6.7.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC169/15
Opinionon:
—theproposalforaCouncilRegulation(EEC)onlicensingofaircarriers,
—theproposalforaCouncilRegulation (EEC)onaccessforaircarrierstointra-Community
airroutes,and
—theproposalforaCouncilRegulation (EEC)onfaresandratesforairservices(J)
(92/C169/06)
On1October1991theCouncildecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,
underArticle87oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,onthe
abovementioned proposals.
TheSectionforTransportandCommunications ,whichwasresponsibleforpreparingthe
Committee'sworkonthesubject,adopteditsOpinionon9April1992.TheRapporteurwas
MrMoreland .
Atits296thPlenarySession(meetingof29April1992)theCommitteeadoptedthefollowing
Opinionunanimously .
1.Background :Commission'sproposals 1.2.3.AirFaresandRates
1.2.3.1.IthasalreadybeenagreedbytheCouncil
thatfrom1January1993theCommunityobjectivewill
beafullydevelopedsystemofdoubledisapprovalfor
allairfares.Itisproposedthat'free'pricingwillbe
introducedin1996.Safeguardsaretobemaintainedon
routeswithinadequatecompetition .1.1.WhentheCouncil,inJune1990,agreedthe
'SecondPackage'onairtransport,itlaiddownthe
furtherstepsrequiredtocompletetheinternalmarket
asregardsairtransport.Thelatestproposalsfrom
theCommissioncoverlicensing,marketaccessandair
fares,andrepresenttheimplementation oftheCouncil's
request.Theyfitintothefourareasofpolicyinair
transportcoveredbythisandotherproposalsunder
discussionorlikelytobeunderdiscussion :liberaliza­
tion,harmonization ,infrastructureandexternalpolicy.
2.Generalcommentsrelatingtoallthreeproposals
1.2.Thecurrentproposalsareconcernedprimarily
(butnotexclusively )withliberalizationandcover:
1.2.1.Licensingofaircarriers2.1.TheCommitteenotesthattheCommissionpro­
posalsaredesignedtomeetearlierconclusionsofthe
Councilonairtransport.Furthermore ,theCommittee
notestheconclusionsoftheCouncilof16December
1991ontheseproposalswhich,subjecttothecomments
inthisOpinion,itendorses.Consequently ,theCom­
mitteewelcomestheCommission'sproposalsand
believestheyprovidethebasisforagreementonfurther
stepsinCommunitylegislationonairtransport.1.2.1.1.Theproposalcoverstheeconomicsandtech­
nicalrulesrequiredforgrantingofalicenceandthe
requirementsforCommunityownership,controland
location.
1.2.2.Marketaccess2.2.TheCommitteerecognizesthedifficultyin
draftingtheseproposals,inthelightoftheobjectives
oftheCouncil,without—ontheonehand—tendingto
beundulyinterventionist or—ontheotherhand—being
vagueandopentovariedinterpretation .Asdetailedin
thespecificcommentsontheindividualproposals,there
areoccasionswhentheCommission doessteertoonear
theseextremes.1.2.2.1.TheCouncilhasalreadyagreedthat
5thfreedomwillbefullyimplementedandcabotage
willbeintroduced .Thisproposalisdesignedtoprovide
furtheropportunities forcarriersandcontinuesto
includepublicservicerequirements .
2.3.Inordertoachievetheobjectivesofthesepro­
posals,theremustbeaclearrecognitionthatStateaid
forairtransportandforairportsisgrantedonlyin (i)OJNoC258,4.10.1991,p.2,10,15.

NoC169/16 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 6.7.92
accordancewithCommunityregulations.(Inthiscon­
texttheCommitteelooksforwardtoexaminingthe
CommissionPaperonthissubject.)a)safetyofoperationsisparamount .Innowayshould
itbeassumedthatavalidlicencemeansthatsafety
checksneednotbecarriedout;
b)thefinancialobligationsshouldbesimplified,with­
outprejudicingtheneedtoensurethatairlineshave
asoundfinancialbase;
c)'social'conditionsshouldbeincludedasappropriate
—particularlyobligationsunderEClegislation.2.4.AstheCommitteehasemphasizedinitsprevious
Opinions,successinachievingtheobjectivesofthese
proposalswillbeseverelyhamperedifconsiderable
improvements arenotmadeasregardsinfrastructure
particularlyintermsofairtrafficcontrolandairports.
TheCommitteeurgestheCouncilandtheCommission
togivethismatteraveryhighpriority.Furthermore ,
MemberStatesshouldreviewtheneedtomaintainlarge
amountsofairspaceformilitarypurposesfollowingthe
changedrelationshipwithEasternEurope.3.2.Specificcomments
3.2.1.Article2
2.5.TheCommissionshouldconsultregularlyon
theoperationofallthreeregulationswithallappropri­
ateairtransportorganizations ,andwithemployeeand
consumerrepresentatives .3.2.1.1.Forclarity,definitionsof'licensingauthori­
ty'and'completecrew'shouldbeincluded.
3.2.2.Article3
3.2.2.1.TheendofArticle3.1shouldread:'...unless
theundertakinghasbeengrantedanoperatinglicense
andanAOC'(forconsistencywithArt.2).2.6.TheCommitteenotesthatcertainArticlesin
theseproposalsappeartoprejudgeaCouncildecision
onairtransportrelationswiththirdcountries.The
CommitteenotesthattheCommunitydesirestoestab­
lishwiththeMemberStatesoftheEuropeanFreeTrade
Association (EFTA)aEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA),
whichencompassescivilaviation;andthattheCom­
munityhasalsonegotiatedanagreementwithNorway
andSwedenwhichcoverscivilaviationonly.Shouldthe
legaldifficultiesovertheEEAcontinue,theCommittee
invitestheCounciltogranttheCommissionamandate
to^extendtheNorway/Swedenaviationagreementto
theotherEFTAMemberStates.Afurthermandate
shouldbegivenfornegotiationswithEasternEuropean
Statesand—atalaterstage—withotherthirdcountries.3.2.3.Article4
3.2.3.1.Asdrafted,thisproposalcouldbeinterpret­
edasforbiddingaCommunitycarrierfromraising
financeoutsidetheCommunity .TheCommitteedisap­
provesofthisinterpretation .Indeedsuchaninterpret­
ationcouldcausepracticaldifficultiesforthoseairlines
whicharelimitedliabilitycompanies,sincetheshares
oflimitedliabilitycompaniesarepubliclytraded.What
isimportantisnotshareholdingassuch,butthatcon­
trolshouldremaininCommunityhands.Therefore,
theCommitteesuggeststhatthedefinitionof'control'
betakenfromArticle3.3ofCouncilRegulation (EEC)
No4064/89onthecontrolofconcentrations .2.7.OneresultofthepresentproposalsfortheThird
Packageistoeliminatedifferencesinregulation
betweenscheduledandnon-scheduled flights.Yetat
times'scheduled'appearsandisdefined.Thetext
shouldbereviewedtoeliminatethewordwhichother­
wisecouldcauseconfusion .
3.2.4.Article4.1
3.Thelicensingofaircarriers 3-2-4-L?isreasonablethatanairlineshouldreceiveitslicencefromtheStatewhereitisestablished .That
establishmentcanbeinanyMemberState.
3.1.TheCommitteesupportstheCommissioninits
intentionthatMemberStatesshouldnotdiscriminate
betweenEC-basedairlinesseekingtoestablishthem­
selvesontheirterritory,otherthanforobjectivetechni­
caloreconomicreasons.HowevertheCommittee
believesthat:3.2.4.2.Thephrase'mainoccupation'seemsconfus­
ing.TheCommitteeunderstandstheCommission's
proposalisnotintendedtopreventtheownershipof
airlinesbycompanieswhichalsocarryonnon-trans­
portactivities.

6.7.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC169/17
3.2.5.Article4.4 unnecessaryinthelightofparagraph 1c)and
Article4.6
3.2.9.Article5.33.2.5.1.TheCommitteeunderstandsthatthisdero­
gationrelatestosituationswhereathirdcountryhasin
somewaytakenadecisionhelpfultotheCommunity's
interest.AstheCouncilhasnotyetagreedtheCom­
munitypositionvis-a-visthirdcountries,theCommittee
interpretsthisderogationasnotpre-emptingaCouncil
position,butmerelyasapreparationforthetimewhen
thatpositionshallbeestablished .3.2.9.1.Sub-paragraphs (a)and(c)refertothepast,
whilesub-paragraph (b)referstothefuture.Conse­
quently(b)and(c)shouldbereversed.
3.2.6.Article53.2.10.Article5.3(b)
3.2.10.1.Businessplansshouldbedetailedand
realistic.Atthesametime,theCommitteerejectsany
implicationthatgovernmentregulatingbodiesshould
'second-guess'theplansofairlines,asthiswouldbe
unnecessarilyinterventionist andbureaucratic .3.2.6.1.Whileitisimportantthatappropriatefinan­
cialconditionsarelaiddowntoensurethatairtransport
operatorshaveasoundfinancialbasis,theCommittee
suggeststhatinformationrequiredbythepresentpro­
posalisunnecessarilyextensiveandbureaucraticand
potentiallydamagingtoanoperator'scommercialinter­
ests.However,somesortofobservationsystemis
necessary . 3.2.11.Notificationshouldalsobegivenofany
takeovers,mergersoranysignificantchangesinshare­
holdings.
3.2.6.2.Giventheimportanceofensuringthatpass­
engersandotherusersdonotlosemoneyorarestrand­
edintheeventofthecollapseofanairline,abonding
schemecouldbeexaminedbytheCommission .3.2.12.Article7
3.2.7.Article5.13.2.12.1.TheCommitteeagreesthatalicencemay
begrantedtoanapplicantevenifitdoesnotownany
oralloftheaircraftitproposestouse,astheleasing
ofaircraftisoftennecessaryforthesmoothoperation
ofairtransport.MemberStates,whichareresponsible
forsafeoperations,maywishtoexercisetheirresponsi­
bilityinrelationtosafetybyrequiringaleased-in
aircrafttobere-registeredwiththeirownauthorities .
TheCommitteebelievesthattheCommission iscorrect
topermittheflexibilityofleasing,butbelievesanyre­
registeringproceduresshouldbeswiftandnotblock
smoothoperations .TheCommitteeexpectsthatthere
willbenoneedtore-registeraircraftwhichareleased
withintheEC,onceharmonisedtechnicalrequirements
areinplace.3.2.7.1.TheCommitteebelievesthatthelastsen­
tenceofArticle5.1(exemptingsmalloperators)should
bedeleted.Itwouldbepreferabletoexcludeonly
generalaviationandairtaxis,andtodosobymeansof
aspecificexemption.However,suchoperatorsshould
clearlyrequireastart-upcapitaloflessthanECU
100000.
3.2.13.Articles8,9,103.2.7.2.Therequirementto'haveanetstart-upcapi­
talofatleastECU100000'ismeaninglessfornearly
allairlines.Theamountis'peanuts',and—formany
airlines—lessthantheannualcostofthepeanutssup­
pliedfreetopassengersonboard.Atthesametime,
ECU100000couldbeunnecessarilyrestrictiveonsmall
operatorsand,ifincluded,onairtaxis.TheCommittee
suggeststhatfinancialrequirementsshouldbedeter­
minedbyreferencetothesizeoftheoperationswhich
areproposedbythefirst-timeapplicant.3.2.13.1.TheCommitteeurgestheCounciltoensure
thattheJointAirworthiness Requirements (JAR)are
completedandappliedassoonaspossible.
3.2.8.Article5.23.2.13.2.OncetheJARrulescomeintoeffect,the
CouncilandCommissionshouldconsiderwhetherthere
isanyadvantageinspecifyinganymorethantheJAR
procedure,asthiscouldleadtoambiguityandnecessi­
tatefutureamendmentstothisregulationtoreflect
changesintheJAR.Consequently ,theArticlesneed3.2.8.1.Asstatedin3.2.7.1,theconditionsforsmall
operatorsshouldbeamended.Paragraph2b)seems

NoC169/18 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 6.7.92
3.2.20.Article15.1 statenomorethanthattheapplicantforanAOC,and
thecompetentauthorityissuinganAOC,shalladhere
totheproceduresintherelevantsectionsoftheJAR
fortheinitialgranting,maintenanceandrenewalofan
AOC.3.2.20.1.IftheCommissionpublishestheinfor­
mationitshouldexcludeinformationwhichiscommer­
ciallyconfidential .
3.2.14.Article9
3.2.21.Artiee15.4
3.2.14.1.WhiletheCommitteerecognizesthediffi­
cultyindraftingthisArticle,theusethroughoutthis
Articleofwordssuchas'adequate','necessary','satis­
factory','appropriateto'indicatesthevaguenessof
manyoftherequirements ,whichareconsequentlyopen
touneveninterpretation .3.2.21.1.WhiletheCommitteeagreesthattheCom­
missionmusthavethepowerstoobtainthenecessary
informationforlicensing,itisopposedtofinancial
sanctions .
3.2.15.Article11.1
3.2.22.Artiee17
3.2.15.1.Presumablyitwouldbeimpracticalto
applythisArticletonon-Community undertakings .3.2.22.1.Inthelightofthecommentsin3.2.7(small
operators),theCommissioninitsReportshouldgive
particularattentiontoexaminingtheevenapplication
oftheRegulation.3.2.16.Article11.2
3.2.16.1.Delete'orprovidingitto'.Theonusfor
approvallieswiththeoperator.4.Accessforair-carrierstointra-Community air
routes
3.2.16.2.Theconditionsfortheapprovaloftheoper­
ationshouldalsoapplytoagreementswhereoneofthe
partiesisnotbasedintheEC. 4.1.Generalcomments
3.2.17.Article12.24.1.1.TheCommitteeagreesthat,subjecttolimited
safeguardsandtotheCouncil'spendingdecisionon
'slots',alloperatorsshouldhaveequalopportunitiesto
serveonanyroute.3.2.17.1.Licencereaffirmation shouldnotbe
requirediftemporarycessationofoperationsisdueto
externalfactors;e.g.airportclosure.Consequently ,the
words'foranyreason'shouldbereplacedby:'...for
reasonsconnectedwithfinancialortechnicalfitness
...'.Article12.3seemssuperfluous,asitiscoveredby
Article12.2.
3.2.18.Article14.14.1.2.TheCommitteeagreeswiththeCommission
(andCouncil)conclusionsthatrestrictionsoncabotage
shouldberemovedtoaccordwiththeobjectiveofthe
completionoftheInternalMarket.Itnotesthatthe
Commissionenvisagesfewdevelopmentsforsometime
inthisarea,as'theexerciseofcabotagerightswould
onlybeoflimitedeconomicinterestforaircarriers'.
However,therecouldbeatransitionalperiodofabout
twoorthreeyearstoallowforadjustments,butother­
wisetheCommitteewouldemphasizetheneedto
implementfullcabotagerights.3.2.18.1.TheCommitteeunderstandsthattheCom­
mission'sintentionisthattheapplicationsshouldbe
published.Itshouldbemadeclearthatanydetailsmade
publicshouldrespectcommercialconfidentiality .The
phrase'competentauthority'maybemoreappropriate
inthisArticle(particularlyin14.2). 4.1.3.TheCommitteeagreesthattherecanbean
eliminationofdifferentregulationsapplyingtosched­
uledairservicesandnon-scheduled .TheCommission
andCouncilshouldensurethattheeliminationof
thedistinctiondoesnotputeitherscheduledornon­
scheduledina'worse'positionthanundercurrentlaw
(which,inanyevent,couldinvokeArticle62ofthe
EECTreaty).Seealsocommentsunder2.7.3.2.19.Article14.4
3.2.19.1.Add:'Thereviewshouldbecompleted
within30days'.

6.7.92 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoC169/19
4.2.Specificcomments
4.2.1.Article2draftsays'toaregionalairport',surelyitshouldalso
say'from'.
4.2.2.2.Article4.1(c)
4.2.2.2.1.Wherenoreasonabletenderisforthcoming
fromaCommunityairline,thentherighttotender
shouldbeopentonon-Community carriers.
4.2.2.3.Article4.24.2.1.1.Forclarityandunderstanding ,thedefinition
of'undertaking'shouldalsobegiven.
4.2.1.2.Article2d(i)
4.2.1.2.1.Shouldbereworded'and/orcargoand/or
mail,insuchamannerthatoneachpassenger
flight'[Art.2(f)shouldalsobereworded'and/
or']-4.2.2.3.1.Itwouldbemorerealistictorelateprotec­
tiontofrequencyratherthantooperationsofsmall
aircraft.
4.2.2.4.Article4.3
4.2.1.3.Article2g
4.2.2.4.1.Itshouldbemadeclearwhetherthefigure
of30000referstothesumofoutboundandinbound
seats,ornot.
4.2.3.Article54.2.1.3.1.Thepresentproposalwouldlegitimise
'seat-only'salesoncharterflightsacrosstheCom­
munity.However,theproposeddefinitiondoesnot
distinguishbetweendifferenttypesof'seat-only'seats.
Forexample,atoneextreme,somearewidelyavailable
throughtravelagentsandareonflightsthatoperate
regularly.Butmanyareavailableonlythroughcertain
touroperators.Inthisactivity,thechartercompany
mustbetreatedasascheduledcarrier.4.2.3.1.Acommonflightnumbershouldnotbeused
ifitinvolveschangesofplanesand/orcarriers.That
is,thereshouldnotbecodesharinginthesenseofthe
regulationsrelatingtoComputerReservationsSystems.
4.2.4.Article64.2.2.Article4
4.2.2.1.Article4.14.2.4.1.IfanairlinefeelsthataMemberStatehas
unfairlyrefusedtograntitaccesstoaroute,itshould
havetherightofappealwithinthatMemberState,in
additiontotherightofappealtotheEuropeanCourt
ofJustice.
4.2.5.Article84.2.2.1.1.TheCommitteesympathisesfullywiththe
Commission'sintentiontopromoteadequateairser­
vicesforremotecommunitiesandislands.However,
thereisacertainconcernthattheRegulationmightbe
usedtorestrictcompetition .Consequently ,theCom­
mitteesuggeststhatMemberStatesshouldberequired
tojustifytheimpositionofapublicserviceobligation;
i.e.thatarouteisvitaltothe'economicdevelopment
ofaregion'.Definitionisalsorequiredfortermssuch
as'adequateprovision'and'fixedstandards'.4.2.5.1.Article8.1
4.2.5.1.1.Thisisalogicaldevelopmentfromthe
capacitylimitationsreductionsof1November1990.In
anyevent,suchlimitationswouldbeincompatiblewith
asinglemarketandwouldthereforebe'noncommu­
nautaire'.4.2.2.1.2.Theclassification ofservicesthatareeli­
giblefora'publicserviceobligation'includesthose
operationsto/fromanyairportnotdefinedasCat­
egory1.Thisshouldberestrictedtonon-Category 1
airportsinObjective1regionsand/ortoremoteparts
oftheCommunity .4.2.5.2.Article8.2
4.2.5.2.1.ThisArticleneedsredrafting (inEnglish,
itisasentenceof110wordsandincludesasplit
infinitive).Essentially,theCommission'sposition
shouldbetoensureroutesarewellservedandthat4.2.2.1.3.TheCommitteeconsidersthattheinten­
tionandworkingofthiswholeArticleneedstobe
examinedmorethoroughly .Forexample,whenthe

NoC169/20 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 6.7.92
airlinesareprotectedagainstunfaircompetition .The
Commissionshouldbecautiousthatitisnotgiving
protectionagainstfaircompetition (whichwouldbe
incompatiblewiththeTreatyofRome).
4.2.6.Article10.4placeaheavyburdenontheCommission ,asitwill
havetoexaminethebusinessman'sfareonallroutes
wherefewerthanthreecarriersoperate.Thiscircum­
stanceexistsonalmostallCommunityroutesatpre­
sent,andislikelytospreadasairlinemergersoccur.
Consequently ,whiletheCommitteesupportsthegen­
eralpurposeoftheCommission'sproposal,itquestions
whether:
a)thesubstanceistoobureaucraticandstillallowsfor
over-lengthyprocedures;
b)thereisanunnecessaryoverlapwiththeCom­
munity'scompetitionrules;
c)'exante'approvalisneeded,orwhether'expost
facto'approvalwouldsuffice.
5.2.Specificcomments
5.2.1.Article24.2.6.1.Aswiththeproposalonlicensing,theCom­
mittee,whilebelievingtheCommissionshouldhavethe
legalpowerstoobtainthenecessaryinformation ,is
opposedtofinancialsanctions.
5.FaresandRatesforAirServices
5.1.Generalcomments
5.2.1.1.Articles2aand2b
5.1.1.TheCommitteebelievesthat,inprinciple,far­
esshouldbesetbyairlinesthemselvesinacompetitive
market.However,untilsuchamarketisachieved,and
airlineshaveequalrightsofestablishmentandfreedom
tooperateservicesthroughouttheCommunity ,reg­
ulatingproceduresarenecessarytopreventfareswhich
areeitherunreasonablyhigh,orwhicharepredatory.
Itisdebatableastohowfartheseproblemsaredealt
withadequately .5.2.1.1.1.TheseArticlesshouldrefertolocalcur­
rencyaswellastotheECU,pendingtheacceptanceof
theECUasacommoncurrency.InArticle2b,reference
tomailshouldbedeleted,asmailratesarenegotiated
bilaterally.
5.2.1.2.Article2e
5.2.1.2.1.Shouldread'and/orcargo'.
5.2.1.3.Article2f5.1.2.SinceNovember1990,therehasbeenagreater
freedomforairlinestochangefares.Fareswithinzones
ofreasonableness mustbeapprovedautomatically ;
whilefaresoutsidethezonescanberejectedonlyif
governmentsatbothendsoftherouteagree.Ifonly
onegovernmentrejectsaproposedfare,thenthedisap­
provalcannottakeeffectuntilithasbeenconfirmed
bytheCommission .5.2.1.3.1.Noneedtodefine'scheduledairservices'.
5.2.1.4.Article2k
5.2.1.4.1.Irrelevant—shouldbedeleted.
5.2.2.Article35.1.3.Judgingbyitsperformancesofar,ittakesa
longtimefortheCommissiontoreachadecision.
Indeed,evenwhenitdoesreachaview,changedcircum­
stancesinthemeantimecanlegitimatelypermitairlines
tochargefareswhicharedifferentfromthosewhich
theCommissionhasexamined,andwhichmaybe
higherthanbefore.Consequently ,thecurrentpro­
cedurehasprovedtobe,atbest,bureaucratic ;and,at
worst,meaningless (sinceitmaynotbeabletoprevent
higherfares).5.2.2.1.ThebasicprincipleoftheCommitteeisthat
faresshouldbeestablishedwiththeminimuminter­
ferencefromStatesorfromtheCommission .TheCom­
mitteealsobelievesthatfarescannotberelatedsolely
tocosts.
5.1.4.Clearly,whilepartoftheproblemisthediffi­
cultyinobtaininginformationfromairlines,inthelight
ofexperiencesofar,itisdebatableiftheproblemof
delaywillbedealtwithadequatelyunderthepresent
proposal.The2monthtimelimitiswelcomebutthe
examinationoffaresreferredtoitfordecisioncould5.2.2.2.WhiletheCommitteeapprovesthegeneral
objectiveoftheCommissiontoliberalizeairfares,and
recognizesthedifficultyofdraftingthisArticle,theuse
ofcertainwords(suchas'reasonably','satisfactory'
and'excessively')indicatesthevaguenessoftheArticle

6.7.92 NoC169/21 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities
andthedangersofunevenapplication—themoreso
giventhefurthervariationsinthedifferentlanguage
versions.TheCommitteenotesthatdifferentairlines
allocatetheircostindifferentways.ofinvestigationto'businessmen'sfares',butwhichdoes
applythosepowerstoalmostallCommunityroutes.
Toavoidconfusion,theCommitteesuggeststhatthe
AnnexbeincorporatedintoArticle7.
5.2.9.Article7.1
5.2.3.Article3.1
5.2.3.1.WhiletheCommitteefullysupportstheneed
for'anadequatecostmargintoensureasatisfactory
safetystandard',itshouldnotbeasubstituteforstrict
enforcementofsafetylaws.
5.2.4.Article3.1b
5.2.4.1.TheCommitteesupportsmeasurestopre­
ventpredatorypricing.However,analternative (and
preferable)mechanismwouldbetoincludeaprocedure
inArt.7topermitappealsagainsteitherpredatoryor
excessivepricing.5.2.9.1.Itshouldbemadeclearthatreferralscanbe
madebyairlines,consumerorganizationsorbyanyone
(althoughthereshouldbeafilteringprocessformis­
chievouscomplaints).
5.2.10.Article7.2
5.2.10.1.TheCommitteebelievesthattheCom­
missionshouldtakeindirectcompetitionintoaccount
initsassessment .
5.2.11.Article7.4
5.2.11.1.TheCommitteewelcomesquickdecisions
inthesecircumstances .
5.2.12.Article8
5.2.12.1.Shouldberewordedtoensurethatitcovers
consumerassociationswithairtransportinterests,in
additiontothoseassociationswhichdealexclusively
withairtransport.
5.2.12.1.1.Under'othermatters,'theCommitteesug­
gests'routeaccess'and'licensing'shouldbeincluded.5.2.5.Article3.2
5.2.5.1.TheCommissioncoulduseitspowersunder
Regulation (EEC)No1284/91,whichcandemand
interimwithdrawalofafarependingtheapplication
ofnormal(i.e.time-consuming )procedures .There
needstobemoreexactcriteriaofwhatismeantby
'excessivelyhigh'.
5.2.6.Article6
5.2.6.1.ThisArticleisoverly-bureaucratic .Itcould
besimplifiedtoachievetheobjectiveofafreemarket,
whilerestraininghighfaresduetoinadequatecompe­
tition.5.2.13.Article9
5.2.13.1.ThisArticlecouldbecombinedwith
Article3.3.Inanyevent,allexistingarrangements
betweenindividualMemberStatesandthirdcountries
shouldbehonoured,althoughtheCommitteeagrees
withtheCommissionthatsucharrangements needto
beexaminedforCommunityinterestwhentheycome
upforrenewal.
5.2.14.Article12
5.2.14.1.AlsopartofRegulation (EEC)No294/91
willberevoked.5.2.7.Article6.2
5.2.7.1.'Aeronauticalauthorities'shouldbereplaced
by'Competentauthorities'(alsoinArt.7.3).Inorder
toallowairlinesmoreflexibilityinmeetingmarket
conditionsthenumberofdaysshouldbereduced.
5.2.8.Article76.Additionalcomments
6.1.While,ingeneral,hopingthattheCouncilwill
beabletoreachagreementontheseproposals,the
Committeewouldpointoutthatthereareotherpro­5.2.8.1.ThisArticlehastobetakeninconjunction
withtheAnnex,whichlimitstheCommission'spowers

NoC169/22 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 6.7.92
posalswhichcannotbeentirelyseparatedfromthis
proposalandstillawaitCouncilagreement :slotallo­
cation,consultationbetweenairportandusers,aircraft
noiseandrelationswiththirdcountries.Asregardsthe
lastpointtheCommitteeurgestheCounciltoseekto
improvethecompetitivepositionofECcarriersvis-a­
visthosethirdcountries.
6.2.Similarly,theCommitteelooksforwardto
receivingproposalswhichtheCommissionhavealready
statedtheywillmake:harmonizingthetechnicalspeci­
ficationsforairnavigation,flighttimelimitations,codeofconductfortravelagents,commonrulesforliability
(WarsawConvention).TheCommitteeinparticularis
concernedthatflighttimelimitationsandthecodeof
conductfortravelagentsseemtohaveanundulylong
gestationperiodgiventhattheCommitteehascalled
forsuchproposalsbeforetocomplementtheexisting
airtransportlegislation.
6.3.TheCommitteecontinuestopressforimprove­
mentstotheinfrastructure ,especiallytoairportsand
toAirTrafficControl,whichisreckonedtocostan
unnecessaryadditionalUSD4billionperyear.
DoneatBrussels,29April1992.
TheChairman
oftheEconomicandSocialCommittee
MichaelGEUENICH
Opinionon:
—theproposalforaCouncilRegulation (EEC)layingdowncontrolrulesandmeasuresto
combatAfricanhorsesickness,and
—theproposalforaCouncilDirectiveamendingCouncilDirective90/426/EECof26June
1990onanimalhealthconditionsgoverningthemovementandimportfromthird
countriesofequidae(*)
(92/C169/07)
On20December1991theCouncildecidedtoconsulttheEconomicandSocialCommittee,
underArticle198oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,onthe
abovementioned proposals.
TheSectionforAgricultureandFisheries,whichwasresponsibleforpreparingtheCom­
mittee'sworkonthesubject,adoptingitsOpinionon2April1992.TheRapporteurwas
MrProumens .
Atits296thPlenarySession(meetingof29April1992),theEconomicandSocialCommittee
adoptedthefollowingOpinionunanimously .
TheCommitteeapprovestheproposedRegulationand
theproposedamendmentofDirective90/426/EEC.
However,itfeelsthatanumberofcommentsshould
bemade,inparticularwithregardtotheproposed
Regulation .1.Generalcomments
1.1.Africanhorsesickness(whichintheFrenchver­
sionoftheproposalshouldbetermed'pesteafricaine
equine'ratherthansimply'pesteequine')isacon­
tagiousdiseasecausedbyavirustransmittedbyCulic­
oides,atypeofmosquitowhichattackshorses,mules,
donkeysandzebras.
1.2.Thediseasecanonlybetransmittedbythese
insectbites.(!)OJNoC312,3.12.1991,p.12,17.