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COM (80)396
Vol.1980/0140

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COMMISSION
OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Genera !SecretariatCOM(80 >396final
Brussels ,22nd July 1980
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PREPARATION OFTHE 11th SPEICAL SESSION OFTHE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NEW YORK,25AUGUST -5SEPTEMBER 1980
(Communication from the Commission tothe Council )
COM(80)396final

The purpose ofthis communication istoprepare the Community 'spositions
for the next special session ofthe United Nations General Assembly .
1
Onthe agenda ofthis session are the opening ofthe North-South global
negotiations provided for byResolution 34/138 and the adoption ofthe
international strategy for thethird United Nations Development Decade .

Thedecline intheworld economic situation ,marked byarenewal ofinfla­
tionary pressures andlarge-scale external deficits linked with therise in
oilprices ,creates therisk ofafai–reaching world recession which could
curb orhalt thedevelopment ofthethird world ,thereby exacerbating the
difficulties oftheindustrialized countries .
Inview oftheseriousness ofthese risks andtheurgency ofthesituation
for alarge number ofdeveloping countries ,the need,which isuniversally
felt,tostrengthen themachinery ofinternational coordination has been
reflected invarious initiatives aimed atreactivating theNorth-South dialo­
gue and cooperation .
The next few months andalso 1981 will seethe .development of.anumber of
these initiatives :theholding inCanada cfaWestern Economic Summit onthe
North-South Dialogue ,themeeting ormeetings atsummit level ofleaders
from theNorth and South recommended intheBrandt Commission 'sreport ,and
theglobal negotiations ,which were proposed bythe Group of77atthe United
Nations General Assembly inSeptember 1979 and the opening ofwhich in1981
should bedecided bythe forthcoming special session .
The context for these negotiations -the United Nations inNew York -is
perhaps not the most suitable forobtaining conclusive results .For progress
tobemade therefore ,theoperation must benefit from thepolitical momentum
which itcould derive from theother meetings referred toabove ,bilateral'
orregional contacts ofamore specific nature ,andalso initiatives under­
taken inparallel within thespecialized agencies belonging tothe United
Nations system :IMF,World' Bank,etc.
' .% •
Thepolitical importance attached tothese negotiations by-the Group of77
isvery great .Afailure atthe next special session would have serious conse­
quences ;itwould deprive anyother steps taken within theNorth-South context
ofagreat deal oftheir credibility .During this session ,the Community must
* ■ * itmaintain the cohesion which has shown todate andcontribute byaconstructive
attitude tothe success ofthis -session andtothe latching oftheglobal
negotiations inreasonable -conditions .Itistherefore more necessary than ever
for 'the Council toconfnrm itsdecision of18March 1980 onthedefinition
andexpression ofacommon position onthepart ofthe Nine .

The same session oftheAssembly must adopt thestrategy forthe newdevelop­
ment decade .This communication also deals with this topic ,towhich many
developing countries attaoh great importance .
Thediscussions atthis session could ,furthermore ,include anexamination of
the suggestion made byMrWaldheim on3July tothe Economic andSocial
Council .TheSecretary-General said that thespecial session could examine ,
among ether measures ,anemergency scheme forthecountries with the lowest
incomes .This matter isnotdealt with inthis communication .
«
I. GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS
Onthebasis ofthe Commission 'spaper of23January 1980,theCouncil ,at
itsmeeting of18March ,laid down theguidelines fortheattitude tobe'
adopted bythe Community inthepreparatory stage ofthenegotiations .After
three sessions ofthe Committee ofthe Whole ,some progress has been made
butcertain major issues remain .
Although certain oil-producing countries (Algeria ,Venezuela )took part in
thepreparatory work,nointerest has been expressed either byOPEC asa
group orbythe Gulf countries inthe current process and,inview ofthe
timetable fortheir meetings ,itislikely that thespecial session ofthe
General Assembly will beheld before the doubts surrounding their effective
commitment totheglobal negotiations can befinally dispelled .
Even ifthe OPEC countries doparticipate inthenegotiations ,this does not
automatically mean that they would bewilling todiscuss indetail inthese
negotiations matters ofmajor importance tothe world economy such assupplies
orprices andstill less that they would agree toenter into undertakings .
The momentum ofthenegotiations and thepolitical and economic context of
1981 will establish thedivision between the problems which will besolved
atmultilateral level and those which will benegotiated atbilateral level .

Insuch acontext ,aresult which the Community would find satisfactory
would befortheglobal negotiations tolead tothesetting upofaforum
forinternational coordination onenergy problems .Theestablishment ofabody
engaged ininternational cooperation anddesigned insuch away astoprovide
anappropriate framework forthejoint effort ofOPEC andtheindustrialized
countries tofurther energy development inthedeveloping countries would
help towards thesetting upofsuch aforum .
Inawider perspective ,theglobal negotiations should constitute ,ifnot
thecontext ,atleast thestructure forreceiving andformalizing theresults
ofother negotiations ,more specific intheir aims,orother political initia­
tives such assummits ofthetype recommended bytheBrandt Commission .
The more ambitious overall objective which could then beaimed atwould beto
involve the OPEC countries inaninternational effort ofcooperation comprising
asetofspecific measures designed tocreate theconditions required for an
orderly transition toaneconomy less geared tooil,tolimit therisks of
ageneralized recession and the slowing down ofdevelopment andtohelp to
increase food security .
Ifthese global negotiations aretoprovide thepossibility ofattaining those
objectives ,solutions must befound bythe special session ofthe General
Assembly tothe problems left inabeyance during thepreparatory stage inthe
spheres ofenergy and monetary matters andparticularly procedures .The
following proposals for these spheres are inline with theguidelines set .
out inthe statement made onbehalf ofthe Community atthe close ofthe last
meeting ofthe Committee ofthe Whole .
The agenda fortheenergy negotiations must reflect allthepoints $fconcern
ofthe consumer countries :predictability ofmarket conditions ,continuity
ofsupplies and thealleviation ofthedeveloping countries' financial burden
resulting from energy costs .Itisparticularly important that the agenda
fortheglobal negotiations should explicitly mention ,asproposed bythe
Community ,thetopic ofthepredictability ofenergy supplies ,demand and
prices .Indeed the spokesman forthe Group of77,speaking inthis respect

onbehalf ofthenon-oil developing countries ,requested the Community to
maintain intact itsproposal onthis matter ,fortheGroup of77,being
devided onthis matter ,"cannot take theinitiative ofinserting such an
item inthe agenda fortheglobal negotiations ,whereas itsadoption bythe
General Assembly would make itmore difficult' for the OPEC countries toavoid
adiscussion onit.
* «
Whatever may bethereal impact ofanyresulting discussions intheUnited
Nations ,they arenecessary ifthese negotiations aretoprovide atleast
anenvironment propitions toaglobal approach toenergy questions .
The second difficulty concerning the agenda isinthe monetary sphere .The
agenda proposed bythe Group of77forthis topic comprises anunber ofpoints
which donotall come within the monetary sphere inthestrict sens ofthe
term .
The Community ,however ,insubsribing toResolution 34/138,agreed that
monetary matters should appear onthe agenda and bethe subject ofnegotia­
tions ;the Community itself indicated ,furthermore ,inanofficial document
(CRP,second session ofthe Committee ofthe Whole ),that thecentral body
could examine all thetopics onthe agenda .
These questions may bedivided into two major groups :those which concern
theinternational community asawhole and those which affect more especially
thesituation ofthe .oil-producing countries -inparticular theopportunities
forinvesting their financial assets .The items belonging tothefirst group
are inthe main already being discussed bythe relevant bodies (IMF and IBRD).
Some results ofthe work ofthese bodies could beincorporated inthefinal
' .« •
act and thus help toachieve abalanced result from theglobal negotiations .

Itmust,however ,bequite clear -see below -that anydiscussion ofthese
questions inthe context oftheglobal negotiations must not encroach inany
way upon the autonomous .decision-making powers ofthespecialized agencies .
Asforthe items belonging tothe second group ,the Community ,when agreeing
totheir insertion inthe agenda ,should state itswillingness todiscuss
these matters ,according totheir nature ,account being taken tothe close
link between them and energy matters ,particularly those relating tothe pre­
dictability ofmarket conditions .
Lastly ,thecrucial question isthat ofprocedures ,especially asregards the
*
responsabi lities ofthe specialized bodies and the nature ofthefinal act.
Itisnecessary toestablish aline ofapproach which eliminates therisks .
ofthe central body encroaching upon theresponsibilities of-the specialized
bodies ,while safeguarding the chances oftruly global negotiations .This
applies toallthespecialized agencies (World Bank,GATT,etc.),butit
must beclear toour partners that the breaking point ofthenegotiating
process exists atthelevel oftherelations between thecentral negotiating
body and the IMF.
This line ofapproach should bebased onthefollowing principles :
i.thespecial session must define thefinal actofthenegotiations asa
global political agreement which has been adopted byconsensus and which
will bebinding asregards itsimplementation only forthose governments .
which agree toenter into such anundertaking .The Community cannot agree
inadvance ,before thenegotiations even .begin ,that thefinal actsetting
outtheconclusions ofthenegotiations should have thevalue ofalegally
binding agreement ,either forgovernments orforthespecialized bodies .
Itmust makeitknown ,however,' that upon theconclusion ofthenegotiations ,
provided that thefinal outcome issatisfactory ,itwill beprepared to
give apolitically more formal undertaking ;Lastly ,thecrucial
*
responsabi lities of

in.thenegotiations must take place ,andtheresults must bereached ,
inaccordance with the agreements onrelations between theUnited Nations
1andthespecialized agenctes :consultation procedures ,recommendations
Consequently ,itmust beensured onthebasis <5ft,hefollowing points that
the autonomous decision-making powers ofthespecialized agencies are observed
* «
i.the consensus procedure enables each participant tooppose adeflection
ofpower tothedetriment ofthe specialized agencies orofthe Member
States ofthe United Nations ;
«
n.within the spheres ofcompetence ofthe specialized agencies the conclu­
sions ofthe New York negotiations cannot gobeyond recommandations onthe
basis ofwhich the specialized bodies may take-any appropriate decisions •
toact.
Itmust,furthermore ,bestressed that where thespecialized agencies ,
and inparticular those founded atBretton Woods ,take theinitiative ,without
waiting tobeasked todosobythecentral body oftheglobal negotiations ,
ofworking towards thesolutions necessitated bythe worsening ofthe
developing countries' situation ,they protect their powers and autonomy just
asmuch asbyinvoking theessential legal precautions ,ifnot more so.
 
* *
Other difficult questions have been left inabeyance bythe Committee of
' ,^ •
the Whole ,with regard tothe agenda andalso totheprocedures (adhoc
groups ).Itwould seem,however ,that acceptable compromises can bereached
during thespecial session if satisfactory solutions can befound to
the main points raised inthis communication .
Seearticle 4(2)ofthe Agreement between tKeUnited Nations andthe
International Monetary Fund :"Neither organization ,nor anyoftheir subsi­
diary bodies ,will present .anyformal recommandations totheother without
reasonable prior consultation with regard thereto .Anyformal recommandations
made *by either organization after such consultation will beconsidered as
soon aspossible bytheappropriate organ oftheother ".

7.
II.INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
After being designed attheoutset asageneral framework fordevelopment
efforts forthenext tenyears ,theinternational development strategy is
changing inscope asaresult ofthecomplementary link which theGroup 77
hasestablished between itandtheglobal negotiations .Evendence ofthis
link istobefound notonly inthe fact that thestrategy isbeing adopted
atthesame time asthe launching ofthenegotiations ,butalso intheGeneral
Assembly resolution onthenegotiations ,which states that theobjectives of
thenegotiations should include the "implementation "ofthestrategy .
Itisclear that ,under these circumstances ,thefailure ofthespecial
session toadopt thestrategy would compromise the launching oftheglobal
negotiations .
Inthis context ,itistheissue ofofficial development assistance which
isatthetopofthe list ofproblems tobesettled atthespecial session
oftheGeneral Assembly .TheCommunity must beable toadopt acommon position
onthis subject too .Forpolitical aswell aseconomic reasons itshould
declare that itisprepared toreach "inthecourse ofthedecade "alevel
ofODA corresponding to0.7% ofitsGNP .
Anincrease inODA isessential todeal with themost urgent problems of
thepoorest developing countries ,many ofwhich ,particularly inAfrica ,
have special relations with theCommunity ancfwhich ,asaresult oftheir
limited access tothecapital markets ,arealmost entirely dependent on
concessionary flows .
»% •
Theexpected growth ofmultilateral orbilateral non-conc.essaonary flows
andtheimprovement ofthefinancial terms attaching thereto will also mean
anincrease inofficial aid .
Itwould bedifficult foranycredibility tobegiven totheCommunity 's
will tohelp solve major problems such asworld hunger ,thedevelopment of
alternative ^energy source.s ,and JD'onunless itcontemplates ,inthemedium
ter'm,mobilizing thenecessary resources .
* »
 
* *