EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 16 October 2015 
on the central register of bank accounts  
(CON/2015/36) 
 
Introduction and legal basis 
On 4 September 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB ) received a request from the Czech Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) for an opinion on a draft law on the Central Register of Bank Accounts (hereinafter the 
‘draft law’).  
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft 
legislative provisions
1, as the draft law relates to a national central bank. In accordance with the first 
sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 
has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 
1.1 The main purpose to the draft law is to set up a centralised database of basic information on bank 
accounts in the Czech Republic. A centralised database could significantly simplify and streamline 
the delivery of account information from the banking sector to the competent authorities. It will 
enable the competent authorities to more efficien tly identify who owns which account and to use 
that information to make further enquiries at the credit institution concerned with a view to 
prosecuting eventual offenders and thereby protecting the financial resources and security of the 
State. 
1.2 The main provisions of the draft law are as follows: 
 The draft law sets up a central database of basic information on accounts maintained for 
their clients by credit institutions, i.e., ban ks, credit unions and branches of foreign banks 
established in the Czech Republic (hereinafter, the ‘central register of bank accounts’ or ‘CRBA’). 
 The Czech National Bank ( ČNB) will administer the CRBA and be responsible for 
supervising the obligations of the above institutions under the draft law. 
 The CRBA will hold certain basic data on account s held by individuals and legal entities with 
the above institutions, namely data identifying the account holder and the credit institution, 
                                                 
1  OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42.  
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2 the date of the account’s opening and closing, any change to the identification data and any 
authorisation to dispose of resources held on the account. No information on the resources on the account will be collected in the CRBA. 
 The State commits to pay ČNB for the costs that ČNB incurs in setting up and administering 
the CRBA. Detailed rules on the CRBA information system and on the reimbursement of 
ČNB’s costs will be covered in an agreement to be concluded between the MoF and ČNB. 
 Credit institutions will be required to submit the prescribed data for the CRBA to ČNB in a 
form, structure and frequency to be set out in a ČNB Decree. 
 The CRBA will be accessible only to listed competent public authorities (e.g. the State 
authorities responsible for financial or customs administration, the authorities involved in 
criminal proceedings and the State intelligence agency, hereinafter referred to as ‘applicant(s)’) that are entitled to request data subject to banking secrecy requirements from 
credit institutions, under the conditions laid down by a further law
2 and only upon a request 
made via an encrypted electronic data box specifically intended for this purpose. 
 ČNB will enable access to the CRBA only if th e applicant meets the access conditions and 
follows the stipulated procedures.  
 The applicants will be exclusively responsible for ensuring that they are properly authorised 
and meet the other conditions for accessing data subject to banking secrecy requirements 
under the applicable banking laws3. 
 ČNB will be obliged to store the aforementioned data on closed accounts for 10 years. 
 ČNB will also be obliged to publish an annual re port on its website on the operation and use 
of the CRBA, including aggregated data. 
1.3  It is understood that the MoF intends to bring the draft law into force on 1 January 2016. To allow 
time to set up the database, the draft law stipulates that the CRBA will only be accessible to 
applicants after fifteen months from the date of the draft law’s entry into force. The ECB notes 
however that this provision was not contained in the draft law on which the MoF consulted it, but in a later version of the draft law attached to the MoF explanatory memorandum. A number of related 
laws will also consequently need to be amended. 
 
2. General observations  
2.1 The ECB would like to recall that when new tasks are conferred on an ESCB member, it is 
necessary to assess these tasks against the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of 
the Treaty. For this purpose and in the light of that basic need, the ECB has developed guidance in the form of general and specific considerations on the basis of which the ECB may decide whether 
                                                 
2  Pursuant to Article 38(3) of the Act on Banks No. 21/1992 Coll., as amended, reports on matters concerning a client 
which are subject to banking secrecy may be submitted by a bank without the client’s consent only upon the written 
request of certain listed authorities. The respective laws governing the activities of each of the listed authorities 
stipulate which individuals(s) may submit the request for such report on the authority’s behalf in the performance of its public tasks. Under the draft law however a much narrower list of authorities would be permitted to request data 
from the CRBA.  
3  See footnote 2 above.  
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3 the new task conferred on an ESCB national central bank (NCB) is to be considered a central 
banking task or a government task for the purposes of the monetary financing prohibition4. This 
guidance is set out in this paragraph 2.1. The concrete assessment of whether the ČNB’s task to 
administer and operate the CRBA is to be considered a central banking task or a government task is then undertaken in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2.  
2.1.1  General considerations  
First, the systematic categorisation of tasks assigned to NCBs as central banking or government 
tasks applies to genuinely new tasks that did not exist in the past or did not form an integral part of 
the central banking tasks already assigned to an NCB. In recognition of the different Member States’ legal frameworks, central banking traditions and national set-ups, the tasks currently 
discharged by an NCB as central banking tasks are not reviewed and re-categorised, but may be reassessed if their substance is amended. 
Second, the principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their 
NCBs in a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB or Eurosystem-related tasks.  
Third, central banking tasks comprise in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks listed in 
Article 127(2), (5) and (6) of the Treaty. 
Fourth, new tasks conferred on an NCB which are atypical of NCBs’ tasks, or which are clearly 
discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or of other public entities, 
should be considered as government tasks 
2.1.2   Specific considerations  
An important criterion for qualifying a new task as a government task is therefore the impact of the 
task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of the NCB. In particular, the following issues should be taken into account. 
First, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task creates inadequately 
addressed conflicts of interests with existing central banking tasks, without necessarily complementing the existing central banking tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing 
and new tasks, there should be sufficient mitigation measures in place to adequately address that conflict. Complementarity between the new task and existing central banking tasks should not, 
however, be interpreted broadly, as this could lead to the creation of an indef inite chain of ancillary 
tasks. The assessment of the complementarity of a new task should also take into account the 
financing of that task. 
Second, it should be assessed whether without new financial resources the performance of the 
new task places a disproportionate burden on t he financial or organisational capacity of the NCB 
and may negatively impact on its capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks. 
                                                 
4  See in the first instance paragraph 2 of Opinion CON2015/22.  
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4 Third, it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task is aligned with the 
institutional set-up of the NCB, in particular as regards central bank independence and accountability considerations. 
Fourth,  it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task entails substantial financial 
risks. 
Fifth,  it should be assessed whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the 
NCB’s decision-making bodies to political risks th at are disproportionate and could also impact on 
their personal independence and, in particular, the guarantee of the Governor’s term of office under 
Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 
2.2 Any final assessment on the qualification of a ta sk given to an NCB as either falling within the 
scope of a central banking task or a government ta sk will be guided by the objective of ensuring the 
consistent application of the monetary financing prohibition within the Eurosystem and the ESCB. 
 
3.  Specific observations 3.1 Conferral of the task of administering the CRBA on ČNB 
The ECB notes that the draft law would assign to ČNB the administration and operation of the 
CRBA.  
3.1.1 New task  
The administration of the CRBA is an entirely new task, which no public authority has yet been 
assigned to perform. In the light of the guidance set out in paragraph 2.1 it must therefore be 
assessed carefully whether this new task and the associated responsibilities for ČNB could 
constitute a breach of the mo netary financing prohibition. 
3.1.2 The principle of financial independence   
The principle of financial independence requires that the Member States may not put their NCBs in 
a position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out not only their ESCB related 
tasks, but also their national tasks, both from an operational and financial perspective. In this 
regard the ECB welcomes Article 14(1) of the draft law, which requires the State to reimburse ČNB 
for any costs that ČNB incurs in setting up and operating the CRBA. This statutory commitment by 
the State will alleviate the burden that the perfo rmance of this new task might otherwise put on 
ČNB’s financial and operational independence and which might also negatively impact on its 
capacity to properly perform existing central banking tasks.  
The ECB notes that Article 14(2) of the draft law requires an agreement to be concluded between 
the MoF and ČNB detailing, among other matters, how ČNB’s costs for the establishment and 
operation of the CRBA will be paid. The ECB would appreciate being provided with a copy of this 
agreement for information purposes, as well as the final draft of the ČNB Decree referred to in 
Article 17 (enabling provisions) of the draft law.  
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5 3.1.3  Discharge of tasks on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the Government or of other public    
entities  
The ECB has previously opined that tasks entrusted to an ESCB member relating to the 
establishment of a central register of bank account numbers are not central bank tasks nor do they facilitate the enforcement of such tasks
5. Similarly, the new task of administering the CRBA does 
not relate to banking supervision, the collection of data for statistical purpose or other existing ČNB 
tasks whether under the Treaty or under Czech law6. The ECB considers this new task to be 
clearly a government task since its purpose is exclusively to further the State’s interest in being 
able to more efficiently locate bank accounts held in the Czech Republic which may hold proceeds of crime and thereby protect the financial interests and security of the State. It thus cannot be 
regarded in any respect as a central bank task
7.   
3.1.4 Complementarity of the new task with existing ČNB tasks and extent to which conflicts of interest 
with existing ČNB tasks are addressed  
The ECB appreciates that one of the main reasons for assigning the administration of the CRBA to 
ČNB is that it is regarded as having the necessary technical experience and integrity for performing 
such a task. It is the only authority which currently possesses an information system for data transmission which enables it to obtain from credit  institutions information on their clients’ accounts 
in the manner required for operating such a database
8. The ECB also notes that the ČNB will be 
bound by the same secrecy and personal data obligations in respect of CRBA data as apply 
currently to data reported by credit institutions under the banking laws. Furthermore, only 
designated employees will be authorised to operate the CRBA and no exchange of data will be 
permitted between the CRBA and any other legally prescribed register. Taken together, these 
elements should limit the possibility of conflicts of  interest arising between the operation of the 
CRBA and other ČNB tasks. 
The ECB further understands that the reporting scheme that institutions will use to submit account 
data to ČNB for the CRBA will be entirely separate from that used by credit institutions to meet their 
prudential reporting requirements and that only the technical format for the transmitted data will be 
the same9. In the light of the above - particularly the prohibition on sharing CRBA data with other 
registers - the new task cannot be regarded as complementing the ČNB’s existing tasks.  
Nonetheless, the ECB considers that - if such legal restrictions were appropriately amended - 
administering the CRBA could serve additional purposes linked to ČNB’s existing or foreseen 
ESCB tasks, or other national tasks such as banking supervision or the collection of granular 
                                                 
5  See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2011/30.  
6  ČNB is obliged to carry out checks on transactions with credit institutions and other obliged entities under the 
domestic  legal acts implementing the EU anti money laundering and terrorist financing directives – principally Act No. 253/2008 Coll. June 5, 2008 on selected measures against legitimisation of proceeds of crime and financing of terrorism; also ČNB Decree No. 281/2008 Coll. of 1 August 2008 on certain requirements for the system of internal 
principles, procedures and control measures against mone y laundering and terrorist financing. However those tasks 
do not involve the collection of individual account data.  
7  See paragraph 2.3.1 (general considerations) of Opinion CON2015/22.  
8  See the General part of the MoF explanatory memorandum to the draft law (page 7).  
9  Under the Act on Banks 21/1992 Coll. and the Act on the ČNB 6/1993 Coll.  
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6 statistical information from credit institutions10. Such new task could then potentially complement 
ČNB’s other statutory tasks. 
3.1.5 Extent to which the performance of the new task is aligned with the institutional set-up of the NCB  
In view of the fact that operating a bank account register cannot be regarded as a central bank 
task, it might raise concerns as to how such a task would fit into the institutional set-up of a central 
bank. In this case, the ECB notes that the reporting scheme is legally entirely separate from the 
prudential reporting scheme for credit institutions, and that the data obtained is not accessible to 
other ČNB departments carrying out ESCB or other national tasks   
3.1.6 Extent to which the performance of the new task entails substantial financial risks  
The State's commitment under the draft law to pay all costs of operating the CRBA should ensure 
that ČNB bears no significant financial risk in taking up this new task. The ECB understands that 
the State will be primarily responsible for any damage or loss, including costs of proceedings, 
incurred by ČNB taking an unlawful decision or using the wrong administrative procedure in 
administering the CBRA11. It is however also noted that the State may request reimbursement from 
ČNB should ČNB be ordered by a court of law to pay damages as a result of its negligence or wilful 
intent when carrying out this task12.  
It will also be necessary to consider the exact financial terms of the agreement to be concluded 
between the MoF and ČNB under Article 14(2) of the draft law. In order to assuage any monetary 
financing concerns, it needs to be ensured that ČNB will be fully and adequ ately reimbursed for all 
the costs incurred in performing activities related to  the tasks entrusted to it in connection with the 
CRBA13. The reimbursement should be made on the ba sis of ‘at arm’s length’ commercial terms - 
either in advance of costs being incurred or on a regular and prompt basis as the costs arise14. 
3.1.7 Extent to which the performance of the new task exposes the members of ČNB’s Board to 
disproportionate political risks or could impact on their personal independence  
The ECB notes that the draft law makes applicants exclusively responsible for being properly 
authorised and meeting the other conditions for accessing data subject to banking secrecy under the banking laws when requesting data from the CRBA. This should limit the risk of ČNB being 
sued for allowing an applicant unauthorised access to the CRBA data. 
However, ČNB will be obliged to perform the new task as any other public function that is assigned 
to it by law. ČNB’s Board will therefore be responsible for the due and proper operation of the 
CRBA. It cannot be excluded that ČNB’s Board could be exposed to reputational risks should the 
CRBA data – albeit of a less sensitive nature than some of the other data received from credit 
institutions when performing its supervisory tasks - be accessed by a non-authorised applicant or 
                                                 
10  This would be for example applicable to the preparatory work launched by the ESCB under Decision ECB/2014/6 of 
the European Central Bank of 24 February 2014 on the organisation of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (OJ L 104, 8.4.2014, p. 72), subject to national 
provisions as regards the re-use of the information for statistical purposes.  
11
  Article 3 of the Act on State Liab ility No.82/1998 Coll., as amended.  
12   Articles 16-18 of the Act on State Liability No.82/1998 Coll., as amended.  
13  See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98 and paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/30.  
14  See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2011/98.  
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7 otherwise be ‘leaked’. The fact that the CRBA will c ontain sensitive information, such as the basic 
data on accounts of politically exposed persons15, could place ČNB’s Board members in a difficult 
position should this information enter into the public domain in breach of the law. This could also 
entail a negative impact on their personal independence.  
3.2 Conclusion  
Whilst welcoming the State's financial commitment to cover ČNB's costs for setting up and 
operating the CRBA, which will deal with certain concerns over ČNB's financial and operational 
independence, as regards the terms of such financing ČNB should either be reimbursed for the full 
budgeted costs of setting up and operating the CRBA in advance of these costs being incurred or on a regular and prompt basis as the costs arise. Additionally, as the reporting scheme for the 
CRBA will be entirely separate fr om the prudential reporting scheme for credit institutions, and the 
data obtained will not be accessible to other ČNB departments carrying out ESCB or other national 
tasks, the new task of administering the CRBA cannot be regarded as complementary to ČNB’s 
current ESCB related and other national tasks. In view of these other considerations, the ECB has a more general concern about the assignment to ČNB of this sensitive new task.  
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 
 
 
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 16 October 2015. 
 [signed] 
 
The President of the ECB Mario DRAGHI 
                                                 
15  Under Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing  amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L141, 5.6.2015, p. 73), NCB Board members are also deemed to be ‘politically exposed persons’.