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COM (84) 233 
 
 
 
Vol. 1984/ 0114 
  
 
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concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
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In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the openi ng to the public of the historical archives of the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
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file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom 1. 
Februar 198 3 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft (ABI. L 43 vom 15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. September 2003  
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CO M M ISSIO N  OF THE EU R O PEA N  C O M M U N ITIES
COM (84) 233 final  
Brussels, 26 April 1984
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL  
The transport of radioactive materials within the European Community
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL  
The transport of radioactive materais within the European Community
COM(84) 233 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
Subject :  The transport of radioactive materials within the European  
Community.
I.  Preamble
In its "Resolution on the transport of radioactive substances and  
radioactive waste" of 22 January 1982 (Annex 1 to this communication),  
the European Parliament (in point 12 of the Resolution of the European  
Parliament) "Urges the Commission to create a special permanent working  
party for the transport of radioactive substances and radioactive waste,  
consisting of representatives of the Commission and national experts, to  
be responsible for :
a) exchange of all relevant information;
b) studying the recommendations made by the European Parliament;
c) preparing proposals for Community action;
d) studying any other questions arising in connection with this kind of  
transport;
e) drawing up an annual report to be submitted to the European  
Parliament".
During the session of the Parliament in February 1982, the Commission  
Undertook to set up the working party in question, hereinafter called the  
special working party, and subsequently called upon the Member States to  
designate their experts who would be members of the special working party.
That working party held its first meeting on 29 September 1982 and, after  
analysing the Resolution of the European Parliament, began to prepare its  
report, which was finalized after its fourth meeting, held on 7 December  
1983; the report was approved unanimously by the members of the special  
working party and is attached to this communication (Annex 2).
The conclusions of the special working party are summarized in Part II  
of this communication and the comments of the Commission are set out in  
Part III.

-  2 -
II. Summary of the conclusions in the report
The conclusions in the report by the special working party can be  
summarized as follows :
1. General
Appropriate rules were formulated and finalized by the Member States  
before any acute practical problems arose and the Member States now  
possess safety rules which are duly observed by all the parties concerned :  
consignors, carriers and transport personnel. The application of these  
rules has guaranteed and continues to guarantee a high level of safety.
2. Regulatory aspects
The regulations adopted by each Member State are based on the recommenda­
tions made at international level which are reflected in the "Regulations  
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)" jointly adopted by the  
experts of the Member States of that Agency, who include those from the  
Community. Differences of detail between national regulations within  
the Community can exist without compromising the safe transport of  
radioactive materials (of which readioactive waste is an integral part)  
within the Community as a whole. A revised edition of the IAEA Regulations  
will be published towards the end of 1984 and should make it possible  
to achieve more thorough harmonization of the national regulations.
3. Technical aspects of safety
The technical solutions adopted with a view to ensuring technological  
safety and radiation protection are the same in all Community countries.
The transport packages are of well defined types accepted everywhere on  
the basis of a "reciprocity system". However, it would be desirable to  
arrive at more general acceptance of type B(U) packages, which are used  
chiefly for transporting spent fuel elements or other heavy and highly  
radioactive loads (type B) and have been unilaterally approved (U) by  
one national safety authority in accordance with the reciprocity system  
referred to above. Unilateral approval should result in acceptance of

- 3 -
the packages concerned by the other States; this is not yet the case,  
mainly because the quality assurance criteria on which approvals are  
based have not yet been the subject of reciprocal recognition by the  
States. There is thus further progress to be made here. In this regard,  
the technical studies financed by the Commission are especially useful.
4. Administrative aspects
Although all the transport documents and approval certificates contain  
the same information irrespective of the Member State in which they  
were prepared, there would be a definite advantage, from the standpoint  
of the administrative procedures inherent in international transport, in  
adopting unified formats at the most international level possible.
5. Radiation protection
The doses of ionizing radiation received by workers and the general  
public as a result of the transport of radioactive materials are  
extremeley low and represent only a small contribution to the exposure  
of the population to this type of radiation. It would therefore appear  
that no special requirements, such as the selection of special routes,  
are called for in the case of this type of transport. It should be  
stressed in this regard that the national regulations relating to the  
transport of radioactive materials take due account of the provisions  
of the Council Directive of 15 July 1980 amending the Directives laying  
down the basic safety standards for the health protection of the general  
public and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation.
6. Accident conditions
The current studies concerning, on the one hand, the estimation of risks  
of all kinds as a function of possible accidents and, on the other hand,  
the training of transport personnel together with the measures for  
emergency assistance in frontier zones are likely to give rise to impro­
vements to existing arrangements and their application.
7. Information
The furnishing of adequate and objective information through the mass  
media concerning the provisions adopted with regard to the transport of  
radioactive materials would help to improve the acceptability of this  
activity to the general public.

- 4 -
III. Comments by the Commission
After examining the report by the special working party, with which it
is extremely satisfied, the Commission is forwarding it to Parliament
and the Council together with its comments :
1. General
The Commission agrees with the special working party that the  
transport of radioactive materials within the Community is generally  
satisfactory as regards the content of the national regulations on  
nuclear safety and the stringency with which they are applied.
The high level of safety attained in this way derives most certainly  
from the fact that, at an adequately early stage and in a sufficiently  
broad international context, relevant guidelines were jointly adopted.  
The activity of the IAEA was a determining factor in this regard and,  
through successive revisions of these regulations, it will doubtless  
continue to be so. The Commission would like to point out, however,  
that the Community’s activity, as reflected especially in :  
a) the implementation of the Euratom Directive on basic safety  
standards, the latest amended version of which was adopted by the  
Council on 15 July 1980 after Parliament had delivered a favourable  
opinion, and b) the technical measures put in hand by the Commission  
which resulted, from 1980 onwards, in an approximation of the  
positions of the Member States at the meetings held by the IAEA,  
contribute, in particular, to the creation of a context favourable  
to the safe transport of radioactive materials within the Community.
In addition, when the Member States implement the revised edition  
of the IAEA Regulations (to be issued by the end of 1984), continuation  
of the technical work conducted on the Commission's initiative and  
supported by a modest annual budget of several hundred thousand ECU  
will further the harmonized incorporation of the IAEA Regulations into  
the national regulations. Moreover, the Commission considers that  
the setting up of the special working party and the continuation of  
its work in accordance with its terms of reference set out in Section  
I above will also contribute to the harmonization of these regulations.

- 5 -
Finally, as will be seen further on, the Commission reserves the  
right to put forward at an appropriate time specific proposals for  
Community action.
The Commission would like to make two comments in addition to those  
concerning the aspects relating specifically and uniquely to nuclear  
safety and protection against ionizing radiation :
a) The safe transport of nuclear materials should not only be  
considered in isolation, but deserves to be regarded from a  
comparative standpoint in relation to the transport of dangerous  
materials in general.
Since almost all the members of the special working party are  
concerned solely with the transport of radioactive materials, the  
working party as such is not an appropriate forum for carrying out  
such a comparison. However, the Commission intends to go into this  
question in greater detail.
b) The Resolution of the Parliament, which led to the setting up of  
the special working party, is chiefly concerned with the safe  
transport of radioactive materials from the standpoint of the  
direct responsibility of the public authorities. The special  
working party thus consists mainly of governmental experts in  
this field. In practice, the members are representatives of  
administrations which, within the meaning of the IAEA Regulations,  
are the "competent authority" in each Member State (see the  
introductory paragraph to Section 5 of the report), in this  
capacity, they are independent of the economic operators of the  
sector which they are responsible for regulating and supervising :

-  6 -
consignors, carriers and consignees. It is therefore natural  
that the report by the special working party does not deal  
directly with the structural and operational problems of  
various kinds that beset this sector.
For this reason, two subjects referred to in the Resolution  
of the Parliament are not covered by the report :
- limitation of the number of movements of radioactive  
materials and avoidance of unnecessary transshipments  
and hold-ups, especially at the Community’s internal  
frontiers (point 4 of the Resolution of the European  
Parliament);
- the issue of the responsibility of the consignor and the  
carrier, respectively (point 10).
In this regard, it is the Commission's intention to expand and  
intensify the study of the structural and operational aspects  
of transporting nuclear fuel and radioactive materials which  
it began when preparing the forthcoming edition of the  
"Illustrative Nuclear Programme for the Community (INPC)",  
due to be published in late 1984.
2. Regulatory aspects
The Commission considers that no steps at Community level should be  
taken in the immediate future. After publication of the new IAEA  
Regulations in late 1984, the Commission will have the special working  
party carry out its periodic examination of developments in national  
regulations and of their degree of harmonization (point 5, first  
part, of the Resolution of the Parliament).
3. Technical aspects
The Commission would point out that two-thirds of the budget allocated  
to the transport of radioactive materials for the 1980-83 period,  
i.e., 1 million ECU out of the 1.5 million ECU granted by the budget

- 7 -
authorities, were expended on technical studies (see paragraph 8.2.1  
of the report) and that these studies made an important contribution to  
the revision of the IAEA Regulations. For example, the results of the  
following studies financed under the Commission budget were presented  
at various meetings held by the IAEA and served as a technical basis  
for the revision of the IAEA Regulations, the new edition of which will  
be published in 1984.
- studies on the behaviour of small type-B packages weighing less than  
500 kg under combined crush and fire accident conditions with a view  
to revising their qualification criteria;
- study on additional specifications for the transport of "special  
form" radioactive sources;
- study on the standardization of transport certificates.
The Commission considers it advisable to continue this work in the years  
to come, emphasis being laid on topics seen to be of current interest by  
the special working party. It also considers that, through this technical  
activity, it will promote the adoption and application of common detailed  
criteria in the regulations of the Member States. This is how, by  
expanding and intensifying the studies on quality assurance, it would  
accelerate the general acceptance of type-B(U) packages; this would  
considerably facilitate the intra-Community transport of all kinds of  
nuclear materials, especially fuel elements from nuclear power stations  
(first part of point 5 of the Resolution of the European Parliament).
4. Administrative aspects
The Commission, in anticipation of the major changes to the IAEA  
Regulations which it played no small part in bringing about, considers  
that it would be preferable not to undertake any Community activity in  
this field in the immediate future; it believes that it is possible to  
attain, on an even broader international scale, an adequate degree of  
harmonisation of the authorization systems and of standardization of  
transport certificates. However, it reserves the right to put forward  
a formal proposal for a Community Directive if the developments  
envisaged do not take place or if they are delayed (second part of  
point 5 of the Resolution of the Parliament).

-  8 -
5. Radiation protection
The Commission considers that application of the Council Directives  
laying down the basic safety standards for which provision is made  
in Article 30 of the Euratom Treaty is at present a satisfactory  
guarantee in the field under consideration and that there is no  
special need to define quantitative criteria for the selection of  
special routes avoiding densely populated areas purely for the  
purposes of radiation protection. Where routes are concerned,  
other parameters must also be taken into account, some of which  
(physical protection against theft, against sabotage, etc.) are  
far removed from the Community's sphere of competence (point 8 of  
the Resolution of the European Parliament).
In the transport sector, the additional IAEA provisions are taken  
into account in such a way as to adapt the general principles  
defined in the above-mentioned Directives for application in a  
field which exhibits special technical features.
6. Accident conditions
It is the Commission's view that in the special area of the transport  
of radioactive materials, the general philosophy concerning the  
protection of workers and the general public against accidents and  
unforeseen events is based essentially on probabilistic considerations  
which are obviously taken into account in the Regulations.
In the context of the occurrence of such events, two important measures  
should be stressed and considered in depth with a view to their  
optimum application, namely :
i) the training of transport personnel, who would have to be  
adequately informed of the nature and extent of the risk associated  
with their professional activity and of the approaches to be  
adopted in the event of an abnormal occurence;
ii) the formulation of model criteria for technical and medical  
assistance in the event of abnormal and/or accident situations  
which would be incorporated in bilateral or multilateral  
agreements between the Member States.
In 1985, the Commission will forward an appropriate communication to  
the Council on the two above-mentioned subjects.

- 9 -
7. Information
The Commission agrees with the special working party that it is useful  
for the mass media to publish objective information on the provisions  
and measures adopted with regard to the transport of radioactive  
materials. It is aware of the role incumbent upon it in the field of  
nuclear information which consists in providing regular reports on  
developments in the Community's overall energy situation as it stated  
in its communication :  "An energy strategy for the Community :  the  
nuclear aspects". (C0MC82) 36 final of 9 February 1982, point 57).
It wishes to point out that, where a wide range of aspects of nuclear  
energy is concerned, the illustrative programme (INPC) referred to  
earlier on (see Sub-section 1(b) and Section III above) is intended  
to be a reference document. In the specific field of the safe  
transport of radioactive materials, this report, in addition to its  
purpose of informing Parliament, can also serve as a reference  
document and be used as such by the mass media. In this regard, the  
Commission intends to have the special working party examine the  
feasibility of drawing up a report based on this one which would  
set out in greater detail the regulatory system governing the safe  
transport of radioactive materials.
8. Final considerations
In view of the generally satisfactory situation of nuclear safety  
in this sector and considering that the effects of amending the  
IAEA Regulations, which will enter into force by the end of 1984,  
will be felt only gradually, the Commission believes that it is  
preferable to envisage publishing reports by the special working  
party regularly at intervals greater than one year, as requested by  
Parliament.
At all events, developments in the area of regulations governing this  
sector are no faster than elsewhere.
Moreover, it should be understood that the Commission can assign  
only a very small number of staff to questions concerning the

-  10  -
transport of radioactive materials and that this staff, in addition  
to their permanent tasks of managing the study contracts concluded  
under the corresponding budget (Item 7015), will also be responsible  
to some extent for tasks resulting from the specific measures  
indicated in this Section, Section III.
For this reason, the Commission proposes that Parliament agree to  
the principle of two editions during one legislative period, that  
is to say, an average of one publication every two and a half years,  
it being understood that the Commission would forward an appropriate  
communication to Parliament if an exceptional event justified such  
action.

ANNEX 1
No C 40/42 ________
Fr
iday, 22 January 1982 
Motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-355/81/rev.)
Preamble: adopted.
Paragraph 1:
—  Amendment No 7 by Mr Galland: rejected,
— Amendment No 2 by Mr Combe: rejected,
— Amendment No 11 by Mr Moreland: adopted by 
electronic vote after the rapporteur had spoken (').
After paragraph 1:
—  Amendment No 8 by Mr Galland: rejected. 
Paragraph 2:
—  Amendment No 3 by Mr Combe: rejected,
—  Amendment No 12 by Mr Moreland: adopted.
Paragraph 2, as amended, was adopted.
—  Amendment No 13: withdrawn.
Paragraph 3:
— Amendment No 20 by Mrs Viehoff, on behalf of the 
Socialist Group: rejected.
Paragraph 3 was adopted.
Paragraph 4:
— Amendment No 19 by Mrs Viehoff: rejected,
—  Amendment No 9 by Mr Galland: adopted.
(') The rapporteur, spoke on all the amendments.15. 2. 82
Paragraph 5:
— Amendment No 4 by Mr Combe: rejected by 
electronic vote,
—  Amendment No 14 by Mr Moreland: rejected,
—  Amendment No 21 by Mrs Viehoff, on behalf of the 
Socialist Group: rejected.
Paragraph 5 and paragraph 6 were adopted.
Paragraph 7:
—  Amendment No 10 by Mr Galland: adopted,
—  Amendment No 15 by Mr Moreland: rejected,
—  Amendment No 5 by Mr Combe: rejected by 
electronic vote.
Paragraph 7, as amended, was adopted.
Paragraph 8:
— Amendment No 16 by Mr Moreland: rejected. 
Paragraph 8 was adopted.
Paragraph 9:
—  Amendment No 18 by Mr Galland: adopted. 
Paragraphs 10 to 12: adopted.
Paragraph 13:
—  Amendment No 6 by Mr Combe: rejected,
—  Amendment No 17 by Mr Moreland: adopted by 
electronic vote,
—  Amendment No 1  by Mr Gendebien: fell. 
Paragraphs 14 and 15: adopted.
Parliament adopted the following resolution:Official Journal of the European Communities
RESOLUTION
on the transport of radioactive substances and radioactive waste
The European Parliament,
—■ having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gendebien (Doc. 1-317/80),

15. 2. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 40/43
Friday, 22 January 1982
—  having regard to the Council resolution of 18 February 1980 on the implementation of a 
Community action plan in the field of radioactive waste (?) and the Council Decision of 
18 March 1980 adopting a programme on the management and storage of radioactive
waste (1980 to 1984) (2 ),
—  having regard to its resolutions of 17 March 1978 on the removal of radioactive 
waste (3)  and 11 February 1980 on radioactive waste management and storage (4),
— having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and the opinion of the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection {Doc.
1-355/81/rev.),
— considering that, without giving an opinion here as to whether it is necessary to have 
recourse to the development of nuclear energy, the problem of the transport of 
radioactive substances and radioactive waste should be examined,
1. Notes the present situation with regard to the transport of radioactive substances and 
radioactive waste within the Community deriving from current safety specifications, and 
believes that, although there may be room for improvement, there is a high degree of safety 
currently in the transport of nuclear waste;
2. Urges that all appropriate measures be taken as soon as possible at every level (i.e. by 
local, regional, national and Community authorities) to ensure optimum safety in the 
transport of such products for the protection of the general public, of persons 'employed in 
this sector, and of the environment;
3. Also notes that the amount of radioactive products transported within the Community is 
at present relatively small, but that a large and rapid increase in the volume of such traffic 
must be expected in the future;
4. Considers it necessary to limit both the number of movements of such substances and as 
far as possible the distances travelled between nuclear power stations, reprocessing plants, 
and the storage and disposal centres for radioactive waste; also considers it essential to 
avoid unnecessary transshipments and hold-ups in such transport, especially at the 
Community’s internal frontiers;
5. Considers it very important, for reasons of safety and in order to eliminate obstacles to 
intra-Community transport of radioactive materials, that the present divergent national legal 
provisions and administrative procedures adopted in the various Member States in 
implementation of the recommendations of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
should be harmonized throughout the Community, that a coherent system of special 
transport authorizations should be introduced within the Community and that the transport 
forms required in the Community should be standardized;
6. Expresses its regret, in this connection, that certain international agreements 
incorporating IAEA recommendations have not yet been ratified by all the Member States 
and therefore asks all the national governments concerned to complete the necessary 
ratification without delay;
7. Considers that in accordance with the provisions of the European Agreement concerning 
international carriage of goods by toad (ADR), k is necessary to provide for compulsory
(?) OJ No C 51, 29. 2. 1580, p. 1.
(* ) OJ No L 78, 25. 3. 1980, p. 22.
(’) OJ No C 85, 10. 4. 1978, p. 46.
(“) OJ No C 59, 10. 3. 1980, p. 16.

No C 40/44 Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 2. 82
Friday, 22 January 1982
special training for all persons directly involved in the transport of radioactive substances 
and radioactive waste and that Community certificates should be issued testifying to the 
completion of such training;
8. Recommends that special routes be designated for the transport of such products 
avoiding as far as possible densely populated areas;
9. Also believes that a well-planned and adequate network of emergency services should be 
created in the Community, using among other things the existing hospital infrastructure 
which has the necessary equipment and qualified staff who can easily be given further 
training. In this context, the emergency assistance procedures should be carefully defined; 
finally, considers that intervention should be as rapid and efficient in border areas should an 
accident occur there in the future;
10. Notes with satisfaction that the Commission is planning to investigate the issue of the 
responsibility of the consignor and shipper of radioactive substances and radioactive waste 
and hopes that a standard Community system can be implemented in the near future;
11. Stresses the urgent need for suitable objective and regular publicity for the various 
measures taken in respect of this kind of transport to ensure that the reasons for popular 
discontent in this respect are eliminated;
12. Urges the Commission to create a special permanent working party for the transport of 
radioactive substances and radioactive waste, consisting of representatives of the 
Commission and national experts to be responsible for:
(a) exchange of all relevant information;
(b) studying the recommendations made by the European Parliament;
(c) preparing proposals for Community action;
(d) studying any other questions arising in connection with this kind of transport;
(e) drawing up an annual report to be submitted to the European Parliament;
13. Urges the cooperation of local authorities to assist in the transport of nuclear waste;
14. Requests the Commission to look into its recommendations as soon as possible and to 
work out corresponding proposals for Community action and asks the Council to follow 
this up with due dispatch;
15. Requests its President to forward this resolution and the report of its committee to the 
Council and Commission and to the appropriate committees of the national parliaments.

REPORT ON THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS  
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
JANUARY 1984  
REVISED EDITION

i -
INDEX
page
FOREWORD
1. INTRODUCTION 2
2. SHIPMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 4
2.1. Data collection
2.2. Percentage of shipments according to the various uses
2.3. Data on nuclear fuel cycles
3. HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 9
3.1. External radiation
3.2. Contamination
3.3. Criticality control
3.4. Heat
3.5. Other hazards
4. BASIC CONCEPTS IN THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 12
4.1. Safe packages
4.2. Simple methods
4.3. Practical considerations
5. RADIATION PROTECTION IN THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 16
5.1. Protection principles
5.2. Rules and procedures
5.3. Experience
5.4. Ongoing developments
5.5. Concluding remarks
6.  PACKAGES AND SHIPMENTS 20
6.1. Type A packages
6.2. Type B packages
6.3. Packages for low-hazard materials
6.4. Additional requirements for packages of fissile materials
6.5. Administrative requirements in respect of shipments
6.6.  Measures to be taken in the event of accidents
6.7. Emergency response

- i  i  -
7. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
7.1. Principles
7.1.1. "Justification"
7.1.2. "Optimization"
7.1.3. "Limitation" of doses
7.2. Practices
7.2.1. Common basis :  IAEA Regulations
7.2.2. Harmonization of the administrative procedures
7.2.3. Quality assurance
7.2.4. Qualification and training of personnel
7.3. International transport organizations
8. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMUNITY AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
COMMISSION AS REGARDS THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
8.1. Responsibility of the Community
8.2. Activities of the Commission
8.2.1. Technical studies
8.2.2. Studies of administrative and regulatory aspects
8.2.3. Activities at international level
8.2.4. The Special Permanent Working Party
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1. Regulatory aspects
9.2. Technical aspects
9.3. Administrative aspects
9.4. Radiation protection aspects
9.5. Conclusionspage
26
33
39

- i  i  i  -
References
Appendix 1 - Members of the special working party on the transport  
of radioactive materials.
Appendix 2 - International transport organizations
Appendix 3 - IAEA transport information collection system
Appendix 4 - Technical requirements of IAEA regulations
Appendix 5 - Radiation doses to workers and the general public  
due to the transport of radioactive materials
Appendix 6 - Introduction of the ICRP basic principles into the  
IAEA transport regulations
Appendix 7 - Studies financed by the Commission.
Appendix 8 - Studies performed in the context of the R & D  
programme on "Plutonium recycling in light-  
water reactors". Indirect nuclear action  
1975 - 79.

FOREWORD
The resolution of the European Parliament of 22 January 1982 (1) requested  
the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) to set up a special  
permanent working party composed of representatives of the Commission and  
national experts from member countries to deal with problems arising  
from the transport of radioactive materials and nuclear wastes (*). A task  
of this working party was the preparation of a report to be submitted to  
the European Parliament
Following this request, the CEC convened the working party to discuss  
transport problems and draft the report. Meetings were held in Brussels  
on 29 September 1982, 23 January 1983, 15 June 1983 and 7 December 1983.
The list of members of the working party is attached as Appendix 1. The  
conclusions of the working party can be summarized as follows :
The situation as regards the transport of radioactive materials is safe  
and the following points should be underlined :
- the common approach adopted at Community level in dealing with transport  
problems;
- the importance of the transport activity in the development of nuclear  
energy applications, and at the same time the nature of the packages  
transported .  around 90 A contain small quantities of radioisotopes for  
medical purposes; the remainder contain  mainly radioisotopes for in­
dustrial and research purposes. Shipments of nuclear fuel cycle mate­
rials represent only a few percent of the packages transported.
Physical protection problems (measures taken in order to avoid actions  
of malevolence such as sabotage, unauthorized diversion of nuclear  
materials or theft..) are not taken into account. These problems  
are of a different nature from those associated with nuclear safety and  
radiation protection, and therefore need to be dealt with separately.
(1) :  See "References" attached to the report
(*) : Nuclear wastes are radioactive materials, among other things, and  
do not need to be differentiated.

-  2 -
Section 1. - INTRODUCTION
The present report endeavours to clarify the "policy" of the transport  
activity by highlighting:
a) the procedures and methods adopted;
b) the radiation protection provisions in force in all member states  
concerning transport in normal and accident conditions;
c) the existence of "consolidated" common regulations in force in all
member states; and in particular,, mention must be made of the European  
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) Directive on health protection."”
d) the thorough analysis carried out prior to introduction of the ra­
diation protection principles recommended by the International Com­
mission for Radiologi cal protection (ICRP);
e) the efforts which have been and are still being made by the
CEC to improve further the already very high standards of nuclear  
safety and radiation protection in the transport of all radioactive  
materials.
From the time of the earliest applications of nuclear energy, it was  
realized that full benefit could not be derived from this new source  
unless radioactive substances could be transported safety throughout the  
world. This obviously implies that the safety of human beings and of the  
environment must be assured.
The first recommendations on the safe transport of radioactive materials  
were prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1959 (*)  
with the cooperation of the member countries and the international  
transport organisations. Appendix 2 sets out the list of the intet  
national organisations responsible for the various modes of transport.
The purpose of the regulations is the reduction to an acceptable level of  
the hazards to workers and the general public arising from the transport
of radioactive materials under normal and accident conditions. __________
(*
) The regulations were revised and updated in 1964, 1967 and 1973 to reflect  
experience in their application, new trends in radiation protection and  
changes in the methods and technology. A comprehensive review of the  
regulations has been carried out in these last years for a revision to be  
published in 1984.

- 3 -
It must be noted that the transport regulations do not distinguish  
between radioactive substances and nuclear wastes. Nuclear wastes are  
radioactive materials and need to be covered by the same provisions.
The IAEA regulations are "model regulations" recommended by the Agency to  
membercountries and appropriate international organizations; they are  
regularly reviewed and updated.
These regulations are based on ICRP recommendations. Member States of  
the Community, in particular, when they update their own legislation take  
account of the IAEA regulations (see Appendix 6) and, where appropriate,  
the EAEC Directive on health protection (see section 5).
By an independent regulatory act, the International transport organ­
izations embody the IAEA transport regulations in their own rules,  
taking into account the special characteristics of the various modes of  
transport.

- 4 -
Section 2 - SHIPMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
The importance of the transport of radioactive materials in the  
development of human activities is undeniable. Radioisotopes are widely  
used in medicine, research and industry,and the use of nuclear fuels  
for research purposes and energy production is growing.
In connection with these applications, the materials must be transported  
between manufacturers, processors and users, and the wastes must be  
transported to the disposal site.
2.1. Data collection
The collection of data concerning shipments of radioactive materials  
by all modes of transport was recognized as being of great importance  
for evaluating the trend of the traffic and the order of magnitude of  
doses to transport workers and the general public.
The collection of such data, however, imposes a heavy burden in terms  
of cost and organization, the reason being that about 90 % of the ship­
ments are of medical radioisotopes and are not easy to keep track of.
Nor would this be justified given the relatively low levels of radio­
activity normally involved and the stringent safety standards applied.
Complete statistics are not available at present, but reliable estimates  
exist which indicate that millions of radioactive packages are transported  
all over the world each year (2), (3), (4), (5).
During 1980, some 400,000 packages were transported in the Federal  
Republic of Germany, 500,000 in France, 250,000 in Italy, 55,000 in 
Belgiurn, 25,000 in Denmark and 200,000 in the United Kingdom.

- 5  -
In  total about 1.4 million packages w ere involved (7). In  the
last fe w  years the I A E A  h as requested countries to furnish annual 
su m m aries of the shipm ents m a d e  within their territories. Particulars 
of this survey are given in A p p en d ix  3 .
2.2. - Percentage of shipm ents according to the various uses
A n  im portant point to b e  noted is that 6 0 %  of the radioactive packages 
transported are e x e m p t packages, i.e. packages w h o s e  content of radio­
active substances is so  lo w  that they need only c o m p ly  w ith a  fe w  regu­
latory requirem ents o f a  general nature a n d  d o  not h av e to b e  labelled.
If w e  consider packages w h ic h  need to b e  labelled as radioactive, the 
estimated percentages are :  9 0  %  radiopharmaceuticals a n d  isotopes for 
m edical research w ith limited radioactive contents; the rem ainder are 
c o m p o se d  of radioisotopes for industrial uses (5 % ), a n d  research (2 % ), 
large sources for therapy (1 % ), nuclear fuel cycle materials a n d  w astes
around 2 %  (6), (7).
2„3. - D a ta  o n  nuclear fuel cycles
T h e  transport o f radioactive materials associated w ith nuclear fuel cycles 
is directly proportional to the im portance of nuclear p o w e r program m es.
In  the C o m m u n ity , the total installed nuclear p o w er increased fro m  less 
than 1  G W e  in 1 9 6 0  to about 5 0  G W e  in 1 9 8 3  an d  is expected to reach 1 0 0  
G W e  b y  1 9 9 0 .
Figure 1  sh o w s the basic nuclear fuel cycles associated w ith the production 
of electricity. T able 1  show s, for each stage of the cycle, the
quantities o f materials to b e  transported for a  1  G W e  light-water reactor, 
together w ith the n u m b e r of vehicles required. It m u st b e  noted that n o t 
all shipm ents are o f the s a m e  im portance as far as the environm ental im p act 
is concerned. Shipm ents of ores are not taken into account since the 
milling plants are usually located near the m ines.
S pent fuels, together w ith the high-level solidified wastes, account for the 
largest quantities of highly radioactive materials w h ich  n eed to b e trans­
ported. Vitrified high-level w astes have not yet been transported in large 
quantities. Nevertheless, it is considered that their transport w o u ld  b e

-  6 -
safer than the transport of spent fuel because they are alm ost free fro m  
fissile material, contain n o  volatile fission products, fo rm  a  solid 
glass matrix a n d  are clad w ith stainless steel.
T able 2  sh o w s the planned net installed capacity of uranium  oxide- 
fuelled therm al reactors in the C o m m u n ity  countries at e n d  of 1 9 8 0  
a n d  at the e n d  of 19 8 5 . C o m p ariso n  of Tables 1  a n d  2  gives a n  idea 
of the v o lu m e  of traffic in C o m m u n ity  countries for the various stages 
of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Fresh Fuel Elements Nuclear
Power
PlantsSpent Fuel
Fuel
Element
Fabrication
2kuo
uo
uo
Fuel
Material
Preparation
Conversion
U 3 ° 8
MillsFissile Material  
Storage
Plutoni u r n
Depleted UFf e  ^
Depleted U
Th
Fertile Material  
Storage
OreMinesReprocessing
Waste
Repository
Fig. 1 . N uclear fuel cycle stages.

- 7  -
T able 1  - A n n u a l shipm ents associated w ith the various stages of the 
nuclear fuel cycle for a  light-water reactor o f 1  G W e  (* )
Quantity (i) Activity (ii) N u m b e r o f
(tonnes) (C i) v eh i des (iii)
O re s 80,000 6 0-
concent rates 1 8 0 - 9
U F 6 , natural 2 4 0 - 2 0
U F 6 , enriched 5 0 - 4
fresh fuel 3 0 - 5
spent fuel 5 0 0 150.1 0 6 6
plutoni u r n 3 0 0  k g 3.3 1 0 4 3
high-level w aste 1 3 0 150.1 0 6 2
m e d iu m - a n d  low-level w aste 7 3 0  m 3 3.103 2 5
(* ) T h e  data are taken fro m  Reference 3 3
(i) T h e  w eights are the net w eights of the materials to b e  transported 
except in the case of spent fuel a n d  high-level wastes, w h e re  the 
w eight is m ainly that o f the package.
(ii) T h e  activity of concentrates, U F 6  an d  fresh fuel is very lo w
(iii) Transport b y  road is assu m ed  except in the case of spent fuel a n d  
high-level waste, w h e re  shipm ent is b y  rail; in this case the 
n u m b e r relates to w a g o n s instead of road vehicles.

-  8 -
T able 2 - N e t installed capacity ( G W e )  of uranium  oxide-fuelled 
therm al reactors.
(Light-water reactors except for the U nited K in g d o m / 
w h ere advanced gas reactors are installed .
N .B . :  First generation gas-cooled reactors are not included).
C o u n t ry 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5
(expected)
F R G 8.95 16.40
B elgi u m 1.65 5.46
D e n m a rk- -
F rance 1 0 34.5
Ireland - -
Italy 1.24 1 .1
Netherlands 0 .5 1 0 .51
U nited K in g d o m 2.10 5.88
G reece- -
L u x e m b o u rg

- 9  -
Section 3  - H A Z A R D S  A S S O C I A T E D  W I T H  T H E  T R A N S P O R T  O F  R A D I O A C T I V E  M A T E R I A L S
Radioactive materials m a y  give rise to five characteristic hazards :  irrad­
iation, contamination, criticality, heating a n d  others classical hazards 
w h ic h  could occur in  the following typical circumstances :
- External exposure of h u m a n s  to radiation em anating fro m  the intact 
package during n o rm al transport a n d  storage
- internal exposure of h u m a n s  d u e  to release of radioactive gases 
during n o rm al transport of certain types of materials
- External a n d  internal exposure of h u m a n s  a n d  contam ination o f 
property b y  radioactive material occurring as contam ination o n  the 
outside surfaces of transport packages during n o rm al transport
- External a n d  internal exposure of h u m a n s  a n d  contam ination o f 
property a n d  the environm ent d u e  to the release o f radioactive 
materials fro m  d a m a g e d  packages in accident conditions
- External a n d  possible internal exposure of h u m a n s  d u e to accidental 
criticality in fissile materials packages.
- D a m a g e  arising fro m  heat production.
- D a m a g e  arising fro m  other dangerous properties :  chem ical toxicity, 
explosiveness...
S o m e  typical m easures o f a  technical a n d  regulatory nature applied b y  the 
persons responsible for the transport in order to reduce or to prevent these 
hazards are described in the following five paragraphs.
3.1. - External radiation
T h e  external radiation emitted b y  radioactive materials cannot, in 
theory,be reduced to zero. In practice, how ever, a  system  of limitation 
o f radiation levels at the outer surface of the packages an d  at a  distance 
o f 1  m etre is in force.
In  deriving the radiation limits for the packages, the protection 
of h u m a n  beings livestock a n d  inanimate objects has been taken into 
account (9).

-10  -
M in im u m  separation distances fro m  people, livestock a n d  films are 
specified for the loading a n d  storing of packages; furthermore, the 
n u m b e r o f packages in a  single vehicle, aircraft or deck area is 
limited in order to provide for a  safe cum ulative radiation level 
a n d  to assure safety against criticality.
3.2. - C ontam ination
A lthough the a im  of the regulations is to ensure standards of 
containm ent appropriate to the nature o f the materials being 
transported, there is alw ays a  possibility of slight radioactive 
contam ination o n  the external surfaces of s o m e  packages; for exam ple, 
the casks containing irradiated fuels are exposed in areas w h e re  
the radioactive materials are handled or stored, a n d  the contam i­
nation cannot b e  completely eliminated.
T h e  s a m e  applies to packagings containing ra w  materials. C o n se­
quently, the régulations provide for surface contamination tests 
a n d  specify the m a x im u m  recognized L im its of radioactivity.
A
B efore shipm ent, the fuel casks are carefully w a sh e d  in order to c o m p ly  
w ith the regulatory contamination levels. S m e a r tests for conta­
m ination control an d  quality-control p ro g ram m es are prescribed in 
the factories w h ich  produce radioisotopes.
In  m o st cases the surface contam ination of packages in  n o rm al 
conditions of transport are w ell below  the regulatory limits.
3.3. - Criticality control
Fissile materials are also radioactive materials an d  are therefore 
subject to the provisions applicable to the latter.

-  11  -
M oreover, if they are assem bled in certain quantities they could 
b e c o m e  critical; consequently, the regulations lay d o w n  special 
requirem ents for fissile materials.
T hree classes of fissile packages are provided for a n d  the n u m b e r 
o f fissile packages that can  b e  transported together safety w ithout 
reaching criticality under n o rm al a n d  accident conditions is fixed.
3.4. - -  H e a t
T h e  regulations contain provisions intended to ensure safe dissi­
pation of the heat fro m  radioactive materials. T h ese provisions 
h a v e  a  tw ofold objective :  to ensure the integrity of the packaging 
containm ent a n d  to prevent injury to persons or d a m a g e  to g o o d s a s 
a  result of the high temperature attained b y  the accessible surface 
of the packaging.
3.5. - O ther hazards
Radioactive materials w h ic h  h av e other hazardous characteristics 
su ch  as explosiveness, flammability, pyrophoricity, chem ical 
toxicity a n d  corrosiveness are subject to the provisions applicable 
to those characteristics.

-  12  -
Section 4  - B A S I C  C O N C E P T S  I N  T H E  S A F E  T R A N S P O R T  O F  R A D I O A C T I V E  
M A T E R I A L S
T h e  transport of radioactive materials poses special radiation 
protection features w h ic h  m a y  differ fro m  those encountered in other 
activities such as the production, processing a n d  use of radioactive 
substances.
In  these cases, in fact, all the parameters are under control an d  the 
approach adopted for coping w ith the radiation protection an d  safety 
problem s relies o n  appropriate control of the environm ent in w h ic h  the 
activity is developed, o n  adequate training of all the personnel 
involved an d  o n  the use of proven facilities.
In  the case of transport of radioactive materials this is not alw ays 
possible, since the environm ent in w h ich  the transport takes place is 
generally uncontrolled :  materials are shipped everywhere,along highw ays, 
m otorw ays, urban roads, railways, etc. an d  the personnel involved cannot 
alw ays receive specialised training, for instance in the case of 
shipm ents of radioisotopes for m edical uses.
T h e  criteria underlying the regulations h av e to take this situation into 
account :  safety has to depend m ainly o n  the packaging itself, both under 
n o rm al an d  under accident conditions.
4.1. - Safe packages
T his m e a n s that safety has to depend o n  the package itself, 
a n d  the following basic requirem ents m u st therefore b e m et:
- effective control of radiation emitted b y  the materials;
- effective containm ent of the materials;
- adequate dissipation of the heat generated w h e n  radiation fro m  
the materials is absorbed;
- in the case of fissile materials, criticality m u st b e  prevented.

- 1 3  -
M oreover, identical standards of safety are required for each type 
of material.
Costly fresh nuclear fuels a n d  radioactive wastes, either for tem ­
porary storage or for final disposal, are transported in accordance 
w ith the s a m e  provisions a n d  the safety standards required are 
alw ays the sa m e .
4.2. - S im ple m eth o d s
O n e  im portant aspect of the transport of radioactive substances is 
the use of sim ple m eth o d s of identifying the radioactive materials :  
m essages easily understandable b y  all workers, even those w h o  h av e 
n o  training. T h e  trefoil sy m b o l (Fig. 2 ) used o n  transport labels or 
placards is o n e  ex am p le of these m essages, together w ith the colour 
a n d  the red stripes superim posed o n  the labels in all cases.
P ackages w ith a  white label are those w h ic h  can  b e  handled a n d  
transported without an y  specific requirements for their segregation 
fro m  persons or goods.
Y ello w  II a n d  yellow  III labels designate respectively packages w h ic h  
n eed  greater care in handling a n d  packages w h ic h  need to b e  limited in 
n u m b e r if accum ulated together.
W hatever the radioactive material, the consignor's contribution to 
safety is m axim ized. Consequently, the contribution of the carrier 
is m inim al, being limited to the observance of sim ple rules based o n  
the information appearing o n  the package labels as regards storage 
a n d  segregation fro m  persons a n d  goods.
T his m ajor contribution b y  the consignor is achieved through c o m p lia n c e  
w ith packaging an d  package requirements appropriate to the nature of 
the material to b e  shipped.

- 1 4  -
4-3 - Practical considerations
T o  ensure com pliance w ith the safety standards, practicable a n d  reliable 
m eth o d s h av e been developed.
M ajo r organisations concerned have devoted a  great deal of research 
effort to this e n d  over m a n y  years. F o r exam ple, inexpensive 
disposable packages have been developed for s o m e  radioactive materials 
transported for m edical purposes. T his w a s  d o n e  to enable su ch  
packages to b e shipped together w ith other g o o d s an d  safely handled 
b y  non-specialist transport personnel.

F ig  2 : Labels a n d  placard
(A) :  C ategory I  w hite
(B) :  C ategory II yellow
(C) :  C ategory III yellow
(D ) :  Placard for vehicles
( D )

- 1 6  -
Section 5  - R A D I A T I O N  P R O T E C T I O N  I N  T H E  T R A N S P O R T  O F  R A D I O A C T I V E  
M A T E R I A L S
T h e  hazards associated with.the transport of radioactive materials w e re  
considered in section 3. It is n o w  im portant to verify that the 
E uropean A to m ic  E nergy C o m m u n ity  ( E A E C )  Directive (1 3 ) o n  the health 
protection of the general public a n d  w orkers is applied to transport 
practi ce.
T h e  m a in  points contained in the Directive are as follows :
the C o m p eten t Authority ^  ^  m u st b e  cognizant of the practice 
(authorization or reporting procedure);
- it m u st ensure the radiation protection of the w orkers;
- it m u st ensure the protection of the general public a n d  the 
environm ent, a n d  m u st assess the levels of exposure deriving fro m  
the practice.
T h e  M e m b e r  States are responsible for incorporating in their 
legislation the principles a n d  the practices laid d o w n  in the 
Directive.
5.1. Protection principles
T h e  radiation protection principles underlying the transport regul­
ations provide adequate safety for w orkers engaged in the 
transport of radioactive materials a n d  for m e m b e rs of the public.
T h e  radiological risks associated w ith the transport of radioactive 
materials relate both to n o rm al conditions of transport a n d  to 
accident situations.
(* ) :  I A E A . Safety Series N °  6  gives the definition of the C o m p eten t
Authority .  C o m p eten t Authority shall m e a n  any national or inter­
national authority designated or otherwise recognized as such for 
any purpose in connection w ith the regulations for the safe 
transport of radioactive materials".
T h e  C o m p eten t Authority is independent of the consignor, the 
carrier a n d  the consignee.

- 1 7  -
D uring n o rm al transport, radiation levels outside the packages o f 
radioactive material give rise to the exposure of w orkers w h o  
handle or transport the packages a n d  of m e m b e rs of the public w h o  
are in the vicinity of these packages. T h e  protection m easures are 
designed to limit the exposures near the surfaces of packages a n d  
to lay d o w n  m in im u m  separation distances betw een the packages a n d  
the areas occupied b y  persons, as w ell as to m inim ize the exposure 
tim es w herever possible.
If in the event of a n  accident during transport, the contents o f these 
packages w ere to be released, people in the vicinity could b e  
exposed to direct radiation a n d  could inhale a n d  ingest radioactive 
substances. T h e  principal protection m easures therefore are: confine­
m e n t o f the materials in packages capable of withstanding accident 
conditions, limitation of the package content, a n d  the use o f 
procedures designed to m inim ize the probability of release of the 
content or the occurrence of excessive external radiation levels 
as a  result of h u m a n  error.
5.2. - R u les a n d  procedures
P ackage designs for the transport of radioactive materials in  
quantities exceeding certain limits require the approval of the 
com petent authorities.
M oreover, com petent authority approval of a  shipm ent is required 
in  specified circumstances, for exam ple w h e n  certain levels of radio­
activity are exceeded a n d  for certain consignm ents of fissile materials 
T h ese requirem ents are in force, inter alia, in all C o m m u n ity  countries
Administrative procedures su ch  as notification or prior authorization 
are also adopted in order to ensure that the com petent authority 
concerned is inform ed of the activities taking place in its territory.

- 1 8  -
5.3. - Experience
Experience gained in the course of thirty years h as s h o w n  that the 
radiation doses received b y  w orkers engaged in the transport o f radio­
active materials are generally w ell b elo w  the dose limit for individual 
m e m b e rs  o f the public as set out in the E A E C  Directive.
O n ly  in special cases w h ere large n u m b ers of packages are handled 
through a  single facility is it possible that certain transport 
w orkers m ig h t receive annual doses exceeding the limit for m e m b e rs 
of the public. In  such cases these w orkers operate under a  
radiation protection p ro g ra m m e  w h ich  includes adequate instruction 
an d  training as stipulated b y  the Directive. D uring this 30-year 
period, millions of packages containing radioactive a n d  fissile 
materials, including fresh a n d  irradiated fuels, h av e b een  
transported. O n ly  a  very sm all n u m b e r of packages h av e b een 
involved in a n  accident, a n d  even few er h av e given rise to an y  
release of the contents or to a  significant increase in radiation 
levels (34).
5.4. - O ngoing developm ents
In  recent years, great efforts h av e been m a d e  b y  various countries 
to perform  risk assessments concerning the transport of radioactive 
materials, m ainly in order to reassure public opinion.
T h e  I A E A  has developed a  m o d e l com puter code, I N T E R T R A N  (IN T E R national 
T R A N sport), (2 9 ) for the purpose of estimating o n  a  w orld-w ide basis 
the risk arising fro m  the transport of radioactive materials under 
norm al an d  accident conditions. T h e  user's m an u al in its final version 
a n d  the co d e itself h av e been distributed b y  the I A E A  to all M e m b e r  States 
in July 1 9 8 3  w ith a  letter fro m  the A g e n c y  inviting M e m b e r  States to 
apply the c o d e  in their respective countries. A s  the A g e n c y  is collecting 
transport data fro m  M e m b e r  States (A ppendix 3 ) it is likely that in the near 
future a n  attempt will b e  m a d e  to perform  risk assessments concerning 
the transport of radioactive materials o n  a  w orld-w ide basis.

- 1 9  -
A  gro u p  o f C o m m u n ity  countries, com prising the Federal R epublic of 
G e rm a n y , France, Italy a n d  the U nited K in g d o m , m e t in order to study the 
possibility of applying the c o d e  to the transport of irradiated fuel under 
n o rm al conditions o f transport. T h e  group terminated its w o rk  in O ctober 
1 9 8 1  w h e n  the user's m a n u a l of the com puter c o d e  w a s  discussed a n d  approved. 
Preliminary results are reported in A p p en d ix  5 .
5.5. C oncluding rem arks
T h e  safety standards for h u m a n  beings are very high and, in applying th e m  
protection o f the environm ent is also implicitly provided for.
Radiation protection principles underlying the I A E A  transport regulations 
are basically derived fro m  recom m endations of the I C R P  w h ic h  apply to all 
aspects of radiation protection.
W h e n  the application of I C R P  2 6  (1 5 ) in the transport of radioactive 
materials w a s  studied, it se e m e d  advisable to optimise the protection o f 
the general public a n d  of the environm ent through a  thorough analysis o f 
the transport m o d e s  used a n d  of the routes. T h e  conclusions (1 6 ) reached 
b y  the a d  h o c  gro u p  appointed b y  I A E A  for this purpose w e re  that there are 
norm ally n o  technical reasons for requiring special routes or prohibiting 
a n y  m o d e  of transport; the real problem s are of a  psychological nature, a n d  
the public should b e  given adequate information through the m a ss m edia.
T h e  experience obtained over the past 3 0  years demonstrates that the 
transport of radioactive materials has achieved a  high standard of safety. 
U n d e r n o rm al conditions of transport, individual doses w e re  s h o w n  to b e  
within the dose limits re c o m m e n d e d  b y  IC R P .

-  20  -
Section 6  - P A C K A G E S  A N D  S H I P M E N T S
T h e  range of potential hazards fro m  radioactive materials during trans­
port is very w id e  a n d  the regulations consequently developed tw o  m a in  
approaches as regards package designs :  packages w ith defined limits a s 
to their content (type A )  a n d  package design requirements w ithout 
specification o f content limits (type B ).
6.1. - T y p e  A  packages
T h e  requirementsfor the design of a  type A  package are such that 
the packaging m u st provide both adequate shielding a n d  containm ent 
under n o rm al conditions of transport (including m inor m ishaps 
during handling a n d  exposure to adverse meteorological conditions),
T h e  content is limited so  that in the event of total release in a  
severe accident the consequences d o  not h av e a  significant effect 
o n  h u m a n  health. If the m aterials to b e  transported are also fissile, 
the contents are limited so  as to c o m p ly  w ith criticality-control 
provisions.
6.2. - T y p e  B  packages
T y p e  B  packages are not subject to content limits. T h e  actual 
content of any type B  package is indirectly controlled through c o m ­
pliance w ith requirements concerning radiation emission, heat dis­
sipation, control of internal pressure and, in the case of fissile 
material, criticality control.
A  type B  packaging m u st m ee t all the requirements for type A  packaging 
an d  m u st also b e  so  designed as to maintain adequate shielding, con­
tainm ent an d  criticality-control features in very severe accident 
conditions. Fig. 3  sh o w s tw o  varieties of type B  packages, n am ely a  
a  g am m ag rap h ic source for industrial radiography (15 k g ) an d  a n  
irradiated-fuel cask (5 0  tonnes).

-  21  -
Besides satisfying special design requirements, type B  packages m u st 
be capable o f passing a  series of regulatory tests intended to produce 
the d a m a g e  that w o u ld  b e  expected to occur under severe accident 
conditions. T h ese tests are m ainly m echanical tests (severe crash) 
follow ed b y  a n  intense fire (*).
D u rin g  the last fe w  years, investigations h av e been carried out in 
the various countries a n d  b y  international organizations to determ ine 
the effects o n  packages in extrem ely severe conditions.
Tests involving vehicle collisions h av e also been conducted (18),
(19), (20), (21).
6.3. - P ackages for low -hazard materials
W h ile  the requirem ents in respect of the type A  a n d  B  package 
designs assure the safe transport of m a n y  nuclear materials 
presenting m e d iu m  or high levelsof potential hazard , the regul­
ations also contain provisions governing the transport of lo w - 
hazard materials such as radioactive ores, intermediate products 
fro m  the processing of natural uranium  an d  thorium, certain w astes 
produced b y  the nuclear industry, a n d  item s w h ic h  are e x e m p t fro m  
specific provisions b y  virtue of their sm all radioactive content.
A s  h as already been pointed out, the principles of safety for the 
transport of low -hazard materials are the s a m e  as those required 
for the m o st hazardous ones.
(* ) Details of the requirements for various types of packages can  b e  
found in A p p en d ix  4.

-  22  -
6.4. - Additional requirem ents for packages of fissile materials
In  order to ensure a  very high a n d  uniform  degree of safety against 
criticality, packages o f fissile materials are divided into the 
following three classes (m o re  details in A p p en d ix  4):
a) £i§SliS_£ia§S_I :  packages w h ic h  are nuclear-safe in a n y  
n u m b e r a n d  in any arrangem ent under all foreseeable 
circumstances of transport;
b>  £i§si.le_C.lass_I! :  packages w hich, in limited numbers, are 
nuclear-safe in any arrangem ent under all foreseeable 
circumstances of transport;
c) £i§§U e_C lass_III :  packages w h ic h  are n u c  lear -safe under 
all foreseeable circumstances of transport b y  reason o f 
special precaution or special administrative or operational 
controls im posed u p o n  the transport of the consignm ent.
T h e  m eth o d  of achieving this depends both o n  the design of the 
package an d  o n  the checks carried out during transport.
6-5. - Administrative requirements in respect of shipm ents
T h e  regulations in force in all C o m m u n ity  countries provide that 
the administrative requirements relating to package designs a n d  
shipm ent approvals shall b e  com plied w ith during the transport of 
radioactive materials. T h e  implicit intention of the regulations 
is to reduce the requirements to a  m in im u m  in order that the packages 
m a y  b e  transported without delay.
M oreover, a  system  of prior notification exists to inform  C o m p eten t 
Authorities of traffic in radioactive materials in their territory.

- 2 3  -
It m u st b e  noted that under the Paris C onvention (* ) a n  insurance 
against third-party Liability is required for nuclear materials.
T his C onvention h as been ratified b y  m o st of the C o m m u n ity  
countries (see table 3, p age 3 2  ).
6.6. - M easures to b e  taken in the event of accidents
G eneral instructions concerning m easures to b e  taken in the event of 
accidents or incidents are issued to transport w orkers b y  the persons 
responsible for the transport (consignor, consignee, carrier) a n d  
constitute part of the training w h ic h  they are required to 
receive under the term s of the E A E C  Directive. -
T h e  s a m e  m easures are applied b y  all countries in the event o f a n  
accident. T h e y  can  b e su m m arized  as follows:
- Intervention b y  the carrier, m edical services, 
fire brigade a n d  police force;
- Evaluation of the radiological hazards an d  mitigation of 
the consequences following the intervention of qualified 
experts;
- D econtam ination of the environm ent an d  rem o v al of contam ination 
through the intervention of qualified team s.
F o r im portant shipm ents su ch  as « p e n t fuels a n d  large radiation sources 
the m easures to b e  taken in the event of accidents are set out in the 
package design approval certificate a n d  in the shipm ent approval 
cert i  fi cate.
In  certain countries, these m easures are set out in the authorization 
that is required for the carriage of radioactive materials.
6.7. E m e rg e n c y  response
A  study carried out recently o n  behalf of the C E C  lists the 
em ergency procedures existing in m e m b e r countries (22). T h e  I A E A  
has also published a  booklet o n  em ergency response in the event of 
transport accidents (23).
(* ) C onvention o n  third-party liability in the field of nuclear enerqy 
2 9  July 1 9 6 0 .

- 2 4  -
It appears that each country has a  system  of em ergency response in 
the event of accidents involving radioactive materials, a n d  the 
em ergency response for accidents occurring during transport is 
part o f that system .
In the case of cross-frontier transport, the intervention procedure 
c an  b e co-ordinated; this is generally d o n e o n  a  bilateral basis.

- 2 5  -
Fig. 3  - Exploded view of tw o type B  packages.
a) Irradiated fuel cask
<32114<3840
CAVITV
SH O C KABSORBER
TRUNNIONS
0 IO O
-FEETP l_A.Nl VIEW  
SHOCK A B S O R B E R  
R E M O V E D
GENERAL INFORMATION 
FLASK WEIGHTS 
UNLADEN 4 G ,O O O K 3 
LADEN S B .lO O  Kg
LID ONLY 4 , 4 0 0  Kg
SH O C K
A BSORBER
b) Portable gam m agraphic source package
handle
Package weight :  1 5  k g

- 2 6  -
Section 7  - N A T I O N A L  A N D  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  R E G U L A T I O N S
7.1. Principles
T h e  recom m endations of the International C o m m issio n  for Radiological 
Protection (IC R P ) (15) are the basis o f all radiation protection 
regulations.
T h e  E A E C  Directive o n  health protection of thegeneral public a n d  w orkers 
against the dangers o f ionizing radiation is based o n  the following < 
principles :
- n o  activity involving exposure to ionizing radiation m a y  b e  undertaken 
unless it is demonstrated that a  net benefit derives fro m  such a  practice
(justification);
- the necessary radiation exposures m u st b e  kept as lo w  as reasonably 
achievable (m inim ization or optimization);
-any exposure of h u m a n  beings m u st not exceed the recognized dose limits 
(limitation of the individual exposures).
T h e  application of I C R P  principles to the transport of radioactive 
materials w a s  review ed b y  a n  A dvisory G ro u p  convened b y  the I A E A  in  
1 9 7 9  (16).
T h e  conclusion reached b y  the G ro u p  w a s  that these principles are 
satisfactorily em bodied in the regulations as they stand (16); and, 
as indicated in §  5.5. it is therefore concluded that the transport 
regulations are in general, adequate an d  effective.
7.1.1. - "Justi fi cation"
T h e  justification of a  practice can  b e  deduced fro m  a  balance o f 
the risks an d  the benefit deriving g ro m  the use of radioactive 
substances.

- 2 7  -
In the context o f the transport of radioactive materials there 
c a n  b e  n o  doubt about the benefits deriving fro m  the use of 
radioisotopes in m edicine a n d  in industry a n d  of nuclear fuels 
for energy production.
7.1.2. - "Optimization"
T h e  optimization of a  practice is generally required in order to 
attain the objective of keeping the radiation doses A s  L o w  A s  
R easonably A chievable ( A L A R A  principles), eco n o m ic a n d  social 
considerations b een taken into account (30). T his m e a n s that it is 
necessary to derive authorized dose limits o n  the basis of a  cost- 
effectiveness assessm ent of w h a t appears to b e  reasonably 
achievable. T h e  dose limits w o u ld  necessarily b e  below  the 
limits set out b y  the E A E C  Directive (1 3 ) a n d  in practice w o u ld  
a m o u n t to only a  sm all fraction of th em .
T h e  various m e a n s b y  w h ic h  optimization c a n  b e  achieved are :
1 ) the intrinsic protection provided b y  the design o f the 
packaging a n d  b y  all technical m e a n s of ensuring that packages 
will m e e t the regulatory requirements;
2 ) appropriate choice of transport m o d e s w ith a  view  to optimizing 
cost, speed, collective doses, probability of accidents, etc. 
and, in s o m e  cases, suitable choice of route;
3 ) adequate training of the personnel involved.
7.1.3. - "Limitation" of doses
Experience gained over the years sh o w s that the radiation exposures 
o f transport w orkers are so  controlled that it is very unlikely 
that the radiation dose received is in excess of that permitted 
for m e m b e rs of the public.
T h e  com petent authorities carry out periodical assessments of the 
exposure dose d u e to transport activity (10), (20), (27), (2 8 ) in
order to ensure that the requirements of the operational procedure 
are being com plied with.

- 28 -
7.2. - Practices
Since transport is in m an y  cases an international activity, the regulations 
in force m ust have a  c o m m o n  fram ework in order to allow speedy m ovem ents 
across frontiers and to assure everywhere the sam e degree of safety 
for every type of radioactive material transported.
7.2.1. - C o m m o n  basis :  IA E A  Regulations
T he c o m m o n  basis of the regulations in force nearly all over 
the world, and in particular in the M e m b er States of the 
European C om m unity, is the IA E A  regulations for the safe 
transport of radioactive materials - Safety Series N °  6.
T he basic criteria governing these regulations w ere illustrated 
in the preceding Sections.
It m ust be pointed out here that there is a substantial measure of 
agreement between these regulations and the provisions of the 
E A E C  Directive on radiation protection. T he status of the 
national regulations with respect to the IA E A  regulations w a s 
examined in a  study (14) carried out under the sponsorship of 
the Com m ission from  w hich it emerged that the M e m b er States 
adopt a c o m m o n  approach to transport problems.
It appeared, however, that certain problems, mainly administra- 
tive ones, could be tackled jointly for the benefit of all the 
countries concerned, as is described in the following 
paragraphs.
7.2.2. - Harmonization of the administrative procedures
T he competent authority in each country has to issue transport 
certificates; it is recognized that great advantages could

- 2 9  -
result fro m  the standardization of these certificates, although 
all the information to b e  contained in th e m  is clearly stated 
in the regulations.
R eco m m en d atio n s o n  these lines h av e b een  m a d e  b y  the I A E A  o n  a  
w orld-w ide basis. T h e  E E C  C o m m issio n  h as tentatively put 
forw ard for consideration a  study o n  standard form ats for 
transport certificates (31). T his study has served as a  starting 
point for the harmonisation of certificates w h ic h  is n o w  under 
developm ent in the fram ew ork of the revision of the I A E A  transport 
regulations. It is im portant to underline the existence o f excellent 
liaison arrangem ents betw een the transport authorities of the 
C o m m u n ity  countries, this facilitates the exchange o f information.
7.2.3. - Quality assurance
O n e  basic concept in the regulations is that of "unilateral" 
approval. T his m e a n s that w h e n  a  package design is approved b y  
a  com petent authority as a  B (U ) package ( U  stands for unilateral), 
the package can  circulate in the other countries w ithout 
requiring further approval.
In  v iew  of the increasing n u m b e r of packages circulating in the 
w orld, it w a s  considered of fundam ental im portance to set u p  
quality-assurance p ro g ram m es in the transport of radioactive 
materials in order to maintain a  service of high quality.
A  quality-assurance p ro g ra m m e  in the field of radioactive- 
materials transport m e a n s a  series of technical an d  administrative 
procedures spanning the entire life o f the packaging fro m  the 
design stage to its withdrawal fro m  service.
A  study carried out under a  C E C  contract in 1 9 8 2  ( 32)  reveals 
that the com petent authorities of several C o m m u n ity  countries 
are w orking o n  developm ent of quality-assurance requirements.
T his study h as s h o w n  that further activities are needed to 
prom ote the universal acceptability of type B (U ) packages.

- 3 0  -
7.2.4. - Qualification a n d  training o f personnel _ _ _ _
Pe
ople w h o  m a y  b e exposed to radiation in the course of their
w o rk  are the subject of the E A E C  Directive w h ic h  requires (under Article 2 4 )
that exposed w orkers :  "shall b e  inform ed of the health risks involved
in their w ork, the precautions to b e  taken a n d  the im portance of com plying
w ith the technical an d  m edical requirements a n d  shall also b e  g iv e n .
appropriate training in the field of radiation protection .
In  1981, the C o m m issio n  conducted a  survey of national requirements as 
regards the training a n d  instruction of persons directly engaged in the 
transport of radioactive materials (37).
F r o m  indications collected during the course of this survey, national 
experts are generally satisfied w ith the standards of training, 
qualification a n d  general conduct of m o st of the categories o f personnel 
defined in the report.
M oreover, other actions are im plem ented at the C o m m u n ity  level w ith 
a  v iew  to producing information an d  material for training purposes (38).
7.3. - International transport organizations
T h e  regulations governing international m o v e m e n ts of radioactive 
materials for all m o d e s of transport are based o n  I A E A  regulations.
It m u st b e  noted that problem s could arise fro m  tim e to tim e concerning 
the date o n  w h ic h  the various international organizations will adopt 
the revision of the I A E A  regulations.
In  the case of international transport, the date of adoption of 
requirements based o n  the current version of the I A E A  regulations 
depends o n  the date of their incorporation b y  the relevant international

- 3 1  -
com petent b o d y  in the agreem ents or regulations applicable to that 
m o d e  of transport.
T h e  im plem entation of the administrative requirem ents at national a n d  
international levels is helped b y  the discussions of the Radioactive 
Transport Study G ro u p  ( R T S G )  established under the aegis of the I A E A  
in 1 9 6 8 .
T able 3  sh o w s the status of the application of the international 
regulations in the C o m m u n ity  countries.
It c a n  b e  seen that nearly all the M e m b e r  States co m p ly  w ith the 
international transport regulations for various m o d e s of transport in 
international traffic. A lthough there are s o m e  discrepancies as 
regards the m an n e r in w h ich  these regulations are applied, the essential 
spirit is universally respected.
A  brief description of the international transport organizations is 
given in  A p p en d ix  2 .

Table 3 - Status of the application of the international transport regulations in Community countries
|  Country |  ADR 
1RID1  IMO IATA ADNR|  Paris  
|conventionBrussels |  
convention|Postal
shipment
|  Belgium 1  in 
|forceinforce|in force 1  i  nforceinforce|  in forceJ_ _ _ _not
permitted
|  Fed. Republic  
|  of Germany1  i - n
iforce inforce|  in force 1  i  nforceinforce|  in forceJ_ _ _ _in
 force | not
permitted
|  France 1  i - n 
1forceinforce|  in force 1  i  n■forceinforce|  in force  
1in force | permitted
i 1 not
1  Italy 1  inforceinforce 1  i  nforce |  in force in force | permitted
i 1 not
|  Luxembourg 1  inforceinforce 1  i  nforce 1permitted
|  Netherlands1
1  inforce inforce|  in force 1  inforceinforce1
|  in force in force |not
permitted
| 1not
|  Denmark |  inforceinforce|  in force 1  i  nforce |  in force in force | permitted
i 1not
|  Ireland 1  inforceinforce|  in force 1  inforceJ_ _ _ _permitted
|  United 
|  Kingdomi
1  inforceinforce|  in force 1  i  nforcei  nforce1
|  in force in force | permitted
|  Greece i
linforce|  in force 1  in forceJ_________
:  E u ro p ean  agreem ent concerning the international carriage of dangerous g o o d s b y  road.
:  International rules concerning the transport of dangerous g o o d s b y  rail.
:  International M aritim e Organization
:  International A ir Transport Association. ,  ■:  International transport of dangerous g o o d s b y  inland w aterw ays craft o n  the R h i
Paris convention a n d  Brussels convention :  C onvention o n  third party liability in the field o f
nuclear energy.A D R  
R I D  
I  M O  
I A T A  
A D N R
T h e  indications reported in table 3  are taken fro m  Reference 3 9 .

- 3 3  -
Section 8  - R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  C O M M U N I T Y  A N D  A C T IV I T IE S  O F  T H E
C O M M I S S I O N  A S  R E G A R D S  T H E  T R A N S P O R T  O F  R A D I O A C T I V E  M A T E R I A L S
8.1. - Responsibility of the C o m m u n ity
T h e  C o m m u n ity  bears responsibility both for ensuring the health of 
general public a n d  occupationally exposed w orkers an d  for facilitating 
the free m o v e m e n t of radioactive materials within the E uropean C o m m u n ity .
T his responsibility derives essentially fro m  C hapter III of the E A E C  
Treaty w ith regard to the protection of the health of w orkers a n d  the 
general public against the dangers arising fro m  ionizing radiations a n d  fro m  
Article 7 5  o f the E E C  Treaty relating to the draw ing-up of c o m m o n  rules 
applicable to international transport.
8.2. - Activities of the C o m m issio n
T h e  C o m m issio n  of the E uropean C o m m u n ity  h as alw ays been fully aw are of 
the role played b y  the transport of radioactive materials in the developm ent 
of nuclear energy applications a n d  has accordingly turned its attention to 
various fields o f activity.
A n  appropriation o f 1,500,000 E C U  granted b y  the budgetary Authorities for 
the period 1980-83 to fund the C om m ission's w o rk  o n  the transport of radio­
active materials h as m a d e  it possible to finance 3 3  study· contracts divided 
into five categories established .o n  the lines w o rk e d  out at a  technical 
m eeting held b y  the C o m m issio n  w ith experts fro m  the C o m m u n ity  in July 1 9 8 0 .
T h e  following are the five categories covering the studies financed during 
the three financial years in question (see the su m m a ry  tables in A p p en d ix  
7 ) :
C at. I. W o r k  w h ic h  m a y  possibly lead to the adoption of m easures 
(recom m endations, directives, etc.) at C o m m u n ity
leve l  ;
studies 9, 1 3  an d  14;

- 3 4  -
C at. II. W o r k  in  support of the com petent authorities of the M e m b e r
States involved in the project for revision of the I A E A  
regulations;
studies 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 20, 2 1  an d  2 7 ;
C at. III. B e n c h m a rk  w o rk  o n  the verification of calculation m eth o d s 
in the design of transport containers for w h ich  design 
approval is required b y  the com petent authorities; 
studies 1, 8, 19, 24, 29, 3 0  a n d  3 1 ;
C at. IV . W o r k  relating to aspects of transport covered only 
partly b y  the I A E A  regulations; 
studies 4, 16, 17, 22, 23, 3 2  an d  3 3 ;
C at. V . W o r k  of a  general nature requested at the abovem entioned 
m eeting of experts; 
studies 1 2  a n d  1 5 .
T h ese studies are devoted either to technical aspects or to administrative 
a n d  regulatory aspects.
8.2.1. - Technical studies
In  the context of the C om m ission's activity, w h ic h  b egan 
in 1980, 6 5  %  of the appropriation has so  far been devoted to 
experim ents :  tests o n  various types of packages, w ith a  v iew  
to im proving the present I A E A  regulations; tests o n  the stow ing 
of packages, in order to pave the w a y  for com plem entary n e w  
regulations; a n d  reference experim ents ("B enchm ark" w o rk ) o n  the 
verification of calculation m ethods.
T hree typical experim ents are reported below .

- 3 5  -
In  1 9 8 0 -8 1  a  considerable a m o u n t of w o rk  w a s  d o n e  
b y  a  joint group of F ren ch  a n d  G e rm a n  experts in studying 
the behaviour of sm all type-B  packages w eighing less than 
5 0 0  k g  under co m b in ed  crush a n d  fire accident conditions 
an d  the resulting increase of risk.
T h e  results of this study significantly influenced the 
joint F ren ch -G erm an  proposal submitted to the I A E A  w ith 
the support of the C E C  for insertion as a n  additional 
paragraph in the I A E A  transport regulations, in  order to 
cover crush loads for so-called lightweight packages under 
certain conditions.
T h e  tie-dow n system s to b e  required for packages under n o rm al 
a n d  accident conditions are under study b y  a  joint gro u p  
of F rench a n d  Belgian experts.
T h e  study is divided into four phases extending over four 
financial years.
T h e  first tw o  phases are devoted especially to the analysis 
of information collected relating to the deceleration forces 
generated in road a n d  rail accidents, an d  to the analysis 
of accident descriptions a n d  statistics in w h ic h  the types 
of vehicles, the im pact speeds a n d  the package d a m a g e  are 
reported. T h e  last tw o  phases are devoted to a  series of 
eight collision tests.
T h e  study as a  w h o le  includes the publication of a  reference 
d o cu m en t (code of g o o d  practice) that will furnish guidelines 
o n  the stow ing of packages o n  land vehicles.
T h e  results of this study will b e  of param ount im portance 
in deciding w hether it is advisable to include a  requirem ent 
o n  tie-dow n system s in the I A E A  transport regulations.

- 3 6  -
Joint studies perform ed b y  F rench an d  British experts 
h av e s h o w n  differences in the calculated reactivity for 
notional nuclear fuel transport flasks. T hese differences 
h av e b een traced to discrepancies as betw een different 
data libraries in the nuclear data for lead.
In  view  of the im portance of lead shielding in transport a n d  
other applications, it has b een suggested that a n  
experimental a n d  theoretical investigation b e  conducted in 
order to establish appropriate data a n d  data libraries.
A  joint group of F rench a n d  British scientists are 
currently perform ing a  series of b enchm ark experim ents o n  
a  lead-reflected system  a n d  a  series of calculations o n  
a  standard transport flask design, using m o st of the 
c o m m o n ly  available nuclear data libraries.
It is notew orthy that in another context, nam ely the R & D  p ro g ra m m e  
o n  "Plutonium  recycling in light-water reactors", w h ic h  en d ed  in 1979, the 
C o m m issio n  of the E uropean C o m m u n ities has assessed the environm ental 
aspects in the 1 9 9 0 s of plutonium  transport within the E uropean 
C o m m u n ity . T his assessm ent w a s  divided into three m ain  parts dealing 
essentially w ith :
.  im pact o n  the environm ent for norm al transport conditions;
.  im pact o n  the environm ent in the event of accidents;
.  radiological consequences to the general public a n d  to transport w orkers.
M oreover, s o m e  research a n d  study them es h av e been identified an d  w o rk  car­
ried out w ith a  view  to reducing the environm ental im pact of plutonium  
transport. A  list of the docum ents issued under this p ro g ram m e is included 
in A p p en d ix  8.
In  addition, the JRC-ispra has carried out studies o n  trends in 
irradiated-fuel transport in the E uropean C o m m u n ity  an d  o n  statistics 
of railway accidents in the C o m m u n ity , in support of the study o n  the 
railway transport of radioactive materials (35), (36).

- 3 7  -
8.2.2. - Studies o n  administrative a n d  regulatory aspects
In 1975, the C o m m issio n  carried out a  survey o n  the transport of 
radioactive materials in M e m b e r  States, regulations in force for 
the various m o d e s  of transport, com petent authorities a n d  their 
role, authorizations required for the transport of radioactive 
materials, em ergency provisions, etc.
D uring 1 9 80, a n  inventory of the regulations in force in C o m m u n ity  
countries w a s  com piled a n d  the follow-up to this study g av e rise 
to a  n u m b e r of contracts o n  topics w h ic h  se e m e d  to w arrant further 
investigation. T h ese are :
1.  standardization of transport certificates;
2.  em ergency assistance procedures in the event of accident during 
the transport of radioactive materials;
3.  analysis of the qualifications required an d  the training o f 
personnel taking part in the transport of radioactive materials 
in C o m m u n ity  countries;
4. list o f test facilities existing in C o m m u n ity  countries
5 . quality-assurance p ro g ram m es in force in C o m m u n ity  countries 
in the field of radioactive materials transport.
8.2.3. - Activities at international level
C o m m issio n  representatives regularly participate in the w orking 
parties, advisory groups a n d  scientific m eetings convened b y  
international organizations IA E A , N E A -C S N I, in the field o f 
radioactive-materials transport; hence the C o m m issio n  is w ell 
inform ed o n  the developm ents all over the w orld.
C o m m issio n  representatives also participate in the I A E A  Standing 
A dvisory G ro u p .

- 3 8  -
8.2.4. - T h e  special perm anent w orking party
T h e  special w orking party of national experts, set u p  in 
response to Parliament's resolution of 2 2  January 1 9 8 2  to advise 
the C o m m issio n  o n  the preparation of proposals for C o m m u n ity  
action a n d  o n  the study of all the problem s raised b y  this type 
of transport, also gives technical advice w ith a  v iew  to the selection 
of contracts for such studies to b e  financed b y  the C o m m issio n .

- 3 9  -
Section 9  - S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N S
T h e  findings of the special perm anent w orking party are 
su m m arized  below .
9.1. - Regulatory aspects
F r o m  the analysis it em erg es that consolidated an d  substantially 
uniform  requirem ents concerning the transport of radioactive 
materials are in force in all the C o m m u n ity  countries. T hese 
requirem ents m a k e  for safe and sm o o th  m o v e m e n ts of radioactive 
materials throughout the C o m m u n ity .
In  v iew  of the difficulties encountered in im plem enting 
international recom m endations at national level (w ith particular 
reference to the timing), the result achieved is undoubtedly
excel lent.
T h e  current revision of the I A E A  regulations will provide a n  
opportunity for a  m o re  general harmonization. T h e  revision 
will b e  com pleted in 1984, an d  in the following years the 
international transport organizations will incorporate it into 
their o w n  regulatory system s.
9.2. - Technical aspects
T h e  technical solutions adopted in the transport of radioactive 
materials to ensure nuclear safety a n d  radiation protection are 
the s a m e  in all C o m m u n ity  countries. T h e  transport packages (type

- 4 0  -
A , type B , etc.) are accepted everyw here o n  the basis of a  "reciprocity 
system "; although further progress w o u ld  b e  w e lc o m e  in the fram ew o rk  o f 
the universal acceptability of type B  ( U )  packages.
F r o m  this point of view , it is not considered necessary to change the 
existing situation.
A s  far as the technical requirements are concerned, they are under 
perm anent review  within the fram ew ork of I A E A  b y  the m e m b e r States o f 
that A g en cy , am o n g st w h ic h  the countries of the E uropean C o m m u n ity  are 
particularly active. In  this connection, m ention m u st b e  m a d e  of 
the im portance of the C E C  study contracts.
9.3. - Administrative aspects
T h e  C o m m u n ity  countries d o  not adopt a  uniform  position w ith regard 
to certain administrative aspects.
A s  far as the transport docum ents a n d  approval certificates, such as 
those in respect of shipm ent a n d  package design, are concerned, it se e m s 
that the information they contain is virtually the s a m e  in all the 
C o m m u n ity  countries. Nevertheless, the com petent authorities, the carriers 
a n d  the custom s offices w o u ld  benefit greatly fro m  the adoption of a  
standard form at in w h ich  the particulars alw ays appear in the s a m e  order. 
T his is only a  form al question, but it could result in the speeding u p  
of the administrative procedures.
It is m o re  than likely that the situation will im prove in the near future 
o w in g  to the edition in 1 9 8 4  of the revised I A E A  transport regulations.
9.4. - Radiation protection aspects
T h e  studies carried out h ave demonstrated that in all C o m m u n ity  countries 
the dose received b y  w orkers a n d  the general public d u e to the transport 
of radioactive materials is extremely lo w  a n d  represents only a  sm all 
contribution to the exposure of the population resulting fro m  the peaceful 
uses of ionizing radiations. It w o u ld  therefore appear that n o  special 
requirements, such as the choice of a  particular route, are called for in 
the transport of radioactive materials.

- 4 1  -
A s  far as accident conditions are concerned both the studies o n  
risk assessm ent w h ic h  allow  the better estimation of risks as a  
function of the accident, a n d  the training of personnel an d  em erg en cy  
assistance, w h ic h  c a n  lead to im p ro v em en t of action undertaken after 
a n  accident, could give rise to proposals w ith the a im  of refining 
existing arrangem ents.
T h e  provisions of the E A E C  Directive o n  the protection of the 
general public a n d  w orkers against the dangers of ionizing radiation 
are being duty taken into account in the national transport regulations. 
T h e  technical requirem ents closely follow a n d  are com patible w ith 
the provisions of the I A E A  transport regulations.
Finally, it is im portant to underline that the furnishing of adequate 
a n d  objective information through the m a ss m ed ia concerning the 
provisions adopted in the transport of radioactive materials w o u ld  
help to im p ro v e the acceptability of this activity b y  the general 
publi c.
9.5. - Conclusions
It m u st b e  acknow ledged that over the years the C o m m u n ity  countries 
h av e accom plished a  great deal o f valuable w o rk  in the field of 
radioactive-materials transport. T h e  regulatory aspects w e re  
settled before the operational aspects, an d  there is n o w  a  bo d y  of 
rules w h ic h  are duly observed b y  all the parties concerned, n am ely  
consignors, carriers a n d  transport workers. T hese rules h av e 
ensured high standards of safety in the past a n d  continue to d o  so  
today.

1.
REFERENCES
1  -  Official Journal of the European Community, No C 40/42 - 15 Feb.
1982.
2 - International Atomic Energy Review, 21, NO 6, 40, 1979.
3 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG 0073, 1976.
4 - G. SWINDELL, Synopsis of some transport studies in Member States,
Working Paper N. 2, AG 225.
5 - HARTWIG et al., Proceedings PATRAM, Las Vegas, 1978.
6 - B. PETTERSON, Consultant paper, AG 225, IAEA.
7 - Information submitted by experts of EC countries.
8 - International Atomic Energy Review, 21, No 6, 48, 1979.
9 - GIBSON R. ed., The safe transport of radioactive materials, Pergamon
Press, London, 1966.
10 - Contract IAEA-CEA No 2792 Rl/CE, 1983.
11 - Papers presented at PATRAM, 1983.
12 - WERNER K.,  Bundesbahn Zentralamt Minden (Westf).
13 - Council Directive on the health protection of the general public and
workers against the danger of ionizing radiation, Official Journal of  
the European Community, L 246, 17 Sept. 1980.
14; - Inventory of the administrative procedures for the carriage of  
radioactive materials in EC countries, 1980 - Report on a CEC-CNEN  
contract.
15 - Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological  
Protection, ICRP No 26, 1977.

2.
16 ~ Advisory Group on Basic Philosophy - Report of the Chairman, AG 225,
July 1979.
17 - B.G. TAYLOR, Radioisotope packages in crash and fire, Proceedings,
PATRAM Symposium, 1980.
18 - F. GLASER, Simulation of aircraft crashes on spent fuel casks,
Proceedings, PATRAM Symposium, 1980.
19 - H.W. HUBNER, B. SCHULZ-FORBERG, Classification of safety margins,
Proceedings, PATRAM Symposium, 1980.
20 - J.D. McCLURE et al., Relative response of type B packaging to
regulatory and other impact, Proceedings, PATRAM Symposium, 1980.
21 - Contract IAEA-CEA No 2791 RI/CF, Comportement des emballages aux feux
de longue durée.
22 - H.A. SELLING, Mutual emergency assistance in the event of accident
during transport of radioactive materials, CEC contract, 1982 (to be  
published).
23 - IAEA - Emergency response planning for transport accidents involving
RAM-TEC DOC 262, 1982.
24 - NUREG 0170, Fuel environmental statement on the transportation of
radioactive materais by air and other modes - Dec. 1977.
25 - Y. S0USSELIER et al., Methodological approach to safety analysis in
transportation of RAM - Proceedings of flftfc PATRAM Symposium.
26 - Contract IAEA-CNEN.
27 - M.W. CARTER et al., Health physics, Vol. 42, No 6, 759, 1982.
2g - HAMARD, IAEA Seminar on packaging, transportation and tests, Vienna,  
1976.
29 - INTERTRAN - Usage manual, 1981.
30 _ p. HUBERT, P. PAGES, The application of the A.L.A.R.A. principles to
the safety of radioactive-materials transportation.
2 n d  E uropean Scientific S em inar o n  Radiation Protection Optimization 
" A s  L o w  A s  R easonably Achievable".
C E C , L u x em b o u rg , 7-8 N o v . 1 9 8 3 .

3 .
31 - Proposal for standardized formats of transport certificates, CEC-CNEN
contract, 1981.
32 - WARNIEZ,  Analysis of different practices concerning quality assurance
as applied to casks for the transport of radioactive materials within  
selected Member States of the European Community. CEC-CEA Contract,  
1982 (to be published).
33 - Y. SOUSSELIER, Impact sur 1' environnement de la gestion des déchets
et des transports de matières radioactives du cycle de combustibles  
nucléaires.
Report presented under the UNO programme for the environment,  
September 1978.
34 - A. W. GRELLA, A review of 5 years experience of accidents involving
nuclear transport.
Symposium on packages test standards. IAEA 1977.
35 - P. ROCCO, Development of spent nuclear fuel transport in the European
Community. Energia Nucleare, Vol. 25, No 12, Dec. 1978.
- P. ROCCO, The transport of irradiated fuel in the Community 1975-1985.  
JRC-Ispra, February 1976.
36 - A. PRINS, Preliminary report on thé frequency and seriousness of
railway accidents in the European Community with a view to the  
transport of radioactive materials. JRC-Ispra, 1978.
3 7  - G .A . H O L D E R , Analysis of qualifications required an d  the training o f
personnel taking part in the transport of radioactive materials in  
E uropean countries, C E C  contract, 1981 (to be published).
3 8  - Preparation of audiovisual training aids to assess in the education needs
resulting fro m  the im plem entation of the E U R A T O M  Directive o n  basic safety 
standards, Contract 1194/82.
3 9  - K . R I D D E R , Carriage of radioactive materials in E u ro p e in consideration o f
the provisions of the traffic law , including the possibilities of taking 
into account the 1984  version of the I A E A  regulations.
P A T R A M  S y m p o siu m , 1983.
4 0  - K . R I D D E R , G efahrguthandbuch.

1.1.
APPENDIX 1
MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING PARTY ON 
THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Mr. L. BAEKELANDT Belgium
Miss G. ROOSEMONT Belgium
Mr. K. ULBAK Denmark
Mr. T. LAURSEN Denmark
Mr. K. RIDDER Germany
Mr. G. WEHNER Germany
Mr. Y. SOUSSELIER France
Mr. M. GRAS France
Mr. N.V. NOWLAN Ireland
Mr, H.A. SELLING Netherlands
Mr. H.J. DRUIJFF Netherlands
Mr. R. Ch. VAN OOSTERWIJK Netherlands
Mr. M.J. CROMPTON United Kingdom
Mr. R.A. O'SULLIVAN United Kingdom
Mr. G. MOROSI Italy
Mr. G. BUCALO Italy
Mr. C. FALOCI Italy
Mrs. S. PIERMATTEI Italy
Mr. P. KAYSER Luxembourg
The following Directorates-General of the Commission of the 
European Communities are associated with the Special Working Party 
on the transport of radioactive materials :
- Directorate-General for Energy;
- Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development;
- Directorate-General for Transport;
- Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Education.

2.1
APPENDIX 2
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT ORGANIZATIONS (40)
International organizations responsible for the carriage of radioactive 
materials have been appointed for all modes of transport. A list of these 
organizations is given below.
- Transport by rail (RID)
In 1890, the International Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods 
by Rail (CIM) was established to remove disparities between national 
la*s which could impede the international transport of goods by rail.
In 1894, the "International Regulations Concerning the Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail" (RID) entered into force. They apply to 
international rail transport in almost all European countries with the 
exception of Albania and the Soviet Union.
The provisions governing the transport of radioactive materials are based on 
IAEA regulations on the safe transport of radioactive materials.
- Transport by road (ADR).
The ADR was developed on the basis of the RID and was ratified in 1959. 
It applies to international road traffic. Western European states and 
some Eastern-bloc countries apply the ADR.
RID and ADR provisions are almost identical.
The IAEA transport regulations have been adopted as the requirements for 
the transport of radioactive materials.  In order to ensure continuing 
conformity between the RID and the ADR, joint meetings between RID and 
ADR experts are bdd in order to consider matters that are common to both 
modes of transport. Arrangements exist for the simultaneous introduction 
of agreed amendments in the two agreements.

2.2
- International transport by inland waterways craft on the Rhine (ADNR)
International transport by inland waterway vessels on the Rhine is based 
on the Mannheim Convention.
Within the framework of this Convention, the riparian States and the 
United Kingdom have developed provisions on the transport of dangerous 
goods, among which are those concerning the transport of radioactive 
materials. Since traffic in these goods has hitherto been insignificant, 
the relevant provisions in the ADNR are still based on the 1967 edition of 
the IAEA regulations. It is likely that in the next few years changes 
will take place that will necessitate the updating of the ADNR provisions.
- Transport by sea (IMP)
<*)
Transport by sea is regulated in most European countries by the 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code). This code is 
being updated by the International Maritime Organization and will have 
to be put into effect by the individual countries through the enactment 
of national laws.
The IAEA transport regulation have been adopted as the requirements for
radioactive materials.
Tables specifying the minimum permissible segregation distances of 
packages from living accomodation or regularly occupied working areas on 
ships are included in the code, together with nomograms enabling these 
distances to be adjusted so as to take account of the presence of 
intervening cargo.
- Transport by air (ICAO, IATA)
The carriage of dangerous goods by air is regulated by two international 
organizations: the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, and the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), a body representing 
most airline compan-ie^
Over a period of almost chirty years the IATA has produced regulations 
for the transport of dangerous goods by air.
These regulations have gained a large measure of international 
acceptance but are not so clearly an expression of the policy of States 
as to ensure full international acceptance and compliance. In 1975, 
therefore, the ICAO set up a panel of experts on dangerous goods to work
(*) see table 3, page 32

2 . 3
on "Technical instructions for the safe transport of dangerous goods by 
air". These instructions were published in 1981 and 1982 and will be 
mandatory in 1984.
The provisions of the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of 
radioactive materials have been embodied in the Technical Instructions.
IATA has issued and periodically reviews IATA dangerous goods 
Regulations, the 24th edition of which has now been published on the basis 
of the ICAO Technical Instructions. These regulations are binding on IATA 
member airlines and specify the special packing and handling required for the
(*)listed materials, including radioactive materials.
- Carriage by post (UPU)
The Universal Postal Union is a specialized Agency of the United Nations 
and is responsible for preparing any amendments to the Universal Postal 
Union Convention and the regulations for the implementation thereof. 
Under this Convention, radioactive materials in quantities specified may 
be carried internationally. Nevertheless, in practice alt member countries
of the Community, except the U.K. and France don't permit postal shipments, 
(see table 3, paye 32).
(*) For the status of application of these regulations, see table 3, page 32.

3.1
APPENDIX 3
IAEA TRANSPORT INFORMATION COLLECTION SYSTEM
In 1980 the IAEA initiated the collection of data on the volume of traffic 
in radioactive materials carried by all modes of transport. The aim of this 
data collection is to conduct a worldwide assessment of radiation doses 
received by transport workers and the general public due to the carriage of 
radioactive material and also to make estimates of the overall radiological 
risk arising from accidents during transport.
The information collected is compiled in a suitable form and stored in a 
computer file for retrieval as required.
In developing the system, the Agency did its utmost to avoid placing any 
undue burden on the Member States.
Member States are required to supply information on the nature and quantity 
of all types of radioactive materials transported within and between the 
States. The information to be provided by the Member States will be 
submitted on summary forms as shown in Figs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
To the extent possible, thr? information is to relate to the year 1980, the 
chosen reporting period. This data collection system will also cover information 
on the occurence and consequences of incidents and accidents during transport.
It was recognised that the number of such events is likely to be too small 
to allow of reasonable predictions concerning the frequency and 
consequences of future accidents; for this reason statistical information 
on the total transport accidents involving other types of dangerous goods 
is also requested.

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Summary Questionnaire of Package Movements (1)IAEA FORM A
page ......... o f .............
Me
mber State reporting: International Transport (report exports onlv)
Reporting period:
ROADRAIL INLAND WATERWAYS
Package classification Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km
Exempt
LSA or LLS (not full load)
Type A
Type B(U)
TYPE B(M)
Special arrangement
Full load (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2)
SEA AIR POST
Package classification Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Distance: miles/km
Exempt
(2)
LSA or LLS (not full load)
Type ANOTES: |
Type B(U)(1 ) Report totals in all cases.
(2) Report the sum of the distances from origins to  
destinations.
(3) Report total number of full loads.
(4) Report sum of radiation levels in mrem/h at 2 m 
from vehicle.
.Type B(M)
Special arrangement
Full load (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2)1
Radiation  
Labelling Category
T .l.
Number of packagesSTATISTICAL DATA ON PACKAGES
Exempt I-W HITE ll-YE LLQ W
0 -1lll-Y E L LO W
1 -3 3 - 5 5 - 1 0 Full load >  10Fissile Class
Exempt Class I Class II Class III
N-120 A/E (Dec 79)
Figure 1

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE ? : fl A TE RIALS
Member State reporting:Summary Questionnaire of Package Movements ( I  
Domestic Transport (i.e. within your borders)IAEA FORM B
page...........o f ..............
Re
porting period:
ROAD RAIL INLAND WATERWAYS
Package classification Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km
Exempt
LSA or LLS (not full load)
Type A
Type B(U)
TYPE B(M)
Special arrangement
Full load (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2)
SEA AIR PCST
Package classification Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Transport Index Distance: miles/km Number of packages Distance: miles/km
Exempt(2)
LSA or LLS (not full load)
NOTES:
(1 ) Report totals in all cases.
(2) Report total number of full loads.
(3) Report sum of radiation levels in mrem/h at 2 m  
from vehicle.Type A
Type B(U)
Type B(M)
Special arrangement
Full load (3) (4) (2) (3) (4) (2)
STATISTICAL DATA ON PACKAGES
Radiation  
Labelling CategoryExempt I-W HITE ll-YE LLO Wlll-Y E L LO WFissile Class
T .l. 0 -1 1 - 3 3 - 5 5 - 1 0 Full load > 1 0 Exempt Class I Class 1 1 Class 1 1 1
Number of packages
N -1 2 0  B /E  (D ec 79)Figure 2

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Summary of Consignment Movements (1)
Member State reportingReport exports and internal movements - do not report importsIAEA FORM C , 
page..o*. . .
Re
porting period:
Type ot materialROAD
comiptmenuN u m b e r o l 
n a c V a flnTotal m a./eo-uO )TiDistance
m.iet/tm!?!RAIL
Numtv- of Number o'  
pacS a^nActiu.ty in O
Toia< rtviWconi(3)TIDniancr
m. le i'i m(?lINLAND WATERWAYS
Numbti o ' Number of  
eeck ap rtActrmfy > A  Cl
T out m an/cantO ITlm ( J(
O tter Tramuraniei
Highl e*e* flatlet
Seated Sou<oi IWt ii .l
A adieetiarmafui'C aft
Indmtnei Redio®raphy
Oiler Indutmai Source*
U *  Th O m  & Cone*rttratet
Of,
d o,
Omer LIS A LSA
U^iued eied fuel
Irrad iated  F u e l
Ortiert. (tprcifyl
NOTES fl) U"I«» omeiynte md.ceied. report tolall.
1 7 1  Reoort turn of the flmaneei from o< 1 9 1 1st to det'ioa\iO«t ol all co«ti*nmei*t» fo> each type of m a in *  
(31 Report mat-mum activity m any O-r (mmjmrwnl
H 1 7 0 /C ,r£  fOee ?*)
Figure 3

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Summary ol Consignment Movement* (1)
Report export* and internal movements —  do not report imports
Member State reporting:IAEA FORM C, 
page ......... o f...........
Re
porting period: .....................................
Ty
p* of malarialSEA
N u m b * ' el Numb*' of  
P K fltoAttn.tv m C.
matJcO'nfSITlD m*n»
m.l*>A'n(?>AIR
Numb*' of
P*ck»9e»A cii.’lv m C >
Total m*«/co"»l3lTlD'»l*ncr  
rr.lei/* ml7>TOTAL
Numb*' 0*  
*ontignm*nuNumb*' 0*  
pKkaortTor*1 m*i/coni(31Tlm .in'.mfj.
Plutonium
Orn*' Tfaniuiome*
Hr^i-Lcvrl Warm
lm r"<M 'iir A  L o» Inti W ntn
S*a<#d Sov'cm IMtb.)
Rad i oon * <  m*c* 0 1 -c »l1
|r*ut"i*' Radiorapriy
Orb*' InOutt'M1  SCurew
U tT h  0**1 A Conc*n|tat«>
UF,
UO,
Oifi«> LLS A ISA
0»*<V Ufat-fyl
MOTES HI U nin>«th*'«nw mdit»i*d. i«0Ott Iblali. ( *, , a* of mairna*!|} ' RtOOfi rum of th« ditlancM f'om  oi'gmi to  of *” con«-9"m*«t» o« «ac »o*
131 RfooM m ti "tH if *("viiv in any on* torwjnmm*
u 170 C y t IC « tsi
Figure 4

Member State reporting:TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ,A e a f o r m d Ï
Package Contents exceeding 102  A2  or, if in special form, 102 A^
* page ........... o f.............. j
i l
I
R
eporting period: .........................................  1Su
mmary of Movements of Substantial Quantities  
Report Exports and Internal Movements —  Do NOT Report Imports
RadionuclideNumber of  
identical  
movementsActivity
per consignment  
in CiChemical/
physical
formDistances shipped —  origin to destination
Road
km/milesRail
km/milesInland Waterway
km/milesSea
km/milesAir
km/miles
1
N-120 D/E (Dec 79)
Figure 5

4.1
APPENDIX 4
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF IAEA REGULATIONS.
The aim of the transport regulations is to ensure, during the transport of 
radioactive materials, adequate containment, control of radiation, safe 
dissipation of heat and prevention of criticality. The means whereby they 
endeavour to do so are briefly examined in the following paragraphs.
Packaging
The function of the packaging used for the transport of radioactive 
materials is to prevent the escape of the materials from the packaging 
itself and at the same time to protect the transport environment from the 
danger associated with the materials being transported. It is obvious that 
if radioactive material escapes from the containment system, the hazards to 
human beings are due to both external and internal irradiation.
The toxicity of radioactive materials varies considerably and the standards 
of containment required should vary accordingly.
As most of the materials transported are small quantities of radioisotopes 
for medical use, the IAEA regulations introduce the concept of a type A 
package (defined as a package with a limited content).
- Type A packages. The basic requirement of a type A package is to resist 
normal conditions of transport, i.e. the package must be able to 
withstand minor mishaps such as rough handling, exposure to rain, 
compression and penetration by other goods without losing any of its 
content and its shielding efficiency.
Studies carried out by various panels set up by the IAEA demonstrate 
that in the case of a minor accident the release of 1/1000 of the content 
is acceptable, and that if an individual came into contact with 
contamination due to that release, the uptake of activity would not 
normally exceed 1/1000 of the quantity released. On this basis, the 
activity limits for materials to be transported in type A packages have been 
fixed.

.4.2
According to the physical form of the materials, two maximum activity 
values have been defined for each of the nuclides to be transported in a 
type A package: A^ is the maximum activity of radioactive material in
"special form", i.e. in a state which by virtue of inherent properties 
(massive, non-friable, insoluble in water, or material encapsulated to 
prescribed standards) would be not di sper&ibLe after its release from a 
package. A^ is the maximum activity if the material is in other forms.
In deriving A^ ,  it was assumed that if the package is subjected to 
accident conditions and is damaged to such extent that the shielding is 
completely destroyed, the emergency whole-body dose to a person will not 
exceed 3 rem.
In deriving A ,  it was assumed that the probability of a major accident,
causing the escape of a large part of the package content, is very— %
small; as a result of a minor accident 10 of the radioactive content 
may escape from the package and 10“ ^ of this escaped content may enter 
the body of a person involved in the accident; an emergency uptake 
should not exceed 3/5 of the maximum permissible annual uptake for
workers.
The requirements concerning type A packages in the regulations result in 
a series of tests designed to simulate the damage effects due to 
mechanical and weather conditions prevailing in the environment in which 
the transport takes place.  Special .consideration is given to type A 
packages containing liquids.
It is important to note that type A packages have "built-in" safety 
features: limitation of the content, and tests which the packages have
to withstand. For this reason, such packages are not subject to the 
approval of the competent authority except when they are used to 
transport fissile materials.
- Type B packages.  The concept of a type B package was introduced to
ensure containment in the case of quantities of activity exceeding the
limits laid down for type A packages.
The tests for demonstrating ability to withstand the accident conditions 
during transport to which a type B packaging is further subjected are: a 
mechanical test, a thermal test and an immersion test.
The mechanical test consists in dropping a package twice onto a target 
so that the damage it suffers on impact will lead to the maximum damage 
in the thermal test which follows.
In the first drop, the package falls from a height of 9 metres, so that 
it suffers the maximum damage. In the second drop, it falls from a 
height of 1 metre onto a mild-steel bar 15 cm in diameter.
In the thermal test which follows the mechanical test, the whole package 
is exposed to a temperature of 800°C for 30 minutes.

4.3
In the immersion test,  the package is immersed in water to a depth of 15 
metres for at least 8 hours.
After these tesls the package must retain sufficient, shielding capacity 
and must keep any loss of content within fixed limits.
There are two kinds of type B package design: B(U) and B (M). Type B(U)
packages must satisfy additional design criteria in respect of 
containment, and they require only the approval of the competent 
authority in the country of origin of the design (U stands for 
unilateral).
A type B(M) package is not required to satisfy all the additional design 
criteria in respect of containment that apply to type B(U) packages, but 
it must comply with certain other specific requirements.
A type B(M) package design is subject to the approval of all the
competent authorities involved in the shipment. Containment standards 
less stringent than those applying to type A packages are set for
materials of low potential hazard, the so-called low-level solids (LLS) 
and low specific activity materials (LSA).
The safe dissipation of heat from radioactive materials ensures the 
integrity of the containment and of the radiation shielding and 
minimizes the likelihood of injury to persons or damage to other goods.
The consignor is responsible for formal heat assessment. The regulations 
impose a limit of45 watt/m*', as the average heat flux for any package to 
be carried together with other packaged goods, and a limit of 50°C at 
any accessible surface. In the case of full load this limit may be exceeded.
Control of radiation
Radiological protection problems arise in the handling of radioactive
packages, owing either to the possibility of uptake or to the external
radiation emitted by the material.
The limitation of uptake is related to the containment standards imposed on 
the package by the regulations.
Limits are fixed for external radiation both at the surface of the package 
and at a distance of 1 metre from the surface.
With a view to limiting the doses to human beings, maximum radiation levels 
were laid down, namely 10 mrem/h at one metre from any pointy on the 
surface of the package (transport index) and 200 mrem/h at any point on the 
surface. In certain cases (full load) these limits can be exceeded.

.4 ,4
Package category labels.
Packages are divided into three categories on the basis of the external 
radiation levels at the surface and at a distance of one metre. A label 
corresponds to each category, as follows:
Category I - White label: surface radiation level not exceeding 0.5
mrem/h;
Category II - Yellow II label: surface radiation level up to 50 mrem/h
and transport index up to 1;
Category III - Yellow III label: surface radiation level up to 200
mrem/h and transport index up to 10.
The label constitutes a warning to persons coming into contact with 
packages. The regulations also impose a limit on the number of packages 
that can be carried in any vehicle,- aircraft, deck area of a seagoing ship, 
or inland-waterway craft.
Criticality
For the purposes of the transport regulations, Pu-239, U-233, U-235 and
uranium at various levels of enrichment are considered to be fissile 
materials; unirradiated natural uranium and depleted uranium are excluded. 
Quantities of fissile nuclides which cannot become critical under any 
circumstances, including accident conditions,are likewise excluded from the 
provisions governing fissile materials.
Fissile materials are divided for transport purposes into three classes: 
Fissile Class I, II and III.
The same degree of criticality safety is required in all three classes. 
Fissile Class I packages are "nuclear-safe" in any number and in any 
arrangement under all foreseeable circumstances.
Fissile Class I package designs require multilateral approval by the 
competent authorities except for the designs mentioned in the regulations as 
examples of Fissile Class I package designs requiring only unilateral 
approval by a competent authority.
Fissile Class II packages are "nuclear-safe" in a limited number and in any 
arrangement under all foreseeable circumstances of transport. All Fissile 
Class II package designs other than those mentioned as examples in the 
regulations require multilateral approval by the competent authorities; 
approval of shipment is not required.
Fissile Class III packages are only nuclear-safe under all foreseeable

4.5
circumstances of transport if special precautions are taken or special 
administrative or operational controls imposed on the transport of the 
consignment. The shipment of these packages has to be multilateral[y 
approved by the competent authorities since it is up to the consignor to 
submit for the approval of the competent authority details of the method 
that is proposed in order to comply with the general provisions for the 
attainment of nuclear safety. In the case of Fissile Class II and Class III 
packages, the "allowable number" is defined as the maximum number of 
packages which may be grouped together in one place.
- Special Arrangement
It is important to mention the special-arrangement procedure.
If a consignment of radioactive materials does not satisfy all the 
appplicable requirements specified in the regulations, it must be 
transported by "special arrangement".
The safety level attained through the special-arrangement procedure has 
to be the same as that which can be attained if all the requirements of 
the regulations are met.
Transport by special arrangement always requires multilateral approval. 
The regulations provide that the application for special-arrangement 
approval shall contain information other than that required for shipment 
and package-design approval: e.g. a statement of the reasons why the
consignment cannot be fully in accordance with the regulations, and 
particulars of the special precautions to be taken or the administrative 
or operational controls to be exercised during transport to compensate 
for the failure to meet all the applicable requirements of the 
regulations.

5.1
APPENDIX 5
RADIATION DOSES TO WORKERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC DUE TO 
THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.
As was pointed out in Appendix 3, the IAEA recently carried out a survey 
among its members to ascertain the number of packages transported yearly, 
so as to evaluate the doses received by workers and the general public as a 
consequence of these shipments.
From these data the risk assessment for the transport of radioactive 
materials in normal and accident conditions will be performed by the use of 
a computer code (INTERTRAN).
This code was developed by the IAEA and has been distributed to all member 
countries; the first evaluations will appear in the near future.
A group of EEC countries, namely France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom, convened to study the application of the code 
to a particular case in order to become acquainted with it. The subject 
proposed was the shipment of irradiated fuel under normal conditions of 
transport.
The results of the work carried out in ·  Italy indicated the following 
collective doses from the shipment of eight casks transported by road: 
handlers 3.65'10"^ man-rem; drivers 1.52·10“^ man -rem; general public.. 
13.5-lCr^ man-rem.
Application of the INTERTRAN code to a single shipment of irradiated fuel 
in Germany gave 3.25"10“1 man-rem for handlers, 5.52,10~2 man-rem for 
drivers and 7-10“2 man-rem for the general public.
Other methods were used to perform evaluations in the United Kingdom .  
These gave estimates of the annual collective dose associated with transpor­
ting irradiated fuel from first-generation UK power reactors. The values yielded 
were 0.8 man rem and 0.07 man-rem respectively for handlers and drivers and 
2.35 man-rem for the general public.
Surveys carried out in several countries (2) showed that the doses received 
by the various groups of transport workers are fairly low and only in a few

5.2
cases exceed 500 mrem/year (by way of example, the results of a French 
study (10) are summarized in Table 1). This can happen in places «here large 
numbers of packages are collected, such as radioisotope production and 
distribution centres, main railway stations and airports; the doses to 
transport personnel in these cases can be above 500 mrem/year but are lower 
than 1.5 rem/year. It is worth mentioning that results of surveys carried 
out in the storage depots of some of the most important Italian railway 
stations (Rome, Milan, Florence) showed environmental radiation levels only 
a few tenths above the natural background (10).

5 .3
Table 1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
MEAN ANNUAL DOSE 
per worker 10~- m SvCOLLECTIVE DOSE (* 
(man.Sv)
RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS 
Type A PACKAGEPACKAGING 16 
TRANSPORT 13-12 .  10 1
IRRADIATED FUELS 
Type B PACKAGE 50 6.5 .  10-3
WASTES
Type B or Industrial 35 4.5 .  10“2
MISCELEANEOUS .
Type B or Industrial 26-33.5 .  10
(*) :  The collective dose (S) to a population or group is given by the 
summation :
s . y h.p.Z__ i  i
1
whe
re H. is the dose to the whole body or to a specified organ
t haveraged over the P . .  members of the iL  subgroup of the population 
or group.
The units of S are man-sieverts (man.Sv).

6.1
APPENDIX 6
INTRODUCTION OF THE ICRP BASIC PRINCIPLES 
INTO THE IAEA TRANSPORT REGULATIONS.
The Advisory Group on radiation protection and safety principles in 
transport was convened by the IAEA on 2-6 July 1979 to re-examine the basic 
radiation protection and safety principles adopted in the transport 
regulations and to consider the application to transport activities of the 
principles of justification, optimization and dose limitation recommended 
by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). It was 
agreed that the principles on which the regulations are based are still 
valid. These principles can be summarized as follows:
Radioactive materials, including fissile materials, shall be transported in 
such a way that:
- under normal conditions of transport the exposures of transport workers 
and the general public are in conformity with the relevant requirements 
of the IAEA Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection (these 
Standards are in conformity with the current ICRP Dose Limitation 
System), which require that:
(i) all unnecessary exposures be avoided;
(ii) all necessary exposures be kept as low as reasonably achievable, 
economic and social considerations being taken into account, and
(iii) any exposure of an individual does not exceed the relevant dose 
limit;
- the effects on sensitive materials, such as undeveloped film, and the 
environment are acceptable;
- the total radiological risk associated with accidents:
(i) is not unacceptable and remains below the level of risk associated 
with the transport of other dangerous goods which have a good safety 
record, and
(ii) is reduced as far as is reasonably achievable, i.e. the precautions 
against accidents have been optimized;
- any design basis accident does not entail an unacceptable individual risk 
or an unacceptable population risk;
- under both normal and accident conditions, the risk of criticality 
occurrence is practically non-existent;

6.2
- in the case of materials and quantities that are not intrinsically safe, 
the primary control for the limitation of radiation exposure is the 
integrity and design of the package;
- heat generated within the material or in any packaging does not adversely 
affect the packaging and does not cause any unacceptable damage to 
persons, conveyances or other goods;
- transport within a country or between countries can be completed with the 
minimum of delay;
- the materials can, to the greatest extent possible, be handled with a 
minimum of special precautions on the part of the carrier in addition to 
the precautions normally taken by him for other dangerous goods.
The Group agreed that
- The regulations provide a framework. for the safe transport of 
radioactive materials and should be changed only when a change is 
justified.
- Primary reliance for safety in transport is on the packaging; however 
special procedures and additional precautions may be necessary to keep 
exposures as low as reasonably achievable.
- Administrative provisions laid down by the competent authorities for 
transport should conform to IAEA recommendations and should not, in 
themselves, restrict free movement.
- When routes or times for shipments of radioactive materials are required 
to be specified, the ICRP principles of optimization should be applied.
- Competent authorities must ensure that the regulations are properly 
observed and should consider appointing an adequate number of qualified 
experts for that purpose.
- Transport workers must be given all appropriate information and must be 
trained in the proper care and handling of radioactive-material shipments 
and in dealing with emergencies.

APPENDIX 7
Transport of radioactive materials 
Studies performed in 1981
Contract number 
and study numberContractor Topics Category Status of the final reports
XVII/322.80.1 
1TRANSNUCLEAIRE (F) Experience de reference (Benchmark) pour la qualification 
des méthodes de calcuL du blindage gamma des emballages 
pour combustible irradié en provenance des centrales nu­
cléaires à eau légère.III EUR 8017 FR, MF, 1982
XVII/322.80.2 
2CEA-FONTENAY-AUX 
ROSES (F)Study on interactions between crysh conditions and fire 
resistance for type B(U) packages of less than 500 kg in­
tended for the transport of radioactive materials.II to be published
XVII/322.80.3 
3BAM - BERLIN (D) Study on interactions between crushconditions and fire 
resistance for type B(U) packages of less than 500 kg in­
tended for the transport of radioactive materials.II to be published
XVII/322.80.4 
4TRANSNUBEL (B) Stowing of packages containing radioactive materials on 
conveyances. Phases 1.IV EUR 8057 EN, Hf, 1982
XVII/322.80.5 
5UKAEA - SRD (U.K.) Criticality safety hazards arising from the transport of 
fissile materials.II EUR 8345 EN, Nf, 1983

Contract number 
and study nuaberContractor Topics Category Status of thè final reports
XVII/322.80.6
6RAOIOCHEMICAL 
CENTRE ( U.K.)The specification and testing of radioactive sources 
designated as "Special Fora" under the IAEA transport 
regulations.II EUR 8053 EH, Mf, 1982
XVII/322/80.7
7UKAEA - SRO and 
CEGB (U.K.)IAEA 9 a. drop tests and iapact tests with aaterials 
likely to be encountered in an accident.II
XVII/322.80.8
8TRANSNUKLEAR (D) Oeteraination of the temperature distribution in spent 
light-water reactor fuel eleaents during transport and 
interaediate storage. Phase I.III
XVI1/322.80.9 
9CNEN (I) Proposal on the standardisation of certificates for the 
transport of radioactive aaterials.I
XVII/322.80.10 
10CNEN (I) Ability of type A packages to withstand regulatory tests. II EUR 8030 EN. Mf, 1983
XVII/322.80.11 
11ISTITUTO DI IMPIANTI 
NUCLEARI PISA (I)Ability of type A packages to withstand regulatory tests. II EUR 8030 EN, Mf, 1983
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
12Catalogue of facilities in Member States of the European 
Communities for testing the packaging of radioactive ma­
terials, Compilation of information provided.V EUR 8254 EN, 1983

APPENDIX 7
Transport of radioactive materials 
Studies performed in 1982
Contract number 
and study numberContractor Topics Category Status of the final reports
XVII/AV/81/140
13MINISTERIE VAN VOLKS­
GEZONDHEID EN MILIEU 
HYGIENE (NL)Mutual emergency assistance in the event of accident 
during transport of radioactive materials.I to be published in 1983.
XVII/AV/81/141
HMr. G.A. HOLDER (U.K.) Analysis of qualifications required and the training 
of personal taking part in the transport of radioac­
tive materials in the E.E.C.I to be published in 1983
XVII/AV/81/142
15CNEN (I) Risk assessment for the transport of irradiated fuel. V to be published in 1983
XVII/AV/81/309.1
16TRANSNUBEL (B) Stowing of packages in normal and accident conditions. 
Phase 2.IV to be published in 1983
XVII/AV/81/309.2
17CEA-FONTENAY- 
AUX-ROSES (F)Stowing of packages in normal and accident conditions. 
Phase 2.IV to be published in 1983

Contract number 
and study numberContractor Topics Category Status of the final reports
XVII/AV/81/455
18CEA-FONTENAV- 
AUX-ROSES (F)Analysis of different practices concerning quality as­
surance as applied to casks for the transport of radio­
active materials within selected Member States of the 
Community.IV to be published in 1983
XVII/AV/81/456 
19TRANSNUKLEAR (D) Evaluation of temperature distribution in spent LWR fuel 
assemblies during transport and intermediate storage. 
Phase 2.III
XVII/AV/81/458.1 
20CEA-CENTRE D'ETUDES 
DE VALDUC (F)Criticality safety hazards arising from the transport of 
irradiated fuel elements.II to be published in 1983
XVII/AV/81/458.2 
21UKAEA-SRD (U.K.) Criticality safety hazards arising from the transport of 
irradiated fuel elements.II to be published in 1983

APPENDIX 7
Transport of radioactive Materials 
Studies performed in 1983
Contract number 
and study numberContractor Topics Category Status of the final reports
XVII/AV/82/446.1
22CEA-FONTENAY- 
AUX-ROSES (F)Stowing of packages in normal and accident conditions. 
Phase 3 (experience)IV to be published in 1984.
XVII/AV/82/ 446,2 
23TRANSNUBEL (B) Stowing of packages in normal and accident conditions. 
Phase 3 (experience)IV I I  I t
XVII/AV/82/592
24TRANSNUKLEAR (D) Evaluation of temperature distribution in spent LNR fuel 
assemblies during transport and intermediate storage. 
Phase 3 (experience)III I I  I I

APPENDIX 7
Transport of radioactive materials
Studies to be performed in 1984
Contract number 
and study numberContractor Topics Category
XVII/AV/83/271.1 25 
XVII/AV/83/271.2 26Mrs S. PIERMATTEI (I) 
Hr C. FALOCI (I)Annual report on transport of radioactive materials in E.C. countries. 
Annual report on transport of radioactive materials in E.C. countries.V
XVII/AV/83/274
27ENEA (I) Ability of large type A packages to withstand regulatory tests for 
transportation of liquid waste and low-level waste.II
XVII/AV/83/275
28ENEA (I) Assessment of the environmental impact resulting from the transport 
by rail of irradiated fuel under accident conditions within the Eu­
ropean Community.V
XVII/AV/83/272
29CEA - CENTRE D'ETUDES 
DE VALDUC (F)Benchmark experiment on a lead-reflected system and calculations on 
the geometry of the experimental facility, using most of the commonly 
available nuclear data Libraries.III
XVII/AV/83/273
30UKAEA - SRD (UK) Benchmark experiment on a lead-reflected system and calculations on 
the geometry of the experimental facility, using most of the commonly 
available nuclear data Libraries.III
XVII/AV/83/494 
31CEA - FONTENAY - AUX - 
ROSES (F)Programme of experiments to supplement the qualification of the compu­
ter codes used in criticality calculations on irradiated fueL coming, 
from LWR power stations. Part 1: Programme feasibility study.III

Contract number  
and study numberContractor Topics Category
XVII/AV/83/193  
32TRANSNUBEL (B) Survey of existing literature in the field of shock-absorbing 
materials with a view to subsequent adaptation of plastic defor­
mation codes.IV
XVII/AV/83/ 665 
33BAM (RFG) Development of EC guidelines - Quality assurance for packages for 
the transport of radioactive materials.IV

Studies perforaed in the context of the R E D  prograaae on "Plutoniua
recycling in light-water reactors". Indirect nuclear action. 1975-1979.APPENDIX 8
Contract number Contractor Topics Issued reports
028-77-5 RPU BBELG0NUCLEAIRE (B) Study of the environmental impact of plutoniua 
transport in normal transport conditions.Final report :  COM N° 3575 EN, FR (1978) 
Summary :  EUR N° 6310 EN, FR (1979) 
report
024-77-4 RPU D TRANSNUKLEAR (D) Study of the environmental impact of plutonium 
transport in accident situations.Final report :  EUR N° 6938 EN (1980)
025-77-4 RPU D TRANSNUKLEAR (D) Suitability of existing casks for the transport 
of mixed-oxide fuel.Final report :  COM N° 3576 EN (1978) 
Summary :  EUR N° 6319 EN (1979) 
report
041-78-12 RPU B BELGONUCLEAIRE (B) Specifications and preliminary design of a large 
container for PUO^ transport.Final report :  COM N° 3890 EN (1981) 
Summary : EUR N° 7359 EN (1981) 
report
037-77-12 RPU UK UKAEA (UK) Specifications and tests respresentative of 
aircraft accidents, for container design.Final report : EUR N° 6994 EN (1980)
Summary : EUR N° 6999 EN (1981) 
report
038-78-1 RPU F CEA (F) Investigation of physical properties of PUO^ 
powder on which knowledge is still needed for 
the design of transport and storage ccntainers.Final report : COM N° 3885 FR (1981) 
Su m m a r y  : EUR N° 7268 FR (1981) 
report