12. 3.. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 62/11 
its own merits. Even if the stabilizer mechanism continues 
in one form or another, it does not necessarily follow that 
the co-responsibility levy arrangements should be con­
tinued. The arrangements, for example, lower the returns 
to growers without encouraging consumers to use more 
grain. 
13. The Committee wishes to emphasize that since 
cereal substitutes are exempt from levy the arrangements 
Done at Brussels, 19 December 1989. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The introduction to the 18th Report on competition 
policy states that Community competition policy is at a 
crossroads. The favourable short-term economic situation 
has led economic operators to incorporate increasingly in 
their planning the need to adapt to the new market 
conditions expected for 1993. The strategic planning 
implemented by firms leads them to overcome the 
Community's internal economic barriers by conducting a 
variety of transnational operations. 
1.2. On these general grounds, the Committee has 
thought it best to divide the Opinion into two specific parts. 
1.2.1. Part I will be a critical review — both positive and 
negative — of the 18th Report. 
1.2.2. Part II will formulate suggestions for certain 
guidelines for Community competition policy in the run-up 
to the Single Market. act as a further incentive to switch from EC cereals to 
imported substitutes. 
14. We may now be witnessing fundamental changes in 
the world supply and demand situation for food which may 
make the stabilizer arrangements redundant. However, 
should structural surpluses continue to be a threat, a 
balance is unlikely to be achieved through the stabilizer 
arrangements as they stand. More direct action on supply 
and demand would then become essential. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
1.3. These suggestions will take account not only of 
competition conditions within the EEC but also of those 
associated with commercial transactions with third 
countries. 
2. Opinion on the 18th Report proper 
2.1. General Comments 
2.1.1. The long wait for a Regulation on the control 
of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures 
2.1.1.1. Chapter I of the fourth part of the 18th Report 
makes an instructive assessment of the progress in links 
between firms. These data are not exhaustive, and are not 
based on official, systematic statistics, but on general 
information. Opinion on the 18th Report on competition policy 
(90/C 62/07) 
On 1 December 1989 the Commission decided, under Article 198 of the Treaty setting up the 
European Economic Community, to consult the Economic and Social Committee on the 18th 
Report on competition policy. 
The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the matter, adopted its Opinion on 29 November 1989. The Rapporteur was 
Mr Mourgues. 
At its 272nd Plenary Session (sitting of 19 December 1989) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion unanimously (apart from one abstention): 
No C 62/12 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 3. 90 
2.1.1.2. However, the data enable the Commission to 
distinguish operations which foster the harmonious 
development of competition from those which produce 
distortions in practice and structure. In this connection the 
Committee would point out that, in the absence of a 
specific provision under Article 86 of the Treaty, the 
Commission has no legal power to grant exemptions 
approving or encouraging concentrations which favour 
competition. 
2.1.1.3. Moreover, if due account is taken of the 
'Continental-Can' judgement of 21 February 1973, the 
abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market or in 
a substantial part thereof jeopardizes an effective competi­
tion structure. 
2.1.1.4. Accordingly the Committee proposes that, at 
the next amendment of the Treaty, an additional provision 
should be incorporated into Article 86, similar in spirit to 
Article 85(3), enabling the Commission to grant exemp­
tions for concentration operations regarded as compatible 
with the aims of improving production or distribution, or 
likely to promote technical or economic progress, and to 
the extent that they are ultimately beneficial to consumers. 
2.1.2. The major disadvantages of this situation 
2.1.2.1. The Commission states that 'the impact of 
mergers and majority acquisitions on competition is likely 
to be more severe in already highly concentrated industries, 
such as chemicals' and particularly 'downstream' for 
pharmaceutical products and certain food products (point 
327). Price-fixing in these sectors shows that the degree of 
concentration has reached a critical point. 
2.1.2.2. This tendency appears to be accelerated by: 
— the imminent prospect of the Single Market; 
— but also probably by the delay in introducing Com­
munity rules in this field, or by the temporary retention 
of sometimes illegally imposed prices; 
— the promotion of research and development agreements 
which establish links between enterprises. 
2.1.2.3. The juxtaposition of these reasons may prompt 
the belief that there is a combination of circumstances 
favourable to the development of capital movement 
operations (takeover bids, etc.) within the Community. 
2.1.2.4. At the same time there is a blatant slowness in 
the development of social provisions and in regulating 
public tenders; these are other factors influencing the 
market and competition. 2.1.2.5. This discord in the factors contributing to 
competition policy threatens to cause serious difficulties, 
and the Committee, which is deeply concerned about this, 
feels duty bound to warn the Commission. 
2.1.3. The direct and indirect causes of inequality 
of treatment of enterprises and holdings 
2.1.3.1. The inequality results primarily from the 
'notification' conditions required sometimes in advance 
and sometimes retrospectively. 
2.1.3.2. In addition, some factors of inequality result 
from the fact that the Commission exercises control 
retrospectively by defining the Community dimension of a 
concentration operation mainly on the basis of a threshold 
based on a high turnover figure (!), but also 
— because the only enterprises concerned are those 
engaged in trade between Member States or with third 
countries; 
— because Community case law has introduced the 
concept of 'collective dominant position' (see point 
2.1.4 below). 
2.1.3.3. On the other hand, in those sectors exempted 
from Article 85 for which rules have been drawn up, prior 
notifications are controlled without a lower limit. This 
applies to know-how licensing, franchising and research 
and development agreements. 
2.1.3.4. In this connection, attention is drawn to the 
Commission's positive stance in the following cases: 
Research and development 
In three interesting cases, the Commission proved that it 
favoured technical progress and innovation in the Com­
munity. The first of these cases concerns the development 
by the Continental and Michelin companies of a tyre of 
entirely new design requiring considerable investments and 
involving an economic risk which is difficult to assess. 
In this context reference should also be made to the 
Commission decision in the case of Brown-Boveri AG, a 
company which had concluded agreements with the 
Japanese company NGK Insulators Ltd. This decision 
authorizes intensive cooperation between these two firms 
for the purpose of developing, manufacturing and 
marketing high-performance batteries, intended primarily 
for use in electrically powered vehicles. 
Franchising 
In a decision on franchising, the Commission also showed 
that it is prepared in certain cases to waive the conditions 
(*) The draft rules currently before the Council seek to diversify 
notification conditions on the basis of geographical criteria, 
competition external to and within the Community and market 
shares held by a firm outside the country where it is based. 
12. 3..90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 62/13 
laid down by the block exemption regulation concerned 
where the structure of competition on the market in 
question so allows (Service Master). 
2.1.3.5. The same applies to subsidies policy: in 
particular, CAP subsidies are precisely assessed irrespective 
of the size of holdings, whereas in other sectors the severity 
of the checks is a function of their impact on intra-
Community trade. 
2.1.4. The 'activism' of case law 
2.1.4.1. There is a hallowed tradition that, when the 
Community legislator is marking time, the Courts move 
things along through case law, which emphasizes the spirit 
of Community law. 
2.1.4.2. This is true of: 
(a) The Van Eycke versus Aspa judgement, which confirms 
that Member States are prohibited from enacting or 
maintaining in force measures likely to render Ar­
ticles 85 and 86 inoperative (point 98). 
Attention should be drawn to the Court of Justice ruling 
in the case 'Pascal van Eycke versus Aspa' by which it 
confirmed and extended its critical case law in respect of 
national measures which prejudice competition. The 
Court ruled that Member States must not enact or 
maintain in force measures likely to render Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty inoperative. This judgement 
confirms earlier case law (e.g. Vereniging van Vlaamse 
reisbureaus — Association of Flemish Travel Agents, 
1 October 1987) in that it maintains that the effective 
benefit of the competition rules is limited: when a 
Member State imposes or encourages the conclusion of 
agreements contrary to Article 85; or when by adopting 
certain rules, it reinforces the impact of such agree­
ments; or when it undermines its own rules by 
delegating to private operators responsibility for taking 
decisions on economic intervention (ground No 16 of 
the judgement). 
The need for this approach to competition law is seen 
(for instance) in the efforts made by cooperatives, faced 
with global competition, to set up an integrated 
cooperative network. 
(b) Judgements relating to the concept of delegated 
monopolies (points 106 ff.) which hinge on 'whether the 
unconnected parallel conduct of several economically 
independent firms might be caught by Article 86 as 
constituting abuse of a collective dominant position' 
and confirm the Commission's conclusions in this 
respect. (c) Particular attention should be given to judgements 
made by certain national courts (e.g. in the Federal 
Republic of Germany) which 'directly apply European 
competition law' (point 127). 
2.1.5. The inadequacy of DG IV resources 
2.1.5.1. The comments in 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate that 
insufficient manpower, equipment and legal resources, 
frequently prevent the Directorate-General for Competi­
tion from fully exploiting its high-quality work on 
analysing the markets and implementing competition 
policy in the Community — a policy which has the 
hallmarks of common sense and realism. 
2.1.5.2. The Committee therefore notes that: 
— the Annual Report appears much too late; 
— there is a significant delay in decision-making on issues 
subject to the decision procedure (cf. point 45). 
2.1.5.3. In these circumstances, the question arises 
whether 'an instrument to monitor concentrations with a 
Community dimension' (Introduction to the Report, 
penultimate paragraph) will have the resources necessary 
for its operation. 
2.1.5.4. This leads the Committee to recommend: 
— Continuing 'public relations' measures in order to 
ensure that all economic operators in whatever sector, 
and all consumers, are always kept informed of their 
rights and duties with regard to competition policy. 
Along these lines, the Commission has announced the 
publication of an additional White Paper for the Single 
Market. 
This White Paper will give particular attention to 
setting out the economic and social significance of 
competition as a basis for a democratic society. 
2.1.6. Coordination with anti-dumping policy 
2.1.6.1. In consultation with the other Commission 
departments, the Directorate-General for Competition 
needs to take account of the safeguard measures in 
Community trade policy authorized by the Treaty of 
Rome. Moreover consideration should be given to re­
opening the debate in the Community on the implemen­
tation of anti-dumping policy. 
2.1.6.2. The Community, and especially Member States 
which joined recently, are sometimes threatened by 
uncontrolled competition from certain third countries — 
either from those at an advanced stage of technological 
development or from those with a large, low — paid 
workforce. 
2.1.6.3. It is not unusual for some countries or their 
firms to engage in dumping in particular sectors, either to 
provide an outlet for their goods or to discourage incipient 
competitive initiatives in the Community. 
No C 62/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 3. 90 
2.1.6.4. While guarding against the risk of a market 
imbalance which would impair fair pricing, the Commis­
sion needs an effective bulwark against certain unfair 
trading practices employed by third countries — practices 
which are often forms of protectionism contradicting and 
indeed violating international agreements such as the 
GATT. In this context, the state of the Community market 
must be assessed not only in relation to world trade but also 
by production sector. 
2.2. Sectors of activity deserving special attention 
2.2.1. Maritime traffic is the subject of a Committee 
Opinion on positive maritime Mmeasures (1). This in­
volves certain competition policy aspects. These are: 
— maritime conferences and exemptions by category, 
already referred to in 1986 (in this connection the 17th 
Report mentioned the formal complaints about the 
Regulation which came into force on 1 July 1987; the 
18th Report provides little information on the follow-
up to these cases); 
— intra-European maritime traffic competing with land 
and air links, raising the problem of taxation planned in 
principle but whose application to Community flags 
should be extended to the flags of third countries to 
avoid distortions of competition (legal difficulties to be 
overcome); 
— in connection with maritime traffic, subsidies to 
European shipyards: investments have considerable 
effects on freight charges, and difficulties are ex­
acerbated by the disparity between subsidies; 
— similarly, the taxes and social security contributions 
paid by ships' crews give rise to distortions which also 
have an effect on these disparities. 
2.2.2. Competition rules and copyright 
2.2.2.1. Throughout the twentieth century, the particip­
ation of 'authors' in economic activities has been 
increasing. Going beyond the traditional arts, the develop­
ment of cinema and audio-visual productions calls for new 
talents. In addition, a new type of 'author' now exists, 
producing computer software. 
2.2.2.2. Sometimes misguided protection of intellectual 
property rights, either by certain national provisions (e.g. a 
single price), or by exercising a dominant position with 
regard to software and refusing information, whether 
subject to copyright or not, prompts the statement that 
'The exercise of exclusive copyrights will not prejudice the 
(!) Doc. CES 1257/89 of 16 November 1989. application of the competition rules and the imposition of 
effective remedies in appropriate cases ...'. 
2.2.2.3. Such unfair protection is incompatible with the 
abolition of internal frontiers. It is essential for Community 
law to develop in such a way as to prohibit certain 
'perverse' forms of discrimination which hamper free 
competition and create new non-tariff barriers. 
2.2.2.4. In this connection, the Committee has reserv­
ations about the 'Tetra Pak' decision. In this case the 
Commission took the view that an enterprise may exploit 
its dominant position by acquiring another enterprise 
which holds exclusive licence rights. The Commission did 
not oppose this concentration, but in order to avoid 
competitive disadvantage for one of Tetra Pak's competi­
tors, the Commission threatened to withdraw Tetra Pak's 
exemption from the patent licensing agreements. Tetra Pak 
had to relinquish its exclusive licence rights, whilst its 
competitor benefited from a non-exclusive licence. By 
doing this the Commission interfered with a contractual 
relationship which was in existence before the merger and 
had no connection with that merger. This case leads the 
Committee (a) to stress the sometimes arbitrary attitude 
adopted by the Commission for a particular purpose, and 
(b) to oppose its attitude strongly in order to stop this 
becoming a trend. 
2.2.3. Competition policy and intervention by 
public authorities in favour of enterprises 
2.2.3.1. In its first report on state aid in the European 
Community, published at the beginning of 1989, the 
Commission seeks to shed some light on the jungle of 
European subsidies, and ultimately to exercise tighter 
control on national aid granted by Member States. 
2.2.3.2. The concept of aid distinct from capital input, 
on which this study is based, covers the widest possible 
field. Thus subsidies to public enterprises (particularly 
national concerns) are included. Taking its cue from 
Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty, the report regards 
measures to encourage certain enterprises or forms of 
production as subsidies which distort or threaten to distort 
competition and which affect trade among Member States. 
2.2.3.3. An overall survey of all Member States shows 
that the bulk of the aid goes to railways, agriculture, coal 
and regional development. In France and Ireland, however, 
the emphasis is more on promoting trade and exports. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany regional aid frequently 
has higher priority, arising partly from the federal 
structure. The importance of regional aid is further 
12. 3. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 62/15 
enhanced by the special situation of Berlin and the 
economic position of the regions bordering on the GDR. 
2.2.3.4. The first report on subsidies in the Community 
has some gaps, mainly due to the inadequacy of the data: 
— Important areas of the taxation and social security 
systems have not been taken into account. 
— The survey does not include funds granted to public 
establishments' research projects, or the funding of 
university research and research assignments (including 
the military field), although these budget headings 
constitute subsidies under the very broad basic 
definition of aid. 
— Because so-called general measures are excluded, some 
subsidies whose importance has been proved by 
experience (e.g. the European Regional Fund or the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section) have not been taken into 
account. 
— There is great uncertainty about subsidies granted in a 
wide variety of forms by local and regional authorities, 
especially in federal structures. 
— Some sectors are omitted, e.g. defence, energy (except 
coal), transport (except rail and inland waterway 
transport), press and media, banking, building and 
public utilities services. 
— The data compiled in some Member States (Greece and 
Italy) are insufficient. 
2.2.4. Other comments on the 18th Report 
2.2.4.1. The programme of studies 
Studies commissioned from bodies independent of the 
Community enable it better to analyse the positive and 
negative impact of competition in the various sectors of 
activity. 
These studies follow on from the proposal made in the 
Committee Opinion on the 12th Report, and their 
continuance is to be welcomed. 
In connection with the 18th Report, it is interesting to note 
that the border posts, whose abolition is envisaged by the 
1984 White Paper, are not the only 'barrier to entry' and 
that advertising expenditure within or beyond an internal 
frontier can also be regarded as a brake on free 
competition. 
It must also be noted that the idea of a merger analysis grid 
could be used in implementing the expected Directive. 
Moreover, in the case of many enterprises, and particularly 
in countries which have recently joined the Community (as 
well as in developing countries) technology transfer contracts include leonine clauses preventing these enter­
prises from exporting or obtaining supplies where they 
wish and from having free access to the market. This 
delicate issue should be the subject of a research project, to 
be included in the study programme, to decide whether 
adequate competition-law procedures should be es­
tablished. 
The Committee hopes that the annual Competition Report 
will assess the results of the independently completed 
studies and the benefits reaped from them by the 
Commission. 
2.2.4.2. Regional policies and the agricultural sector 
In practice, these mean above all subsidies for regional 
purposes; the ESC Opinion on the 17th Report mentioned 
these. Subsidies for agriculture are closely linked with CAP 
subsidies. Some general measures may lead to distortions of 
competition (EAGGF Guarantee Section). The result is that 
the level of agricultural subsidies is sometimes significantly 
underestimated. It was also asked whether instituting the 
incomes subsidy had had beneficial effects. The 18th 
Report confines its treatment of these issues to analysing 
the subsidies granted by Member States, and refers to a 
publication in the 'Green Europe' series; it gives no answer 
to the question raised by the Committee. 
The Committee feels it is very important for the 
Community and its trading partners to work in GATT for 
trade relations which lead to more balanced terms of 
competition in the agricultural sector. 
2.2.4.3. Comparison of prices 
For the consumer, whose freedom to choose his purchases 
is essential, 'domestic' competition policy holds out the 
possibility of comparing quality/price ratios. For the time 
being, prices, and especially large price disparities within 
the EEC Member States, are important indicators for the 
consumer as to whether competition is working. 
The ESC's Opinion on the 17th Report sets great store by 
this and the segmentation of national markets, separated by 
the above-mentioned non-tariff barriers. The Committee 
confirms its wish that the aspect be taken into consider­
ation and that everything possible be done to ensure that 
the Community's competition policy accords with the 
above (see point 3 below). 
3. Proposals for a necessary development of the Com­
munity's competition policy 
3.1. In its successive Opinions, and latterly in examining 
the economic situation of the Community in mid-1989, the 
No C 62/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 12. 3. 90 
Committee mentioned certain conditions in the develop­
ment of competition policy. 
3.1.1. Genuine competition needs to be preserved in the 
Community in order to secure the advantages of the Single 
Market. All citizens will undoubtedly gain from its cost 
benefits. Thus the expected intensification of competition 
and improvement in firms' productivity and ability to 
innovate will come about naturally. On the other hand, the 
European Community must be given legal powers to vet 
concentrations of importance to the Community as a 
whole. The powers to vet these mergers and the powers 
provided by national legislation must be clearly de­
marcated under the Commission's authority. The Commit­
tee would refer to the its 1988 Opinion on this matter (1). 
Once barriers to trade have been abolished, market 
structures and the changes brought about by mergers will 
also have to be assessed in a Community-wide context. 
This would appear necessary when markets are open in 
principle to the rest of the world, if Community industry is 
to be capable of competing with the United States, Japan 
and some highly efficient, newly industrialized countries. 
3.2. Community and national authorities must pay 
particular attention to small and medium-sized enterprises 
which are worse off than large firms with regard to 
information and planning. Public information and ad­
visory services can help to offset these disadvantages. The 
Committee welcomes the steps taken by the Commission in 
helping to set up EC information and advice services in all 
Member States. In addition, support for cooperation 
between firms is important for the reduction of small and 
medium-sized enterprises' competitive disadvantages. 
3.3. In the introduction to its 18th Report, the Commis­
sion states that 'Community competition policy has 
reached a crossroads'. This observation is of fundamental 
importance. 
3.3.1. It should be noted at this point that neither the 
White Paper on the Single Market nor the Single Act 
involve Treaty amendments or decisive new prospects in 
the development of competition policy, which now appears 
to have lost its initial 'institutional lead' over the other 
Community policies. 
3.3.2. It must now take account not only of commercial 
transactions between Member States but also of those 
within each of the Member States and of those with third 
countries. 
3.3.3. DG IV must remain the driving force, and 
continue its work with the help of the relevant Government 
departments of Member States (including that of the 
customs services for commercial transactions with third 
countries) (1). 
(!) OJ No C 208, 8. 8. 1988, p. 11. 3.3.4 The approach must be a global one since, in the 
overall Community context, competition policy acts as a 
jack-of-all-trades and represents the highest common 
denominator of the various policies which help to create 
EEC economic policy. 
3.3.5. But the essential monitoring of compliance with 
the rules of competition and harmonization of subsidies 
policy are not enough. Account must also be taken of: 
(a) protection of the environment (constraints of an 
environmental policy and duties imposed on producers 
should be identical and have an equal effect on cost 
prices within the Single Market); 
(b) equality of consumers, who must reap the benefits of 
healthy competition and obtain equal advantages for 
comparable services; 
(c) the workers who help to keep the EEC economy going 
are entitled to improved remuneration and social 
security at levels such that their impact on costs of 
production or services is likely to improve the terms of 
competition even further and encourage fair competi­
tion; 
(d) this statement refocusses attention on the risks attached 
to work carried out and paid illegally, already 
mentioned in the Opinion on the 17th Report; this is a 
special case, similar to the practice of non-invoiced sales 
in the commercial sector; 
(e) the introduction to the 18th Report states: 'It would 
seem that economic operators are making increasing 
provision in their forward planning for the need to 
adapt to the new market conditions of 1993'; accord­
ingly, it should be ascertained whether, in the present 
state of legislation (Directives and Regulations) there is 
sufficient response to the need for such adaptation: 
— in the various fields of application of Community 
instruments, 
— in the internal legislation of Member States; 
(f) in this connection it should also be stressed that 'The 
prohibition principle is translated, under Articles 85 and 
86 of the EEC Treaty, into prohibition decisions which 
can comprise heavy fines'. (Introduction to the Report, 
p. 12). This raises the issue of whether the fairness of 
contracts and markets could perhaps be facilitated by 
more positive measures. 
4. Conclusions 
4.1. In the Committee's view, the abolition of barriers 
within the Community should lead the Commission to 
12. 3. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 62/17 
consider an amendment — now essential — of the Treaty 
provisions covering the implementation of a healthy 
competition policy within the Common Market. 
4.2. In this context, the Committee would ask the 
Commission to take up and implement the suggestions and 
practical proposals contained in this Opinion. 
4.3. It is therefore important for the Commission to ask 
the Council to give it the resources needed to ensure that its 
departments are in a position — both in terms of 
Done at Brussels, 19 December 1989. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Commission's purpose is to amend its 
Communication of 4 August 1987 and the accompanying 
draft Directives [COM(87) 320-328] relating to completion 
of the internal market through the approximation of 
indirect tax rates and structural harmonization. 
The 1987 proposals had prompted considerable doubts and 
concern in the Council and the Member States and within 
various specialist study groups. 
1.2. In this connection, reference should be made to the 
eight ESC Opinions adopted on 7 July 1988 0). The 
Opinions broadly endorse the idea of harmonizing indirect 
tax rates while highlighting the shortcomings of the 
proposals and stressing the need for substantial changes. 
(!) OJ No C 237, 12. 9. 1988. manpower and work organization — to achieve this 
objective. 
4.4. The Committee takes the view that the maximum 
effort must be made to strengthen competition policy 
within the EEC, so that a state of competition may be 
perpetuated both within the Community and in relation to 
third countries which will contribute to the prosperity of 
all. The future growth of the Community's prosperity and 
that of its citizens will depend to some extent on the success 
of Community competition policy. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
The Commission Communication implicitly takes account 
of these ESC Opinions but contains no specific reference. 
1.3. Attention is also drawn to the Committee's 
statement in Opinion CES 739/88 on the Commission's 
Global Communication on Completion of the Internal 
Market that it 'fully endorses the aim of removing all 
frontiers and all border checks by 1 January 1993'. 
This Opinion held that tax convergence in the broad sense, 
i.e. encompassing direct taxes and parafiscal charges, could 
not be considered as an absolute prerequisite for the 
establishment of the Single Market but only as one 
component of a global strategy embracing, for instance, 
macroeconomic back-up policies. 
It is also clear that the current wide differences in VAT rates 
could generate sharp distortions of competition in a Opinion on the communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European 
Parliament on completion of the internal market and approximation of indirect taxes 
(90/C 62/08) 
On 23 October 1989 the Commission decided, in accordance with Article 198 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, to ask the Economic and Social Committee for 
an Opinion on the communication from the Commisson to the Council and to the European 
Parliament on completion of the internal market and approximation of indirect taxes. 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for the 
preparatory work on the matter, adopted its Opinion on 5 December 1989. The Rapporteur was 
Mr Delia Croce. 
At its 272nd Plenary Session (meeting of 19 December 1989), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a substantial majority, with three dissenting votes and 
11 abstentions: