38 
(d) 
(Fin. serv: € 43) 
                                                 
207  This includes also the staff time spent in action according to the average labour costs per hour in the EU: Civic Consulting study 
on the compliance costs, page 15.  
 
EN 174   EN 3. Providing a statement to the 
ADR scheme regarding the 
complaint and/or proposing 
settlement to consumer Recurring  29,268,393 
to 
51,198,131 €  22 (d) 
(Fin serv: € 78) 
4. Reviewing and filing the outcome of the ADR procedure 
(or results of settlement with 
consumer, if applicable) Recurring  22,378,853 
to 
39,146,513 € 22 
(d) 
(Fin. serv:€ 57) 
  € 93 (d) 
(Fin. Ser: € 221) 
Total recurring costs resulting from involvement  of EU businesses in ADR cases in Year 1: 88,304,062 
to 
154,467,080   
Total administrative and co mpliance costs incurred  
by all EU businesses in year 1: 933,024,093 
to 
1,035,141,09
2  
 Total  €  726 (d) (Financial 
services:€ 854) 
 
Source: Civic Consulting. Notes: (a) Relevant businesses include businesses in the sectors of financial services, telecommunications and postal services; energy, water supply, and heating; transport and package travel/tourism; and non-
food consumer goods. The range provided refers to the diff erence between the ‘current situ ation’ and the ‘rapid growth’ 
scenarios. (b) Under the assumption of a transition period of two years for the implementation of the information obligation 
by businesses. (c) For example, contacting relevant departments (such as the customer service centre), retrieving the 
contract, identifying the complainant, et c. (d) Average cost per business (not in cluding financial services sector).  
 
Figure 7 -Total administrative and complian ce costs for EU businesses in Year 2 and 
each following year 
Obligation  Required action  Frequency of 
action 
(per year) Estimated 
cost of action 
for all EU 
businesses (a) 
(in Euro) Average cost per 
business208 
Obligations of 
businesses 
resulting from 
involvement in 
ADR process      
1.Familiarisation with the 
obligation to cooperate with the ADR scheme  One-off 31,990,599 
to 55,959,920 € 253  
General 
cooperation with ADR 
scheme(s) 
2.Providing information to 
relevant employees 
concerning the ADR 
procedure One-off 15,995,300 
to 
27,979,960 € 126  
 Total one-off costs 
incurred by EU businesses involved for the first time  47,985,899 
to 83,939,880   
 
€ 379 
                                                 
208  This includes also the staff time spent in action accord ing to the average labour costs per hour in the EU: Civic  Consulting study 
on the compliance costs, page 15  
 
EN 175   EN in an ADR case in Year 2 
and following: 
1. Processing a complaint submitted to the ADR scheme, to which the business must provide a 
statement, and retrieving 
information regarding complaint from existing data 
(b) Recurring 15,865,927 
to 27,753,687 € 11 
(c) 
(Financial services: € 43) 
2. Reviewing the statement of the ADR scheme Recurring 20,790,889 
to 36,368,749 €  38 
(c) 
(Financial services:  
 € 43) 
3. Providing a statement to the ADR scheme regarding 
the complaint and/or proposing settlement to consumer  Recurring 29,268,393 
to 
51,198,131 €  22 
(c) 
(Financial 
services: € 78) 
4. Reviewing and filing the outcome of the ADR procedure (or results of 
settlement with consumer, 
if applicable)  Recurring 22,378,853 
to 39,146,513 € 22 
(c) 
(Financial services:  
€ 57) Handling a 
complaint submitted by a consumer to an 
ADR scheme 
    
 Total one-off costs 
incurred by EU businesses 
involved for the first time in an ADR case in Year  2 and following:  88,304,062 
to 
154,467,080  € 93 
(c) 
(Financial 
services:   € 221) 
 Total one-off costs 
incurred by EU businesses  involved for the first time 
in an ADR case in Year 2 
and following:  136,289,961 
to 238,406,960   
 
Total  € 472 (c) 
(Financial services: € 600) 
Source: Civic Consulting. Notes: (a) Relevant businesses include businesses in the sectors of financial services, 
telecommunications and postal services; energy, water supply,  and heating; transport and package travel/tourism; and 
non-food consumer goods. The range provided refers to the difference between the ‘current situation’ and the ‘rapid growth’ scenarios. (b) For example, contacting relevant departments, such as the customer service centre, retrieving 
the contract, identifying the complainant,  etc. (c) Average cost per business (not  including financial services sector).