No C 56/38 Official  Journal  of the European  Communities 7.3. 77 
2.3. Geothermal  energy  (objective  4) 
2.3.1.  In project  D, the  third  action  (hot  rocks)  is 
to be replaced  by 'study  of new  stimulation  methods'. 
A new  project  E (hot  dry  rocks)  is to be subdivided 
into: 
— 1. Studies  and  experiments  on fracturation, 
— 2. Studies  and  experiments  on heat  extraction. 
The present  project  E (training  of specialists)  becomes 
project  F. The ACPM  responsible  for geothermal  energy  took 
the view  that  the  work  on hot  dry  rocks  should 
become  the subject  of a separate  chapter.  The  Com-
mission  agreed  in principle  with  this  proposal. 
Done  at Brussels,  25 November  1976. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Basil  de FERRANTI 
Opinion  on the proposal  for a Council  Regulation  containing  provisions  to enable  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to carry  inspections  and  verifications  in the terri-
tories  of the  Member  States  of the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
iThe text  referred  to the  Committee  has  been  published  in Official  Journal  of the 
European  Communities  No  C 207  of 2 September  1976,  page  2. 
A. LEGAL  BASIS  FOR  THE  OPINION 
On 28 July  1976,  the Council  referred  the abovementioned  proposal  to the Economic 
and Social  Committee  in accordance  with  Article  170  of the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community. 
B. OPINION  OF THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE 
The Economic  and  Social  Committee  prepared  its opinion  on the  above  matter  at its 
143rd  plenary  session,  held  in Brussels  on 24 and  25 November  1976. 
The full  text  of the opinion  is as follows: 
THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  and  in 
particular  Article  170  thereof, 
Having  regard  to the request  for an opinion  made  by 
the Council  of the  European  Communities  on 
28 July  1976, 
Having  regard  to the  decision  taken  by its Bureau 
on 28 September  1976,  instructing  the  Section  for 
Energy  and  Nuclear  Questions  to draw  up  an 
opinion  and  a report  on the matter, Having  regard  to the  opinion  issued  by the  Section 
for Energy  and  Nuclear  Questions  at its  28th 
meeting,  held  on 5 November  1976, 
Having  regard  to the  oral  report  made  by  the 
rapporteur,  Mr Schlitt, 
Having  regard  to the discussions  at its 143rd  plenary 
session  held  on 24 and  25 November  1976  (meeting 
of 25 November  1976), 
Whereas  pursuant  to Article  2 (e)  of the  EAEC 
Treaty,  the Community  is required  to ensure,  through 
7. 3. 77 Official  Journal  of the European  Communities No C 56/39 
appropriate  safeguards,  that  nuclear  materials  are 
not diverted  to purposes  other  than  those  for  which 
they  are intended; 
Whereas  pursuant  to Article  2 (h)  of  che  EAEC 
Treaty,  the  Community  is likewise  required  to 
establish  with  international  organizations  such 
relations  as will  foster  progress  in the  peaceful  uses 
of nuclear  energy, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THE  FOLLOWING  OPINION 
by a majority,  there  being  two  votes  against  and  four 
abstentions: 
1. Background  analysis 
1.1. The  proposal  is one  of a number  of measures 
which  must  be  taken  by  the  EAEC  to  ensure 
application  in the  Community  of the  Treaty  on the 
Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear  "Weapons  (hereinafter 
referred  to as the  NPT).  Also  included  in  these 
measures  is the  adaptation  of the  current  system  of 
Euratom  safeguards  to the IAEA  system  — a measure 
which  was  recently  adopted  by the  Commission  and 
endorsed  by the Council. 
1.2. Hitherto,  the  inspection  of nuclear  installations 
and fissile  materials  in the  EAEC  has  ibeen  based  on 
Chapter  VII  of the  Euratom  Treaty,  which  lays  down 
safeguards  for  the  peaceful  use  of nuclear  energy  in 
the Member  States.  In particular,  the  Commission  is 
required  by  Article  77  of the  Euratom  Treaty  to 
satisfy  itself  that  'ores,  source  materials  and  special 
fissile  materials  are  not  diverted  from  their  intended 
uses  as declared  by the  users'.  Since  these  materials 
may  be used  only  for  peaceful  purposes,  one  purpose 
of the  inspections  is to ensure  that  materials  are  not 
diverted  for  military  use.  Moreover,  Article  84  of 
the Euratom  Treaty  states  in its third  paragraph  that 
'the safeguards  may  not  extend  to materials  intended 
to meet  defence  requirements'.  Both  military 
installations  and  nuclear  materials  set  aside  for 
military  purposes  in France  and  the  United  Kingdom 
are exempted  from  the  safeguards  under  this  clause. 
This  means  that  a solution  still  has  to be found  to 
the fundamental  problem  of treating  all  Member 
States  equally,  regardless  of  whether  they  have 
nuclear  weapons  or not. 1.3. The  Euratom  Treaty  is directly  applicable  in 
all Member  States  of the  Community.  Therefore, 
Member  States  do  not  need  safeguards  systems  of 
their  own.  The  Euratom  safeguards  also  removed 
the need  for  the  bilateral  safeguards  agreements 
which  non-Euratom  countries  (in  their  capacity  as 
suppliers  of  fissile  materials  and  other  nuclear 
equipment)  had  concluded  with  individual  Member 
States  in order  to ensure  that  their  supplies  would 
be used  for  peaceful  purposes.  Apart  from  being 
an appropriate  substitute  for  bilaterial  agreements, 
the Euratom  safeguards  thus  enabled  non-Euratom 
countries  (and  in particular  the  USA  and  Canada  as 
major  suppliers)  to provide  the  Member  States  of 
the Community  with  the  supplies  they  needed.  When 
Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  joined 
the European  Communities,  these  countries  became 
equally  subject  to the  Euratom  Treaty  and  thus  the 
provisions  of Chapter  VII  of this  Treaty,  though  in 
the case  of the  United  Kingdom  t)he  safeguards 
covered  only  installations  and  fissile  materials  used 
for peaceful  purposes.  Regulations  No  7 and  No  8 
were  enacted  in order  to lay  down  details  relating  to 
the implementation  of the  safeguards  specified  in 
Chapter  VII  of the  Euratom  Treaty. 
1.4. The  NPT,  which  entered  into  force  on 
5 March  1970,  created  a new  situation  for  the 
Euratom  safeguards  system  in so far  as it stipulated 
a different  system  for  all the  NPT  signatory  States 
without  nuclear  weapons.  At that  time  five  Member 
States  of the  EAEC  were  included  in this  category. 
This  meant  that  these  five  countries  would 
henceforth  have  to accept  both  Euratom  and  IAEA 
inspections  and  would  be treated  differently  to the 
other  Member  State  which,  being  in possession  of 
nuclear  weapons,  was  not  subject  to  IAEA 
supervision. 
1.5. In a bid  to prevent  this  difference  in treatment, 
the European  Communities  endeavoured  to get  the 
IAEA  to recognize  the Euratom  safeguards  and  forego 
their  own.  The  IAEA  refused  to do so on the  grounds 
that other  NPT  signatory  States  might  take  such  an 
agreement  to be a precedent  and  insist,  for  example, 
on their  own  national  monitoring  systems  being 
accepted  as a substitute  for IAEA  inspection. 
1.6. Faced  by this  difficult  situation,  the Commission 
proposed  verified  Euratom  inspections.  The  original 
idea behind  this  proposal  was  for  the  IAEA  to check 
Euratom  records  with  regard  to the  five  — and  now 
seven  — Member  States  without  nuclear  weapons, 
No C 56/40 Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities 7. 3. 77 
but not  to carry  out  any  inspection  in the  Member 
States  themselves.  This  would  have  at least  ruled  out 
double  inspections  in the  Member  States  in question 
from  the  outset  and,  as the  Euratom  inspections 
would  have  continued  to apply  in all Member  States, 
the Member  States  that  had  signed  the  NPT  would 
not have  been  subject  to different  treatment.  Since 
verified  Euratom  safeguards  were  also  not  accepted 
in this  form,  the solution  which  finally  emerged  was 
that the  Member  States  without  nuclear  weapons 
and the  EAEC,  represented  by  the  Commission, 
should  sign  an agreement  with  the  IAEA.  Under  this 
IAEA/Euratom  Agreement  which  was  signed  on 
5 April  1973,  the  EAEC  undertakes  to  perform 
verified  Euratom  inspections  and  the  Member  States 
undertake  to allow  these  inspections,  which  can 
include  checks  by IAEA  inspectors  on the  territories 
of the Member  States  in question.  In order  that  these 
verified  Euratom  inspections  might  be carried  out, 
the Euratom  safeguards  system  previously  in force 
had to be adapted  to the  IAEA  system.  However,  it 
should  be noted  that  the  IAEA  does  not  generally 
carry  out any  additional  inspections  of its own. 
1.7. The  Commission  states  that  its proposed  draft 
Regulation  is necessary  and  advisable  because  it is in 
the interest  of all the  parties  to the  IAEA/Euratom 
Agreement  that  the  provisions  adopted  at national 
level  with  regard  to IAEA  inspections  are  as similar 
as possible,  in order  to ensure  uniform  implemen-
tation  of the  Agreement  in all countries  where  it 
has to  be  applied.  The  most  effective  way  of 
achieving  this  goal,  the  Commission  thinks,  would 
be to lay  down  Community  rules  designed  to allow 
the agency  and  its inspectors  to exercise  their  rights 
in all countries  that  are  parties  to the  Agreement. 
The draft  Regulation  under  consideration  is also  to 
be applied  in essence  in the  United  Kingdom,  which 
owns  nuclear  weapons  and  is thus  exempted  from 
the IAEA  safeguards  but  which  has  nonetheless 
voluntarily  concluded  with  the  IAEA  a safeguards 
agreement  according  to which  nuclear  installations 
and materials  in the  UK  used  for  peaceful  purposes 
are also  to be subject  to verified  Euratom  inspections 
and IAEA  inspections.  However,  certain  installations, 
parts  of installations  and  materials  are excluded  from 
the inspections  in cases  where  the  national  security 
of the UK  is at stake. 
2. Comments 
2.1. First  of all,  the Committee  would  point  out  the 
need  to adhere  to,  and  continue  with,  effective 
safeguards  so as to ensure  that  nuclear  materials  are 
not diverted  to purposes  other  than  those  for  which 
they  are intended. 2.2. The  Committee  therefore  wholeheartedly 
welcomes  the fact  that  the Commission  has  submitted 
the present  draft  Regulation,  which  seeks  to ensure 
that the  rules  on the  access  of IAEA  inspectors  to 
facilities  are the  same  in all the  Member  States  that 
are Subject  to verified  Euratom  inspections.  Th£ 
Committee  shares  the  Commission's  view  that  it 
would  not  be in the  Community's  interest  if the 
Member  States  that  had  signed  the  IAEA/Euratom 
Agreement  were  to enact  provisions  of their  own 
laying  down  how  the  IAEA  inspectors'  access  to 
facilities  in their  countries  was  to be administered 
and organized.  A Council  Regulation  supplementing 
the revised  Regulation  of  22  September  1976 
concerning  the  application-  of the  provisions  on 
Euratom  safeguards  will,  the  Committee  thinks,  be 
the best  way  of ensuring  that  the  IAEA/Euratom 
Agreement  is implemented  uniformly  in all the Mem-
ber States  in question. 
2.3. The  Committee  is also  gratified  to see  that  it 
has proved  possible  to work  out  an agreement  with 
the IAEA  which  solves  the  difficult  question  of 
safeguards.  It considers  that  the  draft  Regulation 
under  review  should  be enacted  by the  Council  as 
quickly  as  possible,  so  that  the  IAEA/Euratom 
Agreement  can  enter  into  force  at the earliest  possible 
date.  If there  is any  further  delay,  it may  be 
impossible  to observe  the  deadline  laid  down  in the 
NPT  for  the  entry  into  force  of the  IAEA/Euratom 
Agreement,  and  thus  for the application  of the  NPT. 
If this  happened,  the  countries  which  are  the  key 
suppliers  of fissile  materials  would  be entitled  to 
stop supplying  the Community. 
2.4. The  Committee  regrets,  however,  that  it has 
been  asked  to deliver  an  opinion  solely  on  the 
document  now  under  consideration,  which  covers  but 
one aspect  of the  complex  question  of safeguards. 
It would  have  been  much  more  useful  if the  Com-
mittee  could  have  also  commented  on the  content  of 
the IAEA/Euratom  Agreement  and  on the  revision  of 
the Euratom  safeguards,  even  if the  Euratom  Treaty 
does  not  expressly  provide  for  consultation  of the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee.  The  issues  covered 
by the  last  document  and  the  one  now  under  review 
are so closely  linked  that  at least  these  two  docu-
ments  pertaining  to the  interconnected  Euratom  and 
IAEA  safeguards  systems  should  have  been  dealt  with 
by the  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  Only  by 
dealing  with  these  two  documents  concurrently 
would  it have  been  possible  to obtain  a general 
picture  of the impact  of the two  systems  of safeguards 
on the  Community,  and  thus  make  a more  detailed 
assessment  of the  whole  subject-matter.  Regardless 
of the  fact  that  it has  been  limited  to studying  just 
one aspect  of the  complex  question  of safeguards  in 
7. 3. 77 Official  Journal  of the European  Communities No C 56/41 
the EAEC,  the Committee  welcomes  the fact  that  the 
present  document  has  at least  given  it the opportunity 
to comment  on  this  question,  especially  as this 
document  gives  the  clearest  picture  of the  whole 
problem  of interwoven  safeguards  arrangements  and 
the varying  effects  on Merriber  States. 
2.5. The  Committee  would  point  out  that  with  the 
enactment  of the  draft  Regulation  under  review  and 
the entry  into  force  of the IAEA/Euratom  Agreement, 
duplicate  safeguards  cannot  ibe ruled  out  completely 
in the  Member  States  in question  under  certain 
conditions.  It was  obviously  not  possible  to get  the 
Euratom  safeguards  recognized  as adequate  for  the 
purposes  of the  NPT,  and  it was  also  not  possible 
to conclude  the  IAEA/Euratom  Agreement  in the 
form  originally  intended  (i.e.,  with  the  IAEA  not 
carrying  out  additional  inspections  of its own  in the 
Member  States  but  simply  checking  the  data  and 
information  collected  by  Euratom).  However,  the 
Committee  is gratified  to note  that  the  IAEA 
safeguards  are  geared  to close  cooperation  with  the 
Euratom  authorities  so that  doulble  inspections  can 
be avoided  by and  large.  This  point  is also  dealt  with 
in a Protocol  which  is appended  to the  IAEA/ 
Euratom  Agreement  and  is an integral  part  thereof 
and which  states  that  'This  Protocol  amplifies  certain 
provisions  of the  Agreement  and,  in particular, 
specifies  the  conditions  and  means  according  to 
which  cooperation  in  the  application  of  the 
safeguards  provided  for under  the Agreement  shall  be 
implemented  in such  a way  as to avoid  unnecessary 
duplication  of the  Community's  safeguards  activi-
ties'.  The  Committee  therefore  assumes  that  the IAEA 
will not  exercise  its right  to duplicate  in the Member States  the  inspections  conducted  by  the  Euratom 
inspectors,  unless  such  duplication  is  specially 
warranted.  In this  connection  the  Committee  would 
note  that  hitherto  the  Euratom  safeguards  have  not 
involved  the  operators  of nuclear  installations  in the 
EAEC  in any  unacceptable  costs  or been  any  serious 
hindrance  to  them.  Therefore,  the  Commission 
should  take  care  to  ensure  that  when  IAEA 
inspections  are  carried  out,  they  do not  cause  any 
significant  additional  expenditure  or hindrance.  In 
this connection,  it is particularly  important  to observe 
the principles  of fissile  materials  safeguards  and  to 
make  the use of such  safeguards  still  more  automatic. 
2.6. The  fact  that  safeguards  systems  differ,  and  that 
the powers  which  inspectors  have  in countries  with 
nuclear  weapons  are  different  to those  they  have  in 
countries  without  nuclear  weapons,  is considered  by 
the Committee  to be unsatisfactory.  It regrets  that 
the question  of additional  IAEA  inspections  has  not 
been  able  to be solved  in a true  Community  spirit, 
with  one  siingle  and  uniform  solution  being  worked 
out for  all Member  States.  The  Commission  should 
therefore  continue  to press  for  introduction  of 
uniform  safeguards  and  powers  of inspection  within 
the forseeable  future. 
Done  at Brussels,  25 November  1976. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Basil  de FERRANTI