EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 19.9.2022 SWD(2022) 294 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 40th Annual Report from the Commission to the council and the European Parliament on the EU’s Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities and the Use of trade defence instruments by Third Countries targeting the EU in 2021







{COM(2022) 470 final}



Table of Contents 1. Overview of the legislation 1.1. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1. The international framework 1.1.2. The EU legislation 1.2. Safeguards 1.2.1. The international framework 1.2.2. The EU legislation 2. General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures 2.1. Measures in place 2.2. New investigations – recent evolution 2.3. Review investigations – recent evolution 3. Overview of activities in 2021 3.1. New investigations 3.1.1. Initiations 3.1.2. Provisional measures 3.1.2. Definitive measures 3.1.5. New investigations terminated without measures

3.2. Review investigations 3.2.1. Expiry reviews 3.2.2. Interim reviews 3.2.3. New exporter reviews 3.2.4. Anti-absorption investigations 3.2.5. Anti-circumvention investigations 3.2.6. “Other” reviews (reinvestigations, or re-openings) 3.3. Safeguard investigations 4. Enforcement of anti-dumping/countervailing measures 4.1. Follow-up of measures 4.2. Monitoring of undertakings 5. Refunds 6. Information and Communication activities / Bilateral contacts 7. Judicial review: decisions given by the Court of Justice and the General Court 8. Activities by third countries targeting the EU 9. Activities in the framework of the WTO 9.1 Dispute settlement in the field of trade defence 9.2 Meetings of the WTO Anti-dumping, ASCM and Safeguards Committees. 10. Audit of the European Court of Auditors 11. Export transparency and authorisation scheme for COVID-19 vaccines and their active substances

1.Overview of the legislation 1.1.Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 1.1.1. The international framework On an international level, unfair trading practices such as dumping and the granting of subsidies were identified as a threat to open markets as early as 1947, when the first GATT agreement was signed. The agreement contained specific provisions allowing GATT members to take action against these practices if they caused material injury to the domestic industry of a GATT member. Today's globalised trade environment is characterised by quicker and cheaper communication and transportation, as well as the coexistence of different models of economic governance. In such a world, trade defence instruments are more relevant than ever. Indeed, trade distortions that underlie the application of these instruments are widespread. Since the beginning of the GATT in 1947, considerable efforts have been made to harmonise the rules relating to trade defence instruments. During the last GATT round (the « Uruguay Round »), which led to the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the detailed Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements, much of the attention was focused on the procedural and material conditions to be fulfilled before measures can be adopted. The EU played an active role in the negotiation of these agreements, which are reflected in its own legislation. The EU applies its anti-dumping (AD) and anti-subsidy (AS) legislation with rigour and consistency. Unfortunately, many WTO Members lack this type of restraint, thereby affecting negatively also EU operators. The role that the EU plays as a prudent but determined user has therefore also an exemplary function at WTO level. Against this backdrop, the EU also continues to play a leading active role in any efforts to update the WTO rulebook. 1.1.2. The EU legislation The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation was first enacted in 1968 and has since been modified several times. The current basic texts, which form the legal basis of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations in the EU, entered into force in March 1996 and October 1997 respectively. These are in line with the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Agreements adopted during the GATT/WTO negotiations. These texts were codified in 2016 to reflect changes previously made. The basic texts are: –Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version , –Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union – Codified Version . These regulations will overall be referred to as the "basic anti-dumping (AD) Regulation" and the “basic anti-subsidy (AS) Regulation”. Both regulations were last modified by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of 12 December 2017 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of 30 May 2018 . The EU's legislation contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring a balanced application of the EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules on all interested parties. These provisions include the “EU interest test” and the “lesser duty rule”, which go beyond the Union's WTO obligations. The EU interest test is a public interest clause and provides that measures cannot be applied if it is established that they are contrary to the overall economic interest of the EU. This requires an analysis of all the economic interests involved, including those of the EU industry and its suppliers, downstream users, consumers and traders of the product concerned.

The lesser duty rule requires that the measures imposed by the EU be lower than the dumping or subsidy margin, if a lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury suffered by the EU industry. Such a “no-injury” rate is usually determined by comparing import prices with the cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin. Since the 2018 amendments to the basic Regulations, the lesser duty rule does not apply, in principle, in anti-subsidy investigations, which means anti-subsidy measures will fully offset the subsidies that an exporter has received. Also since 2018, in anti-dumping investigations, the application of the lesser duty rule may be modulated under certain conditions relating to evidence of significant raw material distortions in the exporting country. The Commission can only depart from applying the lesser duty rule after receiving a duly substantiated request and where doing so would be not be against the Union interest. This new practice reflects the increased attention of the EU to tackle unfair and injurious subsidisation and artificial distortions by third countries. The EU is one of the few investigating authorities on a worldwide level that applies the lesser duty rule in such a coherent and comprehensive way. 1.2.Safeguards 1.2.1.The international framework The principle of liberalisation of imports was set under the GATT 1947 and strengthened under the 1994 WTO Agreements. As safeguard measures consist of the unilateral withdrawal or suspension of a tariff concession or of other trade liberalisation obligations formerly agreed, they have to be considered as an exception to this principle. Article XIX GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards do not only impose strict conditions for the application of this "escape clause", but also put in place a multilateral control mechanism under the WTO Committee on Safeguards. Under WTO rules, safeguard action has to be viewed as a temporary defence measure that applies to all imports of the product covered by a measure, irrespective of origin. As regards non-WTO members, safeguard measures may be selective and apply to products originating in a specific country. WTO Accession Protocols may also provide for such selective safeguard mechanisms, as was the case in the Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although the provision has now expired. Definitive WTO safeguards should only be adopted after a comprehensive investigation that provides evidence of the existence of a) unforeseen developments leading to b) increased imports, c) the existence of a serious injury or a threat of injury for EU producers and d) a causal link between the imports and the injury. Moreover, FTAs concluded by the Union with third countries often include a ‘bilateral safeguard clause’, i.e. a provision that allows for the temporary suspension of tariff concessions made under the FTA. 1.2.2.The EU legislation The above-mentioned WTO principles are reflected in the relevant EU regulations, except for the “unforeseen development requirement” (which is not found explicitly in the EU legislation nor in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards but has been confirmed as a self-standing condition by WTO jurisprudence, as per Article XIX of GATT 1994). Additionally, the adoption of measures in the EU requires an analysis of all interests concerned, i.e. the impact of the measures on producers, users and consumers. In other words, safeguard action can only be taken when it is in the EU’s interest to do so. The current EU safeguard instruments are covered by the following regulations:

- Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (codification), - Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (recast), - Regulation (EU) 2019/287 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 February 2019 implementing bilateral safeguard clauses and other mechanisms allowing for the temporary withdrawal of preferences in certain trade agreements concluded between the European Union and third countries, - Regulation (EU) 2015/936 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2015 on common rules for imports of textile products from certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other specific EU import rules (recast). The first two regulations are referred to as the "basic safeguard Regulation(s)". 2.General overview of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and measures The number of new investigations initiated in 2021 was similar to the previous year, with 14 initiations (compared to 15 in 2020). The number of measures imposed in 2021 significantly increased as compared to 2020. The Commission imposed 12 new definitive measures and 10 provisional measures giving 22, compared to 17 in 2020. At the same time, 1 new investigation was terminated without the imposition of measures, which brought the total number of new investigations concluded in 2021 to 13. Moreover, during 2021, the Commission initiated 30 review investigations. These included 10 expiry reviews (one of which concerned anti-subsidy measures). The Commission concluded 15 expiry reviews in 2021 confirming the continuation of duties in all cases. Below are details on new investigations and review investigations. 2.1.Measures in place At the end of 2021, the EU had 109 definitive anti-dumping measures (which were extended in 31 cases) and 19 countervailing measures in force (extended in one case). The anti-dumping measures covered 75 products from 18 countries (see Annex O); The countervailing measures covered 16 products (1 more than in 2020) from 7 countries (see Annex P). Of the 140 anti-dumping measures in force at the end of 2021, the countries and territories affected were the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (96 measures – an increase of 5 over 2020), Russia (10 measures), US (5), Korea, India and Indonesia (4 each), Taiwan (3), Belarus, Thailand and Ukraine (2 each) and Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey (1 each). Of the 20 anti-subsidy measures in place, the countries affected were PRC (9), India (4), Egypt and US (2 each) and Argentina, Indonesia and Turkey (1 each).

2.2.New investigations – recent evolution In the 5-year period from 2017 to 2021, the Commission initiated 66 new investigations on imports from 191 countries. The main sector concerned by the investigations was Iron and steel with 23 investigations. A breakdown of the other sectors concerned is in Annex B (A). The countries concerned by the highest number of initiations in the period from 2017 to 2021 include the PRC – 25; Indonesia and Turkey - 6 each, Egypt and Russia – 5 each; India 3, Brazil, Korea and US – 2 each. A table showing all the investigations initiated over the last 5 years broken down by country of export is available at Annex B (B). Table 1 below provides statistical information on the developments regarding new investigations for the years 2017 – 2021.

TABLE 1 Evolution of new anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard investigations during the period 1 January 2017 - 31 December 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 New investigations in progress at the beginning of the period 20 17 15 19 18 New investigations initiated during the period 11 10 16 15 14 New investigations in progress during the period 31 27 31 34 32 New investigations concluded : - by imposition of definitive duty or acceptance of undertakings - terminations 12 2 4 8 7* 5 11 5 12 1 Total new investigations concluded during the period 14 12 12 16 13 New investigations in progress at the end of period 17 15 19 18 19 New provisional measures imposed 2 3 5 6 10 * In the 2019 and 2020 reports, this figure was incorrectly reported as 10. The correction here has had an impact on those figures in the table which were based on it (in italics). 2.3.Review investigations – recent evolution Anti-dumping measures, including price undertakings, may be subject, under the basic AD Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 11(2)), interim reviews (Article 11(3)), newcomer investigations (Article 11(4)), absorption investigations (Article 12) and anti-circumvention investigations (Article 13). The Commission also carries out “other” reviews consisting in re-opening of investigations to implement court rulings. Anti-subsidy measures may also be subject, under the basic AS Regulation, to five different types of reviews: expiry reviews (Article 18), interim reviews (Article 19), absorption investigations (Article 19(3)), accelerated reviews (Article 20) and anti-circumvention investigations (Article 23). In addition, here also, the Commission can re-open investigations to implement court rulings. Reviews continue to represent a major part of the work of the Commission's TDI services. In the period from 2017 to 2021, the Commission initiated 141 review investigations. These reviews represented over 67% of all anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations initiated in that period. In 2021, the Commission initiated 30 reviews. These comprised 10 expiry reviews (compared to 21 in 2020), 5 ‘new exporter’ reviews, 4 interim reviews (of which 2 anti-subsidy), 4 anti-circumvention investigations, 4 ‘other’ reviews, 2 safeguard reviews and 1 anti-absorption investigation. At the same time, the Commission concluded 22 reviews – 15 of which were expiry reviews (3 concerned anti-subsidy measures). An overview of the review investigations in 2021 can be found in Annexes F to K. Table 2 below provides statistical information for the years 2017 – 2021.

TABLE 2 Reviews of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations during the period 1 January 2017 - 31 December 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Reviews in progress at the beginning of the period 29 28 25 26 29 Reviews initiated during the period 30 25 23 28 30 Reviews in progress during the period 59 53 48 54 59 Total reviews concluded during the period 31 28 22 26 23 Reviews in progress at the end of the period 28 25 26 28 26 3.Overview of activities in 2021 3.1.New investigations 3.1.1.Initiations In 2021, the Commission initiated 11 new anti-dumping and 3 new anti-subsidy investigations. The categories of ‘Iron and steel’, as well as ‘Other’ stood out in terms of product coverage (other covers such products as ceramic products, bicycles, solar glass). The investigations concerned 7 different countries, with the highest number of initiations concerning the PRC (4 cases). Details of the investigations are given in Annexes A and B.

The list of cases initiated in 2021 can be found below, together with the names of the complainants. More information can be obtained from the Official Journals - publications reference is given in Annex A. Product (Type of investigation: AD or AS) Origin Complainant Graphite electrode systems (AD) China Graphite Cova GmbH, Showa Denko Carbon Holding GmbH and Tokai ErftCarbon GmbH Calcium silicon (AD) China Euroalliages (Liaison Committee of the Ferro-Alloy Industry) Superabsorbent polymers (AD) Rep. Of Korea European Superabsorbent Polymers Coalition (ESPC) Corrosion resistant steels (AD) Russia European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Corrosion resistant steels (AD) Turkey European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Electrolytic chromium

coated steel (ECCS) products (AD) China European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Electrolytic chromium

coated steel (ECCS) products (AD) Brazil European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Aluminium road wheels (AD) Morocco Association of European Wheel Manufacturers (EUWA) Fatty acid (AD) Indonesia Coalition against Unfair Trade in Fatty Acid Ceramic tiles (AD) India European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers' Federation (CET) Ceramic tiles (AD) Turkey European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers' Federation (CET) Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products (AS) India European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products (AS) Indonesia European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Graphite electrode systems (AS) China Graphite Cova GmbH, Showa Denko Carbon Holding GmbH and Tokai ErftCarbon GmbH 3.1.2. Provisional measures In 2021, provisional duties were imposed in 10 new anti-dumping investigations. There were no provisional anti-subsidy measures imposed. The list of cases where provisional measures were imposed during 2021 can be found below, together with the measures imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex C. Product Origin Type and level of measure Hot rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel Turkey AD: 4,8% - 7,6% Aluminium flat-rolled products China AD: 19,3% - 46,7% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products India AD: 13,6% - 34,6% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products Indonesia AD: 19,9% – 20,2% Mono ethylene glycol USA AD: 8,5% - 52% Mono ethylene glycol Saudi Arabia AD: 11,1% Birch plywood Russia AD: 15% - 15,9% Aluminium converter foil China AD: 31,5% – 50,6% Calcium silicon China AD: 17,5% - 66,5% Graphite electrode systems China AD: 15,8% 3.1.2.Definitive measures During 2021, definitive duties were imposed in 11 anti-dumping investigations and in 1 anti-subsidy investigation. The list of cases where definitive measures were imposed can be found below, together with the range of the duties imposed. More information can be obtained from the Official Journals referred to in Annex D. Product Origin Type and level of measure Aluminium extrusions China AD: 21,2% - 32,1% Hot rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel Turkey AD: 4,7% - 7,3% Aluminium flat-rolled products China AD: 14,3% - 24,6% Birch plywood Russia AD: 14,4% - 15,8% Mono ethylene glycol USA AD: 3% - 60,1% Mono ethylene glycol Saudi Arabia AD: 7,7% Optical fibre cables China AD: 19,7% - 44% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products India AD:13,9% - 35,3% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products Indonesia AD: 10,2% - 20,2% Aluminium converter foil China AD:6% - 28,5% Steel wind towers China AD:7,2% - 19,2% Aluminium converter foil China AS: 10,1% - 18,2% 3.1.4 Details of individual cases with application of new measures Aluminium extrusions from China (Definitive AD)

On 14 February 2020, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in China. The initiation followed a complaint received from the association European Aluminium, which represented more than 25% of the total Union production of aluminium extrusions. The complaint contained prima facie evidence of dumping and related injury justifying the initiation of the investigation. Following a request from the complainant supported by the required evidence, the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration under Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation in August 2020. The product under investigation was bars, rods, profiles (whether or not hollow), tubes, pipes; unassembled; whether or not prepared for use in structures (e.g. cut-to-length, drilled, bent, chamfered, threaded); made from aluminium, whether or not alloyed, containing not more than 99,3 % of aluminium. The product is used in a wide range of applications including building and construction, transportation and engineered products. The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019 (IP) and the examination of trends for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2016 to the 31 December 2019 (IP). Provisional measures were imposed in October 2020. Sampling The Commission applied sampling in this investigation selecting the four largest Union producers in terms of production and sales and accounting for just under 10% of production and sales on the Union market. Two importers were selected for the sample on the basis of the largest representative volume of sales of products under investigation originating from China during the IP. The Commission selected three cooperating groups of exporting producers from China representing 28,1 % of total exports to the EU. Dumping The investigation found significant State-induced distortions as regards the product under investigation in China. The distortions related to the aluminium sector and particularly to the prices and costs of the product concerned, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour. As a result, normal value was constructed on the basis of costs of production and sale in Turkey, the selected appropriate representative country in this case. The cooperating exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers, through a related importer or through a related company acting as a trader. For direct sales or sales through a related trader to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union. For the export sales through a related company acting as an importer, the export price was established based on the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. For these sales, the Commission adjusted the price for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing. A comparison between normal values and export prices, adjusted where necessary, resulted in a dumping margins for sampled exporting producers of 21,2% for Haomei Group, 25% for PMI Group and 22,1% and 32,1% for other cooperating companies and all others respectively. Injury and causation Several injury indicators showed a positive trend such as production, capacity, sales volume on the Union market and employment. However, this related to the increase in consumption and should have increased more strongly, if the Union industry would have been able to benefit fully from the growing market. Despite the increase in sales volume, the Union industry lost 5% market share and while the prices increased by 19 % these did not keep up with increases in costs of 20%. This was because of price suppression caused by the dumped imports. As a result, all financial performance indicators, namely profitability, return on investment and cash flow showed a declining trend, and profits made were below the target profit level during the period considered. Hence, while the market for the product under investigation was growing in the period considered, the Union industry still suffered falling profits, which did not encourage future investments. Given that the Union industry is serving a diverse customer base, which has continuously developing requirements, the Union industry needs to invest in R&D and customer focus solutions to remain competitive. The rapidly deteriorating development of return on investments of ‒ 71% was a serious threat to the continuing viability of the industry. As a result, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury.

To examine if the dumped imports were causing the injury, the Commission examined the effect of other factors on the Union industry’s situation including the cost of raw materials, imports from other sources and the export performance of the Union industry. The deterioration in the situation of the Union industry coincided with the increase in imports from China, which were made at prices which undercut the Union industry’s prices and suppressed EU market price levels. The Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. Injury margin and level of measures The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry was set at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of 10%, based on the profitability of the Union industry before the impact of Chinese imports. The injury margin was determined by comparing the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the IP, which resulted in margins ranging from 30.5% to 65.6%. Given these levels were higher than the dumping margins, the duties to be imposed would be at the level of dumping in line with the legislation. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. Regarding the Union industry, the investigation established that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would restore a level playing field and a fair price level on the Union market, and improve the Union industry’s profitability. As for importers, the Commission recognised that measures were likely to have a certain negative impact by reducing the turnover and profitability of their aluminium extrusions business. However, the Commission concluded that importers would be in a position to pass on the duty to their customers given their significant profit margins of around 7% to 13% and also have the possibility of alternative sources of supply from other third countries and the Union industry. In fact, the investigation showed that both sampled importers had a balanced supply structure and were not reliant on Chinese imports. Several user industries, mainly building, transport, engineering and others including consumer products source the product. Although some users registered as interested parties, most user industries did not cooperate with the investigation and did not submit questionnaire responses. As a result, the Commission did not receive sufficiently detailed information to examine the impact of measures on users in the automotive, construction and other industries. As regards the rail transport industry, the Commission found that the imports of the product for that industry only accounted for a minor part of imports in the Union market and no evidence was provided to support the theory that the imposition of measures would have an adverse impact on that industry. The Commission concluded that the effects of an imposition of duties would not outweigh the positive effects of measures on the Union industry. Three exporting producers submitted undertaking offers; Haomei Group, Shandong Nollvetec Lightweight Equipment Co., Ltd. and Jilin Qixing Aluminium Industries Co., Ltd. However, the Commission considered the undertakings would be unenforceable and impractical and therefore rejected the offers. The definitive anti-dumping measures were imposed in March 2021 (based on the dumping margin applying the lesser duty rule), and ranged from 21,2% to 32,1%. The Commission decided not to retroactively collect duties for the period during which imports were registered as the conditions to do so were not met. Aluminium flat-rolled products from China (Definitive AD) On 14 August 2020, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of aluminium flat rolled products originating in China. The initiation followed a complaint received from the association European Aluminium, which represented more than 25% of the total Union production of aluminium extrusions. The complaint contained prima facie evidence of dumping and related injury justifying the initiation of the investigation. There was a request to register imports of the products, however the conditions were not met. The product under investigation was aluminium products, flat rolled, whether or not alloyed, whether or not further worked than flat rolled, not backed, without internal layers of other material, in coils or in coiled strips, in cut-to-length sheets, or in the form of circles; of a thickness of 0,2 mm or more but not more than 6 mm, in plates, of a thickness of more than 6 mm, in coils or in coiled strips, of a thickness of not less than 0,03 mm but less than 0,2 mm, The product is used in a wide range of wide range of applications in sectors such as building and construction, foil, technical applications, transport and consumer durables.

The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 (‘IP’) and the examination of trends for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the 30 June 2020 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2016 to the 31 December 2019. Provisional measures were imposed in April 2021. Sampling The Commission applied sampling in this investigation, selecting three Union producers accounting for 35% of the estimated total production and 35% of the estimated total Union sales volume of the like product. Three importers were selected on the basis of the largest representative volume of sales of products under investigation originating from China during the IP and the Commission selected three exporting companies/groups of companies representing 18,9% of the estimated total exports from China to the EU. Dumping The investigation found significant State-induced distortions as regards the product under investigation in China. The distortions related to the aluminium sector and particularly to the prices and costs of the product concerned, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour. As a result, the Commission constructed the normal value on the basis of costs of production and sale in Turkey, the selected appropriate representative country in this case. At the same time, the Commission accepted the prices for Titanium Boron Aluminium Rod from one exporting producer which sourced that particular raw material entirely from the UK. When the sampled exporting producers of the Nanshan Group exported the product concerned to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies located in China or in third countries, the export price was that actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union. Two companies within the Nanshan Group also sold the product concerned to the Union through a related importer. For these sales, the export price was constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. The adjustments made related to all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and profits, in order to establish a reliable export price at the Union frontier level. Another sampled company, Xiamen Xiashun, exported the products concerned directly to independent customers in the Union and the export price was the price actually paid for the product concerned when sold in the Union. A comparison between normal values and export prices was made with relevant adjustments for transport, insurance, handling and loading, packaging, discounts, credits costs, bank charges and other import charges. This resulted in the following dumping margins: Jiangsu Alcha Aluminum Group Co., Ltd 72,1%, Nanshan Group 55,5%, Xiamen Xiashun Aluminium Foil Co., Ltd 23,7%, Other cooperating companies 44,5%, All other companies 88%. Injury and causation Imports of the product from China increased significantly both in absolute (+ 70%) and relative terms (+ 3,9 percentage points in market share) while consumption in the EU decreased by 10%. The import prices were consistently low and significantly below Union industry prices undercutting Union prices by 7% on average. The impact on the Union industry was such that production, capacity utilisation, sales volume in the Union market, market share, employment and productivity deteriorated. Only capacity and captive sales/use showed a positive trend. Sales prices in the EU free market, cost of production, labour costs, profitability, cash flow and return on investments also all displayed negative trends. Only investments showed a positive trend after the sampled producers made investments in order to maintain competitiveness and follow the latest product developments. This deterioration in the situation of the Union industry coincided with the increase in imports from China, which were made at prices which undercut the Union industry’s prices and suppressed EU market price levels. To examine if the dumped imports were causing the injury, the Commission examined the effect of other factors on the Union industry’s situation including the contraction in demand, imports from other sources, export performance of the Union industry and the Covid pandemic. The Commission concluded that with the exception of the COVID-19 pandemic, which aggravated the situation of the injured Union industry, none of the factors attenuated the causal link between the dumped imports from China and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. Injury margin and level of measures

The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry was set at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of 6%. The injury margin was determined by comparing the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the IP, which resulted in underselling margins ranging from 19,3% to 46,7%. Given these levels were lower than the dumping margins and the fact that there were no significant raw material distortions found, the lesser duty rule in line would be applied. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, unrelated importers and users. Regarding the Union industry, which employs over 8 000 workers directly, the investigation established that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would allow it to recover lost market share and improve profitability towards sustainable levels. It was also concluded that the primary aluminium sector, which employ around 2 800 workers, relies on the health of its downstream customers. Without measures the viability of these upstream suppliers, would be put at risk if the Union industry contracts further. Some importers argued that insufficient production capacity of the Union industry combined with the strong post-COVID recovery had led to material shortage, delayed deliveries and price increases since the end of the IP. They stated that anti-dumping measures would worsen the supply situation for users while the Union industry would benefit from duties, shortages, delay and an increase in prices and profit to the detriment of the entire industrial EU system. While the Commission acknowledged the existence of material shortage and price increases, it did not conclude that there was a structural lack of capacity in the EU. The Commission concluded that importers would be able to pass on the duty to their customers given their profit margins as well as having the possibility to find alternative sources of supply. Therefore, the Commission concluded that importers would not be affected disproportionally by the imposition of the measures due also, in part, to their other activities. As regards user industries, including aluminium heat exchangers, building industry and foil stock users the Commission considered that the measures would have only have a limited impact on their financial situation. Overall, the Commission concluded that the effects of an imposition of duties would not outweigh the positive effects of measures on the Union industry. The Commission therefore decided that definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of aluminium flat products originating in China. The definitive anti-dumping measures were imposed in October 2021 (based on the underselling margin applying the lesser duty rule), and ranged from 14,3% to 24,6%. Suspension of measures Following final disclosure in the anti-dumping investigation, a number of companies (Airoldi Metalli S.p.a. (‘Airoldi’), Valeo Systèmes Thermiques SAS (‘Valeo’) and related companies, and TitanX Engine Cooling AB (‘TitanX’)) provided information on a change of market conditions which occurred after the IP arguing that the changes would justify the suspension of the measures, in accordance with Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation. In July 2021, the Commission requested interested parties in the Union to provide comments on the possibility to suspend definitive measures in due course. Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation provides that, in the Union interest, anti-dumping measures may be suspended where market conditions have temporarily changed to an extent that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of such suspension. The analysis of the additional information requested by the Commission showed that, following the IP, the situation of the Union industry improved significantly. In the first quarter of 2021, Union producers’ sales increased by over 55% in comparison with the IP and by 34% in comparison with 2017, which was the best year in the period considered. Also, production volume and production capacity developed positively increasing respectively by 11% and 25% in comparison with 2017. Average sales prices to unrelated customers in the Union also increased by 2,4 % in the first semester of 2021 when compared to 2017 and by 6,5% when compared with the IP. Profitability reached 1,9% in the first semester of 2021 whereas the Union industry was loss making in the IP (– 1,8%). All indicators for which the Commission requested post-IP information showed a significant improvement when comparing the first semester of 2021 with the IP or with data from 2017 with the exception of capacity utilization and profitability. Several parties provided evidence that Union producers could not supply the requested products because they had reached capacity for orders in 2021 and for at least the first half of 2022. The Commission concluded that market conditions changed after the period considered in the definitive Regulation but the changed market conditions were temporary in nature and it was likely that supply and demand would align again after the temporary suspension of the measures.

Given the level of demand and the fact that many users switched to the Union industry post IP and the nature of the contracts (very few spot orders), the Commission considered it unlikely that the Union industry would lose significant business to Chinese exporters if measures were to be suspended for 9 months. In addition, the Commission considered that the 9-month suspension would give users, that requested the exclusion of certain products, an additional period to turn to Union producers and ensure a smooth transition from a Chinese to a Union source of supply, if necessary. Given the temporary nature of the change in market conditions concerning demand and supply, together with the Union industry’s prospects for the period, it was considered that the injury linked to the imports of the product concerned originating in China was unlikely to resume if measures were suspended. Consequently, the Commission decided to suspend the measures for nine months on the same day the measures were imposed. The Commission established an operational monitoring system, in which interested parties may draw its attention to relevant developments in the market on a regular basis. Birch plywood originating in Russia (Definitive AD) On 14 October 2020, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of birch plywood originating in Russia following a complaint received from the Woodstock Consortium containing sufficient evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury. Birch plywood is a wood sheet material consisting of layers or strands of wood veneers pressed together with glue into large, flat sheets. It is used in a wide range of applications, for example in the construction, packaging and furniture sectors. The investigation period for dumping and injury was 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 and the examination of injury trends covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period (“the period considered”). On 11 June 2021, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties ranging between 15% and 15,9% on imports of birch plywood originating in Russia by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/940. Sampling Sampling was applied in the investigation. Three Union producers, located in different Member States accounting for almost 40% of the estimated total production and 35% of estimated total Union sales volume of the like product in the Union were selected for the sample. A sample of three out of thirteen importers was selected. As regards exporting companies a sample of three groups of companies was selected accounting for approximately 47% of the total exports to the Union during the investigation period. Dumping The normal value was based on the price paid or payable in the domestic market where domestic sales were found to be representative and constructed where domestic sales were not representative. The three sampled companies exported to the Union directly to independent customers or through a related importer in the Union. For the direct exports, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union. For the exports through a related importer, the export price was based on the price at which the product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, adjusted backwards to an ex-works price by deducting all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing. A comparison between normal values and export prices, duly adjusted where necessary, resulted in a dumping margin of 14,4% for Sveza group, 15,8% for Zheshartsky LРK LLC and 15,72%, for Syktyvkar Plywood Mill Ltd.

Injury and causation During the period considered, Union consumption of birch plywood remained stable at around 1.75m cubic meters. Imports from Russia increased by 14% from around 710 163 cubic meters to around 812 521 cubic meters representing an increase in market share from 40% to 46% over the period considered. The average prices of the imports from Russia decreased by 10 % from 646 EUR/tonne in 2017 to 584 EUR/tonne during the investigation period. The weighted average undercutting found on the basis of the data provided by the sampled exporting producers was 12,6 %. The Commission found that the economic situation of the Union industry worsened with all major macro indicators presenting a negative trend including production - 14%, EU sales - 17% with a significant reduction of its market share from 47% to 39% in the period considered. Because of the pressure from the low Russian prices, the Union industry tried to reduce costs including a reduction of 12% in employment. However, as a result of the pressure exerted by dumped Russian imports in terms of increased volumes and low prices, EU sales dropped and stocks increased rapidly (+ 22%) in the period considered. The cost of production of the Union industry went up over 10% during the period considered, mainly because of a strong increase in the raw material prices. Owing to the pressure from the dumped imports, the Union producers were unable to increase prices to cover these increased costs. As a result, profitability dropped from 9.7% in 2017 to an unsustainable loss of -2,8% in the IP. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. Regarding causation, the Commission found that there was a clear correlation between the rise of dumped imports from Russia and the deteriorating situation of the Union industry. As a result of the significant increase of dumped imports from Russia the Union industry was precluded from increasing prices, resulting in a strong decline in its economic situation. Some of the other factors examined included the impact of Covid-19, strikes of some producers in Finland as well as imports from other sources. However, the investigation found that no other factor attenuated the causal link between the Russian imports and the Union industry's injurious situation. Injury margin and level of measures The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry was set at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of 9,7%, based on the profitability of the Union industry in year 2017, that is, before the surge of Russian imports. The injury margin was determined by comparing the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the IP, which resulted in margins ranging from 35,2% to 58,3%. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. Regarding the Union industry, the investigation established that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would restore a level playing field and a fair price level on the Union market, and improve the Union industry’s profitability. The Commission found that while anti-dumping measures might negatively affect some importers, the impact would not be significant overall and would depend on the importers’ business model, the variety of their sources of supplies and the extent to which increased costs are passed on to their customers. Regarding the main sectors using birch plywood in the EU (construction, transport, furniture and packaging), the impact of the measures was assessed to be limited. Several parties claimed that the imposition of duties might cause carbon leakage due to a substitution of Russian birch plywood with Chinese poplar plywood or plywood from other countries farther away from Europe, raising transport emission and the risk that substitute products are less sustainable than Russian birch plywood. However, the Commission rejected this claim on the basis that measures would not exclude Russian imports and there was no evidence to support that these products were less sustainable than the Russian products. The Commission concluded that the effects of an imposition of duties would not outweigh the positive effects of measures on the Union industry. The Commission concluded that definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of birch plywood originating in Russia. The definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on 9 November 2021 (based on the dumping margin applying the lesser duty rule), range from 14,4% to 15,8%.

Mono ethylene glycol originating in the USA and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Definitive AD) On 14 October 2020, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of mono ethylene glycol (‘MEG’) originating in the USA and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) on the basis of a complaint lodged by the Defence Committee of European MEG Producers representing more than 25% of the total Union production of MEG. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury. The product concerned is mono ethylene glycol produced starting from various feedstocks (ethane, propane, NGL, butane) to make ethylene which is then mixed with oxygen to form ethylene oxide and then with water to produce mono ethylene glycol. It is available in two different grades: fibre grade and technical grade. Fibre grade MEG is used predominantly in the production of PET, polyester fibres, resins and films while technical grade MEG is mainly used in the automotive sector as anti-freeze. Other applications include heat transfer agent, de-icing fluids, surface coatings, unsaturated polyester resins, polyester polyols, and natural gas dehydrogenation. The investigation period covered 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 while the examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period. On 11 June 2021, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties of 11.1% on imports of MEG originating in Saudi Arabia and duties ranging from 8,5% to 52% on the product originating in USA. Sampling Sampling was applied in the investigation for Union producers and US exporters. The sample consisted of three Union producers, out of which two were related accounting for 64,1 % of total Union production and 65% of total Union sales. Two groups of exporting producers in the US were selected for the sample representing approximately 55% of imports from the US to the EU during the IP. Sampling was not applied for exporting producers in the KSA. Dumping Saudi Arabia Only one of the six production entities of the sole company group, SABIC produced MEG for the domestic market. Both domestic sales and exports to the Union were examined at the company group level. In this case, the normal value was based on the price paid or payable in the domestic market where domestic sales were found to be representative. Given that less than 80 % of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. The MEG exported to the EU was manufactured by six exporting producers, two of which are joint ventures with ExxonMobil and SPDC (a company related to Mitsubishi Corporation). The MEG is then exported through three different networks of related traders and importers in the Union: one for SABIC, one for ExxonMobil and one for SPDC. Therefore, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. Adjustments to the export price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits. A comparison between normal values and export prices, duly adjusted where necessary, resulted in definitive dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, of 7,7%.

USA For the US, the normal value was based on the price paid or payable in the domestic market where domestic sales were found to be representative. Given that for MEGlobal Americas Inc, less than 80% of all domestic sales were profitable and the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. For the exporting producer that exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with the basic Regulation. For the exporting producer that exported the product through a related company acting as an importer in Switzerland, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with the basic Regulation. Adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and profits. As to the latter, the same profit margin of 6,89% as for the KSA was applied. A comparison between normal values and export prices, duly adjusted where necessary, resulted in definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, of 3% for one company and 46,7% for the second. Injury and causation The volume of imports from the countries concerned grew by 38 % over the period considered and as there was fairly stable Union consumption, increased their market share from 31,6 % in 2017 to 44,1 % in the IP. As a result, the Union industry lost 10.7 percentage points of their market share. It was through significant price pressure that the exports were able to increase market share with prices on average between 12% and 15% lower than Union industry costs. The Union industry had no choice but to decrease prices as well. Even though the cost of production decreased as well due to a drop in the price of ethylene, the price pressure from the imports was such that it forced the Union industry to decrease prices below the cost of production, resulting in significant losses by the end of the IP. Hence, all main macroeconomic injury indicators showed a negative trend during the period considered. Production volume, sales volume, employment and productivity decreased by 19%, 18%, 7% and 13% respectively. EU producers’ average unit sales prices to unrelated parties decreased by 40% over the period considered while their costs only decreased by 13%. This led to a significant deterioration in profitability, going from profits between 16,7% and 20,5 % in 2017 to losses between 10,8 % and 13,2 % during the IP. The Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. Regarding causation, there was a clear coincidence in time between the substantial increase of imports at dumped prices and market share of the countries concerned and the significant decrease in sales and market share of the Union producers, coupled with the price depression, and the deteriorated financial situation of the Union industry. The Commission examined the effect of other factors on the Union industry’s injury including the Covid pandemic, Union producers export sales performance and higher production costs and lack of competitiveness. The investigation did not find that any other factors attenuated the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered. Injury margin and level of measures The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry was set at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of between 17,5% and 19,5%, taking into account the level of profitability before the increase in imports from the countries concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. The injury margins were determined by comparing the weighted average import prices of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the IP which resulted in underselling margins ranging from 39,6% to 109,4% for USA and 61,5% for KSA. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

Regarding the Union industry, the non-imposition of measures would lead to a discontinuation of thereby reducing the available sources of supply on the Union market and making the EU dependent on imports primarily from the KSA and the US. The Commission found this to be undesirable for users not only in terms of competition, but also of security of supply of importers/traders and users. The Commission concluded that the impact of measures would not be disproportionate for importers/traders as they would be able to pass on part of the duties to users and, in any event, other sources of supply were available (Taiwan, Singapore and Korea) to them. The Commission examined the impact of measures on users particularly in the coolant, PET and industrial products segment (fibres, films, resins) industries. While the investigation showed a mixed impact on the various segments, it was not considered disproportionate to the benefits of imposing measures. The Commission concluded that definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of MEG originating in USA and KSA. The definitive anti-dumping measures imposed in November 2021 (based on the dumping margin applying the lesser duty rule), ranged from 3% to 60,1% for imports from the US and 7,7% from KSA. Steel wind towers originating in China (Definitive AD) On 21 October 2020, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of certain steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China following a complaint lodged by the European Wind Tower Association containing sufficient evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury. The product under investigation is certain utility scale wind towers of steel (‘SWT’), whether or not tapered, and sections thereof whether assembled or not, whether or not including an embedded tower foundation section, whether or not joined with nacelles or rotor blades, and that are designed to support the nacelle and rotor blades. It is used in wind turbines that have electrical power generation capacities – either in onshore or offshore applications – equal to or in excess of 1,00 megawatt (‘MW’) and with a minimum height of 50 meters measured from the base of the tower to the bottom of the nacelle (i.e. where the top of the tower and nacelle are joined) when fully assembled. The investigation period for dumping and injury was 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 and the examination of injury trends covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). Sampling Sampling was applied in the investigation. On the Union industry side, the sample of consisted of three Union producers, located in two different Member States, which accounted for around 38% of the estimated Union sales and production volume of the like product at initiation stage. As regards Chinese exporting producers, the Commission selected a sample of three exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. Dumping Given the finding of significant distortions as regards the product under investigation in China, the normal value was constructed on the basis of cost of costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country (Mexico), in line with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

The three sampled exporting producers exported to the Union directly to independent customers. Therefore, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union. A comparison between normal values and export prices, duly adjusted where necessary, resulted in a dumping margins of sampled exporting producers equalling 126,8 % for Chengxi Shipyard, 49,7 % for Penglai Dajin, and 60,7 % Suzhou Titan, respectively. Injury and causation The Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. The fact that a few indicators (production capacity, stocks) did not deteriorate does not undermine the finding of injury. During the period considered, injury indicators developed as follows: overall, Union consumption increased from 2 707 towers in 2017 to 3 087 in the investigation period while imports from China overall increased by 54%. Their market share grew from 25% in 2017 to 34% in the investigation period, which entails a 35% increase over the period considered. The average prices of imports from China fluctuated. Overall, they increased by 2%, although they dropped significantly between 2018 and 2019 and then recovered. The dumped imports of the sampled exporting producers showed weighted average undercutting margins between 2,7% and 5,1% which was considered significant, given that the product under investigation is very price-sensitive. Union production dropped by 10% whereas production capacity increased by a mere 2% and capacity utilisation fell from 56% in 2017 to 49 % in the investigation period. The Union industry’s sales volume dropped by 7% over the period considered. The Union industry’s market share fell from 69% in 2017 to 56% in the investigation period, which entails a decrease by 18% overall. The level of Union industry employment related to the production of SWT dropped by 5% over the period considered. Productivity fell from 0,71 towers in 2017 to 0,68 towers per employee in the investigation period. The average unit sales prices of full scope orders for Union-origin SWT increased by 12%, while the unit cost of production increased to a larger extent, i.e. by 21%. During the period considered, the average labour costs per employee increased by 7% following the general inflation and labour cost trends. The profitability of the Union industry shrank from +3,6% in 2017 to –1,4 % in the investigation period. The net cash flow was negatively affected by falling profits and was negative between 2018 and the investigation period. The ability to raise capital was hindered by the drop in profits. The level of yearly investments followed a steady downwards trend and dropped by 90% in the period considered. Regarding causation, the Commission concluded that the imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry. Such injury had both volume and price effects. In terms of prices, Chinese import prices were significantly below the Union industry sales prices and below the Union industry cost of production throughout the period considered, leading to price suppression. The price pressure exerted by the high and increasing import volumes from China at such prices over the period considered is a clear explanation for the Union industry’s inability to reflect the cost increases in its sales prices and the resulting losses. In terms of volumes, over the period considered, the Union industry lost sales to Chinese imports. The import volumes from China increased strongly (by 54%) and their market share increased by nine percentage points, from 25% in 2017 to 34% in the investigation period. In the same period, and despite the 14% increase in consumption, the Union industry’s sales volume dropped by 7% over and its market share fell from 69% in 2017 to 56% in the investigation period. The Commission analysed the impact of other factors, such as imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, raw material prices, offshore demand, competition of wind power with other energy sources, non-steel towers and production facilities issues. The Commission concluded that these other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. Injury margin and level of measures The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry should be at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of 9,1%, which is the average profit achieved by the Union industry in two years prior to the period considered (2015 and 2016), before the increase of Chinese imports. The injury margin was determined by comparing the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the investigation period, which resulted in margins ranging from 7,2% to 14,4%. Union interest and definitive measures

The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users, suppliers and environmental issues. Regarding the interest of the Union industry, the investigation established that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would strengthen the renewable value chain in the Union and a sustainable business model based on security of supply and fair competition. In relation to interest of importers, the Commission first noted that unrelated importers did not cooperate in the investigation. The Commission further found that users import the product under investigation directly. In light of the above, the Commission concluded that there is no evidence that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would affect importers. In relation to users, the Commission found that product under investigation is sold directly by SWT producers to wind turbine producers, which are users in this proceeding to the extent they assemble the SWT with a full wind turbine. The Commission concluded that measures on imports of Chinese SWT are not expected to have a major impact on the profits of co-operating users, their R&D activities or the manufacturing operations of certain parts of wind turbines by users. At the same time, the Commission considered that measures would support jobs in the wind sector in the Union overall as jobs in this area are forecasted to grow. Regarding alleged supply problems claimed by some users, the Commission found that the Union industry has the production capacity for all required sizes of SWT. Production capacity of Union SWT producers is higher than Union consumption and significant SWT capacities are available in the Union serving all required locations and both onshore and offshore markets. The Commission therefore concluded that the measures on imports of Chinese SWT are not expected to have a major impact on users while they would benefit upstream industries in the Union, namely suppliers of raw materials (e.g. Union steel mills) and relevant machinery producers in the Union. Similarly, the investigation concluded that measures are expected to support SWT producers in the Union and bring them growth, job stability, revenues and investments. Finally, users should benefit from a broad base of competitive, reliable and financially sound SWT producers in the Union and from convenient lead-times that Union producers are able to offer thanks to their proximity. Consequently, the Commission concluded that that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of steel wind towers and their sections originating in China. The Commission imposed the definitive anti-dumping measures on 16 December 2021 (based on the injury margin applying the lesser duty rule), ranging from 7,2 % to 19,2%. Optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (Definitive AD) On 24 September 2020, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China following a complaint lodged by Europacable containing sufficient evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury. The product under investigation is single mode optical fibre cables, made up of one or more individually sheathed fibres, with protective casing, whether or not containing electric conductors. Optical fibre cables (OFC) are used as an optical transmission medium in telecommunication networks in long haul, metro and access networks. The investigation period for dumping and injury was 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 and the examination of injury trends covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period. Sampling Sampling was applied in the investigation. Three Union producers were selected for the sample on the basis of the highest volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union. They accounted for 52% of the estimated total production of the like product in the Union during the investigation period. As regards Chinese exporting companies, a sample of two groups of companies was selected accounting for more than 40% of the total exports to the Union during the investigation period. Dumping The two sampled groups of companies, the FTT group and the ZTT group, all exported to the EU in the IP. Given the finding of significant distortions as regards the product under investigation in China, the normal value was constructed on the basis of cost of costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country (Argentina), in line with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

The two groups exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies acting as either an agent, trader or an importer. For the direct exports, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union. For the exports through a related importer, the export price was based on the price at which the product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, adjusted backwards to an ex-works price by deducting all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing. A comparison between normal values and export prices, duly adjusted where necessary, resulted in a dumping margins of 44% and 19.7% for the FTT group and the ZTT group, respectively. Injury and causation During the period considered, several indicators showed a positive trend such as production, capacity, sales volume on the Union market and employment. However, the development of these indicators did not match the increase in consumption. In fact, the Commission concluded that in normal competition conditions, those indicators should have had an even stronger positive trend, considering the Union industry would have been able to benefit fully from the growing market. Despite the increase in sales volume, the Union industry lost 10,8 percentage points of market share (from 64,3% to 53,5%), which was found to be linked to the price pressure generated by Chinese exports, with significant undercutting and, in any event, price depression throughout the period considered. The foregoing led to financial injury in the form of lower profits and a drop in investments and on the return thereon. In addition to that, the analysis of sales through tenders indicated that the market share and price erosion was accelerating and would continue to do because of the extremely aggressive behaviour from Chinese exporting producers therein. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. Regarding causation, the Commission found that there was a clear correlation between the rise of dumped imports from China and the material injury observed for the Union industry. The dumped imports have increased in both absolute and relative terms. Consumption in the Union market increased 38% over the period considered, and it was evident that it had been mainly imports from China that took advantage of this growth. The deterioration in the Union industry market share throughout the period considered was simultaneous and directly connected with significant penetration of the Union market by substantial volumes of imports from China, which significantly undercut the Union industry’s prices and, in any event, exercised significant price depression on Union sales. In particular, the adverse impact on profitability caused by the dumped imports and continuous price pressure did not allow the Union industry to undertake the necessary investments for the longterm survival of the industry. The Commission analysed the impact of other factors (imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, captive sales, and raw material prices) in the situation of the Union industry, but found that none of the other factors explained the Union industry’s negative developments in terms of loss of market share, price depression and low profitability, decreasing investments and return on investments. Thus, the Commission concluded that the injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from China. Injury margin and level of measures The duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry should be at a level that would allow the EU industry to sell at a target price which would cover its costs of production, (including future costs resulting from obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions), and a reasonable profit. The investigation established a basic target profit of 12,4%, based on the profitability of the Union industry in year 2016, that is, before the sharp increase of Chinese imports in 2017. The injury margin was determined by comparing the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers with the weighted average target price of the Union industry during the investigation period which resulted in margins ranging from 42% to 61,3%. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. Regarding the Union industry, the investigation established that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would allow the Union industry to maintain a competitive position on the market and recover lost market share, while improving their profitability towards sustainable levels. In relation to importers, the Commission found that while the anti-dumping measures were likely to have a certain negative impact thereon and might reduce their profitability, importers would be able to absorb and/or pass on some of the cost increase considering their significant profit margins (over 20 %). They also had the possibility of finding alternative sources of supply, including from other third countries and the Union industry. Therefore, it concluded that unrelated importers were not disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures. Finally, for users, the investigation established that OFC represents only a minor share of the total rollout cost of digital networks projects - in the case of 5G being much less than 5%. The purchases of the product under investigation by the cooperating telecom operators represented a marginal percentage of company turnover, and the firm purchase a significant part of its OFC from other sources. Therefore, the Commission concluded that users and distributors would also not be disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures. Overall, the investigation found that there was sufficient capacity in the Union and in other third countries to replace imports originating in China. Furthermore, the imposition of anti-dumping measures would enable the Union industry to invest in their Union production sites and new technologies to the benefit the user industry. At the same time, measures would not prevent imports from third countries (including China) from competing fairly in the Union market. Even if the demand for OFC increased in the following years as expected by market players, OFC importers and users would not run any noticeable risks of shortage of supply and the rollout of the optical fibre broadband network to homes and businesses would thus not be delayed. Thus, the Commission concluded that definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of Optical fibre cables originating in the People’s Republic of China. The definitive anti-dumping measures imposed on 18 November 2021 (based on the dumping margin applying the lesser duty rule), range from 19,7% to 44%.

Aluminium converter foil originating in the People’s Republic of China (Definitive CVD) On 4 December 2020, the European Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation on imports of aluminium converter foil originating in the People’s Republic of China following a complaint lodged by six Union producers containing sufficient evidence of subsidisation and of material injury. The product under investigation is aluminium converter foil (‘ACF’) of a thickness of less than 0,021 mm, not backed, not further worked than rolled, in rolls of a weight exceeding 10 kg. The investigation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 and the examination of injury trends covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the investigation period. Sampling Sampling was applied in the investigation. Three Union producers, located in different Member States accounting for more than 50% of the estimated total production and 40% of estimated total Union sales volume of the like product in the Union were selected for the sample. As regards exporting companies, a sample of three groups of companies was selected accounting for over 90% of the estimated total Union imports of the product under investigation. Only two unrelated importers provided the information necessary and agreed to be included in the sample. Given the small number of replies, sampling of unrelated importers was not necessary. Subsidy The product under investigation is regarded by Government of China (GOC) as a key product and as such it is covered by a variety of specific policies and support measures designed to increase its production. The ACF industry is thus regarded as a strategic industry whose development is actively pursued by the GOC as a policy objective. The companies sampled in the investigation were found to benefit from several subsidy schemes, in particular: -Preferential financing - loans: all sampled groups of exporting producers benefited from preferential financing through loans from state-owned financial institutions such as Bank of Yantai, Huishang Bank, Nanyang Commercial Bank during the investigation period. In view of the existence of a financial contribution, a benefit to the exporting producers and specificity, the Commission considered preferential financing through loans a countervailable subsidy. -Preferential financing - other types of financing: Chinese financial institutions (up to 48 banks, 47 of which were State-owned) provided credit lines to each sampled group in connection with the provision of financing. These consisted of framework agreements, under which the bank allows the sampled companies to use various debt instruments, such as working capital loans, bank acceptance drafts and other forms of trade financing within a certain maximum amount. Under normal market circumstances, credit lines would be subject to a so-called ‘arrangement’ or ‘commitment’ fee to compensate for the bank’s costs and risks at the opening of a credit line, as well as to a ‘renewal fee’ charged on a yearly basis for renewing the validity of the credit lines. However, each sampled group of companies benefited from credit lines provided free of charge. The exporting producers also benefitted from preferential financing in the form of convertible and non-convertible corporate bonds and export credit insurance. -Grant programmes: Central and local governments in China provided grants under The Industry Revitalization and Technology Renovation Work Plan which set up special funds for promoting technological progress and technological transformation projects. The sampled groups of companies benefitted from a variety of grants programmes such as grants related to technology, innovation and development, asset-related grants, interest discounts on loans and grants supporting exports. Grants related to technology, innovation and development constituted a significant part of the grants reported by the sampled groups of companies. -Government provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration – land, electricity: the exporting companies benefitted from the provision of land use rights through allocation by local authorities and not through a bidding procedure - to calculate the benefit, land prices from Chinese Taipei were used as an external benchmark; certain companies purchased electricity directly from power generators by signing direct purchasing agreements with the approval of local authorities to participate in the direct electricity pilot scheme. The prices were lower than the official prices set at provincial level for large industrial users. The benchmark used was the standard electricity price. -Revenue foregone: companies within the sampled exporting producer groups qualified as high-tech companies during the investigation period and thus enjoyed a reduced enterprise income tax rate of 15%.

Injury and causation All macroeconomic indicators, such as production, capacity, capacity utilization, sales volume in the EU market, market share, employment and productivity, showed a negative trend over the period considered. The weighted average undercutting found on the basis of the data provided by the sampled exporting producers was 10.8 %. Similarly, virtually all microeconomic indicators, such as sales prices in the EU free market, cost of production, labour costs, profitability, closing stocks, cash flow, investment and return on investments, showed a negative trend over the period considered. The same injury indicators also developed negatively when looking at the period 2017-2019, that is, before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. For many indicators the situation in the IP was better than in 2019. This was mainly due to the lower level of imports from the PRC caused by the pandemic outbreak at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020. This further emphasises the impact these imports have on the overall situation of the Union industry. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. Regarding causation, the Commission found a clear nexus between the deterioration of the situation of the Union industry and the increase of imports from the PRC. The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry (consumption, COVID-19 pandemic, lack of investment, restructuring, vertical integration, energy costs, salary levels, imports from third countries and export performance of the Union industry) from the injurious effects of the subsidised imports. None of the factors contributed, alone or in combination, to the negative developments of the injury indicators observed in the period considered. On this basis, the Commission concluded at this stage that the subsidised imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the subsidised imports and the material injury. Union interest and definitive measures The Commission analysed whether it was in the Union interest to adopt anti-dumping measures. The Commission analysed the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users. Regarding the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression, lower sales and further deterioration of the profitability. The measures would allow the Union industry to reach its potential on the Union market, recover lost market share, and improve profitability to levels to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Regarding users and importers, the investigation did not establish a significant level of dependency on the imports of aluminium converter foil from China. Some parties argued that the EU industry would not be able to supply the users with a product of the same quality of the Chinese imports and that the measures would jeopardise the competitiveness of the users on the Union market as costs increases could not be passed on to the customers. The investigation revealed that the Union producers have made investments to increase quality and that they already competed successfully in third markets with products of Chinese quality. Moreover, the users did not substantiate their other claims including those concerning their inability to pass on costs to customers. The Commission concluded that the effects of the imposition of duties would not outweigh the positive effects of measures on the Union industry. 3.1.5. New investigations terminated without measures In accordance with the provisions of the respective basic Regulations, investigations may be terminated without the imposition of measures if a complaint is withdrawn or if measures are unnecessary (i.e. no dumping/no subsidies, no injury resulting from dumped or subsidised imports, measures not in the interest of the Union). In 2021, 1 new anti-dumping investigation was terminated without measures, compared to 5 in 2020 – see table below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex E.





Product Origin Main reason for termination Hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel Turkey Withdrawal of the complaint 3.2.Review investigations 3.2.1. Expiry reviews Article 11(2) and Article 18 respectively of the basic Regulations provide for the expiry of measures after 5 years, unless an expiry review demonstrates that in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidisation and related injury. In 2021, 1 anti-dumping measure expired automatically. The reference for the measure is available in Annex N. Since the expiry provision of the basic Regulations came into force in 1985, a total of 516 measures have expired automatically. 3.2.1.1. Initiations In 2021, the Commission initiated 9 expiry reviews of anti-dumping measures and 1 expiry review of anti-subsidy measures. The list of the expiry reviews initiated in 2021 are in the following table, together with the name of the complainant. Some expiry reviews may be carried out in parallel with interim reviews. Where there are interim reviews and expiry reviews ongoing at the same time, these are indicated by an asterisk in the table below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal to which reference is available in Annex F.



Product (Type of investigation: AD or AS) Origin Complainant Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron India Saint-Gobain PAM, Saint-Gobain PAM Deutschland GmbH and Saint-Gobain PAM España S.A Tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron India Saint-Gobain PAM, Saint-Gobain PAM Deutschland GmbH and Saint-Gobain PAM España S.A Ring binder mechanisms China Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH Molybdenum wires China Plansee SE Silicon China Euroalliages (Liaison Committee of the Ferro-Alloy Industry) Sodium cyclamate China Productos Aditivos SA Sodium cyclamate Indonesia Productos Aditivos SA Aspartame China HSWT France SAS Cold-rolled flat steel products China European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) Cold-rolled flat steel products Russia European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’) 3.2.1.2. Expiry reviews concluded with confirmation of duties In 2021, the Commission concluded 15 expiry reviews with a confirmation of the duties for a further period of 5 years.

The list of the measures, which were renewed during 2021, together with the results of the investigations, can be found below. More information can be obtained from the Official Journal publications to which reference is given in Annex F. Product Origin Type and level of measure Sulphanilic acid China AD: 33,7% Citric acid China AD: 15,3% - 42,7% Monosodium glutamate China AD: 36,5% - 39,7% Monosodium glutamate Indonesia AD: 7,2% - 28,4% Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel Belarus AD: 38,1% Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel China AD: 90,6% Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel Russia AD: 10,1% – 20,5% Rainbow trout Turkey AS: 1,5% - 9,5% Biodiesel USA AD: €0 - €198 per tonne Biodiesel USA AS: €211,2 - €237 per tonne PSC wires and strands China AD: 0% - 46,2% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products China AD: 24,4% - 25,3% Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products Taiwan AD: 0% - 6.8% Continuous filament glass fibre products China AS: 4,9% - 10,3% Wire rod China AD: 7,4% - 24% 3.2.1.3 Details of some individual cases concluded by confirmation of duty Certain welded pipes and tubes (WPT) of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia On 24 January 2020, the Commission initiated an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia, following a request lodged by the Defence Committee of the welded steel tubes industry of the European Union acting on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of the product concerned. The product under review is welded tubes and pipes (WPT), of iron or non-alloy steel, of circular cross-section and of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm. It is mainly used for the transportation of gases and liquids in plumbing, heating, ventilation systems, etc. The review investigation period (RIP) ran from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the RIP (‘the period considered’). Sampling Sampling applied to Union producers. The sample consisted of three Union producers accounting for 40% of the estimated total Union production and 38% of the estimated total Union sales volume of the product under review. Sampling of exporting producers was not necessary as only a small number of Russian and Belarus companies came forward while no Chinese companies cooperated. Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidisation Belarus

While three producers in Belarus cooperated with the investigation, none reported a significant amount of export sales to the EU. During the RIP imports from Belarus virtually disappeared as compared to the investigation period of the original investigation dropping from more than 29,000 tonnes during the original investigation to 4 tonnes in the RIP. As a result, the Commission investigated the likelihood of recurrence of dumping. As Belarus is not a member of the WTO normal value was to be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in an appropriate representative country. However, in the absence of cooperation from any producer in a potential representative country, the normal value was instead based on the prices actually paid in the Union for the like product. For export prices, the Commission used Belarus’ sales prices to Russia, which absorbs 92% of the Belarusian exports of the product under review. The quantities exported to other third countries than Russia were negligible and therefore considered not to be representative. The import value in Russia was reported at CIF level so therefore, the Commission adjusted the reported prices to calculate the export price at ex-works level by deducting the domestic transport cost in Belarus. The comparison between normal value and the export price showed a likely countrywide dumping margin for the Belarusian exports to Russia expressed as a percentage of the CIF value of 8,0 %. The investigation showed that the Belarusian exports to Russian were made on average at prices at least 5 % lower when compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. In addition, the Commission concluded that significant spare capacity existed in Belarus, estimated at around 50 000 tonnes for the cooperating producers (more than 9% of Union consumption) and could be as much as 125 000 tonnes for all producers. As a result, the Commission concluded that, given the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size, prices and geographical proximity, and the significant spare capacity still available in Belarus, it was likely that Belarusian exports would be (re)directed towards the Union, if the measures be lapsed. Consequently, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping, if measures were not to be extended. China During the RIP, imports from China continued but at a much lower level than in the original investigation dropping from 184 887 tonnes to 559 tonnes in the RIP. Owing to a lack of cooperation by the China producers, the findings were based on facts available. The Commission conducted the investigation in accordance with the provisions of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation as the request contained sufficient evidence of the existence of significant distortions in China. The evidence available showed that prices or costs in the WPT sector including the costs of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials (particularly hot rolled steel coils, which are one of the main inputs) were not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention. The Commission also found evidence of preferential financing as well as many state-owned enterprises in the sector. As a result, the Commission concluded that it was not possible to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Therefore, normal value was calculated on the basis of undistorted prices or benchmarks from the representative country selected in the case, i.e. Thailand. To construct normal value, the Commission used the information provided by the Union industry on the consumption of each factor of production (raw materials, labour and energy) multiplied by the undistorted costs per unit established in Thailand. The calculation was done separately for two basic types of WPT, i.e. for black pipes/tubes and galvanized pipes/tubes. To this, the Commission added an appropriate percentage amount for manufacturing overheads and finally applied the SG&A and profit in Thailand which amounted to 4.3% and 3% respectively. This normal value was compared to the export price which was calculated from Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level by adjusting for sea freight and insurance costs and domestic transport cost in China. On that basis, the weighted average dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was found to be negative. However, given the volume of imports in question was limited and the prices were considered unrepresentative, the Commission decided to also investigate the likelihood of recurrence of dumping. The investigation found that there were several trade defence measures in force against exports of WPT to other third countries including AD and CVD measures by Australia and Canada and AD measures by Colombia, Thailand and Mexico. These exports were made at prices between 8% to 21% lower when compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. In addition the investigation found that China’s spare capacity was more than ten times the total Union consumption during the RIP, with further increases in capacity expected. Given the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices, the fact that other markets remain closed due to protective measures and China’s spare capacities, the Commission concluded that it is likely that dumping of Chinese WPT was likely if measures were allowed to lapse. Russia During the RIP, imports from Russia continued but at a much lower level than in the original investigation, dropping from 36 000 tonnes to 2 000 tonnes in the RIP. Owing to a lack of full cooperation by Russian producers, the findings were based on facts available. The normal value was constructed using the information provided by PAO Severstal (a Russian company that had initially partially cooperated). Export price was based on CIF Eurostat data adjusted for freight, insurance and domestic transport costs in Russia to ex-works level. The comparison resulted in a dumping margin of 12,4 % so therefore the Commission concluded that dumping continued during the RIP. However, given the volume of imports from Russia was limited and the prices were considered unrepresentative, the Commission decided to also investigate the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

The investigation showed that Russian exports, not only to the EU, but to other export markets were made at dumped prices and at prices around 29% lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. The Commission also found that the spare capacity in Russia was very significant, exceeding the total Union consumption during the RUP. In addition, the Russian capacity of WPT production increased by almost 1 million tonnes between 2018 and 2019. The Commission concluded that, given the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices and the spare capacities in Russia, there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping, if the measures were not extended. Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury The investigation showed that the financial situation for the Union industry deteriorated. Production and sales volumes decreased, which had a negative effect on employment and productivity as well as on profitability. The increased competition and price pressure from third country led to a negative profit margin of –11% for the Union industry during the RIP. The cash flow, investments and return on investments also deteriorated, which made it difficult for the Union industry to raise capital and invest. The Commission therefore concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury. As regards t