Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances"

(COM(2001) 624 final - 2001/0257 (COD))

(2002/C 149/05)

On 21 December 2001 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 175 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 4 April 2002. The rapporteur was Mr Levaux.

At its 390th plenary session (meeting of 24 April 2002), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion unanimously.

1. Aim of the proposal

1.1. The proposal under discussion is intended to update the Council Directive, known as the Seveso II Directive, of 9 December 1996, which aims to prevent major accidents which involve dangerous substances, and limit their consequences for man and the environment.

1.2. This updating is intended to take account of certain recent large-scale industrial accidents, such as:

- that of Baia Mare in Romania, in January 2000, where a cyanide spill from a tailings pond contaminated the Danube;

- that of Enschede in the Netherlands, in May 2000, where a series of explosions took place in a stock of fireworks.

1.2.1. The Commission considered the need for immediate amendment of the Seveso II Directive following the explosion which occurred on 21 September 2001 at the AZF site in Toulouse. In this case, it was noted that the Toulouse site, unlike the sites of the accidents mentioned above, was fully covered by the obligations imposed by the Directive. Moreover, to wait for the full results of the enquiry would have meant delaying the application of the amendments covered by the present draft directive.

1.2.2. The Commission has therefore postponed its decision on the timing of a new review of the Seveso II Directive, emphasising at this stage that the consequences of both the Toulouse and the Enschede accidents were aggravated by the fact that the establishments concerned were situated close to residential areas. The Committee emphasises that, unfortunately, such areas have in some cases been created after the establishment was set up.

1.2.3. The Commission points out that Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive, on land-use planning, aims in the long term to separate hazardous industrial establishments from residential areas, and that in practice some Member States are unaware of or do not enforce this separation.

1.2.4. To that end the Commission states that it will increase cooperation with the Member States to develop appropriate follow-up to the accidents as regards a number of specific aspects and that, in the light of work and investigations in progress, it will examine the need to amend its proposal or to propose a new modification to the Seveso II Directive.

1.3. The proposed updating is also intended to take account of the results of the work of two technical working groups:

- TWG 7 on "substances dangerous for the environment";

- TWG 8 on "carcinogens".

1.4. Finally, the updating makes it possible to make drafting changes to Annex I of the Seveso II Directive in order to correct some slight inaccuracies or ambiguities.

2. General comments

2.1. The Committee shares the views expressed in the explanatory memorandum to the draft directive. This particularly detailed and well-argued text throws much light on:

- the pragmatic nature of the approach, which seeks to take into account the consequences of each accident soon after it has happened;

- the joint planning arrangements set in train to prepare modifications, which make it possible to involve as many interested parties as possible at a very early stage.

2.1.1. On this point, the Committee notes that the Commission rightly stresses the full importance of the continuous consultation process set up for the implementation of the Seveso II Directive and on the changes and improvements which could be made to it.

2.1.2. The Commission mentions the relevant conferences and seminars which have been held, and states that in drawing up the present proposal it consulted the countries belonging to the European Economic Area, the applicant countries, environmental NGOs, European and national industrial federations and associations, and certain international organisations including the UN.

2.1.3. For its part, the Committee would point out that it was only belatedly involved in this process of continuous consultation. Thus it is now called upon to issue an opinion within a shorter timescale, without having at its disposal all the information accumulated at the consultation stage.

2.2. On the AZF accident in Toulouse, which occurred on 21 September 2001, the Committee endorses the Commission's decision not to delay the present proposal but to put off taking into account the consequences of this recent disaster until the enquiry results are available.

2.2.1. Nonetheless, and without wishing to prejudge the results of the enquiries or future Commission proposals, the Committee emphasises that the Toulouse accident occurred on a site which was fully covered by the obligations imposed by the Seveso II Directive. The Committee stresses that this fact did not make it possible to avoid the accident, nor to limit its disastrous consequences. Like the Commission, it therefore feels it is essential to give prompt consideration to the changes to the Directive which must now be envisaged.

2.2.2. As regards Article 12 on land-use planning, and more particularly the location of dangerous industrial sites in relation to inhabited areas or other areas frequented by the public, both common sense and experience with accidents clearly show the need to impose strict rules of distance and protection for the location of future sites. Once again the Committee endorses - as it did in its opinion of 2 June 1994(1) - the 1996 decisions which will be re-examined in the light of recent events.

2.2.3. However, for the existing sites the Committee has doubts about the presentation of the Commission's approach. In point 1, paragraph 5 of its introduction, the Commission states that in the near future it "will increase co-operation with the Member States in order to develop an appropriate ... follow-up to the accidents ...".

2.2.4. Seeking and using the lessons which can be learned from accidents is undoubtedly useful and indeed essential, but when presented in this way the approach belittles the priority aspect of a prevention policy, which is the very foundation of the Seveso II Directive.

2.2.5. The Committee stresses that this prevention policy must involve a systematic effort to provide information firstly for the adult populations working nearby, but also for all pupils of educational institutions.

2.2.6. Moreover, the expression "in the near future" is inappropriate when particularly serious risks are involved. The Committee feels it is necessary to stress the urgency of the decisions to be taken, and therefore to oblige the industrialists concerned to plan the measures to be implemented, so that they programme their investments accordingly.

2.2.7. Finally, the Committee is surprised that the Commission envisages strengthening its cooperation only with the Member States, when a number of applicant countries are certainly lagging behind in this field and should immediately start to redress this situation, which arouses concern for the safety of their populations.

2.3. On the Baia Mare accident, the Committee agrees with the Commission on the need to modify the scope of the Seveso II Directive. This accident demonstrated the existence of serious risks, whereas in the 1980 Seveso I Directive and the 1996 Seveso II Directive the exclusions made could be justified by a lack of experience.

2.3.1. The Committee appreciates the arguments set out by the Commission in point 3.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum. However, it regrets that the Commission has not given a better idea of the scope of these exclusions by indicating how many sites for storage and processing of dangerous substances linked with mining activities would have been concerned; the same applies to land-fill sites the use of which is linked with ore processing. The Committee takes the view that, given that transparency is essential for necessarily binding measures or rules to be more easily accepted, it is vital to inform the public and industrialists fully.

2.4. As regards the changes linked with the Enschede accident, the Committee endorses the Commission's proposals, which take account of the lessons drawn from this serious disaster.

2.4.1. When drawing up this opinion, the Committee noted that many problems exist with regard to explosive products and more specifically pyrotechnic products imported into Europe, mainly from Asia. The customs declarations classifying these products in different categories are often incorrect, so that their transport and storage take place under conditions which do not comply with the rules: this can give rise to serious accidents.

2.4.2. The Committee hopes that the Commission, which is aware of these problems, will take them into account when considering a forthcoming review of the Seveso II Directive.

2.4.3. Similarly, the Committee has noted that, unlike the treatment of accidents occurring on sites covered by the Seveso II Directive, there is no survey or systematic follow-up at European level for accidents linked with the transport of dangerous substances by pipeline, road, rail, inland waterway and sea routes.

2.4.4. The Committee notes that this problem does not relate directly to those covered by the Seveso II Directive, but points out that dangerous substances, apart from their presence on the sites where they are used or stored, also have to be transported and can give rise to major accidents in transit.

2.4.5. The Committee proposes that the Commission should examine the possibility of creating, on the model used for the follow-up of on-site accidents involving dangerous substances, a similar follow-up for accidents occurring at the transport stage. By extending the scope of its responsibilities, such a task could be entrusted to the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) or to another body which has the relevant expertise.

3. Specific comments

3.1. The draft directive comprises four articles.

3.2. Article 1, by reducing the number of exclusions laid down in Article 4 (e) and (f) of the Seveso II Directive, broadens its scope to cover chemical and thermal processing operations and related storage linked with mining operations. The Committee, while noting that mining activities proper (exploitation, exploration, extraction and processing) and quarrying activities are still excluded from its scope, endorses the Commission proposal which is the result of a balanced consensus worked out through the prior consultation of the interested parties. However, in the case of reprocessing of tailings containing dangerous substances, the Committee would endorse either the application to them of the Seveso II Directive or the drawing-up of specific rules to cover them.

3.3. The same article broadens the scope to cover tailings disposal facilities which are used in connection with the chemical and thermal processing of minerals and which contain dangerous substances. The Committee notes that other waste land-fill sites are still excluded, and endorses - the Commission proposal on the same basis as above.

3.4. On the updating of Annex I to the Seveso II Directive, after taking note of the Explanatory Memorandum the Committee endorses the Commission proposals as a whole.

3.4.1. However, the Committee emphasises that the Commission added hydrazine to the list of carcinogens after a debate which showed that there was some disagreement about this substance, as the thresholds chosen result from a compromise achieved at meetings with professionals.

3.4.2. The Committee therefore suggests that the Commission should further clarify the proposed text, the current wording of which is difficult to follow, and at the time of the next review should reconsider the position taken on hydrazine, to verify the grounds for it in the light of new research.

3.4.3. Furthermore, the Committee suggests the addition, under Notes to Part 2 of Annex I, of a reference to Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste(2) to ensure complete and consistent classification of dangerous substances and preparations.

3.5. Article 2 sets a time-limit of 12 months for the transposition of the directive. Given the nature of the proposed changes and the importance of the Seveso II Directive in terms of dealing with the consequences of major accidents involving dangerous substances, the Committee endorses this time-limit, which it regards as very short but reasonable.

3.5.1. It hopes that, in the light of the de facto situation of existing installations, each Member State will concert with the interested parties to set realistic deadlines for the establishments concerned to apply the new provisions. These deadlines should be compatible with the specific economic conditions and with the need to protect jobs.

4. Conclusions

The Committee wishes to stress three points.

4.1. Depending on which states are concerned, there are substantial differences in risk assessment. Thus, in order to encourage harmonisation, the Commission should organise, with the Member States, exchanges between the inspectors responsible for detecting these risks.

4.2. Transport infrastructures pass through areas of high population density where a major accident could have disastrous consequences. No database on this exists, and the Commission, following the model used for risk sites, should entrust a follow-up to accidents occurring in the transport stage to the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB).

4.3. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission emphasises that "the obligation to provide information to the public on industrial risks and on the behaviour to adopt in the case of an accident is of paramount importance for the limitation of the consequences of major accidents". However, while respecting subsidiarity, the Commission should extend its awareness-raising message to cover the local authorities and the public, recommending the use of the guidelines it has published(3). In addition, it should suggest that the Member States pass on this message to young people through educational establishments.

Brussels, 24 April 2002.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke Frerichs

(1) Economic and Social Committee Opinion of 2 June 1994 on the Proposal for a Council Directive on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (COMAH) (COM(94) 4 final - SYN 94/0014) - CES 760/94, OJ C 295, 22.10.1994.

(2) OJ L 377, 31.12.1991, p. 20.

(3) General guidelines for content of information to the public, Directive 85/501/EEC - Annex VII, published by the European Commission (available in English, French, German and Spanish at http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/GuidanceDocs.html - Information for the Public).