EN 
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 7 May 2010 
on an amendment to the rules securing the conti nuation of office of the President of Narodowy 
Bank Polski 
(CON/2010/37) 
 Introduction and legal basis
 
On 3 May 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) rece ived a request from the Marshal of the Polish 
Parliament for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the 
‘draft law’)1. 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent  of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Ce ntral Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions2, as the draft law relates to Narodowy Bank  Polski (NBP). In accordance with the 
first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Pro cedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 
Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 1.1 Under Article 10(1) of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the ‘Law on NBP’)
3, in the 
event of absence, the President of NBP is substituted by the Vice-President – First Deputy 
President of NBP (hereinafter the ‘Vice-President’) . This provision is currently the only provision 
in Polish law securing the continuity of office of the NBP President4. 
1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law5, the smooth performance and transfer 
of the duties of NBP’s decision-making bodies following the expiry of the term of office of NBP’s President, as well as the continuity of the operations of NBP, are essential for the financial security 
of the State and the stability of its monetary policy.  The draft law aims to clarify the current rules 
securing the continuity of the office of the NBP Pr esident by adding a new Article 9a according to 
                                                 
1  Published on the website of the Polish Parliament  at www.sejm.gov.pl, parliamentary print No 3008. 
2  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
3  Law of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski (consolidated text: Dziennik Ustaw  (Dz. U.) of 2005 No 1, Item 2). 
4  Article 10(1) does not specify the nature of the absen ce or the scope of duties and powers conferred upon the Vice-
President as regards his participation in certain decision-ma king bodies of NBP. While this lack of full clarity was 
provisionally remedied in practice,  the draft law aims to provide legal certainty to this end. 
5 See explanatory memorandum to the draft law, p. 1. 
2 which: (i) following the expiry of the whole of the 6-year term of office of the NBP President6, the 
NBP President remains in office until a newly appointed President takes up his duties; and 
(ii) following the termination of the term of offi ce of the NBP President due to death, resignation or 
dismissal7, the duties of the NBP President are performed by the Vice-President until a newly 
appointed NBP President takes up his duties.  
 2. ECB comments 2.1 The continuity of the office of the Governor or President of a national central bank raises two 
issues for central bank independence. First, there is the issue of institutional independence. The 
statutes of national central banks have to provide  clear rules on who will take over the office of 
Governor or President in the event of the expiry of the term of office of the existing Governor or 
President by passage of time or due to death, resi gnation or dismissal so as to avoid any external 
interference. Second, there is the issue of pers onal independence. It must be ensured that any 
person who takes over the duties of the Governor or President on an interim basis until a newly appointed Governor or President takes up his duties benefits from the same rules on security of tenure of office and grounds for dismissal as any member of the decision-making bodies of national 
central banks involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks. 
2.2 The ECB welcomes the draft law as it improves lega l certainty by securing continuity of the office 
of the NBP President and removes ambiguities in the existing provisions. As regards personal independence, the ECB notes that, when perform ing the duties of the President under proposed 
Article 9a(2), the Vice-President benefits from th e same safeguards as are normally applicable to 
the members of decision-making bodies of national central banks. 
2.3 As regards the institutional independence, in relati on to the expiry of the 6-year term of office or 
termination of the office under Article 9(4)(2-4) of the Law on NBP, the national authorities should 
ensure that a successor is appointed  within a reasonable time following such expiry or termination. 
2.4 In addition, the ECB notes that, for reasons of  legal clarity, the Law on NBP as amended by the 
draft law would benefit from a clarification of the relationship between the current wording of 
Article 10(1) and the proposed Article 9a.    
 
                                                 
6  Ground for the expiry of the NBP President’s term of offi ce provided for under Article 9(4)(1) of the Law on NBP. 
7 Grounds for termination of the term of office of the NBP President provided for under Article 9(4)(2-4) of the Law on 
NBP. 
3 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 
  Done at Frankfurt am Main, 7 May 2010. 
[signed] 
  
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET