EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 29.5.2019 SWD(2019) 220 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2019 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2019) 260 final}



Table of Contents 1.INTRODUCTION 1.1.Context 1.2Summary of the report 2.FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS 2.1.Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 2.1.1.Democracy 2.1.2.Public administration reform 2.2.Rule of law and fundamental rights 2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 2.2.2.Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 3.Fundamentals first: economic development and competitiveness 3.1.The existence of a functioning market economy 3.2.The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 4.Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation 5.Ability to assume the obligations of membership 5.1.Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 5.2.Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 5.3.Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services

5.4.Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 5.5.Chapter 5: Public procurement 5.6.Chapter 6: Company law 5.7.Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 5.8.Chapter 8: Competition policy 5.9.Chapter 9: Financial services 5.10.Chapter 10: Information society and media 5.11.Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 5.12.Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 5.13.Chapter 13: Fisheries 5.14.Chapter 14: Transport policy 5.15.Chapter 15: Energy 5.16.Chapter 16: Taxation 5.17.Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 5.18.Chapter 18: Statistics 5.19.Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 5.20.Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 5.21.Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 5.22.Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 5.25Chapter 25: Science and research

5.26Chapter 26: Education and culture 5.27Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 5.28Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection 5.29.Chapter 29: Customs union 5.30.Chapter 30: External relations 5.31.Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 5.32.Chapter 32: Financial control 5.33.Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions Annex I – Relations between the EU and Turkey ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX



1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. Context Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by an Association Agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was established in 1995. The European Council granted the status of candidate country to Turkey in December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one of these was provisionally closed. The General Affairs Council conclusions of June 2018 stated that under the currently prevailing circumstances, Turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the Customs Union can be currently foreseen. The Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession has not been matched by corresponding measures and reforms since then, and the EU’s serious concerns on continued negative developments in rule of law, fundamental rights and the Judiciary have not been addressed. The EU-Turkey Association Council held its 54th meeting on 15 March 2019 in Brussels. After a hiatus of three years, the inter-ministerial Reform Action Group resumed its work, holding meetings in August and December 2018, as well as on 9 May 2019. The EU and Turkey continued their dialogue and cooperation in the areas of joint interest including a leaders' meeting between Presidents Juncker and Tusk and President Erdoğan in Bulgaria in March 2018 and a High Level Political Dialogue in November 2018. Dialogue was pursued on foreign and security policy, notably on Syria, Libya and Iraq and, following a counter-terrorism dialogue in November 2017, there is slow movement towards concrete implementation of jointly agreed actions. Turkey and the EU further developed their cooperation in the areas of energy, transport, economy and trade. There was a High Level Transport Dialogue in January 2019 and a High Level Economic Dialogue in February 2019. Technical discussions started for the mutual recognition of a few Geographical Indications of agricultural products. The March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continues to deliver results, with both parties committed to its effective implementation. Turkey sustained its outstanding efforts to host more than 3.6 million registered refugees from Syria and around registered 370,000 refugees from other countries, which is the largest refugee community in the world. Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. By May 2019, out of EUR 6 billion mobilised by the EU, more than 80 projects had been launched and more than EUR 2.2 billion has been disbursed. 1.2 Summary of the report The state of emergency introduced on 15 July 2016 in the aftermath of the attempted coup ended on 18 July 2018, when its last extension expired, but was immediately followed by the adoption by the Turkish parliament of a law that retained many elements of the emergency rule for further three years. The law limits certain fundamental freedoms, allowing in particular to dismiss public servants (including judges) and to prolong detentions, to restrict freedom of movement and public assembly, and extending powers for Government-appointed provincial governors. The EU, which immediately and strongly condemned the attempted coup, reiterated its full support for the country’s democratic institutions and recognised Turkey’s legitimate need to take swift and proportionate action in the face of such a serious threat. However, the broad scale and collective nature of measures taken since the attempted coup under the state of emergency, such as widespread dismissals, arrests and detentions, continued to raise very serious concerns. During the state of emergency, 36 decrees were issued constraining certain civil and political rights, as well as defence rights, expanding police powers and those of prosecutors for investigations and prosecutions as well as foreseeing the dismissal of more than 152 000 civil servants, including academics, teachers and public officials.

The Constitutional Court has ruled that it does not have a mandate to review the legality of decrees using legal powers issued during the state of emergency. Parliament has reviewed 32 of them. In May 2017, the Turkish authorities established an Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures tasked to review all complaints individually. As of May 2019, 126 600 applications had been made. Of these, the Inquiry Commission has reviewed 70 406 and only 5 250 have led to a reinstatement, while 65 156 complaints have been rejected. There are 55 714 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications raises concerns at whether each case is being examined individually. Since there are no hearings, there is a general lack of procedural guarantees for applicants and decisions are taken on the basis of the written files related to the original dismissal, all of which calls into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy. With the ending of the state of emergency, Turkey has withdrawn its derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights and from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the full monitoring procedure that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reopened in April 2017 remains in place. Beyond the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, the capacity of Turkey to ensure an effective domestic legal remedy in the sense of the European Court of Human Rights has been further undermined. Several court rulings favourable to prominent defendants, including human rights defenders, were swiftly reversed by another or even by the same court, in some instances following comments from the executive. Many human rights defenders, civil society activists, media, academics, politicians, doctors, lawyers, judges and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, are still detained – sometimes without indictment, and are facing smear campaigns by the media and senior politicians. The space for civil society organisations working on fundamental rights and freedoms has further shrunk, notably exemplified by the introduction of further administrative obstacles. The rights-based organisations closed down under the state of emergency have not been offered any legal remedy in respect to confiscations. Since October 2018, following the amendment of the Parliament's rules of procedure, civil society organisations are excluded from the legislative consultation process at parliamentary committees. Inclusive mechanisms for consulting across society as widely as possible are not present. Key recommendations of the Council of Europe and its bodies are yet to be addressed by Turkey. Allegations of wrongdoing need to be established by transparent procedures and on an individual basis. Individual criminal liability can only be established with full respect for the separation of powers, the full independence of the judiciary and the right of every individual to a fair trial. The new presidential system has centralised power in the hands of the executive and significantly curtailed Parliament's legislative and oversight functions. Since July 2018, Parliament has adopted 17 pieces of legislation, including controversial changes to its rules of procedure. Ministers no longer appear before Members of Parliament, who can ask only written questions. Growing political polarisation, especially in the run-up to the March 2019 municipal elections continues to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue. The marginalisation of the opposition, notably the People's Democratic Party (HDP) continues, and many HDP lawmakers are detained. The long-standing shortcomings of the system of parliamentary immunity have not been addressed. The June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections and the March 2019 municipal elections were marked by strong turnouts. Voters had a genuine choice despite the lack of conditions for contestants to compete on an equal basis. The ruling party enjoyed a notable advantage, also reflected in excessive coverage by government-affiliated public and private media. After the municipal elections, the Supreme Election Council declared four elected mayors and members of municipal councils ineligible to assume office in the south-east of Turkey, even though their candidacies had been validated before the elections. It also annulled the metropolitan mayoral elections in Istanbul and scheduled a re-run for 23 June. The decisions by the Supreme Election Council to re-run elections in Istanbul as well as to grant the mayorship of individual municipalities in the south-east to second-placed candidates are a source of serious concern regarding the respect of the legality and integrity of the electoral process and the institution’s independence from political pressure. They go against the core aim of a democratic electoral process – that is to ensure that the will of the people prevails. The annulment of the metropolitan mayoral election in Istanbul and its re-scheduling were strongly contested by opposition parties. The full entry into force of the presidential system has remodelled the executive and state administration. The presidential system, including the abolition of the position of Prime Minister and other functions such as Under Secretaries in Ministries has led to greater politicisation of the public administration. The President now has the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of public regulatory authorities. Before the March 2019 municipal elections, continuing arrests and dismissals of local politicians and appointment of trustees as well as the arbitrary nature of these appointments deprived voters of political representation at local level, and seriously risked damaging local democracy. The government has overhauled the legal framework governing the civil-military relations and increased the powers of the executive over the military significantly, thereby strengthening civilian oversight. As part of the constitutional amendments, high military courts were effectively abolished, but the military and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient accountability to Parliament and security personnel continue to have wide-ranging legal protection. The parliamentary law enforcement oversight commission remained ineffective. The legal framework for overseeing military expenditure has not yet been improved. The situation in the south-east has continued to be challenging, despite an improved security environment. The Government continued security operations against a background of the recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. While the Government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is also responsible for ensuring this is done in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. Despite some reconstruction, only few internally displaced persons have received compensation. There were no visible developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform, and there has been serious backsliding in the area of public service and human resources management, which has also affected policy developments and accountability. Changes to the civil service system have further increased the politicisation of the administration. Merit-based, competitive appointments for senior managerial positions remain the exception. Serious procedural shortcomings call into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures can be considered an effective remedy for dismissed public officials. Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage of preparation. There has been further serious backsliding and the recommendations in the previous reports were not accepted or implemented. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors and transfers of a large number of judges and prosecutors against their will continued. This continues to have a negative impact on the independence and overall quality and efficiency of the judiciary. The large scale recruitments of new judges and prosecutors under the current system are concerning because no measures were taken to address the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and preestablished criteria for their recruitment and promotion. The Justice Academy of Turkey was re-established by Presidential Decree, after it had previously been closed under the state of emergency. The chilling effect of the dismissal and forced transfers of judges and prosecutors is still observed, and risk engendering widespread self-censorship. No measures were taken to restore legal guarantees to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive or to strengthen the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP). A judicial reform strategy for 2019-2023 was announced in August 2018 but has not yet been adopted. Turkey consulted the Council of Europe and the Commission on the draft strategy. The country is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was backsliding since dismantled preventive bodies have not been replaced by an independent body, in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption to which Turkey is a party. Both the legal and institutional frameworks continued to allow undue influence from the executive in the investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption cases. The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies have not been implemented. Public procurement legislation remained incompatible with the EU acquis and the scope of the derogations to the public procurement law was increased further. The absence of a robust anticorruption strategy and action plan is a sign of lack of political will to fight decisively against corruption. No permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption body exists and there is no specialised prosecution service to lead anti-corruption investigations and only few specialised courts. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime but progress is limited overall. The country needs to improve its legislation on cybercrime, assets confiscation and witness protections. Turkish data protection is still not in line with European standards and will have to be revised in order to ensure the implementation of the operational agreement with Europol currently being negotiated. Turkey should develop and implement a more comprehensive and coherent legal framework for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime and improve its capacity to manage frozen assets. Turkey made good progress in the area of migration and asylum policy and remained committed to the effective implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey statement. The declining trend in irregular crossings from Turkey to the Aegean islands since the entry into force of the Statement was supported by intensified efforts by Turkey's law enforcement agencies. Turkey sustained its outstanding efforts to provide massive and unprecedented humanitarian aid and support to more than 3.6 million registered refugees from Syria and around 370 000 registered refugees from other countries, thus hosting the largest refugee community in the world. Turkey has set up seven working groups to carry out technical work on the outstanding benchmarks of the visa liberalisation dialogue. However, no progress has been made in the harmonisation of the Turkish visa policy with the EU common visa policy. Serious backsliding remains in terms of human and fundamental rights. While the legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, it still needs to be brought in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). There has been serious backsliding in the areas of freedom of expression, assembly, and association and in procedural and property rights. No changes were made to the legislation introduced immediately after the lifting of the state of emergency, which removed crucial safeguards protecting civil society activists, human rights defenders, journalists, academics and others from abuses. The enforcement of rights is hindered by the fragmentation and limited independence of public institutions responsible for protecting those rights and freedoms as well as by the lack of an independent judiciary. Trade union rights continue to be under severe pressure. No steps were taken to investigate, prosecute or punish those involved in profound human rights violations during the state of emergency. There was a climate of intimidation across society as the state of emergency was used to narrow the space for dissenting or alternative views. As of December 2018, the total number of people in prison without indictment or pending trial is 57 000, more than 20% of the prison population. There is overcrowding and conditions are deteriorating. Severe restrictions on freedom of expression continued and the trend for prosecution of writers, social media users and other members of the public, even children, for insulting the President has dramatically increased. The lack of transparency as to media ownership continues to cast doubt on the independence of editorial comment. Roma continue to live in very poor housing, often lacking basic public services and relying on social benefits. The urban renewal projects continue to affect primarily their settlements, forcing the displacement of entire families. The rights of the most vulnerable groups and of persons belonging to minorities need better protection. Gender-based violence, discrimination, hate speech against minorities, hate crime and violations of human rights of LGBTI persons are still a matter of serious concern. Turkey welcomed the UN’s renewed efforts to consult stakeholders as to a possible resumption of negotiations regarding Cyprus. Tensions in the region around the prospect of hydrocarbon exploration off the coast of Cyprus increased, due to Turkey’s actions and statements challenging the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone. In May 2019, Turkey sent a drilling platform accompanied by military vessels to the Republic of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, escalating tensions further. The Commission recalls the European Council statement of March 2018 strongly condemning Turkey's continued illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It also recalled Turkey's obligation to respect international law and good neighbourly relations and called on Turkey to respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources in accordance with EU and International Law. In March 2019, the EU called on Turkey to refrain from any such illegal acts, to which it would respond appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus.

The EU has repeatedly stressed the sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include entering into bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to ensure full and nondiscriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and has not removed all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Operational cooperation with Greece on migration further continued. However, tensions in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean were not conducive to good neighbourly relations and undermined regional stability and security. Bilateral relations with several individual EU Member States in particular with Austria, Germany and the Netherlands improved. The Netherlands and Turkey normalised relations. There were repeated and increased violations of the territorial waters and airspaces of Greece and Cyprus by Turkey. Another source of serious concern was the six-month detention of two Greek soldiers who had been patrolling the land border but relations improved significantly on their release in August 2018 and following the Greek Prime Minister’s visit to Turkey in February. In this context, the EU has expressed once again serious concern and urged Turkey to avoid any kind of threat or action directed against a Member State, or any source of friction or actions that would damage good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Regarding the economic criteria, serious backsliding continued in the Turkish economy, leading to deeper concerns over the functioning of the country’s market economy. In 2018, a sharp deterioration in the external financing conditions exposed vulnerabilities built up over years. In response, the Turkish authorities took a range of policy actions that have negatively influenced the functioning of markets, more importantly, by interfering with price formation and introducing constraints on the free use of foreign exchange. Concerns regarding the independence of key economic institutions have deepened. The current account deficit reached a peak in the first half of 2018 before a strong correction set in as a result of the weakening economy and the fall in the lira. The inflation rate jumped far above the upper band of the target range following the currency crisis and years of high credit growth, high money growth and low real interest rates. There was no progress in improving the transparency of state aid. Turkey has made some progress and has a good level of preparation to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. Turkey is well-integrated with the EU market in terms of both trade and investment. Improvements were made in the energy sector, as well as some advances in spending on research and development, education and physical capital. However, there are persistent problems with the quality of education and gender equality. Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Turkey has continued to align with the acquis, albeit at a limited pace. There have been more instances of backsliding regarding a number of key aspects in the areas of free movement of capital, public procurement, competition, information society, economic and monetary policy, and external relations. Turkey is well advanced in the areas of company law, trans-European networks and science and research and it has achieved a good level of preparation in the areas of free movement of goods, intellectual property law, financial services, enterprise and industrial policy, consumer and health protection, customs union and financial control. Turkey is moderately prepared on public procurement as important gaps remain in its alignment. Turkey is also moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital, statistics, energy, taxation, economic and monetary union, regional policy, education and culture, CFSP and transport policy where further significant efforts are needed across the board. Turkey has reached some level of preparation on competition, agriculture, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, social policy and employment, environment and climate change where more ambitious and better coordinated policies still need to be established and implemented. In all areas, more attention needs to be given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require further significant progress to achieve legislative alignment with the EU acquis, strengthen the independence of regulatory authorities and build the administrative capacities. 2.FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS Measures under the state of emergency and follow-up The EU, which immediately and strongly condemned the attempted coup, reiterated its full support for the country’s democratic institutions and recognised Turkey’s legitimate need to take swift and proportionate action in the face of such a serious threat. The state of emergency, introduced on 15 July 2016 in the aftermath of the attempted coup, ended on 19 July 2018 when its last extension expired. Its primary objective had been to dismantle the Gülen movement that the Turkish authorities designated a terrorist organisation in May 2016 and held responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. More generally, it was designed to support the fight against terrorism, but the extraordinary powers it sanctioned were disproportionately applied. Some decrees issued under the state of emergency amended key pieces of legislation, particularly in relation to property rights, local authorities and public administration, and audiovisual policy. During the state of emergency, 36 decrees were issued constraining certain civil and political rights. The decrees expanded the powers of the police and investigating prosecutors and sanctioned large-scale dismissals of public officials and closures of entities and the liquidation of their assets by the state. To date, Parliament has reviewed 32 of the decrees. The Constitutional Court has ruled that it does not have a mandate to review the legality of decrees using legal powers issued during the state of emergency. More than 152 000 civil servants, including academics, teachers, police officers, health workers, judges and prosecutors, have been dismissed using emergency decrees. More than 150 000 people were taken into custody during the state of emergency and more than 78 000 were arrested on terrorism-related charges, 50 000 of whom are still in jail. The decisions of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, established in May 2017 to individually review all complaints, are open to judicial review before a designated administrative court in Ankara, and then before the Constitutional Court. The majority of the Inquiry Commission’s board members are appointed by the President of the Republic. Some 220 staff, including judges, prosecutors, inspectors, experts and civil servants, have been seconded to the Inquiry Commission, whose tenure was extended by a presidential decree for another year on 23 January 2019. In August 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that some 70 000 of the individual applications it had received were inadmissible since they had not exhausted all earlier domestic remedies, directing applicants to the Inquiry Commission and/or to administrative courts. The European Court of Human Rights also re-directed some 28 000 applications it had received to the Inquiry Commission. The Inquiry Commission started considering applications in December 2017. There are questions as to how thoroughly individual evidence is being considered. Since there are no hearings, there is a general lack of procedural guarantees for applicants, and decisions are taken on the basis of the written files related to the original dismissal. There are also concerns around the establishment of clear criteria for the prioritisation of cases, the possibility for applicants to seek interim measures, and whether those who are reinstated can seek additional redress before ordinary courts. It is important that applicants who challenge a decision of the Inquiry Commission before the administrative courts have access to their own files. Similarly, it is important that the Inquiry Commission’s decisions are properly reasoned, and that the complainants have access to that reasoning and may contest it in court. Applicants to the Inquiry Commission complain that finding legal representation is often difficult. As of May 2019, a total of 126 000 applications relating to dismissal from public service had been made to the Inquiry Commission. Of these, the Inquiry Commission has reviewed 70 406 and only 5 250 have led to reinstatement, while 65 156 complaints have been rejected. There are 55 714 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications raises concerns at whether each case is being examined individually. Immediately following the expiry of the state of emergency, the Turkish Parliament adopted a law that retained many elements of emergency rule for a further three years, curtailing certain fundamental freedoms, notably allowing the dismissal of public servants (including judges) and the extension of detention periods, restricting freedom of movement and public assembly, and extending powers for government-appointed provincial governors. With the ending of the state of emergency, Turkey has withdrawn its derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the full monitoring procedure that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reopened in April 2017 remains in place until its serious concerns about the respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law have been addressed. This entails regular visits by rapporteurs to hold dialogues with the authorities, and plenary debates to review progress. After a hiatus of three years, the inter-ministerial Reform Action Group resumed its work, holding meetings in August and December 2018, as well as on 9 May 2019. 2.1.Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 2.1.1.Democracy Despite the welcome lifting of the state of emergency, Turkey has introduced many of its more restrictive elements into legislation. The new presidential system has removed many of the checks and balances that existed previously, and has weakened the role of Parliament. It has led to more politicisation of the public administration and the judiciary and given the president the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of the public regulatory authorities. The continuous deterioration in the situation relating to human rights, rule of law or independence of the judiciary continued during the reporting period. Elections Turkey held early presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 June 2018 under state of emergency conditions. Amendments to the electoral Law, which substantially changed the rules for the elections and campaign process, were adopted by Parliament only one month prior to calling the early elections. Turkey also held local elections on 31 March 2019. While both polls enjoyed high turnouts, international observers stressed on these two occasions that even though voters had genuine choice, candidates did not compete on an equal basis, notably in terms of the absence of equal access to the media for all parties running in elections, something which was reflected in excessive coverage by government-affiliated public and private media. The decisions by the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to re-run the metropolitan mayoral election in Istanbul as well as to grant the mayorship of individual municipalities in the south-east to second-placed candidates are a source of serious concern regarding the respect of the legality and integrity of the electoral process, as well as about the institution’s independence from political pressure. One of the new amendments to the electoral law allowed political parties to form electoral alliances, giving rise to the People’s Alliance comprised of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Nation’s Alliance, which united the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Good Party (İYİ) and Felicity Party. Three other parties contested the election: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Free Cause Party and Vatan Party, and there were six presidential candidates.

The Election Observation Mission conducted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the elections offered voters a genuine choice. However, the parties could not compete on an equal basis due to the restrictive legal framework and powers granted under the state of emergency, and limited freedom of assembly and expression. The incumbent president and his party enjoyed a notable advantage, which was also reflected in excessive coverage by public and private media close to the government. Turkey has not formally invited the ODHIR to present its findings since 2014. On a turnout of 86.22%, President Erdoğan won the presidential race in the first round, securing 52.5% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, none of the parties secured an overall majority, although all major political parties won seats. Women remain underrepresented in political life. Overall, 20.5% of party-nominated parliamentary candidates were female, but since few were placed in eligible positions on the party lists only 17.3% of Members of Parliament are women. This is nevertheless an improvement on the 14.7% in the outgoing legislature. The June elections marked the full entry into force of the presidential system that was agreed by a narrow majority in a referendum in April 2017 (for details on constitutional changes, see Governance section). Both electoral alliances were maintained for the local elections held on 31 March 2019. The HDP presented candidates in the south-east, while not fielding any candidate in the large cities including Istanbul and Ankara. Turnout remained high at 84%. Overall, the People’s Alliance secured 51.67% of the votes, while the Nation’s Alliance got 37.53% of votes. The number of women among the candidates fielded by most political parties was very low. The Nation’s Alliance’s candidates won in the three largest provinces as well as in other key municipalities including Ankara, Adana, Antalya, Mersin and Hatay. According to the final count, it also won in Istanbul where the CHP elected mayor eventually received his election certificate after several appeals for recount of the votes in some districts were accepted. After a long appeal process, the YSK eventually annulled the metropolitan mayoral elections in Istanbul and scheduled a re-run for 23 June, based on alleged irregularities in the composition of the ballot box committees. It also annulled the mandate of the CHP mayor-elect, who was replaced by a trustee, appointed by the government. The YSK did not annul the other elections such as the elections for district mayors, council members and mukhtars while the same contested ballot box committees were in charge of these elections as well. Opposition parties strongly protested against it. The YSK rejected the HDP's extraordinary appeals in relation to the YSK’s decision not to confirm four HDP elected-mayors and several members of municipal councils in the south-east. Even though their candidacies had been initially validated by the YSK, they have been denied the right to take up office on the ground that they had been previously dismissed from public service with decree-laws under the state of emergency. At the same time, the YSK gave the mayoral mandates to the candidates who got the second highest number of votes, all from the ruling AKP, thereby in effect reversing the result of the election in these constituencies. This is a source of serious concern regarding the respect of the legality and integrity of the electoral process, as well as about the institution’s independence from political pressure. A delegation from the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, comprising 22 observers, carried out an election observation mission to Turkey from 27 March to 1 April 2019 to assess the local elections. In its preliminary conclusions, the delegation noted that the elections were conducted in an orderly way. However, it also stressed that while voters had a broad choice of political parties, it was not fully convinced that Turkey currently has the free and fair electoral environment which is necessary for genuinely democratic elections in line with European values and principles. The Commission stressed that it expected the Turkish authorities to invite the Council of Europe to observe the re-run elections in Istanbul. Parliament The new presidential system has significantly curtailed Parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. Since July 2018, Parliament has adopted 17 pieces of legislation, but for much of that time has been in recess. Among the pieces of legislation were controversial changes to its rules of procedure. Presidential decrees are also a means of shortening legislative procedure: 17 have been issued since November 2018. Political polarisation, especially in the run-up to the 31 March 2019 municipal elections, continues to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue. The marginalisation of the opposition, particularly the People's Democratic Party (HDP), continues, and many HDP members of parliament are in detention. The long-standing shortcomings of the system of parliamentary immunity have not been addressed. Following the entry into force of the new presidential system, one Vice-President and sixteen ministers were appointed on 10 July 2018 directly by the President without any parliamentary approval, proposal or hearing. The number of members of parliament was increased from 550 to 600 in line with the revised constitutional provision. Growing political polarisation and strong partisan competition continue to prevent constructive parliamentary dialogue between parties. The second largest opposition party, the People's Democratic Party (HDP), whose two former co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, nine former deputies and other party executives remain under arrest on terrorism-related charges, continues to be particularly marginalised. The parliamentary immunity regime in Turkey needs to be strengthened in order to ensure elected representatives’ freedom of expression. The constitutional overhaul has also changed the legislative process. Responsibility for producing draft legislative proposals lies now with members of parliament, rather than with the government. Since June 2018, Parliament has adopted only 17 pieces of legislation out of the 1 479 bills tabled by members of parliament. Several opposition members have repeatedly reported that the ruling majority consistently ignored many proposed amendments (including on important legislation such as the law replacing the state of emergency). Moreover, under the new system, the drafting of complex legislation, originally done by line ministries, is now the responsibility of Parliament, which does not yet have the necessary resources or expertise to do this, which has a severe impact on necessary reforms. In the new system, constitutional provisions enshrine the principle of the primacy of law over presidential decree but without control of the Parliament. They also define the legislative areas that remain the prerogative of Parliament. However, this principle has not always been respected. Indeed, since November 2018, the president has issued 17 presidential decrees covering a wide range of social and economic policy issues, including restructuring the public administration, making key public appointments and introducing major economic policies. During the state of emergency, Parliament’s legislative powers could be by-passed by executive decrees. This was used to regulate policy areas beyond those strictly covered by the state of emergency legislation itself. Parliamentary oversight of the executive has been weakened still further under the new presidential system. Presidential decrees remain exempt from parliamentary control. Parliamentary scrutiny of the decrees issued under the state of emergency is not fully effective. Under the new presidential system, Parliament is largely unable to exercise its role of holding the executive to account. The right to put oral questions has been abolished, and written questions, which can only be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers, are seldom answered in due time. There has been no improvement in follow-up by the executive on issues raised as a result of the ordinary mechanisms of parliamentary oversight, such as committee work or parliamentary inquiry committees. Parliamentary oversight of public spending needs to be improved. The audit reports from the Turkish Court of Accounts are only considered in the planning and budget committees in connection with the approval of the final accounts and the draft government budget for the following year, but there is no formal parliamentary discussion of these audit reports before a specialised parliamentary committee. Limited steps have been taken to align the legal framework on elections and political parties with European standards, including to partly mitigate the very high. 10% electoral threshold. Turkey needs to align with the outstanding ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations on addressing gaps in the electoral legal framework. Governance The President’s executive and legislative powers substantially increased in the constitutional architecture of the new presidential system. The President has remodelled the executive and the state administration by means of presidential decrees. The new Presidential system, including the abolition of the position of Prime Minister and other functions such as under-secretaries in ministries, has led to more politicisation of the public administration. The President now has the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of the public regulatory authorities. Ahead of the March 2019 municipal elections, the appointment of trustees to replace municipal executives and elected representatives continued to have a negative impact on local democracy. A presidential decree adopted in August brings the budgets of local authorities, professional organisations, foundations and social security institutions under the control of a single account managed by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance that answers directly to the President. The June elections marked the full entry into force of the presidential system that was agreed by a narrow majority in a referendum in April 2017. The Council of Europe was not consulted on the constitutional amendments in advance of the vote, and the Council’s Venice Commission, in its March 2017 opinion, concluded that they represented a dangerous step backwards in Turkey’s constitutional democratic tradition. The Venice Commission noted that the state of emergency did not provide a proper democratic setting for a constitutional referendum. It raised procedural concerns such as the detention of a significant number of opposition deputies and the fact that the vote was cast without a secret ballot. The opinion concluded that although every state has the right to choose its own political system, this right is not unconditional. It said that the principles of the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary as part of the rule of law must be respected and built into the political system. The Venice Commission did not find this to be the case in Turkey. It underlined that the system was characterised by a lack of the checks and balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one single office and to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Under the presidential system, the president’s political accountability is limited mainly to elections, and several provisions curtail the independence of the judiciary from the executive and run counter to European standards. Under the new presidential system, the office of Prime Minister was abolished, and the VicePresident and ministers are now appointed directly by the President, with no role for Parliament. The President has the power to:

®appoint and dismiss senior government officials; ®set national security policies and take the necessary implementation measures; ®declare a state of emergency; ®issue presidential decrees on executive matters outside the scope of the law; ®indirectly dissolve Parliament by calling for new parliamentary and presidential elections; ®draw up the government budget; ®veto laws; and ®appoint four of the 13 members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and 12 of the 15 judges of the Constitutional Court. Traditional instruments of scrutiny of the executive by Parliament, such as a vote of confidence and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, are no longer possible; only written questions can be addressed to vice-presidents and ministers. If three-fifths of its members agree, Parliament is able to launch a parliamentary investigation into alleged criminal actions by the President, Vice-President and ministers related to their functions. The principle of precedence of laws over presidential decrees is enshrined in the new system, and the President may not issue decrees in areas reserved to the legislature by the Constitution. The President has the power to veto any law, although Parliament can override this veto if an absolute majority agrees, while Parliament can only apply to the constitutional court to annul presidential decrees. A number of presidential decrees have created new agencies and offices, merging ministries and other institutions. Several key institutions, such as the General Staff, National Intelligence Agency, National Security Council and Sovereign Wealth Fund have now been attached to the presidency. As part of this overhaul, nine policy councils, with advisory and coordinating functions, have been established under the auspices of the presidency. The relationship between presidency councils, which prepare policymaking recommendations for the President (and where ministers are not represented), and implementing line ministries, is not yet clear. The civil service has undergone a wholesale reform that is still not fully complete. Women’s participation in public service, as well as the percentage of women in senior managerial positions, needs to be improved (38.41% in 2018). The percentage of women in senior managerial positions is 9.05%. As regards local government, arrests of elected local politicians on terrorism-related charges continued, and some still remain under arrest. Before the March 2019 municipal elections several municipalities were being run by centrally appointed trustees, mainly on the grounds that their elected mayors had alleged links to terrorist organisations. It is crucial that voters are permitted to choose local elected representatives in accordance with Turkish law and with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, to which Turkey is a party. Arrests and dismissals of local politicians and appointment of trustees as well as the YSK’s decision to deny mayorship to HDP candidates in four municipalities in the south-east deprive voters of political representation at local level, and seriously risk damaging local democracy. A presidential decree published in August 2018 effectively connects all local authority budgets to the Minister of Treasury and Finance. Professional organisations established by law or under the Constitution, foundations and social security institutions are all covered by the decree. Though the establishment of the Single Treasury Institutional Account has the advantage of ensuring a more balanced budget between public institutions, since any budget surplus will be shared, it risks increasing the dependence of local administrations and state economic enterprises on centralised management, further undermining local democracy. The Ombudsman has a steady caseload and has been active in raising awareness of its role. However, the Institution still lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies, and such limitations curtail effectiveness. The legal framework does not protect independent regulatory authorities from undue political interference. Under the new presidential system, many regulatory authorities (such as the Competition Authority (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy), the Information and Communication Technologies Board, the Cyber Security Council, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (see Chapter 10 – Information Society and Media), the Directorate-General for Rail Regulation (see Chapter 14 – Transport policy), the Regulatory Body of the Atomic Industry (see Chapter 15 - Energy) and the central bank (see Chapter 17 – Economic and Monetary Policy) are now directly linked to the Presidency. Civil society There has been serious backsliding regarding civil society as it has come under continuous pressure, notably in the face of a large number of arrests of activists, including human rights defenders. There is also public stigmatisation of independent civil society organisations and a recurrent use of bans of demonstrations and other types of gatherings. The space for civil society organisations working on fundamental rights and freedoms has further shrunk. The rights-based organisations closed under the state of emergency have not been offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. However, civil society has remained active and involved in public life as far as possible. Pro-government organisations continued to gain a more visible role and opportunities for representation. Administrative difficulties for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continue to hamper civil society activities. Since October, following the amendment of Parliament’s rules of procedure, civil society organisations are excluded from legislative consultation processes at parliamentary committees. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for consulting a wide spectrum of civil society, notably on new legislation and policies, need to be in place and used regularly. An empowered and diverse civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and should be recognised and treated as such by the state institutions. Turkish civil society organisations (CSOs) continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the country, notably in the areas of education, female workforce participation, awareness-raising regarding ethnic and social tolerance, and support for refugees. There are a limited number of CSOs operating in the field of human rights. However, civil society continued to face increasing pressure, in particular following the high number of detentions and arrests of activists and human rights defenders. The indictment of Osman Kavala, a prominent human rights defender who was held for more than a year without charge, together with 15 other human rights activists, is deeply worrying, and is emblematic of the shrinking public space and uncertainty in which civil society organisations are trying to operate. Smear campaigns in some media outlets against some of these activists, including for accepting funds from international donors, are a recurrent feature and a matter of serious concern. Furthermore, leaks continued of confidential dossiers on human rights defenders in prison, while their legal procedures were still ongoing, by media groups with close ties to the authorities. Defamatory public rhetoric cast serious doubt on Turkey’s respect for due process and the presumption of innocence. International NGOs also faced difficulties in their work in Turkey, including those providing humanitarian aid to refugees. No effective domestic remedy has yet been made available for the confiscation of assets from civil society organisations closed by emergency decrees. The Directorate-General for Relations with Civil Society was established within the Ministry of Interior, replacing the Department of Associations. The mandate and priorities of this unit, including the drafting of an overarching strategy for civil society or the improvement of the legal framework, remain unclear. A regulation issued in October 2018 makes it compulsory for all associations to register all their members (not only their board members) in the information system of the Ministry of Interior. This is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of association.

Other barriers to civil society and freedom of association remain. Cumbersome administrative procedures imposed on NGOs by the authorities are still in place. Provisions restricting registration, procedures for obtaining required permits and the functioning of associations need to be revised, including facilitating the work of international NGOs working with refugees in Turkey. The Law on Collection of Aid imposes burdensome requirements that discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations. These include prior authorisation for each fundraising activity and long authorisation processes based on non-objective criteria. Public funds are not distributed in a transparent way and the process does not allow the full involvement of civil society organisations and other stakeholders at every stage. The existing tax system makes it difficult for foundations and associations to function and develop. ‘Public benefit’ (for associations) or ‘tax exemption’ (for foundations) status is vaguely defined, and the decision-making process is not transparent. The environment for foreign donors, which provide financial support to the Turkish civil society under the current Turkish legislation, is increasingly shrinking notably because of unfounded public allegations, for example in the Gezi case. There is no comprehensive government strategy in place for cooperation with civil society. There is still no coordination body for monitoring, no transparent mechanism for public funding and no fiscal incentives for civil society organisations. Independent rights-based civil society organisations are mostly excluded from the consultations that are part of law-making and policymaking processes and monitoring. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society. Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector Presidential decrees resulted in the overhaul of the legal and institutional framework governing the security sector. Amendments to the legal framework accorded broad powers over the security forces to the executive branch. Dismissals and arrests in relation to the attempted coup of July 2016 have continued. By December 2018, a total of 15 242 military officers were dismissed from the service due to their alleged links to the Gülen movement while 5 783 former military personnel were also arrested on grounds of their alleged involvement in the averted coup. Security and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient transparency and accountability before Parliament. A Presidential decree of July 2018 overhauled the organisational structure and accountability lines of the Turkish armed forces. The General Staff and all force commands have been subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence. All military hierarchy is now accountable to the President, who is legally entitled to give orders directly to the chief of general staff, force commanders and their subordinates. The Supreme Military Council was restructured to strengthen civilian presence, with the designation of the Vice-President and Treasury and Finance and Education Ministers as members. High military courts were abolished, and civilian higher courts have reviewed the appeals against the decisions of military courts. Despite these recognised improvements, some issues remain. The military, police and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient transparency and accountability to Parliament. Security personnel continue to have wide-ranging legal protection. Despite credible reporting of serious allegations of human rights violations and of the disproportionate use of force by security forces in the south-east, the track record of judicial and administrative examination of such allegations remains poor. The parliamentary law enforcement oversight commission remained ineffective. The legal framework for overseeing military expenditure has not yet been improved. Situation in the east and south-east The situation in the south-east has continued to be challenging despite an improved security environment. The Government continued security operations against the background of the recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and PKK-affiliated groups. The PKK remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. While the Government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is also responsible for ensuring that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. The Government’s investment plan for reconstruction of damaged areas in the south-east, announced in September 2016, led to the ongoing construction of many dwellings. The compensation process and distribution criteria of housing for internally displaced persons are not transparent. There were no visible developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. The PKK or its affiliated groups continued to commit violent terrorist attacks during the reporting period. Terrorist attacks by the PKK targeted cities in the south-east and east of Turkey, which resulted in deaths and injuries. The EU unambiguously condemned these attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. Subsequent to Abdullah Öcalan’s lawyers’ visit of their client on 2 May 2019 and the CPT visit from 6 to 16 May, the Turkish Minister of Justice stated on 16 May that the ban on these visits was lifted. Province governorates reacted by declaring intermittent curfews and security zones in mostly rural settlements. The Venice Commission’s recommendations in its June 2016 opinion on the legal framework governing curfews are yet to be implemented. Investigations into the deaths of civilians in 2015 during security operations under curfews in towns such as Cizre have not progressed. In November 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held an admissibility hearing in 34 ongoing applications in relation to curfews during which people lost their lives in Cizre, in the province of Şırnak and in the Sur district of Diyarbakir. The Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner is a third party to this case. In February 2019, the ECtHR rejected a number of related complaints as inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights by security forces, including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and breaches of procedural rights. The report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of February 2017 still needs follow up; it stated that there is no evidence of effective and independent investigations into the reported killings or the numerous other serious human rights violations allegedly committed between July 2015 and December 2016 during security operations. As also reported by the UN Commissioner, human rights defenders still face major difficulties in accessing areas affected by ongoing violence, which impedes their work on the forced disappearances that occurred in the 1990s. A very broad interpretation of the fight against terrorism, growing restrictions put in place during and after the state of emergency on the rights of journalists, the Bar Associations and Human rights defenders (HRDs) working on the Kurdish issue are among issues raising concern. Other associations and Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions remained closed. There were numerous new detentions and arrests of elected representatives and municipal executives in the east and south-east under terrorism-related charges, and serious concerns regarding the YSK’s decision not to let elected mayors take office and to recognise second-placed candidates as mayors (See section above — Governance). The South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) continues to operate with the objective of improving socioeconomic development in the region. The Government’s investment plan for post-conflict reconstructing of damaged areas in the south-east, announced in September 2016, has led to the ongoing construction of thousands of dwellings. Some initial work was done by the Government to restore the cultural, historical and religious heritage sites damaged in 2015 and 2016. Beyond the restoration carried out by the Government of the Armenian Catholic Church, restoration works have started in 2019 on the Surp Giragos Church and the Mar Petyun Chaldean Church. Civil society has continued to be critical of projects such as the Ilısu Dam which risks damaging natural habitats, agricultural land and historical heritage sites such as Hasankeyf. There is still no comprehensive, consistent approach in relation to missing persons, to the exhumation of mass graves and to the independent investigation of all alleged cases of extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. The February 2017 Council of Europe report on missing persons and victims of enforced disappearance highlighted the excessive length of trials. Most of the investigations into cases of enforced disappearances from the 1990s are, or will soon be, facing the 20-year statute of limitations. However, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) assessed that enforced disappearances are not subject to statutes of limitation, thereby providing a guarantee against impunity. The 2015 recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur to tackle the lack of prosecutions over extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions remain unaddressed. The village guard system is still in place, despite criticism. There were reported incidents of human rights violations. More than 600 village guards were removed from duty due to involvement in criminal activities. Refugees and internally displaced persons Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide; in February 2019, it was sheltering and meeting the needs of approximately 3.6 million Syrians and 370 000 other nationalities. Some 142 000 Syrian nationals under temporary protection live in 13 temporary accommodation centres run by the Directorate-General for Migration Management. Turkey has made sustained significant efforts to provide support for refugees and ensure wider access to healthcare and schooling, with 65% of Syrian children now in school. Many cities provide municipal services to refugees. Of one million Syrians of school age in Turkey, about 635 000 now have access to primary and secondary education, up from 605 000 last year. In May 2018, the number of Syrians under temporary protection who held work permits stood at 43 000 (see Chapter 24 – Justice, freedom and security). Civil society reports highlight some problems, such as high rates of child labour and truancy rates among refugees and asylum seekers, particularly non-Syrians. Many refugees and asylum seekers are exploited in the informal economy and their poverty inhibits access to protection. There has been limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) resulting from the violence in the south-east, and a small percentage of IDPs have been offered new housing. This process is not based on a comprehensive and transparent mechanism (see section above – Situation in the east and south-east).

2.1.2.Public administration reform Turkey is moderately prepared in public administration reform. There has been serious backsliding in the area of public service and human resources management, which has also affected policy development and accountability. A major re-structuring of the public administration and civil service system took place through presidential decrees. Changes to the civil service system have further increased the politicisation of the administration. An effective remedy still needs to be provided for the large-scale dismissals that took place during the state of emergency. In the absence of a comprehensive public administration reform strategy, there is no systematic approach to reform. The low level of female representation in the higher echelons of bureaucracy remains a concern. The Commission’s recommendations from 2018 have not yet been implemented, and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: → ensure that the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures provides for an effective remedy, which safeguards the right of every individual to a fair administrative process; → prepare changes to its legislation to introduce a merit-based, competitive appointment system for senior managerial positions in the civil service; → review the policy-making process with a view to ensuring inclusive and evidence-based preparation of policy planning documents and legislative proposals. Strategic framework for public administration reform Turkey still lacks an overarching public administration reform strategic framework, including on public financial management. There are various planning documents and sectoral policy documents on different aspects of public administration reform, but the lack of political support hinders comprehensive reform efforts. An administrative unit with a legal mandate to coordinate, design, implement and monitor public administration reform has not yet been established. Such a unit would need to coordinate closely with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, to ensure coherence of strategic and fiscal planning and efficiently address managerial accountability (see Chapter 32). The financial sustainability of the overall public administration reform is not guaranteed, as key planning documents do not specify the expected costs of reform measures. Policy development and coordination The extensive restructuring of the executive branch, which took place without any public consultation, resulted in further centralisation of the policy-making system. Policy coordination among central government institutions has remained strong, but planning, monitoring and reporting of whole-of-government performance continue to be inadequate. There are no regulations that describe rules of procedure and processes within the overall decision-making process of the government, risking potential policy and legislative overlaps. The policy-planning process within government departments needs to be improved to ensure greater participation and accountability. Nine Presidential Policy Councils, which have advisory and coordination functions over sectoral policies, were established, but their relation to the work of individual government departments is not yet clear. This is particularly evident in economic planning, where policy programmes do not have a systematic link with fiscal planning. Legislative development and policy formulation have not pursued an inclusive and evidencebased approach. This has worsened with the transition to the presidential system, as responsibility for producing draft legislative proposals lies now with Members of Parliament, rather than with the Government. Public consultation is extremely rare, and inter-ministerial coordination is complicated by the administrative overhaul that accompanied the new presidential system. Public financial management There has been little progress in public financial management, notably because of the increased number of exceptions to the public procurement law, late adoption of the budget and frequent and unannounced changes to tax policy. An independent fiscal council aiming to ensure fiscal discipline is yet to be established. In the absence of adequate ex post monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency. Budget transparency needs to be further improved, with the participation of civil society (see Chapters 5, 16, 17 and 32). Public service and human resources management The amendments to the civil service system have endangered merit-based recruitment, promotion and appointment to managerial posts. Senior managerial posts, i.e. undersecretary and deputy undersecretary posts, have been abolished, and their duties have been taken over by politically appointed deputy ministers, resulting in further politicisation of the civil service. The large-scale dismissals of public servants during the state of emergency have remained a matter of concern. While the legal framework provides uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and disciplinary measures and ensures a possibility for appeal, largescale dismissals during the state of emergency did not identify evidence relating to each individual dismissal case and lacked minimum procedural safeguards for those who were dismissed. The State Personnel Administration was closed in July 2018 and replaced by the Human Resources office under the President of the Republic. However, given its current limited size, it is unclear to what extent it can cover the functions of the State Personnel Administration and ensure central coordination of human resources management in the public sector. The civil service remuneration system is not standardised across institutions and lacks transparency. Although central institutions offer some training and are responsible for some aspects of training policy, the administration lacks sufficient tools to support the professional development of civil servants. While integrity in public service is boosted by ethics committees and an ethics board, no integrity plans have been issued since 2014. Accountability of the administration In the new presidential system, the organisation of state administration follows extremely centralised lines of accountability to the Presidency. Most executive institutions are formally embedded in ministries, although they retain autonomy over day-to-day operational management. The roles and responsibilities of different institutions are not yet fully clear, which risks reducing transparency and accountability. Accountability of agencies is weak, and internal control and audit do not function optimally (see Chapter 32). Internal and external oversight arrangements to ensure citizens’ right to good administration need to be better implemented. The role of oversight institutions such as the Ombudsman needs to be further improved, in the absence of ex officio powers (see Governance). Citizens’ right to access public information is regulated by the law on the right to information, which does not require proactive disclosure of information and provides for broad exemptions on grounds of protecting state secrets, commercial secrets and personal data. A simplified online access system received millions of applications for access to information in 2018. The Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for considering appeals filed against a refusal to provide access to public information. Citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation have remained problematic and the backlog of cases has increased as a result of the measures taken under the state of emergency.

Service delivery to citizens and businesses Strong commitment to a user-oriented administration has continued. E-government services have continued to expand. The number of registered users grew to 40 million in 2018, a significant increase from 25.2 million in 2015. Public services are to a large extent accessible through e-government tools. One-stop-shops and points of single contact for citizens, particularly at local level, need to be further extended. A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce barriers to accessing services for people with disabilities. Simplifying administrative procedures and cutting red tape is hindered by the absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to provide citizens and businesses with greater legal certainty. 2.2.Rule of law and fundamental rights 2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights Turkey is at an early stage of applying the acquis and European standards in this area. Backsliding continued, and the recommendations in the previous reports were not accepted or implemented. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors and transfers of a large number of judges and prosecutors against their will continued. This continued to have a significant negative effect on the independence and overall quality and efficiency of the judiciary. Despite their acquittal, a large number of judges or prosecutors who had been subject to criminal charges were not returned to the profession. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. There has been no revision of the anti-corruption framework to address the gaps. Fundamental rights have been considerably curtailed under the state of emergency and pursuant to the decrees and legislation adopted during and after it. This has led to very limited progress on the outstanding issues identified in previous reports, namely the termination of the state of emergency. Nevertheless, further backsliding continued in all areas of human rights, most notably on freedom of expression including freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association, protection of human rights defenders, property rights and procedural rights. No legal improvements have taken place concerning the removal of crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, or prosecuting civilians who committed crimes while resisting the 2016 attempted coup, as well as any acts in the aftermath of the attempted coup. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: ®revise the legislation so that it is compatible with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law; ®reinstate the necessary conditions to ensure the independence, impartiality, accountability, quality, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary; ®ensure that its international obligations are respected in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, and effectively address serious human rights violations, including respecting the right to a fair trial and effectively investigating allegations of violations of the ECHR and other international Conventions to which it is a party. Functioning of the judiciary Turkey is at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued. Concerns on the independence of the Turkish judiciary following, among other issues, the dismissal and forced removal of 30% of judges and prosecutors following the 2016 attempted coup remain. The recruitment of new judges and prosecutors under the current system added to the concerns, as no measures were taken to address the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for their recruitment and promotion. The chilling effect of the dismissals and forced transfers on the judiciary is still observed, and risks engendering widespread self-censorship among judges and prosecutors. This may weaken the judiciary as a whole, its independence and the separation of powers. No measures were taken to restore legal guarantees to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive or to strengthen the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP). No changes were made to the institution of criminal judges of peace, which risks becoming a parallel system. The recommendations from earlier reports therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Turkey should: ®create a political and legal environment that allows the judiciary to perform its duties independently and impartially, respecting European standards; strengthen judicial responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers; and ensure that judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should follow ECtHR jurisprudence delivered in a timely manner, are respected by lower courts; ®implement Venice Commission (VC) recommendations, also on criminal judges of peace, to ensure that decisions on detentions take effect only if approved by a trial court; ®limit the role and influence of the executive within the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) and provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges against their will; ®introduce further safeguards against any interference by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors in judicial proceedings; ®guarantee the principle of administrative and financial autonomy of the Justice Academy in accordance with European standards, since the independence and composition of the authority responsible for training and its content is a corollary of the general principle of judicial independence. Increase its capacity to train candidates fully and to prepare them to effectively manage their future tasks;

®limit any suspension of judges, as a major infringement of guaranteed judicial independence under the Constitution, to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of serious misbehaviour; ensure that the system of disciplinary proceedings and promotions for judges and prosecutors is guided by objective criteria without undue influence from the executive; ®in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals, ensure that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on evidence, in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary respecting the fair trial criteria of the ECtHR. These procedures must fully respect fundamental rights, including procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to a defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and right to an effective appeal. Strategic documents A judicial reform strategy for 2019-2023 was announced in August 2018 but the strategy has not yet been adopted. Consultations on the draft strategy have taken place, including of the Council of Europe and the Commission, which asked the Turkish authorities to take its comments into consideration when reviewing the draft. Management bodies Since May 2017, the CJP continued to function based on the structure adopted by the constitutional amendments with 13 members (four members appointed by the President, seven members appointed by the Parliament, in addition to the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister). The procedure governing the appointment of CJP members continues to raise serious concerns in relation to its independence from the executive. A budget of TRY 65 million was allocated to the CJP under the 2018 budget for central administration and TRY 77 million in 2019. Improved transparency, full independence from the executive and strict adherence to procedures in line with European standards are urgently needed to restore not only the CJP’s credibility, but also public trust in the entire judiciary. Independence and impartiality The Justice Academy of Turkey (JAT) was re-established by Presidential Decree on 1 May 2019. It replaced the previous Justice Academy that was closed under the state of emergency. Its duties at that time were taken over by the Judges and Prosecutors Training Centre in the Ministry of Justice. According to the decree, the JAT will be responsible for all pre-service training of candidate judges and prosecutors as well as the in-service training. It is affiliated to the Ministry of Justice but has scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. The JAT will have a president and a maximum of four heads of department. It will also have a Consultative Committee, tasked to make proposals. Detentions and court cases against judges and prosecutors, and transfers, continued. No legal and constitutional guarantees were introduced to prevent judges and prosecutors from being transferred against their will. Concerns remained as regards the perceived influence of the executive over the decisions of the criminal judges of peace and their jurisdiction and practice. These particularly relate to their extensive powers and to the fact that objections to their decisions are not reviewed by a higher judicial body but by another single-judge institution. Their rulings increasingly diverge from ECtHR case law and rarely provide sufficiently individualised reasoning. Defence lawyers’ access to their clients’ court files for a specific catalogue of crimes are restricted until the indictment has been issued. Sometimes this takes more than a year. The closure of associations critical of the Government has had negative effects on pluralism in judges associations, and has led to a growing hesitation to become members of such associations. Ceremonies for new judges and prosecutors and the opening of the judicial year are held in the Presidential Palace. Such events contribute to the perception of an increased politicisation and influence of the executive over the judiciary. Public comments especially incriminating ones, on ongoing judicial cases by representatives of the executive and legislative branches disregard the presumption of innocence of the suspects, and cast serious doubt on respect for due process. They have a serious chilling effect on the judges and prosecutors who deal with these cases. Long detention and pre-trial periods have become the norm rather than the exception. Accountability In 2018, nearly all judges had declared their assets as required by law. The disciplinary procedures system for both judges and prosecutors has been perceived as undermining important guarantees that safeguard the independence of the judiciary. Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and to enforce disciplinary penalties are in place but need to be made effective and free from political interference. The Office of Judicial Ethics was founded in February 2016. The CJP adopted the Code of Judicial Ethics in March 2019. Professionalism and competence As of February 2019, 10,000 candidate judges and prosecutors had been integrated into the judicial and administrative jurisdictions since the attempted coup, following an accelerated and non-transparent selection process. Concerns remain over the lack of objective, meritbased, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors. The CJP is not sufficiently independent from the executive, and the Ministry of Justice supervises the selection boards for new judges and prosecutors, and manages their yearly appraisal. The CJP itself plays no role in the selection boards, even though it takes the final decision on recruitment. 2 new regional Courts of Appeals were opened. 116 new members were appointed to the Court of Cassation and the Council of State in July with the declared objective of decreasing the workload in these institutions. Quality of justice The large increase in the number of inexperienced judges and prosecutors in recent years and the drastic reduction of the duration of in-service training have seriously impacted on the skills of the future judges and prosecutors needed to effectively manage the case law and tackle the workload. The Justice Academy should be allocated sufficient resources to tackle the increased need for pre-service and in-service training for newly recruited judges and prosecutors. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors have negatively affected the quality of justice. Overall, there are serious concerns regarding the quality of judicial decisions, particularly in terrorism-related cases, in terms of their legal reasoning and the factual evidence on which they are based. Indictments often reflect allegations, and are not supported by credible evidence. These indictments, which are sometimes based on statements by people who have been accused in other cases or by secret witnesses, raise serious concerns. In some cases, evidence and arguments presented by the defence are not reflected in the Court’s assessment. During court hearings, suspects and witnesses are generally not brought to the courthouse and are heard through an audiovisual information system. This hampers the communication of the defence and the accused, and should be limited to the necessary cases. Lawyers who provide legal assistance to human rights defenders and civil and political activists also face obstacles in performing their work and, in some cases, are subjected to arrest, detention and prosecution. This should be prevented at all costs. There are around 500 lawyers under arrest and awaiting trial.

2 new departments for mediation and for alternative dispute resolution were created in the Ministry of Justice. Efforts continued to increase and promote alternative dispute resolution methods to help reduce the burden on the courts. In July 2018, a regulation on the implementation of the Mediation Law on Civil Disputes entered into force. Efficiency There is no human resources strategy for the judiciary, which struggles to effectively perform its tasks in the wake of the strong reduction of experienced personnel. The recruitment of a large number of inexperienced judges and prosecutors using fast-track procedures without adequate in-service and pre-service training failed to remedy the concerns. Regarding the backlog of cases, the numbers of pending cases in the high courts in December 2018 were 40 636 for the Constitutional Court and 174 632 for the Council of State. In 2018, the Court of Cassation received a total of 1 017 969 cases (352 285 new cases and 665 684 cases transferred from 2017), and dealt with 511 508 cases, resulting in a reduced backlog of 506 461 cases by the end of 2018. These regional courts of appeal continued to operate, but for both civil and criminal cases, their clearance rate remained below 100%, which is leading to a growing backlog. As regards first instance courts, the clearance rate for criminal courts in 2018 was 53.3% compared to 55% in 2016. The total number of cases finalised in 2018 was 1 518 024 compared to 1 324 153 in 2016. As regards the total length of proceedings it went up from 274 days to 294 days. Systemic solutions are still needed, therefore, to further address the emerging backlog and the excessive length of some trials. As of early 2018, there are 13.9 judges and 5.9 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants (16 104 judges and prosecutors in total). According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), the European average is 21 judges/11 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants. Fight against corruption Turkey is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was backsliding, since dismantled preventive bodies have not been replaced by an independent body, in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption to which Turkey is party. No progress was made on closing a variety of legislative gaps. Both the legal framework and the institutional setup continued to allow undue executive influence in the investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption cases, and need to be improved in line with international standards. Limited accountability and transparency of public institutions have remained a matter of concern. The absence of a robust anti-corruption strategy and action plan is a sign of lack of political will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations have not yet been implemented. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. There is a need for strong political will to effectively address corruption issues, as well as a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: ®effectively implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, including the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Conventions; ®ensure effective follow-up to the recommendations issued by the GRECO, including by adopting the necessary legislation; ®establish a track record of successful prosecution of, and convictions for, high-level corruption; ®adopt an anti-corruption strategy, reflecting a clear political will and vision to effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. Track record The existing legal framework and institutional architecture enables the executive branch to exert undue political influence on judges and prosecutors, law enforcement officers and inspectors. Therefore, Turkey’s track record of investigation, prosecution and conviction in corruption cases has remained poor, particularly in relation to high-level corruption cases implicating politicians and public officials. Sentences do not have a deterrent effect, and convicts can benefit from deferred sentences for some offences. The track record of cooperation by audit and inspection units with prosecutions remained poor. Local administrations, land administration and management, public procurement processes, and the construction and transportation industries, including when implemented via public-private partnerships, remained particularly prone to corruption. Some of the GRECO recommendations calling for the adoption of new laws and practices on political contributions and expenditure, as well as public disclosure, have yet to be addressed. Turkish authorities publish no data on corruption cases. Institutional framework Prevention measures No permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption body exists. The level of coordination between various preventive bodies remained inadequate. The Prime Ministry Inspection Board, which used to coordinate preventive anti-corruption measures, ceased to exist with the transition to the presidential system. The State Supervisory Council, which assumed some of the duties and powers of the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, lacks independence. The legal framework of anti-corruption also remains weak in the private sector. There have been no regular awareness-raising campaigns on transparency and the fight against corruption. Law enforcement No specialised prosecution service to lead anti-corruption investigations has been established. There are also few specialised courts. The executive has retained undue political influence over officers acting as judicial police, thereby preventing them from carrying out effective investigations. Inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing between law enforcement and the financial intelligence unit need to be further developed. Financial investigations are not systematically started in corruption and organised crime cases. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective.

Legal framework Turkey is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations Convention Against corruption, which Turkey still needs to implement fully. The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies, i.e. the Law on General Administrative Procedure, the Law on Public Procurement, the Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament and the Law on Whistle-blower Protection, have not been implemented. The legal framework on whistle-blower protection still needs to be aligned with the new EU acquis on this issue. The anti-corruption action plan (2016) has not been followed up and lacks political ownership. Turkey has not aligned with GRECO recommendations on judicial independence or transparency of the legislative process and political financing. Turkey has implemented satisfactorily seven of the seventeen recommendations contained in GRECO's Third Round Evaluation Report. Shortcomings remain unaddressed in the corruption-related provisions of the Criminal Code, which do not meet the standards put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The definition of active bribery, though covered in Article 252 of the Turkish Criminal Code, is still not in line with international conventions. The shortcomings concern, in particular, the provisions on bribery in the private sector. Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU acquis. The vast and increasing number of exemptions inserted into the framework law on public procurement has become a matter of growing concern. In particular, tenders at municipal level and for public-private partnerships for large infrastructure investments remained prone to corruption. The legal privileges of public officials, such as the requirement for prior authorisation from their hierarchy before starting an investigation of alleged wrongdoing, continued to provide legal protection for public officials in anti-corruption criminal and administrative investigations. The legal framework on preventing, prosecuting and issuing penalties for conflicts of interest as well as on declaring, verifying and disclosing assets remained inadequate. Turkey has no legislation governing lobbying. Strategic framework The 2010-2014 anti-corruption strategy and action plan failed to meet most of their initial objectives. Measures envisaged in the transparency and anti-corruption action plan announced in 2016 have not yet been followed up. Turkey needs to strengthen its overall capacity to coordinate, implement and monitor all anti-corruption actions among the many relevant preventive institutions and law enforcement agencies. Fundamental rights After two years of rapid deterioration of the human rights situation, Turkey’s state of emergency finally ended on 18 July 2018. However, this was not accompanied by concrete steps to improve the human rights in the country. Instead, many of the measures introduced during the state of emergency remain in force today, and continue to have a profound and devastating impact on Turkish citizens. The legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights but still needs to be brought into line with ECHR and ECtHR case law on guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights. Serious backsliding in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and procedural and property rights continued. Restrictions imposed on the activities of journalists, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices on a broad scale have a negative effect on the exercise of these freedoms, and lead to self-censorship. Legislation introduced immediately after the lifting of the state of emergency removed crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, thereby augmenting the risk of impunity for the perpetrators of such abuse. The enforcement of rights is hindered by the fragmentation and limited independence of public institutions responsible for protecting human rights and freedoms, and the lack of an independent judiciary. The Council of Europe continued its monitoring of Turkey’s respect for fundamental freedoms. The lack of institutional independence, lengthy review procedures, the absence of sufficiently individualised criteria, and the absence of a proper means of defence resulted in the failure by the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures to provide an effective recourse against dismissals so far. Turkey should in particular: ®effectively ensure full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; ®align Turkish criminal and anti-terror legislation and their interpretation with European standards and ECtHR case-law and Venice Commission recommendations; ®ensure that all public-sector employees arbitrarily dismissed during the state of emergency are appropriately compensated for any harm, including loss of earnings; ®ensure that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on evidence and fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary, and fully respecting relevant procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal; ®ensure the effectiveness of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures as a domestic remedy. Turkey is party to most international human rights instruments. The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, have yet to be ratified. The Turkish Parliament ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2017; it entered into force in March 2018. Following the lifting of the state of emergency, Turkey revoked its derogations to the European Convention on Human Rights and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in August 2018. In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found violations of the ECHR in 142 cases (out of 146) relating mainly to the right to fair trial (41), freedom of expression (40), the right to liberty and security (29), freedom of assembly and association (11), inhuman or degrading treatment (11), and prohibition of torture (10). During the reporting period, 6 717 new applications were registered by the ECtHR. In January 2019, the total number of Turkish applications pending before the Court was 7 107. There are currently 410 cases against Turkey in the enhanced monitoring procedure.

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