[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |

Brussels, 14.7.2006

SEC(2006) 942

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Annex to theCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSIONSummary of the activities carried out during 2004 and 2005 in implementation of Title II, Chapters 3 to 10, of the Euratom Treaty{COM(2006) 395 final}

Table of contents

1. INFRINGEMENT CASES 3

2. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS 3

2.1. Material Balance Evaluation 3

2.2. Safeguards Inspection activities 4

2.3. Communication on nuclear safeguards 4

2.4. Non-proliferation 4

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE USA 5

4. RESOURCES 5

1. INFRINGEMENT CASES

Under Chapter 3, infringement cases addressed unsatisfactory environmental monitoring (Art. 35); the lack of submission to the Commission of general data prior to the authorisation of plans for the disposal of radioactive waste or before authorising revisions of existing plans (Art. 37); the lack of conformity with the provisions of Directive 96/29/Euratom, laying down BSS for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation (“BSS Directive”), of Directive 97/43/Euratom on exposures in the medical field and of Directive 89/618/Euratom concerning information of the public on health measures in case of radiological emergency.

Under Chapter 7, infringement procedures were opened with respect to the obstruction of Euratom inspection activities, e.g. failure to issue the authorisations necessary for shipping samples to installations based in another Member State or prohibition of access to data files outside the installations.

Under Chapter 10, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to six Member States for not having notified the Commission of their bilateral agreements on matters covered by the Treaty before their conclusion (Art. 103).

2. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

2.1. Material Balance Evaluation

A Nuclear Material Balance Evaluation was performed in accordance with the Treaty provisions for all bulk handling facilities, i.e. reprocessing, MOX[1] fabrication, uranium fabrication and centrifuge facilities. This evaluation, based on both accountancy figures and independent physical verifications, did not provide evidence suggesting that nuclear material had been diverted from intended use.

Table 1: Quantities of material under Euratom safeguards (t)

End 1990 | End 1995 | End 2001 | End 2002 | End 2003 | End 2004* |

Plutonium | 203 | 406 | 548 | 569 | 590 | 645 |

Total Uranium | 200 400 | 269 100 | 314 610 | 318 710 | 325 510 | 342 910 |

High Enriched | 13 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 |

Low Enriched | 32 000 | 46 700 | 57 000 | 58 500 | 59 700 | 66 800 |

Natural | 51 400 | 52 700 | 47 700 | 42 600 | 44 800 |

Depleted | 124 400 | 171 000 | 204 900 | 212 500 | 223 200 | 231 300 |

Thorium | 2 600 | 4 600 | 4 500 | 4 500 | 4400 | 4 400 |

* Quantities based on data available on 16-3-2005. Includes 10 new Member States.

2.2. Safeguards Inspection activities

Comprehensive inspection activities took place in 2004 and 2005 aiming at drawing conclusions in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Treaty. Commission inspectors verified supporting documents against the physical reality, conducted targeted interviews with the persons responsible for the management systems and performed measurements on selected nuclear materials. Inspectors submitted over 3,400 detailed reports. As a result, the Commission issued over 200 requests for clarifications or corrective actions on non-conformity, discrepancies and shortcomings to varying degrees in the operators’ nuclear accountancy systems. Commission services ensured the follow-up of action plans proposed by operators, monitoring their execution from the early stages until satisfactory completion.

No evidence was found to suggest that nuclear materials were diverted from their intended use. However, as underlined above, system weaknesses were detected and corrections were implemented by the operators concerned. There was no evidence of non-compliance with the particular safeguards provisions stipulated by the Community under agreements concluded with non-EU States.

2.3. Communication on nuclear safeguards

On the basis of the Communication, adopted by the Commission on 30.04.2004, the principles and modalities for the implementation of the inspections and safeguards tasks were formulated. The new safeguards approach optimises both the efficiency and effectiveness of inspections at nuclear facilities. It also serves to measure the reliability, integrity and effectiveness of the operators’ control systems to independent physical verifications. It will enable the Commission to carry out positive differentiation, adapting the intrusion of the inspections according to the quality standards in the facilities or to the level of risk of a diversion of nuclear material from a facility. The introduction of additional audit tools and methods over and above the current activities contributes to the comprehensiveness of the controls carried out by the Commission.

2.4. Non-proliferation

Responsibility for follow-up issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation was transferred to Luxembourg during 2004. Participation to the Nuclear Suppliers Group meetings, the IAEA General Conference, a Europol seminar on illicit trafficking, a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise as well as to the internal Commission’s groups on weapons of mass destruction and dual-use goods was assured. Participation was continued in the G8 International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling and an exercise of the Polish national response to a seizure of trafficked radioactive materials was witnessed. DG TREN took part in the organizing committee for a conference held in Moscow on Multilateral Approaches to the fuel cycle as well as in the organizing committee for a conference on illicit trafficking held at Europol, the Hague in November 2005.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE USA

During 2004 and 2005 the nuclear co-operation agreements with, Australia, Canada and the USA were implemented to the satisfaction of all parties. Bilateral consultations between the Commission and Australia as well as Canada confirmed the good relations between the parties.

Following enlargement, the procedure for the folding in of the bilateral agreements between EU new Member States and the above third countries to the respective Community agreements with these third countries was engaged.

A meeting between the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DG TREN was held in Luxembourg. Both sides presented their respective regulatory roles and discussed various nuclear issues of mutual concern, including the control of high radioactive sources, nuclear waste and BSS standards. It was concluded that further collaboration is needed to enhance implementation of measures in nuclear safety, safeguards and security issues.

4. RESOURCES

Budget appropriations for Nuclear Safety

Nuclear Safety activities are financed from three types of budget appropriations:

- A general “administrative” appropriation involving the personnel costs, expert meetings costs, missions costs;

- A budget line for expenditure directly related to Nuclear Safety -Decommissioning of first generation Soviet designed nuclear power plants in Ignalina (LT) and Bohunice (SK) (part B of the budget);

- A budget line for expenditure directly related to Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection such as studies, rental of offices, service contracts (part B of the budget).

For 2004, specific operational appropriations in the EU budget for Nuclear Safety and Decommissioning came to €142.1 million and €144.15 million for 2005. Of that the 2004 amount, €140.43million was actually committed. The expenditure was broken down as follows:

Decommissioning | 138M | 100% |

Service contracts (studies) | 2.426M | 59.2% |

Of the 2005 amount, €140.32 million was actually committed. The expenditure was broken down as follows:

Decommissioning | 139M | 100% |

Service contracts (studies) | 1.323M | 25.7% |

Table 2 – Nuclear safety and radiation protection budget 2004/2005:

Expenditure committed for the specific appropriation 06.05.06 for 2004 and 06.07.02 for 2005 (budget lines for expenditure directly related to Nuclear Safety such as studies, rental of offices, service contracts) and 06.05.07 for 2004 as well as 06.07.03 for 2005 (budget lines for expenditure related to radiological protection)

2004 (06.05.06)+(06.05.07)

Topics | Budgeted | Committed |

a) Studies | 3.200.000 | 2.040.592 |

b) Studies on radioactive material transport operations | 500.000 | - |

c) Eurobarometer studies | 350.000 | 334.217,74 |

d) Impact assessment on Joint Undertaking | 50.000 | 48.000 |

e) Rental of offices in Vienna for the annual IAEA conference | - | 3.500 * |

2005 (06.07.02)+(06.07.03)

Topics | Budgeted | Committed |

a) Studies | 4.891.500 | 1.064.815* |

b) Impact assessments | 255.000 | 255.000 |

c) Rental of offices in Vienna for the annual IAEA conference | 3.500 | 3.500 |

* Feasibility study for the power-bridge from Poland to Lithuania was dropped.

Table 3 – Nuclear safety and radiological protection budget 2004/2005:

Expenditure committed for the specific appropriation 01 02 11 (a general “administrative” appropriation involving the personnel costs, expert meetings costs, missions’ costs)

2004

Topics | Budgeted | Spent |

a) Mission costs (H1 and H2 units) | 370.000 | 370.000 |

b) Expert meetings costs (H1 and H2 units) | 260.000 | 237.000 |

2005

Topics | Budgeted | Spent |

a) Mission costs | 350.000 | 350.000 |

b) Expert meetings costs | 340.000 | 340.000 |

Table 4 - Staff Resources in Directorate H

FONCT | TEMP | EXP NAT | AUX | Total |

16 December 2004 | A* | 30 | 5 | 3 | 38 |

B* | 33 | 1 | 1 | 35 |

C* | 22 | 2 | 24 |

Total | 85 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 97 |

16 October 2005 | A* | 32 | 6 | 2 | 40 |

B* | 34 | 1 | 1 | 36 |

C* | 25 | 2 AC | 28 (from whom one more interim) |

Total | 91 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 104 |

Table 5 - Staff Resources in Directorate I

FONCT | TEMP | INT | AUX | Total |

16 December 2004 | A* | 44 | 44 |

B* | 89 | 9 | 98 |

C* | 32 | 1 | 3 | 36 |

Total | 165 | 9 | 1 | 3 | 178[2] |

16 October 2005 | A* | 44 | 45 (of whom one more END) |

B* | 87 | 10 | 97 |

C* | 32 | 3 | 1 | 36 |

Total | 163 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 178 (END inclusive) |

[1] Mixed Oxide

[2] Not including staff resources in JRC/ITU Karlsruhe, that are employed by DG TREN to perform additional inspection duties. By December 2004, 18 ITU analysts were employed for both on-site laboratories and a further 5 or 6 additional ITU staff outside this team were available for performing more specific duties.