EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1469 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Accompanying the document 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation 
{COM(2011) 840 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1470 final}  
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties.............................................. 6 
1.1. Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 6 1.2. Public consultation....................................................................................................... 6 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board............................................................................................ 7 2. Problem definition........................................................................................................ 7 2.1. The problem requiring action and the sc ope of the instrument regulation .................. 7 
2.1.1. Problems requiring action ............................................................................................ 7 2.1.2. Scope of the present Development Cooperation Instrument ("DCI").......................... 8 2.1.3. Areas for improvement linked to the scope of the DCI ............................................. 10 2.2. Mid-term reviews and lessons learnt.......................................................................... 11 2.2.1. Results of the mid term review of the fi nancial instruments fo r external actions...... 11 
2.2.2. Review of the lessons learnt....................................................................................... 12 2.3. The underlying drivers of the problem....................................................................... 14 2.3.1. Driver 1 - DCI objectives are not fully aligned to the latest policy development 
trends......................................................................................................................... . 14 
2.3.2. Driver 2 - The DCI does not contain st rong mechanisms to ensure significant 
differentiation amongst partner countries. ................................................................. 15 
2.3.3. Driver 3 - Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not 
sufficiently embedded in the cooperation mechanisms of the DCI. .......................... 15 
2.3.4. Driver 4 - The current architecture of EU external action instruments does not 
provide the appropriate fram ework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a 
whole.......................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3.5. Driver 5 - Thematic programmes are too fr agmented to tackle global issues in a 
comprehensive and global manner............................................................................. 15 
2.3.6. Driver 6 - The specificities of crisis, post-cr isis and states in situ ation of fragility are 
insufficiently taken into account in the current DCI.................................................. 16 
2.3.7. Driver 7 - Insufficient flexibility with regards to fund-allocation ............................. 16 
2.3.8. Driver 8 - A complex and rigid program ming process and stringent implementation 
rules.......................................................................................................................... .. 16 
2.4. Legal base for EU action............................................................................................ 17 2.5. EU Value Added ........................................................................................................ 17 2.5.1. Global Challenges, Global Response & Global Leadership ...................................... 17 
 
EN 3   EN 2.5.2. The critical mass of the EU........................................................................................ 18 
2.5.3. The EU is best placed to coordinate........................................................................... 18 2.5.4. Acting as one makes financial sense.......................................................................... 19 2.5.5. Greater accountability ................................................................................................ 19  
3. Objectives.................................................................................................................. . 20 
3.1. Policy framework and objectives............................................................................... 20 3.1.1. Policy framework....................................................................................................... 2 0 
3.1.2. Objectives.............................................................................................................. ..... 20 
3.1.2.1. Global objectives of the developm ent policy under the instrument........................... 20 
3.1.2.2. Objectives related to the revi ew of the instrument itself............................................ 20 
3.2. Consistency with external action priorities................................................................ 22 3.3. Consistency with other EU policies ........................................................................... 22 3.4. Geographical/thematic coverage................................................................................ 24 4. Policy options............................................................................................................. 2 4 
4.1. Option 1:"No change": cooperation with the countries concerned remains strictly in 
the framework of the existing DCI Regulation.......................................................... 24 
4.1.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 24 
4.1.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 25 
4.1.3. Strengthen the inclusion of  good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and pr ogramming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 25 
4.1.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 25 
4.1.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enha nce the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 25 
4.1.6. Better address the specific n eeds of countries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 25 
4.1.7. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 26 4.1.8. Simplified programming and flexibility in  implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 26 
4.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation ....................................................................... 26 4.2.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 26 
 
EN 4   EN 4.2.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 27 
4.2.3. Strengthen the inclusion of  good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and pr ogramming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 28 
4.2.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 28 
4.2.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enha nce the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.6. Better address the specific n eeds of countries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.7. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 30 4.2.8. Simplified programming and flexibility in  implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 30 
5. Analysis of impacts.................................................................................................... 31 5.1. Option 1: No Change ................................................................................................. 31 5.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation ....................................................................... 32 5.2.1. Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1)............................................................................................................... 32 
5.2.2. Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2)............................................................................................... 33 
5.2.3. Strengthen the inclusion of  good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and pr ogramming mechanisms (Objective 3) ....... 34 
5.2.4. Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4)............................................................................................................... 34 
5.2.5. Reduce the fragmentation of and enha nce the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)............................................................................................................... 35 
5.2.6. Better address the specific n eeds of countries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile situation 
(Objective 6)............................................................................................................... 36 
5.2.7. Flexibility of fund allocation (Objective 7) ............................................................... 36 5.2.8. Simplified programming and flexibility in  implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8).............................................................. 37 
6. Comparing the options ............................................................................................... 38 6.1. Weighing-up of positive and negative impacts per option......................................... 38 6.2. Preferred option.......................................................................................................... 39 
7. Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 40 7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives ......................................................... 40 
 
EN 5   EN 7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements ................................................ 40 
 
EN 6   EN 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Organisation and timing 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment fo r the EU external action instruments1 for the period 
2014-2020, including this document, has been coordinated by a Task Force  composed of 
services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams, appointed 
on 7 June 2011, have duly take n into consideration the cons ultations, reviews and studies 
mentioned in Section 2.2 and ha ve liaised with other Comm ission services to ensure 
consistency with other EU policies. The Task Fo rce met with the drafting team in charge of 
this Impact Assessment on 7 June, 1 July, 14  July and 4 August 2011 for organisational and 
quality-check purposes. 
An Impact Assessment Steering Group , composed of the members of the Task Force and 
representatives of interested Directorates Ge neral and the Secretaria t General, was launched 
on 22 June 2011. It has met twice, on 13 and 26 July 2011. 
The review of this Impact Assessm ent by the Impact Assessment Board  took place on 14 
September 2011. 
In line with article 27 of the Fi nancial Regulation (Council Regulation  (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementing ru les of the Financial Regulation (Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment is the ex-ante 
evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). 
1.2. Public consultation 
The Commission held a public consultation on futu re funding for EU external action between 
26 November 2010 and 31 January 2011. This pro cess was based on an online questionnaire 
accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action after 2013?'. The 
consultation covered all instruments for external  action, but many issues have been directly 
relevant to the DCI and are detailed below. 
A majority of the respondents (around 70%) c onfirmed that EU financial intervention 
provided a substantial added value in the main policy areas supported by EU financial 
instruments for external action2. Many respondents confirmed that the EU should make good 
use of its comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, 
its supranational nature and its role  as a facilitator of coordination.  
Nearly all respondents (92%) suppor ted a more differentiated approach , tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary country, in orde r to increase the impact of EU financial 
                                                 
1 The instruments are the following: 11th European Development Fund, De velopment Cooperation Instrument, 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, European  Neighbourhood Instrument, In strument for Stability, 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European In strument for Democracy and Human Rights, Partnership 
Instrument and the instruments for the EU-Greenland Partne rship. The Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian Ai d Instrument and the Civil Protection Mechanism are 
not part of this joint exercise.  
2 i.e. peace and security, pove rty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in  stability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood countries, tackling global ch allenges, promoting EU and intern ational standards and values, and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad.  
 
EN 7   EN instruments.  
Over two thirds of resp ondents believed that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account 
in its external acti on, and that the latter  should be based on EU values  and principles, and on 
development objectives of the partner countries.  A number of contributions underscored that 
development cooperation should be based on a mutual partnership. 
A majority of responde nts agreed that joint programmi ng and co-financing with Member 
States could increase the impact and the co herence of EU external  action, simplify the 
delivery of aid and reduce overall transaction costs. 
A vast majority of responde nts supported stronger monitori ng and evaluation systems in 
future instruments and in the impl ementation of projects/programmes. 
A majority of stakeholders s upported increasing information a nd communication activities to 
enhance the visibility of EU external funding, in particular in the beneficiary countries; 
however EU visibility is regarded  as being better served by e ffective policies, strategies and 
active presence in third c ountries, than by additional spending for communication. 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board 
Following the comments of the Impact Assessment Board meeting held on 14 September 
2011, the present Impact Assessment report was improved as followed: 
• An explanation of the legal and policy fram ework determining the content of the next 
development cooperation instrument is introduced (cf. section 2.1.2). 
• The explanation of problems identified and drivers is improved, with concrete cases 
and examples (cf. sections 2.3, 2.2 and 2.3). 
• The options are redefined to i) exclude the options already predetermined by the 
legal framework, ii) reinforce the "baselin e-scenario" option and introduce the sub-
options considered for a possible change  in the current development cooperation 
instrument and iii) introduce more details on how the options would work in practise 
(cf. section 4). 
• The comparison between pros and cons a nd assessment of the impacts are improved 
(cf. section 5 and 6). 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 
2.1.1.  Problems requiring action 
The EU Treaty explicitly states that the Un ion shall define and pur sue common policies and 
actions and shall work for a high degree of cooper ation in all fields of international relations, 
in order to " foster the sustainable economic, social  and environmental development of 
developing countries,  with the primary aim of eradicating poverty ". 
Poverty remains a major problem in developing c ountries. Most of them are off-track towards 
 
EN 8   EN the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals  ("MDGs")3 and they are not enjoying 
a sustainable development. While significant a dvances towards the MDGs have been made, 
there is still a long way to go in  several areas, and strong commitment is required on the part 
of developing countries and dono rs to achieve the MDGs and eradicate poverty. The EU is 
committed to helping developing countries address these problems. In fact, the EU is a key 
actor helping developing count ries to achieve the mentione d goals. The EU is currently the third 
largest donor worldwide, and together with its Member States counts for 50% of global Official Development Aid. Given 
this significant share in development financ ing, it is therefore necessary for the EU to 
continue to support developing co untries' efforts to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty 
while attaining the objectives of sustainable development and gradual integration into the 
world economy4. 
The definition of the MDGs, progress towards targets and shortcomings are presented in 
Annex I . 
In addition, global challenges  continue to be prominent and developing countries were hit 
hard by the succession of recent cr ises (financial and economic crises, food price rises, fuel 
price volatility) resulting in so cial and economic instability, fo rced migration, food insecurity 
and in general a state of increased vulnera bility to external shocks. The continued 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources on which the poor depend (land, water, forests, 
etc…) and loss of biodiversity are other global challenges whic h need urgent attention if 
development is to become sustainable. The environment and natural resources are increasingly being recognized as vital for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction 
meaning that sustainable development require s good environmental management. Ecosystems 
and natural resources are a significant part of the national income and wealth of less 
developed economies, making them a strategi c resource for development. Furthermore, 
climate change and energy issues, including ac cess to energy, exacerbate an already fragile 
and difficult situation and risk to undoing so me development achievements if they are not 
properly addressed. 
Against the above-mentioned background and as the world's population continues to grow, it 
is clear that more action is n eeded to increase developing count ries' resilience to external 
challenges particularly in the case of  the most disadvantaged countries. 
2.1.2.  Scope of the present Developmen t Cooperation Instrument ("DCI") 
The EU has the competence to carry out ac tivities under its own common development 
policy; this does not prevent however EU Memb er States from exercising their own national 
development policy (cf. Article 4(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)). This is why coordination amongst EU  and its Member State is particularly 
important in this policy area (see "How does th e DCI work in practise?" below) in line with 
Article 210 TFEU. 
In the current 2007-2013 period, the DCI ha s a budget (reference amount) of €16.9 billion 
                                                
 
3 The development objectives were defined by donors in the UN's Millennium Development Goals 
("MDGs") in 2000.  
4 Last year, the EU strongly reaffi rmed its commitment to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs, 
including the reaffirmation of the collective target of devoting 0.7% of its GNI to ODA by 2015. Even 
beyond 2015 and even when some or all of the MDGs have been achieved, continued efforts will be 
needed to eliminate poverty. 
 
EN 9   EN representing 32% of Heading IV .  
The DCI was established with the primary and ove rarching objective of er adicating poverty in 
partner countries and regions in the context of  sustainable development, including the pursuit 
of the MDGs as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law. The DCI is one of the EU's key instruments for providing 
development assistance to non-European coun tries alongside the European Development 
Fund ("EDF"), covering the African, Caribbe an and Pacific ("ACP") countries and the 
European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument  ("ENPI"). All these instruments cover 
different geographic areas. The DCI is struct ured into three categor ies of programmes (see 
Annex II for the envelopes per programme). 
Bilateral and regional geographic programmes 
 
The DCI geographic programmes encompass coope ration with partner countries and regions 
selected on a geographical basis ov er five regions, namely: Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, 
the Middle East and South Africa. These five re gions in the world still contained 70% of the 
world's people living on less than $1.25 per day5 and over 68% of the world's hungry people 
in 20106. The range of countries sup ported by DCI bilateral coopera tion is highly diversified 
(see annex II). 
Cooperation with partner countries and regions encompasses a wide rang e of objectives, apart 
from supporting the MDGs and the promotion of democracy, good govern ance, the rule of 
law and human rights including gender equality. It  fosters sustainable de velopment, including 
political, economic, social and environmental as pects. It encourages the integration of the 
partner countries in the world economy, but also supports measur es to preserve and improve 
the quality of the environment and the sustainabl e management of natural resources. It serves 
to strengthen the relations between the EU a nd partner countries and regions. The scope of 
possible areas of action is very comprehensive,  though there are prioriti es defined per region. 
The geographic measures shall fulfil the criter ia for Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
established by OECD/DAC. 
Thematic programmes  
The instrument has five thematic programmes: i)  investing in people, ii) the environment and 
the sustainable management of natural resour ces including energy (w hich includes climate 
change), iii) Non-State Actors (NSA) and Local Authorities, iv) food security, and v) 
migration and asylum. They complement the geographic programmes by covering specific 
areas which are of interest to a group of partner countries not  determined by geography. They 
encompass not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the DCI, but also 
the ACP and EU neighbouring countries. 
Thematic programmes play a major role in su pporting the external di mension of the EU's 
policies. They are critical for addressing challenges in countries where geographic assistance 
is, for whatever reason (security, frag ility, political), not programmable. 
Sugar accompanying measures  
                                                 
5 2005 - WB 2008 report - last global data available. 
6 FAO – 2010. 
 
EN 10   EN The temporary Accompanying Measures for former  Sugar Protocol countries within the DCI 
cover an appropriate period for adjustment of ACP countries following the 2006 EU Sugar 
Reform. No further funds are foreseen for the next financial perspectives.  
How does the DCI work in practise?  
As all the regulations for EU external acti on, the DCI is an enabling and not prescriptive 
instrument for EU development cooperation. Th is means that the DCI provides the general 
framework for EU intervention in third co untries (general polic y objectives, general 
principles, possible areas of intervention, cond itions and decision-making mechanisms), but 
they do not define in detail the exact sector/area or  type of intervention in each of the partner 
countries or regions concerned . Such level of detail is contained in the multiannual 
programming documents.  
Multiannual programming documents detail per c ountry/region (geographic programmes) or 
per theme (thematic programmes), the sectors/areas  of intervention, the t ype of assistance, the 
specific objectives, the expect ed results, the performance in dicators, the amounts involved, 
etc. Before their adoption by the Commission, these documents are s ubject to a political 
dialogue with the relevant pa rtner countries, civil societ y, donors (including EU Member 
States) and other stakeholders. Th is is in line with the principl es of ownership and alignment 
to the development policies of partner countries and with division of labour and coordination 
amongst donors. After these documents have b een adopted, the Commission may decide on 
the implementation of specific projects or programmes . The concrete projects or programmes 
that the EU intends to initiat e in a given year are grouped per country, region or theme in 
action programmes adopted every year by the Commission. Both the multiannual 
programming documents and the annual actio n programmes are discussed with Members 
States (through the so-cal led "comitology" process). 
Generally, the revision of the DCI would main ly imply reviewing the enabling framework 
provided by this instrument in  order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU 
assistance . 
2.1.3.  Areas for improvement linked to the scope of the DCI 
In 2008 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Ar ticle 21 of the Treaty of the European Union 
confirms poverty eradication as one of the main objectives of EU external action and Article 
208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eur opean Union places it as the primary objective 
of development policy. The Commission's Communication "A Budget for Europe 2020"7 has 
further confirmed the need for the Europe an Union to have a specific development 
cooperation instrument during the next Multi annual Financial Framework (MFF), with a 
proposed budget of €20.6 billion in 2011 prices. 
New challenges, together with the priorities set in the Europe 2020 St rategy, have prompted 
the Commission to make proposals to review and adapt the EU’s development policy given 
the urgent need to speed up progress toward s the MDGs and to achieve inclusive and 
sustainable growth globally. Following the public consultati on on the Green Paper published 
in November 2010, a Communication on EU deve lopment policy entitl ed "Increasing the 
Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change" will be adopted by the 
                                                 
7 COM(2011)500, adopted on 29 June 2011. 
 
EN 11   EN Commission in 2011. While this Communication will not propose a change in the overarching 
objective of the EU's development cooperation, which will remain the fight against poverty, 
an adaptation of EU development policy is pro posed in order to meet the challenges of the 
coming decade, mainly:  
(i) the need to focus more on helping to strengthen governance and inclusive and sustainable 
growth in developing countries , while continuing to support basic social services. Those 
objectives should be translated into  specific objectives of the DCI. 
(ii) to take into consideration the increasing differentiation of benefi ciary countries: Apart 
from Least Developed Countries and Low Inco me Countries which get 50% of funds for 
bilateral cooperation, the DCI provides assistance to several middle income countries, 
including OECD members – Chile and Mexico. The list of beneficiaries includes emerging 
world powers: China, Brazil and India, as well as other G20 countries, namely South Africa 
and Indonesia. Some of the emerging powers have in recent years become significant donors 
themselves and are not aid dependent even though they still acknowledge high social 
disparities. The DCI may ensure su fficient and adequate differentiation  amongst partner 
countries taking into account economic and social disparities  amongst and inside partner 
countries and the development of new obj ectives beyond pure deve lopment assistance. 
(iii) to ensure a strong link between EU de velopment assistance and partner countries' 
commitment to key reforms. It could take better into account the partner countries' progress on democratisation and respect for basic human rights
. 
Finally, in a number of regions covered by different EU instruments, it has been difficult to 
support cross-regional or continent-wide initiati ves because of the different nature, scope and 
objectives of the external assistance instruments. This applies to all regions but concerns in particular the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy
 ("JAES"), adopt ed in 2007. The 
expected mainstreaming of the support to the JAES in existing EU (EDF, ENPI and DCI) and 
Member State instruments has largely failed to  materialise despite the recent reconfirmation 
of the JAES at the 2010 Af rica-EU Summit. The Commissi on's Communication "A Budget 
for Europe 2020" specifically states that the DCI will support the JAES. 
2.2. Mid-term reviews and lessons learnt 
2.2.1.  Results of the mid term review of the financial instruments for external actions 
A mid-term review has been conducted for each of the EU external action financial 
instruments for the period 2007-2013, including the DCI. It has been agr eed that the general 
structure of these instruments are adapted to their purpose and that no major change should be 
introduced at that stage. Nevertheless, an en largement of the scope of the Industrialised 
Countries Instrument (ICI) has been proposed in order to support programmes of mutual 
interest with developing countri es that could not be funded under the DCI. For the new MFF 
the Commission proposes establishing a new instru ment, the Partnership Instrument ("PI"), as 
a successor to the ICI. The propos ed DCI together with the PI will enable the EU to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for developing countries that will take into account the development needs of the beneficiary c ountries, as well as wider EU interests and objectives. 
 
EN 12   EN 2.2.2.  Review of the lessons learnt 
In the preparation process of the new MFF, an internal revi ew of the different reports 
(evaluations, audits, studies, mid-term reviews, ) has been undertaken, looking at what worked 
and what did not work, and drawing lessons to  be taken into account  when designing the 
instruments for the next MFF (see Annex III for a more detailed account of lessons learnt and 
Annex IV for a list of reports reviewed). 
The evaluations, Court of Auditors reports, as  well as mid-term reviews of the geographic 
programmes, show that progres s towards several MDGs in the developing DCI countries was 
achieved with DCI support, as one of the most important financial instruments in the world 
supporting these objectives8. However, pursuant to the princi ple of ownership it is for the 
beneficiary governments to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies that were the driving force of these achievements. 
The DCI allows for a more strategic approach
 in planning and implementing EU aid, through 
a clear definition of sectors, objectives and e xpected results (set out in Strategy Papers, 
Multiannual Indicative Progr ammes and Annual Action Programmes as opposed to the 
previous variety of self-standing actions adopted  individually) leading to an agreement with 
the beneficiary country. The DCI puts the be neficiary countries in the driving seat , and 
requires EU/donors to support the beneficiary's development strategy, policies and reforms. 
The new implementation modalities  in the DCI, such as budge t support and sector-wide 
approach, have allowed for a deeper level of cooperation with partner countries: there is a 
clear link between the level of policy dialogue with beneficiary countries and the modality of 
delivering assistance. Also, the new implementing modalities have rendered possible a more efficient division of labour by allowing co-financing amongst donors. New financial 
instruments foreseen in the DCI, such as blen ding mechanisms, could be used further where 
appropriate.
9 
Thematic programmes  provided the Commission some additi onal flexibility in dealing with 
specific challenges and also pr ovided a useful instrument to complement the geographic 
programmes in areas such as: 
– investing in people  allowing responses to emerging priorities in line with the Europe 
2020 Strategy, e.g. social inclusion of disabl ed persons and increas ing the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled for AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
– addressing environment and sustainable management  of natural resources including 
energy, allowing the EU to support key EU and in ternational policy initiatives in the 
area of environment and development, incl uding climate change, such as the Global 
Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) and the REDD+ piloting and Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT); 
– improving food security  for the poorest and most vulnerable, this programme being 
recognised for the relevance of its interventions; 
                                                 
8 As mentioned before, the EU is the third largest donor worldwide, and together with its Member States counting for 50% of global ODA which is 
primarily delivered through DCI and EDF. Hence, it can be concluded that DCI supports the progress on MDG. 
9 Final report of the Working Group on the additionality of grants in the framework of blending 
mechanisms of 18 December 2009: http://www.dev-
practitioners.eu/fileadmin/Redaktion/GroupsFolders/Division_of_Labour/Loans_and_grants/WGBlending_FINAL_complete_report_181209.p df. 
 
EN 13   EN – supporting third countries in their efforts to ensure a better management of migratory 
flows :  this programme enjoys signi ficant flexibility and scope of action and allows 
for an increased integration of migration a nd asylum issues in development policies. 
Notwithstanding the above, a number of factors where identified as areas for improvement to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the DCI. 
In a globalised environment, different inte rnal EU policies (such as climate change, 
environment, energy, water, just ice and security, research, info rmation society, immigration, 
fisheries, etc) are increasingly becoming part of the EU's extern al action, and in  line with the 
EU 2020 agenda and the Lisbon Treaty a mutual  reinforcement of internal and external 
actions is needed. The starting point is that integration, and not duplication, must be the key 
word. However, the existing fragmented architecture of the DCI with several thematic 
programmes  was not adequate to allow the Commission to intervene swiftly on a sufficient 
scale even though this was critical to ensuring the effectiveness of internal EU  policies. In 
some cases the thematic programmes were not su fficiently flexible to respond to recent global 
crises (e.g. the food price crisis, avian flu) or to  international engagement s taken at the highest 
political level (e.g. biodiversity and climate ch ange). The thematic e nvelope therefore needs 
more flexibility in order to allow for a more predictable long-term engagement in response to 
global public goods and challenges, and to react to the various shocks  affecting the poorest 
population. A global thematic envelop would enha nce flexibility, timeliness, effectiveness, 
and sustainability of EU response to such crises. 
The food crisis   
To respond to the food crisis in the second half of the last decade, the Commission had to adopt a 
specific Regulation to tackle the food crisis in 2008  since the existing thematic programmes of the 
existing DCI were excessively pigeonholed to prov ide for a comprehensive co verage for such global 
challenge. 
The avian flu' crisis 
Avian Flu is a development issue as it disproportionately affects less developed countries, which 
have often limited resources to fight the disease and who suffer more from trade restrictions due to 
H5N1. The spread of avian flu is facilitated by traditional husbandry methods of small poultry 
breeders, whose livelihoods are particularly affect ed by poultry losses. It is also in developing 
countries that promiscuity with poultry, lower hy giene and education favour the contamination of 
humans. The risk of an evolution to pandemic form s of influenza (mutation/recombination), resulting 
in very high numbers of human illness and deaths, remains. Other human diseases are emerging of 
animal (zoonotic) origin and have also the potential for crises as they would spread rapidly across the 
world in a globalised context. So far the Commission has been contributing large amounts to the fight 
against avian flu in third countries, however through various separate external assistance instruments 
(DCI-Asia, ENPI, EDF) and different mechanism s: for example, through a Multi Donor Trust Fund 
with the World Bank (AHIF),the programme Highly Pathogenic and Emerging Disease (HPED) in 
Asia, a programme implemented by the African Union and through national envelopes in some 
countries in Africa, etc. Therefore EU response has  been fragmented in geographical coverage, scope, 
and duration, and entailing constraint s in coordination and reporting .  
Development cooperation still remain s too fragmented and over-ambitious . The resources, if 
too thinly spread, do not always reach the required critical mass an d do not allow for the 
necessary leverage to reach al l the expected results. The r ecent increase of economic and 
social disparities amongst partner countries and the development of new objectives beyond 
pure development assist ance calls for further differentia tion amongst such countries. The 
 
EN 14   EN application of geographical di fferentiation becomes of key im portant to ensure that EU 
financing is concentrated in count ries that need it the most (s uch as least developed countries, 
fragile states/countries in cr isis, etc) thus increasing th e impact of EU assistance. 
The review of lessons learnt also shows that, under the present DCI the specific provisions on 
fragile states / countries in post-crisis situation  are not sufficient, underestimating the need to 
support political processes, st rengthening the rule of la w and governance. Addressing 
transition challenges requires a set of responses  at country level, based on specific needs and 
related to a common strategy (hol istic approach). The specific needs of countries in crisis, 
post-crisis and fragile situations were not sufficiently taken into account and the rigidity of the 
decision-making process for fund-allocation, programming and implementation made it 
difficult for the EU to swiftly resp ond to a rapidly evolving situation. 
The DCI had indicative allocations per region,  without keeping any unallocated envelope, 
thus leaving limited possibility to mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs , like new 
political priorities and natural or man-made disa sters. No un-programmed envelope was left to 
be used as a reserve. With very limited possibility to mobilise resources from outside the DCI instrument (except humanitarian assistance and IfS to respond to crises), the only way to 
ensure funding in response to unf oreseen needs is to review an d cut some country allocations. 
Finally, the current programmi ng and implementation process
 foreseen for the DCI is too 
complex, does not permit the alignm ent of the EU programming cycle to those of its partners, 
and also does not sufficiently facilitate joint programming with Member  States. Furthermore, 
it does not allow swift adaptation where so required, due to polit ical or factual (e.g. crisis, 
fragility) requirements.  
Example of lack of flexibility of fund allocation and decision-making: The "Arab spring"  
Current situation in Yemen (as well as those of sever al other countries in the region) demonstrated the 
need for more flexibility in the implementation of co operation in countries in crisis, as well as the need 
for having at disposal a reserve for unforeseen needs.  Before the political crisis erupted in Yemen, the 
adopted annual action programme included con crete cooperation activities that were to be 
implemented through the government. Given th e popular uprising and the repression by the 
authorities it has been later decided that EU cooperati on would need to be refocused to other areas of 
intervention that would not include the government. In this specific case it is planned to focus on 
social welfare through a programme implemented by  the World Bank. Nevertheless, given the long 
and cumbersome procedures to modify the action Progr amme the EU is missing the opportunity to act 
where it is most needed at this important moment in  Yemen, as well as it risks loosing the funding due 
to annuality of the budget. Unallocated reserve an d flexible procedures to adjust the multiannual 
programming would further increase the EU capacity  to act immediately when an opportunity to 
strengthen the long term development process would arise, as it did not in Yemen . 
2.3. The underlying drivers of the problem 
On the basis of the above analysis and aforem entioned reports, the fo llowing drivers have 
been identified as hindering the objectives  or limiting the impact of the DCI: 
2.3.1.  Driver 1  - DCI objectives are not fully aligne d to the latest policy development 
trends 
The evolution of development policy, as refl ected namely in the upcoming Commission 
Communication "Increasing the im pact of EU Development Polic y: An agenda for change", 
 
EN 15   EN are not adequately reflected in  the existing DCI. In particul ar, EU development policy should 
give sufficient recognition to inclusive and su stainable growth in partner countries, as 
identified in the EU 2020 strategy, while assis ting in reducing partner countries' vulnerability 
and exposure to global shocks by addressing problems related to global public goods. 
2.3.2.  Driver 2  - The DCI does not contain strong  mechanisms to ensure significant 
differentiation amongst partner countries. 
The DCI covers a wide range of countries  falling under the OECD/DAC definition of 
developing countries, from the Least Deve loped Countries to Upper Middle Income 
Countries. Each category has very different deve lopment needs, capacities, performance level 
and interests. Although the DCI refers to the differentiation principle and the need to give 
priority to the Least Devel oped Countries and Low-Income Countries, it provides no further 
guidance on how to do so. Such guidance would allow the EU to concentrate funds where the 
EU would have more impact and to apply an  adequate policy/aid methodology mix depending 
on the needs, capacities and specific ci rcumstances of each partner country. 
2.3.3.  Driver 3  - Good  governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are not 
sufficiently embedded in the c ooperation mechanisms of the DCI . 
Respect for good governance, democracy, human right s and the rule of law remain issues of 
concern, as achieving the MDGs is often hampered  by the fact that in a number of countries 
the democratic institutions are still weak, or the power is in  the hands of undemocratic or 
corrupt regimes. In some cases this was furt her exacerbated by a weak security situation in 
partner countries.  
2.3.4.  Driver 4  - The current architecture of EU external action instruments does not 
provide the appropriate framework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a 
whole 
The geographically and thematically fragmented coverage of the existing instruments (EDF, 
ENPI, DCI) does not allow a African-wide respons e to challenges of continental scope, as 
required by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAE S). It has proven difficult to mobilize ENPI 
contributions, despite the fact th at North-African countries play  a key role in the thematic 
partnerships. EDF-resources have been inade quate to cover innovativ e activities through pre-
established national and regiona l programming. Due to the lack of alternatives, intra-ACP 
funds have de facto  become the main source of financing for the JAES'. However, they do not 
allow the Commission to cover all thematic prio rities, they are insufficient to fund the broad 
range of Action Plan activities, and they do not cover Northern Africa. This failure to live-up 
to the joint Summit commitments has negatively a ffected relations with Africa, and has been 
detrimental to the EU's own interests to cooper ate more effectively with  African partners in 
tackling global challenges. 
2.3.5.  Driver 5  - Thematic programmes are too fragme nted to tackle global issues in a 
comprehensive and global manner 
The current structure of the DCI, with stric tly separated thematic programmes, hampers the 
EU's capacity to react promptly and substantia lly to achieve the required impact, as was the 
case for instance during both the recent food crisis and the av ian flu outbreak. Implementation 
is difficult since the scope of each them atic programme is often too narrow. 
 
EN 16   EN 2.3.6.  Driver 6  - The specificities of crisis, post-cris is and states in s ituation of fragility10 
are insufficiently taken into  account in the current DCI 
Countries in crisis, pos t-crisis and fragile states have specific long-term, development  needs 
and requirements such as supporting state-buildi ng, peace processes, the rule of law, security 
sector reform and governance (short-term and immediate needs are covered by humanitarian 
aid and the Instrument for Stability). These ar e by nature fast-evolvi ng situations requiring 
appropriate flexibility to res pond to these countries' needs in  a timely manner. The current 
lack of flexibility within the DCI significantl y impacts EU intervention in those situations.  
Additional flexibility in programming for countries in crisis, post-crisis and fr agile situations 
would allow for a quick adapta tion of the EU response to the changing environment and 
needs, without going through lengthy and cu mbersome programming review procedures. 
Some flexibility exists in the current DCI in this regard, as it is possible to finance ad hoc measures outside the programming documents in  exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. 
The application of this flexibility is limite d, however, because of the lack of un-programmed 
envelopes of funds which could be used to resp ond to such unforeseen needs (see driver 7). 
2.3.7.  Driver 7
 - Insufficient flex ibility with regards  to fund-allocation 
The DCI does not contain any unallocated enve lopes, thus leaving limited possibility to 
mobilise resources to respond to unforeseen needs, such as new political priorities and natural 
or man-made disasters. 
At the programming of the Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2011-2013, no un-
programmed envelope was left to be used as a reserve. The only way to ensure funding in response to unforeseen needs is to review and cut country allocations. However, taking into 
account that the DCI requires the EU to agree on the focal areas , objectives and allocations 
with the beneficiary countries, cutting co untry allocations after completion of the 
programming stage, proved to be politically difficult.  
Flexibility is also important for thematic pr ogrammes. During the last  few years, several 
shocks have hit developing count ries. The “food price crisis” requ ired funding superior to the 
overall envelope devoted to thematic progr ammes under the DCI and led to a complex and 
lengthy process that was in contradict ion to the urgency of the situation. 
2.3.8.  Driver 8
 - A complex and rigid programming process and stringent implementation 
rules 
The DCI rules on programming and implemen tation with regards to the adoption and 
amendment of decisions such as annual action programmes are rather rigid (e.g. extensive use 
of ex ante "comitology" proces s). Moreover, they systematic ally require the adoption of 
specific EU programming in the form of Count ry Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative 
Programmes per country/region. This may be di fficult to conciliate with a number of 
objectives agreed by the Commission under inte rnational and European commitments on Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD's Pa ris Declaration, European Consensus for Development), requiring i) 
                                                 
10 The notion of crisis, as well as that of post-crisis and fragility are defined inter alia  in article 168(2) of 
the Implementing Rules of the EU Financial Regulation and in the Commission Communication of 25 
October 2007 – Towards an EU response to situations  of fragility – engaging in difficult environments 
for sustainable developm ent, stability and peace. 
 
EN 17   EN better division of labour and coordination  amongst donors, which includes the possibility for 
joint programming between the EU and its Member States, and ii) alignment  with 
development strategies/programmes elaborated by partner countries (e.g. Action Plans). Such 
programming modalities, not f acilitated under the current DC I as it imposes specific 
programming rules and documents, are already practiced by donors including the EU in some 
countries (e.g. joint donors response strategies , defining division of labour among donors, EU 
Action Plan partially covering the national deve lopment strategy). By acting as one, the EU 
and its Member States would have more weight  and leverage in poli cy dialogue with the 
partner countries and in  the donor community.  
The role of the private sector and financial ins titutions within development strategies is not 
sufficiently encouraged to support public and pr ivate investments within  partner countries as 
well as sustainable, inclusive and smart growth and the insertion of de veloping countries into 
the global economy. 
2.4. Legal base for EU action 
The specific legal ba ses for EU action in the developm ent field are articles 208 to 210  of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the EU. In particul ar article 209, which establishes the need for 
the European Parliament and the Council to adopt measures necessary for the implementation 
of development cooperation policy, serves as the legal basis for an instrument to replace or 
amend the existing DCI. 
2.5. EU Value Added 
2.5.1.  Global Challenges, Global Response & Global Leadership 
As the world's largest donor, the EU and Member  States provide more than half (56%) of 
global aid to developing countries . The EU provides aid to the poorest people on the planet in 
more than 150 countries worldwide and is committed to achieving the MDGs on time by the end of 2015. The European Commissi on's official development aid alone
11 represents 20% of 
total EU aid. In view of increasingly complex ch allenges, none of the EU 's internal priorities 
– security, smart, inclusive and sustainable gr owth and job creation, c limate change, access to 
energy, resource efficiency, including the protec tion of biodiversity, safe management of 
chemicals and waste, health and pandemics, edu cation and migration - will be achieved in 
isolation from the wider world. 
The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on behalf 
of and with Member States, giving enhanced cred ibility in the countries where it works. It is 
best placed to take on the role  of global leader on behalf of its citizens, for instance in its 
contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. 
Another example for the EU's leading role on the international scene is its effort to combat 
climate change. In order to help other parts of  the world to step up their efforts to combat 
climate change, the Commission intends to increase the proportion of climate related 
expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with contri bution from different policies.12 
EU Heads of State have also agreed 'steppi ng up the EU contributions to averting global 
                                                 
11 Including EDF. 
12 COM (500) 2011. 
 
EN 18   EN biodiversity loss. In particular  the Commission and member stat es will contribute their fair 
share to international efforts to significantly increase resources for global biodiversity, and 
will improve the effectiveness of EU funding for global biodiversity'13. Preserving and 
enhancing biodiversity and ecosystem services will contribute to poverty alleviation and boost 
the green economy. Coherence with the Europe 2020 strategy should be sought as far as its 
smart growth priority is concerned, promo ting support to S&T, innovation and information 
and communication technologies (ICT) capaci ties as catalysts for socio-economic 
development. 
2.5.2.  The critical mass of the EU 
With 27 Member States acting within common po licies and strategies, the EU alone has the 
critical mass to respond to global challenges, such as poverty reduction and climate change. 
The action of individual Member States can be limited and fragmented, with projects which 
can be too small to make a sust ainable difference in the field. 
This critical mass  also puts the  EU in a better position to conduct policy dialogue with partner 
governments. In a recent Green  Paper consultation carried out to find out views from 
stakeholders on our development policy, all thos e who responded agreed on the role that the 
EU played in supporting good governance  (including the participati on of civil society), the 
rule of law, security, human rights and gender equality. The responses also showed that the 
people believe that the EU has a comparative a dvantage in the areas of energy, infrastructure, 
including ICT, agriculture and aid for trad e. Similarly, in the UK's Department for 
International Development's recen t Multilateral Aid Review, EU work in fragile states was 
commended. 
Thanks to the large scale of the EU, it can deliver help to th e poor in some of the world's most 
remote areas, where most of the Member States ha ve no strategic interest and their presence is 
limited. 
2.5.3.  The EU is best placed to coordinate 
The EU has a network of inte rnational agreements all ove r the world, not matched by 
individual Member States, which gives them influence in almost  all fields of international 
relations. The EU plays a multi-faceted role in development: as an implementing agent of EU 
aid and as an EU coordinator and policy-maker in the development field, as an economic and 
trade partner, through security policy and polit ical dialogue, as well  as through other EU 
sector policies – such as mi gration and asylum, climate, information and communication 
technologies, environment or energy. The EU  can do more than other international 
organisations, because of its holistic approach  to development and external relations, in 
addition to instruments for the promotion of  democracy, and mechanisms to respond to a 
crisis. This horizontal approach, especially in  areas like trade, wher e the EU can negotiate 
trade agreements on behalf of the entire EU, puts the EU in a better position than Member 
States to make the most of the development budget. 
The EU also has a long standing reputation a nd role as a promoter of inclusiveness and 
multilateralism. Its efforts in pursuing a compre hensive international climate regime in the 
context of the international UN climate negotia tions and through bilate ral dialogues, as well 
                                                 
13 COM (2011) 244 final. 
 
EN 19   EN as its leadership in multilateral environment ag reements, have reflected positively on the EU 
external identity. The EU has also constructed ar guably the most sophisticated set of policies, 
incentives and standard to faci litate its economy's transition to  low carbon and is working to 
achieve resource efficiency by 2020. These experien ces and lessons should be made available 
to developing partners to advance their integration in global markets. 
Division of labour through the EU is a crucial component of its added value. With its network 
of international agreements, the EU is a natural coordinator, and can influence almost all fields of international rela tions, which individual Member  States, acting within common 
policies and strategies, cannot do alone. 
2.5.4.  Acting as one makes financial sense 
Acting as one, EU can have greater impact and more leverage in policy dialogue and donor 
cooperation. At a time of budgeta ry restrictions, when several Member States are compelled 
to exit entire sectors and count ries, the EU is able to play  an active role in promoting 
democracy, peace, solidarity, stability, prosperi ty and poverty reduction worldwide. In this 
context, it makes more sense than ever from a purely economic perspectiv e to invest money at 
EU level where a real difference can be made. Certain aid effectiv eness reforms, especially in 
terms of division of labour, could add up to po tential savings of between 3 and 6 billion a 
year, according to a r ecent independent study
14. 
Working with the EU is also more cost effective. Commission administrative costs – 
estimated at 5.4% on the basis of 2009 data - are lower than the average administrative costs 
of the principal bilateral aid donors. Furthermore, thanks to  development cooperation, some 
issues can be tackled in advance and save money. By investing in  developing countries, 
migration and asylum, climate change, ecosystem  degradation, food security, piracy, security,  
sexual violence and many other issues  are addressed. It  is often far  cheaper to eliminate the 
root causes of insecurity and poverty than de al with its symptoms further down the line. 
2.5.5.  Greater accountability 
Every euro spent on development is scrutinised by the European Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors, and also by every Member State. In  addition, the European  Commission is one of 
the most transparent aid donors in the world . Transparency is in itself an important tool for 
ensuring effectiveness and value for money. This  has been recognised by the UK organisation 
"Publish what you Fund" which ranked the Europ ean Commission in 4th position (out of 30) 
in it is first Aid Transparency Asse ssment of donors in February 2011.  
                                                 
14 See The Benefits of a European Approach, by HTSPE. 
 
EN 20   EN 3. OBJECTIVES  
3.1. Policy framework and objectives 
3.1.1.  Policy framework 
The 'European Consensus'15 adopted in 2005 together with the Code of Conduct16 provides 
the general framework, orientations and focus to  steer the implementatio n of EU cooperation 
with partner countries and re gions. The communication on EU development policy ('Agenda 
for change') is expected to be adopted by the Commission during th e autumn 2011, whereby 
the revised policy objectives of  EU development policy will be further specified. This policy 
framework, together with the EU Treaty, de termines the objectives  of EU development 
policy, applicable also to the successor of the DCI. 
3.1.2.  Objectives 
3.1.2.1.  Global objectives of the developmen t policy under the instrument 
The overarching objective of the EU developmen t policy should be redu cing and, in the long 
term, eradicating poverty in partner countries  and regions, with a special emphasis on: 
– promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance; 
– supporting inclusive and sustainable growth -oriented development, including inter 
alia environmental and climate smart sustainability. 
On that basis, the EU will continue suppor ting the MDGs, which provides well-established 
performance indicators, while ensuring c onsistency with the upcoming Commission 
Communication on the EU development policy "I ncreasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: An agenda for change". 
3.1.2.2.  Objectives related to the review of the instrument itself 
• Objective 1 - Align the objectives of the DCI with the new trends in EU development 
policy (cf. driver 1) 
In addition to the overarching obj ective of the current DCI, the revised instrument should be 
able to properly project the EU's internal pol icies into its external dimension by elevating 
sustainable and inclusive growth to the level of driver for ac hieving the primary objective of 
poverty alleviation, in order to  increase its response capacity to global challenges and the 
protection of public goods that would proper ly take into account EU internal policy 
objectives. 
                                                 
15 Joint statement by the Council an d the representatives of the gover nments of the Member States 
meeting with the Council, the European Parliament  and the Commission on EU development policy of 
20 December 2005. 
16 The Code of Conduct was agreed in 2007 (COM/2007/72) and presents operational principles for EU donors regarding complementarity in development cooperation. Their aim is to enhance effectiveness by improving overall development results and impact fo r poverty reduction and reducing the transaction 
costs, through a division of labour between donors . For instance, it was agreed each donor will work in 
3 sectors only, plus General Budget Support if app licable and support to civil society organisations. 
 
EN 21   EN • Objective 2  - Establish strong mechanisms to ensure significant differentiation 
amongst partner countries (cf. driver 2) 
The revised instrument should a llow a more differentiated approa ch amongst partner countries 
in order to respond to the specif ic situation of each country, ta king into account their needs, 
capacities and performance, and the potential impact of EU aid.  
• Objective 3  - Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms  
(cf. driver 3) 
The revised instrument should foresee an in creased degree of linka ge between the fund 
allocation/programming  and respect for EU values, namely good governance, democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law, providing incentives to c oncerned partner countries to 
improve governance. The revised instrument shoul d have the necessary flexibility to engage 
and support such processes in th e concerned partner countries.  
• Objective 4  – Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(JAES) (cf. driver 4) 
The revised instrument should provide an ad equate legal basis and coverage for the 
implementation of the JAES.  
• Objective 5  - Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic 
programmes (cf. driver 5) 
The added value of a thematic programme is its ability to project EU core values (gender, 
social inclusion, etc) and to allow the EU to intervene more efficiently on global public goods 
such as research, biodiversity and global cr ises (e.g. avian flu) where the action of the 
Commission should also benefit c ountries without bilateral co-ope ration. The flexibility of the 
instrument should be sufficient to mobilise significant resources to address these issues whenever needed (e.g. food pri ce crises, climate change). 
• Objective 6
 - Better address the specif ic needs of countries in crisis, post crisis and 
fragile situation (cf. driver 6) 
The revised instrument should ensure the nece ssary flexibility in terms of strategies, 
programming and implementation procedures in countries in crisis, po st-crisis and fragile 
situations to allow for the quick adaptation of the EU response to thei r changing environment. 
• Objective 7  - Increase flexibility of f und allocation (cf. driver 7) 
The allocation of funds between regions/countries/themes s hould be flexible enough to allow 
a swift re-attribution of  funds in case of unexpected n eeds requiring a rapid reaction (e.g. 
crisis/post-crisis/fragile states, new political priorities, the need to apply the differentiation 
and mutual accountability principles as well as  the conditionality fo r good governance, etc).  
• Objective 8  - Simplify programming and increase  flexibility of implementation, in 
consistency with the principles of aid effectiveness (cf. driver 8) 
 
EN 22   EN The programming and decision-making process s hould be simplified and flexible, making it 
possible for the EU to make use of joint pr ogramming and alignment with the programming 
cycle of partner countries.  
Finally, the new instrument shoul d provide the legal basis to a llow the EU to use/increase 
innovative instruments allowing  the involvement of the pr ivate sector and financial 
institutions in the implementation of  EU assistance in partner countries. 
3.2. Consistency with external action priorities 
In the context of the principles, objectives and the new institutional framework set by the 
Lisbon Treaty development cooperation must be mu tually coherent with other initiatives for 
external action. The revised instru ment will be an integral part  of the overall architecture of 
external action financial instruments which w ill be organised around four main chapters: a 
policy-based chapter aiming primarily at coop eration with partner countries within and 
outside the budget; working on cro ss-cutting priorities and valu es; humanitarian assistance 
and civil protection; and crisis management. 
Moreover for every country, development cooperation will be complementary to the new 
“Partnership Instrument”. Intera ction between the DCI, EDF and th e ENPI will be particularly 
strong under the DCI thematic envelopes which w ill cover and/or complement actions in the 
geographical zones covered by these respective instruments in the field of: support to civil 
society and local authorites, climate change , energy, food security, human development and 
migration. 
Interaction with the Trade policy, in partic ular GSP/GSP plus an d Everything But Arms 
schemes, but also trade agreements will remain  particularly important with Aid for Trade / 
Trade Related Assistance actions funded under DC I, both at bilateral and regional level.  
The programming principles and approaches of th e DCI shall be adjusted  to better respond to 
the dynamic developmental challenges of the 21st century, such as scarcity of natural 
resources, ecosystem degradation, popula tion pressures and c limate change. The 
omnipresence of these phenomena and the risk s they pose to develo pment progress will 
undermine efforts to reduce poverty and reach the MDGs if they are not comprehensively incorporated into the development cooperation programmes and approaches.
17 
3.3. Consistency with other EU policies 
As laid out under chapter 2.2.2 th e integration of different in ternal EU policies is a key 
priority. The main arguments are:  i) coherence of our external action; ii) aid effectiveness, 
notably the commitment to reduce the number of actors and programmes; and iii) maximising 
synergies between policy objectives.  
In order to ensure the cohe rence and consistency of the EU's overall policy, there are 
important arguments in favour of continuing the current approach of financing such aspects of 
                                                 
17 The onus for more robust and climate resilient development planning rests on the national governments. However, the EU, as the strongest proponent of 
international and inclusive climate action, can promote policies in this respect and ensure its own country programming incorpo rates climate action. Similarly, 
support for natural capital assessments to show the value of supposedly free ecosystem services and for measuring the health ef fects of pollution to show the 
costs of inaction will help our partners pay more attention to the environmental base for sustainable development which in turn  should lead to cooperation on 
environmental protection. 
 
EN 23   EN internal EU policies mainly under Heading 4 of the EU budget through the geographical 
external programmes (i.e. mainstreaming) or through thematic programmes (environment, 
climate change, energy).   
By mainstreaming  internal EU policies through geogr aphical programmes, the external 
dimensions of internal policie s can be included in the agreements concluded with third 
countries and become part of th e policy dialogue with them. Thes e aspects are at the centre of 
EU country and regional programming in areas such as standards setting, infrastructure 
networks, including ICT, trade, business frameworks, energy, e ducation and research, justice 
and home affairs activities etc. The MFF Communication18 specifically suggests to commit 
the EU to mainstreaming climate chan ge and biodiversity throughout the budget.19 
Mainstreaming ensures coherence, fosters owne rship and ultimately enhances effectiveness 
and impact.  
While the "mainstreaming approach" was already followed for the currentMFF, it can be 
further improved. At the level of  country programming, internal  policy prioriti es should be 
taken into account more explicitly in the pr ocess of designing geographic programmes, while 
also respecting the country owne rship principle and alignment on development strategies. For 
example Ministries in partner countries responsib le for environment and climate are often left 
out of discussions on development strategies an d aid allocation even though these issues have 
cross-cutting implications for all sectors as well as being important development issues in their own right. 
Furthermore, this highlights the EU commit ment to advancing on Policy Coherence for 
Development ("PCD"). This requires that th e objectives of development cooperation be 
considered in all EU policies which ar e likely to affect developing countries.
20 The PCD 
strategy was adopted to overcome potential negative impacts of internal policies on 
developing partners but needs to become a mechanism for the mutual reinforcement and 
integration of policies. It requires that the design of every EU sectoral policy avoid 
incoherence with the EU development policy.  
Finally, aid alone cannot bring th e necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out 
of poverty. Private sector development through th e development of trade and investment is 
essential. Aid in general should facilitate reform to foster se rvices to the population but also 
support private sector development and trade inte gration. Economic activity is affected by the 
institutional, legal and politic al conditions prevalent in thir d countries, including development 
ones, such as the existence of functioning market institutions and a sound economic governance. The EU actively encourages its trad ing partners to establish competition regimes 
and this objective also includes developing countr ies. Along with other policy objectives such 
                                                
 
18 COM (500) 2011. 
19 The Lisbon Treaty made combating climate change at international level a specific EU objective. The EU is determined to deliver  on its international climate 
finance commitments. Already today, a proportion of the EU budget is related to climate mainstreaming and thus contributes to E urope's transition to a low 
carbon and climate resilient society. The Commission intends to increase the proportion to at least 20%, with contribution from  different policies, including 
from the external instruments. Equally EU Heads of State have to step up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity lo ss and improve the effectiveness 
of such EU funding, commitments that will be further defined in the preparations for the next Conference of the Parties of the Biodiversity Convention in 2012 
which is due to agree on mobilising resources to implement the global biodiversity strategy adopted in Nagoya. 
20 May 2005 Council Conclusions confirm the EU is co mmitted to the implementation of the objectives 
contained in the Commission's Communication on PCD dealing with the areas of trade, environment, 
climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social dimension of globalisation, employment and 
decent work, migration, research and innovation, informati on society, transport and energy. 
 
EN 24   EN as a well-functioning public administration and an independent judiciary safeguarding the 
enforceability of contracts, an effective comp etition policy creates a business environment 
facilitating economic growth in developing count ries (set of transparent rules, competition 
authorities as arbiters on anti-competitive behaviour, reduced polic y risk and stimulated 
foreign investments due to clear rules of the game). 
3.4. Geographical/thematic coverage 
The legal base should allow for all policy areas  and activities of external action to be 
promoted in third countries with the appropria te mix of sectors and modalities determined 
specifically per country, on the basis of an analysis of n eeds, capacities,  interests, 
commitments and potential EU impact. 
Geographic cooperation will focus on poverty re duction in the context of inclusive and 
sustainable development but also on promoting the principles of good go vernance, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including protection of minorities and other vulnerable 
groups and will cover the developing countries outside those covered by the ENPI, EDF and 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). In the current  DCI, the European Parliament requested at 
least 20% of funding to be spent on health and education. The draft Communication on EU 
development policy ('Agenda for Change') indicat es that a similar funding target for social 
and human development will be maintained by the Commission. 
The thematic envelope under DCI will focus on  (i) the support for civil society and local 
authorities and (ii) global public goods and challenges notably environment especially 
biodiversity, climate change, energy, water,  human and social development (especially 
education, health, social prot ection, employment and gender equality), food security and 
migration and will seek in particular to main stream EU policies into development cooperation 
while increasing flexibility across themes to prom ote a "holistic approach".  In order to live up 
to its international commitments under th e UNFCCC and UNCBD namely to increase 
substantially the mobilisation of financial resources for climate change and for global 
biodiversity by 2020, the EU should aim to spe nd no less than 25% of the programme for 
"Global Public Goods" on climate change an d environmental objectives. The thematic 
envelope encompasses not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the 
DCI, but also the ACP and EU neighbouring c ountries. Furthermore, thematic programmes 
should be in coherence with the overall approach to pa rtner countries and regions. 
The instrument will also support the impl ementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS  
4.1. Option 1:"No change": cooperation with the countries concerned remains 
strictly in the framework of the existing DCI Regulation 
DCI would be extended for the 2014-2020 period with no further amendments. Each of the 
identified objectives is assessed against this backdrop. 
4.1.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with th e new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
The overarching principle of eradicating poverty in the context of sustainable development 
and consolidating and supporting democr acy, good governance, human rights, equal 
 
EN 25   EN opportunities and the rule of law would continue. No reference to  the objectives related to the 
evolved EU development policy as defined in the Communication "Agenda for Change" 
would be included, in particular to su fficiently address global challenges.  
Not changing the objectives would ensure th e familiar focus with which stakeholders are 
already acquainted and comfortable. Nevertheless, this would not allow the EU to sufficiently 
tackle the newly arising EU and global priorities and commitments  in the area of development 
aid. 
4.1.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure sign ificant differentia tion amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2) 
The current DCI includes differentiation as a genera l principle (art. 3.2). Th is principle is also 
reflected in the programming, as the multiannual indicative allocations are based on needs and 
performance of the partner country (art. 18).  
While the basic principles for differentiation would continue to play a role in the DCI, status 
quo would not reinforce it by send ing a clearer message of inte ntion, nor would it be coupled 
with a clear, strong mechanism for its implem entation. In addition, ma ny developing countries 
wish to move beyond pure development assistan ce and are thus becoming less interested in 
DCI funding. 
4.1.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 
The current DCI includes these principles as part of the objectives of the instrument. 
Nevertheless, status quo would mean that pr ogramming and allocation would be carried out 
without having a clear mechanism for supporti ng and rewarding progress towards better 
governance and the reinforcement of democrac y, human rights and the rule of law.  
4.1.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
The financing of the Pan-African strategy woul d need to be funded through three different 
instruments: the European Development F und for Sub-Saharan count ries, the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument for North Africa and the DCI for South Afri ca. Until now this 
proved to be extremely difficult and keeping the same structure would endanger a coherent 
and comprehensive implementation of th e commitments in the Joint Strategy. 
4.1.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)  
Under this option the five thematic programme s would remain. The problem of implementing 
programmes with elements from the different thematic programmes would remain, causing 
EU assistance to be fragmented, less coherent and less efficient 
4.1.6.  Better address the specific needs of count ries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
In case of no change of the DCI,  EU would not be able to take into account the full extent of 
the changes taking place in countri es in crisis, post crisis and fragile situation beyond initial 
planning. EU would be severely  limited to adapt and react to any developments that would 
 
EN 26   EN take place in such vulnerable countries during the time that the DCI would be in force. 
4.1.7.  Flexibility of fund al location (Objective 7) 
The current situation would be maintained, m eaning that the share of un-programmed funds 
would be extremely limited. Funding outside  programmable funds would remain possible 
only through the adoption of special measures in the event of unforeseen and duly justified 
needs related to natural disaster s, civil strife or crisis. In many cases the lack of reserves 
implies that indicative amounts need to be reduc ed to some countries and regions, bring about 
important political implications (example – the Arab Spring and the need for identifying additional funds for this region at th e expense of some other regions).  
4.1.8.  Simplified programming and flexibility in im plementation, in c onsistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
The current complex and stringent programming procedure, which systematically requires the 
adoption of EU-specific Country Strategy Pape rs and Multiannual Indicative Programmes in 
all cases and following the EU's programming cy cle would remain. The instrument would not 
foresee the possibility to move away fr om the EU specific programming documents, 
continuing the duplication of development stra tegy formulation with the member states. 
While not preventing other modalities, the status quo would rely on the usual and tested 
modes of implementation of the EU assistance.  Not introducing or promoting new modalities 
could be perceived as simpler for the implemen tation of EU aid. However, it would not take 
account of the need to seek more innovative  approaches in the programming (e.g. joint 
programming with the Member States) and in the implementation stage (e.g. twinning), which 
could ensure higher added value for the delivered aid. 
4.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 
4.2.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with th e new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
• Sub-option 1A
 – Align the objectives of the in strument with the EU Treaties 
The objectives would reflect the latest evolutio n of EU legislation, in  particular the Lisbon 
Treaty –arts 21(2) TUE and 208(1)  TFEU. While this would put the instrument in line with 
the wide objectives of the Lis bon Treaty, it would lack the necessary focus that an instrument 
for development needs. This would also imply that the priorities could change with each 
additional interpretation of the Treaty or seem as ‘cast in stone’. Neither would ensure the 
required mix of flexibility and predictability. 
• Sub-option 1B  – Align the objectives of the instrument with the latest trends of 
development policy 
The objectives would be updated to reflect the late st evolution of EU le gislation and policy, in 
particular with regards to inclusive and su stainable development which would become a 
general objective of th e instrument, in particular the Lisbon Treaty –arts 21(2) TUE and 
208(1) TFEU but also i) th e Europe 2020 strategy; ii) th e Communication "A Budget for 
Europe 2020" and iii) the future Communicati on "Increasing the impact of EU Development 
Policy: an Agenda for Change"). This option woul d ensure a transparent interpretation of the 
objectives of the EU development policy and si gnal a clear framework for their identification 
 
EN 27   EN and formulation of potential changes. 
4.2.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure sign ificant differentia tion amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2) 
• Sub-option 2A  - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data on their development level 
This option would enable establishing a clear cut and criteria that would determine on which 
countries EU development assistance would be focused. Nevertheless, in many cases statistical data do not paint the entire pictur e of the situation in a country. Indeed, many 
countries’ statistics ar e done on different premises and ar e thus not fully comparable. In 
addition many wealthier countries face challenges  and constraints similar to those of the 
poorest and least developed countries.  
• Sub-option 2B
 - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
The criteria for a differentiated EU approach would be based on the criteria identified in the 
Communication "An agenda for change". Under this option, the Commission may decide not 
to allocate funds to a number of  countries. These criteria are: 
(a) Country needs 
(b) Capacities  
(c) Country commitments and performance 
(d) Potential EU impact on policy reform and on leverage of EU Aid 
This type of focus should enable to concentr ate funds in those coun tries where they are 
needed most, yet still provide a framework for development aid around specific cooperation 
areas and modalities that are necessa ry in all developing countries. 
In principle, grant-based aid should not feature as the primar y vehicle in cooperation with 
more advanced developing countries already on sustained growth pa ths and/or able to 
generate enough of their own resources. However,  they should benefit from grant-based aid 
under thematic and/or regional programmes, in pa rticular under the new investment facilities. 
Grant funds should be secured so  that activities  such as the transfer  of know-how under the 
new blending schemes can be implemented in the more advanced developing countries.  
The above mentioned criteria would also be app lied to define the level of allocations from 
which each country would benefit under bilate ral cooperation. This includes inter alia 
favouring countries with governments which take a strong lead and which assume 
responsibility for the deve lopment of their country21, apply sound policies and are accountable 
to their people through the democratic process.  The policy mix would thus allow for a greater 
country-based approach, looking at needs, capacities, interests and commitments. 
Foreseeing an envelope of funds  for performance-based incentive  distribution would allow the 
necessary flexibility, improve va lue for money and strengthen the role of policy dialogue. 
                                                 
21 In particular in areas of public finance management including the income side, public administration 
reform and institutional development, strengthening their social policies and improving framework for 
private sector development. 
 
EN 28   EN 4.2.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3) 
• Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 
This sub-option would imply that any country th at would no follow these principles would be 
completely excluded from EU development assist ance. This could be as sessed together with 
relevant international organisa tions and institutions (e.g. UN). While this would send a clear 
signal on the importance the EU attaches to these issues, it could pr ove counterproductive 
when trying to engage with some of these c ountries, with the final price being paid by the 
populations.  
• Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of  good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Recognising that aid alone cannot  bring the necessary change on a scale suffici ent to pull 
countries out of poverty, EU c ooperation would further integrate such development drivers as 
the rule of law, good governance, democracy a nd human rights. There would be some degree 
of linkage between fund allo cation and the resp ect of universal values, namely good 
governance, democracy, human rights and the rule  of law, yet this would not be the only 
parameter in defining the available funds. In sufficient progress would not prevent the EU 
from continuing cooperation, but in such cases  strategy would be ad apted (e.g. cooperating 
exclusively with the civil society, limiti ng cooperation to the social sectors). 
4.2.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
• Sub-Option 4A: Pan-African programme establ ished in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES  
Ensuring a complete coverage of the JAES th rough one single instrument would add to the 
coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as well as  add to their overall efficiency. 
Nevertheless, an important problem of potentia l duplication with the EDF would arise. In 
addition the financial reality of DCI is such that it would not be po ssible to finance the 
complete JAES in a comprehensive manner only through DCI.  
• Sub-Option 4B: Pan-African programme esta blished in the DCI that would cover 
only continental activities of the JAES  
An amount would be allocated under the new DC I to only support the implementation of the 
continental activities of the Joint Africa-EU St rategy and its successive Action Plans, as well 
as other relevant African-w ide initiatives. This does not prevent supporting the 
implementation of the Strategy through other components of the DCI or through other 
instruments such as the EDF or the Europ ean Neighbourhood Instrument. Indeed, the Pan-
African Programme would be complementary to activities financed through these other 
instruments, in order to ensure a comprehe nsive and efficient implementation of JAES 
commitments. 
4.2.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5) 
 
EN 29   EN • Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and re duce the number of thematic programmes  
to one  
This sub-option would offer signifi cant flexibility in the implem entation as it would cover all 
types of thematic activities under one umbre lla. This would prevent fragmentation of EU 
assistance in cases where the programme woul d contain elements of different thematic 
priorities (e.g. the case of avia n flu and food crisis in 2008). The danger of this approach 
would be to loose visibility and effectivenes s of some important elements of the current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non- State Actors and local authorities programme .  
• Sub-Option 5B : Increased flexibility and reduced  number of thematic programmes 
This sub-option, like the previ ous one, would reduce the fragmentation of the thematic 
programmes and increase the flexibility of the DCI in responding to unforeseen events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes coveri ng: (i) civil society organisations22 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 
4.2.6.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5)  
• Sub-Option 5A: Increase flexibility and re duce the number of thematic programmes 
to one   
This sub-option would offer signifi cant flexibility in the implem entation as it would cover all 
types of thematic activities under one umbre lla. This would prevent fragmentation of EU 
assistance in cases where the programme woul d contain elements of different thematic 
priorities (e.g. the case of avia n flu and food crisis in 2008). The danger of this approach 
would be to loose visibility and effectivenes s of some important elements of the current 
thematic programmes, in particular the Non- State Actors and local authorities programme .  
• Sub-Option 5B: Increased flexibility and reduced number of thematic programmes  
This sub-option, like the previ ous one, would reduce the fragmentation of the thematic 
programmes and increase the flexibility of the DCI in responding to unforeseen events. 
Nevertheless, in order to take into account in particular the needs of the Non-State Actors and 
local authorities programme, different themes should be brought together under no more than 
two main thematic programmes coveri ng: (i) civil society organisations23 and local authorities 
and (ii) global public goods and challenges. 
4.2.7.  Better address the specific needs of count ries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
• Sub-Option 6A: Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation  
                                                 
22 Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 
23 Civil society organisations better describes the targeted groups than non-state actors. 
 
EN 30   EN This sub-option would imply that for countries th at would be characteris ed as in crisis, post-
crisis or in fragile situation, no annual programming would be required, and all proposed 
activities would be proposed outside of a ny existing programming document. While this 
would allow important flexibility  and swift reaction in the implementation phase, it would not 
provide the necessary level of acco untability and quality control. 
• Sub-Option 6B: Increased flexibility in  programming and in implementation 
procedures  
Provisions allowing a more flexib le and rapid (re)programming fo r fragile states, states in 
crisis and post-crisis situations through quicker  programming procedures, tailor made ad-hoc 
reviews as well as specific implementation proce dures would be introdu ced in the regulation. 
Such provisions would ensure the EU to act sw iftly and with sufficient flexibility in cases 
such as the Arab Spring, while not compromi sing on the accountability and quality, as the 
procedures would keep the regular comitology and democratic scrutiny as the rule, even if 
introducing a type of ex post control.  
4.2.8.  Flexibility of fund al location (Objective 7) 
• Sub-Option 7A: Introducing further flexibil ity through an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level  
A reserve of un-programmed funds would be fore seen at the level of each country strategy 
and indicative programme. This  would increase the capacity to act in cases of unforeseen 
events and opportunities (positiv e conditionality) in these countri es. There could be potential 
difficulties in cases of major national or region al disasters (the 2004 tsunami in South East 
Asia) or global crisis (food crisis in 2008) wher e the availability of funds could prove as too 
limited for the scale of the disaster. In additi on, the reserve would be set to each individual 
country, potentially exhausting it too early in some, while not benefiting from it in other 
countries.  
• Sub-Option 7B – Introducing further flex ibility through an un-programmed reserve 
at the level of the instrument  
A reserve of un-programmed funds would be fores een at the level of the instrument in order 
to allow a swift re-allocation of funds in cas e of unexpected needs a nd opportunities requiring 
a rapid reaction. While this sub-option would clearly  increase the flexibility at the level of the 
instrument, the decision to l eave certain amount of funds un allocated would consequently 
somewhat reduce predictability as less of the total DCI envelope  would be long term 
programmed. 
4.2.9.  Simplified programming and flexibility in im plementation, in c onsistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
• Sub-Option 8A : Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming 
and implementation rules by introduci ng obligatory Joint Programming and 
Alignment  
Joint Programming with Member States and alig nment with the beneficiary countries would 
significantly improve the cohere nce and effectiveness of total EU development assistance, 
putting in practice the principles  of aid effectiveness. Making these elements obligatory would 
ensure that these principles ar e fully respected in all EU de velopment cooperation assistance. 
 
EN 31   EN At the same time, making these arrangements ob ligatory for the delivery of EU development 
cooperation aid could significan tly complicate the programming and implementation process, 
in particular for cases where it would be diffi cult to find a common language between the EU 
and various Member States, wh ere it would not be effectiv e to align to the national 
development plan or where quic k re-programming decisions would need to be taken. In this 
cases we would even risk failing to implement planned cooperation.  
• Sub-Option 8B : Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 
To simplify the decision-making process and improve aid effectiveness, the DCI would 
integrate two elements which would facilitate a better Division of Labour between the EU and 
its Member States as well as joint programming namely: 
– simplification of programming by not requiring Country St rategy Papers when other 
valid strategic documents exist (e.g. EU documents, joint programmes agreed with 
EU Member States, partner country's own development strategy); 
– alignment of EU assistan ce with the development cy cle of partner countries. 
By introducing provisions of the aid effectiveness agenda, the c oherence and effectiveness of 
the total EU development aid co uld significantly be improved.  
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  
This chapter analyses the global impact of the options and sub-options in  terms of their likely 
economic, social and environmental impacts as well as the achievement of policy objectives 
of the instrument and the likely  impact on efficiency and ma nagement. The different options 
have been qualitatively assessed based on the Commission Services' qualitative appreciations 
of the likely impact. 
5.1. Option 1: No Change 
In general, this option would not address a ny of the other aforementioned objectives and 
consequently would not address any of the lessons learnt and areas for improvements 
mentioned in Section 2. For instance, EU a ssistance is currently th inly spread  throughout 
almost all countries eligible fo r ODA assistance leading, in part , to limited result and impact, 
and high fragmentation of development assist ance. With no additional changes, the DCI 
would not live up to the evolved EU devel opment policy, as defined in the Communication 
"Agenda for Change", nor would it be fit to su fficiently address global challenges. It would 
increase management risks as the EU would con tinue to try to do "every thing everywhere". It 
would continue to promote predicta bility sometimes at the cost of  flexibility, and in particular, 
it would be difficult to change and adapt polic y to current political priorities. Introducing 
more flexibility for all c ountries, especially when dealing with states in situation of crises or 
fragility, and facing unforeseen needs require amendments to the DCI.  
 
EN 32   EN 5.2. Option 2: Amend the DCI Regulation 
5.2.1.  Align the objectives of the DCI with th e new trends in EU development policy 
(Objective 1) 
In addition to the overarching principle of  eradicating poverty and consolidating and 
supporting democracy, good governance, human righ ts, equal opportunities  and the rule of 
law, a reference to global public goods a nd resources would allow inclusive and 
environmentally sustainable growth as a primar y objective for development. In this manner, 
development policy could properly project the EU 's internal policies and values into its 
external dimension, in terms of volume of aid as  well as in geographical coverage in order to 
increase its response capacity to global challenges and the protection of public goods. 
• Sub-option 1A  – Align the objectives of the in strument with the EU Treaties 
• Sub-option 1B  – Align the objectives of the instrument with the latest trends of 
development policy 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Incorporate latest evolution of EU legislation and policy, 
in particular with regards to inclusive and sustainable 
development, but as well re garding the Lisbon Treaty and 
the EU 2020 Strategy 
Clearer interpretation of the objectives of EU 
development policy  
Clear framework for the identif ication and formulation of 
potential changes of the obj ectives of EU development 
policy With time, changes in devel opment policy might no longer be 
reflected in the DCI Objectives and will need to be adapted Strengths Weaknesses 
Pertinent framework for de velopment aid in numerous 
countries 
 Does not address the identified lessons learnt and areas of 
improvement  
Increase management risks as the EU would continue to try 
to do "everything everywhere" 
Continue to promote predictability sometimes at the cost of 
flexibility which is necessary for tackling crisis, unforeseen 
needs and new global challenges 
Not in line with current political development priorities 
(Agenda for Change) 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The objectives would reflect th e latest evolution of EU 
legislation, in particular the Lisbon Treaty –arts 21(2) 
TUE and 208(1) TFEU Does not sufficiently take into account the specificities of the 
development coopera tion instruments 
 
EN 33   EN 5.2.2.  Establish strong mechanisms to ensure sign ificant differentia tion amongst partner 
countries (Objective 2)  
Differentiation would have a clear positive impact  both for the beneficiary countries in need 
(focus on poverty), EU Policy Coherence (aid assi stance to emerging countries in particular in 
view of European economic difficulties) and on human resource management in Headquarters 
and Delegations (high administra tive costs due to fragmentation of aid). Focusing EU aid on a 
limited number of countries will allow the EU to  reach a critical mass to achieve change, 
expected results and impact, leading to a re duction of poverty, an improvement of access to 
and the quality of social services and an impr ovement – where relevant – of the environmental 
sustainability of development. It will give the EU  sufficient leverage in policy dialogue with 
partner countries. 
While differentiation (and consequent concentr ation of EU aid) may be welcomed by 
countries that would benefit from it, it may cau se some political uneasiness in countries that 
would no longer benefit from bilateral grant-base d assistance as mentioned in the description 
of this option. Also, one can claim the EU will lo se leverage in relations with the emerging 
countries and other wealthy countries. However,  cooperation with such countries should be 
based more on partnership than development, wh ich may be particularly welcomed by these 
countries which want to be treated by the EU as partners on an equa l footing rather than 
recipients of EU aid. Furthermore, these co untries would still bene fit from regional and 
thematic programmes. The transition from grants to other aid modalities could be gradual in order to smoothen the political impact of the new orientations . Non-grant based instruments, 
such as blending of grant and loans, may still be used with such countries and would also 
prove to be particularly adapted in such cases. 
Finally, concentration of aid shall allow for th e improvement of the quality of management 
and further strengthening of the EU comp arative advantage in a number of areas. 
• Sub-option 2A
 - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
objective statistical data 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Clear cut criteria that determine on which countries we 
would focus EU deve lopment assistance Using solely statistical data does not reflect the entire picture 
of the situation in a country 
• Sub-option 2B  - Focusing EU cooperation on a limited number of countries by using 
a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Concentrate funds in those countries where they are most 
in need: focus on poorest countries and away from 
emerging powers  
Adapt aid modalities to countries (grant aid not primary 
modality for more advanced developing countries)  
Allows for funds for performance-based incentive 
distribution  
Concentration of aid can lead to strengthen EU 
comparative advantage and leverage in a number of areas Impact on bilateral relations wi th some countries who would 
no longer benefit from developm ent aid, particularly for 
developing countries with large population of poor 
Reduced global EU reach  
 
 
EN 34   EN 5.2.3.  Strengthen the inclusion of good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in the EU fund-allocation and programming mechanisms (Objective 3)  
Promoting good governance shall lead to an imp rovement for EU cooperation results and 
impact in economic, social and environmenta l areas. It shall promote good performance, 
while not neglecting countries in cr isis or post-crisis situations. 
On the other hand, the use of such mechanism wo uld be perceived as a political tool by which 
the EU may loose its neutralit y, which is often an important asset for EU cooperation. The 
risks of partially losing  credibility as a neut ral actor in some count ries would be largely 
compensated by the improved coherence of EU policy with EU values, which needs to be 
promoted in the world as underlined by the Li sbon Treaty. It also would enhance the overall 
credibility and legitimacy of the EU developm ent policy vis-à-vis EU external partners as 
well as European citizens. 
In the case of countries with deteriorating human rights situ ation, directing aid through civil 
society, non state actors and international organi sations unavoidably leads to an increase of 
management costs, which in su ch specific cases is justified. 
• Sub-option 3A – Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as 
key parameters in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Clear message on the paramount importance of respect for 
human rights, rule of law and promotion of good 
governance Restrictive and possibly static approach: this might be 
counterproductive when engaging countries showing progress 
(countries in crisis, post-cris is and fragile  situation) 
• Sub-option 3B – Strengthening the inclusion of  good governance, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law in the fund allocation mechanisms 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Fund allocation and continue d cooperation would reflect 
the importance of those values  
Does not neglect countries in crisis, post-cris is and fragile 
situation 
Improved coherence of EU policy with EU values 
Enhance overall cred ibility and legitimacy of the EU 
development policy vis-à-vis EU  external partners as well 
as European citizens Development cooperation, on its own, cannot bring the 
necessary change on a scale sufficient to pull countries out of 
poverty 
Development cooperation might be  perceived as a political 
tool: loss of credibility as a neutral actor 
5.2.4.  Ensure support for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
(Objective 4) 
Establishing a Pan African programme within the DCI will have a positive economic, social 
and environmental impact, both for African beneficiaries and for the EU. It will increase the policy impact and the operational results in th e Joint Strategy's successive Action Plans, in 
particular in the relevant thematic partners hips such as Trade and Regional Integration, 
Climate Change and Environment, Energy, Migr ation, Mobility and Employment, but also 
Democratic Governance, MDGs, and Scie nce and Information and Communication 
Technologies. The mechanism is politically feasible , based on the relevant conclusions of the 
2007 and 2010 Africa-EU Summits. It  will contribute to greater  policy coherence at the EU 
level and will lead to better coordination and complementarity of action between EU 
 
EN 35   EN institutions, Member States and IFIs. Finall y, it will have a positive impact on management 
and implementation issues, as it will reduce ove rlap and competition w ith other instruments. 
• Sub-Option 4A : Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover all 
activities of the JAES 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as 
well as add to their overall efficiency Risk of duplication with other in struments such as the EDF or 
the ENI 
New area with possible impact  on fund allocation for other 
DCI priorities 
• Sub-Option 4B : Pan-African programme established in the DCI that would cover 
only continental activities of the JAES 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Coherence and flexibility of the financed activities, as 
well as add to their overall efficiency Complex follow up to ensure good complementarity between 
EDF, ENI and DCI 
5.2.5.  Reduce the fragmentation of and enhance the focus of thematic programmes 
(Objective 5) 
Designing flexible mechanisms ab le to respond quickly and subs tantially will be of crucial 
importance for the EU to have sufficient impact in its response to these challenges and in support of the poorest segment of the populatio n. The sub-options would allow reducing the 
fragmentation of thematic programmes and in creasing their flexibil ity in responding to 
unforeseen events. Aid cooperation needs to be d ynamic: recent events and scientific evidence 
call for maximum response flexibility: the role of  civil society continues to grow; while some 
countries evolve out of poverty ot hers continue to struggle with their recurrent fragile state; 
climate change is resulting in unpredictable weather patterns as shown by the increasing 
number of extreme weather events; biodiversity is declining, affecting the natural adaptation 
capacity of eco-systems; the wo rld population continues to grow  putting heavy pressure on 
scarce natural resources already deficient in certain parts of the world, which results in 
humanitarian crises; there are waves of migra tion resulting from multiple causes; food prices 
continue to be the source of instability; risks of pandemics ar e real, etc. Designing flexible 
mechanisms capable of responding quickly will be  of crucial importance in order for the EU 
to have sufficient impact in its response to these challenges and in support of the poorest 
segment of the population. Reducing the number of  and adjusting the areas (concentration on 
a reduced number of areas) will lead to furthe r a focus on clear value added interventions. In 
this context, placing higher emphasis on publ ic knowledge goods is a pragmatic way to 
enhance cost-effectiveness. It will also allo w focusing on political priorities, increasing 
responsiveness, enhancing subs idiarity of thematic programmes to geographic programmes, 
building in synergies within programmes and ensuring more coherent support to sectoral 
policies at global/transnational level. 
• Sub-Option 5A
: Increase flexibility and reduce th e number of thematic programmes 
to one 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and possibly reduced fragmenta tion Potential loss of visi bility for stakeholders 
 
EN 36   EN • Sub-Option 5B : Increased flexibility and reduced  number of thematic programmes 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and po ssibly reduced fragmentation 
Two comprehensive thematic programmes allows the 
coverage of current and future challenges  
Higher flexibility will strengthen reduced fragmentation: 
although enhanced flexibility will allow for swift 
responses to new global chal lenges, the programme for 
global public goods and challenges will be 
complementary to geographi c programmes and target 
mainly at addressing climate change, environment, 
energy, human development, fo od security, and migration 
while ensuring coherence with the poverty reduction 
objective. Potential loss of visib ility for stakeholders 
 
5.2.6.  Better address the specific needs of count ries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile 
situation (Objective 6) 
Increased Flexibility for countries in crisis, pos t crisis and fragile situation would allow for a 
quicker adaptation of the EU re sponse and an improved EU capac ity to ensure an appropriate 
response to the specific needs of  countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situation through 
increased flexibility as regards progra mming, re-programming and implementation. 
• Sub-Option 6A : Introduction of complete flexibility for countries in crisis, post crisis 
and fragile situation 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Swift reaction to crisis, post crisis and fr agile situations Accountability and control 
• Sub-Option 6B : Increased flexibility in programming and in implementation 
procedures 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Balanced approach between a swifter reaction to crisis, 
post crisis and fragile situations and accountability and 
control Procedure slightly longer th an with full flexibility 
 
5.2.7.  Flexibility of fund al location (Objective 7) 
Measures to increase flexibility  of fund allocation such as a reserve of un-programmed funds 
would facilitate swift response to unexpected, u nplanned needs, whether of a political nature 
or due to man-made or natural disasters. As a result the beneficiary countries would receive 
assistance in a timely manner tackling the needs at hand. It would also allow for the provision 
of financial incentives taki ng into account the performan ce and commitment of partner 
countries. 
However, care should be taken that these re sponses to unexpected events are without 
detriment to long term issues such as clim ate change and environment (and the political 
commitments of the Commission and the European Council in this regard). 
 
EN 37   EN • Sub-Option 7A : Introducing further flexibility th rough an un-programmed reserve at 
the country level 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and capacity to address unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 
Use of positive conditionality for well performing 
countries Funds might be "trapped" in a country while other country, 
regions could effici ently use the funds 
Unprogrammed funds might decrease predictability of funds 
• Sub-Option 7B – Introducing further flexibility through an un-programmed reserve 
at the level of the instrument 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Increased flexibility and capacity to tackle unforeseen 
needs in a timely manner 
Use of incentive based-allocations for well performing 
countries 
A larger overall reserve can enable improved handling of 
major crisis and unforeseen needs Management rules to be estab lished to avoid possible loss of 
funding at end of programming cycle 
Risk of competition for accessing funds in the reserve   
 
 
5.2.8.  Simplified programming and flexibility in im plementation, in c onsistency with the 
principles of aid effectiveness (Objective 8) 
Simplifying the programming process would sign ificantly improve EU added value though an 
improved division of labour and a faster respons e. Where appropriate, no extensive analytical 
work would be required for partner countries that have their own coherent development 
policy/strategy (national development plan, PR SP or similar). A simplification of the multi-
annual programming cycle would facilitate jo int programming with EU Member States and 
possibly with like-minded donors. Alignment w ith the partner country's programming cycle 
would also become possible and would be in li ne with the ownership and aid effectiveness 
principles. For the beneficiar y country, the advantages woul d be both economic (lower 
economic costs, efficient resources used with  donors cooperation) and social (donors will 
focus better on a limited number of sectors). Simplification in programming would have a 
positive balance in terms of human resources and time consumption. Joint programming could 
however lead to complex situations for coordi nation with Member States both at local and 
capital level.  
Finally, the introduction of innov ative instrument such as bl ending and Private Public 
Partnerships, which could attract private sector  and financial institutions, may increase the 
critical mass of EU assistan ce to address larg er-scale and innovative projects. Such 
instruments, usually applied through regional or th ematic instruments, could also benefit those 
DCI partner countries which, as a result of the application of  the differentiation principle, 
would no longer receive bilateral grant-based EU assistance.  
Finally, this sub-option also permits to better take  into account the specific ities of countries in 
crisis, post crisis and fragile situation. 
• Sub-Option 8A : Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming 
and implementation rules by introduci ng obligatory Joint Programming and 
Alignment 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
EN 38   EN Compulsory nature would ensure the principles of aid 
effectiveness: improved cohe rence and effectiveness of 
total EU development assistance Reciprocity on Joint Programming necessary from Member 
States providing bilateral aid 
Complex and lengthy progra mming and implementation 
process  
Negotiation process with Members States for each partner 
country required  
Risk on timely implementation of assistance 
• Sub-Option 8B : Introduction of simplification and flexibility in the programming and 
implementation rules to enable Joint Programming and Alignment 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Gradual and enabling approach by simplifying 
programming and aligning EU assistance to the 
development cycle of the partner countries 
 Full Joint Programming with Members States will require 
political agreement and time  
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS  
6.1. Weighing-up of positive and negative impacts per option  
Objective  Option 1  Option 2  
Sub-Option A  Option 2  
Sub-Option B  
1 Align the objectives 
of the DCI with the 
new trends in EU 
development policy No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) EU Treaty  
(+) Latest trends of development 
policy 
(++) 
2 Establish strong 
mechanisms to ensure 
significant 
differentiation amongst partner 
countries No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Based on statistical data 
(-) Based on a combination of 
objective quantitative and 
qualitative data 
(++) 
3 Strengthen the 
inclusion of good governance, 
democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of 
law No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Key parameter of fund allocation 
(--) Driver of fund allocation 
(++) 
4 Ensure support for 
the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Cover all activities 
(+) 
 Cover continental activities 
(++) 
 
5 Reduce the 
fragmentation of and enhance the focus of 
thematic programmes No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) One thematic programme 
(+) 
 Two thematic programmes 
(++) 
 
6 Better address the 
specific needs of 
countries in crisis, post crisis and fragile 
situation No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Complete flexibility 
(+) Increased flexibility 
(++) 
 
EN 39   EN 7 Flexibility of fund 
allocation No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Un-programmed reserve at 
country level  
(+) Un-programmed reserve at 
instrument level 
(+++) 
8 Simplified 
programming and 
flexibility in 
implementation, in consistency with the 
principles of aid 
effectiveness No Change (= Status 
quo) 
(-) Obligatory Joint Programming  
(--) Simplification and flexibility 
to enable Joint Programming 
(++) 
6.2. Preferred option 
On the basis of the analysis of underlying drivers of the problems, the policy options 
developed and their impacts, all sub-options B of Option 2 appear to be the optimal 
choice :  
• The DCI Objectives need to be aligned with current trend in development policy 
(sub-option 1B) . 
• On differentiation, using a combination of objective quantitative and qualitative data 
will enable to reduce the scope of countries and improve the means to concentrate on 
EU added value aid assistance in a comprehensive manner ( sub-option 2B) 
• Good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law can best be taken 
into account with sub-option 3B .  
• Sub-option 4B , the Pan-African programme focused on continental activities is the 
response for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy given the 
complexity of procedures and to av oid potential duplication of funds 
• Regarding fragmentation of aid assistance, sub-option 5B  would enable an increased 
flexibility within the thematic envelopes (in particular Global Public Goods) for a 
better EU response to political priorities  and better complementarity to geographic 
programmes for an increased leverage, while leaving the possibility to particularly 
address civil society organisati ons and local authorities.  
• Situations of fragility, crisis and post-cr isis will be better addressed with sub-option 
6B: a set of specific rules a nd objectives, mainly on flexible (re-)programming while 
keeping an effective level of  accountability and control. 
• The reserve at the instrument level in sub-option 7B  enables the EU to better cope 
with unforeseen needs and to promote mutu al accountability with partner countries 
(incentive based-allocations) and avoids "trapping" funds in a specific country. 
• On simplification and flexibility of programming and implementation, sub-option 
8B would provide the elements to simplif y procedures and provide the required 
flexibility for allowing Joint Programmi ng and Alignment, which would enable a 
better Division of Labour with Member St ates (and possible like-minded donors) and 
improved complementarity with partner count ries. Such enhanced aid effectiveness 
may be achieved through the use of innovative instruments. 
 
EN 40   EN 7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives 
The DCI is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for EU 
intervention. The exact actions are defined through multiannual programming and annual action programmes detailing the activities to  be carried out by the EU, including the 
objectives pursued by the actions in question and the expected results. Specific indicators are 
fixed at that moment, having in mind the particularities of th e action in question. 
Internationally agreed targ ets and indicators on the MDGs
24 and climate change are already 
known. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and repor ting rules for all relevant EU policy 
instruments need to be established. The disa ggregation of indicators will be important in 
monitoring the achievement of equitable outcome s for the most vulnerable groups in society 
for social inclusion. 
For the objective of reducing and,  in the long term, eradicating poverty in part ner countries 
and regions, the MDG indicators for Goal 1 may be used, along with other indicators 
Internationally agre ed by all donors: 
• Target 1a : Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day: 
(i.e. proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day; poverty gap ratio and share of 
poorest quintile in national consumption). 
• Target 1c : Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger (i.e. 
prevalence of underweight children under-five years of  age and proportion of 
population below minimum level of  dietary energy consumption). 
The EU has committed itself to mainstreaming action on climate25 and biodiversity and for 
this to be meaningful it needs to be accomp anied by an obligation to identify relevant 
programmes so that the EU is able to set out cl early how much of its spending relates to these 
global challenges. Clear benchmarks, monitoring and reporting rules need to be established. 
Expenditure that promotes climate action or en ergy efficiency as well as the protection and 
sustainable management of biodiversity a nd ecosystems, will be tracked based on the 
established OECD methodology (‘Rio markers’).  
7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements 
The European Commission's Monitoring and Ev aluation systems are increasingly focused on 
results. They involve internal sta ff as well as external expertise.  
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarter s continuously monitor the implementation of 
projects and programmes in various ways, in cluding wherever possibl e through field visits. 
                                                 
24 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm   
25 Regarding instruments under the EU  budget, in order to reach the Eu rope 2020 objectives and to help 
other parts of the world to step up their efforts to  combat climate change, th e Commission stated in the 
June 2011 Communication on “A Budget for Europe 2020”  that it intends to increase the proportion of 
climate related expenditure across the EU budget to at least 20%, with contribution from different 
policies, subject to impact assessment evidence. 
 
EN 41   EN Monitoring provides valuable information on progr ess; it helps managers to identify actual 
and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of  EU external actions 
through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the improvement of ongoing interventions; they also dr aw lessons from past experience to inform 
future policies and actions. The tools all use the internationally-recognised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including (potential) impact. 
Firstly, at the project level, the Headquarters-managed Results  Oriented Monitoring (ROM) 
system provides a brief, focused snapshot of th e quality of a sample of interventions. Using a 
highly structured, standardised methodology, i ndependent ROM experts attribute grades 
which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and give recommendations on 
how to improve effectiveness. 
Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegati on in charge of the project, 
deliver a more detailed, in depth analysis and help project managers to improve ongoing 
interventions and prepare futu re ones. External, independent  experts with thematic and 
geographic expertise are hired to conduct the anal ysis and gather feedback and evidence from 
all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 
The Commission also conducts st rategic evaluations of its po licies, from programming and 
strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education etc), in a country or region, or  of a specific instrument. Thes e evaluations are an important 
input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments and projects. These 
evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is 
included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament. 
A study on legal instruments and lessons learnt from the eval uations managed by the joint 
evaluation unit of the external relations servic es was undertaken. The findings of this study 
provided some valuable insight into the f unctioning of the curren t DCI and have been 
reflected in the preparation of its successor. It is possible to do a simila r exercise sufficiently 
in time for the preparation of the MFF post-2020.  
The current system of monitori ng and evaluation covering various  levels can generate ample 
information. However, it should be kept in mind th at the instrument covers a wide variety of 
countries and situations. Indica tors which are regularly used to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of aid delivery and financial management could support the measuring of the 
objectives related to the review  of the instrument itself. 
 
EN 42   EN Annex I  
Detailed analysis of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
In the year 2000 the UN General Assembly agreed  on eight specific deve lopment goals to be 
achieved by 2015. These MDG are: 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 3. Promote gender equality and empower women 4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, mala ria and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 8. Develop a global partnership for development 
The UN MDG progress report of 7 July 2011 acknow ledges significant pr ogress made towards 
some MDGs, namely fighting poverty and hunge r, ensuring universal education, child and 
maternal health as well as combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases due to the continued 
economic growth of some developing countries, ta rgeted interventions in  critical areas and 
increased funding from many sources. The report alerts however that in several areas there is still 
a long way to go, and the achievement of the MDGs is  at risk. This concerns in particular access 
to quality education, educating and empoweri ng women and girls, promoting sustainable 
development and protecting th e most vulnerable groups.  
Despite significant setbacks after the 2008-9 economic downturn and food and energy crisis, 
developing countries are on track to reach and even exceed the poverty reduction target of 23% as 
the global poverty rate is expected to fall to  15% by 2015. Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, 
South Africa and Latin Am erica covered by the DCI  together still contain around 70%
26 of all 
poor people worldwide. Despite the reduction in poverty, the number and proportion of hungry 
people stagnated at 16% worldwide, with South Asia scoring the highest  rate of undernourished 
children under 5 (43%), almost double in the rate  Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to rising food prices 
and economic crisis, it will be di fficult to meet the hunger reduction target in many regions of the 
world. 
In general, the UN MDG progress report acknowledges that “progr ess tends to bypass those who 
are lowest on the economic ladder or are otherwise disadvantaged because of sex, disability or ethnicity”. In most of the deve loping countries, economic growth has not benefited all parts of 
society and was indeed achieved at the cost of rising social  disparities. Low labour and 
production costs remain the key factor in developing countri es' investment policies. The 
inequality GINI index
27 has not dramatically changed for mo st DCI countries in the period 2006-
2009, presenting slight improvement in 16 count ries and deterioration in 11 countries. 
There are huge disparities between the urban and rural areas, the latter disadvantaged as regards 
access to public services such as health and education, sanita tion and access to safe drinking 
water. On the other hand, despite a decrease of the proportion of the urban population in 
developing countries living in sl ums to 32,7% in 2010, due to a global increase in the number of 
                                                 
26 The Millennium Development Goals Re port 2010, UN; Achieving the Millennium  Development Goals in an Era of 
Global Uncertainty: As ia Pacific Regional Report, 2009/2010, ESCAP . 
27 World Data Bank. 
 
EN 43   EN urban dwellers the global number of urban reside nts living in slum conditions continues to grow 
(828 m in 2010 as compared to 767 m in 2000 and 657 m in 1990). Improving their living 
conditions remains a tremendous challeng e and will require redoubled efforts. 
While MDGs are a useful instrument to measur e progress in development, they do not provide 
the full picture and set objectives only for a part of the most a ffected populations. Notably they 
do not measure progress on key as pects of development such as good governance and respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and institutional development. While measuring progress in access 
to education or health, they do not measure pr ogress in quality. Relying only on statistical data 
does not give the complete picture of the de velopment problems of a country: looking at the 
baseline values, the dynamics of change and the underlying reasons for slow  or lack of progress 
has proved to be of key importance for the success of EU development cooperation. 
Moreover, insufficient attention to strengthenin g the capacity to do and use research has been 
shown to be associated with low development performance in meeting basic needs in health, 
food, and the protection of the environment and th e public goods and services it provides and on 
which poor people depend disproportionately. 
The report of the 7 July 2011 is based on better statis tical information than in the past but there is 
still a long way to go for many countries to de velop a stable statistical system capable of 
providing reliable statistical inform ation for MDG measurement purposes. 
- MDG1 – End poverty and hunger  
In 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of poor people ( 51%), followed by South Asia 
(39%), South-East Asia and Cent ral Asia (19%) and East Asia (16%). Asia, Central Asia, the 
Middle East, South Africa and Latin America together still regroup around 70% of all poor 
people worldwide. The prevalence of vulnerable employment (usu ally without formal working 
arrangements, without adequate social protecti on and bad working conditions) is linked to the 
poverty situation. 
In 2009, nearly 25% of children in the develo ping world were underweight, with the poorest 
children most affected. The pr oportion of undernourished children under 5 is highest in South 
Asia (43%), almost double the rate in Sub-Sa haran Africa (22%), which is followed by South-
East Asia (18%). Such a high rate of malnourishe d children is due to a combination of factors: 
shortage of quality food, poor feed ing practices and inadequate sa nitation. Trends in South East 
Asia, East Asia and Latin Ameri ca indicate they are likely to meet the hunger reduction target, 
the former due to the performance of China, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
- MDG2 - Universal Education  
Many of the poorest countries have made signifi cant progress in educa tion, but progress has 
slowed since 2004, dimming the prospect of reach ing that MDG. The quali ty of education in 
developing countries is often poor , which is not reflected in the MDGs but what undermines 
people's chances for employment and social advan cement. According to a UN report, nearly 90% 
of all illiterate people are concentrated in 2 re gions – South Asia (65 m)  and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(47 m). 
- MDG3 - Gender equality  
While girls are gaining ground as regards access to education, the progress is unequal with South 
Asia, West Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa laggi ng behind. The progress in girls' access to 
 
EN 44   EN education does not however translate into impr ovement in women's access to full and productive 
employment. 
In at least half of all regions, following significant job losses in 2008-9, the growth of 
employment in 2010 was lower for women than for men.  
- MDG4 – Child health  
Child mortality has been diminish ed due to immunisation, improved access to health  services and 
the level of education of women. Ne vertheless the level of mortality  of children under five is still 
unacceptably high, the highest in South Asia ( 69 per 1000) after Sub-Saharan Africa although 
both regions have made the greatest progress. Most  affected are poor rural areas. In number of 
DCI countries with the highest children morta lity rates (exceeding 40 per 1000 live births), 
namely Bangladesh, Laos and Nepal, these ra tes have been reduced by more than half. 
Afghanistan remains the only country outside Sub-Sa haran Africa, with more than 100 deaths per 
1000 births. UN estimates the MDG targets can stil l be achieved, provided that substantial and 
accelerated action is taken to elimin ate the leading killers of children. 
- MDG5 - Maternal health  
Major progress has been made in North Africa a nd Asia, but South Asia still remains the region 
with the highest number of maternal deaths (280 ) after Sub-Saharan Africa (640), which is linked 
with the lowest ration of deliver ies attended by skilled health pers onnel, access to health services 
during pregnancy, adolescent fertility and access to family planning aid, and generally weak 
public health services.  
- MDG6 - Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases  
Good progress has been made on MDG6. Targeted in terventions allowed for a 20% cut in deaths 
from malaria since 2000, the largest in Africa. As far as HIV/AIDS is conc erned, thanks to the 
expansion of major programmes which increase d the number of people re ceiving anti-retroviral 
therapy, a 19% decline in deaths was record ed from 2004 to 2009 and the number of new 
infections in 2009 was 21% lower than in the peak year of 1997. Finally, the number of deaths 
due to tuberculosis was brought dow n by one third during the 1990-2009 period. 
- MDG 7 - Environmental sustainability  
The progress towards environmental sustainability  is mixed. Despite the world economic crisis, 
global greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow , with the most rapid growth taking place in 
East Asia and South Asia even though the industr ialised countries continue to be the biggest 
greenhouse gases producers per capita . Furthermore, the depletion of global marine resources 
continues. Climate change, while a ffecting all regions, is a particul ar threat for the Arctic, small 
islands and big deltas in Asia an d all of Africa, since the populati ons there have the least capacity 
to adapt. The rate of deforest ation is slowing dow n, though it remains alarmingly high. Net gains 
in forest cover have been recorded in Asia, due to China, while the deforestation of South America and Africa continues. Between 12% and 55%  of selected vertebrate, invertebrate and 
plant groups are threatened with extinction. Some 20% of tropical coral reefs have already been 
lost and an additional 50% are at risk. Only 0.7% of the oceans are protected and the depletion of 
global marine resources continues. The 2011 UN MDG re port states there is a need to take more 
decisive steps to protect the ecosystems which support economic growth, su stain life on earth and 
are of particular importance to the livelihood of the poor. The UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012, “Rio + 20” will provide a good opportunity to tackle these challenges. 
 
EN 45   EN Inter alia it will seek to reach agreement on pr omoting green growth and encouraging resource 
efficiency which are essential means of avoiding future food and energy shocks.  
- MDG 8 – Global partners hip for development  
As far as MDG8 is concerned, Information and Communication Techno logy (ICTs) penetration 
had enjoyed a breathtaking growth  in developing countries sin ce the adoption of the MDGs in 
2000; there were at that time 740 million mobile subscribers and nearly 400 million internet users 
worldwide; we are now at 5 billion mobile user s and around 2 billion internet users worldwide, 
and developing countries had by far the highest penetration growth rates.  
A first wave of policy reforms triggering private investments are at the or igin of such growth, 
making those technologies more accessible and a ffordable. In just 10 years, the situation has 
dramatically changed, and the growing access to th e internet and the near ubiquity of mobile 
phones have opened radically new ways to an ticipate, support and leapfrog development 
objectives. In this context, further support is ne eded to expand access to ICTs and as well as to 
expand the availability of  ICT infrastructures and services, as these are an essential prerequisite 
in these countries for the provision of services such  as health, education or banking, to name just 
a few sectors. 
For more detailed information on these trends , see the 2011 Development Goals Report published 
by the UN, on the following website: 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/S tatic/Data/2011%20Stat%20Annex.pdf  
 
EN 46   EN Annex II  
1. Financial breakdown of the DCI 
Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) 16.9 
Of which: 
Geographic programmes: 10.057 
Latin America 2.690 
Asia 5.187 Central Asia 0.719 
Middle East 0.481 
South Africa 0.980 
Thematic programmes
28: 5.596 
Investing in people 1.060 
Environment and sustainable manage ment of natural resources, 
including energy 0.804 
Non-State actors and local aut horities in development 1.639 
Food security 1.709 Migration and asylum 0.384 
ACP Sugar Protocol countries: 1.244  
2. Countries eligible under the DCI geographic programmes 
Latin America 
1. Argentina 
2. Bolivia 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. Colombia 
6. Costa Rica 
7. Cuba 
8. Ecuador 
9. El Salvador 
10. Guatemala 
11. Honduras 
12. Mexico 
13. Nicaragua 
14. Panama 
15. Paraguay 
16. Peru 
17. Uruguay 
                                                
 
28 An indicative amount of € 465 million is earmarked to  finance activities benefiting ENPI countries (art. 38 
of DCI). 
 
EN 47   EN 18. Venezuela 
Asia 
19. Afghanistan 
20. Bangladesh 
21. Bhutan 
22. Cambodia 
23. China 
24. India 
25. Indonesia 
26. Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
27. Laos 
28. Malaysia 
29. Maldives 
30. Mongolia 
31. Myanmar/Burma 
32. Nepal 
33. Pakistan 
34. Philippines 
35. Sri Lanka 
36. Thailand 
37. Viet Nam 
Central Asia 
38. Kazakhstan 
39. Kyrgyz Republic 
40. Tajikistan 
41. Turkmenistan 
42. Uzbekistan 
Middle East 
43. Iran 
44. Iraq 
45. Oman 
46. Saudi Arabia 
47. Yemen 
South Africa 
48. South Africa 
2. OECD-DAC List of Official  Development Recipients 
(Effective for reporting on 2009 and 2010 flows) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/40/43540882.pdf  
 
EN 48   EN Annex III  
Review of lessons learnt 
A) The success of the DCI instrument : 
The geographical programmes  
Geographical programmes supported the pursuit of national devel opment objectives and sector 
strategies. The progress towards the MDGs in several sectors in de veloping countries was 
achieved with EU support (for example, in Asia , child and maternal mo rtality in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh and Philippines, access to educati on in Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Burma/Myanmar and Indonesia, improved food security in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar). In several count ries EU assistance helped to lay solid 
foundations for key sector policies, namely h ealth in Tajikistan, Vietnam and Philippines. 
Under the DCI, there was an incen tive to take a strategic approach  in implementation. This is 
because it is expected that an agreement will be  reached with the beneficiary government on the 
focal areas of cooperation as defined in th e Strategy Paper and th e Multiannual Indicative 
Programme. 
Another advantage is that the DCI regulation puts  the beneficiary countries in the driving seat , 
and requires EU/donors to  support the beneficiar y's development strategy, policies and reforms. 
This has led to a gradual change in the way pr ogramming documents and actions are prepared. In 
the past, the choice of sectors and the prepar ation of actions had often been done by the 
Commission. 
The DCI combined with new implementation modalities , such as Budget Support and sector-wide 
approaches, have allowed for a higher level of c ooperation with partner countries: there is a clear 
link between the level of policy dialogue with beneficiar y countries and the modality of 
delivering assistance. In countries where Sect or Budget Support is provided, the policy dialogue 
has been upgraded and this has allowed the Commission to work more strategically. 
The DCI regulation allows the Commission to accep t funds from EU Member States and other 
donors for management, and to entrust EU Member  States or other donor s with implementation 
of EU assistance. This allows the Commission to  receive funds, especia lly from smaller donors 
that do not have the capacity to manage themselves  and this can enhance th e profile of the EU as 
a donor. This also allows the Commission to be less dependant on International Organisations 
and to draw more on the expe rience of EU Member States. 
The thematic programmes  
The thematic programmes provided the Commission with additional flexibil ity in dealing with 
specific problems and were a useful means to complement the geographic programmes.  
(1) Investing in people  
The objective of this programme is to assist EU  partner countries where they most need support 
in achieving the MDGs in the following human a nd social development fi elds: (i) health; (ii) 
education; (iii) gender equality and women empo werment; (iv) social inclusion, employment and 
decent work; (v) children and youth; (vi) cultura l diversity. The array of delivery methods and 
potential activities ensure that the targeted gr oups are reached by the variety of objectives, either 
 
EN 49   EN through competitive global/regional calls for proposals  or by co-funding intern ational initiatives. 
This programme has allowed responses to emergi ng priorities in line with the 2020 Strategy, e.g. 
social inclusion of disabled persons. The evalua tions of the global ini tiatives co-funded under the 
programme, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS , Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as the 
Education for All Fast Track Init iative, have returned positive re sults in terms of  the number of 
persons treated, tested and counselled, the increas ing number of children enrolled in schools, and 
gender parity.  The programme mainly channels its suppor t through Internationa l Organisations in 
global partnerships and through NSA, whose role  in policy dialogue, implementation monitoring, 
and governance improvements in those specific areas  is crucial. Moreover,  they reach vulnerable 
populations in varied political and development ai d contexts. The programme even 'fills the gap' 
when no bilateral programming is available, as was the case for Cuba in 2009 and 2010. 
(2) ENRTP  
This programme contributes to achieving th e MDGs and favours innovative approaches and 
support to policy-oriented initiatives at regional  and global level, on environmental and climate 
change aspect of development,  including through close coopera tion with the UN system. This 
allows the EU to support key EU and internationa l policy initiatives in the area of environment 
and development (including climate change). The programme encompasses complex climate 
change-environment-energy linkages and offers  the Commission an opportunity to make a 
difference at the international le vel in cooperation with developing countries. It has been flexible 
in promoting new initiatives such as the Global Climate change Alliance (GCCA), the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy F und (GEEREF) and Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT). EU  ability to involve partner countries in ambitious efforts to 
tackle global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation underlines the interdependencies between the EU and its key partners. The programme has also 
allowed the EU to promote its own environmental and climate change policies externally. This is 
particularly important in the c ontext of Europe 2020, since without  real efforts by key strategic 
partners, the EU's own strategies for economic recovery and innovation-led green and inclusive 
growth will be less effective. In  addition, to achieve the objectiv es, increased support forthereof, 
on research and innovation cap acity building is required. 
The EU has already irreversibly pegged its econo mic future to low carbon growth by unilaterally 
adopting the most ambitious emissions reduction  target in the world. Accordingly, the EU2020 
Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth includes climate change and renewable energy targets among its five headline objectiv es. The EU has confid ence in the low carbon 
growth model and this must be projected ex ternally to ensure meaningful advancement 
internationally. 
(3) Non state actors and local authorities
 
This programme is one of the few "actor-oriente d" thematic programmes, giving a wide range of 
civil society actors and local authorities the excl usive opportunity (right of initiative) to propose 
actions and promoting an inclusive and empower ed local society. The actions implemented do 
not necessarily have the backing of the host country government. 
The Mid-Term Review recognises that "a nucleus of high quali ty projects have been funded 
under all three programme objectiv es to date". The Court of  Auditors report on NSA and 
development recognises that "p rojects implemented by NSAs ar e relevant and are likely to 
produce the intended results".  
 
EN 50   EN With regard to "Development Education and Aw areness Raising in Europe" (the second objective 
of this programme), it is worth underlining that this programme is  unique insofar as it is the only 
one in Europe that supports actions aimed at convincing Eur opeans about the purpose of our 
development efforts.  
With regard to local aut horities, their particular role in th e context of development is recognised 
in the Communication from the Commission to the Council regarding local authorities. 
(4) Food security  
The objective of the Food Security Thematic Progr amme (FSTP) is to improve food security for 
the poorest and vulnerable, and mo re broadly, to contribute to achieving MDG1 (on poverty and 
hunger). Over time, the FSTP and agricultural research for deve lopment has been performing 
better, partners are stronger, governance and netw orks are being strengthened, and standards and 
tools are being shared by donors, implementing pa rtners and recipient countries. The enhanced 
involvement of local civil societ y organisations has helped to be tter respond to local needs in 
Linking Relief Rehabilitation a nd Development (LRRD) contexts . The programme intervenes 
successfully in crisis and post-crisis situations , allowing for flexibility in linking humanitarian 
and development operations. The Mid-Term review of the FSTP recognised the relevance of the 
interventions financed by the FSTP and reco mmended maintaining the orientations, while 
streamlining it in fewer areas. 
(5) Migration  
The migration and asylum programme's main obj ective is to support third countries in their 
efforts to ensure better management of migr atory flows. The programme covers the following 
five major fields of action: (a) fostering th e links between migration and development, (b) 
promoting well-managed labour migration, (c) prev enting and curbing irregular immigration and 
facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants, (d) protecting migrants against exploitation and 
exclusion, (e) promoting asylum  and international protection. 
An external evaluation of the programme wa s conducted between October 2009 and February 
2010. Its assessment was positive and it highlighted the high quality of the technical assistance 
and capacity building provide d through the projects. 
This thematic programme enjoys significant flexib ility and scope of action. Above all, it allows 
for an increased integration of migration and asyl um issues in development policies, matching the 
EU's political priorities with third countries ' needs. The programme also stimulates the 
coordination between actions in third countries funded through external inst ruments and actions 
funded under Member States' national programmes. 
B) Areas for improvement  
The geographical programmes  
The current DCI objective is to focus on pove rty eradication (MDGs)  in the context of 
sustainable development, while also promo ting human rights, democracy, good governance and 
the specific objectives of the region. This objectiv e should be reformulated  to highlight a more 
comprehensive view of poverty, i.e. supporting refo rm and modernization efforts in developing 
countries which contribute to building inclusiv e and cohesive societies and reducing social 
exclusion and poverty and protecting the natu ral resource base on which economic growth 
depends while ensuring that growth respect s the environmental limits of the planet. 
 
EN 51   EN The DCI covers a wide range of countries fall ing under the OECD DAC definition of developing 
countries, from the LDCs to upper middle in come countries. Given the very different 
development needs, performance and interests of each type of country, including in fragile states, 
the DCI does not allow sufficient differentiation between the partners. The rise of several 
developing partners, the economic  and social disparities amongst the partner countries and the 
development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance call for an enhanced flexibility in terms of objectives and cooperation modalities within the DCI. 
Under the present DCI there is no specific chapter, nor measures on fragile states or countries in 
crisis, although there is a formal link with the Instrument for Stability (IfS). However, this link 
has created unjustified expectations that any action supported under the IfS will continue, by 
default, to be supported under the DCI. Addr essing transition challenges requires a set of 
responses at country level, based on specific needs and related to a common strategy (holistic 
approach). The EU needs to foster coordina tion and complementarity between the different 
instruments and between donors. This effort should be based on a joint framework with a 
common analysis of the challenges to be addressed. It should ai m to improve the links between 
the various levels of intervention, the diffe rent policies involved to be defined and the 
programming priorities. 
The intention to concentrate DCI cooperation strate gically has only partially worked. In general, 
our development cooperation remains fragmented and over-ambitious. 
The thematic programmes  
For the thematic instruments in general, the following improvements should be considered: 
– improving coherence between actions s upported by geographical and thematic 
programmes; 
– reducing the number of small actions resulting in ad hoc interventions and in a 
disproportionate implementation workload; 
– some thematic programmes should be treated within the country bilateral envelope of 
EU assistance. 
– more support should be granted in synergy with the other EU policies and internal 
instruments (e.g. support for research and in novation capacity build ing to facilitate 
uptake of the EU re search and innovation framework  programme Horizon 2020). The 
same is valid for other policies and their funding instruments to ensure coherence and 
complementarity. 
The issues for improvement more specifi c for each thematic instrument are: 
1. Investing in people: 
 
The area covered by the thematic programme "Inves ting in people" represen ts a high number of 
themes (and budget lines). The difficulty in prog ramming and managing such a large number of 
possible actions is exacerbated by the implemen tation modalities chosen. A high number of calls 
for proposals with relatively small allocations  may create frustration among applicants. 
The resulting perception that whatever cannot be  financed elsewhere can  be financed under the 
"Investing in people" programme, favouring the birth of pilot budge t lines, is adding technical 
 
EN 52   EN and operational difficulties to the management of the human and social development area. 
Investment in the capacity to engage in research and innovation and use it, is  particularly relevant 
here. 
2. ENRTP:  
Because of the wide coverage (biodiversity, cl imate change, desertification, forests, hazardous 
substances, sustainable consumption and produc tion, energy, environmen tal governance etc.) it 
has not always been possible to have clear priorities.  
EU visibility is relatively weak as no promotion budget is foreseen.  
Actions under the programme are identified through a wide range of  channels (calls for proposals 
EU initiatives, direct discussi ons with international organisations and partner countries). 
Implementation modalities are diverse and cover the whole range of possibilities (grant contracts, contribution agreements, financing agreements, cont ributions to trust and equity funds, delegated 
cooperation), offering added value to supporting po licy-oriented initiatives in areas which are 
politically exposed and changing rapidly (FLEGT, c limate change, in particular). To manage this 
diversity is a challenge.  
In turn, achieving these objectives  requires support for research and innovation capacity building. 
3. Non state actors a nd local authorities:
 
The Court of Auditors 76 has noted a potentially disruptive side  effect of the call for proposals 
procedure, contradicting such objectives as (i) “e ngaging civil society organisations of the South” 
and (ii) “capacity building”. Indeed, projec t proposals submitted by "stronger" organisations 
stand a much higher chance of being selected, wh ile as a result, "weake r" organisations are 
increasingly left without being ab le to prove their capabilities. 
4. Food security:  
The programme is fragmented into many sub-com ponents and projects. The Mid-Term review of 
the FSTP recognised the relevance of the interv entions financed by the FSTP and recommended 
maintaining the orientations, while streamlining it in fewer areas. 
The following strategic challe nges are being addressed: 
– the articulation with food s ecurity support funded by geogra phic instruments must be 
ensured while some flexibility needs to be maintained for financing as a follow up to crisis situations (linking relief to rehabi litation and development) and in cases where 
geographical instrument s can not operate; 
– the ability of the instrument to react to cr isis situations is limited by the scope of the 
programme; 
– long term engagement and predictability mu st be ensured in order to support the 
provision of international public goods, in par ticular pro-poor dema nd driven research 
and innovation; 
– the involvement of civil society (including  farmers' organisations) in food security 
governance; 
 
EN 53   EN – coordination, linkages with development (notab ly tools such as rura l micro-finance), and 
regional approaches could be improved. Nutr itional issues have been overlooked and 
private sector development has been negl ected. Similarly, local authorities, a new 
partner for food security, are not supported sufficiently; 
– a "Joint Humanitarian-Development Framewor k" was designed in the context of the 
"FSTP" decision C/2010/9263. It will now be te sted in about 12 countries. The aim is to 
improve coordination with humanitarian and geographical instruments, together with 
other donor assistance. The joint LRRD framew ork will remain the base for action, and 
short and medium term activities will be id entified to guarantee food security for the 
poorest and most vulnerable.  
5. Migration  
Because of its flexibility, the programme finances  innovative and pilot actions that can serve as 
examples for further and more elaborate init iatives. Nevertheless, the thematic programme 
should: (a) better involve governme nts from third countries as act ive stakeholders ; (b) provide 
more support to local civil society organisations and local authorities, and (c) ensure that the 
highest political level both in Europe and thir d country governments is fully informed of the 
projects being implemented, so as to increase th e Programme's visibility and facilitate political 
dialogue. 
 
EN 54   EN Annex IV  
Bibliography 
Reports covering the geographic/thematic areas of the DCI, supporting evidence to the 
Impact Assessment 
 TITLE DATE OF 
PUBLICATION 
 
1 Evaluations  
 
1.1 Country/Region Evaluations  
 
 Evaluation of the European Commission' s co-operation and partnership with the 
People's Republic of China – Country level evaluation April 2007 
 Evaluación de la cooperación regional de la CE en América Central Julio de 2007 
 Evaluation de la coopération de la Commi ssion européenne avec la Bolivie Juillet 2007 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic of India August 2007 
 Evaluation of the Commission's support to Southern African Development 
Community – SADC – Regional level evaluation October 2007 
 Evaluation of the Commission's support to the Region of Eastern and Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean – Regional level evaluation December 2008 
 Evaluation of EC co-operation with the LAO PDR June 2009 
 Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN June 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission' s co-operation with Malaysia July 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission's Cooperation with Vietnam October 2009 
 Evaluation of the European Commission' s co-operation with Thailand October 2009 
 Evaluation of European Commission's Coope ration with Nicaragua 1998-2008 November 2009 
 Evaluation of European Commission's co-operation with El Salvador – Country 
level evaluation March 2010 
 Evaluation of the European Commission’ s Co-operation with Maldives November 2010 
 
1.2 Instruments / Sector / Thematic Evaluations  
 
 Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance June 2006 
 Thematic evaluation of the water and sanitation sector July 2006 
 Joint evaluation of co-ordination of trade capacity building in partner countries November 2006 
 Evaluation of the Commission Support for Statistics in Third Countries 15/02/2007 
 Evaluation thématique - Développeme nt rural et agricole July 2007 
 Evaluation of EC support to partner countries in the area of energy April 2008 
 General Evaluation of Actions to Raise Public Awareness of Development Issues 
in Europe / Development Education EC December 2008 
 
EN 55   EN  Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention 
and Peace Building – Preliminary study: scoping and mapping. Final Report for 
the Preliminary Study July 2009 
 The Five-Year Evaluation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Synthesis of Study Areas 1, 2 and 3. March 2009 
 Evaluation of the AENEAS Programme – Financial and technical assistance to 
third countries in the area of migration and asylum 2004-2006 December 2009 
 Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peace Building - Concept Study – Final Report for the Concept Study September 2010 
 Qualitative Assessment of EC funded Drugs Related Projects October 2010 
 Thematic global evaluation of EC suppor t to the Education sector in partner 
countries December 2010 
 Lessons learned from evaluating EC interventions in the road sector (note ARES) 15/12/2010 
 Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons  Learned from the Evaluations Managed 
by the Joint Evaluation Unit (draft desk report, vol. 1 & 2) January 2011 
 
1.3 Aid modalities Evaluations  
 
 Evaluation of general budget support: synthesis report – A Joint Evaluation of 
General Budget Support 1994-2004 May 2006 
 Evaluating co-ordination, complementar ity and coherence in EU development 
policy: a synthesis November 2007 
 Evaluation of Commission’s external c ooperation with partner countries through 
the organisations of the UN family May 2008 
 Evaluation of Commission's aid delivery thro ugh Development banks and EIB November 2008 
 Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organisations December 2008 
 Final report of the Experts Working Gr oup on additionality of grants in the 
framework of blending mechanisms, est ablished following a decision by the 
ECOFIN Council in December 2008 December 2009 
 Evaluation Methodology & Baseline Study of European Commission Technical 
Cooperation support Inception Report - Final Version  August 2010 
 
1.4. Programme Evaluations  
 
 Midterm evaluation of the Alfa II 2005 
 Midterm evaluation of EUROsociAL November 2007 
 Midterm evaluation of URB-AL II 2007 
 Final evaluation of AL-INVEST III 2008 
 Final evaluation @lis 2008 
 Evaluation of the BOMCA Programme (Border Management in Central Asia) December 2010 
 Midterm evaluation of the Alfa III 2010 
 Midterm evaluation of the Euro-Solar programme 2010 
 
 
EN 56   EN 2. Court of Audits Special Reports  
 
 Special report No 6/2006 concerning the environmental aspects of the 
Commission's development cooperation – OJ C 235 29/09/2006 
 Special report No 6/2007 on the effectiven ess of technical assistance in the context 
of capacity development together with the Commission's replies – OJ C 312 21/12/2007 
 Special report No 6/2008 concerning European Commission Rehabilitation Aid 
following the tsunami and hurricane Mitch 2008 
 Special report No 4/2009 – The Commissi on's management of Non-State Actors' 
involvement in EC development cooperation 2009 
 Special report No 15/2009 – EU assistan ce implemented through United Nations 
organisations: decision-making and monitoring 2009 
 Special report No, 11/2010 - Commission's management of General Budget 
Support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries 2010 
 Special report No. 12/2010 - EU Development Assistance for Basic Education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 2010 
 
3 Internal Audit Service Reports  
 
 IAS-2005-AIDCO/ECHO-001 Implementation of the framework agreement with 
UN agencies 2005 
 IAS-2006-AIDCO-003 Eligibility of Costs unde r the Financial and Administrative 
Framework Agreement with the United Nations by DG AIDCO 2006 
 AIDCO-2006-AIDCO/DEV-003 Audit on B udget Support – Pool Funds and Trust 
Funds 2006 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-001 Audit on NGO's funding by DG AIDCO – Fup1 2007 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-002 Financial Manageme nt of main programmes within 
Directorate D 2007 
 IAS-2007-AIDCO-003 Financial Manage ment of Regional Programmes 2007 
 IAS.B-2008-AIDCO-002 Financial Manage ment of main programmes within 
Directorate B 2008 
 IAS.B-2008-AIDCO/ECHO-001 Follow up of  the FAFA implementation with UN 
in DGs AIDCO and ECHO 2008 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-004 Follow-up of Elig ibility of Costs under FAFA with UN 2009 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-003 Second Follow-up of Audit in NGO Funding by DG 
AIDCO 2009 
 IAS.B5-2009-AIDCO-005 Aud it on Thematic Budget lines 2009 
 IAS.B5-2010-AIDCO-001 Audit on Progra mmes Estimates financed by EU and 
EDF Budget 2010 
 
4 Internal Audit Capability Reports  
 
 Budget Support, pool and trust funds 2007 
 Budget Support Conditionality 2008 
 
EN 57   EN  Audit Report on Food Facility 2010 
 Audit Report on Aid Implementa tion under Crisis Situation 2010 
 
5 Synthesis based on Result Oriented Monitoring Reports  
 
 Causes underlying Effectiveness and Impact of EC Development Projects – 
Qualitative study based on ongoing and ex  post ROM reports (2005-2007)  May 2009 
 Executive Summary (internal): Towards a better use of ROM and project 
evaluations September 2010 
 
6 Mid-Term/End-Term Review of Financial Instruments  
 
 AIDCO contribution to Mid-Term Revi ew of RELEX financial instruments, 
collection of status per instrument (note AIDCO/01 Adonis No 13280) 16/06/2008 
 Mid-term review of the financial inst ruments for external actions (COM(2009) 196 
- Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) 21/04/2009 
 Report evaluating the implementation of the financial instruments for external 
actions (SEC (2009) 530 - Commission Staff working document accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council on the mid-term 
review of the financial instruments for external actions) 21/04/2009 
 Food Facility: Interim report on Measures Taken (SEC 2010(245) - 
Communication from the Commission to the EP & the Council) March 2010 
 Minutes of the 3 meetings of internal working group (AIDCO, ELARG, ECFIN, 
DEV and RELEX) in charge of analysing the governance structure of the existing 
loan-grant blending mechanisms in the extern al assistance field, held internally and 
with the main European Finance Institutions April and May 2010 
 
7 Mid-Term Reviews of Thematic Strategy Papers  
 
 Food Security Thematic Programme mi d-term review (2007-2009) September 2009 
 Mid-Term Review of the themat ic programme NSA/LA December 2009 
 Review of the ENRTP (Environment a nd sustainable management of natural 
resources, including energy) December 2009 
 Mid-Term Review on the Thematic Pr ogramme Migration and Asylum March 2010 
 Investing in people – Mid-term Review of  Strategy Paper for Thematic Programme 
(2007 – 2013) November 2010 
 
8 Mid-Term Reviews of Country/Region Strategy Papers  
 
 iQSG Progress Report on second-generation Country Strategy Papers 2007/8-2013 
(SEC(2009) 431 - Commission Staff working document) 30/03/2009 
 State of play of EU joint programming of external assistance – desk study of recent 
experiences 09/12/2010 
 Strategy Papers – Chapter on Lessons learnt: 
South Africa Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Chin a, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,  
 
EN 58   EN Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Paki stan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Vietnam, , Yemen, Regional Central Asian Countries 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Braz il, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Re gional Latin America, Regional Central 
America, Regional Comunidad Andina, Regional Mercosur 
 
9 External Reviews  
 
 IEG Review of World Bank - Engaging with Fragile States - Support to Low-
Income Countries Under Stress 2006 
 OECD/DAC Peer review of the European Commission 2007 
 Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) Annual 
MOPAN Survey 2008 2008 
 IMF - Emerging from the Global Crisis: Macroeconomic Challenges Facing Low-
Income Countries   October 2010