EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 1.06.2010 
SEC(2010) 659 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying document to the  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CO MMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMI TTEE OF THE REGIONS 
 on market reviews under th e EU Regulatory Framework (3rd report) 
  
Further Steps towards the consolidation of  the internal market for electronic 
communications 
{COM(2010) 271 final} 
 
EN 2   EN ANNEX  I: THE  ARTICLE  7 PROCEDURE 
Under the procedures set out pur suant to Article 7 of the Fram ework Directive (2002/21/EC), 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) must define the boundaries of relevant markets in 
accordance with competition law principles, ta king utmost account of the SMP Guidelines1 
and the Recommendation of relevant markets2. If they find that re levant markets are not 
effectively competitive, NRAs are obliged to  propose appropriate regulatory measures to 
address market failures. A market is not effectively competitive if one or more players have significant market power (SMP) in this market. Where operato rs are found to have SMP, 
NRAs are required to propose appropriate re gulatory remedies to ensure effective 
competition. In the event of effective competition on the market, existing regulation has to be lifted. The market analysis has to be carried out in cooperation with the national competition 
authorities. 
Before adopting final measures on market defi nition, market analysis and the imposition of 
remedies NRAs must not only ca rry out a national consultation, but  are also requi red to notify 
their draft measures to the Commission, either by  means of standard notification procedure or, 
in certain cases
3, by means of a short notification form which, in principle, will not trigger 
comments from the Commission. Once an NRA notifies the Commission of its proposed 
measure for a particular market, the case is registered, and an ad hoc  case team comprising 
officials of the services of both the In formation Society and Media and Competition 
Directorates General is appoint ed. The case team analyses th e notification and may ask the 
NRA concerned to provide some further info rmation or clarification for the purpose of 
conducting the assessment. The team must carry  out its assessment and comply with the 
necessary internal checks and balances, within the legally binding deadline of one month. At 
the end of this period and provided that the notified measure does not raise serious doubts as 
to its compatibility with EU law, the Commi ssion may decide to make comments. NRAs are 
to take utmost account of comments issued by the Commission before adopting the draft 
measure in question. 
In the event the Commission expresses serious d oubts, the investigation period is extended by 
a further two months (phase two investiga tion) during which the NRA may not adopt its 
proposed measure. During these two months, the case team resumes an in-depth examination of the case and the Commission i nvites third parties to make know n their views. What follows 
thereafter is an intense exchange of informa tion between all interested parties (including the 
NRAs and industry players) and all data provided and views expr essed are carefully 
considered by the Commission. At the end of the investigation period, the Commission may 
withdraw its serious doubts (in which case th e NRA may adopt the draft measure), make 
comments (of which the NRA must take utmost account when implementing the draft measure) or require the NRA to withdraw its  proposed measure. In such an event, the 
                                                
 
1  Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of sign ificant market power under the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (SMP Guidelines), OJ C 165, 11.7.2002, p. 6. 
2  Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante  regulation in accordance with the 
Framework Directive, OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p.65. 
3  See footnote 15 chapter 3.3.1 of the present Communication. 
 
EN 3   EN Commission submits its draft de cision to the Communications Committee for an opinion. In 
both phases the NRA may withdraw its draft measure. 
 
EN 4   EN Overview phase 1 investigation 
 
Receipt of notification and
ac knowledgement  of  rec eipt
Assessment of compl eteness
Case reg istration and
relev ant parties informedNotificati on COMPLETENotificati on INCOMPLETEDeci sion on complet eness
AN ALYS IS
of notificationRequest for a meeting
Information required from  NRA
Information supplied without request
NRA withdrawal of notificationTranslation of documents requiredTranslation of documents required
“Comments - without serious doubts
“Serious doubts”“No comment”FINAL draft proposed Decision
COMMUNICATION
to relevant NR ACLOSING
PHASE 1Day 0
+ 1 monthScenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3COMMUNICATION
to relevant NR A
AN ALYS IS
suspend ed
 
Overview phase 2 investigation 
+ 1 month
Analysis of
NotificationRequest for a meeting
Information required from NRA
NRA withdrawal of notificationTranslation of documents required
Communication to relevant NRAStart of Phase 2
Withdrawal of initial objections Draft decision to require the NRA
to withdraw the notification
Communication to COCOM
Advisory procedure before COCOM
Commission’s written procedure
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
+ 3 monthsClosing of Phase 2 Information supplied without requirement
  
 
EN 5   EN ANNEX  II:  TABLE  CONCERNING  COMPETITION/REGULATION  IN THE  EU (31/12/2009) 
Effective competition -no ex ante regulation 1 1st round-competition/regulation
No effective competition - ex ante regulation 2 2nd round-competition/regulation
Partial competition - partial ex ante regulation 3 3rd round-competition/regulation
W Withdrawal (totally or partially) not yet-renotified
V Veto
Access to 
PSTN for res 
& non-res.Call orig. on 
fixed networkCall term. on 
fixed networkUnbund. 
accessBroadb. 
accessTerm. 
segments LLVoice call 
term. on 
mobile 
networksLocal/nat. 
call for res.Internat. call 
for res.Local/nat. 
call for non-
res.Internat. call 
for non-res.Retail LLTransit on 
fixed networkTrunk 
segments LLAccess & call 
orig. on 
mobile 
networkBroadcast 
Transmis.
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5 Market 6 Market 7 ex-Mkt 3 ex-Mkt 4 ex-Mkt 5 ex-Mkt 6 ex-Mkt 7 ex-Mkt 10 ex-Mkt 14 ex-Mkt 15 ex-M kt 18
A u s t r i a 3333223323321212
B e l g i u m 111111121211111w
B u l g a r i a 111 11111C y p r u s 1122212111111121C z e c h  R e p u b l i c 122 1 / w 212222121112D e n m a r k 1112221111111111E s t o n i a 1112212111111111
F i n l a n d 12233111111121V2
F r a n c e 22222121111111 W 2
G e r m a n y 2222112212122111
Greece 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
I r e l a n d 2222121222222211
I t a l y 2122221121221221L a t v i a 1221111111111111
L i t h u a n i a 1121111212111111
L u x e m b u r g 111111111111111M a l t a 1111112222211111N e t h e r l a n d s 2232221222222212P o l a n d 1121112111111111P o r t u g a l 11122111111111 1R o m a n i a 111 11111 1 1
S l o v a k i a 221 1 / w 112111122111
S l o v e n i a 2223323111122122
S p a i n 2222222222222212
S w e d e n 2221111111112112U K 2221222222222211NEW RECOMMENDATION OLD RECOMMENDATION
 
EN 6   EN ANNEX  III: DESCRIPTION  OF THE  STATE  OF PLAY  PER  MARKET4 
1. RETAIL ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORK AT A FIXED LOCATION FOR 
RESIDENTIAL AND NON -RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (MARKET 1)  
In almost all Member States, NR As found the access markets to be non-competitive  and 
imposed regulatory obligations on the incumben t operators, owing sti ll very high market 
shares (around 90%). However, as a result of effective wholesale regulat ion in place, NRAs in 
the Netherlands5 and the UK6 proposed the withdrawal of retail fixed access remedies. 
1.1. Issues related to the market definition 
As defined in the Recommendation, the retail access market includes the provision of a 
connection or access (at a fixed lo cation or address) to the pub lic telephone network for the 
purpose of making and/or receiving telephone ca lls and related servic es (such as fax).  
The revised Recommendation no longer distinguishes between residential and non-
residential customers  in the retail fixed access market s since in most Member States 
contractual terms do not differ significantly betwee n the two types of access. In line with this 
new approach most NRAs have, after the e nd of 2007, defined one single narrowband access 
market for residential and non-residential cu stomers. However, based on national market 
circumstances, such as differences in demand of services, price structures and marketing 
approaches towards the two customer groups, the Commission has accepted to maintain such distinction in some countries
7. 
As regards the product market definition , the Cypriot, Greek and Irish NRAs differentiated 
between lower and higher level narrowband access markets, whereas the British NRA 
distinguished between analogue and ISDN fixed access markets8.  Some NRAs included 
alternative means of a ccess in the market de finition, such as cable9 and optical fibre10 
networks or wireless local loop11. Home-zone access services12 provided over mobile 
networks belong to the relevant market in Sp ain, Romania and Bulgar ia. The Hungarian NRA 
concluded that within the timeframe of the re view home-zone products will not form part of 
the relevant market. Nevertheless, the Commi ssion invited the NRA to examine in its final 
                                                 
4  Overview of notifications assessed between October 2005 and December 2009. Details concerning 
notifications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on 
Market Reviews under the EU Regula tory Framework - Consolidating the internal market for electronic 
communications", (COM(2006) 28 final) of 6.2.2006.  
5  Case NL/2008/0821explain market is effectively competitive. 
6  Case UK/2009/0899.explain market is partially competitive. 
7  Austria, Bulgaria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia and the UK. 
8  Cases CY/2006/0485-486, EL/2006/0500-501, IE/2007/0632 and UK/2009/0899 respectively. 
9  E.g. cases ES/2008/0815, HU/2007/0662-663, PL/2007/0593, PL/2007/0647, EE/2007/0637-638, 
BG/2009/0911and LV/2009/0994. 
10  E.g. cases AT/2008/0832 and IT/2009/0890. 
11  E.g. cases HU/2007/0662-663, EE/2007/0637-638, IT/2009/0890 and BG/2009/0911. 
12  Services which do not allow for mobility and that have been assigned fixed geographical numbering.  
 
EN 7   EN measure the substitutability in terms of functionali ty and prices in this respect. In most cases, 
the broader market definition did not affect th e finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.  
The Commission has pursued a c onsequent line regarding the inclusion of broadband access 
services  in the relevant market. In particular, th e Commission has pointed out that to underpin 
increased substitutability between broadband access and narrowband access products, NRAs must demonstrate that as a result of a sma ll but significant non-tra nsitory price increase 
(SSNIP) customers would switch from a narro wband connection to a broadband connection 
only. It requested the Polish NR A to withdraw its measures
13 concerning retail access markets 
because it had not provided sufficient data to support the inclusion of xDSL access services. 
The NRA in its re-notified draft measure14 excludes any form of broadband access from the 
relevant market. In Austria15, Bulgaria16 and Italy17 different broadband access products are 
included in the relevant market and NRAs have  not always provided exhaustive analysis of 
substitutability, particularly as to pricing structure. Whilst in its comments letters the 
Commission has expressed its concerns, the ques tion of the market definition could be left 
open as the inclusion of these services would not a ffect the SMP assessment and none of the 
NRAs would impose regulatory obligations concer ning these services. On the other hand, the 
Commission did not contest the German NRA's conclusion to include complete connections18 
in the retail access market definition, based on the evidence provided on the increased substitutability between traditional narrowb and connections and complete connections, 
especially as regards their functionality
19 and pricing structure. Furthermore, the Commission 
did not challenge the inclusion of managed VoIP connections in the relevant access market in 
Romania and of IP-based telephony access with numbers in Sweden20 on the basis of the 
substitutability of these access products with traditional narrowband connections (particularly 
in terms of function, price, and intended us e). However, the Commission called upon these 
NRAs to closely monitor market developmen ts and adapt their market definition and 
regulatory intervention accordingly, should the ma rket structure change with regard to the 
increased substitutability of different access products.  
Referring to national circumstances21, the Dutch NRA defined the relevant market as 
including both fixed telephony access and voice calls services. While the Commission was 
                                                 
13  Cases PL/2006/0518, PL/2006/0524. 
14 Cases PL/2007/0593, PL/2007/0647. 
15  Voice over Broadband (VoB) services (cases AT/2007/0579-580 and AT/2008/0832). 
16  Services offered via Wireless Broadband A ccess technologies like CDMA and WiMax (case 
BG/2009/0911). 
17  Broadband access services enabling VoIP services (case IT/2009/0890). 
18  i.e. DSL or broadband cable connections that are bundled with telephone service and are not simultaneously 
coupled with a narrowband connection (Case DE/2009/0897). 
19  i.e. complete connections should offer the functio nalities which the end user of traditional connections is 
used to, for example both types of connections are offered with local exchange telephone numbers. 
20    Cases RO/2009/1001 and SE/2009/0965 respectively. 
21  In the Netherlands end-users would opt increasingly, and more often than in the rest of Europe, for 
purchasing so-called bundles of fixed telephony access and voice calls. Nevertheless, around a third of 
Dutch customers still choose unbund led services (i.e. access and calls provided separately). (Case 
NL/2008/0821) 
 
EN 8   EN not convinced that the arguments and evidence pu t forward demonstrated this conclusively, it 
concluded that the exact scope of the market de finition did not affect the regulatory outcome. 
The geographical market  is mainly national in scope except for Finland, Hungary and the 
UK where it corresponds to the networks of multiple incumbent operators22. 
1.2. Issues related to remedies 
In the fixed access markets the selection of  remedies supporting the access obligation 
(transparency, non-discrimination, price contro l and accounting separation) shows a great 
diversity. 
Looking at the individual remedies imposed, carrier selection/carrier pre-selection 
(CS/CPS) and wholesale line rental (WLR)  are imposed in most Member States either in 
the access market or in the call origination ma rket. WLR is vital to encourage alternative 
operators to climb the ladder of investment towards full u nbundling and it also allows the 
incumbent’s competitors to bundle their products and services in the retail markets as WLR is 
deemed most efficient, comp lementing CS/CPS. However, in quite a few Member States, 
WLR is not imposed or not well implemented23. To this end the Commission invited NRAs to 
consider imposing this obligation.24 
Price control  and price/cost calculation methodologi es play a key ro le in regulating 
telecommunication markets. Ina ppropriate prices (e.g. those discouraging operators from 
investments or becoming efficient over time) ca n lead to significant distortions. Therefore, 
remedies related comments of the Commissi on address in most cas es the proposed price 
control and the cost accounting  obligation25, where a great variet y of methodologies are 
notified under the Article 7 c onsultation procedure. The Co mmission has stressed on various 
occasions that WLR conditions should be designed in a way to avoid margin squeeze, while not discouraging investments in LLU in geogra phic areas where such investment would be 
economically feasible
26. The Commission has invited NRAs to impose or maintain ex ante  
price control obligations where wholesale regul ation has not yet proved sufficient to ensure 
competition at retail level27 or there was a risk of excessive pricing by the SMP operator28. In 
several cases, comments concern the lack of deta ils of the price contro l obligation provided in 
                                                 
22  Cases FI/2003/0020-21, HU/2007/0662-663 and UK/2009/0899 respectively. 
23  E.g.: Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia , Slovakia, Romania as well as Austria and the Czech 
Republic. 
24  E.g. cases EE/2007/0637-638, HU/2007/0662-663, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006. 
 In Germany the NRA did not impose WLR, instead,  it took note of the voluntary commitment of the 
incumbent to offer access lines to wholesale custom ers under retail conditions (i.e. as offered by the 
incumbent to end users). The NRA in its regulatory measure only reserved the right to impose a WLR remedy at a later stage should the voluntary commitment fail to fulfil its regulatory function. The 
Commission stressed that the incumbent's voluntary commitment can under no circumstances be used as a 
reason not to adopt a regulatory measure necessary to redress the competition problem identified in the 
relevant market. 
25  Cases ES/2008/0815, LU/2006/0526-527, BE/2007/0640, IE/2007/0632. 
26     Cases PL/2006/0380, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006.  
27  Cases EE/2007/0637-638 and SK/2007/0696. 
28  Cases ES/2008/0815 and CZ/2008/0755. 
 
EN 9   EN the notifications29, which failed to ensure adequate transp arency and legal certainty for market 
players. 
The Commission made fewer comme nts with regard to non-discrimination, transparency and 
accounting separation obligations. In one case, the Commission reminded the NRA30 that 
voluntary undertakings  of the incumbent, providing additional guarantees of non-
discrimination and transparency , must be notified under the EU consultation procedure. 
Finally, the Commission also commented on the differentiation of the transparency  
obligation31 as regards categories of a ccess products belonging to the same relevant market in 
Spain (i.e. between standardized and customized offers32); as well as on the non-imposition of 
accounting separation  in Latvia and Slovakia33. 
2. WHOLESALE FIXED CAL L ORIGINATION (MARKET 2)  
Call origination markets are characterized by the lack of effective competition in all Member 
States; NRAs designated incumbent operators, having still very high market shares, as 
operators with significant market power. 
2.1. Issues related to the market definition 
Call origination is one of the key wholesale inputs required to  provide retail fixed telephone 
services, including voice calls a nd dial-up Internet se rvices. Call origination may also include 
switching and/or call conveyance services.  
Most NRAs have defined the relevant market in line with the Recommendation on relevant 
markets. However, the Danish and the Dutch34 NRAs have proposed a market delineation that 
includes both wholesale access and call orig ination services. The Commission expressed 
doubts over the inclusion of wholesale access services in the  wholesale call origination  
market, as access services are complements to ra ther than substitutes for call origination 
services. Furthermore the Commission was also  not convinced of the Dutch NRA's proposal 
to subdivide the relevant market into two distinct markets for residential and business 
customers35 since call origination serv ices are in the two mark et segments functionally 
identical; an operator pr oviding these services to  residential customers could easily switch to 
provide the same services to business customers and vice versa.  Nevertheless, in both cases 
the question of the market delineation could be left open since it had no impact on the 
assessment of SMP or on the proposed remedies.  
                                                 
29  CasesGI/2007/0710-711, EE/2007/0637-638, IE/2007/0632 and LV/2009/0994. 
30  Case IT/2009/0890. 
31  Case ES/2008/0815. 
32   Customized offers are defined as  offers to customers whose billing exceeds 12.000 euros per year and that 
comprise not only access but also othe r electronic communications services. 
33  Cases LV/2009/0994 and SK/2007/0696. 
34  Cases DK/2005/0141 and NL/2008/0822.  
35  The NRA stated that residential and business products are not substitutable on the demand and also not on 
the supply side because of the different type of lines used and the differ ent price features. (Case 
NL/2008/0822). 
 
EN 10   EN As the above market definitions deviate from  those identified in the Recommendation on 
relevant markets the Danish and Dutch NRAs carried out the three criteria test  to justify ex 
ante regulation of the defined broader market s in accordance with Ar ticle 15(3) of the 
Framework Directive and the Recommendation. As  regards the Netherlands, the Commission 
explicitly invited the NRA to present its assessmen t on the three criteria test also in its final 
measure. 
NRAs have predominantly defined the geographic scope of the relevant markets as national 
with the exception of Finland, Hungary and the UK where it corresponds  to the operating 
areas of the incumbents' local networks36. 
2.2. Issues related to remedies 
As regards  remedies, most NRAs imposed the full set of  obligations available under the 
Access Directive. The Commission was concer ned with the effectiveness of wholesale 
regulation applied in Latvia and in Malta37. 
Some NRAs38 imposed carrier selection/carrier pre-se lection (CS/CPS) and wholesale 
line rental (WLR)  not in the retail fixed access markets but in the call origination market. In 
this context the Commission called upon the Slovak NRA39 to ensure the effective 
implementation of CS/CPS services and to consider imposing a WLR remedy which should 
also render the CS/CPS services more effective. 
Similarly to other markets, the Co mmission commented on several occasions40 on price 
control and price/cost ca lculating methodologies  in the wholesale call origination market; it 
requested for instance the Slovak NRA to enfo rce the implementation of the price control 
obligation without delay. Furthermore, the Co mmission expressed concerns over the lack of 
details of the price control/cost accounting obligations notified, which fails to provide 
adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players41. Finally, it stressed the need to 
notify cost oriented price caps, glide-paths or  interconnection rates unde r the EU consultation 
procedure in order to ensure transparen cy and coherence of the applied remedies42. 
From the procedural point of view , the Commission pointed out, that it considers the 
German approach to separately notify the propos ed remedies by a subsequent notification as 
an ineffective approach to address swiftly the competition problems identified43. Moreover, it 
reminded the Irish NRA that under the Regulat ory Framework notified draft measures should 
be adopted within a reasonable timeframe44. 
                                                 
36  Cases FI/2007/0703, HU/2007/0726 and UK/2009/0898 respectively. 
37    Cases LV/2009/0960 and MT/2009/0979. 
38  CS/CPS is imposed in market 2 in Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK. WLR is imposed in 
market 2 in Poland, Spain, Ma lta, the Netherlands and the UK. 
39  Case SK/2007/0740. 
40  Cases AT/2006/0543, CZ/2006/0351and SK/2007/0740. 
41  Cases PL/2006/0380 and GI/2007/0716. 
42  Case DE/2009/0887 and SE/2009/1016. 
43  Case DE/2008/0843. 
44    Case IE/2007/0672. 
 
EN 11   EN 3. CALL TERMINATION ON INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORKS PROVIDED AT 
A FIXED LOCATION (MARKET 3)  
Wholesale call termination is the service which operators provide to each other to connect 
incoming calls to subscribers located on their networks. In the EU, the calling party pays 
entirely for the call45, and the wholesale termination rate paid by the originating operator is 
normally passed to its end customer. As the calle d party is not billed for incoming calls, it is 
generally indifferent to the term ination charge set by its networ k provider and has little or no 
incentive to change network in the event that those charges are raised46. Consequently, in the 
absence of other factors pot entially limiting market power such as countervailing buyer 
power, the criteria to merit ex ante  regulation are normally met, and the terminating operator 
is designated as having SMP. 
Since the previous Communication, all NRAs have  notified their relevant markets for fixed 
call termination. The market was found to be non-competitive  and is consequently regulated 
in all Member States47. 
3.1. Issues related to market definition  
As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum to th e Recommendation on rele vant markets, call 
termination is the least replicable element in the series of inputs required  to provide retail call 
services.  
Call termination can only be supplied by the ne twork provider to which the called party is 
connected. There are currently no demand- or supply-side substitutes for call termination on 
an individual network. Therefore, in line with  the Recommendation on relevant markets, all 
NRAs have defined each individual fixe d network operator as constituting a distinct relevant 
network market  for call termination.  
The market has frequently been defined i ndependently of the unde rlying technology. For 
example, termination of calls at fixed locations using managed Voice over Internet Protocol 
                                                 
45  Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. 
46  A different rationale applies to numbers used by se rvice providers. A called service provider is generally 
sensitive to the level of termination charges — which directly affect its reve nues — and may therefore 
switch between providers of termination services.  
47  In its first round review of the fixed termina tion markets (case DE/2005/01 44) the German regulator 
considered that 53 alternative network operators did not have SMP for call termination on their respective networks, despite their 100% market share. In RegT P’s view, the fixed incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG 
had countervailing buyer power which did not allow the alternative operators to behave independently to an 
appreciable extent. The Commission concluded, however, that the evidence provided by the German regulator did not support its finding  of an absence of SMP for each ANO and therefore required RegTP to 
withdraw the notified dr aft measures to the extent that they related to the 53 alternative network operators. 
In a subsequent notification (case DE/2005/0239) the German regulator BNetzA de signated all alternative 
network operators with SMP on the market for call termination on their individual networks. This SMP 
finding has been confirmed again in a recent notification (case DE/2008/0843).
 
 
EN 12   EN (VoIP)/Voice over Broadband (VoB) technology  which provides a high level of quality 
management has been included in the releva nt market by a number of Member States48. 
The market has also been generally defined independently of the origin of the call (i.e. fixed 
or mobile, national or international)49. 
In view of the different  substitution possibilities50 calls to service providers are also generally 
excluded from the relevant market51. Call termination to certain non-geographic numbers  
(frequently for emergency or public interest services) have however been included in the 
relevant market definition where they are subject to the same supply and demand conditions as call termination to st andard geographic numbers
52. 
Voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mobile offers  were increasingly identified 
as part of the relevant market for call termin ation on geographic numbers at fixed locations in 
view of their more limited mobility and similar pricing to fixed calls53, although in Germany 
they fell to be considered as part of the mobile call termination markets54. 
3.2. Issues related to remedies 
In view of the potential for excessive prici ng, the Commission has c onsistently called on 
regulators to ensure an  effective implementation of the cost orientation obligation55 and to 
apply  effective price regulation also in the case of alternativ e network operators which have 
                                                 
48  See, for example, cases DE/2008/0843, RO/2008/ 0774, FR/2005/0228, AT/2008/0834 (TKK proposed to 
include VoB but not VoIP), IT/2008/0777, LV/2009/0889, MT/2006/0388, SI/2007/0690 (APEK excluded 
calls that are terminated at customers of unmanaged  VoIP services from the market definition), and 
ES/2008/0818.  
49 See, for example, case RO/2008/0774. 
50  See footnote 46 above. 
51  UKE's first-round review registered under case number PL/2006/0381 was concluded by the Commission 
withdrawing its serious doubts after UKE withdrew from the scope of th e market definition call termination 
to numbers of information networks (NDSI), non-geographic numbers and numbers for special subscriber 
services (AUS). UKE indicates that the relevant product market does not include call termination to such 
numbers, apart from termination of calls to emergency numbers (99X, 98X and 112 - allocated to services 
officially required to  provide assistance). 
52  For example, TKK (case AT/2009 /0909) includes calls to certain non-geographic numbers in Austria 
provided they are converted into geographic numbers before termination and terminated in the same way as 
a standard geographic number. The op erators terminating this specific type of call are not aware that their 
subscriber, to which the call is addre ssed, is a service provider and charge  the same rates as for termination 
to standard geographic numbers. ANRCTI noted further (case RO/2008/0774) that in the case of calls to 
public interest services in Romania, the service prov iders in question behave like end-users and do not have 
an incentive to switch supplier in cas e of a 5-10% increase in termination rates. Other examples may also be 
found in cases FR/2008/0784, NL/2008/0830, DE/2008/0843, CZ/2007/0660-0661, DK/2009/0984.  
53  Cases IT/2008/0777 (in this case this Commission commented on the fact that although AGCOM included 
voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mob ile offers in the fixed call termination, it proposed to 
defer the definition of obligations for these services until its assessment of the market for voice call 
termination on individual mobile networks), PL/2008/0762 and RO/2008/0774.  
54   Case DE/2008/0813. 
55  Cases MT/2006/0388, FI/2007/0704, BG/2009/0865. 
 
EN 13   EN been designated with SMP56.  In the absence of a fully func tioning cost orientation obligation, 
the Commission has recognised benc hmarking as a temporary measure57.  
The Commission has continuously reiterated the im portance of bringing termination rates to 
the level of the cost of an efficient operator  as soon as possible and has further invited 
NRAs to apply a forward-looking LRIC model for setting termination rates58.  
In terms of costs includ ed in the relevant cost model, th e Commission has underlined that as 
wholesale call termination services are traffic-related services , relevant costs considered for 
wholesale call termination charging purposes are typically those costs wh ich vary in response 
to increased levels of wholesale call te rmination traffic and which reflect the additional costs 
directly involved  in providing the service in question59.  In response to one notification, the 
Commission also noted that a hybrid cost model implemented by way of a simple averaging 
of the results of the top-down and the bottom-up LRAIC models does not seem to be the most 
appropriate means of reconcilia tion nor consistent with the principle of forward-looking 
economic efficiency60. 
The Commission has also on numerous occas ions stated that termination rates should 
normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be ade quately justified by objective cost 
differences and limited to a transitory period taking into account the need for alternative 
operators to become efficient over time61. The Commission has also encouraged NRAs to 
impose effective access obligations on all SMP operators62. The Commission has further 
called for regulators to ensure a symmetric whol esale rate is applied by terminating operators 
irrespective of the origin of the call, i. e. fixed-to-fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls63. 
In recent cases, the Commission has underlined the importance of NRAs notifying their 
actually proposed glide paths as part of the consultation pr ocedure under Article 7(3), as 
price levels, amendments to cost methodologies, as well as the determ ination of glide-paths 
are considered to have a material  impact on the relevant markets64. 
Furthermore, the Commission ha s consistently calle d upon the national re gulators to work 
together towards a coherent European approach to cost accounting and has adopted, in May 
2009, a Recommendation which sets out a cohere nt costing approach for the regulatory 
                                                 
56  Cases AT/2006/0544, DE/2009/0948, IE/2007/0701, PL/2006/0502, PL/2007/0633, PL/2007/0641, 
PL/2007/0685, PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/-0776, PL/2008/0814, LV/2009/0889, EE/2007/0598, 
HU/2007/0727, LT/2009/0983, GI/2009/0976. 
57  Case MT/2006/0388. 
58  Cases NL/2008/0830, LV/2009/0889, PL/2009/0903. 
59  Cases AT/2009/0909, IT/2008/0753. 
60  Case AT/2009/0909. 
61  Cases DK/2005/0207, AT/2006/0504, IT/2008/0753, ES/2008/0818. 
62  Case DE/2009/0948, IE/2007/0701, EE/2007/0598, GI/2009/0976, CZ/2009/0964, IE/2009/0917. 
Furthermore, the Commission has un derlined in case LT/2009/0983 that  an access obligation is unilateral 
and unconditional in its nature, and should in principle not be made subject to conditions offered on markets 
other than the relevant market, i.e. another termination market. 
63  Case BG/2009/0865. 
64  Cases DE/2009/0948, PL/2009/0903. 
 
EN 14   EN treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates in the EU.65 Over the next regulatory period, 
we can expect NRAs to increasingly a lign their regulatory practice with the 
Recommendation66 which holds that all Member States should set their termination rates 
according to the cost of an efficient operator by 31 December 2012.67  
4. WHOLESALE (PHYSICAL ) NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS (MARKET 4) 
The 2003 Recommendation on relevant market s identified the market for wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared access) to metal lic loops and sub-loops as one of the two 
wholesale markets linked to the broadband retail market. As set out in the Expl anatory note to 
the 2007 Recommendation,68 technological change implied that , contrary to a strict limitation 
to the metallic loop or sub-loops, all relevant p hysical infrastructure necessary to reach the 
end consumer would be included in the relevant market. Accordingly, the relevant market 
identified as being susceptible to ex ante  regulation is the whol esale (physical) network 
infrastructure access (including shared or fu lly unbundled access) at a fixed location (LLU 
market).  
This market was found to be non-competitive  and is regulated in all Member States that have 
notified it to the Commission.69 
4.1. Issues related to the market definition 
In the period under review, the upgr ading of copper ac cess networks to next generation 
access  (NGA) networks and the (potential) roll out of new fibre networks have had the 
greatest impact on regulatory measures. Th e deployment of NGA networks brought along 
new issues related to market definition and to the imposition of remedies.  
The impact was especially  pronounced in terms of market definition,  since NRAs had to 
decide on the exclusion or inclus ion of certain technologi es and/or infrastructure in the market 
definition. In even more concrete terms, th e inclusion of access products based on FttN/FttC70 
(or VDSL) and FttH71 has been an issue dealt with by NRAs. 
                                                 
65  Commission Recommendation 2009/396/EC of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and 
Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, p. 67. 
66 The Commission has emphasized the need for a coherent European approach in a number of cases: 
FI/2007/0704, SI/2007/0690, GI/2007/0717, HU/2007/0727, RO/2008/0774, UK/2009/0898, ES/2008/0818, 
IT/2008/0753, IT/2008/0777, NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978, PL/2008/0903, PL/2008/0760, PL/2008/0762, PL/2008/0776, PL/2008/0814, BG/2009/0865, FR/2008/0784, IE/2009/0917, EL/2008/0751, EL/2008/0754. 
67  In exceptional circumstances set out in section 12 of the Termination Rates Recommendation the NRA may 
delay its implementation until 1 July 2014. 
68  Commission Staff Working Docume nt, Explanatory Note accompanyi ng document to the Commission 
Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector 
susceptible to ex ante  regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Second edition), SEC (2007) 1483 final.  
69  Bulgaria and Romania have not yet notified this market. 
70  Fibre to the Node or Fibre to the Cabinet.  
71  Fibre to the Home. 
 
EN 15   EN While several NRAs decided to include fibre ba sed access products in their definitions of the 
LLU market72, some defined the relevant market  excluding FttH and/or fibre access 
products73. The Commission generally invited NRAs to analyse the substitutability between 
copper and fibre based access products in bo th the LLU and WBA markets in a forward 
looking, technologically neutral ma nner and, in the presence of continued lack of effective 
competition, to impose remedies on fibre as appropriate in the following market reviews.74 
Where NRAs excluded fibre access products fr om the market because operators only 
limitedly had started deploying their fibre access networks, the Commission called on the 
NRAs to monitor market devel opments in order to take account  of prospectiv e roll-out plans 
of operators and to reassess their market analyses when appropriate.75 
The French NRA included civil works infrastructure  (ducts) in the product market 
definition and the Estonian NRA included access support services  (including co-location, 
duct access and shared use of buildings).76 While acknowledging that access to such 
supporting infrastructure was an appropriate re medy for the market at stake, the Commission 
also recalled that such access obligation could be imposed without the supporting 
infrastructure being include d in the relevant market.77 
4.2. Issues related to remedies 
The most important development with rega rd to remedies is also linked to the deployment of 
NGAs.  New regulatory remedies were specifically devised by NRAs in order to address the 
increasing deployment of fibre based products. 
Most NRAs mandated access to SM P operators' civil work infrastr uctures (ducts) and/or dark 
fibre in order to foster the rollout of alternative fibre networks.78 In the Spanish case, the 
Commission welcomed the imposition of the ob ligation of access to the physical network 
infrastructure, yet requested the NRA to devel op a reference offer and the corresponding price 
control obligations, as these obligations were ke y to ensure effective access to such bottleneck 
input. The Spanish NRA proceeded accordingly.79 In terms of price regulation of access to 
                                                 
72  E.g. cases EE/2009/0942, ES/2008/0804 (FTTH point to multipoint technology is excluded), FI/2008/0839, 
FR/2008/0780, IE/2009/0875, NL/2008/827 and PT/20080850. 
73  E.g. cases CY/2009/0869 and CZ/2009/0933 (withdrawn by the NRA), DK/2008/0860, EL/2009/0934, and 
SK/2009/0929 (withdrawn by the NRA).  
74  E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and ES/2008/0804. 
75  E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and EL/2009/0934. 
76  Case EE/2009/0942. 
77  Case FR/2008/0780. The Commission pointed out that  access to civil works infrastructure is indeed 
considered as an appropriate remedy in relation to this market, which can be imposed without the inclusion of civil works infrastructure in the relevant market. The Commission invited ARCEP to provide further 
justification in its final decision as to the inclusio n of civil works infrastructure in the relevant market. 
 
78  E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, CY/2009/0869, DK/2 008/0860, EE/2009/0942, EL/2009/0934, ES/2008/0804 
FR/2008/0780, IT/2009/0891 and PT/2008/0850.  
79  Case ES/2009/0961. 
 
EN 16   EN passive infrastructures, most NRAs adopted cost-orientatio n.  The Commission insisted in 
several cases on the adequacy of such -tariff regulation.80 
In an FttN/FttC  (VDSL) scenario, some NRAs impos ed obligations to  ensure unbundled 
access at the street cabinet level (also referred  to as sub-loop unbundling), ancillary services 
(co-location) and appropriate backhaul  (duct, unlit/dark fibre, Ethernet).81 As regards FttH -
based access, the Dutch, the Finish and the Sl ovenian NRAs put in place measures mandating 
unbundled access to fibre loops, although they implemented different price regulation.82  The 
Dutch NRA, OPTA, imposed cost-oriented pri ces for unbundled access to the fibre access and 
proposed a cost model including  a form of risk premium.83 Because the proposed investment 
risks' parameters (internal rate of return and payback period) could lead  to an over-estimation 
of the investment risk, the Co mmission invited the Dutch NRA to review the parameters in 
case competitive conditions ch anged. OPTA proposed to diffe rentiate between FttH and 
FttO84 ODF-access prices, considering that the level of investment required for FttH is higher 
than for FttO and aligning the costing methodol ogy for the latter with the one used for the 
tariff regulation of copper.85 The Finnish NRA instead did not intend to impose a cost-
orientation obligation on the prices for unbundled access to the fibre loop since fibre 
deployment was only in its early stage in Finl and. The Commission urge d FICORA to ensure 
that the access measures were supplemented by a ppropriate costing remedies and to consider 
imposing on fibre loops similar remedi es as proposed for copper loops.86 The Slovenian NRA 
proposed to implement cost-oriented acc ess based on a LRIC+ methodology. The 
Commission invited APEK to reassess the parameters of the proposed cost model87.  
The issue of  transparency88 and migration from copper to fibre networks89 were explicitly  
addressed  by some Member States in their measur es. As for the migration process, the 
Commission pointed out that migration from copper to fibre loops and the dismantling of 
exchanges substantially affects the business case  for alternative operators. In the cases where 
NRAs did not develop remedies specifying in de tail the migration process (e.g. information to 
be provided by SMP operators c oncerning their network rollout  plans, the conditions for 
                                                 
80  E.g. IT/2009/0987 and ES 2008/0805.  
81  E.g. SI/2009/0957, DE/2007/0646, BE/2008/0801. 
82  Cases FI/2008/0839, NL/2008/0826 and SI/2009/0981.  
83  OPTA implemented a multi-annual price cap based on a discounted cash flow model. It applied an Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) methodology to set the price cap instead of the Embedded Direct Costs (EDC) 
methodology it uses to regulate the pricing of acce ss to copper unbundling since it considers that FTTH 
represents a completely new investment undertaken by a company, Reggefibre Group, structurally separated 
from the SMP operator, which provides copper unbundling.  
84  Fibre to the Office. 
85  Case NL/2009/0868 (price cont rol obligation for FttH unbundled  ODF-access) and case NL/2009/0906 
(price control obligation for FttO unbundled ODF-access).   
86  Case FI/2008/0839. 
87  SI/2009/0981.  
88  In particular with regard to access to physical network infrastructure,, to the migration process and to the 
development of the new generation access networ k. E.g. cases BE/200 8/0801, EE/2009/0942, 
EL/2009/0934, ES/2008/0804, FR/2008/0780 and PT/2008/0850.  
89  E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, DK/2008/0860, NL/2008/0826 and ES/2008/0804.  
 
EN 17   EN closing down exchanges and the methods of coll ocation at the newly-built access points for 
LLU operators, and/or the provision of appropr iate backhaul facilities), the Commission 
invited them to do so.90  
On the basis of the early stage of developm ent of fibre networks, some Member States 
proposed to apply lighter regulation on fibre-based access products, exempting such 
networks from specific obligations.91 In such cases the Commission inter alia  pointed to the 
increasing roll-out of/investment in fibre access netw orks and the need to monitor market 
developments. The Commission also invited NRAs  to consider the application of additional 
remedies on fibre products.  
Although strictly speaking not part of a review of the LLU market, complementary  
symmetric measures pertaining to in-building wiring92 – based on national laws or on 
Article 12 of the Framework Directive93 - were also developed in so me countries to tackle the 
remaining physical bottlenecks asso ciated with FttH deployment.94 In Spain, CMT imposed a 
symmetric obligation requiring the first operator having deployed a fibre access solution in 
the building to meet reasonable requests for a ccess and use of its equipments within the 
building. The Commission, whilst acknowledging the importance of in-building cabling, requested the NRA to provide sp ecific justification supporting th e use of Article 12 of the 
Framework Directive and asked CMT to consider  imposing additional obligations. In France, 
as a complement to the obligation of access to  France Telecom's civil works infrastructures , 
ARCEP mandated (i) the shari ng of in-house wiring of any operator deploying a fibre 
network inside a building and, (ii) in very  dense areas, where it is economically most 
profitable for operators to roll -out their own fibre networks into the homes, required all in-
building operators to roll-out multiple fibre lines (i.e. additional dedicated fibre lines) on condition that the requesting opera tors are willing to co-invest.
95 The Commission invited the 
French NRA inter alia  to carefully monitor the developm ent of fibre netw ork roll-out in 
France and to verify whether th e proposed symmetrical regulati on, coupled with the remedies 
imposed in the broadband markets (access to civi l works infrastructure),  would be sufficient 
to ensure effective competition within the foreseeable timeframe . Should this not be the case, 
ARCEP should consider imposing on the SMP op erator other remedies, e.g. unbundled access 
to the fibre loops.  
                                                 
90  E.g. cases FI/2008/0839 and IT/2009/0988. 
91  E.g. cases EE/2009/0942 (absence of non-discrimination and cost orientation obligations on fibre products), 
FI/2008/0839 (absence of a cost-orientation obligation on fibre products), FR/2008/0780 (regulation of fibre 
products limited to access to civil infrastructure and in-house wiring) and IT/200 9/0890 (lack of a fibre 
unbundling access obligation).  
92  Imposed on all operators, irrespective of wh ether these have SMP in the relevant market. 
93  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and servi ces (Framework Directive), OJ L 
108, 24.4.2002, p. 33. 
94 FR/2008/0780, FR/2009/0993, ES/2008/0804. Portugal adopted as well on May 2009 a Decree-Law 
containing specific provisions related to the sharing of in-house wiring.  
95  FR/2009/0993. A regulatory decision and a recommendation are implementing the provisions regarding in-
house wiring regulation under the Law on the Modernisation of the Economy. In-building operators must 
meet reasonable requests for access to their passive lines  at a local connection poin t (at reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions) and give access to a dedicated fibre line or to a shared fibre line to the requesting 
operators. 
 
EN 18   EN In parallel, the Commission also ha d the opportunity to comment on the modification of 
price control remedies  related to the LLU market, more specifically on the increase of the 
LLU prices. In this regard, two cases are worth mentioning. In the Italian case, AGCOM 
notified to the Commission the modification of the prices of the lo cal loop unbundling (LLU) 
services. In line with Telecom Italia's proposal, AGCOM pr oposed to allow increases in the 
LLU prices charged by Teleco m Italia in 2009. In the UK case, Ofcom proposed to amend the 
price control remedies related to LLU services  and to the wholesale line rental ("WLR"), by 
increasing the price for fully unbundled loops, shared lines and residential WLR and by 
lowering the price for business WLR. In both cas es, noting in particular  that at EU level 
regulators adopted different co sting methodologies to calculate  LLU prices, the Commission 
invited the Italian and British regulators to discus s with other NRAs and with the Commission 
on how to achieve more consistency in the costing methodologies us ed for calculating LLU 
prices. 
5. WHOLESALE BROADBAND ACCESS (MARKET 5) 
This market was found to be non-competitive  and is regulated in all Member  States  with the 
exception of Malta, where the market was found to be competitive.96  
In the UK and in Portugal, the market was geogr aphically segmented and parts of the national 
territory were found to be effectively competitive.97 Geographical segmentation  of the 
wholesale broadband access market was a genui nely novel issue which was examined by the 
Commission in several cases dur ing the period under review.98  
5.1. Issues related to the market definition  
As in the LLU market, the upgrading of coppe r access networks to NGA networks and the 
(potential) roll-out of new fibr e networks had a great impact in the definitions of the WBA 
market.99  The NRAs dealt with the inclusion of access products based on FttN/C (VDSL) 
and FttH/B .  Some NRAs excluded VDSL and/or ot her fibre-based access products from 
their market definitions on the basis of a lack  of (extensive) deployment of fibre access 
networks during the on-going market review period.100 The Commission generally urged 
NRAs to properly assess the substitutability of fibre-based products with copper in a forward looking technologically neutra l manner and to monitor market developments. 
In two specific cases, the exclusion of specific access products  from the relevant market 
gave rise to serious doubts from the Commissi on. In its first notifica tion of the WBA, the 
German regulator (BNetzA) excluded the ne w FTTN/VDSL infrastructure of Deutsche 
Telekom from the relevant market. The Comm ission launched a Phase II investigation on the 
grounds that there was no evidence of a lack  of substitution between VDSL and other DSL 
                                                
 
96  Case MT/2008/2003.  
97  Cases UK/2007/0733 and PT/2008/0851.  
98  See 5.1 infra.  
99  See 4.1 supra . 
100  E.g. cases AT/2009/0970 (FTTH excluded), CY/2009/0870, CZ/2008/0797 and EL/2009/0935. In case 
SI/2009/0957, the Slovenian NRA excluded from the relevant market the fibre optic infrastructure owned by 
the alternative operator T-2. 
 
EN 19   EN products.101 Following the Commission's serious doubt s letter, BNetzA finally included 
VDSL infrastructure in the WBA ma rket to the extent that such infrastructure is substitutable 
with other bitstream access products in this  market. Similarly, the Commission expressed 
serious doubts on the proposal of the Spanis h regulator, CMT, to exclude wholesale 
broadband access at speeds above 30 M bps from the relevant product market.102 While CMT 
considered that, due to uncertainties surrounding the substitutability pattern at both the retail 
and wholesale level, speeds above 30 Mbps should be excl uded from the market, the 
Commission stressed that, in the absence of detailed factual information and of a sound 
substitutability analysis, it was not possibl e to draw such a conclusion. Rather, the 
Commission noted that there s eemed to be a general trend towards higher speeds in Spain, 
and that it was artificial to limit the relevant market to speeds below 30 Mbps. CMT eventually withdrew the speed li mit from its market definition. 
Another relevant issue c oncerned the definition of geographically segmented markets . 
While in the first round of mark et analyses all NRAs defined national markets, the second 
round revealed that previously imposed regulat ion of relevant wholesale inputs (LLU and 
bitstream) lead to certain developments. Part icularly in certain regions, mostly densely 
populated areas, competitors were ab le to build their own networks and to connect them to the 
incumbent's local loop. This has lead NRAs to address the question whether to regionally 
segment markets  or to reduce or completely remove regulation  in some areas .  
The first regulator to notify such segmentation was Ofcom.
103 In its comments letter, the 
Commission set the criteria  and type of evidence  required for geographic segmentation  of 
the wholesale broadband access market. The Commission stated, inter alia , that the definition 
of geographic sub-markets had to be based on a thorough analysis of structural and 
behavioural factors . This should include not only structural indicators , such as the number 
of competitors present in a give n exchange area, but also other potentially relevant factors, 
such as the size/density of the areas in quest ion, in order to establish that the presence of 
alternative operators is sustaina ble. The distribution of market shares and their development 
over time within individual exchange areas  should also be looked into. Relevant behavioural 
indicators  would include a preliminary analysis  of pricing, price trends and price 
differentiation at retail and whol esale level, as well as any di fferences in supply and demand 
characteristics, such as the commercial stra tegies and product/servi ce offerings observed in 
the different areas. The definition of geographi c sub-markets would also entail the assessment 
of whether any proposed mark et boundaries would be suffi ciently stable over time. 
Subsequently, in February 2008, the Austrian regulator (TKK)104 decided to define a national 
market but to geographically differentiate the remedies  imposed on the SMP operator on 
the basis of the competition faced by this opera tor in the different areas. The Commission 
accepted this approach, yet in its comments le tter set out the criteria under which such 
differentiation of remedies would be  justified. The Commission stated, inter alia , that the 
abovementioned differentiation coul d be appropriate in those situ ations where, for example, 
the boundary between areas where there is differe nt competitive pressure is variable and 
                                                 
101  Case DE/2005/0262. 
102 Case ES/2008/0805. 
103  Case UK/2007/0733. 
104  Case AT/2008/0757. 
 
EN 20   EN likely to change over time, or where significant differences in competitive conditions are 
observed but the evidence may not be such as to justify the definition of sub-national markets. In addition, differentiation of remedies may be appropriate where premature removal of ex 
ante regulation could have signi ficant detrimental conseque nces for consumers and the 
competitive process.
105 
The Portuguese NRA has also proposed to geographically segment the market.106 The 
Commission found that the geographical segmen tation was substantia ted to the required 
degree, yet pointed out that the NRA should carefully monitor the market in the context of the 
NGA rollout, as the deployment of new infrastruc ture could well reverse the development of 
competition in the referred market. Other NRAs, such as CMT107 (Spanish regulator) and 
Ficora108 (Finish regulator), were also contempl ating a geographical differentiation of the 
market. In these cases, however, the Commission considered that further justification would 
be necessary to remove regulation.  
The Commission has also systematically el aborated on the appropriateness of the inclusion of 
cable in the relevant market. When assessin g NRAs' notifications, the Commission has 
reiterated the need for a thorough assessment of  the direct competitive constraints exerted by 
cable operators on traditional broadband access products for the purposes of properly delineating the relevant whol esale broadband access market.
109 Where cable could not be 
included in the product market definition on this basis, the Commission indicated that, even in 
the absence of a relevant wholesale access offer, competition at the retail level from vertically integrated undertakings may be such as to ex ert an indirect constraint on the market for 
wholesale access services. Such indirect pricin g constraints should be taken into account in 
the context of the SMP assessment.
110 
                                                 
105  On 17 December 2008 the Austrian  Administrative Court (Verwaltung sgerichtshof) annulled the NRA's 
decision. A new notification was submitted to the Commission in September 2009 (Case AT/2009/0970). 
106  Case PT/2008/0851. 
107  Case ES/2008/0805. CMT defined a national market but proposed diffe rentiating remedies according to the 
intensity of retail competition in the different parts of  the country. The Commission had serious doubts as to 
whether the development of the Spanish broadband markets would or would not justify the application of 
geographically differentiated regulatory obligations. The Spanish regulator has in Phase II changed its 
conclusions and has inter alia  abandoned its intent to apply geogr aphically differentiated remedies.  
108  See Cases FI/2008/0848 and FI/2009/0900. Ficora notified its analysis of the WBA market under case 
FI/2008/0848. Therein, Ficora defined 31 regionally different geographic markets, corresponding to the operating areas of 31 fixed telecoms network companies. The Finish NRA proposed to distinguish 
geographic sub-markets within 5 of these operating areas, where it identified 25 municipalities (typically 
urban centres) which exhibited differing competitive ch aracteristics in relation to the rest of the local 
operating area. Ficora proposed to partially deregulate inter alia  the referred 5 operating areas. The 
Commission raised serious doubts as to the proposed de-regulation due to the lack of sufficient evidence to 
substantiate the geographic market definition/partial de-regulation. Following the serious doubts raised by the Commission and the opening of phase II, Ficora with drew the referred notification and re-notified its 
analysis under Case FI/2009/0900. No geographic sub-markets were then defined.  
109  E.g. cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, FR/2008/0781, NL/2009/0827, PT/2008/0851 and 
UK/2007/0733. 
110  Explanatory Note to the Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante  regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (C(2007) 5406), pp. 34-35. See also, inter alia , Case UK/2007/0733. 
 
EN 21   EN The Commission underlined that if weak constrai nts are automatically ta ken into account at 
the market definition stage there is also a risk of understating the real ex tent of market power 
at the wholesale level by including self-supplied market shares for all vertically integrated 
competitors irrespective of whether the latter are actually constraining the market behaviour 
of the incumbent. It is therefore essential that the degree or strength of the constraint posed is 
correctly estimated in the assessment. When assessing the effect of indirect substitution 
through a SSNIP (small but significant non-trans itory increase in prices) test, NRAs are 
required to demonstrated that:111 
(i) based on the wholesale/retail  price ratio, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) would not be 
able to absorb and would th erefore be forced to pass a hypothetical wholesale price 
increase on to their consumers at the retail level; 
(ii) there would be sufficient demand substitution, at the retail level, to  retail services based 
on indirect constraints such as to render the wholesale price in crease unprofitable; and 
(iii) the customers of the ISPs would not switch to  a significant extent to the retail arm of the 
integrated hypothetical monopolist, in particular  if the latter does not  raise its own retail 
prices. 
Two cases have shown specificities which ar e worth mentioning. In the Maltese case  the 
NRA included the provision of wholesale products over cable networks in the relevant market 
on the basis of direct constraints,  which resulted from the partic ular characteristics of the 
Maltese market. The Maltese NRA sustained that: (i) although cable modem and DSL technologies differed, the servic es presented similar network architectures, similar possible 
points of interconnection and similar cost st ructures, which rendered them equivalent 
wholesale products; (ii) on the demand side , both platforms provided eq uivalent products, had 
ubiquitous coverage of the natio nal territory and the interconnection for ISPs and wholesale 
providers was simple and cost-effective; and (iii) on the supply side , despite high entry 
barriers to the roll-out of a new fixed netw ork, DSL and cable modem wholesale providers 
could counteract any price increase by thei r competitor by providing a similar product 
through their own access network. The Commi ssion invited the NRA to monitor market 
developments.
 112  
In the Danish case, the main justification put forward by the regulator to include cable in the 
relevant market was the fact that in Denmark the largest cable TV network was controlled by the incumbent operator (TDC), which owne d the copper network. The Danish NRA 
considered that this fact coul d in itself have a direct im pact on the supply of broadband 
connections based on copper networks
113. Although the Commission was not convinced that 
sufficient evidence on the direct constraints be tween copper and cable had been provided to 
justify the inclusion of cable in the relevant market, it acknowledged, however, that the joint 
control over both parallel networks and the ab sence of appropriate obligations imposed on 
cable could lead TDC to circumvent existing regulation limited to tr aditional copper-based 
                                                 
111 E.g. cases FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0827 and UK/2007/0733.  
112 Case MT/2008/0803. 
113  The joint control of the copper and cable networks would create disincentives for TDC to invest in copper 
network expansion (VDSL2 network) in those areas where TDC would be able to provide higher bandwidth 
connections to end-users based on its cable TV network. 
 
EN 22   EN wholesale broadband access products, thereb y distorting competition by depriving its 
wholesale customers reliant on TDC´s DSL bi tstream access products from the ability to 
match the high bandwidth retail offers provided via the incumbent's cable network. Therefore, 
on the basis of Article 8(2) of  the Framework Directive and of  Article 8(4) of the Access 
Directive, the Commission considered that it was justified to extend the remedies applicable to the copper-based network to TDC's cable network.
114  
In several other cases analysed by the Commis sion, the exclusion of cable-based wholesale 
broadband access services from the relevant market would have ne ither changed the SMP 
finding nor led to a differe nt regulatory outcome.115 Consequently the issu e of the inclusion of 
cable-based wholesale broadband access services in  the relevant market has been left open. 
Finally, in one of the cases notified, the Commission addressed the issue of substitutability, 
at retail level (residential market),  between mobile and fixed broadband . In this regard, in 
its third round review of the WBA market, the Austrian NRA identified two separate markets 
for broadband access at the retail level, for re sidential and business customers respectively.116 
Whereas the business market included only DS L based connections, the residential market 
comprised DSL as well as cable TV and mobile broadb and connections.  On the basis of the 
situation at the retail level, RTR concluded that only the wholesale broadband access market 
based on bitstream connections for the subseque nt use of business customers would warrant 
ex ante  regulation. The Commission had serious doubts as to the inclusion of mobile 
broadband in the retail broadband market for resi dential customers and as to the treatment of 
external and internal supply of bitstream conn ections, for the subsequent use by residential 
customers, in the definition of the wholesale market.   The Commission eventually accepted 
RTR's conclusion that, on the basis of the mark et situation, mobile broadband connections for 
fixed broadband connections for residential user s could be substitutes. The Austrian NRA was 
however invited to closely monitor market deve lopments, in particular the constraints of 
further mobile take-up in comparison with the evolution of fixed broa dband networks and the 
impact of NGA deployment.  
5.2. Issues related to remedies 
The transition to NGA has brought along new issu es related to the imposition of remedies. 
Some NRAs have refrained from regulating or  have proposed lighter regulation on certain 
networks or functionalities. In this regard, some NRAs have in cluded fibre based products in 
their market definitions but have proposed not to impose remedies or to limit such imposition 
in respect of fibre-based products.117  
In Denmark,118 the regulator proposed not to impose a ny obligations on fibre,  stating that in 
case the incumbent started to depl oy fibre in the local  loop in order to provide high bandwidth 
                                                 
114  Case DK/2008/0862. 
115 Cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0826 and UK/2007/0733. 
116  Case AT/2009/0970 (only the market definition was notified). 
117  E.g. cases DK/2008/0862, FR/2008/0781, DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576, PT/2008/0850 
(no WBA regulation imposed); EE/2009/0943, ES/2008/0805, NL/2008/0827 (lighter regulation imposed/no regulation of specific offers). 
118  Case DK/2008/0862. 
 
EN 23   EN broadband services to end-users, such remedies  could be imposed by means of an additional 
decision. The Commission invited the Danish regulat or to closely monitor the overall level of 
retail competition and the development of fibre access networks in Denmark and to perform a 
new market analysis in the event the incumb ent launched fibre based retail product offerings 
on a larger scale. Furthermore, in case of continued lack of eff ective competition, the 
Commission invited the Dani sh NRA to impose remedies on fibre access products. 
In the Netherlands,119 whilst including fibre in both th e low and high wholesale broadband 
access markets, the regulator proposed not to impose regulatory obligations on bitstream access via fibre networks in the low quality market. The Dutch NRA considered that WBA 
access over fibre was in casu  unnecessary due to the fact that unbundled fibre ODF access in 
the LLU market would already allow for market  players to gradually build up a geographical 
coverage based on unbundled fibre access. It considered, moreover, that mandating WBA 
over copper was sufficient to remedy competit ion problems in the WBA market and in the 
underlying retail markets. The Co mmission, while considering the exclusion of fibre from the 
WBA market as potentially justifiable, pointed to the uncertainties regarding the successful 
implementation of ODF unbundled access and invi ted the Dutch NRA to closely monitor  
market developments and to extend the proposed re medies to fibre networks if the obligations 
imposed proved insufficient to ensure competition.  
In Germany,
120 following the Commission's serious doubts on to the exclusion of VDSL 
infrastructure from the WBA market,121 the NRA included such infrastructure in the market 
but considered that substitutability could not yet be assessed given the marginal demand for retail products based on VDSL. Therefore it did not mandate VDSL bitstream.   
In Estonia, the regulator imposed on the SMP operator fibre bitstream at national and local 
level, but specified that the obligation to pr ovide bitstream at DSLAM level and the related 
price control obligation would not apply to the SMP operator's fibre infrastructure since, 
otherwise, there would a duplic ation of the access remedies applied in the LLU market.  
The absence of regulation of specific offers  was also an issue dealt with by the Commission 
in the Spanish case.
122 As previously mentioned, followi ng the serious doubts put forward by 
the Commission on the exclusion of wholesale broadband access at speeds above 30 Mbps 
from the relevant product market, the Spanish NRA eventually withdrew the speed limit from 
its market definition123 but maintained the distinction in  terms of the access remedy applied. 
In this regard, the Spanish regulator proposed to regulate only bitstream offers up to 30 Mb/s, 
considering that such an appr oach would contribute to foster ing infrastructure competition 
and that the imposition of access to passive infr astructure in the LLU market would already 
allow entrants to roll out their own fibre. Th e Commission pointed out th at since the prospects 
for enhanced infrastructure-based competition di d not appear to be particularly strong, there 
was a risk that, with a fibr e-based wholesale broadband acce ss product limited in speed, 
Telefónica could pre-empt the ma rket for retail broadband servi ces during the period in which 
                                                 
119  Case NL/2008/0827. 
120  Cases DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576. 
121  See 5.1 supra.  
122 Case ES/2008/0805. 
123  See 5.1 supra. 
 
EN 24   EN the deployment of fibre was taking up in Spai n. The Commission therefore urged the Spanish 
regulator to reconsider imposing remedies for wholesale access products also in excess of 30 
Mb/s. 
The non imposition of specific remedies  was also criticised by the Commission e.g. in the 
Finnish case,124 where the regulator proposed not to impose any price obligation in the WBA 
market. The Commission invited th e regulator to reconsider impos ing such obligation in order 
to avoid competition problems, given that the abse nce of such a remedy could create a risk of 
access regulation being de facto  annihilated by supra  competitive prices. 
6. TERMINATING SEGMENTS OF LEASED LINES (MARKET 6)  
A leased line is a dedicated permanent communi cation link between two lo cations and is used 
for providing telephone, data or internet services . At wholesale level, le ased lines are rented 
from and by telecoms operators either to comp lete their own infrastr ucture or to provide 
leased line services at retail level. At retail level, leased lines are typically rented by large 
businesses to connect branch offices since these lines guarantee bandwidth for network 
traffic. The "terminating segment" of leas ed lines (as opposed to the "trunk segment"125) 
refers to the segment of a leased line which ends  at the site of a final user. Twenty-five NRAs 
have notified the market for terminating segments for leased lines126. All notifying NRAs 
found that the fixed incumbent operator(s) had SMP  on this market, although the British 
NRA found that there was no SM P on the more narrowly defi ned market for very high 
capacity terminating segments of  leased lines, the Austrian re gulator assessed the wholesale 
market for terminating segments of leased  lines for very high bandwidths and found the 
wholesale market for leased line s with high bandwidths in Area 1127 as not susceptible to ex 
ante regulation, whereas the Lithuanian NRA de signated the incumben t operator as having 
SMP only on the market for low capacity leased lines.  
6.1. Issues related to the market definition 
The precise delineation between trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is highly 
dependent on the national network topologies128. Some NRAs segmented wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines according to bandwidth129. Other NRAs instead 
identified significant geographic variations in  competitive conditions and proposed to define 
separate geographic markets accordingly. The British130 and the Austrian131 NRAs identified 
                                                 
124  Case FI/2009/0900. 
125  A market for long distance dedicated ca pacity between two fixed points (see below). 
126  The Romanian and Bulgarian regulators have not no tified their draft measures related to that market. 
127  See case AT/2008/0836. Area 1 covers the following 12 towns: Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, 
Wels, Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Breg enz and Hallein. The rest of Austria is Area 2. 
128  E.g. as a result of the Commission's comment regarding the lack of a clear definition of the boundary 
between the two wholesale leased lines markets (PL/2 006/0516), UKE defined the terminating segments as 
leased lines between the terminal equipment and the cl osest, from the terminal equipment, network node of 
the operator providing the service to which an altern ative operator purchasing the service is connected. 
129  Cases LT/2006/0430, EL/2006/0422, UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787 and NL/2008/0823. 
130  UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787. 
131  AT/2008/0836, AT/2009/0932. 
 
EN 25   EN different competitive conditions with regard to the areas132 where business customers are 
located and alternative operators are roll ing out high bandwidth networks. The Finish133 NRA 
proposed the regional definition of the geographic market, which follows the borders of the traditional operating areas
134 of telecommunications operators that provide fixed local 
telephone services. One NRA135 segmented terminating segments of leased lines according to 
intended use and proposed to deregu late leased lines connecting w ith base stations of mobile 
network operators. As to the  geographical differentiation  of the market for terminating 
segments of leased lines, the Commission in its comment letters provided guidelines for the regulatory authorities. In particular the Comm ission underlined that in  order to determine 
whether the market is characterised by differe nt competitive conditions NRAs have to analyse 
also other structural and beha vioural factors than the numb er of operators capable of 
providing services in a given ar ea. The Commission also made it clear that the notified market 
definition should reflect th e actual market reality. 
Some NRAs
136 included alternative interfaces  in the wholesale leased lines markets because 
they are functionally equivalent to wholesale le ased lines with traditional interfaces. In that 
respect the Commission considered the inclusion of wholesale leased li nes with functionally 
equivalent alternative interfaces (in particular  Ethernet) in the market definition as being 
technologically neutral. The British NRA defi ned however separate markets for traditional 
and alternative interfaces137. 
With regard to NRAs that notify their market  definitions (including the three criteria test) 
separately from their SMP assessment and regulatory remedies, the Commission has reserved its right to re-assess the market definition in the context of all elements of the draft regulatory decision
138, stressing that such an approach harb ours a high potential risk that the SMP 
analysis is based on a market, which is either  wrongly delineated or no longer susceptible to 
ex ante  regulation. 
6.2. Issues related to remedies 
As to the remedies in the market for wholesal e terminating segments of leased lines, in the 
context of the Dutch notification139 where the proposed access obligation was supposed to 
cover part of the market for tr unk segments of leas ed lines, the Commission stressed that the 
scope of the proposed obligations  should be limited to remedying the lack of competition in 
the market at hand only.  
                                                 
132  In the UK Ofcom identified diffe rent competitive conditions in the Ce ntral and East London Area whereas 
RTR defined the so called "Area 1" covering 12 towns: Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Wels, 
Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Bregenz and Hallein. 
133  FI/2009/0986 
134  The traditional operating areas are those where th e relevant operators had, until 31 December 1993, 
unrestricted rights to oper ate local telecommunications. 
135  IT/2009/1000. 
136  e.g. cases EE/2007/0643 and DE/2007/0677. 
137  Ofcom defined the so called traditional interface symmetric broadband origination ("TISBO") and 
alternative interface symmetric broadba nd origination ("AISBO" ), including LLU backhaul services within 
the latter. 
138  Case AT/2008/0836. 
139  Case NL/2008/0823. 
 
EN 26   EN Commenting upon the British notification140, the Commission expressed its view that 
timeframes  for regulatory obligations should not be fi xed for a too long peri od if competitive 
conditions are likely to improve in the short or  mid term. In such a cas e NRAs should be in a 
position to conduct market analysis at any mo ment and remove unnecessary obligations if 
proportionate and justified.  
With regard to price control  obligations, the Commission has in its comment letter 
concerning the Estonian notification141 recommended direct re gulatory intervention by 
imposing concrete prices to be applied rather than self regulation by the incumbent operator, 
who could itself determin e cost oriented prices. 
In the context of the Italian notification in which AGCOM proposed to lift the regulation for 
leased lines leading to mobile operators' ba se stations , the Commission stressed that 
regulatory obligations should be withdrawn only after a transiti on period long enough to 
enable alternative operators to eliminate remaining bottlenecks in their networks.142 
7. VOICE CALL TERMINATION ON INDIVIDUAL MOBILE NETWORKS (MARKET 7)  
7.1. Issues related to market definition 
As for fixed telephony, the absence of effective substitution possibilities and the presence of 
the CPP principle in the EU have led NRAs to consistently find each individual mobile 
network operator as constituting a distinct relevant network market  for terminating calls on 
their own networks. 
A number of NRAs have also identified relevant termination markets for mobile virtual 
network operators  (MVNOs) to the extent that such MVNOs can determine their 
commercial terms and conditions for call termin ation independently of their host network 
operators143. 
The market definition generally includes all calls terminated on the mobile network, 
irrespective of the technology used (i.e . 2G or 3G) and regardless of the origin of the call144. 
Two NRAs also identified separate relevant  markets for wholesale SMS termination on 
individual mobile networks (not listed in the Recommendation on re levant markets) as 
susceptible to ex-ante  regulation145. 
                                                 
140  Case UK/2008/0859. 
141 Case EE/2007/0643. 
142  IT/2009/0999-1000. 
143 Cases ES/2007/0706, NL/2007/0634, DE/2008/0813, DK/2008/0785, FI/2008/0778, PL/2008/0855, 
EE/2009/0883 (three other MVNOs were however not included by the Estonian regulator in the relevant product markets as they are either service providers/resellers or do not have full control over the data of their 
subscribers' SIM-cards).
 
144  E.g. cases EL/2008/0786, EE/2009/0883, FI/2008/0778, DE/2009/0947, PL/2009/0904, ES/2008/0819, 
RO/2009/0878. 
145  Cases FR/2006/0413, GI/2007/0724. 
 
EN 27   EN 7.2. Issues related to remedies 
As in case of fixed call termination, the Co mmission has also underlined the importance of 
effective cost orientation146 and continuously reiterated th e importance of bringing mobile 
termination rates down to the level which reflects the cost of an efficient operator as soon as 
possible147. While the Regulatory Framework does not  exclude a price control mechanism 
based on comparison with other countries, the Commission has noted that any such 
benchmarking should serve to promote efficiency  and sustainable competition and 
maximise consumer benefits. Furthermore, the prices can be considered as appropriate to 
serve as a basis for comparison  only if they have been set based on an appropriate cost 
accounting model and relevant cost accounti ng data to reflect cost orientation148. 
In urging NRAs to specify their cost-orien tation obligation as soon as possible, the 
Commission has frequently invited them to apply a forward-looking LRIC model149 and has 
also noted that a glide path towards an effici ent rate should be establ ished without delay as 
any grace period could remove the incentive to become cost-effective as quickly as possible
150. In terms of costs include d in the relevant cost model, the Commission has 
continued to highlight the importa nce of LRIC models using the current costs of an efficient 
operator employing  efficient technology  and not historical costs, which risk overestimating 
the appropriate costs considerably151. Where, for example, spectrum is included in the cost 
model, the Commission has noted that the valu e of spectrum licences should be calculated at 
current value on a forward-look ing basis and not on the basis of values which approximate 
past levels152.  
Furthermore, the Commission has underlined that as wholesale call termination services are 
traffic-related services , relevant costs considered for wholesale call termination charging 
purposes are typically those costs which vary in response to increas ed levels of wholesale call 
termination traffic, i.e. the additional costs  involved in providing the service in question153. 
For example, there are costs of spectrum usage,  which are not traffic -related and, as such, 
should not be calculated as part of the wholesale call te rmination service154.  
The Commission has also on numerous occasions stat ed that mobile termination rates should 
normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be ade quately justified by objective cost 
differences and limited to a transitory period155. The Commission has further encouraged 
                                                 
146  Cases FI/2006/0403, FI/2008/0778, DE/2009/0947, SK/2009/0902, PL/2008/0794, PL/2008/0855. 
147 Cases LU/2005/0321, FR/2007/0669, IT/2008/0802, BG/2009/0866, CZ/2008/0841, SI/2009/0946, 
ES/2008/0819, CZ/2009/0959, GI/2009/0977. 
148  Cases LU/2005/0321, EE/2009/0883, MT/2009/0926, PL/2009/0904, IE/2008/0746.  
149  Cases LV/2006/0464, BG/2009/0866. 
150 Case IE/2008/0746. 
151  Cases EL/2008/0786, IT/2008/0802, CZ/2008/0841, SK/2009/0902, ES/2008/0819, PL/20096/0991. 
152  Case UK/2006/0498, HU/2008/0829. 
153   Case EL/2008/0786, HU/2008/0829, AT/2009/0910, SE/2009/0941. 
154   Case IT/2008/0802. 
155  Cases DK/2008/0765, DK/2008/0785, FR/2009/0927, IT/2008/0802, LV/2007/0574, PL/2008/0794, 
PL/2008/0855, ES/2009/0937, PT/2007/0707, RO/2009/0878, DK/2009/1013-1014, SK/2009/0902. With 
 
EN 28   EN NRAs to impose effective access obligations on all SMP operators156. In addition, the 
Commission has called for regulators to ensure a symmetric wholesale rate is applied irrespective of the origin of the call, i.e.  fixed-to-mobile and m obile-to-mobile calls
157.  
As for fixed termination, the Commission has co nsistently called on the national regulators to 
work together towards a coherent cost accounting method  for estimating mobile termination 
rates. Moreover, the Commission has in rece nt cases underlined the importance of NRAs 
notifying their actually proposed glide paths as part of the consultation procedure under 
Article 7(3), as price levels, amendments to me thodologies used to calc ulate costs or prices, 
as well as the determination of glide paths are considered to have a material impact on the 
relevant markets158.  
Finally, in recent notifications a number of regulators have already signalled their intention to 
implement the costing approach set out in the Recommendation on the Regulatory 
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates  in their next market reviews159. In its 
notification, the French regulat or, ARCEP, considered that co st orientation towards LRIC, 
where the relevant increment is defined as th e wholesale call terminat ion service provided to 
third parties, provides the effici ent signal for operators in the l ong term and has identified the 
target efficient cost-based mobile termination rate to be eventually reached by all mobile 
operators at between 1 and 2 €cent/min160.  
8. OTHER MARKETS (OUTSIDE THE RECOMMENDATION ON RELEVANT MARKETS )  
In its Recommendation 2007 on relevant mark ets the Commission removed a series of 
markets listed in the Recommendation on releva nt markets 2003. One set of those removed 
markets covers certain retail markets, in par ticular the markets for calls from fixed location 
and the retail market for the minimum set of l eased lines. Those markets have been removed 
from the Recommendation on relevant markets base d on the expected erosion of market entry 
barriers due to efficien t wholesale regulation.  
A further set of markets removed from th e Recommendation covers certain wholesale 
markets, in particular the transit interconnec tion market, the trunk leas ed lines market, the 
market for access and call orig ination on mobile networks and the broadcasting transmission 
market.  Regarding those markets it is duplicat ion of the network and/or the dynamics of 
competition shown within the notification proce dure have led to the conclusion that at 
European level, those markets do not fulfill anymore the three criteria test. 
                                                                                                                                                         
respect to asymmetry allowed for MNVOs , the Commission highlighted (in case DK/2010/1013-1014) that 
NRAs should identify any objective cost differences that would justify such asymmetry or ensure the 
phasing out of asymmetries in MVNOs' termination rates as soon as possible. 
156  Case DE/2009/0947. 
157  Case BG/2009/0966. 
158  Cases DE/2008/0813, DE/2009/0947, PL/2009/0904, EE/2009/0883. 
159  Cases BG/2009/0866, RO/2009/0878, AT/2009/0910. Following its notification of case IT/2008/0802, the 
Italian regulator, AGCOM, also committed to develop and adopt by 2010 a cost model in line with the Commission's recommended approach to termination rates. 
160  Case FR/2008/0812. 
 
EN 29   EN Where NRAs nevertheless propose to regulate one of those markets no longer considered a 
priori  suscepble to ex ante  regulation, there are recommende d to justify maintenance of 
regulation based on the evidence that given the sp ecificities of their national market the three 
criteria test161 is still fulfilled and SMP is found.162  
8.1. Issues related to the retail call markets (former markets 3-6)  
These markets comprise all outgoing telephone cal ls from a fixed location. They have been 
removed from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected erosion of 
market entry barriers due to e fficient wholesale regulation.  
The majority of NRAs163 which have more recently analyzed the three criteria test in those 
markets also came to the conclusion that the markets were not any longer susceptible to ex 
ante regulation. For instance, the fi rst criterion (high and non transi tory market entry barriers) 
was assessed on the basis of the efficiency of wholesale regulation in pl ace, in particular CPS 
and CS and WLR, which have s ubstantially reduced market entr y barriers. Furthermore, the 
progression of new technologies (e.g. VoIP) has been at the basis of findings of competition 
dynamics (the second criterion of the 3-criteria test). Acco rdingly, since 2007, in those 
countries regulation of the retail calls market s has been withdrawn. However, in some 
Member States regulation was maintained base d on a recent finding of the fulfillment of the 
three criteria test and finding of SMP164. In all cases where an NRA concluded on the 
necessity of maintaining regulation the Com mission stressed the need to strengthen the 
efficiency of wholesale regul ation, to monitor market developments and assess whether 
wholesale remedies alone will be sufficient to  achieve the objectives of the framework.  
Overall, experience with market reviews carri ed out by the NRAs during the reporting period 
largely confirm the Commission's assessment that at EU level this market no longer warrants 
ex ante  regulation. Also, the conclusions and r ecommendations made by the Commission in 
its 2nd report on the need to strengthen the e fficiency of wholesale regulation enabling the 
removal of regulation at retail level remain fully valid165.  
                                                 
161  1) there are high and non-transitory barriers to ma rket entry, which may be of a structural, legal or 
regulatory nature; 2) the market structure does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant 
time horizon; and 3) competition law alone is not sufficient to adequately address the identified market 
failure(s). 
162  Article 15(3) of the Framework Directive.  
163  Cases CZ/2008/0796, CZ/2008/0840 and CZ/2008/0857; DE/2007/0628,  DE/2007/0709, DE/2008/0846, 
DE/2007/0847 and DE/2009/0895; IE/2007/0697-0700; ES/2008/0817; MT/2009/0884; NL/2008/0821; 
AT/2009/0881 regarding the residential calls markets only;  SI/2009/0893; UK/2009/0899 with the exception of the Hull area; RO/2009/1004. 
164  Cases BE/2008/0798 and 0799 – market shares in the national residential calls market have been declining 
but still stay above 65%; for national business calls th ey have been increasing to above 75%; BG/2009/0912 
 market shares stayed above 78% fo r the international calls market for non-residential customers and above 
95% for the other calls markets; LT/2008/0763 and 0764  market shares in the national calls markets have 
been increasing to above 99% for business and above 93% for the residential calls market; AT/2009/0880  for the business national and international calls markets TKK considered the three criteria test to be fulfilled 
and the SMP analysis will be carried out subsequently. 
165 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework – 
Consolidating the internal market  for electronic communications, COM (2007) 401 final of 11.7.2007. 
 
EN 30   EN 8.2. Issues related to the market for the minimum set of leased lines (former market 7)  
The market for the retail minimum set of leased lines has been removed from the 
Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected removal of market entry barriers 
due to the efficiency of wholes ale regulation. The three criteria  test carried out by the NRAs 
during the reporting period largely confirmed this assessment.  
Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC166 provides for the minimum set of 
leased lines to be offered in accordance with A nnex VII of this Directiv e. The minimum set of 
leased lines was defined in the Commission D ecision 2003/548/EC167, while Decision 
2008/60/EC168 has set a null-set, i.e. NRAs are no l onger under an obligation to ensure that a 
defined set of leased lines is pr ovided at retail level. While previously the retail leased lines 
market was regulated in all Member States, th e majority of telecom regulators having more 
recently analyzed this market confirmed that the market was not susceptible to ex ante  
regulation169.  Those conclusions were based on th e technical evolutio n towards higher 
bandwidth, together with the efficiency of w holesale regulation for the competitiveness retail 
level, thus largely confirming the conclusions made  by the Commission in its 2007 
Communication on market revi ews. However, two NRAs170 concluded on the fulfillment of 
the three criteria test. The Commission questione d this finding stressing the need to carry out 
a prospective market analysis and to rely on wholesale regulation.  While accepting the 
conclusions of the British NRA based on the ev idence of national specific circumstances, the 
Commission recalled that NRAs should append detailed reasoning to their (new) analysis 
outlining why, in the particular circumst ances, the three criteria are satisfied. 
8.3. Issues related to the market for fixed transit services (former market 10)  
The market for transit services refers to the c onveyance of calls at a hi gher network level and 
may be defined as pure transit between nodes (unbundled transit) or as being  complemented 
by the call origination and call termination serv ices (bundled transit). The market has been 
removed from the Recommendation on relevant  market based on the observation of 
replication of networks at a hi gher network level which indicates  that market entry barriers 
cannot be regarded any longer as high and non transitory.  
While a substantial number of NRAs171 had already concluded on the competitiveness 
(absence of SMP) of the transit market at a time when this market was still listed in the 
                                                 
166 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users's rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108, 24,2,2002, p. 51. 
167  Commission Decision of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with harmonised characteristics 
and associated standards referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Service Direc tive, OJ L 186, 25.7.2003, 
p.43. 
168 Commission Decision of 21 Decembe r 2007 amending Decision 2003/548/ EC as regards the deletion of 
specific types of leased line from the Minimum Se t of Leased Lines, OJ, L 15, 18.1.2008, p. 32. 
169 Cases CZ/2009/0872,; DE/2009/1009 (removal of remedies not yet notified); EE/2007/0642, 
EL/2008/0751,IT/2009/0998 NL/2009/0824 SI/208/0768 and SK/2009/1008. 
170 Cases AT/2008/0836, UK/2008/0749 and UK/2009/0938 proposing partial withdrawal of regulation.  
171 In addition to the 8 NRAs referred to in the last report see cases DK/2007/0693, EE/2007/0670, 
AT/2007/0590; one NRA (Luxembourg ILR) concluded already during the last period of reporting that the 
three criteria test was not fulf illed, see case LU/2006/0542 . 
 
EN 31   EN Recommendation on relevant markets, the majo rity of NRAs having an alyzed this market 
under the new Recommendation withdrew regulat ion based on a finding of absence of the 
fulfillment of the three criteria test172 supported by the commercial availability of transit 
services and decreasing market shares, together  with self-supply and th e replication of the 
network at transit level, while one NRA173 based the withdrawal of  regulation on the absence 
of SMP. In one case the Commission opposed the three criteria test, together with the SMP-
finding, of an NRA174. The Commission in particular stress ed that the scale of market entry 
and the roll out of parallel infrastructures i ndicated the absence of high and non-transitory 
market entry barriers and thus the absence of the fulfilment of the first criterion of the three 
criteria test. In additi on, on the basis of decr easing market shares below 40% and no further 
evidence the conclusion that the second cr iterion is met would not  be justifiable. 
Subsequently, the NRA withdrew regulation.  
Thus, the experience over th e reporting period with the analysis of the three criteria test at the 
national level largely confirms the Commissi on's statement made in its 2007 Communication 
on market reviews. Indeed, duplic ation of the backbone infrastruc ture in the transit segment 
has continued and the developments have shown that this market does not anymore warrant ex 
ante regulation.   
8.4. Issues related to the trunk leased  lines market (former market 14) 
The market for the provision of wholesale tr unk leased lines has been removed from the 
Recommendation on relevant markets based on th e observed and expected replication of the 
network. However, given that – depending also on the network level at which NRA delineate 
the trunk part from the terminating segment – not all trunk routes may be duplicated, the 
fulfillment of the three criteria test may also be  subject to the fact whether the replication of 
the network is expected to occur to a sufficien t extent to allow operators to compete on the 
relevant market.  
Since the last report two NRAs concluded on th e absence of the fulfillment of the three 
criteria test and two furthe r NRAs withdrew regulation ba sed on a finding of absence of 
SMP175. Among those NRAs which have regarded the three criteria test to be fulfilled, one 
NRA176 concluded on SMP still under the fo rmer Recommendation while two NRAs 
concluded on SMP in parts of the market under the new Recommendation177. The 
Commission commented on the need to carry out the three criteria test, to monitor market dynamics and to provide more evidence for mark et definition and for concluding on the need 
                                                
 
172 See cases DE/2009/0887-888; EE/2009/0962 SE/2009/0968 and UK/2009/0898; see however cases 
IE/2009/0921 and RO/2009/1005. 
173 See Case NL/2008/0800. 
174 See case PL/2008/0766, PL/2008/0788 (absence of SMP without withdrawal of regulation); PL/2008/0831 
(proposal to withdraw regulation). 
175  See cases IE/2008/0791 and IT/2009/999 (absence of th ree criteria test); regarding the findings of absence 
of SMP see DE/2007/0678 and DK/2007/0725 (subsequent to a withdrawal containing an SMP finding in 
case DK/2007/586). 
176  EE/2007/0644. 
177 UK/2009/0901. PL/2008/0882 (second phase), PL/2008 /0856 (splitting the trunk market into routes, the 
draft measures related to the SMP finding regardin g competitive routes was withdrawn); and PL/2009/971. 
 
EN 32   EN of ex ante  regulation. The Commission in particular stressed that (1) in  the absence of a 
detailed analysis as to what extent the ar eas with duplication/multip lication of the trunk 
infrastructure and those which are only connected to the incumbent's network can be regarded to form a substantial part of the relevant market, it is not possible to assess the degree to which the market is constrained with high market  entry barriers; and (2) in the absence of an 
analysis of price trends and pricing behaviour of different operators, which give valuable 
information on whether the market tends toward s effective competition, it is not possible to 
conclude that the sec ond criterion is met. 
Thus, the analysis of the three criteria test at  national level largely c onfirms the Commission's 
statement made in its 2007 Co mmunication on market reviews.  Indeed, duplication of the 
backbone infrastructure at trunk level progressed and allowed a series of further NRAs to 
withdraw regulation. The developments have shown that this market does not anymore 
warrant ex ante  regulation.  Furthermore, it should be not ed that the assessment as to whether 
the replication of the network is expected to occur to a sufficient extent to allow operators to 
compete on the relevant market in particular requ ires NRAs to analyse the impact of a partial 
duplication of the network on th e whole trunk market – which ma y also include also the non-
duplicated trunk lines. A more in depth analysis  of this impact may have led to further 
withdrawals of regulation than re gistered over the reporting period.  
8.5. Issues related to the market for access and call origination on public mobile 
telephone networks (former market 15)  
The market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks has been 
deleted from the Recommendation on relevant  markets based on an observed finding of 
absence of SMP in the large majority of Me mber States, the emergence of a competitive 
wholesale market in a substantia l number of countries and the st atus of retail competition.  
The large majority of NRAs which had already found the market for access and call 
origination to be competitive has not undertaken  a new market analysis , in line with the 
withdrawal of this market  from the Recommendation
178. One NRA proposed in its draft 
measures regulation based on a deviation fr om the Recommendation by defining separate 
markets for the access and the ca lls markets, this latter including calls to reach value added 
services by dialing premium rate numbers , however, the notification was withdrawn and 
subsequently the NRA adjusted its market de finition and concluded on the absence of SMP179. 
The two NRAs having concluded previously on single dominance re-confirmed their findings 
in a second round notification and imposed a set of remedies including access and price 
control180. With regard to the proposed measures by the Slovenian NRA181 the Commission 
stressed the need to provide evidence regarding the fulfillment of the three criteria test, in 
addition to and separately from the evidence provided as part of the SMP analysis, and also 
called on the Slovenian NRA to monitor market  developments with a view to promote 
                                                 
178 With the exception of the Danish NRA, NITA, which previously had concluded on absence of SMP but did 
not withdraw remedies, and subsequently again concluded on absence of SMP, see case DK/2008/0863. 
179 See cases IT/2007/0575, IT/2008/0861. 
180 See cases CY/2009/0877 and SI/200 9/0913 (after a proposal of join t dominance by the Slovenian NRA, 
APEK, in case SI/2008/0806 which was however withdrawn).  
181 See case SI/2009/0913. 
 
EN 33   EN effective infrastructure competition and investme nt, especially when imposing price control, 
and on the requirement to notify decisions on access prices. 
On the background that the large majority of NR As did not identify a need to carry out a new 
market analysis following withdrawal of remedi es and given that keepin g regulation in place 
in two countries could be rega rded as justified onl y on the basis of very  specific national 
circumstances, the developments over th e reporting period support the Commission's 
conclusions in its 2007 Recommenda tion on relevant markets to withdraw this market from 
the list of markets susceptible to ex ante  regulation.  
While in its previous communication on mark et reviews the Commission focused on the 
emergence, the potential and the existence of  MVNO agreements as an important parameter 
to assess the development of competition182, over the current reporting period the 
Commission also stressed the relevance of (indir ect) pricing constraints at the wholesale level 
resulting from the competition at retail level in order to assess th e second criterion of the three 
criteria test, i.e. the dyn amics of competition.    
8.6. Broadcasting transmission se rvices for the provision of content to end users 
(former market 18) 
The market for broadcasting transmission serv ices was withdrawn from the Recommendation 
on relevant markets on the basis of, inter alia , the emergence of new digital transmission 
technologies reducing capacity c onstraints and the emergence of  new transmission platform 
creating dynamics of competition which would erode the fulfillment of the second criterion of the three criteria test. Also, the last report on Article 7 pointed to  increased platform 
competition due to the emergence of further dist ribution platforms, in particular terrestrial 
digital television and internet television.  
A number of NRAs
183 concluded on the absence of the fulf illment of the 3 criteria test and 
withdrew regulation. However, the previous a pproach of the NRA which could predominantly 
be observed and which was based on a splitting of the market according to different platforms 
and the finding of SMP in one of the markets identified, i.e. the terrestrial transmission market
184, could also be observed during the pres ent reporting period, while some NRAs 
extended regulation also to digita l terrestrial transmission services185 and/or proposed also in 
the second round notification to re gulate the cable access market.186 In its comments letters, 
the Commission reiterated the need to monitor the competitiveness of the market in order to 
assess whether broadcasting transmission servi ces provided over different platforms are 
developing to the extent that they become viable substitutes, so that the terrestrial platform would not constitute a market on its own, and therefore enable competitive pressure on the 
                                                
 
182  I.e., the decisive parameters of the assessment of th e status of competition are based on incentives to grant 
MVNO network access, such as excess network capacity. 
183  See cases DK/2007/0618, EL/2007/0684, LV/2007/0694, MT/2008/0810 (following withdrawal in case 
MT/200/0564) NL/2008/0849, 2009/0873, NL/2009/1007, NL/2009/105 and SE/2009/0975 (in this case, however, for free to air digital TV the three criteria was still found to be met.  
184  See cases CZ/2009/0907, EE/2007/0666, LT/2009/1022  (excluding digital terrestrial transmission) 
ES/2009/0905, HU/2007/0734, AT/2009/0896, RO/2009/0876. 
185  See cases FI/2009/0789, FR/2009/0914, SI/2007/0730, PT/2007/0655. 
186  See case NL/2008/0873. 
 
EN 34   EN retail market absent regulation so that the first a nd/or second criteria of the three criteria test 
are no longer met.  
On the background that a number of NRAs concl uded on the absence of the fulfillment of the 
three criteria test it may be concluded that the Commission's prognosis as to the development 
of competition dynamics as a result of the em ergence of new platforms has been confirmed. 
Accordingly, the experience with the measures notified further support that the withdrawal of 
the market from the list of markets susceptible to ex ante  regulation is still justified.   
However, due to a large number of diverging te chnical, economic and re gulatory obstacles to 
the development of direct competition between the different transmission platforms, both at 
retail and wholesale level, competition in the market for broadcasting transmission services, 
to deliver content to end-users has not yet developed to its full potential and therefore, NRAs 
may still conclude on the fulfillment of the three criteria test in certain parts of the market. Where NRAs intend to continue to regulate ce rtain parts of the broa dcasting transmission 
services, it is recommended that  in particular the assessment of the second criterion of the 
three criteria test should include an analysis  of the status of co mpetition on the entire 
broadcasting transmission market at retail leve l, together with the interrelationship of the 
markets, where applicable, and also provide evidence on the absence of relevant indirect 
pricing constraints at wholesale level – taking into account of all those constraints derived 
from any of the transmission platforms - as one  of the preconditions to  demonstrate the three 
criteria test is fulfilled. 
 
EN 35   EN ANNEX  4: TABLE OVERVIEW PER MARKET187 
Market 1: Retail access to the public tele phone network at a fixed location for r esidential and non-residential customers 
         
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators Carrier 
(Pre-) 
selec-
tion Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT188 
 AT/2004/0109 
AT/2004/0110 
AT/2007/0579 
AT/2007/0580  
AT/2008/0832NO** 
VoB is incl. 1 YES 
+WLR YES NO Cost-orientation and ex ante 
tariff authorisation YES Inclusion in the access markets of 
broadband access lines over which VoB 
services are provided; Efficiency of 
wholesale regulation 
BE BE/2006/0400 
BE/2006/0401 
BE/2007/0640 
BE/2007/0657
BE/2008/0750NO** 1 YES 
+WLR YES YES Cost-orientati on for CS/CPS 
(top-down model) + approval of 
tariffs submitted by the 
incumbent and  
retail minus for WLR YES Application of the margin squeeze test to 
markets non-regulated at the retail level; 
Application of a Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) methodology 
(BE/2007/0640) 
                                                 
187  Overview of notifications asse ssed between October 2005 and Decem ber 2009. Details concerning notif ications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, th e European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Re gions on Market Reviews under 
the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications", (COM(2006) 28 final of 6.2.2006  and COM(2007)401 final of 
11.7.2007. 
188  In case AT/2008/0832 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any 
notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon th e effective delineation of the rele vant market concerned at the time of that notification. 
 
EN 36   EN  
YES 
(wholesale level)YES 
(wholesale 
level) Cost-orientati on for CS/CPS 
and retail minus for WLR 
(wholesale level)  YES 
(imposed at 
M2 & M3)  
BG BG/2009/0911NO 
Homezone 
and wireless 
broadband 
incl.; Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 1 YES 
+WLR 
YES 
(retail level) YES 
(retail 
level) Cost-orientation; price cap; 
and requirement to provide 
information on price changes 
of the access price one month 
in advance 
(retail level) NO Inclusion of wireless broadband access 
services in the market  for retail access;  
Retail remedies versus wholesale remedie s
CY CY/2006/0485 
CY/2006/0486NO** 
Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 1 YES 
+WLR YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (FDC costing methodology) 
and retail minus for WLR YES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0356 
CZ/2006/0357 
CZ/2008/0755YES 1 YES NO NO NO YES Efficiency of the proposed remedies in 
resolving identified market failures 
(CZ/2006/0356) 
Insufficient justification for withdrawal of 
the price regulation. 
(CZ/2008/0755) 
DK DK/2005/0183 
DK/2005/0184YES 1 YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
EE EE/2007/0637 
EE/2007/0638YES 1 YES NO NO Cost orientation for CS/CPS NO Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in 
resolving the identified market failure in 
the fixed access market;  
 
EN 37   EN Details of cost-orientation of CS/CPS 
FI FI/2003/0020 
FI/2003/0021 YES 
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 43 YES NO YES NO NO Remedies at retail level 
FR FR/2005/0221 
FR/2005/0222  
FR/2007/0648  
FR/2008/0782NO 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 1 YES 
+WLR NO NO NO NO No comments 
DE DE/2005/0306
DE/2005/0307
DE/2006/0402  
DE/2009/0897
DE/2009/1006NO** 
Complete 
connections 
(~naked DSL) 
incl. 1 YES NO NO Ex-post price control NO Inclusion of complete connections in the 
market for retail access; 
Notification of remedies at a later stage 
 (DE/2009/0897) 
Need to impose an appropriate price 
 
EN 38   EN  
YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Retail minus for WLR 
(FDC /CCA) 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) 
EL EL/2006/0500 
EL/2006/0501 
EL/2006/0555 
EL/2008/0751NO** 
Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 1 NO 
But WLRYES 
(retail level 
for low and high
capacity lines)YES 
(retail level 
diff. for low 
and high 
capacity 
lines) Price cap and a sub-cap 
for new connections 
(Consumer Price Index) 
 (retail level) YES 
(retail level fo r 
low capacity 
lines) No comments 
HU HU/2005/0130 
HU/2005/0131  
HU/2007/0662 
HU/2007/0663YES  
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 5 
 YES YES NO Prohibition of unjustifiably high 
fees by imposing an annual 
ceiling of price increase 
equivalent to the consumer 
price index NO Product market definition (exclusion of 
home-zone products); 
Imposition of wholesale line rental remedy
IE IE/2005/0158 
IE/2005/0159 
IE/2007/0632 
IE/2008/0852 
IE/2009/0928 NO** 
Submarkets 
for 
lower/higher 
level 1 YES 
+WLR YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Retail minus for Single Billing-
WLR 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Further consultation planned by ComReg 
(IE/2007/0632) 
 
EN 39   EN  
YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Cost accounting 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) 
IT IT/2005/0260 
IT/2005/0261 
IT/2007/0611 
IT/2007/0612 
IT/2008/0842  
IT/2009/0890 
IT/2009/0987 NO* 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers; 
VoIP 
connections 
incl.  
 1 NO 
But 
WLR189NO 
(retail level) YES 
(retail 
level) Cost accounting 
 (retail level) NO 
(retail level)Inclusion of broadband access enabling 
VoIP services in the market for retail 
access; 
Lack of notification of the remedies 
(IT/2009/0890) 
Modification of the undertakings; 
Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia; 
The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia; 
Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation(IT/2009/0987) 
LV LV/2007/0565 
LV/2007/0566
LV/2009/0994NO 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 1 YES NO NO Cost-orientation and cost 
accounting NO Implementation of existing remedies and 
non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy; 
Lack of details concerning price control 
obligation and non-imposition of 
accounting separation 
LT LT/2006/0411 
LT/2006/0412 
LT/2006/0512 LT/2006/0513YES 1 YES 
+WLR YES YES Cost-orientation 
(FDC methodology based on 
historical cost accounting) YES The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cabl e
and local area networks in the same 
market as fixed residential analogue and 
cable access lines 
(LT/2006/0411 and LT/2006/0412) 
                                                 
189  The NRA imposed on the SMP operator also the obligation not to unreasonably bundle retail offers and WLR. 
 
EN 40   EN  
YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Cost-orientati on for CS/CPS 
and retail minus for WLR 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) 
LU LU/2006/0526 
LU/2006/0527NO** 1 YES 
+WLR YES 
(retail level) YES 
(retail 
level) To charge reasonable prices 
(retail level) NO Price control obligation 
YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Cost-orientati on for CS/CPS 
and specified price control for 
WLR to be defined at a later 
stage 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) 
MT190 MT/2006/0394 
MT/2006/0395NO** 1 YES 
+WLR 
YES 
(retail level) YES 
(retail 
level) YES 
(retail level) YES 
(retail level)The inclusion of BWA in the same market 
as fixed residential analogue and 
cable access lines 
NL NL/2005/0287 
NL/2005/0288  
NL/2008/0821NO** 
voice calls 
services are 
incl.; 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 1 NO NO NO NO NO Product market definition – inclusion of 
access and calls in the same market; 
Phasing out retail regulation of business 
market 
                                                 
190  Notification MT/2009/0980 has been withdrawn by the authority. 
 
EN 41   EN  
PL PL/2006/0518 
PL/2006/0524  
PL/2007/0593 PL/2007/0647YES 1 
YES YES YES Prohibition of excessive pricing;
Obligation to refrain from 
limiting competition by fixing 
prices below the costs of their 
provision; 
Cost orientation and cost 
accounting obligation on the 
basis of FL – FDC 
methodology;  
Obligation to submit for 
approval prices of service 
provision NO Regulatory obligations to be limited to 
correspond to the scope of market 
definition  
(PL/2007/0593) 
PT PT/2004/0053 
PT/2004/0054 
PT/2004/0091YES 1 YES 
+WLR YES YES Cost-orientation  YES Wholesale line rental 
(PT/2004/0091) 
RO RO/2009/1001191NO** 
Home zone 
products and 
managed VoI P
connections 
incl. 1 YES NO NO NO NO Inclusion of managed VoIP products in the 
access market definition; 
Non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy 
NO (non-residential market) 
SK SK/2005/0172 
SK/2005/0173  
SK/2007/0676 
SK/2007/0696YES 1 YES YES NO YES (residential market) 
prohibition of charging 
excessive prices NO  Market definition; 
Effectiveness of the proposed remedies 
(SK/2007/0676 and SK/2007/0696) 
                                                 
191  The NRA also imposed on the SMP operator the prohib ition of unreasonably bundling access with other services. 
 
EN 42   EN  
YES 
(wholesale 
level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) Retail minus 10% for WLR 
(wholesale level) YES 
(wholesale 
level) 
SI SI/2005/0231 
SI/2005/0232 
SI/2007/0600 
SI/2007/0601 YES 1 YES 
+WLR YES 
(retail level) NO 
(retail 
level) Prohibition to charge excessive 
prices  (price cap for 
subscription fees);   
Cost-orientation (for other end-
user prices (FAC - CCA); 
 Prohibition to set predatory 
pricing 
(retail level) NO 
(retail level)No comments 
ES ES/2005/0336
ES/2006/0337  
ES/2007/0620
ES/2007/0621  
ES/2008/0815NO** 
Homezone 
incl. 1 YES YES YES Price cap related to (recurrent) 
subscription fees on the basis 
of an RPI-X factor YES Standardized and customized offers; 
Withdrawal of price regulation 
SE SE/2004/0112 
SE/2004/0113
SE/2009/0965NO** 
IP-based 
telephony incl.1 YES 
+WLR YES YES Retail minus for WLR and cost 
accounting (LRIC) YES Inclusion of IP-based telephony with 
numbers in the mark et for retail access 
 
EN 43   EN  
NO YES 
(In the Hull 
area) YES 
(In the Hull
area) NO NO 
UK UK/2003/0009 
UK/2003/0010 
UK/2004/0045 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0854
UK/2009/0899NO** 
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network; 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers; 
Submarkets 
for analogue 
and ISDN 2  
(in ISDN 
markets) NO - in the UK excluding the Hull area 
With regard to ISDN 2 and ISDN 30 markets: sole reliance on wholesale remediesNo comments 
GI GI/2007/0710   
GI/2007/0711 YES 1 YES YES YES Price cap - to be specified at the
later stage 
(most likely RPI-x) YES Lack of details concerning price control 
obligations.  
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operator s 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or me rger of markets or geographic differentiation 
 
EN 44   EN  
Market 2: Wholesale call orig ination on the public telephone network at a fixed location 
         
Remedies imposed Comments / no comment 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators 
Access Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation  
AT192 AT/2004/0105 
AT/2006/0543 
AT/2008/0833YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRAIC-model) YES Implementation of the proposed cost-
orientation obligatio n; Reduction of 
minimum interconnection loads 
BE BE/2006/0439  
BE/2007/0657
BE/2008/0750YES 1 YES YES YES Not specified YES No comments 
BG BG/2009/0864 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation (Fully Allocated
Costing methodology)  
The future accounting 
methodology will be LRIC 
bottom up.  YES No comments 
CY CY/2006/0473 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation  (LRIC-model) YES No comments 
                                                 
192  In case AT/2008/0833 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any 
notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon th e effective delineation of the rele vant market concerned at the time of that notification. 
 
EN 45   EN  
CZ CZ/2006/0351 
CZ/2009/0808
CZ/2009/0963YES 1 YES YES YES Price cap 
(LRIC model) YES No comments 
DK DK/2005/0141 
DK/2006/0536NO** 
Wholesale 
access incl. 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRAIC model); 
Minor services may be priced 
according to modified historic 
cost YES Market for wholesale access connections 
(DK/2005/0141) 
EE EE/2007/0597 YES 1 YES YES YES Fully distributed costs based on 
historical costs (HC FDC) NO No comments 
FI FI/2003/0028 
FI/2007/0703 YES 
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 34 YES YES YES NO NO No comments 
FR FR/2005/0227
FR/2007/0650
FR/2008/0783YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation YES No comments 
 
EN 46   EN  
Notification of remedies at a later stage 
(DE/2008/0843) DE 
 DE/2005/0143 
DE/2005/0254  
DE/2008/0843 
DE/2008/0887YES 
2 product 
submarkets  1 YES YES YES Not specified price control 
(ex ante tariff authorization 
procedure) NO 
Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of re medies under the EU 
consultation procedure (DE/2009/0887) 
EL EL/2006/0493
EL/2008/0751YES 1 YES 
+C(P)SYES YES Cost-orientation 
(LRAIC/CC) YES No comments 
HU HU/2005/0151
HU/2007/0726YES 
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 4 YES NO YES Cost-orientation  
(LRIC model) YES No comments 
IE IE/2005/0190 
IE/2007/0672 
IE/2009/0916 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRIC model) YES Failure to adopt previously notified 
measures 
IT IT/2006/0383 YES 1 YES 
+C(P)SYES YES Network cap mechanism YES No comments 
 
EN 47   EN LV193 LV/2006/0365
LV/2009/0960YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation and cost 
accounting 
(Activity based allocation of 
current costs, FDC) YES Implementation of existing remedies and 
non-imposition of a wholesale line rental 
remedy 
LT LT/2006/0364 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
(During a transitional period: 
 top-down fully distributed costs 
(FDC); 
as of 2007: FL-LRAIC model) YES No comments 
LU LU/2006/0541 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (fully allocated historic costs) YES No comments 
MT MT/2006/0387
MT/2009/0979YES 1 YES 
+C(P)S
+ WLR YES YES Cost orientation for call 
origination and C(P)S, 
Retail minus for WLR   YES Need to monitor the effectiveness of the 
wholesale inputs 
NL NL/2005/0286
NL/2006/0511
NL/2008/0770
NL/2008/0793
NL/2008/0822NL/2009/0992NO 
wholesale 
access incl.; 
Separate 
markets for 
res. and non-
res. 
customers 1 YES 
+C(P)S
+ WLR YES YES Cost-orientation for call 
origination and CS/CPS and 
retail minus for WLR NO Inclusion of wholesale access services in 
the market for call origination; Subdivision 
of the wholesale market for fixed 
telephony into residential and business; 
The three criteria test 
(NL/2008/0822) 
                                                 
193 Notification LV/2009/0925 was withdrawn by the authority . 
 
EN 48   EN PL PL/2006/0380 YES 1 YES 
+ WLR YES YES Cost-orientation (LRIC)  
after the calculations have been 
approved by an independent 
auditor; 
 Until then: to set appropriate 
charges based on costs 
incurred, which may be verified 
by the NRA using 
benchmarking or other methodsYES Price control before approval of LRIC cost 
calculation; Wholesale Line Rental 
PT PT/2004/0060 
PT/2004/0092YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation YES No comments 
RO RO/2009/1002 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation  
(hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC) YES Inclusion of conveyance services in the 
definition of the call origination network 
segment 
SK SK/2004/0103  
SK/2007/0740
SK/2008/0792YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation on the basis of 
a FL-LRAIC bottom up model YES  Lack of effective implementation of 
CS/CPS services; 
Non-imposition of wholesale line rental 
(WLR) remedy; 
Timely enforcement of price control 
obligation 
(SK/2007/0740) 
SI SI/2005/0257 
SI/2007/0689 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRIC methodology) YES No comments 
ES ES/2006/0355
ES/2007/0589ES/2008/0816YES 1 
YES 
+WLR YES YES Cost-orientation YES No comments 
 
EN 49   EN SE SE/2004/0049
SE/2009/0966
SE/2009/1016YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
(hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC in 
general, HC FDC for network 
capacity pricing) YES Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of re medies under the EU 
consultation procedure 
(SE/2009/1016) 
UK UK/2003/0011 
UK/2003/0012
UK/2004/0045
UK/2004/0064 
UK/2004/0071 
UK/2004/0088 
UK/2004/0089 
UK/2004/0122 
UK/2005/0165 
UK/2005/0166 
UK/2005/0170 
UK/2005/0180 
UK/2005/0300 
UK/2007/0585 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0769 
UK/2008/0775
UK/2008/0854
UK/2009/0898UK/2009/0972NO** 
Geo. 
submarkets 
corresponding 
to the 
respective 
operating 
areas of the 
incumbents' 
local network 2 YES 
+WLR 
+C(P)SYES YES Charges of BT and KCOM must 
be set on the basis of LRIC plus 
an appropriate mark-up for 
costs which are common across 
products, and for recovery the 
cost of capital; charge control 
based on the RPI-/+X method YES Appropriateness of the proposed costing 
methodology and need for a coherent 
European approach 
GI GI/2007/0716 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation YES Lack of details concerning price control and 
cost accounting obligations 
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or me rger of markets or geographic differentiation 
 
EN 50   EN  
Market 3: Call termination on i ndividual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 
         
Remedies imposed Comments / no comment 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators
Access Non-
discrimi
nation Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation  
AT AT/2004/0106
AT/2004/0432 
AT/2006/0544 
AT/2008/0834
194 
AT/2009/0909YES 12 YES fo r
Telekom 
Austria (TA) YES fo r
TA YES for TA
 Cost-orientation  for Telekom 
Austria (TA) based on hybrid 
model, averaging of TD and 
BU LRAIC models. 
Benchmarking for ANOs to 
TA’s regional termination fees. 
YES for TA 
 
 
 
 Implementation of proposed cost-
orientation obligation should be specified 
and take into account need for ANOs to 
become efficient over time. 
TKK invited to address issue of minimum 
interconnection loads. 
(AT/2006/0544) 
Calculation of the rates on the basis of a 
"hybrid" LRAIC model. Commission's 
recommended approach. 
(AT/2009/0909) 
                                                 
194  In case AT/2008/0834 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any 
notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon th e effective delineation of the rele vant market concerned at the time of that notifi cation.  
 
EN 51   EN  
BE BE/2006/0440 
BE/2007/0588  
BE/2008/0750YES 20 YES YES YES Cost orientation for Belgacom 
based on TD approach 
possibly reconciled with BU 
approach. 
Prohibition of excessive pricing 
for ANOs and benchmarking 
against incumbent (max. mark-
up of 15%). YES for 
Belgacom 
 
 No comments 
BG BG/2009/0865 YES 16 YES YES YES Cost-orientation for BTC 
based on benchmarking 
referring to 7 EU Member 
States that apply TD LRIC 
accounting systems. 
Methodology eventually in 
line with Recommendation. 
 
ANOs prices shall not 
exceed those of BTC. 
  
 
YES for BTC
 
 Further consultations planned by CRC. 
Need to set termination rates at cost of an 
efficient operator and need for a coherent 
European approach.  
Implementation of sy mmetry for fixed-to-
fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls  
 
 
EN 52   EN  
CY CY/2006/0474 YES 3195 YES for ATHK
 YES 
 YES 
 Cost-orientation for ATHK 
(LRIC-model) 
Fair and reasonable prices for 
ANOs equal to the 
corresponding cost-oriented 
double transit  rate of ATHK 
increased by 10% and a 3-year 
time delay. YES (subject 
to a 
€50 million 
turnover 
threshold) Remedies imposed on D.Y. Worldnet, 
Callsat and Telepassport  
(only notify when they enter the market 
and not to adopt the proposed measures 
at this stage). 
CZ CZ/2006/0358 
CZ/2007/0660 
CZ/2009/0809
CZ/2009/0964 YES 24 YES for TO2 YES YES Maximum prices based on 
BU-LRIC model 
(NGN to be taken into 
account in the following 
round) YES for TO2Need to impose the access and cost-
orientation obligations also on ANOs 
DK DK/2005/0207  
DK/2005/0314 
DK/2006/0523 
DK/2007/0683
DK/2009/0984NO 
(includes dial-
up internet 
access) 6 YES  
YES for 
TDC  
YES for TDC 
Cost-orientation for TDC 
 (LRAIC model) 
  
YES for TDCAsymmetric application of remedies.  
(DK/2005/0207) 
Need to review the market; 
Inclusion of calls to service-providers in the 
fixed call termination market 
(DK/2009/0984) 
                                                 
195 At the time of notification, OCECPR expected that three other operators, D.Y. Worldwide, Callsat and Telepassport, which did no t have direct connections to end-users 
at the time, would start providing wholesale call termination during the timeframe of its review and would de facto have SMP on  their individual network markets.  
 
EN 53   EN EE EE/2007/0598 YES 12 YES for Elion YES YES Cost orientation  
(FDC based on HCA) NO Non-imposition of an access obligation on 
the market for call termination on ANOs' 
networks 
Asymmetry of termination rates 
FI FI/2003/0029  
FI/2007/0704 YES 35 YES YES YES Cost orientation. 
According to the Finnish 
Communications Market Act it 
is up to each operator to select 
their cost-accounting model 
and to submit a description of 
the procedures to FICORA 
showing main cost categories 
and cost allocation rules. YES (subject 
to a net sales 
threshold of 
€20 million).Cost-orientation and cost accounting 
obligations in the fixed termination 
markets. 
Need for a coherent European approach  
FR FR/2005/0228  
FR/2008/0784YES 21 YES YES YES Cost-orientation for France 
Telecom (FT) based on LRAIC
 
Prohibition of excessive pricing 
for ANOs YES for FT Need for a coherent European approach 
(differentiated glide-paths for France 
Telecom and ANOs) 
 
 
EN 54   EN  
DE 
 DE/2005/0144
DE/2005/0234
DE/2005/0239
DE/2006/0343
DE/2007/0671
DE/2007/0679DE/2008/0844DE/2009/0888 
DE2009/0948 
YES 
 57 (2 
merged 
since 
original 
notification 
of 58 
operators)YES for 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
 
NO for 56 
ANOs YES YES Not a specified price control. 
Ex-ante tariff authorization 
procedure. In the 
authorisation procedure 
BNetzA ensures that prices 
do not exceed the cost of 
efficient service provisioning. 
 
Ex-post price control. 
ANOs' termination rates 
should not exceed cost level 
of an efficient operator.  NO Notification of remedies at a later stage 
(ineffective approach) 
(DE/2008/0844)  
Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of re medies under the EU 
consultation procedure  
(DE/2009/0888 and DE/2009/0948) 
Need to impose a cost orientation 
obligation on the market for call termination
on ANOs' networks; 
Non-imposition of access obligation on 
ANOs. 
(DE/2009/0948) 
EL EL/2006/0494 
EL/2008/0751 
EL/2008/0754YES 15  
YES 
 YES YES Cost-orientation 
(LRAIC-CCA for OTE). 
Delayed reciprocity for ANOs 
with OTE’s LRAIC-CCA fee. YES for OTENeed for a coherent European approach 
(EL/2008/0751 and EL/2008/0754) 
HU HU/2005/0152  
HU/2007/0727 
YES 
 15 YES for 
incumbents 
 YES 
 YES 
 Price control and cost 
accounting for the incumbents
(to continue with FL-LRIC 
model pending outcome of 
consultation on wholesale 
price cap) YES for 
incumbents 
 Remedy of non-discrimination 
Asymmetric remedies imposed on local 
incumbents and alternative operators 
Need for a coherent European approach. 
 
EN 55   EN  
IE IE/2005/0191 
IE/2007/0701  
IE/2009/0917YES 7 YES for Eircom YES YES Cost-orientation  for Eircom 
 (LRIC model) 
Price control obligation on 
ANOs linked to market share 
threshold of 5% or 5 years 
from date of final decision, 
whichever is soonest. YES for 
Eircom Non-imposition of access obligation on the 
market for call termination on ANOs' 
networks. 
Price control obligation to be imposed on 
ANOs (does not address competition 
problem identified). 
Further consultations on wholesale price 
cap and glide path to be imposed on 
Eircom and ANOs 
Need for a coherent European approach. 
IT IT/2006/0384 
IT/2008/0753 
IT/2008/0777 YES 41  
 
YES 
NO for 23 
ANOs with 
low level of 
infrastructure
 YES 
NO for 2 3
ANOs YES Price control through a network 
cap (CPI-X%) mechanism for 
Telecom Italia (TI). 
For 17 ANOs, starting value of 
glide paths determined in 
derogation proceedings. BU-
LRAIC model used to calculate 
remaining values. 
NO for 23 ANOs YES for TI High starting points of ANOs' glide paths 
and asymmetry between ANOs. 
Inclusion of mark-up in ANO cost model 
for "competition costs". 
Inclusion of costs in ANO cost model 
related to customer premises equipment. 
(IT/2008/0753) 
Definition of obligations for call 
termination to geographic numbers at 
fixed locations for int egrated fixed/mobile 
offers.  
Differentiation of remedies according to 
type of access employed. 
Need for a coherent European approach. 
(IT/2008/0753 and IT/2008/0777) 
 
 
EN 56   EN  
 
LV LV/2006/0366 
LV/2009/0889YES 18 YES for 
Lattelecom 
 YES for 
Lattelecom
 YES 
 Cost-orientation for 
Lattelecom. Subject to 
outcome of consultation and 
Commission Recommendation 
foresees glide path based on 
existing FDC-CCA model. 
Obligation on ANOs to publish 
price lists. YES for 
Lattelecom
 Further consultation planned by SPRK 
on price control and cost accounting 
obligation.  
Asymmetric remedies proposed for 
alternative operators. (SPRK invited to 
ensure that ANOs' termination rates are 
set at an efficient level). 
Need for a coherent European approach. 
LT LT/2005/0263 
LT/2007/0607  
LT/2007/0681
LT/2009/0983YES 10 YES YES fo r
TEO YES for TEOCost-orientati on for TEO 
(HY-LRAIC) 
For ANOs: apply prices not 
higher than TEO's (when 
implementing the price control 
obligation) 
 YES for TEONeed for an appropriate price control 
obligation 
Access obligations proposed for TEO 
and alternative operators (need to 
reconsider their scope and wording)  
LU LU/2006/0560 YES 9 YES YES YES Cost-orientation for EPT 
 (FDC) 
Obligation on ANOs to charge 
reasonable prices. Max mark-
up of 20% on EPT's rates and 
subject to ILR's approval. YES for EPT No comments 
 
EN 57   EN  
MT MT/2006/0388 YES 2 YES YES YES Cost orientation for Maltacom
(FAC-HCA; considering a 
move to CCA) 
Melita's termination rates are 
pegged to Maltacom's as a 
maximum.   YES for 
Maltacom Level of termination charges – 
implementation of cost orientation. (Invites 
MCA to accelerate tariff reduction. 
Suggests benchmarking as temporary 
measure). 
NL NL/2005/0284 
NL/2007/0742 
NL/2007/0743 
NL/2008/0793  
NL/2008/0830
NL/2009/0978 
YES 
 33  
YES 
 NO YES Price control based on 
symmetric price caps for all 
operators from 1 January 
2009. 3-year wholesale price 
caps which take KPN's 
prices into account based on 
TD-EDC.  NO Need for a coherent EU approach - the 
proposed cost calculation methodology 
(NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978)  
PL PL/2006/0381 
PL/2006/0502
PL/2007/0633  
PL/2007/0641 
PL/2007/0685 
PL/2008/0760  
PL/2008/0761 
PL/2008/0762
PL/2008/0776 
PL/2008/0814 PL/2009/0903YES Approx. 40 
YES 
 YES YES Price control only for 
Telekomunikacja Polska (TP) 
based on costs incurred, which 
may be verified by the NRA 
using benchmarking or other 
methods (e.g. Including price 
cap, retail minus, cost 
orientation/cost accounting) 
NO for ANOs YES only for 
TP Non-imposition of price control on ANOs  
(PL/2006/0502, PL/2007/0633, 
PL/2007/0641, PL/2007/0685, 
PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/0776, 
PL/2008/0814) 
Need for a coherent European approach 
(PL/2008/0760-0762,  PL/2008/0776, 
PL/2008/0814) 
Asymmetry of fixed termination rates 
(PL/2008/0814) 
Proposed price control and cost 
accounting obligation (for TP) and need 
for a coherent European approach for 
regulating wholesale fixed termination 
rates. (PL/2009/0903) 
 
EN 58   EN Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of remedies under the 
EU consultation procedure. 
(PL/2009/0903) 
PT PT/2004/0061 
PT/2004/0092YES 8 YES  
YES for 
Portugal 
Telecom 
(PT) YES for PTCost-orientation for PT 
Obligation for fair and 
reasonable prices for ANOs. 
Max difference of 20% to PT’s 
rates. YES for PT Asymmetrical application of remedies; 
(assess whether assumptions on ‘fair and 
reasonable prices’ will remain relevant 
over market review). 
(PT/2004/0092) 
RO RO/2007/0653 
RO/2008/0774
RO/2009/1003YES 
(includes calls 
to public 
interest 
services) 38 YES YES YES Cost orientation for 
Romtelecom based on LRIC 
Delayed reciprocity for ANOs YES for 
RomtelecomInclusion of conveyance services in
definition of the call termination networ k
segment 
Need for a coherent European approach 
(RO/2008/0774)  
Scope and purpose of the draft measure / 
Justification of the us e of Article 5 of the 
Access Directive (0653 RO/2009/1003) 
SK SK/2004/0102 
SK/2005/0187YES  
1 
 YES YES YES Cost-orientation  
(conciliation between the TD-
LRIC of the incumbent and 
BU-FL-LRAIC model 
developed by the regulator) YES  No comments  
 
EN 59   EN  
SI SI/2005/0258  
SI/2007/0690YES 8 YES YES YES Cost-orientation  
LRIC methodology for Telekom 
Slovenije (TS) and FAC-HCA 
methodology for T-2 
(effective until December 
2008). 
Other ANOs obliged to 
introduce prices based on a 
glide path towards cost-
oriented price of TS  YES for TS Need for a European approach 
ES ES/2005/0250  
ES/2008/0818YES 28  
YES YES for 
TESAU YES for 
TESAU Cost-orientati on for TESAU 
(TD FAC). 
Reasonable prices for ANOs. 
30% mark up above TESAU’s 
local level rates.  YES for 
TESAU Asymmetry and the proposed cost 
calculation methodology 
Need for a coherent European approach 
SE SE/2004/0050
SE/2009/0967SE/2009/1017 YES 26 
YES YES YES Cost-orientation for 
TeliaSonera (LRIC) 
Obligation on ANOs to charge 
fair and reasonable prices ; 
reciprocal FTRs (i.e. symmetry 
because non-discrimination) YES Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of re medies (i.e. need to 
notify revision of costing methodologies) 
The proposed cost methodology (i.e. 
includes non-traffic related costs) 
(SE/2009/1017) 
 
EN 60   EN UK UK/2003/0003 
UK/2004/0045 
UK/2004/0072 
UK/2004/0122 
UK/2005/0165 
UK/2005/0217 
UK/2005/0218 
UK/2007/0585 
UK/2007/0649 
UK/2008/0769 
UK/2009/0898 YES196 5 YES for KCOM 
and BT 
 
All other ANOs 
required to 
provide access 
on fair and 
reasonable 
terms YES for 
KCOM and 
BT YES for 
KCOM and 
BT Cost orientation for BT and 
KCOM where charges set on 
the basis of LRIC plus an 
appropriate mark-up for costs 
which are common across 
products, and for recovery of 
the cost of capital. Uses FAC-
CCA data to provide a proxy 
for the LRIC+ model. NO Appropriateness of the proposed costing 
methodology and need for a coherent 
European approach 
GI GI/2007/0717
GI/2009/0976YES 2 YES  
for GibtelecomYES  YES for 
Gibtelecom Cost-orientation (non 
specified) for Gibtelecom 
Fair and reasonable prices 
for CTS YES for 
Gibtelecom Lack of details concerning price control 
and cost accounting obligations; 
Need for a coherent European 
approach (GI/2007/0717) 
Non imposition of an access obligation; 
Need for ex ante price control and 
efficient termination rates(GI/2009/0976)  
 
                                                 
196  Ofcom’s proposed market definition for call termination differs from market 3 as defined in the Recommendation in that it split s out local-tandem conveyance / transit. 
Local-tandem conveyance and transit (LTC/LTT)  includes the conveyance of  traffic between the local exchanges that provide call origination and termination service 
and the tandem layer of the network. Ofco m finds however that once BT has completed its migration to its NGN network, LTC/LTT i s no longer a relevant market 
since the NGN network does not include separate local and tandem layers to which communications providers can interconnect for the routing of voice traffic. Ofcom 
considers therefore that the three-criteria test is no longer met for this market . 
 
EN 61   EN  
Market 4: Wholesale (physical) ne twork infrastructure access (incl uding shared or fully unbundled  access) at a fixed location 
 
         
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators 
Access Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT197 AT/2004/0098 
AT/2005/0318 
AT/2006/0537  
AT/2007/0682 
AT/2007/0795 
AT/2008/0835 
AT/2009/0871  YES 1 YES YES YES FL-LRIC  YES No comments 
                                                 
197 In case AT/2008/0835, the Austrian NRA has already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commis sion commented on the NRA's 
approach which consisted in notifying the market definition incl uding the three criteria test in advance of the full market ana lysis and the proposed remedies.  
 
EN 62   EN BE198 BE/2007/0735 
BE/2008/0801
BE/2009/0949
BE/2010/1033  YES 1 YES YES YES Bottom-up methodology 
reflecting the costs of an 
efficient operator. 
Margin squeeze test. YES Promotion of investment on 
infrastructure in relation to wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared 
access) to the local loop and competition 
at the retail level 
(BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) 
Access to fibre infrastructure 
(BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) 
Timeframe for the market review and 
efficient enforcement of regulatory 
obligations 
(BE/2007/0735) 
The exact scope of wholesale services 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation 
(BE/2008/0801) 
BG NOT YET NOTIFIED 
                                                 
198  The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of  Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to 
insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Com mission under Cases BE/2009/0949 
and BE/2009/0950.  
 
EN 63   EN  
CY CY/2006/0331 
CY/2009/0869 YES 
 
 1 YES YES YES Bottom-up LRIC. Results 
reconciled with hybrid model 
based on FDC and LRIC 
models. 
Margin squeeze test . YES Reinforcing regulatory oversight 
Exclusion of fibre from the relevant 
market 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
CZ CZ/2006/0340 
CZ/2008/0773 
CZ/2008/0828 
CZ/2009/0933
199 YES 1 YES YES YES LRIC. Covers co-location 
services. YES No comments 
DK DK/2005/0176
DK/2007/0683
DK/2008/0860DK/2009/0984YES 
 
 1 
YES YES  LRAIC 
FAHC model applied 
transitionally to certain less 
closely related services and 
for the 2009 price caps for 
“best effort” local loops, 
backhaul sections and 
migration. YES Exclusion of fibre from the market 
Regulation of “best effort” local loops 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
                                                 
199  Case withdrawn by the NRA . 
 
EN 64   EN  
EE EE/2007/0577  
EE/2009/0942 
 YES 1 YES YES YES HC- FDC 
 YES Inclusion of access support services in 
the wholesale (physical) network 
infrastructure access market definition 
Obligations with regard to fibre loops in 
the wholesale (physical) infrastructure 
access market 
FI* 
** 
 FI/2003/0030 
FI/2006/0547 
FI/2008/0839 
 YES 32 YES 
 
 YES YES Up to operator to choose its 
own cost accounting 
methodology. Ficora can 
issue mandatory regulations 
concerning cost accounting 
systems. 
Obligation not applicable to 
fibre loops. YES 
 
Only on 9 
SMP 
operators  
 Pricing of installation charges  
Obligations with regard to fibre loops 
(i) No cost orientation obligation 
(ii) Migration from copper to fibre local 
loops and access to passive 
infrastructure 
 
FR  FR/2005/0174 
FR/2005/0301 
FR/2008/0780 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost oriented prices. 
Access to the civil works 
infrastructure to be 
determined at a later stage. YES 
 Market Definition 
Inclusion of civil works infrastructure in 
the wholesale physical network 
infrastructure access market 
Remedies 
Access to terminating segment of the 
access network 
Recommendation on NGA  
 
 
EN 65   EN  
DE** DE/2004/0119
DE/2005/0150DE/2007/0646YES 1 
YES YES YES Ex ante  price control based 
on the costs of the efficient 
provision of services.  NO Access at the MDF to the new 
infrastructure 
Access to ducts leading to the street 
cabinet 
Access to unlit fibre 
Collocation in and at the street cabinet 
EL EL/2006/0353 
EL/2008/0751  
EL/2009/0934 YES 1 YES YES YES LRAIC YES Exclusion of fibre from the market 
definition 
Operating 
area of 
Magyar 
Telekom 
1 
Operating 
area of 
Invitel 
Operating 
area of 
Hungarotel  HU** HU/2005/0185
HU/2007/0731YES 
Operating 
area of 
Monortel YES YES YES LRIC YES No comments 
 
EN 66   EN IE IE/2004/0046 
 IE/2009/0875  
IE/2009/0918 
IE/2009/0923 
IE/2009/0924 
IE/2009/0969  YES 1 YES YES YES Prohibition of margin 
squeeze. 
LRIC for current generation 
LLU. Further consultation on 
NGA-based services. Obligations 
concerning 
accounting 
separation 
to be 
subject to 
further 
consultationMarket definition 
(IE/2009/0875) 
Further consultation planned by 
ComReg 
(IE/2009/0875) 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
next-generation access (NGA) 
development and the need for a 
consistent European approach 
(IE/2009/0875) 
Need for an overall analysis of markets 4 
and 5 (IE/2009/0875) 
IT IT/2005/0244 
IT/2007/0613 
IT/2009/0867 IT/2009/0891 IT/2009/0988  YES 1 
YES YES YES BU- LRIC model. Network 
cap mechanism (IPC-X).  YES Lack of notification of the remedies 
(IT/2009/0891) 
Modification of the undertakings 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 
The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Reasonable pricing for access to civil 
infrastructure and dark fibre 
 
EN 67   EN (IT/2009/0988) 
Lack of fibre unbundling obligation under 
a forward-looking market analysis 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Migration process in a NGA context 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation 
(IT/2009/0988) 
LV LV/2006/0539  
LT/2009/0995 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC-CCA  YES No comments 
LT LT/2006/0391 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC YES No comments 
LU LU/2006/0509 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented prices 
calculated on the basis of the 
costs of an efficient operator. YES Details of the proposed price control 
obligation 
MT MT/2006/0549 YES 1 YES YES YES FAC-HCA YES No comments 
 
EN 68   EN  
NL NL/2005/0280 
NL/2007/0630 
NL/2008/0793 
NL/2008/0826  
NL/2009/0868 
NL/2009/0906  YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented prices. EDC 
for copper LLU and FTTO. 
DCF/IRR for FTTH.  NO 
(to be 
withdrawn) Recommendation on NGA 
(NL/2008/0826) 
(NL/2009/0906) 
Parameters for the cost model 
Recommendation on NGA and further 
consultations on the price regulation in 
the market for LLU 
(NL/2009/0868) 
PL PL/2006/0418 YES 1 YES YES YES FL LRIC 
 Until an auditor confirms the 
accuracy of the calculations, 
the SMP operator will set 
appropriate charges based 
on costs incurred. The NRA 
will control such costs using 
comparison with competitive 
markets or other methods, 
such as “retail minus”, 
“bottom up” or best current 
practice. YES Price control before approval of LRIC 
cost calculation 
PT PT/2004/0117 
PT/2008/0850 PT/2009/0956 
PT/2009/1012 NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 
YES YES YES ANACOM uses the 
information provided by the 
SMP operator's cost 
accounting model, which is 
FDHC. ANACOM also uses 
other price references and 
international benchmarks. YES Inclusion of cable in market 4 on the 
basis of indirect constraints 
(PT/2008/0850) 
Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 
(PT/2008/0850) 
 
EN 69   EN RO NOT YET NOTIFIED 
SK SK/2004/0107
SK/2009/0929
200 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost orientation YES Implementation of the proposed cost 
orientation obligation 
National public consultation 
SI SI/2005/0142 
SI/2005/0181 
SI/2006/0519  
SI/2009/0957 
SI/2009/0981  
SI/2009/1010 
   YES 1 YES YES YES LRIC+ YES Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
(SI/2009/0957) 
Imposition of a different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis 
(SI/2009/0981) 
Parameters of the cost model 
(SI/2009/0981) 
Effective implementat ion of the glide-
path towards cost-orientation for 
Greenfield optical fibres 
(SI/2009/1010) 
                                                 
200  Case withdrawn by the NRA.  
 
EN 70   EN  
ES ES/2006/0368  
ES/2008/0804 
ES/2009/0961 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation YES Exclusion of FTTH from the market for 
wholesale network infrastructure access 
at a fixed location 
(ES/2008/0804) 
Reference offer and price control 
obligation as regards access to the 
physical network infrastructure 
(ES/2008/0804) 
Economic viability of access to ducts in 
Spain 
(ES/2008/0804) 
Recommendation on NGA networks 
(ES/2008/0804) 
SE  
SE/2004/0084 
SE/2009/1018 YES 1 YES YES YES LRIC 
(mark-up LRIC for shared 
access) YES Need for transparency and coherence in 
the notification of re medies under the EU 
consultation procedure 
(SE/2009/1018) 
Need to carry out a new review of the 
LLU market 
(SE/2009/1018) 
 
EN 71   EN  
UK 
(excluding 
Hull area) 
1 
 YES YES YES FAC-CCA YES 
UK** UK/2004/0094
UK/2004/0123
UK/2007/0585
UK/2007/0649
UK/2007/0741
UK/2008/0854
UK/2009/0901NO 
(Cable 
included) 
Hull area 
 
1 YES YES YES FAC-CCA NO Product market definition, including both 
copper loop-based and cable-based 
wholesale local accesses 
GI GI/2007/0718 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented prices. 
Details on the cost 
accounting model to be 
determined at a later stage. YES Lack of details concerning price control 
and cost accounting obligations 
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or mer ger of markets or geographic differentiation 
*** Geographic differentiation of remedies 
**** Market not included in the Recommendation 
 
 
EN 72   EN  
Market 5: Wholesale broadband access 
         
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related cases Market 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number 
of SMP 
operators
Access Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
Area 1 
TO BE DEREGULATED Area 1 
YES 
AT201***  
AT/2005/0312 
AT/2008/0757202
AT/2009/0970 NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 
Area 2 
YES Area 2 
YES Area 2 
YES Area 2 
Retail minus Area 2 
YES Market Definition 
(i) Strength of indirect constraint from 
vertically integrated competitors 
(ii) Geographic market definition 
SMP assessment and future possible 
constraints 
Sustainability of competition from 
alternative providers  
                                                 
201  In case AT/2009/0970 the Austrian NRA has already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commiss ion issued a letter of serious doubts 
following which the Austrian NRA revised the draft measure. The serious doubts were withdrawn.  
202  On 17 December 2008, the Austrian Administ rative Court (Verwaltungsgerich tshof) annulled the NRA's d ecision concerning case AT/ 2008/0757. The remedies 
currently applied are the ones notified u nder case AT/2005/0312, i.e. access, non-disc rimination, reference offer, price-contro l based on “retail minus”, cost accounting, 
accounting separation. 
 
EN 73   EN BE203 BE/2007/0736 
BE/2008/0801 
BE/2009/0950 
BE/2010/1033 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented prices on the 
basis of the costs of an 
efficient operator. 
VDSL and VDSL2, access 
price on the basis of 
reasonable costs with an 
eviction test. 
Margin squeeze test. YES Promotion of investment on 
infrastructure in relation to wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared 
access) to the local loop and competition 
at the retail level 
(BE/2007/0736 and BE/2009/0949) 
Timeframe for the market review and 
efficient enforcement of regulatory 
obligations 
(BE/2007/0736) 
The exact scope of wholesale services 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation 
(BE/2008/0801) 
BG NOT YET NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/033
2 
CY/2009/087
0 YES 
 1 YES YES YES LRIC in conjunction with a 
margin squeeze model. 
 YES Reinforcing regulatory oversight 
Exclusion of fibre from the relevant 
market 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
                                                 
203  The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of  Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to 
insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Com mission under Cases BE/2009/0949 
and BE/2009/0950.  
 
EN 74   EN  
CZ CZ/2006/0449 
CZ/2008/0797  YES 1 YES YES YES NO YES Market definition 
SMP assessment 
DK DK/2005/0182
204 
DK/2005/0209 
DK/2008/0862  
DK/2009/0984  
 NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 YES YES YES LRAIC for copper based 
access and collocation. 
The price control of cable 
access is based on FAHC 
but only effective upon a 
reasonable request for 
access. YES Inclusion of cable in the wholesale 
broadband access market 
The scope of the access obligation 
Regulation of fibre 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
EE EE/2006/0522  
EE/2009/0943  NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 YES YES YES ECPR for access at the 
national and local level and 
FDHC at the DSLAM level. 
ECPR provides for a result 
equivalent to retail minus. YES Inclusion of cable infrastructure in the 
WBA market definition 
FI** FI/2004/0062 
FI/2006/0548 
FI/2008/0848
205 
FI/ 2009/0900 NO 
(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) 
 32 YES YES YES NO NO Inclusion of cable access in the market 
definition 
Absence of any price regulation 
Definition of geographic sub-markets for 
possible de-regulation in the future 
 
                                                 
204  Case withdrawn by the NRA.  
205  Case withdrawn by the NRA . 
 
EN 75   EN  
 
FR FR/2005/0175
FR/2008/0781NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 YES 
Bitstrea
m 
access 
on fibre 
is not 
mandat
ed. YES YES Cost-orientation YES 
Obligation 
also 
applicable 
to fibre 
connectionsMarket Definition 
(i) Inclusion of cable in the wholesale 
broadband access market 
(ii) Inclusion of fibre in the wholesale 
broadband access market 
(iii) Geographic market  definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market 
Remedies 
Recommendation on NGA 
DE** 
**** 
 DE/2005/0260
DE/2006/0457
DE/2007/0576
DE/2009/0908NO 
(2 markets: 
handover at 
(i) ATM-
level and (ii 
IP-level) ) 
 1 YES YES YES For IP bitstream access, 
tariffs are subject to prior 
approval by BNetza. 
According to German law, 
price control should be 
carried out by means of cost-
orientation to efficient 
cost/benchmarking. 
For ATM bitstream access, 
ex post  price control.  YES Need to base any prior exclusion of 
products from the wholesale broadband 
access markets on a proper 
substitutability test (DE/2005/0260)  
Imposition of remedies (DE/2005/0260) 
Scope of access obligation 
(DE/2006/0457) 
Stand alone bitstream access 
(DE/2006/0457) 
Effective price regulation 
(DE/2006/0457) 
Notification of remedies concerning 
ATM bitstream to be submitted without 
 
EN 76   EN (DE/2007/0576) 
Stand alone bitstream access 
(DE/2007/0576) 
Regional 
broadban
d 
conveyan
ce market 
1 YES YES YES Price caps on the basis of 
the costs of an efficient 
service provider. YES 
DE/2007/0639DE/2007/0702
 NO 
(Wholesale 
broadband 
conveyance 
markets) Supra-
regional 
conveyan
ce market 
0 NO NO NO NO NO Notification and adoption of remedies 
(DE/2007/0639) 
Implementation of bitstream remedies 
(DE/2007/0639 and DE/2007/0702) 
EL EL/2006/0372 
EL/2007/0658 
EL/2008/0751 
EL/2009/0935  YES 1 YES YES YES LRAIC YES Exclusion of fibre from the market 
definitions 
The scope of the non-discrimination 
obligation I market 5 
 
 
EN 77   EN  
Operating 
area of 
Magyar 
Telekom 
1 
Operating 
area of 
Invitel 
1 
Operating 
area of 
Hungarote
l 
1 HU** HU/2005/0186
HU/2006/3632 
HU/2007/0732NO 
(Geo. Diff.) 
 
Operating 
area of 
Monortel 
1 YES YES YES TD-LRIC for the local 
bitstream.  
Retail minus for the national 
bitstream. YES No comments 
IE IE/2004/0093  
IE/2005/0313  
IE/2008/0852  
IE/2009/0919  NO 
(Cable 
included)  YES YES YES Retail minus.  
For the definition of the “minus”, Eircom’s 
costs and revenues will be used as the 
basis for establishing the costs and 
revenues of a similarly efficient operator. 
For the assessment of margins, DCF 
methodology will be carried over a 5-year 
period.  
The margin squeeze test shall be applied on 
a product-by-product basis, with separate 
control for each wholesale and retail product 
pair. The “minus” margin will be reviewed 
annually. (IE/2005/0313) The inclusion of self-supply by cable 
operators and FWA operators in the 
relevant product market 
(IE/2004/0093)  
Further consultation planned by 
ComReg 
(IE/2004/0093)  
 
 
EN 78   EN IT IT/2005/0253 
IT/2007/0609 
IT/2007/0614 
IT/2009/0892 
IT/2009/0989  YES 1 YES YES YES BU- LRIC model. Network 
cap mechanism (IPC-X).  YES Geographic market definition of the 
wholesale broadband access market 
(IT/2009/0892) 
Inclusion of Wireless Local Loops 
(WLL) into the market definition 
(IT/2009/0892) 
Lack of notification of the remedies 
(IT/2009/0892) 
Modification of the undertakings 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Implementation and monitoring of the 
undertakings of Telecom Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 
The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Migration process in a NGA context 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
(IT/2009/0988) 
Notification requirements as to the price 
control obligation 
(IT/2009/0988) 
LV LV/2006/0540 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC-CCA YES No comments 
LT LT/2005/0267 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC YES No comments 
 
EN 79   EN LU LU/2006/0510 YES 1 YES YES YES Retail-minus based on the 
avoided costs of the 
incumbent.  YES Access obligation 
Stand alone bitstream access 
Price control obligation 
MT MT/2007/0563
206 
MT/2008/0803NO 
(Cable 
included) 0 TO BE WITHDRAWN AS FROM 1.07.2009. Monitoring market developments 
Low 
Quality 
1 YES 
Copper 
only YES 
Copper only YES NO NO 
NL**  
NL/2005/0281 
NL/2008/0827NO 
(Segmentat
ion/Cable 
included) High 
Quality 
1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation NO Inclusion of cable in market 5 on the 
basis of indirect constraints 
Regulatory treatment of fibre in the low 
quality WBA market 
Effectiveness of currently envisaged 
margin squeeze test 
Recommendation on NGA 
PL PL/2006/0472 NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 YES YES YES FL-LRIC. Until auditor 
confirms accuracy of 
calculations, TP is obliged to 
set appropriate charges 
based on costs incurred and 
the NRA intends to control 
them on the basis of the 
retail minus method, where 
the wholesale price will be 
calculated as the lowest TP 
retail price minus the 
avoidable cost of the service. YES Defining the scope of the obligations 
imposed 
                                                 
206  Case withdrawn by the NRA . 
 
EN 80   EN "NC" 
areas 
1 YES YES YES Retail minus.  
Cost orientation for naked 
ADSL. 
 YES 
PT** PT/2004/0118 
PT/2008/0851  NO 
(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) "C" areas 
0 
 To be 
phased 
out 
after a 
transito
ry 
period 
of 12 
months To be phased 
out after a 
transitory 
period of 12 
months To be 
phased 
out after 
a 
transitor
y period 
of 12 
months To be withdrawn immediately To be 
phased out 
after a 
transitory 
period of 12 
months Inclusion of self-supply in market 5 on 
the basis of indirect constraints 
Monitoring of trend towards effective 
competition 
Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 
RO NOT YET NOTIFIED 
SK SK/2006/0465 YES 1 YES YES YES Retail minus YES Defining the scope of the access 
obligation imposed 
SI SI/2006/0346  
SI/2007/0664  
SI/2009/0958 
SI/2009/0982 
SI/2009/1010 YES 1 YES YES YES Retail minus. 
Prohibition of margin 
squeeze. YES Market definition for WBA 
(SI/2009/0958) 
Remedies imposed in the context of 
NGA development and need for a 
consistent European approach 
(SI/2009/0958) 
Imposition of a different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis (SI/2009/0981) 
Parameters of the cost model 
(SI/2009/0981) 
 
EN 81   EN YES YES YES Cost-orientation YES 
ES  
ES/2006/0370
ES/2007/0626 
ES/2008/0805YES 1 
Only for speeds up to 30Mb/s Regulation of bitstream  offers only up to 
30 Mb/s 
SE SE/2004/0083NO 
(Cable 
included) 1 YES YES YES Retail minus. YES Cable-TV networks as alternative 
infrastructure for the provision of 
wholesale bitstream access 
Market 1 
1 (BT) YES YES YES NO YES 
Market 2 
1 (BT) YES YES YES NO YES 
Market 3 
No Any existing obligation to be phased out  within a transitional period of 1 year UK** UK/2003/0032  
UK/2003/0033 
UK/2003/0034
UK/2007/0585
UK/2007/0649
UK/2007/0733
UK/2008/0769UK/2009/0901NO 
(Geo. Diff./ 
Cable 
included) 
Hull area 
1 
(Kingston YES YES YES NO YES Strength of indirect constraint from 
vertically integrated competitors 
Geographic market definition and 
Ofcom’s definition of sub-national 
markets 
Monitoring of trend towards effective 
competition 
Sustainability of competition from 
alternative providers 
 
EN 82   EN  
GI GI/2007/0719 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented prices. 
Details on the cost 
accounting model to be 
determined at a later stage. YES Broad regulation of wholesale 
broadband access 
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or mer ger of markets or geographic differentiation 
*** Geographic differentiation of remedies 
**** Market not included in the Recommendation 
 
 
EN 83   EN  
Market 6: Wholesale terminating  segments of leased lines 
         
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators 
Access Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT207 AT/2004/0100
AT/2006/0508
AT/2008/0836
AT/2009/0932YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-oriented access prices 
according to efficient service 
provision cost; 
Price control by dispute 
settlement before the NRA YES Geographical delineation of the market for 
terminating segments of leased lines with 
high bandwidth 
BE BE/2006/0552 
BE/2009/0882  YES 1 YES YES YES Bottom up LRIC NO Cost accounting for wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines 
BG  NOT YET NOTIFIED 
                                                 
207  In cases AT/2008/0836 and AT/2009/0932 the Austrian NRA notified only the market definition for its third round market review, which defines geographic 
submarket s.  
 The Commission commented on the NRA's approach of applying geogra phical differentiation in the market segment of leased lines w ith high bandwid th. 
 
EN 84   EN  
CY CY/2006/0482 YES 1 YES YES YES Retail minus and later (once 
implemented) bottom up LRICYES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0450 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost orientation obligation YES No comments 
DK DK/2005/0245 YES 1 YES YES YES Modified historic costs YES Conditions of competition in low and high 
bandwidth terminating segments, and 
scope of remedies 
EE EE/2007/0643 YES 1 YES YES YES A price cap YES Price control, implementation of the cost-
accounting system 
FI FI/2004/0080 
FI/2009/0986 YES 31 YES YES YES Non-discriminatory prices NO No comments 
FR FR/2006/0416 YES 1 YES YES YES The prohibition of predatory 
prices for all services; 
A cost orientation obligation 
for selected products YES Remedies for terminating segments of 
leased lines 
DE DE/2006/0480 
DE/2007/0677 
DE/2007/0687 YES 1 YES YES YES Ex-post price control NO No comments 
EL EL/2006/0422 NO** 1 YES YES YES FDC and later (once 
implemented) LRIC/CC YES No comments 
HU HU/2005/0168 
HU/2007/0738 YES 1 YES YES YES Retail minus YES No comments   
 
EN 85   EN  
 
IE IE/2005/0139 
IE/2008/0791 
IE/2009/0920 
 YES 1 YES YES YES PPC: Cost orientation (FL-
LRIC) 
WLL: retail minus YES Remedies concerning WLL products; 
Further consultation planned by ComReg 
IT IT/2005/0272 
IT/2009/1000 YES 1 YES YES YES Network cap mechanism YES Removal of regulatory 
obligations 
LV LV/2007/0572 YES 1 YES YES YES YES (not specified) YES No comments 
LT LT/2006/0430 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC or "best practice" 
approach YES No comments 
LU LU/2006/0561 NO** 1 YES YES YES FDC methodology YES Lack of sufficient evidence for not 
separating the markets for terminating 
and trunk segments of leased lines 
MT MT/2006/0374 YES 1 YES YES YES Fully allocated historic costs YES The inclusion of international lines in the 
wholesale and retail market definitions 
NL NL/2005/0282 
NL/2008/0823 NO** 1 YES YES YES Wholesale price cap NO Scope of the access obligation 
 
EN 86   EN  
PL PL/2006/0516 
PL/2007/0667 
PL/2008/0771 NO** 1 YES YES YES Charges based on costs 
incurred YES No comments 
PT PT/2005/0156 YES 1 YES YES YES The cost-orientation obligation 
upon PTC’s costs and 
European benchmark practicesYES No comments 
RO  NOT YET NOTIFIED 
SK SK/2006/0386 NO** 1 YES YES YES The method of fully allocated 
historical costs and a price capYES Inclusion of optical and wireless networks 
in the market for wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines; 
Parallel imposition of cost orientation 
obligation and price cap 
SI SI/2005/0219 
SI/2005/0305 
SI/2008/0767 YES 1 YES YES YES By 1 June 2009 glide path 
based on benchmarking, 
FAC CCA as from 1 June 2009YES No comments 
ES ES/2006/0458 
ES/2009/0930 YES 1 YES YES YES FDC based on current costs 
for traditional interfaces and a 
retail minus for Ethernet 
interfaces YES Limitation of the scope of the remedies in 
the market of terminating leased lines to 
services based on traditional interfaces 
SE SE/2005/0200 YES 1 YES YES YES Fully distributed costs taking 
into account both historic and 
current costs YES Market share data 
 
EN 87   EN UK UK/2003/0037 
UK/2003/0038 
UK/2008/0747 UK/2008/0787 
UK/2008/0858 
UK/2008/0859  NO** 
(Geo. Diff.) 2 
YES YES YES RPI (Retail Price Index)-X for 
BT; 
Conditional cost orientation for 
KCOM NO Geographic segmentati on of the markets 
Re-notification of the draft measure; 
Timeframe of the validity of charge 
control; 
GI GI/2007/0720 YES 1 YES YES YES To be specified at the later 
stage YES Specification of t he cost-orientation 
obligation 
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operator s 
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or me rger of markets or geographic differentiation 
 
 
EN 88   EN  
Market 7: Voice call termination  on individual mobile networks 
         
Remedies imposed Comments / no comment 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 
Recom-
mendation Number of 
SMP 
operators 
Access Non-
discriminat
ion Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation  
AT AT/2004/0099 
AT/2004/0238 
AT/2005/0256 
AT/2004/0317 
AT/2006/0538 
AT/2007/0680 
AT/2008/0837208
AT/2009/0885 
AT/2009/0910YES 4 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRAIC-model including 
mark-up for overheads). 
Uses lowest-cost operator 
as the benchmark for an 
efficient operator.  
Implementation of 
Recommendation on 
Termination Rates foreseen 
for next market review in 
2011. NO Cost model of an efficient operator and 
need for a coherent EU approach.  
(Importance of LRIC models using 
forward-looking costs of an efficient 
operator and only those costs which 
vary in response to the wholesale 
termination traffic). 
                                                 
208  In case AT/2008/0837 the Austrian NRA already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any 
notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon th e effective delineation of the rele vant market concerned at the time of that notification.  
 
EN 89   EN BE BE/2006/0433  
BE/2007/0665YES 3 YES YES  
(Internal 
non-
discriminati
on 
obligation 
for 
Belgacom 
Mobile a n
Mobistar). YES Cost-orientation  
(TD-LRIC model). YES 
(for Belgacom 
Mobile and 
Mobistar). Need for a coherent European 
approach. 
Internal non-discrimination obligation 
(BE/2007/0665) 
BG BG/2009/0866 YES 4 YES YES (for 
Mobiltel, 
Cosmo 
Bulgaria 
Mobile and 
BTC's GSM 
and UMTS 
network)  YES (less 
detailed for 
BTC's NMT/
CDMA  
network)  Cost-orientation  for Mobiltel 
and Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile
and reciprocity for BTC.  
Future accounting 
methodology will follow 
Recommendation. Interim 
glide path based on 
benchmarking. YES (for 
Mobiltel and 
Cosmo 
Bulgaria 
Mobile) Further consultations planned by CRC 
Cost of an efficient operator and need 
for a coherent European approach. 
(Need to reduce termination rates to the 
cost faced by an efficient operator as 
soon as possible).  
Implementation of symmetry for fixed-
to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. 
CY CY/2006/0334  
CY/2009/0874YES 2 YES YES YES Cost-orientation for CYTA 
(LRIC-CCA model) 
Max MTR for MTN 
corresponds to CYTA's 
cost-oriented termination 
fee with additional 
percentage caps allowed 
in the next 3 years. YES  
(subject to a 
€50 million 
annual 
turnover 
threshold for 
MTN) Price control imposed on MTN and level 
of asymmetry. 
Need for a coherent European approach. 
 
EN 90   EN  
CZ CZ/2006/0359 
CZ/2007/0661 
CZ/2008/0841
CZ/2009/0959YES 4 YES 
Only for TO2,
T-Mobile, 
Vodafone YES YES Only for TO2, T-Mobile, 
Vodafone; 
Cost orientation 
FAC-HCA based on the 
lowest - cost operator 
(CZ/2009/0959) YES 
Only for TO2, 
T-Mobile, 
Vodafone Need to (i) impose the access and price 
control obligations also on MobilKom, 
(ii) to notify further planned individual 
decisions (on SMP and remedies) 
DK DK/2005/0204  
DK/2008/0752 
DK/2008/0765 
DK/2008/0785
DK/2009/1013
DK/2009/1014
DK/2009/0945 YES  
(incl. MVNO) 5 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
 (LRAIC model (generic 
hybrid model incl. TD data) 
for TDC, Sonofon/Telenor 
and Telia; transitory 
benchmark period for Hi3G; 
best practice approach for 
Barablu) NO Level of MTRs imposed on Hi3G and 
asymmetry of MTRs in Denmark. 
(DK/2008/0765) 
Symmetric termination rates based on 
the costs of an efficient operator 
(DK/2008/0785) 
Need for coherent European approach 
(DK/2008/0785, DK/2008/0765, 
DK/2008/0752, DK/2009/1014, 
DK/2009/0945) 
Need to phase out asymmetry for the 
MNVO Barablu (DK/2009/1013) 
Asymmetry allowed for HI3G 
Need to carry out a new market review 
(DK/2009/0945) 
 
EN 91   EN  
EE EE/2006/0342  
EE/2009/0883YES 
(incl. MVNO) 4 YES YES YES Benchmarking against ERG 
MTR Snapshot NO Imposition of current price control 
mechanism and the need to set new 
glide-paths based on cost-oriented 
mobile termination rates. 
Need for a notification of the final draft 
access prices to the Commission. 
FI FI/2003/0031 
FI/2006/0403 
FI/2008/0778 YES  
(incl. MVNO) 
 5 YES YES YES Rates commercially 
negotiated. Cost orientation 
and non-discrimination as 
ex post control.  
(Ålands Mobiltelefon and 
TDC subject to non-
discriminatory pricing only).  YES  
(not for Ålands 
Mobiltelefon 
and TDC) Asymmetrical application of certain 
remedies. (FI/2003/0031) 
Price differentiation of termination rates 
according to the origin of the call. 
(Absence of remedies for calls 
originating in a fixed network in Finland 
without CS or CPS) 
(FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) 
Termination rates proportioned to costs. 
(Not clear that commercial negotiations 
would lead to termination rates 
proportionate to costs) 
(FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) 
Need for coherent European approach. 
(FI/2008/0778) 
 
EN 92   EN  
FR FR/2004/0120 
FR/2005/0275 
FR/2006/0461
FR/2007/0104 
FR/2007/0592 
FR/2007/0596
FR/2007/0669
FR/2007/0708 
FR/2008/0812 
FR/2009/0927YES* 3 in mainland
France. 
8 in French 
overseas 
territories YES YES YES Cost orientation towards 
LRIC for 3 mainland MNOs.
Cost-orientation on 2 
overseas operators (Orange 
Caraïbe and SRR).  
Obligation not to charge 
excessive prices for 6 other 
overseas operators. YES Asymmetry in MTRs and need for a 
coherent European approach.  
(FR/2009/0927, FR/2008/0812) 
DE DE/2005/0249 
DE/2006/0421  
DE/2008/0813 
DE/2009/0939 
DE/2009/0947 YES 
(incl. MVNOs) 
 6 YES for 4 
MNOs –  
T-Mobile, 
Vodafone 
D2, E-Plus 
and O2 YES YES Cost orientation for 4 MNOs 
(ex-ante tariff authorization 
procedure). 
 
Ex-post price control for 2 
MVNOs (Vistream and 
Ring). NO Need for coherent European approach. 
(DE/2008/0813) 
Need for transparency and coherence 
in notification of MTRs to the 
Commission. (DE/2008/0813, 
DE/2009/0947) 
Need to impose a cost orientation 
obligation (on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) 
Non-imposition of an access obligation 
(on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) 
EL EL/2004/0078 
EL/2005/0178  
EL/2006/0392  
EL/2008/0786YES 3  
YES 
 YES YES Cost-orientation 
BU LRIC model based on 
average efficient operator YES Cost model of an efficient operator and 
need for a coherent European 
approach. 
(Importance of LRIC models using 
current costs of an efficient operator 
and not historical costs. Relevant costs 
are those additional (traffic-related) 
costs involved in providing the service). 
 
EN 93   EN  
HU HU/2004/0101 
HU/2006/0478  
HU/2008/0829 
YES 
 3 YES YES YES Cost orientation based on 
BU-LRIC model which 
considers an all-traffic 
increment and includes 
both coverage and 
capacity costs. YES Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology and need for a 
coherent European approach 
(Importance of LRIC models using 
current costs of an efficient operator 
and not historical costs. Relevant costs 
are those additional (traffic-related) 
costs involved in providing the service). 
IE IE/2004/0073 
IE/2005/0216 
IE/2008/0746  YES 4 YES (for 
Vodafone, 
O2 and 
Meteor) 
 YES YES Cost-oriented prices for 
Vodafone and O2 and 
benchmarking for Meteor 
and H3G. 
To be consulted on at time 
of notificatio n. Indicated 
that MTRs may be 
established through 
combination of BU LRIC 
model and benchmarking. YES (for 
Vodafone 
and O2) 
 Price control obligation to be imposed 
on H3G (glide path to be introduced 
without delay). 
Price control set up (clarify 
benchmarking approach). 
Need for coherent European approach. 
IT IT/2005/0316  
IT/2007/0659  
IT/2008/0779  
IT/2008/0802 YES 4  
YES 
 YES YES TD FL-LRIC approach NO Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology (Importance of 
LRIC models using current costs; bring 
MTRs to cost of an efficient operator as 
soon as possible). 
Asymmetry in MTRs of the Italian 
MNOs 
Need for coherent European approach. 
 
EN 94   EN  
LV LV/2006/0464 
LV/2007/0574YES 4 YES (for 
Latvijas 
Mobiliais 
Telefons and 
Tele2) 
 YES YES Cost-orientation (for Latvijas 
Mobiliais Telefons and 
Tele2) 
NO (for Telekom Baltija and 
BITE Latvija) YES (for 
Latvijas 
Mobiliais 
Telefons 
and Tele2) Effective cost accounting methodology. 
(Take into account costs of an efficient 
operator e.g. FL-LRIC). 
(LV/2006/0464) 
Asymmetry in mobile  termination rates. 
(Take into account necessity to become 
efficient over time and need for 
coherent European approach). 
(LV/2007/0574) 
LT LT/2005/0189
LT/2009/0990YES 3 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
FL-LRAIC model from 2007.
(During transitional period: 
requirement not to apply 
worse conditions). 
BU-LRAIC as from 2009; 
glide path towards LRIC 
(CCA) NO Adjust the access obligation 
Transparency in the notification of 
remedies 
Set LRIC/CCA based prices before 
31/12/2012 (LT/2009/0990) 
LU LU/2005/0321 YES 3 YES YES YES Price control based on 
international benchmarks.  
Ultimate target reference 
prices to be consulted 
upon. Transitionally apply 
a 6% 
reduction every six months.NO Timely implementation of price control 
obligation. 
Price control based on comparison with 
other countries (appropriate basis for 
comparison only if reflect cost 
orientation). 
Level of reductions (achieve a cost 
oriented level as quickly as possible). 
 
EN 95   EN MT MT/2006/0214 
MT/2008/0790  
MT/2009/0926YES 3 YES YES YES Price control based on 
international benchmarks 
Pegged to the change in 
the average MTRs in the 
27 EU Member States. 
Change to Maltese MTRs 
limited to 10% per annum. YES Imposition of the price control 
mechanism and the need for efficient 
cost-oriented MTRs (benchmark 
countries using cost methodologies 
designed to set efficient MTRs) 
Need for notification of the proposed 
access prices to the Commission. 
NL NL/2005/0215 
NL/2006/0420  
NL/2007/0634YES 
(incl. MVNO) 5  
YES 
 YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
BU LRIC. OPTA considers 
welfare analysis justifies 
imposition of maximum 
MTRs above BU LRIC 
level. NO Determination of maximum MTR on the 
basis of a welfare analysis (depends 
largely on parameters chosen; need for 
coherent European approach). 
PL PL/2006/0379  
PL/2008/0794 
PL/2008/0855
PL/2009/0904PL/2009/0991
PL/2009/0996
PL/2009/1021YES 
(incl. MVNO) 5 
YES YES YES Charges based on costs 
incurred for Polkomtel, PT 
Cyfrowa and PTK 
potentially verified with 
benchmarking or other 
methods. 
Obligation not to charge 
excessive prices for 
Cyfrowy Polsat (CP) and 
P4. Obliged to decrease 
existing MTRs in 
proportion to glide-path 
set for 3 other MNOs in 
2007. NO Need for regulating termination rates 
reflecting efficient costs. 
(PL/2009/0991) 
Need for transparency and coherence 
in the notification of  remedies under the 
EU consultation procedure. 
(PL/2009/0904) 
Price control to be imposed on CP and 
P4 (transition to co st orientation must 
not be unreasonably long); 
Asymmetry in MTRs of CP and P4 and 
need for a coherent European 
approach (PL/2009/0996) 
Avoid amendment of remedies through 
a dispute settlement procedure and 
impose price control on P4 
(PL/2009/0996) 
 
EN 96   EN  
PT PT/2004/0129 
PT/2007/0707YES 3 YES YES YES Price control based on 
benchmarking. Cost 
methodologies and cost-
oriented prices to be 
defined following further 
consultation. YES Further consultations planned by 
Anacom. 
(PT/2004/0129) 
Imposition of different price control 
methodology without a new market 
analysis. (Anacom invited to re-
consider reintroduction of asymmetry). 
Need for a coherent European 
approach. 
(PT/2007/0707) 
RO RO/2009/0878 YES 5 YES YES YES 
(RCS & 
RDS 
exempt 
from 
obligation 
to publish 
reference 
offer) Cost-oriented tariffs to be 
defined in future by BU 
LRIC model reflecting 
costs of efficient operator. 
Sets interim glide path 
based on LRIC plus 
common and joint costs 
for Vodafone and Orange 
Romania. Delayed 
reciprocity for other 3 
operators. NO Asymmetry of mobile  termination rates 
and the cost of an efficient operator. 
(Importance of introducing cost 
orientation for all operators as soon as 
possible). 
Further consultations planned by ANC. 
 
EN 97   EN  
SK SK/2005/0136  
SK/2009/0902
SK/2009/0955YES 3 YES YES YES Cost-orientation based on a 
FAHC model supplemented 
by international 
benchmarking in transition 
from system of no cost 
orientation to implementation 
of a LRIC model.  YES Urgent need for price regulation. 
Appropriateness of the proposed 
costing methodology and need for a 
coherent European approach. 
(Importance of LRIC models 
using current costs of an efficient 
operator. Asymmetries should not 
remain in force for too long). 
(SK/2009/0902) 
Need for efficient cost-based 
termination rates for all operators 
(SK/2009/0955) 
SI SI/2005/0276 
SI/2007/0591  
SI/2009/0946 YES 4 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
BU FL-LRIC approach 
(reconciled with TD data) 
which 
calculates the avoidable cost 
of off-net call termination 
services 
BU-LRIC level to be reached 
by all operators in 2013. NO Proposed non-discrimination obligation. 
Cost of an efficient operator. 
 
EN 98   EN  
ES ES/2005/0251 
ES/2006/0471 
ES/2007/0654 
ES/2007/0654 
ES/2007/0706 
ES/2008/0819 
ES/2009/0937YES 
(incl. MVNOs) 4 MNOs 
9 full MVNOs
 YES 
 YES NO Cost-orientation for TME, 
Vodafone and Orange
based on TD FAC model 
using CCA.  Started work 
on BU LRIC. 
Xfera required to set 
reasonable prices. Existing 
margin of 48.82% (above  
MTRs of the larger 
operators) to be reduced by 
50% over next 2 years. 
Full MVNOs required to set 
reasonable prices, equal to 
MTRs of the host MNOs. YES (for 
TME, 
Vodafone 
and Orange) 
  Cost orientation obligation and cost 
accounting methodology for calculating 
MTRs 
Asymmetry allowed for Xfera 
(ES/2009/0937) 
Need for a coherent European 
approach. 
(ES/2008/0819). 
SE SE/2004/0052 
SE/2009/0941YES 4 YES YES YES Cost-orientation for 
TeliaSonera, Tele2 and 
Vodafone based on LRIC 
(incl. common costs due to 
requirement in law) of 
highest cost operator. 
Obligation of fair and 
reasonable prices for H3G 
but set at symmetric level to 
other 3 MNOs. YES Notification of amendments to price 
control obligations. 
Need for coherent European approach. 
Need to carry out a new market review. 
(SE/2009/0941) 
 
EN 99   EN UK UK/2003/0040 
UK/2004/0087 
UK/2005/0199 
UK/2006/0348 
UK/2006/0498
UK/2006/0499 
UK/2007/0617
UK/2008/0759YES 5 YES 
 YES YES Cost orientation based on 
BU-LRIC NO 3G spectrum costs.  
(Important that LRIC models use 
current costs and not historical costs 
which risk overestimating the 
appropriate costs considerably). 
(UK/2006/0498) 
Monitoring of MNOs’ compliance with 
SMP conditions by Ofcom. 
(UK/2008/0759) 
GI GI/2007/0723 
GI/2009/0977 YES* 1 NO YES NO Price control based on 
benchmarking and 
estimation of reasonable 
prices NO Non-imposition of an access obligation 
on the market for wholesale call 
termination. 
(GI/2007/0723, GI/2009/0977) 
Need for price-control obligation and for 
a coherent European approach. 
(GI/2007/0723, GI/2009/0977) 
Need for efficient rates for all operators 
GI/2009/0977  
* Identification of separat e relevant markets for wholesale SMS termination on an individual mobile network (not listed in the R ecommendation on relevant markets) 
 
 
EN 100   EN TABLE OVERVIEW OTHER MARKETS (OUTSIDE THE RECOMMENDATION ON RELEVANT MARKETS ) 
 
Former markets 3-6209 (Recommendation 2003): Fixed retail calls markets 
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition in 
line with 2003
Recom-
mendation 3 Criteria 
test/ 
Number of 
SMP 
operators CS CPS Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
Former 
market 3: 3 
criteria test 
not fulfilled 
Former 
market 4: 
no SMP  AT AT/2004/0124; 
AT/2004/0125; 
AT/2004/0126; 
AT/2006/0127; AT/2007/0581; 
AT/2007/0582;  
AT/2007/0583; 
AT/2007/0584; 
AT/2009/0880; 
AT/2009/0881 YES 
Former 
market 5 
and 6: 1 
SMP YES (in 
retail 
access 
market) NO NO Cost orientation (in former 
market 5 and 6) YES 3 criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation in former market 5 and 6 
                                                 
209 Former market 3: Publicly available local and/or national teleph one services provided at a fixed location for residential custo mers. 
 Former market 4:  Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers . 
Former market 5: Publicly available local and/or national tele phone ser vices provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers. 
Former market 6: Publicly available international telephone services at a fixed location for non-residential customers. 
 
EN 101   EN  
   Former 
markets 4 
and 6: no 
SMP       
BE BE/2006/0435, 
BE/2006/0436, 
BE/2006/0437; 
BE/2006/0438; 
BE/2007/0640; 
BE/2008/0798;  
BE/2008/0799 YES Former 
market 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP YES (in 
retail 
access 
market)  NO YES (in 
markets 
3 and 5) Prohibition of excessive 
pricing and predatory pricing 
(in markets 3 and 5) NO 3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation in former markets 3 and 5;  
hand-over of mobile termination 
reductions 
BG BG/2009/0812 YES 1 SMP  in 
former 
markets 3-6 YES (in 
retail 
access 
market)  YES YES Cost orientation FDC CC YES 3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale 
regulation 
CY CY/2006/0487; 
CY/2006/0488; 
CY/2006/0489; 
CY/2006/0490 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost orientation based on FDC YES No comment 
CZ CZ/2006/0350; 
CZ/2006/0444; 
CZ/2006/445; 
CZ/2006/0446; 
CZ/2008/0796; 
CZ/2008/0840; 
CZ/2008/0857 YES 3 Criteria 
not fulfilled YES NO NO NO NO No comment 
 
EN 102   EN  
Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 3 
Criteria not 
fulfilled DE DE/2005/0308; 
DE/2005/0309; 
DE/2005/0310; 
DE/2006/0311; 
DE/2006/0402; 
DE/2007/0628;  
DE/2007/0709; 
DE/2008/0846; 
DE/2007/0847; 
DE/2009/0895 YES  
Former 
markets 4 
and 6: No 
SMP  YES NO NO NO NO No comment 
DK DK/2005/0208; 
DK/2005/0194; 
DK/2005/0268; 
DK/2006/0269 Exclusion of 
IP telephony 1 SMP in 
former 
markets 3 
and 4; no 
SMP in 
markets 5 
and 6 YES  NO NO NO NO Exclusion of IP telephony; monitoring of 
markets  
EE EE/2007/0615; 
EE/2007/0616; 
EE/2007/0635; 
EE/2007/0636 YES No SMP YES   NO NO NO NO Efficiency of wholesale regulation; 
availability of CS CPS 
 
EN 103   EN  
Former 
markets 3 
and 5:  SMP
FI FI/2003/0022; 
FI/2003/0025; 
FI/2003/0024; 
FI/2003/0027 ; 
FI/2005/0201; 
FI/2005/0202 YES 
Former 
markets 4 
and 6: No 
SMP YES NO YES (in 
markets 3 
and 5) NO NO Efficiency of wholesale regulation (related 
to former markets 3 and 5) 
FR FR/2005/0223; 
FR/2005/0224; 
FR/2005/0225; 
FR/2005/0226; 
FR/2007/0648 YES 1 YES YES YES NO YES No comment 
Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP 
EL EL/2006/0503; 
EL/2006/0505; 
EL/2006/0556; 
EL/2006/0557; 
EL/2008/0751 YES 
Former 
market 4 
and 6: No 
SMP YES YES (in former 
markets 3 and 
5) YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) Price cap and regulation of 
retention fee, based on FDC 
CCA( in former markets 3 and 
5) YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) No comments 
HU HU/2004/0132; 
HU/2004/0133; 
HU/2004/0134; 
HU/2004/0135 ; 
HU/2007/0602; 
HU/2007/0603;  
HU/2007/0604; 
HU/2007/0605 YES 4 (related to 
network 
coverage) YES NO NO NO NO Efficiency of wholesale regulation 
 
EN 104   EN  
 
IE IE/2005/0160; 
IE/2005/0161; 
IE/2005/0162; 
IE/2005/0163 ; 
IE/2007/0697; 
IE/2007/0698; 
IE/2007/0699; 
IE/2007/0700 YES 3 criteria not 
fulfilled YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
Former 
markets 3 
and 5: 1 
SMP 
IT IT/2006/0398; 
IT/2006/0399; 
IT/2006/0407; 
IT/2006/0408;  
IT/2009/0951; 
IT/2009/952 YES 
Former 
markets 4 
nd 6: 3 
criteria not 
fulfilled YES YES (in former 
markets 3 and 
5) YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) Price cap (in former markets 3 
and 5) YES (in 
former 
markets 3 
and 5) Prohibition of retail price differentiation 
according to the destination of calls 
LV LV/2006/0567; 
LV/2006/0568; LV/2006/0569; 
LV/2006/0570 YES 1 
YES NO NO YES NO Lack of details concerning price 
regulation; Lack of imposition of 
accounting separation 
LT LT/2006/0425; 
LT/2006/0426; 
LT/2006/0427; 
LT/2006/0428 ; 
LT/2008/0763; 
LT/2008/0764 YES 1 YES NO NO YES YES Efficiency of wholesale regulation 
 
EN 105   EN  
LU LU/2006/0532; 
LU/2006/0533; 
LU/2006/0534; 
LU/2006/0535 YES 1 YES YES YES Reasonable prices YES No comments 
MT MT/2006/0396; 
MT/2006/0397; 
MT/2006/0514; 
MT/2006/0515 ; 
MT/2009/0884 YES 3 Criteria 
test not 
fulfilled YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
Combined 
access and 
calls market 
for 
residential: 
No SMP 
NL NL/2005/0287; 
NL/2005/0288; 
NL/2005/0289; 
NL/2005/0290; 
NL/2005/0291; 
NL/2005/0292;  
NL/2005/0293; 
NL/2005/0294; 
NL/2005/0295; 
NL/2005/0296 ; 
NL/2008/0821 Combined 
retail access 
and calls 
markets Combined 
access and 
calls market 
for non-
residential: 
3 criteria not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO Market definition; fu lfilment of the second 
criterion of the 3 criteria test 
PL PL/2006/0528; 
PL/2006/0529; 
PL/2006/0530; 
PL/2006/531 Exclusion of 
certain calls 
from the 
market 1 YES YES YES YES NO Second Phase: Exclusion of calls over 
certain numbers 
 (Case PL/2006/0528);  
monitoring; motivation 
 
EN 106   EN  
PT PT/2004/0055; 
PT/2004/0056; 
PT/2004/0057; 
PT/2004/0058; 
PT/2004/0059; 
PT/2004/0091 YES 1 YES YES YES YES (in market 3 and 4 only); 
cost orientation for retention for 
fixed-to-mobile calls YES No comment 
RO RO/2009/1004 Yes 3 criteria not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comment 
ES ES/2005/0326; 
ES/2005/0327; 
ES/2005/0328; 
ES/2005/0329 ; 
ES/2008/0817 YES No SMP YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
SI SI/2005/0264; 
SI/2005/0265; 
SI/2005/0298; 
SI/2005/0299 ; 
SI/2009/0893 YES 3 criteria not 
fulfilled YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
SK SK/2006/0344; 
SK/2006/0345; 
SK/2006/0347; 
SK/2006/0349 YES 1 SMP YES YES NO YES (prohibition of 
unreasonably low pricing and 
bundling) NO No comments 
SE SE/2005/0195; 
SE/2005/0196; 
SE/2005/0197 ; 
SE/2005/0198 YES 3 criteria not 
fulfilled; no 
SMP YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 107   EN  
UK UK/2003/0007; 
UK/2003/0008; 
UK/2003/0045;  
UK/2007/0585;  
UK/2007/0649;  
UK/2008/0769;   
UK/2009/0899 YES No SMP 
(with the 
exception of 
Hull area) YES NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
 
EN 108   EN  
Former market 7 (Recommendation 2003 ): Minimum set of  leased lines  
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition 
in line 
with 2003 
Recom-
mendatio
n 3 
Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operato
rs Supply of 
minimum 
set Non-
discrimina
tion Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT AT/2004/0079; 
AT/2006/0507; AT/2008/0836  inclusion 
of n* 64 
kbit/s to 
n*2048 
kbit/s) 1 
YES YES YES YES YES Prospective market analysis and efficiency of 
wholesale regulation 
BE BE/2006/0551; 
BE/2007/0640 YES 1 YES YES YES YES NO Efficiency of wholesale regulation 
BG NOT NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/0484 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
based on LRIC YES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0447; 
CZ/2009/0872  YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
DK DK/2005/0177; YES 1 YES YES YES YES NO No comments 
 
EN 109   EN EE EE/2007/0642 YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 
and no 
SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
EL EL/2006/0491; 
EL/2008/0751  YES 1 NO YES YES Transition from 
FDC CCA to    
LRIC-CCA YES No comments 
FI FI/2004/0079; 
FI/2009/0985 YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
YES for 
minimum 
set Cost-orientation for 
minimum set cost 
orientation;: cost 
accounting to be 
defined later on;  FR FR/2006/0415 Inclusion 
of higher 
bandwidth 
and 
separate 
market for 
alternative 
interfaces 1 NO YES 
NO for 
higher 
bandwidth Other than 
minimum set: 
prohibition of 
predatory pricing; YES Inclusion of higher bandwidth in market 
DE DE/2006/479; 
DE/2007/619 
DE/2009/1009  YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
HU HU/2005/0167; 
HU/2007/0737  YES 1 YES NO NO NO NO Efficiency of wholesale regulation 
IE IE/2005/0137; 
IE/2008/0791 YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 110   EN IT IT/2005/0315 
(withdrawn); 
IT/2006/0371 
IT/2009/0988 YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
LV LV/2007/0571 YES 1 YES NO YES Cost-orientation NO No comments 
LT LT/2006/0429 YES 1 NO YES YES Cost-orientation 
based on FDC YES No comments 
LU LU/2006/0559 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
based on FDC NO No comments 
MT MT/2006/0373 Inclusion 
of 
internation
al retail 
leased 
lines 1 NO YES YES Cost orientation 
based on FDC-HC YES No comments 
NL NL/2005/0279; 
NL/2009/0824  YES 3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
PL PL/2006/0550 YES 1 YES YES YES Prohibition of 
excessive high and 
excessive low 
prices based on  
FL-FDC YES Efficiency of wholesale regulation 
PT PT/2005/0155 YES 1 YES YES YES YES NO No comments 
RO NOT NOTIFIED  
 
EN 111   EN SK SK/2006/0463 
SK/2009/1008 YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
SI SI/2005/0240; 
SI/208/0768  YES 3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
ES ES/2006/0352; 
ES/2009/0931  YES 3 
criteria 
test not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
SE SE/2004/0048 YES 1 YES YES YES YES YES No comments 
UK UK/2003/0035; 
UK/2004/0045; 
UK/2004/0077; 
UK/2004/0123; 
UK/2005/0217; 
UK/2005/0218; 
UK/2007/0649; UK/2008/0749; UK/2009/0938  Including 
higher 
bandwidth 2 
YES (on 
BT only) YES (on 
BT only)YES (on BT 
only); 
Obligation 
for Standard 
offer 
withdrawn  YES, (on BT only) 
conditional to 
breach of voluntary 
price undertaking  YES (on BT only) Need to carry out new market analysis 
 
EN 112   EN  
Former market 10 (Recommendation 2003): Transit services in the fixed pubic telephone network  
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related cases Market 
definition in
line with 
Recommen
dation 2003 Three 
criteria test/
Number of 
SMP 
operators Access Non-
discrimination Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT AT/2004/0090 
AT/2006/0590 
AT/2009/0936  YES 3 criteria 
test not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments (/AT/2009/0936) 
BE BE/2006/0441 
BE/2008/0750  YES 1 YES YES YES YES YES No comments 
BG NOT NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/0475 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC YES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0448 YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO Additional information to be included  
DK DK/2005/0525 
DK/2007/0692  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
EE EE/2007/0599 
(withdrawn); 
EE/2007/0670  YES NO SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 113   EN  
FI FI/2004/0075 
FI/2007/0705  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
FR  FR/2005/0229 
FR/2007/0652  YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation  except for 
intra-territorial transit YES No comments 
DE DE/2005/0145 
DE/2005/0255 DE/2008/0845 DE/2009/0887 
DE/2009/888  YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO 
No comments 
EL EL/2006/0495 
EL/2008/0751  YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
LRAIC- CC YES No comments 
HU HU/2005/0153 
HU/2007/0728  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
IE IE/2005/0192 
IE/2007/0673 
IE/2007/0674 
IE/2009/0921  Definition 
of an 
additional 
market for 
internatio
nal transit 1 SMP in 
national 
transit 
market; 
No SMP 
in 
internation
al transit 
market YES  YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC YES Need to monitor replicability 
IT IT/2006/0385 
IT/2007/0695  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
LV LV/2006/0367 YES 1 YES YES YES YES YES No comments 
LT LT/2006/0319 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
FL-LRAIC YES No comments 
 
EN 114   EN  
LU LU/2006/0542 YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
MT MT/2006/0389 YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
NL NL/2005/0285; 
NL/2007/0744; 
NL/2008/0793; 
NL/2008/0800  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
PL PL/2007/0686; 
PL/2008/0766 
(withdrawn); 
PL/2008/0788; 
PL/2007/0745;   
PL/2008/0831  Yes No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
PT PT/2005/0154 YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO Arguments for 3 criteria to be further 
developped 
RO RO/2009/1005 YES 1 YES YES YES LRAIC YES Monitoring SMP 
SK SK/2006/0470; 
SK/2009/0954  YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
SI SI/2005/0274; 
SI/2007/0691  YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
LRIC YES No comments 
ES ES/2006/0404  
ES/2009/'0962  YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comment 
 
EN 115   EN SE SE/2004/0051 
SE/2009/0968  YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
UK UK/2003/0006; 
UK/2003/0015s; 
UK/2004/0045; 
UK/2004/0064; 
UK/2004/0071s; 
UK/2004/0088; 
UK/2004/0122; 
UK/2005/0164s 
UK/2005/0166; 
UK/2005/0170s; 
UK/2005/0180;  
UK/2005/300; 
UK/2007/0585;  
UK/2007/0649  
UK/2008/0769; 
UK/2009/0898  YES 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled; 
no SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comment 
 
 
EN 116   EN  
Former market 14 (Recommendation 2003): Trunk leased lines  
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definition 
in line 
with 2003 
Recom-
mendatio
n 3 
Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operato
rs Access Non-
discrimina
tion Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT AT/2004/074; 
AT/2006/0467  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
BE BE/2006/0553 YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
BG NOT NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/0483 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
based on LRIC; 
transitionally retail 
minus YES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0451 YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
DK DK/2007/0586; 
DK/2007/0725  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
EE EE/2007/0644 YES 1 YES YES YES Price cap;  
accounting system 
to be developed by 
SMP operator YES NRA to develop cost accounting 
 
EN 117   EN EL EL/2006/0423; 
EL/2008/0751  YES 1 YES YES YES Cost orientation 
based on LRIC 
CCA YES No comments 
FI FI/2004/0081 YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
FR FR/2006/0417 Inclusion 
of inter-
territorial 
trunk 
leased 
lines 1 YES YES YES prohibition of 
excessive and 
predatory pricing;  
cost orientation for 
specific lines  YES No comments 
DE DE/2006/0481 
(withdrawn); 
DE/2007/0678; 
DE/2007/0688  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
HU HU/2005/0169;  
HU/2007/0739  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
IE IE/2005/0140; 
IE/2008/0791  YES 3 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled 
and no 
SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
IT IT/2005/0273 
IT/2009/999 YES E 
criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
LV LV/2007/0573 YES No SM P NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 118   EN  
LT LT/2006/0431 YES 1 YES YES YES Cost orientation 
based on FDC 
checked against  
EU benchmark YES No comments 
LU LU/2006/0562 Trunk and 
terminatin
g in same 
market 1 YES YES YES Cost-orientation 
based on FDC YES Need to justify lack of separation of trunk and 
terminating segment 
MT MT/2006/0375 YES 1 YES YES YES YES YES No comments 
NL NL/2005/0283 YES No SM P NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
YES for 
SMP lines YES for 
SMP lines YES for 
SMP lines Cost orientation 
based on costs 
incurred for SMP 
lines YES for SMP 
lines 
PL PL/2007/0668; 
(withdraw in 
Phase II);  
PL/2008/0772 
(withdrawn in 
Phase II); 
PL/2008/0856 
PL/2009/0971  Market 
defined 
line per 
line  3 
criteria 
and 
SMP on 
part of 
lines No for 
other lines No for 
other lines No for 
other lines No for other lines No for other lines Market delineation route per route; need for 
geographic market delineation; lack of 
evidence  from market share based analysis; 
need to withdraw regulation on competitive 
routes 
PT PT/2005/0157 YES 1 YES YES YES YES YES No comments 
RO NOT NOTIFIED  
SK SK/2006/0414 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2007/0675 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2009/0879  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 119   EN SI SI/2005/0220 
(withdrawn); 
SI/2005/0362  YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
NO for 
trunk 
leased 
lines in 
general  NO for 
trunk 
leased 
lines in 
general  NO for 
trunk 
leased 
lines in 
general  NO for trunk leased 
lines in general  NO for trunk 
leased lines in 
general 
ES ES/2006/0459; 
ES/2009/922  Inclusion 
of 
undersea 
cables 3 
Criteria 
fulfilled 
and 
SMP 
only for 
10 
underse
a cable YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables)  YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables)  YES (for 
10 
undersea 
cables)  Reasonable prices 
for 10 undersea 
cables  NO Need to detail price control; need to monitor 
each of the undersea cable routes  
SE SE/2005/0341 YES No SMP NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
UK UK/2003/0039; 
UK/2008/0748; 
UK/2008/0859; 
UK/2009/0901  YES (no 
market 
defined for 
Hull area) 1  YES YES YES YES NO Need to carry out the 3 criteria test; Low 
market share and time-frame of charge control 
 
EN 120   EN  
Former Market 15 (Recommendation 2003) : Mobile access and call origination 
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related casesMarket 
definiti
on in 
line 
with 
2003 
Recom
mendat
ion 3 Criteria 
test/ 
Number 
of SMP 
operators  Access Non-
discriminatio
n Trans-
parency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT AT/2004/0063 YES 0 NO  NO NO NO NO Need to monitor the market 
BE BE/2007/0610 YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments  
BG NOT NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/0333
CY/2009/0877  YES 1 YES YES YES NO YES No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0405 YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments  
DK DK/2005/0243
DK/2008/0863  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments  
EE EE/2007/0651 YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments  
EL EL/2006/0492 YES 0 NO  NO NO NO NO No comments  
 
EN 121   EN FI  
FI/2004/0082 YES 1 NO NO NO NO NO Veto: Need to consider  market dynamics 
FR FR/2005/0179 
(withdrawn) NOT NOTIFIED  
DE DE/2007/0627 Splitting  
the 
market; 
exclusio
n of 
VAS 0 NO NO NO NO NO Splitting of market; exclusion of conveyance to 
VAS; proportionality of licence obligations  
HU HU/2004/0108 
HU/2007/0594  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO  
IE IE/2004/0121 YES 2 (joint 
SMP), 
annulled 
by Panel NO NO NO NO NO Analysis based on retail market; fringe 
competitors; need to notify implementing 
measures 
Second Phase: Definition of markets per 
network for call origination to value added 
services (IT/2007/0575)  IT IT/2005/0259; 
IT/2007/0575 
(withdrawn); 
IT/2008/0861  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO 
No comments (IT/2008/0861) 
LV LV/2006/0545 YES 0 NO  NO NO NO NO No comments 
LT LT/2006/0406 YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
LU LU/2005/0320 
(withdrawn); 
LU/2006/0369  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 122   EN GI GI/2007/0722 YES 1 YES YES YES NO YES Need to monitor the market 
MT MT/2006/0443 YES 2 (joint 
SMP) YES YES YES Cost orientation on 
request YES Competitive conditions at retail level; existence 
of pent-up demand; reta liation mechanism; 
market entry of a third MNO; Need to review 
the market. 
NL NL/2005/0242 YES 0 NO  NO NO NO NO No comments 
PL PL/2006/0378 
(withdrawn); 
PL/2008/0756  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
PT NOT NOTIFIED  
RO NOT NOTIFIED  
SK SK/2005/0248 
(withdrawn); 
SK/2006/0442  YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO Need to monitor the market; absence of 
analysis of wholesale market 
SI SI/2005/0230; 
SI/2008/0806 
(withdrawn in 
phase II); 
SI/2009/913  YES 1 YES YES NO reasonable 
prices NO Second phase: Insufficient evidence for joint 
dominance (SI/2008/0806);  
Comment: Three criteria test and SMP; 
Monitoring market developments; need to 
notify price control (SI/2009/0913) 
ES ES/2005/0330 YES 3 (joint SMP) YES NO NO Yes NO Competitive conditions at retail level 
SE SE/2005/0203 YES 0 NO NO NO NO NO No comments  
UK UK/2003/0001 YES 0 NO  NO NO NO NO Comment on reliance on retail market and 
market shares; on international benchmark for 
concentration 
 
EN 123   EN  
 
Former market 18 (Recommendation 2003): Broadcasting transmissi on services to deliver broadcast content to end users  
 
Remedies imposed 
Member 
State Related cases Market 
definition in
line with 
2003 
Recommen
dation Three 
criteria test/ 
Number of 
SMP 
operators Access Non-
discrimin
ation Transpar
ency Price control /  
cost accounting Accounting 
separation Comments / no comment 
AT AT/2003/0002; 
AT/2003/0018; 
AT/2005/0318; 
AT/2006/0360; 
AT/2009/0896  Market 
split 1 SMP for  
terrestrial 
transmissi
on Terrestrial YES YES FDC HC based on costs of 
operator y Need to delineate mark et at the time of 
market analysis 
BE BE/2006/0578 
(withdrawn) NOT NOTIFIED  
BG                                NOT NOTIFIED 
CY CY/2006/0497 Market 
split 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
CZ CZ/2006/0453; 
CZ/2009/0907  Market 
split 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
 
EN 124   EN DK DK/2007/0618 Market 
split 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO Market delineation 
EE EE/2007/0666 Market 
split 1 SMP for  
terrestrial 
transmissi
on Terrestrial: 
access to 
masts and 
signal 
transmission YES YES Prohibition of excessive 
pricing based on cost 
accounting system decided 
by operator YES Scope of the access obligation; need to 
monitor cost accounting  
TV: Access 
to antenna 
and capacity 
sharing for 
terrestrial 
digital 
 YES (for access to digital TV 
only) 
 YES (for 
access to 
digital TV 
only) 
FI 
 FI/2004/0076; 
FI/2008/0789  Market 
split 1 SMP 
Radio: 
Access to 
antenna and 
capacity 
sharing for 
terrestrial 
analogue  NO YES (for 
access 
to 
antenna 
only) 
NO (for other than digital TV) NO (for 
other than 
digital TV) Lack of further obligations for access to 
antenna sites 
 
EN 125   EN  
Cost orientation for access to 
the 78 non-replicable sites; 
HCA CC  
FR  FR/2006/0335; 
FR/2008/0758; FR/2009/0914  Market 
split
 three 
criteria 
only 
fulfilled for 
transmissi
on of 
digital 
television; 
1 SMP Digital TV 
only: access 
to buildings, 
masts and 
broadcasting 
channel 
multiplexes
210 YES YES 
Prohibition of excessive 
pricing for access to the 
other than the non-replicable 
sites YES Need to monitor the list of sites; need to 
notified withdrawal/adding of antenna  
sites of one of the lists 
Signal 
delivery - 
only if 
downstream 
operator 
connects less 
than 500 
homes YES YES 
DE DE/2006/0469, 
DE/2007/0606; 
DE/2009/0940  Market 
split 3 SMP 
(cable) 
feeding 
content into 
platform NO YES Ex post price control: 
prohibition of abusive pricing 
NO No comments 
EL EL/2007/0684 Market 
split 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
HU HU/2007/0734 Market 
split 1  To terrestrial 
transmission YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
choice of operator between 
ceiling plus glide path or 
FDC NO Constraints on SMP from emerging 
markets211 
                                                 
210   I.e., access to digital television only fo r upstream services, i.e., services offere d to other broadcasting transmission provid ers; no access obligation to downstream 
transmission services offered to broadcasters.  
211  See also Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC and SEC (2007)1483 p. 17. 
 
EN 126   EN IE IE/2004/0042, 
IE/2004/0114  Market 
split 1 SMP 
terrestrial 
trans-
mission  NO YES YES NO YES No comments 
IT IT/2006/0424;  
IT/2007/0729  Market 
split 2 SMP 
terrestrial 
trans-
mission  To terrestrial 
television 
transmission YES NO NO NO No comments 
LV LV/2007/0694 Market 
split 3 criteria 
not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
LT LT/2006/0376, 
LT/2006/0468 
LT/2009/1022 Terrestrial 
analogue 
and 
digital/radi
o/broadca
sting = 7 
markets  3 Criteria 
test and 
SMP 
fulfilled for 
7 defined 
markets;  
2 SMP 
operators YES YES YES Restricted to certain 
terrestrial analogue radio 
and TV transmission: Cost-
orientation with glide path, 
based on  FDC  YES monitor market developments; intra-
platform competition; exclusive rights 
for LRTC and TEO 
LU NOT NOTIFIED 
MT MT/2006/0564 
(withdrawn); 
MT/2008/0810  Market 
split 3 criteria 
test not 
fulfilled NO NO NO NO NO No comments 
 
EN 127   EN  
NL NL/2005/0246 
(cable); 
NL/2005/0270,  
NL/2005/0277, 
NL/2006/0410 
(terrestrial); 
NL/2008/0849 
(terrestrial); NL/2009/0873 (cable);   
NL/2009/1007;  
NL/2009/1015  Market 
split
 3  criteria 
test not 
fulfilled for 
terrestrial;
4 SMP 
operators 
for cable 
transmissi
on  Analogue 
and digital 
cable 
transmission YES 
(for 
cable) YES (for 
cable) Cost-orientation (for cable) 
based on cost accounting, 
and in the absence of cost-
accounting, based on retail 
minus NO Market delineation for 
access/transmission; three criteria test 
for cable; outhpasing of analogue 
PL PL/2006/0455 Market 
split 1 SMP 
terrestrial Analogue 
and digital, 
TV and 
radio212  YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
FL-LRIC  YES Exclusion of cable from analysis; too 
narrow remedies; possibility to 
differentiate remedies between national 
and local transmission services; 
absence of timing for cost accounting 
PT PT/2007/0655 Market 
split 1 Digital TV YES YES YES YES monitoring competition from emerging 
platforms 
RO RO/2009/0876 Market 
split 1 YES NO NO Cost-orientation based on 
FDC -HC   NO examination of infringements due to 
exclusive rights 
SK SK/2006/0456 Market 
split 1 Analogue 
terrestrial TV 
and Radio YES YES Cost-orientation based on 
FDC-HC YES Exclusion of other than analogue 
terrestrial from the market 
                                                 
212  Access obligation imposed only in relation to other transmission se rvices operators due to restric tions on scope of remedy impo sed by la w. 
 
EN 128   EN  
For digital: Cost orientation 
based on FAC HCA; until 
implementation: reasonable 
prices YES for 
digital 
SI SI/2006/0476; 
SI/2007/0730    Market 
split 1 Digital and 
analogue 
terrestrial TV 
and Radio YES YES 
For analogue: NO NO for 
analogue Consider competitive constraints from 
emerging platforms; clarification of 
reasonable pricing 
ES ES/2006/0252; 
ES/2009/0905  Market 
split 1 Terrestrial YES YES Cost-orientation ; prohibition 
of price squeeze, predatory 
pricing NO monitoring effectiveness of access 
obligation (collocation); monitoring 2nd 
criteria due to market entry at regional 
level 
SE SE/2005/0188, 
SE/2005/0266, 
SE/2009/0975 Market 
split Three 
criteria 
test 
fulfilled for 
free to air 
terrestrial 
TV; 
 1 SMP Analogue 
and digital 
terrestrial 
free to air TV; NO NO Cost-orientation based on 
FDC-HC YES No comments 
UK UK/2004/0111 Market 
split 2 To masts and 
antennas for 
terrestrial  YES YES Cost-orientation NO Exclusion of satellite 
 
EN 129   EN