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COM (85) 599 
 
 
 
Vol. 1985/0 216 
  
 
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Conformém ent au règlement (CEE, Euratom) n° 354/83 du Conseil du 1er février 1983 
concernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communauté économique 
européenne et de la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15.2.1983, 
p. 1), tel que modifié par le règlement (CE, Euratom) n° 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003 
(JO L 243 du 27.9.2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas échéant, les documents 
classifiés présents dans ce dossier ont été déclassifiés conformément à l'article 5 dudit 
règlem ent. 
In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983 
concerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Econom ic 
Communit y and the European Atom ic Energy Communit y (OJ L 43, 15.2.1983, p. 1), as 
amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243, 
27.9.2003, p. 1), t his file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this 
file have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation.  
In Übereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom  1. 
Februa r 1983 über die Freigabe der historischen Archive der Europäischen  
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgem einschaft (ABI. L 43 vom  15.2.1983,  
S. 1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. Septem ber 2003  
(ABI. L 243 v om 27.9.2003, S. 1), ist diese Datei der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich. Soweit  
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
C0M(85) 599 final  
Brussels, 31 October 1985
REHABILITATION AND REVIVAL PLAN FOR THE  
AFRICAN COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY THE DROUGHT
(Communication of the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament)
C0M(85) 599 final

CONTENTS
Conclusions of the Milan European Council meeting
REVIEW OF THE DUBLIN PLAN AND FIRST ASSESSMENT OF  
THE CURRENT FOOD SITUATION
1. Quantitative situation (aid supplied)
2. Qualitative situation (conditions of implementation)
2.1 Adapting the products and aid supplied to real needs
2.2 Procedures for supplying aid with the required rapidity
2.3 The intensity of coordination efforts
2.4 The Community's response to the huge logistical  
problem
3. Likely need after the current harvest/ and proposals  
for action
3.1 Emergency food aid likely to be needed in 1985-86
3.2 The Community's capacity to respond to major crises
REHABILITATION AND REVIVAL PLAN FOR THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
WORST AFFECTED BY THE DROUGHT
1. General approach  
... 1.1 'Objective
1.2 General features of the measures planned
2. Identification of rehabilitation and revival measures
2.1 Reinforcement of countries' own capacity to tackle  
disasters
2.1.1 Strengthening countries' own organizational  
capacity for defining and implementing  
their own emergency plans
2.1.2 Early detection of famine situations
2.1.3 Safety stocks of food and seed
2.1.4 The logistics of supplying aid
2.2 Agricultural revival of disaster-hit economies
2.2.1 Ensuring that basic inputs are available  
for 1986-87
2.2.2 Measures to accompany the reestablishment
of displaced persons —

II
3. Financing plan
3.1 a) the Community contribution  
b) Member States' contribution
3.2 Contributions from other aid donors
3.3 Local costs
4. Changes required in implementation procedures
4.1 Administrative organization and coordination
4.2 Procedures for implementing Community measures
TITLE III :  THE MEDIUM AND THE LONG TERM: STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND
--------  MEASURES TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION: THE COMMISSION'S
PR
OGRAMME
1

✓
INTRODUCTION
Conclusions of the Milan European Council meeting
The European Council, meeting in Milan on 28 and 29 June 1985, discussed  
the famine in Africa and concluded that:
harvests in the areas where drought was endemic should be closely  
monitored. The European Council welcomed the
Commission's proposal that the Community budget should provide  
for a "special reserve allocation" for emergency food aid;
as recommended by the Commission, a general coordinated  
strategy against short- and long-term drought should be set  
up.
This, is why the Commission is now, as a start/ putting forward a  
communication:
reviewing the Dublin plan and assessing the current food  
situation;
- containing an emergency plan for the rehabilitation and revival  
of the worst-affected countries ; the Council is asked to agree  
with the orientations proposed in this plan
- setting out the Commission's programme of medium- and long-term  
work regarding food strategies and measures to combat desertifi­
cation.

TITLE I:  REVIEW Of THE DUBLIN PLAN AND FIRST ASSESSMENT OF fHE CURRENT FOOD  
SITUATION
1. Quantitative situation (aid supplied)
At 1 October 1985/ all expenditure on the Dublin Plan/ adopted by the  
Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government on 4 December 1984/ had been  
fully conur.itted and operations were almost finished. The table annexed hereto  
shows that/ in 1985, operations had consisted of:
- emergency aid (175 million ECU) in the form of 281 610 tonnes of cereal  
equivalent supplied by the Commission/ plus other aid worth 56 million ECU.  
Some 94% of this aid has been supplied;
- under the Commission's normal food aid programme/ the supply of
32A 385 tonnes of cereal equivalent/ worth 81 million ECU at the C1F stage.
Some 88% of this aid has been supplied;
- under Member States' bilateral programmes, the supply of 631 020 tonnes of
cereal equivalent worth an estimated 158 million ECU at the Clf stage.
Some 80% of this has been supplied.
The Community's contribution to measures to combat the famine in 1985 thus  
amounted t'o a total of 1 237 015 tonnes of cereal equivalent, worth some
A U  million ECU in all. To this must be added 12 600 tonnes of various
products«* C  mi l  k powder, butteroil, sugar, pulses, dried fish and vegetable oil  
„orth some 16 million ECU supplied under the Commission's normal food aid  
programme. Total Community aid thus amounts to A3Q million ECU (excluding  
Member St at es''"aid other than cereals), 87% of· which has been supplied.
This aid has been concentrated on the eight African countries most affected by  
the famine: Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and
Chad. It represents around a third of all aid
replied Dy the international community. According to the latest United  
N ations report, it has helped in saving "millions of human lives".
2. Qualitative situation (conditions of implementation)
The Commission and the Community have found solutions U r  the  
countless difficulties and problems encountered in their operations. They may  
be summarized under four main headings.
2.1 Adapting the products and aid supplied to real needs
As to the type of products supplied, the flexibility of Community aid has made  
it possiole to meet the real needs: not only cereals or cereal equivalent
(flour, meal), but also a very wide range of higr.-energy piooucts (su.jar,  
vegetable oil, milk powder, pulses) and above all seed for the next hardest,  
together with medical and nutritional programmes aimed at sensitive groups'  
(mothers and children).
The Dublin plan had been preceded by two emergency programmes for Africa  
launched by the Commission '  in April 1985,(83 million ECU) ind October 1984
(60 million ECU).

- 3.
/
As to the other aspects of its aid, the Commission has repeatedly made  
ettorts to protect local or regional markets (to the extent of carrying out  
genuine triangular operations with neighbouring countries), and to give those  
cnspiaced by the famine the opportunity to do things for themselves  
food-for-work operations, drying meat from local livestock, producing  
out-of-season vegetables).
In a continent where there are a number of armed conflicts, the Commission has  
evoted special attention to the problem of refugees and displaced persons and  
has provided finance, to the tune of 35 million ECU for cash aid alone, for  
the programmes o f the United Nations High;Commission for Refugees (U N hCR) and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
The Dublin Plan is thus much more than a way of supplying cereals *from  
Europe's surpluses.
2·2 Procedures for supplying aid with the required rapidity
At the outset the Commission set up an emergency team, within the  
Directorate-General for Development, made up of a small number of officials  
working on permanent standby, who were given powers to decide on aid witnin  
the ove-all allocations by country. This speeded up  
decision-making.
The already very flexible procedures for emergency aid have been further  
accelerated. Simplified invitations to tender have been organized with the  
help of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and the Embassies of the  
recipient countries. The time between a request being made and the aid being  
despatched and landed has been reduced to AO to 60 days in some cases,  
cases.
Normal food aid procedures have also been simplified and accelerated. As soon  
as the Council adopted the annual implementing regulation on 19 February 1985,  
the Commission took its first decisions on allocation by country, and it  
proved possible to adopt the bulk of decisions concerning the countries  
affected Dy the famine in the first four months of^ 1985.
2·3 The intensity of coordination efforts
In accordance with the recommendations of the Heads of State and Government,  
the Commission organized an chaired five
coordination meetings with the Member States, from November 198A to July 19S5.  
These meetings brought together persons actually involved in operations and  
went beyond mere exchanges of information, which are always useful, 
to a joint planning of aid offers and despatch and receipt operations, in  
order to relieve the congestion of transport. This pre-coordination by the  
Community facilitated wider coordination with other aid donors.
P
J

• 4 -
The Commission worked on the spot not only with the Governments of the  
beneficiary countries but also with four international organitat ions and 24 — -  
European non-governmental organizations, with which it organized two  
operational coordination meetings, for the same purpose as those with the  
Member States. At the same time thert were many contacts with the other major  
donors (USA, Canada, Australia).
The Commission would like to pay a particular tribute to the NGOs, which'have  
often, in the most difficult conditions, been those best able to reach victims  
who were likely to be left unaided.
Being convinced that the best, most practical and most effective form of
cooperation is that done on the spot, the Commission decentralized many of its  
powers of decision to its delegations in the field. The Commission delegates  
in the countries affected by the famine were thus given resDonsibilitv and
were thus enable to make their full contribution to the work by the United Nations  
(e.g. in Ihiopia), and even in some cases to take the lead in coordination (e.g.  
as regards transport in Sudan).
As the international community responded by despatching more and more  
foodstuffs, it quickly became clear that the main problem would be the  
logistical one of distribution, with bottlenecks in ports and other centres  
which could not be relieved with the fleet of aging trucks available, in  
regions where access was often difficult (Ethiopia) or over the vast distances  
to be found in countries which are almost continents themselves (Sudan, Mali,
Chad, Niger). The problem wasytrade worse by the arrival of the rains, which
were a godsend for the next harvest but a nightmare for the road and rail  systems.
Ihe Community tried to give a pragmatic response. The Commission did not merely  
wish to supply aid FOB or CIF .and has made efforts to finance as much as possi­
ble of the internal cost of transporting its aid and even, in some cases, that  
of the Member States. It encouraged the Member Stàtes to supply new trucks  
(more than 600 in all) with stocks of spare parts and mobile repair and mainte­
nance units. It helped to finance quickly the refurbishing of the Sudan railway.  
From May through to the end of October, it organized a vast "Community airlift"  
in Sudan, using nine heavy transport aircraft and three helicopters from the  
Member States (Germany, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Nether­
lands) and the USA. This airlift exceeded 10 000 tonnes delivered to the Darfour  
region, in the extreme West of Sudan,, where the lives of hundreds of thousands  
of human beings were in jeopardy. ïhe Commission contributed 7 million ECU to  
this operation, largely in the form of money for fuel.

™ t ‘C , W „ °  . V . " V V , ' « ° / b H . l E  K*° ctt"  ·* deliveries, the ,,ock
Mauritania, Mali Nio«p tn! rh SepteBber *n » U  West African ports serving  
ports servlno Ethioni*9 cm « ^ Chad* l t h·8 *l»o improved in two of the three
thi rd Eth Ionian sort < \  \ *?d °]1bout1)' b«» 1» »till worrying in theEthiopian port (A.s.b) and the single port in Sudan (Port Sudan)!
pi:jzisurP > h r0S ir t "  c r^.v.?l y  ^  * « » ··· ·»·«· * * h ' ^  » « *work. 8 C exptr*»/ <srid ^  b·* contributed to financing their
3. Likely need after the current harvest, and proposals for action
3.1 Emergency food^aid likely to be needed in 1985-86
The FAO's early warning system, and the weekly information sent by Commission  
delegates, seem to Indicate that, on the whole, the prospects for the next  
harvest are better than at the same time last year. The rains came on time  
and were fairly well spread out. Even though the amount of rain is still less  
than the 30-year average (except in Chad and Sudan) harvests are likely to be  
much greater than those of 1984, although somewhat lower than average.
The spectre of famine would seem to be receding, but we must still be  
cautious, as accurate harvest forecasts are not yet available. It is already  
clear that localised difficulties will persist in some countries, due to  
inadequate rainfall or >insufficient seed and cultivation equipment. The  
situation is still very worrying in two countries where the harvest looks  
likely to be well below average: Niger and above all Ethiopia, where a  
shortfall of between 800 000 and 1 million tonnes of grain is expected.
In any case the Commission will soon be organizing a coordination meeting  
with the Member States to review the food situation in the various countries  
which have suffered from the famine, in order to learn what can be learnt  
from the measures undertaken.
3.2 The Community's capacity to respond to major crises
Caution being still the order of the day, the moment has not yet come to  
abandon, as the Council meeting on the budget did in its first reading of the  
1986 budget, the emergency strategic reserve of 500 000 tonnes of cereal  
equivalent (165 million ECU) fpr which the Commission provided in its 
preliminary draft budget for 1986. Not only might this reserve be useful in  
meeting shortfalls in the 198T harvest, and indispensable should the 1986

-  6 -
harvest fail - which cannot be foreseen at present - but it was also  
welcomed by the Summit of Heads of State and Government at Milan, which  
expressly instructed the Council meeting on development to "examine that  
proposal as a matter of urgency". The Commission will therefore stand firm on  
this matter in the rest of the budget procedure.

- 7 -
TITLE II - REHABILITATION AND REVIVAL PLAN FOR THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOP ST  
AFFECTED BY THE DROUGHT ~
The European Council at their meeting in Milan welcomed the Commission's  
proposals for rehabilitating the drought-hit economies and heading off  
any further catastrophes. In the Plan being put forward here, the Commis­
sion has picked out the operations to be as a matter of urgency, pending  
implementation of Lomé III.
1. General approach- ,  ·  —
1.1 OËisstlïË.  *
Now that the critical stage of the famine would seem to be over,"' the  
spotlight turns on two types of action:
(a) reinforcing the countries'1  own capacity to deal with any similar  
disasters which might occur in the future;
(b) relieving .the economic and financial block on the whole of' Life
in the countryside, caused by the drought, by reviving agriculture.
1.2 'General_features_of_the_measures planned
These are urgent measures designed to produce immediate effects: preparation
for the 1986-87 farm year, refurbishing of transport and storage systems,  
so as to be ready for any new disaster in 1986-87.
The fact that this is a short-term and urgent objective means that only  
essential matters should be tackled where things can be achieved very  
quickly. Drastically simplified procedures for drawing up dossiers,  
taking decisions and implementing measures are quite indispensable for  
this.
This degree of urgency, however, does not rneaii that the operations to be  
undertaken should not form part of a medium- and long-term rehabilitation  
and revival scheme. For example, rehabilitation of transport systems will  
to begin with be limited to action at individual points, which  
will then be integrated into the overall plan for these systems.
All action, indeed, including emergency action, must be in line with the  
medium-term economic rehabilitation plans for the countries concerned.
At this stage the measures are defined in general terms, and they do not  
necessarily concern each country. More precise operational programmes  
will therefore have to be drawn up for each of the countries individually.
In its approach, moreover, the Commission will aim at concentration, for  
each of them, on one or t*wo types of measure, in order not to scatter its  
effort. Coordination, fi'rst with the Member States and then with other  
aid donors,should allow a sensible division of labour, while providing  
for any emergencies.
There are still major problems in a number of countries, especially Ethiopia.

-  8 -
This plan does not tackle structural problems (reform of food production ,
systems, measures to combat desertification, etc), which will form a normal !
part of the implementation of Lomé III (see Title III). j
2. Identification of rehabilitation and revival measures1 1  _ “ '  1  1 1  " ■ ■  ”1  ' " ,r,r "  '  ···»♦·
2.1 Reinforcement_of_count rnes^_own_cagacU£_to_tackle_disasters
Experience in 1984-85 showed up the main difficulties encountered by African  
countries in tackling the effects of a disastrous drought: shortcomings
in organization, delay in detecting the crisis, tardy supply of external  
aid, and above all inadequacies in internal transport.
The following action should therefore be undertaken urgently, in case.a  
further disaster occurs in 1986-87.I
2.1.1 Strengthening countries' own organizational capacity for defining
and implementing thg^r own emergency plans ,
In order to rapidly mobilize all available resources, each country should
set up a "central unit" with well-defined powers of decision and coordination,
to be responsible, in the event of a disaster, for implementing a pre- .
existing emergency plan. These national units must coordinate at regional
level, especially as regards transport and supply of food products, and
must be the main channel of communication with external aid sources in the event;
of a crisis.
The aid will consist of technical assistance and advice on drawing up these .  
contingency plans, especially as regards systems of transport and ;
distribution of aid. It might also involve some financing to ensure \
that these units work efficiently. ;
2.1.2 Early detection of famine situations !
UntiL more sophisticated detection infrastructures are set up (remote sensing),  
the countries concerned will have to be helped to:
ensure basic agro-meteorological surveillance;
strengthen the facilities for transmitting information gathered  
on the ground to the central unit (logistics, radio);
reinforce systems for"warning lights" as regards
scarcity of food: population movements, market-prices of food,
nutritional monitoring of special target groups.
A certain amount is already being done, or is planned, in this area in  
the Sahel. It must be speeded up, reinforced and extended to all the  
threatened areas. »
!

- 9 -
In these areas aid in the form of technical assistance and logistical and  
operating resources is indispensable. It could be supplied through  
N60s.
2.1.3 Safety stocks of food and seed
However quickly it is set in train, international aid will always take  
months to reach famine areas. The countries concerned should therefore  
set up, or reconstitute, "buffer stocks" for dealing with initial emergencies.  
They must also be in a position to set up the stocks of seed needed to  
resume production after a major famine.
The aid will involve:
constituting these stocks, preferably from surpluses in the country.  
o r in the region (triangular operations);
supplying storage equipment which is relatively inexpensive and  
versatilein use (e.g. plastic sheeting);
ensuring that the stocks of food and seed are protected.
Great attention will be given to ability to manage these stocks, and to  
their decentralization.
They must be designed, as safety stocks, and their distribution should not  
be allowed to adversely affect markets.
In determining the size of safety stocks, private sector storage capacity  
will have to be taken into account; the public system should.supplement  
this, not replace it.
At the same time measures., must be undertaken, to refurbish peasants' own  
storage capacities at village level, especially through inexpensive methods  
of protecting harvested crops. '
2.1.4 The logistics of supplying aid
Action here must first tackle the "black spots" identified when food aid  
was distributed in 1984-85.
The main aspects will be: *
V  *
strengthening capacities for unloading and storing goods and getting  
them away from the ports, in which there were notable shortcomings.
Some action here will be of a regional character;
\
getting rid of the main black spots encountered in rail and road links  
with the isolated areas where acute famines may reoccur. We are thinking
/ ·

-  10 -
here of light infrastructure (e.g. fords and temporary bridges)/  
remaking of roads damaged by the transport of current aid, which may  
require strengthening of maintenance services, etc. The aim is thus  
to do only what is strictly necessary to open up the areas of  
potential food crisis by early 1987;
ensuring that the existing heavy transport fleet is well-maintained  
and can operate properly, and perhaps that it is reinforced. Stocks  
of vehicle spare parts should be set up and maintenance and repair  
services should be strengthened (mobile teams for road vehicles, with  
the necessary staff and logistics support).
2.2 cuUural_revi_val_of_di_saster;;hi_t_economi_es
The drought has left ruined economies behind it: export income from
agricultural produce has fallen, which is all the more serious as most  
of the countries concerned have relatively high indebtedness, populations  
have been displaced and weakened, livestock farming has been profoundly  
disrupted, etc.
Reviving normal life in the countryside requires the resolution of two  
types of problem.
2.2.1 Ensuring that basic inputs are available for 1986-87
The actual situation of each country is different. The aim is:
to ensure that it is possible to import essential inputs such as  
fertilizer and plant-health products, not in,order to generalize^their  
use but to re-establish a minimum degree of use;
to supply peasants with the means to buy these imported inputs and also  
to reconstitute their stock of draught animals and to obtain the seed  
they require; this will require efforts to help re-establish  
systems of short- and medium-term agricultural credit.
It will thus be possible to put together import programmes and the  
reinforcement of agricultural credit, the one constituting a  
revolving fund to finance the other.

-  1 1  -
2.2.2 Measures to accompany the reestab!ishment of displaced persons
Apart from the supply of essential inputs for traditional crops,
four types of operation must be undertaken or continued .  in order
to help peasants to resume their former ways of life.
Water supplies must be ensured, by restoring human  
drinking-water infrastructures, and more especially by  
deepening wells where the groundwater level has been 
significantly lowered.
- Swamplands must be developed into irrigated gardens allowing 
dry-season vegetable cultivation, along the lin es ci what 
the Community has already undertaken in 1985 in :erte -> .n 
drought-affected areas (see Point 2.2.1 of Title Ij.
In such operations the initiative and collaborâtion of NGOs '*
will be very useful.
- Where ^he health situation is very alarming (threat of  
epidemics) the necessary preventive and curative action 
must be continued.
- In the case of vulnerable groups (the young, pregnant women) 
worst affected by the famine, the supply of high-protein  
food supplements must"'be continued.
Here too the participation of NGOs will be very valuable,  
both in detecting problems and in implementing solutions.
3. Financing the plan
3.1 The European contribution will come from two sources:
/
(a) the_Commun 2t^_contribut 2on:  the Commission, under the
4th and 5th EDF, has a number of non-allocated reserves  
available, which means that they come neither from  
national indicative programmes nor from regional funds:  
they are unused amounts from Lomé I and Lomé II for  
interest-rate subsidies on loans by the Bank, and interest  
earned by money held by the Fund. These reserves are  
such as to allow 100 million ECU to be allocated to  
the rehabilitation plan from the EDF, all of it in the  
form of grants;

(b) Member_States^_çontri but ion :  in all the Member States will  
supply at least as much T n  bilateral aid as thé Community  
contribution, for operations coordinated with those of the  
Commi ssion.
The European plan would thus amount to at least 200 million ECU.
3.2 In addition there might be contributions from other aid donors,  
such as the non-European countries which took part in the Bonn  
Summit, which might join in the Community plan or might undertake  
similar action on their own initiative.
3.3 In addition certain of the plan's local costs might be financed  
by the African countries themselves, from food aid counterpart
funds.
4. Changes required in implementation procedures
The urgency of the action to be undertaken requires that a number  
of administrative measures be adopted.
4.1 Admi nistra12ye_organization_and_coordination
)
For each country being aided, the Commission will set up a small  
team whose main task will be to prepare and carry out the  
rehabilitation and revival plan. These teams should have a person  
with whom to communicate in the various Member States.
The Commission will also set up a coordinating task force, responsible  
not only for guiding and giving impetus to all the Community action  
proper, but also for the essential function of steeringthe  
coordination meetings with the Member States at which bilateral  
and Community programmes will be compared. It will also be  
responsible for implementation procedures, and for contacts with  
other aid donors, especially the World Bank, with NGOs and with  
the embassies of the recipient States.
However, both for precisely’identifying operati-ons and for  
implementing them, the contribution of teams in the field will  
be essential. This means that in each country it will be necessary  
to set up working groups under the guidance of the Delegation,  
with representatives of the Member States concerned and any other  
donors.
4.2 Procedures for^mglement i^g_Communi ty_measures
If we are to be sure that the Rehabilitation and Revival Plan  
can really be designed and carried out within the time limits  
laid down, other procedures than the conventional ones must be  
thought up and applied. They must be simpler and faster.

- 13 -
(a) Procedure —  - for approval of measures, (jommunity measures financed by
the EDF should be put before^'the EOF Committee once only, under an emergency  
procedure, in the form of overall programme outlining the measures  
for each recipient country. Within this programme, and  
within allocations decided on f:>r each country, the Commission would enjoy  
wide powers for taking initiatives, making decisions and adapting measures  
as circumstances develop. It would report afterwards to the Member States.
Cb) Financing conventions with recipient countries. The programmes for the  
different countries would be covered by simplified financing conventions.
(c) Implementation procedures. A distinction should be made between:
- operations which, by their very nature, will lead to imports into the  
recipient countries (fertilizers, pesticides, spare parts for transport  
systems, etc.). There would have to be negotiations with each of the  
beneficiary countries for a derogation from EOF procedures giving the  
Commission the power,on behalf of the country concerned, to issue  
international or restricted invitations to tender and to sign contracts.  
Contracts would actually be signed by the Task Force, in coordination  
with the embassies of the recipient countries;
- operations which, by their very nature, will lead to purchases by or  
services being carried out in the recipient countries (minor agricultural  
equipment, micro-hydraulic works etc.). Thewholeof these operations,  
including tendering procedures, the conclusion of contracts, works, by  
direct labour and the making of payments, would be entrusted entirely to  
the recipient countries, subject to approval in each case by the Commission  
delegate, who would report to Brussels only sùbsequently..
(d) Timescale
The overall programme of Community measures, setting out for each recipient  
country the main outline of the operations to be conducted, needs to be  
approved very quickly by the competent Community bodies. .  There will be close  
Community coordination, allowing sensible division of labour.
The first concrete decisions on implementation ought to be possible very  
soon after: as soon as possible in early 1986.

- 14 -
m s p i i  - ™™»  a n o M .
— ■ ■ ■  1 DESERTAICATION :  THE COMMISSION'S PROGRAMME -------
Ï Ï
 K » bS L “ î S  £ £ £ ■ *  s£ ate9les "hich i4 has ^ m a -
as regards continuing the'measures in^he SunÏÏie?^ Wl11 2 ^  conclusions
ih ÎS g ifm d ^  ^ e LTSfîSe2SïlSe ofS°m?f
s^s^^rirL'Sisr^'Sî s - s  rss;t o
S e  MemberStates. When the costs have been determined, it is exoected S  Î ? S
s s r s s  £ £

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TITLE III - THE MEDIUM AND THE LONG TERM ; STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND MEASURES  
TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION : THE COMMISSION'S PROGRAMME
The Commission has begun assessing the food strategies which it has initia­
ted in four ACP countries; it will report on them and will draw conclusions  
as regards continuing the measures in the countries concerned and extrapo­
lating them to other countries, within the framework of the prograrming  
which is under way and the implementation of Lomé III.
As regards protection of the environment, and more especially measures to  
combat desertification, it is preparing an overall plan which to begin  
with will stress reforestation; the different geographical areas and the  
different approaches to be adopted will be defined together with the Member  
States. When the costs have been determined, it is expected, as the Heads  
of State and Government indicated, that the European aid as a whole, both  
Community and bilateral, gives priority to this kind of action, with long­
term commitments and coherent organization. Tb this end the Commission  
will propose an appropriate coordination structure in its plan.

DUBLIN PLAN
Situation at 1 October 1985 of emergency aid and food aid cfereal commitments 
for the eight African countries most affected
(Ethiopia, Sudan, Mali^ Mauritania, Niger,' Chad, Angola, Mozambique)
(in tonnes of cereal equivalent and ECU estimated)
Total
commitmentsFinished or 
under way
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY AIDQuantity 281.610 100 Z-
- food and seed Value
V .108.212.000-
- other aidIValue 55.652.000 100 z
- reserves by country Value 11.136.000 - •
Sub-Total Value _____ 17
5.000.000 94 Z
COMMUNITY FOOD AID
.  Quantity 324.385 88 Z
(estimated at 250 ECU per tonne) Value81.096.250 -
MEMBER STATES FOOD AID '
a Quantity 631.020 80 Z
(estimated 250 ECU oer tonne) Value 157.755.000 —
Total food aid and seedQuantity
Value1.237.015
374.063.25087 Z
1
Total other aid Value. t  '  *
55.652.000 100 z !
Total reserves by country Value 11.136.000 I
-...........  I, .  A
GR
AND TOTAL Value«413.851.250 87 % |