For an in-depth analysis of recovery and financial corrections in the CAP, see section 2.1.1.3 of the Annual Activity Report of DG AGRI and the 2017 Annual Management and Performance Report for the EU Budget.

Table NR28, therefore, updates the table already published in the last three Reports indicating that the 'ratio of established fraud' has slightly increased in comparison to last year (from 11% to 12%). Likewise, the 'dismissal ratio' increased from 14% to 17%.

Since the PIF Report 2014, the analysis has also tried to focus on the rate of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States for which a final decision was taken, establishing that fraud really occurred. By comparing updated data with those published in 2014, it is also possible to identify how many cases have been dismissed (initially reported as fraudulent and then "declassified" or cancelled).

These irregularities are exclusively referred to rural development. A number of additional cases concern both rural develoment and support to agriculture, including market measures or direct payments (see Table NR7 and Annex 13).

Table NR27 shows the IDR per Member State, which therefore, refers to irregularities reported as non-fraudulent. Romania, Portugal, Poland, Spain, Hungary and Italy reported the highest numbers. The highest financial amounts were communicated by Romania, Spain and Portugal. Lithuania show the highest FDR, above 3%, while the FDR of Romania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary and Slovakia range between 3% and 2%.

These irregularities are exclusively referred to rural development. A number of additional cases concern both rural develoment and support to agriculture, including market measures or direct payments (see Table NR5 and Annex 13).

Poland, Romania and Hungary reported the highest mumbers. The highest financial amounts were communicated by Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary. Estonia show the highest FDR, above 2%, while the FDR of Bulgaria approaches 1%.

25 Member States have reported potentially fraudulent cases in relation to RD during the period 2013-2017, as showed in Table NR26. Detections are measured against the expenditure over the same period to calculate the FDR.

A part of these irregularities (reported as fraudulent or not) are not exclusively referred to market measures, but the reporting authority may have also included budget posts referring to other measures, including direct payments or rural development. These irregularities have been included in their full value in Tables NR24 and NR25 (see also Annex 13).

22 Member States have reported non fraudulent cases with reference to market measures. Spain, France and Italy reported the highest numbers. The highest financial amounts were communicated by France, Romania and Spain. Malta, Romania and Denmark show the highest FDRs, while the FDRs of the Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary and Cyprus are above 2%.

Table NR25 shows the IDR per Member State, which therefore, refers to irregularities reported as non fraudulent.

Individual cases involving significantly high amounts can produce a distortive effect on the overall analysis. This was particularly the case for the Netherlands, which show the highest FDR despite the low number of detections. The main case reported by the Netherlands refers to events dating back almost ten years.

15 Member States have reported potentially fraudulent cases in this area. France, Poland and Hungary reported the highest numbers. The highest financial amounts were communicated by Poland, the Netherlands, France and Italy. The Netherland and Poland show the highest FDRs, while the FDRs of Hungary, Slovenia and France range between about 2% and 1%.

Table NR24 focuses on market measures and shows the Member States which have reported potentially fraudulent irregularities in the period 2013-2017. Detections are measured against the expenditure over the same period to calculate the FDR.

Romania, Poland, Italy and Hungary are the Member States which have reported the highest numbers, while Poland, Romania, the Netherlands and Italy reported the highest amounts. Netherland and Estonia's FDRs are around 1%, more than double the third highest FDR, which is Poland's.

Only Finland notified no irregularities as fraudulent; the majority of Member States (22, excluding Finland) reported less than 100 potentially fraudulent irregularities; one (1) Member State reported between 100 and 200; two (2) Member States notified between 201 and 300 and other two (2) more than 300.

Table NR23 offers an overview of the irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States between 2013 and 2017. It also shows the related amounts, overall payments for the agricultural policy and the FDR.

Poland, Romania and Italy are the three countries which have reported the highest numbers, while Poland, Romania and Bulgaria reported the highest amounts. Estonia and Poland's FDRs approached 1%, more than double the third highest FDR, which is Bulgaria's.

Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Sweden and the United Kingdom have notified no irregularities as fraudulent; other nineteen (19) Member States reported less than 30 potentially fraudulent irregularities; one (1) country reported between 30 and 60; two (2) Member States more than 60.

Table NR22 offers an overview of the irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States in 2017. It also shows the related amounts, overall payments for the agricultural policy and the FDR.

The average duration of the irregularities which have been protracted over time was 26 months (i.e. 2 years and 2 months). For the irregularities reported as fraudulent, this average was 4 months more: 30 months.

Of the 18,281 irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported by Member States in 2013-2017 in relation to CAP, 10,580 (58% of the total) involved infringements that have been protracted during a span of time. For the 2,081 irregularities reported as fraudulent, this percentage is higher at about 61%. The remaining part of the dataset refers to irregularities which consisted of a single act identifiable on a precise date (about 34% of the whole dataset and 37% of that including exclusively the fraudulent irregularities) or for which no reliable information has been provided (8% of the whole dataset, but only 2% of the irregularities reported as fraudulent).

(4)the ratio of cases of established fraud on the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent.

(3)the fraud detection rate (FDR - the ratio between the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and the payments occurred in the same period) and the irregularity detection rate (IDR - the ratio between the amounts involved in cases not reported as fraudulent and the payments occurred in ther same period) over the last five years;

(2)the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by each Member State (in 2017 and over the last five years);

(1)duration of irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent). No analysis by Member State is presented in this section;

The present section digs into some aspects linked to the anti-fraud activities and results of Member States. Four elements are analysed:

Previous sections have examined the trend and main features and characteristics of the irregularities reported as fraudulent.

Map NR6 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent with reference to direct payments during 2013-2017. The most active Member States in detecting non fraudulent irregularities in relation to direct payments were Italy and Romania, which reported 53% of these cases.

'Scrutiny 3508' appears in a significant number of cases, with a low average financial amount. It is possible that some cases were reported in other categories, such as 'Routine' or 'administrative enquiry'. 'Risk analysis' was explicitly mentioned in 218 cases, with an average financial amount lower than the global average.

'Administrative enquiry' and 'routine' were the most recurrent reasons for starting controls that then led to irregularities not reported as fraudulent. The average financial amount involved in irregularities discovered because of 'administrative enquiry' was in line with the global average, while 'routine' was above such average.

Table NR21 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to direct payments to farmers during 2013-2017, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities not reported as fraudulent.

Map NR5 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent with reference to direct payments during 2013-2017. The most active Member States in detecting irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to direct payments were Romania, Italy and Poland, which reported 67% of these cases.

In the direct payments field, Regulation 3508/1992 applies. This Regulation requires the Member State to set up an integrated administration and control system. 'Scrutiny 3508' appears in a limited number of cases. It is possible that some cases were reported in other categories, such as 'Routine' or 'administrative enquiry'. 'Risk analysys' was explicitly mentioned in 54 cases.

'Judicial enquiry' and 'routine' were the most recurrent reasons for starting controls that then led to irregularities reported as fraudulent. The average financial amount involved in irregularities discovered because of 'judicial enquiry' was lower that the global average, while the contrary was recorded in relation to 'routine'.

Table NR20 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to direct payments to farmers during 2013-2017,with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities reported as fraudulent. The description of the 'reason for performing control' has been shortened to simplify the Table and associated Graphs, but the full description can be consulted in Annex 14.

Map NR4 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent with reference to market measures during 2013-2017. The most active Member States in detecting non fraudulent irregularities in relation to market measures were Spain, France and Italy, which reported 63% of these cases.

The reason 'Scrutiny 4045' should be interpreted taking into consideration also the cases where 'Scrutiny 485' is mentioned: both Regulation 4045/1989 and Regulation 485/2008 deal with the scrutiny of commercial documents of those entities receiving payments from the Guarantee section of the EAGGF (Reg. 4045/1989) or from the EAGF (Reg. 485/2008). While Reg. 485/2008 explicitly introduced the concept of risk analysis (see above), Reg. 4045 already required consideration for risk factors and concentration on sectors or undertakings where the risk of fraud is high. The average financial amount involved in irregularities discovered on the basis on 'scrutiny 485' was significantly higher than the average financial amount related to the previous 'scrutiny 4045'. It is possible that some cases were reported in other categories, such as 'Routine' or 'administrative enquiry'. 'Risk analysys' is explicitly mentioned in 25 cases.

There are three reasons that cover most of the cases: 'Routine', 'Administrative enquiry' and 'Scrutiny 4045'. 'Administrative enquiry' stands out in terms of average financial amount.

Table NR19 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to market measures during 2013-2017, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities not reported as fraudulent.

'Judicial enquiry' was mentioned only in two cases, with an exceptional average financial amount.

'Tip' was rarely the reason for controls that led to detect potential fraud, but these cases were very 'productive'. Most of these cases were in Poland and Spain. With 10 out of 162 cases (6.2%), this is the field (irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to market measures) where this reason was relatively more frequent (within the CAP context). In general, it can be noticed that the reason 'tip' is more recurrent in relation to fraudulent cases than in cases not reported as fraudulent (within CAP).

This Regulation provides that the Member States shall carry out systematic scrutiny of the commercial documents of undertakings. Member States shall select the undertaking on the basis of risk analysis. The Regulation provides for a high number of controls, but the ones that led to discover irregularities were concentrated in just two Member States (France and Hungary) and resulted in a below-the-average financial amount. It is possible that some cases were reported in other categories, such as 'Routine' or administrative enquiry'. 'Risk analysys' is explicitly mentioned in 14 cases.

The most recurrent reason for starting these controls was the scrutiny provided for by Regulation 485/2008.

The most active Member States in detecting potential fraud in relation to market measures were France, Poland and Hungary, which reported 74% of these cases.

Map NR3 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent with reference to market measures during 2013-2017.

Table NR18 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to market measures during 2013-2017, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities reported as fraudulent. The description of the 'reason for performing control' has been shortened to simplify the Table and associated Graphs, but the full description can be consulted in Annex 14.

Also 'Tip' and 'Media' showed good average financial amounts, but these reasons are not often at the basis of controls, especially 'Media'. Lithuania was the Member State where more cases were started because of information provided by the media. Cases that started because of a 'Tip' were more widespread, with Poland ranking high (similarly to what could be found in relation to irregularities reported as fraud). Nevertheless, the highest ranking is for the United Kingdom, where 'Tip' had instead a negligible role in detecting irregularities reported as fraudulent.

Another reason that is less frequently reported – but shows a good 'productivity' – is 'risk analysis'. Most cases were concentrated in Hungary, Spain, Germany and Lithuania (in the latter Member State, risk analysis led also to detect a relatively high number of potential frauds – see above).

Controls that started because of a 'Judicial enquiry' were relatively rare, but they were the ones with the second highest average financial amount. These cases are concentrated in Romania and Italy. The highest average financial amount is for the few cases triggered by an irregularity detected and reported by an EU body.

'Administrative enquiry' and 'Routine' were by far the most frequent reasons for starting a control. The average financial amounts were broadly in line with the global average. 'Administrative enquiry' was mostly reported by Romania and Hungary, while 'Routine' by Portugal and Poland.

Map NR2 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent with reference to rural development during 2013-2017. Besides ranking as the most active Member States in detecting potential frauds in RD, Romania, Poland and Hungary were among the most active also for irregularities not reported as fraudulent. For non fraudulent irregularities, also Portugal, Spain and Italy must be mentioned among the Member States with the highest frequency, while they did not report a significant amount of potential frauds. The comparison is striking, in particular for Portugal and Spain, where the ratio (fraud)/(non fraud) was 0.012 and 0.03, respectively.

Table NR17 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to rural development during 2013-2017, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities not reported as fraudulent.

'Risk analysis' was reported only a few times as reason for starting a control, while it showed a good average financial amount. These cases were basically reported only by Lithuania and Bulgaria.

Poland was also the Member State with the highest number of irregularities detected because of a 'Tip' (followed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia). This reason for starting a control showed above-the-average financial amount involved.

'Judicial enquiry' was mentioned as reason mostly in Romania (86% of cases), while 'Administrative enquire' was relatively more widespread, with Hungary as the main Member State (56% of cases). The majority of cases where the control was started because of 'Routine' were reported by Poland (55% of cases).

The most frequent reasons for starting a control were 'Routine', 'Administrative enquire' and 'Judicial enquiry'. The average financial amounts involved in these three reasons are broadly in line with the global average, with a better performance of 'Routine' and 'Judicial enquiry'.

Map NR1 provides an overview by Member State of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent with reference to rural development during 2013-2017. The most active Member States in detecting and reporting potentially fraudulent irregularities in RD were Poland, Romania and Hungary, which represented more than 60% of these irregularities.

The straight lines in the graphs associated to Table NR16 represent the border between 'reasons' that led to identify irregularities with an average amount above or below the global average (that takes into account all potential frauds affecting RD). The vertical distance between a point representing a specific reason and the straight line is an indicator of how higher or lower was the yield of these controls started for that specific reason, in comparison with the hypothetical situation where these controls involved financial amounts in line with the global average.

Table NR16 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to rural development during 2013-2017, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities reported as fraudulent. The description of the 'reason for performing control' has been shortened to simplify the Table and associated Graphs, but the full description can be consulted in Annex 14.

In the context of the antifraud cycle, the detection capability is a key feature, which contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of the system for the protection of the EU budget.

The category 'products of the wine-growing sector' is the most recurrent, but 'fruit and vegetables' is the one with the highest financial amounts, in particular due to the exceptional average amount of cases reported as fraudulent. Another category with an exceptional average financial amount is 'Pigmeat, eggs and poultry, bee-keeping and other animal products'.

As showed in Table NR13, market measures feature high FDR and IDR. Table NR14 shows the frequency and financial amounts of irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to market measures for the period 2013-2017, while Table NR15 shows the same data with reference to irregularities not reported as fraudulent.

As mentioned in section 3.2.2, the financial amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent concerning market measures are heavily influenced by few (4) exceptional cases. Net of these cases, the FDR for market measures would be 0.31% rather than 1.17%. Similarly, excluding the few (3) 'exceptional' non fraudulent irregularities, the IDR would be 1.08% rather than 1.39%.

The same case may cover several budget posts referring to different types of expenditure. In Annex 13, a detailed explanation of this issue and how it has been handled in estimating these FDR/IDR can be found.

EAGF itself has two components with different aims: measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets (insoforth, referred to as 'intervention in agricultural markets' or 'market measures') and direct payments to farmers. Annex 11 provides a detailed explanation about the classification in these two categories of the cases reported by the Member States.

Via its two funds (EAGF and EAFRD) the CAP supports agriculture and rural development across Europe. The

In relative terms, the category Beneficiary is more frequent among RD cases not reported as fraudulent than in other CAP areas (about 10% of cases in 2017). Within this category, 'Operator/beneficiary not having the required quality' is the most reported type of violation.

'(Non-)action' was followed by 'documentary proof' representing 11% of the non-fraudulent cases in 2017 (including 'Documents missing and/or not provided' as the most reported type of violation). During 2013-2017, a number of 'documentary proof' cases (45) concerned the 'false and/or falsified documents' type of violation. The same applies to the category 'request', where a number of cases (17) were related to the 'false or falsified request of aid' type of violation.

When looking at these irregularities, the most frequently detected category is related to 'non-action' (including 'action not completed', 'action not implemented' or 'failure to respect deadlines' among the most reported types of violation). This category ranked very high also in relation to irregularities reported as fraudulent (see Table NR11).

Table NR12 provides an overview of the most frequent categories of irregularities not reported as fraudulent in RD in 2017 and the related financial amounts. It also presents how these most recurrent categories have featured from 2013 to 2017 (included).

Within the CAP, 'RD cases reported as fraudulent' is the domain where the category Ethics and integrity ranks higher, with 22 irregularities in 2017 and 137 in 2013-2017. Similarly to SA cases, most of these violations were communicated by Poland and were not reported under the types 'conflict of interest', 'bribery' or 'corruption', but as 'other irregularities concerning ethics and integrity'. Most of these violations concerned the creation of artificial conditions for receiving financial support. Other Member States may have reported this type of infringement under other categories of irregularity.

In 2017 and in 2013-2017, the category 'documentary proof' ranked first, with 'false or falsified documents' as the most reported type of violation. Also with reference to the 'request', which is another frequent category, the false-related type of irregularity ('false or falsified request of aid') is the most reported.

Table NR11 provides an overview of the most frequent categories of irregularities reported as fraudulent in RD in 2017 and the related financial amounts. It also presents how these most recurrent categories have featured from 2013 to 2017 (included).

In relative terms, infringements related to 'Ethics and integrity' were less frequent than for the irregularities reported as fraudulent. Apart from one case of conflict of interest, all of these violations were reported as 'other irregularities concernig ethics and integrity'.

Another prevalent category of irregularity not reported as fraudulent is related to '(non)action'. In this area, the three most reported types pertained to the action itself ('not implemented or completed'), and 'refusal to repay not spent or unduly paid amounts'.

When looking at these irregularities, violations concerning the 'request' are the most recurrent category (by far, in 2017). More specifically, while during the period 2013-2017 most of these infringements were almost equally split between the types 'incorrect or incomplete request for aid' and 'false or falsified request for aid', in 2017 the latter type of violation was clearly predominant. Violations concerning the other category 'documentary proof' were also quite frequent and often related to the type of violation 'false or falsified documents' (202 cases in 2013-2017).

Table NR10 provides an overview of the most frequent categories (or combinations of categories) of irregularities linked to cases not reported as fraudulent in relation to SA in 2017 and the financial amounts involved. It also presents how these most recurrent categories (or combinations of categories) featured from 2013 to 2017 (included).

In 2017, 10 irregularities were reported as pertaining to the category 'Ethics and integrity' (not combined with other categories of irregularity). In the previous years, other 41 cases of the sort had been reported. All of these violations were communicated by Poland and were not reported under the types 'conflict of interest', 'bribery' or 'corruption', but as 'other irregularities concernig ethics and integrity'. Most of these violations concerned the creation of artificial conditions for receiving financial support. Other Member States may have reported this type of infringement under other categories of irregularity.

Irregularities concerning 'Product, species and/or land' (not combined with other categories of irregularity) were also quite recurrent. More specifically, most of these infringements concerned the types 'overdeclaration and/or declaration of ficticious product, species and/or land' (both in 2017 and in the overall period 2013-2017) and 'quantities outside permitted limits, quotas, thresholds' (considering the overall period 2013-2017).

The most recurrent modi operandi are related to 'documentary proof' or to the 'request' (not combined with other categories of irregularity). Each category is articulated in different types of violations (see Annex 12). With reference to these two categories, the most recurrent types concerned 'false or falsified documents' or 'false or falsified request for aid', both in 2017 and in the overall period 2013-2017.

Table NR9 provides an overview of the most frequent categories (or combinations of categories) of irregularities linked to cases reported as fraudulent in relation to SA in 2017 and the financial amounts involved. It also presents how these most recurrent categories (or combinations of categories) featured from 2013 to 2017 (included).

In 2017, the average financial amounts increased for both RD cases (+15%) and SA cases (+32%). This supported the increase of financial amounts despite the decrease in the number of cases. Considering the overall period 2013-2017, the average financial amount involved in SA cases is higher than in RD cases (+23.5%). This is mainly due to irregularities concerning market measures, where cases with exceptional financial amounts happened to be reported. However, also net of these exceptional cases, the average financial amount of non fraudulent irregularities in market measures is still higher than that of RD cases over the period 2013-2017 (+75%) and is increasing in 2017. On the contrary, when SA is considered net of cases concerning market measures, the average financial amount is lower than for RD cases over the period 2013-2017 and is decreasing in 2017.

In terms of financial amounts (Table NR8), after the peak in 2015, irregularities related to RD gradually decreased, while irregularities related to SA recorded in 2017 a steep raise, after a flat trend. As a result, the gap between RD and SA financial amounts experienced a peak in 2015 and nearly closed in 2017.

In terms of number of irregularities (Table NR7), RD has regularly and significantly exceeded SA across the whole 2013-2017 period, with the result that the number of irregularities linked to RD have been more than double those affecting SA.

Regarding irregularities not reported as fraudulent, the number of those reported in relation to RD has been constantly increasing until 2015, while that related to SA remained stable or recorded minor variations (see Table NR7). Consistently, also the irregular financial amounts linked to RD have been constantly increasing until 2015 (as highlighted in Table NR8). In 2017, the irregular financial amounts linked to SA recorded an unusual increase (+55%), beyond what could be expected due to the related increase in the number of such irregularities (+17%).

The trend of the financial amounts must be assessed while bearing in mind that it can be strongly influenced by single observations of significant value. For instance, the 'distance' observed in 2013 between the two types of support, finds explanation in very few cases involving high amounts linked to the SA.

During 2013-2017, 103 cases concerned both RD and SA. In most of these cases, violations concerning RD were combined with violations concerning direct payments.

Considering the overall period 2013-2017, the average financial amount involved in SA cases was higher than that for RD cases (+104%). This is mainly due to irregularities concerning market measures, where potential frauds with exceptional financial amounts happened to be reported. In fact, in 2016 such exceptional cases did not emerge and the average financial amount of SA fell below that of RD cases. Also net of these exceptional cases, the average financial amount of potential frauds in market measures is still higher than that of RD cases over the period 2013-2017 (+135%). On the contrary, when SA is considered net of cases concerning market measures, the average financial amount is far lower than for RD cases over the period 2013-2017 and is decreasing in 2017.

Table NR6 provides information about the financial amounts involved in the cases considered in Table NR5. In 2017, the overall financial amounts were stable, but this was the result of different patterns in RD and SA. After the peak recorded in 2016 for financial amounts related to RD, the largest share in 2017 was represented again by the SA, which was pushed by increases both in the number of SA cases (+9%) and their average financial amount (+227%). Financial amounts involved in SA cases were predominant also if one takes into account the whole 2013-17 period (58% of the total amount). However, the share of the RD on the total (40%) was well above the share of the resources allocated to RD on the total of the CAP resources over the same period.

Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia accounted for an increasing number of cases reported as fraudulent.

The first ten countries taken together reported 246 cases as fraudulent, which represented about 89% of the total (in 2016 the first ten countries accounted for about 92% and in 2013 about 93% of the total irregularities reported as fraudulent).

In 2017, the irregularities notified by the first three Member States (Poland, Romania and Italy) represented about 65% of the total number of irregularities reported as fraudulent. This concentration was higher than in 2016 (about 63%) and in 2013 (about 58%).

After three consecutive years during which the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to RD had largely exceeded the number of those reported for SA, in 2017 the SA share matched the RD one. As a result, over the period 2013-2017, the number of RD irregularities reported as fraudulent is still higher than the number of SA ones, but the share of the total was just 56%.

For the period 2013-17, Table NR5 provides an overview of the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States in relation to the type of support concerned. This shows a significant decrease in comparison to 2016 (-31.5%), which is due to a drop in the number of relevant RD irregularities (-51.1%) that could not be compensated by the increase recorded for the SA type of support.

Section 3.3.4 will deal later with the reasons why controls that led to discover irregularities were performed. That analysis will bring to a number of findings about the frequency and potential of different detection methods. Here a different perspective is taken. When focusing on the 'over 1 mln' cases, it can be noticed that some of these reasons for performing the control were more present than in the overall set of cases. Reference is made to 'Information published by the media', 'Tip from informant, whistle-blower, etc.' and 'Irregularity detected by EU body'. Even if this is based on a relatively low number of cases, it may be see as corroborating the hypothesis that these targeted controls have the potential to lead to better results.

This contributes to explain the steep increase in 2017 of the financial amounts related to SA irregularities. During 2013-2015 and 2017, each year there were one or two cases concerning market measures which involved exceptional financial amounts (globally adding on average more than EUR 40 mln per year). From this point of view, 2016 was an unusual year, because there were no such exceptional cases. The return to the previous pattern in 2017 contributed to the noticeable upward jump in the financial amounts involved in irregularities concerning SA, which includes market measures.

During 2013-2017, cases which involved financial amounts over 1 million represented less than 1% in terms of numbers, but 33% in terms of amounts. 60% of these 'over 1 mln' cases concerned RD, while 29% concerned market measures. In such a context, where such a significant portion of the financial amounts is linked to a relatively low number of cases, fluctuations are more likely and should not be misinterpreted.

The trend of the financial amounts must be assessed while bearing in mind that it can be strongly influenced by single observations of significant value. The continuous growth of the financial value of irregularities related to RD until 2015 is, however, in line with the general trend of irregularities showed in Table NR3.

Considering the overall period 2013-2017, the average financial amount involved in SA cases is higher than in RD cases (+50%). This is mainly due to irregularities concerning market measures, where cases with exceptional financial amounts happened to be reported. In fact, in 2016 such exceptional cases did not emerge and the average financial amounts of RD and SA cases were broadly aligned. In general, when SA is considered net of cases concerning market measures, the average financial amount is lower than for RD cases. Also in 2016 the average financial amount of cases concerning market measures was 41% higher than that for RD cases.

In fact, the weight of the financial amounts involved in irregularities on payments is very different between the two types of support, as it is 0.1% for SA and 1.3% for RD (0.5% on the overall 2017 CAP expenditure).

Table NR4 provides information about the financial amounts involved in the cases considered in Table NR3. In 2017, the financial amounts have increased by 10% in comparison with 2016. After a decreasing trend during 2013-2016, in 2017 the SA financial amounts bounced back, pushed by strong increases both in numbers and average financial amount (see also below for an explanation). On the contrary, in 2017 the RD financial amounts continued on the decreasing path that had started after the 2015 peak, due to declining numbers and a stable average financial amount. As a result, in 2017 the financial amounts involved in irregularities are nearly equally shared between RD and SA. However, one has to bear in mind that, in 2017, RD represented about 20% of the total resources devoted to the CAP, while the financial value of the irregularities reported in relation to RD accounted for 50% of the total amount of all irregularities related to CAP expenditure in 2017.

The irregularities notified by a minority of Member States (Italy, Romania, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Poland and France) nearly represented 75% of the total number of reported irregularities in 2017.

It should be considered that the two types of support are provided following two different modes. SA follows an annual implementation, while RD finances programmes in a multiannual context, which resembles that of the ESI Funds. In fact, the trends of irregularities detected and reported in relation to RD and ESI Funds are similar and are influenced by the implementation modes.

This difference in stability is reflected in the average year-on-year (yoy) absolute variation, which for SA was just 8%, while for RD it reached 25%.

The number of irregularities decreased by 10% in 2017 (in comparison with 2016) and this brought the overall increase during the period 2013-2017 down to 5%. However, while the irregularities affecting SA have been relatively stable over time, those related to RD have noticeably increased until 2015 and then declined at a similar pace during 2016-2017, as showed by the chart associated to Table NR3 (in 2017, -21.4% in comparison with 2016 and -36.2% in comparison with 2015).

Annex 11 provides a detailed explanation about the classification of cases. When inputting a case, the contributor is requested to specify the currency in which the amounts are expressed. Where the value of this field is 'EUR' or the field has been left blank, no transformation is applied. Where this field has been filled with another currency, the financial amounts involved in the irregularity are transformed on the basis of the exchange rates published by the ECB at the beginning of 2018.

·'SA/RD', where they concern both types of expenditure (rural development and direct support to agriculture) or there is no enough information to assign the case to RD or SA.

·SA, where they do not concern rural development expenditure. SA includes expenditure in relation to intervention in agricultural markets and direct payments to farmers;

Table NR3 shows the number of irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported by the Member States for the period 2013-17 in relation to 'rural development' (RD) and direct 'support to agriculture' (SA). Cases are classified as:

Apart from a difference in scope and objectives, the two funds also function differently. While entitlements and measures supported under the EAGF follow a yearly flow, those under the EAFRD are implemented through multi-annual programmes, very much like the interventions financed through the other ESI funds.

The expenditure made by the paying agencies is then reimbursed by the European Commission to the Member States, in the case of the EAGF on a monthly basis and in the case of EAFRD on a quarterly basis. Those reimbursements are, however, subject to possible financial corrections which the European Commission may make under the clearance of accounts procedures.

The paying agencies are, however, not only responsible for making payments to the beneficiaries. Prior to doing so, they must, either themselves or through delegated bodies, satisfy themselves of the eligibility of the aid applications. The exact checks to be carried out are laid down in the different sectorial regulations of the CAP and vary from one sector to another.

Under the basic rules for the financial management of the CAP, the European Commission is responsible for the management of the EAGF and the EAFRD. However, the European Commission itself does not make payments to beneficiaries. According to the principle of shared management, this task is delegated to the Member States, who themselves work through national or regional paying agencies. Before these paying agencies can claim any expenditure from the EU-budget, they must be accredited on the basis of a set of criteria laid down by the European Commission.

The CAP is financed by two funds, EAGF and EAFRD, which form part of the EU's general budget.

For the last 50 years the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the European Union's (EU) most important common policy. This explains why traditionally it has taken a large part of the EU's budget, although the percentage has steadily declined over recent years.

The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) provides funding and technical support for initiatives that can make the fishery industry more sustainable. The EMFF is the successor of the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), for which the full resources have been committed by the end of 2014. Table NR1 shows also the financial resources available for this policy area. However, in light of their belonging to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) family, EFF and EMFF will be treated together with the other structural funds. EAFRD and the EMFF are among the five ESIF which complement each other and seek to promote a growth and job based recovery in Europe.

oRural development programmes of the Member States (RD), which are mainly financed through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

oDirect support to agriculture (SA), through direct payments to farmers and measures to respond to market disturbances, such as private or public storage and export refunds, which are financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund;

For the purpose of this analysis, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is split in two main parts:

The emphasis of the EU policy in this field is on increasing farms' profitability, diversifying the rural economy and protecting the natural environment. There is a direct management component but the majority of expenditure is disbursed by Member States under shared management funds.

If TOR are not established because of an administrative error by a Member State, the Commission applies the principle of financial liability. Member States have been held financially liable in 2017 for over EUR 29 million, and new cases are being given appropriate follow-up.

Considering the fraud diversion and spreading of specific fraud mechanism, EU-wide and international cooperation in detection of irregular cases is more and more required.

One general conclusion drawn by the Commission from its inspections in Member States in recent years is that their control strategies are increasingly shifting from customs controls at the time of clearance of goods to post-clearance customs controls. The customs controls before or at the time of clearance of goods remain however indispensable for addressing undervaluation and the detection of new types or patterns of fraud or irregularities. Therefore, the customs controls strategy should be frequently reviewed taking into account recent detections or new risks.

In 2017, the general subject of inspection was the keeping of the separate account and the corrections of the normal account, with a specific emphasis on the written-off amounts between EUR 50.000 and EUR 100.000. "Management of the normal and separate accounts in smaller offices","Management of tariff suspensions and quotas", "External EU transit and the TIR procedures" and "Control strategy of large business units" were the main inspection themes of the on-the-spot customs inspections by the Commission services in Member States.

In its TOR inspections, the Commission has put a special emphasis on Member States’ customs control strategies and closely monitors their actions and follow-up in relation to the observations made during the inspections. Member States generally show their willingness to adapt their control strategies and to progressively implement systems that provide for efficient and effective risk analysis to protect the EU’s financial interests. However, budgetary constraints and the increase of tasks related to security have led to cuts in the number of customs officials in charge of duty collection control in many Member States. This may undermine the control efficiency and thus pose risks to the protection of the EU financial interest.

Examination of Member States’ diligence in write-off cases constitutes a very effective mechanism for gauging their activity in the field of recovery. It encourages national administrations to step up the regularity, efficiency and effectiveness of their recovery activity, since any lack of diligence leading to failure to recover results in individual Member States having to foot the bill.

In 2017, 12 Member States submitted 50 new write-off reports to the Commission. In 2017, the Commission assessed 169 cases totalling EUR 74 million. In 34 of these cases amounting to EUR 11 million, the Commission's view was that the Member States did not demonstrate satisfactorily that the TOR was lost for reasons not imputable to them so they were considered financially responsible for the loss.

The HRR confirms that in the long term recovery in cases reported as fraudulent is generally much less successful than in cases not reported as fraudulent (see table TOR4). Classification of a case as fraudulent is thus a strong indicator for forecasting short- and long-term recovery results.

OWNRES shows that on the cut-off date, on average 37 % (1989-2017) of the initially established amount in relation to cases not reported as fraudulent has been corrected (cancelled) since 1989. The RR for non-fraudulent cases reported for 2017 is 50%. On the cut-off date, the annual RR for the last five years has varied between 47% and 85%. The overall RR for all years (1989-2017) for all cases not reported as fraudulent is 71 %.

Over the 1989-2017 period, OWNRES shows that, on average, 22 % of the initially established amount was corrected (cancelled). The recovery rate (RR) for all years (1989-2017) is 37 %. The RR for cases reported as fraudulent and detected in 2017 was 26 % which is below the average rate of 36% for fraudulent cases for the 2013-2017 period. In general, the RR in cases reported as fraudulent is clearly much lower than that for cases not reported as fraudulent.

There are large differences between Member States’ classifications, which may partly depend on their classification practices. This can influence the comparison of the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and as non-fraudulent by Member States. Moreover, individual bigger cases detected in a specific year may affect annual rates significantly. Factors such as the type of traffic, type of trade, the level of compliance of the economic operators, the location of a Member State can influence the rates significantly. Bearing in mind these variable factors, the rates of incidence can also be affected by the way a Member State’s customs control strategy is set up to target risky imports and to detect TOR-related fraud and irregularities.

The total estimated and established amount affected by cases not reported as fraudulent was more than EUR 425 million which indicates an irregularity incidence of 1.66 %. The highest percentages can be seen in Spain (4.11 %), Hungary (3.17 %) and Czech Republic (2.58 %).

In 2017, the total estimated and established amount affected by fraud in the EU was EUR 76 million and the overall incidence of fraud was 0.30 %. For 2017, the highest percentages can be seen in Greece (7.03 %), Malta (2.49 %) and Austria (2.05 %).

For 2017, Member States reported 441 cases as fraudulent out a total of 4 636 cases reported via OWNRES, which indicates a Fraud Frequency Level (FFL) of 10 %. The differences between Member States are relatively large. In 2017, nine Member States categorised between 10-50 % of all cases reported as fraudulent. However, Czech Republic and Slovakia did not categorise any cases reported as fraudulent. Seven Member States categorised less than 10 % of cases as fraudulent. Nine Member States registered more than 50 % of cases as fraudulent.

The total estimated and established amount in non-fraudulent cases where the amount at stake was above EUR 50 000 amounted to EUR 366 million (86 % of the total estimated and established amount for non-fraudulent cases).

In 2017, the established amount was below EUR 50 000 in 3 159 non-fraudulent cases (76 % of all irregularity cases), whereas it was above EUR 50 000 in 1 036 cases (24 %).

In 2017, solar panels originating in China were especially vulnerable to non-fraudulent irregularities in monetary terms. About 12 % (EUR 49 million) of the total amount that was established in non-fraudulent irregularities concerned this type of goods. Incorrect classification/misdescription and incorrect country of origin or dispatching country were the main pattern of the infringement reported. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany were particularly affected by this type of goods and infringement. Other 10 Member States reported also cases related to solar panels to a smaller extent. Most of the cases reported were detected following Mutual Assistance notices issued by OLAF. This underlines the importance of investigations conducted by OLAF in this particular field.

In 13 Member States, more than 50 % of all non-fraudulent cases — in amounts — were detected by post-release controls. In Greece, Spain, France, Portugal and Romania more than 50 % of the amounts relating to non-fraudulent cases were detected by anti-fraud services. Significant amounts were reported as non-fraudulent following voluntary admission by the United Kingdom (EUR 28 million) and Germany (EUR 22 million). In 14 Member States voluntary admission was keyed in as a method of detection of cases reported as non-fraudulent.

Considering the estimated or established amounts, around 52 % of all irregularity cases registered for 2017 were discovered during a post-clearance control, 14 % were related to voluntary admission, 15 % to an inspection by anti-fraud services, whereas 10 % related to a tax audit and 8 % were found during a control at the time of clearance of goods.

In 2017, most non-fraudulent cases (55 %) were revealed during post-clearance customs controls. Other methods of detection for non-fraudulent cases that featured frequently were voluntary admission (19 %), clearance controls (11 %), tax audits (8 %), followed by anti-fraud services (5 %) .

Of all cases reported as non-fraudulent about 49 % concern electrical and mechanical machinery, vehicles, mechanical appliances, plastics, articles of iron and steel, glass and glassware and textiles. In monetary terms those groups of goods represent about 53 % of all amounts estimated or established for cases reported as non-fraudulent. China, United States, Argentina, Sri-Lanka, Thailand, Japan are - in monetary terms – the most important countries of origin of goods affected by irregularities.

In 2017 most of the estimated and established amounts in OWNRES in the EU-28 (83 %) for cases reported as non-fraudulent related to the customs procedure ‘release for free circulation’. 4% of all amounts estimated or established in cases not reported as fraudulent in 2017 involved customs warehousing, 11 % of all amounts estimated or established related to inward processing. Other customs procedures are only marginally affected in 2017.

Not all customs procedures are equally susceptible to irregularities; their vulnerability may change in the course of time as certain economic sectors are briefly targeted. The customs procedure ‘release for free circulation’ is the customs procedure mostly affected by irregularities since at the time of release for free circulation the non-compliance in the customs declaration may relate to a large number of irregularities, e.g. to the tariff, CN code, (preferential) origin, incorrect value, etc. On the other hand, in customs suspension regimes (like warehousing, transit, inward processing, etc. - where the payment of duties is suspended) the sole irregularity that might occur is the subtraction of the goods from customs supervision. Thus, it is normal, and indeed to be expected, that most fraud and irregularities be reported in connection with the procedure ‘release for free circulation’.

A breakdown of irregularities by type of fraud shows that most cases of irregularity related to incorrect declarations (incorrect classification, customs value or country of origin or dispatch) and formal shortcomings (removal of goods from customs supervision, incorrect use of preferential arrangements or failure to fulfil obligations or commitments).

The total estimated and established amount in cases reported as fraudulent, where the amount at stake was above EUR 50 000, amounted to EUR 54 million (70 % of the total estimated and established amount for cases reported as fraudulent).

In 2017, the estimated and established amount was below EUR 50 000 in 303 cases reported as fraudulent (69 % of all fraud cases), whereas it was above EUR 50 000 in 138 cases (31%).

The highest number of cases was reported by Lithuania (32), Greece (25) and Spain (23). The highest amount was reported by Belgium (EUR 8.3 million). No cases were reported by 8 Member States.

In 2017, there were 173 cases of smuggled cigarettes registered (CN code 24 02 20 90) involving estimated TOR of around EUR 25 million. In 2016 the number of cases of smuggled cigarettes was 147, totalling around EUR 25 million.

In Belgium, Ireland, Romania and Slovenia the 100% of all estimated and established amounts in fraudulent cases were detected by an inspection by services or bodies other than customs.

In 11 Member States more than 50 % of all estimated and established amount in fraudulent cases were detected by anti-fraud services. As regards amounts, controls at the time of clearance of goods were the most important method for detecting fraudulent instances in Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom whereas post-clearance controls were in Denmark, Hungary, The Netherlands, Austria, Poland and Sweden.

In monetary terms, of the EUR 76 million estimated or established in fraudulent cases registered for 2017, around 52 % were discovered during an inspection by anti-fraud services, 31% during a post-clearance control, 14 % during a control at the time of clearance of goods.

In 2017, inspections by anti-fraud services (43 %) was the most successful method of detecting fraudulent cases followed by customs controls carried out at the time of clearance of goods (23 %) and post-clearance controls (28 %).

Of all cases reported as fraudulent about 74 % concern such goods as tobacco, electrical machinery and equipment, preparation of foodstuffs, vehicles, textiles and articles of iron and steel. In monetary terms those groups of goods represent about 78 % of all amounts estimated and established for cases reported as fraudulent. China, United States, Ukraine, Switzerland, Turkey and Singapore are the most important - in monetary terms - countries of origin of goods affected by fraud.

In 2017, the customs procedure ‘release for free circulation' remained the procedure most vulnerable to fraud (71 % of the number of cases and 67 % of the estimated and established amount). A total of 19 % of all cases reported as fraudulent and 11% of all estimated and established amounts in OWNRES cases registered as fraudulent for 2017 fall under the category "Other". A total of 7 % of all cases reported as fraudulent and 20 % of all estimated and established amounts in OWNRES cases registered as fraudulent for 2017 involve the transit procedure.

A breakdown by types of fraud reveals that incorrect origin or country of dispatching, smuggling of goods, incorrect value or incorrect classification/misdescription are frequently mentioned in 2017 for cases reported as fraudulent.

On the cut-off date (15 March 2018), the overall recovery rate for all years 1989-2017 was 62%.

Recovery rates vary among the Member States. The highest recovery rates for 2017 are in Slovenia (100%), Slovakia (98%), Ireland (97%), Finland (88 %), Hungary (87 %), Austria (83%) and Germany (82%). Differences in recovery results may arise from factors such as the type of fraud or irregularity, or the type of debtor involved. It can be expected that the recovery rate for 2017 will also go up in the future.

The overall recovery rate is a correlation between the detection, the established amount and the current recovery stage of individual cases (high additional duty claims are more frequently associated with long lasting administrative and criminal procedures).

Over the past five years the annual recovery rate has varied between 44 % and 80 % (see Chart TOR4). The recovery rate for cases reported in 2017 is currently 47 %. In other words, out of every amount over EUR 10 000 of duties established and reported for 2017 in OWNRES as irregular/fraudulent, approximately EUR 4 700 has already been paid.

The fraud and irregularity cases detected in 2017 correspond to an established amount of EUR 483 million. Nearly EUR 212 million of this was recovered in cases where an irregularity was at stake and EUR 15 million in fraudulent cases. In total EUR 227 million was recovered by all Member States for all cases which were detected in 2017. In absolute figures, Germany recovered the highest amount in 2017 (EUR 76 million) followed by the UK (EUR 55 million). This is a starting point for the recovery. Analysis shows that lengthy recovery procedures spread over several years are usually required due to administrative and judicial procedures in complex cases or cases with huge financial impact.

For the seven Member States which established and made available most of the TOR amounts, the average percentage of the estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR for 2017 was equal to 2.02 %. In comparison with the previous year (2.13%), this represents a decrease of 0.11%. For Belgium, the proportion of estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR increased in 2017 (1.14%) compared to the previous year (0.62%), while for Germany it has increased from 1.39% to 1.80%. For the other five Member States, the average proportion of estimated and established OWNRES amounts to established TOR declined in 2017 (2.28%) compared to the previous year (2.66%).

TOR Map1 shows the estimated and established amount reported in OWNRES as a percentage of the collected TOR (gross) amount, by Member State. Further details can be found in Annex 4. There are differences among the Member States. In 11 Member States, the percentage is above the average of 1.96 %. The highest percentage for 2017 can be seen in Greece, Spain and Hungary with 7.17 %, 4.31 % and 3.35 %.

The total estimated and established amount reported in OWNRES represent 1.96 % of the total collected TOR (gross) amount in 2017. This proportion has decreased compared with 2016 when it was 2.14 %. A percentage of 1.96 % indicates that of every EUR 100 of TOR (gross) established, an amount of EUR 1.96 is registered as irregular (fraudulent or non-fraudulent) in OWNRES.

In 2017, the total established amount of TOR (gross) was EUR 25.6 billion and more than 98% was duly recovered and made available to the Commission via the A-account. According to the OWNRES data, around EUR 502 million has been established or estimated by the Member States in connection with cases reported as fraudulent/non fraudulent where the amount at stake exceeds EUR 10 000.

Annex 3 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date for years 2013-2017.

Luxemburg and Malta did not report any case of irregularity exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000 for 2017.

The total estimated and established amount of TOR (EUR 425 million) was 15 % higher than the average estimated and established amount for the years 2013-2017 (EUR 369 million).

At the same time, the number of cases not reported as fraudulent communicated via OWNRES for 2017 (4 195) was 8% lower than the average number reported for 2013-2017 (4 564).

Annex 2 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date for years 2013-2017.

On the cut-off date (15 March 2018), 9.5 % of all cases detected in 2017 were classified as fraudulent. The percentage decreased slightly in comparison to 2016 (11 %).

For 2017, Luxemburg, Czech Republic and Slovakia did not communicate any fraudulent case exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000.

The total estimated and established amount of TOR involved (EUR 76 million) represents a decrease of 28% of the average estimated and established amount for the years 2013-2017 (EUR 106 million).

The number of cases reported as fraudulent registered in OWNRES for 2017 (441) is currently 33% lower than the average number of cases reported for the 2013-2017 period (658).

Annex 1 of the summary tables shows the situation on the cut-off date (15 March 2018) for the years 2013-2017.

In 2017, 3 big cases for a total amount of about EUR 41 million were reported compared to 2016, when 5 big cases with a total amount of about EUR 115 million affected the total estimated and established amount. Luxemburg did not communicate any case exceeding an amount of EUR 10 000.

The total estimated and established amount of TOR involved (EUR 502 million) is about 6 % higher than the average estimated and established amount for years 2013-2017 (EUR 475 million).

The number of cases reported via OWNRES for 2017 (4 636) is about 11% lower than the average number of of irregular cases reported for the 2013-2017 period (5 222).

The following analysis is based on the data available on the cut-off date (15 March 2018) and aims to provide an overview of the reported cases of fraud and irregularities reported for 2017 together with their financial impact.

The technical explanations and the statistical approach are explained in the accompanying document 'Methodology regarding the statistical evaluation of reported irregularities for 2015'.

16 Annexes complement the information and data of this document, providing a global overview of the irregularities reported according to the relevant sector regulations. Annexes 1 to 10 concern Traditional Own Resources, Annexes 11 to 15 complement information on the methodology for the analysis of irregularities concerning expenditure, Annex 16 covers all the expenditure sectors for which Member States and beneficiary countries have a reporting obligation.

The document is completed by 28 country factsheets, which summarise, for each Member State, the main indicators and information that have been recorded throughout the analyses.

The section dedicated to shared management, covers agriculture, cohesion policy and fisheries and other internal policies. Decentralised management refers to the pre-accession policy, while the centralised management section mainly deals with internal and external policies for which the Commission directly manages the implementation.

The second part, concerning the expenditure part of the budget, is composed of three sections, dedicated, respectively, to shared, decentralised and centralised management modes.

The first part is dedicated to the analysis of irregularities reported in the area of the Traditional Own Resources (Revenue).

The methodology (including the definition of terms and indicators), the data sources and the data capture systems are explained in detail in the Commission Staff Working Document – Methodology for the Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities accompanying the Annual Report on the Protection of the EU financial interests for the year 2015.

For this reason, this document should be regarded as an analysis of the achievements of Member States.

The document accompanies the Annual Report adopted on the basis of article 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to which “The Commission, in cooperation with Member States, shall each year submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the measures taken for the implementation of this article”.

The present document is based on the analysis of the notifications provided by national authorities of cases of irregularities and suspected or established fraud. The reporting is performed in fulfilment of a legal obligation enshrined in sectoral European legislation.

29th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2017

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 3.9.2018 SWD(2018) 386 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2017: own resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 29th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against fraud - 2017 {COM(2018) 553 final}

{SWD(2018) 381 final}

{SWD(2018) 382 final}

{SWD(2018) 383 final}

{SWD(2018) 384 final}

{SWD(2018) 385 final}



Contents 4. The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 4.1. General analysis 4.1.1. Irregularities reported as fraudulent 4.1.2. Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 4.1.3. Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2014-2020 4.2. Specific Analysis – Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2007-13 4.2.1. Objectives concerned by the reported irregularities 4.2.2. Priorities concerned by the reported irregularities 4.3 Reasons for performing control 4.3.1 Irregularities reported as fraudulent 4.3.2 Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 4.4. Antifraud and control activities by Member States – programming period 2007-2013 4.4.1. Duration of irregularities 4.4.2. Detection of irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member State in relation to the programming period 2007-13 4.4.3. Fraud detection rate 4.4.4. Irregularity Detection Rate 4.4.5. Ratio of established fraud (programming period 2007-13) 4.5 Other shared management Funds

5. Pre-Accession Policy (Pre-Accession Assistance and Instrument for Pre-Accession I and II) 5.1. The Pre-accession Assistance (PAA), 2000-06 5.2. The Instrument for Pre-accession 2007-13 – IPA I 5.3. The Instrument for Pre-accession 2014-20 – IPA II 5.4. General analysis 5.4.1. Pre-accession assistance (PAA) 5.4.2. Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA I) 5.5. Specific analysis – Financial year 2017 5.5.1. Pre-Accession Assistance (PAA) 5.5.2. Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) 6. Direct Management 6.1. Introduction 6.2. General analysis 6.2.1. Five year analysis 2013-2017 6.3. Specific analysis 6.3.1. Recoveries according policy areas 6.3.2. Recoveries according to legal entity residence 6.3.3. Method of detection 6.3.4. Types of irregularity 6.3.5. Recovery

COUNTRY FACTSHEETS Belgium - Belgique/België Bulgaria - България Czech Republic - Česká republika Denmark - Danmark Germany - Deutschland Estonia - Eesti Ireland - Éire Greece - Ελλάδα Spain - España France Croatia - Hrvatska Italy - Italia Cyprus - Κύπρος Latvia - Latvija Lithuania - Lietuva Luxembourg Hungary - Magyarország Malta Netherlands - Nederland

Austria - Österreich Poland - Polska Portugal Romania - România Slovenia - Slovenija Slovakia - Slovensko Finland – Suomi-Finland Sweden - Sverige United Kingdom ANNEXES



4.The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) Over half of EU funding is channelled through the 5 European structural and investment funds (ESIF). They are jointly managed by the European Commission and the EU countries. The purpose of all these funds is to invest in job creation and a sustainable and healthy European economy and environment. The ESIF mainly focus on 5 areas: –research and innovation; –digital technologies; –supporting the low-carbon economy; –sustainable management of natural resources;

–small businesses. The European structural and investment funds are: –European regional development fund (ERDF) – promotes balanced development in the different regions of the EU; –European social fund (ESF) - supports employment-related projects throughout Europe and invests in Europe’s human capital – its workers, its young people and all those seeking a job; –Cohesion fund (CF) – funds transport and environment projects in countries where the gross national income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average. In 2014-2020, these are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; –European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD) – focuses on resolving the particular challenges facing EU's rural areas; –European maritime and fisheries fund (EMFF) – helps fishermen to adopt sustainable fishing practices and coastal communities to diversify their economies, improving quality of life along European coasts. Due to the rules of functioning of the EMFF and (European Fisheries Fund (EFF)), which are very similar to those of the other structural funds, irregularities reported by Member States in relation to fisheries policies are treated in this chapter jointly with the funds for cohesion and economic convergence. All these funds are managed by the EU countries themselves, by means of partnership agreements. Each country prepares an agreement, in collaboration with the European Commission, setting out how the funds will be used during the current funding period 2014-2020. Partnership agreements lead to a series of investment programmes channelling the funding to the different regions and projects in the policy areas concerned. For 2014-2020, EUR 454 billion in ESIF funding has been allocated to promote job creation and growth. National co-financing is expected to amount to at least EUR 183 billion, with total investment reaching EUR 637 billion. These resources will contribute to: ·Strengthening Research and Innovation; ·Supporting the digital single market; ·Supporting the growth of Europe’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); ·Supporting the energy union and the low-carbon economy; ·Investing in environmental protection and resource efficiency; ·Climate change and risk prevention; ·Supporting sustainable transport; ·Promoting sustainable and quality employment; ·Promoting social inclusion;

·Investing in education and training; ·Support youth employment; ·Strengthening institutional capacity and efficient public administration. However, this section of the report will focus on previous programming periods, as only a very limited part of the reported irregularities refer to the period 2014-2020. 4.1.General analysis In comparison with the other budget sectors, the analysis of the cohesion policy poses a higher level of complexity, as information refers to different programming periods, which are regulated by different rules. Table CP1 offers an overview of the number of irregularities (both fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported from 2013 to 2017, by programming period (PP) and fund. Table CP1 does not suggest any major diversion from known trends and patterns in detection and reporting of irregularities, with the exception of year 2015. In this year, the number of reported irregularities doubled, before decreasing in the following years. In relation to this 2015 peak, the following can be pointed out: 1)The increase was mainly related to the PP 2007-13. a.It was for the greatest part linked to the reporting of irregularities by one Member State (Spain), which covered almost half of the total number of irregularities reported in 2015. a.This Spanish anomalous increase was due to delayed reporting of irregularities detected throughout the programming period. If they were excluded, the number of reported irregularities would still be higher than in 2014. However, this increase would be more in line with the programming cycle of the funds. b. When support is based on multi-annual programmes, it can be expected that the number of irregularities increases around the end of the eligibility period and decreases afterwards, when routine controls are less intense. In general, it should be kept in mind that increases in the number of reported irregularities can be influenced by detection capacity building by the Member State. 2)A minor, yet still striking increase in reporting was observed in relation to the previous PP 2000-06. The number of irregularities almost doubled from 2014 to 2015. In this respect, the explanation is belated reporting by another Member State (Ireland). Table CP2 offers an overview by PP and fund of the financial amounts involved in irregularities detected and reported to the European Commission over the last five years. While the number of reported irregularities peaked in 2015 and gradually, but significantly decreased in the following years, the involved financial amounts were stable in 2016, before declining at a slower pace. This trend implied a raise of the average financial amounts, both in 2016 (+17%) and 2017 (+40.5%). This was mainly due to: ·the high amounts involved in the irregularities affecting the Cohesion Fund, which finances infrastructure projects of very high value and in relation to which, sometimes, individual cases of irregularities involving very high amounts can be detected. The financial amounts related to PP 2007-2013 significantly increased in 2016 (+36%) while the financial amounts in 2017 were pushed further by irregularities related to PP 2014-2020; ·the steep upward trend in the average amount of the irregularities pertaining to the ERDF in the programming period 2007-2013 (+16% in 2016 and +53% in 2017) which represent the large majority of all irregularities. Furthermore, in 2017 irregularities related to PP 2014-2020 started to be significantly reported.

The trend of the financial amounts must be assessed while bearing in mind that it can be strongly influenced by single observations of significant value. During 2013-2017, cases which involved over EUR 5 million represented less than 1% in terms of numbers, but 38% in terms of amounts. 71% of these cases concerned the ERDF, while 22% concerned the Cohesion Fund. The average financial amount of cases related to the Cohesion fund was 33% higher than that of ERDF cases. In such a context, where such a significant portion of the financial amounts is linked to a relatively low number of cases, fluctuations are more likely and should not be misinterpreted. While focusing on PP 2007-2013, section 4.3 will deal with the reasons why controls that led to discover irregularities were performed. That analysis will bring to a number of findings about the frequency and potential of information from media, EU bodies, tips and risk analysis. Here a different perspective is taken. Reference is made to the irregularities reported during the period 2013-2017, including all programming periods. Within this context, when focusing on the 'over 5 mln' cases, it can be noticed that these reasons for performing the control were more present than in the overall set of cases, in particular with regard to information from EU bodies. Even if this is based on a relatively low number of cases, this corroborates the hypothesis that these targeted controls based on information from media, EU bodies, tips or risk analysis have the potential to lead to better results. 4.1.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent 4.1.1.1.Trend by programming period Table CP3 provides an overview by PP and fund of the irregularities reported as fraudulent in the last five years (2013-2017). Irregularities reported as fraudulent in 2017 have increased by 10% since 2013, while they have decreased by 18% in comparison with the 2015 peak. During the last five years, while the fraudulent irregularities linked to the PP 2000-06 have been decreasing to reach nearly 0 in 2017, those linked to the PP 2007-13 have peaked in 2015 and gradually decreased in the following years. These trends are linked to the implementation cycle of PP 2007-2013 and the closure of PP 2000-2006. Apart from very few cases in 2015 and 2016, reporting related to PP 2014-2020 started in 2017 (more than 10% of all cases reported in 2017 as fraudulent) Table CP4 provides an overview by PP and Fund of the financial amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent. As already indicated on several occasions, the trend of the financial amounts is more subject to fluctuations due to the possibility of individual cases involving high amounts. While the number of irregularities peaked in 2015, the involved financial amounts resumed strong growth in 2017. This was mainly due to irregularities pertaining the programming period 2007-2013, with noticeable increases for the Cohesion fund (+349%) and the ERDF (+34%), and the programming period 2014-2020, where significant reporting started for the Cohesion Fund. These increases were mainly due to higher financial amounts reported by Slovakia (Cohesion Fund and ERDF), Romania (ERDF) and Portugal (ERDF). Focusing on PP 2007-2013, the financial amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent for the ERDF were predominant (73% in 2013-2017), also due to the high share of EU financing that is channel through this fund.. 4.1.1.2.Trend by Fund The analysis of the same data presented in Tables CP3 and CP4 but focussed on the distribution of the irregularities reported as fraudulent by Fund (Tables CP5 and CP6), highlights the following situations: (1)2015 witnessed a peak in the number of irregularities: this was the end year of eligiblity for Cohesion programmes (PP 2007-2013), when irregularities reported can be expected to increase. The number of irregularities reported by the MS in relation to PP 2007-2013 jumped, both with reference to the ERDF (+105%) and the ESF (+46%). The related financial amounts moved in the same direction (+166% for the ERDF and +268% for the ESF). In 2016, figures concerning the ESF reverted down to previous levels. (2)2017 showed an increase in financial amounts despite a decrease in the number of irregularities. This was the year of closure of Cohesion programmes, when the number of irregularities can be expected to decrease, while the amounts involved are not strictly correlated to the number of irregularities. This increase was due to a growth in the financial amounts involved in CF irregularities (+611%) and, to a lesser extent, in ERDF irregularities (+38%);

(3)The highest number of cases and absolute financial amounts (not relative to payments) relate to the ERDF. The number of cases increased significantly from 2013 to 2017, due to an upward shift in 2015, followed by stable reporting in 2016 and a slight decline in 2017. The financial amounts increased until 2017 (with the exception of 2016). The average financial amount significantly increased in 2017 (+55%); (4)Potential frauds affecting the Cohesion fund are now reported regularly (since 2010), and from 2016 to 2017 doubled, in terms of number, and became seven times higher, in terms of financial amounts. Fluctuations of the amounts, however, can be particularly significant in respect of these cases, because of fewer cases and high amounts involved in the projects financed by the Cohesion Fund. (5)Both in terms of numbers and, even more, of financial amounts, cases related to the ESF peaked in 2015 and their share on the total during 2013-2017 exceeded 15%, in terms of financial amounts (similar to CF); 2 4.1.2.Irregularities not reported as fraudulent Table CP7 provides an overview by PP and fund of the irregularities not reported as fraudulent in the last five years (2013-2017). The reasons behind the high increase in 2015 have already been explained under section 4.1. After 2015, the decrease in the number of irregularities was fast for the ERDF (as from 2016) and the ESF (as from 2017) and more gradual for the CF. The financial amounts followed a different pattern and increased further in 2016, before falling in 2017, but not as much as the number of irregularities. The average financial amounts for PP 2007-2013 have been increasing since 2016: CF (+49% in 2016), ERDF (+19% in 2016, +45% in 2017), ESF (+32% in 2016, +23% in 2017). For PP 2000-2006, the financial amounts reported in relation to the ERDF dropped in 2016. In general, irregularities for this PP are fading towards zero. Considering the fact that irregularities reported as fraudulent usually imply higher financial amounts, one may suppose that some of the cases notified as non-fraudulent might be reclassified later as potentially fraudulent. In 2016, the reporting of irregularities referring to PP 2014-2020 started and increased in 2017, as implementation is progressing. Number and financial amounts are still low, but they can be expected to grow during next years, in line with the implementation cycle. Anti-fraud capacity building by Member States and new anti-fraud provisions may contribute to this increase. The average financial amounts are still lower than for PP 2007-2013 but, in this comparison with previous PP, the ESF sticks out, with very low averages of about EUR 8,300 and 14,800 in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Table CP8 shows the financial amounts involved in the irregularities not reported as fraudulent. Once more, as already mentioned several times in relation to the financial amounts, fluctuations can happen more often, as they can be linked to individual irregularities or groups of irregularities of significant value, which produce distortive effects from one year to the next. 4.1.3. Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2014-2020 Table CP9 provides an overview of all the irregularities and related financial amounts that have been reported up to 2017 with reference to PP 2014-2020. Apart from a few cases in 2015, reporting of these irregularities started in 2016 and increased in 2017. This is consistent with the implementation cycle of the ongoing programming period. There is not enough data yet to present a meaningful analysis focusing on PP 2014-2020.

4.2.Specific Analysis – Irregularities reported in relation to the Programming Period 2007-13 This section of the analysis focuses on the irregularities reported in relation to the PP 2007-13. The closure for the programming period started in March 2017; it therefore offers an ideal opportunity to present an overview of what has happened. Consequently, the analysis will cover a greater time span than the previous section (2013 to 2017), to examine all information available, which dates back to 2008. It will cover the following aspects: ·Objectives; ·Priorities and themes affected; ·Types of irregularity 4.2.1.Objectives concerned by the reported irregularities The reported irregularities followed the pattern that could be expected in relation to the implementation cycle (Table CP10). The majority of the irregularities were notified over the last three years of the reference period and mainly concerned the Convergence objective (60% of the total), in line with the fact that this is the objective to which the greatest financial resources are allocated and in relation to which higher risks are associated. The anomaly concerning the year 2015 has already been explained. For 187 irregularities, the objective was not mentioned by the Member States. Table CP11 provides information about the financial amounts involved in the reported irregularities. They broadly followed the same pattern of the number of irregularities in Table CP10, with the exception of the amounts linked to the Convergence objective reported in 2012, which exceeded those related to the following two years, and those related to 2016, which are higher than those reported in 2015. In 2016, irregular amounts reported in relation to the Cohesion Fund were exceptionally high, as already showed in Table CP2 and highlighted in section 4.1. As for the number of irregularities, the majority of financial amounts were notified over the last three years and mainly concerned the Convergence objective (77%). 4.2.1.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent by Objective Table CP12 and CP13 include only the irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to PP 2007-13. The trends are similar to those presented in the previous section for all irregularities in relation to PP 2007-2013. A difference that is worth highlighting is the strong increase in the number of irregularities in 2016 in relation to Convergence (while the sum of fraudulent and non fraudulent irregularities decreased) and the exceptional drop in 2016 in relation to 'Regional competitiveness and employment'. With reference to the financial amounts, fluctuations are emphasized, as high profile cases can have a significant impact. The higher share represented by the Convergence objective in comparison with that presented in the previous section is also significant (68% of cases and 88% of financial amounts).

Irregularities reported as fraudulent represented about 4.9% of the total number of irregularities reported for PP 2007-13. The highest percentage (Fraud Frequency Level – FFL) was related to the Fisheries (7.1%), the European Territorial Cooperation (6.6%) and to the Convergence (5.6%) objectives. Regional competitiveness and Employment had the lowest FFL (2.8%). Financial amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent represented about 14.7% of the total reported for PP 2007-13. The highest share (Fraud Amount Level – FAL) was related to the European Territorial Cooperation (19.9%), the Fisheries (18.2%) and the Convergence (16.7%) objectives. Regional competitiveness and Employment had the lowest FAL (4.7%). The difference between FFL and FAL indicates the higher financial impact of fraudulent irregularities compared to the non-fraudulent infringements. As a matter of fact, the average financial value involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent is more than three times higher than that related to the non-fraudulent types. 4.2.1.2.Fraud and Irregularity Detection Rates by Objective Table CP14 shows the FDR and the IDR per objective. Looking at the overall detection rate (FDR+IDR), Regional competitiveness and employment programmes show a relatively low level of detection. European Territorial Cooperation programmes, however, show an anomalously low level of detection (about four times lower than the previous objective), especially if one considers that the previous two indicators (FFL and FAL) were high. The situation is different for Convergence, Fisheries and Multiobjective programmes, where the detection rate approaches or is higher than 3%. 4.2.2.Priorities concerned by the reported irregularities 4.2.2.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent (fisheries not included) The operational programmes financed by the Cohesion Policy are implemented in relation to the already mentioned objectives, but also along identified Priorities and Themes. The information provided by the Member States allows for an analysis of the priority areas in relation to which projects potentially affected by fraudulent practices have been identified. Table CP15 shows the number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by priority area since the beginning of the PP 2007-13, their related financial amounts, the average amount per irregularity, FFL, FAL and FDR. In terms of numbers, the 'Priorities' most concerned were 'Research and Technological Development (RTD)', 'Increasing the adaptability of workers and firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs' and 'Improving access to employment and sustainability'. Irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to these three priorities represent about 37% of the total. FFL is highest for 'Tourism' (11.7%) and 'Strengthening institutional capacity' (9.7%), while the top four priorities (in terms of FFL) in the Table are all above or equal to 9%, which is double the average. From the financial amounts point of view, the most significant results concern 'Transport, 'RTD' and 'Urban and rural regeneration'. ‘Transport’ retains by far the highest average value, more than ten times R&TD and the overall average. Financial amounts related to the irregularities reported as fraudulent in relation to these three priorities represent 49% of the total. FAL is highest for 'Urban and rural regeneration' (40%), 'Tourism' (33%), 'Investment in social infrastructure' (24%), and 'Increasing the adaptability of workers, firms, enterprises' (20%). The priorities 'Tourism' and 'Urban and rural regeneration' stand out in terms of FDR.

Irregularities linked to the EFF have not been included. Reference to 'Technical assistance Fisheries' and 'Measures of common interest – fishery' in Table CP15 may depend on errors in encoding by Member States. For about 27% of the irregularities used for this analysis information was not provided about the priority area concerned, decreasing in comparison with previous years. 4.2.2.2.Irregularities not reported as fraudulent (fisheries not included) The same analysis showed in the previous section for the irregularities reported as fraudulent is presented here for the irregularities not reported as fraudulent in relation to the PP 2007-13. Table CP16 provides an overview of the number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent by priority area since the beginning of the PP 2007-13, their related financial amounts and average amount per irregularity and IDR. Again, ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ was the priority with the highest number of occurrences, followed by ‘Environmental protection and risk prevention’ and ‘Transport’. ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ was first also in terms of financial amounts, closely followed by 'Transport' and, at a distance, by ‘Environmental protection and risk prevention’. Irregularities linked to these three priorities together represent 23.6% of the total number and 45.4% of the total amounts. The priorities 'Tourism', ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’, 'Information society' and ‘Transport’ show a IDR higher than or equal to 2%. Irregularities linked to the EFF have not been included. Reference to priorities specific to this policy area may depend on errors in encoding by national authorities. The number of cases not reported as fraudulent for which information about the priority area concerned was missing remains high (45%) and higher than for the fraudulent irregularities, while it is improving. 4.2.2.3.Irregularities related to the priorities 'R&TD' and 'Transport' by theme Research and Technological Development (R&TD) As metioned, ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ is the priority for which the highest number of irregularities, fraudulent and non-fraudulent, have been detected and reported: in total, 4 965 cases, involving over EUR 2 billion. Figure CP1 below, details the specific priority themes that were affected by these irregularities. The description of the themes has been shortened to simplify, but the full decription can be consulted in Annex 15. Please note that the larger the square, the higher the number of irregularities; the darker the colour, the higher the financial amounts involved. Two "residual" themes are those showing the highest number of reported irregularities: 'Other investment in firms' and 'Other measures to stimulate research and innovation and entrepreneurship in SMEs'. Together they represented 48% of the reported irregularities, but only 21% of the related financial amounts. Conversely, the themes 'Investment in firms directly linked to research and innovation ' and 'R&TD activities in research centres' represented only 23.5% of the total number of reported irregularities, but accounted for almost 52% of the total financial amounts involved. Figure CP2 shows the same level of detail for the irregularities reported as fraudulent. Similarly to the overall picture, the highest number of irregularities reported as fraudulent affected the theme 'Other investment in firms', but it was followed by the theme 'Investment in firms directly linked to research and innovation'. The latter was also the theme with the largest share of the financial amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent (40.5%), followed again - but at a distance - by the theme 'R&TD activities in research centres'. The latter was not frequent, but involved relatively high amounts, similarly to the theme 'Assistance in RTD, in particular SMEs'. On the contrary, the most frequently affected theme 'Other investment in firms' involved a low average financial amount. The two most frequent themes accounted for 53.5% of cases and 53% of financial amounts. The two themes with the highest financial amounts accounted for 28% of cases and 55% of value.

Transport As mentioned, 'Transport' was the priority for which the financial amounts involved in irregularities was similar to ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ (over EUR 1.8 billion). However, the average amount was the highest, both for irregularities reported as fraudulent (EUR 7,851,966) and not (EUR 876,902). Similar to Figure CP1, Figure CP3 below, details the specific priority themes that were affected by these irregularities. 'Regional/local roads' was the theme most frequently affected by irregularities (either fraudulent or non fraudulent), accounting alone for 46% of the total number. Nevertheless, the financial amounts involved in these cases were only 11% of the total. On the contrary, the themes 'Motorways (TEN-T)' and 'Railways' accounted only for 13% of the irregularities, but 60% of the financial amounts. Figure CP4 shows the same level of detail for the irregularities reported as fraudulent. The picture is similar when the focus is moved on the irregularities reported as fraudulent. 46% of these irregularities concern 'Regional/local roads' involving just 13% of the financial amounts. 'Motorways (TEN-T)' and 'Railways' accounted only for 19% of the irregularities reported as fraudulent, but 72% of the financial amounts. 4.2.2.4.Types of irregularities / modus operandi detected related to the priorities 'R&TD' and 'Transport' Table CP17 provides an overview of the categories of irregularities reported in connection with the priority ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ within PP 2007-2013, including a focus on the irregularities reported as fraudulent. The same irregularity may be associated to several categories of infringement. That is why the row of totals has been omitted: it would have resulted in multiple counting of the same notification of irregularity. In general, 8% of cases affecting the priority ‘Research and Technological Development (R&TD)’ were reported as fraudulent (see table CP15). Irregularities mainly took place during the implementation of a project as contract infringements, which implied that the project was not implemented according to what was initially agreed (category 'Infringement of contract provisions/rules'). This happened in 39% of all cases and 42% of cases reported as fraudulent. 8.6% of these violations were reported as fraudulent. The following category refers to incorrect, missing, false or falsified supporting documents, which were used in 18% of all cases and 37% of cases reported as fraudulent. 84% of these violations were not reported as fraudulent, among which there were a few cases (17) of false or falsified supporting documents. The category 'Eligibility / Legitimacy of expenditure / measure' was similarly present in all cases (17%) and in cases reported as fraudulent (15%). Violation of public procurement rules were perpetrated in 14% of all 'RTD' cases (715 out of 4,965 irregularities – see Table CP17 and compare with Tables CP15 and CP16) and only 5.5% of cases reported as fraudulent (22 out of 398 irregularities – see Table CP17 and compare with Table CP15). Only 3% of the violations concerning public procurement were reported as fraudulent (22 violations out of 715 – see Table CP17). In general, the category 'Ethics and Integrity' refers to violations concerning conflict of interest, bribery, corruption, but the residual type ‘Other irregularities concerning integrity and ethics’ was the most used (followed by 'conflict of interest'). Besides these two types of violation, only one case of corruption was reported. Violations concerning 'ethics and integrity' were rarely reported, but were more frequent among irregularities reported as fraudulent (3%) than within the entire population of irregularities (0.5%). These violations are the ones with the relative highest frequency of potential fraud (48%). Similarly to Table CP17, Table CP18 provides an overview of the categories of irregularities reported in connection with the priority ‘Transport’ within PP 2007-2013, including a focus on the irregularities reported as fraudulent.

In general, it can be noticed that 2.3% of cases affecting the priority ‘Transport’ were reported as fraudulent. Infringements of 'public procurement' rules were the most reported (in 67% of cases), but only in less than 1% of cases these infringement were reported as fraudulent (9 violations out of 1,198 – see Table CP18). Violations concerning 'ethics and integrity' were rarely reported, but were more frequent among irregularities reported as fraudulent (27%) than within the entire population of irregularities (0.7%). These violations were the ones with the highest relative frequency of potential fraud (92%). More specifically, the types of violations reported included 'Conflict of interest', 'Corruption' and 'Other irregularities concerning ethics and integrity' Incorrect, missing, false or falsified documents were used only in 4% of all cases, but in 56% of cases reported as fraudulent. 70% of these violations were reported as non fraudulent, among which there were a few cases (3) of use of false or falsified documents. Violations concerning 'Eligibility / Legitimacy of expenditure / measure' were the second most frequent category both among all irregularities and among the subset on irregularities reported as fraudulent. 4.2.2.5.Geographical distribution of irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) detected in relation to the 'R&TD' and 'Transport' priorities Maps CP1 and CP2 show the geographical distribution of the irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) reported in relation to the priorities 'R&TD' and 'Transport'. The contribution of Poland was significant and balanced between 'RTD' and 'Transport', as in both priorities this Member State detected about 25% of all relevant irregularities. Other Member States were relatively more affected by (or were more efficient in detecting) irregularities related to 'RTD', such as Hungary, Italy, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Germany, while in other Member States irregularities related to 'Transport' weighed more, such as in Romania, Czech Republic, Latvia and Bulgaria. 4.3 Reasons for performing control 4.3.1 Irregularities reported as fraudulent In the context of the antifraud cycle, the detection capability is a key feature, which contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of the system for the protection of the EU budget.

Table CP19 provides an overview of the reasons why controls were performed with reference to the Cohesion policy for the PP 2007-2013, with a focus on controls that led to discover irregularities reported as fraudulent. The description of the 'reason for performing control' has been shortened to simplify the Table and associated Charts and Graphs, but the full description can be consulted in Annex 14. The straight lines in the graphs associated to Table CP19 represent the border between 'reasons' that led to identify irregularities with an average amount above or below the global average (that takes into account all potential frauds affecting the Cohesion policy for PP 2007-2013). The vertical distance between a point representing a specific reason and the straight line is an indicator of how higher or lower was the yield of controls started for that specific reason, in comparison with the hypothetical situation where these controls involved financial amounts in line with the global average. 'Routine' is the most reported reason, but it shows a low average financial amount of the related irregularities. The highest financial amounts were involved in irregularities where 'Judicial enquiry' was mentioned as a reason for performing the control. 62% of controls that started because of a judicial enquiry were concentrated in 3 Member States: Czech Republic, Poland and R