EUROPEAN COMMISSION Strasbourg, 19.10.2021 SWD(2021) 290 final/2 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2021 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2021) 644 final} - {SWD(2021) 288 final} - {SWD(2021) 289 final} - {SWD(2021) 291 final} - {SWD(2021) 292 final} - {SWD(2021) 293 final} - {SWD(2021) 294 final}



Table of Contents 1.Introduction 1.1. Context 1.2. Summary of the report 2.Cluster 1: The Fundamentals of the Accession Process 2.1.Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform 2.1.1. Democracy 2.1.2. Public Administration Reform 2.2.Rule of law and fundamental rights 2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 2.2.3Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 2.3 Economic criteria 2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 2.4. Public Procurement, Statistics, Financial control Chapter 5: Public procurement Chapter 18: Statistics Chapter 32: Financial control

3.Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation 4.Ability to assume obligations of membership Cluster 2: Internal Market Chapter 1: Free movement of goods Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services Chapter 4 - Free movement of capital Chapter 6: Company law Chapter 7: Intellectual property law Chapter 8: Competition policy Chapter 9: Financial services Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth Chapter 10: Information society and media Chapter 16: Taxation Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy Chapter 19: Social Policy and employment Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy Chapter 25: Science and Research Chapter 26: Education and culture

Chapter 29: Customs union Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity Chapter 14: Transport policy Chapter 15: Energy Chapter 21: Trans-European networks Chapter 27: Environment and climate change Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy Chapter 13: Fisheries Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions Cluster 6: External relations Chapter 30: External relations Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 5.Annex I – Relations between the EU and Turkey 1.Introduction 1.1. Context Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by an Association Agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was established in 1995. The European Council granted Turkey the status of candidate country in December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened and one of these was provisionally closed. The General Affairs Council conclusions of June 2019 reiterated the Council’s position of June 2018 that under the current circumstances, Turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing . Over the reporting period, the Turkish government did not reverse the negative trend as regards the reform agenda despite the Turkish government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. There was further backsliding in many areas.

Relations with the EU deteriorated until December 2020, mostly due to actions taken by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, directly challenging the rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its maritime zones. In addition, there was a sharp increase in provocative action taken by Turkey against Greece, a failure to advance in the Cyprus settlement process, and assertive action by Turkey in most of the surrounding regional conflicts, in ways that often were at odds with broader EU interests. Two individuals remain listed under the November 2019 framework for restrictive measures for Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean . The duration of this framework was extended by an additional year in November 2020 . Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean eased in the beginning of 2021. The EU re-affirmed that it has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. The EU offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in EU-Turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with Turkey in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest, subject to the conditionalities set out by the European Council. In that context high level dialogues were held on climate and migration and security to be followed by the dialogue on health soon. At the same time, the European Union remained committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States and uphold regional stability. Turkey continued its enormous efforts to host the largest refugee population in the world with around 3.7 million Syrians under temporary protection and more than 320 000 non-Syrians, including those who hold or have applied for international protection status. The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey contributed to these efforts, with the full EUR 6 billion operational budget of the Facility contracted by the end of 2020 and over EUR 4.2 billion had been disbursed by August 2021. In addition to the EUR 6 billion already mobilised under the EU Facility for Refugees, in 2020 and 2021 EUR 585 million were earmarked from the EU budget for humanitarian support and to continue two important cash support programmes for refugees. In June 2021, the Commission proposed to allocate EUR 3 billion in additional assistance to Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey. The March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued yielding results and remained the key framework governing cooperation on migration despite Turkey’s repeated calls to update the Statement. Problems arose over implementation of the Statement due to Turkey’s unilateral suspending returns of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers from the Greek islands from March 2020 onwards, the emergence of alternative smuggling routes to Cyprus and Italy. The reporting period continued to be marked by the detrimental impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic. By early October, Turkey had recorded around 7.2 million cases and about 64 000 deaths related to the pandemic. Around 71 % of the population had been fully vaccinated. Turkey took considerable measures to boost domestic demand and soften the economic repercussions of the pandemic. Since the beginning of the pandemic the EU has stood by Turkey and taken several measures, including by reallocating over EUR 103 million of EU funds to help prevent and treat COVID-19 and to mitigate the economic and social impact. 1.2. Summary of the report There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Turkey’s democratic institutions. Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies of the presidential system remained in place. Key recommendations of the Council of Europe and its bodies remain to be addressed. The Parliament continued to lack the necessary means to hold the government accountable. The constitutional architecture continued to centralise powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and balances mechanism, the democratic accountability of the executive branch remains limited to elections. Targeting of the opposition parties continued, including by the Constitutional Court’s acceptance of an indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation seeking to close down the second largest opposition party, which contributed to weakening political pluralism in Turkey. During the report period, the President dismissed the governor of the Central Bank twice. Despite ending the state of emergency in July 2018, certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to government authorities and retaining several restrictive elements from the emergency rule remained integrated into law, which continued to have a significant impact on democracy and fundamental rights. In July 2021, Turkey's parliament approved a bill that extends the duration of these restrictive elements of the state of emergency for one more year. The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency has not yet finalised examining its caseload concerning the public servants who were dismissed by decree during the emergency rule. Pressure on mayors from opposition parties by the ruling coalition government further weakened local democracy. Mayors from the opposition parties faced administrative and judicial investigations. In the south-east, the forcefully dismissed mayors continued to be replaced by government-appointed trustees, denying citizens their chosen representation. In most cases, the incoming trustees have kept the municipal assemblies suspended. Hundreds of local politicians and elected office holders were arrested on terrorism-related charges. The situation in the south-east remained very worrying. The government carried out domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria. The security situation remained precarious in border areas with recurrent terrorist acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The EU unambiguously condemned the PKK’s attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. While the government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is essential that it does so in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There were no developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights by security forces. Around 4 000 members and officials of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) remain in prison, including a number of parliamentarians. In June, the Constitutional Court accepted an indictment demanding the closure of the HDP, seeking a political ban for 451 HDP executives, including the party’s co-chairs and all past and present members of Parliament and executives as well as a freeze on the party’s bank accounts. There were pending requests by the prosecution in the Parliament to lift the immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers. On civil society issues, serious backsliding continued. Civil society faced continuous pressure and their space to operate freely has continued to diminish limiting their freedom of expression and freedom of association. The new law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction raises concerns with regard to possible restrictions on the activities of human rights defenders and civil society. The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained unchanged with reinforced civilian oversight of the security forces under the presidential system. The government took steps to further consolidate the civilian control of the security forces. Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in the field of public administration reform. It made no progress during the reporting period. Turkey lacks a comprehensive public administration reform agenda and a lead institution in charge of the process. Concerns remained over the accountability of the administration and human resources management. The political will to reform is still lacking. Although policy coordination among central government institutions remained strong, policymaking is not evidence-based or participatory. The politicisation of the administration continued. Women’s representation remained low in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage of preparation. The serious backsliding observed since 2016 continued. Concerns remained, in particular over the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and undue pressure on judges and prosecutors. The new human rights action plan envisages certain positive measures but it does not address any of the key shortcomings related to the independence of the judiciary. In particular, no measures are envisaged to improve respect for the principle of the separation of powers or to improve the structure and the selection process of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, long outstanding recommendations of the Council of Europe Venice Commission and the European Commission. Despite their acquittal, none of the judges or prosecutors dismissed following the coup attempt were reinstated. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source of concern. The institution of criminal law judges of peace continued to raise concerns over their jurisdiction and practice. Regarding the fight against corruption, Turkey remained at an early stage of preparations and made no progress in the reporting period. The country did not establish anti-corruption bodies in line with Turkey’s international obligations. The flaws of the legal framework and institutional architecture allowed undue political influence in the investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated a lack of will to fight decisively against corruption. Most of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations have not been implemented. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and made limited progress. Cooperation between Europol and Turkey is based on a Strategic Agreement on Cooperation, which entered into force in July 2004. Negotiations concerning an international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism are ongoing, requiring Turkey to reform its legislation aligning its data protection law with the European standards. Turkey should improve its track record on dismantling criminal networks and confiscating criminal assets. The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing needs to be improved in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and those of the Venice Commission on the law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Efforts are needed to improve the legislation on cybercrime and witness protection. The deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued. Many of the measures brought in during the state of emergency remain in force. The legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights but the legislation and practice still need to be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law. Broad-scale restrictions imposed on the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms and have led to self-censorship. Turkey’s refusal to implement ECtHR rulings, notably in the cases of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, further increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention also put into question its commitment to such standards. The new human rights action plan, which promised reforms in a number of areas, does not address critical issues. Serious backsliding continued on freedom of expression. Legislation and its implementation, especially national security and anti-terrorism provisions, continued to contravene the European Convention on Human Rights and other international standards and to diverge from ECtHR case law. The dissemination of opposition voices and freedom of expression were negatively affected by the increasing pressure and restrictive measures. Criminal cases and convictions of journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers, opposition politicians, students and social media users continued. There was further serious backsliding in the area of freedom of assembly and association in light of recurrent bans, disproportionate interventions and excessive use of force in peaceful demonstrations, investigations, administrative fines and prosecutions against demonstrators on charges of terrorism-related activities. Legislation and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or with international conventions.

The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and of persons belonging to minorities need better protection. Roma remained largely excluded from formal jobs and their living conditions severely deteriorated. Gender-based violence, discrimination, hate speech against minorities, in particular against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern. On migration and asylum policy, Turkey made some progress. After the incidents of March 2020 when Turkey actively encouraged migrants and refugees to take the land route to Europe through Greece, the situation has eventually de-escalated. Some progress was made on strengthening surveillance and protection capacity of the eastern land border. The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 continued to deliver results and Turkey continued to play a key role in ensuring effective management of migratory flows along the eastern Mediterranean route. The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands under the EU-Turkey Statement remained however suspended by Turkey citing COVID-19 restrictions. However, resettlements from Turkey to the EU resumed in July 2020 despite restrictions. Although the volume of irregular arrivals to Greece fell, smuggling routes to Italy and to the government-controlled areas of Cyprus were increasingly used. Turkey has still not implemented the provisions relating to third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, despite these entering into force in October 2017. Overall, the number of illegal border crossings between Turkey and Greece still remained significantly lower than it was prior to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. Turkey continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of the largest refugee community in the world. The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion under the Facility for Refugees was contracted by the end of 2020 and over EUR 4.2 billion was disbursed by August 2021. Efficient integration measures are necessary to address the extended presence of refugees in the country. Access to public health for migrants and refugees should be increased. No outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were fulfilled. Turkey still needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy. Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy continued to collide with EU priorities under the CFSP, notably due to its support for military action in the Caucasus, Syria and Iraq. While the institutional framework enabling Turkey's participation in the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is in place, Turkey maintained a very low alignment rate of around 14 %. Turkey’s military support in Libya, including the deployment of foreign fighters on the ground, and its persistent criticism of, and lack of cooperation with Operation IRINI, are detrimental to the EU’s effective contribution to the UN arms embargo implementation, and have led to conflicting approaches on Libya. Turkey wants to see a stable and prosperous Syria, an objective it shares with the EU. However, Turkey pursued its own military action in northern Syria, including through Turkish-backed militias. At the same time, Turkey increased the provision of basic services and extended its infrastructure networks in northern Syria. In November 2020, the Council extended the duration of the existing framework for restrictive measures in response to Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In its conclusions of December 2020, the European Council strongly condemned Turkey’s unilateral actions, provocations and escalated rhetoric against the EU, EU Member States and European Leaders. The tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean decreased as from the beginning of 2021. Turkey stopped its illegal hydrocarbon exploration activities in the maritime zones of Greece and Cyprus. However, in early October Turkish warships obstructed the vessel Nautical Geo from conducting a survey in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, and Turkey issued a NAVTEX for conducting seismic surveys which would encompass parts of Cyprus’ EEZ. Furthermore, Turkey continued undertaking actions towards changing the status of the fenced-off city of Varosha with unacceptable unilateral decisions which go against the relevant UN SC Resolutions 550 (1984) and 789 (1992). The EU has strongly condemned Turkey’s unilateral steps and the unacceptable announcements made by the Turkish President and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community on 20 July 2021 on the further reopening of the fenced-off town of Varosha in Cyprus, and called for the immediate reversal of these actions and the reversal of all steps taken on Varosha since October 2020. The EU has repeatedly stressed the need for Turkey to respect the sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include entering into bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Turkey failed to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and the removal of all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus and the informal talks in April 2021 failed to pave the way for the resumption of formal negotiations. The March 2021 and the June 2021 European Council recalled the European Union’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. In light of the discontinuation of illegal drilling activities, the resumption of bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey and the forthcoming, at that time, talks on the Cyprus problem under the auspices of the United Nations, the leaders offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in EU-Turkey relations. To this end, they expressed readiness to engage with Turkey in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest, subject to Turkey meeting the established conditionalities set out in previous European Council conclusions, and provided that the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean is sustained. The leaders called on Turkey to abstain from renewed provocations or unilateral actions in breach of international law. Taking into account the Joint Communication, they reaffirmed the determination of the European Union, in case of such action, to use the instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States as well as to uphold regional stability. Turkey continued to assert the validity of the Turkish-Libyan maritime delimitation and military agreements of 2019. The EU considers this an infringement of the sovereign rights of third States, not complying with the Law of the Sea and having no legal consequences for third States. Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced, but made no progress over the reporting period and serious concerns persist over its functioning. The authorities issued a sizeable and wide-ranging set of measures to boost domestic demand and soften the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the economy rebounded quickly from the crisis, reaching pre-crisis levels already in the third quarter of 2020. Amid a strong policy response to the crisis, institutional and policy coordination weaknesses undermined the credibility and effectiveness of authorities’ actions and the imbalances increased. The macroeconomic policy mix relied too heavily on the credit channel, while direct fiscal support measures were rather limited in view of the magnitude of the social and labour market challenges. The strong monetary expansion last year weakened the lira, increased inflation and dollarization, and triggered portfolio outflows. The closing of the current account deficit in 2019 turned out to be short-lived and external imbalances remain a major vulnerability. Monetary policy tightened in autumn 2020 but the abrupt dismissal of the central bank governor in March 2021, only four months after his appointment, stirred financial market instability and called into question the authorities’ commitment to reducing inflation. The institutional and regulatory environment weakened further and there are persistent issues with the predictability, transparency, and implementation of regulations. Market exit remained costly and slow. The informal sector declined during the crisis but still accounts for a large part of the economy. State intervention in price setting mechanisms persists. The provision of State aid lacks proper rules on implementation, enforcement and transparency. Supported by loose monetary policy until the autumn 2020 and favourable regulatory measures, bank lending grew strongly, spurred in particular by state-owned banks. The banking sector remained well capitalised, benefiting from regulatory forbearance and other crisis-mitigation measures. The pandemic had a deeply negative impact on the labour market and on poverty. The number of discouraged workers increased significantly and employment levels fell far below from where they were a few years ago. Female labour market participation and employment remained at particularly low levels. The proportion of young people not in employment, education or training increased. Turkey made limited progress and has a good level of preparation in achieving the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite some progress made in improving access to education, the mismatch between the education system and labour market needs persists. Expenditure on research and development continued increasing at a slow pace, but remained well below the government’s target. Supported by favourable financing conditions and concessional lending, investment activity rebounded in 2020. Progress was made with regard to the diversification of energy supplies and the development of the renewable energy sector. The extension of local content requirement practices continued to raise concerns. The relative share of the EU in Turkey’s foreign trade slightly increased, despite extensive deviations by Turkey from its obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis was very limited and pursued on a rather ad hoc basis. The internal market cluster is key to the good functioning of the Customs Union and to integrating Turkey in the EU’s single market. Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. Although it continued to align with technical EU legislation under the ‘New and Global Approach’, technical barriers to trade remain, which hamper the good functioning of the Customs Union. Preparations in the areas of freedom of movement for workers and right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage as many professions are closed to EU nationals. Turkey is moderately prepared on free movement of capital notably because of the substantial remaining obstacles for acquisitions of assets and real estate. It improved its legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. It has reached a good level of preparation in terms of the legislative alignment of consumer and health protection, as exemplified by Turkey’s strong vaccination campaign against COVID-19. However, in both areas, there is a need to strengthen administrative capacity, consultations and coordination among stakeholders. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. There is a continued lack of State aid implementation rules, enforcement and transparency, while the institutional set up remains incomplete. In the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, there has been mostly backsliding on the economic-related chapters. This was notably the case on enterprise and industrial policy, mainly due to Turkey bringing in measures incompatible with EU industrial policy principles, and on economic and monetary policy, reflecting intensified political pressure on the central bank. There was also backsliding in the area of social policy and employment, linked to the curtailment of trade union rights, the lack of genuine social dialogue and persistent levels of informal economic activity. On taxation, while Turkey is moderately prepared, there is a need for a clear strategy, avoiding frequent changes in tax rates and enabling tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Turkey maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress, including in its implementation. Turkey’s deviations from its obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue, contributing to a high number of trade irritants. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of information society and media. It continued backsliding, mostly due to inadequate competition, concentration of media ownership and the lack of independence of regulatory authorities. Turkey’s preparations in the area of science and research are well advanced and it continued to implement the action plan to boost the national research and innovation capacity and to align with the European Research Area (ERA). Turkey is moderately prepared on education and culture, and needs to further improve inclusive education, with a particular focus on girls and children from disadvantaged groups. Regarding the cluster on the Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, Turkey is moderately prepared in transport and energy policies. It has made some progress on energy and transport networks, with the construction of the Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the Bulgarian border to Istanbul continuing. Turkey has some level of preparation on environmental and climate change and faces critical environmental and climate challenges, both as regards mitigation and adaptation. It made some progress, including the ratification of the Paris Agreement on climate change and increasing capacity in waste management, wastewater treatment and on legislative alignment, but enforcement and implementation remain weak. Turkey needs to follow up with an enhanced nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, long-term strategic decarbonisation and adaptation plans and appropriate legislation reflecting them domestically. . On the cluster covering resources, agriculture and cohesion, Turkey reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. However, there was backsliding over the reporting period, as its agricultural policy diverged from the main principles of the EU common agricultural policy. Turkey is a major exporter of food products to the EU, and made limited progress in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. Turkey needs to make further progress on meeting EU standards, particularly on pesticide residues. It made good progress on fisheries in implementing the fisheries law, resources and fleet management, and inspection and control. Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments. Overall, it made some progress in this area, especially in accelerating the absorption of IPA II funds and in addressing some structural weaknesses. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions and made limited progress during the reporting period to strengthen administrative capacity or to design implementing rules for the correct application of the own resources system. Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of external relations, notably due to the continuing deviations from the Common Customs Tariff and the common commercial policy. It made limited progress in the reporting period, when it successfully concluded a trade agreement with the UK after the EU-UK agreement. Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. There was backsliding in the framework of political dialogue on foreign and security policy as Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy collided with the EU priorities under the common foreign and security policy. Overall, in many areas further significant efforts are needed on legislative alignment with the EU acquis. In all areas, implementation and enforcement needs substantial improvement. Ensuring the independence of regulatory authorities and developing administrative capacity are key for Turkey to achieve further progress. 2.Cluster 1: The Fundamentals of the Accession Process 2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform

2.1.1. Democracy There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Turkey’s democratic institutions. Democratic backsliding as well as deep political polarisation continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies of the presidential system remained in place. Despite ending the state of emergency in July 2018, certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to government authorities and retaining several restrictive elements of the emergency rule remained integrated into law. In July 2021, Turkey's Parliament approved a bill that extends the duration of these restrictive elements of the state of emergency for one more year. The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency has not yet finalised the examination of its caseload concerning the public servants who were dismissed by decree during the emergency rule. This prevented them from launching appeal procedures. Elections No elections were held in the reporting period. In the south-east, mayors, elected in 2019 and forcefully dismissed, continued to be replaced by government-appointed trustees, which is a source of significant concern as it undermines local democracy and denies citizens their chosen representation. The new human rights action plan foresees changes to the legislation on political parties and elections, which provides an opportunity to bring Turkish legislation in line with international obligations and standards for conducting democratic elections. Turkey needs to take steps to improve the broader environment for elections. The legal framework for elections and political parties remains problematic and needs to be aligned with the outstanding recommendations of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission. Turkey also needs to address broader questions with regard to democratic media plurality and provide equal and fair conditions to all political parties and candidates. The human rights action plan announced in March 2021 foresees changes to the legislation on political parties and elections. This represents an important opportunity as past elections were marked by undue restrictions of certain fundamental freedoms, including the right to vote and be elected and the freedom of expression. Turkey should introduce key amendments to the election legislation with proper consultation, which would provide stability of the legal framework in line with international good practice. In the south-east, 48 mayors had been forcefully dismissed and replaced by government-appointed trustees, denying citizens their chosen representation. No steps were taken to address the June 2020 opinion of the Venice Commission, according to which decisions to deny mayoral mandates to HDP candidates who received the highest number of votes at the municipal elections of March 2019 in six municipalities and to give these mandates to second-placed AKP candidates, were deemed not consistent with international norms and standards, and should be reversed. The Venice Commission further emphasised that, while the removal of elected officials may exceptionally be justified by the need to prevent officials from abusing their office to favour terrorist activities, replacing elected officials by candidates who lost the election, without repeating elections, cannot be justified on this basis. Parliament The presidential system has largely weakened the Parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. The President possessed vast legislative powers and continued to curtail the legislative role of the Parliament through presidential decrees and decisions regulating key policy areas. Policy deliberations forging cross-party consensus rarely occurred. The Parliament continued to lack the necessary means to hold the government accountable. Targeting of the opposition parties continued, including by the Constitutional Court’s acceptance of an indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation seeking to close down the second largest opposition party, which contributed to the weakening of political pluralism in Turkey. Inter-party electoral alliances were sustained in the Parliament. The parliamentary majority of the ruling AKP-led alliance marked the Parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting functions. Opposition parties failed to exert influence in parliamentary discussions. Key public policy discussions forging cross-party compromises very seldom occurred within the Parliament. The presidential system has weakened the Parliament’s legislative function, in particular due to the extensive use of Presidential decrees and decisions. During the reporting period, the Parliament adopted 61 pieces of legislation out of the 821 proposed bills. 77 presidential decrees were issued on a wide range of policy areas including in the socio-economic policy areas, which do not fall within the remit of presidential decrees. As an example, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which had been unanimously ratified by the Parliament in 2011, was implemented by a presidential decision, without any involvement of the Parliament. Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very weak. The Parliament lacks the necessary means to hold the government to account. Members of Parliament can only address written questions to the Cabinet members. They cannot ask questions to the President. Presidential decrees remained exempt from parliamentary control. Parliamentary oversight of public spending needs to be improved. The judiciary systematically targeted parliamentarians from the opposition parties on the account of alleged terrorism-related offenses. Currently, 4 000 HDP members and officials remain in prison, including a number of parliamentarians. In June 2021, the Justice Ministry’s prosecutors submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly summaries of proceedings seeking to lift the legislative immunity of 20 opposition lawmakers from six different opposition parties. The parliamentary immunity system did not provide adequate legal protection that would allow the parliamentarians from the opposition to express their opinions within the boundaries of freedom of speech. Legal actions against representatives of the opposition parties, notably the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), increasingly endangered political pluralism. In the current legislative term, four opposition deputies were stripped of their immunities and arrested due to terrorism-related charges. One of them re-gained his parliamentary status after his appeal to the Constitutional Court. Two former co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and other former HDP deputies remained in jail. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court accepted an indictment seeking the closure of the HDP. The Prosecutor alleged that the HDP became the focus of activities aiming to disrupt the indivisible integrity of the State with its nation by acting as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The prosecutor also sought a political ban of 451 HDP members and a freeze of the party’s bank account. The move to close down the second largest opposition party appears to be politically motivated and seriously undermines the legitimacy of the Turkish democratic institutions and political pluralism in the country. The legal framework for elections and political parties remains problematic. The 10 % electoral threshold is the highest among Council of Europe members. It contradicts the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and hinders the representation of many Turkish voters. Turkey did not take any step to align with the outstanding recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Venice Commission (see also Elections). Representation of women in Parliament remained low (17.32 %). Despite the Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men and some individual deputies’ efforts, the Parliament did not prioritise advancing gender equality across the country. Governance

The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances and by politicisation of the public administration. Most regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations of the Council of Europe Venice Commission on the presidential regime still need to be addressed. Pressure on mayors from opposition parties by the ruling coalition government further weakened local democracy. The presidential system remained characterised by a lack of the necessary checks and balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one office and to ensure the independence of the judiciary, as highlighted in the 2017 opinion of the Venice Commission. The presidential system negatively affected the functioning of the branches of government and the state administration. The President’s political accountability is limited to elections, due to a lack of effective checks and balances. The use of traditional instruments of oversight of the executive by Parliament, such as a vote of confidence and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, is still not possible; only written questions can be addressed to the Vice-President and ministers. The politicisation of the administration, judiciary and the security sector further increased. Most of the key institutions are directly attached to the Presidency. The civil service has been politicised, especially in the senior managerial levels. The legal framework enabled undue political influence over regulatory authorities. Most regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency and the President has the power to nominate the heads of the vast majority of the public regulatory authorities. During the reporting period, the President dismissed twice the governor of the Central Bank. Despite the increase in the caseload of the Ombudsman, the institution remained silent on politically critical issues concerning fundamental rights. The Ombudsman still lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies. Local government The pressure of the government over opposition mayors further intensified. Mayors of the opposition parties faced politically motivated administrative and judicial investigations. The Court of Cassation upheld the prison sentence for the Istanbul provincial chair of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Canan Kaftancıoğlu, who was charged for her social media posts. The situation of local democracy in the south-east further deteriorated. 48 HDP mayors were removed from office on grounds of terrorism-related changes since the local elections in 2019. Additionally, one CHP mayor in the region of Izmir was replaced due to alleged links to the Gülen movement. Governors, as trustees, continued to hold the posts of the dismissed mayors. In most cases, the incoming trustees have kept the municipal assemblies suspended. Hundreds of local politicians and elected office holders were arrested on terrorism-related charges. All these measures ran counter to the basic premises of democracy by denying citizens their chosen representation. According to the Venice Commission, the voters’ choice needs to be restored either by reinstating the suspended mayors or determination of acting mayors by the elected municipal assemblies or by organising repeat elections. A lawsuit was filed against İstanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on the grounds that in his press release of November 2019 he allegedly insulted the members of the Supreme Election Council (YSK) after the İstanbul elections had been cancelled. The legal framework regulating the Ministry of Interior’s tutelary powers over elected local office holders was not revised in line with Turkey’s commitments under the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The municipal law envisages local administrations' engagement with citizens and civil society. Citizens’ assemblies, which aim to bring together professional and civil society organisations and other local stakeholders, remained inactive in most provinces. Some municipalities increased their level of transparency and accountability through innovative solutions, such as live broadcasting of municipal tenders. The representation of women at local level continued to be low. Only 2 of 30 (6.6 %) metropolitan mayors and 42 of 1 389 (3 %) mayors are women. Civil Society Serious backsliding regarding the civil society environment continued. Civil society faced continuous pressure and their space to operate freely has continued to diminish, limiting their freedom of expression and freedom of association. Turkey did not implement the ECtHR judgement, which ruled for the immediate release of Osman Kavala, a prominent human rights defender. His continued pre-trial detention, further prolonged on 1 September 2021, had a deterrent effect on the work of the civil society at large. Human rights organisations, which were closed under the state of emergency, were not offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. The new law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction raises concerns with regard to possible restrictions on the activities of human rights defenders and civil society. Despite all impediments, civil society remained vocal, involved in civic life and reported on developments as much as possible. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for consulting a wide spectrum of rights based civil society organisations, notably on new legislation and policies need to be in place. A powerful and diverse civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and should be acknowledged and treated as such by the state institutions. Civil society organisations in Turkey continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the country, notably in the areas of education, anti-discrimination, female workforce participation, awareness-raising regarding ethnic and social tolerance, hate crimes monitoring and support for refugees. Civil society working in the area of human rights faced increased pressure, in particular following detentions and arrests of activists and human rights defenders. Court cases with severe sentences and frequent investigations led to increased challenges and a hostile environment for the civil society. The ongoing court case of prominent human rights defender Osman Kavala, held in pre-trial detention since November 2017, is deeply worrying in view of the relevant ECtHR judgment, which became final in May 2020. The judgement underlined that in addition to violating Osman Kavala’s right to liberty and security, his pre-trial detention is serving ulterior purpose, namely to silence him and dissuade other human rights defenders, contrary to Article 18 of the ECHR. The Council of Europe urged the Turkish authorities to ensure Osman Kavala’s immediate release. In December 2020, the Constitutional Court rejected for the second time the individual application from Osman Kavala concluding that his right to personal liberty and security had not been violated. As underlined by the Commissioner for Human Rights, the decision of the Istanbul 13th Assize Court of 1 September 2021 to prolong the detention of Mr Osman Kavala perpetuates the violation of both his human rights and of Turkey’s obligation to abide by a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. Another symbolic case against human rights defenders, the Büyükada case was pending before the Court of Cassation. Portrayal in some media outlets of some of activists as criminals, including for accepting funds from international donors remains a matter of serious concern. Defamatory rhetoric by public officials casts serious doubt on the respect for a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The pressure faced by female politicians and women’s organisations activists characterised by frequent detention, investigation, and arrest created a serious hurdle for the exercise of freedom of association, freedom of expression, and for participation in political life. Discriminatory discourse and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ community increased.

International non-governmental organisations, including those providing humanitarian aid to refugees, also faced difficulties in their work in Turkey. No effective domestic remedy was provided for the confiscation of assets from civil society organisations closed by emergency decrees. The legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations lacks clarity in terms of the distribution of responsibilities among public institutions as well as arbitrariness in the implementation of the relevant legislation. It was still compulsory for all associations to register all their members in the information system of the Ministry of Interior. This legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of association. The overly broad definition of terrorism and its interpretation by the judiciary has a worrisome deterrent effect on civil society. The law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction came into force in December 2020 after a speedy parliamentary procedure without any prior consultation and public debate. Three UN Special Rapporteurs, among many national and international stakeholders, shared their concerns over the law and argued that it might pose new limitations to freedom of association and has a negative impact on fundraising. The Venice Commission, while fully recognising Turkey’s difficult security situation, also shared these concerns. It underlined that the introduced measures go beyond what is necessary and proportional, and some of them will have a chilling effect on NGOs. The law on collection of aid continues to impose burdensome requirements for permits that discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations. These include prior notification for each fundraising activity and lengthy authorisation processes. Public funds are not distributed in a transparent way and the distribution process does not allow for the full involvement of civil society organisations and other stakeholders at every stage. The existing tax system impedes the functioning and development of foundations and associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for associations and ‘tax exemption’ for foundations is vaguely defined and granted by the President. The space for foreign donors, which provide financial support to civil society in Turkey under current Turkish legislation, is increasingly shrinking. Other barriers to civil society and freedom of association remain, notably cumbersome administrative procedures and repetitive frequent inspections and fines. Provisions restricting registration, procedures for obtaining required permits and the functioning of associations need to be revised, including facilitating the activities of international and national NGOs working with refugees and migrants in Turkey. There is still no comprehensive government strategy or mechanism in place for cooperation with civil society or for improving the legal framework. Nor is there any legal framework or transparent and consistent practice for public consultations. Independent civil society organisations are largely excluded from the consultations that are part of policy-making processes and monitoring. It is crucial that the elements of full participatory approach are adopted for a functioning democracy. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society in Turkey. Civilian oversight of the security forces The legal and institutional framework governing the security and intelligence sector remained unchanged, with strengthened civilian oversight under the presidential system. Broad powers over the security forces lie within the executive branch. During the reporting period, the government took steps to further consolidate civilian control of the security forces. As of March 2021, the Ministry of Defence was entitled to propose military personnel’s promotion and appointment, a legal mandate that previously belonged to the General Staff. However, the transparency and accountability of military, police and intelligence services remained very limited. The culture of impunity remained prevalent and the security personnel continued to enjoy significant judicial and administrative shelters in cases of alleged human right violations and disproportionate use of force. In June 2021, the Parliament adopted a law introducing legal shelters and exceptions to the military personnel. Except the cases of in flagrante delicto, the investigation of offences committed by the military staff is subject to prior authorisation. The parliamentary oversight of the security agencies was ineffective. The legal framework for overseeing military expenditure was not improved. There were further dismissals and arrests of officers in relation to the coup attempt of July 2016. Situation in the east and south-east The situation in the south-east remained very worrying. The government carried out domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria. The security situation remained precarious in border areas with recurrent terrorist acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The EU unambiguously condemned the PKK’s attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. While the government has a legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is essential that it does so in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There were no developments on the resumption of a credible political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. Visits by his family and lawyers to life-sentence serving PKK leader Öcalan were allowed only intermittently. There were renewed hunger strikes in several prisons demanding an end to Öcalan’s isolation and protesting against human rights violations in prisons. Provincial governorates declared recurrent military security zones in rural settlements. The curfew in six districts of Diyarbakir's Sur municipality, in place since December 2015, was not lifted. The Venice Commission’s opinion on the legal framework governing curfews are yet to be implemented. Investigations into the deaths of civilians during security operations under curfews in 2015-2016 in towns such as Cizre did not progress. Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights by security forces, including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and procedural rights violations in prisons and in police and gendarmerie establishments. Eastern and south-eastern provincial governors declared frequent blanket bans on all demonstrations and events, with the longest repeated ban in Van in force since 2016. A very broad interpretation of the fight against terrorism, growing restrictions imposed on the rights of journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders working on the Kurdish issue raised repeated concerns. Associations, Kurdish-language media outlets, and cultural rights institutions remained mostly closed. In April 2021, the Constitutional Court annulled a provision of the emergency decree that set the basis for the closures of media outlets on the ground of "posing a threat to national security” in 2016. The Constitutional Court also reversed a provision that paved the way for the seizure of the properties of those that were shut down. Attempts to link the HDP to a terrorist organisation, and prosecute it accordingly, intensified. In June, the Constitutional Court accepted an indictment demanding to close down the HDP, seeking political ban for 451 HDP executives, including the party’s co-chairs and all past and present members of Parliament and executives as well as a freeze on the party’s bank accounts. There were hundreds of new detentions and arrests of elected representatives and mayors, municipal council members and municipal executives in the east and south-east of Turkey on terrorism-related charges. Requests by the prosecution in the Parliament to lift the immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers are pending. Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş was not released from prison despite two final ECtHR judgements ruling for his immediate release. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of June 2020 on the violation of Demirtaş’s right to liberty and security was not implemented. Overall, 48 elected mayors were replaced by state appointed trustees, out of the 65 municipalities won by the HDP in the March 2019 local elections. Since the first trustee appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors were detained. Currently six HDP co-mayors are in prison, and five co-mayors are under house arrest. In metropolitan municipalities alone, almost 100 elected municipal assembly members were suspended. These dismissals and arrests triggered reactions across the political landscape and civil society, as well as from the international community. As a long-standing member of the Council of Europe and a candidate country, Turkey must safeguard its democratic system, including the freedom of political association. Court cases launched against government-funded construction projects on cultural, historical, and religious heritage sites damaged in 2015 and 2016 are ongoing. There were renewed tensions around several projects, which are considered to be culturally and environmentally destructive, such as the mining project in Tunceli Mountains, which is part of a national park and a sacred site for Alevis. The Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River flooded most of the historic town in Hasankeyf and surrounding sites, natural habitats and historical heritage. The serious risk of such damages had been raised for years by residents and activists. There was still no comprehensive, consistent approach in place in relation to missing persons, to the exhumation of mass graves or to the independent investigation of all alleged cases of extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations into cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have faced the 20-year statute of limitations. Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons, only 16 court cases have been launched. 14 ended in acquittals of the alleged perpetrators, two are ongoing and two other cases are before the Court of Cassation. Refugees and internally displaced persons

Turkey continues to host the largest number of refugees worldwide. According to Turkey’s Directorate-General of Migration Management, Turkey hosted 3 670 342 Syrian refugees with temporary protection status, some 92 000 Syrians with legal residency and 110 000 Syrians with Turkish citizenship. The number of Syrian refugees who voluntarily returned to Syria from Turkey stood at 420 000 according to the Turkish government. Besides the Syrian refugees, Turkey hosts 320 000 asylum-seekers and refugees from countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia as of January 2021, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In 2020, Turkey granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or, subsidiary protection) to 8 753 applicants (5 449 in 2019). The authorities rejected 10 674 applications compared with 5 212 in 2019. The backlog of international protection applications remains high. Human rights organisations and lawyers reported challenges with access to registration in several provinces. Barriers to registration compound vulnerability of applicants as they increase the risk of detention and deportation. In December 2020, 886 653 foreign nationals holding residence permits were present in Turkey, including humanitarian residence holders. Turkey continued to refuse to resume the readmission of returnees from the Greek islands, interrupted in March 2020, citing COVID-19 restrictions despite the European Commission’s repeated requests to fully implement all the provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement. However, resettlement of Syrians from Turkey to the EU Member States resumed in July 2020 with the necessary health precautions in place. Disaggregated data on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on refugees was not available. The pandemic had a disproportionately negative effect on vulnerable groups including refugees and internally displaced persons, who were already living in dire economic conditions. Many refugees lost jobs in the informal sectors of the economy. Others continued to be exploited in the informal economy and their poverty and unregistered status inhibited access to health care, social security, benefits and other services. Administrative requirements, restrictions on the freedom of movement and prejudice were among the main obstacles to secure a formal (legal) employment. Turkey made sustained significant efforts to provide support for refugees and ensure wider access to healthcare and schooling, with 768 839 children enrolled in formal education by December 2020, compared to 684 728 children in 2019. However, more than 400 000 school-aged refugee children were still out-of-school and did not have any access to education opportunities. Syrian refugees continued to benefit from free-of-charge healthcare provided in 177 Migrant Health Centres funded by the EU through its Facility for Refugees in Turkey and in Turkish hospitals. Many cities continued to enhance municipal services and infrastructure to respond to the population increase as a result of the influx of refugees. Turkey needs to further align its practice with European standards in removal centres, in particular with regard to protection of human rights, including access to legal counselling and interpreters and protection of vulnerable groups, in particular children staying with their families. There was limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from the violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated economic exclusion and deteriorating living conditions for internally displaced persons. 2.1.2. Public Administration Reform Turkey has some level of preparation/is moderately prepared in the field of public administration reform. There was no progress during the reporting period. Overall, the country lacks a comprehensive public administration reform agenda and a relevant leading institution in charge. Concerns remained over the accountability of the administration and human resources management. The political will to reform is still lacking. Policymaking is not evidence-based or participatory. The politicisation of the administration continued. Women’s representation remained low in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Last year’s recommendations were not implemented. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: ®prepare and present an inter-institutional public administration reform plan in line with EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support; ®ensure that the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures provides for an effective remedy, which safeguards the right of every individual to a fair administrative process; ®introduce merit-based appointments and promotions for the senior managerial positions of the civil service. Strategic framework for public administration reform Turkey has not produced an overarching strategy or planning document on public administration reform. The continued absence of political support and the limited ownership shown by the administration have further compromised the conditions for a comprehensive governance reform. Several planning documents and sectoral policy documents on various aspects of public administration reform exist but provide only a fragmented framework. Most of these policy documents do not specify the expected costs of reform measures, so financial sustainability of public sector reforms is not guaranteed (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). An administrative unit legally entitled to coordinate, design, and monitor public administration reforms needs to be established. Such a unit would need to coordinate with the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, to ensure coherence of strategic and fiscal planning and efficiently address managerial accountability. Policy development and coordination The centralisation of policymaking under the presidential system continued. The collegiate decision making was further reduced by the stronger role of the Presidency. Policy coordination among central government institutions has remained strong in practice. The Presidential administration and the Presidential Councils continued to play an increasing role in policy making, while the policymaking role of ministries further diminished. Most regulatory authorities are linked by law to the Presidency. The link between policymaking and financial planning remains weak. An inclusive and evidence-based policymaking process is still absent and there is no legal obligation for the Presidency and ministries to conduct public consultations. During the reporting period, public consultations seldom took place. Evidence-based policymaking instruments, such as regulatory impact assessments were not used by the executive and by the legislative branch which has no resources to conduct them. In the absence of systematic ex-post monitoring and public reporting on the implementation of key government programmes, the public scrutiny of government's work has remained inadequate, contributing to the lack of accountability of the administration. Public financial management

Turkey continues lacking an overarching public financial management reform programme. The annual budget is prepared as part of the medium-term budgetary framework. Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU acquis. The vast number of exemptions inserted into the Law on Public Procurement disrupts public transparency and accountability (See also Chapter 5). In the absence of adequate ex-post monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency. There is no clear strategy for domestic revenue mobilisation; ad hoc tax changes continued (see also Chapter 16). The implementation of the strategy and an action plan for the fight against the informal economy (2019-2021) continued at a good pace. As regards external audit, the Turkish Court of Accounts’ ex-post controls continued to provide substantive information for parliamentary oversight as well as for the public. The Court of Accounts’ reports produced mass media coverage about alleged corruption and misuse of public resources. However, there remained certain shortcomings. Under the Law on the Turkish Court of Accounts, certain institutions are exempted from the Court’s remit and, thus, from the associated parliamentary scrutiny. The parliamentary and judicial follow-up to audit reports need to be improved. The limited parliamentary oversight of the budget resulted in reduced budget transparency. The Turkish State Wealth Fund lacks accountability and transparency; its investments and borrowing is not integrated into the budget. Annual budgetary figures are aggregated and the budget reports are hard to comprehend. Opportunities for citizens to engage in the budgetary process were absent in the reporting period. Public service and human resources management The civil service remains substantially governed by the Civil Servants’ Act of 1965. The need for new legislation on the public service has been raised several times, but a non-systematic approach continued to prevail. Turkey is still missing an overall civil service strategy and overall monitoring report on the implementation of civil service policy. The civil service legal framework does not guarantee neutrality, continuity or merit-based recruitment and promotion procedures. Numerous reported incidents affirmed the politicisation of the civil service. The President dismissed two Central Bank Governors in the reporting period. Moreover, between March and May 2021, the President dismissed and replaced four of the Central Bank’s seven-member Monetary Policy Committee. The first phase of external recruitment for entry-level positions is based on merit, whereas the oral interview phase remains poorly regulated and thus open to political patronage. Nepotism was prevalent in the absence of competitive objective criteria for the top civil service posts and access to top civil service positions was prone to political interference. Accountability of the administration In the presidential system, the organisation of the state administration follows centralised lines of accountability to the Presidency. Accountability of agencies remains largely weak and internal control and audit does not function effectively. Most executive institutions are formally embedded in ministries, although they retain autonomy over day-to-day operational management. The roles and responsibilities of different institutions are still not fully clear, which has a negative impact on efficiency, transparency and accountability. State institutions are required to submit annual accountability reports on the use of resources to achieve targets, but a systematic follow-up mechanism by the executive was not put in place. Institutions lack a culture of managerial accountability and delegation of responsibilities (see Chapter 32 - Financial control). Citizens’ right to good administration is formally ensured through relevant internal and external oversight arrangements, such as internal audit and control units, and the Turkish Court of Accounts. The impact of the control functions was however limited. The role of oversight institutions such as the Ombudsman remained limited in the absence of ex officio powers (see Governance). The right to access public information is regulated by the Law on the Right to Information. There is no centralised independent body in charge of overseeing the implementation of the law. The law allows for broad exemptions on grounds of protecting state secrets, commercial secrets and personal data. The absence of a revised legislation covering those areas of exemption, limits the citizens’ access to information. Easy online access led to about 1.3 million applications for access to information in 2020, with 7 % of refusals. Concerns remain as regards the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures. There are 11 544 applications pending. Strong concerns remain as to whether each case is being examined individually, the rights of defence of those dismissed are respected and the assessment procedure is in line with international standards. Since there were no hearings, there was a general lack of procedural rights for applicants and decisions were taken on the basis of the written files related to the original dismissal, all of which called into question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy. Service delivery to citizens and businesses There is still no law on general administrative procedures in Turkey. The lack of such legal framework makes it difficult to assess to what extent the principles of good administration are guaranteed and hinders work on simplifying administrative procedures as well as cutting red tape. In this context, citizens and businesses are faced with increasing legal uncertainty. There is no central policy or co-ordination mechanism for improving horizontally the overall quality of services. Most of the institutions developed service delivery standards within their own legal remit. No institution is responsible for overall promotion or measurement of the quality of public services. Given the particular conditions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-government services and administrative simplification progressed further. The number of e-government users exceeded 54.2 million. Ministries, central government agencies and municipalities developed their online services. 2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, of quality and efficient) judicial system and effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. Turkey is at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in this area. Serious backsliding continued during the reporting period. Major issues identified in previous reports were not addressed, in particular the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation. A new human rights action plan, while a welcomed initiative in principle, did not present concrete steps to remedy the most acute problems in this area.

Undue pressure on judges and prosecutors continued to have a significant negative effect on the independence and the overall quality of the judiciary. The negative effects of the large-scale dismissals of judges and prosecutors continued to weigh on the efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary. Turkey’s refusal to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights further increased concerns regarding its judiciary’s adherence to the international and European standards. Corruption remained widespread and continued to be an issue of concern. There was no progress in addressing the many gaps in the Turkish anti-corruption framework, which is a sign of a lack of will to fight decisively corruption. Serious backsliding continued on human rights. Broad restrictions imposed on the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms. Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention raised further concerns about its adherence to international human rights standards. The damage caused by the state of emergency on the fundamental rights and the related legislation adopted was not remedied. Functioning of the judiciary Turkey is at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued as further judicial decisions contradicted the ECtHR case law. The new human rights action plan envisages certain measures to improve the independence of the judiciary. However, the human rights action plan does not address any of the key shortcomings related to the independence of the judiciary. Despite their acquittal, none of the judges or prosecutors dismissed following the coup attempt were reinstated. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source of concern. No changes were made to the institution of criminal law judges of peace and concerns remain regarding their jurisdiction and practice. The recommendations of last year were not addressed. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: ®create a political and legal environment that allows the judiciary to perform its duties independently and impartially, respecting European standards; strengthen judicial responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers; and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should follow ECtHR jurisprudence; ®amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors so that the role and influence of the executive is limited, and introduce safeguards against any interference by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors or high level officials in judicial proceedings; ®provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent; ®in accordance with the guaranteed judicial independence under the Constitution, limit any suspension of judges from office to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of serious misbehaviour and take measures to remedy the damage caused by the dismissals that took place in breach of procedural rights; ®revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is based on objective criteria without undue influence from the executive; ®in relation to the administrative and judicial measure taken against individuals, ensure that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence, in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary; ®ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights, including procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal. Strategic documents The implementation of the Judicial Reform Strategy for 2019-2023 continued. The Judicial Reform Strategy Action Plan was announced in October 2020. According to the authorities, the rate of implementation of the Strategy is around 50 %. However, there is no evidence-based assessment of the results of its implementation. A new human rights action plan announced in March 2021 foresees some notable improvements, including limited activities to improve the independence of the judiciary. However, it does not effectively address the key shortcomings to tackle the systemic lack of the independence of the judiciary. Most importantly, the human rights action plan does not address the Venice Commission’s opinion on the constitutional amendment of April 2017, referring to the principle of separation of powers and the revision of the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Management bodies Concerns remain around the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the lack of independence from the executive and the appointment process of its members. In accordance with the Constitution, four members out of 13 are appointed by the President and seven members are appointed by Parliament by qualified majority. None is elected by their peers. In May 2021, the President appointed four new members and the Parliament appointed seven new members. The remaining two seats are attributed ex officio to the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister, who are also appointed by the President. The budget allocated to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors is 93 163 000 TRY (9 150 405 EUR) for 2020 and 103 209 000 TRY (10 148 850 EUR) for 2021. Due to its lack of independence, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors remains suspended, since December 2016, from participating in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary. Independence and impartiality

Although judicial independence is set out in the Constitution and the relevant legislation, there were further concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court accepted the indictment to close the second largest opposition party HDP. The shortcomings identified in the December 2016 opinion of the Venice Commission, related to the minimal standards for dismissals of judges as well as legal safeguards regarding the transfer of judges and prosecutors are yet to be addressed. Appeals against such transfers are possible but usually unsuccessful. Throughout 2020, the transfers of judges and prosecutors without their consent and without any justification apart from requirements of the service continued. In May 2021, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors transferred 3 070 judges and prosecutors, just before the end of the Council’s mandate. Overall, 3 968 judges and public prosecutors were dismissed for alleged links to the Gülen movement since the attempted coup. The human rights action plan foresees a few activities to improve the independence of the judiciary, including the prevention of frequent transfer of judges, geographical guarantees for judges and prosecutors, a review of the disciplinary and promotion system of judges and prosecutors and an improved inspection system based on objective criteria. Most of these activities were already included in the Judicial Reform Strategy. Representatives of the executive and the legislature continued to publicly criticise and openly reject the ECtHR case law and the Constitutional Court. The leader of the MHP, part of the ruling coalition, pleaded for the abolition of the Constitutional Court. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors took no action against the members of courts who refrained from abiding by Constitutional Court judgments. Judicial independence was further undermined by public comments of representatives from the executive and legislature, including from the President over ongoing judicial cases. Justice professionals frequently resorted to pre-trial detention, while European standards consider it a last resort measure and for the shortest amount of time. The ECtHR concluded in several cases, including in the judgement of Selahattin Demirtaş, that the judicial authorities’ decision to extend the detention was based on grounds that were not sufficient to justify such decision and its duration. The recommendations of the Venice Commission’s opinion on the criminal peace judgeships have not been implemented. Under the current system, criminal law judges of peace have far-reaching powers while objections to their decisions are not reviewed by a higher judicial body but by another criminal judge of peace. Lawyers, especially those providing legal assistance to Human Rights Defenders and civil and political activists, faced considerable obstacles in performing their work, including pressure and external interferences. Such interferences entail the refusal of admissions to the profession of lawyer for those who were dismissed by a state of emergency decree. The elections of most of the Bar Associations were prevented from taking place due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the elections of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations were not held. Accountability Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and enforce disciplinary penalties need to be made effective and free from political interference. However, they are undermined by the lack of independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Some members of the judiciary were subjected to sanctions for the legitimate exercise of their professional duties. The examination lodged in February 2020, by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors into the three judges who acquitted the defendants in the Gezi Park trial due to a lack of evidence is still pending. The obligation of judges and prosecutors to declare their assets every five years is still applicable. It remains important to have a credible and functioning verification system and to ensure that due follow-up is given to late or wrong declarations of assets. No information is available as to sanctions imposed in case of breach of this procedure. Professionalism and competence Recruitments of judges and prosecutors continued to be carried out through a non-transparent selection process. The Ministry of Justice supervises the selection boards for new judges and prosecutors, and manages their yearly appraisal. The Council of Judges and Prosecutors itself plays no role in the selection boards, even though it takes the final decision on recruitment. There was no progress concerning the establishment of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors. The legal exam introduced in October 2019 for prospective judges, lawyers or public notaries to be conducted by the Higher Education Council has yet to take place. Quality of justice The pre-service training of candidate judges and prosecutors as well as in-service trainings continued to be delivered by the Justice Academy of Turkey. While the Academy has scientific, administrative and financial autonomy by law, concerns remain related to its independence, as it has no general assembly or board of directors and the management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The lack of independence of the Academy affects its capacity to provide training programmes that meet the requirements of openness, competence and impartiality. The European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) decided at its 2021 General Assembly to maintain the suspension of the observer status of the Judicial Academy of Turkey decided in 2017. The human rights action plan envisages modifications of the seating order to ensure that defendants enjoy a more effective access to the legal assistance of a lawyer during the hearing. The objectives announced in the human rights action plan should also improve the quality of judicial decisions in terms of legal reasoning and factual evidence. Particularly in terrorism-related cases, there is a need to eliminate the concerns that evidence extracted coercively may be used to convict people. Evidence presented by the defence needs to be duly reflected in the court’s assessment. The system of confidentiality of decisions should be revised, as it is still used in many cases to limit access to justice and the right of defence. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors continued to negatively affect the quality of justice along with posting of newly recruited judges and prosecutors with less experience to the criminal courts. Efficiency While the Judicial Reform Strategy aimed to increase the quality and quantity of human resources, this goal was not achieved yet and did not lead to a reduction of the current backlog of cases. The budget for the judiciary was almost TRY 20 billion in 2020 (around EUR 2.02 billion), representing 0.32 % of GDP and EUR 25 per inhabitant and TRY 24 billion for 2021 (around EUR 2.42 billion). Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under severe pressure to handle cases in a timely manner, as the effects of the large-scale dismissals were still observed. Regarding the backlog of cases in the high courts, in June 2021 there were 43 372 pending cases for the Constitutional Court, compared to 36 265 in June 2020, and 133 428 for the Council of State as of 31 March 2021. In 2020, the regional court of appeals received a total of 724 558 cases and dealt with 799 974 cases. It settled 780 193 cases. The Code of Procedures in general is free of formalism and does provide adequate tools in cases of urgency. Nevertheless, abusive delays are not sanctioned. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court continued to increase. Since the individual applications started in September 2012, it received a total of 295 038 individual applications as of 31 December 2020 and has concluded 257 108 of them. The Court has found violation of at least one of rights in 14 027 applications. The number of pending applications is 37 930. In 2020, 40 402 applications were lodged and 45 414 were concluded. As of April 2021, there were 19.7 judges and 8.6 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants (against the European average of 21 judges/12 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants). There were 21 979 judges and prosecutors in total, 1 379 of whom were recruited in 2020.

Fight against corruption Turkey is at an early stage in the fight against corruption and there was no progress during the reporting period. The country has not established anti-corruption bodies in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, to which Turkey is party. The flaws of the legal framework and institutional architecture allowed undue political influence in the investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated a lack of will to fight decisively corruption. Most of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) outstanding recommendations have not been implemented. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. In this regard, the Commission’s recommendations of the last years are maintained. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: ®effectively implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, including adhering to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Conventions; ®ensure effective follow-up to the recommendations issued by the GRECO, including by adopting the necessary legislation; ®establish a track record of successful prosecution of, and convictions for high-level corruption; ®adopt an anti-corruption strategy, reflecting a clear political will and vision to effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. Track record The track record of investigation, prosecution and conviction in corruption cases remained poor, particularly in relation to high profile corruption cases implicating politicians and public officials. The President dismissed the Minister of Trade in April 2021, amidst allegations of a corruption scandal implicating her family members and advisors in public tenders. Despite suspicions raised by public revelations, no judicial investigation was launched. The main opposition party, CHP, filed a motion requesting a parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the allegations. Corruption-related sentences need to be more dissuasive. The corruption perception remains high and was further exacerbated by public accusations from a mafia leader targeting several government members and public figures for their alleged involvement in corruption and other crime cases. Institutional framework Prevention measures Turkey has still not established any permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption body. Inspection units within the administration remained ineffective. The coordination between various preventive bodies such as the audit and inspection units and the prosecution offices remained inadequate. The legal framework of anti-corruption also remained weak in the private sector. There were no awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption. Law enforcement There were no prosecution services nor courts specialised in anti-corruption cases. The executive exerted undue political influence over judicial police. Financial investigations were not systematically carried out in corruption and organised crime cases. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective. Legal framework Turkey is party to all international anti-corruption conventions. However, Turkey fails to fully align with the provisions of these conventions. Previous anti-corruption strategies and action plans have not been effectively followed up. The legislative reforms foreseen in previous anti-corruption strategies have not been undertaken. The legislation on whistle-blower protection and public procurement is not aligned with the EU acquis. No tangible progress was made to implement GRECO’s recommendations. In its Second Interim Compliance Report under the Fourth Evaluation Round, published in March 2021, GRECO concluded that no changes intervened in Turkey since the adoption of the Interim Report in March 2019: out of 22 recommendations in the area of “Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors”, only three remain satisfactorily implemented. Nine recommendations are still only partially implemented and ten recommendations remain not implemented. GRECO further underlined the absence of a law on ethical conduct for members of Parliament and the lack of measures to ensure integrity of Members of Parliament. Under the Third Evaluation Round, officially closed in October 2020 after 10 years, Turkey implemented satisfactorily only seven of the 17 recommendations. More specifically, as regards the transparency of political financing which was assessed under that Round, only one GRECO recommendation out of nine has been fully implemented over the last 10 years. Shortcomings remain unaddressed in the Criminal Code, which do not meet the standards put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The significant number of exemptions included in the Law on Public Procurement created a grey area for corruption. The legal privileges and shelters of public officials, such as the requirement for prior authorisation from their hierarchy before starting an investigation of alleged wrongdoing, continued to provide legal protection for public officials in anti-corruption criminal and administrative investigations. The legal framework on preventing, prosecuting and issuing penalties for conflicts of interest as well as on declaring, verifying and disclosing assets remained inadequate and unaddressed. Turkey took no steps to align its legislation governing lobbying.

Strategic framework The 2010-2014 as well as 2016-2019 anti-corruption strategies and their respective action plans failed to meet most of their stated objectives. Outstanding measures have not yet been implemented. Turkey again failed to take measures that will strengthen its overall capacity to coordinate, implement and monitor all anti-corruption actions among the relevant preventive institutions and law enforcement agencies. Fundamental rights The deterioration of human rights continued and no progress was made on last year’s recommendations. Many of the measures introduced during the state of emergency remain in force and continue to have a profound and devastating impact on people in Turkey. The legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights but the legislation and practice still need to be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly continued its monitoring of Turkey’s respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Broad scale restrictions imposed on the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms and lead to self-censorship. Turkey’s continued refusal to implement ECtHR rulings, notably in the cases of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala, further increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s adherence to the international and European standards. Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention also questioned its commitment to such standards. The new human rights action plan, which promised reforms in a number of areas, does not address critical issues. In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out in this section, which have still not been addressed, in the coming year Turkey should in particular: ®align criminal and anti-terror legislation and their implementation with European standards, ECHR and ECtHR case-law and Venice Commission recommendations; ®ensure that any allegation of offence is subject to due process, based on concrete evidence and fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent and impartial judiciary, and fully respecting the right to a fair trial and relevant procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal; ®ensure the effectiveness of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures as a domestic remedy and that all public-sector employees arbitrarily dismissed during the state of emergency continue to be re-instated, and appropriately compensated for any harm, including loss of earnings; ®effectively tackle all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological and physical abuse, sexual harassment, rape, crimes committed in the name of “honour”, stalking, and forced marriage; implement measures to prevent violence against women, to protect the victims and to prosecute the perpetrators. Turkey is a party to most international human rights instruments, although the respect for fundamental rights in practice continued to be undermined. The withdrawal from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (“Istanbul Convention”) was widely considered to be an important setback. It also led to renewed legal debates regarding Turkey’s possibility to withdraw from other international conventions. In June 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that the President has the authority to withdraw Turkey from international conventions by Presidential decree and rejected the request for the suspension of the enforcement of the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention made by a number of political parties and CSOs. Turkey has not yet signed the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The full monitoring procedure by the Parliamentary Assembly