EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 24.3.2009 
SEC(2009) 364 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
Accompanying the 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL  
 
On the functioning of Commission Regulati on (EC) No 358/2003 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain cate gories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices in the insurance sector 
  
{COM(2009) 138 final}
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ .. 6 
1. Background and aims of the review............................................................................. 6 2. Purpose and scope of the Report and of the Working Document................................ 7 
3. Insurance markets in the EU ........................................................................................ 7 4. Methodology and data.................................................................................................. 8 4.1. Phase One (leading up to and incl uding the Consultation Paper)................................ 8 
4.2. Phase Two (leading up to the Report to th e European Parliament and Council)......... 9 
4.3. The Sector Inquiry into Business Insurance............................................................... 10 4.4. Consultation of NCAs................................................................................................ 11 5. Approach to analysis of whether to renew BER ........................................................ 12 5.2. If the BER is not renewed .......................................................................................... 13 5.2.1. Applicability of Article  81(1) of the Treaty............................................................... 13 
5.2.2. Applicability of Article  81(3) of the Treaty............................................................... 14 
II. JOINT CALCULATIONS, TABLES AND STUDIES ...................................................... 14 
1. Scope of the BER....................................................................................................... 14 1.1. What the BER covers................................................................................................. 14 1.1.1. Agreements which relate to certain  joint calculati ons and tables .............................. 14 
1.1.2. Agreements which relate to the jo int carrying-out of certain studies ........................ 15 
1.2. What the BER does not cover .................................................................................... 16 2. Main findings of the review and analysis .................................................................. 16 2.1. Question One: is the insuran ce sector special or different to other sectors such that it 
gives rise to an enhanced need for cooperation in this area? ..................................... 16 
2.1.1. Data from joint calculations, tables and studi es is important in order to price risks in 
the insurance sector.................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Question Two: If the answer to question one  is positive, does this enhanced need for 
cooperation require a legal instrument in order to protect or facilitate it?................. 17 
2.2.1. Cooperation is useful, particularly for small and medium sized insurers.................. 17 2.2.2. Cooperation increases consistency in terms of Solvency II....................................... 18 2.2.3. Alternatives to cooperation ........................................................................................ 18 
EN 3   EN 2.3. Question Three: if the answer to question two is positive, what is the most 
appropriate legal instrument?..................................................................................... 19 
2.3.1. Questions about the scope of the current BER........................................................... 19 2.3.2. Exemption under the BER – current thinking............................................................ 19 2.3.3 Whether BER is most appropriate and if so in what form? ....................................... 21 3. Conclusions and Proposals......................................................................................... 22 
III. STANDARD POLICY CONDITIONS AND MODELS .................................................. 23 
1. Scope of the BER....................................................................................................... 23 1.1. What the BER covers................................................................................................. 23 1.1.1. Agreements on SPCs.................................................................................................. 23 1.1.2. Agreements on Models on Profits.............................................................................. 23 1.2. What the BER does not cover .................................................................................... 23 2. Main findings of the review and analysis .................................................................. 24 2.1. Question One: is the insuran ce sector special or different to other sectors such that it 
gives rise to an enhanced  need for cooperation?........................................................ 24 
2.1.1. SPCs are not specific to  the insurance sector............................................................. 24 
2.2. Question Two: does this enhanced need for cooperation require a legal instrument in 
order to protect or facilitate it?................................................................................... 24 
2.3. Applicability of Article 81 ......................................................................................... 24 2.3.1. Applicability of Article 81(1)..................................................................................... 25 2.3.2. Applicability of Article 81(3)..................................................................................... 26 2.4 Effects on SPC cooperation in  event of non-renewal ................................................ 27 
3. Conclusions and Proposals......................................................................................... 27 
IV. COMMON COVERAGE OF CERTAI N TYPES OF RISKS (POOLS).......................... 29 
1. Scope of the BER....................................................................................................... 29 1.1. Pools newly created which cover new risks............................................................... 29 
1.2. Pools covering risks which are not new..................................................................... 29 
1.3. What the BER does not cover- Co(re) insurance on subscription markets................ 30 
2. Main findings of the review and analysis .................................................................. 30 2.1. Question One: is the insuran ce sector special or different to other sectors such that it 
gives rise to an enhanced  need for cooperation?........................................................ 30 
EN 4   EN 2.2. Question Two: if the answer to Question one  is positive, does this enhanced need for 
cooperation require a legal instrument in order to protect or facilitate it?................. 30 
2.2.1. The need for a consistent approach  regarding market share rules ............................. 30 
2.2.2. Pools can benefit from the BER provided they meet certain strict conditions .......... 31 
2.2.2.1. Some pools are outside the scope of the BE R because they are necessary and as such 
do not give rise to a rest riction of competition .......................................................... 32 
2.2.2.2. Some pools are outside the scope of the BE R because they do not comply with its 
conditions ................................................................................................................... 33  
2.2.2.3. Some pools are within th e scope of the BER............................................................. 35 
2.2.3. The simple existence of the BER does not provide for automatic cover for pools.... 35 2.2.3.1. The relevant market................................................................................................... . 35 
2.2.3.1.1.Available guidance................................................................................................... . 35 
2.2.3.1.2.Uncertainty in practice despite the BER ................................................................... 36 2.2.3.2. The notion of "new risks" .......................................................................................... 37 2.2.4. Pools appear to have positive effects ......................................................................... 38 2.2.5. Risk of reduction in cooperation for pools................................................................. 38 3. Conclusions and Proposals......................................................................................... 39 
V. SECURITY DEVICES........................................................................................................ 40 
1. Scope of the BER....................................................................................................... 40 1.1. What the BER covers................................................................................................. 40 1.1.1. Conditions of the BER ............................................................................................... 40 1.1.2. Link with the rules on the free movement of goods and services and on the freedom 
of establishment ......................................................................................................... 41 
1.2. What the BER does not cover .................................................................................... 42 1.2.1. Agreements in areas which are harmonised at EU level............................................ 42 1.2.2. Agreements in areas which do not comply with the conditions pr ovided in Article 9 
of the BER.................................................................................................................. 43 
2. Main findings of the Review and analysis ................................................................. 44 2.1. Question One: is the insuran ce sector special or different to other sectors such that it 
gives rise to an enhanced  need for cooperation?........................................................ 44 
2.2. Question Two: does this enhanced need fo r cooperation require a legal instrument 
such as the BER in order to protect or facilitate it? ................................................... 44 
2.2.1. Competition issues on the downstream market for security devices ......................... 44 
EN 5   EN 2.2.2. The existence of obstacles to the fr ee movement of goods and services................... 44 
2.2.3. The scope of the BER is significantly reduced  or eliminated due to existing EU level 
harmonisation............................................................................................................. 45 
2.2.4. Transparency and non-discrimination in standard-setting ......................................... 45 2.3. Applicability of Article 81(3)..................................................................................... 46 3. Conclusions and Proposals......................................................................................... 47 
VI. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................ 48 
1. Options and proposals................................................................................................ 48 2. Next Steps .................................................................................................................. 48 
ANNEX 1 Definitions............................................................................................................ .. 50 
ANNEX 2 Replies to Consultation .......................................................................................... 52 ANNEX 3 Questions from Consultation on Join t Calculations, Tables and Studies............... 55 
ANNEX 4 Questions from Consulta tion on Standard Policy Cond itions and Models on Profits
............................................................................................................................... ................... 56 
ANNEX 5 Questions from Consultation on Co mmon Coverage of Risks (Pools).................. 57 
ANNEX 6 Questions from Consultation on Security Devices ................................................ 58 ANNEX 7 General Questions from Consultation.................................................................... 59 ANNEX 8 Questionnaires to Small and Medium Sized Insurers following Consultation ...... 61 
ANNEX 9 Questionnaires to Pools following Consultation.................................................... 63 ANNEX 10 Questionnaires to Producer Federations  concerning Security Devices following 
Consultation ................................................................................................................... .......... 64 
ANNEX 11 Fire Detection and Fi re Alarm Systems-Harmonised European Standards ......... 66 
EN 6   EN I. INTRODUCTION 
1. B ACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE REVIEW  
1. Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/20031, the Insurance Block Exemption 
Regulation (the BER) applies Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (the Treaty)2 to four 
categories of agreements, decisions and con certed practices in the insurance sector 
namely agreements in relation to (i) joint calcu lations, tables and studies; (ii) standard 
policy conditions and models on pr ofits; (iii) the common coverage of certain types of risks 
(pools); and (iv) security devices. 
2. The European Commission (the Commission) is required, not later than six years after 
the entry into force3 of the BER to submit a report (the Report) to the European 
Parliament and Council on the functioning of the BER.4 
3. The BER will expire by default on 31 Marc h 2010. The intention of the Commission 
during 2008 was to review the functioning of the BER on the basis of a Consultation 
Paper as well as targeted questionnaires sent  to certain stakeholders (the Review). 
This Review was carried out in co-operation with the European Competition Network (ECN). The findings of the Review  to date are included in the Report as 
well as this accompanying Working Document. 
 
4. It should be noted that the Report and Working Document confine themselves to 
presenting the Commission's preliminary views on the functioning of Regulation 
358/2003 and do not prejudge in any respect a final decision on the outcome of the 
review. The Report and Working Document together constitute one of the steps in a 
comprehensive consultation process to which a ll stakeholders are invited to contribute. 
5. Since 1 May 2004, like most other sectors, the insurance sector has been subject to the 
generally applicable provisions of Counc il Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 (Regulation 1/2003) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Regulation 1/2003 provides that agreements that 
satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) are not prohibited, no prior decision to that effect 
being required. Undertakings and associations must now assess for themselves whether their agreements
5 are compatible with Article 81 of the Treaty. Only a few sectors 
currently benefit from a sector specific BER and there have been other sectors for which 
the relevant BER were not renewed.6. 
                                                   
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 of 27 February  2003 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector (Official 
Journal L 53, 28.02.2003). 
2 Wherever Article 81 is referred to in this docume nt, the reference is to Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 entered into force on 1 April 2003. 
4 This requirement was laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1534/91 (the Implementing 
Regulation) empowering the Commission to adopt a block exemption regulation in the insurance sector. 
5 Wherever the term "agreements" is used in this document, it shall mean agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices. 
6 Recent repeal of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the Application of 
Articles 85 and 86 [now named Articles 81 and 82] of th e Treaty to maritime transport; and the expiry of 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1459/2006 on the applic ation of Article 81(3) to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices concerning consultations on passenger tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports. 
EN 7   EN 6. The question now arises as to whether there are sufficient grounds to continue to declare 
by regulation Article 81(3) applicable to certain categories of agreements in the 
insurance sector.  
7. The BER applies only in relation to the specific categories of agreements and under the 
conditions set out in the BER. In that context it is important to note (though overlooked 
by many respondents to the Commission during the current Review as well as during the Sector Inquiry
7) that even if a new BER is not adopted, this does not necessarily mean 
that agreements previously falling under the BER become illegal. An assessment under 
Article 81(1) and, if applicable, under Article  81(3) rather than under the BER would be 
required. At the moment, in each case a legal assessment must also be undertaken in 
order for undertakings to determine whether the forms of cooperation in which they participate fulfil the conditions imposed by the BER. 
2. P
URPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE REPORT AND OF THE WORKING DOCUMENT  
8. The purpose of the Report and of the Working Document is to present the findings of the 
Commission's review of the functioning of  the BER over the past six years and to 
present the Commission's initial analysis of whether the BER should be renewed. 
9. Through this work, the Commission's intention is to analyse whether competition and 
consumers in the insurance sector are helped or hindered by the BER and whether any 
changes should be made to the current approach to the application of Article 81 in this 
area in particular in relation to each of the four forms of agreement exempted by the 
BER from the prohibition of Article 81(1). 
10. The scope of the Report and of the Working Document covers all of the EU-27 Member 
States. 
3. I NSURANCE MARKETS IN THE EU 
11. The Sector Inquiry Report contained an extensive account of how insurance markets are 
organized in the EU, including a significant amount of original research by the Commission services during the inquiry, which will not be repeated here. However, it is 
useful to recall briefly some salient features. 
12. Primary insurance markets for most risks tend to be national in scope, even when they 
are primarily served by consolidated multinational insurance groups. This is for a variety 
of reasons, of which the most important is probably the fact that insurance contracts are 
written under, and subject to, general national contract law as well as specific insurance 
law, and that liability issues similarly arise under national law which may substantially 
vary from one jurisdiction to another. In addition, there is a need for a local presence, 
often for distribution and always for claims se ttlement, and language issues may arise. It 
is natural thus to characterise the organiza tion of the market as multi-domestic and to 
                                                  
 
7 As noted in the Final Report, almost all replies failed to make a distinction between the necessity of the forms 
of cooperation covered by the BER, and the necessity of the BER itself. The primary initial objective of the 
BER was to exclude certain generic types of agreement from the ambit of Article 81(1) and limit the BER to 
those agreements for which it can be assumed with sufficient certainty, satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) 
- thereby obviating the need for separate and time-consuming individual exemptions (see page 77 of the Final Report and the preamble to the BER). 
EN 8   EN exclude, in many cases, the possibility of an y competitive constraint from cross-border 
providers short of actual entry. 
13. The mode of entry for insurers seeking to enter new markets has, to date, usually been 
through acquisition of a local company which becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer. 
Greenfield entry is uncommon. National markets tend as a consequence to be quite 
concentrated, especially in the major categories of risk. 
14. The insurance industry has tended not to be examined outside the industry with the same 
degree of interest as other areas of financial services. This is likely gradually to change, 
with the Commission's work on Solvency II8, the Insurance Mediation Directive9 and the 
BER particularly in the forefront of the debate. 
4. M ETHODOLOGY AND DATA  
4.1. Phase One (leading up to and including the Consultation Paper) 
15. DG Competition, in November 2007 consulted the ECN for their experience and 
analysed its own relatively limited case experience in this area. It then began drafting a 
detailed Consultation Paper. The Consultation was opened in April 2008 for three 
months giving a significant time window for those interested to present evidence for renewal or non-renewal. 
16. The Consultation Paper primarily sought information on the functioning of the BER in 
particular in relation to how, where and by whom it was being used. It first generally set 
out the comments which the Commission received in relation to the BER on the Sector 
Inquiry. It then went on to review each exemption under the BER individually setting out the comments from the Sector Inquiry, the comments received from the consultation of 
NCAs on the functioning of the BER as well as the Commission's considerations and 
case experience in relation to the BER. Finally it asked a number of specific and detailed 
questions, both in relation to each exemption category and generally encouraging replies 
substantiated with evidence, from across the EU and all categories of stakeholders. 
17. In order to facilitate replies from a wide range and number of stakeholders DG 
Competition published the Consultation in English, French and German and also 
published a detailed press release in all the EU's official languages. 
18. Replies were received from a relatively small number of market participants as 
illustrated in the chart below. See also a list of respondents in Annex 2. The contents of the replies will be dealt with in detail in relation to each category of agreement exempted 
by the BER in the sections below. 
19. In order to cover all possible types of market  participants, a first round of questionnaires 
was also sent out to all national consumers associations and to several associations of 
undertakings representing customers (large customers and SMEs). Targeted questionnaires were sent to Supervisory Authorities in all Member States as well. 
                                                  
 
8 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament  and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the 
business of Insurance and Reinsurance - Solvency II, COM (2007) 361, 10 July 2007 
9 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/mediation_en.htm 
EN 9   EN 27
11
8
68
051015202530Number of Respondents
Insurance Associations Insurers Supervisory Authorities Other entities Consumers' Associations
Category of RespondentsRESPONDENTS TO THE CONSULTATION
 
4.2. Phase Two (leading up to the Report to the European Parliament and Council)  
20. Following closure of the Consultation, the Commission analysed the replies and sent out 
further detailed questionnaires in particular to  categories of stakeholders from whom it 
had received either no or a very limited direct response, namely, smaller insurers, pools 
and producer federations/associations of security devices. 
21. Table: Replies to Follow-up questionnaires 
Respondent Group Organisations / Undertakings 
to whom Questionnaires were sent
10 Replies Received  
Small Insurers 63 19 
Pools  37 27 
Producer 
Federations/Associations of producers of security devices 10 2 
TOTAL 110 48 
 
                                                   
10 Contact details for Small Insurers and Pools were primarily provided by the European Insurance Association, 
CEA and supplemented by the Commission's market research. 
EN 10   EN 22. These questionnaires were specifically targeted at how and in which instances the BER 
was being used. See Annexes 8, 9 and 10. 
23. All the non-confidential versions of the replie s to the Consultation, with the exception of 
submissions from NCAs, have been published on DG Competition's website. 
24. Furthermore the Commission's Services had a number of meetings during this review to 
discuss contributions or raise other questions with NCAs as well as with a range of stakeholders, insurers, insurance associations and pools. 
4.3. The Sector Inquiry 
25. 
The Commission recently completed a Sector  Inquiry into Business Insurance ('the 
Sector Inquiry')11. The Sector Inquiry had a different  scope to this Review of the 
BER: first, it concerned onl y the provision of insurance products and services to 
businesses in the Community; and second, it  was aimed at 'better understanding the 
functioning of the insurance se ctor with a view to ultimately identifying restrictive 
practices or distortions of competition.  
26. However, the Sector Inquiry also examined the use of the BER and market participants 
were invited to express their views on its necessity. The Interim Report was published on 
24 January 2007, with a public invitation to comment on its findings including the 
application of the BER12. The Commission obtained 44 replies from insurance 
companies, brokers, insurers associations, NCAs, most of which13 have been published 
on the DG Competition's website14. 
27. The main arguments put forward by respondents to the public consultation in the Sector 
Inquiry were: 
• Legal certainty is required as to the antitrust status of a given practice, in the sense 
that the BER has a clarifying character as an exemption ipso jure . 
• Costs deriving from the alleged additional administrative burden caused by assessing 
the legal compliance costs would ultimately be passed on to policyholders, which would trigger an increase in insurance premiums. 
• Fears were also expressed that without the BER, competition rules would be applied 
inconsistently across the 27 Member States of the EU. 
• Market participants also insisted that the variations in the use of the BER across 
Member States do not mean that the BER is no longer useful. They explained that 
differences in the use of the BER may originate from different legislation (high 
number of compulsory insurance policies in some Member States) or from the fact 
that Member States' insurance markets are at different stages of development (e.g. 
                                                  
 
11 On 13 June 2005, the Commission initiated a sector inquiry into the provision of insurance products and 
services to businesses in the Community, based on article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. See the 
Final Report of 25 September 2007 (The Communication from the Commission and The Commission Staff 
Working Document):  
 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/ financial_services/inquiries/business.html  
12 See Section XI.3 of the Interim Report. 
13 With the exception of those labeled confidential in their entirety or for which no non-confidential version was 
provided. 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/financia l_services/inquiries/replies_interim_report/index.html  
EN 11   EN countries in central and Eastern Europe have recently developed from monopolies to 
competitive markets). Some respondents interpreted the diverging use of the BER as 
a sign of competition, claiming that the BER is used most in Member States that are 
mature and highly competitive. 
• The forms of cooperation allowed under the BER effectively facilitate market entry 
for insurers with insufficient expertise. If there is better knowledge and accessible risk information, the argument is that this leads to more entry to the market (in particular 
by insurers with insufficient scale/historical expertise). 
• Non-renewal of the BER would cause a larger number of compliance issues with 
supervisory authorities as a consequence of the fact that insurance companies would develop their activities on markets on which they are not specialised but no longer 
have the benefit of access to the experience of other insurers. 
28. The Commission's Services concluded that the evidence received suggested that the 
practices covered by the BER are in most cases unproblematic or even desirable in the 
market. However, the Commission noted that the Sector Inquiry did not produce "compelling reasons"
15 to renew the BER, which may also cover some practices which 
distort competition. A conclusion on this matter was not reached as it was outside the 
scope of the Sector Inquiry Report. However, the Final Report encouraged market 
participants to continue their reflection, in advance of the current Review, focusing more 
on the necessity of the legal instrument of the BER itself than on the necessity of the specific forms of cooperation covered by the BER. 
4.4. Consultation of NCAs 
29. During the consultation of NCAs on the functioning of the BER the following comments 
were received: 
• Many NCAs consider that the BER is used  as a justification for a wide-range of 
information exchange. This may result in a restriction of competition. Also, it was 
observed that co-insurance groups could be used in certain cases to coordinate and 
engage in cartel activity. 
• One NCA considers that price uniformity in the sector could be combated by 
allowing the BER to expire. 
• In another's experience, data sharing on risks tends to overlap with a general 
exchange of information, including commercial premiums, especially in the motor-
vehicle insurance market. 
• However, the ability to share information as allowed under the BER may decrease 
premium fees for consumers since insurers may need to tie up less capital if they have more information on risks. This may in turn facilitate entry for smaller insurers and 
for insurers established in other Member States and decrease administrative and other 
expenses. 
                                                  
 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Council Regulation 
No. 1/2003 on Business Insurance (Final Report), paragraph 41.  
EN 12   EN • Some NCAs noted that exchanges of information are only performed through the 
National Insurers' Federation and there are no direct exchanges of information 
between insurance associations. Furthermore, insurers appear to use the BER for 
information sharing but only in the retail sector. There does not appear to be any data sharing in more concentrated business markets. 
• New entrants to a Member State often use data available to them in other Member 
States where they are also active. 
• Standard policy conditions offered by insurers based on net prices may represent 
agreements on discounts. These are not binding but they do provide an indication to 
insurers of the kind of discounts that can be offered. Such systematic approaches go 
beyond the exemptions envisaged by the BER and Article 81(3). 
• Some NCAs are against renewal and consider that there are no elements to justify the 
continuance of a specific insurance BER fixing rules which are different from those applying to other sectors. They consider that insurers should self-assess their 
agreements on the basis of Article 81(3), as is required in other sectors. 
• A few NCAs were more in favour than against renewal on the basis of the following 
arguments: i) the BER enables more accurate calculation of risks to the advantage of 
newcomers and smaller companies, particularly with regards to facilitating market 
entry; ii) the BER is consequently a sour ce of market diversity, lower premiums and 
higher transparency for consumers; iii) they have not experienced competition 
problems in applying the BER; iv) the BER may facilitate the consistent application 
of competition rules across 27 Member States; v) cooperation on standard policy 
conditions makes it easier for buyers to sw itch insurance providers and results in 
cheaper premiums for the buyer as long as these conditions are non-binding; vi) the BER can be an instrument of legal certainty; and vii) the insurance industry has a 
unique nature raising problems of information asymmetry. 
• A recent Report from the EFTA Surveillan ce Authority concerning its own sector 
inquiry into business insurance in the EFTA States shows that it is highly 
concentrated and that insurers do not rely on shared data to calculate risk for most 
insurance classes (except for a few cases limited to specific insurance classes typically with a relatively low share of gross premiums written).
16  
5. A PPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF WHETHER TO RENEW BER  
30. The Working Document deals in Chapters II to V with each of the four categories of 
agreements that are exempted under the BER. At the end of each Chapter, the 
Commission draws together the conclusions of its analysis and makes proposals for the future of the BER. 
31. In relation to each of the four categories of agreement exempted by the BER, the 
analysis as to whether or not to renew it follows the same analytical process by 
addressing a number of key questions. Those key questions are: 
                                                  
 
16 The EFTA Surveillance Authority acknowledges that the results of the survey are biased towards larger 
insurers (due to an over-representation of large insu rance companies); and that smaller insurers may use 
external databases to a larger extent. 
EN 13   EN (a) whether the business risks or other issues in the insurance sector make it "special" 
and different to other sectors such that this leads to an enhanced need for 
cooperation amongst insurers; 
(b) if the answer to the question in (a) is po sitive this gives rise to a second question as 
to whether this enhanced need for cooperation requires a legal instrument such as 
the BER or Guidance to protect or facilitate it (in comparison to other sectors for example, where there a high level of cooperation without such a legal instrument); 
and 
(c) if the answers to the questions in (a) and (b) are positive this in turn raises a third 
and final question as to what is the most appropriate legal instrument (i.e. whether 
it is the current BER or whether partial renewal, amended renewal, or Guidance would be more appropriate). 
32. In order to answer the above questions the Commission's Services considered the 
following issues: 
(i) whether there is a significant and real risk that there would be less 
cooperation (i.e. that a category of agreements would not be entered into) in the event of non-renewal to the disadvantage of both competition and 
consumers or have other negative consequences; 
(ii) whether the BER is currently being used and if so in which Member States, 
for which insurance lines and which forms of cooperation are used most 
intensively; 
(iii) whether alternative, reasonable and practicable arrangements could not be 
made which would create greater benefits to consumers; and 
(iii) pro-competitive and consumer aspects of each category of agreement under 
the BER. 
5.2. If the BER is not renewed 
33. If the BER is not renewed, or is partially renewed, an analysis under Article 81(1) and, if 
appropriate, under Article 81(3) should be undertaken. 
5.2.1. Applicability of Article 81(1) of the Treaty  
34. It is possible that an agreement or pool does not give rise to a restriction of competition 
and is therefore not caught by Article 81(1) . This would be the case for instance as 
regards pool members which are not actual or potential competitors, as explained in 
Chapter IV, Section 2.2.2.1. Moreover, agreements whose activity do not influence the 
relevant parameters of competition because they are of minor importance and/or do not 
appreciably affect trade between Member States
17 are not caught by Article 81(1). 
                                                   
17 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty, OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, p.13 and Guidelines on the effect on trade concept , OJ C 
101, 27.4.2004, p.81. 
EN 14   EN 5.2.2. Applicability of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
35. Where forms of cooperation are caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty, the undertakings 
involved need to ensure that they fulfil the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3)18. 
36. Any restrictive agreements that fulfil the four conditions of Article 81(3) are covered by 
its exemption from prohibition. This analysis in corporates a sliding scale. The greater the 
restriction of competition found under Article 81(1), the greater the efficiencies and the pass-on to consumers must be. 
37. It is up to the undertakings involved to demonstrate that the cooperation they are part of 
promotes technical or economic progress in the form of efficiency gains. This is 
discussed further in relation to each of the chapters below. In addition, where an 
exemption under the BER is not renewed, the Commission intends to give reasons in a Communication stating that it will not renew. It is also likely to include the extent to 
which the Commission considers that the conditions of the current BER can be used as 
guidance in this event. 
38. Consumers must receive a fair share of the efficiencies generated. Under Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty, it is the beneficial effects on all consumers in the relevant market that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each individual consumer
19. The pass-on of 
benefits must at least compensate consumers for any actual or potential negative impact 
caused to them by the restriction of competition under Article 81(1)20. 
39. An agreement must not impose restrictions that are not indispensable to the attainment of 
the efficiencies. In this respect it is necessary to examine whether the parties could have achieved the efficiencies on their own. 
40. Finally, the cooperation in question must not afford the parties the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question. 
41. All positive effects of an agreement includi ng those mentioned by respondents to the 
Consultation and Questionnaires can be considered on a case-by-case basis when undertaking a legal analysis under Article 81(1) and (3). 
II. JOINT CALCULATIONS, TABLES AND STUDIES 
1. S COPE OF THE BER  
1.1. What the BER covers 
1.1.1. Agreements which relate to certain joint calculations and tables 
42. The BER (Article 1(a)) exempts agreements which relate to the joint establishment and 
distribution of (i) calculations of the average cost of covering a specified risk in the past 
and (ii) calculations in connection with insurance involving an element of capitalisation, 
                                                   
18 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), OJ C 101, 27.4.2004. 
19 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 23 November 2006 in Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax v Asociation de 
Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) , (2006) ECR I-11125, paragraph 70. 
20 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), cited above in footnote n° 16. 
EN 15   EN mortality tables, and tables showing the frequency of illness, accident and invalidity 
(Tables). 
43. Agreements in relation to (i) and (ii) above  are covered by the BER only on condition 
that they are: 
(1) based on the assembly of data, spread over a number of risk-years chosen as an 
observation period, which relate to identical or comparable risks in sufficient number to constitute a base which can be handled statistically and which will yield 
figures on ( inter alia ): 
• the number of claims during the said period, 
• the number of individual risks insured in each risk-year 
• of the chosen observation period, 
• the total amounts paid or payable in respect of claims 
• arisen during the said period, 
• the total amount of capital insured for each risk-year during the chosen observation 
period; 
(2) include as detailed a breakdown of the available statistics as is actuarially 
adequate; 
(3) do not include in any way elements for contingencies, income deriving from 
reserves, administrative or commercial costs or fiscal or para-fiscal contributions, 
and take into account neither revenues from investments nor anticipated profits. 
Furthermore, the BER applies only where the results of the calculations, or tables: 
(4) do not identify the insurance undertakings concerned or any insured party; (5) when compiled and distributed, include a statement that they are non-binding; 
(6) are made available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to any insurance 
undertaking which requests a copy of them, including insurance undertakings which are not active on the geographical or product market to which those 
calculations or tables results refer. 
1.1.2. Agreements which relate to the joint carrying-out of certain studies 
44. The BER (Article 1(b)) exempts agreements on the probable impact of general 
circumstances external to the interested undertakings, either on the frequency or scale of future claims for a given risk or risk category or on the profitability of different types of 
investment and the distribution of the results of such studies. 
45. Similarly to the calculations and tables mentioned above, the BER only covers these 
agreements on condition that the study results: 
(1) do not identify the insurance undertakings concerned or any insured party; 
EN 16   EN (2) when compiled and distributed, include a statement that they are non-binding; 
(3) are made available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to any insurance 
undertaking which requests a copy of them, including insurance undertakings 
which are not active on the geographical or product market to which those 
calculations or tables results refer. 
1.2. What the BER does not cover 
46. Agreements in relation to the joint calculations, tables and studies will not be covered by 
the BER where participating undertakings enter into an undertaking or commitment 
among themselves, or oblige other undertakings, not to use calculations or tables that 
differ from those established as outlined in Artic le 1(a) of the BER (set out above) or not 
to depart from the results of the studies referred to in Article 1(b) (also set out above). 
2. M AIN FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
2.1. Question One: is the insurance sector sp ecial or different to other sectors such that 
it gives rise to an enhanced need for cooperation in this area? 
2.1.1. Data from joint calculations, tables and studies is important in order to price risks in the 
insurance sector 
47. The costs of insurance products are unknown at the time the price is agreed and the risk 
covered. This makes access to past statistical data crucial in order to technically price 
risks. Some respondents to the Consultation and targeted Questionnaires argued that the 
availability of this kind of data is very important in order for them to be able to reliably 
assess risk, build stochastic models, correctly analyse cost and choose a price by calculating the risk exposure on the basis of historical data. 
48. Since calculation of risk is a key issue in pricing all insurance products, this aspect 
appears to be a differentiating factor from other sectors including the banking sector.
21 
Although, the UK NCA has pointed out that this form of cooperation is not being used in 
the UK, which could be an indication that it is not specific to the insurance industry, insurers in the majority of Member States argue that they do cooperate in this area and 
continue to emphasise the importance of this cooperation for their activities. 
49. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence before the Commission, it appears that 
cooperation in this area is both specific to the insurance industry and may be necessary 
(in at least most Member States) in order to  price risks. In particular, most respondents 
on this issue highlighted that, in the absence of the BER, the competitiveness of small 
insurance companies would decrease, driving smaller insurers out of the market, due to 
the restricted size of their portfolio. 
                                                  
 
21 Credit registers in the field of banking seem to be a similar feature. However,  there are a number of 
fundamental differences. Credit registers are often run by private companies, they are often only 'negative 
lists' (i.e. bad clients). Furthermore,  Banks can ask for collateral whereas insurance companies have no such 
option. 
EN 17   EN 2.2 Question Two: If the answer to question one is positive, does this enhanced need for 
cooperation require a legal instrument in order to protect or facilitate it? 
2.2.1. Cooperation is useful, particularly for small and medium sized insurers 
50. Agreements which increase the number of insurers potentially capable of covering a 
given risk generally increase market access and competition. The fact that major insurers 
are allowed to engage in cooperation on the calculation of risk cover may enable entry of small and medium sized firms. It appears that large insurers can also generally benefit 
from a broader statistical base, even if their in ternal statistics would have been sufficient. 
However, grouped statistics must be justifie d by similarity of risks, if necessary 
interpreted sufficiently broadly to reach the minimum size having statistical relevance, 
but not resulting in the grouping of obviously disparate risks. 
51. The vast majority of respondents drew our attention to the industry need to cooperate on 
this issue and connected it to the existence of the BER. 
52. One could argue that the pro-competitive character of such cooperation on statistics 
would, even in the absence of the BER, not fall under Article 81(1) or would be 
exempted under Article 81(3). However, an argument submitted not only by insurers, but also by some supervisory authorities and a risks management federation 
22 is that without 
the BER, insurers would no longer cooperate on joint calculations, tables and studies or 
would not share the outcome of any cooperation with smaller or foreign insurers. Indeed 
some large insurers (who, according to insura nce associations, would be able to compile 
the relevant information alone or by involving perhaps one or two other large insurers) may have no incentive to do so without the condition in the BER requiring that where 
such agreements do exist, the resulting calculations, tables and studies must be made 
available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. However, it should be noted that 
insurance companies are under regulatory pressure (for example, under the Solvency II 
Directive) to exchange information and improve their risk management systems. Whereas the BER requires that when insurance companies enter into these forms of 
cooperation, they must give access to the information compiled, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, to other companies, it was argued that in the event of non-renewal of the BER, 
insurers could cooperate to prevent access by for example, smaller or foreign insurance 
companies, to the information compiled in order to narrow the market. 
53. This would be to the disadvantage of smaller/foreign insurers who would be prevented or 
discouraged from entering the market since assessing risk on the basis of their own 
tables and studies alone would be insufficient to allow them to cover certain risks. Some 
respondents pointed out that cooperation on joint calculations, tables and studies is 
necessary in order to allow new entry (in particular greenfield entry) and that the absence of such cooperation would lead to the creation of entry barriers, which would in turn 
increase the concentration in the market, li mit the supply of insurance products and, 
consequently, decrease competition. Consumers in turn would be negatively affected by 
a reduced range of insurance products, from fewer insurance companies. 
54. A number of respondents during the Review in particular small and medium sized 
insurers said they could not have entered the market with the use of this part of the BER. 
Arguments were also made that (a) competition is increased by the availability of data 
that small companies can directly and easily find and (b) that transparency of the 
historical data and publication of market trends are important tools in the formation of a 
                                                  
 
22 FERMA (Federation of European Risks Management Associations). 
EN 18   EN correct cost related price. Moreover, customers can easily (c) choose among products 
and services and (d) better compare between them. 
55. Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence before the Commission, it appears that the 
newer a market is, the more important it is to have access to the data from joint 
calculations, tables and studies in order to assist entrants to accurately assess risk. 
56. The antitrust regime for insurance in the US is notably different to that in the EU. The 
US McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 provides a targeted exemption from antitrust laws, 
for certain limited insurance activities23, whereas in the EU, the BER is only a 
presumption that Article 81(3) applies, - meaning that these categories are within the 
scope of competition law (Article 81(1) applies in the first place). The McCarran-
Ferguson exception was discussed in a Report24 issued by the Antitrust Modernisation 
Commission (AMC) on 3 April 2007 which, although it did not call for an outright 
repeal of the exemption allowing insurers to share data, did recommend that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act should be further reviewed by the US Congress. 
2.2.2. Cooperation increases consistency in terms of Solvency II25 
57. Another argument from some respondents to the Consultation was that non-cooperation 
in this field would hamper the implementation of Solvency II, which encourages data 
exchange between insurers. Solvency II will impose a new risk-sensitive solvency 
regime and will require firms to have high-quality risk management and actuarial data. 
Whilst not imposing the use of pooled and external data, it is implicitly accepted in the 
ongoing Solvency II debate that the use of such data would facilitate compliance with the standards envisaged in the new regime. 
2.2.3. Alternatives to cooperation 
58. Some respondents to the Consultation and Questionnaires made clear that alternatives to 
horizontal cooperation do exist. In particular, insurers could add to their research and 
development staff in order to conduct market surveys and analyses themselves. Alternatively, best practice may be for governments or public organisations to collect 
and publish data. However the evidence appears to be that the first option is not an 
efficient way to achieve this goal and that  the second is not necessarily a resource 
priority for public organisations or governments. 
59. 
The Commission's Services considered the question of whether cooperation in this 
area is so important to the insurance industry, that the le gal risks caused by any lack 
of legal certainty woul d, be secondary to the need to cooperate and as such would not 
significantly restrict it. However, it appears at  this stage that even if the risk may be 
low, the possibility that such pro-comp etitive cooperation may be diminish, should 
be avoided.  
                                                   
23 This exemption (amongst other things which are irrele vant to this question) allows insurance companies to 
exchange data regarding losses and other factors and allows the development of standardised policy 
language.  
24 This Report addressed, inter alia, the argument that th e exemption is necessary for insurers to share data and 
that this exemption, and the shared data, in particul ar benefits smaller insurers. AMC found the justification 
"questionable" and responded that, under the current application of antitrust law, the data sharing would be evaluated under the rule of reason that would take into consideration the pro-competitive effects of the activity.  
25 The Commission adopted the Solvency II Directive Proposal in July 2007, with the aim of modernising 
regulation and supervision in the insurance sector. 
EN 19   EN 60. Thus, it appears that there are good reasons to  protect and facilitate the agreements on 
cooperation in this area. The next question is to consider whether the current BER is 
doing this effectively. 
2.3. Question Three: if the answer to question two is positive, what is the most 
appropriate legal instrument? 
2.3.1. Questions about the scope of the current BER 
61. The Commission's Services considered the question of whether a blanket block 
exemption such as the current BER may be too broad in its risk coverage for the three 
reasons: 
62. First, certain statistics, such as the producti on of mortality tables, seem to require little 
cooperation since life expectancies are widely known, often published and are not subject to sudden and large changes. Some information can be found in population 
dynamics research or public available info rmation; for example, in Italy, ISTAT 
provides tables concerning the Italian population concerning demographic risk and 
behavioural tendencies. However, several respondents also pointed out that government 
information is often only partial, inadequate or difficult to find or access. 
63. Second, more pro-competitive solutions may exist to overcome the information problem 
in particular instances. For example, if policy holders were rated and this information is 
communicated to them, they can switch insurance companies carrying this information 
with them.  
64. Third, it is not clear to what extent the uncertainty underlying premium calculation is not 
a normal business risk. However, some respondents highlighted particular circumstances 
where risk information can be only obtained by the common efforts of the whole 
insurance industry, especially in the case of information on natural catastrophes; because 
the access to such data would be t oo cost-intensive and time-consuming. 
2.3.2. Exemption under the BER – current thinking 
65. Agreements that set pure and risk premiums have been exempted by the BER
26, as they 
are not prices, but statistical indicators.27 The commercial (or gross) premium is the price 
                                                   
26 Complaint against Italian legislation establishing a claims settlement system (2007):  The complainant 
alleged that the direct settlement system imposed by the Italian legislation requiring insurance companies to 
enter into an agreement whereby claims settlement should be performed on the basis of average costs of risks in the past was anticompetitive. The complainant argued, inter alia,  that insurers will set commercial 
premiums not on the basis of supply and demand but inst ead on standardised average costs based on the cost 
of claims borne by all member companies. The complain t was rejected. First, contrary to these allegations, 
the claims settlement system does not oblige insurance companies to set insurance rates on standardized average costs, but to establish financial settlements on the basis of average costs, calculated on the basis of 
claims actually paid during the previous year. Secondly, the joint establishment and distribution of calculations of the average costs of covering a specified risk in the past is permitted, under certain conditions, 
by Articles 1a) and 3 of the BER.  
27 The Test Achats complaint (1995): The case involved the Belgian professional association of insurance 
companies (UPEA) and had been communicated to the Commission by the Belgian consumer association, 
Test Achats . It had complained, inter alia , about a recommendation from UPEA aiming to establish a 
minimum pure premium for the coverage of hospital expenses in the case of group contracts. There was a uniform premium for contracts with groups containing up to 10 members and reductions for contracts with 
larger groups. There was nothing to indicate that this recommendation was based on statistical data. The 
Commission consequently, concluded that the recommendation was not covered by the BER. The recommendation was withdrawn and the file closed. 
EN 20   EN that the insured pays to cover a given risk and corresponds to the risk premium plus the 
administrative costs and the profit margin of the individual insurer. The risk premium 
reflects the net cost of the cover and is fixed by first determining the pure (or net) 
premium, which is based on the statistical data concerning the frequency and the average 
intensity of the risk in the past, and by then applying to it a coefficient which takes 
account of forecasts of the future occurrence of the risk. 
66. On the other hand, agreements that set or recommend uniform commercial premiums 
have been considered price-fixing agreements falling within Article 81(1)28 of the EC 
Treaty and not normally capable of being exempted. 
67. In practice, both the Commission's and NCAs' consider the possibility that cooperation is 
a cover for the anti-competitive exchange of information, as was the case in Italy or, most recently, in Bulgaria. Following a general inquiry, the Italian Competition 
Authority criticised the maintenance of a uniform system of parameters with similar 
values to calculate repairing costs as one of the major causes of the increase in 
premiums. Although A.N.I.A (The Italian Insurers' Association) formally abandoned the 
system, it continued to encourage the insurance companies to follow the same criteria and was fined for infringing Article 81(1) in 2005. The Bulgarian NCA adopted a 
decision
29 in July 2008 against insurers who agreed, to define and respect the common 
minimum risk premium in their activities. Risk premiums established by insurers 
actually became commercial premiums (final insurance prices) as soon as the parties 
agreed to "obey the common minimum risk premium…when determining their minimum tariffs and not to allow conclusion of insurance on prices below the thus determined 
minimum threshold". This was considered price fixing and so was outside the scope of 
the BER. 
68. Also, individual instances of widespread practices
30, when they result from agreements 
between undertakings, may fall within the scope of Article 81(1).31 
69. In some cases, the infringing recommendations were abandoned and the cases closed.32 
The Commission has sometimes started ex-officio investigations in order to check if 
                                                   
28 Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer e.V.v Commission (1987) ECR 405: The German Association of 
Property Insurers recommended increases in commercial premiums for industrial fire and consequential loss 
insurance in specified circumstances. Although the r ecommendation was stated to be non-binding, the Court 
held that it reflected the Association's aim to coordinate the conduct of its members. 
29 CPC Decision № 576/15.07.2008 on CPC Case № KZK-765/20.12.2007. After the appeal before the 
Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) the Decision was conf irmed by the court which rejected the appeals of 
all the appellants. The SAC judgment is currently being appealed before the Court of Cassation whose decision will be final.  
30 As a result of the Commission's investigations during the Sector Inquiry, it appeared that widespread 
practices in both co-reinsurance and coinsurance markets almost always results in an alignment of premiums 
and other conditions of coverage. Potential co(re)insurers are asked to indicate the share of the cover and the 
price they would be willing to accept. Once a lead insurer has been determined, the broker will negotiate and agree terms and premiums with this insurer. The broker subsequently approaches the follow market to fill 100% of the cover and advises the following co-insurers the same terms and conditions, including premium, as the ones agreed upon with the lead-insurer. 
31 Paragraph 15 of the Communication of the Commission on the Sector Inquiry of 25 September 2007:  
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex UriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0556:FIN:EN:PDF  
32 E.g.: Commission Decision 93/3/EEC of 4 December 1992 - Lloyd's Underwriters' Association and The 
Institue of London Underwriters OJ L004, 08/01/1993 p.26-31: The Joint Hull Understandings agreement 
recommended minimum increases in premiums, fixed the rate of increase in deductibles and fixed the rebate 
paid for prompt cash payment and for deferred payment. The notification carried out by UPEA (The Belgian 
professional association of insurance companies) in 1988:  This case involved a recommendation concerning 
the calculation of premiums for so-called special risks, concerning fire coverage for properties with a value 
EN 21   EN some recommendations of insurance associations met all conditions of the BER.33 
Insurance associations have also been fined by NCAs34 for cooperation infringing Article 
81(1). 
70. It should be noted that the Commission also now considers that calculations on pure-
premiums should be non-binding.35  
71. However, these cases concern cooperation on commercially sensitive information which 
is outside the scope of the BER and which can be sanctioned both in the absence and in 
the presence of the BER. On the basis of the evidence before the Commission, 
cooperation within the limits of the BER appears to be generally pro-competitive. 
2.3.3 Whether BER is most appropriate and if so in what form? 
72. On the basis of the analysis above and the evidence before it, the Commission considers 
there to be particular risks in relation to the non-renewal of this exemption which lead to 
a relatively high risk of smaller/foreign insurers being driven out of or being prevented 
from entering the market. This may result in adverse consequences for consumers. 
Without the BER, large insurers may continue to cooperate without the explicit 
obligation in the BER to share data with smaller/foreign insurers (in order for such agreements to fall under the BER). Moreover, renewing this particular exemption might 
avoid possible inconsistency with the Solvency II principles and other EU directives. 
73. The current BER appears to be working effectively for competition and consumers. 
However, the Commission has not yet decided whether to amend the structure or 
drafting of the current exemption and whether, if concluded that renewal is necessary, it should be total or partial. This will depend on the further input it may receive and on a 
thorough and specific analysis of all data and information available. In terms of 
improving the current exemption, the Commission will consider a range of options 
including (i) whether the scope of this exemption can be narrowed on the basis of risk 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
above a certain amount. Having regard to the considerable divergences between the premiums charged by 
insurers, the Commission restricted itself to informing the association of the incompatibility of its recommendation with the BER and finally closed the case without further action. The notification submitted 
by UNESPA (Unión Española de Entidades Aseguradoras y Reaseguradotas) in 2000:  This notification 
involved a decision of an association of undertakings (UNESPA) related to the creation of a database 
containing the history of the contracts signed-up by the policy-holders of motor vehicle insurance, as well as 
the damages linked with these contracts for previous last five years. The periodic exchange of information, the sensitivity of the information exchanged (lists of clients, price elements) and the homogeneity of the products led the Commission to appreciate that this exchange of information agreement facilitated or encouraged the anti-competitive behaviour of the insurance companies participating in it.  
33 In 1997, an ex-officio procedure was started by the Commission in relation to certain A.N.I.A  (The Italian 
Insurers' Association) recommendations.  The investigation proved that A.N.I.A did not collect data on 
commercial premiums, nor recommend commercial pr emiums. However, the investigation showed that 
insurance companies based their tariffs on very similar parameters (for instance: bonus/malus; type of fuel; age of the policyholder) to which they attributed similar values. The Italian Competition Authority fined 38 insurance companies for exchange of information by concerted practices in the branch of motor vehicle insurance. The Commission then closed its case.  
34 Following a general inquiry, the Italian Competition Authority criticised the maintenance of a uniform 
system of parameters to calculate repairing costs as  one of the major causes of the increase in premiums. 
Although A.N.I.A formally abandoned the system, it continued to encourage the insurance companies to follow the same criteria and was fined for infringing Article 81(1) in 2005. 
35 Commission Decision 84/191/EEC of 30 March 1984 – Nuovo CEGAM, OJL 099, 11/04/1984, p.29-37 : An 
Italian association of insurers agreed not only to set pure premiums for industrial engineering insurance, but 
also to apply them jointly. The Commission exempted the agreement as it considered that it brought new 
competition onto the market (the members of the associ ation collectively had a 26% market share while their 
largest competitor had a 25% market share).  
EN 22   EN type; (ii) adding further examples of information which may be shared and of 
commercially sensitive information which may not be shared; and (iii) adding a 
transparency requirement such that shared  information should be more easily/freely 
accessible to non-insurance companies such as consumer organisations or private 
individuals. 
3. C ONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS  
74.  The Commission has not yet decided whether to amend the structure or drafting of 
the current exemption and whether, if concl uded that renewal is necessary, it should be 
total or partial. This will depend on the further input it may receive and on a thorough 
and specific analysis of all data and information available. 
EN 23   EN III. STANDARD POLICY CONDITIONS AND MODELS 
1. S COPE OF THE BER  
75. The BER exempts subject to certain conditions, the joint establishment and distribution 
of non-binding standard policy conditions (SPC s) for direct insurance; and non-binding 
models on profits36. 
1.1. What the BER covers  
1.1.1. Agreements on SPCs 
76. Agreements on the joint establishment and distribution of non-binding SPCs are only 
permitted under the BER on condition that they are established and distributed with an 
explicit statement that they are non-bindi ng and that their use is not in any way 
recommended. Furthermore, such agreements on SPCs are only exempt under the BER if 
they expressly mention the participating undertakings are free to offer different policy conditions to their customers and are accessible to any interested person (provided 
simply upon request).
37 
1.1.2. Agreements on Models on Profits 
77. Agreements on the joint establishment and distribution of non-binding models 
illustrating the profits to be realised from an insurance policy involving an element of 
capitalisation (Models) are only exempt  under the BER from the prohibition in 
Article 81(1) on condition that these Models  are established a nd distributed only by 
way of guidance. 
78. The Commission's Services received no comments from respondents during the 
course of its Review in re lation to models on profits. Th is category of agreements 
will therefore not be analysed further in this document.  
1.2. What the BER does not cover 
79. As mentioned above there are strict conditions which must be fulfilled before an 
agreement on SPCs will be covered by the BER. Furthermore the BER will not cover 
SPCs which include clauses which for example contain any indication of the level of 
commercial premiums; or require the policyholder to obtain cover from the same insurer for different risks.
38 
                                                   
36 Illustrating the profits to be realised from an insurance policy involving an element of capitalisation. 
37 Article 1 and 5 of the BER. 
38 A list of agreements which exclude cover by the BER is contained in Article 6 of the BER, namely, 
agreements which (a) contain any indication of the level of commercial premiums; (b) indicate the amount of 
the cover or the part which the policyholder must pay himself; (c) impose comprehensive cover including risks to which a significant number of policyholders are not simultaneously exposed; (d) allow the insurer to maintain the policy in the event that he cancels part of the cover, increases the premium without the risk or the scope of the cover being changed (without prejudice to indexation clauses), or otherwise alters the policy 
conditions without the express consent of the policyholde r; (e) allow the insurer to modify the term of the 
policy without the express consent of the policyholde r; (f) impose on the policyholder in the non-life 
assurance sector a contract period of more than three years; (g) impose a renewal period of more than one 
EN 24   EN 2. M AIN FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
2.1. Question One: is the insurance sector sp ecial or different to other sectors such that 
it gives rise to an enhanced need for cooperation? 
2.1.1. SPCs are not specific to the insurance sector 
80. Several insurers and insurers associations (for instance the LMA in the UK) argue that 
cooperation in order to establish standard policy conditions (SPCs) ensures that the costs incurred by insurers and in turn the premiums they charge to customers are kept low. 
They argue that without the BER, there woul d be an increase in insurers' and brokers' 
costs resulting from the increased effort required to agree wordings for policies due in 
particular to the lack of an agreed starting point. 
81. The Commission agrees that in many cases SPCs can give rise to positive effects for 
competition and consumers (as discussed below). However the question for this review 
is primarily whether this category of agreements is special to the insurance sector. The 
answer to that question appears to be that technically or legally complex agreements in 
fast changing legal environments are commonplace in a number of sectors and not 
specific to the insurance sector. SPCs are used in some of these sectors without the cover of sector-specific BERs. 
82. For example in the banking sector to whom the Commission's Services also sent 
questionnaires, SPCs are agreed between banks in a number of Member States, for 
services such as money transfer, issuance of cards, use of ATMs, account terms, credit 
agreements and payments. In addition it has been argued by representatives of the banking sector that it does not require a legislative framework (such as a BER) in order 
to set policy conditions and furthermore, that the absence of such a framework has not 
caused any tangible difficulties for banks. 
2.2. Question Two: does this enhanced need  for cooperation require a legal instrument 
in order to protect or facilitate it? 
83. As discussed above it appears that that co-operation on SPCs is not specific to the 
insurance sector and as such cooperation does not objectively require a sector specific 
BER. 
2.3. Applicability of Article 81 
84. As shown in Chapter I, Section 5.2, in the event that the BER is not renewed, Article 
81(3) together with the Guidelines on the a pplication of Article 81(3) will be applicable 
to the insurance sector, as is currently the case for the vast majority of sectors which do 
not benefit from a BER. The BER itself is "an application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance 
sector”. Given this fact and the evidence gath ered in this review, it is unlikely that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
year where the policy is automatically renewed unless notice is given upon the expiry of a given period; (h) 
require the policyholder to agree to the reinstatement of a policy which has been suspended on account of the disappearance of the insured risk, if he is once again exposed to a risk of the same nature; (i) require the policyholder to obtain cover from the same insurer for different risks; (j) require the policyholder, in the event of disposal of the object of insurance, to make the acquirer take over the insurance policy; (k) exclude 
or limit the cover of a risk if the policyholder uses security devices, or installing or maintenance 
undertakings, which are not approved in accordance with the relevant specifications agreed by an association or associations of insurers in one or severa l other Member States or at European level. 
EN 25   EN Commission or NCAs would consider that an SPC currently covered by the BER would 
fail to comply with Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. 
85. Indeed, most of the criteria used in the BER would remain valuable for interpretation 
purposes as regards the analysis under Article 81(3). Further guidance on SPCs may also 
be envisaged by the Commission in the event of non-renewal. 
2.3.1. Applicability of Article 81(1) 
86. Standard policy conditions would, in most  cases, be unlikely to fall within the 
prohibition of Article 81(1). 
87. However, there are some categories of agreem ent on SPCs which will usually fall foul of 
the prohibition in Article 81(1) in particular the categories of agreement listed in Article 
6 (the black list) of the BER. In the past, the Commission has received notifications for individual exemptions in the past, in relation to clauses which were on the black list of 
the BER. However, its view has been that the arguments in favour of exemption had to 
be particularly strong and that it had to be cautious not to open the door for any 
"softenings" of the black-list clauses.
39 In addition some respondents recalled that 
cooperation in respect of standard policy conditions should not be tied to cooperation in the establishment of risk premiums and pure premiums. 
88. SPCs allow the comparison of insurance policie s offered by different insurers allowing 
customers to verify the content of guarantees more easily and facilitating switching 
between insurers and insurance products. Similarly, the main effect of the proposed EU 
Directive on Consumer Credit Loans will be to provide standard, comparable information to customers across the EU when taking out a credit loan. 
89. However, whilst there is clearly a need fo r comparability between insurance products for 
consumers, this cannot be at the expense of homogeneous standard conditions which can 
hinder consumers' ability to find products suited to their needs, a risk highlighted by 
some respondents. Indeed, too much standardisation can harm consumers by limiting product choice, as pointed out by one consumer association
40 in its reply in relation to 
motor vehicle insurance. Comments that standard policy conditions are capable of being 
a hindrance to competition as they may influence the use by insurers of restrictive or 
exclusionary terms were also made in response to the present Commission's 
Consultation. 
                                                   
39 The notification of the German Association of Insu rers' (GDV’s) “Security Device Guidelines for Banks, 
Building Societies and other financial institutions) (2000): These Guidelines contained inter alia a general 
description of the risks and protection requirements, installations for reports of robbery and burglary, 
installations for optical monitoring of the rooms, special security devices as well as money and value transports. Furthermore, they contained a part dealing with recommended insurance premiums for cover of different types of value containers (such as safes etc) which were dependent on the robustness of the 
containers. The Commission considered that the recomm ended level of coverage sums for subscription was a 
black clause because of an indication of the amount of the cover. Even though the policy-holder could have benefited from the comparability of the conditions of the insurance companies and from the prevention of burglary and robbery in the form of lower insurance premiums and earlier compensation, as GDV argued, they were inevitably confronted with a range of similar products and similar prices. A similar assessment was made in relation to the notification of the GDV’s “S ecurity Device Guidelines for Banks, Building Societies 
and other financial institutions) (2000). 
  
40 Test Achats, Belgium. 
EN 26   EN 90. Clearly, concerns may arise with SPCs and responses during the Review were divided on 
whether the overall effect is restrictive of competition. A blanket BER such as is 
currently in place would therefore not appear appropriate since on the basis of the 
Commission's current evidence, an analysis of an agreement on SPCs would need to be 
undertaken in the context of the product and geographic market for which it is intended. 
2.3.2. Applicability of Article 81(3) 
91. In the event that an agreement on SPCs (outside of the black list in Article 6) were 
caught by Article 81(1), it may still fall within the effici ency exemption provided by 
Article 81(3). For example in one Commi ssion Decision, the complainant argued that 
the GDV member companies applied uniform conditions in occupational disability 
insurance and that this amounted to a “cartel” between the GDV members. The 
Commission rejected the complaint on the basis that it met the exemption conditions for Article 81(3) as set out in the BER. Furthermore there was no evidence that GDV 
or its members agreed, to oblige other undertakings to apply the standard policy conditions.
 41 
92. Replies to the Consultation and targeted questionnaires supported the initial view of the 
Commission and many NCAs that common standard policy conditions which are not 
black listed in the BER have advantages for consumers and competition. The variation in the frequency of use of standard policy conditions across EU Member States may depend 
on the national insurance regulations (e.g.: the high level of use of standard policy 
conditions in some Member States may be explained by the high number of compulsory 
insurance products). 
93. An argument made by some respondents in favour of SPCs is that new market entrants 
require sample insurance terms, in particular where a foreign language or a different 
jurisdiction is involved as this reduces the investment expenditure connected with entry 
into a new market. Furthermore, it was argued that without SPCs established by 
insurance associations a reverse effect could occur whereby big market players could set 
up their own conditions and smaller companies lacking the means and resources would have to follow. 
94. Respondents also argued that SPCs can facilitate  the insurance of new risks because once 
non-binding SPCs have been agreed for new risks, even small insurers can include new 
products in their product range from the very start of the coverage such new risks. 
95. The question arises as to whether customers should be involved in a more transparent 
way in the process of drafting standard policy conditions. On this issue the Commission's 
investigation into the behaviour of providers of aviation war and terrorism insurance in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 concluded in March 2005 with a 
settlement involving several reforms. These foresaw inter alia  greater transparency and 
customer involvement in key industry committees including one that establishes standard wordings for aviation insurance policies and clauses. A new Aviation Insurance Clauses 
Group would grant customers – previously not involved in the preparation of standard 
clauses - the opportunity to participate and make proposals.
42  
                                                   
41 Commission Decision to reject a complaint agains t DBV Winterthur insurance company and the GDV (the 
German Insurance Industry Association) (2004). 
42 The Aviation case (2005). 
EN 27   EN 96. The BER clearly requires SPCs to be non-binding.  In addition it may be the case that a 
requirement to notify derogations to establishing associations would also be exempt 
under Article 81(3). A case in point is the Commission's Decision in Concordato 
Incendio t o exempt not only standard policy conditions, which members were free to 
derogate from, but also a requirement that members notify the Concordato of any such 
derogation that might affect the statistic s used to calculate pure premiums. This 
requirement was considered necessary to guarantee the reliability of the statistics.43 
97. It has been argued that SPCs can help to reduce the use of restrictive or exclusionary 
terms. However, there are indications from the evidence before the Commission that 
some imbalanced clauses are still being used by  insurers and that consumer associations, 
as they would wish, are not fully involved in  the drafting of such clauses (which would 
obviously be the ideal scenario in terms of ensuring balance between insurers and 
consumers). 
2.4 Effects on SPC cooperation in event of non-renewal 
98. It has been argued by some respondents in the course of the Commission's review that 
the legal uncertainty that would result from non-renewal would lead to less cooperation for fear of a risk that such cooperation could be challenged by the Commission or NCAs. 
The argument continues that in the event of non-renewal there would be an individual 
assessment which would be time consuming and expensive especially for smaller 
insurers which would pass on costs to policyholders. 
99. However, even under the current regime, a careful legal assessment of standard clauses' 
compliance with the BER must be undertaken, in particular to ensure that the conditions 
are fulfilled and that no prohibited black clauses are present. In addition, some national 
regulations have already fixed these standard policy conditions, which results in a 
reduced need for cooperation. Moreover, there are cases where the national regulator 
(e.g. FSA in the UK) challenged market participants to achieve contract certainty
44 and 
made clear that if the market fails to devel op its own, it will be forced to intervene with 
new rules and requirements.  
100. Therefore, there does not appear to be a significant and real risk of less or non-
cooperation in the event of non-renewal of the BER, particularly where the national 
regulator imposes a high degree of contract certainty. Furthermore, many national associations have been taking the lead on SPCs for some time, which further supports the 
view that it is unlikely that SPCs would not continue to be agreed in the absence of a 
BER. This is in particular given the Commission's view that in many cases SPCs would 
not fall foul of Article 81(1) or would not fail to comply with the exemption criteria of 
Article 81(3). 
3. C
ONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS  
101. The Commission agrees that in many cases SPCs can give rise to positive effects for 
competition and consumers. In many cases SPCs would not fall foul of Article 81(1) or 
would not fail to comply with the exemption criteria of Article 81(3). 
                                                   
43 Commission Decision 90/25/EEC of 20 December 1989 – Concordato Incendio, OJL 015, 19/01/1990, p.25-
29. 
44 This being with a view to achieving greater certainly for buyers about what they have bought and for insurers 
about the risks they are covering, whilst also reducing risks for brokers.  
EN 28   EN 102. However the question for this review is whet her this category of agreements are special 
or peculiar to the insurance sector such that they should be protected by a legal 
instrument. The answer to that question appears to be in the negative on the basis of the 
fact that similar SPCs are agreed in other sectors in particular in the banking sector, 
without the need for a BER. 
103. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a significant risk of non-cooperation on SPCs in 
the event of non-renewal. 
104. On the basis of the above analysis the Commission therefore proposes, at this stage, not 
to renew the BER for agreements on SPCs. 
EN 29   EN IV. COMMON COVERAGE OF CERTAIN TYPES OF RISKS 
(POOLS) 
105. Co(re)insurance pools (or groups) are frequently used for the coverage of large or 
exceptional risks, such as aviation, nuclear and environmental risks, for which individual 
insurance companies are reluctant or unable to insure the entire risk alone. 
106. In these pools, in general, each member insu rance company agrees in advance to take 
a fixed percentage of all risks insured and the pool acts as one si ngle interlocutor for 
the insured party.  
107. The BER is based on the premise that any such pools might involve restrictions of 
competition and that it is therefore a ppropriate to lay down the circumstances 
(market share thresholds45 and other conditions46) under which such groups can 
benefit from the Article 81(3) exemption.  
1. S COPE OF THE BER   
1.1. Pools newly created which cover new risks 
108. The BER exempts the setting up and operation of insurance pools (groups of insurance 
undertakings or groups of insurance undertakings and reinsurance undertakings) for the 
common coverage of new risks for three years from the date of first establishment of the 
group, regardless of the market share of the group. 
109. Given that it is not possible to know either what subscription capacity is necessary to 
cover the risk nor whether two or more such groups could co-exist to provide this type of insurance, the BER provides that new risks are exempt for a limited period of 3 years. 
1.2. Pools covering risks which are not new 
110. The BER exempts co-insurance or reinsurance pools that have been in existence for three 
years (and have covered new risks for a period of three years) or that were not created in 
order to cover new risks, and provide common coverage of a specific category of risks 
                                                  
 
45 Article 7(2) (a) and (b) of the BER: more than 20% of the relevant market in the case of co-insurance groups 
and, respectively, more than 25% of the relevant market in the case of co-reinsurance groups. 
46 Article 8 of the BER provides: "The exemption provide d for in Article 1(e) shall apply on condition that:  
 a) each participating undertaking has the right to withdraw from the group, subject to a period of notice of not 
more than one year, without incurring any sanctions.  
 b) the rules of the group do not oblige any member of the group to insure or re-insure through the group, in 
whole or in part, any risk of the type covered by the group; 
 c) the rules of the group do not restrict the activity of the group or its members to the insurance or reinsurance 
of risks located in any particular geographical part of the European Union; 
 d) the agreement does not limit output or sales;  e) the agreement does not allocate markets or customers;  f) the members of a co-reinsurance group do not agree on the commercial premiums which they charge in 
direct insurance; and 
g) no member of the group, or undertaking which exercises a determining influence on the commercial policy of the 
group, is also a member of, or exercises a determin ing influence on the commercial policy of, a different 
group active on the same relevant market. 
EN 30   EN (e.g. nuclear, environmental, terrorism risks), subject to certain conditions, in particular 
market share thresholds. 
111. However, the BER will not cover any exem ption for such groups/pools if the group 
benefits from a significant level of market power (25% for co(re)insurance pools and 
20% for co-insurance pools), since the restriction would otherwise outweigh any 
advantages. 
1.3. What the BER does not cover- Co(re) insurance on subscription markets 
112. Co(re)insurance can be offered both through institutionalised pools (which are covered 
by the BER under certain conditions) or through arrangements on subscription markets 
(ad-hoc  co(re)insurance) in which each insurance company agrees independently to 
insure a certain percentage of a risk. In this case a lead insurer covering the largest part of the risk is chosen normally by the broker and his client, agreements on terms and 
conditions including premium are concluded between the lead-insurer and the client and 
then other small or medium sized insurers are invited to cover the remaining part of the 
risk. 
113. This latter category of cooperation is outside the BER. Following the consultation on the 
previous insurance BER (in 2002), the Commission did not include ad-hoc  
co(re)insurance in the current BER as at the time there was no information or evidence to 
indicate any possible restriction of competi tion. However, during the Business Insurance 
Sector Inquiry the Commission found that co(re)insurance on the subscription market 
(not covered by the BER) usually involves premium alignment, which may restrict competition and may not be justified under Article 81(3). 
2. M
AIN FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
2.1. Question One: is the insurance sector sp ecial or different to other sectors such that 
it gives rise to an enhanced need for cooperation? 
114. Several replies to the Consultation Paper emphasised that the insurance sector is special 
as regards co(re)insurance and that its specificity gives rise to an enhanced need for 
cooperation in the sense that pools permit insurers to mitigate risk and fulfil the need to 
pool financial capacity which companies might not be able to find in isolation for 
complex risks (nuclear risks, terrorism) or less well documented risks (environment, 
climate change). 
115. The Commission agrees that risk sharing for certain types of risks (usually very large or 
new risks) is crucial in order to ensure that all such risks can be covered. Furthermore, 
this is an requirement that appears to be specific to the insurance sector. However if it is 
accepted that the insurance sector gives rise to an enhanced need for such cooperation, 
the question arises as to whether a legal inst rument such as the BER or sector specific 
guidance is required in order to facilitate it. 
2.2. Question Two: if the answer to Question on e is positive, does this enhanced need for 
cooperation require a legal instrument in order to protect or facilitate it? 
2.2.1. The need for a consistent approach regarding market share rules 
116. Article 11-1 of the first Insurance BER provided that market share should be calculated 
by taking into account the members' "global turnover in the relevant insurance market, 
EN 31   EN irrespective of whether they do their business through the pools or independently". As 
regards the coverage of catastrophic or aggravated risks, article 11-2 specified that the 
market share to be taken into account related to "the insurance products brought into the 
group", i.e. the members' turnover made through the pool. 
117. The current BER follows this last method and provides in Article 7(2) and 7(3)(a) that  
for the purposes of applying the market share thresholds provided by the BER, the market shares shall be calculated taking into account the insurance products underwritten 
within the pool by the participating undertakings or on their behalf, on the basis of the 
gross premium income of the preceding calendar year
47. 
118. This new methodology for calculating market shares made the market share calculation 
more generous for co(re)insurance pools, as the turnovers achieved by the participating companies outside the co(re)insurance group in the relevant insurance market are not to 
be considered. 
119. It is important to note that this method of calculating market share is not in line with 
other general and sector-specific competi tion rules on the assessment of horizontal 
cooperation. The Commission's de minimis  Notice
48 refers to the "aggregate market 
share held by the parties to the agreement"49 and not to the market share of the 
cooperation in question. In addition, no other BER, be it general50 or sector-specific51, 
bases its calculation of market share on the cooperation only instead of the aggregate 
share of all companies involved52. Applying different rules on the calculation of 
market shares in the insurance sector to t hose applied in other se ctors would result in 
treating the insurance sector in a preferential way.  
120. Whilst there appears to be no reason to maintain such preferential treatment in relation to 
other sectors, the inconsistency related to market shares calculations in the current BER is not in itself a reason not to renew. In the event that the Commission decided to renew 
this exemption, the Commission would consider that the section on market shares should 
be significantly amended with a view to bringing it into line with the rules on other forms of horizontal cooperation. 
2.2.2. Pools can benefit from the BER provided they meet certain strict conditions 
121. The vast majority of respondents to the Consultation Paper and questionnaires 
emphasised that in the absence of the BER there is a risk that they would not continue to 
cooperate within pools. However, this assertion presumes that the pools in question currently benefit from the BER, since otherwise non-renewal of the BER would result in 
no change. 
                                                  
 
47 If gross premium income data are not available, estimates based on other reliable market information, 
including insurance cover provided or insured risk value, may be used to establish the market share of the 
undertaking concerned. 
48 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty, OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, p.13 and Guidelines on the effect on trade concept , OJ C 
101, 27.4.2004, p.81. 
49 The Commission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance referred to above. 
50 Article 4 of the Specialisation BER considers that market share "of the participating undertakings", and 
Article 3 of the Technology Transfer BER consider s the "combined market share of the parties".  
51 Article 5(2) of the Draft Consortia BER provides for the aggregation of the market shares of carriers that 
offer services both individually and within a consortium on the same relevant market.  
52 As also pointed out by a NCA in reply to the consultation.  
EN 32   EN 122. Yet, on the basis of the evidence the Commission has found, it appears that some pools 
do not actually benefit from the BER, for a number of reasons, and therefore renewal or 
non-renewal of the BER should not affect their legal assessment. First, certain pools do 
not need a BER to provide them with a safe harbour because they do not give rise to a 
restriction of competition in the first place. Secondly, there are pools which do restrict 
competition and wrongly consider themselves covered by the BER. For example one pool argued that although it had been in existence for 30 years, it still considered it 
covered a "new risk" (within the definition of the BER). For this category of pools the 
renewal or non renewal of the BER should not be of primary importance, as it is unlikely 
that they benefit from the BER. However, it may still be possible to benefit from an 
exemption under Article 81(3). 
123. However, there is one category of pools which may experience a change in terms of their 
legal assessment in case of non-renewal, namely the pools which are restrictive of 
competition, but currently benefit from the BER as they fulfil all its conditions. 
2.2.2.1. Some pools are outside the scope of the BER because they are necessary and as such do 
not give rise to a restriction of competition 
124. Certain catastrophic risks may be such that no individual insurer is capable of insuring 
them alone. In the P&I Clubs case
53 it was considered that members of the pool were not 
actual or potential competitors, given the fact that they were unable to insure alone the 
risks covered by the pool. The so-called P&I Clubs doctrine currently applies in relation 
to pools on markets where no coverage outside the pool is possible. In accordance with this doctrine, pools, no matter how high their market share, may be considered not to be 
anti-competitive as long as pooling is necessary  to allow their members to provide a type 
of insurance that they could not provide alone. 
125. The same approach was taken in the nuclear insurance pool cases (2001)
54. Moreover, in 
the Austrian and the German terror pool case  (2002)55, the Commission considered that 
the pools did not fall within the scope of Article 81(1) because it was not in a position to 
clearly demonstrate that the pool is not necessary or could be replaced by more than one 
pool. It has therefore been the Commission's practice to grant the "benefit of a doubt", if 
it cannot prove that more than one pool can exist. 
                                                   
53 Commission Decision 1999/329/EC of 12 April 1999 – P& I Clubs, Pooling Agreement, OJL 125 of 
19/05/1999, p.12-31:  A claim-sharing agreement between insurance mutuals covering 89% of the world 
market for maritime third party and contractual liab ility insurance (protection & indemnity - P&I) was not 
considered to restrict Article 81(1) because the me mbers of the P&I Clubs were not actual or potential 
competitors, given the fact that they were unable to insure alone the risks covered by the pool (very large 
maritime liability risks).  
54 The nuclear insurance pool cases (2001) : In January 2001 the Commission closed its investigations into 
three nuclear insurance pool cases (a Swedish co-insurance and co-reinsurance nuclear pool, an Italian 
reinsurance nuclear pool and a Spanish pool providing co-insurance to nuclear installations in Spain and co-reinsurance to nuclear risks outside Spain). The Commission concluded that without the pooling agreements there would be no supply of nuclear liability insurance with adequate coverage for the risks involved. 
55 The Austrian pool and the German pool (terror pools) (2002) : The Commission received two applications for 
negative clearance: one concerned an agreement for the creation and operation of a co-insurance group 
("Austrian Terrorpool') with the aim of covering the risk of terrorism within insured threats for private customers and small business located in Austria. The second concerned the German Pool Extremus, providing terror risk insurance for risks located in Germany. The Commission considered that due to the highly atypical and more political character of the terrorism risk, the pools would fall within the category of 
pools for which it is the Commission's practice to grant th e "benefit of a doubt", if it is not in a position to 
clearly demonstrate that the pool is not necessary or could be replaced by more than one pool. Therefore it was concluded that the pools did not fall within the scope of Art. 81(1). 
EN 33   EN 126. Replies to questionnaires from nuclear pools show that some are aware of the 
Commission's analysis as they do not consider that they benefit from the BER for the 
simple reason that "the pool is not violating Article 81(1) of the Treaty as its members 
would not be able to provide the necessary capacity for the reinsurance of nuclear risks 
and are only enabled to grant reinsurance cover by means of their cooperation". 
Conversely, other pools active on national nuclear liability markets, which appear to fall into the same category (outside the BER because they would not restrict competition in 
the first place), might wrongly consider themselves within the scope of the BER.. These 
pools say they are concerned that in the absence of the BER "this form of cooperation 
would become more difficult or even impossible due to legal uncertainty. Nuclear 
business is really not attractive and compared to other types of insurance is not generating enough premium to justify the legal uncertainty". 
127. It therefore appears that not renewing the BER should not have any effect on pools 
which are outside its scope because they do not  give rise to a restriction of competition 
and are not prohibited by Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
128. On the question of whether it is possible for any member of a pool to cover individually 
the same risks or whether they currently cover the same risk outside the pools, some of 
the pools reply in the affirmative. This leads to the conclusion that such pools fall under 
Article 81(1), even if they cover such risks in  a "very limited way as the values at risk 
are substantial and monitoring of exposures  is complex". Such pools could still be 
exempt if they fulfil the market share thresholds and other conditions provided by the BER, as shown in the following section. 
2.2.2.2. Some pools are outside the scope of the BER because they do not comply with its 
conditions 
129. Pools which can be replaced by two or more insurance entities can give rise to 
restrictions of competition, such as "the standardisation of policy conditions and even of amounts of cover and premiums"
56. These pools are only covered by the BER if they 
have market shares that fall within the thresholds set out in the BER57 (20% for co-
insurance groups and 25% for co-reinsurance groups) and comply with the other 
conditions of the BER. The replies to the consultation indicate that there are a number of 
pools operating on the market, which are restrictive of competition, but do not comply with either the market share thresholds or other exemption conditions set out in the BER. 
130. A pool might have as its object a restriction of competition. Otherwise, its effects in the 
market concerned are analysed to determine whether it is likely to have an appreciable 
adverse impact on the parameters of competition on the market such as prices, costs, 
level of coverage, service differentiation, service quality and innovation. Agreements can have this effect by appreciably reducing rivalry between the parties to the agreement or 
between them and third parties
58. 
131. A pool's ability to cause appreciable negative market effects depends on its economic 
context, taking into account market shares together with other structural factors in the 
relevant market as well as the nature of the agreement. If the pool and its members have 
                                                   
56 Recital 18 of the BER. 
57 Recital 21 of the BER last sentence: "However, any exemption for such groups is not justified if the group in 
question benefits from a significant level of market power, since in those circumstances the restriction of 
competition deriving from the existence of the pool would normally outweigh any possible advantages".  
58 Guidelines on the application of Ar ticle 81(3), OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.97. 
EN 34   EN a low market share, the pool is unlikely to produce restrictive effects. Market 
concentration, the position and number of competitors, market entry barriers and the 
likelihood of entry should be taken into account as additional factors in assessing the 
impact of a given pool on the relevant market. 
132. As regards the nature of the agreement, consideration should be given to clauses 
affecting the pool or its members competitive behaviour in the market such as those stipulated by Article 8 of the BER (e.g. the so-called the "obligation d'apport" clause: the 
obligation for a member to insure or re-insure through the group, in whole or in part, any 
risk of the type covered by the group
59). 
133. There have been cases in several Member States where pools were set up, despite the 
fact that the risks in question could have been covered by several individual insurers rather than a pool and the market share thresholds were exceeded. 
134. In 2007, the German NCA prohibited a pool covering pecuniary loss liability risks for 
auditors and chartered accountants.
60 The Bundeskartellamt  considered that the relevant 
market was the market for pecuniary loss liability risks for auditors and chartered 
accountants. On that basis, the pool largely exceeded the market share thresholds fixed by the BER. Given that insurance cover was only provided at standard premiums and 
terms and that there was no competition between the insurance companies for insurance 
premiums and conditions or for service quality in claims processing, four insurance 
companies were prohibited from continuing to jointly insure the pecuniary loss liability 
risks of auditors and chartered accountants from 2009 via the insurers' pool.
61 Another 
similar case is currently being investigated in the Netherlands, where the Dutch 
Competition Authority considers that a pool offering primary professional liability 
insurance to notaries is restrictive of competition and not exemptible. Firstly, members 
of the pool do not compete with each other regarding the premium or terms, although 
other insurers already cover this risk independently. This means that two or more competitors could co-exist on the market and that Article 81(1) is applicable in this case. 
Secondly, due to high market shares (60%) which are beyond the market share 
thresholds provided by the BER, the pool in question does not benefit from the 
exemption afforded by the BER. 
135. Some replies to the Commission's targeted Questionnaires indicate that some pools do 
not benefit from the exemption under the BER because they do not fulfil the additional 
condition set out in Article 8(g) of the BER. In accordance with Article 8(g), if an 
insurer or reinsurer is simultaneously a member of two pools active on the same relevant 
market, then neither pool is covered by the BER. Some replies indicate that this is an 
issue which arises in practice. 
                                                  
 
59 A nuclear insurance pool case (the German pool DKVG ) was closed in 2002, following the deletion of a 
clause obliging members to insure nuclear risks only through the pool, whatever the amount of cover. 
60 Decision no B4-31/05 of 10 August 2007, available at: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/do wnload/pdf/Kartell/Kartell07/B4-31-05.pdf .  
61 The decision of the Bunderskartellamt was annulled by the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal on the grounds of 
market definition (Judgement VI-Kart 11/07 (V) of 17 September 2008). The Appeal Court considered that 
the market should be defined more widely. On that basis, the pool under investigation would fall under the 
market share thresholds defined by the BER. The judgment is not yet final, the Bundeskartellamt is 
considering whether to appeal to the Supreme Court.  
EN 35   EN 2.2.2.3. Some pools are within the scope of the BER 
136. Although the first two categories of pools discussed above are outside the scope of the 
BER and hence could not theoretically be affected by the non-renewal of the BER, pools 
which do comply with market shares thresholds and other conditions established by the 
BER would be affected by its non-renewal. 
2.2.3. The simple existence of the BER does not provide for automatic cover for pools 
137. It appears from many replies during the Review that pools use the BER as a general 
"blanket" exemption and that they consider the simple existence of the BER enough to 
provide them with legal certainty. This is a misconception as the BER offers exemption 
to pools only in certain conditions, which must be assessed case by case. Compliance 
with the BER is being assessed incorrectly in many instances according to the evidence the Commission has found. 
138. It is essential that all pools undertake a proper legal assessment in order to determine 
whether they are restrictive of competition or otherwise and/or whether they are covered 
by the BER. 
2.2.3.1. The relevant market 139. In order to assess the effects on competition of  an agreement for the purposes of Article 
81, it is first necessary to carefully define the relevant product and geographic market(s). 
Market definition is also a prerequisite in order to assess the applicability of the 
Insurance BER, especially for the application of the market share thresholds for pools. 
However, the subsequent versions of the BER have never offered any guidance on market definition in the insurance sector. As a consequence, despite the adoption of the 
first Insurance BER in 1992, many pools felt the need to maintain their individual 
notifications to the European Commission, because of uncertainty as to market definition 
and market shares
62. 
2.2.3.1.1.Available guidance 140. The main purpose or market definition is to identify in a systematic way the competitive 
constraints faced by an undertaking. The methodology adopted by the Commission for 
its definition of the relevant market in its Notice on the definition of the relevant market 
for the purposes of Community competition law
63 is normally based on an analysis of the 
substitutability of demand and supply. The relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use. 
141. Given that substitutability of demand is theore tically zero, as the insurance of each risk 
category and even of specific risks within each category is not substitutable for the 
insured person for whom each insurance policy is unique, supply substitutability is particularly important in insurance market definition. An analysis of the substitutability 
of supply reveals that different types of risk can often be included in a single product 
market, since the conditions needed to insure them are similar. The conditions in 
question, which may allow the insurance of different risks to be included in a single 
product market, are, inter alia, the laws and regulations applicable, the distribution 
                                                  
 
62 For instance, three comfort letters were issued to nuclear pools in 2001. 
63 OJ C372, 9.12.1997, p.5. 
EN 36   EN channels, the necessary expert know-how and the characteristics of the risk (frequency 
and scale of claims). 
142. The relevant geographic market  comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned 
are involved in the supply and demand of produc ts or services, in which the conditions 
of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas
64. In the insurance sector, the geographic market must be defined essentially 
by the actual cross-frontier provision of services: if customers unable to find appropriate 
insurance in their own countries obtain cover in another country, the market is 
international; if not, the market is national. It is also possible that an undertaking 
operates on a market larger than its domestic market but smaller than the world market (e.g. the European Union) or operates simultaneously on several geographic markets 
having different competitive conditions. 
143. In addition, relevant Commission's decisions and comfort letters can be used in order for 
pools to determine the relevant market in which they operate. For example, the 
Commission distinguished: a nuclear liability insurance market in the nuclear insurance cases of 2001
65 and a third-party liability insurance market for maritime shipping in the 
P&I Clubs case66. Also, in aviation insurance, the Commission considered that insurance 
for commercial and non-commercial aviation (private and pleasure aviation) constitute 
distinct products markets67. 
144. In some cases, the Commission's Services have defined the relevant product or 
geographic market in a broad way (e.g. an Austrian pool for international transport risks 
which appeared to obtain around one-third of its turnover abroad was considered to 
operate on a geographic market which was wider than Austria; the market share of 
another Austrian pool dealing with the insurance of Volkswagen-type cars was 
determined with reference to the wider product market for car insurance; and an Italian pool providing entrepreneurs or contractors with insurance against late delivery of their 
work was considered to operate in competi tion with financial institutions providing such 
companies a bank guarantee against the same event)
68. 
2.2.3.1.2.Uncertainty in practice despite the BER 
145. In the consultation process, we received i ndications from several pools and NCAs that 
the geographic product market on which pools operate is often national (in the sense that 
the risks being covered are situated in the Member State where the pool is located) and 
have market shares beyond the ones permitted by the BER, with the consequence that 
they would not be covered by the BER. Conversely, pools which cover risks situated in 
                                                   
64 Notice of the Commission on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community 
Competition Law, referred to above, paragraph 8. 
65 See footnote 54. 
66 See footnote 55. 
67 The Aviation Pool cases (1998):  In 1998 the Commission closed an investigation into several notifications of 
aviation pool cases. For the insurance of large aviation risks, the market was international and the market 
share of each pool was sufficiently small as to benefit from negative clearance. For small aviation risks (private and pleasure aviation), for which markets were national the pools in question did not seem to be necessary in order to allow their members to be present on those markets. The Commission found there to be insufficient Community interest to bring proceedings but warned the pools of the possibility of action by national competition authorities. 
68 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the operation of Commission 
Regulation n° 3932/92 concerning the application of Artic le 81 (ex-Article 85), paragraph 3, of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions and con certed practices in the field of insurance, p 16. 
EN 37   EN several countries worldwide consider that they fall under the BER " because the market is 
global ". 
146. In the case of the insurers' pool in Germany for auditors and accountants, the German 
competition authority's decision defining the relevant market as the one for pecuniary 
loss liability risks for auditors and chartered accountants was annulled by the German 
Appeal Court in 2008. The Court held that this market definition was too narrow and that liability of risks of other professions (such as lawyers) should be included. On that basis, 
the pool would fall under the 20 per cent market share threshold provided by the BER 
and would be excluded. 
147. In the case of the insurers' pool offering insurance to notaries in the Netherlands, the 
Dutch competition authority defined the relevant market as the market for professional liability insurance for notaries. The definition is based on the fact that there is no 
substitute for the demand and that there is no substitute offer either. An important barrier 
to entry was considered to be the specific knowledge necessary to assess the risk. On the 
basis of this market definition, the notary pool had a market share of around 60% in the 
period under consideration (from January 2008 onwards) and therefore is not covered by the BER. Furthermore, the Dutch competition authority considers that the pools 
agreement would not be exemptible even if a broader definition was accepted, that is, the 
market for all legal professions, where the pool has a market share of just over 50%. 
148. In comparison with these narrow definitions, some pools' definition of their relevant 
market may be too large. For instance, a coinsurance group for professional liability of 
insurance intermediaries defines the relevant market of the pool as the national liability 
market (excluding motor third party liability). On this basis, their market share would 
only be of 2%, which would allow them to benefit from the BER. 
149. The reply of one nuclear pool illustrates not only the importance of the definition of the 
relevant market but also shows that the simple existence of the BER does not offer legal certainty as such. They consider that the pool in question is not covered by the BER "if 
the relevant market is the global nuclear liability market" (probably because of high 
market shares). However, "if the relevant market is the global general liability market", 
the pool would be covered by the BER. 
2.2.3.2. The notion of "new risks" 150. According to article 2(7) of the BER, "new risks means risks which did not exist before, 
and for which insurance cover requires the development of an entirely new insurance 
product, not involving an extension, improvement or replacement of an existing 
insurance product". Recital 20 of the BER further clarifies the definition, stating that: 
only risks which did not exist before are incl uded in the definition, thus excluding for example 
risks which hitherto existed but were not insured. Moreover, a risk whose nature changes 
significantly (for example a considerable increase in terrorist activity) falls outside the definition, 
as the risk itself is not new in that case. A new risk, by its nature, requires an entirely new 
insurance product, and cannot be covered by additi ons or modifications to an existing insurance 
product . 
151. From replies to the targeted Questionnaires it appears that some pools seem to interpret 
this definition too broadly, wrongly considering that they are being covered by the BER. 
First, it is unlikely that a risk that existed before such as pollution would be considered 
"new" within the definition in the BER, even if this risk is "an unknown risk, which 
EN 38   EN demands studies and specific knowledge". Secondly, only pools which were created after 
31 March 2003 (i.e. the entry into force of the current BER) in order to cover new risks 
are exempt, independently of their market shares. 
152. Therefore, pools which do not correctly apply the definition of "new risks", as well as 
pools which started to cover "new risks" more than 3 years ago, should assess whether 
they comply with the thresholds established by the BER for the second category of risks, i.e risks which are not new. It appears from the replies that not all of the pools make this 
new assessment, which means that they could be outside the BER without being aware 
of it. 
153. Several replies to Questionnaires emphasised the fact that the definition of "new risks" 
should be clarified and extended
69. Moreover, some of the respondents consider that the 
BER hinders the setting-up of pools with i nnovative policies because the definition of 
"new risk" in the BER is not clear. This shows that there are situations where pools 
refrain from innovation as they are reluctant to cooperate on risks which might not be 
considered "new" and could therefore fall outside the BER. 
154. This also suggests that there may be a certa in amount of confusion between the scope of 
what is unambiguously exempted under the BER and the larger set of agreements which 
is exempt under Article 81(3) due to efficiencies created. 
2.2.4. Pools appear to have positive effects 
155. Many respondents both to the Consultation Paper and Questionnaires consider that pools 
help insurers and reinsurers to gain the necessary experience of risks with which they are unfamiliar. For instance environmental pools would allow smaller and medium-sized 
insurers to share information and to gather experience in evaluating environmental 
damage. 
156. Moreover, several respondents emphasised a range of positive effects of pools such as 
the fact that they increase the availability of insurance products on the market and that 
cross-border pools create a more integrated insurance industry throughout the EU. Pools 
would also allow smaller and medium-sized insurers to enter and remain in the market 
and to gain the necessary experience of risks with which they are unfamiliar. The 
Commission's services agree that pools can give rise to such positive effects and this is 
one of the arguments that the BER mentions itself in Recital 18. 
2.2.5. Risk of reduction in cooperation for pools 
157. Some of the pools which are very much in favour of renewing the BER appear not to fall 
foul of Article 81(1) and therefore would have no reason under the competition rules, to 
stop cooperating. 
158. However, many respondents both to the Consultation Paper and to the targeted 
Questionnaires mentioned that this form of cooperation would become more difficult or 
even impossible due to legal uncertainty and that many pool members would consider 
withdrawing from the pool due to the lack of legal certainty. They argued that the 
consequence would be that some risks which are "not attractive"(such as nuclear risks) 
                                                  
 
69 For instance, one respondent argued that risk of terrorism is not new but that nowadays it is considered new 
because of the possible impact and geographical scope; some risks may not be new in some markets but 
totally new in other markets.  
EN 39   EN would no longer be covered, as this would not generate enough premium to justify the 
legal uncertainty. 
159. In addition some respondents considered that a decrease in insurance capacity could not 
be ruled out, especially in the context wh ere emerging risks in the area of natural 
catastrophes may increase the need for joint coverage of risks. 
160. On the basis of the evidence before the Commission at this stage, it appears that there is 
some risk of non-cooperation in this area in the event of non-renewal. Although this risk 
may not be real and significant, it may be appropriate to keep an exemption under the 
BER in place for pools at least for a certain further period of time beyond expiry of the 
current BER in 2010.  
3. C ONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS  
161. It appears that covering large risks for which individual insurance companies are 
reluctant or unable to insure the entire risk alone is specific to the insurance sector, 
which triggers an enhanced need of cooperation. It also appears at this stage that this 
enhanced need for cooperation would need to be facilitated by a BER for a certain 
further period of time. 
162. It should be noted however that legal certainty provided by the BER is not absolute and 
can be a safe harbour codifying Article 81(3) only if the conditions of the BER are 
fulfilled. Many pools appear to rely on the legal certainty provided by the simple 
existence of the BER, without carrying out the required careful legal assessment of their 
compatibility with the market share threshol ds and other conditions established by the 
BER. Contrary to this practice, it must be stressed that, even in the case of renewal of 
this part of BER, insurance companies con cerned would still need to carry out a careful 
legal assessment of a pools' compliance with the competition rules. This analysis would 
have to ascertain whether the pool in question is restrictive of competition in the first 
place and then, where the response is affirmative, to ensure that the conditions set out in the BER, particularly the market share conditions are fulfilled. 
163. Moreover, neither the BER nor another legal instrument can define the relevant market. 
It can merely establish clear rules to be followed for this purpose. Defining the relevant 
market is a matter which must be individually assessed by pools, in the framework of the 
legal assessment mentioned above. 
164. In the event that the Commission decides to renew the BER for this form of cooperation, 
the current text of the BER would need to be  significantly redrafted, in particular with a 
view to bringing the market share rules in line with the rules on other forms of horizontal 
cooperation.
EN 40   EN V. SECURITY DEVICES 
1. THE SCOPE OF THE BER  
165. This form of cooperation enables insurers to evaluate better the risks that they cover. 
Indeed, as provided by Recital 24 of the BER, this form of cooperation "can be 
beneficial in providing a benchmark to insurers and reinsurers when assessing the extent 
of the risk they are asked to cover in a specific case, which depends on the quality of 
security equipment and of its installation and maintenance". Consequently, insurers can calculate more precisely the premium they charge. In theory, policyholders benefit from 
this form of cooperation because if they bu y safety equipment corresponding to certain 
technical specifications, the risk to their pr operty decreases, which can lead to a decrease 
in their insurance premium. It can also encourage manufacturers of safety systems to 
improve them and thereby minimise the insured risks. 
1.1. What the BER covers 
1.1.1. Conditions of the BER 
166. The BER subject to certain conditions
70 covers agreements with respect to the 
establishment, recognition and distribution of: 
• Technical specifications, rules or codes of practice concerning security devices and 
procedures for assessing and approving the compliance of security devices with such 
specifications, rules or codes of practice; 
• Technical specifications, rules or codes of practice for the installation and 
maintenance of security devices and procedures for assessing and approving the 
compliance of undertakings which install or maintain security devices with such 
specifications, rules or codes of practice. 
167. These agreements are covered by the BER in so far as no EC-level harmonisation exists. 
Indeed: 
                                                   
70 Set out in Article 9 of the BER i.e: "(a) the techni cal specifications and compli ance assessment procedures 
are precise, technically justified and in proportion to the performance to be attained by the security device 
concerned; (b) the rules for the evaluation of installation undertakings  and maintenance undertakings are 
objective, relate to their technical competence and are applie d in a non-discriminatory manner;  (c) such specifications and 
rules are established and distributed with an accompanying statement that insurance undertakings are free to accept for 
insurance, on whatever terms and conditions they wish, other security devices or installation and maintenance 
undertakings which do not comply with these technical specifi cations or rules; (d) such specifications and rules are 
provided simply upon request to any interested person; (e) any lists of security devices and installation and maintenance 
undertakings compliant with specifications include a cla ssification based on the level of performance obtained; (f) a 
request for an assessment may be submitted at any time by any applicant; (g) the evaluation of conformity does not 
impose on the applicant any expenses that are disproportionate to the costs of the approval procedure; (h) the devices and 
installation undertakings and maintenance undertakings that meet  the assessment criteria are certified to this effect in a 
non-discriminatory manner within a period of six months of the date of application, except where technical considerations 
justify a reasonable additional period; (i) the fact of compliance or approval is certified in writing; (j) the grounds for a 
refusal to issue the certificate of compliance are given in wr iting by attaching a duplicate copy of the records of the tests 
and controls that have been carried out; (k) the grounds for a refusal to take into account a request for assessment are 
provided in writing; and (l) the specifications and rules are a pplied by bodies accredited to norms in the series EN 45 000 
and EN ISO/IEC 17025."  
EN 41   EN where there exists Community level technical sp ecifications, classification systems, rules, 
procedures or codes of practice harmonised in line with Community legislation covering the free 
movement of goods, it is not appropriate to exempt by regulation any agreements among insurers 
on the same subject, since the objective of such ha rmonisation at European level is to lay down 
exhaustive and adequate levels of security for security devices which apply uniformly across the 
Community.  (Recital 24) 
168. Therefore, when no harmonisation has taken place in the field concerned, agreements 
between insurers are covered by the BER (provided that they also fulfil the other 
conditions set out in Article 9 of the BER). However the BER provides no exemption 
where EU standards do exist – something which has become increasingly common in 
recent years. Thus the BER will not exempt  agreements between insurance companies 
for example on the categorisation of security devices for the purposes of setting 
discounts.  
1.1.2. Link with the rules on the free movement of goods and services and on the freedom of 
establishment 
169. In the absence of harmonisation at EU level (e.g. in anti-burglary systems), Member 
States are nevertheless obliged to notify to the Commission and to the other Member 
States of their draft national technical regulations (concerning products and/or 
information society services), in accordance with Directive 98/34/EC 71. Moreover, 
Member States must respect the principle of mutual recognition introduced by the ECJ in 
Cassis de Dijon72. In accordance with the provisions of Article 28 EC and the mutual 
recognition principle, goods which are lawfully produced in one Member State cannot be 
banned from sale on the territory of another Member State, even if they are produced to 
technical or quality specifications different from those applied to its own products. The 
only exceptions to this principles are restrictions that are justified on the grounds 
described in Article 30 EC (protection of public morality or public security, protection of the health and life of humans, animals or plans, etc) or on the basis of overriding 
requirements of general public importance recognised by the case law of the Court of 
Justice, and are proportionate to the aim pursued. The same principle applies to services. 
170. The Treaty rules on the free movement of goods are not applicable to private 
undertakings and their associations. However, agreements which have as their object or 
effect the partitioning of the common market along national borders have in some 
instances of established case law been cons idered as anti-competitive and contrary to 
Article 81(1)
73. 
171. Unlike the Treaty provisions on free movement of goods, the provisions of Article 39 
(free movement of workers), 43 and 49 (free dom of establishment and to provide 
services) are binding not only on the State but also on private bodies74. In case Walrave 
and Koch75, the ECJ ruled that the Treaty prohibition on discrimination on the grounds 
                                                   
71 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 (as amended by Directive 
98/48/EC) laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and 
regulations and of rules on information society services, OJEU L 204 of 21.07.1998. 
72 Case 120/78, Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein, ECR 1979 p. 0064. 
73 Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 299, page 340; Case 41/69 ACF 
Chemiefarma [1970] ECR 661, para.128. 
74 Cases C-415/93, Bosman  [1995] ECR I-4921, paras 83 and 84; and C-281/98, Angonese  [2000] ECR I-4139, 
para.32. 
75 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch  [1974] ECR 1405. 
EN 42   EN of nationality applied not only "to the action of public authorities but extends likewise to 
rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment 
and the provision of services". The abolition, as  between Member States, of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons would be compromised if the abolition of State 
barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal 
autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law.76 
172. The application of Article 81 is inherently linked to those relating to the application of 
Article 28 (free movement of goods) and Articles 43 (free movement of persons) and 49 
of the EC Treaty (free movement of services). The BER encourages insurers to define 
standards for security devices, which can sometimes pose (private) obstacles to the 
marketing of security devices legally manufactured and sold in another EU Member State, or equally to the services of installation and maintenance undertakings whose 
professional qualifications were recognised in another EU Member State. This should be 
taken into account when assessing the need to renew this part of the BER. 
1.2. What the BER does not cover 
1.2.1. Agreements in areas which are harmonised at EU level 
173. Agreements are outside the BER as long as the Community legislator has adopted 
harmonisation legislation in the field concerned. For example, the Construction Products 
Directive 89/106 CE
77 (which also deals with security devices and safety equipment) isin 
line with the Commission's new approach  to technical harmonisation and 
standardisation78. In accordance with a Council Resolution79 of 1985, legislative 
harmonisation is limited to essential safety requirements to which products on the market 
must conform in order to enjoy free movement throughout the Community. For example, 
safety in case of fire is one of the essential requirements to which construction products 
must conform, in accordance with the Construction Products Directive. Public 
authorities of Member States are obliged to recognise that products manufactured in conformity with harmonised standards are presumed to conform to the essential 
requirements established by the directive in question. If the producer does not 
manufacture in conformity with these standards, he has an obligation to prove that his 
products conform to the essential requirements. 
174. The task of drawing up technical production specifications is entrusted to organisations 
competent in industrial standardisation, which take the current stage of technology into 
account when doing so. The European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the 
European Committee for Electrotechnical  Standardisation (CENELEC) are the only 
bodies with the competence to adopt European harmonised standards in the field of 
                                                  
 
76 Case C-309/99, Wouters v.Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten  [2002] ECR I-1577; C-
411/98; Ferlini v. CHL  [2000] ECR I-8081, para.50. 
77 Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States rela ting to construction products, OJ L 40, 11. 02. 1989. 
78 The aim of completing the internal market at the end of 1992 necessitated a new approach to technical 
harmonisation and the use of standardisation. In its communication entitled "Technical harmonization and 
standardization: a new approach" [COM(1985)19 final - Not published in the Official Journal], the Commission therefore proposed that the methods and procedures be revised. The main idea is to develop an approach establishing general rules which are applicable to  sectors or families of products as well as types of 
hazard. This avoids the lengthy decision-making pro cedures which, in the past, established technical 
harmonization through very technical and detailed product-specific directives. 
79 Council Resolution (85/C 136/01) of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards – OJ C136 of 4 June 1985. 
EN 43   EN security devices/safety equipment, following a mandate issued by the European 
Commission after consultation of Member States. The standardisation mandate is issued 
according to the procedure of Directive 98/34/EC. 
175. The adoption of protectionist practices by Member States is prohibited For example, in 
accordance with Article 6 of the Construction Products Directive, "…Member States 
shall ensure that the use of such products, for the purpose for which they were intended, shall not be impeded by rules or conditions imposed by public bodies or private bodies 
acting as a public undertaking or acting as a public body on the basis of a monopoly 
position". 
1.2.2. Agreements in areas which do not comply with  the conditions provided in Article 9 of the 
BER 
176. Several conditions must be fulfilled for an agreement in relation to security devices to be 
covered by the BER. One is that "such specifications and rules are established and 
distributed with an accompanying statement that insurance undertakings are free to 
accept for insurance, on whatever terms and conditions they wish, other security devices 
or installation and maintenance undertakings which do not comply with these technical specifications or rules"
80. 
177. However, the Consultation indicates that even if an agreement does allow insurers to 
insure property protected by such non-compliant devices or installation/maintenance, 
this is often only a purely theoretical freedom. Although the agreement itself could easily 
comply with the BER ("accompanying statement that insurance undertakings are free to 
accept other security devices "), in practice its effects could become obligatory: for 
example, it appears from several replies to the Consultation, that insurers do extensively 
use the specifications and rules commonly established by the agreement, with the 
consequence that these agreements become, de facto , mandatory for the security devices 
producers or the installation and maintenance undertakings. As policyholders will only buy security devices that conform to the commonly agreed standards, producers, 
installers and maintenance providers of securi ty devices will need to comply with these 
standards.  
178. It should also be noted that decisions or recommendations of associations of 
undertakings, although non binding, could infringe Article 81
81 . In such cases it is 
necessary to consider whether members in the past have tended to comply with 
recommendations that have been ma de, and whether compliance with the 
recommendation would have a significant influence on competition within the relevant 
market. This would suggest that the BER grants insurers preferential treatment as 
compared to other sectors, since any non-binding agreement, even if it does have recommendation character, can be exempted. 
                                                  
 
80 Article 9 c) of the BER. 
81 Case 8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977; Case 71/74 FRUBO v 
Commission [1975] ECR 563; Cases 209/78 etc Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125; Cases 
96/82 [1983] ECR 3369; Case 45/85 VDS v Commission [1987] ECR 405, para 32; Fenex OK [1996] L 181/28, paras 32-42. 
EN 44   EN 2. M AIN FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS  
2.1. Question One: is the insurance sector sp ecial or different to other sectors such that 
it gives rise to an enhanced need for cooperation? 
179. It appears (and this is supported by replies to the Consultation) that there is a mutuality 
of interests in the insurance sector in relation to cooperation on security devices since 
insurers actively seek ways to help customers to reduce their exposure to the risk covered. 
180. However agreements on technical specifications for security devices and their 
installation fall into the general domain of standard setting which is not unique to the 
insurance sector. 
2.2. Question Two: does this enhanced need  for cooperation require a legal instrument 
such as the BER in order to protect or facilitate it? 
181. As it appears that this form of cooperation is not specific to the insurance sector, the 
Commission has doubts whether the BER is required in order to facilitate this 
cooperation. In addition, as explained below, the interest to reduce risk exposure needs 
to be carefully weighed against the potentially market-partitioning effect of private standardization at national level. 
2.2.1. Competition issues on the downstream market for security devices  
182. The Commission considered the possibility that manufacturers of security devices and 
companies providing installation and maintenance services do not comply with technical 
specifications and compliance assessments co mmonly established by insurers and are 
therefore excluded from the market because consumers cannot get insurance for such 
products/services. Some of the replies confirmed Commission's Services concerns 
already identified in the Business Insurance Sector Inquiry. 
183. One consumer association's argued in response to the Consultation, that difficulties could 
arise if customers wish to switch to suppliers  of security devices that do not wish to 
adhere to the standards. One European association of producers of security devices in its 
reply to the Commission's Questionnaire argued that consumers must qualify for 
acceptance for insurance by proving they apply approved security, devices, systems, 
installations and services for achieving an acceptable level of prevention as desired by 
the associations of insurers. In addition one NCA submitted that cooperation in relation to the distribution of technical information regarding security devices should not be too 
restrictive because this may lead to a diminution of competition in the downstream 
market for security devices. 
2.2.2. The existence of obstacles to the free movement of goods and services  
184. A respondent from one European security devices association argued that in the most 
Member States only installations and services from regionally or nationally operating 
"approved" suppliers, using "approved" devices  are accepted by the insurance companies 
(who are themselves, mostly organised within national associations). According to this 
respondent, national quality marks based on national certification bodies and test 
laboratories prevail over national quality marks of different EU Member States even if they are tested against the same standards. This association argued that the high costs of 
multiple testing and certification are a significant barrier to marketing new and 
innovative products in to the European market. This respondent considers that 
EN 45   EN CEN/CENELEC European harmonised standards should be applied instead. The 
Commission also considers that European Standardisation has proven to be a successful 
tool for the completion of the Single Market for goods82. 
185. It appears that a large number of historically developed national, regional or technical 
requirements fragment the European market and are a growing barrier for efficiency in 
development, design, manufacturing, installati on and maintenance of security devices 
and systems. A 2004 Report83 also emphasised that a range of obstacles to the free 
movement of goods continue to exist and these should no longer be accepted: "Free 
movement continues to be hindered by a range of local rules, often applied arbitrarily 
and in clear contradiction to the mutual recognition principle that is the cornerstone of 
the internal market". The estimated cost of the non-application of the mutual recognition principle is around EUR 150 billion. Yet, the BER encourages the de facto  adoption of 
infra-European industry standards
84. 
2.2.3. The scope of the BER is significantly redu ced or eliminated due to existing EU level 
harmonisation 
186. Approximately 90 EU harmonised standards (or technical specifications) concerning fire 
detection and fire alarm systems as well as fixed fire fighting systems have been already 
published in the EU's Official Journal and another 30 EU harmonised standards are 
under development for different categories of construction products. These technical 
specifications are not mandatory and maintain their status of voluntary standards (See 
Annex 12). 
187. It appears that this standardisation work covers to a large extent the possible fields of 
technical harmonisation for these categories of products. Thus, the scope of the BER is 
being continually reduced.  
188. EU-harmonised standards are listed on this webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/standardization/harmstds/reflist.html  
2.2.4. Transparency and non-discrimination in standard-setting 
189. Since the early 1990ies, the Commission has recognised the potential economic benefits 
of industry standard setting, but warned against its anti-trust risks. In particular, the 
Commission has always advocated that the standard setting process be open to all 
interested industry participants and the resu lts be made available on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms. Similarly, the Commission has stressed in its 
Communication85 on the role of European standardisation in the framework of European 
policies and legislation that improving the efficiency of standardisation entails, among 
other things, the involvement of all interested parties in the standardisation process 
because this helps enhance the strategic value of standardisation for competitiveness and 
                                                   
82 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the role of European 
standardisation in the framework of European policies and legislation, 18.10.2004. 
83 Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok: Facing the challenge – The Lisbon strategy for growth and 
employment, November 2004, p. 26.  
84 "There will clearly be a point at which the specification of a private standard by a group of firms that are jointly dominant 
is likely to lead to the creation of a de facto industry standard" (Paragraph 174 of the Commission notice of 6 January 
2001: Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, Official Journal 
C 3 of 06.01.2001).  
85 Communication from the Commission to the Eur opean Parliament and the Council, 18.10.2004.  
EN 46   EN facilitates its uniform application. Al so the recent Commission Communication 
"Towards an Increased Contribution from Standardization to Innovation in Europe"86, 
states that it is necessary that the standard-setting process is in line with European 
competition law; "standardization complements market-based competition, typically in 
order to achieve objectives such as the interoperability of complementary 
products/services and to agree on test methods and on requirements for safety, health, organizational and environmental performance". 
190. Moreover, the Commission's Guidelines on horizontal cooperation
87 provide in 
paragraph 172 that "all competitors in the ma rket(s) affected by the standard should have 
the possibility of being involved in discussions. Therefore, participation in standard 
setting should be open to all, unless the parties demonstrate important inefficiencies in such participation or unless recognised procedure are foreseen for the collective 
representation of interest, as in formal standard bodies". 
191. The relevant section of the BER contains none of these general requirements and does 
not, in particular, force insurers to involve all manufacturers and service providers 
concerned when deciding standards. This lack of transparency is presumably closely linked to the subsequent de facto exclusion of certain manufacturers from the market. 
192. Moreover, "to avoid elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to the 
standard must be possible for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms"
88. It seems that not all security devices producers have such a "fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory" access to standards, given that their products must comply with different sets of national rules, depending on the Member State where they sell their 
products. 
193. From replies to the Consultation and Questionnaires it appears that some of the 
agreements currently existing in different Member States cover sectors where there is 
already harmonisation at EU level. Such agreements are therefore outside the scope of the BER. If this is the case, companies involved in such agreements should have 
undertaken a self-assessment on the basis of Article 81(1) and 81(3). It is difficult to see 
why further standardisation at national level is  indispensable and thus exemptible in such 
a case, but of course an assessment would need to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
194. Therefore, since agreements on technical specifications for security devices and their 
installation are not specific to the insurance sector, and since there are competition 
concerns and obstacles to free movement of goods and services within the EU, it appears 
that a BER is not appropriate in order to protect or facilitate these agreements. 
2.3. Applicability of Article 81(3) 
195. Agreements regarding security devices and their installation and maintenance can be 
exempt under Article 81(3), provided the positive effects of such agreements outweigh 
restrictive effects on competition. 
                                                  
 
86 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, 11.3.2008. 
87 Commission notice of 6 January 2001: Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
horizontal cooperation agreements, Official Journal C 3 of 06.01.2001  
88 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements (see 
footnote 18), paragraph 174. 
EN 47   EN 196. Several respondents emphasised positive effects of agreements in this area of the BER. 
Such positive effects can and should be  taken into account when analysing the 
application of Article 81(3) on a case-by-case basis. For example these agreements assist 
with risk prevention and help to develop risk insurability. They also provide a 
benchmark to insurers and reinsurers when assessing the extent of the risk they are asked 
to cover in a specific case. Otherwise, insurers would have to fund separate testing and approval, costs which would then have to be passed on to policyholders. Also, when the 
same security device requirements are used it is easier for consumers to switch between 
insurance undertakings, and the existence of a single standard assists manufacturers in 
bringing new technology and security devices to the various EU national markets. 
197. Furthermore insurers will benefit from guidance in terms of applicability or otherwise of 
Article 81 of the Treaty to their agreements afforded by the general standardisation 
chapter in the Commission's Notice on the Applicability of Article 81 to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements which are currently being reviewed.
89 
3. C ONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS  
198. On the basis of the evidence before the Commission, it appears that competition 
problems arise on the downstream market for the supply security devices, given that the 
use of security devices not compliant w ith national or regional certification/listing 
schemes will not be accepted by in surers or their associations. 
199. This type of behaviour also constitutes an obstacle to free movement of goods, persons 
and services, particularly when the mutual recognition principle is not applied in practice (in non-harmonized areas). As regards the products and services which have been 
harmonised at EU level, replies to the Consultation show that cooperation is still taking 
place and some stakeholders incorrectly co nsider they are covered by the BER. 
200. Where an EU standard has been adopted, the BER does not apply and has no effect. It 
should be noted that the remaining scope for possible agreements in this area is significantly reduced or eliminated in relation to some products since EU harmonisation 
is now extensive and increasing. The effect of the BER is therefore to allow national 
harmonisation of security devices by insurance companies – very often without the 
involvement of the manufacturers – where no EU standards have yet been adopted. 
201. It should be borne in mind that even if cooperation is outside the scope of the BER as 
regards a harmonised field, the agreements in  question may not restrict competition (in 
terms of being prohibited by Article 81(1)) or if they do, they may qualify for exemption 
on the basis of Article 81(3). Furthermore insurers will benefit from guidance in terms of 
applicability or otherwise of Article 81 to their agreements afforded by the general 
standardisation chapter in the Horizontal Guidelines. 
202. Therefore, the Commission proposes not to renew the BER for agreements in this area.
                                                  
 
89 OJ, C3 of 6 January, 2001. 
EN 48   EN VI. CONCLUSIONS 
1. O PTIONS AND PROPOSALS  
203. The Commission has come to the preliminary conclusion that there are good reasons to 
protect or facilitate the agreements on cooperation in the area of joint calculations, tables 
and studies, that the current BER is doing this effectively and should therefore be 
renewed. The Commission has not yet decided whether to amend the structure or 
drafting of the current exemption. However, in terms of improving it, a range of options would be considered. 
204. The Commission's view at this stage is that pools are also specific to the insurance sector 
and that there are several arguments in favour of the necessity of a BER in order to 
protect or facilitate such agreements. The Commission therefore proposes to renew the 
BER in relation to pools. However, the Commission would be likely to significantly redraft the wording of the chapter in question in order to take on board many of the 
comments received during the Review and also to make it consistent with other general 
and sector-specific legislation.  
205. Furthermore the Commission considers at this stage of the Review that even if the risk of 
non-cooperation in these two areas may be low, the possibility that such pro-competitive cooperation may diminish, should be avoided.  
206. Cooperation on SPCs does not appear to be specific to the insurance sector and as such 
does not necessarily require a sector specific BER. Nor does there appear to be a 
significant risk of less or non-cooperation on SPCs in the event of non-renewal of the 
BER. The Commission therefore proposes not to renew the BER for SPCs. Further guidance on SPCs may be envisaged by the Commission if non-renewal is the final 
decision. 
207. Agreements in relation to security devices appear to give rise to concerns in relation to 
both competition and the development of the EU's internal market. Moreover, they do 
not appear specific to the insurance sector.  
208. The Commission therefore proposes non-renewal of the BER for this category of 
agreements. However, insurers will benefit from guidance in terms of applicability or 
otherwise of Article 81 of the Treaty to their agreements on security devices, afforded by 
the general standardisation chapter in the Horizontal Guidelines
90 which are currently 
under review.  
2. N EXT STEPS  
209. DG Competition plans to hold a public event following publication of the Report and 
Working Document, on 2 June 2009 in order to give the industry and stakeholders a final 
opportunity to make representations before the Commission takes a decision on whether 
to renew. 
                                                   
90 Commission Notice of 6 January 2001: Guidelines on th e applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
horizontal cooperation agreements, Official Journal C 3 of 06.01.2001 
EN 49   EN 210. The Commission looks forward to receiving comments from the European Parliament 
and Council. The Commission's Services welcome any other comments on the Report 
and/or Working Document which should quote the reference: "Review of Insurance BER 
– COMP/D1 HT 1221" and be sent to:  
COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu 
211. Although any comments should be sent in writing to the address above, queries by 
telephone may be addressed to Eithne McCarthy at Tel: +32 (0)2 299 4138; or Laura 
Stefanescu at Tel: +32 (0)2 298 6569. 
EN 50   EN ANNEX 1  
Definitions  
 
Please note that the definitions provided below are exclusively for the purpose of the 
report and do not necessarily correspond to the definitions contained in EU insurance 
legislation. 
Acronyms for Member States 
AT – Austria  
IT - Italy 
BE – Belgium 
LT - Lithuania CY – Cyprus  
LU - Luxemburg 
CZ – Czech Republic 
LV - Latvia 
DE – Germany MT - Malta 
DK – Denmark 
NL – The Netherlands 
EE – Estonia 
PL - Poland EL – Greece 
PT - Portugal 
ES – Spain 
SE - Sweden 
FI – Finland SK - Slovakia 
FR – France 
SL - Slovenia 
HU – Hungary 
EN 51   EN UK – United Kingdom 
IE – Ireland 
Business insurance 
The provision of insurance products and services to any type of business, irrespective of 
its size, form of organisation or legal structure.  
Small and Medium Sized enterprises ("SME") 
Any company whose staff number is below 250 people and whose turnover is under 50 
MEUR (million EUR). Micro-companies are thus also included in the SME category. 
Businesses exceeding these thresholds are c onsidered large corporate clients (LCC). 
EN 52   EN ANNEX 2  
Replies to Consultation  
Respondent Group Number of Replies 
Insurance Associations 27 
Insurers 11 
Insurance customers 1 
Supervisory Authorities 8 
Consumer Organisations 8 
Other Entities91 6 
TOTAL 60 
Insurance Associations: 
– ABI Association of British Insurers 
– AIRMIC Association of Insurance and Risk Managers 
– ANIA Italian Insurance Association  
– APS Portuguese Association of Insurers  
– Association Francaise de l'Assurance 
– Assuralia 
– BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie92 
– BFV Federal Association of Insurance Intermediaries and Companies tied to a 
specific firm 
– BIPAR European Federation of Insurance Intermediaries 
– CEA European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation 
– CEFOR Central Union of Marine Underwriters 
– Czech Insurance Association 
– DIA Danish Insurance Association 
                                                   
91 Society of Actuaries in Ireland, Norton Rose LLP (law  firm), Austrian Economic Chamber, Harold Caplan 
(private citizen), European Actuarial Consultative Group. 
92 Three Associations (BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, DVS, BFV) responded together. 
EN 53   EN – Fire Protection Association 
– FNH Norwegian Financial Services Association 
– Försäkringsförbundet Swedish Insurance Federation 
– GDV German Insurance Association 
– Hellenic Association of Insurers Companies 
– Irish Insurance Federation 
– Lloyd's Market Association 
– MABISZ Association of Hungarian Insurance Companies 
– PEIF Pan European Insurance Forum 
– PKV Verband der privaten Kranken Versicherung 
– Slovak Insurance Association 
– VNAB Cooperatieve Vereniging Nederlandese Assurantie 
– VVO Austrian Insurance Association 
– VVV Dutch Association of Insurers 
Insurers: 
– Allianz SE 
– Aviva 
– AXA 
– Ecclesia 
– Marsh Group 
– Nürnberger Versicherung 
– Provinzial NW Holding 
– QBE Insurance 
– R+V Versicherung AG 
– RSA Insurance Group 
– Zurich Financial Services 
Supervisory Authorities: 
– CBFA Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances 
EN 54   EN – CSA Insurance Supervisory Commission Romania 
– Czech National Bank 
– Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones 
– FKTK Financial and Capital Market Commission of Latvia 
– ISP Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds 
– ISVAP Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni Private 
– National Bank of Slovakia 
Risks management federation: 
– FERMA 
Consumer Associations: 
– Altroconsumo 
– Deco Proteste 
– KEPKA Consumers protection Center 
– NACP Hungary 
– TEST-Achats 
– DVS German Association for the Protection of Insurance Customer 
– VZBV Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband 
Other Entities: 
– Actuaries Society in Ireland 
– Caplan Harold 
– FIN-USEs Rzu Gov Poland 
– Groupe Consultatif Actuariel Europeen 
– Norton Rose LLP 
– WKO Austrian Federal Economic Chamber 
EN 55   EN ANNEX 3  
Questions from Consultation on  
Joint Calculations, Tables and Studies  
 
Note : You are requested to answer the questions with reference to the market or 
markets in which you are or have been active (this could be a single EU Member State or a number of EU Member States). Please always indicate to which Member State your 
comments relate. Wherever possible, please support your arguments with evidence. 
1. (i) How do you evaluate the current functioning of the BER in this area? 
(ii) What is the impact of this form of cooperation on the demand and supply of 
insurance and on the pricing of insurance policies? (iii) To what extent is the performance (profitability, solvency) of the insurance industry affected? Please explain 
your answers. 
2. Are there any changes that you believe may be useful in the current BER in order to 
improve its functioning e.g. differentiating between insurance classes / specific risks 
(e.g. should the frequency and diversifiability of specific risks play a role in block exempting cooperation among insurers)? Pleas e explain the reasons for your answer. 
3. Considering the greenfield market entries in the insurance sector
93 over the last five 
years to your knowledge (i) did such entrants make use of the joint calculations, tables, 
and studies envisaged in the BER? (ii) Is there evidence that this exemption has affected 
entry and if so, how? (iii) Please describe an y entry barriers affected by this exemption 
and provide estimates of the costs involved in overcoming these barriers. Please provide 
any analysis, report, study or survey to substantiate your views. 
4. (i) What do you consider would be the impact if any of the non-renewal of the BER on 
the scope and level of cooperation in this particular area? Please explain why you would 
expect this impact. (ii) What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in terms of market structure, entry barriers, co mpetitiveness of smaller insurers, level of 
customer mobility, etc.) of these changes in cooperation? Please provide any analysis, 
report, study or surveys to substantiate your claims. 
5. Do you consider there to be alternative (pro-competitive) solutions to overcome the 
information asymmetry problems faced by the industry other than through renewal of the BER as it is currently drafted? Please explain your answer. 
                                                  
 
93 Entry by insurance companies in a Member State through the establishment of subsidiaries/branches as opposed to the 
acquisition of insurance companies alr eady existing in that Member State.  
EN 56   EN ANNEX 4  
Questions from Consultation on  
Standard Policy Conditions and Models on Profits  
 
Note : You are requested to answer the questions with reference to the market or markets 
in which you are or have been active (this could be a single EU Member State or a number of EU Member States). Please always indicate to which Member State your 
comments relate. Wherever possible, pl ease support your arguments with evidence.  
1. (i) How do you evaluate the current functioning of the BER in this area? (ii) What is the 
impact of this form of cooperation on the demand and supply of insurance and on the 
pricing of insurance policies? To what exte nt is the performance (profitability, solvency) 
of the insurance industry affected? Please explain your answers. 
2. Are there any changes that you believe may be useful in the current BER to improve its 
functioning (e.g. differentiating between insura nce classes)? Please be specific and give 
reasons for your answer. 
3. Considering the greenfield market entries over the last five years in the insurance 
sector
94, to your knowledge: (i) did such entrants make use of standard policy conditions, 
clauses, models envisaged in the BER? (ii) Is there evidence that this exemption has 
affected entry and if so how? (iii) Please describe any entry barriers affected by this 
exemption and provide estimates of the costs involved in overcoming these barriers. 
Please provide any analysis, report, study or survey to substantiate your claims. 
4. (i) What do you consider would be the impact if any of the non-renewal of the BER on 
the scope and level of cooperation in this particular area? Please explain why you would 
expect this impact. (ii) What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in 
terms of market structure, entry barriers, co mpetitiveness of smaller insurers, level of 
customer mobility, etc.) of these changes in cooperation? Please provide any analysis, 
report, study or surveys to substantiate your views. 
5. (i) In your experience, how does cooperation on standard policy conditions affect the 
variety of available insurance policies? (ii) Can cooperation lead to a decreased supply of 
insurance products? 
6. In your experience, how does cooperation on standard policy conditions affect the use of 
restrictive or exclusionary terms? Please explain your answer. 
                                                   
94 Entry by insurance companies in a Member State through the establishment of subsidiaries/branches as opposed to the 
acquisition of insurance companies alr eady existing in that Member State.  
EN 57   EN ANNEX 5  
Questions from Consultation on  
Common Coverage of Risks (Pools)  
 
Note : You are requested to answer the questions with reference to the market or markets 
in which you are or have been active (this could be a single EU Member State or a number of EU Member States). Please always indicate to which Member State your 
comments relate. Wherever possible, pl ease support your arguments with evidence.  
1. (i) How do you evaluate the current functioning of the BER in this area? (ii) What is the 
impact of this form of cooperation on the demand and supply of insurance and on the 
pricing of insurance policies? (iii) To what extent is the performance (profitability, solvency) of the insurance industry affected? Please explain your answers. 
2. Are there any changes that you believe may be useful in the BER to improve its 
functioning? Please be specific and give reasons for your answer. 
3. (i) What do you consider would be the impact if any of the non-renewal of the BER on 
the scope and level of cooperation in this particular area? Please explain why you would expect this impact. (ii) What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in 
terms of market structure, entry barriers, co mpetitiveness of smaller insurers, level of 
customer mobility, etc.) of these changes in cooperation? Please provide any analysis, 
report, study or surveys to substantiate your claims. 
4. (i) Do you consider that the current BER provisions define pro-competitive pools 
sufficiently? (ii) Are there any exceptions (e.g. pro-competitive pools not exempted, 
anti-competitive pools exempted)? Please give examples and explain. 
5. Do you consider that the BER hinders se tting-up pools with innovative policies (e.g. 
against natural disasters) on the basis that the risks are not new? Please give examples 
and explain. 
5. In what sense, if any would non-renewal / absence of the BER affect the setting-up of 
cross-border pools? Please explain your answer. 
EN 58   EN ANNEX 6  
Questions from Consultation on  
Security Devices  
 
Note : You are requested to answer the questions with reference to the market or markets 
in which you are or have been active (this could be a single EU Member State or a number of EU Member States). Please always indicate to which Member State your 
comments relate. Wherever possible, pl ease support your arguments with evidence.  
1. (i) How do you evaluate the current functioning of the BER in this area? (ii) What is the 
impact of this form of cooperation on the demand and supply of insurance and on the 
pricing of insurance policies? (iii) To what extent is the performance (profitability, solvency) of the insurance industry affected? 
2. Are there any changes that you believe may be useful in BER to improve its functioning? 
Please be specific and give reasons for your answer. 
3. (i) Considering the greenfield market entries over the last five years in the insurance 
sector
95, to your knowledge, did such entrants make use of the cooperation in the field of 
security devices envisaged in the BER? (ii) Is there evidence that the BER has affected 
entry in a positive way in the past? 
4. (i) What do you consider would be the impact if any of the non-renewal of the BER on 
the scope and level of cooperation in this particular area? Please explain why you expect 
this outcome. (ii) What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in terms of market structure, entry barriers, competitiveness of smaller insurers, level of customer 
mobility, etc.) of these changes in cooperation? Please provide any analysis, report, 
study or surveys to substantiate your claims. 
5. Did you experience any competition problems in relation to the BER in the following 
sectors: (i) production of security devices; (ii) evaluation of security devices; (iii) 
installation and maintenance of security devi ces? In each case, if so, please explain your 
answer. 
                                                  
 
95 Entry by insurance companies in a Member State through the establishment of subsidiaries/branches as opposed to the 
acquisition of insurance companies alr eady existing in that Member State.  
EN 59   EN ANNEX 7  
General Questions from Consultation  
 
Note : You are requested to answer the questions with reference to the market or markets 
in which you are or have been active (this could be a single EU Member State or a 
number of EU Member States). Please always indicate to which Member State your comments relate. Wherever possible, pl ease support your arguments with evidence.  
1. Do you consider that the business risks or information asymmetries in the insurance 
industry are special compared to other sectors, such that the proper functioning of the 
sector requires a BER? Please explain your answer. 
2. From your experience, do insurers use the forms of cooperation exempted in the BER? 
What forms of co-operation are used and why? 
3. How do you consider the scope and level of cooperation changed after the BER came 
into force or the Member State in which you are active, entered the European Union? 
Please explain your answer. 
4. (i) What is the relationship between the scope and level (intensity) of cooperation and 
the provisions / existence of the current BER? (ii) What other factors (e.g. market 
structure, maturity of the market, competitiveness, national legislation, etc.) influence the 
level of cooperation in the insurance i ndustry and how? (iii) How does the level of 
cooperation influence market structure? Please explain your answer. 
5. Please list all greenfield entries in the insurance sector
96 over the past 5 years. 
6. If your company entered the insurance sector since the BER came into force, did the 
forms of co-operation exempted in the BER affect your entry and if so please explain 
how. 
7. Would you expect a change in the current level of cooperation (e.g. that is currently 
covered by the BER) in the case of non-renewal of the insurance BER? Please explain what change you would expect and why you would expect it. 
8. (i) What impact would you expect (e.g. economic, social, etc.) as a consequence of any 
change in cooperation? Please explain your answer. Please differentiate between any 
such kinds of impact according to stakehol der group. (ii) Please also state if you would 
expect any impact to affect certain groups of stakeholders more than others and why? 
9. In your experience, does the BER give rise to any anti-competitive effects such as 
reduced supply of insurance products or higher prices due to agreements between 
competitors? Please provide examples to illustrate your response. 
10. (i) How does the BER affect market integration in the insurance sector in the EU? (ii) 
Does the BER create obstacles to or facilitate cross-border provision of insurance services? Please explain your answer. 
                                                  
 
96 Entry by insurance companies in a Member State through the establishment of subsidiaries/branches as opposed to the 
acquisition of insurance companies alr eady existing in that Member State.  
EN 60   EN 11. How do you consider expiration of the BER would affect supervision by supervisory 
authorities, and competition law enforcement? Please explain your answer. 
12. Do you consider that non-renewal of the BER would lead to an inconsistent application 
of competition rules across EU Member States? Please explain your answer. 
13. (i) Which justification for having the current BER (premium calculation argument, 
standard policy argument, pooling argument, etc.) is most important for you / your company? Please explain your answer. (ii) What percentage of your business is affected 
by the BER? Please explain how you make this calculation. 
14. What specific elements of the BER if any, would you like to see improved if a new BER 
were adopted? Please explain your answer. 
15. Do you think the BER should be more tailored to specific risks, e.g. according to the 
diversifiability and/or the frequency of the unde rlying risks? Please explain your answer. 
16. (i) Do you think the expiry of the BER would have any cost implications (positive or 
negative) in the context of the new actuarial and risk management requirements to be 
imposed under the Solvency II project? (ii) Would the expiration of the BER have an 
impact on the conduct of quantitative impact studies (QIS)? If so please explain how and why. 
EN 61   EN ANNEX 8  
Questionnaires to  
Small and medium sized Insurers  
following Consultation  
 
1 Please provide the following information in relation to your company: (i) full name of 
company; (ii) your activities, and (iii) size e.g. by turnover / number of employees; (iv) 
in which Member States you are active. 
2. (i) When did you enter the insurance sector? (ii) Was your entry greenfield97 or through 
acquisition? (iii) Did use of the BER facilitate  your entry and if so please explain how? 
3. (i) Do you enter into any agreements with other insurers under the BER? If so (ii) what 
kinds of agreement; and (iii) how often. 
4. What do you consider would be the impact if any, of the non-renewal of the BER on the 
scope and level of your cooperation with other insurers under the BER? Please explain 
why you expect this outcome.  
5. What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in terms of (i) insurance 
market structure , (ii) entry barriers, (iii) co mpetitiveness of smaller insurers, (iv) level of 
customer mobility, etc.) of any such changes in cooperation? If available, please provide 
any analysis, report, study or surveys that you consider may substantiate your views. 
6. Do you consider there to be a link between concentration in the insurance sector and the 
use of the BER. Please explain your answer. 
7. Do you consider there to be any links between your co-operation under the BER and (i) 
your premiums and (ii) the range of products you offer to policy holders. Please explain 
your answer. 
8. In the event that the BER is renewed, are there any changes to the BER that you consider 
may be useful to improve its functioning? Please be specific and give reasons for your answer. 
Concerning Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the BER_- Joint Calculations and Tables and Studies: 
 
9. Do you consider that agreements of this kind are necessary in order to accurately assess 
risk? Please explain your answer. (ii) Is this information available through other sources 
e.g. publicly? 
10. Do you think that without the BER, large insurers would continue to cooperate with 
smaller insurers in this way by sharing information on joint calculations, tables and 
studies? 
11. (i) Do you think the expiry of the BER would have any implications (positive or 
negative) in the context of the new actuarial and risk management requirements to be imposed under the Solvency II project? (ii) Would the expiration of the BER have an 
                                                  
 
97 Entry by insurance companies in a Member State through the establishment of subsidiaries/branches as opposed to the 
acquisition of insurance companies alr eady existing in that Member State.  
EN 62   EN impact on the conduct of quantitative impact studies (QIS)? If so please explain how and 
why. 
Concerning Articles 1, 7 and 8 of the BER - Pools  
12. (i) Do you participate in any pools? (ii) Do you consider that those pools are covered by 
the BER. If so, please explain on what basis. 
13. Do you consider that you would be able to offer this kind of insurance outside of the 
pool? Please explain your answer. 
Concerning Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the BER - Standard Policy Conditions  
14. (i) Where did you obtain the standard policy conditions that you use in your policy 
documents? (ii) Do you ever adapt these standard policy conditions? (iii) Do you 
consider that you are obliged in any way to use these standard policy conditions? 
15. In terms of the products you offer, do you face competition on policy conditions or only 
on price? Please explain your answers. 
Concerning Articles 1 and 9 of the BER - Technical Specifications, Rules or Codes of Practice for 
Security Devices  
16. (i) What information do you use in order to assess risk involving security devices? (ii) 
Do you rely on testing results from other insurers / insurance associations? 
17. In what way are you involved (if at all) in establishing, recognising and distributing 
technical specifications, rules or codes of practice for security devices. 
18. Do you consider that the fact that you have the same technical specifications for 
securitydevices as other insurers - fac ilitates switching for policy holders between 
insurers. 
EN 63   EN ANNEX 9  
Questionnaires to Pools following Consultation  
 
1. Please provide the following information in relation to your pool / the pool in which you 
participate: 
a. (i) name of the pool; (ii) the risks covered by the pool, and (ii) what you consider 
is the relevant product market of the pool; 
b. where the pool is established; 
c. when the pool was established; 
d. list the members of the pool; 
e. (i) are any members of your pool also members of any other pools and (ii) if so 
please list the other pools in which they are involved; 
f. what do you consider is the geographic market covered by the pool (e.g national, 
European, global etc); 
g. does the pool cover risks situated in countries other than the country in which the 
pool is established and if so, please list those countries. 
2. (i) Do you consider that your pool is covered by the BER and if so, (ii) please explain 
why. 
3. (i) Do you consider that it is possible  (even if this is not currently happening) for any 
individual members of your pool to over the same risks individually (i.e. without the 
pool); (ii) do any individual members cover the same risks outside of the pool? 
4. (i) What do you consider would be the impact if the BER were not renewed, on the 
scope and level of cooperation for pools? Please explain why you would expect this 
impact. (ii) What do you consider would be the economic effects (e.g. in terms of market 
structure, entry barriers, competitiveness of smaller insurers, level of customer mobility, 
etc.) of these changes in cooperation? Please provide any analysis, report, study or surveys to substantiate your claims. 
5. Do you consider that the BER hinders setting-up pools with innovative policies on the 
basis that the risks are not new? Please give examples and explain. 
6. In what sense, if any would non-renewal / absence of the BER affect the setting-up of 
cross-border pools? Please explain your answer. 
7. In the event that the BER were renewed in relation to pools, are there any changes that 
you believe may be useful in the BER to improve its functioning? Please be specific and 
give reasons for your answer. 
EN 64   EN ANNEX 10  
Questionnaires to  
Producer Federations concerning  
Security Devices following Consultation  
 
1. Please provide the following information in relation to your association: (i) full name of 
the association; (ii) your activities, and (ii) list of your members together with contact 
details (name of company, name of contact person, email address and telephone 
number). 
2. What do you consider is the impact of the kinds of agreements (between insurance 
companies) permitted by Article 1(f) of the BER (quoted in the cover letter) on (i) the demand and supply of security devices and/or the installation or maintenance of security 
devices and/or the evaluation of undertakings which install or maintain security devices? 
(ii) the demand and supply of insurance policies and (iii) the pricing of insurance 
policies? 
3. (i) Do you consider that there is an enhanced need of cooperation between insurers in the 
areas permitted by Article 1(f) of the BER, which is specific to the insurance sector? 
4. Are you aware of any other similar forms of cooperation in these areas (security devices 
and technical specifications etc) between companies other than insurers or insurance 
associations? 
5. Do you consider that the forms of cooperation permitted by Article 1(f) of the BER have 
pro-competitive effects on the insurance market (e.g. by allowing policyholders to switch 
more easily between insurance companies accepting the same type of security devices)? 
Please explain your answer. 
6. Do you consider that policyholders benefit from the forms of cooperation between 
insurers permitted by Article 1(f) of the BER? If so, what do you consider are the main benefits for policyholders? 
7. Have you experienced any competition problems (since 2003) on the downstream market 
for security devices as a result of the kinds  of agreements between insurers that are 
covered by the BER in the following sectors: (i) production of security devices; (ii) 
installation and maintenance of security devices; (iii) evaluation of undertakings which install or maintain security devices? In each  case, if so, please explain your answer. 
8. Do you consider that you are prevented from producing security devices or from issuing 
any specifications, rules or codes of practice in relation to the installation and 
maintenance of security devices or in relation to the evaluation of companies which 
install or maintain security devices which are not being agreed upon by insurers? 
9. Given that cooperation between insurers on specifications, rules or codes of practice 
concerning security devices is possible to the extent to which these are not harmonised at 
EU level, do you consider that there remain s any scope for cooperation between insurers 
in this area? 
10. Do you consider that specifications, rules or codes of practice arising from cooperation 
between insurers in the areas covered by Artic le 1(f) of the BER are too difficult for you 
to comply with or, on the contrary, are you happy with them? 
EN 65   EN 11. Do you actively participate in cooperation between insurers or insurance associations in 
relation to security devices and/or their installation and maintenance (e.g. are you asked 
for your views on codes of practice or technical specifications)? Could you please 
describe the role you play in any such cooperation? 
12. In the event that the BER is renewed, are there any changes to the BER that you consider 
may be useful to improve its functioning? Please be specific and give reasons for your answer. 
EN 66   EN ANNEX 11  
Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems  
Harmonised European Standards  
 
Standard reference Title Citation in OJ Directive 
89/106/EEC, CEN/TR 14568:2003 EN 54 - Fire detection and fire alarm 
systems - Interpretation of specific clauses 
of EN 54-2:1997 No 
96/98/EC 
CEN/TS 54-14:2004 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
14: Guidelines for planning, design, 
installation, commissioning, use and 
maintenance No - 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 EN 14604:2005 Smoke alarm devices 
(2005-12-14) 89/106/EEC 
EN 14604:2005/AC:2008 Smoke alarm devices Expected 89/106/EEC 
EN 54-1:1996 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
1: Introduction No 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-10:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
10: Flame detectors - Point detectors 
(2006-12-13)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-10:2002/A1:2005 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
10: Flame detectors - Point detectors 
(2006-12-13)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-11:2001 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
11: Manual call points 
(2006-12-13)  
EN 67   EN Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-11:2001/A1:2005 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
11: Manual call points 
(2006-12-13)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08),  
C 165  EN 54-12:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
12: Smoke detectors - Line detectors using 
an optical light beam 
(2003-07-16)  
EN 54-13:2005 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
13: Compatibility assessment of system 
components No 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 321 EN 54-16:2008 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
16: Voice alarm control and indicating 
equipment 
(2008-12-16) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 54-17:2005 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
17: Short-circuit isolators 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 321 EN 54-17:2005/AC:2007 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
17: Short-circuit isolators 
(2008-12-16) 89/106/EEC 
EN 54-18:2005 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC 
EN 68   EN C 304 18: Input/output devices 
(2006-12-13) 
Cited in OJ 
C 290 EN 54-18:2005/AC:2007 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
18: Input/output devices 
(2007-12-04) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 290 96/98/EC EN 54-2:1997 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
2: Control and indicating equipment 
(2007-12-04)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 290 96/98/EC EN 54-2:1997/A1:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
2: Control and indicating equipment 
(2007-12-04)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 290 96/98/EC EN 54-2:1997/AC:1999 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
2: Control and indicating equipment 
(2007-12-04)  
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 54-20:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
20: Aspirating smoke detectors 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
EN 54-20:2006/AC:2008 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
20: Aspirating smoke detectors Expected 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 54-21:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
21: Alarm transmission and fault warning 
routing equipment 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
EN 54-24:2008 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC 
EN 69   EN C 321 24: Components of voice alarm systems - 
Loudspeakers 
(2008-12-16) 
Cited in OJ 
C 321 EN 54-25:2008 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
25: Components using radio links 
(2008-12-16) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  EN 54-3:2001 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
3: Fire alarm devices - Sounders 
(2005-06-08)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08),  
C 320  EN 54-3:2001/A1:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
3: Fire alarm devices - Sounders 
(2002-12-20)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-3:2001/A2:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
3: Fire alarm devices - Sounders 
(2006-12-13)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC, EN 54-4:1997 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
4: Power supply equipment 
C 319 96/98/EC 
EN 70   EN (2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08),  
C 165  EN 54-4:1997/A1:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
4: Power supply equipment 
(2003-07-16)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-4:1997/A2:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
4: Power supply equipment 
(2006-12-13)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 139 96/98/EC EN 54-4:1997/AC:1999 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
4: Power supply equipment 
(2005-06-08)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  EN 54-5:2000 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
5: Heat detectors - Point detectors 
(2005-06-08)  
EN 54-5:2000/A1:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
EN 71   EN C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08),  
C 320  5: Heat detectors - Point detectors 
(2002-12-20)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  EN 54-7:2000 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
7: Smoke detectors - Point detectors using 
scattered light, transmitted light or 
ionization 
(2005-06-08)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-14),  
C 139  
(2005-06-08),  
C 320  EN 54-7:2000/A1:2002 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
7: Smoke detectors - Point detectors using 
scattered light, transmitted light or 
ionization 
(2002-12-20)  
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC,
C 304 96/98/EC EN 54-7:2000/A2:2006 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - Part 
7: Smoke detectors - Point detectors using 
scattered light, transmitted light or 
ionization (2006-12-13)  
Table 2 -  Fire detection and fire alarm systems – harmonised European standards under 
development 
 
EN 72   EN Project reference Title Directive Current 
status Expected 
approval 
  prEN 54-23 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 23: Fire alarm devices - Visual 
alarms 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2008-10 
  prEN 54-22 Fire detection and fire alarm system - 
Part 22: Resettable line type heat 
detectors 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2008-11 
  prEN 54-1 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 1: Introduction 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2011-05 
  prEN 54-26 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 26: Point fire detectors using 
carbon monoxide sensors 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2009-10 
  prEN 54-27 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 27: Duct smoke detectors 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2010-04 
  prEN 54-12 rev Fire detection and alarm systems - Part 
12: Line type smoke detectors using a 
transmitted optical beam 89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2011-01 
prCEN/TS 54-14 rev Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Guidelines for planning, design, 
installation, commissioning, use and 
maintenance   Under 
Development 2009-10 
  EN 14604:2005/prA1 Smoke alarm devices 
89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2010-01 
  prEN 54-5 rev Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 5: Heat detectors - Point detectors 
89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2011-04 
prEN 54-7 rev Fire detection and fire alarm systems -   Under 2011-04 
EN 73   EN Part 7: Smoke detectors - Point 
detectors using scattered light, 
transmitted light or ionization 89/106/EEC Development 
  prEN 54-11 rev Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 11: Manual call points 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2009-06 
prEN 54-3 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 3: Fire alarm devices - Sounders   Under 
Approval 2010-11 
  prEN 54-10 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 10: Flame detectors - Point 
detectors 89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2011-08 
  prEN 54-2 rev Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 2: Control and indicating 
equipment 89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2010-10 
  prEN 54-30 Fire detection and fire alarm systems - 
Part 30: Multi-sensor fire detectors - 
Point detectors using a combination of 
carbon monoxide and heat sensors 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2011-11 
EN 74   EN Table 3 – Fixed firefighting systems – Harmonised European standards already published 
Standard reference Title Citation in 
OJ Directive 
CEN/TR 12101-4:2006 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 4: 
Installed SHEVS systems for smoke and 
heat ventilation No 89/106/EEC 
CEN/TR 12101-4:2009 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 4: 
Installed SHEVS systems for smoke and 
heat ventilation No - 
CEN/TR 12101-5:2005 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 5: 
Guidelines on functional recommendations 
and calculation methods for smoke and heat 
exhaust ventilation systems No - 
CEN/TR 15276-1:2009 Fixed firefighting systems - Condensed 
aerosol extinguishing systems - Part 1: 
Requirements and test methods for 
components No - 
CEN/TR 15276-2:2009 Fixed firefighting systems - Condensed 
aerosol extinguishing systems - Part 2: 
Design, installation and maintenance No - 
CEN/TS 14816:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Water spray 
systems - Design, installation and 
maintenance No - 
CEN/TS 14972:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Watermist 
systems - Design and installation No - 
CEN/TS 15176:2005 Evaluation of conformity for fixed 
firefighting systems standards No - 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 EN 12094-1:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 1: 
Requirements and test methods for electrical 
automatic control and delay devices (2005-12-89/106/EEC 
EN 75   EN 14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 
(2005-06-08) 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-10:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 10: 
Requirements and test methods for pressure 
gauges and pressure switches 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-11:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 11: 
Requirements and test methods for 
mechanical weighing devices 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
EN 76   EN Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-12:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 12: 
Requirements and test methods for 
pneumatic alarm devices 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 139 
(2005-06-
08), 
C 202 EN 12094-13:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 13: 
Requirements and test methods for check 
valves and non-return valves 
(2001-07-18) 89/106/EEC 
EN 12094-13:2001/AC:2002 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 13: 
Requirements and test methods for check 
valves and non-return valves No - 
EN 12094-16:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 16: 
Requirements and test methods for 
odorizing devices for CO2 low pressure 
systems No 89/106/EEC 
EN 77   EN Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-2:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 2: 
Requirements and test methods for non-
electrical automatic control and delay 
devices 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-3:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 3: 
Requirements and test methods for manual 
triggering and stop devices 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 263 EN 12094-4:2004 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 4: 
Requirements and test methods for container 
valve assemblies and their actuators 
(2004-10-
26), 89/106/EEC 
EN 78   EN C 139 
(2005-06-08) 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12094-5:2006 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 5: 
Requirements and test methods for high and 
low pressure selector valves and their 
actuators (2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12094-6:2006 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 6: 
Requirements and test methods for non-
electrical disable devices (2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 139 
(2005-06-
08), 
C 202 EN 12094-7:2000 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 7: 
Requirements and test methods for nozzles 
for CO2 systems 
(2001-07-18) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 139 EN 12094-7:2000/A1:2005 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 7: 
Requirements and test methods for nozzles 
for CO2 systems 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
EN 79   EN Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12094-8:2006 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 8: 
Requirements and test methods for 
connectors (2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12094-9:2003 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
gas extinguishing systems - Part 9: 
Requirements and test methods for special 
fire detectors 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12101-1:2005 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 1: 
Specification for smoke barriers 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12101-1:2005/A1:2006 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 1: 
Specification for smoke barriers 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12101-10:2005 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 10: 
Power supplies 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ EN 12101-10:2005/AC:2007 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 10: 
Power supplies 
C 290 89/106/EEC 
EN 80   EN (2007-12-04) 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12101-2:2003 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 2: 
Specification for natural smoke and heat 
exhaust ventilators 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 67 
(2004-03-
17), 
C 139 EN 12101-3:2002 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 3: 
Specification for powered smoke and heat 
exhaust ventilators 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12101-3:2002/AC:2005 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 3: 
Specification for powered smoke and heat 
exhaust ventilators 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ EN 12101-6:2005 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 6: 
Specification for pressure differential 
C 319 89/106/EEC 
EN 81   EN systems - Kits (2005-12-14) 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12101-6:2005/AC:2006 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 6: 
Specification for pressure differential 
systems - Kits 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 40 
(2002-02-
14), 
C 139 EN 12259-1:1999 + A1:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 1: 
Sprinklers 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 263 
(2004-10-
26), 
C 139 EN 12259-1:1999 + 
A1:2001/A2:2004 Fixed firefighting systems components for 
sprinkler and waterspray systems - Part 1: 
Sprinklers 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ EN 12259-1:1999 + 
A1:2001/A3:2006 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 1: 
C 304 89/106/EEC 
EN 82   EN Sprinklers (2006-12-13) 
Cited in OJ 
C 139 EN 12259-2:1999 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 2: 
Wet alarm valve assemblies 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 358 
(2001-12-
15), 
C 139 
(2005-06-
08), 
C 97 EN 12259-2:1999/A1:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 2: 
Wet alarm valve assemblies 
(2004-04-22) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12259-2:1999/A2:2005 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 2: 
Wet alarm valve assemblies 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 139 EN 12259-2:1999/AC:2002 Fixed firefighting sytems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 2: 
Wet alarm valve assemblies 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
EN 83   EN Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 139 EN 12259-3:2000 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
automatic sprinkler and water spray systems 
- Part 3: Dry alarm valve assemblies 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 358 
(2001-12-
15), 
C 139 
(2005-06-
08), 
C 97 EN 12259-3:2000/A1:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 3: 
Dry alarm valve assemblies 
(2004-04-22) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 12259-3:2000/A2:2005 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 3: 
Dry alarm valve assemblies 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 EN 12259-4:2000 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 4: 
Water motor alarms 
(2005-12-89/106/EEC 
EN 84   EN 14), 
C 139 
(2005-06-08) 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 358 
(2001-12-
15), 
C 139 EN 12259-4:2000/A1:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 4: 
Water motor alarms 
(2005-06-08) 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 
C 319 
(2005-12-
14), 
C 139 
(2005-06-
08), 
C 47 EN 12259-5:2002 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 5: 
Water flow detectors 
(2003-02-27) 89/106/EEC 
EN 12416-1:2001+A2:2007 Fixed firefighting systems - Powder systems 
- Part 1: Requirements and test methods for 
components No - 
EN 85   EN EN 12416-2:2001+A1:2007 Fixed firefighting systems - Powder systems 
- Part 2: Design, construction and 
maintenance No - 
EN 12845:2004 Fixed firefighting systems - Automatic 
sprinkler systems - Design, installation and 
maintenance No 89/106/EEC 
EN 13565-1:2003+A1:2007 Fixed firefighting systems - Foam systems - 
Part 1: Requirements and test methods for 
components No 89/106/EEC 
EN 15004-1:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 1: Design, 
installation and maintenance (ISO 14520-
1:2006, modified) No 89/106/EEC 
EN 15004-10:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 10: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for IG-541 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-15:2005, 
modified) No - 
EN 15004-2:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 2: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for FK-5-1-12 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-5:2006, modified)No - 
EN 15004-3:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 3: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for HCFC Blend A 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-6:2006, modified)No - 
EN 15004-4:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 4: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for HFC 125 No - 
EN 86   EN extinguishant (ISO 14520-8:2006, modified)
EN 15004-5:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 5: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for HFC 227ea 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-9:2006, modified)No - 
EN 15004-6:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 6: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for HFC 23 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-10:2005, 
modified) No - 
EN 15004-7:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 7: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for IG-01 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-12:2005, 
modified) No - 
EN 15004-8:2008 Fixed firefighting system - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 8: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for IG-100 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-13:2005, 
modified) No - 
EN 15004-9:2008 Fixed firefighting systems - Gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 9: Physical 
properties and system design of gas 
extinguishing systems for IG-55 
extinguishant (ISO 14520-14:2005, 
modified) No - 
EN 87   EN EN 1568-1:2008 Fire extinguishing media - Foam 
concentrates - Part 1: Specification for 
medium expansion foam concentrates for 
surface application to water-immiscible 
liquids No 89/106/EEC 
EN 1568-2:2008 Fire extinguishing media - Foam 
concentrates - Part 2: Specification for high 
expansion foam concentrates for surface 
application to water-immiscible liquids No 89/106/EEC 
EN 1568-3:2008 Fire extinguishing media - Foam 
concentrates - Part 3: Specification for low 
expansion foam concentrates for surface 
application to water-immiscible liquids No 89/106/EEC 
EN 1568-4:2008 Fire extinguishing media - Foam 
concentrates - Part 4: Specification for low 
expansion foam concentrates for surface 
application to water-miscible liquids No 89/106/EEC 
EN 25923:1993 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Carbon dioxide (ISO 5923:1989) No 89/106/EEC 
EN 27201-1:1994 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Halogenated hydrocarbons - Part 1: 
Specifications for halon 1211 and halon 
1301 (ISO 7201-1:1989) No 89/106/EEC 
EN 27201-2:1994 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Halogenated hydrocarbons - Part 2: Code of 
practice for safe handling and transfer 
procedures (ISO 7201-2:1991) No 89/106/EEC 
EN 615:1994 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Specification for powders (other than class 
D powders) No 89/106/EEC 
EN 615:1994/A1:2001 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Specifications for powders (other than class No 89/106/EEC 
EN 88   EN D powders) 
EN 615:1994/AC:2006 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Specifications for powders (other than class 
D powders) No 89/106/EEC 
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC, 
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-
14),   
C 139   
(2005-06-
08),   
C 202   EN 671-1:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 1: Hose reels with semi-rigid hose 
(2001-07-18)   
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC, 
C 304 96/98/EC EN 671-1:2001/AC:2002 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 1: Hose reels with semi-rigid hose 
(2006-12-13)   
Cited in OJ 89/106/EEC, 
C 319 96/98/EC 
(2005-12-
14),   
C 139   
(2005-06-
08),   EN 671-2:2001 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 2: Hose systems with lay-flat hose 
C 202   
EN 89   EN (2001-07-18)   
Cited in OJ 
C 304 EN 671-2:2001/A1:2004 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 2: Hose systems with lay-flat hose 
(2006-12-13) 89/106/EEC 
EN 671-3:2000 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 3: Maintenance of hose reels with semi-
rigid hose and hose systems with lay-flat 
hose No 89/106/EEC 
EN 671-3:2000/AC:2000 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - 
Part 3: Maintenance of hose reels with semi-
rigid hose and hose systems with lay-flat 
hose No 89/106/EEC 
EN 90   EN Table 4 – Fixed firefighting systems – Harmonised European standards under development 
Project reference Title Directive Status Expected 
approval 
prEN 13565-2 Fixed firefighting systems - Foam systems - Part 
2: Design, construction and maintenance   Under 
Approval 2007-07 
  prEN 12259-8 Fire protection - Components for automatic 
sprinkler systems - Part 8: Pressure switches 
89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2002-12 
  prEN 671-1 Fixed firefighting sytems - Hose systems - Part 1: 
Hose reels with semi-rigid hose 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2007-10 
  prEN 671-2 Fixed firefighting sytems - Hose systems - Part 2: 
Hose system with lay-flat hose 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2007-10 
  EN 671-3:2009 Fixed firefighting systems - Hose systems - Part 3: 
Maintenance of hose reels with semi-rigid hose 
and hose systems with lay-flat hose 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2009-03 
  prEN 12094-7 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for gas 
extinguishing systems - Part 7: Requirements and 
test methods for nozzles 89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2007-10 
EN 
12845:2004/prA1 Fixed firefighting systems - Automatic sprinkler 
systems - Design, installation and maintenance   Under 
Approval 2008-04 
EN 
12845:2004/prA2 Fixed firefighting systems - Automatic sprinkler 
systems - Design, installation and maintenance   Under 
Approval 2008-04 
prEN 615 Fire protection - Fire extinguishing media - 
Specifications for powders (other than class D 
powders)   Under 
Approval 2009-05 
prEN 12259-6 Fixed firefighting systems - Sprinkler and water 
spray systems - Part 6: Pipe couplings   Under 
Development 2011-02 
prEN 12259-12 Fixed firefighting systems - Sprinkler and water   Under 2011-02 
EN 91   EN spray systems - Part 12: Sprinkler pumps 89/106/EEC Development 
EN 
12845:2004/prA3 Automatic sprinkler systems - Design and 
installation   Under 
Development 2011-11 
  prEN 12101-7 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 7: Smoke 
duct sections 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2010-03 
  prEN 12101-8 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 8: Smoke 
control dampers 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2010-03 
  EN 12101-
1:2005/prA2 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 1: 
Specification for smoke barriers 
89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2010-10 
  prEN 12101-2 rev Smoke and heat control systems - Part 2: 
Specification for natural smoke and heat exhaust 
ventilators 89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2010-10 
  prEN 12101-9 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 9: Control 
panels 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2010-10 
  EN 12101-
10:2005/prA1 Smoke and heat control systems - Part 10: Power 
supplies 
89/106/EEC Under 
Approval 2010-10 
  prEN 12259-9 Fixed firefighting systems - Components for 
sprinkler and water spray systems - Part 9: Deluge 
valve assemblies 89/106/EEC Under 
Development 2011-11