29. 6. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 159/7 
Opinion on the proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the common 
organization of the market in fishery products 
The text referred to the Committee has not yet been published in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities. 
A. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE OPINION 
On 3 December 1980 the Council referred the abovementioned proposal to the 
Economic and Social Committee in accordance with Article 43 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community. 
B. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The Economic and Social Committee prepared its opinion on the above matter at its 
186th plenary session held in Brussels on 25 and 26 March 1981. 
The full text of the opinion is as follows: 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, and in particular 
Article 43 thereof, 
Having regard to the request made by the Council of 
the European Communities on 3 December 1980 for 
an opinion on the proposal for a Regulation (EEC) 
of the Council on the common organization of the 
market in fishery products, 
Having regard to the decision taken by its Bureau on 
9 December 1980 to request the Section for 
Agriculture to prepare its work on this matter, 
Having regard to the opinion adopted by the Section 
for Agriculture at its 222nd meeting, held on 5 March 
1981, 
Having regard to the oral report made by the 
Rapporteur, Mr Wick, 
Having regard to its discussions at the 186th plenary 
session held on 25 and 26 March 1981 (meeting of 
25 March 1981), 
HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING OPINION 
unanimously: 
1. General comments 
1.1. Revision of the existing market regime for 
fishery products (Regulation (EEC) No 100/76 of 16 January 1976), which itself merely consolidates 
Regulation (EEC) No 2142/70, has become an 
urgent necessity. Fundamental changes have taken 
place in the fisheries sectors since the entry into force 
of the first arrangements governing the market in 
fishery products on 1 January 1971. In 1971 the 
Member States' fishing fleets still had relatively free 
access to the oceans. The Community enjoyed a high 
level of self-sufficiency. As a result of the 
introduction of 200 nautical mile economic and 
fishing zones in 1976 and 1977, especially in the 
North Atlantic, the rights of access of the Member 
States' fishing vessels to their traditional fishing 
grounds were severely restricted. On top this we have 
had the effects of overfishing of individual species in 
certain areas (e.g. herring in the North Sea) and 
changes in market structures in trading and the 
processing industry. These various factors have 
inevitably led to changes in the patterns of trade and 
in the make-up of catches. More fish have had to be 
imported. 
1.2. Because of the difficulties in working out the 
fisheries regime within the EEC (fishing quotas, 
access rights, structural policy) and the related 
problems in reaching agreement on access rights with 
non-member countries, the whole of the 
Community's fishing industry is facing considerable 
difficulties. Producers, that is to say the owners of 
fishing smacks and larger vessels, are unable to make 
plans for the economic use for their craft until the 
questions of fishing quotas and rights of access are 
solved and a satisfactory arrangement concerning 
non-member countries has been reached. Moreover, 
No C 159/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 29. 6. 81 
the enormous increase in the price of fuel is posing 
major economic problems for producers. In some 
Member States fish processors and traders are in 
difficulty as a result of the drop in fish supplies, since 
the shortfall in Community catches cannot be 
completely offset by imports from non-member 
countries. Workers in the fishing industry, in 
production and in processing alike, are confronted 
by great problems because many companies have 
closed down or have had to cut back. The situation of 
fishing vessel crews is made more difficult by the fact 
that their pay depends on the proceeds of the sale of 
catches, so that they have been directly affected 
financially by the decline in catches. 
1.3. The Committee welcomes the submission of 
this proposal for changes in the organization of the 
market in fishery products, but wonders whether the 
proposed corrective measures will be adequate to 
meet the present situation and future developments. 
The Committee would also like to point out that the 
proposed arrangements must be practicable. 
1.4. With this reservation, the Committee approves 
the Commission's proposal, subject to the comments 
set out below. 
2. Specific comments 
2.1. Title II (Producers' organizations) 
The Committee welcomes in principle the 
Commission proposal that the producers' 
organizations, which are the mainstay of the entire 
fisheries regime, should be strengthened. 
2.1.1. Article 5 (2) 
The question arises whether the producers' 
organizations, which are only involved in the first 
stage of the marketing process, are at all able to hold 
a dominant position in the Community market. 
2.1.2. Article 6 
The Committee feels that giving aid to the producers' 
organizations in the way suggested might lead, in 
individual cases, to problems with existing 
producers' organizations, if new organizations 
formed under Article 6 (2) were to qualify for 
significantly greater aid than existing bodies have 
received. Provision should be made for 
compensatory arrangements in the event of 
problems. 2.1.3. Article 7 
To solve the problem of outsiders, i.e. non-members 
of producers' organizations, the position of the 
members of such organizations must be strengthened. 
It would therefore be desirable to make the measures 
provided for in Article 7 mandatory. It is recognized, 
however, that this would conflict with constitutional 
law in some Member States. 
At all events, care must be taken to ensure that non-
members are under no circumstances in a better 
position than members of producers' organizations. 
Non-members should therefore be required to pay 
producers' organizations a higher share of 
administrative costs in respect of intervention 
measures under Article 7 than members, in order to 
offset the regular contributions which members have 
to pay to producers' organizations. 
Paragraph 1, lines 5—6 should read 'one or more of 
the products listed in Article 1 
This wording enables all the species of fish covered 
by the proposal for a Regulation to be included in the 
arrangements applying to outsiders. 
2.1.4. Article 8 
Here, too, the Committee feels that it is absolutely 
necessary to avoid a situation in which non-members 
of producers' organizations could be better off from 
the point of view of indemnities than members. It 
should be borne in mind here that members of 
producers' organizations have both rights and duties. 
Experience has shown that non-members are 
interested only in the rights arising from the common 
organization of the market. 
2.2. Title III (Prices) 
2.2.1. Article 9 
In the Committee's view, it would make for greater 
clarity if Article 9, which governs the application of 
withdrawal prices by producers' organizations, were 
to come after Articles 10 and 11. 
For maximum market transparency and optimum 
management of the market, it would be advisable to 
adopt the official withdrawal price below which the 
producers' organizations and their members may not 
sell. 
2.2.2. Article 10 
The Committee welcomes the fact that, in 
determining the guide price, which forms the basis 
29. 6. 81 Official Journal of the European Communities NoC 159/9 
for all other price fixing and compensatory payments 
under the fisheries market regime, new criteria such 
as the need to stabilize prices, safeguard producers' 
incomes and consider the interests of the consumer, 
are to be applied in addition to the existing yardstick 
(prices in the three previous fishing years). 
The Committee has reservations, however, about the 
fact that the prices recorded on representative 
wholesale markets or in representative ports during 
the preceding three fishing years are to continue to be 
used as a basis. This period of time seems too long 
and it is suggested that it be reduced to one to two 
years. 
2.2.3. Article 12 
The Committee doubts whether it is a good idea to 
calculate the withdrawal price by taking first of all an 
amount lying between 70 % and 90 % of the guide 
price and then multiplying this by quality conversion 
factors in order to obtain the withdrawal prices for 
the individual quality categories. It is felt that it 
would be sufficient merely to multiply the guide price 
by these conversion factors to obtain the appropriate 
withdrawal price. This would simplify the system and 
make it more practicable without leading to 
distortions of competition. 
The wording of Article 12, which is intended to form 
the basis for the establishment of the official 
withdrawal price, appears misleading. The 
Committee notes the Commissions's statement that 
the beginning of Article 12(1) should now read as 
follows: 'For the products listed in Annex I (A) a 
Community withdrawal price shall be fixed by ...'. 
Use of the regionalized withdrawal prices referred to 
in Article 12 (2), will require great care and must be 
seen in conjunction with application of the margin 
under Article 13(1) and the trend as regards currency 
divergencies, so as to avoid disruption of the 
market. 
2.2.4. Article 13 (1) 
The Committee welcomes the fact that, in contrast to 
the present rigid adherence to the official withdrawal 
price, it is now planned to allow the producers' 
organizations to make a reduction of up to 10 % on 
the official withdrawal price without losing their 
right to reimbursement. It feels, however, that, in the 
interests of better adjustment to the market, it would 
be preferable to permit the producers' organizations 
to deviate from the official withdrawal price by up to 
10% in both an upward and a downward 
direction. On the other hand, the Committee has reservations 
about the proposal that the producers' organizations, 
when engaging in intervention, should have to pay 
the producer 90 % of the withdrawal price, although 
(for example, under paragraph 3) a producers' 
organization is not to receive any compensation from 
the EAGGF if the quantities withdrawn exceed 20 % 
of the fish sold. 
2.2.5. Article 13 (3) 
The Committee supports the principle of graduated 
compensatory payments. It feels, however, that the 
implementation of these provisions will present 
considerable difficulties in some sectors of the 
industry, as the reference quantities can only be 
determined after the year has ended. The same 
applies to the level of compensation from the 
EAGGF, since this is dependent on the relationship 
between the quantities withdrawn from the market 
and the landings. Calculation of the level of financial 
compensation should be based on the quantities 
landed by the members of the producers' 
organizations. 
2.2.6. Article 13 (4) 
This concerns measures to obtain intervention fish 
for human consumption. As this fish is to be made 
available again for human consumption, these 
quantities withdrawn from the market and processed 
under Article 14 should not be taken into account 
when calculating the reimbursement under Article 
13. 
2.2.7. Article 13 (5) 
The Committee is afraid that the fishermen might 
lose interest in obtaining the best possible prices for 
their products on the market if— as proposed here — 
80% of the proceeds of the sale of intervention 
products as fish meal or animal feed is deducted from 
the financial compensation. Therefore, either the 
percentage should be considerably reduced, or lump 
sums should be applied as in the past. 
2.2.8. Article 14 
The Committee welcomes the fact that it will now be 
possible to use for direct human consumption those 
products which have had to be withdrawn from the 
market because of market disturbances. The 
Committee is assuming that the instruments provided 
for will serve to improve the market position of 
producers. Consideration should, however, be given 
to whether, in addition to the possibilities set out in 
paragraph 3 (freezing, filleting and freezing, salting, 
No C 159/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 29. 6. 81 
drying, manufacture of the products falling within 
heading No 16.04 of the Common Customs Tariff), 
more frozen fish could be supplied to the developing 
countries. 
Steps should also be taken to ensure that the products 
manufactured under Article 14 do not disrupt the 
normal market in these goods. 
2.3. Title IV (Trade with non-member countries) 
2.3.1. The Committee would make the fundamental 
point that access to the Community market could be 
made dependent on, inter alia, the granting of access 
for Community vessels to the economic or fishing 
zones of these non-member countries. 
The proposed reference price system seems very 
complicated and hardly practicable. 
2.3.2. Article 20 
The proposed free-at-frontier price is no protection 
for producers and could therefore mean that 
producers would be forced even more to make use of 
intervention. A minimum import price below which 
fish would not be allowed to enter the Community 
would, in the Committee's view, be more effective 
and, above all, significantly clearer. With a minimum 
import price system supervision would also be much 
simpler than under the proposed system. 
2.3.3. Article 21 (2) 
It is suggested that the relevent criteria set out in 
Article 10 should also be taken into consideration 
when fixing reference prices under paragraph 1. 
2.4. Title V (General provisions) 
2.4.1. Article 27 (2) 
According to the draft proposal, the measures 
provided for in Articles 8, 13, 14, 16 and 17 are only 
to be financed out of the EAGGF where the fishing 
quota for the particular group of stocks in the 
Member State in question has not been used up. This 
would hit the producers' organizations hard. They 
have, however, no means of influencing non-
members as regards the exhausting of the fishing 
Done at Brussels, 25 March 1981. quotas. Moreover, the proposed arrangement could 
result in the market regime not being applied to the 
desired extent. This rule must therefore be 
dropped. 
2.4.2. Article 39 
The Committee thinks that every effort should be 
made to bring the revised Regulation (including the 
implementing provisions) into force as soon as 
possible. 
2.5. Annexes 
2.5.1. Annex I 
The Committee points out that the different markets 
for individual species of fish within one tariff 
heading should be taken into account when fixing 
guide prices (e.g. A 12 hake or A 13 dogfish). 
Shrimps of the genus 'Crangon' ex subheading 03. 03 
A IV b) 1 of the Common Customs Tariff should be 
re-included in Annex I. In this way shrimps would 
once again be covered by the withdrawal price 
system as is customary under the existing market 
regime. 
2.5.2. Annex III 
Under B, calculations in respect of Thunnus 
albacares should be based on fish weighing more 
than 10 kg each. 
2.5.3. Annex IV 
Trout should also be re-included in Annex IV a) so 
that the entry reads: 'ex 03. 01 A I a) trout'. 
It is pointed out that the correct tariff heading 
number for carp is 'ex 03. 01 A III Carp' (applies to 
German text). 
In Annex IV b) the same problems might arise as 
referred to in the comments on Annex I. 
2.5.4. Annex V 
Polar cod should be included in Annex V. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Tomas ROSEINGRAVE