(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.

A high perceived independence of the judiciary is paramount for the trust which justice in a society governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals, and is contributing to a growth-friendly business environment, as a perceived lack of independence can deter investments ( ). In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence from various sources, the Scoreboard presents a number of indicators on how justice systems are organised to protect judicial independence in certain types of situations where independence could be at risk. Reflecting the input from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC), and from the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EGMLTF), the Scoreboard presents indicators related to security checks on judges, possibility of higher/Supreme Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on their own initiative , safeguards in revolving doors situations regarding judges and prosecutors, as well as a more in-depth view on the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case.

The involvement of National Security Agencies belonging to the executive in the appointment and status of judges is particularly sensitive from the perspective of judicial independence. While there may be a legitimate interest, especially for certain specific judicial posts, to conduct a verification of security (), this should be done in full respect for judicial independence. According to European standards, “independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch” (). Security checks on judges, especially when carried out by an executive body, may constitute such an ‘external pressure’ (). When security/integrity checks are not carried out by self-governing bodies of the judiciary themselves but by an external body, utmost consideration must be given to respecting the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances ().

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment nor present quantitative data on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details of the procedures and accompanying safeguards. It should also be noted that implementing policies and practices to promote integrity and prevent corruption within the judiciary are also essential to guarantee judicial independence. Ultimately, the effective protection of judicial independence also requires, beyond whatever necessary norms, a culture of integrity and impartiality, shared by magistrates and respected by the wider society.

Specifically, this edition of the Scoreboard contains new indicators on: (i) authorities involved and the frequency of potential security checks on judges (Figure 56); (ii) the possibility of higher/Supreme Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law on their own initiative (Figure 57); and (iii) the safeguards in place relating to the temporary employment of judges/prosecutors on political posts (Figure 58) ( ). It also presents a more detailed overview of the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case involving crimes with a victim or a case involving 'victimless crimes' (e.g. corruption or money laundering) (Figure 59), and shows the bodies with power to conduct criminal investigations (Figure 60) ( ). The figures present the national frameworks as they were in place in December 2021.

The guarantees of structural independence require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the court and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it ( ). Those rules must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also types of influence that are more indirect and that are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned ( ).

(*) DE: In all federal states, the National Security Agency can check its records about a candidate judge before appointment upon an explicit request. In two federal states, the National Security Agency conducts a check of its records on all candidate judges before appointment: in Bavaria (if a candidate judge does not give consent for the check of records, they cannot be appointed); since 2021, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (not requiring their consent). By law, the National Security Agency or the agencies of the federal states only perform verification processes if judges are to be concerned with tasks within the court administration and need to get access to classified information for that purpose. Apart from that, judges are legally exempt from security checks when granted access to classified information, as such procedures could influence judicial independence. EE: The Internal Security Service performs the security check of a candidate for judicial office, except if the candidate holds a valid access permit to access state secrets classified as top secret or if the candidate occupies a position that provides the right by virtue of office to access all levels of state secrets. The Internal Security Service presents the information gathered as a result of the security check to the judge’s examination committee and provides an opinion on whether a person who submitted the application meets the conditions for being issued a permit for access to state secrets. HR: The Security and Intelligence Agency conducts security checks on all candidates for judges and on all existing judges every 5 years (as well as state attorneys). According to the law, for existing judges, the Security and Intelligence Agency, after conducting a check including an interview, will send its report to the Supreme Court President who will then assign it to a panel of five Supreme Court judges to decide if there is a security issue. If the panel finds a security issue, this will be notified to the Minister of Justice, the Court President and Judges’ Council and the President of Higher Court where the judge in question sits. The Minister of Justice will prescribe the by-laws regulating the procedure for conducting security checks. FR: As all state officials, all candidate judges are subjected to a police records check/an administrative investigation led by the national police under the authority of the general prosecutor (checking its records, classified information, morality behaviour…). IT: The chart reflects the situation for judges in civil and criminal courts. National security agencies are not involved in the procedure for appointing administrative judges. HU: All regional court presidents, vice presidents and judges who permit intelligence data gathering or deal with cases related to classified information need to undergo a security check by the National Security Agency . The security check is conducted before assuming their responsibilities and then every five years (Section 71/C, paragraph (7), of Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security and Sections 42/A to 42/C of Act CLXII of 2011 on the Status and Remuneration of Judges). NL: A certificate of good conduct (VOG) needs to be handed over before a candidate judge can be appointed. This is only done at first appointments or when a judge becomes president of a court. The organisation providing VOGs is called Justis - the screening authority that is a benefit-expense agency with independent management, which is formally under the Ministry of Justice & Security. The authority checks whether a candidate’s (judicial) history is an objection to carrying out the duties of the new office. Justis is not the National Security Agency (AIVD). It is the decision of Justis, whether or not to hand out a certificate of good conduct. If someone wishes to appeal this decision, they can take the case to an administrative judge. PL: When a person first applies to a judicial post, the president of the competent court (where the vacant post exists) requests information on the candidate from the Regional Head of Police. RO: Judges give a formal statement, on a yearly basis, that they are not operatives, including undercover agents, informers or collaborators of the intelligence services. SE*: The Judicial Appointments Board, an independent judicial body, conducts the verification procedure for all security levels for court presidents, based on a questionnaire. Each court performs the verification procedure for all security levels for first or second instance judges. The Swedish Security Service conducts a records check (whether the candidate has been referred to in its records in any way), which is carried out before a person can take part in security sensitive activities (the Service does not collect information through a questionnaire, which is the task of the Judicial Appointments Board). For court presidents, the government decides which positions are to be classified for security on the highest security level and the Government Office decides which positions are to be classified for security on the lower security levels. For first or second instance judges, the government decides which positions are to be classified for security on the highest security level and the court decides which positions are to be classified for security on the lower security level.

Figure 57 shows whether courts or judges have the possibility to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on their own initiative. Such decisions could either be advisory or obligatory, and could apply only to a particular case, or to all cases of a similar type. The figure below shows four different situations in Member States: higher courts/judges i) cannot issue such decision on their own initiative, ii) they can issue advisory (non-binding) decisions of general application that apply to all courts/judges in particular types of cases (e.g. practice statements), iii) they can issue obligatory decisions of concrete application that apply only to a specific judicial decision (e.g. decision which oblige a judge/panel to adapt the draft judgment), or iv) they can issue obligatory decisions of general application that apply to all courts/judges in particular types of cases.

Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, and higher/appeal courts in general, are essential to secure the uniform application of the law in Member States. Nevertheless, hierarchical judicial organisation should not undermine individual independence (). Superior courts should not address instructions to judges about the way they should decide individual cases, except in national preliminary rulings or when deciding on legal remedies according to the law (). A hierarchical organisation of the judiciary in the sense of a subordination of judges to higher instances in their judicial decision-making activity would be a clear violation of the principle of internal independence, according to the Venice Commission (). Any procedure for the unification of case-law must comply with fundamental principles of separation of powers, and even after such a decision of a higher/Supreme Court, all courts and judges must remain competent to assess their cases independently and impartially, and to distinguish new cases from the interpretation previously unified by a higher/Supreme Court.

Figure 57: Possibility of higher/Supreme Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on their own initiative (*)

(*) BG: Not following the obligatory decision or a general direction for particular kinds of cases is taken into account during the evaluation of the magistrates, which is an objective assessment of their professional, business and moral qualities, demonstrated in the performance of their position. CZ: The Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court can issue unifying opinions which are not formally binding for the courts of lower level. The binding nature of the unifying opinions is based not on their formal status but on the authority of the Supreme Courts and the persuasiveness of their reasoning. The Supreme Court uses unifying opinions for legal questions they consider to be of special importance. Regarding the possibility to diverge, a judge is bound only by the law in their decision-making. A diversion is thus possible but such a decision should be properly justified. HR: There are registration judges on each county court and on High Commercial Court, High Misdemeanour Court, High Administrative, High Criminal Court and Supreme Court, which register the judgments so that they can be notified to the parties, and can alert a judge/chamber when a draft judgment diverges from previously delivered case law and can propose to discuss the divergence at a section meeting pursuant to Article 40 of the Law on Courts, in order to issue a decision of the section which is binding on all judges in the court. LV: The Plenary Session (the assembly of all judges of the Supreme Court) and the general meeting of judges of the Departments of the Supreme Court can adopt opinions regarding the issues of interpretation and application of law standards in the form of a decision, which is published on the web site. HU: a judge can diverge from the obligatory decision 'only if the facts of the case differ from the facts of the obligatory decision or with reasoning of diverging in points of law.' PL: Among others, the First President of the Supreme Court or Presidents of the Supreme Court’s chambers, or the President of the Supreme Administrative Court may propose on their own initiative that an ‘abstract legal issue’ is clarified by a panel of seven judges of the Supreme Court/Supreme Administrative Court in case of non-uniformity of judicial decisions/judgments delivered by the courts. The abstract resolution adopted by seven judges, presenting interpretation of the law, is not binding for the lower courts and has an influence on lower court only based on the authority of the Supreme Court/Supreme Administrative Court and on the persuasiveness of their reasoning. Such abstract resolutions may be binding on the Supreme Court only if the seven-judge panel decides so, unless overruled by a larger bench (e.g. a resolution of a whole Chamber of the Supreme Court or by the whole Supreme Court; Art. 88 of the Law on the Supreme Court). RO: To ensure a consistent interpretation and implementation of the law by all courts, the High Court of Justice and Cassation in the procedure ‘appeals in the interest of the law’, ex officio or upon request by parties, rules on legal issues that have been settled differently by courts of law. Such decisions have no effects on the court judgments being examined or on the status of parties in those cases. According to Article 99 of Law no. 303/2004 on the statute of judges and prosecutors, not complying with the appeals in the interest of law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice constitutes a disciplinary misconduct. This means that a disciplinary procedure against the judge concerned can be initiated. SI: Principled legal opinions on issues important for the uniform application of laws have a nature of a normative individual legal act whose scope goes beyond a specific case. It is binding on all panels of the Supreme Court and, only by force of reasoning, on lower courts, for which it is constitutionally acceptable to deviate from the adopted principled legal opinion, as in the case of deviating from the established case-law, if such deviation is supported by reasoning. SK: A court/judge is bound by the obligatory decision of the hierarchically superior court. In certain cases the inferior court is entitled to diverge from the obligatory decision of hierarchically superior courts/judges. There are three main reasons for doing so: (i) change of facts; (ii) different legal opinion expressed in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU; and (iii) an amendment of the laws. For specific proceedings, a judge can be subject to disciplinary proceedings at the Supreme Court.

Figure 58 shows the safeguards in place in situations where judges or prosecutors decide to temporarily become employed in politically-exposed positions, notably positions as politicians, ministers, government officials, cabinet members or positions in other political offices. The figure shows whether or not judges or prosecutors can take up such employment and afterwards return to the position of a judge or a prosecutor, or whether specific rules are in place to safeguard their impartiality.

Figure 58: Safeguards relating to temporary employment of judges/prosecutors as politicians/ministers/government officials/cabinet members/in other political offices (*)

(*) BG: Magistrates can temporarily be appointed in these positions. For their re-appointment as judges/prosecutors/investigative magistrates, special procedural rules are in place requiring an application to be submitted to the relevant panel of the Supreme Judicial Council within 14 days from the date of their dismissal from the other (temporary) position with a view to their reinstatement. DE: If a prosecutor is elected to the Federal Parliament/appointed as a member of the Federal Government, the rights and duties deriving from the public employment are suspended for the period of the mandate (with the exception of duties relating to official secrecy and the prohibition to accept rewards or gratifications); when the mandate at the Bundestag has come to an end, the respective public servant may request (within a period of 3 month after the end of the mandate) their reinsertion into their former service, which has to be realised within 3 month after the request and at the same or an equivalent level as the former position (if reinsertion is not requested, the rights and duties deriving from the public employment continue to be suspended). In case of a return of a public official after a period of activity as a government member, which, in principle, is possible with consent of both sides (otherwise a status of retirement applies), the specific rules (statutory disclosure requirements or related possibilities for a temporary prohibition to take up certain activities) do not apply - such requirements only apply, where subsequent activities in the private sector are intended by a former government member. DK: It is a prerequisite that upon returning to the prosecution service, the prosecutor can be approved and sustain the security approval provided. EE: Judges: Although there is no specific regulation, which would limit the areas in which the judge could work, upon returning to judgeship, there is one important condition upon the return: a judge may return to a vacant position of judge in the same court by giving at least one month’s advance notice thereof to the chairman of the corresponding court. If after leaving the state service, a judge does not have the opportunity to return to a vacant position of judge in the same court and they do not desire to be transferred to another court, the judge is released from office and receives compensation in an amount equal to their six months’ salary. Prosecutors: a prosecutor cannot be a member of a political party. ES: Judges: Judges who become members of Parliament or Government can return to the same court or judicial position after their political mandate. The only exception to these rules applies to judges of the Supreme Court, who lose their judicial position at the Supreme Court upon returning to judgeship and must sit at a lower court. Furthermore, the general rules of withdrawal and recusal apply if the judge has to decide a case which involves politicians or political interests upon returning to judgeship. Prosecutors: Those who are returned to the prosecution service must refrain, and where appropriate may be challenged, from intervening in any matters in which political parties or groups are involved, or those of their members who hold or have held public office. FR: To return to the judgeship, a judge who has been previously politician/minister/government official/cabinet member is required to apply to a new position and the Council must formally approve their appointment. Before returning to a position of a judge, the person must wait during a "cooling-off" period of five years in the area it exercised a public mandate, or three years in the case of a European Parliament mandate. HR: There are specific rules regarding the positions to which prosecutors can temporarily be seconded as well as procedure that must be followed. IT: The chart reflects the situation in the civil and criminal courts. The High Council for the Judiciary must give authorisation for judges in civil and criminal courts. Administrative judges can work in consultative sections of Council of State or in jurisdictional sections which have no competence on matters related to the previous activity of the judge. Prosecutors who run for Parliamentary elections may return to the prosecution service only to work in a district other than the one where they run for election (irrespective of whether they were elected or not). Prosecutors may not run for Parliamentary elections in the district where they performed their functions in the last six months prior to their candidacy. For regional and municipal elections, prosecutors may not run for election in the Region where they exercise their functions. LV: Judges cannot be involved in any capacity in political life (even not members of a political party). AT: regarding prosecutors, before returning to a position of a prosecutor in a management position (i.e. head of a public prosecutor's office, of a senior public prosecutor's office, of the General procurator's office), the person must wait during a "cooling-off" period of five years. PL: As regards appointment to political positions, the elected judge must renounce his judicial mandate but retains the right to return to judicial office (to the post held prior to the appointment) if the period in which the political function was exercised does not exceed 9 years. Authorisation is required by the National Council for Judiciary. PT: Judges and prosecutors need a previous authorisation of the Judicial High Council or Superior Council of Public Prosecution (CSMP), respectively. SK: After returning to judgeship, judge must not apply for a position of President or Vice-President of court. Notification is done to Ministry of Justice 60 days before returning to the judgeship.

– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU –

Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system as well as in cooperation between Member States in criminal matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution service is crucial for the effective fight against crime, including economic and financial crime, such as money laundering, and corruption. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision ( ), the public prosecutor’s office can be considered a Member State judicial authority for the purposes of issuing and executing a European arrest warrant whenever it can act independently, without being exposed to the risk of being subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, such as a Minister for Justice ( ).

The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no uniform model for all Member States. However, the Council of Europe has noted a widespread tendency to have a more independent prosecutor’s office, rather than one subordinated or linked to the executive ( ). According to the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, an effective and autonomous prosecution service committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights in the administration of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic state (). Moreover, in a democratic society, both courts and the investigative authorities must remain free from political pressure. The concept of independence means that prosecutors are free

from unlawful interference in the exercise of their duties so as to ensure full respect for and application of the law and the principle of the rule of law and that they are not subjected to any political pressure or unlawful influence of any kind (). Independence applies not only to the prosecution service as a whole, but also to its particular bodies and to individual prosecutors ( ). Whatever the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards require that Member States take effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and responsibilities under adequate legal and organisational conditions ( ) and without unjustified interference ( ). In particular, where the government gives instructions of a general nature, for example on crime policy, such instructions must be in writing and published in an adequate way ( ). Where the government has the power to give instructions to prosecute a specific case, such instructions must carry with them adequate guarantees ( ). According to the 2000 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, instructions not to prosecute should in principle be prohibited or be exceptional and subject to specific safeguards ( ). Interested parties (including victims) should be able to challenge a decision of a public prosecutor not to prosecute a case ( ), which also provides a form of accountability of prosecutors ().

The decision not to prosecute can create an issue in terms of accountability of prosecutors, which is why a legal remedy is important ( ). The figure below provides a more detailed overview of the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case. These figures do not assess the effective functioning of the prosecution services, which requires a qualitative assessment that takes account of the specific circumstances of each Member State.

Figure 59 presents the authorities that decide on a request to review a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute in an individual case for victimless crimes (e.g. money laundering, corruption) and for crimes with a victim (e.g. bodily harm) (). It shows who conducts a check on the work of individual prosecutors, which has an impact on the functioning of the prosecution service. In some Member States, the decision not to prosecute is reviewed by different authorities: either superior prosecutors (including where relevant the Prosecutor General) or a court. In some Member States, the decision is first reviewed before the superior prosecutors, and then this decision can be challenged before a court (countries where column is in two colours). Where the column is in one colour, either only the superior prosecutor, or only the court review the decision not to prosecute. In some of Member States, the decision cannot be reviewed.





Figure 59: Authority reviewing a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute (*) (Source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)

(*) For all Member States: Where such review exists, in the case of victimless crimes, the decision not to prosecute could be challenged/overruled by the superior prosecutor (in BG, CZ, DE, ES, FR, LV, LU, PL, PT and RO), challenged by the complainant who notified about the alleged criminal offense (in DE (via disciplinary complaint), IE (National Police Service), FR (including administrative bodies), PL (as regards state and local-government institutions, and private parties in specific cases, HR, IT, LV, HU, NL, SI and SK) or could be challenged by others, such as persons who have presumed/legitimate interest (DK, DE, RO), the Commissioner for Legal Protection (AT), anyone (PT: for certain victimless crimes) and anyone (FI). In the case of crimes with a victim, the decision not to prosecute can be challenged by the superior prosecutor (in BG, CZ, DE, FR, LV, LU, PT and RO), by the victim (in BG, CZ, DE, EE, IE, ES, FR, IT, LV, HU, MT, NL, AT, PT, PL, SI and SK) or by others, such as persons who have presumed/legitimate interest (DK, RO, PL), an administration that its entitled to act (FR), and anyone (FI). Private prosecution is possible in BG, IE, HR, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI and SE.

The symbols ‘##’ for AT: Austrian law knows different types of decisions not to prosecute. If the prosecution refrains from starting investigations because of the lack of an initial suspicion, then the decision cannot be challenged (The decision is however not binding). If the prosecution decides not to prosecute after an investigation (both in certain victimless crimes and crimes with a victim), the decision can be challenged before the court. The symbol ‘*’ for BG: The prosecutor decides whether the requirements of the law for initiating preliminary proceedings are present. If not, the prosecutor issues a Decree for refusal to institute preliminary proceedings (the refusal to open an investigation). This refusal is subject to appeal only before the higher-standing prosecutor’s office. If preliminary proceedings were initiated, once concluded, the prosecutor can terminate them or to bring the case to the court (the decision to prosecute). The decree not to start a prosecution for crimes with a victim, is subject to appeal before court within 7 days. If this deadline is not met, the decision can still be appealed but only before the higher-standing prosecutor’s office. In cases of victimless crimes, the decision not to prosecute can only be revoked ex officio by the higher-standing prosecutor’s office by a signal or after self-initiation. EE: A victim can file an appeal against the investigative body’s decision not to initiate criminal proceedings with the prosecutor’s office. The decision of the prosecutor’s office not to initiate or to terminate criminal proceedings can be challenged at the Office of the Prosecutor General. The decision of the Office of the Prosecutor General can be challenged at the District Court. ES: The judge investigator is the authority vested with the power to decide whether to prosecute or not. Following a decision not to prosecute, the judge investigator should inform the other parties to the process (i.e. the public prosecutor and the victim/complainant), who are able to challenge the decision before the court. IT: In any criminal proceedings, if the public prosecutor deems that the conditions for prosecution are not met (e.g. due to insufficient evidence), he/she shall file a request for dismissal with the judge for preliminary investigations who shall decide whether to accept or not the prosecutor’s request. CY: If the Attorney General decides not to prosecute a case (based on the evidence at hand and recommendations of the Attorneys at the Law Office), only the Attorney General can reverse such a decision. LT: The decision of a pre-trial investigation officer not to commence a pre-trial investigation is made only with the consent of the head of the pre-trial investigation authority. The resolution not to commence a pre-trial investigation must be sent to the prosecutor within 24 hours, who checks the decision within 10 days. The rejected decision of the prosecutor can be appealed to the court. The resolution of a pre-trial investigation officer can also be appealed to the prosecutor. If rejected, the prosecutor's decision can be appealed to the court. The judge's decision again can be appealed to the superior court. HU: Judicial review for crimes with a victim is possible only in the framework of private prosecution (e.g. in cases of defamation and libel) or substitute private prosecution (following a prosecutorial decision not to prosecute). MT: Prosecution of criminal offences is being transferred from the police to the Office of the Attorney General. The transition is planned to be completed by the end of 2025. In October 2020, the Attorney General took over the decision to prosecute and the institution of prosecutions before the inferior courts of specified serious crimes. Regulation, entered into effect in October 2020, provides for judicial review (before civil courts) of decisions not to prosecute of the Attorney General on the ground of illegality or unreasonableness. When the decision to prosecute and prosecution is vested in the Commissioner of Police, challenge proceedings may be instituted before the Court of Magistrates. PL: The framework differentiates between a decision to refuse the initiation of prosecution and a decision to discontinue the prosecution. The initiation of prosecution can be challenged in front of the superior prosecutor and before court, by the victim, State, local-government or community institution which notified the alleged offence. The discontinuation of prosecution can be challenged by the parties to proceedings, State or local-government institution that notified the alleged offence, and, only if the alleged offence led to breach of that person’s rights, a person notifying an offence concerning solely specific types of criminal acts listed in the law. PT: A prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be reviewed either through an autonomous procedural phase, the instrução (reopening of the inquiry), which specifically envisages the judicial confirmation of the decision to indict or to file the investigation. This reopening of the inquiry may be requested by an ‘assistente’ if the procedure does not depend upon private prosecution. A prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can also be reviewed before an immediate superior of the Public Prosecutor within 20 days from the date in which the opening of the inquiry may no longer be requested. SI: State prosecutors cannot dismiss criminal complaints for certain criminal offences without the co-signature of the head of state prosecutor’s office. State prosecutors must inform certain categories of people and state authorities that filed a criminal complaint about their intention and reasons to dismiss it, and enable them to give an opinion on the reasons for the dismissal. Once the decision to dismiss a criminal complaint or to discontinue prosecution has been taken it is final, but the injured party may decide to take over the (private) prosecution. SE: The decision is public. The victim of a crime as well as the suspect can ask for a review. The request is taken care of by the prosecutor who made the decision. In case of new evidence or circumstances, the prosecutor can decide to take action. If no new information, the Development Centre decides on revision.