EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/1

SPECIAL REPORT No 8/2004

on the Commission's management and supervision of the measures to control foot-and-mouth disease and of the related expenditure, together with the Commission's replies

(presented under Article 248(4) second subparagraph EC)

(2005/C 54/01)

CONTENTS

I-VII SUMMARY

1-15 INTRODUCTION

1-5 Background

6-7 Main characteristics of measures to prevent and control FMD

8-11 Impact on the budget

12-15 The Court's audit

16-43 COMMISSION ACTION BEFORE THE CRISIS

16-20 Analytical method not sufficiently up-to-date

21-43 Commission supervision was insufficient in some respects and deficiencies in the regulations were not remedied in time

22-23 Transposition of Community directives into national law not systematically verified for compliance

24-25 Health and veterinary checks at Union frontiers well supervised but certain risks not adequately covered by regulations

26-28 Delays in imposing controls and banning the use of catering waste for animal feed

29-34 Insufficient checks and criteria for Member States' contingency plans

35-37 Incomplete identification and inadequate tracing of animals of FMD sensitive species

38-41 Uncorrected deficiencies in the ANIMO system before the crisis

42-43 Restrictions on animal movements throughout Member States' territories

44-58 COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS

44-45 Effective supervision by the Commission

46-58 Deficiencies in control arrangements and in the implementation of them in the Member States

48-49 Reduced veterinary services

50-56 Insufficient incentive for immediate notification of disease and compliance with animal movement restrictions

57-58 Delays in culling

59-89 COMMISSION ACTION CONCERNING THE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM

60-73 No Commission proposals for directives on procedures and calculation of compensation for farmers by Member States

62-66 Variations in compensation systems and lack of uniformity in valuations

67-71 Established cases of double payments of animal premiums

72-73 Variations in slaughter premium payments

74-83 Rules and procedures governing eligibility of Member States' expenditure for Community reimbursement were defined late

82-83 Delays in reimbursing Member States' expenditure

84-85 Cofinancing rates aligned in the pig sector

86-89 Farmers do not contribute to Community financing of the control system

90-100 COMMISSION MANAGEMENT AFTER THE CRISIS

90-97 Action in the veterinary field

98-100 Action in the financial field

101-106 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission's replies

SUMMARY

I. The need to complete the single market and promote trade in livestock in general made it essential for the Community to establish a common policy for preventing and controlling foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). As from 1992, therefore, it extended to all Member States the ban on preventive vaccination of livestock against the disease and introduced a complex system of prevention and control with the aim of both restricting the introduction of the virus and preventing it from spreading throughout the territory of the Community. In the event of an epidemic, contaminated animals were to be slaughtered, the carcasses destroyed, and premises and equipment disinfected. All the expenditure defrayed by Member States in this connection would then become partially reimbursable from an emergency veterinary fund set up within the EAGGF Guarantee Section.

II. Following the 2001 crisis Member States requested reimbursement of 1 616 million euro from the emergency veterinary fund. That cost, combined with the scale of the outbreak, was the motivation for the Court's audit. The audit had three objectives: to ascertain, firstly, whether the analytical method used by the Commission as the basis for the strategy for eradicating the disease was up-to-date; secondly, whether the strategy had been implemented effectively; and thirdly, whether the system for reimbursing to Member States expenditure on compensating farmers and slaughtering their animals was adequate, rapid and non-discriminatory. In as far as some of the lessons learned from previous epidemics might be relevant to the strategy for preventing and controlling FMD, the Court examined Commission action before, during and after the crisis.

III. The report makes the point that, before the 2001 crisis, the Commission had not revised its strategy in the light of changes in risk factors.

IV. It also shows that in the absence of comprehensive evaluation and inspections by the Commission before 2001, some weaknesses in the prevention and control arrangements were not corrected in time, especially as regards protective measures at borders, animal feed, contingency plans, sheep identification, and the messaging system concerning livestock movements between Member States (ANIMO). Parliament criticised the Commission for failing to review Member States' contingency plans before the crisis, but acknowledged that the Commission acted very positively during it (1). At the time of the crisis the Commission did, in fact, identify very quickly the weaknesses of the arrangements and their implementation in the Member States, as regards the number of veterinarians, disease notification and rapid culling, but it was too late to remedy them. More particularly, the Court observed that the effectiveness of the arrangements that had been introduced relied heavily on farmers notifying the disease immediately and complying with movement restrictions.

V. The audit showed that the Community financing system could be further improved. The compensation paid to farmers by Member States was not always adequately defined at Community level, even though it was reimbursed at a rate of 60 % of the amount accepted as eligible by the Commission. In the absence of a better-defined Community framework Member States were able to introduce a variety of systems that gave rise to variations in the treatment of farmers within the Community.

VI. Since then, the recent revision of the Community regulations has remedied many omissions. Nevertheless, the financial framework was not revised and the Community measures are still minimal in terms of the notification of the disease, supervision of farms and speed of culling. There is thus a risk that Member States' application of these measures could once again prove to be insufficient to contain a future epidemic, and yet still give rise to Community reimbursement.

VII. The Court recommends that the Commission update its evaluations and analyses of the strategy at a time when there is no crisis. It is in favour of examining ways of including farmers in the control system, to induce them to notify the disease rapidly and to comply with movement restrictions. Lastly, it calls on the Commission to clarify the financial framework as applied to epidemics of animal disease and, as far as possible, to reduce financial risk to the Community budget.

INTRODUCTION

Background

1. Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a disease of animals, harmless to humans, but highly contagious among cloven-footed animals. It can destroy the food sources and means of subsistence of farmers in less developed countries virtually overnight because it affects many cloven-footed species, including cattle, pigs and sheep. The virus can be transmitted by direct contact between animals and through animal feed, by indirect contact with various vectors, such as vehicles or people, and may even be spread by wind-borne transmission. The mortality rate among infected adult animals is low. Most animals recover within three to four weeks, but they are nevertheless still severely affected: the growth of young animals is retarded, the abortion rate increases and milk production declines significantly, and permanently. Countries that are free of the disease are obliged to put security measures in place, in order to protect themselves against the virus and avoid embargoes on their exports of animal products.

2. The completion of the internal market within the Community was planned for January 1993. Consequently, since the free movement of animals and agricultural products is a fundamental aspect of the common organisation of markets, the rules on trade in animals and animal products within the Community had to be harmonised. That also required the establishment of a common policy for preventing and controlling FMD. In a 1989 report on Member States' policies for controlling FMD (2), the Commission noted that some Member States that did not practise preventive vaccination of livestock (3) could impose restrictions on trade in animals with Community partners that did vaccinate. The restrictions were justified by the fact that even though vaccinated animals appear clinically normal they may be carrying the virus.

3. In order to remove veterinary and similar obstacles to the development of intra-Community trade in animals and animal products the Commission considered health regulations applicable to international trade in animals and animal products, such as those laid down by the Office international des Epizooties (OIE) (4). Under its rules, if there were an outbreak of FMD, return to unrestricted trading conditions would be much faster if a stamping-out policy were applied (three months) than if any kind of vaccination were used (12 to 24 months).

4. Because of these commercial considerations, the same Commission report concluded that the adoption of a non-vaccination policy was preferable to a policy of preventive vaccination. This was why the stamping-out policy was supplemented at Community level, in 1990 (5), by the ban on preventive vaccination and by prohibition of imports of vaccinated animals into Community territory. However, it was still possible to vaccinate, but only as an emergency measure when the presence of FMD had been confirmed and there was a danger of large-scale spread of the disease.

5. Since the adoption of this new strategy there have been several outbreaks in the Union, in Italy in 1993 (57 outbreaks) and in Greece, in 1994, 1996 and 2000 (95, 39 and 14 outbreaks respectively). Epidemics have occurred in neighbouring areas (Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Algeria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran). In addition, on 21 February 2001, an unprecedented crisis hit the United Kingdom and lasted for a period of 10 months. There were 2 034 outbreaks of infection extending to 10 124 farms and leading to the slaughter of some four million animals (6). In addition, more than two million animals were slaughtered because of the welfare problems that arose when they were confined to farms following movement restrictions (7). It was not possible to contain FMD to the United Kingdom: it spread, on 13 March 2001 to France (two outbreaks), on 20 March 2001 to Ireland (one outbreak), and on 21 March to the Netherlands (26 outbreaks). The United Kingdom had to apply slaughter measures until September 2001. In January 2002 it was able to recover the status of an FMD-free country that did not practise vaccination, which allowed it to start trading again.

Main characteristics of measures to prevent and control FMD

6. A complex set of prevention and control measures aims to limit the risk of the virus being introduced into the Community territory and spreading (see Box 1). The prevention and control measures are provided for in Community directives (8). The Member States are responsible for bringing them into force and applying the rules derived from them. The Commission, on the other hand, is responsible for checking that the Community provisions are implemented by the Member States. The Commission also supports non-member countries' efforts to control and eradicate epidemics of animal diseases. At the Commission the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection is responsible for the direct management and control of Community veterinary expenditure (9). The system of prevention focuses on collaboration with international organisations and substantial support for neighbouring countries in combating the disease, on veterinary, zootechnical and health controls on stock farming and meat in the Union and at its frontiers, the drafting of contingency plans by the Member States, with the resources needed to counteract any crisis that might arise, and systems for identifying and tracing animals. The control system relies on immediate notification of the disease, introduction of restrictions on movements of people and animals, the launch of epidemiological inquiries to identify animals suspected of being contaminated, and on Member States applying their contingency plans and implementing the necessary culls, followed by destruction of the carcases and disinfection of contaminated premises and materials.

7. After the 2001 crisis the Commission presented a proposal for a directive modifying the system for controlling FMD (10). The Directive was adopted by the Council on 29 September 2003 (11).

Impact on the budget

8. The conditions applicable to the Community financial contribution to the expenditure for eradicating certain serious contagious animal diseases, including FMD, were laid down in 1990 by the Council (12). The contribution is compulsory if the Member States have implemented the prescribed Community measures and takes the form of reimbursement, at a rate of 60 %, of FMD expenditure incurred by Member States in compensating farmers for the slaughter and destruction of animals and disinfection of premises and equipment. It is entered in the budget (13), under the heading of ‘Emergency fund for veterinary complaints and other animal contaminations which are a risk to public health’ (14).

9. Following the adoption of the new strategy the appropriations for the Fund, for all animal diseases together, were increased fourfold in 1999 and were doubled in 2000, reaching a grand total of 978,1 million euro for financial years 2001, 2002 and 2003 (15), mainly due to the 2001 FMD crisis. For the 2001 crisis alone the overall total expenditure declared by Member States for compensation for slaughter and destruction of animals as well as disinfecting of farms and equipment was around 2 693,4 million euro, of which 1 616 million euro was claimed for Community reimbursement. The total declared for slaughter compensation alone was 1 775,1 million euro, of which 1 065,2 million was claimed for reimbursement (see Table ). Table Claims for reimbursement submitted by Member States in connection with their expenditure on compensation for animals slaughtered Country Number of animals covered by compensation Total compensation (euro) Sheep Goats Cattle Pigs Other Total Sheep Goats Cattle Pigs Other Total France 48 573 206 1 406 10 138 — 60 323 5 739 074 23 651 1 697 635 1 868 433 — 9 328 794 Ireland 50 172 98 1 172 70 15 51 527 7 359 366 18 658 859 862 9 800 11 443 8 259 129 Netherlands 39 011 9 654 90 842 136 545 1 134 277 186 3 965 380 1 363 801 65 247 745 16 339 358 586 037 87 502 322 United Kingdom (16) 2 449 424 — 579 637 135 084 2 438 3 166 583 625 586 405 — 1 018 384 592 22 415 862 3 660 692 1 670 047 551 Total 2 587 180 9 958 673 057 281 837 3 587 3 555 619 642 650 225 1 406 110 1 086 189 835 40 633 454 4 258 172 1 775 137 795 NB: The Member States' reimbursement claims cover 3,5 million animals. The highest number is for the United Kingdom, with 3 166 583 animals, representing 89 % of the total. The compensation paid amounts to 1 775,1 million euro, of which 1 670 for the United Kingdom, i.e. 94 % of the total compensation for countries affected by FMD in 2001. The category of animals most affected by FMD in 2001 was sheep, with 2 587 180 sheep. The number of sheep for which compensation was granted in the United Kingdom accounts for 94,53 % of this total. The highest compensation per animal category is that for cattle, with a total of 1 086 189 835 euro, 93,8 % of which was paid to the United Kingdom. Source: FR/ Reimbursement claims (5 October 2001 and 6 December 2002). IRL/ Reimbursement claim (6 February 2002). NL/ Reimbursement claim (April 2002). UK/ Reimbursement claims (December 2001 and 26 February 2003) plus reimbursement claim for Northern Ireland.

10. Following its decisions to grant aid (17) in connection with FMD, the Commission allowed payments to Member States for a total of 433,5 (18) million euro for slaughter expenditure and 32,1 million euro for other costs, bringing the total Community reimbursement to 465,6 million euro at 31 December 2003 (see Diagram 1).

11. The Commission has not yet completed its review of Member States' expenditure and reimbursed the balances due as compensation for this 2001 expenditure (except in the cases of France and Ireland). As a consequence, the budget appropriations available for the emergency veterinary fund were under-utilised by more than 48 % for financial years 2001 to 2003 (see Diagram 2).

The Court's audit

12. Following the classical swine fever and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crises, the Court examined the Community measures to control these animal diseases (23).

13. In view of the scale of the FMD crisis and the cost to the budget the Court decided to carry out a new audit with the objective of establishing whether: (a) the analytical method followed by the Commission in determining the strategy for preventing and controlling FMD was sufficiently up-to-date; (b) the Commission, on the basis of its checks and appraisals, had presented adaptations to the Community strategy to the Council; (c) the system introduced by the Commission for reimbursing Member States' expenditure was adequate, rapid and non-discriminatory.

14. In order to answer these questions, the Court assessed the Commission's action in the light of the latter's analytical methods, its supervision of Member States' implementation of the Community measures and any proposals that it made for adapting the Community regulations. In as far as some of the lessons learned from previous epidemics might be relevant to the strategy for preventing and controlling FMD, the Court first examined the Commission's action before and during the crisis. It then studied the reimbursement system, especially in the light of its previous recommendations. This examination was confined to the expenditure on compensation for the slaughter of animals (24). Lastly, the Court undertook a review of the lessons learned by the Commission after the 2001 crisis.

15. The audit work was carried out at the Commission and in Member States affected by FMD (France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) (25). The audit visits were mainly to the agriculture ministries responsible for the health and veterinary aspects and their regional offices (26). Account has been taken in this report of work by the authorities visited and by the European Parliament and the International Conference on Control and Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and other public inquiries carried out in the Member States (27).

COMMISSION ACTION BEFORE THE CRISIS

Analytical method not sufficiently up-to-date

16. In the 1989 report (28) mentioned above (see paragraph 2), the Commission carried out a cost-benefit analysis of the various policies followed by the Member States in controlling FMD (policy of preventive vaccination, or policy of systematic slaughter), with a view to defining the strategy to be followed at Community level. In particular, it assessed the risk of FMD occurring in the Community if one or other of the two policies were to be applied from 1992 onwards, together with the economic effects of the two possible alternatives. The Commission projected the costs over a period of 10 years (from 1993 to 2002) according to three different scenarios for the scale of the crises. For the non-vaccination policy it used an intermediate scenario with 13 epidemics of 20 outbreaks. The estimated cost over the same period was 35 million euro. The estimate for the cost of the optimistic scenario, on the other hand, was 0,3 million euro, and that for the worst scenario was 955 million euro.

17. Moreover, the main emphasis of the 1989 report was on commercial considerations and consideration of budgetary and agricultural costs and profits, without taking into account the wider social and environmental costs.

18. Because of the nature of the animal disease epidemics that occurred in the Union before 2001, the Commission was unaware of the need to check whether the Community arrangements were viable. There had, in fact, been three epidemics that involved more than 20 outbreaks (the maximum possible in the scenario used by the Commission), but on the other hand, there had only been four crises in eight years (compared with thirteen in ten years according to the same scenario). On the other hand, a number of risks conducive to the spread of the virus had increased since 1993: the number of livestock movements had increased (29) with the completion of the single market, the number of abattoirs had fallen (30), leading to increased concentrations of animals and an enhanced risk of infection, while stocking densities, particularly of sheep, goats and pigs, had soared (31). In February 1998 the FAO (32) drew the attention of the 33 Member States of the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease to the fact that, at any time, ‘Europe may face further devastating animal disease epidemics due to long-distance transport of animals and increasingly dense livestock units’ (33).

19. Moreover, the swine fever epidemic in 1997/1998 had generated significant costs for the Community (34), Member States and producers. In the light of that experience, the Commission itself judged the anti-FMD measures provided for in Directive 85/511/EEC incomplete (35). Based on expert opinion the Commission then began to revise the Directive, but its work was interrupted when the disease broke out in the United Kingdom on 20 February 2001.

20. The strategy has not been fully evaluated by the Commission since its adoption in 1990. Furthermore, the Commission has not submitted a report to the Council and the Parliament every three years on the conditions of application of Decision 90/424/EEC concerning Community eradication measures and the financial aid granted for that purpose (36). Neither has it updated the study of Member States' veterinary services carried out by the Directorate-General for Agriculture in 1992, even though the updated study would have enabled it to check whether they were in an adequate state to ensure that the strategy succeeded (see paragraphs 48 to 49)

Commission supervision was insufficient in some respects and deficiencies in the regulations were not remedied in time

21. In normal times Commission supervision of health and veterinary aspects essentially takes two forms: firstly, its staff in Brussels verify that directives have been incorporated into national law, and secondly, inspectors from the Health and Veterinary Office (HVO) in Dublin (37) carry out on-site inspections. In the period preceding the 2001 crisis the inspections required by the regulations should have focused, in the Court's opinion, on the essential measures for preventing and controlling FMD that are defined in Community directives and with the transposition of them into the national law of the Member States. Those measures include: (a) veterinary and health checks at frontiers in the case of imports of animals and animal products; (b) checks on animal feed in order to avoid contamination of animals or animal products; (c) drawing-up of contingency plans by the Member States to ensure that human resources, equipment and adequate organisation can be drawn upon, should a crisis arise; (d) the drawing-up by Member States of systems for identifying and tracking animal movements and a system of messages between Member States (ANIMO), all of which are essential for tracing and slaughtering contaminated animals quickly.

Transposition of Community directives into national law not systematically verified for compliance

22. The Commission verifies quasi systematically the formal transposition of legislation by Member States within the time allowed by Community directives. Compliance tests, on the other hand, are not operated systematically. In practice they are only carried out when there are HVO inspections (38) in Member States, or following complaints by third parties. The risks of non-compliant transposition are thus high and may still exist now.

23. The Commission has addressed to the Member States a large number of warnings for not transposing directives in time. When the national measures adopted were communicated the Commission archived the files, without checking them for compliance. Consequently, no infringement file has ever been opened by the Commission as far as non-compliance is concerned. As regards the directive on animal identification, and identification of sheep in particular, which Member States were to transpose by 1 January 1995, the Commission had sent warnings to Member States for not communicating national measures between 1993 and 1996. Between 1994 and 1997 it archived the files, following formal transposition of the Community law in the Member States, without making a compliance check. During the 2001 crisis, however, the HVO pointed out that in all the Member States affected by FMD (apart from the Netherlands) there were significant omissions regarding the Directive and they had had a negative impact on the spread of the epidemic in 2001 (see paragraph 35).

Health and veterinary checks at Union frontiers well supervised but certain risks not adequately covered by regulations

24. The HVO carried out numerous health and veterinary checks at Member States' border inspection posts (BIPs) in order to check that only products that met the Community standards for animal health and food safety entered the Community territory through the BIPs. In cases where deficiencies were found the Commission temporarily suspended BIPs' approval, and in order to have the suspensions lifted Member States were fairly quick to take the corrective action required by the HVO, for example, providing additional personnel, stepping up veterinary controls, improving hygiene in installations and equipment, strengthening the systems for recording batches introduced, veterinary certificates and registers.

25. Even though it is impossible to provide total protection against external sources of contamination, there were nevertheless a number of shortcomings in the Community regulations at the time of the crisis. They mainly concerned border-protection, especially as regards the carriage of foodstuffs by travellers and the possibility of storing in free zones products that did not comply with Community regulations (see paragraph 91(a)). Before the crisis the Commission had proposed that introduction into the Community territory be limited to products of animal origin, which meet European animal health standards, but the proposal was only adopted in 2002 (39). Not until November 2002, after the crisis, did the Commission propose reinforcing controls on imports of products of animal origin intended for personal consumption. The Decision was adopted in December 2002 (40).

Delays in imposing controls and banning the use of catering waste for animal feed

26. The HVO inspections concerning animal feed were carried out late, partly after the crisis. The HVO highlighted the gaps in Member States' checks on the treatment of waste used for animal feed. In so doing it brought to light the risks associated with this type of feedstuff, but partly only after the crisis.

27. The risks associated with this type of animal feed had already been illustrated however in 1997/1998, when there was an outbreak of swine fever in Germany as a consequence of using for pig food catering waste and swill that had been inadequately treated and thus infringed Community legislation. For that reason some Member States had forbidden the use of catering waste on their territory before the 2001 FMD crisis, even if the waste had been treated (France and the Netherlands). Others (Germany and the United Kingdom) had not done so. At the Community level, the use of processed catering waste in pig feed was still legal in February 2001 (41), despite the Commission's proposals.

28. In the United Kingdom the farm where the crisis originated was licensed to feed catering waste to pigs, provided that it had been treated. In practice the farmer collected catering waste from restaurants, hotels, schools and an armed forces establishment in the vicinity, and stored it outside the farm before sending it to two processing establishments close to the farm. Once it had been treated the catering waste was given to the pigs. However, inspections carried out by the Ministry after the start of the outbreak revealed the presence of abnormal waste in the feeding troughs, clearly demonstrating that the waste had not been adequately treated (42). The exact provenance of the pan-Asiatic O type virus could not be established with certainty. The possibility of the virus having entered via BIPs was more or less ruled out and suspicion fell on illegal shipments of products presented as non-food imports for wholesale outlets or for sale to restaurants or canteens (43).

Insufficient checks and criteria for Member States' contingency plans

29. In 1990 the Council (44) called on the Member States to draw up contingency plans setting out the action to be taken if an outbreak of FMD occurred. The plans were to facilitate access to the plant, equipment, personnel and all other appropriate materials necessary for the rapid and efficient eradication of an outbreak. The Commission was to lay down the criteria to be applied in drawing up the plans, examine them in order to determine whether they provided a feasible means of achieving the desired objective, and suggest to the Member States where they could be amended. The Council had provided for the possibility of supplementing or amending the plans later, to take account of any changes in the situation.

30. In 1991 the Commission laid down the minimum criteria to be met by Member States' contingency plans (45). The aim of the criteria was to ensure that the contingency plans allowed rapid mobilisation of the resources needed to eradicate the disease quickly and efficiently in the event of an outbreak of FMD. Although the Commission required the Member States to establish a basic crisis management structure such as emergency units, local emergency centres and personnel responsible for emergency measures, the Court noted that some important information and conditions for controlling the disease and for efficient financial and administrative organisation had not been required by the Commission at the time, including: (a) details of personnel and resources needed for different scenarios (optimistic, intermediate and pessimistic) and how the personnel and resources were to be mobilised; (b) a review of contingency plans in the light of experience and circulation of them to farmers, together with regular simulation exercises; (c) the criteria in excess of which emergency vaccination would be used; (d) information on the established procedures for recording the number of animals slaughtered, their value, payments made and cross-checks with existing veterinary and animal identification databases; (e) the system for recruiting valuers in an emergency and the general principles for remunerating them; (f) the farmer compensation system and its use before or after culling.

31. The Commission has not revised these criteria since 1991. It adopted Member States' plans between 1993 and 1995. During that process, however, the Commission confined itself to making documentary checks, with no on-the-spot checks of the effectiveness of the described measures. Contrary to the Commission's reply to paragraph 33, its 1995 Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans (46) only required the Member States to have sufficient veterinary staff to deal with up to 10 outbreaks of disease at any one time, and did not ask them to provide for the number of staff to be increased as a function of the epidemiogical situation. Moreover, the first on-the-spot inspections of these plans by the Commission (HVO) in the Member States affected by FMD only took place at the end of 2001 and during the 2002 year, after the crisis. The Parliament also pointed out that, before the crisis, the Commission did not ‘review the Member States' contingency plans within an appropriate period’. It went on to say, ‘At the time of the 2001 crisis – apart from the assessments in connection with the approval of the contingency plans – [the Commission] had still not reviewed the implementation either of the UK's contingency plan or of those of the Netherlands or France’ (47).

32. As a consequence the Member States' plans, although adopted by the Commission, could not be adapted to a crisis that was unprecedented and on a scale that was difficult to imagine. The plans had not provided adequately for the worst scenario, made no provision for stepping up the resources to counteract it and did not provide the necessary administrative and financial organisation.

33. For example, the plan submitted to the Commission by the United Kingdom had not been substantially reviewed since its adoption in 1991. In line with the Commission's guidelines it did not make provision for a pessimistic scenario (48) and even in the national plan, the basis for plans at local level, the scenario only covered up to ten outbreaks at any one time (49), without establishing any procedures for rapidly increasing the resources needed to handle culling and destruction. There was no mention of any system for recruiting valuers in an emergency, nor the general principles for paying them. The plan had not been issued to farmers or farmers' representatives. In France the plan made it possible to deal successfully with the two outbreaks that occurred simultaneously, but there was no provision for the increased resources needed to deal with a more pessimistic scenario. The Irish contingency plan envisaged dealing with ten outbreaks at any one time. Only the Netherlands had learned from the swine fever crisis and had provided for the necessary resources to be increased to deal with its 26 outbreaks by introducing emergency vaccination as soon as the resources were found to be insufficient to carry out culling immediately.

34. The Commission's internal audit showed that the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection, which is constantly being confronted with crises in the animal sector, had introduced standardised routines, which were judged effective, but these working procedures had not been documented. Moreover, crisis management materials and manuals were not available. Although the Commission responded rapidly during the crisis (see paragraph 44), the Court considers that good groundwork by the Commission, especially from the point of view of the financial arrangements for the reimbursement to be granted to Member States (see paragraphs 74 to 81), would have made it possible to avoid some of the problems encountered during the 2001 crisis.

Incomplete identification and inadequate tracing of animals of FMD-sensitive species

35. At Community level there is a compulsory system for identifying and registering cattle individually (50). However, the Court noted that the system could not guarantee the traceability of cattle moved between Member States or between Member States and third countries. This covers around three million head per year (around 4 % of the total herd). In addition, there are still some weaknesses in its implementation in the Member States (51). In the case of sheep (the species mainly affected by the 2001 crisis) and pigs, identification was compulsory from 1 January 1995 until November 2003, but only for batches of animals (52). During the crisis the HVO pointed out that the system of batch identification had been poorly applied in three out of the four Member States affected by FMD (53).

36. The fact that Community regulations did not require sheep to be identified individually, and that there were also shortcomings in the system of batch identification, hampered the tracing of animals that were suspected of being infected and so delayed their slaughter. In the United Kingdom sheep that should have been slaughtered were not killed, so adding to the risk of the virus spreading.

37. The Community rules (54) also allowed Member States not to include on the compulsory list (which they are required to compile and update) of all farms in their territory holding animals, small holdings with a maximum of three sheep or goats for which the farmers do not claim premiums. In the Netherlands, for example, the responsible authority discovered in the course of the epidemic that 18 000 small holdings or individuals with only a very small number of animals were neither registered nor known, constituting an additional risk that it might not be possible to trace in time all the animals that had to be slaughtered. The HVO found the same problem in France.

Uncorrected deficiencies in the ANIMO system before the crisis

38. In 1990, the Community rules (55) introduced a computerised system linking veterinary authorities, one of the main aims being to facilitate exchange of information on animal movements between the competent authorities of the regions of origin and the responsible authorities in the Member State of destination. This system is called ANIMO (56). The Commission developed the model message to be transmitted by this system in 1991 (57).

39. Before the 2001 crisis the HVO had already pointed out that the ANIMO messages contained no mention of the transit points used during the transport of animals between a Member State of consignment and a Member State of destination. The farm of origin did not appear in the model message either. The Court, too, had already drawn attention to the deficiencies of the system, in its special report on classical swine fever (58). Despite the HVO and the Court advocating changes to the regulations on these points, the Commission had not proposed any revision of the ANIMO system.

40. During the 2001 crisis, following the confirmation of the first outbreak in the United Kingdom, the other Member States did indeed need to trace the sheep that they had imported from that country over the previous month, in order to be able to increase surveillance of animals that were potentially carrying the virus. It was crucial to know the holding of origin of the animals and the transit points. However, the ANIMO messages did not always contain this essential information.

41. During the 2001 crisis these two omissions caused delays in locating and slaughtering animals suspected of being contaminated (see Box 2). The ministry of agriculture in the Netherlands told the Court that compulsory details of transit points would have made control of the disease much more effective, especially during the critical initial phase of the crisis. During the crisis the authorities in the United Kingdom experienced problems in tracing the farms of origin for sheep exported to other Member States and determining whether the sheep were from contaminated farms, because that information was not given in the ANIMO messages. It was only possible for them to establish the link after an interval of between six and sixteen days after confirmation that the farms of origin were contaminated. On account of this they were not able to give Member States that had imported sheep timely warning of the risk of infection. Due to the lack of adequate information the Member States of destination had to carry out preventive culling of all sheep identified as having been imported from the United Kingdom, as it was impossible to differentiate between suspect sheep and others. The absence of a trail for the sheep was evidence of the difficulties experienced by the responsible authorities in France in tracing the French farms that were the ultimate destination of sheep imported from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the ministry was not sure that all the imported sheep had been slaughtered, which meant that there was still a potential risk of contamination. In the Netherlands, because of the absence of details of transit points in the ANIMO messages, it took a day to trace animals from Ireland. The animals had transited via a stopping point close to the farm in France (Mayenne) which, three weeks later, was found to be the site of an outbreak, following the importation of infected British sheep. The time taken to find the documents delayed precautionary action.

Restrictions on animal movements throughout Member States' territories

42. Directive 85/511/EEC requires immediate imposition of restrictions on animal movements in protection and surveillance areas of a minimum radius of 10 km around infected farms, in order to limit the risks of an epidemic spreading. These measures were implemented in the United Kingdom, but the restrictions alone could not contain the spread of the epidemic in view of the extent of contamination before the first outbreak had even been detected.

43. In the United Kingdom a nationwide ban on animal movements was not introduced until three days after the epidemic had been officially confirmed. On the basis of Article 10(4) of Directive 90/425/EEC the Commission, for its part, adopted Decision 2001/190/EC, banning movements of animals in Member States other than the United Kingdom. According to the NAO report, another 62 premises were believed to have been infected in seven other counties in the interval between confirmation of the first outbreak and the introduction of the ban on livestock movements in the United Kingdom (59), with an increase in the scale of the epidemic (and, therefore, its cost) which university epidemiologists estimated to be twice what it would have been had restrictions been imposed on the same day that the disease was confirmed (60).

COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS

Effective supervision by the Commission

44. Commission staff were available 24 hours a day throughout the crisis. The Commission was able to take the necessary emergency measures promptly by, for example, notifying Member States of the existence of the disease, carrying out surveillance measures which included the slaughter of sheep imported before the crisis started, closing markets, etc. Many of the decisions taken by the Commission in the veterinary area during the crisis were deemed by the Member States to have been timely and appropriate.

45. Comparisons of the dates of inspections carried out by the HVO and crises arising show that, as far as the crisis itself was concerned, the HVO succeeded in carrying out inspections at the opportune time, even if it meant postponing other planned visits to later dates. Normal procedures were speeded up during the crisis and HVO inspection reports were available within two months of its consideration of the comments of other departments of the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection and the replies from Member States.

Deficiencies in control arrangements and in the implementation of them in the Member States

46. Some deficiencies which the HVO had found in the control arrangements in the United Kingdom (the country most affected by the crisis) could not, however, be dealt with promptly, because they required fundamental revision of the measures in question by the Commission and the Member States. These deficiencies merit attention because, in fact, they potentially concern other Member States. The main ones are: (a) a significant shortage of government vets, (b) the effectiveness of the control arrangements relied on farmers notifying the disease immediately, (c) in some cases, unacceptable delays in identifying suspected cases, confirming them and slaughtering and disposing of the animals in question (61).

47. During the audit the Court also identified shortcomings similar to those found by the HVO. They are described below.

Reduced veterinary services

48. In its 1989 report the Commission said (62) that the success of abandoning preventive vaccination depended on the availability of a finely-tuned system of government veterinary supervision. Although the Council instituted a series of disease controls that qualified for Community funding, there was no Community funding for veterinary controls on non-endemic diseases, and FMD was, therefore, excluded. After the 2001 crisis, which brought to light the general decrease in the number of government vets, the European Parliament (63) and the international conference in December 2001 (64) raised the question of epidemiological monitoring of livestock and the funding of it as an effective means of preventing the disease. As yet there has been no Community-level response to this question which, in actual fact, concerns all animal diseases.

49. Cumbria was the region most affected by FMD and has four million sheep, more than 880 000 cattle and 170 000 pigs. In that region the number of government vets went down from 27 in 1967 to only nine in 2001 (65). Statistics show (66) that the United Kingdom had 9,5 government vets per million animals (cattle, sheep and pigs), compared with an average of more than 20 vets per million animals for the other Member States. Due to the reduction in the number of government vets in the United Kingdom and the delay in calling up additional manpower (67), the effectiveness of measures to control the epidemic was significantly reduced. The NAO noted (68) that until April 2001 the increase in the number of government vets employed in the United Kingdom during the crisis lagged behind the increase in the number of infected premises. Hence the culling delays described in paragraphs 57 and 58 and Box 3.

Insufficient incentive for immediate notification of disease and compliance with animal movement restrictions

50. Immediate notification of the disease is fundamental to rapid eradication. The aim of the Community regulations is to ensure both that farmers notify the disease to the responsible supervisory authority and, similarly, that the Member State notifies it to the Commission. In the first case Directive 85/511/EEC requires Member States to ensure that they are notified of any suspected or actual cases of FMD immediately.

51. Paradoxically, although the success of Community control of FMD actually relies substantially on farmers themselves, as they are the first people able to note the physical condition of their livestock and to notify any diseases in the herd, the Community regulations did not require Member States to involve farmers in disease control, consult them over contingency plans, provide them with information about the nature of different animal diseases and immediate action to be taken, make them aware of their responsibilities or encourage them by some other means to notify the disease quickly.

52. Following a detailed epidemiological enquiry national reference laboratory experts took the view that a certain livestock unit was the origin of the 2001 epidemic, but it had not informed the responsible authority in the United Kingdom of the infection among the livestock. The disease was detected approximately one month after its appearance in another region, by which time, according to estimates made since then, there were already 57 contaminated holdings (69). In the meantime (between 1 February 2001 and 21 February 2001), however, 49 796 head of livestock had been exported to the other Member States, increasing the risk of the epidemic spreading beyond the frontiers of the United Kingdom.

53. As regards the Member State's notification to the Commission and the other Member States, it was essential that the latter be notified as early as possible during the crisis, so that they could take the necessary precautions. This compulsory notification of the disease by the Member State concerned to the Commission and the other Member States is, moreover, a requirement (70). In the case of the first outbreak, however, it only has to be effected within 24 hours of the disease being confirmed on the basis of a test that is carried out by a specified national laboratory on samples taken from the animals. This interval of 24 hours can thus be added to the time needed for carrying out the tests, even though scientific confirmation has been obtained.

54. In order to offset this disadvantage the Council (71) gave the Commission the option of establishing a warning system, allowing any Member State affected by an epidemic to alert the Commission and the other Member States quickly to the occurrence of an outbreak of FMD. On 20 February, five hours after the national reference laboratory had officially confirmed the disease, the United Kingdom, in accordance with the provisions of the Community regulations, notified the Commission of the existence of the first outbreak, thus demonstrating that the 24-hour period allowed by the regulations could be shortened, given modern methods of communication. The Commission then immediately informed the veterinary services in the other Member States and, on the following day, stopped exports from the United Kingdom. In the intervening period around 287 pigs were still exported from Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic, before the export ban was actually implemented, at 17.00 hours on 21 February.

55. Prompt notification is essential if FMD is to be contained. Farmers' observance of animal movement restrictions is equally important. Member States found that in some cases these aspects had been disregarded in their territories and took action against the farmers concerned in the courts.

56. In the United Kingdom and France farmers who did not notify the disease or respect the animal movement restrictions were taken to court by the Member States concerned and were fined. These farmers were entitled to full compensation because the Community provisions did not make the payment of compensation conditional on compliance with essential aspects of the control provisions, such as disease notification and observance of movement restrictions (72). The absence of such provisions made it possible for the Member States to claim back from the Commission the amounts that they had paid to those farmers (see paragraph 77).

Delays in culling

57. In order to be entitled to Community reimbursement Member States must immediately slaughter infected animals, as required by Directive 85/511/EEC, as soon as the disease is officially confirmed. Immediate slaughter is essential, to prevent the spread of the virus.

58. In the case of secondary outbreaks, however, the Community regulations allow, but do not require, Member States to slaughter animals, if the epidemic spreads, as soon as clinical symptoms of the disease are detected by an official veterinarian. Furthermore, they do not require animals to be culled before they have been valued and the relevant administrative procedures completed. In consequence culling was more or less rapid according to the practice of the Member State and the veterinary resources available (see Box 3), thereby increasing the risk of the epidemic spreading. In the United Kingdom, as allowed by the Community regulations, the responsible authority waited for laboratory confirmation of infection before culling the animals from the first outbreak: in the meantime three other outbreaks had occurred. In the case of the first 100 outbreaks the interval between confirmation of contamination and slaughter was, in most instances, more than 24 hours and could be up to seven days. The United Kingdom subsequently took the appearance of clinical symptoms as the basis for culling. In 78 % of such cases subsequent tests confirmed the vets' diagnosis (see NAO report, Table 38, p. 63). In the other Member States, on the other hand, slaughter took place as soon as an outbreak was suspected, before the final results of laboratory tests were received. In the Netherlands, France and Ireland preventive culls were carried out, especially in the case of sheep imported from the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom animals were killed after they had been valued and after the valuation had been accepted by the farmer, thus delaying slaughter of infected animals. In France, on the other hand, animals were valued after slaughter, so as not to delay eradication of the infection.

COMMISSION ACTION CONCERNING THE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM

59. Before the crisis the Court and the discharge authorities had already made recommendations to the Commission, some of them coinciding with the HVO findings mentioned in paragraph 46. In the financial area the Commission did not take advantage of the recommendations made by the Court in 1996, nor those made by the discharge authority in connection with classical swine fever and BSE - it did not adapt them to the FMD situation (see Box 4). Clarify the rules and procedures relating to eligibility of Member States' expenditure and compensation payments to farmers (Special Report No 1/2000, paragraph 80): in reply to the follow-up to the Court's 1995 Annual Report the Commission undertook to address directives to the Member States on compensation procedures and calculation of the amounts involved; this was not done. Align the cofinancing rates applicable to veterinary measures and market support measures (Special Report No 1/2000, paragraph 79); the Commission undertook to do this for classical swine fever; however, the cofinancing rates still vary according to the nature of the animal disease. Submit to the Council a proposal for reviewing the regulations so as to increase the contributions from owners of intensive pig units to measures to combat the disease (Special Report No 1/2000, paragraph 81): the Commission carried out a comparative study of other forms of financing but did nothing towards the introduction of systems in the Member States involving farmers' contributions for FMD.

No Commission proposals for directives on procedures and calculation of compensation for farmers by Member States

60. The rules (73) give the Commission the task of adopting the necessary implementing measures as regards the special Community financial contribution for eradicating FMD. It makes the Community reimbursement of expenditure to Member States conditional on ‘adequate compensation of the livestock farmers’, but without specifying the meaning of the expression. In December 2000 the Council (74) made the Commission alone responsible for direct management of this expenditure. Paradoxically, although the Commission undertook to present directives containing the arrangements for compensating farmers in the Member States, it considers that it is not legally competent to do so. The regulations are incomplete as a consequence, in as far as the Commission has not presented the directives. On the basis of the current legal arrangements the Commission confines itself to determining whether Member States' expenditure is eligible for Community reimbursement, without providing the framework for their calculation of the compensation to be paid to their farmers.

61. On the other hand, in the context of compulsory slaughter of cattle affected by BSE (75), the Commission set limits on the amount of compensation to be paid to farmers by the Member States (76). The latter are authorised to pay the objective current market value for each animal, established on the basis of a system of objective individual evaluation approved by them. Even if this system does not entirely meet the wish for a harmonised, fair and economic compensation system, it is still preferable to the absence of any definition of compensation from Member States to farmers which prevails in the area of FMD. It was in fact the absence of any framework for compensation that made possible the inconsistencies and inequalities of treatment meted out to farmers according to their geographical location and/or the slaughter method chosen, as described below.

Variations in compensation systems and lack of uniformity in valuations

62. The compensation for direct losses by farmers, i.e. the gross value of slaughtered livestock, was not set in advance (except in the Netherlands). This meant that Member States had to set it during the crisis, when some price references were unavailable because markets were closed. Most Member States drew up price grids for use as a reference by the official valuers responsible for valuing animals, but without instructing that the figures were upper limits. Price references were unavailable for some categories of animals.

63. As regards indirect losses (77) there was no compensation in three Member States (Ireland, Netherlands, United Kingdom), leaving farmers without resources for at least three weeks after animals had been slaughtered, while the farm was being decontaminated. In France, on the other hand, the losses were reimbursed to farmers by the French authorities, who considered that the expression ‘adequate compensation’ for farmers ought to cover all losses (animals and income). However, the Commission did not accept them for reimbursement.

64. The contracts concluded by Member States with valuers varied and the instructions for valuers were inadequate in some cases. In the absence of instructions from the Commission to Member States about cattle valuations, the bovine identification system (78), which contains important data relating to the value of animals (breed, age, sex), was not used by valuers to determine cattle values, leaving them a good deal of latitude. The identity of cattle was not included in the valuation forms and there was no trace of valuations having been reviewed by senior valuers or by the ministry.

65. The systems adopted by Member States are described in Box 5. The compensation system chosen by the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands was based on the value of the animals, excluding indirect losses, whereas France included the latter, thus supplementing the animal value by around 30 %. In the United Kingdom the system fluctuated between one where valuers alone assessed the value of the animals and a mixed system where farmers could opt for either a valuation based on a standard rate card or a value set by the valuers. The standard rate card did not include price references for all categories of animals and had no upper limits. After a very strong rise in valuation figures use of the standard rate card was abandoned. Valuers were not given precise guidelines, and instructions on including outstanding animal premiums in the compensation figure were imprecise, leading to variations in the practices followed. In Ireland the responsible authority produced a monthly list of precise prices for all categories of cattle. In the case of sheep, on the other hand, the price grid established by the responsible authority was incomplete and provided no upper limits. In the Netherlands the reference price grid was set in advance by the responsible authority and the valuation procedures to be followed had already been laid down in the contingency plan. This was a contributory factor in achieving more precise and uniform assessments of animal value. In France a flat-rate scale had been set for sheep, but for other categories of animal the inadequacy of the national framework allowed prefectures to opt for various systems.

66. In the absence of detailed Community regulations the systems introduced in the Member States resulted in lack of uniformity in the compensation to farmers. In the United Kingdom the NAO, like the Commission and the Court, detected animal values that were higher than the values at the beginning of the crisis. Additional payments totalling 4,2 million euro relative to the initial valuation of the animals were granted to some farmers (France, Ireland, United Kingdom). In other cases the compensation was reduced (Netherlands). The average compensation paid to farmers was noticeably higher in the United Kingdom for cattle and sheep than in the other Member States, while in France it was higher for pigs (see Box 6 and Diagram 3). In the United Kingdom the compensation paid was high: the National Audit Office reported that the standard rate card used to value animals during part of the crisis was based on the highest prices prevailing just before the crisis. The contracts that were concluded with the valuers tied their remuneration to the estimated value of the animals, with the inherent risk that the estimated value (and, therefore, the compensation paid) would be unduly increased. The Commission has calculated that the average compensation paid for cattle was more than twice their value, more than 2,5 times value for sheep and almost twice value for pigs, resulting in an over-valuation (811,7 million euro) of the amount declared by the responsible authority. In the case of France the Commission estimated that 1,1 million euro of the amount declared was attributable to the over-valuation of animals, mainly because the compensation included indirect losses and the valuations for pigs were too high. In Ireland and the United Kingdom additional amounts (0,5 million euro and 1,7 million euro respectively) were paid to farmers who disputed valuations, but the amount of compensation paid was not cut in cases where the responsible authority found the valuation too high. In France the flat-rate scale for sheep was revised upwards, adding almost two million euro to the compensation for destroying carcasses. In the Netherlands the ministry decided to reduce the compensation for infected animals by 50 % of their value. As a consequence farmers received 50 % of the value of infected animals and 100 % of the value of other animals, all on the same farm. A price grid was drawn up in advance and used as a valuation guide.

Established cases of double payments of animal premiums

67. Five months after the start of the FMD crisis, when Member States had already begun to award compensation, the Commission drew up a regulation of derogation (79) concerning Member States' payment of the Community per capita animal and slaughter premiums under market support measures (80). The Regulation authorised Member States to pay the premiums to farmers, in addition to the FMD compensation, without their having to comply with the conditions governing retention of animals on the farm which are necessary for control purposes under normal circumstances (identification and counting of the animals).

68. However, when it drafted the derogation Regulation the Commission did not take into account the selling practices that normally apply, particularly in Ireland and the United Kingdom, whereby the sale price of animals includes the amount of any animal premiums still outstanding from which the next buyer might benefit. In actual fact, valuers in Ireland and the United Kingdom followed the usual practice and, taking the view that adequate compensation for farmers ought to include any premiums still due to the farmers, they included them in the livestock valuations for FMD compensation purposes. The Commission, however, omitted to take this practice into consideration and did not instruct Member States to refrain from paying animal premiums subsequently if they had already been included in the FMD compensation.

69. After granting farmers FMD compensation the Member States applied the derogating Regulation and then proceeded to pay any animal premiums that were still due. Given that Ireland and the United Kingdom had already included the amount of some of these premiums in the FMD compensation previously paid to farmers, this meant that some farmers were able to collect the amount of premium twice.

70. In practice the animal valuation forms only gave an overall amount, without distinguishing between the premiums and the intrinsic value of the animals, so that it was difficult for an auditor to set a precise figure on the extent of double payments. However, given that valuers had been instructed to include the amount of the premiums in the livestock valuations and that some of them had given direct confirmation of the inclusion, the Court was able to estimate that the total for animal premiums (81) paid to the United Kingdom in duplication of those included in the FMD compensation could be of the order of 10 million pounds sterling (more than 16 million euro) (82).

71. In Ireland as well, the Court identified cattle premiums that had been paid in addition to compensation, but the amounts were smaller (83). In France some prefectures included bovine premiums in the compensation, others did not. The agriculture ministry in the Netherlands, on the other hand, told the Court that it had not included any premiums in the FMD compensation.

Variations in slaughter premium payments

72. Still in the context of market support measures, provision for payment of a slaughtering premium for cattle is included in a Council Regulation (84) requiring an abattoir certificate to confirm that the animal has been slaughtered. This Regulation, however, does not specify the nature of the slaughtering, i.e. whether it is for purposes of human consumption (EAGGF Guarantee Section - market support) or on health grounds (EAGGF Guarantee Section - veterinary). Depending on the interpretation it was possible for the slaughter premium to be paid in addition to the FMD compensation, but only to a small minority of farmers whose contaminated animals were slaughtered at an abattoir. This led to inequality in the treatment of farmers within Member States, according to where slaughter took place.

73. When questioned on the subject by one of the Member States the Commission did not resolve the matter, and did not give a reply on the interpretation to be adopted before the deadline of 30 June 2002 set by the regulations for payment of the 2001 slaughter premiums. As a result the Member States adopted differing decisions, leading to inequalities of treatment among farmers. The Netherlands, where a significant part of the culling was carried out in abattoirs, did not pay slaughter premiums to farmers in addition to FMD compensation, thereby making a saving for the Community budget of some 3,5 million euro. On the other hand, in Ireland, where part of the culling was also carried out in abattoirs, the premiums were paid; they were recovered, however, after the Court's audit visit. In the United Kingdom the premiums were not paid, in order to avoid possible duplication with the FMD compensation, which already included them. In France the question did not arise because contaminated animals were not slaughtered at abattoirs, and so slaughtering premiums were not paid either.

Rules and procedures governing eligibility of Member States' expenditure for Community reimbursement were defined late

74. Under Decision 90/424/EEC the Commission, with the help of the Standing Veterinary Committee (85), is responsible for laying down procedures for implementing the Community financial contribution to Member States' expenditure. The Commission, again with the Committee's help, is also responsible for defining the nature of any additional measures that might be needed to eradicate an outbreak of disease, and the nature of the resultant Community financial contribution.

75. Before the crisis, the Commission had not made any proposals for procedures for implementing the Community financial contribution, despite the undertaking it had given earlier in response to the follow-up of the Court's 1995 Annual Report, ‘to issue guidelines to the Member States concerning both procedures and the calculation of compensation with regard to Community co-financing of veterinary measures’ (see Box 4). Neither had it provided Member States with details of the nature of the supporting documents that they would need to keep if their expenditure was to be allowed for Community reimbursement. In this way it deprived itself of resources that were important for its own checks.

76. Six months after the start of the crisis it informed the Member States (86) that it would only reimburse compensation for animals ‘at the value the animals had immediately before they became affected’, whereas all the Member States concerned had already paid a substantial part of the compensation to farmers, using different methods (see paragraphs 62 to 66). Furthermore, it did not say how the value would be determined, nor the documents on which it would be based.

77. Similarly, in the absence of Commission instructions, the Member States' requests for reimbursement included compensation paid to farmers who had not complied with national provisions implementing the Community directives on notification and movement restrictions (some 972 876 euro in the United Kingdom and 58 769 euro in France, see paragraph 56).

78. In the absence of Commission guidelines on the checks to be carried out by Member States and the supporting information to be kept, the beneficiary files examined on the spot were incomplete: in many cases slaughter certificates were missing, cross-checks of the number of cattle identified in the national databases against the number of cattle slaughtered had either not been carried out or revealed numerous discrepancies in most of the Member States audited. Even though many of these shortcomings can be attributed to the scale of the crisis, fuller contingency plans (see paragraphs 30 to 32) and more precise Commission criteria could have reduced the importance of them. For the other categories of animals, which were not recorded because the Community regulations provided for individual identification only in the case of cattle (87), it was not possible to obtain assurance as to the reliability of the number declared.

79. After the crisis the Commission specified the eligibility criteria mentioned in Decision 90/424/EEC, together with the necessary documents for obtaining Community reimbursement (see Box 7). As the Commission itself said, in its reply to this paragraph, it had not made any substantial changes to the eligibility rules contained in Decision 90/424/EEC since 1990. The decision in question is not sufficiently precise and can be interpreted in various ways. Protective culling in the Member States that had imported sheep from the United Kingdom the month before the crisis: in France there was reimbursement for the animals slaughtered, even though there was no Commission decision on the reimbursement. Partial protective culling around outbreaks in Ireland, France and the United Kingdom (3 km slaughter zone in Cumbria gave rise to expenditure to a sum total of some 112,3 million euro); reimbursement decisions were adopted by the Commission in July 2002 for France, in December 2003 for the United Kingdom and Ireland and, at the time when this report was being drafted, were still being finalised in the case of the Netherlands. Protective culling by Member States where there had been no outbreaks (Belgium, Germany, Spain and Portugal): the decision was not adopted by the Commission until August 2003, almost two years after the end of the crisis (88). Decisions on the financing of associated costs, with details of the information to be supplied to the Commission (veterinary costs, destruction costs, disinfecting costs): were not adopted until 2003 (89).

80. The Community contributes to Member States' expenditure on condition that they have immediately implemented Community measures such as isolating holdings as soon as disease is suspected, combined with slaughter of all animals, destruction of the carcases and cleansing and disinfecting of premises as soon as the disease has been confirmed officially (90). However, the financial reports which, according to its decisions granting financial assistance to Member States, the Commission requires in order to determine the reimbursement due, only contain part of the information needed for assessing the eligibility of the expenditure mentioned in Council Decision 90/424/EEC (91).

81. Member States submitted numerous amendments to reimbursement claims. The claims varied widely and, again, contained numerous errors, so that Commission staff were obliged to extend their checks and, therefore, to delay their final reimbursements.

Delays in reimbursing Member States' expenditure

82. Due to the variety of compensation systems adopted by the Member States (see paragraphs 62 to 73) and the amendments to reimbursement claims submitted by Member States, the Commission's task of identifying within reimbursement claims the eligible value of each animal, or, at least, each category of animal, proved to be complex. Added to this was the lack of assurance as to exactly how many animals had been culled.

83. This was why, as of 1 October 2003, more than two years after the end of the epidemic, neither Ireland, the Netherlands nor the United Kingdom had received any Community reimbursements, even though as a general rule farmers had received compensation within three months, after the culls in 2001.

Cofinancing rates aligned in the pig sector

84. Council Decision 90/424/EEC specifies that the Community contribution is equal to 60 % of the eligible costs incurred by the Member State in controlling FMD (see Table).

85. Management and specific regulations concerning reimbursement rates and compensation payable to farmers continue to be divided between the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection and the Directorate General for Agriculture: the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection handles the compensation for most animal diseases, with the exception of compensation for cattle slaughtered because of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), which is still managed by the Directorate General for Agriculture. Even though the reimbursement rates applied by the Directorate General for Agriculture and the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection have been aligned for the pig sector, this does not apply for FMD and TSE: the rate is 60 % for FMD, while for TSE it is 70 %. For other animal diseases, including swine fever, it is 50 %. It follows that the reimbursement rates for the same categories of animal vary according to the disease that was the reason for slaughtering. The Court was unable to find the reason for these variations in the rates, which have been in force since 1996.

Farmers do not contribute to Community financing of the control system

86. In its reply to the Court's Special report on classical swine fever (92), the Commission recognised that ‘producers should share greater responsibility for the financial aspects of the eradication of animal diseases’ and said that it intended ‘to evaluate the possibility of supporting the Member States in establishing these schemes, in the framework of the revision of Community legislation on these issues’. The Commission has not made any proposals for such support, neither for classical swine fever nor for FMD.

87. No-one in this branch of agriculture (neither farmers affected by the epidemic nor those unaffected) contributes to Community eradication costs, although, as a study carried out by a university on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture in Ireland shows (93), some of them, namely farmers who were unaffected by movement restrictions or slaughter measures, were able to benefit from price rises. The study quantified agriculture-related benefits in Ireland as some 107 million euro for 2001, essentially due to the increase in the volume and prices of exports to the United Kingdom.

88. However, some initiatives were taken in some Member States independently of the Commission, by either the public sector or the agricultural sector in question, partly with a view to reducing or supplementing the national expenditure on eradication. In the Netherlands, following the classical swine fever crisis, an animal health fund was set up, to pay compensation in the event of an epidemic. It is funded from three sources: farmers, the European budget (where relevant) and the Dutch agriculture budget. The majority of contributions come from farmers. A similar system is currently under study in the United Kingdom. In France farmers who are members of animal health associations (groupements de défense sanitaire) voluntarily set up equalisation funds to compensate members who, in times of crisis, incur losses as a result of measures restricting animal movements if there is no Community reimbursement to compensate for such losses (94).

89. There are thus interesting initiatives of various kinds under development in the Member States. There is a risk that without a Community framework they may create inequality between farmers. Moreover, although some of these initiatives may result in a reduction of Member States' contributions to the system for controlling disease, none of them offers any guarantee that the cost to the Community can be reduced.

COMMISSION MANAGEMENT AFTER THE CRISIS

Action in the veterinary field

90. In December 2002 the Commission presented a new proposal for a directive. It was adopted by the Council in September 2003 (95) and made important amendments to the incomplete measures of Directive 85/511/EEC, in particular: (a) without prejudicing the policy that has been in force since 1992, which gives priority to slaughtering animals contaminated by the virus, the new Directive puts forward emergency vaccination as an important means of controlling an epidemic of animal disease and lays down conditions for the possible marketing of meat from animals vaccinated on Union territory during an outbreak of animal disease; (b) it extends the Community requirements as regards contingency plans and requires Member States to review them every five years in the light of real-time alert exercises (96); for their part, most of the Member States had already revised their plans in the light of the experience gained during the crisis; (c) it gives five separate criteria, any of which may be used as the basis for declaring an outbreak of FMD on a holding (97); this should help to set preventive measures in motion more quickly; (d) it requires the Member States to introduce systems of penalties to be applied in cases of infringement of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Community directives (98); (e) it requires Member States to provide information about the dates on which the Community measures were implemented. This should enable the Commission to determine the extent to which Community reimbursement is due.

91. Complementary measures were adopted at the same time, to reinforce the prevention and control measures: (a) as regards border controls, additional precautions were adopted by the Commission after the crisis, reinforcing checks on travellers' luggage and providing information to travellers (99); (b) on the basis of earlier Commission proposals, a ban on the warehousing in free zones of products that do not meet Community veterinary requirements was adopted after the crisis (100); (c) as regards animal feed, the Commission had already proposed a generalised ban on the use of kitchen waste and swill before the crisis (101); it succeeded in obtaining the adoption of its proposals at EU level; (d) after the crisis the Commission introduced a proposal for individual identification of sheep (102), which was adopted in December 2003 (103).

92. However, the measures adopted thus far have not taken some aspects sufficiently into account and remain minimal in these respects: (a) the desirability of farmers' notifying the disease quickly has not been reinforced by means of incentive measures or by imposing conditions on the payment of compensation to them; (b) the time allowed for Member States to notify the Commission of the first outbreak has not been reduced and is still 24 hours from confirmation of the disease, whereas experience showed that this time could be shortened; (c) slaughter of animals is compulsory as soon as an outbreak is confirmed. Confirmation is now being obtained more quickly, but there is nothing to say that slaughter must be effected immediately, before the administrative procedures relating to valuation of the animals have been completed.

93. Moreover, as was the case for classical swine fever (104), the Commission has not updated its initial study, even though some of the data that were missing at the time have become available since the 2001 crisis (105). The cost/benefit analysis of the new Community strategy of using emergency vaccination and authorising consumption of meat from animals vaccinated on European territory has not been updated, despite the changes introduced by the Office International des Epizooties (see paragraph 3) concerning the time limits for resuming commercial activities after an epidemic.

94. In 2002 the Office actually reduced the time limit for resuming commercial activity from 12 months to six where vaccination is used during a crisis. In terms of commercial consequences this has narrowed the difference between vaccination, on the one hand, and a policy of stamping out and no vaccination on the other (in the latter case the time limit is only three months). This is a significant factor, in as far as the policy change that has been made at Community level gives emergency vaccination more importance than it had before.

95. At the time of the audit the Court pointed out that a number of countries, some of which had concluded veterinary agreements with the Community, continued to block exports from the EU after the countries concerned had recovered their disease-free status (106).

96. The Commission, however, has not quantified the Community-level cost of export bans. There is a risk of bans becoming more significant if the EU pursues emergency vaccination, because of the risk that third countries that do not vaccinate may be reluctant to accept exports from zones that do.

97. In addition, the Commission has still not updated its study on Member States' veterinary services. Despite the recommendations of the Parliament (107) (and of the international conference), that Member States introduce regular farm inspections, the Commission has not, so far, presented any proposals encouraging Member States to introduce such a system.

Action in the financial field

98. In a memorandum of April 2002 (108), the Spanish Presidency of the Council stated that agricultural insurance programmes in the livestock farming sector could provide an alternative solution to the mechanisms that are currently covered by the Emergency Fund. Following that memorandum, and earlier recommendations by the Court and the discharge authority (see paragraph 59 and Box 4), the Commission, in January 2003, ordered a study on insurance against the risks associated with animal diseases.

99. The study highlighted the inconsistencies of the current system and was clearly in favour of generalised introduction in the Member States of financial systems managed by farmers themselves, with their own financial contributions, to encourage them to participate in disease control. In the case of compensation for indirect losses, the study suggested introducing a system of voluntary insurance between farmers in the form of a mutual fund of some kind.

100. Due to the recency of this study (May 2003), the Commission has not yet proposed amendments to the current system and has not laid down implementing procedures for the financial contribution to Member States' expenditure.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

101. The need to complete the single market led the Community to ban preventive vaccination of livestock against FMD. At the time the choice was justified by commercial considerations and it was assumed that the counterpart would be a system of disease prevention and control that would make it possible to recover FMD-free status rapidly. The Community accordingly introduced prevention and control arrangements which effectively take into account the risks associated with the free movement of animals and animal products and seek to limit the risk of the virus being introduced into Community territory, as well as the risk of its becoming widespread throughout Community territory (see paragraph 6).

102. In the nature of things such arrangements cannot be completely effective under all circumstances, but in the absence of full and timely appraisals and checks by the Commission some of the shortcomings of the arrangements, and deficiencies in their implementation by the Member States, could not be corrected in time. The omissions of the Community regulations were not corrected before the 2001 crisis, although some Commission proposals predated the crisis (see paragraphs 18 to 43). During the 2001 crisis the Commission was confronted with a large-scale epidemic, but quickly identified the shortcomings of the prevention and control arrangements and their implementation by some of the Member States, especially as regards the number of government vets and systems for notifying the disease and implementing culls. However, it was impossible to rectify these shortcomings immediately (see paragraphs 48 to 58) They were a contributory factor in the increased financial cost of the 2001 epidemic. Moreover one Member State had its disease-free status officially withdrawn for 11 months under the OIE animal health code, while the Union, for all practical purposes, lost that status for over a year in that its exports were blocked by non-member countries.

103. The audit revealed that the effectiveness of the control arrangements relied heavily on farmers notifying the disease immediately and complying with movement restrictions.

104. The Court also found that the system of funding could be further improved: the scope of compensation and reimbursement is poorly defined, some Member States have still not been reimbursed, and treatment of farmers varies, depending on the location of the holding or the method of slaughter (see paragraphs 60 to 73). The rules and procedures governing the eligibility of Member States' expenditure for Community reimbursement were laid down at a late stage (see paragraphs 74 to 83). Following Commission checks, payments for the United Kingdom and France were reduced by 58,1 % and 2,7 %, i.e. 573,2 million euro and 0,1 million euro respectively.

105. Since then, the Council and the Commission have remedied many of the omissions in the legislation (see paragraphs 90 and 91). The texts adopted are clear evidence that the Commission has learnt, and is still learning, from the experience acquired during the crisis. Some of the weaknesses persist nevertheless, and threaten to compromise the effectiveness of Community disease prevention and control. This is particularly true as regards surveillance programmes, notification of FMD, and rapid culling (see paragraph 92). Community regulations now require Member States to put in place penalties for non-compliance with the national rules implementing Community directives. They do not, however, include incentives to encourage farmers to participate actively in prevention and control. In particular, farmers do not make a direct contribution to the Community funding for prevention and control arrangements. Moreover, the funding system has still not been revised. In spite of these omissions the current arrangements may give rise to reimbursements to Member States, leaving a substantial persistent financial risk to the Community budget.

106. On the basis of the above findings the Court recommends: (a) outside crisis periods, regular evaluation of the prevention and control arrangements and increased supervision of their implementation; (b) a study of ways of involving farmers more closely in rapid notification of disease and compliance with movement restrictions; (c) clarification of the financial framework applicable to epidemics of animal disease, combined with maximum reduction of the financial risks to the Community budget.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg on 21 July 2004. For the Court of Auditors Juan Manuel FABRA VALLÉS President

(1) European Parliament resolution adopted on 17 December 2002, paragraph 54.

(2) Report from the Commission to the Council on a study carried out by the Commission on policies currently applied by Member States in the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (89) 1731 final, 18 October 1989.

(3) Preventive vaccination should not be confused with emergency vaccination; the latter is possible if an outbreak occurs. Two different policies were being applied in 1988: eight Member States (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal) vaccinated livestock as a precautionary measure, followed by partial or total stamping out of contaminated animals if the disease occurred. The other Member States (Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom) did not carry out preventive vaccination and eradicated all animals in the event of an FMD outbreak.

(4) An intergovernmental organisation set up in 1924. The World Trade Agreement recognises the OIE standards as a reference for international animal health rules.

(5) Council Directive 90/423/EEC of 26 June 1990 amending Directive 85/511/EEC introducing Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine and Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection upon importation of bovine animals and swine and fresh or meat products from third countries (OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 13).

(6) Statistics on foot-and-mouth disease, DEFRA, United Kingdom, 12 December 2002.

(7) Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme, state aid introduced by the United Kingdom on 22 March 2001, administered by the Rural Payments Agency and accepted by the Commission.

(8) Council Directives 90/423/EEC and 85/511/EEC of 18 November 1985 introducing Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease (OJ L 315, 26.11.1985, p. 11).

(9) Although the Community reimbursement for veterinary expenditure incurred by the Member States is booked to the EAGGF Guarantee Section, it is treated as a grant. For that reason it is not subject to the procedure for clearing Member States' accounts, nor does it involve the bodies that certify their paying agencies' accounts. Instead, it is subject to direct management and financial control by the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection.

(10) Proposal for a Council Directive on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease and amending Directive 92/46/EEC, COM (2002) 736 final, 13 December 2002.

(11) Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC (OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 1).

(12) Council Decision 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field (OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 19).

(13) The item in question is heading B1-332. The budget classification was changed for 2004. The emergency fund is now included in Article 17 04 03 of the budget.

(14) This does not cover bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

(15) The annual budget of the emergency veterinary fund rose from five million euro between 1995 and 1998 to 20 million euro in 1999, before reaching a total of 41 million euro for financial years 2000 and 2001. The FMD crisis necessitated a transfer of 400 million euro in addition to the initial appropriations of 41 million for the Fund for 2001, a supplement of almost 10 times the initial amount. For financial years 2001, 2002 and 2003, the final appropriations entered in the budget reached a total of 978,1 million euro.

(16) Exchange rate: 1 euro = 0,62380 pound sterling (on 3 December 2001)

NB:

The Member States' reimbursement claims cover 3,5 million animals.

The highest number is for the United Kingdom, with 3 166 583 animals, representing 89 % of the total.

The compensation paid amounts to 1 775,1 million euro, of which 1 670 for the United Kingdom, i.e. 94 % of the total compensation for countries affected by FMD in 2001.

The category of animals most affected by FMD in 2001 was sheep, with 2 587 180 sheep. The number of sheep for which compensation was granted in the United Kingdom accounts for 94,53 % of this total.

The highest compensation per animal category is that for cattle, with a total of 1 086 189 835 euro, 93,8 % of which was paid to the United Kingdom.

Source:

FR/ Reimbursement claims (5 October 2001 and 6 December 2002).

IRL/ Reimbursement claim (6 February 2002).

NL/ Reimbursement claim (April 2002).

UK/ Reimbursement claims (December 2001 and 26 February 2003) plus reimbursement claim for Northern Ireland.

(17) Commission Decisions 2001/646/EC (OJ L 228, 24.8.2001, p. 24), 2001/652/EC (OJ L 230, 28.8.2001, p. 8), 201/653/EC OJ L 230, 28.8.2001, p. 12) and 2001/654/EC (OJ L 230, 28.8.2001, p. 16 concerning a financial contribution towards the eradication of foot-and-mouth disease in France, Ireland, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

(18) Payments made as of 31 December 2003.

(19) FMD 2001: foot and mouth disease in year 2001.

(20) FMD 2001: FMD in year 2001.

(21) Commitments for ‘Other animal diseases’: 114,38 million euro.

(22) Payments for ‘Other animal diseases’: 36,2 million euro.

(23) Annual report concerning the financial year 1995 (OJ C 340, 12.11.1996, p. 1). Special Report No 19/98 concerning the Community financing of certain measures taken as a result of the BSE crisis (OJ C 383,9.12.1998, p. 1). Special Report No 1/2000 on classical swine fever (OJ C 85, 23.3.2000, p. 1). Special Report No 14/2001. Follow-up to Special Report No 19/98 on BSE (OJ C 324, 20.11.2001, p. 1).

(24) As long as the Commission has not completed its negotiations with the Member States and adopted a final decision on the reimbursement to be granted, the Court will not be able to give an opinion either on other FMD expenditure in connection with the disposal of carcases and the disinfecting of premises and equipment or on the Commission's financial controls.

(25) Three of the audit visits were carried out jointly with Commission staff.

(26) Beneficiaries and valuers who had established the value of the slaughtered animals were also interviewed. The Office international des epizooties (OIE) in Paris, Pirbright Laboratory and the National Audit Office (NAO) in London were also visited.

(27) International Conference on Control and Prevention of Foot-and-mouth disease, Final Report, organised by the Belgian EU Presidency, European Commission, Netherlands and United Kingdom, Brussels, 12-13 December 2001;

The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London;

Rapport d'information n° 405 by J-P Émorine of the French Senate, adopted at the Senate meeting of 21 June 2001;

Foot-and-mouth disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned, Inquiry Report by Dr Iain Anderson CBE, July 2002, The Stationery Office, London;

Infectious diseases in livestock, The Royal Society, July 2002;

Response to the Reports of the Foot-and-mouth disease Inquiries, HM Government with the Welsh Assembly Government, November 2002;

European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2002 on measures to control foot-and-mouth disease in the European Union in 2001 and future measures to prevent and control animal diseases in the European Union, and Report of the Temporary Committee on Foot-and-mouth disease, European Parliament, document No A5-0405/2002.

(28) Report from the Commission to the Council on a study carried out by the Commission on policies currently applied by Member States in the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (89) 1731 final, 18 October 1989.

(29) In the case of cattle, there are movements involving around three million head per year.

(30) The number of abattoirs in the United Kingdom fell from 1 400 in 1990 to 400 in 1999.

(31) Between 1987 and 1997 the density of pigs per farm had more than tripled in Ireland, and increased by more than 50 % in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. The density of sheep per holding had also increased substantially in Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom in particular, where it reached almost 500 head per holding, four times higher than the average density for the Union (137,9 head per holding). The stocking density for goats increased likewise over the period, especially in Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. (Structure of agricultural holdings Historic results — Surveys from 1966/1967 to 1997 — Final version: October 2000 Eurostat, p. 88, 89 and 92).

(32) United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.

(33) FAO press release 98/05.

(34) A total of 650,5 million euro was charged to the Community budget for 1997 and 1998. Court Special Report No 1/2000, paragraph 1.

(35) COM (2002) 736 final of 13 December 2002, p. 4.

(36) Article 43a of Decision 90/424/EEC requires the Commission to submit a report on the conditions of its application to the Parliament and the Council every three years.

(37) Directorate F of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection.

(38) During on-site visits the HVO also checks that the national transposing measures are effective and makes recommendations for the attention of the Commission if, amongst other things, it considers that the national measures are not in accordance with Community norms.

(39) Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption (OJ L 18, 23.1.2003, p. 11).

(40) Commission Decision 2002/995/EC of 9 December 2002 laying down interim safeguard measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption (OJ L 353, 30.12.2002, p. 1).

(41) The Commission presented a proposal to the Parliament and the Council concerning a ban on the use of catering waste and swill in animal feed (COM (2000) 574) in 2000, but it was not adopted until 2002 (Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002, OJ L 273, 10.10.2002, p. 1). In January 2001, just before the crisis, it also presented a proposal for a ban on the use of catering waste as pig feed, but it was not adopted until 23 October 2001. Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 5).

(42) Origin of the UK foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), June 2002.

(43) Foot-and-mouth disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, p. 47.

(44) Directive 90/423/EEC.

(45) Commission Decision 91/42/EEC of 8 January 1991 laying down the criteria to be applied when drawing up contingency plans for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 90/423/EEC (OJ L 23, 29.1.1991, p. 29).

(46) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, paragraph 6.12: ‘Each Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each. It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than five holdings on one day if he/she