COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
COM(94) 595 final 
Brussels, 13.12.1994 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1994 Report 
(presented by the Commission) 

TpbiQ of Content? 
Introduction 1 
Chapter I - The demographic model of the European Union 3 
1.1 The European Union in the world 3 
- 1 - The Union's demographic ranking: third in the world, first in the 
developed world 3 
- 2 - Natural growth: almost zero in the developed world, still high 
elsewhere 5 
- 3 - The ageing of age structures: soon to affect the world as a whole . . 5 
1.2 The European Union among developed countries 6 
- 1 - Geographical distribution of the population 6 
- 2 - Moderate demographic growth 7 
1.3 Similarities between Member States 8 
- 1 - The migration model: emigration at an end, and a reserve of foreign 
population 8 
- 2 - Simultaneous nature of some practices connected with the family 
life cycle 8 
- 3 - Trends in mortality 11 
1.4 The variables generating a North-South divide in the Union 13 
- 1 - Recent total fertility patterns 13 
- 2 - Women's work 13 
- 3 - Family models 14 
1.5 Disparities between Member States 14 
- 1 - Differential ageing in Member States 15 
- 2 - The active population 15 
- 3 - Specific features as regards stocks and flows of migrants 16 
1.6 Future development scenarios 17 
Chapter II - Trends in age structures 23 
2.1 Age structures in the European Union 23 
2.1.1 The ageing of structures 23 
2.1.2 The mature structure of the European Union: review and 
prospects 24 
- 1 - The age pyramid - an increasingly narrow base 24 
- 2 - Stable dependency ratios, but a significant ageing of the 
active population 25 
2.1.3 Disparities between Member States 26 
- 1 - • Age pyramids with very different shapes 26 
- 2 - Ageing coefficients 26 
2.2 The causes of ageing .-• 27 
2.2.1 Falling fertility, responsible for "bottom-up" ageing 29 
2.2.2 Continuing increases in life expectancy, or "top-down" ageing .... 29 
- 1 - - Life expectancy: general increase and convergence of levels 
in the Union 29 
- 2 - Future prospects for increased life span « 29 
2.3 The economic and social impact of ageing 31 
2.3.1 Profound change in the life cycle: more free time 31 
ii 
2.3.2 Organisation of the labour market 32 
- 1 - Relationship between numbers of workers and volume of 
employment 32 
- 2 - Correspondence between types of employment and 
workers' qualifications 35 
2.3.3 Social protection expenditure 35 
- 1 - Financing of retirement pensions 35 
- 2 - Social expenditure on the elderly 36 
2.3.4 Economic and social situation of pensioners 37 
- 1 - Standards of living and sources of income 37 
- 2 - The state of health of the elderly 38 
2.3.5 The social and economic usefulness of the elderly 39 
Chapter III - Less consistent famiy structures 41 
3.1 The household - a space for the family 41 
3.1.1 The main categories of househokis 41 
- 1 - Chifeffess family households account for one fifth of family 
households 41 
- 2 - Famfty households with children - disparities among Member 
States 43 
- 3 - Single-parent families - mothers are responsible in 85% of 
cases 43 
- 4 - Substantial growth in single-person households 44 
3.1.2 Household size 45 
3.2 Family biographies 45 
3.2.1 More complex family patterns 45 
3.2.2 Signs of the breakdown of family biographies 46 
- 1 - Cohabitation outside marriage, frequent in the Noah, but 
still minimal in the South 46 
- 2 - Marriage rates: marriage is postponed everywhere, but more 
in the North than the South 48 
- 3 - Majority-age children living with their parents 48 
- 4 - A new stage between retirement and genuine old age .... 49 
- 5 - Breakdowns and reconstitutions of unions 51 
3.3 The issues raised by changing families 52 
3.3.1 The new family model of our time: the "family-as-a-pact" 52 
3.3.2 Socio-demographic consequences of family change 52 
- 1 - The entry of women into working life 52 
- 2 - Decreasing fertility 56 
- 3 - Equality between men and women 59 
- 4 - Births outside marriage 59 
3.3.3 Development prospects 59 
Chapter IV- Migration 63 
4.1 Analytical constraints 63 
- 1 - Sources of data 63 
- 2 - Stocks of migrants 63 
- 3 - Migration flows 64 
4.2 The foreign population in the European Union 64 
- 1 - Composition and development of the population by nationality .... 65 
- 2 - Distribution and origin of the foreign population 66 
- 3 - Demographic characteristics of the foreign population 68 
- 4 - Foreign workers 70 
4.3 Migration flows 72 
- 1 - Components of demographic growth 72 
- 2 - Characteristics of migrants 73 
4.4 The demographic impact of migration 77 
- 1 - The role of migration in the ageing of the population 77 
- 2 - Migration prospects 77 
- 3 - Freedom of movement 77 
Glossary 80 
III 
A <} i 

INTRODUCTION 
Article 7 of the Protocol on social policy to the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union states that "The 
Commission shall draw up a report each year on progress in achieving the objective of Article 1, 
including the demographic situation in the Community.". (Article 1, for its part, provides that "The 
Community and the Member States shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, 
improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and 
labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating 
of exclusion. ") 
It is the Commission's intention to publish a report covering the aforementioned objectives in Article 1 
after the end of 1994. However, because the report on demography is the first of its type for the Union 
and because it is especially highlighted in Article 7 of the Protocol, the Commission considers it 
appropriate to publish this report separately at this juncture. 
This report has been prepared on the basis of material and of technical assistance supplied by Eurostat, 
with the assistance of private experts iri the field of demography. 
Contemporary European demography immediately raises four main questions, each of which is dealt 
with in a separate chapter. 
The main trends in European demography in the world and the issues that they raise are examined in 
Chapter 1. Is there a "European" demographic model? Are the Twelve faced by the same demographic 
processes and therefore the same social and economic challenges? In the case of economic challenges 
in particular, what changes have taken place in the active population? Is the population of the Union 
moving towards demographic behaviour and an age structure which is specific to this population? Do 
the forecasts point to new developments? 
The ageing of the population is nowadays a major and central trend in demographic evolution. During 
the next century, this ageing is likely to cause the world population to move towards a stationary 
situation. Ageing is affecting many aspects of our economic and social organisation. Chapter 2 studies 
the development of age structures in the European Union and opens up discussion of its consequences 
from the point of view, among others, of the situation of the elderly, labour organisation and the financing 
of retirement. 
This population ageing is being paralleled by growing differences in household and family life. Analysis 
of this trend, in Chapter 3, is important for two reasons. First, because the family is the place of 
demographic reproduction and is therefore closely involved in the construction of demographic models. 
Second, because the family is the pivot between the individual and society with the result that its 
analysis makes it possible to observe trends in the socio-economic system as a whole. 
Chapter 4 looks at migration. The mechanism of declining natural growth, i.e. the surplus of births over 
deaths, is amplifying the extent of the increase due to migration. Bearing this in mind, does migration 
help to modify demographic evolution and in particular the ageing process? 
These are all vast questions and have complex interrelations. It is therefore very important to give the 
analysis a global dimension, as demographic evolution is part and parcel of a wider set of far-reaching 
changes, in particular a technological and economic revolution, a family and social revolution and finally 
a political and cultural revolution. 
It is for this reason, in this first report, that we will shall endeavour principally to describe demographic 
events in a broad perspective rather than attempting a detailed analysis of the actual causes of certain 
aspects. 
4 
The approach is broad in time, as demographic events take place over a longer time-space than other 
events. Today's demographic situation is to a large extent the result of demographic behaviour in the 
past, just as today's demographic behaviour will structure the population of the next century. 
It is also broad in space, since world demographic balances are constantly changing in the same way 
as economic balances. 
It is also broad as regards its investigations, as the issues affecting human life are very complex: the 
economy, politics, ways of thinking and social structure are all factors involved in demographic 
behaviour. 
This initial report analyses what we currently know about demographic development. This may seem 
reductive. The aim of this work is surely to provide a vision of the future? This is true, but the choice 
of strategy can be explained. In the first instance, it was vital to identify the major, societal trends linked 
to demographic development. We needed to understand the mechanisms that are generating this 
development in order to be able to pinpoint inevitable changes in the short term and separate those 
factors that can be influenced from those that it is difficult to control. The major trends that our analysis 
has highlighted are summarised in boxes at the end of each chapter. This is the only way of building 
up relevant scenarios of future development that can be used to provide a serious and constructive 
forward-looking perspective that avoids short-term suppositions. This forward-looking perspective will 
be the guiding thread of subsequent reports. 
CHAPTER I 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
If a description of the main demographic parameters of the European Union is to be of use it must 
shed some light on wider questions relating to these parameters. It is precisely for this reason that 
the consequences of the ageing of the population and the issues raised by family changes and by 
migration are analysed in this report. A more general question needs to be raised in the first 
instance if this analysis is to be meaningful: will the various common policies entailed in European 
union lead to a convergence of demographic behaviour or will this behaviour be independent of this 
union? This initial chapter examines the question in detail and attempts to find out about the 
demographic model specific to the European Union, to understand, as far as this is possible, on what 
essential principles it is based and to estimate, from this, the demographic future of the Union. 
All the demographic indicators of the European Union can, when analysed in the long term, be 
classified in terms of their ability to discriminate at geographical level, i.e. their ability to show a 
difference or a similarity, on the one hand between the Union and other regions of the world and, 
on the other hand between Union Member States. Five series can be identified: 
(1) At world level, natural growth (surplus of births over deaths) and the ageing of age structures 
differentiate developed countries from developing countries; 
(2) In comparison with other developed countries, the European Union forms a block with the other 
countries of the European continent as regards population density and growth rates. Population 
density is half that of Japan but much higher than that of the USA or Australia; demographic growth 
is more vigorous than in Japan but less than in North America; 
(3) On the European continent, three indices clearly separate the European Union and EFTA countries 
from other States: the migration model, the simultaneous nature of changes in behaviour as regards 
fertility and other family parameters and mortality levels; 
(4) Within the European Union itself, some demographic variables closely linked to the status of 
women show a North-South axis, short-term fertility levels, family models and women's work; 
(5) No grouping is possible for some variables that require observation at the at the level of Member 
States. This is true of the ageing effect and in particular the structure of the active population 
whose differences are sustained by social and employment policies specific to each Member State. 
The composition of migration stocks, where history plays a major role, is also specific to each 
Member State. 
1.1 The European Union in the world 
- 1 - The Union's demographic ranking: third in the world, first in the developed world 
With its 348.5 million inhabitants on 1 January 1994, the European Union is the third world 
demographic power after China (1.188 billion) and India (870 million). It is in front of the CIS (290 
million) and the United States (255 million). Indonesia (180 million), Brazil (156 million), Japan, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (120 million each) and lastly Nigeria (around 116 million) come further 
down the ranking. 
The Union retains its third place, among the groups mentioned above, in the United Nations' mean 
projection for 2025. 
TaWel 
Th« European Union in th« World 
R+gtoti Population (1) 
7JT3" 
Stz* 
(mMont) world TW 
Stzt 
(rrWons) 1T3T 
world TStT 
Su* 
(mUtton») Xof 
world "5335" 
Stz» 
(mlMann) wwW "J35T 
stz» 
(mmfons) %ot 
world Onowtti rati" 
1950-71 1970-93 1992-01 2000-29 
Wortd 
Developed countries 
o/wfacA 
EUR12 
USA 
Japan 
Russian Federation 
Developing countries 
Cnena 
India 
Nigeria 
Brut 2516 100.0% 
•32 33,1% 36*7 100.0% 
1041 Jfl.3% 
278 
152.3 
43,6 
554.8 
157,6 
32.9 
53,4 11.0% 
6.1% 
3.3% 
•6,1% 
22.1% 
14.2% 
1.3% 
2.1% 320,3 
205,1 
104,3 
130.1 
264» 8.7% 
5.5% 
2.8% 
3,5% 
71.7% un 100.0% 
1224.7 22.4% 
347.3 6,3% 
255,2 4.7% 
124.5 2.3% 
149 6228.3 100.0% 
127» 20.6% 
353.5 5.7% 
275.3 4,4% 
128.1 2.1% 8472.4 100,0% 
1403.3 1«,t% 
358,7 4,2% 
322 3.8% 
127 1,5% 46.9% 48.2% 13.7% 
26,0% 16,6% 4,4% 
15,2% 6,4% 1.6% 
34.7% 24.4% 7.9% 
24,8% 19.4% 2,9% 
14.5% 
830,7 22,5% 
554.» 15.0% 
56,6 1,5% 
95.8 2.6% 4264,3 
1168 
879,5 
115,7 
154.1 77.6% 
21.7% 
16,1% 
2,1% 
2.8% 4*60, J 7», 6% 
1308,7 21,0% 
1018.7 16,4% 
147.7 2.4% 
172.8 2.8% 70M.2 
1539.8 
1393.6 
285.8 
219.7 •3.4% 
18.2% 
16,5% 
3.4% 
2,6% 67.3% 
49.7% 
55.2% 
72.0% 
79.4% •0.1% 
43.0% 
58.5% 
104.4% 
60.9% 16,4% 
10,2% 
15.6% 
27.7% 
12,1% 
5om« demographic features In 1993 (2) 36.0% 
«.•% 
1.9» 
17.0% 
-0.9% 
42,»% 
17.6% 
36.8% 
93,5% 
27.1% 
Infant 
MortaMTy Expect FTtiHTy Pop. 
<1S Pop. 
>«5 
WorW 
Developed countries 
c/wftcA 
EUR12 
USA 
Japan 
Russian Federation 
Developing countries 
rfwhrcft 
Chfr>a 
Indu 
Nçena 
Brut 7.0% 
1.4% 
0.7% 
0,9% 
0.4% 
2.0% 
7.7% 
5.3% 
9,1% 
8.4% 
6.3% A47F 
63/67 
71f?6 
73/80 
72/79 
76/82 
64/74 
61«4 
68/71 
58/59 
52/54 
64771 3.3 
1.8 
1.5 
2 
1.5 
1.7 
3.7 
1.9 
3.9 
6,6 
2.6 33% 
21% 
18% 
22% 
18% 
23% 
36% 
28% 
36% 
45% 
35% 6% 
12% 
15% 
13% 
13% 
11% 
4% 
6% 
4% 
3% 
5% 
Saurai (1) ferait»! • Oemoarepoè sliïstKS t»W. ÇQ Poputa ton Retarence BunMu- Wohd Popuhton Del» Steo< 1. 
These figures show the extent to which the world demographic situation has changed over the last 
forty years. Over this short period of time the world population has doubled, increasing from 2.5 
billion to 5.5 billion inhabitants. There is, however, a major difference between the developing 
countries and the developed countries. It would not be exaggerated to talk about a demographic 
explosion among the former where growth has been from 1.7 to 4.2 billion. Growth in the latter 
group has been much more moderate: from 832 million to 1.2 billion. In percentage terms, a growth 
of 147% as against 44%. Is it surprising that the population of the developed world, which 
accounted for one third of the world population at the end of the war, now accounts for no more 
than one fifth? Its decline would have been even more precipitate if it had not been offset by the 
positive effects of the baby boom, falling mortality rates and immigration. 
The world population: changing groups 
A comparison of trends in developing countries and in developed countries over the period 1960 to 2025 
assumes that these two groups will retain the same composition. Nothing is less certain. What would the 
term "developing" otherwise mean? Among the countries of the third world in 1960 some, such as South 
Korea and the other Asian "tigers", are now developed. Others are very likely to be developed by 2025. 
Brazil and the whole of South America, Turkey and part of the Middle East, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and possibly China and Vietnam will have joined the group of developed countries by 2025. This forecast 
is borne out whatever the development criterion used: per capita income, human development index of the 
United Nations Development Programme or fertility levels. It is to be feared, however, that some countries 
which are developed at present will leave the leading group if the political and economic problems that they 
currently face continue. The observation, based on United Nations' forecasts, that the developed countries 
will account for a further reduced proportion of the world population in 2025 is not relevant as it does not 
take account of the entry of new countries into this group. 
This situation also applies to the future of the European Union: forecasts should take account of both 
demographic changes and political changes. Since this report has been drawn up, three additional States 
have voted to adhere to European Union. By early in the next Century, other EFT A countries and a number 
of Eastern and Central European countries may have also joined the Union. There is little doubt that the 
area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals formed in this way would not only retain its current world 
demographic ranking fifty years hence, but could even increase it. There is also little doubt that these 
changes would have a major impact on the conclusions that can now be drawn from the current European 
Union's "demographic model". 
- 2 - Natural growth: almost zero in the developed world, still high elsewhere 
The UN has estimated world population growth in 1993 at 1.6%, which would, if this rate were 
maintained, double the planet's population in 42 years, i.e. between now and 2035. This growth is not, 
however, equally distributed over the planet: it is almost zero in the most developed countries (0.4%) 
and still substantial in those countries which are least developed (2.3% if China, which has restrained 
its growth to 1.2%, is excluded). 
The Third World Conference on population and development which took place in Cairo last September 
examined demographic problems linked to development. There now seems to be a consensus about 
the need for slower natural growth in the developing countries. Since a fall in fertility rates has to do 
with personal decisions, couples' free choice to decide on the number and timing of their children has 
been put forward as a basic principle. The action programme adopted at the conference therefore 
focused on ways of promoting this free choice, essential among which were: enhancing the status of 
women, equality between men and women in society, support for the family and all that this entails in 
the area of information, education and health services. 
While it may be true that world growth has slowed down in recent years, two large areas of Africa have 
not yet joined this trend. In sub-Saharan Africa, women still have an average of 6.7 children and 
demographic growth in this area exceeds 3% which is close to the growth rate of North Africa and the 
Middle East, the second area with high fertility levels. 
- 3 - The ageing of age structures: soon to affect the world as a whole 
Differences in fertility and mortality levels between developed and developing countries have led to a 
twofold age structure. In the developing countries, 40% of the population is aged under 15. This 
proportion is close to 50% in those African countries where fertility levels are high, whereas it is only 
20% in the developed countries. The latter, however, have proportions of elderly people (aged over 65) 
of some 12% to 15%, whereas these proportions are 4% or less in the developing countries. 
Despite this, the demographic indicators show that a number of countries are now in the midst of a stage 
of demographic transition where declining fertility is running parallel with the earlier drop in mortality. 
Demographic ageing has therefore become - and will increasingly become - a worldwide phenomenon 
likely to affect all countries of the planet as they progress through their demographic transition. 
In overall terms, the classical divide - the wealthy and old developed countries and the poor and young 
developing countries - will become increasingly irrelevant, not only from the economic point of view, but 
also from the demographic point of view. What will remain true, however, is that major differences in 
ageing levels between these two groups of countries will continue for a long time, even if there is a 
certain amount of catching up because the demographic transition proves to be more rapid in the South 
than it was in the North. 
This highlights the main problem - the developing countries will have to deal with the challenge of ageing 
when they are having to tackle a number of other problems - integrating young people, modernising their 
economy, paying off their debts, improving their health and education systems and safeguarding their 
environment. Even though they still have fairly low ageing indices, many countries in the Southern 
hemisphere are already having to support growing elderly populations in large towns and cities and in 
some cases in rural areas which have been abandoned by young people. Elderly people are already 
more numerous, in absolute terms, in the countries of the South than in the countries of the North and 
this trend seems likely to continue to worsen over the next twenty to thirty years. 
According to United Nations' forecasts for 2025, the developed countries, including Europe and North 
America, will have no more than a quarter or so of all the world's "elderly" (60 and over) - less than in 
Southern Asia alone. On this same date, China and India will probably have more octogenarians (80 
and over: 36 million) than Europe, plus the former USSR, the United States and Japan, but with the 
additional difference that in the seventy-five years since 1950 the number of elderly people will have 
increased fivefold in these two giants, whereas they will only have doubled in Europe1. 
The burden of ageing will therefore be more difficult to support in those areas of the world with the most 
urgent development needs. Ways of tackling the demographic explosion, which will continue long after 
fertility has started to decline, need to be found. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that 
administrative, health and social welfare structures for elderly people are not well developed. 
1.2 The European Union among developed countries 
- 1 - Geographical distribution of the population 
Wth Asia, the European Union is one of the planet's most densely populated areas: 140 inhabitants per 
km2 in the European Union as against 40 in the world and 110 in Europe as a whole - the decrease in 
the European average being explained by the low population density of Scandinavia. 
In the other developed countries - with the exception of Japan which has 330 inhabitants per km2 -
densities are very low. North America and the CIS, for instance, have only 13 inhabitants per km2 and 
Australia has only 3 inhabitants per km2. 
Source : D. Tabutin, "L'âge vermeil du Tiers Monde: perspectives des populationsâgées dans les pays jeunes" (The 
silver age of the third world: prospects for elderly populations in young countries), in M. Loriaux, D. Remy and E. 
Vilquin, (1990), Populationsâgées et révolution grise, pp. 1087-1103. 
Provided that these United Nations projections are not invalidated by wars or epidemics, the situation 
of these two extremes should not be any different in 2025. The European high density pole, however, 
will extend to the Middle East and that of Asia will increase in size. Two secondary areas of 
demographic concentration are also likely to appear on the Guinea coast and in Eastern Africa. 
At national level, the map of densities shows a concentric distribution in the European Union as a whole. 
The population epicentre is in Benelux with over 300 inhabitants per km2. Close to this, densities are 
200 inhabitants or over in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, but start to decrease further away. 
Densities are below 100 inhabitants beyond the Pyrenees, in Scandinavia, over the Russian-Polish 
border and in the South of the Balkans. 
When a more detailed breakdown is made for the main regions of the Union, population densities are 
not so uniform. There is some consistency, however, since adjacent regions have the same features. 
From Manchester to Milan there is a large very highly populated crescent. Around this backbone, ribs 
of population extend over the Italian, French and even Spanish coasts and towards Central Europe. 
Population density in Europe, 1992 
% »h»/» o» total population. 1992 
26 6 
i 
- 2 Eurostat / Competitiveness and cohesion: trends in the regions - Fifth periodic report on the social and economic situation and development of the regions 
in the Community (EC 1994) 
Moderate demographic growth 
In comparison with growth in the USA which is much higher and growth in Japan which is lower, the 
total growth of the Union population can be seen as moderate and also as more stable. This is due to 
two factors. Japan's population structure is older than that of the Union. As fertility (1.5 children per 
woman) and migration balances are low in Japan, growth is in decline, and may even be negative at 
the beginning of the next millennium. In contrast, the United States still has a fertility level close to the 
generation renewal threshold (2 children per woman) and positive migration flows. 
Moderate demographic growth and a high density are consequently the two main features of Europe. 
They separate Europe from the other developed countries - CIS, United States, Japan - although 
there does not seems to be a clear-cut divide between the Union Member States and the other 
European countries. This divide does, however, exist. In order to find it, more detailed indicators 
pinpointing the dynamic that has given the Union its specific nature need to be examined. The 
trends which shape this or that demographic system and provide it with its originality consequently 
need to be investigated. There is little doubt that Western Europe has its own demographic system. 
1.3 Similarities between Member States 
If, after comparing the European continent with the rest of the world, the field of investigation is 
limited to Europe alone, it can be seen that the European Union differs from the remainder of the 
continent because of converging processes which to some extent determine its population flows: 
(1) migration models, (2) some family practices, <3) mortality. 
- 1 The migration model: emigration at an end, and a reserve of foreign population 
At the beginning of the 1 960s, migration varied greatly among Union countries. Greece, Spain, Italy 
and Portugal provided large numbers of immigrants. Migration flows to France, Belgium and 
Germany were substantial: people returning from colonial empires in France and Belgium and foreign 
workers in Germany. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg also took in significant 
numbers of immigrants. This trend was not reflected by other countries, such as the Scandinavian 
countries where there had been intense emigration to the United States at the beginning of the 
century. 
Table 2 
Trends In n<< migration in a Selection 
of Member States (annual average in thousands) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (BDR) 
Germany (DOR) 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 1960-1969 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1986 1992T1 
9 
•6 
275 
-187 
-21 
-78 
96 
-101 
-15 
-66 
-54 12 
1 
191 
-64 
-40 
-61 
197 
-95 
7 
-66 
-8 B 
3 
178 
-10 
20 
14 
262 
1 
33 
-6 
-22 3 
4 
-2 
-27 
13 
0 
66 
72 
10 
27 
-16 
Source; CouncfoTEurop* Th» Futur* of Eurqp«% Population", by H. CaYguat 
Urlm mT)*nogrq>hy" - Fopubdon Studl* nr. *«. 19*3 
O EumM - Oa*nc0r»pMe Jratiatfc» fM4 26 
11 
788 
60 
9 
90 
-6 
173 
4 
58 
-10 
-11 Nowadays, the number of foreigners is 
increasing more rapidly in Italy, Greece and 
Spain, where immigration is a recent 
development. It is levelling off in France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and Luxembourg where immigration is older. 
Despite this timelag, all the Union Member 
States are tending towards the same model: low 
emigration, controlled immigration from non-EU 
countries and a trend towards settling in of the 
foreign population. There is nothing mysterious 
about these similarities: international migration 
is sensitive to economic factors. In a 
democratic system, an economic community is 
gradually reflected by similar migration flows 
resulting from converging standards of living, 
migration thus becoming an act of reasoned 
decision and free personal choice. The recent 
history of the Eastern block shows similar 
migration patterns. While the block was 
isolated, migration was. almost zero. Once the 
barriers were down, migration was more 
substantial. 
-2 Simultaneous nature of some practices connected with the family life cycle 
The similarity of family practices is a much more curious example since it cannot be explained by 
a common European policy on the family as no such policy exists. This similarity does, however, 
exist. Western Europe, in particular the Union, obviously differs from Eastern Europe in this area. 
This is borne out by two figures: the mean age of women at first marriage and the mean age of 
women at the birth of their first child. 
Map 2: Mean age of women at birth of first child around 1993 
> 27 
26.0-26,9 
25,0-25.9 
24.0-24.9 
23,0-23.9 
22.5-22.9 
22.0-22,4 
< 22 te 
<*r 
Map 3: Mean age of women at first marriage around 1993 
Source: Council of Europe, Recent demographic developments in Europe - 1994 
For both of these variables, a precise line divides Europe into two: in the West the mean age of 
women at first marriage is over 24 and in the East it is still below 22.5. 
The difference in age at marriage between the West and the East may well be explained by the two 
opposing systems which were in force until recently. In the East, it was necessary to be married 
to have a flat allocated by the State. In the West, it was - and still is - necessary to be settled to 
marry. In other words, people in the West have to have adequate savings or income which entails 
a relatively long waiting period. 
Over and above age at marriage, this historical difference between the East and West - maintained 
by economies of opposite types - highlights an even more fundamental difference in family life 
cycles and in individual relationships within families and with society. Methods of controlling and 
trends in procreative behaviour provide a further illustration. 
There are few reliable data on induced abortion. The few official data that are available, those on 
abortion carried out under medical supervision, are underestimated to varying extents. Despite this, 
these data show that abortion is practised in the East to an extent that is three, four and even five 
times higher than in the West. In the European Union, percentages around 1990 were below 35 
abortions per 100 births, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had rates of 60 to 1 50 
abortions per 100 births. Whatever the reason for this, one thing is clear: women in the European 
Union, because they use modern contraceptive methods, have more control over their fertility than 
women in the countries of the East and Centre of Europe, providing them with greater autonomy 
in their choice of family model. This factor has undoubtedly helped to differentiate the Western 
family from the Eastern family. 
Before modern contraceptive methods were available, this difference was already perceptible in the 
extraordinarily simultaneous way in which fertility trends were reversed in all the Western countries. 
To appreciate this, we need to focus on fertility trends rather than fertility levels which vary from 
country to country. 
If the dates corresponding to the reversal of the fertility trend in the countries of the European 
continent are plotted on a time line extending from 1900 to the present, Western Europe forms a 
very compact group from the 1920s onwards, while Central and Eastern Europe is very erratic. In 
all the countries of the West, from Finland to Spain, from Iceland to Italy and from Ireland to Austria, 
fertility fell between 1920 and the mid-1930s. It then rose again from a date between 1934 and 
1939. There was a pause during the war followed by a further increase immediately after the war. 
It soared in the 1 950s but the trend was reversed between 1 961 and 1964, marking the beginning 
of a long decline. The same fluctuations took place in North America and Australia, but five years 
earlier. Japan, where fertility has simply fallen from over four children to less than two in the few 
years following the war, has not followed this pattern. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, 
a new trend seems to be generating a North-South divide within Western Europe itself. 
It seems likely, therefore, that different societies started to evolve together after the first world war. 
While they undoubtedly retained the differences of level shaped by their past, they were now 
subject to the same determining factors. At this stage, parallelism would be a more appropriate 
term than convergence. 
The substantial increase in the age at which women have their first child highlights an important 
development. The period of life separating childhood, and even youth, from the age of parenthood 
has been extended with the result that people live for longer with their parents, in consensual 
unions, or continue their education for longer periods in the hope of obtaining a better job. 
Unemployment has also had an impact. In many Member States, 50% of young people now 
become settled only after the age of 25. It is only at this age that they have a job, a residence away 
from the parental home and a relationship with a stable partner. What some people have called a 
"new age of life" then takes the form more of a time of experimentation than a waiting period, 
profoundly changing morals and in particular relationships between sexes and the generations. This 
is likely to produce young Europeans having a profile which differs from that of young Americans, 
young Eastern Europeans and young Japanese. 
10 
The fertility index is very sensitive to calendar variations, i.e. earlier or later marriage and conception 
- events which provide family formation with its rhythm. It is for this reason that it does not 
measure the dimension of the family once it has been fully formed. All this makes the concomitant 
trends in the countries of Western Europe even more surprising. It means that, despite relatively 
different family structures, these countries have reacted in the same way to historic events. People 
have curbed or accelerated family formation at the same time. Made prudent by the 1929 crisis, 
for instance, they postponed conception, but returned to their normal practices five or six years 
later. In other words, rather than pointing to a convergence of structures, this seems to show that 
influences and reactions are identical. 
Analysis of the European Union therefore shows a community of reactions as regards contraceptive 
methods, age at marriage and fertility rates, differentiating Member States from other European 
countries and from the rest of the world. 
-3 Trends in mortality 
Trends in life expectancy and in infant mortality in Europe since 1945 are both constructed around 
the same scenario. After the war, infant mortality fell to fifty per thousand throughout Northern 
Europe. It was slightly higher in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria and Italy; and much higher -
seventy per thousand - to the East of the Elbe and the South of the Pyrenees. Progress was so rapid 
in the East that in 1970 the distribution was completely reversed: mortality showed a North-South 
divide as the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reached the low levels 
of the West. Scandinavia and the Netherlands remained at the top with levels lower than fifteen 
per thousand, whereas the whole of the Southern Europe was behind with levels still over twenty-
five per thousand and even close on fifty per thousand in Rumania, and fifty-five per thousand in 
Portugal. 
Table 3 
Infant mortafity trends (1970-1992) and Life Expectancy In Europe around 1993 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain (1991) 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UnKed Kingdom 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Bulgaria 
Czech Rep. 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
Polmnd 
Rumania 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Russian Fed. 
Albania (1991) Infant Mortaftty 
rates 
1970 1992 
(per lOOOl 
21.1 8,2 
14.2 6,6 
22.5 6.2 
29.6 8,4 
28.1 7,2 
18.2 6.8 
19.5 6,7 
29.6 8,3 
24,9 8,5 
12.7 6,3 
55,5 9,3 
18,5 6,6 
25,9 7,5 
13,2 5,2 
12,7 5,8 
11.0 5,3 
15.1 6,4 
27,3 15.9 
20.2 9,9 
17.7 15,8 
35.9 : 14.1 
19.3 16,5 
33.2 14,5 
49.4 23,3 
25.7 12,6 
24.5 8,9 
22,9 17,6 
97,9 32.9 Life Expectancy around 1993 
Male 
> 73 Year» 70-73 Year» < 70 Year» 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x' 
! Female 
> 79 Year» 77-79 Year» < 77 Year» 
• x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X -
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
: 
Sourcw: Eurottmt - non-UE LU* Expectancy: CoirxJ of Europ* 
11 
This was followed by a new change of geography: infant mortality started to stagnate in the East 
whereas it fell rapidly elsewhere. In 1980 the dividing line between East and West was almost as 
exact as for mean age at marriage or at the birth of the first child. At present, the gap has 
continued to widen. The same sequence would also be observed if the trend in mens' life 
expectancy or adult mortality were to be monitored. 
Consequently the main demographic flows have converged towards the creation of an identity, or 
rather a specific demographic nature, of Western Europe. The combination of moderate migration 
and late fertility, leaving aside a mortality differing from that of the East, has led to a development 
and an age structure specific to the European population. It has a trough, which is specific to 
Europe, at the base of the age pyramid, a slower demographic growth and much more accentuated 
ageing than in other developed countries and the East. 
TWO CENTURIES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE UFE OF INDIVIDUALS 
IN THE AREA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Far-reaching demographic changes take a long time to become established and need several generations 
before their effects are fully felt. This pseudo-inertia of population trends conceals the substantial 
changes that have taken place in the main demographic parameters in the recent history of Western 
countries and in the lives of men and women over the last 200 or 250 years, as the secular progression 
of these parameters shows. 
Overall, life expectancy at birth has increased by at least a factor of 3 (increasing from 25 to 75) and 
fertility has been divided by a factor of 3 or 4; infant mortality has been reduced by a factor of 25; the 
duration of life after marriage has more than doubled and the age at which children lose at least one of 
their parents has increased by 30 years (from 15 to 45). 
In other words, behind these relatively stark and not very explicit figures, the conditions of individual 
life and collective organisation have changed dramatically and have had to be adapted to the new social 
situations created by demographic change. Living longer does not solely mean gaining years of life, but 
living in a different way, living longer with parents and grandparents (even though this means inheriting 
at a later date) or supporting one's partner for a longer period (which may help to explain - to some 
extent • the increase in divorces). States must also take steps to modify their legislation or organise the 
relationships between generations in different ways through social, fiscal, health and employment 
policies. 
At the same time, however, while demographic conditions modify economic, social and political 
conditions, they are not unconnected with or due to external causes, but are the product of the changes 
in the other main structures of society, such as technology, pr^Uuction methods, social relationships, 
political ideOi'ogies, etc. This means that major sectors of o-ir society develop through complex 
processes of interdependence and mutual interaction. 
Table 4 • Historical changes in the demographic timetable of the European citizen 
Average life span(female) 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 
Mean age at first marriage (women) 
Number of people surviving at this age (out of 1000 bom alive) 
Average life «pan after marriage 
Median duration of the couple's common life (not broken up by divorce) 
% of marriages broken up by divorce 
Number of birth» per woman 
Mean age at which a child becomes fatherless or motherless 
Average life span after retirement (at 60 years) In the XVIIrth. 
century Around 1946 Around 1992 
25,0 
250,0 
25.0 
450.0 
25.0 
17.0 
0,0 
6.5 
15.0 
8.0 65.0 
70,0 
24,0 
920.0 
50,0 
38,0 
10,0 
2,5 
35,0 
15,0 80,0 
. 7,0 
25.0 
980.0 
55.0 
46.0 
20.0 
1.8 
45.0 
23.0 
Sourc*: EurtmtsC 
12 
1.4 The variables generating a North-South divide in the Union 
While there is little doubt, however, that differences with the East and to a certain extent with 
America and Japan have become more marked, differences within the Union should not be 
underestimated. Nothing is more uncertain than the convergence of several independent States 
towards a shared ethic. Within the overriding trend which is bringing the European Union towards 
a particular demographic model, there are still very active differences. Some of these have been 
marked for some years. 
• 1 - Recent total fertility patterns 
Fertility, after reaching its lowest level, began to rise in some European countries between 1983 and 
1987. This rise was not uniform: fertility patterns differed for the first time in the period between 
the wars. From the second half of the 1980s, fertility increased regularly in Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden. There was a smaller recovery in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. In contrast, between 1985 and 1991, it 
fell in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Trends in France, Switzerland and Austria have fluctuated 
with a drop in France and an increase in Switzerland and Austria. 
Whether or not the countries in question are 
part of the Union, there is therefore a consistent 
landscape opposing the North and South of 
Europe. This will shape the future classification 
of levels of completed fertility. Northern Europe 
has already outstripped the figures for the West 
and in particular the South. These observations 
point to a possible hypothesis: is the divide 
between the North and the South of the Union, 
recorded since the 1980s, no more in practice 
than a symptom of converging demographic 
behaviour? This difference may well be linked 
to the different status of women in the 
respective societies of these two parts of the 
Union, since it is mainly the variables 
concerning women that have shaped this divide. Table 5 
EUR12 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spefa 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxerr.bourg 
Ne the Hand» 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 1960 
2,t1 
2.56 
2.54 
2.37 
2.28 
2.66 
2.73 
3.76 
2,41 
2,28 
3.12 
3.10 
2,72 Total fertility rate 
1970 1980 1990 
2,40 
2,25 
1,95 
2.03 
2.39 
2.90 
2.47 
3.93 
2.42 
1.98 
2.57 
2,83 
2.43 1,82 
1.68 
1.55 
1.56 
2,21 
2.20 
1.95 
3.23 
1.64 
1.49 
1.60 
2.18 
1.90 1,64 
1.62 
1.67 
1.45 
1.42 
1.33 
1.78 
2.19 
1.30 
1.61 
1.62 
1.54 
1.84 1992 
1,48 
1.56 
1.76 
1.30 
1.39 
1.23 
1.73 
2.03 
1.25 
1.64 
1.59 
1.55 
1.79 
Soiree. Euros tat - OemogrspAc atabsbos IPv4 
Table 5 
There seems to be a kind of "catching up" as regards women's demographic behaviour, which may 
ultimately lead to a greater demographic similarity between Member States. 
- 2 - Women's work 
In all European countries, working women have fewer children than other women. Fertility might 
well be expected, therefore, to be greatest where the proportion of working women is lowest. In 
fact, the opposite is true. In Northern Europe, where fertility is rising to levels close to two children 
per woman, the majority of the female population works between the ages of 20 and 50. In the 
South, in contrast, where fertility is decreasing and is still around 1.5 children/most women are 
excluded from the labour market. Rather than explaining this contrast by women's status, we 
undoubtedly need to look at aspirations. 
13 
Should we see this as a short-term reaction or as a long-term and far-reaching change likely to affect 
the issue of the generations in question? Perhaps the question should not be posed in these terms. 
The recent trend in fertility seems to show that behaviour can no longer be explained in terms of 
"calendar" and "intensity", but rather by a combination of both. If, for instance, women in the 
South, believing that they are not achieving their social aspirations, continue to postpone 
motherhood, their family aspirations could be curtailed. 
Table « 
Several measures regarding the female activity and the famfly 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
FR 
IRL 
1 
L 
NL 
P 
UK % Ive births 
outeide 
marriage 
1992 
«•) 
(V 
11 
46 
15 
3 
10 
33 
18 
7 
13 
12 
16 
31 % of young 
people not 
involved in 
any 
association 
(21 
41 
15 
41 
74 
67 
59 
41 
54 
24 
26 
76 
41 % of young 
' people having 
found a Job 
thanks to 
their famfly 
(3) 
28 
19 
21 
69 
61 
35 
33 
65 
27 
18 
58 
28 Female activity rata* et 
16-V» •-- 20-24 26-M 
Year» Yaer» Year» 
14) 
7,2 60,6 80,0 
64.1 77,6 86,1 
34.8 72.2 74,3 
16.2 51.7 59.6 
20.9 58.7 66,6 
11,0 62,1 78,7 
19.2 69,1 70,9 
22.3 52,2 60,6 
23,6 70.4 70,1 
43.3 75,0 74,3 
29.5 64,0 79,7 
50.4 72.6 70.5 J 
Source.• Eurosltt • Damoçrmphic ittbstxu 1994 Mot*: CI B (19691 E (1991) 
12] (31 OvrvTvittrort ol ttf Evrop—n Communtt»*, Evroe+fomttmr 'Young *uroo—n* in 1990'. n'34-2. 1991 
(41 Etromt • Labotr fore* St*vy 1992 
- 3 - Family models 
A number of aspects linked to family formation show similar trends. Events which have become 
commonplace in the North are still peripheral in the South: cohabitation prior to marriage, births 
outside marriage, frequency of divorce, proportions of single-parent families and reconstituted 
families. 
1.5 Disparities between Member States 
Population ageing is a development which is now shared by all developed countries. It is, however, 
having different demographic and economic effects in the Member States of the European Union. 
From the demographic point of view, ageing depends on the initial age structures to which it is 
applied, and these structures vary from one Member State to another. From the economic and 
financial point of view, the effect of population ageing depends on the ways in which the age-groups 
which economically define this ageing are managed, on the regulations and legislation on social 
welfare linked to age (health, pensions, old age) and on the structure of the labour market (length 
of employment, income levels, rate of participation by age and sex, extent of unemployment). It 
is not therefore surprising that examination of this trend points to a disparate situation. 
We concluded earlier that migration models were converging, in the sense that all Member States 
have become countries of immigration. The timetable, intensity and composition of migration flows 
are, however, factors shaping differences between Member States, principally for reasons of 
geopolitical history. 
14 
-1 Differential ageing in Member States 
Examination of the ageing of structures within the Union highlights two apparently contradictory 
trends: the current disparity between Member States, shown by different timetables and differences 
in the intensity of ageing, will lead in fifteen to twenty years' time to more similar relationships of 
dependence as regards the elderly. These relationships, whatever development hypothesis are taken 
as a starting point, will undoubtedly grow. 
If the extreme groups, i.e. the under-20s and the over-60s, are related to total numbers aged 
between 20 and 59, the index for the Twelve is 0.82. The index for seven Member States is higher 
than this EU average. Ireland has the highest index (1.01) largely because its population still has 
a very young structure, and therefore a substantial proportion of people aged 0 to 19. Portugal, 
Spain and France, which also have indices higher than the average, are substantially in the same 
position. In two other Member States, however, the index is higher than the average because of 
the high proportions of elderly people. These are the United Kingdom and Belgium. 
Table 7 
Population ageing in 1993, 
and demographic dependency ratio in 1991 
Age groupa in 1993 Dependency 
0-19 ans 20-69 ans 60 ans et • ratio in 1991 
a 
EUR12 48,7 
Belgium 24.3 54.6 21.1 49,6 
Denmark 23.8 56.1 20.1 48.3 
Germany 21.5 58.1 20.4 45,3 
Greece 24.6 54,6 20,8 49,0 
Spain 26,5 53.9 19.6 49,1 
France 26,8 53,5 19.7 51.9 
Ireland 34,9 49.8 15.3 62,2 
Italy 22.6 56.1 21.3 45.1 
Luxembourg 23.3 57.5 19,2 44,7 
Nathertands 24.6 57.8 17,6 45.2 
Portugal 27.4 53,1 19.5 51.6 
United Kingdom | : : : | 53.4 Despite the fact that they have the lowest 
proportions of young people in the Union and 
elderly people already account for one fifth of 
their total population, Germany and Italy 
currently have a smaller burden of demographic 
dependency because their intermediate 
population is well represented. In these 
countries, however, ageing will soon have 
repercussions from the point of view of 
dependency. In Luxembourg and Denmark, the 
larger proportion of young people will delay this 
development. The demographic effects of 
ageing are least in the Netherlands where the 
elderly population is still small (17.6%), the 
proportion of young people fairly high (24.6%) 
and demographic dependency is relatively 
moderate (0.73). 
On 1991. P-14]*163 end >]/{13-94} 
Soiree: Eunostat - DefnographK stabsbes 1994 
- 2 - The active population 
On its own, demographic dependency shows little more than the ratios between age groups. If it 
is wished to deduce financial dependence from this, i.e. to measure an economic burden, a number 
of variables defining this dependency need to be added. This work is complex and a large number 
of statistical indicators cannot be used because they are not available. The most that is possible is 
to compare the economic burden and the demographic burden by examining differentials among the 
active population. 
In 1992, 150 million people were part of the European Union's active population. Expressed as 
rates of participation of the over-15s, these figures represent a participation of 67.8% among men 
and 44% among women. While men's participation in the workforce is similar in extent in all 
Member States and is generally around 65% or 70%, the same cannot be said of working women 
and the participation of certain age-groups. 
As mentioned above, fewer women in the South of the Union have joined the labour force. Just 
over one third of these women are economically active, as against close on half, and in some cases 
such as Denmark even more, in the Northern Member States. Belgium is an exception here, with 
a women's participation rate which is still below 40%. If these data are to be correctly interpreted, 
account should be taken of differences between men and women as regards working hours: full time 
work is the prevailing model for men, whereas part time work is very widespread among women. 
15 
Amongst young workers aged 15 to 24, the differences between men and women are less marked-
The difference here relates to the intensity of participation in different Member States. The United 
Kingdom and Denmark stand out because of high rates for both sexes. The same is true of the 
Netherlands and Germany. Elsewhere, young men's participation is lower than the overall level, and 
that of women is higher, showing different career paths since women often take a break when 
families are formed. Among more elderly people, the male-female differences are more sizeable than 
ever Differences between men and women in the age groups reaching retirement age and the type 
of work carried out undoubtedly provide an explanation. There may well be, however, a difference 
in generational behaviour, in that women presently on the labour market have not adopted the model 
of their elders and continue to work until older ages. 
Marked differences among Member States as 
regards work and unemployment, may have a 
substantial impact on our conclusions on the 
financial impact of demographic ageing. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom, 
demographic dependency due to ageing is one 
of the highest in the Union: it occupies second 
place. If account is taken, however, of the high 
participation rate (76.2%) and the lower level of 
unemployment (8.9%), the real dependency that 
can be calculated, placing the United Kingdom 
in seventh position, is lower than that of 
Member States which had, however, a younger 
age structure and a smaller demographic 
dependency. This is true of Italy, which in 
terms of demographic dependency was in eighth 
position in the Union and which, in view of low 
participation rates (61.8%) and a high 
unemployment rate (10.1 %), is in sixth position 
from the point of view of its actual dependency. Tables 
EUR12 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Me theHand» 
Portugal 
United Kingdom Dependency ratios in 1991 
taking activity into account 
Activity rates Unemployment Dependency 
67,1 
63,0 
83,5 
69,6 
57.6 
58.6 
65.7 
61.7 
61.8 
75.4 
67.6 
74.3 
76.2 r»te« 
8.9 
7.5 
8.9 
5.8 
7.2 
16.4 
9.5 
16.2 
10.1 
1.6 
7.1 
4.0 
8.9 
Source Eirostat - Demographic itababc* 1994 
Euroatat - Labour Força Sunraya 19S2 
ntO-Hf* 1**5 •* *W*-64] eetrve and mmpkyad n 
30,9 
35.5 
15.2 
23.8 
42.7 
51.1 
35.5 
58.0 
36.0 
15.5 
26.7 
20.8 
23.5 
In conclusion, classification of Member States by level of demographic dependency is completely 
overturned when the structure of the labour market is taken into account. 
. 3 - Specific features as regards stocks and flows of migrants 
It is possible to see a certain convergence in the Union in the area of migration since all the Member 
States have started to receive migrants from increasingly far-off areas over the last twenty or so 
years Historical differences have created specific national features in this case as well. The 
presence of North Africans in France is closely linked to the repercussions of the Algerian war. The 
presence of Turks in Germany is a result of labour shortages in the post-war period. In the United 
Kingdom, the presence of Indians and Pakistanis is a result of the Commonwealth. 
This difference can also be seen in the rules for obtaining the various nationalities and their 
application. As will be seen in Chapter 4, however, migration has no impact in practice on the other 
demographic variables and in particular on demographic flows (fertility, mortality). 
16 
1.6 Future development scenarios 
We shall conclude with a question: how can the demographic future of the European Union be 
envisaged? According to the United Nations most recent demographic projections, this future can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The total population seems unlikely to increase to any great extent (graph 1). A maximum of slightly 
over 353 million inhabitants will be reached around the year 2005, i.e. an increase of five million 
people from today. Beyond that date there is likely to be a slow but constant decrease. The Union 
seems likely to lose approximately half a million people each year, with the result that its population 
will be the same in 2020 as it is now: 348 million, but with a very different age structure. 
2. The number of children aged under fifteen is likely to continue to fall (graph 2), entailing a decrease 
of between 18% and slightly under 15%. 
3. After reaching a maximum of 237 million at the turn of the century, the population aged between 15 
and 64 should in turn start to decline (graph 3). Between 1994 and 2020, this trend is likely to be 
reflected by the loss of 9 million people. 
4. The number of elderly people aged over 65 will grow throughout the period of projection (graph 4). 
In 20?r 'his age group should include 70 miilion pec^s i.e. 18 miliion people more than today. As 
a proportion of the total population, it will therefore have increased from 15% to 20%. 
Are these forecasts meaningful? Do they not need to be considered with some misgivings? There are 
two ways of estimating the degree of uncertainty. The first is to compare former projections with the 
actual population recorded and the second is to compare demographic projections with forecasts based 
on scenarios. 
The accuracy of old projections can be checked in table 9. This table compares the real population in 
1980 and 1990 with the forecasts produced by the United Nations 20 years earlier. This shows that the 
forecasts, in general and in the short term, under-estimated growth in the least populated Member States 
and over-estimated it for other Member States. The margins of error of these short- term forecasts have 
been recorded for Portugal (underestimation of 8.3%) and France (overestimation of 2.3%). In the 
medium term, over-estimation is widespread. The total population of the Union was overestimated by 
0.5% in 1980 and 2.9% in 1990. 
There is little doubt that this illustration is not representative of the quality of more recent population 
projections. The quality of forecasts may vary from one period to another. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
it was very difficult to predict future trends in fertility and forecasts of future levels of immigration are very 
problematic at present. The conditions under which projections are conducted have also improved: there 
has been a major improvement in data collection, resources and knowledge of demographic behaviour. 
Several empirical studies carried out at national level have also shown that projections are more likely 
to be incorrect for certain age-groups. The size of the population of working age can be predicted with 
a greater degree of certainty than the size of the population of young people who have not been born 
and the size of the population of the very old. 
This potential for errors makes it necessary to raise a key question: what will demographers of the turn 
of the century have disregarded? They are no more sheltered from the caprices of History than their 
predecessors, which bears out the idea that it is time to take demographic forecasting out of its isolation. 
If it is to be efficient it must be accompanied by forward socio-economic and political studies. It must 
also take place over the very long term bearing in mind that demographic change goes together with 
social and political change. This redefinition of demography will obviously make it necessary to produce 
forecasts for shorter periods or to increase the number of scenarios. 
17 
Table 9 
Total population: comparison between observed and forecasts figures 
- thousands -1980 and 1990 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Gt)R 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 Observed pop. 
(thousands) 
1980 1990 
(1) (2) 
9852 9951 
5123 5140 
78304 79365 
9643 10238 
37542 39272 
53880 56718 
3401 3503 
56434 57023 
364 381 
14144 14952 
9766 9868 
56330 57411 
334783 343822 UN 1973 forecasts 
(thousands) 
1980 1990 
(3) (4) 
10061 10464 
5104 5238 
62023 64188 
17228 17532 
9080 9369 
37209 41041 
55103 58816 
3298 3658 
56319 58677 
345 350 
14107 15116 
8957 9463 
57519 59993 
336353 353905 Différence between forecasts 
and observed population 
1980 1990 1980 1990 
<3)-(1) (4)-(2) (3-1)/(1) (4-2)/(2) 
209 513 2.1 5.2 
-19 98 -0.4 1.9 
947 2355 1.2 3.0 
-563 -869 -5.8 -8.5 
-333 1769 -0.9 4,5 
1223 2098 2.3 3.7 
-103 155 -3.0 4.4 
-115 1654 -0,2 2.9 
-19 -31 -5,2 -8.1 
-37 164 -0.3 1,1 
-809 -405 -8.3 -4.1 
1189 2582 2.1 4,5 
1570 10083 0,5 2,9 | 
Sources: United Nations (1973 forecasts! and Eurostat - Demographic Statistics 1994 (observedpopulations} 
It is precisely in order to introduce this forward study element that the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (Eurostat) has used population scenarios rather than demographic 
projections. This type of forecast explores the realistic boundaries of future demographic trends and 
does not aim to produce hypotheses. In other words, scenarios predict substantial uncertainties, 
whereas projections envisage maximum probability. Eurostat has recently built up, for all Mender 
States, two long-term development scenarios which differ completely from one another, for 
population by region and for the active population by sex and by age. 
The "low" scenario assumes: 
- fertility will continue to decline to a level oi 1.5 children per woman among recent generations; 
- a slight increase in life expectancy to its end of the century, then a levelling off of life 
expectancy; 
- an abrupt fall in immigration levels in the Union. The migration balance is likely to drop from its 
1990 level of 1 million to an annual level of 250 000 people; 
- the gradual, but less pronounced, continuation of recent trends in participation rates, i.e. an 
increase for women and a decrease for men. 
In the case of international and regional variations, the low scenario assumes that many processes 
of convergence will stagnate. 
18 
The "high" scenario assumes, in contrast, that processes of convergence will continue in the Union. 
The impact of this convergence is quantified using the following indicators: 
- achievement of a generational fertility level of two children per woman; 
- continued increase in life expectancy; 
- reduction of migration balances to an annual level of 750 000 people after 1994; 
- continued growth in women's work and an upturn in men's work to the levels recorded in the 
second part of the 1970s. 
Graph 1 -Trends in total population - EU 1960r2020 (millions) 
c 
3 a o a. 425 
375 
325 
275 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Year 2000 2010 ?020 
The results of the forecasts based on these two European Union scenarios show th j.t, in the period 
1990-2000: 
- The number of teenagers, young adults, and people reaching the age of eighty will undoubtedly 
fall, while the number of people in their thirties, forties, early fifties, early sixties, seventies and 
the very old will undoubtedly increase; 
- If the present low fertility level continues (low scenario), the number of young children will 
decrease again, but if it shows an upturn (high scenario), there will be a small-scale baby boom; 
- The reduction in the number of young people and very young workers cannot be avoided, and 
will take place at the same time as numbers of older working people (aged 30 to 55) increase; 
- If the low participation rate of the over-55s proves untrue, the oldest group of the active 
population will ultimately decrease in number; if current trends in these rates are reversed, 
however, there could be a considerable increase in this category of people. 
Uncertainties about the future population increase with time. Whatever the case t.»ay be, it is now 
accepted that during the next twenty-five years the Union will have to take accou^ ' an increasing 
number of elderly people, both youni pensioners and the very old. The number of, ,ple aged over 
50, currently 110 million, will be between 142 and 155 million in 2020. 
The population of 20-34-year-okta will probably decrease. Even if the Unit;* corded a net 
migration flow of 750 000 immigrants each year (high scenario), the population v working age 
would decrease by eight million people. 
Long-term estimates of groups of children, teenagers and young adults are very dubious. These 
categories could increase or substantially decrease depending on trends in fertility levels. 
19 
turupudn Union - i^o V iUiv/ 
Graph 2 
Trend» In populatk>n aged 0-14 (million») 
60 
70 
60 | 
50 
40 -i 1——< 1 1 < l H 1 1 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 275 Graph 3 
Trend» In population aged 1S-<4 (million») 
250 4 
225 
200 4 
175 
1960 1970 1960 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Graph 4 
Trends In population aged 65+ (millions) 
20 -I 1 1 1 1 » « » 1 1 i 1-
1960 1970 1960 1990 2000 2010 2020 
'Observed 
Eurostat low ~~ "— Eurostat high 
UN forecasts 
Forecast of EU population growth (%i ay age 
Graph 5: between 1990 and 2000 Graph 6: between 1990 and 2020 
(1990 = 100%) 
150 
130 
110 1 
90 I N 
70 •High 
Low K 
"1— ^\ .raj 4 K-J-
\ c 
^T 
«• « » « *"• * 
rM rt e# A •»***• • 
g a ? a é a $ 250 
200 
150 
100 
50 •High 
Low 
s s ; z i s i 
a $ $ s .? é ; 
Source: Eurostat 
20 
According to the development scenarios for tne active population, the number of workers seems set 
to increase up to the year 2000 in both a pessimistic and an optimistic scenario. This positive trend 
is due to two events: variations in age structure piay the major part, but in some Member States the 
behavioural effect, i.e. the increase in the number of working women, piays a more substantial part. 
Over the iast five years, for instance, there has been a positive variation in participation in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium largely as a resuk of the increase in working 
women. 
Evaluations of demographic dependency must in this case take account of this increase in the 
number of working women as this could absorb a proportion of demographic mishaps. 
It needs to be borne in mind, however, as shown in graph 8, that there are major u (certainties about 
the development of the active population in the long term. There is a twofold uncertainty, relating 
on the one hand to the development of the population structure and, on the other hand, to that of 
participation in economic activity. This uncertainty is particularly marked among working people 
aged over 60. 
Forecast of working population growth in the EU (%) by age 
Graph 7: between 1900 and 2000 (1900 = 100%) 
140 
120 J 
100 j~ 
80 4-
60 
to • High i 
Graph 8: between 1900 and 2020 (1900 = 100%) 
L_ Lowj 
Source: Eurostat 
in the equation balancing workers and non-workers, a differentiation needs to be made between 
economically useful workers, their degree of usefulness and the length of this usefulness. At this 
point, we will merely observe that intergenerational balances are threatened and that their 
development will be based on the combination of three factors: increase in women's work, 
continuation of men's work, increase in "useful" work. For this purpose, it is not just the job supply-
that needs to support this growth, but solutions also need to be found, in the case of women's 
work, so that the family is no longer an obstacle to work. 
21 
Chapter 1 
Key points for further consideration 
1. The European Union's demographic size, which places it at the top of the developed 
countries and in third position in the world, makes it one of the major players on the world 
scene. From a geo-political point of view, it is a key axis for the populations surrounding it, 
whether in the Mediterranean basin or in the centre and east of Europe. These two regions 
of the world are encountering problems of various economic, social and political types and 
the Union has a key role to play in helping these regions to develop and become genuine 
trading and political partners of the Union. 
2. As part of the developed world, the European Union has not evolved in the same way as its 
partners. In comparison with North America and Australia, the Union has managed to 
provide its citizens with a better quality of life, as the indicators relating to mortality, life 
expectancy and infant mortality show. In comparison with Japan, it has given its citizens 
a more egalitarian status, by offering, for instance, more equal opportunities for men and 
women. It is therefore important for the Union to maintain its principles of social protection 
and equal opportunities, despite the new demographic trends and in particular population 
ageing. 
3. There is some convergence of demographic behaviour within EU Member States, although 
differences in level are continuing as a result of timelags. The mobility of European Union 
citizens has changed character since movement is now free and no longer generates mass 
migration. All the Member States have become host countries for non-EU citizens. 
Mortality has fallen everywhere in the European Union and the differences which existed 
even ten years ago have levelled out. Mortality and migration have a direct link with the 
economic situation. 
4. According to the scenarios of demographic development that have been put forward, 
continued convergence or a stagnation of this process would both have a major impact on 
the future structure and size of the Union population. These scenarios need to be refined 
and produced in larger numbers so that the effects of the different parameters can be 
measured independently. 
22 
CHAPTER II 
TRENDS IN AGE STRUCTURES 
Despite timelags, there seems to be some convergence in overall demographic trends within the European 
Union. This is true of mortality profiles which are all moving in the direction of increased life expectancy; 
it is true of fertility where, despite calendar variations, differences between Member States are being 
reduced in terms of completed fertility and it is also true of migration which is not having a significant 
effect on population anywhere. 
When these developments are applied, however, to different age structures, they may produce a marked 
disparity between Member States as regards the ratios between people belonging to different age-groups 
and as regards the size of these groups. Many aspects of our economic, social and political organisation 
are rightly based on age: compulsory education, legal age of majority, right to work, retirement, financial 
benefits for certain public services, etc. The active population is also recruited from an age-group which 
may well be large but is relatively demarcated. If the balance between the active population and the non-
active population is lost, other balances which depend on it, in particular the financial balance, may well 
be affected. 
The aim of this chapter is to update current and predicted age structures for Member States, to clarify the 
demographic mechanisms which have led to these structures and to sketch out the longer-term challenges 
that the modifications of this age structure entail for the European Union. 
2.1 Age structures in the European Union 
Like most Western countries, the European Union is recording a rise in all the indicators pointing to the 
ageing of its age structures. As, however, an "ageing" population structure is not necessarily a population 
with an old structure, it is useful to bear in mind some of the mechanisms intrinsic to the ageing process 
before attempting any analysis. 
2.1.1 The ageing of structures 
Demographic ageing is no more than a transformation of the age structures of a population. While its 
mechanisms are relatively complex, it is relatively simple to describe. It entails a situation in which the 
older age-groups are increasing in proportional terms to the younger age-groups; in other words, where the 
average age of the population as a whole is increasing. 
Sometime after it has started, demographic ageing is accompanied by an increase in the absolute number 
of elderly people, but at the beginning of the process, when the birth rate is falling and the number of 
children decreasing, the number of elderly people does not necessarily increase, even if the proportion of 
the total population for which they account does increase. 
This is no longer the case in the European Union: nowadays, most ageing parameters are developing in a 
similar way: increase in the number of elderly people - especially the very elderly - in absolute terms and 
as a percentage, and in the average age of the total population and of the main age-groups (adults and the 
elderly). This, as will be seen below, is a sign that ageing is well and truly underway and that it will 
continue in the long term whatever changes take place in the younger age-groups. 
23 
2.1.2 The mature structure of the European Union: review and prospects 
1 - The age pyramid - an increasingly narrow base 
A« PYRAMIO • fUH U M1993 
**J pooyjri on Graphique 9 
It might be wondered whether the term "age 
pyramid" is in keeping with the situation of the 
Union population, especially as it is now far from 
the triangular shape which gave it its name. 
It has a narrow base as a result of the relatively low 
fertility levels of the Union. The most numerous 
age- groups are currently the 20-39 year-olds who 
account for 29.8% of the total population, in 
future, however, the 40-59-year-oids will become 
the largest group. This is important from the point 
of view of the structure of the active population. 
The apex of this pyramid shows the arrival of larger 
numbers among the oldest age-groups (60 and 
over). The magnitude of this age-group becomes 
increasingly evident if it is related *o the younger 
groups (0-19). There is a ratio of four elderly 
people to five young people (which ratio is likely to 
in- ease in the future). Within the elderly grouo, 
mon <ver, the ratio of those aged 80 and over to 
thv jged 60 79 is 1 to 5. This also ceems set 
increase, when larger groups reach the age of 80. 
Over and above the ageing of the population reflected by the increase in the proportion of those aged 
60 and over, there is currently, therefore, a second cqeing within the group of the elderly where the 
over-80s are increasing in proportional terms. 
Table 10 
Population by broad ago groups and by sex 
on 1.1.1993, 
and some ageing indicators 
0-19 
20-59 
60 + 20-39 
40-59 
60-79 
80 + male female 
12,5 
27,9 
8,3 15,7 
12,3 
7,2 
1,1 11,9 
27,5 
11,9 15,1 
12,3 
9,3 
2,6 
Mean age of EU population 
Ageing ratio (60 + )/(0-19) 
Dependency ratio ((0-19) +• (60 + ))/(20-59) 
Old active/young active ratio (40-59}/(2O-39) 
Agsing intensity (80 + )/(60-79) Total 
24,4 
55,4 
20,2 30,8 
24,6 
16,5 
3,7 
38 years 
0,83 
0,81 
0,80 
0,22 
SOCKCO: Eurastat- Oomograplw: statistics 1994 
24 
One fact is evident: "bottom-up" ageing due principally to the decrease in the birth rate which has long 
been predominant, is gradually being replaced by "top-down" ageing due to an increase in life 
expectancy to very old ages. All the structural "mishaps" due to historic events (wars, crises and/or 
short-term fluctuations of demographic parameters) leave their mark on the pyramid long after they have 
taken place. 
- 2 - Stable dependency ratios, but a significant ageing of the active population 
Most demographic ageing coefficients, i.e. indicators through which it is possible to measure its 
different dimensions, progress during the period 1950-2025. The progression is slow for some and 
rapid for others and reflects the extent of the chang c in balances due to ageing. These indicators are 
based on a notion of economic burden, linked to ar management practices in our societies. 
The ratio of the elderly (60 + ) to the young 
( < 20) is the most rapid trend, but is reversed as 
regards the coefficient of dependency which 
starts to decrease after the year 2000. 
In contrast, this population of working age is 
likely to undergo increased internal ageing: 
starting at the beginning of the 1990s, this 
ageing will increase substantially over the next 
fif-een years. The gradual entry of >'ie baby-
bccmers, i.e. the age-groups of the post-war 
Ç- JO, into '.' :ing life ~nc soon rr* ment, Is 
therefore having its initial impact. It ic this that 
will contribute to a substantial increase ir, 
ageing from the next century onwards. The 
generations born between 1945 and 1965, 
whose numbers are in some cases 30% higher 
than those of the generations preceding or 
following them, will reach retirement age 
between 2000 (in the case of those retiring 
early) and 2025 (in the case of those retiring 
later) with a peak around 2015. The financial 
burden of these surplus non-workers will 
therefore weigh more heavily on the smaller 
number of workers. 
This "knock-on" effect of the baby-boomers is 
also incontrovertible and measurable, since the 
protagonists are already on the scene and their 
chances of survival are known with some 
accuracy. 
Lastly, there is an "ageing within ageing", i.e. 
the proportion of the over-80s to 60 to 80-year-
olds will really start to increase over the next 
few years. 
These overall data for the Union, however, may 
be shaped by compensatory effects among 
Member States; it is therefore necessary to look 
at the situation in each of these Member States. Trend* In • orrve. ag«ir,Q Indicator* 
from 1960 to 1990, and from 1996 to 2020 
according to Eurostat scenarios 
Graph 1(h To<ai dependency ratio and Elderly dependency ratk» 
«0-1SI + (90i-M?0-59! 
CkJorty 6*ç»nA*icy t«x> (90 + ).'(JO-59) 
_: . ^ 
Graph 11 : Ageing coefficient and Intensity of ageing 
Ac*~^j coerfcisnC (40-S9M2& 59) 
! -V 
-*y of «ormo (80 *J/fOO •) 
.t 
tamo iMi I«TO ii r» t*«o i*et iseo i»i woo joo» 
Sourcaa: Burrmta' 
••* Graphs 10-11 
25 
2.1.3 Disparities between Member States 
- 1 - Age pyramids with very different shapes 
The profiles of the age pyramids of Member States are not at all identical (see the annexed age 
pyramids for Member States). 
Ireland has the most "conventional" and also the youngest structure, even if the initial two age-
groups have been pointing to a fall in the birth rate for ten years or so. Spain and Portugal also have 
fairly uniform structures where a baby boom effect is not very visible. This confirms that the 
timetable of "top-down" ageing will come later in the countries of the South (including Greece) than 
in the countries of the North. Curiously, it is the Mediterranean countries which have been in top 
position as regards "bottom-up" ageing for some ten years or so with a sharp decline in the birth 
rate. 
Germany has the most irregular pyramid as a result of its turbulent history (wave of births after the 
war followed by a wave of massive immigration in the 1950s). 
The French pyramid shows that it has had the longest period of high fertility and that the decline 
in fertility has been lower and slower than among its neighbours. The Dutch pyramid shows one 
of the greatest contrasts due to variations in the birth rate between 1945 and 1965. 
In the United Kingdom, the baby boom reached a peak of births in 1965, which will help to delay 
the time at which the repercussions of the baby boom on ageing will be felt. 
The imbalances between the sexes at older ages are particularly marked in Germany and Belgium. 
- 2 - Ageing coefficients 
Examination of a number of indices measuring the nature of ageing takes further account of the 
differences between Member States. This is of particular interest, as each of these indices is 
associated with consequences that are specific to it. 
The ageing coefficient relates the oldest to the youngest. It evaluates the demographic situation, 
by measuring whether and to what extent ageing is likely to increase, hence its name. This indicator 
shows a clear-cut line between four groups: (1 ) Member States in which the indicator is low, where 
the older age-groups clearly ec'ipse the new generations are, in order, Germany, Belgium ar\d Italy; 
(2) Member States where this situation is not so pronounced, but is on t'e point of becoming 
pronounced because fertility *'ends are not being reversed, are Denmark, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom and Greece; (3) four Member States - Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands - have 
better balanced numbers of the oldest age-groups; (4) the situation in Ireland differs as its younger 
generations are strongly represented. 
The dependency ratio is not used to find out about a demographic future, but rather an immediate 
economic weight. As the term and the categories are not chosen at random, it attempts to compare 
"non-workers", i.e. those who have not yet reached working age (0-19) and those who are no 
longer working (60 + ), with "workers", or at least those who are of a working age (20-59). The 
index has to be viewed with caution as it is based on only one of the variables Which play a part in 
real economic dependency. It measures, to a substantial extent, the structure of the active 
population (unemployment, women's work) or the structure of financial transfers (social security 
payments, income levels). The larger the gaps between Member States in these areas, the less 
comparable the dependency ratios are. The Union is currently in this situation with the result that 
care has to be taken in interpreting this ratio. Another weakness is that the indicator does not take 
account of a possible difference of "economic burden" between the youngest and the oldest 
generations. This makes it possible to illustrate a situation, unrealistic it is true, but very convincing, 
of two population structures whose dependency ratios are identical. 
26 
Population aged over 60 
Population of working age 
Young population 
These few considerations highlightthe need to comment on dependency ratios in the Member States 
in the light of other indicators that have already been analysed. It is only in this way that it is 
possible to interpret the Irish ratio, by far the largest, as due to a large extent to the dependency of 
young people. It can also be seen that higher proportions of elderly people are exerting greater 
pressures on Belgium and Italy than on Germany, because Germany has a higher proportion of 
people of working age. It can also be seen that dependency is accentuated in Member States which 
do not have the most significant ageing: Portugal, France, United Kingdom, Spain and Greece. 
Whatever the case may be, the figures are clear: there is no mechanical, one-way link between 
demographic ageing and economic burdens with the result that refinements need to be introduced 
into the age-groups and a number of other variables need to be included. 
Finally, the intensity of ageing is measured by the ratio of people aged over 80 to those who are 
younger but already retired (60 to 79). The Member State having the largest proportion of the very 
elderly is France. This proportion is lowest in Portugal. The differences between Member States, 
currently low, will become more explicit over the next few decades. France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, i.e. those Member States which currently have the largest proportions of the very 
elderly, could well be overtaken, in particular by Greece and Italy, in the next twenty years. 
2.2 The causes of ageing 
Demographic ageing is not true of all populations. For centuries, even millennia,.demographic 
evolution was not reflected by any significant ageing of populations, the proportion of elderly people 
remaining at levels which were insignificant in practice (less than 5% for the over-65s). It is also 
true that the birth and death rates have hardly evolved at all during most of the history of humanity, 
reaching a ceiling at very high levels of relative balance. 
Demographic ageing could start to soar only when the Western demographic transition started, 
paving the way for a movement away from a traditional demographic system with high mortality and 
fertility rates towards a "modern" system where these variables are low. The history of 
demographic ageing is therefore relatively recent. In Europe, it dates back no more than two 
centuries in countries where this transition started early and no more than one century for those 
where the transition came later. 
Table 11 
Soma agaJng Indicators by Member State on 1st January 1993 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
Franca 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Unhed KJngdom Broad age groupa 
0-19 20-69 60+ 80 + 
(Y) (A) (0) (VO) 
24.3 54.7 21.1 3.7 
23,8 56.1 20.1 3.9 
21.5 58.1 20,4 3,9 
24.6 54.6 20.8 3.4 
26.5 54.0 19,6 3,0 
26.8 63.6 19.7 4.0 
34.9 49.9 15.3 2.4 
22.6 56.2 21.3 3.6 
23.3 57.6 19.2 3.3 
24,6 57,8 17.6 3.0 
27.4 53.1 19.6 2.7 
24,3 53.6 22.2 3,8 Mean -
•9* 
38.57 
38.80 
39.48 
38.75 
37,32 
37.37 
33.36 
39.31 
38.09 
37,07 
37.26 
38.11 Oemographtc ratios 
Ageing Depend. Ageing intens. 
(0/Y) IY + 0J/IA) (VOJ/JO) 
0.87 0.8S 0,17 
. 0.85 0.78 0,19 
0.95 0.72 0.19 
0.85 0.83 0,16 
0,74 0.85 0.15 
0,74 0,87 0.20 
0,44 1,01 0.16 
0.94 0.78 0.17 
0.82 0,74 0,17 
0.72 0.73 0.17 
0.71 0.88 0.14 
0,91 0,87 0,17 -
Sourca: Eurostat • Damûçmpttlc itatlétca 1994 
Not»: Y- Young A - A*j* O - OU VO - VWy OU 
00 
Table 12 
Percentage of the EU population aged 80 and over in the total population (TP) and among the over 60-8 
1960 
80 + /TP 1960 
80 + /60 + 1980 
80 + /TP 1980 
80 + /60 + 2000 
80 + /TP 
Low 2000 
80 + /60 + 
Low 2000 
80 + /TP 
High 2000 
80 + /60 + 
High 2020 2020 
80 + /TP 80 + /60 + 
Low Low 2020 
80 + /TP 
High 2020 
80 + /6O + 
High 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 1,8 
1.6 
1.5 
1,3 
1.2 
2.0 
1.9 
1.3 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.9 10,5 
10.4 
9,0 
11,0 
9.4 
11.8 
12.2 
9.7 
9.9 
10.4 
10,3 
11.2 2,6 
2,8 
2,7 
2,3 
1.7 
3,0 
1,9 
2,2 
1.9 
2.3 
1,4 
2,7 14.1 
14,6 
14.0 
13,3 
11,3 
17.5 
12,5 
12,7 
11.0 
14,4 
9,5 
13,5 3.5 
4.1 
3,3 
3.7 
3.5 
3.4 
2.7 
3.5 
3.2 
3,2 
3,2 
4,0 15.9 
20,2 
14,6 
15.5 
16,5 
16,9 
17.1 
15,3 
15,4 
17,7 
15,8 
19,5 3.5 
4,1 
3.4 
3.7 
3,5 
3.4 
2,7 
3,6 
3,1 
3,2 
3,2 
4,0 16,2 
20,6 
15.1 
15,9 
16,9 
17,2 
17,6 
15,7 
15,6 
17.0 
16.1 
19,7 4,9 
4,2 
5,2 
5.5 
4.9 
4,9 
3.1 
5.9 
4.5 
4.0 
4,3 
4.3 18,4 
16,1 
18,7 
21,1 
19,3 
19,2 
13,6 
20,7 
16,9 
15.6 
18,6 
17.7 5.5 
4,6 
6.0 
6.1 
5.4 
5,4 
3,1 
6.5 
4.5 
4.3 
4.8 
4.9 21.4 
18,6 
22,6 
24,e 
23.3 
21,8 
16.4 
24,0 
19.9 
18,0 
22.1 
20.4 
EUR12 | 1.6 10,3 
Source: Eurostat • Demographic statistics 1994 2,5 13.9 3,5 16.4 3.5 16,7 4.9 18.9 5,5 22.0 
2.2.1 Falling fertility, responsible for "bottom-up" ageing 
While falling fertility is an important historical factor, it has not been continuous in the post-war 
period. An initial period during which ageing slowed down as a result of the upturn in fertility 
between 1945 and 1965 (the baby boom) was followed by a period of intensification linked to the 
massive déclina in fertility from 1965 to the present, with a slight trend towards a levelling off or 
upturn since the 1990s. Chapter 3 gives detailed data on fertility and analyses these data. 
Future trends in fertility are very uncertain and it is not yet clearly known whether it will stabilise, 
whether and to what extent it will start to increase, or whether it will fall again after a short 
recovery. At present, the most likely hypothesis - or in any case the hypothesis put forward most 
frequently - seems to be a gradual stabilisation around a threshold which is not far from the 
generation replacement level (for instance 1.8 or 1.9 children per woman), which would limit, but 
would not completely eliminate, the impact of fertility on ageing. 
2.2.2 Continuing increases in life expectancy, or "top-down" ageing 
The decline in mortality, or more precisely its age structure, points to another cause of ageing. This 
decline affects the top of pyramid as increasing numbers of the oldest people continue to survive. 
- 1 - Life expectancy: general increase and convergence of levels in the Union 
The second cause of ageing is the increase in average life span and in particular in life expectancy 
at adult ages. In the European Union, these two developments are part of a continuation of the first 
epidemiological transition, when deaths due to infectious diseases declined sharply, which ended 
everywhere in Western Europe around 1950 or 1960. This first epidemiological transition was 
followed by a new period of declining mortality due, this time, to changes in lifestyles and advances 
in the treatment of organic degenerative diseases (cancer, cardiovascular diseases). 
In the second quarter of the 20th century, life expectancy on birth differed by ten years between 
the least favoured Member States and the others. In the Southern Member States (Spain, Greece 
and Portugal), life expectancy on birth was just over 50 for women, but was well over 60 in 
Denmark and the Netherlands for both men and women. 
Member States which had lagged behind in the past made up for this delay during the 1970s. They 
are now among the leaders. In sixty years, therefore, Spanish women gained a further life 
expectancy of 30 years, whereas Danish women, whose gain in life expectancy came earlier, only 
achieved half of this figure. 
The 1970s were a period of major progress for men and women in all Member States. This trend 
shows that declining mortality is the result of a process involving a complex interaction of biological 
factors and the environment, helped by the methods of socio-economic organisation of societies. 
Nowadays in the Europe of Twelve, life expectancy is 72.9 years for men and over 79 for women, 
tending towards a gain of one additional year approximately every four years. 
- 2 - Future prospects for increased life span 
There is some uncertainty about increasing longevity. There may be surprises in store which may 
belie many of the current forecast hypotheses which are rather pessimistic as regards a future 
decline in mortality. If the rate of decline observed since the 1980s were to continue or speed up, 
and average life span was, for instance, around ninety years within the next thirty or forty years, 
ageing would then make considerable progress and wojid exceed all the current demographic 
forecasts for 2025 or 2050. 
29 
Table 13 
The potential progression of viral epidemics 
such as AIDS, or increases in morbidity linked to 
increasing pollution and environmental damage 
seems, however, to urge caution. 
What do the figures show? The continuing 
decline in mortality at very old ages even in 
Member States which have relatively low levels, 
in particular France, tends to suggest that 
further reductions of mortality are still possible. 
This also seems to be borne out by the absence 
of a concentration of deaths at very old ages 
around a limit threshold. 
Deaths at high ages are still very dispersed. At 
present there seems to be nothing to prevent 
the gain of an additional year of life, at least in 
the short term, every 3 to 4 years as is the case 
at present. Ufa expectancy at aavaral agaa 
In tha mambar Stataa of the) EU. In 1991 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
£40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
£65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
£40 
£65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 
EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 Male 
72,8 
35.0 
14,2 
8.5 
72.5 
34,7 
14,3 
8,7 
72,1 
34,4 
14.2 
1.3 
r4,6 
36,9 
15,7 
9,5 
73.3 
36.1 
15,3 
9.2 
72,9 
35.7 
15.7 
9.5 
72.2 
34,3 
13.4 
7.8 
73.6 
36.0 
15.0 
8,9 
72,0 
34,9 
14,6 
8,8 
74,0 
35,8 
15,4 
8,6 
70.7 
34.4 
14.3 
8.2 
73,2 
35,2 
14,2 
8.6 Female 
79.5 
41,0 
18,6 
11,1 
78,0 
39,3 
17,9 
11.1 
78.7 
40.1 
17.8 
10.5 
79,8 
41.2 
18.1 
10,6 
80.5 
42.0 
19,1 
11.2 
81.1 
42.7 
20.1 
12.2 
77.7 
39,0 
16.9 
10.0 
80,3 
41.6 
18.9 
11.2 
79.1 
40,8 
18.6 
11.2 
80,1 
41.4 
19.0 
11.4 
77.5 
39.5 
17.2 
9.7 
78,6 
39.9 
17.8 
10,9 
EUR12 EO 
E40 
E65 
E75 72.9 
35.3 
14,7 
8,8 79.5 
40.9 
18.5 
11,1 
Source. Eurostat • Demographic statistics 1994 
30 Tabla 14 
Ufa expectancy In year 2020 according to effferent forecasts In a selection of mambar States 
Denmark 
Franca 
turfy 
Netherlands 
Portugal Unhed Nations 
1994 
M F 
75.5 81.2 
76.9 83,6 
78.5 84,3 
77.6 83.2 
75,5 82,0 Eurostat 
(High scenario) 
M F 
77.5 82,0 
78,0 84,5 
79,0 84.0 
78.5 83,5 
77,5 82,5 Eurostat 
(Low scénario) 
M F 
72,5 78,0 
73,5 81,5 
74,5 81,0 
74,0 80,5 
72,5 79,0 CaseR and Egkl 
1991 
M F 
74.6 80.2 
75.7 85.4 
78.1 84,5 
77.0 87,2 
76,4 82,6 National statistical 
Institutes 
M F 
72.2 77.7 
78,0 86.5 
76,0 81,5 
2.3 The economic and social impact of ageing 
The prospect of an increased life span for everyone has changed attitudes and behaviour. The social 
need for procreation for the purposes of group reproduction is no longer a collective constraint. 
Work no longer occupies more than a small part of the life capital available. Free time and leisure 
are taking its place. Savings and investments can be made over much longer periods and used to 
finance long-term projects with little risk of compromise by an early death. 
These considerations bear out the idea that the ageing of populations is not simply a demographic 
matter but, more than a simple modification of age structures, has become an overall problem of 
society. It has more, further reaching and more subtle implications than has long been supposed. 
Over and above the very real questions raised by this development in the area of family policy, of 
financial balance between the generations and of differential systems for financing pensions, it 
needs to be tackled from a forward-looking and dynamic point of view. In this section we shall look 
at some key areas in which the main issues of ageing in the Union are having an impact. 
2.3.1 Profound change in the life cycle: more free time 
Birth-education-work-death was for long the fate of most men and women. Nowadays, birth and 
death still bound the human adventure, but the time interval which separates them has become 
much greater with a long period of inactivity prior to death. Education now lasts longer than ever. 
The most change has taken place as regards work, whose nature and intensity have been 
transformed. 
In slightly over a century, the working hours of an urban manual worker in industrialised countries 
has fallen from approximately 4000 hours per year, without a free evening, without a weekend, 
without holidays and without retirement, to approximately 1600 hours with free time which 
overtook working time between 1975 and 1985. This development is not just linked to periods of 
prosperity as it has continued during periods of recession as well. This change in working practices 
is no more than the result of a far-reaching technological, economic, social and ultimately cultural 
revolution. 
It is not therefore unreasonable to put forward the hypothesis that, as past trends continue, working 
hours will be reduced in the future in one of three conventional ways: reduction of daily or weekly 
hours, increase in holiday periods, reduction of the number of working years. Assuming 30 hours 
per week, 40 weeks per year and 33 Vears of working life, provided that the male life span has 
reached 80 by this time, working time would account for only 6% of the total life span. The result 
would be an increase of some 53% in free time. 
Demographic ageing therefore raises the fundamental structural implications, even greater in the 
longer term, of the technological progress that we have generated making it necessary rapidly to find 
ways of adapting our attitudes, behaviour, institutions and methods of organisation to this evolution. 
It is very inviting when anticipating the future, on the basis of current ageing, to put forward very 
daring hypotheses such as a future life cycle where a new period devoted solely to the family would 
take its place between "education time" and work time. This free time also opens up major 
prospects for continuing training and leisure. 
At present, however, ageing is presenting society with two immediate and considerable challenges: 
how to maintain economic performance with a smaller and older labour force and how to ensure the 
same level of social protection for increasing numbers of social security claimants with greater 
chances of survival. 
31 
Graph 12 
Trends in the use of time from 1900 to 1990, and according to a forward scenario 
Free time 
(leisure/ 
education) 
25% Around 1900: 
440000 hours of We 
150000 hours of work 
Committed 
time (duties) 
41% 
Constrained 
time (woriQ 
34% Around 1990: 
640000 hours of We 
70000 hours of work 
Free time 
(leisure/ 
education) 
48% Committed 
time (duties) 
41% 
Constrained 
time (work) 
11% Foreward scenano: 
700000 hours of We j 
40000 hours of Vkorkj 
2.3.2 Organisation of the labour market 
The relationship between population and employment covers two questions: the correspondence 
between volume of employment and workers and the correspondence between types of employment 
and workers' qualifications. The structure of the labour market (workers, non-workers, unemployed 
people, nature of jobs, etc.) depends on these balances. If one of these parameters is modified, the 
whole equilibrium of the system is affected. 
- 1 - Relationship between numbers of workers and volume of employment 
It may be said in practice that employment/population imbalances are a constant phenomenon, since 
it is true that the labour market and the labour force are continuously changing. History often shows 
considerable divergences in this area. In the post-war period, several Western States had to call 
upon large numbers of foreign workers to make up for the local labour force deficit. What is new, 
however, is the present nature of the imbalance and possibly its extent. There is a shortage of work 
rather than a shortage of workers, and therefore an imbalance caused in the first instance by 
economic factors rather than as a consequence of demographic factors. 
Nobody would deny, however, that demographic developments make these imbalances more 
worrying, but instead of merely blaming the inability to finance the age risk on a lack of income, it 
would be better to attack the roots of the problem. Job creation has to be seen as a priority 
objective in this area. At the same time, it may be useful to examine the distribution of resooiccs 
between all the social partners, in societies which are continuing to become more wealthy, and to 
rethink the economic and social usefulness of the growing category of the population formed by the 
elderly. 
At the same time, a way of making work more flexible needs to be found. 
32 
Graph 13 - Trends in the working population by aga, 
1990-2020. EUR 12, according to Euroatat acanarioe 
Graph 13-A: Low scenario 
Working population 1990-2020 EU (Low scenario) 
160 
140 
120 
100 
i » 
60 
40 
20 
0 D60* 
D 40-59 
020-39 
• 15-19 
1990 2010 
Graph 13-B: High scenario 
Working population 1990-2020 EU (High scenario) 
• 60* 
• 40-50 
020-39 
• 15-19 
Soon:*: lurotat This is the root of the problem: the total amount 
of work available is tending to decrease as 
technical progress is made; new activities with 
a high concentration of human capital are not 
offsetting losses of employment due to more 
intense automation. These activities could, for 
instance, be in the field of information and 
communications technologies, where research 
and development require major investments of 
human time. 
Most experts foresee a decrease in the volume 
of employment. The consequences of this can 
only be offset by a reduction of working hours 
(whether daily, weekly or annual). The active 
population will continue to increase up to the 
next millennium at least, as a result of the entry 
of the baby boomers into the labour market and 
the potential increase in the numbers of working 
women. There is therefore likely to be more 
pressure on employment in future years. 
In the past, men's participation rates were 
around 100% at all ages of working life 
between 15 and 65 and slightly less in the 
extreme age-groups (15-19 and 60-64). This 
situation was still true around 1950, but since 
then the profiles of the participation curves have 
changed substantially: while men's participation 
in economic activity is still maximum at the 
central ages (between 25 and 50), there has 
been a very substantial decrease in participation 
among young and elderly adults: this is due, on 
the one hand, to longer periods of education and 
training which may continue in some cases to 
the age of 25 and, on the other hand, to the 
effects of the lowering (in some countries such 
as France) of the statutory age of retirement or 
the implementation of early retirement 
programmes as well as a general lowering of the 
actual age at which people give up work, which 
is becoming earlier and earlier in many 
countries. 
These practices have substantially modified 
peoples' life cycles. During the 1950s or 1960s, 
many Europeans had a working life of 
approximately 45 years with 15 years of 
retirement, whereas today they are more likely 
to work for 35 to 40 years and be retired for 20 
to 25 years; the ratio has fallen from three to 
one to two to one or less. 
33 
Grap'i *£' 
Peroantaga of EU working population by aga 
groupa - 1992 
00+15-19 
4% 4% 
Soufcas: Eurostat • Comnuniry Ubour Fotoa Surraya -
1992 Working lives are not only shorter nowadays, 
but increasingly erratic with alternating periods 
of work and unemployment and periods of 
retraining and redeployment. This is not 
without an impact on workers' ability to 
accumulate old-age capital or pension rights on 
a par with those available to current 
beneficiaries. 
For some years there has been a substantial increase in the number of women on the labour market. 
At present the curve of women's participation rates in Europe is very similar to the curve for men 
except that there is a timelag at the bottom and a more rapid outflow after 40. The negative curve 
between 15 and 30, reflecting the effects of marriage and fertility, has disappeared and has been 
replaced by a very marked upward trend. 
Graph 15 • Activity rata by aga. EU. 1992 and 2020 
wtomaft 9nan-
Sourca: Eurostat • Community Labot* Força Survays 
Entry into the static category of the "over-60s" 
does not mean that everyone stops work 
everywhere. The statutory ages at which 
people can retire still vary considerably from one 
country to another and departure from the 
labour market may be later in some professions 
or in some sectors of activity. 
Approximately 6 300 000 of the over-60s work 
in the European Union, including 4 300 000 
men and 2 000 000 women. Most people 
working in the services (over 50% of women) 
and employees continue to work beyond 60. 
Among the over-60s still working, however, the 
proportion of employers and the self-employed 
is higher than in the remainder of the active 
population. 
34 Graph1€ 
Percentage of EU working population 
by age groups -1992 
a) by occupational statua 
b) by sector of activity 
100% 
90% 
eo% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
'10% 
I 5 * 
c) by working hours OPsrtJnwl 
• Ftaame 
100% 
90% 
ao% 
ro% 
*o% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
These workers are not affected by the statutory age of retirement and can freely continue to work 
to an elderly age. A breakdown by sectors of activity shows that the same is true of farmers, who 
are proportionally more numerous after the age of 60 than before. Lastly, part-time work is more 
widespread amongst elderly workers than among the young (5 times more among men and 1.6 
times among women). 
- 2 - Correspondence between types of employment and workers' qualifications 
If the total population is ageing, it is evident that the active population is also ageing. This 
conclusion is often put forward as one of the main sources of concern and problems. Is an older 
labour force more of a handicap from the point of view of economic performance than a younger 
labour force? Many arguments would seem to bear this out: larger numbers of elderly workers cost 
more in a system where salary scales are linked to age; these same workers will have many 
handicaps: reduced productivity and geographical and professional mobility, less ability to adapt to 
new technologies and greater absenteeism due to illness and disability. 
These arguments are less and less in keeping with the current situation of 40-to-60-year-old 
workers. They can be counterbalanced by arguments that are just as valid: the ageing of the labour 
force increases the average qualification level of the active population because workers are more 
experienced, thereby reducing the costs of training and apprenticeship. 
This still leaves, however, the question of the balance between employment and population. 
Drawing more sophisticated conclusions from the demographic parameter alone would not be very 
credible or meaningful. Analysis has to be based on a larger number of empirical variables, not just 
demographic but economic and social as well, and should be able to measure their correlations. The 
juxtaposition of two data is not just inadequate in this case, but dangerous as well. A resolutely 
forward-looking view also needs to be adopted, as the current situation is based on a past 
employment model which differs substantially from that of the future as regards working hours, 
professional life cycle, nature of work, capitalization as well as accumulated rights. Using a 
simplifying strategy would simply impede the quest for more comprehensive solutions within the 
framework of integrated age and employment policies. 
2.3.3 Social protection expenditure 
The arrival of larger numbers of claimants having greater chances of survival will inevitably step up 
the volume of social protection expenditure. 
- 1 - Financing of retirement pensions 
The financing of retirement pensions is generally seea as the key problem raised by population 
ageing. It immediately raises two questions: despite increasing numbers of claimants and decreasing 
numbers of contributors, can old-age insurance systems continue to operate as in the past? Which 
is more in keeping with the new pressures exerted by ageing: financing based on a principle of 
distribution or financing based on a principle of capitalisation? 
The demographic dimension of the financing of retirement pensions is only one aspect of the 
problem. Developments such as slower economic growth and increasing unemployment, which 
reduce income and increase burdens, are more directly "responsible" for the increased cost of social 
security. This has been demonstrated by studies carried out at national level which have evaluated 
the purely demographic burden of ageing in a distribution system. 
In the debate on systems of financing retirement pensions, demographers are often asked whether 
it is preferable, during a period of population ageing, to use a capitalisation rather than a pay-as-you-
go system. 
35 
The potential risks of this kind of development are immediately evident: basic schemes may 
gradually be prevented from adjusting to trends in the cost of living index so that supplementary 
schemes can take up the baton in the interests of the financial survival of these protection systems 
to which we are so attached. 
The risk, in other words, is of recreating a very substantial divide within the retired population: on 
the one hand, those who have been able to acquire solid supplementary personal pensions or have 
done so through enterprises or professional associations and, on the other hand, those who will have 
to make do with a basic pension based on an "old-age minimum" which is increasingly remote from 
the average levels of workers' pay. 
Some economists have argued that this debate is wide of the mark for another reason: the idea that 
the use of capitalisation makes it possible to offset the "lackof young people" due to ageing. From 
a macro-economic point of view, the financial saving offered by capitalisation has a basic corollary: 
over time, when the generations of workers who have made capital savings enter retirement, they 
need to realise the assets which they have accumulated. The only people to whom they can go for 
this purpose is the group of people who are still working, i.e. the younger generations. Market laws 
mean that the demand from younger generations, fewer in number, for these assets capitalised by 
their elders may be smaller and may lead to depreciation. Capitalisation does not therefore resolve 
the demographic imbalance, as it is impossible, from the point of view of the global economy, to 
store up purchasing power. 
- 2 - Social expenditure on the elderly 
Have elderly people become the main beneficiaries of public social expenditure under redistribution 
mechanisms, in particular pensions and health care? The proportion of social expenditure for which 
they account is undoubtedly much greater than their demographic size (between 35 and 45%), but 
this age-group is also the most delicate and the most threatened. The proportion allocated to adults 
(15-64) is also far from negligible and may be as much as 50% (as in Italy). 
Social protection expenditure accounts for a 
very substantial proportion of European States' 
budgets. This heading includes various types of 
protection, such as protection against sickness 
and disability or old-age which are by far the 
most important items, but also unemployment 
insurance, family allowances and maternity 
benefits and housing benefit. In 1992, each 
European citizen received on average the 
equivalent of ECU 4348 although the 
differences between countries are in some 
cases, in absolute terms, approximately 1 to 4. Graph 17 A 
Social protection expenditure 
per head in 1980 and 1992 
9000 
5000 
4000 
3000 01860 ! 
•_, «1002 
Socrce Eurasia/ 
Graph 17 B 
Eight Member States are in almost complete 
alignment along an upward straight line which 
clearly shows that social protection expenditure 
increases when GDP per inhabitant also 
increases. Five Member States (NL, DK, F, B 
and UK) which have more or less the same 
standard of living have very different 
expenditure levels, with the Netherlands at the 
top and the United Kingdom at the bottom, 
which also bears out the idea that it is possible 
to increase the proportion of social expenditure 
without automatically endangering the economic 
equilibrium. 
36 S Social protection expenditure as a % of 
gross domestic product (GOP) 1992 
° 36,0 o 
S 30.0 
26.0 
16,0 •GR 
1 UK 
af* IR1 
IP • NL 
• OK 
• F 
• •« • 
• 1 o •*• 
6000.0 10OO0.0 16OO0.0 20000,0 26000.0 
GOP oat h+ad (in PPS) 
Sourc»: EuroMtmt 
In the Union, the two main functions of "old age" and "health" account alone for 80% of social 
protection expenditure. Family allowances and even unemployment allowances come well behind 
old age and health, representing six times less in percentage terms. 
Graph 17-C 
Social protection benefits by function, in Mio ECU (1992) 
(4)6% (5)7% 
(3)8% (1)45% 
(2)35% (1) OW-age and survival 
(2) Sickness, dtsabtbty 
(3) Maternity, famrfy 
(4) UnerrKrtjyment 
(5)OtfNers 
Sou/cav Eurostat 
The growth of the social protection/GDP ratio slowed down considerably during the 1980s after the 
rapid increase of the 1970s. In some European countries the trend seems for some years to have 
been towards stabilisation (Belgium, Denmark) or towards a reduction (Germany). Nevertheless, 
there are still substantial differences between Member States because those States in which social 
protection was less developed have started to catch up (Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal) with respect 
to those where major progress had already been made (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark). 
A final question needs to be raised. Is the increasing proportion of elderly people likely to generate 
an increase in health costs? Although studies have demonstrated that the consumption of health 
care actually increases with age, there is not enough data at present to measure the impact of 
ageing on health costs with any accuracy. The information available is not broken down by the age 
of beneficiaries and shows only overall costs. Health expenditure, moreover, depends on State 
regulations that define beneficiaries, on the types of benefits financed and on the amounts of these 
benefits. A decrease or an increase in health expenditure is more likely to be caused by these factors 
than by demographic development per se. 
It may be wondered, however, whether demographic development will rapidly lead to a demand for 
new social protection services. The ageing of age structures goes together with changes in family 
models and increasing numbers of working women. The traditional suppliers of care within the 
family then become less available. 
2.3.4 Economic and social situation of pensioners 
- 1 Standards of living and sources of income 
Wages and pay account for only a small proportion of the total resources of elderly people (between 
5 and 20%). Old-age pensions and other retirement benefits, whether public, professional or 
private, are the most substantial source of income and range from 70% to 95% or more in different 
Member States. 
In the Union as a whole, the mean retirement pension represents approximately 60% of the GDP 
per inhabitant and pensioners can expect a pension giving a net replacement of 40 to 100% 
(depending on the country) of the average salary of an employee. 
These figures mask, however, major disparities, not only between countries, but within the same 
Member State between different social categories. It should be borne in mind that it is difficult to 
37 
measure this disparity with any accuracy as there is a shortage of information on this type of data. 
Taking all ages together, percentages of the poor, defined as people possessing less than half the 
mean income per inhabitant, vary from 7% (Belgium, Netherlands) to more than 25% (Greece, 
Portugal), but poverty is generally^ more intense among the elderly than among the younger age-
groups since the situation of the very old is also more unstable. Victims of poverty include people 
who have not had a full working life, who have not been able to claim any entitlement to a 
survivor's or reversionary pension (widows) or who do not satisfy the conditions for the allocation 
of minimum living allowances. 
Although all social security systems contain, to different degrees, provisions to cover atypical cases, 
levels of protection may vary substantially in different Member States. In surveys conducted in the 
Union, only 12% of the elderly people surveyed said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
with their financial situation in comparison with three times as many people (36%) who considered 
their situation comfortable or very comfortable. There are substantial differences between countries. 
They range from only 2% of dissatisfied people in Denmark to more than 50% in Greece. Countries 
with the highest levels of satisfaction are, in decreasing order: Denmark (76%), the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg (69%), the Netherlands (53%) and Italy (51%). 
- 2 - The state of health of the elderly 
Is increasing longevity accompanied by a parallel improvement in health? At the outset, during the 
1970s, declining mortality rates went together with an increase in minor disabilities. Since the mid-
1980s, however, this pattern seems to have been reversed, with an apparent decline in health 
problems. In other words, life without disability seems to increase at the same rate as life itself. 
When the over-60s are questioned, moreover, two thirds say that they are "in good health" in the 
sense that they are not suffering from any disorder which limits their activity - the percentage being 
slightly higher for men than for women. The percentage drops with age but, nevertheless, over half 
of octogenarians and above do not seem to have any restrictions on what they do. 
Graph 18 
Elderly people's perception of their state of health 
Percentage ofover-60s stating that they are not suffering from any illness, 
disability or long-term infirmity limiting their activities - EU 
60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ Men Women 
Source: Eurobarometer 1992 
38 
This percentage varies substantially among the Member States. It is only 46% in Greece, whereas 
it is above 75% in Belgium. Without supplementary information, it is undoubtedly difficult to 
interpret these differences validly. They raise questions, however, in particular when it is borne in 
mind that functional independence, or at least its perception, is a basic criterion in characterising 
the living conditions of elderly people. 
2.3.5 The social and economic usefulness of the elderly 
Western societies are going through a spectacular change in the area of service production, which 
is no longer in competition with, but supplements and even stimulates the production of goods. 
Services are now an integral part of production and make use, both upstream and downstream, of 
high-technology goods with a high added value. They therefore have substantial spin-off effects 
on the economy as a whole. .-= . 
The elderly and the demand from elderly people, especially the "new old", are one of the main 
potential markets for many of these activities. This can already be seen in the area of health and 
leisure, although it is slightly less true at present in the area of education. 
In Europe, the senior citizens' market already contains over 100 million people, who have high levels 
of purchasing power because of the quality of European social protection schemes. 
The demand from new consumers will completely reshape Western economies in a growing number 
of sectors. In so doing, new jobs will be created in these cultural industries and services which may 
offset, partially or totally, losses in traditional sectors and in particular in those industrial activities 
most threatened by robotics. 
Lastly, elderly people, because they have an unrivalled health capital and life span, play an essential 
role in the informal economy as a result of the services that they transfer to the other generations. 
39 
Chapter 2 
Key points for further consideration 
1. Analysis of trends in age structures in the Union undoubtedly requires an examination of 
two dimensions at the same time. A basic dimension, which consists in studying the 
ageing process as part of a developing societal system, and another shorter-term 
dimension attempting to measure the effects of this ageing on today's economic and 
social organisation. 
2. As a process, the ageing of population structures in the European Union is inevitable. 
This is a normal stage of human development which is due to major advances and the 
extension of life and its quality, and which is leading towards a stationary demographic 
situation. The developing countries are at present in the midst of a demographic 
transition or are likely to be so soon, thereby triggering the process of ageing. 
Attempting to reverse this trend is not just illusory but serves no purpose either. 
3. While our demographic structures are changing so is the world of employment. We are 
leaving the industrial era and entering the era of technology and services. This situation 
requires redeployment towards other types of activity, more costly in terms of research 
and development, but much less costly in terms of production. An investment in human 
capital today would perhaps provide the economic stimulus needed to finance 
tomorrow's pensioners. 
4. One way of ensuring that the elderly are genuinely integrated into our societies would be 
to abolish certain practices which artificially accentuate the ageing of society. These 
include the abolition of age limits (on jobs), the removal of the linear career model with 
three successive stages and the establishment of an alternation between work, training 
and leisure in the organisation of life cycles, the removal of barriers between working life 
and non- working life by abandoning fixed retirement in favour of flexible retirement and 
making the most of human capital by _ encouraging pensioners to take on "second 
careers" in sectors of social utility. 
5. Because of the structural effect of the "baby boom" between 1945 and 1965, ageing 
has yet to place its most substantial burdens on social protection. The oldest of these 
generations will reach retirement age only at the beginning of the next century. The 
"demographic balance" of the active population is not guaranteed anywhere. It may well 
be offset by the growth of women's work, but this growth will be compromised if the 
volume of jobs currently available is not sufficiently attractive. 
6. There is no doubt that demographic anaiysis has some relevance in explaining the causes 
of changes in the balances between generations and predicting their impact. On its 
own, however, it is unable to measure the economic and social cost of the imbalances 
that it reveals. In order to do so, analysis has to include economic variables (level and 
structure of income; unemployment; sectors of activity; professional cycles; and many 
others) and in particular factors linked to the current organisation of social protection 
(définition of beneficiaries and their entitlements). This is a question that cannot be 
treated lightly and it is to be deplored that conclusions in this area are sometimes drawn 
solely from estimates of demographic development which are themselves hypothetical. 
40 
CHAPTER III 
LESS CONSISTENT FAMILY STRUCTURES 
By proclaiming 1994 as the international year of the family, the United Nations wanted to give a 
new boost to international cooperation intended to promote this basic entity of society. The motto 
"Building the smallest democracy within society" stressed the essential aspects of this event's 
message: the respect of individual rights and freedoms, equality of the sexes and solidarity within 
the family. The role of the family as a pivot between the individual and society was vigorously 
emphasised at the recent international conference on population and development in Cairo. Those 
decisions which, when added together, fashion the overall structures of the population are made 
in this private and closely-knit space, in this "pivot" micro-group formed by the family. The family 
therefore seems to be the key protagonist in future trends in demographic evolution, and it is for 
this very reason that it is studied here. 
In turn, however, the economic and social organisation of States has an impact on families. 
Policies on housing, social law, labour organisation, the dates of school holidays and social 
protection systems are all fields in which decisions affect families. It is not therefore possible to 
disregard the fact that the family is part and parcel of all social and economic changes; the 
relationship between these different developments needs to be stressed. This is particularly true 
oi the position that the family occupies in the informal economy through its function as a network 
of solidarity and through the transmission of wealth, property and services. 
3.1 The household - a space for the family 
The solidarity of the nuclear family is reflected by its shared life, accommodation and income. It 
is for this reason that it corresponds in most cases to a household, which can then be seen as its 
morphological expression. Households do occasionally include members who are unrelated, 
although the counterpart to this is that some people nowadays live outside of any family. The 
household is therefore a broader concept than the family. The immediate focus of demographers 
when collecting data, moreover, is the household in the first instance and not the family. 
Households consequently have to be taken into account, bearing in mind that by far the largest 
number of households consists of one family and that the inclusion of members outside the "close" 
family is much less common. 
3.1.1 The main categories of households 
The main distinction between households is between households with family and households 
without family. Households with family are themselves divided into three main categories: couples 
with children, childless couples and single parents with children. Households without family include 
single-person households and those of several people not related by family ties. 
- 1 - Childless family households account for one fifth of family households 
Statistics on childless family households are difficult to interpret as they cover three groups whose 
numbers may not all have changed in the same way in different Member States: households of 
former parents, households of "parents-to-be" and those of partners who have never had children. 
Overall, these households account for a relatively consistent percentage of around 20%. Their 
components are undoubtedly weighted, however, in very different ways: increasing life span after 
the departure of the first child, increased age when the first child is born and also, as in certain 
countries such as Germany, increasing numbers of couples permanently without children. These 
percentages are also influenced by the age structure of the population. 
41 
-p» 
TABLE 15: Breakdown of private households by composition (in %) 
EUR 12 B DK OR IRL NL UK 
TOTAL PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS Numbar 
Parcantage 
Slrrçi* famûy housahoJda 
Coupla* without children 
without other person 
with other person 
Coupla» with chlWrem 
without other person 
with other person 
Singlo-paront famille» 
Single father» with child(ron) 
without other person 
with other person 
Single mothari with child(ron| 
without other person 
with other person 
Household* of two or mora famtH«$ 
NON FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS ;' 
Slnçleperton houaahofda 
Male 
F emote 
2 or mora unreJatad people 
Source EuroilMt 130879 3963 
100,0 100,0 227* 
100,0 36266 
100,0 3206 
100,0 11836 
100,0 21642 
100.0 1029 
100,0 19909 
100,0 IUW.U IUU,U ll/V.V IUU.U IISU.U IUU,U ll/VI,U 
68.8 
23.9 
37.9 
2.8 
7,4 
1.6 67,7 
22,9 
21,9 
0,9 
35,7 
34,3 
1,4 
9.2 
1.8 
1.2 
0.6 
7.3 
6.2 
1.1 
0,8 
297v'v -.1 •'• 31<4 
26,1 28.4 
9,6 11.6 
16.6 16.6 69,9 
26.6 
26.3 
3.5 3.0 0.9 
4.9 
1.9 
38.2 
34.4 
14.5 
19.9 
3.8 60,1 
23.3 
23,1 
0,2 
30.5 
30.2 
0.3 
6.3 
1.2 
0.9 
0.3 
5.1 
4.6 
0.6 
2.2 
33.6 
12.4 
21.2 
4.0 23.7 
20,2 
3,6 
49.1 
41,8 
7.3 
6.0 
1.2 
0.9 
0.3 
4.8 
4.1 
0.7 
16.3 
5.8 
10.5 
4.9 82,0 
17.9 
16,1 
1.8 
55,8 
49.6 
6.2 
8.2 
1.1 
1.0 
0.2 
7.1 
5.9 
1.2 
1.1 70,2 
24,9 
23.7 
1,3 
38.1 
36.4 
1.7 
7.2 
1.0 
1.0 
0,1 
6.1 
5.7 
0.4 
0.6 72,3 
13.7 
12.2 
1.5 
47.9 
41,9 
6.0 
10.6 
1.8 
1.5 
0.3 
8.8 
7.3 
1.5 
0.0 
0,7 7*.«' 
19,4 
17,8 
1,5 
46.7 
42,9 
3,7 
8,5 
2.0 
1,2 
0.9 
6,5 
5,7 
0,8 
1.7 146 
100,0 
m 
67,5 
21.2 
19.5 
1.6 
38,4 
34.6 
3.8 
7,9 
1.6 
1.0 
0.6 
6.4 
4,9 
1.4 
1,5 6162 
100,0 3146 
100.0 22422 
100.0 
ïïtmm&mtwgïïï 
13,4 
3.8 
9.6 
3.5 27.1 
10.1 
17.1 
2.1 20.2 
9.5 
10.6 
6.9 20,6 
6,3 
14.3 
3.1 25.4 
10.0 
15.5 
5.6 62,3 
22,5 
22,2 
0.3 
33.5 
33.0 
0.5 
6.3 
1,5 
0.8 
0.6 
4.8 
4.2 
0.6 
0,0 
37.7 21.2 16.9 29,2 . . v ; 27,1 V-;"? ••'•' 237 -^f^f'.3l!o~-? h?A 
30.0 
12.5 
17.4 
7.7 78,8 
22.2 
20,0 
2,2 
49,9 
43.9 
6.0 
6,8 
0.9 
0.8 
0.2 
5.9 
4.8 
1.1 
16.3 
13.8 
4.2 
9.7 
2.4 69.6 
27.4 
26,2 
1.1 
33.2 
31.7 
1.4 
9.0 
1.3 
1.1 
0.1 
7.8 
7.1 
0.7 
3,9 0.9 
"29.5 
26.2 
10.0 
16.2 
3.3 
- 2 - Family households with children - disparities among Member States 
The percentages of households made up of a couple with at least one child are higher and more 
diverse than the preceding group. They exceed 40% in Ireland and Portugal, but reach only 26% 
in Denmark. A whole range of factors has an impact on these percentages in this case as well: 
percentage of childless couples, increasing numbers of young adults living with their parents and 
in some cases the age limit from which the child, even when resident, is no longer considered to 
be a child for statistical purposes. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to draw any 
general conclusions. It seems to be the case, however, that in the Union (with the exception of 
the Mediterranean Member States) the percentages show a swing away from households of two 
parents with children towards single-parent households in particular. 
- 3 - Single-parent families - mothers are responsible in 85% of cases 
There has undoubtedly been a clear increase in the numbers of single-parent households. 
Tabla 16 
Percentage of single-parent families 
with at least on* child aged under 15 (*) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
EUR 12 1981/82 
9.4 
18,1 
9,8 
5,4 
8.3 
7,2 
7,3 
9,1 
7,9 
13,7 1990/91 
14,6 
20,4 
15,4 
5,7 
6,0 
10,8 
10,7 
12,3 
12,2 
9,0 
19,0 
(*) art of total familia* with at faatt on* child agad undar 1S 
Soorxa: Euroatat 
The percentage of this type of household where the mother has sole responsibility is.85% in all the 
Member States. This percentage has not decreased for thirty years. Whether the division of the 
"burden" of children is decided by the courts or by agreement between the parents, this figure 
remains unchanged. It.is evident, on the other hand, that mothers, in this type of family, are 
increasingly less likely to be single or widowed and increasingly more likely to be divorced. 
Spiralling divorce rates explain the substantial increase in this type of household since 1980. 
43 
Reconstituted households 
Do we need to look at reconstituted households? Hardly any reliable statistics are available for these 
households. Evaluations are possible only on the basis of retrospective surveys. Estimates of their 
proportion of all households have provided)figures of 4% in France, 8% in the United Kingdom and 
7% in Denmark. Even though the remarriage rate has fallen, it is the spiralling divorce rate that has 
made this family model more common. 
- 4 - Substantial growth in single-person households 
The family is traditionally the core of the household. In the past it was inconceivable for someone, 
whether single or widowed, to live on their own permanently. 
Table 17 
Nine tenths of households without family are 
those formed by a single person. Other types 
are not generally studied in any great detail. 
The proportion of single-person households with 
respect to all households has continued to 
grow. Trend* In •Jngto-fMraon houtehold* aloe* 1950 (%) 
1950 1960 1971 1981 1991 
B 
DK 
O 
OR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
P 
UK 16 
14 
12 
9 
19 
10 
9 
9 
8 
11 17 
20 
17 
10 
20 
12 
11 
12 
12 
11 
11 19 
23 
25 
11 
7 
20 
14 
13 
16 
17 
10 
18 23 
30 
31 
15 
10 
25 
17 
18 
21 
23 
13 
22 
Secret: Exsrxxat 
This type of household was exceptional for a long time. It was inconceivable to live outside the 
family. Nowadays, in many Member States, the percentage is close on or over 30%. This increase 
is due to a whole range of factors which are difficult to analyse if the very heterogeneous 
aggregate that this type of family forms is taken as a starting point. It includes single people living 
alone, divorcees, married people awaiting divorce or simply separated, elderly widowers and in 
particular elderly widows. Any analysis of these factors has therefore to be preceded by a 
breakdown of the people making up these households by sex, marital status and broad age-groups. 
These data are available and it is to be hoped that they can be processed and published for the 
Union as a whole. 
The increase in the number of single-person households augments cases of single life. This 
quantitative observation has a pejorative connotation. It concerns women in particular, bearing in 
mind that larger numbers of women remain permanently single than men, the remarriage rate is 
lower for women and, in particular, their life expectancy is longer. These considerations should 
not mask the fact that some people choose the single life and that living alone does not mean living 
outside a network of relationships. A new, but inevitable, factor is that certain single-person 
households represent situations, of differing length, of transition between two family households 
or between two consensual unions, whereas others are permanent. This period of transition and 
permanent single life have nothing in common apart from the morphological structure of the 
moment. 28 
34 
34 
16 
13 
27 
20 
21 
25 
30 
14 
26 
44 
3.1.2 Household size 
Recent trends, especially the proliferation of single-person households and the drop in the birth rate, 
are causing demographic composition to become less consistent. One- or two-person households 
account for half of all households and in certain cities single-person households reach this 
percentage on their own. Households of five or more people account for only 13% of all 
households. 
This overall breakdown undoubtedly masks 
disparate situations in different Member States. 
The average size of households is 
approximately three people in the 
Mediterranean Member States and Ireland, but 
is no more than 2.1 people in Germany and 
Denmark. The most striking trend, perhaps, is 
the downturn in the type of household which 
was most widespread for many years: 
households made up of two married people and 
at least one child. Even when households of 
unmarried parents are included, the figure is 
never more than 50% of the total and is often 
around 35%. 
This situation reflects major changes in 
behaviour accompanied, in some cases, by a 
certain haziness of the concept of the 
household which has up to now been relatively 
clear. Graph 19 
Breakdown of private households by size 
of household - EU 
30.0 
25,0 01981/82 «1990/91 
Source. Eurostat 
Graphique 19 
This is true, for instance, of some reconstituted households where the children live part of the time 
with one parent and part with the other; at the time of formation of some couples; in cases, albeit 
rare, of married people who each have a home but are not actually "separated" and are often 
known as "LATs" (Living Apart Together). These changing situations make statisticians' tasks 
more difficult. 
3.2 Family biographies 
The structure of households, at a given moment, is a snapshot of the many events causing new 
households to be formed, modified or broken up. The different histories of these households 
therefore have to be analysed if we are genuinely to understand this overall structure. 
3.2.1 More complex family patterns 
In societies where the extended family formed the family unit, this family was constantly renewed. 
The same was true of the patriarchal family. People left "home" and were replaced by others 
through marriage and birth. There was continuity. This history has now become more complex, 
marking a definite break with the past as the same is not now true of the conjugal household. A 
family is created by the union of two partners: it develops through the birth of children, who grow 
up and leave the household. One of the partners dies. With the death of the other partner, the 
family history comes to an end. This outline is the simplest and, for the most part, the most 
common. 
45 
Divorce and separation break up the initial family, however, and often lead to reconstituted families. 
If the beginning of the consensual union and not marriage is taken as the family's starting point, 
cases of these episodic histories mushroom. 
Looking now from the point of view of individuals, it can be seen that family histories can take a 
whole range of directions. The diagram of family routes shows that, following departure from the 
parental home, people take a wide variety of routes of differing complexity. The central route is 
the simplest: it reflects a single choice binding the individual from marriage to death. 
It can also be seen that men's or women's lives 
may be made up of a number of family 
sequences, in most cases separated by differing 
periods of single life. This discontinuity is then, 
in most cases, the result of a decision by one of 
the partners. In this case, the story becomes a 
sequence of episodes with a large number of 
protagonists linked only by their common 
children. The time of the break-up, the length 
of the union and the extent of the solidarity ties 
that have been broken give the break-up 
different meanings. The separation of a young 
childless couple, whose shared life has been 
short, cannot be viewed in the same way as 
divorce in a family with children whose union 
has lasted several years. 
3.2.2 Signs of the breakdown of family biographies 
- 1 - Cohabitation outside marriage, frequent in the North, but still minimal in the South 
At the beginning of family life there is now, in some countries at least, a relatively long period 
during which young men and women live together without marriage. Measuring this phenomenon 
is no easy task, and estimates from censuses and through household analysis enable only an 
imprecise evaluation. They do however provide an order of magnitude. 
Table 18 
Consensual unions as percentage of a! unions, 
around 1985. in a selection of European countries 
Age 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
Total D (FGR) 
30,0 
6.2 
2,0 
2.0 
1.9 
4.7 35,8 
14.0 
10,1 
6,0 
5.5 
8,8 I 
4,2 
2.1 
1.8 
1.6 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.4 
1.4 NL, 
63.0 
36,3 
15.9 
6.7 
4.0 
2,2 
2.1 
1.8 
2.3 
1.8 
7.7 UK 
50.4 
29,0 
12,8 
6.8 
4.3 
3.7 
2.8 
1.5 
0.9 
1.2 
6.2 92.7 
77.1 
48.1 
29.6 
19.2 
13.0 
10.2 
8,7 
5.9 
4.7 
19,9 FIN 
49.7 
23.9 
11.6 
7.1 
3.7 
3.7 
11.4 N 
75.0 
47,0 
23.0 
12.0 
7.0 
3.0 
3.0 
10,8 45.4 
18.7 
5.9 
3,9 
3.2 
2,9 
2.1 
2.0 
1.5 
2.2 
4.2 H 
8,2 
3.3 
2.4 
2.7 
2,9 
2.3 
3,1 
2.7 
2.7 
3.0 
2.9 
Sourca: Popnai 1994-2 
46 
Since 1985, percentages have increased substantially, although the Member States have retained 
more or less the same rankings. Three different levels of living together by young people can be 
seen. It is clearly evident that this situation accounts for half or more of unions between people 
aged between 20 and 24 in the Scandinavian countries. The example of Italy is, nevertheless, 
significant: even if under-declarations are taken into account, this model has not really gained a 
foothold among Mediterranean populations. Between these two extremes there are varying, but 
relatively substantial, frequencies among the remaining European countries. 
This photograph does not, however, give an exact picture of the extent of this phenomenon. Some 
of the situations of cohabitation observed on a given date will lead rapidly to marriage, others to 
marriage at a later stage and others will not end in marriage at all. The real extent of the "pre­
marital cohabitation" model can be pinpointed only if ft is possible to answer the question: "What 
proportion of marriages have been preceded by living together on a permanent basis?" The 
answer, in this case as well, is very difficult and can be provided only by specific surveys. Some 
information is available, however, for some countries. 
This table does not show the percentage of people living together who go on to become married, 
but the percentage, among a number of marriages, of those preceded by living together. At 
present less than 10% of marriages now take place immediately in Sweden. The percentage for 
France is no more than 30%. This means that these data are largely out of date: there has been 
a rapid increase over the last 10 years. This table is interesting, however, as it highlights the 
increase in Denmark, which is fairly representative of the Scandinavian countries, and the absence 
of the Mediterranean countries where the trend was still of little significance around 1980. 
It is obviously impossible to predict the proportion of people currently living together who will get 
married. The percentages of those "already married" by the age of 35 among generations for 
whom living together has been a common practice show that this is for the most part a premarital 
lifestyle. In Denmark and Sweden, for instance, some 70% of the 1955 generation of women were 
married by the age of 35. 
Graph 21 - Percentage of women living In consensual unions, by age, for certain countries 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 45-49 5C-54 -Q— Denmark 1985 
-àt- Norway 1988 
-•—Sweden 1985 
-*— France 1986 
-X- Netherlands 1989-90 
-O— United-Kingdom 1989-90 
-•— Switzerland 1985 
Table 19 
Source. Loot* Houaaal. 'La futur da la tamiMa '. In firostmt. 
Human Capital at OS* dawn oT XXl-tt) c+ntury, Novambaf Percentage of women who have cohabited before marriage 
Country 
Denmark 
Frar.ce 
United Kingdo 
Sweden 
Norway 
Unrted States . Marriage cohorts 
1950-1965 
39% 
1947-1965 
11% 1966-1970 
13% 
1966-1970 
4% 
1965-1970 
53% 
1965-1970 
15% 
1965-1974 
9% 1971-1975 
80% 
1971-1976 
22% 
1971-1975 
12% 
1970-1975 
81% 
1970-1970 
26% 
1975-1979 
26% 1976-1977 
31% 
1976-1977 
20% 
1975-1981 
89% 
1975-1977 
47% 
1980-1984 
34% 47 
-2 Marriage rates: marriage is postponed everywhere, but more in the North than the South 
Living together can be reconciled with a marriage rate which continues to account for the majority 
only if age at the time of marriage increases. 
Teble 20 
Mean age of women at first marriage, between 1960 and 1992 
EUR12 B DK GR IRL I NL UK 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1992 24.0 22.8 22,8 23.4 25,2 26,1 23,0 27.6 24,8 24,2 24,8 23,3 
23.1 22,4 
23.2 22,2 
25.1 24,2 
26.4» 24,7 22,8 
24,6 
27,6 
28,0 22,5 
22.9 
25,3 
25,8 23.7 
23.1 
24,5 
25,0 24.7 
23.5 
25.3 
25,6(1) 22,6 
23.0 
25,5 
26,1 25,3 
25.0 
26,1 
26,6 23,9 
23,8 
25,6 
25,7(1) 23,0 
25,4 
26,0 22,9 
23,1 
25,9 
26,5 23,0 24,3 
23,2 
24.9 
24,3 25,5(1) 
HI: 1991 
•: eurostat attimataa . . 
Sotrca: Eurostat • Demographic statistic* 1994 
This age decreased generally between 1960 and 1980 and has increased over the last ten years. 
It is very significant that Denmark, as well as Sweden, are exceptions. In practice, the general 
trend towards a decrease in age at the time of marriage was affecting ail the Member States in the 
1960s and 1970s. The reversal of the trend started in the North while age at the time of marriage 
was continuing to fall in the South, especially in Spain. The reversal of the trend that is affecting 
all the Member States of the Union is therefore the same, but with a substantial timelag between 
the North and the South. This is concealed by the overall trends in average ages at the time of first 
marriage for the Union as a whole. 
Graph 22 - Trends in mean age at first marriage 
EU, 1960-1992 
29 
22 I t i t t i i ) i i < i t • < t i t i t i i 1 i t i i i t i t i 
O CM T <D »0 
r>» r^ fs. N. f^ 
O) © O) o> o» X s s 
35 95 o> 
Source; Eurostat - Demographic statistics 1994 and estimates for 1991-1992 
AH these changes have ultimately had only a relatively small impact on the number of coupler 
sharing their lives: people living together have cancelled out the deficit of non-marriages and th< 
reduction in the number of married people between the ages of 20 and 40 is almo« 
counterbalanced by the number of consensual unions. It is not, therefore, falling numbers of people 
living together that provide an explanation for the fall in fertility. 
- 3 - Majority-age children living with their parents 
Another major change has taken place in the family life cycle: children continue to live with their 
parents for much longer periods after reaching the age of majority. In the 1950s, young men 
generally left the parental home after their military service and young women after their marriage; 
48 
this took place in most cases around the ages of 21-22, at least in the Northern and Central areas 
of the Union. The current situation is quite different in many Member States. 
Several surveys have shown, for instance, that young women continue to leave the parental home 
earlier than their brothers. They are now older, however, than they vyere 25 years ago. The most 
rapid change has taken place over the last ten years. Two consecutive factors explain this change: 
in the first instance, parents wanted to make the most of this period of economic prosperity to give 
their children good vocational qualifications. Between 1960 and 1980, the numbers of men and 
women students continued to grow throughout the Union. The rates differed in different Member 
States but were high everywhere. 
Table 21 
Portion of students In the population aged 20-24, 1991-92 
Total 
Women EUR12 B DK 0 GR E F IRL I L NL P UK 
C) C) C) C> (•) 
25% 30% 30% 29% 28% 26% 18% : : 34% 15% 18% 
25% 31% 31% 26% - "-:" 29% 28% 16% : 29% 19% 18% 
CI: asdmatad vahja : data non avaitabla 
Sourta: Eurostat 
For the last ten years, unemployment among young people has extended the period during which 
majority-age children continue to live with their parents almost everywhere. The lack of a job not 
only encourages them to look for higher qualifications at university but also deprives them of their 
own resources. 
Table 22 
Unemployment rata of population aged 20-24, by tax. In 1992 
EUR 12 B DK D OR E F IRL I L NL P UK 
Male 16,1 10,5 15,6 5,9 17.0 26,6 17,2 22,3 22.2 : 6,9 8.7 18,9 
Female 18,0 14,0 14.7 7,0 31,1 38,6 23,6 17.9 29,5 ~i~ '••-, 7.5 ;- 9.1 .10,5 
Total 17,0 12.3 15.2 6,4 23.4 32.0 20.4 20,2 25.5 (2.6) 7.2 8.9 15.1 
Sourca: Eunatat • Labour fore* Survaya 1992 
As can be seen, these levels vary greatly from one Member State to another and it seems likely 
that the frequency of living with parents is linked to these levels. In many Member States, over 
50% of young men, if not young women, in this age-group remain at home. This is a new situation 
for the family. It undoubtedly has advantages for both generations, since parents are in most cases 
happy to keep in daily contact with their children and children gain the security that their social 
integration has not yet given them from this extension of life in the parental home. These 
advantages are not without drawbacks, however. This leads to an ambiguous situation. Is this 
extended hospitality part of parents' normal obligations or is it a generous contribution on their 
part? Is it possible for children to be both dependent and adult? These ambivalences lead in some 
cases to situations where the parents find it hard not to feel exploited in some way or another and 
the young people consider the hospitality that they receive as an inevitable, but "overly Jong, 
constraint. 
- 4 - A new stage between retirement and genuine old an* 
A pensioner who stops work at the age of sixty can now expect a further twenty or so years of 
life. At the same age, a woman can expect twenty-five. During part of this time, there will 
undoubtedly be a loss of autonomy, whose extent and length may differ. It seems, however, that 
the expectation of life without any disability is increasing at the same rate as life expectancy itself. 
Under these circumstances, it is the proportion of "alert" retirement which is continuing to increase. 
The length of this period is likely to vary substantially depending on the individual, but it would not 
be unreasonable for men to count on fifteen years and women on at least twenty. 
49 
Two "active* generations therefore coexist; the first is submerged, however, by its tasks, while 
the second has a substantial capital of leisure time. It is possible, therefore, for these "young" 
retired parents and their 30 to 40-year-old children to complement one another, as the former can 
make the substantial amount of time that they have available to the latter. This symbiosis often 
starts before retirement. The "pivotal" generations, made up for the most part of women, are likely 
to be around 50 years old and are likely to have intense contacts with their children and 
grandchildren, as a survey of this issue has shown. 
Demographic development has therefore laid the foundations for the family to take its share of the 
securities which are still assumed in most cases by society. The economic recession and the job 
crisis have meant that instrumental values are regaining a strong foothold in the family. For young 
unemployed people, handicapped parents, discouraged teenagers, the family appears to be the only 
safe haven. Will this rediscovered function of unconditional solidarity not provide the family with 
new vigour? There is no certain answer. Recent studies show that the precarious nature of 
employment has an impact on the stability of marriage. Marriages find it hard to withstand long-
term unemployment. The malaise of our time does not therefore always lead to closer links 
between generations or between partners. It may also generate, if the family remains without 
support, a permanent divide between integrated citizens and the marginalised. 
THE SOLIDARITY Of THREE CENBRATIONS 
Key to interpretation: 96% of the -pivot» 
generation provide their children with at 
least once service and 89% provide their 
parents with at least one sewice. These 
figures are obtained by combining the 
replies obtained from each of die 
generations. Gifts of money are restricted 
to regular or occasional financial help: 
they do not include legacies and bequests or 
help in furnishing accommodation. 
The overall financial flow is therefore 
greater than this graph shows. 
50 
- 5 - Breakdowns and reconstitutions of unions 
In most Member States the divorce rate was similar in 1960 to the rate 40 years previously with 
an approximate average of 10 divorces for 100 marriages. Nowadays, again with the exception 
of the South, numbers of divorces have increased two, three or even more times. In Scandinavia, 
divorce affects one out of two marriages. The break-up of a marriage has therefore become an 
everyday event. This development can be explained, as we will see below, not by short-term 
reasons tending to multiply the causes of divorce, but because the marriage pact now includes a 
"de-marriage" clause for cases in which the partners feel that their expectations have been 
seriously compromised. The environment of marriage has not become less favourable, but the 
model of marriage itself has been transformed. The meaning of divorce has therefore changed and 
any comparisons between the situation now and in 1965 have to be carried out with great care. 
The graph illustrating the divorce rate in the European Union shows the existence of a North-South 
divide. 
To provide a complete picture, break-ups of consensual unions have to be taken into account. Few 
data are available in this case. Data that have been collected in some European countries show 
that these unions have continued to become more unstable over the last 15 years. When a 
marriage takes place, it is fairly common for each partner to have lived with one or several partners 
beforehand. 
In overall terms, except in the Southern Member States, a substantial proportion of the population 
will enter into several unions, in most cases under different types of marital status. 
Map 4 - Current divorce rate for 100 marriages in 1990 
O <10 
H 10-15 
§! 15-2D 
20-30 
30-40 
>4D 
Household analysis led to the conclusion of fragmentation. It is now clearer that this fragmentation 
is partly due to the discontinuity of family histories. The last two centuries have seen a move 
away from complex extended households to simple closely-knit households. Relatively short, but 
generally simple, family histories have been replaced by histories that are longer, but much more 
fragmented. In no way can these be seen as small changes. They reflect genuine, rapid and clear-
cut changes in our family patterns. 
51 
3.3 The issues raised by changing families 
All the morphological changes which have been described above require explanation if we are to 
estimate their inertia and evaluate their possible duration. Their relatively simultaneous occurrence 
suggests that a single, but central, change has led, in the space of a few years, to these different 
developments. Both conventional anthropology and sociology have developed their nature, and it 
seems useful to examine them here in order? better to understand the demographic consequences 
of family change. 
3.3.1 The new family model of our time: the "family-as-a-pact" 
Since the 1960s the old institutional model of the family has disintegrated and been replaced by 
a new model based on greater autonomy. Under the old system, partners chose one another freely, 
but their new status entailed a certain number of obligations laid down by society, especially the 
hierarchy of the sexes and the generations. These two fundamental precepts of differentiation, sex 
and generation, seemed in the 1960s to be out of kilter with equality perceived as the cornerstone 
of modernity and democracy. At the same time, economic prosperity and advances in science 
made people feel that the time had come to take down the barriers so that everyone could forge 
their own identities. 
Legislation very quickly endorsed the idea of the equality of the sexes and the freedom to break 
up marriages by mutual consent. Private life was then regulated by the agreement of two parties 
with equal rights. Statisticians monitored this trend and relatively quickly abandoned the concept 
of "head of household". In principle, marriage stopped being an institution and became a pact. 
This pact is based in the first instance on the clear perception of a kind of passport to happiness: 
this is what is known as love. This is, in any case, the prerequisite stated by respondents to a 
Eurobarometer survey of the perception of the family by Europeans: to get married, the partners 
need to respect one another, then love one another intensely, they say in proportions of 87 and 
78% respectively. Consequently, in comparison with the 1950s' model, contemporary couples 
seem to have retained the same central objective of.happiness but now consider the old 
institutional strategies to be alienating. The whole system has moved away from external 
regulation towards regulation which is seen as autonomous. The results of this change are 
obviously substantial, both for partners and for their children, and are reflected by completely new 
demographic behaviour such as the family breakdowns and reconstitutions already discussed 
above. 
3.3.2 Socio-demographic consequences of family change 
- 1 - The entry of women into working life 
It was not enough for women to obtain equality in principle. They needed their own resources if 
they were to achieve actual equality. Massive numbers of women therefore entered the working 
world from 1970 onwards. 
Table 23 
Female activity rates • I960 to 1992 
0n%) 
EUR 12 B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1992 22.0 20,0 28,0 33,0 28,0 14,0 28,0 21,0 20,0 22,0 16,0 29.0 21,0 
26.6 24.9 36,9 30.3 18.2 29.4 19.7 21.9 21,7 18,9 31,2 
30.0 30,8 45,3 32,0 21.1 20.0 33,8 20.5 25.7 26.4 23,7 34.6 36.4 
42.4 36.0 60,8 44,9 34,9 31.9 46,0 34.5 34,5 33,6 43,3 46,8 51.7 
44,0 38.9 62,4 47,9 34,2 33,4 47,3 36.8 34,5 39,1 46,1 49,5 52,1 
Sourca: Eurostat - 19SO to 1930: Ernftloym+nt ttatistics; I990 and 1992: Labour força survays 
52 
In many Member States, the proportion of working women has doubled over 30 years. This 
increase is even more spectacular when it is borne in mind that it relates to only one group of 
women, since levels have dropped sharply in the 15-24 age-group because of longer periods of 
education. Moreover, women aged over 45 have not been affected to any great extent by this 
change. The increase in the average is therefore due for the most part to women aged between 
25 and 44 and, among them, to mothers of families in particular, most of whom had tended not 
to work between these ages. 
The Irish situation shows that working women are in most cases single women and women without 
children. Levels in Denmark are fairly close to those for men. Lifestyles, timetables and space for 
family life are obviously very different in these two extreme cases. Paradoxically, however, the 
birth rate is very similar. While mothers of one or two children almost all work in Denmark, 
however, the same is not trueof those with three children. There is a sharp fall in the rate for 
these women, as in other Union Member States. 
Full-time work is not the only factor in this increase in women's work. Between 1983 and 1989, 
the spread of part-time work was by far the most decisive factor in this increase in a number of 
Member States. 
This type of work has therefore grown in 
popularity over the last 20 years: it represents 
a third way of life and a kind of compromise 
allowing women to retain their financial 
independence, but not their capacity to forge a 
real career and also makes it possible for 
women to stay with their children for longer 
periods. 
Opinion surveys showed, some twenty-five 
years ago, that women preferred this 
compromise. The formula which is nowadays 
preferred is that of full-time work as it is most 
in keeping with the egalitarian ideal. It might 
have been thought that the current economic 
recession would lead, as in the 1930s 
recession, to an outflow of women from the 
labour market. This has not been the case. 
Wives feel that their jobs are safeguards against 
their husband's unemployment or divorce. 
Over and above this material advantage, 
women still want, despite the problems which 
it raises, to ensure their independence through 
their work. Table 24 
Growth of women's employment between 1987 and 1992 
Total full-time Part-time Growth 
employment employment employment due to part-
growth growth growth tima growth 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
EUR12 
B 
OK 
D (1) 
GR 
E 
F 
WL 
I 
L 
NL 
P 
UK 11.6 
19.5 
1.9 
17.3 
3.8 
21.3 
6.5 
15.8 
7.5 
13.2 
24.8 
11.9 
7.5 8.3 
13.2 
11.5 
8.3 
6.5 
21.6 
4.5 
12.0 
6.2 
14.3 
6.1 
10.7 
7.1 19.6 
39.2 
-11.2 
38.9 
-18.9 
19.4 
13.3 
36.1 
18.7 
7.9 
38.5 
21.6 
8.0 
Souna: Eiroatat - Labour Força Surrayt 1992 
(1) witttin ka fmntiara prior to 3 Oclobar 1990 
* .' part-tana amploymant m dacSning in tftaaa eountriaa 47.7 
46.6 
66.2 
12.7 
47.0 
36.2 
25.9 
10.5 
89.5 
19.0 
47 8 
This has had a major impact on trends in the active population. During the last five years, it is 
largely the growing number of working women which has shaped the increase in the active 
population. Eurostat estimates, moreover, that in five years' time between 50 and 60% of this 
increase will be due to women. This increased participation by women in the labour force will play 
a significant part in counterbalancing the number of non-workers generated by the ageing process. 
53 
en 
EU Graph 24 - Activity rates by age, in 1992 
100 y 
80 -BELGIUM DENMARK 
FRANCE 
100 T IRELAND 
Source: Eurostat • Community Labour Force Survey 1992 
Graph 24 (end) - Activity rates by age, in 1992 
100 T LUXEMBOURG 
100 T NETHERLANDS 
100 T PORTUGAL 
100 r UNITED KINGDOM 
Source: Eurostat - Community Labour Force Survey 1992 
01 rji 
- 2 - Decreasing fertility 
The most widespread of all the demographic changes observed over the last 30 years is 
undoubtedly the drop in fertility. It has affected all the Union Member States to differing extents 
at different times. 
Fertility is measured by two conventional indicators: the total fertility rate and the completed 
fertility of generations. The former is much more sensitive, but of less importance as it refers to 
a single year, although it can obviously be monitored over time. The second brings together the 
children of women of a given generation: it is available only when these women have reached the 
end of their reproductive life. 
There has been a spectacular fall almost everywhere in the total fertility ^ate. From a starting point 
where the generation renewal threshold (2.10 children per woman) was reached everywhere In 
Europe, we have moved to a situation where only a few countries come near to this threshold 
(Ireland and Scandinavian countries). In some countries there does seems to have been a 
temporary levelling off at between 1.7 and 1.4 children per woman. In some regions (former 
Federal Republic of Germany, Northern Italy) the rate has fallen below 1.0. In all likelihood, a 
calendar effect will entail a slight rise in countries where the rate is currently below 1.4. The 
recent increase in Scandinavian countries raises problems and will need time for objective 
interpretation. 
In the case of completed fertility "he calendar effect is cancelled out. A movement towards a 
fertility rate which is (lose to or Jightly less than the renewal threshold can. Le seen an- .ng the 
1960 generation, the < ~t for wh! h there is : satisfacto-y estimât It woulc. however se as 
naive to take this relative balance as the truth as to be alarmed by the surpluses that so.ne total 
fertility rates are showing. Thes-' two indicators, whose significance differs, obviously need to be 
read together. For the moment, completed fertility in European Member States does not seem to 
be pointing to a failure to replace the generations. If current total fertility rates continued, however, 
they would lead to a completed fertility which rapidly showed a deficit. National officials should 
base their appraisals on this twofold observation. 
Are the spread of the contraceptive pill and the legalisation of abortion responsible alone for the 
drop in fertility? Two demographers, Westoff in the United States and Leridon in France, have 
shown that new contraceptive methods were a necessary factor but do not explain the drop in 
fertility on their own. The drop is due to the fact that couples, now able to exercise total control 
over their fertility, want fewer children than couples in 1 960. It is this reduction of the number of 
children that couples want, that needs to be explained. 
Despite a genuine increase in infertility, surveys conducted in Member States show that most 
couples want to have at least one child. While this may differ in different countries, it would not 
be exaggerated to see it as an almost general desire. In practice, most parents do not just want 
one, but two, children. In most Member States there is some disapproval of only children. Why, 
then, is the rejection of a third child so widespread? 
In this case we need to return to the family plan. The family is a plan for happiness, but for 
balanced happiness. The ideal number of children is therefore that which is compatible with the 
quest for the other belongings that people want, without forgetting the imperative of equality 
which means that these objectives are as possible for the woman as for the man. The prevailing 
opinion is that almost ail parents' goals can be achieved with two children, but not with three. 
European Union figures show that a third child costs one out of ten women their jobs and that this 
child considerably increases the financial burden linked to having children. 
56 
Graph 25 - TOTAL FERTILITY RAIE PER WOMEN. 1950-1993, in the EU Member States 
—, r—| r [—i 1 1 TT 
c 
(0 E o 
a 
c « 3.5 
TJ 
u 
V 
XI 
c 
u a» 
S3 
> < 
2.5 
1.5 
en GCCH 
Pays-Bas 
\ Irlande _j 3 
^L< Angleterre-Galles 3.5 
2.5 
-J 2 
1.5 France 
Belgique /' GCq 
Allemagne 
!990 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Graph 26 - COMPLETED FERTILITY OF FEMALE GENERATIONS 1915-1959, in the EU Member States 
Ol 00 
c 
(0 E o 
Ï3.5 
a. 
c 
V 
x: u 
o x> 
E 
3 
C 
« 
I 2.5 
1.5 F-Irlande 
**.. Pays-Bas 
Danemark GO© 
^ 3.5 
1 I ^ 4F-
2.5 
1.5 F-France GCoi 
1 I u 3.5 
2.5 
1.5 \ Portugal 
J i I G« 
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 
- 3 - Equality between men and women 
On a day-to-day basis, an equal distribution of tasks is a necessary consequence of basing the 
family on a pact. If equality between men and women has been acquired in principle, actual 
practices are far from this ideal, as functions remain specialised and women bear a much heavier 
burden of domestic work than men, even when the wife has a full-time job. Time-budget surveys 
agree on this point: the time that men devote to domestic work is far from the time spent on it by 
women and the progress which has been made does not add up to much. Many people rightly 
stress the need for a genuine adjustment, i.e. a more equal distribution of tasks, including 
education. In this sense, endeavours to reconcile family life and work will in the future affect men 
just as much as they affect women at present. 
-4- Births outside marriage 
Nowadays the union exists solely by the decision of the union; Couples therefore gain emotional 
and sexual solidarity in stages: the partners do not live together, then they live together on a more 
or less regular basis and finally they move into a permanent and declared home; in an increasing 
number of cases the decision to have a child is taken before marriage is on the cards. In some 
countries, births outside marriage, very often premarital, have reached statistical values that make 
them completely unexceptional. 
Tabla 25 - Uv« births out»id» marriage par 100 liva births, batwaan 1960 and 1992 
EUR 12 B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL P UK 
1960 0,5 2.1 7.8 7.6 1.2 2.3 6.1 1.6 2.4 3,2 1.4 9.5 5.2 
1970 5,2 2,8 11,0 7.2 1,1 1.4 6,9 2.7 2,2 4,0 2,1 7.3 8,0 
1980 8,8 4.1 33.2 11.9 1.5 3.9 11,4 5.0 4,3 6,0 4.1 9,2 11.5 
1990 18,6 11,3" 46,4 . 15,3 2,2 9,6 30,1 14,6 6,5 12,9 11,4 14,7 27,9 
1992 20,0 : 46.5 _ 1.4,9 2.6 33,2 18,0 6,8 12,7 12.4 16,1 30.8 
Sourca: Eurostat Ncna: * Data for 1989 
As can be seen, the main increase in births outside marriage has taken place over the last ten 
years. The changes consequently followed one another in a more or less regular order: first of all 
a falling birth rate and growing numbers of divorces; then the spread of living together before 
marriage and finally births outside marriage. In this case as well, it can be seen that Denmark and 
in practice all the Scandinavian countries have the highest indices, while the South of Europe, apart 
from Portugal, has lower indices. 
The only thing that these children born outside marriage have in common with 1950s' children is 
the marital status of their parents. In those days, 40 years ago, such children were born to 
mothers abandoned by the father who became mothers in an atmosphere of social stigma. 
Nowadays, in most cases, children are born to an established couple who intend to get married at 
some point in the future. Society willingly assumes that their parents will put their house in order 
in the near future. 
3.3.3 Development prospects 
There is little doubt that Union Member States will have to tackle a number of similar problems in 
the near future. Europeans are increasingly following the same fashions, buying the same 
consumer products and watching the same films. Has this "common market" bred or is it about to 
breed similar lifestyles and similar family practices? 
59 
The European Observatory on National Family Policies provides very detailed information on trends 
and developments in family policy in the Union Member States. EUROSTAT collects demographic 
data. Eurobarometer surveys make it possible to compare opinions in Union Member States. What 
is currently emerging from all these resources is the diversity of Europe. 
The analyses discussed above show major differences within the current situation: from Portugal, 
where the marriage rate remains high, to France, where, according to current indices only one out 
of every two men is likely to get married; from Sweden, where the fertility rate is higher than two 
children per woman to Spain where it is just over 1.2; from Sweden again, whefe divorce is 
affecting one out of every two marriages, to Ireland, where divorce is not legal. At present Europe 
is divided into two by a very clear boundary. In Northern Europe, family models where couple 
formation and family practices do not necessarily presuppose marriage are widely accepted. 
Premarital cohabitation is the norm in the Scandinavian countries and births outside marriage 
account for close on 50% of all births. 
In the Mediterranean Member States, however, cohabitation and births outside marriage are rare 
or exceptional. From this point of view, and this is fundamental,, there are two Europes. From the 
point of view of the optional nature of marriage, it would be possible to draw a different, and less 
clear-cut, boundary: in this case between the Scandinavian countries where cohabitation is the 
norm and intermediate countries where it is acceptable and relatively frequent. From this point of 
view, the European Union, with the Scandinavian countries, is not therefore a jumbled mosaic, but 
rather a curve along which the institution of marriage increases in importance from North to South. 
The picture is much less intelligible for the other demographic characteristics. The fert.lity rate in 
Germany is close to the rate in the Mediterranean countries. Marriage in Britain, from the point of 
view of its timetable at least, is not very far removed from marriage in Greece. The situation of 
the Scandinavian countries which are both the most emancipated and the most fertile is 
paradoxical. Portugal, which seems to be the most religious of the Mediterranean countries but 
has a relatively high percentage of births outside marriage (16%), is also paradoxical. Spain, where 
marriage remains the norm, but where, among all the European countries, people are most in favour 
of "total sexual freedom" ("Values" Survey, 1990), is also paradoxical. There is a clear picture of 
differences in cohabitation, births outside marriage and divorce rates. Practices and opinions in 
other areas are more confused. This is the current situation. Have recent changes entailed greater 
coherence or have they intensified previous disparities? 
If account were taken only of the situation on the two extreme dates, 1965 and 1994, the 
conclusion would have to be that differences have undoubtedly become more accentuated. While 
the present Europe of the Twelve was far from comparable thirty years ago, the current divide 
between the Mediterranean countries and the remainder of Europe did not exist: consensual unions 
and births outside marriage were relatively exceptional everywhere. Where, in the past, similar 
colours were juxtaposed, there are now striking contrasts. Development therefore seems to have 
moved in the direction of substantial differentiation. 
Following the developments that have taken place in the European Union over each ten-year period 
provides a very different interpretation. A massive movement started in the North, eating away 
at the institutions of marriage, rendering them useless in principle or emptying them of their 
traditional meaning, causing a reduction in the fertility and marriage rates and then a proliferation 
of couples living together but not married. 
There appear to be two, or even three, stages in this development bearing in mind the timelag 
between the spread of consensual cohabitation and that of births outside marriage. A single large-
scale movement, but with major timelags from North to South, which means that the basic change 
has still only skimmed the surface of the South. It could therefore be argued, without fear of 
contradiction, that current differences are no more than a moment in a history which will ultimately 
converge. 
60 
The importance of economic data, alongside social and cultural factors, needs to be stressed by 
way of conclusion to this analysis. Successful families depend on faith, in the broad sense, but 
also on resources and the country's economic system. 'While these two dimensions are not 
genuinely independent, it is not enough merely to mention the former. Standards of living, labour 
organisation, social ïegislation, living conditions and laws or. inheritance are all factors which have 
an impact on daily relationships and family models. A potential rapprochement of Union Member 
States in the area of demographic behaviour depends on the convergence of all these factors. 
Similar lifestyles can be achieved only by reducing differences between standards of living. 
Economic constraints stratify conduct and opinions within each country. This ajso has to be true 
of countries. It is impossible to dissociate the development of families in the European Union from 
the more general development of social solidarity. In other words, these convergences are not 
necessarily written in tablets of stone, but also depend on * \e volition of those involved. 
61 
Chapter 3 
Key points for further consideration 
1. Over the last twenty to thirty years, relatively short, but generally simple, family histories 
have been replaced by histories that are longer, but much more fragmented. Family 
histories have become complex: cohabitation and births outside marriage, separation and 
divorce and reconstituted households have become everyday events, at least in the 
northernmost part of the Union. The very basis of the family has changed. The family, in 
the past an institution and means of social integration, has become a pact between two 
individuals looking for personal fulfilment. 
2. The instability of some families, combined with economic problems, may make young 
people feel rejected by society. They become independent increasingly làtë in life, their 
fixed reference points are becoming blurred and their parents are in increasingly frail 
economic situations. Many ybung people feel excluded in advance and this Is a major 
problem that the Union as a whole will have to tackle. 
3. These changes in the role of the family have gone together with the major events of our 
century: women's emancipation, the massive entry of women into the labour market and 
control over fertility. These have entailed radical and permanent changes in economic and 
social organisation and in the relationships between generations and between the sexes. 
4. Despite these changes, the family is the main network of individual relationships and 
solidarity. It plays an important part in social equilibrium. In a period of dwindling 
resources and doubts about State intervention in the family arena, the time has come to 
think about an answer to the following question: what place should the European Union 
give to the family and children in the light of the key issue of social ties and social 
cohesion? —-
62 
CHAPTER IV 
MIGRATION 
A complete demographic portrait of the Union has to include migration flows. This is an important factor, 
as it is increasingly significant as a component of population growth and is one the essential parameters 
in demographic projections. We need to find out, therefore, what impact migration is having on the 
developments already discussed above such as ageing, the active population, family models, etc. 
4.1 Analytical constraints 
Some precisions are needed for a clearer understanding of the role of migration in the Union's demography: 
they involve two characteristics differentiating migratory growth from natural growth. In the first instance, 
there is a difference in duration. Whereas birth and death rates develop over the long term and with 
substantial continuity, at least when there are no major disturbances (wars, natural catastrophes), this is 
not true of migration whose intensity may vary substantially in very short periods under the impetus of a 
less abrupt short-term development. The statistical data needed for a reliable evaluation of the levels and 
composition of migration flows are also difficult to find. While births, marriages, divorces and deaths are 
scrupulously recorded in most modern States, changes of residence are not recorded in the same detail. 
Consequently, only countries with a population register are able to provide this information and we know, 
from experience, that these are in some cases incomplete. 
- 1 - Sources of data 
In the European Union, five Member States do not have a population register: France, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. 1n the absence of direcrstatistical or administrative data, use then has 
to be made of a range of approximations of numbers of migrants for these Member States, using population 
censuses, labour force surveys or other surveys carried out at national level. An approach of this type then 
raises the problem of the comparability of information between Member States. It is for this reason that 
analysis of migration trends, which is difficult to carry out and necessarily incomplete, has to be 
supplemented by other indicators. For this purpose, it is useful to observe the population by nationality, 
a variable for which there is reliable information and for which it is possible to separate out demographic 
characteristics such as age or sex. Observation of this typfc is commonly known as "stock" measurement, 
in contrast to the evaluation of migration "flows" or streams. 
- 2 - Stocks of migrants 
The confusion that is caused in some cases by the use of these two concepts needs to be avoided. Flows 
relate to the volume and characteristics of people who, over a given period, leave or enter a given territory. 
Stocks are the results of all these movements. Stocks are measured at a given moment - vertically, it 
might be said - whereas flows are measured horizontally, over a specific period. 
Stocks of migrants are usually ascertained, for statistical and administrative purposes, by separating the 
national population and the population of foreign nationality. 
Nationality, it is true, is an important indicator in studying the economic and political impact of migration. 
As it is based on a legal notion, nationality determines rights and privileges in a territory, from both an 
economic point of view (right to work, to claim social benefits, to receive a pension, to have preferential 
relationships with financial organisations) and a political point of view (right to vote, employment in the 
public service). 
63 
Nationality is, however, a relatively poor indicator for understanding the social implications of migration. 
Many subjective factors far removed from the legal status represented by nationality determine the way 
in which a person is perceived by a community. The other problem linked to the use of this variable to 
estimate migration is that nationality is not exclusive and may vary during people's lives. A non-national 
may acquire the nationality of the host country depending on the legislation in force in that country, just 
as a national may return to the country. In both these cases, the migratory movement is not identified 
simply by nationality. These principal limitations need to be borne in mind when interpretinfj data on 
nationality. 
- 3 - Migration flows 
Statistics are ultimately of little help in understanding not only the direction - immigration or emigration -
of migration flows and their intensity, but also their, frequency and their demographic and social 
composition. This is a pity as statistics are a substantial source of information when measuring the impact 
of migration on demographic development. In order to refine demographic analysis, EUROSTAT needs to 
be able to pursue the efforts to harmonise and supplement data collection that it has undertaken with 
Member States. 
When migration is not recorded in a population register it is possible to make use of censuses. These latter 
provide indirect information on spatial mobility through questions about place of birth, previous residence 
or residence at a particular date in the past. These censuses take place, however, only every ten years. 
Moreover, the question about place of previous residence, when asked, does not cover the same periods. 
The limitations imposed by the use of these derived estimates are evident. 
Another data collection source is the United Kingdom's frontier survey evaluating international mobility. 
There are shortcomings, however, in its cover and accuracy. 
Lastly, migrant identification criteria vary from one Member State to another. They often differ depending 
on whether nationals or foreigners are involved. In 1981, the United Nations proposed to define "long-
term" immigrants as people entering national territory with the intention of residing there for at least one 
year, after having been absent from that territory for at least one year. In practice, the only country to 
make use of this definition is the United Kingdom in its International Passenger Survey. The identification 
criteria of other countries are limited either to the migrant's intention to reside for a period of at least one 
year in the country, or quite simply, the intention to reside and occupy housing, taking no account of 
duration. 
This diversity of sources and identification criteria is not the only factor which makes it difficult to draw 
up comparable statistics on migration flows. There are also major shortcomings in the reliability of the 
collection process. The level of cover of data collection varies greatly from one country to another, 
whatever the type of criteria used, and it is not rare for the recording of emigration, for instance, to cover 
only one out of two emigrants and even, in certain cases, one out of ten. It is to be hoped that EUROSTAT 
and the United Nations will review international recommendations in this field. 
4.2 The foreign population in the European Union 
Before presenting the most recent data on the foreign population resident in the Union, it is pointed out 
that a distinction has be drawn between the situation of nationals of Member States of the EU, who are 
entitled to move around and reside freely within the Union under the terms of the EC Treaty, and the 
situation of nationals from non-EU countries, who are not in principle so entitled. It is useful to recall Article 
8 of the Treaty on European Union which defines citizenship of the Union as follows: 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties 
imposed thereby. 
64 
Article 8A states: 
Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territories 
of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by 
the measures adopted to give it effect. 
The Council may adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of the rights referred 
to in paragraph 1; save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament. 
- 1 - Composition and development of the population by nationality 
The most recent statistics show that on 1 January 1992 slightly over 97% of the population of the Union 
was made up of Union citizens. Within this group, 4 million people, i.e. 1.5%, were living ina Member 
State other than the State whose nationality they possessed. On this date, the foreign non-EU population 
was therefore 10 million people (3% of the total). 
Graph 27 
Breakdown of EU population 
by nationality- 1.1.1992 
»5.7 % 
(329.1 
O Nationals 
• Other EU citizens 
D Non-EU citizens 
Source: Eurostat There was little change in the distribution of the 
Union population by nationality until four years ago. 
From 1990, the number of non-EU foreigners 
suddenly increased, growing by more than 1.5 
million people in two years. Slightly earlier, 
between 1988 and 1990, Union citizens had 
started this trend; a larger proportion of Union 
citizens had decided, during this period, to reside in 
another Member State. The intensity of this recent 
increase in the proportion of foreign population is 
obviously reflected by an increase in migration 
flows. The flows do not, however, explain the 
whole of this increase; during this period, a 
proportion of the foreigners already, but illegally, 
residing in a Member State regularised their 
situation making use of a number of régularisation 
laws. 
The proportions of foreigners in the Union are 
not comparable. Member States to which, in 
the past, workers have immigrated or people 
have returned from former, colonies have higher 
percentages of foreign non-EU populations. 
These include Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Belgium. These countries alone account for 
7.5 million foreigners of non-EU origin, i.e. 77%: 
of the total of this category of foreigners. This 
means that these foreigners reside in much 
smaller numbers in other Member States, 
especially in the Union's Southern Member 
States. Graph 28 
Trends in the national and non-national 
population in the EU - 1980 to 1992 
HiiUH l'i s S 
Sourca: Eurostat 
65 
It is again Germany and France, together with 
Benelux and in this case the United Kingdom, 
which account for almost alt (90.5%) foreign 
citizens of the Union. 
These two findings show that while there may 
be positive migration flows to the other Member 
States, these are mainly the result of people 
returning to their own countries. Graph 29-A 
Breakdown of the national population 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 
Graph 29-B 
Breakdown of the other EU citizens 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 Graph 29-C 
Breakdown of the non-EU citizens 
by Member State, on 1 January 1992 
non-EU ritùena: 9857 (2.9%) 
Source: Eurostat 
- 2 - Distribution and origin of the foreign population 
The distribution of foreigners by original nationality has to be interpreted with care, as it does not 
take account of the foreigner's length of residence in the host country. We know that naturalisation 
criteria vary from one Member State to another. The fact that there were more Turks in the Union 
in 1992 than, for instance, Moroccans, may be because fewer Turks and their offspring have taken 
the nationality of their host country than Moroccans. This does not necessarily mean, therefore, 
that more immigrants have come in the past from Turkey than from Morocco. 
The increase in the number of foreigners of a given nationality between 1985 and 1992 makes it 
possible to fill this gap to a certain extent. During this period, Turks accounted for the greatest 
increase in the European Union: more than half a million. The number of Italian, Portuguese and 
Spanish foreigners decreased during this seven-year period, a very clear sign that these people are 
returning to their own countries, as it is not very likely that they are emigrating out of the Union or 
becoming naturalised. The decrease in the number of Algerians, however, is more likely to be due 
to the acquisition of French nationality. 
66 
Graph 30 • Twelve main nationalities among the non-national population of 
the EU*, in 1985 and 1992 
W////////////////M^^^ 
Source: Eurostat Notes: France 1985: 1982 census results: France 1992: 1990 census results; Ireland and 
United Kingdom: Community Labour Force Surveys, spring 1985 and 1992: ': excluding Italy and Luxembourg 
In the recent period between 1990 and 1992, Germany admitted eight times more foreigners, both 
Union citizens (160 000) and non-EU foreigners (800 000), than the other Member States. 
Nationals of Central and Eastern Europe accounted for 25% of this increase (over 200 000 people). 
Graph 31 - Increase in numbara of non-nationals from 1990 to 1992 
Increase of other EU citizens 
200OO0 j 
150OO0 -
10OO0O --
50OO0 -
oil 
8 OK D OR m. NL P 
Country of rasldance 
Sourca: Buroatat Increase of non-EU citizens 
850000 -
750000 -
65OO00 -
5500O0 -
45000O -• 
350000 -
250000 -
150000 -• 
50000 -
-50000 B p»; p "OR pu. _ «. r 
• Oth«r non-EU citizana 
O Central & Eaatarn European* 
As mentioned above, only 1.4% of Union citizens reside in a Member State other than the State 
whose nationality they possess. There is a very different picture for each Member State. Over 12% 
of the Irish and 8% of the Portuguese reside elsewhere in the Union. The Irish, as is known, migrate 
in large numbers to the United Kingdom and large numbers of the Portuguese have emigrated in the 
post-war period, which, in proportion to the size of the population, generates a greater effect than 
in Italy, for instance. 
67 
Graph 32 
Percentage of EU citizens residing in another EU Member State - 1.1.1992 
Source: Eurostat NL P UK 
Country of origin 
So that these nationality data can be interpreted 
more correctly, a table has been drawn up of 
trends in the numbers of acquisitions of 
citizenship by foreigners by Member State and 
of levels of naturalisation of all foreigners for 
the last year for which this information was 
available. Several Member States, including 
Germany and Belgium, the Union's main 
catchment areas for foreigners, have 
naturalisation levels which are rather low in 
comparison with those of France and the 
Netherlands, which are also hosts to a 
substantial non-EU population. Shaped by 
different laws, these differences in acquisition 
of citizenship generate an underestimate of the 
extent of migration flows for France and the 
Netherlands. Tabla 26 
B 
DK 
O 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
P 
UK Acquisition of citizenship in EU Mambar Stataa 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1705 
3744 
16521 
1571 
8143 
46351 
333 
917 
9114 
34 
64584 1878 
3258 
17573 
1217 
5919 
49330 
529 
780 
28730_ 
210 
117129 2049 
3028 
20078 
1090 
7033 
54381 
383 
893 
1Z794 
97 
57271 1410 
5484 
27162 
886 
3752 
59684 
373 
748 
29112 
43 
57836 2536 
5104 
1204 
5226 Ratio 
(•) 
0.3% 
3% 
0.5% 
0.6% 
1.4% 
59252 (1) 1.5% 
347 0.4% 
739 
36237 
117 
41601 0.6% 
4.9% 
0.1% 
2.1% 
Sourca: Eurostat 
Notas: 1*1 parcantaga of non-national population 
111 Warring to 1990 on 1. January or tfta lataat yaar avaaabk 
-3 Demographic characteristics of the foreign population 
The aim was to understand what part migration played in the demographic development of the 
Union. While it is true that the characteristics of the foreign population are an initial index, it needs 
to be borne in mind that an essential datum is missing: length of stay. There is then arisk of 
producing an amalgam of very different contributions, bearing in mind that impact on demographic 
behaviour (fertility, family formation model, mortality) takes place over the long term and will be 
shaped by older immigrants, and impact on demographic structures (age, sex, employment) takes 
place immediately and is generated by new immigrants. If it is added that the composition of the 
population of foreign nationality may vary, even if its volume does not change, simply through the 
effect of migrations and naturalisations, the limitations of this analysis are evident. 
68 
Graph 33 - Breakdown of the population by nationality and age-group in a number of Member States, 1.1.1992 
The breakdown of the resident population by main age-groups and nationality (nationals, EU citizens, 
non-EU citizens) is given for those Member States for which the information was available. The age 
structure of non-EU residents is, without exception, not as old as that of nationals. Non-EU 
residents have smaller proportions of elderly people (aged over 65) and in general higher proportions 
of young people (0-19) as well. Foreigners who are citizens of the Union also have a structure 
which is not as old as that of nationals, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Among EU 
foreigners, however, young people account for a smaller proportion than among young nationals 
everywhere. Fewer elderly people and fewer young people necessarily mean more people of 
working age. In the 20-64 age-group, young workers aged between 20 and 49 are again 
proportionally more numerous among foreigners than among nationals. 
Why these differences? They are largely explained by migration, which is principally undertaken for 
reasons of employment. This is particularly evident in the age profile of foreigners who are EU 
nationals. In the non-EU population, the largest proportion of young people could be due to the 
migration of migrant workers' families. It is difficult, however, to dissociate the effect of migration 
from the effect of the fertility of foreigners in this case. In some Member States, the birth of a child 
to foreign parents makes it easier for this child to acquire the citizenship of that State. Failure to 
record the reason for migration again places limits on more detailed processing of this variable. 
It should be noted that the breakdown of foreigners by sex leads to the same divergence between-
nationals and foreigners. In all Member States, the number of women is higher than the number of 
men among nationals. _The female/male ratio varies in Member States from slightly over 100 
(Ireland) to 110 (Germany). This variable is obviously linked to age structure: since it is known that 
women have a higher life expectancy than men, women are necessarily over-represented in the 
elderly population. The ratios between sexes are, however, almost always in favour of men in 
foreign populations, in particular among non-EU citizens. The youth of this population is 
supplemented in this case by a probable differential between the sexes from the point of view of 
migration. 
- 4 - Foreign workers . 
We concluded from the above that the foreign population included a substantial proportion of people 
of working age. This observation is borne out by data that it has been possible to draw from the 
labour force surveys. In Member States as a whole, there is a certain consistency, over a ten-year 
period, in the proportion of workers among foreigners. There were almost 6 million foreign workers 
in 1992, distributed in a non-uniform way among the Member States. In comparison with the 
Union's current figure of 52%, the proportion of workers among foreigners is lower in Belgium 
(38.5%), France (46%) and the Netherlands (44%) and higher in the other Member States with high 
levels of foreigners: Germany (60%), Luxembourg (65%). 
Tabla 27-A 
Number of foreign workers (thousands) 1883-1992 
EUR 12 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
P 
UK 1983 
4776 
246 
37 
2024 
24 
1332 
26 
43 
165 
878 1984 
4811 
229 
38 
2063 
23 
1383 
27 
44 
1006 1986 
4869 
209 
40 
1966 
24 
1344 
26 
48 
155 
1060 1986 
4688 
244 
38 
1970 
20 
1288 
25 
46 
18 
1059 1987 
4946 
217 
38 
2044 
20 
37 
1237 
26 
48 
168 
14 
1096 1988 
4893 
216 
36 
1937 
24 
35 
1271 
28 1989 
4999 
218 
44 
2143 
21 
34 
1313 
27 
48 49 
175 185 
24 28 
1100 937 1990 
5123 
236 
45 
2310 
23 
33 
1287 
29 
52 
189 
25 
893 1991 
5271 
243 
53 
2484 
30 
49 
1253 
32 
53 
202 
28 
843 1992 
5931 
. 271 
49 
2836 
44 
69 
1230 
32 
188 
60 
224 
19 
908 
Source: Eurostat - Labour force surveys 
70 
Tabla 27-B 
Proportions of foreign workers In the total non-national population. 1983-1992 
EUR 12 
B 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
P 
UK 49,3 
40,9 
60,2 
44,0 
52,2 1984 
53.3 
37,9 
52.0 
61,5 
35.6 
48,3 
39.2 
61,7 
52.0 1986 
55,2 
39.2 
59,3 
59.8 
39,1 
46.9 
39.6 
60.8 
40,8 
52.2 1986 
51.4 
38.6 
58,2 
57.5 
36,2 
46,8 
38,5 
02,1 
51.4 
51.4 1987 
50.1 
35,8 
58,8 
56.6 
36,7 
38,1 
45,6 
38,7 
62,6 
41.3 
51,5 
51,5 1988 
50,7 
34,9 
51.8 
57.6 
40,0 
36,3 
45,7 
40.6 
61.2 
41,3 
48,3 
53,9 1989 
51,6 
35,0 
53.7 
58.4 
38,7 
34,4 
46,1 
40.1 
61,0 
41,7 
56.6 
56,2 1990 
51.9 
35.6 
53.0 
58.2 
41.0 
34,9 
46,6 
41,7 
60,0 
41.1 
50,7 
56.9 1991 
51.3 
37.5 
53.1 
67.8 
44.5 
39.4 
46,1 
43.4 
61.6 
40.0 
54.6 
52,8 1992 
52.3 
38.5 
56.7 
60.0 
49.1 
47.6 
45.9 
40.2 
47,6 
64,7 
43.8 
43.4 
51.4 
Source: Eurostat - Labour force surveys 
It has been possible to break down these foreign workers by nationality for some Member States. 
The table shows, in order of impoaance, the four most common nationalities. The direction of 
certain migration flows are very clear. Turkish workers and workers from the former Yugoslavia 
account for 51% of the foreign labour force in Germany. They are also numerous (22%) in 
Denmark. Some other Member States also have a concentration of foreign non-EU workers where 
some groups are represented to a greater extent: Moroccans in Spain (27%), Italy (14%) and the 
Netherlands (14%); Turks in the Netherlands (21%). 
In other Member States the predominant proportions of foreign workers are Union citizens: the 
United Kingdom with 26% of Irish workers; Greece with 33% of British workers; Luxembourg with 
27% of both French and Portuguese workers; Portugal with 6% of Spanish and 5% of British 
workers. In these two Member States, no more than 6% of non-EU workers have the same 
nationality. 
Table 28 
Non-national worker» by largest citizenship groups, in a selection of Member State» - 1992 
Turk. 14% 
Britiih 10% 
Germans 9% 
Former-Youoo»lavs 8% 
Other EU 9% 
Other non-EU 51% 
Total non-nationals 100% 
I 
Moroccans 14% 
Tunisians 7% 
Former-Yougoslave 5% 
British 4% 
Other EU 11 % 
Other non-EU 59% 
Total non-nationals 100% Turks 
Former-Youooslav 
Italians 
Greeks 
Other EU 
Other non-EU 33% 
18% 
8% 
5% 
11% 
25% 
Total non-national» 100% 
French 
Portugueee 
Belgiene 
Germans 
Other EU 
Other non-EU 27% 
27% 
.17*. 
11% 
13% 
6% 
Total non-national» 100% OR 
British 33% 
Garmana 13% 
French 10% 
Italian* 5% 
Other EU 10% 
Other non-EU 29% 
Total non-national» 100% 
Turkc . 21% 
Moroccans 14% 
Belgiene 10% 
British 9% 
Other EU 21 % 
Other non-EU 23% 
Total non-national» 100% Moroccan* 
Portuguese 
British 
Germans 
Other EU 
Other non-EU 27% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
8% 
50% 
Total non-nationals 100% 
Spanish 
British 
Germa na 
USA citizens 
Other EU 
Other non-EU 6% 
5% 
.3% 
3% 
6% 
76% 
Total non-national» -100% UK 
Irish 
Italians 
French, 
Spanish 
Other BJ 
Other non-EU 26% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
6% 
55% 
Total non-nationel» 100% 
Source: Eurostat - Labour força sùrvaya 1S92 
Nota: Du* to rounding, total non-national workar* might not sum up tu IOO% 
71 
The sectors in which foreign workers work is also a factor of differentiation. Whereas less than half 
of male nationals work in industry, a percentage of close on 60% of foreign workers work in 
industry. Over-representation in industry can also be seen among foreign women. 
Graph 34 - Breakdown of employee» by nationality, sex and sector of activity - EU • 1992 
Man 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% I Services 
I Industry 
I Agricuttur Women 
• Services 
i3 Industry 
• AgricuHurs 
% 20% 40% 80% «0% 100%-
Source: Eurostat 
4.3 Migration flows 
We have looked up to now at the population of foreign nationality. This has meant that we have 
disregarded information that is fundamental in evaluating the demographic impact of migration: what 
are the yearly volumes of migration flows and what are their composition? We shall now attempt 
to answer this question. 
- 1 - Components of demographic growth 
Graph 35 - Total and natural increase of the EU 
population, from 1960 to 1992 
3500 
Natural increase 
Source: Eurostat 
\ I | I I l i i l l I I I 1 I I 1 1 I 1 l l l i I I I I I I l 
3 8 The differences between total growth and 
natural growth represent the proportion of a 
population for which migration growth 
accounts. The continuing decline in the natural 
growth of the European Union began in 1965. 
For close on ten years, births have exceeded 
deaths in the Union by only 500 000 to 600 
000. Total growth is, however, more erratic 
over this period as a result of the effect of 
migration. While there were divergences in 
migration balances in the period 1960-1985, 
which were positive in some cases and negative 
in others, for the first timeln forty years there 
was a sustained growth in the migration 
proportion over a longer period. Between 1985 
and 1990, the migration balance increased from 
278 000 to 954 000. During the last two years 
of observation, between 1990 and 1992, this 
balance was again higher (2 million in total). 
72 
These migration balances represent the 
difference between the number of immigrants 
and emigrants. An increase in these balances 
may therefore be due to two factors: a rise in 
the number of immigrants or a fall in the number 
of emigrants. There may also have been 
improvements in data collection which may 
have pinpointed previous disparities. In order to 
find out which of these is applicable, it is 
therefore essential to look at the statistics on 
migrants. These data are not readily available. 
There are no data for Italy; no data on 
emigration in Greece, France and Spain and the 
data available on immigration in France and 
Portugal relate only to nationals. 
It is striking, when looking at the emigration and 
immigration trends for those countries supplying 
this information, that emigration.is very stable 
with respect to immigration. The sharp upturn 
in numbers of immigrants between 1987 and 
1989 may be due to the return to the former 
Federal Republic of Germany of people of 
German origin resident in the former German 
Democratic Republic (the "Ûbersiedler") or 
elsewhere in the countries of the East (the 
"Aussiedler"). Graph 36 - International migration, from 1980 4o 1992. 
in a «election of Member State» 
Belgium. Denmark. Germany. Spew, Netherlands. United Kingdom 
1000 • 
§ i I I I ! I! I i 
Sourca: Eurostat ~~— Immigration (ind. ûbersiedler) 
^Emigration 
" Immigration (sxd. 
Since 1990, Germany has again attracted the largest number of immigrants, this time from Central 
Europe and the former Yugoslavia. It should be borne in mind, however, that these data relate only 
to legal immigrants and that in 1990, after German reunification, movements between the Federal 
Republic and the Democratic Republic were no longer deemed to be international migration. 
In the United Kingdom, the Member State with the second highest figures for migration flows, 
emigration exceeded immigration in 1992. Migration balances are also negative in Portugal and 
Ireland. 
Graph 37 - Immigration and emigration in the Member States, in 1992 
Q Immigration 
E3 Emigration 
WMM'jjtfflMM 
Source: Eurostat 
- 2 - Characteristics of migrants 
Apart from their nationality and country of last residence, little is known about the characteristics 
of migrants. The direct demographic impact of immigration on geographical distribution and age 
structure, for instance, cannot be measured. 
73 
It is interesting to note that Union citizens, often nationals returning to their own countries, account for 
at least half of immigrant flows in most Member States. Immigration into the Netherlands is below this 
figure, however, and immigration into Germany does not follow this pattern at all. 75% of immigrants 
to Germany in 1992 were non-EU citizens and 25% were non-EU citizens from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Emigration which is, as mentioned above, small in extent except in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, relates mostly to Union citizens and in many cases to nationals themselves. In Germany, 
however, emigration by citizens is proportionally distributed in the same way as immigration. This shows 
that many people come and go between Germany and countries with which it has migration exchanges. 
Observation of the countries from which migrants come and their nationality, highlights the important part 
that the political events in Eastern Europe, especially the Yugoslav conflict, have played in recent 
migration movements. The former Yugoslavia and Poland are the two regions from which the majority 
of migrants seem to come and go: they have the nationalities of those countries, and leave in massive 
numbers, but also return in large numbers (migrants returning to the former Yugoslavia can only be of 
Croatian or Slovenian nationality, although this precise information is not shown in the statistics). In 
1992, 300 000 immigrants were of German nationality and were Aussiedler coming for the most part 
from the countries of Eastern Europe. Not all of them came to settle permanently in Germany: volumes 
of German emigrants are still sizeable (110 000 people). The USA is also a popular destination for 
many emigrants. 
74 
Graph 38 - Breakdown of immigrants and emigrants 
Irrvnigration by nationality - 1992 
(main groupa) 
Form., YouflO*.v. Tj^/iM^/^^^^ i 
Germans r///////////A?////////^^^^^ 
Poles 
British 
Rumanians ^ 
Turks 
Former USSR 
Greeks 
US citizens 
Czechosiovakians l££^f -I 
100 200 300 400 
thousands Emigration by nationality - 1992 
(main groupa) 
B...* ^ SKW^KSS; mmmsm^^^^^^^^^^ Former Youao-.v. l^^Wk^^^^^^^^ 
Pole. Mkum^m^mv^MMm^ 
^55 
Turks jgç^^^^^^^jj 
50 100 150 
thousands 
Immigration by country of previous residence - 1992 
(main groups) 
////////////y/////////^^ 
Turkey ^^2^' 
100 200 300 400 Emigration by country of previous residence - 1992 
(main groups) 
Former Yougoslavie liMjMMMMMMiMM^^ 
Poland T" 
USA >a^aa^^^'^^^-^^a 
Rumania WNNNNVNNNNNNNV^^ 
Turkey }^\\S\N\\\\N\NS\\N^ 
Italy 
Australia 
F.ancMiMMl 
Germany )^^S1 
Czechoslovakia 
o 50 100 150 
thousands 
Source: Eurostat 
In 1990, the number of people leaving one Member State to settle in another was estimated at 
600 000. This information has not been calculated for 1992 because no data are available. The 
origin-destination grid that can be drawn up for 1992, albeit incomplete, bears out the powers of 
attraction that the central Member States, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, exert on 
Union citizens. 
A proportion of non-EU immigrants are asylum seekers. Estimating their numbers from applications 
would be erroneous in this case as well. Data are not comparable among Member States and 
several applications for asylum may come from a single applicant. The growth in the number of 
applications is indicative, however, and Germany appears to be the most attractive country. The 
United Kingdom records ten times fewer applications, but its powers of attraction have increased 
substantially since 1985. Since the beginning of the 1990s, France seems to have become less 
attractive to asylum seekers. 
The origins of applicants for asylum differ in different Member States. Applications received in 
Belgium come principally from Zaire and Rumania. In Denmark, 65% of applicants are nationals of 
the former Yugoslavia. These asylum applications from Yugoslavs also account for the majority in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Spain and France have different profiles: 
applications come from Peruvians and Poles in Spain and from Turks and Zairians in France. 
75 
Table 29 
Asylum application*, in tha main EU host countries. 1988 to 1992 (1) 
in thousands 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
1985-100 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 1155 
73,8 
6.2 
28.9 
5.6 
5.3 
8.7 
2.3 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 im. 
99,7 
5.7 
26.3 
5.9 
7.6 
9.3 
2.8 
135 
93 
, 9.1 
104 
143 
107 
122 1987 
57.4 
5.9 
?7.7 
13.5 
6,0 
2.7 
3,7 
78 
95 
96 
238 
113 
31 
161 1988 
103.1 
5.7 
34.4 
7.5 
4.5 
4.7 
4.5 
140 
93 
. 119 
133 
85 
54 
196 mi 
121.3 
16.8 
61.4 
13.9 
8.1 
4.6 
4.1 
164 
272 
213 
246 
153 
S3 
177 1990 
193.1 
30.3 
54.8 
21.2 
12.9 
5.3 
8.6 
262 
492 
,190 
376 
243 
61 
376 1991 
256.1 
57.7 
47.4 
21.6 
15.4 
4.6 
8.1 
347 
937 
164 
383 
290 
53 
354 1992 
438.2 
32.0 
27.0 (2) 
20.3 
17.6 
13,9 
11.7 
594 
520 
. 93 (2) 
360 
332 
160 
509 
Source; Eurostat 
0) 77»e counties (Save been rankad by number of applicants for asyktm in 1002. 
Because th* nationals definitionsmay dHTor stongfy torn each other, 
the poasibiMies for international comparison of th* absolut* numbar» ara ltmit*d. 
P) Provisional 
Table 30 - Asylum applicants by country of origin, 
for a selection of host countries, 1992 
Host country > Belgium 
v Country of origin 
Rumania 3463 
Former- Yougosla via 1927 
India 1093 
Ghana 934 
Zaira 3749 
Other 6481 
Total 17647 Former- Yougosla via 
[irak 
Somalia 
Former USSR 
Sri Lanka 
Other 
Total Denmark! 
9008; 
9321 
896 i 
533; 
361 
2154; 
138841 | Former- Yougoslavie 
'.Rumania 
; Bulgaria 
I Turkey 
i Vietnam 
\ Other 
Total Germany 
121592 
103787 
31540 
28327 
12258 
140687 
438191 \Peru 
\ Poland 
; Dominican Rep. 
: Senegal 
| Rumania 
[Other 
Total 2580 
1190 
1041 
959 
891 
5047 
11708 
Host country > France 
v Country of origin 
Turkey 9915 
Zaïre 4402 
Sri Lanka 3400 
Mai 3223 
Rumania 2486 
other 23954 
Total 47380 Netherlands! United 
Former- Yougoslavie 
Somalia 
Iran 
Sri Lanka 
Rumania 
Other 
Total 5658! 
4246! 
1298| 
1034; 
981 
71291 
203461 Former- Yougoslavie 
Sri Lanka 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
Ghana 
Other 
Total Kingdom 
5635 
2085 
1865 
1700 
*"' 1600 
11725 
24610 
Source: Eurostat 
76 
4.4 The demographic impact of migration 
The history of migration is part and parcel of overall changes in world societies and economies. A 
question can then be raised about the demographic impact of migration: is migration likely to modify 
the course of demographic development, in particular by affecting the ageing of structures, and is 
it possible to apprehend future trends in migration? 
1 - The role of migration in the ageing of the population 
The effects of the ageing of the populations of Northern countries should be felt to an even greater 
extent at the beginning of the 21st century. It is only then that an imbalance between the active 
and non-active population can be predicted in most European countries. This type of reasoning is 
based, however, on the hypothesis that everything else will remain the same - a forward-looking 
intellectual exercise that history has often disproved. In the meantime, the ratio of young to less 
young people in the active population will be in favour of the older group and the dynamic nature 
of the Western labour force could, looked at pessimistically, be eaten away. Some people are 
worried about imbalances in social security systems and in particular in pension payment systems. 
These fears have led to the idea that it is possible to offset demographic ageing by importing 
foreigners. Empirical observation disproves this idea: it is mistaken to believe that an immigration 
policy can remedy the growing imbalance in the age pyramid. 
Studies at national level have unequivocally shown that it takes less than one generation for 
immigrants settling in a country to adopt its demographic behaviour, in particular as regards fertility 
and mortality. It is not therefore possible to rely, in order to "rejuvenate" the population, on the 
long-term impact of immigration. Massive immigration by a population with a very young structure 
is the only other way of plugging the "gaps" in our age pyramids. Over and above the practical and 
ethical problems that massive immigration would entail from the point of view of the reception of 
these populations, immigration largely by young children, i.e. the group that contains the deficits 
that are causing ageing, is unthinkable. 
- 2 - Migration prospects 
Migration currents are closely linked to short-term economic and political events. It is just as 
impossible to predict the former as it is to anticipate the latter. Past trends are almost useless in 
predicting future immigration levels as the profiles of migration have undergone such major structural 
changes. This is vital. It makes it necessary to understand the important part played by better 
economic and political balances in controlling migration flows. Consequently, the economic and 
political development of regions bordering on the Union, such as the Central and Eastern part of the 
European continent and the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, will play a key role in 
determining migration pressures in the next century. 
- 3 - Freedom of movement 
The challenge currently facing the Union is to create a genuine European area of free movement in 
which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily reality for the people 
of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives of the Single Market, while 
establishing a more flexible and more efficient European employment market. 
77 
In a period of high unemployment, it is obviously more difficult to achieve this objective; the 
remaining barriers need to be removed, however, so that free movement can be promoted. The 
EURES system was created with this aim in view. Some estimates predict, as the Single Market 
is completed, an increase in the migration flows of frontier-zone managers and workers. Some 
Community programmes are promoting the mobility of some groups of people such as students, 
researchers and teachers. 
78 
Chapter 4 
Key points for further consideration 
1. Migration is the least predictable of demographic events as its extent may vary substantially 
in very short periods in response to short-term developments. This was the case between 
1990 and 1992 when the political upheavals of the central and eastern part of Europe 
caused substantial migration to the Union. From this point of view, the development of the 
Mediterranean basin regions and the European countries in economic transition has to be 
seen as one of the key factors in potential migration pressures on the Union. 
2. International migration has little impact on the demographic model of the Member States. 
Migration cannot, in any case, counteract the effects of population ageing. At local level, 
however, a spatial concentration of new immigrants can generate particular stratifications. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to appreciate this issue on the basis of the statistics 
currently available. •"-
3. The challenge currently facing the Union is to create a genuine European area of free 
movement in which freedom of movement is not only a legal right but also becomes a daily 
reality for the people of Europe. This mobility would make it possible to attain the objectives 
of the Single Market, while establishing a more flexible and more efficient European 
employment market. 
79 
GLOSSARY 
Some definitions which may be of use n understanding the demographic concepts used in this repoa are 
given below. 
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT 
Population increase 
Changes in the size of a population over a given period, i.e. the increase of this population, depend on its 
natural growth and its net migration. Natural growth is the difference between births and deaths; net 
migration measures the difference between numbers of emigrants and immigrants. 
Demographic transition 
The term "demographic transition" is used by demographers to denote a transition from the uncontrolled 
mortality and fertility of traditional societies to controlled systems where natality and mortality levels are 
much lower. Practically all countries of the world have now entered this stage of demographic transition, 
but most countries are facing a much more rapid fall in mortality than in the European countries in the last 
century. As their birth rate is also high, the timelag between falling mortality and falling fertility entails a 
period of very high demographic growth. 
Demographic projections 
How can we find out about a particular population in 5, 10, 15 or even 20 years' time? Current population 
figures are projected to the date which is of interest on the basis of hypotheses about fertility, mortality 
and migration. If a sub-population such as the active population needs to be studied, these need to be 
supplemented by hypotheses on men's and women's future participation rates. The longer the period, the 
more questionable these hypotheses become, as they then apply to a population which is itself 
hypothetical. Moreover, the age-group's most affected by some events (young people in the case of 
fertility; old people in the case of mortality; young adults in the case of migration) may be subject to 
varying degrees of error. It is therefore preferable to use scenarios which make it possible accurately to 
test the impact of a particular hypothesis on the population as a whole. 
DEMOGRAPHIC A GEING 
Population ageing 
Demographic ageing entails a modification of the age structure of the population leading to an increase in 
the proportion of elderly people. At the outset this is generated by a fall in fertility which proportionally 
reduces the population of young people. At present, however, the ageing of western populations is due 
to a proportional increase in the numbers of elderly people as a result of increasing longevity. 
Life expectancy 
Life expectancy measures the mean number of years for which a person of a given age can expect to live. 
When no age is specified, life expectancy is measured from birth, expressed as e0. Life expectancy at 65 
(e66), for instance, indicates the mean number of years for which a person reaching the age of 65 can 
expect to live. This value is calculated from mortality tables which establish, from the deaths recorded by 
age for a year, the probability of death at each age. 
80 
Demographic dependency 
Demographic dependency, also known as the dependency ratio, is a ratio between age-groups showing 
the proportions that some age-groups represent with respect to others. This dependency attempts, in 
general, to evaluate the burden that the numbers of. young people and pensioners place on workers by 
relating the population aged under 15 and over 65 to that aged between 15 and 65. 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 
Terminology 
Birth rate, fertility and fecundity are often confused. These terms relate to different concepts. Birth rate 
refers to the number of births that take place at a given time in the total population, while fertility measures 
the number of children born to women. The former is a "snapshot" measurement while the latter is a 
longitudinal measurement. Not having given birth to children is described as infertility. Fecundity refers 
to a couple's biological ability to procreate. 
Birth rate 
The birth rate is obtained by dividing the number of births taking place during a year by the mean 
population of a country for that year. This measurement, although useful, does not genuinely reflect a 
population's procreative behaviour, however, as it provides no information on the number of children 
actually born to women of procreative age. From this point of view, the birth rate does not make it 
possible to ascertain the direction in which the population will evolve in the long term. 
Total fertility rate 
In order to evaluate the reproduction of a population using the number of births, use needs to be made of 
the total, also called the synthetic, fertility rate. This measurement shows the number of children that 
women would have during their life if the procreative behaviour, by age, of all women remained similar to 
that observed in a given year. Although it can be readily measured, this rate is shaped by the events of 
a given year and may therefore be greatly influenced by short-term events. 
Completed fertility of a generation 
Completed fertility is the only real indicator of fertility: it measures the mean number of children that 
women born in a given year have actually had during their life. Unfortunately, it can be calculated only for 
the older generations, when women are no longer fertile. It is for this reason that use is often made of the 
fertility rate, taking account of the limits on its interpretation. 
The generation renewal threshold: fertility of 2. J to prevent a decline 
At what level does women's fertility need to be to ensure the renewal of the generations, when there is 
no immigration? If as many boys as girls are born, and no woman dies before reaching the end of her 
reproductive life, the answer would be obvious: an average of two children per woman which would allow 
the full reproduction of each couple. For unexplained reasons, however, 105 boys are born on average for 
every 100 girls, throughout the world. To prevent a population reduction, 100 women must obviously give 
birth to an average of 100 girls, which means a total of 205 children, i.e. 2.05 children per woman. As 
there is still a low level of mortality among women of procreative age, however, the necessary level is 2.1 
children per woman. This means that if the short-term fertility index is below 2.1 for a long period, and 
there is not a positive migration balance, a demographic decrease is inevitable. 
81 
ANNEX 
Age pyramids of the EU Member States at 1.1.1993 



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