EN

Brussels, 18.11.2008

COM(2008) 759 final

Proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel

(presented by the Commission)

Proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel

- originating in Belarus, the People's Republic of China and Russia following a proceeding pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96,

- originating in Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the same Regulation,

- originating in the Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) and interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the same Regulation,

- and terminating the proceedings in respect of imports of the same product originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Turkey.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

Context of the proposal |

| Grounds for and objectives of the proposalThis proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005 ('the basic Regulation') to imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China ('PRC'), Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine |

| General contextThis proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation. |

| Existing provisions in the area of the proposalCouncil Regulation (EC) No 1697/2002 of 23 September 2002 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine. |

| Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the UnionNot applicable. |

Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment |

| Consultation of interested parties |

| Interested parties concerned by the proceedings have had the possibility to defend their interests during the investigation in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation. |

| Collection and use of expertise |

| There was no need for external expertise. |

| Impact assessmentThis proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation.The basic Regulation does not foresee a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed. |

Legal elements of the proposal |

| Summary of the proposed actiona) Anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5 of the basic Regulation concerning imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in the PRC, Russian Federation, Bosnia Herzegovina, and BelarusIn 2007, the Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry of the European Union, lodged a complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation, on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 %, of the total Community production of the product concerned.Having determined that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, the Commission initiated the case on 26.09.2007 [1]. The investigation found dumping of the product concerned, which caused injury to the Community industry by imports from the countries concerned, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The investigation also showed that there was no compelling Community interest aspect against the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures.It is thus proposed that definitive anti-dumping duties be imposed on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Belarus, the People's Republic of China and Russia and that the proceeding in respect of imports of the same product originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina be terminated.b) Expiry reviews of the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Turkey, Thailand and Ukraine, and interim review concerning imports originating in TurkeyThe request was lodged by the Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry of the European Union, on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 % of the total Community production of the product concerned. Having determined that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of the reviews, the Commission initiated the case on 26.09.2007 [2].The investigation confirmed the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and it is hereby proposed to maintain the anti-dumping measures on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Thailand and Ukraine, with the exception of Turkey.Regarding the interim review in respect of Turkey, Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry of the European Union provided information that, with regard to imports of the product concerned from Turkey, the level of the measure was no longer sufficient to counteract the injurious dumping, which appeared to have significantly increased.For Turkey, the interim review concluded that the duties set by the previous regulation should be lifted.c) Interim review of the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel limited to dumping for a Ukrainian company, Interpipe GroupThe request was lodged by the Ukrainian company, Interpipe Group, which alleged that a comparison of normal value based on its own costs/domestic prices and its export prices to a third country market comparable to the EU, would lead to a reduction of dumping significantly below the level of the current measures. Therefore, the continued imposition of the measure at its current level is no longer necessary to offset dumping.Having determined that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of the review, the Commission initiated the case on 24.01.2008. [3]The investigation concluded that the rates of duty set in the previous regulation should be adjusted.Member States were consulted during the Anti-Dumping Committee of …. 2008. X Member States were in favour of the proposed course of action, X opposed, X abstained and X did not react.It is proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a Regulation which should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on XX at the latest. |

| Legal basisCouncil Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005. |

| Subsidiarity principleThe proposal falls under the exclusive competence of the Community. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply. |

| Proportionality principleThe proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reason(s). |

| The form of action is described in the basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision. |

| An indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Community, national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable. |

| Choice of instruments |

| Proposed instruments: regulation. |

| Other means would not be adequate for the following reason:The basic Regulation does not foresee alternative options. |

Budgetary implication |

| The proposal has no implication for the Community budget. |

Proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel

- originating in Belarus, the People's Republic of China and Russia following a proceeding pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96,

- originating in Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the same Regulation,

- originating in Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) and an interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the same Regulation,

- and terminating the proceedings in respect of imports of the same product originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [4] ('the basic Regulation'), and in particular Articles 9, 11(2) and 11(3) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission after consulting the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

A. PROCEDURE

1. Measures in force

(1) The Council, by Regulation (EC) No 1697/2002 imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel originating inter alia in Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine (the 'measures in force'). [5]

2. Present investigation

2.1. Complaint

(2) A complaint was lodged on 20 August 2007 by the Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry of the European Union (the Defence Committee), the complainant, on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50%, of the total Community production of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel.

(3) The complaint contained sufficient evidence of dumping of the said product, originating in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China ('PRC') and Russia, and of material injury resulting therefrom to justify, after having consulted the Advisory Committee, the initiation of a proceeding.

2.2. Requests for review

(4) On 25 June 2007, a request for reviews pursuant to Article 11(2) and 11(3) of the basic Regulation was lodged by the Defence Committee of the Welded Steel Tube Industry of the European Union, the complainant, on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50%, of the total Community production of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel.

(5) The request contained sufficient evidence for the initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of the said product from Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine; and an interim review, covering dumping and injury, as far as imports from Turkey are concerned. After having consulted the Advisory Committee, the Commission initiated reviews in accordance with Article 11(2) and (3) of the basic Regulation.

(6) Regarding Turkey, the request contained sufficient evidence that imports of the product concerned remained at significantly high levels both in absolute terms and in terms of market share. It further stated that the volumes and prices of the imported product concerned from this country had, among other consequences, a negative impact on the market share held and on the level of prices charged by the Community industry, resulting in substantial adverse effects on the overall performance and the financial situation of the Community industry.

(7) A request for a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation was lodged on 15 October 2007 by Interpipe Group, an exporter from Ukraine. The request was limited in scope to the examination of dumping.

2.3. Initiation

(8) On 26 September 2007, the Commission announced by a notice ('notice 1') published in the Official Journal of the European Union [6], the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding pursuant to Article 5 of the basic Regulation with regard to imports of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China and Russia (the 'anti-dumping investigation').

(9) On the same day, pursuant to Article 11(2) and (3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission announced by a notice ('notice 2') published in the Official Journal of the European Union [7], the initiation of an expiry review for imports from Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine (the 'expiry review') and an interim review as far as imports from Turkey are concerned with regard to imports of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel (the 'Turkey interim review').

(10) On 24 January 2008, pursuant Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission published in the Official Journal of the European Union [8] a notice of initiation ('notice 3') of an interim review limited to the dumping of one exporter of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Ukraine, the Interpipe Group (the 'Ukraine interim review').

(11) The above-mentioned investigations have been treated jointly since they are obviously interlinked with each other, in particular as regards the determination of injury and likelihood of recurrence of injury. For the sake of good administration, they have been combined in a single Regulation.

3. Parties concerned by this proceeding

(12) The Commission services officially advised the complainant, the Community producers mentioned in the complaint and the request, any other known Community producers, importers, traders, the known exporting producers in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine, and the authorities of the countries concerned.

(13) Interested parties were given an opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limits set in the notices of initiation. A number of exporting producers and Community producers represented by the complainant made use of this opportunity and submitted claims to be considered during the investigation.

3.1. Sampling

(14) In view of the large number of exporting producers for certain exporting countries, Community producers and importers involved in the investigations, the application of sampling techniques was envisaged wherever relevant in the anti-dumping proceeding, the expiry review and the Turkey interim review, as set out in recitals (8) and (9) above, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(15) In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would be necessary and, if so, to select a sample, exporting producers and representatives acting on their behalf, Community producers and importers were requested to make themselves known and to provide information as specified in the notices of initiation.

3.1.1. Sampling of the Community producers

(16) Fifteen parties, 13 complainants and 2 supporting producers, replied to the sampling form, a further 2 companies cooperated by completing a mini-questionnaire. The level of cooperation reached around 95% of Community production.

(17) In accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation, the sample was selected, after consultation with the complainant, based on the largest representative volume of sales. As a result of this exercise, a sample of 9 companies was selected. The sampled companies accounted for 67% of the total Community production during the IP.

3.1.2. Sampling of the importers

(18) Around 140 importers were contacted based on the information available to the Commission. Out of those 140, 16 declared that they were not importing welded tubes from the countries concerned and 3 companies replied that they were no longer active on the market of the product concerned. Thirteen unrelated importers replied to the questionnaire, but only two submitted a complete response. The cooperating unrelated importers represented less than 5% of total imports concerned - a very low level of cooperation.

3.1.3. Sampling of the exporters

(19) As mentioned in the notices of initiation, sampling was envisaged for the exporters/producers in the PRC, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Thailand. Detailed information on the sampling exercise per country concerned is set out in the analysis for each country below.

4. Verification of information received

(20) The Commission sought and verified all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of the determination of dumping, resulting injury and Community interest. Information submitted by the following companies was verified on-spot:

a) Community industry producers

– Jäkl Karvina, Czech Republik (member of the ArcelorMittal Group)

– ArcelorMittal Poland S.A.,Poland (member of the ArcelorMittal Group)

– Corus Tubes UK, United Kingdom

– Corus Tubes B.V., the Netherlands

– Laminaciones Arregui S.L., Spain

– Ruukki Sverige AB, Sweden

For the remaining 3 sampled companies:

– Mittal steel Iasi, Romania

– Arvedi Tubi Acciaio spa, Italy

– Zelezarny Veseli a.s., Czech Republik (in this case the verification method entailed a detailed analysis and cross-check of the reply on the basis of supporting documentation provided).

b) Unrelated importers

– Comercial de Tubos, Spain

– Anastel Ltd, United Kingdom

c) Exporting producers and producers in the People's Republic of China

– Jinghua Steel Pipe Group:

– Hengshui Jinghua Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.

– Tangshan Jinghua Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.

– Laiwu Jinghua Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.

– Jilin Jinghua Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.

– Guangzhou Jinghua Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.

– Chengdu Pengzhou Jinghua Steel Pipe Co Ltd.

– Zhejian Kingland Group:

– Zhejian Kingland Pipeline and Technologies Co. Ltd.

– Kingland Group Co. Ltd.

– Fubo Group:

– Shandong Fubo Group Co. Ltd.

– Zibo Fubo Steel Pipes Factory Co. Ltd.

– Weifang East Steel Pipe Co. Ltd,

– Huludao Group:

– Huludao City Steel Pipe Industrial Co. Ltd.

– Huludao Seven-Star Steel Pipe Group Co. Ltd.

– Jiangsu Guoqiang Zinc-plating Industrial Co. Ltd.

d) Exporting producers in Russia

– TMK Group (Joint Stock Company Taganrog Metallurgical Works ('Tagmet'), Taganrog)

– OMK Group (Open Joint Stock Company Vyksa Steel Works ('VMZ'), Vyksa)

In each of the two groups only the producer with the largest volume of Community exports was verified.

Related traders in Russia

– CJSC Trade House TMK, Moscow, TMK Group

– Closed Joint Stock Company United Metallurgical Company ('UMC'), Moscow, OMK Group

– OMK Steel, LLC, Moscow, OMK Group

Related importer

– TMK Sinara Handel GmbH, Köln, Germany, TMK Group

In order to avoid any circumvention in the future, dumping margins have been calculated on a group-wide basis.

e) Exporting producer in Thailand

– Samchai Steel Industries Public Company Ltd., Samutsakorn, Thailand

f) Exporting producers in Ukraine

– OJSC Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Production Plant

– OJSC Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsk Tube Rolling Plant.

Related traders/importers located in Ukraine:

– Interpipe Ukraine LLC

Related traders/importers located outside Ukraine:

– Interpipe -M LLC.

– Interpipe Europe, S.A

In order to avoid any circumvention in the future, dumping margins have been calculated on a group-wide basis.

g) Exporting producer in Bosnia and Herzegovina

– Unis Fabrika cijevi a.d., Derventa

h) Operator in Belarus

– Mogilev Metallurgical Works Joint Stock Company

Unrelated importer and owner of exports:

– FB Stahlhandel GmbH

i) Exporting producers in Turkey

– Cayirova Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ [9]

– Yücel Boru ve Profil Endüstrisi AŞ

– Noksel Çelik Boru Sanayi AŞ, Ankara

– Erbosan Erciyas Boru Sanayii ve Ticaret AŞ, Kayseri

– Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, Istanbul

– Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi AS, Iskenderun.

In order to avoid any circumvention in the future, dumping margins have been calculated on a group-wide basis.

5. Investigation period

(21) The investigation of dumping and injury for the anti-dumping investigation covered the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 ('investigation period' or 'IP'). The examination of trends in the context of the injury analysis covered the period from 1 January 2004 to the end of the IP ('period under consideration'). The same IP was also used for the Turkey interim review and for the expiry review, which also had the same period under consideration.

(22) The investigation period for the Ukraine interim review covered the full calendar year 2007 ('Interpipe investigation period' or 'IIP').

6. Disclosure

(23) All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend:

– the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports from certain countries

– the termination of the proceeding against imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey

(24) In accordance with the provisions of the basic Regulation, parties were granted a period in which they could make representation subsequent to this disclosure.

(25) The oral and written comments submitted by the parties were considered and, when appropriate, the definitive findings have been modified accordingly.

B. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

7. Product concerned

(26) The product concerned is welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel, of circular cross-section and of an external diameter not exceeding 168,3 mm, excluding line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas, precision tubes and tubes and pipes with attached fittings suitable for conducting gases or liquids for use in civil aircraft, originating in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine. It is normally declared within CN codes ex 7306 30 41, ex 7306 30 49, ex 7306 30 72 and ex 7306 30 77.

(27) Welded tubes and pipes are used in a wide range of applications including amongst others, the conveyance of water, steam, natural gas, air and other liquids and gases in plumbing, heating and ventilation systems, air-conditioner units, automatic sprinkler systems, and other similar uses. Quite often they are also used for construction purposes, for load-bearing, fence tubing, protection means and scaffoldings.

(28) The major raw material for the product concerned is hot-rolled coils, which are formed into tubes. Welded tubes and pipes may then further be treated by coating or galvanisation. These further treatments are intended to increase the quality of the product. They are mostly delivered with plain ends, but can also have bevelled or threaded ends, with or without couplings. The product concerned is produced in numerous sizes and according to various standards and classifications. They are, to a considerable extent, interchangeable with regard to their end-use and, therefore, there exists a significant degree of overlap and competition between the various types of the product concerned. It is therefore concluded, as has been done in previous investigations covering the same product, that all types of the product concerned should be considered as a single product for the purpose of the investigation.

(29) For the purposes of the expiry review, the Turkey interim review and the Ukraine interim review, the product concerned is the same as that covered by the original and previous investigation, mentioned under recital (1).

8. Like product

(30) The product produced in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the People's Republic of China, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine and exported to the Community is alike in all aspects to the product sold on the domestic market of these countries as well as to the product produced by the Community producers and sold on the Community market. The same is true with regard to the product produced and sold for export to the Community as compared to the product produced and sold in the USA which served as a market economy third country for the People's Republic of China and Belarus. All these products were therefore considered to be alike within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

C. DUMPING

1. GENERAL METHODOLOGY

(31) The general methodology set out below has been applied to all exporting operators as appropriate. The subsequent presentation of the findings on dumping aspects for the countries concerned describes therefore only those issues which are specific to a particular exporting country.

2. NORMAL VALUE

(32) In accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation, it was first examined for each cooperating exporting producer whether its domestic sales of welded tubes and pipes were representative, i.e. whether the total volume of such sales represented at least 5% of its total export sales volume to the Community.

(33) The Commission subsequently identified those types of welded tubes and pipes sold domestically that were identical or directly comparable with the types sold for export to the Community. With regard to the examination on the basis of product type, the Commission considered domestically sold and exported product types, which had similar origin, size (outside diameter), wall thickness, outer finish and end finish as being directly comparable.

(34) For each type sold by the exporting producers on their domestic markets and found to be directly comparable with the type of welded tubes and pipes sold for export to the Community, it was established whether domestic sales were sufficiently representative for the purposes of Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. Domestic sales of a particular type of welded tubes and pipes were considered sufficiently representative when the total domestic sales volume of that type during the IP represented 5% or more of the total sales volume of the comparable type of welded tubes and pipes exported to the Community.

(35) An examination was also made whether the domestic sales of each type of welded tube could be regarded as having been made in the ordinary course of trade, pursuant to Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. This was done by establishing for each exporting producer in the country concerned, the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market, of each exported type of the product concerned on the domestic market during the investigation period.

(a) For those product types where more than 80%, by volume, of sales on the domestic market were not below unit costs, i.e., where the average sales price of the product type concerned was equal to or higher than the average production cost for the product type concerned, normal value was calculated as the average price of all domestic sales of the product type in question irrespective of whether these sales were profitable or not.

(b) For those product types where at least 10% but no more than 80%, by volume, of sales on the domestic market were not below unit costs, normal value was calculated as the weighted average sales price of those transactions which were made at or above unit costs of the type in question.

(c) For those product types where less than 10%, by volume, was sold on the domestic market at a price not below unit cost, it was considered that the product type concerned was not sold in the ordinary course of trade and therefore, normal value had to be constructed in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation.

(36) For those product types where there were no domestic sales made in the ordinary course of trade, it was examined whether normal value could be established on the basis of the domestic prices of other producers in accordance with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation. If no reliable domestic prices of other producers were available constructed normal value was used, in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation.

(37) If the normal value was constructed in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation, the selling, general and administrative expenses ('SG&A') and amount of profit were based on actual data pertaining to production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product, by the exporting producer in question, pursuant to Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation.

3. EXPORT PRICE

(38) In all cases where the product concerned was exported to independent customers in the Community, the export price was established in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation, namely on the basis of export prices actually paid or payable.

(39) Where the export sale was made via a related importer and it was not deemed to be reliable, the export price was constructed, pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the price at which the imported products were first resold to an independent buyer, duly adjusted for all costs incurred between importation and resale, as well as a reasonable margin for SG&A and profits. In this regard, the related importer's own SG&A costs were used. The profit margin was established on the basis of the information available from cooperating unrelated importers.

(40) In cases where there was no export price and consequently no resale of imported products the export price was constructed, pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, on any reasonable basis.

4. COMPARISON

(41) The normal value and export prices for comparable product types were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Appropriate adjustments were granted in all cases where they were found to be reasonable, accurate and supported by verified evidence.

5. DUMPING MARGIN FOR THE COMPANIES INVESTIGATED

(42) As a general rule and according to Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, the dumping margin for each exporting producer was established on the basis of a comparison between the weighted average normal value with the weighted average export price per product type.

(43) In cases of groups of several companies related to each other a common dumping margin applicable for all companies in the group, was established, in accordance with the standard practice of the Commission in order to avoid potential circumvention of the measures.

6. RESIDUAL DUMPING MARGIN

(44) For non-cooperating companies, a residual dumping margin was determined in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available.

(45) In order to determine the residual dumping margin, the level of cooperation was first established. The level of cooperation was considered to be high when the volume of exports by the cooperating exporting producers was close to that provided by Eurostat for the country concerned and there was no reason to believe that any exporting producer abstained from cooperating. In such cases, the residual dumping margin was set at the level of the cooperating company with the highest dumping margin, in order to ensure the effectiveness of any measure.

(46) In general, where the level of cooperation was low, the residual dumping margin was set at the highest margin established for a representative model for another cooperating producer. This approach was also considered necessary in order to avoid rewarding non-cooperation

7. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

7.1. General remarks

(47) The imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to 33 kilotonnes (KT) in the IP and reached a market share of about 2.5%. The largest exporting producer represented more than 90% of the total production in Bosnia and Herzegovina (destined for domestic market and exports). It cooperated with the investigation and replied to the questionnaire.

7.2. Normal value

(48) The total volume of domestic sales of the like product was representative, as defined in recital (32). In accordance with the general methodology described above, normal value was based on prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, where applicable, constructed.

7.3. Export price

(49) In all cases the product concerned was sold to independent customers in the Community. Thus, the export price was based on the prices paid or payable by unrelated customers in the Community, pursuant to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(50) The exporter contested the transport cost rate alleged by the complainant. Indeed, it could demonstrate during the on-spot investigation that such costs were lower.

7.4. Comparison

(51) The normal value and export price were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. After disclosure, one party questioned alleged adjustments made for physical characteristics made by the Commission. However, adjustments for physical characteristics were neither warranted nor actually applied when calculating the dumping margin for the sole exporting producer in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7.5. Dumping margin

(52) The comparison between the normal value and the export price on a weighted average to weighted average basis was applied and this method showed a dumping margin of 0,7%.

(53) Since the dumping margin is de minimis, i.e. less than 2%, in accordance with Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation, the proceeding against Bosnia Herzegovina should be terminated without imposition of measures. The nature and impact of imports from this country are analysed in the injury part under “other factors”.

8. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

8.1. General remarks

(54) As reported by Eurostat (all CN Codes), Chinese imports increased sharply in the recent years from 22 KT in 2004 to 111 KT in 2006 (180 KT in the IP). The PRC is thus by far the biggest importer on the Community market with a market share which increased from 1.8% in 2004 to more than 13.8% in the IP. The co-operating producers have reported even higher volumes of 233 KT exports. Six sampled companies reported 219 KT. A first implication of this discrepancy is that the market penetration and share of Chinese exports is even more significant than originally thought.

(55) This discrepancy in quantities reported by Eurostat and by the co-operating producers could also correspond to a customs misdeclaration of the product concerned. This coincides with the allegations made by the Community industry, which indicate that the product concerned is being misdeclared. The investigation as a whole has shown that operators may sell different types of tubes (some belonging to the product concerned, some not) under the same invoice. It is therefore not excluded that, depending on how clearly these differences are specified on the invoice, this could be used for an incorrect declaration by a declarant of the product concerned under codes other than those associated to the product concerned.

8.2. Market economy treatment (MET)

(56) Pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation, in anti-dumping investigations concerning imports originating in the PRC, normal value shall be determined in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6 of the said Article for those producers which were found to meet the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation.

(57) Briefly, and for ease of reference only, the MET criteria are set out in a summarised form below:

1. Business decisions and costs are made in response to market conditions and without State interference.

2. Accounting records are independently audited, in line with international accounting standards and applied for all purposes.

3. There are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system.

4. Legal certainty and stability is provided by bankruptcy and property laws.

5. Currency exchanges are carried out at the market rate.

(58) Following the initiation of the present investigation, a sample of six Chinese producers/groups of producers ('entities') was selected, all of which had claimed MET pursuant to Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation and replied to the MET claim form within the given deadlines. Pursuant to their claims they were verified on spot. It is the Commission's consistent practice to examine whether a group of related companies as a whole fulfils the conditions for MET. Therefore, where a subsidiary or any other company related to the applicant is a producer and/or an exporter and/or a trader of a product concerned, the company was invited to complete a separate MET claim form.

(59) Pursuant to on-spot-verifications at the premises of the six sampled entities, it was decided that all their MET claims had to be rejected. This was due to the fact that none of the entities fulfilled criteria 1, 2, and 3 (see analysis below). The investigation revealed that all entities fulfil criteria 4 and 5. This means that the bankruptcy and property laws guarantee stability and legal certainty and that the exchange rate conversions are carried out at market rates.

Criterion 1 - Business decisions are made in response to market signals, without significant State interference, and costs reflect market values

(60) In many cases the documentation of the companies was not reliable. Some companies presented different versions of the same document (e.g. corrected business licences, two different sets of Articles of Association with different shareholders, Articles of Association that have never been signed). The local authorities not only accepted such a situation but even issued corresponding certificates and documents without any substantiation. Such unreliable documents made the legal status of the companies uncertain and suggested that state influence has not been eliminated.

(61) In some other cases, there were ambiguities regarding the business license. In one case, initially a business license was produced which specified neither the start nor the end date of operation. At a later stage, a version was produced which contained only an end-date. This casts a general doubt on the reliability of documents produced.

(62) After the Commission's findings had been disclosed, the companies generally pointed out they were privately owned. However, contrary to their claims, state interference was also established where there was no or only partial state ownership. As demonstrated above, other elements led to the conclusion that on balance there was significant state interference.

(63) The comments received were not such as to alter the Commission's findings. It was concluded that the companies were subject to significant State interference.

Criterion 2 - Firms have one clear set of independently audited accounting records

(64) A number of irregularities were found with regard to the accounting practices of the investigated companies. For all entities it was found that the accounts were not kept in a coherent manner.

(65) For example, some irregularities were established with regard to the manner in which companies increased their registered capital (the increase of capital did not reflect any actual investment). In some cases the value of the company's equity was never deposited in cash or in kind. In some other cases, bad debts were not booked in accordance with international accounting standards. The financial statements of some companies did not reflect the registered capital as stated in the company documents like Articles of Association or Business Licence. Irregularities were established with regard to depreciation (some companies ceased to depreciate some assets) or land-use rights, which were not booked properly.

(66) Some entities claimed that the irregularities in the accounting system should not have had an impact on the decision on MET to such an extent. According to those claims, the irregularities in the accounting system, even if numerous, are not sufficient in themselves to lead to the conclusion that criterion 2 is not met. However, even assuming that criterion 2 could be deemed to be met if accounting irregularities could be qualified as minor, in this particular case, as explained in the previous paragraphs, the irregularities were not minor.

(67) It was also claimed in some cases that the accounts were audited by external, hence independent, auditors. However, the auditors did not point out any of the problems that were found during the investigation and were thus not in line with international accounting standards. Therefore, the entities concerned could not demonstrate that they had one clear set of basic accounting records which were independently audited in line with international standards.

Criterion 3 - No distortions carried over from the non-market economy system

(68) There were also irregularities with regard to land-use contracts. In many cases no proof of payment for land-use rights could be presented, which, given the fact that land is State-owned, exposes those entities to significant state influence. Some entities failed to present reliable evidence on the acquisition and transfer of shares. In some cases the revaluation of assets had been clearly arbitrary. The irregularities of the privatisation process shed doubts upon all subsequent transfers of shares and seem to be the source of power for local authorities to interfere with the operation of some of the companies.

(69) Consequently, the irregularities concerning the privatisation process still have an impact on the current situation and operations of the companies, since the production costs and the value of assets are subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system.

(70) The Advisory Committee was consulted and the parties directly concerned were informed accordingly. The Community industry was given the opportunity to comment, but no comments were received concerning the MET determination.

(71) The Commission received comments from the MET applicants. Those comments have been addressed where appropriate, either in the analysis above or in an individual reply to the exporter concerned. However, none of the comments received was such as to alter the findings on market economy treatment.

8.3. Individual treatment (IT)

(72) Pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, a country-wide duty, if any, is established for countries falling under that Article, except in those cases where companies are able to demonstrate that they meet all criteria set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

(73) The nature of State interference established for all companies affects their activity as a whole. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that such an influence would impact on the determination of export prices and quantities as well as the determination of the terms of sale and other related aspects regarding export activity.

(74) Equally, it is recalled that the six investigated entities covered almost the totality of the exports into the Community. Given this concentration, the relatively small number of market operators and the significant level of state interference established with regard to all entities investigated, it cannot be excluded that state interference will be used to circumvent measures if individual exporters are given different duty rates.

(75) Consequently, the companies could not demonstrate that they fulfilled criteria (b) and (e), as set out in Art. 9 (5) of the basic Regulation.

8.4. Determination of normal value for all exporting producers not granted MET

8.4.1. Analogue country

(76) According to Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation, normal value for companies to which MET could not be granted was established on the basis of the prices or constructed value in an analogue country.

(77) In notice 1, the Commission indicated its intention to use the USA as an appropriate analogue country for the purpose of establishing normal value for the PRC and Belarus, and interested parties were invited to comment. One interested party objected to this proposal, indicating that Turkey would be a more appropriate choice and pointing out that, according to Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation, where appropriate, a market economy third country which is subject to the same investigation shall be used. It was further noted that Turkey was used as an analogue country for Ukraine in the original investigation.

(78) However, the institutions maintained their view that the USA was a more appropriate choice of analogue country for the purposes of the present new investigation, in view of the arguments set out below.

(79) Firstly, the Community institutions would agree, in principle, that in a review it would be logical to take as a starting point to use the same analogue country as in the original investigation (although even in a review there may be valid reasons for a change). However, in as far as the PRC and Belarus are concerned, this regulation is not based on a review, but on a new investigation. Such considerations there do not apply. Moreover, as explained elsewhere in this Regulation, pursuant to the WTO beef and rice (Mexico) Appellate Body report, [10] those Turkish companies who were found to have a zero-duty in the original investigation were not considered to be subject to the present proceeding. The institutions therefore do not have a full picture of normal value on the Turkish market. In addition, certain distortions appear to exist on the Turkish market. In particular, the market share of imports in Turkey was very low, at 3,3%, whereas the market penetration of imports in the USA was at 39%. Such low market share of imports may point to some impediment in international competition on the Turkish market, despite that fact that there are around 15 known producers in Turkey.

(80) On the other hand, the USA is a large market for welded tubes in general and for the product concerned, of a similar size as the Community. The degree of competition appears to be significant. There appear to be more than 15 domestic producers in competition with each other, accounting for a significant level of domestic sales when compared to Chinese exports to the Community.

(81) In addition, there are significant imports into the USA from third countries, notwithstanding the existence of anti-dumping measures during the IP on imports from several countries (Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand, Brazil, India, and Korea). During the IP, imports were estimated to cover more than a third of the US consumption, and originated, for ca. three quarters of the volume of imports, from countries which were subject to 0% customs duties and not subject to anti-dumping duties. In fact, the IP corresponds to a period where the USA authorities were investigating the Chinese exports for the alleged injurious dumping practices, which led in January 2008 to the imposition of measures (later amended in April 2008 and ranging from 69,2% to 85,55%). [11] These measures thus have had no discernible impact on the aforementioned analysis, but rather point to the price levels in the USA during the IP which could well be artificially suppressed or depressed due to the impact of the dumped Chinese imports.

(82) Furthermore, the production process and the access to raw materials are comparable in the USA and the PRC, the latter not appearing to enjoy any discernible natural advantage in the production and sale of the product concerned.

(83) Comparing Turkey and the USA on that basis, it has been concluded that the USA is a more appropriate analogue country for the PRC and Belarus.

(84) Questionnaires were sent to all known producers in the USA. The Commission received a reply from a significant producer. Both the production and the domestic sales of the co-operating producer were representative for the purpose of establishing normal value.

8.4.2. Determination of normal value in the analogue country

(85) Following the choice of USA as an analogue country and pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, normal value was established on the basis of information received from the co-operating producer in the analogue country, i.e. on the basis of prices paid or payable, in accordance with the methodology set out in recitals (32) to (37) above.

(86) The domestic sales of the producer of the like product were found to be representative compared to the product concerned exported to the Community by the exporting producers in the PRC. Furthermore, its domestic sales were considered to be made in the ordinary course of trade.

8.5. Export price

(87) Where export sales to the Community were made directly to independent customers, the export prices were established on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for the product concerned in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(88) Where export sales to the Community were made through unrelated trading companies, export prices were established on the basis of the prices of the product when sold for export to the trading companies i.e. to an unrelated buyer, by the producers concerned in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

8.6. Comparison

(89) The normal value and export prices were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Appropriate adjustments concerning transport and insurance, credit, commission and bank charges were granted where warranted. Due adjustments were also made for physical differences, wherever necessary.

8.7. Determination of Dumping

(90) In order to calculate the country-wide dumping margin applicable to all exporters in the PRC, the Commission first established the level of cooperation. A comparison was made between the total imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC calculated on the basis of Eurostat and the volume of exports as reported in the questionnaire replies submitted by the exporters in the PRC. As mentioned above in recital (54) there was a discrepancy between the quantity of exports as reported by Eurostat and the quantity declared by the exporting producers in their questionnaire replies (180 KT as compared to 216 KT). On this basis it was established that the level of cooperation was very high.

(91) The dumping margin was consequently calculated as follows. The export price was calculated on the basis of the detailed information provided by the cooperating exporters in the questionnaire replies, with the exception of one entity, the reply of which was not complete and made impossible the comparison of the physical characteristics of the products. The export price was compared to the normal value established in the analogue country.

(92) The country-wide level of dumping was established at 130,8% of the CIF Community frontier price.

9. BELARUS

9.1. General remarks

(93) According to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, Belarus is not considered a market-economy country. Therefore the normal value in respect of Belarusian exports to the Community was determined on the basis of data obtained from a producer in a market-economy third country.

(94) During the IP, imports from Belarus totalled around 29 KT and had thus a market share of about 2,3%. The only known Belarusian manufacturer co-operated with the investigation and sent a questionnaire reply. It works under a tolling agreement with two importers in Germany and Switzerland. Only the EU-based importer co-operated with the investigation.

(95) Under the tolling agreement the German importer, who is an independent entity from the Belarusian manufacturer, supplies the latter with the raw material and covers all expenses linked to their imports into Belarus (transportation, handling and insurance costs). It then pays a tolling fee and covers the transportation, handling and insurance expenses from Belarus to the EU. Throughout the process of manufacturing, the German importer remains the owner of the product concerned exported from Belarus. Due to the fact that under the tolling agreement there is no actual export price, it had to be constructed.

(96) A comparison was made between the total imports of the product concerned originating in Belarus calculated on the basis of Eurostat (using CN codes ex 7306 30 41, ex 7306 30 49, ex 7306 30 72 and ex 7306 30 77) and the volume of exports as reported in the questionnaire replies submitted by the co-operating manufacturer and the aforementioned German operator. On this basis it was established that the level of cooperation was low, i.e. 30% of the overall Belarusian exports to the Community.

(97) There were no requests for individual treatment pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

9.2. Normal value

(98) Normal value was established on the basis of the prices or constructed value in an analogue country, pursuant to Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation.

9.2.1. Analogue country

(99) As mentioned above in the part concerning the PRC, notice 1 indicated USA as an appropriate analogue country for the purpose of establishing normal value for Belarus as well as the PRC. The main reasons justifying the choice of the USA, mentioned above in the analysis of the PRC, also apply to Belarus. Two parties opposed the choice of the USA as an analogue country and suggested Turkey instead. The main reasons that led the Commission to choose the USA over Turkey have been outlined in recitals (76) to (84) above.

(100) Consequently, the methodology detailed in recitals (32) to (37) has been applied to determine the normal value.

9.3. Export price

(101) The data furnished by the German importer only related to a part of the products originating in Belarus and exported to the Community. No data were furnished for the other, very substantial part of those imports. Therefore, use had to be made, with regard to that latter part to the best facts available pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(102) Two main sources of information were analysed. Eurostat data was not considered adequate. Firstly, it contained tolling transactions with the German operator for which there was no export price. Secondly, it contained also tolling transactions with the Swiss company which did not co-operate. It should also be stressed that, according to the claim by certain parties, and according to the website of the Interpipe Group, the Ukrainian company which is the subject of the Ukraine interim review, this group is related both to the Swiss company and to the Belarusian company. In the absence of any co-operation from the Swiss company, no export prices could be established for the transactions made by it.

(103) On the other hand, the detailed type-by-type data from transactions associated with the aforementioned German operator, including the operator’s cost and expenses, were available. This allowed the investigating authority to establish the export price on a type-by-type basis, as explained below. This was therefore considered the best information available to the Commission.

(104) The export price was constructed on the basis of the price of the product concerned sold to the first independent customer of the co-operating German importer. In this specific case, due to the tolling agreement, certain adjustments had to be made in order to establish a reliable export price, at the Community frontier level. Adjustments were thus made for all costs incurred between the Community border and the first independent customer of the German importer. These included SG&A and profit of the German importer, as well as transportation, insurance and custom fees within the Community.

9.4. Comparison

(105) The normal value and export prices were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, due allowances in the form of adjustments were made for differences affecting prices and price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Appropriate adjustments concerning physical characteristics, transport, insurance costs and customs charges were granted where they were found to be justified, accurate and supported by verified evidence.

9.5. Determination of dumping

(106) On this basis the country-wide level of dumping was established at 92,4% of the CIF Community frontier price.

10. RUSSIA

10.1. General remarks

(107) The volume of Russian imports amounted to around 36 KT, corresponding to a market share of 3.3% in the IP.

(108) Due to the apparent large number of exporting producers, a sample was initially selected. In that context, four groups were notified to reply to the Commission's questionnaire, but replies were received only from two, therefore sampling was no longer necessary.

10.2. Normal value

(109) For both exporting producers, domestic sales of the product concerned were representative as defined in recital (32). In accordance with the methodology described in recitals (33) et seq., normal value was based on prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the Russian Federation.

(110) With regard to manufacturing costs, and in particular energy costs, as far as gas is concerned, it was examined whether the gas prices paid by the exporting producers reasonably reflected the costs associated with the production and distribution of gas.

(111) It was found that the domestic gas price paid by the exporting producers was around one fourth of the export price of natural gas from Russia. In this regard, all available data indicates that domestic gas prices in Russia are regulated prices, which are far below market prices paid in unregulated markets for natural gas. Therefore, since gas costs were not reasonably reflected in the exporting producers' records as provided for in Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, they had to be adjusted accordingly. In the absence of any sufficiently representative, undistorted gas prices relating to the Russian domestic market, it was considered appropriate to base the adjustment, in accordance with Article 2(5), on the basis of information from other representative markets. The adjusted price was based on the average price of Russian gas when sold for export at the German/Czech border (Waidhaus), adjusted for local distribution costs. Waidhaus, being the main hub for Russian gas sales to the EU, which is both the largest market for the Russian gas and has prices reasonably reflecting costs, can be considered a representative market within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation.

(112) For those product types where the normal value was constructed, as described above, the construction was done on the basis of the manufacturing costs of the exported types after the adjustment for the gas cost.

10.3. Export price

(113) For those cases where exports to the Community were made via a related importer located in the Community, a constructed export price has been established pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In cases where exports were made to independent customers in the Community, via a related trader located in the Russian Federation, export prices were based on prices paid or payable by independent customers in the Community.

10.4. Comparison

(114) Appropriate adjustments concerning credit, transport costs and ancillary charges were made where they were found to be warranted and supported by verified evidence.

10.5. Dumping margin

(115) The comparison between the normal value and the export price showed the existence of dumping. After disclosure, comments were submitted by both Russian exporting producers. In the first case, substantiated comments, dealing in particular with adjustments on constructed normal values, led to a minor change of the dumping margin, which will have no impact on the anti-dumping duty, as the revised dumping margin is still above the injury margin. In the second case, the interested party pointed to a clerical mistake leading to the double counting of the SG&A; this mistake has been corrected. On that basis, the dumping margins (per group of exporting producer) expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at the Community border, duty unpaid, are the following:

– TMK Group (Seversky Pipe Plant Open Joint Stock Company and Joint Stock Company Taganrog Metallurgical Works) – 22,7%

– OMK Group (Open Joint Stock Company Vyksa Steel Works and Joint Stock Company Almetjvesk Pipe Plant) – 10,1%

10.6. Conclusions on dumping regarding Russia

(116) Since the level of cooperation was high (more than 90 % of the exports of the product concerned from the Russian Federation to the Community, as reported in Eurostat), the residual dumping margin applicable to all other exporters in the Russian Federation was set at the same level as the one established for the cooperating exporting producer TMK Group, namely 22,7%.

D. LIKELIHOOD OF A CONTINUATION AND/OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 11(2) OF THE BASIC REGULATION; ADEQUACY OF THE LEVEL OF THE MESURE AS REGARDS DUMPING ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 11(3) OF THE BASIC REGULATION.

1. GENERAL

(117) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, it was examined whether dumping was likely to continue or recur upon a possible expiry of the measures in force against Thailand, Turkey and the Ukraine.

(118) Further, in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, for Turkey and for the one Ukrainian company, it was examined whether there were changed circumstances since the original investigation regarding dumping which could be considered to be of a lasting nature.

2. THAILAND

2.1. Preliminary remarks

(119) Unlike in the original investigation there were no exports of the product concerned from Thailand in the IP according to Eurostat data. The single co-operating producer declared no export sales to the Community, and no other exporting operators co-operated. Thai export statistics did suggest that there were some Thai exports recorded in the IP that could relate also in part to the product concerned but these were in any event negligible in terms of volume and would thus not have been representative.

(120) The cooperation level in the current review was very low, with only one Thai producer making itself known in the course of the proceeding. According to the complaint and as confirmed from publicly available data, there were however at least twelve other producers of the product concerned in Thailand during the IP. None of these cooperated in the investigation and as a consequence the cooperation level corresponded to less than 10% of the total estimated Thai production of the product concerned.

2.2. Dumping of imports during the investigation period

(121) The single cooperating Thai producer had no exports to the Community during the IP. Considering that there were no exports of the product concerned to the Community originating in Thailand, there could be no continuation of dumping. It follows that the analysis in this case has to be based on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping should measures be terminated.

2.3. Development of imports should measures be repealed

2.3.1. Preliminary remarks

(122) As outlined in recital (120), the investigation has shown that there were at least thirteen producers of the product concerned in Thailand during the IP and only one cooperated in the investigation.

(123) It was examined to what extent data from the one cooperating Thai producer could be used for the purpose of analysing the overall situation pertaining to the likely development of exports from Thailand as well as, more specifically, to serve as a benchmark in terms of indicators of domestic and export prices, costs, production capacities and capacity utilisation.

(124) In this respect a number of deficiencies were noted in relation to the data provided by the cooperating company. Firstly, the company was unable to reconcile domestic and export prices with actual transactions and with its audited accounts for the IP. Furthermore the company could not provide a breakdown of the cost of production by product control number, as defined in the questionnaires sent to interested parties ('PCN'). The producer was only able to provide the cost of production as the average of the cost of production broken down between black and galvanised of all the PCNs produced. Evidence of the PCNs' cost structure from different producers in other countries concerned by the investigation including the Community, showed that there indeed is a large variation in the cost of production per PCN. This also applies to the specific product types produced and sold by the Thai company in question. Under these circumstances, a cost breakdown that does not allow a comparison per PCN cannot be considered sufficient for the purpose of determining domestic normal value.

(125) Even in the event that such data could have been obtained it should be borne in mind that the co-operating producer corresponded to less than 10% of the total production of the product concerned in Thailand meaning that the data in any event would have to be complemented by other statistical material in order to assess the representativity for the purpose of the country wide assessment.

(126) The company was notified of the Commission's intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation and the reasons for which this was considered necessary within a reasonable period of time, due account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. Comments were received, thoroughly analysed and replied to in detail. None of explanations given by the company was considered to be satisfactory as to allow the Commission to avoid the application of best facts available to the areas highlighted above.

(127) Consequently, information on domestic and export prices to other countries for Thai exporters has been based on best facts available including the complaint and publicly available information.

(128) Conversely, data pertaining to stocks, production level and capacity that had been provided by the company could be verified. This information in conjunction with data from the complaint could therefore be used to establish the production volume and capacity of all exporting producers in Thailand.

(129) In view of the above, the following considerations were taken into account when assessing the likely impact should measures be repealed.

2.3.2. Production, unused capacities and likelihood that these capacities would be directed to the Community

(130) The complaint shows a spare capacity in Thailand of more than 370 KT, accounting for almost 30% of the total capacity. This spare capacity corresponds to more than 25% of the total Community consumption (as defined in recital (231)) which could be directed toward the Community market.

(131) The level of spare capacity was even more pronounced in the cooperating producer, which represented less than 10% of the Thai total production in the IP. For this producer, spare capacities of above 50% were found in the IP.

(132) Together, these factors point to the existence of significant spare capacity in Thailand. In the absence of evidence showing that this capacity could be absorbed by increased domestic sales, sales to other third countries or the production of products other than the product concerned, it is concluded that should measures expire, such spare capacities would in all likelihood be directed towards the Community, not least because of the Community's attractiveness as an export market.

(133) Considering that the Community market is one of the biggest in the world, its sheer size makes it attractive to any Thai exporting producer of the product concerned. The potential importance of the Community market is further enhanced by the fact that the US which is another major market, has measures in place against imports from Thailand.

(134) Taken together with the relatively attractive price level in the Community, where well developed distribution channels exist, it is considered that, in the absence of measures, there would be a clear economic incentive for a shift of exports away from major third markets such as the US and towards the Community.

(135) Overall, under these circumstances it is considered that any increase in the current capacity utilisation is likely to be directed towards exports, and specifically to the Community market.

2.3.3. Likely price levels

(136) A number of factors point to the likelihood that Thai export prices to the Community would be dumped.

(137) To start with, exports to major third country markets appear to have been made at dumped prices. This was confirmed by the existence of US anti-dumping measures in the range of 15% for Thai exports of welded tubes. This points to a more general pattern of behaviour based on dumping to large third markets. The fact that Thai exports to the Community stopped after measures were imposed appears to reinforce the idea that Thai exporting producers would be unable or unwilling to sell at non-dumped price levels.

(138) In addition, for the product under consideration, which is in general rather homogeneous, would-be Thai sellers would be likely to provide products at the prevailing prices of other imports in the Community. As has been concluded in the sections above, the import prices of other exporting countries are generally low. When considering that potential export prices of Thai producing exporters are likely to have to mirror these low prices and when considering the cost structure of the product concerned, which is heavily based on steel coil and zinc prices that have seen a significant increases across the world, it would be likely that export prices would be dumped.

2.4. Conclusion

(139) A significant amount of Thai exports would therefore be likely to be sold in the Community at dumped prices should measures be allowed to lapse.

3. TURKEY (i): GENERAL DUMPING AND ARTICLE 11(2) ASPECTS

3.1. General issues

(140) The complainant claimed that the dumped imports from Turkey would likely lead to a very serious injury to the Community industry, should the measures be allowed to lapse. In the context of the interim review (see below) the complainant submitted that the measures should be adjusted upwards due to the allegedly increased dumping and injury levels.

(141) Statistical data showed that imports from Turkey amounted to 110 KT, representing almost 9% of the Community consumption (as defined in recital (231)). There was a discrepancy between the amounts reported by Eurostat and those reported by the companies (138 KT). Reference is made to comments made under recital (55).

(142) The general methodology used to calculate dumping (set out in recitals (31) to (46) above) has been applied to all exporting producers in Turkey. It differs from the methodology applied in the original investigation, which was used exceptionally for some exporters due to significant currency fluctuations during the original investigation period. Due to these fluctuations, it was considered more appropriate in the original investigation to make a comparison between the monthly weighted average normal value and the monthly weighted average export price. However, these exceptional circumstances were absent in the current investigation and the standard methodology, as described in recitals (31) to (46) above, was applied instead. Thus, in the current investigation, the dumping margin for the exporting producers in Turkey was established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average export price.

(143) The following companies: Cayirova Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret AS, Istanbul, Yücel Boru ve Profil Endüstrisi AS, Istanbul, and Noksel Çelik Boru Sanayi AŞ, Ankara, each of whose individual dumping margin in the original investigation was zero, were initially investigated in the review and chosen as part of the sample. However, although Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation provides that companies with a zero or de minimis margin in the original investigation may be included in a review, it does not oblige the Community institutions to include such companies. Moreover, after the adoption of the basic Regulation, in the case Mexico-Beef and Rice, the WTO dispute settlement body has interpreted the relevant provision of the ADA as prohibiting reviews of such companies. Therefore, the Community institutions concluded that it is appropriate not to use data gathered during the review concerning these three companies. Consequently, these companies were excluded from the sample. Moreover, in this Regulation, it is assumed that none of these companies are currently engaged in dumping.

3.2. Sampling (exporters) and co-operation

(144) Sampling forms were sent out to 15 potential producers/exporters in Turkey and 8 of them responded. Three companies/groups, which account for 41% of the total Turkish imports into the Community, were selected for the sample.

3.3. Normal value

(145) As mentioned above the normal value was either constructed or established on the basis of prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in Turkey. Some of the adjustments claimed by the exporting producers have been rejected or amended.

3.3.1. Credit costs

(146) Following the disclosure of the Commission's findings some of the exporters claimed that credit costs should be established on the basis of the actual payment terms agreed between the producers and their customers. These claims were accepted.

3.3.2. Duty drawback

(147) Certain companies claimed an allowance for duty drawbacks on the grounds that import charges were levied on the raw material used for the like product when intended for consumption in Turkey but were refunded when the product was sold for export to the Community.

(148) In one case, the amount claimed was found to be higher than the amount of duty levied on materials physically incorporated in the like product sold in the domestic market. It was established that the duty burden was less because that company/group of companies used in their domestic production not only coils imported with a duty but also coils imported with 0% duty rate, as well as locally purchased coils. Consequently, the allowances were adjusted accordingly.

(149) Another company for which the allowance was originally rejected claimed that it should have been allowed as their domestically sold products did bear the burden of the duty. The claim was partly accepted.

(150) In this context, it was claimed by the Community industry that this would be a countervailable subsidy. However, it has to be noted that the present proceeding is an anti-dumping investigation. Therefore, this allegation has not been analysed.

3.3.3. Selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A)

(151) One of the Turkish exporters, for those of its sales for which the normal value had to be constructed, claimed negative SG&A. This was due to the fact that their foreign currency exchange gains were substantial and higher than the total amount of SG&A. In this case those financial gains were disregarded. Only financial costs related to the companies' loans were taken into account. The SG&A were thus adjusted accordingly.

3.4. Export price

(152) In all cases the product concerned was sold to independent customers in the Community. Thus, for all exporters, the export price was based on the prices paid or payable by unrelated customers in the Community, pursuant to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.5. Comparison

(153) The normal value and export price were compared on an ex-works basis. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, due allowance in the form of adjustments was made for differences affecting price comparability in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Accordingly, adjustments were made for rebates, discounts, transport, handling, charging costs, bank charges and insurance and credit costs, where appropriate and supported by verified evidence.

3.6. Dumping during the investigation period

(154) The dumping margin for the exporting producers in Turkey was established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average export price, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(155) The comparison of weighted average export prices with a weighted average normal value showed the following dumping margins:

– Erbosan Erciyas Boru Sanayii ve Ticaret AŞ, Kayseri ('Erbosan') 0,5%,

– Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, Istanbul ('Borusan') -1,4%,

– Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi AS, Iskenderun ('Toscelik') 0,9%.

(156) Two companies declared their intention to co-operate but were not included in the sample. Given that the dumping margins determined for all the companies in the sample were de minimis and the co-operation in the investigation was very high, the countrywide dumping margin was also considered to be de minimis.

(157) Therefore, it is concluded that there was no continuation of dumping in case of Turkey. The further analysis in the framework of Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation will therefore solely concentrate on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

3.7. Likelihood analysis

3.7.1. General remarks

(158) The EU market is undeniably a very attractive market for the Turkish producers. This is due to a number of factors, the first of which is size. Size pertains not only to the large consumption, but also to the fact that most Turkish exports to other third country markets are fragmented - i.e. small quantities being shipped to many different destinations. In that sense the Community is more attractive as a single destination with large absorption capacity.

(159) Geographical proximity is another important factor, as transportation costs for these products are not insignificant.

(160) The Community is also a traditional market for Turkish exporters who have well established distribution channels and a wide range of clients.

3.7.2. Share of exports to the EU and pricing practices

(161) Despite the measures in force exports from Turkey continued throughout the IP. However, no dumping was found for any of the sampled companies. It should be noted that the sampled companies and the non-sampled companies that co-operated in the current reviews as well as those whose margin in the original investigation was found to be zero or de minimis cover around 90% of total Turkish exports to the Community. The market for these Turkish exports appears to be stable and there is no indication that the companies would change their pricing strategies. Furthermore, the three sampled companies as well as those three whose dumping margin in the original investigation was found to be zero or de minimis are by far the biggest players on the market and price leaders. Therefore, it is likely that any other company would rather follow their pricing practices. It thus appears unlikely that dumping would recur for Turkey. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, the factors below were also examined.

3.7.3. Unused capacity in Turkey

(162) The investigation established a total spare capacity of about 143 000 tonnes in the IP for the co-operating producers, including sampled and non-sampled companies. This quantity would correspond to around 10% of the total Community consumption (as defined in recital (231)) of welded tubes.

3.7.4. Possible absorption capacity of third country markets

(163) The largest third-country market for the product concerned (the USA) has antidumping measures in place for Turkish exports ranging up to 14,7%. This would imply that, other things being equal, the USA would not be likely to absorb significant additional export quantities from Turkey. However, the fact that the exports to third countries are fragmented with shipments to many different destinations appears to indicate that the Turkish exporters are actively in the process of exploring new markets, and it is therefore not unlikely that third country markets could absorb some of the capacities. In addition, taking into account the actual ratio of Turkish exports to the Community and to third countries (70/30), the same ratio can reasonably be expected if the currently unused capacities were sold. This would then amount to an additional import into the Community of around 100 000 tonnes, which would correspond to an additional market share of 7 %, based on the IP consumption figures. It has to be noted, however, that this would be the maximum theoretical increase of sales based on the assumption that the spare capacity is used at the rate of 100%, which is rare in such industry.

3.7.5. Price factors

(164) The price differences between Turkish exports to the Community and to third countries have not been significant and depended on the company concerned. After further analysis subsequent to the disclosure, it was established that the Turkish export prices to third countries were slightly higher than those to the Community. Given that no dumping was established for Turkey in respect of their exports to the Community, it can be assumed that generally exports to third countries were not made at dumped prices. There are also no other indications that Turkish exporters would change their price strategy. Nothing in the circumstances of the market or the situation of the exporters as a whole showed that they were likely to change their overall market behaviour.

(165) In view of the foregoing it is concluded that dumping is not likely to recur for imports originating in Turkey.

4. TURKEY (ii): ARTICLE 11(3) ASPECTS

(166) The complainant claimed that the measures in force did not prevent the continuation of dumped imports and that the level of measures was no longer sufficient to counteract the injurious dumping by imports of the product concerned from Turkey.

4.1. Lasting nature of changed circumstances

(167) As found above, imports from Turkey no longer continued to be made at dumped prices. Indeed, all levels of dumping established in the present investigation are below the de minimis threshold. In particular, this is true for three companies, which originally were found to be dumping.

(168) The Community market will, as mentioned, most likely remain an attractive market for the Turkish exporters in terms of prices as well as well-established and long-lasting commercial relations. At the same time, Turkish producers sell significant volumes on their domestic market. These quantities are sold at competitive and relatively low prices, when compared to other major markets, including the EU and USA. Indeed, domestic prices and subsequently normal values were at such levels that dumping in respect to exports to the Community has disappeared entirely.

(169) The investigation has not detected any other circumstances which would suggest that the price and dumping are likely to change if measures are allowed to lapse. For the companies that have been subject to zero-duties since the original investigation, the considerations based on the Mexico Beef and Rice report, as explained above in recital (143) will continue to apply. As regards the other companies, the present investigation indeed showed that circumstances have changed, as they were found not be dumping any more. In addition, no compelling reasons are at hand that would indicate that such changed circumstances are not of a lasting nature. Moreover, all investigated companies made exports to third countries in 2006 and the IP at prices higher than export prices to the Community. In the same periods, exports to the Community were made at prices exceeding domestic sale prices. This clearly indicates that the changed circumstances (exports no longer dumped) are of a lasting nature.

4.2. Conclusion

(170) It can therefore be concluded that, should the measures be allowed to lapse, the exports to the Community will not be likely to be made at dumped prices. Also, the changed circumstances with respect to the original investigation regarding the lack of dumping can reasonably be considered to be of a lasting nature.

(171) In view of the foregoing the proceeding concerning imports originating in Turkey should be terminated.

5. UKRAINE (i): ARTICLE 11(3) ASPECTS

5.1. General remarks

(172) The Interpipe Group alleged that a comparison of normal value based on its own costs/domestic prices and its export prices to a third country market comparable to the EU, would lead to a reduction of dumping significantly below the level of the current measures. Therefore, it is alleged that the continued imposition of the measure at its current level was no longer necessary to offset dumping.

(173) During the course of the investigation, the company was notified of the Commission's intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation. This was because the company did not provide cost of production data in the product type (product control number (PCN)) format required. The company only submitted cost of production data as an average of all the product types produced in a specific workshop.

(174) Examination of the facts showed that the cost of production data submitted could not be accepted by the Commission as they would not permit a proper comparison with domestic market selling prices by product type.

(175) The company was notified of the reasons why this was necessary within a reasonable period of time as required by Article 18(4) of the basic Regulation. Comments were received, analysed and replied to in detail. None of the explanations given by the company was considered to be satisfactory as to allow the Commission to avoid the application of best facts available to the area highlighted below.

(176) Following the disclosure, the complainant claimed that the case should be terminated as the cooperation of the sole Ukrainian producer was so poor that the Commission had to use Article 18 of the basic Regulation to adjust the cost of manufacturing. However, it should be noted that Article 18 was applied in order to allow the Commission to complete the information submitted by the sole Ukrainian co-operating producer by using the best information available. The claim was therefore rejected.

5.2. Normal value

(177) The Commission examined whether the domestic sales could be considered as being made in the ordinary course of trade pursuant to Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. To this end, the cost of production of the product produced and sold by the co-operating exporting producers on the domestic market was examined.

(178) OJSC Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Production Plant (NMPP), which produces the product concerned, failed to provide a breakdown of the cost of production ('CoP') by PCN. This exporting producer only provided the average CoP of all the PCNs produced in each of its two workshops. Evidence of the PCNs' cost structure from different producers in other countries concerned by the investigation including the Community showed that there is a large variation in the cost of production per PCN.

(179) OJSC Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsk (NTRP) tube rolling plant which is related to NMPP, submitted the break down of the CoP per PCN.

(180) As explained in recital (173), the Commission applied Article 18 of the basic Regulation to NMPP to obtain the cost of production by PCN. The option of using data available from the original investigation was considered, but as Ukraine has since been granted market economy status, such data was not considered to be the best information available. In addition, the Commission considered that the quality of the information reported by the Community industry was such as would allow conclusions to be drawn on the Cost of Production (CoP) per Product Control Number (PCN). Therefore, the information submitted by the co-operating Community industry was considered to be the most reliable and the best information available from which to derive the CoP per PCN. In this respect, the findings of the investigation showed that the variances between the cheapest Community industry PCN and all other PCNs could be calculated. This variance was then applied to the average CoP reported by NMPP. When there was a match between the PCN produced by the Community industry and the same PCN produced by NTRP, the NTRP cost was used.

(181) The same party questioned the fact that the Commission used data from the IP to construct the normal value and the export price in the IIP. Some of the claims related thereto were accepted. The Commission considered the weighted average of the CIF export prices to the Community during the overlapping six months of both proceedings. In addition, to allow a fair comparison within the same period of time, between the weighted average normal values of each type of the product concerned exported to the Community when compared to the weighted average export price of each corresponding type of the product concerned, the cost of production of the co-operating producers was adjusted. The adjustment was made to reflect the cost of manufacturing for the same six months taken into account to calculate the CIF export prices to the Community. The sole Ukrainian co-operating exporter argued that the Commission should use the unit manufacturing cost from the related company, OJSC Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsk (NTRP) tube rolling plant, when the PCNs are nearly identical to those produced by OJSC Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Production Plant (NMPP). As explained in recital (175), the Commission has however evidence of large variations in the cost of production per PCN. This claim thus was rejected.

5.3. Export price

(182) As regards to the exports to the Community, the group exported a negligible volume of the product concerned to the Community during the IIP. These transactions, on their own, could not be considered as representative to establish whether any change of behaviour of a lasting nature had taken place.

(183) The Interpipe Group suggested using exports to third countries in order to establish the level of prices at which the exports to the Community would take place. In particular, the exporter claimed that exports to Russia should be used in this regard. The company provided evidence of its exports to third country markets, and to the Russian market.

(184) It was first determined whether the export volumes of the product concerned to the third countries proposed by the Interpipe Group were sufficiently significant in terms of overall sales. In this respect it was concluded that sales to Russia represented more than half of the total exports of the group and were in principle adequate to draw conclusions, should the Russian market be sufficiently similar to the Community.

(185) On the basis of the information at the Commission's disposal, it was examined whether Russia had similar market conditions and structure to those which exist in the Community, in order to assess whether exports to Russia are a reliable proxy of likely export prices to the Community for the purposes of establishing a new level of the measure.

(186) On the one hand, the size of the Russian market for the product concerned, like that of the Community, appears to be significant and the product types sold in both areas are generally similar.

(187) On the other hand, salient differences were detected between the two markets. To start with, significant import duties exist in Russia, in contrast to the absence of such duties in the Community [12]. This is reflected in import shares which are significantly lower than in the Community. In addition, the production sector in Russia appears to be much more concentrated, with a handful of large producers accounting for the bulk of activity – whereas in the Community activity is spread across a larger number of producers. Also, channels of distribution appear to involve fewer stockists than in the Community. Furthermore, the fact that significant Russian dumping exists in the Community points to differences in price formation and to distortions in the Russian domestic market without which such practices could not exist.

(188) In addition, the existence of dumping indicates that domestic price levels in Russia are above the prices at which exporters would be likely to export to the Community. This is because prevailing prices for importers which maintain a significant presence in the Community are likely to be at the same level as those of Russian export prices and because of the homogeneous nature of the product concerned, which implies that exporters wishing to make inroads in the Community would, in all likelihood, need to align themselves to the level of prices of the lowest bidders.

(189) The foregoing points to dissimilarities which would affect price formation and hence levels, and which therefore imply that Russian prices may not be used for the purpose of establishing a new level of measures.

(190) The Commission further examined whether export prices to third countries other than Russia could be used for this purpose. It was first examined whether the second largest market in terms of exports could be taken as a reference country. However, this option was disregarded, as Belarus is not a market economy country. Sales to other countries were also analysed but their exports volumes were too small to be considered as representative.

(191) In these circumstances, the use of export prices from Ukraine to Russia (and to other third countries where the applicant exported during the IIP) cannot be considered as representative of the likely export price behaviour to the Community and are therefore disregarded. In view of the above, it was instead considered necessary to apply Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation for the Interpipe Group. In this respect, it was considered whether the weighted average of the CIF export prices to the Community during the IP from all the co-operating exporting producers in all countries concerned by the investigation, could be aggregated on a per PCN basis and used as a reference to establish an export price for the Ukrainian exporting producer.

(192) This method was found to be appropriate since it is reasonable to presume that should Ukrainian exports enter the Community market, they would not deviate to any significant extent from the price pattern of their direct competitors, i.e. the other exporters to the Community.

(193) As explained in recital (181), when establishing the export price, the Commission only used the data from the six overlapping months of the IP and IIP.

(194) The matching PCN unit export prices of these exporters were thus used to establish the export price of the Interpipe group.

(195) Following the disclosure, the sole Ukrainian exporting producer claimed that when determining the export price, no deduction should be made for the related company’s SG&A and profit, as Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation is not applicable in the present case. It was argued that Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation only applies to related importers located in the Community as its wording makes a clear distinction between ‘importation and resale’. It was further argued that the related company acts as an export department.

(196) It should be noted that, for sales of the product concerned to the Community, the sole Ukrainian exporting producer consigned the product concerned directly to the Community, invoiced its related company in Switzerland for each consignment and received payment accordingly. Thus, the exporting producer performed all functions of an exporter. The related company in Switzerland negotiated sales contracts and invoiced the first independent buyer in the Community. The related company also arranged the delivery of the products sold.

(197) Concerning the disclosure comments made by the Ukrainian company, it is held that export prices may be constructed under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation where there is no export price (first option under article 2(9)). Again under Article 2(9), export prices can be constructed on any reasonable basis. Such reasonable basis will also cater for a deduction of the related company's SG&A and a reasonable profit. Even if it was considered that these elements are more appropriately reflected as "commissions"/"mark-ups" in accordance with Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, quod non, the resulting dumping margin would be the same.. Since the profit of the related company was affected by the fact that it purchased under inter-company conditions, a reasonable profit was therefore determined on the basis of data gathered from independent importers/traders co-operating with the investigation.

(198) Following disclosure, the Community industry claimed that the Basic Regulation and WTO law do not allow the calculation of dumping margins when there are no exports made to the Community. For the reasons stated in the previous recitals, it is reiterated that Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation explicitly mentions that when there is no export price, such price may be constructed on any reasonable basis. Consequently, the claim is rejected.

5.4. Dumping margin

(199) The comparison between the normal value calculated as described above and the export price also calculated as described above, showed the existence of dumping. The dumping margin for the Ukrainian group expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at the Community border, duty unpaid, is the following:

Interpipe Group (OJSC Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Production Plant and OJSC Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsk tube rolling plant): 10.7%.

5.5. Conclusions on dumping regarding Ukraine

(200) In conclusion, dumping by the Interpipe Group was found to exist at the level described in recital (199). As regards all other exporting producers in the Ukraine, the applicable residual dumping margin will not change.

6. UKRAINE (ii): ARTICLE 11(2) ASPECTS

6.1. Preliminary remarks

(201) The exported volumes from the country concerned to the EU have steadily decreased from 29 KT in 2002 to 17.2 KT in 2005 to nearly nil in the IP.

(202) Only two Ukrainian producers belonging to the same group (the Interpipe Group) made themselves known and submitted a questionnaire reply, OJSC Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Production Plant and OJSC Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsk Tube Rolling Plant.

(203) It was established that there were at least another 7 producers operating in Ukraine. On the basis of the information available to the Commission, the Interpipe Group accounts for around 26% of the Ukrainian production. Under these conditions, it is considered that the level of co-operation was very low.

6.2. Dumping of imports during the investigation period

(204) The single cooperating Ukrainian group producer had negligible exports to the Community during the IP. The very low level of Ukrainian exports of the product concerned to the Community was not representative and thus did not provide a reliable and meaningful basis for establishing whether there was a continuation of dumping. It was therefore considered appropriate to base the analysis in this case on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping should measures be terminated.

6.3. Development of imports should measures be repealed

6.3.1. Preliminary remarks

(205) As outlined in recital (203), the investigation has shown that there were at least 7 producers of the product concerned in Ukraine during the IP and only one group cooperated in the investigation.

(206) It was examined to what extent data from the one cooperating Ukrainian group could be used for the purpose of analysing the overall development of likely exports from Ukraine as well as, more specifically, to serve as a be