EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
Brussels, 2.2.2011 
SEC(2011) 132 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
   
Accompanying document to the 
  
Proposal for a 
 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
on the use of Passenger Name Record data fo r the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime  
  
{COM(2011) 32 final} 
{SEC(2011) 133 final} 
 
 
EN 2   EN 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES... 4 
1.1. Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 4 1.2. Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 5 1.3. Impact Assessment Board............................................................................................ 7 2. PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................... 8 2.1. Description of the problem........................................................................................... 8 2.1.1. Threat of terrorism and serious crime .......................................................................... 8 2.1.2. PNR and its uses........................................................................................................ ... 9 
2.1.3. Divergence between national PNR systems............................................................... 14 2.1.4. Types of carriers collecting PNR data ....................................................................... 16 2.2. EU right to act and s ubsidiarity principle .................................................................. 16 
2.3. How would the problem evolve , all things being equal?........................................... 17 
3. POLICY OBJECTIVES............................................................................................. 18 3.1. Objectives................................................................................................................ ... 18 
3.2. Respect of fundamental rights.................................................................................... 19 4. POLICY OPTIONS AND TRANSVERSAL ISSUES.............................................. 20 
4.1. Policy options............................................................................................................ . 20 
A. Refraining from addressing the issue at EU level – Ma intaining the status quo ....... 20 
4.2. Transversal issues....................................................................................................... 2 2 
4.2.1. Geographical scope .................................................................................................... 22  
4.2.2. Data to be transmitted from the Passenger Information Units/Centralised Unit to the 
competent authorities ................................................................................................. 26 
4.2.3. Bodies receiving data from the Passenger Information Units.................................... 26 5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS........................................................................................ 26 5.1. Impacts of the option of refraining from  addressing the issue at the EU level – 
Maintaining the status quo (Policy Option A) ........................................................... 27 
5.2. Impacts of the options addr essing the structure for collect ing and processing PNR data 
(Policy Option B) ....................................................................................................... 28 
5.2.1. Decentralised collection a nd processing of data by Member States (Option B1)...... 28 
 
EN 3   EN 5.2.2. Centralised collection and processing of data at EU level (Option B2) .................... 30 
5.3. Impacts of the options addressing the purpose limitation of the proposed measures 
(Policy Option C) ....................................................................................................... 32 
5.3.1. Access for the prevention, detection, investig ation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime only (Option C1)........................................................................... 32 
5.3.2. Access for the prevention, detection, investig ation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime and other polic y objectives (Option C2)....................................... 32 
5.4. Impacts of the options addre ssing the modes of transport to  be covered by the proposed 
measures (Policy Option D)....................................................................................... 33 
5.4.1. Air carriers only (Option D1)..................................................................................... 33 5.4.2. Air, sea and rail car riers (Option D2)......................................................................... 34 
6. COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................. 35 Summary table of the impact s of the policy options................................................................ 37 
7. PREFERRED POLICY OPTION.............................................................................. 38 7.1. Analysis of the preferred policy option...................................................................... 38 7.2. Costs of the preferred option...................................................................................... 38 8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION ..................................................................... 40 
 
EN 4   EN Impact Assessment 
on a common approach to the use of Passenger Name  
Record data  
1. PROCEDURAL  ISSUES  AND  CONSULTATION  OF INTERESTED  PARTIES 
1.1. Organisation and timing 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data are unverifi ed information provided by the passengers and 
collected by carriers for their own commercial purposes.  
A European policy in this area was announced  in the Commission Communication "Transfer of 
Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A global EU approach" in December 20031. The 
European Council in its Decl aration on combating terrorism  of March 2004 called on the 
European Commission to br ing forward a proposal " for a common EU approach to the use of 
passengers' data for border and aviation secu rity and other law enforcement purposes".  
Moreover, the Hague programme for 2005-2010 calle d for a common EU approach to the use of 
passengers' data for law enforcement purposes.  
In this context, on 6 November 2007 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the use of PN R data for law enforcement purposes2 ('the 2007 proposal'). 
The proposal was accompanied by an Impact Assessment3 ('the 2007 Impact Assessment') on 
which the Commission's Impact Assessment Bo ard delivered a positive opinion on 5 September 
20074. The proposal was extensivel y discussed in the Council wo rking groups and the progress 
made in the discussions was endorsed by the J HA Councils in January, July and November of 
2008. The discussions on the proposal in the working groups allowed consensus to be reached on most of the provisions of the proposal
5.  
Upon the entry into force of th e Treaty of Lisbon on 1 Dece mber 2009, the Commission proposal 
not yet adopted by the Council6 became obsolete. This was due to the change of the legal basis of 
the proposal and a change of the decision-maki ng procedure from the c onsultation procedure to 
the co-decision procedure. 'The Stockholm Progra mme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizens'7 calls on the Commission to present a proposal for the use of PNR data to 
prevent, detect, investigate and pros ecute terrorism and serious crime.  
                                                 
1 COM (2003) 826 final 
2 COM(2007) 654 
3 SEC (2007) 1453 
4 SEC(2007) 1457 
5 Council Document 5618/2/09 REV 2 of 29.6.2009 
6 The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the proposal on 20.11.2008 - P6_TA (2008)0561 
7 Council document of 2/12/2009 17024/09 
 
EN 5   EN 1.2. Consultation and expertise 
For the purposes of the Impact Assessment accompanying the 2007 proposal, the Commission 
departments consulted all the rele vant stakeholders on the basis of a questionnaire which was sent 
out in December 2006. Subsequently, the Commission invited the Member States to a meeting in 
Brussels on the 2nd of February 2007, during which the repr esentatives of the Member States had 
the opportunity to exch ange their views. 
The questionnaire was sent to all the Member St ates, the data protecti on authorities of the 
Member States, the European Data Protection S upervisor (EDPS), the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA), the Air Transport Association of  America (ATA), the International Air Carrier 
Association (IACA), the European  Regions Airline Asso ciation (ERA) and th e International Air 
Transport Association (IATA). The replies we re summarised in the 2007 Impact Assessment 
which accompanied the 2007 proposal. 
Extensive discussions have also been held sin ce 2003 with carriers, data  protection authorities 
and border and law enforcement authorities duri ng the negotiations for the agreements on the 
transfer of PNR data to the United States, Ca nada and Australia. The Article 29 Working Party 
issued a number of opinions on the use of PNR data in relation to international agreements8. The 
implementation of the 2004 PNR agreement with the United States9 was subject of a joint review 
by the Commission, assisted by national authorities,  and United States. authorities in September 
2005. The implementation of the 2007 PNR agreement with the United States10 was also 
reviewed by the Commission, assisted by national au thorities, and United States. authorities in 
February 2010. The PNR agreement with Canada11 was also jointly reviewed in November 2008. 
Following the adoption of the Commission's 2007 proposal, all the relevant stakeholders 
published their pos itions on it. 
The position of the Member States is reflected in the latest version of the proposal which was 
discussed in the Council working groups in June 200912. The Member States in general agreed 
with the policy lines s uggested by the Commission. In thei r contribution they  suggested the 
exclusive use of the "push" method, the shorteni ng of the data retention period, the clarification 
of the uses of PNR data and the adoption of  a specific data protection framework for the 
proposal. A few Member States favoured extending the purpose so as to also cover irregular migration and border controls, while other Me mber States favoured an extension of the 
                                                
 
8 Opinion 1/2005 on the level of protection ensured in Canada for the transmission of Passenger Name 
Record and Advance Passenger Information from airlines, January 2005, Opinion 6/2004 on the 
implementation of the Commission decision of 14-V-2004 on the adequate protection of personal data 
contained in the Passenger Name Records of air passe ngers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, and of the Agreement between the European Community and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, June 2004, and others. 
9 OJ L 183/83, 20.5.2004 and OJ L 235/11, 6.7.2004 
10 OJ L 204/16, 4.8.2007 
11 OJ L 91, 29.3.2006 p.53, OJ L 91, 29.3.2006 p.49 and OJ L 82, 21.3.2006 p.15 
12 Council Document 5618/2/09 REV 2 of 29.6.2009 
 
EN 6   EN geographical scope of the proposal in order to in clude intra-EU flights ar guing that the necessity 
of processing PNR data did not change depending  on whether a flight is internal or external. 
The main criticism expressed in the Resoluti on of the European Parliament was that the 
'necessity' of the proposed actions had not been sufficiently demonstrate d. It questioned whether 
the proposal met the standard for justifying an interfer ence with the right to  data protection. The 
Resolution expressed the Parliament 's concern that the added value of the proposal in the light of 
other border initiatives had not been assesse d. In terms of data protection the European 
Parliament called for a clear pur pose limitation and a better justif ication of the retention period 
and stressed that sensitive data should be used only under certai n conditions and that data should 
be transmitted using exclusively the "push" method. It further cal led for restrictions of onward 
transfers to third countries, while stressing th at only specific authoriti es should have access to 
PNR data. Finally the European Parliament e xpressed concerns that the proposed method of 
automatically assessing PNR data on the basis of fact-based assessment criteria was a very wide 
use of the data and recalled that such assessmen t should never result in "p rofiling" on the basis of 
sensitive data. 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Pa rty adopted an opini on on the proposal on 
5.12.200713. It considered that the proposal was disp roportionate and that it might violate the 
right to data protection. It called into questio n the data protection regime as the Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA does not cover domestic pro cessing of data. It c onsidered that the 
justification for the necessity of  the proposal was inadequate, that  the data retention period was 
disproportionate and that only the "push" method of transmi ssion of data should be used. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor (E DPS) also issued an  opinion on the proposal14. This 
opinion questioned whether the "necessity" and "proportionality " of the proposal had been 
demonstrated since the proposal c oncerned a very wide collection of  data of innocent people. The 
EDPS criticised the proposal as leading towards a "surveillance society" and called into question 
the data protection regime as domestic proces sing of data is not covered by the Framework 
Decision 2008/997/JHA. The EDPS specifically s uggested to better defining the authorities 
which would have access to PNR data and the cond itions for transferring data to third countries  
The Fundamental Rights Agency i ssued an opinion on the proposal after being requested to do so 
by the French Presidency of the Council15. It was also of the opinion that the "necessity" and 
"proportionality" of the proposal ha d not been demonstrated and it considered that there should 
be more guarantees in the proposal so as to avoid profiling on the basis of sensitive data. 
Some airline associations, namely the Internat ional Air Transport Association (IATA) and the 
European Airlines Associations (EAA) issued opinions on the proposal. These associations 
mainly criticised the decentralised structure of  the proposal and stressed that a centralised 
collection of the data would have financial advant ages to the carriers. They also criticised the 
                                                 
13 Opinion number 145 of 5.12.2007 
14 OJ C 110, 1.5.2008 
15 http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_opinion_PNR_en.pdf 
 
EN 7   EN choice of the "push" method and called for the c hoice of transmission method to be left to the 
carriers. 
Even though the 2007 Impact Assessment received a positive opinion from the Impact 
Assessment Board and the Commission considered that a legislative proposal was necessary, it 
was deemed preferable to nevertheless carry out  a new Impact Assessment. The present Impact 
Assessment therefore aims to answer criticism raised by the above men tioned stakeholders. It 
also aims to include all the new facts and expe rience gained since 2007 and to analyse the issues 
in an updated way The Impact Assessment and a ny subsequent legislativ e proposal should reflect 
the latest positions resulting from the discussions in the Council working parties, the resolution of 
the European Parliament, the opinions of other relevant bodies, and new information gathered 
since 2007. 
The purpose of this report is to  examine the possibility of adop ting a new proposal to replace the 
2007 proposal on the basis of the TFEU. It aims to assess whether there is a need for a proposal at 
European Union level to set up a coherent le gal framework on the obligation of carriers to 
transmit PNR data to the relevant competent author ities for the pur pose of preventi on, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, whilst ensuring a high level of protection of personal da ta throughout the Union.  
An inter-service group was setup to steer the Impact Assessment work. The steering group 
consisted of officials from DG HOME, DG JU ST, DG RELEX, DG MOVE, SJ and SG. It met 
on 4.8.2010 and 18.8.2010 to discuss the issues arising from the Impact Assessment and further 
comments were provided in writing.  
1.3. Impact Assessment Board 
On 10 September 2010, the Commission's Impact Assessment Board delivered an opinion on a 
preliminary version of this Impact Assessment re port. In the opinion, the Board stated that the 
Impact Assessment report provides a sound basis for action. It recomme nded that the report 
should provide additional information on the following issues: 
– Further illustrate, through exam ples, that PNR data are an effective tool for combating 
terrorism and serious crime; 
– Further clarify the rationale for the ge ographical scope of the initiative;  
– Further discuss the different ranges of data re tention periods, the optimal duration of the 
transition period from 'pull' to 'push', presentati on of the position of the Member States and the 
possibility of voluntary coopera tion between Member States as  a means of achieving the 
objectives of the initiative; and 
– Further clarify the costs for carrier s, public authorities and passengers. 
The present version of the Impact Assessment repor t has been redrafted to take account of those 
recommendations. Additional information and modifi cations have thus been introduced to this 
end in many of its sections. 
 
EN 8   EN 2. PROBLEM  DEFINITION  
2.1. Description of the problem 
2.1.1.  Threat of terroris m and serious crime 
Over the last decade the European Union and othe r parts of the world have experienced a further 
spread of cross-border crime. Trafficking in human beings and drugs constitute a very serious threat to European society and influence the so cietal and economic structure of every day life. 
These crimes are showing a steady increase in the EU
16. Drug trafficking has risen by between 
3% and 24% per year in the EU over the last 8 years, while violent crime has risen annually 
between 2% and8% in the same period. Facil itation of irregular immigration, smuggling of 
currency and illegal goods are also serious problems with cross-border elements. According to the EU Source book, there were 143.948 criminal offences per 100.000 population in the EU Member States in 2007 (excluding Italy and Portugal for which data  were not made available), 
ranging from 14.465 offences in Sweden to 958 in Cyprus.  
Serious crime and terrorist offences cause severe  harm to victims, inflict economic damage on a 
large scale and undermine the sense of security  without which persons cannot exercise their 
freedom and individual rights effectively.  
A study published in 2009
17 for the International Labour Organi sation estimated that the cost of 
coercion from underpayment of wages resulting from trafficking in human beings in 2007 in 
industrialised economies was $2.508.368.218, while  the total for the world were 
$19.598.020.343. 
The 2010 Annual report on the state of the drugs pr oblem in Europe of the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addi ction acknowledges the global natu re of the drugs problem and 
the growing and severe drug-related problems. By undermining social development and feeding 
corruption and organised crime they  represent a real threat for th e European Union. In Europe we 
have annual seizures of about 1 000 tonnes of  the cannabis and about 1 000 cocaine-related 
deaths annually. The number of problem opioid users in Europe is cautiously estimated at 1.35 
million. As regards the economic and social imp acts of drugs, in 2008, 22 EU Member States 
reported a total labelled expenditure on the drugs problem of EUR 4.2 billion. 
Another study of the UK Home Office “The economic and soci al costs of crime against 
individuals and households 2003/04” measured the co sts incurred in anticipa tion of crime, such 
as defensive expenditure, the costs as a conseq uence of crime, like the physical and emotional 
impact on the victim and the value of any property  stolen and the costs incurred in response to 
crime, including the costs to the criminal ju stice system. These costs were measured at 
£36.166.000.000 in 2003.  
                                                 
16 Eurostat 36/2009 
17 Measuring the costs of coercion to workers in forced labour-Alexandra Vinogradova, Michaelle De Cock, 
Patrick Belser 
 
EN 9   EN In the meantime, four out of five Europeans wi sh to see stronger action at EU level against 
organised crime and terrorism18.  
Europol's EU Organised Crime Threat Assess ment 2009 (OCTA 2009) found that most of 
organised crime threats have an international dimension, with crim inal groups trying to traffic 
and smuggle people, drugs and other illicit goods  into the EU. The OCTA  2009 established that, 
in the majority of cases, the most serious organised crime threats involve international travel. Trafficking in human beings a nd facilitation of irregular immi gration involves third country 
nationals being trafficked into the EU. In addition, most drugs tra fficking also involve 
international travel, with large quantities of drugs being smuggled into the EU every day. 
Intelligence has further indicated that, due to  the increasing access that law enforcement 
authorities have to e-communications , terrorists and criminals tend to prefer to travel and meet to 
discuss their business rather than communicat e long-distance. It is therefore becoming 
increasingly important to obtain as  much information as possible abou t the travel of such persons. 
Because of the transnational and organised nature  of these serious crimes, it is important to 
ensure close cooperation of law enfo rcement authorities within the EU. 
Terrorism currently constitutes one of the greatest threats to security, pea ce, stability, democracy 
and fundamental rights. The threat of terrorism is not re stricted to specific geographical zones. 
Terrorists and terrorist organisatio ns can be found both inside and outside the borders of the EU 
and have shown their capability to carry out attacks and acts of violence against any country. 
Europol's "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Re port 2010", despite finding that terrorism has 
decreased in the EU during 2009, stre ssed that the threat remains real and serious. Most terrorist 
campaigns have a transnational ch aracter with either the involvement of either transnational 
contacts or travel to attend training camps outside the EU.  
The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the abor ted terrorist attack in August 2006 
aimed at blowing up a number of aircraft on th eir way from the United Kingdom to the United 
States, and the attempted terrorist attack on boa rd a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in 
December 2009 showed the ability of terrorists to m ount attacks, targeting in ternational flights, in 
any country.  
2.1.2.  PNR data and their uses 
There are some types of data traditionally coll ected specifically for law enforcement purposes, 
such as fingerprints and DNA. In executing it s mandate to enhance police cooperation, the EU 
acts in order to streamline the sharing between Member States of  such data and other information 
that might be necessary for criminal invest igations or criminal intelligence operations
19. There are 
other types of data that are initially collected by Member States for non-law enforcement 
purposes, for example, data on immigration, asyl um, vehicle registration and citizenship, but to 
which law enforcement authorities are given acce ss for the performance of their tasks. A third 
category is privately-held or pr ivately-collected (as opposed to th e aforementioned publicly-held) 
data. Access by law enforcement to such data is regulated differently in Member States 
                                                 
18 Standard Eurobarometer 71. 
19 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA 
 
EN 10   EN depending on the type of data and their function. Passenger information such  as PNR data are one 
type of such privately-collect ed and privately-held data. 
PNR data is unverified informa tion provided by passengers, and collected by and held in the 
carriers’ reservation and departure control syst ems. It contains several different types of 
information, such as travel dates, travel itinerar y, ticket information, contact  details, travel agent 
at which the flight was booked, means of paymen t used, seat number and baggage information. 
The PNR data of a certain passenger usually  do not contain all potential PNR elements20, but only 
those actually provided by the passenger at the time of reservation a nd information given upon 
check-in and boarding. PNR data are traditionally co llected by air carriers. It  should be noted that 
most non-air carriers usually do not collect such data. 
PNR data are different from a nd should not be confused with Advance Passenger Information 
(API) data. API data are biogra phical information taken from the machine-readable part of a 
passport and contain the name, pl ace of birth, nationality of a person, passport number and expiry 
date. API data are mainly used for carrying out bor der checks in advance of a person's arrival or 
departure. Although in some cases the data are also  used by law enforcement authorities in order 
to identify suspects and persons sought, they ar e mainly used as a border management tool. API 
data are used systematically in more than 30 countries around the world21.  
In the EU, the use of API data is regulated by the API Directive22. The Directive provides that 
API data should be made availabl e to border control aut horities, at the request of each Member 
State, for flights entering the territory of the EU  for the purpose of impr oving border controls and 
combating irregular immigration. Even though their use for law enforcement purposes is 
permitted by the Directive, this is possible only in limited circumstances.  
PNR data are mainly used as a criminal intelligen ce tool, in particular for assessment, rather than 
as an identity verification tool. The uses of  PNR are unique and are mainly the following: 
(i) PNR data make it possible to carry out a pr e-arrival and pre-depart ure assessment of all 
passengers on the basis of fact-based assessment criteria23 in advance of the arrival or departure 
of passengers; this allows authorities to focus on those passengers who f it into the fact-based 
assessment criteria but who were previously unsuspected, rather th an subjecting all passengers to 
an extensive assessment by border guards, 
(ii) PNR data can be made available well in advan ce of a flight's arrival or departure, and hence 
provide authorities with more  time for processing, analysi ng and potentially taking action, 
                                                 
20 The list of all possible PNR elements has been adopted by ICAO in its Guidelines for the use of PNR data 
of 2005 
21 Some examples include Australia, Brazil, Canada China, Cuba, India, Japan, Mexico, Unites States and 
several other countries- information sourced from IATA 
22 Directive 2004/82/EC of 29.8.2004 
23 "fact-based risk indicators" are rules established by law enforcement authorities through the analysis of past 
PNR data and other relevant intelligence. They are usua lly the result of trend analysis and aim to set out 
rules for carrying out the automated risk assessment of passengers. They could relate to ways of travel 
behaviour, travel routes etc. 
 
EN 11   EN (iii) it is possible to match PNR data agains t databases with specific addresses, telephone 
numbers, credit cards connected to criminal offe nces and establish to wh om such data belong, 
and  
(iv) by matching PNR data of persons known to law enforcement author ities against the PNR 
data of persons unknown to such au thorities, it is possible to id entify associates of suspects 
assisting in the preparation and execution of a crime.  
For several years this is how PNR data have be en used, mainly by customs and law enforcement 
authorities around the world. However, , it was un til recently not technically possible for the 
authorities of a country to access such data electr onically and in advance of the flight, so they 
were only processed manually and only in relati on to a limited number of flights. Technological 
advances have since made the advance electronic tr ansfer, analysis (and s ubsequent retention) of 
such data possible.  
To address the threat of serious crime and te rrorism, law enforcement authorities may use PNR 
data in several ways: 
• re-actively:  use of the data in investigations, pr osecutions, unravelling of  networks after a 
crime has been committed. In order to allo w law enforcement authorities to go back 
sufficiently in time, a commensurate period of retention by law enforcement authorities is necessary. 
• in real time: use of the data prior to the arrival or de parture of passengers in  order to prevent a 
crime, watch or arrest persons before a crime has been committed or because a crime has been 
or is being committed. In such cases PNR data are especially useful for running such data 
against predetermined assessment criteria in order to identify persons that were previously "unknown" to law enforcement authorities and fo r running the data agai nst various databases 
of persons and objects sought. 
• pro-actively:  use of the data for analysis and creati on of assessment criteria, which can then 
be used for a pre-arrival and pre-departure assess ment of passengers. In or der to carry out such 
an analysis of relevance for the prevention, dete ction, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime, a commensurat e period of retention of the data by law 
enforcement authorities is necessary in such cases. 
It is necessary to impose those legal obligati ons on air carriers for the following reasons: 
First, PNR data enable law enforcement authorit ies to identify persons,  who were previously 
"unknown", i.e. persons previously unsuspected of  involvement in serious crime and terrorism, 
but whom an analysis of the data suggests may be involved in such crime and who should 
therefore be subject to further examination by th e competent authorities. Identifying such persons 
helps law enforcement authorities prevent and dete ct serious crimes incl uding acts of terrorism. 
To achieve this, law enforcement authorities need  to use PNR data both in real-time to run PNR 
against predetermined assessment criteria which indicate which previously ‘unknown’ persons 
require further examination and pro-actively for analysis and creation of  assessment criteria.  
 
EN 12   EN For example, an analysis of PNR data may give indications on the most usual travel routes for 
trafficking people or drugs which can be made part  of assessment criteria. By checking PNR data 
in real-time against such criteria, crimes may be  prevented or detected. A concrete example given 
by a Member State on trafficking in human bei ngs is a case where PNR analysis uncovered a 
group of human traffickers always travelling on the same route. Using fake documents to check 
in for an intra-EU flight, they would use authen tic papers to simultaneously check in for another 
flight bound for a third country. Once in the airpor t lounge, they would board the intra-EU flight. 
Without PNR it would have been impossible to  unravel this human trafficking network. 
The combined pro-active and real-time use of PNR data thus enable law enforcement authorities 
to address the threat of serious crime and terror ism from a different pers pective than through the 
processing of other categories of personal data: as explained further below, the processing of 
personal data available to law enforcement au thorities through existing and planned EU-level 
measures such as the Directiv e on Advance Passenger Information,24 the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and the second-gene ration Schengen Information System  (SIS II) do not enable law 
enforcement authorities to identif y 'unknown' suspects in the way th at the analysis of PNR data 
does.  
Second, PNR data help law enforcement authoritie s prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute 
serious crimes, including acts of terrorism, after a crime has been committed. To achieve this, law 
enforcement authorities need to use PNR data in real-time to run the PNR data against various 
databases of 'known' persons and objects sought . They also need to use PNR data in a re-active  
manner to construct evidence and, where relevant, to find associates of criminals and unravel 
criminal networks.  
For example, the credit card information which is part of the PNR data may enable law 
enforcement authorities to identify and prove links between a person an d a known criminal or 
criminal organisation. An example given by a Memb er State relates to a large scale human and 
drug trafficking involving a Member State and th ird countries. Cartels were importing drugs to 
several destinations in Europe. They were using drugs swallowers who were themselves 
trafficked persons. They were identified on the basis of having bought the ticket with stolen 
credit cards on the basis of PNR. This lead to a rrests in the Member State. On this basis, an 
assessment criterion was created which itself led to several arrests in other Member States and 
third countries.  
Finally, the use of PNR data prio r to arrival allows law enfor cement authorities to conduct an 
assessment and perform a closer screening onl y of persons who are most likely, based on 
objective assessment criteria and previous experience, to pose a threat to security. This facilitates the travel of all other passengers and reduces the risk of passenge rs being subjected to screening 
on the basis of unlawful criteria such as nati onality or skin colour which may wrongly be 
associated with security risks by law enfor cement authorities, including customs and border 
guards.  
                                                
 
24 Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 August 2004. 
 
EN 13   EN The value of using PNR data in this context is confirmed by info rmation from third countries and 
Member States that already use PNR data for the preventi on, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The experience of those countries shows that 
the use of PNR data has led to crit ical progress in the fight agains t crime, in particular, drugs and 
human trafficking and the fight ag ainst terrorism, and a better unders tanding of terrorist and other 
criminal groups through the ga thering of intelligence on their travel patterns. The "European 
Union Strategy for Combating Radi calisation and Recruitment to Terrorism" notes, for example, 
the importance of identifying persons who travel to conflict zones in order to prevent terrorist training, build intelligence about terrorists and cr iminals and identify behavi our patterns of such 
persons. Even though PNR data are passenger data li nked to travel, they ar e mainly used as a 
criminal intelligence tool rather than as border co ntrol tool. They are used in advance of a border 
crossing and not at the border cr ossing itself. Their main aim is to fight terrorism and serious 
crime rather than fight irregular immigration and facilitate border co ntrols. The Commission 
adopted on 20.7.2010 a Communication on the Overview of information management in the area 
of freedom, securi ty and justice
25 the purpose of which was to provide a full overview of EU-
level measures in place, under implementation or  consideration regulati ng the collection, storage 
or cross-border exchange of personal inform ation for the purpose of law enforcement or 
migration management. This Communication noted  that the Schengen Information System 
(SIS)26 the second-generation Schengen  Information System (SIS II)27, the Visa Information 
System (VIS)28, and the anticipated Entry/Exit System  and Registered Travellers Programme29 
are EU measures that deal directly with ac tions taking place physically at the borders. 
The proposal will neither change nor interfere with curre nt EU rules on the way border controls 
are carried out or with the EU rules regulating en try and exit from the terr itory of the Union. The 
proposal will rather co-exist w ith and leave thos e rules intact. 
PNR data are also useful for ot her policy purposes. For example, they are useful for immigration 
purposes to find persons who have exceeded thei r permitted stay on a visa by providing a record 
of when a person enters the EU. In aviation security, PNR data c ould be used to prevent persons 
who might pose a threat to th e security of the aircraft  from boarding, through the 
implementation/establishment of 'no-fly lists'. In re lation to health safety, if a passenger is found 
to be suffering from a highly cont agious disease, PNR data coul d be used to quickly inform 
passengers on the same flight, in particular those who sat in the immediate surroundings of that 
passenger 
                                                 
25 COM (2010)385, 20.7.2010 
26 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000 , p. 19. 
27 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, Decision 2007/533/JHA, Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006. 
28 Council Decision 2004/512/EC, Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Council Decision 2008/633/JHA . See also 
Declaration on combating terrorism, European Council, 25.3.2004. 
29 […]. 
 
EN 14   EN 2.1.3.  Divergence between national PNR systems 
Even though only a limited number of Member Stat es have set up a PNR system to date, most 
Member States use PNR data for the preventi on, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime in a non-sy stematic way or under ge neral powers granted to 
the police or other authorities.  Within the EU, the United Kingdom already has a PNR system, 
while France, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden and th e Netherlands have either enacted relevant 
legislation and/or are currently  testing using PNR data. Seve ral other Member States are 
considering setting up PNR systems, but they are waiting for a proposal from the Commission 
which will enable them to obtain the full benefits of using PNR.  
An analysis of the national legislation of the United Kingdom, France and Denmark30 indicates 
that their provisions diverge and can be summarised as follows: 
• The United Kingdom  provides for the use of PNR data in the fight against terrorism, all crimes 
and irregular immigration. PNR data will be requ ired from all flights, including intra-EU and 
domestic flights. The retention period would be 5 years in an active database and 5 years in 
archives. PNR data will be required from air, sea and rail carriers to the extent that such data 
exists.  
• French  legislation provides for the use of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and irregular 
immigration but not for other crimes. PNR data will be required from all flights, including 
intra-EU and even domestic flights. The retent ion period is 24 hours fo r immigration purposes 
and 5 years for terrorism purposes in an active database. PNR data will be required from air, 
sea and rail carriers to the extent that it exists. 
• Danish  Legislation provides for the use of PNR data only in th e fight against terrorism and 
crimes against the State. The proposed retention period is 1 year and cove rs only air travel. It 
does not propose a system of transmission of PNR da ta but a system of rete ntion of the data by 
the air carriers while giving direct access to such data to some law enforcement agencies. Informal talks with Denmark indicated that th ey are considering amending their legislation 
because the system of retention of the data by the air carriers is thought to be ineffective. 
These provisions indicate that there are divergences  with regards to the purpose of the system, the 
period of retention, the structur e of the system, the geographical scope and the modes of transport 
which are covered. It is also lik ely that once the complete regulatory framework for the use of 
PNR data in these Member States is adopted, th ey will diverge, for instance, on data protection 
rules, the use of sensitive data , rights of access and judicial re dress, the role of supervisory 
authorities and the range of  authorities having access to the data. It is also expected that there will 
be divergences on the measures taken to safeguard th e security of the transmission of the data, i.e. 
different transmission protoc ols and message formats. 
                                                
 
30 For the United Kingdom, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 
For Denmark, the Air Navigation Act 
For France, Article 7 Division IV et V - art. 8 de la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 
 
EN 15   EN As more Member States are prep aring their own PNR legislation, th is might lead to  the creation 
of up to 27 considerably diverging systems. This could result in uneven levels of data protection 
across the Union, security gaps, increased costs and legal uncertainty for carriers. This could lead 
to distortions in the internal market. 
2.1.4.  Agreements with third countries 
The first country that recognised and made use of  PNR data in a systematic electronic way was 
the United States, which, after the terrorist a ttacks of 9/11, proceede d immediately with the 
introduction of PNR data legisl ation. Since then, more countri es have followed and passed 
similar legislation, namely Australia, Canada and New Zealand and more recently Japan and 
South Korea. Various other countri es are also currently working towards such legislation. The 
EU has signed agreements for the transf er of PNR data with the United States31, Canada32 and 
Australia33. These Agreements regulate the transfer of PNR data by carriers operating flights 
between the EU and these countries for the purpose of the fight against terrorism and 
transnational serious crime. They also list a se ries of safeguards that the third country must 
respect when handling personal data of passengers whose PNR data are transmitted under the Agreements. The Agreements do not deal with tran sfers of PNR data for f lights by carriers to the 
EU or the authorities of Member States' as the EU does not yet have a PNR system in place. The 
Agreements only provide, in terms of reciprocity, th at the authorities of the third countries share 
some analytical information with the Member St ates' authorities. If th e EU had a PNR system, 
the reciprocity element of such Agreements would be implemented more thoroughly. 
The Commitments on which the PNR Agreement with Canada was based have expired in 2009 
and therefore the Agreement needs to be renego tiated. The Agreements with the United States 
and Australia are only provisional  and have not yet been offici ally concluded by the EU. Upon 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, th e European Parliament proposed that both these 
Agreements should be renegotiated as they do not  provide for adequate protection of personal 
data. Therefore, the Commission requested th at the Council provides it with negotiating 
directives to enter into new ag reements with the United States
34 and Australia35. The Commission 
also recommended that the Council provide it w ith negotiating directives to enter into a new 
agreement with Canada36 as well. The Council adopted the relevant Decisions on 2 December 
2010. Other countries, notably Japa n and South Korea have also requested to negotiate such 
agreements.  
Through the experience gained by the countries that already use PNR da ta, the Member States 
have come to appreciate the full value of PNR data  in the fight against te rrorism and other serious 
crime.  
                                                 
31 OJ L 204/16, 4.8.2007 
32 OJ L 91, 29.3.2006 p.53, OJ L 91, 29.3.2006 p.49 and OJ L 82, 21.3.2006 p.15 
33 OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p.49 
34 SEC(2010)1082, 21.9.2010 
35 SEC(2010)1083, 21.9.2010 
36 SEC(2010)1084, 21.9.2010 
 
EN 16   EN 2.1.5.  Types of carriers collecting PNR data 
Currently only air carriers collect PNR data. Sea and rail carriers do not collect such data, with 
some exceptions. For example, some rail and sea car riers collect PNR-like data for instance the 
Eurostar. and Thalys collect some data when th e reservation is made online and cruise ships 
collect some PNR-like data as well. On the othe r hand, ferries and trains other than the Thalys 
and the Eurostar do not have computerised reserv ation systems which are similar to those of air 
carriers.  
The collection of PNR data by ca rriers should also be consid ered against the background of 
increasing passenger flows. According to the data provided by the Member States, there were 767 
million external border crossings in 2007 and 714 m illion in 2008. It should be noted that the data 
are not fully comparable because the Schengen enlargement in 2007 (land borders) and 2008 (air borders)
37 shifted the physical location of the Schenge n external border and affected the number 
of external border-crossing points. Furthermore, Member States do not record such movements in 
a consistent manner, so rates are based mainly on estimations. However, based on discussion with 
Member States it can be assumed that border-crossings at  the largest and busie st points have been 
increasing and will continue doing so in the future38. 
In addition, the total number of travellers di ffers a lot between Member States with some 
Member States recording over three million travelle rs crossing the borders in a one week period 
and others recording below 50.000 travellers.  
As regards the number of flight movements a nd passengers affected by the possible introduction 
of PNR measures, air carrie rs carried approximately 500.000.0 00 passengers on 3.300.000 flights 
going in and out of the EU-27 in 200639. With an annual rate of in crease of these flights of 
7.7%40, the number of flights going in and out of the EU-27 in 2010 was 4.500.000.   
2.2. EU right to act and subsidiarity principle 
The right of the EU to act in this field is ensh rined in Articles 82 and 87 of Title V of Chapter V 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
As the threat from terrorism and cross-border seri ous crime remains significa nt, it is important to 
provide law enforcement authorities with new eff ective tools with which to perform their tasks. 
As most of the categories of serious crimes, like drugs and human trafficking, often involve 
international travel, it is essential that author ities collect, process and exchange PNR data to 
increase the internal security of the EU. Moreover i nvestigations for the purpose of preventing, 
detecting, investigating and pros ecuting terrorist offences and se rious crimes carried out by the 
                                                 
37 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hung ary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Pola nd, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the 
Schengen area in 2007 (air borders were lifted in 2008). 
38 See also the World Trade Organisatio n (WTO) forecast: Tourism 2020 vision, 
http://www.wto .org/english/tratop_e(ser_e/omt. ppt and the travel forecast of Office of Travel and Tourism 
Industries (OTTI), http://tinet.ita.doc .gov/view/f-2000-99-001/index.html. 
39 Figures according to Eurocontrol on the basis of CFMU IFR Flights 
40 Eurocontrol Annual Report 2009 
 
EN 17   EN competent authorities of the Member States are largely dependent on international cross-border 
cooperation.  
Because of the free movement of persons in th e Schengen area, it is necessary for all Member 
States to collect, process and exchange PNR data, in  order to avoid security  gaps due to criminals 
diverting their planned journe ys through Member States not collecting PNR data. By acting 
collectively and coherently this m easure will have a substantial imp act on the security of the EU.  
If Member States are left to legi slate independently on issues such  as data reten tion periods, use 
of sensitive data, purpose limitation, push/pull met hods and onwards transfers to third countries, 
safeguards might diverge. Action at EU level will help to ensure harmonised provision on 
safeguarding data protecti on throughout the Union.  
A further reason why EU action would be more a ppropriate is that differences between national 
requirements adopted in Member States that ha ve already established similar mechanisms or 
which will do so in the future, may impact nega tively on the air carriers as they may have to 
comply with several potentially diverging requirements. Different standards regarding the method 
of transfer of data, the messaging format, th e data security mechanisms, the frequency of 
transmissions etc, would be very costly for ca rriers operating in different Member States to 
implement. 
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that the EU is both entitled to act and better placed 
to do so than the Member States acting indepe ndently. Such an action should not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve its objectives.  
2.3. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? 
Without action at EU level, it is likely that  several Member States will implement their own 
domestic PNR systems. This would mean that th e full benefits offered to develop the fight 
against terrorism and serious crime to increase in ternal security of the Union, by cooperating on 
PNR data collection, would not be attained. This would also mean  that the Union might end up 
with various diverging PNR system s leading to negative effects on the internal security of the 
Union, by the potential creation of serious security gaps.  
The development of different and diverging PN R systems in the Union could also have an 
adverse effect on the level of protection of personal data afforded to passengers, since the 
standard of data protection in  the Member States may vary, despite respecting the general 
European standards. As more and more Member States adopt national legi slation for the use of 
PNR data and as more and more third countries request such transmission from carriers, it is 
important to ensure uniform and high level pr otection of personal data when processing PNR 
data. Sufficient safeguards should be provided to ensure that passengers have access to enforce 
their rights. The Article 29 Data Protection Work ing Party, despite opposing the use of PNR data, 
strongly prefers a European instrument with robu st data protection guarant ees to various national 
systems with diverging da ta protection standards. 
In addition, diverging PNR systems in the Union would create difficulties for carriers having to 
comply with a number of differ ent systems, and the national authorities would have to develop 
 
EN 18   EN systems to be able to receive and transmit data in poten tially many different ways. For this 
reason, the carrier associations whic h were consulted for the purposes  of this report were strongly 
in favour of harmonising the use of PNR data at EU level. 
Another aspect to be taken into account is that the number of travellers continues to increase. 
This, together with additional border and security controls, has started creating problems of managing the flows of passengers efficiently. This problem is expected to worsen as the number 
of passengers increase. The collection and use of PNR data will contribute  towards managing this 
problem more efficiently. The possibility of performing border and security controls of a 
passenger's PNR data before he or she actually a rrives in the country of destination will make it 
possible to clear non-identified tr avellers and subject them only to minimum controls at the 
border. 
3. POLICY
 OBJECTIVES 
3.1. Objectives 
One of the fundamental goals of the Union is the development of a genuine European area of 
justice, freedom and security. Such an area ai ms to ensure that the fundamental rights of 
individuals living in the EU, such as the right to life, physic al integrity and the protection of 
personal data and privacy, are guaranteed.   
The general objective is therefore to  increase the internal security of the EU, while respecting the 
right to protection of personal da ta and other fundamental rights . This is in line with the 
Stockholm Programme, which calls on the Commission to present a proposal for the use of PNR 
data to prevent, detect, inve stigate and prosecute terrorism  and other serious crime.  
This general objective translates into the following specific policy objectives: (1) To prevent and reduce terro rist activities an d other serious crime through a global 
approach to the use of PNR data avoiding  security gaps. At operational level, the 
objective would be to collect and process PNR data in an electronic format in order to 
benefit fully from the advantages offere d by modern technologies for such use. 
(2) To ensure that individuals' ri ght to the protection of personal data is duly respected when 
PNR data are collected and processed. At operational level, the objectives is to facilitate the exchange of PNR data among responsible au thorities and to ensure  that access to PNR 
data is limited to what is nece ssary for the pre-defined purpose(s). 
(3) To provide legal certainty to  and reduce costs for carrier s. There are two operational 
objectives, to reduce differences in legal and technical requirements  imposed on carriers 
and to avoid distortion of the internal ma rket due to diverging legal requirements. 
 
EN 19   EN 3.2. Respect of fundamental rights 
The impacts on fundamental rights in the Impact A ssessment have been assessed in line with the 
Fundamental Rights "Check List" as provided for in the Commission's Strategy for the effective 
implementation of the Charter of Funda mental Rights by the European Union41. 
The purpose of any proposed measure would be to prevent and combat terrorism and other serious 
crime so as to increase the public security in  the EU and safeguard fundamental rights.  
The use of PNR data would involve  the collection, processing, exch ange and use of personal data 
of individuals for public policy pur poses. As such, this processing interferes with the fundamental 
rights to the protection of privat e life and to the protection of personal data as recognised by 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter on Fundamental Right s of the European Union and Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, as well as  Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. The right to private life and to the protecti on of personal data is however 
subject to limitations and conditi ons defined in Article 8 of th e European Convention of Human 
Rights and Article 52 of the Charter on Fundam ental Rights of the European Union. These 
limitations permit interferences that are in so far as  necessary "in the intere st of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the count ry, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals , or for the protection of the ri ghts and freedoms of others". "in 
accordance with the law" and "neces sary in a democratic society". As the proposed actions would 
be for the purpose of combating terrorism and othe r serious crime, containe d in a legislative acts 
they would clearly comply with such requirements provided they are "necessary in a democratic 
society" and comply with th e principle of proportionality.  
Any proposed action would fall with in the scope of Title V of Chapter V TFEU on police and 
judicial cooperation. The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC42 would not apply as actions within 
a framework established by public  authorities to safeguard pub lic security are excluded. The 
provisions of the Council Framework Decision  2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters43 would apply to 
data exchanged between Member States but not to the domestic processing of personal data for law 
enforcement purposes, leaving a protection gap at  national level. Since any proposed measure 
would involve domestic processing  of PNR data by Member States, it is necessary to devise data 
protection rules for such processi ng. The most suitable so lution in the circumstances would be that 
the data protection safeguards of any proposed measure are in line with the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. On this basis, any proposed action should ensure that the purpose of the use of 
PNR data is clearly defined, that  processing of personal data is secure, that the right of 
individuals to information, access,  rectification, erasure and bl ocking are respected, and that 
Member States impose liability, appropriate sancti ons and remedies. Equally, the supervision of 
                                                 
41 COM (2010)573 of 19 October 2010 
42 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 
23/11/1995 p 31, Article 3 
43 Council Framework decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the Framework of police and judicial c ooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, 
p.60. 
 
EN 20   EN the application of these rules by the data protec tion supervisory authori ties in Member States, 
exercising their functions with co mplete independence, is an e ssential component for efficient 
protection of personal data under any such proposal.  
This solution would guarantee a uniform standard of protection of personal data under any 
proposal, and provide legal certainty for individu als, commercial operators and law enforcement 
authorities.  
4. POLICY  OPTIONS  AND  TRANSVERSAL  ISSUES 
4.1. Policy options 
In order to achieve the objectives mentioned abov e, the Commission considers that there are four 
main policy options described below: 
A. Refraining from addressing the issue at  EU level – Maintaining the status quo  
This policy option involves no action being take n by the EU. This means that the issue of 
processing and exchanging PNR data will remain unresolved at EU level while different and largely diverging solutions to the processing a nd exchanging of PNR da ta would be developed 
and implemented by Member St ates acting independently.  
Three Member States have already started im plementing national PNR data systems and it is 
expected that more will follow.  
B. Options addressing the structure of a syst em for collecting and processing PNR data 
B.1: Decentralised collection and processing of data by Member States 
This policy option would involve an EU legislativ e instrument to ensure that Member States 
collect, process, use and share certain categor ies of PNR data for specific purposes. Each 
Member State would be required to collect and pr ocess the PNR data of travel to and from its 
territory, while sharing relevant PNR data or analysis of PNR data with other Member States. Therefore each Member State would be indivi dually as well as collectively responsible for 
increasing the internal security of the EU. Under this option, the Member States would bear the 
costs of establishing their national PNR systems.  Consequently, it would be  Member States that 
decide on how best to use PNR da ta, within the limits of the EU  legislative instrument. These 
activities would be subject to a number of safeguards aimed to  comply with data protection 
requirements and the security of data transfer s. Such safeguards should include appropriate 
purpose limitation, clearly defined periods of retention, and rules ensuring the security of data 
processing as well as redress mechanisms.  
B.2: Centralised collection and processing of data at EU level 
This policy option would involve an EU legislative instrument to require that an EU central unit 
collects, processes, uses and shares with Memb er States certain categories of PNR data for 
defined purposes. It would involve  the centralised collec tion and processing of the data by an EU 
 
EN 21   EN body, rather than requiring each Member State to collect and process the PNR data of travel to 
and from their territory. Carriers would be obliged to transmit the PNR data of their passengers to 
a Centralised Unit at EU level which would f ilter out the non-required data when necessary, 
process and share PNR data or anal ysis of PNR data with the relevant authorities of the Member 
States. The Centralised Unit would be responsible  for retaining the data. Consequently, the EU 
would be responsible for processi ng and retaining the data, within  the limits of the legislative 
instrument. These activities woul d be subject to a number of sa feguards aimed at providing the 
highest level of protection of personal data and a secure transmission of the data. Such safeguards 
should aim at ensuring the appropriate purpos e limitation, defining the retention period, and 
setting rules for the security of the data and re dress mechanisms. The work of such a unit would 
be substantial, it would require an important numb er of staff and it would need to work on a 24/7 
basis. Under this option, the EU, together w ith each Member State would be collectively 
responsible for increasing the internal security of the EU. Th e costs for establishing and running 
the system would be borne by the EU budget.  
C. Options addressing the purpose li mitation of the proposed measures 
C.1: Access for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime only 
Under this option, PNR data would be used fo r the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offen ces and other serious crimes . The term "terrorist offence" could be 
defined according to the Framework Deci sion on combating terrorism 2002/475/JHA44. The term 
"serious crime" could be defined according to the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 
13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender proce dure between Member 
States. This option would be cons istent with the approach of th e Commission as regards transfers 
of PNR data to third countries , as set out in the Communicati on on the global approach to 
transfers of PNR data to third countries and with its general approach in police and judicial cooperation instruments. 
C.2: Access for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime and other policy objectives 
Under this option, PNR data would be used not ju st for the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offen ces and other serious crime, but al so for other pur poses, such as 
immigration control, aviation security a nd health safety, described in section 2.1.2. 
D. Options addressing the modes of transpor t to be covered by the proposed measures 
D.1: Air travel only 
Under this option, PNR data would be collected only for air travel . Currently only air carriers 
regularly collect such information. The data are provided by the passenge r voluntarily and are 
collected and processed by the air carriers for commercial purposes via their reservation and 
                                                
 
44 OJ L164, 22/6/2002, p.3 
 
EN 22   EN departure control systems. The na ture of air travel requires that at least the name and flight 
number for each passenger are known at the time of booking.  
D.2: Air, sea and rail travel 
Under this option, PNR data would be collected for air, sea and ra il travel. Because most sea and 
rail carriers do not currently regularly collect PNR data, th is option involves extending the 
collection of PNR data to those types of carriers. 
E. Voluntary/enhanced cooperation 
This option would result in the issue being d ealt with by encouraging cooperation between the 
Member States. Such cooperation co uld take the form of exchanges of best practices. However, it 
is considered that the option of encouragi ng cooperation between Memb er States, would not 
achieve the desired objectives. Firstly, it would be ex tremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure 
a common EU approach, and it would be impossibl e to ensure that such best practices are 
actually being exchanged. Moreover, the problems of terrorism and organised crime affect all 
Member States and are not only limited to some Memb er States. If Member St ates refuse or fail 
to coordinate their activities, they would create a substantial security ga p within the Union. The 
security of the EU is the join t responsibility of Me mber States and they should all act in a 
harmonised manner to achieve the desired results.  The goal of increasing security can therefore 
not be sufficiently achieved merely by encourag ing cooperation between Member States. In 
addition, the airlines and the data  protection authoritie s of the Member States generally opposing 
the idea of using PNR data for law enforcement purposes were adamant that if any action were to be taken it should involve harmonisation. Otherwise it is likely that we wi ll end up with diverging 
requirements which will ultimately be very costly for the airlines and the Member States. It is further noted that the guidelines of the Inte rnational Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) on PNR 
data are not binding and have  proved not to provide a suffi cient basis for the required 
cooperation. 
On the basis of the above, the option of encour aging cooperation between the Member States in 
this field is rejected at this initia l stage and will not be further examined. 
4.2. Transversal issues 
There are a number of transversa l issues which arose from the c onsultations with Member States 
and other stakeholders that are relevant to the use of PNR data  but which are not presented as 
policy options in the present report, either because there is already a general consensus on these issues or because an alternative approach to the one presented is not consid ered realistic at this 
stage. This section provides an overview of  a preliminary analysis of these issues. 
4.2.1.  Geographical scope 
It would be most reasonable and proportionate that any proposed measure would apply to travel 
from a third country to or from a Member Stat e. This would ensure that PNR data of all 
passengers entering or departing from the EU would be collected, processed and retained. 
 
EN 23   EN Member States and the EU would undertake to act individually a nd as well as co llectively to 
increase security in the EU. 
Given that the objectives pursued by the collecti on of PNR data are the same inside and outside 
of the EU, there would be an im portant added value in including in ternal flights, i.e. flights 
between Member States in any proposed measure. Making the instrument applicable to all travel, 
including internal travel, t hough favoured by some Member Stat es, is however considered 
premature at this stage. Considering the large numb er of travellers on internal flights, which is 
three times more than the number of  passengers on international flights45, the costs for setting up 
and operating the system would be much higher. The hardware and software required to set up 
the system would have to have a much larger  capacity, and therefore would be much more 
expensive. A system including internal flights woul d be too ambitious to a dopt as a first step, but 
it is one that should be considered for the futu re, as part of a step-by-step approach. The 
possibility and necessity of includi ng internal flights in any measure could be the subject of an in-
depth evaluation a couple of years after the m easure has been in operation. The experience of 
those Member States that collect PNR data on inte rnal flights by that point should be taken into 
account for the purposes of the evaluation. 
4.2.2.  Sensitive data 
As regards the processing of sensitive data, any proposed measure should be consistent with the 
2007 Impact Assessment and the 2007 proposal ensuring that "sensitive" data46, to the extent that 
they are contained in the PNR data, are filtered out and deleted immediately. 
4.2.3.  Data retention period 
On the length of the data reten tion period, a commensurate period of  retention of the data by the 
relevant authorities is necessary when using PN R data re-actively or pro-actively. The option of 
deleting the data upon the arrival of  the passengers at the country of destination does not seem 
appropriate as it would limit the potential of PNR data to one of the three possible uses listed in 
2.1.2, namely real-time use. Such a limitation woul d not make full use of the added value of 
using PNR data. 
The retention period should not be longer than n ecessary for the performance of the tasks for 
which PNR data are used and should take into a ccount the different ways in which PNR data are 
used and the possibilities of lim iting access rights over the period of retention. The 2007 Impact 
Assessment and 2007 proposal set the active reten tion period to 5 years and retention in an 
inactive database for another 8 years. This c hoice was heavily criticise d by the data protection 
stakeholders and the European Parliament as t oo long and disproportionate. For the purposes of 
this report, it is proposed that any new measur e should provide for a reduced period of data 
retention. Such a data retenti on period should also provide fo r the gradual reduction of access 
                                                 
45 Eurocontrol Annual Report 2009 
46 As defined in Article 6 of the Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe, i. e. personal data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs,  or concerning health or sexual life 
 
EN 24   EN rights, for example through anonymising the data . The solution should meet the concerns 
expressed by Member States and must draw on e xperience gained from in ternational agreements 
that the EU signed in the field. It must represent the absolute minimum of what is required for the 
prevention, detection, investigatio n and prosecution of te rrorist offences and serious crime, and 
what can be considered acceptable from a data pr otection point of view. The chosen period must 
meet data protection requirements. 
On the basis of the above, and taking into account the data retention periods  in the countries that 
currently use PNR data, the period of retention should be one year  with an additional period of 
five years in an anonymised database.  
4.2.4.  Push/pull 
As regards the method of transmission of the data  by the carriers, the "pus h" and "pull" methods 
were considered. 
With the "push" method carriers tr ansmit (push) the required PNR da ta into the database of the 
requesting authority. On the othe r hand with the "pull"  method, the requesting authority can reach 
in to the carrier's reservation system and extrac t (pull) a copy of the re quired data into their 
database.  
The advantages of the "push" method over th e "pull" method are undisputable, as public 
authorities can keep control ove r what happens with the databa ses located on their territory. 
Another advantage would be that the public authorit ies keep control over the security of the data 
transfers. The risks of th e "pull" method are that the authority which receives the data potentially 
may access all data in the databases of the carri ers and would then have  to filter them out 
themselves. The carriers are therefore left with no  control over the data they have collected and 
for which they are responsible.  
It is important to stress that the transmissi on of PNR data by carriers to public authorities 
generates a substantia l cost for carriers47, with the "push" method bei ng substantially more costly 
than "pull" method. Carriers would have to im plement "push" method from a hardware and 
software point of view. They would then have  to pay the transmissi on costs (telecommunication 
lines) for each "push" of the data. As such, the actual cost for carriers will depend on the carrier's size and the number of flights th at it executes under any proposed  measures. Therefore, small 
carriers, with few flights would have fewer cost s. The system's hardware and software would 
need to be of a smaller capacity and the transmi ssion costs would not be substantial. On the other 
hand, large carriers with many f lights will need systems with  bigger capacity and many more 
telecommunication lines. 
The risks however to the protect ion of the data of passengers with the "pull" method clearly 
outweigh the advantages that it o ffers in relation to costs.  
                                                
 
47 Detailed explanations and figures on costs are provided in Annex A and Chapter 7 of this Report. 
 
EN 25   EN Even though the 2007 Impact Assessment and 2007 proposal had proposed the use of the "push" 
method for EU carriers and a combination of " push" and "pull" methods for third country 
carriers, the data protection stakeholders and the European Parliament criticised this decision and 
insisted on the exclusive use of the "push" method. In response to these criticisms and in further 
consultations with the Member States, it is ad visable that any proposed  measure should provide 
for the exclusive use of the "push" method by a ll carriers. Even though the "push" systems are 
currently being developed, it requires a certain timeframe to become fully operational. More specifically, carriers will have to  implement the "push" method, a dopt the necessary data formats 
and encryption methods and develop links to all re levant Member States in order to transmit the 
data. Member States would also have to impl ement the "push" method on the receiving side, 
adopt the necessary technical requirements and li nks with the carriers. All these processes are 
complex and difficult to implement and air carrier s and Member States should do their utmost to 
comply with this method.  
4.2.5.  Automated Individual Decisions 
One of the biggest criticisms of the use of PNR data for trend analysis and for running it against 
the fact-based assessment criteria is that it might  result in what is critically referred to as 
'profiling'. Profiling can be described as an automa tic data processing technique that consists of 
applying a “profile” to an individua l, in order to take decisions affecting him or her. EU data 
protection legislation in principle grants every individual the right not  to be subject to a decision 
which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects hi m and which is based 
exclusively or to a decisive extent on automated processing of data intende d to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to him.
48 A person, however, may be subjec ted to a decision of this kind 
if it is authorised by law which also lays down measures to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests. Any proposal for the use of PNR data s hould therefore comply with this data protection 
principle and lay down effective measures to safe guard the data subject's legitimate interests. 
Such measure could include that any automated individual decisions ha s to be verified and 
confirmed by a human being and allow for arrangem ents allowing the data subject to present his 
or her point of view.  
4.2.6.  Scope of the data 
As regards the issue of the scope of the data, th e competent authorities s hould be able to use only 
those elements of PNR data considered proportio nate and necessary for the fulfilment of the 
purpose of the specific measure. Any list of PNR categories to be used should include the 
minimum of what is necessary and the maximum of  what is proportionate to fulfil its purpose in 
this specific case. It is also important to note that any measure should not oblige carriers to 
introduce mandatory fields in their collection of PNR data from their passengers. The carriers should continue to collect and make available to the competent author ities only those data 
voluntarily provided by the passeng er for the reservation of the flight or which have been 
collected following check-in and boarding. 
                                                
 
48 Article 15 of Directive 95/46/EC; Article  7 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
 
EN 26   EN 4.2.7.  Data to be transmitted from the Passenger Information Units/Centralised Unit to the 
competent authorities 
Data can be transmitted to the competent authorit ies either in bulk or on a case-by-case basis. 
It seems preferable that the carriers do not f ilter the data which they will transmit to the 
competent law enforcement authorities. This filtering could best be done by the Passenger 
Information Units designated by the Member Stat es or by the EU Centralis ed Unit (depending on 
which option is finally adopted). The Passenger  Information Unit or Centralised Unit would 
thereby filter out the non-required data and r un the PNR data through the alert systems and the 
assessment criteria in order to identify suspicious  passengers. The Unit w ould then transfer only 
the PNR data of identified pass engers to the relevant authori ties. In addition, the relevant 
authorities could make specific requ ests to the Unit for the provision of data in relation to specific 
investigations or to assist in analysing the data. These authoritie s will not have access to the PNR 
data of other passengers. In this way, the possi bility of abuse of the data would be reduced. The 
advantage to the increase of security in the case of bulk transmissions of data is minor and does 
not outweigh the disadvantage on the protection of data.  
4.2.8.  Bodies receiving data from th e Passenger Information Units 
The Passenger Information Units/Centralised Un it should process and then transfer to the 
competent national authorit ies of the country of destination/de parture, only the PNR data of the 
identified passengers. They should also transfer th e PNR data of the identified passengers to the 
Passenger Information Units of the other Member St ates, which should then, in  their turn, transfer 
them to their national law enforcement or other competent authorities.  
5. ANALYSIS  OF IMPACTS   
This section identifies the social and economic im pacts of the options, whet her direct or indirect, 
in the short term and in the long term. It shoul d be noted at this stage that no significant 
environmental impacts could be identified. The most significant impacts will be analysed below against the following criteria: security in the Un ion, protection of personal data, costs for public 
authorities, costs for carriers/comp etition, the internal market an d aim to encouraging a global 
approach. Impacts are rated as abse nt, small, medium or significant: 
Table of symbols (using (-) for negative and (+) for positive impacts) 
Small impact - / + 
Medium impact -- / ++ 
Significant impact - - - / +++ 
No impact 0 
 
 
EN 27   EN 5.1. Impacts of the option of refraining from  addressing the issue at EU level – 
Maintaining the status quo (Policy Option A) 
This policy option entails no action to be ta ken by the Union. The status quo will therefore 
remain . The status quo, as explained, is that cu rrently three Member States have relevant 
legislation for the use of PNR data. The consulta tions however, suggested th at in the very near 
future, more and more Member States will start adopting similar internal measures as well. Therefore, in our assessments, the status quo al so takes into account expected developments in 
the very near future. 
Increasing security in the EU (0) : A "no action" policy will impede the ability of the EU to 
fight terrorism and serious crime and hence have a negative effect on the security in the Union.  
This would mean that the full advantages offere d by PNR data to the security of the EU, would 
not be attained. This would also  mean that the Union might en d up with various diverging PNR 
systems, leading to negative effects on the internal  security and the creation of security gaps. The 
Union will have fewer means of identifying terrorists and criminals. Furthermore, it will deprive 
the Member States of a very important source of obtaining intelligence on terrorists, criminals 
and their associates. Nevertheless, if some Member  States develop their ow n systems, the impact 
on increasing the security in the Union will be positive but to a lesser extent than if action is taken collectively. Terrorists and criminals migh t choose to enter the Union through a Member 
State which does not have such a system or a system  with lower standards. In addition, in view of 
the free movement of persons within the Sche ngen area, a system introduced in one Member 
State might prove to be insufficient, as it cannot go beyond its territory . Therefore the aim of 
substantially increasing the security of the Union cannot be sufficiently achieved merely by 
relying on national measures. 
Increasing the protection of personal data (0) : Each Member State which develops a national 
system would have to safeguard the right to data  protection of passengers. The standards of data 
protection might vary depending on  which Member State a passeng er travels to or from. For 
example, data might be retained for different pe riods in different Member States, some Member 
States might use sensitive data wh ile others do not, Member States  might have different standards 
for notifying passengers of the processing of their data or provide different  levels of access to 
data. More importantly, Member States might us e the data for different purposes, for example 
some might use the data for the prevention, detect ion, investigation and pr osecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime and immigration pur poses, while others might exclude immigration. 
Some may use the data for all types of crimes while others limiting the use to serious crimes. Member States might have wide exce ptions as regards the access to data or in relation to redress. 
Such divergence of standards would be undesira ble as passengers would have different rights 
depending which Member State they  travel to and from. The data protection authorities would 
deplore such a development and the Article 29 Working Party on Da ta Protection and the 
European Data Protection Supervisor are adamant that in case Member States start implementing 
national measures, harmonised EU  action would become necessary .  
Costs on public authorities (0) : Public authorities in Member States deciding to introduce 
national PNR legislation would need to set up systems to receive data from carriers. This is likely 
to lead to the development of a number of  different national systems of collection and 
 
EN 28   EN transmission of data, thus having a serious negative impact on efficiency and ultimately on costs. 
Each national authority would have to develo p technology based systems of transmission to 
potentially 26 other different syst ems of the other Member States.  
Costs for carriers/competition in the internal market (0):  National legislati on obliging carriers 
to communicate PNR data to the relevant national authorities would mean that carriers collecting 
and processing this data would n eed to comply with the legal a nd technical requirements of each 
different system, regarding for example methods of transmission, data security standards for 
transmission of data, varying data formats amongst other. Considerable costs, as well as technical 
challenges, can be expected for carriers if they  would have to respond to multiple requirements 
which differ substantially from one another. Sin ce each Member State would be left to regulate 
the issue of access to PNR data domestically, it is not unlikely that such solutions will not comply 
with the 'single window' approach, i.e. that ther e should only be one aut hority in each Member 
State requesting data  from the carriers . This would lead to a sharp increase in the costs for 
carriers as they would need to establish and keep secure communication channels with each 
different authority. In addition, in  case some but not all Member States choose to develop their 
own PNR data collection and transfer systems,  carriers operating predominantly from Member 
States which do not have PNR data  legislation might be in an a dvantageous position compared to 
carriers in countries that do.  
Encouraging a global approach (0):  It is anticipated that more third countries will request the 
provision of PNR data from the Union. Even though the Communication on the global approach to the transfer of PNR data to third countries en courages the Union to insist on certain standards 
and to ensure consistency in such bilateral agreements with third countries , these standards will 
have less impact if the EU is  unwilling or unable to impose such standards on its own Member 
States. Under this option the EU would not take full advantage of  the possibility of requesting 
reciprocal treatment from third countries with wh ich the EU has an agreement. Currently the third 
countries with which the EU has signed PNR Ag reements only undertake to share some analysis 
of PNR data with authorities of Member States . The Agreements do not go as far as requesting 
the third country to transmit all relevant flight da ta to the Member States to do their own analysis 
and processing. 
5.2. Impacts of the options addressing the stru cture for collecting and processing PNR 
data (Policy Option B) 
5.2.1.  Decentralised collection and processing of  data by Member States (Option B1) 
Increasing security in the EU (+++):  This option would potentially entail a faster transmission 
of the collected PNR data from a Passenger Inform ation Unit designated in each Member State to 
the relevant competent law enforcement authoriti es, than under the EU Centralised Unit option. 
Fast transmission is important since it allows more time to process the data  and identify high-risk 
passengers in advance of their arrival, especially  in cases where tickets for travel were bought at 
the last minute. It further provides time for law en forcement authorities to organise their reaction 
when they are expecting the arri val of a wanted or suspected individual by setting up teams to 
make the arrest or organise surveillance. More importantly, as PNR data are usually processed on 
the basis of very sensitive information, like th e assessment criteria and other law enforcement 
databases held by each Member States, our consu ltations showed that the Member States would 
 
EN 29   EN be more willing to use such sensitive inform ation under the auspices of their own national 
systems than with an EU Centralised Unit, thus rendering the processing of  PNR data much more 
effective and contributing to increasing security in the EU quite substantially. There is a risk, 
however, that the Passenger Info rmation Units of the Member States would a pply diverging 
criteria in assessing passengers, leading to the risk that the same passenger is identified in one 
Member State but not in another. This could be remedied with the establishment of guidelines at 
the EU level on how passengers shou ld be assessed. Such guidelines could be in the form of best 
practices on how the assessment of passengers shoul d be carried out, resulting from an advisory 
comitology procedure. It would of course be esse ntial that the actual assessment of passengers is 
carried out by each Member State separately as each would have different information on the 
basis of which to make its assessments. 
Protection of personal data (--): Under this option the transmitted data would remain within one 
Member State and only the PNR data of identifi ed passengers would be transmitted to other 
Member States. The data of passengers would be processed only by the Member State from 
which the passenger arrives or de parts rather than by other Memb er States irrelevant to the 
person's travel. It would also involve the proces sing of the passenger's data only on the basis of 
data available in the specific Member State rath er than against any information that might exist 
about the passenger elsewhere in the EU. Furthe rmore, it would be clear which Member State 
will be responsible for implementing the passenge r's data protection rights and the passenger 
would know where to seek redress in the ev ent of any violation of such rights.  
Costs on public authorities (--): The option of creating Passenger Information Units in each 
Member State would entail costs which would be borne by each Member State directly. The costs 
would need to cover the creation of the Unit, its staff, the development of the mechanism for the 
processing of the data and their transmission to the competent authorities. The costs for establishing the system would be substantial beca use each Member State would have to set up or 
designate a Passenger Information Unit which would receive the data and would have to develop 
the necessary mechanisms for the filtering and pro cessing of the data and their transmission to the 
relevant law enforcement authorities and the Pa ssenger Information Units of the other Member 
States. The operation of such a Unit is estimate d to require between 30- 50 members of staff for 
Member States with few international flight s and 70-100 for Member  States with many 
international flights. Because the setting-up an d operation of such a Unit involves substantial 
costs, it should be possible for two or more Me mber States to establish or designate the same 
Passenger Information Unit to receive, filter, process and forward the data. This would be 
especially helpful to Member States with few in ternational flights or wh ich do not face a severe 
threat to their security or seri ous problems with serious crime. 
Costs on carriers/competition in  the internal market (--): Carriers would have to bear the cost 
of "pushing" the data to the Pa ssenger Information Unit, which is estimated at around 0,04 Euro 
per passenger (as opposed to the cost of "pulling"  data which is estimate d at around 0,03 Euro per 
passenger). The carriers would also  have to bear the one-off co st of setting-up the system 
(hardware and software), as well  as recurring costs such as, pe rsonnel and maintenance costs. It 
should be noted that the software for carrying out  transmissions of data by "push" and "pull" 
methods, have already been developed and therefor e the cost of purchasing such software would 
be considerably less that some y ears ago. Furthermore, as PNR data  are more often used in third 
 
EN 30   EN countries than before, new software developers have entered the market, which until some years 
ago was dominated by fewer companies. This ha s led to substantial re duction in costs. The 
carriers would also need to establish communi cation channels with each Passenger Information 
Unit in order to transmit the relevant data to each Member State. This option would provide 
carriers with a 'single window' in each Member State rather than having several different 
authorities in each Member State re questing data from the carriers. 
Encouraging a global approach (+++):  It is anticipated that an  increasing number of third 
countries will request PNR data from the EU. This  option would provide the EU with the ability 
to insist on certain standards and to ensure consistency in bilateral agreements with third 
countries. It would also make it po ssible to request recipr ocal treatment from third countries with 
which the EU has already concluded an agreemen t, something that is not currently possible. 
Together with the Communication on the global a pproach to transfers of PNR data to third 
countries, this would allow the EU to encourag e a global approach on the use of PNR data. 
Because the use of PNR data requires specific acti on from non-EU carriers, it is possible that the 
third countries where such carri ers are based will react by intr oducing similar measures or by 
refusing to provide such data unless bilateral ag reements are concluded with the EU. This is 
however considered unlikely becau se the experience with countri es that use PNR data shows 
quite clearly that, despite their national measures which affect carriers worldwide, no retaliation 
has been recorded from another country. Addi tionally, the setting up and operation of a PNR 
system requires a high investment by the country that introduces it, which can be a dissuasive factor for most third countries. Therefore the us e of PNR data is curren tly only undertaken by 
those countries that consider such  an investment necessary to enha nce their internal security. As a 
result, our consultations and experience shows that  the possibility of retaliatory action by third 
countries does not present such  a great risk as to outweigh the advantages offered by the 
proposed measure to increase the internal security of the EU. 
5.2.2.  Centralised collection and processing  of data at EU level (Option B2) 
Increasing security in the EU (++):  This option would ensure the application of common 
criteria for identification of passengers and woul d make it possible to identify travel patterns and 
behavioural characteristics more  accurately because they would be based on PNR data for the 
whole of the EU. As such, the centralised collec tion of data would contri bute substantially to 
increasing security in the EU. However, for th e purpose of performing the assessment of the 
passengers, the responsible central authority woul d have to gather information from all the 
Member States. Such information would have to be up-to-date at all times, and the processing 
system would have to be fed with information on a 24/7 basis because of the number of flights 
entering and leaving the Union. In addition, the responsible authority  would have to have direct 
access to a variety of different national databases  in order to be able to carry out the assessments 
of passengers.  Such direct access is considered highl y sensitive by the Member States and the 
consultations with the Member States indicated th at they would be very reluctant to exchange 
such information and give direct access. Member States' reluctance  to this option could result in 
practical problems in the implementation of the sy stem and a high probability of failure, thereby 
reducing/obstructing/impedi ng substantially the positive impact that the measure is expected to 
have on security.  
 
EN 31   EN Protection of personal data (--): The advantage of having an EU  Centralised Unit to collect, 
process and retain the data is th at it might be in a better position to ensure that the data is 
transmitted and used within the uniform safeguards and redress mechanisms for the data subjects. 
This might ultimately involve less interference with the right to data protection of passengers. It 
would also ensure that exactly the same rules apply to all passengers. Furthermore, the data for each passenger will be assessed on the basis of in formation from all Member States, irrespective 
of where the passenger arrives or  departs from. Such extensiv e processing would, however, be 
very cumbersome and outweigh the other adva ntages of having an EU Centralised Unit. 
Costs on public authorities (-): Under this option, the costs would be borne by the EU budget 
and as a result, the Member States would not have  to bear any costs as they would not have to 
develop their own Passenger Info rmation Unit. The costs of se tting up an EU Centralised Unit 
would be very high because such a Unit would r eceive the data and would therefore need to 
develop the necessary mechanisms for processing and transmitting the data to the relevant authorities. The mechanism developed would have to be of an especially high capacity in order to 
deal with the vast amounts of data from carrier s and would be quite comp licated. There is a high 
possibility that such a system could be subject to  frequent crashes because of the vast amount of 
data and there is therefore a risk that it w ould be unworkable. A centralised system can be 
distinguished from systems such as the Sche ngen Information System (SIS) and the Visa 
Information System (VIS) because the volume of data which will be entered into such a system 
will be substantially bigger than that in SIS a nd VIS. SIS and VIS contain the data of specified 
individuals which are put into the systems by each Member State. On the contrary, the PNR data 
which will have to be handled  by such a Centralised Unit would relate to approximately 
500.000.000 passengers who fly in and out of the EU each  year. Such figures are also expected to 
rise every year. In addition, an EU Centralised Unit would need to operate on a 24/7 basis and be 
staffed with officials requiring speci al training in order to be able to work with fact-based rules. 
The EU does not currently have the expertise or th e capacity to establish such a Centralised Unit. 
Costs on carriers/competition in the internal market (-): Carriers would have to bear the cost 
of "pushing" the data to the Centralised Un it, which is estimated at around 0,04 Euro per 
passenger, (as opposed to the cost of "pulling" data which is estimated at around 0,03 Euro per 
passenger). The carriers would also have to bear the one-off cost of setting-up the system for "pushing" or "pulling" (hardwar e and software), as well as r ecurring costs of personnel and 
maintenance.. This option would provide carriers with a 'single window' for the whole of the EU, 
i.e. they would need to establish secure communication channels for transmitting the data only with one authority for the whole of the EU rather than different authorities in each Member State. 
This would be very beneficial to the carriers from a financial point of view. 
Encouraging a global approach (+++):  The impacts are the same as  those described above for 
option B1. 
 
EN 32   EN 5.3. Impacts of the options addressing the purpo se limitation of the proposed measures 
(Policy Option C) 
5.3.1.  Access for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime only (Option C1) 
Increasing security in the EU (++): The use of PNR data exclusively for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecu tion of terrorist offences and se rious crime would have a very 
positive impact on increasing security in the EU. Terrorism and other serious crime are the biggest threats to security. By  making PNR data available for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of such crimes, la w enforcement authorities will be provided with a 
necessary tool for the efficient performance of their tasks.  
Protection of personal data (--) : Limiting the measure to the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offen ces and serious crime would invol ve the processing of PNR data 
only for the narrower possible purposes. The use of that data would be authorised only for 
purposes for which no other tool would be able to fulfil the same objectives.  
Costs on public authorities (--): Restricting the use of the data  to the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offen ces and serious crime would involve a limited and 
specifically targeted group of au thorities using the data. This w ould have cost advantages, as it 
would not be necessary to build secure connecti ons for the exchange of the data between more 
authorities or to connect the national PNR da tabase with additional databases on visas and 
aviation security amongst othe rs. Extending the purpose beyond th e abovementioned would lead 
to greater costs.  
Costs on carriers/competition in  the internal market (--): Both the option of using the data 
exclusively for the prevention, de tection, investigation and prosecu tion of terrorist offences and 
serious crime and the option of using it for furt her purposes would have the same impacts as 
regards the costs on the carriers and the competition in the internal market.  
Encouraging a global approach ( +++): Limiting the measure to law enforcement purposes 
would be in line with the genera l international approach of the EU towards third countries on 
PNR which only refer to such purposes and would a llow the EU to set up its own standards to be 
promoted at international level.  
5.3.2.  Access for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
and serious crime and other policy objectives (Option C2) 
Increasing security in the EU (+++) : Extending the scope of the use of PNR data for other 
purposes could be considered useful, especially rega rding the use of such data in the fight against 
irregular immigration, aviation security and health safety. However, other less intrusive instruments would be preferable for addressing those concerns, such as the use of API data. There 
is currently no clear and direct need  to use PNR data for these purposes. 
Protection of personal data (---) : Although extending the use of PNR data to other purposes 
would be very useful, it cannot be  justified as necessary. Other, less intrusive measures would be 
 
EN 33   EN more appropriate for these purpo ses. Moreover, under this option, more authorities would have 
the right to use the data which would require add itional safeguards in order to comply with data 
protection principles. 
Costs on public authorities (---): If extension of the use of PN R data is extended to purposes 
other than the prevention, detec tion, investigation and prosecuti on of terrorist offences and 
serious crime this will lead to  a substantial increase in costs for public authorities.  
Costs on carriers/competition in  the internal market (--): The impacts are the same as those 
described above for option C1. 
Encouraging a global approach (-) : Extending the use of PNR data  to purposes other than the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offe nces and serious crime, would 
be inconsistent with current practice as it woul d go further in its domestic PNR system than the 
approach taken for third countries. .  
5.4. Impacts of the options addressing the mo des of transport to be covered by the 
proposed measures (Policy Option D) 
5.4.1.  Air carriers only (Option D1) 
Increasing security in the EU (++):  Even if the use of PNR data is limited to travel by air, it 
would contribute towards a substantial increase of th e internal security in th e EU. Air travel is the 
most common mode of transport fo r travelling to and from the EU territory from the majority of 
third countries. Due to its speed, it  represents the most attractive m ode of transport. As a result, 
even if any future measure is limited to air trav el a high percentage of travellers would be 
covered by it. Further, because of the dramatic  effects of a plane crash, and because of the 
destruction caused by such a crash, terrorists app ear to have a preference for using aircraft to 
perform an act of terror. In addi tion, criminals who traffic people and goods also tend to use air 
travel because it is faster than other modes of transport. However, under this option not all 
controlled border crossings to the EU would be c overed, and there would ther efore continue to be 
a high possibility of terrorists and criminals entering its territor y via other border crossings/land 
or sea borders. Furthermore, there remains a risk  that those wishing to enter EU territory use 
alternative means of transport, fo r example ship, ferry, train, bus, thus making the instrument less 
effective. However, overall, this option could suffi ciently achieve the goal of increasing security 
in the EU as a measure covering all flights to a nd from any third country would ensure that the 
Member States authorities are gi ven sufficient tools for identifyi ng when a potential suspect will 
attempt to enter the territory of the EU and will allow the analysis the data over a given period of time of relevance for the assessment criteria.  
Protection of personal data (--): Limiting the use of PNR data to  travel by air would involve 
collecting and processing of data of air passengers  only, thereby limiting the interference with the 
passengers' right to the protection of their personal data. In addition, it is important to note that 
 
EN 34   EN air carriers already collect and store these data  for quite long periods for commercial purposes49; 
this option would therefore not lead to the collection of any new data.  
Costs on public authorities (--): This option would involve fewer costs than the extension of the 
use of PNR data to air, sea a nd rail carriers because it would involve collection, processing and 
retention of less data and fewer connectio ns with carriers to obtain this data 
Costs on carriers/competition in the internal market (--): Because air carriers are the only 
transport providers that already have mechanisms  to collect PNR data of passengers developed 
and used for commercial purposes, the restriction of the use of PNR data  to air carriers only 
would not lead to heavy costs for air carriers . However, it should be not ed that the distinction 
between air and other forms of travel, leads to  a possibility that air carriers are put at a 
competitive disadvantage as they would have to incu r costs to comply with the system that other 
carriers will not have to do. This could lead to  a distortion of competition in the EU. However, 
this would depend on which air routes are consider ed to be in competition with non-air routes, 
and which markets are considered to be separate. 
Encouraging a global approach (+++):  Restricting the use of PN R data to air carriers only 
would be in line with the general international approach and the agreemen ts that the EU signed 
with third countries on PNR data which only refer to air travel.  
5.4.2.  Air, sea and rail carriers (Option D2) 
Increasing security in the EU (+++): Any measure covering air, sea and rail travel would 
ensure that all (other than road) border cr ossings are covered and would therefore limit the 
possibility of having security gaps, th ereby increasing security in the EU. 
Protection of personal data (---): Extending the use of PNR data to  sea and rail travel would 
lead to the collection and processi ng of more data because these carriers do not currently collect 
such data. In any case it would lead to the collec tion of more data than under Policy Option D1.  
Costs on public authorities (---): Extending the use of PNR data to  all modes of transport would 
be more costly for public authorities than restricti ng it to air travel because  it would involve more 
collection, processing and retention of data and more  connections with carriers to obtain the data. 
Costs on carriers/competition in  the internal market (---): This option would entail substantial 
costs and administrative changes fo r non-air carriers because they w ould have to set up such data 
collection and transfer mechan isms from scratch and change their operational systems 
substantially.  
Encouraging a global approach  (-): If the EU extends the use of PNR data to sea and rail travel, 
it would be going further for its domestic PNR sy stem than it does for third countries. This 
approach would therefore not be co nsistent with existing practice.  
                                                 
49 The retention periods by car riers vary substantially and sometimes reach 40 years 
 
EN 35   EN 6. COMPARING  THE  OPTIONS 
Policy Option A on maintaining the status quo presents very lim ited advantages on increasing the 
security of the EU, but otherwise would have very negative impacts. Bearing in mind the 
direction in which this policy fi eld is currently developing, it is anticipated that it would have 
negative impacts in the sense of creating admini strative difficulties for the public authorities 
stemming from numerous diverging national syst ems. The costs of compliance with potentially 
27 diverging systems would be huge, for both the public authorities and the carriers. Security 
benefits would be limited, since there would be no harmonisation of the various aspects of the 
national systems for the exchange and use of PNR data. In additi on, the development of different 
legal frameworks and mechanisms in the different Member States presents more possibilities for 
intrusive interferences to the data protection pr inciples because it would lead to diverging 
standards of data protection in each Member St ate. Moreover, such an option would not be 
consistent with the Union policy as regard s agreements on PNR with third countries. 
The options under Policy Options B aim to address th e structure of the system  needed to regulate 
the use of PNR data. Whether through a centralised or a decentralised system , taking action at the 
EU level is preferable to refraining from taking any action because it presents the clear advantage 
of significantly increasing security in the EU. Re garding the structure of any system to collect 
and process PNR data, the decentralised collection of data (Option B1) presents advantages over 
the centralised collection of such data (Option B2 ). The option of centralis ed collection of data 
would have a high possibility of  failure because it could not guarantee adequate co-operation 
between the Member States and at  a practical level the system w ould be cumbersome and costly 
to operate due to the enormous amount of data th at it would have to pr ocess and retain. Policy 
Option B1 would be more costly , for both the public authorities and the carriers compared with 
Policy Option B2 . The advantages, however, for security ou tweigh the disadvantages in terms of 
costs, since increasing security is the primary aim of the proposed measure. Both options would 
have the same impacts on the protection of pers onal data and on encouraging a global approach. 
Concerning the purpose limitation of any future measures, Policy Option C2 whereby the scope 
of the proposed measure would be extended to  purposes other than th e prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences  and serious crime presents some advantages 
for security compared with Policy Option C1. However, it also involves substantially more 
interference with data pr otection and more costs for the public authorities than Policy Option C1 
which would allow the use of PN R data exclusively for the prev ention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offences and seriou s crime. Moreover, Policy Option C2 presents 
fewer opportunities in terms of encouraging a global approach than Policy Option C1 since it 
would go further than the policy of the EU on PN R agreements with third countries. On this 
basis, Policy Option C2 on extending the use of  PNR data to other purposes seems to be 
disproportionate at this stage. 
Regarding the options in relation to the modes of transport that should be covered by any future 
measure, Policy Option D2 whereby the proposed m easure would be extended to air, sea and rail 
carriers presents some advantages for security compared with Policy Option D1 as it would cover more modes of transport and more passengers . However, it involves substantially more 
interference with data protecti on and more costs for the public authorities and the carriers than 
 
EN 36   EN Policy Option D1 under which the measure would be applied exclusivel y to air carriers. 
Moreover, Policy Option D2 presents fewer adva ntages in terms of encouraging a global 
approach since it would go further than the po licy of the EU on PNR agreements with third 
countries. In addition, the idea behind using PNR da ta is simply to obtain access to the data that 
is already collected by carriers.  Since most train and ships/ferry  carriers do not normally collect 
such data, it would be disproportio nate at this stage to require them to transmit data to public 
authorities. On the basis of the above, Policy Op tion D2 on extending the scope of the measure to 
cover sea and rail travel seems to be premature, at least at this stage. Such an extension to sea and 
rail travel could be considered in the future, on ce we will have learned from the experiences with 
PNR collection from air travel. 
 
EN 37   EN  
Summary table of the impacts of the policy options 
Status 
quo Options addressing 
structure for collecting 
and processing PNR Options addressing 
purpose limitation of PNR Options addressing 
modes of transport 
covered by PNR Impacts of 
policy options 
Policy 
Option A 
Status 
quo Policy 
Option B1 
Decentra-
lised PNR 
system at 
MS level Policy 
Option B2 
Centralised 
PNR 
system at 
EU level Policy 
Option C1
Terrorist 
offences 
and 
serious 
crime Policy Option 
C2 
Terrorist 
offences and 
serious crime 
and other 
policy 
objectives Policy 
Option D1 
Air 
carriers Policy 
Option D2
Air, sea 
and rail 
carriers 
Increase security in the EU 
0 +++ ++ ++ +++ ++ +++ 
Protection of personal data 0 -- -- -- --- -- --- 
Costs on public authorities 0 -- - -- --- -- --- 
Costs on carriers / competition in the internal market 
0 -- - -- -- -- --- 
Encouraging a global 
approach 0 +++ +++ +++ - +++ - 
Preferred 
policy option  √  √  √  
 
 
EN 38   EN 7. PREFERRED  POLICY  OPTION 
7.1. Analysis of the preferred policy option 
On the basis of the above, the creation of a new legislative proposal appli cable to travel by air 
with a decentralised coll ection of data for the pu rpose of preventing, detec ting, investigating and 
prosecuting terrorist offences and other seri ous crime seems to be the best policy option 
(combination of Policy Options B1, C1 and D1). This option would be pr eferable since it would 
provide better means of increasing security in the EU, while at the same time ensuring that 
interference with the protection of personal data is  kept to a minimum and that costs are kept at 
an acceptable level. It should be no ted that this option it  is not believed to present the ultimate 
solution to the problem but, at the current stage,  it is the most desirable solution. It is a good 
starting point and will help towards gathering e xperience in this field. In any event an EU 
instrument on the use of PNR data should be evalua ted after a reasonable period of time to assess 
its implementation. It should be noted that the pr eferred option will not have an impact on the EU 
budget. 
The structure of the system shoul d be decentralised. This option w ould have more benefits for the 
security in the EU since any cen tralised system, because of the nature of PNR data processing, 
would risk failing. Even though the centralised option involves fewe r costs than the decentralised 
option, the advantage to security, which is the main purpose of the measure, would outweigh the 
costs element.  
The purpose of any future measure should be limited only to the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious cr ime rather than be extended to 
other purposes such as health safety, aviation security, immigration for instance. The negative 
impact this would have on th e protection of personal data, costs and encouraging a global 
approach to PNR data outweigh the advantages to increased security this purpose extension 
would bring.  
As a first step, it seems more proportionate that  the proposal is limited to air carriers. Even 
though an extension to other modes of transport would have benefits fo r security, it would 
involve more costs for the public authorities and the carriers and more interference with data 
protection.  
The EU needs to act as soon as possible in this area in order to reduce th e possibility of various 
diverging systems being developed by each Member  State. Different approaches by different 
Member States would lead to inconsistencies, uncertainty and different rights for individuals, 
which would entail citizen dissatisfaction as  well as high costs for implementation and 
compliance. 
7.2. Costs of the preferred option 
An analysis of the costs of the prefe rred policy option appears in detail in Annex A and 
corresponds to the analysis carried out for the purposes of the 2007 Impact Assessment.  The costs 
are differentiated between costs for public authori ties and costs for carriers. This analysis did not 
 
EN 39   EN elicit any comment from either the Member States or the air carriers at the time of publication of 
the 2007 Impact Assessment. According to the 2007 calculations, the overall cost of the preferred 
option for public aut horities and carriers would be as follows: 
In relation to public authoritie s, the estimated costs for all Member States together are : 
Set-up cost (non-recurring cost) €  614  833  187 
BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years €  122  966  637 
Annual personnel costs (recurring) €  11 686  749 
Annual maintenance costs (recurring) €  61 483  319 
In relation to all EU carriers together, such costs are : 
Set-up cost for PUSH (non-recurring costs) €  11 647  116 
BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years €  2 329  423 
Transmission costs for PUSH twice per passenger (recurring) €  2 250  080 
Personnel and maintenan ce costs (recurring) €  5 435  321 
Following the 2007 Impact Assessment, the Comm ission published a tender for a study on ways 
of setting up an EU network for exchanging PN R data. The report ‘Study on ways of setting up 
an EU network on exchange of  Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement 
purposes’50 was issued in 2009 and includes a new assessment of the costs. 
In relation to public authoritie s, the estimated costs for all Member States together are:  
Set-up cost (non-recurring cost) 
5 large Member States * €  25 million = €  125 million 
15 medium-sized Member States* €  5 million = €  75 million 
7 small Member States* €  3 million = €  21 million €  221  000  000 
BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years €  44 200  000 
Annual personnel costs (recurring)51 €  11 686  749 
Annual maintenance costs (recurring)52 €  61 483  319 
                                                 
50 Authors: Accenture and SITA. 
51 These costs were not re-assessed under the Accenture study. The 2007 figures are therefore maintained. 
52 Ditto. 
 
EN 40   EN In relation to all EU carriers together, such costs are:  
Set-up cost for PUSH (non-recurring costs)53 
€ 100  000 * 120 EU-based carriers = €  12 000  000 
€ 100  000 * 80 non-EU-based carriers54 = €  8 000  000 
BUT assuming an amortisation period of five years €  4 000  000 
Transmission costs for PUSH twice per passenger (recurring) €
 33 500 per airline per year*120 ca rriers*3connections*2 PUSH €  24 120  000 
Personnel/maintenance costs (recurring) €  6 240  000 
The 2009 figures indicate a decrease in costs for public authorities to set up an EU PNR system 
but an increase in costs for carriers in compar ison with the cost calculation performed in 2007. 
The actual costs will be somewhere in between thes e two assessments and, at  least as regards the 
costs to carriers, most likely closer to the 2007 assessments, whic h are based on the market prices 
taken directly from carriers. 
It is important to note that, even with the very high calculations of 2009, if the carriers decide to 
pass on their costs to passenge rs, this would result in a surcharge of less than €  0.10 per ticket, a 
negligible amount in relation to  the overall ticket price. 
8. MONITORING  AND  EVALUATION 
It is important that the proposal includes pr ovisions for its monitoring and evaluating the 
measures. Such arrangements could be: 
Each Member State could prepare and transm it to the Commission an annual report on the 
implementation of the systems containing information on the following indicators: 
– volumes of data received,  
– cases which have ended in successful  identifications of suspects,  
– number and type of case where retained data were used for investigations,  
– cases where data were exchanged with ot her Member States and third countries,  
                                                 
53 The costs for PULL have not been assessed under the study, as it had become obvious at that stage of the 
negotiations between stakeholders that this would not be an acceptable option. It  is, however, clear from 
Annex A that the costs of PULL would be substantially less than the costs of PUSH. 
54 It is noted that the costs for non- EU-based carriers were not assessed for the purposes of the 2007 Impact 
Assessment. 
 
EN 41   EN – number of cases of redress related to  data protection and their outcome.  
The Commission should assess the op eration of the Directive within four years from its entry into 
force and submit a report to the Parliament and th e Council. This should evaluate whether the use 
of PNR data has met its objectives and whethe r Member States have complied with their 
obligations. The review should also examine wh ether the system has been successful and 
substantiate its conclusi ons with statistics. The review shou ld also take into account the annual 
reports of the Member States and cons ider all matters arising there from.  
The Commission should also consider the possibili ty of extending the measure to internal EU 
flights within two years from its  entry into force. This would provide the opportunity to have a 
transitional period and to gain experience from the functioning of  first PNR data Directive.  
 
EN 42  ANNEX A – TABLE OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PREFERRED OPTION  
Proposal On A Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name  
Records (PNR) Data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime  
If the act assessed is the transposition of an act adopted at another level, insert 
here the name and reference of that 'original' act Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) Time 
(hour) Price 
(per action or 
equip) Freq (per 
year) Nbr of 
entities Total nbr 
of actionsTotal cost Regulatory origin (%)
No. Ass. 
Art. Orig. 
Art. Type of 
obligation Description of required acti on(s) Target group i e i e      Int EU Nat Reg
1     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information (sending it 
to the designated recipient) non-recurrent costs for airlines 
(installation of IT systems and software)         2.329.423,00 1 1 1 2.329.423  100%  
2     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Adjusting existing data recurrent costs for airlines 
(personnel and operation of the system)         5.435.320,94 1 1 1 5.435.321  100%   
     Submission of 
(recurring) reports Submitting the information (sending it 
to the designated recipient) recurrent costs for airlines 
(transmission of PNR data)         0,04 1 1 54.880.000 2.250.080     
3     Other Inspecting and checking (including 
assistance to inspection by public authorities) non-recurrent costs for public 
administrations (installation of IT systems and software)         122.966.637,04 1 1 1 122.966.637  100%   
4     Other Inspecting and checking (including 
assistance to inspection by public authorities) recurrent costs for public 
administrations (personnel and maintenance)         73.170.067,09 1 1 1 73.170.068  100%   
5                   0,00   0 0  100%   
6                   0,00    00     
7                   0,00    00     
8                   0,00    00     
9                   0,00    00     
 
EN 43  Proposal On A Common Approach to the Use of Passenger Name  
Records (PNR) Data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime  
If the act assessed is the transposition of an act adopted at another level, insert 
here the name and reference of that 'original' act Tariff 
(€ per 
hour) Time 
(hour) Price 
(per action or 
equip) Freq (per 
year) Nbr of 
entities Total nbr 
of actionsTotal cost Regulatory origin (%)
No. Ass. 
Art. Orig. 
Art. Type of 
obligation Description of required acti on(s) Target group i e i e      Int EU Nat Reg
           Total administrative cost 
(€)206.151.529
explanation: type of obligation "other": refers to the receipt of  the PNR data by the passenger information units, screening of  data and transmission 
to law enforcement authorities (TBC). 
 
 
Airlines   
Statistics from Eurocontrol show a total number of XXX European carrier s operating international flights 
in 2006.   
XXX of these carriers operate le ss than 1000 flights per year.  
non-recurring cost 
source Lufthansa (costs in curred in joint project with 5 other European airlines.  
Cost for European airline of PULL system to USA: € 200 000,00
Cost for European airline of PUSH system to USA/Canada: € 600 000,00
Additional costs would have to be borne for increasing the capacity of existing systems to cope with EU 
PNR obligations. It is assumed that this  would double the costs mentioned above. 
Total estimated cost for European airline for setting up PULL: € 400 000,00
Total estimated cost for European airline for setting up PUSH: € 1 200 000,00
Total number of outbound flights operated by EU carr iers per year (2006, source Eurocontrol) 560 236 
Within which total number of LH-operated flights  57 721
(10,3%)
Extrapolation of set-up cost of PUSH to tota l number of flights operated by EU carriers  € 11 647 116,00 
Assuming an amortisation period of 5 year s, the yearly cost would amount to:  € 2 329 423,00 .
Carriers with less than 1000 international outbound flights per year (repres enting 13% of the total 
 
EN 44  number of flights) are expected to  use the intermediary method of transmission, which would diminish 
non-recurrent costs. 
This administrative costs calculation is limited to costs for EU carriers, which account for 49% of 
international flights.  
Estimating the costs of non-EU carriers was not judged feasible due to the diverse economic conditions 
applying there.  
source Lufthansa (costs in curred in joint project with 5 other European airlines. 
 
recurring cost  extraction/transmission 
1) push/pull 
CA push 
US pull 
source: Lufthansa 
 
Estimated cost of one push per PNR (source: dat a from EU flights to CA) in EUR: € 0,04
Estimated cost of one pull per PNR (source: data from EU flights to US) in EUR: 0,03
 
total number of passengers flying in and out of Europe per year (source Eurocontrol) 56 000 000
EU carriers operate 49% of international fli ghts and will be obliged to use the PUSH method. 
It is assumed that out of the 51%  of non-EU carriers, 50% would re sort to PUSH and 50% PULL. For 
the purpose of this calculation, only t he cost for EU carriers is calculated. 
Number of passengers on EU carriers on international flights: 27 440 000
Yearly transmission cost for EU carriers using PUSH: € 1 125 040,00
Yearly cost for EU carriers using PUSH twice per passenger: € 2 250 080,00
2) preparation of PNR personnel and maintenance  
source: Lufthansa for current US/Canada PNR transmission 
Cost for European airline for personnel € 200 000,00
Cost for European airline for maintenance € 80 000,00
Additional costs would have to be borne for increasing the capacity of existing systems to cope with EU 
 
EN 45  PNR obligations. It is assumed that this would double the costs mentioned above 
 
Total estimated cost for European airline for personnel € 400 000,00
Total estimated cost for European airline for maintenance € 160 000,00
 
Share of Lufthansa in total number of outbound flights operated by EU carriers per year 10,3%
Extrapolation of personnel and maintenance co sts of EU carriers based on the above  € 5 435 321,00
Carriers with less than 1000 international outbound flights per year (repres enting 13% of the total 
number of flights) are expected to use the in termediary method of transmission, which would 
substantially diminish pers onnel and maintenance costs. 
This administrative costs calculation is limited to costs for EU carriers, which account for 49% of 
international flights.  
Estimating the costs of non-EU carriers was not judged feasible due to the diverse economic conditions 
applying there.  
Public administrations  
non-recurring costs 
source UK 
estimation of setting up costs for a big MS (soft and hardware) for API and PNR € 250 000 000,00
It can be assumed that the proportion of costs for PNR are substantially lower than for API, 
as API covers all modes of transport in that MS. Therefore, it is assumed that 30% of set-up costs 
are for PNR. 
Estimated hard- and software costs for a big MS for PNR: € 75 000 000,00
It is assumed that international flights of EU carr iers from the UK are pre dominantly operated by UK 
companies: 
Number of outbound flights operated by UK companies: source Eurocontrol) € 68 340,00
Share of these flights in the total num ber of outbound flight s (EU carriers): 12,2%
Extrapolation of hard- and software costs for MS based on the above: € 614 833 187,00
Assuming an amortisation period of 5 years, t he yearly cost would amount to: € 122 966 637,00
 
EN 46  Member States with few international flights ar e expected to use the option of having common  
Units with one or more Member States in whic h case the non-recurring costs are expected to 
substantially less 
recurring costs  
personnel 
Source UK 
Estimated number of FTEs for running a central pass enger information unit dealing with API and PNR 
in a big MS: 100
It can be assumed that 70% of this personnel is working on API. 
Estimated number of FTEs working on PNR in a big MS:  30
Share of UK in the total number of  outbound flights (EU carriers): 12,2%
Total number of FTE required for operating PNR in all MS: 246
estimated hourly wage in EUR (average  employment costs + 50% overheads) 27
(EU 25 figures by Mercer Consulting, 11 April 2005, 
www.mercerhr.com/pressrelease/detai ls.jhtml/dynamic/idcontent/1175865) 
working hours per year (8 hours * 20 days * 11 months) 47 520
total yearly personnel costs for all MS € 11 686 749,00
maintenance 
In analogy to the maintenance costs for airlines, this is calculated as a percentage of set-up costs 
maintenance costs for airlines are 10% of set-up  costs. The same ratio is assumed for public 
administrations. 
total yearly maintenance costs for all MS: € 61 483 319,00
sum total yearly maintenance and personnel costs for all MS: € 7 3170 068,00