1.

Recommends that the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: (a) reiterate that effective multilateralism and a rules-based international order are a precondition for countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for advancing nuclear disarmament; reaffirm that the NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, a vital bulwark against the risk of nuclear proliferation, and an irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening peace and security worldwide; (b) reaffirm the full support of the EU and its Member States for the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and confirm the validity of the previous step-by-step approach based on commitments made during past review processes, in particular in 1995, 2000 and 2010; stress that a balanced approach between the three pillars is essential for a positive outcome of the 10th Review Conference, and for the adoption of concrete, effective and consensual measures that would allow previous commitments to be built on; stress the important role of the EU in facilitating peace-oriented policies and promoting international stability; (c) ensure without delay the adoption of a Council decision formalising the common position of the EU as regards the NPT Review Conference; (d) emphasise that the NPT has been indispensable for peace and security in the world for five decades; (e) continue providing support to the activities leading up to the 10th NPT Review Conference, through a financial contribution of EUR 1,3 million to outreach activities comprising three thematic seminars covering disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy pillars, four regional meetings, and two side events; continue to uphold the main goals of the EU activities, in particular as regards trust and confidence-building, raising awareness of the obstacles and potential areas of convergence, and developing input for a roadmap for a successful outcome of the 10th review process; (f) continue emphasising that any further deepening of divergences among states would lead to a progressive discrediting of the NPT as a reliable global legal instrument and to an erosion of the global disarmament regime, thereby raising the risk of further global nuclear arms proliferation; warn states parties that, owing to the lack of consensus both at the 2015 Review Conference and in the preparatory committees, the future of the NPT can no longer be taken for granted without clear commitment by the states parties; (g) remind the states parties that the 50th anniversary of the NPT, coinciding with the 10th Review Conference, could provide the momentum for engaging in a sincere and results-oriented dialogue in order to restore mutual trust and confidence, the aim being to enlarge areas of overlap and identify common ground in order to make headway with discussions and the ultimate goal being the adoption of an agreed document recognising nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as a common objective in line with Article VI of the NPT; (h) call for strong political leadership to support the NPT review conference; convey a message to the NPT states parties that the participation of the heads of state and government at the conference would show the importance the states attach to the NPT and to the review process; call on the representatives of the states parties to use the opportunity of the 10th Review Conference to reaffirm that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’; (i) Stresses that the selective application of the Treaty or non-compliance with NPT memoranda by some of the states parties undermine trust in the whole NPT system; calls on all signatories to the NPT to ensure compliance with the commitments that they signed up to; (j) welcome the fact that for 72 years nuclear weapons have not been used; warn the NPT states parties that any expansion of the situations in which nuclear weapons could be used could seriously jeopardise global strategic stability and the practice of non-use; (k) call on all states, as regards nuclear arms and related delivery technologies, to recognise control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as crucial tools in confidence-building and in substantially contributing to reversing the deterioration of the international security environment, thereby preventing major inter-state war and preserving peace and security; (l) stress that effective nuclear disarmament verification is essential for achieving a world without nuclear weapons; pursue and intensify efforts, including in cooperation with international and regional organisations and civil society, to address verification challenges with respect to safety, security and non-proliferation requirements; reaffirm that only a realistic arms limitation and confidence-building process will contribute to strategic stability and shared security; (m) urge the states parties to do their utmost to achieve further progress in arms control and nuclear disarmament processes, in particular through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, and to ensure that the trend of nuclear arsenal reduction since the peak of nuclear weapons in 1986 is not reversed; convey a message that the NPT should be used as a platform for all diplomatic efforts in this regard; (n) urge the US and Russia to enhance mutual trust and confidence with a view to resuming a dialogue on possible ways to build a new arms control relationship; stress that a clear commitment by Russia and the US, ahead of the 10th NPT Review Conference, to extend the new START Treaty before February 2021 would be an important contribution to the review conference; strongly encourages both parties to negotiate a new instrument that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed, as well as strategic and non-strategic weapons, and would include China, in light of its massive missile build-up; express concern regarding Russia's recent deployment of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles in the Orenburg region; remind Russia that all deployed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles will be subject to the new START Treaty’s overall 1 550 warhead limit and associated verification provisions; (o) reiterate the EU’s deep regret in connection with the recent collapse of the INF Treaty due to Russia's deployment of the SSC-8 missile system, which is nuclear-capable, mobile and hard to detect, and lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, while stressing the significant negative impact of this on European security and on the strategic nuclear arms control architecture; call on both signatories to the INF Treaty to resume dialogue on possible ways to put in place a new legally binding instrument for short- and medium-range missiles; support efforts to multilateralise such an instrument to all other countries owning weapons of this kind, including China; (p) express alarm at the demise of the INF Treaty, also in view of the fact that medium-range missiles are particularly liable to increase the risks of nuclear escalation on the European continent; (q) encourage talks about the possibility of a multilateral ballistic missile treaty that goes beyond the INF Treaty between the US and Russia to include other parties; (r) call on the US and Russia to each make available, to all other parties to the NPT and to the UN Security Council, a declaration in which they set out the steps they are taking after their withdrawal from the INF Treaty to ensure compliance with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT; take the necessary steps to that end on behalf of the Union; (s) call on Russia to abide by its commitment enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum and to respect the security guarantees offered to Ukraine; (t) consider the withdrawal from or the collapse of nuclear arms control regimes a dangerous precedent for the NPT; bear in mind that parties to the NPT could consider such events as a threat to their national security, and that the consequences thereof could destabilise the NPT as a whole; (u) make these concerns heard at the 10th NPT Review Conference; take the necessary diplomatic and political steps to remove the direct threat posed by intermediate-range nuclear weapons to the European Union and its Member States; (v) highlight the contribution made by the NATO states in fulfilling their commitments under the NPT as regards reducing the stock of nuclear weapons by 95 % since the end of the Cold War, detargeting them, reducing their alert status and downgrading their role in defence; call on NATO and the other NPT signatory states to pursue their efforts in further reducing nuclear weapons in full compliance with the NPT, on the basis of the step-by-step approach that promotes international stability and security; (w) note that the adoption of the TPNW by 122 countries, with it now having being signed by 84 states and ratified by 47, is evidence of the desire to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world; stress that nuclear disarmament cannot be separated from collective security and can only be achieved by taking the strategic context into account, and that it must be part of a gradual process guaranteeing the undiminished security of all while preventing any new arms race; recall that, as a means of preventing the quantitative development of nuclear weapons arsenals, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is a vital and irreplaceable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons; (x) confirm the right of the NPT parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to meet their long-term energy requirements, in conformity with the NPT provisions; work with countries wishing to develop capacities in this area towards a responsible use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, provided all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions are met; consider appropriate measures in cases where such countries fail to cooperate and comply with all safety, security and non-proliferation conditions; provide help while making it obligatory for countries wishing to develop capacities in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to develop a strong nuclear safety culture, and recognise the role and value of the IAEA and its safeguards system in implementing the NPT and in strengthening the nuclear security framework; (y) limit the transfer of proliferation-relevant nuclear technology to NPT states parties which have concluded and are implementing IAEA full scope safeguards, thus supporting the decision by the 1995 NPT Review Conference that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (z) continue its efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in line with the 1995 resolution; pursue the initiatives to promote confidence-building through actions aimed at fostering inclusive dialogue among experts and policymakers, supported by a financial envelope of EUR 2,86 million for the implementation of the projects; (aa) support the regional approach as one of the important avenues for the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation; take into account the outcome of the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; encourage all participating states to do their utmost to advance in this endeavour at the second session of the Conference; (ab) uphold the ‘stepping-stone approach’ proposal put forward by Sweden with the aim of building political support for pragmatic, short-term and achievable commitments to the global disarmament regime, the overall goals of which are to rebuild trust and confidence, support measures focused on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, enhance habits of cooperation among states, reduce nuclear risks and enhance transparency, as intermediate steps towards facilitating the fulfilment of existing obligations by states parties; (ac) call on the states parties to develop and put in place measures aimed at mitigating the risks of using nuclear weapons, be it intentionally or accidentally; measures could include improving communication channels and protocols, cybersecurity, and creating a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear assets, as well as improving resilience to hybrid threats and cyberattacks and extending decision time in a crisis; (ad) support the commitment to enhance transparency by the nuclear weapon states in line with the 13 steps on disarmament adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; recall that further improving the reporting mechanism by systematising the nuclear weapon states’ reporting frameworks would contribute to achieving the same level of transparency among those states; pay, in this context, special attention to the proposals of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative proposals for enhancing transparency so as to strengthen the review process of the NPT; (ae) take note of the ‘Operationalising and creating an environment for nuclear disarmament (CEND)’ proposal put forward by the US to the Preparatory Committee for the 10th Review Conference, aimed at identifying and addressing the factors in the international security environment that hinder further progress in disarmament, and at establishing a more pragmatic approach to disarmament and positively contributing to a successful outcome of the 10th Review Conference; engage in further discussions on the proposal, in the framework of the 2020 Review Conference and beyond; (af) call on all states to engage without further delay in discussions on the path towards the launch and completion of one of the outstanding priorities — the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons — as an indispensable means of ruling out the risk of a resumption of the nuclear arms race and a vital step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons; (ag) ensure that the EU continues to be a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO); recall also the importance and urgency of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT in order to prevent new weapons from being developed; (ah) reaffirm the EU’s continuing commitment to the JCPOA as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the Middle East; continue emphasising the EU’s important role in finding a way forward when it comes to securing the nuclear agreement; reiterate the EU’s regret over the withdrawal by the US from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions; welcome the opposition expressed by France, Germany and the UK (E3) at the United Nations to the US motion to reimpose sanctions on Iran under UNSC resolution 2231, as the US is no longer party to the JCPOA; welcome the Joint Statement of the AEOI and the IAEA of 26 August 2020 on the resolution in good faith of the safeguard implementation issues specified by the IAEA, under which Iran is providing the IAEA with access to the two locations specified by the agency and facilitating the IAEA’s verification activities; recall the crucial role of the IAEA as the sole independent international organisation responsible for the monitoring and verification of nuclear non-proliferation commitments; call on Iran to ensure full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the NPT; (ai) regret Iran’s support of violent non-state actors and the development and use of ballistic missile capabilities that destabilise the broader Middle East; (aj) reiterate the EU’s full support for the objective of the denuclearisation of the DPRK in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions; urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards; continue to support the ongoing dialogue process while seeking a more active part in the negotiations, capitalising on the EU’s diplomatic expertise; recall that the DPRK continues to represent a regional and international nuclear and ballistic threat; (ak) continue to uphold and preserve the NPT as a key multilateral instrument for the benefit of international peace and security, to promote its universalisation, and to strengthen its implementation across its three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars; encourage all states parties to the NPT to renew their efforts to engage with each other and press on with a renewed commitment to the comprehensive, full and balanced implementation of the NPT; (al) call on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and, pending accession, to adhere to its terms and commit to its non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, including by providing evidence that they are not engaging in nuclear technology transfers and by strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; (am) recall that nuclear disarmament must be carried out in a realistic and progressive manner, with due regard for the security interests of all, and that the reduction of strategic risks related to nuclear weapons is based on the transparency of nuclear doctrines, dialogue between political and military decision-makers, crisis communication tools and reinsurance measures;