EN    EN EN 
EN    EN  COMMISSION OF THE E UROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 25.6.2008 
SEC(2008) 2093 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
accompanying the 
 
Proposal for a 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (E C) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004 and (EC) 
No 552/2004 in order to improve the performa nce and sustainability of the European 
aviation system 
   
IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
{COM(2008) 388 final} 
{SEC(2008) 2094} 
EN 2   EN COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Proposal for revision of the Si ngle European Sky legislation 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Executive summary: 
The impact assessment on the revision of the Single European Sky (SES) legislation1 
(2008/TREN/030) follows the recommendations of two major preparatory reports: the 
High Level Group report on the future regulatory framework for aviation (July 2007) and the Performance Review Commission report on the ‘Evaluation of the impact of the 
Single European Sky initiative on ATM
2 performance’ (December 2006). The SES 
proposals will form an integral part of a wide r package, with two other elements: (1) the 
extension of EASA competence s to air traffic management  (ATM) and air navigation 
services (ANS) (2) the endorsement of the SESAR3 master plan. Because of their 
specific nature, the SESAR and EASA propos als will be the subject of separate 
appraisals. 
The proposals considered for SES II do not intr oduce new legislation as such, but rather 
consolidate  the previous SES package (SES I) and add an overall performance-driving 
framework. This framework will strength en the network appr oach and introduce 
environmental performance as a new area.  
What is the problem? 
Our current air traffic management (ATM) system is operating close to its limits  and 
there is scope for improvement. There are in efficiencies in cost and capacity and ATM 
does not restrict the environmental imp act of aviation. The system is still fragmented 
along national borders, lacks good network coor dination and efficient use of airspace. 
These problems lead to total additional costs of over €3bn per year.  
Sub-optimal routing ( flight inefficiency ) not only translates into loss of time and 
money, but also to unnecessary fuel burn and emissions. At the same time, traffic is 
                                                 
1 Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the 
framework for the creation of the Single European Sky,  Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of 
air navigation services in the Single European Sky,  
Regulation (EC) No 551/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the organisation and use of airspace in th e Single European Sky, 
Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
interoperability of the European Air Traffic Management Network. 
2 For a list of all abbreviations used in the text, see Annex 1 . 
3 SESAR is the Single European Sky ATM Resear ch project, which aims to modernise the ATM 
system both technologically and operationally. For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/transpor t/air_portal/sesame/index_en.htm and http://www.sesar-
consortium.aero/. 
EN 3   EN expected to double or, in some regions, even  triple by 2020, to a volume that current 
technology and organisation will struggle to handle safely. In creased congestion in turn 
leads to unmet demand, reduced competitiv eness and unrealised economic potential 
both for aircraft operators and the economy at large. 
What are the main causes of the problem? 
1. Lack of a network approach:  air routes were historically  designed as a function of 
national air carrier needs or to reflect the network of traditional radionavigation aids. 
While navigation technology and the needs of  airspace users have changed significantly, 
the route network does not reflect these chan ges. As routes cha nnel fee-paying traffic 
through predetermined territories, hence dete rmining the income of service providers, 
the national approach has led to cross-count ry flight efficiency being a secondary 
concern in route network design. The situa tion is further complicated by sub-optimal 
civil-military cooperation.  
2. Insufficient oversight of natural monopolies:  air traffic management is mostly a 
natural monopoly (one service provider in each block of airspace due to technical 
constraints and sunk investment costs) , which prevents efficiencies through 
competition. This system and the corresponding full-cost recovery mechanism do not incentivise service providers to improve their services to customers (i.e. airspace users). 
Instead, it contribute s to a ‘live and le t live’ attitude.  
3. Governance : while the Single Sky legislation brought air traffic management under 
the Community umbrella, essential obligations  were left to nati onal discretion. Some 
elements of the system also remain the resp onsibility of intergove rnmental structures 
with limited enforcement powers. The curr ent institutional arrangements for ATM are 
not in line with industry developments (cor poratisation, privatisati on, etc.) and require a 
clear separation of policy- and law-maki ng from oversight functions and service 
provision. 
What are the main  policy objectives? 
The over-arching objective of the revision of th e Single Sky legislation is to ensure that 
the ATM system effectively provides the infr astructure for the aviation industry and 
other users so that the Lisbon objectives can  be fulfilled. Performance must focus on 
four key areas — cost-effici ency, flight efficiency, ca pacity/delays and safety. 
Environmental protection will be  added in the revised package as an explicit objective, 
as a key area for service provision a nd a criterion for route network design. 
What are the main tools for achieving the policy objectives? 
The proposals aim to drive the pe rformance of the ATM system. A regulatory 
framework with target setting will gradually ensure this. The network approach  will be 
enhanced to solve local problems with syst em-wide effects. Wherever possible, the 
unbundling of services should be considered w ith a view to introducing competition. 
This performance framework should ensure more efficient integration of service 
provision within functional airspace blocks (FABs). 
EN 4   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties .............................................. 6 
1.1. Organisation and timing ............................................................................................... 6 1.2. Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 6 1.3. Results of external consultation rounds........................................................................ 8 1.4. Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board.................................................................... 9 2. Problem definition...................................................................................................... 10 2.1. The European air traffic management syst em is working at sub-optimal level ......... 10 
2.1.1. Safety.................................................................................................................. ........ 11 
2.1.2. Flight efficiency ....................................................................................................... .. 11 
2.1.3. Capacity/delays ......................................................................................................... . 12 
2.1.4. Cost-efficiency ......................................................................................................... .. 12 
2.2. Causes of the persisting problems .............................................................................. 13 2.2.1. Lack of a genuine European network a pproach (legal, institutional, technical 
fragmentation) ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2 Poor governance of a natural monopoly..................................................................... 18 2.3. Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? .................................................. 20 2.4. How will the problem evolve, all things  being equal? Should the EU act? ............... 21 
3. Objectives of the proposals ........................................................................................ 22 4. Policy options............................................................................................................. 2 3 
4.1. First pillar: Performance re gulation for monopoly services....................................... 23 
4.1.1. Option 1: Status quo – continue with current SES legislation ................................... 23 4.1.2. Option 2: Local target setting (LTS) .......................................................................... 24 4.1.3. Option 3a: European target setting (ETS) .................................................................. 25 4.1.4. Option 3b: European Regulator (ETS)....................................................................... 26 4.2. Second pillar: Network approach fo r a European-level network and the 
management of scarce resources: ............................................................................... 27 
4.3. Third pillar: Introduction of market  measures for unbundled services...................... 31 
4.3.1. Description ............................................................................................................. .... 31 
4.3.2. Option 1: ‘Continue with current legi slation (market measures decided at 
national level)’............................................................................................................ 34 
EN 5   EN 4.3.3. Option 2: ‘Market measures for unbundled services’ ................................................ 35 
4.4. Fourth pillar: Functional airspace blocks (FABs) in the performance 
regulatoion framework: .............................................................................................. 36 
4.4.1. Option 1: No changes — keep the status quo ............................................................ 36 4.4.2. Option 2: Clarify the current concept with a combination of statutory and non-
regulatory measures.................................................................................................... 37 
4.4.3. Option 3: The structural division of serv ice provision into FABs is decided at 
Community level ........................................................................................................ 38 
4.5. Role of Eurocontrol in the pe rformance regulation framework:................................ 39 
5. Comparing the alternative options ............................................................................. 40 
5.1. First pillar: Performance regulation ........................................................................... 40 5.2. Second pillar – Network approach for a European-level network and 
management of scarce resources ................................................................................ 43 
5.3. Third Pillar: Comparison of the opt ions for the introduction of market 
measures for unbundled services................................................................................ 44 
5.4. Fourth pillar: FABs within the performance framework............................................ 45 
6. Policy monitoring and evaluation............................................................................... 46 7. Technical updates of the first SES package ............................................................... 47 List of Annexes ........................................................................................................................ 48 
 
EN 6   EN 1. P ROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Organisation and timing 
This impact assessment has been performed  by DG Energy and Tran sport (TREN) with 
contributions from an Inter-Services  Steering Group in which the following 
Directorates-General participated: the Secr etariat General, the Legal Service, COMP, 
SANCO, TRADE, EMPL, ENTR, ENV,  BUDG, INFSO, RTD and ECFIN. 
The revision of the legislation could draw  upon two influential reports. Firstly, the 
Performance Review Commission (PRC) adopt ed in December 2006 its ‘Evaluation of 
the Impact of the Single European S ky initiative on Air Traffic Management 
Performance’4, providing a thorough analysis of  the implementation of the Single 
European Sky over the previous three ye ars. Secondly, the High Level Group on the 
Future Aviation Regulatory Framework delivered its report to Vice-President Jacques Barrot (July 2007): ‘A  framework for driving performance 
improvement’
5. 
The two reports were produced separately, but both called for a revision of the current 
Single Sky legislation. Based on thes e inputs, the Comm ission adopted in 
December 2007 its ‘First Report on the implem entation of the Single Sky Legislation: 
achievements and the way forward’6. Immediately afterwards, and thus before the 
drafting of the proposal itself, work was st arted on the impact assessment to explore 
options for revising the SES7. 
In order to meet the goal of a total system approach, recommended by the High Level 
Group, the revision of SES I will be devel oped and coordinated together with the 
proposal for an Airport Capacity Acti on Plan, the proposal to extend EASA 
competences to aerodromes, air traffic management and air navigation services and the proposal on the ATM Master Plan, which are all due to be put forward mid-2008. 
1.2. Consultation and expertise 
The preparation of this proposal has been preceded by the publication of the two reports 
mentioned above, one of a more technical na ture, the other more politically oriented, 
and intense consultation of the aviation industry.  
Technical expertise 
This impact assessment relies on several source s of expertise, but mostly on the various 
reports published by the Eurocontrol Perf ormance Review Commission (PRC). The 
PRC is independent and provides highly resp ected reports. It produces not only annual 
                                                
 
4 See report on 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/gallery/cont ent/public/Docs/PRC_Evaluation_of_SES.pdf. 
5 See details of composition and report on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/a ir_portal/hlg/index_en.htm. 
6 COM(2007) 845. 
7 CLWP ref.: 2008/TREN/030. 
EN 7   EN reports but also specific reports on issues  such as the cost of fragmentation or 
comparisons between the EU and US systems,  some at the request of the Commission.  
The PRC report analyses the impact of the Single Sky legislation from a performance 
standpoint, taking into account user needs. The report conclu des that the Single Sky has 
already had a positive impact, especially in (i) increasing collaboration between service 
providers and (ii) ensuring se paration between national serv ice provision and oversight. 
However, while Community legislation pr ovides the basis for better air traffic 
management, it does not drive the industry towards more tangible improvements: the 
most promising tools for improving performan ce have remained the responsibility of the 
Member States. For this reason, the PRC c onsiders the developm ent of quantitative 
performance criteria  necessary for further progre ss. To this end, it proposes 
31 concrete measures to be implem ented in the short or medium term8. 
Political expertise 
In September 2006, Vice-President Ba rrot called upon a High Level Group9 to examine 
the way forward. In July 2007, the Group subm itted a unanimous report containing ten 
recommendations10. The report concentrated on perfor mance and governance in order to 
strengthen the capabilities of the main act ors. The Community regulatory framework 
should give more responsibil ity to industry to deliver the required environmental, 
safety, cost-efficiency and capacity benefits. 
Consultation of stakeholders 
Besides the two major contributions menti oned above, to ensure a full assessment, 
additional consultation of stakeholders  has been organised at all levels: 
1. A high-level  consultation forum was held on 22 January 2008 with an audience 
of over 400 people. Vice-President Ba rrot attended the meeting. There was 
broad agreement among stakeholders on th e need to rapidly change the Single 
Sky legislation now in order to driv e the performance of the air traffic 
management system, using the ‘Commun ity method’ as the sole vehicle for 
change. Performance should be considered  in a broad sense, including safety, 
capacity, cost-efficiency and above all the environment11. The idea of a 
network design and management function also received widespread support.  
2. Use of the three formal consultation channels: (1) Member States and their 
military representatives on the Single Sky Committee, (2) industry stakeholders in the Industry Consultation Body, establ ished by the Framework Regulation, 
and (3) social partners in the Ai r Traffic Management Working Group 
established in the framework of the Sectoral Dialogue Committee on Aviation. 
                                                
 
8 Evaluation of the impact of the SES Initia tive on ATM Performance, Eurocontrol PRC, 
December 2006. 
9 See details of composition and report on 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/a ir_portal/hlg/index_en.htm. 
10 The 10 recommendations are given at the end of Annex 2 . 
11 Conclusions of the conference are given in Annex 3 . 
EN 8   EN 3. Informal consultations  were also organised. Beyond bilateral meetings, more 
structured meetings — at European association level — were organised 
directly with the airline community, general aviation (GA), air navigation 
service providers, trade unions (both in the air traffic management industry and 
at Eurocontrol), airports, the milit ary community and aviation equipment 
suppliers. These meetings served as a firs t acid test for more concrete ideas and 
the possible options for legislative proposals. 
Consultation of Commission services 
The inter-service steering group met on 18 and 25 January 2008 to assess the draft 
impact assessment report. Practically all comments and observations were incorporated 
into the text. 
1.3. Results of external consultation rounds 
As stakeholders were continuously involve d in the reflection on the revision, most 
associations and formal consultation bodies  were able to adopt formal positions, 
culminating in a series of presentations. These discussions demonstrated that the 
aviation community expects significant and, es pecially, operationa lly robust proposals 
for change. All stakeholders endorse  the need to introduce a performance 
framework12. 
Broadly speaking, all Member States, includi ng the military representatives, support the 
direction for action suggested in the Commi ssion communication on the ‘First report on 
the implementation of Single Sky and the way forward’. Military airspace users 
expressed the view that the Community should engage with the Ministries of Defence to 
promote collaboration in line with the Statem ent of Member States on military issues 
related to the Single European  Sky, attached to the Framew ork Regulation. In addition, 
they agree that sovereignty should no longer be  seen as an obstacle  to reorganisation of 
the ATM network and that pragmatic soluti ons should be found within a civil-military 
partnership. 
Industry is also supportive of change. Th ere are differences, however, regarding 
timeframe and scope. Among airspace users , the airlines insist on the rapid 
introduction of strong performance re gulation at Community level, while air 
navigation service providers  point to better regulation, subsidiarity and respect for 
local particularities. General aviation  (GA) supports the use of the Community 
method, as long as they are effectively consul ted and the Community sets principles that 
are then implemented locally to ensure flex ible access to airspace and services on fair 
terms. Staff  representatives too endorse the idea of  performance, stressing that safety 
must remain the overriding pr inciple and that workers’ or ganisations must be closely 
involved in the process of change. 
Consultations have shown widespread suppor t for the planned measures to improve 
network management . After some initial concerns on the part of the military that it 
                                                 
12 Stakeholders are represented on the Industry Consultation Body, which has been working 
intensively during the consultation period (from December 2007 onwards). This has resulted in 
substantive position papers. Note that Annex  4 lists all the consultations held. 
EN 9   EN would affect their segregated areas were addressed, all parties now support the creation 
of a route network design body. Concerning the manageme nt of scarce resources, 
expectations are very high — sometimes even unexpectedly high — that the coordination measures will effectively alleviate the shortages. Overall, the changes in network management are seen not so much as  a revolutionary new measure but rather as 
the logical enhancement of alrea dy existing, or planned, initiatives. 
Stakeholders did not agree on the way forward on the measures for opening to the 
market. In general,  this concept was perceived as a managerial tool likely to help in 
reaching performance targets rather than as an  end in itself. While some stakeholders, 
especially airspace users, were favourable to the idea, in general it was felt that the use 
of unbundling should be left to the discretion of Member Stat es and ANSPs rather than 
be imposed at EU level. Unbundling may im pact on contingency and continuity of 
service, and hence is closely linked to core business. Some stakeholders stated that the 
issue should be dealt with during discussions  on integrating services into functional 
airspace blocks. Staff representatives we re against any form of opening. Even on 
meteorological services and tr aining services, stakeholders could not reach a unanimous 
position. 
Discussions on functional airspace blocks  generated no clear fee dback as this issue 
had taken a back seat in relation to the performance framework and the concept of 
economic regulation. However, there was a f eeling that a top-down approach would not 
be welcomed, especially from the military side. 
To conclude, the minimum standards for consultations  were met and stakeholders 
were given the chance to actively cont ribute to the consultation process. 
1.4. Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board  
The report was submitted to the Impact A ssessment Board in early March. Following 
the opinion issued by the Board on 11 Marc h, the following improvements were made 
to the report: 
• Clarification of the problem definition: 
– Institutional issues with Eurocontrol are clarified in 2.2.2.1, last paragraph, 
together with an explanation in Annex 6; 
– The impact of the lack of compe tition for certain unbundled services is 
described in chapter 4; 
– The role of functional airspace blocks is clarified in the assessment in 
chapter 4; 
– The link with SESAR is specified in chapter 2.5; 
• The comparison of options was facilitated by bringing together the 
description and analysis; 
EN 10   EN • The environmental performance of ATM is expressed per flight — as with 
improved airframes and engines; the overa ll level of emissions is the object 
of ETS; 
• The outcome of consultations is fu rther detailed, especially on the 
introduction of market measures; 
2. P ROBLEM DEFINITION  
Aviation is a global industry contributing to  employment, social cohesion and growth. 
Air traffic management13 provides, together with airports, the infrastructure  for air 
transport. Although the current EU air traf fic management system is in general 
functioning well for current needs, it is operating close to its limits  and there is much 
scope for improvement in performance. Europe’s ATM infrastructure is facing a doubling or even, in some regions, tripling of traffic by 2020
14, which will inevitably 
lead to a capacity ceiling and increased de lays and may compromise  safety. Air traffic 
management should not become a bottleneck for aviation growth. 
Air traffic management is a network  industry: the performan ce of the system depends 
on its weakest link. A technical hiccup at one  airport causes a ripple effect throughout 
the whole system, leading to significant ( external ) costs for operators, the travelling 
public and the economy as a whole. Consequent ly, the external costs of a failing system 
may exceed  the costs charged to air space users. 
This means that our system is  confronted with fundamental  problems . Firstly, despite 
the good safety  record, many Member States and se rvice providers need to improve 
safety levels in view of increasing traffic.  The route network has to deal with flight 
inefficiencies  to improve the environmental capacity of aviation. There is also the 
challenge of meeting capacity  requirements to avoid costly delays. Last but not least, 
air traffic management needs to become more cost-efficient . 
2.1. The European air traffic management  system is working at sub-optimal 
level 
The International Civil Aviation Or ganisation (ICAO) has developed a global vision  for 
aviation. Air traffic management should perf orm better. ICAO has therefore come up 
with eleven areas for improving performance.  Four are of particular importance for 
Europe: safety, capacity/delays, cost-efficiency and flight efficiency. Flight efficiency in 
particular is attracting attention as it is intrinsically linked to environmental performance. The performance of the European ATM system can be analysed and 
measured against targets
15. 
                                                 
13 Under the ICAO definition, Air Navigatio n Services are: Air Traffic Management, 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance, Ae ronautical Information Services, MET, and 
Search and Rescue. ATM encompasses Air Traffi c Services, Air Traffic Flow Management, and 
Air Space Management. 
14 PRC Reports. 
15 The report uses as a reference the reports  of the Performance Review Commission of 
Eurocontrol. 
EN 11   EN 2.1.1. Safety 
Safety is the overriding objective of the w hole aviation system. Although Europe has a 
good safety record, safety procedures vary  widely among the Member States. This 
means that accurate and consistent risk meas urement across Europe is lacking. Incident 
reporting, which is mandatory under Community law16, is progressing and provides 
clarity on some risk areas, but progress is  slow and uneven across Member States. 
These variable trends make it difficult to reach  conclusions on safety trends at European 
level. Without robust and tr ansparent reporting and adequate information, it is not 
possible to undertake a performance review. The system also suffers from a lack of best 
practices in safety management17 
Some Member States (i.e. national supervis ory authorities introduced to oversee safety 
under the first SES package) and air navi gation service providers would need to 
enhance their capability to implement all the SES safety requirements and specific 
safety enhancements. Without a proper Eu ropean framework this undermines the 
confidence that every air navigation service provider has been certified properly by the 
local NSA and that the SES regulations are implemented so as to guarantee minimum safety standards
18. 
All in all, despite the good safety record, th ere is a need to improve safety management, 
as increasing traffic leads to an exponential increase  in risk. As yet, there are no 
commonly accepted safety performance indicators  at European level to drive 
improvements in the overall safety perfor mance of air naviga tion service provision. 
2.1.2. Flight efficiency 
Airspace is a scarce resource , which must be used in an optimal way to satisfy the 
requirements of both civil and military airspace users. An optimal flight would allow an 
aircraft to take off steeply to reach its ideal  flight level (some 10 – 13 km high with less 
gravity and resistance) as fast as possible, to take the shortest great circle route, and then 
to continuously descend to a pproach its end destination. 
Flight efficiency  measures the difference between the actual and optimum aircraft 
trajectories. On average, aircraft fly 49km per flight longer  than strictly necessary, or 
about 6% of an average 850km route. This flight  inefficiency is costly in terms of lost 
time and money, but also leads to unnecessary fuel burn  and consequently greenhouse 
gas emissions. If flight efficiency c ould be improved by 2km between 2006 and 2010, 
aviation could save up to €1 080m19. 
                                                 
16 Directive 2003/42/EC of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation; and  
Commission Regulation 2096/ 2005 of 20 December 2005 laying down the common 
requirements for the provision of air navigation services. 
17 Evaluation of the impact of the SES Initia tive on ATM Performance, Eurocontrol PRC, 
December 2006. 
18 Idem and SES Factual Review and Reporting project, 2006. 
19 Performance Review Commission, 2007, An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe 
during the calendar year 200 6, Eurocontrol, Brussels. 
EN 12   EN 2.1.3. Capacity/delays 
Air traffic management should not become a bottleneck  for the development of the 
aviation industry and should be able to cope with demand by providing sufficient capacity. After the crisis provoked by the Yugo slavian war, triggering enormous air 
traffic delays in the ’90s, delays have improved, especially after the 9/11 traffic 
downturn. 
Recently, this improved trend has begun to revers e, as the Eurocontrol ‘notional’ target 
of one minute delay was not met for second consecutive year
20. The main reason is the 
insufficient provision of capacity  and inadequate commitment to the timely and 
complete implementation of capacity plans. 
Delays carry a heavy cost  for operators, the flying public and the economy as a whole: 
9.2 million minutes of delay translate into a cost of €710m (sub-optimal allocation of 
aircraft and crew and time lost for passe ngers). Bigger delays have particularly 
disruptive effects: the two per cent of cancelled flights account for 2/3 of total delays. In 
general, the system is very susceptible to any form of disruption, where the performance 
of the network as a whole depends on the performance of its weakest link.  
2.1.4. Cost-efficiency 
The market for air navigation services amounts to € 7.8bn , or about 4% of the aviation 
market. The largest part, some €6.155bn, is for en-route services, the rest for terminal 
air traffic control. In comparison, air traffic control in the US is nearly twice as 
efficient : it handles nearly two times more traffic for about the same cost as in Europe. 
Further, the annual cost-inefficiencies of th e European system are estimated at €2bn 
(PRR 2005, Chapter 9), which represents  around 20% of the total costs. 
The principles for the financing of  air traffic control are based on ICAO rules , 
established in 1944, when state administrations  still were in char ge of provision. The 
charging rules allow full cost recovery from  users. This system does not provide any 
incentive to improve cost-efficiency and expl ains the strong backing of the civil aviation 
industry for regulation. The Singl e Sky has translated these principles into Community 
law, while allowing Member States to use incentives to improve cost-efficiency. 
None has done so since 200421.  
A system of de facto self-regulation has yielded a patchwork  of results across countries 
(-45% to +32% over the last four  years). Generally, costs have continued to grow  
steadily over the last five years (27.8% for the Eurocont rol 38-country area). The 
notional target of a 3% reduction per serviced flight has not been attained22. The 
achievement of a -3% cost efficiency ta rget between 2003 and 2008 would have saved 
€2.6 billion. If extended to 2020, this target, even if met, would not allow the SESAR 
target  of halving ANS costs to be achieved by that year. 
                                                 
20 Idem. 
21 UK has a price cap system and operates ATC in airports on a market basis. Germany has 
recently introduced compe tition in ATC at some regional airports. 
22 Overview of unit rates over the last 10 years in Annex 5. 
EN 13   EN 2.2. Causes of the persisting problems 
The SES I legislation has introduced powerfu l tools to improve pe rformance through: 
designation of service providers; unbundling of services; use of  economic incentives; 
setting of user charges; changes in r oute structure; establishment of FABs; 
rationalisation of infrastructure23; etc. However, the use of these tools was left to the 
discretion of Member States . Member States have hardly used these tools. Moreover, 
a fully performing system can only be achieve d if the amalgamation of national systems 
is transformed into a genuine network . 
2.2.1. Lack of a genuine European network approach (legal, inst itutional, technical 
fragmentation) 
2.2.1.1. A fragmented system on the ground  … 
Other segments of aviation have been organi sed within the single ma rket, but air traffic 
management has remained heavily fragmented , organised within na tional borders. For 
the sake of clarity, fragmentation in ATM can be defined as th e division of service 
provision into smaller decision-making units than would result from considering the 
optimum scale24. 
Graph 1: Fragmentation of Air Navigation Service Provision  
 
Source: Performance Review Commission Eurocontrol  
This system is the result of historical decisions taken within  the constraints of national 
boundaries,  resulting in the sub-optimal scale of operations . This leads to 
                                                 
23 PRC, 2006, Evaluation of the impact of the SES initiative on air traffic management 
performance , Brussels, p. iii. 
24 The impact of fragmentation in European ATM/CNS, Report commissioned by the Eurocontrol 
PRC, prepared by Helios Economic s and Policy Services, April 2006. 
EN 14   EN fragmentation in airspace, in service provi sion, in systems and in regulations, which 
brings significant additional  overhead costs for airspace users and end-consumers. 
Fragmentation prevents the air traffic ma nagement industry from developing economies 
of scale, leading to the sub-optimal size  of en-route centres and unnecessary 
duplication  of systems between and within countries25, with the associated support and 
maintenance costs. 
Table 1: Annual Cost of Fragmentation in Air Navigation Service Provision 
 
Source: PRC, 2006, the Impact of Fragmentation in European ATM/CNS, p. 55 
The comparison here is against a theoretical ideal with a reduced number of centres and 
a common system. 
Despite technological progress in  aviation in general, air traffic control (ATC) remains 
primarily craftsmanship . While cockpits have become automated, ATC systems have 
not evolved and controller working me thods are fundamentally unchanged. The 
productivity  of air traffic controllers (the numbe r of flight-hours controlled for each 
hour spent by an ATCO on operational duty) is low in Europe : on average, an air 
traffic controller monitors less th an 1 aircraft at  any given time26. 
The increase in traffic is met mainly by opening new ‘sectors’ with a proportional 
increase  in staffing and hence cost. As this appro ach is reaching its limits, it will lead to 
                                                 
25 Some Member States have integrated military and civil service provision, which reduces costs 
and allows for a genuinely flexible use of airspace. 
26 The ratio of the number of controller hours divided by the number of flight hours controlled is 
0.7 — PRC reports. 
EN 15   EN a capacity wall in the coming 5 to 10 year s without the necessary technological 
innovation. 
2.2.1.2. … leads to fragmentation in the air The main reason for horizontal
27 flight inefficiency is the lack of an optimised 
strategic  design and use of airspace from a trans-European  network  perspective: 
routes may be direct within national airs pace, but this does not imply the shortest 
distance between departure and destination. Th e current European route network is still 
an amalgamation  of the national routes that served the (then) national flag carrier or 
followed conventional terrestrial radionaviga tion aid facilities. Therefore, the route 
network is not always well aligned with curr ent cross-border traffic flows. The shortest 
available routes are underus ed due to the lack of pr ecise real-time information. 
The Performance Review Commission points out  that 63% of route inefficiencies can 
be resolved within country  boundaries and the other third at country interfaces, which 
demonstrates the European dimension of fli ght efficiency. At pres ent, air navigation 
service providers are not pena lised if they do not offer the optimal available route and 
airlines are not penalised if they do not take  the optimal route but use longer routes to 
avoid costly areas. 
Graph 2: Flight inefficiencies 
A patchwork of national networks 
In order to ensure the safety and orderline ss of traffic and to avoid areas reserved for 
military training, aircraft do not fly straight but are required to use a historically grown 
patchwork of routes. In this way, they mi ss out on one of the major advantages of air 
traffic: the ability to travel ‘as the crow flies’. 
 
                                                 
27 Vertical inefficiency is a lim ited issue at European level — 23 kg more fuel consumption per 
flight, or 0.6%, while horizontal inefficiency results in 5.9% more. 
EN 16   EN Member States are hesitant to tackle airspa ce fragmentation. Routes (and hence traffic) 
determine income flows  for air navigation service provid ers and hence directly impact 
on employment28. Another source of reluctance is the military , which have their own 
exercise areas along routes. 
Currently, the route network is managed on an intergovernmental basis  within 
Eurocontrol, where Members States, with the help of their air navigation service 
providers, come together to disc uss improvements to the network29. This model brings 
together stakeholders that would not normally  agree to coordinate  their air navigation 
service providers or netw orks. However, there are no incentives  to change, and the 
voluntary nature of the process is also its gr eatest drawback in that  exactly those parties 
that most need to improve are always able  to stop short of actually implementing the 
agreed improvements. 
Another issue is the need to enforce Member  State implementation of  appropriate routes 
and sectors to optimise airspace use, especial ly at weekends where there is no military 
activity. Currently, there are no performance indicators to  monitor progress in the 
effective  use of airspace by civil and military users . 
2.2.1.3. … and insufficient network manageme nt capacities and coordination of 
management of scarce resources 
Linked to fragmentation is the failure to establish robust network management  
functions. As noted above, routes are determ ined in a national context and not with the 
interest of the network  in mind. Similarly, national cons iderations in the distribution 
of some scarce resources — for example radi o frequencies — cause inefficiencies, as 
every actor has to keep a pool of reserve fr equencies for itself, due to the lack of a 
system of coordination to ensure more effici ent allocation of frequencies. This in turn 
causes the scarce resources to run out prematurely and leads to unnecessary installation of new technologies, when better use of ex isting resources coul d avoid those costs
30. 
Hence, the network management initiative seeks to answer not only the problems of 
flight inefficiency and the environment, but also that of unnecessary cost . 
In general, flight efficiency depends not only on the use of airspa ce, but also on other 
scarce resources. Many technologies are also  limited in how many ‘customers’ they can 
serve, which limits capacity growth in th e ATM system and causes additional costs by 
requiring the installation of alternativ e technologies. A good example of these 
                                                 
28 Aircraft operators are charged on the basis of the distance flown through national airspace 
(multiplied by a factor for weight) according to the last filed flight plan. 
29 Eurocontrol Route Network Design Sub-Group. 
30 For example, the urgency of implementing equipage with 8.33 KHz radios in aircraft is mainly 
due to poor coordination of frequency allocation in Europe. Despite having twice the European traffic, the US does not see a need for this invest ment — which in Europe carries a cost of some 
€600-800 million — because as a single administration it has been able to establish efficient 
frequency usage and coordination. Community spectrum policy supports efficient use of frequency bands, which has so far not been attain ed in aviation. A similar situation exists for 
example for transponder codes. 
EN 17   EN constraints is radio frequencies31. The VHF frequency band currently allocated to 
aviation is 118 to 136 MHz (allowing 720 channels, with 25 KHz spacing).  
Traffic growth requires more and more ch annels, since each new air traffic control 
sector needs its own channel to ensure interference-free communications . However, 
the installation of new technology (for exam ple to reduce channel spacing and thus 
create new channels within the assigned band)  is very costly due to the large number of 
radio stations to be equipped. To re-equi p all the 120 000 to 150 000 stations with new 
radios, for example, the cost would be in the order of €600-750 million32. This 
underlines the need to strive for optimal use of these scarce resources  through 
coordination and optimal allocation to pe rmit capacity growth and cost-efficiency. 
2.2.1.4. … and unnecessary fuel burn and environmental impact A direct consequence of fli ght inefficiencies and sub-op timal management of scarce 
resources is the problem of unnecessary fuel burn  in aviation. Aviation currently 
contributes around 3% of all CO
2 emissions in Europe. Air traffic management could 
play a considerable role in limiting emissions — some 7-12%  of emissions are 
influenced by ATM measures33. Improving horizontal flight  efficiency could save 
nearly 5 million tonnes  of CO 2 per annum. This could offset , at least for a while, the 
emissions from a growing aviation industry.34 Environmental impact should be a 
consideration in route design. Noise is another issue, especially in terminal areas, where 
noise restrictions may sometimes affect environmental performance. 
A quote from a recent PRC report:35 ‘In the European core area, 32% of the airspace 
volume above FL195 is shared between civi l traffic and milita ry activities. On 
average… the shared airspace is assigned 74% of the time to civi l traffic and 26% to 
military operations. In the European core area, although shared airspace is fully 
available for civil traffic one  third of the year (i.e. weekends), airspace utilisation by 
civil traffic does not improve significantly compared to we ekdays. During weekdays, in 
the European core area, the airspace booked by  military is actually not used half of the 
time (13% of the daytime period on a yearly basis) .’ 
                                                 
31 Current technologies that are quickly becoming scarce include radio frequencies and (radar) 
transponder codes, but as traffic grows, more and more technologies are li kely to approach their 
capacity limits and their optimal  use has to be addressed. 
32 The calculation is based on the conservative a ssumption of only one radio on average for each 
aircraft or ground station and an average price of €5 000 per radio installation. Many aircraft 
have more than one radio and the cost of radio installation varies widely depending on radio and 
aircraft type, so exact estimates are difficult. 
33 Performance Review Commission, 2007, An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe 
during the calendar year 2006, Eurocontrol.  
34 ATM, like research on engines and airframe s, deals only with environmental performance per 
flight . Total emissions as such are not addressed. 
35 Evaluation of civil/military airspace utilisation, 15 November 2007, PRC. 
EN 18   EN 2.2.2 Poor governance of a natural monopoly 
2.2.2.1 National monopolies under self-regulation 
One of the most prominent features of th is sector is that air traffic services36 are 
provided by natural monopolies  not subject to competition. Physical and technological 
constraints make it impossible for two air tr affic control organisa tions to compete for 
control in the same airspace. Competition for the market is also difficult due to high 
sunk costs. 
In a number of Member States, air na vigation service providers have been 
corporatised37 with a view to increasing the qualit y of services. The problem is that 
regulatory structures  have not been adapted to cope with these natural monopolies38. 
Strong oversight  depends on separation from service provision to avoid conflicts of 
interest. In some Member States, oversight authorities are still in a learning phase and understaffed. Some authorities need support and cooperation to effectively implement 
SES obligations. 
Continuing with the traditional principle of full cost recovery
39 has not given sufficient 
incentives to service providers in Europe to  control costs and ma ke productivity gains. 
Indeed, the US system — which is run as a state administration — manages to handle 
twice the traffic at a similar cost. 
Few countries have developed a proper econo mic regulatory framework together with 
proper oversight of investment plans and spending of the ai r navigation service provider 
in order to introduce incentives to cut cost s or improve services. In any case, no matter 
how effective a separate national economic oversight structure is, it cannot overcome 
the deficiencies affecting the entire network. Benchmarking  through performance 
review under the Eurocontrol in ter-governance structure has ke pt self-regulation and has 
not led to satisfactory results. 
Weak governance explains why SES I has not delivered the expected results in some 
important areas. In general, the functional airspace blocks  approach40 is not producing 
the benefits hoped for in terms of improve d flight efficiency, cost reduction and 
defragmentation. Early indications from ongoing initiatives are that tangible results in 
terms of cost reductions a nd capacity increases are modest at this stage.  
One — but not the only — reason for this is that most projects have been launched by 
air navigation service providers without sufficient support  from Member States41. It 
                                                 
36 ATC is a service provided for: preventing collis ions between aircraft; preventing collisions on 
manoeuvring areas between aircraft and obstructions on the ground; and expediting and 
maintaining the orderly flow of traffic. 
37 Removed from government and turned into state-owned corporations. Only the UK NATS is a 
public-private partnership. For details on shareholding see www.nats.co.uk. 
38 ICAO Doc. ANSConf-WP/26(2000). 
39 ICAO principles allow for the full recovery of costs for air navigation service provision. Member 
States have scrupulously applied this prin ciple to recover costs from airspace users. 
40 Regulation 551, Article 5. 
41 ‘Evaluation of FAB initiatives and their contri bution to performance improvement’, 2008, PRC 
study, ordered by the European Commission. 
EN 19   EN has also become clear that the division between upper and lo wer airspace set at flight 
level 285 (28 500 feet) is artificial and only contributes to unn ecessary fragmentation, 
thus running counter to the SES objectives. In  fact, even though not legally required, all 
ongoing FAB projects currently cover all the airspace. 
While it is recognised that the creation of FA Bs is a new challenge and faces significant 
technical and organisational difficulties, sovereignty , particularly the Member States’ 
responsibilities and associated liability for their airspace and the involvement of the 
military, remains an issue. Instead of pr ompting innovative mechanisms to exercise 
sovereignty, it often is used as an argument  against enhanced cross-border cooperation 
and integration. 
Following successful certifica tion, each air navigation serv ice provider is entitled to 
offer its services in other EU countries. However, no Member State has taken up this opportunity to designate a foreign provider. Some Member States have even raised the 
issue that the designa tion of foreign providers is pr ohibited under their national law. 
Nor have Member States used the possibility to unbundle  some services to improve 
their quality. 
Governance is an acute and widely recogni sed problem within Eurocontrol. Over the 
years, Member States have had a clear sepa ration between regulation, oversight, service 
provision and financing. In Eurocontrol, thes e functions have all been concentrated 
within an intergovernmental structure. Regulation  is flawed by the requirement to 
obtain consensus for decision-making. Moreove r, the implementation of rules depends 
on the good-will of Member States. Oversight  is not organised for all non-regulatory 
activities, and responsibility for both oversig ht and service provision remains within the 
same organisation. Aircraft operators, who finance  the ATM system through charges, 
and air navigation service providers that have  been corporatised at  national level have 
difficulty influencing decisions on  operational issues within an intergovernmental  
organisation where final deci sions are taken by Member St ates, which may no longer be 
responsible for directly providing air transport or air navigation services. 
2.2.2.2 Sovereignty and the military  
Changes to the ATM system have always proved difficult because of the association of 
airspace management with sovereignty and defe nce. Member States are sensitive to the 
introduction of rules for the design and use of  airspace. As signatories to the Chicago 
Convention, they see airspace management as a means to comply with their obligations. 
An intergovernmental approach , however, cannot ensure the flexible and effective 
use of a common resource — airspace — for all users. Although ICAO offers a global 
regulatory framework, Member States are inc lined to deviate from these standards due 
to ‘national particularities’.  
The country reports for the ICAO Univer sal Safety Oversight Audit Programme 
indicate large differences in the compliance of Member States with ICAO standards and 
recommended practices (SARPS). They al so point to worrying issues with safety 
oversight capability . Especially striking is the fact th at Member States are to be found 
in both the most compliant and the least co mpliant third of count ries audited, which 
shows that the intergovernmental approach 
maintains regulatory fragmentation .  
EN 20   EN Similarly, the ongoing study by the European Commission, ICAO and Eurocontrol on 
the official differences from ICAO SAR PS reported by Member States has so far 
revealed 1 522 differences (situation as at 20 February 2008). These are all cases where 
Member States have implemented their own national rules or procedures  in place of 
the commonly agreed ICAO rules.  
Both studies indicate a worry ing tendency for Member Stat es to accept non-uniformity 
and disregard for ICAO rules. The negative im pact on safety is obvious, as ICAO rules 
have been put in place mainly to ensure that  international air traffic can operate in the 
knowledge that safety rules are implemented and applied in a harmonious manner in all 
countries. This may lead pilots to mis understand local procedures or controller 
instructions and cause a safety hazard. This form of regulatory fragmentation is incompatible with a single aviation market and is irrelevant to defence interests. 
Military airspace users demand a fair share of  access to airspace. However, building an 
effective civil/military relationship on ATM issu es through the ‘second pillar’ of the EU 
(the Common Foreign and Security Policy) is not always easy. Variations in the 
organisation of civil/milita ry cooperation in the EU stand in the way of uniform and 
timely airspace management  and the implementation of changes. Moreover, the 
military has no mechanism for establishing a common European view, as this is 
impeded by different alignments of states  — NATO or not, neutral or not. Where 
agreements are in place, they have been concluded between a lim ited number of states. 
2.3. Who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent? 
Air traffic control provides its services and guarantees safe flights outside the awareness 
of the flying public. Only when there is the least disruption, such as  delays, incidents 
caused by bad weather or acci dents does air traffi c control become vi sible, underlining 
the critical need for safe and effi cient air traffic control practices.  
A better performing air traffic control ne twork will benefit the whole economy. 
• The flying public , particularly professional travellers , will benefit most in terms of 
safety and time. The increased reliability and resilience of the system should reduce 
external costs. 
• Member States  should adopt a network appro ach to offer aviation the best 
infrastructure to ensure that it prospers. 
• Oversight authorities  need to ensure a standard overs ight capability in view of the 
integration of service provision. 
• Defence : the military is involved as airspace  user, oversight authority, service 
provider and regulator. It is of  the utmost importance to ensure that security needs 
are catered for. 
• Airlines  finance the air traffic control system and should be guaranteed performance 
standards. As the air traffi c control system evolves, pilots  will benefit from better 
navigation tools and better surveillance. 
EN 21   EN • General Aviation42 will be able to rely on better performing air traffic control. 
• Air navigation service providers  will become subject to performance regulation. 
This may lead to restructuring and require staff  involvement. 
• The efficiency of airports  impacts on the performance of  the network. Predictability 
requires all stakeholders to collaborate. Ai rports will have to integrate information on 
their operations to ensure an efficient gate-to-gate system. 
• The equipment  industry must ensure the swif t introduction of new technologies. 
2.4. How will the problem evolve, all thin gs being equal? Should the EU act? 
While major achievements  can be observed since the adoption of the legislative 
package in 2004, there is a pressing n eed to adjust the legislation to overcome current 
limitations , adapt to technical change and take account of new challenges. 
First of all, the external an alysis demonstrates that Memb er States have not fully used  
important tools for improving efficiency. This leads to variation in performance, 
whereby the performance of the network as a whole depends on the performance of its 
weakest link. 
4. The level of ambition for the regional integration of serv ice providers into 
FABs differs widely: while some initi atives are promising, others can be 
considered as window-dressing; 
5. No Member State has used the possibility to unbundle services and open them 
up to markets; 
6. Only one Member State uses an economic incentive scheme43; 
7. The route and sector design mandate remains blocked. These instruments need to be used in a coordinated manner in order to tackle the 
problems of fragmentation and flight inefficiency. 
Secondly, while the first legislative packag e was mainly driven by the dramatic 
increases in delays after the Kosovo crisis, the legislation does not take due account of 
new challenges  such as the environment. 
Thirdly, the current organisation of the ATM syst em is in general not able to cope with 
the future growth of traffic. Th ere is a need to speed up the pace of innovation , 
coordinate the introduction of  new technologies and ensu re their con tinuous updating. 
SESAR is intended to bring about this technol ogical leap towards a better performing 
system. This requires financial control a nd the use of incentives to orchestrate 
technological progress. 
                                                
 
42 General aviation covers all flights other than mi litary and scheduled airline flights, both private 
and commercial. General aviation flights range from gliders and powered parachutes to large, non-scheduled cargo jet flights. 
43 UK NATS see: www.nats.co.uk  ; www.caa.co.uk . 
EN 22   EN Consultations and studies have re vealed wide recognition of the need for change and 
the threat posed by the current incapacity to the longer-term position of air navigation 
service providers and their employees (social sustainability): if the problems are not tackled early, there is a danger of a cris is leading to sudden and uncoordinated re-
organisation. 
In conclusion, there is overall agreement that  it is time for the Community to act with a 
view to improving the performance of the ATC industry and to prepare for future challenges, so as to ensure that aviation plays its role in contributing to the Lisbon 
objectives. 
3. O
BJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSALS  
The High Level Group on the future European regulatory framework advised the 
Commission to focus on performance . The over-arching gene ral objective of the 
revision of the Single Sky legislation is to ensure that the ATM system will provide the infrastructure  for the aviation industry and other users so that the Lisbon objectives 
can be met. This will be done by stre ngthening the network approach. Community 
intervention is possible on the basis of Article 80(2)  of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. 
The table below depicts the hierarchy of objectives. 
General Objective 
ATM to provide the infrastructure for the aviati on industry and other users to meet the Lisbon 
objectives  
Specific objectives 
Improved performance  of ATM; 
Target ATM to enhance safety, capacity and cost-efficiency; Introduce the notion of the environmental 
performance of aviation; 
Transform the amalgamation of national systems into a seamless, gate-to-gate network for the benefit of aviation. Consistent governance of service provision 
within the regulatory performance framework. 
Operational objectives 
•  Introduce a framework for setting 
binding objectives  for air navigation 
service providers at Community level, including performance review and follow-up; 
• Strengthen network functions; 
• Make use of the market where possible; 
• Support initiatives to integrate service 
provision. • Proper balance between the Community method 
and local discretion; 
• Establish the basis for the independence of 
national supervisory authorities. 
EN 23   EN 4. P OLICY OPTIONS  
The performance proposals build upon SES I, consolidate and develop it  by 
strengthening instruments, and provide a framework adapted to particular ATM 
characteristics. As the first pill ar of the proposals, a system of performance regulation  
is to be introduced. Based on the strong tradition of benchmarking against quantified targets by the Performance Review Com mission, options will be analysed for 
transforming this self-regulatory system with voluntary targets into a genuine regulatory 
system capable of driving th e performance of the networ k. Network-wide objectives 
will provide the basis for a process to translate these objectives into local targets. The 
Charging Regulation
44 can be used as a tool to pr ovide economic incentives. As the 
second pillar, to supplement perf ormance regulation, the necessary regulatory tools 
need to be put in place to strengthen network management functions . Scarce 
resources are best managed from a networ k perspective. Thirdly, beyond regulation, 
competition  should be considered for areas wher e a process of consolidation could 
yield better quality for lower price than pe rformance regulation. Finally, as the fourth 
pillar, initiatives to integr ate service provision within functional airspace blocks  
should be supported as a tool to reach the performance targets. 
In order to facilitate unde rstanding of the impact of the different options, the 
descriptions of the options are given toge ther with the analyses of their impact. 
4.1. First pillar: Performance regulation for monopoly services 
Performance regulation needs to put in pl ace (i) mechanisms to set Community-wide 
principles and objectives for safety, the e nvironment, capacity and cost-efficiency and 
(ii) the processes for translating these objec tives into local binding targets for each 
ANSP.  
Three options are studied: the status quo (Op tion 1), local target setting (Option 2), 
where decisions on targets are taken at national level, and Community target setting, 
where decisions are taken at European level. This last option has tw o variants (Options 
3a and 3b). 
4.1.1. Option 1: Status quo – continue  with current SES legislation 
The first SES package already contains a number of tools for improving efficiency: 
• The legal barriers to cross- border cooperation have been removed with system-wide 
recognition of certificates for ANS providers  and Community air traffic controller 
licensing. Further, Member St ates are legally obliged to reconf igure their upper 
airspace into functional airspace blocks45, which are supposed to bring about 
defragmentation and rationalis ation of infrastructure.  
                                                 
44 Commission Regulation 1796/2006 of 6 December 2006 on laying down a common charging 
scheme for air navigation services. 
45 Article 2 of the Framework Regulation defines ‘f unctional airspace block’ as an airspace block 
based on operational requirements, reflecting the need to ensure more integrated management of 
airspace regardless of ex isting national boundaries. 
EN 24   EN • The legislation allows the unbundling of services and the use of economic incentives 
(including economic regulation regimes for ANSPs and unbundling), but leaves this 
to the discretion of the Member States. Member States can also use designation 
procedures to impose performance levels. 
Option 1 ‘Do-nothing’ / Status quo 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact / Likelihood of reaching 
targets -
- Self-regulation does not give sufficient incentive for change and obtaining 
economies of scale, so has a limited effect in terms of performance improvement. The effect is also unpredictable, uncoordinated and 
dependent on the willingness of Member States and ANSPs to reach these 
targets.  
The variation in performance across the network brings overall 
performance down to that of the weakest link. 
Excessive charges result in higher prices and lower mobility for end-
customers, the weakened competitiv eness of European airlines, and a 
reduced ability to invest in SESAR programmes. 
Improvements in parts of the netw ork may be offset by growing 
inefficiencies in some ANSPs.  
Responsibility for network management and airspace regulation is diluted 
between ANSPs, Member States and Eurocontrol. The resulting non-optimal route network has a high ne gative economic and environmental 
impact.  
2. Social 
impact - ANSPs continue managing restructuring following their own rhythm. 
Governance structures are blu rred: responsibilities for network 
management and airspace regulation ar e currently diluted between ANSPs, 
Member States and Eurocontrol, resulting in insufficient capacity in 
several areas. 
The social impact is borne by airlines, which are adversely affected by 
constraints on growth and excessive cost s, and by the EU at large because 
of delays incurred by passengers, poor job creation in the air transport sector and low induced job creation in the economy at large.  
Moreover, if the European ATM situat ion does not improve, this will have 
a negative impact on overall European mobility and therefore on the 
internal market and social cohesion. 
3 Environmental impact -
- The SES I Package does not address environmental issues. 
The sub-optimal design and management of airspace leads to a non-
optimal route network with a high negative environmental impact.  
4.1.2. Option 2: Local target setting (LTS) 
An independent Performance Review Body  (PRB) proposes non-binding European-
wide objectives on the basis of information it collects and analyses. The Community objectives are translated into local targets  by the national supervisory authorities 
(NSAs). After consultation of  ANSPs and users, the pric ing of services and the 
performance targets are approved by the NSAs  and communicated to the Commission. 
EN 25   EN Option 2 ‘Local Target setting’ 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact / Likelihood of 
reaching 
targets + Improvements will remain slow and vary from Member State to Member 
State. Convergence will not be guaranteed (patchwork of variable national performance levels). 
This option risks adding to fragmentation: good performers already carry 
out cost-containment exercises and already perform well. Bad performers will feel hardly any pressure to contain their costs and converge towards the good performers. The costs of the fragmentation of service provision and sub-optimal route 
networks will continue to be borne  by airspace users, passengers, and 
ultimately by the EU at large (see estimates above). 
2. Social impact = Limited social impact for ANSPs, as they will remain masters of their cost 
containment efforts. The restructuring of ANSPs will be slow and will have a limited impact on their employees. This scenario will bring about only limited improvement in the social 
domain. Airspace users and the EU at large will continue to bear all the 
social costs of the shortcomings of the system, which are well above the social benefits enjoyed by ANSP employees. Governance: the chances fo r the success of this option will be greater if 
NSAs can be appropriately sized and protected from political influence 
through independence from state admi nistrations. However, this will 
generate substantia l additional costs. 
3 
Environmental impact - The issue will only be tackled at national level. The European aspect of 
flight efficiency and the corresponding environmental impact risks being ignored.  The environmental situation risks worsening as the gap between good and 
bad performers widens, thus prompting airlines to fly longer routes to 
avoid costly airspaces. 
4.1.3. Option 3a: European target setting (ETS) 
Performance regulation for ANS provision is carried out at Community level. This 
option is inspired by the regulatory proce ss used for the Emissions Trading Scheme. 
The Commission approves  the performance targets on the basis of proposals by 
national authorities , after verifying that the propos ed contribution to the overall 
performance objectives is sufficiently amb itious and realistic. Th e Commission’s takes 
an individual decision for each Member  State (or, in future, for each FAB) 
communicating its final and bi nding performance targets. 
This option is based on a combination of  local initiative and Community decision-
making, ensuring that the overa ll, system-wide performance targets are complied with 
and that the targets set are binding and enforced. 
5.1.3 Option 3.a European Target Setting (ETS) 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
EN 26   EN 1. Economic 
impact / 
Likelihood of reaching targets +++ The option can be implemented wit hout any additional structure (NSAs 
will need to be strengthened but the additional costs will be marginal). 
Coherent and substan tial improvements in operational and economic 
efficiency can be enforced. This w ill bring certainty regarding savings on 
route charges, flight time and fuel burn for airspace users and their passengers. Moreover, it will prov ide more certainty that SESAR 
objectives will be met.  
Furthermore, airlines will be able to  use these savings to invest in SESAR 
programmes, thus generating even faster improvements in capacity, 
reduced delays, flight efficiency (environment) and safety. 
2. Social impact +++ Improved service provision and economic efficiency will enable the 
sustainable growth of air traffic and thus contribute to the quantity and 
quality of jobs at all levels (ANSPs, airlines, industry, EU). 
The restructuring of ANSPs will be more effective than in the ‘local target 
setting’ option. The cost reductions imposed through targets set at EU level may necessitate restructuring in their business organisation, such as the integration of service provision. Pe rsonnel will be able to benefit from 
the Community license and exercise mobility.  
Governance: this option can be im plemented without any additional 
structure (NSAs will need to be stre ngthened but the additional costs will 
be marginal). Social efforts by the ANSPs will be more than offset  by the increased 
potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced effects on 
the economy at large.  
3 Environmental 
impact +++ The combination of local initiative (making use of local knowledge and 
respecting national sovereignty and military requirements) and 
Community decision-making is expected to bring positive and substantial improvements in flight efficiency and therefore in the environment. Clear responsibilities for target setting,  network management and airspace 
regulation will ensure that environmental performance targets are met. 
4.1.4. Option 3b: Europe an Regulator (ETS) 
Performance regulation for ANS provision is fully entrusted to a Community agency: 
this ‘ SES Performance Agency’  carries out independent pe rformance reviews of the 
local/regional ANSPs and, after extensive cons ultation of stakeholde rs, issues proposals 
for European-wide performance objectives as well as specific performance targets for 
all 27 ANSPs. The Commission adopts the fina l binding individual targets and transmits 
them to the national authorities for implementation. 
Option 3.b ‘European Regulator’ 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact / Likelihood of reaching 
targets ++9 The most radical  approach, bringing results immediately after 
implementation. However, this option necessitates the cr eation of a European agency, with 
the following drawbacks:  
The time needed
 to establish an SES Performance Agency, plus 
the time needed to allow it to perform its task of setting binding individual performance targets, is considerable and may be some 
EN 27   EN 6 years. 
Administrative costs : by far the most costly policy option in terms of 
administrative budget. The agency will require a staff of at least 50 and an annual budget of more than €5 million per year.  
2. Social impact -- Because of the lack of local initiative,  the social impact will be radical and 
likely to trigger resistance from controllers in particular. Governance: would require the establishment of a new agency. 
3 Environmental 
impact +++ The most effective scenario in terms of environmental efficiency, as 
Member States will be left with no room for manoeuvre. Flight efficiency 
improvements will be driven by a top-down approach. 
However, the weak point of this scenar io is that it does not in itself take 
into account the military/sovereignty aspects of route design. This risks generating resistance from national and military authorities. 
4.2. Second pillar: Network approach for a European-level network and the 
management of scarce resources: 
Network management Network management comprises a wide range  of network management tasks. These 
tasks form a set of flexible coordination and planning functions to l ook after the interest 
of the whole European network. The diffe rent network management tasks, which 
together form the ‘Network Manager’, can be  handled by different actors, but together 
consist of at least the following: 
• Route network design 
• Management of scarce resources 
• Traffic flow management and slot coordination & allocation 
• Management of network technologi es resulting from SESAR (‘System 
Wide Information Management’, satellite-based datalinks, etc.) 
• Coordination of technologi es & their procurement 
Some of these functions need to be deta iled through implementing rules, and it is 
important for SES II to provide for these in order to prepare for SESAR implementation.  
In line with proper application of subsidiarity , the design of sectors — unlike routes — 
is best left to the service providers, as it goe s deep into local arrangements, such as staff 
rostering and qualifications. Airspace design in the wider sense of allocating different 
airspace classes or segregated (military) areas to  different parts of airspace is also best 
left to national or FAB level, given state sovereignty in this area and military concerns. 
The only European-level rules envisaged here are general principles stating that airspace 
design is performed at local level taking in to account traffic demands and complexity 
and including consultation of all airspace users. 
EN 28   EN Route network design function 
Route network  design is used below as the ‘model’  case for all these network 
functions, since it is represen tative. The other functions coul d be organised in a similar 
fashion, or simplified for the coordination of scarce reso urces, which involves purely 
distributional tasks.  
As the problem largely revolves around the lack of coordination  and an overall system 
level  strategy, all the options considered  involve introducing better and more 
concentrated coordination functions. Decentr alising network management to local or 
FAB level would only aggravate the current difficulties, which are due to the 
fragmented use of airspace and other resources.  
Experience shows that the efficient use of a network requires an independent ‘network 
design function’, in which a ll Member States pa rticipate. This will propose a route 
network that combines local, regional and Eu ropean network needs in a way that takes 
into account not only th e needs of all three groups of airspace users and the ANSPs but 
also the efficiency of the wider transport network  (intermodality). The aim is 
primarily to create the shortest possible rout es between different city pairs and provide 
the airspace needed by non-commercial airsp ace users to operate, while also taking into 
account other justifiable concerns. The impl ementation of the network should then be 
overseen and its efficiency monitored re gularly by the Performance Review Body. 
Three main options can be identified fo r route network desi gn, and are developed 
below. All aim for the gradual adaptation and optimisation of the route network: 
Option 1 — Status quo  
The current system can be described as a loos e, ‘soft’ form of coordination at European 
level, which is easy for Member States to accept and comparable to the local target 
setting (LTS) option described for perfor mance regulation (see 4.1 above). While 
Member States are fully responsible for thei r route networks, the majority have agreed 
to meet together in the Eurocontrol R oute Network Development Sub-Group (RNDSG). 
This group does not make decisi ons on routes, but acts as a forum for states , ANSPs 
and some airline representatives to discuss issues. Its resolutions or conclusions are 
therefore in no way binding on the Member States. In th is option, while coordination 
work is important, decisions  are taken at local level. 
Option 1 — Status Quo 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact  -- Major improvements to the current situation are unlikely. Under the SES I 
rules, the Community is allowed to develop implementing rules for route and sector design principles. However, decisions on routes are simply too complex to be the subject of anything but a case-by-case assessment. Therefore, the current model, usin g the Eurocontrol RNDSG Group, has 
largely come to the end of its development possibilities, risking a 
EN 29   EN considerable economic a nd environmental cost. 
As air traffic is expected to double or even triple in the next 20-30 years, 
this cost will not rise proportionall y, but increase all the more due to 
congestion exacerbating the network choke points.  
2. Social 
impact - This option will not have any immediate social impact, but compared to 
the ideal situation (with an optimised network) it has a social cost . If the 
network were better designed it woul d allow air transport to develop 
without the previously mentioned annual €2bn charge and thus create more 
secondary services and jobs. Airlines would be able to expand their 
operations or alternatively compete with slightly lower prices. Additionally, they would benefit from being able to make better use of 
their fleets due to shorter routes, hence freeing aircraft for additional 
operations. All this has the potential to create jobs among airspace users, 
which is not the case in the first option. 
3 Environmental impact -- The current situation already causes CO
2 emissions of around 5 million 
tonnes per year. Increasing traffic and congestion would make this much worse, since delays and congestion of ten mean having to hold aircraft at 
airports or in the air with their engines running, and flying at sub-optimal altitudes, which increases fuel consumption and emissions. 
Option 2 — Central network design & management function augmented by 
national and European consultation mechanisms  
This second option is based on Community d ecision-making, but the in itiative is shared 
between the local/FAB level and European level. It calls for an independent network design body to be set up to arbitrate between the overall e fficiency of th e network and 
local constraints and specificities, such as m ilitary interests. The lo cal levels makes their 
best route design proposals (having first c onsulted local airspace users and ANSPs) and 
the network design body ensures the cohere nce of these local proposals and their 
compatibility with the overall performance targets. After in-depth consideration and 
European-level consultation of stakeholders , the network design body finalises its draft 
and submits it for Commission considerati on. The Commission take s its final decision 
on the European route network plan after having obtained the positive opinion of the 
Single Sky Committee (using qualified major ity voting). The Commi ssion also ensures 
that adequate appeal and re view procedures are in place  to preserve Member State 
sovereignty and overriding national interests. 
Option 2 — Central network design & management function augmented by 
national and European consultation mechanisms 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact  ++ This option will probably be very efficient purely from the network 
viewpoint, even if some compromises are necessary after consultation of Member States and stakeholders. It will not only ensure an optimised network and corresponding savings, but also considerable commitment on 
the part of Member States and stakeholders. There are also potential 
EN 30   EN economic gains for the airlines, which will be able to cut their costs and 
utilise their aircraft more efficiently, thereby opening up new routes and 
increasing revenue. This potential is im possible to quantify exactly, since 
it depends on the current route network of each airline, its product portfolio, and the general economic cycle and the demand for seats or freight capacity.  
Since Member States and national service providers would be involved in 
the work, the personnel savings would be minor, but the political 
acceptability of decisions will be hugely enhanced. The ANSPs would have some concerns about losing traffic due to route changes, but much less so than in option 3, as their concerns would be properly heard and taken into account under the appeal and review procedures. The economic 
impact would thus be roughly comparab le with option 3, depending on the 
effectiveness of the consultation me chanism, which may even be better 
than with a single central designer by being more efficient in conveying local or regional constraints to the design body. 
2. Social impact + Compared to option 3, the model has a significant positive social impact. 
Some changes in the work performed  by staff and some — real or 
perceived — loss of sovereignty would result in this option as well, but the 
gains should be enough to outweigh the negative side-effects. The majority 
of staff at national level would continue to be needed for the collection of data and stakeholder views, while the central network design function 
would need to obtain sufficient expertise. The positive effects of 
improving the efficiency of the air tr ansport network will give the industry 
a similar ‘a license to grow’ as in op tion 3 and thus have a positive impact 
on jobs and employment. 
3 Environmental impact ++ As with the other options, the potential for environmental improvement is 
considerable. It is difficult to evaluate exactly how much in the way of emissions will be avoided, but the pot ential is more than the proportional 
increase in traffic since congestion e ffects then also come into play. If 
many compromises are necessary following consultations, the positive 
impact might be lessened or at least different in character (for example less 
noise in exchange for more emissions) but  will still be practically equal to 
option 3. Here too, the end result naturally depends on whether the route network improvements also lead to increased flight activity. 
Option 3 — Central network designer and implementer of changes  
The third option would be to create a st rong Community network agency, independent 
of all other actors. It will have sufficient expertise to design the network by itself and be 
institutionally separate from Member St ates, ANSPs and airspace users. Following 
stakeholder consultation by the Agency, the fi nalised network plan will be implemented 
by a Commission decision binding on all Member  States. This will guarantee that the 
network design plan focuses only on creatin g the shortest possible routes between 
different city pairs and providing the airspa ce needed by non-commercial airspace users 
to operate. In this scenario, the initiative is fully at Community level, with Member 
States only consulted in the preparatory phase. 
EN 31   EN Option 3 — Central network designer and implementer of changes 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact  ++ This option would be the most effi cient from a purely network viewpoint. 
It would ensure an optimised netw ork and corresponding savings. Since 
the Member States and national service providers would be largely 
uninvolved in the work, they coul d reduce staff and make additional 
savings, therefore giving rise to a potential reduction of slightly more than the €2bn noted above. Like in option 2,  this potential would emerge over a 
period of several years as the design process improves and each problem area is tackled in turn. The design can  never be considered to be fully 
complete, due to changing demand patte rns on the part of airspace users. 
On the other hand, centralised deci sion-making would reduce the political 
acceptability of decisions for Member States and especially for those ANSPs that will lose traffic. 
2. Social impact + While economically efficient, this mo del would have an undeniable social 
and political impact. It would take aw ay from Member States an activity 
traditionally considered to be their sovereign area and make a group of 
people redundant in both the Member State administrations and their service providers. Some 20 people design the whole US en-route network — which has a comparable area and twice the traffic — while in Europe 27 Member States and ANSPs each have their own offices performing this 
task. More importantly for the efficiency of the network, this option would 
also create considerable concern as to  how the interests of local airspace 
users and service providers are to be taken into account. However, some of this negative impact could be offset by the possible increase in activity and 
jobs among airspace users. 
3 Environmental 
impact ++ As in Option 1, the potential for environmental improvement is 
considerable. It is impossible to evaluate exactly how much in the way of 
emissions will be avoided in practice,  since some of the gain could be 
negated by the increase in activity, bu t the potential is more than the 
proportional increase in traffic since congestion effects then come into 
play as well. 
4.3. Third pillar: Introduction of ma rket measures for unbundled services 
4.3.1. Description 
The provision of air navigation services (A NS) is generally considered, given the 
current technological possibilities, as a natural monopoly . Accordingly, improving the 
performance of the system requires performance regulation. 
However, some of the services currently provided by vertically integrated service 
providers could be provided under market conditions after ‘ unbundling ’. In most 
discussions, the provision of communica tion, navigation and surveillance (CNS) 
services, aeronautical information services, meteorological services, tower services at 
EN 32   EN aerodromes, and (parts of) training are s een as candidates for the introduction of 
competition. 
Table 2: Air navigation services market (2006 figures — in ‘000 €) 
1 Air traffic management  5 054  65% 
  En-route 4 014  52% 
  Terminal 1 056  14% 
2 Meteorological  389  5% 
3 Search & Rescue  23  0.3% 
4 Aeronautical information  156  2% 
5 CNS  1 322  17% 
  Communication 544  7% 
  Navigation 311  4% 
  Surveillance 467  6% 
6 Supervision  78  1% 
7 Eurocontrol Agency  622  8% 
8 Other  156  2% 
The current legislation allows for unbundling at Member State leve l. However, Member 
States are quite hesitant to consider this  tool for increasing performance. In some 
Member States, air traffic services at aerodromes are provided under competitive 
conditions (competition for the market). Initial training for air traffic controllers is 
another domain where some Member Stat es have introduced market forces. 
This chapter looks at these services with  a view to assessing the possibilities for 
introducing competition. 
Communication, navigation, sur veillance services (CNS) 
CNS services provide the ‘eyes and ears’ for air traffic controller s and pilots and are 
critical  services for air traffic control. Accoun ting for 17% of total ANS costs, they are 
a substantial cost component, which is refl ected in the relative share of employment: 
nearly 30% of ATM staff are technical suppo rt staff, ranging from  a maximum of 54% 
to a minimum of 10%. This reveals quite patchy  performance in CNS provision, and 
competition in the market could be consider ed as a means to improve performance. 
Air traffic control in towers (‘Tower services’) 
Some Member States have experience w ith competition for this €1bn market, while 
others are considering  market opening. Market opening is  considered from two angles: 
the choice of airports for airlines and the effective range of competitors for providing air traffic control. 
Meteorological services (MET)  
Member States have established meteorologi cal services for the protection of their 
citizens. MET services are considered to be of general interest  and cover a variety of 
tasks and functions with a multitude of user groups, both the general public and vital industries such as energy, agriculture, transport, media, military and transport. 
EN 33   EN In recent years, the introduction of new technologies wi th satellite observation, high-
powered computing facilities and new communication technologies has transformed  
meteorology from a labour-inten sive industry with many obser vational tasks to a high-
tech sector with the potential for cent ralising operations and reducing costs. 
ICAO has defined MET as an air na vigation service, so it can be charged  to the civil 
aviation industry at the discretion of indi vidual countries. Some Member States may 
decide not to recover any costs, while others  have decided to esta blish a meteorological 
provider exclusively for aviation (a nd hence recover 100% of costs). 
In some Member States, the MET co sts recovered from aviation appear 
disproportionate  compared to what other industries  pay. On average, civil aviation 
MET costs represent some 25% of total na tional MET costs, with shares ranging 
between 10% and 50%. In addition to the disc retionary charging of costs, there appears 
to be scope for improving  the relationship between ae ronautical users and the 
aeronautical MET providers. 
Aeronautical information services (AIS) 
To ensure flight safety, aeronautical information provides the pilot with basic  
information on the state of airports, runways,  signalling, availability of routes, military 
exercises, etc. AIS provision is naturally much more limited in scope compared to 
MET, but a similar technological evolution is  taking place. Paper information is being 
replaced with modern electroni c forms that can be downloaded. 
Under the ICAO rules (dating from  1944), AIS are provided ‘under State 
responsibility’ . Countries are free to provide the se rvice themselves or use any method 
they wish to choose a service provider, bu t ultimate responsibility  and liability lie 
always with the country whose airspace it  is. Since — understandably — no country is 
eager to take responsibility for more than one provider they have always designated only one provider for these services. 
ICAO also defines a set of ‘standard services ’ describing the datasets  and formats to be 
provided. These standard services are under revision, as modern technology  is 
resulting in more and more services being considered minimum public services. It is 
even estimated that the current ICAO-type AIS services will triple in terms of content, 
but technological development still leaves  ample room for additional value-added 
services to be provided outside the ICAO framework. 
Training for air traffic management personnel 
Air traffic control remains a craft . Safety lies in the hands of  controllers who require the 
ability to visualise a three/four-dimensional picture of flights from a two-dimensional 
radar screen, to take quick decisions and to communicate these in an authoritative way 
to pilots. This craftsmanship is the result of rigorous se lection and intensive training. 
Training for air traffic controll ers is regulated on the basis of the Directive establishing 
the ‘Community air traffic controller licence’
46. Initial training  is traditionally given in 
                                                 
46 Directive 2006/23/EC of 27.04.2006 (OJ L114/22). 
EN 34   EN academies, linked to the service provider, wh ere students receive theoretical courses and 
simulation training. The skills and competen ces can only be acquired on the job under 
supervision through a period of work in an ai r traffic control unit. This unit training 
cannot be separated from air traffic contro l and hence is not e ligible for unbundling. 
Conclusions: two options 
The first option would be to continue with the current legislation , i.e. leaving the 
discretion for unbundling to Member States . The second option would be to have 
decisions taken at Community  level and introduce open te ndering procedures for the 
provision of these services. 
4.3.2. Option 1: ‘Continue with current legi slation (market measures decided at 
national level)’ 
While some Member States have taken the de cision to organise tendering procedures for 
ATC at airports, none has decided to unbundl e. Under the current legislation, most 
Member States are expected to retain the  vertical integration  of service provision 
(services would be subject to performance  regulation). 
Option 1 — Continue with current legislation 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact  +/- As air navigation service providers would continue to be designated, they 
would be sheltered from competiti on, but would be subject to regulation . 
This regulation could lead to the a doption of performance indicators for 
specific services and hence improve performance in a planned way. Where no specific performance indicators are de fined, improvement will be slow 
and marginal. It will be a challenge for the regulator  to set the appropriate 
performance level. 
Vertical integration implies that service providers continue to operate in 
the national context, unless the integration of service provision into functional airspace blocks leads to some form of consolidation  of these 
services. The pace of innovation could be slow due to small economies of 
scale and lack of market incentives to change. It is important to master the 
changes in critical services like CNS, as the smallest hiccup in the system 
could lead to significant external costs. Leaving discretion to national level would in most cases imply leaving decisions to management which can best assess the associated business risks. As restructuring may be slow, the flying public might have to pay too high 
a price for these services. This opportunity cost must be weighed against 
the possible increased risks  of incidents leading to delays, and hence lost 
time.  This assessment has to be made by type  of service eligible for unbundling. 
The risk of external costs  may be high in the case of CNS, but quite low 
in the case of meteorological or training services. Indeed, a technical 
defect in a major airport or service provider may cause disruptive effects 
throughout the whole network, costing millions of euros. 
2. Social 
impact -/+ Preserving vertical integration would protect  existing jobs in an industry 
sheltered from competition. This could lead to poor allocation of human resources in the overall labour market. The incentive to restructure  is 
EN 35   EN quite weak and cross-border  service provision is hampered. 
If air traffic management fails to meet  demand, growth in aviation as such 
is jeopardised, hence leading to a bottleneck  in the creation of jobs in the 
much wider aviation sector (37 000 in  ATM versus 380 000 in aviation). 
To the extent that the slow pace of innovation delays the introduction of better performing technologies, the safety  of the flying public could be 
impacted. 
3 Environmental 
impact - The slow pace of innovation could ne gatively impact the environment, as 
the introduction of modern equipment allowing for more precise 
navigation and hence ‘ greener flights’  could be delayed. However, the 
concerted introduction of equipment could also be regulated. 
4.3.3. Option 2: ‘Market measures for unbundled services’ 
The other option is to have the decision to  unbundle taken at Community level and open 
the unbundled services for public tendering. 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact  + The unbundling of services could boost competitiveness , especially in 
cases where these services carry a disproportionate weight in the overall 
cost. The patchy performance of CNS a nd MET in particular suggests that 
there is much scope for improvement. For meteorological services, which are in most Member States provided by organisations separate from air navigation service providers, this may require more transparent funding, possibly through the public purse. In addition, market pressures would lead to a healthy consolidation , e.g. in 
the training market, where some academies organise training courses for 
very limited numbers of students. Centralised MET services could also be provided for several Member States. Unbundling would create opportunities for cross-industry  cooperation. 
For instance, CNS could be provided by non-ATM providers; air traffic 
controller training could be organised together with pilot training or in 
conjunction with universities. Service provision could be more focused on the needs of the market instead of  the needs of the individual service 
provider, which may be more influenced by ‘short-term’ management decisions. Market players would also have an in centive to capture the market through 
the introduction of new technologies , as seen in telecoms. For CNS, MET 
and AIS services in particular, there is considerable scope for using existing and new technologies. The acid test for unbundling is th e assessment of the associated business  
risk in this network industry, where the least hiccup is highly costly to all 
actors involved. This requires an asse ssment of the critical character of 
each type of service. 
2. Social impact - Competition could lead to the abrupt  consolidation of services and would 
require change  management. In general, restructuring would take place in 
a sector serving a growing  aviation industry. Social dialogue structures in 
air traffic management should provide for socially acceptable solutions 
and appropriate outplacement possibilities, if so required. New jobs may require geographical mobility  in order to service installations in different 
Member States from a central location. 
EN 36   EN For CNS, this could entail the outplacement of technically skilled  
employees who may be in high demand on the labour market. The impact 
on meteorological services may be more limited, as it would depend on finding alternative funding. Staffing in training institutes is rather limited, 
with the smaller academies in particular using temporary staff from universities or service providers. The measures may meet social resistance. 
3 Environmental 
impact + Competition could introduce an ince ntive to capture markets through 
innovative technologies allowing for more precision surveillance and 
navigation, hence increasing the environmental  performance  of air 
traffic management. However, SESA R should bring about these changes 
and possibilities. 
4.4. Fourth pillar: Functional airspace blocks (FABs) in the performance 
regulatoion framework:  
Functional airspace blocks (FABs) are a majo r driver for change, introduced in the first 
SES package. This tool will now be used  within an overall performance regulation 
framework with regulation, reinforced ne twork management functions and unbundling. 
In any event, FABs should continue to play their full role  as a means to achieve the 
performance targets. In the consultations , most Member States wanted target 
implementation dates to be put in place for FABs. Three main options can be envisaged 
for FAB development: 
4.4.1. Option 1: No changes — keep the status quo 
Member States already have a legal obligatio n to establish FABs and meet the criteria 
set out in the Airspace Regulation. The Commission continues to support  ongoing 
initiatives47 through studies and some funding options . It reserves the right to adopt 
common general principles  for the establishment and m odification of FABs in the 
form of Implementing Rules, as provided for in SES I. 
A forum on inter-FAB coordination is proposed in the shape of a sub-committee of the 
Single Sky Committee, where Memb er States will be able to exchange information and 
best practice on their initiatives. 
Option 1 ‘No changes — keep the status quo’ 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact - This option would have the least economic impact. The introduction of 
FABs is considered to be one of the most effective ways of achieving a performance-based ATM system in Europe with subsequent cost 
reductions stemming from greater economies of scale. The overall added value of such initia tives will include economic benefits 
for airspace users in the form of co st reductions, increased capacity and 
                                                 
47 Baltic FAB, Blue Med, Danube FAB, FAB Ce ntral Europe, FAB Europe Central, FAB Spain 
Portugal, FAB UK Ireland, North European FAB and NUAC. 
EN 37   EN Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
hence reduced delays due to air traffic management. The cost is difficult to 
estimate because of the variety of different initiatives, but the obligation to establish FABs is conditional upon a positive cost-benefit analysis. 
In this situation, there could be a role for the Community to play by 
providing financing through the TEN-T programme to alleviate the costs of transition. Providing more capacity at a lower pr ice will induce air carriers to offer 
even more choice to end-users for business and leisure travel, thus 
achieving the Lisbon agenda objectives in  terms of reducing the internal 
and external cost of mobility across Europe. 
2. Social impact - The social impact is borne by airlines, which are adversely affected by 
constraints on growth and excessive costs, and by the EU at large because of delays incurred by passengers, poor  job creation in the air transport 
sector and low induced job creation in the economy at large.  
Moreover, if the European ATM situa tion does not improve, this will have 
a negative impact on the internal market, mobility and therefore the economy. 
3. Environmental impact + Not relevant 
4.4.2. Option 2: Clarify the current concept with a combination of statutory and non-
regulatory measures  
Clarify the definition and concept  of FABs so as to better reflect their relationship to 
service provision and airspace design. This option still leaves the decision to the 
Member States to establish FABs but makes integration a more useful and flexible means to reach the performa nce framework objectives.  
Set a firm deadline  for Member States to establish FABs by the end of 2012 and start a 
performance review of regional ta rget settings for FABs by 2012. 
Extend the scope  of FABs to lower airspace by removing the limitation to upper 
airspace only. A forum for inter-FAB  coordination is also proposed. 
The requirements of military users will be ta ken into account not only with respect to 
airspace design (part of network manageme nt and FUA management) but also with 
respect to service provision. 
Option 2 ‘Clarify the current concept wi th a combination of statutory and non-
regulatory measures’  
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact + This option recognises the work alre ady done by Member States while 
redirecting the focus from airspace management to the integration of 
service provision. Basically, it would embrace already ongoing initiatives 
EN 38   EN Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem 
addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
to extend FABs to lower airspace as well. 
The transaction costs of service provision integration cannot be estimated at present, but may offset the benefits in the short term. In this situation, 
there could be a role for the Community to play by providing financing 
through the TEN-T programme to alleviate the costs of transition. Furthermore, the integration costs a nd possible gains will greatly depend 
on the level of integration of existing service provision. The feasibility studies for ongoing FAB initiatives have shown that higher 
levels of integration will provide more benefits in terms of reducing costs. 
2. Social 
impact + The establishment of FABs has direct  social implications, as even the 
lowest level of integration will inev itably require the restructuring of 
operations. Such restructuring, however, will affect the different functions within the ANSPs in different ways. Support functions (administrative, IT, 
technical, training, etc.) will see the highest mobility. On the other hand, 
there should be an increase in the number of operational personnel due to 
the forecast increase in traffic and the need for greater capacity within an 
FAB. However, personnel may be needed  at different locations and/or for 
different tasks than was previously th e case. This mobility will be aided by 
the EU licensing scheme for air traffic controllers. 
Leaving the initiative to create FABs to  Member States means they are in a 
better position to handle the social dimensions of proposed initiatives at local level compared to specific solu tions for FABs decided at European 
level. The feasibility studies for ongoing FAB initiatives have shown that higher 
levels of integration will provide mo re benefits in terms of reducing 
costs
48. However, the social and socio-economic implications of 
integration should not be underestimat ed, as social tensions in the ANSPs 
have a direct impact on the safety and capacity of air navigation services. Efforts by the ANSPs in the social doma in will be more than offset by the 
increased potential for job creation am ong airspace users and the induced 
effect on the economy at large. 
3. Environmental 
impact + In general, FABs can be expect ed to improve the quality of ANS 
provision, promote mobility of the workforce, generate more capacity and 
encourage innovation, without any negative impact on the environment. In addition, increased flight efficiency will bring about significant fuel savings, yielding a positive environm ental impact. Eurocontrol’s PRU 
report for 2007 estimates that horizontal flight inefficiencies result in a 
3.7% additional fuel burn. If TMA airb orne delays and taxiing delays are 
included as well, this represents a further 3-7% fuel burn. 
4.4.3. Option 3: The structural division of se rvice provision into FABs is decided at 
Community level  
The Commission overturns the current wa y of deciding on FABs (‘bottom-up’ 
approach) and organises a top-down process to  establish them. This process would be 
based on actual traffic flows and would take into consideration the changes to the route 
                                                 
48 For example, a cost-benefit analysis of NU AC, the FAB in the Nordic region, indicates a 
minimum 10% annual cost savings for the merger scenario. 
EN 39   EN structures established through the propos ed network management function. The 
Commission takes a decision on the basis of expert advice from the different network 
functions (design, flow management, review, etc.). 
The scope of FABs is extended to lower airspace as well. 
Option 3 ‘The structural division of se rvice provision is decided at Community 
level’ 
Benefits 
achieved/ 
problem addressed Impact:  Explanation of rating and aspects of the policy option most relevant 
for the benefits 
1. Economic 
impact +/- This option would yield the optimum economic benefits for a specific 
FAB. However, an imposed solution for FABs would force ANSPs to work together, with may not lead to the most efficient organisation of service provision. This may offset the theoretically positive impact. 
2. Social impact -- The establishment of FABs has direct social implications, as even the 
lowest level of integration will inev itably require the restructuring of 
operations. Such restructuring, however, will affect the different functions 
within the ANSPs in different ways. Support functions (administrative, IT, 
technical, training, etc.) will see the highest mobility. On the other hand, there should be an increase in the number of operational personnel due to the forecast increase in traffic and the need for greater capacity within an 
FAB. However, personnel may be needed  at different locations and/or for 
different tasks than was previously th e case. This mobility will be aided by 
the EU licensing scheme for air traffic controllers. Efforts by the ANSPs in the social domain may be offset by the increased 
potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced effect on the economy at large.  
3. 
Environmental 
impact + In general, FABs can be expect ed to improve the quality of ANS 
provision, promote mobility of the workforce, generate more capacity and 
encourage innovation, without any negative impact on environment. In addition, increased flight efficiency will bring about significant fuel savings, yielding a positive environm ental impact. Eurocontrol’s PRU 
report for 2007 estimates that horizontal flight inefficiencies result in a 3.7% additional fuel burn. If TMA airb orne delays and taxiing delays are 
included as well, this represents a further 3-7% fuel burn. 
4.5. Role of Eurocontrol in the p erformance regulation framework: 
Over the course of SES I, the Commission has cooperated with Euroco ntrol in particular 
on the development of technical implementing rules  under a system of mandates. 
There has also been some cooperation in s upport of mutual policies on international fora 
and in the collection of data and studies. 
SES II would require a number of operational network  functions that cannot be 
performed by the Commission. These functions  require an independent network view, 
separate from national interests. In many cases, the nucleus of such arrangements 
already exists in Eurocontrol, but the or ganisation would need to be empowered and 
EN 40   EN focused49 to deliver the full benefits if it is chosen to perform some or all of the network 
functions discussed here.  
Since it contributes only indirectly  to the attainment of ob jectives, a more complete 
discussion of the possibilities of enhanc ing Eurocontrol coordi nation to carry out 
network and performance functions is to be found in Annex 6 . 
5. C OMPARING THE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS  
5.1. First pillar: Performance regulation 
OPTIONS: 1. Do nothing / 
status quo 2. Local 
Target Setting 3.a. European 
Target Setting 3.b. European 
Regulator 
Economic Impact 
Competitiveness 
of European 
airlines - -  
Excessive 
charges result in 
higher prices and weaken the competitiveness of European airlines + 
Improvement. 
Users will be 
consulted on targets but decisions will remain at national level, 
which will 
perpetuate the big performance gaps between Member States +++  
A coherent and 
substantial 
improvement in operational and economic efficiency can be enforced, 
bringing savings 
on route charges, flight time and fuel burn for airspace users. ++ 
Same as for ETS, 
but in a more 
radical manner, as there will be no negotiations with ANSPs. The most radical 
approach, 
bringing results immediately after implementation. 
 
Performance of 
ANSPs -  
The differences in performance continue. There 
is no tool for 
ensuring convergence. Bad performers offset the improvements of 
good performers 
+  Notional targets are agreed under Eurocontrol 
arrangements, 
without any enforceability +  
ANSPs will follow national targets, but 
there will be no 
system-wide approach and gaps in performance will remain.  
No strong 
incentive for bad performers to change behaviour. +++  
Improved service provision and economic 
efficiency will 
permit the sustainable growth of air traffic. The increased 
economic 
pressure on ANSPs, coordinated at European level, 
will ensure 
convergence of cost efficiency, capacity and +++ 
Same as for ETS with probably more radical 
results, but offset 
by the time needed to set up an operational SES Performance 
Agency. 
                                                 
49 Recommendation 6 of the High Level Group on Aviation Regulation (page iii of the report), July 
2007. 
EN 41   EN flight efficiency. 
Coordination of 
investment and enforcement of coherent and coordinated performance 
targets. 
Governance of the ATM system - -  
Decisions are 
shared between Member States and ANSPs. Fragmentation is 
not reduced. The 
Community method is not used. NSAs have no 
independence 
from state authorities and cannot perform their performance 
oversight role. =  
Decision-
making remains at national level  - -  No effective use 
of the 
Community method. +++ 
Initiatives are 
local, ensuring that local constraints and specificities are 
duly taken into 
account. The final decision is taken at European level, 
thus ensuring 
that performance is driven in a consistent way following a ‘total system 
approach’. 
+++  Efficient use of the Community method for 
target setting 
through the comitology procedure. +++ The implementation 
of local targets is 
left to local level with flexibility to accommodate local 
specificities. 
 + - 
Target setting 
and enforcement are entirely at European level. The Agency 
consults 
stakeholders but the final decision taken by the Commission. 
The substantial 
costs of such an agency will considerably exceed the costs of Option 3a. 
Administrative costs =  
No new costs 
incurred in the status quo option -  
Some additional costs due to the need to create strong NSAs 
with separate 
budgets and resources. - —  Additional costs for airlines, -  
Need to create or designate an independent performance 
review body and 
structure. Need to upgrade NSAs to allow them to carry out performance - — - 
High administrative costs: by far the most costly 
policy option in 
terms of administrative budget. The agency will require a staff of 
EN 42   EN which will have 
to negotiate 
individually with each NSA. oversight. 
Slight increase 
in reporting requirements for ANSPs. at least 50 
persons (€5 
million per year). 
End consumers - -  
More costly travel because of excessive and 
unjustified costs. 
Capacity crunch may create problems for travellers and 
freight. +  
Slow and variable improvements 
may be 
expected, provided that ANSPs cooperate 
together on a 
voluntary basis. +++ 
More capacity will be delivered. 
More flights at 
better prices will be offered to passengers by more 
competitive 
European airlines. +++ 
More capacity will be delivered. More flights at 
better prices will 
be offered to passengers by more competitive European 
airlines. 
Social impact 
Employment  - 
No change for 
ANSPs. -- For airlines and the European 
economy. =  
Limited social 
impact for ANSPs as they will remain masters of their 
cost 
containment efforts.  =  Limited 
improvement in 
the social domain. Airspace users and the EU at large will 
continue to bear 
all the social costs of the shortcomings of the system. +++  
Improved 
service provision and economic efficiency will contribute to the 
quantity and 
quality of jobs offered at all levels (ANSPs, airlines, 
industry, EU). 
Efforts by ANSPs in the social domain will be more than offset by 
the increased 
potential for job creation among airspace users and the induced 
effect on the 
economy at large. +++ 
The improved 
competitiveness of airlines will generate new jobs in their 
sector. Improved 
mobility will generate more jobs in the economy at 
large. 
--- The social impact and the loss of local initiative for 
ANSPs will 
trigger resistance in particular from controllers. 
Environmental impact 
Air quality 
Climate -- 
The ‘Do 
nothing’ scenario 
does not address the environmental issue. 
The non-optimal 
route network +  
The issue will 
be tackled only 
at national level. -  No European action. 
-  
Airlines fly +++ 
The ETS option 
brings positive 
and substantial improvements in flight efficiency and therefore for 
the environment. 
Clear +++ 
The most 
effective 
scenario in terms of environmental efficiency as no room for 
manoeuvre will 
be left to 
EN 43   EN has a high 
negative 
environmental impact (several million tonnes of additional CO
2 
emissions per 
year). longer routes to 
avoid costly 
airspaces. responsibility for 
target setting, 
network management and airspace regulation. Member States.  
(The weak point 
of this scenario is that it does not in itself take into account the military / 
sovereignty 
aspects of route design.) 
Conclusion: 
The ETS option is the preferred one. It is expected to bring coherent and substantial  
improvements in operational, environmental and economic efficiency in a cost-efficient (low implementation costs) and socially acc eptable manner. The option is acceptable for 
controllers and would bring w ealth and jobs to the airlines and the European economy. 
This option better respec ts the principles of better regulation  (no additional structure 
or process required), proportionality and subsidiarity  (local initiative, use of national 
expertise to propose sound targets taking accoun t of local constraints and specificities, 
and Community decision-making ensuring th at the system-wide targets are met and 
enforced). 
5.2. Second pillar – Network approach for a European-level network and 
management of scarce resources 
The summary table below presents a comparison of the three options (the - sign 
indicating a negative impact and the + sign a positive impact). 
 Economic Social Environmental General 
feasibility 
Option 1 -- - -- + 
Option 2 ++ + ++ ++ 
Option 3 ++ + ++ +/- 
Best: Option 2/3 Option 2 Option 2/3 Option 2 
Option 2 compromises on some of the theoretica l gains to ensure pol itical acceptability. 
Much depends on the quality of the consu ltation mechanism. If it succeeds in taking 
proper account of local and regional needs without negatively a ffecting the network 
view, it could achieve the same or even better  results than option 3. Ev en if it leads to a 
slight reduction in the gains, its realism is still an argument in its favour. Option 3 is theoretically efficient, but suffers from low feasibility. The feasibility of option 1 also 
diminishes if the sub-optimal route network increasingly affects ai r operations and thus 
causes discontent. 
On basis of this analysis, option 2 is the preferred solution. Network design and 
management should be seen as a part of the wider target setting a nd attainment process, 
EN 44   EN where network efficiency is just one of many factors contributi ng to good output. Target 
setting should be done at Euro pean level, with a mechanism for translating this into 
actions specified and overs een by the NSAs at Member State or FAB level.  
The best results are normally ensured th rough transparent a nd public planning and 
review of the results as close to the regulated  parties as possible, bu t for some areas like 
network design the main responsibility fo r planning actions must be at network 
(European) level. This is due to the fact that optimising r oute networks at national level 
resolves only part of the inefficiencies and may even worsen the situation in cases 
where there is considerable interaction with neighbouring countries or FABs. Only 
cooperation at both state/FAB and European le vels, with the prime consideration being 
overall network efficiency, can ensure th at all inefficiencies are addressed. 
Therefore, only option 3 can bring about the necessary benefits by ensuring proper 
planning and implementation in  the interest of the whole network. The process 
envisaged for network design is presented in more detail in Annex 7 . 
5.3. Third Pillar: Comparison of the opti ons for the introduction of market 
measures for unbundled services 
The impact analysis demonstrates that unbund ling is not straightforward and that such 
decisions must be taken on a service-by-service basis. While competition in general would boost performance , the possible gains should be assessed against the cost in 
terms of the business risk. Ind eed, the critical factor is the increased risk  for safety and 
continuity of service. 
Options/Dimensions Decision at national level Market opening at Community 
level 
Economic -/+ 
Performance depends on regulation. 
Consolidation within the 
framework of FABs. Control of internally provided services. + 
Competition will boost performance. 
Impact on FABs not clear: 
facilitator or obstacle. Risk of disruption may increase. 
Environment -/+ 
Impact if slow take-up of innovation + 
New technologies allow for greener flights. 
Social -/+ 
Social management of change under control. Safety of the flying public depends on introduction of new technologies. - 
Consolidation may require a restructuring effort — social resentment. ATM is financed by a growing aviation industry. Safety benefits from the swift introduction of new technologies. 
 
EN 45   EN Conclusions: preferred option: 
In order to benefit from improved perfor mance, unbundling should be pursued after an 
appropriate assessment of the associ ated business risks. Decisions on unbundling 
should be taken at Community level th rough comitology, after specific impact 
assessments. This way of proceeding would allow consultation of stakeholders to 
obtain their views on the balanci ng of possible gains against co sts. This approach is in 
line with previous studies, which argued for leaving decisions to unbundle at national 
level with a view to safeguarding continuity  of service. This would also take due 
account of the progress achieved through FAB initiatives and perf ormance regulation. 
5.4. Fourth pillar: FABs within  the performance framework 
The summary table below presents a comparison of the three options. 
 Economic Social Environment General 
feasibility 
Option 1 - - + + 
Option 2 + + + ++ 
Option 3 +/- -- + - 
Option 1 risks adding a need for further gui dance as to the cont ent of the current 
obligation to establish FABs. This is es pecially the case if the route network 
management function is at Euro pean level, leaving it to Me mber States to evaluate the 
resulting route network /traffic flow patterns in order to decide whether to establish 
FABs. There is no consensus on the FAB concept, resulting in a diverse set of interpretations and different degrees of  cooperation and inte gration in ongoing FAB 
initiatives. 
Option 2 brings clarity rega rding FAB objectives, acceler ating existing integration 
efforts and yielding efficiency and economi c gains at a general level, not only in 
tackling flight inefficiencies . It takes proper account of the proposal to pursue route 
network management at European level. Much  responsibility is still left to Member 
States since most of the aspects (operational, technical, legal, social, etc.) remain well 
within their competence. 
Option 3 could be challenged on the basis that  there is no Community competence, as it 
touches upon Member States’ sovereignty and the defence issues relating to military 
requirements in Member States’ own airspace . For this reason, it is probably the most 
political difficult option to realise. In a ny case, option 3 could be envisaged as a long-
term step, should option 2  not deliver the desired performance improvements to service 
provision. 
The option chosen: 
On basis of the above analysis, option 2 is the option with th e most positive and 
favourable prospects for meeting our policy objectives. 
EN 46   EN 6. P OLICY MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
The need for a constant monitoring and evalua tion process is heightened in ATM, since 
the nature of the system does not allow for nor mal market mechanisms to be used in all 
cases. These monitoring and evaluation processes have to ensure a reliable and full flow 
of information to provide legi slators and policy makers with  feedback on the success — 
or otherwise — of their actions. 
SES I actions 
Since the need for this kind of process was seen very early, the European ATM system 
is in a fortunate situation in that the co re of the evaluation and monitoring system 
already exists. SES I built on the existing Eu rocontrol tradition, w ith Articles 11 and 12 
of the Framework Regulation setting out a set of performance review and reporting 
requirements to feed the proces s. The performance review is de facto  based on the work 
of the Eurocontrol Perf ormance Review Commission, which produces yearly 
performance reports on the ATM system . These reports call for European-wide 
performance targets, but l ack legal or binding status. 
Improvements in SES II — Performance Framework 
In SES II, this process needs to be streng thened by creating a closed-loop structure to 
feed into the performance framework desc ribed in Chapter 5. Performance regulation 
requires a permanent flow of information to feed the review, target setting and 
enforcement process. SES II will therefore introduce a continuous loop of monitoring 
and evaluation  for performance regulation of na tural monopolies and other policy 
areas. In this particular case, therefore, the efficiency of le gislation will be monitored by 
following the progress of performance  indicators  covering safety, capacity, cost-
efficiency and the environment. In addition, a political  assessment  will decide on the 
balance between the different areas of pe rformance according to societal needs. 
Improvements in SES II — Institutional Framework 
Beyond monitoring through performance regulat ion, the institutional set-up of the 
Single Sky provides for a permanent flow of information and assessments from different stakeholders . The Commission receives input from Member States through 
the Single Sky Committee, from national supe rvisory authorities a nd most importantly 
from the Performance Review Body. In additi on, input is provided by industry through 
the Industry Consulta tion Body and by representatives of  staff and employers through 
the social dialogue structures. 
All in all, the aviation industry , which finances air traffi c management, is given a 
guarantee that it will receive value for mone y and that the standards for air navigation 
provision will genuinely improve. As the aviation  industry is an indispensable partner in 
the institutional set-up, th e reporting line to the Co mmission on efficiency and 
evaluation is quite direct a nd also independent of the pe rformance review framework 
described above. 
EN 47   EN 7. T ECHNICAL UPDATES OF THE FIRST SES  PACKAGE  
From the technical evaluation it has become a pparent that the current regulations need 
to be modified in a number of  areas to take acc ount of the lessons learned from SES I 
and technical developments  and to enable the transiti on from regulatory action based 
on Eurocontrol drafts to action based on EASA, Eurocontrol, ICAO and any other 
bodies that may be considered appropriate for the task at hand. In particular, the 
harmonised application of ICAO rules requires particular attention in the regulations.  
Last but not least, there are three articles in the SES I legislation which apply only to 
upper airspace. It is proposed to extend the scope of these ar ticles to lower airspace. In 
addition, consideration should al so be given to whether the articles now referring to 
specific IRs need to be modifi ed to provide for necessary u pdates to them, etc. A more 
detailed presentation of these technical updates is given in Annex 8 . 
EN 48   EN List of Annexes 
Annex 1: List of abbreviations used 
Annex 2: High Level Group recommendations Annex 3: Conclusions on the Conf erence of 20.01.2008 on consulting aviation 
stakeholders 
Annex 4: List of consultations Annex 5: Unit costs Annex 6: Options for institutional arrangements with Eurocontrol Annex7: Network design process 
Annex 8: Technical update of SES II 
EN 49   EN ANNEX 1  
List of Abbreviations 
AFIS Aerodrome Flight Information Service 
AIM Aeronautical Information Management 
AIS Aeronautical Information Services AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance 
ANS Air Navigation Services 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider ATCO Air Traffic Controller 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
BISP Blocks of Integrated Service Provision 
Central 
FAB Initiative by DE, FR, CH, BE, NL and LU for a common FAB 
CFMU Central Flow Management Unit (Eurocontrol) 
CRCO Central Route Charges Collection Office (Eurocontrol) 
DAP Directorate of ATM Programmes (Eurocontrol) DAS Directorate of ATM Strategies (Eurocontrol) 
EAD European Aeronautical Database (Eurocontrol) 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency (Community) ECAA European Common Aviation Area 
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference 
Eurocontrol European Organisation for the Safety  of Air Navigation (www.eurocontrol.int) 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (US) 
FAB Functional Airspace Block 
FUA Flexible Use of Airspace (between civil and military) GA General Aviation 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation (UN) 
ICB Industry Consultation Body INSTILUX Institute of Air Navigation Services (training, Eurocontrol) 
EN 50   EN IR Implementing Rule 
MET Meteorological services 
Mil Military MS Member States (EU) 
MUAC Maastricht Upper Area Co ntrol Centre (Eurocontrol) 
NAA National Aviation Administrations NSA National Supervisory Authorities 
NSACB NSA Coordination Body 
PC Provisional Council (Eurocontrol) PRB Performance Review Body (proposed) 
PRC Performance Review Commission (Eurocontrol) 
PRU Performance Review Unit (Eurocontrol) 
QMV Qualified Majority Voting 
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima SAIP Single Aeronautical Information Publication 
SESAR JU SESAR Joint Undertaking 
SES Single European Sky SES1 First SES Package (2004) 
SES2 Second SES Package (2008-09?) 
SESAR SES ATM Research Programme SID Standard Instrument Departure 
STAR Standard (instrument) Approach Route 
SWIM System-Wide Information Management TEN-T Trans-European Networks – Transport 
TMA (Airport) Terminal Area  
US United States 
EN 51   EN ANNEX 2  
High Level Group Report and Recommendations  
To facilitate cross-referencing between th e Commission recommendations in section 4 
(Accelerating the Implementation St rategy) and the High Level Group 
recommendations, the corresponding HLG Recommendations (HLG 1, 2, etc) are 
identified in the Communication: 
HLG 
Recommendation Subject 
HLG 1 EU as a driving force in  aviation regulation in Europe 
HLG 2 Greater responsibilities for industry 
HLG 3 Better regulation 
HLG 4 Drive improved performance 
HLG 5 Deliver the Single European Sky 
HLG 6 Empower and focus Eurocontrol 
HLG 7 Address airport capacity 
HLG 8 Deliver continuously improving safety 
HLG 9 Deliver environmental benefits 
HLG 10 Commit Member States to deliver 
The Executive Summary (below) of th e High Level Group Report gives more 
information. 
Executive Summary  
Vice-President Barrot appoint ed the High Level Group for the Future European 
Aviation Regulatory Framework in November 2006 in response to strong demand from 
industry, EU Member States and other st akeholders to simplif y and increase the 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework for aviation in Europe. Vice-President Barrot 
asked the High Level Group to present a visi on for the development of the aviation 
regulatory framework — with a particular focus on air traffic management — and to 
provide a roadmap with pr actical next steps.  
The High Level Group underlines the need for,  and indeed urgency of, change in the 
regulatory framework for aviation in Europe. This is necessary to ensure alignment 
across the aviation system towa rds achieving shared objectives. 
The High Level Group has faced a set of co mplex and occasionally conflicting aims 
when considering the perform ance improvement objectives: 
EN 52   EN • Aviation has a key role to play in achievin g the objectives of the Lisbon agenda, in 
terms of reducing the internal and extern al cost of mobility within Europe and 
between Europe and the rest of the world. Li ke other transport modes, aviation is an 
important enabler of economic growth. The av iation sector itself is also a significant 
source of employment and technological innovation. 
• At the same time capacity in the air a nd on the ground is increasingly scarce, the 
environmental impact a growing source of c oncern at local and international levels, 
while improving safety becomes ever more challenging with increa sing traffic levels. 
• Additionally, aviation in Europe faces grow ing competition from other parts of the 
world for the market in Europe and the global aviation market. This emphasises the importance of finding cost-effective solutions. 
To determine the priorities for change, the High Level Group has reviewed ongoing 
initiatives to improve the European aviati on system such as the Single European Sky 
(SES) initiative, the inclusion of aviation in  the emissions trading scheme, and the Clean 
Sky programme. It has concluded that the challenge for Europe is not to embark on 
new system changes but to focus on acce lerating the effective delivery of the 
existing initiatives and to strengthen the capabilities of the key players to deliver 
them . The High Level Group has focused on the SES initiative in particular . 
Improved ATM can play a vital role in  increasing capacity and reducing the 
environmental impact of aviation. 
The High Level Group has therefore c oncentrated on two main themes: performance 
and governance . This leads to proposals for clear roles for the European Commission, 
the Member States and the Eurocontrol and EASA organisations, and proposals for 
concrete actions to address the current and e xpected bottlenecks in pe rformance. It also 
leads to proposals to rebalance the governan ce of the aviation system in Europe to 
enable industry (airlines, air navigation servic es providers (ANSPs), airports and 
manufacturers) to play an appropriate role in influencing decisions that affect them. 
This focus has been validated by a pro cess of stakeholder (industry, the military, 
professional staff associations a nd non-EU states) consultation.  
The High Level Group has followed the Eu ropean Commission in taking 2020 as the 
target date for completing the major cha nges already initiated within Europe, in 
particular the Single European Sky. Howeve r, the High Level Group has targeted 2014 
as the date by which its propos als must be implemented to ensure that the European 
aviation system remains safe, competitive and environmentally responsible. 2013 is the date when the SESAR deploymen t phase is due to start.  
To facilitate the next steps, the High Level Group has outlined a roadmap for change. 
The roadmap provides for actions that can be started immediately and for putting in place a process of continuous change to re spond to market developments. Because 2013 
is a critical date, the High Level Gr oup proposes a timely evaluation of its 
recommendations in 2011 to ensure that the necessary additional actions are taken.
  
The High Level Group recognises that its prop osals represent a major change process 
challenge. This challenge can only be met if  it fully involves the people working in the 
organisations involved in the change proce ss. The High Level Group therefore urges the 
EN 53   EN European Commission to continue the process of extensive consultation with 
stakeholders during the decision-making process following on from the High Level 
Group’s work. In particular, the High Level Group points to the valuable contribution 
that can be made by representatives from pr ofessional staff organisations and the need 
for inclusive social dialogue.  
The proposals of the High Level Group can be summarised in the following 10 
recommendations: 
HLG 1 EU as a driving force in aviation regulation in Europe: Fragmentation is a 
major bottleneck in improving the perf ormance of the European aviation 
system. As this can only be addressed at  European level: strengthen the role of 
the European Community and the Community method as the sole vehicle to set the regulation agenda for European av iation by eliminating overlaps between 
EU and other regulatory processes, ensuring independent structures for 
regulation and service provisi on, and ensuring that safe ty regulatory activities 
are conducted independently from othe r forms of regulation. Drive change 
forward at the strategic level through regular meetings of the European 
Directors-General of Civil Aviation wo rking together with the European 
Commission, coordinating across the govern ing bodies of Eurocontrol, EASA 
and ECAC and creating a more structur ed dialogue between the EU and non-
EU states. Appoint a senior  figure as an ‘Aviation System Coordinator’ to 
drive forward the necessary actions. 
HLG 2 Greater responsib ilities for industry:  Give more responsibility to industry in 
line with the liberalisati on of the internal market . Involve industry more 
systematically in the rule-making process for the aviation system. Realign the governance of service provision f unctions to give industry greater 
responsibilities within a harmonised regulatory framework. Make possible 
competition for contestable activities which can be executed by industry. 
HLG 3 Better regulation:  Apply the principles of be tter regulatio n, avoiding over-
regulation, and undertaking full impact  assessments and consultation. Apply 
consistent definitions and rationalise existing legislation.
  
HLG 4 Drive improved performance: Every regulatory intervention should target 
improving performance within overriding safety objectives.  As general 
principles, set performance improvem ent objectives, maximise the use of 
performance incentives and require i ndependent performance reporting. For 
ATM, adapt the regulatory framework a nd governance structures to stimulate 
management to deliver improved performa nce. Where possible, facilitate the 
application of market principles by the unbundling and liberalisation of ANSP 
services. Introduce economic regulation to  drive performance improvement in 
the monopoly elements of ANSP activities. 
HLG 5 Deliver the Single European Sky: Accelerate the deliv ery of the Single 
European Sky (SES) and SESAR through proactive management and annual progress monitoring and reporting by the European Commission. Translate the SES ambitions into an implementation strategy and plan. Introduce economic 
regulation for ATM services to ensure th at ANSPs are incentivised to achieve 
EN 54   EN converging objectives in Europe and to  regulate the monopoly elements of 
ANSP activities. Address the hurdles to implementing FABs and task the Aviation System Coordinator to facili tate their progress. Strengthen the 
orientation of the SESAR programme to wards results, including quick wins, 
and develop proposals for the pan-European ATM governance structure post the SESAR JU in 2013. Increase the political support for SES and SESAR, 
including the military stakeholders in European ATM.  
HLG 6 Empower and focus Eurocontrol: Empower Eurocontrol to play a key role in 
delivering the Single European Sky and SESAR objectives within the strategic 
and regulatory framework set by the EU. Focus its activities on excellent pan-
European functions and ATM network design, and support for regulation as 
requested by the European Commission and Member States. Transfer the 
responsibility for safety regulatory activ ities to EASA. Invite the Eurocontrol 
governing bodies to give industry an appr opriate role in the governance of the 
pan-European functions and facilitate the unbundling of activities through corporate structures or undertakings  where appropriate to allow the 
Eurocontrol organisation to evolve in  line with industry developments while 
ensuring that the interest s of employees are considered. Prepare for the 
appropriate pan-European ATM governan ce and operational structures for the 
post-2013 SESAR deployment phase. 
HLG 7 Address airport capacity: Address the forthcoming ai rport capacity crunch by 
asking the European Commission to raise the profile of this emerging bottleneck in the European aviation syst em and point the way forward in terms 
of reconciling growth and environmen t goals. Request Member States to 
provide strategies for addressing the airport capacity issue while demanding 
that airports themselves take greater responsibility for securing the local 
‘licence to grow’. Enable the Europ ean Commission to facilitate progress 
through the ‘Aviation Syst em Coordinator’. Integrate airports more 
systematically into the total system approach. 
HLG 8 Deliver continuously improving safety:  Require states to apply safety 
management principles consistently and, in particular, facilitate the uniform 
application of ‘just culture’ principl es. Empower EASA as the single EU 
instrument for aviation safety regulation including airports and ATM, and ensure that EASA is funded and res ourced accordingly. Prepare for the SESAR 
challenge through timely cert ification processes. Ensu re that states’ safety 
oversight is harmonised and that coope ration between nationa l authorities is 
stimulated to achieve overall higher levels of performance. 
HLG 9 Deliver environmental benefits: Building on the three pillars of improved 
gate-to-gate ATM, cleaner and quieter aircraft, and market-oriented solutions, 
ask the European Commission to devel op an integrated environment strategy. 
Incorporate ambitions from the tran sport and environm ent perspectives, 
enabling Europe to play a leading role in balancing economic, environmental, safety and social impacts. 
HLG 10 Commit Member States to deliver:  Require more systematic implementation 
of existing commitments by EU Me mber States, in particular the 
EN 55   EN defragmentation targeted by the Single European Sky initiative. States should 
address inconsistent guidelines for ANSPs , performance shortfalls in oversight, 
bottlenecks in airport capacity and safe ty management, and the new challenges 
of mitigating and adapting to climate ch ange. Encourage regulatory authorities 
to exchange best practices and develop common approaches. 
The High Level Group thanks Vice-Preside nt Barrot for the oppor tunity to develop 
these recommendations and hopes that th ey will be acted upon without delay.  
The High Level Group commends its report to the Vice-President, to the European 
Parliament, to Eurocontrol’s Provisio nal Council and to the Member States. 
EN 56   EN ANNEX 3  
Conference 
‘Towards a more performing European Aviation System’  
Conclusions  
22 January 2008  
• The European air transport sector faces significant challenges from known  areas such 
as capacity, safety, security and effi ciency but also from new dimensions  such as 
economics and the environment; 
• The High Level Group’s conclusions and their focus on enhanced governance and 
performance are supported by a vast  majority of stakeholders; 
• Aviation is an important enabler of ec onomic growth and technological innovation, 
and a significant source of employment and jobs as it reduces the internal and 
external costs of mobility within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world;  
• Urgent need  to address the cost  of fragmentation of the ATM system (€3bn per year 
due to the inefficiencies and  external environmental costs of the current system); 
• The Community method confirmed as the mo st effective tool — better regulation 
and close dialogue and cooperation between all relevant stake holders (Community, 
Member States, the military community, industry, the social partners and non-EU states), building on the unique expert ise of Eurocontrol in ATM matters;  
• The Commission to drive the change  process — regulatory structures,  performance 
framework and timely introduction are  addressed and handled at Community level;  
• Performance-driven approach to achieve the required  improvements in safety, 
efficiency, capacity and cost -effectiveness, together with  appropriate incentives and 
disincentives; 
• Environmental dimension to be incorporated  in the aviation system as a whole to 
achieve a balance between economic, envir onmental, safety and social impacts; 
• The environment needs a comprehensive approach embracing technologies (Clean 
Sky, SEAR), SES and market measures (ETS);  
• Pan-European approach for a European  Common Aviation Area — the Single 
European Sky to be open to non-EU countries;  
• The social dimension  is essential and must be linke d with the objectives of the 
Lisbon Agenda; 
EN 57   EN • Functional airspace blocks (FABs) are key to tackling defragmentation and 
efficiency; 
• Member States should politically commit to the creation of FABS by 2010, with 
implementation by 2012; 
• ‘Capacity crunch’ to be a ddressed through technological innovation from the SESAR 
programme together with measures  to improve airport capacity; 
• The implementation of SESAR is a necessity to ensure that the European aviation 
system will be safe, competitive and environmentally responsible; 
• The Commission should be encouraged to act quickly and draw up the SES II  
package,  including performance targets at European level, the creation of a European 
network manager, accelerating the introducti on of FABs, and establishing a genuine 
performance review mechanism (in consensus with the Member States and all relevant stakeholders) by streamlin ing and simplifying governance elements; 
• Reform of Eurocontrol; EASA as the Eur opean safety entity; partnership with the 
network of National Superv isory Authorities (NSAs) 
• Europe to maintain its competitive position in the global aviation market in the most 
safe, efficient and sustainable manner. 
EN 58   EN ANNEX 4  
List of consultations held for the development of SES2  
A large number of consultations have been he ld to ensure that the second package of 
SES regulations truly covers all stakeholder concerns. The consultations started under 
the auspices of the High Le vel Group (HLG) on Aviation Re gulation (January to June 
2007) and continued as a series of bila teral and group consultations during the 
development of SES2 (July 2007 to February 2008). The list below contains the main 
consultation meetings, but there have also been many other meetings where the main 
subject was different but SES2 was also di scussed. Unless marked ‘HLG’ (for High 
Level Group), the meetings were organise d by the Commission in connection with the 
development of the second SES package. 
1. Airspace users (end users)  
Mr Martin Robinson, IAOPA  20 Mar 2007  HLG 
Association of European 
Airlines board meeting  April 2007 
 HLG  
Airspace Users Associations  April 2007 
 HLG  
Airlines  19 Nov 2007   
 29 Nov 2007   
 12 Dec 2007   
 8 Jan 2008   
 15 Jan 2008  
 14 Feb 2008  
 28 Feb 2008  
Bilateral meeting with 
General Aviation in the 
context of the conference on 
aviation regulation  22 Jan 2008  
2. Service providers  
Civil Air Navigation Services 
Organisation EC3 meeting April 2007 HLG 
Airport Council International April 2007 HLG 
EN 59   EN board meeting  
Bilateral meetings with Canso 6 Dec 2007   12 Feb 2008  Bilateral meeting with NATS 10 Jan 2008  Bilateral meeting with ENAV 30 Jan 2008  
3. Manufacturers
 
Mr Olaf Dlugi, Chair 
SESAR consortium executive committee  26 Jan 2007  HLG  
Mr Bertrand de l’Epinois, 
Air Traffic Alliance  20 Mar 2007  HLG  
4. National administrations & regulators
 
Single Sky Committee Jan & Apr 2007 HLG 
European Civil Aviation 
Conference May 2007 HLG 
NSA Conference 18 Oct 2007  
Single Sky Committee 9 Jan 2008  SES2 presentation and 
consultation with NSAs 19 Feb 2008  
5. Military
 
EURAMID: General Major Antonio 
Pilotto 23 Feb 2007 HLG 
 Colonel Ian Logan   
 General Major Peter 
Vorderman   
 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Olivier Mrovicki   
Bilateral 
meeting with Mil representatives  30 Jan 2008  
 
EN 60   EN 6. Third countries & International organisations  
Mr Patrick Goudou, Execu tive Director EASA 
Mr Ron Elder, Chair, Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Commission Mr Keith Williams, Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission Mr Bo Redeborn, Director DAS, Eurocontrol 26 Jan 2007 HLG 
Turkey, delegation headed by Mr Ali Ariduru
Ukraine, delegation headed by Mr Anatoliy Kolisnik,
Norway, delegation headed by Mr Heine Richardsen 25 May 2007 HLG 
Eurocontrol Provisional Council  May 2007 HLG 
EASA Management Board  June 2007 HLG Eurocontrol PRU 6 July 2007   18 Sept 2007   24 Oct 2007   12 Nov 2007   28 Nov 2007   10 Dec 2007   20 Dec 2007  
7. Staff
 
Mr Marc Baumgartner, IFATCA 
Mr Danny Van Der Biest, IFATSEA Mr Joe Magee, ETF Mr François Burgues, ATCEUC Captain Heinz Frühwirth, ECA  20 Mar 2007  HLG  
ETF 21 Nov 2007   
IFATCA/IFALPA/ECA  13 Feb 2008   
ATCEUC  29 Feb 2008   
8. Others
 
High-Level Conference on Aviation Regulation  22 Jan 2008  
Industry Consultation Body (including sub-groups)  4 Dec 2007  
EN 61   EN  13 Dec 2007  
 11 Jan 2008 
 21 Jan 2008  
 26 Feb 20  
 
EN 62   EN ANNEX 5  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1997-2008 2000-2003 2003-08
1Slovenia 76,05 65,00 63,52 63,00 62,63 61,25 73,18 76,60 63,88 61,98 60,77 60,84 -20,00% 13,91% -20,43%
2United Kingdom** 74,73 79,27 76,65 81,53 83,52 84,81 83,83 82,58 82,58 81,15 81,38 78,08 4,48% 2,75% -3,01%
3Germany 72,61 66,56 62,56 60,50 67,82 75,02 92,26 89,31 71,31 65,06 67,37 64,93 -10,58% 34,42% -36,94%
4Slovak Republic 68,39 67,81 59,61 54,74 58,75 58,97 58,89 54,89 39,34 37,44 37,86 48,33 -29,33% 7,04% -55,54%
5Belgium - Lux. 68,11 82,04 74,63 59,61 66,70 85,12 94,98 90,63 83,65 77,78 70,95 69,52 2,06% 37,24% -33,88%
6Italy 64,93 64,99 64,50 63,33 56,26 57,94 67,99 68,30 69,39 72,25 67,66 67,07 3,30% 6,85% -0,48%
7France 61,61 61,36 59,36 54,39 52,21 58,11 61,94 61,34 60,40 61,03 60,97 58,63 -4,84% 12,19% -1,59%
8Austria 59,44 50,04 54,12 63,33 65,36 69,56 72,24 71,48 66,29 60,67 58,05 60,47 1,74% 12,33% -24,45%
9Netherlands 55,48 45,45 46,71 47,39 52,88 58,10 65,74 61,22 53,51 49,19 47,67 59,64 7,50% 27,91% -37,91%
10Denmark 54,38 51,83 51,67 52,08 51,90 53,58 63,48 64,27 56,78 56,78 55,11 59,39 9,22% 17,96% -15,19%
11Spain Continental 51,37 47,80 44,11 44,44 48,99 59,19 71,34 71,34 71,77 72,45 76,64 79,61 54,96% 37,71% 6,91%
12Czech Republic 48,81 45,03 45,76 36,35 34,51 35,78 36,32 28,05 26,45 31,94 40,91 41,43 -15,13% -0,07% 11,21%
13Spain Canarias 48,22 45,90 43,11 43,85 50,01 59,33 66,76 66,76 65,87 66,49 67,75 67,23 39,41% 34,32% 1,47%
14Sweden 46,52 49,20 47,99 44,43 54,65 55,23 59,11 62,33 50,61 46,23 46,28 52,20 12,21% 24,84% -27,73%
15Malta 43,38 34,31 34,85 33,49 44,04 40,16 36,35 28,73 31,85 34,24 34,81 26,97 -37,82% 7,86% -4,42%
16Portugal Lisboa 35,91 39,57 40,84 37,86 40,25 53,29 52,04 50,80 48,84 51,87 48,22 46,75 30,19% 27,25% -7,92%
17Greece 34,87 25,60 18,95 30,57 37,13 38,23 44,05 38,03 36,66 38,69 44,18 44,82 28,54% 30,60% 0,29%
18Hungary 23,73 24,59 22,99 26,71 28,64 34,49 39,09 37,70 34,62 30,80 28,09 33,64 41,74% 31,66% -39,15%
19Cyprus 22,62 25,14 24,15 23,25 19,42 24,76 31,23 33,46 34,56 32,50 35,61 34,02 50,40% 25,57% 12,30%
20Ireland 20,92 21,87 22,04 20,63 19,46 21,42 28,35 31,88 30,91 31,31 24,95 28,14 34,51% 27,22% -13,63%
21Portugal S. Maria 12,44 14,50 19,68 16,15 12,57 20,81 20,82 17,69 14,80 14,74 13,29 15,04 20,87% 22,47% -56,68%
22Finland 38,91 39,02 38,07 38,07 38,09 38,23 40,44   -2,07%
49,74 47,99 46,56 45,60 47,99 52,00 5 7,23 55,70 51,46 50,58 50,31 51,69 3,92% 20,32% -13,76%
 
 
EN 63   EN ANNEX 6  
Options for cooperation with Eurocontrol 1. Specificities of the problem 
For the creation and further development of  SES, the European Commission has been 
tasked with developing implementing rule s, Community specifications and various 
support actions in increasingly technical ar eas. Traditionally, the Commission has not 
possessed the technical expertise to do this and even recent plans for the extension of 
EASA to aerodromes and ATM/ANS cover only  the safety-related aspects. For SES1, 
therefore, the Commission has made use of  the technical competence of Eurocontrol 
and the European standardisation bodies for its legislative work.  
In the SES2 context, the role of centralised  functions to manage the network and scarce 
resources is becoming increasingly impor tant. The successful implementation of 
SESAR also requires all actors to be m obilised in coordinated support of ATM 
modernisation. The current inst itutional structures have not been designed for this 
purpose, so the current organisational set-up ne eds to be enhanced. This need was also 
foreseen by the High Level Group on Aviatio n Regulation, which recommended that 
Eurocontrol should be empowered and focused  
‘to play a key role in delivering the Single European Sky and SESAR 
objectives within the strategic and regulatory framework set by the EU. [It 
should]  focus its activities on excellent pan-European functions and ATM 
network design, and support for regula tion as requested by the European 
Commission and Member States.’
50 
As noted by the Group, however , this role cannot be perf ormed by the organisation in 
its current shape. The Eurocontrol organi sation has grown steadily over recent decades 
both in the number of staff and variety of  tasks. While it has undeniably performed 
quality work in various areas, the organisa tion has grown more in  response to diverse 
initiatives for new work than in response to a clear and systematic customer-needs 
approach. In doing so, the organisation has transformed from the original idea of a 
single ANSP for upper airspace into an organi sation that still has service provision 
elements, but is also involved in pan-Eu ropean functions, rese arch, development, 
regulation and training and at the same time l acks clear direction or focus. This spread 
of tasks has led to problems in three main areas: 
(1) Potential:  The pan-European functions (P RC, CFMU, EAD, etc.) show good 
potential and some very high quality wo rk, but are not give n the appropriate 
priority in the current orga nisation. By their nature, th ey are areas that benefit 
from centralisation (coordination and pla nning tasks requiring a network-centric 
view, straightforward collection tasks th at benefit directly from economies of 
scale, and data distribution, which for technical reasons needs to be planned 
centrally to ensure the pr ovision of consistent and high-quality datasets) and 
                                                 
50 Recommendation 6 of the High Level Group on Aviation Regulation (page iii of the report), July 
2007. 
 
EN 64   EN contribute significantly to the running of the Europe an-level network. Unless 
these functions can be run efficiently, it is not meaningful to implement the 
enhanced network functions of SES2, as they would suffer from the same limitations as the current system. 
(2) Problem of focus in the current organisation:  The current organisation has 
spread in all directions in search of a raison d’être , which leads to a need to 
prioritise tasks in order to ensure th e best added value for the organisation’s 
members. While still a good platform fo r regulatory drafting and pan-European 
mandates, its work would benef it from clearer prioritisation. 
(3) Budgetary problems and delivery rates:  airspace users in pa rticular and some 
Member States have voiced concerns over the non-optimal use of resources and the need to improve productivity:  
(a) Many units and programmes overlap w ith one other (4 safety units, 2 
frequency units etc.) 
(b) Few programmes have been fully implemented (with the notable 
exception of the Reduced Verti cal Separation Minima (RVSM) 
programme) 
(c) Over 40% of the annual agency budge t (over €700m) is taken up by the 
programmes
51, but these activities are in creasingly covered by SESAR. 
They thus need to be strictly a ligned with the SESAR programme, which 
for both the Commission and Eurocontrol is the primary driver of technological development.  
2. Options 
In order to meet the SES2 objectives, three main options could be considered (NB this 
part of the assessment does not consider the costs and benefits of actually having such 
centralised functions as network design and management or allocation of scarce 
resources. Those parts of the impact asse ssment dealing with performance targets and 
the network functions pres ent the anticipated costs and environmental gains. 
Eurocontrol is a tool for realising these tasks and hence its gains are related to those of network functions as a whole. As noted elsewh ere, these aim to cut route lengths by an 
average of 48 km and save approximately half a million tonnes of CO
2 emissions per 
year).  
The current situation is not assessed as an option, as it appears that its possibilities have 
been exhausted over the course of SES1. The Community has attempted to use tools 
such as Community coordination to drive Community policies, but as decision-making 
is based on unanimity, this ha s not had sufficient effect. Fu rthermore, most important 
                                                 
51 Based on the presentation of the ‘Functional Budget’ to the Standing Committee on Finance on 4 
October 2007. Note that all bu dgetary and staff figures are on ly approximations due to the 
transparency problems with the organisation’s budget, as often pointed out by both states and 
airspace users on the Euroc ontrol Provisio nal Council. 
 
EN 65   EN policy decisions are taken at level lower th an the Eurocontrol Provisional Council, so 
the problem is more one of governance than Community action. 
Option 1 — Transformation into a Community Agency 
The first option is to transform the current  Eurocontrol organisa tion into a Community 
agency. This would require  an international agreement between the European 
Community and those Eurocontrol states th at are not EU states. The agency would 
concentrate on rule preparat ion and support for policy-ma king for the Community and 
on the semi-operational pan-European functi ons, such as flow management, network 
design, route charges collection, and allocatio n of scarce resources. The agency could 
also have a more limited and focused ro le in supporting SESA R in validation, 
maintenance and updating activities. 
Option 2 — Maintaining Eurocontrol for th ird state needs, but creating a separate 
Community agency for SES2 
A second option could be for the Community to take the initiativ e independently and 
create a Community agency for the above ta sks. This would be done through the normal 
EU decision-making process and the current  Eurocontrol organisation would continue 
to exist for the needs of third states. The new agency would concentrate on rule 
preparation and support for policy making for the Community and on the semi-operational pan-European functions, such as  flow management, network design, route 
charges collection, and allocation of scarce  resources. The agency could also have a 
more limited and focused role in supporting SESAR in validation, maintenance and updating activities. 
Option 3 — Refocusing of Eurocontrol on its core tasks 
A third option would be to maintain Euroc ontrol as an international organisation, but 
refocus it on its core tasks. This could be done through a similar system of Community 
mandates as is used today fo r rule preparation and would allow the third states to 
continue as fully fledged members of th e organisation. The core functions of 
Eurocontrol would be based on its curren t strengths and concentrate on the semi-
operational pan-European functions, such as  flow management, network design, route 
charges collection, and allocation of scarce reso urces as well as on rule preparation and 
support for policy-making for EU and third countries. If the programme activities (currently spread over three directorates) can be reformed to avoid overlaps and internal 
discontinuities and to improve strategic focus,  the organisation could also have a central 
role in supporting SESAR in validation, ma intenance and updating activities. Retaining 
the programme activities would also increase the synergies gained from having the data 
sources for the pan-European functions in the same organisation as the programmes, 
which can make use of them and vice versa. 
3. Comparing the options  
Option 1 — Transformation into a Community agency 
Many legal and institutional difficulties exist,  since there is no precedent for turning an 
intergovernmental organisati on into a Community agency. 
 
EN 66   EN Economic impact 
Assuming that the Community agency could continue to be funded through the route 
charges system, its financial basis would be s ecure. However, it is uncertain as to what 
extent this can be done, as  at least the regulatory suppo rt tasks should probably be 
funded preferably thro ugh the Community budget as is the case for EASA. Looking at 
the issue from the Community perspective, the new agency would be a departure from 
the traditional format of Community agencies , both in terms of size and tasks. It would 
be far larger than any other Community ag ency in terms of staff, and would be 
performing tasks that are more geared toward s actual operational needs than those of the 
current agencies or the Commission. 
The agency would have a di sproportionate share of expe nditure among the Community 
agencies, and introducing new efficiencies w ould probably be somewhat difficult in an 
agency transferred together with its pers onnel and internal culture from a different 
environment. On the other hand the de-facto  dismantling of the current organisation 
would cause much uncertainty and disruption of work, and it  is uncertain whether the 
final goal of a fully functioning agency can be achieved. Third parties could be 
encouraged by the transformation process to  influence it in ways diverging from 
Community objectives. It would be especially harmful if th ere were any disruption to 
the pan-European network serv ices, as these are central to  the realisati on of SES2.  
This option threatens to sidetrack the Commun ity machinery, which is more regulatory 
than operational. It would create a large Co mmunity agency, without  actually tackling 
the underlying problems of the organisation an d fragmentation of European ATM. It 
could thus be seen only as a first st ep towards reforming the organisation. 
Social impact 
The social impact concerns mainly Eurocontrol’s staff52, who would become regular 
Community contract agents. As many of th em have permanent international civil 
servant contracts with somewhat better bene fits and grades than is usual in the 
Community (NB Eurocontrol uses a modifi ed Community personnel statute), there 
would be both fears of reduced work-related benefits in the agency and concerns about 
different treatment compared with other Co mmunity institutions. Equally, the numerous 
contract agents in Eurocontrol would f ace changes in their employment conditions. 
Environmental impact 
No difference in environmental impact be tween the different op tions can be found.  
Conclusion 
This option is certainly possibl e and would be achievable with a relatively limited social 
impact. However, it would be only the first step towards the ideal solution and the new 
body would risk becoming a misfit within the internal system of Community agencies. 
In the long run, however, the option w ould bring the required benefits. 
                                                 
52 The Eurocontrol organisation currently has over 2900 staff, divided between permanent officials, 
temporary staff and an increas ing number of contractors. 
 
EN 67   EN Option 2 — Maintaining Eurocontrol for thir d state needs, but creating a separate 
Community agency for SES 
Economic impact Since the first option is likely to be difficult to achieve, due to the need to include third 
countries in the work of a Community agen cy (and to get their unanimous agreement 
for its transformation from an internationa l organisation), a second option could be for 
the Community to take the initiative indepe ndently and create a Community agency for 
the tasks in question. Compared to the first option, this yields a clear economic benefit, 
but is naturally not without cost either. The creation of a new Community agency from 
scratch would have an impact on the Community budget and an elaborate economic 
arrangement would have to found in order to  avoid a situation wh ere all the cost is 
borne by the EC budget (continuing to cover mo st of the cost through route charges is 
the most likely alternative). The agency w ould still have a large share of staff and 
expenditure compared with the other Commu nity agencies and its tasks would differ 
from traditional agency tasks, but at l east the budgetary impact would be limited. 
While setting up the agency would be rela tively straightforw ard, it would however 
create a situation where the Community w ould have to renounce its membership of 
Eurocontrol and withdraw from  the organisation. The current Eurocontrol agency would 
continue to exist for the remaining non-EU members but its useful ness would be greatly 
reduced, e.g. retaining network management or coordination tasks in what would then 
be a geographically splintered area would be nonsen sical. It is therefor e likely that after 
a while the third countries would elect to br ing the remnants of the organisation within 
the Community system. 
Social impact 
The social impact of this option would be much  greater than in the first option. It would 
make the majority of current  Eurocontrol staff redundant an d put the whole organisation 
in a precarious situation. This would be guara nteed to cause social unrest and have a 
most negative impact on the lives of the employees, even if they would most likely 
move to the new agency. The only positive social effect would be avoiding disparity in terms of employment between Commission st aff (and possibly also saving money due 
to lower employment costs in Commission agencies). 
Environmental impact 
No difference in environmental impact be tween the different op tions can be found.  
Conclusion 
This option is easier to achieve for the Commission than the first option, but would 
create much more social problems in the resi dual Eurocontrol agency. In all likelihood, 
the operational and social problems would be  such that eventually third states would 
agree to merge the two entities into one, th ereby creating option one, but through a more 
circuitous way. Furthermore, as EASA ha s already been created as the Community 
agency for aviation safety, the creation of a second EC agency for aviation might generate concerns about overl ap and poorly coordi nated regulatory initiatives. For the 
Community, the second option woul d bring benefits faster than  the first option, but with 
 
EN 68   EN an obvious cost to the wider European ATM system and with  a need to reconsider the 
role of EASA. 
Option 3 — Refocusing and empowering Eurocontrol in its core tasks 
Economic impact Compared to the previous two options th is option would have negligible economic 
impact on the Community budget, as none of the operations would be  covered by it. It 
would also avoid many transiti on costs as staff would conti nue to be employed by their 
current employer on current terms. For the wi der ATM system, the option is either cost-
neutral or, if other parts of the organisation are also refo rmed (see below), could yield 
significant financial gains. The option also offe rs the advantage that it would not need a 
transition period to a new scheme and ther eby would allow work to commence without 
delay on the various functions assigned to Eu rocontrol in SES2. The fact that staff are 
already working on the same issues that need  to be tackled for the SES2 network and 
performance review functions gives them a fl ying start and enables the SES2 benefits to 
be achieved much earlier. While it is true that in the long run the sa me benefits can also 
be attained by setting up a Community agency , using a focused Euroco ntrol as a tool to 
this end would save several years of wo rk and avoid the uncertainties inevitably 
associated with such a major undert aking as creating a new agency.  
Social impact 
Socially, this option would initially have  a positive impact since the Eurocontrol 
organisation would be given a new or at  least a much stronger mission. It would 
reassure the staff of their future — a ques tion that has essentially remained unanswered 
due to the constant reorientat ions in the past. In the long er run, the possible additional 
reform of Eurocontrol could cause problems, unless it is planned well in advance and carried out using ‘soft’ methods, such as not filling the posts of retired personnel. 
Environmental impact 
No difference in environmental impact be tween the different options can be found. 
Conclusion 
It appears that while all three options are possible and would over time bring the desired 
benefits, it is the third option that would ach ieve them with the least cost and social 
unrest. Politically, it is th e most feasible option, since it is mostly a question of 
tweaking an existing organisation to empower and focus it. Options 1 and 2 would also 
make the position of third states more di fficult, hence giving ri se to concerns and 
possible resistance to change, while option 3 en ables them to continue to participate as 
full members in the same organisation and reap  similar benefits as EU Member States. 
Considering that option 3 would also be ab le to utilise the existing expertise in 
Eurocontrol to the full without having to  go through lengthy periods of hiring and 
training personnel, it should be retained as the primary strategy. Early contacts with 
Eurocontrol have indicated great understanding for Comm unity objectives and, most 
importantly for the feasibility of opti on 3, a sincere commitment to reform.  
 
EN 69   EN 4. Option chosen: Refocusing and empowering Eurocontrol in its core tasks 
After consideration of the various options it is evident that the Eurocontrol organisation 
should be realigned with SES implementation so as to build on its main strengths and 
avoid overlap with areas where either th e Member States, Ai r Navigation Service 
Providers or the Community (SES/SESAR/E ASA) are primarily active (option 3). 
Although the choice between the different optio ns does not have a long-term impact on 
the objectives for flight efficiency, the environment or performance, it is the limited side-effects and the promise of speedy implem entation that tip the scales in favour of 
this option.  
However, it has to be kept in mind that if option 3 becomes impossible to implement, 
option 2 is also feasible as  a back-up since it s budgetary impact is limited (due to 
financing through route charges after the build-up pe riod) and it would eventually bring 
the same benefits as the other options. 
The next chapter develops the proposal to re orient Eurocontrol towards those areas that 
are not core tasks for the Community but wh ich nevertheless bene fit from coordinated 
action on a European scale. It will not go into detail on how the Community structures (especially EASA, when it develops to it s full potential) cover regulatory functions, 
SESAR coordinates R&D actions, and pure serv ice provision is returned to the ANSPs. 
These aspects are considered in more detail in their respective sections. 
The new format chosen for the organisa tion should also enable a reinforced 
Performance Review Body to conduct fully i ndependent reviews of the organisation and 
its mission. These reviews should then lead to recommendations for improvements and 
Community performance targets and aid the efficient oversight of the organisation.  
In conclusion, we believe that the best opt ion is to empower and focus Eurocontrol to 
perform certain key functions on behalf of the Community in order to successfully 
achieve the Single European Sky. The revise d Eurocontrol Conventi on (which has been 
pending for a decade) should be ratified onl y after the internal reform on governance, 
transparency and focus has taken place. 
5. Core functions of a refocused and empowered Eurocontrol 
The core functions of a tran sformed Eurocontrol organisa tion should be built around the 
successful pan-European functions. No stakehol der seems to dispute that these functions 
should be run from a centralised location a nd that the Eurocontro l agency has done a 
good job in the actual operational running of these systems.  
The main current pan-European services  are the Central Flow Management Unit 
(CFMU), the Central Route Charges Offi ce (CRCO), the European Aeronautical 
Database
53, the Central Office for Delay Analys is (CODA), and the Height Monitoring 
Service in support of RVSM applications. 
                                                 
53 EAD, which will probably form the seed for th e Community Single Aeronautical Information 
Service. 
 
EN 70   EN These services are all located in Eurocontrol,  because by their nature  they would be less 
efficient to run if performed in a distribute d manner at national or regional level. Many 
of these services also provide an impartial network link between the actual ANSPs. It is therefore unlikely that any efficiencies w ould be gained by having these activities 
performed directly by states or their service providers. W ith increased responsibilities 
following the revision of the Single Sky legisl ation, the independence of these functions 
from the individual interests of various stakeholder group s would also need to be 
guaranteed even more than today in orde r to ensure a true network approach. 
In the increasingly technologically interdep endent European ATM system, the number 
of functions that need to be performed on a pan-European level is likely to increase. 
Good examples of such new functions ar e the network design function and the 
coordinated procurement function planned in SESAR. Further likely candidates for 
tasks to ensure the efficient use of scarce  resources are the coor dination of frequency 
allocation and the coordination of transponde r codes. As with the CFMU or CRCO, 
these tasks are most efficiently done from a si ngle location and need to be kept separate 
from actual ANSPs to ensure impartiality. It should also be considered whether the 
performance review function should be located with the pan-European services, or whether it should report directly to the Co mmission. The SES2 legislation needs to 
enable such tasks to be performed as they arise, if need be th rough implementing rules. 
The ‘New Eurocontrol’ organi sation would continue to operate as an international 
organisation, thus easily allowi ng non-EU states to particip ate. The current problems of 
non-enforceability and voluntarity are much le ss problematic in an organisation that is 
focused on operational tasks, and the remainin g problems in this regard can be solved 
for the EU Member States by using the re gulatory powers of the Commission. While the 
organisation would not be part of the Co mmunity structure, it would however be 
entrusted with the performance of functi ons for the EU through Commission mandates, 
given after consultation of the Single Sky Committee and the Industry Consultation 
Body. 
Some well-focused development capability has to  be retained in this new organisation, 
but this capability should target the areas that  it serves. SESAR JU should clearly be the 
main client for this part of the organisation and a close — perhaps even institutionalised — coordination mechanism has to be created between the two entities to ensure that 
there is no deviation from the SESAR Joint Undertaking objectives as set out in the 
Council Regulation. The organisa tion would similarly partic ipate as an ATM network 
expert in rule-making within  groups of experts managed by EASA, or lead the work 
under mandates from the Co mmission or third states. 
 
EN 71   EN ANNEX 7  
Network Design and Management Process 
1. Process 
Key to success of this func tion is that the process by which it reaches decisions is 
transparent and considered fair. 
• The decisions must be based on open consultation of all airspace users, the military 
and ANSPs  
• The decisions must be based on the combin ation of routes that best achieves the 
stated objectives (the order of importance for these also needs to be transparently 
stated) 
• Flight efficiency 
• Environmental friendliness 
• Acknowledgement of the fact that rout es with more demand get priority 
• In conflict cases, the g ood of the whole network has to be taken into 
account. Where other modes of tran sport are available (especially 
environmentally friendly forms such as ra il), the routes in  question have to 
give way to those that ha ve no such alternatives 
• Other needs that arise over time 
• The final form of the network is deci ded by the network design function and 
approved in the Network Sub-Group of th e Single Sky Committee, using qualified 
majority voting. 
• It constitutes an input from the Network Manager 
The flow of the network desi gn and management process co uld be based on a two-level 
input, with states ensuring input at nati onal/FAB level and the network function at 
European/global level. A possibl e process could be as follows: 
(1) The Member States arrange consultation with all three groups of airspace users 
(Mil, GA, airlines) and the ANSPs at na tional level to discuss the needs for 
improving the route network. The Member St ates will then cons olidate this input 
and present the national propos als at European level, al so indicating the differing 
opinions of airlines, the military, GA or ANSPs and why they have not been taken on board. If a Member State is involve d in an FAB, this part of the process 
is performed through cooperation between the FAB-NSAs at FAB level. 
(2) Once the network design function has r eceived the Member States’ input, it 
performs its own planning process, feedi ng into it both the Member States’ input 
and its own expert view of what is n eeded to optimise the overall network. At 
 
EN 72   EN this stage, it is obvious that compromi ses have to be made between national 
interests and the efficiency of the network as a whole. 
(3) The network design functi on publishes an ‘initial netw ork plan’ for consultation 
with the representatives of all three groups of airspace users and ANSPs at 
European/global level.  
(4) Once the network plan is finalised, it is submitted to the Network Sub-Group of 
the Single European Sky Committee for fi nal approval using qualified majority 
voting. 
(5) The approved ‘Community Network Plan’ is published through the Single 
European AIS service. It is also co mmunicated to the appropriate ICAO bodies, 
and constitutes the infrastructure requirements (navigation, communication, 
information, etc.) for the Network Manager 
(6) The appeal process provides for appeal first to the Commission, which bases its 
assessment on the independent advice of  the Performance Review Body and a 
hearing of all relevant parties. However,  this appeal proces s should not delay the 
implementation of the plan.  
(7) In its annual reports, the Performan ce Review Body will also assess the 
functioning of the network design proce ss and the network design function and 
propose improvements. 
2. Enforcement 
The decisions reached have deadlines for implementation and are legally binding on 
states (important since ANSP structures cha nge). If states do not implement the routes 
an infringement procedure can be started if ‘name & shame’ through the performance 
review is not enough. 
 
EN 73   EN ANNEX 8  
Technical Updates of SES I 1. Adapting to technical progress since SES I 
The Airspace Regulation provides for the creat ion of a Single Aeronautical Information 
Publication (SAIP) for upper airspace. M eanwhile, development work has started on 
updating traditional paper-based AIS (of which AIP is the main publication) to modern electronic Aeronautical Information Manage ment (AIM), with its improved products 
and tools. We also need to ensure that the new SAIP, which is a ‘safety-of-life’ service, 
is at the forefront of this development and provides a comp rehensive integr ated briefing 
facility (‘Common Integrated Br iefing Portal’?). In addition  to the need to support the 
global modernisation work performed by IC AO, Eurocontrol and many states, one of 
the major motivations for the upda te of SAIP to provide a safe ty-of-life public service is 
that the 2007-2008 Eurocontrol study on airspace infringeme nts has identif ied the lack 
of readily available comprehens ive and high-quality briefing facilities as a major cause 
of airspace infringements and related safe ty hazards. The Community should take the 
lead here and provide for a ‘standard’ solution that may be augmented by value-added 
service providers. 
Rules on the Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA)  by military and civilian airspace users 
have been put in place in SES I, but need to be strengthened  to reap the full benefits in 
terms of capacity and efficiency. 
The Community instruments for extending our  regulatory philosophy beyond direct EU 
membership have developed greatly during the years SES I has been in place. We 
should take this into consideration in the ar ticles providing for work with third states. 
Since the goals of SES II are broader than those of SES I, we also need to change the 
focus of the regulations from just capacity to efficiency, environmental friendliness and 
smooth functioning of the system in acco rdance with airspace user needs. 
The text on the harmonisation of airspace classi fications needs to be updated so that it 
no longer refers to the now defunct Eurocont rol airspace strategy, but  concerns a normal 
stand-alone Comm ission activity. 
The current work on creating harmonised European Rules of the Air should be 
explicitly highlighted in the regulations. 
We need to improve the flexibility of the basic regulations to allow us to propose and 
adopt rules as we go along, thereby bette r responding to the n eeds of a changing 
technical environment. 
2. Facilitating EASA extension to ATM 
The competences of the European Aviation Sa fety Agency (EASA) are being extended 
to cover ATM/ANS as well. The current SE S I only provides for the development of 
rules with the support of Eurocontrol or the European  standardisation bodies, so 
provision has to be made for rule development with the aid of any appropriate body.  
 
EN 74   EN We should also consider harmonising SE S and EASA terminology, since we have 
several concepts that are very similar or ev en identical in substance, but use different 
terms due to the history of their developm ent (for example, AMC vs EC Specifications 
or NSA vs NAA, etc). 
The implementation of Eurocontrol Safety  Requirements (ESARRs) has also been 
achieved, so we should update the article accord ingly so as not to have a situation where 
we are bound to implement all ESARRs that  Eurocontrol may develop in future — 
especially since EASA w ill be the body responsible for safety regulation.  
3. Extending the remaining SES I concepts to lower airspace 
SES I has four concepts (FABs, SAIP, EUIR and route & sector design) limited just to 
upper airspace, unless Member St ates specifically see the n eed to extend them to all 
airspace. It has since become evident to the Commission and stakeholders that the 
altitude limitation is irrelevant in normal life. Airspaces are not normally divided at 
28500 feet and, for example, all FAB proj ects currently cover all the airspace. 
Maintaining the division between upper and lower airspace would on ly contribute to 
unnecessary fragmentation and th us run counter to the objecti ves of SES. This view was 
also confirmed by a major Member Stat e at the conference of 22 January 2007. 
We should therefore modify Articles 3, 5 a nd 6 of the Airspace Regulation to cover 
lower airspace and delete Article 2 on the di vision level as redundant . The text on route 
and sector design should also be modified to take into account the network design 
function described above and provide fo r airspace design, general rules and/or 
guidelines stating that airspace  design is performed at loca l level taking into account 
traffic demands and complexity and includ ing a proper consultati on of all airspace 
users.