EN    EN EN 
 
EN    EN  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Brussels, 13.07.2010 
SEC(2010) 887 
  
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
 
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
 
 
accompanying the 
Proposal for a 
 
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
seasonal employment 
{COM(2010) 379 final} 
{SEC(2010) 888} 
 
 
EN 2   EN TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Procedural issues and consulta tion of interested parties.............................................. 4 
1.1. Background ................................................................................................................ .. 4 
1.1.1. Legal and policy context .............................................................................................. 4 1.1.2. Organisation and timing............................................................................................... 5 1.1.3. Consultation and expertise ........................................................................................... 5 1.1.4. The Opinions of the Impact Assessment Board........................................................... 6 1.2. State of play: existi ng legal instruments ...................................................................... 7 
2. Problem definition........................................................................................................ 8 2.1. Scope of the problem: Non-EU seas onal work in Member States............................... 8 
2.1.1. Size and sectors of seasonal work................................................................................ 9 2.1.2. Legislation in Member States..................................................................................... 10 2.2. What are the problems that may require action?........................................................ 11 2.2.1. Shortages in Member Stat es for seasonal labour ....................................................... 11 
2.2.2. Exploitative working conditions ................................................................................ 12 2.2.3. Illegal immigration and illegal work.......................................................................... 13 2.2.4. Limited contribution of EU legal migrat ion policies to the development of third 
countries ..................................................................................................................... 1 4 
2.3. Possible evolution of the problem all th ings being equal (bas eline scenario) ........... 14 
2.4. Does the EU have the right to act?............................................................................. 15 2.4.1. EU right to act ......................................................................................................... ... 15 
2.4.2. Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality............................................................ 16 2.4.3. EU added value .......................................................................................................... 17 
3. Objectives.................................................................................................................. . 17 
3.1. Global objectives........................................................................................................ 1 7 
3.2. Specific and operational objectives............................................................................ 18 4. Developing policy options ......................................................................................... 18 4.1. Option 1: Status Quo.................................................................................................. 18 4.2. Option 2: Legal instrument on entry and residence conditions of  seasonal workers. 19 
4.3. Option 3: Directive laying dow n common admission procedures............................. 20 
 
EN 3   EN 4.4. Option 4: Directive on measures to ensure effective return....................................... 20 
4.5. Option 5: Communication, coordination a nd cooperation among Member States.... 21 
5. Assessment of policy options..................................................................................... 21 5.1. Implementation costs of the policy options ............................................................... 33 6. Identification andassessment of  the preferred policy option...................................... 34 
6.1. Comparison of policy options .................................................................................... 34 6.2. Identification of the pr eferred policy option .............................................................. 36 
6.2.1. Main benefits and effects ........................................................................................... 38 6.2.2. Proportionality and EU added value .......................................................................... 39 6.2.3. Assessment of costs ................................................................................................... 40  
7. Monitoring and evaluation ......................................................................................... 43 
 
EN 4   EN Lead DG : Home Affairs 
Other involved services : Secretariat General, Legal Servi ce, and Directorates-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opport unities, for Agriculture and for External 
Relations. 
Work programme reference : Agenda Planning or Work  Programme Reference: 
Commission Work Programme  2010 (31.3.2010 COM(2010) 135 final 
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES  
1.1. Background 
1.1.1.  Legal and policy context  
Since the Tampere European Council of 1999 the EU has sought to deve lop, on the basis of 
the new powers conferred to it by the Treaty of  Amsterdam (Title IV EC), a comprehensive 
immigration policy that would address the pheno menon in all its main dimensions, i.e. legal 
and illegal immigration, integration and coope ration with the countries of origin of 
immigrants. As concerns legal immigration, an d in particular economic  immigration, Article 
79(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on the Functioni ng of the European Union explicitly empowers 
the European Union to adopt measures laying  down conditions of en try and residence of 
third-country nationals and the standards of issue by Member St ates of residence permits, as 
well as to define rights of th ird-country nationals residing le gally in a Member State.  
In 2001, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive dealing with ‘the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-
employed economic activities’1. Whilst the other European Institutions gave positive 
opinions2, discussion in Council was limite d to a first reading of th e text and the proposal was 
officially withdrawn in 2006. It has to be recall ed in this context that  legal immigration was 
subject to unanimity in the C ouncil and consultation of the European Parliament. The 2004 
Hague Programme recognised the important role legal migrat ion will play in advancing 
economic development in the EU and asked the Commission to present a policy plan on legal 
migration, ‘including admission procedures, capa ble of responding promptly to fluctuating 
demands for migrant labour in the labour ma rket’. The Policy Plan on Legal Migration 
(COM(2005) 669) defines a roadmap and a set of actions and legislativ e initiatives for the 
coherent development of EU legal migration policy3. It suggests establishing EU rules on 
specific channels of legal migration (highly sk illed migrants, seasonal workers, remunerated 
trainees, intra-corporate transf erees) and a general directive on the rights of third country 
workers on the other. The propos als regarding highly qualified workers (‘EU Blue Card’) and 
for a general framework Directiv e were presented in October 20074. The Council adopted the 
first proposal on 25 May 2009; the second one is currently under negotiation in the European Parliament and the Council. Both texts excl ude seasonal workers from their scope of 
application. 
                                                
 
1 COM(2001) 386. 
2 Opinions of the: European Parliament of 12.2.2003 (A5-0010/2003); Economic and Social Committee 
of 16.1.2002 (SOC/084, CES 28/2002); Committee of the Regions of 13.3.2002 (CdR 386/2001). 
3 Adopted by the Commission on 21.12.2005 - COM(2005) 669. 
4 COM(2007) 637 and 638, 23.10.2007. 
 
EN 5   EN Under the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, endorsed by the October 2008 
European Council, one of the five basic commitm ents is ‘to organise legal immigration to 
take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration’. This proposal, together with  the proposals on intra-
corporate transferees, presented in parallel, co ntributes to the completion of the legislative 
elements of the 2005 Policy Plan  on Legal Migration and trans poses the commitment made in 
the 2008 European Pact on Immigration a nd Asylum into concrete measures. 
The Stockholm Programme, adopted by the European Council of 10 and 11 December 2010, 
recognises that labour immigrati on can contribute to increased competitiveness and economic 
vitality and that, in the context of the importa nt demographic challenges the Union will face 
and the increased demand for labour, flexible immigration policies will make an important 
contribution to the Union's economic development and performance in the longer term. It thus 
invites the Commission and Counc il to continue to implement the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration. 
1.1.2.  Organisation and timing 
The chronology of this impact assessment was as follows: 
– December 2007 – July 2008: data gathering and discussion with Member States in the 
context of the Commission's Committee on Immi gration and Asylum (h ereinafter “CIA”); 
– Throughout 2008: consultation and exchange of  views with relevant stakeholders 
(including NGOs, social partners) in a number of meetings and conferences; 
– December 2007 – October 2008: external study (h ereinafter “the external study”) ordered 
by the Commission in December 2007;  
– 29 April and 16 September 2008: Meetings  of the Inter-service Steering Group 
accompanying the Impact Assessment, at whic h participated representatives of the 
Commission's Secretariat Gene ral and Directorates-General  for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, for Ag riculture and for External Relations. 
1.1.3.  Consultation and expertise 
This report is based on consultations with Memb er States and other stakeholders. The data 
was collected from these consultations as well as  from case studies and literature reviews. The 
data-gathering and large parts of  the consultations were underta ken through an external study 
ordered by the Commission in December 2007. That  study constitutes the main support for 
this report. The problem, objectives and policy options assessed were based on the final report 
from the contractor and on basis of a desk an alysis of appropriate analytical methods and 
applicable legal documents. 
A public consultation was carried out with the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing 
economic migration. The Commissi on received more than 130 contributions from Member 
States, other EU institutions, social pa rtners, NGOs, third countries, academia, etc.
5. A public 
                                                 
5 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_pub lic/economic_migration/news_contributions_eco
nomic_migration_en.htm. 
 
EN 6   EN hearing was held on 14 June 2005. Member Stat es were consulted within the framework of 
the Commission's Committee on Immi gration and Asylum. A major ity was supportive of such 
an initiative and underlined the need for common flexible rules and a secure legal status for 
seasonal workers. Issues raised concern the ques tion of subsidiarity, the type of permit to be 
issued (visa or residence permit), as well as  the range of rights to  be granted for such 
temporary workers. 
Through the external study, furthe r consultations of the main st akeholders (inc luding Caritas 
Europe, the International Organisation for Migration, BUSINESSEUR OPE, and also an 
organisation representing small and meeting enterprises (UEAPME)) were undertaken by 
means of questionnaires and interviews. The results  of such consultations are reflected in this 
report where relevant, and in addition a summary is presented in Annex 5.  
A specific consultation of the social part ners was undertaken, namely ETUC and EFFAT 
(European Federation of Trade Unions in the Fo od, Agriculture and Tourism sectors) as well 
as COPA-COGECA (European Farmers – European agri-cooperatives ); the employers' 
organisation from the sector by far most con cerned with seasonal work. ETUC advocated in 
favour of common rules, in order to reduce unfair competition based on the exploitation of 
weak and under-protected seasonal workers. EFFAT specifically pointed to the need for a 
very precise definition of seasonal work in order to avoid regular, full-time jobs being filled 
by third-country national seasonal workers. Anot her concern relates to the fact that third 
country national seasonal worker s may have contributed over years to the pension system 
without being eligible to receive any pension, either b ecause of long waiting periods or 
absence of portability to home countries. Agri cultural employers raised issues such as the 
need for simplification of procedures and the c oncern that return afte r the end of the season 
should be effectively ensured; that the author isation for stay should allow workers to move 
freely within the EU (currently problems with  the homeward journey in case of D-visas) and 
the question of whether intra-EU mobility shoul d be granted to seasonal workers in order to 
take up subsequent jobs in  different Member States. 
1.1.4.  The Opinions of the Impact Assessment Board  
On 3 February 2009 and 12 May 2009 the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) of the European 
Commission delivered its opinions regarding pre liminary versions of this Impact Assessment 
report. In these opinions, the Board requested:  
(1) to put less emphasis on the functioning of the labour market, given the rather low 
numbers of third-country workers involved; 
(2) to put more emphasis on the problem of  exploitation of seasonal workers and to 
demonstrate that regulation woul d be a proportionate response and meet the subsidiarity test; 
(3) to justify why Article 63 of the Treaty was chosen as legal basis (and not Article 137 
on "working conditions for third-country nationals) ; 
(4) to clarify the key aspect s of the proposed approach, in cluding whether EU national 
migrants could be treated less favourably  than third-country national migrants; 
(5) to analyse the impact on the number of migrants and improve the analysis of impacts 
on enterprises and public finances. 
 
EN 7   EN The present version of the Impact Assessment re port has been redrafted, with a view to taking 
these recommendations into account. Namely, 
(1) the numbers of TCN seasonal workers were rechecked and revised; an explanation on 
why it was necessary to include numbers of illegally staying/ non-registered was added (see 
2.1.1); information on certain regions of the EU th at are in particular need of TCN seasonal 
workers was added (see 2.2.1); 
(2) a further update on statistical data on s easonal workers has been made taking into 
consideration the query on Seasonal Workers launched through European  Migration Network 
in March 20106; 
(3) the proposal has been re-focused: a stronge r case is made about the need to regulate 
migration to avoid exploitation of the third-country seasonal workers; 
(4) given the still relatively low numbers and thus the limited impact on EU wide 
competition, the second general objective to prot ect labour force and enterprises from unfair 
competition was deleted, as well as the referenc e to the functioning of the EU labour market 
in the first general objective; 
(5) the exploitation aspect was strengthened in particular in section 2.2.2 (examples of 
exploitative working and liv ing conditions in certain re gions and sectors added); 
(6) the references to a level pl aying field and distortions of the migratory flows have been 
removed; 
(7) proportionality of the proposed in strument has been explained; : 
(8) a description of the linkages with th e existing legislation has been added;  
(9) the legal base point was clarified – the IAB delivered its opinion at a time when the 
Treaty establishing the European Community a pplied, under which Article 63(3) was the legal 
basis for measures on immigration policy; 
(10) the issue of the possible better treatment of third-country  national seasonal workers as 
compared to EU posted workers has been addressed.  
1.2. State of play: existing legal instruments 
The 2001 proposal on economic migration refe rred to above under 1.1.1 contained some 
specific rules on admission of seasonal workers,  including a definition and rules on the length 
of the residence permit. In the absence of suppor t for that proposal, the only existing EU level 
instrument that also addresses conditions for the admission of seasonal workers is a 1994 
Council resolution ‘on limitations on admission of  third-country national s on the territory of 
the Member States for employment’7, adopted under Article K.1 of the Treaty. That resolution 
includes elements for a definition of seasonal workers (workers who undertake well-defined 
jobs, normally fulfilling a traditional need in a Member State). It also sets the maximum 
                                                 
6 Ad-Hoc Query on Seasonal Workers and Intra-Co rporate Transferees Requested by Commission to 
EMN NCP on 17 March 2010. 
7 OJ No C 274, p. 3-6. 
 
EN 8   EN duration of stay at six months in any 12 month period and excludes extensions of the stay for 
a different type of employment. 
The EU law concerning the posting of workers in  the context of the pr ovision of services do 
not apply. In particular, there is  no risk of better treatment of third-country seasonal workers 
as compared to EU posted workers in the fram ework of a provision of services because these 
two categories of workers are not in the same position. Namely: 
– posted workers remain linked to the labour mark et on their country of recruitment, whereas 
seasonal workers, although they are temporary workers, they form a part of the national 
labour market where they work;  
– third-country seasonal workers have a work cont ract with an employer established in that 
Member State and therefore they are subject to  general labour law that  does not distinguish 
on the basis of nationality. In other words,  unlike posted workers they do not provide 
services on the basis of a c ontract concluded abroad;  
– posting of workers takes place in the context of a provision of services and, pursuant to 
Directive 96/71/EC genera l law does not apply to a provision of service.  
– Nevertheless, to avoid any misunderstanding th ird-country nationals who are carrying out 
activities on behalf of undertakings establis hed in a Member State in the framework of a 
provision of services covered by Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, including those posted by undertak ings established in a Member State in 
the framework of a provision of  service in accordance with Directive 96/71/EC should be 
clearly excluded from the scope of any le gislative proposal on third-country seasonal 
workers.  
– At the same time, considering the vulnerability  of this particular group of workers and the 
temporary nature of their task, there is a need  to define clearly legal rules applicable to 
their working conditions. Such a definition will not only ensure legal certainty and 
guarantee a level playing field with other categories of workers, but it will also provide effective protection of the rights of  third-country s easonal workers.  
2. P
ROBLEM DEFINITION  
2.1. Scope of the problem: Non-EU se asonal work in Member States 
Seasonal workers can be defined as third- country national workers who migrate on a 
temporary basis to work in a sector of activity  dependent on the passing of the seasons, in 
other words, the activity is  tied to a certain time of the y ear by an event or pattern during 
which required labour levels are far above those necessary for normal ongoing operations Seasonal workers are generally engaged in non-  or low-skilled sectors of the receiving 
country’s economy such as in  agriculture or tourism. 
EU economies face a structural need for seasona l work for which labour from within the EU 
is expected to become less and less available. It  is expected to be in creasingly difficult to fill 
these gaps with EU national workers, primarily owing to the fact that these workers consider 
seasonal work unattractive, in addition to demo graphic changes the European Union will have 
to face in the coming years.  
 
EN 9   EN Further, there is significan t evidence that certain third- country seasonal workers face 
exploitation and sub-standard wo rking conditions which may threat en their health and safety.  
Lastly, sectors of the economy that are charac terised by a strong presence of seasonal workers 
– most notably agriculture, horticulture and tour ism – are repeatedly identified as the sectors 
most prone to work undertaken by third-c ountry nationals who are staying illegally.  
2.1.1.  Size and sectors of seasonal work 
Some Member States admitted a considerable  number of non-EU seasonal workers. For 
example, in 2008 alone Spain admitted 24 838 non-EU seasonal workers8. For the 2008 
calendar year, already by 7 February  2008, Italy received 11 273 applications9 (for 2008, 2009 
and 2010, the quota set by the Italia n Ministry of Interior fo r seasonal work by non-EU 
nationals was 80 000)10. In 2009, Germany admitted 4  248 non-EU seasonal workers, France 
2 215, whereas Sweden 7 25211. 
Non-EU seasonal workers have been also work ing in the new Member States. For example, 
Hungary admitted 919 and 892 third-country na tionals in 2008 and 2009 respectively. The 
data available for Poland conc erns temporary work undertaken by third-country nationals and, 
as a result, the numbers are considerably higher, namely, 181 030 for 2009. In Slovenia over 
10 000 non-EU nationals were admitted as seasonal/temporary workers in 2008 and 2009. 
Although trends are short and not comparable given the gaps in data, general increases of 
foreign seasonal labour have been registered in recent years in Member States such as France, United Kingdom and Slovenia.  
The scarcity of recent data does not allow a prop er assessment of the impact of the current 
economic crisis on the demand for non-EU seasonal  workers. Nonetheless, the comparison of 
the data for 2008 and 2009 does not show any fa lling off in respect of the demand. Whereas 
there are Member States where the numbers of  the admitted third-country nationals admitted 
for 2009 are lower (Austria, Slovenia, Hungary) or  even considerably lower in 2009 (France), 
there are also Member States in which an increase has been observed (Germany and Sweden)
12.  
In this perspective, the percentage of third country seasonal workers as compared to all 
foreign seasonal workers remains above 50% in mo st of the Member States for which data is 
available. In particular, Portuga l and Slovenia receive nearly al l their foreign seasonal labour 
from non-EU countries, followed by Sweden and United Kingdom. Other Member States, 
such as Germany, traditionally recruit their non-national seasonal labour  from EU-10 Member 
States so that the share of third-countr y seasonal workers is relatively low.  
Further, it should be emphasised th at seasonal work sectors are ve ry prone to work undertaken 
by illegally staying workers or  otherwise unregistered workers. Accordingly, the total 
                                                 
8 Ad-Hoc Query on Seasonal Workers and Intra- Corporate Transferees Requested by Commission's 
EMN NCP on 17 March 2010. 
9 See 
<http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/defa ult/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/084
8_APP_domande_pervenute_STAGIONALI.html>. 
10 Above, at 2.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Above, at 2.  
 
EN 10   EN numbers of seasonal workers can be assu med to be much higher (well above 100  000 per 
year). 
The main regions of origin of third-country seasonal workers are neighbouring regions such 
as the Balkans and Eastern Europe, followe d by Central Asia, North Africa and Latin 
America. 
For certain regions in certain Member States seasonal labour re cruited from third countries is 
crucial. Thus, regarding agricult ure in Andalusia, in particul ar in the provi nce of Huelva, 
35 000 third-country nationals were recruited from non-EU countries in 2008. An estimated 
12 000 agricultural seasonal workers from third c ountries were employed in southern Italy, 
especially in Apulia, and an estimated 5  000 Moroccan seasonal workers in the French 
department of Bouches-du-Rhône. In those re gions third-country workers are thought to 
represent about 80-90  % of total seasonal workers. In touris m, certain regions of Austria, most 
notably Tyrol and Salzburg, strongly rely on s easonal workers from thir d countries to cover 
seasonal peaks: the quota was set at 8  000 for the 2008/09 winter season. 
In many Member States seasonal workers from th ird countries take up jobs in specific sectors 
such as agriculture (e.g. 60  % of total seasonal labour force in Italy, 20  % of total labour force 
in agriculture in Greece) and tourism (e.g. in Spain work permits for work in the hotels and 
catering sector reached 13  % of the total work permits issued in 2003), which generally 
require non- or low-skilled or manual workers and where there are significant shortages of 
manpower. More detailed informa tion on size and sectors of seas onal work is given in Annex 
1, p 3-6. 
2.1.2.  Legislation in Member States 
At least 20 Member States ha ve specific, though rather di vergent, admission schemes for 
seasonal workers from third countries, while six Member States do not have separate systems 
in place because of the current lack of need for se asonal labour from third countries. There are 
divergences in the definitions of  seasonal work, criteria for a nd duration and contents of the 
work permit, as well as rights granted to seasona l workers. These differences seem to result 
from divergent basic assumptions on the role  of third-country seasonal workers; some 
Member States appear to focus mostly on f illing labour market gaps , while others also 
emphasise measures to ensure return and thus to avoid overstaying13. Several Member States 
have bilateral agreements with specific thir d countries on admission of seasonal workers that 
typically fill annual quotas. Such  agreements exist, for exampl e, between Greece and Albania 
on seasonal employment of labour force (1997) ; France and Morocco (Convention on Manual 
Labour, 1963); the Slovak Republic and Russi a (Agreement on individual seasonal 
employment of citizens, 1995); Spain and Ecua dor/Colombia (Agreement on migratory flows, 
2001) and Germany and Croatia (1998). 
The main divergences in Member States' legisl ation relate to the definition (from defining 
seasonal work as temporary work to stricter de finitions such as seasona l work being linked to 
specific sectors of the economy in a fixed peri od of the calendar year); the duration of the 
permit (from a maximum of 4 months per calend ar year to a maximum of 12 months in a 14-
months period; some Member States also fore see a possibility for renewal of the permit); the 
                                                 
13 A detailed description can be found in Annex 1.2.2. 
 
EN 11   EN procedure (from one-stop shop procedures to separate procedures for work permit and 
authorisation to stay) and the leve l of rights granted (a set of ri ghts and/or equal treatment in 
the full range of socio-economic rights includi ng unemployment benefits). Specifically, only a 
few Member States grant a right to free accommodation, or explicitly foresee that the 
accommodation has to respect certain standards. 
2.2. What are the problems that may require action?  
2.2.1.  Shortages in Member States for seasonal labour 
EU economies already face a structural need fo r seasonal workers for which labour force from 
within the EU is expected to be less and le ss available. Seasonal work implies by definition 
temporary work that is limited to a number of  months per year, as activities depend on the 
passing of the seasons. Thus, there is a perman ent need in the EU for such temporary, 
seasonal work, but no need for permanent labour in the temporary (seas onal) sector of the 
economy. 
It should also be noted that  regional differences exist wi thin the EU. For some regions 
seasonal labour recruited from third countries is crucial14. There are also significant 
differences between EU Member States in term s of entry and temporary residence conditions 
of seasonal workers and several Member Stat es do not have any specific rules for this 
category. In some Member States, rules are ve ry tight and few channels for re-entry are 
provided. Also, there is anecdotal evidence of competition among Member States for the most 
attractive conditions in terms of salary, tr avel arrangements, accommodation or working 
conditions. Such wide differences may hinder an efficient allocation of seasonal workers, as 
these may prefer to go where they are easily admitted or are more likely to remain both in a legal (by renewing their permit) or illegal (due to overstaying) situation, instead of where their 
work is most needed.  
It has to be also added that  the decision to migrate does not exclusively depend on the legal 
framework in place in a given destination countr y but is influenced by a variety of factors 
such as geographical vicinity, tradition, language  preference, cultural ti es etc. The relative 
importance of these latter factors are however di fficult to measure, and they outside the remit 
and impact of EU legislation. 
A future needs scenario… 
As regards future skills shortages in the EU, a medium-term forecast
15 found that despite a 
shift towards services a nd knowledge-intensive jobs , traditional sectors w ill continue to play 
an important role in the EU economy and the structural need for low skilled and low qualified 
workforce will continue to expand.  
In particular, employment in hotels and cat ering will experience a sustained growth (+1.7% 
per annum). Agriculture will experience high  job losses (-2.5%); however, it will still 
represent 3.5% of total employment.  
Regarding prospects by occupations, despite a growing demand for highly skilled workers, 
there will also be significant increases in job numbers for low skilled workers (+0.6%) as well 
                                                 
14 See section 2.1.1 on page 7. 
15 CEDEFOP: Future skill needs in Europe – Medium-term for ecast, Synthesis report, 2008. 
 
EN 12   EN as in elementary occupations (+1.6%), and especi ally for sales services (+2%). Moreover, in 
2015 non- or low-skilled occupations will represent the most important occupational group (that is 11.8% of total employment)
16.  
…that is unlikely to be matched by EU labour force 
It is expected to be increasingly difficult to f ill these gaps with EU national workers, mostly 
owing to the unattractiveness of seasonal wo rk for EU national workers, along with the 
mismatching between EU nationa ls’ qualifications and the de mand for low-skilled labour. 
The impact of the global economic crisis remains difficult to pr edict. However, according to 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM ), it is expected that ‘(i)n certain labour 
market sectors in destination countries, there is likely to be a cont inued stable need for 
migrant workers, particularly in healthcare,  household/domestic employment and care work 
(as well as in agriculture in some countri es) where the demand for such workers is 
structural’17.  
Another advantage generally attached to tempor ary and seasonal migration is improved labour 
market flexibility. Indeed, admission of foreign workers on a temporary basis is attractive for 
enhancing the flexibility, availability and wi llingness of sufficient numbers of workers to 
work at prevailing wages of the labour market  without involving permanent settlement by the 
workers. Such flexibility is of importance in sectors where the demand fo r labour is inherently 
seasonal, especially agriculture and tourism. Labour market gaps are currently often filled 
with seasonal workers from EU-12 MS. However,  this may not be sustainable because of the 
changing economic and social conditions in th ese Member States. For example, the net 
income of Polish workers 1999-2006 increased by mo re than 50 %. In addition, workers from 
new Member States may decide to stay and work in other Member States on a permanent 
basis and seek better opportuni ties and more stable jobs rath er than seasonal employment. 
Lastly, as EU-12 Member States are expected to follow similar development patterns as the EU-15, the extent of push and pull factors for economic migration from these Member States 
will be reduced, and shortages similar to those already experienced in the EU-15 are expected in the next years
18.  
2.2.2.  Exploitative working conditions 
There is significant evidence to  suggest that certain third- country seasonal workers face 
exploitation and sub-standard working conditi ons. Examples frequently quoted include the 
absence of a work contract and thus no form of legal protection, bad working conditions with 
low salaries, limited social protection particular ly for sickness at work and invalidity, sub-
standard accommodation, and social segregation. This is reported in particular for agriculture 
with its often remote locations and demanding, sometimes dangerous work (such as through 
heavy use of pesticides).  
Certain evidence exists about the situation in Spain, Italy and Fr ance. For instance, as regards 
living conditions, in interviews  with some 600 seasonal worker s from North and sub-Saharan 
Africa in Southern Italy,  90 % of the respondents said that th ey did not have work contract, 65 
% lived in shacks, 62 % had no access to basic sanitary services, and 71 % did not have the 
                                                 
16 More details are given in box 2.2. of Annex 1. 
17 IOM Policy brief: ‘The impact of the global economic crisis on migrants and migration’, March 2009, 
p. 5-6. 
18 See above for the statistical data for Poland, section 2.1.1, page 7. 
 
EN 13   EN necessary card to  access healthcare19. Regarding working conditions  there are problems with 
issues such as salary levels which are of ten below the legal minimum, extremely long 
working hours, very little prot ection, occupational diseases, and absence of social security 
coverage20. 
Another phenomenon is that regular, year-round occupations are filled with third-country 
seasonal workers under the often pr ecarious conditions described above. This situation is the 
consequence of either a gap in the rights that  third-country seasonal workers enjoy in some 
Member States compared to EU national season al workers, or lax national legislation that 
does not precisely define seasona l work and thus allows filli ng posts for permanent, ongoing 
operations with seasonal workers. Finally, in sufficient enforcement of the existing rights 
plays its role21.  
In respect of social alienation of third-country seasonal workers,  it has to be noted that some 
degree of social aliena tion may be inherent in the very nature of the temporary stay combined 
with the workload, which leaves few opport unities to acquire ba sic knowledge of the 
language and day-to-day organisa tion of life in the host countr y. This situation is obviously 
exacerbated for third-country nationals who ar e illegally working as seasonal workers. 
2.2.3.  Illegal immigration and illegal work 
Two aspects are of relevance. First, there is the risk that in the absence of meaningful 
opportunities in the EU for legal migration in the non- and low-sk illed sector pressure from 
illegal immigration will remain high. Second, th e fact that sectors of the economy that are 
characterised by a strong presence of seasonal wo rkers such as agriculture, horticulture, or 
tourism are repeatedly identified as the sectors most prone to work un dertaken by illegally 
staying third-country nationals22.  
These are made up of both illegal entries and ove rstayers, that is, persons who entered the EU 
legally but stayed beyond the ex piry of their authorisation to  do so. In a Schengen area 
without internal borders, illega lly staying persons could subse quently move to other Member 
State and work there illegally. 
Illegal entry, overstaying and illegal employme nt of third-country nationals have adverse 
consequences for the EU such us discrimina tion and exploitation of migrant workers and 
threats to social and economic cohesion in th e EU; reduced tax revenues for Member States 
and additional costs for identifying, appreh ending and returning illegal migrants.  
Due to the very nature  of the phenomenon of illegal immigr ation, it is impossible to give 
precise figures. However, various data collections  exist at EU level on aliens refused at the 
borders, illegally staying persons apprehended within the EU and removed aliens. These can 
serve as indicators for the extent of the phenomenon. Thus, 915 860 and 803 069 aliens were 
refused at the borders of the today's EU- 27 in 2006 and 2007 respectively. There were 516 
000 apprehended persons in the EU-27 in 2006 and 467 501 in 2007. 201 870 and 174 265 
                                                 
19 Report by Doctors Without Borders ‘Una Stagione all`inferno’, 2007.  
20 Report by GISTI ‘Saisonniers en servage’, 2008. Report by CODETRAS ‘Les omis. Livre noir de 
l´exploitation des travailleurs etrangers dans l´agriculture des Bouches-du-Rhone’, 2005. 
21 For details see box 2.6 on page 16 of the Annex. 
22 See section 2.3 of the Impact Assessment accompan ying the Proposal for a Directive providing for 
sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (see SEC(2007) 603.  
 
EN 14   EN persons were returned to a third country in 2006 and 207 respectively. Although, there is no 
specific data on illegally stayi ng seasonal workers, it might be assumed that many of the 
illegally staying third-country nationals worked as seasonal workers as this type of work is 
particularly prone to illegal work. 
Such illegal immigration and il legal employment in seasonal wo rk sectors may be facilitated 
by the diverging rules on entry and temporary residence of seasonal workers. Illegal immigration and illegal work can be also cause d by lax enforcement of the existing rules, but 
in most of the cases it is induced by lax rules (such as vague definitions of seasonal work or 
the possibility to change the status for seasonal  workers). It follows that lax rules may act as 
pull-factors for illegal immigration. 
2.2.4.  Limited contribution of EU legal migration policies to the development of third 
countries 
The Global Approach to migration illustrates th e ambition of the European Union to establish 
an inter-sectoral framework to manage migratio n in a coherent way th rough political dialogue 
and practical cooperation with third countries. It  is based on genuine partnership with third 
countries and addresses all migration issues, covering legal migration and mobility, irregular 
immigration, and migration and development. 
Sending countries are typically developing coun tries with high rates of unemployment and 
surpluses in labour supplies, which temporar y migration towards the EU could somewhat 
relieve. From the perspective of certain third co untries, there is however a lack of transparent 
and efficient rules for legal migration into the EU. Instead, potential migrants are faced with a 
range of very diverse rules set by EU Member  States, on which information is not always 
readily available. This is particul arly relevant for the seasonal work sector, as facilities in that 
area could be of particular in terest to countries with high unemployment rates and strong 
migration pressure, most notably the countries of Northern and sub-Sa haran Africa and, to a 
lesser extent, Eastern Europe. 
Also, the implementation of the Global approach was somewhat affected by the difficulty at 
EU level of commitments on labour migration fo r low- and non-skilled migrants. Progress in 
this area would thus allow for a stronger commit ment in countries of origin and transit, 
including cooperation to fi ght illegal immigration. 
2.3. Possible evolution of the problem all th ings being equal (baseline scenario) 
Decisions to migrate are based on push fact ors (unemployment or lack of productive 
employment along with permanently low wage levels, including lack of enforcement of 
internationally recognised la bour and social standards; na tural disasters or ecological 
devastation) and on pull factors (informal empl oyment; political stability and maintenance of 
the rule of law; the structural need for low-skilled workers in the EU). These factors are expected to remain relatively stable, and so  will be the migration pressure on the EU, 
especially from North and Sub Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the 
low- and non-skilled sector of the labour market. 
As described above, labour market needs in th e low- and non-skilled s ectors that typically 
employ seasonal workers are expected to increase.  Member States could partly fill these needs 
through additional bilateral agreements with specific third countries, which would have 
different entry and residence cond itions for seasonal workers, as is the case today. Yet, such 
divergences could continue to prompt seasona l workers to enter illegally or to overstay 
 
EN 15   EN illegally, in particular in those Member Stat es that have less defined regimes on seasonal 
workers. The sending countries of third-country  workers continue to benefit less from the 
outward migration of their workers than they co uld given limited possib ilities for transfer of 
savings. Cooperation between the EU and countries of origin could not fully  exploit its 
potentials in the absence of common EU rules,  that is, a stronger  cooperation-oriented 
message in an area of non- and low-skilled mi gration. Illegal stay and work of seasonal 
workers are likely to be somewhat reduced with  more effective employe r sanctions, including 
inspections provides for in the Directive on sanc tions against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals23. Control of illegal empl oyment will be based on  risk assessment of 
sectors where such employment is concentrated . As noted above, season al work sectors are 
prone to such illegal employment so that there will be positive spill-over effects. 
2.4. Does the EU have the right to act? 
2.4.1.  EU right to act 
The legal basis for Community action in the area  is Article 79(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (hereina fter TFEU) which states that the European 
Parliament and the Council shall adopt measures  on ‘conditions of entry and residence, and 
standards on the issue by Member  States of long-term visas a nd residence permits…’, as well 
as ‘the definition of rights of third-country na tionals residing legally in a Member State…’. 
The main purpose of Union action is to design an admission instrument for seasonal workers, 
thus, to define conditions of entry in the sens e of Article 79(2) of the Treaty. Necessary and 
ancillary provisions regarding the status of seasonal workers, once admitted, would be regulated as ‘conditions of resi dence’ in the sense of Artic le 79. The same approach was 
already adopted for existing migration acquis  and proposals, such as  Directives 2003/109 
(long-term residents), 2005/71 (research ers), and 2009/50 (EU Blue Card).  
Article 79(2)(b) TFEU is a legal basis clearly al lowing the EU to regulate the rights of third 
country nationals in order to ensure an effi cient management of migration flows and fair 
treatment of third-country nationals
24. On the basis of ex. Art 63 TEU, the same approach was 
already adopted for existing migration ac quis such as Directives 2003/109 (long-term 
residents), 2005/71 (researchers) and 2009/50 (Blue Card).  
In accordance with the objective stated in the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European 
Council in December 2009, the Commission intends  to table the proposal ensuring fair 
treatment to third-country nati onals and protecting them with rights comparable  to those of 
EU citizens. The objective of the proposal is to give the seasonal workers, who are a 
particularly vulnerable group of mi grants, a secure legal status in order to prevent exploitation 
and protect their safety and health. Provisions are therefore proposed to give seasonal workers 
a significant core of rights in a number of socio-economic fiel ds, including working 
                                                 
23 Directive 2009/52/EC on the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country 
nationals should. The deadline for transposition by Member States is 20 July 2011. 
24 The legal basis for immigration is contained in Article 79§1 and article 79§2 (ex Article 63, points 3 
and 4, TEC) which states that: ‘The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, … fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, .. ’ 
and the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including 
the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States. 
 
EN 16   EN conditions, as well as health and safety requi rements at the workplace. Also a procedure on 
accommodation standards and facilitation of complaints in case of abuse have been foreseen. 
2.4.2.  Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality  
The principle of subsidiarity applies since this is an area of shared competence. The principle 
requires that the Union does not take action in areas of shared competence unless ‘the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, either 
at central level or at regional and local level, but  can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be bette r achieved at Union level’25.  
The reasons for a common EU in tervention are the following: 
– The need for third country se asonal workers is a common phenomenon in the majority of 
Member States.  
– Although third-country workers en ter a specific Member Stat e within the EU, a Member 
State's decision on the rights of third country nationals could affect other Member States 
with possible impact on migratory flows26. The difference in treatment granted to third 
country nationals in the different Member St ates - as perceived by potential migrants - 
consequently has a supranational dimensi on that lies outside the scope of national 
legislation. 
– The Schengen area without internal borders  requires a common discipline (common 
minimum rules) to reduce the risk of overstayi ng and illegal entries that may be caused by 
lax and diverse rules on admission of seasona l workers. Shortcomings in one Member 
State can have adverse implications for othe r Member States as well as the European 
Union and, accordingly, it is in the interest of all Member States to effectively manage this 
segment of labour migration. Indeed, as expl ained above sectors of the economy that are 
currently characterised by a strong presence of seasonal workers – agriculture, horticulture, and tourism – are repeatedly identified as th e sectors most prone to work undertaken by 
illegally staying thir d-country nationals. 
– Exploitation and sub-standard working cond itions of third-count ry national seasonal 
workers needs to be overcome, by granting certa in socio-economic rights in a binding, and 
thus enforceable, EU level instrument, in lin e with the call of the 1999 Tampere Council to 
grant third-country nationals fair tr eatment and a secure legal status. 
– With respect to the external aspects of mi gration policy, an EU instrument on seasonal 
workers is important for effective cooperation w ith third countries and further deepening of 
the Global Approach, in giving the EU the possi bility to facilitate  low- and non-skilled 
legal migration by creating credible legal migrat ion channels and in strengthening third the 
commitment of third countries to fight against illegal immigration. 
The principle of proportiona lity also applies. That  principle stipulates that ‘the content and 
form of Union action shall not exceed what is  necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties’ (Article 5(4) of the Treaty  on European Union). Accordingly: 
                                                 
25 Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union. 
26 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. 
 
EN 17   EN – The instrument chosen should give Member Stat es a high degree of flex ibility in terms of 
implementation. The form of action should not ex ceed what is necessary to achieve the aim 
to regulate seasonal migration flows effectiv ely. Non-binding measures would have too 
limited an effect as potenti al third-country seasonal wo rkers and their prospective 
employers would continue to face an array of  different rules for entry and residence and 
different levels of rights would be granted during the residence. 
– The content of the action should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the above aim. 
The proposed rules should concern admission conditions, procedure and permit, as well as rights of seasonal workers, that is, the ar eas that constitute elements of a common 
immigration policy under Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.  
Finally, any measure proposed should respect the competence of the Member States to 
determine the numbers of economic migrants se eking access to the EU, including by means of 
national quotas. Thus, it remains up to the respecti ve Member State to assess whether it has an 
economic need for the admission of third-country seasonal workers. 
2.4.3.  EU added value 
The EU added value lies in the following aspects: 
– Member States and employers of seasonal work ers would benefit from a flexible admission 
system to fill seasonal labour shortages. 
– Third country national seasonal workers an d their employers would benefit from a 
common, transparent and accessible European framework, allowing them to move legally to Member States in need of work and to work under a secure lega l status. Such legal 
migration opportunities may also diminish ille gal immigration and illegal employment. 
– Additional added value lies in  the external dimension. An EU intervention would send a 
cooperation-oriented message to third countri es concerning the management of labour 
migration. A commitment on behalf of the EU as a whole in the field of economic 
migration in the non- and low-skilled sector has the potential of facilitating cooperation 
with third countries including in fighting illegal migration and fostering mutually 
beneficial circular migration. 
3. O
BJECTIVES  
3.1. Global objectives 
The global objectives, that is, the overall goals expressed in terms of its ultimate impact of an 
EU intervention, are the following:  
1. To respond to seasonal fluctuations in th e economy and offset labour shortages faced 
in specific industries/ec onomic sectors and regions; 
2. To contribute to prevent exploitation and poor working conditions for third-country 
seasonal workers and illegal immigration; 
3. To contribute to the development of third countries. 
 
EN 18   EN 3.2. Specific and operational objectives 
The specific objectives, that is, the immediate objectives expressed in terms of direct and 
short-term effects or outcomes, are the following:  
1. To provide for flexible rules to facilitat e the temporary legal migration of seasonal 
workers and to promote thei r circular migration;  
2. To provide for equal conditions for empl oyers of third-country seasonal workers 
legally entering the EU labour market; 
3. To ensure a secure legal status and prot ection against exploita tion of third-country 
seasonal workers; 
4. To enhance cooperation with th ird countries in the manageme nt of seasonal migration. 
At this stage, only a set of basic operational objectives  are identified, that is, those objectives 
that should be considered  valid irrespective of the policy option actually adopted. 
1. To limit the extent of labour shortages in the EU for seasonal work by reducing the 
average processing time for applications  for third-country seasonal workers; 
2. To limit the number of overstaying and illegally working third-country seasonal 
workers; 
3. To approximate the average sa lary level of third-country seasonal workers to that of 
EU national seasonal workers.  
The objectives above are consistent  with horizontal EU strategies , in particular, with the EU 
2020 Strategy. In the Integrated Guidelines fo r growth and jobs ( 2008-2010), guideline 20 
calls to ‘Improve matching of labour mark et needs’ through the modernisation and 
strengthening of labour market institutions, notably employment services; greater transparency of employment and training opport unities; better anticipa tion of skill needs, 
labour market shortages and bottlenecks and a ppropriate management of economic migration. 
4. D
EVELOPING POLICY OPTIONS  
This section addresses policy options the imp acts of which will be further analysed. 
Information on discarded options is given in Annex 3.8. These policy options are not mutually 
exclusive, but complementary, in part icular as regards options 2 to 4. 
4.1. Option 1: Status Quo 
No changes are made to the curr ent situation, that is, current developments in Member States 
and at EU level would conti nue within the existing legal framework, accordingly, current 
divergences would continue to exist. Empl oyers, including those employing third-country 
seasonal workers, will be under certain obliga tions under the Directive on employer sanctions, 
namely as concerns notifications to authorities  and penalties in case of illegal employment. 
 
EN 19   EN 4.2. Option 2: Legal instrument on entry and residence conditions of seasonal 
workers 
A basic level of harmonisation would be r eached by establishing some common rules, in 
particular:  
– Definition of seasonal workers: the definitio n would comprise various elements. These 
elements would be the obligation to retain a legal domicile in a third country; the employment in the territory of a Member Stat e in a sector of activ ity dependent on the 
passing of the seasons and one or more fixe d-term contracts for a specific job. An 
alternative choice, that is one single elemen t for a definition only – ‘temporary stay’ – was 
discarded for the reason that only a strict definition as described above will ensure that third-country seasonal workers are used fo r peak times only and thus for genuinely 
seasonal occupations rather than on a regular basis and for permanent jobs. In addition, 
laxer definitions and admission rules are more likely to encourage illegal immigration and 
overstaying. 
– Admission criteria include the need for a work  contract or a bind ing job offer and the 
possibility for Member States to perform a labour market test as well as to ensure 
preference for Union workers. In  addition, the requirement of a salary equal to or above a 
minimum level of one granted to national season al workers in the respective Member State 
and sufficient resources to maintain him/hers elf was considered. The alternative choice, 
namely only relying on a work contract or a jo b offer, was discarded since it would create 
the risk of social dumping and re course to Member States' soci al assistance systems and it 
could also deprive Member States of the means to exercise effective control before entry of 
a seasonal worker.  
– Maximum duration of the work/residence permit for seasonal employment: a strict time 
limitation is required in order to ensure that  seasonal workers stay on a temporary basis 
only and are indeed used for seasonal occupa tions only, rather than for regular jobs.  
As regards the residence conditi ons during the temporary stay, two sub-options are identified. 
– Sub-option A: clear determination of worki ng conditions (for example, treatment in 
payment/wages, right to health and safety protection) of seasonal workers by providing a 
reference to a set of legal instruments applic able in the Member St ate (for example laws, 
regulations or administrati ve provisions, and/or univers ally applicable collective 
agreements). 
– Sub-option B: clear determination of working conditions (for example, treatment in 
payment/wages, right to health and safety protection) of seas onal workers by a reference to 
a set of legal instruments applicable in that Member State (for example, laws, regulations or administrative provisions , and/or universally applicable collective agreements) and 
equal treatment with EU nationals in resp ect to certain rights pertaining to working 
conditions (such as right to association and a ffiliation of workers or ganisations) and social 
security rights, such as occupational diseas es, accidents at wor k, sickness benefits, 
invalidity benefits, family bene fits, death grants, as well as  the right to change employer 
(under certain circumstances and conditions). It  should be noted that third-country national 
seasonal workers would not be treated in a more preferential way compared to EU 
nationals to whom transition periods for free movement of workers ap ply. In particular, a 
set of rights and/or equal treatment in certa in socio-economic areas would only be granted 
 
EN 20   EN once the third-country national seasonal worker  has been admitted to a Member State to 
work. There is no right to admission since it is up to Member States to determine the 
numbers of third-country nationals admitted to their territory for employment. Member 
States are also free to ap ply a labour market test.  
4.3. Option 3: Directive laying do wn common admission procedures 
In addition to the elements considered unde r Option 2 the following rules would be laid 
down: 
– Introduction of a single permit for work and re sidence: a single document allowing third-
country seasonal workers to work  and reside in the territory of the Member State would be 
issued. All these single permits are technically  identical as they are based on Regulation 
1030/2002 and include specific security features. What differs obviously is the remark put 
in the permit that specifies the type of empl oyment authorised, such as ‘seasonal work’ in 
this case. For short periods of stay (not exceeding 90 days), admission could take place on 
the basis of a visa.  
– Deadlines for processing applications for the single permit to grant applicants and 
employers with a quick a nd facilitated procedure. 
– This option would focus on the introduction of  a single permit. At the same time, the 
ability for both employers to meet their needs for seasonal labour and third-country 
nationals to have a work perspective in the EU in upcoming seasons could be facilitated. 
Two sub-options were identified: 
– Sub-option A: single permit, including re-ent ry in subsequent years: This sub-option 
considers the introducti on of a multi-seasonal permit, that is, a single work and residence 
permit allowing a third-country seasonal worker to re-entry in the same Member State for 
successive seasons, with a maximum duration defi ned (for example, up to three years). The 
previous compliance of the th ird-country seasonal workers w ith all rules would be also 
considered as a condition for re-entry.  
– Sub-option B: single permit, including a faci litated procedure for subsequent entries. 
Seasonal workers who in the past complied w ith the permit conditions including return 
after the end of the duration of the permit w ould have access to a facilitated procedure to 
re-enter that Member State as a seasonal wo rker (as a minimum: preference over first 
applicants). 
4.4. Option 4: Directive on measu res to ensure effective return  
This option would establish a common definition of seasonal workers among EU Member 
States (see Option 2) as a first condition for es tablishing a minimum le vel playing field across 
the European Union.  
To ensure the temporary nature of the stay, a maximum duration of stay per year would be 
introduced, as well as the explicit obligation to re turn after that period, that is, there would be 
no possibility for changes in status. In addition, obligations on third-country seasonal workers 
could be introduced to ensure effective return afte r the expiry of the authorisation to stay such 
as reporting to the consulate of the Member St ate of employment in the country of origin. 
Last, both non-compliant employers and season al workers could be excluded from multi-
seasonal permits and/or access to the facilitate d procedure considered under sub-options 3A 
 
EN 21   EN and 3B. Third-country seasonal wo rkers would have the right to challenge decisions rejecting 
an application for admission. 
4.5. Option 5: Communication, coordination  and cooperation among Member States 
No new legislation is introduced so that  the non-binding 1994 Council Resolution would 
remain the yardstick. The focus would be on complementary and supporting activities. The 
aim would be to achieve an approximation of the legislative practices of Member States, 
through the gathering and excha nge of knowledge and informa tion including best practices, 
performing comparative analyses, giving advice, evaluating experiences, promoting 
innovative approaches and organising inform ation campaigns. The activities would be 
particularly focused on disseminating informa tion on EU legislative framework, exchanging 
information and best practic es on measures against ille gal immigration and illegal 
movements, and measures ensuring return and avoiding exploitation of third-country seasonal 
workers. Social partners and other relevant act ors could be involved in the elaboration of the 
content of such activities. 
5. ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS  
A multi-criteria analysis was used to assess and compare impacts. The assessment criteria are 
aggregated with respect to thei r relevance, feasibility  and expected impact s. In view of the 
limits of the data available and of the fact that  Member States will retain competence for the 
numbers of third-country seasonal workers adm itted to their territory , no attempt has been 
made to quantify the impact of each option.  
For each policy option, the anticipated impact ha s been assessed on an ‘intuitive’ scale of 
positive impact from one to four. Ne gative impact is highlighted by - √ and positive impact by 
√, whilst 0 means that there would be no effect . A brief explanation of rating and various 
aspects of the policy options necessary to ach ieve the desired impacts are provided in the 
grids.  
 
EN 22   EN  
Policy Option 1: Status quo 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Relevance  
To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the 
economy and offset 
labour shortages faced in specific 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions 0 Labour shortages in low skill sectors  will persist and increase in the future, in 
parallel with a growing difficulty for EU em ployers to rely on EU national workforces 
only. 
MS could take unilateral measures to allow further entries of third-country Seasonal 
Workers (TCN SW)  to address labour shortages. 
Wide differentiations of MS legislati on concerning seasonal migration may cause 
distortions in the inflow and allocation of TCN SW.  
To contribute to preventing exploitation and poor working conditions for third-
country seasonal 
workers and illegal immigration,  
 0 Illegal immigration  and overstaying of TCN SW remain important problems for the 
EU. The possible setting up of an  entry/exit system  at the external borders of the EU 
would contribute to identifying overstayers, including TCN SW. It is however currently not foreseen to use such a system  for the management of legal migration, 
including seasonal work. 
The Directive on sanctions for EU employ ers of illegally staying third-country 
nationals, once agreed and applied, will ha ve a positive impact on reducing illegal 
immigration, as it should reduce one of th e pull-factors (the possibility of finding 
employment without legal status). There coul d be a certain spill-over effect from that 
Directive also as regards detecting the most serious forms of exploitative working 
conditions. 
To contribute to the development of third 
countries  0 Numerous cooperation and development pr ogrammes between EU and third 
countries  are supported in a range of sectors,  including migration and development, 
the prevention of illegal immigration and tr afficking in human beings. However, these 
programmes do not have a specific focus on seasonal migration  and, more 
generally, EU action in this field remains quite fragmented . The “ Thematic 
Programme ” enhances a horizontal approach and could contribute to the development 
of EU external migration policy. However, projects only have a limited size . 
Moreover, this Programme is not specifically addressed  at seasonal migration . 
Feasibility  
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition, incl. 
proportionality  N/A 
Simplification/ 
administrative burden  N/A 
Financial impacts  N/A 
Expected Impacts   
Economic Impacts at 
EU level  0 The current and expected labour shortages  in low skill sectors in numerous MS, 
along with the development patterns followed by the EU-12 , will lead to difficulties 
in relying on national labour forces and on the current bilateral seasonal worker 
schemes which still do not tap seasonal labour shortages. 
Illegal migration and overstaying  of TCN SW would persist, with implied risks of 
illegal employment and exploitation.  
The policies on seasonal migration at MS level could improve the current 
macroeconomic framework, by contributing to  offset labour shortages (the focus of 
national legislations in MS of Group B27) . 
However, without a common instrument, the ab ility of EU MS to provide for an even 
allocation of seasonal workers is limited. 
 
Impacts on SMEs 0 SMEs in sectors such as agriculture, tourism and construction  will continue to 
suffer from labour shortages. 
 
Social Impacts at EU 
level 0 Labour and skill shortages inlow skill sectors are currently faced in many EU MS, 
especially in tourism, construction and agriculture . These shortages are expected to 
                                                 
27 See Annex (Survey of MS legislations) for an explanation of MS groups mentioned in the assessments. 
 
EN 23   EN Policy Option 1: Status quo 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
increase in the future. 
At the same time, TCN SW ( illegally entering or overstayers ) are one of the main 
pools of illegal employment  in several EU MS. As mentioned, the application of the 
Directive on sanctions for EU employers c ould contribute to tackling these issues. 
Impacts on third 
countries 0 The positive impacts of migration on the countries of origin (in terms of remittance  
inflows, circular migration, reduced brain drain ) will continue to depend on 
various factors, such as protection from exploitation  and the illegal employment  of 
seasonal workers (which could reduce the size of remittances ), their overstaying in 
the EU  (thus excluding circular migration ), the over-qualification of these workers  
(risk of brain drain). 
Cooperation and development programmes with third countries  can help address 
these issues; however  EU action remains fragmented  and does not specifically 
focus on seasonal migration .  
Impacts on third-
country seasonal 
workers (including 
impacts on social inclusion and 
fundamental rights)  0 The position and socio-economic integrati on of TCN SW would depend on how far 
national rules grant rights and benefits to TCN SW . 
However, the exposure to risks of exploitation of TCN  linked to situations of  illegal 
migration, overstaying and related risks of illegal employment , will continue to 
impact on TCN SW. Without a secure le gal status and future employment 
perspectives, TCN SW would continue to face social exclusion .. 
Impacts on EU national 
seasonal workers 0 EU labour forces  (EU national and non-EU national workers) would continue to be 
affected by third-country seasonal workers em ployed at lower wage  levels and in poor 
working conditions. 
Stakeholders and experts’ view  Stakeholders support an EU intervention to address aspects such as coherence of EU 
immigration policy, efficiency of the EU economy, illegal/irregular migration and fair 
treatment of TCN SW. However, also positive aspects of the status quo are 
highlighted, such as: labour market policies could be best adapted to national labour 
market needs if no action at the EU level is taken (Caritas Europa) some national 
systems are considered well establishe d (i.e. UEAPME on the AT system).  
In status quo admission procedures would con tinue to be rigid and slow for employers, 
would not diminish the level of illegal immi gration, would harm the overall efficiency 
of the EU labour market and would continue  to have negative impacts on TCN SW so 
that countries of origin could not benefit from additional remittances (Business 
Europe). Moreover, this option is not considered desirable since it maintains unfair 
competition based on the exploitation of  weak and under-protected SW (ETUC). 
 
Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Relevance  
To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the 
economy and offset labour shortages faced in specific 
industries/economic 
sectors and regions /√ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 
 Common EU conditions of entry and temporary residence of TCN SW would ensure that 
needs for third-country seasonal workers could be satisfied more easily, and harmonized 
entry conditions could offset an uneven distribution of TCN SW among MS.  
However, compared to the status quo (most MS already have rules for TCN SW), this 
option does not greatly improve the ability of  the EU employers to fill labour market 
gaps.  
Granting a set of rights in the field of work ing conditions (2A) would generate a more 
level playing field across the EU, leading to a better allocation of TCN SW .  
This effect would be further strengthened under 2B, as a cons equence of a higher level of 
harmonization. Moreover, the right to change employer  would improve the availability 
of seasonal workforces, the ability of EU em ployers in matching la bour shortages and the 
flexibility of EU labour market. 
 
EN 24   EN Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
To contribute to 
preventing exploitation 
and poor working 
conditions  for third-
country seasonal workers; 
and illegal immigration. √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) Granting a set or rights (2A, and even stronger 2B) would enhance the level of 
protection for TCN SW and would reduce the risks  that this category of workers 
usually face in terms of poor working co nditions and exploitation. Moreover, the 
provision of a secure legal status  for TCN SW entering the EU labour markets could 
further encourage seasonal workers to legally enter and stay  in the EU. On the other 
hand, increased rights could mean additional costs for employers which could resort to 
illegal channels. However, as the scope of right s granted is limited, such negative effects 
are negligible. 
This option would have only an indirect and marginal effect on illegal migration, by 
offering specific and common rules at EU level for TCN SW wishing to legally enter  
the labour market of one of the MS.  
 
To contribute to the 
development of third 
countries   √ (2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 
 Possibilities for temporary migration could relie ve surpluses of labour supply in sending 
countries. Granting a set of rights in respect of working conditions (2A and B), especially 
in terms of wages granted, could allow th ird country seasonal workers to save enough 
earnings to send/take back remittances  to their countries of origin. Further, EU 
commitment as evidenced by 2B would st rengthen the credibility  of the external 
migration policy as a whole 
 
Feasibility  
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition, incl. proportionality -√ 
(2A)/ 
-√√ 
(2B) The establishment of common rules  would entail legal adjustments at MS level. 
However, this option would not seem to present major transpos ition difficulties.  
Specifically, many of the rights in the area of working conditions are already granted in 
EU MS (2A). Some more adjustments would be  needed in order for MS to comply with 
provisions on social security (2B). Issues could arise in (non) compliance with new provisions. 
Binding regulation of these areas appears proportionate, as it would entail a change in 
only some Member States , and would have the benefits of ensuring fairer competition 
and higher protection both for non-EU and EU workers. 
Simplification/ administrative burden -√ 
(2A)/ -
√√ 
(2B) The degree of simplification would not be considerable. The imposition of a common 
definition  would, on the contrary, add administrative burden to those MS which 
currently do not have such a definition and would have to admit TCN SW according to 
this definition. This burden would however be minimal. The rights of sub-option 2A 
appear to be generally respected throughout the EU; rights under 2B would partly and for 
some MS have to be included in nationa l legislations and respect ensured.  
 
 
EN 25   EN Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Financial impact - √√ 
(2A)/ 
- √√√ 
(2B)  
Financial costs  would arise for employers  due to additional costs to provide a set of 
rights to TCN SW relating to wages and possible investments in improved working 
conditions (2A), and additional co sts for employers' contributions to social security, such 
as sickness and health care, disability and old-age pensions  in those MS that do not 
currently grant full equal treatment in that  area (2B) (see below under 6.2.3. for a more 
detailed assessment of these costs). As a result of increased costs for employers under 
option 2A and even more 2B, it is not e xpected that the demand for third-country 
seasonal workers could significantly fall (g iven that, for exam ple for agricultural 
employers it will not be an option to simply let the products be unpicked and rotten), but 
rather that prices would somewhat increase to  reflect the actual costs. Given reinforced 
future inspections under the employer sanctions Directive especially in risk sectors such 
as the seasonal work sector, it is also not expected that employers would more often turn 
to illegal employment.  
Positive impacts on public finance  as a consequence of increased wages paid to TCN 
SW, thus increased revenues from the payment of taxes . Additional costs for public 
finance owing to granting a set of rights in areas and in MS where these rights are not 
already granted (disability (MT,LU,IT), ol d age pensions (IT,LU,MT), sickness 
insurance (BG); see in more detail below p.  37 for an analysis of net implementation 
costs). Given that TCN SW and their employe rs pay contributions to security schemes 
and that only a minority of seasonal workers will meet the eligibility criteria especially 
for drawing an old-age pension, it is assu med that these costs are outweighed by the 
increased revenues from taxes and social insurance. 
Limited costs due to: One-off financial/implementation costs  on MS in order to adapt 
their legislation, and recurring costs for veri fication procedures (e.g. verification that 
admission criteria are met, labour market test if assigned to MS authorities). In addition, 
costs  would arise for possible monitoring in order to verify the respect of proposed 
provisions in terms of granting a set of rights and equal treatment (2 A and B). 
Expected Impacts   
Economic Impacts at EU 
level   √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) Positive impacts in terms of: offsetting the possible distortions in the allocation  of 
TCN SW, owing to the differences between MS in terms of admission and residence 
conditions; fostering legal inflows of TCN SW , facilitated by specific and common rules 
across the EU, and consequently reducing illegal immigration and overstay  as an effect 
of transparent channels for entry. 
Employers, especially SMEs , would benefit from better allocation of TCN SW but 
could incur additional costs (e.g. if required to do a labour market test). The impact on 
legal flows, illegal migration and overstay of could be only indirect. Also, most MS 
already have specific rules on TCN SW. Thus, the overall economic impacts appear 
limited . 
Under 2A, additional positive impacts  on the competition in the internal and EU 
labour market , due to reduced risks of expl oitation of TCN SW and related unfair 
competition between EU employers (Similar impact as results from the Directive 
96/71/EC on the posting of workers that la ys down terms and cond itions of employment 
for posted workers, thus for temporary employ ment, often in sectors subject to seasonal 
work). Negative impacts  may arise as a consequence of possible increases in the labour 
costs for EU employers (due to higher wages)  and the related prices of goods. This risk 
could worsen the  competitive positioning of EU firms (especially SMEs) especially  
for agricultural goods , which are more exposed to a high international competition. 
SMEs could turn to illegal employment to reduce costs.  
Under 2B, positive impacts on EU em ployers could be stronger: wider availability of 
legal labour forces (stronger incentives for TCN SW to legally enter the EU and the 
possibility to change employer); right to change employer  strengthens the protection of 
TCN SW against exploitation. Higher risks  for increased prices that could fall back on 
consumers , thus risks of a negative impact on EU competitiveness 
By including a reference to the passing of seasons a nd to fixed term contracts in the 
common definition , the main option should ensure TCN SW are not used to cover 
year-round positions , which could entail unfair co mpetition for EU and non-EU 
permanent labour force as well as for law-abiding enterprises/employers. The 
requirement of a salary level that is equivale nt to the one of an EU national SW as an 
entry condition contributes to  avoiding social dumping. 
 
EN 26   EN Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Impacts on SMEs - √√ 
(2A)/- 
√√√ 
(2B) Especially SMEs in the agricultural sector could be affected by increased labour costs. 
SMEs could turn to illegal employment in orde r to reduce their prices and maintain 
competitiveness. This is particularly true for the group of southern EU Member States 
with a relatively high share of  seasonal agricultural work.  
. 
Social Impacts at EU 
level  √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) Better allocation  of TCN SW between MS could offset possible distortions and 
shortages at regional level . Possible increased inflows of TCN SW could help to  fill 
current labour shortages . However, as previously pointed out, impacts on inflows of 
TCN SW are not likely to be significant.  
Under 2A, the ability of EU employers in filling seasonal labour shortages  would be 
improved by facilitated lega l inflows of TCN SW and better allocation  of seasonal 
workers . The legal status of TCN SW would be secure with positive impacts on their 
social inclusion. However, employers may turn to illegal employment . In this case, the 
proper functioning of the EU labour mark et would be negatively affected. The 
functioning of the EU labour market c ould be still improved under 2B through a right to 
change employer . Limiting the possibility for mobility  only to specific circumstances 
would reduce the risks related to difficultie s of temporary migration control, illegality 
and overstay.  
Impacts on third countries  √ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) Positive impacts  in terms of remittances’ size (higher still under sub option 2B), as 
granting a set of right to TCN SW could grant better working conditions and 
payments/wages. Given that SW usually implies low/non-skilled work, but seasonal 
workers from TC are not necessarily low/  non-skilled (more often, the younger, more 
educated persons tend to migrate), risk of (temporary) brain drain.  
Impacts on third-country seasonal workers (including impacts on 
social inclusion and 
fundamental rights)  √√ 
(2A)/ 
√√√ 
(2B) 
 More secure legal status for TCN SW under the main option. This would have limited 
positive impacts on social inclusion  of TCN SW.  
Under 2A, benefits on fundamenta l rights of TCN SW, especially non discrimination 
(art. 21  of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights , the Charter), and right to fair and 
just working conditions  (art 31 Charter ). Indeed, working conditions would be 
explicitly protected by the clear  determination of the appli cable law. The possibility to 
have access to other benefits (such as social secu rity, health care, etc) would be left to the 
decision of single MS. However, the im proved working conditions and possible 
additional benefits would foster the social inclusion  of TCN SW. As compared to 2A, 
under 2B, positive impacts  in terms of protection from exploitation  and benefits 
granted would be reinforced.  
Impacts on EU national seasonal workers   √ 
(2A)/ 
√√ 
(2B) 
 The risks of job displacement  of EU national workers would be reduced by admission 
criteria providing for a labour market test and the exis tence of a concrete job offer/ 
work contract . Moreover, a specific defi nition would ensure that third country 
seasonal workers are not employed to cover year-round positions , avoiding risks of 
unfair competition.  
Providing a set of rights in the field of work ing conditions, 2A, (with particular reference 
to treatment in payment/wages) reduces risks of unfair competition between EU 
national seasonal workers and TCN SW . The risks of job displacement  of EU 
national workers would be notably reduced, and even further under 2B. 
 
EN 27   EN Policy Option 2 –Entry conditions and rights 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Stakeholders’ view  Most stakeholders agree with the various as pects included in the definition, affirming 
that common definition and criteria would in crease the transparency of the EU legal 
framework (Business Europe). TCN SW would be more attracted to the EU, alleviating 
labour shortages, a nd would avoid discrimination between EU citizens and TCN 
(ETUC). Some state that the definition must be  very strict so that SW may be used only 
when strictly justified, for a limited pe riod of time and in specific sectors (ETUC). 
Caritas Europa suggests denying  admission for overqualified TCN for seasonal 
employment to avoid brain drain. ETUC states th at political consensus could be built on 
protection of SW and the effectiveness of the internal market through more fair 
competition. 
All stakeholders support the provision of the rights under option 2A. Some stakeholders 
(ETUC) do not consider the level of rights granted by this option as sufficient to protect SW and would include other rights (i.e. occupational diseases, accidents at work, 
sickness benefits, etc.), as in 2B. One stak eholder (Business Europe) underlines that 
equal treatment is already a reality in the larg e majority of MS and that extra costs could 
arise for employers for investing in working conditions in the other MS. 
A general consensus exists on granting the possibility to change job/employer (2B) , 
except one stakeholder (Business Europe) that  considers that the permit for seasonal 
work is limited to a specific enterprise’s needs and that employers who first hired SW 
should be protected against sudden loss in  manpower. Another stakeholder (UEAPME) 
stresses the need to have a strict control ove r the circumstances for change of employer: 
if too easy, such might contribute to the informal economy. 
6.  
Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Relevance  
To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the 
economy and offset labour shortages faced 
in specific 
industries/economic sectors and regions  
√√√ 
(3A)/√√ 
(3B)  More efficient recruitment procedure for EU employers. Common definition and 
admission criteria would allow a more even allocation of TCN SW between EU MS .  
Multi-seasonal permits (3A) would ensure a steady and fairly predictable 
availability of seasonal workforces to EU employers/enterprises ; labour shortages 
would be efficiently addresse d. Delays for recruiting third country seasonal workers 
would be reduced. A facilitated procedur e for re-entry (3B) would foster a more 
continuous supply of le gal channels to TCN SW  which would provide a slightly 
more certain and available labour force to labour shortages, albeit less predictable as 
3A. 
To contribute to 
preventing exploitation 
and poor working conditions for third-
country seasonal 
workers and illegal immigration. √√√ (3A)/ 
√√(√) (3B Simplified admission procedure and fewer obstacles for legal immigration  of TCN 
SW, in turn possible reduction in illegal immigration and illegal work. 
A multi-seasonal permit (3A) woul d offer, under certain conditions, concrete 
perspectives of re-entry . Requiring the previous compliance with all rules as a 
condition for re-entry  would create an additional incen tive for return in the home 
country at the end of the term. Thus, positive impacts in terms of reduced illegal 
immigration and overstay . Phenomena of exploitation, sub-standard working 
conditions  linked to situation of illegal migrati on and illegal stay would be reduced.  
3B would foster the legal inflows  of TCN SW through simplified procedures for re-
entry  in subsequent years. As access to f acilitate procedure only for those TCN SW 
complaint with all rules during previous stay s, incentives for return  as perspective for 
re-entry. Thus reduction of  overstay . As working legally, TCN SW would be more 
protected against exploitation and poor working conditions. Incentives appear weaker 
as in 3 B , which give a more concrete perspective for re-entry through a multi-
seasonal permit 
 
EN 28   EN Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
To contribute to the 
development of third 
countries   √√√√  
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) Providing TCN SW with channels for admi ssion could foster legal inflows of TCN 
SW, thereby relieving certain labour supply surpluses in sending countries, and 
reduce recourse to illegal routes.   
3A fosters circular migration , as it encourages TCN SW to  return at the end of each 
season, benefiting from eventual skills a nd knowledge acquired in the EU. Households 
of seasonal workers would benefit from a steady income . 
Mechanism would foster cooperation of third countries in coordinating migration 
policies to combat illegal immigration  and other migration related issues. 
To a lesser extent as 3A, 3B could enhance circular migration  by encouraging TCN 
SW to return to their countries of origin. Moreover, would provide a  more stable 
seasonal income  for households in the countries of origin though remittances. May 
foster cooperation with the EU migration  policy  in terms of migration-related issues 
Feasibility  
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition, incl. 
proportionality -√√√√  
(3A)/ 
-√√√(3B)  
Regarding 3A, all MS (except IT and FR ) would have to introduce multi-seasonal 
permits, including  procedures to ensure the correct functioning of the multi-
seasonal work/residence permit  (i.e. verifying the previous compliance with all 
rules, etc.). All MS (except for FR and IT  which have comparable procedures to the 
one proposed) would have to adapt their procedures  to the facilitated re-entry 
procedure. This would require verification of compliance with rules in the previous 
year  and a simplification of the procedure the year after (most likely including a 
database).  
Such adaptation appears proportionate, give n the expected gains both in terms of 
labour supply and likelihood of return afte r the season that such facilitated re-entry 
possibilities will allow. 
Simplification/administrative burden -√(3A)/ 0 
(3B) Streamlining of procedure s: National authorities  as main beneficiaries, followed by 
third country seasonal workers. 
A multi-seasonal permit (3A) would  simplify and lighten the administrative 
burden, however at the same time require the set up of mechanisms to have an 
overview of multi-seasonal permit holders. A facilitated re-entry procedure (3B) 
would require additional checks upon application in the second year of whether the 
TCNSW has complied with all conditions in a previous year as well as require mechanism to have an overview of seas onal workers in a previous year, which 
however is useful to have for migration management. 
 
Financial impact  -√ (3A)/ 
- √ (3B)  For MS, financial costs  in the short term would occur as a consequence of the 
introduction of a single permit. However, given that under the future framework 
Directive, MS would introduce that permit anyway for other categories of workers, 
additional adaptation costs are not expected to be high Financial costs:  multi-seasonal 
permit (3A) would entail costs for adapting procedures at MS level, as well as getting 
acquainted with new legislation. However, considerable savings for MS  would be 
achieved in the medium term as a consequence of reduced admission procedures. 
Under 3B,, financial costs  on MS for introducing the new procedure would be more 
limited. Savings for MS  would occur but to a more limited extent 
Additional administrative costs for EU employers and TCN SW  to familiarise with 
the multi-seasonal permit, but once the system  is set up and running, costs could be 
reduced for the recruitment of TCN SW.  
 
Expected Impacts   
Economic Impacts at 
EU level  √√√√  
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) Positive economic impact ( faster and simplified procedures  increase availability of 
legal seasonal labour) . Multi-seasonal permit (3A)  would have strong positive 
impacts on legal inflows  of TCN SW and reducing  illegal immigration and 
overstay . Steady and predictable availabilit y of legal seasonal workforces  would 
allow a quick response to labour market needs . Enhanced fair competition 
between employers through incentives for legal employment .  
Several economic benefits: higher availability of legal seasonal labour forces , which 
would strengthen the position of EU firms reduction of distortions due to illegal 
migration, overstay. 
This is valid also for 3B, however, to a lesser extent , as less concrete and predictable 
perspectives for re-entry would exist. 
 
EN 29   EN Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Impact on SMEs √√√√  
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) Given that labour demands could be more easily and quickly satisfied, the competitive 
position of SMEs , which represent more than 35% of the total EU firms in the 
relevant sectors for seasonal empl oyment, would be strengthened.  
 
Social Impacts at EU 
level  √√√√  
(3A)/ √√√ 
(3B) Better ability of EU employers to match labour shortages . Both EU employers and 
TCN SW would have more incentives (as reduced costs , simpler and faster 
procedures ) for opting for legal migra tion and employment channels. Positive impact 
on illegal migration and the related risks of employment .  
Under 3B, strong positive impacts , as enterprises could rely on a pool of legal seasonal 
workers, with  agriculture and tourism  being particularly positively affected. 
Incentives for legal migration, against ille gal entry and overstay in the EU labour 
market, could further reduce the size and likelihood of illegal employment linked to 
illegal inflows and overstay of TCN SW . 
The same is valid to some extent for 3B, however, the availability of seasonal 
workforces could be less predictable  for employers and the ability to fill the gaps 
and improve the flexibility of the EU labour market would be more limited. Illegal 
inflows would probably persist with consequences, inter alia , on the social inclusion 
of TCN SW. 
Impacts on third countries  √√√√  
(3A)/ √√ 
(3B) Positive impact on remittances  to third countries, as legal employment of SW is 
favoured. However, the impact is indirect and quite limited. 
3A would contribute to effectively enforce the temporary nature of seasonal migration 
and could imply notable benefits for countries of origin, including to reduce the risk of 
(permanent) brain drain. In particular, circular migration  between EU and home 
countries would be fostered, including transfer of skills and support to investments . 
Stable and predictable sources of income  within the duration of the multi-seasonal 
permit-stability and continuity of inflows of remittances  in countries of origin. 
3B would encourage the return in the countries of origin after the period of 
employment which reduces the risk of (p ermanent)brain drain. Nevertheless, the 
impacts in terms of  circular migration, skill transfer and investments  would be 
indirect and lower as in 3A, due to the less concrete perspective for re-entry offered to 
TCN SW. The same is true for the impacts on remittances . Indeed, the continuity 
and predictability of these inflows  would be reduced  compared to 3 B . 
Impacts on third-
country seasonal 
workers (including impacts on social 
inclusion and 
fundamental rights) √√ (3A)/ 
√√ (3B) Possible reductions of illegal immigration a nd overstay could prevent situations of 
illegal employment and of social exclusion; more secure legal status  for TCN SW. 
Exploitative and sub-standard working conditions ( art. 31 of the Charter ) linked to 
illegality could be reduced. Effects on protection against exploitation of third-
country seasonal workers  could be lower under 3B, as mo re limited effectiveness of 
this sub-option with respect to illegal migr ation and overstay. As a consequence, the 
expected level of social inclusion and the granting of fair and just working conditions  
(art. 31 of the Charter ) are likely to be lower. 
Impacts on EU national 
seasonal workers  √ (3A)/ √ 
(3B) The provision for labour market test and the job offer/work contract  would reduce 
risks of job displacement of EU seasonal workers. The possible reduction of illegal 
migration  would limit risks of unfair competition for EU national SW.  
The positive impact in terms of protection of TCN SW from exploitation linked to 
illegal migration and overstay  would be stronger, with related positive effects on 
risks of unfair competition for EU national wo rkers. Such effects are expected to be 
slightly lower under 3B. 
 
EN 30   EN Policy Option 3: Single permit and facilitations for re-entry 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of the policy option necessary to achieve the 
impact 
Stakeholders’ view  Stakeholders support a single permit to avoid lengthy and complex procedures 
(Business Europe, Coordeurop, IOM, UEAPME), reducing costs (IOM), improve the 
labour market functioning (IOM, UEAPME ) and ensure better management of 
seasonal migration (Caritas Europa, IOM, Social Platform-Youth Forum). 
Stakeholders support multi-seasonal permits. IOM highlights however that if there are 
no sufficient or suitable seasonal jobs av ailable, irregular migration could be 
prompted. Caritas Europa and ETUC suggest a temporary multi-seasonal permit of 
max. 5 years. In addition, ETUC suggests to allow re-entry in different seasons of the 
same year and to use this option for the first MS of entry while using sub-option 3B 
(i.e. facilitated re-entry procedure) to improve geographical mobility (guaranteeing 
continuous and sufficient income for SW). IOM underlines that a multi-seasonal 
permit could be issued and managed with the involvement of EU MS consular services 
in countries of origin. 
Regarding 3B, limits and negative impacts  are highlighted. In particular, IOM points 
out that if there are no longer sufficient/ suitable seasonal jobs available, irregular 
migration could be prompted. Further difficu lties are identified in the potential lack of 
political consensus due to the larger impact on national legislations (ETUC). 
 
Policy Option 4 : Measures ensuring return 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of  the policy option necessary to achieve 
the impact 
Relevance  
To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the 
economy and offset labour shortages faced in 
specific 
industries/economic sectors and regions 0√ Marginal impacts only , as no enhancement of legal inflows of TCN SW to fill 
labour market gaps and no impr oved allocation within the EU. 
In case of reporting obligations on TCN SW, reduced risks for overstaying and 
illegal employment, thus fairer competition. 
To contribute to preventing exploitation 
and poor working 
conditions for third-country seasonal workers 
and illegal immigration. √√ An explicit obligation to return could cont ribute to reducing overstaying, as no false 
expectations on TCN SW side are created. 
Reporting obligations on TCN SW would reduce risks for overstaying and illegal 
employment and exploitative working conditions. . 
 
   
To contribute to the 
development of third 
countries,  √ Reporting obligations on TCN SW should foster return which is potentially 
beneficial to third countries  (circular migration) for skills enhancement/ to avoid 
brain drain. 
Feasibility  
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition, incl. 
proportionality - √√√ Limits in feasibility, acceptability  and proportionality for reporting obligation on 
TCN SW, as there is no obligation to return  to the country of origin, difficulties in 
practical application. 
Simplification/administrative burden - √√√ No reduction of administrative burden, but additional one for MS who do not have a 
definition currently. Marginal costs  for MS to introduce de finition of TCN SW.  
Reporting obligations on TCN SW would create additional burden for already 
overburdened consular posts (need to regist er return, check against database etc) 
Financial impact - √√√√  Reporting obligations on TCN SW would a dd costs for TCN SW and consulates, as 
need to check files and repor t in case of non-return.  
Expected Impacts   
Economic Impacts at EU 
level √ Marginal impacts on EU competitiveness ma inly due to fewer distortions in the 
allocation of seasonal workers between EU MS .  
A common definition and maximum stay duration would help avoiding the use of 
TCN SW for all year-round jobs, thereby posing unfair competition to EU labour or 
permanent non-EU labour. 
 
Impact on SMEs  √ Especially  SMEs  would benefit from a slightly mo re efficient allocation of seasonal 
workers to where the strongest economic need is.  
 
EN 31   EN Policy Option 4 : Measures ensuring return 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspects of  the policy option necessary to achieve 
the impact 
Social Impacts at EU level √√ The establishment of a common definition  across EU could be a first condition for 
achieving a more efficient allocation of seasonal workers  and contributing to 
offset labour shortages at the regional level.  
Sucha specific definition for seasonal workers could contribute to better and 
specifically  address seasonal needs  in the EU labour markets, helping MS filling 
job vacancies in sectors characterised by  cyclical labour needs (agriculture and 
tourism in particular).  
Impacts on third countries √√ Reporting obligation on TCN SW may enhan ce return and thus (through compliance 
with that obligation) open ways for entr y as seasonal worker in a following year, 
thus foster circular migration  with the benefits that brings to TC.  
Impacts on third-country 
seasonal workers 
(including impacts on 
social inclusion and fundamental rights)  -√√√ The establishment of a common system at  EU level (i.e. a common definition, 
common admission criteria) would grant a somewhat more secure legal status for 
TCN SW with (limited) positive repercussions in terms of social inclusion .  
Reporting obligations on TCN SW are likely to have negative effects , as may be 
difficult in practice (logistical problems such  as remote locations) and the travel to 
the consulate costly for the TCN SW, so some of the development effect would 
likely be lost. This would raise concerns  about proportionality, as TCN SW will not 
necessarily have to return to their country  of origin, plus consular offices may be 
difficult to reach in particular in big countries. 
Impacts on EU national seasonal workers √ Reduced overstaying and better protection against exploitation and poor working 
conditions for TCN SW would also pr otect EU and non-EU labour forces  from 
unfair competition. 
Stakeholders’ view  Overstaying reduced through a common de finition since temporary nature of 
seasonal migration reinforced and SW woul d invest upon return through financial 
means and experience acquired in the EU (Business Europe).  
This option could be “too attractive fo r MS, given the current political climate 
toward migrant workers” (Caritas Europa). In  addition, costs would rise not so much 
for EU public authorities but for employers (Business Europe). 
“Ensuring return” per se  is not generally considered a valid option, whereas 
supporting the mobility between EU MS and third-countries is considered as a 
useful means for reducing illegal migration and ensuring the functioning of the EU 
labour market and promoting the development of countries of origin.  
TCN SW would be faced with limited administrative costs that could be 
compensated by prospect of future work in the EU (Business Europe). 
However, there would be difficulties for TC N SW to report in the consular office of 
the MS of employment abroad (UEAPME) and experience shows how 
consular/diplomatic offices abroad are not effective in monitoring and recording re-
entry with the risk of bureaucratic bottlen ecks if competent authorities in the hosting 
countries are not involved (ETUC). 
 
Option 5 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspect s of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 
Relevance  
To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the economy and offset labour shortages 
faced in specific 
industries/economic sectors and regions 0/√ The option would aim at approximation of legislative practices  on TCN SW 
throughout the EU. This could reduce the differentiation  between MS (in terms 
of definitions, admission criteria, tem porary residence and work permits) and 
favour a better allocation of TCN SW within the EU . Moreover, by spreading 
knowledge and information (especially best  practices), MS legislations may be 
improved and adapted in order to better re spond to fluctuations in some economic 
sectors and specifically offset labour and skills shortages. However, impacts are 
likely to be very  limited , as such measures would not be mandatory for MS. 
To contribute to preventing 
exploitation and poor working conditions for 
third-country seasonal 
workers and illegal immigration. 0/√ Exchanging information on the conseque nces of illegal migration and best 
practices on measures against illegal immigration, illegal employment and 
exploitation of TCN SW  could help preventing these phenomena in the EU.. 
However, impacts are likely to be very  limited , as such measures would not be 
mandatory for MS. 
 
EN 32   EN Option 5 
Assessment Criteria  Rating Explanation of the rating and aspect s of the policy option necessary to 
achieve the impact 
To contribute to the 
development of third 
countries 0/ √ The diffusion of knowledge and best practices within the EU on seasonal 
migration could include some relevant issu es in this field: measures ensuring the 
return of TCN SW to their countries of origin where they could contribute to the 
development of their local economies through the acquired skills; the protection 
of TCN SW from exploitation and poor working conditions, which could increase 
the size of remittances. At the same time , MS could be encouraged (e.g. through 
advising and information campaigns) to promote cooperation with third 
countries  in the area of seasonal migration. 
Feasibility  
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition, incl. proportionality 0 No difficulties or risks of transposition would be envisaged by this policy option 
since it would not impose any additional le gislative interventions and MS would 
have complete discretion in whether to ad apt to the content of the information and 
best practices delivered through this policy option. 
Simplification/administrative burden -√√√ No simplification or reduction of the ad ministrative burden would be attained 
through this policy option. Possible add itional administrative burdens (compared 
to status quo) could occur to carry out OMC activities (e.g. sharing best practices) 
to collect and share information. Only if  MS were to spread the use of certain 
practices (i.e. single work/residence perm it, facilitated re-entry procedure, etc.) 
would there be a certain degree of simplifi cation within those MS that adopt such 
legislative provisions. 
 
Financial impact - √√√ At EU and MS level, fair additional recurrent financial costs  for organizing OMC 
activities such as creating networks of expertise, data collection and 
dissemination. Administrative costs  for OMC activities such as drafting national 
action plans, sharing good and best prac tices and setting up awareness campaigns 
Expected Impacts   
Economic Impacts at EU 
level 0 Performing analysis, exchanging informati on and best practices  could improve the 
ability of MS to provide better and fast er responses to the needs for seasonal 
labour through the recruitment of TCN SW. Nevertheless, these impacts appear 
be very limited .  
 
Impact on SMEs  0 The competitiveness of SMEs could be -marginally- improved.  
Social Impacts at EU level 0 /√ Positive impacts on functioning of EU labour market could arise from: the 
possible harmonization among MS and the resulting effect on allocation of TCN 
SW across EU; the offsetting of illegal immigration of TCN SW. Nevertheless, 
these impacts are expected to be very limited and not significant .  
Impacts on third countries 0/√ Improving the measures ensuring the return of TCN SW and the protection from 
exploitation and poor working conditi ons could benefit third countries. 
Nevertheless, these impacts are expected to be very limited . 
Impacts on third-country 
seasonal workers (including 
impacts on social inclusion 
and fundamental rights)  0/ √ Protection against exploitation  could be strengthened by the exchange of 
information and best practices  between MS on measures and approaches in 
force in single MS. However, the effec tive impact on working conditions of TCN 
SW ( art. 31 of the Charter ) as well as on non-discrimination ( art. 21 of the 
Charter ) will continue to depend on the national policies . Moreover, situation 
of illegal migration , if not in parallel and properl y addressed, will continue to 
pose serious risks of exploitation of thir d country seasonal workers and jeopardize 
the social inclusion  of these migrants. Nevertheless, these impacts are expected 
to be very limited . 
Impacts on EU national 
seasonal workers 0/ √ The possible strengthening of protection of TCN SW from exploitation and sub-
standard working conditions  would contribute to protect EU national seasonal 
workers from risks of job displacement.s.  Nevertheless; these impacts are 
expected to be very limited . 
Stakeholders’ view  This option would help to spread best practices (business-friendly) and would 
have a positive impact in terms of mana ging SW migration po licies and attracting 
limited additional SW, with limited ex tra costs and no problems in terms of 
political acceptability (Business Europe). Moreover, it would anticipate labour 
demand and allow a more effective pl anning of migration flows (ETUC). 
Coordination and cooperation would be “necessary, but insufficient” to ensure 
granting a set of rights to TCN SW and an efficient functioning of the EU labour 
market (Caritas Europa). 
 
EN 33   EN 6.1. Implementation costs of  the policy options  
A qualitative assessment of costs of the policy options is given. Policy option 1 would not 
require additional resources. 
Option 2 brings about additional costs for the fi ve Member States (EE, IE, LV, LT, MT. DK 
is not calculated given its opt-out) which curren tly do not have specific legislation on seasonal 
workers and would be required to  introduce such and monitor it s application. A 2 months full 
time equivalent per Member State is calculated for transposing legislation, and a 4 months per 
2 years for monitoring. EU staff resources (3 m onths full time equivalent) would be required 
to prepare and channel that legislation. 
Option 2B entails limited additional costs fo r Member States and employers for equal 
treatment in social security, including enforcem ent, where the proposed range of rights is not 
currently granted. EU staff resour ces would be required to prepar e and channel that legislation 
(see in more detail below under 6.2.3). 
For option 3, additional cost regarding the intr oduction of a single permit for Member States 
that currently do not have such a system are not  expected to be very high; under the future 
framework Directive28. EU staff resources (3 months full time equivalent) would be required 
to prepare and channel that legislation. 
Under options 3A/B some additional costs fo r the introduction of multi-seasonal permits/a 
facilitated procedure are foreseen for Memb er States´ authorities, most notably costs 
associated with keeping an overview-database of multi-seasonal permit holders and seasonal workers in view of their re-entry, and with opera ting a system to apply pr eferential re-entry). 
At the same time, cost savings can be expected  for Member States' authorities (in particular 
fewer working hours for processing applications - document checks- of third-country seasonal 
workers already admitted previously) and employers (re-activation of an application made in a previous year instead of need for new application)
29. 
One element of option 4 – reporting at consular offices – would entail co nsiderable costs for 
consular offices (following the reporting proc edure, issuing the rece ipt to third-country 
seasonal workers and submitting reports to immigration authorities: an estimated cost of € 22.8 million), immigration authorities (estab lishing a reporting form and procedure; 
examining, processing and filing the reports: an  estimate cost of € 19 million) and third-
country seasonal workers (costs of time and money to reach, report and return from the consular office: an estimate cost of € 1.5 million) . These costs are estimated  at a total of more 
than € 43 million (see annex 4.1 for an EU cost model). 
Option 5 would require EU staff resources (1 month full time equivalent annually) for support 
activities, and Member State govern ment resources in terms of cost of time of participants in 
these activities (0.5 months full time equivalent per Member State), as well as costs to convey 
information on their respective legislative fr amework and admission conditions. This option 
would not imply additional costs for employers and third countries. 
                                                
 
28 See point 6.2.3. 
29 See point 6.2.3. 
 
EN 34   EN 7. IDENTIFICATION ANDASSESSMENT OF THE PREFERRED POLICY OPTION  
7.1. Comparison of policy options 
Table 6.1 compares the "ratings" of the fi ve policy options set out in section 5. 
PO 2 PO 3 Assessment 
criteria  PO 1: Status 
Quo PO 2A PO 2B PO 3A PO 3B PO 4 PO 5 
 
Relevance  
• Global 
Objective 1: 
To respond to 
seasonal fluctuations in 
the economy 
and offset labour 
shortages 
faced in specific 
industries/eco
nomic sectors and regions 0 √ √√ √√√ √√ 0 √ 0/ √ 
• Global 
Objective 2 
prevention of exploitation 
and illegal 
immigration. 0 √√ √√ √√√ √√(√) √√ 0/ √ 
• Global 
Objective 3: 
To contribute to the 
development 
of third countries 0 √ √√ √√√√  √√√ √ 0 
 
EN 35   EN PO 2 PO 3 Assessment 
criteria  PO 1: Status 
Quo PO 2A PO 2B PO 3A PO 3B PO 4 PO 5 
 
Feasibility 
Difficulty/risks for 
transposition N/A - √ - √√ - √√√√  - √√√ - √√√ 0 
Simplification of 
administrative burden N/A - √ - √√ - √ 0 - √√√ -√√√ 
Financial and 
administrative 
costs N/A - √√ - √√√ - √ - √ - √√√√  -√√√ 
 
Expected impacts 
Economic impacts 
at EU level 0 √√ √√√ √√√√  √√√ √ 0 
Impacts on SMEs 
 0 - √√ - √√√ √√√√  √√√ √ 0 
Social impacts at 
EU level 0 √√ √√√ √√√√  √√√ √√ 0/ √ 
Impacts on third 
countries 
 0 √ √√ √√√√  √√ √√ 0/ √ 
Impacts on third 
country seasonal 
workers 0 √√ √√√ √√ √√ - √√√ 0/ √ 
Impacts on EU 
national seasonal workers 0 √ √√ √ √ √ 0 
 
 
EN 36   EN 7.2. Identification of the pr eferred policy option 
On the basis of comparison of the options and their impacts on reaching the policy objectives, 
the preferred option set out belo w is a combination of different  aspects of policy options 2B, 
3A, 3B and 4. 
Main fields of 
the EU 
intervention Provisions of the preferred Policy options Policy Options and sub-options 
considered 
Admission 
conditions • Common definition of seasonal workers ; 
• Common admission criteria , such as the need to perform a labour market 
test; the need for a work contract/job offer; 
• Definition of the maximu m duration of the permit ; 
• Single permit for work and residence  on the territory of the MS; 
• Admission allowed on the basis of a visa  bearing the mention “seasonal 
workers” for short periods of stay (up to 3 months); 
• . Policy Option 2B 
 
Re-entry in 
subsequent 
years • Multi-seasonal permit , with a defined maximum duration (e.g. up to three 
years); or facilitated procedure fo r re-entry (optional for MS)  
• Previous compliance  of the third-country seasonal workers with all rules as a 
condition for re-entry; 
•  Sub-option 3 A/B 
Rights and 
benefits granted 
to TCN SW • A set of defined rights in the field of  working conditions ; 
• Equal treatment with EU nationals with respect to:  
• Social security rights , as defined in Council Regulation 1408/71, such as 
occupational diseases, accidents at work, sickness benefits, invalidity benefits, 
family benefits, death grants.   
• Right to change employer under specific circumstances  (e.g. in the event of 
situation of exploitation/poor working conditions, in the case of consecutive short harvests) and within the duration of authorized stay.  Sub-option 2 B 
Provisions 
ensuring return 
of TCN SW  • Explicit obligation to return  after the end of each season 
• Maximum duration  of the authorisation to stay per season 
• Possibilities for facilitated re-entry  in subsequent years that are accessible 
only to TCN SW who have complied  with all conditions during their 
previous stay as seasonal worker Option 4, 3 A/B 
 
 
EN 37   EN Given that the preferred option is a combin ation of various options, this table re-
assesses the preferred option ag ainst the policy objectives. 
• Assessment criteria 
• Relevance Rating Provisions contributing to the rating 
To respond to seasonal fluctuations 
in the economy and offset labour 
shortages faced in specific industries/economic sectors and 
regions √√√√√  A high impact in this field could be ach ieved due to the streamlining of entry 
conditions and the establishment of specific provisions for re-entry: 
- single permit for work and residence (  visa in exceptional cases ); 
- definition of a maximum time for processing applications ; 
- multi-seasonal permit  or facilitated re-entry 
Moreover, a common definition and admission criteria  would grant a more 
efficient allocation of TCN SW across EU  MS. Regarding the number of TCN SW, 
the instrument would not have an immediat e effect, as it falls upon MS to determine 
the volumes of admission to their territories. However, a more attractive scheme 
coupled with increased labour market needs is likely to lead to higher numbers of 
TCN SW being admitted to the EU. 
Given that, for competence reasons, it will re main for MS to determine the volumes 
of TCN SW admitted, the impact on the nu mbers of TCN SW coming to the EU is 
impossible to estimate. However, it is assu med that a flexible system that includes 
guarantees for return after each season, comb ined with labour market needs in that 
sector, will lead to a rise in numbers. 
To contribute to preventing exploitation and poor working conditions for third-country 
seasonal workers and illegal 
immigration. √√√√  - single permit  for work and residence and one-s top shop procedure for obtaining 
the permit and multi-seasonal permit , as a means for granting TCN SW with better 
channels for entry and re-entry; 
- right to change employer  under specific circumstances (i.e. in the event of 
exploitation); 
- equal treatment  with respect to working cond itions and social security.  
To contribute to the development of 
third countries √√√ The positive impact would be due to: 
- multi-seasonal permit  or facilitated re-entry  in subsequent years, as specific 
means to foster circular migration; 
- a set of rights in respect of working conditions and equal treatment  with EU 
nationals in the field social security , whic h would positively affect remittances’ size.  
Feasibility   
Difficulty/risks for transposition -√√√ - Possible considerable transposition  difficulties  related to multi-seasonal permit  
(especially for MS particularly concer ned with a strict control over seasonal 
migration from third countries, i.e. MS of Group A); 
- more limited difficulties  with respect to single permit , collective applications, 
the rights granted in respect of working conditions, equal treatment.  
- risks of compliance of EU employers  with the obligation foreseen in terms of 
equal treatment; 
Simplification of administrative burden √√√√  High simplification of administrative burdens  and establishment of more efficient 
admission and recruitment procedures, through the introduction of the single permit , 
the multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry .  
Financial and administrative costs - √√√ - Financial costs  for MS Authorities, EU employers and TCN SW for familiarising 
with the new procedures ( single permit; multi –seasonal permit, facilitated re-
entry ). However, given that under the futu re framework Directive, MS would 
introduce a single permit anyway for other cat egories of workers, additional costs are 
not expected to be high. 
Moreover, positive impacts on public finance  as a consequence of increased wages 
paid to TCN SW and higher numbers of seasonal workers legally employed, thus 
increased revenues from the payment of taxes . Certain increase in employment 
costs linked to the provisions granting a set or rights in respect of working conditions, in particular for employers who currently pay salaries below such 
threshold (in contradiction to th e respective national legislation). 
 
EN 38   EN • Assessment criteria 
• Relevance Rating Provisions contributing to the rating 
Expected impacts   
Economic and social impacts at EU 
level   √√√√  Particularly high positive impacts would be  achieved through the establishment of a 
simpler and more efficient admission procedure:  
Single permit  for work and residence; 
definition of a maximum time for processing applications ; ; 
multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry .  
Further positive effects on the proper functioning of the in ternal market and the EU 
labour market would be achieved through the establishment of common definition 
and common admission  criteria across the EU; 
the provision granting a set of rights relating to working conditions  and equal 
treatment in respect of other socio-economical rights , which would support the 
fair competition between EU employers and between EU national and TCN SW.  
Impacts on SMEs √√√ Very positive impacts especially for SM E through simpler and more flexible 
admission procedures includi ng possibility to rely on a more stable and trained 
workforce as a result of provi sions for facilitated re-entry. 
Support to fair competition in the intern al market, including vis-à-vis bigger 
enterprises. 
Some negative impact as a result of granting a set of rights with to salary and equal 
treatment with respect to certain  social security rights, as costs are partly to be borne 
by employers, with SME being particularly  affected. However, such additional costs 
would be mostly borne by employers who even currently do not abide by the rules 
set in national legislation in respect of issu es such as wage level and social (security) 
rights. 
 
Impacts on third countries   √√ The impacts on third countries would be ma inly related to the provisions supporting 
circular migration, granting a secure legal status, ensuring return of TCN SW, i.e. 
respectively:  
Multi-seasonal permit/facilitated re-entry ; 
A set of rights in the field of working conditions (in particular with respect of 
wages) and equal treatment  with EU nationals in the fi eld of social security, which 
could positively affect remittances’ inflows (i n terms of increased size and possibility 
for TCN SW to send them); 
Impacts on third country seasonal workers (including impacts on social 
inclusion and fundamental rights) √√√√  A set of rights relating to working conditio ns and related field and right to change 
employer  under specific circumstances (i.e. in the event of exploitation); 
Common definition and admission criteria across the EU, single permit and 
multi-seasonal permit , as provisions granting more efficient and more transparent 
opportunity for admission.  
Impacts on EU national seasonal workers √√√ Admission criteria  including labour market test; 
Re-entry subject to the existen ce of a work contract/job offer ; 
A set of rights relating to  working conditions and equal treatment  with respect to 
social security 
. 
 
7.2.1.  Main benefits and effects  
The preferred option would achieve  better results than any of th e policy options alone, or any 
other combination of options. Common admission standards with simplified entry procedures 
would have positive impacts by providing Member  States with the required seasonal labour 
force from third countries through a flexible ad mission system. With respect to facilitated re-
entry in subsequent years and in  view of expected transpositi on difficulties in Member States 
in particular in respect of the multi-seasonal pe rmit, the preferred option is to require Member 
States either to introduce multi- seasonal permits or to set up a facilitated procedure. This 
would have positive impacts on the ability to meet labour market needs as a seasonal workforce would be more easily available. Additionally, this system would offer to third-country seasonal workers the prospect of return to the Member State, in other words, it would 
 
EN 39   EN support circular migration and by offering the possibility to re turn, it would dissuade third-
country seasonal workers from overstaying a nd working illegally. This aspect could be 
reinforced through an obligation of third-countr y seasonal workers to register at a Member 
State consulate after their return. However, in  view of the negative financial impacts and 
doubts about feasibility of such solution, this element was discarded. Third-country seasonal 
workers who enjoy a secure legal status woul d be better protected from exploitation and 
dangerous work. Further, countries of origin  could benefit from increased remittances.  
The decision on the numbers of admitted third- country nationals remains the competence of 
Member States so that the impact of the instrument on numbers of admitted third-country seasonal workers is difficult to measure. Howe ver, looking at economic needs forecasts for 
the mid-term, combined with th e introduction of a more flexible  admission procedure, a rise 
in numbers of seasonal workers can be expected. Th is is so even in the context of the current 
economic crisis
30. On the other hand, increased levels of  protection granted to third-country 
seasonal workers could lead to a certain decreas e in demand by employers. An increase in the 
number of illegally staying seasonal worker s is not expected, given the future labour 
inspections in certain designated risk sect ors under the employer sa nctions Directive. 
Some impact of the preferred option on the curr ent problem of lax enforcement is expected 
due to the fact that a number of safeguards are foreseen, in particular, the authorities will have 
to undertake controls before the arrival of a th ird-country seasonal worker (such as existence 
of a work contract or a binding job offer that stipulates a salary). Th is should contribute to 
ensuring higher standards from the outset. In  addition, under the employer sanctions Directive 
labour inspections in certain risk sectors for ill egal employment shall be undertaken that are 
expected to have positiv e spill-over effects on se ctors of seasonal work. 
7.2.2.  Proportionality and EU added value  
Proposing binding rules on the admission and resi dence conditions of third-country seasonal 
workers is in accordance with the principle of proportionality since the content of the action is 
limited to what is necessary to achieve the above aim. The proposed option consists of 
admission conditions, procedure and permit, as well as rights of seasonal workers, that is, the 
areas that constitute elements of a common im migration policy under Article 79 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.  
Further, the proposed option constitutes a relatively small change from the status quo  in terms 
of both the legislative action re quired and the burden on prospective employers. Whereas some 
Member States may have increased burdens resu lting from the need to set up (more) specific 
rules, these are considered to be  justified in view of the objec tives of the present proposal and 
the structural demand for this category of thir d-country workers. Furthe r, as stated above, it 
will remain for Member States to determine the volumes of third-country seasonal workers 
admitted. 
– The instrument chosen is a Directive, wh ich gives Member States a high degree of 
flexibility in terms of implementation. The form of action does not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the aim to regulate seasonal migration flows effectively as non-
binding measures would have too limited an  effect; potential third-country seasonal 
                                                 
30 See section 2.1.1. 
 
EN 40   EN workers and their prospective employers would c ontinue to face an arra y of different rules 
for entry and residence and different levels of  rights would be granted during the residence. 
This combination of policy options has the po tential to generate the following EU added 
value: 
– Thanks to simplified admission procedures a nd residence conditions, seasonal workers will 
be available more quickly, when EU economies need them; 
– Rules governing working conditions will help pr event exploitation and protect the health 
and safety of non-EU seasonal workers;  
– Clear, simpler admission rules should result in fewer people working illegally in seasonal 
jobs and/or staying on longer than they are entitled to; 
– Impetus to the further development of third coun tries and of the external aspects of the EU 
migration policy. 
7.2.3.  Assessment of costs 
• Administrative costs 
• The following assumptions and estimates were made: 
– The number of third-country seasonal workers to be admitted to the EU is estimated at 
roughly 230 000 per year, thus on average 9000 per Member Stat e (based on available data 
for 10 Member States, and projected onto EU-26) . At least half of these, thus 115 000, are 
estimated to be eligible for a multi-seasonal pe rmit or facilitated re-entry because they are 
expected to be interested in regular em ployment opportunities in the EU and they 
previously complied with all obligations, including return. 
– The hourly tariffs of Member States' personnel are estimated to be €23, based on EU 
average hourly labour costs in public administration (NACE L) , extracted from Eurostat. 
The examination of an applic ation is calculated to require six hours; information on multi-
seasonal permits half an hour a nd annual reporting at 10 hours. 
The preferred option would generate the followi ng additional administrative costs for Member 
States authorities:  
– Information by regional/local foreigners' offi ces to the Member St ate authority handling 
the database of multi-seasonal permits and facilitated re-entry procedures. 
– Obligation to submit annual statistics to th e Commission and other Member States on 
numbers of residence permits or visa issu ed to third-country seasonal workers.  
Costs for Member States' authorities for the examination of the submitted applications are not 
added here, given that these costs already occu r at present, where such applications are 
checked either as part of speci fic legislation on admission of seas onal workers, or as part of 
the general immigration laws. Accordingly, the preferred option does not create additional costs for employers and seasonal workers. 
 
EN 41   EN  
Proposal on conditions of entry and residence of third-
country seasonal workers  
 Tariff 
(€ per hour)  
Time  
(hour) Price 
(per 
action or 
equip) Freq  
(per 
year) Nbr  
of  
entities Total nbr
of  
actions Total  
cost Regulatory 
origin 
(%) 
No
.   Type of obligation Description of required 
action(s) Target group i e I e           Int EU Nat Reg 
                   
2   Application for individual 
authorisation or 
exemption Producing new data MS –
Immigration 
Services at 
regional/local 
level (information 
on multi-
seasonal permits) 23  0.5  11.5 1 26 115.000 57.500   100
%  
 
 
3   Application for individual 
authorisation or exemption Retrieving relevant 
information from existing data MS – (Annual 
reporting to 
COM and other MS) 23  10  230 1 26 26 5980   100
%  
          
 Total administrative costs (€) 63.480  
    
 
 
EN 42   EN Net implementation costs 
The below quantitative conclusions should be us ed with extreme caution, given the absence of 
reliable data and numbers, as well as the various underlying assumptions.  
Introduction of a single permit 
Net implementation costs for the introduction of  a single permit are not expected to be 
considerable, given that:  
– Under the framework Directive (currently und er negotiation in Counc il and Parliament) the 
12 Member States that currently do not have a single permit system would be required to 
introduce such. Given certain specificities that a seasonal workers regime requires, seasonal workers have been excluded from th e scope of that proposal for a Directive.  
– Under the preferred option, a sing le permit would have to be i ssued only for stays of more 
than 3 months, as shorter stays are covered by the Schengen visa regime. There are no 
specific data on the average length of stay of  seasonal workers. From  indicative data in 
Member States, it appears however that approx imately a third of seasonal workers stay for 
a period shorter than 3 months.  
Costs savings could occur in the 12 MS (BE, BG, CZ, ES, IE , HU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SL) 
that currently do not have a single permit, notab ly with respect to assumptions of reduced 
labour input (up to one working day less) in a single application procedure that leads to a 
single permit. Assuming an average of 9000 s easonal workers per MS, half of which would 
be issued with a single permit, this would entail savings of up to € 8.64 Euro. 
Multi-seasonal permit/facilitated procedure 
This kind of permit/procedure would require Memb er States to run tools (most likely in the 
form of databases) to have an overview of s easonal workers who are beneficiaries of a multi-
seasonal permit or the facilitated procedure. It is  estimated that at least half of the Member 
States already have tool s that could be used for this new obligation. 
Costs for the set up and operation of such a database are estimated at between 10 000 and 20 
000 Euro for the other 13 Member States, thus at a range of  between 130.000 and 260.000 
together. At the same time, in subsequent years, savings up to 1.85 million Euros can be expected due to reduced labour input (up to one  working day less) for the evaluation of the 
renewed applications, as less checking of, for example, documentary evidence will be required.  
A set of defined rights and/or  equal treatment in a range of areas: impact on public 
finances 
Member States already grant s easonal workers equal treatmen t in working conditions. With 
respect to social security rights, the majority of Member States also grant the full range of 
rights to seasonal workers. Gaps in rights that the proposal woul d close are relevant in four 
Member States that appear to have either wa iting periods of between one and 10 years before 
access is granted to rights, or not  to grant certain rights to th ird-country nationals. These are 
sickness and health care (BG), disability (MT, LU, IT), and old age pensions (IT, LU, MT). 
Seasonal workers would thus be excluded from access, unless a specific regime covered them. 
 
EN 43   EN In recent years, Malta has not admitted third-count ry seasonal workers and is not expected to 
do so in the near future, so no additional costs are expected. There are no data on numbers of 
seasonal workers admitted to LU. Thus, addition al costs are calculated for IT and BG only, on 
basis of Eurostat data on per cap ita expenditure on social security benefits. For IT, these are € 
215.8 million for old age pensions (providing th at the quota of 80.000 third-country seasonal 
workers will be filled, it is assumed that rough ly 10 % will have worked over several decades 
and are therefore, in the long run, eligible for such pensions; the per capita expenditure in IT 
amounts to € 3.084. It should be noted however  that this calcula tion does not include 
contributions and tax paid by third-country s easonal workers and their employers.) and €  25.8 
million for disability benefits (the expenditure being € 369 per capita.). For BG, the numbers 
of third-country seasonal workers admitted are ‘negligible’ (statement of Ministry in reply to COM questionnaire), thus assumed at 100 persons/year. There ar e no data on expenditure for 
sickness insurance in BG so that the PL expe nditure of € 204 is used as a proxy. That way, 
additional costs of € 20 400 are expected. 
Costs for employers 
Additional costs for employers aris e as a consequence of higher wages to be paid. Given that 
all Member States already now grant equal treatment in working conditions, including 
salaries, these additional costs would be borne  by employers who currently do not abide by 
the respective nationa l legislation. Data or estim ates for such payment of sub-standard salaries 
for either legally or illegally staying seasonal wo rkers are not available so  that an estimate of 
these additional costs is impossible to make. As indicated above, the employers sanctions 
Directive is expected to have certain spill-ove r effects in terms of en forcement of rights of 
third-country seasonal workers. In addition, binding EU rules would allow controlling the 
application of these rules in the Member States. 
8. M
ONITORING AND EVALUATION  
The table below includes suggestions for indica tors that could be de veloped to assess the 
progress and effectiveness of the preferred op tion in achieving the ma in policy objectives. 
Main Objectives  Indicators Sources of Information 
I) To respond to seasonal 
fluctuations in the economy 
and offset labour shortages 
faced in specific industries/economic sectors 
and regions  - Estimated extent of the labour shortage (job 
vacancies rate in seasonal occupations according to 
employers’ requests); 
- Average time taken to process an application; - Number of requests for a multi-seasonal 
permit/facilitated procedure;  
- Number of TCN SW admitted through a multi-
seasonal permit on total number of TCN SW admitted 
in the EU. - EUROSTAT; 
- Member States authorities involved 
in the administration of the migration 
policy at national level; 
- Labour force Survey (LFS); 
- Surveys at EU and national level.  
II) To contribute to 
preventing illegal 
immigration, exploitation 
and poor working conditions for third-country 
seasonal workers - Number of alerts on TCN SW overstayers on total 
number of alerts on overstayers; 
- Estimated number of TCN SW without the right to 
work employed on total number of TCN illegally employed in the EU territory; 
- Conditions of work of legally-employed TCN SW 
(such as average salary level of TCN SW; compared - Data collected through the future 
entry/exit system; 
- MS authorities involved in 
employers inspections; 
- MS Monitoring reports; 
 
EN 44   EN Main Objectives  Indicators Sources of Information 
to average salary level of EU nati onal SW). - Surveys at MS level. 
III) To contribute to the 
development of third 
countries   -Number of agreements signed with TCN SW 
concerning seasonal migration; 
- Estimated size of remittances sent by TCN SW. - EUROSTAT 
- Member States authorities involved 
in the administration of cooperation programmes at national level; 
- Surveys at EU and national level. 
 
In accordance with the Commission Communi cation ‘A Europe of results – Applying 
Community law’31, the Commission suggests setting up an expert group of representatives of 
the Member States and the Commission (the ‘Contact Committee’), which would meet to 
discuss issues concerning the tr ansposition of the proposed dir ective, along the lines of the 
Contact Committees that meet regularly to consider the implementation of for example 
Directives 2009/50/EC and 2009/ 52/EC. The proposed expert group would ensure improved 
information flow between EU and national auth orities on how the directive is implemented 
and would help to anticipate and re solve problems mo re effectively.  
Member States would be required to communi cate to the Commission and the other Member 
States statistics on the volumes of third-count ry national seasonal workers who have been 
granted, renewed or withdrawn a seasonal work  permit during the previous calendar year, 
indicating their nati onality, age and sex, length of validity of the permit and economic sector.  
Lastly, monitoring and evaluation arrangements w ill be also carried out in the form of a 
Commission evaluation report three years after the transposition deadline of the Directive, on 
the basis of Member States reporting. Following this report, the Commission will decide whether a proposal for amendment of the Directive should be put forward. 
                                                
 
31 COM(2007) 502.