A4-0074/97

Resolution on the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America (C4-0264/96)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the basic agreement ((OJ 59, 19.3.1959, p. 309.)) and the cooperation agreement ((OJ 59, 19.3.1959, p.312.)) concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the amendment to the additional cooperation agreement ((OJ L 139, 22.5.1974, p. 24.)) of 11 June 1960 between Euratom and the United States,

- having regard to its resolutions of

7 April 1992, on the results of the intergovernmental conferences ((OJ C 125 18.5.1992, p. 81.)),

29 September 1994, on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials ((OJ C 305, 31.10.1994, p. 78.)),

16 March 1995, on the agreement for nuclear cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America ((OJ C 89, 10.4.1995, p. 139.)),

5 April 1995, on the Conference on the Extension of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty ((OJ C 109, 1.5.1995, p. 41.)),

17 May 1995, on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - implementation and development of the Union ((OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56.)),

13 March 1996, on (i) the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference, and (ii) an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and a definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference IGC ((OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77.)),

27 March 1996, on the transport of radioactive waste ((OJ C 117, 22.4.1996, p. 12.)),

4 July 1996, on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 'The illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials¨ ((OJ C 211, 22.7.1996, p. 15.)),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy and the opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations (A4-0074/97),

A. dismayed that it had and has to deal with the contradictory situation in which the Treaty on European Union has extended the powers of the European Parliament in various fields, including some aspects of energy policy, but the democratic approach provided by the Treaty is still not applied to policy under the Euratom Treaty,

B. whereas, both with regard to negotiations on the US-Euratom agreement and in subsequent, similar cases, Parliament should have been better informed and involved by Commission and Council, in accordance with the aims and possibilities of relevant paragraphs in the Treaty on European Union and subsequent positions adopted by Parliament on its involvement in all aspects of EU energy policies,

C. whereas the European Parliament has not been able to play a constructive part in drafting the agreement now being considered, although to do so would have helped the transatlantic relationship to grow in a sustained, harmonious and balanced way and would have accorded with the democratic rules of the game,

D. pointing out that inadequate parliamentary involvement under the Euratom Treaty continues to prevail, a clear example of which is the different involvement of Parliament in the allocation of funds for the Fourth Framework Programme for nuclear safety research (1254 million ECU) as compared to non-nuclear energy research (984 million ECU),

E. whereas, in the light of this experience and pending the forthcoming integration of the Euratom Treaty into the Treaty on European Union, Parliament needs to remain alert, so as to ensure that it is properly informed and involved in current and forthcoming developments regarding external nuclear relations,

F. reaffirming its commitment, through its involvement in the IGC process, to ensure that its positions with regard to integration of the ECSC and Euratom treaties into the Treaty on European Union, as expressed in its abovementioned resolutions of 7 April 1992 and 13 March 1996, are reflected in the revision of the Treaty on European Union,

G. whereas the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) implies a certain extraterritorial effect of US legislation on EU policy, requiring that US agreements for nuclear cooperation include a US right to approve or to disapprove the back-end activities of US-origin spent nuclear fuel,

H. whereas the US has taken especially stringent unilateral measures in the field of exports, supply and technology, particularly as in the nuclear sphere the European industry is dependent to a considerable degree on US supplies and technology,

I. whereas the question of mutual consent before certain fissile materials are used is a critical point, since continuing US control over products exported to Europe must be replaced by internal control,

J. concluding that the time schedule of at least 30 years, during which the US has granted Euratom 'generic programmatic consent' would result in enabling European 'reprocessing and alteration of the form of sensitive fissile materials', as did the USA-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement,

K. believing that the substance of the final outcome of the US-EU negotiations has to be evaluated in the light of recent developments, in particular with respect to issues of non-proliferation, reprocesing of nuclear materials and transport,

L. whereas political and technological developments throughout the world mean that the campaign against possible nuclear action is increasingly necessary and difficult and the agreements on which cooperation between the EU and the US is based must therefore be updated,

M. taking note that some non-proliferation advocates are now warning of the dangers of a global ¨plutonium economy' and the commercial spread of nuclear materials, usable in nuclear weapons, as illustrated by the fact that in 1994 an average stock of 342 000 kilos of plutonium was under Euratom safeguards, one third of which falls under the US-Euratom agreement, and that 545 000 kilos of plutonium could be separated by the year 2010,

N. considering that this 'plutonium economy' could become a cause for concern, irrespective of proliferation risks, if current standards of health protection of professional workers, nuclear safety and security in all the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing, manufacturing, transport, effluents and waste management are not maintained,

O. reaffirming its priority, as expressed in its abovementioned resolution of 5 April 1995 for the development of alternative and sustainable energy sources as a more promising strategy in order to meet energy needs,

P. whereas another effect of the present agreement will be to enable the manufacture of MOX fuel,

Q. whereas Euratom or IAEA safeguards by inspections, audits and containment or monitoring measures cannot detect losses of significative amounts of plutonium,

R. whereas the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is insufficient to provide a guaranteed assurance of a safe and uninterrupted shipment,

S. whereas the research reactors in Europe operate mainly for industrial and medical purposes, and the supply of nuclear fuels and the subsequent accumulation of spent fuel after years of activity could create a problem for the operation of these reactors,

T. worried that application of the IAEA transport safety standards to the exchanges of nuclear materials covered by the agreement will permit transports to third countries in casks that would be denied entry into or overflight across the USA, as Japan has already been experiencing,

U. believing, in the context of current disputes over the new standards for air transport of nuclear materials, that the Palomares accident in Spain, recent near-misses between military aircraft and airplanes carrying nuclear freight in Scotland and other recent air crashes warrant the conclusion that the air transport of nuclear materials is unacceptable from an environmental and aircraft safety point of view,

1. Considers that the US-Euratom agreement achieves its objective of enabling peaceful nuclear cooperation under the recognized international standards relating to safety and safeguards;

2. Considers unacceptable its weak involvement in current, similar cases of international cooperation under the provision of the Euratom Treaty, in the context of the broader debate on the EU democratic deficit concerning nuclear policy and other energy policies;

3. Demands that the Commission and the Council introduce greater democracy by putting right the current non-involvement of Parliament in the Euratom agreements with USA, Russia, Argentina, Japan and the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as other future Euratom agreements with third countries;

4. Asks the Council to recognize Articles 203 of the EAEC Treaty and 235 of the EC Treaty as a relevant and valid legal base for formal consultation and involvement of Parliament in all matters relating to nuclear energy, and reserves the right to use the provisions of Article 107a of the EAEC Treaty as a way of overcoming the democratic deficit in those areas;

5. Asks the Commission and Council to inform the Parliament on its implementation of paragraphs 10(iv) and 14(i) of its resolution of 7 April 1992 and paragraph 15.1 of its resolution of 13 March 1996 referred to above;

6. Asks the Commission and the Council to inform Parliament comprehensively and in detail how the demands and criteria, in particular paragraphs 1 and 3, in its resolution of 16 March 1995 referred to above are reflected in the US- Euratom Agreement as finally concluded;

7. Ask the Commission to fully explain the reasons, consequences and implications of the fact that parts of the agreement may even remain in force after its formal period of validity;

8. Welcomes the appointment by the Commission of a panel of independent experts to review the IAEA air transport safety standards;

9. Demands that the Commission and Council inform Parliament about and discuss with it, fully and in good time, all current and forthcoming international negotiations in the nuclear technologies field;

10. Welcomes the agreement, despite the reservations expressed above, as an important milestone in transatlantic cooperation on issues of nuclear safety;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.