ddrg/super_eurlex huggingface dataset:
4.

Highlights that the Joint Undertaking is responsible for the management of the Union's contribution to the ITER project and that the budget cap of EUR 6 600 000 000 must be maintained until 2020; stresses, furthermore, that the main challenge for the ITER project is to make sure that the realistic schedule and budgeting are kept and that any potential deviation or problem is detected at the earliest stage possible; notes that the Court's report, once again, notes in its ‘emphasis of matter’ that the budget cap of EUR 6 600 000 000, which was double the initial budgeted costs for the construction phase in 2010, did not include contingency costs; notes some progress, therefore, in the updated valuation to the Joint Undertaking's contribution in 2015, which is a more comprehensive figure; is aware that recent changes that still are being introduced in this regard are key for the future success of the project;
20.

Observes that the Centre still experiences various safety issues related to the building's glass façade and the skylights of the Centre's conference rooms, which exhibit specific accelerated wear-and-tear; notes that the works aimed at completely resolving those issues were completed in November 2016; notes also that because repairs to the windows were critical, the works were financed from the Centre's budget and the Centre is now actively following up the issue of financial liability with the Greek authorities; calls on the Centre to report to the discharge authority about the completion and effectiveness of the works, as well as the issue of financial liability; further, calls on the Centre to assess whether the recurring problems with the current building call into question not only its economic viability, but, more importantly, the safety and security of its personnel and whether relocation to a new building would be a more preferable solution;
8.

Notes that, according to the Agency, its new policy on prevention and management of conflicts of interest for its administrative board members was approved; notes that the Agency consequently published the declarations of absence of conflicts of interests and CVs of its administrative board members on its website; notes furthermore that an action for publishing the CVs and declarations of interest of the Agency's management board will follow once the policy on conflict of interests is revised in 2017; calls on the Agency to publish CVs and declarations of interests of its management board members on Agency's website without further delay and carry out the revision of the policy parallel to it; calls on the Agency to report to the discharge authority on the result of the action;
7.

Notes that, according to the Court's report, the existence of an unaddressed risk of double funding relating to the Internal Security Fund (ISF); recalls that the ISF, which is set up for the period 2014 to 2020 and is composed of the ISF Borders and Visa and ISF Police instruments, has EUR 3 800 000 000 available for funding actions; recalls moreover that the Commission, under the ISF Borders and Visa instrument, reimburses Member States' purchases of means, such as vehicles or vessels, as well as running costs such as fuel consumption or maintenance; points out that the Agency also reimburses such costs to participants in joint operations; acknowledges that the Agency, in cooperation with the Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, put in place measures which mitigate that risk; notes in particular that those measures include access to the ISF database, where all plans and reports of the beneficiaries are made available, training on the functionalities of the Shared Fund Management common system, as well as carrying out ex ante and ex post controls by checking supporting documents and simultaneously raising awareness of the issue amongst the beneficiaries;
ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Italy

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2017/1599.)
1.

Acknowledges that it is not in the Agency’s power to decide to centralise all the Agency’s operations into one location; recalls that when it was created in 2004, the Agency’s double seat (Lille/Valenciennes) was decided by the Council; takes note of the Court’s remark about the possible savings that could be achieved with a single location solution; takes note of the analysis made by the Agency on the budgetary impact of having a double seat and of its recommendation to keep that double seat; stresses that it is likely that costs would be reduced if all operations were centralised in one location; points out that the reduction of costs might also be facilitated by a comprehensive seat agreement with the host Member State — which would also have the effect of clarifying the conditions under which the Agency and its staff operate — ending a situation in which the costs of operations are likely to be higher than necessary; calls on the Council to reconsider its previous decision and opt instead for centralising all the Agency’s operations into one location;
21.

Notes that Eurojust maintains a register of declarations of absence of conflicts of interest signed by management board members, which is regularly updated, but points out that these declarations and the CVs of the management board members are not publicly available; points out that this practice does nothing to further transparency and calls for the declarations to be made public; calls on Eurojust to report to the discharge authority on progress on this issue and consider the publication of the declarations and the CVs on its website;
10.

Stresses that even though the new baseline does not include a contingency, the Commission suggested in its above mentioned communication from 14 June 2017 that a contingency of up to 24 months in terms of schedule and 10 to 20 % in terms of budget would be appropriate; notes in addition that the measures taken to respect the EUR 6 600 000 000 capped budget included postponing the procurement and installation of all components not essential to First Plasma; draws attention to the fact that while positive steps have been taken to improve the management and control of the ITER project construction phase, there remains an ongoing risk of further cost increases and delays in project implementation compared to the new proposed baseline; notes that the recognition of such risks must be appreciated by the Joint Undertaking and indeed all parties of the project;
46.

Notes that, according to the current discharge procedure, the EEAS submits annual activity reports to the Court in June, the Court then submits its report to the Parliament in October, and the discharge is voted by Parliament in plenary by May; notes that, unless the discharge is postponed, at least 17 months pass between the closing of annual accounts and the closing of the discharge procedure; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much shorter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the EEAS and the Court follow best practice in the private sector; proposes in this regard to set a deadline for the submission of annual activity reports of 31 March of the year following the accounting year and a deadline for the submission of the Court’s reports of 1 July; proposes also to review the timetable for the discharge procedure as set down in Article 5 of Annex IV to Parliament's Rules of Procedure so that the vote on the discharge would take place in Parliament’s plenary part-session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question.
33.

Reiterates its call on the Bureau to ensure that the social and pension rights of Members and Accredited Parliamentary Assistants (APAs) are respected, and that adequate financial means are made available; in this regard, reiterates its call to find a workable solution for those APAs who, having worked for two parliamentary terms without interruption in the end of the current term, will not be entitled to access to the European pension rights scheme, when they will reach the pension age, since they will be lacking some time out of ten years' service needed as set out in the Staff Regulations, due to early elections in 2014 and the delays in the validation of the APAs new contracts because of heavy workload during the periods after the elections of 2009; recalls that Article 27(2) of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament provides that “[a]cquired rights and future entitlements shall be maintained in full”; notes, however, continuing problems with the voluntary pension scheme and asks the Bureau and the Secretary-General to explore all options in order to minimise the burden for the Parliament's budget;
29.

Notes that the nomination of the members of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the responsibility of the Member States under Articles 253 and 254 TFEU; highlights the importance of a timely nomination and appointment of judges for the performance of the CJEU; asks for a new rule setting a specific deadline for the (re)nomination of a judge well before the end of a judge’s mandate and calls on the Council to weigh cost against benefits when appointing new judges to the CJEU; criticises the irregular nomination, without a call for applications, of two judges for the Civil Service Tribunal for a mandate which moreover lasted only from 14 April 2016 until 31 August 2016; notes with regret the costs associated with one of those judges taking up and ending his ‘4 month mandate’, amounting to EUR 69 498,25 in addition to the salary received by the judge; condemns such a waste of Union taxpayers’ money;
—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (2), and in particular Article 44 thereof,
E.

whereas Parliament has consistently stressed its support for the continuation of the FRT while emphasising that, as one of the two arms of the budgetary authority, it must be fully associated with the decision-making process relating to the extension of the FRT, inter alia to avoid the repetition of the procedure of its setting-up; whereas no negotiations on the financing of the second tranche of the FRT have so far taken place between Parliament and the Council; whereas it would have been advisable that the discussions on the financing of the second tranche take place within the conciliation on the 2018 Union budget;
15.

Notes with concern from the Court's report that the Agency signed a framework contract for the provision of IT consultancy services from 2014 to 2017, for which prices were set contingent to the time spent on the projects and not linked to the delivery, and over which the Agency has limited monitoring possibilities, since for example in 2016 half of the services were carried out offsite its premises; calls on the Agency to report to the discharge authority on the measures taken in this regard;
15.

Notes that, according to the Court's report, by the end of 2017, the Agency had not yet introduced all of the tools launched by the Commission aimed to introduce a single solution for the electronic exchange and storage of information with third parties participating in public procurement procedures (e-procurement); notes that, according to the Agency, it already has some of the tools in place and that it is in the process of introducing the remaining tools by the beginning of 2019; calls on the Agency to report to the discharge authority on the implementation of all the necessary tools;
16.

Notes with satisfaction the fact that the issue concerning the variation in the methodologies and procedures used by the NFAs is no longer relevant to the implementation of Horizon 2020 projects, as the ex-post audits are undertaken either by the Joint Undertaking or by the Commission; notes that in accordance with the provisions of the common ex post audit plan for Horizon 2020, there are at present 17 ex-post audits already launched on transactions relating to the activities of the Joint Undertaking;
2.

Notes that, according to the Commission, the competition fines in 2018 accounted for EUR 1 149 million; considers again that, besides any surplus resulting from under-implementation, the Union budget should be enabled to reuse any revenue resulting from fines or linked to late payments without a corresponding decrease in GNI contributions; recalls its position in favour of increasing the proposed Union reserve in the next Multiannual Financial Framework by an amount equivalent to the revenue resulting from fines and penalties;
9.

Notes with regret that, according to the Court’s report, the carry-overs to 2019 for Title II (administrative expenditure) stood at 35 % (compared to 40 % in 2017), while for Title III (operational expenditure) they were as high as 46 % (compared to 40 % in 2017), which was in contradiction with the budgetary principle of annuality; recalls that such high carry-overs were also reported for the financial years 2016 and 2017 and calls on the Agency to analyse the underlying reasons and to improve the budget planning accordingly; notes the Agency’s reply specifying the possibility of adding and justifying a list of potential additional IT purchases regarding carry-overs for Title II and pointing to the planned nature of carry-overs regarding the programming of large-scale research projects, running over two years, for Title III in order to achieve more significant impact for the given resources;
19.

Notes with concern that, at the end of 2017, the Institute was a defendant in four cases related to three procurement procedures which were brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) by unsuccessful tenderers; notes that in 2018 the Court of Justice ruled on two of the four cases and dismissed the actions of the claimants, finding that the Institute was not liable, and that in 2019 the Court of Justice ruled on the two remaining cases linked to the same award decision and contract; notes that, according to the Institute’s reply, it further improved procurement procedures in order to minimise the risk of potential dissatisfaction among unsuccessful tenderers and of future legal cases;
3.

Notes from the Court’s report that in 2018 the Agency had financing agreements with cooperating countries for operational activities, representing 59 % of the Agency’s budget; notes the launch of a new simplified financing scheme based largely on unit costs for expenditure related to deployments of human resources, and, in late 2018, the launch of a new ex post control system covering all types of expenditure and also the modification of its system of ex ante checks embedded in the financial circuits; highlights the emphasis placed by the Court on the fact that the reimbursement of equipment-related expenditure continues to be based on actual cost and that the project to move to unit-cost based reimbursements continues to be unsuccessful; notes with concern, furthermore, the Court’s observation that, since 2014, the proof of actual costs claimed by cooperating countries for equipment-related costs continues to be inadequate and that the Agency’s ex ante verifications of these costs are ineffective unless they are substantiated by supporting documents; notes the absence of ex post verifications on reimbursements by the Agency, further increasing the risk of unjustified cost reimbursements; notes with concern that the Agency allowed several reimbursements for expenditures claimed by cooperating countries in spite of the latter not providing the evidence indicated and required by the Agency; acknowledges from the Agency’s reply that supporting documents indicating detailed costs were submitted by the cooperating countries in question; calls on the Agency to clearly indicate in the future the type of supporting documents it accepts as required evidence; further calls on the Agency to reimburse only legally justified expenditure; expects the Agency to rapidly introduce solid ex post verifications on reimbursements and to report to the discharge authority on the progress made in this regard by June 2020;
25.

Notes that, in 2018, one Associated Member became a wholly-owned subsidiary of a founding member, as a result the founding member’s representation in the governing board increased; observes that the provisions of the Joint Undertaking’s current legal framework do not sufficiently address corporate acquisitions among the Joint Undertaking’s industry members and the implications they might have on the balanced representation of members in the governing board; takes note of the Joint Undertaking’s reply that the legal framework established within the Joint Undertaking does not allow an increase in the influence of a founding member on the decision-making process and overall governance; notes that the finding of the Court will be considered in any possible amendment to the regulation;
23.

Recalls that in its resolution of 16 January 2020 on Institutions and bodies of the Economic and Monetary Union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest, Parliament noted its concern about the conflict of interest that has arisen as a consequence of the appointment of the Authority’s executive director as chief executive of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) from 1 February 2020, which was insufficiently addressed by the restrictions imposed by the Board of Supervisors; expresses its concern that the Authority’s Board of Supervisors have also nominated a candidate for the position of executive director who was formerly employed as managing director for advocacy at the AFME; underlines that post-public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict-of-interest situations are a problem common to many bodies and agencies across the Union which affects their reputations; encourages the Authority to enhance its policy regarding conflict of interest;
P9_TA(2020)0312

Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: assistance to Croatia and Poland in relation to a natural disaster and advances to Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in relation to a public health emergency

European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2020 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia and Poland in relation to a natural disaster and to provide for the payment of advances to Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in relation to a public health emergency (COM(2020)0960 — C9-0318/2020 — 2020/0299(BUD))

(2021/C 425/23)

The European Parliament,

— having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0960 — C9-0318/2020),

— having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (1),

— having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (2), and in particular Article 10 thereof,

— having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management (3), and in particular point 11 thereof,

— having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0221/2020),

1. Welcomes the decision as a sign of the Union’s solidarity with the Union citizens and regions hit by natural disasters and the major public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020;

2. Stresses the urgent need to release financial assistance through the European Union Solidarity Fund to the affected regions;

3. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

4. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union ;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3.

(2) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884.

(3) OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1.
ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Austria

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2020/1076.)
38.

Acknowledges the Agency’s measures taken to mitigate all risks associated to the UK’s withdrawal from the Union, including the establishment of a contingency plan in coordination with the Commission; notes that the Agency cooperated closely with the European Commission during the negotiations with the United Kingdom and that the risk of disruption of aviation activities disappeared with the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement, which entered into force on 1 February 2020; notes that the Agency has evaluated the effect of the UK’s withdrawal from the Union on human resources, concluding that only a relatively small number of staff members might be affected (less than 10); is concerned to hear that, despite this announcement, the Agency is in the process of dismissing all permanent workers of British nationality; requests the Agency to report back to Parliament with the exact figures, and reminds the Agency that the Commission policy on UK’s withdrawal from the Union is to safeguard British workers as much as possible;
17.

Is satisfied that the Foundation has acted upon the majority of the observations made by the discharge authority in the framework of the 2018 discharge procedure but draws attention to the fact that it still has to take action to respond to Court’s observations as regards non-competitive price elements in award criteria; notes that there was no evidence that the procurement procedure through which five interim workers worked for the Foundation led to the award of the best value for money contract; endorses the Court’s observation in that regard that the Foundation should use award criteria which focus on competitive price elements; notes that in its reply, the Foundation’s fully acknowledges the issue and aims for the next procurement procedure for interim workers to include competitive price elements in the award criteria;
19.

Notes with concern that, according to the Court’s report, the Centre signed contracts with IT companies for the provision of IT services that contained an ambiguous formulation that could imply the assignment (‘mise à disposition’) of temporary agency workers instead of the provision of clearly defined IT services, which would not be in compliance with Union social and employment rules; further notes that in 2019 the total amount of payments made by the Centre in that regard amounted to a total value of EUR 1 207 560; notes the Centre’s reply that that practice is performed under an interinstitutional framework contract; notes that a case of that practice is currently pending before the Court of Justice; recommends that the Centre follow the pending Court case and inform the discharge authority of the outcome and measures taken to comply with that outcome;