EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 30.4.2020 SWD(2020) 71 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT […] Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 38th Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities and the Use of trade defence instruments by Third Countries targeting the EU in 2019 {COM(2020) 164 final}



COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 38th Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament

on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities and the Use of trade defence instruments by Third Countries targeting the EU in 2019



Table of Contents 1. Overview of the legislation 1.1. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1. The international framework 1.1.2. The EU legislation 1.2 Safeguards 1.2.1. The international framework 1.2.2. The EU legislation 5 2. General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures 2.1. Measures in place 7 2.2. New investigations 2.3 Review investigations

3. Overview of activities in 2019 3.1. New investigations 3.1.1. Initiations 3.1.2. Provisional measures 10 3.1.3. Definitive measures 3.1.4. Details on individual cases with application of new provisional or definitive duties 3.1.5. New investigations terminated without measures 26 3.2. Review investigations 27 3.2.1. Expiry reviews 27 3.2.2. Interim reviews 35 3.2.3. New exporter reviews 35 3.2.4. Anti-absorption investigations 36 3.2.5. Anti-circumvention investigations 36 3.2.6. “Other” reviews (reinvestigations) 38 3.3. Safeguard investigations 38 3.3.1. Details on individual safeguard cases 39 3.4. Verification activities 41 4. Enforcement of anti-dumping/countervailing measures 41

4.1. Follow-up of measures 42 4.2. Monitoring of undertakings 42 4.3. OLAF activity 42 5. Refunds 43 6. Information and Communication activities / Bilateral contacts 7. Judicial review: decisions given by the Court of Justice (CJ) and the General Court (GC) 7.1. Overview of the judicial reviews in 2019 7.2. Cases pending 7.3. New cases 7.4. Judgments rendered by the General Court (a selection) 7.5. Judgments rendered by the Court of Justice (a selection) 51 8. Activities by third countries targeting the EU 9. Activities in the framework of the WTO 58 9.1. Dispute settlement in the field of trade defence 58 9.2. Other WTO activities (in more detail) 59

LIST OF ANNEXES 61 ANNEX A 62 ANNEX B 63 ANNEX C 65 ANNEX D 66 ANNEX E 67 ANNEX F 68 ANNEX G 70 ANNEX H 71 ANNEX I 72 ANNEX J 74 ANNEX K 75 ANNEX L 77 ANNEX M 78 ANNEX N 79 ANNEX O 80 ANNEX P 98 ANNEX Q 100 ANNEX R 101

ANNEX S 105 ANNEX T 109 ANNEX U 110 1. Overview of the legislation 1.1. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1. The international framework On an international level, unfair trading practices such as dumping and the granting of subsidies were identified as a threat to open markets as early as 1947, when the first GATT agreement was signed. The agreement contained specific provisions allowing GATT members to take action against these practices if they caused material injury to the domestic industry of a GATT member. Today's globalised trade environment is characterized by quicker and cheaper communication and transportation, as well as the coexistence of different models of economic governance. In such a world, trade defence instruments are more relevant than ever. Indeed, trade distortions that underlie the application of these instruments are widespread. Since the beginning of the GATT in 1947, considerable efforts have been made to harmonise the rules relating to trade defence instruments. During the last GATT round (the « Uruguay Round »), which led to the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the detailed Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, much of the attention was focused on the procedural and material conditions to be fulfilled before measures can be adopted. The EU played an active role in the negotiation of these agreements, which are reflected in its own legislation. The EU applies its anti-dumping (AD) and anti-subsidy (AS) legislation with rigour and consistency. Unfortunately, many WTO Members lack this type of restraint, thereby affecting negatively also EU operators. The role that the EU plays as a prudent user has therefore also an exemplary function at WTO level. Against this backdrop, the EU also continues to play a leading active role in any efforts to update the WTO rulebook. 1.1.2. The EU legislation The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation was first enacted in 1968 and has since been modified several times. The current basic texts, which form the legal basis of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations in the EU, entered into force in March 1996 and October 1997 respectively. These are in line with the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements adopted during the GATT/WTO negotiations. These texts were codified in 2016 to reflect changes previously made. The basic texts are: Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version –Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version. These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic anti-dumping (AD) Regulation" and the “basic anti-subsidy (AS) Regulation”. Both regulations were recently modified by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of 12 December 2017 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of 30 May 2018. The EU's legislation contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring a balanced application of the EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules on all interested parties. These provisions include the “EU interest test” and the “lesser duty rule”, which go beyond the Union's WTO obligations. The EU interest test is a public interest clause and provides that measures cannot be applied if it is established that they are contrary to the overall economic interest of the EU. This requires an analysis of all the economic interests involved, including those of the EU industry and its suppliers, downstream users, consumers and traders of the product concerned. The lesser duty rule requires the measures imposed by the EU to be lower than the dumping or subsidy margin, if such lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury suffered by the EU industry. Such a “no-injury” rate is usually determined by using the cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin (although, as a result of the recent TDI modernisation, the latter rules have been further elaborated, as explained below). In almost half of the cases, the anti-dumping measures for individual exporting companies are set at the level of the injury margin instead of the higher dumping margin. The EU is one of the few investigating authorities on a worldwide level that applies the lesser duty rule in such a coherent and comprehensive way. 1.2. Safeguards 1.2.1. The international framework The principle of liberalisation of imports was set under the GATT 1947 and strengthened under the 1994 WTO Agreements. As safeguard measures consist of the unilateral withdrawal or suspension of a tariff concession or of other trade liberalisation obligations formerly agreed, they have to be considered as an exception to this principle. Article XIX GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards do not only impose strict conditions for the application of this "escape clause", but also put in place a multilateral control mechanism under the WTO Committee on Safeguards.

Under WTO rules, safeguard action has to be viewed as a temporary defence measure that applies to all imports of the product covered by a measure, irrespective of origin. As regards non-WTO members, safeguard measures may be selective and apply to products originating in a specific country. WTO Accession Protocols may also provide for such selective safeguard mechanisms, as was the case in the Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China (China), although the provision has now expired. Definitive WTO safeguards should only be adopted after a comprehensive investigation that provides evidence of the existence of a) unforeseen developments leading to b) increased imports, c) the existence of a serious injury or a threat of injury for EU producers and d) a causal link between the imports and the injury. 1.2.2. The EU legislation The above-mentioned principles are all reflected in the relevant EU regulations, except for the “unforeseen development requirement” (which is not found explicitly in the EU legislation nor in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards but has been confirmed as a self-standing condition by WTO jurisprudence, as per Article XIX of GATT 1994). Additionally, the adoption of measures in the EU requires an analysis of all interests concerned, i.e. the impact of the measures on producers, users and consumers. In other words, safeguard action can only be taken when it is in the EU’s interest to do so. The current EU safeguard instruments are covered by the following regulations: - Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (codification), - Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (recast), - Regulation (EU) 2019/287 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 February 2019 implementing bilateral safeguard clauses and other mechanisms allowing for the temporary withdrawal of preferences in certain trade agreements concluded between the European Union and third countries, - Regulation (EU) 2015/936 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2015 on common rules for imports of textile products from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific EU import rules (recast). The first two regulations are referred to as the "basic safeguard Regulation(s)". 2. General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures The number of new investigations initiated in 2019 was substantially higher compared to the previous year, at 16 initiations (compared to 10 in 2018). In addition, the Commission reopened 7 cases to implement findings following court rulings (see "Other reviews"). The number of measures imposed in 2019 also increased as compared to 2018: 7 new definitive measures and 5 provisional measures were imposed, a total of 12, versus 6 in 2018. At the same time, 5 investigations were also terminated without the imposition of measures, which brought the total number of new investigations concluded in 2019 to 17. Moreover, during 2019, the Commission initiated 16 review investigations (excluding re-openings). Among the latter, there were 8 initiations of expiry reviews (two of which regarding anti-subsidy measures). As many as 18 expiry reviews were concluded in 2019 - 16 with a confirmation of the duty and 2 by termination and repeal of measures. In other words, 2019 stood as a particularly busy year, with even more significant new casework and reviewing activity than 2018. Below are details on new investigations and review investigations. 2.1. Measures in place At the end of 2019, the EU had in force 94 definitive anti-dumping measures (which were extended in 27 cases) and 15 countervailing measures in force (extended in one case). The anti-dumping measures product coverage remained at 67 products, concerning 15 countries (see Annex O); the countervailing measures covered 13 products and 6 countries – two more than in 2018 (see Annex P). The large majority of measures was in the form of duties. In one case, undertakings have been put in place. Of all the 121 anti-dumping measures in force at the end of 2019, the countries affected were China (86), Russia (10), US (4), India and Korea (3 each), Belarus, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and Ukraine (2 each), Brazil, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, and Trinidad and Tobago (1 each). Of the 16 anti-subsidy measures in place, 7 concerned imports from China, whereas India remained subject to 4 measures, the US to 2 measures and Argentina, Indonesia and Turkey to 1 measure each. 2.2. New investigations – recent evolution In the 5-year period from 2015 to 2019, 66 new investigations were initiated on imports from 22 countries. The sectors concerned by the investigations were mainly: 'iron and steel' – 30 investigations, and 'chemical and allied industries' – 18 investigations, A breakdown of the product sectors is available in Annex B(A). The countries concerned by the highest number of initiations in the period from 2015 to 2019 include China – 25 investigations; Egypt and Russia – 5 each; Brazil, India, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey – 3 each. A table showing all the investigations initiated over the last 5 years broken down by country of export is available at Annex B(B). Table 1 below provides statistical information on the developments regarding new investigations for the years 2015 – 2019.

TABLE 1 Evolution of new anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard investigations during the period 1 January 2015 - 31 December 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 New investigations in progress at the beginning of the period 20 20 20 17 15 New investigations initiated during the period 14 15 11 10 16 New investigations in progress during the period 34 35 31 27 31 New investigations concluded : - by imposition of definitive duty or acceptance of undertakings - terminations 11 3 7 8 12 2 4 8 10 5 Total new investigations concluded during the period 14 15 14 12 15 New investigations in progress at the end of period 20 20 17 15 16 Provisional measures imposed during the period 10 9 2 3 5 2.3. Review investigations – recent evolution Anti-dumping measures, including price undertakings, may be subject, under the basic AD Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 11(2)), interim reviews (Article 11(3)), newcomer investigations (Article 11(4)), absorption investigations (Article 12) and anti-circumvention investigations (Article 13). The Commission also carries out “other” reviews consisting in re-opening of investigations to implement court rulings. Also anti-subsidy measures may be subject, under the basic AS Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 18), interim reviews (Article 19), absorption investigations (Article 19(3)), accelerated reviews (Article 20) and anti-circumvention investigations (Article 23). In addition, here also, the Commission can re-open investigations to implement court rulings. Reviews continue to represent a major part of the work of the Commission's TDI services. In the period from 2015 to 2019, 133 such review investigations were initiated by the Commission. Reviews represented 2/3 of all TDI investigations initiated. In 2019, specifically, the Commission initiated 23 reviews of a broad range of types. These comprised 8 expiry reviews, 2 interim reviews, 4 anti-circumvention investigations, 1 anti-absorption investigation, 1 ‘new exporter’ review and 7 re-openings. At the same time, 22 reviews were concluded by the Commission. An overview of the review investigations in 2019 can be found in Annexes F to K. Table 2 below provides statistical information for the years 2015 – 2019. TABLE 2 Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations during the period 1 January 2015 - 31 December 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Reviews in progress at the beginning of the period 36 33 29 28 25 Reviews initiated during the period 33 23 30 25 23 Reviews in progress during the period 69 56 59 53 48 Total reviews concluded during the period 36 27 31 28 22 Reviews in progress at the end of the period 33 29 28 25 26

3. Overview of activities in 2019 3.1. New investigations 3.1.1. Initiations In 2019, the Commission initiated 11 new anti-dumping and 5 new anti-subsidy investigations. Iron and steel as well as glass fibre products stood out in terms of product coverage. The investigations concerned 6 different countries, with the highest number of initiations occurring against China (7) and Egypt (4). Details of the investigations are given in Annexes A and B. The list of cases initiated in 2019 can be found below, together with the names of the complainants. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex A. Product (Type of investigation: AD or AS) Origin Complainant Steel road wheels China Association of European Wheel Manufacturers Glass fibre fabrics (AD) Egypt China Tech-Fab Europe Glass fibre fabrics (AS) Egypt China Tech-Fab Europe Glass fibre reinforcements (AD) Bahrain Egypt European Glass Fibre Producers Association Glass fibre reinforcements (AS) Egypt European Glass Fibre Producers Association Polyvinyl alcohols (AD) China Kuraray Europe GmbH Stainless steel hot-rolled flat products (AD) Indonesia China Taiwan Eurofer Stainless steel hot-rolled flat products (AS) Indonesia China Eurofer Heavyweight thermal paper (AD) Rep. of Korea European Thermal Paper Association Pins and staples (AD) China Atrom Impex srl Bizon Int. Sp. z o.o. Ergo Staples Grupodesa Omer SpA Velo srl 3.1.2. Provisional measures In 2019, provisional duties were imposed in four 4-dumping investigations, and 1 anti-subsidy investigation. The list of cases where provisional measures were imposed during 2019 can be found below, together with the measures imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex C. Product Origin Type and level of measure Biodiesel Indonesia CVD: 8% – 18% Steel road wheels China AD: 50.3% – 66.4% Urea and ammonium nitrate Russia Trinidad and Tobago US AD: 31.9% – 34% AD: 16.3% AD: 22.6% 3.1.3. Definitive measures During 2019, definitive duties were imposed in 4 anti-dumping investigations and in 3 anti-subsidy investigations. The list of cases where definitive measures were imposed during 2019 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex D. Product Origin Type and level of measure Biodiesel Argentina Indonesia CVD: 25% – 33.4% CVD: 8% – 18% Electric bicycles China AD: 10.3% – 70.1% CVD: 3.9% – 17.2% Urea and ammonium nitrate Russia Trinidad and Tobago US AD: 27.77 EUR/t – 42.47 EUR/t AD: 22.24 EUR/t AD: 29.48 EUR/t 3.1.4. Details on individual cases with application of new provisional or definitive duties Electric bicycles from China (Definitive CVD) On 21 December 2017, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of electric bicycles originating in China. The initiation was based on a complaint lodged on 8 November 2017 by the European Bicycle Manufacturers Association (EBMA) on behalf of Union producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of electric bicycles. The complaint contained evidence of subsidisation and of a resulting injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation. Sampling

The final sample of Union producers consisted of four Union producers, which accounted for 60% of total production volume and 58% of total sales of the Union industry. The Commission selected a sample of five unrelated importers on the basis of the largest volume of imports into the Union. It has also selected a sample of five groups of exporting producers on the basis of the volume of the product concerned and considered as the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The sampled exporting producers represented 43% of the total imports of the product concerned to the Union. Product concerned The product concerned was defined as: cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor, originating in the PRC The Commission concluded that speed electric bicycles, L1e-A category electric bicycles and electric tricycles shared the same basic physical characteristics and properties as well as end-uses with other types of electric cycles, and therefore could not be excluded from the product scope of the investigation. Subsidisation The following subsidies were investigated: (1) provision of preferential loans and directed credits by State policy banks and State-owned commercial banks; (2) preferential Export credit insurance; (3) grants; (4) Government revenue that is otherwise due or forgone or not collected; (5) revenue foregone through Indirect Tax and Import Tariff Programmes; (6) Government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration. Given the partial non-cooperation from the Government of China (GOC) and the sampled exporting producers, the Commission had to use the best facts available in relation to the preferential lending, export credit insurance, and provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration. The investigation showed that the following subsidies and subsidy programmes were countervailable subsidies: (1) Provision of preferential loans and directed credits by State policy banks and State-owned commercial banks: financial institutions had provided loans, credit lines or bank acceptances to exporting producers. Those of the banks that were State-owned qualified in a straightforward manner as public bodies. With regard to other banks, which were not directly owned by the State, the Commission found that they were nevertheless entrusted and directed by the GOC to carry out functions normally vested in the Government. Chinese bicycle producers benefited from advantageous credit lines (without the need to pay additional fees to compensate the bank’s costs and risks) and from bank acceptances with extended repayment deadlines, which were granted at conditions, which the market does not normally offer. This preferential lending was only available to a limited number of companies/industries compliant with the GOC’s policies. (2) Preferential Export credit insurance: These insurance agreements were provided by a State-owned enterprise (“SOE”) to electric bicycles producers at rates that were not market-oriented nor based on risk assessment. Premiums were also insufficient to cover the claims’ cost and the overhead expenses of the SOE. Furthermore, some exporting producers benefited from a partial or total refund of the export credit insurance premiums. These agreements could not be obtained without exporting (hence were export contingent). (3) Grant Programmes: some sampled companies were found to benefit from one-off or recurring grants from different levels of government authorities. These subsidies constituted a transfer of funds from the GOC in the form of grants to the producers of the product. They were specific as they were limited to certain companies or specific projects in concrete regions and/or specifically the electric bicycle industry. In addition, some of the grants were contingent upon export performance. (4) Government revenue that is otherwise due or forgone or not collected: the direct tax exemption within the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) regime allowed some high and new technology enterprises determined by the State to benefit from a reduced income tax rate of 15% (instead of 25 %). This tax reduction was found to be a specific subsidy as it conferred a benefit to only some companies. Furthermore, the EIT offset for research and development (R&D) expenses entitled companies to preferential tax treatment for their R&D activities in certain high technology priority areas determined by the State, when certain thresholds for R&D spending were met. A tax exemption on dividend income between qualified resident enterprises was also regarded as a subsidy as it conferred a benefit to specific companies the development of which was encouraged by the State. (5) Revenue foregone through Indirect Tax and Import Tariff Programmes: Chinese producers benefited from an exemption from VAT and import tariffs for imports of capital equipment used in their production processes. To that end, the equipment must not fall in a list of non-eligible equipment and the claiming enterprise had to obtain a Certificate of State-Encouraged project issued by the Chinese authorities or by the NDRC, thereby making the subsidy specific. (6) Government provision of goods/inputs for less than adequate remuneration: the Commission concluded that the GOC was entrusting or directing Chinese producers of engines and suppliers of batteries to supply these inputs for less than adequate remuneration to the domestic producers of electric bicycles. These subsidies were not generally available. No evidence was submitted suggesting that those subsidies were based on objective criteria or conditions. In addition, the electric bicycles sector benefited, as a key industry, from the granting of Land Use Rights at preferential rates, which were also considered countervailable subsidies. Injury and causation During the IP, where the Union sales and production developed negatively despite a growing Union consumption, the Union industry suffered from a decreasing productivity per employee. Such a decreasing productivity and the consequent negative impact on the profitability of the Union industry was directly linked to the increasing quantities of subsidized imports of Chinese electric bicycles during the period considered. Confronted with an accelerating flow of subsidized imports from China, the Union Industry was not able to capitalise on the growth of the electric bicycle market and has lost market share to Chinese imports. The pressure on prices and the inability to seize economies of scale in a nascent market kept the profitability of the Union industry at depressed levels throughout the period considered. This low level of profit and the variation of stocks led to low operating cash flows which were below the level of investment incurred during the period considered and created an additional element of vulnerability for this cash-intensive business, strongly dependent on the liquidity provided by banks. Four producers went into bankruptcy during the IP, thus confirming a situation of injury within the Union industry. Regarding the causality analysis, the Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the subsidized imports. In particular, imports from Taiwan and Vietnam had also average lower prices than the Union industry. However, notably, Vietnamese imports ceased to win market share after 2015, and imports from Taiwan were accompanied by a significant increase in prices (while average prices of Chinese products kept on decreasing). This led the Commission to conclude that overall those imports did not attenuate the causal link. Furthermore, with regard to investment in capacity by the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the growth in production capacity between 2015 and 2016 was in line with consumption levels in that period and the EU production capacity was reduced as from 2016 only due to unfair pressure by subsidised Chinese imports. Lastly, the Commission found that the introduction of incentives for electrical bicycles’ sales did not contribute to a shift to Chinese bicycles to the detriment of those produced in the Union. The latter was only caused by the price undercutting resulting from subsidisation. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious subsidisation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. The Commission concluded that the imposition of a countervailing duty would be in the interest of the suppliers of the Union Industry and the Union industry itself. Even if the imposition of duties could have an adverse effect on small importers, this could be mitigated by the possibility to source bicycles from the Union Industry, in other third countries, and in the PRC at fair, non-injurious prices. In any case, any potential adverse effect on importers would not outweigh the positive effect of measures on the Union industry. What is more, the European Cyclists Federation argued that price is not the determining factor in whether people cycle more or less and provided evidence that countries where people cycle more are the countries where bicycles and electric bicycles cost more. The Commission therefore concluded that the measures would not unduly affect the situation of consumers and would contribute to the sustainable development of electric bicycles in the Union as well as its wider benefits to society in terms of protection of the environment and improved mobility. A definitive countervailing duty was imposed at a level sufficient to eliminate the injury caused by the subsidised imports without exceeding the amount of subsidisation found. The definitive countervailing duty rates ranged between 3.9% and 17.2%. Biodiesel from Argentina (Definitive CVD)

On 31 January 2018, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of biodiesel originating in Argentina. The initiation was based on a complaint lodged on 18 November 2017 by the European Biodiesel Board (EBB) on behalf of Union producers representing more than 70% of the total Union production of biodiesel. The complaint contained evidence of subsidisation and of a resulting threat of injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation. The investigation covered the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017. Sampling The final sample of Union producers consisted of three Union producers, accounting for 23% of total production. Sampling of importers was not carried out due to the low number of unrelated importers that provided information. The Commission selected eight exporting producers which exported biodiesel to the Union during the investigation period (IP). This last sample represented 84% of the total exports of the product concerned to the Union. The product concerned The product concerned was ‘biodiesel’, in pure form or as included in a blend, originating in Argentina. The investigation showed that biodiesel produced in Argentina was exclusively soybean methyl ester derived from soybean oil, whereas biodiesel produced in the Union is mainly rapeseed methyl ester but made also from other feedstock, including waste oils as well as virgin oils. However, both the product concerned and the biodiesel produced and sold in the EU were found to have the same basic physical, chemical, and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses. Subsidisation The following subsidies were investigated: (1) the Government's support to the biodiesel industry including through the provision of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration; (2) the Government's mandated purchase of biodiesel for more than adequate remuneration (‘Biodiesel Supply Agreement’); (3) the Provision of loans and export financing on preferential terms and preferential lending by the National Bank of Argentina (Banco de la Nación Argentina, ‘BNA’); (4) the Government's revenue forgone or not collected, such as the accelerated depreciation for biodiesel producers under the Biofuels Law of 2006, the exemption and deferral of the minimum presumed income tax for biodiesel producers under the Biofuels Law of 2006; as well as (5) Provincial and municipal tax exemptions. Given the partial non-cooperation from the Government of Argentina (‘GOA’) and the sampled exporting producers, the Commission had to use the best facts available in relation to the provision of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration. (1) Government's support to the biodiesel industry including through the provision of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration (‘LTAR’): The GOA supported the biodiesel industry through various measures, notably by implementing a policy of imposing high export taxes and other regulations relating to soybeans and soybean oil. As soybean oil is the key raw material used for the production of biodiesel in Argentina, these measures allowed domestic prices of this raw material to remain significantly lower than global prices. The investigation found that the GOA resorted to the following measures with regard to soybeans: export taxes on soybeans, subsidies to soybean producers to continue producing and selling domestically to biodiesel producers, countermeasures on producing other grains such as by imposing export quotas, and public statements to encourage soybean producers not to stop their production, but to continue selling domestically. The GOA explicitly pursued the support and development of the biodiesel industry as a policy objective. The Commission also established that the GOA entrusted/directed the input producers to carry out its policy, which created a compartmentalised domestic market by providing goods to the domestic users of soybeans (the biodiesel producers) for LTAR. The Commission considered that the provision of soybeans located on Argentinian soil to the Argentinian biodiesel industry was a function which was normally vested in the government. Alternatively, the Commission also analysed whether the measures followed by the GOA could be considered as ‘income or price support’. The investigation showed that several legislative acts clearly and explicitly pointed to the GOA’s support the domestic biodiesel industry. Thus, the Government directly or indirectly provided income/price support to the biodiesel industry resulting in an increase of exports of biodiesel. The Commission then analysed whether the GOA's support to the biodiesel industry conferred a benefit. As the prices paid by the domestic biodiesel producers differed from a benchmark based on the prevailing market conditions in Argentina for soybeans, this difference represented the ‘savings’ obtained by the Argentinian producers of biodiesel which purchase soybeans in the Argentinian distorted market, compared to the price which they would have paid in the absence of subsidies. Ultimately, this total amount ‘saved’ represented the benefit conferred. Lastly, the GOA's set of measures was directed to benefit certain industries, including the domestic biodiesel industry. Indeed, even though the distortions on soybeans also benefited downstream products other than biodiesel, the benefit was available only to certain industries in Argentina, being those in the soya value chain. Thus, the Commission concluded that these measures were specific and they therefore qualified as a countervailable subsidy. The subsidy amount was calculated as reflecting a rate in the range of 25.05% – 33.15%, depending on the beneficiary. (2) Government's mandated purchase of biodiesel for more than adequate remuneration (‘Biodiesel Supply Agreement’) These agreements were designed to provide biodiesel to the domestic market given the blending mandate in force since 2010. This mandate required blending companies to purchase biodiesel and blend it with mineral diesel before sale. Furthermore, the GOA established individual and collective quotas for biodiesel to supply the domestic market. Given that none of the sampled exporting producers received a quota during the IP, none of these companies sold biodiesel on the domestic market through the quota system in force during that period. In addition, no Biodiesel Supply Agreement was in force during the IP with respect to the exporting producers. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there was no inherent benefit from any quota system received by the sampled exporting producers. (3) Provision of loans and export financing on preferential terms and preferential lending The complainant argued that the Banco de la Nación Argentina, a State-owned bank, was lending money to micro, small and medium enterprises for investment and working capital at preferential rates. The investigation showed that the loans granted to the sampled companies were not at preferential rates when compared to similar loans provided by privately owned banks. (4) Government's revenue forgone or not collected under the Biofuels Law of 2006 The complainant also alleged that provisions of the Biofuels Law would allow biofuel producers to reduce the tax base on which the minimum presumed income tax is calculated as well as an accelerated depreciation for capital goods. The investigation showed however that none of the sampled exporting producers benefited from these promotional benefits and thus the Commission concluded that there was no countervailable subsidy involved. (5) Provincial and municipal tax exemptions Despite several schemes providing either tax exemptions to the biodiesel industry (Province of Cordoba), exemptions from the payment of taxes (Province of Buenos Aires) or tax advantages (Province of Santiago del Estero), the investigation showed that none of the sampled exporting producers benefited from these measures. Finally, it was found that the Province of Santa Fe had been granting during 15 years an exemption from income tax, stamp duty, real estate tax and vehicle duties to biodiesel companies located in that province. This fiscal exemption was considered a subsidy due to the revenue being foregone by the GOA and to specificity to only certain industries which could avail from it. The subsidy rate was calculated in the range of 0.06% - 2.15%. Threat of injury and causation Due to the effect of anti-dumping duties on imports of biodiesel from Argentina that were in place between 2014 and August 2017, there were no or negligible imports from Argentina to the Union. However, in September 2017, the latter anti-dumping duties were reduced and, as a result, imports from Argentina started to increase rapidly and significantly, reaching a 2.8% market share in the IP. Despite a 5% growth between 2014 and 2016, the Union production of biodiesel did not increase at the same rate as the Union consumption due to the Argentinian subsidised imports which started entering the Union market at the end of the IP. The Commission found that the IP was already negatively influenced by imports from Argentina and the period following the IP indicated a further deterioration of the situation of the Union industry. In spite of an increase of sales and production, caused by increasing consumption during the IP, the Union industry did not show indications of improving its economic situation. In fact, during the IP, the Union industry showed almost no profits, in view of the pressure exercised by the low prices of the subject imports. The low profits during the IP turned into losses in the first six months of 2018. The trends showed that the Union industry appeared not to have fully recovered from the effects of past dumping. The Commission also examined whether the subsidised imports caused a threat of material injury to the Union industry. Taking into account the nature of the subsidies, which decreased the costs of inputs, the reduction of the anti-dumping duties, the spare capacity of the Argentinian biodiesel producers, and the lower price of biodiesel imports, the Commission concluded that the fragile economic condition of the Union industry was likely to be aggravated by the imminent and continuing massive quantities of subsidised imports of biodiesel from Argentina. There was therefore a threat of a clearly foreseeable and imminent injury to the Union industry at the end of the IP.

Regarding the causality analysis, the Commission established that there was a causal link between the threat of injury suffered by the Union industry and the subsidised imports of biodiesel from Argentina. In particular, the sharp increase in subsidised imports at prices undercutting the Union industry's prices coincided in time with the drop of the Union industry's performance. At the same time the Union industry was unable to reap the benefits of increased Union consumption and had to limit its increase in production, lost market share and was unable to achieve profits. The Union industry was forced to follow the price level set by the subsidised imports in order to avoid a further shrinking of its market share. Exports from third countries, sales performance of the Union industry and a reduction of capacity of the Union industry were found not to attenuate the causal link between subsidised imports and the threat of injury. Union interest and definitive measures The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. With regard to importers, they were found usually not only to import but also to trade biodiesel purchased from Union producers. Importers might have faced additional difficulties to fully replace the level of imports affected by measures with supplies from Union producers, which normally used their own distribution channels. However, the Commission concluded that this possible negative effect could be balanced by the increased volume of trade of biodiesel purchased from the Union industry. Regarding the final consumers, they could be affected by the price increase following the imposition of measures. The Commission found that the imposition of duties would have the negative effect of increasing consumer prices. However, because of the limited content of biodiesel in the final product purchased by consumers (typically less than 10 %), this negative effect on the price of diesel fuel would only be a small proportion compared to the direct change in the price of biodiesel on the Union market. A definitive countervailing duty was therefore imposed in the range of 25% - 33,4%, at a level sufficient to eliminate the threat of injury caused by the subsidised imports but without exceeding the amount of subsidisation found, Undertakings Further to the disclosure by the Commission of the case facts, cooperating exporting producers offered price undertakings in accordance with Article 13(1) of the basic AS Regulation. The offer consisted in selling biodiesel in the Union market at one minimum import price, linked to the average monthly soybean oil price quoted the GOA, which comprised the soybean export tax. Moreover exporters were to ensure that the volume of imports would be set at an annual level corresponding to their overall market performance (around 10% of the average annual Union consumption between 2014 and the IP). The Commission carefully analysed, inter alia, the current export prices of biodiesel, the level of countervailing duty as well as other relevant investigation findings and found that the injurious subsidisation could be removed by the price undertakings offered at the proposed annual level of imports, while an ad valorem duty levied on imports exceeding that annual level would provide for a safety net against circumventing the measure. The Commission therefore concluded that the undertakings offered could be accepted in that latter form. Biodiesel from Indonesia (Definitive CVD) On 6 December 2018, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of biodiesel originating in Indonesia. The initiation was based on a complaint lodged on 22 November 2018 by the European Biodiesel Board (EBB) on behalf of Union producers representing 32% of the total Union production of biodiesel. Producers representing 63% of the total Union production of biodiesel supported the complaint. The investigation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 October 2017 to 30 September 2018. Sampling The final sample of Union producers consisted of three Union producers. A sample of importers was not selected due to the low number of unrelated importers that provided information. Four Indonesian exporting producers accounting for 100% of exports to the Union provided information. The Commission decided not to carry out sampling but rather to investigate all these Indonesian exporting producers. The product concerned The product concerned was commonly known as ‘biodiesel’, in pure form or as included in a blend, originating in Indonesia. Biodiesel produced in Indonesia is primarily palm oil methyl ester, which is derived from palm oil. Biodiesel produced in the Union is instead mainly rapeseed methyl ester but made also from other feedstock, including waste oils as well as virgin oils. However, both the product concerned and the biodiesel produced and sold in the EU were found to have the same basic physical, chemical, and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses. Subsidisation The following subsidies were investigated: (1) direct transfer of funds, such as direct subsidies granted through the Oil Palm Plantation Fund; (2) government support to the biodiesel industry including through the provision of crude palm oil (CPO) for less than adequate remuneration (LTAR); and (3) government support via revenue forgone via the Bonded Zone scheme. Given the partial non-cooperation from the Government of Indonesia (‘GOI’) and the sampled exporting producers, the Commission had to partially rely on facts available in relation to the existence and the extent of the alleged support granted to the biodiesel industry including through the provision of CPO for LTAR and for the government support via revenue forgone. (1) Government support to the biodiesel industry through direct transfer of funds via the Oil Palm Plantation Fund: According to the complaint, the GOI supported the biodiesel industry by providing grants to the Indonesian biodiesel producers covering the difference between the GOI's reference price for biodiesel and the price at which oil companies purchase biodiesel, namely the reference price for diesel oil. The GOI established an Oil Palm Plantation Fund (‘OPPF’) to support purchases of biodiesel by entities appointed by governmental bodies. A Biodiesel Subsidy Fund was part of the OPPF and served the procurement and utilization of biodiesel on the domestic market. Additionally, the GOI created a management agency to collect export levies on the exportation of palm oil commodities and to manage the OPPF. These compulsory export duties were then used to fund the OPPF. The Directorate General of New Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (EBKTE) selected the domestic biodiesel producers which participated in the procurement of biodiesel, and the allocation of the volume of biodiesel for each producer. The selected producers were then constrained to sell the monthly amount of biodiesel to the Petrofuel Entities. The OPPF envisaged a specific payment mechanism, whereby the buyers paid biodiesel producers the diesel reference price (lower than the actual biodiesel price). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources determined the reference price. The difference between such diesel reference price and the biodiesel reference price was paid to the biodiesel producers out of the OPPF by the Management Agency. The Commission analysed whether this set of measures adopted by the GOI to support the Indonesian biodiesel industry would amount to a countervailable subsidy. First, regarding the possible existence of a financial contribution, the investigation showed that all the exporting producers chose to participate in the procurement of biodiesel and thus were under the obligation to sell biodiesel to Pertamina and AKR. Furthermore, the reference price for biodiesel was higher than the reference price for mineral diesel and, thus, all the exporting producers received payments from the OPPF. The OPPF was created by an act of the GOI and the Management Agency was explicitly entrusted by the GOI with the duty to make payments to biodiesel producers. The Management Agency was granted the exercise of governmental functions with respect to the biodiesel sector, thus acting as a public body. The legal acts implementing the OPPF expressly confirmed that its funds (from the export levies and taxes) were used for the benefit of the biodiesel producers. The compensation of differences between reference prices made by the Management Agency to the biodiesel producers qualified as financial contributions in the form of a direct transfer of funds from the government. This situation allowed exporting producers to be in a better situation than they would be absent the scheme, thus entailing a benefit. As the OPPF was only available to some industries (those industries in the CPO value chain), the Commission concluded that the subsidy was specific. The subsidy amount was calculated as reflecting a rate in the range of 7.91% - 12.76%, depending on the beneficiary. (2) Government support to the biodiesel industry including through the provision of CPO for LTAR

CPO was the main raw material used for the production of biodiesel in Indonesia. It was contended that CPO prices were distorted in Indonesia due to GOI’s intervention, namely through the imposition of high export taxes on CPO. This ensured that the CPO’s price remained significantly lower than global prices, thus benefiting Indonesian biodiesel producers. Additionally, the GOI introduced an export levy of 50 USD per tonne on CPO and a lower levy on downstream processed palm oil products. Overall, this policy of high export taxes and levies on CPO imposed by the GOI allowed for a depressing effect on the domestic palm oil price in Indonesia. It encouraged private CPO producers to sell their products internally and leading to the conclusion that the GOI entrusted or directed Indonesian palm oil producers to provide CPO to biodiesel producers for LTAR. Further to this export restraint system, the GOI also intervened in the market in order to de facto control CPO prices through the company PTPN - a CPO producer wholly owned by the State, which ensured that CPO was sold at an artificially low level. The investigation showed that in the CPO’s daily auctions organized by this company, the price of CPO was set by the GOI and did not reflect undistorted market conditions. Also, all the independent CPO suppliers aligned their prices with the daily PTPN prices. The Commission concluded that PTPN was a public body and exercised governmental functions when selling CPO on the market. The GOI directed the CPO suppliers to provide CPO at less than adequate remuneration to, inter alia, biodiesel producers by de facto setting a maximum price on the Indonesian domestic CPO market. The Commission concluded that the set of measures adopted by the GOI lead to a financial contribution in the form of government's provision of CPO for LTAR to the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers. Alternatively, the Commission further concluded that the GOI provided income or price support to the biodiesel producers through its intervention in the CPO market, as the categories of ‘financial contribution’/‘income or price support’ are not mutually exclusive. The investigation showed that the GOI’s intention to support the creation and development of the Indonesian biodiesel industry was manifest. Through the measures mentioned above (export taxes and levies, control of PTNP and direct subsidies to CPO producers), the GOI intervened in the market, allowing biodiesel producers to benefit from artificially low prices for CPO. These measures qualified as ‘a form of income/price support” to the biodiesel industry. Either through the financial contribution or the income/price support, this set of measures allowed the Indonesian biodiesel producers to benefit from ‘savings’ when purchasing CPO in the Indonesian distorted domestic market. The GOI and most of the exporting producers argued that the Commission erred in qualifying the export restraints as a countervailable subsidy as those measures are WTO-consistent. However, the Commission observed that it did not consider export restraints per se as countervailable subsidies but rather the imposition of export restraints (such as export taxes and levies) was one of the tools used by the GOI to provide CPO for LTAR which amounted to a countervailable subsidy. The latter was calculated to be in the range of 0.13% - 5.15%. (3) Government Support via revenue forgone: the Bonded Zone scheme The Bonded Zones scheme allowed import duties and VAT on imported goods to be suspended or exempted for certain companies. The Commission considered that, particularly, the import duty exemption on machineries granted by the Bonded Zones scheme constituted a financial contribution by the GOI to the exporting producers in the form of revenue forgone. The investigation showed that the exporting producers essentially never paid the import duty and the VAT on the machinery they imported. The GOI conferred a benefit to the exporting producers which allowed them to be placed in a better financial position that they would be absent the scheme. The scheme was specific as it was available only to certain companies depending on their export performance and location in specific geographic areas. The subsidy rate was calculated in the range of 0.03% - 0.16%. The Commission also identified certain other support schemes of relevance, which however were found not to be used by the exporting producers or not to provide a benefit, hence these schemes were not analysed further. The definitive total subsidies rates reflecting subsidies amounts in the companies’ turnover were in the range of 8 to 18%, depending on the beneficiary. Injury, threat of injury and causation With regard to the analysis of imports price, the Commission calculated the level of undercutting according to various methodologies, depending on the type of biodiesel product. It was established that the prices of Indonesian imports significantly undercut the prices of the Union industry, by at least 6%, and as much as 17.5%, depending on the methodology chosen. Due to the previous anti-dumping duties on biodiesel from Indonesia, which were in place, until March 2018, imports from Indonesia were negligible. However, as a result of the repeal of the latter duties, imports of the product concerned increased significantly. While the Union consumption increased during the IP by 33%, this positive development could not be reflected in the production and sales volumes of the Union industry which have only increased by 11% and 13% respectively. This allowed Indonesian imports to increase their market share. During the period considered, the injury indicators showed a mixed picture. Union production and sales followed the market demand. Investments fluctuated throughout the period considered and the number of employees in the Union industry remained stable. However, the profitability of the Union industry remained poor, thus leading to the conclusion that the Union industry did not manage to reach the level of normal profitable operations. The Commission could not conclude on the existence of material injury and thus examined whether the subsidised imports from Indonesia could constitute a threat of material injury to the Union industry. As imports of the product concerned benefited from governmental support, the significant undercutting and price depression found during the IP lead to the conclusion that the delicate economic situation of the Union industry could develop even more negatively in the future. This could happen notably due to the fact that the Union market was very attractive for Indonesian exports (it constituted 40% of the global demand), that production inputs could be obtained at low cost in Indonesia, that the production capacity of the Indonesian biodiesel producers exceeded the domestic demand and that provisional anti-dumping and countervailing duties on biodiesel from Indonesia were imposed by the US. Moreover, the analysis of post-IP indicators indicated that the economic situation of the Union industry further deteriorated. The Commission concluded therefore that subsidized imports from Indonesia constituted a threat of material injury to the Union industry. The Commission also established that there was a causal link between the threat of injury and the subsidised imports of biodiesel from Indonesia, notably as the undercutting of the Union industry prices by at least 6.0% to 11.6 % due to the significant and sudden increase of imports during the IP contributed to the loss of market share by EU producers. Exports from third countries, sales performance of the Union industry, and a reduction of capacity of the Union industry did not attenuate the causal link between subsidised imports and the threat of injury found. Notably, with regard to export from third countries, Argentinian imports, which featured generally lower prices than Indonesian ones in the IP, were now subject to countervailing duties, with a price undertaking since February 2019. Therefore, the latter could no longer be the main cause for a threat of injury to the Union industry. With regard to imports from Malaysia, the Commission found that, while they featured a similar market share than those from Argentina in the IP, the prices of Malaysian biodiesel were higher than Indonesian prices (and the Union sales prices). The same applied to imports from China, which also held a much smaller market share. Therefore, the former and latter could not be considered as a price-setting factor on the market, and they did not weaken the causal link. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed finally whether it was not in the Union interest to adopt countervailing measures despite the determination of injurious subsidisation. The Commission based the determination of the Union interest on an analysis of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and consumers. Regarding the interest of the Union industry, the Commission found that the situation of the Union industry was fragile since it did not recover from the dumping previously suffered. Furthermore, the investigation showed that the Union industry used feedstock produced by the Union agriculture and the upstream agricultural oil sector also largely depended on the biodiesel industry. Thus, the Commission concluded that the imports of biodiesel from Indonesia would affect both the Union biodiesel industry and the agricultural sector. With regard to importers, they were found usually not only to import but also to trade biodiesel purchased from Union producers, and they might have faced additional difficulties to fully replace the level of imports affected by measures with supplies from Union producers, which normally used their own distribution channels. However, the Commission concluded that this possible negative effect could be balanced by the increased volume of trade of biodiesel purchased from the Union industry. Regarding the final consumers, the Commission found that the imposition of duties would have the negative effect of increasing consumer prices. However, because of the limited content of biodiesel in the final product purchased by consumers (typically less than 10%), this negative effect on the price of diesel fuel would only be a small proportion compared to the direct change in the price of biodiesel on the Union market. The Commission concluded that a definitive countervailing duty should be imposed, corresponding to the total amount of countervailable subsidies established. The countervailing duty rates ranged between 8.0 % and 18.0%. In relation to the measures, one of the exporting producers made an offer of price undertaking. However, the latter was judged by the Commission as unworkable, notably due to the level of minimum price proposed (considered as insufficient to offset the subsidies amounts), to the unsatisfactory level of annual imports, and to the applicant’s complex structure and sales channels, which increased the likelihood of circumvention and cross-compensation, putting at risk the proper enforcement of such undertaking. Urea and ammonium nitrate from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States (US) (Definitive AD) On 13 August 2018, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the Union of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the. The initiation was based on a complaint lodged on 29 June 2018 by the Fertilizers Europe on behalf of Union producers representing more than 50% of the total Union production of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate (UAN). The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of a resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. Registration of imports and provisional measures

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. A provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed on 12 April 2019 on imports into the Union of UAN originating in all three countries. Sampling The Commission selected the provisional sample on the basis of the reported production and Union sales volume by the Union producers. The sample consisted of three Union producers that accounted for around 70% of Union production and sales. Product concerned The product concerned (UAN) was a liquid nitrogen fertilizer: mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution. The most significant feature of this product was the nitrogen content which can vary depending on the water added to the solution. However, whatever their nitrogen content, all solutions of UAN are considered to have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and therefore constitute a single product. UAN produced and sold in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the US, as well as UAN produced in the Union by the Union industry, were regarded as like products. Dumping Two Russian companies produced UAN and exported to the Union during the investigation (Acron and Eurochem). For Acron, the domestic sales were found not to be representative as the like product was sold in low quantities on the domestic market. Thus, the Commission constructed the normal value. For Eurochem, it was found that the like product was sold in representative quantities on the domestic market. The investigation found that wholesale prices of natural gas produced by State-owned company Gazprom in Russia were regulated by the State via federal laws and based on policy objectives. At the same time, Gazprom was the biggest gas provider in the country with a market share of above 50% and acted as a price-setter. The investigation confirmed this price-setting behaviour, as all other providers sold gas at low price levels, similar to Gazprom’s. In addition, it was established that Gazprom was the owner of the pipelines through which all gas, including the one supplied by the independent producers. Therefore, Gazprom held a de facto monopoly for the export of Russian piped gas, which was transported at tariffs that were also regulated by the State, as the investigation found. Therefore natural gas prices in Russia did not reflect normal market conditions. Under normal market conditions, prices would mostly be set based on production costs and profit expectations of each producer. The Commission therefore concluded that the price of Russian natural gas needed to be adjusted. The Commission selected the price at the Waidhaus hub - the price of exported Russian gas at the German/Czech border - as the proper benchmark for gas adjustments. With regard to Trinidad and Tobago, the only cooperating exporting producer did not have sales of the like product on the domestic market and, therefore the Commission constructed the normal value. Only one US producer exported the product concerned to the Union during the IP. The total volume of domestic sales of this producer was regarded as representative. The normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. On the basis of a comparison between normal value and export prices, the following dumping margins were calculated: a) Russia: between 20% and 31.9 %; b) Trinidad and Tobago: 55.8% and c) US: 37.3 % Injury, causation and level of measures During the period considered, the Union consumption fluctuated with an overall fall of 5%. Imports from the countries concerned increased by 64% over the period considered, which led to an increase in market share (increase by 72%, from 21.9 % in 2015 to 37.7% in the IP). The steep increase in market share by the countries concerned was clearly to the detriment of other market participants. Regarding price undercutting, the investigation showed that imports from the countries concerned undercut the prices of the Union industry by 6,8% on average. Besides price undercutting, the investigation showed that the effect of the dumped imports caused also price suppression on the Union market and thus sales prices could not be raised to cover substantial increases in costs. In terms of macroeconomic indicators, due to increased imports from the countries concerned, the Union production of UAN fell by 8% over the period of 2015 - 2017. Production capacity increased whereas capacity utilization fell by 12% over the same period. Overall, the Union industry was not able to grow over the period considered. The impact of the magnitude of dumping margins on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned. Regarding microeconomic indicators, sales prices and unit cost of production in the Union fell over the period considered. Labour costs per employee increased, especially in 2017, when production and productivity increased. On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic AD Regulation. Regarding the causation analysis, over the period considered and against a backdrop of decreasing consumption in the Union, import volumes from the countries concerned and their market shares increased significantly whereas prices from the countries concerned fell on average by 33%. The increase in the market share of the imports coincided with a similar decrease of market share for the Union industry. Bearing in mind that UAN is a price-sensitive commodity, that the market share of imports from the countries concerned was 37.7 % in the IP, and that those imports were made at prices that undercut Union industry prices, such imports produced substantial harmful effects. The price pressure from imports from the countries concerned on Union producers was particularly damaging in 2017 and the IP when costs were increasing. The Commission’s analysis found that no other factor had a significant impact on the Union industry's injurious situation. On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned. Furthermore, the Commission needed to determine the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry. It therefore proceeded to calculate a target price which would allow it to cover for all costs of production (including the additional costs resulting from complying with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, to which the EU is party to and relevant ILO Conventions) and to still obtain a reasonable profit. With respect to additional costs, non-injurious price was increased by 3.7% to cover for the EU producers’ future compliance with the EU Emission Trading System, based on the cost of average estimated additional EU ETS allowances which will have to be purchased during the life of the measures. The injury elimination level was determined on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers in and the US as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the IP. The underselling margins for Trinidad and Tobago was eventually at 16.2%, for the US at 23.9% and for Russia ranged from 13.7 % to 16.3%. To determine the level of the measures with regard to Russia, the Commission found the existence of raw material distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic AD Regulation. Notably, the investigation showed that natural gas was subject to an export tax of 30%, which affected the sales of natural gas in Russia. Furthermore, an exclusive right for gas export in gaseous state was granted to the Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS), the latter entity being controlled by the Russian State. As Gazprom enjoyed a unique licence to export natural gas through the UGSS, the Commission argued that this measure could also qualify as either a “licensing requirement” or a “qualified exporter list” measure. Lastly, a dual pricing of natural gas for domestic and export sales was found in the investigation, in the form of the domestic price being significantly lower (more than twice) as compared to the Waidhaus price. Consequently, pursuant to Article 7(2a) of the basic AD Regulation, the Commission decided to set the provisional level of duties for Russia at the dumping margin. It was also argued that raw material distortions were existent in the natural gas markets of Trinidad and Tobago and the US. The Commission concluded that such distortions did not exist.

Union interest The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to the investigation, including the spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies. In particular, the Commission first established that there were distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in Russia. Second, the Commission found that Russia had spare capacity which can be used to increase exports into the Union. In addition, the Commission found that Russian producers had an unfair advantage vis-à-vis Union producers with regard to natural gas due to the regulation in the Russian market. The Commission concluded that measures would not negatively affect the supply chain in Europe. More specifically, the Commission found that, although a limited number of farmers in the Union could potentially be affected by measures, any impact would be limited and not disproportionate overall. Finally, the Commission considered that imports of UAN would continue and, therefore, supply would not be disrupted by measures. Imports from the countries concerned, with a market share above 37% in the IP, were expected to continue in light of the growth foreseen in UAN demand. In addition, Union producers, with spare capacities, could produce significant volumes of UAN. Additionally, regarding the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the measures would allow the Union industry to exploit its potential on a Union market on a level-playing field basis, recover lost market share, and improve profitability to levels considered sustainable. Importers would also benefit from the imposition of the measures. From the side of the users, even though it has been argued that ultimate users (farmers) could be affected by price increases steaming from the measures, the Commission found that UAN represented less than around 1% of overall farming costs in the Union. A price increase derived from measures, if any, should thus not have a significant impact on the farming sector as a whole in the Union. Even in specialised firms where UAN is used as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser and it represents a high percentage of the costs (ex: common wheat), the increase in the cost of production would not be higher than 3%. Definitive anti-dumping measures The Commission concluded that definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of UAN originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the US in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry. In the determination of the form of the measures, with regard to arguments from importers to apply a minimum import price or the opposition of complainants to a specific duty, the Commission considered that minimum import prices were not justified and could not protect the Union industry and that ad valorem duties could be insufficient to eliminate injury when prices would be low or could unduly hurt the user industry when prices would peaking. Consequently, it concluded that a specific duty reflecting previously calculated ad-valorem duties would be more appropriate for the present situation. Therefore, the anti-dumping duty was determined as a fixed amount per tonne applicable to imports of the product originating in: Russia - at 27.77 EUR/t (Azot and Nevinnomyssky Azot), 42.47 EUR/t (Acron and other companies); in Trinidad and Tobago - at 22.24 EUR/t and in the US - at 29.48 EUR/t. 3.1.5. New investigations terminated without measures In accordance with the provisions of the respective basic Regulations, investigations may be terminated without the imposition of measures if a complaint is withdrawn or if measures are unnecessary (i.e. no dumping/no subsidies, no injury resulting from dumped or subsidised imports, measures not in the interest of the Union). In 2019, 5 new proceedings (all were anti-dumping investigations) were terminated without measures, as compared to 8 in 2018. The list of cases which were terminated without the imposition of measures during 2019 can be found in the following table. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex E.



Product Origin Main reason for termination Hollow sections North Macedonia Russia Turkey Negligible injury (North Macedonia) De minimis dumping (Russia, Turkey) Hot-rolled steel sheet piles China Withdrawal of the complaint Solar glass Malaysia Withdrawal of the complaint 3.2. Review investigations 3.2.1. Expiry reviews Article 11(2) and Article 18 respectively of the basic Regulations provide for the expiry of measures after 5 years, unless an expiry review demonstrates that they should be maintained in their original form. In 2019, 1 anti-dumping measure expired automatically. The references for this measure are available in Annex N. Since the expiry provision of the basic Regulations came into force in 1985, a total of 513 measures have expired automatically. 3.2.1.1. Initiations During 2019, the Commission initiated 6 expiry reviews of anti-dumping measures and 2 concerning anti-subsidy measures. The list of the expiry reviews initiated in 2019 can be found in the following table, together with the name of the complainant. It should be noted that some expiry reviews may be carried out in parallel with interim reviews. Where there are interim reviews and expiry reviews ongoing at the same time, these are indicated by an asterisk in the table below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is available in Annex F.



Product (Type of investigation: AD or AS) Origin Complainant Ferro-silicon (AD) China Russia Euroalliages Solar glass (AD) China EU Pro Sun Glass Solar glass (AS) China EU Pro Sun Glass Ammonium nitrate (AD) Russia Fertilizers Europe Citrus fruits (AD) China FENAVAL Glass fibre products (AS) China European Glass Fibre Producers Association Sulphanilic acid (AD) China Bondalti Chemicals S.A.

3.2.1.2. Expiry reviews concluded with confirmation of duties In 2019, the Commission concluded 16 expiry reviews with a confirmation of the duties for a further period of 5 years. The list of the measures, which were renewed during 2019, together with the results of the investigations, can be found below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex F. Product Origin Type and level of measure Threaded tube or pipe cast fittings, of malleable cast iron China Thailand AD: 24.6% – 57.8% AD: 14.9% – 15.5% Aluminium radiators China AD: 12.6% – 61.4% Chamois leather China AD: 58.9% Tube and pipe fittings Malaysia Rep. of Korea Russia AD: 49.9% – 75% AD: 32.4% – 44% AD: 23.8% Organic coated steel products China AD: 5.9% – 26.1% CVD: 13.7% – 44.7% Aluminium foil in small rolls China AD: 14.2% – 35.6% Ceramic tableware and kitchenware China AD: 13.1% – 36.1% Tungsten electrodes China AD: 17% – 63.5% Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) India CVD: 18.73 EUR/t – 74.6 EUR/t Bicycles China AD: 19.2% – 48.5% Ironing boards China AD: 18.1% – 42.3% Sweetcorn in kernels Thailand AD: 3.1% – 14.3% 3.2.1.3. Details on some individual cases concluded by confirmation of duty Ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China (AD) On 15 May 2018, the Commission decided to initiate an expiry review of the measures on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in China. The initiation was based on a request filed by the European Federation for Table- and Ornamentalware (FEFP) that represented more than 28% of the total Union production of ceramic tableware and kitchenware. Sampling The Commission decided to limit its investigation to a reasonable number of exporting producers by using a sample of three groups based on the largest sales volume to the Union during the RIP. The three sampled groups covered 8.8% of the total Chinese exports to the Union in the RIP. On 25 July 2018, one of the sampled groups withdrew from cooperation forcing the Commission to select a new sample by adding one more group, the fourth largest in terms of Union sales during the RIP. The Commission also sampled five Union producers, out of which two SMEs, covering all major product types and located in five Member States. That sample represented over 10% of the estimated total production of the Union industry in 2017. Existence of significant distortions and Normal value The Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in China in view of the possible existence of significant distortions in the Chinese market. The analysis mainly covered the substantial government interventions in the Chinese economy in general and in the specific market conditions of the sector that includes the product under review. The Commission found that all the available evidence pertaining to China’s economy in general as well as to the Chinese ceramic sector specifically pointed to the fact that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, were not determined by free market forces, because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic AD Regulation. Among others, the Commission found that tableware and kitchenware producers in China were subject to control or policy supervision or guidance by the Chinese government. While the sector included a significant number of private companies, the high level of government control and intervention in the sector and the economy as a whole prevented even privately owned producers from operating under market conditions. It was also established that the Government interfered with respect to prices and costs through its presence in ceramic tableware and kitchenware firms, as well as in the financial sector and other input sectors, Moreover, the Commission found extensive evidence of policy directives whereby the State steered the development of the ceramic tableware and kitchenware sector with regard to: market composition and restructuring, raw materials, investment, capacity management, product range, geographical location, or upgrading. All this evidence pointed to the fact that public policies or measures influenced free market forces in the Chinese ceramics sector. On the basis above, and in the absence of any cooperation from the Chinese government, the Commission concluded that it was not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. In that context, the Commission needed to determine the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks pertaining to a representative country. The Commission identified three such potential countries: Brazil, Thailand and Turkey. All three countries met the essential criteria to be eligible for a representative country: first, they have a level of economic development similar to the PRC, they all produce the product concerned and thirdly there are relevant public data available. Thus, the Commission analysed the data on all factors of production in the three potential representative countries. It was concluded that Turkey was the most appropriate representative country to establish a reliable normal value. Notably, as compared to the other countries, Turkey featured relatively high import quantities of inputs concerned, had information on labour costs publicly available, and the lead Turkish producer had published recent audited financial reports. Likely continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury After having constructed the normal value, the Commission compared it with the average Chinese export prices and concluded that the dumping margin in the RIP stood at of 35% for the only cooperating exporting producer, and at circa 70% for all other exporting producers. Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the RIP, the Commission investigated the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed. To that end, the Commission analysed the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, the pricing behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in other markets and the attractiveness of the Union market. The Commission found that Chinese imports of the product concerned continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the RIP. In addition, China was the biggest exporter of ceramic tableware in the world characterized by significant spare capacities, which could have turned in a continuation of dumped exports. Furthermore, the pricing behaviour of the Chinese exporting producers in third markets supported the likelihood of continuation of dumping into the Union. Finally, the Commission established that the Union market remained an attractive market for Chinese exporting producers of ceramic tableware even after the impositions of measures (Chinese exports of ceramic tableware represented almost 60% of the Union consumption). Considering all these factors, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the repeal of the measures would result in increased exports of ceramic tableware from China into the Union at dumped prices. Concerning injury, the Commission’s analysis showed that the situation of the Union producers improved in the period considered (increased production, Union sales volumes and market share). It was inferred that the Union industry did not suffer anymore material injury in the RIP and started recovering. However, the Commission also found that this recovery was slow and the industry’s general economic situation still fragile. What is more, given the high spare capacities in China, the attractiveness of the Union market and the pricing behaviour of Chinese exporting producers, there was a high likelihood of significant volumes of low-priced Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware available for sale/redirection to the Union already in the short term, in case the measures were allowed to lapse. The Commission simulated the potential increase of low-priced imports, and found that it could amount to additional imports of 67,800 tonnes and a decrease in EU production by 12,000 tonnes, which was considered sufficient to cause material injury to the Union industry, as it would lead to a lower capacity utilisation, an increase in the average cost of production, and thereby lower profitability (which was already below the target profit). As per all these facts, the repeal of the measures on the imports from China would likely result in a recurrence of material injury. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed all the interests at stake, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. The investigation found that should the measures expire, this would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry by further deteriorating its current low profitability. With regard to the interest of importers, no comments were received but a prior investigation had shown that the impact of continuing the measures would not be significant. Users in the EU did not manifest any significant interest and those that made themselves known stated that their use of the concerned product was marginal. The Commission therefore concluded that it was in the Union interest to maintain the measures. Accordingly, an anti-dumping duty on ceramic tableware and kitchenware products originating in China, was extended for five years: at the individual rates in the range of 13.1% - 23.4%; at the individual rate of 17.9% for all other cooperating companies; at the residual rate of 36.1% for all other companies. The definitive duty imposed was also extended to imports consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in those countries or not.

Organic coated steel products from China (AD) On 14 March 2018, the Commission initiated an expiry review of the measures imposed on imports of certain organic coated steel (OCS) products originating in China, further to a request lodged by The European Steel Association (EUROFER) on behalf of producers representing more than 70% of the total Union production. Sampling The Commission selected a sample of three operators which were found to be representative of the Union industry in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union. The sample accounted for 28% of the estimated total production of the Union industry and for 27% of total Union sales volume of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union during the review investigation period (RIP). No Chinese exporting producers cooperated in the case. Dumping and continuation of dumping The Commission’s analysis showed that due to China’s intervention in the economy and, in particular, in the steel sector, prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces as they are affected by substantial government intervention. No exporting producer cooperated with the investigation and no claim was presented that some domestic costs would be undistorted under the third indent of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic AD Regulation. Therefore, Chinese domestic prices and costs could not be used and the normal value for China was constructed based on corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country. Malaysia and Mexico met all the criteria to be considered as appropriate as potential representative countries: they had a substantial production of the product under review and a complete set of data available for all factors of production, manufacturing overheads, SG&A expenses and profit. In that situation, the Commission additionally assessed both countries’ level of social and environmental protection. Mexico had ratified almost all fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions (except for one) and all major environmental conventions, whereas Malaysia had not ratified three out of the eight core ILO conventions, nor one of the major environmental agreements. The Commission therefore decided to choose Mexico as appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic AD Regulation. The Commission compared the constructed normal value price with the export price to countries other than the Union on an ex-works basis and concluded that dumping continued during the RIP. The Commission found the average dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, to be 134%. The expiry review investigation showed that despite the low level of imports, Chinese imports of OCS products continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices. The Commission further analysed whether there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures lapse. Given the significant spare capacities found in China, the fact that other countries have imposed trade defence measures against China and the attractiveness of the Union market compared to some of the third markets and the domestic market, it was considered likely that Chinese exporting producers would (re)enter the Union market with significant quantities at dumped prices in case the measures would be allowed to lapse. Thus, the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would be likely to lead to a continuation and, in any case, recurrence of dumping. Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury The Union industry economic situation improved significantly during the review period. The imposition of the definitive anti-dumping measures in March 2013 allowed the Union industry to slowly but steadily recover from the injurious effects of the dumping. The fact that the Union industry has significantly benefited from the measures is illustrated, inter alia, by an increase in production and Union sales volumes, positive cash flow and return on investments, selling prices in general higher than the unit cost of production, minimum increase in labour costs and improved profitability. However, even if the Union industry had largely recovered from the past injury and seemed to be on the right track to further improve its condition in the long-run, it was still in a fragile situation due to its limited profitability, which was still below the target profit. Moreover, China's overcapacity in steel production was well enshrined and 80% of the production was exported. At the same time, the Union was the largest OCS market (after Asia and North/Central America) and trade defence measures by third countries were in place against Chinese steel products. All these facts led the Commission to conclude that the repeal of measures on the imports from China would likely result in a recurrence of injury to the Union industry. Union interest and definitive measures With regard to the interest of importers, the investigation showed that the measures in force had no substantial negative effect on the financial situation of importers. Similarly, key users experienced improvements in profitability during the period under review and the measures in place did not have a sizeable impact on users and consumers as OCS represented a negligible part of the cost of downstream products. The investigation showed that the measures allowed the Union industry to further exploiting its potential on a Union market that was now a level-playing field and thus its expiration would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry. As a consequence, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that maintaining the definitive anti-dumping measures would go against the Union interest. Therefore, the anti-dumping measures applicable to certain OCS products originating in China were maintained in the range of 5.9% - 26.1%. Organic coated steel products from China (AS) On 13 December 2017, the Commission initiated an expiry review of the countervailing measures imposed on imports of certain OCS products originating in China. The request was also lodged by EUROFER on behalf of producers representing more than 70% of the total Union production. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the countervailing measures would be likely to result in the continuation or recurrence of subsidisation and injury to the Union industry. Sampling The Commission selected the same three operators as in the case of the parallel anti-dumping investigation (see above). Likelihood of continuation of subsidisation The original investigation determined that the following measures constituted countervailing subsidies:

1) the provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration (LTAR): both SOE and private bodies entrusted by the GOC provided hot-rolled and cold rolled steel at LTAR; the GOC proved land-use rights bellow the normal market rate and electricity was provided at lower rates and limited to certain enterprises and regions; 2) direct transfer of funds through privately owned banks entrusted by the GOC to provide financial contributions to steel producers at more favourable terms than those obtained on the market (in the form of preferential lending and below the market interest rates) or through public bodies entrusted by the GOC to provide financial contributions in the form of equity infusion and/or loans or in the form of revenue forgone resulting from debt cancelled or not repaid (debt for equity swaps) or grants to exporting steel producers, either under national, regional and municipal programmes or through export subsidy programmes at rates that were not market-oriented nor based on risk assessment criteria; 3) government revenue forgone or not collected that was due in the form of preferential treatment in income, direct and indirect tax regimes or import tariff programmes which were only available to certain enterprises such as the OCS producers; In the absence of cooperation from Chinese exporters, the Commission resorted to facts available. The overall conclusion was that the OSC producers in China continued to benefit from countervailable subsidies during the RIP. In order to evaluate the likelihood of continuation of subsidisation, the following elements were taken into account: the production and spare capacity in China, the availability of other markets, and the attractiveness of the Union market. Chinese exporting producers had significant spare capacity as only 20% of capacity utilisation was reached. Thus, in case of removal of countervailing measures, OCS producers would have spare capacity to export to the Union market. Furthermore, trade defence measures against Chinese OCS exports had already been imposed in other important markets (India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam). The removal of measures would have allowed Chinese exporting producers to redirect exports towards the Union. Lastly, the Union industry’s price was higher than the Chinese export price thus in case of removal of the measures, Chinese exporting producers could easily redirect the exports of substantial volumes of OCS into the Union market. The Commission concluded that there was sufficient evidence that subsidisation of the OCS industry could continue in the future. Injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury The Union industry improved significantly during the review period. The imposition of the definitive countervailing measures in March 2013 allowed the Union industry to slowly but steadily recover from the injurious effects of the subsidisation and allowed the Union consumption to increase by 18%. Due to the measures, imports from China to the Union remained low. However, the analysis of Chinese export prices to other third markets showed that China was selling in some of its main export markets at prices similar to or sometimes even lower than those to the Union, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the current level of Chinese prices would undercut the sales prices of the Union industry in the Union market. The analysis of the imports from third countries (India, Korea, Turkey and Taiwan) to the Union showed that, in general, the import price was higher than the average price of Chinese imports. However, even if the Union industry had largely recovered from the past injury and seemed to be on the right track to further improve its condition in the long-run, it was still in a fragile situation due to its limited profitability, which was still below the target profit. The precarious situation of the Union industry could be undermined in case of repeal of measures. As the parallel AD investigation had also established, China's overcapacity in steel production was significant and 80% of the production was exported. The Commission therefore concluded that the repeal of countervailing measures on the imports from China would likely result in a recurrence of injury to the Union industry. Union interest and countervailing measures The Commission analysed whether the maintenance of the existing countervailing measures would not be against the interest of the Union as a whole. With regard to the interest of the Union industry, the repeal would result in a significant negative effect as sales and profitability would decrease. The investigation also showed that the countervailing measures had no substantial negative effect on the financial situation of importers and users and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect the latter. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that maintaining the countervailing measures would go against the Union interest. Consequently, the measures imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2013 were applied anew in the range of 13.7% to 44.7%. 3.2.1.4. Reviews concluded by termination In 2019, 2 expiry reviews were concluded by the termination of measures in force. One selected example is described in more detail below. Tube and pipe fittings from Turkey (termination of expiry review) On 25 October 2017, the Commission received a request for an expiry review regarding measures on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings (TPF) originating in Korea, Malaysia, Russia, and Turkey. The request was lodged by the Defence Committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry, on behalf of Union producers representing approximately 51% of the total Union production of TPF, on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would likely result in continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and/or the recurrence of injury to the Union industry. The Commission initiated the expiry review on 27 January 2018. Dumping The Commission analysed first whether imports of TPF from the countries concerned were dumped during the RIP. While dumping was found to occur in the case of imports from Russia (with a margin of 41.8%), Korea (with a margin of 7.2% - 9.1%), in the case of Turkey no dumping was established during the RIP, while imports from Malaysia were negligible thus not allowing a dumping analysis. Further to that, the Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping in case the measures on imports of TPF from the countries concerned would lapse. The following elements were analysed: exports to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacities, and the attractiveness of the Union market. The Commission found that TPF producers from Malaysia, Korea and Russia would be likely to export significant quantities of TPF at dumped prices to the Union should the measures be allowed to lapse: Malaysia had a spare capacity close to the Union consumption and US AD measures were in place on imports of Malaysian TPF; the Korean spare capacity equalled two times the Union consumption and AD duties blocked access to Korean TPF in Japan, while their exports to the US were already significant; finally, Russia's spare capacity was close to the Union consumption too and the EU had been traditionally a key export market for Russian TPF. Regarding Turkey however, the Commission found that the Turkish domestic market remained the main focus of Turkish TPF producers, and exports to third