1.7

On the other hand, the EESC has serious misgivings and strong doubts about the following points: (a) some innovation introduced into the ‘universal service’ provisions which, on the pretext of the declared aim of modernising the regime for this service, in practice involves replacing services and even abolishing a series of requirements such as public payphones, comprehensive directories and directory enquiry services, making the desired outcome redundant; (b) the definition of functional broadband, since this might be likely to create just an arbitrary list of accessible internet services, unlike a neutral minimum quality link, and may thus in the future give rise to discriminatory practices detrimental to end-users; (c) reference to social assistance and welfare, i.e. to the national budget through taxes: ‘support is provided to low-income or special social needs end-users in view of ensuring affordability of functional internet access and voice communications services at least at a fixed location’. This removes such requirements from the sphere of service providers and enables them to only provide coverage for profitable sectors, which protects their interests and reduces both the scope of universal service and consumer rights; in the same vein, it is public funds which are being called upon to cover the costs of public service, since the possibility of pooling costs, which was previously available, has now been removed; (d) the express choice of the maximum harmonisation method as regards end-users’ rights, at a low level of protection, which ends up curtailing users’ rights out of a desire for simplification and runs counter to the stance systematically defended by the Committee; (e) the removal of some regulatory requirements or a reduction in earlier rights and guarantees on the pretext (not demonstrated) that they are no longer necessary or are covered by general consumer rights. One example thereof is the revocation of national regulators’ powers to impose retail price regulation directly on operators with significant market power (SMP) or certain provisions on contracts, transparency, equivalence of access for users with disabilities, directory services and the interoperability of digital television equipment; (f) shortcomings in the regulation of certain practices reported as unfair in contracts with users, such as upper limits on the length of contracts or termination of contracts, contract renewal in the event of bundled offers, the lack of sanctions for ensuring efficiency of the process of changing supplier for end-users, maintenance of the requirement for compensation by the end-user ‘for the pro rata temporis value of subsidised equipment bundled with the contract at the moment of the contract conclusion and a pro rata temporis reimbursement for any other promotional advantages marked as such at the moment of the contract conclusion’; (g) lastly, this proposal does not respond to the Council’s express wish that there be a European code of rights for users of electronic communications services, the aim of which would be to ‘have at EU level a simple, user-friendly tool bringing together all the rights of users of electronic communications services in the areas of ICT (information and communications technology) and consumer protection’.