Special Report EU-funded airport 
infrastructures: poor 
value for moneyEN 2014  NO 21
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS  
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LUXEMBOURG
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014
ISBN 978-92-872-1253-5
doi:10.2865/96815
© European Union, 2014
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Luxembourg
EU-funded airport 
infrastructures: poor 
value for money
(pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)Special ReportEN 2014  NO 21
02
 Contents
Paragraph
 Glossary
I–V Executive summary
1–15  Introduction
1–5 Main characteristics of air transport in Europe
6–8 EU air transport policy and funding of airport infrastructures
9 –11  The management of investments in airport infrastructures under the ERDF and CF
12–15  Types of airport infrastructures examined
16–21  Audit scope and approach
22–67  Observations
22–26  Need for new or upgraded infrastructures demonstrated for half of the airports examined
27 Delays in constructions for most and cost overruns for half of the airports examined
28–35  More than half of the constructions were under-used
36–38  EU funding for investments which are not cost -effective
39–45  Seven of the 20 audited airports are not financially self -sustainable
46–48  Forecast of passenger numbers significantly over-optimistic for 12 of the 20 airports examined
49–52  Limited impact of EU -funded investments on passenger numbers, customer service and job 
creation
53–59  Similar investments in airports in close proximity to each other
60–65  Planning of investments in airport infrastructures generally not coordinated at national level
66–67  Limited information available to the Commission on EU funding of airports
03 Contents
68–72  Conclusions and recommendations
 Annex I —  ERDF and CF allocations between 2000 and 2013 for airport infrastructures per 
Member State
 Annex II — List of airports and projects audited
 Annex III — Overview of audit results and assessment
 Annex IV  — Catchment area analysis of individual airports
 Reply of the Commission
04
 Glossary
Airport infrastructure investments : Investments on the landside and airside of airports. Landside infrastructure 
investments include the construction of new terminal buildings, extensions of existing terminals and connections to 
the road and rail network. Airside infrastructure investments include the construction of runway, taxi‑way, exit‑way 
and apron space, air traffic control infrastructure and equipment and safety equipment.
Air traffic movement (ATM) : A landing or take‑off at an airport of an aeroplane engaged in air transport. Airside 
capacity is usually measured in terms of ATMs per hour — indicating the number of aeroplanes able to land, park or 
take‑off within 1 hour. 
Catchment area : The area of influence of an airport to attract visitors and customers, depending on the population 
nearby and the surface transport possibilities. 
Cohesion policy funds : Funds to promote the policy which aims at strengthening economic and social cohesion 
within the European Union, reducing the gap in the level of development between the regions of the EU. This audit 
concerned in particular: (i) the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): aimed at investing in infrastructure, 
creating or preserving jobs, sustaining local development initiatives and activities of small and medium ‑sized 
enterprises, and (ii) the Cohesion Fund (CF): aimed at strengthening economic and social cohesion by financing 
environment and transport projects in Member States with a per capita GNI of less than 90 % of the EU average.
Directorate-General (DG) : A department of the European Commission (EC). In this audit, the relevant DGs were  
DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Mobility and Transport.
Managing authority : The body at national, regional or local level designated by the Member State that proposes 
the operational programme for adoption to the Commission and that is responsible for its subsequent management 
and implementation.
Major project (MP) and cohesion fund project (CFP) : A project which comprises of an economically indivisible 
series of works fulfilling a precise technical function having clearly identified aims and whose total cost taken into 
account in determining the contribution of the funds exceeds 50 million euro. The approval of the Commission is 
required for both MPs and CFPs at individual project level.
Operational programme (OP) : The document prepared at central or regional level in a Member State and 
approved by the Commission which takes the form of a consistent set of priorities comprising multiannual 
measures.
05
 Executive  
summary
I
Through this audit, the Court analysed EU‑funded 
investments in airport infrastructures and examined 
whether:
 — there was a demonstrated need for these 
investments;
 — constructions were completed on time and on 
budget;
 — the newly built (or upgraded) infrastructures were 
fully used.
In addition, the Court assessed whether these invest ‑
ments resulted in higher passenger numbers and in an 
improved customer service. Finally, the Court ana ‑
lysed whether the EU‑funded airports were financially 
sustainable.
II
The audit focused on 20 EU‑funded airports in five 
Member States (Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Poland). These airports received a total EU funding 
of 666 million euro during the 2000–06 and 2007–13 
programme periods through the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion fund (CF).
III
The overall conclusion is that the EU‑funded invest ‑
ments in airports produced poor value for money: too 
many airports (which were often in close proximity 
to each other) were funded and in many cases the 
EU‑funded infrastructures were oversized. Only half 
of the audited airports succeeded in increasing their 
passenger numbers and improvements in customer 
service were either not measured or not evidenced.IV
The Court also observes that the EU funding was not 
cost‑effective and that seven of the 20 airports exam ‑
ined are not profitable and, as a result, there is the risk 
that they may need to be closed unless they receive 
continuous public financial support. This is particularly 
the case with small regional airports having fewer 
than 100 000 passengers per year. The Court also 
noted that the EU funding is not well coordinated by 
the Member States and, in particular as regards major 
projects and cohesion fund projects, is insufficiently 
supervised by the Commission, leading to over ‑  
cap acity and poor value for money.
V
The Court recommends that:
(i) the Commission should ensure during the 2014–20 
programme period that Member States only al ‑
locate EU funding to airport infrastructures in 
those airports which are financially viable and 
for which investment needs have been properly 
assessed and demonstrated. This should also be 
part of the approval and monitoring of operational 
programmes carried out by the Commission;
(ii) the Member States should have coherent regional, 
national and supranational plans for airport 
development to avoid over ‑capacity, duplica ‑
tion and uncoordinated investments in airport 
infrastructures.
06
 Introduction
Main characteristics of air 
transport in Europe
01 
Air transport is the dominant form of 
passenger transportation over long 
distances but it also serves the needs 
of many middle‑distance travellers. 
According to Eurocontrol, air traffic 
in Europe will nearly double by 2030 
and Europe will not be in a position to 
meet a large part of this demand due 
to a shortage of runway and ground 
infrastructure, mainly at major hub 
airports.
02 
There are over 500 commercial airports 
in Europe today, divided into:
(i) hub airports, providing a full 
range of services (business/leisure, 
domestic/intra‑European/inter ‑
continental) and bringing together 
traffic from smaller airports; and
(ii) regional airports connecting 
remote regions to the centres of 
economic activity, feeding hub air ‑
ports but also having direct flights 
to other regional airports.
03 
The main hub airports in Europe with 
at least 5 million passengers per year1 
capture 78 % of the total European air 
traffic; airports with between 1 and 
5 million passengers per year have 
18 % of the overall numbers whereas 
smaller airports with less than 1 million 
passengers per year are only used by 
4 % of passengers.04 
Air transport is an important eco ‑
nomic area: European airports directly 
and indirectly employ over a million 
people working for airlines as well as 
on maintenance, catering services, 
retailing and air traffic control. As such, 
airlines and airports contribute more 
than 140 billion euro to the European 
GDP2.
05 
However, profitability is often prob ‑
lematic: despite the fact that, between 
2001 and 2010, traffic at regional 
airports in Europe increased by nearly 
60 %, nearly half (48 %) of Europe’s 
airports were loss‑making in 2010. This 
is in particular the case for smaller, 
regional airports which the public 
authorities may wish to maintain for 
socioeconomic reasons.
EU air transport policy 
and funding of airport 
infrastructures
06 
Since the early 1990s, EU air transport 
policy3 has aimed at overcoming cap ‑
acity problems by building additional 
infrastructure, but also by making 
better use of existing facilities. Such 
optimisation could be achieved via 
a more efficient use of slots4, better 
ground ‑handling services and better 
integration with the railway network.1 For classification rules see 
‘Community guidelines on 
financing of airports and 
start‑up aid to airlines 
departing to regional airports’, 
Section 1.2.1(12) (OJ C 312, 
9.12.2005, p. 1).
2 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
modes/air/internal_market
3 Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 
on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at 
Community airports (OJ L 14, 
22.1.1993, p. 1); White Paper  
‘European transport policy for 
2010: time to decide’ 
(COM(2001) 370 final of 
12.9.2001); ‘Keep Europe 
moving — sustainable 
mobility for our continent’ 
(COM(2006) 314 final of 
22.6.2006); ‘An action plan for 
airport capacity, efficiency and 
safety in Europe’ (COM(2006) 
819 final of 24 .1.2007); White 
Paper ‘Roadmap to a single 
European transport 
area — towards a competitive 
and resource efficient 
transport system’ (COM(2011) 
144 final of 28.3.2011).
4 A permission given to use the 
full range of airport 
infrastructure necessary to 
operate an air service at an 
airport on a specific date and 
time for the purpose of 
landing or take‑off.
07 Introduction
07 
Transport infrastructure projects, 
including airport‑related actions, are 
an important area of spending from 
the EU budget. The EU allocated some 
4,5 billion  euro5 over the 2000–13 
programme periods to airport infra ‑
structures via the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion 
Fund (CF) and TEN‑T6. Some 1,2 bil ‑
lion euro (or 27 % of this) was allocated 
to airport‑related investments in 
technologies and in multimodal con ‑
nections (e.g. air traffic management 
infrastructure and airport–city centre 
links), see Figure 1 .
Overview of funding sources for airport infrastructure investments in 
2000  to 2013Figure 1Air traﬃc management and
multimodal airport support:1,2 bn or 27 % 
TEN- T funds f or
infrastructures:
0,5 bn or 11 %Cohesion polic
y funds
for infr astructures:
2,8 bn or 62 %
Source:  European Court of Auditors.5 In addition, EIB loans of 
14 billion euro were provided 
to support airport 
infrastructures as of 2000 in 
non‑cohesion policy regions, 
and some 2,3 billion euro were 
provided as loans to support 
fleet renewal for European air 
carriers  
(http://www.eib.org/projects/
loans/sectors/transports.htm ).
6 The trans‑European network 
for transport (TEN‑T) funding 
is mainly limited to studies 
and some smaller 
infrastructure works in 
airports in non‑cohesion 
policy areas.
08 Introduction
08 
More than 2,8 billion euro of the 
3,3 billion  euro infrastructure support 
(85 %) for the 2000–13 period came 
from cohesion policy funds (i.e. ERDF 
and CF), and 75 % of this was invested 
in four Member States (Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Poland). Figure 2  provides 
an overview of the allocations and An-
nex I  has the detail per Member State.
Overview of cohesion policy funds allocations for airport infrastruc -
ture investments per Member State in 2000 to 2013Figure 2
Source:  European Court of Auditors.Italy, 17 %Greece, 13 %Rest of EU-28, 25 %
Poland , 21 %Spain, 24 %
09 Introduction
The management of 
investments in airport 
infrastructures under the 
ERDF and CF
09 
The responsibility for EU spending 
 under the ERDF and CF is shared 
between the Commission and the 
Member States7. The Commission 
establishes guidelines for the planning 
of operational programmes (OPs), and 
negotiates, approves and monitors the 
implementation of the OPs proposed 
by the managing authorities in the 
Member States.
10 
The Commission bears overall respon ‑
sibility for the proper use of funds, 
as it is responsible for supervising 
the set‑up and operation of control 
systems in the Member States, and for 
reimbursing approved expenditure. 
The managing authority is responsible 
for the OP management and imple ‑
mentation, while Commission approval 
is required for both major projects and 
CF projects8.
11 
Implementing bodies, acting on 
behalf of the managing authorities, 
are usually in charge of managing the 
airport infrastructure project itself. For 
the projects examined, the entities 
concerned were AENA (Spain), ENAC 
and ENAV (Italy) and Tallinn airport 
(Estonia). In Poland, the centre for EU 
transport projects carries out functions 
the managing authority has delegated 
to it and projects are managed by the 
beneficiaries, whereas in Greece the 
HCAA, a public service owning and 
managing all airports, except Athens 
airport, is responsible for prioritisation 
and selection of airport infrastructure 
investment projects.Types of airport 
infrastructures examined
12 
Airport infrastructures can be either 
landside or airside. Landside infra ‑
structure investments include the 
construction of new terminal build ‑
ings, extensions of existing terminals 
and connections to the road and rail 
network. Airside infrastructure in ‑
vestments include runway, taxi‑way, 
exit‑way and apron ‑space construc ‑
tions, air traffic control infrastructure 
and equipment and safety equipment.
13 
Most investments in the sample of 
projects examined were for airside 
infrastructures: these covered invest ‑
ments in runways, aprons, taxi‑ways 
as well as safety improvements in 
18 of the 20 airports. Landside infra ‑
structure investments were mainly 
the construction of new terminals or 
extensions to existing terminals. The 
remainder of the audited funds were 
spent on miscellaneous infrastructures 
such as car parks, cargo terminals and 
automated people movers. Table 1  
provides a general overview of the EU 
co‑financing per type of infrastructure.7 http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/how/
index_en.cfm
8 The Commission approval for 
all cohesion fund projects 
applies only to the 2000–06 
programme period; in the 
2007–13 period, such approval 
was only needed for projects 
costing more than 
50 million euro.
10 Introduction Table 1Type of EU -funded airport infrastructures examined
Audited airport infrastructure typesEU funds audited  
(in euro)%
Terminals (14 airports) 164 227 220 35,66
Runways (13 airports) 80 590 629 17, 5 0
Aprons (14 airports) 50 988  499 11,07
Taxi‑ways (10 airports) 39 594 288 8,60
Safety improvements (12 airports) 34 681 200 7, 53
Other (12 airports, e.g. car parks, cargo terminals, 
automated people movers)90 419 523 19,64
TOTAL 460 501 539 100,09 A bottleneck is a limitation in 
the operational capacity of the 
overall airport caused by 
a single component (e.g. 
runway, apron, terminal) 
which determines the overall 
airport capacity and prevents 
the other components being 
used to their full capacity.
14 
The objectives of most projects 
examined were to tackle existing or 
upcoming infrastructure bottlenecks9, 
to increase the level of services to 
passengers, to adapt to new safety re ‑
quirements or to improve connections 
to and from the airports.
15 
Box 1  provides two examples of the 
type of airport infrastructures exam ‑
ined during the audit.
11 Introduction
Examples of EU -funded airport infrastructuresBox 1
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
Picture 1 — View of the new terminal and apron space at Tallinn airport 
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
Picture 2 — Part of the extended apron space at Naples airport (a) In Tallinn airport in Estonia some 
53 million euro of EU funding was 
invested in an extension to the 
terminal, an extension of the runway, 
a reconstruction of the biggest part 
of the apron as well as environmental, 
safety and security infrastructure.
(b) The investments audited at Naples airport 
in Italy dealt with the extension of the 
terminal, runway, apron and air traffic 
management equipment. The cost of the 
investments was 52,4 million euro, out of 
which 20,6 million euro was from the EU.
12
 Audit scope  
and approach
16 
Through this audit, the Court analysed 
EU‑funded investments in airport in ‑
frastructures and examined whether:
 ο there was a demonstrated need for 
these investments;
 ο constructions were completed on 
time and on budget;
 ο the newly built (or upgraded) infra ‑
structures were fully used.
In addition, the Court assessed 
whether these investments resulted in 
higher passenger numbers and in an 
improved customer service. Finally, the 
Court analysed whether the EU‑funded 
airports were financially sustainable.
17 
The audit focused on 20 EU‑funded 
airports in five Member States (Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Poland). These 
airports received a total EU funding 
of 666 million euro during the 2000–
06 and  2007–13 programme periods 
through the ERDF and the CF, out of 
which 460 million euro was audited.
18 
Eight airports were selected for audit 
in Spain, five in Italy, three in Greece, 
two in Poland and two in Estonia. The 
sample selection methodology was 
that: 
(i) all airports which had major pro ‑
jects and cohesion fund projects 
were selected10; 
(ii) five airports were selected 
randomly; (iii) five airports were selected on the 
basis of risk assessment. The re ‑
maining11 four airports were select ‑
ed because these were the airports 
with the largest amounts spent on 
infrastructure projects other than 
major projects and cohesion fund 
projects. Annex II  provides a list 
of the audited airports with the 
amounts audited, implementation 
periods and types of infrastructure 
audited per airport.
19 
The audit comprised a desk review of 
relevant legislation, air transport plan ‑
ning documents of the five Member 
States and publications of the main in ‑
dustry associations (including Airports 
Council International, Air Transport Re ‑
search Society, Eurocontrol, IATA, Inter ‑
national Transport Forum  — OECD, 
etc.). It also involved on‑the‑spot audit 
visits to assess the outputs, results 
and impacts of the EU funding and the 
financial situation of the airports. The 
audit scope did not include an analysis 
of state aid issues in relation to airport 
infrastructures.
20 
The audit work was carried out be ‑
tween May 2013 and May 2014.10 This concerns six airports: 
three in Spain, one in Italy, one 
in Greece and one in Estonia.
11 The audit concentrated on 
mainland airports: small 
airports on islands, wherever 
possible, were excluded from 
the audited population, as 
generally these would exhibit 
lower economies of scale and 
also the population has 
limited possibilities to choose 
another airport.
13 Audit scope and approach 
21 
The Court notes the following.
 ο The long ‑term trend of air trans ‑
port demand is positive: despite 
a temporary dip following the eco ‑
nomic crisis, there was a recovery 
of air transport numbers in Europe 
in 2010, with a 3,4 % increase 
in total number of passengers 
compared to 200912. Overall, EU ‑27 
passenger numbers increased by 
6 % between 2007 and 2013.
 ο The national averages for all 
airports in the five Member States 
examined in this report had an 
average growth of 2 % between 
2007  and  2013.
 ο While there was a limited and 
temporary crisis effect noted in 
2007  and  2008, growth returned 
to the air transport sector for the 
rest of the audited period. There ‑
fore the economic crisis did not 
significantly affect the results of 
the airport infrastructure projects 
examined.12 Eurostat, ‘Air transport 
recovers in 2010’, Issue 
number 21/2012 ( http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITY_OFFPUB/KS‑SF ‑12‑021/EN/
KS‑SF ‑12‑021‑EN.PDF ).
14
 Observations
Need for new or upgraded 
infrastructures 
demonstrated for half of 
the airports examined
22 
During the audit the Court assessed 
whether at landside there had been 
a need for the investments in termi ‑
nals. To this purpose, the Court com ‑
pared the yearly number of passengers 
per m² before and after the invest ‑
ment using as criteria the European 
benchmark13 of 104 annual passengers 
per m².
23 
In 10 of the 14 terminal construction 
projects, there was a demonstrable 
need for expansion to avoid future sat ‑
uration or projected bottlenecks (Cata ‑
nia, Crotone, Naples, Fuerteventura, La 
Palma, Vigo, Heraklion, Thessaloniki, 
Rzeszów and Tallinn). In two cases (Co ‑
miso and Tartu), new terminals were 
needed to allow the operation of com ‑
mercial traffic. However, there was no 
pressing need for terminal expansions 
at Alghero (5,2 million euro of EU funds 
spent) or Badajoz (6 million euro of EU 
funds spent): sporadic hourly peaks at 
these airports could have been better 
dealt with through temporary solu ‑
tions14, rather than building permanent 
infrastructures which are for the most 
part under ‑used (see Figure 3 ).24 
Similarly, at airside, half of the runway 
and apron expansions financed with 
EU money were needed to manage 
peak hour bottlenecks: in nine of the 
18 EU ‑funded airside investments, 
there was evidence that capacity 
expansion was needed (Badajoz, La 
Palma, Murcia, Vigo, Catania, Naples, 
Gdansk, Rzeszow and Tallinn). In 
three cases (Córdoba, Fuerteventura 
and Kastoria), the need for a cap ‑
acity expansion was not justified: the 
existing airside infrastructure was 
more than sufficient to cope with the 
forecast demand even in the long run 
in Córdoba and Fuerteventura, while in 
Kastoria the business case supporting 
the project to extend the runway was 
not adequate.
25 
Overall, in 9 of the 20 airports audited, 
one or more of the projects sampled 
for audit were not needed at all. This 
represents 28 % or 129 million euro of 
the EU funding to airports examined.13 ‘2012 Airport Benchmarking 
Report’, Air Transport Research 
Society (ATRS) ( http://www.
atrsworld.org/docs/
KeyFindings2012ATRSBench ‑
markingReport‑June22.pdf ).
14 E.g. hiring more (part‑time) 
staff to speed up the handling 
of incoming or departing 
passengers; installing 
temporary and mobile 
infrastructures to transport 
passengers between airside 
and landside.
15 Observations
Use of terminal before expansionFigure 3
Source:  The airport authorities’ data. 
Key:  The benchmark of 104 passengers per m² is indicated by the red line; use of the existing capacity before expansion above this benchmark 
is coloured in green; orange is used for airports having between 50 and 100 % of the benchmark; whereas red is used for airports with less than 
50 % of the benchmark. As Comiso is a new airport that was only opened in 2013, analysis of the use of the terminal before expansion is not 
relevant. 
Yearly  passengers /m2 of terminal
FuerteventuraVigo
La PalmaBadajoz
Alghero
CataniaComisoCrotoneNaples
Thessaloniki
HeraklionRzeszow
Tallinn Tartu500
450
400
350
300
250200
150
100
50
0Use of terminal before terminal expansion
(average before terminal expansion)  
16 Observations
Examples of EU -funded airport infrastructures
(a) Building of a new terminal
In Catania in Italy, the terminal building was too small for the number of passengers using the airport. 
A local aero‑club hangar was therefore upgraded and used as a temporary departure hall until the open ‑
ing of the new passenger terminal building (see Figure 3 ) which could accommodate passenger traffic and 
eliminate the previous bottlenecks.Box 226 
Box 2  provides examples of EU‑funded 
infrastructure projects.
Picture 3 — New terminal building at Catania airport 
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
17 Observations
(b) Unnecessary airside expansion
The 2001 master plan for Córdoba airport in Spain stated that there would be no need for expansion of the 
existing runway based on the traffic forecast and the types of aircraft expected (the historical maximum of 
ATMs/hour in Córdoba was four, while the existing capacity of the apron and runway was 11 ATMs/hour). 
Moreover, 99 % of the 4,2 million residents living in the catchment area of this airport also have access 
to at least one other airport within a 2 ‑hour drive. The traffic attracted by the nearby airports of Málaga 
(12,5 million passengers in 2012) and Seville (4,3 million passengers), combined with the connectivity 
provided by the high‑speed rail line between Seville, Córdoba and Madrid, significantly limits the air traf ‑
fic demand of this airport. Nevertheless, the Spanish government decided in 2008 to expand the runway, 
without any needs analysis or study of potential growth, cost–benefit analysis or justification for the sud ‑
den expected increase in passenger traffic. The runway was extended, allowing the landing and take‑off 
of larger aircraft, at a cost of more than 70 million euro, of which more than 12,6 million came from the EU 
budget. However, the volume of air traffic, essentially non‑commercial general aviation, remained at the 
low level which existed prior to the expansion. The apron space was also extended by 17 300 m² at a cost 
of 1,5 million euro, including an 810 000 euro EU investment, despite the original plan being for an expan ‑
sion of only 6 775 m². Since there is very little commercial traffic at this airport (less than 7 000 passengers 
in 2013), the extended runway is rarely used and the increased apron space is used as parking space for 
non‑commercial planes (general aviation) (see  Picture 4 ).Box 2
Picture 4 — Córdoba apron: expansion used only for general aviation purposes 
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
18 Observations
Delays in constructions 
for most and cost 
overruns for half of the 
airports examined
27 
The Court also examined whether the 
examined airport infrastructure pro ‑
jects were completed on time and on 
budget. The audit found that:
 ο at the time of the audit, all but one 
project had been completed;
 ο there were delays in construction 
and in the final delivery of the 
airport infrastructures in 17 of the 
20 audited airports15. In 14 cases, 
the delay was more than a year 
with the average delay being 23 
months. The longest delays were 
noted in Murcia‑San Javier, Thes ‑
saloniki and Naples16; and
 ο there were cost overruns noted at 
9 of the 20 audited airports, result ‑
ing in approximately 95,5  mil ‑
lion euro more being spent than 
initially budgeted (eight of these 
nine airports17 had cost overruns of 
several million euros). The high ‑
est cost overrun was noted in La 
Palma, with 25,6 million euro on 
the projects audited, and Thes ‑
saloniki, where the runway exten ‑
sion to the sea had a cost overrun 
of 21,7 million euro at the time of 
the audit. These cost overruns are 
more than 10 % of the total cost 
amount for these nine airports and 
are covered by national budgets18.More than half of the 
constructions were 
under-used
28 
The IATA19 manual suggests a careful 
approach when investing in airport 
infrastructure, recommending a policy 
of modular growth20. European Com ‑
mission guidance on such building 
stressed the need to make better use 
of existing capacity in the first instance 
and only build infrastructures which 
are necessary, proportional to the ob ‑
jective set and which have satisfactory 
medium‑term prospects for use21.
29 
The Court examined the actual use of 
the EU‑funded infrastructures in the 
audited airports. To this purpose the 
Court assessed the use of the addition ‑
al terminal space created by analysing 
the annual number of passengers per 
m² as well as the use of the terminal 
at the peak hour. For airside invest ‑
ments, the Court examined the use of 
the capacity created by analysing the 
evolution of the ATM numbers.15 The airports without any delay 
in the building and delivery of 
the infrastructure compared 
to initial planning were 
Crotone, Gdansk and Tartu.
16 In Murcia‑San Javier, the 
airside facilities, the control 
tower and the runway were 
put into operation 5 years 
after their completion; in 
Thessaloniki, the delay was 
4,5 years for the terminal 
project; in Naples, the delay 
was 4,5 years for the air traffic 
management project despite 
the fact that the contracting 
authorities had awarded 
works directly for reasons of 
urgency.
17 The exception is the airport of 
Badajoz, where a small 
overrun of 223 000 euro or 
2,8 % of the budget was 
noted.
18 In another audit the Court also 
noted similar weaknesses in 
project preparation in an 
airport infrastructure project 
financed under TEN‑T 
spending. In the case of Berlin 
Brandenburg international 
airport, planning documents 
were not ready and had to be 
modified during the tendering 
process, leading to significant 
cost overruns.
19 The International Air Transport 
Association is the trade 
association for the world’s 
airlines. It represents some 240 
airlines or more than 84 % of 
total air traffic. IATA supports 
airline activity and helps 
formulate industry policy and 
standards.
20 Building of infrastructure in 
a modular  fashion (phases) 
and at intervals to keep 
slightly ahead of demand, and 
to maintain predetermined 
and required levels of service. 
Source:  Section C1.13.7 of the 
2004 IATA Airport Development 
Reference Manual.
21 Point 61 of ‘Community 
guidelines on financing of 
airports and start‑up aid to 
airlines departing from 
regional airports’ (OJ C 312, 
9.12.2005, p. 1).
19 Observations
Yearly terminal utilisation rate after terminal expansionFigure 4
Source:  The airport authorities’ data. 
Key:  The benchmark of 104 passengers per m² is indicated by the red line; green is used for airports which have an average use above this bench ‑
mark following expansion; orange is used for airports between 50 and 100 % of the benchmark; whereas red is used for airports which have an 
average of less than 50 %.FuerteventuraVigo
La PalmaBadajoz
Alghero
CataniaComisoCrotoneNaples
Thessaloniki
Heraklion Rzeszow
Tallinn Tartu250
200
150
100
50
0Yearly  passengers /m2 of terminalYearly t erminal utilisation rate after t erminal e xpansion
(average after t erminal e xpansion)  30 
At landside, when comparing the use 
of the new or additional terminal space 
created to the benchmark22 of 104 an ‑
nual passengers per m², only 4 of the 
14 audited airports (Catania, Naples, 
Heraklion and Thessaloniki) attained 
the benchmark. Average use at the 
other 10 airport terminals was con ‑
siderably below the benchmark with 
seven terminals23 having a yearly utili ‑
sation rate below 50 % (see Figure 4 ). 
Overall, more than half of the EU funds 
audited (55 %, or 255 million euro) 
went into infrastructures which were 
unnecessarily large.31 
When assessing the use of the ad ‑
ditional terminal space at the peak 
(usually the busiest hour of the busiest 
month of the year24), eight airports had 
a good use of their terminal space (Al ‑
ghero, Catania, Comiso, Thessaloniki, 
Heraklion, Rzeszów, Tallinn and Tartu) 
and three airports had a reasonable 
use of their capacity (La Palma, Vigo 
and Naples). However, two airports 
(Badajoz and Fuerteventura) had built 
capacity which is not fully used at peak 
hour.22 As published by the ATRS in 
respect of European airports 
in 2010 ( http://www.atrsworld.
org/docs/KeyFindings2012A ‑
TRSBenchmarkingRe ‑
port‑June22.pdf ).
23 Of the seven terminals 
identified as being under ‑
used, the terminals at Comiso 
and Rzeszów only became 
operational in 2013 and 2012 
respectively. According to 
their forecasts, these airports 
will reach the benchmark of 
104 passengers per m2 in 2018 
(Comiso) and 2031 (Rzeszów).
24 In Spain, the definition of the 
peak hour was either the 30th 
busiest hour of the year or the 
one that accumulates 97,75 % 
of the traffic.
20 Observations
Examples of oversized infrastructures
(a) New terminal
At Fuerteventura airport in Spain, a project involving 21 million euro of EU funding was undertaken to en ‑
large the terminal. This project almost tripled the existing floor area (from 34 000 m2 to 93 000 m2), added 
14 boarding gates (from 10 to 24), eight more luggage belts (from 7 to 15) and four additional contact gates 
(from five to nine contact gates). The scale of the works was predetermined by a passenger forecast of 7,5 
million passengers by 2015, whereas in 2013 the airport had 4,3 million passengers. However, even if the 
forecasted 7,5 million passengers had been achieved, the terminal would still have been over‑  dimensioned 
as, according to IATA standards, 10 belts would have been sufficient rather than the 15 built. Moreover, as 
there was not enough traffic to allow the new terminal to be used to its full capacity, and as there will not 
be enough traffic before 2030 taking into account the latest forecast, the airport authority decided to close 
part of it (6 of the 24 gates) in order to reduce overall maintenance costs (see Picture 5 ).Box 332 
Similarly, the Court assessed airside 
capacity, which depends on the num ‑
ber and characteristics of runways, the 
size and configuration of aprons, the 
existence of taxi‑ways and exit‑ways 
and the type of aeroplanes using the 
airport. In only four of the airside infra ‑
structure expansions using EU funding 
(in Catania, Naples, Thessaloniki and 
Tallinn) were the works in line with real 
needs; one airport (Alghero) created 
reasonable capacity regarding peak 
hour use, while excessive capacity 
was created in the other 11 airports 
audited.33 
Box 3  provides examples of oversized 
infrastructures.
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
Picture 5 — Closed part of the Fuerteventura terminal
21 Observations
(b) Expansion of runway
Although there was a need to extend the airside capacity at La Palma, one of the Canary Islands, the addi ‑
tional capacity created by expanding the platform and works on the runway (including the construction of 
two car parks under the runway which are not used) in 2008 was not in keeping with the real needs: after 
expansion (total cost 36,4 million euro; EU funding of 17,1 million euro) the new airside capacity increased 
from 12 to 30 ATMs/hour, while the peak of ATMs/hour since the expansion has only been 13 ATMs/hour. 
Therefore the additional capacity created will continue to be under ‑used until the number of ATMs/hour 
rises significantly (see Picture 6 ).Box 3
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
Picture 6 — Oversized apron at La Palma airport
22 Observations
Empty and unused airport infrastructures
The cargo project at Thessaloniki airport in Greece involved building two new cargo terminal buildings, the 
renovation of two existing cargo buildings and the construction of a parking area. The two newly built cargo 
buildings remained empty (see Picture 7 ), and only one of the two renovated cargo buildings was in regular 
use at the time of the audit visit (EU funds involved: 7 million euro). There was no evidence of any study being 
carried out to demonstrate a need to extend capacity for air cargo in the region.Box 434 
The Court also assessed whether the 
built infrastructures were in use at the 
time of the audit. Most of the infra ‑
structures were being used, but some 
38 million euro (8 % of the total) of EU 
funds audited was invested in infra ‑
structures which were not used at the 
time of the audit.35 
Box 4  provides an example of an un ‑
used infrastructure.
Source:  European Court of Auditors.
Picture 7 — One of the two new cargo buildings at Thessaloniki airport which were empty at the time of the audit visit
23 Observations
EU funding for 
investments which are not 
cost -effective
36 
For infrastructure projects, at the pro ‑
ject application approval stage, an in ‑
vestment decision is made based upon 
the projected costs and revenues of 
future operation. Theoretically the pro ‑
ject should only go ahead if forecast 
revenues more than cover costs and 
ideally make a contribution towards 
financial sustainability. The risk to EU 
investment in such projects would be 
that the forecast costs and revenues 
turn out to have been unrealistic. For 
the type of project examined, the main 
areas of concern would be a failure to 
see the expected increase in passen ‑
ger numbers or that costs have been 
underestimated.
37 
The Court calculated an estimated 
cost per additional passenger and 
compared this with the planned cost 
included in the forecasts made when 
the investments were being decided 
upon to assess the risk for the EU of 
investing in airport infrastructures 
which are not cost ‑effective. This cost 
per additional attracted passenger 
was calculated by dividing the capital 
investments made in the 20 airports 
during the period 2000 to 2012 by the 
number of passengers over a notional 
20‑year25 period (based on the actual 
number of passengers up to 2013 and 
on the latest forecasts made by the air ‑
ports for the remainder of the period 
(see Figure 5 ).38 
The Court’s assessment26 shows that:
 οfor 10 airports (Alghero, Catania, 
Comiso, Crotone, Naples, Thessa ‑
loniki, Heraklion, Rzeszów, Gdansk 
and Tallinn), the cost per additional 
passenger is less than 10 euro, and 
is generally in line with the forecast 
cost;
 οfor Madrid, the estimated real cost 
per passenger is 32 euro, far higher 
than the 19 euro used at the plan ‑
ning stage;
 οfor six Spanish airports 
(Fuerteventura, Burgos, Murcia, La 
Palma, Badajoz, Córdoba) and Tartu 
in Estonia, the estimated actual 
cost of attracting an additional 
passenger is more than double that 
forecast. This indicates that these 
investments bear a higher risk of 
not providing a return on invest ‑
ment, and that the forecasts upon 
which they were based were over ‑
optimistic; and
 οfor Vigo and Kastoria, the estimated 
cost per additional passenger 
cannot be calculated as the invest ‑
ments did not result in attracting 
any additional passengers.25 Different time spans are 
suggested for assessing the 
lifetime of airport 
infrastructures: the European 
Commission cost–benefit 
analysis (CBA) guide suggests 
a 25 ‑year period; the Jaspers 
(Joint Assistance to Support 
Projects in European Regions) 
guidance gives a range of 20 
to 40 years for buildings and 
between 15 and 30 years for 
runways, taxiways and aprons; 
IATA suggests to build for 10 
years and national 
implementing bodies have 20 
or 25 years as standards. On 
this basis, the Court’s 
calculation took 20 years as 
the expected lifespan of the 
infrastructure.
26 It should be noted that the 
figure reported includes only 
initial infrastructure costs 
while operational items such 
as the cost for maintaining the 
infrastructure, police, 
firefighters, customs and 
marketing have not been 
included.
24 Observations
Cost per additional passenger1Figure 5
Source:  The airport authorities’ data. 
Key:  Blue = planned cost per additional passenger; red = calculated cost per additional passenger.
1 The planned cost per additional attracted passenger was calculated by dividing the capital investments made in the 20 airports during the 
period 2000 to 2012 by the number of passengers forecast over a notional 20 ‑year period. The cost per additional attracted passenger was cal ‑
culated by the Court by dividing the capital investments made in the 20 airports by the actual number of passengers up to 2013 and by the most 
up‑to‑date forecasts for the remainder of the period, provided by airport management.0 20 4060 80 100 120 
Fuerteventura
Madrid BurgosMurcia
La PalmaBadajoz
Tartu
TallinnGdanskRzeszow
Heraklion
Thessaloniki
Naples ComisoCataniaAlghero
CordobaCrotone
Planned c ost per additional passenger Cost per additional passengereuroCost per additional passenger
25 Observations
Seven of the 20 audited 
airports are not 
financially 
self -sustainable
39 
The Court also assessed whether 
the audited airports are financially 
self‑sustainable and profitable27. To 
this end the Court carried out an analy ‑
sis of the financial statements of the 
airports.
40 
The analysis showed that 4 of the 
20 audited airports were regularly 
profitable during the audited period 
(Catania, Naples, Tallinn and Gdansk). 
Seven airports, whilst not yet profit ‑
able, had prospects of breaking even 
in the medium term (Fuerteventura, 
Madrid‑Barajas, Murcia, Alghero, Co ‑
miso, Rzeszów and Tartu) but another 
seven airports audited (Badajoz, Bur ‑
gos, Córdoba, La Palma, Vigo, Crotone 
and Kastoria) made significant losses 
between 2007 and 2012.
41 
The Court also calculated a profit or 
loss per passenger using the airports’ 
financial statements and categorised 
the airports using three thresholds 
based on the number of passengers 
served on average during the audited 
period: fewer than 100 000 passen ‑
gers, between 100 000 and 1 500 000 
passengers, and more than 1 500 000 
passengers. This analysis (see  Figure 6 ) 
shows that airports with fewer than 
100 000 passengers per year made an 
average loss per passenger of 130 euro 
over the period.42 
Although not the only factor, the low 
number of passengers at many of the 
airports audited suggests that there 
is a high risk that there will not be 
a financial turnaround in the medium 
term (the lower the passenger num ‑
bers, the higher the loss per passenger 
as such items as high fixed costs or 
depreciation are spread across a rela ‑
tively small number). Typically, those 
with fewer than 100 000 passengers 
per year are smaller regional airports, 
which will struggle to remain in opera ‑
tion without continuing financial sup ‑
port from public funds.
43 
Investments in airport infrastructure 
also imply costs in future years for 
both operations and maintenance. 
Therefore, any decision to invest in 
such airports needs to be based upon 
convincing evidence that the socioeco ‑
nomic benefits will outweigh the often 
significant costs involved28.27 Based on the financial 
statements provided by the 
HCAA for the airports of 
Thessaloniki, Heraklion and 
Kastoria only an estimation of 
cash flows could be produced 
by the Court.
28 For example, in order to cut 
costs while maintaining the 
operability of smaller airports, 
the Spanish Ministry of 
Development decided in June 
2012 to reduce the 
maintenance costs of 17 
airports having fewer than 
500 000 passengers per year, 
and decreased their weekly 
operating hours and staff 
numbers.
26 Observations
Average profit or loss per passenger for the audited airports over the 
2007  to 2012 periodFigure 6
Source: The airport authorities’ accounting data. The losses per passenger may in reality be higher as:
(i) some of the costs for operating an airport do not appear in an airport’s financial statements (for example the cost of policing, the fire service, 
customs, marketing, etc.); and
(ii) the Greek airports neither calculate depreciation costs nor include interest charges.
29 The airports of Bilbao, Leon, 
Logrono, Valladolid and Vitoria 
are less than a 2 ‑hour drive 
from Burgos, while Pamplona, 
Santander and San Sebastian 
are within 2 hours and 10 
minutes.20
 0
- 20
- 40
- 60
- 80
- 100
- 120
- 140euroProﬁt/loss per passenger per year 
(average in 2007-12)
Airpor ts over
 1 500 000 passengersAirpor ts bet ween 100 000
and 1 500 000 passengers Airpor ts under
100 000 passengers 
1 eur o
- 7 eur o
- 130 eur o
44 
An example of the problems facing 
smaller airports can be seen at Burgos. 
Burgos airport, due to high depreci ‑
ation charges on the infrastructure 
and low passenger numbers (18  905 
passengers in 2013), accumulated a fi ‑
nancial loss of 30 million euro (67 % of 
its total assets) from its opening in July 
2008 until the end of 2012. In addition, as 90 % of all commercial flights are 
operated by one single carrier to 
only one destination (Barcelona), this 
airport runs a high risk of continuing 
unsustainably low passenger numbers 
going forward as the population in 
the catchment area has at least five 
alternatives29 to fly from other airports 
within a 2 ‑hour drive (see also Box 5 ).
27 Observations
Example of an airport which is not financially self -sustainable
In Kastoria, airport revenue was 176 000 euro for 2005–12 whilst, during the same period, the total cost of 
keeping the airport open was 7,7  million  euro. For the period given, the total number of passengers was 
25 thousand people representing a loss of about 275 euro per passenger. Some 16,5 million euro (5,6 mil ‑
lion euro of EU funds) has been invested in an extension to the runway at this airport which has up to the time 
of this report never been used by the type of aircraft for which the extension was built. This cannot be consid ‑
ered as an effective use of public funds.Box 5
45 
According to the Airports Council 
International (ACI) Economics Report 
2 011 , airports with over 5 million pas ‑
sengers per year can operate profit ‑
ably, airports having between 1 and 5 
million passengers per year can meet 
their operational expenses and the 
revenues of smaller airports cannot 
even cover their variable costs. This is 
in keeping with the Court’s own calcu ‑
lations outlined in Figure  6.
Forecast of passenger 
numbers significantly 
over-optimistic for 12 of 
the 20 airports examined
46 
The Court assessed the quality and the 
reliability of the traffic forecasts that 
were prepared to support the invest ‑
ment decisions, examining the diver ‑
gences with the actual evolution of 
passenger numbers.47 
The Court found that the forecasts of 
additional passenger numbers con ‑
tained within these plans were sig ‑
nificantly over ‑optimistic in 12 out of 
20 airports. For example, in Córdoba, 
in 2013, 6 955 passengers travelled, 
against 179 000 forecast, and for 
Crotone, the numbers were 28 892 pas ‑
sengers, against 306 000 forecast.
28 Observations
48 
Considering the number of passengers 
that used the airports up to 2013 and 
the numbers forecast by the airports 
for the following years, the additional 
passengers are likely to be on average 
36 % less than had been forecast at the 
time of deciding on the investments. 
In only six cases (Alghero, Catania, 
Comiso, Gdansk, Heraklion and Tallinn) 
were actual passenger numbers in 
2013 higher than those forecast. Two 
airports had forecasts which were 
less than 10 % higher than the actual 
additional passenger numbers (Naples 
and Rzeszów) while the forecasts for 
all other airports were significantly 
over ‑optimistic (see Figure 7 ).Limited impact of 
EU-funded investments 
on passenger numbers, 
customer service and job 
creation30
49 
The Court examined whether antici ‑
pated results have been achieved by 
analysing the evolution of passenger 
numbers, customer services and the 
impact of the investments on job 
creation.30 A list of the audited airports 
with a full overview of audit 
findings and results can be 
found in Annex III .
Quality of forecasting1Figure 7
Source:  The airport authorities’ data. 
Key:  The airports having a higher number of additional passengers in the 20 years after expansion works compared to those forecast are in green; 
additional passenger numbers of less than 10 % below the forecasts are in orange; whereas those below the latter threshold are in red.
1 The Court assessed the quality of the forecasting by comparing, for each airport, the original forecast of additional passengers to be attracted 
with the actual number of passengers that used the airport until 2013, and with the most up‑to‑date forecast for the remainder of the period, 
provided by airport management. This was calculated for a period of 20 years following the expansion works.- 180 %- 160 %- 140 %100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 %
0 %
- 20 %
- 40 %
- 60 %
-  80 %
- 100 %
- 120 %
FuerteventuraMadrid Burgos MurciaLa PalmaBadajoz
Tartu
TallinnGdansk Kastoria
Heraklion
Thessaloniki
Naples ComisoCataniaAlghero
CordobaCrotone Vigo
Rzeszow
Average- 73 %- 36 %
- 162 %- 40 %
- 68 %- 52 %
- 73 %- 62 % - 60 %- 50 %- 9 %
- 47 %
- 126 %- 6 %
- 71 %11 %28 %40 %85 %
12 % 14 %
29 Observations
50 
Table 2  provides the passenger data 
for the audited airports for 2007 (the 
first year of measurement), 2010 (pas ‑
senger data after the crisis) and 2013. 
Only 10 of the 20 audited airports suc ‑
ceeded in increasing their passenger 
numbers between 2007 and 2013. The 
main gains in passengers were noted 
in Gdansk (an increase of 1,1 million 
passengers) and in Catania, Heraklion and Rzeszów (300 000 to 400 000 
more passengers). Nine of the airports 
(Fuerteventura, Madrid, Vigo, Murcia, 
La Palma, Badajoz, Cordoba, Crotone 
and Naples) had even lower passenger 
numbers in 2013 than they had in 2007.
Overview of passenger trends at the examined airports
2007 2010 2013Variation 
2007–13
Fuerteventura 4 629  877 4 173 590 4 259 341 - 8 %
Madrid 52 110  787 49 866 113 39 729 027 - 24 %
Vigo 1 405 968 1 093 576 678 720 - 52 %
Burgos 13 037 33 595 18 905 45 %
Murcia 2 002  949 1 349 579 1 140 447 - 43 %
La Palma 1 207 572 992 363 809 521 - 33 %
Badajoz 91 585 61 179 29 113 - 68 %
Córdoba 22 410 7 852 6 955 - 69 %
Alghero 1 300 115 1 388 217 1 563 908 20 %
Catania 6 083  735 6 321  753 6 400 127 5 %
Comiso   59 513
Crotone 106 122 103 828 28 892 - 73 %
Naples 5 775  838 5 584 114 5 444 422 - 6 %
Thessaloniki 4 168 557 3 910 751 4 337  376 4 %
Heraklion 5 438 825 4 907 337 5 675  653 4 %
Kastoria 3 806 3 019 5 304 39 %
Rzeszów 279 996 454 237 589 920 111 %
Gdansk 1 715 816 2 225 113 2 844 308 66 %
Tallinn 1 728 430 1 384  831 1 958 801 13 %
Tartu 1 182 23 504 13 790 1 067 %
TOTAL 88 086 607 83 884 551 75 594 043 - 14 %
Source:  The airport authorities’ passenger data.Table 2
30 Observations
51 
Evidence showing improvements in 
customer service was limited. At three 
airports (Fuerteventura, Thessaloniki 
and Heraklion) EU‑funded projects 
had specific objectives to increase 
the quality of service to passengers. 
Surveys among passengers and 
airlines using ‘satisfaction indicators’ 
generally indicated an upward trend 
of customer service since 2010 at these 
three airports. This was also the case 
for eight others (Badajoz, La Palma, 
Madrid‑Barajas, Vigo, Alghero, Catania, 
Naples and Rzeszów). In the remain ‑
ing nine airports, there was either no 
improvement in the quality of service 
provided to passengers, or no meas ‑
urement of whether such improve ‑
ments had taken place.
52 
Job creation and economic growth are 
generally claimed to be good reasons 
for investing in airports. The Court 
found, however, that socioeconomic 
benefits were generally not measured. 
There was also little evidence that ad ‑
ditional jobs were created as a result 
of the EU investments in the audited 
projects. In the case of four airports 
(Comiso, Rzeszów, Gdansk and Tallinn), 
a limited number of newly created 
permanent jobs can be directly linked 
to the EU projects audited. Studies 
provided by Madrid ‑Barajas, Alghero 
and Gdansk indicate generic benefits 
for a region from the siting of an air ‑
port and its operation. However, these 
studies do not establish a link between 
an improvement in regional GDP 
figures and EU‑funded investments in 
airport infrastructures.Similar investments in 
airports in close proximity 
to each other
53 
The Court also examined the area 
of influence of the airports, i.e. their 
capacity to attract visitors and cus ‑
tomers (the catchment area) which 
depends on the population nearby 
and the surface transport possibili ‑
ties. To this purpose the Court used 
the latest Eurostat data available on 
current road connections, traffic speed 
data, population and potential tour ‑
ist numbers31. The Court analysed the 
overlaps of catchment areas, applying 
a uniform criterion of 120 minutes’ 
driving distance32.
54 
This analysis (all charts for the audited 
airports are in Annex IV ) indicates the 
following.
 ο For 13 out of 18 audited airports33, 
significant overlaps34 exist with the 
catchment areas of neighbouring 
airports, and in many cases there 
are overlaps with several catch ‑
ment areas. The vast majority of 
the population living in the catch ‑
ment area of the airports audited 
had several other opportunities 
within a 2 ‑hour drive to travel by 
air via a neighbouring airport. Only 
five airports of the audited sample 
(Madrid‑Barajas, Badajoz, Tartu, 
Tallinn and Rzeszów) were located 
in places where the majority of 
the population had limited oppor ‑
tunities to choose an alternative 
airport within a 2 ‑hour drive.31 The latest road data available 
was from the 2009 TeleAtlas 
road network. Population data 
were based on the 2006 
population grid. Tourism data 
were also from 2006, derived 
from nights spent in tourist 
accommodations and number 
of beds. Airport locations were 
taken from the reference 
database of Eurostat (GISCO). 
Nearby competitor airports 
were identified based on the 
number of passengers per 
year (airports having fewer 
than 15 000 passengers per 
year were not considered).
32 While accepting that each 
individual airport has its own 
specificities, the Court has 
opted to use an overall 2 ‑hour 
catchment area definition for 
its assessment, as this was 
supported by various 
references in the relevant 
literature: e.g. Starkie 2008, 
Marucci and Gatta, 2009. In 
addition, many passengers go 
beyond this time: for example 
there are regular bus lines 
scheduled to bring passengers 
from the audited airport of 
Tartu to Riga in 3,5 hours 
(https://www.airbaltic.com/
en/bus ).
33 The airports of Fuerteventura 
and La Palma were excluded 
from this assessment, as these 
are single‑island airports.
34 The Court considers an 
overlap to be significant if 
more than 75 % of the 
population has access to 
multiple airports within 
a range of 120 minutes’ driving 
time.
31 Observations
 ο There is a proliferation of airports 
very close to each other which 
invested in similar infrastructure 
(terminals, aprons, runways): 
although most airports had sig ‑
nificant overlaps, there was little 
consideration given to investments 
in neighbouring airports, which 
would have been necessary for 
rational planning and optimising 
the use of EU funds.
55 
An alternative analysis carried out 
by the Court, using the 90 minutes’ 
driving distance as criterion which has 
also been used by the Commission in 
a 2013 study35, has resulted in similar 
findings36.
56 
Only some airports used catchment 
area analysis in their future invest ‑
ment planning. However, each airport 
had a differently defined catchment 
area as none of the Member States 
had established a common defini ‑
tion. Catchment area analysis was 
generally not used to identify overlaps 
between airports in close proximity to 
each other and their consequences on 
growth potential. This often resulted 
in the double counting of potential 
passengers in the totals used by each 
airport to justify its expansion (for 
example, the master plans of Catania 
and Comiso airports, both of which 
received significant EU funds, double 
counted a major part of the population 
living in the catchment area of both 
airports).57 
The impact of the investments made 
in the nearby airports or the impact of 
competing modes of surface transport 
was usually not taken into considera ‑
tion when deciding whether or not 
to expand an airport’s capacity (see 
the two examples in Box 6 ). A notable 
exception was Madrid ‑Barajas airport, 
where traffic forecasts were adjusted 
to take into account the fact that the 
air route to Barcelona would lose 40 % 
of its passengers as a result of the 
expected opening of a high‑speed rail 
line.35 Commission publication 
‘Measuring accessibility to 
passenger flights in Europe: 
Towards harmonised 
indicators at regional level’, 
Regional Focus , 01/2013,  
September 2013.
36 The percentage of residents 
with access to multiple 
airports — when using the 90 
minutes’ instead of the 120 
minutes’ driving distance 
criterion — remains over 75 % 
for 12 audited airports.
32 Observations
Examples of catchment area analysis
(a)  In Vigo, extensive overlaps exist as basically the whole population (99,92 % of the 6 164 630 residents in 
the Vigo catchment area) also has access to at least one other airport within a 2 ‑hour drive. The air traffic 
demand of this airport will be affected by the presence of nearby airports at La Coruña, Santiago de 
Compostela and Porto, and high ‑speed rail connections to other parts of Spain.Box 6
 LisboaSantiago
VigoLa Coruña
León
Valladolid 
Porto
           
0 20 40 60 80 100 kmNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Vigo, Spain (LE VX)
    
1
2
3Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderAdministr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics
Vigo (LEVX) overlap with airport
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents
in overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time
to competitor 
airport (minutes)
La Coruña (LECO) 2 431 790 39,45 137 83
Santiago (LEST) 3 316 240 53,79 93 57
Porto (LPPR) 4 658 720 75,57 128 77
León (LELN) 411 0,01 328 234
Lisbon Portela (LPPT) 527 0,01 439 226
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  overlap 
with access to 
multiple airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance  to rail 
line (km)No of tourist 
nights per year 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airports
6 164 630 6 159 440 99,92 3,02 2,98 19 166 393
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
33 Observations
(b) Murcia ‑San Javier was initially a military airport open to civil traffic with some restrictions related to the 
operating hours. Decisions were taken from 2003 to 2007 to build additional airside capacity for the 
military which would in return allow the civil airport to also open in the morning. However, there was no 
analysis of the overlap between the catchment areas of San Javier and Alicante, or the nearby airport of 
Corvera, only 37 kilometres away37. The Corvera airport was completed in 2012, at the same time as the 
Murcia ‑San Javier investments, but was not operational at the date of the audit as it had not yet received 
the certification it had applied for in October 2011.Box 6
0 20 40 60 80 100  kmAlbacet e
AlmeríaCorvera
Mur cia - S an Ja vierAlic anteValenciaNumber of airports overlapping with the audited airport Murcia - San Javier, Spain (LELC)
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderMurcia (LELC) overlap with airport
(ICAO code)No of residents  
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in
overlap (%)Distance  to
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor airport 
(minutes)
Albacete (LEAB) 2 451 970 66,39 183 123
Alicante (LEAL) 3 532 000 95,64 69 52
Almeria (LEAM) 691 125 18,71 201 118
Granada (LEGR) 77 610 2,10 307 200
Valencia (LEVC) 1 733 710 46,94 232 149
Corvera (LEMI) 3 431 170 92,91 36 33
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
3 693 100 3 692 610 99,99 13,28 13,02 28 630 490
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
34 Observations
58 
For the airports of Córdoba, Vigo, Mur ‑
cia, Burgos, Alghero, Crotone, Naples, 
Catania, Comiso, Kastoria and Gdansk, 
overlaps in their catchment areas were 
particularly pronounced. The nearest 
competitor airport is in most cases 
only a 1 ‑hour drive away and 97 % of 
those living within 2 hours of these 
11 airports also have access to at least 
another airport within a 2 ‑hour drive. 
In Córdoba, Vigo, Murcia and Naples, 
there are three competitor airports 
within a 2 ‑hour drive and in the case 
of Burgos there are five competitor 
airports within the same range, see 
Table 3 .59 
The definition used by the Commis ‑
sion for issuing state aid decisions is 
that the catchment area of an air ‑
port in general means a geographic 
market boundary that is normally set 
at around 100 kilometres or around 
60 minutes’ travelling time by car, bus, 
train or high‑speed train. On the basis 
of new guidelines on state aid adopted 
in February 2014, the Commission 
adopted a number of decisions con ‑
cerning investment and operating aid 
to airports and airlines highlighting 
that: (i) subsidies to airport infrastruc ‑
tures which are too close to each other 
do not contribute to regional acces ‑
sibility or development, and (ii) the 
duplication of unprofitable infrastruc ‑
ture is a waste of taxpayers’ money 
which distorts competition between 
airports38. These observations are in 
keeping with the Court’s audit results.37 In 2003, the idea of the new 
airport in Corvera was 
approved by the ministry and 
the airport was declared to be 
of a general interest for the 
state. The tender for 
concession was awarded in 
May 2007; the technical design 
project was completed in June 
2008 and the physical 
installations completed in 
April 2012.
38 Statement of the 
Vice‑President of the 
Commission, Joaquín Almunia, 
1.10.2014; see also: IP/14/1065, 
MEMO/14/544.
35 Observations
Number of airports competing with the audited airports with data on driving time 
and distance
Country Audited airportsNo of competitor 
airports within 2 
hours  of audited 
airportAverage  driving 
time to competi -
tor airports  (min) 
for residents in 
overlapsNearest  
competitor 
airportDriving time 
to nearest  
competitor 
airport (min)Road 
distance 
to nearest  
competitor 
airport (km)
SpainCórdoba 3 113 Seville 87 119
Vigo 3 72 Santiago 57 93
Fuerteventura 1 79 Lanzarote 79 81
La Palma 0    
Murcia 3 80 Corvera 33 36
Badajoz 0 134 Lisbon 127 226
Burgos 5 100 Vitoria 70 114
Madrid ‑Barajas 0 158 Valladolid 140 213
ItalyAlghero 2 109 Olbia 93 126
Crotone 1 101 Lamezia T. 62 88
Naples 3 94 Salerno 47 73
Catania 2 103 Comiso 67 84
Comiso 1 111 Catania 66 84
GreeceThessaloniki 1 105 Kozani 87 137
Heraklion 1 116 Sitia 107 102
Kastoria 2 85 Kozani 52 68
PolandGdańsk 2 65 Gdynia 37 32
Rzeszów 0 152 Lublin 138 155
EstoniaTallinn 0 131 Helsinki 124 109
Tartu 0 174 Tallinn 160 189Table 3
36 Observations
Planning of investments 
in airport infrastructures 
generally not coordinated 
at national level
60 
The Court examined the robustness of 
the long‑term strategies on airport de ‑
velopments of the five Member States 
visited, checking whether there was 
a strategic framework for a coherent 
development of all airports within its 
territory based upon the identification 
of needs.
61 
The Court found that at the time the 
decisions were taken on the main air ‑
port investments in the audit sample, 
only one of the five Member States 
had a long‑term strategic vision: in 
Poland there was an ‘Airports develop ‑
ment programme’ with a list of airport 
infrastructure investments deemed 
necessary.
62 
There was no strategic long‑term air ‑
port development plan in Spain, Italy, 
Greece or Estonia. These countries had 
general and long‑term plans encom ‑
passing all modes of transport which, 
however: (i) had no particular focus 
on either air travel or airport develop ‑
ment, and (ii) were not coordinated 
with developments in other transport 
modes which could potentially com ‑
pete with air traffic.63 
Master plans usually existed for indi ‑
vidual airports and described their 
geographical and economic context. 
However, only 11 of the 20 airports 
(Badajoz, Burgos, Fuerteventura, La 
Palma, Madrid‑Barajas, Murcia, Vigo, 
Catania, Heraklion, Thessaloniki and 
Kastoria) included a needs assessment 
for additional infrastructure invest ‑
ments for the airport in their plans.
64 
The objectives set for the audited 
airport projects were usually neither 
quantified nor time‑scaled. They 
tended to be expressed in terms of 
construction outputs, such as: ‘to build 
an airport for 400  000 passengers 
per year’, or to ‘increase the level of 
service to passengers and improve 
infrastructures’. Once the projects 
were implemented, the Member State 
authorities checked the outputs but 
did not usually check whether, or to 
what extent, the project objectives 
had been achieved.
65 
The indicators used to measure project 
success tended to be physical output 
indicators and the number of jobs cre ‑
ated during construction. In the few 
cases where there were results indica ‑
tors, they were either not sufficiently 
specific or they lacked a baseline or 
a stipulation as to how and when their 
achievement should be measured. 
Sometimes, project data were ag ‑
gregated with other projects making 
it impossible to measure ex post  the 
achievement of individual project ob ‑
jectives39. As a result, the management 
and monitoring systems in Member 
States usually only compared achieved 
outputs using physical indicators.39 For example, the indicator 
‘expected growth in domestic 
passenger numbers’ for the 
2007–13 projects at Tartu 
airport does not allow analysis 
of airport passenger growth as 
airport passenger numbers 
are included with ferry 
passenger numbers.
37 Observations
Limited information 
available to the 
Commission on EU 
funding of airports
66 
The way the shared management 
reporting system worked in the 
2000–06 period meant that informa ‑
tion on ERDF infrastructure projects 
in EU airports was not available to the 
Commission until the closure of the 
operational programme (at the end 
of 2009 at the earliest). There should 
have been an improvement for the 
2007–13 multiannual financing period 
as managing authorities were sup ‑
posed to publish information on such 
projects on their website. However, 
there is still no full overview of airport 
infrastructure projects financed by the 
ERDF and CF.
67 
This situation prevents the Commis ‑
sion from having a complete picture 
of all EU investments going to airports 
and limits its possibilities for moni ‑
toring and ensuring that policies are 
properly designed and implemented.
38
 Conclusions and 
recommendations
68 
The overall conclusion is that the 
EU‑funded investments in airports pro ‑
duced poor value for money: too many 
airports (which were often in close 
proximity to each other) were funded 
and in many cases the EU‑funded 
infrastructures were oversized.
69 
In particular, the Court found that:
 ο a need for the EU‑funded invest ‑
ments in airport infrastructure 
could be demonstrated for around 
half of the projects examined 
(based on a benchmarking with 
comparable airports, paragraphs 
22 to 26);
 ο there were delays in construction 
and the final delivery of airport 
infrastructures in 17 and cost over ‑
runs in 9 of the 20 airports exam ‑
ined (paragraph 27);
 ο more than half of the newly built 
(or upgraded) infrastructures were 
not fully used. In some cases, this 
was even the case at peak hours 
(paragraphs 28 to 35).
70 
The Court also observes that the EU 
funding was not cost‑effective and 
that 7 of the 20 airports examined are 
not profitable and, as a result, there 
is the risk that they may need to be 
closed unless they receive continuous 
public financial support. This is par ‑
ticularly the case with small regional 
airports having fewer than 100 000 
passengers per year (paragraphs 36 to 
48).71 
Moreover, the EU‑funded investments 
did not always lead to anticipated 
results: actual passenger numbers fell 
significantly short of initial forecasts 
and only 10 of the 20 airports suc ‑
ceeded in increasing their passenger 
numbers between 2007 and 2013. 
Improvements in customer service 
were in most cases not measured and 
therefore difficult to assess (para ‑
graphs 49 to 52).
Recommendation 1
The Court recommends that the 
Commission should ensure during 
the 2014–20 programme period that 
Member States only allocate EU fund ‑
ing to airport infrastructures in those 
airports which are financially viable 
and for which investment needs have 
been properly assessed and demon ‑
strated. This should be part of the 
approval and monitoring of opera ‑
tional programmes carried out by the 
Commission.
39 Conclusions and recommendations
72 
In many cases EU funding is provided 
to airports in close proximity to each 
other. The Court’s analysis showed that 
for 13 of 18 airports examined, signifi ‑
cant overlaps exist with the catchment 
areas of neighbouring airports. This 
can result in over ‑capacity and is poor 
value for money (paragraphs 53 to 59). 
Finally, the EU funding of airports is 
not well coordinated at national level 
and, in particular as regards major 
projects and cohesion fund projects, is 
insufficiently supervised by the Com ‑
mission. For projects selected by Mem ‑
ber States, the Commission generally 
does not know which airports receive 
funding and how much they receive 
(paragraphs 60 to 67).Recommendation 2
The Court recommends that the 
Member States should have coherent 
regional, national or supranational 
plans for airport development to avoid 
over ‑capacity, duplication and un ‑
coordinated investments in airport 
infrastructures.
This Report was adopted by Chamber II, headed by Mr Henri GRETHEN, Member 
of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 12 November 2014.
 For the Court of Auditors
 Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA  
 President

40
 Annexes Annex IERDF and CF allocations between 2000  and  2013 for airport infrastructures1 per 
Member State (in euro)
CountryERDF + CF  
(2000–06)ERDF + CF  
(2007–13)ERDF + CF  
(2000–13)% of total  
ERDF + CF
1 Spain 390 324 552 295 047 976 685 372 528 23,98   %
2 Poland 0 601 446 388 601 446 388 21,04   %
3 Italy 306 237 009 187 381 345 493 618 354 17, 27  %
4 Greece 170 111  813 202 400  000 372 511  813 13,03  %
5 Czech Republic 4 203 169 96 510 469 100 713 638 3,52  %
6 France 44 861 420 50 609 810 95 471 230 3,34 %
7 Latvia 16 562 376 78 500  000 95 062 376 3,33 %
8 Estonia 54 973  097 12 526  683 67 499  780 2,36 %
9 Lithuania 11 388 469 48 066 024 59 454 493 2,08  %
10 Portugal 13 820  420 40 959 745 54 780 165 1,92  %
11 United Kingdom 30 703 979 23 000  000 53 703 979 1,88  %
12 Bulgaria (ISPA) 45 000  000 0 45 000  000 1,57  %
13 Romania 0 41 061 301 41 061 301 1,44  %
14 Slovenia 0 28 700  000 28 700  000 1,00  %
15EU cross ‑border 
cooperation13 789 117 14 007  318 27 796 435 0,97  %
16 Hungary 15 516 000 0 15 516 000 0,54  %
17EU interregional 
cooperation6 060 967 6 060 967 0,21  %
18 Germany 5 341 238 490 000 5 831  238 0,20  %
19 Slovakia 4 261 687 0 4 261 687 0,15  %
20 Sweden 0 3 347 149 3 347 149 0,12  %
21 Austria 1 317 325 0 1 317 325 0,05  %
  Totals 1 134 472 638 1 724 054 208 2 858 526 846 100  %
1 Not including the cohesion policy funding for technologies and multimodal investments, estimated to be around 1,2 billion euro. 
41 Annexes Annex IIList of airports and projects audited
Country AirportEU funds 
for projects 
audited Start date 
(main 
works)End date 
(main 
works)Audited 
termi -
nals (EU 
funding)Audited 
aprons 
(EU 
funding)Audited 
taxiways 
(EU 
funding)Audited 
runways 
(EU 
funding)Audited 
safety and 
control 
tower 
systems (EU 
funding)Other  
(e.g. APM, 
cargo, car 
park) (EU 
funding)
SpainBadajoz 6 134 779 2008 2010 4 047 417 1 409 190 84 785 593 387
Burgos 191 603 2007 2008 191 603
Córdoba 13 468 562 2006 2008 810 855 12 657 707
Fuerteventura 53 695 604 2004 2010 21 358 194 7 549 633 3 464 284 17 463 071 2 631 649 1 228 773
La Palma 49 764 569 2004 2010 26 315 005 13 661 002 3 435 400 220 835 6 132  327
Madrid 41 043 520 2000 2007 41 043 520
Murcia 20 396 706 2004 2011 2 636 907 2 937 427 2 775 913 12 046 459
Vigo 6 058 451 2006 2009 734 640 2 459 015 2 017 122 847 674
ItalyAlghero 13 278 792 2001 2007 5 179 050 2 338 322 2 482 393 2 192 707 1 086 320
Catania 44 660 578 2002 2006 28 012  093 2 688 203 6 090 574 2 329 754 5 539 954
Comiso 20 263 062 2004 2010 5 209 079 1 366 465 1 578  057 5 607 996 5 183 279 1 318  186
Crotone 4 736  007 2006 2011 869 283 1 877 056 1 199 550 437 453 352 665
Naples 20 649 583 2000 2009 5 517 072 2 817 663 5 106 493 3 124 613 4 083 742
GreeceThessaloniki 54 054 434 2001 2009 11 779 105 1 524 912 23 908 629 16 841 788
Heraklion 9 240 605 2001 2005 9 240 605
Kastoria 5 635 060 1999 2003 5 635 060
PolandGdańsk 13 732 481 2007 2012 1 401 465 5 594 565 6 736  451
Rzeszów 18 597 944 2009 2013 15 686 246 2 090 980 820 718
EstoniaTallinn 53 093  520 2005 2008 29 212  175 10 308  691 10 665 438 288 579 2 618 637
Tartu 11 805 499 2008 2012 1 067 256 776 027 776 027 776 027 8 410 162
Population 
audited460 501 359 164 227 220 50 988 499 39 594 288 80 590 629 34 681 200 90 419 523
In % 35,66  % 11,07  % 8,60 % 17,50 % 7, 53  % 19,64  %
42 Annexes Annex IIIOverview of audit results and assessment1
Country AirportWas the 
invest -
ment 
well 
planned?Were the 
physical 
outputs 
achieved?Were the 
invest -
ments 
needed?Are all 
outputs 
being 
used?Were expect -
ed quantita -
tive results 
between 
2007 and 2013 
achieved?Were 
qualita -
tive 
benefits 
achieved?Was any 
impact on 
regional 
economy 
evidenced?Is the 
cost per 
additional 
passenger 
reason -
able?Is this 
a sus -
tainable 
airport?
SpainBadajoz
Burgos
Córdoba
Fuerteventura
La Palma
Madrid ‑Barajas
Murcia
Vigo
ItalyAlghero
Catania
Comiso
Crotone
Naples
GreeceHeraklion
Kastoria
Thessaloniki
PolandGdańsk
Rzeszów
EstoniaTallinn
Tartu
1 See the key on the next page.
43 Annexes Annex IIIWas the 
investment 
well 
planned?Were the 
physical 
outputs 
achieved?Were the 
investments 
needed?Are all 
outputs 
being 
used?Were expected 
quantitative 
results 
between 
2007 and 2013 
achieved?Were 
qualitative 
benefits 
achieved?Was any 
impact on 
regional 
economy 
evidenced?Is the 
cost per 
additional 
passenger 
reasonable?Is this a sus -
tainable 
airport?
Green 
indicates 
a satis ‑
factory 
situationA long ‑term 
air sector 
plan exists; 
catchment 
area analysis 
and reliable 
forecasts are 
in an airport 
master planOutputs have 
been built as 
plannedEvidence of 
a proper needs 
assessment 
has been 
producedCo‑
financed 
infrastruc ‑
tures were 
being used 
effectivelyThe expected 
quantitative im ‑
provements have 
been achievedThe expected 
qualitative 
benefits 
have been 
evidenced via 
passenger 
surveysThe positive 
impact on 
the regional 
economy 
has been 
evidencedThe real 
cost per 
additional 
passenger 
is below 
20 euroThe airport is 
profit ‑making
Orange 
indicates an 
in‑between 
situationSome of 
the above 
indicated ele ‑
ments existOutputs have 
been built with 
differences 
compared 
to what was 
plannedThere was no 
evidence that 
some of the 
investment 
was neededCo‑
financed 
infrastruc ‑
tures were 
being 
used, but 
far below 
capacityThere were 
improvements, 
but lower than 
expected, or 
too early to tell 
(Comiso)There were 
qualitative 
benefits, even 
though these 
were not 
measuredThere were 
studies on 
the impact 
on the 
regional 
economy 
without 
a link to the 
investmentsThe real 
cost per 
additional 
passenger is 
between 20 
and 80 euroThe airport 
is not profit ‑
making but 
will be able 
to break even 
within the 
medium term 
(7 years), or 
there are no 
transparent 
accounts (two 
Greek airports) 
Red 
indicates 
an unsat ‑
isfactory 
situationNone of these 
elements 
either exist 
or are taken 
into account 
for the invest ‑
ment decision(Part of the) 
outputs 
planned have 
not (or not yet) 
been builtThere is 
evidence that 
the invest ‑
ment was not 
needed(Part 
of) the 
infrastruc ‑
tures were 
not being 
usedThere were no 
quantitative 
improvements There was no 
evidence of 
qualitative 
benefitsThe positive 
impact on 
the regional 
economy 
has not been 
evidencedThe real 
cost per 
additional 
passenger 
is above 
80 euroThe airport 
depends on 
a continuous 
support for its 
operationsKey to Annex III
44 Annexes Annex IVCatchment area analysis of individual airports: Badajoz
CórdobaBadajo z
JérezLisboa
SevillaCiudad R eal
0 20 40 60 80 100  km
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics    Number of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Badajo z, Spain (LEBZ)
Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderBadajoz (LEBZ) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Sevilla (LEZL) 204 602 14,80 211 143
Lisbon Portela (LPPT) 486 566 35,20 226 127
Córdoba (LEBA) 8 488 0,61 248 216
Jérez (LEJR) 16 550 1,20 284 188
Ciudad Real Central (LERL) 1 372 0,10 278 225
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
overlap with 
access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance  to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
1 382 390 693 233 50,15 6,01 6,01 6 167 787
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
45 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: BurgosAnnex IV
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013    MadridBur gosLeónBilbao
Vitoria
Logroño PamplonaSantander
ValladolidSan S ebastián
0 20 40 60 80 100 kmNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Bur gos, Spain (LEBG)
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderBurgos (LEBG) overlap with airport
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Bilbao (LEBB) 2 987 330 73,59 150 90
León (LELN) 1 056 690 26,03 184 105
Madrid ‑Barajas (LEMD) 148 291 3,65 237 151
Pamplona (LEPP) 2 523 380 62,16 194 124
Valladolid (LEVD) 1 220 930 30,08 140 96
Vitoria (LEVT) 3 047 830 75,08 114 70
Santander (LEXJ) 2 721 210 67, 0 4 153 122
San Sebastián (LESO) 2 549 690 62,81 226 126
Logroño (LERJ) 2 835 972 69,86 120 85
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
overlap with 
access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to 
line station 
(km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
4 059 290 4 048 972 99,75 0,52 0,23 17 919 871
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10) .
46 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: CórdobaAnnex IV
Ciudad R eal
Sevilla
Jérez
MálagaGranada
AlmeríaCórdobaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Córdoba, S pain (LEBA)
Bádajo z
0 20 40 60 80 100  km
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderCórdoba (LEBA) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Granada (LEGR) 2 322 320 55,51 157 117
Jerez (LEJR) 1 762 730 42,13 195 143
Málaga (LEMG) 1 981 110 47,35 167 109
Sevilla (LEZL) 2 526 950 60,40 119 87
Ciudad Real Central (LERL) 300 514 7,18 180 146
Almería (LEAM) 20 044 0,20 249 217
Badajoz (LEBZ) 8 488 0,20 249 217
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
4 183 640 4 130 200 98,72 1,40 1,31 14 544 934
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
47 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: Madrid-BarajasAnnex IV
Ciudad R ealBur gos
MadridLeón
Jerez
MálagaCorveraVitoria
Sevilla
GranadaLogroño
ValenciaPamplona
Valladolid
Albacet e
Córdoba
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013     
0 20 40 60 80 100  kmNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Madrid-Barajas, S pain (LEMD )
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderMadrid Barajas (LEMD) overlap with 
airport (ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Ciudad Real Central (LERL) 364 187 4,86 215 155
Albacete (LEAB) 212 409 2,83 248 156
Bilbao (LEBB) 124 0 379 231
Burgos (LEBG) 148 291 1,98 236 152
León (LELN) 40 648 0,54 335 205
Logroño (LERJ) 404 0,01 565 379
Valencia (LEVC) 4 724 0,06 335 218
Valladolid (LEVD) 552 119 7, 37 213 140
Vitoria (LEVT) 32 433 0,43 345 211
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
7 493 690 1 032 770 13,78 1,76 1,02 20 680 692
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
48 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: MurciaAnnex IV
0 20 40 60 80 100  kmAlbacet e
AlmeríaCorvera
Mur cia- San Ja vierAlic anteValenciaNumber of airports overlapping with the audited airport Murcia-San Javier, Spain (LELC)
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderMurcia (LELC) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Albacete (LEAB) 2 451 970 66,39 183 123
Alicante (LEAL) 3 532 000 95,64 69 52
Almeria (LEAM) 691 125 18,71 201 118
Granada (LEGR) 77 610 2,10 307 200
Valencia (LEVC) 1 733 710 46,94 232 149
Corvera (LEMI) 3 431 170 92,91 36 33
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
3 693 100 3 692 610 99,99 13,28 13,02 28 630 490
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
49 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: VigoAnnex IV
 rLisboaSantiago
VigoLa Coruña
León
Valladolid 
Porto
           
0 20 40 60 80 100 kmNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Vigo, Spain (LE VX)
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics     Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderVigo (LEVX) overlap with airport
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
La Coruña (LECO) 2 431 790 39,45 137 83
Santiago (LEST) 3 316 240 53,79 93 57
Porto (LPPR) 4 658 720 75,57 128 77
León (LELN) 411 0,01 328 234
Lisbon Portela (LPPT) 527 0,01 439 226
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
6 164 630 6 159 440 99,92 3,02 2,98 19 166 393
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
50 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: AlgheroAnnex IV
Catania-FontanarossaRoma
CagliariOristanoOlbia
Algher o
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Number of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Algher o, Ital y (LIEA)
Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderAlghero (LIEA) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Cagliari Elmas (LIEE) 125 890 18,69 202 177
Olbia ‑ Costa Smeralda (LIEO) 580 098 86,11 126 93
Oristano (LIER) 520 798 7 7, 31 117 111
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
673 656 670 032 99,46 6,06 6,05 9 850 595
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
51 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: CataniaAnnex IV
TrapaniLame zia
Reggio D i Calabria PalermoSalerno/P ont ecagnano
CataniaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Catania, Ital y (LIC C)
ComisoCrotone
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderCatania (LICC) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Palermo/Falcone ‑Borselino (LICJ) 1 567 350 35,04 236 130
Reggio di Calabria (LICR) 2 437 880 54,87 122 82
Vicenzo Florio (LICT) 960 610 21,62 300 169
Comiso (LICB) 2 733 510 61,52 84 67
Crotone (LICB) 225 174 5,07 306 189
Trapani/Lamezia Terme (LICA) 1 188 268 26,74 224 129
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
4 473 650 4 435 420 99,15 8,89 1,16 13 018 947
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
52 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: ComisoAnnex IV
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics     TrapaniLame zia Terme
Reggio D i Calabria Palermo
CataniaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Comiso , Ital y (LICB)
Comiso
0 20 40 60 80 100  km
Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderComiso (LICB) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor airport 
(minutes)
Catania (LICC) 2 733 510 99,10 84 66
Trapani/Vincenzo Florio (LICT) 115 839 4,20 254 200
Palermo/Falcone ‑  Borselino (LICJ) 524 789 19,03 247,92 175,11
Reggio di Calabria (LICR) 1 619 010 58,70 203,49 137, 35
Lamezia Terme (LICA) 477 309 17, 3 306,1 185,2
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
2 758 230 2 753 410 99,83 7,72 4,38 6 532 819
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
53 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: CrotoneAnnex IV
Napoli
Crotone
Lame ziaFoggia/Gino Lisa
Reggio D i CalabriaBari
Salerno
CataniaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Crotone , Ital y (LIBC )
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderCrotone (LIBC) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport 
(minutes)
Lamezia Terme (LICA) 1 511 610 98,61 88 62
Reggio di Calabria (LICR) 1 061 540 69,25 211 128
Bari (LIBD) 10 695 0,70 300 222
Catania (LICC) 225 174 14,69 307 189
Salermo (LIRI) 96 220 6,28 325 209
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access 
to multiple 
airports (%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per 
year within 2 
hours of audited 
airports
1 532 920 1 514 999 98,83 5,96 5,86 13 361 638
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
54 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: NaplesAnnex IV
Naples
Trapani-Bir giRoma- Ciampino
Lame zia TermeRoma-F iumicino
Foggia
Reggio D i CalabriaBari
Palermo -Punta RaisiSalernoNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Naples, Ital y (LIRN)
Crotone
0 20 40 60 80 100  km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics     Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderNaples (LIRN) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Bari (LIBD) 1 459 880 14,96 243 135
Foggia (LIBF) 6 320 640 64,78 146 102
Fiumicino ‑  Leonardo da Vinci (LIRF) 2 964 220 30,38 239 137
Salerno (LIRI) 7 401 890 75,87 73 47
Rome Ciampino (LIRA) 6 532 240 66,95 201 111
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
9 756 490 9 728 730 99,72 9,78 1,33 33 232 248
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
55 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: HeraklionAnnex IV
SitiaChaniaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Heraklion, Gr eece (L GIR)
Heraklion
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics     Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderHeraklion Kazantzakis (LGIR)
overlap with airport
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Sitia (LGST) 294 139 56,87 102 107
Chania (LGSA) 168 734 32,62 144 131
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
517 246 459 637 88,86 320,53 280,84 9 403 257
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
56 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: KastoriaAnnex IV
Thessalonik i
Arist otelis
IonninaKozaniNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Arist otelis, Greece (L GKA)
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics     Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderAristotelis (LGKA) overlap with 
airport (ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Kozani (LGKZ) 1 953 400 99,80 68 52
Thessaloniki "Macedonia" (LGTS) 1 557 190 79,56 196 121
Ioannina (LGIO) 632 234 32,30 150 93
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
1 957 300 1 953 400 99,80 132,70 36,10 3 792 879
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
57 Annexes Annex IVCatchment area analysis of individual airports: Thessaloniki
Thessalonik i
Arist otelis
Kozani
IonninaNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Thessalonik i ‘Macedonia ’, Gr eece (L GTS)
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderThessaloniki ‘Macedonia’ (LGTS) 
overlap with airport (ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Kozani (LGKZ) 2 063 090 78,74 137 87
Aristotelis (LGKA) 1 557 190 59,43 196 121
Ioannina (LGIO) 279 278 10,66 270 154
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
2 620 110 2 063 090 78,74 17, 2 2 12,81 10 276 325
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
58 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: GdańskAnnex IV
Gdynia
Bydgosz czKaliningrad
Gdańsk
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Number of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Gdańsk, P oland (EPGD )
Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderGdansk (EPGD) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Bydgoszcz (EPBY) 2 361 950 63,15 166 111
Khrabrovo/Kaliningrad (UMKK) 528 010 14,12 N/A N/A
Gdynia (EPOK) 2 620 577 70,12 32 37
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
3 717 825 3 738 940 99,39 1,90 0,83 7 816 900
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
59 Annexes Annex IVCatchment area analysis of individual airports: Rzeszów
RzeszówNumber of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Rz eszów, Poland (EPRZ)
Lublin
L’viv
Kraków
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderRzeszów (EPRZ) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Kraków/John Paul II International
Airport (EPKK)1 305 790 33,31 217 167
L'viv (UKLL) 509 919 13,01 169 140
Lublin (EPLB) 1 022 582 26,08 155 138
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
3 920 450 2 761 281 70,43 3,81 3,77 2 937 098
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
60 Annexes
Catchment area analysis of individual airports: TallinnAnnex IV
Number of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Tallinn, Est onia (EETN)
Tartu
Riga
Intern ational
AirportHelsink i
Tallinn
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics    Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderTallinn (EETN) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Helsinki (EFHK) 562 190 43,81 109 124
Tartu (EETU) 120 234 9,37 190 161
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
1 283 340 682 424 53,18 2,36 0,83 1 707 093
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
61 Annexes Annex IVCatchment area analysis of individual airports: Tartu
Number of airpor ts o verlapping with the audit ed airpor t Tartu, Est onia (EETU)
RigaTartuTallinn
0 20 40 60 80 100 km
Administr ative boundaries: © E uroGeogr aphics     Cartography: Eurostat — GISCO, 10/2013
1
2
3Legend
2-hour travel time from audited airport
Audited airports
Competitor airports
Non-competitor airports
Number of overlapping airports
No overlaps
> 4
Country borderTartu (EETU) overlap with airport 
(ICAO code)No of residents 
in the overlap 
area per airportResidents  in 
overlap (%)Distance  to 
competitor 
airport (km)Time  to 
competitor 
airport (minutes)
Tallinn (EETN) 120 234 20,59 189 160
Riga (EVRA) 60 168 10,30 248 202
No of residents 
within 2 hours  of 
audited airportTotal No of 
residents  in 
overlap with 
access to multiple 
airportsResidents  
in overlap 
with access to 
multiple airports 
(%)Distance  to rail 
station (km)Distance to rail 
line (km)No of tourists 
nights per year 
within 2 hours of 
audited airports
583 965 180 401 30,89 2,32 1,82 997 201
Sources : Eurostat population (2006) and tourism data (2006/10).
62
All major projects will have to go through a quality 
review, either by the Commission or by independ ‑
ent experts (Jaspers or other entities nominated 
by Member States and agreed by the Commission) 
before approval by the Commission. 
IV
The Commission notes that regional airports may 
often serve communication purposes for a region 
or community and the public authorities may wish 
to maintain their functioning for other than sim ‑
ply financial reasons. That is why public transport 
infrastructures which are not profitable and require 
state support are kept in functioning.
The fact that the Commission does not have full 
detailed knowledge of all EU ‑funded projects 
throughout the EU and throughout sectors does not 
mean that it fails to fulfil its regulatory supervisory 
role. On the contrary, the Commission exercises its 
supervisory role — often beyond its regulatory pre ‑
rogatives  — through annual reporting and moni ‑
toring also at project ‑by‑project level if needed, ad 
hoc treatment of problematic issues and specific 
audits. What is more, the Commission has in the 
past refused co ‑financing to regional airports for 
which the business case was not evident and which 
did not seem justified from the cohesion point of 
view.
The Commission also notes that Cohesion Fund 
projects were directly approved by it in the 
2000–06 period, while in the 2007–13 period they 
were included in the programmes and approved 
individually only if they were major projects. The 
Commission took steps in the 2007–13 period to 
improve the assessment of major projects, through 
the establishment of the Jaspers initiative, which 
provides technical assistance to Member States, the 
preparation of a comprehensive CBA guide and the 
use of outside expertise if needed. Executive summary
III
The Commission acknowledges the Court’s con ‑
clusions for the audited projects of the 2000–
06 and 2007–13 periods and accepts that in these 
programming periods support from cohesion fund ‑
ing for airport infrastructure did not in certain cases 
represent an effective use of EU funds. It wishes to 
underline that lessons have already been learned 
from this experience, and as a result there is a radi ‑
cally different approach in the legislation for the 
2014–20 programming period.
The new regulatory framework has been made 
stricter when it comes to investing in airport 
infrastructures, limiting the possible options to 
improving the environmental performance or safety 
features of the infrastructures. On top of that, the 
Commission services are following a more limited 
line in the negotiations, focusing in particular on 
airports belonging to the core TEN ‑T network.
As far as strategic planning is concerned, the new 
framework requires the existence of transport 
plans at regional or national level as a specific ex 
ante  conditionality, which set out a comprehensive 
transport strategy per sector, the contribution to 
the completion of the TEN ‑T and which include 
a list of projects to be implemented ( a ‘mature and 
realistic project pipeline’). The Commission takes 
these plans fully into account before approving any 
operational programme which provides for invest ‑
ments in the transport sector. 
Concerning major projects, the Commission has 
adopted delegated and implementing acts that will 
define the quality review process and the quality 
elements of the cost–benefit analysis (CBA) to be 
respected by all major projects, such as the main 
benefits and costs by sector, list of risks to be con ‑
sidered, precise reference periods by sector, etc. In 
addition, CBA guidance will soon be issued includ ‑
ing practical recommendations for specific sectors 
and case studies to allow the beneficiaries to modu ‑
late their projects towards the best EU added value.Reply of the  
Commission
Reply of the Commission 63
At another level, the Commission will intensify the 
monitoring and assessment of the ability of the EU 
air transport market to meet future challenges and 
opportunities.
Introduction
01
The latest Eurocontrol ‘Challenges of growth 2013’ 
study confirms and reiterates the capacity chal ‑
lenge identified in previous studies.
In the most ‑likely (capacity constrained) scenario, 
there will be 50 % more flights in 2035 than in 2012. 
Nearly two million flights will not be accommo ‑
dated (12 % of total demand for travel) because of 
reduced airport expansion plans. That is equivalent 
to an estimated 120 million passengers unable to 
make their return flights (in total, 240 million pas ‑
sengers per year).
In addition, by 2035, more than 20 airports will be 
running at or close to capacity, compared to just 
three in 2012 (hotspots — including airports in 
Spain and Greece).
This study shows that misplaced capacity is an 
issue for further discussion and that, based on the 
recently reported airport expansion plans, capacity 
shortages will occur in Europe in the next 20 years.
Source:  ‘Challenges of growth 2013’ study, avail ‑
able at https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/
challenges ‑growth .
06
In its 2011 White Paper on transport policy, the 
Commission considered congestion as a major 
concern. It went on to affirm that ‘airport cap ‑
acity needs to be optimised and, where necessary, 
increased to face growing demand for travel1.
1  The 2011 White Paper ‘Roadmap to a single European transport 
area — Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport 
system’ (paragraph 28), available at http://eur ‑lex.europa.eu/
legal ‑content/EN/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=HjP8JnxMmKkbg0nMHr
xTqR3DX1042Lqfy2gdgLbQLf5rnTVZwSq6!1996567712?uri=CELE
X:52011DC0144 .In the 2007–13 period, the Commission received 17 
major project applications for airports. During the 
appraisal, the Commission paid significant atten ‑
tion to the issue of overall cost of the projects, their 
bene  fits and added value for society. This resulted 
in specific cases such as the reduction of scope of 
projects (e.g. Lasi airport and Wroclaw airport) or 
the inclusion of conditions in the approval decision 
(for Gdansk airport due to construction plans for the 
adjacent airport in Gdynia). The Commission always 
carefully verified the demand analysis. In some 
cases, the Commission urged national authorities 
to abandon projects (e.g. airports in Kielce, and in 
Bialystok) due to insufficient demand and the Com ‑
mission’s concerns linked with the financial sustain ‑
ability of those airports.
V(i)
The Commission accepts the recommendation 
and will implement it during the negotiations on 
operational programmes for the period 2014–20. 
The approach of the Commission’s services in the 
negotiations is that EU funding to airport infrastruc ‑
ture is focused in particular on airports belonging 
to the core TEN ‑T network. The Commission also 
requires that the comprehensive transport master 
plans should serve as a basis for the choice of trans ‑
port investment priorities. All investments should 
contribute to delivering the objectives for the prior ‑
ity axis concerned and investments in any airport 
would in particular need to be subject to a prior 
detailed assessment of economic viability and 
competition (e.g. whether private operators could 
finance the investment). Finally, investments should 
be underpinned by plausible results of the required 
feasibility study and a positive CBA.
V(ii)
The Commission agrees with the importance of 
coherent airport strategic planning as a means to 
avoid misplaced capacity in the future.
The Commission agrees with the recommendation 
which is addressed to the Member States (coherent 
regional, national and, where appropriate and pos ‑
sible, supranational plans for airport development). 
On its side, it will verify the implementation during 
the negotiations on operational programmes for the 
2014–20 period through the assessment of transport 
plans in the framework of the fulfilment of ex ante  
conditionalities. See also reply to paragraphs 68 to 71.
Reply of the Commission 64
21 Second bullet point
The Commission considers that there is no clear 
trend in air passenger transport development in 
the audited Member States. For the years 2007–13, 
air transport in Greece decreased by 3,3 % and in 
Spain by 3,5 %. In Spain, air passenger transport 
decreased in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013; in Greece it 
decreased in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012; and in Italy, 
it decreased in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013. 
21 Third bullet point
The Commission notes that the economy of the 
EU‑27 has been either in stagnation or in reces ‑
sion since 2007, with the only exceptions of 
2010 and 2011. Some of the audited Member States 
experienced dramatic GDP drops: Greece is in its 
sixth consecutive year of recession, and Italy and 
Spain were in recession in four out of six years. 
Therefore, the Commission considers that the crisis 
has had a serious and continuous impact on air 
transport.
Observations
Common reply to paragraphs 28 and 30
Airports are infrastructures which have a long life ‑
time. The Commission considers that the utilisation 
rate of airports should be verified over the lifetime 
of the investments made in order to assess whether 
they have fully reached their operational usage. In 
addition, building airport infrastructure in phases to 
keep close or just above the benchmark, while ideal, 
would in practice mean that works would have to 
be constantly carried out in the airport, requiring 
particular arrangements and disturbance in the 
functioning and services offered by the airport.In its subsequent 2011 communication accom ‑
panying the airport package, the Commission 
confirmed that congestion at airports is an issue 
for Europe. Besides, if capacity on the ground is 
lacking, the success of the single European sky 
project as a whole will be threatened. At the same 
time, Europe’s aviation sector faces increased com ‑
petition and a shift in the global aviation market 
towards regions such as Asia Pacific, the Middle East 
and Latin America, which threaten Europe’s privi ‑
leged position as a cross ‑road of the global aviation 
network and the benefits in terms of connectivity 
that this position provides2.
Audit scope and approach
21 First bullet point
While air transport has picked up in the 
EU‑27 since  2010, the Commission considers that 
there has been no general recovery in air transport 
in the years 2007–13. The average EU ‑wide figures 
alone cannot reflect the different developments 
in air transport in different Member States which 
vary considerably between each other. In 2010, 21 
Member States faced an increase and six a decrease 
in passenger volumes; in 2011, 25 an increase and 
two a decrease; in 2012, 18 an increase and nine 
a decrease; and in 2013, 21 an increase and six 
a decrease. The fluctuation between increase and 
decrease during the last few years was significant 
in Spain, Italy and Greece — the economic woes of 
all three being well documented. Eurostat data for 
2013 confirm that air passenger numbers have not 
reached the pre ‑crisis levels for Greece and Spain. 
2  2011 communication on airport policy in the EU, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/airports/index_en.htm .
Reply of the Commission 65
Common reply to paragraphs 53  
to 55
The definition used by the Commission for issuing 
state aid decisions is that the ‘catchment area of 
an airport in general means a geographic market 
boundary that is normally set at around 100 kilo ‑
metres or around 60 minutes travelling time by 
car, bus, train or high ‑speed train. However, the 
catchment area of a given airport may be different 
and needs to take into account the specificities of 
each particular airport. The size and shape of the 
catchment area varies from airport to airport, and 
depends on various characteristics of the airport, 
including its business model, location and the des ‑
tinations it serves.’ The 100 km threshold (200 km 
if a high ‑speed railway line exists) is also defined in 
Article 24 of the TEN ‑T regulation setting out the 
criteria for air transport infrastructure components. 
As mentioned by the Court, in a recent study of the 
Commission’s services on accessibility to passenger 
flights in Europe, the Commission’s services drew 
conclusions on the basis of a catchment area of 90 
minutes’ travel time to the airports. The Commis ‑
sion considers that the catchment areas should 
also take into account other elements such as the 
business model of the airport, number and type of 
destinations served, availability of airport capacity 
at other airports, public transport links, time ‑sensi ‑
tive travellers and whether the airport mainly serves 
the residents or visitors coming to the area.
Regional airports often do not serve the same des ‑
tinations with the same frequency as their neigh ‑
bouring airports and even more so as the main 
airport in the Member State. 37
The Commission considers it difficult to identify 
a trend in passenger traffic figures for the years 
2007–13, on which the Court bases itself for the re ‑
calculation of the cost per additional passenger. The 
Commission therefore considers that an assessment 
on the basis of milestones and mid ‑term reviews 
would provide a suitable basis for the assessment of 
the cost ‑effectiveness of projects. See also the Com ‑
mission’s reply to paragraph 21.
Common reply to paragraphs  40 to 43
For the purposes of assessing major projects in 
cohesion policy, financial sustainability is under ‑
stood by the Commission as the capacity of a pro ‑
ject to generate enough revenues to cover the 
operating costs in every year of its operation, and 
not the capacity to generate profits. Though indeed 
EU support should ideally be provided to profit ‑
able infrastructures, it happens that some transport 
infrastructures are loss ‑generating, despite the 
existence of revenues, and in such cases the deci ‑
sion to provide EU support is based on whether the 
project is socioeconomically desirable (i.e. brings 
more benefits than costs).
45
Regional airports may serve communication pur ‑
poses for a region or community and the public 
authorities may wish to maintain their function ‑
ing for other than simply financial reasons. That is 
why public transport infrastructures which are not 
profitable and require state support are kept in 
functioning.
50
Air passenger transport in Spain decreased 
between 2007 and 2013 by some 3,5 % and in 
Greece by 3,3 %. The Commission considers that the 
audited airports followed this trend and noted also 
a decrease in traffic, which follows the course of the 
Spanish and Greek economies, which is in recession 
almost without interruption since 2007. 
See also the Commission’s reply to paragraph 21.
Reply of the Commission 66
Conclusions and recommendations
Common reply to paragraphs  68 to 71
The Commission acknowledges the Court’s con ‑
clusions for the audited projects of the 2000–
06 and 2007–13 periods and accepts that in these 
programme periods support from cohesion funding 
for airport infrastructure did not in certain cases 
represent an effective use of EU funds. It wishes to 
underline that lessons have already been learned 
from this experience, and as a result there is a radi ‑
cally different approach in the legislation for the 
2014–20 programme period.
The new regulatory framework has been made 
stricter when it comes to investing in airport 
infrastructures, limiting the possible options to 
improving the environmental performance or safety 
features of the infrastructures. On top of that, the 
Commission services are following a more limited 
line in the negotiations, focusing in particular on 
airports belonging to the core TEN ‑T network.
As far as strategic planning is concerned, the new 
framework requires the existence of transport 
plans at regional or national level as a specific ex 
ante  conditionality, which set out a comprehensive 
transport strategy per sector, the contribution to 
the completion of the TEN ‑T and which include 
a list of projects to be implemented (a ‘mature and 
realistic project pipeline’). The Commission takes 
these plans fully into account before approving any 
operational programme which provides for invest ‑
ments in the transport sector. 
Concerning major projects, the Commission has 
adopted delegated and implementing acts that will 
define the quality review process and the quality 
elements of the CBA to be respected by all major 
projects, such as the main benefits and costs by 
sector, list of risks to be considered, precise refer ‑
ence periods by sector, etc. In addition, CBA guid ‑
ance will be soon issued including practical recom ‑
mendations for specific sectors and case studies to 
allow the beneficiaries to modulate their projects 
towards the best EU added value.Common reply to paragraphs  61 to 63
As far as strategic planning is concerned, a radi ‑
cal reform has been put in place for the 2014–20 
period, whereby the legal framework provides for 
the fulfilment of specific  ex ante  conditionalities in 
the transport sector, which require the existence of 
a specific comprehensive transport plan or frame ‑
work at national or regional level prior to approval 
of support to operational programmes. The trans ‑
port plan is to set out the contribution to the single 
European transport area, the core and comprehen ‑
sive TEN ‑T where investment from the ERDF and the 
CF will be made, as well as a realistic and mature 
project pipeline for implementation by the opera ‑
tional programmes.
Operational programmes include an analysis of the 
situation and specific needs at the time of program ‑
ming and a link with the interventions planned. As 
such, the Commission considers them as planning 
documents for the purposes of EU co ‑financed 
interventions.
Common reply to paragraphs  66 and 67
Under the system of shared management, pow ‑
ers are shared between the Commission and the 
Member States, the latter being responsible for 
the day ‑to‑day management and the former being 
responsible for the monitoring and overview at 
programme and not at project level. This means 
that the Commission is not supposed to and cannot 
base its implementation and monitoring compli ‑
ance activity by reference to detailed information 
on every single project, given that thousands of 
projects are co ‑financed every year through cohe ‑
sion policy. 
Reply of the Commission 67
72
The definition used by the Commission for issuing 
state aid decisions is that ‘catchment area of an air ‑
port in general means a geographic market bound ‑
ary that is normally set at around 100 kilometres or 
around 60 minutes travelling time by car, bus, train 
or high ‑speed train. However, the catchment area of 
a given airport may be different and needs to take 
into account the specificities of each particular air ‑
port. The size and shape of the catchment area var ‑
ies from airport to airport, and depends on various 
characteristics of the airport, including its business 
model, location and the destinations it serves.’ The 
100 km threshold (200 km if a high ‑speed railway 
line exists) is also defined in Article 24 of the TEN ‑T 
regulation setting out the criteria for air transport 
infrastructure components. As mentioned by the 
Court, in a recent study of the Commission’s ser ‑
vices on accessibility to passenger flights in Europe, 
the Commission’s services drew conclusions on the 
basis of a catchment area of 90 minutes’ travel time 
to the airports. The Commission considers that the 
catchment areas should also take into account other 
elements such as the business model of the airport, 
number and type of destinations served, availability 
of airport capacity at other airports, public trans ‑
port links, time ‑sensitive travellers and whether the 
airport mainly serves the residents or visitors com ‑
ing to the area.
Regional airports often do not serve the same des ‑
tinations with the same frequency as their neigh ‑
bouring airports and even more so as the main 
airport in the Member State. 
The fact that the Commission does not have full 
detailed knowledge of all EU ‑funded projects 
throughout the EU and throughout sectors does not 
mean that it fails to fulfil its regulatory supervisory 
role. On the contrary, the Commission exercises its 
supervisory role — often beyond its regulatory pre ‑
rogatives  — through annual reporting and moni ‑
toring also at project ‑by‑project level if needed, ad 
hoc treatment of problematic issues and specific 
audits. What is more, the Commission has in the 
past refused co ‑financing to regional airports for 
which the business case was not evident and which 
did not seem justified from the cohesion point of 
view.All major projects will have to go through a quality 
review, either by the Commission or by independ ‑
ent experts (Jaspers or other entities nominated 
by Member States and agreed by the Commission) 
before approval by the Commission. 
69 First bullet point
The Commission considers that the utilisation rate 
of the airport should be verified over the lifetime of 
the investments made in order to assess whether 
they have fully reached their operational usage.
70
Regional airports may serve communication pur ‑
poses for a region or community and the public 
authorities may wish to maintain their functioning 
for other than simply financial reasons. That is why 
public transport infrastructures which are not prof ‑
itable and require state support are sometimes kept 
in functioning.
Recommendation 1
The Commission accepts the recommendation 
and will implement it during the negotiations on 
operational programmes for the period 2014–20. 
The approach of the Commission’s services in the 
negotiations is that EU funding to airport infrastruc ‑
ture is focused in particular on airports belonging 
to the core TEN ‑T network. The Commission also 
requires that the comprehensive transport master 
plans should serve as a basis for the choice of trans ‑
port investment priorities. All investments should 
contribute to delivering the objectives for the prior ‑
ity axis concerned and investments in any airport 
would in particular need to be subject to a prior 
detailed assessment of economic viability and 
competition (e.g. whether private operators could 
finance the investment). Finally, investments should 
be underpinned by plausible results of the required 
feasibility study and a positive CBA. 
Reply of the Commission 68
Recommendation 2
The Commission agrees with the importance of 
coherent airport strategic planning as a means to 
avoid misplaced capacity in the future.
The Commission agrees with the recommendation 
which is addressed to the Member States (coherent 
regional, national and, where appropriate and pos ‑
sible, supranational plans for airport development). 
On its side, it will verify the implementation dur ‑
ing the negotiations on operational programmes 
for the period 2014–20 through the assessment of 
transport plans in the framework of the fulfilment 
of ex ante  conditionalities. See also the reply to 
paragraphs 68 to 71.
At another level, the Commission will intensify the 
monitoring and assessment of the ability of the EU 
air transport market to meet future challenges and 
opportunities.The Commission also notes that Cohesion Fund 
projects were directly approved by it in the 
2000–06 period, while in the 2007–13 period they 
were included in the programmes and approved 
individually only if they were major projects. The 
Commission took steps in the 2007–13 period to 
improve the assessment of major projects, through 
the establishment of the Jaspers initiative, which 
provides technical assistance to Member States, the 
preparation of a comprehensive CBA guide and the 
use of outside expertise if needed. 
In the 2007–13 period, the Commission received 17 
major project applications for airports. During the 
appraisal, the Commission paid significant atten ‑
tion to the issue of overall cost of the projects, their 
bene  fits and added value for society. This resulted 
in specific cases such as the reduction of scope of 
projects (e.g. Lasi airport and Wroclaw airport) or 
the inclusion of conditions in the approval decision 
(for Gdansk airport due to construction plans for 
adjacent airport in Gdynia). The Commission always 
carefully verified the demand analysis. In some 
cases, the Commission urged national authorities 
to abandon projects (e.g. airports in Kielce, and in 
Bialystok) due to insufficient demand and the Com ‑
mission’s concerns linked with the financial sustain ‑
ability of those airports.
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QJ‑AB‑14‑020‑EN‑N ISSN 1977 ‑5679
The Court audited 20 airports in five Member 
States and found that EU funding is in many 
cases provided to airports in close proximity to 
each other: for 13 airports, significant overlaps 
exist with the catchment areas of neighbouring 
airports. This produced poor value for money 
and resulted in oversizing of the EU-funded 
infrastructures and in over-capacity. The Court 
also observes that the EU funding was not 
cost-effective and that seven of the airports 
examined are not profitable: these may need to 
be closed unless they receive continuous public 
financial support. The EU funding of airports is 
not well coordinated at national level and, in 
particular as regards major projects and 
cohesion fund projects, insufficiently supervised 
by the Commission which generally does not 
know which airports receive funding, and how 
much they receive.
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF AUDITORS