EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 28 January 2011 
on the implementation of the principles for the development of 
financial supervisory structures in Belgium  
(CON/2011/5) 
 Introduction and legal basis
 
On 23 December 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB)  received a request from the Belgian Ministry 
of Finance for an opinion on a draft royal decree im plementing the development of financial supervisory 
structures (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and the third, fifth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consulta tion of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions1, as the draft royal decree relates to the Nationale Bank 
van België/Banque Nationale  de Belgique (NBB), payment and settle ment systems, and rules applicable 
to financial institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and 
markets. In addition, the Eurosystem shall contribut e to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit ins titutions and the stability of the fi nancial system under Article 127(5) 
of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft royal decree 
1.1 The draft royal decree is aimed at implementi ng the Law of 2 July 2010 amending the Law of 
2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financia l sector and financial services, as well as the Law 
of 22 February 1998 establishing the Organic Stat ute of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque 
Nationale de Belgique and c ontaining various other provisions
2 (hereinafter the ‘Law of 2 July 
2010’). The Law of 2 July 2010 lays down the principles for the development of the Belgian financial supervisory structures towards a ‘t win-peaks’-type model under which the NBB will 
become the sole authority responsible for the financial sector’s micro- and macro-prudential stability.  
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
2  Belgian Official Gazette, 28.9.2010, p. 59140. The validity  of the empowering clause in Article 26 of the Law of 
2 July 2010 that is the legal basis for the draft royal decr ee was extended to 31 March 2011 (Law of 6 January 2011 
amending the Law of 2 July 2010). The ECB commented on an early draft of the Law of 2 July 2010 in Opinion 
CON/2010/7. All ECB opinions are published on  the ECB’s website www.ecb.europa.eu.  
2 1.2 In order to implement the planned supervisory m odel, the draft royal decree will, on the one hand, 
extend the NBB’s responsibilities to the pruden tial supervision of financial institutions3, including 
the specific supervisory tasks relating to  system-relevant financial institutions4. These new micro-
prudential supervisory tasks will be in addition to  the NBB’s existing task of contributing to the 
stability of the financial system5. On the other hand, the responsibilities of the current Banking, 
Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC) will c over the surveillance of all aspects related to 
financial markets, including the adherence to the rules of conduct6, and the supervision of certain 
entities that are not subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision7. The BFIC’s name will be changed 
to the Financial Services and Market Authorit y (FSMA) to reflect its new mandate. The ECB 
understands that a preparatory committee compo sed of NBB and BFIC representatives provided 
their assistance in the context of drawing-up the arrangements put in place by the draft royal decree
8. 
1.3 The NBB’s prudential supervision will coexist with  the tasks entrusted to the future FSMA. The 
ECB understands that in specifying the respective competences of the two supervisory authorities 
in the existing framework, the Belgian legislator h as aimed to avoid both any duplication of tasks as 
well as the risk of conflicting decisions9. To this end, the draft royal decree provides for various 
information10 and mutual consultation11 requirements. In this respect, the conclusion of a 
Memorandum of Understanding aims to ensure  smooth cooperation betw een the NBB and the 
future FSMA12.  
                                                 
3  New Article 12bis §1 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishi ng the NBB’s organic statute (hereinafter the ‘Law on the 
NBB’), Article 187 of the draft royal decree, and new Artic les 39 to 61 of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft 
royal decree). The financial institutions that are subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision as  listed in new Article 40 of 
the Law on the NBB are the following: (i) credit institutions, including electronic money institutions, (ii) stockbrokerage 
firms, (iii) insurance companies, reinsurance companies, sure ty companies, (iv) clearing in stitutions, securities settlement 
institutions and assimilated instituti ons, and (v) payment institutions..  
4  New Article 41 §2 of the Law on the NBB. The concept of ‘systemically relevant institutions’ will not be generally 
defined in or under the draft royal decree (Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 48 and 49). 
5  Article 12 of the Law on the NBB.  
6  New Article 45 §1 3° of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supe rvision of the financial sect or and on financial services 
(Article 217 of the draft royal decree). The FSMA’s supervisory responsibilities with regard to  institutions subject to the 
NBB’s prudential supervision only apply: (i) with regard to certa in of these institutions; and ( ii) with respect to a list of 
rules of conduct set out in the draft royal decree. This li st may be completed by the King, acting upon advice from the 
BFIC and the NBB (new Article 45 §2). The draft royal decree also introduces rules of conduct with regard to settlement 
institutions (new Article 23 of the Law of 2 A ugust 2002, Article 205 of the draft royal decree). 
7  Notably portfolio management and investment advice companies, or intermed iaries in insurance, banking and investment 
services (new Article 45 §1 2° of the Law of 2 August 2002). 
8  The establishment of the preparatory committee was provided for in Article 26 §2 of the Law of 2 July 2010. 
9  Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11.  
10  See e.g. new Article 41§6 of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft royal decree) and new Article 59 of the Law of 
22 March 1993 on the status and supervision of credit in stitutions (Article 131 of the draft royal decree). 
11  For instance, when authorising a credit institution, the N BB will have to consult the future FSMA on a number of issues 
that relate to the latter’s competence (e.g. new Article 9bi s of the Law of 22 March 1993, Article 111 of the draft royal 
decree). The future FSMA’s opinion will not be binding on the N BB, but it will have to provide reasons if it departs from 
it. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 31.  
12  Articles 36, 125 and 176 of the draft royal decree with regard  to, respectively, the supervision of insurance companies, 
credit institutions and investment firms. 
3 1.4 The general framework governing the exerci se of the NBB’s new supervisory tasks13 is largely 
modelled on that which applied to the BFIC and to the ‘Committee for systemic risks and system-
relevant financial institutions’ (CSRSFI), with re gard to the supervisio n over system-relevant 
institutions.  
1.5 Finally, the draft royal decree addresses certain i ssues arising as a consequence of the transfer of 
new tasks to the NBB, such as issues relating to its governance structure and the human and 
financial resources necessary to carry out these tasks.  
1.5.1 First, the royal decree establishes some limited  changes affecting the N BB’s organs and governance 
structure. These changes include, notably, the est ablishment of a Sanctions Committee as a new 
NBB body that will decide on the imposition of admi nistrative penalties and fines applicable to the 
institutions subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision14. 
1.5.2 Second,  the staff members whose main responsibility is the execution of prudential tasks within the 
current BFIC will automatically be transferred to  the NBB when the transfer of micro-prudential 
tasks to the NBB becomes effective15. In addition, the two members of the BFIC’s Management 
Committee in charge of the BFIC departments res ponsible for the transferred prudential tasks will 
be assigned to the NBB for the remainder of thei r current terms of office; these two members will 
have the status of special representatives16.  
1.5.3 Third, the transfer of prudential tasks to the NBB will also cover the rights and obligations related 
to such tasks stemming from the BFIC’s previ ous activities. The actual financial burden arising 
from any such obligations in the form of liabiliti es is however not supposed to be borne by the 
NBB, as the NBB will be authorised to charge such financial obligations to the supervised 
institutions to the extent that they would not be sufficiently covered by the provisions and reserves 
transferred from the BFIC to the NBB17. 
                                                 
13  In this respect, it is noted that the rules on professional se crecy will be split into a general provision applicable to all N BB 
tasks (new Article 35 of the Law on the NBB, Article 194 of th e draft royal decree) and a set of provisions specifically 
covering the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks (new Articles 51 to 53 of the Law on the NBB). The NBB will also be 
subject to the same limitation of liabilit y (Article 12bis §3 of the Law on the NBB, Article 187 of the draft royal decree, 
Explanatory Memorandum, p. 43). 
14  New Articles 17 and 46 of the Law on the NBB (Article s 188 and 195 of the draft royal decree), Explanatory 
Memorandum, p. 8. The Sanctions Committee is composed of si x members, of which four are judges, appointed by the 
King who can only be dismissed if they no longer fulfil the conditions for their appointment  or in case of serious 
misconduct. In addition to the conflicts of interests rules appl icable to the members of the other NBB organs under Article 
25 of the Law on the NBB, the members of the Sanctions Committ ee will be subject to their own regime of conflicts of 
interests (e.g. three years before their appointment, they ca nnot have been members of the NBB’s Board of Directors or 
members of the NBB or CSRSFI’s staff,  new Article 46 §4 of the Law on the NBB). The Committee is further required to 
establish its own ethics regime (new  Article 46§8 of the Law on the NBB).  
15  This also covers the staff providing the related legal, administrative  and IT support (Article 336 of the draft royal decree).  
The ECB understands that the Preparatory Committee agreed on the number of persons to be transferred in accordance 
with this allocation principle, taking into account the need to ensure continuity in supervision and in the functioning of the 
two authorities and also identified the individua ls concerned (Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5).  
16  Article 337 of the draft royal decree, Explanatory Me morandum, pp. 9 and 69. They will be subject to the 
incompatibilities regime in Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on the NBB and will be assimilated to NBB Board Members for 
the purpose of the monitoring of the NBB’s Code of Deontolog y, but will not be subject to the other provisions of the 
Law on the NBB applicable to NBB Board Members.  
17  Article 335, second subparagraph, of the ro yal decree. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 67. 
4 1.5.4 Fourth,  the exercise of the prudential tasks transferre d to the NBB will be financed by way of a 
contribution charged by the NBB to the institutions it supervises18, i.e. in accordance with a similar 
system as the one currently applied to  finance the BFIC’s supervisory tasks19. To this end, the 
NBB’s operational costs will be duly and separately identified in its books, which will be monitored 
by the NBB’s audit committee. Th e NBB’s external auditor shall audit the calculation method and 
the total amount of these costs. 
 2.  General observations 
2.1 The ECB notes that the draft royal decree implemen ts the Belgian supervisory reform outlined in 
the Law of 2 July 2010, so that all comments and recommendations made in ECB Opinion CON/2010/7 apply equally in this case. However, th e ECB notes that the exercise of the prudential 
supervisory tasks will be fully integrated into th e NBB, without the creation of a distinct legal 
entity
20.  
2.2 Cooperation between the NBB and the future FSMA in  the exercise of their respective tasks should 
not impinge upon the NBB’s independent execution of tasks within the framework of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB)21. This general principle should be  given due consideration, in 
particular, when drafting the Memorandum of Understanding to be conc luded between the NBB 
and the future FSMA pursuant to the draft royal decree22. 
 3.  Specific observations 
Central bank independence and th e monetary financing prohibition 
3.1 As regards the financing of the prudential supervisory tasks transferred to the NBB
23, the ECB 
refers to the principle of financial independe nce under which a national central bank (NCB) must 
have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB-related tasks, but also its own national tasks24. 
The tasks transferred to the NBB should not affect  its ability to carry out its ESCB-related tasks 
from an operational and financial point of view. Th e ECB understands that, to this end, the draft 
royal decree provides that the exercise of the prud ential supervisory tasks transferred to the NBB 
                                                 
18  New Article 12bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB (Article 187 of the draft royal decree).  
19  Pending the adoption of a Royal Decree on the financing of the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks under the new Article 
12bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB, it is the Royal Decree of 22 May 2005 on the financing of the operating costs of the 
BFIC that will, provisionally, apply to calculate the supervised in stitutions’ contributions (Article 343 §1 of the draft 
royal decree). For 2011, the year of the transfer of tasks, th e NBB will request the contributions as calculated by the BFIC 
under the Royal Decree of 22 May 2005. These are to be consid ered as an advance payment against the final amount due 
to the NBB for that year under the future Royal Decree on the financing of the NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks 
(Article 343 §3 of the draft royal decree). 
20  The possibility of having these prudential supervisory tasks exer cised by a separate legal entity triggered certain concerns 
expressed in previous Opinion CON/2010/7. 
21  Opinion CON/2003/19. 
22  This Memorandum must cover all instances where the authorit ies’ respective consultation or information is provided for 
by law or where they need to adopt a concerted action to en sure the uniform application of  the law (Articles 36, 125 and 
176 of the draft royal decree). 
23  In accordance with a Roya l Decree to be adopted by the King under new Article 12bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB. 
24  See the ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2010, p. 21, and notably Opinion CON/2009/93, paragraph 3.1.5.  
5 will be financed by way of a contribution that the NBB will be authorised to charge to the 
supervised institutions25. The ECB also notes that in the cont ext of the work by the preparatory 
committee, the NBB was able to assess the additional financial and human resources that would be 
made available in the context of the transfer, including the conditions of employment of the 
transferred staff, as well as the costs related to  the transfer. The ECB welcomes the provisions of 
the draft royal decree concerning the financing of  the new NBB tasks, subject to the safeguards 
detailed in the following paragraphs.  
3.2 Provisions under which an NCB becomes the le gal successor to any liabilities of a distinct 
supervisory authority may raise issues of fi nancial independence and compliance with the 
prohibition of monetary financing laid  down in Article 123(1) of the Treaty26, read in conjunction 
with Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13  December 1993 specifying definitions for the 
application of the prohibitions referred to  in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty27. In this 
respect, the ECB understands that the assignment to  the NBB of the BFIC’s tasks and powers is 
accompanied by measures that in sulate the NBB from financial obligations resulting from any 
BFIC activities from the period before the transfer of tasks28. The ECB understands that such 
financial obligations would include, for example, any pending or future le gal proceedings from the 
period before the transfer of tasks to the N BB or any financial obligations deriving from 
employment relations that any new NBB st aff member may have had with the BFIC29.  
3.3 The principle of financial inde pendence requires that the new tasks transferred to the NBB are 
adequately financed by contributions from supervis ed institutions and that their exercise will not 
result in any loss for the NBB. The ECB understands  that the concrete terms for financing the 
NBB’s prudential supervisory tasks beyond the year  2011 will be laid down in a Royal decree that 
is still to be adopted30. This separate legislation should be the subject of a separate consultation 
based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty.   
3.4 Legal certainty would be enhanced if the draf t royal decree would expressly provide that the 
transfer to the NBB of liabilities arising from the BFIC’s31 previous activities is accompanied by a 
concomitant transfer of assets, including the corresponding provisions and reserves which were at 
the BFIC’s disposal for the performance of  its tasks are transferred to the NBB. 
3.5 Concerning the BFIC staff transferred to the NBB,  the ECB stresses that from the perspective of 
central bank independence, the NBB should be free to retain the necessary personnel resources, in 
terms of quantity and quality, to carry out all its t asks and that it should also have control over its 
                                                 
25  Explanatory memorandum, p. 43. 
26  Opinion CON/2010/33, paragraph 3.2.3. 
27  OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1. 
28  ECB’s Convergence Report, May 2008, pp. 23 and 24; see Opinion CON/2005/24, paragraph 12, and Opinion 
CON/2005/39, paragraph 9. 
29 Opinion CON/2010/33, paragraphs 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 
30  New Article 12bis, § 4 of the Law on the NBB (Article 187 of the draft royal decree) and Article 343 §1 of the draft royal 
decree, see also footnote 19. 
31  Article 335 of the draft royal decree. 
6 entire staff32. An express provision clarifying this aspect in the draft royal decree would be 
welcome.  
Coexistence of the NBB’s oversight comp etence with the FSMA’s supervisory powers  
3.6 Under the fourth indent of Article 127(2) of th e Treaty and the fourth indent of Article 3.1 and 
Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), in conjunction with the derogations provided for 
under Article 139 of the Treaty and 42.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is the promotion of th e smooth operation of payment systems. In this 
respect, the ECB and the NCBs of the Member States whose currency is the euro may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment 
systems within the Union and with other countri es. The Eurosystem’s oversight competence over 
payment, clearing and settlement systems derives from these provisions
33. The oversight 
competence is also inherent to the ESCB’s task of contributing to the stability of the financial 
system under Article 127(5) of the Treaty, as mirrored in Article 3.3 of the Statute of the ESCB. Moreover, the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area under the first indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, as mirrored in the first indent of Article 3.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, depends on the existence of re liable and effective market systems and infrastructures. The 
promotion of the smooth operation of payment, cl earing and settlement infrastructures is, therefore, 
a basic task of the Eurosystem
34. Moreover, the NBB has traditionally exercised broad oversight 
powers over settlement systems based on its national legal framework35.  
3.7 The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft royal decree provides that the supervision by the future 
FSMA shall not prejudice the exercise by the NBB of the powers it currently has36. This is 
particularly important for the tasks that the N BB has to execute pursuant to the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB. In this respect, the E CB notes that cooperation between the NBB and the 
future FSMA in the exercise of their resp ective tasks should not impinge upon the NBB’s 
independent execution of tasks executed within the framework of the ESCB, and notably its 
oversight tasks37.  
3.8  However, in view of the above context, the draf t royal decree should be further elaborated to ensure 
that it adequately reflects the NBB’s oversight co mpetence over infrastructures, as laid down in the 
Treaty, the Statute of the ESCB and national legal acts.  It must be ensured in the draft royal decree 
                                                 
32  See Article 29(2) of the NBB’s Articles of Association.  
33  In addition, the oversight activities of some NCBs of Memb er States whose currency is th e euro are carried out on the 
basis of national laws and regul ations, which complement and, in some cases, repeat the Eurosystem’s competence. The 
oversight competence of NCBs of the Member States whose cu rrency is not the euro is laid down in national laws and 
regulations. 
34  See also ‘Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework’ , 20 February 2009, published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
35  Article 8 of the Law on the NBB and Article 23 §3 of the Law of 2 August 2002.  
36  New Article 33 of the Law of 2 August 2002 (Article 212 of the draft royal decree), referring notably to Article 8 of the 
Law on the NBB regarding oversight. 
37  Opinion CON/2003/19, see also pa ragraph 2.2 of this Opinion. 
7 that the powers of the future FSMA are complement ed and balanced by the adequate involvement 
of the NBB which oversees payment, clearing and settlement systems. Such an amendment of the 
draft royal decree would avoid the risk of duplicatio n of work undertaken by the future FSMA from 
a supervisory perspective and by the NBB from an oversight perspective. It would also be more 
efficient for market infrastructures. For these reasons , the ECB considers that the respective roles of 
the future FSMA and the NBB should be explicitly re flected and specifically described in the draft 
royal decree to address these considerations.  
Divergence between FSMA and NBB with regard to  the adoption of individual measures against 
financial institutions  
3.9 Under the draft royal decree, the future FSMA will be empowered, as part of its task to supervise 
compliance with the rules of conduct, to take  measures against certain individual financial 
institutions that are subject to the NBB’s prudential supervision38.  Where such financial institution 
seriously breaches the rules of conduct, the future  FSMA will inform the NBB of the alleged breach 
and may under specific conditions take the fo llowing measures against this institution: 
(i) prohibiting or suspending (in whole or in part ) the activities of the institution concerned; or 
(ii) ordering the replacement of its management39. Where such breaches are systematic, this 
includes the power to request the NBB to re voke the licence of such financial institution40. In this 
context, the ECB understands that two main scenarios should be distinguished:  
(a) Where the future FSMA requests the NBB to revoke a license, the NBB may only refuse if 
the withdrawal is likely to compromise the st ability of the financial system. The NBB must 
issue a reasoned decision, which the future FSMA may challenge before the Ministry of 
Finance. Under such circumstance, the Ministry  of Finance will render a final decision on the 
issue. 
(b) Where the future FSMA measures do not concern the revocation of a financial institution’s 
license, these will be notified to the NBB. The NBB may oppose such measures only where 
they would compromise financial stability or where they would result in the suspension or 
termination of a financial institution’s activity as a whole41. If the future FSMA and the NBB 
disagree, an arbitration panel composed of three members appointed by the NBB and the FSMA (not belonging to their staff or decision-making bodies)
42, decides on whether the 
                                                 
38  i.e. credit institutions, stock broking firms or insurance companies (see new Article 36bi s §1 and §2 of the Law of 
2 August 2002, Article 215 of the draft royal decree).  
39  New Article 36bis §2, 1° and 2°, of the Law of  2 August 2002. Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 38 and 57. 
40  New Article 36bis §2, 3°, of the Law of 2 August 2002. 
41  New Article 36bis §3, second and third subparagraphs, of th e Law of 2 August 2002. The NBB’s decision to oppose the 
envisaged measures must provide th e reasons on which it is based. Ex planatory Memorandum, p. 14 and 23.  
42  One member of the arbitration panel is appointed by th e NBB, another by the future FSMA and these two members 
choose a third member (new Article 36bis § 4 of the Law of 2 August 2002).  
8 measures affect financial stability43. This decision is binding and it is not subject to 
recourse44. 
The ECB would welcome clarification in the draft royal decree of the allocation of statutory 
responsibilities conferred, on the one hand, to the future FSMA and, on the other hand, to the NBB 
as the authority responsible for the prudential superv ision of financial institutions and as the central 
bank contributing to the stability of the financia l system. Concerning the measures addressed in 
point (b), instead of resorting to an arbitration panel, the draft royal decree could provide the NBB 
with a right to veto the future FSMA’s proposed measures for reasons of financial stability. Another 
possibility would be to provide the NBB with the right to issue a non-binding opinion, which is submitted to the future FSMA. After having cons idered the NBB’s opinion, if the future FSMA 
decides to maintain its decision to adopt the pr oposed measures, it must adopt a reasoned opinion 
explaining the reasons for such decision desp ite the NBB’s opinion in relation to the potential 
impact of the measures on the stability of the financial system. Exchange of information  
3.10 The draft royal decree also provides that the NBB and the future FSMA may exchange information 
in so far as this information is necessary for th e accomplishment of their respective tasks. Such 
transmission needs to be accompanied by approp riate protection measures to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the information. In line with th is, the ECB understands that the draft royal decree 
allows for confidential data to be communicated to  the ECB, not only in its capacity as a monetary 
authority but also for the performance of the ESCB tasks outlined in Article 127 of the Treaty
45. 
Access to prudential information and cooperation wi th financial supervisor y authorities is essential 
for macro-prudential monitoring which, in turn, is indispensable for the smooth conduct of monetary policy and helpful in reducing the re porting burden imposed on institutions. The recent 
financial crisis has shown that from a financial st ability perspective, the ECB needs to be involved 
in the event of any financial market crisis and in that context, the availability of relevant 
information and the ability to interpret it are crucial. 
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 January 2011.  
[signed] 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET 
                                                 
43  New Article 36bis § 3, fourth subparagr aph, of the Law of 2 August 2002. The measures can also be taken by the future 
FSMA if the NBB, despite its assessment that the measures co uld compromise financial stabil ity, decides not to engage 
the arbitration procedure. 
44  New Article 36bis §4, ninth subparagraph, of the Law of 2 August 2002 
45  New Article 52 § 1, 1° and 2°, of the Law on the NBB (Article 195 of the draft royal decree).