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Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
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règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Communit y and the European Atom ic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), t his file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februa r 1983 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 v om 27.9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
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der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.  
COMMISSION OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
COM(83)  147 final 
Brussels,  14 March 1983 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY 
(Communication from the Commission to the 
European  Council of 21-22 March 1983) 
COM(83)  147 final 

THE ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL SITUATION  IN THE  COMMUNITY 
(Communication  from  the  Commission  to the 
European Council  of 21-22  March  1983) 
CONTENTS 
1 . Introduction 
2. The  facts  and  immediate prospects 
3. Guidelines 
Tables  1-3 :  Main economic indicators  1981-83 

I. Introduction 
In early 1983, the Community economy is hesitating. 
1. Recent indicators point to some incipient recovery in a number of 
Member States  that  is attributable  in part  to the more favourable trend 
of the US economy since the end of 1982, to the downward movement in 
interest rates internationally and,  with  some reservations, to the 
prospect  of an easing of the oil constraint. 
This  does not mean  that  the end to the recession is already assured. 
The favourable developments observed still need to be confirmed as to 
their scale and duration. In addition, many of the world's economies 
liave not as yet adjusted sufficiently to the consequences of the 1979 
oil shock and the trend in the dollar since 1980. The international 
financial situation also need:, to be closely monitored. 
2. There is thus the chance of a positive turnaround, but  there  are also 
uncertainties. This chance to  start  bringing down unemployment through 
non-inflationary and hence sustained growth is offered to us for the first 
time  in several years and must be seized. 
For this reason, the ways and means of accentuating the favourable 
tendencies  and initiating a period of sound growth must be the main point 
of the debate  that  is started at this European  Council,  will  continue at 
the OECD  and at the Williamsburg Summit, and  will  be completed at the 
European  Council to be held in June. 
3. This memorandum should help to launch the  discussion  and prepare the 
ground  for follow-up action at Community level: 
- it gives a brief description of the current economic situation and of 
the outlook for the immediate future, 
- and sets out a number of thoughts on how to manage the recovery,  that 
is to say on how to reinforce it and make it last. 

- 2 -
II. The present situation and immediate outlook 
A. Developments in 1982 
1. On account of a very pronounced  fall-off  in the  third  quarter, growth 
in the Community in 1982 was weaker than forecast: it was 0.2% in volume 
terms,  with  Denmark showing the largest increase of 2.3% and Germany and 
the Netherlands recording declines of 1% and 1.5% respectively. This 
experience was common to all the industrialized countries, their real 
output  falling in 1982 for the  first  time since 1975. 
Much  of the deterioration was due to the combined impact of: 
- a worsening in the recession in the United States, where real GDP 
declined by 1.7%; 
- a contraction in world trade attributable to cyclical conditions but 
also  to the growing difficulties in international financing. World 
trade, which had expanded at an average annual rate of 6.9% in volume 
terms between 1976 and 1979, declined by 1.5% in 1982, after having 
been  flat  in 1981. 
2. The number of people out of work continued to climb, to reach 9.6% 
of the labour force in 1932 on average, i.e. a level 75% higher than in 
1979.  As a result, unemployment in the Community, which, on average, 
has not shown any contraction since 1973, has risen steadily since 
1978/79. 
3. Two more positive aspects should be  stressed: 
- inflation, which dropped from 11.8% in 1981 to 10.5% in 1982, has eased 
in all Member States. However, the slowdown is  less  pronounced than in 
the United States or Japan and, what is more, quite marked divergences 
are still discernible  within  the Community.  Inflation  is below 6% in 
Germany  and the Netherlands and has been brought down from 15.5% in 
1980 to 8.5% in 1982 in the United Kingdom but it is still running at 
over 15% in  Greece,  Ireland and  Italy; 
- for the Community as a whole, progress in bringing the current account 
of the balance of payments back  into  equilibrium has been faster than 
anticipated; the deficit was equivalent to only 0.5% of GDP in 1982 
compared  with  1.3% in 1980. 

- 3 -
Here  too, the overall result masks sharp divergences between Member States. 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  France,  Ireland and  Italy  are in deficit while 
Germany,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are running a 
surplus,  in some  cases  a large one. 
B. Outlook for  1983 
1. The forecasts at present available for  1983  are subject to three external 
factors of uncertainty: 
- the first  is the  scale  and duration of the US recovery, which are bound up 
inter alia  with  the prospects for interest rates, themselves dependent to 
a large degree on how developments in the Federal budget deficit will affect 
monetary policy; 
- the second factor of uncertainty has to do  with  international financial 
developments; 
- lastly, there is no way of knowing at the moment what the  full  extent or 
effects of the fall in oil prices will be. 
Confirmation of the upturn in the US economy and, under certain conditions, 
3 decline in oil prices should make it easier for the European economy to pick 
up again, although the combined effect of these two factors cannot be expected 
to alter fundamentally the profile for  1933. 
2. The poor performance in the  third  quarter of  1982  has made it necessary to 
revise  the GDP forecast for  1983  downwards for virtually all Member States 
(an increase of only  0.4%  in volume terms compared  with  one of  just  over  1% 
forecast at the end of last year). Growth is expected to pick up during the 
second  half of the year, helped by restocking, some support from public-sector 
demand and a recovery in exports, while private consumption and, at least in 
the first  half of  1983,  investment are unlikely to make any major contribution 
to a revival in activity. 
These  forecasts are based on a very cautious assumption regarding oil prices. 
All in all, in the present cyclical situation, the strength and duration of the 
hesitant expansion which is now getting under way are not assured even if the 
tendency towards recovery were to be more pronounced than expected. 

- 4 -
3. According to present forecasts, there will probably oe a  further 
slowdown in the rate of inflation: in 1983, this rate is likely to be 
8.6% for the Community as a whole, which is the lowest for seven years 
(with  the exception of 1978 when it was 7.1%). While the need for 
consolidation remains as pressing as ever and differences in inflation 
rates will not disappear, 1983 is likely to see some narrowing of the 
differences in price rises  within  the Community: the rate of inflation 
will probably be slow in the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands  and relatively moderate in many countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg,  France and the United Kingdom). 
4. Unemployment, on the other hand, is likely to continue to rise in 
1983  throughout the Community: the average rate of unemployment as a 
proportion of the labour force will easily exceed 10% in 1983, giving 
a total  of more than 12 million jobless; the rates of increase will 
vary from one Member State to another. 
5. The prospects in 1983 should see  further  improved equilibrium in 
the balance of payments on current account,  with  the deficit for the 
Community as a whole likely to fall to approximately 0.3% of GDP, 
notably as a result of reduced deficits in Belgium, Denmark,  France, 
Ireland and  Italy. 
Ill. Gui de li nes 
Despite  the modest outlook for growth and the present uncertainties, 
there is a possibility of a change of trend, of a gradual upturn in the 
economy  and therefore of a check to and then a reversal of the unemploy­
ment trend. If we miss this opportunity, the danger of continued 
stagnation is likely to increase. It is therefore more than ever necessary 
to define a common approach which can encompass the various elements of 
heal-thy and sustained growth. 
The following three lessons can be drawn from the experience of recent 
years: 
(a) The crisis, which is both cyclical and structural in nature, calls 
for national policies which are directed equally towards stability 
(the  fight  against inflation) and - if the employment problem is to 
be solved - towards the development of productive activities through 
creation of the conditions necessary for growth (improvements in 
supply,  investment, mobility and competitiveness). No international 
cooperation will remove the need for such efforts. 

- 5 -
(b) The Community, which is a Large integrated market helping, through 
the EMS, to pulL individual policies closer together and so to 
make  them more effective, which acts as a catalyst for the strategies 
pursued in the fields of investment, industrial development and energy, 
and which is an influential spokesman in dealings  with  the outside 
world, is an asset which must be exploited at all costs. This theme 
is one which constantly underlies the Commission's actions and which 
'.he European Council has begun to examine. The fact  that  it is not 
set out in detail in this Communication in no way  lessens  the degree 
of priority  it is given nor the obligation to observe the programmes 
laid down and to propose new courses of action. 
(c) Economies are now so interdependent  that  no national policy can be 
sure  of success  without  an orderly external framework. It is this 
order which is lacking, depriving economies and firms of a suffici­
ently stable environment, distorting expectations and altering 
management conditions through abrupt and unforeseen changes which do 
not reflect economic fundamentals. The economies which are most 
market-oriented cannot endure the present level of disorganization 
in the international economic system. Here lies also one of the 
dangers  of rising protectionism, which we must  join  forces to roll 
back.  The Community must cooperate  with  its main partners in order 
to assure the international conditions of a recovery - particularly in 
trade, financial, monetary and interest rate policies, but also in 
the economic domain proper. 
This  document, drawn up ahead of important international meetings, is 
largely centred on this final aspect. If recovery is to be brought about, 
it is not so much ud hoc measures, however  firm  they may be, but rather the 
awareness  of interdependence and the manner of administering  that  inter­
dependence  more effectively which must form the substance of  future  concerted 
action. 
It is  with  this in mind  that  the Commission, aware  that  the evidence 
which it has ciced is now beginning to be generally accepted, proposes  that 
discussions  should cover five points relating to the strengthening of inter­
national economic organization or to the search for a cohesion in national 
policies  which will improve the chances of a  return  to growth. 

- 6 -
A. The security of the international financial system 
1. The  level,  in absolute terms, of the indebtedness of the developing 
countries,  the level of real interest rates and the effects of stagnation 
have  created strains in the international financial system. Reactions 
have  been rapid and effective: the amendment of the General Arrangements 
to Borrow, the increase in IMF quotas and the way in which a number of 
specific  cases  have been settled all bear witness to this fact. 
2. These results do not obviate the need for continued and more thorough­
going work to consolidate a still fragile situation. In addition to the 
decisions  already taken, lessons must be learnt from developments which 
the western worud has been unable to ward off. 
Priority must be given to establishing an information and monitoring 
mechanism,  to reinforcing the capacity of the international financial 
system  as a whole to react, and to improving preventive machinery. In 
these  various fields, the Community must define common positions and co­
operate  with  its partners in order  first  to consolidate the results 
achieved  and then to establish means of preventing a repetition of similar 
situations. 
3. The solutions adopted will have to take account of a second factor: 
one of the reasons for the present stagnation lies in the low level of 
international demand. The Community and its Member States must therefore 
actively help to maintain an adequate flow of funds to the developing 
countries,  both via the banking sector and through official development 
aid.  The aim must be to carry out the necessary adjustment and at the 
same  time to maintain international trade at an adequate  level. 
This  last point is all the more important in  that  the health of the 
international financial system will depend greatly - through the develop­
ment of trade, improved terms of  tr^de  and the reduction of indebtedness -
on strong and lasting growth-

- 7 -
B. The stability of the international monetary system 
1. One of the major  lessons  to be learnt from recent events is  that  the 
international economy can no Longer withstand upheavals in its essential 
components.  This applies not only to energy prices and interest rates, 
but also to exchange rates. 
Volatile exchange rates, whose financial function is ominously tending 
to supplant the trade function: 
- make business decisions more difficult at a  time  when a vigorous 
investment  effort  is a key condition for recovery; 
- above all, disrupt trade relations to an intolerable  extent,  and jeopardize 
the maintenance of free trade. 
2. The EMS, an essential element of stability, has shown, despite its 
setbacks,  the value of systematic monetary cooperation. It is a major 
asset  for internal Community purposes and a valuable means of influencing 
international monetary developments. Consequently: 
- the Council of Ministers, and subsequently the European  Council,  should 
give careful thought to strengthening it and extending it to include 
sterling and the drachma; 
- for the reasons which led to the setting up of the EMS and for basic 
economic  reasons, the Community must get its partners to share its 
determination to stabilize international exchange  rate  relationships. 
3. A step in this direction was taken at the Versailles summit. The 
Community must not be content  with  adopting a common position on the follow-
up to the study of intervention problems. It must also persuade the United 
States and Japan of the importance of bringing exchange rates more into 
line  with  economic facts and of bringing down real interest rates. It must 
put across  to them its view of how monetary cooperation should be organized. 
The Commission  will  put forward guidelines for this purpose and hopes  that 
a Community position on these points can be voiced clearly at Williamsburg. 

- 8 -
C. Oil prices,  growth  and energy policy 
1. The recent drop in oil prices is likely under certain conditions to 
produce a moderate but real increase in growth, and this is to be welcomed. 
However, the net results are  difficult  to forecast in any detail: they 
will  depend on the impact of physical, financial and psychological threshold 
effects.  Price  falls  that  are visible but smooth are likely to be beneficial 
in terms of prices, external equilibrium and growth,  without  affecting unduly 
the pursuit of energy policy. Out tumbling prices would jeopardize the policy 
on energy restructuring and impose strains on the international financial and 
trade equi libii urn. 
2. The Community must therefore help to keep matters on an even  keel;  this 
requires close cooperation  with  the Community's partners, notably the 
industrialized countries, so as to ensure a common view and consistent 
attitudes, including, if necessary, the provision of safety nets. 
In this area of essential importance for economic  growth  and the pursuit 
of energy objectives, the Community must establish its general approach at 
the highest  level.  It  will  then be for the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers to implement it and Tollow up its effects. 

- 9 -
D. Monetary  pol i r.y 
1. In Last December's guidelines,  priority  was given, wherever economic poLicy 
conditions allowed, to the pursuit of monetary policies  that  would make for a 
fall in real interest rates and underpin the recovery in growth. 
2. The Commission proposes  that  the European Council confirm this priority. 
It is a key element in consolidating the recovery both  within  the Community 
and international ly, especially as a fall in  real,  interest rates is the best 
way of stimulating investment and reducing the burden of internaL and external 
i ridebt  edness . 
It is therefore essential  that  those Member States which have been the 
first  to achieve favourable results in terms of inflation and the balance of 
payments (the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) should pursue their monetary policy  with  the degree of flexibility 
and openness  that  is consistent  with  a steady and lasting fall in real interest 
rates.  CLoser  monetary policy coordination and greater efforts to achieve 
economic  convergence  within  the EMS would help to extend the benefits of this 
policy to the whole of the Community. 
3. The same need to provide rapid support for the early signs of recovery is 
evident at international  Level,  especially as the results achieved in the 
United States will be decisive even for the  success  of our own efforts. The 
Community must endeavour to get its main partners to recognize explicitLy the 
central role of lower interest rates in improving the economic situation and 
the need to pursue the measures  that  will alLow this objective to be attained, 
and to  affirm  their desire to establish the necessary close cooperation. 

- 10 -
E. Public  finance 
1. With regard to public finance, the two-pronged approach adopted in December 
remains  entirely valid. The  first  element was the steadfast pursuit of  efforts 
to bring the deficits and the  growth  of the budget aggregates under control and 
to change the emphasis of budget structures,  with  a shift  towards investment. 
But provided  that  this general line was observed, a second element was  that  in 
certain Member States, for example the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom, when the results of current policies permitted, public finance 
<:ould  be used to fuel the upturn, in fostering the development of productive 
activities by stimulating investment, adjusting taxation or reducing company 
costs. 
2. At any event, the present situation holds out two definite, and one possible, 
courses  of action for these few countries in the use of public expenditure: 
- the  basic  principle to be respected absolutely must be to restore or to 
reinforce confidence in governments' ability to bring budgets under control; 
this means  that  every instance of the use of public finance must be 
compatible  with  the  fight  against inflation, must comply  with  the imperatives 
for restructuring public expenditure, and must not impede the rundown of the 
deficits; these are the essentials for credibility in a situation where  lack 
of confidence is rife; 
By "automatic stabilizers1' is meant those public expenditures or receipts 
whose  impact tends to attenuate economic fluctuations. - even it the automatic stabilizers must, in any event, operate on the 
assumption  that  developments are disappointing, they must not be allowed, 
with  the  first  uncertain signs of recovery, to move prematurely in the 
direction of lowering deficits; 
- lastly, despite the hopes  that  the economic situation  will  improve, should 
it not do so as rapidly and as substantially as wished, there is no reason 
why, in the present situation, certain Member States should rule out the use 
of cyclical budgetary action which satisfies the above conditions and  will 
consolidate  an  upturn  which is still hesitant. 

- 11 -
The question whether to pursue such a course of action must be decided 
soon,  i.e. as soon as the facts are clearer, so  that  if it is decided 
to go ahead action can be taken at the  right  time in the  cycLe.  The 
decision  ought to be taken as part of the process of determining inter­
nationally coordinated economic action in the few weeks between the 
next European Council meeting and the Williamsburg Summit. 
* 
To permit Europe to approach the forthcoming international meetings in a 
position of initiative, the European Council should approve the proposed 
guidelines  on the five main domains of action indicated above, and take 
the procedural decisions necessary for the Council of Ministers to assure 
their rapid and precise implementation. 

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