EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 7.12.2011 
SEC(2011) 1472 final 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
Accompanying the document 
COUNCIL REGULATION 
establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation 
 
{COM(2011) 841 final} 
{SEC(2011) 1473 final}  
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties.............................................. 4 
1.1. Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 4 1.2. Consultation and expertis e (public and internal) ......................................................... 4 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board............................................................................................ 5 2. Problem definition ....................................................................................................... 6 2.1. The problem requiring action and the sc ope of the instrument regulation .................. 6 
2.2. Review of evaluation reports ....................................................................................... 9 2.2.1. Results of mid-term review of the financ ial instruments for external actions (2009) . 9 
2.2.2. Study on legal instruments - linking eval uation results (2006-2011) to the legal 
instruments objectives................................................................................................ 11 
2.3. Review of lessons learnt ............................................................................................ 12 2.4. The underlying drivers of the problem ...................................................................... 13 2.5. Legal base for EU action............................................................................................ 14 2.6. Added value of the EU action.................................................................................... 14 3. Objectives .................................................................................................................. 16 
3.1. Policy framework and objectives............................................................................... 16 3.2. Consistency with external action priorities................................................................ 18 3.3. Consistency with other EU policies........................................................................... 18 3.4. Geographical/thematic coverage................................................................................ 18 4. Policy options............................................................................................................. 1 8 
4.1. Option 0: No further EU action ( no Nuclear Safety Instrument)............................... 18 
4.2. Option 1: ’No change’ (cooperation with third countries would continue in the 
framework of the existing INSC Regulation) ............................................................ 19 
4.3. Option 2: Amend the INSC Regulation..................................................................... 19 4.4. Option 3: New instrument.......................................................................................... 20 5. Analysis of Impacts.................................................................................................... 20 5.1. Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options ............. 20 
5.2. Impacts on external action, in particular  on Policy Coherence for Development ..... 20 
5.3. Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities................................... 20 
 
EN 3   EN 6. Comparing the options............................................................................................... 21 
6.1. Weighing of positive and negative impacts per option.............................................. 21 6.2. Trade-offs and synergies associated with the options................................................ 22 6.3. Preferred option ......................................................................................................... 2 2 
7. Monitoring and evaluation......................................................................................... 22 7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives ......................................................... 22 7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements ................................................ 24 
 
EN 4   EN 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Organisation and timing 
The drafting of the Impact Assessment for th e EU external action instruments for the 
period 2014-2020, including this document1, has been coordinated by a Task Force  
composed by services in charge of EU external action and the Legal Service. The drafting teams , appointed on 7 June 2011, have duly taken into consideration the 
consultations, reviews and studies mentioned in Section 2 and have liaised with other 
Commission services to ensure consistency wi th other EU policies.  The Task Force has 
met with the drafting team in charge of th is Impact Assessment on 7 June, 29 June, 14 
July and 2 August 2011 for organisational and quality-check purposes. 
An Impact Assessment Steering Group,  composed by the members of the Task Force 
and representatives of interested Directorat es General and the Secretariat General, was 
launched on 22 June 2011. It has met twice, on 13 and 26 of July 2011. 
The review of this Impact Assessment by the Impact Assessment Board  is scheduled 
on 14 September 2011. 
In line with article 27 of the Financial re gulation (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002) and article 21 of the Implementi ng rules of the financial Regulation 
(Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002), the present impact assessment 
is the ex-ante evaluation of the Instrument for Nu clear Safety Cooperation. 
1.2. Consultation and expertise (public and internal) 
Public consultations
 
The Commission held a public consultation on  future funding for EU external action 
between 26 November 2010 and 31 January 201 1. This process was based on an online 
questionnaire accompanied by a background paper 'What funding for EU external action after 2013?'  prepared by Commission services a nd the European External Action 
Services involved . The 220 contributions received to the public consultation reflect a 
broad and diverse spectrum re presenting the variety of stru ctures, views and traditions 
characterising the external action community.  
A majority of the respondent s (around 70%) confirmed that EU financial intervention 
provides a substantial added value  in the main policy areas supported through EU 
financial instruments for external action
2. The criterion of EU added value is put forward 
                                                 
1 The instruments are the following: Internal Agreement for the 11th European Development Fund, Development 
Cooperation Instrument, Instrument fo r Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument for 
Stability, Instrument for Nuclear Safe ty Cooperation, European Instrume nt for Democracy and Human Rights, 
Partnership Instrument and the inst ruments for the EU-Greenland Partners hip. The Macro-Financial Assistance 
instrument, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian aid instrument  and the Civil Protection 
mechanism are not part of this joint exercise.  
2 i.e. peace and security, poverty reduc tion, humanitarian aid, investing in st ability and growth in enlargement and 
neighbourhood countries, tackling global ch allenges, promoting EU and intern ational standards and values, and 
supporting growth and competitiveness abroad. 
 
EN 5   EN by many respondents as the main driver for the future: the EU should exploit its 
comparative advantage linked to  its global field presence, it s wide-ranging expertise, its 
supranational nature, its role as facilitator of  coordination, and to the economies of scale.  
Nearly all respondent s (92%) support a more differentiated approach , tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, 
to be used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial instruments.  
Over two thirds of re spondents believe that EU interests are sufficiently taken into 
account in its external action , and that the latter  should be based to a larger extent on EU 
values and principles, and on development objec tives of the partner countries. Inversely, 
a minority considers that EU external ac tion should concentrate more on EU's own 
interests in the global economy, partic ularly towards emerging economies.  
A majority of res pondents agree that joint programming and co-f inancing with Member 
States  can increase the impact and the cohere nce of EU external  action, simplify the 
delivery of aid and reduce overall transaction costs.  
Regarding like-mindedness and conditionality,  there is wide support among respondents 
for exploring conditionality based on the beneficiary country's respect for human rights, minorities, good governance and diversity of cu ltural expressions (78%), or on the 
quality of its policies and of its ability  and willingness to implement sound policies 
(63%). However, a majority of respondent s is critical towa rds basing external 
cooperation on the EU's own interests.  
A vast majority of respondent s support a stronger focus on  monitoring and evaluations 
systems in the future instruments and in projects/programmes implementation.  
As concerns the means to enhance the visibility of EU external funding , a majority of 
stakeholders support increasing efforts for in formation and communica tion activities, in 
particular in beneficiary count ries; however EU visibility ap pears to be better served by 
effective policies, strategies and presence in  third countries, than by additional spending 
for communication. The ideas of reinforcing EU's coordinating role  among other donors 
and of ensuring that implemen ting partners give more visibility to EU funding also 
obtain a strong support from stakeholders. 
1.3. Impact Assessment Board 
The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation's draft impact assessment was submitted 
to the Impact Assessment Board on 5 August 2011. The Board issued its opinion on 09 September 2011. The Board recommended hat the report should be improved in various respects in particular as regards: 
1 Problem analysis, setting of  the objectives, policy choices 
2 Analysis of impact, illustrate with examples 3 Improve presentation and shorten the text 
 
EN 6   EN 2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. The problem requiring action and the scope of the instrument regulation 
Definition of the problem  
Nuclear safety3 and safeguards4 are issues of paramount importance, both in connection 
with the operation of nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations, as well as, 
more generally, any othe r radiological practice. 
The Chernobyl accide nt in 1986 and the F ukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 highlighted 
the global importance of nuclear safety. In order to fulfil the objective of the Euratom 
Treaty to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate h azards to the life and 
health of the public, the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Community’) should be 
able to support nuclear sa fety in third countries. 
There is also a particular need for the Community to continue its efforts in support of the 
application of effectiv e safeguards of nuclear material in  third countries, building on its own 
safeguard activities within  the European Union. 
The EU established a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations  
through the adoption of the Council Direct ive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009. A 
Council directive approved on 19 July 2011 established a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste . It is important to 
ensure that third countries adhe re to comparable principles.  
The commitment of third countries to im plement the highest safety standards and 
safeguards can be considered partly fulfilled by them joining the relevant international convention and treaties (e.g. the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Non Proliferation 
Treaty). However, some third countries, particularly in the EU neighbourhood, have 
shown difficulties in complying with the terms laid down in the international 
conventions and treaties they did adhere t o. In addition, not all third countries which 
may give cause for safety concerns to the EU citizens have joined the relevant international Conventions. 
The promotion and enforcement of the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation 
protection within the boundaries of the EU may not be suffici ent to suitably protect the 
general public and the environm ent. Therefore action with th ird countries needs to be 
envisaged. In parallel, acti on is also required to help ensuring effective nuclear 
safeguards in third countries. 
Some major achievements of th e nuclear safety instrument 
                                                
 
3 Nuclear safety  concerns the achievement of proper ope rating conditions, prevention of accidents or 
mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment  
4 The safeguards  system comprises an extensive set of techni cal measures by which the IAEA [and Euratom 
within the EU] independently verify the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States 
about their nuclear material and activities. 
 
EN 7   EN Three major projects implemented under the instrument illustrate the achievements and 
impact of the INSC on nuclear  safety in the neighbourhood. 
The Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF):  
The CSF managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
provides the financing of majo r projects at the Chenobyl site  (including the New Safe 
Confinement (NSC)). The finalisation of th e NSC has been delayed due to unforeseen 
technical difficulties which resulted in increased cost. The Commission has set up a contact group within EBRD with the other G8 donors to monitor the implementation of 
the project. The EU as major donor to the fund through the INSC also became the 
driving force for the success of the April 2011 pledging conferen ce to ensure the 
completion of the project. The Shelter Fund can  be a model for developing similar major 
nuclear safety projects financed by the future INSC 
The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
 
The Medzamor NPP is one of the first genera tion nuclear reactors of Russian design in 
the EU neighbourhood. This power plant presents nuclear safe ty risks due to its design, 
its location in a highly seismic area and also  to the lack of proper maintenance by the 
Armenian operator. Under the coordination of  the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), together with other donors, the IN SC has set up a major assistance programme 
to resolve the major safety issues of the plant. Only 6 years were needed from the evaluation of the safety issues and their classification in the IAEA urgency scale 
(Categories 1 to 4).and the implementation of  the projects. This cooperation with the 
IAEA may serve as example for future cooperation with Agency and other donors 
The evaluation of the safety of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants
 
Following a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Ukraine and the EU, an 
evaluation of the safety of the Ukrainia n NPPs was performed under a joint project 
Ukraine-EU-IAEA. The project was co-finan ced by the Commission (mostly the INSC) 
and the IAE . The result of the evaluation de monstrated that the Ukrainian Regulator has 
in pace a comprehensive regulatory system w ith a sound legal infrastructure respecting 
the relevant international conve ntions in force. It also concluded that the design and 
operational safety of the Ukrain ian NPPs were compliant with the majority of the IAEA 
safety requirements. The progress noticed by the IAEA was very of ten the result of 
projects funded under the T acis and INSC programmes. 
The INSC has started to expand its activities,  based on lessons learned in projects as 
described above. This experience in large scale and multi-donor projects may be useful in future when the instrument  will be faced to the results of the stress tests conducted in 
third countries.. 
Scope of the current instrument
 
The above objectives are being pursue d, in the period 2007 to 2013 through the 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperati on (INSC), adopted through Council Regulation 
(EURATOM) No 300/2007 of 19 February 20 07. The implementation of the measures 
foreseen under the INSC wa s founded on the prior experien ce gained by the European 
 
EN 8   EN Commission in assisting countries in the Co mmonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
through the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme.  
The scope of the INSC  covered the following main areas:  
• Promotion of the highest standards of nucl ear safety and radiation protection to be 
applied to nuclear facilities and other radi ological practices out side of the EU, in 
view of safeguarding the health of the citizens and the environment.  
• Responsible approach to nuclear safety as pects related to the environment (disposal 
of spent fuel, waste management, decommi ssioning of installations, restoration of 
sites, etc.).  
• International cooperation on nuclear safety to ensure that the highest and most 
robust levels of nuclear safety  are in place and implemented. 
• The opportunity to encourage a nd assist other countries to  adopt the highest nuclear 
safety standards and responsible radio active waste and spent fuel management 
taking into account the common frameworks developed in the EU (EU directives 
on nuclear safety and radioactive waste and spent fuel management). 
• Promotion of an effective framework a nd methodologies for the implementation of 
nuclear safeguards worldwide. 
The current instrument has enlarged its geogra phical area from the countries of the CIS 
(Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Uzbeki stan) to 13 additional third countries (status 
in 2011) from the Southern Mediterranean  neighbourhood and Middle East (Jordan, 
Iraq, Egypt, Morocco), Asia (Philippines, I ndonesia, Malaysia, China, Mongolia and 
Vietnam) and Latin America (Bra zil, Argentina and Mexico). 
This scope should be expende d under the new instrument, with a revision of the 
geographic scope (see pa ragraph 4.3 here below). 
Evolution since the adoption of the present instrument  
It is expected that over the period 2014 to 2020, the above motivatio ns to engage in 
cooperation with third c ountries in the domains of nuclear  safety, radiation protection 
and nuclear safeguards will remain valid.  
Some major projects carried out under the INSC (in partic ular those related to the 
remediation of the Chernobyl site5 and nuclear plant improvement projects) will have 
been mostly completed by 2014. However other important projects concerning 
restoration of mining sites (legacy of uranium mining, wh ich did not respect basic 
environmental requirements), disposal of spent fuel, waste management and 
decommissioning of installations will need to  be dealt with as a programme priority.  
                                                 
5 The major Chernobyl projects, which are financed through EBRD managed funds, are currently scheduled 
to be completed in 2015. The international donors (mostly G8 and the EU) have already pledged enough 
funds to cover the cost of the projects. No further sums are planned for the EBRD managed funds for Chernobyl over the period 2014-2020. 
 
EN 9   EN The lessons learnt in the wake  of the Fukushima-Daiichi accid ent will play an important 
role in the improvement of nuclear safety in the coming years. The results of the EU 
Member States comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments (“stress tests”), which are due to be extended to  the EU neighbouring countries and possibly 
other third countries, are expected to have a considerable impact in the design, operation, 
maintenance and regulation of nuclear power plants. The experience gained within the 
EU will be important to other third countries. The experience gained in the coordination 
of activities with IAEA and ot her donors will also help to  optimise the impact on safety 
of the undertaken measures. 
2.2. Review of evaluation reports 
Some reviews on a number of polic y areas have been undertaken e.g. 
2.2.1.  Results of mid-term review of the financ ial instruments for ex ternal actions (2009) 
Annual reports on the progress achieved in th e implementation of the INSC have been 
submitted to the European Parliament and the Council, as per Article 18 of Council Regulation No 300/2007
6. These reports have shown a regular implementation of the 
actions foreseen in the first Annual Acti on Programmes, and a regular commitment of 
the budget allocated to the instrument. 
In addition, a report evaluating the implementa tion of the Regulation in the first three 
years has been prepared, to be submitted in the near future to the European Parliament 
and the Council (as per Article 21 of the Regulation). This  report was based on an 
assessment of the programme carried out by a team of independent experts appointed by 
the Commission. 
The Article 21 report concluded that each of the specific meas ures foreseen in the INSC 
has been addressed by one or more proj ects adopted in th e period 2007 to 2009. 
However limited attention has so far been paid  to nuclear safeguards, to the development 
and implementation of strategi es for decommissioning existi ng installations and to the 
remediation of former nuclear sites (with the exception of the Ch ernobyl site though 
bilateral and multilateral initiatives). 
The report found also that the INSC implementation was well targeted and the projects 
well conceived. When successfully implemented,  the projects are expected to contribute 
significantly to enhance nuclear  safety and nuclear  safety culture. The INSC projects 
with focus on exchange of know-how and pr actices were found to be particularly 
appreciated by partners in ta rget countries. …The concer ns which were raised in 
respect of the implementation of the INSC Regulation, and ho w they might be mitigated, 
can be addressed within the existing provisions of the Regulation. Consequently, there is 
no need for a legislative proposal to be introduced  [to modify the Instrument] as 
foreseen in Article 21 of the INSC.  
                                                 
6 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation, First Report - Annual Action Programmes for 2007, 2008 and 2009. Ref. COM(2011) 111 final, SEC(2011) 284 final. 
 
EN 10   EN Interface with the Instrument for Stability (IFS)  
Nuclear safeguards cooperation falls under th e INSC scope, however safeguards projects 
are also eligible under the In strument for Stability (IFS) (established by Regulation (EC) 
No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament an d of the Council of 15 November 2006). 
The overlap is apparent in the control of illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials which falls in the framework of Pr iority 1 (chemical, biol ogical, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation) of th e IFS; however the establishment of the 
necessary regulatory framework and methodol ogies for the implementation of nuclear 
safeguards is clearly identified in  the framework of the INSC.  
In order to prevent overlap and to enhance complementarity of the two instruments in 
this regard, it was recommended to clarify in  the relevant Strategy Papers which kind of 
nuclear safeguards cooperation activities were eligible under each instrument. The 
matter needs to be reconsidered in the c ontext of the new inst ruments for the period 
2014-2020. 
Delay on implementation of projects
 
The relatively long time elapsed between the conception of new project proposals and 
the start of the actual implementation of the relevant actions was identified as a 
significant issue. An investigation of the causes of such delay was recommended in 
order to adopt appropriate corrective measures . In some circumstances e.g. inspection of 
the primary circuit of the Armenian nuclear  power plant, the delays between project 
definition and implementation have b een reduced to less than12 months. 
Suspension of the cooperation with the Russian Federation  
Failure in concluding Financing Agreements  with the Russian Federation related to 
adopted Annual Action Programmes for 2007 an d 2008 led to the suspension of nuclear 
safety cooperation with Russia under the INSC7. This was identified as an issue of 
concern as it prevents new cooperation be tween the EU and Russia under the INSC. To 
date, in spite of the efforts of the Co mmission to establish a renewed cooperation 
framework, a solution does not appear at hand. Nevertheless, th is interruption of 
cooperation does not affect the implementati on of projects on insta llations of Russian 
design in other countries. Russian Instit utes and manufacturer s can continue to 
participate in the INSC awarding procedures. 
Simplification  
Programming and implementation of the INSC  could be simplified by a better definition 
of the thematic and geographic priorities for the selection of cooperation projects. 
                                                 
7 Limited cooperation continued under the INSC in order to complete ongoing projects, for which a new 
Financing Agreement was not required, however this will cease once the pr ojects are completed. 
 
EN 11   EN 2.2.2.  Study on legal instruments - linking evalu ation results (2006-2011) to the legal 
instruments objectives8  
The Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Le arnt from the Evaluations analysed how 
the following major objectives of the INSC were being fulfilled: 
i) Existence of an effective nuclear safety culture; ii) Protection of EU citizens against radiation; iii) Establishment of safeguards for accounting and control of fissile material; iv) Prevention of nuclear accidents; v) Mitigation of the conseque nces of nuclear accidents; 
vi) EU cooperation with the IAEA. Most of the results were positive; howev er the report also noted mixed results 
concerning nuclear safety cult ure and safeguards suggesting th at the actions in question 
were not yet assured. 
The evaluation reports recognize that the EU has made useful  contributions to promoting 
nuclear safety principally in neighbourhood countri es and that it has in  fact a record of 
being one of the largest fore ign contributors. The EU’s c ontribution was particularly 
noteworthy in addressing the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster where it acted 
effectively in an emergency situation and at an appropriate scale by providing up to 
50%
9 of the international funding required.  
At the same time, , the evaluators also  recognize that progress cannot be purely 
attributed to the EU’s input nor is th ere much certainty as to the longer-term 
sustainability of the impact. One of the re sults also specifically mentions that ‘Overall 
progress in nuclear safety is very hard to evaluate, as no risk assessment has been 
conducted recently’.  
Identification of Any Overal l Trends or Lessons Learnt  
It is apparent from the Energy Thema tic Evaluation (2008) that the European 
Commission’s has built up considerable expert ise and credibility in the sector and a 
good network of collaborating institutions both within the EU at national level and 
internationally under the auspices of the IAEA. hTerefore a good basis exists on which 
to build further EU work in this area. Ho wever the evaluators of the 2008 study also 
noted a number of points which are im portant to stress for the future: 
                                                 
8 Ref. Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learnt from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation 
Unit, based on an evaluation carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management. 
Draft Final Report, March 2011. 
9 The EU is the largest contributor to the Chernobyl Funds managed by the EBRD, these were set up to 
finance projects at the site costing about EUR 2 billi on. The EU's contributions to these Funds amount to 
some 25% of the total. In addition the EU financed directly other specific projects at the Chernobyl site.(EC Services' note). 
 
EN 12   EN (1) Over time without the crystallizing effect  of a major nuclear disaster, such as 
Chernobyl, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the European Commission 
to build consensus around the policies it proposes to the Council10. 
(2) There is clearly still considerable work to be done to achieve the full “Effective 
nuclear safety culture”  that the INSC instrument talks about as “…partner 
governments seem less convinced than the EU of the necessity of promoting the 
independence and the technical and in stitutional strengthening of the 
Regulatory Authorities.”   
Although no strong overall conclusion can be draw n on the effect of the INSC due to the 
limited evidence emerging from the evaluations, the limited evidence is positive. The EU is now an experienced and credible actor in the field. Yet there are clearly continuing 
issues to be tackled and not all of them will be straightforward. On the basis of the evidence available ther efore it appears to be important to  maintain an EU budget in this 
area. 
. Having argued that the INSC should probably be maintained as a separate instrument 
does not mean however, that no improvements could be made to the instrument. In 
particular the paucity of resu lts identified in the evaluati on reports does suggest that 
there is a case for strengthening the evaluati on of EU work financed  from the INSC. The 
clear reference to the need for an overall ri sk assessment of nuclear  safety would also 
support such a conclusion. 
2.3. Review of lessons learnt 
The root causes of the major nuclear accidents have been mainly lack of nuclear safety 
culture
11, design safety (safety aspects of the pl ant design) and operati onal safety. It was 
therefore considered appropriate that the nuclear safety coopera tion programmes of the 
European Union addressed the nuclear operato rs, to improve the situation on the ground, 
and the nuclear regulators to ensure that th ey had the required te chnical capability and 
independence to enforce adherence to a ppropriate nuclear sa fety standards. 
In the CIS, , under the Tacis nuclear safety programme, safety related equipment had to 
be supplied to ensure that ur gent cases were promptly reso lved. However, as these cases 
have been addressed and the programmes are guided by the principle of the most 
efficient use of resources and avoidance of  practices which might have commercial and 
competition implications, supply of equipment has, in general, been discontinued under 
the INSC. 
Under the INSC, cooperation was initiated with a number of third countries which intend 
to use nuclear energy as part of their energy mix (the so cal led 'emerging countries'). The 
cooperation covered mainly the building up of the capacity of the regulators, the 
                                                 
10 The situation changed considerably after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. (EC Services note). 
11 Safety culture was originally defined in IAEA's IN SAG 4 as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes 
in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warrant ed by their significance.” 
 
EN 13   EN regulatory infrastructure and waste management strategies to ensure that a nuclear safety 
culture and framework is deve loped at a sufficiently early stage. The selection of the 
countries followed the criteria proposed by th e Council. This has become an important 
part of the programme which should be con tinued, but may require a clearer definition 
of the criteria. 
The consequences of nuclear accidents can, to some extent, be mitigated by emergency 
preparedness. Therefore, emergency preparedne ss needs to remain an important part of 
the programme.  
Major accidents with radiological conseq uences have required the help of the 
international community to the affected population and to restor e the sites to an 
environmentally safe situation. This was the case with Chernobyl where the major 
construction projects are entering the final phase . The possibility should be left in future 
programmes to cooperate with third countries in  this respect, if needed and appropriate. 
Past activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of nuclear powered ships and 
submarines and radioisotopes have not alwa ys been up to the standards required to 
protect the population and the environment. Governments a nd local authorities have 
been left with the difficult task of restoring affected sites to an environmentally safe 
situation and the disposal of  nuclear spent fuel and waste, for which international 
cooperation may be required. This part of the nuclear safety programme should be 
among the instrument’s priorities in the future. 
In order that spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste be dealt with in a proper and 
responsible way, the nuclear safety programmes have prov ided for cooperation with 
third countries to establish natio nal strategies for the spent fu el and nuclear waste. As the 
European Union has just adopted a radioa ctive waste and spent fuel management 
directive, third coun tries should continue to be en couraged to adopt similar high 
standards, cooperation in this field should al so be continued as a matter of priority. 
The promotion of international cooperation will remain essen tial to ensure coordination 
of activities by the different actors and the best  use of resources. The IAEA will continue 
to play a fundamental role in this respect , particularly to enha nce the Global Nuclear 
Safety Regime (the framework for achievi ng the worldwide implementation of a high 
level of safety at nuclear installations). S upport to IAEA activities, particularly those of 
global or regional nature should continue to be  envisaged, with the ap propriate visibility 
for the EU actions /contributions. 
2.4. The underlying drivers of the problem 
• Following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, issues related to risk and safety 
assessments of operating nuclear power plan ts (‘stress tests’) are likely to become 
more relevant and to be extended to othe r nuclear facilities, including research 
reactors, spent fuel interim storage f acilities, radioactive waste storage and 
disposal facilities. 
• Cooperation with nuclear regulators  (including their technical support 
organizations) should remain at the centre of the nuclear safety cooperation, while 
 
EN 14   EN cooperation with nuclear opera tors needs to be  reconsidered ta king into account 
the performance and results of the ‘stre ss tests’ and specific circumstances.  
• Disposal of spent fuel, waste manage ment, decommissioning of installations, 
restoration of sites have gained increa sed relevance over the years. Future 
cooperation in these areas should be  treated as a programme priority12. 
• Geographical proximity to the EU (pre-accession countries and EU 
neighbourhood) should remain a priority. Nevertheless, it s hould not be an 
exclusive criterion..  
• The evolution of the international situa tion requires a change in focus and in 
priorities rather than a change in the br oader scope of nuclear safety cooperation. 
2.5. Legal base for EU action 
The legal base of the INSC (Regulati on No 300/2007) is the Euratom Treaty (in 
particular the Article 203). C onsidering the legislative fram ework for nuclea r safety at 
EU level, this should remain the case with  the future regulation, unless the scope is 
enlarged (see discussion on different options under paragraph 4. here below). 
2.6. Added value of the EU action  
Nuclear safety  
With a large number of commercial nuclear power plants (146 out of 436 worldwide) 
and nuclear power providing for about 30% of the electricity generation, the EU has 
accumulated a long experience in the domain of nuclear safety, including in 
decommissioning of nuclear inst allations and radioactive waste management. As a result 
a wide expertise in all the dom ains of nuclear safety is av ailable in EU Member States. 
The diversity of technologies, which requi res different approach es, allows for the 
necessary flexibility in addressing the needs of third countries.  
The EU has adopted common legal framew orks concerning nuclear safety and 
radioactive waste and spent fuel management . In this respect, th e EU has set up an 
example and expects to persuade othe rs to adopt similar high standards. 
Global Challenges, Global Re sponse and Global Leadership  
                                                 
12 Possible projects may include, inter alia, the remediati on of uranium legacy sites in Central Asia (object of 
an international initiative strongly su pported by the UN organi sations and by the Gove rnments of the region, 
to which the Commission already participates through the INSC); the recovery, processing and storage of 
sunken objects in the Arctic Sea ( nuclear submarines and other objects containing spent nuclear fuels and 
radioactive waste, part of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy); and issues related to the responsible management of radioactive waste in countries that do not presently have any nuclear power generation 
capacity or consider developing it. A symbolic case in this respect is Iraq, with a comprehensive programme 
for the dismantling of its shut-down, heavily damaged, nuclear installations and the management of the resulting radioactive waste. Other third countries also f ace problems related to the management of 
radioactive waste deriving from practices not related to  power production (e.g. in the medical sector), which 
need to be properly addressed at the level of their nuclear regulatory authorities and organizations responsible for waste management. 
 
EN 15   EN In the face of increas ingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities – 
security, growth and job cr eation, climate change, acce ss to energy, health and 
pandemics and migration - will be achieved in  isolation from the wider world. In times 
of economic crisis, a more coordinated and in tegrated approach between the EU and its 
Member States through joint programming will bring about more added value, increased 
strength and legitimacy, and more impact and effectiveness. 
The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impar tial position to deliver on external action on 
behalf of and with Member States, giving enha nced credibility in the countries in which 
it works. It is best placed to take on the role  of global leader on behalf of its citizens. 
The critical weight of the EU  
With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has 
the critical weight to respond to global chal lenges, while the action of Member States 
can be limited and fragmented, with projec ts which are often too small to make a 
sustainable difference in the field. This criti cal mass also puts the EU in a better position 
to conduct policy dialogue with  partner governments. This is reflected, for example in 
the strong position of the EU in discussions  and negotiations with the G8 and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which manages large 
nuclear safety funds on behalf  of international donors. 
The INSC should remain an instrument accompanying the EU policy dialogue with third 
countries. 
When programming its cooperation, the EU pays particular attention to  the structural as 
well as economic capacity of the countries  concerned. The possi bility to react to 
unforeseen needs is envisaged within th e current INSC regulation and was made 
available to Japan after the Fukushima accident. 
The EU is best placed to coordinate  
The EU has a network of inte rnational agreements all ove r the world, not matched by 
individual Member States, which gives th em influence in almost all fields of 
international relations, including nuclear safety. The EU plays a major role in this domain but needs to continue  enhancing its visibility.  
The EU can do more than other international organisations as it has a holistic approach 
to development and external relations. 
Division of labour through the EU is a crucial component of  its added value. With its 
network of international agreements with pa rtners and organisations all over the world, 
the EU is a natural coordinator, and can in fluence almost all fields of international 
relations, which individual Member Stat es, acting within common policies and 
strategies, cannot do alone. 
Furthermore, at a time of budgetary restri ctions, when several Member States are 
compelled to exit entire sectors and countries, the EU is able to continue playing an active role. 
 
EN 16   EN 3. OBJECTIVES  
3.1. Policy framework and objectives 
.  
The need to adopt the highest nuclear safety standards worldwide has recently become 
even more evident in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident 
The health, environmental, social and econom ic impact of nuclear accidents in third 
countries in the EU has been confirmed to be potentially ve ry high. The need to establish 
effective cooperation aimed at preventing acci dents through the establishment of high 
levels of nuclear safety is being reaffirmed. 
. While the EU recognizes that the use of nucl ear power is a soverei gn decision, it is in 
the EU’s best interest that nuclear installati ons are operated safely, in particular in the 
EU neighbourhood, and that nuclear materials ar e properly accounted for. The EU will 
cooperate with third countries and organizations in these respects. 
General objectives  
• Cooperate in the implementation of the hi ghest nuclear safety standards in third 
countries in order to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards 
to the life and health of the public , as nuclear accidents have trans-boundary 
consequences (Euratom Treaty). 
• Cooperate with third countries to make certain, by appropriate supervision, that 
nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are 
intended  (Art. 2b of the Euratom Treaty). 
Specific objectives  
• Support the promotion and implementation of the highest standards of nuclear 
safety and radiation protection in nuclear in stallations and radiol ogical practices in 
third countries. 
• Support the development and implementation of responsible stra tegies concerning 
the disposal of spent fuel, waste manage ment, decommissioning of installations and 
restoration of former nuclear sites.  
• Support international co operation on nuclear safety to ensure that the highest and 
most robust levels of nuclear sa fety are in place and implemented. 
• Support the promotion and implementa tion of effective frameworks and 
methodologies for the improvement of nuclear safeguards worldwide. 
).  
Operational Measures to be implemented to support the objectives  
 
EN 17   EN The following measures are of particular im portance for supporting the achievement of 
the above objectives. 
(a) the promotion of an effective nuclear safe ty culture at all levels, in particular 
through:  
– continuous support for regulatory bodies , technical support organisations, 
and the reinforcement of the regula tory framework, notably concerning 
licensing activities, including the review and follow up of the risk and safety 
assessments (‘stress tests’) ;  
– Cooperation with third countries in the domain of radioactive waste and 
spent nuclear fuel management (i.e. transport, pre-treatment, treatment, processing, storage and disposal) and de velopment of specific strategies for 
the responsible management of spent nuclear fuel and waste; 
– the development and implementation of  strategies for decommissioning 
existing installations and the remediat ion of former nuclear sites; the 
recovery and safe disposal of nuclear objects sunken in the sea or dispersed 
on land;l 
– support for the performance of effec tive and comprehensive safety and risk 
assessments (in line with the specifications adopted by the EU Member States) and incorporation of the lessons learnt, so that high safety levels can 
be achieved; 
(b) the promotion of effective regulatory fr ameworks, procedures and systems to 
ensure adequate protection ag ainst ionising radiations fr om radioactive materials, 
in particular from high activity radioac tive sources, and their safe disposal; 
(c) the establishment of the necessary re gulatory framework and methodologies 
(including nuclear forensics methods ) for the implementation of nuclear 
safeguards
13, including for the proper accounting a nd control of fissile materials at 
State and operators level; 
(d) the establishment of effective arrangemen ts for the prevention of accidents with 
radiological consequences as well as the mitigation of such consequences should they occur (monitoring the environment in case of releases, design and 
implementation of mitigation and remediation activities) , and for emergency-
planning, preparedness and response, civil protection and rehabilitation measures; 
(e) measures to promote international coope ration (including in the framework of 
relevant international organisations, notab ly IAEA) in the above  fields, including 
the implementation and monitoring of in ternational Conventions and Treaties, 
exchange of information capacity building  and training in the domain of nuclear 
safety  and research. 
                                                
 
13 Cooperation in this domain is limited to the techni cal aspects of safeguards, th e non-proliferation aspects 
should be dealt within the framework of the IFS. 
 
EN 18   EN The above measures should not be limited to  countries operating (or with foreseen) 
nuclear power plants, but also include th ose having civil nuclear  installations and 
radiological practices, including, inter a lia, research reactors  and laboratories, 
radioactive waste management facilities, ur anium ore mining and processing sites. As 
such, cooperation will extend to  countries that may neither have nor have planned the 
construction of nuclear power plants. 
3.2. Consistency with external action priorities 
The measures adopted in the framework of cooperation in the domain of nuclear safety 
must be consistent with the EU’s overall st rategic policy framework. In particular they 
must be consistent with the overall coope ration framework established with single 
partner countries. 
3.3. Consistency with other EU policies 
Consistency with the measures envisaged in the domain of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigatio n, in the framework of the IFS must be 
ensured, particularly those related to nuclear safety, including countering illicit 
trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials, border control and emergency 
preparedness. 
3.4. Geographical/thematic coverage 
The need to focus the nucl ear safety cooperation in th e EU neighbourhood and accession 
countries is obvious. Neverthele ss, it should not ex clude the possibility  for actions in 
other geographical areas, as appropriate (in particular if EU ove rseas territories are 
concerned). Criteria concerning  the prioritization of coopera tion with third countries, the 
specific topics to be addressed (safety/sa feguards/environmental remediation/other) and 
the type of beneficiary need to be more clearly established in the context of a new 
regulation. 
Today, the INSC covers activit ies in 18 countries (see above 2.1). It could be expended 
to several (up to 10 more) additional count ries of the CIS and of the neighbourhood or 
accession countries (in particular those mainta ining research reactors or having no policy 
for hospital or industrial nuclear waste). 
The specific domains of nuclear safety listed in paragraph 3.1 above should all be 
covered in the new regulation.  
4. POLICY OPTIONS  
Possible options including a 'no EU action' a nd a 'no change' option are discussed below. 
These options must be linked to the estimated budget alloca ted to the new instrument 
(EUR 631 million). 
4.1. Option 0: No further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Instrument) 
Some cooperation activities in nuclear safe ty could be included in the geographical 
cooperation instruments and be implemented as such. However this would create 
 
EN 19   EN difficulties regarding the legal basis of the respective instruments, as nuclear safety falls 
under the Euratom framework. 
4.2. Option 1: ’No change’ (cooperation with third countries would continue in the 
framework of the existi ng INSC Regulation) 
The necessary fine-tuning of the cooperation framework, in view of the developments 
and lessons learnt as well as the need to refocus the implementation of the Regulation 
could be taken account of in the preparation of the Strategy Papers. However this option would not allow for a revision of the geogr aphic scope and for a new setting of the 
criteria for cooperation and priorities in th e regulation. In addition, it would not be in 
line with the proposed budget. 
4.3. Option 2: Amend the INSC Regulation 
An amended Regulation may provide for ta king into account the evolution of the 
international situation on nuclear safety, fo r incorporating the le ssons learnt and the 
criteria for cooperation. This would perm it a clearer understandi ng of the limits of 
intervention when considering cooperation pr ojects, leading to a simplification and a 
more efficient decision-making process than  is the case for the existing regulation. 
The amended regulation could al so provide for a re vision of the geogr aphical scope to 
include the countries in the pre-accession process (currently  covered by the Instrument 
for Pre-Accession (IPA)) whenever such an ex tension proves to be  relevant (e.g. for 
supporting nuclear regulations for countries which decided to embark into nuclear 
energy production, prevention of illicit trafficking of nucle ar materials). However IPA 
will continue to be used for actions that support the candidate countries and potential 
candidates in order to be eventually in line with the EU acquis, i. e. the Euratom Treaty 
and related Euratom Council Directives plus the International Conventions to which the 
EU is a party. 
The geographic scope would thus include all ‘third countries’ (non EU Member States) 
which satisfy the criteria for cooperation. This option woul d include countries covered 
by the IPA as well as industrialized / high income countries. The latter should be 
included only to allow for exceptional measures  to be undertaken, for example following 
major nuclear accidents, as in the case wi th Fukushima in Japa n, if needed and 
appropriate. 
In addition, an amended Regulation could prov ide for more clarifi cation on the range of 
cooperation with countries that neither have nuclear power plants in operation nor are 
expected to embark into nuclear power progr ammes, but seek nonetheless cooperation in 
the domain of the management of radioac tive waste, decommissioning and the related 
licensing issues. 
A specific mandate to cooperate in large s cale and long-term projects for the recovery 
and management of sunken radioactive object s in the Arctic Sea or on sites with 
dispersed radioactive sources and to addre ss the remediation of uranium legacy sites 
(worldwide) could be included. Participation in internatio nal funds to address these 
issues would be fully possibl e within the foreseen budgets. 
 
EN 20   EN Detailed guidance on criteria for cooperation wi th third countries and the priorities could 
be provided in an annex to the regulation. 
4.4. Option 3: New instrument 
Safety, security and safeguards are compleme ntary. Clearly security (protection) and 
safety are closely related as safety nece ssarily contributes to wards protection. A new 
instrument could provide for a unified appr oach towards nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards (the ‘3S’) and further explore the synergies between the INSC and the IFS. In 
this case, the issues related to radiological and nuclear ma terials risk mitigation, which 
are presently addressed in the framework of the IFS, would be covered by an ‘extended’ 
INSC Regulation. 
5. ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS  
5.1. Likely economic, social and environmen tal impacts of each of the options 
Nuclear accidents may have dramatic economic , social and environmental impacts, as 
demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident ( 1986) and the Fukushima accident (2011). 
They may affect also the health of populations. Both accidents produced large 
contaminated areas, fatalities, displacemen t / resettlement of affected population and 
resulted in the need to decommission / dism antle very expensive nuclear power plants 
and to replace the lost power generating capacity. Such accidents disrupt economic and 
social life and affect the choices concer ning the energy mix in some countries 
(moratorium or phasing out nuclear energy). Furthermore they may have an impact on 
the environment as the replacement power pl ants may require, for example, the use of 
fossil fuels or hydropower.  
The EU proposed actions are intended to help prevent the occurrence of nuclear 
accidents and to minimize and mitigate their consequences (through emergency preparedness measures) should they occur. Each of the above options pursues these 
objectives. However, option 0 would be likely to disconti nue most of the on-going 
actions undertaken by the EU on nuclear safety. 
5.2. Impacts on external action, in particul ar on Policy Coherence for Development 
Except for option 0, which would discontinue cooperation on nuclear safety with third 
countries, no specific impacts are anticipated  on Policy Coherence for Development. 
However the external action in the domain of  nuclear safety would appear to be more 
effective if an amended Regul ation is adopted which would resolve the shortcomings of 
the present INSC. 
5.3. Impact in terms of management  / implementation modalities 
There appears to be no major differences in the implementation modalities of the 
Options 1, 2 and 3 outlined above. Option 3 w ould maintain the present situation and 
role of the EEAS, but Options 1 and 2, con cerning regulations whose legal basis is the 
Euratom Treaty, would imply a leading role for the Commission services both at the 
 
EN 21   EN policy definition level and at the implementati on level. In any case, coherence with EU’s 
external action and external polic y strategies must be ensured. 
Option 0 would raise major problems with the legal basis as well as implementation 
issues due to the difficulties in mobilising the necessary resources and specific expertise in the context of the geographic instruments.  
6. C
OMPARING THE OPTIONS  
6.1. Weighing of positive and negative impacts per option 
Option 0 -  limited cooperation might still be possible in the framework of the 
geographical instruments, but it would likely le ad to the discontinuation of most of the 
on-going actions on nuclear safety, includi ng cooperation with nuclear regulatory 
authorities in the EU neighbourhood countries. It would have a definite impact on the 
credibility of the EU vis-à-vis the partner c ountries with which it is already engaged in 
cooperation in the domains of nuc lear safety and safeguards.  
This option would require a multiple legal basis. During the implementation phase it 
may raise difficulties due to the requirement for specific competences on nuclear safety as well as in coordination. The fragmentation would also lead to a possible reduction in 
the visibility of the EU actions. 
Should this option be pursued, the basic objectives and th e underlying issues risk not 
being addressed by the EU.  
Option 1  - would simply extend the applicat ion of the INSC through the period 2014-
2020. It would basically leave the situation as it is, with the current problems of 
interpretation and implementation not being a ddressed in the Regulation but left to be 
defined in high-level programming documen ts (e.g. Strategy Paper and Multi-Annual 
Indicative Programme), whose definition might remain controversial and time-
consuming.  
This option has the advantage of simplifying discussion and using th e current structure 
and experience gained in the previous pe riod. However it would miss the opportunity to 
provide a clearer mandate to address cons equences of nuclear accidents (through 
dedicated mitigation activities), to better de fine the scope currently covered by the INSC 
and IFS concerning issues re lated to nuclear safeguards and to clarify the criteria and 
priorities for cooperation with third countries.  
Should this option be pursued, the outstanding issues in the implementation of the INSC 
would not be addressed or resolved. 
Option 2  - would allow the present uncertainties and inconsistencies to be resolved and 
provide the opportunity to clea rly establish the future focu s of EU cooperation in the 
domain of nuclear safety and safeguards. A revised Regulation w ould provide a clearer 
basis for the development of the Strate gy papers and Multi -annual Indicative 
Programmes. The clearer defini tion of geographic and themat ic objectives and priorities 
in the regulation itself would improve the efficiency of the implementation of the 
 
EN 22   EN instrument. A more effective and timely management of the project cycle could 
therefore be expected. 
In comparison with options 0 and 3, it woul d allow for continuity and the use of the 
experience of a well tried system, while reso lving a number of issu es which have been 
identified. This, as well as the utilization of a single legal basi s, would simplify the 
approach and the discussions on the new in strument. This appears to more than 
compensate for a possible greater coherence to  be gained by an entirely new instrument 
covering nuclear safety, securi ty and safeguards (option 3).  
Option 3  - could provide for a unified approach  towards nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards (the ‘3S’) and resolving the out standing overlapping / c onflict between the 
INSC and the IFS. However, while resolving the overlapping / conflict of interpretation between nuclear safeguards and nuclear secu rity measures (which might include not 
only illicit trafficking but also, e.g., nuclear forensics), it would maintain the need for 
close coordination with other risk mitiga tion actions (chemical and biological).  
In addition, the discussion of such a new instrument would likely be problematic and 
time-consuming due to the complexity of the dual legal basis and the prerogatives of the 
EU Member States on security matters. The adoption of a dual legal basis might also 
have an impact on the consistency with the approach on matters under the exclusive 
competences established under the Euratom Treaty (nuclear safety and safeguards). 
It appears preferable to resolve the identi fied issues by better coordination during the 
elaboration of strategy papers and the implem entation phase of separate regulations for 
the INSC and IFS. 
6.2. Trade-offs and synergies associated with the options 
Option 2 can be regarded as an  improvement of the situati on relative to option 1. If 
adopted, it is expected to simplify the impl ementation of future cooperation on nuclear 
safety and safeguards with third countries.  
Option 3 would take advantage of the sy nergies between the actions currently 
undertaken in the context of the INSC a nd IFS, however it would require complex 
negotiations and might not lead to a major simplification of the current situation (option 
1). 
6.3. Preferred option 
Option 2 appears to be the one offering the most advantageous solution while providing 
for continuity of the EU’s actions and re solving the problems experienced in the 
implementation of the current Regulation.  
7. M
ONITORING AND EVALUATION  
7.1. Core indicators of progress towards objectives  
The INSC is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for 
the EU intervention. The annual action progra mmes detail the activitie s to be carried out 
 
EN 23   EN by the EU, including the objectives pursued by  the respective actions and the expected 
results. Specific indicators are defined prior to implementation, having in mind the 
particularities of each action.  
The implementation of the actions complie s with performance-based management. 
which serves the following purposes: 
– making the most of limited resources; 
– improving decision making processes and decisions; 
– achieving transparency and accountability. 
A performance management system involves the setting of objectives, the decision of 
how to measure progress and th e selection of indicators. This implies a three stage 
process, firstly a sound analysis of the policies with a common understanding – through 
policy dialogue – of the objec tives and of the logical linka ges between the objectives, 
activities and outcomes. Next comes the questio n of identifying what can be measured in 
relation to the objectives, which of the purpos es above it serves and the availability, 
reliability and precision of statistical data, including such questions as the frequency of measurement and the use of proxy indicators. Finally the decisions  need to be codified to 
the link between the programmes, the methods of calculation, the in terpretive framework 
and the allocation of respons ibility for their provision. 
The success of the nuclear safety cooperation with third countries in achieving the above 
objectives may be assessed, inter alia, through the following results indicators. 
Results indicators
 
– Number and importance of issues identified during IAEA Integrated 
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS ) missions (concerning nuclear 
regulators); 
– Number and importance of issues iden tified during IAEA Op erational Safety 
Review Team (OSART) missions (concerning nuclear operators); 
– Number and importance of reported nuclear safety in cidents, by the 
respective country; 
– Signature and ratification of intern ational treaties and conventions; 
– Status of development and implementa tion of spent fuel and nuclear waste 
strategies; 
– For ‘emerging countries’, number and im portance of issues identified during 
IAEA IRRS missions and progress in ‘E stablishing the Safety Infrastructure 
for Nuclear Power Programme ’ (Ref IAEA DS 424). 
– Number and importance of irregularities in IAEA nuclear safeguards reports. 
 
EN 24   EN 7.2. Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements  
The European Commission's Monitoring a nd Evaluation systems are increasingly 
focussed on results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.  
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the 
implementation of projects and programmes in various ways, including wherever 
possible through field visits. Monitoring provides valuable information on progress; it 
helps managers to identify actual and potential  bottlenecks, and to take corrective action. 
External, independent experts ar e contracted to assess the performance of EU external 
actions through three different systems. Thes e assessments contribute to accountability, 
and to the improvement of ongoing intervention s; they also draw lessons from past 
experience to inform future policies and ac tions. The tools all use the internationally-
recognised OECD-DAC evaluation crit eria including (potential) impact. 
Firstly, at the project leve l, the Headquarters-managed Results Oriented Monitoring 
(ROM) system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a highly structure d, standardised methodology, independent ROM 
experts attribute grades whic h highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and 
give recommendations on how to improve effectiveness.  
Project-level evaluations, whic h are managed by the EU Delegations (when they are in 
charge of the projects), deliver a more deta iled, in depth analysis and help project 
managers to improve ongoing interventions  and prepare future ones. External, 
independent experts with thematic and ge ographic expertise are hired to conduct the 
analysis and gather feedback and evidence from all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries. 
The Commission also conducts st rategic evaluations of its policies, from programming 
and strategy to the implementation of interven tions in a specific sector (such as health, 
education etc), in a country or region, or of  a specific instrument. These evaluations are 
an important input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments and 
projects. These evaluations are all pub lished on the Commission's website and a 
summary of the findings is included in the Annual Report to the Council and the 
European Parliament.