7.8.2001 EN C 221/31 Official Journal of the European Communities
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on action by Member States concerning public service requirementsand the award of public service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and inland
waterway’
(2001/C 221/04)
On 20 October 2000 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 71 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.
The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 May 2001. The rapporteur was
Mr Garcı ´a Alonso and the co-rapporteur Mr von Schwerin.
At its 382nd plenary session (meeting of 30 May 2001) the Economic and Social Committee unanimously
adopted the following opinion.
1. Introduction 1.5. In the passenger transport sector, certain public service
obligations are imposed on operators, including the obligationto operate, the obligation to carry and tariff obligations (
1),
e.g. to cover a particular geographical area (containing zones
1.1. The aim of this Regulation is to enhance legal certainty of both high and low or very low user density) or to provide a
by creating a harmonised framework for exclusive rights and certain quality of service (e.g. frequency); which the operator,
State aid in passenger transport, thereby ensuring that they are if it were considering its own commercial interests, would not
compatible with the single market in the transport sector. assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the
same conditions (2). In return for these obligations, which
usually form part of a concession, the operator is granted:
1.2. As is pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to
the proposal, the situation varies considerably from one
Member State to another: some markets are open to compe-
tition (on the basis of tendering for public service contracts of— exclusive rights for that area. The reason for these
varying duration), while in a substantial number of countries exclusive rights is to provide a service and to compensate
there is no competition as the markets are closed; in onethe operator, in part or in full, for the additional costscountry, part of the market is totally deregulated. In addition,occasioned by certain routes or special conditions. The
there are public and private enterprises (this is mentioned only exclusive rights give the operator security and mean that
in the explanatory memorandum), often competing togethercosts can be offset within its concession area, thusin the same market segments.encouraging the provision of more regular and reliable
services;
1.3. Passenger transport may be divided into three broad
categories:
— and/or financial compensation for the costs incurred in
meeting the public service requirements. — urban transport;
— inter-urban transport, with three sub-categories: peri-
urban transport (local transport to surrounds of large
cities); long-distance transport (linking widely spaced
major population centres); and regional transport (linksto rural or thinly populated areas);
(1) The obligation to operate is the obligation for transport undertak-
ings to ensure the provision of a transport service satisfying fixed — occasional transport (e.g. school or works buses); on
standards of continuity, regularity and capacity. The obligation toaccount of its nature such transport is liberalised andcarry is the obligation for transport undertakings to accept andtherefore not covered by this Regulation.carry passengers and goods at specified rates and subject tospecified conditions. The tariffs obligation is the obligation fortransport undertakings to apply, in particular for certain categoriesof passengers (...) or on certain routes, rates fixed or approved by
1.4. Clearly each of these categories of transport has itsan authority which are contrary to the commercial interests of
own economic and social characteristics which must be taken the undertaking and which result from the imposition of, or
into account when framing the legislation which is to govern refusal to modify, special tariff provisions.
(2) Article 2, Council Regulation (EEC) 1191/69. them.
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1.6. This makes for relatively fair tariffs (which are also — the costs of maintaining coordination between the
operator and the manager of the infrastructure covered by the concession contracts) for different groups of
users, irrespective of the real cost of providing the service. In would exceed the benefits accruing from the bid;
addition, in certain cases, the concessionary arrangements may
provide for supplementary aid to keep down tariffs. It is— where an operator provides transport services other thanimportant to highlight the word ‘tariffs’ because what it meansrail transport but they are integrated with directly awardedis that the operator cannot unilaterally set the prices whichrail services;users have to pay; they are set (and adjusted) by the relevant
authority as stipulated in the concession contract.
— for public service contracts with an annual value of less
than EUR 400 000 (or in the case of a network, less than
EUR 800 000);
— with an exclusive right, provided that no financial com- 1.7. This Regulation covers the organisation of various
pensation is given and it involves modes of transport (rail, road and inland waterway) and the
aforementioned categories, insofar as the authorities grant
exclusive rights to operators, impose minimum requirements— a new service, oror grant compensation for providing services. Transport modes
which do not meet any of these three requirements are
— an individual route which is awarded on the basis of therefore excluded from the scope of the Regulation.
quality criteria.
1.8. Four of the Regulation’s chapters concern: ensuring 1.12. Finally, some safeguards are established for the auth-
the quality of public passenger transport, public service ority: a requirement to subcontract a defined proportion of
contracts, minimum criteria for public passenger transport the total contract, the possibility of not awarding new contracts
operation, and procedural issues. to an operator who controls more than 25 % of the passenger
transport market, a requirement to keep on staff who worked
for the operator which held the concession previously, arequirement for the operator to establish itself in the Member
State in question, save as otherwise stipulated in Article 71
ECT.1.9. Ensuring the quality of public passenger transport
involves criteria such as: safety, frequency, punctuality, accessi-
bility for persons with reduced mobility, environmental factors,
and the transport needs of people living in less denselypopulated areas. Further criteria are integration with other1.13. The minimum criteria for providing services will betransport modes and the level and transparency of tariffs.applied without discrimination to all transport services of a
similar character in the area for which a single authority isresponsible. These minimum criteria may include compen-
sation, provided that any limitation on tariffs applies only to
certain categories of passenger, that the compensation doesnot exceed 20 % of the value of that operator’s services in 1.10. Public service contracts are compulsory in all cases
that area, and that compensation is granted on a non- where financial compensation is given for the expenditure
discriminatory basis. In this case the compensation granted in incurred in meeting the public service requirements and where
accordance with this Regulation will be exempt from the exclusive rights are guaranteed. Public service contracts are
notification procedure laid down in Article 88(3) ECT for State generally awarded by tender. These concessionary contracts
aid. have a maximum duration of five years, though a number of
derogations are provided for. Operators must furnish econ-
omic and social information annually for each route.
1.14. The purpose of the procedural provisions is to
safeguard the transparency and fairness of the whole process
and its compatibility with the rules governing public contracts
1.11. Public service contracts may be awarded directly on a in the single market.
case-by-case basis for any rail, metro or light rail initiative:
— provided that it can be shown that:
1.15. Finally, the transitional measures include a general
period of three years (with certain exceptions) for terminating
arrangements which do not comply with the proposed Regu- — it would be impossible to meet national or inter-
national rail safety standards, or lation.
7.8.2001 EN C 221/33 Official Journal of the European Communities
2. General comments 2.7. With particular reference to the Commission Com-
munication ‘Services of General Interest in Europe’ (1)o f
20.9.2000, the Committee suggests underpinning the import-
ance of general interest services by means of better instruments.
2.1. The Committee shares the thinking behind this Regu- For instance, where a decision has to be made between
lation as set down in recital 7: ‘with appropriate safeguards, the tendering or derogation (direct award), every Member Stateintroduction of regulated competition between Community should be free — in the case of services which this State defines
operators in this sector leads to more attractive services’. as of general interest within the meaning of Commission
Communication COM(2000) 580 — to decide whether it
wants to create additional criteria for amending its legislation
in order to improve its transport system.
2.2. The Committee welcomes the Commission’s intention
of introducing a market regime for public passenger transport
based on controlled rather than full competition. 2.8. This amendment would also respond better to the
question-mark still hanging over the draft Regulation, namely
compliance with the subsidiarity principle. In the Committee’sview, the arguments advanced so far by the Commission for
2.3. The Committee basically approves the most important direct responsibility for local public passenger transport do
regulatory instruments listed in the Regulation, in particular: not hold water.
— the obligation for the competent authorities to provide2.9. Greater respect for the competences of the Memberadequate public passenger services;States on the basis of the Communication on general interest
services would also meet the arguments of those Member— the establishment of quality criteria;States which, in the case of local public passenger transport,
invoke the fundamental rights of local authorities as laid down
in their constitutions (e.g. Germany). — financial compensation that covers expenditure incurred
in meeting the public service requirements;
2.10. In the interests of improving and helping to stream-— compensation for the cost of public services;line the proposed Regulation, the Committee would neverthe-
less set out the following comments:
— the granting of exclusive rights (for a specified period);
— the organisation of competition through tendering, with
appropriate derogations. 3. Chapter I — Scope and definitions
These instruments serve the Commission’s intention — sup-3.1. Article 2 — Relationship to public procurement lawported by the Committee — of achieving an optimum balance
between public mission and the competition principle.
3.1.1. With an eye to Article 12 of the draft Regulation,
which concerns a special award procedure, Article 2 should be
deleted. It is more important to spell out clearly the award2.4. The Committee also notes with satisfaction that hence-provisions in Article 12. The present wording of Article 2forth equality of opportunity and competition between allcould lead to demarcation problems and consequent legaltypes of enterprise, irrespective of their legal form, will beuncertainty.achieved through legal and accounting transparency.
3.2. Article 3 — Definitions
2.5. However, the Committee cannot conceal the fact that
it is sceptical as to whether the arrangements laid down for
applying the specified resources and instruments will result in 3.2.1. The scope of the ‘public service requirement’ is not
practice in a cohesive balance between public mission and defined clearly. The Committee would have preferred to retain
competitive market regulation. the definition of ‘public service obligation’ laid down in
Regulation (EEC) 1191/69, namely: ‘“Public service obli-
gations” means obligations which the transport undertaking in
question, if it were considering its own commercial interests,
2.6. While the Committee regards the instruments for would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or
regulating competition, especially the tendering procedure, as under the same conditions’.
very practical and solid, the derogations and quality criteria are
rather imprecise and unwieldy. They need to be considerably
(1) COM(2000) 580 final of 20.9.2000. expanded and clarified.
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3.2.2. The Committee further proposes widening the defi- to flow of passengers, level of comfort provided for
customers, the extent of the network and the service nition so that ‘integrated services’ covers several operators
cooperating on the same terms, e.g. in a transport consortium information that is provided;
owned by the same body.
(c) integration between different transport services, including
integration of information, tariffs, ticketing, timetables,
consumer rights and the use of interchanges in the
3.2.3. The following definitions are imprecise and need geographical area under the responsibility of the com-
reformulating or are missing altogether: petent authorities and with operators designated by other
competent authorities;
— competent authority: replace ‘State body’ by ‘public body’;
(new letter) the provision, where necessary, of inte-— the term ‘route’ used in various articles, and ‘individualgrated intermodal services;route’ in Article 8, should be defined precisely. At all
events the latter term should also encompass regional(f) the balanced development of regions and coordinationservices.with long-distance transport services;
(g) the transport needs of people living in less densely
populated areas, including the ability to propose appro-
priate innovative solutions without any deterioration in
the service provided (choice of mode, method and 4. Chapter II — Ensuring the quality of public passenger
adaptation of the service, ticketing); transport
(h) passenger health and safety, cleanliness and hygiene of
equipment, safety of passengers and goods;
(i) the qualifications of the staff, in particular those with 4.1. Article 4
responsibility for safety;
4.1.1. For the ESC it is not enough to establish criteria (new letter) respect for collective agreements
for the ‘qualifications’ of staff; it is necessary to meet the and/or labour regulations in force in
requirements of the directives on minimum social standards in the sector concerned;
general, e.g. working time and rest periods.
(new letter) having a system for maintaining equip-
ment and facilities that ensures the4.1.2. Generally speaking the Committee regards the pre-reliability of the transport services onsent wording of Article 4 as too weak on the actual qualitya daily basis;criteria. The Commission should once again consider whether
it should not recommend specific Europe-wide minimum
criteria for services in conurbations as well as rural areas.(new letter) the financial strength of the companyThought should also be given, in the interests of best practice,and existence of an adequate system ofto organising a permanent information exchange on theguarantees to cover claims by thirdquality of local transport and to using benchmarking. Oneparties.such example is ELTIS (European Local Transport Information
Service — www.eltis.org).
4.1.3. Nor is it clear what the connection is between quality 5. Chapter III — Public service contracts
criteria and the corresponding obligation to finance the costs
which cannot be covered by fares. A clear obligation must becreated whereby quality requirements must be part-financed
5.1. Article 6 — Award of public service contracts by public funds if the receipts from fares are not enough.
5.1.1. Article 6(b): the stipulation that the operator has to
4.1.4. The Committee would suggest amending Article 4(2) meet certain costs in full is unworkable in the Committee’s
as follows: view as ticket revenue may depend to such an extent on
transport policies that such costs cannot be adequately covered.
The Committee therefore calls for the deletion of Article 6(b). (a) consumer protection factors including the accessibility of
the services, in terms of their frequency, speed, punctu- Tariffs will also be subject to negotiation between operators
and the authorities. ality, reliability, capacity of the resources used in relation
7.8.2001 EN C 221/35 Official Journal of the European Communities
5.1.2. Article 6(c): the five-year limit on public service to be opened up to new competitors, especially in very closed
sectors or countries. In this respect the five-year period contracts is too low and should be raised. The derogations
provided for in (c) already make it clear that five years is not provided for in the Regulation would generally seem too short.
There is in addition the need to avoid any threat to jobs, which long enough. Moreover, these derogations are worded so
imprecisely that it will be difficult for the operator to claim would have an adverse impact on service quality and safety.them vis-à-vis the competent authority. The depreciation
period for buses, for instance, is currently far more than five
years. In the Committee’s view the duration of contracts should 5.1.6. Seen in this light, the derogation criteria are too
be such as to guarantee exclusive rights for a period long general and not tailored to the different categories of passenger
enough to enable operators to recover their investment, and service defined in point 1.3. The Committee suggests fixing
should be from eight to fifteen years depending on the type of the duration of the concession on a case-by-case basis,
service (see point 1.3). differentiating between the various categories of service and
passenger transport modes; seeking in each case to strike the
optimum balance between more intensive competition, withrapid renewal of concession contracts, and longer periods of
exclusive rights allowing tariffs to be geared to the long term.
This would also make it possible to reduce the considerablediscretionary powers allowed by the extensive special con-
ditions provided for in the Regulation, even though they are
subject to scrutiny by the European Commission. 5.1.3. The proposal establishes a similar operational frame-
work for all countries, but ignores the fact that degrees ofmarket openness currently differ considerably from one coun-
try to another and that many of these countries already have 5.1.7. In the Committee’s view Article 6 should include
established concession systems which are to a great extent, but a new paragraph stating that contracts entailing reckless
not entirely, compatible with the Regulation. Others have underbidding will not be accepted.
embarked on a process of devolving responsibilities to the
regions including the negotiation of new, directly awarded,public service contracts and are making significant process on5.1.8. Article 6(d): the words ‘or for specific sectors of theirimproving transport quality and increasing flows.network’ should be added after ‘each route’. Operators of
smaller networks should be required to provide informationon the whole network.
5.2. Article 7 — Direct award of public service contracts
5.1.4. The proposal quite rightly differentiates between
passenger transport modes (rail and metro, road, inland5.2.1. In line with the basic principle of general interestwaterway), but does not differentiate in the same way betweenservices laid down in the general part of the text underthe very different features of these modes in the way they serveconsideration the Committee proposes that a new first para-their user categories (see point 1.3).graph be added to Article 7:
‘1. As soon as a Member State has defined a transport
service as a service of general interest within the meaningof Communication COM(2000) 580 of 20.9.2000, the
competent authorities should be allowed to opt for direct
5.1.5. In some instances criteria such as openness to management of these services (
1).’
competition, limitation of aid and scope of exclusive rights are
confused, thereby introducing potentially incorrect options atcertain points in the Regulation. As the central plank of the5.2.2. Old paragraph 1 becomes new paragraph 2, with theproposal is to provide passengers with public services of afollowing added:certain standard at as low a cost as possible (with or without
tariff subsidies), the granting of exclusive rights for a specific ‘In addition to “national and international safety stan-
period allows operators to minimise costs over the long term dards”, it should be possible for the competent authority
provided that the concession is granted for long enough. This to cite “regional and local safety and quality criteria” as
means that the competition factor (which makes for the lowest grounds for a derogation.’
tariffs possible) must be applied when the concession (and
associated exclusive rights) is granted; nevertheless, the con-
cession must strike a balance on the duration of the contract;(1) Demand formulated by various Member States at the Council of
this should be long enough to enable operators to make more Transport Ministers on 20 and 21 December 2000 in Brussels;
competitive bids by allowing them enough time to recover session No 2324 of the Transport Council; Press: 470 —
No 14004/00. their fixed and start-up costs but short enough for the process
C 221/36 EN 7.8.2001 Official Journal of the European Communities
5.2.3. Old paragraph 2 becomes new paragraph 3, 5.4.2. Article 9(3): the Committee welcomes the Com-
mission’s intention of providing direct protection for staff in amended as follows:
the case of a change of operator. But the proposed provision
is too weak in that the competent authority ‘may’ require the‘Only the “additional costs for maintaining coordination”operator to offer rights; it is proposed amending this to ‘must’.should be mentioned and the rest of the paragraphThe Committee also doubts whether the protection affordeddeleted. It should be added that the direct award of aby the reference to Directive 77/197/EEC is sufficient. It wouldcontract is also possible if “existing integrated services arebe better to state expressly that in the event of a change ofthreatened or their further integration impeded”.’operator staff are to be retained on the same terms as
previously.
5.2.4. The Committee approves direct award on the basis
of a new initiative, as provided for in Article 7(6). However, itconsiders that the quality criteria which the operator agrees to
6. Chapter IV — Minimum criteria for public passenger abide by and which justify the award of such exclusive rights
transport operation should be assessed and taken into account when the contract
is awarded.
6.1. Article 10
5.3. Article 8 — Award of public service contracts following
quality comparison
6.1.1. The Committee endorses the wording of the first
paragraph which requires the general rules or minimum
criteria to be adhered to by all operators but regards any
limitation [e.g. the 20 % clause in paragraph (b)] as superfluous.5.3.1. The direct award of contracts on the basis of qualityAs the neutral impact on competition is assured, it mustcriteria as provided for in Article 8 should not be limited toremain a matter for the individual Member States to grant‘individual routes’ and should be extended to regional servicescompensation for special services without limiting it to aas set out in point 1.3.percentage of the total value of the services.
6.1.2. The Committee would also like to make the following
comments on the minimum criteria set out in Article 10:5.4. Article 9 — Safeguards
6.1.2.1. Article 3 of the recent proposal for a Community
Regulation on aid for the coordination of transport (
1) states5.4.1. The Committee has some criticisms to make of thethat ‘Aid ... for the management, maintenance or provision ofsafeguards laid down in Article 9, in particular:inland transport infrastructure, shall be compatible with the
EC Treaty’; by its very nature, such infrastructure aid benefits
— The power of the competent authority to require the all categories of users equally. The EU has frequently reiterated
award of subcontracts, albeit limited to 50 % of the its policy of promoting public over private transport for
contract value, is contrary to the principle of efficiency environmental and social reasons.
which the Regulation seeks to establish. This requirement
severely limits operators’ freedom to manage and intro-
duces reasonable doubts as to whether operators will be
6.1.2.2. Similarly, the limitation of compensation to 20 % able to choose subcontractors freely, especially when the
of the value of the services covered seems to spring more from competent authority is regional or local.
a desire to help balance the budget than to meet a social need.
This is all the more serious as the same criterion covers such— The decision not to award a service to any operatordiverse categories as long-distance transport (where suchwhich would have more than 25 % of the market is alsomodes as train and bus compete), urban transport (oftena matter of considerable concern to the Committee.heavily subsidised), and regional transport (which by nature isFirstly, on account of the virtually unlimited discretionalways potentially in deficit if a certain minimum level ofwhich it gives the competent authority not to award aquality is to be maintained).contract. Secondly, because of the vagueness of the phrase
‘market for public passenger transport services’. What is
the scope of this market: national, regional, local? How
can a competent authority be familiar with the market
(1) COM(2000) 5 final. position of an operator outside its own area?
7.8.2001 EN C 221/37 Official Journal of the European Communities
6.1.2.3. It also unduly penalises enterprises which carry out 8. Chapter VI — Final provisions
only one of these activities within an area and cannot set it offagainst other categories of service or increase the amount of
revenue eligible for compensation, the services they provide
not requiring the same level of compensation.
8.1. Article 17 — Transitional measures
6.1.2.4. Nevertheless, the Committee agrees with the pro-
posal that such compensation be available to all operators on
a non-discriminatory basis provided the various transport
categories are differentiated. Article 17(1)
7. Chapter V — Procedural issues8.1.1. The Committee regards the proposed transitional
period of three years as totally inadequate. For instance, someof the concessions currently running in the Member States are
7.1. The Committee supports the Commission on all of substantially longer duration. Three years is also too little to
procedural issues and would merely suggest that a more amortise existing investments.
precise legal definition be developed of the ‘public appeal
body’ whose features mean that at least partially it will be
called upon to play the role of independent regulator as in
other sectors where intervention is customary (water, gas,8.1.2. The Committee also has serious doubts about theelectricity, telecommunications). If so, consideration should beeffectiveness of the transitional measures provided for ingiven to it also playing the role of arbitrator betweenArticle 17 as some of them could give rise to the expropriationcompetent authorities and operators with regard to the settingof legally acquired rights and a barrage of legal actions whichof tariffs.could block the further progress of the current provisions.
This assessment is based on the following considerations:
7.2. Article 12 — Award procedures
8.1.2.1. Article 17(1) stipulates that: ‘schemes, contracts or
arrangements implemented otherwise than in compliance with7.2.1. Article 12(3): add a new indent (d):the provisions of this Regulation [shall] cease to be valid
within three years’.‘employees to be retained and their contractual rights in
accordance with Article 9(3)’.
8.1.2.2. However, as the explanatory memorandum to the
proposal points out, there are other countries whose markets7.3. Article 13 — Transparencyhave been opened up to competition through tendering
procedures or concessions (the latter based on a combination
of exclusive rights of a duration directly linked to the
7.3.1. In the interests of greater transparency for citizens amortisation of the investment required to provide the service,
and hence users, it should be ensured that before any decision thereby eliminating the need for regular compensatory pay-
is taken to initiate a tendering procedure, consultations are ments to the operator), all in accordance with the laws of the
held at local or regional level with operators, other competent Member State concerned. Nevertheless, no Member State’s
institutions and consumer and passenger groups to clarify current national or local tendering or concession scheme, even
whether tendering or direct award is the right course. This if guided by the philosophy behind this Regulation, can fully
recommendation is linked to the proposed amendment to comply with its provisions. Thus under the present wording
Article 7 regarding further direct award options. of the draft Regulation such tendering procedures and con-
cessions are not valid and must be abolished within three
years.
7.4. Article 15 — Accounting provisions
8.1.2.3. These existing public invitations to tender and
concessions, which were originally open to competition 7.4.1. The accounting provisions laid down in Article 15
deserve the Committee’s full support. Their aim is to guarantee between various operators, each specified a duration, generally
more than ten years, enabling the operator to quantify its costs the transparency and non-discrimination of the award pro-
cedures and a fair balance between compensation and (and in many cases enter into fixed agreements with third
parties for the purchase of rolling stock or the use of additional costs incurred in complying with public service
obligations. These provisions should be seen in conjunction infrastructure). Shortening these periods would lead to finan-
cial claims against the competent authority for the unilateral with Annex I.
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breach of the terms of the concession; these would have to be 8.1.5. The proposed amendment to Article 17(1) would
automatically take care of 17(2). settled in the national courts, or even go to the Court of Justice
in Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling.
8.1.6. As a constructive alternative the Committee therefore 8.1.3. The Committee proposes raising the transitional
suggests a selective system of transitional periods differen- period to 8-10 years, with consideration being given to the
tiating between the various categories and modes of transport. possibility of applying different arrangements in the various
Member States.
Article 17(2) 8.1.7. The Committee is very pleased to note that applicant
country operators are treated as Community operators for the
purposes of this Regulation and it hopes that these countries 8.1.4. The additional period of up to three years specified
in Article 17(2) for operators investing in rail infrastructure is will also be able to apply the provisions of the Regulation in
full when the treaties of accession come into force. still too short to amortise the investment.
Brussels, 30 May 2001.
The President
of the Economic and Social Committee
Göke FRERICHS
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and
creating a European Aviation Safety Agency’
(2001/C 221/05)
On 22 December 2000 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 80 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.
The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 May 2001. The rapporteur was
Mr von Schwerin.
At its 382nd plenary session held on 30 and 31 May 2001 (meeting of 30 May) the Committee adopted
the following opinion by 112 votes to one, with one abstention.
1. Introduction has, in the opinion of the Commission, been shown to be not
working properly. The current system is seen as lengthy,
inflexible and often inconsistent with Community obligations
and policies. 1.1. In its Introduction, the Commission recalls the need to
establish, as a logical complement to the rules establishing the
internal air transport market, common rules in the field ofaviation safety. The current system, based on Regulation (EEC)
3922/91 and the work of the Joint Aviation Authorities (
1), 1.2. In order to remedy the perceived deficiencies of
the current system, and to create a European Safety bodycomparable to the US Federal Aviation Authorities (FAA), the
Council adopted on 16 July 1998 a decision to authorise the(1) The JAA consists of a number of civil aviation regulatoryCommission to negotiate with non-Community JAA memberauthorities who have agreed to co-operate in developing andstates an agreement establishing a European Aviation Safetyimplementing safety regulatory standards and procedures. For this
Authority (EASA) with the legal status of an international purpose, they develop and adopt Joint Aviation Requirements
organisation, covering all tasks related to the regulation of (JARs) and undertake to implement these in a co-ordinated and
uniform manner. aviation safety.