EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 28 June  2016 
on extend ing access to the central register of bank accounts   
(CON/ 2016/35) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 1 June 2016  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from  the Belgian Ministr y of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft  law extending access to the central register of bank accounts  
(hereinafter the ‘draft law’)  to certain tax authorities , various departments of the Ministry of Justice and 
public notaries .  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles  127(4)  and 282(5)  of the Treaty  on the 
Functioning of the European Union  and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law relates to the National e Bank van Belgiё/Banque Nationale de Belgique  (NBB). In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft Law  
1.1  The purpose of the draft law is to extend the list of  persons authorised to access the central 
register of bank accounts, with a view to combating not only tax fraud and money laundering but 
also the financing of terrorism and financial crime in general . This central register, which has been 
operated by the NBB since 20112, consolidates data on bank accounts held by clients of financial 
institutions established in Belgium and on other financial operations (such as investment , leasing,  
mortgage and credit  agreements ). The NBB exercises formal control over the structure of the data 
but it has  no control over the correctness  and completeness  of such data, which are provided by  
the financial institutions  directly . 
1.2 Under the current legal framework, only a limited number of  specific ally nominated high-ranking tax 
authority civil servants appointed  by the Ministry of Finance have access to the central register , for 
the purpose of identifying possible cases of tax fraud. Such access is provided by the NBB  in the 
form of an extranet portal, which has been specifically designed for use by the Ministry of Finance. 
The information queries  posted by the authorised officials of the Ministry of Finance  are manually 
processed by NBB  staff, who thereafter have to upload the relevant data  to the portal. The costs 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  In accordance with the Law of 14 April 2011 and the Royal Decree of 17 July 2013.  
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2 incurred by the NBB for the set-up, development , operat ion and maintenance of the central register 
are invoiced quarterly , in accordance with the  agreement  concluded between the NBB and the 
Ministry of Finance on the basis of Article 20 of the Royal Decree of 17 July  2013.  
1.3 The draft law  extends access to the central register to (a) high-ranking officials in charge of , in the 
event of fraud,  value  added tax and customs and excise duties ; (b) high ranking officials in charge 
of collectin g value added tax, customs and excise duties , non-tax debts , registration, mortgage and 
court registry rights, inheritance tax, criminal fines, confiscat ed sums of money  and court costs ; (c) 
public prosecutors in charge of  investigations relating to tax fraud, money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism ; (d) examining magistrates and the criminal courts ; (e) the unit for the 
prevention of  the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism ; and (f) notaries  for the purpose of issuing  inheritance declarations .  
1.4 The draft law does not  specify in which form access to the central register is to be provided to the 
persons  granted access under the draft law .  
1.5 The draft law is expected to enter into force shortly  in order  to enable imm ediate availability of the 
data contained  in the central register to the persons  mentioned in paragraph 1.3.  
 
2.  General observations  
2.1 The ECB takes note of the fact that the draft law  aims  to combat  tax fraud and prevent the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.  
2.2 The ECB understands that the draft law amends the national  legal framework governing the 
establishment  and operation of the central register of bank accounts, which consists of  the Law of 
14 April 2011 and the Royal Decree of 17 July 2013. The ECB was consulted o n these legal acts  
prior to their adoption and issued opinion s on them3. In its opinions , the ECB noted, in particular,  
that the new  task entrusted to the NBB is not a central banki ng task, nor does it facilitat e the 
performance of such a task. Rather , the ECB understood that the new task entrusted to the NBB is  
linked to a State task, i.e. the collection of taxes by the State and the reinforcement of the fight 
against tax fraud, and is performed in the interest of the State. The ECB concluded, therefore, that 
if the NBB is to be entrusted with such a task, it needs  to be adequately remunerated in advance, to 
ensure compliance with with the monetary financing prohibition.  In addition,  the f inancing of this 
new task entrusted to the NBB must comply with the principle of financial independence, under which a national central bank must have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB -related 
tasks, but also its national tasks, e.g. fina ncing its administration and own operations
4. 
2.3 The ECB would like to recall that when new tasks are conferred on a member  of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) , it is necessary to assess  these tasks against the prohibition of 
monetary financing  under Article 123 of the Treaty. For this purpose, t he ECB has developed 
guidance in the form of general and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may 
                                                 
3  See Opinions CON/2011/98 and CON/2011/30.  All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu.  
4  See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of  Opinion CON/2011/30 and paragraph 2 of  Opinion CON/2011/98.  
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3 decide whether the new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be 
considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of  the monetary financing 
prohibition5. This guidance is set out in paragraph 2.4.  The concrete assessment of whether the 
NBB’s task s in connection with the central register  and the extension of  access proposed under the 
draft law  are to be considered central banking task s or government task s is then undertaken in  
paragraph 3 of this opinion.  
2.4  Guidance on the assessment of  the monetary financing prohibition  
2.4.1 First, the systemic c ategorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government 
tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 
the central banking tasks already assigned to an NCB. In recognition of the dif ferent Member 
States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, the tasks currently 
discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re- categorised, but may be 
reassessed if their substance is amended.  Second,  the principle of financial independence requires 
that the Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem -related tasks.  Third, central banking tasks 
comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of 
the Treaty.  Fourth, the new tasks conferred on an NCB which  are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which 
are clearly discharged on behalf of and  in the exclusive interest of the government or of other 
public entities, should be considered to b e government tasks.  
2.4.2  An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is therefore the impact of the 
task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the 
following issues should be taken into account.  First, it should be assessed whether the 
performance of the new task creates inadequately addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, without necessari ly complementing the existing central bank tasks. If a 
conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation  
measures in place to adequately address that conflict. Complementarity between the new task and 
existin g central banking tasks should not, however,  be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the 
creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. The assessment of the complementarity of a new 
task should also take into account the financing of that task.  Second,  it should be assessed 
whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task places a disproportionate 
burden on the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB and may negatively impact on its 
capacity to properly perform exi sting central banking tasks.  Third, it should be assessed whether  
the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set -up of the NCB, in particular as 
regards central bank independence and accountability considerations.  Fourth, it should b e 
assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks.  Fifth, it should 
be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB’s 
decision -making bodies to political risks that are disproportionat e and could also impact on their 
personal independence.  Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as 
either falling within the scope of a central banking ask or a government task will be guided by the 
                                                 
5  See Opinion CON/2015/22.  
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4 objective of ensuring the consistent application of the monetary financing prohibition within the 
Eurosystem and the ESCB.  
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1 Extended access to the central register  
 The EC B notes that the draft law makes  the NBB responsible for  granting access to the cent ral 
register of bank accounts to the persons mentioned in paragraph 1.3. The ECB understands that by  
extend ing access to the central register  the users’ group will be considerably broadened and will 
thus become more heterogene ous. The NBB may need to revis it its communication  channels  with 
the users, since these were only  developed to accommodate a small number of requests entered 
by a few high -ranking Ministry of Finance officials. The substance of the task initially conferred on 
the NBB would be significa ntly expanded  by the provisions of the draft law  and should therefore be  
reassessed in the light of the proposed extension of  access against the prohibition of monetary 
financing.  
3.2 Principle of financial independence  
 The principle of financial indepe ndence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in 
a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB related 
tasks, but also their national tasks, both from an operational and a financial perspective.  In the two 
previous ECB opinions submitted to the Belgian authorities on the legal framework governing the 
central register of bank accounts6, the ECB insisted that the NBB be adequately remunerated for 
all costs incurred when performing activities relat ed to its tasks in connection with the central  
register, be it through remuneration provided in advance or through full and prompt reimbursement 
of costs on market terms. The Royal Decree of 17 July 2013 implementing Article 322, section 3 of 
the Revenue C ode had met these concerns by requiring that all costs incurred by the NBB for the 
establishment , development, operation and maintenance of the central register be allocated 
quarterly to the Minist ry of Finance , in accordance with the agreement entered int o with the NBB. 
Currently the costs incurred in connection with the central register can be easily tracked and 
invoiced to the Ministry of Finance. However, full coverage of the costs associated with the task of  
extending access to the central register to the persons  mentioned in paragraph 1.3, most of whom 
operate within the remit of the Ministry of  Justice, cannot be ensured. T he existing financial 
arrangements  only cover the costs of the requests filed by persons falling within the remit of the 
Ministry of Finance and thus  the reimbursement  of all costs incurred by the NBB  when performing 
the significantly expanded task  cannot be ensured.   
 The draft law contains no provisions  on procedures for  monitor ing, allocat ing and invoic ing the 
supplementary costs incurred by NBB in  granting the extended access to the central register. The 
ECB understands that t he Belgian legislator intends , at a later stage,  to adopt a standalone law that 
would govern all relevant aspects of the central regist er, including its technical infrastructure and 
the financing mechanisms.  However, the ECB notes that the expected significant increase in the 
                                                 
6  See p aragraph 2 of Opinions CON/2011/30 and CON/2011/98.  
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5 number of requests for access  may, if the  new access requests are not received in an automated 
manner or via electronic means , necessitate the mobili sation of substantial NBB staff resources 
and place a disproportionate burden on the NBB’s organisational capacity . This may negatively 
impact  the NBB’s capacity to properly perform its existing central banking tasks. The ECB therefore 
urges t he Belgian legislator t o ensure that the entry into force of  the draft law be accompanied by  
the implementation of a corresponding cost recovery mechanism , in order  to safeguard the 
financial independence of the NBB  and dispel the monetary finan cing concer ns associated with 
carrying out a government task . 
3.3 Discharge of task s on behalf and in exclusive interest of Government  
 The ECB has previously opined that tasks entrusted to an ESCB member relating to the 
establishment of a central register of bank accounts are not central bank tasks nor do they facilitate 
the enforcement of such tasks7. The ECB consider s this task to be clearly a government  task since 
its purpose is to combat tax evasion, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It thus  
cannot be regarded in any respect as a central bank task . 
3.4 Complementarity of task s with existing NBB tasks  and extent to which conflicts of interest  with 
existing NBB tasks are addressed 
Under the Royal Decree of 17 July 2013, the reasons for entrusting the  NBB with the task of 
operating the central register are that the NBB is capable of handling sensitive bank account data, 
the NBB is neutral and independent of the other institutions involved in tax collection and the NBB 
has experience in centralising sensitive financial data. Notwithstanding these reasons , the ECB has 
analysed if  the operation of a central register with such broad access is complementary to the 
NBB’s existing tasks. The ECB notes  that the draft law is only extending the scope of persons 
having access to the existing register and that the central register has been placed into a separate 
department, with access to the database being exclusively granted by the NBB Board to certain 
staff. This institutional set -up should help to alleviate conc erns regarding potential  conflict s of 
interest . 
3.5 Extent to which the performance of task s is aligned with institutional set -up of NCB  
 In view of the fact that operating a central register of bank accounts cannot be regarded as a 
central bank task, this  might raise concerns as to how such a task would fit into the institutional set -
up of the NBB. However , it is acknowledged that locating the central register in a separate 
department adequately ensures that the data obtained in this context are not access ible to other 
NBB departments carrying out ESCB or other national tasks.  
3.6 Extent to which the performance of task s entails substantial financial risks  
 As emphasised in its previous opinion8, the liability of the NBB in relation to the operation of the 
central register is explicitly limited to cases of misconduct or wilful negligence, on account of the 
extremely limited control that the NBB has over the correctness and completeness of the data 
contained in the central register. This limitation of the NB B’s liability should help to reduce the 
financial risks associated with the performance of the extension of access to the exisiting register to 
a broa der range of persons . 
                                                 
7  See p aragraph 3.1.3 of  Opinion CON/2015/46.  
8  Paragraph 1.2 of Opinion CON/2011/98.  
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6 3.7 Extent to which the performance of task s exposes members of NBB’s Board to dispr oportionate 
political risks or could impact their personal independence 
 The limitation of the NBB’s liability in relation to the operation of the central register is without 
prejudice to the Law of 8 December 1992 on the protection of privacy in relation to the processing 
of personal data, which  applies to NBB as the central register is deemed to be a ‘ filing system ’ 
within the meaning of the said law.  This law requires, in particular, that the NBB takes any 
appropriate technical and organisational measures necessary to protect personal data from 
unauthorised access and processing. In view of the increased number of persons authorised to 
access the central register, the NBB’s  compliance with this obligation will inevitably become more 
complex. It cannot be excluded that the NBB’s Board could be exposed to reputational risks, 
should the data be accessed by a non- authorised applicant or otherwise be publicly disclosed . The 
fact that the central register will contain sensitive information could place NBB’s Boar d members in 
a difficult position should this information enter into the public domain, potentially entailing a 
negative impact on their personal independence.  
3.8 Conclusion  
 The ECB is concerned by the absence in the draft law of clear financial arrangem ents regarding 
the full recovery  of the costs to be incurred by the NBB in perform ing its tasks concerning the 
central  register  of bank accounts . With a view to safeguarding  the financial independence of the 
NBB and dispel ling the monetary financing concer ns associated with carrying out a government 
task, the ECB urges the Belgian legislator to ensure that the entry into force of the draft law be 
accompanied by procedures for monitoring, allocating and invoicing all costs associated with 
granting extended access to the central register .  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 June 2016 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI