ARCHIVESHISTORIQUES
DELACOMMISSION
COLLECTION RELIEEDES
DOCUMENTS "COM"
COM(79)584
Vol.1979/0201

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COMMISSION OFTHEEUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
COM(79 )584 final
Brussels .25th October 1979
<"
GATT -MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
(Communication from the Commission tothe Council )
SUPPLEMENT TOTHE FINAL REPORT ONTHE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INGENEVA (TOKYO ROUND )
AND PROPOSAL FOR ACOUNCIL DECISION
(doc .COM(79 )514 final )
ANTI-DUMPING/<>/ .-
(Agreement onImplementation ofArticle VI
fV " VoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade ):VANTI-DUMPING :
V
COM (79)584 final

6ATTMULTILATERAL TRADENEGOTIATIONS
-Communication fromtheCommissiontotheCouncil
-Jointcommunication fromMMHaferkamp,Davignon,GundelachandCheysson
Supplementtothe"FinalreportontheGATTMultilateral TradeNegotiations
inGeneva(TokyoRound)andproposalforaCouncilDecision"
(doc.C0M(79)514final).

"2-
I.Introduction
1.Initsfinalreport(doc.C0M(79)514final,PartII,page26)the
CommissionreportedontheexistenceoftwoversionsoftheAnti-Dumping
AgreementandproposedthattheCouncilconcludethewidely-approved
versionoftheAgreement,containedin6ATTdoc.MTN/NTM/W/232/Rev.1,
asamendedbyW/258.
II.Pointsdiscussed
2.InSeptemberandOctober1979,aseriesofmeetingswereheldinGeneva
betweenrepresentatives ofanumberofdevelopedanddeveloping
countries.Themainproblemraisedbythedevelopingcountries was
thattheirhomemarketpricesmaynotformanappropriate basisforthe
calculation ofadumpingmarginbecauseofthespecialeconomic
situationofthesecountries.Afterlongdiscussions acompromise was
reachedwhichrecognisesthisproblem.Wherespecialeconomicconditions
existindeveloping countries,thedumpingcalculations maybebased
onexportpricesoronthecostsofproduction .Thiscompromise isin
fullconformity withtheprovisions ofArticleVIGATTandwiththe
Agreement.Itwasagreedthatthecompromisefoundwouldbewordedin
theformofa'statement' bycertainnameddelegations andwouldbe
annexedtotheAgreement as'AddendumI*(seeattacheddocument).It
wasfurtheragreedbythedelegations namedinthestatementthatthe
proposalforanalternative versionoftheAnti-Dumping Agreement,as
containedinGATTdoc.MTN/NTM/W/241/Rev.1,wouldnolongerbemaintained .
3.Secondarypointsraisedbyrepresentatives ofdeveloping countries
concernedtheimplementation oftheAgreementinviewoftheadaptation
ofexistinglegislation andthelackofanti-dumping experience in
developing countries.Heretooasolutionwasfoundintheformofa
'statement' tobeattachedtotheAgreementas'Addendum %%(see
attacheddocument). *

-3-
III .Conclusion
4.TheCommission considers theoutcome ofthediscussions satisfactory
andrecommends theCouncil toapprove theAnti-Dumping Agreement andits
Addenda ontheunderstanding that theAddenda will notbeformally
accepted onbehalf oftheCommunity until firm assurances arereceived
from asufficient number ofdeveloping countries that they intend to
adhere tothe Agreement .
5.Tothis endtheCommission proposes thefollowing amendments toits
proposal foraCouncil decision ,ascontained inAnnex 1toPart IIof
itsFinal report (doc .C0M(79)514 final ):
Inthelist ofagreements inthePreamble andinArticle thewords
"andtheAddenda annexed thereto "should beinserted after thewords
"Agreement onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement
onTariffs andTrade ".

Multilateral Trade?ferotiations
Crouo"Non-Tariffy^ssures **
.1
•%
A-Tri-DUMPI^G 1
Afferent onIrplenentation ofArticleVI
oftheGeneralArreenent onTariffsandTrade
■ι .
Add?ndua
Thefollovingstatesentiscirculatedat.therequestofthedelegations
f
WithregardtotheAgreementonIcplenentation ofArticleVIofthe
GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(MTN/!rTM/V/2^2/Rev.l)theabove-
noteddelegations,cognizantofthecomnitcentinArticle13oftheAgreement
*./.thatspecialregardnustbegivenbydevelopedcountriescothespecial
situation •fdevelopingcountriesvhenconsideringthereplicationof
anti-durpir.gseas-resUnderthisCode,agreethat:-

/-2-
1-Indevelopingcountries,governmentsplayalargerole
inpromotingeconomicgrovthanddevelopmentinaccordancevith
theirnationalpriorities,andtheirecononicregimesforthe
exportsectorcanbedifferentfromthoserelatingtotheir
domesticsectorsresultinginteraliaindifferentcost
%
structures.ThisAgreementisnotintendedtopreventdeve­
lopingcountriesfromadoptingmeasuresinthiscontext,
includingceasuresintheexportsector,aslongastheyare
usedinamannervhichisconsistentviththeprovisionsof
theGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,asapplicableto
'.. . / •thesecountries..
2«Inthecaseofimportsfromadevelopingcountrythefact
%
thattheexportpricenaybeloverthanthecomparableprice
forthelikeproductvhendestinedfordomesticconsumptionint
Φ
theexportingcountrydoesnotpersejustifyaninvestigation
orthedetermination ofdumpingunlesstheotherfactors
mentionedinArticle5:1arealsopresent.Dueconsideration
shouldbe&irencoallcaseswhere,becausespecialeconcxiccondi­
tionsaff'-Xpricesinthehomemarket,thesepricesdonotprovide

acommerciallyrealisticbasisfordumpingcalculations .In
vsuchcasesthenormalvalueforthepurposesofascertaining
whetherthegoodsarebeingdumpedshallbedeterminedby
methodssuchasacomparisonoftheexportpriceviththe
comparablepriceofthelikeproductwhenexportedtoany
thirdcountryorwiththeqostofproductionoftheexported
goodsinthecountryoforiginplusareasonable amountfor
administrative ,sellingandanyothercostsandforprofits.
^.twouldbetheunderstandingoftheabove-noted
delegationsthattheproposalforanamendmenttothetextoftheAgreement
ontheImplementation ofArticleVIoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffs
/
andTradeassetoutindocument WTN/NTM/W/2Ul/irev.lispolonger
maintained .

Multilateral TradeNegotiations
Group"Non-TariffMeasures" \.
ANTI-DUMPING
'. ' •• I
AgreementonImplementation ofArticleVI
oftheGeneralAgreement onTariffsandTrade
Addendum
Thefollowingstatementiscirculatedattherequestofthe
delegationsof...
Itisrecognizedthatdevelopingcountriesmayfacespecial
problems'initiallyinadaptingtheirlegislation ^totherequirements
oftheCode,includingadministrative' andinfrastructural problems,
incarryingoutanti-dumping investigations initiatedbythem.
Accordingly,theCommitteeonAnti-Dumping Practicesmaygrant,
uponspecificrequestandonconditionstobenegotiated onacase-
by-casebasis,time-limited exceptionsinwholeorinpartfrom
obligations whichrelatetoinvestigations undertakenbyadeveloping
countryunderthisAgreement. ^•
DevelopedcountriesPartiestothisAgreementshallendeavour
tofurnish,uponrequestandontermstobeagreed,technical
assistancetodevelopingcountriesPartiestothisAgreement,with
regardtotheimplementation ofthisAgreement,includingtraining
*
ofpersonnel,andthesupplyingofinformation onmethods,
techniquesandotheraspectsofconductinginvestigations ondumping
practices.