EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. Context of the proposal

The Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) are systemically important institutions for the financial markets. Any trade of securities on or off a securities exchange is followed by post-trade processes that lead to the settlement of that trade, which is the delivery of securities against cash. The CSDs are the key institutions that enable settlement by operating so-called securities settlement systems. CSDs also ensure the initial recording and the central maintenance of securities accounts that record how many securities have been issued by whom and each change in the holding of those securities.

CSDs also play a crucial role for the collateral market especially for monetary policy purposes. For instance, almost all of the eligible collateral for central bank monetary policy operations in the EU, especially in the Euro area, flows through securities settlement systems operated by CSDs.

Securities settlement systems in the EU settled approximately €920 trillion worth of transactions in 2010, and held almost €39 trillion of securities at the end of 2010. There are over 30 CSDs in the EU, generally one in each country, and two 'international' CSDs (ICSDs – Clearstream Banking Luxembourg and Euroclear Bank), which are a sub-category of CSDs specialised in the issuance of international bonds, commonly known as "Eurobonds".

While generally safe and efficient within national borders, CSDs combine and communicate less safely across borders, which means that an investor faces higher risks and costs when making a cross-border investment. For example, the number of settlement fails is higher for cross-border transactions than for domestic transactions and cross-border settlement costs are up to four times higher than domestic settlement costs.

These safety problems are the result of a number of factors, including:

· The length of the settlement cycle. The time between trade and settlement is not harmonised in the EU, creating disruptions when securities are settled cross-border;

· A small but substantial proportion of securities still exist in paper form. These are settled after a much longer settlement cycle, which increases the risk incurred by investors;

· Settlement fails, which are situations where a transaction fails to be settled on the intended settlement date, are not subject to deterrent penalties in all markets and where they exist settlement discipline measures differ widely between markets;

· While Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (SFD)[1] reduces the disruption to a securities settlement system caused by insolvency proceedings against a participant in that system, it does not address other risks of the system or the resilience of the CSD operating the system. Some CSDs are subject to additional credit and liquidity risks derived from the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement;

· Agreements between CSDs to link-up, while being considered as a first step towards the consolidation of the European settlement markets, raise safety concerns in the absence of specific prudential rules for such links. In addition, they increase the interconnectedness between CSDs, which justifies further the introduction of a common prudential framework.

The absence of an efficient single internal market for settlement also raises important concerns. Important barriers to the European post trading market continue to exist, such as for instance the limitation of securities issuers' access to CSDs, different national licensing regimes and rules for CSDs across the EU and limited competition between different national CSDs. These barriers result in a very fragmented market. As a consequence, the cross-border settlement of transactions relies on unnecessarily complex holding 'chains' often involving several CSDs and several other intermediaries. This has a negative impact on the efficiency, but also on the risks associated with cross-border transactions.

These problems are important as cross-border transactions in Europe, ranging from usual purchases/sales of securities to collateral transfers, continue to increase and CSDs become increasingly interconnected. These trends are expected to accelerate with the advent of Target2 Securities (T2S), a project launched by the Eurosystem to provide a borderless common platform for securities settlement in Europe, which is scheduled to start in 2015.

This proposed Regulation addresses these problems. It introduces an obligation to represent all transferable securities in book entry form and to record these in CSDs before trading them on regulated venues. It harmonises settlement periods and settlement discipline regimes across the EU. It introduces a common set of rules inspired by international standards addressing the risks of the CSDs' operations and services. As CSDs will be subject to identical substantive rules across the EU, they will benefit from uniform requirements for licensing and an EU wide passport, which will help remove the existing barriers of access.

The proposed Regulation will therefore increase safety in the system and open the market for CSD services, therefore improving the efficiency of securities settlement. The proposed Regulation will complete the regulatory framework for securities market infrastructures, alongside the Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (MiFID) [2] for trading venues, and the proposal for a Regulation on derivative transactions (EMIR) for Central Counterparties (CCPs).

This initiative has received wide political support. The ECOFIN Council of 2 December 2008 emphasised the need to strengthen the safety and soundness of securities settlement systems operated by CSDs and agreed that EU legislation is needed to address legal barriers relating to post-trading, including barriers of access to CSDs. The need for appropriate standards for CSDs is also agreed internationally. As early as 2001 global banking and securities regulators (CPSS-IOSCO) adopted a set of recommendations for securities settlement systems. These were adapted through non-binding guidelines by European regulators (ESCB-CESR) in 2009. In October 2010 the Financial Stability Board re-iterated the call for updated standards for more robust core market infrastructures and asked for the revision and enhancement of existing standards.

2. results of consultations with the interested parties and impact assessment

This initiative is the result of an extensive and continuous dialogue and consultation with all major stakeholders, including securities and banking regulators, the ECB and all types of market participants. It takes into consideration the views expressed in a public consultation from 13 January to 1 March 2011, and the input obtained through a broad range of stakeholder groups since summer 2010.

In addition, an external study of costs and prices in the post trading sector was commissioned from Oxera Consulting. Oxera delivered a first report in 2009 and a second one in 2011. These reports provide useful data on the cost gaps between cross-border and domestic post trading costs in Europe.

In line with its "Better Regulation" policy, the Commission conducted an impact assessment of policy alternatives. Policy options were assessed against the key objectives of increasing the safety, efficiency and level playing field for CSD services in Europe. The assessment was done by considering the effectiveness of achieving the objectives above and the cost efficiency of implementing different policy options.

The draft impact assessment report was submitted on 16 March 2011 to the Commission's Impact Assessment Board (IAB), followed by a resubmission of a revised draft on 8 August 2011. The draft report was considerably improved following the comments of the IAB by strengthening the evidence base underlying the problems found and the analysis of different policy options, in particular with respect to banking services ancillary to settlement and by including an estimation of the overall benefits and of the impact of different policy options on different stakeholder groups and a clearer and more robust monitoring and evaluation framework.

3. Legal elements of the proposal

3.1. Legal basis

The proposal is based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') as the most appropriate legal basis in this field. The proposal aims principally at addressing the lack of safety and efficiency of securities settlement and the resulting obstacles to the functioning of the internal market resulting from the divergent national rules regulating securities settlement and the activities of the CSDs, which operate securities settlement systems, by introducing a set of common rules concerning certain aspects of the settlement cycle and discipline, as well as a set of common prudential requirements addressing the resilience of and access to CSDs.. In the absence of such common rules and requirements, likely divergent measures taken at national level will have a direct negative impact on the safety, efficiency and competition in the settlement markets in the Union. A regulation is considered to be the most appropriate instrument to ensure that all market participants are subject to uniform and directly applicable obligations regarding the settlement cycle and discipline, and that CSDs are subject to uniform and directly applicable prudential standards in the Union, which should reinforce their resilience and central role in the maintenance of book-entry systems and in the settlement process.

As the main purpose of the proposed Regulation is to introduce a number of legal obligations imposed directly on market operators consisting, inter alia, in the recording of virtually all transferable securities in book-entry form in a CSD and a stricter time frame for settlement and as CSDs are responsible for the operation of securities settlement systems and the application of measures to provide timely settlement in the Union, it is essential that all CSDs constantly comply at all times with uniform and stringent prudential requirements provided in the proposal. It is therefore necessary to include in this proposal a set of uniform and directly applicable rules regarding the authorisation and ongoing supervision of CSDs, as a corollary to the legal obligations imposed on market operators.

3.2. Subsidiarity and proportionality

According to the principle of subsidiarity provided in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, action at Union level should be taken only when the aims envisaged cannot be achieved sufficiently by Member States alone and can, because of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the EU.

This proposal essentially aims at making the European securities market safer and more efficient within the Union, which calls for a coordinated EU action. The Union action is further justified by the systemic nature of CSDs and their increasing interconnection, in particular after the introduction of T2S.

As regards authorisation and supervision of CSDs, the proposed Regulation aims at striking a balance between the competences of national authorities and the interests of other competent authorities. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) will play a key role in resolving disputes, facilitating the cooperation arrangements between national authorities and developing technical standards in close consultation with the members of European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

Certain issues are already covered by existing Union legislation. For instance, securities settlement systems are already defined by Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems[3] and Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) provides for certain rules of access by market participants to the securities settlement system of their choice. The proposed Regulation is consistent with these Union texts.

The proposal also takes full account of the principle of proportionality required in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union, namely that Union action should be adequate to reach the objectives pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary. The proposed Regulation is compatible with this principle and strikes the right balance between the public interest at stake and the cost-efficiency of the measures proposed. The proposal has taken full account of the need to balance safety, efficiency of the markets and costs for the stakeholders.

3.3. Detailed explanation of the proposal

The proposed Regulation has two main parts: measures addressing all market operators in the context of securities settlement (Title II) and measures addressing specifically CSDs (Titles III, IV and V). The remaining titles, on scope and definitions (Title I) and transitional and final provisions (Title VI) apply to both parts of the proposal.

3.3.1. Scope of proposal (Title I)

The proposed Regulation covers all CSDs, but exempts from the authorisation and supervision requirements the members of the ESCB and other national or public bodies performing similar services, such as the Member States national bodies charged with or intervening in the management of the public debt, that would otherwise qualify as CSDs. These institutions nevertheless remain subject to the full set of requirements for CSDs. They are exempt from Title IV, which imposes the segregation between banking services ancillary to settlement and other CSD services since these institutions, by their very nature, provide such ancillary services.

Regarding financial instruments, the proposal covers all financial instruments as far as the requirements for CSDs are concerned, but it mainly covers transferable securities as defined in point (18) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) (essentially shares and bonds) for the purposes of Title II on securities settlement.

3.3.2. Securities settlement (Title II)

A key objective of the proposed Regulation consists in increasing the safety of settlement. Title II includes three sets of measures to achieve this objective. First, it imposes the so-called dematerialisation/immobilisation of securities, which is the issuance of securities in book-entry form. This measure is aimed at increasing the efficiency of settlement, facilitating the shortening of settlement periods and ensuring the integrity of a securities issue by allowing for easier reconciliation of securities holdings. Book entry securities do not necessarily need to be recorded in a CSD before they are traded or given as collateral. They may be, for instance, recorded by registrars. However, if they are traded on venues regulated by Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID), they need to be recorded in a CSD, in order to benefit from the protection for securities settlement systems under Directive 98/26/EC and in order to facilitate reconciliation between securities recorded, on the one hand, and securities traded, on the other hand. The proposed Regulation provides for a sufficiently long transitional period, until 1 January 2018, in order to allow market operators from the Member States where significant amounts of paper securities still exist to comply with this measure.

Second, Title II harmonises the settlement period for the securities transactions across the EU. In Europe most securities transactions are settled either two or three days after the trading day, depending on each market. The settlement period will be harmonised and set at two days after the trading day, although shorter settlement periods will be allowed. Third, Title II harmonises settlement discipline measures across the EU. These consist of ex ante measures to prevent settlement fails, and ex post measures to address settlement fails. The key objective is to reduce settlement fails and to discourage any competition lowering the standards for settlement discipline, for instance between markets that may have different penalties systems in place. The proposed provisions go beyond the level of CSDs and aim to subject market participants that fail to deliver securities on the intended settlement date to a harmonised 'buy-in' procedure, which may be executed by a CCP, in the case of a cleared transaction, or otherwise included in trading venues own rules.

3.3.3. CSDs (Title III)

Authorisation and supervision of CSDs (Chapter I)

Directive 98/26/EC defines already securities settlement systems as formal arrangements allowing transfers of securities between different participants. However, that directive does not address the institutions which are responsible for operating such systems. In view of the increasing complexity of such systems and risks related to settlement, it is essential that institutions operating securities settlement systems are legally defined, authorised and supervised along a set of common prudential standards. A CSD is defined as being a legal person that operates a securities settlement system and at least one other core service (either 'notary' service or central maintenance service). In addition, CSDs would only be permitted to perform certain 'ancillary' services, which are mostly related to the core services. Where such ancillary services include tax services, CSDs would need to ensure that they comply with the tax legislation of the Member States concerned. In the case of withholding tax relief procedures, CSDs would need to observe any requirements that the Member State of source of the payments subject to withholding tax imposes on financial intermediaries in order to authorise them to apply the withholding and claim withholding tax relief on behalf of the beneficial owners of the payments. This may in particular involve the obligation to report investor information directly to the source Member State (in return for being able to claim relief from withholding taxes at source), which may in turn pass it on to the Member State of residence of the beneficial owner of financial instruments.

CSDs will have to be authorised and supervised by national competent authorities of the place where they are established. However, in view of the increasing cross-border element of their activity, other authorities, related to the securities settlement system(s) operated by the CSD and to other group entities would have to be consulted. ESMA will have an important role in developing draft technical standards to harmonise the authorisation process and to ensure cooperation between authorities.

The proposal grants authorised CSDs a "passport" to provide services in the Union, either by providing directly a service in another Member State or by establishing a branch in that Member State. A CSD from a third country can be granted access to the Union if it is recognised by ESMA. Such recognition may be granted only when the Commission has ascertained that the legal and supervisory framework of that third country is equivalent to the Union one and that the third country provides for a effective equivalent recognition of the Union regulatory and supervisory framework; the CSD is subject to effective authorisation and supervision in that third country; and cooperation arrangements are in place between ESMA and that third country authorities.

Requirements for CSDs and conflict of law (Chapters II and III)

Since CSDs are systemically important and perform critical services for the securities market, they must be subject to high prudential standards to ensure their viability and the protection of their participants. The requirements for CSDs are grouped into several categories in Chapter II: organisational requirements (Section 1), conduct of business rules (Section 2), requirements for CSD services (Section 3), prudential requirements (Section 4) and requirements for CSD links (Section 5).

Section 1 requires CSDs to have robust governance arrangements, experienced and suitable senior management, board and shareholders, and to set up user committees representing issuers and participants for each securities settlement system. Any outsourcing of services or activities should not compromise the responsibility of a CSD towards participants or issuers or the exercise of supervisory and oversight functions by different authorities. An important exception is foreseen for outsourcing arrangements with public entities, such as the T2S project operated by the Eurosystem, which are governed by a dedicated framework agreed by the competent authorities.

Section 2 introduces important requirements for CSDs to have non-discriminatory, transparent and strictly risk-based criteria for participation to securities settlement systems. These requirements are reinforced by the provisions on access set out in Chapter IV. It also introduces important principles on transparency regarding public disclosure of prices and disclosure to the competent authorities of costs and revenues by service provided.

Section 3, in Article 34 on requirements for CSD services, recognises the important role played by CSDs in ensuring the integrity of a securities issue and includes obligations about intraday reconciliation of accounts. In terms of account segregation for the purpose of protecting participants' assets, the proposal goes beyond the requirements provided in Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) and requires CSDs to segregate the accounts of each participant from those of other participants and to enable participants to segregate the accounts of each of the participants' clients. Regarding cash settlement, the proposal requires CSDs to settle on central bank accounts whenever practical and available. Commercial bank money settlement is allowed, however, contrary to some current practices, it must be done via a separate credit institution that acts as settlement agent.

The prudential requirements for the CSDs themselves in Section 4 include important provisions on the mitigation of operational risk. Since CSDs would not be permitted to perform banking type of services directly, the key risk CSDs will face is operational risk. These provisions include appropriate measures to ensure the continuity of operations, including settlement, at all times. Capital requirements are also set by reference to operating expenses – CSDs should hold capital, retained earnings and reserves to cover at least six months of operating expenses.

As CSDs are increasingly interconnected and this process is expected to accelerate with the advent of T2S, Article 45 provides for important prudential requirements for linked CSDs, including the setting up of identical settlement finality rules.

Chapter III aims at increasing the legal certainty for securities transactions, by proposing a conflict-of-law rule with respect to proprietary aspects for securities held by a CSD.

Access to CSDs (Chapter IV)

Opening up the market for CSD services and removing barriers of access is one of the objectives of this initiative. Chapter IV addresses three types of access: (a) between issuers and CSDs, (b) between CSDs, and (c) between CSDs and other market infrastructures.

In many Member States issuers are required by law to issue certain types of securities, most notably shares, in the national CSD. Article 47 introduces the right of issuers to record their securities in any CSD authorised in the Union as well as the right for CSDs to provide services for securities that have been constituted under the law of another Member State. National specificities are respected by recognising that this right should be without prejudice to the corporate law under which the securities are constituted.

Sections 2 and 3 lay down the principles on access. A CSD should have the right to become a participant in a securities settlement system of another CSD based on non-discriminatory and risk-based principles. A CSD should also have the right, based on the same principles, to request another CSD to develop special functions, which should be charged on a 'cost-plus' basis. Similarly, a CSD should have the right to receive transaction feeds from CCPs and trading venues and those infrastructures should have access to securities settlement systems operated by CSDs. Any disputes between the relevant competent authorities could be referred to ESMA for dispute resolution.

3.3.4. Credit institutions designated to act as settlement agents (Title IV)

As described before, when central bank settlement is not practical or available, CSDs may offer commercial bank money settlement to their participants. However, CSDs should not provide the banking services ancillary to settlement themselves, but should be authorised by their competent authorities to designate a credit institution to act as settlement agent to open cash accounts and grant credit facilities to facilitate settlement unless the competent authorities demonstrate, based on the available evidence, that the exposure of one credit institution to the concentration of credit and liquidity risks is not sufficiently mitigated. This separation between CSDs and settlement agents is an important measure to address and increase the safety of CSDs. Banking services ancillary to settlement increase the risks to which CSDs are exposed and therefore the likelihood of CSDs suffering a default or being subject to severe stress. While the banking services are usually provided by some CSDs on intraday basis and are limited to the services ancillary to settlement, the amounts handled are however significant and any default of such CSDs would have negative consequences for the securities and payments markets. The requirement to provide the banking services in a separate legal entity than the one which provides the core CSD services will prevent the transmission of risks from the banking services to the provision of core CSD services, in particular in case of insolvency or severe stress resulting from the banking services. This requirement will also provide CSDs and public authorities with more options to find appropriate solutions in case of default of the settlement agent providing banking services. For the CSDs which currently provide banking services, the main costs associated with this measure are the legal costs involved in the setting-up a separate legal entity for providing banking services, while CSDs willing to develop such services in the future would not incur significant incremental costs for setting-up of a separate legal entity. There are no less stringent alternatives to the separation of banking services, which would entirely eliminate the danger of transmission of risks from the banking services to the core CSD services.

In order to secure the efficiencies resulting from the provision of both CSD and banking services within the same group of undertakings, the requirement that banking services be carried out by a separate credit institution should not prevent that credit institution from belonging to the same group of undertakings as the CSD. However, if both CSD and banking services are provided within the same group of undertakings, the activities of the credit institution providing banking services should be limited to the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement. The latter restriction aims at reducing the overall risk profile of the group resulting from the presence of a credit institution in that group.

The competent authority should be able demonstrate on a case by case basis the absence of systemic risk incurred by the provision of both CSD and banking services by the same legal entity. In such a case, a reasoned request could be made to the European Commission which may authorise the derogation. In any case, the activities of a CSD licensed as credit institution should be limited to the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement.

The credit institution acting as settlement agent should be authorised under the Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions[4]. However, as securities settlement system(s) operated by CSDs should be protected as much as possible against any potential risks caused by settlement agents, such agents should comply with additional requirements to mitigate credit and liquidity risks in respect of each securities settlement system they serve.

Considering that Directive 2006/48/EC does not address specifically intraday credit and liquidity risks resulting from the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement, credit institutions should also be subject to specific enhanced credit and liquidity risk mitigation requirements that should apply to each securities settlement system in respect of which they act as settlement agents. The proposed requirements for the settlement agents are inspired by the international CPSS-IOSCO standards for financial market infrastructures and by current market practices. They include full collateralisation of credit exposures, monitoring of intraday liquidity taking into account the liquidity risk generated by the default of the two largest participants and concentration limits on liquidity providers.

3.3.5. Sanctions (Title V)

A review of the existing sanctioning powers and their practical application aimed at promoting convergence of sanctions across the range of supervisory activities has been carried out in the Commission Communication 'Reinforcing sanctioning in the financial services sector'[5]. A stock taking of the national regimes in place has, for example, revealed that the levels of pecuniary sanctions vary widely among Member States, that some competent authorities do not have certain important sanctioning powers at their disposal and that some competent authorities cannot impose sanctions on natural and legal persons. As a result, the Commission now proposes that Member States should provide that appropriate administrative sanctions and measures can be applied to breaches of the Regulation. To this end, a minimum set of administrative sanctions and measures should be available to the competent authorities, including withdrawal of authorisation, public warnings, dismissal of management, restitution of profits gained from the breaches of this Regulation where those can be determined, and administrative fines. The maximum level of administrative fines should not be lower than the level provided for by the Regulation – 10% of the annual turnover of a legal entity or five million Euro or 10% of the annual income of a natural person. When determining the type and level of sanctions, the competent authorities should take into account a number of criteria set in the Regulation, including the size and financial strength of the responsible person, the impact of the violation and the cooperative behaviour of the responsible person. The proposed Regulation does not prevent individual Member States from fixing higher standards.

3.3.6. Compliance with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU

On 23 September 2009, the Commission adopted proposals for Regulations establishing EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA. In this respect the Commission wishes to recall the Statements in relation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU it made at the adoption of the Regulations establishing the European Supervisory Authorities according to which: "As regards the process for the adoption of regulatory standards, the Commission emphasises the unique character of the financial services sector, following from the Lamfalussy structure and explicitly recognised in Declaration 39 to the TFEU. However, the Commission has serious doubts whether the restrictions on its role when adopting delegated acts and implementing measures are in line with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU."

4. Budgetary implications

The proposal has implications for the European Union budget related to the tasks allocated to ESMA, as specified in the legislative financial statements accompanying this proposal.

2012/0029 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national Parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee[6],

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank[7],

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) Central Securities Depositories (CSDs), along with Central Counterparties (CCPs) contribute to a large degree in maintaining post trade infrastructures that safeguard financial markets and give market participants confidence that securities transactions are executed properly and in a timely manner, including during periods of extreme stress.

(2) Due to their position at the end of the settlement process, the securities settlement systems operated by CSDs are of a systemic importance for the functioning of securities markets. Being situated at the top of the securities holding chain through which their participants report the securities holdings of investors, the securities settlement systems operated by CSDs also serve as an essential tool to control the integrity of an issue, playing an important role in maintaining investor confidence. Moreover, securities settlement systems operated by CSDs are closely involved in the collateralisation of monetary policy operations as well as in the collateralisation process between credit institutions and are, therefore, important actors in the collateral markets.

(3) While Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems[8] reduced the disruption to a securities settlement system caused by insolvency proceedings against a participant in that system, it is necessary to address other risks that securities settlement systems are facing, as well as the risk of insolvency or disruption in the functioning of the CSDs that operate securities settlement systems. A number of CSDs are subject to credit and liquidity risks deriving from the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement.

(4) The increasing number of cross-border settlements as a consequence of the development of link agreements between CSDs calls into question the resilience, in the absence of common prudential rules, of CSDs when importing the risks encountered by CSDs from other Member States. Moreover, despite the increase in cross-border settlements, the settlement markets in the Union remain fragmented and cross-border settlement more costly, due to different national rules regulating settlement and the activities of CSDs and limited competition between CSDs. This fragmentation hinders and creates additional risks and costs for cross-border settlement. In the absence of identical obligations for market operators and common prudential standards for CSDs, likely divergent measures taken at national level will have a direct negative impact on the safety, efficiency and competition in the settlement markets in the Union. It is necessary to remove those significant obstacles in the functioning of the internal market and avoid distortions of competition and to prevent such obstacles and distortions from arising in the future. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Regulation should be Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted in accordance with the consistent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(5) It is necessary to lay down in a Regulation a number of uniform obligations to be imposed on market participants regarding certain aspects of the settlement cycle and discipline and to provide a set of common requirements for CSDs operating securities settlement systems. The directly applicable rules of a Regulation should ensure that all market operators and CSDs are subject to identical directly applicable obligations and rules. A Regulation should increase the safety and efficiency of settlement in the Union by preventing any diverging national rules as a result of the transposition of a directive. A Regulation should reduce the regulatory complexity for market operators and CSDs resulting from different national rules and should allow CSDs to provide their services on a cross-border basis without having to comply with different sets of national requirements such as those concerning the authorisation, supervision, organisation or risks of CSDs. A Regulation imposing identical requirements on CSDs should also contribute to eliminating competitive distortions.

(6) The Financial Stability Board (FSB) called, on 20 October 2010[9], for more robust core market infrastructures and asked for the revision and enhancement of the existing standards. The Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) are finalising draft global standards. These are to replace the BIS recommendations from 2001, which were adapted through non-binding guidelines at European level in 2009 by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).

(7) The Council, in its conclusions of 2 December 2008[10], emphasised the need to strengthen the safety and soundness of the securities settlement systems, and to address legal barriers to post-trading in the Union.

(8) One of the basic tasks of the ESCB is to promote the smooth operation of payment systems. In this respect, the members of the ESCB execute oversight by ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems. The members of the ESCB often act as settlement agents for the cash leg of the securities transactions. They are also important clients of CSDs, which often manage the collateralisation of monetary policy operations. The members of the ESCB should be closely involved by being consulted in the authorisation and supervision of CSDs, recognition of third country CSDs and the approval of CSD links. They should also be closely involved by being consulted in the setting of regulatory and implementing technical standards as well as of guidelines and recommendations. The provisions of this Regulation should be without prejudice to the responsibilities of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs) to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and other countries.

(9) Member States' central banks or any other bodies performing similar functions in certain Member States, such as the Member States national bodies charged with or intervening in the management of the public debt may themselves provide a number of services which would qualify them as a CSD. Such institutions should be exempt from the authorisation and supervision requirements, but should remain subject to the full set of prudential requirements for CSDs. Since central banks act as settlement agents for the purpose of settlement, they should also be exempt from the requirements set out in Title IV of this Regulation.

(10) This Regulation should apply to the settlement of transactions in all financial instruments and activities of CSDs unless specified otherwise. This Regulation should also be without prejudice to other legislation of the Union concerning specific financial instruments such as Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC[11] and measures adopted in accordance with that Directive.

(11) The recording of securities in book-entry form is an important step to increase the efficiency of settlement and ensure the integrity of a securities issue, especially in a context of increasing complexity of holding and transfer methods. For reasons of safety, this Regulation provides for the recording in book-entry form of all transferable securities. This Regulation should not impose one particular method for the initial book-entry recording, which may take the form of immobilisation through the issuance of a global note or of immediate dematerialisation. This Regulation should not impose the type of institution that should record securities in book-entry form upon issuance and permits different actors, including registrars, to perform this function. However, once such securities are traded on trading venues regulated by Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC[12] or provided as collateral under the conditions of Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements[13], such securities should be recorded in a CSD book-entry system in order to ensure, inter alia, that all such securities can be settled in a securities settlement system.

(12) In order to ensure the safety of settlement, any participant to a securities settlement system buying or selling certain financial instruments, namely transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment undertakings and emission allowances, should settle its obligation on the intended settlement date.

(13) Longer settlement periods of transactions in transferable securities cause uncertainty and increased risk for securities settlement systems participants. Different durations of settlement periods across Member States hamper reconciliation and are sources of errors for issuers, investors and intermediaries. It is therefore necessary to provide a common settlement period which would facilitate the identification of the intended settlement date and facilitate the implementation of settlement discipline measures. The intended settlement date of transactions in transferable securities which are admitted to trading on trading venues regulated by Directive 2004/39/EC should be no later than on the second business day after the trading takes place.

(14) CSDs and other market infrastructures should take measures to prevent and address settlement fails. It is essential that such rules be uniformly and directly applied in the Union. In particular, CSDs and other market infrastructures should be required to put in place procedures enabling them to take appropriate measures to suspend any participant that systematically causes settlement fails and to disclose its identity to the public, provided that that participant has the opportunity to submit observations before such a decision is taken.

(15) One of the most efficient ways to address settlement fails is to require failing participants to be subject to a buy-in, whereby the securities which ought to be delivered must be bought in the market after the intended settlement date and delivered to the receiving participant. This Regulation should provide for uniform rules concerning certain aspects of the buy-in transaction for all transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment undertakings and emission allowances, such as the timing, notice period, pricing and penalties.

(16) As the main purpose of this Regulation is to introduce a number of legal obligations imposed directly on market operators consisting, inter alia, in the recording in book-entry form in a CSD of all transferable securities once such securities are traded on trading venues regulated by Directive 2004/39/EC or provided as collateral under the conditions of Directive 2002/47/EC and in the settling their obligations no later than on the second business day after trading takes place and as CSDs are responsible for the operation of securities settlement systems and the application of measures to provide timely settlement in the Union, it is essential to ensure that all CSDs are safe and sound and comply at all times with stringent organisational, conduct of business and prudential requirements established by this Regulation. Uniform and directly applicable rules regarding the authorisation and ongoing supervision of CSDs are therefore an essential corollary of and are interrelated with the legal obligations imposed on market participants by this Regulation. It is, therefore, necessary to include the rules regarding the authorisation and supervision of CSDs in the same act as the legal obligations imposed on market participants.

(17) Taking into account that CSDs should be subject to a set of common requirements and in order to dismantle the existing barriers to cross-border settlement, any authorised CSD should enjoy the freedom to provide its services within the territory of the Union either by establishment of a branch or by way of direct provision of services.

(18) Within a borderless Union settlement market, it is necessary to define the competences of the different authorities involved in the application of this Regulation. Member States should specifically designate the competent authorities responsible for the application of this Regulation, which should be afforded the supervisory and investigatory powers necessary for the exercise of their functions. A CSD should be subject to the authorisation and supervision of the competent authority of its place of establishment, which is well placed and should be empowered to examine how CSDs operate on a daily basis, to carry out regular reviews and to take appropriate action when necessary. That authority should however consult at the earliest stage and cooperate with other relevant authorities, which include the authorities responsible for the oversight of each securities settlement system operated by the CSD and, where applicable, the relevant central banks that act as settlement agent for each securities settlement system, and, also, where applicable, the competent authorities of other group entities. This cooperation also implies immediate information of the authorities involved in case of emergency situations affecting the liquidity and stability of the financial system in any of the Member States where the CSD or its participants are established. Whenever a CSD provides its services in another Member State than where it is established either by the establishment of a branch or by way of direct provision of services the competent authority of its place of establishment is mainly responsible for the supervision of that CSD.

(19) Any legal person falling within the definition of a CSD needs to be authorised by the competent national authorities before starting its activities. In view of taking into account different business models, a CSD should be defined by reference to certain core services, which consist of settlement, implying the operation of a securities settlement system, notary and central securities accounts maintenance services. A CSD should at least operate a securities settlement system and provide one other core service. This definition should exclude, therefore, entities which do not operate securities settlement systems such as registrars or public authorities and bodies in charge of a registry system established under Directive 2003/87/EC. This combination is essential for CSDs to play their role in the securities settlement and in ensuring the integrity of a securities issue.

(20) In order to avoid any risk taking by the CSDs in other activities than those subject to authorisation under this Regulation, the activities of the authorised CSDs should be limited to the provision of services covered by their authorisation and they should not hold any participation, as defined in the Regulation by reference to the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies[14], or any ownership, direct or indirect, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital in any other institutions than the ones providing similar services.

(21) In order to ensure the safety in the functioning of the securities settlement systems, the latter should be operated only by the CSDs subject to the rules provided in this Regulation or by central banks.

(22) Without prejudice to specific requirements of Member States tax legislation, CSDs should be authorised to provide services ancillary to their core services that contribute to enhancing the safety, efficiency and transparency of the securities markets. Where the provision of such services relates to withholding tax procedures, it will continue to be carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Member States concerned.

(23) A CSD intending to outsource a core service to a third party or to provide a new core or ancillary service, to operate another securities settlement system, to use another central bank as settlement agent or to set up a CSD link should apply for authorisation following the same procedure as that required for initial authorisation, with the exception that the competent authority should inform the applicant CSD within three months whether authorisation has been granted or refused.

(24) CSDs established in third countries may offer their services either through a branch or by way of direct provision of services to issuers and participants established in the Union in relation to their activities there and may set up links with CSDs established in the Union subject to recognition by ESMA. In view of the global nature of financial markets, ESMA is best placed to recognise third country CSDs. ESMA may recognise third country CSDs only if the Commission concludes that they are subject to a legal and supervisory framework equivalent to the one provided in this Regulation, if they are effectively authorised and supervised in their country and if cooperation arrangements have been established between ESMA and the competent authorities of CSDs. Recognition by ESMA is subject to an effective equivalent recognition of the prudential framework applicable to CSDs established in the Union and authorised under this Regulation.

(25) Considering the global nature of financial markets and the systemic importance of the CSDs, it is necessary to ensure international convergence of the prudential requirements to which they are subject. The provisions of this Regulation should follow the existing recommendations developed by CPSS-IOSCO and ESCB-CESR. ESMA should consider the existing standards and their future developments when drawing up or proposing to revise the regulatory technical and implementing standards as well as the guidelines and recommendations required in this Regulation.

(26) Considering the complexity as well as the systemic nature of the CSDs and of the services they provide, transparent governance rules should ensure that senior management, board members, shareholders and participants, who are in a position to exercise control as defined by reference to the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts[15], over the operation of the CSD, are suitable to ensure the sound and prudent management of the CSD.

(27) Transparent governance rules should ensure that the interests of the shareholders, the management and staff of the CSD, on the one hand, and the interests of their users, on the other, are taken into account. These governance principles should apply without prejudice to the ownership model adopted by the CSD. User committees should be established for each securities settlement system operated by the CSD to advise the board of the CSD on the key issues that impact its members.

(28) Considering the importance of the tasks entrusted to CSDs, this Regulation should provide that CSDs do not transfer their responsibilities to third parties through outsourcing of their activities. Outsourcing of such activities should be subject to strict conditions that maintain the CSDs' responsibility for their activities and ensure that the supervision and oversight of the CSDs are not impaired. Outsourcing by a CSD of its activities to public entities may, under certain conditions, be exempted from these requirements.

(29) Conduct of business rules should provide transparency in the relations between the CSD and its users. In particular, a CSD should have publicly disclosed, transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria for participation to the securities settlement system, which would allow restricting access of the participants only on the basis of the risks involved. A quick and appropriate remedy should be made available to competent authorities to address any unjustified refusal of CSDs to provide their services to participants. A CSD should publicly disclose prices and fees for its services. In order to provide open and non-discriminatory access to CSD services and in view of the significant market power that CSDs still enjoy on the territory of their respective Member States, a CSD may not diverge from its published pricing policy. A CSD should provide for recognised communication procedures. These participation provisions complement and reinforce the right of market participants to use a settlement system in another Member State provided for in Directive 2004/39/EC.

(30) Considering the central role of securities settlement systems in the financial markets, CSDs should, when providing their services, ensure the timely settlement, the integrity of the issue, the segregation of the securities accounts maintained for each participant and the possibility to offer, upon request, further segregation of the accounts of the participants' clients. CSDs should ensure that these requirements apply separately to each securities settlement system operated by them.

(31) In order to avoid settlement risks due to the insolvency of the settlement agent, a CSD should settle, whenever practical and available, the cash leg of the securities transaction through accounts opened with a central bank. If this option is not practical and available, a CSD should be able to settle through accounts opened with a credit institution established under the conditions provided in Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions[16] and subject to a specific authorisation procedure and prudential requirements provided in Title IV of this Regulation. The latter, when acting as settlement agent, should be able to provide to the CSD's participants the services set out in this Regulation, which are covered by the authorisation, and may otherwise provide other services not covered by this Regulation.

(32) Considering that Directive 2006/48/EC does not address specifically intraday credit and liquidity risks resulting from the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement, credit institutions providing such services should also be subject to specific enhanced credit and liquidity risk mitigation requirements that should apply to each securities settlement system in respect of which they act as settlement agents. In order to ensure full compliance with specific measures aimed at mitigating credit and liquidity risks, the competent authorities should be able to require CSDs to designate more than one credit institution whenever they can demonstrate, based on the available evidence, that the exposures of one credit institution to the concentration of credit and liquidity risks is not fully mitigated.

(33) The requirement that the settlement of the cash leg of the securities transaction be carried out by a separate legal entity acting as settlement agent is an important measure to increase the safety and resilience of CSDs. Such a separation between core services of CSDs and banking services ancillary to settlement appears indeed indispensible for eliminating any danger of transmission of the risks from the banking services, such as credit and liquidity risks, to the provision of core services of CSDs. There are no less intrusive measures available for eliminating those credit and liquidity risks in order to ensure the envisaged level of safety and resilience of CSDs. However, in order to secure the efficiencies resulting from the provision of both CSD and banking services within the same group of undertakings, the requirement that banking services be carried out by a separate credit institution should not prevent that credit institution from belonging to the same group of undertakings as the CSD. If both CSD and banking services are provided within the same group of undertakings, in order to increase the safety and efficiency of the services provided, the activities of the credit institution providing banking services should be limited to the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement. Furthermore, a derogation to the obligation to separate banking services ancillary to settlement from core CSD services should be available in the absence of any danger of transmission of credit and liquidity risks from the banking services to the provision of core services of CSDs. In order to ensure a consistent application of the possibility to derogate from the obligation on CSDs not to provide any banking type of ancillary services, the Commission should be empowered to decide, at the request of a national competent authority, whether any such derogation is permitted in view of the absence of systemic risk incurred by the provision of both CSD core and banking services by the same legal entity. In any case, the activitities of a CSD benefiting from any such derogation and authorised as a credit institution should be limited exclusively to the provision of banking services ancillary to settlement.

(34) In order to provide a sufficient degree of safety and continuity of the services provided by the CSDs, the CSD should be subject to specific uniform and directly applicable prudential and capital requirements which do mitigate their legal, operational and investment risks.

(35) The safety of the link arrangements set up between CSDs should be subject to specific requirements to enable the access of their respective participants to other securities settlement systems. The requirement to provide banking type of ancillary services in separate legal entity should not prevent CSDs from receiving such services, in particular when they are participants in a securities settlement system operated by another CSD. It is particularly important that any potential risks resulting from the link arrangements such as credit, liquidity, organisational or any other relevant risks for CSDs are fully mitigated. For interoperability links, it is important that linked securities settlement systems have identical moments of entry of transfer orders into the system, irrevocability of transfer orders and finality of transfers of securities and cash. The same principles should apply to CSDs that use a common settlement information technology (IT) infrastructure.

(36) As operators of securities settlement systems, CSDs perform a key role in the process of transferring securities on securities accounts. In order to enhance legal certainty especially in a cross-border context, it is important to establish clear rules on the law applicable to ownership aspects in relation to the securities that are maintained by a CSD in its accounts. Following the approach taken by the existing conflict of laws rules, the applicable law should be the law of the place where the accounts of a CSD are maintained.

(37) In many Member States issuers are required by national law to issue certain types of securities, notably shares, within their national CSDs. In order to remove this barrier to the smooth functioning of the Union post-trading market and to allow issuers to opt for the most efficient way for managing their securities, issuers should have the right to choose any CSD established in the Union for recording their securities and receiving any relevant CSD services. A quick and appropriate remedy should be made available to competent authorities to address any unjustified refusal of CSDs to provide their services to issuers. In order to protect the rights of shareholders, the right of issuers to choose a CSD should not prevent the application of the national corporate laws under which the securities are constituted and which govern the relation between issuers and their shareholders.

(38) The European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement of 7 November 2006[17] created a voluntary framework to enable access between CSDs and other market infrastructures. However, the post-trade sector remains fragmented along national lines, making cross-border trades more costly. It is necessary to lay down uniform conditions for links between CSDs and of access between CSDs and other market infrastructures. In order to enable CSDs to offer their participants access to other markets, they should have a right to become a participant of another CSD or request another CSD to develop special functions for having access to the latter. A quick and appropriate remedy should be made available to competent authorities to address any unjustified refusal of a CSD to grant access to another CSD. Since CSD links may introduce additional risk for settlement, they should be subject to authorisation and supervision by the relevant competent authorities.

(39) CSDs should also have access to transaction feeds from a CCP or a trading venue and those market infrastructures should have access to the securities settlement systems operated by the CSDs, unless such access endangers the operation of their activities. A quick and appropriate remedy should be made available to competent authorities to address any unjustified refusal of CSDs or market infrastructures to provide access to their services.

(40) A sound prudential and conduct of business framework for the finanical sector should rest on strong supervisory and sanctioning regimes. To this end, supervisory authorities should be equipped with sufficient powers to act and should be able to rely on deterrent sanctioning regimes to be used against any unlawful conduct. A review of existing sanctioning powers and their practical application aimed at promoting convergence of sanctions across the range of supervisory activities has been carried out in the Communication of 8 December 2010 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on reinforcing sanctioning in the financial services sector.

(41) Therefore, in order to ensure effective compliance by CSDs, credit institutions designated as settlement agents, the members of their management bodies and any other persons who effectively control their business or any other persons with the requirements of this Regulation, competent authorities should be able to apply administrative sanctions and measures which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

(42) In order to provide deterrence and consistent application of the sanctions across Member States, this Regulation should provide for a list of key administrative sanctions and measures that need to be available to the competent authorities, for the power to impose those sanctions and measures on all persons, whether legal or natural, responsible for a breach, for a a list of key criteria when determining the level and type of those sanctions and measures and for levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions. Administrative fines should take into account factors such as any identified financial benefit resulting from the breach, the gravity and duration of the breach, any aggravating or mitigating factors, the need for fines to have a deterrent effect and, where appropriate, include a discount for cooperation with the competent authority. The adoption and publication of sanctions should respect fundamental rights as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the rights to respect for private and family life (Article 7), the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8) and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47).

(43) In order to detect potential breaches, effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of potential or actual breaches of this Regulation to the competent authorities should be put in place. These mechanisms should include adequate safeguards for the persons who report potential or actual breaches of this Regulation and the persons accused of such breaches. Appropriate procedures should be established to comply with the accused person's right to protection of personal data, with the right of defence and to be heard before the adoption of a final decision affecting that person as well as with the right to seek effective remedy before a tribunal against any decision or measure affecting that person.

(44) This Regulation should be without prejudice to any provisions in the law of Member States relating to criminal sanctions.

(45) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data[18] governs the processing of personal data carried out in the Member States pursuant to this Regulation. Any exchange or transmission of personal data by competent authorities of the Member States should be undertaken in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data as laid down in Directive 95/46/EC. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data[19] governs the processing of personal data carried out by ESMA pursuant to this Regulation. Any exchange or transmission of personal data carried out by ESMA should be in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.

(46) This Regulation complies with the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the rights to respect for private and family life, the right to the protection of personal data, the right to an effective remedy or to a fair trial, the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence, the freedom to conduct a business, and has to be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.

(47) European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC[20], should play a central role in the application of this Regulation by ensuring consistent application of Union rules by national competent authorities and by settling disagreements between them.

(48) As a body with highly specialised expertise regarding securities and securities markets, it is efficient and appropriate to entrust ESMA with the elaboration of draft regulatory and implementing technical standards which do not involve policy choices, for submission to the Commission. Whenever specified, ESMA should also involve closely the members of the ESCB and the European Banking Authority (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC[21].

(49) The Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and with the procedure set out in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 with regard to the detailed elements of the settlement discipline measures; the information and other elements to be included by a CSD in its application for authorisation; the information that different authorities shall supply each other when supervising the CSDs; the details of the cooperation arrangements between home and host authorities; the elements of the governance arrangements for CSDs; the details of the records to be kept by CSDs; the details of the measures to be taken by CSDs so that the integrity of the issue is maintained; the protection of the participants' securities; the timely achievement of settlement; the mitigation of the operational risks and of the risks derived from the CSD links; the details of the capital requirements for CSDs; the details of the prudential requirements on credit and liquidity risks for the designated credit institutions.

(50) The Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 with regard to standard forms and templates for the application for authorisation by CSDs; for the provision of information between different competent authorities for the purposes of supervision of CSDs; for the relevant cooperation arrangements between home and host authorities; for formats of records to be kept by CSDs; for the procedures in cases when a participant or an issuer is denied access to a CSD, CSDs are denied access between themselves or between CSDs and other market infrastructures; for the consultation of different authorities prior to granting authorisation to a settlement agent.

(51) The Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty. In particular, the delegated acts should be adopted in respect of specific details concerning definitions; the criteria under which the operations of a CSD in a host Member State should be considered of substantial importance for that Member State; the services for which a third country CSD shall seek for recognition by ESMA and the information that the applicant CSD shall provide ESMA in its application for recognition; the risks which may justify a refusal by a CSD of access to participants and the elements of the procedure available for requesting participants; the assessment of situations when settlement in central bank money is not practical and available; the elements of the procedure for access of issuers to CSDs, access between CSDs and between CSDs and other market infrastructures.

(52) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to take decisions on the assessment of rules from third countries for the purposes of recognition of third country CSDs and derogations from the obligation to separate banking services ancillary to settlement from core CSD services. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers[22].

(53) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to lay down uniform requirements for settlement as well as for CSDs, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(54) It is necessary to amend Directive 98/26/EC to bring it in line with the Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority)[23], whereby designated securities settlement systems are no longer notified to the Commission but to ESMA.

(55) The application of the authorisation and recognition requirements of this Regulation should be deferred in order to provide CSDs established in the Union or in third countries with sufficient time to seek authorisation and recognition provided for in this Regulation.

(56) It is also necessary to defer the application of the requirements of recording certain transferable securities in book-entry form and settling obligations in securities settlement systems no later than on the second business day after the trading in order to provide market participants, holding securities in paper form or using longer settlement periods, with sufficient time to comply with those requirements.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Title I Subject matter, scope and definitions

Article 1 Subject matter and scope

1. This Regulation lays down uniform requirements for the settlement of financial instruments in the Union and rules on the organisation and conduct of central securities depositories to promote safe and smooth settlement.

2. This Regulation applies to the settlement of all financial instruments and activities of CSDs unless otherwise specified in the provisions of this Regulation.

3. This Regulation is without prejudice to provisions of Union legislation concerning specific financial instruments, in particular Directive 2003/87/EC.

4. Articles 9 to 18 and 20 as well as the provisions of Title IV do not apply to the members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), other Member States' national bodies performing similar functions or Member States' public bodies charged with or intervening in the management of the public debt.

Article 2 Definitions

1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘central securities depository’ ('CSD') means a legal person that operates a securities settlement system listed in point 3 of Section A of the Annex and performs at least one other core service listed in Section A of the Annex;

(2) 'settlement' means the completion of a securities transaction with the aim of discharging the obligations of participants through the transfer of funds or securities;

(3) 'securities settlement system' means a system under the first and second indents of point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC whose business consists of the execution of transfer orders as defined in the second indent of point (i) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC;

(4) 'settlement period' means the time period between the trade date and the intended settlement date;

(5) 'business day' means business day as defined in point (n) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC;

(6) 'settlement fail' means the non-occurrence of settlement of a securities transaction on the intended settlement date due to a lack of securities or cash, regardless of the underlying cause;

(7) 'intended settlement date' means the date on which the parties to a securities transaction agree that settlement is to take place;

(8) 'central counterparty (CCP)' means an entity that interposes itself between the counterparties to the contracts traded within one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer;

(9) 'competent authority' means the authority designated by each Member State in accordance with Article 10;

(10) 'participant' means any participant, as defined in point (f) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC, including a CCP, to a securities settlement system;

(11) ‘participation’ means participation within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 17 of Directive 78/660/EEC, or the ownership, direct or indirect, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking;

(12) ‘home Member State’ means the Member State in which a CSD has been authorised;

(13) ‘host Member State’ means the Member State, other than the home Member State, in which a CSD has a branch or provides CSD services;

(14) ‘branch’ means a place of business other than the head office which is a part of a CSD, which has no legal personality and which provides CSD services for which the CSD has been authorised;

(15) ‘control’ means the relationship between two undertakings as defined in Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC;

(16) 'participant's default' means a situation where insolvency proceedings, as defined in point (j) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC, are opened against a participant;

(17) 'delivery versus payment' ('DVP') means a securities settlement mechanism which links a transfer of securities with a transfer of funds in a way that the delivery of securities occurs only if the corresponding payment occurs;

(18) 'securities account' means an account on which securities may be credited or debited;

(19) 'CSD link' means an arrangement between CSDs whereby one CSD opens an account in the securities settlement system of another CSD in order to facilitate the transfer of securities from its participants to the participants of that CSD. CSD links include standard link access, customised link access and interoperable links;

(20) 'standard link access' means a CSD link whereby a CSD is connected to another CSD as any other participant to the securities settlement system operated by the latter;

(21) 'customised link access' means a CSD link whereby a CSD provides specific services to another CSD distinct from the services provided to other participants to its securities settlement system;

(22) 'interoperability links' means CSD links whereby the securities settlement systems operated by CSDs become interoperable as defined in point (o) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC;

(23) 'transferable securities' means transferable securities as defined in point (18) of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(24) 'money-market instruments' means money-market instruments as defined in point (19) of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(25) 'units in collective investment undertakings' means units in collective investment undertakings as referred to in point (3) of Section C of Annex I of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(26) 'emission allowances' means any units recognised for compliance with the requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC;

(27) 'regulated market' means 'regulated market' as defined in point (14) of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(28) 'multilateral trading facility (MTF)' means multilateral trading facility as defined in point (15) of Article 4 of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(29) 'organised trading facility (OTF)' means any system or facility, which is not a regulated market or MTF, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, in which multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments are able to interact in the system in a way that results in a contract in accordance with the provisions of Title II of Directive 2004/39/EC;

(30) 'subsidiary' means a subsidiary undertaking within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC;

(31) 'settlement agent' means settlement agent as defined in point (d) of Article 2 of Directive 98/26/EC.

2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64 concerning measures to specify the technical elements of the definitions in points (17), (20), (21) and (22) of paragraph 1, and to specify the ancillary services set out in points (1) to (4) of Section B of the Annex and the services set out in points (1) and (2) of Section C of the Annex.

Title II Securities settlement

Chapter I Book-entry form

Article 3 Book-entry form

1. Any company that issues transferable securities which are admitted to trading on regulated markets shall arrange for such securities to be represented in book-entry form as immobilisation through the issuance of a global note, which represents the whole issue, or subsequent to a direct issuance of the securities into a dematerialised form.

2. Where the securities referred to in paragraph 1 are traded on regulated markets, traded on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) or organised trading facilities (OTFs) or are transferred following a financial collateral arrangement as defined in point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/47/EC, those securities shall be recorded in book-entry form in a CSD prior to the trade date, unless they have already been so recorded.

Article 4 Enforcement

1. The authorities of the Member State where the company that issues securities is established shall be competent for ensuring that Article 3(1) is applied.

2. The authorities competent for the supervision of the regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs shall ensure that Article 3(2) is applied when the securities referred to in Article 3(1) are traded on regulated markets, MTFs or OTFs.

3. Member States' authorities responsible for the application of Directive 2002/47/EC shall be competent for ensuring that Article 3(2) of this Regulation is applied when the securities referred to in Article 3(1) of this Regulation are transferred following a financial collateral arrangement as defined in point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/47/EC.

Chapter II Settlement periods

Article 5 Intended settlement dates

1. Any participant to a securities settlement system buying or selling on its own account or on behalf of a third party transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment undertakings and emission allowances shall settle its obligation in relation to the securities settlement system on the intended settlement date.

2. As regards transferable securities referred to in paragraph 1 which are traded on regulated markets, MTFs or OTFs, the intended settlement date shall be no later than on the second business day after the trading takes place.

3. The relevant authority of the Member State whose law applies to the securities settlement system operated by a CSD shall be competent for ensuring that paragraphs 1 and 2 are applied.

Chapter III Settlement discipline

Article 6 Measures to prevent settlement fails

1. Any regulated market, MTF or OTF shall establish procedures that enable the confirmation of relevant details of transactions in financial instruments referred to in Article 5 (1) on the date when the orders have been sent to it.

2. For each securities settlement system it operates, a CSD shall establish procedures that facilitate the settlements of transactions in financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) on the intended settlement date. It shall promote early settlement on the intended settlement date through appropriate mechanisms, such as a progressive tariff structure.

3. For each securities settlement system it operates, a CSD shall establish monitoring tools that allow it to identify in advance settlements of transactions in financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) that are most likely to fail and it shall require participants to settle such transactions on the intended settlement date.

4. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) shall develop in consultation with the members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) draft regulatory technical standards to specify the details of the procedures enabling confirmation of relevant details of transactions and facilitating settlement referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 and the details of the monitoring tools identifying likely settlement fails referred to in paragraph 3.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by six months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

Article 7 Measures to address settlement fails

1. For each securities settlement system it operates, a CSD shall establish a system that monitors settlement fails of transactions in financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1). It shall provide regular reports to the competent authority and to any person with a legitimate interest as to the number and details of settlement fails and any other relevant information. The competent authorities shall share with ESMA any relevant information on settlement fails.

2. For each securities settlement system it operates, a CSD shall establish procedures that facilitate settlement of transactions in financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) that are not settled on the intended settlement date. These procedures shall provide for a sufficiently deterrent penalty mechanism for participants that cause the settlement fails.

3. A participant to a securities settlement system that fails to deliver the financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) to the receiving participant on the intended settlement date shall be subject to a buy-in whereby those instruments shall be bought in the market no later than four days after the intended settlement date and delivered to that receiving participant and other measures in accordance with paragraph 4.

4. The measures referred to in paragraph 3 shall specify at least the following:

(a) the daily penalty paid by the defaulting participant for each business day between the intended settlement date and the actual settlement date;

(b) the notice period given to the defaulting participant before the execution of a buy-in;

(c) the pricing and costs of a buy-in;

(d) where relevant, the party that executes the buy-in;

(e) the amount of compensation for the receiving participant in case the execution of the buy-in is not possible.

5. The measures referred to in paragraph 3 shall ensure that:

(a) the receiving participant receives at least the price of the financial instruments agreed at the time of the trade;

(b) the daily penalty paid by the defaulting participant is sufficiently deterrent for the defaulting participant;

(c) where the execution of the buy-in is not possible, the amount of cash compensation paid to the receiving participant is higher than the price of the financial instruments agreed at the time of the trade and the last publicly available price for such instruments on the trading venue where the trade took place, and is sufficiently deterrent for the defaulting participant;

(d) the parties referred to in paragraph 7, including CCPs, who execute the buy-in disclose to participants the fees charged for this service;

(e) if a party other than the failing participant executes the buy-in, the failing participant reimburse all amounts paid by the executing party in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4.

6. CSDs, CCPs, regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs shall establish procedures that enable them to suspend any participant that fails systematically to deliver the financial instruments referred to in paragraph 1 or cash on the intended settlement date and to disclose to the public its identity only after giving that participant the opportunity to submit its observations.

7. Paragraphs 2 to 6 shall apply to all transactions of the instruments referred to in Article 5 (1) which are admitted to trading on regulated markets, traded on MTFs or OTFs or cleared by a CCP.

For transactions cleared by a CCP before being settled within a securities settlement system, the measures referred to in paragraph 3 to 5 shall be executed by the CCP.

For transactions not cleared by a CCP, the regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs shall include in their internal rules an obligation on their participants to be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 3 to 5.

8. ESMA shall develop in consultation with the members of the ESCB draft regulatory technical standards to specify the details of the system monitoring settlement fails and the reports on settlement fails referred to in paragraph 1, of the procedures facilitating settlement of transactions following settlement fails referred to in paragraph 2 and the measures referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by six months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

Article 8 Enforcement

1. The relevant authority of the Member State whose law applies to the securities settlement system operated by a CSD shall be competent for ensuring that Articles 6 and 7 are applied and for monitoring the penalties imposed, in close cooperation with the authorities competent for the supervision of the regulated markets, MTFs, OTFs, and CCPs referred to in Article 7. In particular, the authorities shall monitor the application of penalties referred to in Article 7 (2) and (4) and of the measures referred to in Article 7(6).

2. In order to ensure consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices within the Union in relation to Articles 6 and 7 of this Regulation, ESMA may issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

Title III Central securities depositories

Chapter I Authorisation and supervision of CSDs

Section 1 Authorities responsible for authorisation and supervision of CSDs

Article 9 Competent authority

A CSD shall be authorised and supervised by the competent authority of the Member State where it is established.

Article 10 Designation of the competent authority

1. Each Member State shall designate the competent authority responsible for carrying out the duties under this Regulation for the authorisation and supervision of CSDs established in its territory and shall inform ESMA thereof.

Where a Member State designates more than one competent authority, it shall determine their respective roles and shall designate a single authority to be responsible for cooperation with other Member States' competent authorities, the relevant authorities referred to in Article 11, ESMA, and EBA whenever specifically referred to in this Regulation.

2. ESMA shall publish on its website a list of the competent authorities designated in accordance with paragraph 1.

3. The competent authorities shall have the supervisory and investigatory powers necessary for the exercise of their functions.

Article 11 Relevant authorities

1. The following authorities shall be involved in the authorisation and supervision of CSDs whenever specifically referred to in this Regulation:

(a) the authority responsible for the oversight of the securities settlement system operated by the CSD in the Member State whose law applies to that securities settlement system;

(b) where applicable, the central bank in the Union in whose books the cash leg of a securities settlement system operated by the CSD is settled or, in case of settlement through a credit institution in accordance with Title IV, the central bank in the Union of issue of the relevant currency.

2. ESMA shall publish on its website the list of the relevant authorities referred to in paragraph 1.

Article 12 Cooperation between authorities

1. The authorities referred to in Articles 9 and 11 and ESMA shall cooperate closely for the application of this Regulation, in particular in emergency situations referred to in Article 13. Whenever appropriate and relevant, such cooperation shall include other public authorities and bodies, in particular those established or appointed under Directive 2003/87/EC.

In order to ensure consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices within the Union, including cooperation between authorities referred to in Articles 9 and 11 in the different assessments necessary for the application of this Regulation, ESMA may issue guidelines addressed to authorities referred to in Article 9 in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2. The competent authorities shall, in the exercise of their general duties, duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned, in particular in the emergency situations referred to in Article 13, based on the available information.

Article 13 Emergency situations

The authorities referred to in Articles 9 and 11 shall immediately inform ESMA and each other of any emergency situation relating to a CSD, including of any developments in financial markets, which may have an adverse effect on market liquidity and on the stability of the financial system in any of the Member States where the CSD or one of its participants are established.

Section 2 Conditions and procedures for authorisation of CSDs

Article 14 Authorisation of a CSD

1. Any legal person that falls within the definition of CSD shall obtain an authorisation from the competent authority of the Member State where it is established before commencing its activities.

2. The authorisation shall specify the services set out in Sections A and B of the Annex, which the CSD is authorised to provide.

3. A CSD shall comply at all times with the conditions necessary for the authorisation.

A CSD shall, without undue delay, inform the competent authority of any material changes affecting the conditions for authorisation.

Article 15 Procedure for granting authorisation

1. The applicant CSD shall submit an application for authorisation to its competent authority.

2. The application for authorisation shall be accompanied by all information necessary to enable the competent authority to satisfy itself that the applicant CSD has established, at the time of the authorisation, all the necessary arrangements to meet its obligations set out in this Regulation. The application for authorisation shall contain a programme of operations setting out the types of business envisaged and the structural organisation of the CSD.

3. Within 20 working days from the receipt of the application, the competent authority shall assess whether the application is complete. If the application is not complete, the competent authority shall set a time limit by which the applicant CSD has to provide additional information. The competent authority shall inform the applicant CSD when the application is considered to be complete.

4. As from the moment when the application is considered to be complete, the competent authority shall transmit all information included in the application to the relevant authorities referred to in Article 11 and consult those authorities concerning the features of the securities settlement system operated by the applicant CSD.

5. The competent authority shall, before granting authorisation to the applicant CSD, consult the competent authorities of the other Member State involved in the following cases:

(a) the CSD is a subsidiary of a CSD authorised in another Member State;

(b) the CSD is a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of a CSD authorised in another Member State;

(c) the CSD is controlled by the same natural or legal persons who control a different CSD authorised in another Member State.

The consultation referred to in the first subparagraph shall cover the following:

(a) the suitability of the shareholders and participants referred to in Article 25(4) and the reputation and experience of persons who effectively direct the business of the CSD whenever those shareholders, participants and persons are common to both the CSD and a CSD authorised in another Member State;

(b) whether the relations referred to in paragraph 5 between the CSD authorised in another Member State and the applicant CSD do not affect the ability of the latter to comply with the requirements of this Regulation.

6. Within six months from the submission of a complete application, the competent authority shall inform the applicant CSD in writing with a fully reasoned decision whether the authorisation has been granted or refused.

7. ESMA shall develop in consultation with the members of the ESCB draft regulatory technical standards to specify the information that the applicant CSD shall provide to the competent authority in the application for authorisation.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by six months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

8. ESMA shall develop in consultation with the members of the ESCB draft implementing technical standards to establish standard forms, templates and procedures for the application for authorisation.

ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by six months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

Article 16 Effects of the authorisation

1. The activities of the authorised CSD shall be limited to the provision of services covered by its authorisation.

2. Securities settlement systems may be operated only by authorised CSDs and central banks.

3. An authorised CSD shall not be exposed to any risks related to the provision of banking type of ancillary services by the credit institution designated to provide such services in accordance with Title IV.

4. An authorised CSD may only have a participation in a legal person whose activities are limited to the provision of services set out in Sections A and B of the Annex.

Article 17 Extension and outsourcing of activities and services

1. An authorised CSD shall submit a request for authorisation to the competent authority of the Member State where it is established whenever it wishes to outsource a core service to a third party under Article 28 or extend its activities to one or more of the following:

(a) additional core and ancillary services set out in the Sections A and B of the Annex not covered by the initial authorisation;

(b) the operation of another securities settlement system;

(c) the settlement of all or part the cash leg of its securities settlement system in the books of another central bank;

(d) setting up any CSD link.

2. The granting of authorisation under paragraph 1 shall follow the procedure set out in Article 15.

The competent authority shall inform the applicant CSD whether the authorisation has been granted or refused within three months of the submission of a complete application.

Article 18 Withdrawal of authorisation

1. The competent authority of the Member State where the CSD is established shall withdraw the authorisation in any of the following circumstances:

(a) where the CSD has not made use of the au