3. 5. 82 . Official Journal of the European Communities No C 112/23 
Opinion on the Commission's tenth report on competition policy (published in conjunction 
with the fourteenth general report on the activities of the European Communities in 1980) 
The text referred to the Committee has not yet been published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 3 July 1981 the Commission referred the abovementioned report to the Economic and 
Social Committee in accordance with Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
B. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The Economic and Social Committee prepared its opinion on the above matter at its 195th 
plenary session held in Brussels on 24 and 25 February 1982. 
1. General comments 
1.1. Public awareness of Community competition 
policy 
The Committee welcomes the intention of the European 
Parliament and the Commission to make public opinion 
in the Community more aware of Community 
competition policy. Public opinion in the Community 
very often forgets, particularly in periods of crisis, the 
advantages to all those directly and indirectly concerned 
of having a common market organized on the basis of 
competition. At the present time it is therefore 
particularly appropriate and necessary to point out the 
role of competition in the Community in safeguarding 
prosperity, while at the same time making a realistic 
appraisal of the possibilities and limits of competition 
policy. The Committee sought to underline these points 
by issuing its recent own-initiative opinion on 
Community competition policy in the light of the current 
economic and social situation. The Committee therefore 
wishes to use the present opinion on the tenth report on 
competition policy as a means of taking part in the work 
of publicizing the competition policy. At the same time 
the Committee readily accepts the proposal put forward 
by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs in the EP's report on the 
Commission's ninth report on competition policy (see 
the document of 13 February 1981, page 14), that the 
Committee issue an annual opinion on the Commission's 
report, following the pattern adopted by the European 
Parliament. In future the Committee will monitor 
Community competition policy even more attentively and 
will endeavour to provide in its opinions in this field a 
contribution towards the further development of the 
common market in an enlarged Community. 
1.2. Continuity and interdependence of Community 
competition policy 
The tenth report on competition policy marks the end of a 
decade in Community competition policy. During this The full text of the opinion is as follows: 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 198 
thereof, 
Having regard to the request made by the Commission of 
the European Communities on 3 July 1981 for an opinion 
on the matters of general interest in the tenth report on 
competition policy, 
Having regard to the decision taken by its Bureau on 
7 September 1981 instructing the Section for Industry, 
Commerce, Crafts and Services to prepare an opinion on 
the matter, 
Having regard to the opinion adopted by the Section for 
Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services at its meeting 
held on 3 February 1982, 
Having regard to the oral report made by the rapporteur, 
Mr Neumann, 
Having regard to the opinion of 30 April 1981 on 
Community competition policy in the light of the current 
economic and social situation (*), 
Having regard to the discussions at its 195th plenary 
session held on 24 and 25 February 1982 (meeting of 
24 February), 
Whereas the European Parliament and the Commission 
are both concerned to hold a systematic dialogue on the 
important social and economic aspects of Community 
competition policy with those sectors of society mainly 
affected, thereby helping to make public opinion in the 
Community better informed as to the overall aims of this 
policy, the measures used to implement it and the 
problems facing it (cf. letter of 15 July 1981 from 
Mr Andriessen to Mr Roseingrave), 
HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION 
with 56 votes in favour and 15 abstentions: 
0) OJ No C 322, 10. 12. 1981, p. 3. 
NoC 112/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 3. 5. 82 
period it has proved possible, e.g. by means of the cases 
decided by the Court of Justice, to give continuity to 
certain aspects of this policy. There is no doubt that 
competition policy continues to be a key instrument of 
both EC and national economic policy. In the face of the 
profound socio-economic changes and the world-wide 
economic crises which have occurred, however, it has 
also become clear that competition policy must pay due 
regard to other sectoral policies in the economic field, e.g. 
social and employment policies, industrial policy, foreign 
trade policy, regional policy and structural policy in 
general. The Commission already draws attention to this 
interdependence in the introduction to the tenth report. It 
endeavours to rough out, at Community level, a coherent 
overall policy despite the fact that the implementation of 
such a policy is likely to be continually hampered by 
difficulties. 
1.3. Links with the report of the Section for Industry, 
Commerce, Crafts and Services and the opinion of 
the ESC of 30 April 1981 on Community 
competition policy in the light of the current 
economic and social situation 
The Committee set out its basic views on competition 
policy in these two documents. Many of the comments 
made are also applicable to the tenth report on 
competition policy. In its present opinion the Committee 
can therefore be brief and only needs to expand upon its 
arguments in so far as it is prompted to do so by the tenth 
report. The Committee thus does not intend to comment 
in detail on the cases decided by the Court of Justice and 
on the most important decisions and measures taken by 
the Commission. It will also not be commenting on the 
main developments in national competition policies set 
out in Chapter 3. 
2. Comments on competition policy in respect of 
business undertakings -
2.1. Distribution 
Generally speaking, it is difficult to make an assessment 
of the effects of marketing agreements on competition, 
whether these agreements take the form of exclusive 
dealerships or selective marketing arrangements. On the 
one hand such arrangements may lead to excessively high 
and inflexible prices and to a compartmentalization of 
markets with all the disadvantages that this brings for 
final consumers; on the other hand, marketing 
agreements are regarded as a legitimate business 
instrument in the light of the principle of freedom of 
contract in the economic field. From the point of view of 
competition policy, marketing agreements may 
sometimes be justified if they provide consumers with 
particular benefits, such as advice, installation facilities, 
servicing, improved distribution through greater market 
penetration, etc. 
As far as exclusive dealing agreements are concerned, up 
to now the Commission has granted a large number of 
exemptions for agreements under Regulation No 67/67/EEC. This Regulation is now to be completely 
redrafted, the new Regulation coming into force on 
1 January 1983. The Committee takes note of the 
objectives pursued in the new draft Regulation on block 
exemptions in the case of exclusive dealing arrangements, 
as set out in the tenth report. The Committee would, 
however, stress with reference to the discussions on the 
proposed changes to Regulation No 67/67/EEC that 
there must under no circumstances be any uncertainty 
amongst the enterprises concerned as to whether their 
exclusive dealing agreements are covered by the new 
Regulation or not. The new Regulation should therefore 
make the general legal position clearer as regards the 
legality of marketing agreements. 
As the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
majority of Member States have recognized, selective 
distribution arrangements also require EC provisions in 
the form of specific Regulations covering the relevant 
economic sectors. This being the case, the system of 
Regulations governing specific sectors of the economy 
must be used with caution to avoid the danger of 
imposing additional constraints and restrictions on the 
productive sector. 
The Committee shares this view. It awaits the publication 
of the forthcoming draft Regulation on block exemptions 
in respect of selective distribution arrangements in the 
motor vehicle sector in order to be able, in its opinion on 
the eleventh report on competition policy, to assess the 
extent to which it has been possible to set out an 
appropriate definition of acceptable and unacceptable 
restrictions of competition and to distinguish between the 
two types. The authorization of marketing agreements -
in contrast to other fields, and in contrast to the OECD 
and GATT codes of conduct, which are not fully 
mandatory - represents an aspect of Community 
competition policy in which the Commission is in a 
position to exert a guiding influence from a micro- and 
meso-economic point of view. 
2.2. The special role of competition in sea and air 
transport 
In the organization of competition in transport it has 
always been necessary to take account of the particular 
features of the transport markets. We are dealing here not 
merely with internal competition between the various 
modes of transport and the impact on the common 
market made by carriers based outside the Community. 
International air and sea transport reflect in a special way 
the difficulties encountered in organizing competition in 
these markets. 
The Commission has drawn up a proposal for a 
Regulation on the application of the rules on competition 
to international shipping based on the UN Code of 
Conduct for Liner Conferences. This draft Regulation 
sets out both procedural provisions and substantive 
provisions. In the Committee's view it is fundamentally 
necessary for international maritime transport to be 
subject to rules on competition which are in line with the 
specific characteristics of this transport market. 
3. 5. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 112/25 
The Commission's endeavours to apply rules of 
competition to international air transport have also led to 
the submission of a draft Regulation to the Council. 
There are a number of reasons for this, namely: 
— a series of airlines are facing economic difficulties, 
— governments are exercising a considerable influence 
on tariff policy. 
As cartel agreements working against market forces can 
evidently not be implemented in some particular markets, 
it appears absolutely necessary to draw up substantive 
rules on competition in the field of scheduled air services. 
A close examination of pages 22 to 27 of the 
Commission's competition report makes it clear that the 
Commission envisages enormous difficulties in trying to 
put forward draft Regulations for the application of the 
competition rules in the shipping and aviation sector. 
We must, therefore, first of all achieve a minimal degree 
of consensus which will ultimately provide the basis for a 
reasonable set of provisions covering competition in these 
fields. 
The Committee will consider these draft Regulations 
separately and draw up detailed opinions. 
2.3. The work of the International Energy Agency -
Simply crisis management? 
The fact that the Commission, in its tenth report on 
competition policy, looks at the institutional structure 
and working methods of the International Energy Agency 
is to be welcomed. In line with the desire to make the 
public in the EEC aware of the Community's competition 
policy, it publicizes the fact that the operation of the 
International Energy Agency also has a bearing on 
Community competition policy. It reveals that in the 
event of an international supply emergency the aim of the 
Agency's crisis management must be - irrespective of the 
EEC's competition rules and in accordance with the 
Agreement on an international energy programme of 18 
November 1974 - to develop a self-sufficiency in oil 
supplies and to allocate available oil among the 
participating countries on an equitable basis during a 
supply shortage. However, as long as no state of 
emergency exists it would seem expedient and necessary 
to keep a regular check on whether the participation of 
the oil companies in the Agency's work is compatible with 
EEC competition rules. The Committee recommends 
that the Commission check to what extent the 
information system for the international oil market, 
which is the responsibility of the Agency's Standing Group on the Oil Market, is suitable for explaining the 
situation and structure of the international oil market to 
the European public. 
2.4. The shortcoming in the Community's competition 
policy — Lack of merger control 
Increasing concentration in the Community economy 
encourages oligopolistic market structures. This can 
increase the risk of abuse to the detriment of small and 
medium-sized businesses. From the point of view of the 
economy as a whole, mergers and the trend towards 
oligopolistic market structures which frequently 
accompanies them are not to be condemned out of hand; 
nevertheless, the structural change brought about by 
concentration should be kept under control. As far back 
as 20 July 1973 the Commission submitted a proposal for 
a Council Regulation on merger control and this was 
approved by the Committee in an opinion of 28 February 
1974. The Committee continues to advocate the 
adoption of a draft Regulation, provided that the 
Commission still tries to do justice to the demands of both 
industrial and social policy (1). As the Committee stated 
in its opinion of April 1981, the enforcement of a 
Regulation on merger control would come within the 
scope of the wider competition policy, which has to take 
into account the still differing situations in the various 
Member States, and therefore provide flexible, phased 
measures to reach the desired goal: the safeguarding of 
the competitiveness and efficiency of the entire 
Community economic system. The Committee also notes 
with satisfaction that in its report on the tenth report on 
competition policy the EP Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs takes up once again the arguments the 
ESC put forward in its abovementioned opinion. 
The Committee furthermore supports the Commission's 
efforts also to investigate, within the meaning of Article 
86 of the EEC Treaty, cases of mergers if they threaten to 
lead to the abuse of a dominant market position. 
2.5. Fulfilling the Community's international 
obligations to combat restrictive practices in 
international trade 
The Commission reports on its participation in the work 
being done by the OECD and United Nations on 
restrictive practices in international trade and on its 
cooperation with the anti-trust authorities in Japan, 
Canada and the USA. Special reference should be made to 
the 'set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and 
rules for the control of restrictive business practices', 
recently adopted by the General Assembly of the UN. 
(x) As it was concluding its discussions the Committee learnt that 
the Commission had amended its proposal for a Regulation. 
The Committee will look at these amendments during the 
coming year. 
No C 112/26 Official Journal of the European Communities 3. 5. 82 
Although this code is not legally binding, the question 
naturally arises as to what measures the Commission is 
considering adopting to monitor compliance within the 
Community and in the other countries which have agreed 
to the abovementioned principles and rules. In so far as 
the provisions of the code accord with Articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty, such vetting is to a certain extent 
automatic since the Community constantly monitors 
compliance with its own competition rules. But the 
Committee is not sure whether this is sufficient to meet 
the international moral obligations to combat restrictive 
practices in international trade imposed on the 
Community by the code. The Committee therefore urges 
the Commission to inform the public of its findings 
regarding the application of the code in a future report on 
competition policy. 
2.6. The need to speed up the decisions and measures 
taken by the Court of Justice and the 
Commission 
Although this opinion does not make a detailed critical 
analysis of the Court of Justice rulings commented on by 
the Commission or the main decision and measures taken 
by the Commission, this does not imply that the 
Committee concurs with the Commission's assessment in 
every instance. More important than the analysis of 
individual cases, however, is the need to speed up both the 
Commission's decisions and measures and the Court 
rulings. While the Committee noted the explanations 
given by the Commission representatives, i.e. that there 
were limits to any acceleration of the procedures (e.g. the 
issue of a negative clearance takes at least a year), it still 
thinks that procedures can and should be speeded up. 
Particularly unsatisfactory is the situation which arises 
when cooperation between firms meets the requirements 
of Article 85 (3) and therefore the aims of the Treaty of 
Rome, but has for procedural reasons to wait a long time 
for approval by the Commission, by which time the 
market situation may already have changed again. As 
regards the application of competition law in the 
individual Member States, the non-binding nature of the 
so-called 'comfort letters' also leads to considerable legal 
uncertainty. 
The Committee expects the Commission to put forward 
proposals for speeding up procedures and to provide 
information on this in its next report (*). 
(') To this extent the Committee supports the European 
Parliament in its request for a review of the Commission's 
procedures and in particular for the adoption of rules of 
procedure. The Committee considers that there is a need for an 
overall survey of the procedural rules arising from the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome in 
cases of alleged infringement of competition rules. 
3. State aid (under the EEC Treaty) 
3.1. Coordination of competition policy and aid policy: 
A fundamental requirement 
In purely theoretical terms, 'competition' and 'State aid' 
might be regarded as incompatible. The Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community does 
not support such a dichotomy, nor so far has it been the 
determining factor in Community policies derived from 
this Treaty. It may be recalled that in the EEC Treaty the 
heading 'Rules on competition' covers both Articles 
85 ff., representing the key elements of Community 
competition policy, and Articles 92 ff. on State aid. It is 
true that Article 92 (1) declares State aid to be basically 
incompatible with the common market, but Articles 92 
(2) and (3), 93 and 94 set out in detail those State aids 
which are compatible with the common market. 
The juxtaposition of competition policy and aid policy 
has in fact been a characteristic feature of Community 
economic policy over the past decade. Community 
regional policy, social policy and sectoral structural 
policy are predominantly Community aid policies 
(Regional Fund, Social Fund). The economic policies of 
the Member States are likewise characterized to a greater 
or lesser extent by the juxtaposition of competition policy 
and aid policy. 
Since competition policy does not enjoy overall primacy 
there is a constant need to coordinate it with other 
policies, e.g. social and employment policy, industrial 
policy, regional and general structural policy. There is of 
course no side-stepping the question of what criteria 
should govern this coordination (2). 
(2) This problem is also recognized by the EP Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs in its report on the tenth 
report on competition policy; it notes that: 
'Problems are posed all the way along the line for competition 
policy, in that cartels may be formed, derogations may be 
granted from competition rules, and State aids may be 
granted whose compatibility with competition rules may 
often be extremely difficult to assess. Pragmatic judgements 
will be necessary in these cases; what is clear is that 
competition policy cannot be the only criterion for 
judgement. Nevertheless, these decisions should not just be 
taken on an ad hoc basis.' 
3. 5. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 112/27 
The Committee acknowledges the effort made by the 
Commission to develop State-aid criteria compatible with 
Community competition policy. This is proved by the 
relevant Commission documents. In the Court of Justice 
judgment of 17 September 1980 in the Philip Morris 
case the Committee sees a confirmation of its view that 
'normal' structural change in a market economy must be 
brought about by competition. State aid, approval of 
which is at the discretion of the Commission under Article 
92 (3), must contribute to the attainment of Community 
objectives and interests; the exclusive furthering of 
national goals is not enough. Misgivings therefore arise 
when in point 161 the Commission states that it may look 
favourably on certain measures 'planned specifically to 
combat the crisis in certain sectors where, by means of 
some degree of reorganization, they are capable of 
helping to adapt existing industrial structures to the new 
requirements of the world economy'. The Committee 
fears that, despite the Court's judgement in the Philip 
Morris case, such a criterion for approval could under 
certain circumstances lead to competition between State 
aids and the transfer of the economic difficulties of one 
Member State to another. 
The Committee thinks that the Commission should give 
priority to the harmonization of State aid and to ensuring 
that the basic decision adopted by the Council in 1975 at 
the Commission's instigation and concerning compliance 
with certain criteria (transparency, ceilings, etc.) is 
applied. 
3.2. Against State protectionism 
The Committee notes that throughout the EEC there are 
still wide social, economic and political disparities 
between the Member States, and there are many instances 
of protectionist measures being adopted by Member State 
Governments to benefit their own industries, particularly 
in times of recession and falling employment. These 
measures include discrimination, taxation, marketing 
controls, testing requirements, State aids, and 
prolongation of State commercial monopolies in 
contravention of Article 37. Even where the European 
Court has condemned some examples of discrimination, 
Member States have taken several years to comply with 
the ECJ's ruling, or have ignored it. These distortions 
have a considerable foreclosing effect on intra-State trade 
and competition. Indeed, it is because of the existence of 
such measures that in some cases enterprises have 
adopted marketing tactics which the Commission has 
then condemned. 
The Commission's policy appears to have been to devote 
far more of its limited resources to dealing with individual 
cases, pursuing these vigorously, whereas in those comparatively few cases it has brought against Member 
States, it seems to have taken a less urgent view and has 
been more generous in the time allowed for compliance. 
The Commission should be urged to take action speedily 
against distortions of competition arising from Member 
States' actions and to be energetic in bringing before the 
ECJ cases where Member States have failed to comply 
with the Court's rulings within a reasonable time or at all. 
In addition, the Commission must take into account these 
market disparities and distortions in applying the rules of 
competition to enterprises. 
4. Public undertakings 
Actions have been brought by France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom against the Directive adopted by the 
Commission on 25 June 1980 on the transparency of the 
financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings. The purpose of these actions is to have 
Directive 80/723/EEC declared null and void. These 
actions mean that until the Court of Justice reaches its 
decision the question of whether the Commission was 
entitled to adopt this Directive on the basis of 
Article 90 (3) remains unsettled. The Court's decision is 
undoubtedly of great importance for the future 
convergence of the economies and economic policies of 
the Member States. 
Like the Commission, the Committee sees major 
problems of economic policy arising when the State 
operates indirectly or directly as an undertaking -
sanctioned by Article 222 of the EEC Treaty ('this Treaty 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership'). Disputes 
can easily arise over whether or not entrepreneurial 
activity by the State in such cases has a de facto aid effect. 
In this connection the Commission notes that it is having 
its attention drawn increasingly to cases 'where it seems 
unlikely that an investor following standard company 
practice in a market economy would have acted in a 
similar way. This is particularly so where rescue 
operations and replacing of loss-depleted capital are 
concerned'. If, however, 'standard company practice in a 
market economy' is taken as a criterion, the fact cannot be 
ignored that private firms and private-sector 
organizations can also grant aids which are not generally 
regarded as a distortion of competition. For instance, 
companies operating in several sectors of the economy 
can use their financial strength at least temporarily to 
subsidize internally those parts of the company in deficit. 
Small and medium-sized businesses, which do not have 
the same opportunities for internal subsidies, suffer 
severe competitive disadvantages in such a situation. 
The Committee feels it should stress the impact of 
banking and financial concentration on competition 
NoC 112/28 Official Journal of the European Communities 3. 5. 82 
develop principles which, while preventing distortions of 
competition between different types of undertaking, 
nevertheless allow the State to play its legitimate 
entrepreneurial role. 
The Committee would like the Commission to go into this 
important problem in greater depth in its next report on 
competition policy. 
The Chairman of 
the Economic and Social Committee 
Tomas ROSEINGRAVE 
ANNEX 
to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
REJECTED AMENDMENTS 
The following amendments, tabled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, were rejected in the course 
of the Committee's debate: 
Page 5, point 2.1 
Delete the second and third sentences from 'On the one hand such arrangements . . .'to 'greater market 
penetration, etc' and substitute the following text: 
'As the Committee has already stated, in its opinion of last April on competition policy, such 
arrangements may do much to improve marketing networks and distribution methods, with obvious 
advantages for the final consumer; care should be taken, however, to ensure that these arrangements do 
not involve compartmentalization of markets or allow abuses, particularly on the price front. 
Furthermore, the large number of Commission decisions and judgements by the Court of Justice 
provide adequate guidelines for industry.' 
Reasons 
These two sentences are neither clear nor comprehensive; it would be preferable to provide a concise 
summary of the positive and negative features of marketing agreements, and to acknowledge the important 
role played by the Commission and the Court of Justice in this context. 
It is essential, in the interests of coherence, to refer to Chapter V of the Committee's opinion of 30 April 
1981 on Community competition policy in the light of the current economic and social situation. 
The present opinion on the Commission's tenth report should take heed of the principles and suggestions 
contained in the abovementioned opinion (CES 561/81), which was unanimously approved by the 
Committee.. 
Voting 
For: 30; against: 32; abstentions: 2. 
The following passages in the Section's opinion were deleted in the light of the amendments adopted during 
the debate: 
Page 7, first paragraph 
Final sentence: 
'There is, however, a general need for rules governing competition in both of these fields.' 
Voting 
For: 60; against: 6; abstentions: 15. between industrial enterprises; accordingly it calls the 
Commission's attention to the need to acquire detailed 
information on this subject. 
The Committee realizes that the problems in this area are 
extensive and that they will probably continue to present 
Community competition policy with major difficulties in 
the future. This makes it all the more imperative to 
Done at Brussels, 24 February 1982. 
3. 5. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 112/29 
Page 7, second paragraph 
Final sentence: 
'The Section therefore expects that a Regulation governing the application of the rules of competition to 
international maritime shipping will provide more legal certainty and stimulate competition more than 
decisions on individual infringements of the rules of competition taken under Articles 85(1) and 86 of 
the EEC Treaty, e-.g. decisions concerning discrimination by Liner Conferences.' 
Voting 
For: 52; against: 6; abstentions: 13. 
Page 8 
First, fourth and fifth indents: 
- 'it is clear that the International Air Transport Association (IATA) tariff policy is frequently being 
circumvented, 
- airline companies, for the most part, come under Article 90(1) (public undertakings or 
undertakings having special or exclusive rights); the Commission does not exclude the possibility 
that governments are infringing Articles 90 (1), 85 and 86, and that these infringements may 
warrant action under Article 90 (3), 
- whilst there exists in international airtransport a price war which is in some cases having ruinous 
effects, the fares for scheduled air services within Europe often appear excessive and this has led 
inter alia to complaints from the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions.' 
Voting 
For: 41; against: 12; abstentions: 20. 
Opinion on the proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2511/69 
laying down special measures for improving the production and marketing of Community 
citrus fruit 
The text referred to the Committee has been published in Official Journal of the European 
Communities No C 276 of 28 October 1981, page 6. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 26 October 1981 the Council referred the abovementioned proposal to the Economic and 
Social Committee in accordance with Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
B. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The Economic and Social Committee prepared its opinion on the above matter at its 195th 
plenary session held in Brussels on 24 and 25 February 1982. 
The full text of the opinion is as follows: 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 43 
thereof, 
Having regard to the request made by the Council of the 
European Communities on 26 October 1981 for an 
opinion on the proposal for a Regulation amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2511/69 laying down 
special measures for improving the production and 
marketing of Community citrus fruit, Having regard to the decision taken by its Bureau on 
27 October 1981 instructing the Section for Agriculture 
to prepare an opinion on the matter, 
Having regard to its previous opinions on this subject, 
with particular reference to the opinion on agricultural 
aspects of enlargement of the Community to include 
Spain, 
Having regard to the opinion adopted by the Section for 
Agriculture at its 231st meeting held on 7 January 
1982,