EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 6 October 2021  
on a law re- enacting the Federal L aw on the establishment of a Fiscal  Advisory  Council and 
establishing a Productivity Board   
(CON/ 2021/ 29) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 23 August  2021  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Austrian Federal Ministry 
of Finance  for an opinion on a draft law re -enacting the Federal Law on the establishment of a Fiscal 
Advisory Council and establishing a Productivity Board  (hereinafter the ‘draft law’)1. 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles  127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as 
the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). In accordance with the first sentence of 
Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted 
this opin ion. 
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The draft law replicates, with minor adjustments, the existing tasks of the Fiscal Advisory Council, 
which principally comprise  assessing  the current and future fiscal situation and analysing the 
economic effects of financial operations in connection with the financial debt related to public 
budgets. In the future, the Fiscal Advisory Council will  also analyse the quality of macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts on a regular basis.  
1.2 The draft law also establishes a Productivity Board in accordance with Council Recommendation 
2016/C 349/013. The Productivity Board’s primary task is to diagnos e and analys e developments 
in productivity and competitiveness in Austria. It will also be entrusted with conducting independent 
analys es of the challenges that exist and the possible measures that may be taken in the areas of 
productivity and competitiveness , and with exchanging expertise and best practices with similar 
institutions. In addition to analytical activities, the Productivity Board is to submit recommendations 
to the Federal Minister for Digital and Economic Affairs  and to prepare report s on these 
recommenda tions which the Federal Minister is required to submit  to the National Council, the lower 
house of the Austrian P arliament . 
 
1 Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung des Fiskalrats neu erlassen und ein Produktivitätsrat 
eingerichtet wird (Fiskalratsanpassungsgesetz 2021).  
2 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
3  Council Recommendation 2016/C 349/01 of 20 September 2016 on the establishment of National Productivity Boards 
(OJ C 349, 24.9.2016, p. 1).    
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2 1.3 The explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law  states that Recommendation 
2016/C  349/01 leaves it to the Member States to tra nsfer the tasks of a productivity board or 
committee to an appropriate existing institution or to create a new one. For reasons  of 
administrative efficiency and in order to exploit synergies, the Productivity Board in Austria  is to be 
organisationally co- supervised by the Secretariat of the Fiscal Advisory Council ; while f or reasons 
of resource efficiency and, again,  in order to exploit synergies, the Board is to be kept small and 
the President of the Fiscal Advisory Council will act as its Chair. The Fiscal Advisory Council is to 
be composed of 15 persons and the Productivity Board of five  persons.  
1.4 As far as the tasks of the OeNB with respect to the Fiscal Advisory Council and the Productivity 
Board are concerned,  the draft law requires the OeNB to provide the necessary staff and equipment 
to carry out scientific analyses for the Fiscal Advisory Council and the Productivity Board.  
Furthermore, t he draft law provides  that the President of the Fiscal Advisory Council , who  also acts 
as the Chair of the Productivity Board,  is to receive remuneration for his or her activities and the 
reimbursement of  travel expenses i ncurred in the performance of his or her  duties. The 
remuneration to be paid shall be determined by the Federal Minister for Finance after consulting 
the OeNB. The ECB understands from the explanatory memorandum that the OeNB shall  be 
responsible for paying  such remuneration.  The costs incurred by the OeNB as result of the draft 
law shall be borne by the Austrian Federation up to an amount of EUR  200,000 per year . For this 
purpose, the OeNB shall reduce the payment of the Austrian Federation’s share of the net profit 
pursuant to Section 69(3) of the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank4 (hereinafter the ‘Law 
on the OeNB’)  accordingly. If the net profit is insufficient, costs up to EUR 200,000 shall be borne 
directly by the Austrian Federation. Th is regime is to be applied for the first time for the 2021 
financial year, on a pro rata temporary basis with regard to that year.  
 
2. Conferral of new tasks on the OeNB in relation to the Productivity Boa rd 
2.1 The draft law confers new tasks on the OeNB, namely carrying out scientific analyses for the 
Productivity Board. While the OeNB carries out scientific analyses for the Fiscal Advisory Council 
for many years and must provide the necessary staff and equipment to do so, the draft law newly 
establishes the Productivity Board. Therefore, the task of the OeNB to carry out scientific analyses 
for the Productivity Board is a genuinely new task of the OeNB. The ECB underlines that, i n the 
context of a proposed conferral of new tasks on a national central bank  (NCB ) in the European 
System of Central Banks ( ESCB) , it is necessary to assess such a conferral against the prohibition 
on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of that prohibition, 
Article  1(1)(b)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/935 defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter 
alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties’.  
2.2 Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary poli cy is one of the key objectives of 
the monetary financing prohibition6. Therefore, the task of financing measures, which are normally 
 
4 Bundesgesetz über die Oesterreichische Nationalbank, BGBl. Nr. 50/1984 as amended by BGBl. I Nr. 61/2018.  
5  Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).  
6  Article 123 of the Treaty also serves the objective of maintaining price stability and reinforces central bank independ-
ence.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 the responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather 
than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes financing of the 
public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of central 
bank financin g outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case- by-
case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central bank task 
or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States.  
2.3 As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), t o ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down 
by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria 
for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within 
the me aning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, constitute a 
government task as follows:  
First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government 
tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 
the central banking tasks already assigned to the NCB in the past. In recognition of the different 
Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, the tasks cur-
rently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and recategorised but may 
be reassessed if they are s ubject to legislative amendments of substance7. 
Second central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been 
conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks 
are mainly defi ned in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 
and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
Third , as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new 
tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, 
are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which are atyp-
ical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive in terest of the 
government or of other public sector entities should be considered government tasks.  
Fourth, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interes t of the government or other public sector enti-
ties is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB.  
In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  
(a) whether the performance of the new tas k creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 
tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement those exist-
ing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new tasks, sufficient 
safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a new 
task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to lead to the 
creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity shou ld also be 
 
7  See paragraph 2.2.1 of CON/2015/21 and paragraph 2.3.1 of CON/2015/22. All ECB opinions are published on EUR -
Lex. 
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 examined in relation to the financing of those tasks;  
(b) whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 
to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity and may have a negative impact on the ca-
pacity to  perform properly the existing central bank tasks;  
(c) whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the light 
of central bank independence and accountability considerations;  
(d) whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks;  
whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision -making bodies 
to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their personal 
independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in Article 14.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB.  
2.4 Assessment of the conferral of new tasks on the OeNB in relation to the Productivity Board  
On the basis of  the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the OeNB’s 
new tasks are in line with the monetary financing prohibition.  
2.4.1  Tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the ESCB and the Eurosystem by the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB a nd the ECB  
The task of carrying out scientific analyses for the Productivity Board is indirectly linked to the tasks 
conferred upon the ESCB and the Eurosystem by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB insofar 
as the ECB and the NCBs  closely monitor and analyse both fiscal and structural economic 
developments in euro area Member States in order to effectively exercise the tasks conferred upon 
the ESCB and the Eurosystem . However, they only do so in relation to the tasks conferred upon 
the ESCB and the Eurosystem, not the tasks of public entities  such as the Productivity Board.  
2.4.2  Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks  
The ECB notes that Member States have followed di fferent approaches when implementing 
Council Recommendation 2016/C 349/01. The majority of Member States  that have established 
productivity boards benefit in some way from existing institutions. Some Member States have 
established productivity boards withi n existing institutions  and broadened the mandates of those 
institutions to carry out  the envisaged tasks. Other Member States have created new bodies, which 
typically rely on support from an existing structure such as  a ministerial department or a research 
institute8. However, Austria is the only Member State to have created a new produc tivity board that 
relies on its NCB  for the provision of scientific analyses . For that reason, the new task conferred on 
the OeNB is atypical of central bank tasks.  
2.4.3  Extent to which the new task s are performed on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the 
government or of other public entities  
While the ECB understands that carrying out scientific analyses for the Productivity Board might 
create useful inputs for the OeNB’s own scientific analyses , it nevert heless notes that the new task 
for the provision of scientific analyses to the Productivity Board is performed on behalf of this public 
 
8  See Report from the Commission to the Council, Progress repor t on the implementation of the Council Recommenda-
tion of 20 September 2016 on the establishment of National Productivity Boards, COM(2019)152 final.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 entity and for the benefit of the Federal Minister  for Digital and Economic Affairs .  
2.4.4  Extent to which the performance of the new tasks creates conflicts of interest with existing central 
bank tasks  
In common with other central banks , the OeNB closely monitor s and analys es both fiscal and 
structural economic developments in euro area Member States in order to effectively exercise the 
tasks conferred upon the ESCB and the Eurosystem. From this perspective , the OeNB’s  provision 
of scientific analyses for the Productivity Boar d carries synergies with its central bank  tasks,  and 
will enhance the OeNB’s level of expertise.  However, as repeatedly emphasised by the ECB, an 
NCB’s role in monitoring and analysing economic, fiscal and structural developments should not 
go beyond activities that result from or are linked –  directly or indirectly – to the discharge of their 
monetary policy and central banking mandate9. 
2.4.5  Extent to which the performance of the new tasks is disproportionate to the OeNB’s financial and 
organisational capacity  
2.4.5.1  The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in 
a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their  ESCB- related and 
national tasks, both from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, when allocating 
specific non- ESCB- related tasks to the NCBs, additional personnel and financial resources must 
also be allocated so that these tasks may be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ 
operational or financial capacity to perform their ESCB -related tasks10.  
2.4.5.2  The draft law entrusts the OeNB with the potentially resource- intensive task of carrying out scientific 
analyses. The ECB understands from the explanatory memorandum that the OeNB will also pay 
the remuneration of the Chair of the Productivity Board , who is also to act as President of the Fiscal 
Advisory Council . Furthermore, the OeNB will reimburse costs incurred by members of the 
Productivity Board. In this regard, the ECB notes that Section 4(12) of the draft law states that the 
costs incurred by the OeNB as a result of the draft law  shall be borne by the Austrian Federation 
up to an amount of EUR 200,000. However, the draft law does not state that the Austrian Federation  
is to be responsible for  reimburs ing the OeNB in respect of  the costs related to its new tasks for 
any amount above EUR 200,000.  The ECB understands that the actual annual costs are likely to 
be considerably in excess of  EUR 200,000.  While the ECB understands that the new task is not 
disproportionate to the OeNB’s financial and organisational capacity, it cannot be entirely excluded 
that the costs for the Productivity Board, in connection with the costs for the Fiscal Advisory Board, 
might have a negative impact on the OeNB’s financial resources.  
2.4.6  Extent to which the performance of the new task s is aligned with the OeNB’s institutional set -up in 
the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations  
The performance of the OeNB’s new tasks  under the draft law  appear s to be consistent with its 
institutional set -up and seems  not to raise any issues in terms o f central bank independence and 
accountability considerations .  
 
9  See paragraph 5.5 of Opinion CON/2013/90,  paragraph 5.5 of Opinion CON/2013/91 , paragraph 7.1 of Opinion 
CON/2014/30 and paragraph 5.2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/13 . 
10  See, for example, paragraph 3.1.2 of Opinion CON/2016/6.   
ECB -PUBLIC  
6 2.4.7  Extent to which the performance of the new task s entails substantial financial risks  
The performance of the new tasks does not seem to entail substantial financial risks for the OeNB. 
In the ECB’s view, it is unlikely that carrying out scientific analyses for the Produ ctivity Board  will 
lead to damages for which the OeNB may potentially be held liable.   
2.4.8  Extent to which the performance of the new task s exposes members of the OeNB’s decision-
making bodies to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence  
The performance of the new task s does not appear to expose the members of the OeNB’s decision-
making bodies to disproportionate political risks or to impact their personal independence. 
However, it cannot be entirely excluded that the OeNB and/or the members of its decision- making 
bodies  might be exposed to reputational risks in the performance of the new task s. 
2.5 Conclusion  
2.5.1  The OeNB’s  new tasks in relation to the Productivity Board are not related to the tasks conferred 
upon the ESCB and the Eurosystem by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Moreover, the 
tasks in connection with the Productivity Board are atypical of central bank t asks. Austria is the only 
Member State implementing Recommendation 2016/C 349/01 that has created a new body which 
relies on its NCB for the provision scientific analyses. To ensure compliance with the monetary 
financing prohibition, it will be necessary t o ensure that the new tasks in relation to the Productivity 
Board are fully and adequately remunerated.  
2.5.2  In this respect, the draft law raises two concerns. First, the ECB understands from the wording of 
the draft law that the Austrian Federation will bear  costs up to a maximum annual limit of 
EUR  200,000 in any event and that it will only bear such costs directly if the OeNB’s net profit is 
insufficient to cover an amount of up to EUR 200,000. In order to comply with the monetary 
financing prohibition, it will be necessary to ensure that all costs of the OeNB related to the 
performance of the new tasks in relation to the Productivity Board are fully and adequately 
remunerated. Second, the ECB understands that the OeNB is to reduce the payment of the Austrian 
Federation’s share of the net profit pursuant to Section 69(3) of the Law on the OeNB to cover its 
costs. Where the remuneration of the new tasks in relation to the Productivity Board takes place in 
the context of the distribution of the OeNB’s profits, the reduction must be distinct from and 
subsequent to the OeNB’s profit disbursement in order for such financing to be regarded as being 
compliant with the monetary financing prohibition11. In addition, profits that have been fully realised, 
accounted for and audited may be used to remunerate the new tasks in relation to the Productivity 
Board insofar as the OeNB has a distributable profit within the meaning of Section 69(3) of the Law 
on the OeNB. In this regard, the ECB understands that the OeNB’s costs are borne by the Austrian 
Federation after the end of the respective financial year, subject to the approval of the annual 
financial state ments by the General Council and the General Meeting. This mechanism is 
inappropriate for the present draft law. In contrast to the laws on which the ECB has opined 
previously, under the draft law the OeNB must cover ongoing costs relating to the fulfilment of its 
tasks during the financial year. The ongoing coverage of costs in advance under the draft law by 
the OeNB qualifies as granting credit facilities in favour of the Austrian Federation and accordingly 
 
11  See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2021/23 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CO N/2017/26.  
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7 constitutes a breach of the monetary financing prohibition. The draft law should therefore be 
amended in order to remedy this breach.  
 
3. The OeNB’s financing of the Fiscal Advisory Council  
3.1 The systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks 
applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the 
central banking tasks already assigned to the NCB s in the past. In recognition of the different 
Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, the tasks 
currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re- categorised,  but 
may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments of substance12. Under the current 
legal framework, the OeNB’s obligations in relation to the Fiscal Advisory Council are to bear its 
costs and to provide the necessary staff and expenses , but no explicit reference is made to the 
OeNB discharging these duties with a view to carrying out scientific analyses for the Fiscal Advisory 
Council . However, the ECB understands that in practice the OeNB provides the necessary staff to 
the Fiscal Advisory Council in order to carry out such scientific analyses. T he draft law  now explicitly 
clarifie s that the OeNB is to  provide the necessary staff and equipment in order to carry out such 
scientific analyses. The ECB understands this clarification as merely expressing what  was alre ady 
implicit in the current legal framework. Accordingly, the draft law does not substantially amend the 
OeNB’s existing tasks as regards the Fiscal Advisory Council.  
3.2 Although the draft law does not substantially amend the OeNB’s  existing tasks in relation to the 
Fiscal Advisory Council, it substantially amends the existing arrangements governing the OeNB’s 
financing of the Fiscal Advisory Council . While under the current legal regime the OeNB bears the 
entirety of the Fiscal Advi sory Council ’s costs, in the future the costs incurred by the OeNB as a 
result of the draft law in relation to both the Fiscal Advisory Council and the Productivity Board are 
to be borne by the Austrian Federation up to an amount of EUR 200,000 per year. Furthermore, 
the draft law entitles the President of the Fiscal Advisory Council to receive remuneration which is 
to be paid by the OeNB.  
3.2.1  The systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government tasks 
applies to tasks that d id not form an integral part of the central banking tasks already assigned to 
the NCB in the past. The exemption from reassessments is therefore only applicable to tasks 
currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks. The ECB has repeatedly emphas ised 
that the tasks assigned to i ndependent fiscal institutions , in particular under Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013  of the European Parliament and of the Council13, are neither  central banking task s, 
nor do they facilitate the performance of such tasks , and that  the government is exclusively 
competent for compliance with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union and Regulation (EU) No 473/201314. Accordingly, t he OeNB’s 
 
12  See paragraph 2.2.1 of Opinion CON/2015/21 and paragraph 2.3.1 of Opinion CON/2015/22.  
13  Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions 
for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area  (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 11).  
14  See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/96, paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2012/105, paragraph 5.5 of Opinion 
CON/2013/90, par agraph 5.5 of Opinion CON/2013/91 and paragraph 7.1 of Opinion CON/2014/30.  
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8 existing tasks in relation to the Fiscal Advisory Council can also not be regarded as central banking 
tasks but as government task s. In this context, it is noted that the vast majority of Member States 
have not assigned to their NCBs the task of carrying out scientific analyses and providing  the 
necessary staff and equipment to their independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) , and neither do NCBs 
finance this task . There are three Member States ( the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary)  the 
NCB s of which are represented in the IFI  or in an advisory body to the IFI , albeit  without conferring 
any tasks on these  NCBs15. There are t hree further Member States (Austria, Estonia and Slovakia) 
the NCBs of which finance IFIs16. The NCBs of two of these Member States (Estonia and Slovakia) 
are entitled to be fully compensated by the ir government s for expenses incurred in this respect17. 
The OeNB is currently the only NCB within the ESCB that is required to provide the necessary staff 
and to bear the costs of an IFI without any right to compensation from the respective Member State. 
While the draft law improve s the situation, as it stipulates  an annual compensation of the OeNB’s 
costs up to EUR 200,000, the ECB understands that the OeNB’s annual costs in respect of the 
Fiscal Advisory Council and the Productivity Board are likely to be considerably in excess of the 
EUR 200,000  threshold . 
3.2.2  The ECB has repeatedly noted that the financing by NCBs of independent fiscal institutions or of 
government tasks relating to the monitoring of fiscal developments breaches the prohibition of 
monetary financing18. To ensure compliance with the monetary financing prohibition,  it will therefore 
be necessary to ensure that OeNB’s existing tasks in relation to the Fiscal Advisory Council  are 
fully and adequately remunerated.  In this respect, the draft law raises the same two concerns as 
are outlined above in relation to the Productivity Board (see paragraph 2.5.2 above). First, the ECB 
understands from the wording of the draft law that the Austrian Federation will bear costs up to a 
maximum annual limit of EUR  200,000 in any event and that it will only bear such costs directly if 
the OeNB’s net profit is insufficient to cover an amount of up to EUR 200,000. In order to comply 
with the monetary financing prohibition, it will be necessary to ensure that all costs of the OeNB 
related to the performance of the existi ng tasks in relation to the Fiscal Advisory Council are fully 
and adequately remunerated. Second, the ECB understands that the OeNB is to reduce the 
payment of the Austrian Federation’s share of the net profit pursuant to Section 69(3) of the Law 
 
15  In the Czech Republic, one member of the Czech Fiscal Council  (CFC)  is proposed by the Czech National Bank (CNB) . 
However, this member is only nominated by the CNB  and is neither  subject to any control nor takes  instructions from 
the CNB . Furthermore, the respective law stipulates that this member cannot be a current or former CNB Bank Board 
member whose term of offic e ended in the previous three years. In Germany, the Advisory Board,  an independent 
body of experts which assists the Stability Council , comprises one member from Deutsche Bundesbank.  In Hungary, 
the Governor of Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB)  is a member of the Budgetary Council.  The activity of the MNB Governor 
in the work of the Budgetary Council does not affect the statutory responsibilities of the MNB.  
16  In Slovakia, Národná banka Slovenska (NBS)  does not have the task of carrying out scientific analyses and providing 
necessary staff and equipment  but has to finance  the Fiscal Responsibility Board.  In Estonia, Eesti Pank provides the 
Fiscal Council with the means required for the performance of its tasks , including the suppl y of background information , 
assistance with the Council’s technical tasks by a secretary employe d by Eesti Pank and temporarily providing neces-
sary staff.  Furthermore, the members of the Fiscal Council are appointed to and removed from the Council by the 
Supervisory Board on the proposal of the Governor of Eesti Pank,  and Eesti Pank provides the Council with rooms 
and technical equipment.  
17  In Slovakia, according to Article 3(8) of constitutional law 493/2011 , NBS is entitled to a repayment of the resources 
provided in connection with the operation of the Board from the state budget . According to the Eesti Pank Act , on the 
request of Eesti Pank , the government refunds to it any direct expenses which Eesti Pank has incurred in relation to 
the work of the Fiscal Council . 
18  See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/96, paragraph 6.2 of Opinion CON/2013/ 90 and paragraph 6.2 of Opinion 
CON/2013/91 . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
9 on the OeNB to cover its costs. Where the remuneration of the OeNB’s existing tasks in relation to 
the Fiscal Advisory Council takes place in the context of the distribution of the OeNB’s profits, the 
reduction must be distinct from and subsequent to the OeNB’s profit disbursement in order for such 
financing to be regarded as being compliant with the monetary financing prohibition19. In addition, 
profits that have been fully realised, accounted for and audited may be used to remunerate the 
OeNB’s existing  tasks in relation to the Fiscal Advisory Council insofar as the OeNB has a 
distributable profit within the meaning of Section 69(3) of the Law on the OeNB. In this regard, the 
ECB understands that the OeNB’s costs are borne by the Austrian Federation after the end of the 
respective financial year, subject to the approval of the annual financial statements by the General 
Council and the General Meeting. This mechanism is inappropriate for the present draft law. In 
contrast to the laws on which the ECB has opined previously, under the draft law the OeNB must 
cover ongoing costs relating to the fulfilment of its tasks during the financial year. The ongoing 
coverage of costs in advance under the draft law by the OeNB qualifies as granting credit facilities 
in favour of the Austrian Federation and accordingly constitutes a breach of the monetary financing 
prohibition. The draft law should therefore be amended in order to remedy this breach.  
 
This opinion will be published on EUR -Lex. 
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 6 October  2021. 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine LAGARDE  
 
19  See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2021/23 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON /2017/26.