EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 18 December 2015  
on certain amendments to Banka Slovenije’s institutional framework  
(CON/20 15/57) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 22 October 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the 
National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka 
Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the European Central Bank,  the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
The draft law , prepared and submitted to the Slovenian National Assembly by a group of its deputies,  
proposes amendments to the Law on Banka Slovenije2, the Law o n the Court of Audit3, the Law on 
banking4, the Law on civil servants5 and the Law on the public sector salary system6, which would bring 
about changes to Banka Slovenije’s  institutional framework . In particular , the draft law : 
(a) proposes c hanges to the procedure and groun ds for removing a member of Banka Slovenije’s 
Governing Board from office, by stipulating that the National Assembly is to decide on their remov al 
from office if  they are in breach of the law or the Constitution  or where the Court of Audit of the 
Republic of Slovenia call s for their dismissal. Additionally , the draft law proposes that the 
incompatibility of functions of a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board, which may lead to 
their termination or removal from office by the National Assembly , is to be determined by the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia. Moreover, the draft law 
proposes deleting a currently applicable provision according to which, in the event that specific 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS -1) (Ur. l. RS No 72/06 –  official consolidated text, 59/11).  
3  Zakon o računskem sodišču (ZRacS -1) (Ur. l. RS No 11/01 and 109/12).  
4  Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan- 2) (Ur. l . RS No 25/15).  
5  Zakon o javnih uslužbencih (ZJU) (Ur. l. RS No 63/07 – official consolidated text, 65/08, 69/08 – ZTFI -A, 69/08 – 
ZZavar -E and 40/12 –  ZUJF).  
6  Zakon o sistemu plač v javnem sektorju (ZSPJS) (Ur. l. RS No 108/0 9 – official consolidated text, 13/10, 59/10, 
85/10, 107/10, 35/11 –  ORZSPJS49a, 27/12 –  Decision of the Constitutional Court, 40/12 –  ZUJF, 46/13, 25/14 – 
ZFU, 50/14, 95/14 – ZUPPJS15  and 82/15).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 laws are breached, early termination of office, which is a sanction provided for in those laws, shall 
not apply to Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members;  
(b) proposes that the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia shall carry out regularity and 
performance audits of Banka Slovenije ’s operati ons as well as carry out  audits of Banka Slovenije’s  
supervisory activities . In this regard,  the draft law also permit s confidential bank data to be shared 
with the Court of Audit;  
(c) provides that, in addition to the representative f rom the National Assembly ’s committee in charge of 
finance and monetary policy and the Minister for Finance, a representative of the National 
Assembly’s committee in charge of supervision of public finances may be a non -voting participant  
in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meeti ngs; 
(d) increases Banka Slovenije’s reporting requirements to the National Assembly, in particular with 
regard to banks that received State aid, and adds that the receiving body must  protect such 
information, in line with the law s regulating confidential information;  
(e) prohibits any of  Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members , other than the Governor, from  being  
employed by Banka Slovenije, and prohibits  the Governor from chair ing Banka Slovenije’s 
Governing Board;  
(f) states that Banka Slovenije must  prepare and i mplement a financial plan, an employment and 
dismissal policy, and must  use resources for salaries in accordance with the laws and regulations 
applicable for direct and indirect  State ‘budget  users7’. The draft law further introduces  provisions  
that include  Banka Slovenije’s staff under the definition of  ‘public servants ’ and that specify that 
Banka Slovenije is to use the public sector salary system as regards its staff ; 
(g) limits the number of possible terms of office of a governor and other members of Banka Slovenije’s 
Governing Board to two; and  
(h) gives Banka Slovenije’s Governor the possibility to  dismiss directors or deputy directors of its 
departments without providing any grounds.  
 
2. General observations  
The draft law proposes changes to Banka Slovenije’s  institutional framework, some of which are identical 
to or adding to changes already proposed by two previous legislative initiatives  on which the ECB issued 
Opinions CON/2015/88 and CON/2014/25, which were not adopted  by the National Assembly . The ECB 
now reiterates the views expressed in the two opinions  where they are applicable to the draft law and 
supplements them as follows.  
 
                                                 
7 ‘Budget users’ means those entities that are defined by t he Law on public finance ( Zakon o javnih financah, Ur. l. RS 
No 11/11 – official consolidated text, 14/13 – corr., 101/13 and 55/15 –  ZFisP) as State and municipal authorities and 
organisations, municipal administrations and public funds, institutes and ag encies established by the State or a 
municipality.  
8  All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 3. Remov ing a member  of Banka Slovenije’s decision -making bodies  from office  and other 
changes concerning  Banka Slovenije’s decision -making bodies  
3.1 As explained in its previous o pinions, Article 130 of the Treaty , as reflected in Article 7 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter 
the ‘Statute of the ESCB’),  lays dow n the principle of central bank independence, which prohibit s 
national central banks (NCBs) and members of their decision- making bodies from  seek ing or tak ing 
instructions from external parties , and prohibits  governments of the Members States from seek ing 
to influence the members of the NCB’s decision- making bodies . A core element of this principle is 
the personal independence of the members of an NCB’s  decision -making bodies , as reflected in 
Article 14.2  of the Statute of the ESCB . In particular, Article 14.2 provides, inter alia, that governors 
may only be relieved from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance 
of their duties or if they have been found guilty of serious misconduct, with the possibility of 
recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
The purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent the authorities involved in the 
appointment of governors, particularly the government or parliament, from exercising their 
discretion to dismiss a governor , which would be contrary to the principle of personal independence 
of the members of the NCB ’s decision- making bodies . Since Article 14.2 is directly applicable, NCB 
statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal in line with Article 14.2, or should omit any 
mention of such grounds.  
As consistently noted in the ECB’s convergence reports and opinions, p ersonal independence 
would be jeopardised if the same rules did not also apply to other members of NCB  decision-
making bodies involved in the performance of European System of Central Bank - (ESCB- ) related 
tasks. Various provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB require comparable security of tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB does not restrict the security of tenure to t he 
governor ’s office , while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to 
members of the decision- making bodies of NCBs rather than to governors specifically. This applies 
in particular where a governor is ‘first among equals’  as regards  colleagues with equivalent voting 
rights or where such other members are involved in the performance of ESCB -related tasks
9. 
3.2 Article 39(1) (4) of the Law on Banka Slovenije, as proposed under Article 8 of  the draft law, 
provides  for a member  of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board to  be removed from office if they 
have failed to act in accordance with the law or the Constitution. The subsequent paragraphs of 
Article 39, as proposed under the draft law,  set out the procedure for bringing this  ground for 
dismissal, which is to be based on an allegation of a breach of  the law or the C onstitution and 
which requires a call for evidence.  Further, the National Assembly working body responsible for 
finance and monetary policy is required to assess the initiative for removal from office and,  
subsequent ly, submit  to the National Assembly a proposal to dismiss a member of Banka 
Slovenije’s Governing Board on the basis of a found breach of  the law or the C onstitution,  after  
 
                                                 
9  See, for example, page 24 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014. All ECB Convergence Reports are available on 
the ECB’s  websit e at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 which time the National Assembly must  then decide on whether the member should be remov ed. 
Article 39(1) (5) of the Law on Banka Slovenije, as proposed under Article 8 of the draft law, 
provides that a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may be removed from office if the 
Court of A udit issues a call to relieve them from their office . Again, t he subsequent paragraphs of 
Article 39, as proposed under the draft law,  set out the procedure for bringing this ground for 
dismissal, which is to be based in this situation on an audit report f rom the Court of Audit.  
According to Article 39(4), as proposed under the draft law,  such report may include allegations of 
irregularities  and of underperformance10. 
3.3  As a preliminary point, the ECB recommends that the procedures, including any initiati ve of the 
National Assembly for the dismissal of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members , should be 
kept clearly distinct from the substantive provisions on the grounds for dismissal, i.e. in a separate legal provision, to ensure full consistency with the provisions of the Statute of the ESCB
11. 
3.4 Further, the ECB understands , in view of the explanation in the explanatory memorandum , that 
these  two grounds for dismissal aim to define the concept of ‘serious misconduct’ contained in 
Article 14.2 of the St atute of the ESCB . However, o n the one hand, Article 39(1) (4) and (5) , as 
proposed under the draft law,  broaden the scope of ‘serious misconduct’ , for which not  every 
breach of law  or negative regularity  or performance audit  is tantamount to or  analogous w ith 
serious misconduct . On the other hand,  points 4 and 5 may be seen as limiting the scope  of the 
Union ’s legal concept  of ‘serious misconduct’  to situations covered only by those two grounds . In 
this respect , it is also noted that serious misconduct may not necessarily lead to a call for dismissal 
from the Court of Audit . Consequently, Article 39(1)( 4) and (5), as proposed under the draft law,  
add two new grounds  for dismissal that are not provided in,  and are therefore in addition to,  those 
stipulated under Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. In conclusion, the national legislator 
should not specify what amounts to serious misconduct12. 
3.5 Furthermore,  as already pointed out in its earlier opinions,  the ECB has previously commented 
favourably on dism issal procedures where the finding of a breach of law had been within the remit 
of the judicial system13. However, the draft law entrusts a National Assembly working body, and not 
an independent judicial body, with the competence to determine whether the law or the C onstitution  
has been breached. Thus, the dismissal of a Governing Board member may be based on a 
discretionary assessment by a National Assembly working body , whereas the purpose of 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB is to prevent competent authorities, typically the government 
or parliament, from exercising their discretion on the grounds to dismiss a governor.  
                                                 
10  See Article 20(3) of the Law on Court of Audit, according to which (i) “regularity audit” means obtaining relevant and 
sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on compliance of operation with regulations and guidelines that 
any user of public funds is required to observe in the conduct of operation and (ii) “performance audit” means 
obtaining relevant and sufficient data to enable an opinion to be expressed on economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of business operation.  
11  See, to that effect, paragraph 3.4.1 of Opinion CON/2012/73.  
12  See Opinion CON/2012/73.  
13  See Opinion CON/2012/73 and Opinion CON/2012/49.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 3.6 In addition to the proposed changes addressed above, Article 7 of the draft law proposes  that 
Article 38(3) of the Law on Banka Slovenije should  be amended so that  the Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption would establish the compatibility of functions and their subsequent 
assignment  of functions following the appointment of Governing Board members.  In this regard,  it 
is first recalled that t he incompatibility of functions referred to in Article 39(1) (2) of the Law on 
Banka Slovenije, which lays down the conditions for the dismissal from office of the members of the 
Governing Board,  is understood to only address the situations of incompatibility defined in 
Article  38(2)  of that Law. In this respect, the ECB reiterates the view expressed in its Convergence 
Report of May 2006, Opinion CON/2014/2514 and Opinion CON/2015/815 that inserting a n explicit  
cross- reference to Article 38 i n Article 39(1) (2) would be welcome for legal certainty reasons. In 
addition, it should be clarified that Article 39(1) (2) of the Law on Banka Slovenije is a ‘condition 
required for the performance of duties ’ within the meaning of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the 
ESCB,  and not a ground for dismissal in addition to the two grounds provided by Article 14.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB , as described in paragraph 3.1 above . 
3.7 As has been consistently noted by the ECB in its Convergence Reports, membership of a decision-
making body involved in the performance of ESCB -related tasks is, as a matter of principle, 
incompatible with the exercise of other functions that could create a conflict of interest. This is a key aspect of the personal independence of members of an NCB’s decision- making bodies. 
Further, the ECB has noted –  with regard to the grounds for a Governor’s dismissal – that the 
principle of personal independence applies from the moment a Governor is elected or appointed, even if the Governor has not yet taken up his or her duties. In order to safeguard this principle of 
personal independence, the ECB considers that an assessment of compatibility of functions should 
be carried out before a member is appointed to an NCB’s decision- making body. Otherwise, there 
is the possibility of a conflict of interest between the other functions carried out by such member 
and the performance of his or her ESCB- related tasks. Here, the issue of potential conflicts 
appears to be addressed through the provision, in Article 38(3) of the L aw on Banka Slovenije, that 
the Governor may not begin performing his or her functions until any incompatibility has been 
removed. Thus, in this respect, the procedure for assessing the compatibility of functions appears 
to be in line with t he principle of personal independence, provided that the ECB’s comments made 
below  with regard to Article 38(2) (5) are taken into account.  
3.8 Furthermore, according to Article 38(4)  of the Law on Banka Slovenije, as proposed under Article 7 
of the draft l aw, the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption also establishes the existence of 
an incompatibility of functions  arising after a Governing Board member has been appointed.  
However, it appears that this is not wholly consistent with Article 39(6) of the Law on Banka 
Slovenije, in conjunction with Article 39(1) (2), which state that a Governing Board member may be 
relieved from office when the National Assembly has established that there are grounds for the 
incompatibility of functions.  As provided for in Article 38(2) (5) of the Law on Banka Slovenije,  ‘other 
work or activities that might affect their members’ independence or could conflict with Banka 
Slovenije’s interests ʼ may be considered to be  a function that is incompatible with the position of a 
                                                 
14  See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2014/25.  
15  See p aragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2015/8.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
6 Gove rning Board member. The provision of Article 38(2)(5) of the Law on Banka Slovenije involves  
a discretionary assessment on what affects the independence of , or constitutes a conflict of interest 
for, the Governing Board members. Given that incompatibilities may lead , under the terms of the 
draft law,  to the dismissal of Governing Board members , and given that their dismissal should not 
be subject to a discretionary assessment of the National Assembly , this provision raises  concerns 
as regards the personal i ndependence of the Governing Board members. Thus, for reasons of 
clarity and legal certainty, the ECB recommends that the draft law should specify  that the National 
Assembly is only allowed to establish that grounds for incompatibility of functions exist i f the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption has already made such a finding.  
3.9 In any event, it is not clear whether  the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption would be 
competent to assess the full range of circumstances that would be incompat ible with the role of a 
Governing Board member. In assessing the compatibility of functions, the Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption will examine the points outlined in Article 38 of the Law on Banka 
Slovenije. However, as noted above, Article 38(2) (5) involves a discretionary assessment of what 
constitutes a conflict of interest – the object ive being to ensure that no situation exists that would 
be incompatible with the function of a Governing Board member . Such incompatibilities may or may 
not rel ate to the sphere of corruption. Yet, it is not clear from the draft law whether  the Commission 
for the Prevention of Corruption would have the mandate to assess incompatibilities that extend 
beyond its scope of competence. Thus, the ECB recommends that Banka Slovenije’s Governing 
Board should retain the power to determine whether there are incompatibilities between the roles of  
members of the Governing Board and their other roles , insofar as such incompatibilities fall outside 
the mandate of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption.  
3.10 Article 9 of t he draft law removes Article 39.a of the Law on Banka Slovenije, which currently states 
that ‘the provisions of the law governing the prevention of corruption and the law governing the 
incompatibility o f holding public office w hile simultaneously running a profitable activity, 
respectively, which contain  the sanction of early termination of the term of office,  shall not apply to 
Banka Slovenije’s  Governing Board members ’. As explained in the Convergence Report of 
May 2006, as well as in Opinion CON/2010/2716 in relation to the Law on integrity and prevention 
of corruption17 the aim of Article 39.a, together with Articles 38 and 39 of the Law on Banka 
Slovenije, is to provide that members of Banka Slovenije’ s decision -making bodies can only be 
removed on grounds and using procedures that are compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of 
the ESCB and laid down in the Law on Banka Slovenije. With the deletion of Article 39. a, the ECB 
notes that the Law on integrity and p revention of c orruption contains provisions indicating that 
breaches of some of the requirements thereunder may lead to early termination of office18. It 
should be ensured that the sanctions  do not constitute new grounds and procedures to remov e 
members of Banka Slovenije’s decision- making bodies from office, in addition to those compatible 
with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB that are laid down in the Law on Banka Slovenije.  
                                                 
16  See paragraphs 3.1, 3.2 and the third subparagraph in paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2010/27.  
17  Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju korupcije (ZIntPK) (Ur . l. RS  No 69/11 – official consolidated text ). The earlier  
law on prevention of corruption and the incompatibili ty of holding public office while running a profitable activity, are 
no longer in force.  
18  See, e.g. Articles 13, 26, 28 and 45 of the Law on i ntegrity and p revention of c orruption).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
7 3.11 The draft law also proposes additional changes concerning Banka Slovenije’s decision- making 
bodies. Banka Slovenije has two decision- making bodies: the Governor and the Governing Board. 
The Governing Board is composed of five members, i.e. the Governor and four Vice- Governors. 
The draft law prohibits any of Banka S lovenije’s Governing Board members, other than the 
Governor, from being employed by Banka Slovenije, and does not allow the Governor to chair 
Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board.  
3.12 Firstly, as highlighted in the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, the ECB is n ot limited to making a 
formal assessment of the letter of national legislation, but may also consider whether the implementation of the relevant provisions complies with the spirit of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. The ECB is particularly concerned about any signs of pressure being put on any NCB ’s 
decision -making bodies that would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Treaty as regards central 
bank independence. In this respect, the ECB recalls that the office of an NCB’s Governor is accorded special status due to his or her capacity to act as a member of the ECB’s Governing 
Council. The fact that this special status should be fully respected has led to the common practice 
among NCBs that the Governor is seen as ‘ first among equals’ where decisions are taken by 
boards as collegiate NCB decision- making bodies. However, by providing that Banka Slovenije’s 
Governor may not chair the Governing Board, the draft law departs from this practice and, as such, 
could be seen as an attempt to undermine the Gov ernor’s authority. Consequently, the suggested 
amendment to Article 30(2) of the Law on Banka Slovenije is, in itself, capable of jeopardising the 
Governor’s personal independence.  
3.13 The ECB considers that the draft law is unclear with regard to the nat ure of the powers of the new 
Governing Board President and the division of competences that would exist between the other 
Board members and the Governor. In particular, it is unclear whether the powers accorded to the 
Governor under Banka Slovenije’s statute and rules of procedure would be construed as 
references to the powers of the new President of the Governing Board. In the ECB’s view, it is 
imperative that the draft law provide clarity in terms of: (a) the precise scope of the powers and 
tasks to be as signed to the President of the Governing Board; (b) the limits of the competence of 
the President of the Governing Board, in particular as regards whether the role will have decision-
making powers; and (c) the position of the President in Banka Slovenije’s  organisational structure, 
for instance, whether or not Banka Slovenije’s staff members will report directly to the President of 
the Governing Board. The latter would raise additional concerns as regards the Governor’s 
personal independence, if the Governor were not the President of the Governing Board. Without 
clarity in these respects, the ECB is concerned that Banka Slovenije’s decision- making processes 
will be undermined.  
3.14 It is also emphasised that any changes to the Governor’s mandate can only be made in respect of 
future appointments, in order to ensure the existing Governor’s personal independence.  
 
ECB -PUBLIC  
8 4. Auditing of Banka Slovenije by the national Court of Audit  
4.1 The draft law , with  Articles 13 and 14, proposes entrust ing the Court of Audit  with the competence 
to carry out regularity and performance audits of Banka Slovenije’s operations a s well as  to audit 
Banka Slovenije’s supervisory activities19. 
4.2 In relation to the proposal to entrust the Court of Audit with the competence to carry out aud its on 
the regularity and performance of Banka Slovenije’s operations20, the ECB reiterates the view 
expressed in Opinion CON/2015/8. Accordingly, the competences  that a state audit office or similar 
body, such as the Court of Audit, may  hold with respect to NCB activities and use of public 
finances , are compatible with the principle of  central bank independence when the following 
safeguards  are in pl ace: (a) the scope of the control should be clearly deﬁned by the legal 
framework; (b) the activities of the NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced; 
(c) in line with the principle of institutional independence, as enshri ned in Article 130 of the Treaty 
and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, the audit should: (i) comply with the prohibition on giving 
instructions to an NCB and its decision- making bodies ; (ii) not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB -
related tasks ; and (iii) be carried out on an  apolitical, independent and purely professional basis.  
On the basis of the above, the scope of the control is defined in the draft law , through the 
provisions of the Law on the Court of Audit, which define  the concepts of regularity and 
performance audit s. However, with a view to respect ing the institutional independence of B anka 
Slovenije , the draft law should specify that the Court of Audit may not give instructions to B anka 
Slovenije , nor may it seek  to influence the members of Banka Slovenije’s  decisi on-making bodies 
in situations where this may have an impact on B anka Slovenije ’s fulfilment of its ESCB- related 
tasks21. Additionally , the activities of B anka Slovenije ’s independent external auditor , which the 
Council approves  pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB,  should not be prejudiced .  
4.3 The ECB recommends that the draft law should define the precise scope of the audit provided as 
regards Banka Slovenije’s supervisory activities so as to ensure that the principle of independence 
set out in Article 19 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1024/2013,  as well as the limitations provided in 
Article 27.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and Article 20(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1024/2013 
as regards the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by Regu lation (EU) No 1024/2013,  are 
respected.  
Further, in line with the principle of independence set out in A rticle 19 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013, the ECB recommends that the audit carried out by the Court of Audit on Banka 
Slovenije’s supervisory activit ies should: (a) not extend to the application and interpretation of 
supervisory law and practices; (b) not interfere with the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EC) No 1024/2013, nor be extended to result in an indirect audit of the ECB ; and (c) be carried out 
on a non- political, independent and purely professional basis.  
 
                                                 
19  See the amendment of Article 52 of the Law on Banka Slovenije and of Article  25 of the Law on the Court of Audit . 
20  For the definition of the regularity and performance audits  from the Law on the Court of Audit s ee footnote 10.  
21  Similarly, see paragraph 3.3 in Opinion CON/2011/9.  It is noted that Article 2 of the Law on B anka Slovenije does not 
contain a prohibition against  the Government and other bodies giving instructions to B anka Slovenije or seek ing to 
influence the members of its decision- making bodies ; however such prohibition is contained i n Article 130 of the 
Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
9 5. Participation by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board 
meetings  
The proposed changes under the draft law that  extend the right to participate in meetings of Banka 
Slovenije’s Governing Board to the  representative of the committee of the National Assembly responsible 
for the supervision of public finances  are fully identical to the previously proposed changes T he ECB 
hereby reiterates22 that the principle of central bank institutional independence, enshrined in Article 130 of 
the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, renders the participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB’s decision- making body with a right to vote on matter s concerning the performance by 
the NCB of ESCB- related tasks incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, even if such a 
vote is not decisive
23. Furthermore, the principle of central bank institutional independence also renders 
the participati on of third party representatives, without a right to vote in the meetings of an NCB’s 
decision -making body entrusted with the performance of ESCB -related tasks, incompatible with the 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, if such participation interferes wit h the performance of  ESCB- related 
tasks24 by that decision- making body or endangers compliance with the ESCB’s  confidentiality regime.  
 
6. Reporting by Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and confidentiality of information25 
6.1 The proposed amendments  to Article 26 of the Law on Banka Slovenije with regard to Banka 
Slovenije’s reporting to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the 
Law on Banka Slovenije on the protection of confidential data, as well as the proposed amendment  
to Article 16 of the Law on Banking  with regard to Banka Slovenije sharing confidential supervisory 
information with the Court of Audit for the purposes of the proposed audit of Banka Slovenije’s 
supervisory activities, as proposed  under Articles 1, 12 and 15 of the draft law , should be assessed 
with regard to applicable Union law.  
6.2 First, the proposed new Article 26(3) of the Law  on Banka Slovenije specifi es that the report 
addressed to the National Assembly should describe the work and the performance of the tasks of 
each of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board  members  separately . However, the Governing Board is 
a collegial body ; accountable as a whole to the National Assembly. Depending on the level of detail 
required for such a report, this provision raises concerns regarding Banka Slovenije’s  institutional 
independence and the personal independence of the Governing Board members. The draft l aw 
should contain adequate safeguards in order to ensure that: (a) the reporting obligations do not 
interfere with the independence of the Governing Board members as provided for in Article 130 of 
the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB; (b) the special status of governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision- making bodies is fully respected;  and (c) confidentiality 
requirements pursuant  to the Statute of the ESCB are observed
26. 
                                                 
22  See paragraph 5.2 of Opinion CON/2015/8 and paragraph 3 of Opinion CON/2014/25.  
23  See, for example, page 22 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 . 
24  Pursuant to Article 2 of the Law  on Banka Slovenije, the principle of central bank independence should be respected 
not only when Banka Slovenije performs ESCB -related tasks, but also when it performs national tasks.  
25  See paragraph 5.1 and 5.2 of Opinion CON/2 014/25 and paragraph 5.3 of  Opinion CON/2015/8.  
26  See, for example, p. 23  of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
10 6.3 Second, as pointed out by the ECB in its Convergence Reports27, the obligation of professional 
secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB may give rise to similar 
provisions in NCBs’ statutes or in Member States’ legislation. The primacy of Union law and rules 
adopted thereunder also means that national laws on third party access to documents may not 
result in infringements of the ESCB’ s confidentiality regime. Access to an NCB’s information and 
documents must be without prejudice to the ESCB’s confidentiality regime, to which the members 
of NCBs’ decision- making bodies and staff are subject. Where access to an NCB’s information and 
documents is allowed under Union law, the NCBs should ensure that the receiving bodies protect 
the confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied 
by the NCBs themselves. Therefore, any provision of information permitted by the proposed 
amendments to Article 26 of the Law on Banka Slovenije with regard to Banka Slovenije’s reporting  
to the National Assembly and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Law on Banka 
Slovenije on protection of confidential data should comply with applicable Union laws, including 
those governing the exchange of statistical and supervisory information, as well as the obligation of 
professional secrecy.  In this respect, the ECB welcomes that  Articles 26 and 47 of the Law on 
Banka Slov enije, as proposed under the draft law , include a provision that confidential information 
contained in reports to the National Assembly must  be handled in accordance with the l aws 
governing the protection of confidential information.  However,  it should be clear that  the proposed 
amendments  refer not only to national laws in this respect but also to Union law , including Article  
37 of the Statute of the ESCB. For purposes of clarity and t o avoid doubt, the ECB suggests 
inserting a specific  reference to the obligation of professional secrecy laid down in Article 37 of the 
Statute of the ESCB in the amendments to Articles  26 and 47 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.  In 
addition, the ECB recommends that the conditions for disclosing confidential information to the National Assembly, as referred to in paragraphs 6. 4 and 6.5, are also respected when Banka 
Slovenije reports to the National Assembly.  
Furthermore, without prejudice to the ECB’s observations regarding the specific protection of 
statistical or supervisory information laid down in Union law and referred to in paragraphs 6. 4 and  
6.5, the ECB emphasises that confidential information may be exchanged only if necessary for the 
performance of the tasks of the body that receives the information. In this context, and subject to 
compliance with the conditions in paragraph 5 regarding participation of third party representatives 
in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board meetings, a  representative of the National Assembly’s 
committee for finance and monetary policy  may partic ipate  in meetings of the Governing Board  
where they can become privy to  any confidential information, including the details on  granting State 
aid to credit institutions.  
6.4 Third, with respect to the exchange of confidential statistical information, it is reiterated that 
according to Article 8(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98
28, ESCB members shall take all 
the necessary regulatory, administrative, technical and organisational measures to ensure the 
physical and logical protection of confidential st atistical information. The ECB recalls that 
                                                 
27  See, for example, p. 27 of the ECB’s Convergence Report 2014 . 
28  Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical inform ation by the 
European Central Bank  (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
11 confidential statistical information collected pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 may 
only be used for the purposes defined in Article 8(1) of that  Regulation, in particular for the exercise 
of the tasks of the ESCB and, as regards NCBs, in the field of prudential supervision or for other 
statutory NCB tasks.  
6.5 Fourth, as stated in Opinion CON/2015/8,  while Article 59(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council29 and Artic le 84(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council30 allow  Member States to,  under certain conditions , 
authorise the disclosure of certain information relating to the prudential supervision of institutions to parliamentary enquir y committees, courts of auditors and other entities in charge of enquiries in 
their Member State, such disclosure should not be made to the National Assembly per se. With 
regard to t he amendments in the draft law  to protect confidential information
31, addit ional  
safeguards for the exchange of confidential information with a parliamentary inquiry committee and 
the Court of A udit as referred to in Article 59(2)  of Directive 2013/36/EU  must always be observed:  
(a) the parliamentary enquiry committee and the C ourt of A udit must have a ‘precise mandate’ 
under national law; (b) the information must be ‘strictly necessary’ f or fulfilling that mandate; 
(c) persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under 
national law that are at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU ; 
(d) where the information originates in another Member State, it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities that have disclosed it , and solely for the purposes 
for which those authorities gave their agreement; and (e) to the extent that the disclosure of information relating to prudential supervision involves processing of personal data, any processing 
by the parliamentary enquiry committee or the Court of Audit must comply with national law 
transposing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
32. Furthermore, t he 
above conditions should be applied not only to information that is confidential under 
Directive  2013/36/EU  but also to information that is confidential under other U nion or national law 
provisions.  
 
7.  Amendments to the  Banka Slovenije’s staff status and other amendments  
7.1 The draft law states that Banka Slovenije must  prepare and implement a financial pla n, 
employment and dismissal policy, and must  use resources for salaries in accordance with the laws 
and regulations applicable for direct and indirect State budget  users . While the ECB welcomes the 
fact that the preparation and implementation of the necess ary plans are left to Banka Slovenije, the 
                                                 
29  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of 
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/ EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).  
30  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework  for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No  1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).  
31  Article s 26(4) and 47(2)  of the Law on Banka Slovenije, as proposed under the draft law.  
32  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p.31).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
12 restrictions placed on Banka Slovenije’s discretion by the laws and regulations in question raise 
concerns . As indicated in the ECB’s convergence reports, Member States may not put their NCBs 
in a position where t hey have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB -related tasks. 
Additionally, the principle of financial independence requires an NCB to have sufficient means not only to perform its ESCB -related tasks , but also its national tasks.  Thus, t he implementation of a 
financial plan in accordance with the  applicable laws and regulations and its impact on Banka 
Slovenije’s financial independence needs to be sufficiently addressed in the draft law.  
7.2 Further, Member States may not impair an NCB’s ability to employ and retain the qualified staff 
necessary  for the NCB to perform independently the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty , the Statute  
of the ESCB and national legislation. A dditionally , an NCB may not be put into a position where it 
has limi ted control or no control over its staff, or  where the government of a Member State can 
influence its policy on staff matters
33. In this regard, the ECB understands, in particular, that the 
laws and regulations applicable for direct and indirect State budget  users impose  strict limits on 
remuneration – through set salary structures and salary bands  – which may entail a decrease in 
salaries for Banka Slovenije staff. Any amendment  to the legislative provisions on the remuneration 
for members of an NCB’s decis ion-making bodies  and its employees should be decided in close 
and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing 
ability of the NCB to independently  carry out its tasks34 and, hence, its financial independence.  In 
addition, any changes that may affect the remuneration of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board 
members should,  as a matter of principle and in order to ensure the independence of those 
members , apply only in respect of future appointments35. Similarly, any a lteration to the 
remuneration of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members  that results from changes made 
pursuant to the Law on the public sector salary system should, again as a matter of principle, apply 
only in respect of future appointments.  
7.3 The draft law  also proposes that  Banka Slovenije  staff are to be subject to the laws and regulations 
governing public servants and, additionally,  that such staff and Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board 
members  should be subject to the public sector salary system36. Since  the proposed amendments 
withdraw Banka Slovenije’s authority to determine the legal relationships and career polic ies for all 
categories of staff and transfer this authority to the government, the ECB considers them to reduc e 
Banka Slovenije’s  independence. The ECB therefore recommends that sufficient safeguards be 
introduced, at least for example by providing that Banka Slovenije continues to autonomously 
regulate certain features of the legal relationships and career polic ies for all categories of  staff, in 
order to ensure that Banka Slovenije’s ability to carry out all its tasks, particularly its ESCB -related 
tasks, will not be affected.  
7.4 Finally, the proposal that gives Banka Slovenije’s Governor the possibility to dismiss the directors 
or deputy directors of its departments without providing any grounds is , in principle , a matter of 
                                                 
33  See Opinion CON/2008/9, Opinion CON/2008/10 and Opinion CON/2012/89.  
34  The main opinions are CON/2010/42, CON/2010/51, CON/2010/56, CON/2010/69, CON/2010/80, CON/2011/104, 
CON/2011/106, CON/2012/6, CON/2012/86 and CON/2014/7.  
35  See the ECB’s Convergence Report June 2014, p. 23.  
36  Currently, s taff matters at Banka Slovenije are regulated with acts adopted by Banka Slovenije and in accordance 
with the L aw governing employment relationships (see Article 42 of the Law on Banka Slovenije) . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
13 national law. Nevertheless, if adopted, the mere existence of such a possibility could have a 
negative impact on Banka Slovenije’s efforts  to attract qualified st aff. 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
  
Done at Frankfurt am Main,  18 December 2015.  
 [signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI