TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up of recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2012

1........... SUMMARY................................................................................................................. 3

1.1........ Diverse approaches to fraud......................................................................................... 3

1.2........ Adoption of common rules on fraud............................................................................ 4

1.3........ The most significant risks are confirmed...................................................................... 5

1.4........ Anti-fraud bodies and law enforcement agencies remain the most effective in detecting fraudulent irregularities….............................................................................................................. 8

2........... Replies of member states............................................................................................ 12

2.1........ Diverse approaches to fraud....................................................................................... 12

2.2........ Adoption of common rules on fraud.......................................................................... 25

2.3........ The most significant risks are confirmed – public procurement................................. 82

2.4........ The most significant risks are confirmed – cohesion policy..................................... 102

2.5........ The most significant risks are confirmed – ERDF / ESF.......................................... 108

2.6........ The most significant risks are confirmed - agriculture.............................................. 123

2.7........ Anti-fraud bodies and law enforcement agencies remain the most effective in detecting fraudulent irregularities….......................................................................................................... 142

2.8........ Anti-fraud services and administrative bodies – fraud detection............................ 168

2.9........ Anti-fraud services and administrative bodies – fraud prevention.......................... 195

1. SUMMARY

In the 2012 Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests, the Commission made certain recommendations to the Member States. The Commission has followed up the implementation of these recommendations by the Member States as part of the 2013 reporting exercise and to report to the European Parliament and to the Council.

1.1. Diverse approaches to fraud

The information provided by Member States is a key contribution to the Commission's endeavour of ensuring the best possible protection of the European Union's financial interests. The constant exchange of information between the Commission and Member States enables the former to both draw on and expand the latters capacities, expertise and experience as a means to achieve maximum harmonisation, consistency and, as a result, maximum effectiveness in the Union's fight against fraud.

As the 2012 Report showed, the approaches of Member States remain very diverse, with a group of six countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania[1]) leading in terms of fraud detection capability in the expenditure area and five countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain[2]) leading the way in relation to the revenue (traditional own resources) side.

Results for the remaining Member States are more homogeneous in the area of revenue than in the area of expenditure, where significant beneficiaries of EU resources, such as Greece, France and Spain, show a very limited capacity to detect fraud.

Member States approach and address the detection of fraud in different ways. The explanations for these divergent approaches lie mainly in legal and organisational differences, which vary not only between Member States but also between administrations in the same country.

Recommendation 1

The identification of national coordination services for the fight against fraud would increase the consistency in approach between and within Member States.

Member States are invited, where not already done, to quickly designate or establish their Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS).

In response to the request to promptly establish an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS), the results demonstrate the recommended action was largely implemented. However, certain states are still setting up an AFCOS, debating where in their public administration to locate it, or have not taken steps to set up an AFCOS. Spain, Greece, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom are currently establishing AFCOS. Ireland outlined its intention to comply by the inaugural AFCOS meeting but has yet to identify where within its public administration to place AFCOS. Denmark has yet to make a final decision on establishment but this is under active consideration.

Germany intends to continue the national coordination of OLAF matters via the Federal Ministry of Finance, Unit EA6 and believes that the structure of a coordination service, as outlined in the OLAF guidelines, is incompatible with the separation of powers that exists between the German Federal Government and Länder administrations.

Belgium has designated its AFCOS but would like more information on what its AFCOS is expected to do.

1.2. Adoption of common rules on fraud

Currently, sanction levels for fraud are so low in some Member States that they cannot be said to have any deterrent effect at all. Many cases of fraud affecting the Union's financial interests go unpunished because the time that is allowed by law to investigate and prosecute fraud has lapsed.

The proposal for a Directive on the protection of the EU financial interests by means of criminal law addresses these problems by providing for a minimum statute of limitation. Serious cases of fraud should be punished with a minimum penalty of at least six months and a maximum penalty of at least five years.

Recommendation: 2

Member States should ensure that sanctions for fraud have a deterrent effect and investigations and prosecutions can be pursued for a sufficient period of time. Member States should quickly adopt and implement the Directive on the protection of the EU financial interests by means of criminal law.

Almost half of Member States[3] reported that they already have in place minimum penalty of at least six months of imprisonment in cases of serious fraud. In general, they highlighted that fraud against the EU budget is equated with that at domestic level and the crime is subject to the equivalent punishment.

The Czech Republic outlined its intention to increase criminal penalty for fraud involving amounts exceeding CZK 5 million to 10 years imprisonment. The duration under which prosecutions can occur in the Czech Republic has already been prolonged. In 2012, the crime of budgetary fraud was codified in Hungary. Further clarifications to the definition of its 2012 law were made in July 2013. Efforts to accelerate the pace of legal proceedings, with the aim of having these completed within a two year timeframe, have been initiated. Hungary only extends the two month window to investigate a case of fraud in exceptional circumstances. The concept of statute of limitations does not exist in Cypriot law but this should not be a barrier to the initiation of proceedings against perpetrators of fraud. In Malta, the prescribed period in which a prosecution can occur does not begin to elapse until the originator of the fraud is identified.

France reiterated its objections in principle to the introduction of minimum penalties. Its support for the provision is in relation to the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). France believes its three year window from the date of the offense to be a sufficient period of limitation.

1.3. The most significant risks are confirmed

As in previous years, one of the main problems identified by the authorities in relation to fraudulent irregularities detected is the infringement of public procurement rules. Corruption has also been identified in a limited number of cases linked to this type of violation.

Recommendation 3

The package on the reform of public procurement directives should be approved by the legislator and rapidly implemented by Member States in order to react to the heightened risk identified in this area.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden outlined their commitment to implementating the package of reforms to Public Procurement Directives, as soon it is adopted, and indicated that transposition of the Directives is advancing. Public procurement measures have not been implemented in Finland and no progress was reported in 2013.

Malta reported that it undertook policy development but has not yet been enacted measures. Ireland identified the transposition of these rules as a priority but implementation has not yet occurred and no measures were taken in 2013. Sweden's objective is to transpose the directive by Spring 2016. In 2013, Spain established a Directorate-General for Streamlining and Centralising Public Procurement, which includes a Centralised Procurement Board, a body which will be procurement body for the state centralised procurement system. Spain also enacted laws promoting the use of electronic billing in the public sector and the creation of a register of invoices.

In Lithuania, following a 2013 ammendment, contracting entities are now obliged to publish procurement contracts, the winning tender and any later amendments to the procurement contract in the information system. The value of electronic procurement in Lithuania in 2013 was 90% of the overall value of published procurements. As of January 2014, contracting authorities must acquire goods and services via the central contracting authority.

Slovenia stated that it ammended its Public Procurement Act to reduce the risk of corruption and fraud. Some delays were reported in enacting changes at the level of contracting authorities but Slovenia envisages that 2013 will have seen a reduction in the number of negotiated procedures without prior publication of contract notices, thereby reducing the risks associated with this practice.

Romania compiled a guide to the main risks in public procurement to be used by managing authorities and intermediate bodies. Mechanisms to detect ex ante and ex post conflicts of interest were enacted by Romania to address the shortcomings of management and control systems.

In line with previous years’ analysis, cohesion policy (in particular operational programmes linked to the convergence objective) remains the area where the greatest number of fraudulent irregularities has been detected.

Recommendation 4

In view of the low reporting of fraudulent irregularities as regards some Member States in the area of Cohesion Policy, the Commission recommends in particular to Greece, France and Spain to strengthen their efforts to detect fraud.

Three Member States were specifically referenced for low reporting of fraudulent irregularities in Cohesion Policy.

Greece drew attention to updates undertaken to its internal procedures resulting in substantial progress in this area as a result, significant progress has been observed.

Spain is currently examining the implementation of a more integrated approach to combatting fraud for the 2014-20 programming period, with a particular focus on risk analysis mechanisms. In reference to the 2007-2013 period, Spain outlined that it has an annual monitoring plan to verify the quality of management and control systems adopted by intermediate bodies operating projects involving ERDF and the Cohesion Fund. The quality control plan is drafted annually by the relevant actors, incorporating concerns raised by various intermediate bodies and/or the Commission, the Audit Authority or Court of Auditors.

France replied that ineligible expenses are usually incurred due to a lack of awareness of procedures or incorrect application of legislation. This usually does not involve fraudulent intent and therefore France believes there is no need to report to OLAF. In France, irregularities are classified as fraud when the act in question is deemed to be a criminal offence. France stressed that Commission and Court of Auditors’ checks did not make any finding of suspicion of fraud where expenses were deemed ineligible.

With further regard to the cohesion policy, considering the period 2008-2012, until 2010 the number of fraudulent irregularities detected was higher in relation to the ESF than in relation to the ERDF. Since 2011 it has been the other way around. Looking at the financial impact of these cases, the priority areas most affected are those where the greatest investments are made: transport, environment and investments in social infrastructure.

Recommendation 5

Competent authorities should take the results of the analysis included in the report and its accompanying staff working documents into account when planning their checks and controls.

Most Member States[4] stated they take account of analysis included in the report and the accompanying staff working documents (SWD) when planning checks and controls in Cohesion Policy.

Cyprus was the only Member State to report that its audit authorities have no formal procedures for taking the SWDs and accompanying documentation into account but outlined its intention for changes in this regard, within the framework of the Anti-fraud Strategy under development. Slovakia considers this recommendation as unreflective of risk areas in need of targeting by the Audit Authority in the Slovak Republic, Italy, Latvia, and Romania outlined changes made as a result of the report’s SWDs.

Estonia reported that its Managing Authority for Cohesion Policy plans to include some of the risks highlighted by the PIF Report in its control plan. The trends and indications of new fraud patterns are analysed and incorporated into the annual training plan, legislative amendments and risk management systems.

The rate of fraud detection in relation to rural development remains fairly stable compared to 2011, but lower than that for similar instruments implemented in the previous programming period (under structural funds and pre-accession assistance). Authorities’ attention seems still to be focused on the European Agriculture Guarantee Fund (EAGF).

Recommendation 6

Member States should step up their efforts on rural development investment projects in relation to the elements of risk highlighted by similar findings in the previous programming period.

In response to the request to step up efforts in relation to risks highlighted in rural development investment projects, Sweden reported major progress in 2013 to systems and payments, after ‘serious or very serious shortcomings’ were identified following a 2012 review of procedures. Improvements to the identified shortcomings, which included a lack of documentation and incomplete proof of payments, is ongoing. Spain reported advances in a number of fields including selection criteria, cost evaluations, applicant eligibility and risk criteria for on-the-spot checks, following recommendations of the Commission and Court of Auditors.

Slovenia conveyed the results of a 2013 report on infringements that found significant weaknesses in areas including public procurement documentation and beneficiaries claiming payments for work or services that were not approved. Slovenia prepared seminars aimed at improving procedural processes occurred in 2013 and are planned for 2014.

Germany reported the implementing of special action plans in the EAFRD since early 2013. The Netherlands reported progress in 2013 in tightening up the implementation of administrative checks and the area of monitoring, following a 2011 recommendation in the certifying audit report. Estonia undertook additional control activities of EAGF and EAFRD measures with the goal of uncovering fraud networks and detecting fraud patterns. Belgium’s reply stated that there are no rural development programmes in the Brussels Capital Region but reports that a number of ‘urban farms’ and sustainable food projects will receive funding in the 2014-2020 programming period.

1.4. Anti-fraud bodies and law enforcement agencies remain the most effective in detecting fraudulent irregularities…

On the revenue side, customs controls proved important for the detection of fraud cases at the time of clearance of goods.

Recommendation 7

When developing customs control strategies, in parallel with the their post-clearance customs control activities, Member States should ensure that they have effective systems of risk assessment in place allowing them also to carry out checks targeted at high-risk imports at the time of clearance.

In relation to revenue and customs control for high risk imports, almost all States believe themselves to have adequate risk analysis systems and no changes have occurred changes since 2012. Sweden is currently undertaking enhancements to its IT capability and aims to comply with the Union Customs Code. Spain uses a computerised system in processing all types of customs declarations and this system is being gradually improved. Romania believes its 2010 Risk Management Framework (RMF) application can be used for EU/national customs risk profiles for potential financial risks.

Bulgaria will employ a risk information exchange system with the ability to gather, store and exchange information for the purposes of risk analysis, to facilitate control activities and document the results of controls already undertaken. France comprehensively outlined a revamped audit policy. Germany believes it has undertaken risk management measures that far exceed EU requirements. Ireland implemented a new Customs Risk Intervention Selection Programme (CRISP) in 2013, aimed at targeting non-compliant imports for post-clearance intervention. Greece began operating a new Integrated Customs Information System (Icisnet) which permits the use of tools and data that enables detections, in the area of exports, of dangerous goods or customs offences. Spain’s computerised risk analysis system is constantly updated with necessary improvements, within the parameters of the powers of its customs and excise authorities.

Hungary reported no changes to its integrated risk management system since 2012 but it developed an integrated risk assessment and network visualisation accounting instrument in 2013, in order to identify company relationships and tax risks. This enables the viewing of customs risk assessments and audits.

On the expenditure side, the successful detection of fraud (in particular, where there is a high financial impact) remains to a significant extent the result of investigations run by anti-fraud bodies or law enforcement agencies; their positive impact is particularly evident in Member States that have tried to structure cooperation between the administrations primarily responsible for the management and control of EU funds and law enforcement bodies.

... but the role of managing and audit authorities is increasing …

Detection of fraud by administrative bodies in Member States is improving, especially as regards less complex cases. Some Member States reported introducing checks and controls based on risk analysis and the use of IT tools to enhance fraud detection. Targeting checks and controls with a specific focus on fraud is particularly important in relation to the costs connected with this type of check, in order to maximise effectiveness.

Recommendation 8

The Commission recommends that all Member States adopt and develop checks and controls, in particular, structuring and improving cooperation between managing authorities and anti-fraud bodies as well as improving risk analyses and IT tools.

A structured cooperative relationship between Managing Authorities and relevant anti-fraud bodies is in place for the most part. An outline of the cooperative arrangements and the role played by MAs was provided by many Member States[5]. Cyprus, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia[6] responded that cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis. Finland’s Audit Authority, Managing Authority and Paying Agency cooperate on the basis of an action plan drafted for 2014.

With regard to specific IT tools for analysing the risk of fraud, Belgium’s ESF Flanders reported its intention to use ARACHNE in the forthcoming programming period. Denmark highlighted that the use of ARACHNE is under consideration in the area of Structural Funds and it will endeavour to utilise IT tools in Agriculture[7].

Estonia is at the ‘pre-preparation phase’ of compiling a common strategy between relevant partners[8] on protecting the EU financial interest. Estonia does not have in place IT risk assessment tools but plans to develop a new system for implementing measures in the EAGF and EAFRD. Representatives of AFCOS Malta are receiving training in the use of ARACHNE to identify operations most at risk and this will be used in conjunction with existing IT tools. Slovakia is engaging in efforts to ensure its systems of collecting and evaluating data is compatible with ARACHNE for the 2014-2020 programming period. Cyprus is reviewing the ARACHNE tool and foresees the development of IT tools for the 2014-2020 programming period.

In relation to Cohesion, Ireland outlined its intention to develop checks and controls, aimed at improving the cooperation between Managing Authorities and anti-fraud bodies. The Memorandum of Understanding with Ireland’s Paying Agency for agriculture was revised in the past year to assist in the quicker reporting of potentially fraudulent activity.

Germany rejects requirements outlined in the guidelines (or regulations and delegated legislation subject to implementation), such as ARACHNE, that go beyond the legal requirements of Regulation 1303/2013.

Luxembourg questioned the rationale for formalised exchanges with regards this recommendation on the basis that there is an ESF central database with project financial information, including audits and checks carried out.

… in particular in connection with fraud prevention.

In this period of budgetary constraints, the importance of fraud prevention measures should not be underestimated and the role of managing authorities, agencies and bodies should be strengthened by specific provisions in regulatory proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20.

Recommendation 9

The Commission recommends that the legislator adopt the MFF provisions on fraud prevention in their current formulation and that they be quickly and correctly implemented at national level.

Preparations are advancing or underway in most Member States[9] for the implementation of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. Finland noted that the Regulations covering Structural and Investment Funds were only adopted in late December 2013.

Malta underscored its awareness of the need to introduce effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, in addition to its existing measures. Sweden identified internal outstanding issues its Government Offices must resolve before implementation. Hungary does not have an anti-fraud strategy outlined in a single document but ‘anti-fraud instruments’ are used to protect the financial interests of the European Union. Croatia adopted a National Anti-Fraud Strategy in the field of the Protection of EU Financial Interests for the period 2014-2016.

Lithuania stated that appropriate anti-fraud measures for the 2014-2020 programming period will be adopted when creating the relevant management and control systems. A survey among Managing Authorities is currently being conducted to assess what measures are needed to improve the management and control system for EU Structural Funds.

Luxembourg stated that as the ESF Managing Authority carries out checks in 100% of cases, fraud will be detected at the first level; therefore it believes the Commission is not at risk of any fraud. Germany is unable to provide information in relation to MFF as it awaits the Commission’s approval process for its partnership agreement, a condition for the granting of Structural Funds for the 2014-2020 funding period.

2. Replies of member states

2.1. Diverse approaches to fraud

Diverse approaches to fraud

The information provided by Member States is a key contribution to the Commission's endeavour of ensuring the best possible protection of the European Union's financial interests. The constant exchange of information between the Commission and Member States enables the former to both draw on and expand the latters capacities, expertise and experience as a means to achieve maximum harmonisation, consistency and, as a result, maximum effectiveness in the Union's fight against fraud.

As the 2012 Report showed, the approaches of Member States remain very diverse, with a group of six countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania[10]) leading in terms of fraud detection capability in the expenditure area and five countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain[11]) leading the way in relation to the revenue (traditional own resources) side.

Results for the remaining Member States are more homogeneous in the area of revenue than in the area of expenditure, where significant beneficiaries of EU resources, such as Greece, France and Spain, show a very limited capacity to detect fraud.

Member States approach and address the detection of fraud in different ways. The explanations for these divergent approaches lie mainly in legal and organisational differences, which vary not only between Member States but also between administrations in the same country.

Recommendation 1

The identification of national coordination services for the fight against fraud would increase the consistency in approach between and within Member States.

Member States are invited, where not already done, to quickly designate or establish their Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS).

BE || As stated in the letter of 18 December 2013 sent by the Permanent Representation to Mr Giovanni Kessler, Director-General of OLAF, Belgium has designated an AFCOS (Anti-fraud Coordination Service) as required by Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of 11 September 2013. It is the CICF (Commission interdépartementale pour la Coordination de la Lutte contre les Fraudes dans les secteurs économiques - Interdepartmental Committee for the Coordination of the Fight against Fraud in Economic Sectors), a member of the Inter-ministerial Economic Commission. It is based in the FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy, Directorate-General for Economic Inspection, Directorate A, Product Quality and Safety Control, North Gate III, 3rd floor, Boulevard du Roi Albert II, 16, 1000 Brussels (Tel.: 02 277 74 82; Fax: 02 277 54 51 and e-mail: cei.iec@economie.fgov.be). (Please note: following the Royal Decree of 29 January 2014 amending the Royal Decree of 20 November 2003 setting out the names and powers of the Directorates General of the FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy Directorate-General for SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy, the names of the Directorate-General and of Directorate A are not the same as those communicated to Mr Kessler in the letter of 18 December 2003). The AFCOS will be represented by the Director-General, Chair of the CICF (up to 28 February 2014, this was Mr De Maeseneer). We will communicate the name of the new Director-General to you as soon as he/she is appointed. The Belgian authorities have decided that 'pursuant to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office, Belgium has designated the CICF for all contacts of a residual nature, which means that cooperation with the contact points of the authorities already designated at the national level by Belgium or in the framework of the implementation of European legislation continues to apply. Should the Commission wish to amend AFCOS's tasks in the future, Belgium reserves the right to change its designation of the CIFC as the AFCOS'. Furthermore, it will be necessary to get more details as to what exactly the Commission expects the AFCOS to do, and this will, in any case, need to be agreed bilaterally, particularly as regards the operational side. The replies to the questions relating to Part II of the 2013 Article 325 questionnaire will also provide further information on the implementation of the AFCOS in Belgium.

BG || The Bulgarian Directorate for the Coordination of the Fight against Infringements Affecting the Financial Interests of the European Union (AFCOS) is a specialised structure of the Ministry of the Interior set up to coordinate the fight against infringements through operational cooperation, reporting of irregularities and administrative checks. To this end, AFCOS: 1. assists the minister of the interior and the Council for the Coordination of the Fight against Infringements Affecting the Financial Interests of the European Union in coordinating activities to combat such infringements; 2. acts as the national point of contact with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the relevant agencies responsible for protecting the financial interests of the EU in Member States and elsewhere; 3. is responsible at national level for reporting irregularities and fraud involving funds, instruments and programmes co-financed by the EU to the European Commission and for issuing methodological guidelines on administering irregularities; 4. conducts administrative checks to ensure that the structures which administer EU funds, programmes and instruments comply with the administrative procedures for irregularities; 5. coordinates and collaborates operationally with OLAF in investigations and on-the-spot checks it carries out in Bulgaria; 6. receives reports of irregularities affecting the European Union’s financial interests which it then evaluates, analyses and verifies; 7. conducts administrative checks to identify irregularities and fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union on its own initiative as well as at OLAF’s request; 8. develops and organises training activities on the protection of the financial interests of the EU; 9. cooperates with government authorities and structures and coordinates the fight against irregularities and fraud involving EU funds; 10. provides the organisation required for preparing the Bulgarian annual report to the European Commission under Article 325 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); 11. carries out other functions and tasks as required under primary and secondary legislation.

CZ || No Response.

DK || The final decision on establishing the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service has not yet been taken, but thought is being given to how best to organise this. The decision is expected to be taken within the next few months.

DE || The entry into force of the new OLAF Regulation imposes an obligation on the Member States to establish a coordination service under Article 3(4). Article 3(4) of Regulation 883/2013 states: ‘Member States shall, for the purposes of this Regulation, designate a service (‘the anti-fraud coordination service’) to facilitate effective cooperation and exchange of information, including information of an operational nature, with the Office. Where appropriate, in accordance with national law, the anti-fraud coordination service may be regarded as a competent authority for the purposes of this Regulation.’ National coordination of OLAF matters will continue to be administered by the Federal Ministry of Finance, Unit E A 6. A cooperation agreement was already in place between the German Government and OLAF before the new OLAF Regulation came into force and this is to be continued as before. The German Government has already confirmed this to OLAF in its letter dated 13 January 2014. However, according to OLAF the most important functions and competencies for an anti-fraud coordination service are in the OLAF Guidelines. Whereas Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) No 883/2013 and the 2008 cooperation agreement are the result of an exchange of views and a lengthy negotiation process, the OLAF Guidelines reflects a one‑sided perception of the functions of a coordination service which is detached from the division of powers between the German Government and the Länder which exists in Germany. It is difficult to reconcile the authority of an ‘AFCOS’ under the OLAF Guidelines with the division of powers in Germany’s federal structure. Under Article 30 of the German Constitution (GG) administration is fundamentally a matter for the Länder. This is particularly true where the administration affects individual rights or security. Consequently the present coordination service can fulfil its functions under Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) No 883/2013 only on the basis of cooperation taking account of the division of powers and the responsibilities arising out of this. In our opinion it would have been more constructive to include all the relevant parties in the run-up to the negotiations on the OLAF Regulation to show the need to define specific functions for the coordination service and to explore the possibilities where necessary. The German Government is of the view that Article 3(4) Regulation (EU) No 883/2013 does not fully authorise the functions set out in the Guidelines.

EE || The administrative co-operation arrangement between OLAF and AFCOS Estonia was concluded on 2 October 2003. AFCOS Estonia is within the Financial Control Department of the Ministry of Finance of Estonia. General areas of responsibilities of AFCOS Estonia: 1. Inter-institutional cooperation with OLAF, with national implementing administrations, investigation, prosecution and other connected authorities as partners. AFCOS liaises between partners and OLAF in cases of suspected fraud and/or irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests. 2. Preventive activities such as taking the lead in formulating and co-ordinating the writing and implementation of a national strategy for the protection of EU’s financial interests and training responsibilities. 3. Co-ordinating the use of the Irregularity Management System (IMS) – the roles of the Liaison Officers. The reporting of detected irregularities, suspected and established fraud is the duty of the Managing Authority (Ministry of Finance of Estonia) since 1 January 2014.

IE || As required by Article 3(4) of the new OLAF regulation (883/2013), Ireland will establish an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS). At present, internal deliberations are ongoing as to where the AFCOS will be placed within the Irish administration. It is fully intended that the AFCOS will be established in time for the inaugural AFCOS meeting in October.

EL || Ministry of Finance –State General Accounting Office - Directorate 41 – Financial Relations with THE EU & INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS In the context of the High Level Meeting + Training under the title ‘THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD IN THE AREA OF EU COHESION POLICY FUNDS – THE CHALLENGES AHEAD’, organised by OLAF in cooperation with the Ministries of Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport and Networks and Finance, held in Athens on 26 & 27 February, shortly before the submission hereof, with the broad participation of bodies and authorities, OLAF was fully updated at a high level on the priorities and planned action in the fight against fraud in Greece. In the context of this event, the Deputy Minister for Finance Mr Chr. Staikouras announced, inter alia, the establishment of a very broad working group comprising officials of the Greek administration and judicial functionaries from interrelated services, auditing bodies and independent authorities, which is expected to meet shortly, in the next few days, and with an intensive schedule, the subject of which will be proposing to the political leadership the most appropriate organisational structure for the establishment of AFCOS, in accordance with regulatory requirements, the relevant OLAF instructions and real current needs. The goal is to complete the relevant legislative process and begin AFCOS operations before the summer of 2014.

ES || AFCOS is currently being set up.

FR || The Délégation nationale à la lutte contre la fraude (National Delegation for the fight against fraud - 'DNLF') was set up in 2008 for the purpose of coordinating and promoting the implementation of measures intended to better fight fraud against public finances. By decision of the Minister for Finance in May 2013, the DNLF was made national correspondent for OLAF, it is thus in charge of providing anti-fraud coordination in order to improve protection of the EU's financial interests.

HR || The Republic of Croatia State has an ACFOS in place; therefore the obligation laid down in Regulation 883/ 2013 has been fulfilled. I. AFCOS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AFCOS in the Republic of Croatia is established and functions as a system. The AFCOS system is comprised of 3 main pillars: Network of accredited bodies managing and using EU funds (Irregularity Reporting System); Network of bodies dealing with combating fraud, corruption or some other form of illegal activities (AFCOS network); Ministry of Finance - Service for Combating Irregularities and Fraud (SCIF), carries out a coordinative role within the system and represents the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) contact point. IRREGULARITY REPORTING SYSTEM The Irregularity Reporting System has continuously developed since 2005, when state administration bodies were preparing for accreditation by the European Commission concerning the use of EU assistance funds. The main function of this system is reporting on irregularities. Bodies constituting the Irregularity Reporting System are obliged to provide quarterly reports on irregularities which occurred in their bodies, throughout the use of EU pre-accession funds (CARDS, PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD and IPA). Reporting is performed by Irregularity Officers who are appointed in each of the bodies managing and using EU pre-accession funds. From 1 July 2014 bodies within the Irregularity Reporting System will be obliged to report quarterly on irregularities which occurred within programmes of EU structural instruments and of European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, according to valid regulations of the Republic of Croatia and the EU. Procedures for prevention, detection, reporting and follow up of established irregularities, in the context of EU funds, constitute part of the internal manuals of procedures of all bodies within the Irregularity Reporting System. Following the submitted irregularity reports, the Service for Combating Irregularities and Fraud (SCIF), as a 3rd pillar of the AFCOS system, checks the quality of those reports before being forwarded to OLAF. Reports on irregularities are submitted to OLAF via the Irregularities Management System – IMS by SCIF. AFCOS NETWORK The AFCOS Network was established by Government Decision (OG 151/2013). This Decision defines bodies of the AFCOS Network and their tasks within the AFCOS Network, as well as the purpose of the AFCOS Network. The AFCOS Network was established in order to achieve full operability of the AFCOS system. The main role of the AFCOS Network is to provide advice and recommendations to all the bodies within the AFCOS system. The AFCOS Network comprises representatives of: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance – Tax Administration, Customs Administration, Sector for Harmonisation of Internal Audit and Financial Control, Anti-Money Laundering Office, Sector for Financial and Budget Supervision, Ministry of Economy – Directorate for Public Procurement System, State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia, and Agency for the Audit of European Union Programmes Implementation System. The main tasks of the AFCOS Network include: cooperation with the Service for Combating Irregularities and Fraud and OLAF regarding issues surrounding the protection of financial interests of the European Union; proposing legislative and other measures with the purpose of efficient protection of the financial interests of the European Union, and strengthening inter-institutional cooperation; communication and exchange of data with the bodies of the AFCOS system. SERVICE FOR COMBATING IRREGULARITIES AND FRAUD The Service for Combating Irregularities and Fraud (SCIF) is established within the Ministry of Finance for which the legal basis is contained in the Government Decree on internal organisation of the Ministry of Finance (OG 32/12, 67/12, 124/12, 78/13). The Decree on internal organisation sets out the organisational framework, as well as tasks and responsibilities of SCIF. The document describing the position/role of SCIF, as regards the AFCOS system, is the Government Regulation on the institutional framework of the system of combating irregularities and fraud (OG 144/13). Namely, Article 5 of the Regulation explicitly states that the Ministry of Finance, as a body competent for the protection of financial interests of the European Union in the Republic of Croatia, is responsible for the establishment and efficient functioning of the system for combating irregularities and fraud. Furthermore, an organisational unit for combating irregularities and fraud (SCIF) within the Ministry of Finance has a coordination role between the bodies of the Irregularity Reporting System and the bodies of the AFCOS Network. It is a main contact point for OLAF in the Republic of Croatia and ensures inspections are performed by OLAF in the Republic of Croatia. SCIF also receives checks and consolidates the reports on irregularities for the purpose of submitting them to OLAF. SCIF shall independently produce Irregularities Management Guidelines, approved by the Minister of Finance, which are binding for all bodies of the Irregularity Reporting System and internal procedures for the implementation of the competences. Together with competent bodies, SCIF shall participate in the production of rules linked with the irregularities management field. At present, SCIF is made up of 3 departments (Department for Data Collection and Analysis, and Irregularities Reporting, Department for Monitoring Notified Irregularities Procedures and Co-ordination with competent bodies, Department for Training and Risk Management) and has 6 employees. II. NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS National rules setting the obligation to protect EU financial interests, i.e. to have in place an AFCOS include: Budget Act (OG 87/2008, 136/2012) - Article 114a obliges the Republic of Croatia to set up a system for combating irregularities and fraud in order to protect the EU financial interests. Regulation on the institutional framework of the system of combating irregularities and fraud (OG 144/2013) - lays down rules for the functioning of the AFCOS system. Decision on the establishment of the AFCOS Network (OG 151/2013) - lays down rules on the functioning and role of the AFCOS Network in the AFCOS system. The AFCOS Network was established in order to achieve full operability of the AFCOS system. Strategic documents setting goals and measures in order to enhance the protection of financial interests of the EU in the Republic of Croatia include: The National Anti-Fraud Strategy for the Protection of the European Union’s Financial Interest for the period 2010 – 2012 and its Action plan: the purpose of which is to ensure the effective protection of EU financial interests by strengthening the AFCOS system in the Republic of Croatia, through the implementation of previously defined measures and the accomplishment of set objectives. The National Anti-Fraud Strategy in the Field of Protection of EU Financial Interests for the period 2014-2016 and its Action plan, presents a follow-up document to the National Anti-Fraud Strategy for the Protection of the European Union’s Financial Interest for the period 2010 – 2012. It sets goals and measures to be achieved in the framework of Structural instruments.

IT || The AFCOS in Italy (called COLAF - Comitato per la lotta contro le frodi nei confronti dell’Unione europea [Committee for combating fraud against the European Union]) was established by Article 76 of Law No 142 of 19 February 1992, and subsequently confirmed by Law No 234 of 24 December 2012. Article 3 of Presidential Decree of 14 May 2007 sets out its functions and composition. It has advisory and directive functions for the coordination of all action to combat fraud and other irregularities in the fields of taxation, the common agricultural policy and the structural funds. It is headed by the competent policy authority and includes top-level representatives of all the administrations concerned (Prime Minister's Office; Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Economic Affairs and Finance, Economic Development, Agricultural Policies, Infrastructure and Transport, Employment, Education; Guardia di Finanza; Carabinieri; Customs and Revenue Agencies; AGEA [Agricultural Payments Agency]; Conference of the Regions, Union of Italian Provinces and Italian National Association of Municipalities).

CY || Cyprus has designated an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) in 2002. Currently the main tasks and responsibilities are the coordination between the various national authorities and the reporting of detected fraudulent activities to OLAF. However, there is the intension to strengthen the role of AFCOS on the basis of the COCOLAF Guidance Note.

LV || The Latvian system for the protection of the financial interests of the EU is based on two entities: the Coordination Council for the Protection of the European Union's financial interests (AFCOS network), chaired by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, and the contact point for OLAF - AFCOS (established in the Ministry of Finance EU funds Audit department). AFCOS is primarily designed for the exchange of information between OLAF and national institutions and for ensuring co-operation with OLAF and the Republic of Latvia, as required by Article 325 of the TFEU. AFCOS evaluates information requests received from OLAF, coordinates preparation of replies and sends replies these to OLAF (Article 325 Questionnaire 2013, Follow-up Questionnaire, competent authority for OLAF investigations/on-the-spot checks, meetings organised by OLAF etc). The Council includes high level officials from: - State Police's Economic Crimes Department; - Customs Criminal Board of State Revenue Service; - State Revenue Service (int.al. Finance Police Board, National Tax Board); - Office of the Prosecutor General; - Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau; - The Managing Authority for EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund; - Ministry of Agriculture; - Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development; - Ministry of Justice Permanent experts from: - State Treasury; - Rural Support Service; - Central Finance and Contracting Agency - Procurement Monitoring Bureau The main task of the Council is to promote the implementation and development of a single State policy for the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. AFCOS organises Council meetings at least biannually. The Council has the right to initiate amendments to legislative acts, but each institution is responsible for the development and implementation of a policy in its respective field of competence. Members of the Council representing investigation offices (State Police, State Revenue Service, Office of the Prosecutor General and Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau) have an investigative role and functions outside AFCOS, and cooperation occurs on a case by case level within the institutions involved. Usually OLAF communicates directly with investigation bodies regarding investigation issues, and, if necessary, AFCOS puts OLAF in contact with the relevant national authority that can provide necessary cooperation in the case of an investigation. Managing Authorities ensures the application of the Union’s sectoral legislation on the reporting irregularities, suspected fraud and fraud by sending regular reports via IMS to OLAF/EC for the programming periods 2004-2006 and 2007-2013. AFCOS evaluates summaries on unduly paid expenditure within European Union funds, submitted by the Managing Authorities and National Authorising Officers, and reports irregularities to the Cabinet of Ministers once a year together with the draft protocol of the Cabinet of Ministers, if necessary, to give specific tasks to certain authorities for further actions. AFCOS has taken the initiative in formulating a national anti-fraud strategy, aimed at reinforcing the protection of EU’s financial interests.

LT || No Response.

LU || Luxembourg has not yet established this service. Preliminary discussions have taken place on the subject but further work is needed.

HU || No Response.

MT || Not Applicable to Malta.

NL || In the Netherlands, the Customs Information Centre (Douane Informatie Centrum - DIC) has been designated by law as the AFCOS, and as such the central Dutch contact body for OLAF. It is responsible for all operational action based on Regulation No 515/97 (cooperation between the authority and the Commission) and, since October 2012, also for action based on Regulation No 2185/96 (checks and inspections carried out by the Commission). The DIC is the operational unit; all judicial, legal and policy matters are dealt with by the National Customs Office (Douane Landelijk Kantoor).

AT || The unit covering the coordination work of AFCOS is set up at Bundesministerium für Finanzen, Abteilung für Betrugsbekämpfung, Steuer und Zoll, and was established on 1.1.1995. As the other points (2-9) either refer to specific other MS or do not specifically mention Austria, please do not expect any further comment on this document.

PL || Poland has had an operating AFCOS since 2002: the Department for Protection of EU Financial Interests of the Ministry of Finance. Information on this was sent to OLAF's Director-General on 27 January 2014, ref. DO8/9013/2/AKQ/14/7763.

PT || The Inspectorate-General of Finances (IGF) was designated as the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) by Order No 07/14/MEF of 10 January 2014 of the Minister for Finance. The IGF acts as the national interlocutor for the European Commission in the fields of financial control and the protection of the financial interests of the EU under Article 11(2)(d) of Decree-Law No 117 of 15 December 2011 and Article 2(2)(d) of Decree-Law No 96 of 23 April 2012, respectively an Organic Law of the Ministry of Finance and Organic Law of the IGF. The IGF is a central service directly administered by the Government in the form of the Ministry of Finance. Its mission is to provide strategic control of the management of public finances. Its activities include legality checks and financial and performance audits, as well as evaluation of services and bodies, activities and programmes. It also provides specialised technical support to all public sector bodies, including local authorities and equivalent entities, other local government and business organisations, as well as bodies in the private and cooperative sectors – in the latter instance where there is a financial or tax relationship with the State or the European Union, or when there is a need to exercise indirect control over entities covered by its activities. It should be pointed out that IGF inspectors enjoy full technical autonomy in their actions. Their positions must be technically rigorous to guarantee that their work is free and independent. Moreover, in addition to the legislative rules governing inspection and audit activity, IGF inspectors are also subject to a strict Code of Ethics embodying rules and principles of behaviour with a specific requirement that in the performance of their duties they respect the principles of legality, integrity, independence, impartiality, conferred power, cooperation, good faith, proportionality and confidentiality.

RO || Not applicable to Romania.

Sl || An AFCOS was established in Slovenia in 2002 and is actively operating.

SK || No Response.

FI || Finland's reply to OLAF's follow-up questionnaire is provided by the Financial Controller's function of the Ministry of Finance. According to the State Budget Act, the Financial Controller's function of the Ministry of Finance coordinates the internal and administrative control of European Union funds for which the Finnish State is responsible and draws up opinions and the report relating to the supervision and audit of Union funds, errors in management of these funds and irregularities involving them for European Union institutions and other bodies, unless these tasks fall to some other authority.

SE || Since late 2013, the Government Offices of Sweden has been working to investigate the prerequisites for creating a coordination service pursuant to Article 3(4) of the OLAF Regulation (883/2013). The next step is to locate the service in an appropriate authority, and draft proposals for any national statutory amendments. A statutory amendment requires a decision by the Government.

UK || The UK Government is in the process of establishing a contact point for OLAF and will communicate this to the Commission at the earliest time.

2.2. Adoption of common rules on fraud

Currently, sanction levels for fraud are so low in some Member States that they cannot be said to have any deterrent effect at all. Many cases of fraud affecting the Union's financial interests go unpunished because the time that is allowed by law to investigate and prosecute fraud has lapsed.

The proposal for a Directive on the protection of the EU financial interests by means of criminal law addresses these problems by providing for a minimum statute of limitation. Serious cases of fraud should be punished with a minimum penalty of at least six months and a maximum penalty of at least five years.

Recommendation 2

Member States should ensure that sanctions for fraud have a deterrent effect and investigations and prosecutions can be pursued for a sufficient period of time. Member States should quickly adopt and implement the Directive on the protection of the EU financial interests by means of criminal law.

BE || Reply from Belgium, FPS Justice: Belgium welcomes the prospect of harmonisation of the minimum statute of limitations for offences affecting the Union's financial interests, although it wonders about consistency, given that the minimum harmonisation of the statute of limitations is being proposed only in the area of the protection of financial interests (PFI) and not other fields. There is a clear link between the proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law and the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation to set up a European Public Prosecutor's Office, given that the PFI Directive is to determine the material jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor's Office concerning offences affecting the financial interests of the European Union (Article 12 of the Commission proposal on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office). The PFI Directive has to be transposed into national law. There is a risk that the European Public Prosecutor's Office will have different powers depending on the Member State where the offence is brought before the national courts.

BG || Bulgaria has been party to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests since 1995 and to its First and Second Protocols of 29 November 1996 and 19 June 1997, since its accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. An analysis of the provisions of criminal law shows that the Special Part of the Criminal Code provides wide-ranging criminal law protection with regard to the unlawful distribution and use of funds from the European Union by criminalising a wide range of infringements. A. Convention on protecting the European Communities’ financial interests (Arts. 1 and 2) The Criminal Code (NK) provides definitions of misappropriation by officials (Art. 202(2)(3)), documentary fraud (Art. 212(3)), the use of false information to obtain funds from the EU (Art. 248a(2) and (3)), the unlawful release of EU funds (Art. 248(4)) and the use of funds belonging to the EU for purposes other than those for which they were originally granted (Art. 254b) as criminal offences. These conform to the definitions of Art. 1(1) and (2) of the Convention. B. First protocol of 29 November 1996 Active and passive bribery are crimes under Chapter Eight, Section IV of the Special Part of the Criminal Code. A comparative analysis of these offences shows that they conform to the components of passive and active corruption provided for in Arts. 2 and 3 of the Protocol. Accessories to active and passive bribery are subject to the penalties envisaged under the general provisions of the Code. C. Second protocol of 19 June 1997 Money laundering (Art. 2 of the Protocol.) Under Bulgarian law, money laundering is a criminal offence addressed by NK Art. 253. Liability of legal persons (Arts. 3 and 4 of the Protocol) Legal persons are liable for criminal offences under administrative criminal law and are subject to the Administrative Infringements and Punishments Act (ZANN). Under Art. 83a(1) of ZANN, legal entities can be held responsible if the legal entity in question has enriched itself or could enrich itself from crimes comprehensively listed in the same article. The list of crimes include criminal documentary fraud (Art. 212(3)), money laundering (NK Art. 253) and active bribery (NK Arts. 301—307) and all crimes committed at the order, or, by the decision of an organised criminal group. A legal prerequisite for liability under ZANN Art. 83a is the existence of a link between the legal entity for whose benefit the crime was committed and the natural person committing the crime. Such a link would exist in the event that the perpetrator is a person authorised to make decisions on behalf of the legal entity, represents the legal entity, has been appointed to a controlling or supervisory body of the legal entity, or is an employee whom the legal entity has charged with a particular task when the crime was committed in the course of or in relation to the fulfilment of that task. The prerequisites for imposing a financial penalty on a legal entity under ZANN are sufficiently broad to cover the cases set out in Art. 3(2) of the Directive. In this case a legal entity can be held liable when the crime has been committed for its benefit by an employee charged by the legal entity with a particular task and the crime was committed in the course of or in relation to the fulfilment of that task. The law does not take into consideration the reasons for which the employee committed the crime, as long as it was committed in the course of or in relation to the work assigned to the employee and the legal entity benefited from the crime. In practice this means that the financial sanction under ZANN can also be imposed upon the legal entity when the crime was committed due to lack of control or supervision by the persons referred to in Art. 83a(1)(1, 2 and 3). Financial sanctions are imposed on the legal entity regardless of whether criminal proceedings have been instituted against the natural person who committed the crime. Under ZANN Art. 83a, legal entities are subject to a fine of up to BGN 1 000 000, but no less than the value of the proceeds if they are assets; if the proceeds are not assets or the value cannot be established, the fine is from BGN 5 000 to 100 000. This range of penalties allows the court to tailor the punishment to the nature and type of offence, as well as the nature and value of the benefit obtained by the legal entity. At the same time, the comparative severity of the penalty has a deterrent effect on infringements of this kind. Confiscation (Art. 5 of the Protocol.) Assets belonging to the perpetrator which have been the subject of a premeditated crime are subject to confiscation under NK Art. 53(1)(b). This possibility is explicitly provided for in respect of a wide range of crimes, including those of active and passive bribery (NK Art. 307a) and money laundering (NK Art. 253(6). Under NK Art. 53(2)(b), the proceeds of the crime are appropriated by the State if they are not subject to repayment or recovery. Under NK Art. 53(1)(a) the means used to commit the crime is also appropriated by the State. There is also provision in ZANN Chapter IV for the confiscation by the state of the proceeds of the crime or items of equivalent value from a legal person, if the proceeds are not subject to repayment or recovery, or confiscation under the provisions of the Criminal Code (ZANN Art. 83a(4)). In some cases, there is also provision for the confiscation of some or all of the offender's assets as a punishment (for example, for abusing one’s position to misappropriate funds under NK Art. 202(2)(3), fraud under NK Art. 212(3), (4) and (5), bribery under Art. 301(3) with reference to NK Art. 302(b) and bribery under NK Art. 302a). D. Analysis of sanctions under the Criminal Code Under the Criminal Code, the majority of crimes that fall within the scope of the Convention and its protocols provide for the cumulative imposition of imprisonment and fines. In the majority of cases there is no minimum sentence, except for crimes under NK Arts. 248a(2) and (3), 253(1), (4) and (5) and 302a, for which the minimum prison sentence is 1 year and the maximum 10 years. The maximum prison sentence varies from 3 years (for crimes under NK Arts. 248a(2) and 305a to 30 years for crimes under NK Art. 302a. As far as fines are concerned, the legislative approach is the same. In the majority of cases only the maximum penalty is stipulated, which can be up to BGN 200 000 (NK Art. 253(4)). The minimum statutory fine is BGN 100, and for offences where this threshold applies, it varies from BGN 1 000 to 20 000 (NK Arts. 248a (2) and (3) and 253(1)(4) and (5). In other cases, other penalties can be imposed in addition to imprisonment, such as a ban on holding a particular State or public office and/or a ban on exercising particular professions or activities (NK Arts. 202(2)(3), 212(3), 245b(2), 301(4) and 302a) and confiscation of some or all of the offender's assets (NK Arts. 202(2)(3), 212(3) and 302a). For passive bribery under NK Art. 301(3), the law provides for the confiscation of half of the person's assets (NK Art. 302(b)). In some cases (NK Arts. 248(5) and 245b(1) the offender is only punished with imprisonment (1 to 15 years). E. Limitation periods Under the general provisions of the Criminal Code (Arts. 80—82), the limitation period for criminal prosecutions depends on the punishment provided for by law for the offence and vary from 3 to 35 years. Limitation periods for crimes under the Convention and the protocols range from 3 to 15 years and, in the majority of cases, from 5 to 15 years. The absolute limitation period cannot exceed the limitation period for the offence in question by more than one half. For crimes under the Convention and the protocols thereto, the absolute limitation period ranges from 4 ½ years to 22 ½ years. The Public Prosecutor’s Office has the function of investigating and the criminal prosecution of all offences, including those against the EU’s financial interests. In carrying out this function, it operates within the definitions of crimes provided for under the law and criminal law institutions. When cases of fraud involving EU funds are investigated, the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code are applied and the position of the Prosecutor’s Office before the competent court complies with these provisions in terms of the punishment imposed. When legislative changes are initiated by authorities with legislative initiative, the Public Prosecutor’s Office expresses its position on the adequacy of penalties by participating in coordination procedures and public discussions. As far as guarantees of adequate time for investigation and criminal prosecution are concerned, the Public Prosecutor’s Office observes its obligations under Arts. 22 and 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code (NPK), which in combination with the option of extending the pre-trial investigation timescales, ensures that the recommendation is implemented. It should be noted that the amendments to the NPK promulgated in State Gazette (DV) No 71 of 2013 reinstate Chapter 26, ‘Consideration of cases in court at the request of the accused’ (rescinded DV No 32/2010, effective from 28 May 2010, reinstated DV No 71 of 2013). This reinstates the accused’s option to request a hearing before a court after the expiry of a specified period after this status has arisen. This limits the multiple use of the option to extend the period of pre-trial investigation, including in crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests. As an EU Member State, Bulgaria has stated its framework position supporting the proposed draft Directive on protecting the European Communities’ financial interests through criminal law. If the European Parliament adopts the Directive amendments, it will have to be adopted to Bulgarian law, and in particular the Criminal Code, to accommodate the parameters of the Directive (minimum and maximum penalties for this category of crime). When the draft of the new Criminal Code is discussed, the institutions concerned will have to take Bulgaria’s framework position into account.

CZ || The Czech Republic adopted legislative measures to ensure the financial interests of the EU have exactly the same level of protection as the interests of the Czech Republic and other natural and legal persons. In relation to the adoption of Act No. 418/2011 Coll., the criminal liability of legal persons has ensured the possibility of criminal prosecution, as well as companies, and acts by other legal persons which threaten the financial interests of the EU (area drawdown of EU subsidies, illegal influencing of public procurement, tax evasion and customs). It is intended to increase the criminal penalties – in cases where the damage exceeds CZK 5 mil. – the possibility of imprisonment for up to 10 years. In the case of criminal liability of legal persons – a ban on participation in public procurements or financial fines of up to CZK 1,5 billion. Changes in legislation have resulted in the duration in which prosecutions can occur being prolonged – if damage exceeds 2 000 EUR – a limitation period of 10 years; 20 000 EUR – a limitation period of 15 years. The prosecution of crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU is ensured by highly professional prosecutors at regional level.

DK || Fraud involving EU funds is punishable under Section 289a of the Criminal Code, according to which a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and six months is imposed on any person who gives incorrect or misleading information or fails to disclose information – including by failing to comply with the duty to disclose information significant to deciding a case – for use in decisions on the payment or refund of customs duties or charges or the payment or refund of subsidies or grants from Danish authorities or the institutions of the European Communities or other community bodies, with intent to evade a payment to be made by himself or others or with intent wrongfully to obtain an amount for the benefit of himself or others. The same penalty is imposed on any person who wrongfully exploits a legally earned entitlement to the above-mentioned payments and on any person who wrongfully applies any such amount paid for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was originally granted. This does not, however, apply to benefits granted for personal use. Violations of a particularly serious nature are punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years; see Section 289 of the Criminal Code and, specifically, Section 289a(4). Moreover, there are, in a number of areas, special laws containing provisions on fraud involving EU funds. This applies, for example, in the spheres of agriculture and fisheries. Section 289a of the Criminal Code is subsidiary to provisions in special laws, where the special law in question contains a corresponding regulation. In addition, various other forms of fraudulent conduct damaging to the EU's financial interests are punishable under, for example, Section 278 of the Criminal Code on embezzlement, Section 279 on fraud and Section 280 on breach of trust. Infringement of the stated provisions is punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and six months. The term of imprisonment may be increased to up to eight years if the crime is of a particularly serious nature; see Section 286(2) of the Criminal Code. An infringement is not punished if the limitation period has expired. The limitation period for the above-mentioned infringements is five years, unless the crime is of a particularly serious nature, in which case the limitation period is 10 years; see Section 93(1) of the Criminal Code. In accordance with Section 94(5) of the Criminal Code, the limitation period is interrupted if the charge is communicated to the person concerned or if the public prosecutor requests that legal action be taken, in which case the person concerned is charged with the infringement. In Denmark, the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (Danish acronym, SØIK) deals with economic crimes, including cases of fraud, if there may be cause for thinking that the infringement is particularly wide in scope, involves organised crime, was carried out using distinctive business practices or is otherwise of an unusual character. SØIK has developed a special Investigation Guide on the handling of large-scale criminal cases. The Investigation Guide contains guidelines designed to ensure that the police's and public prosecutor's resources are used in the best ways possible and that the necessary impetus is given to dealing with the case. It states that an investigation should be based on: a project-oriented working method, the setting of goals and sub-goals subject to constant assessment, cooperation between different personnel groups and authorities throughout the investigation, a strong focus on the essentials of the case, and on-going assessment of the need for resources and, if appropriate, the adjustment of these following discussions with the investigator responsible for the project and the public prosecutor. In terms of ensuring that large-scale criminal cases are investigated, and prosecutions brought, as quickly and efficiently as possible, the Investigation Guide has proved to be a very useful tool for developing and pursuing 'best practices', as well as objectives in terms of the time taken to deal with cases.

DE || In Germany fraud (Section 263 German Criminal Code [Strafgesetzbuch]) and subsidy fraud (Section 264 Criminal Code) are punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to five years. In especially serious cases imprisonment of between six months and ten years is provided for (Sections 263(3) and 264(2) Criminal Code). In cases of fraud or subsidy fraud committed on a commercial basis as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of such offences imprisonment of between one to ten years may be imposed (Sections 263(5) and 264(3) Criminal Code). Criminal proceedings for such offences are generally subject to a limitation period of five years (Section 78(3) No 4 Criminal Code), as are cases under Section 263(2) or 264(2) Criminal Code (cf. Section 78(4) Criminal Code). Offences under Sections 263(5) and 264(3) are subject to a limitation period of ten years (Section 78(3) No 3 Criminal Code). In principle this period commences as soon as the offence is completed (Section 78a, first sentence, Criminal Code). The limitation period may, however, be interrupted — even repeatedly — by certain procedural steps (Section 78c Criminal Code). Each interruption has the effect that the limitation period commences to run anew; however prosecution is statute-barred at the latest where twice the limitation period (here five or ten years) has elapsed since the end of the offence (‘final statute bar’, Section 78c(3) Criminal Code). This means that generally prosecution for fraud and subsidy fraud is statute-barred at the latest after ten years and in cases under Sections 263(5) and 264(3) Criminal Code after twenty years. However, there will be no statute bar if there was a first instance decision before the end of the limitation period so long as the proceedings have not been finally resolved (Section 78b(3) Criminal Code); this applies even where this results in the period for a ‘final statute bar’ being exceeded.

EE || Criminal offence || Offence || Aggravated circumstances || Limitation period of offence[12]

§201. Embezzlement || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year imprisonment || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years’ imprisonment || five years

§ 209. Fraud || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment || punishable by 1 to 5 years’ imprisonment || five years

§ 210. Benefit fraud || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years imprisonment || - || five years

§ 280. Submission of false information || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year imprisonment || - || five years

§ 293. Accepting of gratuities || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment || punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment || five years

§ 294. Accepting bribe || punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment || punishable by 2 to 10 years imprisonment || five years /ten years

§ 295. Arranging receipt of gratuities || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year imprisonment || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment. || five years

§ 296. Arranging bribe || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year imprisonment. || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment || five years

§ 297. Granting of gratuities || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment. || punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment. || five years

§ 298. Giving bribe || punishable by 1 to 5 years imprisonment || punishable by 2 to 10 years imprisonment || five years /ten years

§ 2981. Influence peddling || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment. || - || five years

§299. Counterfeiting or falsification of documents by officials || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment. || - || five years

§ 394. Money laundering || punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years imprisonment || is punishable by 2 to 10 years imprisonment || five years /ten years

Limitation period:

No one shall be convicted of or punished for the commission of a criminal offence, if the following terms have expired between the commission of the criminal offence and the entry into force of the corresponding court judgment: 1) ten years in the case of commission of a criminal offence in the first degree; 2) five years in the case of commission of a criminal offence in the second degree.

A criminal offence in the first degree, as prescribed in this code, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than five years, life imprisonment or compulsory dissolution. A criminal offence in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to five years or a pecuniary punishment.

The limitation period of a criminal offence is interrupted with the performance of the following procedural act in the criminal proceeding: 1) application of a preventive measure with regard to the suspect or accused, or seizure of his or her property, or property involved in money laundering; 2) the prosecution of the accused; 3) adjournment of the hearing of a matter in the case where the accused fails to appear; 4) interrogation of the accused in the court hearing; 5) ordering of expert assessment or additional evidence in the court hearing.

The limitation period of an offence is suspended: 1) when a suspect or accused, subject to proceedings, absconds from pre-trial proceedings, extra-judicial proceedings or court, until the person is detained or appears before the body conducting proceedings; 2) upon commencement of criminal proceedings in a matter of an act with elements of a misdemeanour, until the termination of the criminal proceedings; 3) upon committing a criminal offence against the sexual self-determination against a person younger than eighteen years of age, until the victim attains 18 years of age, unless the reason for the criminal proceedings became evident before the victim attained such age.

Estonian Penal Code

§ 4. Degrees of criminal offences

(1) Criminal offences are criminal offences in the first and in the second degree.

(2) A criminal offence in the first degree is an offence the maximum punishment prescribed for which in the Code is imprisonment for a term of more than five years, life imprisonment or compulsory dissolution.

(3) A criminal offence in the second degree is an offence the punishment prescribed for which in the Code is imprisonment for a term of up to five years or a pecuniary punishment.

(4) The mitigation or aggravation of a punishment on the basis of the provisions of the General Part of this Code shall not alter the degree of a criminal offence.

§ 81. Limitation period of offence

(1) No one shall be convicted of or punished for the commission of a criminal offence if the following terms have expired between the commission of the criminal offence and the entry into force of the corresponding court judgment: 1) ten years in the case of commission of a criminal offence in the first degree; 2) five years in the case of commission of a criminal offence in the second degree.

(2) Offences against humanity, war crimes and offences for which life imprisonment is prescribed do not expire.

(5) The limitation period of a criminal offence is interrupted with the performance of the following procedural act in the criminal proceeding: 1) application of a preventive measure with regard to the suspect or accused, or seizure of his or her property, or property which is the object if money laundering; 2) the prosecution of the accused; 3) adjournment of the hearing of a matter in the case the accused fails to appear; 4) interrogation of the accused in the court hearing; 5) ordering of expert assessment or additional evidence in the court hearing.

(6) If the limitation period of a criminal offence is interrupted, the limitation period shall commence again with the performance of the procedural act provided in subsection (5) of this section. A person shall however not be convicted of or punished for the commission of a criminal offence if the period between the commission of the criminal offence and the entry into force of the corresponding court judgment is five years longer than the term provided for in subsection (1) of this section.

(7) The limitation period of offence is suspended: 1) in a case where the suspect, accused or person subject to proceedings absconds from pre-trial proceedings, extra-judicial proceedings or court, until the person is detained or appears before the body conducting the proceedings; 2) upon commencement of criminal proceedings in the matter of an act with elements of a misdemeanour, until the termination of the criminal proceedings; 3) upon commission of a criminal offence against the sexual self-determination of a person younger than eighteen years of age, until the victim reaches 18 years of age, unless the reason for the criminal proceedings became evident before the victim reached 18 years.

(8) In the cases provided by clauses (7) 1) and 2) of this section the limitation period shall not be resumed if more than fifteen years have passed from the commission of the criminal offence or more than three years have passed from the commission of the misdemeanour.

§ 201. Embezzlement

(1) A person who illegally converts into his or her use, or the use of a third person, movable property which is in the possession of another person or other assets belonging to another person which have been entrusted to the person shall be punished by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who has previously committed larceny or embezzlement; 2) on a large-scale basis; 3) by an official; or 4) by a group or criminal organisation; shall be punished by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years of imprisonment.

§ 209. Fraud

(1) A person who receives proprietary benefits by knowingly causing a misconception of existing facts is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who has previously committed fraud, larceny or embezzlement; 11) by an official; 2) on a large-scale basis; 3) by a group or a criminal organisation; or 4) by addressing the public, is punishable by 1 to 5 years of imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 210. Benefit fraud

(1) For the purposes of this section, “benefit” means a payment made without charge or partly without charge out of the funds of the state budget or a local government or other public funds to a person engaging in economic activities, or a tax incentive for promoting economic activities.

(2) A person who receives a benefit by using fraud or uses a benefit for purposes other than its intended purpose shall be punished by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years of imprisonment.

(3) The same act, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 280. Submission of false information

(1) Submission of false information to an administrative agency, if committed in order to obtain an official document or any other benefit or gain, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 293. Accepting of gratuities

(1) An official who consents to a promise of property or other benefits, or who accepts property or other benefits to himself/herself, or third persons, in return for a lawful act which he or she has committed or which there is reason to believe that he or she will commit, or for a lawful omission which he or she has committed or which there is reason to believe that he or she will commit and, in so doing, takes advantage of his or her official position, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years' imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person previously in receipt of gratuities or a bribe; 2) by demanding gratuities; 3) by a group; or 4) on a large-scale basis; is punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 294. Accepting bribe

(1) An official who consents to a promise of property or other benefits or who accepts property or other benefits to themselves or third persons in return for an unlawful act which he or she has committed, or which there is reason to believe that he or she will commit, or for an unlawful omission which he or she has committed or which there is reason to believe that he or she will commit and, in so doing, takes advantage of his or her official position shall be punished by 1 to 5 years’ imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who was previously in receipt of a bribe or gratuities; 2) by demanding a bribe; 3) by a group; 4) on a large-scale basis; or 5) with serious consequences, is punishable by 2 to 10 years’ imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

(4) An act provided for in subsection (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or compulsory dissolution.

(5) For the criminal offence provided for in this section, the court shall impose extended confiscation of assets or property acquired by the criminal offence pursuant to the provisions of § 832 of this Code.

§ 295. Arranging receipt of gratuities

(1) Arranging a receipt of gratuity is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who has previously committed arranging receipt of a gratuities or bribe; or 2) by taking advantage of an official position, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years of imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 296. Arranging bribe

(1) Arranging a bribe is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to one year of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who has previously arranged the receipt of a bribe or gratuities; or 2) by taking advantage of an official position, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 297. Granting of gratuities

(1) Granting or promising a gratuity is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who has previously granted gratuities or a bribe; 2) by a group; or 3) on a large-scale basis; is punishable by up to 5 years of imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

§ 298. Giving bribe

(1) Giving or promising a bribe is punishable by 1 to 5 years of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed: 1) by a person who was previously granted a bribe or gratuities; 2) by a group; 3) on a large-scale basis; or 4) with serious consequences, is punishable by 2 to 10 years’ imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

(4) An act provided for in subsection (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or compulsory dissolution.

§ 2981. Influence peddling

(1) A person who consents to a promise of property or other benefits, or who accepts property or other benefits in return for illegal use, by the person of his or her actual or presumed influence with the objective of achieving a situation where an official performing public administration duties commits an act or omission in the interests of the person handing over the property or giving the benefit, or a third person, shall be punished by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment. § 299. Counterfeiting or falsification of documents by officials

(1) An official who falsifies a document or issues a falsified document is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 3 years of imprisonment.

§ 394. Money laundering

(1) Money laundering shall be punished by a pecuniary punishment or up to 5 years of imprisonment.

(2) The same act, if: 1) by a group; 2) at least twice; 3) on a large-scale basis; or 4) by a criminal organisation, is punishable by 2 to 10 years imprisonment.

(3) An act provided for in subsection (1) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment.

(4) An act provided for in subsection (2) of this section, if committed by a legal person, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or compulsory dissolution.

(5) A court may, pursuant to the provisions of § 83 of this Code, apply confiscation of a property which was the direct object of the commission of an offence provided for in this section.

(6) For the criminal offence provided for in this section, the court shall impose extended confiscation of assets or property acquired by the criminal offence pursuant to the provisions of § 832 of this Code.

IE || Ireland has opted into the proposed Directive on the protection of the EU financial interests by means of criminal law. In relation to the request for information on the limitation periods and deterrent effect of the sanctions currently in place, fraud offences in Ireland carry a penalty of up to 5 years imprisonment and in many cases this penalty extends to 10 years. In all cases, an unlimited fine may be imposed in addition to a penalty of imprisonment. There is no prescribed statutory limitation period for bringing a criminal prosecution on indictment.

EL || BODY: Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights

REPLY

LAW || PENALTY FRAMEWORK || LIMITATION PERIOD

1). Art. 235 of the Penal Code Passive Bribery[13] || 1. Imprisonment for 1-5 years and fine = fifty times higher than the benefit with a ceiling of EUR 150 000. In the case of benefits which cannot be assessed in monetary terms, the fine ranges from EUR 10 000 to EUR 150 000 2. If the value of the benefits exceeds the amount of EUR 120 000 or the offender is an employee of the Ministry of Finance, 5-10 years’ imprisonment and a mandatory fine of EUR 50 000 - EUR 500 000. || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

(2). Art. 236 of the Penal Code Active Bribery || 1. Imprisonment for 1-5 years and fine = fifty times higher than the benefit with a ceiling of EUR 150 000. In the case of benefits which cannot be assessed in monetary terms, the fine ranges from EUR 10 000 to EUR 150 000 2. If the value of the benefits exceeds EUR 120 000, 5-10 years’ imprisonment and a mandatory fine of EUR 50 000- EUR 500 000. || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

3). Art. 237 of the Penal Code Bribing a judge || 1. Imprisonment for 1-5 years and fine = fifty times higher than the benefit with a ceiling of EUR 150 000. In the case of benefits which cannot be assessed in monetary terms, the fine ranges from EUR 10 000 to EUR 150 000 2. If the value of the gifts or benefits exceeds the amount of EUR 120 000, 5-10 years’ imprisonment and a mandatory fine of EUR 50 000 – EUR 500 000. The penalties under points (a) and (b) are also imposed on anyone who, for the purpose referred to Article 237(1), offers, promises, acts as intermediary for or gives such gifts or benefits to any of the persons referred to in para. 1 or to a relative thereof. || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

4). Art. 239 of the Penal Code Abuse of power || 1. 1 - 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 5 - 10 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

5). Art. 241 of the Penal Code Violation of domestic sanctuary || 3 months’ – 2 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

6). Art. 242 of the Penal Code Fake certification, falsification, use of counterfeit document || 1. 1 - 5 years’ imprisonment 2.5-20 years’ imprisonment if unfair benefit or unlawful damage to another party are intended or if the total benefit or damage exceeds EUR 120 000 || 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

7). Art. 243 of the Penal Code Failure to certify identity || 10 days’-3 months’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

8). Art. 244 of the Penal Code Extortion or dishonest receipt of money by a public officer || 3 months’ – 5 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

9). Art. 246 of the Penal Code || 10 days’ – 5 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

10). Art. 247 of the Penal Code Strike by civil servants || 10 days’ – 1 year’s imprisonment 3 months’ – 5 years’ imprisonment and fine (EUR 150 -15 000) || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

11). Art. 251 of the Penal Code Violation of judicial confidentiality|| 10 days’ – 2 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

12). Art. 252 of the Penal CodeViolation of service confidentiality|| 1. 3 months’ – 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 6 months’ – 5 years’ imprisonment for anyone working, in any position, in the Political Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministers or the Deputy Ministers, in particular as a special partner, special adviser, transferable administrative official, seconded or under the delegation of tasks of an official, with a works contract or as a member of working groups or committees 3. 1-5 years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100 000 – EUR 500 000 if the person acts with the intention of himself/herself or another person benefiting from that action or harming the State or another party|| 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

13). Art. 254 of the Penal CodeConcealment of reason for exemption|| 3 months – 5 years || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

14). Art. 255 of the Penal CodeUnfair participation || 10 days’ – 2 years’ imprisonment and a fine || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

15). Art. 256 of the Penal Code Misappropriation of funds || 1.6 months’ to 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment if the reduction in funds is particularly high 3. 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment, a) if the offender used special tactics and the reduction in funds is particularly high and exceeds EUR 30 000 in total or b) the object of the action has of a total value greater than EUR 120 000 || 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 3. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

16). Art. 257 of the Penal CodeExploitation of entrusted funds or objects || 10 days’ – 1 year’s imprisonment or a fine || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

17). Art. 258 of the Penal CodeEmbezzlement in service || 1. 6 months’ – 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 2 – 5 years’ imprisonment if the object of the action is of particularly great value, 3. 5 – 10 years’ imprisonment if: a) the offender usedspecial tricks and the object of the action is of particularly high value, exceeding, in total, EUR 30 000 or b) the object of the action has a value of more than EUR 120 000 || 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 3. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

18). Art. 259 of the Penal CodeNeglect of duty|| 10 days’ – 2 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

19). Art. 261 of the Penal CodeInducement of subordinate employee to perpetrate crime and tolerance of any such crime || 10 days’ – 2 years’ imprisonment || 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

20). Art. 159 of the Penal Code Bribing Members of Parliament || 1. 1 – 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 5 - 10 years’ imprisonment if the value of the gifts, benefits or considerations exceeds EUR 120 000 in total || 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

21). Article four and five of Law 2803/2000 ||Article four ‘Fraud at the expense of the European Communities’ financial interests’: 1. 10 days’ – 5 years’ imprisonment 2. 5 - 10 years’ imprisonment if the damage under the previous provisions exceeds the amount of GRD 25 000 000 and, if the damage exceeds the amount of GRD 50 000 000, the offender is convicted to 5 - 20 years’ imprisonment.Article five: Fraud of minor value at the expense of the European Communities’ financial interests:10 days’ – 1 year’s imprisonment or a fine|| 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

22). Art. 45 of Law 3691/2008 ‘Prevention of money laundering etc.’ || 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from EUR 20 000 to EUR 1 000 000 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from EUR 30 000 to EUR 1 500 000 if the offender acted as an employee of a liable legal entity or the predicate offence is included in the offences referred to in points (c), (d) and (e) of Article 3 of the same Law, even if these offences are punishable by a prison sentence.10-20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 50 000 to EUR 2 000 000 if the person pursues such activities professionally or habitually or is a recidivist or has acted on behalf of, in the interests of or within the context of a criminal or terrorist organisation or group.10 days’ – 2 years’ imprisonment of the liable legal entity’s employee or any other person liable for reporting suspicious transactions, who intentionally fails to mention any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities or presents false or misleading information, thus violating the relevant legal, administrative or regulatory provisions and rules, if a stricter penalty is not provided for under other provisions.[14]|| 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension 5 + 3 year litigation suspension

23). Article 7B of Law 3310/2005 ‘Measures to ensure transparency and prevent transgressions in the procedures for the award of public contracts’ || 1. 5 - 20 years’ imprisonment 2. 1 - 5 years’ imprisonment, A. in case of refusal to produce evidence or submission of false information to the ESP or the Competition Commission, B. for public authority officials who knowingly award a public contract, C. for the members of the scientific staff of the ESP, who do not issue, within the prescribed period, the decision or certificate provided for under the provisions of Article 6, in order that they, or third parties, benefit from these actions or to damage to a third party || 1. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension 2. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension

24). Law 2656/1998 OECD ‘Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials’ (Article 2, as replaced by Law 3666/2008) || 1. 1 - 5 years’ imprisonment[15] 2. 5 -10 years’ imprisonment if the value of the gifts or considerations exceeds EUR 73 000 in total || 1. 5 years + 3 year litigation suspension 2. 15 years + 5 year litigation suspension

25). Law 3560/2007: Ratification-implementation of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption Article fiveActive and Passive bribery in the private sector Article sixBid for influence Article eightAccounting offences || 1 - 5 years’ imprisonment[16] 5 - 10 years’ imprisonmentif the value of the benefits or considerations exceeds EUR 73 000. Three months’ to 5 years’ imprisonment and a fine[17] 10 days’ to 5 years’ imprisonment and a fine if the action is not punished more strictly under another penal provision[18] || 5 + 3 year litigation suspension 15 + 5 year litigation suspension 5 + 3 year litigation suspension 5 + 3 year litigation suspension

26). Law 3849/2010 ‘amending Law 3213/2003 and the provisions of the Penal Code regarding crimes related to the Service’ ||Art. 4 of Law 3213/03: 3 - 5 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from EUR 20 000 to EUR 1 000 000[19]. 2. 5 - 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from EUR 30 000 to EUR 1 500 000 (a) if the unfair material benefit acquired or yielded exceeds, EUR 73 000 in total or (b) if the offender acts as