EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 13.9.2017 SWD(2017) 293 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT



IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Australia {COM(2017) 472}

{SWD(2017) 292}



7.1. Operational objectives 7.2. Future monitoring and evaluation Annex 1 - Procedural information Annex 2 - Stakeholder consultations Annex 3 - Who is affected by the initiative and how? Annex 4 - Analytical models used in preparing the Impact Assessment Annex 5 - External study INTRODUCTION The Commission services conducted this Impact Assessment, supported by an external independent study carried out by LSE Enterprise and an online public consultation, in preparation of Commission decisions to request authorisations from the Council to launch negotiations for free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia and New Zealand, respectively. The aim of this Impact Assessment is to assess the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand trade and investment relationship, identify problems and corresponding options on the further developments of these relations and assess the impact of these options. Once the negotiating directives are approved by the Council and negotiations are underway more detailed analysis will be undertaken in the framework of Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs), which will be conducted for each FTA. SIAs, using quantitative and qualitative approaches complement the Impact Assessments by conducting a more in-depth analysis of the likely impacts of the future agreement on the three pillars of sustainable development and on human rights. They also include wide-ranging, continuous stakeholder consultation. SIAs are carried out by external consultants. The findings of the SIAs will feed into the negotiation process to help steer the negotiations and provide recommendations and propose flanking measures to maximise the benefits of the agreement and prevent or minimise any potential negative impacts. Overview of the current EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand relations The EU has very good political relations with Australia and New Zealand based on shared values of democracy and human rights. The EU has well-developed trade and investment relations with Australia and New Zealand, sharing many view points on trade policy and the working of the multilateral trade system. However, while Australia and New Zealand have concluded numerous FTAs, the EU does not have preferential bilateral trade arrangements with either of them. This leaves the EU’s economic operators with comparably less favourable conditions to access these markets. Australia and New Zealand are among the fastest-growing developed economies. According to World Bank data Australia's GDP in 2015 was US$1,340 billion, its GDP growth rate 2.3% and per capita GDP US$56,328; New Zealand's GDP in 2015 was US$174 billion, its growth rate 3.4% and per capita GDP US$37,808. EU-Australia bilateral trade and investment relations The EU is one of Australia's biggest trade and investment partners. The bilateral trade in goods was worth €45.5 billion (2016), trade in services was worth €29.3 billion (2015) and EU foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Australia was worth €145.8 billion (2015), while Australian FDI stock in the EU was worth €25.1 billion (2015). Australia is the EU’s 15th largest export market for goods while the EU is the largest foreign direct investor in Australia. EU-Australia trade relations are governed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. In addition, the EU and Australia have bilateral agreements on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, certificates and markings as well as on trade in wine.

The Joint Statement of 22 April 2015 by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission and the Australian Foreign Minister highlighted the need to further strengthen the bilateral trade and investment relationship. This was followed by a Joint Statement of 15 November 2015 by the leaders of the EU and Australia, who agreed to commence work toward the launch of negotiations for an FTA. EU-New Zealand bilateral trade and investment relations The EU is one of New Zealand’s biggest trade partners and its second largest investor. The bilateral trade in goods was worth €8.1 billion (2016), trade in services was worth €4.3 billion (2015) and EU FDI stock in New Zealand was worth €9.8 billion (2015), while New Zealand FDI stock in the EU was worth €4.5 billion (2015). EU-New Zealand trade relations are governed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. In addition, the EU and New Zealand have bilateral agreements on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment and on sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal products. In a joint statement of 25 March 2014, the leaders of the EU and New Zealand set out objectives for deepening the partnership. This included a reflection process on enhancing trade and investment relations. This was followed up by another Joint Statement of 29 October 2015 in which the leaders of the EU and New Zealand committed to start the process for negotiating an FTA. Trade policy developments Both Australia and New Zealand have an active trade agenda and concluded FTAs with several partners including China, South Korea, and all countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both Australia and New Zealand participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and are engaged in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and other bilateral negotiations such as with India. These agreements provide preferential access for goods, services and investment originating from these countries to Australia and New Zealand. From the Australian and New Zealand perspective, the EU, their biggest trade and investment partner, is a "missing link", as there is no FTA between both sides. Despite their specificities, Australia and New Zealand remain similar countries. Australia and New Zealand have a highly developed Trans-Tasman Single Market covering trade in goods, services, government procurement, mutual recognition arrangements, etc. This close cooperation and shared cultural, legal and political heritage results in similar regulatory environments. Patterns of EU exports to Australia and New Zealand are very similar. To a large extent, so are the problems encountered by EU stakeholders. The structures of EU imports of goods from Australia and New Zealand are different reflecting the predominant export oriented economic activities of each country: mining, natural resources for Australia and agriculture (sheepmeat, and fruits and vegetables) for New Zealand. Bilateral political relations In 2015, the EU concluded negotiations for framework agreements with Australia and New Zealand respectively. The EU-New Zealand Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (PARC) was signed on 5 October 2016 and the process for signature of the Framework Agreement with Australia is under way. These political agreements provide a comprehensive policy framework of the bilateral relations with Australia and New Zealand, respectively. They also contain some trade and investment provisions, which are of a non-preferential nature, i.e. they do not contain specific (preferential) market access provisions (such as elimination or lowering of import tariffs or removal on non-tariff barriers), or specific trade rules or regulatory issues. While trade and investment remain one of the cornerstones of the EU's bilateral relations with Australia and New Zealand, the bilateral trade and investment frameworks with Australia and New Zealand are not as advanced as cooperation in the political and sectoral fields. Political level contacts with both countries made it apparent that it is politically not feasible to foresee negotiations for comprehensive trade and investment arrangements with one of them only. The Commission took the political decision to move towards launching negotiations with both countries in parallel. The Commission Communication 'Trade for All' set out the intention to prepare the agreements with both Australia and New Zealand in parallel. The Inception Impact Assessment (IIA) followed this approach, which was not questioned in the comments received on the IIA. Taking into account both, the similar nature of the two countries, and the calendar of our engagement with them, the Impact Assessment was conducted together. This facilitated and created synergies during the public consultation. Combining the two countries in one single Impact Assessment also allows to measure the combined impact (e.g. on the sensitive beef and dairy sectors) with a view to taking the appropriate decision. 1. What is the problem and why is it a problem? 1.1. What is the issue that may require an action, what is the size of the problem What are the general issues at stake? The 'Trade for All' Communication of the Commission has three key general policy messages that are also applicable to the trade and investment relationships the EU has with Australia and New Zealand. EU trade policy needs to be: ·effective: trade needs to actually deliver on its promise of new economic opportunities. That means addressing the issues that affect today's economy. It also means providing the means and information necessary to ensure SMEs, consumers and workers can take full advantage of - and adapt to - more open markets. It also means improving implementation and enforcement of our trade rights. ·transparent: opening up negotiations to more public scrutiny by publishing negotiating directives and key negotiating texts from negotiations.

·based on values: first of all, this means safeguarding the European social and regulatory model at home. It also calls for using trade agreements and preference programmes as levers to promote, around the world, European values like sustainable development, human rights, fair and ethical trade and the fight against corruption. The EU also leads a reform of investment policy globally which is taking into account these non-economic values of societies. As highlighted in the 'Trade for All' an ambitious programme of multilateral and bilateral negotiations is needed to deliver the full potential from trade. The initiative aiming at opening of FTAs negotiations with Australia and New Zealand is anchored among the concrete initiatives listed in 'Trade for All'. What are the specific problems? The cumulative impact of the FTAs concluded by Australia and New Zealand with other non-EU countries means that EU economic operators face comparably less favourable conditions to access the Australian and New Zealand markets. Even though Australia and New Zealand have a low level of applied import duties, there are some products that are subject to relatively high tariffs levied by either of the countries. The following concrete cases should be highlighted in particular: ·As a result of FTAs between Australia and in particular the US, Japan, South Korea and China, in practice it is only the EU that has to pay import duties to import its cars to Australia. The situation will be similar in New Zealand's case when the TPP or other bilateral FTAs would enter into force. EU automotive exports are the most significant export items; EU exports of automotive products including cars to Australia amounted to €5.7 billion (18% of total EU exports to Australia) and to New Zealand €0.4 billion (15% of total EU exports to New Zealand) ·There are relatively high tariffs in Australia and New Zealand for processed agricultural and food products, which is an area where the EU is globally competitive. For example tariff peaks of applied most-favoured nation (MFN) duties that are applicable to EU exports for certain dairy products reach 16% in Australia and 5% in New Zealand. Final bound duty rates, which Australia and New Zealand could use under WTO rules, are even higher. EU companies are the biggest source of FDI in Australia and the second largest in New Zealand. Only five EU Member States have bilateral investment protection agreements with Australia, while no Member State has any similar agreement with New Zealand. EU investors are subject to different treatment depending on which Member States they originate in in Australia. EU investors are in a less favourable position compared to investors from countries which Australia and New Zealand have included investment protection in their FTAs or bilateral investment protection agreements. EU investors face stricter screening thresholds than investors from other countries (e.g. the US, China, Japan and Korea) that have already concluded FTAs with Australia or New Zealand. Furthermore, the existing BITs that EU Member States have with Australia include outdated investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, that no longer are in line with the EU's new approach to investment policyes as set out in the 'Trade for All'. The existing sectoral agreements address some limited sector-specific issues: ·conformity assessment for both Australia and New Zealand (these mutual recognition agreements(MRAs) cover a limited number of industrial sectors); ·trade in wine in the case of Australia; and ·trade in animal products in the case of New Zealand. The limited scope of the current agreements, which address non-tariff measures only within their respective scope, and the absence of tariff liberalisation as well as any further opening of service and public procurement markets create unnecessary burdens and additional costs for EU businesses, including small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and an unfulfilled potential for trade in goods and services. Non-tariff market access barriers EU business face in both markets include: ·Australian biosecurity measures impede exports of European products such as pork and poultry products by placing onerous or costly sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements on exporters and exporting country authorities. New Zealand plant health measures impede some exports from the EU. ·Some technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures and standards in Australia and New Zealand result in an unnecessary burden and cost to EU businesses in cases where standards are not recognised or fully aligned (e.g. motor vehicles, olive oil). ·Some impediments remain to further accessing the government procurement markets as some local content requirement or price preference polices are in place in Australia. Australia is in the process of joining the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), but its current legislative framework does not cover some public utilities. Large infrastructural developments in Australia (such as those linked to mining and transport) and in New Zealand (such as those linked to the Christchurch earthquake rebuilding) would provide important new opportunities for European companies. New Zealand has joined the WTO GPA, but its market opening does not cover sub-central entities. ·There is insufficient protection or enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), such as copyrights, trademarks and designs (e.g. inadequate customs enforcement of IPR at the border, replica furniture in Australia, and a shorter period of copyright protection afforded to works in New Zealand than in the EU). There is also insufficient protection for geographical indications (GIs) in particular of EU foodstuffs, such as cheeses in Australia and New Zealand. EU products with GIs are confronted with imitations and face unfair competition in Australia and New Zealand. The limited scope of existing agreements also means that the EU's overarching trade related objectives cannot be achieved with respect to Australia and New Zealand. This is due to the lack of relevant substantial bilateral enforceable rules, and the lack of general enforcement mechanism in the bilateral trade and investment frameworks. These overarching objectives include trade and sustainable development and promotion of EU values and standards (such as labour rights and environmental, health, consumer protection, and business and human rights,) and facilitating trade and investment for SMEs. Stakeholders in general, in their responses to the public consultation, noted the existing market access obstacles as problems, in particular existing tariff barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and other non-tariff measures, inadequate protection of IPR including geographical indications, obstacles to government procurement, investment protection and the need for further regulatory cooperation. The non-profit sector stakeholders in addition highlighted the importance of further strengthening social, environmental and other standards, such as animal welfare standards, to bring these to the highest level.

1.2. What are the drivers of the problem? Some of the drivers are related to specific problems the EU faces with Australia and New Zealand, while others are more general in nature, but apply to the specific context of the EU trade and investment relations with Australia and New Zealand. Problem drivers relating to specific problems: ·While both Australia and New Zealand generally apply low import tariffs, there are tariff peaks in particular in the transport equipment, chemical, electrical machinery, textile and clothing, and food sectors. Furthermore, both countries could increase applied tariffs to their considerably higher bound levels under WTO rules. There are no bilateral agreements providing preferential (better than MFN) market access to EU goods. ·Due to Australia's and New Zealand's FTAs with other partners, goods from other countries such as the US, China, Japan, South Korea do not or will not face such tariffs. ·Bilateral MRAs do not cover all key sectors or need complementary measures to reflect the latest EU regulatory developments to bring their full benefits to EU companies. ·Australia has a strict and different SPS regime. Australia had been criticised for being unduly stringent and protectionist on, for example, market access for pork. ·The EU-New Zealand Agreement on sanitary measures in live animals and animal products was updated in 2015 to boost existing trade relations in products of animal origin. However the agreement does not cover plant health issues therefore does not facilitate trade in products of plant origin. ·Different approaches to the protection of IPR, in particular geographical indications in Australia and New Zealand compared to the EU leads to insufficient protection of EU GIs, including in particular for foodstuffs, in Australia and New Zealand ·The EU-Australia wine agreement, which protects wine GIs, recognition of wine-making technologies and terms used on labels, does not yet include all wine GIs that the EU aims to protect. Its scope is also limited (i.e. does not cover spirits or foodstuffs). ·There are some remaining sectoral restrictions to accessing markets for services in Australia (e.g. postal and express delivery, distribution and professional services) and New Zealand (e.g. distribution services, telecommunication). ·New Zealand's membership of and Australia current application process to join the of the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) do not ensure the best possible access to the public procurement markets in Australia and New Zealand for EU businesses. ·Due to higher investment screening thresholds, investors from other countries that have already concluded FTAs with Australia and New Zealand face fewer barriers to investment. ·There is no modern, investment protection for all EU investors. Only five EU Member States have bilateral investment treaties in place with Australia and there is none between any EU Member State and New Zealand. Furthermore, the existing BITs that EU Member States have with Australia include investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, which are not in line with current EU approach. Problem drivers relating to general issues: ·There are no bilateral binding enforcement mechanisms to address effectively barriers to EU trade and investment in Australia and New Zealand. ·There is no mechanism to address new trade issues such as digital trade bilaterally. ·There is no dedicated binding bilateral mechanism to facilitate trade and investment for SMEs. ·The political framework agreements or the sectoral agreements provide no binding bilateral mechanisms for trade and sustainable development issues.

The above list of problem drivers is derived from the stakeholders' responses to the public consultation complemented by the expertise of the Commission through working on market access issues raised by EU Member States and businesses relating to Australia or New Zealand, and the information gathered during the regular EU-Australia Trade Policy Dialogue and the EU-New Zealand Trade Talks and other similar fora. The business sector stakeholders pointed out the tariff and non-tariff measures, the gaps in the existing sectoral agreements and issues related to services, investment and public procurement. The non-profit sector stakeholders noted, in particular, the current lack of any measures to efficiently address the impact of trade on social and environmental aspects of sustainable development. 1.3. Problem tree The chart on the following page highlights the problems identified to the principal causes, groups them thematically and links them to the actual or potential consequences for the EU-Australia and the EU-New Zealand relations respectively, in the form of a "problem tree". 1.4. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? The identified problems appear to persist and increase as Australia and New Zealand progressively implement their new FTAs with other partners. If no policy action is taken, European manufacturers, the services industry, traders and their workforce as well as consumers and regulators would forgo potential additional benefits. For example the current relative tariff barriers will increase as Australia and New Zealand implement their FTAs and progressively phase out tariffs for non-EU countries, while EU exports would continue to face full MFN tariffs. The problems, and possible loss of market and income associated with inadequate protection of IPR such as geographical indications, would likely increase. 1.5. Has any fitness check/retrospective evaluation been carried out of the existing policy framework? What was concluded from the evaluation / fitness check? No evaluation been carried out as there are no overarching bilateral preferential trade and investment frameworks with either Australia or New Zealand. 2. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? The main objective of the policy intervention is twofold, to create more favourable conditions for further increasing trade and investment between the EU and Australia and the EU and New Zealand respectively, while implementing the general EU trade policy objectives as set out in the 'Trade for All' Communication. This objective is in line with the Council conclusions on trade of 21 November 2014 which underlined that trade in goods, services and investment can make a significant contribution to achieve the aims at the core of the ‘Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change’ and expressed that building on the tangible progress made in the EU's bilateral trade agenda, efforts should be devoted to pursuing agreements with key partners. Similarly, this objective is also in line with the Council conclusion on trade and investment of 27 November 2015 that supported the conclusion of ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment agreements and calls on the Commission to work to advance negotiations […] in the Asia-Pacific region. The action is also fully in line with the Communication ‘Trade for All - Towards a More Effective, Transparent and Responsible Trade and Investment Policy ’ which highlights that the EU needs to move forward bilateral relationships in order to deliver jobs and growth. This can be done by tackling trade and investment barriers in a comprehensive way while securing the EU's high level of social and environmental protection and contributing to other policy objectives, such as sustainable development and the particular needs of SMEs. In particular the 'Trade for All' Communication highlighted that "Australia and New Zealand are Europe’s close partners, share Europe’s values and views on many issues, and play an important role in the Asia-Pacific region and in multilateral settings. Stronger economic ties with these countries will also provide a solid platform for deeper integration with wider Asia-Pacific value chains. Strengthening these relationships should be a priority."

According to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the subsidiarity principle does not apply in areas of exclusive EU competence. The common commercial policy is listed among the areas of exclusive competence of the Union in Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This policy includes the negotiation of trade agreements under Article 207 TFEU. In line with the principle of proportionality, all reasonable policy options are presented below in order to assess the likely effectiveness of such policy action. 3. What should be achieved? 3.1. General objectives The EU’s general objective on economic and trade relations derives from the TFEU, which in Article 3(1)(3) establishes the EU’s exclusive competence for the common commercial policy. Furthermore, Article 206 provides that the overall objective of EU policy on economic and trade relations is to ‘contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers’. As established by Article 205 of the TFEU, the common commercial policy also serves the more general objectives of the Union’s external action as described in Article 21 of the TEU. The general objectives of this initiative are in line with the general EU trade policy and include concretely: ·promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth through the expansion of trade and investment and relevant rules; ·creating job opportunities and welfare gains ; ·increasing consumer benefits (e.g. in terms of choice, availability, price and maintaining high standards); ·improving Europe’s competitiveness in global markets; and ·Strengthening cooperation on trade-related issues with a like-minded partner. 3.2. Specific objectives In respect of future EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand economic and trade relations, the general objectives set out above would translate into the following specific objectives: ·reap the benefits of enhanced trade and investment flows between the EU and Australia and between the EU and New Zealand respectively by reducing barriers for trade and investment, taking into account the EU agricultural sensitivities, and by exploring forward-looking regulatory cooperation in appropriately selected areas, such as public procurement, intellectual property investment protection and to increase opportunities through specific mechanism and simplified procedures for SMEs; ·level the playing field with other countries that already enjoy preferential treatment due to their FTAs with Australia and New Zealand; ·provide a new framework with comprehensive, progressive and up-to-date set of rules for the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand trade and investment relationships including for the promotion of sustainable development in line with the general EU trade policy objectives. This is also to be seen in the light of the political framework agreements recently concluded with the two countries.

Just over half of all stakeholders' who responded to the public consultation considered that the EU's current bilateral relationship with Australia and New Zealand is not satisfactory and should be improved, while about one fifth were satisfied. The priority sectors and types of objectives identified by stakeholders generally fall into the following categories: reducing existing trade and investment barriers, providing a level playing field with non-EU competitors and creating a comprehensive and up-to-date framework to address broader issues related to sustainable development. 3.3. Consistency of the objectives of this initiative with other EU policies The objectives described above are fully consistent with, and indeed stem from the principle that the EU should encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade. The objectives are also in line with the Europe 2020 Communication which announced that the European Commission would draw up a trade strategy in 2010 including proposals for high-level strategic dialogues with key partners, to discuss strategic issues ranging from market access, regulatory framework, global imbalances, energy and climate change, access to raw materials, to global poverty, education and development. By contributing to the multilateral trading system, deep and comprehensive FTAs can usefully reinforce the possible benefits from the multilateral process. In particular they improve trading conditions, not just for the partners who are parties to bilateral agreements but also by providing benefits via MFN treatment to other WTO members, where this results from the agreement in question (e.g. through the reduction of NTBs or the binding services commitments). The objectives are also fully consistent with the objectives set out by the European Commission's Communication ‘Small Business Act for Europe’ (2008) and ‘Small Business, Big World’ (2011). Supporting SME's activities outside the EU is also embedded in the EU's overall competitiveness strategy as outlined in the Europe 2020 Communication on Industrial Policy. The objectives also comply with the principles established in the TEU stipulating that EU's policies and actions should aim to consolidate and support human rights and to help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources in the manner set out in Chapter 5 of this document. The objectives are consistent with other EU policies and with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, the objectives are also fully consistent with the Juncker Commission’s top priority to get Europe growing again, to increase the number of jobs without creating new debt, the Investment Plan and the specific priorities set out by the Commission Work Programme for 2017. 4. What are the various options to achieve the objectives? With a view to achieving the objectives set out in Chapter 3, this chapter outlines options which were considered in the course of the impact assessment. A) No EU policy change (baseline scenario) The baseline scenario continues to operate under the framework already in place for bilateral relations and continue to use existing sectoral bilateral agreements covering only a very limited number of sectors. The existing sectoral agreements are by their nature limited in their scope to specific sectors covering some non-tariff barriers for industrial products (MRAs with both Australia and New Zealand), animal products (in the case of New Zealand) and trade in wine (in the case of Australia). The economic modelling tool (see chapter 5 and Annex 4) projects this baseline scenario into the long term for it to be comparable with the policy scenarios. B) Options of improving implementation and enforcement B1) Improved implementation scenario

This option would be the baseline scenario and improved implementation of the existing sectoral bilateral agreements. The current MRAs with Australia and New Zealand cover a number of sectors, and sectoral annexes (e.g. low voltage electric equipment (LVD), telecommunication terminal equipment (TTE) of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) for pharmaceuticals) that could be modernised within the current framework. However earlier analysis showed that these kind of agreements delivered relatively limited benefits. Furthermore, this option would not address tariff and non-tariff barriers in other sectors for goods, barriers to trade in services and investment. In the case of the status quo (option A), it would also mean that important policy areas, such as related to trade and sustainable developments, digital trade and SMEs would not be addressed. This option, overall, would be unsuited to address the EU broader trade policy objectives. B2) Sectoral agreements scenario This option would consider further sector-specific agreements in addition to and building on the currently existing bilateral sectoral agreements. Further sector-specific agreements (e.g. wine agreement with New Zealand, or veterinary agreement with Australia) would likely provide additional benefits related to their specific, limited sectoral scopes, as also noted by some of the stakeholders active in the sectors concerned. However, they would not be able to address or provide new, modern frameworks for the overall bilateral economic relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Past experience shows that such sectoral agreements are not always feasible (e.g. the earlier negotiations for an EU-New Zealand wine agreement were abandoned) as no sufficient mutual interest could be gathered on a sectoral basis. The administrative burden of participating in several sectoral agreements needs to be considered, as negotiating and managing these in parallel will involve higher administrative burden than in negotiating comprehensive bilateral FTAs with Australia and New Zealand. Ensuring policy coherence among several parallel and potentially overlapping initiatives would present some challenges. Options B1 and B2 were not developed further during the impact assessment due to the above-mentioned reasons and also because both Australia and New Zealand only aim at comprehensive bilateral FTAs with the EU. Options B1 and B2 would thus fall short of expectation and would meet a refusal from Australia and New Zealand to engage. C) Modern and comprehensive EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand free trade agreements scenario This option would provide for two modern and comprehensive agreements – one with Australia and another with New Zealand. These FTAs would involve a major effort to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers, liberalising and facilitating services and investment, protection of investment, as well as further regulatory cooperation. Option C includes ambitious objectives that are in line with best FTA practice for removing barriers to services and investment, public procurement, and for providing rules covering IPR including geographical indications, competition policy, investment protection, SMEs, energy and raw materials, transparency, dispute settlement, customs and trade facilitation, and sustainable development. As part of the EU general policy more recent EU FTAs include an ambitious Trade and Sustainable Development chapter with robust labour and environmental protection provisions, which refer to ILO Conventions, other ILO instruments and multilateral environmental agreements; specific provisions encouraging trade practices and schemes that support and promote sustainable development goals (e.g. corporate social responsibility, voluntary sustainability assurance schemes etc.); a dedicated institutional set-up combining governmental and civil society involvement so as to foster transparency, accountability and dialogue; as well as a tailored mechanism to address disputes involving third party assessment. Option C would also need to take into account existing sensitivities and exceptions, and is further divided into two sub-options depending on the level of ambition to be aimed at regarding trade in goods: C1) Conservative, partial liberalisation scenario C2) Increased liberalisation scenario including full liberalisation of import tariffs for goods Both of these sub-scenarios provide for comprehensive FTAs as described above, but with different levels of ambition for liberalising trade in goods. ·In terms of tariffs, option C1 includes full tariff elimination for industrial goods and an asymmetric tariff elimination for agricultural products, i.e. for EU agricultural exports to Australia and New Zealand full liberalisation, while EU imports of agricultural goods from Australia and New Zealand are subject to substantial liberalisation while keeping the status quo (such as existing treatment of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) or tariffs) for EU sensitive sectors such as rice, cereal, sugar, fruit and vegetables, ruminant meat (i.e. beef and sheepmeat) and dairy. Option C2 includes full tariff elimination across the board. ·Option C1 does not assume any reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), while option C2 includes their reduction for all non-agriculture goods sectors at a 10% rate (based on ad-valorem equivalent) by Australia and New Zealand, while. The effect of reducing NTBs in the agricultural sector was not modelled due to the lack of reliable datasets. Therefore it was not possible to quantify the impact of the expected reductions of agricultural NTBs that make up a significant part of NTBs flagged by stakeholders or otherwise identified by the Commission and the external study. Overview of differentiated assumptions for trade in goods in options C1 and C2 Option C1 Option C2 Tariff Full liberalisation by the EU for all industrial products and most agricultural products apart from selected sensitive products: rice, cereal, sugar, fruit and vegetables, ruminant meat and dairy Full liberalisation by Australia and New Zealand for all products Full liberalisation by the EU for all products Full liberalisation by Australia and New Zealand for all products Non-tariff barriers No change No change by the EU A 10% cut of NTBs by Australia and New Zealand modelled for industrial goods

The assumptions are asymmetric in the tariff and non-tariff barriers aspects. These reflect the Commission's expert judgement of the likely negotiations in view of the asymmetric situation of existing tariff structure and also based on the FTAs the EU, Australia or New Zealand negotiated with other partners. These existing FTAs – to a variable degree – include long phase out periods for tariffs, partial liberalisations (TRQs or not zero final duties) or other specific treatment of sensitive products. The negotiations are not expected to impact on the EU regulatory framework that could be classified as a non-tariff barrier. On the other hand the pull of the EU's large market could reasonably induce some changes in the domestic regulatory framework of Australia and New Zealand. The stakeholders' responses to the public consultation in general suggest the need to address tariff and NTBs for goods in a differentiated manner. While the submissions in general call for strong ambition in addressing existing services and investment. Stakeholders' have different views on tariff liberalisation in the agricultural sub-sectors considered sensitive from the perspective of EU producers. Some European stakeholders called for existing tariffs or other arrangements (such as TRQ) not to liberalised. This view is shown in the different assumptions in options C1 and C2 in terms of the level of tariff liberalisation on the EU side. The conservative tariff liberalisation under option C1 would result in a lower level of ambition overall concerning trade in goods and therefore less scope for achieving EU objectives for reducing NTBs. This borne out by the difference in the assumed NTB reductions under options C1 and C2. However, the importance of trade and sustainable development does not depend on the assumed level of liberalisation. Therefore there are no different assumptions on this under options C1 and C2. 5. What are the impacts of the different policy options and who will be affected? This chapter analyses the impacts of the different policy options outlined in Chapter 4 on a number of different levels. It firstly examines the overall economic impacts resulting from the different policy options for strengthening EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand bilateral trade and investment relations. Then it looks at impacts on specific sectors, SMEs and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and covers environmental, social and human rights impacts. The administrative and budgetary impacts are also assessed, as well as the administrative capacity of Australia's and New Zealand's customs authorities to implement the new agreements. The analysis focuses on the impacts for the EU, Australia and New Zealand, respectively. It does not present detailed results at EU Member States' or regional level which could be misleading for methodological reasons. Firstly, an assessment by Member State or by region would be difficult to conduct due to lack of data and it would not lead to further insights on the overall benefits of the trade agreement. For example, estimates of the level of NTBs for goods at Member State or regional level by sector are not available. Therefore the impact of reducing sector-specific NTBs would differ across depending on their sector-specific trade exposure and the specific products they have problems with in trading. Secondly, statistics on international trade in goods are accurate at EU level. At Member State level trade can be over-estimated or underestimated mainly due to the "Rotterdam-effect", i.e. a Member State receiving a good from a non-EU country is not necessarily the Member State of final destination and a Member State sending a good to a non-EU country is not necessarily the Member State of origin of the good. Even if basic data on originating goods and NTBs were available, an attempt to assess the impact for sectors at the level of Member States or regions where the sectors are in particular concentrated could still result in misleading identifications given the widespread intra-EU supply chains and different value-added elements (including intermediate products, services, non-tangible elements such as IPR, etc.) from across the EU. The analysis in this chapter is based on the economic modelling performed by the Chief Economist Unit of DG TRADE, the study carried out by external consultants (a consortium led by LSE Enterprise) commissioned by the European Commission, and the assessment and information available to the Commission including the stakeholders' input to the public consultation. 5.1. Model and assumptions As regards assessing the economic impacts of the various scenarios throughout chapter 5, the quantitative analysis stems from the economic modelling carried out by the Chief Economist Unit of DG TRADE, in some areas (e.g. on CO2 emissions) complemented by the external study. For the simulations made in the quantitative analysis, the global quantitative CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) and its most recent database V9, with a base year of 2011 were used. The projection horizon of the economic modelling is 2030. The description of the analytical model used, including its limitations, can be found in Annex 4. However, the main features should be highlighted at this stage to help the reader better understand the results: ·The general model projects trade flows in the longer term, factors in the measures impacting on trade flows and calculates, using a series of assumptions, what the impact of reduced bilateral barriers might be on trade flows. FTAs are made up of market-access liberalisation measures covering goods, services and investment, and there are rules-based provisions. It is not possible to model rules, such as intellectual property rights. While rules included in FTAs would certainly increase the level of certainty and decrease risk for business, it is very difficult to capture these through a model. The modelling, therefore, looks at tariff liberalisations that would happen as a result of the FTAs, reductions of NTBs and binding of market openings in services. ·The CGE model and the underlying GTAP database cannot separate in smaller parts (disaggregate) the ruminant meat sector to beef and sheepmeat. This methodological limitation therefore cannot fully model the complexity of the ruminant meat imports from Australia and New Zealand into the EU. Each sub-category, i.e. beef and sheepmeat has further special sub-groups (i.e. fresh or frozen, products, different cuts, grass or grain-fed beef, etc.). In addition Australia and New Zealand use various TRQ for their exports to the EU. ·To understand output results, it is necessary to consider the following model restriction. The model cannot expand the factors of production (as might be the case in reality) but instead pulls them across to the most efficient sector. This partially explains the decline in output in some sectors when production is increasing in other sectors (hence "general equilibrium"). ·The model was run to simulate the impact of the two parallel FTAs one with Australia, and the other with New Zealand. While the figures on changes to bilateral trade flows (i.e. EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand) are separated, only the combined impact is measured for the EU output, reallocation of labour and consumer price index (CPI). ·The model works with what is called a ‘fixed employment closure’, meaning that the overall number of jobs is not set to change, and that labour market adjustments take place through wage changes. This approach is commonly used for this type of analyses since there is no established theoretical framework linking the functioning of labour markets to CGE models. However, the fixed employment closure approach provides information on shifts between sectors thus indicating in sectors in which employment is likely to increase and decrease as a result of the new agreement. ·The modelling provides figures for the impact of reduction of NTBs on trade in goods, in option C2. However, as robust estimates could not be established for reductions of NTBs for trade in agricultural products, a qualitative assessment of agricultural NTBs has been provided in the external study. This would mean that the likely impact of NTB reduction as modelled by the CGE simulation for EU exports is probably underestimated. ·For cross-border services, the assessment of likely NTB reduction is more difficult than for goods. This is mainly due to the nature of service trade liberalisation, which usually takes place through binding, i.e. a commitment by the negotiating partner not to raise the levels of existing barriers, thus removing uncertainty in terms of risks for economic operators. The impact of this is difficult to estimate since this is not a traditional cut in trade barriers. At the same time, it is acknowledged that removing uncertainty through binding has a value. Previous empirical work in this area has found that, on average, binding corresponds to a 3% reduction in trade costs. Australia, New Zealand and the EU are engaged in negotiations for the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) that would also provide additional measures for facilitating trade in services. ·The model does not contain data on the economic impacts of liberalisation in the areas of public procurement and investment or on the impact of rules regarding investment protection, or protection of IPR (e.g. geographical indications). This was because of the difficulty in quantifying these impacts. Hence the modelling results are likely to underestimate the benefits the FTAs can generate.

All the limitations duly considered, the CGE model remains the best tool in the methodological toolbox of economists to quantify the impact of trade agreements. In this context, it should be mentioned that administrations around the world, including in EU Member States, and also in Australia and New Zealand rely on CGE modelling to analyse the impact of trade policies. The Chief Economist Unit of DG Trade actively engages in exchanges with the research community to stay at the forefront of methodological progress in trade policy analysis. Recently advanced approaches have not been able to offer convincing alternatives. Essentially all the limitations of the CGE model identified above are inherent to competing approaches, too. 5.2. Policy option A: the baseline scenario On the one hand, Australia and New Zealand both have open, liberal and rules-based economies, and possess highly developed regulatory systems. This creates environments that are open and which make foreign trade and investment easier. Australia and New Zealand are among the WTO members with the lowest bound and applied tariffs for goods and the lowest trade restrictiveness for services. In addition, both Australia and New Zealand, along with the EU are pursuing multi- and plurilateral trade liberalisation via various channels. They are all party to the updated Information Technology Agreement (ITA2), and are participating in the negotiations for the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). New Zealand joined the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in 2015, while Australia is in negotiations to join the GPA. These multi- and plurilateral arrangements could bring additional benefits to the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand trade and investment relationship independent of the bilateral frameworks. On the other hand, it can be assumed that no further reduction of regulatory trade costs and no substantial further growth of bilateral trade and investment volumes should be expected from continuing the status quo. The current bilateral frameworks, notably the absence of preferential arrangements for trade and investment, preclude further gains in overall welfare in either the EU or Australia and New Zealand. Under this scenario any changes in the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand trade and investment relationships would therefore be only those that could be attributed to changes in the respective economies, the multilateral trade system and in the world economy at large. In particular the status quo (the baseline scenario) would not address the comparative disadvantage of EU exports and investments in Australia and New Zealand resulting from preferential arrangements (i.e. FTAs) between Australia and New Zealand respectively and other non-EU countries. The status quo would also mean that important policy areas, such as those related to trade and sustainable development, digital trade and SMEs, would not be addressed. Overall the status quo would result in a comparatively deteriorating environment for European exports and investment, compared to their main competitors from non-EU countries. The economic modelling tool, within its limits, projects this baseline scenario to the stimulation horizon by using projections e.g. with respect to GDP growth. This baseline scenario is compared with the policy scenarios options C1 and C2 that are based on the same long-term projections and include the parameters of the policy choices as defined in the respective scenarios. So, for example, the EU export as projected by the model in the long term in option A is compared to the relative change under options C1 and C2 in the equivalent projection horizon. The figures for gains in trade provided for option C2 can, thus also be interpreted as an estimate of untapped trade potential. 5.3. Policy Option C: comprehensive FTAs with Australia and New Zealand, respectively – overall economic impact The comparison of option C represents the change between option A and option C using the long term projections for both. Over the long term, the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs are estimated to have a positive impact on real GDP for the EU, Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand will see a positive change in real GDP of 0.28% in the conservative scenario and of 0.52% in the increased liberalisation scenario. In absolute values the gains are between €0.7 billion and €1.3 billion. Similarly, the simulations indicate that Australian real GDP will increase by between 0.13% (conservative scenario) and 0.20% (increased liberalisation scenario). In absolute values the gains correspond to between €2.7 billion and €4.2 billion respectively. The gain in real GDP for the EU is estimated to range between 0.01% (conservative scenario) and 0.02% (increased liberalisation scenario), i.e. about €2.1 billion and €4.9 billion in absolute value in the two scenarios respectively. In terms of economic welfare (an economic indicator that compares the change in consumer utility), the impact on the EU, Australia and New Zealand is positive. In absolute values, the EU's gains in the long term vary between €2.6 billion (conservative) and €4.8 billion (increased liberalisation). Australia's welfare gains in the long term vary between €0.9 billion (conservative scenario) and €1.8 billion (increased liberalisation). New Zealand's in the long term vary between €0.4 billion (conservative) and €0.6 billion (increased liberalisation). The EU would increase its exports to Australia and New Zealand more than the two countries would increase their exports to the EU. The EU increases its exports to Australia by 16.4% and 33.3% respectively in the conservative and increased liberalisation scenarios. Similarly, Australia increases its exports to the EU by 6.9% and 11.1% respectively in the two scenarios. EU exports to New Zealand are projected to increase by 14.2% and 32.4% respectively. Similarly, New Zealand exports to the EU would increase by 10.5% and 22.2% respectively. (The relative higher growth of exports from New Zealand compared to Australia could be explained by the higher ratio of New Zealand exports that have currently higher tariffs in the EU such as ruminant meat and dairy.) Main impacts of the options C1 and C2 - GDP, welfare, and bilateral exports in the two scenarios in the long term Variable Scenario EU Australia New Zealand GDP

(% change) Conservative 0.01 0.13 0.28 Increased liberalisation 0.02 0.20 0.52 GDP gain

(€ billion*) Conservative 2.1 2.7 0.7 Increased liberalisation 4.9 4.2 1.3 Welfare gain

(€ billion*) Conservative 2.6 0.9 0.4 Increased liberalisation 4.8 1.8 0.6 EU-Australia bilateral exports

(% change) Conservative 16.4 6.9 - Increased liberalisation 33.3 11.1 - EU-New Zealand bilateral exports (% change) Conservative 14.2 - 10.5 Increased liberalisation 32.4 - 22.2 * US dollars were converted to euros at $1.1095 to €1 5.4. Policy Option C: comprehensive FTAs with Australia and New Zealand, respectively – impact on sectoral competitiveness Overview EU-Australia

The CGE modelling indicates growth of exports for all sectors apart from minor decreases in EU exports of rice (on a very low basis). In terms of relative change of sectoral output in the long term the situation is mixed. Under option C1 the changes are insignificant for the EU and marginal for Australia apart from for meat, motor vehicles and machinery. Under option C2 the relative output changes for the EU are more pronounced and negative for ruminant meat, fruit and vegetables, sugar and electric equipment, while positive for motor equipment and machinery. For Australia relative output changes are particularly positive for ruminant meat, sugar, rice, oil seed, beverages and tobacco, and utilities and negative for machinery, motor vehicles, gas, and chemicals. This quantitative analysis indicates that the overall positive impact (based on export growth, sectoral output growth) in the EU would be on motor equipment, machinery, chemicals and services sectors under both options C1 and C2, albeit in a varying degree, while the main negative impact would be on the fruit and vegetables sectors under option C1 and on the ruminant and sugar sectors under option C2. EU-New Zealand The CGE modelling indicates growth of exports and imports for all sectors apart from minor decreases of EU exports of some agricultural sub-sectors (rice, cereals fruit and vegetables and fibres and other crops - all of these have low base of trade volumes) and New Zealand exports of energy (coal, oil, gas) and minerals to the EU. In terms of relative change of long term sectoral output the situation is mixed. In option C1 the changes are insignificant for the EU while for New Zealand there is growth for fruit and vegetables, other animal products and beverage and tobacco, textiles, chemicals and services sectors and decrease for a number of agricultural sectors (cereals, sugar, ruminant and other meat and dairy) as well as motor vehicles and machinery. In option C2 the relative output changes for the EU are combined and described above under the overview for EU-Australia. For New Zealand relative output changes are particularly positive for ruminant meat, fruit and vegetables, beverage and tobacco, while some other agricultural and industrial sectors (wood and paper, chemicals, motor vehicles and electrical equipment) would experience negative relative long term output changes. This quantitative analysis indicates that the overall positive impact (based on export growth, sectoral output growth) in the EU would be on motor equipment, machinery, chemicals and services sectors under both options C1 and C2, albeit in a varying degree, while the main negative impact would be on the fruit and vegetables sectors under option C1 and on the ruminant, dairy, and fruit and vegetables sectors under option C2. Industrial sectors Chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) EU-Australia EU exports of chemicals to Australia were 19% of total EU exports in 2015 (€6.1 billion out of which pharmaceuticals were €3.9 billion). EU imports of chemicals were less significant (€0.6 billion of which about half was pharmaceuticals). The bilateral trade in chemical products, taking into account the large base, are projected to grow significantly: EU exports by 7 or 20% and Australian exports by 10 or 11% under options C1 and C2 respectively. This would offer sizeable business opportunities, even though this is not reflected in sectoral output changes in the EU due to the very large base of EU production. EU-New Zealand EU exports of chemicals to New Zealand are similarly significant, making up 14% of EU's current exports (€0.6 billion, out of which pharmaceuticals were a bit less than half). EU imports of chemicals are of a smaller magnitude, but still relatively important among non-agricultural imports from New Zealand (7% of total, €0.2 billion). The bilateral trade of chemical products are projected to grow significantly in both directions, up to 29% in the long term (EU exports by 9 and 27% in option C1 and C2 respectively and New Zealand exports by 29 % in both options. This makes the chemical sector a relatively significant source of new business opportunities. Transport equipment, including motor vehicles EU-Australia EU exports of transport equipment to Australia were 23% of total EU exports in 2015 (€7.1 billion, of which automotive products were €5.7 billion). EU imports of transport equipment were much smaller (€0.2 billion, of which about one quarter was automotive products). Bilateral trade, especially EU exports of motor equipment is projected to grow very significantly (EU exports by 38 or 52% and Australian exports by 14 or 16% under options C1 and C2 respectively). Therefore this sector accounts for a very large overall gain in export value also considering the large existing trade. Australia maintains a 5% import duty for cars, which in effect is only applied to cars imported from the EU as Australia has dismantled tariffs for the EU's competitors. The elimination of this comparative disadvantage alongside the reduction of NTBs it would further contributes to the significant increase of projected EU exports in the long term. The relative sectoral output change for the EU is +0.2 for both options C1 and C2 due to the very large base of EU production. For Australia, in terms of sectoral outputs motor equipment is the most negatively affected and would see its output reduced by around 1.4% in the conservative scenario and by 1.7% in the increased liberalisation scenario. It is important to note that all current Australian domestic car assembly operations will cease in the coming years. Therefore the Australian domestic automotive production is expected to contract significantly regardless of the impact of the EU-Australia FTA.

EU-New Zealand The most important sector for the EU in its trade with New Zealand concerned is transport equipment, which accounts for 28% of EU's current exports (€1.3 billion, out of which automotive products made up about half). EU imports of transport equipment are of a smaller magnitude, accounting for 2% of total imports (€70 million, out of which automotive products made up only one tenth). For bilateral trade in motor equipment, EU exports especially are projected to grow significantly in the long term (EU exports up by 23 or 44% and New Zealand exports up by 13 or 14% under options C1 and C2 respectively). Therefore this sector become a significant source for new EU export opportunities even though this is not reflected in sectoral output changes in the EU due to the very large base of EU production. New Zealand would experience a rather large negative change in output (1.4% 2.7% under options C1 and C2 respectively). However, this change would come on a relatively small base as New Zealand does not have a major automotive industry. Machinery and electric equipment EU-Australia EU exports of machinery (including electric equipment but not including transport equipment) to Australia were 24% of total EU exports in 2015 (€7.5 billion). EU imports of machinery were much smaller (€0.7 billion). EU exports are projected to grow very significantly (EU exports up by 21 or 61% and Australian exports up by 9 or 10% under options C1 and C2 respectively). Therefore this sector accounts for a very large overall gain in export value, also considering the large existing trade. However, the relative sectoral output change for the EU is only +0.2% for machinery (in option C2) and -0.1% for electric equipment and other manufactured products. For Australia, in terms of sectoral outputs the machinery sector would be one of the most negatively affected and would see its output reduced by around 2.0% in the increased liberalisation scenario, while the electric equipment and other manufactured products would experience an increase of 0.2%. EU-New Zealand EU exports of machinery (including electric equipment but not including transport equipment) to New Zealand were 26.1% of total EU exports in 2015 (€1.2 billion). EU imports of machinery were much smaller (€0.2 billion). EU exports are projected to grow very significantly (EU exports up by 19 or 62% under options C1 and C2 respectively and New Zealand's exports up by 9% in both options). Therefore this sector accounts for a very large overall gain in export value also considering the large existing trade. However, the relative sectoral output change for the EU is small, as shown in the section above (+0.1% for machinery and -0.1% for electric equipment and other manufactured products). For New Zealand, in terms of sectoral outputs the machinery sector would be the most negatively affected and would see its output reduced by around 2.9% in the increased liberalisation scenario, while the electric equipment and other manufactured products would experience a decrease of 0.1%. Agriculture EU-Australia EU-Australia trade value in agriculture products were €4.8 billion in 2015 (EU exports €2.8 billion, 9% of total, EU imports €2 billion, 21% of total). The share of agricultural goods in total EU exports to Australia (8.8%) is higher than that in the overall EU trade in agricultural goods (7.2%). Australia was the 13th largest export market for EU agricultural exports while Australia was the 19th largest source of EU imports. The top five exported EU agricultural products were: chocolate and confectionary, spirits and liqueurs, pasta and biscuits, pork and wine. The top five imported agricultural products were: oilseed (canola, mostly used for bio-diesel production in the EU), wine, tropical fruits and nuts, bovine meat and animal fibre (including wool). The CGE modelling shows that in the long term, as the result of an EU-Australia FTA, EU exports of dairy and, to a lesser extent, fruit and vegetables, other food and beverages would increase. Among the EU imports there would be significant relative (in percentage terms) increases would occur for ruminant meat, beverages, dairy, sugar, cereals and rice under both options C1 and C2. The relative changes in the long term EU sectoral output would generally be marginally negative results in the increased liberalisation scenario with the exception of ruminant meat, which would experience the biggest decrease. Australia would experience sectoral output growth for ruminant meat, sugar, rice, oilseeds and, to a lesser extent, cereals, fruit and vegetables and dairy. EU-New Zealand EU-New Zealand agricultural trade is asymmetric, reflecting the underlying historical trade relationship. The bilateral trade in agriculture products was €2.9 billion (EU exports €0.4 billion, 10% of total, EU imports €2.5 billion, 71% of total) in 2015. The share of EU agricultural exports to New Zealand (9.6%) is higher than that of the overall extra-EU trade (7.2%). New Zealand is not a major export market for the EU though, whereas it was the 11th largest source of EU imports. The top five exported EU agricultural products were: pork, milk powder and whey, food preparations, wine and preparations of vegetables, fruit or nuts. The top five imported agricultural products were: sheep meat, wine, fruit, animal fibre (wool) and casein. The CGE modelling shows that the EU-New Zealand FTA would result in a long-term increase of EU exports of other meat (e.g. pork), dairy and, to a lesser extent, other food and beverages. Among New Zealand's exports, significant relative increases would occur for dairy, ruminant meat, fruit and vegetables and other food. While the percentage increases for imports of sugar and rice are significant, the underlying actual trade flows are negligible. As also noted above, the relative changes in the long term EU sectoral output would generally be marginally negative, with the exception of ruminant meat, which, in the increased liberalisation scenario, would experience the biggest decreases. New Zealand would experience sectoral output growth for ruminant meat, fruit and vegetables and - to a smaller extent - dairy, and a decrease for most other sectors.

Sugar EU-Australia While Australia is a significant global sugar exporter, the EU-Australia sugar trade fluctuates depending on price levels. In general it is limited (EU exports €11 million; EU imports €7 million in 2015). This is largely due to the current EU import tariff and the limited TRQ available to Australia. The CGE modelling shows significant growth in Australian sugar exports to the EU (in percentage terms) in the increased liberalisation scenario (124% under option C2, no change under option C1). Given the low volume of current imports the actual projected increased trade would not be significant. It is worth noting that stakeholder input to the public consolation showed major differences on the desirability of liberalising cane sugar imports into the EU. In addition a stakeholder pointed out that sensitivity of the EU's Outermost Regions over special sugar should also be taken into account. EU-New Zealand Between EU and New Zealand the underlying actual trade flows of sugar are not significant (EU exports €11 million, EU imports €2 million in 2015). New Zealand is not a major producer or exporter of sugar, so no major sugar exports to the EU are expected. Fruit and vegetables EU-Australia EU-Australia bilateral trade in fruit and vegetables (EU exports: €31 million, EU imports: €261 million in 2015) mostly consists of imports of Australian nuts (€219 million). The effect modelled on exports by the CGE analysis shows a small change of magnitude in current EU exports (8% and 9% increase under options C1 and C2 respectively) and a somewhat bigger increase of Australian exports (20% under both options C1 and C2). Australia currently maintains some measures that negatively impact on EU exports (e.g. anti-dumping measures on canned tomatoes, SPS measures on certain vegetable seeds). However the FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively. EU-New Zealand EU-New Zealand bilateral trade in fruit and vegetables (EU exports €9 million, EU imports €394 million in 2015) mostly consist of imports of apples, kiwifruit and onions from New Zealand. The effect modelled on exports by the CGE analysis shows no change in the magnitude of EU exports (2% and 3% increase under options C1 and C2 respectively), while there is a sizeable increase of imports from New Zealand (39% and 38% under options C1 and C2 respectively). When assessing the impact of these increased imports it is worth noting the counter-seasonality of most fruit and vegetables imports. This means that a certain amount of New Zealand's produce is not directly competing with EU domestic production, but rather with produce from other Southern hemisphere producer countries (i.e. kiwifruit). The existing commercial cooperation and mutual investment is also significant in this sector. For example, EU and New Zealand investors own fruit orchards in each other's territory, or engage in further cooperation, such as New Zealand imports kiwifruit from the EU in the off-season. New Zealand maintains some measures that negatively impact on EU exports (e.g. anti-dumping measures on preserved peaches, SPS measures on plant breeding material). The FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively. Overall the increase of fruit and vegetable imports is not expected to have a major impact on EU production (the sectoral output change according to the CGE modelling would be -0.2% in the long term). Dairy EU-Australia EU exports of dairy products (€203 million in 2015) mostly include cheese, milk powder and whey. Australia has already some preferential access to the EU market through TRQs for some types of cheese but EU imports remain small (€1 million in 2015). The CGE analysis shows a significant increase of EU exports (48% and 49% under options C1 and C2 respectively). The import growth (1% and 87% under options C1 and C2 respectively) is limited in value, due to the small base of current Australian dairy exports to the EU. Australia currently maintains some measures that negatively impact on EU exports (e.g. biosecurity related measures on certain cheeses, insufficient protection of geographical indications). The FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively, although this effect is not modelled, as explained earlier. Overall the FTA would provide sizeable new export opportunities for the EU producers.

EU-New Zealand New Zealand is the world's largest dairy exporter accounting for one third of global trade in dairy products. New Zealand's dairy production is extensive; it relies largely on pasturage and its expansion is limited by resource constraints (i.e. availability of suitable land and water) and competition for the same resources from other domestic sectors such as ruminant meat production. EU trade with New Zealand in dairy products is moderate, especially in light of the amount of these products traded by the EU and New Zealand with other partners (EU exports: €51 million, EU imports: €100 million in 2015). EU-New Zealand dairy trade consists mostly of EU exports of milk powder and whey and EU imports of butter and cheese. New Zealand has significant preferential access to the EU through TRQs for butter and, to a lesser extent, cheese though these are not fully used presently because of the in-quota tariff rates are high. The CGE analysis shows a significant increase of EU exports (27% and 29% under options C1 and C2 respectively), and imports (0% and 134% under options C1 and C2 respectively). However, these relative changes would mean limited negative change for overall EU domestic production and consumption. There are also increasing sectoral cooperation and investments by New Zealand's dairy sector in Europe. This cooperation makes it easier to supply other, Asian markets, thereby taking advantage of the seasonal nature of milk production and, more importantly, specialisation (such as EU-produced whey and its derived products). New Zealand currently does not provide sufficient protection of geographical indications for EU dairy products. The FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively. However, this effect is not taken into account in the CGE modelling. Ruminant meat (beef and sheepmeat) EU-Australia The EU-Australia bilateral trade in meat is important (EU exports: €258 million – essentially all pork; EU imports: €338 million – out of which €211 million is bovine meat and €102 million is sheepmeat). EU exports of meat products (beef, pork and poultry) face various SPS barriers in Australia. Australia is a leading world exporter of beef and sheepmeat exporting large quantities to Asia and the US. Australia has preferential access to the EU through various TRQs for beef and sheepmeat. The CGE modelling projects no change essentially in EU exports of meat products (1% and 2% in options C1 and C2 respectively). However, this modelling does not take into account a possible reduction of NTBs such as SPS measures. The FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively. Australian exports of beef and sheepmeat to the EU are currently limited by the size of TRQs and high out–of-quota tariffs. Under option C2, Australian exports of ruminant meat are projected to grow more than fivefold (539%) there is no substantial change under option C1. The CGE modelling, due to its limitations, cannot divide the ruminant sector into beef and sheepmeat, and cannot fully simulate the complexity of trade of the different product categories of ruminant meat. Nevertheless this finding is in line with another relevant study undertaken by the Commission. EU-New Zealand New Zealand is also a leading exporter of beef and especially sheepmeat. EU-New Zealand bilateral trade in meat is very significant (EU exports: €70 million – essentially all pork; EU imports: €1,142 million –of which €943 million for sheepmeat and €80 million for beef). EU exports of some meat (poultry) products still face SPS measures in New Zealand. However the modelling does not account for a possible reduction of NTBs such as SPS measures. The FTA is expected to provide the necessary frameworks to address such issues more effectively. Due to historical connections, New Zealand exports a very large proportion of sheepmeat to the EU. It is free from duties under a very large TRQ. New Zealand also benefits from preferential access for beef, although for a much smaller quantity. In practice New Zealand does not fill its large sheepmeat TRQ and could, under the current circumstances, increase its duty free exports by about 40%. The reason that New Zealand exporters do not use this opportunity is that they pursue other lucrative export opportunities in Asia and elsewhere. New Zealand exports of ruminant meat are projected to grow by 25% under option C2 (there is no substantial change under options C1). This is very significant due to the large base of mostly sheepmeat exports to the EU. As noted above, CGE modelling does not allow for disaggregation of beef and sheepmeat. While the CGE modelling shows that ruminant import from New Zealand would grow significantly the currently unfilled sheepmeat quota suggests that expansion of such magnitude is unlikely to happen. New Zealand accounts for about 85% of the total EU imports of sheepmeat (in addition Australia accounts for about 10%). The sheepmeat market is affected by seasonality, which is linked to the counter-seasonal lambing season in the Southern hemisphere, as a significant part of EU imports from New Zealand (and Australia) are chilled (fresh) lamb. While there is an overlap, the impact on EU domestic producers is less significant than the overhead trade figures would suggest, while EU consumers benefit from the year-around supply of chilled lamb. New Zealand exports of beef are currently limited by the size of current TRQs and high out-of-quota tariffs (i.e. the MFN tariffs that imports pay outside of the TRQ). Overall The full removal of the current tariff barriers and TRQ limitations (primarily for beef and Australian sheepmeat) would negatively impact EU production and producers under option C2. The CGE modelling projects a 1.2% decrease of sectoral output for the EU ruminant sector due to the combined impact of the FTAs with Australia and New Zealand. This figure, however, needs to be viewed in the light of the above analysis, especially the very significant EU imports of sheepmeat (€1,045 million from Australia and New Zealand), compared to EU imports of beef (€291 million from Australia and New Zealand). The results from the modelling are likely overestimate the actual impact in the case of New Zealand due to the specific circumstances of sheepmeat trade (in particular the unfilled TRQ).

Alcoholic beverages EU-Australia EU-Australia bilateral trade in alcoholic beverages (wines, spirits and beer) was sizeable (EU export: €559 million, mainly spirits and wine; EU imports: €485 million, almost exclusively wine). The EU and Australia have a wine agreement that provides for recognition of wine-making practices and protection of geographical indications, but no tariff liberalisation. EU-New Zealand EU-New Zealand bilateral trade in alcoholic beverages (wines, spirits and beer) was sizeable (EU exports: €60 million, mainly spirits and wine; EU imports: €369 million, almost exclusively wine). Overall the CGE modelling looks at a larger sectoral aggregation for beverages and tobacco, but alcoholic beverages is the largest sub-group in this category. The CGE modelling projects a moderate increase of trade both ways for beverages and tobacco. However, the increase would appear to have no impact on the sectoral output in the EU. Services EU-Australia EU services exports to Australia were worth €18.6 billion, while imports were €7.8 billion in 2014. EU exports services sectors would make modest gains in bilateral exports of about 7%, while imports would be at 9%. For the EU there is no measurable impact on sectoral output for services. For Australia (in both the conservative and the increased liberalisation scenarios), most of the gains lie in the transport services and communication services sectors. EU-New Zealand EU services exports to New Zealand were worth €2.2 billion, while imports were €1.3 billion in 2014. In the conservative and increased liberalisation scenarios EU services' sectors would make modest gains in bilateral exports of about 7% and 8% respectively, while imports increase by 9 and 8%,. As noted above, there is no measurable impact on sectoral output for services in the EU. For New Zealand most of the relative output change occurs in the utilities and communications sectors. It is important to point out that the relatively modest gains for projected bilateral services trade with Australia and New Zealand are partly due to the constraints in the modelling: as stated in point 5.1 above, fixed labour closure is applied, meaning that any change in demand would impact on the prices rather than on the volumes. This leads to gains in the services' sectors being underestimated. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis does not contain estimates on the positive effects of liberalisation in public procurement, in view of the difficulty in quantifying such provisions. 5.5. Impact on SMEs The external study showed that in addition to tariff barriers regulatory trade barriers including regulatory heterogeneity (i.e. the existence of different regulatory frameworks in different countries) may have a greater impact on SMEs than on larger companies. SMEs generally have more limited financial resources and lower human resource capacities than larger companies. Therefore they are less equipped to handle differing regulatory frameworks, deal with diverse national regulatory bodies and absorb risks. This is especially the case when operating in diversely regulated, intensely competitive markets, particularly those dominated by large and long-established companies. As a consequence of heterogeneous non-tariff trade barriers, many SMEs are effectively prevented from engaging in international trade. This has adverse consequences for intra-industry competition, cross-country innovation spill-overs, and economic convergence. It is very important for SMEs to have provisions that speed up and simplify customs procedures and paperwork. This would mean less costs and red tape, which can disproportionately impact small exporters. Specific provisions under the comprehensive FTAs on SMEs and bilateral cooperation would contribute to improving such transparency for SMEs. Statistics available show that EU SME exporters are prevalent in “wholesale, retail trade and repair” services, “manufacturing”, “professional, scientific and technical activities”, “transportation and storage” services, “construction” services, “accommodation and food” services, “information and communication” services, “administrative and support” services, and “agriculture, forestry and fishing” sectors. Options C1 and C2 have similar general implications for SMEs. Option C1 features a conservative scenario that would provide comparatively less benefits for enterprises, including SMEs, due to no reduction of NTBs in Australia and New Zealand. Option C2, by contrast, would provide more benefits in terms of more ambitious provisions for NTB reduction and rules that would be able to reduce trade costs also for SMEs. As concerns the quantitative impact of FTAs with Australia and New Zealand on EU SMEs, both changes in sectoral output and in sectoral exports as projected by the CGE model are marginal under option C1. SMEs producing dairy products, wood and paper products, food products, textiles products are likely to benefit more. SME service providers in transport, communications and business services are also likely to see rising exports as the result of the FTAs.

Under option C2 sectoral changes in bilateral exports are significant for a number of sectors in which EU SMEs are strong exporters. Accordingly, EU SMEs active in the manufacturing of wood and paper products, textiles, chemicals products, metal products, non-metal products, motor equipment, machinery and electrical/electronic components are likely to benefit most from liberalisation measures that go beyond tariff eliminations and effectively aim to reduce regulatory differences. The size and direction of the estimates matches the literature on non-tariff trade barriers and how NTBs particularly hinder the internationalisation of SMEs. 5.6. Impact on Third Countries, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Based on the summary of CGE modelling results, LDCs in general will not experience a change in their GDP due to the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs, while they will increase total trade. This is due to a large increase in trade with the EU that compensates for a decline in trade with Australia, New Zealand and other partners. On the other hand, a small sub-set of Pacific countries would encounter a small (0.2%) decline in their total exports in the long term under option C2, due to a reduction in their trade with Australia and New Zealand. This result is partly due to CGE modelling limitations, and is not supported by further qualitative analysis. Exports from Pacific island countries to the EU are not in direct competition with the exports of Australia and New Zealand. Pacific island countries continue to benefit from the existing Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement and current preferential arrangements under the EU's General Scheme of Preferences (GSP), including for LDCs the "Everything but Arms" (EBA) arrangement, as well as Australia's and New Zealand's GSP schemes. Pacific island countries could benefit separately from further improved access to Australia and New Zealand under the PACER Plus agreement. This is a regional trade agreement including Australia, New Zealand and most of the Pacific Island countries that is currently being negotiated. Percentage change of total exports under the two scenarios, (long term) 5.7. Environmental impact As noted above (chapter 4, point C) sustainable development is an overarching policy objective of the EU. Trade policy also has its role to play. The inclusion of Trade and sustainable development (TSD) provisions in EU FTAs is a key tool in this regard. The aim of TSD provisions is to maximise the potential of increased trade and investment, among others to environmental protection, including the fight against climate change, and to engage with partner countries in a process which includes and enhances dialogue, transparency and civil society involvement. Provisions also allow for independent and impartial review. Such engagement will allow to raise awareness of these policy objectives and to draw more attention to ratification of the relevant conventions and to enhance the quality of their implementation. In addition, it will allow an exchange of best practice in dialogues, leading to timely mitigation. The results of the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) assessed the overall environmental performance of Australia and New Zealand on six main aspects: water resources, fisheries, biodiversity, forest, climate and energy. Australia ranked 13th worldwide, while New Zealand ranked 11th, and both countries ranked above the EU average. Australia performs better than the EU averages on air quality and health impact, while it scores much lower on fisheries and climate and energy, which is its worst performing category, due to its trend in carbon emissions for electricity generation. Minor differences are observed for water and sanitation and water resources, where Australia tops the ranking. New Zealand performs better than EU averages in terms of air quality and health impact. However, it lags behind on agriculture and scores very low in nitrogen balance sub-category, ranking 141st, as well as on forestry and fisheries. The EU and New Zealand show very similar scores for climate and energy and water resources. Quantitative analysis: CO2 emissions CO2 emissions will increase in all three trading partners in both C1 and C2 scenarios. New Zealand increases its CO2 emissions the most, ranging between 0.29% and 0.64% respectively in the conservative and increased liberalisation scenarios. The figures for Australia are 0.12% and 0.38% in the two scenarios, while in the EU the increases in CO2 emissions are negligible and 0.03% and 0.04% in the conservative and increased liberalisation scenarios respectively. Percentage change in CO2 emissions in options C1 and C2 Conservative (C1) Increased liberalisation (C2) EU 0.03 0.04 Australia 0.12 0.38 New Zealand 0.29 0.64 In parallel to the marginal increase of CO2 emissions in the EU, Australia and New Zealand, the CGE modelling simulation projects decreases in almost all other countries. This suggests that overall; the FTAs are expected to have only a negligible, though negative, impact on CO2 emissions globally over the long term.

Qualitative analysis: Air pollution While the CGE model does not provide estimates on the impact of air pollution, some insight can be gained by exploring air pollution (sulphur oxides (SOX) and nitrogen oxides (NOX)) by sectors. In the EU and New Zealand the major sources of NOX are transport, while in Australia, the largest source of NOX is industrial combustion. Although the sectors that are expected to benefit most from the FTAs in the EU involve combustion processes, the impact is very small and therefore does not pose particular concern. Biodiversity The expansion of the agricultural sector in Australia (to a small extent the rice, sugar and cereals sectors) and New Zealand (in the animal and the fruit and vegetables sectors) could pose some potential threat to biodiversity. The long term increase in land use and intensity in New Zealand and the inefficient use of nitrogen fertilisers pose some limited concerns about the potential negative implications for ecosystems. Land use change The external study also provides additional quantitative analysis for land use intensity change calculated on the basis of the CGE simulation results. Land intensity is expected to experience a negligible increase (0.55%) in the EU. This is largely due to the expected increase in some agricultural sectors such as animal farming. Australia is expected to experience a moderate increase (0.98%) on land use intensity most likely due the expansion of the ruminant meat and some agricultural sectors. A similar moderate increase (0.99%) is, expected in New Zealand, most likely due the expansion of the ruminant meat and the vegetable and fruit sectors. This suggests that land use would increase by about 1%. Overall, the findings of the analysis point to a minor impact of both FTAs on the environment. The expected impact on global emissions is negligible as it is mitigated by the fact that the FTA favours relatively less energy- and emission-intensive sectors, leading to a reallocation of production towards cleaner sectors in the EU. Although some of the sectors that could benefit most from the FTA in Australia and New Zealand are environmentally sensitive, such as oil and coal and some agricultural production, the long-term impact predicted by the CGE modelling is limited, even in the increased liberalisation scenario. The only area of limited concern is a potential pressure on biodiversity by the expected expansion of some of the agricultural sub-sectors in New Zealand and Australia. In the EU there could be potential negative impact on biodiversity in the case of reduction of sheep farming, as a part of such farming takes place in high nature value land. The policy to include ambitious trade and sustainable development provisions in EU FTAs is expected to have a positive environmental impact overall in both Australia and New Zealand. The aim of these provisions is to maximise the potential contribution of increased trade and investment for environmental protection. This would include, among others, the fight against climate change, and threats to biodiversity and promotion of sustainable management of natural resources, such as forestry and fisheries, through the improved engagement with the partner countries based on international rules and agreements and through a process with dialogues, transparency and civil society involvement. Stakeholders from the non-profit sector and as the business sector noted the importance of enforcing environmental rules and not lowering standards. Non-profit sector stakeholders noted specific issues such as maintaining high biosecurity standards (to mitigate risk to biodiversity) and addressing harmful fishery subsidies. 5.8. Social impact Similarly to the environmental aspects the overarching sustainable development policy objective also applies to labour and social aspects. The aim of trade and sustainable development (TSD) provisions in EU FTAs is to maximise the potential of increased trade and investment to the decent work agenda and to engage with partner countries in a process which includes and enhances dialogue, transparency and civil society involvement. Provisions also allow for independent and impartial review. Such engagement will allow to raise awareness of these policy objectives and to draw more attention to the ratification of the relevant conventions and to enhance the quality of their implementation. In addition, it will allow for an exchange of best practice in dialogues, leading to timely mitigation. The TSD provisions contain commitments on adherence to core ILO standards and conventions and effective implementation in law and in practice, the pursuance of high levels of labour protection, and the effective enforcement of and non-derogation from domestic laws in these areas, in order to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’. Specific provisions encouraging trade practices and schemes that support and promote sustainable development goals, such as Corporate Social Responsibility, are also included in the TSD provisions. Quantitative analysis Wages In the long term real wages will increase for all trade partners under the two scenarios with the largest increases in New Zealand. For New Zealand, real wages will increase around 0.3% in the conservative scenario for both unskilled and skilled labour. In the increased liberalisation scenario, real wages of unskilled labour and skilled labour will increase by around 0.8% and 0.6% respectively. For Australia the figures are 0.2% (both unskilled and skilled) in the conservative scenario and around 0.3% (both unskilled and skilled) in the increased liberalisation scenario. Given the difference in respect of the size of the economy and the labour markets, the EU would experience a negligible increase in real wages in both the conservative and increased liberalisation scenarios. Both unskilled and skilled real wages would increase between 0.02% and 0.05% in both scenarios. Reallocation of jobs

The modelling suggests a reallocation of EU labour primarily towards the motor equipment sector (0.22 and 0.28% in options C1 and C2 respectively for both skilled and unskilled labour), which is in line with the increase in output of motor equipment seen above. On the other hand, the fruit and vegetables sector would experience the largest decline in labour in the conservative scenario (-0.19%) while the ruminant meat sector would experience the largest decline in labour in the increased liberalisation scenario (-1.21%), followed by the sugar sector (-0.23%). As above, this seems to reflect increases in exports from Australia and New Zealand in these sectors. The reallocation of labour in other sectors is marginal or negligible in the long term. The impact of the EU-Australia FTA on reallocating labour from one sector to another in Australia is mixed. In general agricultural and food-related sectors are allocated labour (the highest gains are for oil seed sector under option C1 and the ruminant meat sector under the options C2), while other sectors see mostly negative changes (e.g. the automotive and machinery sectors). The pattern for New Zealand is different. This is because most sectors are impacted negatively as labour is mostly reallocated to ruminant meat (only under option C2) and the fruit and vegetable sectors (under both options C1 and C2) Qualitative analysis All EU Member States ratified the core International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions. Australia and New Zealand have ratified most of these, except the minimum age core convention (ILO 138). In addition, New Zealand has not ratified the convention on freedom of association (ILO 87). Nevertheless Australia and New Zealand, in practice provide sufficient protections for workers’ rights. However, even some core labour standards remain subject to individual cases before the ILO. Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining Cases relating to freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are among the most common those reviewed by the ILO. Analysis of the external study reveals several cases across the EU and in New Zealand where freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are being infringed upon. This comes in a general context of declining trade union membership. Child labour The fact that Australia and New Zealand have not ratified ILO Convention 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment does not mean that child labour is necessarily more common than in the EU. Australia has the legislative and institutional frameworks in place to address the requirements of Convention 138, and previously conducted a compliance assessment on in 2012/2013; Australian law and practice was found to be compliant with the Convention. However a timeframe for ratification has not yet been set. Such labour is also regulated under domestic laws and other ILO conventions ratified by Australia and New Zealand in different sectors (Conventions 10, 58, 59). However, the ILO has recently highlighted inadequate monitoring of preventing children from doing hazardous work, especially in the construction, agriculture and hospitality industries. This issue has also been raised in a recent study by the New Zealand Work and Labour Market Institute at Auckland University of Technology. Work done by children under the age of 15 is generally concentrated in services (restaurants, supermarkets, petrol stations) or family work (cleaning, household assistance), which do not have a direct impact on international trade flows. In addition, work done by children exists in agriculture, and mostly consists of working on family farms. The prospect of increased trade and investment opportunities - as the result of the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs – are not expected to negatively impact on the current child labour practices. Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation Despite ratifying and applying ILO Convention 100 concerning equal remuneration and Convention 111 on discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, the external study highlights the existing gender-, race- and disability-based discrimination in Australia and New Zealand, in particular the enduring gender pay gap. The records of Australia and New Zealand in this regard are comparable with that of EU Member States. The EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs may positively impact the gender pay gap through direct or indirect trade effects. For example salaries in exporting sectors are on average higher than in other sectors. Conversely, the impact of an EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs on the gender pay gap is likely to be uneven across sectors, reflecting the sectoral effects described above. Cooperation activities The external study has highlighted cases where cooperative mechanisms could be most effective, such as the participation of unions, labour and human rights organisations in the monitoring of the FTAs’ labour provisions. The policy to include ambitious trade and sustainable development provisions, covering, among others, effective implementation of ILO fundamental principles and rights at work and cooperative provisions in EU FTAs, is expected to have an overall positive social impact. Stakeholders noted the importance of maintaining social standards. Non-profit sector stakeholders noted specific issues related to education and social security and stated their belief that these sectors should not be subject to trade liberalisation. 5.9. Impact on consumers Consumers may be affected in various ways by the potential enhancements in the EU's trade and investment relations with Australia and New Zealand. Impacts may be felt in areas such as expenditure, prices and choice.

For New Zealand, consumer prices would increase negligibly under option C1 (0.02%) and marginally under option C2 (0.14%). By contrast, for Australia consumer prices would go down under both options (-0.13% and