COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMLFNITIES 
C0M(92) 318 final 
Brussels, 9 JuIy 1992 
Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) 
imposlng a deflnitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal 
origlnatlng in Brazil and definltively collecting the amounts 
secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty 
(presented by the Commission) 
EXPLANATORY MEMO 
Procedure 
Commisslon Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposed a 
provisional anti-dumping duty of 42.1% on imports of silicon metal 
originating in Brazil.1 The following rates of duty were applied to 
the companies below: 
- Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA) 42.1% 
- Rlma Eletrometalurgia SA 37.7% 
- Eletroila SA 33.0% 
- Minasligas 40.1% 
- Camargo Correia Metais 28.3% 
- Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio 18.5% 
After provisional duties were imposed, those parties concerned who had 
requested it were heard by the Commission and submitted written 
comments on the investigation's provisional findings. 
These oral and/or written comments were examined and, where 
appropriate, taken into account in the Commission's final conclusions. 
0J No L 96, 10.4.1992, p.17 
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II. DumpIng 
The arguments put forward by the Brazilian exporters were not 
considered to warrant a change in the method used to make a 
provisional assessment of dumping. Certain specific corrections to 
factual errors or mistakes in the interpretation of existing data did, 
however, lead the Commission to alter slightly the normal value and 
export prlce of Brazilian silicon metal. Other adjustments were made 
to ensure the comparabiIity of the prices actually paid at different 
marketing stages in domestic and export transactions. 
The overall result of these adjustments was a small change in the 
dumping margins established for the above Brazilian exporters. 
The dumping of Brazilian silicon metal is therefore confirmed. 
III. Inlurv 
The provisional findings regarding injury are confirmed since none of 
the arguments presented cast doubt on their Justification. 
IV. Community Interest 
Comments by certain industrial users in the Community regarding the 
soundness of imposing anti-dumping measures were not considered 
sufficient to warrant reconsidering the Community interest as 
provisionally defined. 
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V. Undertafcinos 
Undertakings QfferQd by the Brazilian producers were not Judged an 
approprfate sotution in this c&se and were therefore rejected. 
VI. peffnitfve naa^ura^ 
The CoasaTssrion concludes that a 36.S3S anti-dumplng duty should be 
imposed on silicon metal iraports origlnating in Brazil and that tne 
foilowfng rates of duty should be appjied to compam'es beiow; 
- Rima Eletrometalurgia SA 34.6% 
- eietroiia SA 29.8% 
~ MinasTigas 26,4% 
- Canrargo Correia Uetais 20*4% 
- Companhia Brasfleira Carboreio de Calelo 18-35* 
The Coovnission is therefore submitting to the CouncII a proposal for a 
Council Regufatfon: 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metai 
originating In Brazil; 
- definrtively collecting. amounts secured by way of the provisional 
antl-duroping duty at the rates definitlveiy imposed. 

Council Regulation (EEC) No .../92 
of ... 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal 
originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts 
secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on 
protection against dumped or subsidized imports originating in countries 
not members of the European Economic Community,1 and in particular 
Article 12 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission after 
consultations within the Advisory Committee as provided for by the above 
Regulation, 
Whereas: 
A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
(1) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposed a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of silicon 
metal falling within CN code 2804 69 00 originating in Brazil.2 
1 0J No L 209, 2.8.1988, p.1. 
2 0J No L 96, 10.4.1992, p.17. 
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B. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING 
(2) After provisional duties were imposed, those concerned who had 
requested it were heard by the Commission. They also made known in 
writing their views on the provisional findings of the investigation. 
(3) At their request, the parties known to be concerned were informed of 
the essential facts and considerations on which it was intended to 
base the recommendation to impose definitive duties and def.init ively 
collect the amounts provisionally lodged. They were then allowed a 
period in which to make known their views. 
(4) The parties' oral and written comments were examined and, where 
appropriate, incorporated in the Commission's findings. 
C. THE PRODUCT AND LIKE PRODUCT 
(5) A trade association representing the interests of the Community 
chemical industry claimed that the definition of the product given in 
recital 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 contained inaccuracies 
regarding the chemical composition of the silicon metal used as a raw 
material for the manufacture of silicons. 
(6) The above trade association claimed furthermore that silicon metal for 
chemical uses could not be considered a Iike product to silicon metal 
for metallurgical uses for the reasons given in recital 10 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. 
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(7) It should be polnted out that trace elements, such as lead, found in 
sllicon metal constltute impurlties Inasmuch as they prevent the 
Rochow chemlcal synthesis and thus the productlon of chlorosllanes, a 
precursor of the siloxanes used In the manufacture of slllcones. 
Slmilarly, alumlnlum productlon is also governed, albelt to a lesser 
degree, by speciflcatlons relating to the content of trace elements, 
such as phosphorus which must be kept to a mlnimum. 
(8) While seeing no need to repeat the answer given in the above 
Regulation, the Commission thlnks it necessary to emphaslze that ail 
grades of silicon metal are the product of the initlal manufacturing 
process described in recital 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. The 
fact that standard-grade silicon metal may subsequently be further 
refined to the specifications of a given user , especially in the field 
of silicon chemicals, by the addition or removal of trace elements 
does not make chemical-grade silicon metal a different product from 
other grades, since ail have extremely slmilar physical properties, 
come from the same factories and pass through the same distribution 
networks, differing onIy insignificantIy in their production costs. 
(9) The Commission also stresses that the list of uses of silicon metal 
given in recital 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 is not exhaustive, 
and that the procedure covers ail grades of silicon metal with a 
silicon content of less than 99.99% by weight, regardless of its 
content in trace elements. The Commission confirms that it is 
technically posslble to use the silicon metal usually intended for the 
chcni i c.i I imlu'.try for t h>s alumlnlum Industry, provlded Its phouphoruo 
content does not exceed a certain threshold. 
4 -
(10) The Council consequently confirms that all grades of silicon metal are 
manufactured by the Community industry and possess technical 
properties comparable to those of the Brazilian industry as indicated 
in recital 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. The Council likewise 
confirms the Commission's conclusions in recital 7 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 906/92 that all grades of silicon metal should be regarded as a 
single product for the purposes of this procedure to assess dumping 
and the resulting injury to the Community Industry. 
D. DUMPING 
1• Normal value 
(11) For the purposes of the definitive conclusions, normal vaiue was 
generally established by the same methods as the provisional dumping 
margin, account being taken, where necessary, of the new circumstances 
and arguments presented by the parties. 
{12} One Brazilian producer claimed that its domestic sales did not reach 
the 5% threshold for export sales to the Community in any two 
consecutive months of the investigation period and could not therefore 
De aeemea a sufficient basis for the calculation of normal value. 
The Commission considers that the representativeness of an exporter's 
aomestic sales should generally be tested on the basis of the entire 
investigation period and not monthly, even if normal value was 
aetermined on a monthly basis to eliminate as far possible the impact 
of infiation in Brazil. The sales concerned must therefore be 
inciuded in the calculation of normal value according to tne method 
aescribed in recital 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. 
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The Council confirms these conclusions. 
(13) Claiming that the Brazilian government's economic recovery programme 
(the "Collor Plan") had led to an abnormal increase in energy costs 
and to the US dollar being undervalued against the cruzeiro from March 
to June 1990, several Brazilian producers asked that production costs 
for those months be excluded from the calculation of constructed 
normal value. 
The Commission, however, sees no reason to exclude the data for the 
period of the "Collor Plan". In the first place, a dumping case must 
be based on real and exhaustive data, such as a company's costs and 
sales during the investigation period as confirmed by examination of 
the evidence and on-site inspections. 
Secondly, the alleged impact of the "Collor Plan" does not mean that 
the Commission's findings regarding such production cost components as 
energy misrepresent Brazil's general economic situation in that period 
or that those components were not calculated in the course of normal 
trading on the Brazilian market. 
Thirdly, even if the "Collor Plan" did cause the cruzeiro to be 
temporarily overvalued in comparison with the US dollar, it is not for 
the Community to question either the soundness or the impact of the 
Brazilian government's monetary policy. The Commission has therefore 
followed established practice in the matter and used the official 
exchange rates applied wherever transactlons involved the conversion 
of currency. 
The Council confirms these conclusions. 
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(14) Several Brazilian producers asked that interest earned on currency 
operations be fully deductible from a firm's financing costs, and that 
any net financial profit be deducted from the production costs of the 
f irm concerned. 
The Commission, however, takes the view that such profits may be taken 
into account only if connected with a firm's main production activity 
and the ensuing sales, and then only to offset financial costs 
resulting directly from that production and those sales. This net 
financial profit may in no circumstances be offset against the firm's 
production costs. 
The Council confirms these conclusions. 
(15) Claiming the availability of stocks, one Brazilian producer asked that 
constructed normal value be based on production costs for the first 
haIf of the investigation period since transactions in the latter half 
of that period involved materials manufactured earlier at much lower 
costs. 
The Commission refuses to comply with this request because the figures 
provided do not corroborate the alleged availability of stocks and 
because the firm in question failed to support its request with data 
known to be available on its production costs calculated on the basis 
of updated costs. 
The Council confirms these concluslons. 
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(16) Another Brazilian producer asked that the export of a sample to an 
American company, mistakenly recorded as a domestic transaction, be 
excluded from the calculation of normal value. 
The Council confirms the Commission's agreement to exclude that 
transaction from the scope of this procedure. 
(17) Yet another Brazilian producer asked for a review of the method used 
to calculate its average profit margin: the margin seemed to have been 
overestimated because the provisional constructed normal value did not 
take proper account of some of the company's domestic sales of silicon 
metal. 
After examining the matter, the Commission accepted this request and 
adjusted the company's average profit margin accordingly. 
(18) The Council confirms these conclusions and those of recitals 14 to 16 
of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. 
2. Export prices 
(19) For the purposes of the definitive conclusions, the export price was 
generally established in the same way as the provisional dumping 
margin, due account being taken of new circumstances and arguments 
presented by the parties with appropriate supporting evidence. 
(20) In view of the above and recitals 17 and 18 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 906/92, the Council confirms the Commission's findings and 
conclusions in the matter. 
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3. Comoarison 
(21) A Brazilian producer submitted several requests regarding adjustments 
to the transport and packaging costs of certain exports to the 
Commun11 y. 
The Council confirms the Commission's refusal to accede to these 
requests on the grounds that they were not supported by evidence 
conclusive enough to cast doubt on the data gathered and verified 
during inquiries at the premises of the company concerned. 
(22) Some Brazilian producers claimed there was a need to adjust the normal 
value based on domestic sales to take account of the impact on price 
comparabiIity of differing sales costs caused by differences in the 
quantities sold on the domestic market and exports to the Community. 
The Council confirms the rejection of this request on the grounds of 
the applicants' inability to show that their request was, in this 
instance, weIl-founded. 
In the absence of other comments, the Council confirms the 
Commission's conclusions as set out in recitals 19 and 20 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. 
4. Dumpina maralns 
(23) After the above adjustments to the normal value and/or export prices, 
the weighted average dumplng margin, expressed as a percentage of the 
free-at-Community-frontier cif price, not cleared through customs, for 
each of the exporters concerned is as follows: 
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- Rima Eletrometalurgia SA 67.0% 
- Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA) 50.6% 
- Eletroila SA 44.1% 
- Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais (Minasligas) 26.4% 
- Camargo Correia Metais 20.4% 
- Companhia Braslleira Carboreto de Càlcio 18.3% 
In the Iight of the above, the Council confirms that the above 
exporters are dumping imports of silicon metal. 
(24) Where Braziiian exporters failed to answer the Commission's 
questionnaire or come forward, dumping was assessed on the basis of 
the information available in accordance with Article 7(7)(b) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88. Given that the cooperating exporters 
account for almost all sales of Braziiian silicon metal in the 
Community, the Commission considers the results of its investigation 
to be the most suitable basis for assessing the dumping margin. 
Failure to apply the highest dumping margin found in the course of the 
investigation, 67%, to those exporters which had not seen fit to 
cooperate would provide loopholes and an incentive not to cocperate in 
the future. The Council confirms this approach and the resulting 
consequences for that group of exporters. 
E. INJURY 
(25) In its preliminary findings, the Commission concluded that the 
Community silicon metal industry had suffered material injury. This 
view was founded mainly on the convergence of economic indicators such 
as falling sales, loss of market share, the erosion of Community 
producers' prices and the resulting flnanclal losses. 
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(26) One Brazilian producer argued that the trend in the cif price in ecus 
of imported Brazilian silicon metal had resulted in the drop in prices 
being overestimated owing to the growing parity between the US dollar 
and the ecu. The Commission, however, finds that the price of imports 
from Brazil, whether in ecus or another Community currency, did 
actually help depress the Community market from 1986 to 1990. 
(27) Several Brazilian producers cailed for account to be taken of the 
different marketing stages at which transactions were carried out, 
i.e. differences at the stages of import and end-use, when prices were 
being compared to determine undercutting and the margin of injury 
attributable to the exporters concerned. 
Where the information supplied was full, verifiable and consistent, 
allowances were systematically made to ensure fair comparison with the 
Community industry's prices. 
The Council confirms the Commission's approach and the resulting 
findings. 
(28) The Commission received no further submissions regarding the 
assessment of injury. 
The Council consequently confirms the findings set out by the 
Commission in recitals 24 to 26, 28 and 30 to 35 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 906/92 and in recitals 26 to 28 of this Regulation. 
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F. CAUSE AND EFFECT 
(29) Seeking to show a close causal link between dumped silicon metal 
originating in Brazil and the injury to the Community industry, the 
Commission pointed out in its provisional findings the correlation 
between the decline in the Community industry's market share and a 
corresponding increase in that of Brazilian exporters. This was 
further borne out by the transparency of the world silicon metal 
market, which is extremely sensitive to price fluctuations. 
(30) A Brazilian producer claimed that the Community industry had lost 
market share because it was unable to meet increased demand for high-
quality silicon metal. This is refuted by data in the Commission's 
possession on the Community industry's capacity utilization and 
product range during the investigation period. 
(31) Another producer claimed that prices for imports from the People's 
Republic of China were consistently lower than Brazilian exporters', 
constituting a world reference price of sorts. 
The Commission points out that imports of Chinese silicon metal are 
currently the object of another anti-dumping proceeding and dismisses 
the claim that the price of Chinese silicon metal imports could be 
considered a sort of world reference price. Quite apart from the 
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fact that Chinese exporters' share of the Community market is 
relatively small when compared with that of their Brazilian 
counterparts, Chinese silicon metal has a much narrower range of 
potential uses than the Brazilian product and cannot therefore be 
considered likely to determine prices. 
(32) Another producer alleged that the assessment of cause and effect did 
not take sufficient account of imports from other non-member countries 
such as Argentina, Australia or China, particularly since recital 17 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 tended to absolve imports 
originating in Brazil of responsibiIity for the injury to the 
Community industry. 
The Commission feels that these arguments do not controvert the 
findings of recital 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92, and that the 
findings of an investigation on which the Council based conclusions in 
an earlier proceeding concerning imports of the same product from the 
People's Republic of China are irrelevant to the facts of the present 
anti-dumping proceeding. They certainly do not diminish the fact that 
the dumping in question caused material injury to the Community 
industry and that, viewed in isolation, this injury is substantial. 
(33) Another Brazilian producer claimed that the injury to the Community 
industry was largely attributable to the actions of Community 
producers, to competition between them or the obsolescence of their 
production apparatus, but failed to substantiate the allegatlons wlth 
evidence likely to call into question the Commission's provisional 
f indings. 
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The Council therefore confirms the Commission's findings in 
recitals 37 and 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 and recitals 30 to 34 
of this Regulat ion. 
G. COMMUNITY INTEREST 
1. General 
(34) The Commission received no new evidence or arguments on this issue. 
The Council therefore confirms the Commission's findings in recitals 
39 and 40 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92. 
2. The interests of the Community industry 
(35) In the absence of any new evidence, the Council likewise confirms the 
Commission's conclusions in recitals 41 and 42 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 906/92 
3. The interests of other parties 
(36) The trade association mentioned earlier as representing the interests 
of the Community chemical industry repeated its concern at the 
weakening of its members' ability to compete on the Community market 
with non-Community rivals whose inputs were not subject to anti-
dumping dut ies. 
(37) Other trade associations representing the interests of the secondary 
aluminium industry also expressed concern about the increased costs 
facing processing industries downstream on their intermediate inputs. 
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RepresentatIves of some Internatlonal dealers speclallzlng In ferro-
alloys made slmllar objectlons, argulng that Industrlal consumers In 
the Communlty were effectlvely loslng an attractlve source of cheap 
slllcon metal outside the Communlty. 
(38) The Commlsslon Is aware of the llkely Impact of antl-dumplng measures 
on the Intermedlate Input costs of some groups of Communlty consumers. 
However, this increase concerns only the sllicon metal orlglnating in 
Brazll, whlch represented less than 15% of the Communlty market in 
1990. Other supplylng sources are also avallable and used, 
consequently, nothlng indicates that this Increase would be reflected 
In the same proportlon on the production costs of the flnlshed 
products downstream. In these clrcumstances, It cannot be concluded 
that the Impositlon of an antl-dumplng duty on imports of brazillan 
sllicon metal would lead the user industries withln the Communlty to 
suffer from a comparatlve dlsadvantage proportlonal to the amount of 
the duty imposed vls a vls their competltors In the third countrles. 
Moreover, claims that Brazillan slllcon metal Is irreplaceable are 
contradicted by the fact that the Communlty chemlcal Industry carries 
out Rochow synthesis uslng non-BrazIIlan sllicon metal, purchasing 
chemical-grade slllcon metal from both Communlty and non-CommunIty 
suppllers. 
(39) The Council therefore confirms the Commisslon's remarks in recital 43 
together with its flndings in recitals 44 and 45 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 906/92 and recitals 35 to 39 of this Regulation, whlch show that 
the Communlty Interest requlres an end to the injury caused to the 
Communlty industry by the dumping found. 
However, If changed clrcumstances would occur calllng Into question 
the preceeding conclusions, the Commission would be ready, If the case 
arises, to reconsider the overall sltuatlon of the Communlty Industry 
in view of these new elements. 
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H. DUTIES 
(40) The Commission provisionally found that the removal of the injury 
caused to the Community industry and the restoration of the conditions 
for normal profitabiIity required anti-dumping measures that would 
permit the industry to make sufficient profit and increase the 
proportlon of capacity in use. The provisional duties were therefore 
calculated to cover the difference between the price of Brazilian 
silicon metal and a reference price allowlng the Community industry to 
cover costs and generate a reasonabie profit of 6.5%. 
The Council confirms the Commission s approach and the resulting 
conclusions. 
(41) Several Brazilian producers claimed that the Community reference price 
used to calculate the margin of injury exceeded the level needed to 
offset the injury. 
The Commission cannot accept this argument. The previous recital 
shows that the reference price was based on the Community industry's 
production costs plus a reasonabie profit margin guaranteeing the 
producers concerned an adequate return on investment. 
The Council confirms these findings. 
(42) For the establishment of the definitive duties to be imposed, the 
Commission feels that the individual margins of injury specified in 
recital s 48 and 49 of Regulation (El-X) No 906/92 should also be 
expressed as a percentage of the cif value of imports. An 
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injury margin represents the increase in the price at Community 
frontier needed to end the injury c?msed by a given exporter. After 
allowing for corrections and other adjustments to the weighted average 
cif prices charged by the Brazilian exporters concerned, the 
individual injury margins are as foilows: 
- Rima Eletrometalurgia SA 34.6% 
- Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA) 36.8% 
- Eletroila SA 29.8% 
- Companhia Ferroligas Mlnas Gerais (Minasligas) 43.8% 
- Camargo Correia Metais 24.2% 
- Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio 51.0% 
(43) The Council confirms the Commission's findings in recitals 46 to 48 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 and concludes on the basis of the previous 
recital of this Regulation that the duty to be imposed should equal 
the dumping margins established for the above exporters, save where 
they exceed the individual Injury margins, which then determine the 
duty applicable: 
- Rima Eletrometalurgia SA 34.6% 
- Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA) 36.8% 
- Eletroila SA 29.8% 
- Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais (Minasligas) 26.4% 
- Camargo Correia" Metais 20.4% 
- Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio 18.3% 
(44) For reasons already set out in recital 24 of this Regulation, the 
Council confirms that the maximum rate of duty, namely 36.8%, wiII be 
applied to the companies which did not reply to the Commission's 
questionnaire or failed to come forward. To impose on those producer-
exporters a rate of duty lower than the highest rate of anti-dumping 
duty established by the investigation would be to reward their failure 
to cooperate and create loopholes. 
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I. COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTIES 
(45) ln view of the dumping margins established and the seriousness of the 
injury to the Community industry, the Council considers that the 
amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed 
should be definitively collected in fuil. 
J. UNDERTAKING 
(46) After provisional anti-dumping dutios were imposed, all the Brazilian 
exporters involved Jointly offered an overall quantitative undertaking 
or, as an alternative, individual price undertakings. 
Following consultations, the Commission rejected these undertakings, 
explaining to the producers concerned that the undertakings offered 
were not such as to remove the injury and required, moreover, frequent 
adjustments owing to the fluctuating price if silicon metal on the 
world market. The Council shares this opinion and considers it 
necessary to impose anti-dumping duties, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty of 36-.8% of the net free-at-Community-
frontier price, not cleared through customs, is hereby imposed on 
imports of silicon metal falling within CN code 2804 69 00 and 
originating InBrazil (Taric additional code: 8654). 
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2. The rate of duty applicable to silicon metal produced by the following 
companies shalI be: 
Tar ic 
addit ional 
code 
Rima Eletrometalurgia SA, 34.6% 8649 
Belo Horizonte 
EletroilaSA 29.8% 8650 
Belo Hor izonte 
Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais 26.4% 8651 
(Minasligas) Contagem 
Camargo Correa Metals SA 20.4% 8652 
Sao Paolo 
Companhia Brasilelra Carboreto de Calcio 18.3% 8653 
(CBCC), Rio de Janeiro 
3. The provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. 
Artlcla l 
The amounts secured by way of the provisional antl-dumping duty imposed by 
Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 shall be defiriitIvely collected at the rate 
definitively imposed. 
Sums secured in excess of the definitive rate of duty shall be released. 
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A£llcle_.2 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication 
in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in 
alI Member States. 
Done at Brussels For the Council 
The President 


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