EN ECB-PUBLIC  
 
 
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
of 13 February 2014 
on the macro-prudential mandate and instruments of the NBB 
(CON/2014/16) 
 Introduction and legal basis 
On 10 January 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB)  received a request from the Minister for Finance 
for an opinion on a draft law establishing instruments of macro-prudential policy and specifying the tasks 
assigned to the Nationale Bank van Be lgië/Banque Nationale de Belgique  (NBB) in the context of its 
mission to contribute to the stability of the financial system (hereinafter the ‘d raft law’). The ECB was 
asked to deliver an opinion within one month so that  the ECB’s opinion could be taken into consideration 
before the draft law is submitte d to the Belgian Parliament. 
The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third, f ourth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of Council 
Decision 98/415/EC1, since the draft law relates to the NBB, st atistics and rules applicable to financial 
institutions insofar as they materially influence th e stability of financial institutions and markets. In 
accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central 
Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 
 1.  Purpose of the draft law 
1.1  The draft law implements Recommendation ESRB/2011/3
2. 
1.2 Under the draft law the NBB’s mandate is to ‘c ontribute to the stability of the financial system’, 
which concept is defined as ‘a situation in which th e probability of lack of continuity, or disruption, 
of the functioning of the financial system is low or, if such disruptions were to occur, their effects 
on the economy would be limited’. To achieve the objective of contributing to financial stability, 
the NBB will have the following powers: (a) to  detect and monitor different factors and 
developments which may affect the stability of th e financial system; (b) to issue recommendations 
on measures to be implemented by the competent authorities, in order to contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole, particular ly through (i) strengthening the robustness of the 
                                                 
1  Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultati on of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
2  Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Ri sk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential 
mandate of national aut horities. Available on the website of the ESRB at www.esrb.europa.eu. 
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2 financial system, (ii) preventing the occurrence of systemic risks, and (iii) limiting the effect of 
potential disruptions; and (c) to adopt measures fa lling within the ambit of its own competences 
with a view to achieving the objectives described under (b) above. The draft law stipulates that the 
principle of independence – provide d for in Article 130 of the Treaty – will apply to the NBB when 
acting in the context of contributing to the stability of the financial system. 
1.3 The draft law also sets out specific accountab ility mechanisms under which the NBB is to provide 
the Chamber of Representatives with an annual repo rt on its activities in the areas of prudential 
supervision and contributing to the stability of th e financial system. The Governor of the NBB may 
also be invited to hearings before the compet ent committees of the Chamber of Representatives, be 
it at the request of such committees or at the Governor’s own initiative. 
1.4 In order to strengthen the framework for the coll ection of information, the draft law authorises the 
NBB to use any information in its possession or to make use of any entitlements to information it 
has in the context of its other tasks (including that of prudential supervision). The NBB may also require a private entity that is not subject to its supervision to provide it w ith any information that 
entity has which would be useful for discharging the NBB’s macro-prudential mandate. Failure to 
comply with such requirements may be penalis ed by the imposition of administrative fines. 
Communication of such information to the NBB might  be ensured by means of the control function 
exercised by other competent authorities over the private entity in question. Finally, the NBB may 
enter into arrangements to cooperate with the ECB,  the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the 
European supervisory authorities (ESAs) and foreign authorities with competence in the field of 
macro-prudential supervision, and it may ex change confidential in formation with those 
organisations. 
1.5 The draft law provides that, in discharging its macro-prudential mandate, the NBB may, without 
prejudice to the competences assigned to the ECB, use any of the following tools in respect of 
financial institutions: (a) the power to impose ow n funds requirements or  additional liquidity 
requirements in respect of all credit institutions or  specific categories of credit institutions; (b) the 
power to impose specific requirements as regard s own funds, which may vary depending on the 
nature of exposures, the value of collateral received  by the credit institution concerned, the areas of 
activity or the geographic area of operation of the debtors, such measures being in addition to or 
stricter than those applied in the context of prudential supervision; (c) the power to impose 
quantitative limits on exposures in respect of an  individual counterparty or a group of linked 
counterparties; (d) the power to impose limits on the total levels of activity of institutions, as a 
percentage of their own funds, which are in addition to or stricter than those applied in the context 
of prudential supervision; (e) the power to impose conditions fo r the valuation of collateral 
accepted against credits extended for verifying compliance with the requirements regarding 
solvency as provided for under or in accordance with prudential legislation; (f) booking all or part of the distributable profits to an account whic h cannot be accessed by the institution concerned; 
(g) the power to impose asset valuation rules different from those imposed under accounting rules 
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3 in the context of prudential supervision; (h) the power to require the disclosure of information in 
addition to that which may be required under pruden tial supervision rules in respect of all credit 
institutions or those belonging to a specific categor y; and (i) the power to issue public statements 
on the adoption of the abovementioned measures  and their corresponding objectives. Prior to 
imposing any of the abovementioned measures, the NBB shall inform the ESRB, the ECB and, if 
necessary, the ESAs and the European Commission.  Prior to imposing own funds requirements or 
any measures intended to reduce systemic risks, th e NBB must take into account objections raised 
by the ECB or any other European authority. 
1.6 The NBB may issue recommendations to the ECB or any other Union authorities on measures to be 
adopted and implemented in order to  contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole, 
be it by means of measures intended to strengt hen the robustness of the financial system, to 
anticipate the occurrence of systemic risks or to limit the potential effects of disruption. National 
authorities to whom recommendations are addressed are requested to provide the NBB with a formal opinion giving reasons why those reco mmendations are not followed. If recommendations 
issued by the NBB addressed to federal national authorities are not followed, the King may decide 
to adopt the measures necessary to implement the NBB recommendation concerned by means of a royal decree adopted in the Council of Ministers. 
 2.  General observations 2.1 The ECB supports the effective design of macr o-prudential policy framewo rks within the Member 
States, in line with the guiding principles expressed in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. The ECB welcomes the fact that the NBB plays a leading role  in this respect, given its expertise and existing 
responsibilities in the area of financial stability
3. 
2.2 The ECB furthermore welcomes that the NBB, in respect of the discharge of this macro-prudential 
mandate, enjoys the same degree of independence as established in Article 130 of the Treaty, which 
shall also be adequately balanced with the strengthened accountability of the NBB before the 
Chamber of Representatives. In the interests of clarit y, it would, however, be  appropriate to exclude 
the power of the Minister of Finance to exerci se control over decisions made by the NBB in the 
discharge of its macro-prudential mandate under Ar ticle 22 of the Organic Law of the NBB which, 
in its current form, excludes such control only in r espect of the European System of Central Banks’ 
tasks and operations and the prudential supervision described in Article 12 bis of the Organic Law 
of the NBB . Without prejudice to the principle of independence and this proposed change, the 
Organic Law of the NBB could be further amende d in order to establish specific mechanisms for 
cooperating with any authority whose actions have  a material impact on financial stability, in 
accordance with Recommendation B.2 of Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. 
                                                 
3  Opinion CON/2013/70, especially paragraph 2.1. A ll ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
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4 2.3 The ECB welcomes the strengthening of the me thods for collecting information. The ECB also 
welcomes the fact that the NBB may require a wide  range of private entities to provide information 
and that they may be subject to administrative fine s in the event of failure to comply with those 
requirements. While the ECB also welcomes the fact that domestic authorities must provide the NBB, at its request, with any information useful  for the discharge of its macro-economic mandate
4, 
it nevertheless recommends that those authorities should be required by law to communicate the 
information concerned at their own initiative. 
2.4 The ECB understands that, once collected in  accordance with the mech anisms described under 
paragraph 2.3 above, information may be shared  with the ECB, the ESRB, the ESAs or other 
domestic supervisory authorities in accordance with  cooperation agreements to be entered into 
between the NBB and the organisations in questi on. However, such agreements should not be 
necessary for the exchange of information falling within the ambit of Articles 56 and 58 of 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council5, and Article 6(2) of Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/20136, between the NBB and authorities competent in the areas of 
prudential supervision, macro-prudential supervis ion, banking resolution and recovery, the ECB, 
the central banks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the ESRB and the ESAs. The 
ECB recommends that cooperation arrangements as referred to above should be without prejudice 
to Article 36/14, 1° and 2°7 of the Organic Law of the NBB, pursuant to which the NBB may 
provide information to the ECB and ESCB central ba nks in certain cases. This includes cases when 
the information concerned is relevant for disch arging the mandate of the ECB and of the ESCB 
central banks with regard to monetary policy, em ergency liquidity assistance, oversight of payment 
and securities settlement systems, and safeguarding the stability of the financial system, especially 
in cases of emergency, and where the information is  relevant to the institutions entrusted with a 
macro-prudential mandate. In the interests of clarity, it is also advisable to include a cross-reference 
to Article 36/34 § 4, as amended by Article 36/14 of the draft law, in  order to have a comprehensive 
and consistent list of all cases in which the NBB may share confidential information with other 
authorities. 
 3.  Specific comments 3.1 The draft law sets out comprehensive mechanis ms further substantiating the already existing 
macro-prudential responsibilities of the NBB. In th e period since the financial crisis began, the 
Belgian legislator in 2011 entr usted the NBB with specific tools described in Article 36/3 of the 
                                                 
4  Article 36/33 § 3 of the Organic Law of the N BB, as amended by Article 9 of the draft law. 
5  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of th e Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institu tions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
6  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 c onferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 20.10.2013, p. 63). 
7  The ECB notes that these two paragra phs will be amended by the Law on vari ous amendments accompanying the draft 
Law on status and supervision of credit institutions, whic h was submitted to the ECB for its opinion on 3 January 2014. 
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5 Organic Law of the NBB in order to: (a) detect pot ential threats to the stability of the financial 
system, especially through monitoring and assessing st rategic evolutions and profiling systemically 
important financial institutions; (b ) issue opinions to the federal government and parliament on the 
measures necessary or useful for the stability, good  functioning and efficiency of the financial 
system of the country; (c) coordinate the manageme nt of the financial crisis; and (d) contribute to 
the objectives of international and European institu tions involved in the matters described under (a), 
(b) and (c) above, including in particular the ESRB.  Financial institutions designated by the NBB as 
systemically important, and notified of this d esignation, must provide their proposed strategic 
decisions to the NBB, which may oppose such  decisions. The NBB may also impose specific 
measures regarding solvency, liquidity, risk  concentration and risk positions on the 
abovementioned systemically importa nt financial institutions. Previ ous reforms also gave the NBB 
the power to take extraordinary measures, including  the forced transfer to the State or any other 
domestic or foreign public-law entity of assets, cred its, categories of activity, securities or pools of 
securities held by such central securities deposito ries vis-à-vis central securities depositories and 
assimilated institutions. This aimed at avoiding a situation whereby financial stability might be 
disrupted domestically or globally by a breach of the law by those entities or by mismanagement, 
liquidity problems, operational and administra tive or accounting problems arising within the 
entities in question. 
3.2 The ECB understands that the new macro-prudentia l tools introduced by the draft law are without 
prejudice to the two abovementioned regimes, which shall therefore remain unchanged. As part of 
the comprehensive reform of the status  and supervision of credit institutions8, Article 36/3 of the 
Organic Law of the NBB will, however, be ame nded in order to exempt credit institutions 
designated by the NBB as systemically important , and notified of this designation, from the 
requirement to provide the NBB with their strate gic decisions. Such a requirement will be imposed 
in the future on all credit institutions as part of micro-prudential supervision. Future legal 
developments may affect the macro-prudential superv ision of financial institutions other than credit 
institutions, especially the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on improving securities settlement in the European  Union and on central securities depositories 
(CSDs)9. The ECB recommends, for the sake of clarity of the Organic Law of the NBB, that the 
Belgian legislator reflects on the appropriateness of  maintaining three different sets of provisions 
on macro-prudential supervision. This  is particularly appropriate in view of the similarities between 
Articles 36/3 and 36/34, both of which apply to financial institutions on which the NBB may 
impose requirements relating to ow n funds, liquidity, risk concentr ation and risk positions with a 
view to contributing to the stability of th e financial system. Should these two provisions 
nonetheless remain separate, the mechanism for d esignating systemically important institutions 
                                                 
8  The ECB was consulted on 3 January 2014 on the draft Law on th e status and supervision of credit institutions and on the 
draft Law on various amendments. 
9  See the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament  and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the 
European Union and on central securities depositories (CSD s) and amending Directive 98/26/EC, COM (2012), final. 
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6 should also be reflected in Article 36/34, in  order to comply with Recommendation C.3 of 
Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. This mechanism is curre ntly provided for in Article 36/3 only, and 
will apply in the near future to financia l institutions other than credit institutions. 
3.3 The draft law provides that the NBB, in the app lication of its macro-prudential powers, is to take 
into account the recommendations of the ESRB and the views of the Commission and the ECB, in 
particular when the ECB applies stricter requireme nts for capital buffers or other measures aimed at 
addressing systemic risk10. In this respect, the ECB recommends that the draft law is further aligned 
with the procedures set out in relevant Union law a nd in particular those of Article 5 of Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/201311. 
3.4 This opinion is without prejudice to the conc lusions of the ESRB’s fo llow-up assessment, which 
will be prepared pursuant to Article 17 of Re gulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council12. 
 This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.   Done at Frankfurt am Main, 13 February 2014.  
[signed] 
 
The President of the ECB 
Mario DRAGHI 
 
                                                 
10  Article 11 of the draft law, which introduces a new Article 36/34, § 3 in the Organic Law of the NBB. 
11  See in this respect, Rec ital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which sp ecifically provides that national competent 
authorities or national designated author ities and the ECB shall act in respect of  any coordination procedure provided for 
in such acts after having followed the proce dures provided for in that same regulation. 
12  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union 
macro-prudential oversight of the fina ncial system and establishing a Europe an Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 
15.12.2010, p. 1).