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Vol. 1983/02 59 
  
 
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(83) 722 final
Brussels, 28th November 1983
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION 
IN THE COMMUNITY
(Communication from the Commission to the European Council, 
Athens, 5-6 December 1983)
COM(83) 722 final

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY
(Communication from the Commission to the European Council,
5-6 December 1983)
CONTENTS
I. The European economy: the outturn for 1983 and the outlook for 1984
II. The factors of uncertainty
A. The instability of the international environment
B. The revival of investment
C. The reinforcement of the Community's economic structures
III. Economic policy guidelines
A. Domestic economic policies
B. The Community's contribution
IV. Unemployment: particular considerations

This Communication on the economic and social situation addresses the 
questions raised by the European Council at its meeting in Stuttgart on the 
extent of the upturn and the conditions for a lasting recovery of the 
European economies, as well as increasing employment and productive 
investment.
It follows on, in particular, from the Annual Economic Report 1983-84, 
which contains a detailed analysis of the economic situation and immediate 
outlook, the structural difficulties still confronting the Community 
and the conditions for consolidating the economic upturn. In addition 
the European Council has received a number of communications on the 
development of a range of new policies at Community level.
The first part of this Communication on the economic and social situation 
examines the economic outturn for 1983 and the outlook for 1984. The second 
part describes the factors of uncertainty affecting a lasting recovery, 
and the third part presents proposals for bringing about such a recovery.
I- THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY :  THE OUTTURN FOR 1983 AND THE OUTLOOK FOR 1984
A. There are some signs of economic recovery in the Community, and this 
should be confirmed in 1984; real growth, which was negative in 1981 
(-0.4%), is expected to be +0.5% in 1983 and +1.5% in 1984. This recovery 
has three characteristics :
the upturn is slow and, for example, significantly weaker than in the 
United States (+3.5% in 1983; 4.5% in 1984) and in Japan (+2.8% in 1983; 
+3.6% in 1984);
- it is unevenly distributed amongst the Member States; the average figure 
for the Community is largely due to the performance of the economy in 
Germany (+0.7% in 1983 and +2.1% in 1984) and in the United Kingdom 
(+2.8% in 1983 and +2.2% in 1984); but in five Member States growth is 
expected to be negative in 1983 and still weak in 1984;

-  2 -
- it is fragile in that it is due mainly to rising private consumption, 
stock replenishment and a temporary increase in house-building. Investment 
and export demand will have contributed little in 1983; but in 1984 
world imports could increase at a rate of some 3.5% in volume terms
(0.1% in 1983), which will help to underpin the recovery.
B. The rise in unemployment slowed down in 1983, and even levelled off 
in the first half of the year. Two points must be made to qualify this 
statement :
- the initial levelling-off of unemployment towards the end of the first 
half of 1983 must be interpreted with caution; it is difficult to say 
whether, after three unbroken years of sharply rising unemployment,
a change in trend has really occured in the Community. Uncertainties 
remain as regards behaviour affecting the trend of activity rates and 
the labour supply in general, and as regards the possible effect 
of incipient economic recovery and specific employment measures on the 
demand for labour;
- both the level of unemployment (10.4% of the labour force in 1983) 
and the outlook for 1984 (around 10.9%) confirm that, in spite of the 
recovery which is beginning, the problem of unemployment remains serious 
and, consequently, the objective of reversing the present trend and
then reducing the rate of unemployment must remain a central consideration 
in the formulation of economic policies.
C. Convergence in economic performance has improved significantly :
1. inflation has fallen rapidly :  after years of sharp rises in consumer 
prices (11.2% in 1980, 10.1% in 1981 and 8.7% in 1982), inflation should 
be down to 6.3% in 1983 and is expected to fall to 5.6% in 1984.

- 3 -
These Community averages mask increased convergence between national 
rates of inflation :  the spread in 1980 was from 5.5% (Germany) to more 
than 20% (Italy and Greece) and will narrow in 1983 to a range of 3% 
(Netherlands) to some 15% (Italy and Greece) and, in 1984, to a range 
of 3.5% (Germany) to some 11.5% (Italy), leaving aside Greece where 
inflation will still be 18.5%.
2. The Community's balance of payments on current account is gradually 
moving back into equilibrium; following deficits of 1.3% of GDP in 1980 
and 0.6% in 1981 and 1982, equilibrium should be achieved in 1984 
(deficit of 0.3% in 1983).
Here too, the wide divergences between Member States in 1981 and 1982 
should be reduced, mainly because of a significant improvement in the balance 
of payments positions of Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy.
3. Lastly, the average level of general government borrowing requirements, 
while remaining high at around 5.4% of GDP in 1983, is tending to stabilize 
and could indeed be reduced to some 4.7% of GDP in 1984. The public debt 
burden accounts for a considerable proportion of the deficit :  if net interest 
payments were excluded, the deficit would account for only 0.6% of GDP in 1984.
H. THE FACTORS OF UNCERTAINTY
The prospects for a lasting recovery with satisfactory stability are 
influenced by three factors, namely the international monetary and financial 
situation, the revival of investment and the strengthening of the Community's 
economic structures.
A. The j_ns_t_abi_lji_ty^ £f_the_internat_i£njal_envi_ronment_
(1) The level of interest rates, in real terms, is still too high, largely 
as a result of the fiscal policy pursued by the United States. Quite 
apart from the fact that it is not normal for the cost of money 
to be so high during a period when activity is picking up again, 
persistent high real interest rates are seriously handicapping the economies 
of the developing countries, where the burden of the external debt 
continues to stultify development potential. In addition, they could

- 4 -
affect the recovery in the industrialized countries, where a fall in 
interest rates is needed for the revival in investment that is crucial 
to a return to lasting growth.
(2) Similarly, exchange rates continue to fluctuate widely, at levels 
which do not reflect basic economic realities. This sort of situation 
inevitably encourages purely speculative activities that absorb an 
undue proportion of savings. It is also liable to provoke protectionist 
reactions; it is therefore a factor of uncertainty hampering the recovery 
in investment in the exporting sectors.
The sharp rise in the'dollar during recent months has improved Europe's 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States; but since at the same time 
the yen and the currencies of the other South-East Asian countries have 
remained weak, the Community's real gains have been rather limited.
(3) Lastly, the question of international indebtedness :  stabilization 
of the financial situation, accompanied by appropriate adjustment 
policies, the reinforcement of the financial resources and of the supervisory 
rôle of international institutions, and, above all, the strengthening of the 
recovery in the industrialized countries,are the main conditions for a 
lasting solution to this problem.
B. _The £ev_i va_l_ £f_i nyestment_
Only a revival of investment, and especially productive investment, can 
sustain the recovery and gradually increase the potential rate of growthA
of the European economies , which has fallen from 4.7% per year over the  
period 1969-73 to some 2% over the period 1975-83. At the same time,  
investment as a proportion of GDP has fallen from 21% per year over the  
period 1971-80 to less than 19% in 1983.
The potential rate of growth is defined as the rate of growth which can 
be achieved assuming maximum use of productive capacity.

- 5 -
C. The reinforcement of_the_Commuriity_^s_e£oriomi_c st£uc_tiJres_
The European economy has suffered a number of rude shocks over the Last 
ten years :  oil prices have tripled in six years; the Labour force has 
grown on average by 0.8% per year; the international monetary system 
has been disrupted, whilst an immense international financial market has 
grown up which has facilitated massive capital movements; and competition 
from newly industrialized countries has considerably increased.
Generally speaking, Europe has reacted effectively to the shocks which 
have befallen the world economy. In the energy sector, for example, it 
has made significant progress in uncoupling essential energy consumption 
and GDP growth :  the elasticity of energy consumption with respect to 
GDP growth fell from 1 in 1973 to 0.65 in 1981.
However, Europe lags behind its principal competitors (notably the 
United States and Japan) in certain fields which, by reason of their 
technical and technological content, will determine, in future, whether 
or not Europe can maintain and increase its market share :  an improved 
performance in these fields would contribute, directly and indirectly, 
to strengthening the productive base of European economies and to the 
creation of viable employment.
For example, Community exports of plant and machinery over the period 1978-81 
increased by only 5.2% per year in real terms compared with an increase in 
United States exports over the same period of 8.7% per year and in Japanese 
exports of 11.5% per year. The situation concerning the spread of new technolo­
gies is the same :  at the end of 1982, for exampLe, the number of robots 
in use stood at 3 000 in Germany, 1  000 in the United Kingdom, 750 in France 
and 600 in Italy, compared with 13 000 in Japan.
To sum up, although the European economy has begun a series of structural 
adaptations, it is still faced with the dual imperative of modernization and 
competitiveness, on which the solution of the employment problem largely 
depends. It is therefore still of paramount importance to continue, and in 
some fields step up, the process of adapting productive structures to  the new 
conditions governing international competition and demand. This medium term 
action cannot be separated from that required to correct fondamental disequi- 
libria (prices and balance of payments). Short-term economic policy and 
structural policy must be mutually coherent :  they interact with each other.

III. ECONOMIC POLICY GUIDELINES
While economic developments in 1983 and the forecasts for 1984 firmly 
indicate that the corner is being turned, they also show that recovery 
so far is limited, patchy and hesitant.
The present upturn - the first since 1979 - must be consolidated as a first 
stage in re-establishing lasting and stable growth. However, the room for 
manoeuvre available to each Member State is limited and the influence of external 
uncertainties is powerful :  organizing and establishing the conditions for a 
lasting recovery are, therefore, at least as important as the first signs of 
an improvement, perhaps short-lived, in the economic situation.
The attainment of this objective will require both coherent national 
economic policies and the full use of the Community framework.
A. 2222££i£_2£2Q22!i£_E2ii£''es
Economic policies in 1984 should be such as to :
- reaffirm the priority given to reducing the rate of inflation;
establish the conditions for a progressive, lasting and stable revival 
of activity, especially by the introduction of policies which stimulate 
investment, in order to boost the confidence of producers, distributors and 
consumers;
- be credible, which means that these policies must be applied with 
determination; this implies, in particular, the establishement of realistic 
objectives, careful timing, and, if necessary, flexibility in application;
- within this framework, the growth of incomes must be compatible with 
the objective of restoring fundamental equilibrium and competitivity.

- 7 -
1. In the budgetary field, the Member States have already initiated 
difficult adjustments without waiting for recovery to begin :  these efforts 
must continue. At a time when the first successes are being won, priority 
must, indeed, continue to be given to the drive to reduce deficits and 
steadily bring down the share of output accounted for by public expenditure.
This stance is necessary, both because of the economic effects of 
excessive deficits, on investment for example, and because of the high 
level of national debt in most Member States. However, budgetary policy 
should not be pursued without regard for the impact it may have on supply 
and demand. Account must be taken of economic developments when pursuing
the clear objective of reducing deficits; for example, those countries which have 
made large strides in their adjustment process (in terms of inflation and 
external balance) and have modest public deficits should not try to make 
further inroads into those deficits too abruptly. Whatever the circumstances, 
in the event of a renewed deterioration in activity, the automatic stabilizers 
should be allowed free play.
2. In the monetary fieId,external factors continue to exert a strong 
influence. Experience shows, however, that a policy which gives priority 
to an easing of real interest rates, albeit at the cost of increased 
differentials in relation to rates obtaining on international markets, 
is feasible: so important is the need for a fall in interest rates to 
consolidate recovery that such a policy should be maintained provided 
that there is a continued slowdown in inflation. This approach means 
that monetary agregates should be managed accordingly and, at the same 
time, that abrupt changes in monetary policy should be avoided.

-  8 -
B. T he_C om rnun i^ t _cont^r;ibut i^ o n
1. As the experience of the Last few years has shown, the close coordination 
of economic policies at Community level - both overaLl policies and those 
in specific fields like public finances - enhances their impact and 
boosts confidence. The EMS has become an essential frame of reference for 
the conduct of economic policies at Community level. It assists the 
processes of analysis, diagnosis and the agreed ordering of priorities; 
it is a direct, fundamental force for convergence and for the economic 
cohesion of the Community. In addition, the EMS has the effect of strengthening 
and amplifying the results of policies introduced in each Member State 
by emphasising the Linkages between these policies within the Community. 
Strengthening the EMS would therefore be one means of making progress 
towards monetary stability, greater economic discipline and more effective 
policies.
On the international scene, exchange rate uncertainties, high interest rates 
and the consequences for the financial situation of heavily indebted countries, 
are still a very serious threat to the economic situation. International 
monetary and financial relations must, therefore, be stabilised. Recent 
developments like the undertaking by the United States and Japan on the rate 
of the yen confirm, as the Community has urged on many occasions, that 
national economies cannot cope with exchange rates that, for too long, are 
utterly divorced from basic economic realities. Member States must adopt, 
particularly in the discussions following the Williamsburg Summit, a tightly 
co-ordinated position on the need to organize concerted international 
action in the monetary field. It is most important that the Community should 
be committed to arriving at common positions and, if possible, to putting 
forward commonly agreed proposals in forthcoming discussions on such matters 
as the role of the IMF, the problems of liquidity creation and distribution, 
and on exchange rates.

- 9 -
2. The Community is an economic entity which, if used systematically, 
could have a direct and positive impact on current economic difficulties 
by providing a framework for joint initiatives designed to stimulate 
investment, to accelerate the adjustment process in European economies 
and to strengthen the competitive structures of Member States. The 
Commission has sent the Council a series of proposals for exploiting the 
Community's advantages, which discuss the following broad policy 
guidelines :
- bringing greater depth and substance to the single market in the broad 
sense (i.e. including standards), in order to give companies better 
conditions in which to develop at a higher level of productivity;
- a joint approach to the use and development of advanced technologies 
and more coherent organization of the means deployed by Member States, 
should increase the effect of measures to adjust production structures;
- a new impetus to the process of building an integrated financial market 
commensurate with the overall savings resources in the Community, as a 
means of harnessing, at lower cost and with greater efficiency, increased 
financial resources for the benefit of investment, especially in industry.
IV. UNEMPLOYMENT :  PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS
Unemployment remains, the principal problem facing the Community.
Even the prospect of moderate recovery in 1984 offers no hope for a fall in the 
rate of unemployment. In these circumstances, specific employment policy 
measures are therefore still necessary. They must have a direct and 
rapid effect on unemployment as the economy recovers.

ft
- 10  -
Vocational training programmes are a means, in particular, of attacking  
structural unemployment by adjusting skills to technological change.
These programmes are of the greatest importance, especially for the  
young unemployed, and priority must be given to their further expansion.
The expansion of programmes of local measures can help to create, on a  
highly decentralized basis, new small businesses or new jobs in very small  
industrial and service sector companies. Such programmes should be given  
every encouragement, especially by the provision of advisory services  
covering management, tax matters and relations with officialdom.
The reduction and adaptation of working time is still at the top of the  
agenda in employment policy discussions, while all manner of measures  
affecting working time are being tried out. How far such measures  
will help to create lasting jobs will depend directly on how they are  
applied and especially on the extent to which they are accompanied by  
increased flexibility in the use of equipment and on their sensitivity  
to the requirement that companies remain competitive.
Amongst the different methods of reducing working time, early retirement  
schemes act directly on the number of unemployed. However, this type of  
measure must take into account the possible effects on the social security  
budget and demographic prospects.

MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
|TABLE  1  i  CROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT  <PERCENT■ CHANCE AT CONSTANT  
|  PRICES ON PRECEDINC TEAR. EC,  1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 4 )
I.................. ................-
)
I
I19
70
19791979 1980 1901 1982 1983 1984
I. . . . . . . . . . . .
IB 3.2 2.4 3.0 -1.8 1.0 -.9 .6
\DK 2.6 3.7 -1.1 .1 3.4 2.2 1.2
ID 2.9 4.1 1.9 .2 -1.0 .7 2.1
\CR 4.8 3.7 1.6 -.7 .0 .0 1.5
I? 3.6 3.2 1.3 .2 1.8 -.3 .4
|  IRL 4.4 2.5 2.8 1.1 1.2 .5 i.a
II 3.2 4.9 3.9 -.2 -.3 -. 8 * 1. 5
U 3.1 4.0 1.7 -1.8 -1.1 -2.4 -1.0
\NL 3.6 2.1 .9 -1. 2 -1.6 .3 .0
I  UK 2.2 1.6 -2.0 -2.0 1.5 2.8 2.2
I. . . . . . . . . . .
I  E
C 3.1 3.3 1.3 -.4 .4 .5 1.5I........... . ........
\T
ABLE 2 ■. DEFLATOR OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION  (PERCENT .  CHANCE ON  
|  PRECEDING YEAR, EC,  1970-1984)
1
1
11  1970 
|  19791979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
j- - - - - -
J  B |
 6.7 3.8 7.0 8.9 7.4 7.8 6. 5
1DK |  9.8 10.2 11.2 11.8 9.8 6.6 5.4
1D 1  5.1 4.2 5. 4 5.6 5.3 3.0 3.2
1GR 1  11.5 17.5 22.2 24.4 21.1 20.5 18.5
If 1 8.6 10.6 13.3 12.9 10.9 9.0 7.2
U RL ·1 12.8 14. 2 17.6 19.5 17.1 11.0 8.8
II 1 1  .13. 1 15.0 20.3 19.0 16.7 15.0 11.5
II 1  6.3 5.8 7.7 7.7 10.0 8.4 7.7
1 2 9 1 1 . 7-5 4.0 6.7 6.2 5.7 2.8 3.6
1 1 « 1  12.3 13.2 16.4 11.0 8.0 5.7 5.8
1- - - - - -
1  E
C 1  '  9.1 8.9 11.2 10.1 8.7 6.3 5.6
\TABLE  3  :  NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED AS PERCENTAGE OF WORKING  
|  POPULATION  (EC , 1970-1984)
1
1
11970
19791979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
i. . . . . . . . .
1B 5.0 8.7 9.4 11
.6 12.6 14.4 15.3
1  DK 3.3 5.3 6.1 8.3 9.7 10.7 11.8
1D 2.5 3.4 3.4 4.7 6.8 8.6 8.7
|  GR- (2.2) (2.8) (1.2) (6.1) (7.8) (8.7)
1F 3.3 6.0 6.4 7.8 8.7 8.9 9.7
\IR L 7.1 7.4 8.3 10.2 11.7 14.6 16.6
II 5.6 7.5 8.0 8.8 8.7 9.0 9.4
li .2 .7 .7 1.0 1.2 1.8 2.4
1 2 9 1 3.0 4.1 4.7 7.1 12.7 15.6 17.6
IUK 4.0 5.0 6.4 9.6 11.1 11.7 11.9
i. . . . . . . .
\EC 3.
8 5.3 5.9 7.8 9.5 10.4 10.9\TABLE  4  :  BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT  (PER CENT OF GDP,  
|  EC. 1970-1984)
I.............................. — ...............................................................................- ................................... ...............
I  
I  1970
1
1 1979’1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
I- - - - - - - -
I B .
4 -2.7 -4.7 -4.2 -3.6 -2. 4 -1.5
1  DK -2.9 -4.7 -3.7 -3.1 -4.2 -2.2 -1.3
1D .9 -.8 -1.9 -1.0 .5 .9 .9
1  GR -2.8 -2.9 -.9 -.2 -3. 8 -5.0 -5.5
1F -.3 .0 -1.4 -1.4 -2.9 -1.8 -1.2
URL -4.2 -11.2 -10.0 -13.1 ' -8.3 -2.6 -.6
II -.2 1.7 -2.4 -2.3 -1.6 -.4 -.2
II 22.5 28.3 22.6 31.1 38.8 37.2 36.3
M il 1.3 -1.1 -1.5 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.4
1 1 « -.9 .0 1.6 2.4 1.5 .2 -.2
1  EC '  -.1 · -.4 -1.3 -.6 -.6 -.2 .0
\TABLE  5  i  GENERAL GOVERNMENT LENDING OR BORROWING  (-) 
|  A S PERCENTAGE OF GDP (E C ,  1970-1984)I  TABLE  6IMONEY SUPPLY M2/M3  (PERCENTAGE CHANGE AT END OF YEAR  
ON TWELVE MONTHS EARLIER. EC.  1970-1984)
1—
I f l
\DK
1 1
ICR 
1F
\IR L-4.2 -6.9 -9.4 -12. b -11.9 -12.2 -11.1  1 I B 10.9 6.0 2.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 67
.0 -3.1 -5.9 -7.0 -9.1 -8.8 -7.8 | 1  DK 11.0 a-9 10.9 9.6 11.7 12.5 75
-1.5 -3.0 -3.5 -3.9 -3.5 -3.3 -2.1 1 1D 10.1 6.0 6.2 5.0 7.1 7.5 55
-4.4 -4.8 -5.4 -10.1 -6.4 -6.3 -6.3 1 1  GR 23.3 18.4 24.7 34.3 29,1 22.6 20 2
-.6 -.8 .5 -1.8 -2.7 -3.1 -3.3 1 1F 15. 4 14.4 9.7 11.4 10.8 8.8 65
-8.5 -11.9 -12.8 -15.8 -16.2 -13.4 - u . 8  1 U RL 18.2 19.0 16.9 17.4 12.9 14.4 1 4 4
i  I -8.6 -9.5 -8.4 -11.7 -11.9 -11.9 -10.0  1 II 19.6 20.3 12.0 16.0 17. 2 16.0. 1 10
II 2.3 .1 -1.8 -2.3 -2.0 -2,9 -1.5 1 I I - - - - ■
liV I -1.3 -2.0 -3.4 -5. 2 -6. 9 -6. 7 -7.1 1 INL 11.6 7.6 3.6 5.2 7.6 5.5 b0
11« -3.2 -3.3 -3.5 -2.9 -2.1 -2.2 -2.1 1 1  UK 13.6 12.7 18.6 14.6 9.3 10.6 8b
1.........
1  EC -2.9 -3.6 -3.5 -5.2 -5.2 -5.4 -4.7 1 1  EC 13.9 11.9 10.5 10.8 10.7 1 0.1 78
(1 ) T h e  figures s h o w n  in this table are taken fro m  forecasts m a d e  in O ctober. It is possible that g ro w th  in the U nited States, 
in 1 9 8 4 , will b e  greater than foreseen :  the forecasts o f current account balances (and, to a  m u c h  lesser extent, o f 
growth/could therefore b e  generally better for the C o m m u n ity  than the figures s h o w n  in the a b o v e  tables.