EN ECB -PUBLIC  
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 25 August  2022  
on the establishment and operation of a Central Credit Registe r  
(CON/20 22/28) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 29 July 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Greek Ministry of Finance 
for an opinion on a draft l aw on the establishment and operation of a c entral credit regist er (hereinafter  the 
‘draft law’) . 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is  based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third, fourth and sixth indents of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 
98/415/EC1, as the draft law relates to the Bank of Greece, the collection, compilation and distribution of 
monetary, financial, banking, payment systems and balance of payments statistics, and to rules applicable 
to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets.  
In accordance with the first sentence of Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The draft law establishes a c entral credit register ( hereinafter the ‘R egister’) as a national personal 
data filing system as defined in Article 4 , point ( 6), of Regulation  (EU) 2016/6792 (hereinafter the ‘GDPR’) . 
The Register  will operate as an electronic database, be established, maintained and operated by the Bank 
of Greece,  and record,  at a granular level, inter alia, the payment history, type of collateral provided and 
any other information relating to any form of credit granted to natural and legal persons  including guarantors  
(hereinafter ‘data subjects ’) by credit  and financial institutions that have their registered office in Greece 
and by branches of foreign credit and financial institutions operating in Greece. The exact scope of credit covered by the draft law , namely the relevant credit thresholds and the relevant creditors to be covered
3, 
will be specified in an act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece.  
 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29  June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2   Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1) . 
3   The draft law defines ‘creditors’ as the legal persons to which data subjects owe credit that falls within the scope of the 
draft law but other than: entities listed as public sector agencies in article 51 of Law 1892/1990 (Government Gazette issue Α  101/1990 , p. 101); local an d regional municipal authorities and their enterprises/corporations; and utility 
undertakings to the extent that the Greek State holds, directly or indirectly, part of the share capital.  
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2 The Register will allow, among others : (a) the collect ion and extract ion of  (positive and negative) financial 
history data on natural and legal persons by creditors which hold and manage such data; (b ) the produc tion 
and provi sion of  credit reports on data subjects; (c ) the retention and process ing of  financial history data, 
in keeping with the applicable institutional framework for the protection of personal data and information 
security; (d) the provision of a single contact point from which data subjects can obtain credit report s; and 
(e) the provision of a single contact point to which data subjects can apply to have financial history data 
that is collected by third- party agencies updated or rectified,  or generally to exercise their rights under the 
GDPR.  
1.2 Objectives of the draft law   
The primary aim of establishing and operating the Register is to enhance the financing of the real economy by the Greek financial system and to safeguard financial stability by improving the quality of available 
information and thereby enabling a more rati onal assessment of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers 
and generally contributing to more informed decision- making in relation to credit granting
4. According to the 
explanatory note5 accompanying the proposal on the establishment of  the Register submitted by Greece 
to the European Commission t o obtain funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility6, the Register is 
also expected to increas e available information regarding the credit history of potential debtors, have a 
positive impact on the quantity and quality of investment spending, encourage competition among financial 
institutions, result in a lower cost of capital for Greek borrowers, and greatly increase the ability of i nvestors 
to price risk in the secondary market for non- performing loans (NPLs). This will increase NPL valuations, 
boost recovery rates and, thereby, help banks to resolve legacy NPL challenges faster and more efficiently 
in terms of use of capital.  The ex planatory note also states that the Register , since it is maintained and 
operated by  the Bank of Greece, supports the Bank’s obligations and functions in supervising the financial 
sector and ensuring financial stability.  
1.3 Information to be recorded with the Register  
The Bank of Greece may hold the following in the Register: (a) identification information and general 
information on the data subject; (b) financial history data relating to any credit application or credit 
agreement entered into by the data subject (including in its capacity as guarantor); (c) infor mation linking 
data subjects that are parties to the same credit agreement or have provided a guarantee in connection 
 
  The draft law contains a non- exhaustive/indicative list of credito rs, that includes: i) credit institutions within the meaning 
of Article 3(1)(1) of Law 4261/2014 and Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 established in Greece; ii) branches 
in Greece of credit institutions established abroad; iii) credit institutions established in the EEA which trade in Greece 
pursuant to Article 39 of Law 4261/2014; iv) corporate credit providers within the meaning of Article 153(4) of Law 
4261/2014; v) factoring companies within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Law 1905/1990 (Gover nment Gazette 
A147/1990); vi) leasing companies within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Law 1665/1986 (Government Gazette A 
194/1986 ); vii) branches in Greece of financial institutions within the meaning of Article 3(1)(22) of Law 4261/2014 
established ab road; viii) loan and credit debt management companies within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a)(aa) of Law 
4354/2015 and branches within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a)(bb) of Law 4354/2015; ix) credit agencies within the 
meaning of Article 3(2) of Law 4438/201 6; x) microfinance institutions within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Law 
4701/2020; xi) payment institutions within the meaning of Article 4(4)(f) of Law 4537/2018, inasmuch as they provide 
credit; xii) e -money institutions within the meaning of Article 10(3) of Law 4021/2011, inasmuch as they provide credit; 
xiii) card issuing and management companies; and xiv) other financial institutions within the meaning of Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.  
4   See Article 1(3) of the draft law.  
5   Available here: https://greece20.gov.gr/en/the -complete -plan/
. 
6  The Recovery and Resilience Facility was established by Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 February 2021 (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17 –75).  
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3 with the same credit agreement; and (d) any credit commentar y or other analys is produced by the Bank of 
Greece in connection with a data s ubject. The credit information that the Bank of Greece may hold in the 
Register may be used for the production of general reports, analyses and statistics produced by the Bank 
of Greece and held in a form that prevents identification of the data subject.  
1.4 Credit report  
Based on the aforementioned information and data recorded therewith, the Register will also produce, upon 
application, a credit report for all credit receivers . The exact contents of the report will be determined by an 
act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece and will vary depending on the recipient of the report and the 
purpose for which the report was requested. These  purposes are listed in the draft law: (a ) to verify 
information provided by the data subject in connection with a credit application to a creditor; (b ) to assess 
the risks incurred by the creditor in granting credit to the data subject or accepting the data subject’s 
guarantee for the credit agreement; (c ) to assess the risks atta ched to credit granted to the data subject or 
a change to the nature or term of the respective credit agreement or guarantee; (d ) to monitor and assess 
failure to comply with the terms  of a credit agreement relating to credit granted by the creditor to a d ata 
subject or to a guarantee provided by that data subject; (e) to evaluate a data subject’s application to a 
creditor for a debt payment plan; and (f) to analyse portfolios of credit agreements held by financial 
institutions. The report may not , however , assign a credit rating or a creditworthiness score for the credit 
receiver.  
1.5 Role of the Bank of Greece  
The draft law requires the Bank of Greece to establish, maintain and operate the Regist er. The Bank of 
Greece is also responsible for  its technical design and the implement ation of  its filing system, collect ing 
and organis ing personal and other data from all source s, keeping  them in a way that safeguards  data 
integrity, confidentiality and availability , comply ing with data protection legislation and,  in general , ensur ing 
the seamless operation of the Regist er. The Bank of Greece is also appointed as the ‘ controller ’ within the 
meaning of the GDPR and Law No 4613/20197, both of which apply to the processing of data by the Bank 
of Greece and third parties that receive the credit report produced by the Register.  The Bank of Greece 
must also inform data subjects that their data have been shared with the Register , as requir ed by the GDPR.  
1.6 Information and data provided to the Register  
Where the relevant credit falls within the scope of the draft law, creditors must provide financial history data 
to the Register by giving the Register access to, and allow the electronic transmission from,  their electronic 
systems covering a period of at least the past 12 months. The draft law requires creditors to transmit data 
(and update already provided data) on a monthly basis and to connect online to the Register  within 12 
months of the adoption of the act of the Governor of the Bank of Greece (see paragraph 1. 9 below). The 
Bank of Greece may request creditors to provide additional data that may be used for financial analys es 
and the compilation of statistics  produced by the Bank . 
The draft law defines ‘financial history data’ as all information on debts (whether due, repaid or outstanding) 
of natural and legal persons, including in particular:  data identifying the debt; the type of debt and its basic 
terms;  the real and contractual collateral for the debt; the payments made, the time of payment and the 
outstanding balance of the debt; debt payment plans; changes to the identity of the debtor; information on 
 
7   Government Gazette A 78 /2019.  
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4 any litigation between the debtor and creditors, on any administrative or enforcement measures taken, on 
any criminal proceedings for default where default is a criminal offence, as further specified in the draft law ; 
and whether the data subject is unemployed or bankrupt or has been discharged and the debt  has been 
written off.  
1.7 Persons entitled to access the data held in the Register , and related purposes  
Under the draft law, the data held in the Register  will only be accessible upon request  to: the data subject , 
whose access will be restricted exclusively to data relating to them personally ; any creditor to which credit 
is owed or to which an application for credit has been submitted and which has connected to the R egister ; 
the Personal Data Protection Authority for the purposes of verifying compliance with data protection 
legislation; and judicial and prosecutorial authorities for the purposes of dispensing justice and, in particular, 
preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing.  
Creditors may only use data to which the Reg ister provides access for the sole purpose of managing credit 
risk and improving the quality of the credit information at their disposal on data subjects. Creditors which further process data received from the Register must be acting as ‘controllers ’ within the meaning of the 
GDPR ; and, for the purposes of the transmission of data to the Register, they must be regarded as 
processors and must conclude a contract for that purpose with the Bank of Greece in accordance with 
Article 28 of the GDPR. A similar con tract must also be concluded between the Bank of Greece and 
Teiresias S.A. , a privately owned and operated credit bureau that also processes and stores financial 
history data.  
Data subjects  whose data are filed with the R egister , have the rights provided for in the GDPR and may 
also challenge said data and the credit report produced by the R egister on the basis of the said data, and 
request the Bank of Greece to correct inaccurate data.  
1.8 Interoperability of the Register with other databases  
The draft law provides that the Register must complement and be fully harmonised and interoperable with 
the Public Debt Office, the Independent Credit Rating Authority, the Private Debt Monitoring Register (all 
of which will be established under separate legislation) and the existing system of Teiresias S.A. . For the 
purpose of cross -checking and corroborating identification information and general information held 
therei n
8, the Register may have recourse to the IT systems of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue 
and of the General Commercial Registry, ERGANI and of any other public sector entity.  
In addition, the Register must  also interoperate  with GR -AnaCredit, the analytical credit dataset operated 
by the Bank of Greece in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/867 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2016/13)
9 and Act 2677/19.05.2017 of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, which is used to collect 
information on loans granted by credit institutions to legal persons. In order to achieve its purposes, the Register may collaborate with similar central credit regist ries abroad.  
Furthermore, in order to be able to provide information in the context of producing financial analyses or 
statistical reports based on the data it holds, the Register m ust also interoperate and exchange information 
 
8  ‘Identification information’ and ‘general information’ are defined in Article 2 of the draft law .  
9  Regulation (EU) 2016/867 of the European Central Bank of 18 May 2016 on the collection of granular credit and credit risk 
data (ECB/2016/13) (OJ L 144, 1.6.2016, p. 44).  
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5 (while prevent ing the identi fication of the data subject) with the databases and electronic systems of the 
public or the private sector or of credit rating agencies . 
1.9 Secondary legislation to be adopted by the Bank of Greece  
The draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt  secondary legislation, in the form of an act of the 
Governor of the Bank of Greece,  determining several aspects of the draft law , including the following: (a) 
credit thresholds falling within the scope of the draft law; (b) when and how often the Register access es 
and extract s financial history data held by creditors; (c) the technical details and operating specifications of 
the Register and the method used to interconnect it with the agencies referred to in the draft law; (d) what 
an application f or credit reports should contain, how it will be submitted to the Register and how data 
subjects may exercise their rights; (e) how the Register will process data; (f) for how long the Register is 
required to retain data, depending on the category of data and on whether or not the relevant debt has 
been repaid; (g) what credit reports will contain, depending on their recipient; (h) any other details conducive 
to or necessary for the operation of the Register.  
Moreover , the draft law authorises the Bank of Greece to adopt an operations regulation for the Regist er, 
detailing how creditors and data subjects interconnect and communicate with the Register, how information 
and data will be recorded to ensure that they are mapped and transmitted in an appropriate manner, the 
format in which information and details must be provided,  and any other matter relating to the operational 
management of the Register.  
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB notes that several important aspects of the Register are expected to be determined by 
means of secondary legislation to be adopted by t he Bank of Greece. In that respect, the ECB should 
be consulted on such legislation before it is adopted.  
2.2 The ECB in principle welcomes the establishment of the  Register , insofar as it is envisaged to 
contribute to a comprehensive and efficient centralisation of granular credit data,  which in turn should 
contribute to improving existing and developing new ESCB statistics since it provides important 
breakdowns and details not available from currently us ed data sources, such as information on the 
structure and risk patterns of credit granted by the financial sector. In addition, t he Register should 
enable more informed assessments of credit risk  by credit and financial institutions  (both in terms of 
the initial decision to grant credit and in terms of ongoing assessments of existing exposures ) and 
should therefore enhance the risk management capabilities of these institutions.  In this sense, the 
data held in  the Register are considered to constitute a usef ul tool for micro-  and macroprudential 
supervision.  The data to be held in on the Register , and access thereto, are also considered to be 
useful from a financial stability and macroprudential supervision perspective, as  it would allow the 
monitoring and assessment of the build- up of and appetite for credit risk in the banking and financial 
system more generally, thereby helping to calibrate the use of macroprudential instruments .  
2.3 However, t he draft law does not contain any  provision  explicitly allowing the Bank of Greece, the 
ECB, or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to access data held in the Register .  
2.4 Regarding microprudential supervision, the ECB understands that, subject to data protection 
requirements, the ECB may, in the exercise of its supervisory duties that relate to credit institutions, 
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6 require the Bank of Greece, as ‘national competent authority ’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201310, to request and pass on information held in the Register11. 
This point is also relevant in the context of the macroprudential tasks conferred on the ECB under 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201312, which requires the ECB to take into account the specific 
situation of the financial system, economic situation and the economic cycle in the individual Member 
States or parts thereof13. However, in view of the exhaustive list of persons granted access to the 
information held in the Register according to Article 6 of the draft law, any such access would be 
limited and granted on a case- by-case basis. G iven the scope and the significance that  the data to 
be held on the Register has for micro - and macroprudential supervision purposes  and, therefore,  for 
the tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other 
financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings conferred on the ECB pursuant to 
Article 127(6)  of the Treaty , the ECB would welcome the explicit inclusion of these purposes in the 
aims of the draft law and a provision in the draft law explicitly giving the Bank of Greece and the ECB  
access to the Register .  
2.5 The consulting authority could also consider w ider access rights to the Register, for example by other 
bodies and agencies of the Union that play a role in banking supervision , such as the European 
Systemic Risk Board, the European Banking Authority and other relevant bodies established at Union 
level, such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Single Resolution Mechanism, 
as has been done by other Member States14, and provided that the purposes for which the data can 
be shared with each specific body are clearly stipulated in the draft law and that the confidentiality of 
the said data is ensured . In that respect, the ECB notes that the draft law already provides that the 
Register may collaborate with similar central credit registries abroad in order to achieve its purposes. 
The ECB therefore notes that facilitating supervis ory purposes  could be usefully listed among the 
objectives of the Register , so that such wider access may be permitted.  
2.6 Regarding the access of the ECB and the Bank of Greece to the data held in the Register for 
statistical and monetary policy (as distinct from supervisory) purpos es, without  an explicit legal basis 
in the draft law,  such access would either be limited or completely impossible. Although the draft law 
does not explicitly list among the objectives of the Register that it w ould contribute to the tasks of the 
ESCB as laid down in Article 127 of the Treaty , the ECB considers that accessing the Register  would 
be beneficial for, and materially support , the exercise of  these tasks. Consideration should therefore 
be given to adding the contribution to the tasks of the ESCB to the objectives that the Register is 
 
10  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p.  63). 
11 This understanding is based on Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63) and Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of 16 April 2014 of the 
European Central Bank establishing the framework for cooperation within the S ingle Supervisory Mechanism between 
the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM 
Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ L 141, 14.05.2014, p. 1).  
 This understanding is also based on Article 55C of the Statute of the Bank of Greece but in that case, the Bank of 
Greece would only be able to share the information it has received on an aggregated basis. Pruden tial supervision -
related information can also be shared with the ECB on the basis of Artic le 54 of Law No 4261/2014  (Government 
Gazette A  107/2014 ).  
12  Article 5 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  
13  See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/20.  
14  See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2013/93.  
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7 intended to serve and to further amending the draft law to explicitly include these purposes in the 
aims of the draft law and to ensure a clear legal basis establishing the said access rights , as has 
been done in other Member States15, and taking into account the provisions of  Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2533/9816. The ECB understands that such an explicit authorisation is necessary from a 
national law perspective to ensure that the Bank of Greece has a robust legal basis for disclosing 
data held in the Register to the ECB for the purposes of discharging its obligations under Regulation  
(EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13)17. Such a legal basis is required because the draft law prohibits the 
disclosure of information held in the Register unless such disclosure is explicitly provided for. This 
provision is without prejudice to the requirements of Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 
(ECB/2016/13) , which regulates the use of credit data reported under that Regulation by the ECB 
and national central banks ( NCBs ).  
2.7 In considering whether to g rant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece, as noted in paragraph 
2.6 above,  regard should be had to reducing and simplifying the reporting obligations of credit and 
financial institutions and avoiding the duplication of reporting requirements for credit -related data in 
line with the recitals of Regulation (EU) 2016/867  (ECB/2016/13) , the recitals of w hich note that, with 
a view to ensuring efficient reporting and adequate interoperability with other existing or new 
reporting frameworks, NCB s should be allowed to collect the information to be transmitted to the 
ECB as a part of a broader national report ing framework and to extend the reporting of credit data 
beyond the scope outlined in Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13) , for their own statutory 
purposes, in line with relevant national law18. It is all the more important to avoid reporting 
redundanci es given that the Register will, according to the draft law, ‘interoperate’ or ‘cooperate’ , or 
‘have recourse to’, several other public and private sector databases, some of which have not yet 
been established.  
2.8 In considering whether to grant access to the ECB and the Bank of Greece as noted in paragraph 
2.6 above, regard should be had to full compliance of the national framework with the objectives and 
requirements of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13) , including with legal requirements 
concerning feedback loops since further provisions on the scope and implementation of feedback 
loops by the NCBs may be laid down in separate legal acts  to be  adopted by the ECB , and NCBs 
may enter into Memoranda of Understanding regarding their respec tive cooperation in the feedback 
loops  based on the applicable legal frameworks19. 
2.9 The recitals of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13) also note that the framework for the 
collection of credit data under that Regulation should be set up with a view to ensuring interoperability 
 
15 See, e.g., paragraph 1.3 of Opinion CON/2021/24; paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2013/93; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion 
CON/2014/57.  
16  Council Regulation No (EC) 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the 
European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).  
 For example, article 8(1) Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 allows for the use of confidential statistical 
information by the ESCB “exclusively for the exercise of the tasks of the ESCB”, except in a number of defined 
circumstances. Moreover, para graphs 4, 4a and 5 of Article 8 of the same regulation allow for the transmission of 
confidential statistical information within and outside the ESCB, subject to the fulfilment of a number of requirements 
and conditions. These latter provisions are particu larly important when it comes to information collected by other NCBs 
in accordance with the AnaCredit Regulation (EU) 2016/867 to which the Bank of Greece may have access.  
17  See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/13.  
18 See recital 15 of Regulation (EU ) 2016/867 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2017/33.  
19  See recital 1 7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13).  
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8 with central credit registers and other relevant credit data sets established by public sector entities, 
including databases on s ecurities statistics as well as the ESCB Register of Institutions and Affiliates 
Dataset20. The ECB understands that the Register will interoperate with GR -AnaCredit. In that 
respect  and for reasons of legal certainty , it is suggested that the draft law or  the secondary 
legislation to be adopted thereunder could more clearly incorporate the reporting obligations that have direct effect by reason of Regulation (EU) 2016/867  (ECB/2016/13)  with the additional 
obligations imposed by the draft law on reporting agents that are covered by both frameworks. This 
would ensure full compliance of the draft law with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13) .  
2.10 The draft law does not contain any explicit provisions regarding sanctions to be imposed in cases  of 
non-compliance of reporting agents with reporting obligations established in the draft law . The ECB 
understands that this may be one of the points regarding the Register that will be addressed in the 
secondary legislation that the Bank of Greece is authorised to adopt under the draft law. In that 
respect, the ECB wishes to draw the attention of the consulting authority to the sanctioning regime that applies in respect of a failure by reporting agents to comply with the ECB’s statistical reporting 
requirements, and which is referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/867 (ECB/2016/13)
21, and to note 
that: (a) the sanctioning regime to be established for the Bank of Greece under national law should 
operate without prejudice to the ECB’s sanctioning regime under Union law; and (b) national law 
should ensure the compliance of both the ECB and the Bank of Greece with the non bis in idem  
principle, which is reflected in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of the European Central 
Bank ( ECB/1999/4)22 and whereby no legal action may be instituted twice in respect of the same 
cause of action. National law should therefore facilitate the provision of information and consultations 
between the ECB and the Bank of Greece before any decision to initiate an infringement procedure 
is taken by either23. 
2.11 Lastly, the ECB notes that the draft law does not explicitly state that the Register will be owned by 
the B ank of Greece. However, t he ECB understands that the Bank of Greece will be the exclusive 
owner of the Register and would therefore welcome, for the sake of legal clarity, the inclusion of a 
provision in the draft law explicitly stating that the Bank of Gr eece is not only the sole operator  but 
also the exclusive owner  of the Register .  
 
3. Conferral of a new task on  the Bank of Greece  
3.1 The draft law confers on the Bank of Greece the new task of  establish ing and operati ng a credit 
register as a centralised collection of granular credit and credit risk data.  
3.2 The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank (NCB) in the 
ESCB must be assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123(1) of the 
 
20  See recital 16 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867  (ECB/2016/13) . 
21  Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/867.  
22  Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of 23 September 1999 on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose 
sanctions (ECB/1999/4) (OJ L 264, 12.10.1999, p. 21).  
23  See paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON/2021/24.  
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9 Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/9324 
defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis 
third parties ’. 
3.3 Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of the 
monetary financing prohibition, which may not be circumvented25. Therefore, the task of financing 
measures, which are normally the responsibil ity of the Member States, and which are financed from their 
budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes 
financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision 
of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case- by-
case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibilities of the Member States.  
3.4 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article  35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of  the 
ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation 
within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii ) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes 
a government task as follows:  
First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been conferred 
on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are mainly defined in 
Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 and Article 25.1 of the 
Statute of the ESCB.  
Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perfor m ‘other functions’, new tasks, i.e. 
tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred on the ECB and the NCBs, are not precluded 
per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atypical of NCB tasks or which 
are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public sector 
entities should be considered government tasks.  
Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 
dischar ged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities is the 
impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB.  
In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  
(a) whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank tasks, 
which are not adequately addressed, and does not necessarily complement those existing central bank 
tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient safeguards to mitigate that 
conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new task and existing central bank tasks should 
not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such 
complementarity should be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks;  
 
24  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
25  Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank 
independence.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
10 (b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate to the 
NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, and may have a negative impact on the capacity to properly 
perform the existing central bank tasks;  
(c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the light of 
central bank independence and accountability considerations;  
(d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks;  
(e) whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision- making bodies 
to political risks that are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal independence 
and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the Statute  of the ESCB . 
3.5 Based on the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new task proposed 
to be conferred on the Bank of Greece under the draft law is  in line with the prohibition of monetary 
financing.  
3.6 Tasks related to the tasks conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the 
ESCB  
Generally , it is noted that granular credit and credit risk data based on central credit registers are necessary 
for the development and production of new ESCB statistics, as well as to improve the quality of ESCB 
statistics. These new or improved statistics are, in turn,  necessary for the performance of ESCB  tasks.   
To assess whether the establishment and operation of a register holding such credit  data is an ESCB -
related task, it is necessary to examine whether the purpose of that register is ESCB -related, i.e. whether 
the credit data are collected and analysed in order to support  the performance of an ESCB -related task.26 
Such an assessment needs to consider the legislator’s intention, as manifested in the provisions regarding 
the aims of the credit register as well as the access to and specific set -up of the register . 
While s ome provisions of  the draft law seem to imply that the credit data held i n the Register may be used 
by the Bank of Greece for statistic al purposes27, such purposes are not included in the wording of the draft 
law’s explicit provision on its primary aim and are not reflected in the rules governing access to the Register  
(see paragraphs 2.4 to 2.6 above).  However, the draft law explicitly lists ‘ safeguarding financial stabili ty’ as 
one of the primary aims of the Register28. Bank of Greece’s new task of establishing and operating the 
Register can thus be considered a task related to  the ESCB’s contribution to the stability of the financial 
system under  Article 127(5) of the Treaty.  
3.7 Tasks which are atypical of central bank tasks   
Safeguarding financial stability is a task that is not atypical of a central bank. Moreover, the Bank of G reece 
already has a financial stability mandate29. Consequently, the task of establishing and operating the 
 
26  For the relevance of the purpose in determining ESCB -related tasks , see paragraph 2.4.1  of CON/2021/29, paragraph 
3.3.4.1 of CON/2016/54 , and paragraph 3.2 of CON/2016/45 . Regarding the purpose of a specific credit register, see 
CON/2 013/29. Also compare  Article 5.1 Statute  of the ESCB: ‘In order to undertake the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB, 
assisted by the national central banks, shall collect the necessary statistical information .. .’ 
27  Article 3(5) of the draft law stipulates that credit information which the Bank of Greece may hold in the Register also 
encompasses analyses and statistics produced by the Bank; Article 4(3) of the draft law allows the Bank of Greece to 
request additional data from creditors so that they can be processed for the purpose of preparing financial analyses and 
statistical reports.  
28  See Article 1(3) of the draft law.  
29  Article 55A of the Statute of the Bank of Greece.   
ECB -PUBLIC  
11 Register with the explicit primary aim of safeguarding financial stability is not an atypical task for  the Bank 
of Greece.  It is also noted that a number of Member States have established central credit registers and 
conferred the tasks involved in operating them upon NCBs , albeit for different  purposes30. Also, all 
Eurosystem NCBs are required to operate national granular credit datasets under Regul ation (EU) 
2016/867 (ECB/2016/13) .  
3.8 Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government  
The Bank of Greece is designated by the draft law as the sole operator of the Register31. There is no 
indication that, in carrying out its task, the Bank of Greece would act exclusively in the interest of the 
government or another public entity.  
3.9 Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central ba nk 
tasks 
The performance of the new task of establishing and operating the Register is  unlikely to give rise to any 
conflicts of interest in connection with the Bank of Greece’s existing central bank tasks.  
3.10 Extent to which performance of the new task is di sproportionate to the financial or organisational 
capacity of  the Bank of Greece 
As previously noted by the ECB32, Member States must not put their NCBs in a position where they have 
insufficient resources to carry out both their ESCB -related tasks and their national tasks, from an 
operational and financial perspective. In order to ensure that the Bank of Greece’s capacity to perform its 
ESCB- related tasks is not impaired, the Bank of Greece must, therefore, be able to avail itself of the 
necessary resources to carry out its responsibilities under the draft law.  
The draft law does not cover the costs/funding of the Bank of Greece’s new task  and currently provides 
that access to financial history data shall be granted free of charge33. However, the ECB understands that 
on condition that the draft provision is revised, the secondary legislation that the Bank of Greece is 
authorised to adopt under the draft law may contain provisions regarding such funding,  e.g. in the form of 
fees to be levied on the reporting agents under the draft law which the secondary legislation will ultimately 
determine. The ECB also understands that the Bank of Greece has already taken the necessary measures 
to ensure that sufficient resources are available for establishing and operating the Register.  
3.11 Extent to which performance of the new task s fits into the institutional set -up of the Bank of Greece, 
in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations  
Given the Bank of Greece’s existing financial stability mandate, the performance of the new tasks appear s 
to fit into the Bank of Greece’s current institutional set -up.  
3.12 Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
The draft law does not contain any specific provisions on liability for the operation of the Register. Under 
the draft law the Bank of Greece will assume liability for processing personal data, under both the GDPR 
and national law. The Bank of Greece may also incur potential contractual or non- contractual liability vis -à-
 
30 See, for example, Opinions CON/2016/57, CON/2021/2 and CON/2017/28 (Bulgaria); CON/2021/24 and CON/2011/20 
(Belgium); CON/2019/2 and CON/2015/20 (Malta); CON/2017/33 (Austria); CON/2016/42 (Slovenia); CON/2014/57 
(Portugal); CON/2013/93 and CON/2017/13 (Latvia); CON/2012/111 and CON /2012/74 (Ireland).  
31  See also paragraph 2.11 above.  
32  See, for example, paragraph 4.6.1 of Opinion CON/2018/21.  
33  See Article 6(3) of the draft law. 
ECB -PUBLIC  
12 vis the reporting agents or data subjects, stemming from the es tablishment of the Register, under national 
law. This potential liability does not appear to be disproportionate to the new tasks conferred on the Bank 
of Greece.  
3.13 Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of the decision- making bodies  
of the Bank of Greece to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence  
The performance of the new task conferred under the draft law does not appear to expose the Bank of 
Greece’s decision- making bodies to any disproportionate political risk or have an impact on their personal 
independence.  
3.14 Conclusion  
The ECB considers that the Bank of Greece’s new tasks relating to the Register qualify as central banking 
tasks and are therefore in line with the prohibition on m onetary financing.  
 
This opinion will b e published on EUR -Lex.  
 
 Done at Frankfurt am Main, 25 August  2022.  
 [signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine  LAGARDE