EN  ECB -PUBLIC  
 
 OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK  
of 20 April  2020 
on reform of Sveriges  Riksbank  
(CON/20 20/13) 
 
Introduction and legal basis  
On 10 December 2019 , the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Swedish Ministry 
of Finance for an opinion on a proposal for amendments to the Swedish Instrument of Government, which 
forms part of the Swedish Constitution1, amendments to the Law on Parliament2, a new Law on Sveriges  
Riksbank (hereinafter the ‘ draft law on Sveriges Riksbank’ ), amendments to the Law on exchange rate 
policy3, and amendments to the draft Law  on the National Debt Office ’s borrowing for the needs of 
Sveriges Riksbank4 (hereinafter referred to collectively as the ‘ draft law’).  The draft law is contained within 
a Swedish Government Official Report (2019:46 A new law on Sveriges Riksbank)  (hereinafter the 
‘Report’) by a Committee of Inquiry on Sveriges Riksbank  (hereinafter the ‘Commit tee’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘Treaty’)  and the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth 
indents of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC5, as the draft law concerns means of payment, 
Sveriges Riksbank , the collection, compilation and distribution of monetary, financial and banking 
statistics, payment and settlement systems and rules applicable to financial institutions insofar as they 
materially influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. In accordance wit h the first sentence 
of Article  17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has 
adopted this opinion.  
 
1. Purpose of the draft law  
1.1 As noted by the Committee in the Report, the Law on Sveriges Riksbank6 entered into force in 
1989 . The Law was largely framed in the second half of the 1980s when the exchange rate was 
fixed  in Sweden and the financial system had a completely different appearance. Since then 
there have been great changes in the economic policy landscape, inclu ding, for instance,  
changes to t he Swedish exchange  rate regime, the deregulation and internationalisation of 
                                                 
1 Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform . 
2 Riksdagsordningen (2014:801) . 
3 Lagen (1998:1404) om valutapolitik.  
4 Förslag till lag om Riksgäldskontorets upplåning för Riksbankens behov . 
5 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).  
6 Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges Riksbank . 
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2 financial markets and Swedish membership of the Union.  In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis considerable changes have also been made to the international and European regulatory 
frameworks in order to promote financial stability. In Sweden, the Finansinspektionen (SFSA, 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority)  has been given responsibility for macroprudential 
policies and the Riksgäldskontoret  (NDO, Swedish National Debt Office)  has been given 
responsibility for resolution. Moreover, as a result of technological development and digitalisation, 
extensive and rapid change has occurred in the payment market , which  has affected Sveriges 
Riksbank’s  activities in the payment system. The conditions for Sveriges Riksbank ’s cash 
activities have also been affected by the rapid decrease in the use of cash in Sweden7. 
1.2 As a result of the institutional and economic changes that have taken place over  the past 30 
years, many parts of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank are, according to the Committee,  outdated . 
According to the Committee,  this, in turn, contributes  to a lack of clarity  regarding Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s responsibility in the area of financial stability , its objectives, tasks and powers in 
relation to monetary policy  and its international activities , cash activities and responsibility to 
maintain preparedness  for contingencies . There are also some unclear points concerning the 
powers and distribution of responsibility in the management of Sveriges Riksbank , both within the 
Executive Board and between the Executive Board and the Governing Council8. 
1.3 In the light of this  new situation, the Committee was given the task of  review ing the monetary 
policy framework and the Law on Sveriges Riksbank . In the Report the Committee analyses , 
review s and proposes  amendments in the following areas: (1) the objectives of the monetary 
policy  and the means by which it is carried out;  (2) Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibility regarding 
financial stability ; (3) Sveriges Riksbank ’s institutional independence, organisation a nd role in 
international contexts ; (4) democratic scrutiny of Sveriges Riksbank ; and (5)  cash activities and 
preparedness for contingencies in the payment system9. 
1.4 A significant change proposed in  the draft law is that if  Sveriges Riksbank  decides  on the 
formulation of a price stability objective, its Executive Board will submit a request to the 
Parliament for approval of this  objective. If the  Parliament does not approve the request, Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s immediately preceding decision on the formul ation of the price stability objective will 
continue to apply10. According to the Committee, the price stability objective would, for this 
purpose, cover the target variable (inflation target, price level target or mean inflation), the target 
level (growth rate) and the price index11. Currently, Sveriges Riksbank  can amend the 
specification of the price stability target without any requirement for approval from the Parliament.  
1.5 A notable structural change proposed by the draft law is that in the draft law on S veriges 
Riksbank there is a division between (1) Sveriges Riksbank ’s monetary policy objectives, tasks 
and powers, and (2) its  financial stability objectives, tasks and powers. In this respect, the 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 6.3.8 of the Report.  
8 See Chapter 13.1 and 13.4 and pp. 42- 43 of the Report.  
9 See Chapter 3.2 of the Report.  
10 See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 11, Section 18a of the Law on Parliament.  
11 See Chapter 15.2.4 of the Report.  
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3 monetary policy and financial stability objectives, tasks and powers are contained in separate 
chapters in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  The monetary policy chapter contains prov isions 
relating to, inter alia, Sveriges Riksbank ’s main objective of maintaining price stability, and its  
exchange rate management, interest rate management and liquidity instruments, purchase and 
sale of financial instruments other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments and minimum 
reserve requirements. The financial stability chapter contains provisions relating, inter alia, to the 
following objectives, tasks and powers of  Sveriges Riksbank : (1) the objective of contribut ing to 
the financial system’s st ability and effectiveness, including the public being able to make 
payments, without neglecting the price stability objective;  (2) the provision of payment settlement 
systems, including related deposit -taking and the provision of credit in relation to its payment 
settlement system ; (3) the oversight of financial infrastructures and the development of the 
payment market ; (4) powers in relation to central counterparties in third countries ; (5) support for 
the liquidity of the financial system, including gener al liquidity support, market -making, 
emergency liquidity  assistance and special liquidity facilities ; (6)  monitoring of the financial 
system in general and preparing for crises ; and (7) provision of  information to and/or collaboration 
and consultation with the Swedish Government, the SFSA  and the NDO  with respect to these 
financial stability  related activities and liquidity  supporting measures12. 
1.6 According to the Committee, the main reason for this division between  provisions concerning 
(1) monetary policy and price stability  and (2)  the financial system and financial stability  is that 
Sveriges Riksbank  has sole responsibility  for monetary policy and the U nion prohibition on 
seeking or taking instructions under Article 130 of the Treaty applies in thi s area. With respect to 
financial stability, however, responsibility is divided between several authorities, including the 
Government, the SFSA, which is responsible for macroprudential policies, and the NDO, which is 
responsible for resolution.  The Commit tee emphasises that, despite the fact that Sveriges 
Riksbank  shares some of its responsibility, e.g. in respect of  financial stability, with others, it 
makes independent decisions on what actions to take and will be able to act swiftly on its own 
within al l of the areas of its operations if the situation so requires.  According to the Committee, 
this division between monetary policy and price stability and the financial system and financial 
stability is made despite the fact that the powers within the two ar eas partially overlap, e.g. when 
it comes to liquidity assistance. In such a situation, the main purpose of the credit is decisive as 
to whether the credit is a matter of monetary policy or financial stability. Since there is , according 
to the Committee,  a connection between price stability and financial stability, situations where the 
main purpose of an operation is not obvious may arise . However, the Committee considers that 
this lack of clarity is offset by, inter alia, improving collaboration between Sveriges Riksbank , the 
Government and other authorities with respect to tasks outside the area of monetary policy13. 
1.7 It is also of note that Sveriges Riksbank ’s general authority  under the Law on Sveriges Riksbank 
to decide on the implementation of the foreign exchange rate system decided on by the 
Government and to purchase and sell foreign reserves and issue its own debt instruments 
                                                 
12 See Chapters 2 and 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
13 See Chapter 25 of the Report.  
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4 denominated in foreign currency in pursuance of its foreign exchange policy is not confirmed in 
the draft law on Sveriges Rik sbank14. Instead it provides  that Sveriges Riksbank  may conduct 
foreign currency interventions for a monetary policy purpose, taking into account which exchange 
rate system applies. In terms of Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to build up its foreign reserves for this 
purpose, a specific set of provisions is introduced that  authorise Sveriges Riksbank , subject to 
certain constraints, to build up foreign reserves either through borrowings from the NDO or 
through arrangements with foreign central banks. Borrowings from the NDO in excess of the 5% 
gross domestic product ( GDP ) cap would only be possible in exceptional circumstances, with an 
obligation to report the matter to the Parliament’s Finance Committee. Insofar as  arrangements 
with foreign central banks are rec iprocal in nature and do not contribute to the stability of the 
financial system, the Parliament’s approval would be required. Aside from borrowings from the 
NDO and arrangements with foreign central banks, Sveriges Riksbank ’s authority to 
independently bu y foreign currency is confined to purchases made in order to finance its 
provision of general liquidity assistance, market -making and emergency liquidity assistance for 
financial stability purposes15. 
1.8 Finally, the draft law  modifi es substantial aspects of Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity and provisioning 
regime. According to the Committee, the draft law thereby  aims to strengthen Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s financial resilience.  
 
2. General observations  
Sweden’s status as a Member State with a derogation  
2.1 The ECB would like to emphasise that, although Member States with a derogation, including 
Sweden, do not yet participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union, they have a 
legal duty to adapt the statutes of their national central banks  (NCBs) to ensure 
compatibility with the Treaty16 and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank  (hereinafter the ‘ Statute of the ESCB’). Any legislative 
reform in any such Member State should aim to gradually achieve consi stency with E SCB  
standards17. 
2.2 The ECB has repeatedly pointed out in its convergence reports that Sweden needs to adapt its 
legislation governing Sveriges Riksbank  to comply with Treaty requirements18. The ECB and its 
precursor, the European Monetary Institut e (EMI) , have issued several opinions in response to 
consultation requests from the Swedish authorities  which have considered matters relating to the 
independence of Sveriges Riksbank19. 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 7, Sections 1- 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
15 See Chapter 2, Section 3 and Section 4(3), and Chapter 10 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also 
paragraphs 8.1.1 to 8.1.6.  
16 See Article 131 of the T reaty.  
17 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2008/34. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu.  
18 See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 201- 207. 
19 See paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of Opinion CON/2005/54, paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2008/34, paragraph 4 of 
 
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5 Sveriges Riksbank’s independent design of its price stability objective  
2.3 As regards the Parliament’s right to approve or reject any decision taken by Sveriges Riksbank  
on the design of the price stability objective, the ESCB’s primary objective is  to maintain price 
stability under Article s 127(1) and 282(2) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute of the 
ESCB . As previously noted by the ECB, c entral bank independence is not an end in itself, but is 
instrumental in achieving an objective that should be clearly defined and should prevail over any 
other objective. Functional independence requires each NCB’s primary objective to be stated in a 
clear and legally certain way and to be fully in line with the primary objective of price stability 
established by the Treaty. It is served by providing the NCBs with the necessary means and 
instruments to achiev e this objective independently of any other authority. The Treaty’s 
requirement of central bank independence reflects the generally held view that the primary 
objective of price stability is best served by a fully independ ent institution with a precise 
definition of its mandate20.  
2.4 As regards timing, as previously noted by the ECB, the Treaty is not clear about when the NCBs 
of Member States with a derogation must comply with the primary objective of price stability set 
out in Articles 127(1) and 282(2) of the Treaty  and Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB . While 
Article  127(1) of the Treaty does not apply to Member States with a derogation (see 
Article  139(2)(c) of the Treaty) , Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB  does appl y to such Member 
States (see Article 42.1 of the Statute of the ESCB ). The ECB takes the view that the 
obligation of the NCBs to have price stability as their primary objective applies from 1 
June 1998 in the case of Sweden.  This is based on the fact that one of the guiding principles of 
the Union, namely price stability (Article 119 of the Treaty), also applies to Member States with a 
derogation. It is also based on the Treaty objective  that all Member States should strive for 
macroeconomic convergence, including price stability. This conclusion is also based on the 
underlying rationale of central bank independence, which is only justified if the overall objective of 
price stability has primacy21. 
2.5 Under Article 130 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB , neither an NCB nor any 
member of its decision- making bodies shall seek or take instructions f rom Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This 
obligation applies to all Member States. As far as c entral bank independence is concerned, 
national legislation in Member States with a derogation, such as Sweden,  had to be adapted to 
comply with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB  by the date of 
establishment of the ESCB on 1 June 1998. The rights of third parties to approve, suspend, 
annul and defer an NCB ’s decisions are contrary to NCBs ’ institutional independence and 
incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB  as far as ESCB -related tasks are 
concerned. The Parliament’s right to approve or reject Sveriges Riksbank’s decisions on 
                                                                                                                                                             
Opinion CON/2013/53, paragraph 3 of Opinion CON/2017/17, and paragraphs 4 to 15 of EMI Opinion CON/1997/26.  
20 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20.  
21 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20.  
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6 the design of the price stability objective would therefore be inconsistent with Article 130 
of the Treaty22. This decision should rather be taken by Sveriges Riksbank’s Executive Board, 
as the decision- making body responsible for the formulation of Sver iges Riksbank’s monetary 
policy.  
Sveriges Riksbank’s independent performance of its basic monetary policy and payment system 
tasks necessary for Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to achieve its primary objective of price stability  
2.6 Article 139(2)(c) of the Treaty  stipulates,  inter alia,  that the basic tasks of the ESCB as listed in 
Article 127(2) of the Treaty, including the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of 
the Union and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, shall not apply to M ember 
States with a derogation , such  as Sweden. In addition, in accordance with Article 4 2.2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB , the central banks of Member States with a derogation shall retain their 
powers in the field of monetary policy according to national la w. Nevertheless, each Member 
State with a derogation is also obliged under Article  131 of the Treaty to ensure that its national 
legislation , including the statutes of its NCB , is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the 
ESCB, in  view of the abrogation of the potential derogation and the adoption of the euro in those 
Member States  in accordance with Article 140 of the Treaty . Therefore , any legislative reform 
in Sweden  should aim to gradually achieve legal converge nce with, rather than diverge nce 
from, ESCB  standards, in accordance with the convergence process obligations 
enshrined in the Treaty.   
2.7 Against this background, the narrow conceptualisation of monetary policy and broad 
conceptualisation of financial stability under the draft law, combined with the prohibition 
on Sveriges Riksbank seeking and taking instructions applying only within the narrowly 
defined area of m onetary policy, does not provid e the legally required compatibility  with 
the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB . Sveriges Riksbank  needs to independently exercise 
all the basic monetary policy and payment system  tasks that are necessary for a central bank to 
be able to achieve its primary objective of price stability established under the Treaties and the 
Statute of the ESCB . Under Article 127(2) of the Treaty the basic central banking tasks to be 
carried out through the ESCB , in order to achieve the primary objective of price stability,  include, 
inter alia, defining and implement ing the monetary policy of the Union and promot ing the smooth 
operation of payment systems. Under Chapter IV of the Statute of the ESCB  the monetary 
functions and operations of the ESCB include a variety of open market and credit operations, as 
well as providing facilities and making regulations to ensure efficient and sound clearing and 
payment systems within the Union and with third countries.  The provision of li quidity is a 
monetary policy task at any central bank, including Sveriges Riksbank . Within the framework of 
the Eurosystem the provision of liquidity  support is, with the exception of emergency liquidity 
assistance, considered to be part of the basic task of implement ing monetary policy, and is 
subject to the prohibition on NCBs seeking or taking instructions. Sveriges Riksbank ’s provision 
of payment settlement systems and its oversight of financial market infrastructures and the 
                                                 
22 See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 20, 22.  
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7 payment market are also inextricably linked with its monetary policy tasks and price stability 
objective. Settlements in a central bank’s payment system take place in central bank money, and 
the provision of intra- day credit in a central bank’s payment system operations can spill ov er into 
overnight credit extended within the framework of the central bank’s monetary policy operations. 
Disturbances affecting financial market infrastructures can have an impact on a central bank’s 
price stability objective through several channels. For example, such disturbances can affect the 
liquidity position of credit institutions, potentially disrupting the smooth functioning of payment 
systems. This could lead to increased demand for central bank liquidity and possible challenges 
in implementing monetary policy. In addition, such disturbances can impair the functioning of 
financial market segments that are key to the transmission of monetary policy23. 
2.8 The ability of an NCB  of a Member State with a derogation to independently achieve its 
primary stability objective , as required under Article s 127 and  130 of the Treaty and 
Article s 2 and  7 of the Statute of the ESCB , would be jeopardised if that NCB’s  basic 
monetary policy an d payment system tasks are not subject to the prohibition on seeking 
or taking instructions24. 
2.9 It is therefore suggested that the provisions relating to Sveriges Riksbank’s operation and 
oversight of payment settlement systems, financial infrastructures and  the payment 
market and the provision of liquidity support (with the exception of emergency liquidity 
assistance) should be removed from  Chapter 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
regarding the financial system, and  placed  in a single chapter addressing monetary policy 
and payment systems. Furthermore , Sveriges Riksbank’s responsibilities under the 
proposed amendments to the Instrument of Government, in respect of which Sveriges 
Riksbank may not seek or take instructions, s hould be aligned with the conception of 
basic central banking tasks under the Treaty25. 
2.10 It may also be noted that  the restriction on Sveriges Riksbank ´s ability to purchase and sell 
financial instruments other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments constit utes a constraint in 
the context of  the Statute of the ESCB  that encroaches on Sveriges Riksbank ’s independent 
monetary policy under the Treaty26. 
Sveriges Riksbank’s independent performance of its basic foreign exchange and foreign reserve 
management tasks  
2.11 As noted by the ECB in a previous opinion addressed to the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the 
conduct of foreign exchange operations and the holding and management of foreign reserves in 
pursuance of a central bank’s monetary, exchange rate and liquidity po licies is a basic  central 
bank  function, both within the ESCB and internationally27. Two of the basic tasks to be carried out 
through the ESCB are the conduct of foreign exchange operations consistent with exchange rate 
                                                 
23 See Opinion CON/2017/39 (General observations).  
24 See also paragraphs 7.2.1 to 7.2.3.  
25 See also paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2.  
26 See also paragraph 6.2.3.  
27 See paragraph 3.4.1 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
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8 policy , whose primary objective is price stability,  and the holding and manage ment of Member 
States’  official foreign reserves . In order to achieve the ESCB’s objectives and to carry out its 
tasks, the ECB and the NCBs may operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright 
(spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or borrowing claims and 
marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as well as precious metals.  In order 
to ensure that their  national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the 
ESCB, as required by Article 131 of the Treaty, the NCBs have to be allowed to acquire and sell 
(spot and forward)  all types of foreign exchange assets, including securities and all other assets 
in the currency of any country or unit s of account and in whatever form held, and precious 
metals28. 
2.12 As previously noted, central bank independence requirements under the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB  require that Sveriges Riksbank must be able to autonomously avail 
itself of sufficient financial resources to fulfil its monetary and foreign exchange policy 
mandates and finance its own operations.  A Member State may not put its NCB in a position 
where it has insufficient financial resources to carry out its monetary and exchange rate policy 
tasks, as well as its national tasks. Sveriges Riksbank is best placed to independently 
assess what level of foreign reserves is necessary to enable it to perform its tasks. The 
ECB is particularly  concerned that, under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges 
Riksbank may only build up its foreign reserves for financial stability purposes. The 
constraints under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  on Sveriges Riksbank’s ability to 
increase its fo reign reserves whenever necessary in pursuance of its independently 
formulated monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies clearly encroach on Sveriges 
Riksbank’s independence under the Treaty and Statute of the ESCB  in the performance of 
its basic m onetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies , jeopardising its capacity to 
achieve its Treaty -based primary objective of maintain ing price stability29. 
Sveriges Riksbank’s financial independence and compliance with the prohibition s on monetary 
financing and privileged access under the Treaty  
2.13 In addition to the foregoing, certain other provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 
undermine Sveriges Riksbank’s financial independence  or are incompatible with the 
prohibition  of monetary financing under the Treaty.  
First, the ECB would welcome the introduction of an explicit reference to the possibility of 
Sveriges Riksbank submitting a request for the restoration of its capital, in line with its  
existing general right to subm it such a request to the Parliament or the Government.  
Furthermore,  the level at which Sveriges Riksbank should have the possibility to request the 
Parliament to restore its target equity level should be increased, in order to ensure that Sveriges 
Riksbank  has sufficient funds at its disposal to be able to perform its tasks, consistent with its  
                                                 
28 See the second and third indents of  Articles 127(2) of the Treaty; and the first and second indents of Article 18.1, 
and Articles 30 and 31 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
29 See paragraphs 3.4.3 and 3.4.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
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9 financial independence under the Treaty30. 
Second , Sveriges Riksbank may only grant credit to international financial institutions of 
which Sweden is a member to the extent compatible with the monetary financing 
prohibition under the Treaty31. 
Third, the restriction on Sveriges Riksbank’ s ability to purchase and sell financial 
instruments other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments appears to circumvent the 
prohibitio n of privileged access under Article 124 of the Treaty32. 
2.14 Finally, the ECB understands that since Sveriges  Riksbank’s  annual accounts are audited, the 
possibility for the Parliament to set aside a decision of Sveriges Riksbank  on the profit and loss 
account, the balance sheet and the profit for the year if the numbers are not calculated in 
accordance with the applicable law is rather theoretical in nature and the likelihood of such 
rejection occurring in practice is slim . 
 
3. Specific observations on d raft amendments to the Instrument of Government 
3.1 Purpose of the draft amendments to the Instrument of Government  
The draft law contains an amendment to the Instrument of Government, which forms part of the 
Constitution. The present Instrument of Government states that Sveriges Riksbank  is responsible 
for monetary policy and that no public authority may determine how Sveriges Riksbank  shall 
decide in matters regarding monetary policy33. According to the amended Instrument of 
Government Sveriges Riksbank  is responsible for  the following : (1) defining and implementing 
monetary policy; ( 2) conducting  foreign currency interventions; ( 3) holding and managing foreign 
reserves; ( 4) promoting the smooth operation of paym ent systems within the framework of 
cooperation in the E SCB; and ( 5) collecting the statist ical information needed for cooperation 
within the ESCB . The amended Instrument of Government  also states  that no public authority 
may determine how Sveriges Riksbank  shall decide in matters for which it is responsible (as 
described above) and that Sveriges Riksbank  may not seek or take instructions in these areas of 
responsibility from anyone34. 
3.2 Specific observations  
3.2.1  The ambit  of the tasks conferred upon NCBs by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB , in 
order to indep endently achieve their primary objective of price stability,  is wider than that 
envisaged by the propos ed amendments to the Instrument of Government . Article 139(2)(c) of 
the Treaty stipulates that the basic tasks of the ESCB as listed in Article 127(2) of the Treaty, 
including the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and promoting the 
smooth operation of payment systems, shall not apply to Member States with a derogation, such  
                                                 
30 See paragraphs 13.3.5 to 13.3.10.  
31 See paragraphs 11.2.1 to 11. 2.2. 
32 See paragraph 6.2.4.  
33 See Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government.  
34 See the amendment to Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government. See also Chapter 28.3 of the Report.  
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10 as Sweden. Nevertheless, Member States with a derogation are obliged under Article  131 of the 
Treaty to ensure that their national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of 
the ESC B of the ESCB, in view of the potential abrogation of the derogation and the adoption of 
the euro in those Member States. The NCBs of Member States with a derogation must also  
independently exercise all the basic monetary policy and payment system tasks that are 
necessary for a central bank to be able to achieve the primary objective of price stability 
established under the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB . Against this bac kground, the ECB 
refers to Chapter IV of the Statute of the ESCB  on the monetary functions and operations of the 
ESCB,  which include a variety of open market and credit operations, as well as the task of 
ensuring efficient and sound clearing and payment systems. Furthermore, under  Article 128(1) of 
the Treaty the ECB  has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes  within the 
Union and the ECB and the NCBs may issue such banknotes35. It is not clear that all of these 
basic  central banking tasks are covered by the list of Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibilities under 
the proposed amendments to the Instrument of Government . 
3.2.2  As noted in paragraph 1. 5, many of Sveriges Riksbank ’s proposed powers in relation to liquidity 
support, including the provision of liquidity within Sveriges Riksbank ’s payment settlement 
system,  general liquidity support, market -making, emergency liquidity assistance and special 
liquidity facilities, are classified under the draft law as falling within Sveriges Riksbank ’s objective 
of contribut ing to the financial system’s stability and effectiveness. Within the framework of the 
ESCB the provi sion of liquidity  is, wit h the exception of emergency liquidity assistance, 
considered to be part of the basic task s of implement ing monetary policy  and promot ing the 
smooth operation of payment systems , and is  subject to the prohibition on NCBs seeking or 
taking instructions. In the case of emergency liquidity assistance, there are procedures in place to 
ensure consistency with monetary policy.  
3.2.3  Similarly, Sveriges Riksbank ’s powers in relation to payment systems , monitoring financial 
infrastructures and developing the payment market,  outside the narrow context of promoting the 
smooth operation of payment systems  within the framework of ESCB cooperation, are classified 
under the draft law as falling within Sveriges Riksbank ’s objective of contribut ing to the financial 
system’s stability and effectiveness, which includes  the public being able to make payments.  
Within the framework of the ESCB these powers are considered to be part of the basic task of  
promot ing the smooth operation of payment systems and the related task of ensur ing efficient 
and sound clearing and payment systems , and are thus covered by the central bank 
independenc e protection under Article 130 of the Treaty  and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB . 
3.2.4  The ECB recommends that Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibilities under the proposed 
amendments to the Instrument of Government , in respect of which no public authority may 
determine how Sveriges Riksbank  shall decide and Sveriges Riksbank  may not seek or take 
instructions, be ali gned with the concept ion of basic  central banking tasks under the Treaty . 
                                                 
35  Article 139(2)(g) of the Treaty also stipulates that Article 128 of the Treaty does not apply to Member States with a 
derogation.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
11  
4. Specific observations on d raft a mendments to the Law on Parliament  and the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions re garding  public information and reporting to the 
Parliament’s Finance Committee  
4.1 Purpose of the draft amendments to the Law on Parliament  and the provisions regarding  public 
information and reporting to the Parliament’s Finance Committee in the draft Law on Sveriges 
Riksbank  
4.1.1  A new provisi on is introduced in to the Law on Parliament36 stating that, with respect to the 
activities of Sveriges Riksbank , the Finansutskottet  (Parliament’s Committee on Finance) wi ll also 
be responsible, alongside the Riksrevisionen  (NAO , National Audit Office) , for monitoring and 
evaluating Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities . As noted by the Committee37, this provision will provide 
the Parliament with a right to hold Sveriges Riksbank  accountable for its decisions and the 
achievement  of its goal s by making Sveriges Riksbank  explain the reasons for  its actions. The 
Parliament wi ll regularly scrutini se and evaluate all the activities of Sveriges Riksbank  with 
respect to the achievement of its objectives an d efficiency. The Parliament wi ll be entitled to 
demand both oral and written presentations  from Sveriges Riksbank  in relation to various 
questions. It will also be entitled to pose questions to individual members of the Executive Board 
regarding the re asons for their decisions.  
4.1.2  As noted in paragraph 1.4, the draft  amendments to the Law on Parliament propose that if 
Sveriges Riksbank  should decide on the formulation of the price stability objective, its Executive 
Board will then submit a request to the Parliament for approval of the objective. If the request is 
not approved by the Parliament , Sveriges Riksbank ’s immediately preceding decision on the 
formulation of the price stability objective will continue to apply38. 
4.1.3  The draft amendm ents to the Law on Parliament  provide that the Parliament’s Committee on 
Finance may decide to launch a special investigation of circumstances that can form the basis for 
removing a member of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board from office39. This provision would 
supplement  the existing provisions of the Instrument of Government , whereby Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s General Council has the right to remove a member of the Executive Board from their 
employment if they no longer fulfil the requirements laid down for the performance of their duties 
or are guilty of serious misconduct40. 
4.1.4  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  requires  Sveriges Riksbank  to publish the minutes of 
monetary policy meetings and other meetings of its Executive Board and General Council. 
However, information covered by secrecy requirements under the Law on p ublic access to 
information and s ecrecy41 will not be published. The monetary policy  meeting minutes  must 
                                                 
36 See the amendment to Chapter 7, Section 9 of the Law on Parliament.  
37 See Chapter 33.6.4 of the Report.  
38 See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 11, Section 18a of t he Law on Parliament.  
39 See the amendment introducing the new Chapter 13, Section 25 of the Law on Parliament.  
40 See Chapter 12, Sections 1 and 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
41 Offentlighet och sekretesslagen (2009:400) . 
ECB -PUBLIC  
12 reflect the viewpoints presented at meetings. Sveriges Riksbank  must  also provide information 
about  payment settlement systems,  other aspects of the financial system, cash, crisis 
prepar edness, and its international and other activities42. 
4.1.5  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  also requires  Sveriges Riksbank  to regularly report to the 
Parliament’s Finance Committee (including at the Committee’s request) on a range of matters, 
including monetary policy, monetary policy strategy , Sveriges Riksbank ’s assessment of future 
price trends  and other factors affecting price stability and the interests of the real economy , the 
cash handling situation in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank ’s work regarding pa yment settlements, the 
financial system, crisis preparedness and Sveriges Riksbank ’s international activities43. 
4.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  requires its  General Council to  submit annual financial 
statements  to the Parliament  and the NAO each year before 22 February44. Currently, the Law on 
Sveriges Riksbank  provides that the annual report is presented by the Executive Board45. This 
amendment reflects the fact that under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  it is the General 
Counc il that adopts Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss account and balance sheet46. 
4.1.7  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  requires  Sveriges Riksbank  to report annually to the 
Parliament on what measures it has taken based on the NAO’s observations47. 
4.2 Specific observations  
4.2.1  As regards the Parliament’s Committee on Finance’ s democratic scrutiny of Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
achievement of objectives and efficiency, central bank independence under Article 130 of the 
Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB  is fully  compatible with holding NCBs accountable 
for their decisions, which is an important aspect of enhancing confidence in their independent 
status. This entails transparency and dialogue with third parties . Dialogue between an NCB and 
third parties, even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange 
views, is compatible with central bank independence,  provided that:  (1) this does not result in 
interference with the independence of the members of the NCB’s decision- making bodies;  (2) the 
special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision- making bodies is 
fully respected; and  (3) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB  are 
observed 48. 
4.2.2  As noted in paragraph 2.3, t he Parliament’s right to approve or reject Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
decisions on the design of the price stability objective would be inconsistent with Article 130 of 
the Treaty.  
4.2.3  As regards the Parliament’s Committee on Finance’s  power to launch special investigations of 
                                                 
42 See Chapter 12, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
43 See Chapter 12, Sections 3- 6 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
44 See Chapter 12, Section 7 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
45 See Chapter 10, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
46 See Chapter 8, Secti on 4, second paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
47 See Chapter 12, Section 10 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
48 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20, paragraph 2.2.3 of Opinion CON/2016/33 and paragraph 3.2.4 of 
Opinion CON/2016/52.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
13 circumstances that can form the basis for removing a member of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive 
Board from office,  the ECB understands  that this constitutes a specific tool for the Parliament to 
assess whether  grounds for relieving from office as referred to under Article 14.2 of the Statute of 
the ESCB  can be established. The ECB would appreciate clarification that this specific tool is 
without prejudice to the personal independence of the member of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive 
Board . 
4.2.4  As regards the NAO’s audit of Sveriges Riksbank , as previously noted by the ECB, where an 
NCB’s operations are subject to the control of a state audit office or similar body charged with 
controlling the use of public finances, the scope of the control should be: (1)  clearly defined under  
the legal framework ; (2) without prejudice to the activities of the NCB’s independent external 
auditors ; and, (3) in line with the principle of institutional independence, comply with the 
prohibition on giving instructi ons to an NCB and its decision- making bodies and not interfere with 
the NCB’s ESCB -related tasks. The state audit should be done on a non- political, independent 
and purely professional basis . The access of a state audit office to an NCB’s confidential 
information and documents must be limited to what is necessary for the performance of the 
statutory tasks of the body that receives the information and must be without prejudice to the 
ESCB’s independence and the ESCB’s confidentiality regime to which the members of NCBs’ 
decision -making bodies and staff are subject. NCBs should ensure that such bodies protect the 
confidentiality of information and documents disclosed at a level corresponding to that applied by 
the NCBs49. 
 
5. Specific observations on the draft law  on Sveriges Riksbank: general provisions  
5.1 Purpose of the draft general provisions in the draft law on Sveriges  Riksbank  
5.1.1  The draft general provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  clarify that Sveriges Riksbank  
is a separate legal entity owned by the State. Further more, it is clarified that the State guarantees 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s obligations, and that Sveriges Riksbank  manages its own assets and related 
income. It is also stated that Sveriges Riksbank  is part of the ESCB and is one of the 
shareholders in the capital of the ECB , and shall participate in collaboration with other central 
banks within the ESCB . Sveriges Riksbank  shall aim for a high level of efficiency and manage 
State funds prudently , and  may only take a measure in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality.  In order to be able to fulfil its tasks, Sveriges Riksbank  shall follow general 
economic developments and developments in financial markets. It shall also identify the threats 
to sustainable development that affect the possibilities of attaining the objectives under the draft 
Law on Sveriges Riksbank . Sveriges Riksbank  may also conduct research of importance for its 
ability to attain the objectiv es under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 50. 
5.1.2  The general provisions in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank 51 purport to reproduce the 
                                                 
49 See Convergence Report 2018, p. 24.  
50 See Chapter 1, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
51 See Chapter 1, Sections 10 and 11. See also Chapter 13.7 and pp. 1772- 1774 of the Report.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
14 prohibition of monetary financing contained in Article 123 of the Treaty  and Council Regulation 
(EC) No  3603/9352. 
5.2 Specific observations  
5.2.1  The ECB welcomes the draft general provisions in the draft Law on Sveriges Riksbank clarifying 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s role within the ECB and the ESCB. The ECB also welcomes the 
clarifications that the State guarantees Sveriges Riksbank ’s obligations  and that Sveriges 
Riksbank  manages its own assets, which serve to underline its  financial independence under 
Article 130 of the Treaty . Regarding Sveriges Riksbank ’s proposed duties to follow general 
economic developments, identify t hreats to sustainable development and conduct research, the 
ECB notes that these duties are linked to Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to fulfil its tasks and attain 
its objectives under the draft Law on Sveriges Riksbank . The ECB understands that Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s role in this respect w ould not go beyond monitoring activities that result from or are 
linked , either  directly or indirectly , to the discharge of its monetary policy and central banking 
mandate53. 
5.2.2  Regarding the proposed reproduction of the monetary financing prohibition, it is , in general,  
unnecessary to transpose Article 123 of the Treaty, supplemented by Regulation (EC) No 
3603/93, into national legislation as they are both directly applicable. If, however, national 
legislative provisions mirror  these directly applicable Union  provisions, they may not narrow the 
scope of application of the monetary financing prohibition or extend the exemptions available 
under Union  law54. For example, although the proposed reproduction of the monetary financing 
prohibition under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  seems to have amended the existing Law 
on Sveriges Riksbank55 to address previous comments  made by the ECB56, there is still a 
discrepancy between the wordin g of Article 123( 2) of the Treaty and the relevant provisions  of the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank57. The ex emption from the monetary financing prohibition for 
publicly owned credit institutions set out in Article 123( 2) of the Treaty is only stated to apply ‘in 
the context of the supply of reserves by central banks ’, whereas this wording is absent from the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , thus expanding this exemption beyond the particular context  
envisaged under the Treaty . In the event of a conflict between these provisions, the directly 
applicable Union  provisions prevail . 
 
6. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on m onetary 
policy  
6.1 Purpose of the provisions on monetary policy in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
                                                 
52 See Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibitions referred to in Article 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1) . 
53 See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2012/105, paragraph 5.5 of Opinion CON/2013/90 and paragraph 5.5 of Opinion 
CON/2013/91.  
54 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 30.  
55 See Article 1(3) and (4) of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
56 See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 203- 204. 
57 See Chapter 1, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
15 6.1.1  Under the provisions on monetary policy in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s primary objective is to maintain price stability through sustainably low and stable 
inflation. Within the sphere of monetary policy, Sveriges Riksbank  shall also contribute to a 
balanced development of production and employment without setting aside the price stability 
objective ( upholding the interests of  the real economy) 58. The Law on Sveriges Riksbank  
contains  no provision stating that Sveriges Riksbank  shall take considerations relating to the real 
economy  into account . According to the Committee59, as long as the Swedish formulation of the 
interests of the real economy does not conflict with the corresponding requirements  of Union law, 
it should be compatible with Union  law to incorporate a provision that is worded differently from  
the rule under Union  law. The formulation of the type of interests of the real economy that should 
be furthered by Sveriges Riksbank  should be more conc rete than, for example, supporting the 
economic policy of the Swedish Parliament, as this increases the clarity of Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
duty and facilitates assessment and accountability . The Committee considers that production and 
employment  encapsulate what a central bank can chiefly influence in the real economy in order to 
improve the welfare of society, and notes that these are also terms are commonly used in other 
countries.  
6.1.2  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges Riksbank  would be assigned a number of 
monetary policy powers, including interest rate management and liquidity instruments and 
minimum reserve requirements60. Sveriges Riksbank ’s interest rate management and liquidity 
instruments61 include receiving deposits, provi ding credit in Swedish kronor or foreign currency 
against adequate collateral, entering into repurchase agreements and  buying and selling Swedish 
sovereign debt instruments in the secondary market. Sveriges Riksbank  may also buy and sell 
financial instruments , other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments,  admitted to trading on a 
regulated market, but only if there are exceptional reasons  for doing so. In the Law on Sveriges 
Riksbank  no such distinction is drawn between Swedish sovereign debt instruments and other 
financial instruments.  
6.1.3  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges Riksbank  must publish the conditions that 
are generally applicable to Sveriges Riksbank ’s deposit -taking, lending, repurchase agreements 
and the collateral that can be accepted in respect of its Swedish kronor credits. Further more, 
Sveriges Riksbank  shall inform the public in an appropriate way about: (1) the price stability 
objective, the interests of the real economy and its monetary policy strategy; (2) monetary policy 
decisions t aken, the reasons for them and dissenting opinions in the Executive Board; and (3) its 
assessment both of future price development s and of other circumstances that have a substantial 
impact on the design of monetary policy and the possibilities of attaining the price stability 
objective and the interests of the real economy. Sveriges Riksbank  must also make public the 
minutes of the monetary policy meetings and other meetings of the Executive Board and General 
                                                 
58 See Chapter 2, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
59 See Chapter 16.4 and 16.6 of the Report.  
60 See Chapter 2, Sections 4- 7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
61 See Chapter 2, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
16 Council. Minutes of the monetary policy meetings must  reflect the standpoints put forward at the 
meetings, except that , under the Law on public access to information and secrecy62, information 
covered by secrecy obligations  shall not be made public63. 
6.1.4  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges Riksbank  shall inform the mini ster 
designated by the Government of the monetary policy decisions taken. This information shall be 
given as soon as possible after the decision and, if possible, before it is announced to the public. 
Sveriges Riksbank  may also conduct a dialogue with the Government and other public authorities 
or organisations about questions that affect the design of monetary policy and the possibilities  of 
attaining the price stability  objective and the interests  of the real economy.  
6.2 Specific  observations  
6.2.1  Taking into account Article  131 of the Treaty , which oblig es Member States with a derogation to 
ensure that their national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB  
in view of the potential abrogation of the derogation, t he ECB welcomes that Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
primary monetary policy objective is stated in a clear and legally certain way that is in line with the 
ESCB’s primary objective of maintain ing price stability under  Article 127(1) of the Treaty.  
6.2.2  As previously noted by the ECB, the draft l aw on Sveriges Riksbank  should also reflect the 
ESCB’s secondary objective of supporting the general economic policies of the Union in line with 
Article  127(1) of the Treaty64. Although the ECB welcomes the proposed introduction of the 
interests of  the real economy into the secondary monetary policy objective of Sveriges  Riksbank  
in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  (i.e. contribution to balanced development of producti on 
and employment) , the ECB notes that this formulation is more limited than the objective of 
supporting the general economic policies in the Union as set out in Article 127(1)  of the Treaty.  
6.2.3  The first indent of Article 18.1 of the Statute of the ESCB  provides that NCBs may, in order to 
achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks , operate in the financial markets by 
buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or 
borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies . The restriction 
on Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to purchase and sell financial instruments other than Swedish 
sovereign debt instruments constitutes  a constraint in the context of  Article 18 of the Statute of 
the ESCB , which  allows the NCBs to buy and sell outright or under repurchase agreement s and 
by lending or borrowing all manner of claims and marketable instruments, including instruments 
issued by sovereign and private issuers alike. In addition,  and as previously mentioned by the 
ECB65, NCBs shall be provided with the necessary means and ins truments for achieving the 
primary objective of price stability independently of any other authority to meet the requirements 
in respect of  functional independence.  
6.2.4  Further more, the restriction on Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to purchase and sell financial 
                                                 
62 Offentlighet och sekretesslagen (2009:400) . 
63 See Chapter 2, Sections 8- 9 and Chapter 12, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
64 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 204.  
65 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 20.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
17 instruments other than Swedish sovereign debt instruments raises  the question of compliance 
with Article 12 4 of the Treaty, which applies to Member States with a derogation, such as 
Sweden. Article 124 of the Treaty prohibits any measure, not based on prudential considerations, 
establishing privileged access by, inter alia, central governments to financial ins titutions.  Under 
Article 1(1) of Cou ncil Regulation (EC) No 3604/9366 privileged access is understood as any law, 
regulation or other binding legal ins trument adopted in the exercis e of public authority which, inter 
alia, obliges financial institutions to acquire or to hold liabilit ies of , inter alia, central governments , 
or confers financial advantages that do not comply with the principles of a market economy, in 
order to encourage those institutions to acquire or hold such liabilities. Thus, as public authorities, 
NCBs may not take measures granting privileged access to financial institutions by the public 
sector if such measures are not based on prudential considerations67. Furthermore, in 
accordance with Article 3(2) and recital 10 of Regulation (EC) No 3604/93, rules on the 
mobilisation or pledging of debt instruments enacted by the NCBs must not be used as a means 
of circumventing the prohibition on privileged access. Member States’ legislation in this area may 
not establish such privileged access. Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 defines ‘prudential 
considerations’ as those which underlie national laws, regulations or administrative actions based 
on, or consistent with, Union  law and designed to promote the soundness of financial institutions 
so as to strengthen the stability of the financial system as a whole and the protection of the 
customers of those institutions.  According to the Committee the purchase and sale of private 
securities can directly affect asset prices and loan terms, and entails much greater financial risk -
taking for Sveriges Riksbank  and for public finances68. As the Committee’s concerns do not seem 
to be motivated by prudential consider ations within the meaning of Article 124 of the Treaty, the 
restrict ion on Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to purchase and sell financial instruments other than 
Swedish sovereign debt i nstruments  appear s to circumvent the prohibition on privileged access 
under Article 124 of the Treaty.  
6.2.5  The ECB generally welcomes the provisions designed to contribute to Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
transparency.  
6.2.6  Under the existing Law on Sveriges Riksbank , the minister appointed by the Government is 
required to be informed prior to Sveriges Riksbank  making a monetary policy decision of major 
importance69. As previously noted by the ECB70, this requirement could potentially breach the 
prohibition on giving ins tructions to the NCBs pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty  and Article 7 of 
the Statute of the ESCB , and should therefore be adapted accordingly. By adapting this provision 
so that inform ation may only be furnished to the mini ster before it is announced t o the public if 
this is possible, the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  will ensure that the Government may continue 
to be kept informed of monetary policy decisions without constraining Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
                                                 
66 See Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the 
prohibition of privileged access referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 4) . 
67 See Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 35- 36. 
68 See Chapter 18.11.3 of the Report.  
69 See Chapter 6, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
70 See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 202.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
18 independence. As previously noted71, dialogue between an NCB and third parties, even when 
based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views, is compatible with 
central bank independence provided that: (1) this does not result in interference with the 
independence of the members of the NCB’s decision- making bodies; (2) the special status of 
Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB’s decision- making bodies is fully respected; 
and (3) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute of the ESCB  are observed.  
 
7. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on the financial 
system  
7.1 Purpose of the provisions on the financial system  in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
7.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that the objective of Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities 
regarding the financial system shall be to contribute to the financial system ’s stabil ity and 
efficien cy, including the public being abl e to make payments, without setting aside Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s price stability objective72. According to the Committee, t his objective does not exist in 
the Law on Sveriges Riksbank  but has been considered to be part of Sveriges Riksbank ’s task of 
promoting a safe and efficient payment system73. 
7.1.2  To achieve its financial stability objective Sveriges Riksbank  is given a number of tasks related to 
the operation and oversight of payment systems, financial infrastructures and the payment 
market under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank74, which the Committee views as  largely a 
codification of the activities currently conducted by Sveriges Riksbank  with respect to financial 
stability: ( 1) to provid e a payment settlement system  and issue regulations thereon,  deciding 
which financial companies and public authorities may be participants in this system , taking 
deposits, charging fees and extending credit in connection with this system,  and tak ing account of 
the principles of open access and neutrality; ( 2) to collaborate in payment settlement s and 
participat e in payment or settlement systems; ( 3) to conduct oversight of central counterparties, 
other clearing organisations, financial market settlement systems, central securities depositories, 
trade repositories, and operations conducted by other legal persons of particular importance for 
the financial infrastructure in Sweden ; (4) to adopt relevant  requirements in relation to a central 
counterparty established in a third country ; and ( 5) to follow the development of the payments 
market . 
7.1.3  As part of its financial stability obj ective the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  also gives Sveriges 
Riksbank  the task of assessing whether the financial system is stable and efficient and work ing to 
identify vulnerabilities and risks in the financial system that may lead to serious disturbances or 
significant efficiency losses. If Sveriges Riksbank  concludes that another authority needs to take 
measures to reduce the risk of serious financial dist urbances in the Swedish economy, it is to 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, pp. 22- 23. 
72 See Chapter 3, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
73 See Chapter 20.8.6 of the Report.  
74 See Chapter 3, Sections 2, 5, 8, 9 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
19 alert the authority in question and other interested parties75. 
7.1.4  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank76, Sveriges Riksbank  may also decide to provide 
liquidity support pursuant to its  financial stability objective.  
First, Sveriges Riksbank  is given the power to provide general liquidity support in the form of 
collateralised credit extensions or repurchase agreements in Swedish kronor or foreign 
currencies to/ with Swedish financial firms, foreign firms operatin g in Sweden through branches 
and central counterparties, if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial 
system in Sweden.  
Second, Sveriges Riksbank  may also buy and sell financial instruments at predetermined prices, 
in a similar manner  to a market maker, in order to temporarily support the functioning of system -
critical financial markets if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the financial system 
in Sweden and if there are exceptional reasons  for doing so.  
Third, r egarding emergency liquidity assistance,  Sveriges Riksbank  may, in order to support 
liquidity,  extend collateralised credit s in Swedish kronor or foreign currency to a going- concern 
firm that has temporary liquidity problems if this is needed to counter a serious disturbance in the 
financial system in Sweden and if there are exceptional reasons  for doing so. Sveriges Riksbank  
must inform the minister designated by the Government before deciding to provide any  
emergency liquidity assistance.  
Fourth, Sveriges  Riksbank  may, after consulting the SFSA,  also offer special liquidity facilities 
which may be included in the calculation o f the liquidity coverage requirement under Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU)  2015/6177. 
Sveriges Riksbank  is also required to plan and make preparations to establish good capability  to 
counter serious disturbances  in the Swedish financial system. As part of this, it must  identify 
liquidity support measures that may be used to  counteract such disturbances . 
Sveriges Riksbank  must  make public  the facilities it intends to offer  and the specific conditions  
applicable to them, unless it is inappropriate to do so having regard to the stability and efficiency 
of the financial system . 
Sveriges Riksbank  must provide the Swedish Government, the SFSA  and the NDO with 
information about liquidity -supporting measures undertaken that the agency in questi on requires 
for its activities.  
Sveriges Riksbank  is also authorised to issue regulations on the terms for i ts general liquidity 
support, market -making and special liquidity facilities . 
7.1.5  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  clarifie s that Sveriges Riksbank  may also take part  in 
resolution colleges and participate  in other crisis preparation work  organised by bodies  in 
                                                 
75 See Chapter 3, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
76 See Chapter 3, Sections 6, 7, 11- 14, 17, 18 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
77 Commi ssion Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 
the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for Credit Institutions (OJ 
L 11, 17.1.2015, p. 1).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
20 Sweden or abroad78. 
7.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  requires Sveriges Riksbank  to collaborate with the SFSA and 
NDO  in order to contribute to the stability and effectiveness of the financial system79. Sveriges 
Riksbank  must consult with the SFSA and the NDO on important matters that are linked to the 
stability and efficiency of the financial system and/or that affect their respective supervisory and 
resolution activities, providing  the authority concerned with the information it needs. No 
consultation needs to take place if there are exceptional reasons , but i n such a case Sveriges 
Riksbank  must inform the SFSA or the NDO  of the matter.  
7.1.7  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  requires Sveriges Riksbank  to immediately inform the 
relevant authorities within the European Economic Area (EEA) with responsibility for group- based 
supervision if it learns of a critical situation that has arisen in Sweden and which may jeopardise 
liquidity in th e financial markets or the stability of the financial system within an EEA state80. 
7.2 Specific o bservations  
7.2.1  Article 139(2)(c) of the Treaty stipulates that the basic tasks of the ESCB as listed in Article 
127(2) of the Treaty , including the financial stability mandate referred to in Article 127(5) of the 
Treaty, shall not apply to Member States with a derogation , such  as Sweden. Nevertheless, 
Member States with a derogation are obliged under Article  131 of the Treaty to ensure that its 
national legislation is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB , in view of the 
abrogation of the derogation and the potential adoption of the euro in those Member States. 
Against this background, the broad conceptualisation of financial stabil ity and the narrow 
conceptualisation of monetary policy under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , combined with 
the prohibition on Sveriges Riksbank  seek ing and taking instructions only applying within the 
narrowly defined area of monetary policy, does not provide the legally required compatibility  with 
the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB  (see paragraph 2. 7). 
7.2.2  In addition to the ESCB’s basic tasks under Article 127(2) of the Treaty , Article 127(5) of the 
Treaty provides that the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of 
the financial system. Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB , under which the ECB may offer 
advice to and be consulted on the scope and implementation of Union legislation relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system, is contained 
within Chapter V  (entitled ‘Prudential  Supervision’)  of the Statute of the ESCB . The close links 
under Union law between financial stability and prudential supervision are also reflected in the 
provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201381. 
7.2.3  From a material perspective, the provision of liquidity is a monetary policy task at any central 
                                                 
78 See Chapter 3, Section 7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
79 See Chapter 3, Sections 15 and 16 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
80 See Chapter 3, Section 19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
81 See Article 1(1) and recitals 2, 5, 6, 13, 16, 27, 30, 42, 44, 55, 56 and 65 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
21 bank, including Sveriges Riksbank . For example, in implementing its monetary policy, the 
Eurosystem employs the following monetary policy tools: it conducts open market operations, 
offers standing facilities and requires credit institutions to hold minimum reserves on accounts 
with the Eurosystem. The set of instruments at the Eurosystem’s disposal for conducting open 
market operations aim to ensure the orderly functioning of the money market and to help banks 
meet their liquidity needs in a smooth and well -organised manner. Within the Eurosystem the 
main responsibility for the provision of emergency liquidity assistance lies at national level, with 
the NCBs conc erned. In order to ensure that emergency liquidity assistance operations do not 
interfere with the  Eurosystem’s  single monetary policy, the ECB would have to be informed or 
consulted in order to allow for a smooth sterilisation of any undesired liquidity effects and an 
assessment of any systemic implications82. 
7.2.4  The requirement that Sveriges Riksbank must inform the Swedish Cabinet Minister before 
Sveriges Riksbank approves any emergency liquidity assistance should not be understood as 
undermining the requirement that  the assistance be granted by Sveriges Riksbank independently 
and at its full discretion.  Furthermore, the ECB notes that an NCB within the ESCB is required to 
have sufficient financial resources not only to perform its ESCB -related tasks but also its national 
tasks, including the provision of ELA83. 
7.2.5  The ECB notes that Sveriges Riksbank would not be obliged to make public the financial stability 
liquidity facilities it intends to offer, and the specific conditions applicable to them, where it is 
inappropriate to do so having regard to the stability and efficiency of the financial system. The 
degree of ex ante transparency in this respect is a policy issue which Sveriges Riksbank’s 
Executive Board is best positioned to decide on.  
7.2.6  The clarification that operations conducted by other legal persons  ‘of particular importance for the 
financial infrastructure in Sweden’  should be included under Sveriges Riksbank ’s oversight (see 
paragraph 7.1. 1) is to be welcomed, considering the increasing use and importance of services  
such as Swish, a mobile payment service, and BankID, an electronic authentication service, on 
the Swedish market . 
 
8. Specific observations on d raft amendments to the Law on e xchange rate policy and the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions on exchange  rate management and foreign 
reserves  
8.1 Purpose of the draft amendments to the Law on e xchange rate p olicy and the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank’s  provisions on exchange rate managem ent and foreign reserves  
8.1.1  The Law on exchange rate policy provides that the Government shall decide on the exchange 
rate system for the Swedish krona in relation to foreign currencies. The draft law amends the Law 
                                                 
82 See paragr aph 3.1 of the ECB/Eurosystem Agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (17 May 2017), available 
on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.  
83  See paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2020/11 and paragraph 2.5 of CON/2016/55.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
22 on exchange rate policy84 by adding that, where applicable, the Government shall also decide on 
the central exchange rate and bandwidth, that Sveriges Riksbank  may request the Government 
to set a central exchange rate or bandwidth and that the Government will consult with Sveriges  
Riksbank  before it sets a central exchange rate or bandwidth. It is further stated that decisions by 
the Government as set out above must be consistent with the price stability objective set out in 
the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank85. 
8.1.2  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides  that if the Government has decided on an exchange 
rate target under the Law on exchange rate policy, Sveriges Riksbank  will apply that target 
without prejudice to the price stability objective. Sveriges Riksbank  may conduct foreign currency 
interventions for a monetary policy purpose and these must be carried out taking into account 
which exchange rate system applies. However, Sveriges Riksbank  may only issue and trade in its 
own debt instruments in Swedish kronor86. It is thus clarified that , in line with the Committee’s 
interpretation of the present situation,  Sveriges Riksbank  is not allowed to issue debt instruments 
in foreign currency87.  
8.1.3  The task of Sveriges Riksbank  to hold and manage foreign reserves is expr essly included in the 
amended Instrument of Government as one of Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibilities, with respect 
to which no authority may stipulate how Sveriges Riksbank  must decide, and Sveriges Riksbank  
may neither request nor receive instructions88. The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  sets out the 
objectives of this task, providing that Sveriges Riksbank  holds and manages the foreign reserves 
and its other assets to enable it to fulfil its tasks and generate sufficient yield to finance its 
activities. The principles governing asset management are that Sveriges Riksbank ’s assets will 
be managed taking into account Sveriges Riksbank ’s status as a central bank, in accordance with 
a low -risk strategy, taking into account the various purposes for which the assets are held. In the 
management of assets, special consideration will be given to how sustainable growt h can be 
promoted without compromising the abovementioned objectives and principles89. As noted by the 
Committee, Sveriges Riksbank ’s asset management provides a means for it  to fulfil its other 
tasks (e.g. concerning monetary policy and the financial system) and is not an objective in itself. 
From a risk management perspective, the performance of these monetary and other tasks takes  
precedence over the prescribed level of risk90. 
8.1.4  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that Sveriges Riksbank  may decide t o borrow 
foreign currency from the NDO to reinforce its  foreign currency reserve. Sveriges Riksbank  will 
fully reimburse the State’s borrowing costs, and repay loans to the NDO when there is no longer 
a need for them. Sveriges Riksbank  will consult the NDO before deciding to borrow  and may  
                                                 
84 Proposed law amending Lagen (1998:1404) om valutapolitik , p. 221.  
85 See Chapter 2, Section 1, first paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
86 See Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4, third paragraph and Chapter 10, Section 5, second paragraph of the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank.  
87 See Chapter 18.2.1 and Chapter 30.4 of the Report.  
88 See the amendment to Chapter 9, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government.  
89 See Chapter 9, Sections 1- 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
90 See Report, p. 1835.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
23 borrow foreign currency that, including previous borrowing, corresponds to,  at most , 5% of 
Sweden’s GDP  for the previous year in order to reinforce foreign currency reserves in advance. If 
there are exceptional reasons  for doing so, Sveriges Riksbank  may decide to temporarily borrow 
foreign currency for advance reinforcement of the foreign reserves beyond the 5% GDP limit. 
Sveriges Riksbank  must explain the reasons for such advance reinforcement of the foreign 
reserves to the Parliament’s Committee on Finance as soon as possible91. According to the 
Committee, exceptional reasons justifying such additional borrowing refer to clear sign s of 
elevated concern in the financial markets, an increased risk of Sw edish banks potentially being 
exposed to serious liquidity stress in foreign currency or other circumstances that  make further 
enforcement of the foreign reserves clearly necessary to co unteract a serious disturbance in the 
Swedish financial system92. If Sveriges Riksbank ’s total outstanding foreign currency loans from 
the NDO on 1 January 2023 exceed the 5% GDP limit and the conditions for borrowing beyond 
the 5% GDP limit are not met, Sveriges Riksbank  must repay the loans as they fall due until the 
loan balance falls within the 5% GDP cap93. 
8.1.5  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that Sveriges Riksbank  may also decide to borrow 
foreign currency to replenish the foreign reserves if they have been us ed in Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
provision of general liquidity assistance, market -making and emergency liquidity assistance. The 
portion of the foreign reserves that has  not been funded with loans from the NDO will be 
replenished up to its previous level with th e borrowed funds. The 5% G DP limit does not apply in 
the event of such a replenishment.  
8.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that Sveriges Riksbank  may also buy foreign 
currency in order to be able to finance its  provision of general liquidity assis tance, market -making 
and emergency liquidity assistance for financial stability purposes, either immediately or at a later 
date. Foreign currency that has been bought for this purpose may be sold if appropriate94. 
8.2 Specific  observations   
8.2.1  As previously noted by the ECB, it is relatively unusual within the ESCB for an NCB to strengthen 
its foreign reserve assets by borrowing from its national debt office or government. Insofar as 
such borrowings are financed by debt issuances in the internat ional capital markets by the NDO , 
on behalf of the State, the ECB fully understands the Government’s desire to impose limitations 
on Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to increase its foreign reserves by these  particular means. It would 
not seem realistic for Sve riges Riksbank  to rely exclusively on the NDO  to meet its  foreign 
currency needs in a financial crisis situation, taking account of the availability and cost of funding 
in such situations, as well as the time period within which the NDO  would be able to borrow the 
necessary amounts of foreign currency on the market95. Thus , Sveriges Riskbank needs to be 
able to increase its foreign reserves in any way it considers necessary  in pursuance of its 
                                                 
91 See Chapter 10, Sections 1- 3 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
92 See Report, pp. 1840- 1841.  
93 See Chapter 13, Section 8, point 10 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
94 See Chapter 10, Section 5, first paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
95 See paragraph 3.4.5 of Opini on CON/2017/17.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
24 independently formulated monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity  policies.  
8.2.2  So far as arrangements with foreign central banks  are concerned, as previously noted by the 
ECB, the provision of euro liquidity pursuant to currency swap arrangements between Sveriges 
Riksbank  and the ECB is not available on an unconditional basis96. 
8.2.3  As previously noted by the ECB, central bank independence requirements under Article 130 of 
the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB  require that Sveriges Riksbank  must be able 
to autonom ously avail itself of sufficient financial resources to fulfil its monetary and foreign 
exchange policy mandates and finance its own operations. A Member State may not put its NCB 
in a position where it has insufficient financial resources to carry out its  monetary and exchange 
rate policy tasks, as well as its national tasks. Sveriges Riksbank  is best placed to independently 
assess what level of foreign reserves is necessary to enable it to perform its tasks. The ECB is 
particularly concerned that , under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges Riksbank  may 
only build up its foreign reserves for financial stability purposes. The constraints under the draft 
law on Sveriges Riksbank  on Sveriges Riksbank ’s ability to increase its foreign reserves 
whenever necessary , through appropriate means,  in pursuit of its independently formulated 
monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies clearly encroach on Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
independence under the Treaty and Statute of the ESCB  in the performance of its basic  
monetary, foreign exchange and liquidity policies97. 
8.2.4  Consistent with previous observations made by the ECB regarding the powers of the Swedish 
Government and Sveriges Riksbank in the area of exchange rate policy98, the draft amendments 
to the Law on exchange rate policy and the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank’s  provisions on 
exchange  rate management and foreign reserves do not recognise the Council’s and the ECB’s 
powers in the area of exchange rate policy and the management of foreign reserves  in the e vent 
of the abrogation of Sweden’s derogation.  
8.2.5  The ECB notes that the draft amendments to the Law on exchange rate policy would provide a 
legal basis for any possible future decision by Sweden to enter the exchange rate mechanism in 
Stage Three of Economic  and Monetary Union (ERM II)99. 
 
9. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on cash  
9.1 Purpose of the provisions on cash in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
9.1.1  According to the Committee, Sweden is probably the country in the world where the use of cash 
has decreased the fastest during the last decade and where the proportion of cash payments in 
comparison with electronic payments is the lowest100. However, accordi ng to the Committee, 
cash still has a special position as it is the only means of payment that can be used to settle a 
                                                 
96 See paragraph 3.4.4 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
97 See paragraphs 3.4.3 and 3.4.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
98 See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 206.  
99 See Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange- rate mechanism in the third stage of 
economic and monetary union Amsterdam, 16 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 5).  
100 See Report, p. 1579.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
25 debt immediately and finally without intermediaries. It is the physical form of cash that allows this 
as there is no need for accounts or  clearing. It is also easier to use cash than some electronic 
means of payment, particularly for the disabled. Cash may be the only means of payment 
available to people who have no access to bank services. The physical form of cash means it can 
also be transported and kept in many different places and can be used even when there is no 
electricity or access to electronic communication. These characteristics and its high level of 
protection against counterfeiting give cash some advantages over electronic means of payment 
from a contingency planning point of view. The fact that cash is not traceable, in other words a 
cash payment is anonymous and cannot be traced to a particular person, is , according to the 
Committee,  an advantage f rom the privacy  and data protection perspectives . Finally, the 
Committee states that the possibility to convert private bank money (claims on a bank) into risk -
free central bank money with legal tender status (at present cash) can be important for 
confidence in the monet ary system as a whole.  At present,  however,  it is not clear who is 
responsible for ensuring that cash management and the related cash infrastructure is functioning 
properly in Sweden. There is no authority with specific overall responsibility for cash 
management. Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibility for the various parts of the cash chain under the  
Law on Sveriges  Riksbank has been interpreted in different ways over the years. The Committee 
therefore believes that responsibilities for the cash chain should be clarified and defined in law101. 
9.1.2  Against this backdrop and for the purpose of strengthening the position of cash as a means of 
payment  and store of value accessible for all groups of the population,  and emphasising that the 
State should work to ensure conti nued access to cash services so that the public’s and society’s 
need for cash are met102, the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank provides that the objective of  
Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities concerning cash is to contribute to the availability of cash to a 
satisfactory extent throughout Sweden103. According to the Committee, the word ‘contribute’ was 
chosen in order  to clarify that , in addition to Sveriges Riksbank,  other actors , such as banks and 
the State104,  also affect the availability of  cash in society105, even though Sveriges Riksbank , by 
issuing and redeeming banknotes and coins , is the first and last component in the cash chain106. 
To ‘contribute’ means that Sveriges Riksbank , when performing its tasks regarding cash, needs 
to analyse and take into account how cash handling and access to cash is affected and how 
Sveriges Riksbank  contributes to the maint enance of the cash chain in the whole of Sweden107. 
According to the Committ ee108, the objective of Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities concerning cash is 
closely connected to the proposed legislation on the requirements for certain credit institutions to 
provide cash services to an adequate extent in the whole of Sweden, on which the EC B issued 
                                                 
101 See Chapter 34.1, 34.4.1 and 34.4.4 of the Report.  
102 See Chapter 34.1 and 34.3 (in particular pp. 1543- 1544) of the Report.  
103 See Chapter 4, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
104 See Report, p. 1545.  
105 See Report, p. 1769.  
106 See Report, p. 1546.  
107 See Report, p. 1524.  
108 See Report, pp. 1543- 1544.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
26 an own- initiative opinion on 26 November 2019109. 
9.1.3  According to the Law on Sveriges Riksbank110, banknotes and coins issued by Sveriges 
Riksbank  are legal tender . This has been interpreted in court practice as being mandatory in most 
legal relationships governed predominantly by public law (e.g. legal relationships concerning 
medical care)111. The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank112 provides  that everyone has the right to 
discharge an obligation by paying with banknotes and coins issued by Sveriges Riksbank  (legal 
tender), unless otherwise provided by another statute or by the terms of a contract.  
9.1.4  In addition, under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank, Sveriges Riksbank  is, as is currently the 
case113, responsible for issuing and redeeming banknotes  and coins in kronor  that have legal 
tender status , but will be assigned overall responsibility for cash handling.  Further more, Sveriges 
Riksbank  may, as  is currently the case114, redeem banknotes and coins that have ceased to be 
legal tender. The draft law clarifies  that Sveriges Riksbank  is responsible for running depots, 
which are physical locations for the storage,  release and delivery of cash. Unless otherwise 
decided by the Parliament, there must be at least five depots in Sweden at which companies 
approved by Sveriges Riksbank  may collect and deliver banknotes of all denominations. At least 
two of these depots must be in northern parts of Sweden. Sveriges Riksbank  may carry out these 
activities through outsourcing in collaboration with another entity115. Although cash handling is 
currently performed by a private company , as agent and on behalf of Sveriges Riksbank , and the 
depots are run by private actors that  have entered into cash supply agreements with Sveriges 
Riksbank , it is still Sveriges Riksbank  that is  currently responsible for ensuring that the ir 
performance is in line with the objective set out in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank116. Sveriges 
Riksbank  may also issue emergency currency in a heightened state of emergency117. 
9.1.5  Sveriges Riksbank  may only issue or circulate electronic money  under the Law on electronic 
money118, which implement s Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council119, or otherwise provide means of payment intended for the public other than banknotes 
and coins o r emergency currenc y if the Parliament has approved this120. 
                                                 
109 See Opinion CON/2019/41.  
110 See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Law  on Sverige Riksbank.  
111 See Report, p. 1582.  
112 See Chapter 4, Section 15 of the draft Law on Sverige Riksbank.  
113 See Chapter 5, Section 3 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
114 See Chapter 5, Section 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
115 See Chapter 4, Sections  3-7 and 15 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
116 See p. 1547 and Chapter 34.4.3 of the Report and Section 29 of Riksbankens föreskrifter om kontantförsörjning 
(RBFS 2013:2)  (Sveriges Riksbank’s provisions on cash supply).  
117 See Chapter 4, Sections 3- 6, 10 and 15 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
118 See Chapter 4, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
119 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, 
pursuit and prudential supervi sion of the business of electronic money institutions, amending Directives 2005/60/EC 
and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).  
120 See Chapter 4, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
27 9.2 Specific  observations  
9.2.1  As previously noted by the ECB121, although electronic payment instruments are increasingly 
used as the preferred method of payment in Sweden, and the use of cash is declining, cash in 
general is still an established means of payment providing for immediate settlement of debts and 
direct control over the payer’s spending.  Furthermore, the ability to pay in cash remains 
particularly important for cert ain groups in society that, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to 
use cash rather than other means of payment, or who are unable to use digital technology. 
Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by 
allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way122. Further more, the number of 
krona banknotes in circulation in Sweden has increased since 2017 and while the rate of identity 
theft and card fraud continues to rise with the increasing number of transactions , it is still among 
the lowest in Europe123. The ECB notes that cash could play an important role in the event of a 
disturbance in the payment systems, even though cash machines and other service points may 
also be affected as these are dependent on interaction with the account holding institutions.  
9.2.2  Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the 
field of electronic payment instruments, the ECB also welcomes the objective of the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank’s  provisions on cash to facilitate the continued use of cash in Swedish society 
by ensuring an adequate level of access to cash services throughout Sweden124. However, the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank seems to undermine the legal tender status of kronor banknotes 
and coins in Sweden. A s noted in paragraph 9.1.3 , the provisions in the Law on Sveriges 
Riksbank regarding the status of banknotes and coins as legal tender have  been interpreted in 
court practice as being mandatory in most legal relationships governed predominantly by public 
law, e.g. legal relationships concerning medical  care.  However , the Committee is of the opinion 
that the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank should allow freedom of contract even in legal 
relationships governed predominantly by public law125. Consistent with this , the draft l aw on 
Sveriges Riksbank  seems to impair the status of banknotes and coins as legal tender in 
comparison with what is currently the situation.  It seems inconsistent to seek to ensure that, on 
the one hand, cash is available to a satisfactory extent through out Sweden, and, on the other 
hand, to undermine the legal tender status of cash by  weakening the right to pay with banknotes 
and coins in a public law context. It is therefore strongly suggested, at a minimum, to preserve 
the existing legal tender status of cash in Sweden.   
9.2.3  The ECB considers it important that all Member States, including non- euro area Member States, 
take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their 
                                                 
121 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41.  
122 Prop. 2019/20:23 om skyldighet för kreditinstitut att tillhandahålla kontanttjänster (Legislative proposal (2019/20:23) 
on the requirement for credit institutions to provide cash services), p. 31. See Opinions CON/2017/8, CON 2017/40 
and CON/2019/4.  
123 See Sveriges Riksbank’s report Payments in Sweden  of 7 November 2019, p. 24, available at 
https://www.riksbank.se/payments -in-sweden- 2019 , and Sveriges Riksbank’s statistics  on notes and coins, available 
at https://www.riksbank.se/en- gb/statistics/payments -notes -and-coins/notes -and-coins/ . 
124 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2019/41.  
125 See Report, p. 1582.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
28 territories provide adequate access to cash s ervices, in order to facilitate the continued use of 
cash126.  
9.2.4  With reference to paragraph 9.1.5, the ECB understands that the provision in the draft l aw on 
Sveriges Riksbank regarding Sveriges Riksbank  issuing or circulating electronic money  or 
otherwise provid ing means of payment intended for the public other than banknotes and coins or 
emergency currency , establishes a duty for Sveriges Riksbank  to seek the Parliament’s approval 
before issuing ( 1) electronic money within the meaning of Directive 2009/110/EC , and ( 2) any 
form of central bank digital currency.  
9.2.5  Regarding electronic money , under Article 1 (1)(d) of Directive 2009/110/EC Member States are 
required to recognise NCBs of the ESCB , including Sveriges Riksbank , as eligible issuers of 
electronic money, provided that, in issuing electronic money, the latter are not acting in their 
capacity as monetary or other public authorities. To the extent that, as an issuer of electronic 
money, Sveriges Riksbank  would not be acting in its capacity as Sweden’s monetary authority, it 
would seem that Sveriges Riksbank  would not be required under the Directive to seek the 
consent of the Parliament for its  possible issuance of electronic money.  
9.2.6  Regarding Sveriges Riksbank ’s possibl e future issuance of means of payment intended for the 
public other than banknotes and coins , the ECB notes that discussions regarding the possible 
issuance of central bank  digital currency are ongoing . Insofar as these discussions might evolve 
in a direction whereby central bank digital currency  is equated with cash, and insofar as Sveriges 
Riksbank  is responsible for issuing cash in Sweden by issuing and redeeming banknotes and 
coins denominated in kr onor, the legislator m ay wish to consider whether the consent of the 
Parliament for Sveriges Riksbank ’s possible issuance of central bank digital currency  would 
necessarily be required in all circumstances. This is especially the case so long as central ba nk 
digital currency  does  not enjoy  legal tender status in Sweden,  and would merely be offered as an 
alternative to krona banknotes and coins, without affecting access to cash and deposit facilities 
for the general public and businesses. That said, it is appreciated that these discussions are still 
ongoing, and that it m ay therefore be necessary to revisit these issues as discussions unfold.  
 
10. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on c rises and 
heightened states of emergency  
10.1 Purpose of the provisions on crisis and heightened states of emergency  in the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank  
10.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides127 that the objective of Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
activities regarding crisis and heightened states of emergency are to enable the public to make 
necessary payments (which, according to the Committee, including payments for , e.g., food, 
accommodation, medicine and fuel128) during peacetime crises and heightened states of 
                                                 
126 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41.  
127 See Chapter 5, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
128 See Report, p. 1803.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
29 emergency , to ensure that Sveriges Riksbank  has a good capability to handle its tasks even 
under these circumstances and to limit vulnerability concerning payments.  
10.1.2  Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges Riksbank  will be responsible for planning for 
peacetim e crisis situations and heightened states of emergency as regards its own activity. 
Sveriges Riksbank  will also have a planning and control responsibility in relation to legal entities 
and economic operators within the domain of cash handling services and the performance of 
electronic payments. Sveriges Riksbank  is required to plan and undertake preparations to handle 
peacetime crises, and in a heightened state of emergency to first focus on tasks that are 
significant for defence purposes . Sveriges Riksbank  must ensure that the relevant personnel both 
at Sveriges Riksbank  and at relevant legal entities and economic operators undergo the 
necessary training and exercises129. 
10.1.3  Neither the General Council nor the Executive Board of Sveriges Ri ksbank  may meet in an area 
occupied by a foreign power. Provision is also made for the wartime deployment of the personnel 
of Sveriges Riksbank  and relevant legal entities and economic operators130. 
10.1.4  Sveriges Riksbank  is required to consult the SFSA  on its ac tivity regarding crises and heightened 
states of emergency , and to keep the Swedish Government and the NDO informed in the event of 
a heightened state of emergency or of  serious disruptions to payments during peacetime crisis 
situations . In a heightened state of emergency Sveriges Riksbank  must provide the Swedish 
armed forces with the documents necessary for the armed forces to be able to keep the Swedish 
Government informed131. 
10.2 Specific  observations  
10.2.1  It should be clarified that Sveriges Riksbank  will achieve its objectives relating to its activities 
concerning crises and heightened states of emergency without neglecting its main objective of  
maintain ing price stability.  
10.2.2  The ECB notes that, in adopting the euro,  a Member State irreversibly  transfers to the Union 
monetary policy , payment system  and other powers enumerated in the Treaty and the Statute of 
the ESCB  with regard to ESCB tasks132. In these fields certain policymaking and legislative 
powers, including contingency planning with respect to the continued performance of these tasks, 
belong exclusively, under Articles 8 and 12 of the Statute of the ESCB , to the decision- making 
bodies of  the ECB133. As previously  noted by the ECB, pursuant to the principle of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, these  Member States should 
refrain from taking any measures that  could jeopardise the ECB’s or the ESCB’s object ives134. 
Article 347 of the Treaty envisages that a Member State may be called upon to take action in the 
                                                 
129 See Chapter 5, Sections 2- 9, 15 and 16 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
130 See Chapter 5, Sections 10- 13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
131 See Chapter 5, Sections 17- 19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
132 See Article 3(1)(c) of the Treaty.  
133 See paragraph 9 of Opinion CON/2002/27, paragraph 8 of Opinion CON/2006/6, paragraph 2.1 of 
Opinion CON/2014/24, and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
134 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2018/46 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
30 event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, war, serious 
international tension constituting a threat of war, or i n order to carry out obligations it has 
accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security. Accordingly, in the 
event of emergency conditions under Article 347, national authorities may be justified in 
exercising, on a temporary basis , powers that fall within the exclusive competence of the 
ESCB135. Any reliance on Article 347 of the Treaty must take place strictly under conditions laid 
down in the Treaty itself, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)136. 
10.3 New task of Sveriges Riksbank  
10.3.1  Responsibi lity for planning for peacetime crisis situations and heightened states of emergency as 
regards its own activit ies is not a new task of Sveriges Riksbank137. However, the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank  also tasks it with  planning and control responsibility in relation to legal entities 
and economic operators within the domain of cash handling services and the performance of 
electronic payments  (the ‘crisis preparedness task  for cash handling and electronic payment 
services ’), which does  not exist  in the Law on Sveriges Riksbank . Currently, Sveriges Riksbank  is 
only responsible for crisis preparedness as concerns its own activities, and not in respect of any 
financial companies138. 
10.3.2  The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of new tasks on an NCB in the ESCB must be 
assessed against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty139. For the 
purposes of that prohibition, Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 defines ‘other type 
of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third 
parties’.  
10.3.3  The monetary financing prohibition aims to encourage the Member States to follow a sound 
budgetary policy  and not to allow the monetary financing of public deficits or privileged access by 
public authorities to the financial markets to lead to excessively high levels of debt or excessive 
Member State deficits140. Therefore, the task of financing measures, which are normally the 
responsibility of the Member States, and which are financed from their budgetary sources rather 
                                                 
135 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/24 and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
136 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 1968, Salgoil v Ministero del commercio con l’esturo, C -13/68, 
ECLI:EU:C:1968:54; judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 May 1981, Commission v UK , C-804/79, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:93; paragraph 13 of Opinion CON/2006/6; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/2; Gilsdorfer and 
Brandtner, ‘Vorbem. zu den Artikeln 296 bis 298 EG’, No 3- 5, in Bardenhewer -Rating, Grill, Jakob and Woelker 
(eds.), EG- und EU -Kommentar , 6th ed. (2004), p. 1534; Zilioli, C., ‘National Emergency Powers and Exclusive 
Community Competences –  A Crack in the Dam?’ Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks, ECB, 
2005, pp. 115- 133, at pp. 131- 132. 
137 See Chapter 9, Section 7 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank  and Chapter 35.3.3 of the Report. Sveriges Riksbank 
will also voluntarily coordinate the planning initiated together with the other involved authorities within the financial 
services sector regarding the reinforcement of the total defence capacity in Sweden, see https://www.riksbank.se/en-
gb/payments --cash/payments -in-sweden/payments -in-sweden- 2019/the- riksbank -is-adapting- to-the-digital -
world/strengthened- preparedness- in-the-financial -sector/swedens -total-defence- has-been- resumed/ , as well as 
participate in a total defence exercise during 2020, https://www.riksbank.se/en- gb/payments --cash/payments -in-
sweden/payments -in-sweden- 2019/the- riksbank -is-adapting- to-the-digital -world/strengthened- preparedness -in-the-
financial -sector/the- riksbank -to-participate- in-total-defence- exercise- 2020/ . 
138 See Report, p. 1598.  
139 See paragraph 3.1.4 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
140 See, to that effect, judgments of the Court of Justice of 1 October 2015, Bara and Others , C-201/14, EU:C:2015:658, 
paragraph 22, and of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others , C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 100.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
31 than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To decide what constitutes financing of the  
public sector’s obligations vis -à-vis third parties, which can be translated as the provision of 
central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a 
case -by-case basis, an assessment of whether the task to be undertaken by an NCB is a central 
bank task or a government task, i.e. a task within the responsibility of the Member States. In other 
words, adequate safeguards must be in place to ensure that circumventions of the objective of 
the monetary financing pro hibition of maintaining a sound budgetary policy of Member States do 
not take place141. 
10.3.4  As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 
Article 35.6 of the Statute of the ESCB , to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down by 
the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for 
determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector obligation within the 
meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(i i) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes a 
government task . These are as set out below142. 
First, central bank tasks relate, in particular , to tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs 
under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB . These tasks are mainly defined in Article 127(2), 
(5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 and Article 25.1 of the Statute of 
the ESCB.  
Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB  allows NCBs to perform other functions, new 
tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the 
NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which 
are atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of, and in the exclusive 
interest of , the government or of other public sector entities should be considered government 
tasks.  
Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being 
clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public 
sector entities is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and per sonal independence 
of that NCB.  
In particular, the following aspect s should be taken into account:  
(1)  Whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central 
bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement 
those tasks. If a conflict of interest arises bet ween existing and new tasks, sufficient 
safeguards to mitigate that conflict should be in place. The complementarity between a 
new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so as to 
lead to the creation of an indefinite chain of ancillary tasks. Such complementarity should 
be examined in relation t o the financing of those tasks . 
(2)  Whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is 
                                                 
141 See paragraph 3.1.5 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
142 See paragraph 3.1.6 of Opinion CON/2020/2.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
32 disproportionately burdensome in view of the NCB’s financial or org anisational capacity, 
and may have a negative impact on its  capacity to properly perform  existing central bank 
tasks . 
(3)  Whether performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of the NCB in the 
light of central bank independence and accou ntability considerations . 
(4)  Whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks . 
(5)  Whether performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision- making 
bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on their 
personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in 
Article  14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 
10.3.5  Based on the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s new task is in line with the prohibition of monetary financing.  
Tasks related to those conferred upon the ECB and NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the 
ESCB  
The ECB understands that the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment 
services  is closely linked to the central banking tasks of issuing banknotes under Article 128(1) of 
the Treaty and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems under  the second indent of  
Article 127(2) of the Treaty.  Sveriges Riksbank ’s crisis preparedness task for cash handling and 
electronic payment services is therefore related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and NCBs 
by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB.  
Task which are atypical of NCB tasks  
As the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment services is closely 
linked to the central banking tasks set out above, it is not to be considered a task that is atypical 
of NCB tasks.  
Tasks clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the G overnment  
As the performance of  Sveriges Riksbank’s  crisis preparedness task for cash handling and 
electronic payment services is closely linked to the performance of its central banking tasks , the 
crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment services cannot be considered 
to be discharged  on behalf of or in the exclusive interest of the G overnment.  
Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflict s of interest with existing central 
bank tasks  
The performance of the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment 
services would be unlikely to give rise to any conflicts of interests with Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
existing central bank tasks . Rather, it could be seen as complementing the performance of some 
of those tasks.  
Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to Sveriges Riksbank’s  financial 
or organisational capacity  
ECB -PUBLIC  
33 As previously noted by the ECB143, the principle of financial independence requires that Member 
States may not put their NCBs in a position where they have insufficient resources to carry out 
both their ESCB -related tasks and their national tasks, from an operational and financial 
perspective. Furthermore, when allocating specific new tasks to NCBs, each NCB concerned 
should have sufficient financial and human resources at its disposal to ensure that the tasks can 
be carried out without impacting on the NCB’s financial or operational capacity to perform its 
ESCB tasks. In order to ensure that Sveriges Riksbank ’s capacity to perform its ESCB -related 
tasks is not impaired, Sveriges Riksbank  must, therefore, be in a position to avail itself of the 
necessary resources to carry out its duties under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank . According 
to the Committee144, the effects of Sveriges Riksbank ’s greater responsibility for preparedness 
regarding payments during crises and in wartime, i.e. the crisis preparedness task for cash 
handling and electronic payment services, on the overall public sector finances  amounts to 
roughly  15 to 20 full-time employees  (amounting to increased costs of approximately SEK 19 to 
25 million per year) as from 2023 , and means that significantly more resources will be required in 
this area in a few years’ time.  It is suggested that these estimates be evaluated by Sveriges 
Riksbank.  
Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set -up of Sveriges Riksbank , 
in the light of central bank independence and accountability  considerations  
The ECB considers that the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic payment 
services is unlikely to be in conflict with the institutional set -up of Sveriges Riksbank  as Sveriges 
Riksbank  is alread y responsible for issuing banknotes and promoting the smooth operation of 
payment systems, to which  this crisis preparedness task is  closely linked.  
Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  
The ECB understands that the general principles on State liability ar e applicable to Sveriges 
Riksbank , in its capacity as a public authority under the Swedish Parliament. In this respect, 
under the Law on tort liability the State or a municipality  shall compensate145: (1) personal injury , 
property loss and pure economic loss  caused through wrongful or negligent exercise of public 
authority146 within operations  for whose performance the State or a  municipality is responsible;  
(2) pure economic loss caused by a  public  authority , through the commission of a wrong or 
through negligence,  providing  incorrect information or advi ce, if there are special reasons 
considering the circumstances147; (3) personal injury , property loss, pure economic loss , loss 
other than that set out under (2) above,  if arising due to the victim’s rights in accordance with the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms being  
                                                 
143 See, e.g., paragraph 4.6 of Opinion CON/2018/21.  
144 See Chapter 38.4.3 and p. 1745 of the Report.  
145 Skadeståndslagen (1972:207) , Chapter 3, Sections 2- 4. 
146 I.e. decisions and actions which constitutes expressions of society’s power to decide over its citizens’ rights and 
obligations or otherwise grant benefits only a public authority may grant.  
147 In accordance with Chapter 3, Section 3 of the Law on tort liability, in determining whether there are special reasons 
considering the circumstances, especially the nature of the information or advice, the connection between the 
information and advice and the  relevant public authority’s areas of operations and the circumstances at hand when 
the information or advice was offered shall be taken into account.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
34 infringed by the State or a  municipality ; and (4)  other  intangible loss caused by such infringement . 
In each specific case the relevant public authority  must pay compensation in respect of  any loss 
or damage caused by it148. Thus, the ECB understands that Sveriges Riksbank  will harbour  
substantial financial risks to the extent that it is liable for the performance of all its tasks, 
including, in this particular context,  the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic 
payment services.  
Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes members of the decision- making 
bodies of Sveriges Riksbank  to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal 
independence  
The ECB does not consider that the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and electronic 
payment services would expose the member s of the decision- making bodies of Sveriges  
Riksbank  to disproportionate political risks or that it would impact on their personal 
independence.  
Conclusion  
The ECB considers that, given the link to the ESCB tasks of issuing banknotes and promoting the 
smooth operations of payment systems, the crisis preparedness task for cash handling and 
electronic payment services is a central banking task. As such, its financing by Sveriges 
Riksbank  is in compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the 
Treaty.  
 
11. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on i nternational 
activities  
11.1 Purpose of the provisions on international activities in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
11.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  clarifies that Sveriges Riksbank  may act as a liaison body in 
relation to international financial institutions of which Sweden is a member.  Sveriges Riksbank  
may grant credit to international financial institutions of which Sweden is a member and make 
agreements on long- term international financial commitments, if the Parliament so approves149. 
11.1.2  Sveriges Riksbank  must ensure that the Government regularly receives information about events 
of significance to the international work in which  Sveriges Riksbank  participates . In respect of  
decision s on important matters of principle in international contexts that are linked to the activities 
of other public authorities, Sveriges Riksbank  must consult with such other authorities . Sveriges 
Riksbank  shall base its international work on statements  that the Parliament or the Government 
has made about Sweden’s general stance150. As statements about Sweden’s general stance are 
meant to affect the society at large and not constitute instructions to specific authorities or 
concern a certain negotiation or inter national organisation, the intention of this obligation of 
Sveriges Riksbank  is that it is to  operate , on a general level , in the same direction as the State at 
                                                 
148 Förordning (1975:1345) med instruktion för Justitiekanslern, Section 2a.  
149 See Chapter 6, Sections 1 and 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
150 See Chapter 6, Sections 11- 13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
35 large151. If Sveriges Riksbank  chooses  to not pursue a position which i s in line with the general 
stance of Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank  should be able to explain to the Parliament’s Committee 
on Finance the circumstances leading to this position152. 
11.1.3  Regarding the financing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  in particular , the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank  provides that153 Sveriges Riksbank  may be a financial counterparty to the 
IMF. Sveriges Riksbank  may make capital contributions from its own funds to the IMF , if the 
Parliament approves  this. Sveriges Riksbank  may acquire the special drawing rights resulting 
from Sweden's participation in the IMF  and must fulfil the obligations resulting from Sweden's 
participation  in this system. Sveriges Riksbank  may decide to provide credits or other funding of 
the IMF’s activities if the funding has been approved by the Parliament . Regarding the financing 
of the IMF’s activities for low  income countries, Sveriges Riksbank  may decide to provide credits 
or other financing when informed by the Government that the Parliament has approved this.  This 
provision is new, as at present it is Sveriges Riksbank  that submits  a petition to the Parliament t o 
be allowed to participate as concerns both the IMF’s financing directed towards low  income 
States and other financings . According to the Committee, Swedish standpoints in the IMF should 
be developed in cooperation between the Government and Sveriges Riksbank , as they are at 
present. However, since it is Sweden, as a country, that is a member of the IMF, the Committee’s 
assessment is that, ultimately, it is the Government that decides what position Sweden should 
adopt . The exception to this is in matters concerning monetary policy or other E SCB-related 
questions154. 
11.1.4  In connection with the transfer of funds from Sveriges Riksbank  to the IMF when making capital 
contributions  from its own funds to the IMF or providing credits or other funding of the IMF’s  
activities, Sveriges Riksbank  must borrow a corresponding sum from the NDO , and will 
remunerate the NDO  at the interest rate corr esponding to the interest payment received by 
Sveriges Riksbank  from the IMF . Capital amounts that Sveriges Riksbank  receives back from the 
IMF must be returned to the NDO155. 
11.2 Specific observations  
11.2.1  The tasks performed by Sveriges Riksbank  must comply with the monetary financing prohibition 
under Article 123 of the Treaty . As previously noted by the ECB, national legislation providing for 
the financing by an  NCB of a Member State’s financial commitments to international financial 
institutions other than the IMF in the capacities provided for in Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 is 
incompatible with the monetary financing prohibition156. As previously noted by the EMI, the 
Swedish Government’s assumption of all responsibilities resulting from Sweden’s membership in 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) was necessary to 
                                                 
151 See Chapter 26.9.5 of the Report.  
152 See Chapter 26.9.5 of the Report.  
153 See Chapter 6, Sections 3- 8 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
154 See Chapter 27.9.2 of the Report.  
155 See Chapter 6, Sections 7 and 8 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
156 See Convergence Report, May 2018.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
36 ensure that Sveriges Riksbank ’s statute was compatible with the prohibition of central bank 
financing of public sector obligations vis -à-vis third parties specified in Article  1(1)(b)(ii) of 
Regulation (EC) No 3603/93157. Against this backdrop, it is suggested to clarify that Sveriges 
Riksb ank may only grant credit to international financial institutions of which Sweden is a member 
and make agreements on long- term international financial commitments to the extent compatib le 
with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the Treaty.   
11.2.2  Regarding Sveriges Riksbank ’s financing of Sweden’s obligations vis -à-vis the IMF , this is subject 
to an exemption from the monetary financing prohibition laid dow n in Regulation (EC) 
No 3603/93. In particular, Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 provides that the financing by 
NCB s of obligations falling upon the public sector in relation to the IMF are not regarded as a 
credit facility within the meaning of Article 123 of the Treaty. Recital 14 of Regulation (EC) No 
3603/93 clarifies the rationale behind this exemption, stating that it is appropriate to authorise the 
financing by the central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector in relation to the IMF 
because such financing ‘results in foreign claims which have all the characteris tics of reserve 
assets’.  The exemption laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 must be interpreted 
in line with this rationale. IMF-related financings  that do not result in claims that have the 
characteristics of reserve assets within the meaning of recital 14 of Regulation (EU) No 3603/93 
are therefore a form of monetary financing prohibited by Article 123(1) of the Treaty158. Reserve 
assets have been defined for this purpose as those external assets that are readily available to 
and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for 
interventions in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related 
purposes, such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a 
basis for foreign borrowing. Under this definition,  reserve assets must be foreign currency assets 
and, other than gold bullion, must be claims on non- residents159. Against this backdrop, the ECB 
recommends clarify ing that Sveriges Riksbank ’s financing of Sweden’s obligation in relation to 
the IMF is subject to compliance with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 of the 
Treaty.  
11.2.3  Regarding Sveriges Riksbank’s  obligation to base its international work on statements made by 
the Government or the Parliament about Sweden’s general stance described in paragraph 11.1.2, 
the ECB emphasises that, in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty, a n NCB must not be 
limited in terms of its ability to perform its ESCB- related tasks independently.  The 
abovementioned obligation of Sveriges Riksbank  entails a risk of the Parliament influencing 
Sveriges Riksbank  in a way that is not compatible with Article 130 of the Tr eaty. Therefore, the 
ECB suggests setting out t he obligation in the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  without prejudice to 
Sveriges Riksbank’s  independence under the Treaty . 
 
                                                 
157 See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/1995/8.  
158 See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Opinion CON/2016/21.  
159 See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/4 (citing International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position Manual (Sixth ed., 2009), pp. 111- 18). 
ECB -PUBLIC  
37 12. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: o ther provisions regarding 
reporting, statistics and the provision of benchmarks  
12.1 Purpose of the provisions regarding r eporting, statistics and the provision of benchmarks  in the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  
12.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank160 provides that, at the request of Sveriges Riksbank , 
financial companies that conduct operations in Sweden are obliged to provide it with the 
information necessary to enable it to ful fil its tasks under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank . This 
means that the group of com panies obliged to report information to Sveriges Riksbank  has been 
expanded slightly compared with the present regulations to enable Sveriges Riksbank  to carry 
out all its tasks under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank . 
12.1.2  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank161 provides that Sveriges Riksbank  is responsible for 
producing and publishing balance- of-payment statistics, statistics on the international investment 
position and financial market statis tics. An express provision is introduced concerning the right of 
Sveriges Riksbank  to produce and disseminate statistical information required for collab oration in 
the ESCB , the Bank for International Settlements ( BIS), the IMF or other international 
organisations . 
12.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank162 provides that Sveri ges Riksbank  may provide and publish 
interest rate benchmarks and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council163. 
12.2 Specific o bservations  
12.2.1  Interest rate benchmarks are important for the functioning of financial markets and the 
transmission of monetary policy164. The ECB understands that the Stockholm Interbank Offered 
Rate (STIBOR) has , up until now , been provided by the Swedish STIBOR banks, and that 
Financial Benchmarks Sweden AB, a Swedish subsidiary of the Swedish Banking Association, 
has been responsible for administering STIBOR, whilst Nasdaq Stockholm AB is responsible for 
publishing STIBOR every business day at 11:00. The ECB notes that  the common framework to 
ensure the accuracy and integrity of indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and 
financial contracts under Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 does not  apply to central banks165, as 
centr al banks already apply  principles, standards and procedures which ensure that they exercise 
their activities with integrity and in an independent manner166. Accordingly, if Sveriges Riksbank  
were to decide to provide and publish reference interest rates and other benchmarks under the 
                                                 
160 See Chapter 7, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.1.2 of the Report.  
161 See Chapter 7, Section 5 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.1.3 of the Report.  
162 Chapter 7, Section 6 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. See also Chapter 36.3 of the Report.  
163 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and 
amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2017/14/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (OJ L 171, 29.6.2016, p. 1).  
164 See recital 1 of Guideline (EU) 2019/1265 on the euro short -term rate (€STR)  (ECB/2019/19) (OJ L 199, 26.7.2019, 
p. 8). 
165 Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011.  
166 Recital 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
38 draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , it would have full discretion to develop the methodology for 
determining the new benchmark so as to ensure its accuracy, integrity and reliability. When 
central banks provide benchmarks, it is thei r responsibility to establish appropriate internal 
procedures in order to ensure the accuracy, integrity, reliability and independence of those 
benchmarks, taking into account international best practice where relevant and appropriate167. 
12.2.2  The draft law on Sv eriges Riksbank  does not confer any new tasks on Sveriges Riksbank  as 
concerns the provision and publication of reference interest rates and other benchmarks. The 
ECB understands that, pursuant to the Law on interest168, Sveriges Riksbank  is currently obliged 
to publish a reference rate every six months, which is used for calculating interest on arrears. The 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  merely opens up the possibility that Sveriges Riksbank  may also 
provide and publish reference interest  rates and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 
2016/1011. Based on this , the ECB understands that the possibility for Sveriges Riksbank  to 
provide and publish reference interest rates and other benchmarks referred to in Regulation (EU) 
2016/1011 would  not confer a new task on it . Therefore, the issue of assessing whether the 
conferral of new tasks on an NCB  complies with the prohibition of monetary financing does not 
arise in the case at hand.  
 
13. Observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions regarding Sveriges 
Riksbank’s b udget, accounting and  equity  
13.1 Purpose of the provisions on Sveriges Riksbank ’s budget, accounting and equity in the draft law 
on Sveriges Riksbank  
13.1.1  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank’s  provisions regarding Sveriges  Riksbank ’s budget, 
accounting and equity regime apply as of the financial year 2023169. 
13.1.2  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that, each year before the end of December, 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board will adopt a budget for Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities during 
the following financial year. The Executive Board shall submit the budget to the Parliament’s 
Committee on Finance, the NAO and Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council for information  
purposes170. 
13.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  further pro vides that Sveriges Riksbank  is obliged  to maintain 
accounting records and to draw up its annual financial statements in accorda nce with generally 
accepted accounting principles. In this context , Sveriges Riksbank  will continue to follow 
Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2016/34)171 to the extent that it 
                                                 
167 See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2019/18; Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(OICU- IOSCO), Principles for Financial Benchmarks (July 2013), available at www.iosco.org . 
168 Räntelag (1975:635).  
169 See Chapter 13, Section 8(7) of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank. In this context, it should be noted that Sveriges 
Riksbank’s rules for annual accounts refer to Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34). See Annual Report for 
Sveriges Riksbank 2019, p. 71.  
170 See Chapter 8, Section 1 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
171  Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of 3 November 2016 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the 
European System of Central Banks (ECB/2016/34) (OJ L 347, 20.12.2016, p. 3).  
ECB -PUBLIC  
39 applies  to Sveriges Riksbank , and it will substantiate any deviations from it172. 
13.1.4  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  also provides that Sveriges Riksbank  may establish financial 
provisions to a reasonable extent in accordance with Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 
(ECB/2016/34)173. The Committee states that in order not to risk the purpose of a statutory profit 
allocation rule being undermined, one might conceive of a system in which all or certain financial 
provisions are aggregated with equity and the result for the year and defined as distributable 
capital174. Thus, the scenario in which Sveriges Riksbank  sets aside funds in order that the equity 
be kept under the target level and thus prevents a distribution of profits taking place could be 
avoided. However, including financial provisions in distributable capital would, according to the 
Committee, risk confounding the purpose of the provisions themselves and make the profit 
allocation rule more opaque. As long as the guidelines that Sveriges Riksbank  applies to financial 
provisions are clear and transparent, the risk of the proposed profit allocation rule being 
undermined is, according to the Committee, probably low.  
13.1.5  The annual report shall contain a profit and loss account, a balance sheet and a directors’ report. 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council will adopt  the profit and loss account and the balance 
sheet. The directors ’ report drawn up by Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board will contain an 
account of the monetary policy conducted and of Sveriges Riksbank ´s other activities. In the 
annual report, the Executive Board will make an assessment whether the internal control s at 
Sveriges Riksbank  are satisfactory175. 
13.1.6  The Law on Sveriges Riksbank176 provides that Sveriges Riksbank  will have capital in an amount 
of one billion kronor (SEK), a reserve fund of SEK 500 million and a contingency fund177. Each 
year, Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council makes proposals to the Parliament and the NAO on 
the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit. Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss account and 
balance sheet are approved by the Parliament , which also determines the allocation of  Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s profit178. 
13.1.7  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity will consist of 
capital, a reserve fund and retained profits. Funds in revaluation accounts , as referred to in 
Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34) , are not included in equity.  Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity 
shall initially be SEK 60 billion upon the new draft law on Sveriges Riksbank entering into effect 
(referred  to as the ‘target  equity’) . At the same time, the Parliament  may decide on a higher target 
                                                 
172 See Chapter 8, Section 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
173 See Chapter 8, Section 10 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
174  See Chapter 29.6.5 of the Report.  
175 See Chapter 8, Section 4 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
176 See Chapter 10, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
177 Sveriges Riksbank’s balance sheet also includes, within the ‘reserves’ item, a balancing fund. See Annual Report for 
Sveriges Riksbank 2019, p. 94.  
178 Guidelines have been drawn up by the General Council of Sveriges Riksbank on how its profit is to be allocated. 
They provide that Sveriges Riksbank should pay 80% of its profit to the State, after adjustment for exchange rate 
and gold valuation effects and based on a five- year average, with the remaining 20% to be used to increase its own 
capital. See Sveriges Riksbank's submission to the Parliament, Proposal for the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank's 
profits for the financial year 2016, p.4, and the General Council's Annual Report 2016, available at  www.riksbank.se . 
However, as these guidelines are not legally binding, there is no statutory provision limiting the amount of profit that 
may be paid out.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
40 equity. The amount correspond ing to two  thirds of target equity is described as the base level of 
equity.  The target equity will be adjusted annually in accordance with the percentage change in 
the Swedish consumer price index published by Statistics Sweden (the ‘CPI adjustment’), except 
that if  the change is less than zero (i.e. in the event of deflation), no recalculation needs to  be 
done179. 
13.1.8  Based on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , at the end of the financial year 2023 the capital  will 
amount  to SEK 40 billion  and the reserve  fund to zero. The proportion of Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
equity exceeding SEK 40 billion at that time will be included in retained profits. Furthermore, i f 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity for the financial year 2023 exceeds the target level of SEK  60 billion, 
the excess amount is to be  included in retained profits.  
13.1.9  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that if Sveriges Riksbank ’s annual accounts show a 
profit, a transfer must be made to the reserve fund. T his transfer may not exceed an amount 
corresponding to the change in the base level of equity, as adjusted pursuant to the CPI 
adjustment. Any excess funds will be transferred to retained profits. If , after such transfers to the 
reserve fund and retained profits , Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity exc eeds the target equity 
(SEK 60 billion , subject to the CPI adjustment, if applicable), the excess profit is to be distributed 
to the  State . Whenever  the reserve fund exceeds SEK 5 billion, Sveriges Riksbank  must transfer 
these funds to capital180. 
13.1.10  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  also provides  that if Sveriges Riksbank ’s annual  accounts  
show  a loss, this loss will in the first instance be covered by retained profits, then by the reserve 
fund and, as a last resort, by the capital. If, after covering for loss es, retained profits are greater 
than zero, an amount may be transferred from retained profits to the reserve fund that 
corresponds to no more than the change  in the base level of equity pursuant  to the CPI 
adjustment. If the capital has been used to cover losses, the profits of future years will in the first 
instance be used to restore the capital to its level prior to incurring losses. Excess funds  may be 
transferred to the reserve fund until Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity  amounts to the base level set out 
above  (SEK 40 billion , subject  to the CPI adjustment,  if applicable)181. 
13.1.11  As set out in the Law on Sveriges Riksbank , Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council makes 
proposals to the Parliament and the NAO on the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit , and 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss account and balance sheet are approved by the Parliament, 
which also determines the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit182. The draft law on Sveriges 
Riksbank  stipulates that, following the Executive Board’s approval , the General Council may 
decide on the distribution of funds from retained profits, following the appropriation of profit as set 
out above . The General Council will also decide on the profit and loss for the year. The 
Parliament  will decide either to approve or to set aside the General Council’s decision concerning 
the profit and loss account, the balance sheet and the profit or loss for the year. Thus, the 
                                                 
179 See Chapter 8, Sections 6- 9 and Chapter 13, Sections 8 and 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
180 See Chapter 8, Section 11 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
181 See Chapter 8, Section 12 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
182 See Chapter 10, Sections 3 and 4 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
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41 General Co uncil’s decision does not become definitive until approved by the Parliament . 
However, t he General Council’s decision can only be set aside if the numbers are not calculated 
in accordance with applicable law . If the decision is set aside, the General Counc il makes  a new 
decision. Any profit allocation to the Swedish State budget is to be made no later than one week 
after the Parliament ’s decision183. 
13.1.12  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that if losses result in the level of Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s equity being less than one third of the target level set out above (i.e. less than SEK 20 
billion , subject to the CPI adjustment, if applicable), Sveriges Riksbank  must  submit a request to 
the Parliament for the level of the base equity to be restored, unless unr ealised gains on the 
balance sheet mean that restoring equity is not justified.  The request may be for a higher amount 
if this is  required to secure Sveriges Riksbank ’s capability to be self -financing in the long term, 
but is not to exceed the amount that brings equity to its target level after restoration184. In general 
terms, i f Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities give rise to a question of statutory amendment or any 
other measure on the part of the State, Sveriges Riksbank  may make a proposal concerning the 
matter to the Parliament or the Government185. 
13.2 General observations  
13.2.1  The ECB has repeatedly  pointed out in its convergence reports  that Sweden needs  to adapt  its 
legislation  governing  Sveriges Riksbank  to comply  with Treaty  requirements  relating to financial  
independence and the distribution  of profits186. Furthermore, the ECB and, earlier, the  EMI have 
issued several opinions addressing matters relating to Sveriges Riksbank’s financial 
independence in response to consultation requests from the Swedish Ministry of Finance and the 
Parliament187. 
13.2.2  The overall independence of an NCB , as required under Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of 
the Statute of the ESCB , would be jeopardised if it could not autonomously avail itself of sufficient 
financial resources  to fulfil its mandate,  i.e. to perform  the ESCB- related tasks required of it under 
the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB . The principle of financial independence also implies  that 
an NCB  must  have sufficient  means  to perform  not only its ESCB- related  tasks  but also its own 
national tasks, e.g. financing its administration and own operations. Therefore, a Member State 
may not put its NCB  in a position where  it has insufficient  financial  resources  and inadequate net 
equity to carry out its tasks. For all these reasons, financial independence implies that an NCB 
should always be sufficiently capitalised. Financial independence requires that in performing its 
tasks an NCB can independently assess the risk s involved and has the power to decide on any 
necessary precautions to take. An NCB is best placed to make these assessments and needs to 
                                                 
183 See Chapter 8, Sections 4, 11 and 14 and Chapter 12, Section 9 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
184 See Chapter 8, Section 13 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
185 See Chapter 11, Section 27 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
186 See, e.g., Convergence Report, May 2018, p.  203; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
187 See Opinions CON/2005/54, CON/2008/34, CON/2013/53 and CON/2017/17, and EMI Opinion CON/1997/26.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
42 have the necessary  tools  to evaluate the relevant  circumstances and to make  forecasts188. 
13.2.3  The ECB takes  particular  note that Sveriges Riksbank  faces  a number  of financial  risks,  including  
the relatively  large size of the banking sector  in Sweden,  Sveriges Riksbank ’s significant holdings 
of low interest -bearing government bonds, and the anticipated decline in Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
seigniorage income due, inter alia, to a possible decrease in banknote usage in Sweden.  Regarding 
the relatively  large size of the Swedish  banking sector,  the Swedish  banking  system ’s total 
balance sheet amounted to SEK 14 ,724 billion in January 20 20189, which is approximately three  
times Sweden’s GDP190. Sweden’s  large cross- border  banking  sector  has considerable  
commitments  in foreign currencies191. This entails  significant  risks to financial  stability  both in 
Sweden,  as well as potentially for other countries in the Nordic -Baltic region, where Swedish 
banking groups have substantial market presence. In this respect it would be advisable, from a 
financial stability perspective, to carefully  consider  Sveriges Riksbank ’s day-to-day and 
exceptional  spending needs  given  Sveriges Riksbank ’s tasks, including its tasks in exceptional 
circumstances, with the aim of supporting liquidity, to grant credit or provide guarantees on 
special terms to banking institutions and Swedish companies, subject to the supervision of the 
SFSA. It is therefore critical to ensure that  Sveriges Riksbank  has sufficient capital and foreign 
reserves to conduct its functions, and that it remains in a position to ensure the required 
existence of financial buffers, to preserve an appropriate level of own funds and reserves192. 
13.3 Specific  observat ions 
Level of Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity  capital  
13.3.1  Pursuant to the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank193, Sveriges Riksbank  has its own funds that are 
kept separate from the Treasury. Furthermore, the Government’s budget has no special 
appropriations item for Sveriges Riksbank . The cost of Sveriges Riksbank ’s operations are 
instead covered by its own revenues, e.g. from  the return it receives  from investing  the capital  
allocated to it. Therefore,  it is important  that Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity is able to generate 
sufficient return to cover costs and accrued losses in its  operations.  
13.3.2  The ECB notes the existence of a statutory ceiling on the level of targeted equity that  may be 
held by Sveriges Riksbank . In carrying out their  tasks NCB s should assess the risks involved and 
have the power to independently decide on the necessary precautions to take.  Consequently, 
NCBs should be given the ability to safeguard the real value of their capital and assets by being 
                                                 
188 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 27; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2009/53, paragraph 2.4.2 of Opinion 
CON/ 2009/83, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2014/24, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2014/27, paragraph 3.1.1 of 
Opinion CON/2014/56 and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
189 See Statistics Sweden’s Financial Markets Statistics, January 2020.  
190 See Statistics Sweden, https://www.scb.se/en/finding- statistics/statistics -by-subject -area/national -accounts/national -
accounts/national -accounts -quarterly- and-annual -estimates/ . 
191 See Sveriges Riksbank, Financial Stability Report 2019:2, 
https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/fsr/engelska/2019/191120/financial -stability -report -2019_2.pdf , 
pp. 15- 16. 
192 See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Opinion CON/2017/17.  
193 See Chapter 1, Section 2 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
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43 free to independently create adequate financial buffers.194  
13.3.3  Further more, the ECB understands that if Sveriges Riksbank’s  equity exceeds  SEK 60 billion at 
the end of the financial year 2023, the excess amount will not be allocated to the State , but 
instead transferred to retained profits  and remain under this item, unless needed for subsequent 
loss coverage, or unless the General Council , following consent from the Executive Board,  
decides  differently .195 
Allocation of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profits and  losses  
13.3.4  Detailed legal regulations on profit allocation are a positive development as they bring not only 
transparency and predictability to the treatment of profits and the timing of payments to the 
Treasury,  but also legally  bind the Government  and the Parliament . In this respect, the ECB 
welcomes that profits may be distributed to the Treasury only after any accumulated losses from 
previous years have been covered and financial  buffers  deemed necessary to safeguard the real 
value of the NCB’s capital and assets have been created.  
13.3.5  The ECB has repeatedly pointed out196 that the current arrangements regarding the Parliament’s  
approval  of the allocation of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profits  are incompatible with the  requirement of 
central bank independence under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB . Against this backdrop, 
the ECB notes  that the Parliament ’s formal role in approving Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss 
account and balance sheet and in determining the allocation of its profit is significantly reduced 
under  the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank . In particular, the General Council’s decision 
concerning the profit and loss account, the balanc e sheet and the profit or loss for the year can 
only be set aside if the numbers are not calculated in accordance with applicable law.  The ECB 
understands that since this condition should be evident from the NAO’s  audit report, the setting 
aside  by the Parliament of  the General Council’s decision concerning the profit and loss account  
and the balance sheet for the year is an unlikely event.  Any other  more extensive  role for the 
Parliament  in this respect would be incompatible with the requirement  of central bank 
independence under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB . 
Financial provisions  
13.3.6  As regards financial provisions or buffers, NCBs must be free to independently create financial 
provisions to safeguard the real value of their capital and assets. Member States may not hamper 
NCBs ’ ability to build  up their reserve capital to the level necessary for a member of the ESCB to 
fulfil its tasks197. In this regard, the ECB welcomes that under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank , 
Sveriges Riksbank  may establish financial provisions to a reasonable extent in accordance with 
Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34) , Article 8 of which provides that  an NCB  may 
establish a provision for financial  risks in its balance sheet and is to  decide on the size and use 
                                                 
194  See paragraph 3.1.9 of Opinion CON/2018/23 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2013/96.  
195 See Chapter 13, Section 8(9) and Chapter 8, Section 14 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank and pp. 1709- 1710 
and Chapter 29.6.5 of the Report.  
196 See, e.g., Convergence Report 2018, p.  203. 
197 See Convergence Report 2018, p. 28; paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2009/26, paragraph 3.2 of Opinion 
CON/2009/53 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/69.  
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44 of the provision on the basis of a reasoned estimate of the NCB's risk exposure.  At the same 
time, the ECB notes that operational risks are outside the scope of such provisions.  
13.3.7  Further more, the ECB understands that the Committee possibly intends  (see paragraph 13.1.4) 
that Sveriges Riksbank  may not use financial provisions to circumvent the framework for target 
equity and profit distribution to the State, although the risk of such circumvention is low as long as 
the guidelines that Sveriges Riksbank  applies to financial provisions are clear and transparent. 
This, in turn, could be interpreted as relating to the requirement that Sveriges Riksbank  may 
establish financial provisions to a ‘reasonable extent’ in accordance wit h Guideline (EU) 
2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34) . As Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34)  already requires clear 
and transparent motivation of any financial provision198, the requirement on the ‘reasonable 
extent’ could be considered redundant, also taking into account the principle of proportionality set 
out in the draft l aw on Sveriges Riksbank199. 
Request for recapitalisation of Sveriges Riksbank  
13.3.8  The ECB has a number of specific concerns regarding the provisions of the draft law on Sveriges 
Riksbank  concerning  requests  by Sveriges Riksbank  for recapitalisation  following losses.  
13.3.9  The ECB understands that , under the provisions of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank200 and the Law 
on Parliament201, Sveriges Riksbank  has an unrestricted right to make proposals to the 
Parliament or the Government with respect to the restoration of Sveriges Riksbank ’s capital. The 
ECB understands that the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  should not be understood as implying 
that Sveriges Riksbank  will only be entitled to submit a request to the Parliament for the level of 
its equity to be restored up to a sum necessary to ensure the base level if Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
equity has fallen below a certain level  (i.e. when the equity  is less than the initial level of SEK 20 
billion,  as adjusted by the CPI  adjustment,  if any).  In this respect, the ECB understands that 
Sveriges Riksbank  would be able to make a proposal to the Parliament or the Government if 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities give rise to a question of statutory amendment or any other 
measure on the part of the State, which implies that Sveriges Riksbank  may request a 
recapitalisation at any point in time, even if the reported equity is more than one third of the target 
level. However , for the avoidance of doubt, the ECB would welcome the introduction of an explicit 
reference to the possibility of Sveriges Riksbank  submitting a request for the restoration of its 
capital, consistent with its existing  general  right to submit such a request to the Parliament or the  
Government . It is a  crucial element of Sveriges Riksbank ’s financial independence that it has  
sufficient funds at its disposal to be able to per form its tasks, including ESCB -related and national 
tasks.  
13.3.10  Further more, the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  neither obliges the State to provide capital after 
Sveriges Riksbank has submitted a request to have its base level equity restored nor specifies 
                                                 
198  See Article 8 of Guideline 2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34).  
199 See Chapter 1, Section 5 of the draft Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
200 See Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
201 See Chapter 9, Section 17 of the Law on Parliament, 2014.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
45 the time period within which the State should respond to Sveri ges Riksbank ’s request202. 
13.3.11  Lastly, according to the Committee, in its request for recapitalisation Sveriges Riksbank  must 
take into account whether  there are significant  amounts on the revaluation accounts and assess 
whether a lower increase of capital than that required for it to reach the base equity level would 
suffice203. The ECB notes that funds in revaluation accounts as referred to in Guideline (EU) 
2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34)  are not included in Sveriges Riksbank ’s equity under the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank, whic h could raise an issue of consistency. Furthermore, the amounts in the 
revaluation accounts may  be volatile, and it accordingly seems  inappropriate to consider them 
when assessing Sveriges Riksbank ’s long -term financing ability.  
13.3.12  In the light of the foregoing,  the ECB reiterates  the importance of ensuring  that Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s financial independence is safeguarded. Sveriges Riksbank  should not be put in a 
position where it has insufficient financial resources and inadequate net equity to carry out its  
tasks204. 
 
14. Specific observations on the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank: provisions on o rganisation 
and management  
14.1 Purpose of the provisions on Sveriges Riksbank ’s organisation and management in the draft law 
on Sveriges Riksbank  
14.1.1  In accordance with the existing provisions of the Instrument of Government, Sveriges Riksbank  
has a General Council of 11 members, who are appointed by the Parliament. Sveriges Riksbank  
is run by an Executive Board, which is appointed by the General Council. The General Council 
may relieve from office a member of the Executive Board only if the member no longer fulfils the 
requirements laid down for the performance of his or her duties or is guilty of serious 
misconduct205. Under the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  a decision to relie ve from office a 
member of the Executive Board requires at least eight of the General Council members to be in 
favour of the decision. The General Council will supervise the work of the Executive B oard and 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s other activity. The General Council will keep the Parliament’s Finance 
Committee informed of relatively significant matters, and report its observations to the Finance 
Committee regularly and at the Committee’s request. The General Council’s audit function will 
review the work of the Executive Board206. 
14.1.2  In addition to the appointment of the members of the Executive Board, the draft law on Sveriges 
Riksbank  provides that the General Council decides on the following matters : (1) appointment of 
the Governor from among the members of the Executive Board; (2) determining  the order in 
which the Deputy Governors serve in place  of the Governor if he or she resigns, is relieved from 
                                                 
202 See paragraph 3.3.6 of Opinion CON/2007/14.  
203 See Report, p. 1274.  
204 See paragraph 3.3.7 of Opinion CON/2007/14.  
205 See Chapter 9, Section 13, fourth paragraph of the Instrument of Government.  
206 See Chapter 11, Sections  6 and 7 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
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46 office or cannot participate due to illness or other comparable circumstance; (3) deciding on the 
remuneration and terms of employment of members of the Executive Board;  (4) granting approval 
for a former member of the Executive Board becoming, within one year after the end of his  or her 
term of office,  a member of the executive board of a bank or firm supervised by the SFSA , or 
holding  other employment or office that disqualif ies him or her  from being a member of the 
Executive Board; (5 ) approval of Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss statement and balance 
sheet; (6) after approval of the Executive Board, approving distributions from the profit and loss 
account; ( 7) deciding on the motifs used in the design of notes and coins issued by Sveriges 
Riksbank ; and (8) stakeholder responses within the  scope of its responsibility 207. 
14.1.3  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provid es that the Executive Board consist s of five members 
appointed for a period of five or six years. In comparison with the Law on Sveriges Riksbank , this 
means a reduction of the number of members from six to five, but the Executive Board may 
comprise five or six members up to 31 December 2028. A member may only be reappointed 
once, but this  restrictio n only applies to reappointments made after 31 December 2022. However, 
a person who has previously been a Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank  may be appointed as 
Governor for one or two terms of office . The Governor chairs the Executive Board, and the other 
members are Deputy Governors. When recruiting, the General Council must ensure that, taken 
together, the Governor and Deputy Governors have appropriate competence and expertise in all 
areas  of Sveriges Riksbank ’s activities. The candidate profile for the Governor must include a 
requirement for good leadership skills . A member of the Executive Board may not be a member 
of the Parliament, a G overnment minister, employed at the Government offices o r at the central 
level of a political party, a member or alternate member of the board of directors of a bank or 
other company subject to supervision by the SFSA, or hold any other employment or assignment 
that makes him unsuitable as a member of the Executive Board, or be a bankrupt or prohibited 
from trading208. 
14.1.4  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that the Executive Board is responsible for the 
activities of Sveriges Riksbank  and will ensure that they are conducted efficiently and in 
accordance with the law and the obligations following from Sweden’s membership of the Union , 
that they are reported in a reliable and fair manner and that Sveriges Riksbank  manages public 
funds well.  Matters other than those to be decided by the Executive Board may be decided by the 
Governor, or, unless otherwise decided by the Executive Board, by a person designated by the 
Governor209. 
14.1.5  The Chair and Vice Chair of the General Council have the right to be present at meetings of the 
Executive Board with the right to speak but without the right to make proposals and vote210. 
                                                 
207 See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Ins trument of Government; Chapter 8, Section 4, second 
paragraph and Section 14 and Chapter 11, Sections  8-10, Section 11, second paragraph and Sections 14- 18 of the 
draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
208 See Chapter 11, Sections 12, 14, 15 and 17 and Chapter 13, Section 8, points 5 and 6 of the draft law on Sveriges 
Riksbank.  
209 See Chapter 11, Sections 19 and 20 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
210 See Chapter 11, Section 21, second paragraph of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
47 14.1.6  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that members of the Executive Board may neither 
seek nor take instructions when fulfilling the ir duties concerning the responsibility referred to in 
Chapter 9,  Section 13, first paragraph of the Instrument of Government . These duties comprise 
the following: (1) defining and implement ing monetary policy ; (2) conduct ing foreign currency 
interventions ; (3) holding  and managing  foreign currency reserves ; (4) promot ing the smooth 
operation of payment systems within the framework of cooperation in the ESCB; and 
(5) collect ing the statistical information needed for cooperation within the ESCB211. 
14.1.7  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  contains provisions requiring the members of the General 
Council and the Executive Board to make written disclosures  to the Parliament regarding their 
ongoing holdings of financial instruments  and/or other investments (e.g., commercial properties) 
and financial interests (e.g. payments, pension benefits) having an aggregate market value of 
SEK 500,000 or more, as well as loans and other liabilities aggregating SEK 500,000 or more. 
Sveriges Riks bank  may also require designated employees and contractors to make written 
disclosures to Sveriges Riksbank  regarding their ongoing holdings of financial instruments212. 
14.1.8  The draft law on Sveriges Riksbank  provides that legal action against a decision by the General 
Council on the relieving from office of a member of the Executive Board shall be brought within 
two months from service of the decision. If legal action is not brought within this period, the party 
in question loses his or her right to bring legal action. In addition, it is provid ed that Sveriges 
Riksbank  may bring an action before the CJEU, and that the members of the Executive Board 
other than the Governor may bring legal action before the Swedish Supreme Court, which may 
declare a decision on relieving from office invalid213. 
14.2 Spec ific observations  
Role of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board  
14.2.1  The ECB notes that the members of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executi ve Board may not request or 
receive instructions from anyone when they are fulfilling duties concerning Sveriges Riksbank ’s 
responsibility under the Instrument of Government for monetary policy, foreign currency 
interventions, foreign currency reserves, the smooth operation of payment systems within the 
framework of cooperation in the ESCB and the collection of the statistical information needed for 
cooperation within the ESCB214. As noted in paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 , the ECB suggests that 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibilities under the proposed amendments to the Instrument of 
Government, in respect of which Sveriges Riksbank  may not seek or take instructions, should be 
aligned with the concept of central banking tasks under the Treaty.  Within the framework of the 
Eurosystem the provision of liquidity  is, with the exception of emergency liquidity assistance, 
considered to be part of the basic tasks of  implement ing monetary policy and promot ing the 
                                                 
211 See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of the Instrument of Government; and Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft 
law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
212 See Chapter 11, Sections 31- 34 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
213 See Chapter 13, Section 5 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
214 See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of the Instrument of Government; Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft law on 
Sveriges Riksbank.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
48 smooth operation of payment systems, and is subject to the prohibition on NCBs seeking or 
taking instructions. Similarly, within the framework of the ESCB Sveriges Riksbank ’s powers i n 
relation to payment systems, monitoring financial infrastructures and developing the payment 
market  are considered to be part of the basic task of  promot ing the smooth operation of payment 
systems and the  related task of  ensur ing efficient and sound clearing and payment systems , and 
are thus covered by the central bank independence protection under Article 130 of the Treaty  and 
Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB . 
14.2.2  The ECB welcomes the five or six -year terms of office of the members of the Executive Board. 
This is consistent with the first paragraph of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB , which 
provides that NCB statutes must, in particular, provide that the term of office of an  NCB Governor 
be no less than five ye ars. Applying the same rules in respect of the security of tenure and 
grounds for relieving from office of Governors will also safeguard the personal independence of 
other members of the decision- making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB -
related tasks215.  
14.2.3  As regards legal action against a decision by Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council on the 
relieving from office of a member of Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board, the second paragraph 
of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB  provides that a decision to relieve a Governor from 
office may be referred to the CJEU by the Governor concerned or the ECB ’s Governing Council 
on grounds of infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application. Such 
proceedings shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the decision or of its 
notification to the plaintiff or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge 
of the latter, as the case may be.  As mentioned in paragraph 14.2.2,  applying the same rules in 
respect of  security of tenure and in respect of grounds for relieving from office of Governors will 
also safeguard the personal independence of other members of the decision- making bodies of 
NCBs involved in the performance of E SCB- related tasks. Against this backdrop, the ECB 
welcomes that the members of the Executive Board other than the Governor may bring an action 
before the Swedish Supreme Court in respect of a decision to relieve them from office. It should 
be clarified that action in respect of relieving from office  by the Governor and the members of the 
Executive Board needs  to be brought within two months of the publication or notification of the 
relieving from office decision, which m ay not necessarily be t he same time as the date of 
issuance of that  decision. It should also be clarified that there is no provision under the Treaty for 
Sveriges Riksbank  to institute such proceedings.  
Role of Sveriges Riksbank ’s General Council  
14.2.4  Pursuant to Article 130 of the T reaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 
duties conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB , neither a n NCB, nor any 
member of its decision- making bodies, may seek or take instructions from, inter alia, any 
government of a Member State ‘or from any other body’, which includes a statutory body such as 
                                                 
215 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2019/24, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2019/19, paragraph 7 of Opinion 
CON/2004/35, paragraph 8 of Opinion CON/2005/26, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2006/32, paragraph 3.7 of 
Opinion CON/2006/44, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2007/6.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
49 the Supervisory Board. The ECB understands that the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank  is 
exclusively responsible for the performance of ESCB -related tasks216, and therefore qualifies as a 
decision -making body of Sveriges Riksbank  within the meaning of Article 130 of the Treaty. The 
ECB notes that the members of  the Executive Board may not request or receive instructions from 
anyone when carrying out  duties concerning Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibility  under the 
proposed amendments to the Instrument of Government  for monetary policy, foreign currency 
interventions, foreign currency reserves, the smooth operation of payment systems within the 
framework of cooperation in the ESCB and the collection of the statistical information needed for 
cooperation within the ESCB217. Sveriges Riksbank ’s responsibilities under the proposed 
amendments to the Instrument of Government, in respect of which the Executive Board of 
Sveriges Riksbank  shall decide and may not seek or take instructions from the General Council, 
should be aligned with the concept  of central banking tasks under the Treaty. As previously 
noted, within the framework of the Eurosystem the provision of liquidity  is, with the exception of 
emergency liquidity assistance, considered to be part of the basic tasks of implement ing 
monetary po licy and promot ing the smooth operation of payment systems, and is subject to the 
prohibition on NCBs seeking or taking instructions. Similarly, within the framework of the ESCB 
Sveriges Riksbank ’s powers in relation to payment systems, monitoring financia l infrastructures 
and developing the payment market are considered to be part of the basic task of promot ing the 
smooth operation of payment systems and the related task of  ensur ing efficient and sound 
clearing and payment systems , and are thus covered by the central bank independence 
protection under Article 130 of the Treaty  and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB . Provided this 
point is clarified , the ECB understands that the General Council would not intervene in the 
performance of ESCB -related tasks, nor in the decisions concerning those ta sks, and that it 
therefore would not  be considered to be a decision- making body within the meaning of Article 130 
of the Treaty  and Article 7 of the Statute of  the ESCB . Therefore, having regard both to the 
structure of the General Council , as a constituent part of Sveriges Riksbank , and to its tasks, the 
General Council  may not seek to influence the Executive Board in its capacity as Sveriges 
Riksbank ’s decisio n-making body responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank ’s ESCB-
related tasks218. 
14.2.5  Regarding the General Council’s competence to approve Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss 
statement and balance sheet , the ECB has noted that the annual accounts should be adopted by 
the NCB’s decision- making bodies, assisted by independent accountants, and may be subject to 
ex post approval by third parties (e.g. the G overnment or the P arliament)219. This requirement 
would be materially satisfied by an arrangement whereby the profit and loss statement and 
balance sheet  are submitted by Sveriges Riksbank ’s Executive Board to the General Council for 
                                                 
216 See Chapter 11, Section 19 of the draft law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
217 See Chapter 9, Section 13, paragraph 1 of  the Instrument of Government; and Chapter 11, Section 26 of the draft 
law on Sveriges Riksbank.  
218 See paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2002/16, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion 
CON/2020/7.  
219 See Convergence Report, May 2018, p. 27.  
ECB -PUBLIC  
50 approval220. In order to properly reflect  the Executive Board’s exclusively resp onsibility  for the 
performance of Sveriges Riksbank ’s ESCB- related tasks , it would be advisable to clarify  that the 
General Council will approve Sveriges Riksbank ’s profit and loss statement and balance sheet on 
the proposal of the Executive Board.  
14.2.6  Regarding the General Council’s competence to approve distributions from the profit and loss 
account, after the approval of the Executive Board, decisions on the allocation of profits should 
be taken by the NCB’s decision- making bodies on professional grounds, and should not be 
subject to the discretion of third parties unless there is an express safeguard clause stating that 
this is without prejudice to the financial means necessary for carrying out the NCB’s ESCB -
related tasks as well as national tasks221. This requirement is satisfied as the distributions from 
the profit and loss account  are first approved by the Executive Board, which, as already noted, is 
exclusively responsible for the performance of Sveriges Riksbank ’s ESCB- related tasks . 
 
This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 2 0 April  2020.  
 
[signed]  
 
The President of the ECB  
Christine LAGARDE  
                                                 
220 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2020/7.  
221 See Convergence Report (May 2018), p. 27. See also paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2019/12 and paragraph 2.6 of 
Opinion CON/2020/7.