EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 20.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1632 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT - 2011 review of the Ci vil Protection regulatory framework 
Accompanying the document 
Decision of the European Parliament and the Council 
on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism and on establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument for the period 2014-2020 
{COM(2011) 934 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1630 final}  
 
EN    EN Disclaimer: This report commits only the Commissi on's services involved in its preparation 
and does not prejudge the final form of any  decision to be taken by the Commission. 
 
EN 1   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................ .. 3 
2. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties.............................................. 6 
2.1. Consultation of interested parties................................................................................. 7 2.2. The Impact Assessment Board..................................................................................... 8 3. The problems to be addr essed and subsidiarity............................................................ 8 
3.1. Overview of Mechanism operations and cu rrent activities financed by the CPFI....... 8 
3.1. Current disaster trends................................................................................................ 13 3.2. Environmental, social and fundament al rights impacts of disasters .......................... 19 
3.3. The limitations of the current CP  cooperation and the Mechanism........................... 20 
3.4. Baseline.................................................................................................................. .... 28 
3.5. Justification for EU action and subsidiarity............................................................... 31 4. Objectives.................................................................................................................. . 32 
4.1. General objectives...................................................................................................... 32  
4.2. Specific objectives ..................................................................................................... 33  
5. Better response through planning and predictability ................................................. 34 5.1. Specific objective: Shifting from a reactive and ad hoc coordination to a pre-planned, 
pre-arranged and predictable system.......................................................................... 34 
5.2. Policy options for better planning and availability of assets...................................... 35 
5.3. Analysis of impacts of options for a voluntary pool.................................................. 36 5.4. Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 39 6. Addressing capacity gaps........................................................................................... 40 6.1. Specific objective: Identifying and filling critical gaps in response capacity............ 40 
6.2. Policy options for addre ssing gaps in capacities........................................................ 41 
6.3. Analysis of impacts.................................................................................................... 42 6.4. Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 44 7. Transport ................................................................................................................... . 45 
7.1. Specific transport objectives ...................................................................................... 45 7.2. Policy options............................................................................................................ . 45 
7.3. Analysis of impacts.................................................................................................... 47 
 
EN 2   EN 7.4. Comparison of options ............................................................................................... 48 
8. Preparedness............................................................................................................... 4 9 
8.1. Specific preparedness objectives................................................................................ 49 8.2. Preparedness policy options....................................................................................... 50 8.3. Analysis of impacts of preparedness options............................................................. 51 8.4. Comparing preparedness options ............................................................................... 55 9. Prevention .................................................................................................................. 55 
9.1. Specific prevention objectives ................................................................................... 55 9.2. Prevention policy options........................................................................................... 56 9.3. Analysis of impacts of options for an EU prevention policy framework .................. 58 9.4. Comparing the prevention options............................................................................. 63 10. Summary of Options and Key Consider ations for the Preferred Options.................. 64 
11. Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 65 12. Legislative Proposal and further elem ents of CPFI Ex-Ante Evaluation .................. 65 
13. List of Acronyms........................................................................................................ 68 14. List of Annexes .......................................................................................................... 69  
 
EN 3   EN  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1. The aim of EU action in the field of civil protection (CP)  is to support and 
complement Member States’ action in pr eventing, preparing for, and responding to 
natural or man-made disasters. As the numbe r, intensity, and complexity of disasters 
are rising, the current systems for preventing and protecting against disasters, and the 
current means of coordination at the EU leve l are not able to d eal with the upcoming 
challenges in an effective and efficient wa y. Eventually, this will lead to a lower 
level of protection of people, the environm ent and property in Europe and elsewhere 
in the world where European CP assist ance is needed. Moreover, the European 
cooperation on response, preparedness thr ough training and exercises and other 
measures, as well as prevention will make all the difference especially in the event of 
a high impact disaster, something th at cannot be excluded in Europe 
2. Since 2001, the basis for EU civil protection cooperation is the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism (the Mechanism) decision,1 which was recast in 2007.2 The Civil 
Protection Financial Instrument (CPFI) prov ides a basis for fundi ng of all activities 
under the Mechanism.3 The main role of the Mechanism is to support and coordinate 
the preparation and deployment of Member States' in-kind assistance (teams, experts 
and equipment) to countries requesting inte rnational assistance in major emergencies 
of all kinds, natural and man-made, within and outside the EU. Typical examples of 
CP assistance provided in th e past include search and re scue after earthquakes, water 
purification and high capacity pumping duri ng floods, field hospitals and medication, 
forest fire fighting with airplanes, emergency shelter and power generators. 
3. Starting with just a few ope rations in 2002-2003, the Mechan ism is now activated in 
up to 30 emergencies per year. Recent ope rations include for example the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, floods in Poland, the 2011 earthquake, tsunami,  and nuclear accident in 
Fukushima, Japan, as well as the explosion and energy shortage in  Cyprus, to name 
but a few. 
4. The Commission has established and directly  operates a Monitoring and Information 
Centre (MIC), which is accessible around th e clock and acts as a communication hub 
among 31 Participating States of the Mechanism (PS),4 the affected country and the 
EU experts deployed in the field. It also pl ays a co-ordination role by matching offers 
of assistance put forward by PS to the needs of the disaster-stricken country. 
Through the MIC, the EU can also co-finance costs of transport of  assistance to the 
disaster site. 
5. The need for stronger civil protection coope ration at EU level has been repeatedly 
recognised and emphasized at political le vel. Acknowledging the inherent limits of 
                                                 
1 Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions; 
Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 (OJ L 297, 15.11.2001, p. 7). 
2 Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism (recast) (O J L 314, 1.12.2007, p. 9). 
3 Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument (OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9). 
4 EU-27, Iceland, Liechtens tein, Norway and Croatia. 
 
EN 4   EN the Mechanism, the Commission adopted in  October 2010 a Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council 'Towards a stronger European disaster 
response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance'  presenting a broad 
vision and concrete proposals on how to rein force in particular the effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and visibility  of EU's response to disasters.5 The General 
Affairs Council welcomed the key ideas6 and the substance of the Commission's 
proposals has met with strong support by the European Parliament.7 The response 
options developed in this impact assessment were included in the Communication and its associated assessment of impacts. 
6. Preparedness actions are directed toward s national CP services. Main actions to 
better prepare them for operations outside  of national borders and coordination 
activities currently include training cour ses, full-scale field exercises, and an 
exchange of experts programme.
8 These preparedness actions are widely praised for 
their important contribution to improving compatibility and complementarities between intervention teams operating in an  international cont ext. The 2008 Council 
conclusions on European disaster manageme nt training called for diversification and 
reinforcement of training.
9 The Commission is also assi sting PS in organising certain 
CP resources into intervention 'modules' th at are interoperable and can be quickly 
deployed to the field. These modules are made  up of national resources from one or 
more PS. A technical framework has been put in place for seventeen types of CP 
modules and more than 130 intervention modules are currently registered for information in a Commission's database. Ex amples of types of modules are high 
capacity pumping water purif ication, heavy and medium search and rescue, and 
aerial fire fighting with airplanes. 
7. In 2007, the CPFI has enlarged the scope of  CP cooperation to prevention projects. 
On the policy side, in line w ith requests from the Europ ean Parliament and Council, 
the Commission is implementing an EU  disaster prevention framework
10 and has 
recently issued guidelines on risk a ssessment for disaster management.11 EU-level 
disaster risk management policy was also  announced in the Commission's Internal 
                                                 
5 COM(2010)600 final. The Communication was accompanied by an impact assessment analysing 
various options: SEC (2010) 1242 final.. 
6 Conclusions of the General Affairs C ouncil, adopted on 14 December 2010, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118460.pdf . 
7 Report ‘Towards a stronger Europ ean disaster response: the role of  civil protection and humanitarian 
assistance’ 2011/2023 INI (Rapporteur E. Gardini), approved in the plenary of 27 September 2011. 
8 Commission Decision No. 2004/277/ EC, Euratom of 29 December 2 003 lays down the rules for the 
implementation of the Mechanism, defining its duties and the functioning of the various preparatory 
measures, including a training programme. 
9 27.11.2008 Conclusions called for: (1) Promoting consistency amongst national training programmes in 
support of disaster management and enabling the improvement of training programmes provided by PS, 
and (2) Offering a wide range of training opportunities at EU level for disaster management experts and intervention personnel, primarily by diversifying and reinforcing the existing training programme. 
10 COM(2009)82 final of 23.2.2009; The Communication on the Internal security strategy addressed the 
need for an integrated approach between security and other policies. 
11 Commission Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster 
Management , 21 December 2010, 17833/10, SEC(2010) 1626. The Commission guidelines were 
welcomed by related Council conclusions on Further Developing Risk Assessment for Disaster 
Management within the European Union, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 11-12 
April 2011. 
 
EN 5   EN Security Strategy, which states that the EU should establish by 2014 a coherent risk 
management policy linking threat and risk assessments to decision making.12 
8. Disaster prevention policy and actions ha ve become important themes in the 
European CP cooperation (and elsewhere), not least because of the close links 
between prevention, preparedness and respons e actions. In a Union of solidarity that 
fosters mutual assistance in times of crises,13 it is crucial that each PS make the 
corresponding efforts to prevent emergencies from occurring in the first place. There are strong demands from PS stakeholders  to support and complement European 
cooperation on cross-sectoral disaster risk  management policies as a pre-condition 
for further solidarity on the response side. 
9. In addition to the Council conclusions on response, preparedness and prevention, and 
the related European Parliament reso lutions mentioned above, the Council has 
adopted a number of Conclu sions recognizing the need for improvement and inviting 
the Commission and the Member States to take action, in particular on host nation 
support
14, the role of the Mechanism in major emergencies15, EU disaster 
management training arrangements16, forest fire prevention17, innovative solutions 
for financing disaster prevention18, integrated flood management19, on further 
developing risk assessment20, and civil protecti on awareness-raising21. 
10. The Lisbon Treaty created a de dicated Title XXIII on civil protection in Article 196 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU), which also stresses the role of 
prevention actions in European CP cooperation. 
11. By bringing together the CP capabilities of 31 PS, the Mechanism and European 
prevention actions help to protect people,22 the environment and property in multiple 
ways: 
(1) Monitoring of emergencies, information sharing, and coordination of actions 
increase the speed and effectiveness of  CP interventions and thereby helps 
saving lives and protecting people, the environment and property;  
                                                 
12 EU Internal Security Strategy In Action: five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 
final of 22.10.2010. Civil protection is also one of five major components in a shared EU agenda for increasing the security of EU citizens and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters as an 
important part of the Stockholm Programme: ‘An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens’ (document 2010/C 115/01). 
13 As stipulated by Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity Clause). 
14 Council Conclusions of 22 November 2010 on Host Nation support (document 15874/10). 
15 Council Conclusions on the psychosocial interventions in the event of emergencies and disasters and on 
the role of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in major events.  
16 Council Conclusions of 14 November 2008 on European disaster management training (document 
15520/08). 
17 Council Conclusions of 26 April 2010 on prevention of forest fires within the EU. 
18 Council Conclusions of 09 November 2010 on innovative solutions for financing disaster prevention. 
19 Council Conclusions of 12 May 2011 on integrated flood management within the EU. 
20 Council Conclusions of 12 April 2011 on further developing risk assessment for disaster management 
within the EU. 
21 Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009 on civil protection awareness raising (document 9976/09).  
22 This applies to EU citizens inside the EU and travelling abroad, as well as populations of third 
countries. 
 
EN 6   EN (2) Pooling of assets, and of knowledge, information and expertise leads to 
economies of scale and better cost-effec tiveness, and allows to provide for 
higher protection levels; 
(3) Training and exercises for international assistance, as well as other 
preparedness and prevention actions re duce the risks and consequences of 
disasters and raise awareness. 
12. While the Mechanism has performed well for what it was designed for in 2001, in its 
current set-up its effectiveness and efficien cy is limited by a number of shortcomings 
related notably to the limited response planning and the limited integration of 
preparedness and prevention actions, thus making it increasingly difficult to ensure 
an appropriate handling of the upcoming challenges. 
13. This impact assessment will examine a ra nge of policy options to improve the 
functioning of the CP disaster management  cooperation in Europe. Its scope covers 
five key areas:  
(1) Improved disaster response through be tter planned EU coordination and a 
voluntary pool of pre-committed assets; 
(2) Addressing critical re sponse capacity gaps; 
(3) Enhanced financial and logi stical transport support; 
(4) A more coherent European prep aredness policy framework; and  
(5) A European prevention policy framew ork and national disaster risk 
management plans integrated into the EU CP cooperation. 
As will be discussed in this report, these ar eas are interlinked, complementary and mutually 
support each other. 
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
14. This impact assessment report was prepar ed by the Commission Directorate-General 
responsible for humanitarian aid and civ il protection (DG ECHO) to examine policy 
options in the field of EU CP cooperation and their impacts, including all relevant 
aspects of an ex-ante evaluation.23  
15. The impact assessment process24 was accompanied by an Impact Assessment 
Steering Group involving 21 relevant services25 and benefitted from input of an 
external study.26  
                                                 
23 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2342/2002 of 23.12.2002, laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p.1).  
24 A summary list of steps taken and the timeline are included in Annex A. 
25 SG, SJ, DG BUDG, DG HOME, DG ENV, DG CLIM, DG RTD, DG JRC, DG MOVE, DG ENER, 
DG REGIO, DG SANCO, DG AGRI, DG ENTR, DG INFSO, DG ELARG, DG DEVCO, FPIS, 
EEAS. Reports of the three consultation meetings are in Annex B. 
 
EN 7   EN 2.1. Consultation of interested parties 
16. Three targeted stakeholder consultations were  carried out, in addition to a series of 
stakeholder events preceding the Commission's 2010 Disaster Response Communication. Two with a wide group of invitees
27 and one with national CP 
authorities who are the key stakeholders.28 National authorities al so provided input in 
other informal ways, taken into cons ideration in this impact assessment.29  
17. Other stakeholders interested in EU CP po licy, all of whom were  invited to provide 
comments, are professional or voluntary organisations active in the field of 
emergency management, the humanitarian community, UNOCHA,30 UNISDR,31 as 
well as relevant players active in the resear ch, internal security, environment, foreign 
policy, and other related areas. Stakehol ders were consulted on the basis of 
comprehensive consultation documents (Annex D).  
18. As concerns the different policy pro posals, there was a common ground among the 
key stakeholders that the EU should advance advanced planning of operations under 
the Mechanism. A large majority of stak eholders expressed support for building the 
European Emergency Response Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool of Member 
States' assets  on call for EU operations, while some pointing out certain reservations, 
depending on the detailed implementation of such a pool. On the idea to provide 
possibilities for EU funding of re sponse assets (EU-funded assets ), there were 
stakeholder reservations that this should not lead to the EU owning assets or a 
command and control structure at EU level.  Stakeholders expressed their general 
satisfaction with the current  system of transport suppor t and various opinions on 
different elements of it and strongly we lcomed proposals to simplify procedures. 
19. On the preparedness actions , stakeholders expressed genera l satisfaction in particular 
the current training and exercise arrangements and many speakers at the first stakeholder meeting expressed the view that the scope of the training needed 
broadening so as to include also other re levant subject matters of international 
cooperation. On the import ance of prevention actions
, there is a general agreement 
among all stakeholders that it needs to be come an integral part of a balanced 
approach in moving EU civil protection forward. 
20. All comments by stakeholders were fully considered and are reflected in the specific 
sections of this report. 
                                                                                                                                                         
26 Study report Annex C. Just prior to the impact assessment, DG ECHO has been carrying out a 
comprehensive evaluation of all EU CP activities in the years 2007-2009. The evaluation was supported by an external and independent evaluation study which included a comprehensive stakeholder survey: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/evaluation/thematic_en.htm
. 
27 General stakeholder meetings were held on 6 April and 17 June 2011 with 600 invited stakeholders and 
about 120 participants each.  
28 Meeting of CP Directors-General held in Budapest on 23-25 May 2011. Three consultation papers 
included a number of specific questions on the policy options in the field of prevention, preparedness, 
and response (see Annex F). MS CP authorities have  regular and frequent contact among themselves 
and with the Commission on all matters of policy, impl ementation, evaluation, and lessons-learned, etc. 
29 This includes a non-paper drafted by a group of Participating States in June 2011. 
30 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
31 UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
 
EN 8   EN 2.2. The Impact Assessment Board 
21. In response to the IAB's opinion, this repo rt was revised to improve the problem 
definition by providing more evidence of the size and seriousness of the problems. The baseline scenario and the content of the policy change options was clarified including diverging stakeholder views. Opti ons are analysed in greater detail and 
their comparative advantages and value added of the preferred opti ons is described in 
more detail using a clear set of compar ison criteria. Finally, the monitoring and 
evaluation arrangements are spelled out in the text. 
3. T
HE PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED AND SUBSIDIARITY  
22. Without renewal the CPFI will expire at the end of 2013. But beyond the mere 
renewal and a possible streng thening of the CPFI, the Me chanism is evolving in a 
context of three major challenges:  
1) the continuing trend of in creasing number, intensity, and complexity of disasters;  
2) budgetary constraints re lated to the current ec onomic situation; and  
3) systemic limitations inherent in the curr ent mandate of the Mechanism, restricting 
the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU's disaster response.  
3.1. Overview of Mechanism operations and current activities financed by the CPFI 
23. The Mechanism has over the years significantly increased its activity, gained in 
professionalism, and has become an importa nt component of international disaster 
management.32 An extensive external evaluatio n of the Mechanism for the years 
2007-2009 (Annex H) concluded that the curr ent system of coordination among PS 
has led to a better response to disasters in side and outside the EU, while training and 
exercises have successfully raised the level of EU preparedness. The role of the MIC 
– currently reorganised into the European  Emergency Response Centre (ERC) – is 
particularly appreciated by PS. The UNOCHA,  which has a central coordination role 
for disasters outside the EU, recognises the Mechanism as a model 'regional' disaster 
management arrangement and cooperates cl osely with the MIC,  including through 
joint expert missions. 
24. When comparing the Mechanism/CPFI budget of € 189 million for 2007-2013 with 
the available budgets for humanitarian aid of next to € 1 billion for the same period, 
it needs to be born in mind that the M echanism is essentia lly a coordination 
instruments which helps channelling the na tional CP assistance, which in terms of 
volume sometimes reaches a substantial share of the overall relief effort. So, when 
placing the Mechanism in the context of interna tional relief efforts, it is clear that the 
monetary contributions of the Mechanism are modest, but the coordination role is 
substantial. For example in the 2010 Haiti earthquake reli ef efforts, the Mechanism 
coordinated the involvement of 25 Europ ean countries in close cooperation with 
UNOCHA. 
                                                 
32 Evaluation of the Mechanism for the years 2007-2009 (see Annex H). 
 
EN 9   EN 25. In the year 2010 the share between the di fferent areas was as follows: € 4.5 million 
for response, € 8 million for transport, € 10 million for preparedness, and € 2.3 million for prevention. 
26. On the response
 side the following graphs give an overview of the Mechanism 
activities (until mid 2011). 
Total number of activations of the Mechanism
37 61217 182028 28
1124731
1 171111612 432
23
05101520253035
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Request for assistance Pre-alert Monitoring
 
27. Mechanism activations 2011 per types of hazards. 
 
EN 10   EN Mechanism activations for different types of hazards
2
15%
1
8%
2
15% 3
23%3
23%1
8%
1
8%Earthquake
Waste spill (MP)
Tropical storm
Volcano eruption
Civil unrest
Forest fires
Flood
 
28. The deployment of assessment and coordinati on teams of experts on the site of an 
emergency, upon the request of an affected  state can be financed by the CPFI. 
Number of experts and MIC Liaison Officers deployed on 
assessment and coordination missions
2 339
4111412
579738
17343648
40
00 11310 1116
6
0510152025303540455055
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of missions Number of experts MIC LO s
 
29. Mechanism activations 2010. 
 
EN 11   EN 
HAITI
Earthquake : 12.01-06.04
-2 6  P S  - 3 EUCP teams (7 weeks, 
13 experts + 3 MIC LO)
- 12 USAR teams – 25% of 
all USAR deployed, 2 field 
hospitals, 43 AMPs & 
medical teams, water 
purification, 7 assessment 
teams, tents for 20.000 
people – 60% of all tents by 
31 Jan, 1 base-camp (300 people capacity), € 4.37 mil 
for transport grants. 
- 3 PA* modules (TAST, field 
hospital, water purification 
unit)
Cholera 
outbreak/Hurricane
Tomas: 21.10
ALBANIA
Floods: 07-21.01
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts, 1 
MIC LO & 1 UNDAC 
associated expert)
- 8 PS (AT, GR, SI, IT, FR, 
HR, SK, BE) : water pumps, 
generators, medicines, 
helicopters, expert teams, boats, other relief itemsUNITED STATES
US Oil Spill – Deep 
Horizon: 29.04 (monitoring), 27.05 
(request for assistance)
- several PS offered 
assistance: DE, EMSA, 
FR, IE, NL, NO, SE –
sweeping arms, skimmers, 
containment boom, fire 
boom, busters
Monitoring status: Iceland volcano (15.04-18.05), Forest Fires in Russia (03.08.2010), Torrential rain in 
Malta (25-27/10)
Pre-alert (early warning message ) status: Ukraine Floods (02.07.2010)
Mechanism activations (requests for assistance):
-not followed by delivering assistance or deploying experts through the Mechanism: Tajikistan floods 
(11.05);Cuba oil spill potential effects (25.06); 
-facilitating resource identification: UK salt for roads (09-26.01); Netherlands salt for roads (11-25.01).November 2010UKRAINE
Environmental prepared n
mission: 01-09.03 – pote n
tailing dam collapse (Kal u
- Joint UN-EU mission 
- 2 experts (NO) & 1 MIC 
- report underlines critica l
threats and recommenda
for priority measures
CHILE
Earthquake: 27.02-07.06
- 9 PS (AT, BG, SK, FR, 
DE, IT, ES, SE, UK): power 
generators, tents, water 
purification, experts 
(medical, USAR, etc), 8 
mechanical bridges, 1 field 
hospital with surgery 
rooms, other relief items
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts 
+ 1 MIC LO)-1  P A  m o d u l e  ( T A S T )POLAND
Floods: 19.05 – 25.06.2010
- 8 PS (DE, FR, CZ, DK, NL, EE, LV, LT ): 50 high 
capacity pumps, 20 expert 
teams (over 250 rescuers)
-1  M I C  L O
- 1 PA* module (high 
capacity pumping)HUNGARY
Floods: 25.05 –
01.07.2010- 3,408,000 sandbags 
have been accepted from 
8 PS (NO, SI, RO, NL, CZ, 
HR, DE, BG) and CH, MD, 
UA.
PORTUGAL
1. For. fires, 25.07-02.08 
• IT: 2 Can CL415
2. For. fires, 10-20.08
• EUFFTR (2 CL415 FR)
3. For. Fires, 29.08-01.09 • ES (2 Can CL215+415)
ROMANIA
Floods: 02.07 – 16.07.2010- 4 PS (AT, BE, DE, HU) 
provided assistance: pumps, 
pwr gen, geotextile
- other PS offered 
assistance: PL, EU RRC –
FR and BFC, BG, LURep of MOLDOVA
Floods: 07.07 – 28.08.2010
- 1 EUCP team (3 experts, 1 M
LO) 
- 3 PS (AT, EE, RO): pumps, p w
gen, sandbags, plastic sheets, 
boats for shallow water
- COM mobilized EU RRC – B F
module (EE/LV/LT)FRANCE
Forest fires: 30.08.2010
- EUFFTR (2 Can CL215)
PAKISTAN
Floods: 03.08 – 29.10.201 0
- 1 EUCP team (5 experts, LO) 
- EU Air Bridge – 12 flights
BG, DE, DK, FR, IT, SE, U
shelter, water purification, 
medicines, NFI
- 3 flights co financed by C
FI
- 8 requests for transport c
financing
- several PS sent assistan
c
BG, CY, DE, DK, ES, FR, G
HU, IT, LT, MT, NO, SE, SFRANCE
Speleological 
Relief: 
04.10.2010
-IT sent a diver
team of 7 
people
-UK sent 2 
divers and a 
liaison officer
HUNGARY 
Alkali sludge accident: 
04.10.2010
1 EUCP team 
(DE,SE,FR,BE,AT,MIC)
BENIN
Floods: 06.10.2010
1 expert from FR as 
an associate memberto the UNDAC teamGUATEMALA
Tropical storm
Agatha:25.05.2010
AT provided 1,275 
kg of Sodium 
Dichloroisocyanurat
e (NaDCC) 
Granules 
30. For transport  assistance, a maximum of € 90 million can be used under the CP 
Financial Instrument over the period 2007 to 2013. The to tal of CPFI co-financing 
used since the start of the transport provisions up to the end of May 2011 amounts to 
around € 18,4 million, with 2010 and 2011 showing a marked increase in the number of requests for pooling and financial assi stance. In 2007, there was one request for 
transport financing of a to tal value of around € 0.03 million;  the total value of the 
transport co-financing during 2008 and 2009 st ayed at around € 0.4 million yearly; in 
2010, it reached around € 6.6 million (for 55 requests), and in 2011 it has increased 
to € 10.8 million (for 35 requests) so far.  
 
EN 12   EN 0100000200000300000400000500000600000
051015202530# of grantsOverview of disasters for which transport grants were used
2010 to July 2011 (arranged chronologically)
# of grants
Average grant size
 
024681012141618
Less than 
5k5k - 9k 10k - 29k 30k - 49k 50k - 99k 100k -
149k150k -
249k250k -
499k500k+# of grantsDistribution of grant sizes
2007 - July 2011
 
31. Actions are eligible for financial assist ance under the Instrument only if certain 
criteria are met. These crit eria refer to (i) the additional transport resources being 
necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of the CP response under the Mechanism; 
(ii) all other possibilities for finding transport under the Mechanism have been 
exhausted; (iii) the assistance to be transported: - has be en offered to and accepted by 
a requesting country, - is necessary to meet  vital needs arising from the emergency. 
In order to fulfil the second criterion (prove that "all other possibility for finding 
transport under the Mechanism have been ex hausted"), article 4 of the Commission 
Decision 2007/606/EC, Euratom provides for the organisati on of the pooling 
procedure, and it also foresees that EU financing may become eligible only at the end of the pooling phase (which shall not ex ceed 24 hours from the notification, and may 
 
EN 13   EN be shortened by the Commission to a minimum of 6 hours, where this  is necessary in 
order to respond effectively to  urgent and vital needs).  
32. For preparedness  actions, the year 2010 training ac tivities amounted to € 4.2 million, 
€ 3.3 for exercises, and € 0.6 million for the exchange of experts. 
33. At the end of May 2010 a total of 142 traini ng courses had been conducted and in 
total some 2500 participants received traini ng. Training courses currently include the 
following types: Community Mechanism Induction Course (CMI), Operational 
Management Course (OPM), High Level Coordination Course (HLC), Assessment 
Mission Course (AMC), Staff Management  Course (SMC), Media and Security 
Strategy Course (MSC), International Coordination Course (ICC), Operational 
Management Refresher Course (OPMR), Hi gh Level Coordination Refresher Course 
(HLCR), Modules Basic Course (MBC), Technical Experts Course (TEC). 
34. Overall, there have been more than 22 full-scale exercises since 2002 supported by 
the Mechanism. The scenarios were: 11 earthquakes (incl. 3 CBRN), 7 floods, 5 
CBRN, 4 terrorism, 1 forest fire, 1 volcano. On average five countries participate in any given EU exercise, and on average th ere are three exerci ses per year. On 
average, 14 mechanism countries (som e 44 per cent of Par ticipating States) 
participate annually in one or more simula tion exercises. The most active countries 
are Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, the UK and Italy. 
35. The exchange of experts programme allo ws qualified civil pr otection personnel and 
officials to spend a number of weeks in a nother host country civ il protection system 
for the purpose of learning, exchange of experience and creating networks. By now, 
some 200 experts have made use of this po ssibility, which is co -financed by the EU. 
36. As regards prevention
 actions, the current Mechanis m Decision makes no reference 
to prevention policy as part of the Ci vil Protection Coopera tion. The current 
legislative provisions in the CPFI  Decision include Article 1(2)(b)  and Article 2(1)  
which place preventive measures within the scope and the subject matter of the 
CPFI. Consequently, the CPFI has financed a number of EU actions in this area. The 
eligible actions and criter ia for both prevention and pr eparedness are specified in 
Article 4(1). 
3.1. Current disaster trends 
37. The impacts of disasters in Europe have b een very substantial in the past and this 
despite the fact that Europe has been spar ed in recent decades of the mega-disasters 
that other regions have experienced. A r ecent report by the European Environmental 
Agency assessed the occurrence and impact s of disasters and the underlying hazards 
such as storms, extreme temperature events, forest fires, water scarcity and droughts, floods, snow avalanches, landslides, ear thquakes, volcanoes and technological 
accidents in Europe for the period 1998-2009 (see figure below).
33  
                                                 
33 EEA Technical Report No 13/2010: Mapping the impacts of natural hazards and technological 
accidents in Europe ; Link: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publica tions/mapping-the-impacts-of-natural . 
 
EN 14   EN 38. Thus, for the period 1998-2009 total disaster  impacts in the EU are estimated at 
almost 100.000 fatalities and close to  € 150 billion in economic damage.34 The most 
expensive individual European  event was Winter Storm X ynthia, causing some € 4.5 
billion in losses in several countries. EU citizens are also exposed to disasters in third 
countries, such as the South-East Asian tsunami of December 2004.35  
39. Disaster impacts in Europe  in the last ten years: 
  Main types of impacts  Impacts 1998-2009 EU  
Hazard  Hazard type  Human 
fatalities  Economi
c losses  Eco-
system 
degradatio
n Event
s Fatalitie
s Economic 
losses 
million 
EUR1) 
Storms  Hydro-
meteorologi
cal x x   155  729 44,338  
Extreme 
temperature 
events  Hydro-
meteorologi
cal x    101  77,551  9,962  
Forest fires  Hydro-
meteorologi
cal x  x 35 191 6,917  
Water 
scarcity and 
droughts  Hydro-
meteorologi
cal  x x 8 0 4,940  
Floods  Hydro-
meteorologi
cal x x  213 1,126  52,173  
Snow 
avalanches  Geophysica
l x x  8 130 742 
                                                 
34 EEA Report 13/2010: "Mapping th e impacts of natural hazards and technological accidents in Europe" 
at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publicati ons/mapping-the-i mpacts-of-natural . 
35 For more on consular aspects see Communication "Consular protection for EU citizens in third 
countries: state of play and way forward" [COM(2 011) 149 final] and related impact assessment.  
 
EN 15   EN   Main types of impacts  Impacts 1998-2009 EU  
Hazard  Hazard type  Human 
fatalities  Economi
c losses  Eco-
system 
degradatio
n Event
s Fatalitie
s Economic 
losses 
million 
EUR1) 
Landslides  Geophysica
l x x  9 212 551 
Earthquakes
/volcanoes  Geophysica
l x x  46 18,864  29,205  
Oil spills  Technologi
cal   X 9 n/a 70,000 
tonnes 
spilled  
Industrial 
accidents  Technologi
cal   X 339 169  
Toxic spills  Technologi
cal   X 4 n/a 5 million 
m3 spilled  
Total      928 98,972  148,831  
 
40. On a worldwide scale, in just the one  year 2010 more than 200.000 were people 
killed in the earthquakes of Haiti, Chile and central China, the floods in Pakistan, and 
the heat wave in Russia; overall some 17% of worldwide economic losses incurred in 
Europe.36 The year 2010 demonstrated also the vulnerability of the networked global 
economy, as the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull  volcano in Iceland paralysed the 
entire air traffic in Europe for days, l eading to worldwide economic repercussions. 
41. Looking at the evolution over time we percei ve a clear trend of increasing numbers, 
intensities, and complexity of disasters. The figures below provide a synthesis of the 
key data on disaster trends, showing in pa rticular the continuous rise of the number 
of people affected by natural disasters in the last decad es and the steep rise in 
economic damages. 
                                                 
36 Report of Munich Re:  http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/pre ss_releases/2011/2011_01_03_press_release_en.pdf . 
 
EN 16   EN Figures 2 and 3: Rising trends in disasters (p eople affected and damages caused by natural 
and technological disasters37 
                                                 
37 EM-DAR: The OFDA/CRED International Database – www.emdat.be  – Université Catholique de 
Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
EN 17   EN 
42. The corresponding disaster figures for techno logical disasters display sudden surges 
but an overall less pronounced rising tre nd. The number of people reported killed 
from technological disasters starte d declining in the last decade. 
43. Contributing to these rising trends is a number of new risks with potentially 
devastating effects in the future. A ccording to recent reports and studies38, these 
include complex risks such as the inte raction between physical and technological 
hazards. Another driving factor are the eff ects of climate change, and its potential 
future security implications.  
                                                 
38 For example, 2011 UNISDR Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2010 European 
Commission's 5th Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, CRED Annual Disaster 
Statistical Review 2010, Munich RE Natural catastrophes 2010, EEA Re port on the European 
Environment: State and outlook 2010 etc. 
 
EN 18   EN 44. One of the main advantages of European CP  cooperation resides in the advantages to 
collectively prevent, prepare for and res pond to very large disasters that are 
overwhelming individual PS. The extent  of possible problems caused by such 
disasters will be illustrated below by reference to the recent triple disaster in Japan. The earthquake-tsunami-nuclear  disaster striking Japan in March 2011 is a salient 
reminder that even well prepared countries can be overwhelmed by complex disasters. Comparable events are possible also in Europe at any moment and may 
lead to a number of severe consequences , due to the increased  vulnerability of 
today's networked societies with their reli ance on technologies and infrastructure.
39 
Example : As was shown by the disaster in Japan, a mega-disaster within Europe may require 
the urgent mass evacuation of te ns/hundreds of thousands of i nhabitants and give rise to 
enormous temporary shelter need s within Europe. They may also  give rise to spontaneous 
population movements, with large groups travelling by their own means in search of safety 
and temporary shelter. Very few EU MS have  had practical experience with such mass 
evacuations. The affected country may loose so me of its capacity to coordinate the overall 
response. It was for this reason that Japan reque sted a coordinated EU approach, pooling all of 
the assistance and taking care of its delivery on  a door-to-door basis. Another major impact 
may be on the available transpor t infrastructure, thus negatively impacting the capacity to 
deliver essential relief supplies. This is one of  the reasons why Japan requested the EU to try 
to deliver its assistance directly to the be neficiaries in the affected municipalities. 
Furthermore, modern societies tend to face va rious types of legal obstacles when receiving 
external assistance in order to respond to mega-disasters  and though the EU is based on the 
principle of free movement, a number of legal issues  still constitute barriers to the free flow of 
assistance within the EU (and from non-EU c ountry). The recent study carried out by the Red 
Cross, the Belgium Presidency Seminar on Host  Nation Support (HNS) and the recent work 
on the HNS guidelines have identified various legal obstacles that need to be further 
addressed40. Furthermore, the events of such scal e would pose cross-sectoral issues going 
beyond the 'pure' remit of Civil Protection, such  as those related to disruption of economic 
activity, massive movements of people, energy supply, law and order, security, even political 
issues etc. This would require extensive inte raction and coordination between Civil Protection 
and other state authorities, busin esses, as well as the service.  In some MS, civil protection 
authorities will have a central coordinating ro le during major crises, bringing together the 
national actors across the various  sectors. This is not mirrored at EU level, where the civil 
protection Mechanism is one sectoral instrume nt next to others. Finally, the additional 
challenge of rescue efforts under CBRN conditio ns may easily overwhelm national capacities. 
45. Somewhat different to the example above which deals with unknown disasters is the 
fact that Europe faces also a number of  known hazards which require attention. 
European countries feature ten volcanoes th at potentially aff ect population centres 
with a total of 1.3 million inhabitants. Ves uvius is the most dangerous volcano in 
                                                 
39 The following example was discusse d at the recent Directors-General meeting in Krakow in September 
2011. Necessarily, disaster preven tion, preparedness and response actions are concerned with future 
risks for which the exact impacts are to an extent hypothetical. 
40 Inter alia, recognition of qualifications of regula ted professions (e.g. doctors, nurses, paramedics, 
engineers, etc.), national cross bord er and transport regulations and rest rictions, liability of international 
intervention teams, regulation concerning standards for food and medicines in emergency situations, 
visas regulations for non-EU personnel, in-country taxation for international intervention teams, etc. 
 
EN 19   EN Europe, creating life-threatening hazards  to more than one million people.41 
Moreover, large earthquake events are expected any ti me in Lisbon and Istanbul. 
Such large events can by fa r overwhelm the capacities of individual countries. For an 
earthquake magnitude 7.5 in Istanbul, pub lic estimates expect 55000 or more 
buildings destroyed or severely damage d, 73.000 fatalities, 120.000 severely injured 
inhabitants, 2 million homeless people, and economic damages of up to 60 billion €, 
i.e. 30% of Turkeys gross national product.42 Considering the time-scales of geo-
physical phenomena, it is relevant to consid er also the devastati ng effects of the 1755 
earthquake causing the near destruction of Lisbon. Between 30 and 40 thousand people (of 200 thousand) lost their lives and 85% of the cities buildings were 
destroyed.  
46. While today's buildings and emergency proced ures may be considered more resilient 
than at earlier times, the economic values at  risk have increased significantly, as has 
the population at risk in dangerous places. Moreover, today's networked societies are 
vulnerable to many severe knock-on effect s, e.g. when the electricity supply is 
disrupted for longer periods. German author ities have analysed the effects of a 
prolonged electricity blackout on the German society and co ncluded that the effects 
would be wide-ranging and heavily disrupti ng after only a few days , with significant 
risks also to human lives. 
3.2. Environmental, social and fundament al rights impacts of disasters 
47. The impacts of natural and man-made disasters have immediate detrimental impacts 
on the environment and can contribute to climate change. The impacts can include 
loss of bio-diversity due to fires and/or floods. For example over 3.5 million ha of forest areas were burnt by forest fire s in Europe 2003-2009 of which over half a 
million hectares were located in prot ected ecosystems – Natura 2000 areas.
43 Impacts 
of forest fires on ecosystems are widespread. Other environmental impacts can include increased water pollution due to floods, as well as industrial and 
technological disasters, e.g. if waste wate r treatment plants are inundated or when 
factories holding large quanti ties of toxic chemicals are also affected. In addition 
forest fires can also contribute to increased CO
2 emissions. 
48. Flooding and storms are the most important natural hazards in Eu rope in terms of 
economic losses (over € 96 billion 1998-2009)  (EEA 2010) and the floods affecting 
Europe in recent decades have shown an in crease in economic losses as a result of 
increased population and wealth in  the affected areas (EEA 2010). 
49. At the same time vulnerability  among people and territories  affected by disasters is 
very heterogeneous throughout Europe, as highl ighted by recent disasters. In the heat 
waves affecting France and other countries in the summer 2003, most of the fatalities 
were elderly people. The UK floods of 2007 affected disproportionally the poorer 
                                                 
41 Spence, Robin; Gunesekara, Rash min, and Zuccaro, Giulio: Insuran ce Risks From Volcanic Eruptions 
in Europe, Willis Research Network, October 19th 2009: 
http://www.willisresearchnetw ork.com/Lists/Publications/Attachments/64/WRN%20-
%20Insurance%20Risks%20from%20Volcanic%20Eruptions_Final.pdf. 
42 http://www.zukunftsforum-oeffentliche-siche rheit.de/downloads/ZOES-2-Wenzel.pdf. 
43 EFFIS, 2010European Forest  Fires Information System: http://effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu . 
 
EN 20   EN segments of people living in flood prone areas.44 Many of the deaths from flooding in 
Romania and other Eastern European count ries occurred in rural areas with 
insufficient flood control and defences. As  reported by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change in 2007 the burden of di sasters including th eir health impacts 
falls disproportionately on vulnerable popula tions also in Europe, namely the poor, 
ethnic minorities, old people a nd people with disabilities.45 
50. Involving the active participation of  local communities, business and non-
governmental organisations would boost the so cial impact of disaster management. 
Positive social impacts may occur in particular when EU citizens experience increasingly comparable levels of protec tion, irrespective of th e region confronted 
with comparable risks. In terms of avoi ding fatalities and cost damage, positive 
benefits occur when reducing the number of  deaths and injuries, reducing damage to 
infrastructure and buildings, or reducing productivity loss, e.g. in industries and 
agriculture during floodi ng. A significant proportion of the prevention and 
preparedness funding will also contri bute to combating climate change. 
51. Actions that reduce casualties and minimi ze harm and damage to individuals and 
communities have a positive impact on a num ber of rights protected under the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the right to life (article 2) and the right 
to the integrity of the person (article 3) . Such actions help ensuring an improved 
access to health (article 35) and enhanced  environmental protection (article 37). 
Improvements in the EU CP may also posi tively affect the consular protection of 
unrepresented EU citizens in third countri es, therefore strengthe ning the fundamental 
right to consular prot ection (article 46). 
3.3. The limitations of the current CP  cooperation and the Mechanism 
52. Current disaster trends and the possible event of a mega-d isaster in Europe reveal 
that in its current set-up the Mechanism ha s a number of shortcomings related to the 
response to, preparedness for and also the prevention in particular of large-scale 
disasters, making it difficult to respond eff ectively to the future challenges. However, 
when considering also the likely limited public budgets availabl e for increased CP 
actions, the European CP cooperation via th e Mechanism must be seen as one of the 
most effective and efficient means of be tter preparing the European systems for 
preventing and protecting to th e future disaster landscape. 
53. When a disaster hits a European country, a great deal of nati onal resources can be 
mobilised, in most cases including the military and sometimes even the private 
sector. However, whenever the national re sources would be overwhelmed, it is the 
CP cooperation that may in most circumstances play the most effective and efficient role considering that it has been es tablishing functioning cooperation modes and 
participated in a lot of training and exercises. The Mechanism builds on this cooperation and tries to develop it further in to a comprehensive disaster management 
cooperation system where the EU can play its role to support and complement MS 
                                                
 
44 UK Environment Agency 'Addressing Environmental Inequalities: Flood Risk' Science Report: 
SC020061/SRI. For instance over half the population of Hull, heavily damaged in 2007 lived in areas 
that were amongst the 20% most deprived in England. 
45 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II report, 2007, Climate Change: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability, Geneva: United Nations. 
 
EN 21   EN efforts. As such it is not supposed to replace any regional cooperation that is already 
in place. But due to its larger scope of cu rrently 31 PS it widens the scope of possible 
protection and is therefore more effectiv e in the context of a larger disaster. 
3.3.1.  Reactive and ad hoc mechanics of the EU CP cooperation limit the effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence of European disaster response 
54. The current Mechanism has been set up as  a monitoring and information sharing 
platform, and is therefore dependent on volunt ary and ad hoc offers of assistance by 
PS (EU does not have own assets). It is not in a position to guarantee the 
availability of assistance  when needed. This can lead to situations when life-saving 
assistance is not available or delayed, thus, undermining the e ffectiveness of EU 
response.  
55. The ad hoc  system also necessarily implies that the Mechanism is of a reactive rather 
than a pro-active nature. The impossibility of foreseeing exactly what and how much 
(if any), assistance will be offered for any given emergency means that a meaningful 
contingency planning for deploying assistance cannot be done  for operations 
under the Mechanism. This inevitably lead s to a degree of improvisation in the 
immediate response phase, which denies the (economic) advantages of pooling and 
thus negatively affects the cost-effectiveness  of overall EU response. Furthermore, 
over the years it has become evident that the ad hoc system leads to a degree of 
fragmentation  of assistance . Given that PS offer assi stance without necessarily 
taking into account the overa ll EU response effort, th e assistance may lack 
coherence . It has been a recurrent phenomenon that assistance provided by PS caters 
abundantly for some of the needs whilst unable to cover others.46  
56. An example of the past is the major forest  fires in Bulgaria in the summer of 2007, 
where the request for assistance (fire figh ting aircraft) was left unanswered by other 
PS, partly explained by the fact  that their assets were eith er in use in other PS or on 
high alert to react domestically. Looking in to the future, in an extreme case, a 
deployed field hospital could be rendered virtually useles s in the absence of water 
purification support if access to clean water were an issue. It should be noted that 
there is a virtual consensus among the stak eholders on the need  to step up the 
planning of operations under the Mechanism.  
3.3.2.  Unavailability of critical response assets (capacity gaps) 
56.1. An effective EU disaster re sponse requires that assets  are available and can be 
quickly mobilised. Where gaps in response assets exist (which could be either 
because they are not available in sufficien t quantities or not available for sharing), 
critical needs of disasters' victims may not  be met. Gaps can occur especially with 
regard to assets to deal with low probability/high impact  risks, when the risk is 
considered too low for an individual count ry to justify invest ment, even though the 
impact could be huge (for instance in the case of a massive terrorist CBRN47 attack). 
Yet, the risk for the EU as a whole may in certain cases justify investing in such assets, thus filling the gap (i.e. situation comparable to that of 'market failure').
48 
                                                 
46 For details see Impact Assessment for 2010 Communication, SEC(2010)1243 – SEC (2010) 1242 final . 
47 Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. 
48 For a detailed economic rationale see external  consultant's study, Annex C, section 4.4. 
 
EN 22   EN Some reports suggest that in some extrem e scenarios Europe may face for instance a 
shortage of CBRN-related capacities and medical facilities for burnt victims.49 
57. Gaps may also occur with regard to specialised high-cost assets , when initial 
investments could be very high or even prohibitive. In such cases there are strong economic arguments to jointly invest in so me ‘top-up’ European capacities that could 
be shared by all PS. One example is the oil pollution combating vessels managed by the European Maritime Safety Agency (E MSA). Another example could be aerial 
forest fire-fighting. While all PS can be reasonably expected to prepare for the 
average level of risk – past experience indicates that this is the case in practice the 
EU as a whole is sufficiently equipped to deal with average forest fires seasons – it would be economically beneficial to deve lop reserve capacities for more extreme 
seasons and to share the burden related to that.
50  
58. Furthermore, some ' horizontal ' assets by their very nature are such that they can be 
used in virtually every emergency and serv e equally all actors involved, as e.g. the 
Technical Assistance and Support Teams (T AST) that provide logistical support 
(field accommodation, communi cations, food etc.) to a ny expert team or CP 
'module.'51 Similarly, private-sector stakeholders pointed that the same rationale 
could apply to heavy-lift helicopters that can  be used for a variety of purposes in 
almost every emergency involving the Mechanism.  
59. While the feasibility and usefulness of such arrangements has been successfully 
tested through pilot and preparatory action projects, the current CP legal basis does 
not allow the EU's support to filling such gaps and reaping benefits of economies of scale associated with sharing such assets at EU level, rather than having 31 PS making parallel investments. In this regard is should be noted that a number of key 
stakeholders felt strongly that in view  of primary responsibility of PS for the 
protection of their populations, it would be inappropriate for the EU to develops its 
'own' assets should it pose a risk of 'crowding out' the national capacities. 
3.3.3.  Limited transport solutio ns and heavy procedures hinder optimal response 
60. Transport is a critical element in ensuri ng an effective, efficient and coherent 
response to disasters, and a major cost  and logistical ch allenge for PS. The 
availability of means and f unds for transport is usually checked at PS level before 
making offers of assistance and often leads to  delays in offering assistance, or offers 
                                                
 
49 Study on Strengthening the EU capacity to respon d to disasters: Identification of the gaps in the 
capacity of the CP Mechanism to provide assistance in major disasters and options to fill the gaps – A 
scenario-based approach, at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protecti on/civil/prote/pdfdocs/Final%20Report%20-
%20scenario%20study.pdf , ECORYS 2009 . 
50 This was successfully tested through a pilot and prep aratory action projects on EU Forest Fire-fighting 
Tactical Reserve, whereas two CL21 5 fire-fighting aircraft were made available to assist all PS during 
2009 and 2010 summer seasons. In 2009, this reserve was used in 6 out of 9 EU operations in four PS, 
largely covering the difference between the requested capacities and offers from PS. 
51 EU aims to organise CP assets sent abroad into CP 'modules' that are fully interoperable and can be 
quickly deployed to the field, which is done on a voluntary basis. Technical specifications have been 
developed for 17 types of modules and more than 130 PS' intervention modules of various types are currently registered in the Commission's database. Examples of types of CP modules are high capacity 
pumping, water purification, heavy and medium search and rescue, and aerial fire fighting with 
airplanes. 
 
EN 23   EN not being made, or in le ss than required quantities.52 Likewise, the delivery of 
assistance has often become a critical i ssue when unexpected transport costs arise 
during an operation. 
61. The access to transport means can be a serious issue. In a number of past 
emergencies, the absence of good access to transport means precluded the provision 
of assistance, for example after the eart hquake in Peru (August 2007), offers from 
Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slova kia covering medical equipment, 
medicines, and other relief items were pa rtly not delivered because of lack of 
transport. In a ddition, the broker53 was also activated by a PS that reimbursed 100% 
of associated costs (Bulgaria for deliver y of assistance in Pakistan, 2010), thus 
confirming that the access to transport is a problem in itself that some CP authorities face.
54 Sometimes only military transport means are available, while the situation in 
the affected country requires a cautious use of military means. 
62. PS can request support from the Mechanis m according to the provisions of the 
revised 2007 CP legislation in the form of a 50% transport co-financing or the 
Commission's activation of a transport broker.55 However, the current burdensome 
procedures and the maximum 50% EU tran sport co-financing clearly represent a 
bottleneck in certain time-critical deployments of assistance. According to an 
extensive e-survey conducted for the 2010 CP Evaluation, 26 respondents considered 
that the existence of trans port provisions have a decisive  impact on the decision to 
offer assistance, against 22 respondents w ho considered the c ontrary, and 18 whom 
did not know. 
63. Furthermore, the procedures for requesting EU financial transport assistance through 
grants and service contracts are consid ered administratively burdensome in the 
context of quick response actions. This was the conclusion of last year's Evaluation, 
and a significant number of PS has expressed it at the first stak eholder conference. 
To the extent that the administrative proce dures deter PS from offering assistance, as 
explained by stakeholders, the current tr ansport provisions pose a problem for the 
future functioning of the Mechanism as an  effective and efficient response tool. 
Administrative procedures : The burdens are considered excessive for both the 
Commission and the PS. There are several specif ic issues: 1) if two or more countries 
pool the transport of their assistance a corresponding number of  requests for co-
financing have to be submitted (one from each of the States that contribute with 
assets and that wants to re quest co-funding), see example below; 2) the procedure for 
transport grant agreements is lengthy, invol ving 100% of transpor t costs being paid 
by the Commission upon the signature of the grant agreement, and the PS 
reimbursing at least 50%; 3)  organising the whole logist ical chain of a transport 
operation involving several PS poses significan t challenges, as important time can be 
                                                 
52 During some of the recent emergencies (e.g., Japa n 2011, Tunisia evacuation 2011), there were cases 
when some PS made offers of assistance, while a nnouncing their lack of financial means to cover 
transport costs. 
53 When requested by PS, the Commission tries to iden tify cost-efficient transport options by using the 
services of a transport contractor  ("broker") to lease transport a ssets. Such operations can be co-
financed by the Commission up to maximum 50 per cent.  
54 This disregards the (few) cases where offers from the broker were rejected. 
55 For details see Annex L. 
 
EN 24   EN wasted and administrative and logistical costs incur when trying to organise 
operations in airport hubs or in the affected country, due to the fact that EU transport 
co-financing can only cover a maximum of 50% (meaning that administrative and 
financial procedures have to be carried out with each of the concerned PS for very 
small amounts), see example below; 4) an  affected PS cannot benefit directly of 
transport services provided by the Commissi on (access is limited to offering states), 
which can translate into a lengthy admini strative procedure if the offering state 
engages in obtaining part of the transpor t costs from the Commission and the rest 
from the affected state.  
64. One example is related to evacuating EU citizens from Libya (2011), for which the 
broker provided options. The operation did not take place inter alia  due to the fact 
that there were more than four PS involved and some PS were reluctant to deal with 
the administrative process for sharing the 50% part.  
65. An example of problems in managing comp lex operations occurr ed in during the 
Japan earthquake 2011 (organ ising storage and transport from Narita airport to the 
affected prefectures of assistance from  three PS), and the Pakistan floods 2010 
(organising the transport chain so that assi stance from three PS gets on time in the 
common airport hub, making sure that all the assistance is packed in the right way 
and fulfils all requirements for overseas transport, ensuring storage, loading and 
unloading upon arrival). 
3.3.4.  Limited CP preparedness in training and exercises 
66. CP preparedness training cons ists of PS’ national traini ng/exercises programmes and 
the EU training courses. The latter focu ses on preparing for response actions 
involving the Mechanism. Other preparedne ss actions include the development of 
early warning systems and preparedness pr ojects, as well as assisting PS in 
organising their CP resources  into intervention modules. 
67. As mentioned stakeholders expressed genera l satisfaction in particular the current 
training and exercise arrangements. Howeve r, since national trainings have been 
developing independently from each other, co ordination and sharing of experience is 
limited. Each PS has its own individual se t-up, which is developed, implemented and 
evaluated independently of the actions and programmes of other PS. There is no 
systematic exchange of experience or best  practice between the PS (even if a number 
of regional and neighbouri ng arrangements may be well developed), nor does any 
systematic effort for interoperability ta ke place (even if there may be specific 
examples of transfer betw een e.g. neighbouring countries  as well as specific 
agreements on or tradition for mutual assistance). Consequently, emergency operations across-borders are difficult when  teams from different states operate 
together. Precious time is lost due to a l ack of a common vocabulary, or incompatible 
operating procedures. Incompatibility pr oblems have arisen for equipment, 
cooperation procedures, individual prepar edness, and a good unders tanding and trust 
into the partners' capabilities. Moreover, without a minimum of consistency between 
national systems, the sharing of experience s, good practices, and lessons learned will 
remain under-developed. The current situ ation based on neighbouring countries’ 
cooperation is not reaping the important benefits and synergies of closer EU 
cooperation, which are therefore lost. Like wise, the EU CP preparedness programme 
 
EN 25   EN has been too limited in terms of scope to bridge this gap, in particular as regards 
overwhelming events inside EU re quiring international assistance.56 
68. Indeed, the current EU training and exerci ses programmes and the applicable legal 
provisions focus on coordina tion tasks and have not yet integrated further 
developments in preparedness cooperat ion, including training on prevention, host-
nation support and consular support.57 Member State stakeholders have made strong 
request to broaden the scope of the traini ng so as to include also other relevant 
subject matters of intern ational cooperation, and to develop a proper training 
network. 
69. Finally, in the stakeholder consultations  several PS have noted that without 
assistance from the EU they will not be able to substantially raise their preparedness 
levels for overwhelming and cross-border events.58 The challenges are particularly 
pronounced for receiving incoming assistan ce in the event of an overwhelming 
disaster, so-called “host nation support.”59 This seems to be the case for most PS, 
particularly for those with insuffici ent experience and financial capacity. 
3.3.5.  Lack of integration of prevention policies 
70. EU prevention policy in the area of CP have led to so me limited cooperation among 
PS in the area of risk assessments and a number of policy declarations. The latter 
included the 2009 Commission Communicati on on prevention and the related 
Council conclusions in 200960, 201061, and 201162. The 2009 Communication was 
also endorsed by the European Parliament.63 However, the CP cooperation and 
progress in PS is uneven and slow, as will be explained below. 
71. The drivers behind increased prevention activities at Member State level have 
hitherto been sector-based legislative de mands, such as in the areas of critical 
infrastructures, dangerous substances, elec tricity, IT, water, transport, agriculture, 
etc. At the EU level, seve ral pieces of legislation addr ess sector-based hazards and 
include detailed provisions on risk assessments, minimum prevention standards, and 
risk management plans.64 However, separate planning and isolated action (“silo” 
                                                 
56 The CP Evaluation (see Annex H). 
57 The need for more inter-operability between CP an d consular experts was expressed e.g. at recent 
consular seminar and workshop on the concept for common trainings for CP and consular experts. The 
issue is explained in an Impact assessment on the coordination and cooperation measures regarding the 
consular protection of unrepresen ted EU citizens prepared by DG JUST in parallel to this report. 
58 Most recently again in the interviews carried  out by the external consultant, see Annex C. 
59 Idem.  The report which reports on the broad agreement among MS on this point. These recognised 
shortcomings have led to the work on related guidelines on host-nation support. 
60 On a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU of 30.11.2009 (document 15394/09). 
61 On prevention of forest fires within the EU of 26.04.2010, and: On innovative solutions for financing 
disaster prevention of 09.11.2010.  
62 On further developing risk assessment for disaster management within the EU of 12.04 2011, and On 
integrated flood management within the EU of 12.05.2011.  
63 Resolution of 21 September 2010 on the Commission communication: A Community approach on the 
prevention of natural and man-made disasters (2009/2151(INI). 
64 Such as the Directives on flood risk management (2007/60/EC), on the protection of critical 
infrastructures (2008/114/EC), on the control of major accident hazards  (Seveso-96/82/EC), on drought 
management (2000/60/EC), as well as other initiatives on climate change, environment, land use policy, 
health, nuclear safety, consular pr otection (incl. Guidelines on cons ular protection of EU citizens in 
 
EN 26   EN operations) without improved coordination will prove insu fficient to prevent the 
consequences of future disasters given the growing complexity of emergencies in our 
networked societies.65 What is missing is a general EU risk management framework 
where the different elements can be brough t together to bette r link the prevention 
actions with those of pr eparedness and response. 
72. Furthermore, the sharing of  experience is under-develope d in Europe. Most PS are 
developing their own methods, processes and knowledge bases for assessment and 
management of the risks they are exposed  to. The lack of minimum comparability 
between the national disaster risk mana gement systems hinders cross-border 
cooperation and the sharing of experience.  There is a unanimous agreement among 
stakeholders that EU action would be the mo st efficient way to address this problem 
and avoid duplication of work. During stak eholder consultations for this impact 
assessment, as well as in a number of Counc il conclusions, PS have repeatedly called 
for a more systematic and structured approach to sharing knowledge and best 
practices across national borders, an view th at is shared in Parliament reports. One 
example to illustrate the importance of pooling and sharing of experience and resources is the now possible use of satellite t echnology to provide European citizens 
with an optimum of protection at affordab le costs, which would otherwise not be 
possible. Satellite technologies have helped  save lives in the immediate aftermath of 
disasters, but are also used as predictiv e tools both for immediate preparedness and 
for longer term prevention issues. 
73. Prevention generally constitutes a good invest ment when comparing to the cost of 
response to disasters.
66 However, the costs for prevention measures are immediate 
while the benefits lie in the future and ar e spread out over time. There is a general 
lack of awareness among the populati on and decision-makers on the possible 
devastating effects of disaster s. Therefore, it is important to foster the awareness of 
stakeholders and to raise the political will  and vision to engage in strategic longer-
term investments. Some PS explicitly re fer to insufficient human and financial 
resources as a barrier for introduc ing proper preventive measures.67 The lack of 
coordination between national authorities and the unclear definition of responsibilities also impede necessary investments in prevention. The current 
Mechanism decision lacks any reference to  prevention objectives, and thus cannot 
contribute to implement a closer link be tween prevention and response. There are 
currently a number of efforts ongoing at the EU level to better integrate prevention 
consideration in all spending programmes, such as the Structural Funds. However, the current Mechanism itself cannot be used as  an instrument to reinforce prevention 
policies. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
third countries – Council documents 10109/2/06 and 15613/10 (not published), etc. Further descriptions 
available in Annex I. 
65 The impact assessment for the Floods directive conc luded that the real added value of flood prevention 
is the integrated preventive approach, recognizing th at local flood protection measures alone can have 
negative effects further downstream. It  is therefore important to address the risk in an integrated manner 
and across administrative and geographical boundaries by integrated flood risk management plans. 
66 Literature gives strong indications that investments in prevention pay off; estimates quotes between 1:4 
and 1:7 when comparing prevention costs and savings due to preventive efforts. Natural Hazards, 
UnNatural Disasters, The Economics of Effectiv e Prevention, the World Bank and the UN, 2010. 
67 See external consultant's study, Annex C, section 2. 
 
EN 27   EN Examples of prevention benefits68: Investment in various types of early warning 
systems can help save lives, protect propert y and the environment, and even more so 
if integrated with relevant preventive risk assessment and preventive planning 
measures. Global studies have shown that benefits of weather-related information 
and forecasts can be ten times as high as costs.69 
Mortality in the United States has declined  significantly over the years because its 
early warning systems for recurring hazards such as lightning, floods, storms, and 
heat waves have continually improved: mort ality fell by 45 per cent and injuries by 
40 per cent in 15,000 tornadoes from 1986 to 1999.70 
Heat health warning systems have been part icularly effective in reducing mortality. 
In France, after the 2003 heat wave th at killed 15,000 corresponding to a 60 per cent 
increase in expected mortality in France,  the French Institute for Public Health 
Surveillance elaborated a heat health watch warning system based on bio-
meteorological indicators as well as a Nati onal Heat Wave Plan (NHWP). This was 
tested during the July 2006 heat wave, and despite the 2,000 extra deaths observed, 
an evaluation showed that approx. 4,000 pr emature deaths were avoided during the 
2006 event, most of which were probably due  to public awarene ss and the NWPH. In 
operation from 1 June to 31 August, the Fren ch preventive warning system aims at 
modifying the behaviour of people, health institutions and health authorities 
concerning high summer temperatures a nd provides special communication and 
assistance to people at risk71. Efficient and timely services from climate and 
meteorological services to hea lth authorities can thus to a large degree prevent heat 
waves from causing premature deaths.72 
In 2007, the Department of Health and th e Cabinet Office in the UK developed a 
national framework for responding to H1N1  pandemic flu. This framework included 
prevention, preparedness and response m easures, such as national pandemic flu 
services, sleeping contracts with vaccine ma nufacturers, stockpiles of antivirals, as 
well as clear policies on how to behave during the pandemic. The national planning 
framework was informed by a number of exercises involving more than 5,000 people 
from government, industry, and third sector, in response to what was ranked as one 
of the top risks facing the UK in its Na tional Risk Register . The framework was 
developed based on the assumption that it would not be possible to prevent the 
pandemic, but focused on what could be done  to slow down its sp read and to prevent 
(delay) its arrival, and what would be e fficient in this respect, recognising that 
efficient preparedness and response to a gl obal health emergency depend on the level 
of prevention planning. A later review of the UK pandemic prevention planning73 
concluded with respect to the economic review of the business case (value for 
                                                 
68 Examples from the External study, See Annex C. 
69 Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters, th e Economics of Effective Prevention, 2010. 
70 David Rogers and Valdimir Tsirkunov, Cost and Benef its of Early Warning Syst ems, 2010, Global Assessment 
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 (ISDR; The Wo rld Bank), referring to Teisberg and Weiher, 2009 .  
71 Fouillet Anne, G.Rey, E.Jougla, D. Hé mon, 2006b: Estimation de la surmortalité observée et attendue au cours de 
la vague de chaleur du mois de juillet 2006, Rapport remis à l’Institut de Veille Sanitaire, 6 Décembre 2006.   
72 David P. Rogers, Melvyn A. Shapiro et al., Health and Climate - opportunities, Procedia  Environmental Sciences 1 
(2010) 37-54.   
73 Dame Deirdre Hine, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic, July 2010, which also presents further breakdown 
of costs. 
 
EN 28   EN money) that the benefits substantially out weighed the costs, the pandemic flue pre-
planning and preparedness pr ogramme offered significant value for money. Based on 
the impact of the -in the end less severe- fl u, the benefits turned out to be smaller 
than in the expected severe outbreak, howev er still the 'value for money case' for 
maintaining substantial preparedness progr amme remained sound. The total costs of 
preparedness and response was estimated to be GBP 1242.13. The level of details in 
the framework pre-planning meant that all ke y issues were already outlined with 'to-
do-lists' for all involved, which became th e key to organising a rapid response and 
reduced pressure on the central decision-making process. 
74. The link between prevention, preparedness, an d response is crucial. In a Union of 
solidarity that fosters mutual assistance in times of crises, it is self-evident that each PS makes the requisite efforts to prevent em ergencies or disasters from occurring. As 
stressed repeatedly by stakeholders
74, further progress in the development of CP 
cooperation between PS requires a comm on understanding of minimum good 
practices in disaster prevention and of the challenges ahead. The current Mechanism 
Decision has not established a clear li nk between prevention, preparedness and 
response in line with the wording of Ar ticle 196 TFEU and by the above-mentioned 
Commission Communications and Council Conclusions. 
75. Under the current CPFI provisions, the deve lopment and implementation of disaster 
risk management plans at national or lowe r levels cannot be co-financed through the 
CPFI, as CPFI co-financing on prevention is limited to studies, surveys, modelling and scenario building, demonstration proj ects and public awar eness activities.  
76. Considering the above, and as clearly expressed by all stakeholder comments, further 
advances in cooperation on CP respons e are only possible in line with the 
development and integration of a more coherent EU prevention policy framework. 
3.4. Baseline 
77. The baseline implies that no changes to the Mechanism Decision would be made and 
that the CPFI would be re newed in its current form. 
78. Generally speaking, not adequately addres sing the challenges and problems outlined 
above while bearing in mind the rising tre nds in disasters an d limited public budgets, 
will result in: 1) widening gap between the needs of disaster-stricken populations and the provided assistance, 2) losing the economic  benefits of European cooperation and 
pooling, and 3) leaving unexploited the potential to avert the most severe 
consequences of disasters through re inforced prevention and preparedness 
cooperation. For the different areas, the fo llowing developments would constitute the 
baseline against which the different policy options will be compared. 
79. In response
 operations, the Mechanism would continue its work coordinating PS' 
assistance offered via the MIC, offer m onitoring, information and early warning 
services, maintain a databa se of CP modules, develop guidelines on certain response 
issues, such as host-nation support or modul e requirements, and pr ovide co-financing 
for certain transportation needs. However,  the number, intensity and complexity of 
                                                 
74 See Annex E – stakeholder consultation meetings reports 
 
EN 29   EN disasters will increase and the expected i nvestments in additional assets will remain 
limited. In these circumstances, PS woul d make fewer assets available for 
deployment via the Mechanism because th ey would be needed domestically. The 
Mechanism would more frequently fail to ensu re an effective, efficient and coherent 
EU response to disasters. C onsequently, the level of prot ection of European citizens 
would generally fall. The gap between the n eeds and the assistance actually provided 
would gradually widen. This would in par ticular be the case in case of a mega 
disaster hitting Europe. 
80. As regards the transportation  of assistance, a few measures can be implemented 
without legislative changes, such as the use of framew ork partnership agreements 
with PS,75 which may reduce the costs compared to processing individual transport 
grant requests. Other simple measures may include fast-track gr ant procedures and 
partnerships for cost-free transport by private companies. These measures may reduce to a limited degree the administrati ve costs for PS and the Commission, but 
would not significantly improve the availab ility of transport. As a result, the 
deployment of European assistance w ould not be signifi cantly improved. 
Consequently, transport-relate d problems are expected to be more pronounced in the 
future considering the rising disaster tr ends and the possible large disasters. 
81. EU preparedness
 actions would continue to further develop, but the convergence of 
national preparedness programmes to the poi nt that they woul d allow for smooth 
cooperation, cost-savings and effective shari ng of experience is a very slow process 
with no defined objective or benchmarks . Without setting of clear objectives, 
broadening the scope of pr eparedness actions and providi ng additional finance via 
the CPFI, EU preparedness actions will not be able to accommodate for the future 
needs. Some PS stakeholders expressed the view that individual  Member States will 
not be able to lift their preparedness sufficiently in relation to overwhelming and cross-border events at a national le vel without assistance from the EU.
76 In particular 
the training, exchange of experience, and policy on receiving assistance, on 
prevention and other future needs could not be pursued with the requisite financial 
push from the EU-level, which will leave so me short-term risks (in particular of 
large-scale overwhelming disasters) largely unmanaged.  
82. Considering the limited progress achieve d so far in further developing the 
cooperation of a training network across Europe beyond the mere co-financing of 
MS training, exercises, and exchange of experts actions, the Council Conclusions of 
16 June 2008 remain valid: ´The Counc il of the European Union urges the 
Commission to assess a wide  range of options for esta blishing and coordinating a 
sustainable European Disaster Management  Training Network, covering all phases of 
disaster management, and to present pr oposals for such a network as soon as 
possible´ (item 15). Further, the Council De cisions also welcomed the integrated 
approach to disaster prevention put forwar d by the Commission that covers the full 
disaster cycle. 
                                                 
75 Under Article 6.3 of the Commission Decision 2007/606/EC, Euratom, the Commission may conclude 
framework partnership agreements as defined in Ar ticle 163 of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 2342/2002 with the relevant competent authorities of PS. This provision has not been used yet.  
76 Study by the external consultant in Annex C. 
 
EN 30   EN 83. Prevention : The current Mechanism Decision ma kes no reference to prevention 
actions, while the CPFI has financed a number of EU actions in this area.77 Current 
prevention actions at EU level mainly a ddress four areas of  voluntary cooperation 
and there is a minimal amount of availa ble financing and re sources available: 
(1) actions to improve the knowledge base, (2 ) strengthening of national and EU risk 
assessment and mapping capacities, (3) providing good practi ce examples and 
minimum prevention standards, and (4) comb ining all of these elements in a risk 
management policy.78  
84. Assuming that no further action is taken at th e EU level, the trend towards partial and 
uneven systems of national risk assessmen t and risk management procedures are 
likely to continue. Guidelines will be i ssued on developing nati onal disaster risk 
management plans to help Member States in  their efforts to draw together sectoral 
policies. However their use is not linked to any legal objective in the EU CP 
cooperation. Even though a few advan ced Member States have developed 
methodologies for risk assessment procedures at either horizontal or sectoral levels, 
the other Member States have no such syst ems or are developing these only at a very 
slow pace due to lack of political priority and resources.79 As there are no systematic 
and comparable prevention approaches across borders, cooperation benefits in 
prevention are left under-utilised, which ne gatively affects the cooperation in the 
areas of preparedness and response. The sharing of experiences between Member 
States would develop in an uneven manne r, slowing down overall progress, in 
particular where several countries  are sharing the same risks. 
85. Assuming that the policy framework is not  developed further, the opportunities for 
better linking prevention and preparedness and response will not be fully explored. 
86. An additional dimension to effective and efficient risk management procedures is 
that preventive and mitigating action shoul d reflect expectations of actual damage. 
Presently, there are few examples of cost  benefit analyses at the EU level of 
preventive efforts at Member State or EU level. Adopting a more global perspective, 
the World Bank's recent report concludes, "Prevention is often possible and cost-
effective" , and further "Prevention pays, but you do not always have to pay more for 
prevention. A relatively easy and effective measure is for governments to make 
information about hazards and risks easily  accessible (such as maps of flood 
plains…)". The report also concludes that most  governments do not routinely collect 
or monitor spending on disaster preven tion, and measuring prevention spending 
require much effort and considerable j udgment to identify spending across sectors 
and levels of government and to collect budgeted amounts. Even though cost benefit 
analyses are useful as ex ante guides, and ex post evaluations ensure that lessons are 
                                                 
77 CPFI has co-financed some 20 prevention coop eration projects with more than € 5 million. 
78 In addition to these, there is also limited funding available for awareness actions. Further details of the 
prevention policies are included in Annex L. 
79 The external study estimated that the group of advanced countries include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. The group of medium advanced countries include: 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sp ain whereas the less advanced countr ies are assumed to be Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. 
 
EN 31   EN learned, these are only rarely used.80 Assuming that no further work is done on cost 
benefit analyses in sector risk manage ment systems as well as horizontal risk 
assessment systems, it appears to be difficu lt to persuade policy and decision makers 
to act on the insight that di saster prevention pays off. 
87. Considering all of the above elements, sl ow progress and in particular lack of 
comparability and coherence would likely lead to prevention and preparedness achievements that are insufficient to match the trend of increasing numbers and intensities of disasters and would fall be hind the political will of improving such 
systems. As a result, the overall protection in Europe may even decrease as compared 
to current levels. Indeed, a number of PS stak eholders have alrea dy noted that it may 
be difficult to define appropriate disaster risk prevention measures without an overall 
disaster prevention framework. Other stakeholders have focused more on 
preparedness and response actions due to l ack of resources. Fina lly, as clearly noted 
by a number of key PS stakeholders, absent fu rther progress in th e field of disaster 
prevention, where the biggest achievements can  be made for protecting Europe from 
the consequences of disasters, further adva ncement in EU CP cooperation will not be 
possible. 
3.5. Justification for EU action and subsidiarity 
88. The Union's role in the field of civil protection at  Treaty level is for the first time set 
out in Article 6(f) TFEU, according to which the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support,  coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member 
States, without thereby supe rseding their competence in this area. Article 196 TFEU 
provides the specific legal basis which sets the scope  and arrangement for the 
exercise of the Union's powers in the ci vil protection policy. Accordingly, the Union 
shall inter alia  support and complement Member St ates' action at national, regional 
and local level in preventing, preparing fo r and responding to natural or man-made 
disasters within the Union and promote cons istency in international civil-protection 
work. Harmonization of Member States' laws and regulations is explicitly excluded.  
89. The subsidiarity principle applies insofar as civil protection does not fall under the 
exclusive competence of the Union. To solve the problems presented in this impact assessment an EU-level action and coordina tion is necessary (necessity test). The 
Mechanism was established because majo r disasters can overwhelm the response 
capacities of any Member State which can no longer cope alone. EU action in this 
field involves managing situations with  a strong trans-/multinational component, 
which necessarily require an overall c oordination and con certed action beyond the 
national level. This is particularly releva nt for the overall pre-planned EU response 
and the voluntary pool of assets. Likewise, su fficient level of preparedness for cross-
border and large-scale disasters cannot be achieved only at Member  State level. In 
addition, the joint work on prevention and risk management has been carried out in recognition of the fact that significant progress in the coope ration between the 
Member States needs to rely on reinforced coherence and coordination at EU level.  
                                                
 
80 Natural Hazards, UnNatural disaster s - The Economics of Effective Pr evention, The International bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank, 2010. 
 
EN 32   EN 90. Taking into account the benef its in terms of reducing the loss of human life, 
environmental, economic and material damage, the proposed action would bring 
clear EU added value. It would allow Member  States to contribute more effectively 
to the EU assistance under the Mechan ism and to benefit from improved 
coordination and cooperation which links prevention, preparedness and response. 
Simultaneously, it would provide Member St ates with the reassurance of a more 
effective, efficient, coherent and visible assistance in times of need, an increased level of preparedness and a more cohere nt disaster risk management policy.  
91. The proposed amendments would allow Me mber States to pursue economies of 
scale, such as cost-effective logistics and transport, coherent and effective response 
through the voluntary pool of a ssets and better use of scar ce resources by sharing the 
EU-funded assets. The work on prevention and risk management would generate also 
economies of preventive action instead of  post factum response to disasters. 
4. O
BJECTIVES  
4.1. General objectives 
92. The general objective of the re view of the CP legislative framework is to improve the 
arrangements for EU CP cooperation enabli ng it to face future challenges. To 
encourage cooperation between MS in order to improve the effectiveness of systems 
for preventing and protecting against natura l or man-made disasters, ensure an 
adequate level of prevention, preparedness and response to disasters, and promote 
swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union be tween national civil-
protection services (Article 196 TFUE), EU CP should: 
(1) Provide more effective and efficient means of response cooperation through 
pre-planning and enhanced av ailability of assistance; 
(2) Address critical gaps in response capacity; 
(3) Improve the response to major emergenc ies through better tr ansport solutions; 
(4) Support and complement PS actions at na tional, regional, and local level by 
preparedness actions taken in advance; 
(5) Support and complement PS actions at na tional, regional, and local level by 
setting a more coherent pr evention policy framework; 
while taking into account the recent experi ence in disaster risk management and in 
line with the new legal basis under Articl e 196 TFEU and the political commitments 
of the European Parliament and the Council. 
 
EN 33   EN 4.2. Specific objectives 
93. The specific and operational objectives a nd options and their impacts will be 
discussed below individually for each of th e elements related to response, transport, 
preparedness, and prevention.81  
94. As will be specifically assessed in the impacts sections for each option, more 
effective and integrated EU support fo r disaster management including risk 
management planning will always have a positive impact on society  and provide 
positive environmental  impacts including contributing to adaptation to climate 
change .82 
95. The following table shows how the problems are linked with the specific objectives 
in the areas of response, transp ort, preparedness, and prevention. 
Problems General objectives Specific objectives 
Reactive and ad hoc  mandate of the 
Mechanism limits the effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence of the 
European disaster response Response 
(1) More effective and 
efficient response 
through planning and 
enhanced availability of 
assistance Shift from a reactive and ad hoc  
coordination to a pre-planned, pre-
arranged and predictable system  
Certain needs cannot be met due to 
unavailability of assets (capacity gaps) (2) Address critical 
gaps in response 
capacity Identify and fill critical gaps in disaster 
response capacity in a cost-effective way  
Limited financial and logistical 
transport solutions slow down or hinder optimal response Enhanced financial and logistical 
transport support. 
(A) Reduce bottlenecks posed by limited 
logistical and financial transport resources. 
Burdensome EU transport administrative procedures Transport 
(3) Improve the 
response to major 
emergencies through 
better transport 
solutions (B) Simplify the transport provisions and 
streamline administrative procedures  
(1) Lack of consistency among 
national training programmes hinders the sharing of experience. 
(2) Limited scope of EU 
preparedness actions and limited link with national programmes lead 
to lower preparedness levels. 
(3) Uncertain preparedness for 
major emergencies leaves risks unmanaged.  Preparedness 
(4) Support and 
complement PS actions 
preparedness actions 
with a more coherent 
EU preparedness policy 
framework (1) Better link national preparedness 
systems by creating more consistency. 
(2) Enlarge the scope of current EU 
preparedness actions and link them better with national programmes. 
(3) Define preparedness considerations 
explicitly as one objective of the EUCP cooperation and provide sufficient 
funding.  
(1) Lack of coordination between 
sector-specific prevention policies. 
(2) Under-developed organisation 
for the sharing of experience. 
(3) Insufficient link between Prevention 
(5) Support and 
complement PS 
disaster risk 
management actions by (1) Foster the advancement of national 
disaster risk management planning. 
(2) Improve the sharing of experience by 
promoting a common understanding of disaster risk management practices and 
                                                 
81 Social and economic impacts covering  all the elements discussed in this report, as well as those on the 
fundamental rights, are discussed in a dedicated Chapter 9. 
82 EU disaster prevention policies wo rk in close cooperation with th e EU policies on climate change 
adaptation. 
 
EN 34   EN prevention with preparedness and 
response. 
(4) Limited awareness, vision and 
strategic investments. a more coherent EU 
prevention policy 
framework provide funding for catching up to a high 
level of protection. 
(3) Integrate disaster prevention policies 
into the EU CP cooperation. 
(4) Strengthen the means in the EU for 
continuous support to prevention awareness raising.  
 
5. BETTER RESPONSE THROUGH PLANNING AND PREDICTABILITY  
96. The overall objective stat ed in the 2010 Disaster  Response Communication83 is to 
improve the effectiveness (rapidity of depl oyment and appropriateness of action), the 
efficiency (cost-effectiveness), coherence (among the various CP assets, as well as 
with other actors, primarily with humanitari an aid) and visibility of EU response to 
disasters. It shall be noted that some ac tions proposed in the Communication, such as 
increasing the visibility of  EU response through e.g. pres enting aggregate figures or 
wearing double badges (PS’ and EU), are important and readily achievable, but 
would not have sizeable economic, social and environmental impacts that would 
justify their analysis in this report. The same applies for an obligation of PS to 
inform the ERC/other PS of all assistance they send to di saster-stricken countries, or 
the clarification of procedures for the us e of the Mechanism in support of consular 
operations, which also has some positive impacts for the EU citizens but do not have to be elaborated here.
84 
5.1. Specific objective: Shifting from a reactive and  ad hoc coordination to a pre-
planned, pre-arranged and predictable system 
97. The 2010 Communication calls for a shift of the EU’s disaster response from the 
current ad hoc coordination towards a system that  is pre-planned, pre-arranged and 
predictable. This shift w ould require a complex of measures related to advance 
planning of operations, underpi nned by a predictable and ensu red availability of key 
response assets. This includes developing reference scenarios, mapping PS' assets 
that could be used in these scenarios,  and drawing contingency plans for their 
deployment. To increase the availabilit y, it also includes developing a European 
Emergency Response Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool of pre-committed PS' 
assets on standby for European oper ations, as well as creating the Emergency 
Response Centre , reinforcing and streamlining arra ngements for the transportation of 
European assistance to disa ster areas, looking into ar eas where EU-funded assets 
might usefully fill response capacity gaps, as well as other measures. Ultimately, this should ensure a higher level of protection for disaster-victims. 
                                                
 
83 COM(2010) 600 final. 
84 On consular support, see impact assessment currently being developed by DG JUST in parallel to this 
report. In particular it covers (a) the possibility of triggering the Mechanism for consular support by the Lead State (possibly in consultation with the Presiden cy), (b) including consular experts in the EU CP 
assessment/coordination teams, and (c) including consular issues in the Mechanism training 
programme. 
 
EN 35   EN 98. The idea of more planning, pre-arrangements and predictability is strongly supported 
by all stakeholders, including PS, European Parliament and the UN.85  
5.2. Policy options for better planning and availability of assets 
99. The impact assessment preceding the Co mmunication already looked into a wide 
spectrum of options to achieve the stated ob jective. These ranged from the 'no-action' 
and even discontinuing the Mechanism altogether on the one hand, which were 
discarded as not capable of delivering on th e stated objectives, to a full-fledged EU 
CP Force (as advocated by 2006 Barnier repo rt ‘for a European Civil Protection 
Force: Europe Aid’) on the other hand, wh ich was eliminated due  to subsidiarity/ 
proportionality considerations, as well as  prohibitive costs for the EU budget. This 
has left two realistic options, namely the strengthening of European disaster response 
through (1) the EU-level assets (a 'top- down' approach), which would have the 
advantage of effectiveness, and (2) a voluntary pool of committed PS' assets, which could bring about the advantage of cost -effectiveness and follows a 'bottom-up' 
approach favoured by the stakeholders. Having considered pros and cons of these options in detail, the impact assessment concluded in favour of the latter, while 
acknowledging the benefits of the former in some cases. The Commission in its 2010 
Communication therefore proposed strengthenin g the EU's disaster response capacity 
primarily through the development of a voluntary pool of pre-committed PS' assets, which is most in line with the voluntary spirit of the Mechanism as it is today. 
Therefore, options related to the better plan ning and availability of assets analysed in 
this impact assessment centre around  the voluntary pool of assets. 
100. While assets committed by PS to the pool w ould remain under nati onal direction and 
control, there would be an expectation that  these assets would be made available for 
EU operations, unless the concerned State has a compelling reason to refuse their 
deployment (for instance due to domestic  emergencies). Notably, these capacities 
would not sit idle in-between the EU ope rations, as PS would continue using them 
for national purposes. It is envisaged that the deployment of these on-call assets from 
the pool would form the nucleus of any EU CP operation, which would be further 
complemented by additional ad hoc  offers provided in the same way in which the EU 
CP assistance is organised today.  
101. The system would require a hub at European level that can plan (before emergencies) 
and organise (during emergencies) the overa ll EU response in the most efficient way. 
Once a request for assistance is received, this hub will quickly determine the core 
components of the European response (e.g. 2 SAR teams, 1 advanced medical post, 1 
water purification team and 1 TAST) and la unch a call to the relevant pool members 
to mobilise these specific modules within  a certain deadline. The concerned PS will 
take the go/no go decision and inform the hub of their availability. Where more 
assets are available than necessary, the hub will make a selection based on different 
criteria, including cost-efficiency, capacity, transport possibiliti es and logistical 
constraints. The ERC could meaningfully pl ay the role of a central hub in close 
partnership with PS, since such a role for the MIC has been already successfully 
                                                
 
85 It is recognised that the UN/OCHA (Office for Co ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is the central 
leading role for emergencies in the third countries. See e.g. European Consensu s on Humanitarian Aid. 
 
EN 36   EN tested thought pilot actions.86 To fulfil this role, the ERC will need to work in close 
partnership with PS. In this respect, the ERC could be reinforced by representatives 
of CP authorities of PS that contribute to  the pool. These and other elements on the 
functioning of the pool would be de tailed in implementing rules. 
102. The creation of a voluntary pool of PS' assets on standby for EU operations would 
significantly facilitate the planning of operations and add an element of predictability, as it would ensure that some key asse ts can be relied upon when 
needed. This is of crucial importance, as  the knowledge of which assets will be 
available in crisis is key for a meaningf ul contingency-planning. It will also allow 
ensuring an adequate EU response in all emergencie s, as well as maximising 
synergies among the various deployed assets. It can be foreseen that intervention 
modules comprising the pool would need  to comply with minimum quality 
requirements and respect the applicable international and EU guidelines, thus 
resulting in enhanced quality  levels of the overall EU response. In the end, this 
would deliver a more robust EU response capacity. 
103. It should be noted however that only a fu lly functioning and complete pool will lead 
to a well planned, quick and effective response  to disasters. It is uncertain whether 
PS will be prepared to provide a sufficient number of assets without financial 
compensation for the use of their assets for EU operations.  
104. With this in mind, policy options have b een devised along the sc ope and degree of 
EU incentives that can be provided to PS for committing assets to the voluntary pool 
(VP):  
(1) VP Option 1: Voluntary pool without EU co-financing;  
(2) VP Option 2: Voluntary pool with a limited EU co-financing (covering only 
deployment costs); and  
(3) VP Option 3: Voluntary pool  with a higher degree of EU co-financing (some 
development (including equipment) and st andby costs, as well as deployment  
105. The underlying rationale behind th is classification is that di fferent types of cost may 
require a different approach: when the EU ca lls for the deployment of certain assets 
from the pool and the relevant PS is mobilis ing the asset as part of an EU operation 
and to the benefit of the EU as a whole, it  is appropriate to cover the full deployment 
costs from the EU budget. Since the assets  are developed, used and kept on standby 
for both national and EU operations, any EU  co-financing of the development and 
standby costs should in principle be limited to the portion of these costs that corresponds to their use for European operations.  
5.3. Analysis of impacts of op tions for a voluntary pool 
106. Impacts of the options are drawn and the options are compared to the baseline (no 
change of policy option) on the basis of multi-criteria analysis in terms of 
                                                
 
86 This includes ca. 20 projects under the preparatory action on an EU's Rapid Re sponse Capability (calls 
issued in 2008-2010; some projects continue until mid-2012), as well as pilot project on EU Forest Fire-
fighting Tactical Reserve (FFTR) implemented in 2008-2009. 
 
EN 37   EN effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective, efficiency 
– the extent to which the objective can be achieved at least cost (cost-effectiveness), 
and coherence – the extent to which options would ensure a coherent  EU response to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies. 
107. As outlined in the impact assessment re port preceding the 2010 Disaster Response 
Communication, the pool woul d help reducing situati ons of non-deployment or 
delayed deployment of assistance, thus provi ding benefits in term s of effectiveness 
(delivering appropriate, timely and quali ty response) and cost-efficiency of 
assistance provided. It will also produce economic gains deriving from pooling and sharing logistics and transport, which are easier to achieve in a pre-planned and pre-
arranged system. Furthermore, the voluntar y pool will deliver important synergetic 
effects by ensuring the availa bility of complementary re sponse assets that support 
and mutually reinforce the effectiveness of ot her assets, as well as that of the EU and 
international humanitarian and, as well as mo re coherence in Eur opean assistance in 
general. 
108. In terms of costs for PS, the pool would be composed of assets that already exist in 
PS and would therefore not have signifi cant impacts on capital investment. The 
increased use of these assets may result in increased wear and tear. However, this 
would need to be offset against the benef it of the increased visi bility and additional 
'training' opportunities associated with more  frequent deployments in live-emergency 
situations. As to the administrative burden  related to setting up the pool, it should be 
noted that most of PS' assets that are li kely to be committed are already registered 
(though without any commitment) in the CECIS
87 database: the administrative effort 
involved in this registration has proven not  to be prohibitive. Since assets committed 
to the pool are already on standby for nati onal purposes, the cost  of extending this 
function to a broader European service wi ll in most cases be limited to some 
additional training of personnel and will ther efore not be excessive. Finally, since the 
commitment of assets to the pool is vol untary, there would be no obligation for 
'unwilling' PS to carry out any action or bear any of corresponding costs. 
109. On the EU institutions' side, there would be some costs associated to the additional 
tasks of the ERC as the central hub for th e pool (including de veloping scenarios, 
mapping assets and contingency planning, which in itself will require a joint effort of 
the Commission and PS). The most significant  cost element related to the operations 
from the pool will be the deployment/transport costs, especially in cases of emergencies in far-away third countries. 
110. All of the described options are fully coherent with overarching EU objectives, 
strategies and priori ties. Depending on the option chos en, the pool would also have 
effects on equity and implications for the EU budget (mostly in terms of shifts of 
budgetary burden from PS to the EU level rath er than an increase in absolute  terms). 
The impacts of the options will differ from the baseline in the following way: 
                                                
 
87 The Common Emergency Information and Communication System. 
 
EN 38   EN 5.3.1.  Impacts of VP-Option 1: Voluntar y pool without EU co-financing  
111. This option could be implemented without le gislative changes or cold only introduce 
only essential elements and principles, a nd would not bring about any burden on the 
EU budget, except for some marginal costs for running the system (e.g. training of 
staff and updating communications software).  
112. However it is unlikely that a purely political commitment without financial 
incentives from the EU can ensure the availabi lity of a sufficient number of assets of 
various types in a sustainable way. It is unlikely that PS would commit substantial 
assets to an unknown future, where they woul d need to be ready to cover costs that 
may be significant. The option is therefor e not fully effective and sustainable. 
113. It should also be noted that VP Option 1 mi ght have a negative impact on equity, in 
the sense that it would imply that PS co mmitting assets to the pool would bear a 
higher fraction of the costs of the overall European response than other PS. This can 
also result in PS not committing assets to the pool becoming less active in the EU 
response and hence also less visible 'free-riders'. 
5.3.2.  Impacts of VP-Option 2: Voluntary pool w ith limited EU co-financing (covering 
deployment costs but not d evelopment or standby costs) 
114. Providing EU co-financing for deploymen t/transport costs will enhance the 
effectiveness of the pool. Compensating the costs of deployments will substantially 
reduce the financial constraints on PS, making it more feasible to contribute assets to 
the pool. In order to provide a genuine in centive, the co-financing rates should be 
higher than those available unde r the present provisions (cu rrently up to 50% of total 
transportation costs). Such a system would introduce a shift in burden-sharing where 
– compared with today – a higher fr action of costs of providing European 
coordinated assistance is shared through the EU budget rather than that of PS. 
Covering the deployment costs from the EU  budget has the additional advantage of 
making the overall EU response more cohere nt and needs-based, as it allows the 
MIC to steer MS' response to those types of assets that are cons idered most urgent, 
avoid duplication and encourage comple mentarity. Finally, if funding for the 
deployment is available from the EU budget, MS will be able to decide very quickly 
on deployment, which will result in a more rapid delivery of life-saving equipment, 
enhanced predictability of the assist ance and overall efficiency gains.  
115. It is very difficult to estimate the annual co sts associated with deployments/transport, 
as variations from one year to another can  be very significant. Transport costs can 
vary hugely depending on the distance, timing (prices for transport tend to rise in the 
wake of major emergencies) and other factors. The best estimate made by the 
consultant is that the budgeta ry shift from PS to the EU (rather than overall increase) 
for having the voluntary pool up and running  in line with this option (on the 
assumption of 100% EU funding of deploym ent/transportation costs) would amount 
to around €6 million/year.88  
                                                 
88 See external consultant's study Annex C, section 4.3. 
 
EN 39   EN 116. VP-Option 2 would effectively achieve the st ated objective. It would also be cost-
effective, especially if co mpared to achieving the objec tive through EU-level (owned 
or leased) assets, the costs of  which would be prohibitive.89 
5.3.3.  Impacts of VP-Option 3: Voluntary pool  with higher EU co-financing (full 
deployment costs plus some development and standby costs) 
117. The same arrangement as described under VP Option 2 but with partial 
compensation of some development (incl uding equipment) and standby costs will 
have comparable economic impacts. To the extent that these assets are also being used for EU operations, it may be appropriate to also cover a corresponding part of the development and standby costs, includi ng notably additional investments needed 
to ensure the full interopera bility with other modules. Th is would further enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the pool, as  it would more quickly result in a fully 
functional pool with all the necessary types of respons e assets in sufficient numbers. 
The EU co-financing of costs other than thos e related to deployment, especially those 
related to standby costs, w ould further add to the 'European' dimension of the pool 
and is likely to result in a stronger commitment from PS to make these assets available for EU operations. The consultant considered that some compensation 
arrangements for costs not related to de ployments/transport could be especially 
useful in cases where capital costs are high compared to deployment costs, such as in 
the case of aerial forest fi re-fighting or CBRN teams.
90  
118. It is estimated that VP-Option 3 would re quire the budgetary shift from PS to EU of 
around €9 million/year, of which around €1.6 million would cover the development/ equipment costs and €1.4 million standby (based on assumption that 25% of development, 25% of standby and full depl oyment costs are covered). This higher 
budgetary shift appears to be  reasonable compared to additional benefits gained. 
5.4. Comparison of options 
119. The impacts of options vis-à-vis  the baseline are summarised below:  
 
VP Option 1  VP Option 2  VP Option 3  
Effectiveness  0 ++ ++ 
Efficiency  + + ++ 
Coherence  + ++ ++ 
Social impacts + ++ ++ 
Environmental impacts + ++ ++ 
Ranking of options  3 2 1 
 (++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 
                                                 
89 Report ‘Assessing costs and benefits of various options related to the development of EU Disaster 
Response Capacity’ by GHK Consulting & Crown Agents  on behalf of EPEC, 2010 (not published).  
90 This model should entail safeguards against the risk of distorting the balancing act performed by PS 
when deciding whether or not to invest in particular  assets, e.g. by careful examination of candidates for 
such funding, minimum quality standards and not excessive co-financing rate. 
 
EN 40   EN 120. All the options are comparable in terms of  coherence, but only VP Option 2 and VP 
Option 3 can however effectively achieve obj ectives sought. VP Op tion 3 is superior 
in terms of efficiency and is therefore ranked above the others. 
6. ADDRESSING CAPACITY GAPS  
6.1. Specific objective: Identifying and fillin g critical gaps in response capacity 
121. The primary responsibility for disaster prep aredness and response lies with PS. It has 
to be recognised that PS are at different levels of devel opment of their CP structures 
and capacities. An additional effort is requ ired in some cases. These differences are 
best addressed through the Cohesion Polic y instruments, which may be used to a 
certain extent and subject to various cr iteria to address gaps in certain MS’ 
preparedness and response capacities.91 Overlaps between the CPFI and those 
instruments need to be avoided.  
122. The CPFI may have a role to play in addr essing more structural gaps at EU-wide or 
regional level, i.e. cases where the normal mechanisms fail, where the sharing of assets results in economic gains or where th e gaps have a particular relevance to the 
EU cooperation. In their inve stment decisions, PS are (mostly) guided by economic 
considerations, weighting the probability of  certain disaster against the cost of 
developing the appropriate response capacities. A protec tion level of 100 per cent, 
which would imply that capacities are available for all possible disasters, is not realistic for any PS and some gaps are ther efore inevitable. The objective here is to 
devise ways for the EU to support and fac ilitate filling capacity gaps – identified or 
potential – in a cost-efficient way to enha nce the overall level of protection across 
the EU.  
123. The work on gap analysis is closely linke d to the ongoing work on risk assessments, 
scenario development and mapping of PS’ as sets, as well as the development of 
thresholds/determination of what would be  an appropriate EU 's protection level.
92 At 
this stage, therefore, the proposal should fo cus on process rather than concrete gaps.  
124. Furthermore, the consultant's study points to th e fact that in certain cases the cost of 
asset development would be more or le ss the same irrespect ive of whether the 
investment is done at PS or EU level, wh ereas the risk against which the asset in 
question can be used would be much higher for the Union taken collectively.93 In 
addition, central procurement may streng then the EU's nego tiation power on the 
market, resulting in further economic benefits . In such cases in particular burden-
sharing in the form of jointly developed assets and their common use can provide a 
higher level of protection across the EU in  a cost-efficient way, as each PS would not 
need to invest in expensive assets individually.  
                                                 
91 The Commission intends to engage in awareness-raisin g activities in the relevant regions to ensure that 
disaster management needs are taken into account  when setting priorities for the use of possible 
funding. 
92 Examples include Bulgaria 2007, Portugal 2010 and Poland 2010; see also ECORYS study quoted 
above.  
93 See external consultant's report, Annex C, section 4.4.  
 
EN 41   EN 125. In general, three broad categories of assets have been identified where further work 
is needed to determine whether burden shar ing would be appropriate: a) assets to 
deal with low probability/high impact risks  (e.g. specific tec hnical equipment to 
respond to solar flares or volcanic ash cloud-like situat ions; b) assets performing 
horizontal tasks , thus benefiting equally all PS and other actors involved 
(assessment, logistics and coordination, such as TAST); and c) ta ctical reserves of 
specialized high-value assets (such as fire-fighting aircraft, or EM SA network of 
ships to deal with marine pollution). In al l of these cases, there is a strong argument 
for EU action and it is unlikely that th e objective of a higher protection level at 
acceptable cost could be achieved on a pure subsidiary basis. Decisions on burden sharing would need to be taken on a case-by-case basis, building on the ongoing 
work on risk assessment and asset mapping. 
126. In view of PS’ already relatively high prepar edness and ability to assist others, it is 
clear that assets developed through this ga p-filling exercise w ould form only a very 
limited part of all emergency response asse ts available in the EU. This could be 
further limited by emphasising MS' primar y responsibility to prepare for risks 
occurring on their territory and by establishi ng clear criteria for the use of EU funds 
for the development of such common buffers. In addition, the decision on the 
development of such extra capacity, on tope of what MS are expected to do at their level, should be based on a thorough economic analysis fo r each type of asset and 
should be taken in close consultation with  MS, preferably th rough comitology (with 
expert support). 
127. Therefore, the EU should develop a flexible  mechanism that would allow identifying 
gaps, setting priorities and ensuring that th ey are filled in a cost-effective way. The 
essential principles, criteria and procedur e of this mechanism could be usefully 
enshrined in the legislation itself, with de tails to be defined in implementing rules. 
6.2. Policy options for addressing gaps in capacities 
128. Critical capacity gaps can be filled by additional assets developed by PS or through 
EU-level assets. The former alternativ e could involve EU co-funding or not. 
Whichever method is chosen, PS should unde rtake the operational management of 
such newly developed disaster respons e assets – if needed on a delegated 
management basis – as they are the most apt and best equipped for such a role.  
129. The assets developed to fill the gaps would be shared across the EU (or parts of it) 
and would be deployed in a similar way as  those from the voluntary pool. When the 
assets are not required for EU operations, the PS managing the assets could use them domestically. Yet, wherever the EU funding is involved in the development of assets 
addressing the gaps, it would be reasonable to expect that in cases of competing 
national and EU needs their use would be prioritised for the EU operations.  
130. The following options should be considered for filling the critical gaps (CG) in 
European disaster response capacities:  
(1) CG Option 1: filling gaps by PS without EU co-financing;  
(2) CG Option 2: filling gaps by PS w ith some EU co-financing; and 
 
EN 42   EN (3) CG Option 3: filling gaps with EU-level assets. 
6.3. Analysis of impacts 
131. Impacts of the options are drawn and the options are compared to the baseline (no 
change of policy option) on the basis of multi-criteria analysis in accordance with the following criteria: 
• effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective.  
• efficiency – the extent to which the objec tive can be achieved at least cost (cost-
effectiveness).  
• coherence – the extent to which options would ensure a coherent EU response to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies.  
132. The impacts of all the options would be pos itive to the extent that they would all 
contribute to avoiding poten tially huge economic, social  and environmental losses 
due to disasters. It is impossible to quantify these losses and to compare them with costs of limiting them with a degree of precision due to th e inherently unpredictable 
nature of disastrous events. The level of magnitude can however be illustrated by for 
instance the fact that following the deva stating forest fires in 2007, Greece was 
awarded the grant of €89.8 million from th e Solidarity Fund (which represents a 
fraction of losses estimated at  €2.1 billion). In comparison, th e cost of a single aerial 
fire fighting module amounts to roughly €4.5 million/year.  
133. The options involving EU support for the de velopment of additional capacities (CG 
Option 2 and CG Option 3) o ffer a number of advantages over the CG Option 1. EU 
support may have an enabling effect, providi ng the necessary stimulus to engage in 
tasks that would otherwis e be considered too complex (e.g. in the case of 
multinational modules developed by different  MS). It will allow MS to expand the 
level of protection they can ensure by ta king full advantage of economies of scale 
and shifting action from the PS to the EU as a whole when individual action is not 
deemed economically feasible. The EU support will also gua rantee a greater 
availability of the assets to  all PS and result in closer  European cooperation in the 
development and use of the assets. . 
134. It has to be noted that benefits from the filling of gaps with additional assets to a 
large degree are subject to sharing these assets, as it allows optimising their use.
94 
When this is achieved, the identification and filling of gaps will increase the overall level of protection agains t disasters across the EU. 
135. Considering the scope of the exercise lim ited to ‘topping-up’ PS’ assets above the 
‘normal’ preparedness level, the amount requ ired for this purpose can be expected to 
be at the level of magnitude of €5-10 million /year.
95 Depending on the option 
chosen, the costs would fall on PS or the EU  budget, or be shared. The possible EU 
                                                 
94 Idem.  
95 Idem.  Assumption is 80-100% co-financing, i.e. comparable to that applied during the preparatory 
action. 
 
EN 43   EN (co-)funding would mean shifting some co sts from PS to the EU level, thereby 
creating a new model for burden-sharing among PS.  
136. The consultant's study explains that with rega rd to some types of assets investing into 
the development and subsequent EU-wide  sharing of assets can provide important 
economic benefits and savings.96 The latter would however  depend on a number of 
factors, such as the frequency of use of assets in question, their mobility, high or low 
probability of risk, initial capital investme nt costs and sharing mechanism, such as 
for instance of CBRN scientific back-office or other assets for low probability/high 
impact risks. Even where th e EU-wide sharing would not be economically justified, a 
case for a regional  sharing would almost always be present. One example of the 
latter could be the multinational BaltFlood  high capacity pumping module developed 
and successfully tested by three PS in the framework of preparatory action.  
6.3.1.  Impacts of CG Option 1: filling gaps  by PS without EU co-financing 
137. Although the option is virtually  cost-free from the EU budget perspective, as costs 
would be limited mostly to research and th e organisation of meetings and workshops 
aimed at identifying the gaps and setting prio rities, the effectivene ss of this option is 
limited: even when an identified risk would be important for the EU as a whole, it 
could still remain below the threshold prom pting individual PS to  invest, especially 
in cases where the initia l capital costs are high.97 The only multinational module 
registered in CECIS database so far is the BaltFlood  module developed with EU co-
financing. It should be noted however that  EU funding could play an intermediate 
role to demonstrate the benefits from sh aring, after which PS could continue jointly 
developing shared assets w ithout EU financial support. 
138. CG Option 1 would imply that PS investing in the deficit assets would bear the 
whole burden of initial costs, although the availabili ty of asset should benefit all or at 
least a group of PS. Other PS not investing in assets in  question but nevertheless 
benefiting from them might be therefore pe rceived as taking undue advantage of the 
system. 
6.3.2.  Impacts of CG Option 2: filling gaps with EU co-financing 
139. Some EU financing would effectively lead  to addressing ga ps and sharing the 
developed assets across the EU, as compen sating (some) of the related costs would 
reduce financial constraints for PS to i nvest in assets in question. All PS could 
therefore draw on these assets without  making parallel investments. The PS 
developing, maintaining and deploying su ch assets would furthermore receive 
benefits of visibility and prestige, as well as 'training' in real-life situations, which would somewhat compensate for the part of investment it would need to cover. 
140. CG Option 2 would lead to a more equita ble model, as some of the development 
costs would shift from PS to the EU, thus  introducing a (partial) burden-sharing in 
which all PS take part. Thus the relati vely modest incentives could result in 
significant improvements in the overall EU response capacity. 
                                                
 
96 Idem.  
97 Idem.  
 
EN 44   EN 141. Finally, as some PS are likely to benefit from some types of assets more than from 
the others, the proposal should take in to account an overa ll balance among 
competing priorities of various PS and regions . Thus it might be useful to decide on 
priorities as 'packages' rather than on individual basis. Applicable decision-making 
procedure could also be conducive to keep ing this balance (e.g. comitology process 
supported by expert advice should ensure su ch a balanced techni cal/political input). 
6.3.3.  Impacts of CG Option 3: filli ng gaps with EU-level assets 
142. Filling gaps with EU-level assets scores high in effectiveness, as it would allow the 
EU taking decisive action in addressing any identified gaps in a timely manner – 
subject to budget availa bility of course. It also has advantages in terms of cost-
efficiency, as economies of scale can be better pursued.  
143. However, the implications for the EU budget are also more prominent (depending on 
the number and type of gaps to be filled). The lease of one aerial forest fire-fighting module would be at the level of around €4.5 m illion/year, while other types of assets 
can be much less expensive, as for instan ce the service of a small-sized TAST for 
one operation would bring the cost of approximately €67,000.
98 Importantly, 
however, few key stakeholders would support this option due to 
subsidiarity/proportionality considerations , especially if some PS/regions would 
benefit more than others. Therefore, it can  be concluded that CG Option 3 would be 
justified only in very limited cases, such as  for horizontal assets /services benefiting 
all.  
6.4. Comparison of options 
144. The table below gives a comparison of the opti ons with the baseline.. At this stage of 
analysis and given the eminently political choices involved, no clear preferences are 
expressed. Using some EU co-financing (C G Option 2) nevertheless appears to merit 
particular attention, especially for assets  dealing with low probability/high impact 
risks. CG Option 3 would appear justified for horizontal assets benefiting all actors, with smaller budgetary implications (such as TAST). 
 CG Option 1 CG Option 2 CG Option 3 
Effectiveness + ++ ++ 
Efficiency ++ + + 
Coherence + ++ ++ 
Social impacts + ++ ++ 
Environmental impacts + ++ ++ 
 (++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 
                                                 
98 Actual amount from a servic e contract signed under the preparatory action 2009 call. 
 
EN 45   EN 7. TRANSPORT  
7.1. Specific transport objectives  
145. Enhanced financial and logistical transpor t support and more cost-effective transport 
operations: The ultimate goal of the tran sport provisions is to improve the EU 
response to major disasters, by making it more coherent (making sure that all priority 
resources are deployed at the right moment and along with other complementary 
assets), more efficient (by choosing the mo st appropriate and least costly transport 
solution), and more cost-effective (in terms of financial and human resource 
requirements).  
146. The operational transport-related objectiv es include reducing the bottlenecks posed 
by limited logistical and financial transport re sources, in particular for the delivery of 
the most urgent priority n eeds, as well as simplifying the transport provisions and 
streamlining the relevant administrative procedures. 
147. The voluntary pool of committed assets has th e potential to significantly increase the 
availability of CP assets for operations  conducted under the M echanism, but it will 
probably not cover the entire ra nge of the most urgent n eeds (e.g. generators, mobile 
laboratories, tents, medical supplies). Theref ore, these needs will have to be covered 
through additional ad hoc  offers by PS, and it is important to reduce potential 
barriers to the deploymen t of these assets.  
7.2. Policy options  
148. Two different sets of options were identi fied for each of the two objectives stated 
above:  
7.2.1.  Options to reduce bottlenecks posed by lim ited logistical and financial resources  
149. The following options have been devise d to reduce bottlenecks posed by limited 
logistical and financial resources:  
(1) Transport Option A1 : a discontinuation of the sc heme. No more support is 
provided at EU level in  finding and financing tr ansport activities.  
(2) Transport Option A2 (baseline) : no policy change. In addition to the current 
modus operandi, the Commission will also work on improving the current system within the limits of the existing legislative provisions. 
(3) Transport Option A3
: increase the EU transport maximum co-financing for the 
most urgent priority needs. The list of  such needs would be set immediately in 
the wake of emergency based on the reque st for assistance and assessments on 
the ground (by EU CP Teams and humanita rian aid experts, UN reports and the 
like), and in the light of cl ear and transparent criteria defined in the legislation 
(e.g. life-saving character , short supply, and rapid delivery (less than a week 
after the event) , etc.). At the same time, the Commission/ERC will consider 
introducing a cut-off date/time after which offers will no longer be eligible for 
transport funding. 
 
EN 46   EN (4) Transport Option A4 : increase the EU transport maximum co-financing99 
across the board. This option conc erns all transport operations. 
150. Stakeholders have generally expressed s upport for further developing the transport 
support provided under the Mechanism, and th erefore pursuing options A1 or A2 is 
not desired. A more consistent use of private cost-free transport solutions was 
favoured by some PS as an additional tool (it is part of the baseline scenario). 
Stakeholders' opinions on the increase of the co-financing rate were rather split, as 
some PS representatives see this as the right step forward, while others favour 
avoiding additional transport support and ensuring cost-effective CP operations, cautioning against false incentives from overly cheap transport, to the detriment of local/regional procurement. 
7.2.2.  Options for simplifying and stream lining EU transport provisions 
151. The following options have been devised to simplify and streamline EU transport 
provisions:  
(1) Transport Option B1
: no policy change is the baseline scenario. In terms of 
simplification, the only development as compared to the current situation will be the use of framework partnership agreements with PS.  
(2) Transport Option B2
: simplification of the current transport provisions, with 
the aim of reducing the overall burden  on the PS and the Commission. Five 
elements are included in this option:  1) introducing the possibility of a 
coordinating country to request transpor t grants when several PS are involved, 
which would allow one of the States c ontributing to a transport operation to 
apply on behalf of all of the States; 2) further simplification for the financing of 
small value transport grants and services ; 3) paying the enti re EU co-financing 
amount for a transport grant at the end of the transport op erations (it means 
replacing the current syst em of the Commission pre- financing 100% followed 
by a reimbursement by the beneficiary of minimum 50%, and sometimes followed by recovery of undue amounts); 4) increased financing rate up to 
maximum 100% for local transport and othe r logistical operations in the airport 
hubs or in the affected countries to a llow an effective and smooth delivery of 
assistance; 5) more extensive use of  the transport broker and framework 
arrangements with service providers; 6)  affected PS being able to request 
transport support at EU level.
100 The latter proposal (6) under option B2 would 
facilitate the organisation of transport ope rations inside EU. This is relevant for 
cases when an offering PS cannot organise  or pay transport costs. It would 
allow the organisation of door-to-door  deliveries during an emergency 
(organised through the Commission broker).  
152. As part of transport Option B2, other small revisions will also be proposed in order 
to bringing more clarity (e.g. in case of support to consular assistance operations).  
                                                 
99 This option refers exclusively to the delivery of assistance that is not included in the voluntary pool. For 
the pool, a full financing (100%) is being proposed (see chapter 6). 
100 The co-financing rate would be according to the rules in force for any other operation.  
 
EN 47   EN 7.3. Analysis of impacts  
153. Impacts of the options are drawn and the options are compared to the baseline (no 
change of policy option) on the basis of multi-criteria analysis in terms of effectiveness – the extent to which options achieve the specific objective, efficiency 
– the extent to which the objective can be achieved at least cost (cost-effectiveness), 
and coherence – the extent to which options would ensure a coherent  EU response to 
disasters, while maximising possible synergies.  
7.3.1.  Impacts of Transport Options A1-A4 
154. Transport Option A1
: Discontinuing the transport support at EU level would strongly 
undermine the achievement of the CP object ives and of the specific and operational 
transport objectives. It would go agains t the results of the 2010 evaluation and 
against most stakeholders' views, which s upport further development of the transport 
provisions.  
155. Transport Option A2 : The baseline includes relying on private cost-free solutions and 
on PS offering transport to each other, wh ich are both relativ ely neutral from a 
financial impact perspective, as these solu tions could be offered in limited cases. The 
main drawback is the lack of certainty  on whether transport solutions will be 
provided in specific situati ons, in sufficient quantity, a nd under time pressure.  
156. Transport Option A3 : Increasing the maximum EU co-financing rate for a limited 
part of the European response - the most urgent priorities will reduce the barriers 
related to financing transport, and it is e xpected to reduce the decision-making time 
in the PS when offering assistance. It wi ll make the overall response needs-based, 
with a greater focus on priority needs. The financial impact is estimated on the basis 
of the previous operations and considering on average 5 priority deployments per 
disaster, for 10 disasters pe r year, with a value of €50,000 per deployment. Increased 
transport co-financing of up to 85% would l ead to an increase of the transport budget 
with €875,000 yearly. 100% tran sport financing would lead  to an increase of the 
transport budget with €1.25 million yearly. The financial impact of both possibilities 
is considered acceptable for the benefits that would be reached. 
157. Transport Option A4 : The financial impact of Tr ansport Option A4 (increased 
maximum EU co-financing across the board ), judging from the 2010 experience and 
as compared to the 2010 budget, ranges be tween €1.1 million/year increase (for a 
increase up to 85%), and €1.6 million/year (for a increase up to  100%). The main 
risk associated with this option is that  overly cheap transport might lead to non-
essential goods being deployed. This would need to be balanced by stricter needs 
assessments under the Mechanism.  
158. Administrative costs, for the Commission, a ssociated with Transport Options A3 and 
A4 would presumably be negatively affect ed, due to the potential increase of the 
number of grants and services, but in view  of the use of the framework partnership 
agreements these costs should be limite d. The administrative burden on external 
partners is likely to remain the same fo r these two options. The introduction of the 
concept of the "most urgent priority needs" leads to a need for clarifying it within an implementing act, thus having a limited impact from a simplification perspective.  
 
EN 48   EN 7.3.2.  Impacts of Transport Options B1-B2 
159. Transport Option B1  is expected to yield benefits in particular to countries which 
regularly request transport co-financing, as  it simplifies the settling of accounts. For 
countries which only rarely offer assets, how ever, the effort to conclude a framework 
contract with the Commission may be less obvious compared to the present practice 
of individual requests. Transport Option B1  is not considered sufficient to yield 
significant improvements of the system. The budgetary impact is considered small. 
160. Transport Option B2 : The elements proposed under th e simplification option are all 
expected to contribute to reducing the administrative costs for the Commission and 
the PS. They are coherent with the Comm ission's better regulation objective. They 
will also contribute to achieving a fast er response (through smoother transport 
procedures), and to achieving the overall transport and response specific objectives. 
As the various elements complement each other and have overall limited impacts, 
except for the simplification results, they are proposed as  one single option, instead 
of separate options. Allowing an affected  PS the possibility to request transport 
support is likely to have a low financial impact, taking into account that so far, during the four years of implementation, th ere was only one request  for grant inside 
the Mechanism. It could, however, have im portant positive impacts for an affected 
PS in cases of low probability/high impact cr ises, as the affected state could ask the 
Commission to arrange door-to-door deliver y of the most needed assistance and 
could also benefit of transport co-financing.
101 Stakeholders are generally in favour 
of the simplification process.  
161. The overall financial impact of Trans port Option B2 is estimated at around €300,000 
per year, resulting mainly from the 100% financing proposed for local transport and other logistical operation s in airport hubs or in the affected countries.
102 This is 
considered justified, in view  of the benefits gained.  
7.4. Comparison of options 
162. Concerning the options for reducing the bottlenecks posed  by limited logi stical and 
financial transport resources, on the basis of the impact s assessed above and of the 
analysis below, Transport Options A3 and A4 are the highest ranking options. 
Taking into account the risk  associated with Trans port Options A4, Transport 
Options A3 is preferred. Within Transpor t Options A3, the financial impact of the 
two sub-options (85% and 100% financing ra tes) is comparable, while the maximum 
of advantages can be reached if full fina ncing is provided. Therefore, Transport 
Options A3 with the 100% fina ncing rate is preferred.  
163. The options for simplification are straight-f orward and the choice is easy to make. 
Thus, the simplification Transport Options is the preferred one.  
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 
                                                 
101 When organised through the Commission broker, the Commission is paying 100% of the transport 
operation, while the requesting state is reimbursing at a later stage the co-financing amount. During crisis times, this support can be si gnificant for the af fected state.  
102 Based upon experience, the order-of-magnitude of local costs as compared to other transport costs is 
typically quite small, ranging between €25.000-50.000.  
 
EN 49   EN Effectiveness  - 0 ++ ++ 0 ++ 
Efficiency  - 0 ++ + 0 ++ 
Coherence  - 0 ++ ++ 0 ++ 
Social impacts - 0 ++ ++ 0 ++ 
Environmental impacts - 0 ++ ++ 0 ++ 
 (++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 
164. The social and environmental  costs and benefits of the options are directly linked to 
achieving the objectives of improved provision of transport to the disaster site, and 
thus to the effectiveness cr iteria discussed above. This means that Transport Options 
A3, A4 and B2 score high, while Tran sport Options A2 and B1 score low. 
8. PREPAREDNESS  
8.1. Specific preparedness objectives 
165. (1) To address the lack of consistenc y among national training programmes, which 
hinders the sharing of experi ence, it is a specific objec tive of the EU CP regulatory 
review to better link nationa l preparedness systems by creating more consistency . 
This linking of national prepar edness systems can be best realised by work at the EU 
level. Even though currently there is some cooperation among some neighbouring 
MS in their CP preparedness efforts, MS ca nnot individually arra nge for other MS to 
accept and adhere to a common understand ing of methods and procedures for 
international coordination and cooperation. The system is dependent on common 
actions at the EU level, where MS can  develop together the necessary common 
understanding on: (1) minimum quality levels  of training, (2) mutual recognition of 
training based on feasible, adequate a nd recognised standards and principles, 
(3) cooperation in sharing of  good practices and lessons learned through a network 
structure, and (4) interoperabili ty of equipment and experts. 
166. (2) To address the limited scope of current  EU preparedness actions and the limited 
link with national programmes, it is a specific objective of the legislative changes to 
enlarge the scope  of current EU preparedness ac tions and link them better with 
national programmes , including an established training network. Additional training 
programmes may include training on preven tion, host-nation support, and consular 
support. The training network should fo cus on the preparedness for large-scale 
disaster events. 
167. (3) To address the uncertain preparedness for large-scale disasters,  it is a specific 
objective of the legislative review to raise the level of preparedness for such disasters 
within the EU by further integrating pr eparedness objectives into the EU CP 
cooperation  and provide for sufficient preparedness funding . Adequate previous 
training and exercises will significantly enhance the effectiveness of response 
resources available within Europe. Integr ating EU CP preparedness actions better 
into the EU CP regulatory framework will reinforce the link between prevention, preparedness and response. 
 
EN 50   EN 8.2. Preparedness policy options 
168. In the framework of the Training Poli cy Group (TPG) the Commission and the MS 
have made plans to develop guidance on enhanced national preparedness for large-
scale disasters. The place of possible guidelines is illustrated in the picture below: 
 
169. Because there is broad support for further developing EU CP preparedness policy, as 
recently reiterated in stakeholder mee tings, and when considering the general 
agreement on substance, the legislative revi ew focussed its reflection of options on 
the implementation options and the most appr opriate levels of EU financial support. 
170. It is noted that an option to introduce binding legislation or binding standards or 
quality labels has been discarded at an ear ly stage of the assessment as these would 
not be possible by the legal basis of Article 196 TF EU, which excludes 
harmonisation. Likewise, the option of disc ontinuing the CPFI which would stop all 
EU CP related activities was discarded early on in the assessment as it is unacceptable to the MS stakeholders and w ould go contrary to the Treaty provisions 
of Articles 196 and 222 TFEU. 
171. Considering that a certain baseline level of preparedness policy work will be carried 
forward in any case, including the deve lopment of guidance on CP training and 
exercises, the options considered for the impact assessment are the following: 
(1) Preparedness Option 1: No new EU legi slation related to preparedness will be 
proposed. The Commission would issue non-binding guideline s on training and 
exercises, including (1) minimum quality levels of training, (2) mutual recognition of training based on feasible , adequate and recognised standards 
and principles, (3) cooperat ion in sharing of good pract ices and lessons learned 
through a network structure, and (4) interoperability of equipment and experts. 
The CPFI budgetary proposals would be at current spending levels. 
(2) Preparedness Option 2: The Mechan ism decision would pronounce a general 
EU preparedness policy framework (object ives, slightly enlarged scope) but 
contain no binding provisions  for PS. Supplementary EU financial assistance 
would support the establishing of a tr aining network and other actions.  
 
EN 51   EN (3) Preparedness Option 3: In addition to the policy framework and the 
supplementary funding under Prevention Option 2, EU support for CP training 
would be made conditional on PS trai ning centres meeting certain minimum 
requirements, which could be se t out in Commission guidelines.103 
172. Stakeholders generally welcomed the pr oposals for further development of the 
training and exercises arrangements.104 A formal quality label for training centres as 
envisaged under Preparedness Option 3 re ceived mixed reactions, with some 
representatives of MS e xpressing strong scepticism on any mandatory standard. 
Participants also expressed overall support for the need fo r training/exercises to be 
linked to the new developments in response and prevention policy, such as the outputs from risk assessments.  
173. There seemed to be general agreement on the need to broaden the scope of the 
training. There were several re quests from MS representatives for the EU to do more 
to support training for the general population, in particular in tourist areas where 
European citizens from many different countries may be  affected by a disaster, 
including in third countries.  
174. Finally, a number of MS representatives e xpressed their support for a future training 
network system for a better exchange of knowledge, and one also stressed the value 
of informality in such a network. 
8.3. Analysis of impacts of  preparedness options 
175. The effectiveness
 of the options was assessed according to four criteria: 
(1) To what extent does the option maximi se the consistency between national 
systems within the limits of the mandate  of the CP mechanism and with due 
respect to the principle of subsidiarity? 
(2) To what extent is the option likely to re inforce and ensure th e rapid response to 
emergencies? 
(3) To what extent does the option contri bute to the integration of further 
developments in preparedness cooperation? 
176. The efficiency  of the options was assessed mainly in terms of reaching the specific 
objectives at minimal costs for the MS authorities and the EU budget. For this 
purpose an economic assessment of the cost s compared to the benefits has been 
carried out by the external study. For this pur pose an analysis of the impacts of the 
options on the preparedness levels  was carried out, as follows.  
177. The benefits ideally w ould be measured at the level of  each type of natural and man-
made disaster in each MS. Some MS have already more of a habit of international 
cooperation and may require only little supplementary efforts to bring their 
preparedness to a higher standard. More over, the exposure, vulnerability, and 
                                                 
103 Budgetary proposal as in Option 2, but PS training centres must meet minimum requirements to be 
eligible for funding. 
104 Report from the 1st stakeholder meeting, Annex E. 
 
EN 52   EN resilience to different types of mega-disasters requiring international intervention 
vary between MS. The results of the anal ysis at the level of each MS may be 
summarized for the whole of Europe to isol ate the estimations of costs and benefits 
for each of the options. The difficulty in assessing the impacts for the future 
preparedness policy framework lies in the f act that PS organise their preparedness 
systems in many different ways; some ha ve a bottom-up approach where local and 
regional actors (private and public) play the core role. Other PS have a more 
centralised approach. Furthermore, PS have  a different focus – it can be primarily on 
assets or it can be primar ily on using already existing resources (inc luding private 
companies, NGOs and volunteers). In this situ ation it is a challe nge to decide which 
gains could be achieved for a number of di fferent countries and different disaster 
types for the options assessed. The consul tants have carried out a number of 
interviews with key MS and noted broad agreement that there is still room for 
improvement. From these interviews the study concludes that efficiency gains in the 
order of 20% could be gained by achieving fa ster and more targeted assistance inside 
Europe. On a number of real-life sample cases and using the revealed preferences 
method, the consultant then illustrates the value added that can be achieved by better 
preparedness, which can be easily in the area of € 100000 for particular cases when 
using extremely prudent valuation met hods. A full account of the methodology and 
the sample cases are reported in Annex C. An overview of the re sults of the study is 
provided in Annex G. 
178. The coherence  of the options was assessed in te rms of the achievement of more 
consistency between national training sy stems enabling an improved level of 
cooperation and the effectiv e sharing of experience. 
8.3.1.  Impacts of Preparedness Option 1 (base line): No legislative change, Commission 
guidelines 
179. This baseline scenario without legislativ e change of the Mechanism Decision would 
require the CP Financial Instrument to recycle the current provisions and budgets 
into the next programming period. EU  guidelines would be non-binding.  
180. This option would result in the continuing  development of inconsistent national 
preparedness systems that cannot interface ea sily in times of emergencies. As the 
cooperation remains limited, and progress very slow, the option woul d likely lead to 
widely varying preparedness levels in the different MS. Therefore, for the 
Preparedness Option 1 the effectiveness is considered low .  
181. Considering that the current budget levels wi ll be spent also in  a renewed CPFI and 
contrasting these costs with the limited bene fits in terms of effectiveness as outlined 
above, Preparedness Option 1 is  considered inefficient . 
182. Preparedness Option 1 will result in litt le achievements for more consistency 
between national training systems enabling an improved level of cooperation and the 
effective sharing of experience. Theref ore the coherence of the option is low . 
183. Expressed in terms of environmental and social impacts  Preparedness Option 1 will 
lead to overall low levels of preparedness in Europe for people and the environment 
as compared to the other options. These as pects will be furthe r elaborated in the 
discussions of the othe r two options below. 
 
EN 53   EN 8.3.2.  Impacts of Preparedness Option 2: Ge neral EU preparedness policy framework 
(objectives, scope) plus dedicated funding fo r the establishing of a training network 
and other actions 
184. Given that the PS understand, organise and fo cus differently as regards preparedness, 
the implementation of guidelines will have different implications depending on the 
individual PS. The costs involved for each  PS will differ accordingly. The funding to 
be provided would thus enhance the numbe r of PS which would work to meet the 
standards of the guidelines. For those PS who decide to voluntarily adhere to a 
common minimum understanding, the preparedness levels w ill increase (for targeted 
areas) resulting in enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of preparedness systems. 
This would include improved host nation support. The ov erall higher preparedness 
levels would however be dependent on a suff iciently critical mass of PS to opt for 
adhering to the guidelines for any considerable impact to be obtained. If 
neighbouring countries and/or countries with si milar risk profiles and ability to assist 
in relevant disasters do not decide to a dhere to guidelines, then the benefit is 
minimal. This would be the case for econom ic, environmental and social impacts.  
185. Providing funding for PS to adhere to the gu idelines would most likely increase the 
effect of efficiency and effectiveness of  preparedness systems. The impact would 
depend on the target of the funding a nd the degree of funding. The enhanced 
readiness for effective response during cross- border events or large events will result 
in a better protection of EU citizens, envi ronment, infrastructure and buildings, in 
particular for less a ffluent societies.  
186. Considering all of the above Preparedness Option 2 is rather effective , as it increases 
the consistency between national systems,  improves preparedness cooperation so 
some degree and is likely to reinforce and ensure the rapid response to emergencies. 
187. In some PS, cost of training, exercises etc may increase as the requirements may 
introduce new contents that were not ther e before, or that were covered to a 
significantly lower extent before . It is reasonable to assume, that those PS that would 
incur most costs by adhering to the guide lines may be less willing than those 
suffering less costs. For the PS where financ ing is provided by the EU, the cost will 
instead be incurred by the EU (to a certa in extent depending on the degree of 
financing foreseen). The consul tant notes that increased sharing of best practices and 
common training activities can also reduce Me mber States expenses on own training. 
188. Due to the lack of data a nd the inherent uncertainty in  the modelling of this policy 
option, the external study, de spite best efforts, was una ble to provide quantitative 
evidence. However, the consultant estimates that the value of the reduced damage is likely to be much higher than the exampl es provided though this was not quantified. 
Assuming 10-15 smaller intra EU deployments  per year means th at the value of 
improved preparedness could be in excess of € 1-3 million per year. 
189. Considering that with limited extra budgetary spending in MS and through the 
increased CPFI finance, a number of clear benefits in terms of effectiveness as 
outlined above can be achieved, Preparedness Option 2 is considered efficient
. 
 
EN 54   EN 190. The coherence of the option is good  because Preparedness Option 1 will result more 
consistency between national training sy stems enabling an improved level of 
cooperation and the effectiv e sharing of experience. 
191. The administrative burden  is considered low, as there would be no systematic 
reporting requirement over and above what MS  have already agreed in the baseline. 
Finally, environmental and social impacts  of Preparedness Option 2 will lead to 
overall higher levels of preparedness in  Europe for people and the environment as 
compared to Preparedness Option 1, and are thus positive. 
8.3.3.  Impacts of Preparedness Option 3: EU support for CP training conditional on PS 
training centres meeting certain minimum requirements that c ould be set out in 
Commission guidelines 
192. The guidelines on preparedness would in th is option be compulsory for all PS as 
would the 'ownership' and responsibility for the network structure. The network 
structure should have the ability to fac ilitate exchange of knowledge and methods 
among PS also with a view to re levant external institutions. 
193. The assessment of impacts would suggest significantly enhanced effectiveness and 
efficiency in response operations where two or more PS are involved, due to 
adherence to common princi ples, common knowle dge and better interoperability. 
This includes also the effect through the 'bigger resource pool'. Economies of scale: 
costs related to developing and updating cu rricula may be less for each PS and the 
quality may be improved as the more join t development can ease the bringing on 
board of 'best practices'.  
194. Considering the above, Preparedness Option 3 is very effective  in achieving 
increased levels of consistency between national systems, improved preparedness 
cooperation, and reinforced ra pid response to emergencies. 
195. Preparedness Option 3 is also more expe nsive. Network costs at EU level may 
include additional costs up front for designing the network and some limited operation costs for ongoing coordination and exchange through the network. 
Implementation cost in MS/PS will relate  to meeting standard s for curricula and 
other minimum requirements. Due to the lack of data and the inherent uncertainty in 
the modelling of this policy option, the external study was unable to provide 
quantitative evidence of these benefits and co sts. It has estimated benefits and costs 
of the Preparedness Options as follows: 
 
Benefits  Costs  
 Effectiveness of 
response  Efficiency of  
training etc  Cost to PS  Cost to EU  
 Preparedness Option 1  + 0/+ 0 0 
 Preparedness Option 2  ++ + -/0 - 
 Preparedness Option 3  +++ + -/0 - 
196. In any case, increased adherence to common principles, co mmon knowledge and 
better interoperabi lity will involve subs tantial expenses in MS  which need to be 
balanced against the additional benefits in  terms of effectiveness. The assessment 
concludes that Preparedness Option 3 w ould score well in terms of efficiency , but 
 
EN 55   EN because of higher costs not necessarily significantly better than Preparedness 
Option 2. 
197. The coherence of th e option is very good  because it will result more consistency 
between national training systems enabling an improved level of cooperation and the 
effective sharing of experience. 
198. The administrative burden  under this option may be more significant as the 
adherence to the standards and the fulfilm ent of the requirements will likely entail 
considerable extra reporting costs for MS as compared to the baseline. Finally, environmental and social impacts
 of Preparedness Option 3 will lead to overall much 
higher levels of preparedness in Europe fo r people and the environment as compared 
to Preparedness Option 2, and are thus positive. 
199. As mentioned, this option has met reservati ons from stakeholders and may therefore 
not find the necessary political backing. 
8.4. Comparing preparedness options 
200. The following table provides an overview over the estimated benefits of each 
Preparedness Option: 
 Preparedness 
Option 1  Preparedness 
Option 2  Preparedness 
Option 3  
Effectiveness  0 + ++ 
Efficiency  0 + + 
Coherence  0 + ++ 
Social impacts 0 + ++ 
Environmental impacts 0 + ++ 
 (++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 
201. It must be noted that in the world of CP  which relies on the voluntary cooperation of 
Member States, setting standards that are hard to achieve for some countries could 
lead to the counter-productive result that it would exclude them fr om participation in 
the preparedness cooperation. Standards theref ore have to remain achievable for all 
countries. 
202. When comparing the three options, Prepar edness Options 2 and 3 provide better 
results as regards effectiveness, efficien cy and coherence, as compared to the 
baseline scenario (Preparedness Option 1). Preparedness Option 3 would lead to 
greater effectiveness and coherence in th e EU preparedness policy. However, it has 
met significant reservations from stake holders and may even tually not find the 
necessary political backing.  
9. PREVENTION  
9.1. Specific prevention objectives 
203. (1) To address the lack of coherence and coordination between sector-specific 
policies, it is a specific objective of the le gislative review to complement the sector-
 
EN 56   EN specific work by combining them for major di saster risks into na tional disaster risk 
management plans  allowing for the necessary overview and coordination. Risk 
management plans are based on risk assessments and guide the decision-making processes on developing, selecting, a nd implementing measures to reduce and 
mitigate risks cost-effectively. 
204. (2) To address the under-developed organi sation of sharing of experience among 
MS, national disaster risk management pl ans should be developed according to a 
minimum common understanding of what ar e the guiding principles, objectives, 
methods, and processes to be employed. It is therefore a specific objective of the 
legislative review to define appropriate ways to ensure the use of minimum standards
 
and disaster risk management planning in the EU CP legi slation and provide 
sufficient funding via the CPFI  allowing for a generally hi gh level of protection in 
Europe and for certain countries to catch up. 
205. (3) To address the insufficient link between  prevention and preparedness/response it 
is a specific objective of the legislative review to integrate disaster prevention 
policies into the EU CP cooperation .105 
206. (4) To address the limited awareness and vision of the value of prevention and 
consequential strategic investments, it is a specific objective of the legislative review 
to strengthen the means in the EU for c ontinuous support to prevention awareness 
measures .106 Wide dissemination and awareness-raising are important steps to further 
develop and fully integrate a risk manage ment and prevention cu lture into sector 
policies, and for creating a strong prevention cu lture in Europe in view of an overall 
higher level of protection for EU citizens a nd elsewhere in the world. This policy aim 
should be an objective of the EU CP cooperation. 
9.2. Prevention policy options 
207. The proposed EU-level prevention policy ha s met great support by  all stakeholders 
along the way and in the recent stakeholde r consultations. Indeed, as regards the 
necessity and the contents of  disaster management plan s and the general prevention 
policy agenda, stakeholders have, in repl y to several questions to this effect, 
unambiguously welcomed and endorsed th e Commission’s considerations. A few 
MS have merely cautioned that the Commi ssion’s guidance would need to find the 
right level of detail and remain flexible  enough to provide added value to all MS. 
208. In many sector-specific policy areas it s eems generally understood that it is CP 
policy that can be the platform where the work of different s ectors and policies on 
disaster risk management can  be integrated into an ove rall risk management policy 
framework. 
                                                 
105 The link derives from the objectives of Article  196 TFEU, as well as Council Conclusions and 
Parliament resolutions, which will be a basis for fu rther advances in the operational cooperation in EU 
CP. 
106 This should include the development of coherent cross-sector national risk management plans on the 
basis of sound national risk assessments. Risk ma nagement plans necessarily improve the awareness 
and understanding of decision makers, stakeholders and interested parties of the risks a country faces, and bring them into a better position to determine the best prevention measures. The mere process of 
developing the plans is beneficial to the awareness and vision of public authorities, businesses, NGOs, 
and the general public alike.  
 
EN 57   EN 209. Because of this broad support and agr eement on substance, the Commission has 
focussed its considerations of  the possible ways forward in  the legislative review on 
the legal implementation of the prevention policy and the most a ppropriate level of 
EU financial support. The range of options that  can be analysed is in any case strictly 
limited by the fact that harmonisation is e xplicitly ruled out by the provisions of 
Article 196 TFEU. Therefore, a Directive, for instance, is not possible, and also 
further details on the contents  of the risk management plans cannot form part of the 
options. 
210. The following options thus present the fu ll range of legally possible ways of 
supporting and complementing PS disaster ma nagement actions by a more coherent 
EU prevention policy framework: 
(1) Prevention Option 1 (baseline): No new EU legislation related to prevention 
will be proposed. The Commission w ould issue in 2012 guidelines on 
minimum national prevention standards which would also address national 
disaster risk management plans. The CPFI budgetary proposals would be in 
line with current spending levels. 
(2) In Prevention Option 2, the revised M echanism decision will pronounce a 
general EU prevention policy framew ork stating the objectives of EU 
prevention policy in the c ontext of the Mechanism and the actions to be 
pursued by the Commission and the MS . These would include Commission 
actions on the knowledge base, on national risk assessments, on an overview of EU risks, awareness-raising measures , and other actions. Member States 
actions would include the adoption a nd regular update of national risk 
management plans and other appropriate actions. None of these actions would 
be binding on the Member States. Howeve r, limited additional supplementary 
EU financial assistance via the C PFI would support the development and 
implementation of national risk management plans and the meeting of minimum standards. 
(3) Under Prevention Option 3, the revised Mechanism Decision would pronounce 
a general EU prevention policy framework and increase funding as laid out in Prevention Option 2 above, and Member St ates would be requi red to draw up 
their national disaster risk management plans by a certain date, e.g. 2016, i.e. 
as early as possible after the entry into force of the revised Mechanism 
Decision. As in Prevention Option 2, th e Commission would issue guidelines 
on certain characteristics of the plans. 
211. Stakeholders have commented in very positive ways on these options which were 
first presented already in this form in April 2011. Many stakeholders spoke in favour 
of Prevention Options 1 and 2.
107 A few PS advocated mandatory risk management 
planning at national level (Prevention Option 3). Eight PS expressed reservations in 
respect of legal obligations, highlighting inter alia difficulties where the planning 
competence resides at sub-national level. 
                                                 
107 Report from the 1st and 2nd stakeholder meetings (see Annex E). 
 
EN 58   EN 212. There was full agreement among stakeholde rs that sharing e xperiences and good 
practices is an essential component of pr evention policy, as well as developing a 
prevention culture that is shared by all actors. Finally, many stakeholders expressed 
support for the necessity to create more ba lance in the EU CP co-operation between 
prevention, preparedness and response acti ons. The Commission concluded that there 
was strong support for the risk manageme nt planning agenda, including guidance 
from the Commission; as well as for integrating prevention considerations into the Mechanism decision, making it an objective of EU CP policy. 
9.3. Analysis of impacts of options for an EU prevention policy framework 
213. The effectiveness
 of the options was assessed according to four criteria: 
(1) To what extent does the option reinfo rce the coordination between sector-
specific policies within the limits of  the mandate of the Mechanism and the 
existing legislation? 
(2) To what extent does the option contri bute to the development of cooperation 
and sharing of experience between PS? 
(3) In how far does the option maximise the common understanding of good 
practices and challenges and thus genera lly raise the level of prevention across 
Europe? 
(4) To what extent is the option likely to contribute to raise the political will and 
vision for more investments and cooper ation in the area of prevention?  
214. The efficiency  of the options was assessed mainly in terms of reaching the specific 
objectives at minimal costs for the MS authorities and the EU budget. For this 
purpose an economic assessment of the cost s compared to the benefits has been 
carried out by the external consultant.  
215. The external study focussed its economic an alysis on the impacts of the additional 
funding under Prevention Option 2 or the bi nding nature under Prevention Option 3 
on the benefits of higher prev ention levels, as compared to the costs of achieving 
them. Benefits would result from: (1) better decision-making on the most cost-
effective preventive measures, (2) savi ng costs of preparedness, response and 
recovery actions, and (3) saved lives, economic and social costs and avoided 
environmental damage. The benefits ideally would be measured at the level of each 
type of natural and man-made disaster108 in each PS. Concretely, for each hazard the 
existing and likely future disaster manageme nt planning in each PS is considered in 
response to the supporting regulatory framework at EU level. The assessment of achievable protection levels in PS needs to consider also the size and the internal organisation of the country, its exposure, vulnerability, and resilience to different 
types of disasters. In addition to the analysis at PS level,  costs and benefits should be 
also estimated at EU level and overall costs and benefits determined in the end. To 
simplify the analysis, the external study ha s clustered PS into  three groups with 
respect to their current level of advancement in horizontal risk assessment and 
                                                
 
108 Storms, extreme temperatures, forest fires, water scarcity/droughts, floods, landslides, earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, oil spills, industrial  accidents, toxic spills, and others. 
 
EN 59   EN prevention planning. Accordingly, 8 MS ma y be considered advanced, 13 medium 
advanced, and 6 less advanced. The detailed results of the consultant’s analysis are 
available in Annex C. An overview of study results is presented in Annex G. 
The cost-benefit calculati ons of the external study  are based on a number of 
interviews with representatives from diffe rent Member States institutions in a 
selected number of national administrations in order to learn about their challenges, 
views, experience, costs and potential be nefits. The interviews focused on those 
Member States which already have produc ed or carried out considerable risk 
assessment and mapping in this areas, such as  UK, NL, DE, and SE.  
Based upon this insight, the study has:  
(1) Grouped Member States according to the current level of progress with regard to 
prevention into three groups: Very advance d, Medium advanced, and Less advanced.  
(2) Assumptions : the advanced countries would achieve a 100% implementation in 
all three Prevention Options; moving from  Prevention Option 1 to Option 2 (i.e. 
providing co-financing in support of the e fforts) would provide an additional 20 
percentage point increase in implementation for both the medium advanced and the 
less advanced Member States. The specific  effect of Option 2 in terms of more 
prevention will depend on political decisions  and priorities within each Member 
State. This is difficult to predict and he nce, the 20% effect is an assumption to 
illustrate a likely order of magnit ude. Option 3 would provide for 100% 
implementation for all Member States as it is mandatory. 
(3) The study was able to obtain an estim ate of the costs from two of the highly 
advanced Member States. Assuming a linear relation between implementation level 
and the cost level, cost estimates were  developed for Prevention Option 1, 2 and 3. 
The study then applied a break even assessment.  For the effort to be worth the costs, 
the benefits should at least correspond to the costs. A recent European Environmental 
Agency study provides a minimum estimate of the costs of natural hazards in Europe 
over a decade. Comparing the cost calculations  to these estimates i ndicated that if the 
better prevention resulting from the initiativ es under considerat ion can reduce these 
costs by less than 1%, the in itiative can be justified from cost-benefit arguments.  
The study has supplemented the above generic calculations with specific examples to 
illustrate the benefits from prevention. 
Uncertainties : Given the difficulties in obtaining cost data, the study opted for a 
methodology that was simple and transparen t. Further refinements and work on the 
method would have added only little to th e analytical results and would not have 
made the analysis more robust. 
The key message that the analysis brings  is that it would only demand a slight 
reduction in damage costs to justify the initiative. 
216. The coherence  of the options was assessed in terms of the achievement of a 
minimum common understanding which would be required for an improved level of 
cooperation and the effectiv e sharing of experience. 
 
EN 60   EN 9.3.1.  Impacts of Prevention Option 1 (baseline) : No legislative c hange but Commission 
guidelines 
217. This baseline scenario woul d not require any legislativ e change in the Mechanism 
Decision but would presume the renewal of the CP Financial Instrument at current 
funding levels. EU guidelines would be  non-binding. This option may lead to 
varying planning intensities in the different  MS, some of which may opt not to have 
a disaster risk management plan or mini mum prevention standards at all. To the 
extent that the Commission guidelines are lik ely not widely applie d and there will be 
very different standards pertaining in MS, this option would contribute only little to 
coordination between sector-specific pol icies, cooperation between MS and a 
common understanding of good practices. It wi ll not help to raise the political will 
and vision for longer-term investments in sensible prevention policies. Prevention 
Option 1 would therefore score lo w in terms of effectiveness . Because the 
comparability will be low, the sharing of  knowledge will stay limited. This option 
therefore scores also lo w in terms of coherence .  
218. As there would be no closer link betw een prevention with preparedness and 
response, this option would al so slow down progress in thes e other fields of EU CP 
cooperation. Less progress in all of these ar eas will lead to more costly policies in 
most countries and Europeans will be less well protected. This option is therefore 
also inefficient , as MS will still incur disaster cost s without the adequate benefits of 
cooperation. Expressed in terms of environmental and social impacts  this option will 
lead to low levels of protection in Europe for people and the environment as compared to the other options. These aspe cts will be further elaborated in the 
discussions of the othe r two options below. 
9.3.2.  Impacts of Prevention Option 2: General EU prevention policy framework, plus 
dedicated funding for the deve lopment and implementation of  national disaster risk 
management plans 
219. The main result from Prevention Option 2 will be a faster implementation of the 
disaster risk management planning guidelines based on the assumption that PS will 
apply for EU funding where possible and/or th at the financial assistance will be made 
available for those countries facing the biggest challenges  on implementation of the 
guidelines. In addition, the better li nk with the Mechanism will ensure that 
prevention considerations can become an inte gral part of the EU CP cooperation and 
further develop in the future. 
220. To the extent that the Commission guidelin es would be applied sooner and more 
consistently due to the additional funding av ailable that can help some MS to catch 
up on their prevention agenda , this option would signif icantly contribute to 
coordination between sector-specific pol icies, cooperation between MS and a 
common understanding of good prac tices. It will also help to raise the political will 
and vision for longer-term investments in sensible prevention policies. Prevention 
Option 2 would therefore score we ll in terms of effectiveness
.  
221. Prevention Option 2 coul d be very effective  also in the sense that guidelines and 
national risk management plans could be developed from early on, rather than be 
linked to a deadline set out in legisla tion (Prevention Option 3), which after 
negotiations between the EU institutions may be quite far in the future or not 
 
EN 61   EN accepted at all.109 Earlier preparation of risk management plans would provide 
opportunities for some implementing meas ures to be supported by the next 
generation of EU Structural Funds and coul d lead to a more rapid development of a 
risk management culture.  
222. The stakeholder consultation shows overw helming support from the PS and other 
stakeholders for the development of nationa l risk management pl ans accompanied by 
guidelines from the Commission. Preparatory work could start before adoption of the 
revised legislation and Participating States  could voluntarily commit to develop such 
plans over the next three to four years. The experience of  the voluntary approach on 
risk assessments should be taken into account. Guidelines110 have been prepared and 
all PS are committed (voluntarily) to prepare their national risk assessments within 
relatively short deadlines. 
223. Because the comparability of MS's preven tion approaches will increase, the sharing 
of knowledge will be much improved. This op tion therefore scores well also in terms 
of coherence .  
224. The general EU prevention policy framework would crea te a closer link between 
prevention with preparedness and response.  Prevention Option 2 would thus enable 
progress also in these other fi elds of EU CP cooperation.  
225. In terms of costs of implementation by MS  and the EU budget, and thus the measure 
of efficiency, the external economic study ha s carried out an estimate with available 
data. According to the extern al study, few examples exis t today where cost-benefit 
analyses of preventive efforts have been carried out at PS or EU-level. The analysis 
therefore provided a number of illustrative examples, which make a compelling case for the immediate benefits of preventive measures based on integrated approaches.
111 
Good examples of such benefits and cost sa vings can be seen in the areas of flood 
risk management, early warning systems, flu pandemic prevention and climate change adaptation, discussed in more detail in Annex C. Using a rough estimation of reduction of total losses that is gained by implementing the option, the study has arrived at simulated benefits between €16 million and €157 million for Prevention Option 2 as compared to Prevention Option 1 and between €35 million and €350 
million for Prevention Option 3 compared to Prevention Option 1.  
226. The costs of Prevention Option 2 will depend on the level of EU co-funding 
available. Whereas this option may imply no extra costs or very little for advanced 
PS who already have a comprehensive disast er risk management system in place, 
other PS starting from a low level of prevention will have to invest substantial administrative resources to introduce horizont al risk assessment systems. Based on 
available information on the state of play  and starting point in different PS, the 
                                                
 
109 Note e.g. long implementation periods agreed in the Directive on Flood Risk Management (6-8 years). 
110 Commission Staff Working Paper: Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management 
SEC(2010) 1626 final. 
111 From a more global perspective, the World Bank 's recent report conclude s: "Prevention is often 
possible and cost-effective. [It] pays, but you do not always have to pay more for prevention. A relatively easy and effective measure is for governments to make information about hazards and risks 
easily accessible (such as maps of flood plains…)." Natural Hazards , UnNatural disasters… quoted 
above. 
 
EN 62   EN external study has estimated average costs per one million inhabitants and additional 
implementation costs depending on the level of advancement of the national horizontal risk assessment This option woul d entail 13% higher costs than Prevention 
Option 1, but as pointed out in the study the increase aff ects in most cases PS where 
public budgets are already constrained. Cons idering average implementation costs of 
€ 50,000 per person-year (staff costs), this option may be up to € 13 million more expensive than Prevention Option 1. If EU  co-financing would be provided up to 
50%, the additional budgetary requirement s would amount to a maximum of € 6.5 
million, which could be spr ead over several years.
112 These economic estimates can 
merely provide an order of magnitude, as they are based on strong assumptions. 
227. Considering the costs of the option (€ 13 million) in relation to its possible benefits 
(between € 16 million and € 157 million), th e efficiency of the option is good . 
228. The administrative costs  of additional reporting fo r public and private operators 
under this option are considered low, as  there would be no systematic reporting 
requirement over and above what PS have  already agreed in the baseline. 
229. The social and environmental costs and  benefits must be considered overall positive 
for Prevention Option 2 as it will lead to a higher state of prevention, preparedness, 
and ultimately also better response in Eu rope and elsewhere in  the world. Indeed, 
more effective and integrat ed EU support for disaster management including risk 
management planning will have a positiv e impact on society and provide positive 
environmental impacts including contribut ing to adaptation to climate change. 
9.3.3.  Impacts of Prevention Option 3: Legal require ment to establish a national disaster 
risk management plan by the end of  2015, plus the Commission’s guidelines 
230. Prevention Option 3 would, in addition to the policy framework and the funding of 
Prevention Option 2, oblige PS to elaborate di saster risk management plans based on 
an all hazard approach by a certain date.113 The Commission would issue guidelines 
on the content of risk management plans and minimum prevention standards. 
231. As disaster risk management will in th is option no longer be optional, Prevention 
Option 3 would likely provide for a more co mparable, consistent and equal approach 
throughout the EU, in the medium-term probably above the level that can be achieved by Prevention Option 2. This option may lead to a higher degree of ambition and higher protecti on levels than the previ ous options, and a better 
understanding between PS of the co mmon challenges and priorities.  
232. However, the implementation may be delaye d due to the length of the legislative 
processes and the difficulty to agree on a co mmon target date. This may also make it 
more difficult to reap the benefits of early implementation and damage some good 
will of PS. A risk may also be that those PS that have already advanced and well-functioning horizontal risk management syst ems will have to align with a proposed 
                                                
 
112 It should be noted that the costs are mainly due to the faster implementation of comprehensive disaster 
prevention policies and would level off over the years. 
113 This option may be considered more in line with Ar ticle 222(4) TFEU, as well as the Internal Security 
Strategy. 
 
EN 63   EN new system, which should therefore provi de sufficient flexibility accommodate 
current well-functioning risk management systems.  
233. Overall Prevention Option 3 is considered  to lead to a very high level of 
effectiveness and coherence  in terms of achieving the specific objectives. 
234. The assessment of costs and benefits by th e external study has arrived at simulated 
benefits between € 35 and € 350 million fo r Prevention Option 3 compared to 
Prevention Option 1 (baseline). As for Pr evention Option 2, this option may imply 
little additional costs for advanced PS wh ich already have comprehensive risk 
assessment systems in place. However, other MS starting from a low level of prevention planning would have  to invest substantial admi nistrative resources. This 
may in particular affect MS where publ ic budgets are constrained. With the 
assumptions mentioned above, the st udy estimate the additional costs of 
implementing this option would be in the or der of 33% higher th an Prev. Option 1, 
equal to some € 29 million. A 50% maximum EU co-financing rate would thus lead 
to total EU budget expenditure of € 14.5 million. 
235. Considering the costs of the option (€ 29 million) in relation to its possible benefits 
(€ 35 and € 350 million), the efficiency of the option is good
.  
236. The social and environmental  costs and benefits of the option is directly linked to 
achieving the objectives of better disaster prevention, and thus to the effectiveness 
criteria discussed above.  
237. The administrative burden  of additional reporting for public and private operators 
under this option are still considered relativ ely low, as the requirement for setting up 
a planning programme will entail little extr a reporting costs to MS over and above 
what is already agreed in the baseline.114 
9.4. Comparing the prevention options 
238. The following table summarises the estimated  impacts of the different options, as 
discussed above: 
 Prevention 
Option 1  Prevention 
Option 2  Prevention 
Option 3  
Effectiveness  0 ++ ++ 
Efficiency  0 + + 
Coherence  0 + ++ 
Social benefits 0 + + 
Environmental benefits 0 + + 
 (++ = high benefits, + = benefits, 0 = no benefits, - = problematic) 
239. While Prevention Option 1 is problematic as  concerns effectiveness and coherence of 
European prevention policy, Prevention Options 2 and 3 would provide better 
                                                 
114 Administrative burden has been estimated with the Commission Calculator of Administrative Costs 
(AC) & Administrative Burdens (AB)  on Public authorities. Amount for the 27 MS are about € 500 per 
state, i.e. a total of € 13500 per year, and another € 2000 per year for the other 4 Participating States: 
See full calculation at: http://adminburden.sg .cec.eu.int/Public administrations/ECHO/ 
 
EN 64   EN benefits in terms of effectiveness, effi ciency and coherence. However, Prevention 
Option 3 was rejected by eight key PS at the stakeholder meetings. 
240. In terms of social and environmental  costs and benefits Prevention Option 3 may 
reach a slightly better score in the medium -term as compared to Prevention Option 2, 
but the results are too uncertain to sufficiently distinguish it. 
10. SUMMARY OF OPTIONS AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PREFERRED OPTIONS  
241. The following table summarizes the Options and key considerati ons leading to the 
preferred option 
 Options Key considerations / comparison of 
options 
Response-
Voluntary Pool VP-Option 1 : Voluntary pool without 
EU co-financing. VP-Option 2
: Voluntary pool with 
limited EU co-financing (covering 
only deployment costs).  VP-Option 3
: Voluntary pool with 
higher EU co-financing 
(deployment, as well as (some) 
development and stand-by costs).  Certain options (discontinuation, no-action, 
pool of EU-level assets and fully-fledged EU CP Force) discarded earlier in the 
impact assessment for 2010 Disaster 
Response Communication. Among the remaining 3 realistic options considered 
here, VP-Options 2 and 3 are superior in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiency, with 
benefits under VP-Option 3 more 
pronounced. 
Response-EU-funded assets CG-Option 1
: Filling gaps by 
Participating States (without EU co-
financing).  
CG-Option 2 : Filling gaps with 
(some) EU co-financing.  
CG-Option 3 : Filling gaps with EU-
level assets.  CG-Option 2 merits attention, notably with 
regard to assets for low probability/high 
impact risks, as well as those performing 
horizontal tasks (such as TAST), while CG-Option 1 can be implemented without 
legislative changes and is the least costly 
for EU budget, but is weak in terms of effectiveness; CG-Option 3 did not receive 
sizeable support of key stakeholders. 
Transport  
Co-financing Transport-Option A1 : 
Discontinuation of the scheme.  Transport-Option A2
: No policy 
change. 
Transport-Option A3 : Increase EU 
transport max co-financing for the 
most urgent priority needs 
Transport-Option A4 : Increase EU 
transport max co-financing across 
the board Transport-Options A3 and A4 both score 
relatively high on effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. Taking into account the 
high risk associated with Transport-Option 
A4 (overly cheap transport might lead to non-essential goods to be deployed), 
Transport-Option A3 is preferred. 
Transport-
Administration Transport-Option B1 : No policy 
change (some improvements in the 
limits of the current provisions).  
Transport-Option B2 : Simplification 
(incl. "coordinating country 
concept", 100% financing for local 
transport and other logistical operations, further simplification for 
low value grants, paying the entire 
EU co-financing at the end of operations, EU affected state 
becoming eligible)  Transport-Option B1 is not considered 
sufficient to yield significant improvements 
of the system. The elements proposed 
under the simplification option (Transport-Option B2) are all expected to contribute to 
reducing the administrative costs for the 
Commission and the PS. They are coherent with the Commission's better regulation 
objective. Therefore, Transport-Option B2 is 
the preferred one.  
Preparedness Preparedness Option1 : No 
legislative change, Commission 
guidelines.  Preparedness Options 2 and 3 provide 
better benefits in terms of efficiency and EU 
added-value. Preparedness Option 3 is 
 
EN 65   EN Preparedness Option 2 : General EU 
preparedness policy framework + 
dedicated funding. Preparedness Option 3
: EU support 
for CP training conditional on MS 
training centres meeting certain minimum requirements (to be set 
out in Commission guidelines). likely to be superior in terms of 
effectiveness and coherence, but it has met 
reservations from stakeholders. 
Prevention Prevention Option 1 : No new 
legislation but Commission guidelines. 
Prevention Option 2
: General EU 
prevention policy framework + dedicated funding for the 
development and implementation of 
national disaster risk management plans (CPFI).  
Prevention Option 3
: Legal 
requirement to establish a national disaster risk management plan by 
the end 2015, + Commission 
guidelines & dedicated funding.  Prevention Options 2 and 3 provide better 
benefits in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. They present different 
advantages. Prevention Option 2 can be 
implemented more speedily, while Prevention Option 3 may lead in the 
medium-term to more coherent 
implementation of disaster risk management plans in the longer term. 
 
11. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
242. In order to improve the implementation and facilitate the evaluation of the CP 
system, the Commission will collect a limite d, continuous series of monitoring and 
result indicators, as well as a number of baselines in terms of coordination 
mechanisms, time of response, coverage of  preparedness and prevention measures, 
etc. (see Annex K for details). 
243. On the basis of the monitoring informati on, as well as any other additional evaluation 
work, the Commission will evaluate the implementation of the legislation not earlier than three years afte r the coming into force of the ne w EU legislation, in order to 
allow for enough time for the re sults of the implementati on to become measurable. 
On the basis of the baselines established the appraisal will identify implementation 
results that are an effect of  the new EU regulatory framew ork, from other effects that 
would have come about in any case (bas eline scenario), and will compare it with 
established benchmark levels  and criteria (see below). 
244. Moreover, on the basis of the monitoring indicators collected, the Commission will 
assess the evolution in the implementation of  individual operati ons in the field of 
prevention, preparedness and, notably, re sponse, by comparing them with the 
baselines identified at the beginning of  the implementation of the measures. 
12. L
EGISLATIVE PROPOSAL AND FURTHER ELEMENTS OF CPFI  EX-ANTE 
EVALUATION  
245. On disaster response , it is proposed to include the e ssential elements and principles 
on the voluntary pool of assets, as well as those on the EU-funded assets, with a 
reference to the implementation rules. Furthermore, it would include some additional 
 
EN 66   EN elements without sizeable economic, social and environmental impacts and thus not 
covered in this report. To enable financi ng or related activities,  this would require 
adapting the CPFI accordingly. 
246. On transport  support at EU level, it is proposed to  revise some of the current legal 
provisions, to increase the maximum EU financing rate for transport operations 
(under specific conditions), and to simplify the applicable admini strative procedures.  
247. On disaster prevention  and preparedness , it is proposed to inte grate into the revised 
Mechanism Decision a general EU preven tion and preparedness policy framework 
(definition of objectives and scope) and announce Commission guide lines. The latter 
could also be contained in a future Commission Recommendation. Furthermore, a 
legal requirement to develop national disa ster risk management plans should be 
considered. Supplementary EU financial assistance would support the development 
and implementation of nationa l risk management plans an d minimum standards, as 
well as a training network and other acti ons. The funding would require changes to 
the CPFI, which should also continue all act ions currently stipul ated under Article 4 
CPFI, although with shifted priorities.  
248. Elements of the ex-ante evaluation115 for the CPFI, which are not yet addressed in the 
earlier parts of the impact assessment, c oncern in particular the most appropriate 
method of implementation for the preferred options, the internal coherence of the 
proposed programme or activity and its relatio ns with other relevant instruments, and 
an indication of the volume of appropriations. 
249. Given that no substantial modification in the implementation of the CPFI would be 
introduced, the management method would c ontinue to be the existing one, i.e., 
direct centralised management in the sense of art. 53a of the Financial Regulation. 
The annual work programme would be implemented through calls for proposals, direct grants, procurement a nd reimbursement of expenses. 
250. There are close links and coordination betw een the internal CPFI and the following 
instruments: the Solidarity Fund supports re covery investments in the EU following a 
disaster; the Structural Funds support risk  prevention and prepar edness investments 
in MS, including infrastructure measures to prevent disasters; EU RTD framework 
programmes provide significant support to help develop tools and methods for 
improved disaster management; under the new GMES regulation support will be 
provided for mapping and early warning servic es for disaster response; other funding 
instruments with which CPFI is coordina ted include the environment instrument 
LIFE+, and the Specific Programme Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other security related risks. 
251. The proposed breakdown of CP budgets is in line with the financial envelope 
foreseen for the next MFF 2014-2020 (Communication 2011/500 of 29/06/2011). 
The following comparison table shows the additional funding needed for Options 2 
and 3 as compared to the current situation (baseline). 
                                                
 
115 Commission Regulation 2342/2002 EC, Euratom, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget.  
 
EN 67   EN [€ million]  Now  Additional funding 
for Option 2  Additional funding 
for Option 3  
Response  4.0   
Voluntary Pool   + 2 + 5 
Capacity Gaps   + 5 +10 
Preparedness  10.5  + 2 + 2 
Prevention   2.5 + 1 + 2 
Administrative   0.5 + 0 + 0 
Other   1.0 + 1 + 1 
Total inside EU  18.5  +11 
Total Option 2  +29.5  +20 
Total Option 3 +38.5  
Response outside EU  19.0116 + 4 (Vol. Pool)  + 4 (Vol. Pool)  
Transport new   + 1.6  + 1.9  
Total outside EU  19.0  + 5.6 
Total Option 2  + 24.6  + 5.9 
Total Option 3 + 24.9  
252. Total funding for proposed options (grey in table above): € 58.4 million = € 33.5 
million inside EU + € 24.9 million outside EU. 
                                                 
116 The estimate of € 19.0 million for EU co-financing  of transport operations is based on the budget 
figures for the year 2011 (status: October 2011). 
 
EN 68   EN 13. LIST OF ACRONYMS  
CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear 
CECIS Common Emergency Communication and Information System   
CP Civil Protection CPFI Civil Protection Financial Instrument 
DG ECHO Commission Directorate-General respon sible for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection 
DG RTD Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 
EEA European Economic Area 
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency 
ERC European Emergency Response Centre 
ERC European Emergency Response Centre 
EU  European Union 
GBP British Pound 
GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
H1N1 Hemagglutinin type 1 Neuraminidase type1 
HNS Host Nation Support 
IAB Impact Assessment Board 
MFF Multiannual Financial framework 
MIC Monitoring and Information Centre 
MS Member States 
NHWP National Heat Wave Plan 
PS Paticipating States 
SAR team Search and Rescue team 
SILO Separate Planning and Isolated Actions 
TAST Technical Assistance and Support Teams 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the Union 
TPG Training policy Group 
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
 
 
EN 69   EN 14. LIST OF ANNEXES  
Annex A: Impact Assessment summ ary list of steps and timeline 
Annex B: Meeting minutes from the three Impact Assessment Steering Group meetings 
Annex C: Impact Assessment exte rnal study final report by COWI 
Annex D: Stakeholder meetings consultation papers Annex E: Stakeholder meetings reports Annex F: Consultation of CP Directors-General, consultatio n papers and meeting report 
Annex G: Summary of results of  the external study by COWI 
Annex H: Evaluation of EU CP extern al study final report (plus web link) 
Annex I: Examples of policies featuring risk management plans Annex J: Main components of di saster risk management plans 
Annex K: Criteria for monitoring and evaluation of implementation Annex L: Current legisla tive and policy framework