EN Official Journal of the European Union C 309/51

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Air safety

(2006/C 309/11)

On 19 January 2006, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on: Air safety

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 30 May 2006. The rapporteur was Mr McDonogh.

At its 428th plenary session, held on 5 and 6 July (meeting of 5 July 2006), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 155 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions.

1. Recommendations

1.1 Cabin crew should be certified or licensed by a competent Authority in order to guarantee proficiency in their functions (safety, security, medical aspects, passenger management, etc), as well as technical qualifications on each aircraft type that they are required to work on.

1.2 Careful consideration must be given by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) before allowing equipment suppliers autonomy to approve component designs without recourse to either EASA or the aircraft manufacturers.

1.3 Non European Airlines should be approved by EASA before they are allowed to fly into or to over fly EU airspace.

1.4 There should be only one rule maker and that must be EASA. This should allow for the future harmonisation of aerodrome regulations, and should as far as possible, avoid competitive distortion between EU and non-EU airports. EASA should be strengthened and given more powers, like those of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).

1.5 EASA should consider how best for the industry to protect the safety and integrity of communications, data links and onboard avionic systems such as electronic flight bags (EFB) from hacking.

1.6 EASA must ensure that future development of aircraft such as Light Business Jets (LBJs) are regulated to ensure that owners and fliers have sufficient flight hours before being allowed to commence flight operations. LBJs will have ceilings of 25 000 ft or more and should be required to meet the maintenance and operational standards of larger commercial jets.

1.7 EASA must have the necessary protocols in place before any consideration is given for the approval of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights outside segregated airspace.

1.8 Random drug and alcohol tests should be carried out on both flight and cabin crews.

1.9 EASA should also ensure that local regulators are properly qualified for the job, and also have enough staff and finance.

1.10 A detailed scientific study of the effect on flight and cabin crew of fatigue, stress, and deep vein thrombosis (DVT) should be undertaken by EASA.

1.11 A review of the policy and procedures for the granting of a General Aviation Pilots Licences and the certification of General Aviation aircraft should be carried out.

1.12 EASA should ensure that the introduction of a European General Aviation Licence, with endorsements, ratings, pertaining to the approved aircraft to be flown takes place.

1.13 Safety of crew, passengers and residents of areas affected by air corridors must over-ride political considerations in banning airlines using European air space.

2. Introduction

2.1 With the cooperation of member states and their experts, a black list of 96 airlines has been published. 93 of them are facing outright bans and three are facing operational restrictions. Separately, France is considering the introduction of a new system of safety labels that could be used in advertising.

2.2 Europe has been under pressure to improve its aircraft safety legislation since early 2004, when a charter aircraft owned by Flash airlines crashed in the Red Sea killing 148 people, mostly French tourists. That crash highlighted the lack of co-ordination among governments about sharing safety information, since it then emerged that Flash had been banned by the Swiss aviation authorities.

2.3 Consistency and harmonisation among member states in relation to the standards of operation of airlines is crucial, if the black list is to have the desired effect. Member states must avoid a situation where for economic and social reasons one state decides that an airline listed is ‘marginally acceptable’ to operate on its airports while the other member states see the airlines standards as unacceptable.

2.4 However, Brussels has been asked to intervene in some disputes, notably, when Turkey was angered about a decision by some European Governments, led by Netherlands, to withdraw temporarily the landing rights of Onur Air, a budget Turkish airline on safety grounds. Separately, Greece is under pressure to make progress in its investigation of the crash of the Helios Airways aircraft that was flying from Larnaca in Cyprus.

2.5 Areas of concern are general maintenance standards, crew training, crew flying hours, and rest periods and fuel saving practices, and noise commitment, also air traffic control.

2.6 Since the increased competition in the aviation sector, and the precarious financial position of many airlines, has brought about increased pressure in crews to take off in conditions which they would not normally fly in, and also to fly planes that are not completely air worthy. The crews are under increasing pressure to take off as the airlines under EU regulations have either put up the passengers for a night, or compensate them for delays. All this impinges on safety. There is also the added problem that many national aviation authorities tend to turn a blind eye to the enforcement of many regulations, where the national airline is concerned.

2.7 Despite a ban in a number of European countries, because of safety concerns, a certain airline is still flying into Brussels and Paris. Switzerland, with its stern cultural fixation with business confidentiality, had banned 23 aircraft from flying through its airspace, although the names, and even the number of companies, remained classified.

3. Effects of fatigue and performance safety

3.1 Fatigue has been blamed in numerous aviation accidents over the years and is a continuing problem facing crews flying aircraft of all sizes. But how can a pilot recognise when he or she is too tired to fly? What roles do sleep cycles, dehydration, nutrition and illness play in identifying and responding to fatigue?

3.2 Pilots going through various time zones are bond to suffer fatigue and impairment of judgement. They are supposed to be able to take rest periods on long flights, but for this they need proper facilities which should include flat beds, etc.

3.3 There is plenty of evidence to show that fatigue is a factor in safety. In a recent National Transportation Safety Board report on the fatal crash at Kirksville, Missouri on the 19 October 2004 — The NTSB outlined ‘the less than optimal overnight rest time available, the early reporting time for duty, the length of the duty days, the number of flight legs, the demanding conditions — non-precision approaches flown manually in conditions of low ceiling and reduced visibilities — encountered during long duty days, it is likely that fatigue contributed to the pilots' degraded performance and decision making.’

3.4 True or not, no pilot with a modicum of experience can deny having occasionally had to battle a bout of fatigue or that it somehow affected their performance. The quality of sleep during rest periods is very important.

3.5 Diet and nutrition also play any important role. For example, any pilot from a brand new student to the about to retire captain will tell you that the beverage of choice among pilots is coffee. However, while coffee is a stimulant and causes a temporarily increased level of alertness, fatigue is symptomatic of its withdrawal. Furthermore, coffee is a diuretic, which causes the body to discharge more fluid than it is taking in, resulting in dehydration, which in turn can cause fatigue.

3.6 Boredom is a major problem with tiredness on long haul flights, where aircraft are almost completely automatic. To keep the crew alert, some airlines particularly in trans-Siberia flights insist that the automatic pilot is re-set every hour.

3.7 Many of the accidents in aviation are due to pilot error, and fatigue is a major cause of those errors.

3.8 It is planned for EASA to take over the licensing process and replace the current JAA in this area, however the use of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) licences obtained in the US and operated by pilots in Europe may not be affected by this change.

4. Cabin crew

4.1 All improvement regarding rest requirements for flight crew should — where practicable — also apply to cabin crew, who must be fully alert in preventing any safety or security occurrence as well as the case of emergency.

4.2 Cabin crew should have adequate training in resuscitation and be always competent in their native language, and at least ICAO level 4 English, and be able to facilitate communication with passengers in the event of an emergency.

5. Air traffic control

5.1 The EESC has already expressed its views on air traffic control (ATC) and problems associated with it (1). The proposed SESAR system, if and when it is introduced, should improve safety. This is subject to another paper of the EESC (2), but this does not get away from the fact that Europe needs a uniformed ATC system which transgresses boundaries of all countries and where Eurocontrol would be recognised as a ‘Federal Regulator’ similar to, e.g. the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the USA. The awarding of the first contract in Eurocontrol's TMA2010+ programme is welcomed.

5.2 There is strong need for standardisation and integrated systems to be introduced throughout Europe in the interests of safety.

5.3 It is desirable to also introduce appropriate certification of air traffic safety electronics personnel (ATSEP).

6. Aircraft maintenance

6.1 There appears to be a difficulty for some member states to convert their national rules to European Part 66 standards. Maintenance licences issued by states are based on the requirements set by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and were adopted into national law to give them legal teeth. Under the EASA system, however, the licensing rules are subject to European Union law. Enforcing them appears to be a lengthy process and subject to appeal.

6.2 In 2005 all 25 EU members took up a derogation option under which they were given until September 2005 to meet Part 66. Dates set by EASA for states to comply with safety rules need to be enforced or at lease agreed dates should be made with all parties so as to avoid the need for extension of deadlines or transition periods.

6.3 The EESC wonders if there is a provision for EASA to monitor, if required, the outsourcing of maintenance by Low Cost Carriers (LCC) to maintenance facilities in third countries.

6.4 Adequate time needs to be allowed for inspection on the ground, particularly in the turn around of the aircraft. The 25 minutes on average for short haul can certainly not be considered as adequate in all cases.

6.5 Adequate resources need to be allocated also, and also qualified staff who use only certified parts to carry out maintenance.

6.6 Random inspections and audits should be carried out by the National Aviation Authority to see that standards are being maintained.

7. Airline companies

7.1 Airline companies must be financially sound and properly financed before a start up licence is granted, states should be also required to monitor financial performance on a regular basis to ensure that there is no ‘corner cutting’.

7.2 They must have experience and have competent management available to them.

8. Competencies of the European Aviation Safety Agency

8.1 The current intention of the European Commission is to further extend the competencies of EASA in the field of regulation (including safety and interoperability) of airports, air traffic management and air navigation services.

8.2 We support EASA as created by regulations 1592/200/EC and believe that a European framework for procedures and authorisations for aircraft and appliances issued by a single authority certainly improve aviation safety and efficiency in Europe.

8.3 There is an opportunity for EASA to address the issue of standards and recommended practices (SARPS) and the anomalies that are created by the ‘Recommended Practice’ and ‘Standard Practices’ found in the ICAO Annex documentation.

9. General aviation licensing

9.1 Private pilot licensers (PPL) operating on FAA licences in European airspace should be required to have an EASA endorsement on their licence.

9.2 All general aviation aircraft (GA) must comply with EU standards set by EASA before being allowed to fly in European airspace.

10. Avionics safety

10.1 EASA should produce guidelines/rules for protecting specific equipment or networks against ‘acts of unlawful interference’ as defined by ICAO.

10.2 Apart from the increasing use of Ethernet (LAN) and IP the other areas of vulnerability would be: — increased use of air/ground data link technologies for communications by passengers, airlines and ATC; — more general use of data and software transfer using networks on aircraft and between ground sites for production, delivery, maintenance or update purposes; — the multiplication of software viruses and hacker attacks, plus the search for confidential data through interconnected networks.

11. Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs)

11.1 EASA must have the necessary powers to regulate this area of the industry not only from airworthiness and design but also the certification of ground operators, launching systems etc.

11.2 All regulations pertaining to conventional aircraft must be considered obligatory for UAVs and all airspace users should be consulted where this type of activity could affect those users.

12. EASA

12.1 EASA is the overall EU regulator. It lays down the principles and rules for airline safety in the EU. It is under financed, under staffed, and it has no power of enforcement.

12.2 It depends on various National Regulators to enforce rules and regulations.

12.3 This amounts to self-regulation. No national regulator would be likely to clamp down on an airline in its jurisdiction, unless there was an extremely serious problem.

12.4 National regulators are also responsible for all aircraft, which are registered in their country, and whose company have offices located there. These aircrafts and crews are very often based and operated out of other EU countries. This makes proper regulation more problematic.

12.5 The requirement by EASA to the National Regulators to implement its decisions could lead to an un-even implementation of the rules and regulations in the EU, due to different interpretations. This could lead in the airline industry to flags of convenience where one country appears more lax in the interpretation of regulations than others.

12.6 Meanwhile, the Airport Security Regulator, ECAC, has the power to audit local levels of compliance. EASA should have this.

12.7 EASA is currently funded from certification revenues which has left it with a forecast loss of EUR 15 million for 2006, it is critical that the necessary funding from central government be forth coming to ensure EASA's future.

Brussels, 5 July 2006 The President of the European Economic and Social Committee Anne-Marie SIGMUND

(1) Air transport: Community air traffic controller licence, single European sky package (rapporteur: Mr McDonogh), OJ C 234, 22/09/2005, p. 0017-0019.

(2) Common enterprise — SESAR CESE 379/2006 rapporteur: Mr McDonogh.