EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 11 May 2009  
on the legal relationships applying to Deutsche Bundesbank staff 
(CON/2009/45) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 30 April 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB ) received a request from the Deutsche Bundesbank 
for an opinion on a draft order regulating the par ticular legal relationships applying to Deutsche 
Bundesbank staff (hereinafter the ‘draft order’). 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 
on the consultation of the European Central Bank by  national authorities regarding draft legislative 
provisions1, as the draft order relates to the Deutsche Bund esbank. In accordance with the first sentence 
of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of th e European Central Bank, the Governing Council has 
adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft order 
The draft order regulates certain features of the le gal relationships between the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
its civil servants, employees and workers, a nd replaces the Deutsche Bundesbank’s existing Staff 
Regulations
2. 
The draft order is necessary because the power to re gulate these issues was transferred to the Federal 
Government (hereinafter the ‘Government’) as the result of an amendment to § 31 of the Law on the 
Deutsche Bundesbank made by the Law on the reorgani sation and modernisation of Federal civil service 
law3, on which the ECB gave its views in Opinion CON/2008/9. 
Before the abovementioned amendment to § 31 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank was adopted, the 
Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank (hereinaft er the ‘Executive Board’) itself had the power to 
regulate staff and career matters autonomously, subject to approval or agreement, as applicable, by the 
Government. Pursuant to the ame nded § 31(4) and (6) of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, however, 
the Government is authorised to regulate the legal relationships between the Deutsche Bundesbank and its 
civil servants, employees and workers either by adopting orders itself, or by delegating the power to adopt 
orders to the Executive Board.  
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42. 
2  [2007] Bundesanzeiger  p. 2120. 
3  [2009] Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) I p. 160. 
2 Since adoption of the amendments to § 31 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Government has 
delegated its power to the Executive Board by means of §§ 1 and 2 of the Order on the transfer of the 
Federal Government’s powers to a dopt orders pursuant to § 31 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank4.  
The Executive Board now intends to make use of the implementing power delegated to it by the 
Government to adopt the draft order.  
 2. General observations 2.1 The ECB welcomes this consultation request by the Deutsche Bundesbank on the draft order. 
Bearing in mind the principle of central bank independence and central bank autonomy in staff 
matters, however, the ECB would like to take th is opportunity to express its concerns about the 
regulatory arrangements that form the basis of the draft order.  
2.2 In Opinion CON/2008/9, the ECB stated its concerns about the change of regulatory competence in 
relation to Deutsche Bundesbank staff issues. In particular, it considered that the proposed 
amendment would increase the Government’s discre tion in this context, thereby reducing the 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s autonomy to take decisions concerning its staff regulations. Further, the ability of the Government to withdraw the dele gation at any moment was considered a potential 
tool to unduly influence a national central bank (NCB) in fulfilling its tasks and thus limits that NCB’s independence
5. The ECB therefore recommended including sufficient safeguards in the 
draft law under consideration to ensure that the De utsche Bundesbank’s ability to carry out its tasks 
would not be affected; moreover, the ECB stated th at it considered that the delegation of powers to 
the Deutsche Bundesbank as provided for in the draft law was insufficient. 
2.3 The ECB’s concerns and recommendations, as e xpressed in Opinion CON/2008/9, were not taken 
into account by the national legislator. Against this background, the ECB considers it highly important to restate that an NCB’s autonomy in sta ff matters is a particular aspect of the principle 
of central bank independence under Article 108 of the Treaty
6. As has been recently emphasised on 
several occasions regarding different Member States7, an NCB may not be put into a position 
where it has limited or no control over its staff,  or where the government of a Member State seeks 
to influence it in the performance of its tasks8. This stance taken by the ECB with respect to the 
autonomy of the NCBs in staff matte rs is well-established practice. 
2.4 In this context, the ECB once again stresses that, when it comes to the adoption of orders regarding 
staff matters and the direct regulation of the le gal relationships between the Deutsche Bundesbank 
and all categories of its staff, including the careers of such staff, the amended § 31 of the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank now authorises the Govern ment both to delegate such power to the 
                                                 
4  [2009] BGBl. I p. 813. 
5  See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2008/9. All E CB opinions are available on the ECB website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/o pinions/html/index.en.html. 
6  See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2009/15. 
7  See ECB Convergence Report 2008, p. 22 , and Opinions CON/2008/9 and CON/2008/10. 
8  See ECB Convergence Report 2007, p. 20, footnote 7, referring, inter alia , to Opinion CON/2004/1. 
3 Executive Board and to withdraw such power fro m the Executive Board. Although it was already 
the case prior to the amendment of § 31 in 2008  that Government approval was required for the 
adoption of orders by the Executive Board, the ECB considers that the amended § 31 nonetheless 
amounts to a withdrawal of the Deutsche Bund esbank’s authority to determine the legal 
relationships and career policies for all categories of its staff. This is a situation which, in 
comparison with the rules previously in force,  is detrimental to the Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
independence.  
2.5 The ECB therefore reiterates to the national legi slator and the Government its recommendation that 
the Deutsche Bundesbank should be given more au tonomy in staff matters, thereby providing for 
sufficient safeguards to ensure that  it can carry out all of its tasks independently, in particular its 
ESCB-related tasks.  
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.    Done at Frankfurt am Main, 11 May 2009. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET