EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 30 January 2019  
on remuneration for  executive s and senior manag ement in Narodowy Bank Polski  
(CON/20 19/3) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 28 January 2019 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Polish Sejm  
(Parliament ) for an opinion on three draft laws amending various laws on  remuneration policies at 
Narodowy Bank Polski  (NBP) . Each of the three draft laws has been introduced by members of the 
Parliament drawn from different political parties i n the Parliament.  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union  and the third indent of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as 
the draft law s relate to NBP.  In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law s 
1.1 Law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski and the Law on restri cting business activities for 
public officials (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’)  
1.1.1  The first draft law , proposed by members of Parliament from the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and 
Justice party ), introduces , inter alia,  a provision that requires  the NBP management board to set 
the remuneration for individual categories of senior manage ment positions  at NBP , provided that 
the maximum remuneration for a position m ust not exceed 60% of the NBP Governor’s total 
remuneration  (including any applicable awards , bonuses and other benefits) . Under the current 
version of the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski2, the NBP management board takes into account 
salary levels  in the banking sector when establishing the amount of funds available for 
remuneration of NBP staff  memb ers. 
1.1.2 Additionally, the first draft law proposes to make public the remuneration of persons occupying 
senior managerial pos itions  at NBP and of NBP management board members , as well as the NBP 
management board’s resolution  on the rules of remuneration of NBP staff  members . The 
publication would include the specific pos ition and its remuneration for each month, including any 
applicable awards , bonuses and other benefits paid in the calendar year preceding the year in 
which the information is published.  
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Centr al Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim (Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1373) . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
2 1.1.3 The first draft law also proposes publi shing certain historical data. In particular,  within 30 days of 
the entry into force of the draft law,  the NBP Governor would be required to publish,  on the NBP ’s 
website,  the NBP management board’s resolution s on the rules of remuneration of NBP staff 
members  and levels of remuneration of  NBP management board members and other senior 
management from  1995 to 2018 . 
1.1.4.  Finally, the first draft law  proposes to amend the Law on r estricting business activities  for public 
officials3 by requiring N BP management board members and other senior management to make 
declarations of their financial interests . This requirement is similar to requirements for the NBP 
Governor and certain other public administration officials  in Poland. The draft law also has a 
provision that puts restrictions on the type of business activities in which NBP management board 
members and other senior management  are able to participate.   
1.2 Law amending the Law on restricting business activities for public officials (hereinafter the ‘second 
draft law’)  
 Similarly  to the first draft law, the second draft law , proposed by members of Parliament from the 
Platforma Obywatelska ( Civic Platform  party ), aims to impose a requirement on  NBP management 
board members and othe r senior management to make declarations of their financial status. 
Additionally, in this case, much of the information disclosed in these declarations of financial 
interests  would be public, incl uding the name of the individuals  submittin g the declaration . 
Address es, information on the location of real estate property and information that would allow the 
identification of  personal  property owned by the person submitting the declaration would not be 
made public . 
1.3 Law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the ‘third draft law’)  
 The third draft law , proposed by me mbers of Parliament from the Kukiz ‘15 movement , introduces a 
new mechanism  under  which  the Marshall of the Sejm, acting upon the proposal of the NBP 
Governor , is to issue an ordinance specifying the qualification requirements, remuneration rules 
and position bands applicable to NBP staff members. This  ordinance is to  be made public. 
Accordingly, under the third draft law the rules  for NBP staff remuneration would no longer be laid 
down by the NBP m anagement board and salary level s in the banking sector will no longer be 
taken into account when establishing the amount of funds available for remuneration of NBP staff 
members.  
 
2. Specific observations  
2.1 Central bank indepen dence  
As all of the three draft law s apply to and directly affect the NBP’s decision -making bodies and its 
employees,  they should be examined from the perspective of central bank independence 
requirements under  Article 130 of the Treaty, in particular financial independence, as well as that of 
the personal independence of the members of the NBP ’s decision -making bodies4. 
                                                 
3  Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 roku o ograniczeniu pro wadzenia działalności gospodarczej przez osoby pełniące 
funkcje publiczne (Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1393) . 
4  See, e.g. , paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2017/49.  All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 2.2 Financial independence  
2.2.1  The ECB has a well -established doctrine that autonomy in staff matters is an integral aspect of the 
principle of fi nancial independence of national central banks (NCBs)  in the European System of 
Central Banks . According to this principle, Member States may not impair an NCB’s ability to 
employ and retain the qualified staff necessary for the NCB to perform independentl y the tasks 
conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Statute of the ESCB ’). Also, an NCB may 
not be put into a position where it has limited cont rol or no control over its staff, or where the 
government of a Member State can influence its policy on staff matters5. 
2.2.2  In order to protect NBP’s autonomy in staff matters, the Polish legislator is  under an obligation to 
ensure that a decision on any legis lative proposal  is taken in close and effective cooperation with 
NBP, taking due account of its view, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to independently 
carry out its tasks6.  
2.2.3  Amendments  included in any legislative proposal  that lead to reductions i n remuneration are not 
compatible with the principle of financial indepen dence if NBP’s ability to employ and retain staff to 
perform  independently the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB is 
affected. The ECB notes that the expl anatory memoranda  accompanying the draft laws  do not 
analy se this issue, including the effects of a possible reduction of remuneration on NBP’s ability to 
employ and retain the necessary staff . In order to be compatible with the principle of financial 
independence,  any adopted legislative solution should provide for a cooperation mechanism with 
NBP, to ascertain if NBP considers that an exception to a  cap on remuneration is required. Such a 
deviation should be decided upon in close and effective cooperation with NBP, taking due account 
of NBP’s views, to ensure the ongoing ability of NBP to independently carry out its tasks7. Any 
amendments that lead to reductions in the remuneration for an NCB ’s staff members should not 
interfere with that NCB’s powers to administer its own financial resources, including the funds 
resulting from any reduction in salaries that it pays8. 
2.2.4  Personal independence  
The ECB notes that any sanctions  which are imposed by  the Law on restrict ing business activities 
for public officials  (under the first or the second draft law s) due to the NBP Governor ’s and other 
members of the NBP management board’s  non-compliance with the obligation to submit 
declarations of their financial interests should be compatible with Article 14.2 of the Statu te of the 
ESCB,  and should not establish new grounds for dismissal of the NBP Governor or other members 
of the NBP m anagement board,  contrary to that Article .  
2.3 Transparency  
                                                                                                                                                             
www.ecb.europa.eu.  
5   See paragraph 6 of Opinion C ON/2012/89, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2008/10 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion 
CON/2008/9.  
6  See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2018, 2.2.3 (‘Autonomy in staff matters’) . See also paragraph 2.1 of Opinion 
CON/2016/32.  
7  See paragraph 2.1 of  Opinion CON/2016/32.  
8  See the ECB’s  Convergence Report 2018, 2.2.3 (‘Autonomy in staff matters’)  and paragraph 4.2.2 of  Opinion 
CON/2014/38.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 The doctrine of autonomy in staff matters  does not prevent the publication of information on the 
method by which  remuneration is determined and the remuneration of NCB staff members  and the 
members of the NCB ’s decision- making bodies . Such disclosure princip ally promotes transparency 
and good governance and constitutes best practice in pub lic administration910. However, to the 
extent that the provisions included in any of the draft laws  might  lead to the publication of personal  
information, the relevant data protection legislation and related case- law would need to be 
considered prior to the draft law being adopted.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 January 2019.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
                                                 
9  See paragraph 3.1 of  Opinion CON/2008/10.  
10  At the ECB and in several Member States , such information is public or can be di sclosed upon request.