EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels,18.4.2018 SWD(2018) 112 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT



IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document Proposal for REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing a multiannual plan for fish stocks in the Western Waters and adjacent waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) 509/2007 and (EC) 1300/2008

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Contents 1.Introduction: Political and legal context 1.1.Rationale of the reformed CFP and its main elements 1.2.Scope of the initiative 1.3.Legal context 2.What is the problem and why is it a problem? 2.1.The Problem: Overfishing 2.1.1.Underlying drivers of overfishing 2.2.The problem: Ineffective governance 2.2.1.Underlying drivers of ineffective governance 2.3.Complexity of the current rules 2.4.Consequences of the problems of overfishing and ineffective governance 2.5.Implications of "Brexit" 2.6.Who is affected by the current situation and how? 2.6.1.Fishing sector 2.6.2.Processing sector 2.6.3.Markets 2.7.Perception of the problems by consulted stakeholders

3.Why should the EU act? 3.1.Perceptions of pertinence of EU action by consulted stakeholders 4.What should be achieved? 4.1.Objectives of the initiative 4.2.Perceptions by consulted stakeholders on these objectives 5.What are the various options to achieve the objectives? 5.1.Discarded policy options 5.2.Retained policy options 5.2.1.Option 1 Baseline scenario: 5.3.Perceptions of the options by consulted stakeholders 6.What are the impacts of the different policy options and who will be affected? 6.1.Approach to the impact analysis 6.2.Option 1: Baseline (Status quo) 6.2.1.Environmental impacts 6.2.2.Socio-economic impacts 6.2.3.Administrative costs 6.3.Option 2: one mixed fisheries multiannual plan for western waters 6.3.1.Environmental impacts 6.3.2.Socio-economic impacts 6.3.3.Administrative costs

6.4.Option 3: Two mixed fisheries multiannual plans (south-western waters and north-western waters) 6.4.1.Environmental impacts 6.4.2.Socio-economic impacts 6.4.3.Administrative costs 7.How do the options compare? 7.1.Assessment of environmental, economic, social and other impacts 7.2.Assessment against the objectives 7.3.Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability 7.4.The preferred option 8.How would actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? Annex 1Procedural information Annex 2:Main Elements of the Common Fisheries Policy Annex 3Stakeholder consultation Annex 4Who is affected by the initiative and how Annex 5. Analysis by the STECF: main findings Annex 6. Models used by STECF in simulations Annex 7. Coherence between different EU multiannual plans and overview of EU multiannual plan for Baltic fisheries Annex 8

1.Introduction: Political and legal context This impact assessment (IA) concerns a proposal for a multiannual plan to manage fisheries for demersal stocks (fish that live on or near the sea bottom) in the western waters of the north-east Atlantic, in the context of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which entered into force in on 1 January 2014. 1.1.Rationale of the reformed CFP and its main elements Fisheries management means regulating the activities of fishermen. This involves deciding what can and cannot be fished (e.g. prohibited species), how much can be fished (e.g. maximum amount of fish that can be caught), when fishing is allowed or forbidden (e.g. during the season when fish reproduce) and where fishing is allowed or forbidden (e.g. in marine protected areas). Fisheries management is an exclusive policy of the European Union under the reformed CFP. The rationale of the CFP is that fishing activities should be environmentally sustainable and managed in a way to achieve social, employment and economic benefits (see Annex 2). Fishing is a small segment of the EU economy, as the income generated represents less than 0.5% of the EU GDP. It is, however, important in relative terms in many coastal regions. Firstly, fishing provides jobs and income to coastal regions with few alternative options. Secondly, in a number of regions, fisheries go beyond pure economics and are part of the social fabric of communities. Fisheries management through the CFP also contributes to the EU’s growth and jobs agenda through an emphasis on sustainability and economic competitiveness, supported by EU funding through the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). While improved fisheries management is unlikely to directly contribute to increases in jobs, it has proven to increase the number of sustainable fisheries in Europe. For example in 2009 we had only 5 sustainable fisheries in EU waters, while in 2017 this number has increased to 44 sustainable fisheries. Sustainable fishing in turn can curtail the decline of jobs in the fishing industry and having more fish available from sustainable sources will stabilize profits and provide better salaries and better working conditions for fishermen. The economic figures underpin this, as over the 2008 to 2014 period, the net profit margin generated by the EU fleet has steadily increased to 11%, registering record-high profits in 2014 of 770 mio €. The CFP has the following management tools as a toolbox to achieve its objectives: Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the maximum amount of fish that can be fished from the sea each year (i.e. output controls). These amounts are set per fish stock (e.g. “cod in the Irish Sea, Northern hake, southern megrim etc.”). The amounts are then allocated as fish quotas among Member States. The Member States in turn allocate their national quotas to their fishermen; Discard plans lay out how the landing obligation (i.e. that all fish caught have to be landed), a key element of the reformed CFP, is implemented. This includes well-defined exemptions for returning minimal amounts of unwanted fish to the sea. Fishing effort limitations regulate how many hours or days a vessel can spend at sea (input controls). This instrument is used less and less in the management of fisheries. What, how, where and when to fish? Technical measures govern the way of fishing (for example gear type or closed areas), which aim to protect fish stocks (often juveniles) and ecosystems, and to avoid unwanted catches, and thus reduce discards. The CFP foresees the adoption of multiannual plans (MAPs) containing some or all of these tools, with the aim to provide a transparent, predictable and stable framework to manage fish stocks in an integrated manner by sea-basin. Such plans can cover one or more fish species in specific areas. The plans on the one hand contain management measures to help safeguard the stocks, for example by limiting the catches (e.g. when the amount of fish in the sea falls below a minimum level). On the other hand the plans set long term management measures to foster fisheries, which are both environmentally and economically sustainable. Multiannual plans have been foreseen by the CFP since 2002 as an option. However following the 2013 reform they became a priority: article 9 of the Basic Regulation states that "Multiannual plans shall be adopted as a priority, based on scientific, technical and economic advice, and shall contain conservation measures to restore and maintain fish stocks above levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield". The precise shape of future multiannual plans was the subject of work by an Inter-Institutional Task Force involving the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission,. This Task Force provided guidance on the structure and content of these multiannual plans and solved issues on the sharing of competences among those EU Institutions. Its conclusions were published in April 2014. Since the reformed CFP and its new Basic Regulation entered into force in 2014, only one EU multiannual plan has been adopted, covering the Baltic Sea. Other multiannual plans have been prepared or are in preparation by the Commission and the coherence between these initiatives is presented in Annex 7. The new generation of multiannual plans under the reformed CFP should be better geared to the reality of EU fisheries and therefore the Basic Regulation sets out that they should cover mixed fisheries, where relevant, taking into account the interactions between fish stocks, fisheries and marine ecosystems (see Annex 2, point 4). The idea is to move from annual management decisions for fisheries towards multiannual management plans for all EU sea basins, which are adapted to the specific fisheries in these sea basins. The new CFP also brought greater flexibility and simplification by introducing regionalisation. Regionalisation means involving Member States and stakeholders (e.g. industry, environmental NGOs) at a regional basis (e.g. Baltic Sea, North Sea, western waters) in the design of how to manage fisheries sustainably, with a view to increasing their ownership of the management measures and thereby the effectiveness of these measures. Concretely, Member States sharing a fishing area (this can be both an entire seabasin or a smaller area in a seabasin) can make joint recommendations on management measures, and the Commission can adopt these measures as delegated acts, if empowered to do so. Such an empowerment would typically be granted in a multiannual plan – hence the necessity of such multiannual plans. 1.2.Scope of the initiative The geographical scope of this initiative is the north- and south-western part of Union waters of the north-east Atlantic (see map below). These waters range from UK and Ireland in the North to Madeira in the South and out to Azores in the West. The fisheries concerned by this initiative are those targeting demersal fish. These fisheries comprise almost 50 % of total demersal fisheries regulated by TACs in the EU. The TACs for the main demersal target species in western EU waters (hereinafter referred to as "western waters") amounted to some 368 thousand tonnes in 2017 with a first sale value of around € 1,4 billion. Demersal fish live on or near the bottom of the sea (in contrast to pelagic fish which live in the middle range of the sea). The main demersal fish caught in western waters and covered by this initiative are alfonsinos, anglerfish, black scabbardfish, blue ling, cod, haddock, hake, megrim, Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, seabass, sole and whiting. Many other fish (including several deep sea fish) are caught as by-catches. The main gears used are bottom trawls and seines, gillnets, pole and lines and bottom longlines.

“Targeting” means fishermen want to catch particular fish species and adapt their fishing strategy to catch them. Fishermen will always also have “by-catch” fish in their nets. “By-catch” is that part of the catch which the fisherman was not aiming for, but nevertheless ends up in the net. Parts of this by-catch may be welcome, other parts not so (e.g. fish of little commercial value, or fish below the minimum size). For example, a fisherman targeting valuable sole will also have by-catch of less valuable plaice. While he will be happy to sell some plaice, he would prefer not to keep too much plaice on board since it reduces the storage space available for the more valuable sole. Fishermen fishing for cod and haddock in north western waters will also catch whiting, while in the south when fishing for anglerfish, fishermen may also catch megrim and hake. Some fish stocks such as hake or sea bass live in a wider area from the Atlantic to the North Sea, but the vast majority of the fisheries take place in western waters. For such fish stocks the scope of this initiative hence also includes the Union waters of the North Sea, to allow for measures to be taken for the entire stock. This initiative thereby links in with the proposal for a multiannual plan for North Sea demersal fisheries as it complements this plan in managing similar fisheries in waters adjacent to the North Sea. Both the proposed North Sea plan and the future Western Waters plan link very well with each other as they would manage demersal fisheries in the same way with MSY ranges for target fisheries and precautionary management for by-catch species. Both plans also have other similar mechanisms such as safeguards mechanisms for when the amount of fish in the sea would decrease below a minimum level. Furthermore both plans would foresee mechanisms for regionalisation. The Western Waters plan is therefore the mirror initiative to the North Sea multiannual plan. This initiative intends to set the basis for management of mixed, demersal fisheries in the western waters of the Union, including the management of stocks predominantly present in western waters, but also present, however to a lesser extent, in adjacent waters. The main objective of the initiative is to ensure that the fisheries are sustainable and thereby ensuring that the fishing sector can draw economic benefits from these fish resources in the long-term. This impact assessment will focus on assessing the impacts of introducing a multiannual management plan for demersal species in western waters compared with other policy options. Procedural information about this impact assessment is given in Annex 1. The procedure included two consultations: a public one addressed to the general public and a more technical one, addressed to specific stakeholders and decision makers. The results of those consultations are summarised in Annex 3. Figure 1: Map of the areas concerned by this initiative 1.3.Legal context This section describes the legal framework for fisheries management in western waters in order to show the context for this initiative. This legal framework is exclusively EU-legislation, with certain national measures to supplement the EU legislation in the coastal waters of Member States. The framework includes the annual fishing opportunities regulation, where the EU establishes the amount of fish that fishermen are allowed to land from each fish stock. This amount is referred to as the total allowable catch (TAC) and the Commission bases its proposals for TACs on scientific advice given by ICES. Furthermore the framework includes the Basic Regulation, (more details on the relevant provisions of the Basic Regulation of the CFP can be found in Annex 2), the technical measures regulation, the western waters effort regime and the Deep Sea Access Regulation. The technical measures regulation sets out when and where what kind of fishing gears can be used. The western waters effort regime sets out limitations to how much fishing can be undertaken (i.e. how many vessels can fish for how many days) in a certain, limited area of western waters, in order to protect a sensitive biological area in the south-west of Ireland. Furthermore a number of MAPs were introduced under the former CFP and five of these MAPs for demersal fish are currently in force in western waters: a)The cod recovery plan ( Regulation (EU) No 1342/2008 ), covering cod fisheries in the Kattegat, the North Sea (including Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel), the West of Scotland and the Irish Sea; b) The multiannual plan for sole in the western Channel ( Regulation (EC) 509/2007 ); c) The multiannual plan for sole in the Bay of Biscay ( Regulation (EC) No 388/2006 ); d) The recovery plan for the northern stock of hake ( Regulation (EC) No 811/2004 ); e) The recovery plan for hake and Norway lobster in the Iberian Peninsula (Regulation ( EC) No 2166/2005 ); The five recovery or multiannual plans, listed under a) to e), do not take into account the requirements of the reformed CFP and are therefore outdated: they neither have an MSY objective, nor do they take into account the landing obligation and regionalisation, nor are they compatible with the guidelines of the Inter-Institutional Task Force (see section 1.1). Most of them also focus on single fish species, and do not take into account the mixed character of the demersal fisheries (see Annex 2). At EU level, following the entry into force of the new CFP Basic Regulation and the gradual implementation of the landing obligation in demersal fisheries from 2016-2019, discard plans for demersal fisheries where adopted for the years 2016 to 2018. These allow for very small quantities of demersal fish to be discarded (thrown back to the sea) as a de minimis exemption from the landing obligation. In accordance with the CFP, the provisions of these discard plans should be integrated into multiannual plans for the fisheries concerned. Adopting multiannual plan is therefore important as it enables to keep the flanking measures currently contained in the discard plans and which are necessary for the implementation of the landing obligation.

2.What is the problem and why is it a problem? There are two main problems concerning demersal fish in western waters: a number of fish stocks are overfished, such as cod in the Celtic Sea, hake in southern Iberian waters, sole in the Bristol channel and sole in the Irish Sea, and the governance framework is ineffective (see figure 2). Figure 2 Drivers, problems and consequences 2.1.The Problem: Overfishing Overfishing is linked to the objectives of the CFP, which is to have stocks at maximum sustainable yield (MSY). We therefore consider that overfishing takes place when the mortality caused by fishing is greater than the mortality compatible to MSY, as this means that stocks will be fished above the level that ensures sustainable stocks, also in the long term. According to the most recent data, around 43 % of western waters fish stocks assessed are overexploited whilst for a number of other stocks, the status still remains unknown. In the stakeholder consultation carried out in 2015, with a deadline 15 September 2015, in the context of the current impact assessment, stakeholders agreed that too many fish stocks are overfished. Most biologically and economically important stocks in EU waters are assessed by the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), which is the independent scientific body advising the Commission on the state of the stocks. For cod in the Celtic Sea, hake, common sole and Norway lobster in southern Iberian waters, sole in the Bristol Channel and whiting in the Irish Sea, the most recent scientific advice from ICES indicates that these fish stocks are still being overexploited beyond their reproduction capacities and that the situation is not improving sufficiently for these stocks to achieve MSY as soon as possible and by 2020 at the latest. ICES recommended in 2016 that to reach sustainable levels of fishing, catches need to be decreased for these species. Especially for cod in the Celtic Sea ICES advised that even setting the fishing opportunities for 2017 at zero would not prevent the stock from staying below the precautionary biomass level. This situation has precisely come about due to cod being caught in a mixed fishery with haddock and whiting. Therefore even when the fishing opportunities for cod have been low, they have still been caught in this mixed fishery, and subsequently discarded, when fishermen went fishing for haddock and whiting. This shows that overfishing is also linked to the mixed character of fisheries in western waters. The fisheries management however has so far not been adapted to the fisheries, as the management approach has been to consider each stock separately. Sole in the Eastern English Channel is also below the precautionary biomass level, and fishing mortality is very high. This is furthermore one of the only highly priced sole stocks where discarding happens. The state of the sole stock is driven by it being caught in a mixed fishery with plaice, and plaice in a healthy state, where the advised fishing opportunities for plaice are 3 times higher than the advised fishing opportunities for sole. Southern hake is currently being fished above MSY. It is caught together with megrim and anglerfish, whereby an advised increase in the fishing opportunities for one stock has been used as an argument for postponing reductions for the others, due to the single species management approach so far. 2.1.1.Underlying drivers of overfishing i) Lack of a coherent framework to manage mixed fisheries The first underlying driver is the lack of a coherent management framework to deal with the reality that most fisheries for demersal stocks in western waters are mixed fisheries. This often leads to situations where management decisions taken for one species are incompatible with those required for other species. For example, sole and plaice are often caught together. If scientific advice recommends catching less sole and at the same time more plaice, then the tools currently in place do not ensure a sustainable exploitation of both stocks. This is due to the fact that discarding (i.e. throwing fish back to the sea) has so far been allowed (for amount of discards see table 1). The new Basic Regulation phases in the obligation to land all catches until 2019. In a situation with a higher plaice quota than sole quota, the landing obligation will mean that fishermen will continue fishing sole until their quota is used up. Once their quota for sole is used up, they will have to stop fishing and can hence no longer use their quota for plaice. The landing obligation therefore implies that fishermen have to stop fishing when they run out of quota for one of the stocks that they catch as discarding is no longer allowed. Thereby sole has the potential to be a 'choke species' for plaice. Sole is here just an example of the complexity of managing mixed fisheries under a landing obligation. An analyses of this 'choke species' issue for western waters fisheries was undertaken by STECF, which showed that for many Member States and for a number of stocks catches were well in excess of the available quota which indicates that these stocks would become choke species as of 2019 when the landing obligation will come into force for all fisheries if we simply continue with the existing fisheries management, including the current single species multiannual plans. In order to have measures that match conservation requirements in mixed fisheries we need multiannual plans that are tailored specifically for such mixed fisheries. Table 1. Discards are very frequent in western waters. This discard problem is presented in the following tables (for demersal fisheries of western waters). These figures (from report 15-17 of STECF ) show that for the stocks covered between 2% and 55% of the catches were thrown back to sea. Species area ICES stock DR % Haddock VIa Haddock in IIIa, IV & VIa 10% Nephrops VIa Nephrops in FU11, N. Minch 12% Nephrops in FU12, S. Minch 10% Nephrops in FU13, Clyde 21% Hake VI & VII Northern Hake 14% Nephrops VIIa Nephrops in FU14, Irish Sea E 13% Nephrops in FU15, Irish Sea W 25% Nephrops in FU17, Aran grounds 14% Nephrops in FU19 49% Nephrops in FUs 20-21 45% Nephrops in FU22 21% Haddock VIIa Haddock in VIIa 55% Sole VIId Sole in VIId (Eastern Channel) 11% Whiting VIId Whiting in IV & VIId 29% Sole VIIf-g Sole in VIIf-g (Bristol Channel) 2% Whiting VIIb-k Whiting VIIb-k 20% Hake VIIIa-e Northern Hake 14% Hake VIIIc & IXa Southern Hake 16% Nephrops VIIIab Nephrops in FUs 23-24 44% ii) Environmental factors, external to fishing Secondly, environmental factors influence the state of fish stocks and can compound overexploitation. Environmental conditions (e.g. water temperature, nutrient changes) can influence the reproduction of fish stocks, and further contribute to the negative status of stocks caused by overfishing. On the other hand, healthier fish stocks are more resilient to environmental fluctuations and can thus sustain exploitation better in the long-term. In the long term, the various environmental factors, together with high fishing pressure, are likely to increase the vulnerability of the ecosystem and worsen the state of the fish stocks. This driver however falls outside the scope of this initiative.

This initiative aims to address: Overfishing because several fish stocks are not exploited sustainably in line with the MSY target – TACs and/or catches are too high compared to the long-term objective, which endangers the stocks. In addition, some of these fish stocks are outside safe biological limits, or depleted. A recent report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) No 16-05 of May 2016 shows the following evolution of fish stocks in western waters: Table 2. State of fish stocks in western waters. This table contains only those fish stocks covered by this initiative for which MSY assessments were available at the time. Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. of stocks assessed 25 24 25 26 26 26 27 26 27 28 29 27 No. fished in excess of MSY 14 15 15 14 20 17 16 13 12 17 13 12 No. fished in accordance with MSY 11 9 10 12 6 9 11 13 15 11 16 15 No. of stocks outside safe biological limits 13 14 14 12 16 14 15 12 13 16 14 14 This table shows that too many fish stocks are still fished in excess of MSY, many of these are also outside safe biological limits. This leads to an increased risk of stock collapse, which means a stock is at such low levels that it may never recover to levels which allow for economically optimal exploitation. 2.2.The problem: Ineffective governance The second problem is ineffective governance, which is defined as a governance set up (in particular management measures) not achieving the desired objectives. The Basic Regulation lays out the principles of good governance which should be followed under the CFP (Article 3). This includes: taking into account of regional specificities, through a regionalised approach, the establishment of measures in accordance with the best available scientific advice, a long-term perspective, administrative cost efficiency, appropriate involvement of stakeholders, in particular Advisory Councils, at all stages, consistency with other Union policies, the use of impact assessments. Despite the numerous management tools currently in place, which includes the 5 existing, but outdated multiannual plans, they have not proven sufficient to ensure sustainable fishing of demersal stocks in mixed fisheries. The former CFP provided only limited ability to deal with specific regional issues of a highly technical nature. The decision-making process has furthermore been too rigid to allow timely adaptation to new technical solutions and regional specificities. There is a need to target and improve the management framework to ensure it effectively manages the EU demersal fish stocks. The reformed CFP has taken an important step to address these shortcomings by introducing regionalisation. However some of the management tools in the Basic Regulation are not directly applicable; instead they have to be 'activated' through other legislative instruments, either discard plans or multiannual plans. Member States are using regionalisation for the so-called discard plans to phase in the landing obligation for demersal species between 2016 and 2019. Under regionalisation since 2015 Member States have sent joint recommendations to the Commission bringing more and more demersal fisheries under the landing obligation. These joint recommendations also contain accompanying measures to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation, namely 1) the so called de minimis exemptions allowing vessels to continue discarding a small percentage of up to 7% of fish, on the basis of defined criteria, e.g. where further improvements in selectivity are difficult to attain, and 2) high survivability exemptions for those fish that will survive discarding. These joint recommendations have been put into EU law via delegated acts. These delegated acts however have a limited life span and will expire on 31.12.2018. Continuing these measures as of 1.1.2019 requires a legislative instrument empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts. The western waters MAP is the legislative instrument for implementing the landing obligation. The specific drivers of this problem are detailed below. 2.2.1.Underlying drivers of ineffective governance Management measures agreed in top down manner The underlying driver is that current management plans and other management measures have been agreed in a top-down manner via proposals from the Commission which are then agreed by the co-legislators. Input from stakeholders has been either lacking or is at best fragmented. Stakeholders have become more organised since the 2002 CFP via the Advisory Councils (ACs), but there is no structural framework in place for management measures designed by stakeholders to be taken on board (e.g. a new closed area or a new kind of fishing gear) by the Member States or the Union.

Furthermore, management cannot respond quickly to innovations by the fishing industry. This works as a disincentive for developing more selective gears. For example, if fishermen design more selective gears, then they can currently only use them once co-legislators have agreed these as a management measure. This leads to time lags of years before they are in place. By the time they are in place many are often already overtaken by new gear innovations and the measures risk being outdated. This limits much needed innovation in gears that are more selective or that have less impact on the marine environment. To implement the landing obligation discard plans have been adopted by the Commission as delegated acts, on the basis of joint recommendations from the regional groups of Member States. These plans contain locally tailor made measures for the implementation of the landing obligation and for any exemptions, e.g. based on high survivability of a species. However these plans will expire by January 2019. If no multiannual management plan is in place before 2019 there will be a legal void, where the tools to implement the landing obligation will no longer be available to the legislators and stakeholders. Such a void risks jeopardize the implementation of the landing obligation. Furthermore both the fact that management cannot respond quickly to innovations and the top-down management approach contribute to overfishing, because stakeholders do not participate in designing measures to manage the fisheries, despite their specific regional knowledge and capacity to innovate. Stakeholders therefore often feel a lack of ownership to the measures. 2.3.Complexity of the current rules There is currently no comprehensive framework to manage demersal fisheries in western waters. Instead certain stocks are subject to single species management plans, and the scope of these differs from plan to plan. The effect of this situation is that stakeholders are faced with a complex system of several single species plans that are not adapted to the reality of mixed fisheries. Finally, the current management plans are not fit for monitoring whether the 2020 MSY objectives would be met, as no MSY objectives have been defined in the MAPs. This is a contradiction to the current policy as the MSY objective is an instrinsic part of the Basic Regulation. As the management tools do not fit together, this adds complexity to the governance. 2.4.Consequences of the problems of overfishing and ineffective governance Overfishing and ineffective governance have five concrete consequences. 1) Lack of ownership: the current system of MAPs does not allow timely updates for e.g. including bottom-up innovations like more selective gears to cater for changing needs. The current system is inflexible and slow. The results in a lack of buy-in from the industry and avoidance of the rules. This undermines stable and long-term management. 2) Lack of coherence in the implementation of rules: for most of the demersal stocks in western waters the Council does not take its annual decisions on fishing opportunities within the framework of a management plan. TACs are therefore set from a short-term perspective. This poses a real risk that the MSY target will not be reached in 2020. TAC decisions, while being among the most important decisions for the fishing industry, are thereby made largely isolated from other policy discussions, such as discard plans, or technical measures. 3) Progress has been made towards sustainable fishing, but still too many fish stocks are not yet fished sustainably. Table 2 shows that further progress is required and only limited time is left until 2020 to achieve the sustainability goal of MSY. 4) Socio-economic consequences: threat to viability and profitability of the sector: the EU fishing fleet in western waters is currently losing potential economic rents, because too many fish stocks are fished at levels that cannot deliver sustainable yields. When fish stocks are smaller (due to fishing above sustainable levels), it takes more working hours and more fuel to fish your quota in the same area. Moreover, fishing at too high levels risks stock collapse, and subsequently poses a real risk that the sector dependent on the stock will also collapse. Ensuring that fish stocks remain at safe levels is crucial for the social and economic well-being and for the fabric of the coastal communities. 5) Environmental consequences: excessive levels of fishing pressure often go hand in hand with increased impacts to fish habitats, causing loss of biodiversity, changes in the structure of fish populations (e.g. fewer large individuals), food web modifications (e.g. decline of top predators with cascading effects). For example, intensive fishing of Norway lobster in the Celtic Sea caused significant changes to the bottom habitat, combined with discards of whitefish of around 55%, because of the mixed character of these fisheries. Overfishing and ineffective governance hampers sustainable management: short term perspectives trump the long-term advantages of achieving MSY as soon as possible; year-to-year fluctuations on TACs negatively impact market supply, prices and planning of fishing activities; the absence of mixed-fisheries management leads to choke effects and inefficient quota consumption and the lack of transparency and participation in the decision process prevents industry buy-in. 2.5.Implications of "Brexit" Given the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, the majority of fish stocks in the North East Atlantic will be shared between the EU and the UK and will have to be managed jointly. The economic, social and environmental consequences of Brexit and the modalities of the joint management cannot be envisaged at this early stage of negotiations. However, it is clear that the objectives of this initiative, notably to avoid overfishing and to make governance more efficient, would still be relevant after Brexit. 2.6.Who is affected by the current situation and how? 2.6.1.Fishing sector

The problems affect fishermen fishing for demersal species from the north and west of Scotland over the Gulf of Cadiz down to Madeira in the South. These are fishermen from Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK. According to the Annual Economic Report (AER) of 2016 more than 48 000 fishermen, and 18 000 vessels are active in western waters. This includes both the demersal and the pelagic sector and can be broken down by Member State as follows: Table 3 Fishermen and vessels active in Western waters Member State Estimated no of vessels Estimated employed Estimated FTE Live weight of landings (t) % of total landed weight Value of landings (1000 €) % of total value Belgium 39 120 76 5.497 21 20.628 25 Germany 8 102 87 8.623 12 18.623 14 Spain 7.898 17.371 13.990 305.087 33 569.774 27 France 2.739 6.015 4.555 297.890 57 687.981 62 UK 2.464 6.336 4.240 336.710 45 511.903 48 Ireland 1.343 3.154 2.319 226.954 100 244.522 100 Portugal 3.803 15.041 7.316 129.401 79 259.754 74 Total 18.294 48.139 32.583 1.310.162 50 2.313.185 50 In 2014 over 1.48 million tonnes were landed by the western waters fishing fleets, to a value of € 2.4 billion, representing 30% of the total revenue of the EU fleet. Between 2001 and 2016 TACs for demersal species have increased in north-western waters by 40 %, and in south-western waters by 31 %, mainly due to the increase in the hake stocks. In north-western waters anglerfish has also increased by over 40 %, while the TAC for sole has decreased slightly. In south-western waters the TAC for sole and Nephrops has been stable, while the TAC for anglerfish has been increasing slightly. This will affect individual Member States depending on their quota availability. E.g. the Irish fleet is very dependent on Nephrops, while the Belgian fleet is very dependent on sole. In terms of volume hake was in 2014 the 3rd most important stock (82.500 tonnes) and the only demersal stock in the top 4 stocks in western waters. In terms of value however hake was 2nd with a landings value in 2014 of € 230 million, anglerfish was 3rd with a landings value of € 173 million, while Norway lobster was 4th with a landings value of € 161 million. The impact of the overall fleet segments in western waters can be broken down as follows: Table 4 Fishermen and vessels broken down in small scale and large scale fleet Fleet segment Total number of vessels % of total Total employed FTE Live weight of landings (t) % of landed weight Value of landings (1000 €) % of landed value Small-scale fleet 9.511 52% 19.874 9.367 137.220 9% 344.003 14% Large scale fleet 8.793 48% 28.382 23.357 1.332.795 91% 2.041.739 86% TOTAL 18.304 100% 48.256 32.724 1.470.015 100% 2.385.742 100% Demersal species are often targeted by the small-scale fleet, however a number large scale vessels also target demersal species. Consequently the difference between the share of the landed weight and landed value shows the higher value of demersal species. Furthermore the difference between the number of people employed in the small-scale fleet and the full-time equivalents shows the predominant part-time nature of this fishing fleet activity. Overall the western waters fleets are not as profitable as e.g. the North Sea fleets. In 2014 the gross profit per day was three times higher in the North Sea (€ 828) compared to western waters (€ 264). Broken down to fleet segments this difference is widened, as the gross profit margin of the western waters demersal fleet was 4.5 times lower than the North Sea demersal fleet in 2014. This notwithstanding all fleets operating in western waters, apart from the Belgian fleet, made a profit in 2014. The Belgian fleet's deficit was linked to a drop in the price of sole. The economic performance of the demersal fleets in western EU waters has recently improved. However it is clear that overfishing harms the social and economic development of the fleets and the fishermen, also taking into account that roughly half of the total revenues of fishermen go into salaries and profits for the fishing communities. With the gradual implementation of the landing obligation in the demersal fisheries, there is however a need for new tools and approaches to ensure that the process of achieving MSY, is sustained and strengthened, in a way that does not disproportionally strain the fishing communities socio-economically, while also ensuring effective governance. Maximizing yields, through MSY, will have a further positive effect on the upstream and downstream related industries: suppliers, service providers, maintenance, processors, retailers, etc. by increasing the availability of raw material and offering additional and more stable income and job opportunities and, ultimately, more locally sourced fish to consumers. The current situation is instead still characterized by the persistence of overfishing, despite progress and a management framework that is not well adapted to the reality of mixed fisheries, which reduces the fleet's potential economic performance. The large majority of fishing businesses are micro-enterprises and small or medium-sized enterprises (SME) who would be the first to benefit from maximized yields (see Table 5 below). Table 5: No of fishing firms Structure and economic performance by fleets operating in the western waters, including demersal and pelagic vessels (source: AER 2011) MS No vessels Total income Income per vessel (EUR mio) Total FTE FTE per vessel Total firms Firms with Firms with 2-5 vessels Firms with 6+ vessels (EUR mio) 1 vessel BE 80 85,39 1,07 293 3,66 77 75 2 0 DE 1508 134,6 0,09 1253 0,83 1016 718 289 9 ES 9921 2035,18 0,21 28629 2,89 9195 8588 599 8 FR 7069 1171,71 0,17 7545 1,07 6059 5321 723 15 IE 2095 320,55 0,15 2395 1,14 1843 1672 170 1 NL 735 384,69 0,52 1680 2,29 576 481 93 2 PT 8256 364,88 0,04 8515 1,03 3657 3474 180 3 UK 6552 1117,98 0,17 7909 1,21 5606 5032 564 10 Totals 36216 5614,98 0,30 58219 1,76 28029 25361 2620 48 % 90,48% 9,35% 0,17%

About 95% of fishing firms in western waters own 5 vessels or less and employ around 10 crew members or less and around 90% of the fleets own just one vessel and employ around two crew members (micro-enterprises).SMEs are not the only firms affected by these problems, but they are impacted disproportionally. These figures refer to the entire fleet of the relevant Member States. 2.6.2.Processing sector The problem also affects the processing sector. Most of the catches of demersal species in western waters are sold fresh, however in terms of secondary sectors that are dependent on fisheries, the processing sector is the most important one. Overall in the EU the processing value of whitefish in 2014 reached 11.6 billion €, a 3 % increase from 2013. This amounts to almost 60 % of total revenues (19.85 billion) from the processing sector in 2014. The processing sector is heavily dependent on imports of whitefish, while the EU almost fully covers its need for flatfish in the processing sector. The main whitefish species supplied by the EU fishing fleets (cod, hake, saithe, haddock) meet only a small percentage of the market needs, providing between 10% for cod and 30% for haddock. Cod is the most important source of whitefish for the EU processing industry, and is widely used in the UK, France and Spain. Hake is the third most important whitefish species for the processing industry. The processing of hake, on the basis of both fresh hake caught in the EU and imports, mainly takes place in France and Spain. Only France has increased its whitefish processing since 2010. As far as the processing industry is concerned, firms tend to be larger. The proportion of SMEs and micro-enterprises is slightly above 50%: Table 6: Number of processing firms in the EU and employment data

(elaborated from data extracted from AER 2013) No of jobs 2008 2009 2010 2011 <10 employees 1758 1779 1798 1850 11-49 employees 1088 1139 1091 1016 50-249 employees 476 416 408 400 >250 employees 81 81 79 78 Total 3402 3415 3376 3344 Proportion of SMEs 51.68 52.09 53.26 55.32 2.6.3.Markets Markets are also affected by the problem. Demersal fish are sold mostly on the fresh fish market and some are frozen. Fishery products in western waters are sold by wholesale fish traders and only a minor part is sold directly by fishermen. EU consumers overall in 2015 spent €54 billion on fisheries and aquaculture products - the highest amount ever recorded. The seafood supply in the EU grew by almost 650.000 tonnes between 2013 and 2014 (+4.5%). The main driver was internal production, which rose by 570.000 tonnes, mostly originating from fishing activities. The EU’s self-sufficiency also improved, moving from 44.5% to 47.5%. In 2015, Spain, Italy, the UK and France covered 85.7% of the total EU fresh fish consumption by volume and 85.2% by value. Of these, Spain ranks first with 38% of total fish consumed (€4.95 billion, 686,000 t) with the most important species being hake, salmon, cod and flounder. By value the most important demersal species in the wider region are hake (€230 million), anglerfish/monkfish (€173 million) Norway lobster (€161 million). Cod is one of the EU's most consumed fish species, with 2.4 kg consumed per person per year and household purchase of €1.4 billion. However most of this is supported by imports from third countries, with an EU self-sufficiency rate of only 12% in 2014. Similarly, hake (1kg per capita per year) and anglerfish/monkfish have only a 37% and 56% self-sufficiency rates, respectively. All downstream related industries (see above) are also affected by the problems described and therefore rely on imports to alleviate these effects. Data on other downstream industries (market distribution, retailers) were not available at the time of carrying out this exercise. It may be taken that in this field firms tend to be larger, especially in the field of retailers (supermarkets). 2.7.Perception of the problems by consulted stakeholders A summary of the stakeholder consultations is shown in Annex 3. During the public consultation stakeholders were asked about their views on the main problem: (1). the fact that a number of stocks are not yet at MSY and hence the industry cannot fully enjoy the economic benefits of sustainable fishing; and (2) the fact that the current MAPs are inadequate to use the management measures of the new CFP. 18 respondents out of 23 agreed fully (5) or mostly (13), while 5 stakeholders agreed only partially. Comments received pointed to the fact that the problem was not due to obsolete or inadequate MAPs, but to wrong TAC decisions and a too rigid management system. On the severity of the problem, 22 out of 23 replies qualified it as very severe (17) or severe (5); only 1 stakeholder considered the problem as moderate. Most of the comments received agreed that it is an important social and economic issue. Parallel to this Public Consultation, a targeted survey was done with more precise and technical questions. It was addressed to the Advisory Councils, to Member States authorities, to the PECH Committee of the European Parliament and to the NAT Committee of the European Economic and Social Committee. In response to this targeted consultation, one Member State mostly agreed with the identification of the problem and considered it as a severe one. The other Member State which replied agreed only partially and considered it a moderate problem. In the relevant sections below, further reference is made to the specific responses received. 3.Why should the EU act? The principle of proportionality requires that the involvement of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.

According to Article 3.1.d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the EU has exclusive competence for the conservation of the marine biological resources under the CFP, managed directly through EU regulations. Furthermore, both fish stocks and fishing vessels concerned move freely across national boundaries so action at Member State level alone is unlikely to be effective in achieving the objectives. For measures to be effective, these should be taken in a coordinated manner and made applicable to the whole area of distribution of the stock and to all fleets concerned. This initiative respects the principle of subsidiarity and fulfils its requirements. In addition, most contributors to the public consultation agreed that EU intervention is necessary, in the form of either one or two EU management plans (see Annex 3). The EU should act, because otherwise we risk that: → Sustainable fishing, defined as maintaining fish stocks over the long term at levels corresponding to MSY, will not be achieved for all fisheries by 2020. This will jeopardize the objectives of the Basic Regulation, as this will have socio-economic implications with the fishing industry and coastal regions in the EU losing potential economic rents. There would also be a negative impact on the environmental sustainability as certain stocks in a mixed fishery will either be overfished or fisheries will need to be closed early, because of a mismatch in available quotas. Furthermore stocks fished above MSY will fail to deliver on the objective of contributing to the availability of food supplies. → implementation measures for the landing obligation via discard plans cannot be continued after 2019 as there is no MAP in place which caters for measures such as de minimis and survivability exemptions and; → this in turn will mean no regionalisation for fisheries management measures. A lack of regionalisation will lead to a further loss of industry buy-in, as stakeholders will become increasingly disappointed that there is no structural framework that allows them to design together with the Member States management measures and to ensure that measures can be taken quickly so that they are always up to date. Regionalisation thus constitutes an important shift from instrument-based to results-based management. →From a legal point of view, the CFP has as an objective to achieve MSY by 2020, and MAPs are prescribed as a measure to achieve this objective. Without MAPs in place, essential measures, such as the landing obligation, cannot be implemented in the long term and this will make it more difficult to achieve the CFP objectives. →Finally, considering the fact that the EU is one of the most adamant promoters of sustainable fishing at global level, not being able to ensure a proper management of fish stocks in the EU also risks putting at stake the EU's credibility globally. 3.1.Perceptions of pertinence of EU action by consulted stakeholders All the contributions to the online public consultation have agreed to act at EU level (out of 23 replies, 20 fully agreed with the need for the EU to act, 1 mostly agreed and 2 partially agreed). It was noted that beyond the need to act, there is a legal obligation under the Treaty to manage fisheries by MAPs, and some requested a better involvement of stakeholders. 18 stakeholders fully agreed, 2 mostly agreed and 3 partially agreed that action should be multiannual and proactive rather than annual and reactive. It was noted that there should also be a capability to react swiftly to changing circumstances. Technical Measures introduced on the basis of the management plan should be agreed on at a regional level. See further details in Annex 3. 4.What should be achieved? The general objective and specific objectives and their relation to the problems being addressed by this initiative are presented in Figure 3 and detailed below under point 4.



Figure 3: Specific and general objectives and their relationship to the problems 4.1.Objectives of the initiative The main objective is to contribute to the objectives of the common fisheries policy (CFP) listed in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, namely: "The CFP shall ensure that fishing (…) activities are environmentally sustainable in the long-term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the availability of food supplies;

The CFP shall apply the precautionary approach to fisheries management, and shall aim to ensure that exploitation of living marine biological resources restores and maintains populations of harvested species above levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield (…) by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks; The CFP shall provide conditions for economically viable and competitive fishing capture and processing industry". These objectives fit very well with the priorities of the Commission and will help deliver on the key objective of jobs and growth in Europe. To achieve the main objective, it is necessary to address the identified problems of overfishing and ineffective governance with specific objectives as follows: Overfishing is addressed by the following specific objectives of the initiative: To provide a transparent framework to achieve that stocks are fished sustainably by 2020 at the latest for western waters fisheries, to ensure environmental sustainability and to achieve a socio-economically sustainable fisheries sector for demersal fisheries in western waters. Ineffective governance is addressed by the following specific objective of the initiative: To provide an effective governance framework for demersal fisheries in western waters, which is simpler and provides stakeholders with greater ownership; To facilitate the achievement of these objectives the initiative will also facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation established under the Basic Regulation, by providing a basis for derogations for selected demersal fisheries in western waters in certain circumscribed situations. The initiative shall be coherent with the Union environmental legislation, in particular with the objective of achieving a good environmental status by 2020 as set out in Article 1(1) of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). 4.2.Perceptions by consulted stakeholders on these objectives Out of 23 stakeholders, 16 agreed fully (3) or mostly (13) and 7 agreed just partially. Generally speaking, the fishing sector found that the current MAPs did not address the real problem (for them the problem lies with too rigid and obsolete rules) and NGOs believed that the objectives should mirror those of the CFP and include MSFD-related objectives. For details on the respondents see Annex 3. 5.What are the various options to achieve the objectives? 5.1.Discarded policy options i) No action at EU level Because fisheries policy is an exclusive competence of the Union, the first policy option that can be discarded is that of no action at the European level. ii) Amendment of the existing management plans

The 5 existing management plans do not meet the requirements of the CFP nor those of the Inter-Institutional Task Force and would thus be unable to achieve the objectives of the CFP. Reviews of current MAPs by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), concluded as follows: a)On the cod plan ( Regulation (EU) No 1342/2008 ), STECF concluded in 2011 "the plan is not delivering reduced F [fishing mortality rate] and additionally in many areas does not have stakeholder support."; b)On the plan for western Channel sole ( Regulation (EC) 509/2007 ), STECF concluded in 2014 that, 'The TAC restriction is the only effective element of the plan'.. Furthermore STECF concluded that: 'Given the multispecies nature of all the fisheries in the area, STECF considers that efficient management of the fisheries would best be achieved through the development and implementation of a regional multiannual fishery management plan', as this would: 'make management more efficient and avoid problems of TAC unbalance' c)The Bay of Biscay sole plan ( Regulation (EC) No 388/2006 ) has the objective to rebuild the stock but no target has been set under the plan for reaching MSY; In 2011 STECF commented that, the plan 'requires that new biological targets be fixed once the stock has recovered to its precautionary biomass level'. Even if the stock reached this level in 2010, no revision has taken place. d)In the Northern hake plan ( Regulation (EC) No 811/2004 ), the objective is considered to be achieved when the size of the spawning stock is kept above safe biological limits for two consecutive years. It is therefore not specifically designed to achieve MSY. Besides, ICES has reported that "the current recovery plan (EC Reg. No. 811/2004) is based on precautionary reference points that are no longer appropriate"; e)Similar comments apply to the Southern hake and Nephrops plan (Regulation ( EC) No 2166/2005 ): it is not designed to achieve MSY and, according to ICES, it uses "precautionary reference points that are no longer appropriate". In 2010, STECF assessed that "the F reduction from 2006 expected from the plan has not been achieved" and that "Fmsy will probably not be reached by the intended date of 2015. In consequence the plan is not succeeding in achieving its stated objectives"; These plans were introduced to rebuild and recover fish stocks above defined levels that at the time were considered safe in terms of sustainability. However these definitions are today outdated and moreover these older plans do not contain any MSY objectives. This option would entail amending the 5 existing management plans, and subsequently need the introduction of a series of many more new single-species plans for other stocks and fisheries not covered by the current plans. Existing plans would be amended to meet the challenges of the new CFP, and in light of their evaluations - introduce amendments on the current scope (in terms of stocks, fisheries, area), introducing MSY targets, objectives and safeguards for conservation and technical measures. Delegation of powers to the Commission should also be introduced in order to implement regionalisation. Over time, new additional, plans could be introduced for stocks not currently under a management plan. This would entail the development of a range of plans for the main/driving demersal fish stocks for which ICES currently provides scientific advice on maximum sustainable yield (45 stocks are considered target stocks in western waters), and potentially further plans for other commercially important bycatch stocks (34 stocks are considered as bycatch stocks in western waters). Each multiannual plan would address a "cluster" of fisheries sharing certain characteristics. Examples of clusters could be the fisheries for roundfish with important by-catch of megrim and anglerfish, Nephrops fisheries (with by-catch of roundfish and also megrim and anglerfish), and fisheries targeting flatfish15 (sole and plaice mainly), also with considerable by-catches. Clusters would need to be chosen following consultation and on the basis of scientific advice. Ultimately from a management perspective such clusters would be much less optimal than one or two new mixed-fisheries plans, which address species caught together. Amending the existing plans would, however, make it more difficult to achieve the objectives of implementing regionalisation and facilitating the introduction of the landing obligation. This is because integrated approaches to the implementation of the landing obligation (introduced per fishery) or of technical measures to be introduced at a regional level would be much more difficult because the same technical measures applying to fishing different stocks would have to be introduced in separate delegated acts based on different (multiple) single-stock plans – and would therefore create a proliferation of delegated acts. In a mixed fishery it would be unclear which of the species/stock-based plans would have to include details on the fisheries-based phasing in of the landing obligation. Additionally, future exemptions from the landing obligation for western waters would need to be distributed over many different plans instead of being contained within one document as is the case for the current 2 discard plans covering western waters, with one discard plan covering south-western and north-western waters respectively. The foreseen outcome would create a complex legal framework, with complicated management challenges and an increased administrative burden in developing each plan and implementing and updating them to ensure coherence between them. The risk of unforeseen loopholes would also increase. The objective of simplifying legislation would clearly not be met (see North Sea IA section 5.1.2). The Public Consultation showed that, among stakeholders, there has been strong criticism of the complexity of the existing legislation, so any further complications arising from a multiplicity of even more plans will be further criticised. Additionally, stakeholders fully or mostly agreed that a multiannual plan for western waters should manage the fisheries coherently, by taking into account the interactions between fish stocks (that these are mixed fisheries). There is thus general support by stakeholders that the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see Annex 3). 5.2.Retained policy options For the purposes of this impact assessment, three options have initially been considered:

5.2.1.Option 1 Baseline scenario: Use the existing relevant rules of the CFP. This should be considered as a background against which the other options can be assessed. The main tools currently used to manage stocks are: oTotal Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota setting Each year, the TACs for western waters are decided by Council based on a Commission proposal. For some fish stocks the TAC setting is governed by one of the existing multiannual management plans, which have outdated objectives that are no longer in line with the new CFP. Decisions are made on a stock-by stock basis and do not take into account fisheries which are mixed. oDiscard plans to implement the landing obligation Member States propose specific measures to help implement the landing obligation under discard plans. Such measures are particularly useful to manage mixed fisheries, but the discard plans will run out after 3 years (i.e. 31 December 2021 for demersal fisheries) and cannot be renewed. oTechnical measures The recent Commission proposal for a new Regulation on technical measures simplifies existing rules, with a number of provisions common to all sea basins (the baseline) and further to this, provisions on regionalisation, with a view to set further specific measures in regionalisation. The following measures can, according to the proposal be adopted in regionalisation: species and size selectivity of fishing gears, closed or restricted areas to protect juveniles and spawning aggregations, minimum conservation reference sizes, real-time closures and moving-on provisions, innovative fishing gears and nature conservation measures. This proposal is likely to enter the trilogue process in autumn 2017. These regionally adopted technical measures should contribute to achieving the objectives of the MAPs for the different regions and ensure alignment of technical measures with other conservation measures within each region. To allow for this synergy, regionally based MAPs need to be adopted. oExisting single-species management plans The status quo or no policy change at EU level means to continue applying the existing outdated management plans in combination with all other existing rules of the new CFP. Under this option the objectives of the CFP would not be reached for all fisheries as the outdated plans have biomass safeguards only for sole in the Bay of Biscay (ICES has not evaluated this plan), while a biomass target is set for the recovery of Northern hake and southern hake. For southern Nephrops and Bay of Biscay sole no biomass target is set in the plan. For cod stocks under the cod plan the 2016-amendment deleted the biomass safeguards. Thereby no biomass safeguards are foreseen in legislation for most target fisheries in western waters. Furthermore they lack the objective to achieve maximum sustainable yields. Moreover this option does not enable Regionalisation in the western waters. This means it would not be possible to replace the discard plans after they have lapsed and the landing obligation would then have to be applied in cases where this is disproportionate. Option 1 reflects the status quo which does not effectively address the problems of overfishing and ineffective governance (see sections 1.4 and 3). The problems of the status quo are instead precisely what the initiative intends to address. Due to the contradictory provisions that would hence remain in force, this option clearly does not reach the specific objectives shown in figure 3. Additionally stakeholders are against this option. The public consultation for the western waters multiannual plans showed that, among stakeholders, there has been strong criticism of the complexity of the existing legislation, so any further complications arising from a multiplicity of plans are unlikely to be welcomed. Additionally, stakeholders fully or mostly agreed that a multiannual plan for western waters should manage the fisheries coherently, by taking into account the interactions between fish stocks (that these are mixed fisheries). There is thus general support by stakeholders that the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see Annex 3). Additionally the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address the issues that have evolved during their implementation. The Member States directly concerned have requested to replace these plans as soon as possible. There are high expectations by all stakeholders that these plans will be replaced. In addition there are expectations from the European Parliament to bring more fisheries under multiannual plans in the future. In 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which "calls on the Commission to provide for the establishment of long term management plans for all EU fisheries". Options 2 and 3: Replace existing plans with one (option 2) or two mixed-fisheries multiannual plans (option 3) The content of plans and their structure would be very similar and the following considerations are relevant for the structure of both options: i) Which species should be included? The demersal species in western waters that are defined as targeted fisheries are alfonsinos, anglerfish, black scabbardfish, blue ling, cod, haddock, hake, megrim, Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, seabass, sole and whiting. These account for 89 % of volume of catches of demersal species in western waters and have been assessed by scientists (and therefore conservation reference points are available for most). Furthermore, they are caught in mixed fisheries, with by-catch of other species and to date high levels of discarding. Industry stakeholders during the public consultation considered that the measures of a possible multiannual plan should be focused on species currently driving the main fisheries, such as cod, hake, megrim and anglerfish. They did not suggest including data poor species in multiannual plans, but there should be a move to coherence between catch composition and quota.Taking into account that the landing obligation for demersal species will only come fully into force for all stocks in 2019 the current discard plans for demersal fisheries in western waters covering 2016-2017 cover, for north-western waters fisheries catching above a certain threshold of the following species: cod, haddock, hake, Norway lobster, pollack, saithe, sole, whiting. For south-western waters the discard plan covers certain gears catching: anglerfish, black scabbardfish, hake, Norway lobster, place, red seabream and sole – furthermore for several of these demersal species specific derogations were considered necessary to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation. ii) Management of target stocks

-The species driving the fisheries in western waters, by being the main targeted species. are alfonsinos, anglerfish, black scabbardfish, blue ling, cod, haddock, hake, megrim, Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, seabass, sole and whiting. -The fisheries for these species in western waters are mixed fisheries which means that the same fishers and vessels will inevitably catch a mix of species in one fishing operation, also including by-catch species such as plaice, ling or tusk. It therefore makes sense to manage these species together rather than under separate multiannual plans. This also follows STECF's recommendation, that having larger MAPs may “promote” more coherent regulations in terms of objectives and safeguards for each stock and avoid over-regulating the sector. Furthermore these MAPs need to specifically address the mixed character of demersal fisheries. The measures contained in these plans would mean that management of each species would take into account the state of the other species caught together. iii) The geographical scope Several demersal species in western waters occur in different parts as distinct stocks (i.e. populations). There are e.g. 8 distinct sole stocks considered as drivers in each their fisheries in western waters. Few stocks in western waters are however only present in one seabasin. Here the Irish Sea is an exception with several stocks (cod, haddock, plaice, sole and whiting) restricted to this seabasin. Many other stocks in both the north and the south of western waters cut across seabasins, and are present in larger areas. Furthermore, the fisheries on these stocks often happen in larger areas, and consequently the TACs are most often set for a larger area in order to cover all catches of a certain stock. As an example the cod stocks in western waters are the most localised stocks often only being considered belonging to one seabasin, while there are only two hake stocks spread over rather large areas, namely the whole Iberian Atlantic area for southern hake and the area stretching from the Atlantic to the North Sea for northern hake. The EU multiannual plan would cover all EU vessels fishing in EU waters, and beyond EU waters, where stocks extend into international waters, hence the full coverage would be ensured in terms of the EU fishing sector iv) Deadline for achieving sustainable fishing levels Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation provides for a binding obligation to reach sustainable fishing levels but leaves some flexibility regarding the timeframe for reaching this target (by 2015 where possible and […] at the latest by 2020). The multiannual plans should specify this deadline of 2020 for the western waters fisheries. v) Conservation reference points including the range of sustainable fishing mortality On the basis of Article 10 of the Basic Regulation, the multiannual plan would contain the following reference points for the target fisheries: ·A range of target fishing mortality which is considered compatible with sustainable fishing (FMSY range). ·Safeguard values in terms of fish biomass which serve as triggers for management action: when the stocks concerned fall below these pre-defined sizes, safeguard measures should be adopted. ·the by-catch species would be managed following the precautionary approach; As the multiannual plan should be based on the best available science, the conservation reference points would be based on the latest scientific advice. At the time of drafting this impact assessment the latest scientific advice from ICES with MSYranges, the independant scientific advisory body for fisheries, was of July 2016 and these values were used to model the impacts under Option 2 (Annex 2). vi) Management measures to ensure the targets are reached As demonstrated by the scientific advice (Annex 5), current fishing mortality and hence catch levels will need to be adapted to reach sustainable levels by 2020 at the latest. EU fish stocks are managed using catch-limits, whereby a total allowable catch (TAC - for the whole stock) and national quotas (per Member State) are fixed annually or biennially (see Annex 5). The use of TACs and quota in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Atlantic is thought to have contributed to the overall improvement in stock status, with an increasing number of stocks being fished sustainably in recent years. For these reasons, the multiannual plan would include MSYranges to determine TACs and quotas as the management approach in order to further increase the number of stocks fished sustainably. In practice, the plan would, where available, set the range of fishing mortality for alfonsinos, anglerfish, black scabbardfish, blue ling, cod, haddock, hake, megrim, Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, seabass, sole and whiting (at stock-level) that needs to be respected to ensure sustainable fishing levels are reached by 2020. Each year the Commission would adopt a proposal for TAC and quotas compatible with these target fishing mortality ranges, based on the most recent scientific advice. The Council should then adopt annual TAC and quotas in line with these fishing mortality ranges. For deep sea species the Council would adopt bi-annual TACs and quotas in line with the ranges. Where ranges of fishing mortality are not yet available ICES will be asked to deliver these and in the meantime the species would be managed by the ICES precautionary approach. TACs and quotas managed by MSYranges should provide the necessary flexibility needed for mixed fisheries. Furthermore Member States can foresee additional measures at national level to adapt the quota share system to the likely catch mixture of the fleets or at regional level to recommend closing areas/periods to fishing etc. The mechanism to achieve sustainable fishing levels would therefore be set in the multiannual plan (F-ranges/precautionary biomass levels as the basis for TAC and quotas) but the exact management tools to deliver on this would be left to Member States, through regionalisation. This is in line with the request of stakeholders in the public consultation to let the multiannual plan focus on the orientation and determination of the objectives, while the micro management is decided in a more flexible way (regionalisation). vii) Choice of how to introduce measures regarding the landing obligation As described in Annex 2, the Basic Regulation allows the adoption of so-called "discard plans" through Regionalisation to adopt exemptions from the landing obligation for no more than three years. After the expiry of these discard plans, exemptions will still be needed, in order to allow for the discarding of species that survive discarding (i.e. it makes more sense for them to be thrown back in the sea if they will survive as they can reproduce and increase the biomass) and to allow for exemptions in situations where the landing obligation would put a disproportionate burden on the industry (e.g. in terms of the cost of implementing the landing obligation). The Basic Regulation itself foresees in Article 15(5) that such exemptions should be adopted as parts of a multiannual plan and could be done on the basis of Regionalisation.

When drafting a multiannual plan, the Commission will have to decide which elements of the future exemptions from the Basic Regulation will be included in the multiannual plan itself and which elements will be adopted as a part of a delegated act to be adopted on the basis of joint recommendations by Member States. The approach for this will follow the future political compromise on the North Sea plan. The discard plans covering the demersal fisheries in north- and south-western waters respectively were supplemented for 2017, through joint recommendations from the regional groups, and are supplemented further for 2018, with new fisheries coming under the landing obligation. This includes additional exemptions on the basis of new scientific research for example on survivability of species after discarding. In line with the current system, respondents during the public consultation expressed a preference for not fixing the specific measures in the multiannual plan but leaving this to be decided through regionalisation. The adaptive, flexible approach of regionalisation would therefore be the preferred option for this element of the plan rather than having to amend the multiannual plan through the ordinary legislative proposal for such non-essential supplements or amendments. The choice of how to introduce provisions to implement the landing obligation is not considered to affect the possible environmental, social or economic impacts of an EU multiannual plan or the effectiveness in achieving the objectives. In conclusion the WW MAP, to be adopted under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, would thereby translate the provisions of the Basic Regulation relating to the MSY objectives, regionalisation and the landing obligation into a specific geographically targeted framework, taking into account the most up–to–date scientific information about demersal fisheries in that area. This will include allowing certain technical parametres (e.g. closed areas, gear specifications, exemtions from the landing obligation) to be updated through regionalisation, in order to ensure updated and fit-for-purpose management tools. Summary for options 2 and 3: Option 2: One mixed-fisheries multiannual plan covering western waters Following the outline above this option would imply one plan covering all of the western waters. This option would take into account that many of the same Member States and the same fleets fish in both north- and south-western waters. Furthermore one plan would also allow presenting joint recommendations covering specific fisheries in either the north-western waters or south-western waters respectively. Further to this there is a significant overlap in the Member States represented in both the north- and the south-western waters groups. Option 3: Two mixed-fisheries multiannual plans covering north-western waters and south-western waters Following the ouline above this option would imply two plans, covering north-western waters and south-western waters respectively. The difference between this and option 2) would be that this option would emphasise the current set-up for regionalisation, as these two areas are covered by the Advisory Council for the north-western waters and the Advisory Council for the south-western waters separatly. These are also the areas covering the north-western waters Member State Group and the south western waters Member State Group, which produce joint recommendations for the discard plans. Two plans could thereby work as a natural continuation of the work done through the discard plan recommendations within the regional Member State Groups. The differences between options 2) and 3) are thereby mainly associated to issues of consistency, involvement of stakeholders and administrative burden. 5.3.Perceptions of the options by consulted stakeholders This question was only addressed in the targeted consultation. In total there were 28 replies from a mix of environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional organisations (POs) and one from a Member State authority (UK), details of which can be found in Annex 3. The Member State who replied (UK) and the majority of other respondents either "Fully" or "Mostly" agreed that MAPs (Options 2 and 3) would be the most effective options. All agreed on the need for the EU to take action. For further details please refer to Annex 3. 6.What are the impacts of the different policy options and who will be affected? 6.1.Approach to the impact analysis Annex 1 describes the procedural steps followed for this Impact Assessment Report. This impact assessment is a revised version of the report examined by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) on 12 February 2016. The RSB suggestions for improvements at that occasion, together with a summary description of how they have been addressed, are described in Annex 1. DG MARE asked STECF to provide a technical and scientific analysis of the options considered, which is provided in Annex 5. STECF provided expert judgement on the advantages and disadvantages of setting alternative geographic coverage of MAPs and ran forecast models to describe the likely situation of the fisheries on 1 January of 2017, 2021 and 2025 - using given environmental, economic and social indicators for the different options. On the basis of this study, the following indicators have been used:

1. Socio-economic impacts: Catches, revenues from catches, costs, Total Allowable Catches (TACs) or quota and their inter-annual variability, quota usage, fleet dependency and employment were all considered to have both social and economic dimensions and have been considered together in one section. Higher revenues, sustainable catches, stable and predictable TACs or quotas and lower fleet dependency, with stable or increased employment are considered to be beneficial and desirable during analysis of the options as they provide more certainty of financial income and stability of employment for the fishing community. 2. Environmental impacts: FMSY ranges, fishing mortality, fishing effort, stock size/biomass, risk to biomass were used to consider the environmental and conservation elements of the different options. Sustainable or reduced fishing mortality and effort leading to an increased stock size and biomass, in line with Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) objectives were considered a positives. This is especially the case when comparing sustained use of different points of the FMSY ranges and boundaries. In scenarios where sustained use of an upper boundary led to increased fishing mortality and reductions in the fisheries’ population, especially the spawning stock biomass, such scenarios were considered as not beneficial or desirable in the subsequent analysis. These scenarios may result in a deviation from sustainability objectives such as MSY and even risk possible overfishing. 3. Administrative Burden: The complexity and coherence of management frameworks and corresponding administrative costs and burden are also considered for each of the options. Where an option is considered more complex, it has been considered more expensive, less coherent and more cumbersome to administer and therefore has been considered more negatively in the subsequent analysis and comparison of the options. 6.2.Option 1: Baseline (Status quo) The environmental and socio-economic impacts of this option are presented in section 2. However the main impacts of continuing the status quo are summarised as follows: 6.2.1.Environmental impacts Although considerable progress has been made in achieving sustainable stocks, some stocks remain in a bad state with low recruitment and low stock size and biomass. The status quo risks objectives of the CFP not being achieved, such as not reaching MSY, not having all stocks in safe biological limits and not taking into account the mixed fisheries aspects of fishing effort. Fishing mortality is still considerably high on several fish stocks in the western waters and is the principle source of mortality for several key fish species in the regions. 6.2.2.Socio-economic impacts

A lack of "ownership" and connection to the management of fisheries by stakeholders, could threaten the viability and profitability of the sector due to overfishing and ineffective governance. Inter-annual TAC variations do not make for stable and predictable yields, which complicates the business management of fishing fleets and their dependant enterprises and communities. In the western waters region, STECF identified a high fleet dependency, ranging from 15 to 60% on fleet segments in north-western waters and 20 to 51% in south-western waters for a range of species from cod, whiting, haddock, hake and nephrops to plaice, sole, megrims and anglerfish. 6.2.3.Administrative costs The current system is complex with a mix of inter-annual TAC, quota and vessel catch limits and single species plans. Further, these do not take into account mixed fisheries aspects, complicating the adoption of the landing obligation and the objective to minimise discards. There are also differences in geographical applications of fisheries management measures that do not reflect stock and fishing fleet locations, causing ineffective implementation of regionalisation and in some cases a lack of coherence in the application of fisheries management and regulations. The departure of the United Kingdom from the EUwill add a layer of international negotiations to this system, and will thus further complicate the system and increase administrative costs. 6.3.Option 2: one mixed fisheries multiannual plan for western waters STECF modelled the condition of key stocks in both the western waters up to the year 2021. The models compared two scenarios under the establishment of a multiannual plan versus the baseline (status quo): The first assumes the systematic choice of lowest end of the MSY ranges (FMSYlow) under the plan; the second is the opposite, modelling the systematic choice of the higher or upper end of the MSY range (FMSYupp). Further details are available in Annex 5. 6.3.1.Environmental impacts Upper boundary of FMSY range: Fishing Mortality would be about 25% higher. spawning stock biomass would be around 10% lower for cod and haddock, around 5% lower for plaice, sole and whiting in the north-western waters, 20% lower for hake and megrim in the Bay of Biscay and up to 10% lower for stocks in the Iberian Peninsula. For Iberian stocks of horse mackerel the model results show the probability of this stock falling below Blim is double that than under the baseline scenario. Lower boundary of FMSY range: Fishing Mortality would be about 25% lower. spawning stock biomass would be around 10% higher for cod and haddock, around 5% higher for plaice, sole and whiting in the north-western waters, 20% higher for hake and megrim in the Bay of Biscay and around 5-15% higher for all stocks in the Iberian Peninsula. For Iberian stocks of horse mackerel the model results show the probability of this stock falling below Blim is less risky, at around 75% less than the baseline scenario. In Summary: Environmental impacts can be most positive if the lower boundary of FMSY range is consistently applied. A systematic application of upper boundary values when considering TAC and quotas would have negative consequences including increased fishing mortality and lower spawning stock biomass. 6.3.2.Socio-economic impacts Upper boundary of FMSY range: In north-western waters TACs and Catches would be around 20% higher by 2021. Inter-annual variability of catches would be around 20% lower (much lower for nephrops and Whiting in north-western waters), with quota consumption increasing for anglerfish (+20%) but decreasing for whiting (-20%) in north-western waters. In north-western waters, there would generally be 30% larger catches except for Spanish and Irish fleets of demersal trawls and seines over 10m. However, these increased catches also have increased costs of around 20%, again except for Irish and Spanish Trawlers. In the Bay of Biscay catches of hake and megrim would again be lower, with a similar decrease in TAC for hake, but megrim TAC remaining the same as baseline scenario. Quota uptake would also remain mostly the same. Inter-annual variability would increase slightly, but far less than the lower boundary scenario, with the exception of sole, where variability would decrease more than 25%. Higher effort is associated with higher variable costs, but also revenues are higher under this scenario, depicting an increase in catch per unit effort in the Bay of Biscay. For the Iberian Peninsula, models depict TACs and catch to be up to 30% higher than in the lower boundary scenario. By 2021 all indicators, except fixed costs and number of vessels are modelled as showing similar trends with 30-40% increases compared to baseline. Lower boundary of FMSY range:

In north-western waters TACs and Catches would be around 20% lower by 2021. Inter-annual variability of catches would be around 10-50% higher (notably for nephrops and Whiting in north-western waters), with quota consumption being generally lower (especially for anglerfish and nephrops in north-western waters, but slightly higher for cod). Generally fleets in the north-western waters would have reduced effort, costs and catches, apart from Irish drift netters who would have a slight increase in catches. In the Bay of Biscay catches of hake and megrim would be around 5% lower, with a similar decrease in TAC for hake, but megrim TAC modelled to increase by more than 15%. Quota uptake is around 20% lower. Inter-annual variability would also be much higher. For the Iberian Peninsula inter-annual variability is higher across all stocks than in the upper boundary scenario, compared to baseline. For Spanish netters, long-liners, hand-liners and trawlers, revenue differences to baseline are minimal. For Portuguese fleets, models show 20-25% lower revenues. In Summary: Socio-economic impacts again differ, depending upon setting TACs and quotas consistently in line with the upper or lower boundaries of FMSY ranges. Whilst choosing the upper boundary can lead to some short-term increases in quota and catches in some stocks, the STECF analysis suggests there can also be increases in costs. 6.3.3.Administrative costs A single plan containing a single management framework for stocks and mixed fisheries over a longer period of time, would represent a considerable simplification upon the current baseline approach (option 1). The current baseline has a mix of inter-annual TAC and quota variations and several plans for several different areas and species. A single plan could still have built-in options for regionalisation and adaption to changes in fisheries, management and scientific advice. Coherence and compliance should be simpler than the current status quo and thus reduce the administrative burden. 6.4.Option 3: Two mixed fisheries multiannual plans (south-western waters and north-western waters) 6.4.1.Environmental impacts The impacts of establishing multiannual plans versus the baseline scenario of option 1, remain the same as option 2. STECF were also asked to assess the number and scope of multiannual plans. They concluded that "provided the objectives were followed and biomass safeguards applied", the number and scope of plans was largely a regulatory and policy issue. However artificial and arbitrary boundaries that do not reflect stock distribution can cause inconsistencies in fisheries management and fishing fleet activity. This can, in turn, have a negative impact upon both stocks and the environment. Such a scenario would not improve upon the current baseline (option 1) and could lead to displaced fishing effort that may have a disproportionate effect on stock structure and recruitment. 6.4.2.Socio-economic impacts Similarly the impacts of establishing multiannual plans versus the baseline scenario of option 1, remain the same as option 2, except for the increased risks from having two separate management regions. Again this could lead to differences in regulations, a lack of coherence and displaced fishing effort, with artificial or arbitrary lines that may not reflect fishing fleets activity or stock distribution. This in-turn may limit inter-area flexibility for usage of quota allocations. Complications in fisheries management may also limit quota uptake. 6.4.3.Administrative costs The establishment of two multiannual plans would be less complicated than the status quo, baseline approach of option, but not as simple as a single framework approach. Different regulatory regimes could complicate control, compliance and cohesion and require increased administrative effort to cover the two separate regimes. Fleets moving between regions and member states who administer national fleets operating in the two separate regions may find they have duplication in administrative effort and expense. Adaptation of two different management plans may also be complicated and lengthier. 7.How do the options compare? 7.1.Assessment of environmental, economic, social and other impacts Table 7 provides a comparison of the options in terms of environmental, socio-economic and administrative impacts of new mixed fisheries multiannual plans compared to the baseline. Table 7 shows that multiannual plans (Options 2 and 3) in general have far more positive environmental, socio-economic and administrative effects than the baseline (Option 1). However the STECF's assessment did highlight that multiannual plans using FMSY ranges could potentially have negative environmental and socio-economic effects versus the baseline, depending on the systemic choice of upper or lower boundaries of FMSY ranges. The division of the western waters area into two different multiannual plans for two different regions (Option 3) could lead to artificial and arbitrary boundaries that may not reflect stock distribution and may lead to differences in management regimes and regulation and trans-boundary "straddling stock" issues compared to the improved cohesion of a wider, single multiannual plan for the western waters (Option 2). This, in turn, could lead to displaced fishing effort that may have a disproportionate effect on stock structure and recruitment and limit quota flexibility and uptake, along with complicated administration of differing fleets and management regions. For these reasons, Option 3 has less positive effects than Option 2.

Table 7. Comparison of options in terms of their environmental, socio-economic and administrative impacts. Option 1: Baseline Option 2: One MAP for all western waters Option 3: Two MAPs (north- and south-) western waters Environmental effects 0 +/-* +/-* Socio-economic effects 0 +/-* +/-* Administrative effects 0 ++ + Key: 0= neutral impact, +=positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), -= negative impact, +/- positive and negative impacts *N.B. The STECF analysis demonstrates that the results are dependent on the choice of the lower (FMSYlow) or the upper (FMSYupp) boundary of the ranges of FMSY. Please see Section 6 for more detail for comparison of use of upper or lower boundaries of FMSY range in each option



7.2.Assessment against the objectives The section below, including Table 8, provides a qualitative comparison of each of the options against the objectives identified in Section 4. Main objective: Whilst both Option 2 and 3 are an improvement over the baseline (Option 1) in achieving the objectives of the CFP, the improved cohesion of having one plan (Option 2), versus several plans (Option 3) is considered an asset. The administrative, socio-economic and environmental benefits of not having fleets and stocks split over two arbitrarily defined areas are considered more positive under Option 2 and should facilitate meeting the objectives of the CFP. Specific objectives: The baseline, status quo of Option 1 would continue with the existing framework and risks not meeting the majority of the objectives, as described in section 2. Options 2 and 3 allow for one or two mixed fishery multiannual plans that would be an improvement on Option 1, providing a transparent framework for achieving MSY whilst taking into account the complexity of mixed fisheries, something that current single species plans under Option 1, would not be able to achieve. Options 2 and 3 would therefore improve the outlook for placing all stocks in safe biological limits compared to the baseline of Option 1. However the increased administrative burden of having two separate plans (Option 3) could complicate management measures, such as the implementation of the Landing Obligation. Also, under Option 3, Regionalisation may be more complex than Option 2 and there is a risk that the units of regional management would not be defined by fish stocks or fleet location. This could lead to a more complicated administration, control and inspection regime than one plan under Option 2 which would provide a more stable and predictable management framework. However both options are an improvement over the status quo of Option 1.



Table 8. Comparison of options against main and specific objectives. Option 1: Baseline Option 2: One MAP for all western waters Option 3: Two MAPs (north- and south-) western waters Main objective To contribute to the achievement of the broad objectives of the reformed CFP, in particular the long term sustainability of the stocks, expressed in terms of MSY, and the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. 0 + + Specific objectives To provide a transparent framework to achieve Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 2020 at the latest. 0 + + To ensure that the relevant stocks are maintained within safe biological limits and those stocks outside of biological limits are brought within those limits as rapidly as possible. 0 + + To ensure that the fishing opportunities on each of the stocks are set taking into account the nature of the mixed fisheries. 0 ++ ++ To provide a management framework facilitating stability and predictability in the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities. 0 ++ + To facilitate the consolidation of the rules on the landing obligations introduced in the reformed CFP and establish the framework that is necessary for the implementation of regionalisation. 0 ++ + Key: 0= neutral impact, +=positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), -= negative impact, +/- positive and negative impacts





7.3.Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability Effectiveness Option 2 is more effective than Option 1 (the CFP objectives are unlikely to be met under Option 1) and considered more effective than having 2 separate plans (Option 3) The analysis can be complemented by examining the effectiveness of the options in achieving other desirable objectives not explicitly mentioned in the CFP. For example, the objective to simplify legislation, where Option 2 is clearly more advantageous than Option 1 since it replaces all former MAPs by 1 regulation, and an improvement on Option 3, which would still require 2 regulations. Options 2 and 3 also outperform Option 1 in that they bring legislation closer to the stakeholders through regionalisation. However splitting the management framework over two separate areas would still be a complication (Option 3) and would be less effective than one multiannual plan (Option 2). Overall Option 2 scores highest in effectiveness, as shown in Table 9. Efficiency Option 1 is inefficient, with poor results and high administrative burden, especially in monitoring and implementing year after year the complicated effort regimes associated to some of existing MAPs. There is a lack of predictability for the industry because of uncertainty in the annual TAC negotiations, which impacts negatively on efficiency. Options 2 and 3 are clearly more efficient especially when considering administrative burden and burden for the industry. One management framework would be the most efficient, avoiding any trans-boundary complications. Therefore, Option 2 scores highest in efficiency (Table 9) Coherence Option 1 will lead to contradictions with the reformed CFP, especially because some of the existing MAPs are not in line with the new objectives, and some use biological reference points that are outdated. Neither is it coherent with the objective of simplifying legislation and it creates an enormous administrative burden. Options 2 and 3 are both coherent with the current policy, legislation and practices equally and are given an equal score (Table 9). Acceptability The replies to the Public Consultation, although not expressly addressing the issue in detail, show that Option 1 has little or no support and that new mixed fisheries multiannual plans (Options 2 and 3), replacing the existing ones, are an acceptable way forward. There was no specific detail in the responses from stakeholders regarding one versus several MAPs, so they have been scored equally positive in comparison to the baseline of Option 1 (Table 9).



Table 9. Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency coherence and acceptability in achieving the objectives. Option 1