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COMMISSIONOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMUNITIES
COM(77)139Final
Brussels,14thApril1977
-■■<7vsO-i »/■>v"v
■• '•-■-v
>
^•*
COMMUNICATION fromtheCOMMISSIONtotheCOUNCIL
ONTHETHIRDUNITEDNATIONSCONFERENCE
ONTHELAV,'OPTHESEA
COM(77)139Final

CONTENTS
C.Events after the5thsession that will have an
influence ontheprogress oftheConferencePages
I.INTRODUCTION 1-9
A.Introductory remarks (l)
B.Overall assessment ofthe 5"thsession (l-4)
(4-5)
D.Future guidelines andpreparation forthenext (5-8
session
1."Package deal *1concept (5-7)
2.Adoption ofcommon positions forthenext (7-8)session
3.Coordination procédure (8)
E.Conclusions (9)
II.THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED 10-22
a.Progress atthe 5"thsession andmeeting ofthe /,Q\
"Evens enGroup "
h.Community coordination (il)
c.Meeting with theACPcountries (il)
d.Main outstanding issues andproposed guidelines
for the next session ofthe Conference(12)
(i)Thesystem fortheexploitation ofthe
sea-bed area \" J
(ii)Ressources policy (15)
(iii)Thereview clause (15-17 )
(iv)Financing oftheEnterprise (18-19 )
(v)Community participation intheAuthority ;
thedecision-making system within theAuthority * '
(vi)Anti-monopoly clause (22)
III .THEECONOMIC ZONE ANDTHE CONTINENTAL SHELF 23-30
i)Developments atthe 5"thsession :Community /00\
coordination v '
ii)Major outstanding issues (23)
A.Thestatus oftheeconomic zone (24–25 )
B.Living resources (26-27 )
C.Thecontinental shelf (28-30 )
IV.A.PROTECTION OFTHEMARINE ENVIRONMENT 31-32
B.MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 33-.35
V.SETTLEMENT OFDISPUTES 36-37
SUMMARY OFTHE GUIDELINES PROPOSED INTHIS
COMMUNICATION38-41

COMMUNICATION PROMTHECOMMISSION TOTHECOUNCIL
ONTHETHIRDUNITEDNATIONSCONFERENCE
ONTHELAWOPTHESEA
I.INTRODUCTION
A.INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1.ThefifthsessionoftheThirdUnitedNationsConference on
theLawoftheSeawasheldinNewYorkfrom2Augustto17September
1976.AsatprevioussessionstheCommunityattendedasanobserver.
Inpreparationforthatsession,theCommissionhadpresentedtothe
Councilproposalsaiminginparticularattheadoptionofcommonposi­
tionsonthemainquestionsbeingcoveredbytheConference (seeCOM(76)
270final).
Atitsmeetingson20and27July,1976,theCouncilstatedits
positiononanumberofthoseproposals,particularly asregardsthe
inclusionofan"EECclause"inthefutureConventiontoenablethe
Communitytobecomeacontractingparty,thecoordination procedures
tobefollowedduringtheConferenceandthedefinitionofaseriesof
commonpositionsonthemajorquestionsstillremainunresolved.
2.Thenextsessionwillbeheldfrom23Mayto8or15July1977
inNewYork.ThisCommunication totheCouncilproposesthemainguide­
linestobefollowedbytheCommunityduringthatsession,completing
orrenderingmoreprecisethoseguidelinesalreadypresentedonthe
occasionofthepreparation ofthelastsession.
B.OVERALLASSESSMENT OFTHEFIFTHSESSION
1.Inordertogiveanoverallassessmentoftheworkofthe
Conferenceatitsfifthsessionandofthealternativecoursesopento
it,itisnecessarytooutlinethesituationinthethreemainCommittees.
2.CommitteeIhasthetaskofformulatingtheregimeforthe
international sea-bedarea(i.e.theareabeyond200milesortheouter
edgeofthe
••••

continentalmargin,whicheveristhefurtherfromthecoast)and
ofestablishing theconstitution andpowersoftheinternational
"body(the"Authority")underwhoseauspicesthearea'smineral
resourcesmay"beexploited.
WhereastheworkofotherorgansoftheConferencehasseen
thecreationofnewgroupsandalliances(essentiallycoastalstates
versusland-lockedandgeographically disadvantaged states),cutting
acrossthestandardUNalignment,thediscussioninCommitteeIhas
beenincreasingly onideologicallines:theGroupof77ontheone
sideandthemajorindustrialpowersontheother.
Atthefifthsession,CommitteeIbecamedeadlockedoverthe
choicetobemadeinthisrespect.TheGroupof77considersthat
theInternational Sea-BedAuthorityshouldhavewidediscretionin
decidinghowsea-bedexploitation shouldproceed,andthatexploitation
shouldnormallybecarriedoutthroughthe"Enterprise",theopera­
tionalarmoftheAuthority.Suchpossibility astherewouldbefor
otheroperatorstohaveaccesstotheareawoulddependonspecific
decisionsoftheAuthority.Inprincipletherewouldberecourse
tootheroperatorsonlyuntiltheEnterprisehadacquiredthenecessary
capacity.Asopposedtothisapproach,themainindustrialpowers,
whoalonepossessthetechnological knowhow,insistedthatasecure
andpermanentrightofaccessshouldbemaintainedforoperatorsother
thantheEnterprise,aswellasfortheEnterpriseitself,andthatthe
sameconditionsshouldapplytoboth("parallelaccess"system).
Owingtothepolarisation ofthedebate,littleifanyadvance
wasmadeatthefifthsession,muchofthetimebeingtakenupin
proceduraldiscussions .
CommitteeIIhasbeenthemajorbodyoftheConference,dealingwiththe
widestrangeofsubjects:theterritorial sea,straits,the200mile
exclusiveeconomiczone,thecontinentalshelf,highseas,archipelagos ,
islands,andenclosedandsemi–enclosedseas.TheCommitteeIItextis
probablyacceptableoveralltothemajorityofdelegations .Theonly
groupwhichmightopposeitsadoptionisthegroupofland-locked and
geographically disadvantaged States,butitisbynomeanssurethat
thisgroupwouldpushitsoppositiontoanextreme.Thereare,however,
anumberof■unresolvedissueswithrespecttothesetopics,themost
importantofwhichare:

-3-
-thehigh–seastatusoftheeconomiczoneforpurposesof
navigation;
-thefishingrightsofland-locked andgeographically dis­
advantagedStatesintheeconomiczonesofneighbouring
countries;
-thedefinitionoftheouter"boundaryofthecontinental
marginwhereitextends "beyond200milesandthepossible
divisionoftheproceedsofexploitation oftheresources
ofsuchareaswiththeinternational community.
ItispossiblethattheConferencewillnot"beableto
providepreciseanswerstotheseissues,leavingthefinalresult
toStatepractice(seealsobelow).
4.CommitteeIIIisresponsibleforthetextsonpreservation
ofthemarineenvironment ,scientificresearchandthetransferof
technology.
Thereareconsiderabledifficulties withrespecttothese
topics,causedinpartbytheircomplexnature(thisappliesespecially
asregardsthepreventionofmarinepollution),andinpartbythe
factthatthefinaloutcomewilldependonthestatusoftheeconomic
zoneandtheextentoftherightsofcoastalStates,amatterwhich
isbeingdealtwithbyCommitteeII.
5.TocompletethepictureitshouldbeaddedthattheConference,
meetingininformalplenarysession,discussedthetextsonthe
settlementofdisputes.Itwashereatthefifthsessionthatthis
questionwastackledinanappropriate wayforthefirsttime.As
farasthesettlementofdisputesisconcerned,theproblemsare
technicalaswellaspoliticalinnature,andthemainrequirementis
timeinwhichtoelaboratethedetailedsolutionswhichwillbeneeded
whenthebroadlinesofthenewlawoftheseahavebeenagreed.
•••/•••

6.Inbroad,summarytherefore,"theresultsoftheConferenceto
date,may"beclassifiedintothreegroupsasfollows:
a.areaswheretheConferenceisconfrontedwithamajordifficulty,
whichwillhavetobeovercomeiffurtherprogressistobemade
(CommitteeI);
b.areaswherethetextsarelargelycompletedandthereisaconsi­
derablemeasureofagreementontheresultsachieved(CommitteeII,
and,toalesserextent,CommitteeIII);
c.areaswheretherehasnotsofarbeentimetoworkoutbroadly
agreedtexts,butwhichshouldnotpresentmajorproblemsforthe
successorfailureoftheConference(CommitteeIII,atleastin
part;thesettlementofdisputes;preambleandfinalclauses).
7.The"EECclause"«Intheabsenceofanydebateatthe
Conferenceonthefinalclauses,theCommunitysubmittedacommunication
intheformofaletterfromtheheadoftheNetherlandsDelegation
(onbehalfofthePresidency)tothePresidentoftheConference,explai­
ningwhyitwasnecessaryfortheCommunitytobecomeapartytothe
Conventionandputtingforwardadrafttext.
EVERTSSINCETHEFIFTHSESSIONTHATWILLHAVEAITINFLUENCE OKTHE
PROGRESS OFTHECONFERENCE
Unilateral introduction of200milezones
Sincethefifthsessionalargenumberofcoastalstateshave
decidedtoextendtheirfishinglimitsto200nauticalmiles(or,in
certaincases,toestablish200mileeconomiczones).
TheCommunitytoohasbeenobligedtotakethatstepinorder
toprotectthebiologicalresourcesoffthecoastsofitsmemberStates
fromthedangerofover-exploitation resultingfromtheaboveunilateral
extensionsoffishingzones.ItwouldbeappropriatefortheCommunity
toexplainthedecisionsithastakeninthismattertotheConference
inadeclaration which,inaccordancewiththeusualprocedures,would
bemadebytheCommissionrepresentative onthebasisofatexttobe
agreedduringthecoordination .

Most ofthe countries that have taken unilateral extension
measures have related their action tothe "lawemerging "within
Committee IIoftheConference .Most ofthe "bilateral fishing
agreements recently concluded orintheprocess ofbeing concluded
are "based onthis emerging lawandinclude ,moreover ,clauses that
provide forthepossibility ofrevision inthelight oftheconclusions
ofthe Conference ontheLawoftheSea .There isnodoubt ,however ,
that these extensions have created anew situation that isbound to
have aconsiderable impact onthework oftheConference ,particularly
onthat ofCommittee II.
/•
Informal consultations between the fifth and thesixth sessions
The"Evensen Group "metinGeneva from 28February to11March ,
this time todiscuss subjects covered byCommittee I.This meeting ,at
which theparticipants were able totalk unofficially andwithout
committing their Governments ,showed that there hadbeen aslight change
intheattitude ofsome oftheGroup of77towards acceptance ofthe
system ofparallel access .Nodoubt this waspartly inresponse tothe
proposals putforward byDrKissinger atthefifth session ,particularly
those relating tothefinancing oftheEnterprise andthereview clause
(seethesection dealing with Committee i).
FUTURE GUIDELINES AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SESSION
1.The "package deal **concept
Since ithasbeen agreed from the outset that theoutcome
oftheConference must beasingle Convention ,acceptable toallthe
main groups (the"package deal"),there isarisk that unless agreement
isreached onallpoints ,andinparticular onthose where there is
themost fundamental disagreement (namely those tinder discussion in
Committee I),there isarisk that theConference asawhole maybreak
down .Thepossibility ofthis occurring will beoneofthefactors
determining theposition which governments will adopt atthenext session .
Itisalready certain that between nowandthenext session
many countries will have adopted legislation ontheextension oftheir
fishing zones to200miles oronthecreation ofaneconomic zone .By
May ,therefore ,the200mile zone will beareality ,andthetask of

-6-
theConference ,whichhascontributedtobringingthatsysteminto
being,willbetotrytospecifythelimitstotheri^itswhichcan
beexercisedinthatzone.
InsofarasStatesmaytakeunilateralactiontoestablish
suchzones,theydonotneedaConferencedecisionbeforegoing
ahead.Whatwouldbelost,therefore,ifthereweretobenoConvention,
wouldbethepossibility ofsettinganyclearrestraints onwhat
Statesmightclaim.ThoseStateswhichalreadyasserta200mile
territorial seawouldcontinuetodoso.Thestatusofthezoneas
partofthehighseasforpurposesofnavigationcouldbeseriously
affected.Thishasimportancenotonlyforsecurityofcommercial
navigationbutalsoasregardsfreedomofmovementofnavalunits-
warshipsandsubmarinesmightnotbeallowedwithin200miles,except
whenthecoastalstategaveitspermission.Iftherewereadeposit
ofmanganesenodules,say250milesoffthecoast,thenearestState
wouldbetemptedtoappropriateit.Thustheelementofuncertainty
astothelawoftheseawouldbegreatlyincreasedand,inthelong
run,stateswouldbeinclinedtoenlargeboththenatureandtheextent
oftheirclaims.Nor,intheabsenceofaConvention ,wouldtherebe
anycompulsorysystemforthesettlementofdisputes,whichwouldbe
afurthercasualty.
Ontheotherhand,itbecomeslessandlessevidentthatcertain
othermajorprovisionsoftheRSMT^necessarily havetobeenshrinedin
theformofaninternational Convention,sinceStatepracticecould
achievethesameresults,orevenachieveresultsthatweremoreadvan­
tageousfortheCommunity.
Thiscouldbethecaseasregardscontroloverfisheriesresources.
Asfarastheexploitation ofthecontinentalshelfbeyond200milesis
concerned,theCommunitywouldbeinamorefavourablepositionifit
continuedtoapplytheprovisionsofthe1958Conventioninsteadof
acceptingarevenuesharingformula,whichmayeventuallyentailquite
importanttransferstoothercountries.Finally,theprovisionsconcer­
ningtheinternational sea-bedmightbenomoreadvantageous tothe
Communitythanwouldbeasituationinwhichtherewerenointernational
Convention :asregardsitsinterestsasaconsumerofcopper,cobalt,
nickelandmanganese,theCommunitywouldhaveaninterestinan
unfetteredexpansionofsea-bedproduction (limitedundertheRSNT);as
1)Revisedsinglenegotiatingtext.•••/••

-7-
apotentialproducer,itisdoubtfulwhethertheprovisionsofthe
RSHTwouldbemoreadvantageous thantheabsenceofcontrolover
access:thoseCommunitycompanieswhichalreadypossessthenecessary
technologywouldbeinafavourableposition,andthereisnoreason
whyothersshouldnotbeabletocatchup.
Onbalance,however,theCommunityandotherdeveloped
countriesprobablyhaveaninterestinpreventingafailureofthe
Conference,provided,ofcourse,thatsatisfactory compromises can
beobtainedontheoutstandingissues.Furthermore ,asageneral
principleoftheCommunity'sapproachtointernational relations,it
wouldappearpreferabletocontinuetoworktowardsaConvention,
avoidingafree-for-allofincalculable consequences .Atthesametime,
itisnecessarytoavoidbecomingentrappedinasituationwhere
extremistpositions,forceduponcertaingroupsattheConferenceby
avocalminority,winthedayowingtoanexcessiveconcernforcompro­
miseonthepartofothercountries.
Thereis,inthissituation,therefore,abalancingoflong-
termpoliticalinterestsandmoreimmediateeconomicconsiderations ,
ofthreatsandcounterthreats.Itisevident,however,thattheout­
comewilldependtoagreatextentonthepositiontakeninCommitteeI
overthesea-bedissueandthateffortsintheperiodpriortothenext
sessionwillneedtoconcentrate inthatarea.
Althoughthesamehasalreadybeensaidinrespectofthelast
twosessions,itnowseemsmorelikelythaneverthatthenextsession
willeithersucceedindefiningagenerallyacceptableConvention,or
thatdiscussionswillbeincreasingly overtakenbyunilateralmeasures.
2.Adoptionofcommonpositionsforthenextsession
ItisintheinterestsoftheCommunitytothrowitsweight
behindthesearchforanoverallnegotiatedsolutionwhichisin
accordancewithitsowninterestsandisacceptabletotheother
countriesinvolved.TheCommunity'scommonpositionshavearoused
considerableinterest,andmanycountriesarehopingthattheCommunity
willplayamoderatingrolebetweentheextremepointsofview.
•••/•••

Consequently ,theCommunitymustadoptcommonpositionsonthe
mainproblemsstillunresolvedandputthemforwardassuchatthe
Conference.ItisallthemorenecessarythattheCommunityproceed
inthiswayas,"bycallingfortheinclusioninthefutureConvention
ofan"EEC"clause,itclearlydemonstrated thepowersitholdsin
thevariousfields "beingtackled "bytheConference,powersthatitis
alreadyexercisinginpracticeinnegotiating "bilateralagreements
withthirdcountries.NowthattheCommunityhastakentheseinitia­
tives,therecan"benoquestionofitfailingattheConferenceto
demonstrateitscapacitytoexercisethosepowers "bypresenting common
positions.
3.Coordination procédure
Communitycoordination proceededrelativelysatisfactorily at
thefifthsessionaridcoveredalltopics "beforetheConference.Meetings
atheadsofdelegationlevelwereheldtwiceaweekanddiscussed
particularlydifficultpointsandtacticalquestions.Meetingswere
alsoheldatexpertlevel,inmostcasesonaregular "basis.
Asfarason-the–spotcoordination andthepresentation of
commonpositionsatthenextsessionareconcerned,theCommission
considersthattheCouncil1sproceduraldecisionof4June1974and
declarationof20July1976havehelpedtoimprovetheproceduresfol­
lowedon-the-spot.However,inordertoavoidanyambiguity(which,
inanyevent,couldonlyprejudicetheCommunity'sinterests),the
CommissionfeelsthatthememberStatesmustinallcasessticktothe
presentation ofagreedpositionsand,ifnecessary,avoidadoptingany
positionunilaterally byawaiting,wherenecessary,theresultsofthe
examinationcarriedoutinBrusselsbytheCommunityauthorities.As
forthepresentation ofthepositionsinfieldsforwhichtheCommunity
isresponsible ,itgoeswithoutsayingthatsuchpositionsmustbeput
forwardthroughtheCommissionrepresentative .

-9-
E.CONCLUSIONS
Forthereasonssetoutabove,theCommissionrequestthe
Counciltoadopttheguidelinessubmittedforitsapprovaloneach
ofthemainoutstandingquestionsreferredto"belowbeforethe
beginningofthesixthsessionon23May1977*

-10-
II.THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-BED
(a)Progress atthefifth session and ,meeting oftheEvensen Group
Asfarasthetopic oftheinternational sea–bedarea wasconcerned ,
thefifth session wasdominated bythereluctance oftheGroup of77
toproceed toadetailed examination oftheRSNT .
However ,inthelight ofsubsequent events (seebelow ),itnow
seems possible that theinitiative taken byDrKissinger could be
thefirst step towards ageneral acceptance ofthesystem ofparallel
access .
Provided that parallel access wassecured ,theUnited States was
prepared tohelp inguaranteeing theviability oftheEnterprise .
Specifically ,theUnited States waswilling tohelp inthefinancing
oftheEnterprise ,inthetransfer oftechnology toit,andsuggested
that theConvention might contain aclause permitting review after
25years (theimplication being that after that period ,andinthe
light of"first generation "operations ,itmight bepossible ,if
everyone agreed ,toproceed toasystem inwhich theEnterprise played
alarger role ).
Atthemeeting oftheEvensen Group held inGeneva from 28February
to11March this year ,there wasafairly detailed discussion ofthe
main questions outstanding inthefield covered byCommittee 1.
Twokeyfeatures ofDrKissinger 'sproposals were thesubject ofa
detailed memorandum submitted byMrCastaneda (Mexico ),namely the
financing oftheEnterprise and thereview clause . Thediscussion
onthese points left theimpression that aconsiderable number ofthe
Group of77countries could already accept thesystem ofparallel access ,
provided that theindustrialized countries made aneffort toenable
theEnterprise tobecome operational quickly andprovided that the
system ofexploitation provided forinPart Iofthefuture Convention
canbesubject toreview in20or25years time . TheUnited States
representative filled insome ofthedetails inDrKissinger 's
proposals ,particularly asregards financing .
MrEvensen will shortly beforwarding tothedelegations proposals for
amendments tocertain provisions inPart IoftheRSNT .

(b)Community coordination
Therelatively slow andprocedural nature ofthediscussions aided
Community coordination .Aseries ofstatements were made Honbehalf
oftheMember States oftheEuropean Community ". Coozdi nation
continued during themeeting oftheEvensen Group ,atwhich the
statements bytheUnited Kingdom representatives ,despite their
personal nature (given theinformal nature ofthemeeting ),were
interpreted asCommunity positions .
Although theMember States have drawn closer together intheir
positions ,there remain some considerable differences onsome issues .
This isdue ,firstly ,tothefact that some Member States see
themselves aspotential operators ,while others have amore detached
position ,and ,secondly ,tothedifferent degrees ofsuccess achieved
bythepotential sea-bed mining companies inmaking arrangements with
other operators .
(c)Meeting with theACPcountries
Itwasinthecontext described above that arequest wasmade tothedelegations
oftheMember States andoftheCommunity byagroup ofAfrican countries
attheendofthefifth session that theCommunity should hold ameeting
inBrussels with theACP countries inorder todiscuss the technical
aspects oftheproposed system forexploitation ofsea-bed resources .
Ameeting washeldmBrussels from 22to25February this year and
discussed thefollowing topics ^
~the creation andcomposition ofthemanganese nodules ,which contain
significant quantit iesofnickel ,copper ,cobalt andmanganese ,and
of_thevarious mining sites ;
-recovery ofthese nodules ;
-theseparation ofthevarious metals ;
-theeconomic problems involved inthebeginning ofcommercial operations .
Therepresentatives oftheACP countries whoattended the seminar seem
tohave appreciated thecomplexity ofthetechnical problems ,forwhich
thepractical solutions areconstantly evolving ,particularly asregards
thepick-up head ,which isthebasis ofthewhole operation .
Inagreement with theACPStates present ,thedocuments circulated at
theseminar were distributed totheparticipants atthemeeting ofthe
Evensen Group inGeneva .Therepresentative oftheGroup of77showed
great interest inallthetechnical data butshowed acertain amount of
scepticism with regard tothefinancial data .

-12-
(d)Mainoutstandingissuesandproposedguidelinesforthenext
sessionoftheConference
Anumberofkeyquestionswillhavetoheexamined ,indetailatthe
sixthsessionifasatisfactory overallsolutionistohereached:
(i)thesystemfortheexploitationofthesea-bed;
(ii)thepolicyofresources;
(iii)thereviewclause;
(iv)financing;
(v)CommunityparticipationintheAuthority,thedecision-making
systemwithintheAuthority;
(vi)theanti-monopoly clause.
Itisincreasingly evidentthattheCommunitycanandmustplayan
importantrcleintheestablishment ofthisoverallsolution.The
CommissionthereforeproposesthattheCounciladoptthefollowing
guidelines ontheissueslistedabove.
However,intheabsenceoffullerinformation onthepropsoalsfor
amendmentsbeingpreparedbyMrEvensen,theCommissionreservesthe
righttoreturntoanygivenpointinthelightofthecontentofthose
proposals.

-13-
(i)Thesystem fortheexploitation ofthesea-bed area
(Articles 22and23oftheRSNT andArticles 7and8ofAnnex i)
Asalready stated above (inthecontext ofthedescription ofthe
meeting oftheEvensen Group ),anumber ofmembers oftheGroup of
77»after previously restating their preference foraunitary system
inwhich theAuthority would have entire responsibility forthe
exploitation ofthe sear-bed area ,nowseem toaccept that the
Enterprise would have neither thetechnical know-how orthe
financial status required tobegin exploitation alone . Recourse
toa"mixed system "nowseems inevitable tothen ,butoncondition
that theConvention contains provisions enabling theEnterprise to
acquire itsownfinds that areadequate toenable ittoexploit
theresources intheareas reserved fortheAuthority andprovided
that areview ofthesystem ispossible .
Though some acceptance oftheparallel system seems tobeapossibility
atthenext session ,theproblem ofthepowers oftheAuthority over
that part ofthearea which would bereserved fortheStates and/or
their firms will have tobestudied indetail inorder toavoid having
anAuthority that isexcessively interventionist inthesigning of
contracts (which wasstill theposition putforward inthedocument
of3March distributed byanumber ofdeveloping countries tothe
Evensen Group )oragain anAuthority that wastoodiscriminatory .
Theanalysis made byDoctor Lauterpacht (Australia )inanother
document distributed totheEvensen Group isparticularly interesting from
this viewpoint since ittries tomake thepresentation ofArticles 8and
8aofAnnex Iasdrafted byMrEvensen more coherent bydifferentiating
between "objective "questions andquestions that need tobenegotiated .
Steps must betaken toavoid anexcessively long time-lag between the
application byanoperator andthebeginning ofcontract negotiations
which would give competitors anopportunity tomake anapplication in
competition with theinitial application .
TheMember States andother developed countries have stressed moreover
that theexploitation ofthesea-bed isarisky technological operation ,
which calls forthegathering together ofunrivalled technical skills
andinvolves avery large investment .This exploitation will not
necessarily prove tobea"gold mine "which theindustrialized States
want tokeep forthemselves tothedetriment ofthedeveloping countries .
Itisnecessary todevise conditions ofexploitation that attract
industry rather than threaten itwith alarge number offinancial
burdens that areleft tothediscretion oftheAuthority andareapplied
onthebasis ofthequantity ofnodules extracted ,without taking
account ofthefinancial situation oftheindustry inquestion .

-14-
Subjecttoanyamendmentsthatmight "besuggested "bythetextbeing
draftedbyMrEvensen,theCommissionproposesthattheCounciladopt
guidelinesforthenestsessionbasedon:
–itssupportfortheparallelsystem(whichfortheCommunityis
alreadyacompromisesolution),possiblyaccompaniedbyacceptanceof
theUnitedStatesproposalforthe"bankingsystem";
-theimportanceofestablishing negotiatingconditionsbetweenthe
Authorityandanoperatoronreasonableandcommercialbases,
withouttheintroduction ofanyelementofdiscrimination ;
–theneedtoensurethattheAuthoritycannot"freeze"thepartof
theareareservedforitandtoensurethatitwouldbeobliged,
afteraperiodtobefixed,toreturnthatparttothegeneral
systemofexploitationifithadnotbegunoperationsitself.
TheCommissiontherforerecommendsthattheMemberStatesshould
continuetoputforwardcommonpositionsreflectingtheCouncil
DecisionofJuly1976ontheacceptanceoftheprincipleofthe
Enterprise,subjecttotheestablishment ofasystemrulingoutany
privilegedtreatmentforthatbodyandguaranteeing acceptable
economicconditionsforallfirms,whetherprivateorbelonging
totheMemberStates.

-15-
(ii)Resources policy
Twointerlocking issues areinvolved under this heading :theneed to
establish intheConvention theoverall rate atwhich thearea might
hedeveloped ,andmeasures toprotect theinterests ofdeveloping
countries which axeland producers oftheminerals (seeArticle 9ot
Part IoftheRSHT).
There isscarcely anyneed toinsist onthefact that itisessential
fortheCommunity toobtain sufficiently advantageous arrangements here .
Asamajor importer ofthefour metals inquestion ,theCommunity
could notaccept anarbitrary limitation oftherate atwhich thesea-bed
resources were worked . Atthesame time ,however ,itshould also be
prepared tosubscribe toprovisions toprevent negative consequences
fordeveloping countries that areland producers ofthese same metals ,
inparticular bytheapplication ofaformula forthemaximum increase in
thearea 'sproduction ,andbytheconclusion ofappropriate product
agreements .
Consequently ,theCommission proposes that theCouncil adopt the
following gudielines onthis subject :
(a)thegeneral principles laid down inArticle 9ofPart IoftheRSNT
areacceptable totheCommunity asoneaspect ofanoverall
solution ;
(b)anyamendment liable tomake those principles more restrictive
would have toberejected ;
(c)however ,theCommunity could agree toconsider therate ofincrease
intheproduction ofthearea (defined inrelation totherate of
increase intheworld demand fornickel )of6$(seeparagraph 21of
Annex ItoPart IoftheRSNT )asamaximum andnotasafloor level .
(iii)Thereview clause
Theimportance ofthecontent ofanyreview clause threatens tobe
considerable ,particularly intheeyes ofthedeveloping countries .
Thedocument putforward onthis subject byMrCastaneda atthemeeting
oftheEvensen Group aroused great interest .Hismain proposals are
asfollows :

-16-
-ageneral andsystematic review oftheoperation ofthesystem
applied intheinternational sea-bed area every five years ;
-theconvocation ofareview conference twenty years after the
entry into force oftheConvention toassess whether ithasachieved
itsobjectives .Those objectives include thefair distribution
oftheresources ofthearea ,compliance with theprovisions
relating totheresources policy ,thebenefits ofthesystem for
thedeveloping countries ,theeconomic balance between theareas
reserved fortheAuthority andthose exploited bytheStates ortheir
nationals ;
-inanyevent ,should thereview conference decide toamend Part I
oftheConvention ,certain basic principles should remain ,in
particular that ofthecommon heritage ofmankind andtherole ofthe
Authority ;
-thereview conference would decide itsownprocedures (including its
voting procedures ).
These proposals enjoyed thegeneral support ofthedeveloping countries ,
butthere were also many that stressed theneed toavoid thepossibility
ofanobstructive attitude with .regard toanyamendments onthepart of
certain countries atthereview conference enabling the^parallel _/
system tocontinue adinfinitum .
TheCommunity 'sinterests inthis matter seem fairly clear :inorder
topermit asatisfactory development oftheexploitation ofthearea
thecompanies will need aconsiderable degree ofcertainty with regard
tothesystem applicable ;inaddition ,theCommunity will also have
tobeonitsguard against decision-making procedures which would enable
certain groups toimpose their will atthereview conference .
Forthese reasons ,theCommission proposes that theCouncil adopt the
following guidelines :
(a)frequent periodical reviews should beopposed ;theappropriate
framework foranongoing assessment oftheexploitation ofthe
area istheAuthority ;

-17-
(ID)thereview conference should "becalled only after thearea has "been
under commercial exploitation for 25years ;
(c)thereview should under nocircumstances affect contracts in
force ;
(d)theprocedures (particularly forvoting )must protect the
interests ofallthegroups ;
(e)alloptions must remain open forthereview conference .
However ,itseems appropriate toaccept that thepresent Conference
should decide now that theidea ofthecommon heritage ofmankind
must not "becalled into question atthereview conference . In
acompletely different context ,theCommunity could declare that
theapproach tothereview should notprovide apretext forslowing
down therate ofexploitation ofthearea ,forexample "byslowing
down the conclusion ofcontracts .

-18-
(iv)Financing oftheEnterprise
TheGroup of77iscalling forthefinancing oftheEnterprise to
make itoperational assoon aspossible inreturn fortheadoption ,
even onatemporary "basis ,oftheparallel system . Inorder to
meet this wish ,theCommunity could envisage twotypes ofsolution
(which arenotmutually exclusive ).
1.Theadequate .financing oftheEnterprise inorder togive itcomplete
freedom ofoperation fortheexploitation ofafirst mining site .
However ,theprinciples putforward "bytheUnited States in
MrRichardson *sstatement totheEvensen Group arefairly restrictive :
-theprofits oftheinitial operation ,andtheAuthority 'sother
financial income ,must enable theEnterprise todevelop other of
theAuthority 'ssites with itsownfunds ;
-thefinancing from theStates islargely intheform ofguarantees for
theloans which theEnterprise must obtain ontheinternational
market tocover theinitial investment expenditure (commercial sources and
international financial authorities ):
-theEnterprise will have topayforitsowndebt servicing ;
-thecontrol ofthefinancial programme oftheEnterprise would probably
beentrusted tothe World Bank ;
-theEnterprise must payforexploitation technology ,since this
technology isconstantly developing andbeing improved .
Thedevelopment ofaviable Enterprise under theabove hypothesis does
notseem atfirst sight tobeentirely guaranteed ,both because ofthe
present difficulty infinding apartner which will agree totransfer
theexploitation technology andbecause ofthedifficulty inrapidly
collecting together thenecessary funds tolaunch asecond operation
areasonable time after thefirst (•unless there isaspectacular rise in
metal prices ).
2.Alternatively ,theEnterprise could bemade operational bythe
conclusion ofservice contracts orbythecreation ofjoint undertakings ,
without thetransfer oftechnology andleaving theprivate operators
responsible forbringing together thecapital needed forcommercial
exploitation .

-19-
That solution would enable theAuthority toputtogether
considerable funds which could beused either asaid for the
poorest developing countries (inaform tobedetermined )or
inorder togive theEnterprise greater chances ofsuccess .
Inview ofthecomplex anddelicate nature ofthis question ,the
Commission proposes that itshould beexamined indetail bythe
experts before -/thenext session toenable theMember States to
adopt common positions *

-20-
(v)Community participation intheAuthority ;thedecision-making
system within theAuthority
Thequestion oftheCommunity 'sparticipation intheInternational
Sea-Bed Authority hasteen referred toindetail "bytheCommission
onanumber ofoccasions (seeCCM(76)270 final andtheCommission
staff paper of12January this year SEC(77)198). This Communication
will therefore limit itself tosetting outthemain proposals put
forward inthe above two texts .
1.Introduction
Asacontracting party tothefuture LawoftheSeaConvention ,theCommunity
will also "beamumber oftheAuthority .Thedecision adopted bythe
Council on20July 1976 relating toCommunity representation inthe
organs oftheAuthority isbased onthat assumption ,which also follows
from theRevised Single Negotiating Text ,Article 20ofwhich stipulates
that "AllStates parties tothis Convention areipso facto members of
theAuthority ".
Ofcourse ,the "EECclause "putforward bytheCommunity atthefifth
session oftheConference does notexpressly provide fortheassimilation
of"customs unions ,communities andother regional economic groupings "
toStates forthepurposes oftheConvention ,buttheassumption remains
that allreferences intheConvention to"States "or"States parties "are
tobedeemed applicable where appropriate tonon-State parties .
Theremoval ofanyambiguity isamatter forthefinal drafting .
2.TheAssembly
Article 25oftheRSHT (Part I)provides that allmembrs oftheAuthority
aremembers oftheAssembly . TheCommunity would accordingly bea
member oftheAssembly andbeable toparticipate initswork . Since ,
astheRSNT stands ,each member oftheAssembly hasonevote ,the
criticism could therefore bemade that theCommunity anditsMember
States were gaining anextra vote through Community participation
(i.e. oneasindividual members andonefortheCommunity ). The
Commission istherfore proposing that aclause beinserted providing that ,

– –
inthecase ofnon-State parties ,these shall nothave avote oftheir
owntutthat thevotes oftheir Member States may "becast collectively .
Aprovision will also berequired ,inrespect ofthefinancial contributions
tobemade byparties other than States . Since discussion ofthe
financial arrangements oftheAuthority hasnotyet ledtoadeveloped ,
andgenerally acceptable result ,itisdifficult toputforward specific
proposals atthis stage . Itissuggested that ,forthepresent ,two
guiding principles should beadopted inthis matter :firstly ,the
principle ofnodouble payment ,andsecondly that thecontributions to
bemade bynon-State parties should belimited toashare ofadministrative
expenses (without prejudice tothepossibility ofvoluntary contributions ).
21.The Council
Initsdecision of20July 197«»theCouncil came outinfavour of
Community representation intheCouncil oftheSea-Bed Authority .The
reasons whytheCommission considers that representation oftheCommunity
intheCouncil would have advantages over separate participation byMember
States have already been setoutindetail inDocs .CCM(76)270 final
andSEC(77)198.
Itisnotcertain that theCommunity could appear asanentity ina
Council of36members inwhich theMember States would occupy only three
orfour seats ,thepermanent nature ofwhich would notbeguaranteed .
Ontheother hand ,avote expressed byasingle Community voice would have
more weight than thevotes ofanumber ofMember States ,particularly in
thecontext ofaweighted system based onimports orconsumtpion .
Along thelines already established bytheCouncil decision of20July 1976.,
theCommunity could show itssupport fortheproposal putforward
unofficially bytheUnited States under which thedecisions oftheCouncil
oftheAuthority would require theaffirmative votes ofcontracting parties
totalling 50$ofthevalue ofconsumption andproduction .
Such anarrangement would help toprovide effective protectionfor the
Community ^interests ,given that theCommunity isoneofthemajor 1
consumers ofthemetals inquestion ,perhaps even thenumber-one consumer .
Once the 5Cfforule isadopted ,theother voting arrangements andthe
distribution ofseats inthe Council would beofless importance .
According tothecalculations oftheCommission staff ,theCommunity
received 53$ofaverage imports byvalue ofthefour minerals inquestion
(nickel ,manganese ,copper andcobalt )during theperiod .1972-74 *
compared with 25$forJapan and 15%fortheUnited States .

-22-
(vi)Anti-monopoly clause
AttheCouncilmeetingson20and27July1976,theCouncilconsidered
that"duringthenegotiations theMemberStatesshouldhereadyto
cooperateinstudyingproposalsforpreventingtheemergenceof
monopoliesordominantpositions.However,theiracceptanceof
suchprovisionsmustnot"besuchthatitcanadverselyaffect
Communityundertakings or"beusedagainsttheCommunityassuch"
(seeI/271/76).
TheCommissionconsidersthattheabovepositionshouldbemaintained
atthesixthsession.

-23-
III .THEECONOMIC ZONE ANDTHECONTINENTAL SHELF
(i)Developments attheFifth Session ;Community coordination
Five negotiating groups were setupattheFifth Session under the
auspices ofCommittee IItoconsider ,respectively ,thelegal status
ofandrights andduties ofStates intheeconomic zone ,transit rights
ofland-locked states ,thedefinition oftheouter margin ofthe
continental shelf andrevenue sharing inrespect oftheexploitation
ofthecontinental shelf beyond 200miles ,theregime applicable to
straits anddelimitation questions .
Aswasindicated intheIntroduction tothepresent Communication ,
questions related totheeconomic zone maybeconsidered tobeamongst
those where alarge degree ofagreement exists inrespect ofthe
provision oftheRSNT (Part II).This impression wasconfirmed atthe
Fifth Session where further progress wasmade onseveral ofthepoints
mentioned above .
Coordination meetings were held regularly .Official meetings inthe
negotiating groups were often replaced byunofficial consultations where
notallmember States ,northeCommission were admitted .ThePresidency ,
however ,wassystematically present insuch groups where itcould present
theCommunity view point ,and itkept other member States andthe
Commission regularly informed oftheproceedings atcoordination meetings
Although this procedure mayhave certain practical advantages ,itisfar
from being completely satisfactory .Ifsuch unofficial orrestricted
meetings were once again tobecome prevalent atthenext session ,it
would seem reasonable (andnecessary from thepoint ofview ofadequate
Community representation )that atleast thePresidency andtheCommission
beadmitted tosuch groups .
(ii)Major outstanding issues
Themajor outstanding issues which have notyetbeen resolved concern
thestatus oftheeconomic zone , certainfishery issues andin
particula rLLandGDSfishing rights ,andthedefinition oftheouter
margin ofthecontinental shelf andrevenue sharing .
TheCommission proposes that theCouncil adopt theguidelines inrespect
ofthese topics summarised inthefollowing sections .

-V4-
THESTATUSOFTHEECONOMIC ZONE
(i)Principleoftheestablishment oftheeconomiczoneand
itsGeneralcharacteristics
TheSingleNegotiating Textestablishes theprinciple :
oftheintroduction ofeconomiczonesof200miiesmeasured
fromthebaselinesusedtodeterminethewidthofterritorial
waters.
Itlaysdown(Article44)thatinthiszonethecoastal ,
statesshallhave"sovereignrights"inrespectofexplora­tionandexploitation ofnaturalresources,"exclusive
jurisdiction "asregardsscientificresearchand"jurisdictioif'
asregardsthepreservation ofthemarineenvironment .
Furthermore ,allstates,whethercoastalstatesornot,shall
havefreedomofnavigationandoverflight andthefreedom
tolayunderwatercablesandpipelinesintheeconomic
zoneandtousetheseaforotherinternationally lawful
purposesrelatingtonavigationandcommunications
(Article46).
DuringtheConferencedebateswhichtheyprompted,
theseprovisions haveonthewholereceivedthesupportof
thecoastalstates.Thereare,however,reservations onthe
partoftheland-locked andgeographically disadvantaged
stateswhich,whilstnotopposingtheactualprinciple
oftheestablishment ofthezone,wouldliketoreduceits
extentandtheexclusivity oftherightswhichthecoastal
stateswouldexerciceoverit.
MemberStates,actingincoordination ,haveat
previoussessionstabledamendmentstotheSingleNegotiating
Textwiththeaimofimprovingthecohesionbetweenthe
generaldefinitionoftherightsandobligations ofthe
coastalstateandthedefinition containedelsewhereinthe
SingleNegotiating Textasregardstheextentofrights
andobligationsinspecificareasandofmakingitclearer
that,insofarastheeconomiczoneisnotcoveredby
specialrules,itwillremainanintegralpartofthe
highseasandwillthusbesubjecttothecorresponding
provisions.

-25-
Although they were supported byother maritime
powers (United States ,japan ,USSR )anxious tosafeguard
the freedom ofnavigation intheeconomic zone ,these
amendments proposed bythe Member States were not
included intheRevised Single Negotiating Text which
reproduces theoriginal Single Text virtually unchanged
andwith the same ambiguities .
(ii)Developments attheFifth Session
Themain question which was examined inthis
context was that ofthe status ofthe economic zone for
purposes ofnavigation .Certain proposals were made at
the Fifth Session tomodify relevant articles ofthe
RSNT .The result ofthese modifications would ,inmost
cases ,betostrengthen the sui generis nature ofthe
economic zone .
(iii)Proposed guidelines forthe coming Session
The Community should not relax itsefforts to
secure theacceptance ofsuitable amendments atthe
next session ofthe Conference ,all the more soas
ithas thebacking ofother influential countries (in
particular the United States and the USSR ).The Commission
does notconsider itopportune toaccompany this proposal
with more detailed guidelines ,inview ofthenecessity
ofallowing forsufficient flexibility ofnegotiation
anddrafting atthe Sixth Session .

-26-
B. LIVING RESOURCES
(i)Fifth session .Thediscussion attheFifth session ofthe
artic leson_living resources followed "broadly thesame .
linesas_atthe19T>6spring sessionwithoutanymajor
development occurring ^.Thetexts concerned havethusremained
virutally unchanged since they were prepared inspring 1975 *Having
regard tothegeneral level ftfacceptance oftheartioles atthe
Conferenoej andthesteps taken "bycoastal states toestablish 200idle
fishing zones reflecting theprovisions ofthe BSBTT ,thetexts in
question canheregarded asrepresenting anemerging consensus ,already
endorsed "bystate practice *
Themain issue attheFifth session inthis area concerned the efforts
made toohange thetexts relating totherights ofland-looked and
geographically disadvantaged states ysoastoprovide these states
with aprivileged position asregards aocess tothesones ofother
states andinthedistribution ofsurplus *Thecompromise texts that
were produced proved unacceptable tomembers oftheooastal states
group andwere considered insufficient bytheland-locked and
geographically disadvantaged group *Theexisting artioles and59
were therefore left unchanged *
Atthe1976 spring session anamendment wasintroduced byDenmark to
strengthen thereferences tofisheries coordination inthepresent Article
130 ;atthe same time anamendment wasproposed onbehalf ofthemember
States tothepresent Article 129inorder tomake itclear that thepro­
visions onenclosed and semi-enclosed seas would notbeapplicable tothe
North Sea .These amendments didnotreceive wide support attheConference
although thearticle nownumbered 130wasmodified soastomake the
obligation less stringent .
Therelevant texts intheRevised Single Negotiating Text were taken over
from theearlier Single Negotiating Text with little ornochange *Fora
summary oftheprovisions seetheCosmi88ioa (scommunication tothe
Council ofJune 1976 (C0M(76)270final ).

-27-
(ii)Community coordination andamendments .Inthecourse oftheFifth
session theNetherlands delegate ,astherepresentative ofthe -&tate
aoting asPresident ,recalled onbehalf oftheMember States the
amendments which hadpreviously been proposed .Thedecision notto
intervene inthediscussion ontheprovisions relating toland-locked
andgeographically disadvantaged states (thereby indicating ,under the
procedures followed bytheConference ,support forthese articles as
they stand )wasmaintained .
(iii)Guidelines
Hieamendments which were submitted onbehalf oftheCommunity
were drawn upprior tothe1976 spring session .Hiemodifications
which _were previously agreed upon need therefore tobereviewed inthe
light ofthediscussions attheConference and,more particularly ,
having regard tothepositions taken bytheCommunity during the
bilateral fisheries negotiations .Those negotiations ,conducted in
conformity with thedirectives given bytheCouncil ,have "brought
outtheimportance fortheCommunity ,under the200mile system ,of
maintaining full control asacoastal state over resources within
Community waters ,subject totheentry into reciprocal orother
arrangements onadirectly negotiated basis .Theposition so
fartaken with respect totheprovisions onland-locked and
geographically disadvantaged states ,namely tosupport theexisting
articles ,should bemaintained )although minor modifications could
bemade ,substantive ohanges inthese articles inthedirection
sought bythegroup inquestion would notbetotheadvantage ofthe
Community .
Theinstitution ofenclosed andsemi–enclosed seas asareas having tosome
degree aspecial status hasdisadvantages from thegeneral standpoint of
theCommunity *Assuming that itwould notbepossible todelete Articles
129and130entirely ,inview ofthesupport they enjoy attheConference ,
thebest course would betoleave thearticles asthey stand *Theparticular
preoccupations relating tofishing inenclosed andsemi–enclosed seacan
best bedealt with through bilateral Community arrangements .

-23-
C.THECONTINENTAL SHELF
(i)DevelopmentsattheFifthSession
TwomainissuesunderthisheadingwerediscussedattheFifth
Session,i.e.,thedefinitionoftheouteredgeoftheContinental
marginandthesharingofrevenuederivedfromtheexploitation of
thecontinental shelfbeyond200miles.
a)Outeredgeofthecontinentalmargin
TheIrishproposalconcerningthedefinitionoftheouteredgeof
thecontinental margin,receivedsupport
frommostwide-marginStateswhileitwasmoreorlessgenerally
criticized "bycertainothercountries(especiallyLLDandGDS)2A
certainnumberofimportantquestionswereraisedwhichwouldneed
furtherexpertscrutiny,alsowithinthecontextoftheCommunity
preparation ofthesixthsession.Inthiscontextitwould "beparti­
cularlyimportanttoclarifythepracticalimplications oftheappli­
cationoftheIrishformula,especiallyasregardstheshelvesof
memberStates,andtoexaminetheextenttowhichitcouldbepossible
tomodifycertainofitscomponentsinordertoprepareaconpromise
solution.
Inanyevent,itisevidentthatapossiblecompromise onthisissue
atthenextsessionhingesonthedefinitionofagenerallyacceptable
formulaonrevenuesharing,thelatterbeingthecrucialfactor.
b)Revenuesharing
Aconsiderable timewasspentonthisissue,whichessentiallyrevolves
aroundthequestionastowhethercoastalStatesshallsharerevenues
arisingoutoftheexploitation ofthecontinentalshelfbeyond200miles.
AproposaltothiseffectiscontainedinArticle70ofRSNT.Itis
recalledthatitwasnotpossibletoestablishacommonpositionon
thisissueintimeforthefifthsession.Sincethisisprobablythe
mostimportantoutstandingissueofprincipleremaininginthecontext
ofCommitteeII,itappearsvitalthatmemberStatesarriveata
commonposition(seebelow).
ThedebatesshowedveryclearlythatLLandCOSwouldonlyaccept
coastalstates*rightsonthecontinental marginbeyond200milesif
afavourablesystemofrevenuesharingwereelaborated.Mostcoastal
Statesseemtobecomingroundtosuchasolution.
TheChairman'ssummingupofthe"emergingconsensus"waswidely
acceptedasafairdescription ofthepresentstateofdiscussions :
i)Asystemofrevenuesharingshouldaccompanytheextensionof
themarginbeyond200miles.
ii)Thesystemshouldbebasedongrossrevenue.
•••j•••
1)Land-locked States.
2)Geographically disadvantaged States.

-29-
iii)TheUSproposal forpercentages wastheminimum acceptable .
Ifthese percentages were reduced ,theperiod ofgrace should
heshortened .Thepercentages should heliable tovariation ,
either upordown inthe light ofexperience when production
isachieved ,bywhatever organisation wasinvolved ,soasto
ensure thecommercial viability ofexploitation .
iv)Thecircumstances ofdeveloping countries should betaken into
account toanextent tobedecided bywhatever organisation was
involved .
v)Developing States should benefit themost ,particularly the
landlocked .Detailed rules should not beincluded inthe
Convention butshould beleft towhatever organisation was
involved .
vi)Arole fortheInternational Authority wasunavoidable butit
would besimple toguarantee that contributions would notbe
used forthebenefit oftheAuthority .
(ii)Proposed guidelines forthenext session oftheConference
Asrecorded above ,theCouncil decided atitssession on27July 1976
onthecommon position that thecontinental shelf maybeextended
beyond 200miles asfarastheedge oftheouter margin .Onthequestion
ofrevenue sharing ,itdidnotconsider itindispensable atthetime to
take position onthis issue ;itwasnoted ,however ,that nodelegation
haddifficulties ofprinciple astosharing revenues from the shelf
beyond 200miles ,andthefollow-up ofthequestion was left to
coordination onthespot (cf.docs .l(27l)76 andR/549/77).
Themoment seems tohave arrived when theCommunity must adopt clear ,
common positions onthevarious outstanding questions ofsubstance in
the context ofthecontinental shelf issue .Substantial Community
interests areatstake ,andthequestion oftheregime applicable tothe
continental shelf outside 200miles iscrucial tothecomposition and
success ofthepackage deal .
Theproposed guidelines submitted bythe Commission tothe Council in
June 1976 (cf.doc.C0M(76)270 final )remain valid ,asanexpression of
general policy .Nevertheless ,theCommission nowwishes torender these
proposals more precise ,especially inthe light ofthedevelopments atthe
Fifth Session .Ittherefore proposes that theCouncil adopt the
following guidelines forthecoming session :
-the experts ofthe Commission andthemember States shall continue
toelaborate common positions inrespect ofthedefinition ofthe
margin beyond 200miles based ontheIrish proposals tothat effect .
–theCommunity should accept areasonable system ofrevenue sharing
provided that such asystem would notimply financial charges liable
toslow down the extraction ofresources .The basis forthe calcu­
lation oftherevenue sharing should begross value ,themaximum
percentage tobefixed intheConvention .(Theprecise figure would
beanelement tobedetermined inthelight oftherest ofthepackage ).
Agrace period ofatleast five years should beanessential feature
ofthe system .
/

developingcountriesshouldcontributetowardsrevenuesharing,
exceptthosewithspecialcharacteristics (e.g.theleastdeveloped),
thedetailstobedetermined "bytheinternational organisation
involved(e.g.theAuthority).
leastdeveloped,LLandGDSdevelopingcountrieswouldbethemain
beneficiaries ,therestgoingtootherdevelopingcountries.
aspecificrolecouldbegrantedtotheAuthorityforthe
distribution ofthefunds.

-31-
IV.A. PROTECTION OFTHEMARINE ENVIRONMENT
(i)Progress made atthefifth session
Since the session inGeneva in1975 "the
Conference hasgiven uptheidea ofdrafting opera­
tional provisions fortheprotection ofthemarine
environment since itisofthe opinion that action
against pollution isorshould "beconducted under
specific conventions andthat theConvention must do
more than define therights andobligations ofStates
with regard toprotection ofthemarine environment ,
particularly intheterritorial seaandeconomic zone .
Atthe fifth session the Conference examined
indetail theprovisions ofPart IIIonprotection of
themarine environment .Thevast majority ofthe
participants considered that Part IIIoftheRSNT was ,
despite itsshortcomings ,afair "basis fornegotiation#
Thediscussions inparticular made itpossible forthe
respective positions to "beclarified through detailed
examination ofthe provision oftheRSNT .
(ii)Community coordination
Coordination has improved compared with the
previous sessions .However ,there isstill room for
progress inthis area .Itshould hepointed outthat
themain difficulty encountered results from the fact
that certain member States prefer ,inthis field ,to
coordinate their positions within the Group of17
(maritime powers ).This situation ,even though there
maybereason tohope that itischanging ,isnot
acceptable -either tothe Community ortothemember
States which arenot part oftheGroup of17*Forthe
various reasons referred tointhe introduction tothis
Communication the Commission proposes that the Council
improve andstrengthen coordination procedures andthose
forpresenting coordinated positions inthefield of
protection ofthemarine environment aswell .
•••/•••

-32-
(iii)AsstatedintheintroductiontothisCommunication ,
protectionofthemarineenvironmentisoneofthesectors
wheretheConferencewillhavetomakeconsiderable effort
toarriveatcompromisesinthenearfuture.Thisisdue
to"boththecomplexityofthesubjectandthefactthat
oceanpollutionbyshipsisoftenapretextforexercising
competenceintheterritorial seaandintheeconomiczone*
InitsCommunication totheCouncilofJune1976(COM(76)
270final),theCommissionhasalreadypresentedadetailed
description oftheprovisionsoftheRSUTandoftheposi­
tionsofthevariousgroupsofcountries.Forthesixth
sessionitproposesthattheCounciladoptfairlygeneral
guidelines:
(a)Provisionsconcerninginnocentpassage(PartII,
Article20)
Oneshouldopposethatthefreedomofnavigationbe
prejudicedforreasonsconcerningthedesign,construc­
tion,manningandequipmentofshipsandsupportpro­
posalswhichwouldgivetointernational organisations
thetaskofdefininginternational standardsinthis
field;
(b)Dumpingofwasteatsea(PartIII,Article20)
Proposalsshouldbesupportedwhichpermitcoastal
Statestocontroldumpingintheterritorial sea
andeconomiczoneinaccordance withinternational
(regional)ruleswhichdonotprejudicthefreedom
21."5)
(c)Thecreationofaspecialzoneshouldcorrespond
tooceanographic andecologicalcriteriaandto
particularcharacteristics ofpollutionthreatening
thesezonesandwhich,therefore,callfortheadop­
tionofmorestringentobligatorymeasures'•
Forthesereasons,thedefinitionofaspecial
zoneshouldbeanexceptionalmeasurerequiring
international consensusandproposalspermittingthe
transformation oftheeconomiczoneintoaspecial
zoneshouldbeopposed.

-32bis–
(dJCompetenceof"theEortState-rightofenquiry
(Article26.1)
IntheperspectiveofextendingtotheCommunity
levelithemeansofactionofmemberStatesinrespect
ofcontrollinginfringements againstinternational
conventions onvesselpollutionandofpermitting
abettercooperation betweenPortStatesandbetween
theseStatesandflagStates,itwouldbepreferable
tomaintaintheRSNTtext(Article28.1)asamended
bytheVallartaGroup;
(e)CompetenceofthePortState-transferofenquiries
(Article28.2)
TheproposalarrivedatduringmemberStatecoordination
meetingsconcerningthetransferofenquiriesshould
besupported,i.e.thattheenquiryinitiatedbythe
PortStateinwhichthevesselisfoundshallbetrans­
ferredtotheFlagStateortotheCoastalStatein
whosejurisdiction theinfringement wascommitted,at
therequestofthesecountries;
(f)CompetenceofthePortState-righttoretainavessel
(Article29)
Theobligationtoreleaseavesselshouldbeaddedto
theRSNTtext;
(g)RightsoftheCoastalStatewithregardtoinfringements
committedinitseconomiczone(Article30.6)
TherightofthecoastalStatetointerveneinthe
eventofflagrantviolationbyashipofinternational
rulesmaybeacceptedprovidedthattheexerciseof
thisrightiscombinedwithadequateguaranteesfor
thefreedomofnavigation ;
(h)CompetenceoftheFlagState(Article38)
Itisnecessarytodefendtheprincipleofpriority
ofcompetenceoftheFlagState,accountbeingtaken,
however,oftheneedtosafeguardthelegitimate
interestsoftheCoastalStates.Theconditions and
modalities underwhicha'CoastalStatecanorshall
startproceedings againstavesselwhichhascommitted
aninfringement againstinternational rulesshould,
therefore,berenderredmoreprecise.

-33-
IV.B.MARINESCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
1.ASSESSMENT OFTHEFIFTHSESSIONOFTHECONFERENCE
Althoughthprewereencouragingelementssuchasthemoderateroleplayed
byMexicoandtheAustraliancompromiseproposalontheonehand,anda
greaterdegreeofinternalco-ordination oftheNineontheother,the
generalviewoftheMemberStateswasthattheoutcomeoftheFifthsession
wasdisappointing .
Negotiations wereconcentrated onthekeyissueoftheregimefortheconduct
ofmarinescientificresearchandthequestionofconsentintheeconomic
zoneoronthecontinental shelfofacoastalstate.Article60oftheRSNT
wasatthecoreofthediscussionssinceitwasfeltthatabreakthrough
therewasnecessarybeforeprogresscouldbemadeonotherissues.Substantii
discussions onotherarticlesdidnottakeplace.
Negotiations wereconductedininformalmeetingsoftheThirdCommitteein
whichallMemberStates participated andinaspecialnegotiating
group(USA,USSR,Fed.RepublicofGermany,France,UnitedKingdom,Spain,
Columbia,Peru,Brazil,Kenya,Tanzania,Norway)wherethethreemaintrends
wererepresented,i.e.:theadherentsofa"full"consentregime,ofa
"qualified"consentregime,andthoseopposedtotheprincipleofconsent.
Whenitbecameapparentthatdiscussions wereonlyfurtheringthedivision
betweentheexistingtrends,ChairmanYankovpresentedacompromisetextfor
Article60whichhebasedonthepremisethatitwasonlyrealistictoaccept
theprincipleofconsentandtomakeitsubjecttosomeexceptionsandcondi­
tionsasguaranteestotheResearchingState.
Thiscompromiseremainedunacceptabletothosecountriesopposedtoitsbasil
premiseofconsent.AswellastheUSA,thisgroupincludedthreeMember
States(UnitedKingdom.Netherlands,Germany).

-34-
Noagreement orcompromise text wasachieved atthis session .Those researching
States whocontinued tooppose the "consent "principle felt that theissues
ofconsent and itsmodalities could not "beagreed upon inisolation from the
other issues atthe Conference notably the character oftheeconomic zone and
dispute-settlement .Furthermore ,they argued that negotiations onArticle 60
could notproceed inisolation from theother related articles oftheRSNT ,
i.e. Article 64allowing for"tacit "consent andArticle "J6providing for
dispute –settlement .Alarge number ofthe"Group of77"made itclear that
"tacit consent "anddispute-settlement were adilution ofthe "consent "principle
andwould "bestrongly opposed "bythem infuture negotiations .
Chairman Yankov *sattempts tofind acompromise formula encouraged those in
favour ofa"qualified "consent regime todraft another version ofArticle §0
acceptable tomoderates from among coastal andresearching States soasto
keep thenegotiations going .Anattempt byitsauthor Australia tohave this
proposal included intheformal records oftheSession failed duetothe
opposition oftheextremists from among the "Group of77w«
2.Community coordination
Atthebeginning ofthesession ,theFrench delegation declared that asa
result ofdrafting their economic zone legislation they hadfound thedistinc­
tion between different types ofMSRvery hard toapply ,andwere nowinfavour
ofaconsent regime foralltypes ofMSR .
However ,theHeads ofDelegations agreed that thecommon approach previously
agreed upon inBrussels should bemaintained atthepresent stage ofthenego­
tiations andagreed tostudy theFrench position andtoconsider theadjust­
ment ofthe common approach ifadvisable .France didnotactively participate
inthenegotiations atthis session ,butdidnot oppose the common approach
ofother Community countries .
Towards theendofthe Conference ,this bommon approach came under certain
strains largely asaresult ofvarying degrees ofsupport fortheAustralian
compromise .Only theFederal Republic ofGermany andtheNetherlands opposed
itonthegrounds that itembodied theprinciple ofconsent andwas little
different from theRSNT orchairman 'stest proposal .However ,theother member
States carefully made itclear that their support foranyqualified consent
proposal isconditional onhaving tacit consent and compulsory dispute –settlement
procedures inanyfuture regime .
3.Guidelines forthe Sixth Session
Itiscertain that discussion inthis Committee will continue tofocus on
theconsent principle andinparticular theprecise formulation ofArticle 60.
Inpreparation forthis ,experts from themember States andtheCommission
have held aseries ofcoordination meetings toexamine theimplications for
MSRandwhere possible what could betheCommunity approach forthenext session .
Inpreparing itsguidelines fortheCouncil ,theCommission hastaken account
ofthese discussions andproposes that :
l)TheCommunity must continue topress foradequate safeguards forresearching
States intheconduct andpromotion ofMSR .Whilst theformulation ofArticle 60
asproposed bytheAustralian delegation isnotwholly satisfactory itcould
serve asthebasis ofanacceptable text .

-35-
2)AnyacceptanceoftheprincipleofaconsentregimeinArticle60
mustdependontheretentionoftheprinciplesassetoutin
Articles64and65oftheRSNT.Thesearticlesensurethatthe
termsofconsentarereasonableandinparticularitisconsidered
essentialtoretaintheideaof"tacit"consentassetoutinArticle64
oftheRSNTtherebyminimisingthecumbersomeproceduresthatmigit
inhibitMSR.
3)TheCommunitymustcontinuetopressforsomeformofquickprocedure
forsettlingdisputesovermarinescientificresearch.Inthisrespect
Article76oftheRSNTcouldformthebasisofanacceptableprocedure.
4)TheCommunityshouldcontinuetosupporteffortstodevelopandtransfer
thebenefitsofmarinetechnologyinthefieldofHSRtothedeveloping
countries.

-36-
V.SETTLEMENT OFDISPUTES
(i)Introduction
ConsiderableeffortshavebeenmadeattheConference,inparticular
bythedevelopedcountries }toincludeasystemforthecompulsorysettlement
ofdisputesinthefutureConvention.Theoriginalproposalsputforwardin
1975were,however,extremelycomplex,offeringpartiesachoicebetween
fourmainprocedures:
-theLawoftheSeaTribunal(apermanentbody)
-theInternational CourtofJustice
-arbitralproceedings(astatutebeingprovidedforadhocarbitral
bodies)
-specialproceduresfordisputesconcerningfisheries,pollution,
scientificresearchandnavigation(involvingtheuseofexperts
chosenfromlistsmaintainedbyspecializedorgansoftheUN).
Itwasproposedthat,incaseswherethepartieshadnotchosenthesame
meansofsettlement,thedefendantwouldhavethechoiceastotheprocedure
tobeused*^
IntheCommission^communication totheCouncilinJune1976
(COM(76)270final),itwassuggestedthatitwouldbepreferableif
arbitrationcouldbemadethecommonfactorofthesystem,tobeusedwhere
thepartieshadnotchosenthesameprocedureordidnotagreetoaparticular
meansofsettlement.TheCouncil,initsdecisionof17July,agreedthat
asystemforthecompulsorysettlementofdisputesshouldbeincludedinthe
futureConvention.
(ii)DevelopmentsattheFifthSession
TheRevisedSingleNegotiatingText(PartIV)onthesettlementof
disputes,whiohwasissuedfollowingthediscussionsatthefifthsession,
containsanumberofimprovements overtheearlierversion.Someofthe
detailsoftheprocedureshavebeensimplifiedandarbitration hasbeen
ForananalysisofthearticlesoftheSingleNegotiating Text,seethe
Commission^communication totheCouncilofJune1976(CGM(76)270final)

made thecommon element ofthesystem when other means arelacking .Ifthe
parties have notaccepted thesame procedure !}theparty initiating pro­
ceedings maysubmit thedispute either tooneoftheprocedures chosen by
theother party ortoarbitration .Thetext still remains relatively
complex however ,inparticular intherange ofpossible defenoes or
exceptions which areavailable toadefendant *
(iii)Community coordination .Community coordination proceeded satis­
factorily during thefifth session .Itwasowing inconsiderable measure
totheefforts ofdelegations ofMember States that improvements were made
inthe RENT .
(iv)Guidelines forthecoming session
Itisproposed that Member States should continue their
support fortheincorporation intheConvention ofasystem forthecom­
pulsory settlement ofdisputes .Theapproach taken intheRSNT ofmaking
arbitration thecommon factor when theparties have not ohosen thesame
procedure should bemaintained .Itwould bedesirable thowever ttotake
further steps toclarify thetext andtosimplify theprocedural arrange­
ments .
Theconsequences asregards thesystem ofdisputes settlement of
Community participation inthefuture Convention should continue tobe
borne inmind .

-\o-
SUMMARYOPTHEGUIDELINES PROPOSEDINTHISCOMMUNICATION
N.B.:Theproposalsalreadyadoptedinwholeorinpart"bytheCouncil
on20and27July1976(see1/271/76andB/549/76)aremarkedwith
anasterisk
I.THEINTERNATIONAL SEA-BEDAREA
(cf.pages10to22)
-Commitmenttotheparallelsystem,possiblyaccompanied ,byacceptance
ofthe"bankingsystem"(cf.page14)»
–Establishment ofnegotiating conditionsbetweentheAuthorityand.
operatorsoncommercialandnon–discriminatory bases(cf.page14);
–Returnofpartoftheareareserved ,fortheAuthoritytothegeneral
systemofexploitationafteraperiodtobefixed,intheeventofthisareanotbeingexploitedbytheAuthority(cf.page14);
(*)-Presentationofcommonpositionsontheacceptanceoftheprinciple
oftheEnterprise,subjecttotheestablishment ofasystemexcluding
anyspecialtreatmentforthatbodyandguaranteeingallfirms,whether
privateorbelongingtothememberStates,acceptableeconomiccondi­tions(cf.page14);
–AcceptanceofthegeneralprinciplesoftheRSNTonthesubjectofthe
resourcespolicy(cf.page15);
–Oppositiontoanychangeintheprinciplesgoverningtheresources
policydesignedtomakethatpolicymorerestrictive (cf.page15);
–Adoptionofanopenattitudeonthedefinitionoftherateofincrease
intheproductionofthearea(6%)asaminimumormaximum(cf.page15)
–OppositiontoperiodicalreviewsatfrequentintervalsofPartIof
theRSNT(cf.page16);
–Acceptanceoftheprincipleoftheconvocationofareviewconferenc
aftertheareahasbeenincommercialexploitationfor25years(cf.
page17);
–Oppositiontoanyquestionofthereviewbeingabletoaffectcontractsalreadyinforce(cf.page17);
/

-39-
-Protectionoftheinterestsofallthegroupsviathedefinition
ofappropriatevotingproceduresforthereviewconference(cf.
page17);
-Adoptionofcommonpositionswithregardtothefinancingofthe
Enterprise(cf.pages18and19);
(*)-ContinuationoftheeffortstoachieveCommunityparticipation intheAssemblyandCounciloftheAuthority(cf.page20);tothat
end,definitionofappropriatevotingarrangements andfinancialcontributions (cf.pages20and2l);
-AcceptanceofaweightedvotingsystemintheCouncilofthe
Authority "basedonimportsorconsumption (cf.page21);
(*)-Searchforsolutionstoavoidtheemergenceofmonopolysituations
ordominantpositions(cf.page22).
II.THEECONOMIC ZONEANDTHECONTINENTAL SHELF
(cf.pages23to30)
-Acceptanceofmodifications enablingthesuigenerisnatureofthe
economiczonetobestrengthened (cf.page25);
-ReviewoftheamendmentsproposedbytheCommunityregardingthe
provisionsoftheRSNTonthebiologicalresourcesoftheseainthe
lightofthewaythesituationhasdevelopedsincethelastsession
(cf.page27)i
(*)-Preparationofacommonpositiononthedefinitionofthemarginof
thecontinentalshelfoutside200miles(cf.page29);
(*)–Acceptanceofareasonablesystemforsharingincomederivedfrom
exploitation ofthecontinentalshelfoutside200miles,providedthat
suchasystemdoesnotinvolvefinancialchargeswhichmightslowdown
theexploitation ofsuchresources(cf.page29);
-Exemptionforcertaindevelopingcountries(e.g.theleastdeveloped)
fromcontributingtothesystemforsharingincome(cf.page30);
-Allocationofthebulkofthefundsderivedfromthesharingof
incometotheleastdevelopedlandlockedandgeographically disadvan­
tagedcountries;assignmentofaspecificroletotheAuthorityfor
thedistributionofthesefunds(cf.page30);
••••*

-40-
III.PROTECTION OPTHEMARINEENVIRONMENT
(cf.pages31,32and32bis)
-Oppositiontoattemptsatprejudicingthefreedomofnavigationfor
reasonsconcerningthedesign,construction ,manningandequipment
ofvessels;supportproposalswhichwouldgivetointernational organi­
sationsthetaskofdefininginternational standardsinthisfield
(cf.page32);
-Supporttoproposalspermittingcoastalstatestocontrolthedumping
ofwasteintheterritorial seaandintheeconomiczoneinaccordance
withinternational (regional)ruleswhichdonotprejudicethefreedom
ofnavigation(cf.page32);
–Oppositiontoproposalspermittingthetransformation oftheeconomic
zoneintoaspecialzone(cf.page32);
-Supporttotheproposalconcerningthetransferofenquiriesinitiated
bythePortStatetotheFlagStateortheCoastalStateattheir
request(cf.page32bis);
–AcceptanceoftherightofCoastalStatestointerveneintheeventof
flagrantviolationbyavesselofinternational rulesprovidedthatthe
exerciseofthisrig£xtiscombinedwithadequateguaranteesforthe
freedomofnavigation(cf.page32bis);
–DefenceoftheprincipleofpriorityofcompetenceoftheFlagState
accountbeingtaken,however,oftheneedtosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofthecoastalState(cf.page32bis).
IV.MARINESCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
(cf.pages33to35)
-SupportforproposalsforadequatesafeguardsfortheStatesundertaking
marinescientificresearchintheconductandpromotionofthatresearch
(cf.page34);
–Maintenanceoftheideaoftacitconsentinordertoavoidcumbersome
procedureswhichmi^itobstructtheconductofmarinescientificresearch
.(cf•page35).
-Searchforrapidproceduresforthesettlementofdisputesinthe
marinescientificresearchfield(cf.page35);
–Supportfortheeffortstodevelopandtransferthebenefitsofmarine
technologyinthemarinescientificresearchfieldtothedevelopingcountries(cf.page35).
•••/•••

-41-
V.SETTLEMENT OFDISPUTES
(cf.pages36and37)
-PursuitofeffortstohaveincludedintheConventionasystemfor
thecompulsorysettlementofdisputes(cf.page37);
-Application ofthearbitration systemshouldoneofthepartiesto
adisputechoosethatmethodofsettlement(cf.page37)*