C 80/148 EN 30.3.2004 Official Journal of the European Union
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on a ‘Wider Europe — Neighbourhood:
A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’
(COM(2003) 104 final)
(2004/C 80/34)
On 3 April 2003, the Commission decided to consult the European Economic and Social Committee,
under Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.
The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the
subject, adopted its opinion on 21 November 2003. The rapporteur was Mrs Alleweldt.
At its 404th plenary session (meeting of 11 December 2003), the European Economic and Social
Committee unanimously adopted the following opinion:
1. Foreword
1.1. Acting on its own initiative, the EESC began at an early
stage to consider the configuration of relations with the
countries that will border the EU directly after the forthcoming
enlargement. From May 2004, the political map of Europe willchange, which is also a cue for the EESC to start to realign itsexternal relations. The urgency lies in the need to ensure as of
now that no new dividing lines emerge in Europe, but rather
that a common area of economic development and socialprogress is created.
1.2. The EESC also sees its role in this process as that of an
active participant wishing to bring to bear the expertise it
has gained through cooperation with the present accessioncountries and the contacts it has forged through specialised
work with partner organisations in many countries in Central,
Southern and Eastern Europe.
2. Focus of the opinion
2.1. In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council
not only decided in favour of enlargement to incorporate ten
new Member States, it also recommended strengtheningrelations with the neighbouring countries to the east and south
of the enlarged EU. The original moves towards concentrating
on the eastern neighbours and Russia were abandoned infavour of a strategy encompassing all future neighbouring
countries (
1).
2.2. In its Communication of 11 March 2003, the European
Commission followed this approach, while nevertheless defin-ing different groups of countries and setting its own priorities.
Its report focuses on the eastern neighbours and the southern
Mediterranean region, whilst expressly excluding the westernBalkan countries, and also Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
(1) This strategy covers the southern Mediterranean states, the western
Newly Independent States (NIS) and Russia.2.3. Relations with the five neighbours in south-eastern
Europe (SEE) (2), were mapped out at the special summits in
Zagreb on 24 November 2000 and Thessaloniki on 21 June
2003 and also in the Stability Pact, and the agreed association
strategy. The EESC is currently drawing up an opinion on thissubject (
3) at the request of the Italian presidency.
2.4. Whilst appreciating the broader approach adopted by
the European Commission, the EESC focuses its attention on
the three ‘eastern neighbours’, Ukraine, Belarus and the
Republic of Moldova, as originally advocated in the request foran own-initiative opinion. In contrast with other neighbouring
states, these countries have hardly been included in any
thinking on transnational cooperation or strategy to date. Eventhe EESC has not specifically defined its position and optionsvis-à-vis these countries (
4).
2.5. For some years now, the states along the southern
Mediterranean have rightfully come in for political attention
and their own MEDA support programme under the BarcelonaProcess. The EESC regularly participates in this cooperation.
At the Euro-Mediterranean Interministerial Conference held in
Barcelona in 1995, the EESC was given the task of organisingcoordination between economic and social councils (andsimilar bodies). The EESC has carried out this task, and
continues to carry it out, by organising an annual Euromed
Conference, by drawing up papers on particular subjectsand by developing bilateral relations with socio-economic
organisations in the regions concerned. The EESC has also lent
its support to the Commission in the latter’s work onimplementing MEDA projects. The present opinion will there-
fore not address the Euro- Mediterranean strategy in detail; for
more information on this subject, reference should be made tothe specific documents and activities relating to this field.
(2) Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia
(FYROM) and Albania.
(3) REX/153 Study Group on the role of civil society in the new
European strategy for the Western Balkans.
(4) Nevertheless, these issues have been touched upon in other work,
such as relations with Russia, discussions on the NorthernDimension and in cooperation on the basis of the pan-European
transport corridors, the latter since as long ago as the early 90s.
30.3.2004 EN C 80/149 Official Journal of the European Union
2.6. In its communication the Commission makes little
reference to relations with the Russian Federation (RF). In
response to a request made by the Council in June 2003,
the three southern Caucasian states, Georgia, Armenia andAzerbaijan, which will, with effect from 2007, become neigh-bours of the enlarged EU on the eastern shore of the Black Sea,
will be considered at the next stage.
3. Essential features of the Commission’s strategy with
regard to neighbourhood policy
3.1. The main aim of the EU’s neighbourhood policy is to
create an area of common values (peace, freedom, prosperity)and to provide an opportunity for enhancing Europe’s econ-
omic, social and political potential. In return for political and
economic reform, the countries concerned will be offered theprospect of a better stake in the internal market (
1) — based
on the model of the European Economic Area. Free trade and
cooperation agreements, as are already in place with some ofthe states around the Mediterranean, would be an innovationfor the neighbouring states to the east.
3.2. Clearly, the EU is interested in securing its external
borders. Thus the new neighbours are to commit to joining
the fight against illegal immigration, signing readmission
agreements to this effect. Cooperation on justice and homeaffairs policy and the fight against organised crime and
corruption are to be stepped up. In return, cross-border traffic
is to be improved and freed up by means of local visaarrangements.
3.3. The existing basis of agreement involving Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) is not to be extended, but
rather utilised to fuller effect. On this basis, action plans are tobe drawn up for each neighbouring country or individual
region, fleshing out the combination of reforms and access to
the EU internal market in terms of concrete measures. Thequestion of possible EU membership is deliberately left aside,
that is to say, answered neither positively nor negatively. On
this point account must be taken of Article 49 of the EC Treaty(Article 1(2) in the draft European Constitution) whereby theEU is open to all states ‘ ... which respect its values and are
committed to promoting them together.’
4. Outcome of the fact-finding visit to the Republic of
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus
4.1. This vision for an EU neighbourhood policy has been
discussed with representatives of civil society organisations
(CSOs) and political circles in the Republic of Moldova,
(1) i.e. participation in the four freedoms (goods, capital, people and
services).Ukraine and Belarus. The EESC’s assessment is also intended
to reflect their expectations of relations with the EU, the fears
surrounding the new borders and the specific features of each
individual country (2).
4.2. Brief description of the countries
4.2.1. In the Middle Ages, Belarus formed part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was subsequently incorporated
into the Tsarist Russian Empire, later becoming a SocialistSoviet Republic. Belarus declared itself an independent republic
on 26 August 1991 but it retained close links with Russia, a
country with which it has been negotiating a treaty of unionfor some time. Belarus is a member of the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. Belarus’ guest status at
the Council of Europe was suspended in 1997 as a result ofinfringements of the statutes. The EU and many individual EU
Member States have since then cut back sharply their diplo-
matic relations with Belarus or broken off relations altogether.
4.2.2. Part of Ukraine also belonged to the Polish-Lithuani-
an Commonwealth and part of the Ukrainian National Repub-lic, which has existed since the beginning of the 20th century,
was a founder member of the Soviet Union. After 1945 the
borders of the Ukraine were extended to take in parts ofGalicia and eastern Slovakia, North Bukowina, and, in 1954,
the Crimea. Ukraine declared itself independent on 24 August
1991. It is a member of the United Nations and is involved inthe activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). It has been a member of the Council of Europe since
1995. It is not yet a member of the WTO.
4.2.3. The Principality of Moldau was annexed by Russia in
1812 and given the name of ‘Bessarabia’. The Republic of
Moldova has been an independent state since 27 August
1991. In 1994 the majority of the population of Moldovavoted against merger with Romania. Since 1991, under theinfluence of the former Soviet Army General Smirnov, the
eastern border region with Ukraine, Trans-Dniester, has
demanded autonomy and there is now a situation of de factodivision within the country. The Republic of Moldova is a
member of the WTO and participates in the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe.
4.3. Basic assessment of the EU’s neighbourhood policy
4.3.1. The most severe criticism of the European Com-
mission’s approach came from Ukraine. Alignment with theEU has provided the impetus for reform uniting all levels ofsociety in that country, although ideas on what such alignment
entails do not always coincide. Most of the Ukrainian interlocu-
tors called for greater recognition of Ukraine as a Europeancountry and an important strategic partner of the enlarged EU.
The prospect offered to them was disappointing and unclear,
as any form of reference to possible EU membership is avoided.Ukraine was, however, quick to see the positive side of the EU
initiative and is now intensively engaged in tailoring to its
needs the opportunities provided under the initiative.
(2) The talks were held by a small delegation from the study group
which travelled to Chisinau (Republic of Moldova), Kiev (Ukraine)
and Minsk (Belarus) from 5 to 12 July 2003.
C 80/150 EN 30.3.2004 Official Journal of the European Union
4.3.2. For the Republic of Moldova, forging closer ties with
the EU was a matter of survival, which it was desirable to
achieve through full participation in the association process
for SEE states. As admitted in a spirit of self-criticism, the PCAhas not yet been adequately exploited. The Republic ofMoldova would like a genuine opportunity to choose, or
a more even balance in its dependence on its powerful
neighbours.
4.3.3. Belarus has not yet decided whether to align itself
with the EU or with the RF. The prospect of union with Russia
is used by the president to manipulate public opinion, with
implications in many areas of daily life. It is said that the EUhas worked itself into a corner with its policy of distancing
itself from Belarus and much ground needs to be made up in
bringing the democratic ideas and values of the EU to ordinarypeople. It would be a mistake to equate Belarus with President
Lukashenko, one expert commented. In the meantime, con-
flicts between Belarus and the Russian Federation aredeveloping to an increasing extent.
4.4. Economic expectations
4.4.1. The Ukrainian economy has shown high growth
rates (9,1 % in 2001) and a dramatic fall in inflation (from
28,2 % in 2000 to 1,2 % in 2001). The country also has good
potential, both in terms of raw materials and fertile soil, andin terms of well-educated human resources. Many interlocutorsin Ukraine now fear that the forthcoming eastward enlarge-
ment of the EU will bring their country more disadvantages
than benefits. At least for a certain period, trade relations withtoday’s accession countries will be significantly disrupted. New
tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as the Schengen Agreement
with strict border controls and visa requirements, have dra-matically restricted the largely free movement of people and
goods between Ukraine and directly neighbouring states which
prevailed previously.
4.4.2. The Republic of Moldova is still economically depen-
dent on the RF, even after achieving independent statehood.98 % of natural gas consumption is imported from Russia and,
owing to a lack of money, is paid for through the sale of shares
in (state) enterprises. Other than that, there are virtually noforeign investors at present. With its low growth and high rate
of inflation, Moldova has become the poor man of Europe.
More than half the population live under the $US 2-a-daypoverty line. An estimated 70 % of net economic output is
produced in the shadow economy. Most Moldovan interlocu-
tors fear further negative repercussions from EU enlargement,especially with the prospect of Romanian accession, since this
would render more difficult the key economic relations
between Moldova and Romania.
4.4.3. The economic situation in Belarus is deteriorating
alarmingly. Before 1991 the country was considered the‘assembly plant of the Soviet Union’, particularly for arma-
ments and precision engineering, with a correspondingly high
standard of living. The economic policy of the ruling regime,
which rejects any kind of ‘Western modernisation’, has led toa critical brake on investment. 80 % of industrial facilities haveeffectively been written off, according to an expert based in
Minsk. This makes it impossible to make use of the potential,
which certainly exists, or of the country’s geostrategicallyfavourable location (transit country for Russian energy supplies
to the West and for goods exported to the East). Commercial
and economic relations with EU Member States are at such alow level that the shift of the EU’s external border will have an
economic impact on the border regions first and foremost,
doing little to change the overall situation.
4.5. Securing the borders and illegal immigration
4.5.1. ‘What interest would we have in securing the EU’s
external borders?’ This question is symptomatic of the attitude
to what the EU clearly reveals to be one of the priorities of its
policy. The border issue calls for greater understanding and abroader vision.
4.5.2. The key problem is the burgeoning trend in emi-
gration, mostly among skilled, younger people. According to
a number of coinciding estimates, more than five millionUkrainians alone are thought to be living and working abroadillegally, often pretending to be returning tourists, especially
in the Russian Federation and in the EU, with marked
concentrations in Italy and Portugal. These expatriate Ukraini-ans send a good billion euro every year to their families back
home. A similar pattern can be seen in Belarus and Moldova.
There is an urgent need for a joint approach to clarifying thestatus and future of these illegal immigrants. These problems
cannot be solved through the use of readmission agreements.
4.5.3. The extent of human trafficking and enforced prosti-
tution, including child abuse, organised on a cross-borderbasis, is inestimable and simply unacceptable. Moves towards
cross-border investigation and the protection of victims must
be at the very top of the EU’s list of priorities.
4.5.4. Securing the external borders in line with the Schen-
gen Agreement must have the least possible detrimental effect
on local border traffic, economic relations and freedom of
movement in general. There is also a feeling amongst thecountries concerned of being left to cope on their own withthe problem of would-be migrants from third countries refused
entry at the new external borders of the EU as a result of
stricter controls; the protection of these migrants constitutes ahumanitarian problem.
30.3.2004 EN C 80/151 Official Journal of the European Union
4.6. Work of civil society organisations (1)and their expectations
of relations with the EU
4.6.1. In all three countries there is a comprehensive
network of civil society organisations, the largest number
being in Ukraine, where over 20 000 are thought to be active
at local, regional and national level in a range of areas. Even inBelarus there are estimated to be some 3 000, of which2 000 are legally registered. Figures by themselves do not,
however, provide much information regarding the level of
importance and independence of these organisations or theirrights. Few of them are able to finance their operations from
members’ subscriptions. There is, however, a number of
significant players (
2) in each country.
4.6.2. Labour market organisations bear the characteristic
traits found in the current accession countries past and present.However, it should be said that in Belarus large parts of the
reformed former state trade unions have fallen under the
sway of the presidential administration and are no longerindependent. Associations of private enterprises are still on the
small side and there is little evidence of sectoral working
structures. Chambers of trade and industry are very active andhave become indispensable as a conduit of foreign traderelations. Cooperation between the organisations works
reasonably well.
4.6.3. It was a matter of agreement and great importance
for all interlocutors to organise a practical exchange of
experience with civil society organisations and institutions inthe EU. The need for information was great and covered a
wide field, ranging from associative structures, economic
contacts, background information on companies, dialogue andnegotiation structures to issues such as youth policy, consumer
policy, e-learning etc.
4.6.4. The EESC was largely unknown, and its work and
the opportunity to establish contact elicited all the moreinterest for that. The development of regular relations with the
EESC was explicitly welcomed, first and foremost because the
institutional framework and cooperation of all civil societyplayers, in a single forum at European level, hold out thepromise of easier access to these players.
4.7. The EU’s support policy
4.7.1. The verdicts on experiences with the EU’s support
policy, especially TACIS, were mixed, and in some cases, very
critical concerning the burden of bureaucracy, particularlybefore projects get underway. There was a desire to see more
(1) A precise description of civil society organisations should be
commissioned with a view to preparing the symposium referredto in point 6.2.4. below.
(
2) At the time of the fact-finding trip, there were moves afoot with
the clear purpose of repressing the central NGO body in Belaruswhich serves as a resource centre for other organisations in rural
areas.support for developing infrastructure and institution building
itself, and not only for reinforcing such institutions’ relations
with the government, and more cross-border cooperation,
especially with local and regional bodies. Key points were thelack of durability, due in part to the short-term nature ofsupport or — especially in the case of Ukraine — the lack of
more individualised support along the lines of the PHARE
programme.
4.7.2. In addition, the representatives of civil society are
very interested in the further development of contacts (as
promoted by TAIEX in the case of the accession countries), in
a regular exchange of experience (as promoted by TWINNING)and in involvement in European dialogue structures. This is
dealt with in more detail in section 6 entitled ‘Recommen-
dations’.
5. Specific comments by the EESC
5.1. Access to the internal market of the EU and reforms
The Commission’s offer of closer economic cooperation and
the endeavour to provide a uniform basis for all neighbouringcountries are positive steps, as is the strategy of seeking to
achieve tangible success rapidly through the use of annual
action plans. This approach does, however, have little to dowith the imparting of EU values and genuine moves to bring
conditions more into line with the EU social model. The
lessons should rather have been learned from the currentaccession negotiations that the social and democratic dimen-
sion forms part of integration policy. There are a good many
reasons for adopting a far-sighted approach to the use of theprinciple of conditionality. On the one hand, the prospect of
market access has a limited impact on the introduction of
internal reforms whilst, on the other hand, there is a perfectlygood case to be made, in the event of conditions not beingfulfilled for giving support to those advocating reform, rather
than calling a complete halt to activities.
5.2. European Economic Area option
5.2.1. The option, suggested in the Commission’s com-
munication, of setting up a European economic area, along
the lines of the current EEA, does not represent a suitable
model for the EU’s neighbourhood policy. The specific featuresof the EEA are the full implementation of internal market rules
and the capacity to monitor these, while having only a very
limited influence on the EU’s political decisions. The presentEEA countries have competitive economies and stable political
and social systems and have decided of their own free will not
to join the EU. The EEA option is illusory for the easternneighbours: if they met the requirements, they could just aswell become Member States. If they do not meet the require-
ments, access to the single market would be one-sided or
explosive for their economies, with a great risk of socialdumping and distorted competition.
C 80/152 EN 30.3.2004 Official Journal of the European Union
5.2.2. It is true of all three countries that their production
structure and trade conditions rule out a unilateral alignment
with the EU market at present. Russia is indispensable for
certain products, such as agricultural produce and energy.They are therefore forced by objective circumstances to adopta twin-track approach, finding their own balance between
their trading partners. The extent to which the establishment
of a common economic area, comprising the RF, Ukraine,Belarus and Kazakhstan, under the Yalta Agreement of 19 Sep-
tember 2003, could, in principle, conflict with closer ties with
the EU is at present unclear.
5.3. The question of EU membership
The idea that it would be possible to avoid the question of EU
membership has turned out to be an illusion. All attempts toformulate a definition of ‘neighbourhood’ which excludes any
observations on the subject of membership have tended rather
to be regarded as provocation than as a means of helping toclarify the situation. It would be better if this question were
addressed openly. Even though the EU should first deal with
the current enlargement, this is, however, compatible with therequirement of keeping the door open in principle (see
point 3.3 above). This approach will allow these countries to
play a stronger role in European integration and it alsoprovides an important impetus for reform. Developments over
the next few years will be of crucial importance to this
fundamental question.
5.4. The Eastern Dimension
In the course of discussion on the EU’s neighbourhood policy,
Poland made a name for itself with a new approach for EUexternal policy. Its blueprint for an ‘Eastern Dimension’ refers
to Belarus, Ukraine and the RF, basically calling for more
intensive work on the imminent problems of the new bordersand for closer contact and links with these states. In thisrespect, the term ‘Eastern Dimension’ means calling upon the
EU to make this issue a focal point for its external policy in
future. Despite the fact that the underlying situation in thesecountries is similar, there are many good reasons for organising
relations with these countries on an individual basis.
6. Recommendations in respect of the individual
countries
6.1. Particular recommendations for Ukraine
6.1.1. Among the eastern neighbours, Ukraine is perhaps
the country most affected by eastward enlargement of the EUand at the same time the most advanced economically. It will
be able to fully realise its role as the driving force in the eastern
neighbourhood region of the EU if further progress can bemade towards an independent legal system and a parliamentary
democracy. Far-reaching economic reform and the harmonis-
ation of norms and standards with those of the EU are also ofcrucial importance to this process. The outstanding problems— which, according to the European Commission, are more
of a technical nature — standing in the way of recognition of
Ukraine’s status as a market economy, and its admission to theWTO, should be resolved as soon as possible.6.1.2. The EESC welcomes the plans, by both the Ukrainian
side and the EU side, to draw up the action plan for 2004
without delay. The EESC also calls for a transparent approach
and for consultations with the Ukrainian civil society organis-ations (CSOs). The EESC is acting on the recommendations ofthe European Parliament by upgrading its relations with
Ukraine. This should also involve laying the ground for closer
trade relations and examining the possibility of visa-free localborder traffic between the enlarged EU and Ukraine.
6.1.3. The EU should take on those elements of the Phare
programme which can be applied to Ukraine, so as to help
speed up the transformation process.
Special attention should also be paid to the Carpathian
Euroregion (western Ukraine) and to improving the aid
provided for cross-border, inter-regional cooperation under
the Community’s Interreg IV programme.
6.2. Particular recommendations for the Republic of Moldova
6.2.1. Finding a solution to the Trans-Dniester dispute,
which effectively divides the country in two, is ultimately a
prerequisite for many other political and economic develop-
ment projects. The EU should step up its commitment tofinding a rapid solution to the conflict and it should promote
coalescence.
6.2.2. In principle, the same political and economic reforms
as in Ukraine are urgently needed in Moldova. Corruptionborn out of poverty often stifles any private enterprise. Despite
the highest rate of support per inhabitant, it is clear that little
has changed in structural terms or in the political climate.
6.2.3. More attention should be given to promoting civil
society organisations (CSOs). They can make a major contri-bution to solving the problems mentioned in the previous
point, in particular the fight against corruption.
6.3. Particular recommendations for the Republic of Belarus
6.3.1. The Commission’s action plan for future neighbour-
hood policy with Belarus should make free access to allinformation and support for an independent media a clear
priority.
6.3.2. The Commission should turn the Minsk ‘branch
office’ of the Kiev delegation, which under the circumstanceshas done sterling work as a ‘bureau for the implementation of
technical assistance’, into a fully-fledged delegation. More press
and public relations work is called for, particularly in the run-up to the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.
30.3.2004 EN C 80/153 Official Journal of the European Union
6.3.3. The promotion of democratic structures and civil
society organisations requires insider knowledge and contacts
in the country. It is particularly true in the case of Belarus that
the groundwork for TACIS projects with this objective cannotget underway without preliminary meetings of the partnersinvolved. In this respect, the EU’s limited relations with Belarus
have resulted in much ground needing to be made up with
regard to communication and mutual understanding.
6.3.4. The EESC welcomes the more rigorous stance on
human rights violations in Belarus, both through the EU’s
general tariff preferences and through the introduction of a
mission of inquiry procedure by the ILO.
7. General recommendations
7.1. Recommendations for the European Commission, the Council
and the European Parliament
7.1.1. The EESC welcomes the Commission’s intention,
confirmed in July 2003, to enhance political and economicrelations with the eastern and southern neighbours of the
enlarged EU and to increase offers of cooperation, not only in
the economic sphere, but also in home affairs and legalharmonisation. As regards moves to facilitate access to the
internal market of the EU, the EESC recommends a proactive
strategy, backed up by adjustments to comply with technicalstandards and integration of the transport, energy and telecom-
munications networks. Support should also be provided for
the adjustments required to enable the countries concerned tocomply with the legal and administrative prerequisites forpromoting business activity, e.g. with regard to provisions in
respect of intellectual property rights and rules of origin,
and to enable them to bolster skills in the field of publicadministration.
7.1.2. The proposals for the practical implementation of
these objectives within the European Commission are lessconvincing. Cooperation across DGs is valuable, but only if
political responsibility and the capacity to act are strong
enough and clearly defined. Both African and European statesare subsumed under the label of ‘Wider Europe’. The EESCrecommends separating the regions referred to as ‘eastern
neighbours’ and ‘southern Mediterranean’ so as to do better
justice to the specific features of these countries, and inparticular to the already established objectives of the Euro-
Mediterranean strategy.
7.1.3. The EESC recommends concrete projects in the
following areas as a matter of priority:
— making the establishment of independent CSOs and the
development of the civil dialogue key areas for support;
strengthening the social partners and the social dialogue,in particular also at enterprise level;— actions to support the development of sound conditions
for business and market economy reform, as well as
preferential trading relations and instruments for invest-
ment promotion and protection;
— people-friendly arrangements to promote the free move-
ment of people on the EU’s new external borders,
impeding links between the ‘new neighbours’ and thenew Member States as little as possible. Every effort must
be made to prevent the emergence of new walls (
1).
— increased cross-border cooperation to combat human
trafficking and international crime;
— measures to combat corruption, which is, inter alia, a key
barrier to foreign direct investment; the support providedby independent civil-society organisations plays a vital
role in this context;
— transitional solutions to the problem of illegal migrants
from these border countries who are living in the EU (
2);
— joint strategies for combating infectious diseases (HIV,
tuberculosis);
— environmental cooperation projects;— projects to promote cultural, scientific and educational
exchanges, backed up by opening of certain EU agenciesto participation by interested neighbouring countries (
3);
— an improved EU information policy with the opening of
Euro-Info centres and support for the work of the
independent media, which could include exchange pro-grammes for journalists;
— as a complementary measure, the provision of infor-
mation on EU member States should be stepped up.
— the introduction of cross-border cooperation pro-
grammes between the accession countries and the ‘new
neighbours’, especially in the field of education and
training and economic and civil society cooperation.
(1) One possibility could be the introduction of permanent visas
with or without a nominal fee. Experience gained with thearrangements in respect of the Finnish-Russian border demon-strates that this system is perfectly compatible with the status of a
‘Schengen frontier’. Agreement has recently been reached on the
introduction of free of charge visas in respect of border trafficbetween Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Ukraine and alsoKaliningrad. In the meantime a proposal relating to local bordertraffic has also been presented by the European Commission,which is a move in the right direction.
(
2) An agreement has recently been concluded between Ukraine and
Portugal on the authorisation of limited periods of residence forUkrainian workers. Portugal and Greece have each now concludedbilateral agreements on immigration quotas with Ukraine.
(
3) The Turin based European Training Foundation (ETF) has included
the three countries within the scope of its work since its
establishment in the mid-1990s.
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7.1.4. The European Commission promises a new funding
instrument for neighbourhood policy from 2007. This must
overcome the practices currently applied under the TACIS
programme, which are too bureaucratic and too far removedfrom the real needs of society in the countries concerned. TheEESC suggests supporting certain projects (infrastructure,
environment, education) on the one hand, and encouraging
the development of independent civil society organisationsand their cooperation with partners in the EU on the other.
Cooperation projects should focus on themes such as encour-
aging entrepreneurship and innovation, economic trans-parency and the fight against corruption, promoting social
dialogue, combating all forms of discrimination, gender equal-
ity, strengthening local authorities, protection of the environ-ment and fostering cultural heritage and cultural diversity.
7.1.5. The EESC recommends linking the national action
plans and neighbourhood policy projects together and listing
them in the context of the annual revision of the action plans.Financial support could then be linked to a medium-termreform programme. Annual progress reports would ensure
greater transparency and better monitoring of the success
achieved. These should also be subject to consultations withinthe countries concerned, and not just in the respective forums
and joint committees with the EU. However, such an approach
requires developing a relationship of trust and ensuring thatthe objectives of neighbourhood relations are not dictated
unilaterally by the EU.
7.2. Recommendations for further work in this field by the EESC
7.2.1. The structured dialogue carried on for many years by
the EESC with partner organisations in the acceding countries,
particular regions (ACP, MERCOSUR) or bilaterally (China,India) is bearing fruit. This instrument should also be used
with the three eastern neighbours in the form of ‘liaison
committees’. This could be acted upon immediately andpreparations made in the longer term for the establishment of
Joint Consultative Committees (JCC), which may, in principle,
be established under the existing PCAs.
7.2.2. To alleviate the obvious information shortfall, access
to EESC documents and publications available on the Internet
should be provided in particular for interested parties in thosecountries. Special attention should be paid, in this context, toenvironmental and consumer protection associations, which
have had little opportunity to develop freely up to now.
7.2.3. In addition to its work on the establishment of
strong organisations and an effective social dialogue and civil
dialogue, the EESC should address, in particular, the subject of
tackling illegal migration, a subject on which it already putforward key proposals in June 2001 (
1).
(1) See OJ C 260, 17.9.2001, p. 104.7.2.4. The establishment of close contacts between theEESC and CSOs in the neighbouring states to the east of the
EU is a long-term task; such relations will be substantially
enriched by the knowledge and contacts brought to an EU-wide strategy by the new EU Member States. The first stepwhich should be taken is to hold a symposium at the EESC,
modelled on the conference with the accession countries and
including representatives from the RF, to garner furthersuggestions for the future configuration of relations with the
EU. If possible, this should be held in Brussels in autumn 2004.
7.2.5. Wherever possible, the EESC and the European
Parliament should cooperate more closely and promote the
exchange of experience between the respective liaison com-mittees.
7.2.6. The next steps to be taken by the European Com-
mission and the Council will concern, above all, the concrete
action plans. The EESC can make an important contribution
to this work and it should participate in an appropriate way.
7.2.7. As an institution representing organised civil society
in the EU, the EESC should encourage national organisationsin the Member States to establish contacts with civil society in
the countries concerned with a view to strengthening demo-
cratic and social development.
7.3. Further recommendations
7.3.1. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the United Nationsare carrying out important work in the countries under
consideration. The EU should gear its activities to the work
carried out by these organisations.
7.3.2. The neighbouring countries of the enlarged EU will
progress towards the EU average that much quicker the more
they are able to benefit from private direct investment and
long-term loans. These countries should therefore have directaccess to the funds of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
There is also a need to boost scope for action on the part of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development(EBRD).
7.3.3. The EU should provide a stronger counterbalance to
the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and theWorld Bank by highlighting ways of achieving socially-
balanced reforms and, in particular, by supporting the reform
of social protection schemes. For their part, the World Bankand the IMF should also be reminded of their duty tostrengthen labour market organisations and civil society
organisations. This action should be carried out in close
cooperation with the EESC, other EU Institutions and theInternational Labour Organisation.
30.3.2004 EN C 80/155 Official Journal of the European Union
8. The role of the Russian Federation
8.1. The future of the states of Belarus, Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova is influenced to a decisive degree by the
relations between these states and the RF. For this reason —
but also because of fundamental considerations, taking accountof the importance of the RF — the EU should be interested in
closer cooperation with the RF and should further extend its
relations with the RF. The EESC should also take account ofthese requirements in its work and should step up its contacts
with organisations in the RF.
Brussels, 11 December 2003.
The President
of the European Economic and Social Committee
Roger BRIESCH8.2. On the basis of the revised Partnership and Cooper-
ation Agreement (PCA) and the ‘common strategy’ of the EUand its Member States towards the RF, the EESC should alsoset out its ideas in an opinion of its own. In addition to thegoal of promoting cooperation at civil society level andcreating a deeper understanding of each other, we should alsobe supporting the process of reform in the RF that will takeplace if, say, it joins the WTO. The proposed symposium inautumn 2004 (see point 7.2.4 above) will, of course, includerepresentatives from the RF and could serve as a starting-point.
A ‘round table’ similar to that held, for example, with India,
would be a possible work platform for further measures andfor putting EU-RF relations onto a permanent footing.