EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 6.10.2020 SWD(2020) 355 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2020 Report





Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2020) 660 final} - {SWD(2020) 350 final} - {SWD(2020) 351 final} - {SWD(2020) 352 final} - {SWD(2020) 353 final} - {SWD(2020) 354 final} - {SWD(2020) 356 final}



Table of Contents 1.INTRODUCTION 1.1.Context 2.FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS 2.1.Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 2.1.1Democracy10 2.1.2.Public administration reform18 2.2.Rule of law and fundamental rights21 2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights21 2.2.2Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security42 3.Fundamentals first: economic development and competitiveness53 3.1.The existence of a functioning market economy54 3.2.The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union60 4.GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION63 5.ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP67 5.1.Chapter 1: Free movement of goods67 5.2.Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers69 5.3.Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 69

5.4.Chapter 4: Free movement of capital69 5.5.Chapter 5: Public procurement71 5.9.Chapter 9: Financial services76 5.10.Chapter 10: Information society and media77 5.11.Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development79 5.12.Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy80 5.13.Chapter 13: Fisheries81 5.14.Chapter 14: Transport policy82 5.15.Chapter 15: Energy83 5.16.Chapter 16: Taxation86 5.17.Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy87 5.18.Chapter 18: Statistics88 5.19.Chapter 19: Social policy and employment89 5.20.Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy92 5.21.Chapter 21: Trans-European networks94 5.22.Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments95 5.25.Chapter 25: Science and research96 5.26.Chapter 26: Education and culture97 5.27.Chapter 27: Environment and climate change99 5.28.Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection102

5.29.Chapter 29: Customs Union104 5.30.Chapter 30: External relations105 5.31.Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy106 5.32.Chapter 32: Financial control110 5.33.Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions112 Annex I – Relations between the EU and Turkey114



1. INTRODUCTION 1.1.Context Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by an Association Agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was established in 1995. The European Council granted the status of candidate country to Turkey in December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters had been opened and one of these was provisionally closed. The General Affairs Council conclusions of June 2019 reiterated the Council’s position of June 2018 that under the currently prevailing circumstances, Turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the Customs Union can be currently foreseen . The Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession has not been matched by corresponding measures and reforms, and the EU’s serious concerns on continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed with further backsliding in many areas. Following its last meeting on 9 May 2019, no further meetings of the inter-ministerial Reform Action Group were held. The relations with the EU worsened due to the developments in Syria and Libya. In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 2019 the Council decided to suspend negotiations with Turkey on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement, not to hold for the time being the EU-Turkey Association Council as well as further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level dialogues, to endorse the Commission’s proposal to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for 2020, and to invite the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign-backed lending. The EU further adopted a framework for targeted measures against Turkey in November 2019 and decided in February 2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations under this sanctions framework. On 1 October 2020, the European Council agreed to launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda, provided constructive efforts to stop illegal activities vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus are sustained. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. The European Council also stressed that in case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States. Turkey sustained its outstanding efforts to host more than 3.6 million registered refugees from Syria and around 370,000 registered refugees from other countries, which is the largest refugee community in the world. Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The full operational budget of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was committed by the end of 2019. Out of a total of EUR 6 billion, EUR 5.1 billion had been contracted, out of which EUR 3.8 billion had been disbursed. Overall, the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued to deliver results, with both parties renewing commitment to its effective implementation. Early in March 2020, Turkey however actively encouraged migrants and refugees to take the land route to Europe through Greece. Later in March, the Turkish authorities organised transport for migrants and refugees away from the border area with Greece and closed the borders with Greece and Bulgaria except for commercial traffic because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Turkey also called for a new agreement to replace the March 2016 Statement. Following the meeting of the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council with the Turkish President on 9 March 2020, both sides engaged in a process to take stock of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. The EU decided to mobilise additional EUR 485 million from the 2020 budget to ensure the continuation of flagship projects funded under the 2016-19 Facility providing refugees with basic needs and access to education. Assisting refugees affected by the Syrian crisis and their hosting countries will continue to be needed, and the and the recent Communication on a new Pact on Asylum and Migration noted that continued and sustained EU funding in some form will be essential. The first half of 2020 has been marked by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU redirected EU funds worth EUR 83 million to support the COVID-19 response in Turkey, notably to support the most vulnerable refugees, and agreed to extend implementing periods for some Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) programmes. In the context of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Commission immediately launched awareness raising activities for the refugee population who are among the most vulnerable people. An agreement was reached with the Turkish government to mobilise savings and contingencies under the Facility to support the national COVID-19 response. This support will continue. Turkey pledged EUR 75 million as its contribution to support the search for a vaccine in the COVID-19 Global Response Summit held on 4 May. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March Turkey set up the Economic Stability Shield package worth TRY 100 billion ($15.4 billion; 2.2% of GDP) A quarter of this support goes to doubling the credit guarantee fund's limit to TRY 50 billion to provide SMEs and companies with liquidity needs. A number of smaller measures under this package include the postponement of repayment terms of loans extended by public banks. The scope of SME support was extended to the services sector, craftsmen and artisans. A new support scheme was established for companies with production capability of personal protective equipment and disinfectants. In order to mitigate the social impact, the government enacted some short-term measures. It eased the eligibility criteria for short-term work benefits to workers and rules for taking unpaid leave. The social security premium liabilities of employers are postponed by 6 months, and employers receive a monthly support of TRY 75 to the wage of each worker paid at minimum wage level until the end of 2020. A one-off payment of TRY 1,000 was made in April to 4.4 million households, including the 2.1 million households receiving regular social assistance. A National Solidarity Fund has been set up to provide further support to families in need. The measures are limited in the light of the impact of the pandemic on employment, in particular on informal workers. The European Commission recommended that emergency measures taken in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic are proportionate, restricted to what is necessary and limited in time so that rule of law and democratic and human rights standards are respected. 1.2 Summary of the report Despite the lifting of the state of emergency in July 2018, the adverse impacts of the two-year long emergency ruling continued to significantly impact on democracy and fundamental rights. Certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the government authorities and retaining several restrictive elements of the emergency rule have been integrated into law. Key recommendations of the Council of Europe and its bodies are yet to be addressed. Allegations of wrongdoing need to be addressed through transparent procedures and on an individual basis. Individual criminal liability can only be established with full respect for the separation of powers, the full independence of the judiciary and the right of every individual to a fair trial and due process.

The constitutional architecture continued centralising powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and balances mechanism, the democratic accountability of the executive branch remains limited to elections. Under these conditions, the serious backsliding of the respect for democratic standards, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms continued. Political polarisation continued to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue. Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained weak. Under the presidential system, many regulatory authorities and the Central Bank were directly linked to the Presidency, undermining their independence. The opposition candidate won the re-run of the metropolitan mayoral elections in Istanbul on 23 June 2019. While the elections were professionally organised, they were characterised by limited plurality for democratic media and conditions that were objectively not fair to all political parties and candidates in all respects. Turkey needs to take steps to improve the broader environment for elections, ensuring a level playing field for all candidates and protecting the integrity of the election process. The implementation of Venice Commission recommendations is crucial in this regard. The situation in the south-east continued to be very worrying, despite an improved security environment. The replacement of 47 democratically elected HDP municipal mayors by centrally-appointed trustees in the south-east put the results of the democratic process of the 31 March 2019 local elections into question. Arrests and dismissals of elected mayors and party representatives continued and seriously damaged local democracy. The Government continued security operations against a background of the recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. While the government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is also responsible for ensuring this is done in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. Despite some reconstruction, only few internally displaced persons have received compensation. There were no visible developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. Civil society came under continuous pressure and their space to operate freely has continued to diminish. The Gezi trial and the continued pre-trial detention of Osman Kavala, despite the existence of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights calling on his release, had a deterrent effect. Administrative difficulties for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continued to hamper civil society activities. Civil society organisations remained excluded from genuine legislative consultation processes. The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained unchanged with strengthened civilian oversight of the security forces under the presidential system. Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in public administration reform. There was backsliding during the reporting period. The major restructuring of public administration and civil service after the shift to the presidential system in 2018 continued to have a negative impact on policy development, accountability of the administration as well as human resources management, although policy coordination among central government institutions remained strong. Changes to the civil service system have increased the politicisation of the administration. No steps were taken to develop a comprehensive public administration reform strategy and an overarching public financial management reform programme. An effective remedy still needs to be provided for the large-scale dismissals that took place during the state of emergency. There remained questions over the extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy. Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage of preparation and serious backsliding continued during the reporting period. Concerns remained, in particular over the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary. The President announced the Judicial Reform Strategy for 2019-2023 in May 2019. However, it falls short of addressing key shortcomings regarding the independence of the judiciary. No measures were announced to remedy the concerns identified by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and in the European Commission’s annual country reports. There are concerns that dismissals in the absence of respect for due procedures caused self-censorship and intimidation within the judiciary. No measures were taken to change the structure of, and process for, the selection of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to strengthen its independence. Concerns regarding the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors persisted. No changes were made to the institution of criminal judges of peace so that concerns regarding their jurisdiction and practice remained. Regarding the fight against corruption, Turkey remained at an early stage and made no progress in the reporting period. The country continued to lack preventive anti-corruption bodies. The flaws of the legal framework and institutional architecture allowed undue political influence in the investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. Accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated the lack of political will to fight decisively against corruption. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and there was limited progress. The 2019-2021 national action plan, for the implementation of the 2016-2021 national strategy on the fight against organised crime, was adopted in May 2019. Cooperation between Europol and Turkey is based on a Strategic Agreement on Cooperation, which entered into force in July 2004. Negotiations concerning an operational cooperation agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Turkey were ongoing, requiring Turkey to align its data protection law in line with European standards. Turkey should improve its track record on dismantling criminal networks and confiscating criminal assets. The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing needs to be improved. Efforts are needed to improve the legislation on cybercrime, asset confiscation and witness protection. A cooperation agreement with CEPOL has been in force since 2010. The deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued. Many of the measures introduced during the state of emergency remained in force and continued to have a profound and devastating impact. The legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights but the legislation and practice still need to be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law. The lack of institutional independence, lengthy review procedures, the absence of sufficiently individualised criteria, and the absence of a proper means of defence cast serious doubt over the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures’ ability to provide an effective remedy against dismissals. Legislation introduced immediately after the lifting of the state of emergency removed crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, thereby increasing the risk of impunity. The enforcement of rights is hindered by the fragmentation and limited independence of public institutions responsible for protecting human rights and freedoms, and is aggravated by the lack of an independent judiciary. Restrictions imposed on, and surveillance of, the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices on a broad scale have a negative effect on the exercise of these freedoms, and lead to self-censorship. Credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment continued to be reported. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a controversial legislative package provided for the conditional release of up to 90,000 prisoners. As of July, 65,000 prisoners had been released. However, it excluded those held in pre-trial detention for alleged terrorism-related offences, including lawyers, journalists, politicians and human rights defenders. Serious backsliding continued on freedom of expression. The disproportionate implementation of the restrictive measures continued to negatively affect the freedom of expression and dissemination of opposition voices. Criminal cases and convictions of journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and social media continued. The ban on Wikipedia was lifted in December 2019, however, the blocking and erasing of online content without a court order on an inappropriately wide range of grounds continued. There was further backsliding in the area of freedom of assembly and association in light of recurrent bans, disproportionate interventions in peaceful demonstrations, investigations, administrative fines and prosecutions against demonstrators on charges of ‘terrorism-related activities’. The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and of persons belonging to minorities need better protection. Roma continue to live in very poor housing, often lacking basic public services and relying on social benefits. The urban renewal projects continue to affect primarily their settlements, forcing the displacement of entire families. Gender-based violence, discrimination, hate speech against minorities, hate crime and violations of human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons are still a matter of serious concern. In the area of migration and asylum policy, Turkey made some progress. Throughout 2019, Turkey was committed to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 and played a key role in ensuring effective management of migratory flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route. Turkey sustained its outstanding efforts to provide unprecedented humanitarian aid and support to more than 3.6 million registered refugees from Syria and around 370,000 registered refugees from other countries, thus hosting the largest refugee community in the world. However, in March 2020, Turkey actively encouraged migrants and refugees to take the land route to Europe through Greece. This led to the set-up of an informal camp at one of the Greek-Turkish border crossing points in Pazarkule, hosting close to 60,000 migrants and refugees in dire conditions. Later in March, the Turkish authorities organised transport for the migrants and refugees away from the border area and closed the borders with Greece and Bulgaria except for commercial traffic because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the Turkish Minister of Interior indicated that this move did not mean a change in Turkey’s policy to allow irregular migrants’ exits over its borders and the government had no intention to prevent anyone who wishes to leave Turkey. While the EU acknowledged the increased migratory burden and risks Turkey had been facing on its territory and the substantial efforts it was making in hosting refugees, it strongly rejected Turkey's use of migratory pressure for political purposes. Overall, the number of illegal border crossings between Turkey and Greece still remained significantly lower than prior to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. The prolonged presence of refugees in the country requires efficient integration measures to avoid social tensions. The authorities should increase access to public health for migrants and refugees in the country. A comprehensive amendment to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was adopted in 2019. Turkey still did not implement the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement towards all Member States nor the provisions relating to third-country nationals. Despite an announced acceleration of work on visa liberalisation, no outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were fulfilled and amendments to the anti-terror law and data protection law are still outstanding. Turkey still needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy. Turkey’s foreign policy increasingly collided with the EU priorities under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean region further increased in the reporting period as a result of Turkey’s illegal actions and provocative statements challenging the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey deployed two drilling and two seismic vessels in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus, including in the areas that have been licensed by the Government of Cyprus to European oil and gas companies, as well as in Cypriot territorial sea. The Turkish Armed Forces accompanied the drilling and seismic ships during their operations, posing a grave threat to the security of the region. Turkey also challenged the status of the fenced-off city of Varosha. The EU has repeatedly stressed the need to respect the sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include entering into bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 2019 the Council decided a number of measures, including not to hold for the time being the EU-Turkey Association Council as well as further meetings of the EU-Turkey high-level dialogues. The EU further adopted a framework for targeted measures against Turkey in November 2019 and decided in February 2020 to add two individuals to the list of designations under this sanctions framework. On 1 October 2020, the European Council stated that, provided constructive efforts to stop illegal activities vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus are sustained, the European Council agreed to launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of the Customs Union and trade facilitation, people to people contacts, High level dialogues, continued cooperation on migration issues, in line with the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The European Council also stressed that in case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States. Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to ensure full and non‑discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and has not removed all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. The signing of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas between Turkey and the National Accord Government of Libya in November 2019 increased tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, as it ignored the sovereign rights of Greece’s islands in the area concerned. There was a sharp increase in provocative actions by Turkey towards Greece, in particular Turkish overflights of Greek inhabited areas. In this respect, the European Council, in December 2019, unequivocally reaffirmed its solidarity with Greece and Cyprus regarding actions by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It stressed that the Memorandum infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States. In May 2020, EU Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the EU’s position on Turkey’s continued illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as on Turkey’s provocative and aggressive behaviour in relation to Cyprus and Greece, underlining that abstaining from unilateral actions is a basic element to allow dialogue between the EU and Turkey to advance and that Turkey’s illegal actions have serious negative impact across the range of EU-Turkey relations. In October 2020, the European Council called on Turkey to accept the invitation by Cyprus to engage in dialogue with the objective of settling all maritime-related disputes between Turkey and Cyprus. The EU condemned Turkey's unilateral military action in north-east Syria and urged Turkey to end its military action, withdraw its forces and respect international humanitarian law. The vast majority of Member States decided to halt arms export licensing to Turkey. Following airstrikes against Turkish troops in the Idlib governorate at the end of February 2020, Turkey launched the military operation ‘Spring Shield’ in the area. Turkey and Russia agreed on a ceasefire in March 2020 that stabilised frontlines in north-west Syria, established a new corridor along the M4 highway, and created a framework for joint Russian-Turkish military patrols. Turkey maintained its military observation posts on the ground, including those situated in territories now controlled by the Syrian regime, and brought in further reinforcements to the region. Turkey further significantly increased its military involvement in the conflict in Libya, contributing to a reversal of the situation on the ground.

Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced, but made no progress over the reporting period and serious concerns persist over its functioning. The economy rebounded from the summer 2018 sharp currency depreciation and the resulting recession faster than expected, helped by expansionary policies and a strong contribution of net exports. However, the recovery remained fragile given the weak labour market and the need to repair corporate balance sheets. As the COVID-19 crisis unfolded, the authorities took a number of measures to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic, including a significant monetary expansion. These measures were constrained, however, by a limited policy space, in particular on the fiscal side, and institutional weaknesses. The current account balance, which had improved markedly since 2017, started deteriorating again by the end of 2019, triggering a sizeable increase of import duties and non tariff barriers. Due to high external financing needs, Turkey remained exposed to rapid changes in investor sentiment, aggravated by the pandemic and rising geopolitical risks. Inflation fell from a very high level but remained elevated and well above target. Monetary policy credibility weakened further because of the dismissal of the governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and recurrent political pressures. Price competitiveness continued to benefit from the weakening of the lira and the real effective exchange rate depreciated in 2019, a trend that accelerated further in 2020. The government continued to further improve the regulatory environment for businesses. However, the informal sector remains large. State interventions in price setting mechanisms continued, and there is a continued lack of state aid implementation rules, enforcement, transparency and institutional set up. The financial sector remained stable. However, vulnerabilities increased, in particular due to rapid credit growth in state owned banks, and various regulatory measures aimed at boosting lending activity. The high level of unemployment, in particular among young people and women, paired with declining employment, low labour mobility and a high share of undeclared work remain major concerns. Turkey has made limited progress and has a good level of preparation in achieving the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Expenditure on research and development increased, although remaining well below the Government’s target. Investment excesses and misallocations declined. Progress was made in the diversification of energy supplies but reforms are needed to open up the natural gas market and increase competition on it. Significant problems remain in education as regards quality and access. Women face difficulties in accessing quality education and the labour market. Although Turkey remains well integrated with the EU market in terms of both trade and investment links, the relative share of the EU in Turkey’s foreign trade declined further amid a growing list of deviations from Turkey's obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Turkey has continued to align with the EU acquis, albeit at a very limited pace and in a fragmented manner. There continued to be instances of backsliding regarding a number of key aspects in the areas of competition on account of an increase in State aid and its lack of transparency, information society and media, economic and monetary policy, customs union, external relations and foreign, security and defence policy. Turkey is well advanced in the areas of company law, trans-European networks and science and research, and it has also achieved a good level of preparation in a number of areas, including free movement of goods, intellectual property law, financial services, and enterprise and industrial policy. Turkey is moderately prepared on public procurement as important gaps remain in its alignment. Turkey is also moderately prepared in areas such as free movement of capital, transport policy, energy, taxation, economic and monetary union, statistics, where further significant efforts are needed across the board. Overall, in most areas more ambitious and better coordinated policies still need to be established and implemented. In all areas, more attention needs to be given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require further significant progress to achieve legislative alignment with the EU acquis, strengthen the independence of regulatory authorities and build the administrative capacities. 2. FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS The first half of 2020 has been marked by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU redirected EU funds worth EUR 83 million to support the COVID-19 response in Turkey, notably to support the most vulnerable refugees, and extended implementing periods for some IPA programmes. In the context of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Commission immediately launched awareness raising activities for the refugee population who are among the most vulnerable people. An agreement was reached with the Turkish government to mobilise savings and contingencies under the Facility to support the national COVID-19 response. 2.1.Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform Despite the lifting of the state of emergency in July 2018, the adverse impacts of the 2-year long emergency ruling continued to significantly impact on democracy and fundamental rights. Certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to government authorities and retaining several restrictive elements of the emergency rule have been integrated into law. Access to justice remained limited for those negatively impacted by the emergency decree-laws, especially dismissed public servants and liquidated legal entities. Considerable shortcomings, such as the lack of institutional and judicial independence, lengthy review procedures, the absence of sufficiently individualised criteria, and the absence of a proper means of defence, call into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures can be considered an effective remedy. Several legal provisions still inhibit the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of assembly and expression, enshrined in Turkey's Constitution and the country's international commitments. The first legislative package following the adoption of the Judicial Reform Strategy allowed for the return of some 11,000 passports revoked by state of emergency decrees. 2.1.1Democracy The executive presidential system and its design as well as implementation are yet to be reviewed in line with the principles of democracy as referred to in the recommendations of the 2017 Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The constitutional architecture continued to excessively centralise powers to the Presidency without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and balances, the democratic accountability of the executive branch remains very limited. Under these conditions, the backsliding of the respect for democratic standards, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms continued. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, no state of emergency was declared. Elections Following the local elections of 31 March 2019, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) decided to re-run the metropolitan mayoral election in Istanbul on 23 June. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe’s election observation report emphasised that the elections were professionally organised in the majority of polling stations, but that there are questions with regards to democratic media plurality and conditions that are objectively fair to all political parties and candidates in all respects. Turkey needs to take steps to improve the broader environment for elections, ensuring a level playing field for all candidates and protecting the integrity of the election process. Forceful dismissals of elected mayors in the south-east and their replacement by government-appointed trustees continued and is a source of significant concern as it undermines local democracy. The municipal elections held on 31 March 2019 offered a mixed picture. Voters had a free choice between distinct political parties, political programmes and candidates, but this was undermined by the limited conditions for contestants to compete in a level playing field. Following the decision of the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to first annul the mayor-elect’s mandate and to schedule a re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections, the elections took place on 23 June. Ekrem Imamoğlu, the candidate of the ‘Nation’s Alliance’, composed of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Good Party (IYI) and Felicity Party, won again, this time with a comfortable margin of 54.2% against 44.9% for Binali Yıldırım, the candidate of the ‘People’s Alliance’, comprised of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Turnout remained high at 84.4%. In its final electoral observation report published in October 2019, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe stated that, while the polls were conducted in order and were administered satisfactorily, with a remarkably high turnout, it is not fully convinced that Turkey currently has the free and fair electoral environment, which is necessary for genuinely democratic elections in line with European values and principles. It noted that the ruling AKP enjoyed a notable advantage in the Istanbul re-run, due to an excessive coverage by government-affiliated public and private media. The Congress recommended the removal of overly restrictive limitations of freedoms of association, assembly and expression in order to establish an environment fully conducive to genuinely democratic elections. The Venice Commission, in its opinion from June 2020, held that the YSK’s decisions to deny mayoral mandates to HDP candidates who received the highest number of votes at the municipal elections of March 2019 in 6 municipalities and to, instead, give these mandates to second-placed AKP candidates were not consistent with international norms and standards and should be reversed. It further stated that, while the removal of elected officials may exceptionally be justified by the need to prevent them from abusing their office to favour terrorist activities, replacing elected officials by candidates who lost the election, without repeat elections, cannot be justified on this basis. Parliament The presidential system continued to curtail the Parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. Legislative procedures are not effective. The new presidential system enshrines the principle of the primacy of law over presidential decrees as well as delimits the legislative areas that remain the prerogative of the Parliament. However, the President has issued decrees covering a wide range of socio-economic policy areas that are in the prerogative of the Parliament. Political polarisation continued to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue. The membership of three members of Parliament was ended in early June 2020. Many members of Parliament of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) remain in detention. Electoral alliances have been de facto preserved in Parliament in the aftermath of the 2018 and 2019 elections. The marginalisation of the opposition, particularly the second largest opposition party, HDP, persisted. Two former co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and seven other elected HDP members of parliament remained in jail. The shortcomings of the system of parliamentary immunity, which limits freedom of expression of elected office holders outside Parliament, remained unaddressed. In early June 2020, 1 member of parliament from the CHP and two from the HDP were stripped of their membership in Parliament in light of court convictions against them, thus leaving their seats in Parliament empty for the remaining parliamentary term. Judicial investigations were launched against the HDP co-chairs and other HDP and CHP members of parliament due to their statements on the Peace Spring military operation in north-east Syria. The constitutional overhaul, attributing responsibility for producing draft legislative proposals to members of parliament only, rather than to the government, hampered the legislative process. Only drafts sponsored by the ruling AKP passed the legislative procedures. In 2019, Parliament adopted only 37 pieces of legislation out of the 2,300 bills tabled by members of parliament. Parliament has not yet made use of the possibility to form specialised legislative committees and the mechanisms of inter-party committee work and parliamentary inquiry committees remained ineffective. In March 2020, Parliament adopted an omnibus law amending several pieces of legislation, particularly aiming to introduce measures to reduce the financial burden of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. However, several amended provisions went beyond this scope and had negative effects on fundamental rights and freedoms. Parliament decided to be in pandemic-related recess for 10 days, which was followed by a regular one-month recess during the month of Ramadan.

Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very limited under the presidential system. Presidential decrees remained exempt from parliamentary deliberation and control. Members of parliament have no right to ask oral questions. Written questions can only be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers. The legal framework enshrines the principle of the primacy of law over presidential decrees and preserves the legislative areas that remain the prerogative of Parliament. However, as of December 2019, the President had issued 53 decrees covering a wide range of socio-economic policy areas, which are not within the remit of presidential decrees. Parliamentary oversight of public spending also needs to be significantly improved. The legal framework of elections and political parties remains problematic. The 10% electoral threshold is the highest among Council of Europe members; it is at odds with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and reduces the representation of many voters. Turkey needs to align with the outstanding recommendations of the recommendations of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Venice Commission on addressing gaps in the electoral legal framework. Representation of women in Parliament remained low (17.3%). Governance The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances and by politicisation of the public administration. Recommendations by the Venice Commission in this regard remain valid and were not addressed. Most of the key institutions are directly attached to the presidency. The President has the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of the public regulatory authorities. In the aftermath of the 2019 local elections, pressure from the central level on elected local authorities increased substantially. Large-scale arrests and dismissals of elected mayors and party representatives, observed since 2017, continued and undermine local democracy. In its current form of implementation, the presidential system remained characterised by a lack of the necessary checks and balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one office and to ensure the independence of the judiciary, as highlighted in the 2017 opinion of the Venice Commission. The presidential system negatively affected the functioning of the branches of government and the state administration. The President’s political accountability is limited to elections, due to a lack of effective checks and balances. Traditional instruments of scrutiny of the executive by Parliament, such as a vote of confidence and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, are no longer possible; only written questions can be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers. Reforms of the relations between the presidency councils, which prepare policy recommendations for the President, and line ministries were announced but did not materialise. The civil service has been politicised, particularly through further nominations of political appointees at senior official level and the lowering of professional requirements for office holders, even in technical portfolios. Policy coordination among central government institutions remained strong. However, the major restructuring of the public administration and civil service after the shift to the presidential system in 2018 continued to have a negative impact on policy development and accountability of the administration. The rate of women in public service was 38.4%, while the percentage of women in senior managerial positions was only 9.05%. The Ombudsman has increased its track record through more active engagement in raising awareness of its role. However, the institution remained silent on politically critical issues concerning fundamental rights. The Ombudsman still lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies. The legal framework provides only limited protection to independent regulatory authorities from undue political interference. Under the presidential system, many regulatory authorities (such as the Competition Authority (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy), the Information and Communication Technologies Board, the Cyber Security Council, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (see Chapter 10 – Information Society and Media), the Directorate-General for Rail Regulation (see Chapter 14 – Transport policy), the Regulatory Body of the Atomic Industry (see Chapter 15 - Energy) and the central bank (see Chapter 17 – Economic and Monetary Policy) were directly linked to the Presidency. During the reporting period, the President dismissed the President of the Central Bank, paving the way for a policy of fast reduction of interest rates under the new President. Local government At local level, the political landscape changed significantly in the aftermath of the 2019 local elections. Most of Turkey’s largest cities and 11 of its 30 metropolitan municipalities are governed by the opposition, while three metropolitan mayors were replaced by government-appointed trustees. The central government’s relations with the municipalities led by opposition mayors developed in a conflictual manner on many occasions. In the framework of the COVID-19 response, the Ministry of Interior launched investigations against the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara over municipal aid campaigns. A local court decision, confirmed by the Court of Appeals, to sentence the Istanbul Provincial Chair of the opposition CHP, Canan Kaftancıoğlu, to almost 10 years imprisonment on five separate charges related to social media posts, raised significant concerns. The construction project Canal Istanbul caused a heated public debate on the issue of competences at national and local level between the President, and the Istanbul municipal mayor and opposition parties. The first tender for the project was launched in March 2020. Developments in south-east Turkey put the results of the democratic process of the 31 March 2019 elections into question. The central government removed 47 democratically elected municipal mayors in the south-east, all HDP members, – including the mayors of Diyarbakır, Van and Mardin, mainly on the grounds that they had alleged links to terrorist organisations. However, the candidates had been vetted prior to elections, making their removal even less justified. Despite his acquittal in mid-February 2020, the mayor of Mardin was not reinstated. Centrally appointed trustees suspended municipal assemblies. Hundreds of local politicians and elected office holders and thousands of party members were detained on terrorism-related charges. In the absence of an indictment, these measures ran counter to the basic premises of democracy, deprive voters in Turkey of political representation at local level and damaged local democracy. According to the Venice Commission, the respect of the voters’ choice could be restored either by reinstating the suspended mayors or by other means such as determination of replacement mayors by the elected municipal councils or by organising repeat elections in the electoral zones concerned. The legal framework regulating the Ministry of Interior’s tutelary powers over elected local office holders was not revised in line with Turkey’s commitments under the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Governors holding a double function as state agents and chairpersons of the provincial executive committees and the state’s overregulation and interventionism in planning decisions of local authorities remain to be revised in line with the Charter and in order to ensure a clear delineation of powers. A delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities carried out a monitoring visit to Turkey in October to assess the implementation of the provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which Turkey ratified in 1992. Municipal law in principle provides for routes for engagement between local public institutions and citizens as well as civil society. However, in this context, citizens’ assemblies, aiming at bringing together professional and civil society organisations and other stakeholders and contributing to municipal decision-making, remained largely dysfunctional in most municipalities. Some municipalities increased their level of transparency and accountability. Following the local elections, representation of women at local level remained low: only 2 of 30 (6.6%) metropolitan mayors and 38 of 1,272 (3.7%) mayors, are women. 3.7% of all local representatives of the central government are women. Civil society Serious backsliding persisted regarding the environment in which civil society operated. Civil society came under continuous pressure, notably in the face of a large number of arrests of activists, including human rights defenders The Gezi trial and Osman Kavala’s continued pre-trial detention had a deterrent effect on their work. Public stigmatisation and a recurrent use of bans of demonstrations and other types of gatherings further shrank the space left for organisations working on fundamental rights and freedoms. Organisations operating in the area of human rights, which were closed under the state of emergency have still not been offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. Despite all difficulties, civil society remained active and involved in public life as much as possible. Pro-government organisations continued to have more visible roles and opportunities for representation. Civil society organisations remained excluded from legislative consultation processes in parliamentary committees. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for consulting a wide spectrum of civil society organisations, notably on new legislation and policies need to be in place. Administrative difficulties for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remained in place. An empowered and diverse civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and should be recognised and treated as such by the state institutions. Civil society organisations in Turkey continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the country, notably in the areas of education, female workforce participation, awareness-raising regarding ethnic and social tolerance, hate crimes monitoring and support for refugees.

Organisations operating in the area of human rights constitute a small share of civil society organisations in Turkey. They faced increased pressure in particular following detentions and arrests of activists and human rights defenders. The Commissioner for Human Rights, in her report issued in February 2020, expressed concerns on the increasingly challenging and hostile atmosphere in which human rights defenders and NGOs have to operate in Turkey. The ongoing court case of prominent human rights defender Osman Kavala, held in pre-trial detention since November 2017 despite a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) calling for his release is deeply worrying. The case is emblematic of the shrinking public space for civil society organisations. Portrayal in some media outlets of some of these activists as criminals, including for accepting project funds from international donors remains a matter of concern. Defamatory rhetoric by public officials casts serious doubt on the respect for fair trial and the presumption of innocence. International non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including those providing humanitarian aid to refugees also faced difficulties in their work in Turkey. No effective domestic remedy was provided for the confiscation of assets from civil society organisations closed by emergency decrees. In the legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations, there is a lack of clarity in terms of the distribution of responsibilities among public institutions as well as arbitrariness in implementation of the relevant legislation. The 2018 regulation and the amended legislation passed through omnibus law in March 2020 make it compulsory for all associations to register all their members, and not only their board members, in the information system of the Ministry of Interior. This legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of association. The obligation to provide personal data to the authorities, in a context where the legislation on data protection is not aligned with the EU acquis and where the overly broad definition of terrorism has a deterrent effect on civil society, is a concern. Other barriers to civil society and freedom of association remain, notably cumbersome administrative procedures and repetitive frequent inspections and fines. Provisions restricting registration, procedures for obtaining required permits and the functioning of associations need to be revised, including facilitating the activities of international and national NGOs working with refugees and migrants in Turkey. The Law on Collection of Aid continues to impose burdensome requirements for permits that discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations. These include prior notification for each fundraising activity and lengthy authorisation processes. Public funds are not distributed in a transparent way and the distribution process does not allow for the full involvement of civil society organisations and other stakeholders at every stage. The existing tax system impedes the functioning and development of foundations and associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for associations (0.03% of the total number of associations) and ‘tax exemption’ for foundations (5% of the total number of foundations) is vaguely defined and granted by the President. The space for foreign donors, which provide financial support to Turkish civil society under current Turkish legislation, is increasingly shrinking. Some donors closed down their offices after the start of the ‘Gezi Park’ and ‘Büyükada’ cases. There is still no comprehensive government strategy or mechanism in place for cooperation with civil society or for improving the legal framework. Nor is there any legal framework for public consultations. Civil society organisations are largely excluded from the consultations that are part of policy-making processes and monitoring. It is crucial that the elements on participatory democracy contained in the 11th National Development Plan for 2019-2023 provide for genuine remedies in this area. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society in Turkey. Civilian oversight of the security forces The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained unchanged, with strengthened civilian oversight of the security forces under the presidential system. Under the presidential system, broad powers over the security forces lie within the executive branch. The General Staff and all force commands remained subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence. The civilian flank of the Supreme Military Council, which decides over military appointments and promotions, continued to outnumber the military members. All military hierarchy is accountable to the President, who is legally entitled to give orders directly to the Chief of General Staff, force commanders and their subordinates. The scope of the military judicial system was reduced. Civilian higher courts continued to review appeals against the decisions of military courts. However, the transparency and accountability of military, police and intelligence services to Parliament continue to be limited. Security personnel continued to have wide-ranging legal protection. The track record of the judicial and administrative examination of allegations of human rights violations and of disproportionate use of force by security forces remained poor. The parliamentary law enforcement oversight commission was ineffective. The legal framework for overseeing military expenditure has not yet been improved. Dismissals and arrests in relation to the coup attempt of July 2016 continued. By June 2020, a total of 19,583 military officers were dismissed from the service due to their alleged links to the Gülen movement, some 3,600 in 2019 alone. Some 6,000 former military personnel were arrested on grounds of their alleged involvement in the attempted coup. Situation in the east and south-east The situation in the south-east continued to be very worrying. The government continued domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria. The security situation was more precarious in the border areas with recurrent terrorist acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. While the Government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is essential that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There were no developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. The PKK continued to commit violent terrorist attacks with fatal incidents. The EU unambiguously condemned these attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. In September, explosives planted on the road in Diyarbakır’s Kulp sub-province killed 7 and seriously injured 10 people. The incident was followed by physical attacks on HDP/DBP officials. An investigation was launched into the incident. Following the government’s lifting the ban on Abdullah Öcalan being visited by his lawyers, family visits were allowed intermittently and related hunger strikes were discontinued. Sit-in protests by Kurdish mothers demanding that the HDP find their children who were allegedly forced to join the ranks of the PKK took place in front of the HDP’s Diyarbakır office. Provincial governorates declared recurrent military security zones in rural settlements. A curfew in six districts of Diyarbakır's Sur municipality has remained in place since December 2015. The Venice Commission’s recommendations in its June 2016 opinion on the legal framework governing curfews are yet to be implemented. Investigations into the deaths of civilians in 2015 during security operations under curfews in towns such as Cizre have not progressed. Human rights organisations and opposition parties continued to report serious violations of human rights by security forces, including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and procedural rights violations in prisons and police and gendarmerie establishments. The report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of February 2017, deploring the lack of effective and independent investigations into the reported killings or other serious human rights violations committed between July 2015 and December 2016, still needs to be followed up. Eastern and south-eastern provincial governors declared frequent blanket bans on all demonstrations and events. A very broad interpretation of the fight against terrorism, growing restrictions put in place on the rights of journalists, the bar associations and human rights defenders working on the Kurdish issue are among issues raising repeated concern. Other associations and Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions mostly remained closed. There were numerous new detentions and arrests of elected representatives and mayors, municipal council members and municipal executives in the east and south-east on terrorism-related charges. In 47 out of the 65 municipalities won by the HDP in the March 2019 local elections, the Ministry of Interior replaced elected HDP mayors with trustees. As of mid-June 2020, among these dismissed mayors, 30 were arrested and 18 remain in prison. The government further deposed 68 HDP members of municipal assemblies in 2019, 15 of which were arrested. In metropolitan municipalities alone, 214 elected municipal assembly members were suspended. Some 1,870 HDP members were arrested and 206 imprisoned in 2019 alone. These dismissals and arrests triggered reactions across the political landscape and civil society, as well as from the international community. Related protest meetings were not allowed for one month. In September, the Court of Cassation issued its decision in the main case against the Kurdish Communities Union, upholding prison sentences for many Kurdish political figures, former and present members of parliament. Under a new strategic plan covering 2019-2023, the South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) continues to operate with the objective of improving socioeconomic development in the region. The government’s investment plan for post-conflict reconstruction of damaged areas in the south-east, announced in September 2016, continued with the construction of new dwellings. According to official sources, as of July 2019, more than TRY 800 million (some EUR 125 million) has been paid in compensation to more than 50,000 internally displaced persons since 2017. Government-funded construction projects on cultural, historical and religious heritage sites damaged in 2015 and 2016 continued. Court cases against these projects are ongoing. There were new tensions around culturally and environmentally destructive projects such as the mining project in Tunceli Mountains, which are part of a national park as well as being sacred for Alevis. There were protests, including by civil society, against the filling of the Ilısu Dam on Tigris River in Hasankeyf, which risks damaging natural habitats, agricultural land and historical heritage. There was still no comprehensive, consistent approach in place in relation to missing persons, to the exhumation of mass graves or to the independent investigation of all alleged cases of extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. The February 2017 Council of Europe report on missing persons and victims of enforced disappearance highlighted the excessive length of trials. Most of the investigations into cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have faced the 20-year statute of limitations. Out of more than 1,400 cases of missing persons, only 16 court cases had been launched. 14 ended in acquittals of the alleged perpetrators and two were ongoing. In September 2019, all military officers and village guards charged with enforced disappearance, murder and extrajudicial execution were acquitted in the Kızıltepe JITEM case, due to the expiry of the 20-year statutory limitation. However, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) assessed that enforced disappearances are not subject to statutes of limitation, thereby providing a guarantee against impunity. The 2015 recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur to tackle the lack of prosecutions over extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions remained unaddressed. The village guard system was still in place.

Refugees and internally displaced persons Turkey continues to host the largest number of refugees worldwide. According to Turkey’s Directorate General of Migration, Turkey hosts 3,576,370 Syrian refugees with temporary protection status, some 100,000 Syrians with legal residency and 93 000 who have been granted citizenship. There are an additional 368,230 asylum seekers and refugees from countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. In addition, in December 2019, 1,101,030 foreign nationals holding residency permits were present in Turkey, including humanitarian residence holders. On 28 February 2020, the Turkish government announced it would cease controlling its land and sea borders with Europe and open the passage for migrants wishing to cross. This led to the setting up of an informal camp at one of the border crossing points between Turkey and Greece and an increase in asylum applications registered in Cyprus in the first quarter of 2020 (see chapter 24). Return and resettlement operations under the EU-Turkey Statement were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The global pandemic negatively affected refugees and internally displaced persons in Turkey, especially children and vulnerable individuals, such as single women and women-headed households, who were already living in dire economic conditions. The majority of refugees in Turkey lost the jobs that they used to hold in the informal sectors of the economy. In 2019, Turkey granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or subsidiary protection) to 5,449 applicants (72,961 in 2018. The authorities rejected 5,212 applications compared with 13,942 in 2018. Some 61,000 Syrian nationals under temporary protection lived in seven temporary accommodation centres in south-eastern Turkey. Human rights organisations, lawyers and media reported individual cases of administrative detention and deportation, which raised concerns about access to asylum. Following the reform of the Law on Foreigners and Temporary Protection introduced by way of emergency decree in 2016, cases of suspension of the temporary protection procedures and deportations for reasons such as public order, security and terrorism increased. Turkey made sustained significant efforts to provide support for refugees and ensure wider access to healthcare and schooling, with 63.27% of Syrian children now in school. Many cities provided municipal services to refugees. Of 1,082,172 Syrians of school age in Turkey in December 2019, 684 728 had access to primary and secondary education, up from 605,000 last year. In December 2019, the number of Syrians who held work permits stood at close to 100,000, up from 43,000 in 2018. Turkey joined countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region in exchanges with UNHCR on the possibility of setting up measures to repatriate Syrian refugees. In parallel, Turkey has publicly announced its plan to resettle up to two million Syrian refugees to the so-called “safe zone” in north-east Syria where it launched military operations in Syria in 2018 and 2019. (Please see Chapter 24 - Justice, freedom and security). Turkey needs to further align its practice with European standards in removal centres, in particular with regard to protection of human rights, including access to legal counselling and interpreters and protection of minors. There have been cases of migrants being forced into signing voluntary return forms. Many refugees and asylum seekers are exploited in the informal economy and their poverty inhibits access to protection. There was limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from the violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated economic exclusion and deteriorating living conditions for IDPs. (see section above - Situation in the east and south-east). 2.1.2.Public administration reform Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in public administration reform. There was backsliding during the reporting period. Turkey has not yet implemented last year’s recommendations from the Commission. Furthermore, the major restructuring of public administration and civil service after the shift to the presidential system in 2018 continued to have a negative impact on policy development, accountability of the administration as well as the human resources management. The roles and responsibilities of different institutions remained to be fully clarified. The civil service system continued to be marked by partisanship and politicisation. No steps were taken to develop a comprehensive public administration reform strategy and an overarching public financial management reform programme. An effective remedy still needs to be provided for the large-scale dismissals that took place during the state of emergency. Female representation remained limited in the higher echelons of bureaucracy. The Commission’s recommendations from previous years remain valid. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: → ensure that the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures provides for an effective remedy, which safeguards the right of every individual to a fair administrative process; → prepare changes to its legislation to introduce a merit-based, competitive appointment and promotion system for senior managerial positions in the civil service; → review the policy-making process with a view to ensuring inclusive and evidence-based preparation of policy planning documents and legislative proposals. Strategic framework for public administration reform Due to the lack of political support, the country still lacks an overarching public administration reform strategy. Several planning documents and sectoral policy documents on various aspects of public administration reform exist but provide only a fragmented framework. Most of these policy documents do not specify the expected costs of reform measures, so the financial sustainability of public sector reforms is not guaranteed (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). An administrative unit legally entitled to coordinate, design, and monitor public administration reforms needs to be established. Such a unit would need to coordinate with the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, to ensure coherence of strategic and fiscal planning and efficiently address managerial accountability. Policy development and coordination The wide-ranging restructuring of the executive branch under the presidential system continued to centralise the policy-making system. Policy coordination among central government institutions has remained strong, but planning, monitoring and reporting of government performance remains inadequate. Inter-ministerial coordination is complicated by the administrative overhaul that accompanied the new presidential system, which has led to delays in approving executive decisions. The policy planning process within government departments needs to be improved to ensure greater participation and accountability. Nine presidential policy councils, which have advisory and coordination functions over sectoral policies, have yet to produce positive results in increasing inclusion and participation in policy-planning. In particular, economic policy programmes do not have a systematic link with fiscal planning. In October 2019, the European Union Coordination Board (ABEK) was established under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director for EU Affairs as an internal coordination mechanism of the EU policy-making process.

Legislative development and policy formulation did not pursue an inclusive and evidence-based approach. Parliament, which is responsible for preparing draft legislation, lacks the capacity and resources to launch, assess and use regulatory impact assessments, which are seldom carried out before the introduction of new policies. Public consultations were extremely rare. Public financial management There was no progress in the development of an overarching public financial management reform programme. Parliamentary engagement and oversight of the budget remains limited. Numerous exceptions inserted into the public procurement law resulted in a corruption-prone area in public finances (See also Chapter 5). No independent fiscal council aiming to ensure fiscal discipline has been established. In the absence of adequate ex post monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack full transparency. There is no clear strategy for domestic revenue mobilisation; on the contrary, there have been many instances of ad hoc tax increases. In May 2019 the Revenue Administration published a strategy and an action plan for the fight against the informal economy (2019-2021) (See also Chapter 16). Roles and responsibilities of the relevant institutions (especially the Ministry of Finance and Treasury and the Strategy and Budget Directorate under the Presidency) are not yet clearly defined in practice, leading to less transparency and weaker accountability. The role of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury was further relegated to executive and regulatory functions only, rather than policy making. Budget transparency needs to be further improved. There was limited information on contingent liabilities, notably those stemming from public private partnerships, and fiscal risks. Investments and borrowings of the Turkish Wealth Fund should be integrated into the budget. Public service and human resources management The amendments to the civil service system after the introduction of the presidential system have increased partisanship and politicisation within the public bureaucracy, notably through further nominations of political appointees at senior official level and the lowering of professional requirements for office holders, even in technical portfolios. Serious concerns remained in terms of merit-based recruitment, promotion and appointment to managerial posts. The legal framework provides uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and disciplinary measures, and ensures a possibility for appeal. However, large‑scale dismissals during the state of emergency remain a matter of serious concern as they did not identify evidence relating to each individual dismissal case and lacked minimum procedural safeguards for those who were dismissed. Only a very limited number of dismissed officials were reinstated in their positions and compensated for damages after a successful appeal. The capacity of the Human Resources office under the Presidency needs to be strengthened to ensure central coordination of human resources management in the public sector. The civil service remuneration system is not standardised across institutions and lacks transparency. The administration lacks sufficient tools to support the professional development of civil servants. Ethics committees across line ministries and a centralised ethics board are in place but their effectiveness remains to be strengthened. Accountability of the administration In the presidential system, the organisation of state administration follows centralised lines of accountability to the Presidency. Accountability of agencies is largely weak, and internal control and audit do not function effectively. Most executive institutions are formally embedded in ministries, although they retain autonomy over day-to-day operational management. The roles and responsibilities of different institutions are still not fully clear, which risks having a negative impact on efficiency, transparency and accountability. Internal and external oversight arrangements to ensure citizens’ right to good administration need to be better implemented. The role of oversight institutions such as the Ombudsman needs to be further improved. The right of citizens to access public information is regulated by the law on the right to information, which does not require proactive disclosure of information and provides for broad exemptions. A simplified online access system continued to receive a large number of applications for access to information, with over three million applications in 2019. The Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for considering appeals filed against a refusal to provide access to public information. The right of citizens to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation have continued to be problematic due to the backlog of cases. The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures established in 2017 continued to state that it individually reviewed all complaints related to more than 150 000 dismissals through emergency decrees. As of the end of March 2020, 126,300 applications had been made. Of these, the Inquiry Commission had reviewed 105,100 and only 11,200 had led to a reinstatement, while 93,600 complaints had been rejected. 57 reinstatement decisions were linked to the re-opening of organisations that were closed after the coup attempt. There were 21,200 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications raises concerns as to whether each case is being examined individually. There are strong concerns with regard to a lack of respect for the rights of defence of those dismissed and an assessment procedure in line with international standards. Since there were no hearings, there was a general lack of procedural rights for applicants and decisions were taken on the basis of the written files related to the original dismissal, all of which called into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy. Service delivery to citizens and businesses Strong commitment to a user-oriented administration continued. Public services are to a large extent accessible through the e-government tool and continued to expand. The number of registered users grew to 48.5 million by June 2020, with a constant, significant increase in the last years (25 million in 2015). A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce barriers to accessing services for people with disabilities. Simplifying administrative procedures and cutting red tape is hindered by the absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to provide citizens and businesses with greater legal certainty. 2.2.Rule of law and fundamental rights 2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, of quality and efficient) judicial system and effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. Turkey maintains an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area. Serious backsliding continued since the July 2016 coup attempt. Turkey did not implement the recommendations from the previous Commission reports. These remain valid, in particular regarding the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation. The negative effects of the large-scale dismissals of judges and prosecutors since the state of emergency and new recruitments in a fast-track procedure and in a non-transparent selection process continued to weigh on the efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors continued to have a significant negative effect on the independence and the overall quality of the judiciary. Corruption remained widespread and continued to be an issue of concern. There was no progress in addressing the many gaps in the Turkish anti-corruption framework, which is a sign of a lack of will to fight decisively against corruption. The corruption allegations were seldom reported and only in a small number of media. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan demonstrate a lack of will to fight decisively against corruption.

The damage caused by the state of emergency on the fundamental rights and the related legislation adopted was not remedied and there was further backsliding on the outstanding issues identified in previous reports, most notably on the right to a fair trial and procedural rights, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, protection of human rights defenders, freedom from ill-treatment and torture, especially in prisons. Functioning of the judiciary Turkey is at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding observed since the coup attempt of July 2016 continued. The Commission’s recommendations in previous country reports remain valid. The negative impact of the dismissal and forced removal of 30% of Turkish judges and prosecutor remained, both regarding independence and efficiency. There were concerns that dismissals in the absence of respect for due procedures caused self-censorship and intimidation within the judiciary. No measures were taken to change the structure of and process for selection of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to strengthen its independence. Concerns regarding the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors persisted. No changes were made to the institution of criminal judges of peace so that concerns remained regarding their jurisdiction and practice. In the coming year, Turkey should: → create a political and legal environment that allows the judiciary to perform its duties independently and impartially, respecting European standards; strengthen judicial responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers; and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should follow ECtHR jurisprudence; → amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the CJP so that the role and influence of the executive is limited, and introduce safeguards against any interference by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors or high level officials in judicial proceedings; → provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges against their will; → in accordance with the guaranteed judicial independence under the Constitution, limit any suspension of judges to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of serious misbehaviour and take measures to restore the damage inflicted after the coup attempt by the dismissals that took place in breach of procedural rules; → revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is guided by objective criteria without undue influence from the executive; → in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals, ensure that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence, in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary; → ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights, including procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and right to an effective appeal. Strategic documents The President announced the Judicial Reform Strategy for 2019-2023 in May 2019. The Strategy consists of nine aims in areas that Turkey identified as key issues, namely: protection and improvement of rights and freedoms, improving the judicial independence, impartiality and transparency, improving the quality and quantity of human resources, enhancement of performance and productivity, ensuring the effective use of the right to defence, ensuring access to justice and enhancing satisfaction from service, enhancing the efficiency of the criminal justice system, simplification and enhancement of the efficiency of civil and administrative trials and promoting alternative dispute resolution methods. 63 objectives and a total of 256 activities were identified to reach the above aims. However, there is no evidence-based assessment of the results of previous such strategies and of the current state of play. The Judicial Reform Strategy was subject to a weak consultation process within Turkey as it did not take into account all stakeholders’ views, whom could not comment on the draft, and did not address the most problematic issues. Comments made by the Council of Europe and the European Commission on the most critical aspects of the draft strategy were not taken into account. The Strategy falls short of addressing shortcomings regarding the independence of the judiciary. In particular, no measures were announced to remedy the concerns identified by the Council of Europe/Venice Commission or in the European Commission’s annual country reports, in particular to limit the role of the executive in the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and to change the jurisdiction and practice of criminal judges of peace which have become a parallel system in criminal proceedings. However, implementing measures regarding the quality of justice could mean a step forward if fully implemented. The concrete implementation of the Judicial Reform Strategy, by means of an action plan, including a timeline, identification of the responsible authorities and a budget still remains. In October 2019, the first legislative package to implement specific aspects of the Judicial Reform Strategy was adopted. Among the 15 legislative changes, the package included an addition to Article 7 (2) of the Anti-Terror Law, according to which statements made within the limits of providing information or made with the purpose of criticism cannot be criminalised. There is, however no definition of the term ‘terrorist propaganda’ and no reference to international standards. The package further introduced time limits for pre-trial detention for different crimes, legislating an already existing practice. In July 2020, the second legislative package was adopted. The 64-article law addressed many issues related to the simplification and increasing the efficiency of civil trials. The law also changed the public nature of hearings as it extended the scope of the case that could be held in camera. Members of parliament from the main opposition political party argued that such a provision might be used to bar public access to high profile cases related to the actions of persons close to the ruling power. In July 2020, the parliament also amended the Law on Lawyers, which would reduce the representation of lawyers from the main cities at the national Union of Turkish Bar Associations and provides that in provinces with over 5,000 lawyers, any group of at least 2,000 lawyers can set up their own bar association. While the government argued that the creation of more bar associations would allow a more pluralistic system, the overwhelming majority of bar associations and lawyers argued that this law would disempower existing bar associations in larger cities, which have regularly criticised the government for violations of human rights and the rule of law. Management bodies Concerns in relation to the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors from the executive, in particular the procedure governing the appointment of its members, continued. Since the introduction of the presidential system, 4 members out of 13 are appointed by the President and 7 members are appointed by Parliament by qualified majority. Although nine of these members are judges and prosecutors, none of them are elected by their peers, which is not in line with European standards for the judiciary. The remaining 2 seats are attributed ex officio to the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister, who are also appointed by the President. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors continued to enjoy autonomy in managing a budget of EUR12.1 million in 2019 (EUR14 million for 2018). Since December 2016, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) had suspended the Council of Judges and Prosecutors’ observer status and excluded it from participation in ENCJ activities, given that the Council of Judges and Prosecutors did not comply with the ENCJ statutes due to its lack of independence from the executive and legislature. To restore the Council of Judges and Prosecutors’ credibility and public trust in the entire judiciary, the Council should improve its transparency and adherence to procedures, and half or more of its members should be judges elected by their peers, in line with European standards. Independence and impartiality The Council of Judges and Prosecutors continued to engage in large-scale transfers of judges and prosecutors without their consent and no constitutional guarantees were introduced to prevent such transfers, which, according to European standards, can only be justified where courts are being reorganised. The Judicial Reform Strategy announced a guarantee of geographical tenure that should be introduced for judges with a certain professional seniority and based on merits. A day after the announcement of the Strategy, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors published a decree through which the posts of 3,358 judges and prosecutors in the civil and criminal judiciary and 364 in the administrative judiciary were changed. Overall, 4,027 judges and prosecutors were transferred in 2019. No reason was given for the transfers apart from requirements of the service.

In total, 4,399 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed since the attempted coup. In 2019, none were reinstated to their positions by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. No action was taken to remedy the shortcomings identified in the December 2016 opinion of the Venice Commission, which stated that every decision ordering the dismissal of a judge needs to be individual and reasoned, must refer to verifiable evidence, and that the procedures before the Council of Judges and Prosecutors must respect at least minimal standards of due process. Regarding the institution of the criminal judges of peace, the influence of the executive over their decisions and their jurisdiction and practice continued to raise serious concerns. Criminal judges of peace have extensive powers with possibly very serious consequences for individuals, such as to issue search warrants, detain individuals, block websites or seize property. Despite these powers, objections to their decisions are not reviewed by a higher judicial body but horizontally, by another criminal judge of peace. This damages the credibility of the system and weakens public trust. The recommendations of the Venice Commission in its March 2017 opinion on the criminal peace judgeships should be urgently implemented, as stated in previous Commission regular reports Pluralism in judges’ associations was seriously affected by the chilling effect that closure of a number of associations during the state of emergency had on the members of the judiciary. There were reports that membership of an association that was perceived to be opposing the government, was seen as hindering the prospect of career advancement. Turkey’s biggest association, the Association for Judicial Unity, which reached around 9,300 members, was perceived as being close to the government. Newly recruited judges and prosecutors are handed a membership application to the Association for Judicial Unity automatically upon recruitment. Representatives of the executive and legislature continued to publicly comment on ongoing judicial cases, disregarding the presumption of innocence of the suspects and contravening the principle of judicial independence. In some cases lower courts did not apply the rulings of the Constitutional Court to cases with similar facts, although the Constitutional Court judgments set out a principle, which should be implemented by the lower courts in similar cases. Business perception of judicial independence increased during the reporting period, but remains low. Accountability Judges and prosecutors are under the obligation to declare their assets every 5 years. However, if they earn assets worth five times their salary, they have to declare these in that given year. It remains important to have a credible and functioning verification system and to ensure that due follow-up is given to late or wrong declarations of assets. The Judicial Ethics Declaration (JED) of March 2019, a binding document of the CJP, reflects universal principles in this area. However, there are issues of concern such as the lack of an explicit reference to ‘sexual and gender orientation’ within the prohibited grounds for discrimination or vaguely formulated rules. The impact of the JED is yet to be assessed, also in view of the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Disciplinary procedures are in place for both judges and prosecutors but the current system calls into question important guarantees that safeguard the independence of the judiciary. Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and enforce disciplinary penalties need to be made effective and free from political interference, which has proved challenging given the lack of independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors from the executive and parliament. In February 2020, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors initiated an investigation into the three judges of the Istanbul 30th Heavy Penal Court who acquitted the defendants in the Gezi Park trial due to a lack of evidence. Professionalism and competence Vacancies continued to be filled by allowing the majority of candidates to enter the system through a fast-track procedure and non-transparent selection process. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors is not independent from the executive and the Ministry of Justice runs the selection boards for new judges and prosecutors and manages their yearly appraisal. Concerns therefore remain over the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors, and hence the politicisation of the judiciary. In accordance with the amending law of October 2019 as part of the first legislative package to implement the Judicial Reform Strategy, a legal exam was introduced for prospective judges, lawyers or public notaries to be conducted by the Higher Education Council (YÖK). However, no measure was taken to thoroughly revise the legal education system, where there are currently around 100 law schools, 5,000 law school students and 100,000 lawyers. Quality of justice The Justice Academy of Turkey (JAT) was re-established by a Presidential decree published in May 2019. The newly established JAT carried out all pre-service training of candidate judges and prosecutors as well as in-service trainings. The decree provides that the JAT has scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. The newly established JAT has no general assembly or board of directors and management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President for a 3-year period. This calls into question the independence of the JAT, which affects its capacity to provide training programmes that meet the requirements of openness, competence and impartiality. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors continued to negatively affect the quality of justice. Serious concerns persist regarding the quality of judicial decisions in terms of legal reasoning and factual evidence, particularly in terrorism-related cases. Indictments often reflect allegations that are not supported by credible evidence. The lack of established links between the evidence and the alleged crime are some of the many elements that raise serious concerns. In some cases, evidence presented by the defence was not included in the court’s assessment. In many cases access to justice and the right of defence was limited due to the use of confidentiality decisions. In parallel, details of prosecution files continued to appear in the media, which resulted in smear campaigns in some cases and violates the presumption of innocence. Efficiency As part of the measures taken against COVID-19, court hearings were postponed until 16 June 2020. Periods concerning the enforcement of decisions, objections and appeals also started as of 16 June 2020. Large parts of the judiciary continue to be under severe pressure to handle cases in a timely manner, as the effects of the large-scale dismissals are still observed. One of the aims of the Judicial Reform Strategy is to increase the quality and quantity of human resources; the focus of planned measures is on legal training, admission to the legal professions and training. The budget for the judiciary was TRY 18 billion in 2019 (around EUR 2.8 billion), representing 0.42% of GDP and EUR 34 per inhabitant. Efforts have begun to increase and promote alternative dispute resolution methods to help reduce the burden on the courts. Over 213,000 cases were resolved by conciliation in 2019, a slight increase on 2018.

Regarding the backlog of cases, in the high courts the number of pending cases were 47,022 for the Constitutional Court in October 2019 and 146,495 for the Council of State in December 2019. In 2019, the Court of Cassation received a total of 891 214 cases (384 756 new cases and 506 458 cases transferred from 2018), and dealt with 494 007 cases, resulting in a reduced backlog of 397 207 cases by the end of 2019. This reduction stems from the creation in 2016 of nine regional courts of appeal. These regional courts of appeal continued to operate, but for both civil and criminal cases, their clearance rate remained below 100%, leading to an increasing backlog. As regards first instance courts, the clearance rate for criminal courts in 2019 was 53.8% compared to 55.1% in 2018. The total number of cases finalised in 2019 was 1,605,130 (1,615,463 in 2018). The total length of proceedings slightly went up from 276 days to 278 days. The clearance rate for civil courts was 55.4% in 2018 (55.2% in 2017). The total number of cases finalised in 2018 was 2,050,198 compared (1,984,974 in 2017). The total length of proceedings increased from 248 days in 2016 to 283 days. Systemic solutions are therefore still needed to further address the emerging backlog as well as the excessive length of some trials. The Law on Court Experts of November 2016 regulates qualifications and criteria in the process of selection and appointment of court experts. However, there remained concerns that not all experts were sufficiently qualified and that the judges based their verdicts merely on the conc