EN 
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 18 June 2007 
at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance  
on a draft law on the regulation and supervision of markets and the functioning of the competent 
independent authorities  
(CON/2007/17) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 14 May 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance for an opinion on a draf t law on the regulation and supervision of markets 
and the functioning of the competent independent  authorities (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) . 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an  opinion is based on Article 105(4) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the third and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 
29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Ce ntral Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions1, as the draft law relates to the Banca d’It alia and rules applicable to financial 
institutions insofar as they materially influence th e stability of financial institutions and markets. In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1. Purpose of the draft law 
1.1 The draft law was approved by the Italian C ouncil of Ministers on 2 February 2007 and submitted 
to the Parliament on 5 March 2007. It is curre ntly being discussed by the competent Senate 
committees. This opinion is based on the version of  the draft law that the consulting authority sent 
to the ECB with its consultation request. The ECB notes that the preparation of the draft law is a 
dynamic process, whereby amendments may still be introduced. It stands ready to comment on any 
such amendments to the extent possible.  
1.2 The aims of the draft law are to strengthen the existing legislative framework as regards the Italian 
authorities for the regulation and supervision of ma rkets, to fill current lacunae and to eliminate 
overlapping jurisdictions. In particular, as rega rds the financial sector, the draft law further 
modifies the institutional supervisory framework in Italy and represents another step in the 
direction of the refinement of the Italian supe rvisory model on the basis of allocating regulatory 
and supervisory tasks to authorities in accordance with their objectives. The ECB has already been 
                                                 
1 OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
 
2 consulted previously on other It alian draft legislative provisions which had as their aim the 
establishment of a functional supervisory model2.  
 2. Refinement of the supervisory model 2.1 In general, the draft law further refines the current functional supervis ory system regarding the 
financial sector. The Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicura zioni Private e di Interesse Collettivo  
(ISVAP, the insurance supervisory authority) and the Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione  
(COVIP, the pension funds authority) will be a bolished by legislative decrees which must be 
adopted within one year from the date of entry into force of the draft law. These two bodies’ 
existing tasks and duties are allocat ed to the Banca d’Italia and the Commissione nazionale per le 
Società e la Borsa  (CONSOB, the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange), 
in accordance with their respective objectives. As a result, as stated in Article 7 of the draft law, 
there will be two supervisory authorities: the Ban ca d’Italia, which will be responsible for matters 
relating to the stability of financial instituti ons, and CONSOB, which will be responsible for 
matters relating to the transparency of the mark et and the propriety of conduct. Moreover, the 
Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (UIC, the Italian Foreign Exchange Office) will be liquidated and its 
functions and assets attributed to the Banca d’Italia. 
2.2 The ECB confirms its positive assessment of this  supervisory model, which involves a functional 
division of responsibilities for supervising the financial sector
3, and welcomes the draft law’s aim 
of enhancing the model’s efficiency and effectiv eness. First, the proposed institutional framework 
is oriented towards recognising the essential role of the central bank in promoting the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and the stability of  the financial system as a whole. Second, the 
chosen approach fully recognises the emergence of financial groups that provide different types of 
financial services and the need to address prudentia l concerns relating to such groups in a highly 
coordinated manner. However, careful attention should be paid to some elements of the new 
institutional framework, as further specified below. 
2.3 The ECB notes that the Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito ed il Risparmio  (CICR, 
Interdepartmental Committee for Credit and Savings) is proposed to be abolished and that the tasks 
and duties assigned to it by the consolidated Law on Banking (TUB) will be allocated to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the Banca d’Italia by means of legislative decrees 
(which must be adopted within one year from the date of entry into force of the draft law). The ECB recalls its previous request for a clarification of CICR’s role, in particular with a view to 
                                                 
2 See ECB Opinions: CON/2004/16 of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on 
a draft law on the protection of savings; CON/2005/34 of 6 Oc tober 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the protectio n of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia; CON/2005/58 of 
23 December 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on an amendment to the draft law on the 
protection of savings concerning the Banca d’Italia; CON/2006/44 of  25 August 2006 at the request of the Banca d’Italia on 
the amended Statute of the Banca d’Italia; and CON/2006/51 of 3 November 2006 at the request of the Italian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft le gislative decree exercising powers delegated under the Law on the protection of 
savings. 
3 See ECB Opinion CON/2004/21 of 7 June 2004  at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands  on a draft 
Financial Sector Supervision Act. 
 
3 safeguarding the operational independence of s upervisory authorities, which is an essential and 
internationally recognised standard4. The ECB therefore welcomes the specific reference to 
‘ensuring the independence of supe rvisory activities’ in Article 10( 1)(g) as regards the matters to 
be specified by subsequent legislative decrees, which will regulate in detail the transfer of powers 
and resources between authorities and coordinate  between existing laws concerning financial 
intermediaries and markets. The ECB stands rea dy to provide a further assessment of such matters 
when consulted on these legislative decrees. Howe ver, the reference in Article 1(3) to the 
‘functions for the general direction and for the hi gh supervision of the Government and of the 
Ministers’ in relation to the matters referred to in the draft law, particularly in connection with the 
cross-reference to this provision in Article 9(4), might merit further clarification to safeguard the 
independence of supervisory authorities. 
2.4 Furthermore, the ECB welcomes the improved acco untability of supervisory action introduced by 
Article 18 of the draft law, which establish es a duty for supervisory authorities to consult 
stakeholders, give reasons for their decisions and explain the consequences of their actions. Indeed, 
supervisory independence must be accompanied  by clear accountability as regards the action 
undertaken by the authorities. The ECB also notes th at Article 21 of the draft law establishes an ad-
hoc bicameral committee, to which all authoriti es will present annual reports, and welcomes the 
explicit prohibition of any interference by this  committee in day-to-day supervision.  
2.5 In addition, in line with the experience of ot her EU Member States, Article 9 of the draft law 
establishes a new Committee for Financial Stability (C FS), composed of the Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Finance (who will chair the CFS), th e Banca d’Italia’s Governor and CONSOB’s 
President. The ECB welcomes the establishment of the CFS, as it responds to the need to promote 
financial stability and take coordina ted action in financial crises that may have an impact on the 
entire financial system. The establishment of such co ordination at national level is also in line with 
recommendations made at EU level. However, the E CB considers that the tasks attributed to such 
committees must not compromise the central bank’s i ndependence, in particular with regard to the 
preservation of the stability of the financial syst em and crisis manageme nt, which may directly 
concern certain central bank functions5.  
 3. The UIC 3.1 The ECB notes that the UIC’s tasks and duti es will in the future be performed by the Banca 
d’Italia, including responsibility for anti-money laundering measures, which will be assigned in 
particular to the Financial Analysis Service
6. Moreover, an Anti-Money Laundering Committee 
                                                 
4 On this issue, see paragraph 10 of ECB Opinion C ON/2004/16 and paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/51. 
5 See paragraph 11 of ECB Opinion CON/2002/13 of 24 April 2002 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a 
draft proposal for a law on prudential supervision of the financial sector and financial services. 
6  Article 12 of the draft law. 
 
4 will be established within the Minist ry of Economic Affairs and Finance7. The ECB welcomes that 
the Committee will be established for coordination purposes only, without affecting the Financial 
Intelligence Unit’s independence. 
3.2 The fact that the UIC and its tasks will be absorb ed by the Banca d’Italia will constitute a transfer 
of additional powers to a national central bank (NCB). The ECB has always made clear that 
‘Member States may not put their NCBs in a pos ition where they have insufficient financial 
resources to carry out their ESCB- or Eurosystem-related tasks, as applicable’8. The ECB therefore 
expects that, in implementing the new structure,  care will be taken to ensure that the Banca 
d’Italia’s operational capacity to carry out Eurosystem-related tasks will not be affected9. 
3.3 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parlia ment and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing10 requires that Member States ensure that  their Financial Intelligence Unit ‘has access, 
directly or indirectly, on a timely basis, to th e financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information that it requires to properly fulfil its  tasks’. The Italian legislation implementing 
Directive 2005/60/EC will therefore have to ensure that the Banca d’Italia is entrusted with such 
powers, in order to be able to request and r eceive all necessary information from the institutions 
and persons covered by that Directive11. 
 4. Relationship between the Banca d’Italia and the Competition Authority  Article 14(5) of the draft law provides that, in th e event of a merger in the banking sector, the Banca 
d’Italia must issue a non-binding opinion within 30 da ys of receiving the relevant documentation. In the 
event of non-compliance with this obligation, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato  
(AGCM, the Competition Authority) may adopt its deci sion without it. The ECB welcomes this solution, 
which reflects the principle of allocating powers to authorities in accordan ce with their respective 
objectives and maintains a clear distincti on from the merger authorisation process
12. 
 5. The Banca d’Italia’s ownership structure 5.1 Pursuant to Article 14(6) and (7) of the draf t law, upon a proposal by the Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Finance, the Government  is delegated the power  to adopt, within one year from the date 
                                                 
7 Article 11 of the draft law. See also paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion CON/1998/35 at th e request of the Italian Ministry of 
the Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning under Articles 109f (6) and 109l (2) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, Article 5.3 of the Statute of the European Monetary Institute and Council Decision 93/717/EC of 
22 November 1993 on a draft legislative decree implementing Article 108 of the Treaty concerning the Ufficio Italiano 
dei Cambi . 
8 See e.g. the ECB’s Convergence Report 2007, p. 19. 
9 See paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/38 of 25 July 2006 at the request of the Bank of Greece on a draft 
provision on the Bank of Greece’s powers in the field of consumer protection.  
10 OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15. 
11 See Articles 21 and 22 of Directive 2005/60/EC. 
12 On this issue, see paragraph 14 of ECB Opinion CON/ 2004/16, paragraphs 7 and 8 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/58 and 
Section 3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/51. 
 
5 of entry into force of the draft law, a legislative decree redefining the criteri a for participation in the 
Banca d’Italia’s capital and introducing limits on the possession of participation shares, as a 
guarantee of the Banca d’Italia’s independence, as well as criteria for the remuneration of participation shares, having regard to the public nature of the functions exercised.  
5.2. The ECB reiterates what it has already stated in th is regard in past opinions, in particular the need 
for the modified ownership structure to comply with central bank independence and the public nature of the Banca d’Italia. It expects to be c onsulted by the Italian G overnment on the relevant 
draft legislative decree
13. 
 6. Compatibility with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 
of the European Central Bank 
Article 16(6) of the draft law provides for a penalty of ‘termination’ if a member of the board of any of 
the authorities referred to in the draft law breaches the rules regarding conflicts of interest. The ECB 
would point out that Article 14.2 of the Statute contai ns an exhaustive list of the grounds for dismissal of 
Governors and other members of NCB decision-maki ng bodies who are involved in the performance of 
ESCB-related tasks. Therefore, to avoid any inco mpatibility with Community law, the ECB strongly 
recommends that Article 16(6) of the draft law is list ed in Article 16(8) of the draft law as one of the 
provisions which do not apply to Banca d’Italia. 
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 18 June 2007. 
 
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Jean-Claude TRICHET 
 
                                                 
13 See paragraphs 8 and 10 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/34, pa ragraph 5 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/58 and paragraph 3.1 
of ECB Opinion CON/2006/44.