No C 332/124 Official Journal of the European Communities 31.12. 90 
to operate when the definitive arrangements are in 
place. 
4.4. Priority should be geven to minimizing the scope 
for fraud. 
Done at Brussels, 19 September 1990. 
1. Introduction 
The Committee (Section) approves the content of the 
present proposal which seeks, in line with the con­
clusions of the ECOFIN Council meeting held on 13 
November 1989, to create a specific Community legal 
instrument for improving the effectiveness of adminis­
trative cooperation on indirect taxation (Value Added 
Tax (VAT) and excise duties). The Committee's (Sec­
tion's) approval is nevertheless subject to the following 
provisos: (a) the formalities falling on firms must be 
reduced, (b) checks must be even-handed and not 
excessively meticulous and (c) the legal basis and form 
of the Commission proposal must be revised. The argu­
ments for a directive rather than a regulation are set 
out further on. 
2. Introductory comments and explanations 
2.1. The case for the Commission proposal 
2.1.1. The proposed amendment to the draft Council 
directive supplementing the common system of VAT 4.5. The proposal for transitional arrangements 
should therefore be closely linked with the proposal 
for administrative cooperation in the field of indirect 
taxation. 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE 
and amending Directive 77/388/EEC provides for the 
establishment of a transitional VAT-based taxation 
scheme. The Commission argues that this and the pre­
sent proposal are warranted by the creation of the 
internal market and the abolition, of fiscal frontiers. 
The present proposal can, moreover, be viewed as a 
corollary of the first one. 
2.1.2. Both proposals seek to abolish checks on intra-
Community cross-border traffic as of 1 January 1993. 
The first proposal, which will be dealt with separately, 
is principally designed to maintain, with some changes, 
VAT-based taxation in the country of destination, 
although it does confirm the medium-term aim of 
changing VAT in the country of origin. The second 
proposal concerns a Regulation (rather than a Direc­
tive) which would be directly applicable in every Mem­
ber State; the explanatory memorandum and the draft 
Regulation proper indicate that the proposal springs 
from the need of strengthen existing provisions for 
administrative cooperation or mutual assistance in mat-Opinion on the proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) concerning administrative cooper­
ation in the field of indirect taxation 
(90/C 332/35) 
On 17 July 1990 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 100 A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
abovementioned proposal. 
The Committee instructed the Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Question to 
prepare its work on the subject. When work was in progress, Mr Giacomelli was appointed 
Rapporteur-General. 
At its 279th plenary session (meeting of 19 September 1990) the Economic and Social 
Committee adopted the following Opinion nem. con. with one abstention. 
31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/125 
ters of indirect taxation, the main argument being the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers. 
2.1.3. As there will no longer be any customs checks 
at intra-Community frontiers, national fiscal controls 
will be based first and foremost on the verification of 
traders' accounts for intra-Community transactions. It 
is vital that the current mutual assitance arrangements 
be backed up by 'a much more developed and compre­
hensive system of cooperation', as proposed in Council 
Directive 79/1070/EEC of 6 December 1979 (OJ No 
L 331/8). This is necessary as each Member State will 
be responsible for checking the accounts of its own 
taxable persons, in order not only to curtail the risk 
of evasion and irregularities, particularly under the 
transitional arrangements, but also to ensure that the 
tax is collected in the country of destination, i.e. where 
the goods are consumed. Appropriate arrangements 
were provided for in document COM(87) 323 of 5 
August 1987 on the introduction of a VAT clearing 
mechanism for intra-Community sales (cf. Section 9.1). 
The idea of a clearing house has been dropped in the 
meantime, but the abolition of fiscal frontiers, to be 
accompanied by the abolition of the Single Administrat­
ive Document (SAD) accompanying goods principally 
for the purposes of fiscal control, nevertheless requires 
an improvement in administrative cooperation, which 
has hitherto been confined to mutual assistance in the 
event of evasion or suspected evasion. 
2.1.4. Finally, the Commission refers of the con­
clusions of the ECOFIN Council of 13 November 1989: 
the Council ruled out the idea of country-of-origin 
based taxation in the near future, due to major disagree­
ments between Member States inter alia on (a) the 
principles and procedures for concomitant alignment of 
VAT rates and (b) compensation arrangements between 
debtor and creditor States. The Council did, however, 
accept the need for checks to ensure effective protection 
against the risk of evasion. These arrangements would 
essentially be based on (a) national monitoring of busi­
ness returns, (b) regular information exchange and (c) 
the communication of documentation established by 
the administration. The Council felt that administrative 
cooperation 'must not give rise to any obstacle on 
grounds of national legislation and will supplement 
existing mutual assistance procedures'. 
2.1.5. The Commission views the present proposal 
as a major component of the three-tier measures: (i) 
transitional VAT scheme, (II) administrative cooper­
ation, (iii) statistics, designed to eliminate controls at 
intra-Community frontiers in the Internal Market as of 
1 January 1993. The legislation must effectively combat evasion and also help build up trust between the admin­
istrations responsible for applying the new arrange­
ments. At her press conference on 8 May 1990, Com­
missioner Scrivener pointed out that such trust was 
necessary both for the transitional and the final VAT 
scheme; the final scheme should in theory replace the 
transitional one from 1 January 1997, following an 
overall examination of the matter by the Council to 
determine, on the Commission's proposal, arrange­
ments for final standardization of the common VAT 
system (cf. COM(90) 152 final—SYN 274 of 19 June 
1990, point 3). 
2.2. Current situation 
2.2.1. The proposal covers administrative cooper­
ation on indirect taxation. It should be noted that 
Community legislation does not yet provide for mutual 
assistance in the administration of excise duties as it 
does in the case of VAT. In accordance with Articles 1 
and 2, the Regulation therefore had to make express 
reference to these excise duties. In the event, the indirect 
taxes concerned are listed in Article 5, title II: value-
added tax; excise duty on manufactured tobacco prod­
ucts; excise duty on alcoholic beverages and alcohol 
contained in other products; excise duty on mineral 
oils. Consequently titles I, III et seq. implicitly apply 
also to administrative cooperation and to exchange of 
information on such duties. 
2.2.2. For administrative cooperation on VAT, the 
Commission decided to invoke the legislative frame­
work provided by Council Directive 79/1070/EEC (cf. 
2.1.3 above) concerning mutual assistance by the com­
petent authorities of the Member States in the field of 
indirect taxation. 
2.2.3. The Commission also cited two other refer­
ences: (i) Regulation (EEC) No 1468/81 on mutual 
assistance in customs and agricultural matters, as 
amended by Regulation (EEC) No 945/87, and (ii) the 
1967 Naples Convention which provides for mutual 
assistance between customs administrations, but is not 
a Community instrument. 
2.2.4. If, as the Commission states, current Com­
munity legislation on mutual assistance provides a 
sound basis for administrative cooperation on VAT, it 
would appear that these measures have not been widely 
deployed, as Member States have decided that their 
own national checking procedures, using import and 
export documents, are adequate for effective control. 
2.2.5. Information received from the relevant autho­
rities, does indeed indicate that these instruments, 
namely Council Directive 79/1070/EEC—have only 
No C 332/126 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
been used haphazardly, in cases of evasion or suspected 
evasion, and within the limits set down in Article 7(2) 
(provisions relating to secrecy) and 8 (limits to exchange 
of information) of Council Directive 77/799/EEC on 
assistance in matters of direct taxation, extended to 
VAT by Directive 79/1070/EEC. 
2.2.6. Administrative cooperation is due to become 
standard practice once fiscal frontiers have been 
removed; it will be part of a system of checking pro­
cedures based on Member States' own 'a posteriori' 
checks of tax declarations. Current arrangements are 
based on 'a priori' checks of transactions by the cus­
toms. The Commission holds the view that it can fulfil 
the mandate assigned by the Council by proposing a 
new legal instrument to improve administrative cooper­
ation between Member States on indirect taxation. 
2.3. The arrangements to apply from 1 January 1993 
2.3.1. Checks will be carried out under national tax 
arrangements and will be based on a posteriori verifi­
cation of tax declarations. 
2.3.2. Periodical VAT declarations show: 
— total VAT payments and deductions, 
— the volume of intra-Community sales and pur­
chases. 
This is sufficient to process VAT. 
2.3.3. Checks are carried out on firms' accounts (on 
the spot and on the basis of documentation) thus 
allowing: 
— checks on firms stocks, 
— checks on exemption conditions in connection with 
the shipment of foods to another Member State, 
— order forms, 
— invoices, 
— certificates, 
— transport documents. 
2.3.4. Improved cooperation between adminis­
trations will allow: 
— mutual assistance in cases of evasion or suspected 
evasion, 
— 'on request' cooperation in respect of routine 
checks, 
— spontaneous assistance and communication of 
information. 
2.3.5. Provision has been made, inter alia, for admin­
istrations to make reciprocal checks by means of ran­
dom sampling, on whether a declared export is matched 
by an equivalent import and vice versa. Any infor­
mation requested in this way must be communicated 
to the applicant Member State within 3 months. 2.3.6. The reduction in paperwork (such as abolition 
of the transit advice note, soon to be followed by 
abolition of the SAD) will thus be reflected in firms' 
statistics. Proposals in this sphere, such as the amended 
proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the stat­
istics relating to the trading of goods between Member 
States (COM(90) 177 final—SYN 181 of 27 June 1990), 
mean that the SAD (with up to 55 entries) will be 
replaced by a form comprising only 10 statistical entries 
for the largest firms (under 20% of Community firms). 
Other firms, however, will only have to supply two 
additional figures in their periodical VAT declarations, 
i.e. their total Community imports and total Com­
munity exports. 
2.3.7. In the absence of any indication to the con­
trary, the impression prevails that the proposed instru­
ment will apply to both the transitional and final 
schemes, irrespective of the decisions taken by the 
Council on VAT or excise duties. 
2.3.8. Notwithstanding recent Commission pro­
posals on excise duties (heavely criticized by the Com­
mittee in its Opinions on these proposals: CES 1328/ 
89, CES 63/90, CES 135/90 and CES 275/90 of 5 July 
1990), the proposed arrangements seem even less con­
crete than those on VAT; in any case, the tax will 
continue to be charged in the country of destination, 
i.e. where the goods are consumed. The operation of 
integrated monitoring systems for goods attracting axc-
ise duty and being transported under exemption 
arrangements still has to be defined in detail. The 
Commission merely notes that the cooperation arrange­
ments here will have to be similar to those for VAT. 
2.4. Administrative cooperation 
There will be two distinct but related types of cooper­
ation under the new legal instrument. 
2.4.1. Existing mutual assistance procedures for 
dealing with cases of evasion or serious irregularity 
(still to be defined) will be continued. These procedures 
will operate largely on a bilateral basis, but will need 
to be incorporated into a Community framework and 
codified in a Community instrument (regulation). 
2.4.2. Furthermore, a new type of administrative 
cooperation is to be introduced in order to achieve the 
principal goal of the present proposal: to exchange 
31. 12. 90 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 332/127 
information for the purposes of checking intra-Com-
munity transactions subject to VAT and excise duties, 
after fiscal checks at intra-Community frontiers have 
been abolished. 
2.4.3. Provision has been made for three categories 
of assistance: 
2.4.3.1. assistance on request, where the initiative 
lies with the applicant authority; 
2.4.3.2. automatic assistance, where both applicant 
and requested authorities agree in advance to exchange 
information; 
2.4.3.3. spontaneous assistance, where one authority 
deems it necessary to take the initiative without being 
requested to do so. 
Assistance on request is and will probably remain the 
most frequently used category. 
3. General comments: remarks on the content and 
form of the proposal 
3.1. If the system is to operate flexibly and without 
excessive evasion, closer cooperation between national 
indirect tax authorities will be vital once fiscal controls 
and formalities have been abolished in the run-up to 
the Internal Market; this will undoubtedly hold true 
for both transitional (as proposed by the Commission) 
and definitive arrangements (to be adopted by the 
Council after examination of the Commission's ad hoc 
suggestions, for implementation by 1 January 1997). 
3.2. The current legal basis for the proposal is Article 
100A of the Treaty; this is dubious insofar as it is 
intended to disregard Article 100A (2) wich states that 
'paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions'. It 
seems that the Commission intends to circumvent the 
unanimity rule by implicitly giving a restrictive 
interpretation of the derogation contained in paragraph 
2 and deciding that paragraph 1 will apply irrespective 
of paragraph 2; the Commission view is that since the 
proposed measures to step up administrative cooper­
ation on indirect taxation are purely executive they 
only require a qualified majority. This is by no means 
certain; fiscal provisions cover the tax, its introduction, 
assessment basis, rate, establishment and collection; 
close scrutiny of the Commission proposal reveals that 
it deals specifically with the establishment of the taxes, 
in that Article 1 introduces cooperation between admin­
istrations and with the Commission in order to ensure 
(a) compliance with legislation on indirect taxation and 
(b) correct establishment of the taxes. 3.3. Moreover, it is reasonable to ask why no refer­
ence has been made to Article 99 of the Treaty since, 
within the framework of wider improved administrative 
cooperation which implies the correct assessment of 
indirect taxes, the proposed new provisions broach the 
issue of aligment of legislation on turnover taxes, excise 
duties and other indirect taxes, insofar as such aligment 
is necessary to secure the establishment and operation 
of the Internal Market within the deadline set in Article 
8A (which is not disputed here). In any case, point 5 of 
the explanatory memorandum does not provide con­
vincing arguments for using Article 100A as the legal 
basis. If the Commission has opted for a regulation 
instead of a directive it should be aware that regulations 
can also be adopted under Article 99. In any case and 
in the absence of more convincing arguments to the 
contrary, Article 99 appears to provide the most appro­
priate bedrock for the proposal. 
3.3.1. It is extremely significant to point out here 
that in reply to a question raised by the ad hoc group 
on the abolition of fiscal frontiers, the EC Council's 
legal service issued an Opinion on 16 July last stating 
categorically that 'Article 99 of the EC Treaty is the 
proper legal basis for application of the Commission 
proposal.' The Opinion contained highly pertinent 
arguments which in some respects overlapped with 
those put forward by the Committee (Section). 
3.4 It is equally debatable whether a regulation is 
the best and most appropriate instrument for this case. 
Assistance between fiscal administrations in applying 
tax legislation to individuals or taxable persons (Article 
7(2) and Article 9 of teh proposal) and in assessing the 
correct tax in most Member States requires statutory 
legislation rather than executive action. In other words, 
whether or not procedures such as this Commission 
proposal are enacted will depend on (a) national parlia­
ments and (b) Member States' unanimity. 
A regulation would be directly applicable to the individ­
ual, and would give no role to the Member State; 
the proposal in question provides for contact between 
taxable persons via their respective Member States, 
with no Community involvement; so there is no need 
for a Regulation, nor would one be warranted. Point 
16 of the explanatory memorandum is not a strong 
enough argument for a Regulation on its own. 
The most appropriate legal instrument is therefore a 
Directive based on Treaty Article 99, both in terms of 
interpretation of the Treaty [(fiscal provisions as set 
out in Article 100A(2)] and in terms of the proposal's 
content. 
No C 332/128 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
Moreover, close examination of Article 19 of the pro­
posal (consultation and coordination procedures) 
reveals optional arrangements, vague measures, unde­
termined procedures all of which leave a considerable 
amount of latitude more appropriate to a Directive but 
incompatible with a Regulation which is interpreted 
literally and is directly applicable. This is yet another 
argument for a Directive, together with the fact that 
the instrument which the present proposal is designed 
to replace (Article 22 of the proposal repeals this text) 
is also a Directive. 
4. Specific comments 
4.1. Second recital * 
— The second recital is based on false premises i.e. it 
refers to 'fiscal harmonization measures taken for 
completion of the Internal Market'; in the current 
situation this is controversial at the very least; a 
Regulation adopted by the Council under these 
conditions would subsequently expose it to restric­
tions to which it had implicitly subscribed and 
which would prejudge a final decision which was 
its prerogative. This recital should therefore be 
amended to read as follows: 'whereas in order to 
give full effect to the abolition of frontier controls 
while avoiding fiscal revenue losses for Member 
States, the measures taken for the transitional period 
in the interests of completing the Internal Market 
require the establishment... etc' 
4.2. Third recital 
— The third recital quite rightly refers to provisions 
whose objective is, by setting up a cooperation 
system, to abolish frontier controls in line with 
Article 8A of the Treaty. This is in fact the aim of 
the present proposal which, contrary to the second 
recital, cannot invoke fiscal alignment measures 
which have not yet been taken; notwithstanding the 
third recital, the proposal effectively provides for 
an alignement of fiscal measures under the terms of 
Article 100A (2); as indirect taxation is involved, 
the legal basis of Article 99 then comes into play. 
4.3. Eleventh (penultimate) recital 
— The second last recital lists instances where a Mem­
ber State is entitled to refuse to undertake research 
or supply information; these same cases, however, 
are not listed in Article 18 and paragraph 1 of 
this Article cites only one example, namely the 
likelihood of prejudicing public policy! Conse­
quently this oversight should be remedied by com­
pleting the list in Article 18 (1). 4.4. Article 1 
As has already been pointed out in the general com­
ments, the proposal in question effectively entails the 
harmonization of fiscal provisions insofar as it seeks, 
through cooperation between the administrative autho­
rities responsible in the Member States for the appli­
cation of the indirect tax legislation, to ensure com­
pliance with such legislation as well as a correct asses-
ment of the taxes in question. Article 1 thus inexplicitly 
brings into play EEC Treaty Article 99 which is con­
cerned with the harmonization of legislation on indirect 
taxation. 
4.5. Article 3 
Article 3 provides for the logical and necessary cooper­
ation beetween the competent authorities of the Mem­
ber States. Except in special cases, such cooperation 
will be mainly bilateral in kind. The Commission is 
also involved, insofar as Community legislation is or 
will be affected and steps have to be taken to ensure 
compliance with Community provisions on indirect 
taxation. 
The second paragraph of Article 3 states at the end 
that the competent authorities shall communicate 'any 
specific or general information to the Commission when 
this may be of interest at Community level'. It would 
be helpful here if the Commission would make clear 
exactly what type of information it has in mind. Vague 
wording is out of place in proposals as far-reaching as 
this. 
4.6. Article 5 
Article 5, which deals with administrative assistance, is 
concerned with requests made by the applicant authori­
ty to the requested authority to divulge all information 
necessary to ensure compliance with the legislation on 
indirect taxation. The Article then lists the taxes and 
duties falling within the scope of the proposal: VAT 
plus excise duties on manufactured tobacco products, 
alcoholic beverages and mineral oils. Would it not have 
been better to have defined the scope of the proposal 
in Article 1 rather than in Article 5 so that the reader 
would have got his bearings right from the start ? 
Article 5 would also be more complete if it were to 
incorporate the second sentence of Article 2(1) of Direc­
tive 77/799/EEC on mutual assistance in the field of 
direct taxation (now equally applicable, via Directive 
79/1070/EEC, to mutual assistance in the field of 
indirect taxation) which states that the requested autho­
rity need not comply with the request if it appears that 
the applicant authority 'has not exhausted its own usual 
sources of information which it could have utilized, 
according to the circumstances, to obtain the infor­
mation requested without running the risk of endanger­
ing the attainment of the sought after result'. 
Assistance on request will no doubt be the most fre­
quently used type of cooperation during the transitional 
period. 
351. LL^ COfficial]oumal of the European Communities ^oC3o5^1^ 
^.7. Ar^^7 
Articl^^d^als with cases of coordinated tax examine 
ations where two or more authorities haveacommon 
orrelatedintererst^eachinitsownterritory^in examine 
ing the indirect tax affairs ofaperson or persons with 
avicw to exchanging the information whichthey so 
obtain. It is questionable whether such a provision 
can be effective if^ as the first paragraph states^each 
authority involved shall decide whether or not itwishes 
to participate inaparticular coordinated tax examine 
ation5Thc provision should at least set out the criteria 
which can justify a party wishing to opt out of a 
coordinated tax examination. 
This Article is concerned with the information referred 
to in Article^being exchanged automatically^regularly 
and withoutprior request ^for categories of cases which 
shall be determined by the competent authorities under 
the procedures laid down in Article 1^5 
Itisnoteasyto^xpressaviewontheexactscopeof 
Article llsince it is anoutline provision and certain 
parts still remain to be clarified under the procedures 
laid down. 
This provision is initially confusing. It would therefore 
help to word it more clearly so that the uninitiated can 
understand it better. 
^.10. A^^^^ 
Likeanumber of other provisions^ this paragraph suf^ 
f^rs from the uncertainty surrounding Article 1^. 
^.11. ATT^^on 
Are the^other member ^tates^who are to receive the 
information referred to in paragraphs 1 and ^ the 
member ^tat^s actually affected or concerned by such 
informations If this is the case^ then it should be spelt 
out in paragraph 3. 
Comment is inappropriate here as the first part of 
Article 1^(1) depends on arrangements still to beagreed 
under the procedures laid down in Article 1^. 
Article 1^) should also make provision for refusals to 
supply informations with an obligation on the requested 
authoritytostateitsreasons (e.g. when the requestfrom 
an applicant authority is accompanied by an application fromacourt authority).Refusal to supply information 
is moreover provided for in Directive 77B7^BEEC on 
mutual assistance in the field of direct taxation (which 
through ^^eTive ^Blt^uB^EC likewise regulates 
mutual assistance in the field of indirecttaxation). 
^t.13. A^^r^ 
Phis important Article is difficult tointerpret. It is 
therefore regrettable that its provisions likewise depend 
on procedures which still remain to be determined 
under the provisions laid down in Article 1^ which are 
moreover insufficiently explicit. 
^BP4 A^^r7 
Phe opening lines of Article 17(1) expressly state that 
any information communicated shall be ofaconflden^ 
rial nature and shallbe covered by the obligationof 
professional secrecy.This would seem to be redundant 
since access to such information is to be confined 
exclusively to civil servants who are bound to secrecy 
by their termsof employment. The wordingof the 
equivalent provision ^Article 7(1) of the directive on 
mutual assistance in the field of directtaxation^ likewise 
applicable to indirect taxation through directive 
7^B1070BPPC)1 is clearer and more concise and so 
should be incorporated lock^ stock and barrel in 
Article 17(1) of the present proposal. 
It has already been pointed out in paragraph^above 
that Article 1^(1) is incomplete insofar as it cites only 
one of the reasons given in the eleventh (penultimate) 
recital ofthe proposal entitling^lember states to refuse 
to carry out enquiries or to provide information. Apart 
from thecasewherethe provision ofinformation would 
be contrary to public policy^the recital also states that 
a^lember^tate has the right of refusal where its laws 
prevent its indirect tax administration from undertake 
ing such enquiries or from collecting or using such 
information for its ownpurposes (the^own accounts 
use of information originating rather in Articled). 
Article 1^(1) should therefore becompleted accords 
ingly. 
^.1^. A^^el^ 
Given the uncertainties which pervade this outline pro^ 
vision concerning as yet unspecified consultation and 
coordination procedures^ not to mention other reasons 
given under the general comments^ it is virtually incon^ 
ceivablethataRegularion should be proposed as the 
legal instrument for administrative cooperarioninth^ 
field of indirect taxation when a directive—which 
would also repeal and replace an existing directive on 
the same subject—would bemore appropriate. ProD 
visions such as those in Article!^ are more appropriate 
for a L^lrecrive than a Regulation which must 
No C 332/130 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 90 
be based on criteria of clarity, precision and literal 
interpretation. This is all the more so since taxation is 
concerned. 
It would also undoubtedly have been simpler to invoke 
Article 9 of the Directive on mutual assistance in the 
field of direct taxation (likewise valid for indirect tax­
ation), incorporating it, mutatis mutandis, into the pre­
sent proposal and leaving Member States and their 
competent authorities as much freedom as possible to 
work out the actual details of cooperation, subject to 
observance of the principles of subsidiarity and national 
fiscal sovereignty. 
4.17. General comment 
In the light of the above comments, the word 'Regu­
lation' should be replaced by 'Directive' in the various 
clauses of the new proposal. 
4.18. Final comment 
The Committee would stress that, in order to ensure 
the successful abolition of tax frontiers on 1 January 
1983, there must be neither discussion nor deferred 
decision in the Council on the package of three measur­
es relating respectively to the transitional VAT arrange-
Done at Brussels, 19 September 1990. ments [COM(90) 182 final], administrative cooperation 
in the field of indirect taxation [COM(90) 183 final] 
and statistics relating to the trading of goods between 
Member States [COM(90) 177 final]. The three pro­
posals are closely interlinked and the relevant dis­
cussions and decisions should occur simultaneously. 
5. Conclusion 
Assuming that Directive 79/1070/EEC of 6 December 
1979, even if duly amended, will be unable to cope with 
the situation prevailing after 1 January 1993 (when 
there will be a system of ex post facto tax controls, 
following the abolition of checks on intra-Community 
crossborder traffic), it is necessary and indeed essential 
to step up mutual assistance and administrative cooper­
ation in the field of indirect taxation. Subject to the 
above comments, the Committee (Section) therefore 
endorses the Commission's proposals on the assump­
tion that definitive solutions will eventually be found 
in the fields of taxation, administrative cooperation and 
intra-Community trade statistics, thus ensuring that tax 
revenue is justly and equitably equitably allocated to 
the entitled parties, i.e. the Member State where the 
goods in question are finally consumed, without a com­
plex, expensive compensatory mechanism on which the 
Committee expressed such strong reservations in its 
Opinion (ESC 742/88) of 7 July 1988 on document 
[COM(87] 323 (cf. paragraph 2.1.3 above). 
The Chairman 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
Alberto MASPRONE