A4-0339/97

Resolution on Opinion No 1/97 of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities on the conditions governing the implementation of expenditure under the common foreign and security policy (C4-0220/97)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Opinion No 1/97 of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities on the conditions governing the implementation of expenditure under the common foreign and security policy (C4-0220/97),

- having regard to Article 188c(4) of the EC Treaty,

- having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on provisions regarding financing of the common foreign and security policy,

- having regard to its resolution of 26 October 1994 on the financing of the CFSP ((OJ C 323, 21.11.1994, p. 72.)),

- having regard to its resolution of 13 December 1996 on Special Report No 2/96 of the Court of Auditors concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) ((OJ C 20, 20.1.1997, p. 405.)),

- having regard to its resolution of 10 April 1997 containing the comments which form part of the Decision giving discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 1995 ((OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 32.)),

- having regard to its resolution of 12 June 1997 on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (January to December 1996) ((OJ C 200, 30.6.1997, p. 148.)),

- having regard to its resolution of 26 June 1997 on the meeting of the European Council on 16 and 17 June 1997 in Amsterdam ((OJ C 222, 21.7.1997, p. 17.)),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A4- 0339/97),

A. whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union has so far fallen far short of the objectives assigned to it in the Treaty on European Union and whereas citizens of the Union have the impression that the Union is not really capable of action in the field of foreign and security policy,

B. whereas one of the prime objectives of the recent Intergovernmental Conference was to change this and to reform the CFSP in the light of experience to date,

C. whereas the Amsterdam Treaty represents progress on some issues but not a thorough reform of the CFSP and whereas there is even a risk that decision- making procedures may become yet more complicated in future,

D. whereas the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997 regarding financing of the CFSP disregarded questions concerning the implementation and supervision of joint actions,

E. whereas the Court of Auditors' opinion very clearly identifies and analyses the weaknesses and shortcomings in the implementation of joint actions under the CFSP hitherto,

F. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that the six-monthly rotation in the Council Presidency renders continuous political management and supervision of joint actions complicated and cumbersome and that this structural defect cannot be remedied by ad hoc working parties of officials from the Member States,

G. whereas, while it was agreed at Amsterdam that in future the Presidency should be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council, who is to exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, responsibility for the implementation of joint actions is still to remain with the Council Presidency and the role and status of the High Representative are not clearly defined,

H. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that the greatest difficulties with joint actions have hitherto as a rule arisen during the initial phase and that vital decisions affecting the future course of events often had to be taken in situations in which essential information was still lacking,

I. whereas it was agreed at Amsterdam that a new policy planning and early warning unit should be established in the General Secretariat of the Council, to which the Member States, the Commission and WEU should also contribute staff; wherehas, however, the Treaty does not vest in the unit any power to prepare or implement joint actions,

J. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that the Commission often has not been promptly or sufficiently involved in decision-making procedures, although in practice it has had to assume all functions relating to the practical management of joint actions,

K. whereas although it was reaffirmed at Amsterdam that the Commission is to be fully associated in representing the Union in CFSP matters and in the implementation of joint actions, the Commission's role was not spelt out beyond this,

L. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that there were failures and shortcomings in the administration of joint actions within the Commission as well as elsewhere, and that they were due mainly to the unclear allocation of competencies and inadequate staffing,

M. whereas it was agreed at Amsterdam that it was desirable that in future a Vice-President should be responsible for external relations at the Commission, a change which would entail a reorganization of the Commission services,

N. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that a total of ECU 266 540 000 was made available for the CFSP in the years 1993-96, of which 242 390 000 - more than 90% - came from the budget of the Union and 24 150 000 in the form of contributions from the Member States,

O. having regard to the Court of Auditors' finding that in some cases there were substantial delays in making available financial resources - not only contributions from the Member States but also funds from the Union's budget - and that these unnecessarily hampered and impeded the implementation of joint actions,

P. whereas the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997 regarding financing of the CFSP will in future prevent delays such as have hitherto arisen from budgetary and administrative procedures for transferring funds from the reserve to operational budget headings,

Q. whereas, however, the Interinstitutional Agreement still does not solve two problems which the Court of Auditors identified as critical, namely the lack of resources available for the preparation and initiation of joint actions and the question of the inadequate participation of the Commission at the preparatory stage,

R. whereas it is laid down in point G of the Interinstitutional Agreement that the CFSP chapter of the budget could be divided into articles concerning observation of elections and participation in democratic transition processes, EU envoys, prevention of conflicts/peace and security processes, financial assistance to disarmament processes, contributions to international conferences and urgent actions,

S. whereas this does not resolve the problem identified by the Court of Auditors that in many cases the objectives of the CFSP coincide with Community tasks in the field of development cooperation, which in the worst case can lead to poor or even non-existent coordination between measures funded from the CFSP and measures funded from non-CFSP resources,

T. whereas even at Amsterdam the fundamental structural flaw that the CFSP is intended to be determined through intergovernmental cooperation but funded from the Community budget was not eliminated,

U. whereas therefore the Commission will continue to be hampered in its efforts to implement the budget under its own responsibility, and whereas there is a danger that it may be confined to a purely financial, administrative and book-keeping role,

V. whereas Parliament has a responsibility to the citizens of the EU to ensure that their money is used economically and sensibly and therefore, when carrying out its supervisory duties as laid down in the Treaties, must not confine itself to a purely accounts-based audit, as this would undermine its right to hold the Commission accountable for the implementation of the budget under the discharge procedure,

W. whereas the Council does not participate in the normal procedures in which all parties can be questioned about the reports of the Court of Auditors, and hence seeks to avoid being criticized or called to account by Parliament and the public,

X. whereas Parliament, in paragraph 7 of its Decision of 10 April 1997 giving discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 1995 - Sections IV - Court of Justice, V - Court of Auditors, VI - Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions ((OJ C 132, 28.4.1997, p. 149.)), instructed its Committee on Budgetary Control to set up an appropriate procedure, commencing with the discharge procedure for the financial year 1996, for considering implementation of the budget in Section II (Council),

Y. whereas care must at all events be taken to ensure that the second attempt to establish an effective CFSP does not, like the first, become bogged down in a tangle of bureaucratic obstacles and administrative rivalries,

1. Observes that the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997 could contribute to a more rapid provision of funds for joint actions, but that this does not mean that the difficulties of demarcation between CFSP actions and measures falling within the sphere of competence of Community policies or the difficulties of implementation and supervision of joint actions which have been identified by the Court of Auditors have been resolved;

2. Calls on the Commission to propose to Parliament and the Council clear criteria for decision-making with a view to determining in which cases a measure should be financed from the CFSP budget chapter and in which cases other budget chapters should be used;

3. Recommends further development of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997, with the aim of arriving at a modus vivendi concerning the implementation and supervision of joint actions, which should ensure that:

(a) in future the Commission is fully involved in and consulted on the planning and preparation of joint actions from the outset,

(b) cooperation between the Council Presidency and the Commission in implementing joint actions abides by clear operational rules in order to ensure continuity and effectiveness in the administration and monitoring of the actions; one minimum requirement is that the Commission should not be hampered in carrying out its duty to implement the budget under its own responsibility,

(c) CFSP envoys can, when necessary, be questioned by the appropriate committee of Parliament on the implementation of expenditure,

(d) statements of accounts and consolidated accounts are drawn up for each joint action, providing an insight not only into the total Community funds invested but also into the contributions of the Member States and other donors;

4. Welcomes the fact that the Commission can now itself contract CFSP envoys directly, and calls on the Council to agree to a salary table to be proposed by the Commission in order in future to obviate the need to undertake arduous searches for appropriate ad hoc solutions to the problem of payment of envoys;

5. Recommends that the Member States establish a CFSP staff reserve which can be rapidly mobilized for joint actions and set up a preparatory group under the overall control of the Commission, to prepare procedures, on the basis of previous experience, particularly of observing elections and deployment of envoys, which can ensure that, once joint actions have been decided on, they proceed as quickly and smoothly as possible from the organizational and financial points of view;

6. Observes that, in connection with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 July 1997, certain procedural questions of a technical nature need to be clarified, particularly:

(a) that the Interinstitutional Agreement has not in any way altered the existing rules on the implementation of the budget, based on the Financial Regulation, nor is there any need for such alterations;

(b) that - in addition to the Council and the Council Presidency - the Commission, which under the terms of the Treaty is the institution of the Union responsible for implementing the budget, participates fully in all procedures laid down by the Agreement for the consultation and information of Parliament;

7. Calls on the Court of Auditors to have its Opinion published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and to submit a special report on the implementation of CFSP expenditure no later than two years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments of the Member States.