EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 26 November 2015 
on the deposit guarantee scheme 
(CON/2015/52) 
 Introduction and legal basis 
On 9 October 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Minister of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft legislative decree on the Dutch Deposit Guarantee Scheme (hereinafter 
the ‘draft decree’), which transposes Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on deposit guarantee schemes1 into Dutch law. 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions, as it relates to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and to rules 
applicable to financial institutions insofar as they mate rially influence the stability of financial institutions 
and markets. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 
1. Purpose of the draft decree 
1.1. The draft decree implements Directive 2014/49/EU and amends inter alia the Dutch Decree on 
special prudential measures, investor compensation and deposit guarantee (hereinafter the 
‘Decree’), which was adopted pursuant to the Dutch Law on financial supervision. The draft decree should be read in the light of the Law on financial supervision as currently in place and the 
proposed amendments to it under another draft law that implements Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
2 (hereinafter the ‘draft law on BRRD Implementation’)3.  
1.2. The draft decree concerns the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), which is presently 
operated by DNB. Based on the legislation currently in place, if a credit institution is no longer able to meet its obligations vis-à-vis depositors, the DGS is activated and the costs are apportioned 
among other participating credit institutions. Hence, the DGS is funded on an ex post basis by 
                                                 
1  Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes 
(OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 
2  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 
3  The draft legislation is available on the website of the Dutch government at www.overheid.nl. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
2 contributions from the participating credit institutions and DNB advances the amounts needed for 
its operation.  
1.3. Under the draft decree ex post funding arrangements for the DGS are replaced with ex ante 
funding arrangements. It establishes a deposit guarantee fund (hereinafter the ‘Fund’) which is a legal entity under public law with its own board, which is the owner of the financial resources in the 
Fund and is responsible for the management of the Fund’s resources. The Fund is financed 
through ex ante contributions impos ed on participating credit institutions
4. Reimbursements that are 
paid under the DGS are charged to the Fund5. The draft decree also provides for the possibility to 
call upon the participating credit institutions fo r extraordinary contributions if the pre-collected 
resources are insufficient. The Fund may enter into agreements with third parties to obtain 
financing from them if the extraordinary contributions are not available immediately6. 
1.4. The Law of financial supervision as currently in place, together with the draft law on BRRD 
implementation and the draft decree, assign certain tasks to DNB in the context of the operation of 
the DGS.  
(i) The Law on financial supervision as currently in place provides that DNB decides when the 
DGS is invoked and is responsible for granting the reimbursements within the applicable payment deadline
7. Moreover, insofar as depositors receive a reimbursement, DNB acquires 
the claims of these depositors and seeks recovery from the assets of the institution in 
relation to which the DGS has been activated8. 
(ii) The draft law on BRRD implementation adds two provisions to the Law on financial 
supervision regarding new tasks of DNB in the context of the operation of the Dutch DGS. These provisions require that DNB (a) supports the Fund in the exercise of its tasks; 
(b) provides the Fund with the financial means that are necessary for the exercise of its tasks
9; and (c) decides on the appointment, suspension and discharge of the Fund’s board 
members10. These provisions form the legal basis for the draft decree. The ECB notes that it 
has not been consulted on the draft law on BRRD implementation. 
(iii) The draft decree provides for the following new tasks for DNB: (a) DNB determines the level 
of the ex ante contributions and of the extraord inary contributions of each participating credit 
institution and the period within which the ex ante contributions must be paid11; (b) DNB 
determines the currency in which the reimbursements are paid and, if reimbursements at the 
DGS’s expense cannot be granted and made payable within seven days, it grants the 
deposit holder an appropriate amount, at the expe nse of the Fund, so that they are able to 
                                                 
4  See Article 29.12 and Annex B of the draft decree. 
5  See Article 29.05 of the draft decree. 
6  See Article 29.14 of the draft decree. 
7  Article 3:260 and 3:261(3) of the Law on financial supervision. 
8  See Article 3:261(4) and 3:265(1) of the Law on financial supervision. 
9  See Article 3:259a(4) of the Law on financial supervision (not yet in force). 
10  See Article 3:259a(3) of the Law on financial supervision (not yet in force). 
11  See Article 29.12(2) and 29.14(3) of the draft decree. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
3 meet their living expenses12; and (c) any revenues obtained by DNB as a result of the 
exercise of its right of recourse13are paid to the participating credit institutions or credited to 
the Fund14, as applicable.  
(iv) The draft decree restates the following tasks that DNB already performs on the basis of the 
Decree: (a) DNB grants the reimbursements to deposit holders15; (b) DNB gives notice of its 
decision to apply the DGS in the Dutch Government Gazette and in national newspapers of 
its own choosing and publishes its decision to grant a reimbursement to a deposit holder on 
a website which deposit holders can use to make arrangements for the payment of the 
reimbursement16; and (c) DNB requests administrators or receivers of the institution in 
relation to which the DGS has been activated to draw the attention of deposit holders to the 
applicability of the DGS17.  
 
2. General observations  
2.1. The ECB supports the establishment of an ex ante funded DGS in the Netherlands, in line with the 
common framework for DGSs laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU. Harmonised arrangements and 
conditions for deposit protection are necessary to ensure a level playing field in the context of the Union’s single market for financial services
18. Ex ante funding of DGSs, supported by ex post funds 
collected if necessary, has the advantage of grea ter reliability and availability and considerably 
enhances financial stability, in particular becaus e the reliance on ex ante contributions from the 
participating institutions may have a counter-cyclical nature19. 
2.2. The ECB stresses, however, that it is not addressing whether the draft decree effectively 
implements Directive 2014/49/EU in Dutch law. Rather, the ECB focuses on those provisions that 
may impact on the role and tasks of DNB as a ce ntral bank and as a member of the Eurosystem 
and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In this respect, as far as central bank 
involvement is concerned, funding arrangements for DGSs must comply with the monetary 
financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty, and in particular with the prohibition of national central 
banks (NCBs) providing overdraft facilities or any type of credit facility within the meaning of 
Article 123 of the Treaty20. 
                                                 
12  See Article 29.07(2) and 29.08(1) of the draft decree. 
13  DNB has this right of recourse based on the current Law on financial supervision, see point (i) above.  
14  Article 29.15 of the draft decree which refers to Article 3:261(4) and 3:265(1) of the Law on financial supervision. 
15  See Article 29.05(1) of the draft decree. 
16  See Articles 27.07(1), 29.04(1), and 29.09 of the draft decree. 
17  Article 29.04(3) of the draft decree. 
18  See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2011/12. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
19  See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2011/60 and Commission staff working document, Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive …/…/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast) and to the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarant ee Schemes, (COM(2010) 368), p. 58, available on the 
Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. 
20
  See paragraph 9.3 of Opinion CON/2011/12. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
4 2.3. The ECB has developed the guidance set out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 of this opinion on the 
basis of which it may decide whether a new task conferred on an NCB is to be considered a central banking task or a government task for the purposes of assessing such conferral against the 
prohibition of monetary financing
21. This guidance applies to genuinely new tasks that either did not 
exist in the past or did not form an integral part of the central banking tasks assigned to an NCB in 
the past. In recognition of the different Member St ates’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions 
and national set-ups, the tasks currently dischar ged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not 
reviewed and re-categorised, but may be reassessed if they are subject to legislative amendments 
of substance. In this regard, the ECB notes that the tasks previously conferred on DNB in relation to the operation of the Dutch DGS are, in part, different from the tasks conferred on DNB by the 
draft decree, which aims at changing essential elements of the set-up of the Dutch DGS. As a consequence, the tasks currently performed by DNB differ substantially from the tasks envisaged 
and should therefore be reviewed. Therefore, it should be assessed whether the new role of DNB in the operation of the DGS is compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing under 
Article 123 of the Treaty. The concrete assessment of whether DNB’s tasks in the context of the 
operation of the Dutch DGS are to be considered central banking tasks or government tasks is 
undertaken in paragraph 3.2 of this opinion. 
2.3.1. General considerations  
First, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their 
NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB − or 
Eurosystem − related tasks, as applicable.  
Second , central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed 
in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty. 
Third , new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, should be considered as government tasks. In that context, a distinction should be drawn between 
liquidity- and solvency-related tasks of NCBs. While, for the purposes of the monetary financing 
prohibition, solvency support is a government task, liquidity-related tasks, the ultimate objective of 
which are to finance the economy, are central banking tasks. 
2.3.2. Specific considerations  
In principle, tasks related to a DGS can be assign ed to central banks provided that they do not 
undermine an NCB’s independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty. However, the 
discharge of these tasks by central banks may not extend to the financing of DGSs as these are government tasks. This is without prejudice to the possibility for central banks to provide short-term 
financing to DGSs provided that such financin g addresses urgent situat ions, systemic stability 
aspects are at stake and decisions are at the discretion of the NCB
22.  
                                                 
21  See Opinion CON/2015/22. 
22  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 30, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu, and 
paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion CON/2011/76. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
5 An important criterion for qualifying a new task as  a government task is the impact of the task on 
the institutional, financial and personal independen ce of the NCB. In particular, the following should 
be taken into account. 
First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately 
addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, and does not necessarily 
complement those existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 
and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation in place to adequately address that conflict. 
Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be 
interpreted extensively, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Complementarity should also be examined from the point of view of the financing of those tasks. 
Second , it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performance of the 
new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB and may 
negatively impact its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. 
Third , it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task does not fit into the 
institutional set-up of the NCB in the light  of central bank inde pendence and accountability 
considerations. 
Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial 
financial risks. 
Fifth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 
NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks wh ich are disproportionate and may also impact on 
their personal independence and, in particular , the guarantee of the term of office under 
Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank. 
2.3.3. Any final assessment on the qualification of a task given to an NCB as either falling within the 
scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 
consistent application of the prohibition of monetary financing within the Eurosystem and the ESCB to the extent that it applies to its members. 
 3. Specific observations 
3.1. The role of DNB in the operation of the DGS 
The ECB welcomes the draft decree, as it establishes an ex ante funded DGS.  
The ECB stresses, that the tasks to be discharged by DNB under the proposed reallocation of 
responsibility for the performance of the functions related to the DGS need to comply with the 
monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty
23. To this end, it is of the utmost 
importance that the role of DNB is clearly defined in the legislative framework on the DGS by further aligning the Law on financial supervision with the aims of the draft decree and clearly 
                                                 
23  See paragraphs 3.1.1-3.1.3 of Opinion CON/2011/76. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
6 embedding the distribution of tasks and responsibi lities between DNB and the Fund, as is further 
discussed in paragraphs 3.2.5 and 3.2.9. 
3.2. Conferral on DNB of tasks related to the DGS 
DNB is designated as the authority which, together with the Fund, operates the DGS. The draft 
decree aims to change DNB’s role in the context of the operation of the DGS and assigns some 
additional tasks to DNB. In the light of the guidance se t out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, it must be 
assessed whether DNB’s tasks and responsibilities in  this field could constitute a breach of the 
monetary financing prohibition. 
3.2.1. New tasks  
It is noted that DNB currently has tasks in the context of the operation of the DGS under the 
Decree and the Law on financial supervision. DNB continues to perform these tasks, although the draft decree revises the set-up of the DGS and thereby, on the one hand, aims to change some of 
DNB’s responsibilities relating to the DGS and, on t he other, assigns additional tasks to DNB, such 
as the determination of the level of ex ante c ontributions and of the extraordinary contributions 
each participating credit institution must pay
24 and the granting to deposit holders of an appropriate 
amount, at the expense of the Fund, so that they are able to meet their living expenses if reimbursements at the DGS’s expense cannot be granted and made payable within seven days. In 
addition, the draft law on BRRD implementation requires that DNB: (a) supports the Fund in the 
exercise of its tasks; (b) provides the Fund with the financial means necessary for the exercise of 
its tasks
25; and (c) decides on the appointment, suspension and discharge of the Fund’s board 
members26 
3.2.2. Principle of financial independence 
The principle of financial independence requires an NCB to have sufficient means not only to 
perform its ESCB-related tasks but also its own national tasks (e.g. financing its administration and 
own operations)27. When allocating specific non-ESCB related tasks to the NCBs, such as tasks in 
the area of deposit protection, additional human and financial resources must also be allocated for these tasks to be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to 
perform their ESCB-related tasks
28.  
In this regard, the ECB notes that the Law on financial supervision stipulates that the credit 
institutions bear the costs of the DGS29. The ECB understands that this provision refers to both the 
reimbursements that are paid under the DGS and the costs of DNB’s tasks related to the operation 
of the DGS. The possibility for DNB to recover its operational costs from the participating credit 
institutions has a positive impact on DNB’s financial capacity to assume those tasks. However, the   
                                                 
24  See Article 29.12(2) of the draft decree. 
25  See Article 3:259a(4) of the Law on financial supervision (not yet in force). 
26  See Article 3:259a(3) of the Law on financial supervision (not yet in force). 
27  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. See also paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion CON/2009/93, paragraph 3.1 
of Opinion CON/2011/5, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74 and paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2013/29. 
28  See, for example, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74. 
29   Article 3:259(2) Law on financial supervision. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
7 ECB notes that no reference is made in the draft decree to the costs incurred by DNB in carrying 
out its DGS-related tasks. According to the explanatory memorandum, it will be necessary to levy a separate charge to cover the costs incurred in relation to the DGS.  Such a separate levy will be 
charged based on the Law on financial supervision funding. The ECB understands that it is being examined whether the current allocation criteria regarding the charging of the costs associated with 
the execution of the DGS require any amendment
30. Taking into account the principle of financial 
independence, which is a key aspect of the principle of central bank independence as laid down in 
Article 130 TFEU, it needs to be ensured that DNB  has sufficient funds for fulfilling its task of 
operating the DGS. 
3.2.3. Links to tasks listed in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty 
As the ECB observed in an earlier Opinion31, central banks are in general in a good position to take 
on responsibility for financial stability, given their insight into money and financial market 
developments and their involvement in payment systems and monetary policy operations. At the 
same time, DGSs are a key element of the financial safety net. Therefore, the governance framework should ensure that the important function of such schemes is carried out professionally 
and efficiently. Moreover, effective coordination with the overall role of central banks in safeguarding financial stability should be ensured.  This aim may be achieved through, among other 
things, maintaining an adequate level of involvement of the central bank in the governance and 
regulation of the national DGS. 
3.2.4. Atypical tasks 
A number of Member States have conferred on their NCBs a role in the operation of their DGSs. 
The tasks of an NCB with regard to the operation of the DGS could therefore be regarded as being 
tasks not atypical of a central bank. As noted in paragraph 3.2.1, DNB currently has tasks related to the operation of the Dutch DGS. 
3.2.5. Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public 
entities 
DNB is designated as the authority which, together with the Fund, operates the Dutch DGS. DNB is 
an independent public body that is not subordinate to the Minister
32. DNB is accountable for the 
performance of these particular tasks to the Minister and the Minister has, among other things, the 
right of access of information on DNB’s tasks33.  
As noted above, the tasks to be discharged by DNB under the proposed reallocation of 
responsibility for the performance of the functions related to the DGS sti ll need to be clarified. 
Unless the Law on financial supervision is aligned with the aims of the draft decree, the responsibilities and the functions to be performed by  DNB under the Law on financial supervision,  
 
                                                 
30  See the explanatory memorandum to the draft decree, p. 23. 
31  See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2007/26. 
32  Article 1:30 of the Law on financial supervision and Article 1 of the framework Law on non-departmental public 
bodies. 
33  Article 1:30, 1:37 and 1:42 of the Law on financial supervision and Article 18 of the framework law on non-
departmental public bodies. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
8 i.e. to grant the reimbursements within the applicable payment deadline and, insofar as depositors 
receive a reimbursement, to acquire the claims of these depositors and to seek recovery from the assets of the institution in relation to which the DGS has been activated, appear to be tasks 
discharged by DNB in the exclusive interest of the Government.  
Moreover, the ECB notes that in the explanatory memorandum to the draft decree the functions to 
be performed by DNB are seen in the light of the draft law on BRRD implementation that requires 
DNB to provide the Fund with the financial means necessary for the exercise of its tasks
34. In 
addition, the explanatory memorandum states that  it cannot be excluded that DNB may, if 
necessary and in the interests of efficiency, be authorised to carry out certain (payment) transactions on behalf of the Fund
35. Insofar as DNB would be required to provide the necessary 
financial resources to the Fund and to carry ou t the Fund’s tasks, these would be tasks discharged 
by DNB in the exclusive interest of the Government. 
3.2.6. Extent to which conflicts of interests with existing DNB tasks are addressed  and the performance of 
tasks fits into DNB’s institutio nal set-up in the light of centra l bank independence  and accountability 
considerations 
The conferral of the tasks on DNB does not, prima facie, raise any issues of conflicts of interest. 
The performance of DNB’s new tasks in the context of the Dutch DGS fits into DNB’s institutional 
set-up, which was adapted to DNB’s functions as regards the operation of the current DGS. The 
complementarity between the tasks related to the operation of the DGS and the supervisory tasks 
discharged by DNB, could be regarded as being reflected in the common system for the financing 
of DNB’s tasks via contributions from the superv ised entities. The performance of these tasks does 
not raise any issues arising out of accountability considerations. The draft decree requires close 
cooperation between DNB and the Fund. It provides that the Fund is accountable to DNB in the exercise of its tasks by, among other things, providing DNB an annual financial report that 
describes the exercise of the Fund’s tasks and the pursued policy
36. DNB is, in its turn, accountable 
for the performance of its tasks to the Minister37. 
3.2.7. Extent to which the performance of tasks is proportionate to DNB’s financial and operational 
capacity and its ability to perform its ESCB-related tasks 
In order to remain financially independent, DNB must have sufficient means to carry out not only its 
ESCB-related tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but also its national tasks. In 
this regard the ECB welcomes the fact that the Law on financial supervision stipulates that credit 
institutions bear the costs of the Dutch DGS. However, further clarifications are needed so as to ensure that DNB is adequately remunerated for the costs of operating the DGS.  
                                                 
34  See Article 3:259a(4) of the Law on financial supervision (not yet in force). 
35  See the explanatory memorandum to the draft decree, p. 21. 
36  Article 29.10(2) and (3) of the draft decree and Articles 18(1), first and second sentence, 20, 26, 34(1) and 35(1) of 
the framework Law on non-departmental public bodies. 
37  Article 1:30 and 1:42 of the Law on financial supervision and Article 18 of the framework Law on non-departmental 
public bodies. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
9 According to the explanatory memorandum to the dr aft decree, DNB will incur one-off, structural 
and incidental costs that relate to the support it provides to the Fund for its payment and management tasks, to the provision of the necessary financial means to the Fund, and to its own 
tasks. These costs will, inter alia, relate to the transition from an ex  post to an ex ante funded DGS, 
to the determination of the amount of the contributions payable by the credit institutions and to the 
supervision of the institutions' fu lfilment of the payment commitments. Given that it is not clear to 
what extent the charges to be levied would cover the financial resources required with regard to the 
operation of the DGS, the ECB recommends that the draft decree should explicitly specify that 
sufficient funds will be made available to DNB for fulfilling its task of operating the DGS. 
3.2.8. Extent to which the performance of tasks involves substantial financial risks 
As noted in paragraph 3.2.5, the Law on financial supervision stipulates that, insofar as the 
depositors received a reimbursement, DNB acquires the claims of these depositors on, and seeks 
recovery from, the assets of the institution in relation to which the DGS has been activated. It is not 
clear to what extent DNB is affected financially by the task to recover on its own behalf the claims 
on the institution in relation to which the DGS has been activated. Hence, the ECB recommends 
aligning the provisions in the Law on financial supervision with the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between DNB and the Fund as laid down in the draft decree.  
3.2.9. Conclusion 
The ECB welcomes the shift of responsibilities from DNB to the Fund as well as the Fund’s role in 
the provision of reimbursements under the DGS. However, it is of the utmost importance that the 
role of the DNB is clearly defined. This clarification is all the more needed in relation to any financing of the Fund’s tasks which the ECB considers to be a discharge of a government task. As 
consistently emphasised by the ECB, in line with the prohibition on monetary financing, an NCB may not finance DGSs
38. In addition, clarification would be recommended with regard to the costs 
of operating the DGS.  
The ECB emphasises the importance of having all the rules according to which the ex ante Fund is 
being established fully compliant with the rationale that it is the Fund itself, rather than DNB, which 
finances the tasks of the DGS, including the pay- outs of the guaranteed depos its. As noted above, 
insofar as DNB would be required to provide the necessary financial resources to the Fund and to 
carry out the Fund’s tasks, these would be tasks disc harged by DNB in the exclusive interest of the 
Government. Consequently, the ECB recommends that the Law on financial supervision is further 
aligned with the aims of the draft decree. To that end, it should be made clear that: (i) the Fund is responsible for paying out the reimbursements under the DGS; and (ii) the Fund, rather than DNB, 
acquires depositors’ claims and seeks recovery from the assets of the institution in relation to which 
the DGS has been activated. In addition, the draft decree should provide for the Fund’s, rather than 
                                                 
38  In line with Opinion CON/2011/76, which relates to another draft law on the Dutch DGS, the ECB would reiterate its 
view that the only forms of central bank financing of a national DGS for credit institutions compatible with the 
monetary financing prohibition are: (i) intraday credit in line with the general rules on provision of such credit by the 
central bank; and (ii) short-term funding addressing urgent situations in cases in which systemic stability aspects are at stake and the decisions are at the central bank’s discretion. 
ECB-PUBLIC  
10 DNB’s, right of recourse and disbursement by the F und of any revenues to the participating credit 
institutions.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 26 November 2015.  
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI