EUROPEAN COMMISSION Strasbourg, 5.7.2016 SWD(2016) 221 final JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders’ views Accompanying the document Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform

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Section 1 - Executive Summary This Joint Staff Working Document accompanies the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR). It aims to provide a critical assessment of the EU’s engagement on SSR by summarising and analysing the findings of the various evaluations, lessons identified reports, studies, and consultations with stakeholders conducted over the past 15 years, from 2001 to 2016. Given the limitations of such an approach, this document is not intended to be a fully-fledged evaluation exercise, but rather provide an overview of the outcomes from past monitoring and evaluation endeavours. This overview was considered to provide a sufficient basis on which to assess the current policy and inform decision-making, based on evaluation practice over the period in question. An overall evaluation of the performance of the Strategic Framework, using the results of the annual evaluations will be carried out within five years. This will be done in accordance with the recently adopted Commission Better Regulation guidelines, providing a basis for consideration of any possible further development of the Framework. Many of the evaluations found that while the SSR issue itself continued to be relevant, the policy framework based on concepts produced in 2005 and 2006 could now be considered insufficient due to the events and changes that have occurred since their creation and their relevance was mixed at times. The findings also point out that the effectiveness and efficiency of EU support for SSR was hampered by several weaknesses such as the lack of institutional capacity, the lack of a long-term political and strategic approach grounded in the wider state-building context, insufficient basing in analysis of local contexts and risks, lack of ownership as well as weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation. The coherence of EU engagement on SSR was found to be hampered by the fragmented policy framework whilst there was also an unclear division of labour inter-institutionally as well as on the ground. Nevertheless, the EU was found to have a strong added-value on SSR due to its reputation and positive perception by many partner countries, the vast array of expertise and instruments it could mobilise, and its long experience in countries around the world. Section 2 – Introduction SSR grew in prominence in the international community and within the EU in the 1990s and has been recognised as an important tool in conflict prevention, peace and state-building, and sustainable development. SSR, as understood by the EU, involves transforming the security system, which includes all the different security and oversight actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. The evaluated activities include European Commission programmes, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, as well as EU Member States’ interventions in order to have a comprehensive picture of the EU’s engagement on SSR. For this Joint Staff Working Document, “support to SSR” encompasses all types of EU engagement in the security sector in third countries ranging from short-term actions to longer-term systemic actions. The aim of this Joint Staff Working Document is to present a critical assessment of the EU interventions on SSR, draw the main lessons learnt and assess how EU support might be improved in the future based on the past experiences of the EU and its Member States. This Joint Staff Working Document is not, however, itself an evaluation of EU support for SSR and does not contain data or quantitative information on the performance of the policy as a whole. Section 3 – Background to the initiative The EU’s external action is guided by the objectives laid down, inter alia, in Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which, amongst other objectives, include to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security” and to “foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty”. Whilst the Treaty of Lisbon only came into force in 2009, these objectives have been at the heart of EU external action under both Community competence and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as reflected in key policy documents. Furthermore, the EU has long recognised the security-development nexus and the need for supporting Security Sector Reform in partner countries in order to build state structures, which can fulfil basic functions and meet the needs of citizens. The EU has long been engaged in supporting Security Sector Reform in partner countries and regions around the world under a wide range of policy areas. In 2005 and 2006, the former Community produced two concepts to shape support under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) , and support under Community competence respectively . The “EU Concept for ESDP Support for Security Sector Reform” focused on the principles, key elements and modalities for ESDP support on SSR. It also stressed the need for close cooperation among all relevant actors to ensure a consistency, coherence and complementarity of EU external action. This approach was mirrored by the “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform” which also identified areas of engagement, the guiding principles, and the need for coordinated and holistic approach to SSR. The Council conclusions of 6 June 2006 established that these two concepts constituted the EU policy framework on SSR. EU action on SSR should be based on principles drawing on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) definition of SSR . The EU policy framework also made clear that the EU can mobilise a broad range of civilian and military instruments able to support SSR activities and that a case-by-case analysis is needed to assess whether proposed activities should be done under EU cooperation instruments, CSDP, or a combination of both. These two documents have been since then guiding the EU activities in the field of SSR. The majority of mandates of the 35 CSDP missions and operations conducted so far (or still ongoing) have included building the capacities of peace and security actors in partner countries. Thus, many of the EU civilian and military crisis management missions and operations deployed worldwide also have a specific SSR component. Taking into account the Union’s development cooperation, over the period of 2001-2009, the European Union disbursed approximately EUR 1 billion targeting justice and security sector reform worldwide. In 2014 alone, the EU has committed EUR 2.26 billion for the sector of governance and civil society and a significant part of these allocations was channelled to improve the security and justice sectors in many beneficiary countries . However, since the policy framework mentioned above was developed, a number of changes have occurred. In particular, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, created the function of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) who is also a Vice-President of the Commission (VP), to ensure greater coordination and consistency in EU foreign policy. To support the HRVP, the Lisbon Treaty led to the establishment of the European External Action Service. The Commission and the HR issued a Joint Communication in December 2013 on the “Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises” which emphasised the strategic and coherent use of the EU’s tools and instruments spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields. This was followed in April 2015 by the Joint Communication on “Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development” (CBSD) which analysed how to better operationalise the Comprehensive Approach in the field of capacity building in the security sector and proposed options and steps to better combine existing EU policies and funding instruments. One of the options proposed was the establishment of an EU-wide Strategic Framework for Security Sector Reform. This was later endorsed in May 2015 by the Council and included in the Commission Work Programme 2016 .

Internationally, the nexus between security and development continues to rise in prominence. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in September 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and vice versa. In particular, Goal 16 of this Agenda aims at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels. Furthermore, the OECD-DAC recognised in December 2014 that “peaceful and inclusive societies will be an increasingly important part of the development agenda” and agreed to “generate greater political momentum in support of peacebuilding and state-building efforts.” The OECD DAC subsequently decided on 19 February 2016 to “update and modernise the ODA reporting directives on peace and security expenditures”. These developments have highlighted the importance of the security-development nexus and have deep implications for EU external action in SSR. These developments at EU and international level also coincide with a time of great challenges for the EU and its partners. As recognised in the Strategic Review , instability as well as emerging and actual crises in the EU’s direct neighbourhood and around the globe are on the rise in an increasingly connected, contested and complex world which threatens the security and development of the EU and its partner countries. Section 4 – Method This Joint Staff Working Document draws upon the input received through different evaluations and reports on EU support to SSR as well as expert consultations. It analyses and summarises the following sources of information: Evaluations based on external studies commissioned by the European Commission on EU’s support to security and justice reform through various EU external action financing instruments, including the European Development Fund (EDF) , and conducted on the basis of clear guidelines. This includes most notably the 2011 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform but also country evaluations on the EU’s cooperation with different countries (Burundi , the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Georgia , Honduras ) which cover support to justice, governance or SSR. Project evaluations were also consulted, such as those on police reform . However, when considering the Commission’s Thematic Evaluation of Support to Justice and Security System Reform, it must be emphasised that it covered the period of 2001-2009 and thus, while it offers useful lessons when read alongside the other evaluations and sources, there are major limitations to this source given its temporal scope. For the country and project evaluations, the inherent limitation of their nature is that they provide snapshots which may not be reflective of EU support to SSR more broadly. Nonetheless, they offer useful and concrete experiences of challenges faced and lessons which could be used to further strengthen EU support. Internal Lessons Learnt Reports on EU CSDP missions and operations produced by relevant European External Action Service divisions responsible for management of these missions that are publicly available . Given the sensitive nature of some of these reports however, parts of these reports remain classified and thus only those which have been declassified can be drawn upon in this Joint Staff Working Document. Selected evaluations commissioned by EU Member States on their support to SSR. These evaluations ranged from country-level evaluations to thematic evaluations. Whilst these do not strictly cover EU interventions on SSR as such and mainly concern bilateral initiatives, they offer pertinent lessons on engagement in SSR and shed light on some of the challenges faced. They were chosen due to their relevance in providing lessons learnt on SSR to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of a future EU framework on SSR. Relevant Council conclusions , reports from the Court of Auditors and European Parliament studies, notably a report commissioned by the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee for Security and Defence in 2013 on the EU’s approach towards SSR . Case-studies facilitated by the EU and conducted by SSR experts to draw concrete lessons from three countries where the EU has supported SSR processes in order to draw upon the experiences and good practices identified. Whilst these have limitations similar to the country and project evaluations mentioned above, they nonetheless offer practical lessons and experiences. Consultations with EU Member State experts and civil society organisations engaged in SSR-related activities which took place in Brussels. However, to comprehensively assess and evaluate EU engagement on SSR both under the CFSP and non-CFSP domains would have required a large data-collection and analysis exercise. This constraint has therefore meant that the evaluations, studies and stakeholder opinions through consultations have been the main source for this Joint Staff Working Document. Furthermore, the differences between the European Commission’s methodology of evaluation towards its development programmes and the one applied by CSDP missions should be noted. While the former has a long tradition of pursuing evidence-based monitoring and evaluation exercises often supported by external studies, the latter relies on internal reporting, does not involve external stakeholders and has a low level of triangulation of data. This fact has been effectively taken into account in the process of preparation of this document. Section 5 – Implementation state of play (Results) In particular since the adoption of the two SSR concepts, the EU has invested significantly in supporting SSR in partner countries under its wide range of instruments and policies such as Enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, Development Cooperation, and CSDP operations and missions. Under European Neighbourhood Policy and Development Cooperation instruments, financed from the EU Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF), the Commission contracted over EUR 1 billion in interventions from 2001-2009 related to support for security and justice sector reform in partner countries, with six main core areas: law enforcement; border management; justice reform; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); civilian management; and civilian oversight. Over 105 countries benefitted from security-related interventions, with 85% of the funding concentrated in 23 countries. The experience and results from these interventions were the subject of a Thematic Evaluation carried out by the Commission in 2011 which drew a number of conclusions and recommendations . Since then, the EU has been increasing its engagement on SSR under its cooperation instruments. In the current 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU has programmed actions in the Governance sector in at least 69 countries around the world whilst there are rule of law programmes foreseen or ongoing in 38 countries and programmes with a clear security component in as many as 16 countries . These programmes have taken into account the recommendations of the Thematic Evaluation of 2011. Meanwhile, under CSDP, a total of 35 missions and operations have been launched since its inception and the mandates of an increasing number of these civilian and military crisis management missions have been related to, if not directly targeted at, support for SSR in partner countries and include a specific SSR component. These include missions aimed at police reform , mentoring and advising , promoting the rule-of-law and capacity building for security sector actors . Since 2014, the EU’s advisory mission for civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) provides strategic support, advice and mentoring. The EU’s military advisory mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) supports the country’s authorities in preparing the coming security sector reform. Through such CSDP operational capacities, the EU has been training, monitoring and advising police, justice and military personnel in countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali or Somalia. Through 3 military training missions in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic, (EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA), the EU also supports these countries authorities and armed forces in building an accountable and professional security sector, including through training in international humanitarian law. Most recently a new emphasis has been put on ensuring the sustainability of CSDP actions through a more systemic approach to CSDP transition strategies that would enable pursuing a medium-term or a long-term approach to SSR and secure gains achieved by these missions on the ground .

Section 6 – Findings from Evaluations: Assessing EU Support for SSR This section analyses the findings and lessons learnt gained from the evaluations, studies and consultations outlined in Section 4. It aims to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and added-value of EU engagement on SSR. 6.1 Relevance of SSR and the EU’s policy framework on SSR Many EU policy documents, Council conclusions, Commission evaluations and other documents conclude that SSR is essential to the EU’s external action with regard to preserving international peace, security and stability as well as promoting sustainable development. The Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation noted that interventions on SSR were consistent with the wider goals of the EU’s external cooperation. Moreover, SSR was identified by the CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports as being an effective tool in promoting common interests and values such as human rights, good governance, and strengthening international peace and security. The issue of SSR has gained even greater prominence in recent times. During the consultation process for the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and as highlighted in the Joint Communication itself , stakeholders were of the view that the EU should engage further in SSR and that the security dimension should be given greater prominence in the ENP. One of the fundamental principles of the new ENP is the stabilisation of the Neighbourhood and a greater focus on SSR flows directly from this principle. The Council conclusions on CBSD and the ENP Review concurred on the importance of SSR. Regarding the relevance of the current EU policy framework from 2006 on SSR, the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation and the case-studies conducted for this Joint Staff Working Document noted that this framework provided guidance on how to engage on SSR. The issues of security and governance were found to have been addressed in many country-level programming documents in the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation. Whilst some were only descriptive without providing guidance on the cooperation strategy, in some cases such as Georgia the policy framework had a strong influence on the EU’s cooperation with partner countries. However, in some cases such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali and Ukraine, the case-studies found that recent EU country and regional level documents did not always make reference to these policy documents, and staff displayed unfamiliarity with the scope and objectives of the 2005 and 2006 concepts. Furthermore, the CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports recommend that this fractured approach needs to be addressed in light of the post-Lisbon era taking into account the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises. 6.2 Effectiveness of EU support for SSR When considering the effectiveness of the EU’s support for SSR, one criticism which has emerged from the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation and the CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports has been the insufficient institutional capacity within the EU institutions. The Commission was found to not have adequately developed in-house expertise on SSR to manage programmes or conduct policy dialogues effectively. In the field of SSR, especially in fragile states, it was difficult to attract and retain skilled staff, whilst the Commission has had limited access to the pool of SSR experts from EU Member States for CSDP missions. Regarding CSDP, dedicated trainings on SSR were found to be useful and staffing pools needed to be revised due to the need for different core competencies. Regarding guidance tools, the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation found that there were limited tools and guidance material available although since then, several of these have been developed. Another issue which has emerged in the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation, the CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports and consultations relates to the anchoring of SSR-related actions in the wider governance and state-building framework. Whilst there was a recognised need to work holistically, due to government requests or the sometimes limited scope of the EU funding instruments or programming documents, EU external action instruments’ programmes and CSDP missions focused too much on specific parts of the security and justice system and did not link these in a broader strategic manner. There was often a lack of a strategic, long-term political approach to anchor SSR-related support to national security and justice strategies of partner countries. This meant that the EU did not always set out clearly what interventions were supposed to achieve, how they related to other SSR-related interventions, and how they were linked to the broader governance, rule-of-law and state-building framework or how they responded to the wider democratisation and poverty eradication goals of the EU’s external action. The case-studies analysing the EU’s efforts in the DRC, Mali and Ukraine provide further evidence of this lack of anchoring, and highlight that Commission programmes and CSDP missions have tended to focus on operational and technical levels of reform. Governance was treated as an additional element rather than a cross-cutting one. The findings from the Commission evaluations and the CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports, echoed in consultations conducted for this exercise, also suggest that the EU has not always paid enough attention to the needs of the local population and service-delivery, although the approach in this regard has very much improved over the years. Much of the focus has been going into institution building or capacity building programmes which may not have a tangible impact on human security. Furthermore, less emphasis was placed on strengthening the role of oversight actors such as parliaments and civil society groups, nor has there been sufficient attention on engaging those who are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of SSR support. Whilst in some cases the institution building approach can have an impact, experience has shown that this was not always the case. As a result, the Thematic Evaluation called for a “problem-solving” approach and for the EU to be more flexible in balancing between strengthening state institutional capacities and meeting the security and justice needs of the local population. The recommendations also called for enhancing the capacity of civil society to monitor the performance and engage in the reform processes. There has also been criticism that interventions were often not tailored to the context and that input was lacking from those with local knowledge of the security and justice situation in the country. EU interventions were in some cases found to be overly ambitious as they were sometimes based on incomplete analysis of the risks or the local context which might have led to their scaling down. Insufficient integration of structural causes of conflicts into bilateral strategies was also a weakness found in the Joint Evaluation of support with Burundi. One lesson which has thus emerged is the need to anchor the design and delivery of EU interventions on SSR on analysis of the local situation. This should be based on firm evidence, risk analysis and consultations with a wide range of local state and non-state stakeholders. The evaluations and studies have also noted that the EU has to improve its approach in securing national ownership from partner countries. For the most part, the EU has taken a technical approach towards SSR, a subject which is deeply political. Experience has shown that it can thus be difficult in securing genuine ownership or commitment from partners to undergo reform. Furthermore, it was identified that there is a need to operate on the political level and secure political commitment from the partner country from the beginning. The case-studies of the DRC, Mali and Ukraine corroborated that EU external action financing instruments tend to lack flexibility to respond to the long-term yet fluid SSR process, although the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace was found to be an exception. The case-studies also found that CSDP missions and their frequent renewals of mission mandates offered more flexibility. Consequently, the EU’s approach to SSR in terms of interventions and procedures has been deemed at times insufficiently flexible and long-term enough to adequately support and respond to security needs. 6.3 Efficiency of EU support for SSR

The project-based approach was not always the most appropriate modality. According to the 2011 Thematic Evaluation, the EU external action instruments programming and implementation procedures for projects, as agreed by the co-legislators, sometimes place limitations on their flexibility and efficiency due to the difficulty in altering objectives or approaches. The short-term nature of projects, and the rigid rules and conditionalities of such assistance also posed difficulties. Furthermore, project-based interventions tended sometimes to be unsustainable. When the required conditions are met by the beneficiary country, the use of Sector Budget Support as a modality has been identified as having potential in overcoming certain short-comings of the project-based approach . However, Sector Budget Support can only be used when local conditions are appropriate. It was found in the Lessons Learnt Reports, as well as the CBSD pilot cases, that the CSDP missions often encountered obstacles in finding sources of funding for SSR-related actions. These include actions complementing CSDP missions such as for military advisory activities or social/community assistance to military actors in support of reform processes. Weaknesses were found in monitoring and evaluating EU interventions. For example, the Evaluation of the Myanmar Community Policing project as well as the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation found that whilst the EU in its programmes did utilise monitoring and evaluation techniques, programmes were weak in developing baselines and clearly defined indicators and less emphasis was put on developing monitoring capacity within these programmes. This remark is not applicable to CSDP missions since there are insufficient monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of these endeavours. The case-studies on the DRC, Mali and Ukraine reinforce this point whereby it was found that the data used was poor when conducting monitoring and evaluation, indicators were not often disaggregated by gender, and risks and assumptions are rarely reviewed. Regarding CSDP missions, it was noted that there were difficulties in monitoring the processes of SSR and that benchmarks used by CSDP missions do not address the reform process overall. There is therefore a need for the EU to systematically incorporate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms through, for example, developing and strengthening guidelines on the use of baselines, clearly defined indicators and benchmarks, and other monitoring and evaluation tools. 6.4 Coherence In terms of coherence between EU interventions on SSR, it was noted in several studies that the complex institutional set-up posed difficulties for EU interventions in SSR due to the lack of a clear division of labour coordination and sometimes also competition between EU development programmes and CSDP missions. Whilst the post-Lisbon set-up and the Comprehensive Approach have gone some way in addressing these, the lack of an overarching single policy framework on SSR has contributed to a fragmented approach lacking adequate coordination, sequencing and complementarity of actions. The findings from the Commission’s 2011 Thematic Evaluation have noted that EU engagement on SSR was often unaccompanied by a strategic, long-term political approach supporting these efforts in partner countries. The EU policy framework with its two concepts did not provide for a clear division of labour. Moreover, when the EU initiatives related to SSR are being implemented, there have been cases where they seemingly operate on parallel tracks. EU external action instruments programmes on SSR and CSDP missions have separate decision-making structure and may therefore also have sometimes strong overlaps . Informal coordination through regular meetings on the ground or formal liaisons have helped to mitigate overlaps. However, as identified for example in the Lessons Learnt Report of 2014 on CSDP, there can sometimes be misunderstandings on the roles of the EU Delegations and CSDP missions with regard to the representation of the EU, political and security reporting, and donor coordination in the security sector despite the guidance on these issues outlined in the Joint Communication on the “Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises”. Regarding the coherence of EU initiatives on SSR with other international actors/donors, it was found that there has been a need for the EU to try and agree on key political objectives and key lines of action with international partners for a joined-up approach during the strategic planning stage of CSDP SSR missions. This should be complemented by coordination on the ground with other international actors and aim to ensure de-confliction, complementarity and consolidation of EU and international efforts on SSR. On the Commission’s side, it was found in the Thematic Evaluation that there was information sharing with other international actors/donors through coordination meetings at the operational and political level but often there were no coordination mechanisms to agree on common objectives or a division of labour. 6.5 Added-value of the EU and its policy frameworks in SSR As has been noted originally in the 2005 and 2006 concepts on SSR support, the EU has a strong added-value in terms of SSR. One key added-value which appears from the findings is that the EU could mobilise a vast array of instruments which would not otherwise be readily available to many EU Member States or other international actors. The 2011 Thematic Evaluation noted that the EU budget’s capacity to mobilise a critical mass of funding and to resort to various financing modalities and implementation modalities was a clear added-value which could allow a holistic approach to SSR. Alongside the external financing instruments, the EU can also use diplomatic and other tools in line with its Comprehensive Approach. However, this was not fully exploited due to a lack of flexibility and coordination. The EU’s supranational nature was also noted as one of its key added-values. Several evaluations and studies noted that the EU could call upon the vast variety of expertise and experience from its different Member States through EU external action instruments or CSDP missions. These stem from the various traditions and systems across the Member States in policing, justice and other sectors. This was appreciated in many cases by beneficiary countries. However, it was also noted that this was not always fully exploited as not all Member States respond to requests for experts. The CSDP Lessons Learnt Reports also noted that CSDP contribution for SSR allowed for the deployment of high-level advisers as a group, the use of active-duty personnel which could be perceived as providing high quality advice. It also allows for CSDP personnel to be seconded to the institutions/administrations of partner countries. The global presence of the EU and its experience on SSR in countries around the world was also noted to be a clear added-value of the EU. In the 2011 Thematic Evaluation, it was noted that the Commission had long experience in many of the partner countries with continuity in terms of assistance and had long-term thematic experience in the fields related to SSR. However, it also noted that the weaknesses of the EU Policy Framework on SSR, with its two concepts, hampered efforts to maximise the added-value. The positive perception of the EU by partner countries is a clear added-value. The 2011 Thematic Evaluation found that partners expressed the view that the EU was more neutral than other international actors/donors which could render it a more appropriate partner on sensitive issues such as SSR. However, the Commission while implementing EU external action programmes was not always seen as a political actor and thus struggled in matching its meaningful technical support with appropriate political engagement. With regard to CSDP missions, it was noted that in the course of their duration the EU in general might have had a relatively neutral reputation compared to other partners due to its principles-based approach. Furthermore, as noted in the study commissioned for the European Parliament, the EU can exercise a strong soft power towards third countries, especially those covered by the Enlargement Process where the prospect of EU accession contributed to the reform of security institutions. However, the study also noted that this was not always the case and that the power of attraction alone does not induce reform but needs to be coupled with political engagement as well as financial and technical support. Section 7 – Conclusions The findings from the evaluations, studies and consultations have made it clear that SSR has a strong relevance in achieving the objectives of the EU’s external action. This relevance has intensified in recent years, as per the reviewed ENP and the CBSD framework. However, the relevance of the policy framework was sometimes found to be mixed, especially due to its fragmented nature with two different concepts. The findings also note that when it comes to the effectiveness and efficiency of EU support for SSR, the lack of institutional capacity, insufficient grounding in the wider governance and state-building framework, local contexts, insufficient ownership, and weaknesses in modalities and monitoring and evaluation have hampered EU engagement. In terms of coherence, the policy framework and institutional differences have hindered effective coordination and consistency in EU actions. The lack of a long-term strategic and political approach and unclear division of labour amongst EU actors and with international partners need to be overcome. When it comes to the EU’s added-value, it is noted that the EU has a wide range of instruments and expertise. The EU also has made use of its global presence, strong experience working on SSR, as well as its perception by partner countries of being neutral and principle-based.

The Joint Communication on Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to support Security Sector Reform to which this Joint Staff Working Document is annexed sets out recommendations on how to implement the findings presented here and further strengthen the EU’s engagement on SSR.



Annex I – List of sources consulted Commission Evaluations Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform, European Commission, November 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1295_vol1_en.pdf Strategic Evaluation of the EU cooperation with Honduras, 2002-2009, April 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-honduras-2002-2009_en Strategic Evaluation of EU cooperation with Jamaica, 2002-2009, September 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-jamaica-2002-2009_en Joint Evaluation of the Cooperation with Burundi of Belgium the European Commission, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, February 2014: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/81065_es Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo 2008-2013, European Commission, August 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-democratic-republic-congo-2008-2013_en Strategic Evaluation of the EU cooperation with Georgia 2007-2013, May 2015: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-georgia-2007-2013_en Final External Evaluation of the EU funded project – Support to Reform of the Myanmar Police Force in the Areas of Crowd Management and Community Policing, December 2015 Communications and Staff Working Documents Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, COM(2006) 253 Final, 2006 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1453735511168&uri=CELEX:52006DC0253 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises”, JOIN(2013) 30 Final, 2013: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development – Enabling Partners to Prevent and Manage Crises, JOIN(2015) 17 Final, 2015: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015JC0017 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Commission Work Programme 2016 – No Time for Business as Usual, COM(2015) 610 Final, 2015: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2016_en.pdf Joint Staff Working Document – Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, SWD(2015) 500 final, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_staff-working-document_en.pdf Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2015) 50 final, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf Council Conclusions Council conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform”, Council of the European Union, Document 9967/06, 2006: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209967%202006%20INIT Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, May 2014, Document 9644/14: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9644-2014-INIT/en/pdf

Council conclusions on CSDP, 18 May 2015, Meeting Document 8971/15, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8971-2015-INIT/en/pdf Council conclusions on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 14 December 2015, Meeting Document 15169/15, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15169-2015-INIT/en/pdf CSDP Documents Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report, 20 March 2014, Document 8015/14, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8015-2014-INIT/en/pdf Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report, 3 March 2015, Document 6777/15, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6777-2015-INIT/en/pdf Court of Auditors Report EU Support for Governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Special Report No. 9, 2013: http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR13_09/SR13_09_EN.pdf European Parliament Studies Assessing the EU’s Approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR), January 2013: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/433837/EXPO-SEDE_ET%282013%29433837_EN.pdf



Annex II – Synopsis report on consultations undertaken in the process of preparations of the Joint Communication on Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform Introduction The stakeholder consultations undertaken to provide views and input for the EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform (SSR) have covered a wide range of stakeholder categories. Through the publication of the Roadmap (14 December 2015) describing the current context and existing challenges and explaining the objectives of the new framework, an invitation to the wider public to provide input was launched. Targeted consultations have also been made throughout the development of the initiative. These have been addressed to EU platforms, public authorities, consultancies, research entities and academia. More precisely, structured discussions were held with representatives from civil society organisations established in the EU as well as in third countries, EU government representatives, and representatives of think tanks, research institutes and universities. A detailed list of the events is included below. For all consultations the aim was to draw upon the experience of experts, practitioners, policymakers and citizens in order to address and formulate a policy framework that would be relevant for partner countries and in line with EU policy objectives. For the consultation events held after the publication of the Roadmap, the Roadmap was disseminated as background document. For the events held before, the main elements of the Roadmap were orally presented at the beginning of the consultation events but not shared in written form. All consultation events focused on specific topics and participants were given an opportunity to express views on key questions deemed to be of specific relevance to that particular target group. The questions were formulated to specifically gather input in areas where the stakeholders had an experience and where they could play a role in helping the application of the new policy framework. Vast majority of the discussions served to test and validate the findings and reflect on the recommendations from previous evaluations and reports of, inter alia, donor agencies, Member States think tanks, international and local NGOs. Unless specified explicitly below, the overall outcome of the consultation process shows that there was an overwhelming consensus over the general indications on the best way forward in transforming EU support to SSR in order to make it more efficient and relevant. It should be noted that the open public consultation carried out on capacity building in support of security and development in third countries included some aspects linked to support to SSR. The results of this open public consultation are reflected in Annex to the Impact Assessment of this initiative. Main issues The main issues resulting from the different consultations are presented below as well as references to how the matter has been addressed in the Joint Communication. I. Political engagement and political dialogues Security sector reform in any given context and EU support to security sector efforts is political in nature. Advancing in SSR processes requires constant dialogue both within a national framework and between the EU and the other relevant international actors and the partner country in question. This should be borne in mind when planning and implementing inventions supporting reform. The development of a framework for political dialogue between the EU and partner countries could be a way to establish a tool and a platform to engage in a discussion in a more structured manner on security issues. This would also help steering the focus away from technical issues related to programme objectives and issues linked to financing which are often short term in nature and do not always link to the political context in which they have to be addressed. Lastly, such a framework would assist the political messaging at various levels and help keeping the security issues on the agenda of the overall partnership.

Engaging in political dialogue on security issues would require more specialised skills and capacities both at EU headquarters and at the field level. Therefore, the need for more and better use of SSR expertise has been noted. Furthermore, linking up with efforts of other international actors could be a way to capitalise on existing experience and to build on and link up with existing processes, instead of addressing issues in isolation and independent from country and regional contexts. Response in the Joint Communication: references are included in various parts highlighting the importance of systematic political and policy dialogues. In that context issues related to human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance are highly relevant and should be discussed and monitored also in relation to support to SSR. The need for coordination of interventions across the EU tools and instruments but also with other multilateral and bilateral actors is also essential. The idea of a “coordination matrix” on the ground in partner countries is proposed as a basis to make commitments of partners more structured. The need for more specialised SSR skills is addressed separately focusing on strengthening the institutional set up at EU headquarters level as well as how to best use capacities in EU delegations and in CSDP missions. II. The importance of local ownership In all consultations the importance of local and national ownership going beyond national authorities was stressed. The significance of ownership is closely linked to sustainability and to catering for local needs and being adaptable to a local context. Any support to reforms needs to start with understanding the local context, identifying the national security and non-security sector actors and what their interests are. The need to achieve local ownership has to be taken into account from the very beginning of a support programme/intervention - already at the stage of its conceptualisation. Local ownership should be sought throughout the formal structures of the national authorities (from top to bottom) but also by reaching out and involving communities. Civil society and non-governmental actors are useful vehicles for understanding local contexts as well as to build trust and understanding around security issues. Furthermore, a financial contribution from the partner country and not only relying on foreign funding helps in increasing the national ownership at the more formal level. Response in the Joint Communication: the link between ownership and sustainability is highlighted. It is underlined that ownership implies involving a wide range of stakeholders not only to be informed about the SSR processes but also to formulate, plan and implement local needs and measures. Often community based solutions have a bigger potential to be sustained than solutions proposed from outside the community. The role of civil society and local community representatives play an important role in promoting local and national ownership and help increase participation. III. Governance, accountability and effectiveness While many interventions are labelled as security sector reform, few EU support actions take a sector-wide approach and opportunities to address strategic governance issues are missed. Parts of the early stages of conceptualisation of SSR support should systematically include a focus on management, accountability and transparency. The involvement of national parliaments and their function to provide an oversight function and strengthen the accountability in SSR processes is often not sufficiently taken into account. Similarly, civil society is important in its watchdog role. However, in many cases security actors are seen as opponents rather than partners to civil society organisations and there are few platforms for dialogue between the two groups. Response in the Joint Communication: the good governance principles are key guiding principles for the new strategic framework and are discussed from the outset in the joint communication. The need for well-functioning systems of internal and external controls is also referred to. Furthermore, the recommendation to anchor SSR processes and support in a wider governance approach should facilitate the effectiveness of interventions. IV. Human security and trust-building In order for service delivery to be effective and well-focused starting with a bottom up and human (or people-) centred approach is considered suitable. When developing SSR processes, there is a need to consider how policies and measures will have a direct impact on the security needs of the population. Early involvement of civil society and community representatives to better target the needs of the people actually affected by the security actions has been highlighted. Civil society organisations can play a key role in ensuring a people-centred approach by liaising directly with local populations and by helping to assess local needs. This approach will also enhance the level of trust between the security actors and the population at large; but also between representatives of civil society and security forces. Building trust is a key element in SSR processes which are often sensitive in nature especially in conflict or post-conflict situations characterised by violence committed by security forces. SSR needs to be gender sensitive and a gender balanced team should be considered for the CSDP missions. Trust is also linked to understanding SSR processes. The importance of available and clear information about the policies and measures helps to demystify the security sector. It is necessary to avoid a too technical SSR discourse which excludes many individuals from the opportunity to influence policy and actions that affect them. Response in the Joint Communication: the strategic framework clearly states that the EU should help the partner country in its task of ensuring the security of individuals, as perceived and experienced by them. Human security is a key objective for any national security sector. The strategic framework proposes that security needs of different groups should be assessed through participatory consultation processes. This could for example be done through security perception surveys. A specific consideration of the different needs of women, minors and elders is also highlighted. Timeline of main consultation events 19 November 2015 Meeting held in Brussels with representatives (mainly SSR experts) from EU Member States. The event was a one day workshop mixing plenary sessions with break-out group discussions. Facilitation and technical support was provided by The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces/The International Security Sector Advisory Team (DCAF/ISSAT). The outcome of the consultation was a consultation report summarising the discussion without apportioning specific comments or positions to individuals. The event discussed the following themes: Political engagement to support implementation Governance, accountability and effectiveness Generating and sustaining capacity Supporting local ownership and building sustainable solutions

4 December 2015 Meeting with civil society organisations (CSOs) held in Brussels. The CSOs invited had been selected based on their experience in the security and justice sectors as well as their implementation experience from various geographical regions. The event was a one day workshop mixing plenary sessions with break-out group discussions. The group discussions were facilitated by representatives from CSOs. Technical support was provided by the European Peace building Liaison Office (EPLO). The outcome of the consultation was a consultation report summarising the discussion without apportioning specific comments or positions to individuals. The event discussed the following themes: Political engagement to support implementation Governance, accountability and effectiveness Supporting local ownership and building sustainable solutions Community security and service delivery-focused interventions 24 February 2016 Joint meeting with EU Member State representatives in the Council preparatory bodies: Politico-Military Group and Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management . The consultation was made within the regular format of a meeting of the Council preparatory bodies. In this case the SSR agenda point was discussed in a joint format. The Roadmap served as a background document and the discussion centred on the following specific questions: 1.Based on the lessons learnt, what are the key elements that would need to be reflected in the new EU wide strategic framework on support to security sector support? 2.How can CSDP missions be jointly planned with development cooperation interventions to increase coherence and complementarity? What are the challenges and opportunities? 3.In specific countries, how can EU Member States SSR interventions be coherent with EU SSR interventions (Security and Development Nexus). Can this be achieved through joint planning exercises? What are the challenges and opportunities? 10 March 2016 Meeting with EU Member State representatives in the Council preparatory body: Working party on Development Cooperation . The consultation was made within the regular format of a meeting of the Council preparatory body. The Roadmap served as a background document and the discussion centred on the same specific questions as in the case of 24 February 2016 Joint meeting with EU Member State representatives in the Council preparatory bodies: Politico-Military Group and Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. 14 March 2016 Meeting with EU Member State representatives in the Council preparatory body: Military Committee Working Group. The consultation was made within the regular format of a meeting of the Council preparatory body. The basis for the discussion was the Roadmap and an internal discussion note “Military Input to the EU-wide Strategic Framework for Security Sector Reform”. 18 March 2016 Meeting with experts and academics relevant to the field of security sector reform. Facilitation and support was provided by EU Institute for Security Studies . Experts invited had been selected based on their expertise in the security and justice sectors. The meeting was a one day event structured around four themes presented in panel discussions with moderators from the EU institutions and EUISS. The panels covered the following themes: a) State vs human security b) Good governance in the security sector

c) Risks taken when engaging in the security sector d) Lessons learnt in SSR Targeted on-line consultation (February 2016) An online consultation questionnaire was sent to four civil society organisation networks. These are: European NGO confederation for relief and development (CONCORD), European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), Human Rights and Democracy Network (HRDN) and Voluntary organisations in cooperation in emergencies (VOICE). The on-line consultation was open 2 February – 29 February 2016. The subject of the consultation was translated into the following specific themes and questions: Political and policy dialogue At which stage(s) and to what extent should civil society organisations (CSOs) be involved in dialogues on security sector reform? Given the sensitivity of the security sector, what are the best ways of involving CSOs in these dialogues? Community security How could coherence between top-down and bottom-up approaches be ensured? Please provide practical examples of grassroots-level SSR activities which have had a positive impact on efforts to reform the security sector at the national level. Good governance Please provide practical examples of how transparency could be ensured in SSR programmes. What kind of CSO-led initiatives could have the most impact in terms of fighting against abuses and corruption in the security sector? Ownership How could EU support to SSR programmes help to increase trust between security sector actors and CSOs? How could CSOs contribute practically to trust-building and information-sharing between local communities and state security actors? In a context in which the EU has made political commitments to support SSR efforts but preparation time is limited, what are the most important factors to consider in order to increase local ownership? How could CSOs play a better role in overseeing the implementation of SSR programmes by national authorities? Gender How could the security sector take into consideration and address the specific needs of women, both as actors within it and as beneficiaries?