EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 18.10.2016 SWD(2016) 330 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 34rd Annual Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities (2015) {COM(2016) 661 final}



COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 34rd Annual Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities (2015) TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive summary 1.Overview of the legislation Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1.The international framework 1.1.2.The EU legislation Safeguards 1.2.1.The international framework 1.2.2.The EU legislation Anti-subsidy and unfair pricing instrument for airline services 2.Basic concepts 2.1.Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 2.1.1.What is dumping and what are countervailable subsidies - the material conditions for the imposition of duties? 2.1.2.Procedure 2.1.3.Review of measures

2.1.4.Judicial reviews 2.2.Safeguards 2.2.1.What are safeguard measures? 2.2.2.Procedure 3.General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures 3.1.Measures in place 3.2.Review investigations 4.Overview of activities in 2014 4.1.New investigations 4.1.1.Initiations 4.1.2.Provisional measures 4.1.3.Definitive measures 4.1.4.Details on individual cases 4.1.5.Investigations terminated without measures 4.1.6.Details on some individual cases 4.2.Review investigations 4.2.1.Expiry reviews 4.2.2.Interim reviews 4.2.3. “Other” reviews 4.2.4.New exporter reviews

4.2.5.Absorption investigations 4.2.6.Circumvention investigations 4.3.Safeguard investigations 5.Enforcement of anti-dumping/countervailing measures 5.1.Follow-up of measures 5.2.Monitoring of undertakings 6.Refunds 7.TDI Modernisation 8.Country-wide market economy status (MES) 8.1.China 8.2.Vietnam 8.3.Armenia 8.4.Kazakhstan 8.5.Mongolia 8.6.Belarus 9.Information and Communication activities / Bilateral contacts 9.1.Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 9.2.Bilateral contacts/information activities – EU economic operators including their key stakeholder associations and third countries 10.11 Judicial review: decisions given by the Court of Justice / Court of First Instance 11.1.Overview of the judicial reviews in 2015.

11.2.Cases pending 11.3.New cases 11.4.Judgments rendered by the General Court Ferro-silicon originating in Russia - T-466/12 - RFA International v Commission – Judgment of 17 March 2015. Bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China - T-412/13 and T-413/13 - Chin Haur v Council and City Cycle v Council – Judgments of 19 March 2015. Ferro-silicon originating, inter alia, in Russia – T-169/12 – CHEMK and KF v Council - Judgment of 28 April 2015. Fasteners from the People’s Republic of China - T-558/12 and T-559/12 - Changshu City Standard Parts Factory v Council Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co., Ltd v Council – Judgments of 29 April 2015. Certain fatty alcohols and their blends originating in India, Indonesia and Malaysia - T-26/12 - PT Musim Mas v Council – Judgment 25 June 2015. Bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China - T-425/13 - Giant China v Council – Judgment of 26 November 2015. Certain compressors originating in the People’s Republic of China - T-73/12, T-74/12, T-75/12 and T-76/12- Einhell, Mecafer, Nu Air Polska and Nu Air Compressors v Commission- Judgments of 18 November 2015. 11.5.Judgments rendered by the Court of Justice Certain aluminium foil originating in Armenia, Brazil and the People’s Republic of China – C-21/14 P - Rusal Armenal v Council - Judgment of 16 July 2015. Integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People’s Republic of China - C-511/13 - Philips Lightning Poland SA and Philips Lightning BV v Council – Judgment of 8 September 2015. Ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China – C-687/13 – Fliesen-Zentrum Deutschland - Judgment of 10 September 2015. Ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China – C-569/13 – Bricmate – Judgment of 10 September 2015. 11.Activities in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 12.1.Dispute settlement in the field of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards 12.1.1.Overview of the WTO dispute settlement procedure 12.2.Other WTO activities 13.Conclusion

11.1.LIST OF ANNEXES 11.1.1.ANNEX A 11.1.2.ANNEX B 11.1.3.ANNEX C 11.1.4.ANNEX D 11.1.5.ANNEX E 11.1.6.ANNEX F 11.1.7.ANNEX H 11.1.8.ANNEX I 11.1.9.ANNEX J 11.1.10.ANNEX K 11.1.11.ANNEX L 11.1.12.ANNEX M 11.1.13.ANNEX N 11.1.14.ANNEX O 11.1.15.ANNEX P 11.1.16.ANNEX Q 11.1.17.ANNEX R Executive summary

This report sets out the European Union's anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard activities during 2015. The report, as in previous years, gives an overview of the EU legislation in force with regard to the trade defence instruments, anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards. The report also summarises the developments in general policy. It gives an overview of all investigations together with the most essential information such as, for instance, the rate of individual duties imposed. Cases which merit some special attention are treated in more detail. Consequently, the report covers the essential facts of the year. The detailed annexes give a complete overview of all the activities carried out during 2015. These are broken down into various categories e.g. initiations, imposition of measures etc. and are designed to complement the narrative of this report by providing details of all cases including references to publications. The year 2015 saw a slight decrease in the number of new cases initiated when compared to the previous year, 14 as compared to 16 in 2014. By contrast, in 2015 there was a significant increase in the number of provisional measures imposed, 10 compared to two as well as the number of definitive measures imposed, 12 compared to three the previous year. The number of investigations terminated without measures was fairly stable (four in 2014 compared to three in 2015). These changes between 2014 and 2015 reflect the fact that following initiations, provisional and definitive measures are imposed normally nine and 15 months later respectively, which might be in the following year. In this context, the number of initiations of new cases in 2014 was much higher than in 2013 which has resulted in the increase in 2015 of the number of measures imposed. As regards review investigations initiated, there was an increase from 22 in 2014 to 34 in 2015. These included 13 expiry reviews, 11 interim reviews, one new exporter review, two 'other' reviews as well as seven anti-circumvention investigations. In the period, 13 expiry reviews were concluded with confirmation of the measures and six interim reviews were concluded with the measures being confirmed or amended. There was no safeguard investigation opened nor safeguard measures imposed during 2015. On the modernisation of the trade defence instruments progress on this file continued to be stalled during 2015 despite the steel crisis seemingly generating more interest in this issue. As in previous years, this report provides an overview of the Court cases relating to the trade policy instruments. In 2015, the Court of Justice (COJ) and the General Court (GC) rendered 27 judgments in total relating to the areas of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy. The European Parliament's INTA Committee continued to be informed about major developments in the EU's trade defence activities. The relevant activities in the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are also reported, including dispute settlement procedures initiated against the EU. The annexes to this report provide easy access to the activities in table form. This report is also available to the general public with the following link. Internet Website : http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence/ 1.Overview of the legislation Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1.The international framework On an international level, unfair trading practices such as dumping and the granting of subsidies were identified as a threat to open markets as early as 1947, when the first GATT agreement was signed. The agreement contained specific provisions allowing GATT members to take action against these practices if they caused material injury to the domestic industry of a GATT member. Even though, the beginning of the disciplines dates back quite some time, the instruments are still relevant because the trade distortions that underlie the application of these instruments are widespread. Since the beginning, considerable efforts have been made to harmonise the rules relating to trade instruments. During the last GATT round (the « Uruguay Round ») which led to the creation of the WTO and the detailed Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, much of the attention was focused on the procedural and material conditions to be fulfilled before measures can be adopted. The EU played an active role in the negotiation of these relevant criteria which are reflected in its own legislation. The EU's role is the more so important today as a number of new users take action without the necessary rigor and restraint, affecting negatively also EU operators. The role the EU plays as a prudent user has therefore also an exemplary function at WTO level. 1.1.2.The EU legislation

The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation was first enacted in 1968 and has since been modified several times. The current basic texts, which form the legal basis of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations in the EU, entered into force in March 1996 and October 1997 respectively. These are in line with the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements adopted during the GATT/WTO negotiations. The basic texts are: – Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version –Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version. These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic Regulation(s)". The EU legislation contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring a balanced application of the EU’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy rules on all interested parties. These provisions include the “EU interest test” and the “lesser duty rule”, which go beyond the WTO obligations. The EU interest test is a public interest clause and provides that measures can only be taken if they are not contrary to the overall interest of the EU. This requires an analysis of all the economic interests involved, including those of the EU industry, users, consumers and traders of the product concerned. The lesser duty rule requires the measures imposed by the EU to be lower than the dumping or subsidy margin, if such lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury suffered by the EU industry. Such a “no-injury” rate is determined by using the cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin; it reduces the anti-dumping measures for individual exporting companies in almost half of the cases. The EU is one of the few investigating authorities on a world-wide level that applies the lesser duty rule. Safeguards 1.2.1.The international framework The principle of liberalisation of imports was set under the GATT 1947 and strengthened under the 1994 WTO Agreements. As safeguard measures consist of the unilateral withdrawal or suspension of a tariff concession or of other trade liberalisation obligations formerly agreed, they have to be considered as an exception to this principle. Article XIX GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards do not only impose strict conditions for the application of this "escape clause”, but also put in place a multilateral control mechanism under the WTO Committee on Safeguards. Under WTO rules, safeguard action has to be viewed as a temporary defence measure that applies to all imports of the product covered by a measure, irrespective of origin. As regards non-WTO members, safeguard measures may be selective and apply to products originating in a specific country. WTO Accession Protocols may also provide for such selective safeguard mechanisms as was the case in the People's Republic of China's Protocol of Accession, although the provision has now expired. WTO safeguards should only be adopted after a comprehensive investigation which provides evidence of the existence of a) unforeseen developments leading to b) increased imports, c) the existence of a serious injury for EU producers and d) a causal link between the imports and the injury. 1.2.2.The EU legislation The above-mentioned principles are all reflected in the relevant EU regulations, except for the “unforeseen development requirement” (which is not explicitly in the EU legislation but has been confirmed as a self-standing condition by WTO jurisprudence). Additionally, the adoption of measures in the EU requires an analysis of all interests concerned, i.e. the impact of the measures on producers, users and consumers. In other words, safeguard action can only be taken when it is in the EU’s interest to do so. The current EU safeguard instruments are covered by the following regulations: - Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (codification), - Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (recast) - Regulation (EU) 2015/936 on common rules for imports of textile products from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific EU import rules (recast) The first two regulations are referred to as the "basic safeguard Regulation(s)". Anti-subsidy and unfair pricing instrument for airline services Regulation No 868/2004 [1] dealing with the effect of subsidisation and unfair pricing for air services from third countries, adopted by the EP and the Council in 2004, has never been used. In December 2012, the Council of the European Union concluded that the Regulation "has proven not to address adequately the specific characteristics of the aviation services sector" and supported the Commission's intention to analyse, in consultation with industry and Member States, possible options for a more effective instrument to safeguard open and fair competition and its intention, on that basis, to present a proposal for a revision or replacement of Regulation 868/2004. Following a public consultation, which took place in 2013, a study was carried out for DG MOVE in 2014, the purpose of which was to analyse policy options to be envisaged in the context of the review. The review of the regulation, involving different services of the Commission as well as external experts continued during 2015.

2.Basic concepts 2.1.Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 2.1.1.What is dumping and what are countervailable subsidies - the material conditions for the imposition of duties? 2.1.1.1.Dumping and subsidies Dumping is traditionally defined as price discrimination between national markets, or as selling below cost of production, plus profit. The EU’s anti-dumping legislation defines anti-dumping as selling a product in the EU at a price below its “normal value”. This “normal value” is usually the actual sales price on the domestic market of the exporting country. Therefore, a country is selling at dumped prices if the prices in its home market are higher than its export prices (i.e. price discrimination). Where sales in the domestic market are not representative, for instance because they have only been made in small quantities, the normal value may then be established on another basis, such as the sales prices of other producers on the domestic market or the cost of production, plus profit. In the latter case, a company is selling at dumped prices if its export prices are below the cost of production, plus profit. A certain segregation of the market, triggered by a variety of distortions, exists in the majority of the cases where dumping occurs on a more than an incidental basis. That segregation may be caused, amongst other reasons, by government intervention e.g. high customs duties. As a result, exporters are shielded, at least to a certain degree, from international competition on their domestic market. Subsidies can have similar effects to sales at dumped prices in that they allow exporters to operate from a distorted home base. Subsidies involve a direct support from a government or a government-directed private body which has the effect of conferring a benefit to producers or exporters (e.g. grants, tax and duty exemptions, preferential loans at below commercial rates, export promotion schemes, etc.), all aimed at allowing the exporters to sell at low prices in the EU. Only subsidies which are “specific”, i.e. targeted at individual companies or certain sectors of the economy, can be subject to trade defence measures. Both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures are thus only second-best solutions in the absence of internationally agreed and enforced rules that ensure full market integration (for instance like in the EU internal market). 2.1.1.2.Material injury and causation For measures to be taken against these unfair trading practices, it is not sufficient that companies are exporting their products to the EU at dumped or subsidised prices. Measures can only be taken if these exports cause material injury to EU producers. Typical indicators of injury are that the dumped and/or subsidised import volumes increase over a certain period and import prices undercut the sales prices of the EU industry. As a consequence, the latter is forced to decrease production volumes and sales prices thus losing market shares, making losses or having to make employees redundant. In extreme cases, exporters may try to eliminate viable EU producers by using a predatory, below cost, pricing strategy. In any event, the injury analysis requires that all relevant factors be taken into account before deciding whether the EU industry is in fact suffering “material injury”. A further condition for the imposition of measures is the need for “a causal link”: the injury must be caused by the dumping or the subsidy. This condition is often fulfilled when the injury to the EU industry coincides with the increase in dumped and subsidised imports. It is important to note that the dumped or subsidised imports do not have to be the only cause of the injury. 2.1.1.3.EU interest Finally, it has to be established whether there are compelling reasons according to which measures would be contrary to the overall interest of the EU. In this respect, the interests of all relevant economic operators which might be affected by the outcome of the investigation must be taken into account. These interests typically include those of the EU industry, industrial users, consumers and traders of the product concerned and the analysis assesses the positive impact measures will have on some operators as opposed to the negative impact on others. Measures should not be imposed only if it can be clearly concluded that their negative impact would be disproportionate. 2.1.2.Procedure Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the basic Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective proceeding by granting significant procedural rights to interested parties. In addition, the results of an investigation are published in the Official Journal, and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication. Finally, it is ensured that each case is decided on its merits and the Commission does not hesitate to terminate a case if the conditions to impose measures are not met. Whereas each investigation is different depending on the products and countries involved, all cases follow the same procedural rules. However, certain preferential rules apply to any candidate countries. The rules relating to a new case are summarised below. Initiation A case normally starts with a sufficiently substantiated complaint from the EU industry manufacturing the same or a similar product to the one referred to in the complaint. Then, the Commission assesses whether the complaint contains sufficient evidence to allow for the initiation of the case. A case is opened by a notice of initiation published in the Official Journal. In this notice, all interested parties, including users, exporting country authorities in anti-subsidy investigations in particular and, where appropriate, consumer organisations are invited to participate and co-operate in the proceedings. Detailed questionnaires are sent to producers in the exporting countries, in anti-subsidy investigations also to the exporting country authorities, and in the EU to the producers, traders (in particular importers) and other interested parties, such as users. These questionnaires cover all different conditions to be fulfilled, i.e. dumping/subsidy, injury, causation and EU interest. The parties are also informed that they can request a hearing and ask for access to the non-confidential files which will help them defend their case.

The investigation up to the provisional measures Following receipt of the replies to the questionnaire, investigations are carried out by Commission officials at the premises of the co-operating parties. The main purpose of these visits is to verify whether the information given in the questionnaires is reliable. The verified information is subsequently used to calculate or determine the dumping margin and the injury factors, in particular the price undercutting margin and injury elimination level, as well as for the EU interest analysis. The respective calculations and analysis often involve the processing of thousands of transactions, the complex examination of production costs and the assessment of the economic situation of numerous economic operators. The results of the calculations and other findings are summarised in a draft implementing act, on the basis of which it is decided whether to impose provisional measures, whether to continue the investigation without proposing duties or whether to terminate the proceedings. In either eventuality the decision is the Commission's responsibility. The investigation up to the definitive stage Following the publication in the Official Journal of a Commission regulation imposing provisional duties, interested parties, which so request, receive a full disclosure which allows them to review the Commission’s findings and to submit comments. Comments can also be made at a hearing. Any submissions and comments in reaction to provisional disclosure, are taken into account when a second, definitive, draft implementing act is prepared by the Commission. After final disclosure, assessment of comments of interested parties and after receiving the opinion of the Member States via the Trade Defence Instruments Committee, the Commission decides whether or not to adopt definitive measures. At definitive stage, Member States can block the adoption of a draft implementing act by qualified majority. The Commission may also accept undertakings offered by exporters, which undertake to respect minimum prices. In the latter case, no duties are generally imposed on the companies from which undertakings are accepted. The Commission regulation imposing definitive duties/accepting undertakings, and deciding on the collection of the provisional duties, is published in the Official Journal. As set out above, throughout the process and at various specific steps, the procedure - consisting e.g. of requests for information, hearings, access to the file and disclosure ensures that the rights of defence of interested parties are fully respected in this quasi-judicial process. If one or more of the conditions for imposing measures are not met, the Commission will decide to terminate a case without the imposition of measures. The same procedure (disclosure, comments, hearing, draft implementing act) as described above applies. The termination of the case is made by a Commission Decision after consultation of the Member States. Timing The procedure described above is subject to strict statutory time limits. A decision to impose provisional duties must be taken within nine months of the initiation and the total duration of an investigation is limited to fifteen months in anti-dumping cases and to thirteen months in anti-subsidy cases. This leads to significant time constraints, taking into account, inter alia, internal consultations and the necessity to publish regulations and decisions in all EU languages at the same time. Anti-dumping or countervailing measures will normally remain in force for five years, and may consist of duties or undertakings concluded with exporters. Measures are taken on a countrywide basis, but individual treatment, i.e. the application of a company-specific duty, can be granted to exporters which have co-operated throughout the investigation. During the five-year period, interested parties may, under certain conditions, request a review of measures or the refund of anti-dumping duties paid. Measures may also be suspended for a certain period, subject to given criteria. 2.1.3.Review of measures The basic Regulations provide for administrative reviews and distinguish between interim reviews, newcomer reviews and expiry reviews. The expiry review is initiated at the end of the five year life-time of the measures. Initiation of such a review requires a request by the EU industry evidencing that the expiry of the measures would lead to the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Since the amendment to the basic Regulations, expiry reviews initiated after 20 March 2004 are subject to strict deadlines, i.e. they shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review, but in all cases be concluded within 15 months. During the five year life-time of measures, the Commission may perform an interim review. Under the latter procedure, the Commission will consider whether the circumstances with regard to subsidy/dumping and injury have changed significantly or whether existing measures are achieving the intended results in removing the injury. Since 20 March 2006, the deadline for concluding an interim review is set at 12 months, but no later than 15 months. Finally, the basic Regulations provide that a review shall be carried out to determine individual margins for new exporters in the exporting country concerned. Since 20 March 2006, the deadline for conclusion of newcomer reviews is nine months. During these reviews, the main procedural rules outlined in chapter 2.1.2 are also applicable. However, in reviews there is no provisional stage. 2.1.4.Judicial reviews

The procedural rights of the parties, including hearings and access to non-confidential files, are respected in the course of the proceeding, and a system of judicial review is in place to ensure their correct implementation. The competence to review anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases lies with the General Court and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Furthermore, WTO members may have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 2.2.Safeguards 2.2.1.What are safeguard measures? Safeguard measures allow temporary protection against the adverse effects of import surges. Under the EU legislation implementing the WTO Safeguards Agreement, they can be applied under the following conditions: if, as a result of unforeseen developments, a product is being imported into the EU in such increased quantities and/or on such terms and conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to EU producers of like or directly competitive products. Safeguard measures may only be imposed to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. 2.2.2.Procedure Investigations are carried out in accordance with the procedural rules laid down in the basic safeguard Regulations. These rules guarantee a transparent, fair and objective proceeding. In addition, the results of safeguard investigations are published in the Official Journal, and the EU is obliged to justify its decisions in this publication. Initiation The Commission is informed by one or more Member States should trends in imports of a certain product appear to call for safeguard measures. This information must contain evidence available, of the following criteria: a) the volume of imports, b) the price of imports, c) trends in certain economic factors of the Union industry such as production, capacity utilisation, stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, employment, etc. Where there is a threat of serious injury, the Commission must also examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury. This information is passed on by the Commission to all other Member States. If there is sufficient evidence to justify an investigation, the Commission publishes a notice of initiation in the Official Journal within one month of receipt of the information and commences the investigation, acting in co-operation with the Member States. Provisional measures Provisional measures may be imposed at any stage of the investigation. They shall be applied in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which would be difficult to repair, making immediate action necessary, and where a preliminary determination provides clear evidence that increased imports have caused, or are threatening to cause, serious injury. The duration of the provisional measures can, however, not exceed 200 days (i.e. slightly more than six months). Definitive measures If, at the end of the investigation, the Commission considers that definitive safeguard measures are necessary, it will take the necessary decisions no later than nine months from the initiation of the investigation, at which stage the results of the investigation are published in the Official Journal. In exceptional circumstances, this time limit may be extended by a further maximum period of two months. Safeguard measures shall be applied only to the extent to prevent or remedy serious injury, thereby maintaining as far as possible traditional trade flows. As to the form of the measures, the EU will choose the measures most suitable in order to achieve these objectives. These measures could consist of quantitative quotas, tariff quotas, duties, etc. Duration and review of the measures The duration of safeguard measures must be limited to the period of time necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustments on the part of the EU producers, but should not exceed four years, including the duration of the provisional measures, if any. Under certain circumstances, extensions may be necessary but the total period of application of safeguard measures should not exceed eight years. If the duration of the measures exceeds one year, the measures must be progressively liberalised at regular intervals during the period of application. If the duration of the measures exceeds three years, the Commission will examine, mid way through their duration, the appropriateness of further liberalisation and necessity for their continued application. This will be done either on the Commission's own initiative or at the request of a Member State. Where the Commission considers that the application of the measure is still necessary, it shall inform the Member States accordingly. Where the Commission considers that any surveillance or safeguard measure should be revoked or amended, it shall do so after having received the approval of the Member States. 3.General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures The number of new investigations initiated in 2015 decreased compared to the previous year, 14 compared to 16. The number of definitive measures imposed increased when compared to 2014 (11 as compared to three) and the number of provisional measures imposed in 2015 also increased from two in 2014 to 10. These changes between 2014 and 2015 reflect the fact that from the date of initiation, provisional measures are imposed normally nine months after initiation with definitive measures imposed six (anti-dumping) or four (anti-subsidy) months after that, which in either case might be in the following year. Below are details on new investigations and review investigations.

3.1.Measures in place At the end of 2015, the EU had 87 anti-dumping measures (which were extended in 30 cases) and 11 countervailing measures in force (which was extended in one case). The anti-dumping measures covered 62 products and 27 countries (see Annex O); the countervailing measures covered 11 products and five countries (see Annex P). The large majority of measures was in the form of duties. However, in a number of cases, undertakings were accepted. Of the 87 anti-dumping measures and 30 extensions in force at the end of 2015 the main countries affected were China (53), Indonesia (seven) Malaysia and Russia (six each), India and Taiwan (five each), Korea and Thailand (four each), Ukraine and Korea (three each) and USA and Philippines, Sri Lanka and USA (two each). Of the 11 anti-subsidy measures and one extension in place the majority concern imports from China (five in total), with imports from India subject to four measures and Canada, Turkey and USA all subject to one measure each. Regarding the anti-dumping measures one has to look at the trade volume of the products concerned, which varies considerably depending on the sector concerned. The largest trade volumes are often generated by high technology, such as electronics, which are high-value products. It should be noted that in 2015, only ___% of total imports into the EU was affected by anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures. Table 1 below provides statistical information on the new investigations for the years 2011 – 2015. TABLE 1 Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy new investigations during the period 1 January 2011 - 31 December 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Investigations in progress at the beginning of the period 24 21 28 11 20 Investigations initiated during the period 21 19 9 16 14 Investigations in progress during the period 45 40 37 27 34 Investigations concluded : - imposition of definitive duty or acceptance of undertakings - terminations 13 11 3 9 15 11 3 4 11 3 Total investigations concluded during the period 24 12 26 7 14 Investigations in progress at the end of period 21 28 11 20 20 Provisional measures imposed during the period 10 9 6 2 10 3.2.Review investigations Anti-dumping measures, including price undertakings, may be subject, under the basic anti-dumping Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 11(2)), interim reviews (Article 11(3)), newcomer investigations (Article 11(4)), absorption investigations (Article 12) and circumvention investigations (Article 13). Also anti-subsidy measures may be subject, under the basic anti-subsidy Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 18), interim reviews (Article 19), absorption investigations (Article 19(3)), accelerated reviews (Article 20) and circumvention investigations (Article 23). These reviews continue to represent a major part of the work of the Commission's TDI services. In the period from 2011 to 2015, a total of 152 review investigations were initiated. These review investigations represented 66% of all investigations initiated in that period. In 2015, 33 reviews were initiated. These comprised 13 expiry reviews, 11 interim reviews, one newcomer reviews, one 'other' review, and seven anti-circumvention investigations. An overview of the review investigations in 2015 can be found in Annexes F to K. Table 2 provides statistical information for the years 2011 – 2015. TABLE 2 Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations during the period 1 January 2011 - 31 December 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Reviews in progress at the beginning of the period 34 21 26 23 18 Reviews initiated during the period 24 37 36 22 33 Reviews in progress during the period 58 58 62 45 51 Total reviews concluded during the period 37 32 39 27 36 Reviews in progress at the end of the period 21 26 23 18 15

4.Overview of activities in 2015 4.1.New investigations 4.1.1.Initiations In 2015, 12 new anti-dumping investigations and two new anti-subsidy investigations were initiated. There was no safeguard investigation initiated. The anti-dumping investigations involved seven different products from eight different countries. The anti-subsidy investigations involve two products from two different countries. Details of these investigations are given in Annex A. The country most affected by the anti-dumping investigations is China with six investigations. The anti-subsidy nvestigations concerned Turkey and India. The main sector concerned by these new cases is Iron and steel. In the five-year period from 2011 to 2015, 79 investigations were initiated on imports from 20 countries. The sectors concerned by the investigations are iron and steel – 33 investigations, chemical and allied – 20 investigations, other - 15 investigations, other metals – four investigations, textiles and allied - three investigations and electronics and other mechanical engineering two investigations each. A breakdown of the product sectors is given in Annex B(A). The breakdown of the countries concerned by initiations during the period from 2011 to 2015 include China - 33 investigations, India - 10, Turkey - five, Indonesia and Russia - four each, Thailand four, USA and Taiwan - three each, Argentina, Oman, Saudi Arabia - two each and Belarus, Brazil, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, F.Y.R.O.M., Mexico, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam - one each. A table showing all the investigations initiated over the last five years broken down by country of export is at Annex B(B). The list of cases initiated in 2015 can be found below, together with the names of the complainants. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex A. Product – Type of investigation (AD or AS) Country of origin Complainant High fatigue performance steel concrete reinforcement bars - AD P.R. China Eurofer Cold-rolled flat steel products - AD P.R. China

Russia Eurofer Aspartame - AD P.R. China Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS Sodium cyclamate - AD P.R. China Productos Aditivos SA Ceramic foam filters -AD P.R. China Vesuvius GmbH Stainless steel tube and pipe butt-welding fittings -AD P.R. China

Taiwan Defence Committee of the Stainless Steel Butt-welding Fittings Industry of the European Union Manganese oxides - AD Brazil Georgia India Mexico Eurachem Comilog SPRL Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron - AS India Saint-Gobain PAM

Saint-Gobain PAM Deutschland GmbH

Saint-Gobain PAM España SA European sea bass and gilthead sea bream - AS Turkey APROMAR (Asociación Empresarial de Productores de Cultivos Marinos) 4.1.2.Provisional measures In 2015, provisional duties were imposed in 10 anti-dumping investigation and no provisisonal measures imposed in anti-subsidy investigations. The list of cases where provisional measures were imposed during 2015 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex C. Product Originating from Type and level of measure Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products P.R. China



Taiwan AD: Individual duties ranging from 24.3% - 25.2% .Residual duty 25.2% AD: Individual duties ranging from 10.9% - 12%. Residual duty 12% Grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel P.R. China

Japan

Korea, Rep. of

Russia

USA AD: Residual duty 28.7% AD: Individual duties ranging from 34.2% - 35.9% Residual duty 35.9% AD: Residual duty 22.8% AD: Residual duty 21.6% AD: Residual duty 22% Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K) P.R. China AD: Residual duty ranging from €1.23 - €3.19 per kg Residual duty €3.09per kg Aluminium foil in big rolls Russia AD: 12.2% Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron India AD:15.3% - 31.2% 4.1.3.Definitive measures During 2015, definitive duties were imposed in 10 anti-dumping investigations and in one anti-subsidy investigations. The list of cases where definitive measures were imposed during 2015 can be found below, together with the measure(s) imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex D. Product Originating from Type and level of measure Monosodium glutamate Indonesia Individual AD Duties ranging 7,2% - 13,3% Residual duty 28,4% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products P.R. China

Taiwan PRC : Individual AD Duties ranging 24,4% - 24,6%; Taiwan: Individual duty 0%; Residual duty 17,1% Grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel P.R. China

Japan

Korea (Rep. of)

Russia

USA PRC: Individual AD Duties ranging 21,5% – 36,6% Residual duty 36,6%

Japan: Individual AD Duties ranging 35,9% – 39% Residual duty 39% Korea (Rep. of): Individual and residual AD Duties 22,5% Russia: Individual and residual AD Duties 21,6%

USA: Individual and residual AD Duties 22% Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K) P.R. China Individual AD Duties ranging €2,64 - €4,47 per kg Residual duty €4,58 per kg Aluminium foil in big rolls Russia Residual AD duty 12,2% Rainbow trout Turkey Individual CVD Duty ranging 6,7% - 9,5%; Residual duty 9,5% 4.1.4.Details on individual cases

Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products (PRC and Taiwan) In June 2014, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products (SSCR) originating in the PRC and Taiwan, following a complaint lodged by Eurofer, on behalf of producers representing more than 50% of total Union production of SSCR. In August 2014, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of SSCR originating in the PRC. In December 2014, the Commission, following a request by the complainant, made imports of SSCR originating in the PRC and Taiwan subject to registration. Product concerned and investigation period (IP) The product concerned is flat-rolled products of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-rolled (cold-reduced) originating in the PRC and Taiwan, currently falling within CN codes 7219 31 00, 7219 32 10, 7219 32 90, 7219 33 10, 7219 33 90, 7219 34 10, 7219 34 90, 7219 35 10, 7219 35 90, 7220 20 21, 7220 20 29, 7220 20 41, 7220 20 49, 7220 20 81 and 7220 20 89. The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013 and for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the investigation period. Sampling The Commission selected a sample of four Union producers. Regarding importers, the Commission selected a sample of four importers based on the level of volume of imports into the Union. Lastly, the Commission selected three Taiwanese exporting producers, and four Chinese exporting producers, as a representative sample of the exporting producers in Taiwan and in the PRC respectively. One exporting producer in Taiwan requested and was granted an individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. Dumping Regarding the PRC, none of the exporting producers claimed Market Economy Treatment (MET) pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. Thus, normal value for the PRC was determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, namely the USA, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis. Adjustments were made where appropriate to ensure a fair comparison in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. The resulting dumping margins ranged between 42,2% and 50,2%. Regarding Taiwan, the normal value was calculated pursuant articles 2(1) to 2(6) of the basic Regulation. The export price was established on the basis of prices actually paid or payable, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis. The resulting dumping margins ranged between 0% and 6,8%. Injury and causation Most of the injury indicators of the Union industry showed a negative trend during the period considered. Production volume decreased (by 5%), leading to a decrease in the capacity utilisation by 8%. Stable sales volumes in a growing market led to a decrease of market share of 5%. Employment decreased by 11% while labour cost increased by 8%. Investments decreased by 17% while return on investments remained negative throughout the period considered and showed a worsening trend. On the other hand, production capacity and productivity, showed a slightly positive trend. In any event, this increase in production capacity is in line with the increase of consumption during the period considered. The rising productivity was a consequence of the reduction of number of employees. The Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The Commission also analysed whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The low-priced dumped imports from the countries concerned increased both in absolute and relative terms compared to the consumption in the Union, at the time when the most of the injury factors of the Union industry (production, capacity utilisation, market share, employment, sales prices, labour cost, profitability, investments, return on investments) deteriorated. The dumped imports from the countries concerned undercut the Union industry prices by 9,6 % — 11,3 % during the investigation period. In light of this, the Commission concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned and that other factors considered individually did not break the causal link. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping. The investigation analysed the interest of the Union industry, importers, distributors, users and assessed potential competition policy issues. The majority of the Union industry supported the imposition of measures while the largest Union producer (Outokumpu) remained silent. Importers and distributors (including steel service centres) were very active in this investigation expressing opposition to the imposition of measures arguing that their possible sources of supply would be limited by the imposition of measures. However, the investigation found that all importers and distributors buy from multiple sources including the Union industry, the countries concerned and other third and would continue to have a choice of sources of supply. A number of exporting producers and distributors expressed concerns regarding possible negative effects of measures on users. However, users themselves did not share these concerns and the degree of participation of users in this case remained very low. The German metalworking trade union (IG Metall) came forward in support of the measures expressing concerns about the negative impact of the dumped imports on the state of the Union industry. This trade union also represents workers in important user industries such as automotive and white goods. As a result the investigation concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC and Taiwan. Consequently, the Commission imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 24,4% to 25,3% for imports of SSCR originating in the PRC, and ranging from 0% to 6,8% for imports of SSCR originating in Taiwan. Grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (GOES) from Japan, the PRC, Rep. of Korea, Russia and the USA In August 2014, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation regarding imports into the Union of grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel originating in the PRC, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the USA. The proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged by Eurofer on behalf of producers representing the whole Union production of GOES. Product concerned and investigation period (IP) The product concerned is grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel, of a thickness of more than 0,16 mm falling within CN codes ex 7225 11 00 and ex 7226 11 00 (‘the product concerned’). The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 while the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2011 to the end of the investigation period. Sampling

No sampling was necessary for the Union producers, since the known (six) Union producers represented 100 % of the total Union production of the like product. Due to the low number of exporting producers and importers that came forward, sampling was not necessary in this investigation. Dumping For Japan, Korea, Russia and the USA, the Commission calculated the normal value pursuant to articles 2(1) to 2(6) of the basic regulation, as appropriate. As regards export price, the Commission used, where appropriate, the export prices actually paid or payable, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. Where this was not possible, the Commission established that this price was unreliable under the circumstances of article 2(9) of the basic Regulation and constructed the export price. Regarding the PRC, no MET claims were received from any Chinese exporting producer. Consequently, the normal value for Chinese imports was based on article the price or constructed value in an analogue country, namely Korea, in accordance with the basic regulation. The export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the exporting producers of the countries concerned on an ex-works basis. Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission made the necessary adjustments in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. The resulting dumping margins established in the investigation were: 22,5% for Korea, between 21,5% and 54,9% for the PRC, between 47,1% and 52,2% for Japan, 29% for Russia and 60,1% for the USA. Injury and causation The economic situation of the Union Industry deteriorated significantly during the period considered: Losses went from – 0,8% in 2011 to – 22,3% during the IP. Compared to 2010, the fall in profits was even more dramatic since the Union industry was still able to achieve profits amounting to 14% during the year 2010. Moreover, sales volumes on the Union market decreased by 11,4%, sales unit prices dropped by 26,5%, production decreased by 17,2%, and the production capacity utilisation went down by 15%. Furthermore, employment was reduced by 9%. As a consequence, losses reached a level which is no longer sustainable. In the particular circumstances of this case, where exporting producers were, in general, not undercutting the Union industry, the crucial factor for the determination of injury is that the Union producers were forced to sell below costs because a significant part of the exporting producers not only sold at dumped prices but even below costs, thus exerting significant pressure on sales prices of the Union industry. Due to the losses incurred during the period considered as a result of the factors described above, the other indicators such as cash flow, return on investment followed the same downward trend as the profitability indicator. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury, showed by all main injury indicators, within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then determined that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In addition, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. These factors were: (i) the economic crisis; (ii) alleged lack of competitiveness of Union industry; (iii) imports from third countries; (iv) export performance of Union industry; (v) alleged overcapacity of EU steel industry; (vi) difference in grade of the Russian GOES. The Commission concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not break the causal link. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping. To this end, the Commission assessed the interest of: the Union industry, unrelated importers, users, as well as other elements such as the impact on the "EcoDesign Directive" (applicable to energy related products). The Commission concluded that definitive measures would allow the Union producers to return to sustainable profit levels. If no measures were imposed, it was uncertain whether the Union industry would be able to make the necessary investments to develop further its high-permeability types of the like product which are both demanded by the users and genuinely needed to make transformers EcoDesign-compliant. Thus, on balance, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of GOES originating in the countries concerned. Nevertheless, in view of certain post-IP developments and to limit any possible serious impact on the users that are heavily dependent on the supply of the product concerned, in particular of the top end high permeability types, the Commission considered it in line with the Union interest to change the form of the measures and not to impose ad valorem duties but instead variable duties. Consequently, the Commission imposed a Minimum Import Price (MIP), on imports of GOES from the countries concerned ranging from EUR 1,536 to EUR 2,043 depending on the product range. In addition, the Commission considered that, in the specific circumstances of the case, collection of the provisional duties, that took a different form from the definitive duties, would not be in line with the Union interest, given that prices during this period were generally above those of the established MIPs. Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K) PRC In September 2014, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the Union of acesulfame potassium originating in the PRC as well as acesulfame potassium originating in the PRC contained in certain preparations and/or mixtures. The investigation was initiated following a complaint lodged by Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH, the sole producer of acesulfame potassium (or ‘Ace-K’) in the Union. Product concerned and IP The product concerned is acesulfame potassium (potassium salt of 6-methyl-1,2,3-oxathiazin-4(3H)-one 2,2-dioxide; CAS RN 55589-62-3) falling within CN codes ex 2106 90 92, ex 2106 90 98, ex 2934 99 90 (TARIC code 2934 99 90 21), ex 3824 90 92, ex 3824 90 93 and ex 3824 90 96. The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 while the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2011 to the end of the investigation period. Dumping None of the three cooperating exporting producers submitted an MET claim and therefore their domestic sales prices or cost of production could not be used for establishing normal value. During the investigation period, Ace-K was produced only in the PRC and the Union. The normal value could not therefore be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries, including the Union. Consequently, pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, normal value had to be determined on ‘any other reasonable basis’. The sales by the Union producer of those product types matching with those sold in the Union market by the Chinese cooperating producers during the investigation period were identified. The sales of the Union producer to independent customers were found representative and were profitable. Their average Union sales price served as the normal value. The cooperating exporting producers exported to the Union directly to independent customers. Therefore, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then compared the normal value and the export price of the cooperating exporting producers on an ex-works basis. Where justified in order to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. In particular, the Commission made an adjustment for differences in level of trade as it was established that the sole Union producer sold mainly to users while the Chinese producers sold mainly to traders. Secondly, based on several submissions an adjustment was made for the quality difference and the market perception of that difference between the Chinese Ace-K and the Union producer's Ace-K. In addition, the normal value was adjusted for certain exceptional research and development (R & D) as well as marketing expenses incurred by the Union producer during the investigation period. The dumping margins found ranged from 64% to 135.6%. Injury and causation Significant negative trends were observed in the following economic indicators: production, capacity utilisation, market share, employment, sales volume and sales prices on the Union market. Stocks (as percentage of production) increased although they decreased in absolute terms. The impact of consistently decreasing sales prices in combination with overall decreasing sales volumes have been substantial, leading to a considerable drop in market share, profitability, return on investment and cash flow. The fact that the Union market is dominated by large players in the food and beverage sector and that such business is conducted through annual contracts means that in this sector the Union industry is particularly sensitive to falls in sales volumes and prices even if these falls concern a small number of customers. Productivity on the other hand improved. However, the development was a consequence of a reduction in the number of employees due to the decrease in demand and, consequently, production, which made some of the workers redundant. Therefore, under these circumstances the increase in productivity cannot be considered a positive element. Union consumption has also increased. However the Union industry was not able to benefit from it due to the fall in both sales volume and sales prices mentioned above. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. Regarding causation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: (a) the performance of the Union industry on export markets, (b) the loss of patent protection and (c) the business strategy of the Union industry. The investigation confirmed that the dumped imports from the PRC caused material injury to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation and that other factors did not break the causal link between the dumped imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

Union interest and definitive measures The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping. The analysis of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, unrelated importers and users. The imposition of anti-dumping measures can be expected to enable the Union industry to stay in the market and following that to improve its situation. The investigation established that there was a high risk that should measures not be imposed, the Union industry would have to consider withdrawing from the Ace-K business in the medium term, resulting in inevitable job losses. This would create a monopoly for the Chinese exporting producers, whose number is also likely to decrease. While having a possible minor impact on importers, this would be detrimental to the end users of Ace-K, some of which have underlined the importance of maintaining a source of supply in the Union. On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of Ace-K originating in the PRC. Accordingly, the Commission imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 49.7% to 126% on imports of Ace-K originating in the PRC. Rainbow Trout (Turkey) In February 2014 the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation concerning the imports into the Union of certain rainbow trout originating in Turkey. The investigation was initiated following a complaint by the Danish Aquaculture Association, on behalf of producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of rainbow trout. The Commission notified the Government of Turkey (GOT) prior to initiation and invited the GOT for consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as regards the contents of the complaint and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. Consultations between the Commission and the GOT were subsequently held. During the consultations, no mutually agreed solution could be found. In parallel to the anti-subsidy investigation, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation. Product concerned and IP The product concerned is rainbow trout falling within the CN codes ex 0301 91 90, ex 0302 11 80, ex 0303 14 90, ex 0304 42 90, ex 0304 82 90 and ex 0305 43 00. The investigation of subsidy and injury covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013 while the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2010 to the end of the investigation period. Sampling Regarding Union industry, the sample consisted of nine Union producers, accounting for more than 12% of the total Union production. Due to the highly-fragmented nature of the industry (with more than 700 producers), the sample was considered representative of the Union industry. As regards exporting producers, the Commission selected a sample of four groups of exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available, considering also the geographical spread. The sampled group of companies account for almost 64% of the declared export sales to the Union. All known exporting producers concerned, and the Turkish authorities were consulted on the selection of the sample. The Commission rejected eleven requests for individual examination as being unduly burdensome and posing a risk to the completion of the investigation within the deadlines. Subsidy The Commission investigated the following schemes that allegedly involved the granting of subsidies to the aquaculture industry in Turkey: (i) State support to investments in the aquaculture sector (e.g. customs duty exemptions, VAT exemption, Tax reduction); (ii) Direct subsidies granted to producers of trout; (iii) Subsidised loans and insurance for trout producers; (iv) Subsidies for consultancy; (v) Subsidies for fishing vessels; (vi) Other subsidies and other subsidy programmes. The Commission calculated the amounts of countervailable subsidies in accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation for the investigated companies scheme by scheme, and added these figures together to calculate a total subsidy amount for each group for the investigation period. As a result of the investigation, the Commission established a subsidy margin ranging from 6.7% to 9.5%. To calculate the overall subsidy margins, the Commission first calculated the percentage subsidisation, being the subsidy amount over total company turnover. This percentage was then used to calculate the subsidy allocated to exports of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On the basis of the subsidy amount per whole fish equivalent of product concerned exported to the Union during the investigation period, the subsidy margins were expressed as a percentage of the CIF value of the same exports. Injury and causation Most injury indicators showed negative trends. The Union industry suffered a decline in profitability, cash flow and return on investments. At the same time, the production volume, production capacity, employment and market shares were reduced under the pressure of the subsidised imports. Over the period considered, imports of the product concerned gained market share and they were found to undercut the Union industry prices on the Union market. As regards the unit sales prices the increase was due to increased production cost. However, this increase did not compensate the full increase of unit cost, thus turning profitability to negative in 2012. The Union industry's increase in average labour cost per employee was below the general increase in labour cost and the inflation rate in the Union. The Union industry had to reduce its number of employees which resulted in an increase in productivity per employee. The increase of investments was mainly linked to the acquisition of production facilities from discontinued companies and consolidation and not to replacement of existing assets or the acquisition of new equipment. Certain injury indicators, such as unit sales price, average labour cost per employee, productivity and investments, developed positively. The Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation. The Commission then examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the subsidised imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the subsidised imports. These factors are: (a) Imports of other third countries (b) Export performance of the Union industry (c) Development of consumption (d) Competition with other fish species (e) Administrative and regulatory burdens, geographical limitations (f) Price pressure exerted by large retailers (g) Over-investments, financial expenses, exchange rate fluctuations and extra-ordinary losses linked to litigations. The Commission concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the subsidised imports from the country concerned and that no other factors could break that causal link. Union interest and definitive measures In accordance with Article 31 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious subsidisation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. The investigation established that the Union industry suffered material injury caused by subsidised imports from Turkey and that the imposition of measures would restore fair competition on the market. The investigation found that the Union industry's downwards trend in financial performance indicators was the result of the difficulty in competing with the subsidised imports from the country concerned. Therefore the imposition of countervailing duties would allow the Union industry increase its prices to cover the cost of production and thus increase its market share, employment, production and improve its financial performance indicators such as profitability, cash flow and return on investments. It was considered that if measures were not imposed, the price pressure from Turkish imports would be likely to continue with further negative effects on the profitability of the Union industry. This further decline in performance would ultimately lead to further cuts in production and more closures of production sites, which would therefore threaten employment and investments in the Union. As a result the investigation concluded that that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of the product concerned from Turkey. Consequently, the Commission imposed a definitive countervailing duty in the range of 6.7% to 9.5%. 4.1.5.Investigations terminated without measures In accordance with the provisions of the respective basic Regulations, investigations may be terminated without the imposition of measures if a complaint is withdrawn or if measures are unnecessary (i.e. no dumping/no subsidies, no injury resulting from dumped or subsidised imports, measures not in the interest of the Union). In 2015, three new proceedings (two anti-dumping and one anti-subsidy) were terminated without measures, compared to four in 2014 and 11 in 2013.

The list of cases which were terminated without the imposition of measures during 2015 can be found in the following table. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex E.



Product (type of investigation) Originating from Main reason for termination Rainbow trout (AD) Turkey Withdrawal of complaint Certain aluminium foils ("converter foils") (AD) P.R. China Withdrawal of complaint Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products (AS) P.R. China Withdrawal of complaint 4.1.6.Details on some individual cases Rainbow trout from Turkey (AD) In February 2014 the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imports of rainbow trout from Turkey. The investigation was initiated following a complaint by the Danish Aquaculture Association, on behalf of producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of rainbow trout. In a letter dated 19 November 2014 addressed to the Commission, the complainant withdrew its complaint. In accordance with Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation, a proceeding may be terminated when the complaint is withdrawn, unless such termination would not be in the Union interest. The investigation did not bring to light any considerations showing that termination of the case would not be in the Union interest. Therefore, the Commission considered that the proceeding should be terminated. Interested parties were informed accordingly and were given an opportunity to comment. However, no comments were received. The Commission therefore terminated the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain rainbow trout originating in Turkey in February 2015. 4.2.Review investigations 4.2.1.Expiry reviews Article 11(2) and Article 18 of the basic Regulations provide for the expiry of measures after five years, unless an expiry review demonstrates that they should be maintained in their original form. In 2015, one anti-dumping measure and three anti-subsidy measures expired automatically. The references for these measures are set out in Annex N. Since the expiry provision of the basic Regulations came into force in 1985, a total of 498 measures have expired automatically. 4.2.1.1.Initiations During 2015, nine expiry reviews were initiated of anti-dumping measures in place and none concerning anti-subsidy measures. The list of the expiry reviews initiated in 2015 can be found in the following table, together with the name of the complainant. It should be noted that some expiry reviews may be carried out in parallel with interim reviews. Where there are interim reviews and expiry reviews ongoing at the same time these are indiacted by an asterisk in the table below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex F.



Product (type of investigation AD or AS) Originating from Complainant Ringbinder mechanisms P.R. China Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH Silicon metal (silicon)* P.R. China Comité de Liaison des Industries de Ferro-Alliages (‘Euroalliages’) Sodium cyclamate P.R. China

Indonesia Productos Aditivos S.A. Molybdenum wires P.R. China Plansee SE Aluminium road wheels P.R. China Association of European Wheels Manufacturers (EUWA) Sodium gluconate P.R. China Jungbunzlauer S.A.

Roquette Italia S.p.A. Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) P.R. China Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (C.P.M.E.) High tenacity yarn of polyester P.R. China CIRFS (The European Manmade Fibres Association) Solar panels (crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components) (AD+AS)* P.R. China EU ProSun Graphite electrode systems (AD+AS) India SGL Carbon GmbH

TOKAI Erftcarbon GmbH

GrafTech Switzerland SA 4.2.1.2.Expiry reviews concluded with confirmation of duties During 2015, 13 expiry reviews were concluded with confirmation of the duties for a further five years. The list of the cases which were concluded with confirmation of duty during 2015, together with the result of the investigation, can be found below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is given in Annex F.



Product Originating from Result of the investigation/ Type and level of measure Citric acid P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD). Individual duty rates ranging between 15,3% and 42,7% Residual 42,7% Monosodium glutamate P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD);

Individual duty rates ranging between 33,8% and 36,5%, Residual 39,7% Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel Belarus

P.R. China

Russia Confirmation of duty (AD) Belarus: 38,1% P.R.C.: 90,6% Russia Individual duty rates ranging between 10,1% and 16,8%, Residual 20,5% Fasteners, iron or steel P.R. China

(extended to Malaysia) Confirmation of duty (AD)

Individual duty rates ranging between 0% and 69,7%, Residual 74,1% PSC wires and strands P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD). Individual duty rates ranging between 0% and 31,1% 531,2 EUR tonne, Residual 46,2% Biodiesel USA

(extended to Canada) Confirmation of duty (AD)./ Duty rate €172,2 per tonne Biodiesel (AS) USA

(extended to Canada) Confirmation of duty (AS)

Duty rates ranging between €211,20 and €237 per tonne Wire rod P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD). Individual duty rates 7,9%, Residual 24% Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD)

Duty rate 58,6% Seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD). Individual duty rates ranging between 17,7% and 27,2%, Residual 39,2% Aluminium foil in big rolls P.R. China Confirmation of duty (AD). Individual duty rates ranging between 6,4% and 24,2%, Residual 30%

4.2.1.3.Details on some individual cases concluded by confirmation of duty Biodiesel from the USA (AD) In July 2014 the Commission initiated an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of biodiesel from the USA in place since 2009. The original measures were extended to imports consigned from Canada in 2011 following an anti-circumvention investigation. The investigation was initiated following a request lodged by the European Biodiesel Board on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of biodiesel. Product under review and review investigation period (RIP) The product subject to this review is fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or paraffinic gasoil obtained from synthesis and/ or hydro-treatment, of non-fossil origin, commonly known as ‘biodiesel’, in pure form or in a blend currently falling within CN codes ex 1516 20 98, ex 1518 00 91, ex 1518 00 99, ex 2710 19 43, ex 2710 19 46, ex 2710 19 47, ex 2710 20 11, ex 2710 20 15, ex 2710 20 17, ex 3824 90 92, ex 3826 00 10 and ex 3826 00 90. The investigation period to examine recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 with the examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2011 to the end of the review investigation period. Sampling The Commission selected a sample of seven Union producers representing around 30% of the total Union production of biodiesel. The Commission originally selected three exporting producers as part of the sample. However, the three companies withdrew their cooperation in the proceeding. Accordingly, no sampling of exporting producers took place. In view of the low number of unrelated importers that came forward, no sampling of importers was necessary. Likelihood of recurrence of dumping Following the imposition of measures in 2009, imports of biodiesel from the USA to the Union dropped to almost zero, with only a very small quantity exported in 2013 and during the RIP. In these circumstances, it was not considered relevant to assess the level of dumping in the RIP. It was therefore concluded that there was no continuation of dumping during the RIP. Regarding the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, the Commission concluded that in light of the significant spare capacity of the US industry, combined with the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and sales price, in particular with regard to the price level of US exports to third countries, for which dumping appeared to be taking place, and the records of past circumvention practices, dumped imports from the USA were likely to recur if the measures in force were allowed to lapse. Likelihood of recurrence of injury To assess the likelihood of recurrence of injury to the Union industry in the absence of measures, the Commission analysed the likely impact of imports from the USA on the Union market and on the Union industry. In particular, the Commission analysed the likelihood of recurrence of dumped imports, the volumes and the likely price levels thereof, spare capacity in the USA, the attractiveness of the union market and pricing behaviour of US producers. The Commission established that producers of biodiesel in the USA are currently exporting biodiesel to other third country markets at price levels that are below the Union prices. Since the Union prices are higher than those in other third country markets it is likely that at least some of those exports may be re-directed to the Union should the existing measures lapse. Furthermore, the Commission established that US producers have a large spare capacity amounting to around 2,678,000 tonnes equivalent to around 22 % of the total Union consumption. The spare capacity available in the USA is not likely to be absorbed by its domestic market. It was also found that, despite sufficient capacity, US producers are not supplying the full demand on the US market. Given that the Union market is the biggest market for biodiesel worldwide and with biodiesel prices in the Union that are in parity or slightly above the price level on the US domestic market, the Union market would be very attractive for US producers of biodiesel. Indeed, historically, that has proven to be the case. The Commission thus concluded that it was very likely that US producers would use a large part of their spare capacity to re-enter the Union market should the existing measures be allowed to lapse. Given their current pricing behaviour on other export markets and the large spare capacity available it was considered very likely that significant volumes of US biodiesel would re-enter the Union market at dumped prices equal to, or below the Union prices. These imports would exercise a significant downward price pressure on Union industry which, at current price levels, is only making a very small profit significantly below its target profit. This would most likely result in a decrease of production and sales volumes, less profitability and loss of market share. Given the fragile economic situation of the Union industry, such likely scenario would have a significant adverse effect on the ongoing recovery of the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission concluded that material injury to the Union industry would most likely recur should the existing duties against imports of biodiesel from the USA be allowed to lapse. Union interest and definitive measures In accordance with the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it would be against the Union interest to maintain the measures in place despite the findings above on the likely recurrence of injurious dumping. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry and importers as well as users of biodiesel. The investigation found that while the Union industry showed positive signs of recovery from past dumping, such as increased production and sales volume, the prices on the Union market decreased significantly and the profitability remained very low, thus leaving the industry in a fragile and vulnerable economic situation. It was concluded that if the existing measures were allowed to lapse, the Union industry would most certainly be faced with increased unfair competition in the form of significant volumes of dumped imports of biodiesel from the USA, thereby putting a halt to the on-going recovery of the Union biodiesel industry and most likely result in the recurrence of material injury. Only three importers/traders came forward and made their views known. Whilst one company claimed that the level of current duties is disproportionate and that extension would distort and limit the market resulting in higher prices, the other two companies claimed that the existing measures had not affected their activities and were neutral as to a possible extension of the existing anti-dumping measures. The investigation did not find that a continuation of the existing measures would limit the market and result in higher prices. It found that in fact Union prices decreased despite the existence of measures. The investigation also found that the Union industry has sufficient capacity to supply Union demand for biodiesel and also spare capacity to satisfy a future increase in demand. Therefore, the arguments put forward did not support the argument that a continuation of existing measures would be against the interest of importers and/or traders. Only one user, an oil company which purchases biodiesel to blend with mineral oils, came forward and made its view known to the Commission. It was strongly in favour of maintaining the existing measures and claimed that their removal could have devastating effects on the Union biodiesel market leading to an influx of significant volumes of dumped biodiesel which would result in a recurrence of severe injury do the Union biodiesel industry. As a result the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures on imports of biodiesel originating in the USA. Accordingly, the Commission maintained the anti-dumping measures on imports of biodiesel originating in the USA, ranging from zero to 198 EUR/tonne, for an additional period of five years. Biodiesel from the USA (AS) A definitive countervailing duty was imposed on imports of biodiesel originating in the USA in 2009. The original measures were extended to imports consigned from Canada in 2011 following an anti-circumvention investigation. In July 2014 the Commission initiated an expiry review of these measures on the basis of a request lodged by the European Biodiesel Board. Prior to the initiation of the expiry review, the Commission held consultations with the USA in July 2014 with the aim of clarifying the situation as regards the content of the review request and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. However the consultations did not result in a solution being found. The product subject to the review and the periods of investigation were the same as those of the expiry review of the anti-dumping measures on the same product from the USA outlined above. The situation regarding sampling was also the same as in the anti-dumping investigation. Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation The Commission first analysed the three federal schemes, namely the Biodiesel mixture credit, the Biodiesel credit and small agri-biodiesel producer credit. These schemes expired at the end of 2014. However, the investigation established a consistent pattern of reintroducing these schemes after their expiry by the US Government, with retroactive effects covering the periods where the scheme may not have been in place. Moreover, the investigation did not find any changes in the prices of biodiesel in the US domestic market, showing that US biodiesel producers had strong expectations that the scheme would be again retroactively reintroduced. Lastly, the investigation established that given the importance of the schemes for the US biodiesel industry, and given the magnitude of the funding provided by means of the three federal schemes, and the expectations from all market operators that the schemes would continue to exist, it would be very difficult for the US authorities to simply allow the schemes to expire. Otherwise it would risk causing serious injury to its domestic biodiesel industry, thereby leading to significant job losses (the industry employs around 60 000 people), dependency on imports of diesel and failure to meet the environmental objectives set by the Government by using biodiesel. Thus, the Commission concluded that as far as the three federal subsidies were concerned, there was a likelihood of recurrence of subsidisation. With regard to other schemes still in force, such as the bioenergy programme for advanced biofuels or the state subsidy schemes, the investigation found no indication that these schemes would come to an end in the near future. Therefore, for these schemes, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood of continuation of subsidisation. Lastly the Commission concluded that in view of the likelihood of continuation and recurrence of subsidisation, combined with the significant spare capacity of the US biodiesel industry and the attractiveness of the Union market, it was likely that US biodiesel producers would resume exporting biodiesel at subsidised prices to the Union market at large volumes, if measures were allowed to lapse.

Likelihood of recurrence or continuation of injury and Union interest The situation regarding the recurrence or continuation of injury as well as Union interest was the same as outlined above under the expiry review of the anti-dumping measures on biodiesel from the USA. As in that case, the Commission concluded that material injury to the Union industry would most likely recur should the existing countervailing duties against imports of biodiesel from the USA be allowed to lapse. The Commission also concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing countervailing measures on imports of biodiesel originating in the USA. Therefore, the Commission maintained the existing measures on imports of biodiesel originating in the US, ranging from 211.2 to 237 EUR/tonne for an additional period of five years. Aluminium foils from, inter alia, the PRC In October 2014, the Commission initiated an expiry review on imports of aluminium foils originating, inter alia, in the PRC, following a request lodged by AFM Aluminiumfolie Merseburg GmbH, Alcomet AD, Eurofoil Luxembourg SA, Hydro Aluminium Rolled Products GmbH, Impol d.o.o. and Symetal SA, on behalf of producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of certain aluminium foils. At the same time the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5 of the basic Regulation into imports of aluminium foils originating in Russia. Product under review and review investigation period (RIP) The product subject to this review is aluminium foil falling within CN code ex 7607 11 19 (TARIC code 7607 11 19 10). The investigation of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014 while the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2011 to the end of the review investigation period (the ‘period considered’). Sampling In view of the limited number of cooperating companies, no sampling was necessary for exporting producers, nor for unrelated importers. As regards Union producers, the Commission selected a sample of six Union producers and their related companies, accounting for 70% of the total Union production of AHF. Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping The Commission selected Turkey as an appropriate analogue country to establish the normal value for Chinese imports of AHF. A comparison of the normal value with the Chinese export prices to the Union showed that Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices with significant dumping margins. It also demonstrated that the spare capacity for production of the product concerned in the PRC is significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the review investigation period. This spare capacity is likely to be directed at least in part to the Union market should the measures against the PRC be allowed to lapse. In addition, the investigation found that exports from the PRC to third countries were also made at dumped prices. This pricing behaviour of the Chinese exports in third markets shows a likelihood of continuation of dumping to the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse. Furthermore, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of prices indicated that there was a risk that Chinese exports would be redirected toward the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood that Chinese dumped imports would significantly increase in the absence of measures. Likelihood of recurrence or continuation of injury To assess the likelihood of recurrence or continuation of injury if the measures against the PRC were allowed to lapse, the potential impact of Chinese imports on the Union market and the Union industry was analysed. The investigation confirmed the existence of significant spare capacities in the PRC that cannot be fully absorbed by the Chinese domestic demand and export markets other than the Union market. In addition, the continuation of dumping during the review investigation period with significant dumping margins and the dumping practice of Chinese exporters to third country markets, clearly indicated that there was a strong likelihood that volumes of Chinese dumped imports would increase significantly in case the measures in force were allowed to lapse. Should the measures in force be repealed Chinese import prices would in all likelihood undercut the Union industry's sales prices on the Union market. Indeed the investigation showed that, in the absence of anti-dumping duties, the Chinese imports made under the normal import regime during the review investigation period would have undercut the Union industry prices on average by 12,2 %. The Union market is attractive for Chinese imports given that prices in the Union market were broadly in line with the prices in other export markets. In addition, in July 2014 Turkey imposed anti-dumping measures against China for a range of aluminium foils including the product concerned. It was therefore likely that part of the production previously exported to Turkey would be reoriented to the Union market should the measures against China be repealed. Therefore, it was concluded that the repeal of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of Chinese imports at dumped prices significantly undercutting the Union industry prices, thus causing further injury to the Union industry. Union interest and definitive measures In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing measures against the PRC would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, traders, importers and users. The investigation established that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period and that there was a likelihood of continuation of injury should measures against China be allowed to lapse. The investigation concluded that if the measures against China were lifted it was likely that Chinese imports would resume in important volumes on the Union market at dumped prices that would also significantly undercut the Union industry's sales prices. The Union industry would be forced to match the lower price levels and thereby increase its losses. As regards users of the product concerned none of the three cooperating users imported from the PRC. Their main sources of supply were the Union industry, Russia and Turkey. During the review investigation period all cooperating users reported to be overall profitable. On that basis it was concluded that the maintenance of the measures against China would not have a significant negative impact on the situation of the users. No importers/traders came forward following the publication of the Notice of Initiation. The investigation also showed that the Union industry and the exporting producers were selling AHF mostly directly to users. On these grounds, there were no indications that the imposition of measures would have an adverse effect on the situation of importers/traders. Some interested parties claimed that the Union industry has insufficient capacity to cover the entire demand in the Union and that if measures were maintained the Union would face a shortage of supply which would increase the price of AHF. However, the investigation showed that the Union industry has excess capacity and could increase production and sales of AHF in the Union. In addition alternative sources of supply were identified such as Turkey, Armenia and South Africa. The Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to maintain measures on imports of AHF originating in the PRC. Accordingly, the Commission decided to maintain the anti-dumping measures in force for the PRC, ranging from 6,4% to 30%, for an additional period of five years. Annex F. Expiry reviews concluded: termination and repeal of the measures 4.2.1.4.Reviews concluded by termination

During 2015, 3 expiry reviews were concluded by termination.



Product Originating from Reason for termination Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel Ukraine No likelihood of recurrence of dumping Candles, tapers and the like P.R. China No likelihood of recurrence of injury Aluminium foil in big rolls Brazil No likelihood of recurrence of dumping Details of some individual cases Aluminium foils from, inter alia, Brazil The Commission initiated in October 2014 an expiry review on imports of aluminium foils originating, inter alia, in Brazil. The review was initiated following a request lodged by AFM Aluminiumfolie Merseburg GmbH, Alcomet AD, Eurofoil Luxembourg SA, Hydro Aluminium Rolled Products GmbH, Impol d.o.o. and Symetal SA, on behalf of producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of certain aluminium foils. In parallel, the Commission initiated in October 2014 a new anti-dumping investigation into imports of aluminium foils originating in Russia. Product under review and review investigation period (RIP) The product subject to this review is aluminium foil of a thickness of not less than 0,008 mm and not more than 0,018mm, falling within CN code ex 7607 11 19 (TARIC code 7607 11 19 10) (AHF). The investigation of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014 while the examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2011 to the end of the review investigation period. Sampling One exporting producer from Brazil cooperated with the investigation. Thus, sampling was not necessary for exporting producers. In view of the limited number of cooperating companies, no sampling was necessary for unrelated importers. As regards Union producers, the Commission selected a sample of six Union producers and their related companies, accounting for 70% of the total Union production. Likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping There were no exports of AHF from Brazil to the Union during the review investigation period. Therefore, there is no likelihood of continuation of dumping from Brazil. The assessment was thus limited to the likelihood of recurrence of dumping using export prices to other third countries. The capacity utilisation of the cooperating Brazilian producer was found to be above 90% and its unused spare capacity to be 3 000 tonnes per year. This is equivalent to 6% of the production of the Union industry and 3% of the Union consumption. It was therefore concluded that there was no significant spare capacity that could be directed to the Union market should the measures against Brazil be allowed to lapse. Regarding the two non-cooperating Brazilian producers, the Commission considered it unlikely that these two producers would have a significant spare capacity that would be directed to the Union market, should the measures against Brazil be allowed to lapse: they were not exporting to the Union, neither during the review investigation period, nor before the imposition of the original measures. Due to the lack of exports to the Union in the RIP, the Commission analysed whether Brazilian exports to other third country markets were made at dumped prices. The exports of the cooperating Brazilia