EN ECB -PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 11 April  2014  
on the independence of  Banka Slovenije  
(CON/20 14/25) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 19 February  2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the President of the 
Slovenian Parliament  for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije1 (hereinaf ter 
the ‘draft law’ ). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article s 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent  of Article  2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, 
as the draft law  relates to Banka Slovenije . In accordance with the first sentence of Article  17.5 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.  
 
1.  Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 Pursuant to the explanatory memorandum to the draft law submitted to the National Assembly for 
the legislative procedure by a group of its deputies , the purpose of the draft law is to strengthen the 
democratic accountability of  Banka Slovenije and to enhance the transparency of its operations , in 
particular in the context of its banking supervisory role. 
1.2 The draft law amends the provisions  of the Law on Banka Slovenije (hereinafter the ‘Law’) 
relating to  Banka Slovenije ’s reporting  to the National Assembly . It contains  exemptions from  the 
duty to safeguard confidential information in respect  of credit institutio ns which are recipients of 
state aid where such information is requested by the National Assembly or its committees.  The 
draft law also proposes that additional representatives of the National Assembly’s committees may 
participate in meetings of Ban ka Slovenije’s Governing Board.  
1.3. The draft law stipulates  a larger  voting majority for the appointment of the  Governor and other 
members of Banka Slovenije ’s Governing Board by the National Assembly  and also contains 
amendments to  the rules on their reappointment , limiting the number of their terms of office  to two.  
1.4 Furthermore, t he draft law introduces a new ground for the dismissal of members of Banka 
Slovenije’s decision -making bodies  and gives the Governor of Banka Slovenije the right to  dismiss 
director s or deputy director s of its departments  without  needing to provide  any grounds.  
                                                 
1  Zakon o Banki Slovenije (ZBS -1) (Ur. l. RS  No 72/2006 – official consolidated text, 59/11 ). 
2  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 2 9 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions ( OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42 ).  
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2 1.5 Finally , the draft law provid es for the auditing of Banka Slovenije’s operations by an external 
auditing company appointed by the National Assembly , on a proposal from the Committee  for the 
control of public finance . This external auditor would also be empowered  to establish the 
incom patibility of functions of the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board , rather than 
Banka Slovenije itself . 
 
2. Dismissal of members of Banka Slovenije’s decision -making bodies  
2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty lays down t he principle of personal independ ence, which is a key aspect 
of the principle of central bank independence for the members of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) . This principle is reflected in  Article 7  and Article 14.2 of the  Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank ( hereinafter  the ‘ Statute  of 
the ESCB ’). In particular, Article 14.2  provides, inter alia,  that governors may only be relieved 
from ofﬁce if they no longer fulﬁl the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if 
they have been guilty of serious misconduct, with the possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union . 
The purpose of Article 14.2 of the Statute  of the  ESCB is to prevent the authorities involved in the 
appointment of governors, part icularly the government or parliament, from exercising their 
discretion to dismiss a governor. Since Article 14.2 is directly applicable, national central bank 
(NCB)  statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal in line with  Article 14.2, or  should  omit 
any m ention of such grounds . Once elected or appointed, governors may not be dismissed under 
conditions other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute  of the ESCB even where they 
have not yet taken up their duties.  
Personal independence wou ld be jeopardised if the same rules did not also apply to other members 
of the decision -making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB -related tasks. 
Various provisions of the Treaty and the Statute  of the ESCB  require comparable security of 
tenure. Article 14.2 of the Statute  of the ESCB  does not restrict the security of tenure of ofﬁce to 
governors, while Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute  refer to ‘members of 
the decision -making bodies’ of NCBs rather than to governors  specifically . This applies in 
particular where a governor is ‘ﬁrst among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights or 
where such other members are involved in the performance of ESCB -related tasks3. 
2.2 Article 39 (1)4 of the Law  provides that the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board  may 
only be removed from  office before expiry of the term  if they ask to be relieved  (indent 1), if 
grounds for the incompatibility of functions arise during their term of office  (indent 2), or if it has 
                                                 
3  See, for example, the ECB ’s Convergence Report 2013, p p. 23 to 24. All ECB Convergence Reports are available on the 
ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
4  In connection with Article 39.a  of the Law which stipulates the application of certain provisions of law governing the 
prevention of corruption . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
3 been found in a prescribed procedure5 that they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or that they have been guilty of serious misconduct  (indent 3).  
2.3 The proposed amendment to Article 39 of the Law also provides for  the dismissal of  a member of 
Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board on a proposal from the Slovenian President , by a majority of 
two thirds of all deputies of the National Assembly.  This adds a new ground for dismissal  to the 
two existing ones  provided by Arti cle 14.2 of the Statute  of the ESCB  and is thus incompatible 
with the  Statute. The proposed  amendment  should  therefore  be deleted .  
2.4 The incompatibility  of functions  refer red to in indent 2 of Article 39 (1) of the L aw only addresses 
the situations defin ed in Article 38 of the Law . In this respect , the ECB  would reiterate the view  
expressed in its Convergence Report  of May 2006  that inserting a cross -reference to Article 38  in 
point 2 of Article 39 (1) would be welcome  for legal certainty reasons . In addit ion, it should be 
clarified that  point 2 of Article 39(1)  of the Law  is a condition required for the performance of 
duties and not a ground for dismissal in addition to the two grounds provided by Article 14.2 of the 
Statute  of the ESCB .  
 
3. Participation  by representatives of third parties in Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board 
meetings  
The principle of central bank institutional independence, enshrined in Article 130 of the T reaty and 
Article 7 of the Statute  of the ESCB , renders the participation by repre sentatives of third parties in 
an NCB’s decision -making body with a right to vote on matters concerning the performance by the 
NCB of ESCB -related tasks incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB , even if such 
a vote is not decisive6. Further more, the principle of central bank institutional independence  also 
renders the participation of third party representatives, without a right to vote in the meetings of an 
NCB’s decision -making body entrusted with the performance of ESCB -related tasks, incompatible 
with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB , if such participation interferes with the performance 
of ESCB -related task s7 by that decision -making body or endangers compliance with the ESCB’s 
confidentiality regime.  
 
                                                 
5  This procedure is governed by a Decision on the Pro cedure of Establishing Responsibility of Members of the Governing 
Board of Bank a Sloveni je, adopted by Banka Slovenije in agreement with the Finance Minister  (Sklep o postopku 
ugotavljanja odgovornosti članov Sveta Banke Slovenije) (Ur. l. RS No 24/2003). 
6  See, for example,  the ECB ’s Convergence Report 2013, p. 22. 
7  Pursuant to Article 2 of the Law, the principle of central bank independence should be respec ted not only when Banka 
Slovenije  performs ESCB -related tasks , but also when it performs  national tasks. 
ECB -PUBLIC  
4 4. External audit of Banka Slo venije’s operations   
4.1 The draft law proposes the int roduction of a new Article 41.a8 into the Law, pursuant to which the 
operations of Banka Slovenije would be audited by an auditing company , selected by the National 
Assembly on a proposal from the Comm ittee for public finance control . 
4.2 Article 27.1 of the Statute  of the ESCB  requires the accounts of the ECB and NCB s to be audited 
by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council and approved by the 
Council  and this is duly reflect ed in Articles 52 and 65 of the Law . The proposed  amendment  is 
thus incompatible with Article 27.1 of the Statute  of the ESCB  and contradicts the existing 
provisions of  Articles 52 and 65 of the Law . 
4.3 Where an NCB’s operations are subject to the control  of a state audit ofﬁce or similar body charged 
with controlling the use of public ﬁnances, a number of safeguards of  central bank independence 
should apply: ( a) the scope of the control should be clearly deﬁned by the legal framework ; (b) the 
activities o f the NCB’s independent external auditors should not be prejudiced9; (c) in line with the 
principle of institutional independence, as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty  and Article 7 of 
the Statute  of the ESCB , the audit should : (i) comply with the pro hibition on giving instructions to 
an NCB and its decision -making bodies, ( ii) not interfere with the NCB’s ESCB -related tasks, and 
(iii) be carried out  on a non -political, independent and purely professional basis10. The proposed 
amendments of the Law  do not meet all these requirements.  
 
5. Reporting by Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly and confidentiality  of information  
5.1 As pointed out by the ECB in its Convergence Reports11, the obligation of professional secrecy for 
ECB and NCB staff under Artic le 37 of the Statute  of the ESCB  may give rise to similar provisions 
in NCBs’ statutes or in Member States’ legislation. The  primacy of U nion law and rules adopted 
thereunder also means that national laws on third party access to documents may not result i n 
infringements of the ESCB’s confi dentiality regime. Access to  an NCB’s information and 
documents must be  withou t prejudice to the ESCB’s confi dentiality regime , to which the members  
of NCBs’ decision -making bodies and staff are subject. NCBs should ensur e that such bodies  
protect the confi dentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that  
applied by the NCBs.  Therefore, any provision of information permitted by  the proposed 
amendments to Article 26 of the Law on the reporti ng of Banka Slovenije to the National Assembly 
and the proposed amendment to Article 47 of t he Law on protection of confidential data should  
comply with the relevant Union law s, including th ose governing the exchange of supervisory and 
statistical informat ion, as well as the obligation of safeguarding professional secrecy . Therefore, 
Article 26 of the Law should refer not only to national laws in this respect but also to Union law 
                                                 
8  In connection with the proposed deletion of point 1  of Article 32 (1) of the Law. 
9  For the activities of the independent external auditors of the N CBs see Article 27.1 of the Statute  of the ESCB . 
10  See, for example, p. 26 of the ECB ’s Convergence Report 2013, Opinion s CON/2011/9 and CON/2011/53.  All ECB 
Opinions are available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu 
11  See, for example, p. 27 of th e ECB ’s Convergence Report 2013 . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
5 including Article 37 of the Statute  of the ESCB . The ECB emphasises that conf idential information 
may be exchanged only if necessary for the performance of the tasks of the body that receives the 
information . In this context , the ECB notes that a representative of the National Assembly ’s 
Committee  for finance and monetary policy ma y participate in meetings of the Governing Board of 
Banka Slovenije12 where they can get acquainted with any confidential information, including the 
details relating to granting state aid to credit institutions.  
5.2 The proposed new Article 26 (3) of the La w provides that the report addressed to the National 
Assembly should contain a report on the work and on the performance of tasks of the members of 
the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. However, the Governing Board is a collegial body 
accountable to the National Assembly as a whole. Depending on the level of detail of this report, 
this provision raises concerns regard ing the institutional independence of Banka Slovenije and the 
personal independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije . The Law 
should contain adequate safeguards  in order to ensure that : (a) the reporting obligations do  not 
result in interference with the independence of the members of Banka Slo venije’s Governing Board 
as provided by Article 130 of the Treaty and Article  7 of the Statute  of the ESCB ; (b) the special 
status of governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision -making bodies is fully 
respected ; and (c) confidentiality requirements  resulting from the Statute  of the ESCB  are 
observed13. 
 
This opinion  will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 April  2014 . 
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Mario DRAGHI  
 
                                                 
12  See Article 33(1) of the Law.  
13  See, for example, p. 2 2 of the ECB ’s Convergence Report 2013.