COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 14.11.2008 
SEC(2008) 2760 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
accompanying the 
Proposal for a 
 
COUNCIL REGULATION 
 
establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy 
  
IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
{COM(2008) 721 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2761} 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
TABLE OF CO NTENTS.............................................................................................................. ....................... II  
CHANGES OF DG MARE COMPARED TO THE EARLIER DRAFTS FOLLOWING THE BOARD'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF  16 JULY 2008 ...................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.  
GLOSSARY....................................................................................................................... ..................................IV  
FLOWCHARTS..................................................................................................................... .............................VI  
1. SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CFP  CONTROL REGIME .......................................... VI 
2. THE NEW CYCLE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................................................................. VII 
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN IMPROVED CONTROL SYSTEM AND REDUCED OVERCAPACITY ........................... VII 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................................................. ................VIII  
SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSU ES AND CONSULTATION OF  INTERESTED PARTIES................. 1  
SECTION 2: PRO BLEM DEFI NITION .................................................................................................. .......... 3  
2.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... ....... 3  
2.2 CURRENT ROLES AND STAKEHOLDERS .................................................................................................. 3  
2.3 CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS AND PROBLEMS ........................................................................................... 4  
2.3. 1 Obsolete and incoherent approaches on control............................................................................. 4  
2.3.2 Overcapacity of fishing fleets and links to non  compliance ............................................................ 4  
2.3.3  Increased competition for marine space ......................................................................................... 7 
2.3.4  Findings and recommendations of the Court of  Auditors on the current  control system................ 7  
2.4. DRIVERS FOR NON -COMPLIANCE ........................................................................................................... 8  
2.4.1  An inadequate legal framework .................................................................................................. .... 8 
2.4.2  Existing culture of  non-compliance............................................................................................. .... 9 
2.4.3  Ineffective cont rol mechanisms ................................................................................................. .... 10 
SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................... .................... 12  
3.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVE .......................................................................................................................... 12  
3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................................... 13  
3.2.1 A new, common approach to  control and inspection .................................................................... 13  
3.2.2 A culture of complia nce........................................................................................................ ......... 13  
3.2.3 Effective applicatio n of CFP rules ............................................................................................. ... 14 
SECTION 4: POLI CY OPTIONS...................................................................................................... ............... 14  
4.1 OPTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE . CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 14  
4.1.1  Sub-option 1: No policy ch ange, continuation of th e current s ituation......................................... 14  
4.1.2  Sub-option 2: Implementation and enforcement of existing framework through implementation 
regulations.................................................................................................................... ............................... 14  
4.1.3  Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of th e option ..................................... 14  
4.1.3.1 Specific e xpected impacts.............................................................................................. ............................... 15  
4.1.3.2 Allocatio n of roles .................................................................................................... .................................... 15  
4.1.3.3 Content of the option .................................................................................................. .................................. 15  
4.2 OPTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION , COMBINED WITH A CODE OF CONDUCT ............... 16  
4.2.1 Approach and assumptions................................................................................................. ................ 16  
4.2.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and conten t of the option .......................................... 16  
4.2.2.1 Specific e xpected impacts.............................................................................................. ............................... 16  
4.2.2.2 Allocatio n of roles .................................................................................................... .................................... 17  
4.2.2.3. Content of the option ................................................................................................. .................................. 17  
4.3 OPTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT , IN THE FORM OF A NEW BINDING REGULATION ..................... 18  
4.3.1 Approach and assumptions................................................................................................. ................ 18  
4.3.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and conten t of the option .......................................... 18  
4.3.2.1. Specific e xpected impacts............................................................................................. ............................... 18  
4.3.2.2 Allocatio n of roles .................................................................................................... .................................... 19  
4.3.2.3 Content of the option .................................................................................................. .................................. 19  
 iii4.4 OPTION 4: CENTRALISATION OF THE CFP  CONTROL POLICY AT EU LEVEL , WITH INCREASED 
COMPETENCES FOR THE COMMISSION AND THE CFCA ..................................................................................... 26  
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ................................................................................................. ........ 27  
5.1 OPTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE . CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 27  
5.1.1 Option 1: Gene ral im pact ....................................................................................................... ...... 27  
5.1.2 Option 1: Link to the pr oblem of over capacity ............................................................................. 30  
5.1.3  Option 1: Enviro nmental impact................................................................................................. .. 31 
5.1.4  Option 1: Econ omic im pact...................................................................................................... ..... 31  
5.1.5 Option 1: Soc ial im pacts....................................................................................................... ........ 32  
5.1.6  Option 1:Cost/b enefit ratio .................................................................................................... ....... 33  
5.2 OPTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION , COMBINED WITH A CODE OF CONDUCT ............... 35  
5.2.1 Option 2: Gene ral im pact ....................................................................................................... ...... 35  
5.2.2 Option 2: Link to the pr oblem of over capacity ............................................................................. 36  
5.2.3 Option 2: Enviro nmental impact................................................................................................. .. 36 
5.2.4 Option 2: Econ omic im pact...................................................................................................... ..... 36  
5.2.5 Option 2: Soc ial im pact........................................................................................................ ......... 37  
5.2.6  Option 2: Cos t/benefit ratio ................................................................................................... ....... 37  
5.3 OPTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT BINDING AT EU LEVEL ........................................................... 37  
5.3.1 Option 3: Gene ral Impact ....................................................................................................... ...... 37  
5.3.2 Option 3: Link to the pr oblem of over capacity ............................................................................. 39  
5.3.3 Option 3: Enviro nmental impact................................................................................................. .. 40 
5.3.4 Option 3: Econ omic im pact...................................................................................................... ..... 40  
5.3.5 Option 3: Soc ial im pact........................................................................................................ ......... 42  
5.3.6  Option 3: Cos t/benefit ratio ................................................................................................... ....... 42  
5.3.7  Option 3: Admini strative costs................................................................................................. ..... 43  
5.3.7.1 Drivers for the reduction of admini strative burden at the level of operators........................................... ...... 43  
5.3.7.2 Drivers for the reduction of administrativ e burden at the level of  the Member States.................................. 4 4 
5.3.7.3 Drivers for the reduction of administ rative burden at the le vel of the Commission...................................... 45 
5.3.7.4 Possible s hort term costs.............................................................................................. ................................. 45  
SECTION 6: HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................................. 46  
SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 51  
ANNEX I:  TABLES................................................................................................................ ............................ 52  
ANNEX II: REPORT ON TH E PUBLIC CONS ULTATION........................................................................ 56  
ANNEX III- ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS................................................................................................ ....... 64  
ANNEX IV: CONTROL PROVISIONS IN CFP LEGISLATION................................................................ 66  
ANNEX V: CURRENT CONTROL SITUATION .......................................................................................... 69  
ANNEX VI: INFORMATION ON THE BIO-EC ONOMIC MODEL USED FOR THE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT REPORT.............................................................................................................. ..................... 72  
 
 
 
GLOSSARY  
 
ACFA                  Advi sory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture  
 CFCA                  Community Fishery Control Agency 
 CFP                     Common Fisheries Policy  
CoA                     Court of Auditors 
 COM                    Commission  DG MARE           Directorate Ge neral for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
 DG SANCO         Directorate Gene ral for Health and Consumer Protection 
 EC                        European Communities  ECJ                      European Court of Justice  EEZ                     Exclusive Economic Zone  EU                       European Union  EUR                    Euro  ERS                     Electronic Reporting System  FAO                   Food and Agriculture Organization  FMC                   Fisheries Monitoring Centre  GPS                    Global Positioning Satellite  ICCAT              International Comm ission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
 ICES                 Interna tional Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
 ISG                   Inter-service steering group  IUU                  Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing  JDP                   Joint Deployment Plans  MCS                 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance  MS                   Member State  NAFO              Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
 v 
NEAFC            North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
 NGO                Non-Governmental Organization 
 RAC                Regional Advisory Council  RFMO            Regional Fisheries Management Organization 
 
SSB                Spawning Stock Biomass 
 TAC               Total Allowable Catch  UN                 United Nations  VMS              Vessel Monitoring System                                   
 vi 
FLOWCHARTS  
1. SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CFP  CONTROL REGIME  
 
Drivers for non compliance 
 Problem identification 
 
Consequences 
 
 
       Black 
landings Overcapacity Shortcomings in 
the control system Inadequate Legal 
Framework Culture of non compliance Ineffective Control mechanisms 
Overfishing 
and financial 
incentives to 
catch more Damage to fish stocks Decreased 
prices and 
poor economic 
results 
 vii 
2. THE NEW CYCLE OF COMPLIANCE  
 
 
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN IMPROVED CONTROL SYSTEM AND REDUCED OVERCAPACITY  
 
 New Control 
Framework 
Control of 
effort regime 
 Control of engine 
power including 
power indicators, 
certification Verification of th e
registered tonnag e
of fishing vessels 
 Verification of 
the specifications 
of fishing gear  Verification of 
the activity of the 
Fishing vessel Overfishing and 
Black landings Relatively stable 
prices 
Sufficient quotas 
and trading Decreased 
overfishing and 
black landings 
Culture of 
compliance and 
Peer pressure to 
act legally Decreased 
overcapacity 
Effective control 
mechanisms, adequate 
legal framework and 
approach based on 
incentives 
Reduction of 
overcapacity 
 viiiLead DG  Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) 
 Other involved services : TRADE, SANCO, TAXUD, ENV, JLS, ENTR, AGRI, COMP, 
EMPL, REGIO, OLAF, ESTAT, CFCA, JRC, TREN, MARKET, Le gal Service, Secretariat-
General  
Commission Legislative and Work Pr ogramme 2008 - Priority initiative  
Agenda Planning no. : 2008/MARE/001 
 
E
XECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This Impact Assessment report lays the ground fo r a proposal for the reform of the current 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) control regime. The objective of the Imp act Assessment is to 
analyse the possible consequences of several op tions to address the current shortcomings in 
the EU fisheries control regime  which should lead to the effective implementation of and the 
proper compliance with the CFP rules to ensure the sustainable exploita tion of living aquatic 
resources.   A wide consultation involving Member States, th e fishing sector, and a ll interested parties 
took place. The Commission services made use of external expertise for a case study based on 
seven stocks, most of which are subject to recovery plans, to support some of the elements 
relating to the present report.  The CFP control system suffers from substant ial failures identified by both the European 
Commission
1 and the European Court of Auditors (CoA)2. The current system is inefficient, 
expensive, complex, and its continued failure will have significant consequences for the future of fisheries resources, the fishing i ndustry and the regions dependent on fishing.  
 
The following options emerged from the Impact Assessment analysis: 
Option 1:
 No policy change. Continue current policy and focus on implementation and 
enforcement of existing framework 
Sub-option 1 : No policy change, continuati on of the current situation 
Sub-option 2 : Implementation and enforcement of existing framework through 
implementation regulations 
Option 2 : Recast of the Control regulation, co mbined with a Code of conduct 
Option 3 : Regulatory Instrument, in the form of a new binding Regulation 
Option 4:  Centralisation of the CFP control policy at EU level, with increased competences 
for the Commission and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)  The Impact Assessment has shown that no significant improvements can be expected under option 1 even though recovery plans might show some positive effects. This situation would 
not change even if all outstanding implem entation regulations were to be adopted. 
                                                
 
1 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM (2007)167 final of 10 April 
2007 on the monitoring of Member States’ implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 2003-2005 
2 Special Report No 7/2007 of the Court of Auditors on the control, inspection and sanction systems relating to 
the rules on conservation of Community fisheries resources 
 ixOption 2  would provide for a simplified legal fram ework and allow for partial improvements 
of the control system in some Member States . However, since shortcomings in the current 
legal provisions could not be amended and since the impact of measures  would mainly rely on 
voluntary improvements by the Member States, th is option would neithe r lead to a global 
approach on control nor would it create a level playing field for all stakeholders. 
A complete reform of the current fisherie s control regime under option 3 would not only 
allow to consolidate the current legislation which is spread in a number of different 
regulations. It would also allo w to develop a harmonised appro ach to inspection and control 
covering all aspects from the catch to the plat e, to develop a common culture of compliance 
and to ensure the effective application of CFP ru les.  This approach wo uld integrate and make 
full use of modern technologies, in particular by cross-checki ng relevant data, enabling cost 
efficient risk analyses to be the basis for target ed control strategies. It  would also provide for 
a proper basis for effort management and a un iform application of CFP rules at Member 
States level. It would add to the simplifica tion of the present legi slation by reducing the 
number of applicable regulations by up to 36 %. The lower number of regular reports that 
Member States would have to submit to the Commission has the potential to reduce 
administrative work by 34 %. A side effect of su ch a reform would be that science would get 
more reliable data in a much s horter time frame providing for a be tter scientific advice leading 
to better management decisions. The MRAG study3 calculated a possible increase in the 
biomass of 51 % and a possible ga in of € 10 billion in the time  span 2010 – 2019 as a direct 
result of such an approach compared to the continuation of the curren t control regime. Gains 
would be most substantial for stocks under reco very plans. The case st udy calculated overall 
gains of 3,900 jobs in the catch (30 %), pro ceeding (50 %) and ancillary (19 %) industries. 
With increasing benefits the costs of control would be likely to fall in relative terms. As the stock situation will improve under a new and comprehensive c ontrol reform, the confidence 
of the public in the CFP would be restored. 
                                                
 
3 MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management  Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute of 
European studies and IFM (2008). ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control 
System applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’ (MRAG) 
 1 
SECTION 1: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
This Impact Assessment report lays the ground fo r the legislative package to be proposed by 
the Commission to reform the current control sy stem of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 
The main objective of the reform will be to implement a sufficiently specified and uniform 
policy for the control system of Member States fishing activities in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CFP rules. It is therefore indirectly linked to the general 
objective of the CFP that is the sustainable expl oitation of living aquatic resources. Due to its 
global and integrated approach focussing on all aspects of the C FP, the reform of the control 
policy should not only result in an improved co ntrol capacity and management of fisheries 
resource, but additionally it should have positive structural im pacts to the fishing industry and 
to the market and thus combat the environm ental, as well as the economic and social 
consequences of non-compliance.  The present report addresses the findings of th e European Court of Auditors Special Report 
No. 7/2007. The Commission is shar ing the Court's concerns and intends to address them in 
the forthcoming reform of the CFP control policy. The Parliament's Committee on Budgetary 
Control supports the findings of  the Court, its recommendations  have also be en taken into 
consideration in  the report. 
 The work on this Impact Assessment was given im petus by the setting up of an Inter-Service 
Steering Group (ISSG) on 11 March 2008 mandated to analyze the overall approach of the 
initiative and it established wo rking groups on specific items.  The following Directorates-
General and services contributed to the ISSG: Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Trade, Health 
and Consumer Protection, Taxation and Cust oms Union, Environment, Enterprise and 
Industry, Employment, Justice, Freedom and S ecurity, Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Legal Service, the European Anti-Fraud Office, Eu rostat, the Joint Research Center Ispra, the 
Community Fisheries Control Agency and th e Secretariat General of the Commission.
4 The 
ISSG met on three occasions, and held its la st meeting on 21 May, it gave regular inputs on 
the initiatives taken by DG MARE, including a disc ussion on the interim ve rsion of this report 
(DG MARE took account of the comments receiv ed by the members of  the ISSG in the 
present report). It was also the forum for exchan ging experiences in fields  of relevance for the 
proposed initiative. Bilateral contacts will be maintained to continue as necessary. 
 The data for the Impact Assessment was collect ed following a broad a nd diverse consultation 
process with: 
• The Member States
: The issue was discussed in an informal meeting with Fisheries 
Ministers on 18 February 2008. Member States broadly suppor ted the analysis of the 
Commission, but had reservati ons on the harmonisation of sa nctions and on the possible 
increased powers of the Commission. Anothe r meeting with Member States' Directors-
General for fisheries had already taken place on 15 January 2008.  
• The stakeholders' advisory bodies
: A one day seminar was organised on 10 April 2008 
with representatives of the Regional Adviso ry Councils (RAC) and the Advisory Committee 
                                                 
4 Moreover, the following Directorates -General were invited but did not pa rticipate in the ISSG: Energy and 
Transport, Competition, Internal Ma rket and Services, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Regional 
Policy, 
 2for Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) in order to get their views on th e envisaged reform of 
the CFP control policy.   
• Technical experts
: A meeting with Member States' fish eries control experts took place on 
1 February 2008, 22-23 April 2008 and 28 May 2008. 
 
• High Level Group of Independent Stak eholders on Admini strative burdens : The reform 
was presented to the High Level Group in its  meeting on 18 September 2008. The chairman 
of the group expressed that th e group appreciated very much the outline given by DG MARE 
and fully supported the proposed reform given the envisaged decrease of administrative 
burden for the sector5.  
A public internet consultation was carried out from Februa ry to May 2008 to assess the 
impact on operators and administrations. The num ber of 25 contributions were received from 
a wide range of stake holders including inter alia  associations from  the industrial sector – of 
fishermen, producers, fisheries control tech nology stakeholders, NGOs and individuals. 
Notably three RACs, the Advisory Committee fo r Fisheries and Aquaculture and one national 
authority-the UK statutory nature conservation agencies expressed their positions in support 
of the reform. The geographical range was al so a broad one including French, Portuguese, 
Polish, Spanish, British, Belg ian and Dutch parties. 
All the contributions received fr om the interested stakeholders were given equal value and 
assessment and all are published on the offici al website of the Co mmission on Fisheries 
together with their authors and origin6. (The summary of the contributions is contained in 
annex II of the present report.) The initiative of the Commission and its ma in objectives were widely endorsed by the 
participants in the c onsultation who contributed  with valuable innovati ve proposals, stressing 
the need to continue the constr uctive dialogue between all intere sted parties. All unanimously 
agreed on the need to reform the control syst em, confirming that the 9 objectives set out by 
the Commission in the consultation paper are the main points of interest in the overall 
assessment of the reform.  Many of the participants stressed that it is th e culture of compliance wh ich should be the main 
objective of the reform, calling to this en d for a bottom-up as opposed to "top-down" 
approach in the decision-making and implemen tation process with mo re active involvement 
of stakeholders, scientists, NGOs and national administrations, leading to more transparency, 
and broader support. There were also a number of suggestions for public training initiatives, 
especially for fishermen. Notably all stakeholders supported the introductio n of harmonized administrative sanctions by 
the Commission, the simplification and rationaliza tion of the rules and the strengthening of 
cooperation and assistance. NGOs a nd public authorities particular ly supported the reform as 
an efficient tool from an envi ronmental sustainable fisheries perspective. All agreed on the 
need to develop a new approach towards inspect ion and control on EC le vel, providing a level 
playing field, favouring an enhanced cooperati on between the Commission, fishery control 
authorities in Member States and operators from the whole ch ain of producti on. They agreed 
that the Agency should play a more important  and constructive role  in coordination and 
training. Advisory bodies proposed  the introduction of an efficient intervention system and 
the use positive incentives regimes. NGOs favo ured the introduction of more instruments to 
                                                
 
5 DRAFT FINAL REPORT, Measurement data and analysis ,As specified in the speci fic contract on Modules 
3&4 for the Priority Area Fisher ies,of the Framework contract n° ENTR/06/061,EU PROJECT ON 
BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/governance/consultations/consultation_280208_contributions_en.htm   
 3the Commission for timely inte rvention whereas the industry was concerned whether it will 
bare the cost of sanctions and suspen sion of EC aid or the Member States. 
  The Commission services made use of external expertise to support so me of the elements 
relating to the present report. A specific co ntract was concluded (within the framework 
contract FISH/2006/09 Studies in the field of the CFP and Maritime Affairs-Lot 4: Impact 
Assessment studies related to the CFP) in fo rce between the Commission and the external 
consultancy firm MRAG. The specific contra ct had as a purpose to assess the probable 
outcomes of policy changes the Commission intends to propose in the area of control. It 
should identify the likely positive and negati ve impacts of proposed policy options, enabling 
informed political decisions to be made ab out the proposal and identify trade-offs in 
achieving competing objectives.   
S
ECTION 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1 B ACKGROUND  
European fisheries are managed by the Commo n Fisheries Policy (CFP), established in 1983 
with the objective of sustainable ex ploitation of living aquatic resources7. The cornerstone of 
this policy is the limitation and control of catch volumes by setting total allowable catches (TAC's) and national quotas. The European fisherie s control policy is at the heart of the CFP, 
because its credibility depends on its effectiv e application. The fisher ies control policy has 
already been partly reformed in the context of  the reforms of the CFP in 1993 and 2002. Such 
reforms have therefore looked to resolve two criti cal issues, being first, the deficiencies in the 
implementation and enforcement of the CFP which compromised the effectiveness of 
conservation and management measures, and se cond, a lack of uniformity which resulted in 
inequitable implementation of control at Community level.   Despite certain progress in solving these deficiencies, the control system continues to suffer from substantial shortcomings iden tified by both the European Commission
8 and the 
European Court of Auditors (CoA)9. The current control system is inefficient, expensive, 
complex, and it does not produce the desired resu lts. The continued failu re of the control 
policy will have significant consequences for th e future of fisheries resources, the fishing 
industry and the regions dependent on fishing.  It is within this context that the Commission is 
considering a proposal to further and substantia lly reform the control system underpinning the 
CFP, and that this initiative is a core priority for the Commission in the field of fisheries in 
2008.    
2.2 C
URRENT ROLES AND STAKEHOLDERS  
The Common Fisheries Policy is an exclusiv e competence of the European Community, 
which therefore sets the legal framework. The Member States have to apply this legal 
framework and have to make sure that the fi shing industry comprising fishermen, processors 
and salesmen comply with the rules. Therefore, it is the primary respons ibility of the Member 
States to ensure effective control, inspection and enforcement of the compliance with the CFP 
                                                 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 establishing a Community system for the conservation 
and management of the fishery resources 
8 COM(2007)167 final 
9 Special Report No 7/2007 
 4rules. In this context, decisions on the deve lopment and the organisation of control systems 
and inspection procedures are to be taken on national level. The Commission's task as the 
guardian of the treaty is to ensure that Member  States fulfil these re sponsibilities. Therefore 
the Commission and its inspectors monitor, cont rol and evaluate the application of the CFP 
rules by the Member States, e.g. by analysis of catch data re ported by the Member States or 
inspections of the national cont rol systems. In the case of shortcomings or failure of 
individual Member States in the applicati on of the CFP rules the Commission can launch a 
procedure before the Court of Justice.  
The Community Fishery Control Agency (CFC A), which became operational in 2007, has the 
task to organise operational coordination and to strengthen the uniformity and effectiveness of 
enforcement by pooling EU and national means of inspection and control,  and to coordinate 
enforcement activities by the establishment and implementation of Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs), which lay down the basis for joint contro l and inspection activities of Member States. 
Moreover, it should enhance cooperation be tween the Member States by supporting 
exchanges between, and capacity building within, Member States ' inspectorates and should in 
general assist Member States to fulfil thei r responsibilities under the rules of the CFP. 
However, for the time being the mandate of the CFCA is limted to activities concerning 
inspections at sea.      
 
 
2.3 C
URRENT 
SHORTCOMINGS AND 
PROBLEMS  
A number of problems have been identified in the way the 
CFP control policy is applied, which are related either to shortcomings to the control regi me as such or to structural 
problems and challenges in the fishing sector.  
2.3. 1 Obsolete and incoherent approaches on control 
 
Although defined as being global and integrate d, the current Community control regime is 
limited primarily to the control of technical measures concerning catches and neglects the 
other aspects of the CFP, i.a th e transports and markets. The ex tension of control measures to 
those areas would certainly cont ribute to significant overall improvements. New needs have 
arisen with respect to control, in particular w ithin the framework of fishing effort systems and 
biologically sensitive fishing z ones which are largely dealt w ith by ad hoc mechanisms on a 
case by case basis. The major efforts undertaken  over the last years to  achieve sustainable 
exploitation and long-term manage ment of stocks simply cannot bear fruit in the absence of 
an effective control system.  
2.3.2 Overcapacity of fishing fleets and links to non compliance 
Agency Organise operational 
coordination  of fisheries control 
and inspection activities by the Member States and assist them 
to cooperate so as to comply 
with the rules of the CFP rules  Member States Implement the CFP rules 
Ensure that the fishing industry 
complies with the CFP rules Commission   Ensure that Member States fulfil their responsibility  
Monitor, control and evaluate 
the application of the CFP rules 
by the Member States 
 5 
   
Overcapacity of fishing fleets is a structural problem, which lead s to the unprofitability of the 
fishing industry and therefore creates incentives for non-comp liance with CFP rules. For a 
high number of vessels it is only possible to operate profitably by exhausting quotas and 
committing overfishing. This leads to a vicious circ le of fishing vessels exhausting fish stocks 
for their economic survival with an increased economic pressure to fish even more over the 
top the following years whereas the legal fishi ng possibilities and quota  allocations shrink. 
Despite the serious ecological cons equences for the environment this results also in a market 
oversupply and therefore in a continuous fall of prices for fishery products. The currently 
insufficient control mechanisms are not able  to interrupt this circle effectively.  
 The reform of the control policy needs to address this issue and create a new cycle of 
compliance, which in turns would lead to reduced overcapacity. The implementation of 
adequate control measures would address th e problem of overcapac ity. On the one hand, 
effective and reinforced control measures on effort regime will reduce current overfishing which maintains artificially the profitability of the fleet, and therefore creates an incentive for 
non compliance with the rules. On the other hand, overcapacity would be  tackled through the 
introduction of effective tools to better control the capacity  of fishing vessels (through 
certification of the engine power, definition of an "active vessel"…). It has to be acknowledged however, that overcapacity drivers lie beyond control issues, and will also need 
to be addressed in the context of the general reform of CFP, and of the emergency package on 
high fuel prices in the fisheries sector. 
 The assessment of the balance between fishing ca pacity and available fishing opportunities is 
one of the main difficulties that the Commissi on and Member States are confronted with 
when trying to achieve a sustainable fishing activ ity. What is the adequate fleet size is a very 
difficult question to answer. Moreover, it has proved difficult to demonstrate on a sound and objective basis the existence of  overcapacity and the unbalance between capacity and fishing 
opportunities on an individual Member State basis.  However, there is agreement that overall 
the Community fishing fleet is oversized. Even if a comprehensive 'calculation' of the Community fleet overcapacity has never been carried out due to the fact, that its indicators, Absence of 
restructuring 
of the  fleet to 
ensure  
renatbility 
Pressure to 
act illegally 
Decreased 
prices 
Market 
oversupply Illegal 
landings Overfishings Absence of 
effective 
control  
mechanismsInsufficient 
quota 
 
Overcapacity
 6such as engine power, are easily manipulated, ther e are clear indications for some parts of the 
fleet that fishing capacity is in excess of what would be required to fish  in a biologically or 
economically sustainable way. Certain segments of the fleet can at present only operate if 
they realise a substantial part of their catches outside the legal system. The particular case of 
the Mediterranean blue fin tuna fleet demons trates that the size of the Community fleet 
targeting this species quantified in terms of theoretical catching capacity is much bigger than the available EU quota. A tuna  seiner needs 300 tonnes a y ear to survive economically. 
Currently, however, the official quota in some  countries only allows 100 t for all vessels 
licensed in the blue fin tuna fishery. Moreover, in some Member States, many vessels are kept 
tied up so that their effort allocation (in kilo watts days) may be transf erred to other vessels 
and allow them to work full time. This fact indi cates as well that those parts of the fleet are 
oversized.  Several steps have been  taken since the 2002 reform of the Comm on Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
to counter this problem. Howeve r, overcapacity and excessive fi shing effort still remain an 
issue for many segmen ts of the EU fleet and continue to  jeopardise the economic viability 
of the sector. EU catches have steadily declined since 1993, at  an average of 2% per year, 
leading to constantly declining revenues (-2 5% since the early nineties). In particular, 
almost all demersal stocks have  declined in recent years and are currently not sustainable. In 
addition market prices have remained constant  or even diminished. With declining revenues 
and an excessive capital invested (estimated at  around 40%), there is a high leverage effect 
of changes in oper ating costs, which has squeezed the industry margins fo r several years. 
The absence of a sufficient return on cap ital has delayed modern isation and further 
weakened competitiveness of  the fisheries sector.  
In the reform of the CFP in 2002, the concept of  capacity reductions has been replaced by the 
mechanism of reference ceilings which are e xpressed in capacity units and constitute 
maximum levels which national fleets may not  exceed. As a result of the CFP reform, 
Member States are exclusively responsible for adju sting the size of their fleets to the fishing 
opportunities made available to them by the Council,  expressed either in the form of quotas or 
fishing effort allocations. No capacity reduc tions are decided and imposed at Community 
level. This system does not oblige Member Stat es to reduce the overcapacity of their fleets, 
but leave them the choice to instead limit the fishing efforts for each vessel. The current 
fishing capacity management system does not es tablish a concrete and measurable obligation 
to reduce excess capacity, but only to 'adjust'  the size of the fleet. However, the current 
approach of giving the responsibility for ma naging capacity to the Member States and 
focusing Community action on fishing effort li mitation has turned ou t to be unlikely to 
resolve the problem and did not lead to a redu ction of overcapacities.  The CFP has so far 
failed to deliver a balance between fleet size and fishing resources. During the past 16 years 
the capacity of the Community fishing fleet has b een decreasing at an average yearly rate of 
barely 2%. A 2% decrease would not even comp ensate for the effect of technological progress 
which is evaluated to be higher that that. If t echnological progress is assumed to be of 3%, as 
argued by some studies, the effec tive capacity of the fishing fleet  may in fact have increased. 
 Even if the issue is quite technical in nature, it is as well highly politically sensitive. The 
reason for this is that overcapacity is one of the great — if not “the” — malady of the CFP, 
and Member States are reluctant in addressing  this proactively in their fleet management 
and/or structural fund use. Gi ven the fact that Member Stat es respect their basic legal 
requirements as regards the entry exit regime fo r fishing efforts, the margin of manoeuvre for 
the Commission to press individual Member States to allocate more funds  in this respect is 
very limited for the time being. 
 7 
In its Communication on tackling the economic consequences of high fuel prices in the 
fisheries sector the Commissi on now proposes an emergency package to address both the 
immediate situation of economic and social hard ship and to make a lasting contribution to 
tackling systemic overcapacity. This response mu st be EU-wide and co-ordinated in order to 
avoid distorting competit ion between Member States or flee ts. The package consists mainly 
of measures based on temporary derogations fr om rules under the European Fisheries Fund, to 
support a faster adaptation of th e Community fleet to the pres ent situation and to provide 
temporary relief in order to cushion economic and social consequences in the transitional 
phase. It will give Member Stat es the possibility to develop Fleet Adaptation Schemes for the 
fleets that are most dependent on fuel and most significantly affected by the situation of 
overcapacity.  
Such measures together with a coherent and e ffective approach on control will finally cut the 
vicious circle of po or economic profitability  and over-explo itation of st ocks the EU 
fisheries sector has long suffere d from and will lead to the necessary restructuring of the 
sector. 
 
2.3.3  Increased competition for marine space   
 
The competition of the various actors at sea fo r available space is sharpening considerably. 
Extraction of raw materials, sea routes, large windmill parks, marine protected areas under the habitat directive, the military, the leisure indus try and fisheries compete for marine space. As 
a consequence of utilisations by other actors it is  likely that fishing areas will become smaller. 
Given the persisting overcapacity of the fishing industry and its  poor economic performance it 
is likely that pressure and excessi ve fishing efforts still will incr ease. It is essential to develop 
a comprehensive and sustainable management  of marine space and to find an acceptable 
compromise among the various users. To this e nd an ecosystem based approach to fisheries 
management would need to be established.  
 
2.3.4  Findings and recommendations of the Court of Auditors on the current control 
system 
 
On numerous occasions, the Commission has ra ised serious concerns about the severe 
problems and obstacles in the app lication of the CFP control system
10. The European 
Parliament supported this view in a resoluti on of 2007 on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
fishing11. Along this line, the recent audit performed by the CoA12 aimed to assess whether 
the Commission and the Member States are taking the necessary steps for an effective system of control, inspection and sanctions for the c onservation of fisheries resources. According to 
the findings of the Court the current situation is  i.a characterized by an  inadequate regulatory 
framework and insufficient procedures for th e exhaustive collection of data and for the 
                                                
 
10 COM(2007)167 final 
11 Paragraph 8 of the European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing, adopted on 15 February 2007 (2006/2225(INI)),  where the EP " reiterates 
its conviction that a crucial and obvious first step for the European Union to take is, first, to fully implement 
the existing provisions of the CFP and other relevant Community legislation in an effective, fair and rigorous manner, in order to reduce unreported and illegal fishing by Community vessels and in Community waters. " 
12 Special Report No 7/2007 
 8detection of inconsistencies. Moreover, the national inspection systems are inadequate to 
prevent and to detect infringements and their divergences do not ensure  adequate inspection 
pressure nor optimise inspection activities.  The Commission under the current conditions and due to its limite d competences is not able 
to identify errors and anomalies in the data forwarded by Member States nor to evaluate 
national control systems and to form an opinion as  to their overall effectiveness. In order to 
carry out its task of controlling the Member St ates in their application of the CFP rules the 
Commission is dependent on complete and re liable data. However, the current non-
compliance and shortcomings in the reporting sy stems and the collection of data prevent the 
proper application of the system . This should significantly impr ove with the use of modern 
technologies and the implementation of syst ematic data cross checking procedures. 
Moreover, legal tools to reac t to infringements of Commun ity legislation are limited. The 
CoA concluded that if this situation continues, it will lead to grave consequences not only for 
the natural resource, but also for the future of  the fishing industry and the areas associated 
with it. It recommended that:  
• the systems for collecting, validating and monitoring catch data should be improved, 
Member States should define the minimum char acteristics of inspections and ensure that 
inspectors have access to all useful information. They should  ensure that inspections are 
supervised and recorded in  centralised databases; 
• control strategies are based on risk analysis and evaluated with the help of relevant 
objectives and higher considera tion is given to verifiabilit y of management measures; 
• powers of Commission inspectors are streng thened and the mandate of the CFCA is 
broadened, more responsive instruments ag ainst Member States are introduced, and 
sanctions have a deterrent effect and are harmonised; 
• the problem of overcapacity  should be addressed. 
 
 
The problems arising from non-compliance, the c onsequent damage to fish stocks and the 
lack of economic and social stability have been recognised by the Member States, both at 
government level and within the fishing sector itself
13. They broadly favour a reform of the 
current system. The Commission shares the major ity of the CoA's findings and intends to 
launch an ambitious reform of the EU policy fo r fisheries control whic h should address all the 
identified failures.  
2.4. D
RIVERS FOR NON -COMPLIANCE  
A number of drivers for non-compliance with th e CFP rules have been identified, which all 
contribute to the failure of the system, as they all have an impact on overcapacity and on the 
efficiency of the control regime. It is difficult to  isolate one factor, as th ey all form part of a 
vicious circle which leads to the current situation. 
 
2.4.1  An inadequate legal framework  
                                                 
13 COM(2007)167 final 
 9The basis for the control policy and the roles of the Commission and the Member States are 
defined in Council Regulation (EEC) 2847/93 (the 'Control Regulation'14), and Chapter V of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 (the 'Basic Regulation'15). The complexity caused by 
the number of amendments to th e Control Regulation is further exacerbated by the fact that 
the Control Regulation is only one of the elements of the control framework. A range of control provisions are contai ned in 27 separate regulations
16. However, only 4 of originally 
foreseen 20 implementation regulati ons were adopted, as a result of a combination of factors, 
such as a lack of political will, the obsolescence  of specific provisions, etc. This complexity 
and incoherence of the legal framework leads to  a lack of clarity a nd legal certainty which 
makes it difficult for Member States and the fi shing industry to accept the concept, to comply 
with the rules and therefor e gives no incentive to not excess fishing efforts. 
 
2.4.2  Existing culture of non-compliance 
The CFP suffers from a culture of non-complia nce in the sector. Beside the difficult and 
complex legal framework and the existing overcap acity of the fleet, the lack of compliance is 
essentially driven by the fact that  the risk of detection of an in fringement is rather low due to 
severe shortcomings in the national control systems17. A number of Member  States have only 
limited dedicated fisheries control services, and the current deployment of inspectors in some 
Member States is inadequate. Moreover, some Member States do not apply sufficient inspection effort on vessels under 10 m, fail to operate a full time inspection and do not 
dedicate enough resources at the stage of landing or marketing of  the catch. In the absence of 
a common methodology at EC level, Member Stat es have developed their own systems of 
control and inspection, frequency an d intensity of control and insp ections differ strongly from 
one Member State to the other a nd fishermen have to face various  procedures and practices. It 
has resulted in a variety of procedures and practices, introducing uncer tainty, and lack of 
credibility of inspection reports , therefore making the systema tic follow up of infringements 
in judicial proceedings more difficult. This di versity, as highlighted by the Court of Auditors, 
gives operators the opportunity to criticise practices which they consider discriminatory, thereby making them less inclined to comply with the rules.  
 
 
Moreover, even in the case of  detection of an infringeme nt, there is no guarantee that 
appropriate sanctions are imposed. Sanctions  for infringements of CFP rules are not 
sufficiently deterrent and therefore the system in place is one more factor which encourages 
non-compliance with the CFP rule s and overfishing. Overall, the total amount paid  in fines by 
the fisheries industry in 2006 came to €9,2 million, constituting only 0.04 % of the number of 
active fishing vessels. The Commission has obs erved the significant disparities of the 
sanctions imposed by the different Member States for the same type of serious infringements: 
for example, the average fine for fishing wit hout holding a fishing licence ranged from €63 to 
                                                
 
14 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/1993 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the 
common fisheries policy, (OJ L 261, 20.10.1993) 
15 Council Regulation (EC) No  2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sust ainable exploitation 
of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy(OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p 59-80) 
16 See annex III to this report 
17 The elements of the current control mechanisms and th e current control situation in the Member States are 
described in annex IV 
 10€24,328 in 200618. The average fine imposed across the EU in the proceedings that ended 
with a penalty in 2006 amounts to € 1 548. The averag e fine is less than half the average fine 
imposed in 2003 (€4 664) and less than the average fine imposed in 2004 (€ 2 272).  According to Member States' responses to the questionnaire on sa nctions sent by the 
Commission in April 2008, even though the susp ension of licences exists as a possible 
measure in their legislation, in most cases it is hardly used in practice, as it is the fines which 
are most commonly imposed. The le vels of those sanctions are largely divergent and notably 
in the majority of Member States they do not take into account the economic benefit from the 
infringement. 
 
The existing culture of non compliance also links  to the perceived poor legitimacy of the CFP 
rules. There is no equal treatment of stakeholders among the EU, which certainly is an obstacle to fair competition. Poor legitimacy also  comes from the fact that it is felt decisions 
are taken only following a top down approach, w ithout effective consulta tion of the interested 
parties. There is a demand from the sector for a more bottom up approach, in a revised system 
where the Commission would only intervene where needed, on the basis of contro l strategies 
agreed with the Member States, which target high risk activities, and reduce the number of 
unnecessary reporting obligation an d move away from the existing system of centralised 
micro decisions.   
  The Commission is already undertak ing short term actions, in particular in areas such as the 
standardisation and harmonisation of control a nd development of inspection methods and full 
implementation of the Vessel Monitoring Syst em (VMS) in conformity with Community 
rules. However, these measures would not be sufficient to address the problems in a long-term perspective. 
 
2.4.3  Ineffective control mechanisms 
As guardian of the Treaty, th e Commission not only verifies and evaluates that Member 
States do meet their responsibility for the appl ication of the CFP rules, it also works in 
partnership with them, by facilitating coordination a nd cooperation. The Community 
assistance to "control and enforcement" activity  of Member States is limited to €45 million if 
only the appropriations directly allocated
19 to it are considered. However, taking into account 
all the activities designed to deal, albeit only pa rtially, with the consequences of the serious 
shortcomings of the resource management polic y, the financial issues for the Community are 
far more substantial, especially the structural  assistance for fisheries (€837 million) and the 
international fisheries agreements (€156 milli on). As it stands, it is difficult for the 
Commission to get Member States  to respect th eir obligations. As expl ained above, structural 
overcapacity creates an incitement to non-complia nce, and prevents the effective application 
of the control mechanisms. The only way to achie ve effective controls would be to set up 
inspection resources and pressure of controls . These control tools so far, have proven 
inadequate to ensure the respect of CFP rules. 
 
                                                 
18 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Reports from Member 
States on behaviours which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2006, COM/2008/xxx, forthcoming 
19 All figures relating to appropriations are 2007 payment appropriations  
 112.4.3.1  Commission inspections  
The verification of Member States' implemen tation of the CFP rule s is carried out by 
monitoring via inspections of Member States activities and evaluation of Member States 
inspection reports. A team of  24 Commission inspectors, whose powers are limited in 
scope20can request access to databases and documen tation held by the national authorities, but 
they cannot carry out their own checks on private entities against the will of the inspected party. They have the right to conduct checks in Member States without prior notice, but need 
to be accompanied by inspectors of the Member States who are ultimately responsible for the 
inspections of the sector. Thus  the inspection competence never equals those of the national 
authorities. In addition, even if evidences gath ered by Commission inspec tors can be used for 
prosecution, Member States are not obliged to  act against individual s on the basis of the 
findings of the Commission inspectors' reports
21. 
 2.4.3.2 The role of the Commission for the management of quotas
 
 
Closure of fisheries 
The management of quotas in general is the res ponsibility of the Member States. This refers 
particularly to the closure of a fishery afte r the exhaustion of the relevant quota. The 
Commission is generally limited to the supervis ion of the management by Member States. It 
has the legal authority to close a fishery either following the notification of the Member State 
or on its own initiative22. The normal practice is to close a fishery on the basis of the figures 
of the relevant Member State. However, this mechanism relies on proper enforcement of Community rules by the Member States, couple d with an efficient monitoring of current 
catches against quota available. According to the report of the CoA, none of the Member 
States showed total complianc e with the regulations. This fact is known and documented by 
the Commission who has started more than 50 in fringement procedures to Member States for 
quota overshooting. Regarding the closure of the fishery on the Commission's own initiative, 
so far, this possibility has been used only twice by the Commission a) to close the 
Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery for all Me mber States (Regulation (EC) No 1073/2007 and 
b) to close the cod fishery for vessels flying the flag of Poland in some areas of the Baltic (Regulation (EC) No 804/2007). The effectiveness of such a measur e is hampered by the fact 
that the Commission has to collect serious evidence first. This procedure is very time consuming and it can take the Commission up to  three months to r eact during which the 
overfishing goes on.  
Deduction of quotas 
The Commission has the capacity to address overfishing in a more routine manner by 
deducting overfished quantities from the relevant  Member State's quota the following year on 
the basis of a gradual penalizing factor
23. This factor has without doubt a disciplinary effect. 
However, its consequences are only felt well after the overfishing has occurred. Moreover, if 
cases of gross overfishing involve  a political discussion on high le vel, the tool is of limited 
use since decisions are influen ced by other criteria. To make quota reduction a stronger tool 
                                                 
20 Articles 29 and 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 
21 Article 27 paragraph 2 fourth subparagraph of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
22 Article 21 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/1993, and Article 26, paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2371/2002 
23 Article 23 paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, and Article 23 of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2847/93 
 12the Commission should have an increased manda te to deduce quotas as a normal act of 
administration and to take the solutions  away from the political discussion. 
2.4.3.3 Emergency and preventive measures  
The Commission can take emergency measures24 if there is evidence of a serious threat to the 
conservation of resources or the marine eco-s ystem resulting from fishing activities, and 
preventive measures25 where there is a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to the 
conservation of resources. However, due to the difficulty to gather evidence and to observe 
the principle of proportionality, these measures have proved ve ry difficult to implement in 
practice. 
2.4.3.4 The infringement procedure against Member States  
In case of non-compliance that cannot be corre cted through other means, the Commission can 
refer the case to the Court of  Justice under the general proce dure for failure to fulfil an 
obligation. So far, there have been only thre e cases whereby Member  States have been 
sanctioned to pay a fine. In one instance the judgment26 was delivered in 2005 for non-
compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case  in which the first in fringement had been 
recorded in 1984, 21 years earlier. The infringe ment procedures culminating in a financial 
sanction could have a deterrent effect for Memb er States. However, the procedure is long and 
cumbersome, and is not suitable  to the urgency of the measur es required to protect the 
fisheries resources. 
Furthermore, except for complian ce with fishing fleet register27, the Commission is not in a 
position to link financial aid to a satisfactory implementation of control rules as it is already 
possible in the agricultural sect or. Up to now there is no similar legal base for fisheries. 
 
SECTION 3: OBJECTIVES28 
3.1 G ENERAL OBJECTIVE  
The general objective is to implement a suffi ciently specified and uniform policy for the 
control system of Member States fishing activities in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CFP rules. It is therefor e linked to the general objective of the CFP that 
is the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources, and will have an impact on the reduction of overcapacity. Due to its global and integrated approach focussing on all aspects 
of the CFP the reform of the control policy sh ould not only result in an improved control 
capacity and management of fisheries res ource, but additionally should have positive 
structural impacts on the fishing industry and on the market and thus combat the 
environmental, as well as the economic a nd social consequences of non-compliance. 
Profitability would be addressed: natural rest ructuring of the fishing sector would be 
enhanced, since operations whose profitability are based on the exhaustio n of fishing efforts 
would become obsolete. This approach should be based on simplification, standardisation, 
increased cost effectiveness and re duction of administrative burden.  
                                                
 
24 Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
25 Article 26 paragraph 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
26Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 12 July 2005 in Case C-304/02: Commission of the European 
Communities v French Republic; action for failure to fulfil  obligations under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay 
a lump sum of 20 million euro and a penalty payment of 57.8 million euro for each period of six months 
(judgment given on 12 July 2005); France paid the lump sum and one penalty payment 
27 Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 
28 For a list of core indicators of progress towards m eeting the objectives, see section 7 of the report 
 13More generally, the objective will contribute to  the Sustainable Development Strategy agreed 
by the European Council in June 2006 via its focu s on the protection of na tural resources. It is 
also in line with the objectives  set out at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002 regarding fisheries management29 and the principle of striving for better ocean 
governance guiding the current reflections on a future Maritime Policy for the Community. 
Moreover, the overall objective of the control reform respects the Commission’s identification 
of the four main areas where there is curren tly space for improvement in the application of 
Community Law30. 
The reform is intended to en ter into force in 2010. However, the most significant impact are 
expected on a medium to long term bases within a period of  5 – 10 years. First, Member 
States and the industry would need some time to implement the new system and to meet its 
full requests. Only afterwards the ecosystem can respond on the new and better conditions, which will be measureable by the increase of bi omass and by the increase of market prices for 
fish. 
3.2 S
PECIFIC OBJECTIVES  
3.2.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection 
The implementation of harmonised inspection procedures and improved standards should 
ensure uniformity in the implementation of co ntrol policy at Member States' level, while 
respecting and considering divers ity and the specific characteristics of different fleets.  
The operational objectives would include: 
• Ability to carry out standardised, coordinate d inspection actions and procedures at all 
stages of the chain, and develop comprehensive traceability systems; 
• Ability to use modern technologies; and carry out effective and systematic cross checking 
of all relevant data and;  
• Ability to use information identifying risks and rationalising control. 
 
3.2.2 A culture of compliance  
The objective is to influence the behaviours of a ll those stakeholders involved in the full cycle 
of fishing activities (capture, processing, distri bution and marketing), so that compliance with 
the policies and regulations of the CFP is achieved through not only monitoring and control 
activities, but as a result of an overall culture of  compliance where all part s of the industry are 
invested in compliant activities, and legi timacy of CFP rules are restored. Moreover, 
significant improvements of the legal fram ework should lead to  the reduction of 
administrative burdens both for the industry and the administrations.    
The operational objectives would include  
• Simplification and rationalisa tion of the legal framework; 
• Ability to introduce of deterrent and harmonised sanctions;  
                                                 
29Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August - 4 
September 2002 (United Nations publication) 
30 See COM(2007)502 final of 5.9.2007 “A Europe of results - applying Community Law”: 
- prevention: increased attention to implementation throughout the policy cycle 
- efficient and effective response: improved information exchange and problem solving - improved working methods: prioritisation an d acceleration in infringement management 
-enhanced dialogue and transparency: between the European  institutions and improving information to the public 
 14• Ensure improved cooperation between Me mber States and w ith the Commission 
(including the adaption of the mandate of the CFCA) and; 
• Develop greater interaction with the sector and the stakeholders. 
3.2.3 Effective application of CFP rules 
The operational objective would be to stre ngthen the management competences and the 
capacity of the Commission to intervene proporti onately to the level of  non compliance by the 
Member States. Responsibilities of the Comm ission and Member States will have to be 
clearly defined in order to avoid substitution and to ensure that the Commission adheres to its 
core activity of controlling and verifying im plementation of the rules of the CFP by Member 
States. It is important to stress that at no stag e it is intended to change the current sharing of 
responsibilities between the Commission and the Me mber States and the fact that the Member 
States are – and should remain – responsible for control and enforcement, but the current 
system of micro decisions should be progressi vely replaced by a macro management based 
approach. 
SECTION 4: POLICY OPTIONS  
4.1 O PTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE . CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK  
 
4.1.1  Sub-option 1: No policy change, co ntinuation of the current situation 
Approach and assumptions 
The main assumption for this sub-option is that current control policy is sufficient to deliver 
compliant behaviour in support of the objectives of the CFP, and that the core issue is poor 
implementation of the existing regulatory re quirements by Member States. On numerous 
occasions, the Commission has raised serious concer ns as to the lack of sufficient measures 
by Member States for this purpose31. In order to address the current shortcomings of the 
existing system, the emphasis could be put on a better implementation of the already existing 
legislation.  
4.1.2  Sub-option 2: Implementation and en forcement of existing  framework through 
implementation regulations 
Approach and assumptions 
 The main assumption for this sub-option, as an alternative to the simp le continuation of the 
current situation, is that emphasis could be put  on the adoption of outstanding legislation. At 
the time of adoption of the control regulat ion around 20 implementation regulations were 
foreseen to provide for a full set of technical  rules as a basis for a comprehensive control 
regime. Of these only four implementation regu lations were adopted. This clearly prevented 
the initial control regulation fr om reaching its full effect.  
  
4.1.3  Specific expected impacts, allocation  of roles, and content of the option 
                                                
 
31 COM(2007)167 final 
 154.1.3.1 Specific expected impacts  
The expected specific impact of option 1, through the completion of the existing legal 
framework and the adoption of outstanding legislation might partly address some of the 
failures. One has to bear in mind however , that, on the one hand, given that many 
implementation regulations are st ill outstanding, their adoption w ould take a lot of time. On 
the other hand, with all the outstanding regulati ons being adopted, the legislative framework 
would become even more complex and more dispersed. 
 
4.1.3.2 Allocation of roles  
 
The current allocation of roles between the Me mber States, the Commission and the CFCA - 
as described in section 2, point 2 - would be kept without changes. 
 
 Member States Commission Community Fishing Control 
Agency Roles Implement the CFP rules 
 Control the implementation of the CFP rules by the 
Member States Organise operational coordination 
of fisheries control and inspection 
activities by the Member States 
Micromanagement  Responsibilities -Responsible for 
collecting, validating and 
compiling catch data, and 
forwarding it to the 
Commission 
-Responsible for the 
establishment of its own 
inspection procedures -Responsible for monitoring all data received, 
identifying errors and misstatements in the data 
forwarded by the Member States and for taking  timely 
decisions necessary to protect the resource 
-Provides transparency and facilitates international co-
operation. 
-Limited capacity to act: Infringement procedures, and 
rarely used Specific proce dures to close fisheries -Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs)  
-Activities limited to inspections 
at Sea 
-Training 
 
 Based on these assumptions, Opti on 1 could develop as follow: 
 
4.1.3.3 Content of the option  
 
4.1.3.3.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection 
 The Commission
32 should prioritise the use of existi ng means of inspection and surveillance 
in selected fisheries or stocks, it should review  periodically the effectiv eness of inspection and 
surveillance activities in co-operatio n with national control experts. 
It should follow up more systematically the repor ts it produces itself or reports sent by 
Member States.  
Member States have not taken all actions forese en in the basic regulation such as e.g. setting 
up a single authority for the collection and verifi cation of data. The lack of action of Member 
States in this respect could be challenged on the basis of Ar ticle 226 EC Treaty (and if 
necessary followed up through a '228-procedure' ). Moreover, in the area of control and 
reporting, the Commission should be less leni ent against none or late reporting.  
 4.1.3.3.2 A culture of compliance  
                                                
 
32 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Towards uniform and 
effective implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy COM(2003)0130 final 
 16The development of a culture of compliance  among fishing operators with regard to the 
implementation of measures affecting their activities  can be attained through better regulation 
and good governance in the CFP decision-making pro cess. In that respect, the current system 
of microdecision and poor legiti macy might be addressed thr ough greater involvement of the 
advisory bodies set up in 2002. Without necessarily extendi ng their mandate, the regular 
interaction between the Commi ssion and these bodies has alre ady allowed for an improved 
dialogue and a better understa nding of the rules.    
 4.1.3.3.3 Effective application of CFP rules 
To ensure that the CFP rules are effectively a pplied, a number of existing competences of the 
Commission could be more freque ntly used. As to the closur e of fisheries on Commission’s 
initiative
33, this has only been used twice in 2007 with regards to the Baltic cod and to the 
Bluefin Tuna fishery. As far as procedure under Article 228 is concerned, the successful 
action by the Commission agains t France created an immediate incentive for France to 
comply with Community law following first judgment. Article 228 regarding enforcement 
should be used fully beyond this case. 
4.2 O PTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION , COMBINED WITH A CODE OF 
CONDUCT  
 
4.2.1 Approach and assumptions 
The second policy option considers the implementation of the reform elements through a 
consolidation of the currently fragmented cont rol regulation in combination with a steering 
instrument, such as a ‘Code of  Conduct’ or ‘Best Practice Gu idance’. It is based on the 
assumption that non compliance with the CFP rule s is a result of a complex control regime, 
and poor legitimacy of the CFP rules among the sector and the Member States. Following the adoption of Regulation (EC) No  2371/2002, and in line with recita l 19 of that Regulation, this 
option would lead to a new C ouncil Control Regulation, based on Chapter V of Regulation 
(EC) No 2371/2002. The aim would be to summa rise into only one regulation all current 
provisions governing cont rol, inspection and enforcement that  are at the moment scattered in 
different regulations
34. This would both consolidate and simp lify the existing rules for control, 
implementation and enforcement, but at the same time would not change or add any new legal requirement, nor would it introduc e any new instrument to the better enforcement of the 
current control framework.   
4.2.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option 
4.2.2.1 Specific expected impacts
 
 
Regarding the specific expected impact of this option, it can be reasonably expected that this 
will lead to a rationalisation of the existing rules and therefore be a contribution to the simplification of Community law. However, there is  no guarantee that  this will lead to a better 
implementation of the recast legal framework by Me mber States. In particular, the inadequate 
                                                
 
33 Article 26, paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 provides that in the event of a Member 
State's quota, allocation or available share being deemed to be exhausted, the Commission may, on the basis of the information available, immediately stop fishing activities 
34 as currently laid down in Council Regulation (E C) No 2847/93 and its implementing regulations 
 17possibilities for the Commission to make Member  States correct thei r shortcomings would 
persist. Given the persisting overcapacity a nd the poor economic perf ormance that create 
strong incentives for the industry not to comply with  the rules and the limited resources of 
Member States in monitoring fisheries it can be expected that the curren t shortcomings of the 
CFP control system will remain.   
4.2.2.2 Allocation of roles
 
 
The fundamental allocation of tasks between the Member States, the Commission and the 
CFCA – as described in section 2, point 2 - would not be altered either under Option 2, 
despite some adaptations. The combination of the recast with steeri ng instruments would 
provide a new mechanism for simplifying and im proving the implementation of the CFP rules 
through clearer provisions and detailed advice  from the Commission to the Member States 
that deliver greater clarity on the requirements.  An additional responsi bility thus for the 
Commission would be to elabor ate and provide guidelines for the implementation of the CFP 
rules, whereas for the Member States there w ould be no additional obligations, since those 
guidelines would not be legally binding.  
 Member States Commission Community Fishing 
Control Agency Roles Implement the CFP rules 
 Control the implementation of the CFP rules by the 
Member States Organise operational 
coordination of 
fisheries control and 
inspection activities by the Member States 
Micromanagement  Responsibilities -Responsible for 
collecting, validating and 
compiling catch 
data, and forwarding it to the 
Commission 
-Responsible for the establishment 
of its own 
inspection procedures -Responsible for monitoring all data received, identifying 
errors and misstatements in the data forwarded by the Member States and for taking  timely decisions necessary 
to protect the resource 
-Provides transparency and facilitates international co-operation. 
-Limited capacity to act: Infringement procedures, and 
rarely used Specific proced ures to close fisheries 
-Develop understanding of  the CFP rules through clearer 
provisions and detailed advice to Member States that 
deliver greater clarity on the requirements, on a voluntary 
basis -Joint Deployment 
Plans (JDPs)  -Activities limited to 
inspections at Sea 
- Training 
 
 
Based on these assumptions, Opti on 2 could develop as follow: 
 
4.2.2.3. Content of the option  
 
4.2.2.3.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection 
The development of a more adequate approa ch as regards inspection would be achieved 
through a simpler legal framewor k and a steering instrument. For example, as it was already 
foreseen in the Communication "Towards uni form and effective implementation of the 
Common Fisheries Policy",35 a code of conduct for inspec tion clarifying the duties of 
                                                 
35 COM(2003)0130 final 
 18inspectors and the procedures to be fo llowed by both masters and inspectors during 
inspections at sea could contri bute in particular to more uni formity at Community level.  
In the same line, the requirement for Member  States to establish a validation system 
comprising cross checks and verification of ce rtain data collected under the CFP already 
exists, but it is clear that the implementation of  such a system varies across Member States, 
and that significant broadening of the checks conducted is possible.  
 
4.2.2.3.2 A culture of compliance 
This option also links in  quite closely with the objective to  develop a cultur e of compliance, 
which can be best achieved through a simplifie d and clear legal framework in combination 
with strong partnership between  all stakeholders in the ma nagement of aquatic resources36. 
Increasingly, those having the re sponsibility for managing natu ral resources look to achieve 
objectives through empowering stakeholders in  collaborative processes and implementing 
policy change through cooperative means. In pr actice, working with the Member States 
through steering action, preparing gu idelines etc. and publicising  the apparent discrepancies 
relating to the issue of  sanctions may be the most realistic option.  
 4.2.2.3.3 Effective application of CFP rules 
Moreover, to ensure that the CFP rules are effectively applied, non regulatory instruments 
could be developed that promote the implemen tation of measures that are currently not 
required by the existing regulations comprising th e CFP (and therefore would not be added in 
a consolidated recast text). Fo r example, through th e expert group on control, Member States 
and the Commission could agree on a specific pr ocedure for closing fisheries: as soon as 
Commission’s inspectorate casts  doubts on the reliability of  catch data against quota 
available, the Member States would commit them selves to immediately close the fishery on a 
provisional basis.  
 
4.3 O
PTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT , IN THE FORM OF A NEW BINDING 
REGULATION  
 
4.3.1 Approach and assumptions 
 
The third option presented for assessment is the implementation of the reform package through a regulatory text that is binding at Comm unity level. This appr oach is founded on the 
establishment of an EU level playing field,  a demand supported to a large extent by the 
Member States and the sector itself, which wo uld ensure a uniform application of the CFP 
rules across the EU and a non discriminatory treatment of all fishermen.  
4.3.2 Specific expected impacts, allocation of roles, and content of the option 
4.3.2.1. Specific expected impacts
 
The regulatory instrument would meet the objectiv es of a truly global a nd integrated control 
policy as it would encompass all control issues, from the net to the plate. The implementation 
of adequate control measures would also address the proble m of overcapacity. On the one 
                                                 
36 Presentation by Mary McAllan (Scottish Government – Ma rine Directorate Sea Fisheries Management) to the 
North Sea Regional Advisory Council (RAC) 
 19hand, effective and reinforced control meas ures on effort regime will reduce current 
overfishing which maintains artificially the profit ability of the fleet, and therefore creates an 
incentive for non compliance with the rules. On the other hand, overcapacity would be tackled 
through the introduction of effec tive tools to better control th e capacity of fishing vessels 
(through certification of the engine powe r, definition of an "active vessel…). 
  
4.3.2.2 Allocation of roles
 
The new system would ensure a clearer allo cation of roles between the Commission, the 
Member States and the CFCA. In first instance the general division of responsibilities, where 
the Member States are responsible for the im plementation of the CFP rules, the Commission 
evaluates and controls the proper implemen tation by the Member States and the CFCA 
provides means for operational coordination an d cooperation among Member States, would 
not change. However, as further elaborated  below, the management competences and 
capacities of the Commission would be strengthene d and it would be give n more possibilities 
to act in case of failure of Member States. The mandate of the CFCA  would be extended to 
other inspection activities than at sea, and it  would be given proper inspection powers and the 
responsibility for the coordination of crisis situations. For the Member States there would be 
new obligations related to the harmonised insp ection procedures, such as cross checking of 
data, risk analysis or increased exchange of information with other Member States.  
  
 
To this end, this new legislative framework c ould address the three ob jectives as follow: 
 
4.3.2.3 Content of the option  
 
4.3.2.3.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection  Member States Commission Community Fishing 
Control Agency Roles Implement the CFP rules 
 Control and evaluate the implementation of the CFP rules 
by the Member States Organise operational 
coordination of fisheries control and inspection 
activities by the Member 
States 
Macromanagement  Responsibilities -Responsible for collecting, 
validating and compiling 
catch data, and making it available to the Commission 
via secured websites 
-Responsible for the implementation of 
inspection procedures on the 
basis of  a  risk analysis 
-Increased  cooperation 
between Member States -Effective sanctions against 
individuals -Responsible for evaluating errors and misstatements in 
the data made available by the Member States and for 
taking  timely decisions nece ssary to protect the resource 
on the basis on the basis of risk management 
-Provides transparency and facilitates international co-
operation -Reinforced capacity to act: Infringement procedures, 
more frequent use of specific procedures to close 
fisheries, auditing function, effective measures against 
member States (cross compliance), increased powers for 
the Commission inspectors, emergency measures - Develop understanding of  the CFP rules through 
clearer provisions and detaile d advice to Member States 
that deliver greater clarity  on the requirements, on the 
basis of control standards and inspection procedures -Joint Deployment Plans 
(JDPs)  
-Extension of the mandate of the agency to cover all 
inspection activities 
(including ports, transport and markets)  
-Extensive investigation 
(where appropriate) and 
inspection powers 
-Management and coordination of crisis 
situations 
 20Although the level of compliance by fishing vesse ls with technical m easures should not be 
ignored, and in that respect in spection at sea would  not be abandoned, greater attention needs 
to be turned towards the comprehensive monito ring of catches. The establishment of an EU 
level playing field for control and inspection would take into account the differences across 
the segments of the fleet.  
Standardised and coordinated inspection acti ons and procedures at sea and on land 
Minimum requirements for inspection at sea and on land would be set up, as well as for 
transport and market. The concept of insp ection should be defined in the proposed 
Regulation, as well as the procedure to be fo llowed during an inspection, the procedure in 
case an infringement is detected, and the follow up to the infringement. To be effective each 
inspection, depending on its nature , must have certain features. Centralised recording of all 
inspection reports in a computerised database  would be envisaged essential. Standard 
observers' scheme would be developed, as well as surveillance procedures. In this context, the 
role of the Member States would be enhanced  since they would have to amend and improve 
their national inspection pr ocedures accordingly.  
 
The Commission also sees the need to establish general standards of control in the following 
fields: -Recovery plans and Multi-annual management plan s: Each one of these plans has associated 
control measures that differ from plan to plan  as a result of differe nt negotiation contexts 
when the measures were di scussed at Council level.  
-Discards: For the time being there is no specifi c legislation on the subject, but a reflection 
has been launched to draft legislation aiming to define measures concerning a progressive 
reduction of discards.  -Real time closures of fisheries: A permanent m echanism of real time closures of fisheries, 
under the responsibility of the Member States, c ould be introduced. For the time being there is 
no specific legislation on the subject, but a reflectio n has started on an a ppropriate procedure 
providing for the requirements to allow Member States to close temporarily certain areas for 
the protection of the stocks, and the conditions  under which those closures have to be lifted 
again. This measure again would force Memb er States to stronger carry out their 
responsibilities and thus enhan ce their active ro le in the implementation of the CFP rules.   
 The extension of control beyond marine activiti es and land inspections to full traceability 
would be introduced. Consumers are increasi ngly aware of the need to contribute to 
sustainability. A comprehensive labelling system (indicating the origin of the fish, name of 
the vessel, minimum landing size…) is needed, w ith sanctions linked to it if the seller does 
not respect its obligations (withdrawal of accr editation). Best practices in Member States 
could be used to develop the system. The cu rrent provisions on the control of the market
37 do 
not fully reflect measures adopted in the Common Organisation of the Markets Regulation38. 
The new regulatory instrument could take into account the requirements for Consumer 
information and traceability provisions39, and the obligation for pr oducer organisations to 
draft and implement operational programmes ever y fishing year (this obligation is already 
part of the CFP legislation).  
Modern technologies and efficient data cross-checking systems 
                                                
 
37 Title VI of Council Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 
39 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2065/2001 
 21Modern technologies generate da ta that have a va lue in their own ri ght such as Vessel 
Monitoring Systems (VMS), Electronic Repor ting Systems (ERS), and Vessel Detection 
Systems (VDS) as they provide additional tool s for the monitoring, control and surveillance 
of fishing activities. Accordingly, system atically applying automated data validation 
procedures by using such modern technologie s complimentary to conventional monitoring 
tools, such as catch registration systems, can focus the limited resources of Member States for 
targeting certain vessels for control purposes.  The Commission proposes the introduction of minimum requirements for the automated and 
systematic validation of data collected by Member States. There should be basic quality 
control procedures in such a system that es tablishes the compliance with for instance, the 
VMS regulation, the Logbook regulation, the Cont rol regulation etc. Amongst many others, 
the following checks or validations could still be included: Declared catch area against VMS 
data, possible fishing activity in closed fishing areas, movements of vessels over effort zones, 
designated ports and landing ports against VMS data, pre-notifications against VMS data and 
catch documents etc.  Computer based technologies will  make it possible to easily se t up a data base containing all 
inspection reports and infringeme nts to allow a global assessment of inspection activities and 
adjust control strategies, if need be. i.a. Fr ance is already running such a system with very 
good results allowing its inspectors to access all relevant informati on in real time. In addition, 
Member States would have the obligation to enter electronically all the relevant data allowing a monitoring of the fishing activities in nearly real time, and provide remote access to the Commission. This would reduce the number of reporting obligations for the Member States, 
and reduce the current system of  micro decision by the Commission. 
 An automated data system also facilitates the exchange of information between Member 
States and between Member States and th e Commission. The Comm ission will be in a 
possibility to cross-check such info rmation easily with Eurostat data.  
 
Adequate strategic programming, tactical targeting and sampling strategy 
Member States would be required to carry out a risk analysis leading to a formal strategy 
document that identifies inspection priorities (with benchmarks) and could be used as the 
basis for a rational allocation of resources, particularly as regards the cost/benefit aspect of 
inspections. Member States would be obliged to set up sampling procedures for specific 
fisheries like those where the national quota is likely to be fully use d, stocks under recovery 
plans and stocks of a high commercial value that  are likely to be subject to illegal activities. 
Member States would have to provide a detailed  description on the stra tegies followed and the 
statistical estimates used making it possible to appreciate the levels of precision and 
relationship between the cost and precision.   
Specific measures  to address overcapacity 
It is essential to guarantee the quality of the fishing capacity indicators (Vessel tonnage and 
engine power
40). While the quality of the tonnage i ndicator is considered satisfactory, the 
                                                 
40 Under the EU legislation the Member States are required to record the ve ssel tonnage using the Gross Tonnage 
(GT) under the London Convention (1969) as opposed to the previously used Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) 
under the Oslo Convention (1946). This change in recording tonnage has taken place over a number of years 
throughout the 1990's and at varying rates in the different countries. Given that the GT of a vessel is generally significantly greater than the GRT, great  care has to be taken in comparing the tonnages of the various fleets at 
different times. By the end of 2003 the recording of the tonnage by GT was largely completed. 
 22under-declaration of engine power is a major problem41. Tackling excessive engine power 
requires both a new engine power certification system and re-enforced control measures 
allowing Member States to dete ct and sanction those vessels wh ich operate with an engine 
power higher than the one authorised  according to their fishing licence. 
 
Measures for the control of recreational fishing 
The proposed initiative would en visage introducing proportio nate control measures for 
recreational fishing, to be carried out by the Memb er States, as this activity has an increasing 
influence on fish stocks and marine environment.  For that purpose, it would be envisaged to 
limit the use of allowed fishing gears, and subm it recreational fishermen to prior registration. 
 
4.3.2.3.2 A culture of compliance 
Simplification of the rules 
The proposed Regulation will bri ng together the control standard s for all the rules of the CFP 
with a global approach based on simplificatio n and covering all aspects from the capture 
through to the market. This proposal should put th e principles in place while leaving the task 
of defining the details to implementing regulations.  
 
Greater interaction with the stakeholders 
The present system of centralised micro decisions and micro ma nagement on Commission 
level has poor legitimacy among stakeholders. The Commission wants to move to a macro 
management approach, where it would mainly act  as an auditor of the control system, and 
intervene only where needed, on the basis of control strategies agreed with the Member 
States, which target high risk activities, a nd reduce the number of unnecessary reporting 
obligation.  In this context, it would be important to increa se the interaction with stakeholders. Since their 
creation, the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) have developed into an important forum for 
interaction between stakeholders and the Commission. In line with the contributions received during the online consultation, the regul atory instrument could foresee:  
• Public training initiatives, especially for fi shermen and inspectors, in continuation with 
community financial assistance for improving the involvement of the fisheries sector
42. 
• Development of a culture of compliance with the law and foresee positive incentives, as 
provided for example in the current TACs  and quotas Council Regulation (EC) No 
40/2008.  
Introduction of a system of deterrent sanctions  
Sanction regime
 
The driving principle should be th at there will not be an economic benefit resulting from the 
infringement and the dissuasive effect of th e sanction should be guaranteed. The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) stressed that the Eu ropean Community does not have the necessary 
competence to legislate as to the type and level of sanctions imposed on the basis of criminal law
43. The Commission has the competence to cr eate or harmonise administrative sanctions 
insofar as they are necessary and proportionate for ensuring the effective application of its 
                                                 
41 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improving fishing 
capacity and effort indicators under the common fisheries policy COM(2007)39 final 
42 Commission Regulation No 861/2006 
43 C-440/05, ECJ Judgment of 23 October 2007, C-176/03, ECJ Judgment of 13 September 2005 
 23rules and policies. It will be then up to the Me mber States to decide whether they apply these 
sanctions within a criminal system or not. The Community could en visage a system to 
approximate the levels of fines that Member  States must impose in respect of serious 
infringements to CFP rules.  Penalty point system
 
Another option would be to consider the idea of using administrative means to restrict or even 
end access to fisheries by those who have re peatedly breached CFP rules. Given that 
livelihoods are involved and the possible social and economic impacts of denying access to 
fisheries it is clear that a gra duated or proportionate approach would be called for. One option 
could be the introduction of a penalty points scheme, whereby each permit holder starts off 
with an equal number of ‘points’ some of which are then lost each time there is an 
infringement leading ultimately to the loss of  the permit either for a defined period or 
indefinitely.   Definition of serious infringements
 
The regulatory instrument could provide fo r the definition of serious infringements44 taking 
into account the gravity of the infringement in question which is to be determined by the 
competent authority, taking into account the criteria such as the damage done, the extent of the infringement, its value or repetition. It would be necessary to extend this list of serious 
infringements to other elements of the ch ain, such as the buyers, and sellers.  
 Enforcement measures and accompanying sanctions
 
The new system could be accompanied by a re gime of immediate enforcement measures, 
applying to persons found in flagrante delicto  while committing serious infringements, and 
designed to prevent the continua tion of those infringements. Those measures would include 
the immediate cessation of fishing activities, the rerouting to port of th e vessel…In addition, 
the Community could encourage the adoption by  Member States of accompanying sanctions 
to fines (such as the confiscation of catches or gear, suspension or withdrawal of fishing 
licences, etc) as they often constitute more de terrent penalties than "traditional" financial 
penalties.  
Reinforce Administrative cooperation and mutual  assistance and extension of the mandate of 
the CFCA 
In the light of a targeted and effective control system there is a clear need for an integrated 
approach on administrative coope ration and mutual assistance, to be expanded to all stages of 
the chain, including the set up of a mutual assist ance system between the Member States for a 
regular and standardized excha nge of control related informa tion, and with the Commission 
and the CFCA. In this context would be necessary to amend the mandate of the CFCA in order to allow its proper involvement in  the operational cooperation of control and 
enforcement measures at all stages. Contrary to  what its name might suggest, the CFCA today 
has no powers of its own in relation to control and enforcement of CFP rules. Option 3 would 
envisage the reinforcement of the mandate of th e CFCA and to involve it more actively in the 
control and inspection procedures. In this respec t, a number of elements need to be further 
elaborated, such as: 
                                                
 
44 In this context, the regulatory instrument could get inspiration from existing practices in Regional Fisheries 
organisation  (notably North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), and North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC) 
 24• The extension of the mandate of the CFCA to establish Joint Development Plans as 
well for territorial waters . It would be important that under the new Control 
Regulation – subject to agreem ent of the costal Member St ates - access to territorial 
waters would be provided in the framework of Joint Depl oyment Plans and that any 
approval procedure for entering territorial wa ters for patrol ships or patrol planes 
would be simple; 
• Coordination and enforcement of control and inspection at all stages of the chain, not 
only at sea would be necessary. Therefor e, initiatives on land, during transport, 
processing or marketing should also be part  of the mandate. In this context the new 
Control Regulation should establish the power  for the CFCA to trace back the origin 
of fish and fisheries products and to orga nise cooperation of a udit inquiries on land; 
• The CFCA in future should assist the Commission in monitoring the implementation 
of the CFP rules and the proper applicatio n of the new CFP control system by the 
Member States. For this purpose, the Ag ency officials could be granted own 
investigation powers, to allow inspections and audits of nationa l control systems and 
the cooperation between Member States ; 
• In order to contribute to th e harmonisation and improvement  of inspection standards, 
the CFCA should elaborate and issue manuals  and guidance material reflecting best 
practices in the field and provide training fo r national inspectors. It should, moreover, 
conduct risk analysis on the basis of catch data provided by the Member States and 
provides the Commission with tech nical and administrative support. 
• It could be considered to extend the manda te of Community insp ectors, without prior 
notice, to all public or private bodies ha ving received from the State some kind of 
delegation of power in the national fisherie s management scheme. This could include 
inter alia producer organisations, auction ce ntres, or wholesale markets. The option 
could include the obligation to Member States  to have these organisations audited by 
independent third parties and have the Co mmission’s inspectors allowed to conduct 
their own checks independently from national authorities on the ba sis of these audit 
reports; 
• The CFCA, following existing provision, notably for the European Food Safety 
Authority, could set up an emergency unit wh ere a serious risk to  the CFP has been 
identified, which should be re sponsible for the collection and evaluation of relevant 
information and the elaboration of opti ons to prevent or eliminate the risk. 
  
4.3.2.3.3 Effective application of CFP rules 
Strengthen the capacity of the Commission to intervene propor tionately to the level of  
non compliance by the Member States 
 
Redefine the powers of Commission inspectors
 
Commission inspectors should be given the same  powers as national inspectors, and should be 
ale to by their own means, to ini tiate and carry out inquiries, veri fications and inspections in the 
Member States. Commission inspectors should be  able to have acce ss to fishing vessels, 
transport vehicles as well as to the premises  of businesses and other bodies with activities 
relating to the CFP. When there is reason to beli eve that irregularities occur in the application 
of the CFP rules, the Commission should be able  to carry out independent inspections. In line 
with the development of a micromanagement appr oach, the Commission shoul d also be able to 
carry out audits of the mon itoring, control and surveillance systems of Member States.  
 
 25Action plan for Member States to improve their implementation  
A legal obligation could be created obliging Memb er States to correct their system and/or 
behaviour at the request of the Commission after shortcomings have been found in an 
inspection mission. This could be set up in an acti on plan, as it is the ca se for example in the 
field of Consumer protection.45 Inspection reports could be pu blished with responses from the 
Member States like SANCO reports, bearing in  mind confidentiality related issues. The non-
respect of such an obligation could be linke d to an authorisation for the Commission to 
suspend financial aid, or to deduc t quotas in the following year.  
 
Strengthen the management capacity of the Commission 
 
Capacity for the Commission to rect ify catch figures of Member States  
The Commission lacks the legal capacity to re ctify any figure transmitted officially by a 
Member State. The rectification of these figures could technically  be done either on the basis 
of findings of Commission inspector s in the relevant Member Stat es and the analysis of other 
relevant figures. The Commissi on could be allowed to close a fishery on the basis of these 
corrected figures.  Closing a fishery on th e Commission initiative
 
A policy option would be to reverse the burden of  proof on Member States and apply fully the 
precautionary principle as defined in Article  3 of Council Regulation 2371/2002: when there 
are strong indications that fish ing conditions are not sustaina ble, the Commission should be 
able to decide on provisional cl osure of fisheries and reopen it only when the Member State(s) 
concerned can provide the Com mission with evidences that the fishery can be safely 
exploited.  More flexibility for the Commission to proceed to deductions of quotas
 
It is important that the deduction of quotas is se t at a more deterrent level to ensure it has a 
strong impact on the Member State concer ned. The Commission could be given more 
capacity to deduct quotas in future years either  by increasing the penali zing factor in the case 
of a heavy overexploitation or by making th e deduction procedure easier or both. The 
Commission could also be allowe d to deduct quotas systematically in the event a Member 
State fails to meet its control obligations. A mu ltiplying factor should th en apply in case of 
repeated failure.  Financial sanctions in ca se of bad management 
 
Member States enjoy financial aid from the Commission in two ways. On the one hand they 
receive structural assistance for the fisher ies sector. On the ot her hand the Community 
contributes to their contro l expenses under certain circ umstances. In case of a poor 
management, these forms of financial assist ance could be withheld partly or wholly 
depending on the gravity of the case. A si milar concept exists in agriculture. 
 
 
  
                                                
 
45 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the 
Regulation on consumer protection cooperation) (  OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p. 1–11  ) 
 
 26 
4.4 O PTION 4: CENTRALISATION OF THE CFP  CONTROL POLICY AT EU LEVEL , WITH 
INCREASED COMPETENCES FOR THE COMMISSION AND THE CFCA 
As a lot of shortcomings for the current control policy are to be found in the poor 
implementation record of the Member States, it  could be envisaged to  modify the overall 
allocation of responsibilities between the Member States and the Commission (and the 
Agency), and give overall implementation powers to the Commission, through a dramatic increase of the powers of the Agency, compilin g all current responsibilities for control and 
enforcement of the Member States . The CFP is  one of the few exclusive competences of the 
EU, but one where the multiple national approaches have resulted in varying procedures and 
practices. This diversity gives operators the o pportunity to criticise practices which they 
consider discriminatory and to  question the relevance of the CFP, thereby making them less 
inclined to observe the rules.  It is therefore proposed that the Commission, and the Agency, pool the inspection means of 
the Member States, and develop universally accepted standards,  with a long te rm perspective 
of setting up some kind of European Coastal Guards system. As such, this would ensure a 
uniform application of the CFP rules and a no n discriminatory treatment to all fishermen 
across the EU. The Commission would be endorsed with polic e and enforcement powers, 
which would also facilitate the collect of info rmation pertaining to po ssible infringements, 
and therefore reinforce the overall efficiency of  the system. This would include a fundamental 
increase in terms of human resources at th e level of the Commission and the Agency and a 
massive financial investment.  This option has to be discarded at an early  stage however, for the following reasons: 
• First, the reallocation of tasks between th e Commission and the Member States would 
exceed what the Treaty provides for. Th e Commission would itself implement and 
enforce the rules it lays down. That woul d also imply that the Commission exercises 
jurisdiction over the Community fishing ve ssels. Until now, such power remains the 
competence of the Member States, and as long as  they have not agreed to transfer this 
authority to the Commission, it will be impossible for the Commission to act.   
• Second, politically, it is hard ly realistic to conceive th at Member States would accept 
to suddenly give up such pow ers to a supranational body.  
• Third, such an option would involve a drama tic increase in costs for the Commission 
(staff and operational deployment), one that it is impossible to afford for the moment. 
• Fourth, it would go against the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, as this 
would be another example of a top down approach, while more bottom up 
perspectives are needed, and required by the Sector, the Member States, and acknowledged by the Commission itself. 
   From the analysis above, it appears that only Op tions 1, 2 and 3 can be considered as  realistic 
options to address the shortcomings of the control policy. All options take it that the 
fundamental allocation between the tasks of th e Commission and the Member States remain 
unaffected, i.e. that the Commi ssion would initiate the appropria te legislative framework and 
monitor the proper application of Community la w while it would be th e responsibility of 
Member States to apply these rules to thei r nationals and their te rritory. The Community 
Fisheries Control Agency would co ntinue to coordinate, with addi tional powers,  activities of 
Member States in all options but to a much lower degree in options 1 and 2. 
 
 27 
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  
The different actors which might be affected by the future policy of the Community are the 
following:  The Community fishing sector: It has to face dw indling fishing opportunities and ever stricter 
rules for a couple of years. For a number of stocks TACs are complemented by effort regimes supposed to reduce the fishing pres sure on specific stocks that ar e subject to recovery plans. 
Combined with factors such as fuel prices th is has made parts of th e fishing industry more 
vulnerable. The Community fish ing sector is composed of  around 70,000 (small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs)  with a total of up to 90,000 vessels  and a workforce on board those 
vessels around 210,000 persons with an overall turnover estimated at  amounting to around 
€8,8 billion. 
The Community processing industry: Due to a lack  of sufficient supplies from its own fishing 
sector, the Community processi ng industry relies heavily on the supply of imported products 
for raw materials and semi-processed products
46. The 6,000 companies in the business employ 
some 150,000 workers with a turnover of €18 b illion. However, this industry is partly 
characterised by a high degree of internationalisation as a numb er of important firms have 
invested in third countries and delocalized pa rt of their production with a view to reducing 
labour costs and benefiting fr om preferential tariffs. 
The authorities of Member States in charge of  control of fishing activities: The scarcity of 
fishing opportunities and the increase in rules that have to  be enforced has put an ever 
increasing strain on the control authorities. The measures proposed would have a direct 
bearing on these authorities as they will be in ch arge of implementing them with respect to the 
industry. 
The fishing sector of third countries would be affected during its fishing activities in 
Community waters as it would nor mally be subject to the same control regime as Community 
fishing vessels in Community waters. 
5.1 O PTION 1: NO POLICY CHANGE . CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY AND FOCUS ON 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK  
5.1.1 Option 1: General impact 
The current situation is charact erized by a constant degradat ion of fish stocks. Despite 
substantial efforts, there are no significant signs of stock recovery or re ductions in overfishing 
since 2003. Fisheries management in the European  Union is not working as it should and the 
objective of achieving long-term sustainability is not being reached. This situation is due 
partly to management decisions that do not fo llow scientific advice and pursue rather short 
term interests. To a large extent, however, also poor implementation of existing technical 
rules and established TACs/quotas  play an important part.  
Some progress has been observe d though. In particular the intr oduction of recovery plans for 
specific stocks that are in part icularly serious conditions with specific control targets and the 
start of the work of the Community Fisherie s Control Agency setting up joint deployment 
plans that pool control means of relevant Member  States and target in particular stocks under 
recovery plans have led to a certain improve ment, even though sometimes favoured by natural 
conditions as in the case of North Sea cod.  
                                                 
46 See also annex I, table 3 
 28In the MRAG study47 it was calculated that even under current conditio ns, with an enhanced 
control in the framework of recovery plans, the stock situation is likely to improve in most 
cases for North Sea hake, Baltic cod, North Sea plaice and sole, Northe rn and Southern hake, 
Western mackerel and Mediterranean hake . However results would be much more 
encouraging under option 3 (see table 4 and 5 in annex 1). Overall, according to this case 
study option 3 is likely to produce a 51%48 increase in the biomass of the modelled stocks, 
and option 2 a 22%49 increase. In view of this outcome  the case study projects a certain 
increase in employment as illu strated in table 6 of annex 1. 
Option 1 would only bring little or no gain afte r 2012 and maximal gain would be attained in 
option 3. However, when referring to this stud y it should be kept in mind that it is only a 
calculation model with all the uncertainties that goe s with it. It refers to specific stocks under 
recovery plans and it is based on certain fixed as sumptions that are supposed not to change in 
the time span under investigation. As the current  conditions are likely to  aggravate, as for 
instance fuel prices, fishermen are likely to take advantage of the weaknesses of the system to 
improve their economic performance. The imp rovements might therefore be less than 
projected under present conditions. 
The continuation of the current policy can be looked at from two different perspectives: 
 
5.1.1.1 Sub-option 1: No policy change, con tinuation of the current situation 
 
The continuation of the current situation does no t necessarily mean that  the content and scope 
of the framework will remain static. This approach is better categorised as a 'business as usual' approach with additional layers of rules being added in an uncoordinated manner to the existing web of complexity in response to isol ated political demands or  emergency situations 
in the fishery.    
With respect to the three main objectives define d in section 3 the cons equences of this sub-
option would be as follows:  5.1.1.1.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection  The fundamental problem would persist, the comp lexities of the regulatory and administrative 
environment of the control regime in place wo uld further the current deficiencies. Member 
States would continue to make only limite d use of modern technologies leaving the 
perception that they are not cost efficient inst ruments. In particular cross-checks of data 
would continue to be used only in a handful of  Member States, preventing the capacity of the 
EU to analyse fisheries that are part icularly subject to irregularities.  
 5.1.1.1.2 A culture of compliance  The current situation that has led to a certain culture where non-compliance of CFP rules is 
widespread would continue. This situation is characterized by the fact that ICES bases its 
assessments to an important extent not only on reported catches but on unreported catches, 
too. Quota management on the basis of unrel iable catch reporting systems would remain 
questionable and science would continue to be depr ived of reliable data. The vicious circle of 
poor data not allowing reliable scientific advice leading to unsustainable management 
                                                
 
47 MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management  Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute of 
European studies and IFM (2008). ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control 
System applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’ (MRAG)  
48 MRAG p. 133 
49 MRAG p. 133 
 29decisions resulting in an over-exploitation of th e stocks would continue. Apart from possibly 
a couple of recovery stocks that are subjec t to specific conditions, the downward trend of 
quotas would generally continue. Even for rec overy stocks an improvement would not be 
ensured as the volume of black landings is likel y to be greater in stocks which are of high 
value and reduced TAC, a situation that specif ically characterizes a recovery plan. As a 
consequence the supply for the processing indu stry would generally not improve and the 
consumer would lose even more confidence in fish as a sustainable food resource.  
 5.1.1.1.3 Effective application of CFP rules  
Under this sub-option the effective application of CFP rules would not be ensured either. The 
capacities of the Commission and its inspectors would remain limited. This incapacity of the Commission would continue to be  matched by a continuous lack of  severity of national legal 
systems in case of infringements and an unsatis factory follow-up for legal or procedural 
reasons and incomplete information about sanc tions and previous non-compliance. The wide 
variations in the level and type s of sanctions applicable by the Member States in respect of 
infringements tend to undermine particularly the notion of a level pl aying field even though 
different living standards in the Member States and the details of the individual case explain 
for a part the considerable differences in th e sanctions. As far as overfishing by Member 
States is concerned the only risk for them woul d be a reduction of thei r relevant quotas the 
following year as infringement procedures before the Court of Justice for breach of 
Community law remain unlikely. The Commission would close fisheries against the will of the relevant Member States only in exceptional circumstances.  
 The weakness of the current legal framework would be exacerbated by the fact that with 
diminishing fishing possibilities  the economic pressure for fi shermen to still fish enough by 
whatever means to achieve at least the break ev en point would increase. As the CFP is relying 
more and more on effort regimes as a supplemen tary management tool to address the problem 
of overcapacity, the temptation for fishermen to  manipulate illegally engine power with a 
view to deploy a higher effort in the limited ti me available will grow. This will risk to 
undermine all effort regimes and therefore threat ens the very basis on which the CFP is likely 
to be based to a substantial extent in the future.  It has therefore to be conclude d that under this option the cont rol system would continue to 
suffer from the shortcomings identified in th e report of the Court of Auditors. The control 
system would remain inefficient, expensive and complex.  
5.1.1.2  Sub-option 2: Implementation and enfor cement of existing framework through  
 implementation regulations 
 
A possible improvement of the current si tuation could be achieved by adopting all 
implementation regulations that were origin ally foreseen in the Control Regulation
50 and in 
the Basic Regulation51.  
 5.1.1.2.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection However, even the adoption of all implementa tion regulations would no t allow to develop a 
new approach to control and in spection. Additional provisions would rather aggravate the 
fragmentation of the current rules even furthe r and lead to an even more complex legal 
                                                
 
50 Council Regulation (EEC) N° 2847/93 
51 Chapter V of Council Regulation (EC) N° 2371/2002 
 30framework. Besides that, the rules would not be  up to date as they would concentrate too 
much on activities at sea and would not comprise  the whole chain from net to plate. Although 
the Treaty obliges Member States to coopera te and support Commission inspectors in their 
work, it could happen that auth orities try to hide some ev idence or mislead Commission 
inspectors. In particular the often unsatis factory follow-up to reports of Commission 
inspectors in which shortcomings have been illustrated demonstrates that the general obligation to cooperate is in sufficient to ensure the full application of CFP rules.  
 5.1.1.2.2 A culture of compliance  
Furthermore such an approach would not allo w to develop a culture of compliance even 
though efficiency would be partly enhanced. For example article 19, paragraph 1 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) n° 2847/93 provides that Member  States shall establis h a validation system 
comprising in particular cross-checks and verifica tion of data. Currently such cross-checks are 
not undertaken in some Member States while othe rs undertake them but perceive them rather 
as a cumbersome administrative requirement. Even in those Member States where this technology is already used more widely, in a co nsiderable number of cas es large irregularities 
have been detected in terms of the inconsis tencies between sales notes, landing declarations 
and log sheets that were not identified in the cross-checking process. Notwithstanding this, it 
could be expected that some improvements are achieved when more pressure is put on 
Member States to finally introduce what  they signed up to many years ago. 
 5.1.1.2.3 Effective application of CFP rules The legal instruments at the disposal of the Commission to oblige Member States to actually implement Community rules would remain weak  and of a limited scope in practice as a 
procedure before the Court of Justice is lengthy and cumbersome and emergency and 
preventive measures would either be unsuita ble or subject to political considerations. 
Furthermore in the field of the control of e ngine power the current control framework does 
not foresee any implementation regulation to better ensure compliance with engine power 
limitations. It would therefore be impossible to address the manipulation of engine power on 
the basis of the current legal framework even  if all outstanding implementation regulations 
were to be adopted.  This sub-option is unlikely to improve the current situation s ubstantially as compared to a 
situation where no action is  undertaken at all.  
 
As sub-options 1 and 2 lead to similar failures w ith regards to the objectives to be attained, 
the environmental and socio-economic impacts of these two sub-options will be considered together, as they would be  more or less identical. 
 
5.1.2 Option 1: Link to the problem of overcapacity  
Option 1 would not systematically address the problem of overcapacity. The logical 
consequence will be that more and more fisheries will be subject to fishing effort regimes with a view to keep fishing pressure in a cceptable limits. As the overcapacity in the 
Community fleet will persist it would resu lt in poor economic performance for some 
important fishing fleets. This situation has recently  aggravated with the sh arp increase of fuel 
prices. Recent economic projections show that su ch fuel prices and the low productivity levels 
will, with a few exceptions, render EU fleets unpr ofitable. With increasing demands of fuels 
this trend is very unlikely to be reversed. With higher operating costs, break even revenues 
become higher, hence incentives to  fish over the top would rise.  
 31The changing framework conditions will affect some segments of the fleet more than others. 
The sharp increase of the fuel prices is al ready causing a certain restructuring of the 
beamtrawl fleets in some Member States as pa rt of these fleets have became economically 
unviable even under current conditions of high fuel  prices. However, that restructuring will be 
unable to bring the capacity in line with available fishing opportunities. 
 
5.1.3  Option 1: Environmental impact 
As the current situation favours over-exploitation of the resources option 1 is likely to have 
negative environmental impacts. Given that abunda nt fish stocks basica lly reflect a healthy 
environment, the continuation of the current si tuation would not allow the full replenishment 
of the stocks anytime soon. On the contrary, u nder current conditions fi shing over the top of 
what has legally been decided or  what the stocks are capable to  bear are likely to remain a 
common feature of the Common Fi sheries Policy. Such increased pressure to fish outside 
legal limits would take a particular heavy toll on the ecosystem as TACs are calculated in a 
way to allow to only extract quant ities that do not threaten the state of the stock in question. 
Extra outtakes by illegal catches undermine that  capacity and may even have consequences 
for other species that interlink with the stock th at is targeted in IUU activities and affect the 
ecosystem even more. Biological changes due to overfishing  may be irreversible so that the fish stocks of the marine 
ecosystems could not recover and regain past productivity even if fi shing is reduced to 
sustainable levels. As fisheries are usually targeting th e biggest specimens, the average size of 
individuals would also decrease. When aver age individual size and stock size are reduced 
beyond safe biological limits, the rate of re production would slow down thereby decreasing 
the capacity for replenishment and natural recovery. Below a certai n level this capacity is lost 
and the stock collapses commercially. There ar e even cases where a high fishing pressure 
induces more fundamental and long term changes such as genetic changes in fish populations 
or changes in marine food web.  
Another effect of overfishing would be the lo ss of the scientific basis for management 
decisions. The quality of data, which is an important basis for scientific advice, tends to be poorest when quality is most needed – when stocks are overfished. The uncertainty of 
scientific assessments would therefore be higher the lower a stock is. Increasing uncertainty in 
the scientific advice de teriorates the basis for developmen t of management proposals and the 
monitoring of their success.  
The continuation of the current situation, even with all impl ementation regulations adopted 
and a stronger emphasis on their implementati on, would not guarantee th at situations as 
described in the preceding paragraph would no t come about. The fishing sector and the 
political actors responsible for the CFP would thus be likely to continue to be blamed for its 
negative impact on the environment. This impact  might even be exacerbated by the fact that 
due to the high fuel prices fishermen tend to fish  closer to the coast thereby putting in some 
areas a high strain on the affected ecosystem.  
5.1.4  Option 1: Economic impact 
As fishing stocks are likely to be fished outsi de safe biological limits or more generally below 
their full biological potential th ey would only produce low profita bility. Total catch volumes 
would be lower and the smaller individual fish  would be less valuable  than when a stock 
would be fished within sustainable limits. In addition to the loss of potential income, costs 
 32would increase as higher fishi ng effort would be necessary to catch volumes big enough to 
create revenue.  
The lower capacity of the stock to compensate natural variations in recruitment would often 
increase the need for large annual variations in the TAC to keep the stock in stable conditions. 
This would reduce the economic stability of the sector and as a result there would be poor 
acceptance of the measures by the sector and Member States. 
Some vessels are able to respond to reduced fi shing possibilities and to  move to other areas 
provided they have quotas in these areas. Other cannot, eith er because they do not have 
fishing possibilities in other areas or are simple too small to move on. Other fisheries are less 
concerned by the changing framework conditions, especially those using passive gear even 
though higher prices will be an issue for them as  well. The situation may also vary subject to 
the species concerned as some species tend to recover faster than others.  
As a result of illegal landings there would be a continued loss of earnings (reduced catches, 
low prices as the size of the fish is smaller,  continually reducing prof its) and an increased 
pressure to commit fisheries fraud. This in creased economic pressure which can be 
considered a vicious circle by which operators are forced, in view of ever more shrinking 
fishing possibilities, to exploit fish stock more than they can sustain and thereby reducing the 
basis for fishing in future years, would force more peopl e out of business at a high 
environmental cost. In view of the dwindled  stocks even the rema ining job opportunities 
would not be certain. This would not only affect  the fishing industry bu t also people in the 
processing industry as the ever increasing pres sure on the stocks will lead to ever more 
reduced stocks which affects the raw material basis for the processing industry. This could 
only partly be compensated by imports.  
 5.1.5 Option 1: Social impacts  
As a consequence of falling wages and low re turns on capitals more fishermen would leave 
the industry, thereby increasing un employment in coastal areas th at often have to face less 
working opportunities than other areas. Lower le vels of fish landed would result in lower 
throughputs into fish factories and thereby affecting employment in some processing 
industries even though some processing companie s receive already their raw materials from 
outside the EU.  
As the profits of the fishing industry would sh rink the ancillary support  industries would be 
affected as well. In some cases this could lead  to the collapse of the local ancillary support 
industry which in turn could force the fisherme n of an affected place to move to another 
place. The collapse of part or th e whole ancillary support industry could result in higher costs 
for obtaining business related services. There w ould be some knock-on-effects in the affected 
communities, too, in terms of falling tax revenues  and increase of income support for laid-off 
people that do not find replacement work. 
The results might be more mitigated as far as fisheries under recovery plans are concerned if 
there are some improvements of these recovery  stocks under the assu mptions of the case 
study referred to above. These improvements w ould be, however, far less substantial than 
under a new regime. As the economic parameters such as fuel prices, which are difficult to predict and therefore are not included in the cas e study, are likely to add further strain to the 
industry, the economic performance of these fi sheries under current conditions might not be 
as good as projected in the case study. It is therefore to be e xpected that these fisheries 
continue under the present regime to be temp ted to improve their economic performance by 
unreported catches. 
 33With the applicable rules becoming ever more complex, national fisheries administrations 
would have to face steadily increasing admini strative costs including increased costs for 
understanding and interpreting th e relevant rules as well as  the necessary training to 
inspectors and managers. More complicated rules would increase the risk that prosecutions in 
Member States where fisheries sanctions are ap plied on the basis of criminal law are either 
not mounted at all or that they will be thro wn out by the courts. The continuation of the 
current situation would create an equi valent increased burden on the CFCA.  
 
Political confidence both of the fishing sector and of the public at large in the management 
regime would continuously suffer and might lead to put into doubt the cr edibility of the CFP 
as such. The idea of a level pl aying field would remain an abst ract concept due  to divergent 
national interpretation of nati onal rules. Even though providi ng for clearer rules in some 
areas, they would not fully address the inadeq uate regulatory framework criticized by the 
Court of Auditors in its report nor would they provide the Commission with the legal tools to 
see to their practical implementation. 
 
5.1.6  Option 1:Cost/benefit ratio 
Total employment in 2005 in the fisheries sector of the EU-27 amounted to about 407,000 
persons, which represents 0.2% of total EU  employment. The catching sector offered 
employment to 187,000 people (46% of total fish eries sector employment), fish processing 
138,000 (34%) and aquaculture 63,000 (16%). Employme nt in ancillary activities is estimated 
at 18,000 jobs (4%). There are no resource rents estimates for the EU  fisheries. However, it is a fact that the 
industry as a whole does not toda y generate taxable resource re nts. The resource rent is 
dispatched through a fishing fleet far too large to  the current resource base. So from a social 
welfare perspective the CFP has failed in two wa ys: the public pays for resource management 
and does not get any quantifiable benefit from  the private use of a public resource.  
The EU market for fishery products, i.e. captures plus aquaculture production, shows a 
structural imbalance between supply and demand. Th is feature has been widening in the last 
years against a background of a decline in  catches of 22% between 1993 and 2005 and 
increase of world catches by 8%. At the same time the consumption rose by 9% reaching 24.6 kg/person in 2001. In 2005 the EU -27 production of fishery produc ts (capture fisheries and 
aquaculture production) was about  4% of the world total, when it was 7% in 1996. Some 
fisheries have managed better than others, but the overall pi cture is falling revenues and net 
profit with excessive capital invested in many fl eets. Margins remain low in many fisheries, 
partly because of continuing declining volumes and also due to the negative economic impact 
of increased fuel price. 
 
Trend in the EU-25 catches (1993-2006): 
 343.0004.0005.0006.0007.0008.0009.000
1993 1994 1995
1996
1997
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2003
2004
2005
2006Volume
(thousands of tonnes)
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Trends can be evaluated only for EU-15 Member States, as historical data are not available 
for the newer MS. In the EU -15 the total employment decr eased by 23% between 1997 and 
2005, primarily due to a decrease in the catc hing sub-sector (-31 %). Employment in 
processing is more or less stable.52 
 Trends in employment in the EU-15 (1000 persons) 
Fisheries sub-sector 1996-8 2005 change 
Fishing 241.3 167.5 -31% 
Processing 101.8 100.7 -1% 
aquaculture 61.4 45.3 -26% 
Total 404.5 313.5 -22% 
 Employment in the total fish eries sector of the EU-15 de creased from 404,000 persons in 
1997 to 313,000 persons in 2005, i.e. by 23%, in  the catching sector from about 240,000 in 
1997 to 167,000 in 2005. With the current situation this downward trend is likely to continue with an average decline of 
catches of 2% per year. Even though the processing i ndustry is generally not  affected to the 
same extent, it is to be expected that imports will not be able to make up for the shortfalls of the EU catching sector forever.  There would be no additional costs for the fishi ng sector. In particular  fishermen who earn a 
substantial part of their income from illegal ac tivities would not lose this source of income. 
However, the ineffective use of control means wo uld continue. In particular the administrative 
burden for control authorities is likely to increase in the long r un with ever new layer of rules 
being added. This situation would not allow to decrease significantly control costs while still maintaining the same quality of control.  However, the MRAG study, under the assumption 
that the recovery plans to wh ich most of the seven stocks on which the study is based will 
have positive effects, calculated a possible reduction of land c ontrol costs in connection with 
                                                
 
52 Source Regional Dependency on Fisheries – European Parliament  Project n° IP/B/PECH/ST/IC/2006-198 
 35these seven stocks from 125 million € to 106.5 million € from the year 2010 to 2019 and an 
average reduction of marine inspection cost s from 69.5 million € to 44.9 million € from 2008 
to 2017. In this regard, though, th ere is a likelihood that other stocks due to current poor 
enforcement will need extra control efforts in the future and thwart any such cost savings.  
 
 
5.2 O PTION 2: RECAST OF THE CONTROL REGULATION , COMBINED WITH A CODE OF 
CONDUCT  
5.2.1 Option 2: General impact 
The development of an approach that consider s the implementation of the reform elements 
through a consolidated legal framework in combin ation with a steering instrument, such as a 
‘Code of Conduct’ or ‘Best Practice Guidance’ could contribute to a ce rtain extent to the 
improvement of the current control system. As  this approach would build on initiatives 
developed by Member States over the years,  coordination of inspection and surveillance 
activities by national authorities at Comm unity level would be improved, based on the 
adoption of inspection and surv eillance strategies by the Co mmission, and the pooling of 
national means of inspections for joint deploymen t. It would result in better value for money, 
as national means of inspection would be used as rationally and as e ffectively as possible. 
Some fisheries might recover as a result of unilateral action of a segment of the fleet or of groups of fleet segments, but overall, this appro ach does not change the content of the current 
provisions or add any new legal instrument s and relies too heavily on a voluntary 
implementation by the Member States. Even in  the context of a recast of the existing 
provisions, Member States would still need  a new legal framework that provides for 
mandatory and new tools for en effective applic ation of the CFP rules. In that respect, a 
combination of consolidation and steeri ng measures would be insufficient.  
 
5.2.1.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection 
In the absence of new requireme nts pertaining to harmonised inspection procedures, Member 
States would continue to apply their ow n inspection methodology. Community guidance on 
the use of modern technologies, including recomme ndations to ensure the use of tamper proof 
satellite tracking devices and on extending the coverage of regulation pertaining to the 
provision of VMS and logbook data  electronically a nd in real time has the potential to 
improve the control of activities. However, this potential is not likely to  be used fully in all 
Member States. Regarding the voluntary im plementation of cross-checking of data,  the nature 
of the impact is likely to be varied across the community. 
 
5.2.1.2 A culture of compliance  
Simplification
 
The recast of the control regulation would conso lidate and rationalise the set of legal rules and 
therefore would resolve the problem of the multiplicity of different rules or the situations where there are apparent overlaps or contradicti ons and provide at leas t partial solutions to 
some of the current problems relating to the interpretation of the rules.  
Sanctions
 
Since there would be no change of legal provisions in this resp ect, it is not clear whether the 
aspect of non-regulatory stee ring action would (a) result in  harmonisation or increased 
sanctions, (b) significantly accel erate or otherwise enhance the existing process of change in 
legal procedures that is alre ady underway in the Member St ates or (c) pr oduce significant 
 36improvements in compliance, particularly with out parallel increases in surveillance and 
enforcement.  
5.2.1.3 Effective applica tion of CFP rules 
In the absence of new instruments, the existing  shortcomings are likely  to continue, as the 
Commission would not be in a position to in tervene proportionately  to the level of non 
compliance by the Member States. Even in the context of a consolidation of the existing texts, the benefits that would result from the rationa lisation exercise would not be enough to bring 
the expected results without adequate  tools to enforce the CFP rules. 
 
5.2.2 Option 2: Link to the problem of overcapacity 
This option does not address the problem of overcapacity in a systematic way. Initiatives for 
adjustments of the fleet would be left to the discretion of Member States. As the level of 
control is likely to improve in those Member States that increase voluntarily their control capacity the fleets of these Member States or flee ts operating in their waters are more likely to 
fish in line with legal fish ing opportunities. There is a certa in likelihood that the economic 
pressure thus caused will lead to a limited rest ructuring of the fleets concerned. However, 
such a restructuring would be insufficient to  solve the problem of overcapacity as such. 
5.2.3 Option 2: Environmental impact 
As the full compliance benefit will not be realised, neither would the environmental benefits. 
Those benefits would be regionally varied and unlikely to be realised in a short term time 
frame. The overall environmental impact a ssociated with pursuing the approach of a 
consolidated legal framework in combina tion with non-binding steering instruments are 
therefore likely to tend towards th e existing situati on on the whole. 
 
5.2.4 Option 2: Economic impact 
As a result of partial or slow  uptake adoption of compliance measures, all fisheries except 
mackerel show negative net benefits in the earl y years of the projection, and in some cases 
these negative net benefits persist throughout the 10 year period. No rth sea cod, Southern 
hake, mackerel and Mediterranean hake would still manage to produce positive net benefits, 
because the small increase in compliance w ould be enough to trigger some recovery. 
However, the costs would outweight the benefits  for North Sea plaice and sole, Baltic cod and 
Northern hake.   The costs of deployment would fall as co mpliance increases. The cost of accumulated 
enforcement expenditure is of €1,889 million in the 10 year period
53. Proportions at the start 
of the case studies represent an average 9% of gross fleet revenue, and 4% at the end of the 
programme. The current level of expenditure against sector reve nue is 9%. Therefore, within 
a ten year time horizon, the model would project net benefits in terms of enforcement cost 
savings, i.e. to below current levels of expenditure. Both la nd and marine inspection costs 
would fall. In the case of land based inspecti on accounts, the implementation costs for the non 
regulatory environment would fall from a high of € 73 m, to € 40 m. The corresponding 
                                                 
53 Idem  
 
 37changes in marine related costs would be € 58 m to € 45 m. Most specifically, more modest 
levels of enforcement expenditure could be afforded in the case of mackerel. 
  
5.2.5 Option 2: Social impact 
The case study shows that some 2300 net empl oyment gains are expected from relative 
improved levels of compliance. However, less efficient fishers would be removed from the 
sector, as they are unable to compete as a result  of only partial compliance in some fisheries. 
Reduction of support to shore side businesses ma y take place with fewer boats (due to the 
removal of less efficient fishers) and knock on effects might be seen in the community if 
support industries do not find replacement for fi shing-related work (e.g., engineering firms 
and ship builders). Some fishing communities, fo r example, are already at the lowest number 
of boats possible for keeping support businesse s operating. The case stud y on the impacts of a 
reform of the CFP control regime projects for this option a crew gain  between € -1,200 and € 
900 income per annum 10 year period
54.  
 Option 2  would provide for a simplified legal fram ework and allow for partial improvements 
of the control system in some Member States. However, shortcomings in the current legal provisions could not be amended and the impact of measures w ould mainly rely on voluntary 
improvements by the Member States.  
5.2.6  Option 2: Cost/benefit ratio 
As this option depends largely on voluntary acti ons of Member States the cost/benefit ratio 
will be different for the Member States and th eir fishing fleets concerned and are therefore 
difficult to quantify for the EU as such. Ho wever, based on seven stocks the MRAG study 
arrives overall for this option at a reduction of  enforcement costs at land from 146.1 million € 
to 63.7 million € from the year 2010 to 1019 and marine enforcement costs from 88.2 million 
€ to 52 million € from the year 2008 to 2017. Ho wever, in the initial years there would be 
additional costs of the enforcement depending on the various species. For instance for the 
North Sea cod, additional costs of 8 million could be expected. Though for the whole period 
2010-2019 a the net gain in enfor cement costs of around 43 million € could be achieved.  For 
the fleets of the Member States concerned, in mo st investigated fisheries in the study there 
would be loss in the in itial year. In th e case of North Sea cod, for instance, a loss of 97 
million € in the first year and 49 million € in th e second year is expect ed. However, according 
to the MRAG study, this would be compensated as from the third year with net benefits of 
174 million € over the whole period 2010 – 2019; 
 
5.3 O
PTION 3: REGULATORY INSTRUMENT BINDING AT EU LEVEL  
5.3.1 Option 3: General Impact 
This option would allow the Community to have the strong and efficient control regime based 
on a simplified legislative fram ework that is necessary.  
 
5.3.1.1 A new, common approach to control and inspection  
A comprehensive regulatory instrument that is binding at EU level would create a new and 
common approach to control and inspection. The establishm ent of common control and 
                                                 
54 MRAG p. 136  
 38inspection standards would provide for a co mmon basis and thereby contribute to the 
achievement of a level playing field. This  would be enhanced by strengthening the 
cooperation between Member Stat es, the Commission and the CFCA  as this would allow to 
better target specific fisheries on the basis of an overall appropriate risk analysis. By linking 
financial aid to making av ailable control means for participating in specific control tasks of 
the CFCA the readiness of Member States to  cooperate with the CFCA and their fellow 
Member States would be improved.  
The quality of inspection would be improved by targeting control re sources at high risk 
activities. Risk Analysis would increase th e probability of detec ting regular groups of 
offenders and the cost effectiveness of control.  A marginal increase of  land based costs would 
result in a greater number of infringements detected (or a corresponding increase in 
compliance), than the same change in expenditu re in marine surveillance. For that reason a 
shift from sea based control to a more land based control is lik ely to lead to a higher number 
of detections and hence to a higher level of  compliance. At the same time due emphasis 
would be put on the fact that certain infringeme nts as the use of certain devices during fishing 
operations can only be successfully controlled at  sea. Marine platforms act as an effective 
deterrent for some illegal fishing practices. Their effectiveness would be significantly improved through the support of a Fisheries Mon itoring Centre (FMC), risk analyses, linking 
VMS to aerial surveillance, and intelligence received.  
The forthcoming introduction of electronic log books would be of particular importance for 
cross-checks to be fully usable as they would allow the registration of  logbook data in nearly 
real time and further contribute  to the reduction of administra tive costs. Electronic logbooks 
would also facilitate the management of fishin g effort, a management t ool that is likely to 
become ever more important in the future.  
 
5.3.1.2 A culture of compliance  
A comprehensive regulatory instrument w ould set a framework that would allow the 
development of a culture of compliance. 
Legal simplification would offer the opportunity to strengthen the curren t set of rules. The 
regulation to be adopted under option 3 would reduce complexity, inte r alia, by setting up 
general, clear and simplified c ontrol rules. This w ould reduce the costs of implementation as 
the more complex a regulatory framework is the mo re costly it will be to implement. A simple 
set of rule would favour  an equal interpretation and appli cation of the rules in a multilingual 
setting as the EU, making life easier both for the industry and for the authorities. It would 
allow a better transparency and improve the confidence in a level playing field among 
Community fishermen.  
The bulk of technical rules woul d be dealt with in Commission regulations allowing them to 
be easily amendable to respond to new conditions. It has been calculated that  the vertical 
codification of the amending legislative acts alone could reduce the amount of legislative 
instruments in force by 36 %
55. This objective would be particularly important as the 
identified deficiencies in the current implem entation and enforcement of the CFP are strongly 
related to the current complexities of the regulatory and administrative environment.  
A decrease in the number of fail ing national infringement pro cedures and prosecutions could 
be expected because of increased clarity, cons istency and awareness of the regulations and 
rules. The substantial change s would increase the possibilities of access to evidence of 
                                                 
55 MRAG p. 195 
 39infringements. In turn an increased deterrence  could be expected. Such  deterrents would be 
created by increasing the risks of being in spected and reducing th e rewards for illegal 
activities (higher fines or loss of licence for repeated offences).  
Harmonised sanctions would help to achieve a level playing field in fisheries by aiming at 
establishing penalties that are proportionate to the gain from illegal activities and comparable 
in all Member States. As the public consulta tion has shown, harmonised sanctions do enjoy 
large support by the industry as a means of en suring fair competition and equal treatment of 
fishermen throughout the EU. Improving the mechanism for imposing penalties by 
introducing administrative sanctions would enhan ce the feeling of equal treatments in all 
Member States and enhance the deterring effect of  the control regime. Possible reservations of 
the Member States in this point could be base d on concerns in relation to national sovereignty. 
However, the outlined positive impacts together  with the respective demand of stakeholders 
should help to overcome such reservations.      
 
5.3.1.3 Effective applica tion of CFP rules 
 
A mandatory regulatory framework would enab le the Commission to ensure the effective 
application of CFP rules. First,  the capacity of the Commission to intervene pr oportionately to 
the level of non compliance by the Member Stat e would be amplified. A strengthening of the 
capacities of Commission inspectors  would ensure that it would b ecome more difficult to hide 
shortcomings in the implementation of CFP ru les. Second, a strengthened capacity of the 
Commission would in particular allow to ensure  a better management of fishing possibilities 
and to stop fisheries easier in real time on the Commission's own initiative to avoid 
overfishing. By ensuring respect of catch limits  the reputation of the Commission as guardian 
of the treaty, and hence of the CFP, would bene fit. However, since  it is likely that Member 
States would have strong rese rvations on such increased competences of the Commission, it 
would have to ensure that such measures are well founded and appl ied proportionately and 
equally. Otherwise it would seriously damage its authority and the confidence of Member 
States and stakeholders, what  would be contra-productive and would put the new control 
system into question resulting in an even lowe r level of compliance w ith the CFP rules.   
 
 
5.3.2 Option 3: Link to the problem of overcapacity 
A comprehensive reform is also likely to entail a substantial restructuring of the current 
Community fleet and thereby to contribute to reduce the current overcapacity. As the future 
control system will ensure that only legal fish  will be caught, the lack  of quotas will entail a 
concentration of the fleet by market forces until  it reaches a level that allows all remaining 
vessels to make a living on the bases of legal quotas. Even though some fleets will be more 
affected than others, this holds true for all parts of the Community fleet where the 
restructuring will result in a fleet that reflec ts available fishing possibilities and therefore 
allow Community fishermen to make a living on th e basis of legal catches. This restructuring 
would reduce some job opportunities in the cat ching industry, though. However, by this the 
vicious circle of fishing vesse ls having to fish over the top for their economic survival by 
fishing above what the stocks can sustain with an increased economic pressure to fish even 
more over the top the following years to make e nds meet as the legal fishing possibilities 
shrink, would be broken. By maintaining such a vicious circle, once th e fish stocks having 
been substantially depleted, job opportunitie s in the catching indus try would have been 
seriously affected as well but with devastatin g ecological consequences for the environment. 
After restructuring of the fishing fleet the suffi cient availability of le gal quotas will allow to 
 40reduce control and surveillance costs as the likelihood of infringements will be lower when 
sufficient economic income can be gene rated on the basis of  legal catches. 
 
5.3.3 Option 3: Environmental impact 
The environmental benefits of having fully recove red stocks are clear. Fishing at a lower rate 
within the limits of established TACs would deliver significant environmental benefits in 
terms of stress on fish stocks. According to the case study the regulator y scenario will allow 
an increase in the biomass of the nine modelled stocks of up to 51 %56. If these results were to 
be extended to all stocks in the EU, the effect  of this regulation woul d be to restore all EU 
stocks to Bpa level and above within 15 years.  Such an extrapolation might be optimistic, 
though, as it does not take into account natural in fluences and predator/prey relationships. The 
growth in size of fish populations as they recover would be accompanied by increases in the 
age distribution of fish both in  the population and in  the catch, associated with lower fishing 
pressure. Such benefits will not be limited to the target species but would have consequences 
for the ecosystem as a whole. As the fishing effo rt to fish the same amount of fish would be 
reduced, by-catches, both of non-target species a nd of juveniles of targ et species, would be 
much less. By this the impact of fish eries on the ecosystem would be reduced. 
As the Commission would have the ability to r eact faster and better to shortcomings, in 
particular with respect to ove r-utilisation of fishing quotas, the environment would be less 
likely to be affected by irresponsible fishing be haviour. As this ability  of reaction would be 
supplemented by more severe quota deductions in  case of overfishing, it could be anticipated 
that over-exploitation of ava ilable fishing possibilities woul d become an exception as 
Member States and the sector will have a keener interest in respecting quota limits. 
 
5.3.4 Option 3: Economic impact 
The case study referred above calculated a sum of  total net profits in th e regulatory option of 
€ 8.9 billion across all the stocks for the time span 2010 - 201957. The case study projects for 
North Sea cod a net benefit of a comprehensiv e new control regime for the period from 2010 
– 2019 of more than € 2,8bn. These include net benefits well above € 400 million as from 
2013 after initial losses in the magnitude of € 257 million in 2010 and € 104,000 in 201158. 
For Baltic cod this would amount to a total be nefit of € 2,8bn with st eadily increasing gains 
ranging from € 125 million in 2011 to € 417 m illion in 2019 with an initial loss of € 30 
million in 201059. The initial loss is most likely to be  suffered by fishermen who have gained 
additional income from the catch of illegal fis h. By definition, such activities are not worthy 
of protection. 
The overall benefits would be likely to have a strong carry through to increased employment, 
particularly in the processing and ancillary su b-sectors. The case study calculated that the 
economic benefits would be 50% to the catchi ng sector, 33% to the proceeding sector and 
16% to the ancillary support sectors60. 
Generally the case study comes to the conclusion that the net economic benefits are highest if 
the current situation is addre ssed under option 3 provided that it will be properly implemented 
                                                 
56 MRAG p. 133 
57 MRAG p. 163 
58 MRAG p. 165 
59 MRAG p. 167 
60 MRAG p. 163 
 41both at the Community level as well as on a na tional level. The costs of deployment would 
fall as compliance increases. For that reason it would be essential that  the Commission's role 
as a guardian of Community law is enhanced and the necessary author ity bestowed on it to 
effectively ensure that Member States respec t their obligations under Community law. Even 
though this is only a case study th at had to work on the basis of certain assumptions which 
cannot take into account all possibl e natural influences, its results  are clearly indicative of the 
potential that could be gained from a comprehensive reform.  
This cost effectiveness would be further enhanc ed by using modern technologies to the extent 
possible. In particular systematic cross-checks of all electronically registered data which are 
technically easy to set up, would be an extremel y useful tool for the identification of control 
needs. They would i.a. allow to summarise the number of vessels licensed to fish for a given fishery, link fishing areas declared in the logbo ok to fishing activities identified with VMS 
data or compare logbook data with landing data . They also would ensure that data would 
become more reliable and more rapidly availabl e. More reliable data in turn would allow to 
break the vicious circle of poor data not allowing  reliable scientific advice which then leads to 
unsustainable management decisions resulti ng in an over-exploita tion of the stocks.  
In the introductory phase of a new control regime both the indust ry and the cont rol authorities 
would have to adapt to the new situation. This holds in particular true if new technologies 
were to be extended to fishi ng vessels currently not covered by their application. In this 
context it should be recalled th at the introduction of electroni c logbooks is already foreseen 
for all fishing vessels above 24 m on 1 January 2010 and for all vessels  above 15 m on 1 July 
2011. However, the utilisation of new technologies will substant ially reduce running costs of 
control authorities by allowing them to concen trate scarce control resources on fishing 
activities that have been identified by way of risk analysis based on comprehensive automated 
cross-checks as being particularly prone to il legal activities. Some of the new technologies 
will also be useful to the industry, for instan ce the electronic logbook as it has the potential to 
be used in contacts with  buyers of the catches.  
 
Concerning the EU budget, the reform will ha ve no additional impact, since there is no 
financial incidence on the Financial Perspectives . Indeed, any expenditure which could result 
from the reform is already covered by Article  8 of the Council Regulation n° 861/2006 of 22 
May 2006, which establishes a financial framew ork for the period 2007 to 2013. In the area of 
control and enforcement of CFP rules, the following expenditure shall be eligible for Community financial measures:  - new technologies and IT networks (Art  8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- automatic localisation devices (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- electronic recording and reporting systems (A rt 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- electronic recording and r ecording devices (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- patrol vessels and aircraft (Art 8 a i. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- training (Art 8 a ii. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- pilot projects (Art 8 a iii. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), - assessment of expenditure (Art 8 a iv. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006), 
- seminars and media tools (Art 8 a v. of Council Regulation n° 861/2006) 
(all those actions are presently  covered under Budget line 11.0801); 
 - all operational expenditure related to insp ection by Commission inspection (Art. 8c of 
Council Regulation n° 861/2006) - these expenditu res are currently financed under Budget 
line 11.0802, 
 42 
 - contribution to th e budget of the CFCA (Art. d of Council Regulation n° 861/2006) and 
Council Regulation n° 768/2005 dated 26 April 2005 : the CFCA expenditure are financed 
under Budget lines 11.080501 (administrative expenditure of the CFCA) and 11.080502 
(operational expenditu re of the CFCA). 
 In addition it is important to point out th at the improvement of the capacities of the 
Commission will not lead to an increased need of  human resources but will rather be realised 
by the reallocation of tasks, the focus on macro management decisions a nd the change in the 
profile of Commission inspectors. 
 
As the experience has shown, a better control th at leads to the eradication or at least 
substantial reduction of illegal catches entails an increase of the price for legal fish. This has been clearly demonstrated in the blue fin tuna campaign where an increased control and monitoring based on a risk assessm ent entailed a remarkable increase of the price for tuna. 
This contributes positively to th e income of legal fishermen. Ev en though such higher income 
on less catches means at the time higher prices for consumers, the interests of consumers are 
protected by the fact th at they can be assured of a sust ainable supply of fisheries products. 
 
5.3.5 Option 3: Social impact 
As the stock situation improves the confidence  of the industry and the public in the CFP 
would increase. The CFP would add to the more  general political e ndeavours to achieve a 
better protection of the environment by favouring an economy that is more respectful of  
nature. A better confidence of the public in the CFP would in turn affect consumer behaviour 
and confidence as he would be convinced of buying a sustainable produ ct, and possibly allow 
to yield a higher price for the product.  Apart from greater quantities to be fished, the 
individual fish would be bigge r and yield a better price for th e same quantities. There would 
be higher returns to fishing effort and a grea ter cost efficiency for the fishing sector.  
A stricter definition of a designa ted ports scheme would entail th at some fishing vessels have 
to travel larger distances to land their catch  at authorized locations . However, the negative 
effect of this might be limited by setting a thresh old either of length of vessels or of transport 
capacity below which vessels would be exempted.  
The risk of losing financial aid from the Co mmunity would be likely to encourage both the 
private sector and national authoritie s to abide strictly by the rules.  
 
 
5.3.6  Option 3: Cost/benefit ratio 
As a new control regulation woul d make widespread use of m odern technologies allowing the 
identification of risky activities and the c oncentration of control means on such risky 
activities, substantial benefits in cost efficiency can be expected. Overall the MRAG study concluded that for the seven stocks investigated there would be a total gain in control costs for 
the period 2010 to 2019 in the magnitude of 389 million € compared to option 1. In the case of North Sea cod for instance this study expects substantial savings in later years coming to a 
net saving until 2019 of up to 42.9 million € for this fishery alone. As to the fishing sector, some pa rt of the fleets that have no t already done so will have to 
install new monitoring devices and be submitted to correspondent transmission costs. For the 
 43monitoring devices there will be Community funds  available as this has been in the past. 
There will also be a sharp decrease in illegal catches which in some fisheries are, according to estimations be ICES, of substantial dimensions. However, being illegal, the magnitude of lost 
income as a consequence of eradicating IUU cat ches is by definition difficult to estimate. In 
any event the loss of illegal prof its is not wort hy of protection. 
The management measures the implementation of  which the control system is supposed to 
ensure, will take some time to bear their fruits . In a situation of a widespread stock depletion 
as a consequence of the current control system this will naturally take a couple of years. For the seven stocks investigated the MRAG study cal culated a combined net additional benefit of 
6.4 billion € over the period 2010 to 2019. For North Sea cod the MRAG study arrives at a 
net additional benefit of 807 million € for the whole period 2010 – 2019. Not included in this 
calculation are the benefits for other stocks or for the environment as such which are currently not quantifiable.   
5.3.7  Option 3: Administrative costs  
 
This section examines the changes that could result from the implementation of option 3, in 
terms of reduction of administrative burdens. The reduction of unnecessary administrative burdens and the high number of reporting obligations  will be addressed in the context of the 
reform and the simplification exercise it inte nds to achieve. The proposals for reduction of 
administrative burden were alrea dy discussed on the occasion of a meeting of the High Level 
Group (HLG) on Administrative Burdens, on 18 Se ptember. The HLG gave full support to the 
proposals of DG MARE.   
5.3.7.1 Drivers for the reduction of administ rative burden at the level of operators
 
 
Reduction of the costs related to the Information Obligations 
The proposed reform will concur to a reduction of the number of Information Obligations 
(IOs) in place under the current control framework, through the im pact of the in tensive use of 
modern technologies. According to the study commissioned by DG ENTR61 on the costs of 
the current control regime the final figures  which are not yet approved by the Commission, 
though, concerning 6 measurement countries, and on the basis of the extrapolation carried out 
by DG MARE, the total administrative cost for the fishermen is 78 million EUR for the 22 EU Member States (except landlocked countries). As a result of the re form, the extrapolated 
total administrative costs for the fishermen would fall to 38 million EUR (see annex III). 
 The reasons for the reduction of th ese administrative burdens are: 
-Extension of the use of the Electronic Reporti ng System (ERS) to vessels above 10 metres 
As the obligation to register the catch of a vessel regularly in the logbook and to submit a 
landing declaration was identified to be the most onerous IO, th e introduction of an electronic 
logbook (ERS) would be likely to lead to a reduction of administration burdens in the 
magnitude of 70% as many of the requested da ta would be already av ailable on the screen 
(identification data, position data) or could be clicked on a screen. Transmission costs in this 
regard would be neglectable. Transmission of  an ERS message (~2KB size) would cost 0.20 
                                                
 
61 DRAFT FINAL REPORT, Measurement data and analysis, as specified in the specific contract on Modules 
3&4 for the Priority Area Fisher ies,of the Framework contract n° ENTR/06/061,EU PROJECT ON 
BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
 44€. For a vessel having 200 fishing days annua lly and involved in di fferent fishing types 
(gears, areas) annual costs would amount to ar ound 100 EUR.  These transmissions costs are 
calculated for satellite data transmitted at sea.  Messages on land/in port  (landing declarations, 
sales notes, take-over declarations) and logbook messages (befor e entering port) could be sent 
from simple laptop/pocket PC free of charge if  wireless internet connection is available in 
port or via mobile phone. As tec hnologies are developi ng fast those costs would very likely to 
fall in the future.   -The impact of the intensive use of modern technologies on th e costs of sales notes as a 
consequence of the reform can not be evaluated at  this time as in the future their submission 
would be an obligation of the registered buyer. Even though, th e fact that these notes would 
be submitted electronically means a substantial simplification in terms of time that would be 
needed to fill them in as these notes are pa rt of the normal business of registered buyers. 
Comparable simplifications would to be expected from other IO s that are currently based on a 
paper format, like for instance transport documents. 
Overall, the reform of the CFP control polic y, through the modernisation of the control 
techniques, the introduction of new technologies and the more  extensive use of modern 
technologies that are already applied, would allow for the reduction of paper work.  
 The assessment of administrative costs also need s to refer to current initiatives taken in DG 
MARE, which intend to reduce th e number of the existing info rmation obligations (IOs) by 
the Member States. The project OBONT will be  instrumental in the achievement of the 
Action Plan for simplifying and improving the regulatory environment of the CFP 
(COM(2005)647), as it will allow to reduce the numb er of the existing IOs that have become  
obsolete or redundant. Since IOs generally imply a cost for the economic  operator who has to 
provide the information to his authority, as a result DG MARE will concur to the 
Commission's initiative aimed at cutting administrative burdens imposed on operators.  
 
5.3.7.2 Drivers for the reduction of administrative burden at the level of the Member States
 
Option 3 develops tools and approaches which will entail an overall reduction of the 
administrative burden and reporting obligations: 
-Simplification of the legislative framework w ill be an inherent part of the CFP control 
reform. As a result of the new legislative fram ework, the development of  control policies that 
would continue to rely on proper enforcement of Community rules by Member States would 
lead to a less expensive, but more organised and effective inspection framework. Both at the 
level of Member State administrations and assimilated EU bodies, the reform of the 
regulatory framework would incr ease the cost effectiveness as the means and resources 
allocated to control purposes would be partly pooled.  
-The national administrations w ould also have to spend less tim e and means on gathering data 
as they would be transmitted a nd fed into the system electroni cally. This would allow national 
administrations to substantially  economize on staff that is currently needed to enter paper 
based information into the system. In one Member State 79 people are currently used 
exclusively to enter such data into the system. These could be put to more effective use in the 
future.  
-At the same time the new approach would allow comprehensive and systematic cross-checks 
of all sorts of data and to concentrate on th e areas where there is the greatest likelihood of 
irregularities. As all data would be automa ted it would also become easier for national 
administrations to provide the Commission with da ta. This effect would s till be reinforced by 
 45the fact that the reform would focus on those control policies which are truly effective and 
absolutely necessary (and avoid redundant reporti ng obligations.  
5.3.7.3 Drivers for the reduction of administrativ e burden at the level of the Commission  
It is one of the objectives of the reform to pr omote a cost effective system, which focuses on 
the respective obligations of the Commission a nd the Member States. By developing a macro 
management approach, the Commission will re-ori entate its tasks towards the control of the 
control systems established by the Member States, based on risk analysis and a more rational use of resources. The extension of the power of  Commission’s inspectors requires that audits 
of parties having received delegation of power fo r managing fisheries are carried out. Overall, 
the use of modern technologies and electronic database means that the Commission will not 
spend its resources focusing on the repor t obligations by the Member States.  
5.3.7.4 Possible initial investment costs 
 
 
For the operators 
Initial investments relate to certain adaptions th at operators of fishing vessels would have to 
undertake like installation of VMS and ERS devi ces for which financial assistance from the 
EU of up to 50% would be available. The t echnological development allows to combine these 
two applications in one device.  The installation of a new VMS/ ERS device is likely to cost 
2500 € per unit including the softwa re (around 1300 € if the availa ble financial assistance is 
taken into account) with approximate running costs of 700 € a year. However, as vessels 
above 15 metres are already equipped with VMS,  the installation costs of the supplementary 
ERS function are likely to be substantially le ss. At the same time fishermen using ERS would 
not need to fill in paper logbooks anymore with the related savings in terms time needed for 
providing the same information in an elec tronic format (as identified in part 5.3.7.1). 
The establishment of a traceability system will al so benefit from the progressive move from 
paper based tools to electroni c tools (logbook, landing  declaration, sale s note), and the 
requirement for operators and auction centers to submit their data electronically. The cost per 
bar code is estimated at 0.005 EUR.  Overall th ose costs would in the long run be offset by 
the benefits of having an integr ated control approach, where most of the IOs are dealt with 
electronically, and where the system provides fo r the automated validation and collection of 
data. 
 
For the Member States 
Member States would need to ensure that th ey have enough control resources to meet the 
requirements of the new control regime to refl ect increases in inspec tions and the number of 
qualified inspectors supported by adding control activities as cross-checking, transparency 
checks and risk analysis, in particular if speci fic control benchmarks are to be met in the 
framework of recovery plans and if these benchmarks were to be increased to address specific 
situations.   At the end of the value chain, it is unlikely to have a measurable effect on consumers through 
change in the cost of seafood products as a resu lt of the implementation of an automated data 
checking procedure. No additional administrative costs are expected as current procedures for 
furnishing data hold, so no additional costs in this respect will be passed to the consumer.  Changes in supply will have an e ffect on the price of s eafood, but it is noted in  this regard that 
 46a considerable range of other f actors will also determine the pr ice a consumer pays for their 
seafood.   In conclusion, there are substantial benefits to be gained for all stakeholders at all levels if there is a comprehensive system of control and in spection that makes sure that the rules of the 
Common Fisheries Policy are a dhered to in th eir entirety. 
  
S
ECTION 6: HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE ? 
The first table below presents the efficiency of the various options with respect to their impact 
on the improvement of the fisheries control sy stem. Their relevance is assessed against the 
three specific objectives of th e reform as identified in sect ion 3. The second table compares 
the advantages and drawbacks of each option, taking into account the performance of each of them compared to the overall objectiv e of the fisheries control reform.  
It can be concluded that option 1  would not answer the concerns of the Court of Auditors. All 
shortcomings in the current system would remain and harmonised and global approaches 
would not be developed. None of the obj ectives of the reform would be met. 
 Option 2 would provide for a simplified legal fram ework and allow for partial improvements 
of the control system in some Member States . However, since shortcomings in the current 
legal provisions could not be amended and since the impact of measures  would mainly rely on 
voluntary improvements by the Member States, this option would not  lead to a global 
approach on control, and it w ould not create a leve l playing field for all stakeholders. The 
concerns of the Court of Auditors would not  be addressed in the absence of any new 
requirement.  Option 3  would establish a gl obal and integrated control sy stem and a common level playing 
field, as it would effectively tack le the issues at stake, and in  doing so, provide an answer to 
the Court of Auditors questions. Even though this option in the beginning might require some 
structural adjustments, these w ould later lead to more efficien t and effective structures and 
increase the level of co mpliance of stakeholders. 
 The comparison between the options demonstrates that option 3  supports in the most efficient 
way the overall objective of an improvement of the fisheries control system. The other two 
options would not be appropriate to meet th e scale of the problem and the demand for an 
integrated and far-reaching reform.
 For all the above mentioned reasons, the Commission has 
decided to propose option 3  
 
 
 47 Relevance of the 
policy options against 
the objectives of the 
reform  Option 1 Continue current policy and 
focus on implementation and 
enforcement of ex isting framework Option 2 Recast of the legal control framework in 
combination with a steering instrument, in the 
form of a Code of conduct Option 3 Regulatory instrument, in the form of a 
new binding regulation  
Objective 1   
A new, common 
approach to control and 
inspection  Negative, as control standards are not 
applied equally across all Member 
States. The complexities of the 
regulatory and administrative environment of the control regime in 
place would continue Overall negative, as only a few Member States are 
likely to be responsive to voluntary measures, 
improvements will be fragmented thus reinforcing 
the situation that there are different levels of 
enforcement; this would be detrimental to the 
objective of a level playing field Positive impact as common inspection and control 
rules and modern technologies will be applied in 
the same manner throughout the EU ensuring the 
same high standards in all Member States 
Objective 2   
A culture of compliance   Negative, the current culture of non-
compliance persists, the wide 
variations in the level and types of 
sanctions applicable by the Member States in respect of infringements tend 
to undermine particularly the notion of 
a level playing field  
Low compliance reflected in the fact 
the ICES bases its assessments often to an important extent not only on 
reported catches but also on unreported 
catches A consolidated and simplified legal framework 
would allow for partial improvements of the 
control system in some Member States only 
Confidence of fishermen that their peers will abide by the rules is undermined as only unilateral/group 
action would be taken 
In the absence of new legal requirements, 
impossibility to develop a level playing field as 
regards sanctions, nor to provide for positive incentives 
 Positive impact with a combination of a simplified 
and transparent framework, a new regime on 
harmonized levels of sanctions across the 
Community which would address one of the most tangible shortcomings of the current situation, and 
greater interaction with the sector which reinforces 
the legitimacy of the rules (including 
harmonisation of the conversion factors) 
Fishermen and other economic players realise that rules are applied everywhere 
New legal framework for increased cooperation 
between the Member States, the Commission and the CFCA 
Objective 3   
Effective application of 
CFP rules   Negative impact, incapacity of the 
Commission would continue to be 
matched by a continuous lack of severity of national legal systems Consolidation with code of conduct do not 
introduce the necessary legal requirements that are 
needed for an effective control policy. No new 
tools for the Commission to ensure effective 
application of the rules. Positive, as the Commission is equipped with 
adequate tools, which as a result allow for proper 
enforcement of C FP control policy 
Overall impact on the 
CFP control policy Negative, as the option fails to 
adequately address the main 
challenges, continuation of the current 
situation, threat for the future of the resource Limited, as this approach would not address the 
current legal shortcomings and relies too heavily 
on a voluntary implementation by the Member 
States, no EU level playing field Consolidation without new instruments: 
continuation of the existing failures Positive, as this option establishes a 
comprehensive approach to control (from the net 
to the plate) addressing all the aspects of the 
current problems, and l eading to a more cost 
efficiency approach. Increased culture of 
compliance as a result of an effective application 
of the CFP rules.  
 48  
 
Advantages and drawbacks 
of each policy option  
  
Advantages  
Drawbacks 
Option 1 Continue current policy 
and focus on implementation and 
enforcement of existing 
framework 
 -Demonstrate commitment of the EU to tackle the 
shortcomings of the control policy under the current 
framework 
-Does not require the adoption of additional regulatory measures which would come in addition to the current 
framework 
 -The economic viability of the fishing industry is jeopardized in the 
medium and long run as a result of ever more depleted fish stocks; 
fishermen leave the industry as a result of falling wages and low return on 
capital; lower levels of fish landed result in lower throughputs into fish factories and increased unemployment 
-Due to the depletion of most stocks in the absence of an effective control 
system, transfer of effort to other fi sheries with resulting pressure on these 
and other biodiversity issues; knock-on effects in ancillary support 
industries  
-Current culture on non-compliance persists; credibility of CFP will be questioned; fragmentation of the legal framework continues  
Option 2 Recast of the legal 
control framework in combination 
with a steering instrument, in the 
form of a Code of conduct - Consolidated and simplified legal framework 
-Certain improvements of comp liance, as a result of clearer 
legal provisions and voluntary approach taken by some Member States 
-No effort needed to adjust to a new legal framework since  
no new requirements would be introduced -Structurally the same economic disadvantages as in Option 1 but effects 
will show later or in a mitigated way 
-There would still be no culture of compliance throughout the EU  -Current shortcomings in the legal provisions could not be addressed since 
no amendments or changes would be made; voluntary changes by some 
Member States lead to different contro l standards which results in distrust 
among Member States; no level playing field  
-Consolidation with code of conduct do not introduce the necessary legal requirements that are needed for an effective control policy 
Option 3 Regulatory instrument, 
in the form of a new binding 
regulation  
 -Most efficient solution, as control policy becomes truly 
global and integrated, to ensure compliance with CFP rules, 
and the sustainable exploitatio n of living aquatic resources 
-Culture of compliance, and new governance will prevail; 
trust in the CFP as a policy will be restored; level playing 
field for all fishermen in all EC waters; intensive use of modern technologies will render control more cost efficient 
-New and simplified legal framework, with new tools for 
the effective control of CFP rules -Price rise in the medium term as a result of 
legitimacy/consumer confidence and an increase in the age 
structure; higher returns to fi shing effort and greater cost 
efficiency and business confidence restored -Some Member States' authorities have to undertake some structural 
adjustments to incorporate changes 
- Authorities and sector have to adapt to the new legal framework  -Resistance expected from Member Stat es to engage in the harmonisation 
of sanctions 
 
 49 Relevance of the 
policy options against 
the three pillars  Option 1 Continue current policy and focus on 
implementation and enforcement of existing 
framework Option 2 Recast of the legal control 
framework in combination with a steering 
instrument, in the form of a Code of 
conduct Option 3 Regulatory instrument, in the form of a new binding 
regulation  
Environmental Pillar   -Absence of stocks replenishment. Irreversible 
biological changes due to overfishing  and 
continued overcapaity -Heavy toll on the ecosystem as TACs are 
calculated in a way to allow to only extract 
quantities that do not threaten the state of the stock in question 
-Loss of the scientific basis for management 
decisions 
 -Overall increase of 22% of the 
biomass.As the full compliance benefit 
will not be realised, neither would the environmental benefits 
-Benefits would be regionally varied and 
unlikely to be realised in a short term time frame. The overall environmental 
impact associated with pursuing the 
approach of a consolidated legal 
framework in combination with non-
binding steering instruments are therefore likely to tend towards the existing 
situation on the whole -Overall increase of 51% of the biomass.The growth in size of 
fish populations as they r ecover would be accompanied by 
increases in the age distribution of fish both in the population and in the catch, associated with lower fishing pressure. -Such 
benefits would have consequences for the ecosystem as a whole. 
-As the Commission would have the ability to react faster and better to shortcomings, in particular with respect to over-
utilisation of fishing quotas, the environment would be less 
likely to be affected by irresponsible fishing behaviour. 
Economic Pillar  -Low profitability. Total catch volumes would 
be lower and the smaller individual fish would be less valuable than when a stock would be 
fished within sustainable limits 
-Increased economic pressure : operators are forced, in view of ever more shrinking fishing 
possibilities, to exploit fish stock more than they 
can sustain and thereby reducing the basis for 
fishing in future years, would force more people 
out of business at a high environmental cost 
-Increasing administrative costs including increased costs for understanding and 
interpreting the relevant rules as well as the 
necessary training to inspectors and managers -All fisheries except mackerel (according 
to the model) show negative net benefits in the early years of the projection, and in 
some cases these negative net benefits 
persist throughout the 10 year period -Within a ten year time horizon, the 
model would project net benefits in terms 
of enforcement cost sa vings, i.e. to below 
current levels of expenditure. 
 
  
 
 -Sum of total net profits in the regulatory option of € 8.9 billion 
across all the stocks for the time span 2010 – 2019 -Substantial restructuring of the current Community fleet 
contributes to reduce the current overcapacity (cg Blue fin Tuna 
case study) -The initial loss is most likely to  be suffered by fishermen who 
have gained additional income from the catch of illegal fish. By 
definition, such activities are not worthy of protection. - The utilisation of new technologies will substantially reduce 
running costs of control authorities by allowing them to 
concentrate scarce control resources on fishing activities that have been identified by way of risk analysis 
Social Pillar    -More fishermen would leave the industry, 
thereby increasing unemployment in coastal 
areas that often have to face less working opportunities than other areas 
-Collapse of the local ancillary support industry 
which in turn could force the fishermen of an affected place to move to another place 
-Fisheries continue under the present regime to 
be tempted to improve their economic performance by unreported catches -Less efficient fishers are removed from 
the sector, as they are unable to compete 
as a result of only partial compliance in some fisheries. 
-Over the 10 year period, crew gain 
between € -1,200 and € 900 income per annum.
62 
 -Net employment gain of almost 4000 jobs 
-A better confidence of the public in the CFP would in turn 
affect consumer behaviour and confidence as he would be convinced of buying a sustainable product, and possibly allow 
to yield a higher price for the product 
-Apart from greater quantities to be fished, the individual fish would be bigger and yield a better price for the same quantities. 
There would be higher returns to fishing effort and a greater cost 
efficiency for th e fishing sector. 
 50 
 51 
SECTION 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
 
7.1. Core indicators of progress to wards meeting the objectives 
The Commission will progressively develop indicators for the assessment of the control 
system of the Member States. As the Commis sion will develop its role as auditor of the 
control system of the Member States, it will carry out its activities on the basis of clear 
performance indicators th at that will include: 
a. the evaluation of the quota and th e effort management system; 
b. the evaluation of data validation systems, including systems of cross-checks of VMS, 
catch, effort, marketing data and data related to  the Community fishing fleet register as well 
as the verification of licences, fishin g permits and special fishing permits; 
c. the evaluation of the administrative organi sation, including the adequacy of the 
available staff and the available means, the traini ng of the staff, the delimitation of functions 
of all authorities involved in monitoring, c ontrol and surveillance and enforcement as well 
as the mechanisms in place to coordinate the work and the joint evaluation of results of 
those bodies; 
d. the evaluation of the operational systems, including procedures for monitoring, control 
and surveillance and inspecti on, and of designated ports;  
e. the evaluation of national control an d inspection program mes including the 
establishment of inspection levels and their implementation; 
f. the evaluation of the national system of sanctions, including the adequacy of the 
sanctions imposed, duration of proceedings, econo mic benefits of which offenders are to be 
deprived and the deterrent nature  of such system of sanctions. 
 
7.2. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements 
Every two years, Member States shall also  transmit a report to the Commission on the 
implementation of this regulation. On this  basis, the Commission should undertake an 
intermediate evaluation of its new initiative within four years of its adoption assessing the extent to which its realisations, results and impacts on economy, society and environment are 
consistent with the objectives set. The eval uation results will be used for decision making 
needs on the future of to the regulatory framework if appropriate.   The Commission will communicate the evaluation results to the European Parliament and the 
Council. The reporting would be  carried out in a transparent manner by making the reporting 
documents publicly available and inviting fee dback. The evaluation contained in these 
documents will take as indicators measures eff ectively taken, but will also look into the scope 
and substantive effectiveness of such meas ures in respect of the basic objective. 
 52 
ANNEX I: TABLES  
 
Table 163 
 
Scientific advice about the stat e of the stock Number of stocks 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Outside safe biological limits 30 29 26 26 26 28 
Inside safe biological limits 12 10 14 11 12 13 
The state of the stock is unknown due to poor 
data 48 53 53 57 58 55 
 
. Scientific advice about ov erfishing Number of stocks 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
The rate of fishing on the stock is known 
compared to maximum sustainable yield rate   34 23 32 33 
The stock is overfished64    32 21 30 29 
The stock is fished at the maximum sustainable 
yield rate   2 2 2 4 
 
  "Emergency" scientific advice Number of stocks 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Scientific advice to stop fishing 24 13 12 14 20 18 
 
Table 4. Difference between TACs and 
sustainable catches       
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Excess of TAC over sustainable catch (%) 43% 48% 57% 47% 44% 49% 
 
 Summary of the scien tific advice about fishing 
opportunities Number of fish stocks    
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Stocks where stock size and fishing mortality can 
be forecast 40 34 40 31 29 30 
Stocks where a scientific advice concerning 
fishing opportunities is available 59 52 54 65 61 59 
Stocks where no scientific a dvice is available 31 40 39 29 35 37 
 
 
 53Table 2 
 
Estimated landings of demersal  species from the North Sea 
(1970-2004) Estimated landings of hake, me grims and Nephrops from the 
Iberian Atlantic Area 
Thousand tonnes landed 
 
Figure 1. Left panel, estimated landings in the North Sea, 1970 - 2004. Right panel, estimated la ndings of the main demersal sp ecies (hake, 
megrims, monkfish and Nephrops) in the Iberian Atla ntic area. Data from ICES (2005) in both cases. 
 
  
Table 3: Relation between EU15's fish  production and imports 1961-2001 (in %)  
(Source: Eurostat) 
0102030405060708090
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001%
 ImportProduction
The balance between production a nd imports of fish products (food and non-food) in the EU.  
 
 54 
Table 4: Performance of the Options in terms of stock65 (in tonnes) 
 
Starting conditions for SSB 
(Spawning Stock Biomass)  SSB in 2019 
  Bpa (Bpa: 
Biomass below 
which the precautionary 
approach should
 
apply) 2006 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
North Sea cod     150,000             29,000      156,100      195,700      250,700  
Baltic cod     240,000               81,000      265,300      312,500      344,200  
North Sea plaice     230,000             197,000      204,400      241,900      283,700  
North Sea sole       35,000               28,000        39,700        40,500        41,400  
Northern hake     140,000             140,000      177,100      190,700      203,800  
Southern hake       35,000               15,000        13,900        21,700        35,700  
Western mackerel   2,300,000           2,231,000    2,377,900    2,377,600    2,377,600  
Mediterranean hake  -                 3,000          6,600          9,800        13,000  
 
 
Table 5: Performance of the Option s in terms of stock, continued66 
 
Improvement over Option 1 Year Bpa achieved 
 
 
Option 2 Option 3 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
North Sea cod 25% 61% 2012 2011 2011 
Baltic cod 18% 30% 2017 2014 2013 
NS plaice 18% 39% - 2014 2011 
North Sea sole 2% 4% 2010 2010 2010 
Northern hake 8% 15% 2010 2010 2010 
Southern hake 56% 157% - - 2019 
W. mackerel 0% 0% 2010 2010 2010 
Med Hake 48% 97%    
 
 55Table 6: Projected changes in employment under each option67 (Number of people) 
 
Catching Option 1 
(a) Option 2 
(b) Option 3 
(c) Net gain 
(No Reg) 
(d) Net gain 
Regulation 
(e) Difference 
(e)-(d) 
NORTH SEA COD 358 527 717 169 359 190 
BALTIC COD 678 695 967 17 289 272 
NORTH SEA PLAICE & SOLE 15 - 155 -           15 140 155 
WESTERN MACKEREL 515 578 640 63 125 63 
NORTHERN HAKE 252 312 443 60 191 130 
SOUTHERN HAKE -          46 433 301 480 347 -        133 
MEDITERRANEAN HAKE  0 61 147 61 147 86 
Sub total 1,772 2,607 3,370 835 1,599 764 
Processing       
NORTH SEA COD 406 597 812 192 407 215 
BALTIC COD 3,288 4,204 4,690 916 1,402 486 
NORTH SEA PLAICE & 
SOLE 219 - 25 -           25 -          193 -        168 
WESTERN MACKEREL 245 554 614 309 369 60 
NORTHERN HAKE 112 101 53 48 -            58 -        106 
SOUTHERN HAKE -           9 22 60 31 69 38 
MEDITERRANEAN HAKE  - 14 33 14 33 19 
Sub total 4,259 5,492 6,288 1,485 2,028 544 
Ancilliary      -  
NORTH SEA COD 66 97 132 31 66 35 
BALTIC COD 198 123 178 -           74 -            20 54 
NORTH SEA PLAICE & 
SOLE 4 18 32 14 28 14 
WESTERN MACKEREL 100 112 124 12 24 12 
NORTHERN HAKE 31 58 156 27 125 98 
SOUTHERN HAKE -           8 18 49 25 56 31 
MEDITERRANEAN HAKE  - 2 2 - - - 
Sub total 391 429 672 36 280 243 
TOTAL 6,422 8,528 10,330 2,356 3,908 1,550 
 
 
 56 ANNEX II: REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION  
 On the initiatives proposed by the Commission  to modernize and reform the control of 
the Common Fisheries Policy  
The Commission carried out a broa d stakeholder consultation to assess the effectiveness of 
the envisaged measures, their imp act on operators and administrati ons, and to form an integral 
part of the impact assessment re port.  All interested parties we re invited from February to 
May 2008  to express their views on the nine fiel ds of action identified in the consultation 
paper, as well as to present their opinions as to  what further measures would be appropriate to 
strengthen the control system of the Common Fisheries Policy.  
 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS  
There were a total of 25 cont ributions received in response to the Commission's invitation for 
public consultation from a wide range of stake holders including inter alia  associations from  
the industrial sector – of fishermen, producer s, fisheries control technology stakeholders; 
advisory bodies, a public aut hority, NGOs and individuals. The geographical range was also a 
broad one including French, German, Portuguese, Polish, Spanish, British, Belgian and Dutch 
parties.  The initiative of the Commission and its ma in objectives were widely endorsed by the 
participants in the cons ultation. All unanimously ag reed on the need of reform of the control 
system and expressed appreciation of the opport unity to take part in the decision-making 
process through the consultation. They also confirmed that th e 9 objectives set out by the 
Commission in the consultation paper are the main  points of interest in the overall assessment 
of the reform.   Along with the overall support of the 9 objectives , the stakeholders raised a number of 
important considerations to be taken into account by the Commission, made some valuable 
and creative suggestions for possible solutions to  those concerns and all stressed on the need 
of a continuous dialogue and c ooperation between all pa rties involved in th e control process. 
 Many of the participants emphasized for instance  that it is the culture of compliance which 
should be the main objective of the reform as o pposed to the culture of control. The industry 
also called for a bottom-up as opposed to "t op-down" approach in the decision-making 
process with more active involvement of stakeholders, scientists, NGOs and national 
administrations, leading to more transparency, clarity and broader support. There were also a 
number of suggestions for public traini ng initiatives, especially for fishermen. 
 The majority of the concerns were related to  the objectives of stre ngthening the capacity of 
the Commission and to the potential costs and administrative burdens that use of modern 
technologies might incur. They underlined that the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity ought to be observed in these re spects. Another important concern express was 
the risk of over centralization of the control of the CFP and the risk of infringing Member 
States' sovereignty.  Notably all stakeholders supported the introductio n of harmonized administrative sanctions by 
the Commission, the simplification and rationaliza tion of the rules and the strengthening of 
 57cooperation and assistance. An im portant point was raised on th e cooperation with developing 
countries. A major concern raised was on the no n-discrimination between EC vessels fishing 
outside Community waters and third country fleets. 
 Even though stakeholders generally agreed that on-land inspections should be further 
developed and utilized, all of them emphasized the importance of sea inspections as the only 
means to assess the compliance of fishing gear , engine size, illegal discarding etc. Some 
suggested that the Community Fisheries Control Agency (her einafter CFCA) should play a 
constructive role in that respect. 
 
NGOs and public authorities particularly supported the reform as an efficient tool from an 
environmental sustainable fisheries perspectiv e. It is interesti ng to note the innovative 
contribution of the FishPop Trace Consortium- a mixed association financed under the EU 
Seventh Framework Programme, drawing th e attention to the development and 
implementation of modern technologies such  as biotechnology, genetics, chemistry and 
forensics in optimizing control mechanisms.   
II. SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTION S RECEIVED BY CONSULTATION 
ISSUES 
 
1. Objective No. 1 Develop a new approach as regards inspection and control 
 
All parties to the consultation strongly agreed  on the urgent need of new approach towards 
inspection and control, drawing th e attention to the Court of Auditors Report as well as to the 
need of level playing field a nd a degree of harmonisation. Th e majority of contributions 
stressed on the need not to abandon nor  undermine the inspections at sea. 
 However many raised concerns towards the wa y of achieving harmonisation especially with 
regard to the conversio n factors. It was underl ined that it should not damage any Member 
State, should be based on sound scientific analysis and adopt ed in close cooperation with 
stakeholders and Norway. Some re presentatives of the industry not ed the difficulty and risk in 
fixing an absolute conversion factor whic h can not take into account the differences 
depending on the fish stock, season, re gional and fleet particularities.  
 Another important consideration noted was the constraint posed by certain Member States 
wishing to maintain the control over their fleets. Parties and es pecially the industry 
emphasized the need of consistent implementa tion, monitoring and regu lation in all Member 
States. In this connection, some requested cl arification on the defi nition of "high risk 
activities", proposing the creation of a list of them and/or th e guiding criteria in their 
assessment such as prioritizing certain species and fishing gears for a ssessment.  The creation 
of a "help desk service" on the Regulation by the Commission for Member States, RACs and 
professional organizatio ns was also proposed. 
 All endorsed the harmonization at EC level of th e inspection procedures in sea and on land as 
a guarantee of equal treatment and fair compe tition. It was observed that so far cooperation 
between states was confined to sea inspections whereas land inspections were very divergent. 
Some contributors noted that it is precisely the role of the Commission to propose and 
promote these standards throughout the chai n of commercial exchanges starting from 
harbours and including the imports. Others a dvocated for a "bottle neck" approach to 
 58inspection meaning verifying catches wher e caught. The industry suggested that the 
Commission should take account of  their potential impacts on th e logistical organisation of 
the fishing enterprises so as not to overburden them with control at too many stages before 
placing the product on the market.  A few contri butors encouraged the expansion of onboard 
observer programmes and even the placing of cameras on vessels for specific high risk 
fisheries.  There were a few proposals for drafting a separate regulation or guidelines on the control 
harmonization elaborating in further details the main articles but also giving an authoritative 
guideline on their uniform inte rpretation for all inspectors an d operators. Othe r contributors 
suggested that a traceability system for fish  and fish products should be developed and 
implemented from the point of landing until they reach the consumer- best practices already in place in member states were given as an example i.e. in UK. 
 
2. Objective No. 2 Rationalisation of the rules  
There was a broad consensus on this objective. Most  of the stakeholders viewed it as the main 
prerequisite for the development of a cultu re of compliance. Transparency and broad 
acceptance were underlined as fishermen and other operators have to be able to understand 
and rely on the rules in order to apply them . The drafting of an e volving "jurisprudential 
guide" of authentic interpretations to the arti cles in the regulation given by the Commission 
and the Member States' authorities was proposed.  A concern was raised that rationalization of th e rules should not mean complete unification 
since account should be taken of the differences in the fishing zones, vessels etc. It was strongly recommended by a number of contributors that implementing regulations should be 
adapted to the particularities of the main fi shing zones. Another concern noted was on the 
interaction between the contro l regulation and the IUU Regula tion proposal and the proposal 
on authorisation. Some stakeholders from the industry suggested all th ese should be merged 
in one single regulation.  The industry also called for reassessing some of the existing obligations in particular the ones 
concerning the declaration of all commercial tran sactions for all fish bought by approved first 
buyer as it created an excessive administrative burden for operators. It was proposed to 
simplify this obligation while at the same ti me still guaranteeing the traceability of the 
transported products by extending control over the commercial ex changes, in borders and at 
ports. One stakeholder suggested that the doc ument required should be  an invoice as opposed 
to a declaration. The obligation to declare the fishing zone in  the documentation was also put 
in question as difficult to ve rify and duplicating the informa tion already contained in the 
logbook.  The stakeholders from the industry request ed more flexibility in the multi-annual 
management of TACs and quotas, especially rega rding the tolerance margins granted in fixed 
% as it was very sensitive for certain species an d differed according to the fleet specificities. 
Some disagreed with the current 8 % marg in, proposing one of 10 % as an acceptable 
compromise for some species. Another proposal in this respect was to ensure that quota 
reductions and other management measures resu lting from breaches of the CFP are targeted 
only towards the Member States res ponsible in a proportionate manner. 
 
 59Finally, all agreed that the new single control regulation should be workable and enforceable 
in order to be applied effectively. To this end some proposed further involvement of the 
stakeholders in the drafting process and a prior testing in practice of the rules before their 
adoption. 
 
3. Objective No. 3 Strengthen th e capacity of the Commission 
 
This objective was overall supported by the cont ributors. However impor tant clarifications 
were made by the industry on the constraints before it. There wa s also an underlying concern 
about touching upon Member States' sovereignty a nd the principle of subsidiarity was called 
for.  Many underlined the need of redefining the cooperation between Member States and the 
Commission in this respect. Stakeh olders also insisted that th ey should have part in this 
process according to the bottom-up approach.  The possibility of transferring the decision making capacity on Real Time Closures to the 
Commission raised many concerns and reservations  in the industry. It was pointed out that the 
Commission already has the possibility to announce interruptions in the fishery. The 
stakeholders called for prior consultation with th em before any measures of this character are 
taken, stressing the risk of the entire fishery industry paying the price for isolated breaches. 
Many took the position that this competence s hould remain for the Member States and/or 
professional organizations. Public authoriti es and NGOs on the othe r side supported the 
strengthening of the Commission's capacity to act on its own initiative for fisheries resources management in teal time except in the area of inshore waters.  
  Clarification was requested by th e industry about whether it will have to pay the cost of the 
sanctions imposed by the Commission or is this fo r the Member State, in particular in cases of 
suspending Community aid. In any case stakeholders called for transparency and proportionality in this process. NGOs strongly favoured the introduction of  more and flexible 
instruments to the Commission for timely intervention targeted precisely at the fisheries sector. The measures proposed included inter alia  suspension of aid pa yment in the fishery 
sector, excluding operators and vessels from Fisheries Partnership Agreements, access to 
European Fisheries Fund, reducing future fi shing rights in cases of non-compliance, 
reimbursement of subsidies received by non-comp lying companies and individuals etc. As 
justification for these measures NGOs drew the attention to examples of overfishing, IUU 
fishing and the need of promoting an overall ecosystem approach.  The introduction of a warning system i nvolving communication between the Commission, 
Member States and the fishing sector as a tool for prevention was proposed by some 
stakeholders. The possibility of the Commi ssion to intervene in the data submitted by 
Member States was also promulgated. All agreed  that the infringement procedures should be 
revisited to make them faster  and more efficient. There we re a number of proposals to 
harmonize and redefine the competences of inspect ors and also to increase the number of EC 
inspectors, especially in sensitive fishery zone s, allowing them to operate without prior 
notice. 
 
 604. Objective No. 4 Harmonise sanctions 
 
This objective was broadly endorsed by all cont ributors. It was noted by many stakeholders 
that the when harmonising, the Commission will have to take due account of the opinions and practices in all Member Stat es in this respect. All stak eholders strongl y favoured the 
introduction of administrative sanctions in pa rticular as a way of ensuring fair competition 
and equal treatment of all EU fishermen. It was agreed unanimously that these sanctions 
should be dissuasive and depriving the perpet rators of the economic benefit from the 
infringement thus giving confidence in the system to all players.  
 
An important concern raised by the industry was that of ensuring uniform interpretation of the 
sanction rules in all Member States and notably, by all inspectors in charge. A special training 
programme coordinated by the Agency was proposed as a way to reach this goal. Stakeholders also noted that fishermen were often unaware, especially when fishing in the 
EEZ of Member States other than their Flag, of  the sanctions and procedures applicable under 
the respective national legislati on so it was suggested that they were made accessible in all 
Community languages.  A few contributors questioned the competence of the Commi ssion to harmonise and impose 
sanctions in the light of the prin ciple of subsidiarity. Other concerns raised in this connection 
were about the specificities (i.e. aggrav ating and attenuating circumstances) of each 
infringement, the need of indi vidualization by national courts, th e appeal possibility and the 
case-by-case approach. Many other stakehol ders however took th e position that the 
Commission does indeed have this competence, putting forward the conclusion of the Council 
Legal service from 16 April 2008 that:"The Community is compet ent to establish a sanctions 
scheme"'. 
 
Some operators proposed the introduction of positive incentives regi me (i.e. allocating 
supplementary fishing days for enhanced obs erver coverage) to complement the sanction 
system and encourage operators to report perpetrators. Othe r stakeholders underlined the 
importance of introducing licence points system  for CFP infringements operating in parallel 
to the other penalties and envisaging a "black list" of persistent offenders, subjected to 
increased monitoring.   One contributor advocated for the introducti on of trade sanctions in addition to the 
administrative ones as it is necessary to impose sanctions on both companies that commercialize illegal fish products and co untries allowing thos e activities. NGOs 
promulgated the strengthening of sanctions for serious infringe ments of the CFP so as to 
include monetary penalties but also confis cation of catches, gear and even vessels. 
 
5. Objective No. 5 Strengthening of  cooperation and of assistance 
 
All operators strongly favoured the enhanc ing of cooperation between the Commission, 
fishery control authorities in Member States a nd operators from the whole chain of production 
including the transport, market, small scale fishermen etc. All agreed that the Agency should 
play a more important and constructive role in  this respect. There were proposals put forward 
for it to verify control and training standards,  to conduct workshops, seminars and exchange 
programmes.  
 61Some recommended the strengthening of c ooperation aiming at harm onizing the methodology 
of inspections at sea and even more on land, taking into account the best practices existing in 
Member States. It was noted that currently operators have suspicions about the varying 
standards of inspections which can be a ddressed by creating a transparent methodology 
subject to external verification and even audit.  Special emphasis was put on the cooperation with competent authorities from third countries, 
in particular developing ones. Some stakehol ders proposed the establishment of cooperative 
arrangements to ensure that developing states  have the means and competence to control 
fishing activities in their waters. 
 One of the individual academic contributors st ressed on the efficiency of encouraging 
cooperation between fishermen and their professi onal organizations in the form of consortium 
so as to manage certain fisheries zones and to control each other in doing so. Italy and its shell 
fishing were given as an example of such  decentralized approach towards control. 
 
6. Objective No. 6 Develop a culture of control  
Generally all contributors agreed with this objective and identified it as a key one. The 
majority of the industry stakeholders however  put the emphasis on the development of a 
culture of compliance rather than control. C ontributors proposed that  the Commission should 
assist Member States who are primarily respons ible for informing the fishery sector of the 
rules.  Many contributors noted that to achieve this objective the credibility of the whole system 
ought to be increased and fishermen have to  understand and believe in the ratio of the 
applicable rules. To this end it was proposed that fishermen, sc ientists and pr oducers are more 
involved in a "bottom-up" de cision-making process for inst ance with resp ect to quota 
management giving the examples of US, Canada , Norway and Iceland where this is already 
applied. Furthermore, representatives of the indu stry suggested that the implementation of the 
CFP and control rules includ ing inspections and sanctions  should be made in close 
cooperation with the stakeholders so that th e effort to comply comes from the bottom. 
 The industry also underlined the need to defi ne on EC level the powers and obligations of 
national inspectors and standardise the procedur es including the right of the vessel to be 
informed of its rights and legal assistance available so as to enhance transparency and their credibility for operators. It was suggested that some data base s should be made available to 
the public online.   Advisory bodies proposed the introduction of an efficient intervention system through 
RFMOs and within the CFP in order to improve the confidence of fishermen that the control 
rules apply equally and in the same manner to all operators. Another suggestion was to use 
positive incentives in return for participation in schemes for use of more selective gears, support for real time closures, and part icipation in stock avoidance plans. 
 
7. Objective No. 7 Use of modern technologies  
This objective was broadly endorsed with the sp ecification by the industry however that it is 
the Commission who should bare the main co st of the implementation. Many noted that 
 62technical equipment should be in troduced only when and where ne cessary so as not to create 
disproportionate financial and administrative burdens.   The industry underlined that the cost of the ne w technologies, the data transmission and their 
maintenance should not be at the expense of fishermen but of specialized funds. It was 
strongly advocated that these measures should no t apply to vessels smaller than 15 meters. It 
was also stressed that the commercially sensitive data should remain strictly confidential and 
be used only for the purposes of control.  
Some contributors came in with innovative ideas on this objective such as the implementation 
of non-collaborative type of cont rol technologies allowing to de tect non-reporting actors and 
biased reports as well as to provide evidence for further investigation. It was suggested that in 
addition and to complement the VMS system ai rborne surveillance, coastal radars, space-
borne sensors like Synthetic Aperture Radar ar e used to improve coverage, availability, 
accuracy, integrity and cost. The attention was also drawn to the new generation of SARSAT 
COSPAS beacons and the future MEOSAR capabilities like GALILEO , GPS and GLONASS 
as providing return link and reducing false alarm rates.  
 
Another interesting proposal on this objec tive was made by the above mentioned mixed 
FishPop Trace consortium. They suggested th e development of framework incorporating 
strict forensic validation based on molecular biology to complement the Monitoring, Control 
and Surveillance in the fisheries sector. It was underlined that these applications are available 
but there is still a lack  of cooperation between scientific institutions, control authorities and 
policy makers. An example of a project work ing in the area was given- The Global Fish 
Barcode of Life Initiative for identification of fish species fr om sample of tissue or fish 
products on the basis of DNA sequence librar y. One of the stakeholders proposed the 
establishment of reference laboratories in Me mber States and one at a Community level. 
 
8. Objective No. 8 Increase of cost effectiveness 
 
This objective was broadly favoured. Many stake holders took the view that introduction of 
modern technologies can reduce the cost of oper ations. The simplification of the rules in a 
common regulation was also seen  as a tool to this end. The main concern raised by 
stakeholders was that the reduc tion of costs does not lead to reduction of cont rols at sea. 
Many proposed that it is quality rather than qu antity which is important in this respect and 
thus the focus should be on high risk activities. 
 
9. Objective No. 9 Adapt the mandate of the Agency  
All contributors unanimously agreed on the ne ed to adapt and broaden the mandate of the 
Agency. The industry also called for increase of the transparency and di alogue in its operation 
by giving the stakeholders an observe r status in its working bodies. 
 Many viewed that the Agency should play a gr eater role in developi ng and harmonizing on 
land control procedures, in analyzing Member States best practices in this respect and 
encouraging inter state cooperati on. It was also suggested that the Agency should be allocated 
more human resources to conduct inspections at sea, in particular in sensitive areas. The 
creation of EU corps of inspectors with full range of inspection powers was broadly 
encouraged.  
 63Some viewed it as a potentia l mediator in the communication between Member States and the 
Commission. Others recommended that it is given the competen ce to standardize control of 
fisheries around offshore Natura 2000 and othe r nature conservation sites, including the 
ability to establish buffer zones for the protection of the sites. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS   
• All stakeholders welcomed and unanimously  supported the Control reform. Valuable 
proposals were made for its optimization.  
 
• Generally all agreed with the main 9 objectiv es of the reform and particularly favoured 
the introduction of harmonized administrative  sanctions and inspection procedures on 
EC level.  
 
• Stakeholders clearly advocated that they wa nt this constructive dialogue between them 
and the Commission to continue both for the decision-making and for the 
implementation process. 
 
 64 ANNEX III-  ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR THE FISHERIES SECTOR  
Table 1-Administrative costs unde r the current control regime 
Council Regulation 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a 
control system applicable to the common fisheries policy 
 Tariff 
(€ per 
hour)  
TIme  
(hour) 
 Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) Freq  
(per 
year) Nbr  
of  
entitie
s Total nbr 
of  
actions Total cost Regulatory 
origin 
(%)  
                   
No. As
s. 
Art. Ori
g. 
Art. Type of obligation Description of required 
action(s) Target group i e i e      Int EU Nat Reg 
1 6,1, 6,2, 
6,3, 19e Submission of (recurring) 
reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) logbook and 
landing declaration: all 
vessels above 
10 meters 17  0.4
5  7.4 340 22500 7650000 56801250     
2 4,2  Inspection Inspecting and checking 
(including assistance to 
inspection by public 
authorities) inspection: all 
registered 
vessels 18  0,9
2  16.6 2 83000 190900 3161304     
3 9,1  Submission of (recurring) 
reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the 
designated recipient) submission of 
sales note: 
registered buyers 12  0.1  1.2 1 98000
00 9800000 11760000     
4   Submission of (recurring) 
reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) Geographical position, landing information,  
transport document, etc* 0,0   0 6300000     
            Total 
administ
rative 
costs (€) 78022554     
*The 3 most costly IOs (logbook, landing declaration and sales not e) together with the IO "inspection" (identified as an import ant "irritant") account for 87% of total cost of the 
control regulation. As the cost in relation to the remaining IOs is minor (ranges betwe en 0.05% to 3.2% of total cost), these I Os are not individually displayed in the table.   
**According to the study undertaken by the Consortium, national obligations, going beyond EU requirements as set out in the Reg ulation under review, amount to 7 million 
Euro. 
***All the information obligations (IO) cont ained in the Control Regulation have been mapped and measured by a consortium, led by Deloitte ("DRAFT FINAL REPORT, 
Measurement data and analysis, as specified in the specific cont ract on Modules 3&4 for the Prio rity Area Fisheries,of the Fram ework contract n° ENTR/06/061,EU PROJECT 
ON BASELINE MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS").  Those figures have not been approved yet by the Commission but  serve as a basis for 
our calculations. 
 65  
Table 2-Administrative costs for the new fisheries control system 
 
Commission proposals  for the new 
fisheries control system  Tariff 
(€ per 
hour)  
TIme  
(hour) 
 Price 
(per 
action 
or 
equip) Freq  
(per 
year) Nbr  
of  
entitie
s Total 
nbr 
of  
actions Total cost Regulatory 
origin 
(%)  
                   
N
o
. As
s. 
Art
. Ori
g. 
Art
. Type of obligation Description of required 
action(s) Target group i e i e      Int EU Nat Re
g 
1 6,1, 6,2, 
6,3, 19e Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) logbook and 
landing declaration: all vessels above 10 meters 17  0.1
4  2,3 340 22500 7650000 17671500     
2 4,2  Inspection Inspecting and checking 
(including assistance to inspection by public authorities) inspection: all 
registered vessels 18  0,7
8  14 2 83000 190900 2680236     
3 9,1  Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) submission of 
sales note: registered buyers 12  0.1
0  1.2 1 98000
00 9800000 11760000     
4   Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information 
(sending it to the designated recipient) Geographical position, landing information,  
transport document, etc 0,0   0 6300000     
             Total 
administ
rative 
costs (€) 38411736     
*The 3 most costly IOs (logbook, landing declaration and sales no te) together with the IO "inspe ction" (identified as an import ant "irritant") account for 87% of total cost of the control regulation. As the cost in relation to the 
remaining IOs is minor (ranges between 0.05% to  3.2% of total cost), these IOs are no t individually displayed in the table.   
 
  
 66ANNEX IV: CONTROL PROVISIONS IN CFP  LEGISLATION  
 
Basic regulations 
1. Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of  fisheries resources under th e Common Fisheries Policy, 
Chapter V, (OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p 59-80) 
 
2. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/1993 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control 
system applicable to the comm on fisheries policy, (OJ L 261, 20.10.1993) 
 
Implementation of Control regulation 
3. Commission Regulation (EC) No 728/1999 of  7 April 1999 providing, pursuant to 
Article 7(3) of Council Regulation (EEC ) No 2847/93, for a notification period for 
Community fishing vessels carrying on fish ing activities in the Baltic Sea, the 
Skagerrak and the Kattegat (OJ L 93, 8.4.1999) 
 
4. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1449/98 of 07 July 1998 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Council Regulation ( EEC) N° 2847/93 as regards effort reports 
(OJ L 192, 8.7.1998, p. 4–8) 
 
5. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 500/2001 of 14 March 2001 laying down detailed 
rules for the application of Council Regul ation (EEC) N° 2847/93 on the monitoring 
of catches taken by Community fishing vessels  in third country waters and on the high 
seas (OJ L 73, 15.3.2001, p. 8–12) 
 
6. Commission Regulation (EC) N° 2244/ 2003 of 18 December 2003, laying down 
detailed provisions regarding satellite- based vessel monitoring systems (OJ L 333, 
20.12.2003, p. 17–27) 
 
Common Market Organisation 
7. Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common 
organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products (OJ L 17, 21.1.2000, 
p. 22–52) 
 
Logbook 
8. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 of 22 September 1983 laying 
down detailed rules for recording information on Member States' catches of fish(OJ L 276, 10.10.1983) 
9. Council Regulation (EC) No 1966/2006 of 21 December 2006 on electronic 
recording and reporting of  fishing activities and on means of remote sensing 
(OJ L 409, 30.12.2006, p. 1–10) 
 
10. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1566/2007 of 21 December 2007 laying 
down detailed rules for the implemen tation of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1966/2006 on electronic recording and re porting of fishing activities and 
on means of remote sensing (OJ L 340, 22.12.2007, p. 46–57)  
 67TAC and quotas 
11. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/2008 of 16 January 2008 fixing for 2008 the 
fishing opportunities and associated c onditions for certain fish stocks and 
groups of fish stocks, applicable in  Community waters and, for Community 
vessels, in waters where catch li mitations are required (OJ L 19, 23.1.2008, p. 
1–203)  
 
Technical measures 
12. Proposal for a Council Regulati on concerning the conservati on of fisheries resources 
through technical measures in th e Atlantic and the North Sea. 
 
Recovery Plans and Multiannual management plans 
13. Council Regulation (EC) N° 423/2004 of 26 Fe bruary 2004 establishing measures for 
the recovery of cod stocks (O.J. L 70 of 9.3.2004, pp 8-11) 
 
14. Council Regulation (EC) No 811/2004 of 21 Ap ril 2004 establishing measures for the 
recovery of the northern hake  stock. (O.J. L 185; 27.5.2004, pp 1-3) 
 
15. Council Regulation  (EC) No 2166/2005  of 20 December 2005 establishing measures 
for the recovery of the Southern hake and No rway lobster stocks in  the Cantabrian Sea 
and Western Iberian peninsula and ame nding Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the 
conservation of fishery res ources through technical measur es for the protection of 
juveniles of marine organisms. (O.J.L345; 28.12.2005, pp 5-10) 
 
16. Council Regulation (EC) N° 2115/2005 of 20 December 2005 establishing a recovery 
plan for Greenland Halibut in the Framework of NAFO (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 3–6) 
 
17. Council Regulation (EC) No 1100/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing measures 
for the recovery of the stock of European eel (EC) No 1559/2007 (OJ L 248, 22.9.2007, p. 17–23) 
 
18. Council Regulation (EC) No 388/2006 of  23 February 2006 establishing a 
multiannual plan for the sustainable exploita tion of the stock of sole in the Bay 
of Biscay, (O. J. L 65; 7.3.2006, pp 1-4) 
 
19. Council Regulation (EC) No 509/2007 of 7 Ma y 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan 
for the sustainable exploitati on of the stock of sole in the Western Channel (O.J. L 
122, 11.5.2007; pp 7-9) 
 
20. Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 of 11 June 2007 establishing a multiannual 
plan for fisheries exploiting stocks of plai ce and sole in the North Sea;( O.J. L157; 
19.06.2007, pp.1-6) 
 21. Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 of  18 September 2007 establishing a 
multiannual plan for the cod stocks in the Ba ltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those 
stocks, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 779/97 (OJ L 248, 22.9.2007, p. 1–10)   
 68 
PPS 
22. Council Regulation (EC) No 1627/94 of 27 J une 1994 laying down general provisions 
concerning special fishing permits (OJ L 171, 6.7.1994, p. 7–13 ) 
 23. Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2006 of 21 December 2006 fixing for 2007 
the fishing opportunities and associated c onditions for certain fish stocks and 
groups of fish stocks, applicable in  Community waters and, for Community 
vessels, in waters where catch lim itations are required (OJ L 15, 20.1.2007) 
 
Other texts 
24. Council Regulation (EC) No 643/2007 of 11 June 2007 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 41/2007 as concerns the recovery  plan for bluefin tuna recommended 
by the International Commission for the C onservation of Atlan tic Tunas  (OJ L 
151, 13.6.2007, p. 1–16) 
 
25. Council Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002 of 16 December 2002 establishing 
specific access requirements and associat ed conditions applicable to fishing 
for deep-sea stocks, (OJ L 351, 28.12.2002, p. 6–11) 
 26. Commission Regulation (EEC) N° 1381/87 of 20 May 1987, establishing 
detailed rules concerning the marki ng and documentation of fishing vessels, 
(OJ L 132, 21.5.1987, p. 9–10) 
 27. Commission Regulation (EEC) N° 1382/87 of 20 May 1987, establishing 
detailed rules concerning the inspection of fishing vessels, (Official Journal L 132 , 21/05/1987 P. 0011 – 0013) 
 
 69ANNEX V: CURRENT CONTROL SITUATION  
A. Elements of the current control mechanisms  
 
• Monitoring of fishing vessels and their activit ies, through satellite tracking (VMS), vessel 
sightings and onshore inspection (appli cable for all vessels exceeding 15 m); 
 
• Catch monitoring via a system of vessel logboo ks (allowing for marg ins of tolerance of 
20% for inspections at sea), landing declarat ions and sales notes ( both recording actual 
live weights). Log books are applicable to all vessels ove r 10 m in length68 and for landing 
weights in excess of 50kg. The complete d sheets are submitted within 48 hours and 
landing declarations and sales are supposed to be cross check ed by the inspectorate to 
ensure consistency. The Commission specifies  the form of reported outputs required, 
outputs and output frequencies are reported to the Commission on a monthly basis, and at 
more frequent intervals as and when the catch reaches 70% of quota. Vessel logbooks are 
to become electronic as from January 2010 (f or vessels 24 m and over in length), extended 
to vessels 15 m and over by July 2011. That land ing declarations reflect the actual weight 
of fish landed in live weights, as opposed to the estimates shown on the log sheets;  
 
• Monitoring of transparency including the sales note (when fish is sold at auction) and 
take-over declarations, when the fish is tr ansported within and outside national borders; 
 
• Fishing effort monitoring (days at  sea assigned to specific vessels); 
 
• Monitoring of fishing gears and minimum landing sizes against a set on technical 
conservation regulations applicab le to various species, fishin g methods and fishing zones; 
 
• Monitoring of third country vessels, when landing into Community ports, and when 
fishing inside Community waters, and spec ific RFOs, when the EC is assigned a 
controlling role, for example NEAFC; 
 
• Special measures applying to recovery species, including: 
o special fishing permits, pre notification of landings and authorisation to land; 
o designated ports; 
o  reduced margins of tolerance; 
o separate stowage of recovery species 
o set inspection benchmarks (in the form of a set percentages (10-20%69 of  
landings, depending on species); 
o compliance observers70; 
o weighing systems71;  
o traceability inspections and  
o prohibition of transhipments. 
 
B. Current control situation in the MS  
 
The controlling means applied by each Member State is on land and at sea fisheries inspection. The primary offence detected on land  relate to unreported landings. The primary 
offences detected at sea relate to techni cal measures and unlicensed fishing. Inspection 
support means include a Fisheries Monitoring Ce ntre (FMC), data cr oss checking systems 
(currently under development), VMS (and requi ring refinement), surveillance ships and 
 70aircraft. Some national administrations also us e more sophisticated deterrent and detection 
systems, most notably forensic analysis, evalua te regular patterns of fisheries fraud and to 
check product traceability beyond first hand sales (i.e. factory inspections ), and inspector hit 
squads (groups of inspectors that can be depl oyed to specific sites at a moments notice). 
Controlling systems are presently being impr oved through Joint deploym ent Plans (facilitated 
by the CFCA); and information sharing and jo int Memorandums of Un derstanding between 
Community countries, and with cooperating Third countries (Norway and Faeroes).  
 The main means of deterrent comp rise the inspection activity, as previously defined, penalties 
and in some unilateral cases, dialogue and cooperation.
72  
 
One of the fundamental problems that exist with  the system is that control is not applied 
equally across all MS. This means that within a single fishery control is uneven. For instance, 
French and Belgian vessels fishing in French waters may be subject to different rates of 
inspection (MRAG, 2003). Fishermen often complai n, justifiably, about this sort of treatment, 
and we showed in our 2003 report that this situation will always lead to higher levels of non-
compliance in fishermen’s behaviour.   It has also been elaborated (MRAG 2003 study), that compliance does indeed increase as the 
level of inspection increases. These issues have been repeat edly recognised by the COM and 
led to the initiation of the CFCA  in 2005. It is still too early to tell whether the Agency is 
having a significant effect on le vels of compliance in the EU, but they have coordinated two 
Joint Deployment Plans (Southern North Sea, Baltic) in 2007 as well as inspector exchanges 
and training.   However, the activities of the CF CA are based on control progra mmes that focus on stocks in 
critical condition (North Sea C od, Baltic Cod and BFT). What is actually required of a system 
of control is to be able to act rapidly to cauterise any impending problems. This has clearly 
failed to be the case in EU waters – control syst ems have apparently not been able to detect 
the increase in non-compliance th at has accompanied the reductio n in TACs required to keep 
stocks at target levels.   Most specifically, the 2003 repor t also identified some useful  inspection trends. Land based 
enforcement is perceived to be the most cost ef fective tool and for the countries identified. It 
is up to five times as likely to detect an o ffence and 2.5 times more efficient than marine 
based activities. This implies that switching some  costs of sea based enforcement to land will 
increase the probability of dete ction but will only have a margin al effect on the number of 
offences detected unless applied with at increasing proportions. The number of offences 
detected at sea is largely stable. However, a ma rginal benefit from incr easing land based costs 
would result in a greater number of infringe ments detected (or a corresponding in crease in 
compliance), than the same change in expenditu re in marine surveillance. However specific 
offences (technical/unauthorised fishing) ar e only detectable at sea, thus requiring 
maintenance of marine based activit ies, but catering for a reduction. 
  The CoA underlined the following fi ndings on the control situation: 
 
• large proportions of the fleet exempted fr om logbook obligations (under 10m), but in 
some cases catching significant quantities of  recovery species (France, Spain, UK);  
• limited means available to the Commission to  apply pressure on the Member States; 
 71• inadequate application of control measures as specified in the core Control Regulation 
(EC 2371/2002) (i.e. additional to those cite d above), or specific species recovery 
programmes. These include:  
o inadequate use of cross checking pro cedures i.e. for consistency between 
logbook, landing declarations, and sale s notes, or log book, VMS tracking and 
vessel sightings; 
o failure of some fishers to comply with  VMS, and inadequate definition of non 
corruptible VMS systems; 
o inadequate enforcement of  transport regulations; 
o inadequate enforcement of mark et and traceability regulations; 
o inadequate enforcement of country landings; 
o inadequate control of fishing gears in specific areas (North Sea blinders in 
beam trawl fisheries and the continued us e of drift nets in the Mediterranean); 
• inadequate application of control measures  as specified in the species recovery 
programmes. These include:  
o failure to appropriately evaluate catch declarations (Baltic cod) 
o lack of a strategy to secure compliance with effort limitation schemes (North 
Sea cod, southern hake and nephrops ) 
o Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) not used  effectively to cross check prior 
notification of landings and fish ing effort (North Sea cod) 
o by-catch rules not systematically checked (North Sea cod) 
o reduced margins of toleran ce (8%) against catch estim ates in the log book not 
properly enforced (All speci es recovery programmes); 
o inadequate control in the landings of undersized fish  (Northern hake) 
o no catch declaration system in place (Bluefin tuna) 
 
 72ANNEX VI: INFORMATION ON THE BIO -ECONOMIC MODEL USED FOR THE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT REPORT  
 
Bioeconomic modelling was achieved through linking a biological population model, projected over a 10 year period from 2010 (t he date on which any regulation would be 
implemented), with an economic model of fl eet performance. Age- structured biological 
models were constructed using the latest ICES Working Group results for relevant stocks with 
extractions separated into reported, unrepor ted (unallocated in ICES terminology) and 
discards, tuned over the period 2000 – 2006 to ICES assessment results.  
 The biological model used was that describe d in the Cabinet Office (2004) report and was 
deliberately chosen to be simple and deterministic so that it could be eas ily integrated with the 
economic model. It uses ICES (2007) assessme nt data to obtain fi gures for historical 
recruitment, stock numbers at age, weight at ag e in the catch and stock, natural mortality and 
selectivity at age and projects the stock into th e future using these parameters. The time-frame 
for this work (about 6 weeks) did not allow for the development of particularly complex 
integrated bioeconomic models in, for example, the FLR framework. The model that we developed allowed stochastic as well as deterministic recruitment to be simulated (either as 
bootstrapped data or as lognorma l distributions) but, apart from  emphasising the uncertainty 
in future projections, this was not helpful wh en integrating with the economic model which, 
because of its complexity, could not be developed beyond a deterministic formulation in the time available. Therefore, we only present deterministic results which are effectively similar to median stochastic results.    Forward projections were undertaken assuming a constant target fishing mortality, equal to 
the target fishing mortality in 2007. The target  fishing mortality was modified by corrections 
for discarding and unreported catches to ge nerate a realised fishing mortality ( Fr=Ft.d.u , 
where Ft was the target fishing mortality, d and u were the discard and unreported catch rates 
respectively, and Fr is the realised fishing mortality rate). The latest ICES assessments 
available to us were those in which the last year in the assessment was 2006, and the latest 
stock status was effective for 1 Ja nuary 2007. Using the ICES calculated Fr in this and 
previous years, together with discard and unreported catch rates calculated from ICES 
reported data, we were able to estimate Ft in these previous years. We then adjusted Ft (2007) 
according to the anticipated catch levels in  2007, management action taken by the EU in 
2007, 2008 and in the future (i.e., a default starti ng point is to set discards and unreported 
catches to zero, estimate the real target fish ing mortality associated  with the 2007 TAC, and 
then apply this in all future years but with the re-introduction of discards and unreported 
catches). We then projected the stock forward to 2019 under this Ft until the stock had 
recovered to a size greater than Bpa, when we reverted to larger fishing mortality. 
 For some stocks (eg North Sea cod) harvest control rules are currently specified by the 
Commission’s recovery plans, which constr ain annual TAC changes to 15% and aim for 
annual population growth rates of >
30%. A fishing mortality rule was adopted for these 
stocks so as to be consistent across all mode ls (i.e. those with and without clear harvest 
control rules), and this had the added advantage of  dealing with target fishing mortalities that 
have demonstrably been achieva ble in the past. For the cod stocks, this fishing mortality 
approach produces more conservative growth fi gures than the strict implementation of the 
15% TAC variance rule.   
 73For instance, with North Sea cod adopting the 15 % rule implies a fishing mortality of 0.15 in 
2008 and 0.12 in 2009, which in the absence of unreported landings should result in SSB of 116000 in 2009 (ICES 2007; ACFM report secti on 6.4.2a) and even with 34% unreported 
landings and 15% discardi ng would result in the stock bein g above Bpa in 2010 – i.e. before 
the control actions proposed by the Commission c ould come into effect, and two years before 
the date estimated by our final model (Table 32). Adoption of the TAC rule in the model 
would have meant that the fishery would be being asked to deliver  much lower fishing 
mortalities than have ever been achieved for this stock (i.e. Ft<0.15, Fr<0.23). Without 
considerably enhanced contro l activity from 2007 (in the pe riod before the new control 
measures could come into effect in 2010) this would imply much higher  intrinsic discarding 
and unreported catch levels than we have hither to seen. One option available to us would have 
been to use the TAC rule and suggest a return to much higher levels of unreported catches at 
these very low target fishing mort alities. The relationship between Ft and unreported catch 
rate would imply that at Ft<0.15 we should be expecting unre ported catch rate s of at least 
100%, but this is based on data from the peri od before Scotland and Denmark increased their 
control action and increased compliance after which the unr eported catch rate dropped 
significantly from over 100% to 34%. It is hoped that when the COBECOS project is 
complete a better understanding of the relations hip between control actions and compliance 
may be developed, but at the time of undertaki ng this modelling that project had not yet 
delivered mature bio-economic models that could be used in this work. Nevertheless, we did 
explore this option, raising the quota in 15% increments from 22000 t in 2008 to 33000 t in 
2011 and increasing the unreported catch rate to 100% over this time period. The resulting 
stock trajectory was very similar to the trajec tory of our main model up to 2010 after which 
time it increased more rapidly, reaching 280,000 t in 2012 despite 100% unreported catches, 
and the cessation of the recovery plan at this point meant that the quota rose from 33,000 t in 
2011 to 145,000 t in 2012 (and in fact that actual removals rose from 72,000 t to 162,000 t).  
 The level of detailed speculation about likely rates of  under-reporting in e ach year of this 
model, and the fact that it rath er unrealistically pred icts a rapid change in quota and catch in 
2012, suggested to us that it was not as likely to reflect reality as our assumption that the 
fishery might be able to maintain a constant and low fishing mortality over this time consistent with its demonstrated performance in 2006. In all our models it was necessary to 
project likely decisions and events through to 2010 before the 10-year projection could even 
start. This is a longer projection (3 years, 2007 - 2010) than ICES normally undertakes in its 
assessment advice, and we did not feel confident that even recovery plan decision rules would 
necessarily be followed over that time period since recent actions taken by the EU have not 
often followed either ICES advice or the rec overy plan decision rules fully (WWF, 2007).  
 Consequently, for both cod stocks we chose to stay within the bounds of  fishing mortalities 
and estimates of unreported catch that have rece ntly been made (in the case of the North Sea 
cod stock, we have used a target F of 0.33, whic h is close to the achieved level of 0.38 in 
2006 when the level of unreported catch was 34%, and delivers a realised F of 0.5 which is 
well below Fpa). Others have noted  the perverse effects of this 15% rule in the past, and we 
wanted to avoid this ( Kell et al., 2006, Kelly et al., 2006 ). However, to give some confidence 
that our model produced results generally consiste nt with the recovery pl an, we can report that 
for the two cod stocks, in the absence of unreported fishing, this approach produced 
significant deviations from the 15% and 30% ru les only when biomass was lower than Blim 
(an allowable deviation under the harvest control rules) and, over the period of recovery of the 
stock delivered annual changes in biomass of 45% for North Sea cod and 21% for Baltic cod.  
 
 74In all cases we have attempted to develop ou r Option 1 model to reflect what is actually 
happening with that stock at the moment, and wh at might realistically be expected to happen 
in the years before the new control measures c ould come into effect. In some cases existing 
control action (for instan ce the JDPs in the North Sea and Ba ltic affecting plaice/sole and cod, 
and the actions by individual Member States) combined with the situation of the stock (high recent recruitment, for instance) creates a situat ion where some recovery of the stock will be 
expected in the next few years even with some continuing level of unrepor ted catches. This is 
consistent with ICES advice a nd the continuing efforts of Memb er States to comply with 
recovery plans.   In all stock projections of this sort a large num ber of assumptions have to be made about the 
likely future state of reality and projecti ons to 2019 from 2007 are necessarily extremely 
uncertain. This does not invalidat e the objective of the modelli ng exercise, however, which is 
to compare the likely outcomes under condit ions of continuing poor  compliance and under 
conditions of improved compliance that is a ssumed to develop under the proposed control 
actions. The various stock projections differ onl y in the proportion of unreported catches (or 
in the case of the plaice/sole model the proportions of juvenile discards), and because the 
underlying model structure is the same for all Options the results  are a direct comparison of 
the benefits of increasing compliance.  
 To simulate the condition when stocks have  recovered to Bpa and above, we relaxed the 
condition F=F2007 in the second year that SSB was greater than Bpa. To be consistent with 
the Commission’s long term management plans, an appropriate F to apply after recovery 
would be Fpa. However, our approach was to be quite conservative about recruitment (see 
below, discussions on individual case studies) choosi ng either the geometric mean of recent 
(10 year) recruitment or allo wing a hockey-stick stock-recr uit relationship to reach an 
asymptote of a geometric mean of the past high recruitment levels. This decision was taken to 
reflect caution that historical high recruitments, particularly in the c od and hake stocks, may 
have resulted from both high stock sizes a nd favourable environmen tal conditions. Taking a 
cautious approach reflects our view that recr uitment will recover fo llowing a recovery of 
stock size but that environmental conditions st ill remain less favourab le than in the 1980s. 
Therefore, we were unable, in some cases, to apply Fpa and achieve stable recovered 
populations (stability in the fina l population was important in this  exercise to avoid confusing 
reductions in catch and therefore net benefit in  the final years). Instead, we chose a final 
realised fishing mortality level for when SSB>B pa that was consistent with our recruitment 
assumptions and allowed populations to reach a smoothly asymptotic maximum above Bpa.  
 Kell, L.T., G.M. Pilling, G.P. Kirkwood, M.A. Pastoors, B. Mesnil, K. Korsbrekke, P. Abaunza, R. Aps, A. Biseau, P. Kunzlik, C. L. Needle, B. A. Roel, and C. Ulrich. An 
evaluation of multi-annual management strategi es for ICES roundfish stocks. ICES J. Mar. 
Sci. 63: 12-24. (2006). Kelly, C. J., E. A. Docling, and E. Rogan. Th e Irish Sea cod recovery plan: some lessons 
learned. ICES J. Mar. Sci. 63: 600-610. (2006). WWF, 2007. Midterm review of the CFP. P ublished in October 2007 by WWF, World Wide 
Fund for Nature (formerly World Wi ldlilfe Fund), Brussels, Belgium. 
Cabinet Office, 2004 . Net Benefits: A sustainable and profitable future for UK fishing . Report of the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Un ited Kingdom Cabinet Office, March 2004.  
 
  
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