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COMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(80)808 final
Brussels,10thDecember1980
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NUCLEAR SAFETYINTHECOMMUNITY OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
THEREPORTOFTHEEXPERTGROUPONNUCLEARSAFETY
C0MC80)808final

COMMISSION
OFTHE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Coyer note
Following anaccident that occurred inanuclear power station atThree
Mile Island (USA),theCommission decided tosetupagroup ofhigh-level
independent experts inthefield ofnuclear safety .
TheGroup 'stask was toadvise theCommission onallproblems relating to
thepresent situation regarding nuclear safety within theCommunity ,
including itsimplications where radiation protection isconcerned ,and to
evaluate theactivities conducted byCommunity institutions inthis field
forthepurpose offormulating anysuggestion that may serve asabasis for
measures tobetaken bytheCommunity .
Oncompletion oftheir deliberations ,theexperts submitted totheCommission
areport giving their opinions andrecommendations onvarious specific
subjects .Some ofthese recommendations areaddressed tothecompetent
authorities intheMember States andtothenuclear power station constructors
andoperators andothers totheCommission .
TheExpert Group hasthus formulated independent views andrecommendations
foraction that without doubt make asignificant contribution tothethinking
intheMember States andtheCommunity onproblems regarding nuclear safety .
TheCommission hasnoted that certain recommendations arealready put into
practice intheMember States while others arealso already thesubject of
Community activities inpursuance oftheEuratom Treaty .Athird category
ofrecommendations covers aspects that fall within thevirtually exclusive
responsibility oftheMember States andinrespect ofwhich theCommission 's
role canonly betopromote dialogue .
Taken asawhole ,therecommendations addressed totheCommission will have to
bestudied indetail ,inparticular where they must beappraised inrelation
totheobligations deriving from theEuratom Treaty ,before anynewproposals

2
foraction canbedrawn up.TheCommission attaches special importance to
the recommendations on:
-thedevelopment ofconsistent administrative procedures forrecording
theindividual dose equivalents accumulated by"migrant "maintenance
workers throughout theCommunity ;
-theestablishment ,inconjunction with power station operators ,ofa
European Equipment Reliability Data System ;
-theestablishment ofasystem fortherapid communication ofinformation
onabnormal events occurring innuclear power stations ;
-attempts tofind common approaches toreactor siting ;
-thecompilation ofalist ofconventions andagreements between Member
States oninformation andassistance intheevent ofanemergency ;
-theholding ofseminars onsimulators andcontrol-room layout ;
-thepromotion ofregular exchanges ofinformation onimproved maintenance
procedures between reactor designers andoperators inthevarious Member
States .
TheCommission considered ,however ,that there wasnoneed towait for
specific proposals foranynewactivities tobeprepared before forwarding ,
forinformation ,thereport oftheExpert Group totheCouncil ,theEuropean
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee .

NUCIEAR SAFETY INTHE CONTEXT OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
THE REPORT OFTHE EXPERT GROUP CNNUCLEAR SAFETY
HJDUNSTER (Chairman )
DGHLATZKO
DSMIDT
SVILLANI
Brussels
May1980
Revised September 1980

NUCIEAR SAFETY INTHE CONTEXT OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
CONTENTS
1.Introduction
2.Safety Criteria andSafety Aspects oftheDesign ofPressurised Water
Reactors .
3.Power Plant Staff
4.Information andData Banks onAccidents andEquipment Failures
5.Reactor Siting
6.Emergency Plans
7.Public Information inEmergencies
8.TheManagement oftheResearch Programmes oftheCommunity
9.Institutional Arrangements
10.General Recommendations andConclusions .
Appendix
1.Commission decisions of16Mayand 2October 1979

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTICN
The Group was established asaresult oftheCommission Decision of16May
1979 (reproduced inAppendix 1)and themembers were appointed bySeptember
1979 .TheGroup comprised : HJDunster ,
DGHLatzko
DSmidt
SVillani
JVanCaeneghem wasappointed bytheCommission tobeourSecretary .Weheld
our first meeting on2October 1979 andelected HJDunster asChairman .We
have met approximately monthly thereafter .Intotal wehave held seven
meetings .
1.1 TheAim andScope ofourWork
Inkeeping with theCommission 'sdecision ,ouraimhas been toprovide the
Commission with suggestions concerning future Community action inthefield of
nuclear safety .While this aimbyitself provides forcertain limitations in
the scope because ofthe Commission 'srole innuclear safety ,which is
complementary tothat oftheMember States ,theterms ofreference setout in
theCommission 'sdecision aresowide that we,asagroup offour with astaff
ofone ,found itimperative todefine further limits tothescope .This was
first setout totheCommission inthefollowing statement :
"The Group considered the mandate defined for usinthe Commission
Decision of16May1979 .
Wereviewed thevery broad scope implied byarticle 2.1ofthat decision
against the inevitable limitations imposed inpractice bythe time and
effort available for ourwork and against the extent ofour individual
expertise .
Weconcluded that weshould concentrate our efforts ontopics which we
considered tobeimportant tothedefinition oftheCommunity 'sfuture
role innuclear safety andagreed tointerpret article 2.1and toassess
thepriorities fortheitems inarticle 2.2inthat light ".
The practical development ofthis statement led ustoexclude from our
considerations topics inwhich we,asagroup ,felt welacked thenecessary
expertise :physical plant protection ,reprocessing of nuclear fuel ,
radioactive waste disposal and thedecommissioning ofnuclear installations .
Apart from our own limitations ,wewould not advocate the discussion of
physical plant protection inwidely accessible reports such asthepresent ,as
this might create more risks than benefits .Wewere encouraged toexclude
reprocessing and waste disposal byour awareness that acomprehensive and
authoritative review oftherelevant technologies hadrecently been completed
intheInternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE ).Decommissioning
isalso thesubject ofinternational discussion which weexpect will continue .
Wehave concentrated ourdiscussion oftheCommunity 'sresearch programme on
the initiation andmanagement ofprogramme items .Anindependent review of
the content oftheprogramme ,even iflimited toreactor safety ,would need
substantially more effort than wasprovided forinsetting upthis group .
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Although theGroup wasestablished astheresult oftheaccident atThree Mile
Island ,our terms ofreference have ledustoexamine anumber ofaspects of
theCommunity 'swork innuclear safety inageneral way ,while keeping the
lessons ofthe Three Mile Island accident inmind .Much ofourwork has ,
therefore ,been ofageneral nature .Its technical content focuses onthe
reactor aspects ofnuclear safety .Where wehave needed tobespecific toa
particular reactor system wehave dealt with thepressurised water reactor
(PWR )because this isthemost widespread type ofreactor intheCommunity .
1.2 OurReport
There are wide variations inthe extent towhich Member States are involved
with nuclear power .Some points aremade inthereport which will already be
commonplace tomany people .Nevertheless ,thereport should beheeded byall
concerned .Nuclear safety isofCommunity-wide -indeed ,ofworld-wide -
importance because abad accident anywhere inthe world would have major
repercussions everywhere .The accident atThree Mile Island had almost no
consequences forpublic health but itsimpact across theWorld hasbeen very
substantial .
Inthe remainder ofthis report wedeal with ,andmake recommendations on,a
number oftopics mainly ofatechnical nature .Insome cases wehave included
more detailed material inappendices .Finally ,inChapter 10,wemake some
general recommendations anddraw some general conclusions .
Our task has been toadvise theCommission ,andmany ofour recommendations
therefore deal with specific Commission functions .However ,weareconcerned
with nuclear safety intheCommunity andsome ofourrecommendations deal more
generally with nuclear safety issues .Wehope these recommendations will be
ofinterest tothe national authorities ofthe Member States aswell asto
the Commission .
1.3 Acknowledgements
Wearevery grateful tooursecretary fortheexcellent work hehasdone in
arranging ourmeetings and dealing with ourworking papers andrecords .We
arealso grateful totheCommission and itsstaff forthesubstantial flow of
information which they have provided andfortheconvenient arrangements which
they have made forourmeetings .
-2-

CHAPTER 2
SAFETY CRITERIA AND SAFETY ASPECTS OFTHE DESIGN OFPRESSURISED WATER REACTORS
2.1 Introduction
While theThree Mile Island reactor was aBabcock andWilcox design ,only one
ofwhich ispresently under construction inEurope ,many ofthelessons learnt
from theaccident atThree Mile Island areofageneral nature .Ourapproach
inthe review ofreactor safety aspects has therefore been tofirst look at
the two PWR designs predominant inthe Community ,viz .that deriving from
Westinghouse and used inFrance ,Italy and Belgium ,and theKraftwerk Union
(KWU )design used inGermany andtheNetherlands ,andinvestigate some safety -
related generic differences between these twodesigns .Weconcluded that these
differences were due principally todifferences indesign philosophy rather
than innational criteria orrequirements .Wethen proceeded toestablish the
main lessons from the Three Mile Island accident that might begenerally
applicable tothesafety ofPWRs intheCommunity .Finally ,webriefly state
our views onthe usefulness ofharmonisation efforts bythe Commission
concerning safety criteria andregulatory requirements .
One very important point for the safety ofPWRs isthe integrity ofthe
reactor pressure vessel andtheprimary circuit .Because ofthecomprehensive
national efforts and the regular meetings of international specialist
committees ,which provide fordetailed studies and fortheadequate exchange
ofinformation inthis area ,theGroup hasnotdiscussed this topic .
There isone notable way inwhich European practice differs from that inthe
United States ofAmerica .Generally speaking ,the electricity supply
companies inthe Community either supervise themselves the design and
construction ofentire plants orarrange forthedesign andconstruction tobe
inthe hands ofasingle large and experienced vendor having effective
feedback ofoperational experience .Inthe United States ,itiscommon for
the nuclear island tobeprovided byone supplier and the remainder ofthe
plant byothers .Webelieve that there aresignificant safety advantages in
the former basis ofsupply ,asitavoids therisks ofinterface difficulties
that may arise from the dependence ofautility oninformation supplied by
vendors with separate responsibilities .
2.2 AComparison ofSafety Principles andDesign ofPWRs intheCommunity
Wehave considered anumber ofsafety systems inwhich wesee significant
differences between theWestinghouse and theKWUdesigns .Some features of
other European reactors have also been taken into account .
2.2.1 Redundancy andDiversity inEngineered Safeguards
Ingeneral terms ,redundancy isprovided toensure that single failures cannot
invalidate asafety system ,while diversity between redundant systems is
introduced toreduce the probability that acommon-mode failure will
invalidate several equivalent systems atthesame time .Redundant systems may
becompletely independent (not interconnected )atallstages ofasequence of
functions ,orthey may beinterconnected sothat thesequence ofafunction
can bediverted from one chain toanother inthecase ofapartial failure .
The former arrangement gives avery simple system ofcontrol and provides
ahigh standard ofprotection against faulty operation .The interconnected
system ,however ,gives greater operational flexibility ,which canbevalue to
3

skilled operators ,butwhich maysometimes beachieved attheexpense ofa
loss ingenuine redundancy .Inparticular ,thenecessary degree ofredundancy
may beomitted from the interconnection .Forexample ,asingle component ,
such asastorage tank ,mayservice alltheotherwise redundant systems .Such
aprovision would beprohibited byarigid refusal toaccept interconnected
systems .Inshort ,while interconnection does not ofitself result ina
reduction ofredundancy ,itsuse inpractice often hasthat effect .
There isaclose relationship between thedegree ofredundancy adopted andthe
emphasis placed ondiversity .Forexample ,Westinghouse plants have diverse
driving mechanisms for auxiliary feed-water pumps ,one being electrically
driven and the other driven byasteam turbine .The KWU system uses more
redundancy but the same type ofdrive mechanism ,though with diverse design
and separate power supplies .Diversity has obvious merit inprinciple ,but
introduces theproblems ofmore complex maintenance procedures .Asfaraswe
areaware ,theadvantages canbedemonstrated theoretically ,buthave notbeen
observed inpractice .
2.2.2 Automation
The use ofautomatic arrangements tocontrol reactors inboth normal and
abnormal situations has been increasing and thedifferences between reactor
systems depend more onthe date ofdesign than onthe difference between
manufacturers .Automation hasanumber ofidentifiable advantages :
itcanhelp toavoid operator errors :
- itprovides anintegration ofdifferent inputs ofinformation ;and
thus relieves theoperators ofunnecessary detailed interpretation ;
itcan initiate those actions which are thought always tobe
appropriate inabnormal situations andthus canreduce toaminimum
those decisions which areamatter ofjudgement ;
itprovides necessary time for careful consideration ofthe
subsequent operator actions .
There isanincreasing tendency forplants tobedesigned sothat operations
inthe 30minutes following ashut-down initiated byafault canbeconducted
automatically and can beoverriden bythe operator only inexceptional
circumstances .
The successful specification oftheautomatic action following this type of
shut-down requires that thedesigners shall beable toforesee thepossible
situations sufficiently clearly toestablish shut-down procedures that are
appropriate inall circumstances .This does notmean that they have tobe
able topredict allpossible accidents ,butonly that theproposed automatic
actions should bereasonably appropriate inallsituations ,whether foreseen
ornot .Webelieve ,and the accident atThree Mile Island supports that
belief ,that design weaknesses inautomatic systems ofthis kind are less
likely tolead totrouble than manual intervention byoperators insituations
which neither they northedesigners hadpreviously foreseen .
Associated with automation isthe use ofdata processing todisplay
information totheoperators .Even iftheoperators donotneed tointervene
inthe 30minutes following the initiation ofashut-down ,they need tohave
detailed information about the state ofthe plant and the development of
abnormal conditions inorder topredict what islikely tohappen andtoplan
thelonger period operations .Inparticular ,they need information onwhich
tobase theinitiation ofemergency plans ,both on-andoff-site .Wereturn
tothis point inChapter 6.While existing European systems arebetter than
-k-

those atThree Mile Island ,additional improvements still need tobe
considered .
2.2.3 TheProcedures forDealing with Small Leaks inthePrimary Circuit
There isadifference between theKWU andWestinghouse designs inrespect of
theprovision ofhigh pressure injection ofwater following theoccurence of
small leaks intheprimary circuit .TheWestinghouse reactors ,like other US
designs ,have provision for injection at,and above ,the normal primary
circuit operating pressure ofmake-up water and ofasupplementary shut-down
solution containing boron .InKWU reactors ,the secondary system isused
automatically toreduce theprimary pressure byreducing theprimary tempera­
ture atarate of100 K/h.Emergency core-cooling water cannot beinjected
until the primary pressure has fallen to11MPa (110 bars ),the zero-flow
delivery head ofthe HPinjection pumps .Framatome has also introduced a
similar automatic temperature reduction .
Although atThree Mile Island the automatic injection ofemergency cooling
water was initiated atapressure well below thenormal operating pressure of
the primary circuit ,the capability ofthe HPinjection system toproduce
pressures above this operating pressure appears tohave introduced into
operator training the concern that there would beadanger offorcing steam
outoftherelief valves until theprimary circuit went "solid ".This concern
would not have arisen ifall the injection systems had been designed to
operate only atpressures below thenormal operating pressure .
Nevertheless ,the failure ofthe relief valve toclose could still have led to
adangerous situation and ,for this reason ,most European FWRs have been
supplied with automatic block valves inseries with the pressuriser relief
valves .
2.3 Some Lessons from theAccident atThree Mile Island
IntheUSthere hasbeen amarked exphasis ontheoperator weaknesses demons­
trated bythe accident atThree Mile Island .This accident ,however ,also
provided anumber ofdetailed lessons for the designers ofnuclear power
plants . Weconsider the following design issues tobeofparticular
relevance .
1.One ofthemost important lessons was theemphasis ontheneed to
consider awide range ofaccident conditions andnot toconcentrate
ononly theworst accidents .Agreat deal ofattention has been
paid toloss-of-coolant accidents involving major leaks inthe
primary circuit but ,until recently ,inadequate attention hasbeen
given tothe consequences ofsmall leaks . has occurred in
spite ofthefact that theRasmussen report^' hadidentified a
number ofsmall loss-of-coolant events which could lead topartial
melting ofthe core .Inthis connection itisnoteworthy that
European reactors have several design features which makes them
less susceptible totheeffects ofsmall leaks than ,forexample ,
thedesign adopted atThree Mile Island .
2.Thesecond lesson concerns theundesirability ofallowing operators
tointervene toreverse safety measures which have been initiated
automatically .They should ,however ,bepermitted tosupplement
safety measures which should have occurred but which ,for some
reason ,have failed todoso.The 30minutes period referred to
above and now employed byall European vendors isagood working
solution .
-5-

3.There isaneecd for instrumentation capable ofacquiring all
relevant information onthe conditions inthe primary system
(liquid level ,boiling margin ,core temperatures )under emergency
aswell asnormal operating conditions .
4.Good design ofthecontrol room instrumentation andtheuseofdata
processing are important inensuring thetransfer ofallrelevant
information tothe operators under emergency aswell asnormal
operating conditions .
5.Inview ofthe subsequent event atCrystal River all the
instrumentation providing information orcontrol functions inthe
control room should beequipped with power supplies of a
reliability comparable with that needed for essential safety
instrumentation .
2.4 Recommendat ions
1. Reactor systems should bedesigned toprovide forautomatic sequences
for shutting down and cooling the reactor after all faults .Only invery
exceptional circumstances should these sequences besubject tocancellation by
the operators inthe first thirty minutes or so,but provision for
reinforcement bytheoperator ofsome functions isdesirable .
2. Theprimary system instrumentation should include indicators ofliquid
level inthecore orpressure vessel andboiling margin .
3. There should beacomprehensive provision ofrelevant information to
the operator using the techniques ofdata processing .Tothis end ,the
Commission should urgently organise seminars onsimulators andoncontrol room
layout ,bringing together utilities ,reactor designers ,equipment suppliers ,
architect engineers ,andergonomists .Inaddition ,theCommission should make
the maximum use ofthe developments inthe communication links between
operators andprocess plant achieved intheframework oftheOECD project at
the Halden reactor .
4. Many newdevelopments can beapplied inpractice only tonew reactor
designs .However ,significant technical improvements should also beapplied
toexisting plants whenever this can bedone without unreasonable economic
penalties .
2.5 TheHarmonisation ofCriteria andRegulatory Requirements
Substantial emphasis has been placed bytheCommission ontheadvantages of
harmonisation ofcriteria and regulatory requirements ,but there has been a
tendency toreduce this emphasis inrecent years .Itisnowclear that there
will beonly alimited international trade inthe Community incomplete
reactor systems ,andthat there will benoneed foroneMember State toaccept
the decisions ofother states' licensing authorities onreactor design
matters .Inthis situation ,oneoftheprincipal values ofharmonisation is
inproviding ,asacommon objective ,aminimum standard ofsafety .Harmonised
criteria for reactor assessment would also help inresolving some ofthe
difficulties faced byaMember State inaccepting apower plant near its
frontier but inanother country .
More comprehensive moves towards harmonisation would beofvalue ifthe
Community were moving rapidly towards theprovision ofacentral licensing and
regulatory authority for thewhole oftheCommunity .Wedonot think that
this issufficiently imminent tojustify any determined effort toachieve
harmonisation from thecentre .Wesupport theway inwhich theCommission is
nowworking ,inparticular bytheprovision ofdialogues anddiscussions ,and
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bytheidentification andexchange ofinformation anddocumentation onsafety
methodology ,criteria ,codes andstandards ,andonspecific safety programnes
applicable tolight water reactors inthevarious member states .
Insaying this ,weare conscious that harmonisation ofdetailed regulatory
arrangements has certain disadvantages which have tobeoutweighed bythe
advantages ;inparticular webelieve that aclosely harmonised system would be
cumbersome ,complicated andinflexible inoperation ,andwould tend tooperate
inaremote manner because ofthe inevitable distance between the Commission
and thelicensees intheMember States .There isalso atendency toreach
agreement inharmonisation discussions only onthe basis ofthe least
restrictive standards andthere isoften afailure torealise that there may
beseveral acceptable solutions toanysingle problem .Hence therelationship
between theharmonisation ofsafety criteria and safety itself tends tobe
remote .
2.5.1 Recommendat ions
1. Harmonisation inthe field ofnuclear safety should proceed asa
natural process resulting from acontinued series ofdiscussions andnot as
theresult ofapolicy imposed from thecentre .
2. The Commission should retain its function asaclearing house for
information andideas andthus encourage this natural process .
References
1. USNuclear Regulatory Commission .Reactor Safety Study :anassessment
ofaccident risks inUScommercial nuclear power plants .WASH 1400 .USNRC ,
Washington DC,1975 .
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CHAPTER 3
POWER PLANT STAFF
3.1 Operators andSupervisors
The first area ofconcern istheselection ,ofreactor operating staff .We
recommend that anyperson selected forreactor operator training should have
atleast several years' experience inaposition involving both significant
personal responsibility andlong uneventful periods .Typical jobs inpoint
are found ,forexample ,intheoperation offossil-fired electric generating
plant ,chemical or petrochemical plant ,ormarine propulsion plant .
Furthermore ,candidates should besubjected toand pass ability tests ,
possibly ofakind similar tothose applied toprospective airline pilots .
Finding suitable candidates answering such requirements obviously implies that
they beoffered commensurate career opportunities .
3.1.1 Trainmg
Training itself may becarried out either bythe utility atanexisting
nuclear power plant ,byaseparate training school ,orbyboth .Ineach case ,
both curriculum and instructor qualifications should besubject toperiodic
review bythenational safety authority (oranindependent body designated by
that authority ).Nosuch training should beregarded assatisfactory unless
each trainee has regular access toacontrol room simulator where heis
trained toreact properly toprogressively more complex transients ofthesort
hemay encounter inthe plant which heistooperate .This implies that
simulators should beprogrammed toinclude serious events ,such asloss of
primary coolant from small breaks followed byfailures ofthesafety systems .
Werecommend that theCommission should organize aseminar tobring together
allparties concerned with theuse ofreactor simulators for thepurpose of
defining such transients andexchanging information ontherequired software .
Training should also cover situations requiring post-damage control .Operator
behaviour insuch situations should berehearsed during emergency exercises ,
the scope ofwhich should bedefined inconcert with the national safety
authority .The latter should also beinformed ofany changes inoperating
instructions resulting from such emergency drills .
Inaddition toformal training ,attention should bepaid tocareer planning so
astoprovide asound basis ofpractical experience onthe job .Neither
formal training norpractical experience issufficient onitsown .
3.1.2 Approval ofOperating Staff
The arrangements for the approval ofoperating staff should satisfy the
requirements ofthe national safety authority .Where this body decides to
delegate thepower ofapproval toeither theutility orathird party (e.g. a
reactor training school ),such delegation should bedefined inwriting and
remain subject towithdrawal ,either onaninstitutional oronanindividual
basis ,atthenational authority 'sdiscretion .
Inview ofthedifferences inpractice existing between Member States ,wedo
not recommend mandatory re-approval .Nevertheless ,the national safety
authority should verify that simulator training and medical checkups take
place atregular intervals ,preferably notless than once every second year .
-8-

3.1.3 Control-room Layout
Noamount oftraining canavoid operator errors due toinadequate control-room
lay-out ,instrumentation anddata processing .This supports therecommenda­
tion made inSection 2.4 concerning control room layout .Inaddition ,we
believe that thedesign ofcontrol-rooms will not befully successful unless
operting staff who have experience ofwork incontrol rooms are directly
involved inthedesign work .
3.1.4 Operating Procedures
Animportant aspect inthe effective functioning ofthe operators ,and one
that tends tobeeasily overlooked ,istheavailability ofclear ,unequivocal ,
and up-to-date operating procedures and instructions .Much may begained by
the continuous involvement oftheoperators themselves inthegeneration and
adaptation ofthese procedures and instructions .While this isamatter of
internal organization atthe utilities ,its importance tonuclear safety
appears such astowarrant thesuggestion that national safety authorities try
tostimulate operator involvement .Werecommend that thepreparation ofthese
procedures and instructions should bemade part ofthe national safety
authority 'srequirements .
3.2 Maintenance Staff
While the above material specifically refers tooperating staff ,great care
should betaken toensure proper training of,and instructions to,maintenance
staff .Both probabilistic studies ,and the actual accident experience at
Three Mile Island ,indicate the high relevance ofmaintenance procedures to
nuclear safety .Itshould not beforgotten that the hostile environment and
the rigorous safety requirements combine tocreate asignificantly heavier
burden for maintenance staff innuclear plants than iscarried bytheir
counterparts infossil-fueled power stations .Itseems desirable that this be
reflected inboth their training and their status .
3.2.1 Radiation Exposure Management
Inexisting PWRs ,more than 80% ofthe total collective dose equivalent is
received during maintenance operations (thepercentage forBWRs isofthesame
order ).There isalso atendency for the average annual collective dose
equivalent per unit ofenergy produced toincrease over thefirst 10years of
operation forPWRs inOECD countries .There arevariations with theyear of
commissioning and between countries and reactor designs ,but overall ,there
are strong grounds for working toward reduction inboth individual and
collective dose equivalents byanumber oftechnical measures .These include
thereduction ofcorrosion intheprimary circuit byimproved water chemistry ,
increased purification oftheprimary coolant ,appropriate materials inthe
primary circuit increased accessibility byattention tolayout ,and the
increased use ofremotely controlled maintenance tools .The necessary
research anddevelopment work should beencouraged and should besupported by
theCommunity .Inthemeantime ,particular attention should bepaid tothe
recording andcontrol ofthedose equivalent received by"migrant "maintenance
workers to reduce the likelihood of their receiving excessive dose
equivalents .
3.3 Senior Management
Line management staff ,including senior management ,must have sound technical
knowledge oftheir plant andmust besupported bytechnical staffs with access
torecent developments andexperience elsewhere .
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3.4 Recommendations
1. The national safety authorities ofMember States and the utilities
should review their practices inthe light ofthecomments and suggestions
made inthis Chapter .
2. The Commmission should promote theregular exchange ofinformation on
improved maintenance procedures between reactor designers and operators in
different Member States .
3. TheCommission should promote consistent administrative procedures for
recording the individual dose equivalents accummulated by"migrant "reactor
maintenance workers throughout theCommunity .
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION AND DATA BANKS ONACCIDENTS AND EQUIPMENT FAILURES
The future assessment ofthe safety ofnuclear installations depends heavily
onadetailed andthorough understanding offailures that have occurred inthe
past .Many countries ,including some oftheMember States oftheCommunity ,
are establishing data banks onthe types and frequencies offailure of
different kinds ofequipment andcomplete systems ,and anincreasing amount of
information isnowavailable commercially .Agood deal ofthis information is
still fragmentary andnotallofitiswidely available because ofproprietary
limitations .Discussions have been going onfor some time ,both inthe
Community and inOECD ,with aview toproviding amore comprehensive flow of
information .Inparticular ,afeasibility study has been carried out for a
European Reliability Data System .
4.1The Need for aCentral Service
Webelieve that there isavaluable function tobeprovided byacentral
service run bytheCommunity .Such aservice would provide access toawide
range ofnational data banks ,butwethink itshould notattempt toduplicate
these banks ;rather ,itshould provide acentral provision for interrogating
the existing national systems ,partly inreply tospecific questions put to
the service ,and also onamore general basis with theaim ofdisseminating
information about abnormal events and the reliability ofcomponents and
equipment .TheCommission will need toestablish some degree ofcompatibility
between national systems ,particularly concerning thetypes ofdata stored and
the methods ofretrieval .
Ingiving support totheproposal ,wewish todraw attention toanumber of
points
(1)Itwill beimportant todefine theobjectives andfunctions ofthe
service with considerable clarity .
(2)The service will beworthwhile only ifitissupported byan
adequate number ofclients .Given such support ,itwill beof
considerable importance totheCommunity andshould notnecessarily
berequired tofind all itsfunds from commercial fees .
(3)Tobesuccessful ,the service will need tobemore than asimple
information service .Itwill need tohave experienced professional
staff who can solve the classification problems inherent inthis
kind ofwork ,who canadvise customers ,andwho canalso provide a
regular outward flow ofinformation .
(4)The service will need aclose collaboration with theelectricity
generating industry ,possibly through aformal link with UNIPEDE .
(5)Inaddition ,utilities operating nuclear power plants should employ
technical staff ,fully abreast ofdevelopments inthenuclear power
field ,andcapable ofmaking full useoftheservice .
4.2Recommendat ions
1.Acommon form forreporting abnormal events should beagreed upon between
the Commission and the Member States .
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2TheCommmission shouldviewseriouslytheresultsofthefeasibility
studyforaEuropeanReliability DataSystemandtakeintoaccounttheviews
oftheAdvisoryCommitteeonProgrammeManagement,ReactorSafety,which
supportstheproposition .Iftheprojectmeetsthecriteriaindicatedabove,
werecommendthatitshouldbeestablished .
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CHAPTER5
RADIATION PROTECTION ASPECTSOFTHESITINGOFNUCLEARREACTORS
Thechoiceofareactorsitedependsonalargenumberofcharacteristics,the
predominating onesofwhicharethoseofengineering andradiationprotection .
Forengineering reasons,thesitemusthavesuitablefoundations ,anadequate
areaofland,convenientaccess,andanadequatesupplyofcoolingwater.The
radiationprotectionfactorsincludetheeaseofapplyingcounter-measures
afteranaccident,theminimisingoftheconsequences ofanaccident,andthe
provisionsfortheroutinereleaseofradioactivewastes.Inaddition,itis
desirablethatthesiteshouldbefreeofsuchdisadvantageous featuresasa
liabilitytofloodandalikelihoodofsignificantearthquakes .Otheraspects
includesuchfeaturesasthecommercialavailability ofthesite,the
availability oflabourforconstruction andoperation,proximitytothe
principalelectricalloads,andthereliability oftheconnections tothe
powergrid.Finally,itmustberememberedthattheviewsofthelocal
populationareanessentialfactorintheselectionofanysite.Acceptance
criteriaforthelocalpopulation ,however,aresomulti-faceted ,andvaryso
stronglythroughouttheCoi.imunityandwithtime,tnattheirdiscussionwould
bebeyondthescopeofthisreport.
Thisreportdealsonlywiththeradiationprotectionaspectsofsitingand,of
these,onlywiththeeffectsofaccidents.Giventheadequateprovisionof
coolingwater,theroutinedisposalofradioactive wastefromnuclearreactor
sitescanbeachievedinwayswhichdonotnoticeablychangethepre-existing
naturalbackgroundlevelofradiation.
5.1GeneralIssues
Accidentstonuclearreactorscanhaveawiderangeofconsequences andthere
hasbeenanaturaltendencytogiveprioritytothereductionofboththe
liKelinood andtheconsequences ofseriousaccidents.Itisthustobe
expectedthattherewillbearelationship betweentheseverityofanaccident
andtheprobability ofitsoccurrence ,withtheworstaccidentsbeingless
probable.Thistendencyhasnotbeenincorporated formallyintolicencing
arrangements :ithasbeenfoundmoreusefultouseitasadesignobjective,
intheformofaquantitative relationship betweenscaleandprobability .Thefirstofsuchrelationships wasthatproposedbyFarmer(1),wherethe
magnitudeoftheaccidentwasexpressedastheactivityofthenuclideiodine
131releasedtotheatmosphere .Thisisoneofthemoreimportantmaterials
inthecaseofanuncontained accidentandcanberegardedasrepresentative
ofanumberofvolatilefissionproducts.
Thereareseveraldifferentapproachesthatcanbeadoptedtoassessthe
influencethatthechoiceofsitemighthaveontheconsequences ofaccidents.
Ailtheseapproachesrequirethepostulationthatverysevereaccidentsare
possible.Reactoraccidentsare,inanyevent,rareandmostofthemwould
havesuchsmallconsequences thattheydonotinfluencesitingconsiderations .
Itissufficienttoconcentrate onthreepossibleaspects.Thefirstofthese
isthelong-termeffectonhealthfromasinglespecifiedaccident,orfroma
probabilitydistribution ofaccidents.Theprincipallong-termeffectstobe
expectedarepossibleadditionalcasesofcancerand,insmallernumbers,of
seriousgeneticdefectsinthenextfewgenerations .Withtheconventional ,
andprobablyconservative ,assumptionofalineardose-effect relationship
withoutthreshold,ameasureofalltheseeffectsisgivenbytheestimation
ofthecollective doseequivalent ,or,forthoseaccidentswhichdonot
releasesignificant amountsofalpha-emitting materials,ieforthegreat
majorityofaccidents,thecollectiveabsorbeddose.
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Formany accidents ,thepossible long-term effects aretheonly significant
health effects .However ,for large accidents and near-in populations ,the
organ doses may belarge enough tocause short-term health effects ,such as
acute radiation damage tothethyroid orlungs ,orthewhole-body doses maybe
large enough tocause radiation sickness and some fatalities .The second
factor tobeconsidered isthen thenumber ofpeople whose absorbed doses are
likely toreach the levels capable ofcausing serious early effects .The
collective absorbed dose isnolonger relevant .
Thirdly ,there istheconsideration ofcounter-measures .Some protection of
the population can beprovided bycounter-measures such asevacuation ,the
administration ofstable iodine toprovide protection against effects ofthe
radioisotopes ofiodine and ,onalonger time-scale ,theprevention ofthe
normal distribution andconsumption offoodstuffs grown inthelocality .The
choice ofsite mayinfluence thefeasibility ofputting these counter-measures
into effect and ,inparticular ,may influence thenumbers ofpeople likely to
beinvolved inurgent counter-measures ,such asevacuation orthe issue of
stable iodine .
These counter-measures ,ifeffectively applied ,will result inasubstantial
decrease incollective and individual doses .However ,they may also have a
significant deleterious effect onthose involved .Forexample ,considerable
human misery results from anyevacuation ofwhich theduration isuncertain .
Thenumber ofpeople subjected tocounter-measures intheevent ofanaccident
isinfluenced bythechoice ofsite and is,therefore ,thethird factor tobe
considered .
The consequences ofpersistent contamination ofland ,homes and industrial
installations may well prove tobeamong themost severe consequences ofa
serious accident toanuclear reactor .The influence ofthis problem onthe
choice ofasite isnot simple andcannot bereduced toasimple quantity ,
such asthenumber ofpeople involved orthelevel ofdose .
Clearly ,the relationship between these three factors and the population
distribution atthesite will becomplex ,andthecomparisons between onesite
and another are not likely tobethe same for the separate factors .In
particular ,estimates ofthe long-term health effects are likely tobe
significantly influenced bysmall doses toalarge number ofpeople atgreat
distances ,while thepossibility ofcounter-measures and ,more importantly ,of
early health effects ,will putemphasis onthenumber ofpeople close tothis
site .The final decisions astothechoices between sites will thus depend on
theimportance attached tothese various factors ,totheengineering features
ofthe reactors ,and tothenon-quantitative features ofthe site and its
surroundings .
5.2 Simplified Comparisions
Inorder toillustrate the inter-relationship between the scale ofpossible
accidents andthechoice ofasite ,simplified calculations have been carried
out using astandard mixture ofradionuclides inthe source term and a
simplified meteorological anddosimetric model .These calculations were not
inanywayintended toreplace site specific calculations ,norwere they used
toevaluate the absolute magnitude ofthe possible consequences ofan
accident .They merely made itpossible tosee how thedifferent siting
factors discussed above might influence the order inwhich sites were
selected .They also allowed theeffects ofdifferent accident distributions
and ofdifferent lower limits onthe integration ofcollective dose tobe
demonstrated .

Thecalculations have been carried out forfour European reactor sites andfor
twohypothetical sites .Ofthefour real sites ,twoare rural and twoare
more heavily populated .Most ofthecalculations relate tothepopulation in
theaverage sector round thesite ,but fortwosites more detailed data have
been used tocompare themost highly populated sectors with theaverage .The
twohypothetical sites arenear andwithin amajor urban area .
Although allthese calculations have been carried outbyasimplified method
using typical weather conditions and ,usually ,nominal population distribu­
tions ,the results are not inconsistent with those ofmore detailed site-
specific calculations .The use ofbad weather conditions and specific
population distributions inparticular directions will change the absolute
magnitude oftheconsequences ofanaccident butwill have little effect on
the comparison between sites unless there are significant site-specific
combinations of weather conditions and population distribution .The
calculations intheRasmussen report' 'andtheGerman risk study (3'take
account oftheexpected effect ofcounter-measures and are thus notdirectly
comparable with those used here .
The results have been used toplace the six sites inanorder ofmerit ,
depending onthefactors discussed above and then tocalculate theratios of
the selected quantity ,egcollective absorbed dose ,atthe "best "site and
each ofthe other sites .This ratio has been called the site ratio .
5.2.1 Site Ratios Based onCollective Absorbed Dose
Foraccidents releasing uptoabout 1%ofthevolatile fission products inthe
core ofareactor with anelectrical output of1200 MW,thesite ratios range
uptoabout 10for all theaccident distributions considered .This range is
reduced iflarger accidents areincluded and ifsmall doses atlarge distances
are included inthe calculation ofcollective absorbed dose .Absorbed doses
below aselected limit ,orthreshold ,have been excluded from thecalculation
ofcollective absorbed dose .
The useofindividual sector populations forTransfynydd andHeysham changes
the collective absorbed dose bynomore than about afactor of2for a
threshold of0.3 rad .
Similar calculations have been carried outonseveral other European sites and
the results are intermediate between those ofthe sites studied here .
5.2.2 Site Ratios Based onthe Number ofPeople Suffering Early Health
Effects
Forarelease of1%ofthevolatile fission products ,early health effects are
notlikely tooccur atranges beyond about 2kminaverage weather conditions
or10kminadverse weather .Site ratios for real sites based onthe number
ofpeople inthemean sector range uptoabout 20 (for 2km)andabout 6(for
10km).The figures at2kmrelate only toresidents ,and local transient
populations mayalso beimportant .
5.2.3 Site Ratios Based ontheNumber ofPeople Affected byCounter-measures
Urgent counter-measures ,such asevacuation and the issue ofstable iodine ,
will beconsidered seriously out todistances ofperhaps 20kminsevere
accidents ,although the level ofrisk between 10and 20kmislikely tobe
small .Site ratios based onthepopulation out to20kmare thus ofsome
interest .Fortheaverage sectors they range uptoabout 15.
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5.2.4 The Effect oftheWorst Sector
Theuseoftheworst sector increases thenumber ofpeople within therelevant
distances ,byafactor ofuptoabout 10,buthaslittle effect onthesite
ratios .
5.3 Existing Siting Policies
Site selection inallcountries takes account invarious ways ofall the
relevant features ofthe site and its surroundings .Insome countries ,
numerical criteria areused toassess thesuitability from thepoint ofview
ofradiation protection ofthevarious sites that areotherwise feasible .In
other countries ,theradiation protection features ,incommon with most other
features ,aredealt with non-quantitatively .All these aspects ofsiting
policy are under review inEurope and intheUnited States and since the
European review isnotyetcomplete andonly tentative proposals have appeared
intheUS,wehave notthought itright toattempt anycomment onexisting
siting policies orontheir possible development .
5.4 The Effect ofMulti-Reactor Sites
Many sites have twoorfour reactors andthere have been proposals forlarge
nuclear parks containing many reactors andpossibly including fuel fabrication
andreprocessing plants .Although reactors andplants onsuch sites would be
subject tocommon-mode failures initiated bythose external events that affect
the entire site ,e.g. earthquakes orfloods ,sites subject tosuch events
could beavoided ,ortheindividual plants provided with adequate protection .
Inaddition ,theprotection systems ofsuch plants canbesuch astomake it
highly unlikely that anaccident occurring atoneplant would affect thesafe
operation orshut-down ofother plants onthesame site .Thus there seems no
reason toassume that themagnitude ofaccidental releases would bealtered by
grouping theplants together .
Bycontrast ,theoverall probability ofanaccident onthesite isincreased
asthenumber ofplants isincreased .Thesimplest approach issimply toadd
the probabilities for each reactor and plant .This ismathematically
acceptable since .all the probabilities are small .However ,this approach
ignores anycontribution from common-mode failures andanybenefit from a
strong site management .
Inpractice ,thepresence oftwoorfour reactors onasite does notsignifi­
cantly alter the siting assessments and islikely tohave management
advantages .The concept ofanuclear park offers further advantages in
relation ,for example ,tophysical protection ,waste storage ,shipping and
disposal ,fuel movements ,andpossibly regional planning .Inpractice ,the
siting ofnuclear parks will bedecided bysuch considerations andbythose of
engineering and economics rather than bythe radiation protection aspects
exclusively considered here .
5.5 Conclusions
The quantitative effect ofsite selection inthe states ofthe European
Community isnotaslarge asitwould beinamore sparsely populated area .
For the number oflong-delayed health effects ,the ratio between sites is
likely tobenomore than 10.Forthenumber ofearly health effects ,which
will occur only after very severe accidents ,orfor the number ofpeople
affected bycounter-measures ,the factor between sites may besomewhat
greater ,uptoabout 15.
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Site slection isatits most effective ininfluencing the consequences of
accidents ofamoderate severity .Some oftheconsequences ofvery serious
accidents will extend toconsiderable distances where the differences between
sites isnotgreat .Since these serious accidents arealso likely tobethe
most rare ,their importance insite selection isnotgreat .The choice of
sites isthus principally influenced bythemoderate scale ofaccidents which
affects only thenear-in population andwhich gives emphasis totheimportance
ofashort-range low-population zone forwhich emergency plans canbedesigned
tobehighly effective .
5.6 Recommendations
1. Siting policy and practice ispredominantly aquestion for Member
States ,but some reactor sites are near tostate boundaries .Wetherefore
recommend that the Commission should arrange fordiscussions between Member
States with theaim ofencouraging aconsistent underlying approach .Itis
also important that there should bediscussion between Member States when it
isproposed tosite areactor inthevicinity ofastate boundary .
References
1. Farmer F.R. Siting criteria -anewapproach .
Containment andSiting ofNuclear Power Plants
Proc Symp Vienna ,1967 -SM-89 /34.
2. USNuclear Regulatory Commission ,Reactor Safety Study ;
anasssanent ofaccident risks inUScommercial nuclear power plants .
WASH 1400 ,USNRC ,Washington DC,1975 .
3. TheFederal Minister ofResearch &Technology .
TheGerman risk study .
GRS ,Köln andMünchen ,1979 .

CHAPTER 6
EMERGENCY PLANS
Many different kinds ofaccidents ofdifferent degrees ofseverity canoccur
onanuclear site .Such accidents may range from minor plant faults orminor
incidents involving radioactivity orradiation exposure ,through serious
failures causing major plant damage orserious exposures ofworkers ,upto
accidents causing major damage toplant and releases ofradioactivity off-
site .The emergency plans must beable todeal with all these situations .
They must bedesigned tolimit the damage tothe plant and toprovide
protection fortheworkers onsite andthesurrounding public .
6.1 Basic Functions ofEmergency Plans
Thefollowing distinct features ofemergency services canbeidentified :-
(1)theprovision ofhigh quality specialist expertise insupport of
theplant management .
(2)the safe shut-down oftheaffected plant ,continued heat removal ,
andthecontinued safe operation oftherest ofthesite ;
(3)damage control ,rescue ,fire-fighting ;
(4)radiation protection on-site ;
(5)evaluation ofthe likely course ofevents and theprediction of
radiation doses off-site ;
(6)initiation andoperation ofcounter-measures .
Onalonger time scale
(7)adjustment andfinal withdrawal ofcounter-measures
(8)provision ofdata for the retrospective assessment ofhealth
consequences ;
(9)provision ofdata forscientific andengineering studies .
Ofthe first six ofthese functions ,all but the first involve detailed
information and executive action on site ,and must be the direct
responsibility oftheoperating management ,supplemented byspecialised help
(Item 1)assoon aspossible ,and bylocal services where early off-site
action isrequired .Asthe situation develops ,additional resources will
become available andtheresponsibility foroff-site action maybetransferred
toother authorities .Such transfers must always beformal andunequivocal .
Onsite ,the senior operating management will progressively take over from
those initially incharge ,butHeadquarters staff should actonly asadvisers
unless they formally relieve the site management oftheir normal function .
The responsibilities and lines ofcommand ,together with theprocedures for
varying them ,must beclearly setout intheemergency plans .
Items (7), (8)and (9)will usually becollaborative responsibilities ,butthe
emergency plans should include the initiation ofthese functions and there
should bearrangements for ensuring that they are carried through toa
conclusion .The information problems ofemergencies and theneed forgood
communication arrangements aredealt with inChapter 7.
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6.2 TheNeed forMultiple Control Centres
Practical experience ofserious accidents ,from the reactor fire atWindscale
in1957 totheaccident atThree Mile Island ,hasemphasised theneed formore
than one control centre and for the clear demarcation ofcontrol centre
functions .Control centre staff have todeal with thereceipt andanalysis
ofincoming data ,theexecutive conduct ofoperations ,and thetransmission of
information toother centres and authorities .The public ,the press ,
national and local authorities with (or sometimes without )relevant
responsibilities ,and political figures will all beattempting toextract
information from those concerned with the accident .Asystem ofmultiple
control centres canstructure these requests andprotect thevital operational
functions from excessive external interference . (Seealso Chapter 7).
Nosingle structure ofcontrol centres has yet emerged asbeing generally
preferred ,but itisrecommended that achoice should bemade using the
following structure asastarting point .The operating management will need
control centres ,possibly ,butnotnecessarily ,inseparate locations ,forthe
following activities
(1)plant operations ;
(2)emergency site operations ;
(3)on-site radiation protection ;
(4)off-site radiation protection including monitoring and thecontrol
ofthe initial counter-measures ;
(5)headquarters control and information functions (at acentre
preferably located near ,butnotat,theaffected site ).
The detailed delineation ofthese activities will beclosely related tothe
structure oftheoperating line management .
Activities 4and 5above are major interfaces between theoperating utility
and theoutside world .Inaddition ,there will always beseveral regulatory
authorities and national advisory bodies closely associated with aserious
accident onanuclear site .These ,andother organisations providing support ,
ormaking measurements ,should belinked into acoherent system ofcontrol
centres andshould refrain from operating independently .
For this network ofcontrol centres tobeeffective ,there must beawell
developed andrehearsed system ofcommunication .Telephone andradio maywell
be essential ,but important information and numerical data should be
transmitted ,atleast inconfirmation ,bysystems producing hard copy .These
communication systems should besecure against overloading byunofficial uses ,
forexample ,bythemedia .
6.3Counter-measures
One oftheproblems facing anincident controller isthat ofdeciding whether
toinitiate counter-measures toprotect members ofthepublic ,and ifso,over
what area .Counter-measures may include evacuation ,theuseofstable iodine
toreduce the effects ofradioisotopes of iodine ,and the control of
foodstuffs ,especially milk .Ccunter-measures are indicated ifthelevels of
dose would otherwise beserious ,and ifthey are likely tobeeffective in
reducing doses .Inprinciple ,itisthemagnitude ofthedose reduction that
should becritical ,but inpractice ,emphasis isgiven tothe level ofdose
that would bereceived inthe absence ofcounter-measures .There isthen an
implicit assumption that counter-measures ,ifapplied ,will beeffective .
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Thegreatest difficulty inmaking decisions about counter-measures isposed by
the need toforecast thecourse ofanaccident and thus toestimate doses and
dose reductions from situations that have notyetarisen .Forthis reason ,
emergency plans should include arrangements for the initiation ofthe first
phase ofcounter-measures interms ofplant conditions ,aswell asinterms of
measured releases ofactivity orenvironmental measurements .
Once theneed forcounter-measures has been established ,itisnecessary to
define thearea over which they should beapplied .Unless there areobvious
geographical factors ,such asrivers ,the outer limit ofthe area will be
somewhat arbitrary andmay give rise toanxiety .Asthe scale ofcounter­
measures increases ,sodoes thecomplexity ofthemeasures themselves .For
example ,ifevacuation istobecarried out itisimportant that those moved
should betransferred toaposition atleast three times asfar from the
source oftheaccident astheouter limit oftheevacuated area .Similarly ,
incoming supplies offoodstuffs must have anorigin farenough away from the
accident tohave only lowlevels ofradioactive contamination .
Inmaking plans inadvance ,and intaking decisions atthe time ofan
accident ,itisvery desirable tohave quantitative guidance ontheinitiation
and scale ofcounter-measures .Several countries have adopted quantitative
values ofabsorbed dose ,orofconcentrations infoodstuffs orair ,above
which counter-measures should bevery seriously considered ,andbelow which
counter-measures are not likely tobejustified ,unless they are easily
applied andoflittle detrimental impact .InBritain ,these values have been
called emergency reference levels ,and inthe United States ofAmerica ,
protective action guides .Inboth cases they relate tothe levels ofdose
that areexpected tooccur intheabsence ofcounter-measures .
Itisimportant tonote that theemergency reference levels now inuse are
well below the levels ofdose that might cause acute health effects .They
correspond toarisk oflate effects ,notably death from cancer after adelay
ofsome decades ,currently thought tobeinthe region ofone chance ina
thousand toone chance inten thousand ,spread over about thirty years .
Members ofthepublic whohave notbeen subject tocounter-measures ,because
their doses were below the relevant emergency reference level ,need tobe
reassured that they have notthereby been exposed tosubstantial risks .
The effectiveness ofcounter-measures will depend partly onpre-planning and
partly onimprovisation .Since some counter-measures ,notably those involving
farm produce ,may extend totens oreven hundreds ofkilometres ,itis
necessary toestablish thescale ofthelargest accident forwhich theplans
are intended tobeeffective .More severe accidents cannot beexcluded ,and
will have tobedealt with byimprovisation beyond theplanned arrangements .
Itisapparent that theplant safety assessment ,theemergency plans andthe
site characteristics should all beconsidered together aspart ofthe
licensing process .
Finally ,weconsider the effectiveness ofcounter-measures tobeheavily
dependent upon therational anddisiplined behaviour ofthelocal population .
This ,andthereassurance ofthose notsubjected tocounter-measures ,will not
beachieved unless thebasis foremergency plans iswell understood bylocal
communities or,atleast ,bytheir representatives andofficials ,andunless
there islocal trust inthecompetence andhonesty ofthelocal organisation .
6.4 Local Emergency Organisation
Theemergency organisation concerned with theprotection ofthepublic must
have theconfidence ofthelocal community .Ithastwoprincipal functions -
toprovide information and toprovide counter-measures .Both ofthese
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functionsdependcritically onaknowledgeandunderstanding ofthecourseof
theaccidentandinthisrespectatleast,thesitemanagementhasamajor
parttoplay.Localaridregionalelementsofgovernmentwillhavetheirown
plansfordealingwithemergencies ,anditisessentialthatthearrangements
fordealingwithanuclearaccidentshouldbecloselyintegratedintothese
moreconventional systemsand,throughthem,withothercommunityactivities .
Particularproblemsareinherentinthemovementofspecialgroupssuchas
schoolchildrenandhospitalpatients.Suitableplans,enlistingthesupport
ofteachersandofmedicalandnursingstaffs,shouldbemadefordealingwith
thesegroups.Difficulties will,however,remainatcertaintimesofdaywhen
membersoffamiliesmaybeneitherathomenorinclearlydefinedlocations
likeschools.
Thereisaconsiderable andwidespreadexperienceofpracticalevacuations ,
e.g.inrelationtoreleasesoftoxicchemicalssuchaschlorine,andthis
experienceshouldbeusedinsettingupevacuationplans.Conversely ,the
Communityshouldalsoencourage MemberStatestomakeuseoftheworkon
nuclearaccidentsinreviewingotheremergencies arrangements .
Onemajorfunctionoftheplanningofemergencyarrangements istoclarifythe
allocation ofresponsibilities .Thedetailsmustdependonthe
characteristics ofthelocalgovernmentarrangements ,butthevitalimportance
oftheexperience andspecialised knowledgeofthesitemanagementshouldbe
fullyreflectedintheplan.
Oncethelocalplanshavebeenworkedouttheyshouldberegularlyexercised.
Exercisesarepartlytoprovidepracticeandexperience andpartlyalsoto
giveanopportunity toreviewandimprovetheprocedures .Theseexercisesof
localsystemsshouldsometimesbeextendedtoincludethenationalarrange­
ments,and,ifappropriate ,tothetestingoftransfrontier arrangements .
6.5SupportServices
Majornuclearaccidentsaretooraretojustifyastandingemergencyteam
largeenoughtocopewithalleventualities .Emergencyplansmusttherefore
includearrangements forcallinginsupportfromothernuclearinstallations ,
andfromotherorganisations ,includingthearmedforces.Exceptwherean
accidentmaycallforcounter-measures inaneighbouring country,thereisnot
likelytobeaneedforsupportservicesfromothercountries,atleastinthe
earlystagesofanaccident.Ifemergencyconditionspersistforsometime,
morewidespreadcallsforsupportmaybenecessary.Supportservicesshould,
inanyevent,puttheirpersonnel,eitherindividually orindefinedcommand
groups,underthecommandoftheappropriatecontrollerformingpartofthe
mainemergencyorganisation .
Thisuseofexternalsupportwillreducetheamountofequipmentandsupplies
thatneedtobeheldinemergencystores.Nevertheless ,abasicminimumstock
shouldbeprovidedtocoveralltheaction,includingcounter-measures ,for
thefirstdaysatthescaleneededbythelargestsizeofaccidentforwhich
plansarebeingmade.
6.6Long-TermPlans
Althoughnotstrictlypartcfemergencyplans,itisnecessarytomake
arrangements forlong-termoperations .Thefirstofthesewillbethe
withdrawalofcounter-measures ;thiswillbeurgentifanareahasbeen
evacuated,butmayextendforseveralweeksinrespectofagricultural
produce.Itwillalsobeimportanttocarryoutscientificandengineering
studiesconcerningtheaccidentitselfanditsenvironmental consequences .
-21-

These studies will behelped ifthenational authority recognises theneed for
the collection and analysis ofdata beyond that needed for the immediate
control ofthe emergency ,and requires this need tobeconsidered inthe
establishment ofemergency plans .
6.7 Conclusions
There have been few occasions onwhich ithas been necessary toapply
emergency action outside ofnuclear sites ,and the accident atThree Mile
Island showed that theplans there were inadequately developed .Itisalso
clear that anyemergency plans must form anintegral part ofthearrangements
made todeal with non-nuclear emergencies andwill thus depend heavily onthe
detailed organisation intheMember States .Asrecently asJanuary 1980 ,
there has been aworkshop onprocedural and organisational measures for
accident management atLaxenburg inAustria ,and itseems likely that this has
fulfilled the need for international discussions for the time being .
Meanwhile ,some Member States oftheCommunity are already reviewing their
emergency arrangements inthe light oflesssons learned from theaccident at
Three Mile Island and werecommend the authorities inall Member States to
conduct such areview .
Wehave not found iteasy toobtain information about the extent towhich
transfrontier emergency arrangements have been put into effect .Theneed for
such arrangements hasbeen identified inseveral locations bytheexpert group
set upunder Article 37ofthe Euratom Treaty and the Commission has
identified reactor stations near enough tonational frontiers tocall forsuch
arrangements .Weare not aware ofanymachinery forconfirming that these
arrangements have been made ,andwerecommend that theCommission should reach
anagreement with Member States foranoutline oftherelevant arrangements to
betransmitted totheCommission .This would have theadvantage notonly of
confirming that such arrangements have been made ,but also ofproviding a
central bank ofinformation which theCommission could use inadvising Member
States ontheform ofsuch arrangements infuture cases .
6.8Recommendat ions
1.Member States should review their emergency procedures inthe light of
the experience from Three Mile Island ,and theCommission should publish a
comparative study ofthese procedures .
2.Member States should ensure that their nuclear emergency plans are
closely integrated with their general emergency plans ,and include arrange­
ments forregular emergency exercises .
3.Member States should ensure that their emergency plans are adequate to
take care ofspecial population groups ,such asschool children andhospital
patients ,andshould also consider theeffectiveness ofsuch plans attimes of
daywhen members offamilies arelikely tobeseparated .
4.Member States should make useoftheexperience they gain inplanning for
nuclear accidents inreviewing their emergency plans forother situations .
5.TheCommission andMember States should setupaprocedure under which
Member States inform the Commission ofthe arrangements for transfrontier
emergency plans .
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CHAPTER 7
PUBLIC INFORMATION INEMERGENCIES
The accident atThree Mile Island ,besides emphasizing the need for rapid ,
clear and reliable public information ,has also brought to the fore
deficiencies inboth itsgeneration anddissemination .Both aspects aredealt
with inthis Chapter .
7.1 TheGeneration ofInform ation and itsDissemination bytheUtility
The initial generation ofinformation isprimarily amatter for theoperating
utility . It istherefore imperative that each utility should have the
confidence ofthepublic andshould provide fortheassessment oftheaccident
information and thepreparation ofstatements .Itshould designate inadvance
anumber ofofficial spokesmen ,available atany time ,and forming the
principal route for releasing information onall events that may have an
impact outside theutility 'snuclear plants .Inaddition tobeing thoroughly
familiar with plant design and operation ,the latter preferably based on
knowledge gained inaposition ofresponsibility ,these spokesmen should have
training inpresenting information tothepublic .Emergency exercises should
beused togive them experience ,which should include questioning bypeople
with experience asnews media representatives .
7.2 The Press Centre
Arrangements should bemade inadvance for apress centre indirect
communication with the site tobeavailable either bytheutility orbythe
government agency responsible for emergency measures .This press centre
should besufficiently large toaccomodate anadequate number ofreporters and
should beproperly equipped ,notably with communications ,visual aids and
reference materials selected inadvance for thepurpose ofillustrating events
onsite for the layman .The requirements for size andgeneral facilities of
thepress centre should bebased onprevious experience obtained intheMember
States with national andinternational coverage ofemergency events .Staffing
ofthepress centre should bethe joint responsibility oftheutility and the
national safety authority .
7.3 TheDissemination ofInformation andInstructions byGovernment Agencies
Inthedissemination ofinformation ,adistinction should bemade according to
the intended destination .Instructions tothepublic inthevicinity ofthe
plant should begiven byresponsible government spokesmen ,using local means
arranged inadvance for such emergencies .All other official information
should gothrough thePress Centre orthegovernment agencies' normal outlets
tothe media .Officials presenting information tothe public should be
trained inthis function and should have adequate experience intherelevant
technical subjects .
Because many government departments and agencies will beinvolved ,itis
important that anunequivocal division ofresponsibilities inthe field of
public information beagreed upon inadvance between theutilities andthese
government agencies ,and that alead agency should bedesignated .Itisalso
important that the arrangements should besuch astoencourage consistency ,
based onshared factual knowledge ,inpublic statements from different organi­
sations .Onewayofachieving this istosetupacommon information centre .
Member States should encourage their national media tohire and train staff
capable ofunderstanding themain aspects ofnuclear power plant behaviour and
-23-

radiation releases .These reporters should inturn beinvited bythe
utilities tovisit nuclear power plants andshould become acquainted with the
utility spokesmen andtherepresentatives ofthegovernment agencies .
7.4 Transfrontier Problems
While the subject ofaccidents innuclear power stations adjacent toa
national border isdealt with inChapters 6and 9,itisemphasized here that
relevant agreements between the neighbouring states should include
adequate arrangements for informing and instructing thepopulation onboth
sides ofthefrontier inthevicinity oftheplant .Where thesame language
isspoken onboth sides ofthe border ,care isneeded inidentifying the
population towhom instructions arebeing given and inspecifying thesource
ofthose instructions .
Inaddition toour view stated inChapter 6onthe Community 'srole in
promoting transfrontier agreements ,webelieve that the European Coircnunity
should beready toprovide technical assistance tonews media ,particularly to
local news networks that are likely todisseminate emergency information
across the borders between Member States .
7.5 Recommendations
1. The national agencies ofthe Member States and the utilities should
review their practices inthe light ofthecomments andsuggestions made in
this Chapter .
2. The news media should examine thequality and training ofthe staff
they would belikely touse following aserious nuclear accident andshould
overhaul their links with theutilities andthenational agencies .
3. The Commission should encourage Member States torequire the intro­
duction of formal local liaison arrangements ,especially where these
arrangements need tocross national frontiers .
4. TheCommission should consider ways inwhich itcould provide technical
help inadvance ofany accident ,tonews media ,particularly tolocal news
networks that arelikely todisseminate emergency information across national
frontiers .
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CHAPTER 8
THE MANAGEMENT OFTHE RESEARCH PROGRAMMES OFTHE COMMUNITY
8.1 TheRationale ofCommunity Research
The individual Member States all have research programmes inthe fields of
nuclear safety andhealth protection ,and theCommunity operates direct action
progr armies within theJoint Research Centre and indirect programmes bymeans
ofresearch contracts placed mainly within theMember States .
There areseveral reasons for initiating andmaintaining acommunity programme
ofresearch ofwhich thefollowing are isnportant examples :
Political Itisdesirable tohave aCommunity programme ofresearch
for institutional reasons .Such aprogramme isevidence ofthe
solidarity ofMember States arid indicates acommon objective onthe
part oftheCommunity .
Common Requirements The existence ofcommon requirements opens the
door tocommon programmes and thereduction ofduplication .
Sharing ofCost Major projects may betoo expensive for any single
Member State and the Community can provide facilities for amulti­
national project .
Sharing ofInformation and Resources ACommunity programme has the
advantage ofensuring anequitable distribution ofthe information
between theMember States .Italso helps togroup small research units
which might not beviable separately .For smaller Member States these
may bepredominant reasons forsupporting aCommunity programme .
Co-ordinat ion ACommunity programme can bedesigned toavoid major
gaps andminimise overlapping between programme items .
These features combine tomake aCommunity research programme desirable and
indeed essential .Itis,infact ,the first oftheCommunity objectives in
Article 2ofthe Euratom Treaty .Inthis respect ,itisthe political
objectives that arepredominant .
Common requirements alone provide only partial justification for common
programmes ,and most transnational projects need justifying ongrounds under
one oftheother headings .The arguments oncost sharing need tobeexamined
critically ,and apply principally tomajor projects like JET .Onasmaller
scale ,international projects areusually less efficient and they tend tobe
more expensive than separate national ones ,unless the latter lead to
excessive duplication .Information sharing could be,and toalarge extent
is,effective between national programmes .Co-ordination and grouping of
small projects isnot easy toachieve without control ofthe funds inthe
Member States .Overlap can becontrolled within theCommunity programme ,
but itisvery difficult toinfluence overlaps between national programmes .
Inprinciple ,aCommunity programme canavoid gaps bycommissioning work which
would not otherwise bedone .Onthe other hand ,itcan beargued that a
programme which has notbeen adopted byanysingle Member State isnotlikely
tobeworth initiating attheCommunity level .
Inconclusion ,themain basis for aCommunity research programme ispolitical
and institutional ,except for major projects which are tooexpensive tobe
conducted nationally .Inaddition ,the smaller Member States get information
more cheaply and more effectively than they could inthe absence ofa
Community programme .Itseems likely ,however ,that all Member States ,
including thesmaller ones ,regard their ownnational programmes asbeing of
more importance than those ofthe Community collectively .Nevertheless ,the
-25-

thecombined national and Community programmes play avery important part
intheachievement ofahigh standard ofsafety anditisimportant that they
should bewell co-ordinated ,but atthe same time sufficiently flexible ,to
meet thedemands ofchanging situations .
8.2 The Community Machinery for Establishing and Monitoring Research
Programmes
TheCommunity research programme isintended tobeanapplied programme with
strictly defined objectives .Thefollowing account refers totheprogramme in
reactor safety andhealth protection ,butmuch ofthematerial applies more
generally .
Because the Joint Research Centre has nodirect responsibility inthe
practical issues ofnuclear power and radiation protection ,itisessential
for ittohave close relationships with operating organisations inMember
States and fortheMember States toparticipate effectively intheestablish­
ment oftheresearch prograimte .Atthesame time itisalso necessary forthe
Joint Research Centre tohave full responsibility for themanagement ofits
own affairs and tobefully accountable totheCommission and thence tothe
Council .Similar considerations apply tothe management ofthe indirect
programme .Itisinthecontext ofthese twobroad requirements that wehave
examined theCommunity 'ssystem formanaging theresearch programmes .
8.2.1 TheInitiation ofProgrammes
After extensive consultation within the Commission ,the Director General of
theJoint Research Centre prepares aproposed programme .This programme is
discussed atthree senior consultative levels -
(1)The General Advisory Committee (GAC ).This advises theJRCon
allaspects oftheprogramme .
(2)The Scientific and Technical Committee (STC ).This advises the
Commission onnuclear matters .
(3)The Committee onScientific andTechnical Research (CREST ).This
deals with both direct andindirect action programmes andadvises
both the Commission and the Council onthe overall orientation of
theprograimies .
These three bodies operate independently and donot always give consistent
advice .TheGACmayalso consult anumber ofmore junior committees known as
Advisory Committees onPrograimies Management -ACPM -which areconcerned more
specifically with theprogrammes once they have been approved .
Following this consultation ,the Commission proposes aprogramme tothe
Council .Atthis stage ,opinions are sought from theEconomic and Social
Committee and the European Assembly .The Council operates with its usual
structure of the Atomic Questions Group and the Committee of
Permanent Representatives .Eventually ,aCouncil decision settles thebudget
for the programme and its major components ,onthe basis ofafour-year
rolling programme .
8.2.2 TheManagement ofProgrammes
Advice onthe continuing management ofprogrammes isgiven bytheAdvisory
Conmittees onProgramme Management .These usually consist ofthree members
from each Member State ,and three from theJRC orfrom other parts ofthe
Commission -atotal ofthirty .

TheseACPMsreporttoboththeCommission andtheCounciland,onrequestfrom
theGAC,advisetheGAConnewprogrammeitems,sendingcopiesoftheiradvice
totheCommission andtheCouncil.Whererelevant,theydealwithbothdirect
andindirectactionprogrammes .
TherearefiveACPMsinthefieldsofnuclearsafetyandhealthprotection .
Theseare:-
ACPM,ReactorSafety
ACPM,Management andStorageofRadioactive Waste
ACFM,PlutoniumFuelandActinideResearch
ACPM,Decommissioning ofNuclearPowerPlants
ACPM,BiologyandHealthProtection (RadiationProtection ).
WehaveconsideredtheworkingmethodsoftheACPMReactorSafetyandtheACPM
BiologyandHealthProtection .Thefinancialscaleoftheprogrammes onwhich
theACPMsadviseisnowabout80MEUA.
TheACPM,ReactorSafety,haschosentodealwiththeprogrammeingreat
detail-moredetailthancanbeaccommodated bytheexpertiseofitsmembers.
Toremedythisdeficiency ,theACPMhashadtoproliferate alargenumberof
workinggroups(tenatpresent)madeupofadozenorsomemberseach,
appointedbytheACPM.Theseworkinggroupsare,inpractice,permanent
committeesadvisorytotheACPM.Inaddition,someworkinggroupsaresplit
intosub-groups andfurtheradhocgroupsarecreatedonatemporarybasisto
discussspecifictopics.Duetothepre-existence ofotherharmonisation and
co-ordination committeesdealingwithliquidmetalfastbreederreactorsand
withlightwaterreactors,someoftheworkinggroupshaveadoublerole.
ThisACPMnormallymeetsthreetimesayear,whilethevariousworkinggroups
meettwoorthreetimesayear.Includingsub-groupsandadhocgroups,the
wholesystemrequiressomethinglikethirtymeetingsperyear.Theoverall
attendance time,excludingtravelandCommissionstaff,isseveralthousand
manhoursperyear.TheACPMandtheworkinggroupshaverequireddetailed
andextensivesupporting documentsandtheDirectorGeneraloftheJRC
estimatesthecommitmentofresearchstaffasinexcessof20manyearsper
year.
Bycontrast,theACPM,BiologyandHealthProtection ,operateswithoutworking
groups.Itdealswithanindirectprogrammeanditsmembersaredrawnlargely
frominstitutions whicharepotentialcontractors .Theyarethusexpertin
therelevantfields,butnotcompletelydisinterested .Ithasbeensuccessful
inestablishing andmaintaining arealisticprogramme,buthasbeen
disinclined torecommendthesubstantial reductionintotalbudgetthatsome
ofitsmembersbelievetobeappropriate .
NeitheroftheseACPMsprovidesaninputofinformation fromtheMemberStates
ontheirresearchprogrammes ,asrequiredbytheCouncilresolutionof18July
1977.ThisresolutionincludedamongthetasksofeachACPM,ensuring"better
liaisonbetweenimplementation oftheprogrammesatCommunitylevelandthe
corresponding researchanddevelopment workbeingcarriedoutinMember
States".
8.3TheViewsoftheExpertGrouponNuclearSafety
Nuclearsafetycomprisesonlyasmallpartoftheworkofthethreesenior
committees ,GAC,STCandCREST,andweneedmakenocommentontheinter­
relationships .NordowefinditnecessarytocommentontheACPM,Biology
andHealthProtection .Bycontrastwestronglycriticisetheoperationofthe
ACPM,ReactorSafety.Wehavenotattemptedtofindouthowthepresent
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situation developed andwedonotwish tobecritical ofthemembers ofthe
Committee anditsworking groups -given therequirements which they judged to
have been placed onthem ,they hadlittle choice .
Itisapparent ,however ,that there isasignificant lack ofunderstanding of
each other 'sproblems between theACPM andtheCommission .TheCommission in
theform oftheJRC ,sees theACPM asbeing avery influential body which must
beprovided with thedetailed information itseeks ;theACPM ,oratleast some
ofits members ,see their efforts frustrated byinadequate orunsuitable
documentation and regard their recommendations ashaving little influence on
the Commission .
The combined effect ofacomplex committee structure and some confusion or
disagreement about objectives andmethods ofwork hasbeen toimpair sound
management and toleave both thetheJRCmanagement andtheMember States with
noclear lines ofaccountability andamounting sense offrustration .
Despite these difficulties ,theworking parties have one incidental advantage
inthat they provide for auseful andstimulating exchange ofviews between
individual scientists andengineers intheMember States andthestaff ofthe
JRC . If theworking groups aredisbanded ,some attempt should bemade
toensure that adequate personal links aremaintained ,and tosee that the
experience intheMember States isstill available totheJRC .
8.4 Apossible alternative Method ofManagement oftheResearch Programme
inReactor Safety
Wehave considered analternative system oflinking Member States andtheJRC
tomeet the needs set out atthe beginning ofthis chapter .The system is
related toreactor safety butmayhave relevance inother programme areas .
TheJRCproduces asix-monthly technical progress report onallprojects and
isstarting aregular report ontheresources applied toeach project .There
isalso afull technical report atthe end ofeach definitive phase ofa
project and atfinal completion .Weare satisfied that these documents
provide sufficient information for Member States tomake comments and give
general guidance ontheprogrammes asthey proceed .
The ACPM should therefore meet after the publication ofeach six-monthly
progress report .The members appointed bythe Member States should be
sufficiently senior totake abroad view oftheprojects andtojudge howthe
progress ismatching theoriginal plans andobjectives .Itwould beuseful
forMember States toconsult theCommission before making their appointments .
There should besufficient time between the issue oftheprogress report and
themeeting toallow members tomake useofconsultation networks intheir own
countries .TheACPM should not call for additional written information ,nor
should itestablish sub-committees indealing with existing programmes .
Inproposing newprogrammes ,theJRCshould make abroad proposal totheGAC .
This should befollowed bymore detailed proposals totherelevant ACPM .As
with existing programmes ,members ofthe ACPM should seek any necessary
detailed briefing from their own countries .Exceptionally ,and only on
special projects ,notonwhole areas ,anACPM mayneed toestablish ashort -
term adhocsub-group todevelop views onacontroversial project .
Toimprove theaccountability oftheJRC ,itshould report totheGAConthe
results from ,and resources used by,each project atthecompletion ofeach
definitive stage andatfinal completion .Itshould also continue thepresent
procedure ofcommenting onanypoint where itsproposals differ from those
recommended byanACPM .
-28-

Toimprove the flow ofinformation from Member States totheCommission ,and
particularly to the JRC ,members of the ACPM should arrange for the
preparation ofsummary reviews ofthemain objectives andprogramme items of
research programnes intheir countries .Such reviews would notbeneeded more
often than annually -biennially may besufficient .
Finally ,wewould like todraw attention tothe problem ofresearch needs
arising unexpectedly .Because ofconstitutional constraints ,theJRC cannot
react rapidly tochancing needs andshould therefore beconcerned mainly with
long-term problems .Webelieve ,however ,that some short-term capacity would
bevaluable ,and that the Commission should introduce amechanism for
establishing acontingency reserve for indirect action ,and apredetermined
fraction oftheJRC resources fordirect action ,tobereleased orredeployed
for urgent work onthe authority ofthe Commission following afavourable
opinion oftheSTC .The other consultative bodies would beinformed ,butnot
consulted inadvance .
8.5Content of11;eResearch Programme inReactor Safety
Wehave not attempted anevaluation ofthe present (198C/1983 )research
prograume inreactor safety .However ,wedid note with approval that it
represents nearly 30% ofthe total CEC research budget .Wealso noted that
about 8%ofthe reactor safety budget has been setaside forthesecond phase
ofthe "Super SARA "project ,exclusively devoted toin-reactor LOCA studies ,
and that significant research activities are under way inthefields offuel-
coolant interaction under accident conditions and thecooling ofmolten core
debris .While endorsing such studies wepoint out theneed toemphasise ,in
the light ofthe twoevents atThree Mile Island ,therelative importance of
small loss ofcoolant accidents and ofinsufficient core cooling with partial
damage tothe core over whole core melt-down studies (for LWRs ).Itis
self-evident that such shifts inemphasis away from large loss ofcoolant
accidents andcomplete core melt-down must beattuned tosimilar trends inthe
research proqramnes ofMember States inorder tobecomplementary rather than
overlapping .
8.6 Recommendations
1.The present system ofbudgeting onafour-year rolling programme should
becontinued .
2.The ACPM ,Reactor Safety ,should bereconstituted without sub-groups .
Members states should reconsider their representation inthe light ofthe
necessary specialist knowledge ,preferably in consultation with the
Commission .
3.TheACPM should normally meet only six-monthly toreview thesix-monthly
progress reports andfinal project reports .
4.The JRC should report totheGAC atthecompletion ofeach definitive
stage ofaproject ,and atfinal completion ,showing results and resources
used .
5.Members oftheACPM should provide regular summaries oftheobjectives
andprojects oftherelevant programmes intheir countries .
6.The Commission should establish contingency plans sothat theJRC can
respond onalimited scale toimportant ,urgent newresearch requirements .
7.Theprogramme oftheJRC should take account oftheimportance ofsmall
loss-of-coolant events and insufficient core cooling with partial damage to
the core .
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CHAPTER 9
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Indealing with individual topics wehave attimes referred toinstitutional
arrangements ,but there arealso some general remarks which wewould like to
make .
9.1 Committee Organisation
Thecharacteristic which ismost obvious toaperson onfirst experiencing the
working ofthe Community isthe predilection toestablish committees .An
organisation such astheCommunity ,built upfrom sovereign Member States ,
certainly has touse awidespread and complex network ofcommittees to
establish consensus views .This procedure isclearly essential atthe level
oftheCouncil and itsinfrastructure ,but itisalso anotable feature ofthe
way inwhich the Commission works .Since the members ofcommittees
established bytheCommission are ,ingeneral ,notdelegates ofMember States ,
but experts operating intheir own right ,the justification for acomplex
committee structure inwhich Member States are given carefully balanced
numerical membership isless obvious .Aconsensus decision atsuch a
committee provides noguarantee ofasimilar consensus ofnational delegates ,
and the size ofthe committee may well make discussions prolonged and
ineffective .
Inaddition totheproblem posed bythe structure ofcommittees ,there are
difficulties posed bytheir sheer number .For acommittee ,particularly a
large committee ,tobeeffective ,itmust beserviced byasubstantial
secretariat .Our own group has been well served inthis respect ,partly
because wehave been fortunate inour secretary ,butalso because wehave
insisted onahigh level ofsupport from other parts oftheCommission .Other
committees ofwhich weareaware arenotsofortunate ,and the quality of
discussion isoften poor because thedocumentation provided isinadequate and
often available only onthedayofthemeeting .
Webelieve that improvements could bemade bymaking more useofindividual
consultants orsmall drafting groups for thepreparation ofmaterial tobe
submitted tocommittees .Werecognise that this introduces therisk that the
initial papers will bebiassed bythepersonal views ofanindividual orsmall
group ,butwethink this would bebetter than presenting thefinal committee
with ill-prepared andinadquate documentation .
9.1.1 Recommendat ions
1. The Commission should undertake areview ofitscommittees with theaim
ofreducing their number andtheir size .
2. Sufficient resources should beallocated totheremaining committees to
ensure that adequate documentation isavailable fortheir meetings .
3. Greater use should bemade ofsmall informal working groups and
individual consultants inthepreparation ofcommittee documents .
4. Greater use should bemade oftheremaining committees ,particularly
the Scientific and Technical Committee ,forproviding theCommission with
opinions ontopics which require ahigher degree ofexpertise than can be
commanded bytheCommission 'sstaff .
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9.2 TheExpert Groups setupunder Chapter III oftheEuratom Treaty
Chapter IIIoftheEuratom Treaty establishes amultidisciplinary group of
experts appointed bytheScientific andTechnical Committee from nominations
made byMember States ,with the function ofadvising the Commission ona
number oftopics ,ofwhich the preparation ofbasic safety standards for
ionising radiations isprobably themost important .This function issetout
inArticle 31oftheTreaty .
InArticle 37,Member States are required toprovide the Commission with
information about plans for thedisposal ofradioactive waste ,sothat the
Commission may determine whether such waste isliable toresult inthe
radioactive contamination ofanother Member State .The Commission isthen
required toconsult the group ofexperts referred toinArticle 31.In
practice theobjectives ofthese twoArticles aresufficiently different for
the Commission and the Scientific and Technical Committee tohave chosen to
appoint two separate groups tofulfil the distinct functions .The second
group hasbecome known astheArticle 37Group .
9.2.1 TheArticle 31Group
This group meets about every 6months and itsprogress ofwork tends tobe
slow .Itslargest single programme has been thepreparation ofadvice tothe
Commission on the basic safety standards and these have posed some
difficulties for thegroup .These difficulties were somewhat exacerbated by
theaccession ofthethree newMember States ,effective on1January 1973 .At
that time ,the basic safety standards ,which were based oninternational
recommendations published in1962 ,were inanadvanced state ofrevision to
bring them into line with international recommendations published in1965 .
Theextension ofthegroup in1973 delayed the completion ofthis revision ,
partly totake into account theviews ofthenewmembers ,butpartly because
the new Member States tended totake adifferent view ofdirectives from that
which haddeveloped intheCommunity ofsix .ThenewMember States expected
directives tobeapplied literally ,while the original Member States were
content toapply theintention rather than theliteral wording .Although this
interpretation was inline with thedefinition ofadirective ,thedegree of
administrative detail inthe basic safety standards caused agreat deal of
discussion ontheproblems ofapplying such detailed requirements todifferent
legislative structures .
The directive bringing the basic safety standards into line with the 1965
international recommendations wasfinally adopted bytheCouncil inJune 1976 ,
but ,within ayear ,new international recommendations were published .The
Article 31group set upasmall drafting team toprepare arevised text and
this wassubmitted bytheCommission totheCouncil inJune 1979 .Despite the
preliminary work ,there was still notfull agreement between theMember States
and atechnical working party ofthe Atomic Questions Group was needed to
resolve the differences .
9.2.2 Conclusions ontheArticle 31Group
TheArticle 31group ,with itsmultidisciplinary membership ,provides asound
basis forgiving opinions totheCommission over awide range oftopics inthe
field ofradiation protection .
Aconsiderable amount oftime isspent inthediscussion ofdirectives because
ofthe different attitudes todirectives byMember States ,and because the
basic safety standards directive goes into great detail about methods of
control ,whereas adirective ought tobeinaform which is"binding astothe
results tobeachieved upon each Member State towhich itisaddressed ,but
-31-

shall leave tothenational authority theform andmethods "(Euratom Treaty ,
Article 161).
9.2.3 TheArticle 37Group
The Article 37group differs from the Article 31group inthat itdeals
principally with specific case studies rather than with general principles .
Possibly asaresult oftheapplication ofthebasic safety standards ,the
Article 37Group found that almost all examples ofthe discharges of
radioactive waste from installations were small enough nottoinfluence other
Member States andthey concluded that their principal effort should bedevoted
to the discussion of the radioactive material released from anuclear
installation inthe event ofanaccident .This interpretation oftheterm
"waste "hasgiven rise todifficulties because anaccidental release differs
from adeliberate discharge ofwaste inbeing uncontrolled .AMember State
can therefore give noguarantee about the limit ofsuch adischarge .In
practice ,Member States have provided their assessment ofthe amount of
material which would bereleased from certain typical accidents ,butthere has
been little uniformity inthebasis ofestimating such releases .TheGroup
has therefore been trying toestablish ,atleast forlight water reactors ,a
setofhypotheses forconsistently evaluating theconsequences ofanaccident .
This will then provide auniform basis for the Commission inusing the
material from aMember State toassess thepotential radioactive contamination
ofanother Member State .Itshould not benecessary for the Group to
undertake any reappraisal ofthe safety assessments carried out bythe
operators andregulators intheMember States .
9.2.4 Conclusions ontheArticle 37Group
If"waste "isinterpreted initsconventional way ,therequirements ofArticle
37oftheEuratom Treaty areunrealistic ,because ofthesmall discharges of
radioactive waste that ,inpractice ,take place from nuclear installations .
The extension ofthedefinition ofwaste toinclude thematerial released asa
result ofanaccident has led tosome difficulties ofinterpretation ,which
are now being resolved bythe Group .Itmight help ifeach Member State
specified the scale ofrelease for which itrequired effective emergency
provisions inthe environment ofthe site within itsown boundaries .The
effect onother Member States ofarelease ofthis magnitude could then be
assessed bytheArticle 37Group andrecommendations made totheCommission on
theneed forastudy oftheeffectiveness oftransfrontier arrangements .
9.2.5 Recommendat ions
1. Further directives establishing basic safety standards forprotection
against ionising radiation should beexpressed inmore general terms
indicating theprimary objectives andstandards tobeachieved ,butemitting
thedetailed administrative requirements that make upmuch ofthe present
directive .
2. The Article 37Group should deal with the relationship between a
specified release ofradioactive material totheenvironment andtheresulting
radiation doses innearby Member States .They should not attempt to
reappraise national safety assessments ,butshould require each Member State
tocertify that the magnitude ofthe forecast release reported tothe
Commission isthesame asthat used forassessing emergency procedures within
the State 'sown boundaries .
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9.3 TheSeparation ofPromotional andRegulatory Activities
Inroost countries ,both intheCommunity andbeyond ,therole ofGovernment in
the early stages ofdevelopment ofnuclear energy was promotional ,inthe
sense that the responsible government bodies financed ,co-ordinated and
carried outresearch anddevelopment innuclear energy tothepoint where this
new energy source could betaken over byindustry and the electricity
suppliers .The growing need for regulation and inspection was initially
filled bythesame bodies that hadbeen andstill were responsible forR&D
and ,insome cases ,fordemonstration plants .This waslargely because ofthe
almost total concentration ofrelevant expertise inthese bodies .The
potential danger ofthis dual role wasperhaps first brought tothefore by
American nuclear critics ,who felt that their questions onthe dangers of
nuclear power were not given adequate attention bythe USA Atomic Energy
Commission .The subsequent decision todissolve this body andform separate
agencies for energy R&D (Energy Research andDevelopment Agency )and for
nuclear regulatory tasks (Nuclear Regulatory Commisssion )was followed to
varying extents and invarious modes byallEECMember States .These changes
reflected the growing awareness that the combination ofpromotional and
regulatory activities within oneagency would impair public confidence .
The situtation intheCommission issomewhat different ,because theCommission
has nodirect regulatory function .Nevertheless ,itdoes seek toinfluence
theregulatory arrangements inMember States andwould bewise tokeep under
review both its organisational arrangements for nuclear safety and health
protection and the relationship ofthese arrangements with itspromotional
activities .
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CHAPTER 10
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONLUSIONS
Most ofour recommendations and conclusions are included inthe relevant
chapters ofour report and themost important recommendations aresummarised
below .Inaddition ,however ,wehave thought itright toexpress some general
conclusions based partly onourwork asagroup andpartly onourcollective
general experience .
10.1 Principal Recommendations
Our detailed recommendations are set out inthe following sections ofthe
report :
2.4 ;2.5.1 ;3.4 ;4.2 ;5.6 ;6.8 ;7.5 ;8.6 ;9.1.1 ;and9.2.5 .
Inmore general terms ,weemphasise thefollowing points :
1. The reactor atThree Mile Island was vulnerable tocertain kinds of
operator error .European designs are not vulnerable tothe same extent .
Nevertheless ,the accident atThree Mile Island provided some important
lessons for thedesigners aswell astheoperators ofnuclear power plants ,
andtheCommission andtheMember States should review both aspects .
2. The fact that transients closely similar tothat which initiated the
accident atThree Mile Island hadoccurred andbeen reported earlier ,buthad
gone unnoticed byboth theUSNuclear Regulatory Commission andMetropolitan
Edison ,underscores theimportance ofthereliable transmission ofsignificant
information about relevant abnormal events between operators .That
information should also berecorded ineasily available user-orientated data
banks forthesystematic storage ofabnormal events atnuclear stations .We
recommend that there should beadefinite role for the Commission inthe
establishment ofsuch adata bank ,ornetwork ofdata banks ,serving utilities
andsafety authorities throughout theCommunity .
3. Thesiting ofnuclear power plants inEurope hasonly alimited part to
play inprotecting thepopulation from theeffects ofaccidents .Both the
Commission and theMember States should work towards aconsistent approach to
siting ,especially ofinstallations near national boundaries .
4. Effective emergency plans andtheassociated supply ofinformation to
the public can achieve asignificant reduction inthe consequences ofan
accident . The accident -atThree Mile Island demonstrated substantial
weaknesses ,some ofwhich also exist inEurope .Toreduce theweaknesses ,we
have made recommendation inChapters 6and 7andnowemphasise thefollowing
points :
a)TheCommission should publish acomparative study oftheemergency
procedures presently inuseintheMember States .
b)National licensing authorities should include areview ofthe
plans defining theoperating utilities' role andorganisational
structure during emergencies aspart oftheprocedures preceding
thegranting offuture operating licences .
c)Both the Member States and theCommission should review their
roles inimproving thetransmission ofinformation tothepublic
intheevent ofanemergency .
-3^-

5. The institutional arrangements ofthe Community are necessarily
complex .Nevertheless ,theCommission should consider theextent towhich it
could improve itsability torespond rapidly tonuclear research needs and
should also review thescale ofitsstructure ofcommittees andtheadequacy
ofthetechnical andadministrative services which itprovides tocommittees .
10.2General Conclusions
Like every other large scale source ofuseful heat ,nuclear energy carries the
potential todoharm and must ,therefore ,betreated with both care and
respect .Noamount ofcare will totally eliminate therisks ofthis ,orany
other sort ofenergy ,butwehave concluded ,from ourwork andfrom ourmore
general experience ,that public health andsafety would notbenefit andmight
well suffer significantly from the replacement ofnuclear energy byother
readily available sources ofenergy .
Asexperience develops ,additional safety measures will become available .
Whenever these can beapplied without unreasonable difficulty ,they ought to
beapplied .Weexpect theCommission oftheEuropean Communities toplay a
part indeveloping andencouraging these additional safety measures .Itwill
not always bepracticable toapply these improvements toearlier plants ,but
safety isnot anabsolute concept ,and thedevelopment ofimprovements for
future plants does notinvalidate thesafety ofearlier ones .
Fears are sometimes expressed about theproblems posed bynuclear energy in
fields other than those discussed inthis report .We have inmind
particularly civil liberties ,international relations and some aspects of
environmental protection .Wedonotwish tocomment onthese problems beyond
expressing ourfirm belief that adequate solutions areeither available orcan
befound ,atleast totheextent that theproblems are specific tonuclear
energy .Weare finally led tothe conclusion that nuclear sources should
continue toplay asignificant part inthesupply ofEurope 'senergy .
-35-

NoL141/26Appendix
OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 9.6.79
II
(Actswhosepublicationisnotobligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION DECISION
of16May1979
relatingtothesetting-upofagroupofhigh-levelindependentexpertsinthe
fieldofnuclearsafety
(79/520/Euratom)
THECOMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES ,
HavingregardtotheTreatyestablishingtheEuropean
AtomicEnergyCommittee,
WhereastheCommission ,followinganaccidentthat
occurredon28March1979inanuclearpowerstation
situatedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,requestedits
staffcompetentinthefieldtoprovideitwithareport
onthecausesandtheconsequences ofthataccident;
WhereastheCommission ,onapprovingthisreport,
consideredthatCommunityactioninthefieldof
nuclearsafety,bothfromthestandpointoftheinstalla­
tionsthemselvesandthatoftheprotectionofthe
publicandtheenvironment ,wouldhavetobeintensi­
fiedandforthispurposeitisadvisabletoentrusta
selectgroupofindependentexpertswiththetaskof
carryingoutageneralreviewofthepresentsituation
regardingnuclearsafetywithintheCommunity,
HASDECIDED ASFOLLOWS :
Artide1
1.Aselectgroupofindependenthigh-levelexperts
inthefieldofnuclearsafety,hereinaftercalledthe
'Group',shallbesetup.
2.ThemembersoftheGroupshallbeappointed
bytheCommissioninapersonalcapacity,itbeing
understoodthattheymaynotbelongtobodieshaving
adirecteconomicinterestinnuclearenergy.AseniorofficialoftheCommissionmaybeappointed
asamemberoftheGroup.Theothermembers
appointedshallnotbeservantsoftheCommunities .
Artide2
1.ThetaskoftheGroupshallbetoadvisethe
Commissiononallproblemsrelatingtothepresent
situationregardingnuclearsafetywithintheCommu­
nity,includingitsimplicationswhereradiationprotec­
tionisconcerned,andtoevaluatetheactivities
conductedbyCommunityinstitutionsinthisfieldfor
thepurposeofformulatinganysuggestionthatmay
serveasabasisforspecificmeasurestobetakenby
theCommission .Itshallforwardinanycaseareport
onitsactivitiestotheCommission before31
December1979.
2.TheGroupshallinparticular:.
–examinesafetystandardsandcriteria,practicesand
regulationsinforceand/orinpreparationinthe
MemberStatesandevaluatetheproceduresfor
Communityactioninprogresswithaviewtotheir
harmonization ,includingtheresultsalreadyesta­
blishedintheirinventorization .
–studytheprocedures .foraCommunitysystemof
informationonaccidents,incidentsandabnormal
occurrencesatnuclearpowerstations,
–evaluatethepresentapplicationofChapterIIIof
theEuratomTreaty(healthandsafety),andin
particularArticle37thereof(releaseofradioactive
waste),

9.6.79 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities NoL141/27
–evaluateactivitiescarriedonhithertowithregard
tothesitingofnuclearpowerstationsandthe
mainprinciplesofoperationalprotectionforthe
population(emergencyplans)withaviewtotheir
strengthening atCommunitylevel,
–examineproblemsassociatedwiththetrainingof
staffemployedintheoperationofnuclearpower
stations,andmorespecificallystaffassignedto
dutiesinvolvingsafetyandhealthprotection,both
fromthepointofviewofharmonizingpractices
andregulationsinforceintheMemberStatesand
fromthatofpromotionalactivitiestobepursued
directlybytheCommission ,
–evaluateresearchanddevelopmentprogrammesin
thefieldofnuclearsafetyandhealthprotection
eitherinprogressorplannedintheCommunity
inordertointensifythemwhereappropriatein
certainfields,
–provideageneraloverviewofthemannerin
whichnuclearsafetyisorganizedwithinthe
Communityandtosuggestpossibleinstitutional
formulaedesignedtoseparateauthoritiesrespon­
sibleforthedevelopmentofnuclearenergyfrom
thoseentrustedwiththeelaborationofregulations
concerningthesafetyofnuclearinstallations .
Artide3
ThetermofofficeoftheGroupshallexpireon31
December197''.Itmaybeextended.Thelistofmembersshallbepublishedbythe
CommissionintheOfficialJournaloftheEuropean
Communities forinformation .
Article4
TheCommissionshallprovidesecretarialservicesfor
theGroup.
Artidef
WithoutprejudicetotheprovisionsofArticle194of
theTreaty,themembersoftheGroupshallbe
requirednottorevealinformationwhichhascometo
theirknowledgebyreasonoftheGroup'swork.
Artide6
ThisDecisionshallenterintoforceontheday
followingitspublicationintheOfficialJournalof
theEuropeanCommunities .
DoneatBrussels,16May1979.
FortheCommission
GuidoBRUNNER
MemberoftheCommission

NoL251/26 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommunities 5.10.79
II
(Actswhosepublicationisnotobligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION DECISION
of2October1979
amendingDecision79/S20/Euratomasregardsthetermofofficeofagroupof
high-levelindependentexpertsinthefieldofnuclearsafety
(79/828/Euratom)
THECOMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ,
HavingregardtotheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity,
HavingregardtoCommissionDecision79/520/Euratomof16May1979relatingtothe
settingupofagroupofhiph-levelindependentexpertsinthefieldofnuclearsafety('),
andinparticularArticle3thereof,
Whereasitisnecessarytoextendto31May1980thetermofofficeofthegroupof
expertssetupinaccordancewithArticle1ofthesaidDecision79/520/Euratomsoasto
enablethegrouptocarryoitthetasktherebyentrustedtoit,
HASDECIDEDASFOLLOWS :
Article1
Thetermofofficeofthegroup,asspecifiedinArticle3ofDecision79/520/Euratom,is
herebyextendedto31May1980.,
Article2
ThisDecisionshallenterintoforceonthedayfollowingitspublicationintheOfficial
JournaloftheEuropeanCommunities .
DoneatBrussels,2October1979.
FortheCommission
GuidoBRUNNER
MemberoftheCommission
(')OJNoL141,9.6.1979,p.26.