EN ECB-PUBLIC 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 3 February 2016 
on the deposit guarantee scheme  
(CON/20 16/6)  
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 12 January 2016,  the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the deposit guarantee scheme (hereinafter the ‘draft law’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union,  and the third and sixth  indent s of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC1, as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and to rules applicable to financial 
institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets . In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to replace the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) in Slovenia 
with a new  DGS  to bring national law in line with Directive 2014/49/EU  of the European Parliament 
and of the Council2. 
1.2 The DGS  is currently regulated by the Slovenian Law on banking3. It is financed on an ex post 
basis  and Banka Slovenije is responsible for operating certain aspects  of the scheme. Under the 
current  DGS , each participating bank is required to hold a certain amount of its assets , equivalent 
to the participating bank’s share in the guarantee,  in liquid investments . Banka Slovenije activates  
the DGS in the event  of a bank’s bankruptcy by calling on the participating banks to contribute their 
share of the guarantee and,  where necessary , by requesting the State to cover any temporary 
financing needs of the DGS. Banka Slovenije then channels the collected funds to the bank it will 
have appoint ed to pay out on the guaranteed deposits. When the claims arising from the 
guaranteed deposits are repaid from the banks’ bankruptcy estate, Banka Slovenije re- allocates 
the funds it receives , back  to the guaranteeing banks. Banka Slovenije, among other things, also 
regularly verifies the DGS mechanisms.  
                                              
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
2  Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes 
(OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).  
3 
 In line w ith the final provisions in Article 405 of the Law  on b anking (ZBan- 2) (Ur. l. RS No 25/15), the DGS is 
regulated in Chapter 8 of the Law  on banking (ZBan- 1) (Ur. l. RS No 99/10 – official consolidated text, 52/11 –  corr., 
9/11 – Z PlaSS- B, 35/11, 59/11, 85/11, 48/12, 105/12, 56/13, 63/13 –  ZS-K, 96/13 and 25/15 –  ZBan -2). 
ECB-PUBLIC 
2 1.3 The draft law repeal s the relevant provisions of the Law on banking,  and the new scheme will be  
now governed by  a separate legislative act . The DGS  syste m will entail the establishment of  a 
deposit guarantee fund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Fund’), and the procedur es for payment of 
unavailable guaranteed deposits in the failing bank  and, as the case may be,  for the financing of 
resolution or compulsor y winding- up measures in which depositors continue to have access to their 
guaranteed deposits. The new scheme will be financed on an ex ante basis . It will be administered 
by Banka Slovenije, which is the designated authority  for the DGS . Banka Slovenije will be  
responsible for the following4. 
(i) Establishing  and managing the Fund. The Fund will not be a legal entity , but will be set up as 
a dedicated pool of assets with its own capacity, by law, to be the holder of certain rights and 
obligations , and to be a party to legal proceedings , that will be managed by Banka Slovenije. 
The Fund will be managed separately from other assets  and liabilities  that Banka Slovenije 
manages  on its own behalf or on behalf of third parties,  and Banka Slovenije will not be liable 
for the obligations of the F und. In its capacity as manager of the F und, Banka Slovenije will 
make decisions on the operation of the F und, and will represent the Fund vis-à-vis third 
parties5. Management of the Fund by Banka Slovenije will include, in par ticular, the following 
tasks: (a) determining the target level of the Fund, whereby its minimum level will, by 
3 July 2024,  amount to 0 .8 % of all guaranteed deposits in Slovenia;  (b) determining the 
level of, and collecting,  the upfront contributions and the extraordinary contributions to the 
Fund of each participating bank, taking account of the ECB’s competences6 arising from 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20137; (c) determining the investment policy of the Fund 
and invest ing its  assets ; and (d) enter ing into alternative financing arrangements for the 
Fund, if necessary . While t he financial resources of the Fund will be ensured primarily by 
means of  regular and, if necessary, extraordinary contributions by participating banks as  well 
as income from  the F und’s  investments, the Fund’s financial resources may also include 
(i) borrowing from the market, in particular through issuing bonds, and (i i) other loans. 
Temporary financing may be provided to the Fund also by the State8. 
(ii) Establishing,  verif ying,  also t hrough stress testing,  and updating procedures and 
arrangements for paying out on guaranteed deposits , including determining the amount s to 
be paid out on guaranteed deposits and provi ding relevant information to the bank appointed 
by Banka Slovenije to make payments to depositors . 
(iii) Activities relat ed to the use of  the Fund’s assets  in resolution or compulsory winding- up 
measures where depositors continue to have access to their guaranteed deposits . 
                                              
4  See Articles 21 and 27 of the draft law , listing the tasks of Banka Slovenije, w hich are further described in individual 
Articles of the draft law .  
5  Such a set up w as also envisaged in the earlier draft legislative act proposing, inter alia, amendments to the current 
DGS, on w hich the ECB issued Opinion CON/2014/79 (see paragraphs 1.5, 4 and 6 of that opinion). The 
amendments relating to the DGS w ere, how ever, not adopted at the time.  All ECB opinions are published on the 
ECB’s w ebsite at w w w .ecb.europa.eu.  
6  See Articles 31(5) and 32(4) of the draft law .  
7  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).  
8  See Article 30 of the draft law .  
ECB-PUBLIC 
3 (iv) Supervision of banks as regards  their obligations arising f rom their  participation in the DGS . 
(v) Drawing up the accounts of the F und9 and prepar ing and publi shing, every year, a report on 
the activities related to the operation of the DGS10. 
1.4  Costs incurred by  Banka Slovenije in performing its tasks as administrator of the DGS and, more 
specifically,  as manager of the Fund, will be met from the Fund or from charges levied on 
participating banks11. 
1.5 Further, t he draft law provides that Banka Slovenije may , exceptionally,  grant a loan to the Fund if 
the Fund is unable,  taking into account the conditions on the financial markets and the breakdown 
of investments of the Fund, to ensure the necessary liquidity to meet  its obligations under  the draft 
law in a timely manner and without disproportionate losses , which could in turn threaten the 
stability of the financial system. Such  loans  may, taking into account Article 123 of the Treaty,  be 
granted by Banka Slovenije only if the following conditions are met: ( i) the loan is short -term; and 
(ii) the loan is based on adequate collateral12. 
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB supports the establishment of an ex ante funded DGS in Slovenia, in line with the 
common framework for DGSs laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU . 
2.2 The ECB stresses, however, that  this opinion does  not address w hether the draft law  effectively 
implements the Directive  2014/49/EU  in Slovenian law. Rather, the ECB focuses on those 
provisions that may impact on the role and tasks of Banka Slovenije as a central bank and as a 
member of the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  
2.3 The ECB has developed the guidance set out in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 on the basis of which it may decide whether a new task conferred on an NCB is to be considered a central banking task or 
a government task for the purposes of assessing such conferral against the prohibition of monetary 
financing
13. This guidance applies to genuinely new tasks that either did not exist in the past or did 
not form an integral part of the central banking tasks assigned to an NCB in the past . In recognition 
of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set -ups, 
the tasks currently discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and recategorised, but may be reassessed if they are subj ect to legislative amendments of substance. 
In this regard, the ECB notes that the draft law changes some of the essential elements of the 
Slovenian DGS. While the tasks currently performed by  Banka Slovenije in relation to the operation 
of the Slovenian D GS are similar  in certain respects  to the tasks conferred on Banka Slovenije by 
the draft law , the tasks conferred on Banka Slovenije by the draft law are substantially wider  in 
scope and it is appropriate, therefore, to assess whether those new tasks  are compatible with the 
prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. The concrete assessment of 
                                              
9  See Article 40 of the draft law .  
10  See Article 21(5) of the draft law .  
11  See Article  24 and Artic le 27(5) of the draft law .  
12  See Article 35 of the draft law .  
13  See Opinion CON/2015/22.  
ECB-PUBLIC 
4 whether Banka Slovenije’s new tasks in the operation of the DGS are to be considered central 
banking tasks or government tasks is undertaken i n paragraph 3.1. 
2.3.1  General considerations  
First, the principle of financial independence requires that Member States may not put their NCBs 
in a position in which they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or 
Eurosystem -related tasks,  as applicable.  
Second, central banking tasks comprise,  in particular , those tasks that are related to the tasks 
listed in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty.  
Third , new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clear ly 
discharged on behalf  of and in the exclusiv e  interest of the government or of other public entities, 
should be considered government tasks. In that context, a distinction should be drawn between 
liquidity and solvency -related tasks of NCBs. While, for t he purposes of the monetary financing 
prohibition, solvency support is a government task, liquidity -related tasks, the ultimate objective of 
which are to finance the economy, are central banking tasks.  
2.3.2  Specific considerations  
In principle, tasks related to a DGS can be assigned to an NCB  provided that they do not 
undermine its independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty14. As far as central bank 
involvement in a DGS is concerned, in particular, funding arrangements for a DGS must comply 
with th e monetary financing prohibition laid down in the Treaty, and in particular with the prohibition 
of NCBs providing overdraft facilities or any type of credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 
of the Treaty15. The same is true with regard to the financing of the costs of operating the DGS.  
An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is the impact of the task on 
the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following should 
be taken int o account.  
First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately -
addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, and does not necessarily 
complement those existing central banking tasks. If a confli ct of interest arises between existing 
and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation in place to adequately address that conflict. 
Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, however, be 
interpreted extensivel y, so as to lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. 
Complementarity should also be examined from the point of view of the financing of those tasks.  
Second, it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performanc e of the 
new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational capacity of the NCB and may 
negatively impact its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks.  
Third , it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task does not fit into the 
institutional set -up of the NCB in the light of central bank independence and accountability 
considerations.  
                                              
14  See Opinion CON/2015/ 52. 
15  See paragraph 9.3 of Opinion CON/2011/12.  
ECB-PUBLIC 
5 Fourth, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task gives rise to substantial 
financial risks.  
Fifth, it shoul d be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 
NCB’s decision- making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and which may impact 
on their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the term of  office under 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank.  
2.3.3  Any final assessment on the qualification of a task conferred on an NCB as either falling within the 
scope of a central banking task or a government task will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 
consistent application of the prohibition of monetary financing within the Eurosystem and the ESCB 
to the extent that it applies to its members.  
 
3. Specific observations  
3.1 Conferral on Banka Sloveni je of tasks related to the DGS  
The draft law designates Banka Slovenije as the authority with responsibility for administering the 
new DGS and within that scheme for managing the F und. The draft law  adapts and extends Banka 
Slovenije’s current DGS -related tasks and responsibilities . In light of the guidance set out in 
paragraphs  2.3.1 to 2.3.3, it is appropriate to assess  whether Banka Slovenije’s tasks and 
responsibilities in this field are compatible with the monetary financing prohibition.  
3.1.1  New tasks  
With the revised set-up of the DGS, Banka Slovenije’s existing tasks as described in paragraph 1. 2 
will be adapted and more comprehensively regulated under the new DGS , in particular to include 
the tasks set out in paragraph 1.3.  
3.1.2  Principle of financial independence The principle of financial independence requires an NCB to have sufficient means not only to 
perform its ESCB -related tasks but also its own national tasks (e.g. financing its administration and 
own operations)
16. When allocating specific non- ESCB rel ated tasks to the NCBs, such as tasks in 
the area of deposit protection, additional human and financial resources must also be allocated so 
that these tasks can be carried out in a manner that will not affect the NCBs’ operational capacity to 
perform its ESCB-related tasks17. The ECB notes that the draft law  stipulates that Banka 
Slovenije’s actual costs for operating the DGS are to be covered by means of the payment by 
participating banks of a sum equivalent to the annual costs related to management of the DGS18 
and, specifically for managing the Fund,  directly from the F und19. The ECB welcomes  the fact  that 
the draft law provides for the financing of costs related to Banka Slovenije’s  DGS -related tasks 
from participating banks’ contributions and charges . The ECB thus understands that all expenses 
                                              
16  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 25. See also paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion CON/2009/93, paragraph 3.1 
of Opinion CON/2011/5, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74,  and paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2013/29.  
17  See, for example, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2012/74.  
18   See Article  24 and Articles 27(5) and 41(4) of the draft law .  
19  See point ( 3) of Article 27(3) and Article 27(5) of the draft law .  
ECB-PUBLIC 
6 related to functions to be performed by Banka Slovenije as the designated authority for the DGS 
will be fully covered by the participating banks. Against this backdrop, the new tasks entrusted to 
Banka Slovenije shoul d not affect the resources it currently allocates for the performance of its 
monetary policy and other existing tasks.  However, with regard to the recovery of the costs by way 
of an annual invoic e or by recovering them directly from the Fund, the ECB notes  that restoration of 
the costs related to the management of the DGS should be done in a timely manner , and invites 
the consulting authority to consider a cost recovery mechanism that would mirror the system for 
payment of costs related to Banka Slovenije’s  supervisory or resolution tasks20. 
3.1.3  Links to tasks listed in Article 127(5) of the Treaty  
As the ECB has observed in previous opinions21, central banks are in general in a good position to 
take on responsibility for contributing to financial stability, given their insight into money and 
financial market developments and their involvement in payment systems and monetary policy 
operations. At the same time,  DGSs are a key element of the financial safety net . Therefore,  the 
governance framework should ensure that the important function of such schemes is carried out 
professionally and efficiently. Moreover, effective coordination with the overall role of central bank s 
in safeguarding financial stability should be ensured. This aim may be achieved through, among 
other things, maintaining adequate involvement of the central bank in the governance and 
regulation of the national DGS . 
3.1.4  Atypical tasks  
A number of Member States have conferred on their NCBs a role in the operation of their DGSs . 
The tasks of an NCB with regard to the operation of the DGS could therefore be regarded as tasks 
that are not atypical of a central bank.  As noted in paragraph 1.2 , Banka Slovenije is also 
responsible for  tasks related to the operation of the current Slovenian DGS.  
3.1.5  Discharge of task s on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public 
entities  
A number of central banks in the ESCB perform certain tasks related to the operation of DGSs . 
These tasks are close ly linked to their  task of contributing to financi al stability , and may therefore 
be regarded as  being not atypical of a central bank . At the same time,  it is noted that , where an 
NCB perform s the entire range of administrative and operational t asks related to the functioning of 
a DGS , that NCB is carryin g out not only tasks which are related to financial stability matters, but 
also tasks more typically pertaining to the government al authority , as reflected in the obligation of 
Member States under Directive 2014/49/EU to ensure that a DGS is introduced and officially 
                                              
20  The actual costs of supervisory and resolution tasks performed by Banka Slovenije are recovered from supervised 
banks through the payment of an annual fee in tw o instalments. Banka Slovenije issues  one invoice for payment of 
the first instalment before 30 September of the current year based on the projected cost of supervision for the year, 
and the invoice for the second instalment by 31 March of the follow ing year for the previous year, taking into account 
the actual costs of supervision in the past year (see Article 238 of the ZBan- 2). For the management of the national 
resolution fund, Banka Slovenije is separately repaid for management costs directly from the resolution fund itself, by 
deducting monthly from the fund the average of the projected costs, w hile follow ing the end of a  financial  year, 
Banka Slovenije calculates the actual costs incurred in the previous financial year and records any difference in 
comparison to the projected costs as an income/expense of the resolution fund in the c urrent financial  year (see 
Article 5 of Banka Slovenije’s Decision on the resolution fund investment policy and management costs, issued on 
the basis of the Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and Fund (ZOSRB ) (Ur. l. RS No 97/14 and 91/15) . 
21  See paragraph 3.2.3 of Opinion CON/2015/52, paragraph 4.2 of Opinion CON/2008/51 and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion 
CON/2007/26.  
ECB-PUBLIC 
7 recognised within its territory . Insofar as Banka Slovenije i s entrusted with such governmental (as 
distinct from central banking) functions, the respective tasks would be discharged by Banka 
Slovenije in the exclusive interest of  the Government. The ECB interprets the draft law as reflecting 
this balance between governmental and central banking tasks in the field of DGSs by , on the one 
hand,  establishing the Fund as a separate pool of assets outside the legal personality of  Banka 
Slovenije and, on the other hand, designat ing Banka Slovenije as the sole authority responsible for 
operating the DGS . In the exercise of its public functions  under the draft law , Banka Slovenije 
would act on its own behalf, and not  on behalf of any other administrative authority.  
3.1.6  Extent to which conflicts of interests with existing Banka Slovenije tasks are addressed and the 
performance of tasks fits into Banka Slovenije’s institutional set -up in the light of central bank 
independence and accountability considerations  
Pursuant to the draft law, Banka Slovenije is required to adopt internal rules , to be published on its 
website, establishing organisational arrangements for the performance of  its DGS -related tasks 
such as to prevent conflicts of interests  arising between t he tasks performed by Banka Slovenije 
with regard to managing the DGS and its other duties22. The ECB expects these internal rules to 
properly address any conflicts of interest  ensuing from the tasks conferred on Banka Slovenije in 
relation to the DGS . The performance of Banka Slovenije’s tasks in the context of the new DGS fits 
into Banka Slovenije’s institutional set -up, which has already  been adapted to take account of its 
functions in the operation of the current DGS  and in asset management23. 
The perform ance of the DGS -related tasks does not raise any issues arising out of accountability 
considerations. The draft law  requires Banka Slovenije to draw up financial accounts of the Fund, 
have them audited by an authorised auditor and include them in a report  on the activities related to 
the operation of the DGS, to be prepared  on an  annual basis and published on its website24. 
3.1.7  Extent to which the performance of tasks is proportionate to Banka Slovenije’s financial and 
operational capacity and its ability to per form ESCB- related tasks  
In order to remain financially independent, Banka Slovenije must have sufficient means to carry 
out, not only its ESCB -related tasks from an operational and financial point of view, but also its 
national tasks. In this regard,  the E CB welcomes the fact that the draft law specifies that Banka 
Slovenije’s actual costs arising from its DGS -related tasks, including the management of the Fund, 
are to be reimbursed by the banks participating in the DGS , or directly by the Fund. However, as  
noted above, with regard to the recovery of the costs by way of an annual invoic e, the ECB notes 
that such reimbursement related to the management of the DGS should be done in a timely 
manner and invites the consulting authority to consider a cost recover y mechanism similar to the 
one in place for the NCB’s supervisory and resolution functions25. 
                                              
22  See Article 5(2) and ( 3) of the draft law .  
23  Banka Slovenije is entrusted w ith the task of managing  the assets held in the national resolution fund on the basis of 
the Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and Fund, also adopted as a separate legal act and not as part of the Law  
on banking as initially envisaged (see also Opinion CON/2014/79).  The Law  on the Bank Resolution Authority and 
Fund w as adopted shortly after the publication of Opinion CON/2014/79, in December 2014.  
24  See Article 21(5) and Article 40 of the draft law .  
25  For more details see footnote 20 above.  
ECB-PUBLIC 
8 3.1.8  Extent to which the performance of tasks involves substantial financial risks  
The ECB welcomes the fact that the draft law clarifies the liability regime applicabl e to Banka 
Slovenije when acting in its capacity as operator of the DGS26. However, and in particular since 
Banka S lovenije has been entrusted with a full range of administrative and operational tasks 
related to the functioning of the DGS , which may be regarded as government tasks, the consulting 
authority may wish to consider whether any limitations of liability for a potential mismanagement of 
the DGS or the Fund,  are warranted such as to shield Banka Slovenije from any substantial 
financial risks that may  potentially arise following an allegation of  misconduct  on the part of Banka 
Slovenije.   
3.1.9  Conclusion 
The draft law takes due account of the concerns that may arise due to entrusting Banka Slovenije 
with the full range of tasks in relation to operat ing the DGS, which may be regarded as a mixture  of 
central banking financial stability and government al tasks. In this respect , the draft law takes due 
account of the need to ensure that Banka Slovenije will not finance the DGS , including with regard 
to any backst op financing (if extraordinary contributions from the participating banks as well as 
funds from the other sources are unavailable or insufficient) which should be ensured by the State.  
A few elements in the draft law could, however, be further developed. In particular, while it is noted 
that all  expenses related to functions to be performed by Banka Slovenije as the operator of the 
DGS will be fully covered, the compensation of the costs related to the management of the DGS 
and the Fund should be done in a timely manner. Thus, the ECB invites the consulting authority to 
consider a cost recovery mechanism that would mirror the system for payment of costs related to 
Banka Slovenije’s supervisory or resolution tasks  as indicated in paragraph 3.1.2 above.  Further, it 
could be considered whether any limitations of liability for mismanagement of the DGS or the Fund,  
respectively, would be warranted such as to shield Banka Slovenije from any substantial financial risks that may potentially arise following an allegat ion of misconduct on the part of Banka Slovenije.  
3.2 Provision of liquidity from Banka Slovenije to the F und 
Separately  from Banka Slovenije’s role in the operation of  the DGS, the draft law allows for the 
provision of liquidity by Banka Slovenije to the Fund by way of exceptional loans
27. As the ECB has 
repeatedly stated in the past, any national legislation that provides for a national DGS  to be 
financed by an ESCB national central bank would only be compatible with the monetary financing 
prohibition under Ar ticle 123 of the Treaty where certain restrictive conditions are met, i.e. such 
financing is short -term, it addresses urgent situations, systemic stability issues are at stake and 
decisions are made at the NCB’s discretion28. The ECB understands that the draft law takes 
account of  these criteria.  
                                              
26 
 See also paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2014/79.  
27  See Article 35 of the draft law .  
28  See the ECB’s 2014 Convergence Report, p. 30. See also, most recently, paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2016/3 and 
paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/52, as w ell as paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2015/40; paragraph 4.1 of 
Opinion CON/2015/17; and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/86.  
ECB-PUBLIC 
9 3.3 Involvement of the ECB in determining the methodology for calculating regular contributions  
Article 31(5) of  the draft law provides for  the involvement of the ECB in determining the 
methodology to be used for calcul ating regular contributions , based on Article 13(2) of 
Directive  2014/49/EU. Such reference should not be construed as conferring on the ECB  the tasks  
in question. The ECB notes that only Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 confers prudential tasks on 
the ECB, in  accordance with Article 127(6) of the Treaty.  
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
  Done at Frankfurt am Main,  3 February 2016.  
 [signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI