EN Official Journal of the European Union C 77/88

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Impact of the ongoing development of energy markets on industrial value chains in Europe’

(2009/C 77/22)

On 17 January 2008, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Article 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on the

Impact of the ongoing development of energy markets on industrial value chains in Europe.

The Consultative Commission on Industrial Change, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 24 June 2008. The rapporteur was Mr Zboril and the co-rapporteur was Mr Kerkhoff.

At its447th plenary session, held on 17 and 18 September (meeting of 17 September), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 62 votes to 5 with 5 abstentions.

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1 The Committee takes note of the changed environment for energy markets and recognises the need to mitigate anthropogenic climate change by cutting GHG emissions. The costs of climate change and cost-efficient approaches of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions are important issues in the climate policy discussion. These questions are even more important, as global energy supplies will have to double by 2050 to meet the energy needs of all the people in the world. Sustainable energy and climate policy must be structured in such a way that it achieves its aims while at the same time retaining the industrial value chains as the backbone of the European economy, even when the costs of the damage associated with climate change are taken into account. This is very much in the interests of the European Union itself.

1.2 Because of the high share of energy which is inevitably required to produce basic materials by conversion from raw materials, the basic material industries are strongly affected by any change of energy costs or by energy taxes or similar financial measures. However, the energy-related footprint of basic materials has to be attributed to the whole industrial value chain and cannot be sensibly addressed separately.

1.3 The Committee's opinion is that economic growth and innovation in European economy can only be achieved on a viable industrial basis. Competitive and innovative basic material industries are a fundamental prerequisite for the industrial value chains. In fact, the support for environmental technology and renewable energy is an important target. But even the development of environmental technologies requires performing industrial value chains. They are dependent on the availability and expertise of the basic material industries. Environment-related innovations, in particular, can be achieved only with cooperation throughout the entire value chain. There can be no success without a holistic approach spanning the entire length of value chains.

1.4 The Committee recalls that buildings, accounting for 40 % of final energy demand in the European Union, represent the single largest consumer of energy. As much as half the potential for gains in energy efficiency can be secured in the built environment and at negative economic cost. Such savings could by themselves achieve the EU's commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, these energy savings can be achieved using technologies that already exist today. Furthermore, raising the energy performance of buildings has only positive effects, creating useful employment, reducing running costs, increased comfort and a cleaner environment. This should be an absolute priority for the European Union. The Committee equally recognises the importance of new and further developed basic materials in domestic and office appliances as well as other sectors such as energy or transport.

1.5 A possible relocation of energy-intensive industry outside the EU would significantly reduce the attractiveness of the industrial location in Europe and lead to a loss in economic growth and employment and jeopardise the European social model. Because of the interdependency within the industrial value chains it is not feasible, in the short run, to compensate for these losses with other sectors, for example environmental technology. Instead, these sectors would lose competitiveness as well.

1.6 The energy-intensive industries must indeed contribute towards energy and climate policy aims. The requirements, however, must be such that competitive disadvantages in a global business environment can be largely ruled out. By their nature, the basic material industries are highly sensitive to the impact of energy costs. Therefore energy and environment policy instruments must be carefully examined and designed in terms of the extent to which they impact on the competitiveness of these industries.

1.7 The energy-intensive industries require secure energy supplies, drawn from an appropriate European energy mix, which should not exclude any energy source (coal, renewable energy nuclear energy) and be based upon efficient competition on the electricity and gas markets ultimately resulting in reasonable prices of energy supplies. The interests of national energy policies should be more strongly embedded in an integrated European concept, because so far the energy market has not kept pace with the single market for industrial goods. Although some Member States have decided not to use nuclear energy, maintaining electricity generation based on fission in the EU would also mean keeping the know-how on this technology in Europe. Of course, continuing the nuclear option would require a high safety level and well-trained employees (1).

1.8 Concluding an ambitious international climate change agreement is of utmost importance for the fight against climate change. It has to lead to emission reduction obligations for all major emitting countries (according to the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities), including the energy-intensive industries in order to ensure fair competition and a level playing field. In the absence of such an agreement, free allocation of allowances to energy-intensive industries at risk of ‘carbon leakage’ should be considered in the framework of the EU ETS in order to counter risks to the competitiveness of industrial location and economic growth in Europe. The final choice of allocation method should be performance-based (such as benchmarking), on the basis of best available techniques.

1.9 To pave the way for a long-term contribution to the aims of energy and climate policy, the Committee strongly recommends focusing on research and development of new technologies, particularly because the available production processes are largely mature. Where technical solutions do not yet exist, the requirements of higher energy efficiency and emission reduction targets cannot be fulfilled. There are workable structures in place already, such as Technology platforms for example, but efforts need much stronger coordination as is expected in the SET-Plan, for instance (2). However, enough time must be allowed to achieve the intended advance in technology and the required marketability in terms of global competitiveness.

1.10 The European and Economic Social Committee, with its special relationship with economic players, should highlight the problems of industrial value chains, which are sometimes not given due consideration by the political institutions.

2. The impact of energy, as a production factor, on industrial value chains in Europe

2.1 The production of basic materials such as steel, aluminium and other non ferrous metals, chemicals, cement, lime, glass and pulp and paper is the indispensable basis for industrial value chains. Industrial products require basic constructional and functional materials with specifically defined mechanical, physical and chemical properties which are not available in a natural form. As a matter of fact, the performance of industrial products is dependent upon the material used having a particular application profile and being optimised in terms of substance and energy consumption, quality, reliability, economic efficiency, durability, environmental effects, etc. The continuous development of such materials is therefore a major factor in the level of technological innovation present in all conceivable products. A value chain is a string of companies or collaborating players who work together to satisfy market demands for specific products or services. Downstream industries in the industrial value chains consume comparably less energy for their manufacturing processes; thus, an isolated consideration of the end-product is not helpful. The energy-related footprint must be judged over the entire value chain. An increase in energy costs does not have an impact solely at the level of basic material production, but may simultaneously result in price increases in the downstream industrial intermediate and end-products as a result of the increased cost of the basic material if there is room on the market for such increases.

2.2 A competitive and innovative basic material industry is an important factor in deciding on the location of subsequent links in the industrial value-creation chain, like car manufacturing, engine building or construction industry. It guarantees the joint development of tailor-made materials, adapted to meet the user's individual requirements. Customer demands for just-in-time delivery also necessitate the supplier's physical proximity. The industrial value chain loses its innovative power and competitiveness if an appropriate material basis is lacking. This is especially true for small and medium enterprises. Many of them can be found in the steel processing sector for example.

2.3 In the main, production of basic materials requires large amounts of energy — particularly when compared with subsequent production steps. The energy consumption required in energy-intensive industries per unit of value is at least ten times (and up to fifty times) greater than in subsequent industries, such as mechanical engineering. In Germany, for example, the primary energy consumption of cement lies at 4.5 kg, of steel at 2.83 kg and paper at 2.02 kg SKE per unit of added value, while this figure amounts to only 0.05 kg SKE in the mechanical engineering sector (3). This is due to the fact that basic materials must be obtained from natural raw materials by means of physical/chemical conversion. This involves high temperatures for burning and melting and reduction processes, as well as electricity for electrolysis. The forming of semi-finished products also requires high levels of energy consumption. In many cases, primary energy sources are not applied for heat and electricity production, but used as raw materials or reducing agents, for example in the reduction processes carried out during iron production. It is also important to note that quality of raw materials is gradually falling and their processing involves usually more energy.

2.4 The overall energy requirements of an industrial product must be compared with both the energy savings which may result from any innovations to this product and its application in other sectors. Such a comparison can only come about as a result of cooperation between the basic material suppliers and the downstream industrial producers, in which newly developed materials play a considerable role. For example, power plants with greater efficiency levels and lower primary energy source consumption rates require high-performance, temperature-resistant steels. Alternatively, specific fuel-consumption rates in the transport sector, for example, can be reduced by using light materials in automobile construction.

3. The situation in various energy markets (coal, oil, gas, electricity) and their impact on energy-intensive industries (4)

3.1 The basic material industries — cement, steel, non ferrous metals, chemical products, glass and pulp and paper — employ fossil fuels in the form of energy as well as raw material and they are affected by the costs of the various energy sources in a variety of ways. Crude oil, for instance, is used in the chemical industry as a raw material for the production of plastics and other petrochemical products. Meanwhile, developments in the oil markets have also affected purchase prices for gas and electricity because gas prices are still linked to the price of oil. Developments in the coal market also affect the cost of electricity for energy-intensive industries. At the same time, the steel industry uses coal and coke as reducing agents.

3.2 The static range of oil reserves, e.g. of those resources which can today be profitably and technically exploited, is about 40 years. It could essentially expand if further resources can be opened up economically in the future, especially non-conventional oil resources like oil sand. The evolution of oil prices is characterised by growth in consumption, particularly in China and India. The effect of this situation is amplified by the OPEC nations' growing power on the market, which is making diversification of supply sources increasingly difficult due to unevenly distributed reserves. The regional concentration of production in nations characterised by considerable political and economic instability will increase uncertainty due to the incalculable nature of possible future restrictions on supply, with all their concurrent effects on price.

3.3 The static range of natural gas reserves is — at approximately 60 years from today's viewpoint — greater than that of oil. Natural gas is Europe's most rapidly expanding primary energy source. The EU's dependence on imports of natural gas is increasing at an even greater rate than its consumption. Individual oil and gas deposits in Member States like the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom are gradually becoming depleted, while the importation of gas — largely from a single source, Russia — increases. Rising gas prices must be expected in the long term and, what is more, such reliance on a single source may result in the potential for Russia to exert political influence over the EU. The possibility of such a development is enhanced by naturally limited strategic reserves of gas within the EU.

3.4 Coal reserves that may be extracted in an economically viable manner are far greater than reserves of oil and gas. A static range of 150 years for coal is the general assumption. Furthermore, these reserves are more widely distributed amongst the continents as well as being, on the whole, located in politically stable countries such as the USA or Australia. Like other energy carriers, due to rising demand, the price of coal has increased significantly in recent years.

3.5 Electricity is a secondary form of energy that is produced mainly from coal, gas, nuclear and renewable primary energy sources and a good deal of power generation is still based upon oil in some Member States. The composition of the electricity generating mix largely determines the electricity generation costs. Coal and nuclear based power offers a cost-effective source for base-load power supplies, while renewable energies in the EU are to be developed further. Compared to other primary energy sources, the latter have so far been characterised by rather high cost, not least because external effects to a large extent are not reflected in the price of conventional energies. In the case of wind power and photovoltaic power, there is low and fluctuating availability with corresponding problems for the grids which will need to be adapted to accommodate the future growth of electricity supply from renewables. Certain renewable sources are less costly than others, differing from region to region. Photovoltaic power, for example, may be economically advantageous in sunny regions like the south of Europe, while it is not economical in Northern Europe.

4. Changing environment for energy markets

4.1 The energy markets exist in a dynamic environment, to which assorted economic, political and social influences — the interactions of which are complex — contribute. Industry is confronted by a change in the conditions and costs of energy supply which results in excessive uncertainty. The growing dependency of Europe on energy imports and anticipated further increases in energy prices reinforce the concerns about meeting energy demand in the future. It is well recognised that ensuring secure and reliable energy supplies at affordable, stable prices is vital to economic and social development and should constitute an integral part of a sound and consistent energy policy.

4.2 The recent rapid changes in the economic environment in Europe and worldwide require the energy sector to develop new concepts and policies to respond better to the security requirements of energy supply. While in the past security of energy supplies has traditionally been considered primarily the responsibility of the MS governments, the current status of the European energy market requires market forces to play a complimentary role. In a liberalised market, security and competitiveness come at a cost. To achieve long-term security of supply the common European energy policy becomes an issue of key strategic importance (5).

4.3 Fossil energy sources are non-renewable. Many of the EU oil and natural gas resources have already been completely exhausted. This should be seen in light of the growing consumption levels of developing countries such as China and India. In the case of oil in particular, there is a wide range of additional, non-conventional deposits (e.g. oil sands), which are still difficult and expensive to exploit and generate vast amounts of GHGs. Reduced deposits are therefore likely to be reflected in increased exploitation costs and thus lead, ultimately, to rising prices.

4.4 The share of imported primary energy sources in the total consumption of the European Union is currently at about 50 % and it is expected to grow to 70 % in the near future (2030). The EU is thus dependent for its oil and gas in particular, on imports from a few countries (such as the OPEC nations or Russia) that have a powerful position on the market. Given that these countries and regions are often characterised by considerable political and economic instability, a stable supply is not guaranteed. A recent increase in the price of oil has demonstrated the EU's economic vulnerability. Therefore, the opening-up of own resources and sustainable development of existing resources in the European Union is an important task. Dependence on energy importation has major security consequences in respect of all its forms except coal, as procurement of the latter takes place from a wider variety of states that happen also to be considered stable. Even so, Europe also has own coal sources which are economically viable: the mining of lignite in the EU is relatively inexpensive.

4.5 The electricity and gas markets, which used to be characterised by a natural monopoly and national scope, are in the process of liberalisation and integration. While the grid is regulated, competition on generation and commercial levels should lead to reduced prices and greater efficiency. This strategy has resulted in a certain degree of price convergence between neighbouring countries. However, the national segmentation of the markets due to the historical bottlenecks in the transmission network, have with few exceptions impaired competition amongst Member States.

4.6 In addition, gas prices and other primary energy prices — which form the main part of electricity generation costs (see 3.5 above) — have experienced huge increases in the last few years. Finally, there are no longer power generation overcapacities and the electricity industry is facing a period of massive investments. All these factors have resulted in rising prices, in spite of continuing improvements (see for example the progressive integration of the Central West region: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Concentration of energy production and distribution can also be found outside the European Union without a correlation between that and gas or electricity price levels.

4.7 The political decision taken in the EU to mitigate anthropogenic climate change with far-reaching cutting of GHG emissions is already a major factor on the energy markets and its importance is ever growing. Correspondingly, energy efficiency has been focused on much more strongly and it has to be increased dramatically so that the CO2 intensity of energy consumption is safely reduced. From this perspective, acceptance of carbon-rich fossil fuels is declining, while the low carbon energy sources (such as gas) or nearly CO2-free technologies (such as renewable energies and, in some respect nuclear energy) have gained in status, although this is not the case in all Member States.

4.8 Ensuring sufficient energy supply for the EU has become both a major challenge from the point of view of acquiring appropriate and available technology and, increasingly, a race against the clock. In the past, a few EU Member States decided to cease using nuclear energy, with all the corresponding restrictions for the electricity generation mix that this would entail. In addition, the construction of both coal-fired power stations and the infrastructure required for energy transmission has been the subject of some resistance among the population. This could increasingly lead to the cancellation of coal fired power plant projects, as happened for example in Ensdorf, Germany, due to the activities of citizens groups. Even certain renewable energies like wind mills are increasingly subject to resistance. Public acceptance of all sorts of energy, not just nuclear energy, has become a serious issue which has to be dealt with the utmost care if power generation is to be brought up to the EU citizens and economy's needs.

4.9 As the result, generation capacity in the EU is stagnating, only a few new projects are under development and it is not inconceivable that the EU will encounter problems in the future. The imminent modernisation of Europe's power stations presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is now imperative that potential investors get the message that only investment in low-carbon technologies makes economic sense.

5. The adaptation strategies of industry

5.1 Energy-intensive basic material industries face numerous pressures to adapt — in view of globalisation of the markets and the changing situation of energy markets. On one hand, companies have to succeed against international competition through the development of innovative products and processes. On the other hand, they are forced to accommodate increasing energy costs, to ensure compliance with the political decisions taken in terms of appropriate reduction of both CO2 emissions and energy consumption levels.

5.2 International economic interactions have intensified in the wake of globalisation. Suppliers from developing countries have caught up in technological terms and they now offer more reasonably priced labour-intensive production. Basic material suppliers have reacted to this challenge by optimising their production processes, specialising in technologically high-quality products, by developing customised products in close collaboration with the customers. Increasingly, partnerships between material suppliers and customers have developed, offering a variety of services.

5.3 Energy costs represent a significant share of the production costs for materials in energy-intensive industries. Thus, reducing specific energy consumption is in the economic interests of energy-intensive industries. Remarkable successes have been achieved here over the past decades. Energy-intensive industries in the EU are worldwide leaders in energy efficiency during production.

5.4 The recent political demands for reduced CO2 emissions and increased energy efficiency pose further challenges for energy-intensive industries. Existing manufacturing technologies and processes have in many cases already reached their physical and chemical limits (6). The steel industry's consumption of reducing agents in the blast furnace converter process, for instance, is already at a chemical/physical minimum and cannot be further decreased without sacrificing demand of customers and production volumes. A number of fundamental technological achievements, which have yet to be identified, researched and developed, would be required before any further noteworthy improvements in energy efficiency could be made. This requires great efforts from industry. For this reason, long-term joint research projects and demonstration projects already exist within the framework of the technology platforms, and endeavours like CCS. The same holds true for other industries with process emissions, such as the lime and cement industries. Also in energy supply, research and development is an important long-term challenge, for example with respect to CCS or renewable technologies.

5.5 The basic materials industries' endeavour to achieve revolutionary new production technologies with lower energy consumptions will take time. In addition to technical advances, the roll-out of new processes must be in sync with companies' investment cycles. Ultimately, the basic prerequisite for the introduction of new processes is their economic viability — which, in turn, must be measured against competition on the world market. For this reason, and other factors (administrative burdens, limited financial resources and ensuing economic uncertainties), a period of several decades must be reckoned on for basic material industries to realise any major steps forward in energy savings. This distinguishes the energy-intensive industries from the power-generating sector, which, while also achieving efficiency improvements in a step-by-step fashion in line with innovation cycles, can more readily pass on improvement costs and other related administrative burdens to captive customers.

5.6 The energy efficiency of industrial products can be increased significantly through the use of new and highly-developed basic materials produced in collaboration with other sectors, such as carmakers or power plant developers, resulting in components with greater temperature resistance or lower weight. Appropriate process control systems also bring about new levels of quality in terms of energy efficiency. Equipment for generating renewable energies is also produced from constructional and functional basic materials (e.g. wind turbines made of steel and high performance plastics). Although the potential is great, the need for material research remains correspondingly great since the majority of new developments are still not mature enough for commercial use.

6. The impact of energy policy on industrial value chains

6.1 Energy policy affects the energy markets by means of a mix of instruments. On one hand, a European regulatory framework for a single market in electricity and gas is slowly progressing, but it has still not led to the sought-after goal of price stabilisation. On the other hand, energy production and industrial energy consumption are and would be heavily affected by the EU ETS, intended to act as a major instrument for emissions reduction. The value of the Emission Trading System (ETS) will be measured by its impact on European GHG emissions and its relevance and example in stimulating global action and/or evolving into a comprehensive global scheme. The main problem is that the system is not global, but restricted to the European Union, which leads to the risk of carbon leakage in international competing industries. For that reason too the EU should push at climate talks for GHG trading to be carried out internationally. The problematic features of the proposed revised system should therefore addressed with great care to minimise the foreseen cost impacts.

6.2 Absolute emission caps of CO2 for power plants and process facilities in energy-intensive industries were introduced in 2005. For energy-intensive industries, the emissions of which are closely interlinked with production volumes because of technological limitations, this considerably increases the cost of any growth of production that exceeds the allocated volumes. The auctioning of emission allowances, planned to start in 2013, would involve a substantial increase of costs of all basic material production, which, in most cases, is not transferable to the downstream customers.

6.3 The EU aims to reduce CO2 emissions, maintain dependency on imports at manageable levels and promote technologies for export by expanding its share of renewable energy sources. Financing the start of renewables would be a reasonable contribution to these targets, but permanent subsidy systems should be avoided. Finally, renewable energies have to become competitive on the market. Current trends in energy prices and technical advances in renewable energies have already significantly increased the competitiveness of renewable energies. The promotion of renewable energies in the electricity sector is currently taking place in the EU by means of national subsidy systems, variously involving quota systems with the trading of certificates and systems of feed-in tariffs for renewables. The additional costs of renewable energies are generally conveyed in the price of electricity for end consumers. Energy-intensive industries are, for the time being, like other users exposed to financing renewable energy via electricity prices.

6.4 Although certain sectors, for example parts of mechanical engineering, benefit from the renewable markets, these gains have to be compared with negative effects in the basic materials industries. Furthermore, their supply chain and therefore competitiveness could be affected if basic materials were crowded out by the additional costs from subsidising renewables (7). This can at least be avoided by cost capping for these industries. While the development of the renewable market also opens up opportunities to export technology, for example wind power, to those regions where it can be profitably operated, it should also be considered that not only European companies but the European economy as well benefit in turn from the subsidised markets in Europe — a large proportion of photovoltaic materials in Europe for example are delivered from Japan.

6.5 Nuclear energy is an important factor in the energy mix of many EU countries, while some other countries have decided to cease using this form of power generation. In such countries, there is no source of reasonably-priced low CO2 electricity generation for base-load power and the latter must be replaced by fossil fuels or renewable resources (8). As a result, electricity prices, CO2 emissions and the price of CO2 allowances would rise, with corresponding impact on the energy-intensive industries.

6.6 Many EU Member States are introducing taxes with the aim of reducing energy consumption or of cutting CO2 emissions. In a green paper on economic climate policy instruments, the EU Commission is considering harmonising these instruments across Europe and introducing more incentives for reducing CO2 emissions. Energy-intensive industries would face considerable electricity and energy price rises. These costs could only be partially offset by means of energy-efficiency measures as indicated above.

7. The global environment

7.1 Energy and climate change policies no longer stop at national or regional borders. Security of supply, shortages of energy resources and, above all, climate change are global challenges. Climate change can only be combated effectively if all the world's regions are involved in the effort. Conversely, ambitious emission reduction policies in the EU will remain ineffective as long as rapidly growing countries such as China can quickly exceed these savings through industrial growth.

7.2 The increasing interaction between global trade and capital flows is leading to increasing competition between global locations. Energy-intensive industries are also increasingly subject to global competition for customers and capital. Firstly, there is immediate competition with other material suppliers outside the EU. Secondly, the processing industrial sectors that are strongly reliant on exports, such as the automotive or machine building industries, pass on the cost pressures induced by the world market to the material industries. The international competitive situation distinguishes energy-intensive industries from regional sectors, such as the electricity sector.

7.3 The combination of the global energy and climate policy challenge with industrial global competition means that an excessive cost burden for energy-intensive industries triggers relocations. These occur when regions outside Europe do not impose any comparable cost burdens on their industries. All the building blocs of the EU climate/energy policy should be soundly based upon realistic assessment of resources (natural, human and social) and their potential development in the time scale (Lisbon strategy etc.) to exploit those resources for our mutual sustainable future. The EU strategic considerations should reflect those strategic fundamentals.

7.4 Relocation of production would probably lead to greater emissions in regions outside Europe. Their production processes might well exhibit lower energy efficiency than in the countries of origin. Additional emissions arise from transporting the leaked products to Europe. Even if the production were relocated to efficient installations, however, the leakage would be unsustainable, because production would be squeezed out from Europe resulting in loss of jobs and technical know-how, even in terms of environmental technology. Global reduction of GHG emissions should be the decisive factor in setting up the community policy.

7.5 Relocation of the energy-intensive industries would result in reduced employment and economic growth. The loss of the basic material link also reduces the attractiveness of the location for subsequent industrial chains and leads to an erosion of all levels of the value chain. The European economy, however, requires its industrial core. A purely service-based economy is not sustainable — because many value-creation-intensive services are industry-related services, which would also be at risk from the loss of their industrial bases. Furthermore, leadership in technology and innovation, (as much for the benefit of environmental issues as others), depends upon the presence of basic industries in the European Union.

Brussels, 17 September 2008. The President of the European Economic and Social Committee Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

(1) World Nuclear Association, ‘World Nuclear Power Reactors 2007-2008 and Uranium requirements’

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html.

(2) SET Plan — COM(2007) 723 final.

(3) Calculations as per Destatis.

(4) For example BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007.

(5) Opinion TEN/312 ‘Towards a common energy policy’ CESE 236/2008 fin.

(6) Presentations Public Hearing CCMI 052, 7 May 2008.

Available at CCMI website: http://eesc.europa.eu/sections/ccmi/index_en.asp.

(7) See, for example, Pfaffenberger, Nguyen, Gabriel (December 2003): Ermittlung der Arbeitsplätze und Beschäftigungswirkungen im Bereich Eneuerbarer Energien.

(8) Hydro-energy, as in Scandinavia for example, remains restricted to a limited number of countries with advantageous natural conditions.

APPENDIX 1 to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee The following amendments, which were supported by at least a quarter of the votes cast, were rejected in the debate: 1. Point 1.9 Add new point: ‘ However, in the medium and long-term it is essential that the European economy moves to low carbon production methods and products. If we wish to achieve a 60-80 % reduction in CO2 emissions in industrialised countries by 2050 (considered vital to prevent climate change from getting out of hand) it is counterproductive to protect CO2-intensive industries. Instead, it is imperative that Europe makes progress in restructuring its economy in order to gain a competitive advantage as the spearhead of technological innovation and to initiate changes in other countries. It will not be possible to carry out this third industrial revolution with a “business as usual” attitude, accompanied by modest efficiency increases in energy-intensive products. ’ Result of the vote Votes in favour: 23 Votes against: 27 Abstentions: 12 2. Point 6.7 Add new point: ‘ However, in the medium and long-term it is essential that the European economy moves to low carbon production methods and products. If we wish to achieve a 60-80 % reduction in CO2 emissions in industrialised countries by 2050 (considered vital to prevent climate change from getting out of hand) it is counterproductive to protect CO2-intensive industries. Instead, it is imperative that Europe makes progress in restructuring its economy in order to gain a competitive advantage as the spearhead of technological innovation and to initiate changes in other countries. It will not be possible to carry out this third industrial revolution with a “business as usual” attitude, accompanied by modest efficiency increases in energy-intensive products. ’ It reproduces same text as in paragraph 1.9 (conclusions and recommendations) but in point 6. (The impact of energy policy on industrial value change). Point 1.9 having been rejected, point 6.7 falls. 3. Point 7.4 and 7.5 Amend point 7.4 and delete point 7.5, as follows: ‘Relocation of production wcould probably lead to greater emissions in regions outside Europe. if Ttheir production processes might well exhibit lower energy efficiency than in the countries of origin, which, given the rise in energy prices, is unlikely for new buildings. Additional emissions arise from transporting the leaked products to Europe. Even if the production were relocated to efficient installations, however, the leakage would be unsustainable, because production would be squeezed out from Europe resulting in loss of jobs and technical know-how, even in terms of environmental technology. It is therefore essential that a climate change agreement be concluded that brings about a Gglobal reduction of GHG emissions should be the decisive factor in setting up the community policy. Relocation of the energy-intensive industries would result in reduced employment and economic growth. The loss of the basic material link also reduces the attractiveness of the location for subsequent industrial chains and leads to an erosion of all levels of the value chain. The European economy, however, requires its industrial core. A purely service-based economy is not sustainable — because many value-creation-intensive services are industry-related services, which would also be at risk from the loss of their industrial bases. Furthermore, leadership in technology and innovation, (as much for the benefit of environmental issues as others), depends upon the presence of basic industries in the European Union. ’ Result of the vote Votes in favour: 21 Votes against: 41 Abstentions: 3