ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES 
DE LA COMMISSION 
 
 
 
COLLECTION RELIEE DES 
DOCUMENTS "COM" 
 
 
 
 
COM (84) 345 
 
 
 
Vol. 1984/01 51 
  
 
Disclaimer  
Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit 
règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the openi ng to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), this f ile is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februar 198 3 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 vom 27 .9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
erforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in Übereinstimmung mit Artikel 5  
der genannten Verordnung freigegeben.  
COMMISSION  
OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
General Secretari atC O M (84) 345 fin al 
B russels, 23 June 1984
F O R  OFFICIAL U S E  O N L Y
F O U R T H  R E P O R T  B Y  T H E  C O M M IS S IO N
on the collectio n  by Member States of information concerning the 
a c tiv itie s  of c a rrie rs p a rtic ip a tin g  in cargo lin er tr a f f ic  in 
certain  areas of operation
(submitted to the Council by the Commission)
C O M(84) 345 fin al

Fourth report by the Commission on the collection 
by M ember States of information concerning 
the a c tiv itie s  of carriers p articipating in cargo 
liner tra ffic  in certain areas of operation
S U M M A R Y
1. The present report describes developments in the three trades covered 
by the Monitoring System, i.e . the trades between the Community on the one 
hand and C e n ta l America, East Africa and the Far East on the other.
The report spans 1982 and 1983, but it attemps to describe current events 
based on information from various sources. Again,the deadlines for sending 
the data were generally not met and the Commission fears that the schedule 
agreed in 1978 may be too tig h t. O n  the other hand fact-finding from other 
sources has enabled the Commission to overcome a certain lack of information 
so that by and large the situ atio n  at the time of writing m ay be considered 
to reflect the actual situation in the trades concerned.
2. A  noteworthy development not recorded by the Monitoring System its e lf  was 
the talks with carriers from the Soviet Union about liner cargo agreements. 
These talks, begun in 1982 between five M ember States (which formed the 
so-called "Hard Core Group") and the Soviet auth o rities,u Itim ately  produced 
an agreement on the. tra ffic  between the Community and Central America.
Not a ll problems have been solved, howeve rr w hi le at the time of writing no 
agreement has s t i l l  been reached on the two other trades involved.
3. In the East Africa trade the share of the Soviet line B E S T A  has settled 
down : the average for the three countries most concerned on the continent 
fluctuates around 8 % per year in the case of southbound tra ffic  and roughly 
5  % for northbound tra f fic . The s ta tis tic s  provided by the conference
indicate about the same level of performance. The a c tiv itie s  of the other

non-conference Line, the Geneva based Mediterranean Shipping C om pany (M S C ), 
regularly operating with ships under Panamanian flag, are difficult to 
monitor, since such flags as the Panamanian one are used by more than one 
carrier. T he conference data show  that M S C  carried more cargo to the U K  
and the North W est Continent ( N W C )  than B E S T A , but the Soviet carrier's 
potential is considered to be m uch greater.
4. A s  a  result of cor»petition and the economic recession rate levels 
have lagged w ay  behind cost increases. T he conference managed to maintain 
important contracts Northbound b y countering the offers m ade by B E S T A .
T he negotiations n o w  revolve particularly around B ESTA 's dem and to carry a  
larger share of the Northbound trade. In the background is the fear that 
a  newly established Soviet-Zambian joint venture in shipping m a y  eventually 
interfere with the competition in this trade. O n  the basis of the data 
reported further monitoring of the activities in this trade is recommended.
5. In respect of the Central America trade the W IT A S S  conference signed an 
agreement with the Baltic Shipping C om pany (operator of the Baltcapas Line) 
and the Scan Pacific Line (a Soviet-Finnish joint venture). In particular 
the volume of cotton and coffee carried by the Soviets from the W est Coast 
of Central America to the L e  Havre-Hamburg range had reached an unacceptable 
level during the past years. T he Monitoring System showed that the carryings 
to G erm an ports in particular (the greater part consisting of cotton and 
coffee) were considerable. This w as supported by the conference, whose 
statistics for cotton and coffee alone showed that the Soviet line carried, 
in 1982, as m u ch  as the seven conference lines together.
6. Since the agreement cam e into effect the situation in this part of the 
trade has improved. However, in the Westbound trade it would appear that 
Scan Pacific Line tried to circumvent the restriction imposed on it by the 
agreement with the conference. It is particularly this aspect, in the w ake 
of the evasion by Baltcapas under earlier commitments m ade by the Soviet 
authorities and Baltic Shipping Com pany, which justifies a  continuation of 
the monitoring, even though the agreement has n o w  co m e into effect.-  2 -

- 3 -
7. The Far East trade has been monitored by the M ember States since 
July 1981. The report describes the d iffic u ltie s  encountered by most 
M ember States owing to the in tricacies of th is vast trade, which is 
highly containerised. Since the flag is the yard-stick for monitoring the 
particip atio n  of carriers it was also d iffic u lt to obtain a picture of the 
market shares of those independent lines which deploy ships under various 
flags. A n  overview of the major flags, therefore, has been included but 
without an attempt to allo cate'th ese flags to individual carriers.
8 Since th is problem does not exist as far as the Soviet flag is 
concerned the report contains in p articu lar an analysis of the two Soviet 
carrie rs, Baltorient line and Odessa Ocean line, whose performance could 
be measured by looking into the Soviet flag data. There are other reasons 
to ju stify  th is pin-pointing of the Soviet lines : they are in a position 
to under-bid rates for longer and by more than commercial outsiders and 
they speeded up the introduction of modern tonnage in the Far East trade 
in the wake of the boycotttheir ships encountered in the U S  trades after 
the invasion of Afghanistan. Besides, the a c tiv itie s  of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (TSR) should be considered in conjunction with the operations of 
the shipping Lines, together operating a pincer movement against the 
conference. Thus, the share of the Soviet shipping lines being estimated 
at about 6 % of the whole Far East trade should be subjected to a more 
balanced appraisal, taking into account that the Soviet carryings from and 
to Japan and Korea are almost en tirely  undertaken by the TSR. Since th is 
"land-bridge" is supposed to considerably extend its  a c tiv ité s in the near 
future, carrying mostly containers with high value cargoes, the situ atio n  in 
the Far East merits further attention. T o obtain a global view, preferably 
.comprising a further Commission's study on the impact of the TSR, the 
monitoring of the liner operations in the Far East trade should, if it is at 
a ll possible, relate to both tonnes weight and containers.

Fourth report Uy Lhe Commission on the col Lection 
by Member States of information concerning 
the activities of carriers participating in cargo 
Liner traffic in certain areas of operation
INTRODUCTION
1. The first three reports on the monitoring system pursuant to Council Decision 
79/4/EEC appeared on 23 October 1980 (1), 27 July 1981 (2) and 2 December 1932 (3) respect i  veLy. 
These reports aLl covered trade between the Community and CentraL America
and between the Community and East Africa. They incLude information on 
1979, 1980 ai.d 1981. Where the monitoring system itseLf was unabLe to 
provide sufficient information use was made of other sources, such as 
the conferences invoLved. However, the Commission has always been 
convinced that additional information of this type should supported 
by documentary evidence.
2. This report describes further developments in the trades mentioned above, 
and at the same time provides an initial, provisional picture of events in the 
trade between the Community and the Far East pursuant to Council Decision
80/1181/EEC of 4 December 1980. This report spans 1982 and 1983, but it 
attemps briefly to describe current events in all trades, based on information 
from various sources.
3. The information obtained from the monitoring system has certainly 
enabled the Commission once again to obtain an overview of what is happening 
in the various trades. Nevertheless, not all of the data passed on by
the Member States are equally exhaustive or comparable
while at the same time there was generally speaking always failure to meet 
the deadlines for sending them to the Commission. This can to an extent 
be due to the tightness of the schedule agreed at the time. Nevertheless 
a more generous deadline than three months after each half-yearly period
(1) COM (80) 645 final (Conf>dential)
(2) COM (81) 399 final (Confidential)
(3) COM (82) 784 final (Confidential)

-  2 -
would give a somewhat out-of-date picture and certainly make fact-finding 
from other sources necessary. Owing to strikes by the staff concerned 
one Member State was even r.itirely unable to provide information on 
carryings in 1982.
4. A noteworthy development not recorded by the monitoring system itself 
(as regards neither the information as such nor any results) were the
talks with third-country carriers, i.e. from the Soviet Union, about liner 
cargo agreements. These talks were begun at government level between five 
Member States and the Soviet Union (1) and ultimately produced an agreement 
on the traffic between the Community and Central America. It will be seen 
from the relevant sections of this report that not all of the problems 
have been solved. The talks between the conferences and the Soviet lines 
on the other two trades covered by the monitoring system have so far 
yielded nothin and, as mentioned later on in this report, the behaviour in 
these trades of the third-flag carriers involved is causing concern. In the 
traffic with the Far East this presence is also considered in connection 
with the activities of the Trans-Siberian Railway. On the other hand the 
Far Eastern Freight Conference has been able to conclude an agreement with 
a commercially operating "outsider", from which it should have been possible 
to deduce that cargo wars between carriers from market economy countries will 
necessarily end more quickly than conflicts in which one of the parties 
flies the flag of a state-trading country or otherwise receives government 
support. It is in general then assumed that the agreement concluded with 
the Soviet carriers on the Central America trade was able to be reached 
because of the influence of the vigorous and, above all, joint action 
by the Member States, who were the most affected in this trade. The 
Community's monitoring system seems also to have been important behind the 
scenes.
EAST AFRICA TRADE
5. As pointed out in earlier reports, it is not always possible to determine 
each shipping line's share exactly. The monitoring system is based on the 
share per flag, since some Member States do not record carriers as such in
(1) Hard Core Group (B, D, F, NL,and UK) and the USSR, in Moscow in 
January 1982 and in Hamburg in February 1983.

- 3 -
their statistics . In the Central America trade, or in other words, 
the disputed sub-route from the West Coast of Central America to the 
Le Havre - Hamburg range, tLis has never been an insuperable obstacle 
since the only two outsiders of any size operate ships under the Soviet 
flag. There are in the East Africa trade more outsiders than merely the 
Russian carrier BESTA. Although these other carriers are all registered in 
market economy countries, the most active of them operates vessels under 
different flags, in this case, the so-called flags of convenience.
Since the same flags in turn are occasionally flown by other carriers 
the Commission considers it impossible to record the share of each of them 
through the Member States' returns. Hence, as in the previous reports, a start 
is being made on a survey in which the share of the Russian flag is set 
against that of all of the other flags. It must be noted here that about 
70X of the conference lines' carryings are assumed to be southbound, and 
80X northbound.
TABLE I : East Africa
Returns Southbound Northbound
by loadingin EEC ports (WT) discharge in EEC ports (WT)
Member
State All flags USSR flagX USSR flag All flags USSR flagX USSR flag
BELGIUM(1)
1979 2103,161 16,250 15.8 33,125 4,511 13.6
1980 170,008 2,187 3.127,080- -
2111,915 5,176 4.6 11,020- -
1981 161,324 .3,854 6.314,072 109 0.8
296,006 7,402 7.712,591- -
1982 191,445 10,718 11.7 19,383 - -
280,891 1,687 2.832,493 120.03
1983 169,943 1,489 2.126,998 - -
F.R.G.(1)
1979 1 86,4447,993 9.274,104 3,341 4.51980 166,491 5,707 8.664,466 2,473 3.8
271,430 10,596 14.8 56,682- -
1981 153,468 4,966 9.356,274 1,981 3.5
261,663 1,963 3.178,219 604 0.71982 172,117 3,352 4.682,938 2,664 3.2
241,706 1,783 4.261,268 5,122 8.3
1983 152,704 2,697 5.163,840 1,519 2.4

- 4 -
Returns Southbound Northbound
by loadingin EEC ports (WT) discharge in EEC ports (WT)
Member
State All flags USSR flag% USSR flag All flags USSR flag% USSR flag
NETHERLANDS (2)
1979 2 74,719 6,678 8.948,462 5,167 10.7
1980 1 80,832 6,060 7.5108,647 10,880 10.0
2105,959 15,106 19.2 94,089 8,294 8.8
1981 1 88,7',0 8,687 9.855,822 9,814 16.0
292,637 12,473 13.5 96,784 14,319 14.8
1982 1 73,375 8,681 11.8 69,604 3,572 5.1
259,146 7,211 12.2 88,869 4,764 5.3
1983 1 50,616 4,879 9.660,131 3,298 5.5
EUR 3 (B,FRG,NL) (1)
1979 2 264,324 30,921 11.7155,691 13,019 8.4
1980 1 217,391 13,954 6.4200,193 13,353 6.7
2289,344 30,878 10.7167,791 8,294 4.9
1981 1 203,502 17,497 8.6126,168 11,184 8.8
2250,306 21,838 8.7187,594 14,923 7.9
1982 1 236,937 22,751 9.6171,925 6,236 3.6
2181,743 10,681 5.9182,630 9,898 5.4
1983 1 153,263 9,065 5.9150,969 4,817 3.1
(1) Figures for 1979 (2 half) are not fully comparable with those of the subsequent periods.
(2) Only total figures, no types of goods (conmodities)
6. The above table again sets out the data for 1979, 1980, and tht
first half of 1981 provided in the third report, in order to illustrate the 
trend from the introduction of the monitoring onwards. It emerges from 
footnote 2 that the Netherlands and the Uni ted Kingdom do not keep statistics 
restricted to the types of goods covered by the monitoring system. Since 
the second half of 1981 Germany and Belgium have been providing information 
on both the carriage of all liner cargoes (like the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) and of the types of goods covered by the monitoring system. 
For the time being the Commission has opted in favour of the latter category 
since "all liner cargoes" is a term that can be interpreted in different 
ways by the Member States. On the other hand the Commission has re-examined 
the list of types of goods. There is a case for adaptation in order to 
describe the liner cargoes current in this trade as closely as possible.

- 5 -
7. It can be seen from Table I that the Soviet share has settled down :  
the average for the thre^ countries most concerned on the continent 
fluctuates around 8% per year in the case of southbound traffic and 
roughly 5% for northbound traffic.
8.  Although the number of sailings tells us little about the cargo 
volumes carried it is nevertheless useful to have a comparative view. 
Although BESTA has never notified northbound sailings from East Africa to 
the UK, this Soviet carrier has indeed been very active in this direction 
towards the continent. In past years equal numbers of north and southbound 
sailings were logged for the traffic with the Netherlands, while in the 
traffic with Germany there were three quarters as many northbound as 
southbound sailings, it thus appears from the cargo statistics that BESTA 
was also suc^ssful in northbound traffic, in contrast with that to the UK. 
The fact that the conference has been able to keep the upper hand in 
northbound traffic to the UK would be due to the retention of the raw 
materials contracts as a result of greatly depressed freight rates.
9. The figures for the sailings also illustrate the activities of the 
Geneva-based Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) which operates regular 
services with ships (mainly) flying the Panamanian flag. It is noticeable 
that MSC notified one-and-a-haIf times to twice as many northbound sai'ings 
than southbound sailings for the Netherlands, this usually being more
than BESTA and the conference lines put together. MSC and BESTA offered 
roughly the same number of southbound sailings. In the traffic with 
Germany, MSC was more active in a southbound than in a northbound direction. 
In both directions it offered almost twice as many sailings as BESTA.
10. As usual the Commission obtained additional information from the 
conference, as set out in the table below :

-  6 -
TABLE II :  East Africa Southbound 1982
U.K. NWC SCAN TOTAL
W.T.P.C. W.T.P.C.W.T.P.C.W.T.P.C.
C0NF 9448264.950163480.02791042.662402674.4
BESTA 120488.337617 6.03761757.48728210.4
MSC 2659218.2 7452011.9 -- 101112 12.1
OTHERS 12507 8.613328 2.1 - -258353.1
TOTAL145629 100627099 10065527 100838255 100
11. It is striking that the conference figures indicate that more cargo 
was carried from the continent (Le Havre - Hamburg range) than quoted
in the Member States' 198? report. The difference is about 
200 000 tonnes more, which Leads to the inference as already noted in 
section 6, that the List of goods types no Longer truly reflects the 
assortment of cargoes carried. If the total liner traffic figures reported 
by Belgium and Germany were to be taken into account about 100 000 tones 
more of liner cargo would have been shipped from the Le Havre - Hamburg range 
in 1982 than reported by the conference. However, even in this instance 
BESTA's share remains at 7 or 81 and is therefore slightly higher than 
the conference's figure.
12. According to the conference the following quantities were carried in the 
northbound direction.
TABLE III :  East Africa Northbound 1982
U.K. NWC SCAN TOTAL
W.T.P.C. W.T.P.C.W.T.P.C.W.T.P.C.
C0NF 15767684.721267674.4726748.337761977.5
BESTA 1493 0.8145915.1411627.4 202004.1
MSC 20804 11.2 5327318.7 2231.57430015.3
OTHERS 62163.3 5150 1.83434 22.8148003.0
TOTAL 186189 100285690 10015040 100486919 100

- 7 -
13. The Member States forming the "North West Continent" :  - Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and France - reported a greater quantity of 
imported cargoes. It is possible that some of the bulk cargoes were 
included since not all countries restrict themselves to the list of goods 
types annexed to the relevant Council decision. The Netherlands reported 
on the liner cargoes carried, but these could also be cargoes carried by 
tramp vessels. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the conference 
has been starved of information on overall liner traffic flows. However 
that may be, it nevertheless emerges from the conference data that BESTA 
accounted for about 51 of the northbound traffic to the North West Continent 
despite the "counter opposition policy" of the conference lines.
14. The conference also reviewed the number of both northbound and 
southbound saiLings.
TABLE IV (a) : Sailings Southbound
Conference BESTA MSC
1982 1982 1981 1982
From U.K. 20 23 25 18
From NWC 66 31 31 22
1983 1983 1983
From U.K. 20 17 13
From NWC 39 24 16
TABLE IV (b) :  Sailings Northbound
Conference BESTA MSC
1982 1981 1982
To U.K. 3 0 21
To NWC 10 12 23
1983 1983 1983
To U.K. 19 5 26
To NWC 41 7 29

-  8 -
15. At the time of writing of this report further talks with BESTA 
are in progress. A stumblinj block would be BESTA's demand for a larger 
share of the northbound traffic than has been offered. The conference has 
experienced great difficulty here since there is no balance between 
southbound and northbound traffic : the ratio is about 2:1. The East 
African countries are having great difficulty in maintaining their exports, 
with the result that the range of cargoes from that area has diminished. 
BESTA's past performance has always been low. However with its wide potential 
for routing vessels from the Indian and Pacific oceans towards East Africa
a bigger share would be attractive. The conference would have to make 
return trips with even more empty hold space.
16. The conference lines have competition to fear not only from BESTA, 
but also from MSC and, increasingly, from WESC (1). It must be borne in
mind that southbound products such as fertilizers and steel are more difficult 
for the conference to carry than hitherto since the majority of conference 
traffic is containerized. As a result of competition and the economic 
recession, rate Levels have lagged way behind cost increases. The following 
comparison of rates in northbound traffic might serve to demonstrate this :
Rate at 1/1/74 Rate at 1/1/84 % change
Coffee 69.02 W 85.80 W 24.3 
Tea 34.59 M 48.12 M 39.1 
Cotton 32.22 M 49.51 M 53.7 
Sisal 35.82 M 42.57 M 18.8 
Copper 43.73 W 43.86 W 0.3 
Canned Pines 26.65 M 47.34 M 77.6
17. Since 1982 there have been no general rate increases, either north 
or southbound (as far as above figures are concerned). However, the port dues 
in Kenya alone have since risen by 150% and the Suez Canal tolls by 22%. 
Moreover from 1 January 1974 to 1 January 1984 consumer prices rose by 200%, 
whereas, as can be seen from the figures above, the rate for copper rose by 
0.3%. Nevertheless contrary to the agreement not to enter into any long-term
(1)West European Container Line

- s >  -
obligations during the discussions, BESTA offered $ 8 below the conference 
rate.
18. Nevertheless BESTA seems in general to have curbed its activities, 
i.e. not to have taken a greater slice of the market than in previous 
years. The conference has the impression that the monitoring system and 
the intervention of the governments of the five Member States involved have 
had an effect.
19. The situation as regards East Africa trade is still unclear.
Although there are outsiders as well as BESTA in this traffic in general the 
latters' scope for quoting an unlimited number of departures and for under­
bidding conference rates at will is viewed with concern. Now that Zambia 
too has set up its own shipping line in partnership with Scansov, a 
Russian-Swedish joint venture, it seems that the Russians will compensate 
for any disappointingly small BESTA share with a sizeable share of the 
Zambian trade through their new cooperative venture. (1)
CENTRAL AMERICA TRADE
20. We have again drawn a distinction between the various sub-routes in 
the traffic between Central America and Europe :
a) N.W. Europe - Central America East Coast and vice-versa, as part of
a service which, at least for the conference (The Association of West 
India Transatlantic Steam Ship Lines) covers several ports in the 
Carribbean sea;
b) N.W. Europe - Central America West Coast and vice-versa, which is 
covered by two groups of liner operators within the conference 
(Central America Service and Servicio Alemania Centroamerica); the 
main outsiders are Scan Pacific Line (Finnish-Russian), Westbound only, 
and BSC (Baltic Shipping Company), the Soviet carrier based in 
Leningrad,-which runs the Baltcapas line.
(1) In the short run the joint venture is supposed to operate 
bulk carriers between East Africa and Europe.

-  10 -
c) Central America West Coast - Italy (Conferenza Centro America);
d) Europe - South America West Coast via Panama (European S/Pacific 
Magellan Conference).
21. The most threatened trade has always been on sub-route b) i.e. that 
from the west coast of Central America to North-West Europe (the Le Havre - 
Hamburg range). It has mainly been a question here of carrying coffee and 
cotton which make up by far the greatest proportion of the goods loaded on 
this coast. It quickly emerged in the wake of the first representations made 
by the five Member States to the Moscow authorities (see section A) that
the agreements concerning the restriction of the Soviet share were not 
being kept. The share agreed for the whole year had already been used up 
after a few months. During the subsequent representations - in february 1983 - 
it even emerged that the talks (on the three trades in question) were in 
deadlock, even though the Soviet shipping companies had expressed willingness to 
keep on talking at commercial level. It was agreed that a solution would have 
to be found by 30 June 1983.
22. Indeed it was possible, as regards the Central America trade, to sign 
a note of understanding with the Baltic Shipping Company (operator of
the Baltcapas Line) and the Scan Pacific Line on 28 June 1983. From 
1 September 1983 both shipping companies would acquire the status of associated 
member, together with a right to underbid the freight rates of the conference 
lines by an agreed maximum percentage or amount. These agreements applied 
both to outward (westbound) traffic and to the disputed return (eastbouppj) 
traffic. The latter thus affected the carriage of coffee apd cqfton of 
which, as shall emerge below, the monitoring system was to provide a very 
gloomy picture. The seven "national shipping lines" in the Central American 
and European areas carried no more or even less than the two genuine 
cross-traders Baltcapas and Scan Pacific. The agreement of 28 June 1983 
was to return the share of these cross-traders to the "significant share" 
mentioned in the United Nations Code of Conduct.
23. The monitoring system revealed the following :

-  11 -
TABLE V :  Central America
Return
MemberbyWestbound] Eastbound
loadingir EEC ports (WT) discharge in EEC pc rts (WT)
State All flags USSR flagX USSR flag All flags USSR flagX USSR flag
BELGIUM(1)
1979 294,435 3900.4 11,224 967 8.6
1980 1125,981 8480.7 9,582 380.4
295,846 3,511 3.7 14,730“ -
1981 1132,422 1,698 1.3 7,573 1
274,075 3,194 4.3 5,436 -
1982 1116,357 4,877 4.2 4,765 - -
249,852 5,104 10.2 5,701 1 1 0.2
1983 1106,887 12,693 11.9
F.R.G.(1)
1979 259,355 4,420 7.4 80,931 - -
1980 118,017 1,107 6.1123,575 28,221 21.8
216,003 2,441 15.2 61,190 19,370 31.7
1981 119,616 1,191 6.1125,411 18,096 14.4
212,474 1,631 13.1 73,779 17,159 23.25
1982 111,363 1,184 10.4 112,397 44,428 39.25
213,353 3,785 28.3 42,688 4,662 11.0
1983 113,958 5,411 38.8 91,954 30,051 32.7
NETHERLANDS (2)
1979 233,017 1,021 3.1 26,607 1,396 5.2
1980 133,606 6491.9 36,730 2,787t.5
243,833 1170.3 19,490 3,116 16.0
1981 148,256 105 0.2 36,753 24 0.1
251,923 1,836 3.5 25,548 1 2 0.1
1982 139,948 247 0.6 41,043 816 1.9
237,577 1,465 3.9 21,903 344 1.5
1983 136,868 1,700 4.6 34,297 —
EUR 3 (B,FRG,Nl)(1)
1979 2186,807 313.1118,762 2,363 2.0
1980 1177,604 2,604 1.5175,887 31,046 17.7
2155,718 6,069 3.9 95,410 22,486 23.6
1981 1352,332 2,994 0.8169,737 18,121 10.7
2138,472 6,661 4.8104,763 17,171 16.4
1982 1167,668 6,308 3.7158,205 45,244 28.6
2100,782 10,354 10.2 70,292 5,017 7.1
'1983 1157,713 19,804 12.5 126,251 30,051 23.8
(1) Figures for 1979 (2 half) are not fully comparable with those of the subsequent periods
(2) Only total figures, no types of goods (commodities)

-  12 -
24. As u su al, an attem pt was a lso  made to  o b tain  a d d itio n a l inform ation 
from the conference on c o n fe re n c e -lin e  and BSC t r a f f i c  (B altcap as, and 
sin ce 1981, Scan P a c ific ). The follow ing ta b le  goes on where e a r l i e r  
re p o rts le f t o ff as regards th e c a rria g e  of co tto n  and c o ffe e .
TABLE VI : Coffee and co tto n  t r a f f i c  from the
West coast of C entral America to  the 
Le Havre -  Hamburg range (su b -ro u te b ).
1979 1980 *
Commodi ty Conference B S C Conferen ce B S C
* W  TX W  TX U  TX U  TX
C O T T O N 14,700 36 25,900 64 20,930 59 14,770 41
COFFEE 116,200 86 18,550 14 70,176 60 47,761 40
TO TA L 130,900 75 44,450 25 91,106 59 62,531 41
* a d ju sted  fig u re s  sin ce th e second re p o rt
Commodity1981 1982
Conference B S C Conference B S C
W  T X W  T X W  T X W  T X
**
C O T T O N 10,971 62 6,715 38 9,290 45 11,355 55
COFFEE 79,448 65 43,004 35 45,820 52 43,007 48
TO TA L 90,419 65 49,719 35 55,110 50 54,362 50
** including 2 445 tons of cotton diverted by Baltcapas from the west coast of 
Central America via Sapto Tones de Castilla (east coast)
Commodi ty1983 (1.1 -  31.8)
Conference B S C
W  T X W  T X
C O T T O N
COFFEE15,960
35,78063
829,353
7,70337
18
T O T A L 51,740 75 17,056 25

- 13 -
25. According to the conference, which completed the information for 1982 
with the above, "third parties" (other ships, presumably on a charter basis) 
carried a further 16 471 tons of coffee in that year. The Commission 
disregarded this amount.
26. The conference provided even more detailed information on the Soviet's 
freight rate policy, by recording in December 1982 $ 60 per TW all in for 
the carriage of a large proportion of the coffee from Nicaragua. The 
conference on the other hond had a contract rate of $ 107.50 - 21 CAC +
$ 14.50 BAC here. Moreover, as already described in the third report, 
the conference could only keep the coffee from El Salvador by offering 
$ 95 all in, as opposed to the $ 90 all in which Baltcapas had offered after 
even quoting $ 80-85. It would be useful to compare this rate with the 
conference rat applying ten years previously : $ 80 - 10% deferred rebate. 
The underbidding for cotton was less in 1982 than previously (before the 
Soviets has been approached for the first time). However, it can be 
assumed all in all that Baltcapas and Scan Pacific must have earned about 
30% less net from their carrying than the conference, although roughly the 
same amount was carried.
27. Now that the agreement has been in force for six months (at the time 
of writing this report) the situation of the conference lines in the 
traffic from the west coast of Central America has improved. The conference 
has been able to hold on to the coffee from EL Salvador (and Costa Rica) 
because Baltcapas kept the agreement by. only quoting $ 5 less than the 
conference rate. The coffee from Nicaragua, however, was carried by 
Baltcapas, who are now also closer to the conference rate for cotton traffic. 
All in all 75/80% of the eastbound liner traffic is now in the hands of
the conference and 20/25% in those of Baltcapas and Scan Pacific, although 
large amounts of coffee are still carried by ships chartered by the 
importers themselves.
28. It appeared that the agreement was not kept too well in a westward 
direction, i.e. from Europe to Central America. Although Baltcapas seemed 
to keep to the agreement the Scan Pacific Line had already reached its

- 14 -
ceiling within five months. There were strong pointers to the fact that 
Scan Pacific uses its  agents to conclude agreements with other outsiders 
to divert cargoes in retu.n for very low freight rates. Scan P acific's 
agents, for instance, advertised sailings to both Central America and 
Mexico on the same ship (flying the Panamanian flag ). For Central 
America the shipping company represented was OCI, for Mexico i t  was 
Scan Pacific Line (which normally charters vessels flying the Soviet flag).
A n  interlocking of interests in th is way is expressly precluded by the 
agreement with the conference. Since the Soviets have a significant holding 
in Scan Pacific i t  was taken that Baltcapas was possibly aware of the 
situ a tio n . Nevertheless, following consultation between a ll of the parties 
involved, no further a c tiv ity  by O C I or Scan Pacific has been notified 
although th e ir com m on agent is now advertising on behalf of a Danish shipping 
company which has used the same vessels. The sim ilarity  with what is happe­
ning in the T  ,st Africa trade (the jo in t venture in Zambia) has been striking.
29. The Conference also supplied the Commission with s ta tis tic a l information 
on westbound tr a f f ic , i.e . from Europe to Central America. A s mentioned 
in e a rlie r reports Scan Pacific gradually became very active in this tra ff ic . 
The Russian vessels chartered by it were returned a fte r unloading on the 
west coast to Balcapas, who then loaded them with coffee and cotton on th eir 
ow n account.
30. According to the conference the following amounts should have been 
carried to both coasts of Central America (including Panama) :
T A B L E  VII : Central American ports - westbound
(JAN-SEPT)
W.T. I W ..T.Ï
Conference 180 970 59 146 311 65
Baltcapas 12 357 4 23626 10
Scan Pacific 23 380 8 7838 4
Others 88 563 29 46476 2 1
T O T A L 305 270 100 224 251 1001 9 8 2 1 9  8 3

- 15 -
31. It can be seen from this breakdown that although the conference 
carries most of the cargoes to Central America Baltcapas and Scan Pacific 
together have acquired a jonsiderable share. The Commission is unaware 
to what extent this share is reflected in the 1 September 1983 ceiling 
acquired by both outsiders. From the assumption made in section 28 it 
rather seems that at all events Scan Pacific had already reached its 
ceiling for an entire year (maximum level of income from cargoes) after only 
five months.
32. It can now be assumed that if the situations before and after 1 Septentoer 
are compared, Scan Pacific obtained more freight from the same cargoes, 
since after 1 September it was tied to a maximum discount, which thus 
yielded a higher income. At ‘he same time the conference shippers were no 
longer penalized for using either it or Baltcapas as carriers. Although 
this could h=»ve caused fewer sailings or to space being filled up with 
low-revenue cargoes, it seems that Scan Pacific were not satisfied with
the agreed ceiling and from the outset had held on to their normal pattern 
of sailings and loadings.
33. Another point here is that the same vessels, whether under Scan Pacific o 
Baltcapas management, always had to be ready to accept consignments for the 
state trading countries on their return trips. Shipments of coffee to 
COMECON ports have continued. EEC shipping lines stand no chance in this 
traffic, one reason being that, for example, Czech importers may pay for
part of the consignment in roubles. It is this imbalance in the conditions 
of competition which is striking. This means, for example, that large 
consignments of cotcake have been carried to Denmark at very low rates by 
Soviet ships, since these were in any case heading for Baltic ports.

-  16  -
FAR EAST TRADE
34. On 4 December 1980 the Council decided to extend the monitoring system 
to cover traffic between the EEC and the Far East (Cotncil Decision n ° 80/1181/EEC).
The details still had to be worked out and appeared three months 
later in Council Decision 81/189/EEC. The first period would run
from 1 July 1981 to 31 December 1982 and this was extended to 31 December 1984 
for all three trades in Council Decision 82/870/EEC of 16 December 1982.
35. Information per type of goods was not required for the monitoring 
of this trade; initially, however, the Member States in general found 
that it was quite difficult to collect adequate and above all comparable 
data. The Commission was aware of this since the trade in question is 
much more extensive and complicated than that between the EEC and Central 
America and between the EEC and East Africa.
36. In order to illustrate the problems involved a review of what the 
Member States have been able to provide so far is provided below.
198119821983
2 s 1 s 2s1 s
FRG(1)  XXXX- no information on freight rates
ITXXXX- no information on containers
NLXXXX- no specification by flag for container cargo,Little
information about freight rates
BXXXX- no freight rates, no TEU's, only figures about
tonnage carried on flats and in containers
UKX- -X- no conplete tonnage figures and no freight rate
information for independent lines
FRXX--- no freight rates information, no T E U 's, only
tonnage carried in container
DKXXX-- minimal information
IRL-- - -
GR---i
(1) X “ information received 
- ■ no information received

- 17 -
37. Although on first examination the above warrants no great expec­
tations, the Commission fell that it nevertheless had enough information 
available to be able to outline the competition from the Soviet lines. ( 1)  
These outsiders, who have been described in press reports as the "toughest 
of all independently operating lines" are at the moment considered by 
everybody to be the biggest threat to the Far Eastern Freight Conference.
38. There are various reasons for this :
they are in a position to under-bid rates for longer and by more 
than commercial outsiders. The examples brought to the Commission's 
attention are extremely alarming (see below);
althouc' under different managements the Soviet "all-water carriers" 
and the Trans-Siberian Railway are considered to complement each 
other and together operate a pincer movement against the conference.
t
Thus the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) estimated the share 
of the Soviet lines to be 8% in a westerly direction (  excluding 
Japan and Korea - and that of the TSR in a westerly direction from 
Japan to be 15-17%. Any agreement with Soviet bodies (government 
and state-owned shipping lines) should preferably also offer a 
solution to the problem of the "land bridge";
- owing to the boycott by American dockers after the invasion of
Afghanistan the ships of the Russian Baltatlantic Line and FESCO 
have all but dissappeared from the trade with the US. This has 
speeded up the introduction of modern tonnage in the traffic between 
Europe and the Far East ( and a significant increase in capacity, as 
already planned) and this is still continuing;
an agreement was reached last year with the "commercial" outsider 
Evergreen; an agreement with the Taiwanese state-owned shipping line 
Yang Ming seems less likely but Lloyd's Shipping Economist estimated 
in October 1983 that the Soviet shipping lines would occupy 
123 000 "slots" in 1984 (compared with a mere 49 000 in 1981) as
(1) Baltorient Line and Odessa Ocean Line

- 18 -
opposed to Yang Ming's 79 000. In addition Yang Ming is 
Taiwan's national shipping line whose trade is covered by the 
Conference, whereas the Soviet lines are assumed in almost every 
case to act as cross-traders.
39. Whenever one wishes to provide a complete overview of the tonnage 
carried per country to the Far East it becomes clear that the percentages 
carried under the Soviet flag are decidedly modest : however the "Far East" also 
includes Japan and Korea -  two countries where the Soviet carryings are almost 
entirely undertaken by the TSR land-bridge and not by the Soviet flag ships (1). Apart 
ƒrcm the Soviet flag, a number of flags which other outsiders tend to use are listed
in the following tables Since these outsiders frequently use the same 
flag - especially the Liberian, Panamanian and Singaporian flags - it is 
impossible to determine the shares of other outsiders accurately. It is 
even difficult in the case of Taiwan since for example Evergreen do not 
fly the Taiwanese flag at all times.
TABLE VIII (a) :  p. 18 a) -TO FAR EAST
TABLE VIII (b? :  p. 18 b) - FROM FAR EAST
40. It is clear that the above tables can provide no information on the 
amounts of cargo carried per shipping line.
Attemps have been made to obtain this information outside the 
monitoring system but the results vary.
For example the specialist press quotes 45% for the conference ,
35% for Evergreen and Yang Ming together and 20% for the other shipping 
lines, including the Soviet lines and the TSR. Lloyd's Shipping Economist 
calculated the capacity offered. In the light of the study the following 
breakdowncouId be adopted for 1983 (see page 19, Table IX) :
(1) Except in the traffic to and from Italy.

TABLE Vili (a)
MARKET SHARES OF FLAGS USED BY NON-CONFERENCE LINES EASTBOUND
TO
FAR EASTTOTAL USSR
lSINGAPOI
ILIBERIA
XPA N A M A
XTAIW AN
XMALAYSIi---------------------- 1
\
X. .
.  _  M  —
CHINA
X
®  81 
82
83 1676 389 
981 094 
555 27220 958 
10 956 
9 6363 .1
1.1 
1 .759 112
60 088 
19 2788 .7
6.1
3 .570 914 
159 578 
67 7311 0 .5
1 6 .2
1 2 .211 539 
89 609 
76 9051 .7
9 .1
1 3 .820 799 
25 903 
22 2563 .1
2 .6
4 .07 643 
33 892 
7 9181.1
3 .4
1 .470 856 
42 620 
22 6761 0 .5
4 .3
4 .1
© 8 1  2 
82 1
2
83 1306 3C2 
256 4584 882 
9371 .6
0 .411 295 
9 8303 .7
3 .818 948 
5 3266 .2
2.18 642 
2 5092 .8
0 .95 047 
2 2451 .6
0 .89 250 
5 0313 .1
1 .91  012 
1  6910 .3
0 .6
©  81 2 
82 1  
2
83 1170 360 
136 779 
165 150 
163 7436 244 
19 963 
8 823 
3 6723 .6
1 4 .6
5 .3
2 .215 303 
20 203 
8 792 
26 2629 . G  
1 4 .7  
5 .3  
1 6 .0477 
4 2660 .2
2 .59 183 
11 602 
25 202 
13 5115 .4
8 .5  
1 5 .2
8 .21C 740 
4 773 
3 546 
3 2876 .3
3 .4  
2 .1  
2 .0- -3 560 
1  8752 .6
1.1
@ 8 1  2 
82 1  
2
83 1730 734 
703 206 
723 270 
793 43531 149
36 742 
66 425 
68 1984 .2
5 .2  
9.1 
8 .633 863
34 485 
28 058 
26 4584 .6
4 .9
3 .8
3 .321 616 
48 818 
48 861 
21 3382 .9
6 .9
6 .7
2 .73 078 
1  035 
9 451 
46 8160 .4
0 .1
1 .3
6 .09 167 
18 561 
28 211 
36 9941 .2
2 .6
3 .9
4 .641 743 
37 288 
23 331 
34 9245 .7
5 .3  
3 .2
4 .43 897 
1  8770 .5
0 .2
NL) 81 2 ^ 82 1  
2
83 11  004 5C9 
755 597 
743 342 
763 91617 388 
16 992 
28 515 
43 3011 .7  
2 .2
3 .8  
5 .642 831 
38 955 
19 131
7 4034 .2
5.1
2 .5
0 .942 562 
36 277 
34 313 
24 7604 .2  
4 .8  
4 .6
3 .292 
4 463 
21 9350.01
0 .6
2 .817 200 
11 603 
11 07C 
13 5501 .7
1 .5
1 .5
1 .750 286 
41 016 
28 807 
44 3115 .0
5 .4
3 .8
5 .88 783 
4 072 
8 267 
17 7160 .8
0 .5
1.1
2 .3
oo

TABLE Vili (b)
MARKET SHARES OF FLAGS USED BY NON-CONFERENCE LINES WESTBOUND
FR O M
FAR EASTTOTAL USSR
XSIN6AP0I IE
XLIBERIA
IP A N A M A
%TAIW AN
lM ALAYSIA
XCHINA
X
(D 1981
1982
1983 1508 067 
921 262 
519 2559 506 
7 774 
6 3321 .8
0 .8
1 .227 003 
29 374 
89 2645 .3
3 .2
1 7 .293 860 
150 020 
40 23918.4
1 6 .2
7 .531 790 
84 300 
40 6696 .2
9.1
7 .84 702 
9 25?
5 2530 .9
1 0 .0
1 .01C 365 
5 282 
4 7522 .0
0 .6
0 .914 374 
7 966 
2 6612 .8
0 .9
0 .5
©  81 2 
82 1  
2
83 1595 785 
636 49929 031 
15 7884 .9
2 .531 072 
35 7505 .2
5 .660 151 
64 6281 1 .0
1 0 .027 916 
16 1584 .6
2 .59 327 
21 1131 .6
3 .315 205 
22 9062 .5
3 .623 131 
162 9333 .9
2 5 .6
®  81 2 
82 1  
2
83 1154 757 
196 374 
172 063 
198 3938 191 
23 044 
10 536 
7 4065 .3
1 1 .7
6 .1
3 .78 189 
15 007 
11 121 
26 5775 .3  
7 .6
6 .4  
1 3 .4503 
6 992 
11 930 
13 8710 .3
3 .5
6 .9
7 .015 280 
28 446 
32 574 
24 2329 .0
1 4 .5
1 8 .9
1 2 .223 983 
25 047
12 663
13 1661 5 .0
1 2 .7
7 .3
6 .62 008 
2 249
1  7801 .3
1.1
0 .93 396
4 626 
6 620
6522 .2
2 .3
3 .8
0 .3
®  81 2 
82 1  
2
83 1694 388 
778 827 
646 938 
738 98231 028 
28 62C
32 478 
51 6484 .4
3 .6
5 .0
6 .919 101 
24 342 
15 380 
14 7362 .7
3 .1
2 .3
1 .941 610 
50 354 
47 499 
25 4545 .9
6 .4
7 .3
3 .44 693 
7 155 
4 446 
43 1180 .6
0 .9
0 .7
5 .89 877 
25 284 
21 565 
31 4210 .1
3 .2
3 .3  
4 .245 768 
47 542 
23 489 
34 9246 .6
6.1
3 .6
4 .74 79?
2 232
3 521
4 4970 .7
0 .3
0 .5
0 .6
(NL) 81 2 
82 1  
2
83 1861 362 
892 793 
840 915 
923 57520 376 
24 159 
19 100 
28 8692 .3
2 .7
2 .2
3 .140 030 
58 565 
29 092 
22 0024 .6
6 .5
3 .5  
2 .445 1C6 
36 028 
21 444 
25 5025 .2
4.C
2 .5
2 .717 977 
19 686 
7 688 
30 3302 .0
2 .2
0 .9
3 .37 024 
11 512 
6 758 
9 0740 .8
1 .3
0 .80-988 433 
74 691 
38 985 
66 73710.2
8 .3
4 .6
7 .29 861 
3 647 
10 411 
18 4961.1
0 .4
1 .2
2 .0

- 19 -
TAB'.E IX
CONFERENCE 
EVERGREEN 
YANG MING 
NORASIA
Other non-SOVIET 
SOVIET LINES 
TSR72.51
7.5Ï
5.01
2.5Ï
(1 )2.51 K Ì J 17.51 
6± 10.01
100 l
41. The monitoring system offered the possibility of checking what amounts 
were carried per flag by examining routes (i.e. countries). Although for 
the reasons mentioned earlier it is not possible to gain an insight into 
each individual line it is indeed possible to plot from the monitoring 
system what is carried by the Soviet lines per country to the Far East.
This also provides a clearer picture of these shipping lines' activities.
TABLE X : p 19 a)
It can be seen from the above table that Soviet competition has made 
itself most felt in the traffic with the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and, 
increasingly, Hong Kong.
42. The Member States' returns were unable to provide much information on 
the Soviet shipping lines' freight-rate policy. According to the 
Commission's own investigations the percentage of under-bidding is very 
high.  The rates charged by the Soviet Baltorient Line for the traffic
(1) Polish Ocean Lines, Hong Kong Container Line, Char Ching Marine, C0SC0.

TABLE X
SOVIET LINER MARKET SHARE BY COUNTRY
EUR 5 (B,D,F,I,NL) 2nd half1981 1st half1982 2nd half 1982(1)1st half 1983 (1)
TO TOTAL USSR1TOTAL USSR%TOTAL USSR%TOTAL USSRÏ
JAPAN 845662 1 23321.4717490168232.3568403 20180.3565215 28630.5
TAIWAN 220617- 184594 81174.3183779 6280.3197282 9780.5
HONG KONG 4291189828 2.2318647 103683.2273960191296.927132824000 8.8
MALAYSIA 25437137771.416897243642.5193634 1 1955 6.1245590142245.8
SINGAPORE 610163191373.1449763 209124.6445783323357.2518854472129.1
KOREA 271 8681880.06170473 100.005 172 1 01 5080.31450i5 8010.5
PHILIPPINES 1471181825912.4135918 2 136215.7 1206473678528.513964631681 22.6
THAILAND 406218 101222.5297566 6793 2.2143371 83035.7295506 108233.6
FAR EAST 3185135736432.3 2443423 887493.6 2109678 1 1 16615.21 8132811325827.3
FROM
JAPAN 1222494167881.3955816 127061.382790677970.9 868 8337247 0.8
TAIWAN 244585 10030.42519303204 1.21835675294 2.8237 634 14514 6.1
HONG KONG 302740165325.4344933137153.9255897 109704.2278237199207.1
MALAYSIA 332764181065.4274643245138.9232852184447.9300680 228737.6
SINGAPORE 324066 127813.9343992147004.2275629 1 10153.9288983164115.6
KOREA 1568451180.07209096 160.007 139204 1 10.007 160742 80.005
PHILIPPINES 2637782901810.9208560 2 181110.4 1 0 19727 8037.6 100180 80037.9
THAILAND 59332193411.5798613 8402 1.0395155 6813 2.02727057206 2.6
FAR EAST 34405931036763.03387583990672.9 2352182 681472.92 507994961823.8
(1) no figures for FRANCE ^
a*

-  20  -
between North-West Europe and Hong Kong are compared with the conference's 
freight rates for the sar.ie cargo. The Commission has reason to assume 
that the latter rates are the actual prices charged :  since the FEFC 
" Neutral Body " was set up the conference rate has been much less open 
to attack from within.
43. The prices quoted in the breakdown below are all net dollar rates per TEU 
(20 foot equivalent container), i.e. the conference freight rate minus the appropriate 
rebate or special reduction. Unless otherwise indicated, no account has been 
taken of the constantly changing CAFs and BAFs :  these were added to the 
rates charged by both the conference lines and the outsiders. The rates apply 
from spring 1984.
Table XI
BENELUX / FRG - HONG KONG and other F. E. destinations
ARTICLE CONFERENCE BALTQRIENT I difference
Animal feed 1502 1067 29
Beer 1397 1088 22
Electrical goods 2249 1325 41
Machinery 2249 1287 43
Milk (condensed) 1292 950 26
Milk powder (in bags) 1202 950 2 1
Groupage (FCL) cargo - 20' 
Groupage (FCL) cargo - 40'11641( 1) 2193j 1
A striking aspect of this breakdown is the rate of $ 1 164 for so-called 
consolidated cargoes (grouped by shippers), regardless of content, which 
amounts to a FAK (Freight of All Kinds) rate. The conference does not apply 
FAK rates. It would seem that an FAK of this type is even common practice 
in westbound traffic from Manila to Europe, the rate being about $ 1 050 
per 20 foot container.
(1) all-in

-  21  -
44. That under-bidding in westbound traffic is so widespread, despite 
the flow of cargoes being greater than in an easterly direction can be 
seen from the following examples :
SINGAPORE - NORTH WEST EUROPE
ARTICLE CONFERENCE BALTORIENT % difference
Rubber (loose) 1526 1150 25
Textiles 2190 1500 32
Electrical goods (audio/video) 2213(1) 1450(1) 34
Furniture 3084(1X2) 2400(1X2) 22
Plastic toys 1996 1450 (1) 27
(1) all-in
(2) Per 40' container.
HONG KONG - NORTH WEST EUROPE
ARTICLE CONFERENCE BALTORIENT % difference
Textiles 2230 1400 37
Plastic toys 1919 1300 32
45. The above comparison of freight rates reflects the usual rate setting 
in this trade, which is highly containerised. As was referred to in para 39 
the Soviet carryings to and from Japan and Korea are mainly in the form of 
the TSR land-bridge and necessarily concern cargo in containers only. The 
full extent of the Soviet competition in this trade therefore, can not be 
assessed as long as the TSR carryings are left without consideration.
Apart from this, the usual high value of goods produced in Japan and Korea 
give the competition by the TSR an extra dimension, in that it is tantamount

-  22  -
to "creaming" of the trafic to and from the Far East in general. This 
leads to the question whether not a further study, to be commissioned by 
the Commission, on the TSR would be necessary, particularly in view of 
the Community shipowners' fears of a drastic increase in competition from 
the land-bridge in the wake of the opening of the BAM railroad (autumn 1984) 
and the expansion of the major Baltic and North Pacific seaports. Although 
the railroad will not operate at full capacity until 1986 the claim by the 
Ministry of Transport Construction that the rail carriage of containers 
between Europe and Japan will treble by the year 2000 has to be taken 
seriously. Be that as it may, a comparison between the carryings by the 
TSR and those by water carriers in the Far East trade would not be valid 
until all Member States returns pertaining to the latter carriers are in 
TEU's as we as in tonnes weight which most Member States have reported 
so far. The Commission hopes to have this matter discussed in a meeting 
with experts as soon as possible after the Council has taken note of this 
report.