EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 16.11.2020 SWD(2020) 269 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Gouvernance économique européenne - Semestre européen - Projet de plan budgétaire pour 2021- Slovénie

Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE assessing the implementation of Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC {COM(2020) 732 final}



Table of contents Executive Summary 1Introduction 2Background to the intervention 2.1Description of the intervention and its objectives 2.2Baseline and points of comparison 2.2.1Problems related to industry evolution 2.2.2Problems related to company-specific corporate practice 2.2.3Problems related to the regulatory framework 2.2.4Problems related to the state of risk-based planning 2.2.5Problems related to the integration of public and industry emergency plans and assets 2.2.6Problems related to clarity and comprehensiveness of liability provisions 2.2.7Baseline costs of a major accident 3Method 3.1Short description of methodology 3.2Limitations and robustness of findings 4State of play and implementation

4.1The offshore oil and gas sector 4.1.1Offshore operations and the Green Deal 4.1.2Offshore Safety and COVID-19 4.1.3Oil prices, investments and offshore safety 4.1.4The European offshore sector 4.1.5Incident rates and safety performance 4.2Implementation of the Directive by Member States 5Achievements assessed by themes 5.1Overview on the themes analysed 5.2Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents 5.3Public participation in release of new areas for licensing 5.4Assignment of the Competent Authority 5.5Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells 5.6Safety in operations conducted outside EU 5.7Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention 5.8Transparency concerning reporting of incidents – the Implementing Regulation 5.9Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of operators/ owners 5.10Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of Member States 5.11Availability of dissuasive penalties for breaches of duty 5.12Recovery of costs of maintaining the competent authority

5.13Special theme: Liability, compensation claims and financial security of offshore oil and gas producers 5.13.1The framework 5.13.1.1Overview 5.13.1.2Legal provisions of the Directive 5.13.2Commission report on liability, compensation and financial security 5.13.2.1The European Parliament’s resolution on liability and compensation claims 5.13.3Diversity of rules on liability, handling of compensation claims, and financial security instruments in Member States’ jurisdictions 5.13.4Implementation by Member States and the effectiveness of rules 5.13.5The Oil Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL) 5.13.6Financial security62 5.13.7Conclusions63 5.14Special theme: Criminal sanctions to breaches of duty to safeguard the environment from major accidents64 5.15Special theme: Post-decommissioning responsibility for ensuring permanent sealing of wells, and for determining extent of removal of fixed installations66 5.15.1Overview66 5.15.2Provisions of the Directive on the decommissioning of installations67 5.15.3The requirements for extent of removal of fixed production installations69 5.15.3.1The Offshore Safety Directive69 5.15.3.2Other EU law70 5.15.3.3International policies71 5.15.3.4Current practice of decommissioning74

5.15.3.5The decommissioning of Brent platforms75 5.15.4Conclusions77 5.15.5The permanent sealing of wells79 5.15.5.1The Offshore Safety Directive79 5.15.5.2Technical challenges and available technologies79 5.15.5.3Conclusions81 5.15.6Biogenic methane seepage81 5.16Special theme: Mutual recognition of mobile drilling units (MODU)82 6Achievements assessed by horizontal criteria84 6.1.1Overview84 6.1.2Relevance86 6.1.3Coherence86 6.1.4Effectiveness88 6.1.5Efficiency89 6.1.6EU-Added Value90 7Conclusions91 7.1Strengths and weaknesses91 7.2Areas to follow-up92 7.3Overall assessment93 8ANNEXES TO THE STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT (SWD)95

9Annex I: Organisation and Timing95 9.1Lead DG & DECIDE planning info95 9.2Organization and Timing95 9.3Evidence and Sources96 9.4Discussions in the Commission's Inter Service Group96 10Annex II: Stakeholder Consultation97 10.1Consultation scope and objectives97 10.2Mapping and participation of stakeholders97 10.3Selection of consultation activities and their accessibility98 10.4Summary /overview on consultation activities by stakeholder groups and indicative timing98 10.5Consultation webpage & communication activities99 10.5.1Roadmap of the Evaluation99 10.5.2Questionnaire for public consultation99 10.5.3Position Statements received from Stakeholders99 10.6Synopsis of Consultation Activities100 10.6.1February-March 2018:100 10.6.2March 2018:100 10.6.303 May 2018 to 31 May 2018:101 10.6.419 September and 4-5 December 2018:101 10.6.519 September to 21 December 2018: public consultation102

10.6.616 and 17 January 2019:105 10.7Stakeholder positions105 11Annex III: Member States’ implementation of the Directive107 12Annex IV: Methodology for the assessment110 12.1Consolidated list of 15 thematic indicators undergoing analysis110 12.2Matrix for the detailed assessment118 12.2.1Structure of the assessment matrix119 13Annex V: Other EU Legislation, International Conventions and Protocols relevant to offshore oil and gas activities242 13.1Primary law242 13.2EU Directives242 13.2.1Mining and other fossil fuel extraction activities242 13.2.2Product safety243 13.2.3Environmental policies243 13.2.4Health and safety of workers at work247 13.2.5Cyber security and external threats248 13.2.6Whistle-blower protection249 13.3EU Regulations249 13.4EU Decisions250 13.5International conventions251 13.5.1Regional seas conventions251

13.5.2International and regional acquis pertinent for claims for damages from an offshore oil or gas incident252 13.6Others (e.g. resolutions, agreements etc.)254 14Annex VI: Liability, Financial Responsibility and Compensation Claims256 14.1Views from stakeholders on liability, handling of compensation claims and financial security256 14.1.1Liability – views from the industry256 14.1.2Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry256 14.1.3Financial security – views from the industry257 14.1.4Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs)258 14.1.5Views from the insurance sector259 14.2Reference documents261 15Annex VII: Statistical background information262 15.1Oil and gas industry’s activity 2010 – 2020262 15.2Accidents and incidents and international benchmarking263 15.3Total running costs of duty holders for implementation of the Directive266 16Annex VIII: Views from stakeholders on liability, handling of compensation claims and financial security269 16.1Liability - views from the industry269 16.2Handling of compensation claims – views from the industry270 16.3Financial security – views from the industry271 16.4Views from non-governmental associations (NGOs)272 16.5Views from the insurance sector272





Executive Summary The Offshore Safety Directive, applicable for oil and gas operations, addresses control of risk of major offshore accidents, in addition to response and recovery mechanisms, should preventive measures fail. The Directive applies to all Member States and predominantly affects the 15 Member States who are active or planning offshore oil and gas operations. At the date of drafting, it applies to the UK until 31 December 2020 when transitional arrangements expire. The Directive draws on existing international best offshore practices for control of risk and improved emergency response. The general deadline for implementation for Member States was 19 July 2015, and transitional periods for the industry applied until 19 July 2018. One year after the latter deadline, in accordance with Article 40 of the Directive, the Commission was obliged to assess the experience of implementing the Directive. According to notifications from Member States of their national transposition measures, the Directive’s measures have been adequately implemented. Crucially, industry has adopted clear duties for management of risk, with each offshore installation having a detailed risk report. Equally, each Member State has appointed an expert Competent Authority with comprehensive powers of oversight. EU annual reports on Union wide safety for offshore oil and gas operations have been published for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. These reports in combination with other data enable a risk performance baseline to be developed, although it is early to identify trends. The content of this assessment is based on intensive stakeholder engagements, including workshops and public consultation. These data collection methods generated a dense database of primarily qualitative information which was complemented by Commission expertise. Based on Articles and Annexes of the Directive, and interactions with stakeholders, 15 priority themes were identified, which were analysed. The clearest indication of the Directive’s success is that the aims of the intervention are being met through the Member States’ transposition. Moreover, the Directive’s requirements are being followed by industry and Member States, albeit with some differences in the detail of application. Overall, the efforts of implementation appear in line with the Commission’s forecast. Most of the emerging themes may be handled under existing communication protocols, as in the European Offshore Authorities Group (EUOAG), whilst a few justify further scrutiny. In providing feedback, Member States and industry welcomed the introduction of the Directive. The views of environmental non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) are more nuanced, and call for then further tightening of some measures. All stakeholders maintain that more time and monitoring is required before considering any changes. Additional analysis is presented on the topics of liability and the handling of compensation claims, the appropriateness of criminal sanctions, the removal and detoxification of fixed production platforms, and the mutual recognition of mobile drilling units in Member States’ different jurisdictions.



Glossary ACSNI: Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable (principle) - Reduction of the risk of a major accident to the point where the cost of further risk reduction would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of such reduction. API: American Petroleum Institute CEN: European Committee for Standardisation CMAPP: Corporate Major Accident Prevention Policy - The corporate level policy by which owners, licensees, and operators responsible for offshore oil and gas operations establish consistent, corporate-wide mechanisms for preventing major accidents (see Annex I - part 8 of the Directive). ECD: Environmental Crime Directive ECI: European Critical Infrastructures - Critical infrastructure located in EU Member States, the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two EU Member States.

EEA: European Economic Area EERP: External Emergency Response Plan EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone - The offshore zone beyond the territorial waters prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and exploitation of marine, mineral and energy resources, including energy production from water and wind. EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment ELD: Environmental Liability Directive EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency EU: European Union EUOAG: European Union Offshore Authorities Group GIRG: Global Incident Response Group (IOGP) HELCOM: Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission - Helsinki Commission - An intergovernmental organization and the governing body of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). HELCOM consists of ten members - the nine Baltic Sea countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden, plus the European Union. HPHT: High Pressure High Temperature - Term referring to oil or gas wells which exhibit characteristics of high temperature and high pressure. HSE: Health and Safety Executive (UK) IA: Impact Assessment IADC: International Association of Drilling Contractors IERP: Internal Emergency Response Plan - Plan at the level of the operator or owner of an offshore oil and gas installation, regarding their response to emergencies such as oil spills, fire, explosion, vessel collision, or personnel evacuation. ILO: International Labour Organization IMO: International Maritime Organization IMP: Integrated Marine Policy IOGP: International Oil and Gas Produces Organization IUMI: International Union of Marine Insurance

KPI: Key Performance Indicator - A measurable value that demonstrates how effectively an objective is achieved. MODU: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MS: Member State NGO: Non-Governmental Organization NIS Directive: Directive 2016/1148/EU on Security of Network and Information Systems OPA: Oil Pollution Act 1990 (USA) OPEP: Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (Oil & Gas UK) OPOL: Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement OSD: Offshore Safety Directive (2013/30/EU) OSPAR: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic REMPEC: Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea RoMH: Report on Major Hazards SEA: Strategic Environmental Assessment - Assessment of the environmental impact of certain plans and programmes, in the context of Directive 2001/42/EC. SECE: Safety and Environmental Critical Element - Element of an offshore oil and gas installation whose function is critical to safety and environmental protection. SEMS: Safety and Environmental Management System - The system of an offshore installation for managing safety and environmental protection in the context of the Directive (see Annex I – part 8 of the Directive) SEMS: Safety and Environmental Management System - The system of an offshore installation for managing safety and environmental protection (a list of its contents is provided in the Directive, Annex I – part 8) SLIC: Senior Labour Inspectors' Committee (UK) SWD: Staff Working Document TFEU: Treaty of Functioning of the European Union TU: Trade Union

UK: United Kingdom UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USA: United States of America WFD: Waste Framework Directive



1Introduction Between 1980 and 2010 there were at least eleven major accidents in offshore petroleum activities which caused significant loss of life and pollution of the sea, as well as economic loss to the coastal states. The two most serious incidents occurred on production installations in European waters, in the North Sea . In April 2010 a disaster in the US Gulf of Mexico at a drilling operation controlled by an EU based company sparked worldwide concerns as to whether the risks of offshore drilling and production were being adequately managed. Subsequent assessments of the Gulf of Mexico disaster in the US and Europe concluded that the industry was displaying an unacceptable lack of operational integrity, and that major accidents were occurring in situations that were avoidable. Given the offshore petroleum sectors’ high-level of maturity, such accidents were occurring in circumstances that should have been eliminated. Imbalances and fragmentation characterised the EU regulatory systems for offshore petroleum. Whilst some Member States had offshore regulatory systems considered effective, all had room for improvement. No Member State was able to claim that it was making full use of best practices available in case of major accidents. The intention of the Offshore Safety Directive (hereafter, the ''Directive'') was to address these shortcomings. The Directive required all Member States to adjust their regulatory systems to a more robust and consistent level, deriving higher standards and greater homogeneity of regulation across the Union. The Directive, establishing minimum requirements for safety, environmental protection and emergency response across the EU, entered into force on 19 July 2013. Member States had to transpose the Directive into national rules and regulations by 19 July 2015. The full implementation of the Directive acts upon all duty holders namely regulators, operators, and owners of production and non-production installations (e.g. mobile drilling rigs, mobile accommodation units and well intervention vessels). Industry duty holders were required to fully comply with the Directive, as transposed by Member States, by 19 July 2018. The Commission was obliged to formally assess the implementation of the Directive pursuant to Article 4 which provides that: “No later than 19 July 2019, the Commission shall, taking due account of the efforts and experiences of competent authorities, assess the experience of implementing this Directive”. The overall framework of the assessment shall consider that the aims of the Directive are consistent with the objective of protection of any coastal state. This assessment addresses the aspects of EU intervention into upstream offshore petroleum activities foreseen by the Directive. These activities include searching for potential underground or underwater crude oil and natural gas fields, drilling exploratory wells, and subsequently drilling and operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil or raw natural gas to the surface. Foremost is the impact on risk of a major accident occurring, including to the environment. The assessment also includes an in-depth analysis on special themes as for example decommissioning of installations, the mutual recognition between Member States of certified mobile drilling units, liability and the handling of compensation claims by relevant enterprises in the event of a major pollution incident. The States in this assessment, for which we carry out an in-depth analysis, are the coastal EU Member States with an active offshore petroleum sector, or a policy to become active in coming the years (“focal Member States”): Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom . The data examined run from 19 July 2015 (deadline for transposition) until July 2019. Articles 23, 24, and 25 of the Directive concern measures for EU-wide reporting systems, under which the Commission is obliged to make an implementing regulation for common reporting parameters of accidents. This Implementing Regulation (1112/2014/EU) provides reporting formats for Member States for annually publishing incident data and other relevant information. The assessment of the Directive also includes the Implementing Regulation. Therefore, based on the experience with implementing the Directive, the assessment’s results will provide help to determine whether the Directive is fully adequate and whether it has achieved its objectives. For any identified shortcomings, the assessment will try to present the reasons behind them. These findings may contribute to possible future changes to the legislation.

2Background to the intervention 2.1Description of the intervention and its objectives Following an assessment of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the Commission concluded that the EU’s own offshore drilling conditions left the Union vulnerable to similar incidents . In response, the Commission launched a policy initiative in 2011 for a regulation aimed at preventing major offshore petroleum accidents. This regulation was intended to include measures for more stringent licensing arrangements of operators, improved public consultation, clearer environmental liability, and more effective financial security provisions. Significantly, the form of the instrument was changed from a regulation to a directive during negotiations in the Council and “Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC” came into effect on 19 July 2013. In contrast to a regulation a directive leaves to the Member States discretion as to the form and methods they choose to reach the result of the Directive. The Directive provides measures that encompass cumulative best global practice regarding the mitigation of major accidents in offshore drilling and oil and gas production. Furthermore, the Directive attempts to improve levels of homogeneity across the sector by applying equal standards and ensuring consistent implementation across geographical areas. Every Member State was required to overhaul its regulatory systems, and the industry was required to produce substantial improvements to its control of major accident hazards. Furthermore, the Directive specifies an entire regulatory framework for an intensive and technically challenging system for the prevention of major accidents, including to the environment. Since North Sea Member States and Italy had more experience with offshore operations than others, the efforts necessary for adopting new systems and arrangements for both Member States and operators were unevenly distributed in the EU. The Directive was introduced to remedy the inadequacy of EU legislation regarding the prevention of major accidents through offshore petroleum operations in EU waters, including environmental concerns. Whereas the North Sea countries had overhauled their legislation in the period 1982 to1992, other Member States had relatively undeveloped regulatory systems, with the exception of Italy. The Directive requires regulators and industry stakeholders with duties relating to the protection against accidents in offshore petroleum activities to undertake all suitable measures to: ·Prevent a major incident from occurring during adjacent offshore oil and gas activities (relating, in particular, to mechanisms to control major accident hazards); and ·Provide affected coastal states with measures for effective response to and remediation from a major emergency, should preventive systems fail. The following figure summarizes the intervention logic, illustrating how the Directive was intended to work.



Figure 1: Intervention logic of the Offshore Safety Directive Whereas the Directive has a unique focus on the safety of offshore operations and the avoidance of major accidents a complex web of EU legislation, international conventions and protocols regulate and frame the area and the way how the offshore sector operates. Part IV of the Annex provides an overview on legislation and conventions applicable. 2.2Baseline and points of comparison The chapters below summarise the baseline situation, at the time of coming into effect of the Directive on 19 July 2013, and the main problems faced at that time.

2.2.1Problems related to industry evolution The offshore oil and gas industry in the EU, and globally, had been facing significant changes in its operational environment. These challenges persist and are driven by three key issues. Firstly, ageing infrastructures related to many of the industries traditional operations, secondly, structural shifts towards smaller specialist companies, thirdly, discoveries of new hydrocarbon reserves in complex environments. ·Ageing infrastructure and maturing industrial environment The industry was and continues to be, increasingly reliant on ageing installations, often in service well beyond their original design lifetime. One reason is that new technology has enabled mature installations to continue to access oil reserves that would otherwise have long been stranded. In the UK, more than half of the fixed platforms had exceeded the original design life of the field . The situation is similar for Italy in the Mediterranean. The consequence of the passage of time on the integrity of structures and process equipment is that challenges accrue for the maintenance of reliability. The costs of these challenges were compounded by declining profit margins as production rates in these fields decline. ·Structural shift of the industry towards diversification Ageing platforms and declining reservoirs often led their primary owners to divest these assets into smaller, specialist oil companies who have low overheads and are in the business specifically for these low yielding operations. This can lead to a loss of corporate memory concerning the operation of the installation, thus posing a potential safety risk. This was prevalent in 2011, but the involvement of smaller companies is, however, not inherently undesirable as they generally operate with a shorter decision chain for expenditure (including safety-related). On the other hand, smaller companies often have limited in-house resources (e.g. for well design), and their emergency response capabilities are usually less than those of the larger, original operators who developed the installation. ·Shift to "frontier" operations and new technologies The scarcity of new discoveries of large, conventional reservoirs had, around the turn of the century, directed the industry to explore more challenging frontier environments. These include high-temperature and high-pressure (HPHT) reservoirs, and reservoirs in hostile climatic conditions, in deep water, or in geographically remote locations. For example, in the North Sea the majority of operations had been at depths of 200 to 300 metres, whereas new projects in 2011 were operating as deep as 1,700 metres . Similarly, in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, there was a trend towards expanding offshore activities into more distant areas, partly in deep water. New players were coming into the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. 2.2.2 Problems related to company-specific corporate practice Besides the drivers that are common to the industry as a whole, level of risks in the offshore sector are impacted by the practices and behaviours of individual companies. Two main types of drivers are distinguished here: one type related to the level of use of best available technology and practices, the other reflecting the degree of compliance with the regulatory framework. The latter is often related to the existence of a strong safety culture within a company (or absence thereof). These factors are described in the three sections below. ·Inconsistent use of state of the art practices and technology Inconsistencies amongst offshore operators were identified in the degree to which operators and owners focused on major accident preventive systems and systemic corporate responsibility. There was an uneven focus on individual responsibility, and occupational safety compliance . Despite progress in this area, greater divergence of practices were to be expected in the absence of a consistent template for industry and regulators. The reason for this was that a greater number of players were expected to engage in offshore exploration and production, bringing their own corporate approaches. ·Failures of compliance with rules and standards Investigations of offshore incidents frequently found that whilst the planned measures were indeed appropriate to prevent critical events, operators did not maintain or follow them. According to available reports, this was clearly evident in the Deepwater Horizon and Montara accidents. Achieving consistency between plans and actual performance is dependent on the degree of compliance with the national regulatory framework and the internal operating rules and procedures within a company. These rules and procedures are designed to comply with the regulatory requirements and often go further than is legally necessary. Nevertheless, if they are not properly adhered to, they cannot support the prevention of incidents. ·Inadequate safety culture Within an organisation, the degree of compliance with external and internal safety rules is directly related to the degree to which safety is prioritised as a standalone corporate value and an integral part of the business model. This is often characterised as a strong "safety culture" . Gaps in safety culture significantly contributed to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Reports by Member States and professional bodies active in offshore operations in the EU agreed that those behaviours were having global impact, including in other European companies. Analysis showed that levels of enforcement in the strongest EU regimes had been broadly constant for the previous 10 years .

2.2.3Problems related to the regulatory framework The level of safety and prevalence of residual risks in the offshore sector is determined not only by industry practices but also by the quality of the regulatory environment and the oversight enforced by the competent public authorities. Several aspects of the existing EU regulatory environment were deemed to adversely affect the industry's management of risk in offshore oil and gas operations. These are described in three sections below. ·Uneven technical expertise amongst regulators Various Member States responded to the accident at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, which happened in the Macondo area (Mississippi Canyon block 252, offshore Louisiana, Gulf of Mexico, USA) by evaluating national regulatory systems . Their initiatives showed that national regulatory practices vary. While this inconsistency does not necessarily mean that the regimes were per se ineffective, the variable degree to which national regulators balanced the attention given to major hazards and to occupational safety factors in their assessments and inspections influenced the behaviour of industry accordingly. National regulators play a role in verifying that operators correctly account for the safety and long term integrity of their undertakings. It is the regulators that need to provide adequate supervision and guidance to the industry in all relevant EU waters. To achieve this, regulators need to have access to expertise to underpin their interventions and judgements. This was determined in 2011 to be problematic, especially in cases where Member States have only a handful of offshore installations. ·Suboptimal transparency and sharing of information Reports on industry performance are most authoritative when prepared by the regulator based upon statutory submissions of the duty holder. Good initiatives existed between some Member States and within some regions for information and experience sharing between regulators. However, there were clear differences in the extent to which key safety information was acquired and shared across EU borders, and to which adequate public assurance concerning the integrity of offshore activities was provided. At the time, there were no EU-wide mechanisms for sharing intelligence or for convening regulatory forums, including relevant adjacent regions. Gaps existed in the quality of data in terms of regional coverage (no EU-wide/global data), in terms of comparability (different formats, indicators etc.), and in terms of lack of precision (e.g. data from some industry databases were fully anonymised and narrowly focused). These shortcomings were conspicuous in contrast to arrangements in other high risk industries such as aviation or the chemical industry. There was also a notable inconsistency in the way relevant information was made accessible to the public. Most national regulators make available information concerning breaches of law (prosecutions, the issue of enforcement notices) either through publishing lists, or having registers that can be viewed by the public. Such enforcement reports give an incomplete picture, however, and are not comparable between jurisdictions. At the time of preparing EU-wide legislation, some regulators published annual reports of safety performance in their offshore jurisdictions. In view of the EU as a whole, there was no common system to provide the public with easily accessible and comparable information on the offshore activities of companies and their regulators in all EU regions/ Member States. In summary, the benefits of transparency in encouraging key learning and continuous improvement across the EU were being missed. Complex procedures for accessing information were hindering the development of new research and reducing inter-state pressure for the deployment of state of the art safety practices. ·Fragmented regulatory framework International law covering offshore exploration and production is, much less comprehensive than in maritime transport, and mainly deals with rights of access to reserves in adjacent seas . Therefore wide differences exist in how the sector is regulated around the world. For example, some European Member States and some other countries (Canada, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand) had adopted a goal setting regime, whilst other influential countries had not . Some countries had a more prescriptive regulatory regime whilst others had no discernible safety regulation. Discrepancies between different regulatory regimes lead to considerable variations in costs for the industry. For example, in countries that rely on self-regulation, industry can decide to deploy rigs and equipment that would not be permitted in the North Sea. Conversely, high integrity operators and MODU owners may be inclined to maintain North Sea standards throughout their operations, this was by no means universal. In such circumstances, the EU had an interest in adopting measures to encourage a global level playing field with suitable standards of performance. One clear example of this interest is that Member States can be directly affected by incidents in adjacent, non-EU waters. Achieving a consistent EU approach to offshore safety and environmental protection would clearly be a great assistance for the EU to promote higher standards beyond the Union’s footprint. In addition, no Member State had developed a holistic, independent, single offshore regime that encompassed major hazards to both humans and the environment, and that took account of civil and economic liabilities. Whilst the risks arising from oil and gas activities are broadly similar everywhere, the national institutions and arrangements in the EU-28 varied considerably. 2.2.4Problems related to the state of risk-based planning Whilst preventing major incidents should remain the primary focus, the risk can never be entirely removed, and therefore provisions need to be present to ensure a suitable and sufficient response in the event of a major incident. The factors that make escalation a higher risk than necessary are: inadequate risk assessment in emergency plans, lack of joined-up responsibility for response (failure to maximise the resources available), and incompatibility of physical assets and expertise for intervention in an incident. The contemporary regional arrangements for risk based maritime response planning across the EU were not optimal, vis-à-vis ensuring oil and gas activity is properly considered. Both, regions such as the Mediterranean and the North Sea were developing a similar approaches. At the time, there were EU-wide coordination schemes and EU-level instruments like the Civil Protection Mechanism which played an important role in the coordination of emergency response, and provided information on the availability of public resources for emergency response. The two underlying drivers for this issue are further highlighted below. ·Inconsistencies in emergency planning between Member States The external emergency plans (those pertaining to a national emergency) also depend on the adequacy of the initial risk assessment by the operator. Therefore, the same concerns must apply to preparedness for a national scale offshore incident as for a localised 'internal' incident in some regions. In addition, a national scale emergency will require the deployment of national assets, coordination by national representatives, consideration to adjoining Member States and others, and the support of EU marine contingency organisations such as EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency). Some Member States were cooperative with their neighbours on emergency planning, particularly where risk based regimes facilitated the development of site specific risk based scenario planning. It was shown to be necessary to coordinate the essential environmental sensitivity data relating to the state of the water column and the seabed so that the correct responses could be planned if an emergency arises. At the time, this data was not consistently collected and collated throughout the EU.

·Cross-border incompatibility of response assets Industry responded with resolve to the Deepwater Horizon incident by actively researching means of dispersing major spills as well as multi-functional devices for capping damaged wellheads. This was commendable and encouraged to continue. Nevertheless, this incident illustrated the scope of the response required to manage a disaster of this scale. Including not only the operating company and national civil contingency, but indeed the efforts of the entire industry and the combined resources of all adjoining countries. On the matter of compatibility of the response equipment and services, only the immediate response tools need be available at the site of the accident, or in close proximity. Other necessary equipment may be available at a distance, even if it is in a different continent. The identified need was for the rapid transportation of equipment that can be connected to locally available equipment and which may be handled using available lifting and transport systems. This applied also to human expertise. 2.2.5Problems related to the integration of public and industry emergency plans and assets The maritime safety and response arrangements in the EU provided for joined up planning and intervention in a maritime emergency, including for pollution incidents. Compared to this benchmark it became clear that the offshore oil and gas sector could attain a greater degree of joined up planning between Member States than was evident at the time, taking the EU as a whole. This is especially important given that the capacity of the offshore oil and gas sector to cause pollution is many times greater than any single shipping incident. Given the specialised nature of the offshore sector as a sea based factory environment and not a shipping sector, maritime standards were not fully adequate and therefore the risk of a major incident escalating further than necessary remained an issue. The specific drivers for this category are discussed below. ·Lack of information on industry emergency response inventories In order for the national emergency response plan to be effective, it was essential that the plan account for all emergency response assets and inventories that could be made available at the start of and during a major incident. As such, this would ensure the coordination of assets and inventories required for the incident to make effective and efficient use of all available resources. Before the Macondo incident, there were indications of insufficient coordination of assets between industry and national authorities, often resulting in ad hoc responses. After the Deepwater Horizon incident, the oil and gas industry reviewed and in certain cases extended and increased their response inventories. National authorities dealing with emergency response of some of the Member States (mainly the countries around the North Sea) were involved in this process, which rectified the coordination deficits to some extent. However, this was seen to be insufficient to remedy similar issues around the Mediterranean and Black Seas. ·Consistency in the quality of company emergency plans Analysis of the Deepwater Horizon incident revealed shortcomings in the preparedness of the companies involved, both in the initial response and in the race to cap the well and contain the spilled oil. The report of the US Coastguard was instructive that in spite of the obvious potential scale of the pollution and the challenges of ensuring a good prospect of survival of the personnel, the risk assessments and response plans were relatively modest. It was also found that major operators in the Gulf of Mexico were prone to copy-out similar emergency response plans rather than develop site specific plans based on proper risk assessments. It was noted that the situation in the EU was different from the US, particularly where a risk based or goal setting regime was deployed such as the North Sea. Also, the EU had a long tradition of maritime response against which the provisions for the offshore oil and gas sector could be tested. However, emergency planning can only be as good as the risk assessment undertaken for the activity as a whole. The first responsibility would be to limit the consequences of an incident once it has occurred to the area under the control of the operator (i.e. the immediate vicinity of the rig or platform or subsea facility). Because such 'internal emergency plans' are a natural derivative of an effective risk assessment of the entire undertaking, and because only some Member States had a risk based offshore regulatory regime, it followed that emergency planning was, in some regions, inadequate to ensure rapid and effective response. 2.2.6Problems related to clarity and comprehensiveness of liability provisions The operator of the Macondo license, BP, estimated the final outcome costs of the incident at $ 63bn. Very few companies could then or now accommodate such a sum, which would therefore leave the host country exposed to unwarranted financial risk. The insurance market cannot furnish an instrument that guarantees unlimited financial indemnity. In order to prevent liability transferring to the citizens of Member States in which the incident occurs some form of financial instrument would be required. In the UK the OPOL scheme is a risk pooling instrument amongst licensees, but as the limit is set at $250m the arrangement is not sufficient in the extreme situations such as Macondo. However OPOL had evaluated that the $250m safety net was sufficient for all but the main outlying incidents This is a complex issue, and it is accompanied by the issue of how to make compensation available quickly to businesses and communities stricken by the effects of a major offshore incident such that they are prevented from failing (compensation that is paid too late to a community that is permanently damaged is not reasonable). The three drivers for this problem are discussed below. ·Clarity and scope of EU legislation on environmental liability The Environmental Liability Directive (ELD ) 2004 was not applicable beyond territorial waters (a distance of 20km/12miles from the shores). This was in line with the Waste Framework Directive (WFD) 2000. However, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) 2008 extended protection to all marine waters in Member States jurisdiction. This difference created an ambiguity in delineating which regulation was applicable in a given circumstance. For example, "water damage" only applied to inner and coastal waters, whereas current EU policy was to treat all EU waters as common good. Therefore this issue needed to be determined in the light of the review of offshore major incidents in the EU. The status quo would have caused the consequences of a marine accident to continue to be limited to the Member State, in contradiction to the polluter pays principle. Also, during an extreme emergency the prevailing framework did not make it clear whether Member States could enforce compensation from the polluter for the deployment of national contingency assets. ·Lack of financial capacity guarantees It was evident that not all Member States’ licensing authorities fully accounted for the capacity of applicants, who may be consortia, or joint ventures, to deal with the financial challenges of responding to a major incident. This was a missed opportunity to provide assurance of capacity and to reinforce to operators that their responsibility for the adverse consequences of offshore activity is without limitation. ·Inadequate compensation schemes for traditional damages

Even when the financial capacity of an applicant has been established by the licensing authority, there is no assurance that sufficient funds would be made available in time to settle third party claims. The funds made available in the event of a major incident would most likely be initially required for this incident itself (e.g. capping and containing the flow from a well). Without clear and unambiguous provisions to swiftly settle third party claims, local business and communities would suffer unduly the consequences of a major incident entirely without control or responsibility. 2.2.7Baseline costs of a major accident The cost of accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry is related to the extent of undesired consequences of these accidents, namely: ·Injuries or deaths; ·Damage to equipment and facilities; ·Environmental pollution; ·Fines due to non-compliance; ·Lost work time and lost revenues due to installation down time. Indirect impacts of accidents include: ·Legal costs and lawsuits; ·Effects on oil prices; ·Damage to offshore industry reputation; ·Effects on security of energy supply. The quantification of all direct and indirect impacts of accidents is a complex undertaking due to the scarcity of comparable data. For this reason, the Commission’s Impact Assessment covered only the two largest directly quantifiable categories of cost: infrastructure losses, and costs associated with the clean-up of oil spills. In this respect the results were considered conservative. The annual cost of offshore accidents was estimated by the cost of the damages caused by such accidents, annualized over their recurrence time. The calculations of recurrence time, or of the frequency with which these accidents occur, were performed based on publicly available historical data , with adjustments for trends. A detailed and complete account of the calculations can be found in Annex I of the Impact Assessment. Two main categories of accidents were identified: a)oil well blowouts; and

b)other major accidents (e.g. releases, fires and explosions, with multiple injuries or fatalities, total loss or severe damage to offshore units and/or environmental pollution). The cost of an oil well blowout depends on the duration and flow rate of the blowout, i.e. on the amount of oil spilt into the sea. The main cost component here is the clean-up of the oil spill. The average per-tonne cost varied among different countries, ranging from Euro 2500 for UK to Euro 18500 for Norway. This brought the estimated average clean-up cost for an oil well blowout lasting for ca. 50 days to Euro 5 billion. This figure was the lower bound of the blowout cost, with upper bound being the cost of the accident, which was taken at the time to be Euro 30 billion. Therefore, taking note of Macondo accident, the blowout cost from one accident was estimated to be in the range Euro 5-30 billion. The calculation of the recurrence period of an oil well blowout was based on historical data, which indicated a probability of 0.65 per year for a blowout of any type and duration to occur in European waters. Annualizing the blowout cost (Euro 5-30 billion) over the period of 35 years (dividing them by 35), gives an annual oil well blowout cost in the range of Euro 140-850 million. Added to this was the annual figure of Euro 65 million in property losses of less costly, but more common, major accidents. The cost of other major offshore accidents, smaller but more common, reflect mainly loss in property. Taking into consideration case histories which indicated a range in costs from tens of millions to over Euro 1 billion, it was estimated at an average of Euro 50 million. Historical data from major accidents occurring in the North Sea in the years 1970-2007 indicated an aggregated rate of 2.6 major accidents per year, with a declining trend for the years immediately preceding 2011. Adjusting for this trend, the rate became 1.3 major accidents per year. This brought the annualized cost of major offshore accidents to Euro 65 million. Therefore the total annual direct tangible cost of offshore accidents in Europe was estimated at Euro 205-915 million. This was the baseline that the implementation measures of the Directive were intended to deal with. 3Method 3.1Short description of methodology The baseline scenario described demonstrates potential safety concerns and shortcomings in the period before the Directive came into force; new legislation was supposed to address them. With reference to the experience of implementing the Directive and specifically with regard to establishing adequate levels of safety for offshore oil and gas operations, and environmental protection, by this assessment the Commission has verified whether: ·The main objectives of the Directive have been achieved and if not, whether the problem is one of implementation of the rules or with the rules themselves; ·Any gaps in legislation exist that have an impact on the level of safety in offshore oil and gas operations; ·Certain provisions of the Directive impose undue burden on Member States or the industry; ·The Directive has adequately harmonised the regulatory structure and level of safety across the EU offshore operations, proportionate to the activity levels of the Member States; ·The Directive is effective, efficient, coherent, relevant, and provides added value at EU level. The Commission has carried out its’ analysis by using a broad range of information channels. To deal with the experiences of the Directive, both experts and the wider public were asked to contribute to the knowledge base. With regard to the expert input, the Commission focussed on the EUOAG . Although the UK has left the European Union on 31 January 2020 the UK’s experiences and contributions to the knowledge used for the assessment are taken into account. In a first step, the Commission consulted competent authorities in order to obtain feedback on their technical and regulatory experience of implementing the Directive. Secondly, the Commission consulted stakeholders represented in the EUOAG’s plenary meetings, which included industrial associations, unions, and NGOs. These meetings facilitated fact finding and thematic discussions on liability, handling of compensation claims, the financial security of operators and owners of installations, as well as a further stakeholder event, and several workshops. Data gathering from these diverse sources incorporated input from parties involved in the practical implementation of the Directive, and the handling of rules and legislation on offshore safety. Details on data collection and consultations are included in the annex (part I and II). To complete the knowledge base, the Commission carried out a broad public consultation , based on a comprehensive questionnaire targeting both the Directive and the Implementing Regulation on the reporting of accidents. All interested parties, e.g. private, business, public entities, were asked to provide views and comments. Within the Commission, the relevant services contributed to the assessment actively in the framework of an Inter-Service-Group and a bilateral dialogue with the Directorate-General for Energy. Both Member States and industrial associations have shared their views on the assessment of the Directive with the Commission, and NGOs actively contributed to the discussions. The assessment has taken this information into account in the context and comparison with the Directive’s objectives, as established in the Impact Assessment from 2011 preceding the adoption of the Directive. Furthermore, for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 quantitative information on the safety performance of the EU offshore sector as a whole or in individual Member States is available, in the form of Commission annual reports . This information in combination allowed for conclusions to be drawn on the assessment criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, coherency, relevance and value-added. Through this methodology the Commission attempted to incorporate the perspectives of a representative range of stakeholders. Firstly, the assessment considers the experience of Member States with the implementation of this Directive. Secondly, through the stakeholder consultation, the experiences of competent authorities enforcing the Directive’s provisions are accounted for, in addition to owners and operators of offshore oil installations working within the national legal frameworks. Thirdly, the methodology also collected and analysed the views of parties not directly involved in these activities, for example citizens and NGOs.

3.2Limitations and robustness of findings Member States were obliged to implement the Directive by 19 July 2015. However, additional transitional periods for applying laws, regulations and administrative provisions in Member States, following the implementation of the Directive, ended only on 19 July 2018. Therefore, so far the Directive had a full impact on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations only for a relatively short period of time. Although the Directive requires implementation by Norway – the Directive is EEA relevant - Norway did not take steps to comply with this legal obligation. The Commission could not persuade Norway to change its negative stance; accordingly the EEA committee may work on a solution to settle this dispute. As a former Member State, after Norway the UK is the most important producer of offshore oil and gas. It contributed constructively to the design and drafting of the Directive, which it implemented in a very satisfactory manner. Since the assessment and implementation report shall analyse the experiences with the Directive and shall cover the years from the adoption of the Directive until recent days, and the UK has been a Member State during this period, it was included in the assessment. Depending from the final Treaty between the UK and the EU, it is unclear whether the UK may apply at least some parts of the Directive’s provisions. Despite the loss of more than 70 % of the EU’s indigenous offshore oil and gas production due to the departing UK, the Directive remains of outmost importance for the safety of installations in the North Sear, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Due to consultations with stakeholders concerned, the assessment is rich in qualitative information. This information includes: anecdotal evidence, commentary supporting assessment of the themes, assisting determination of the efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, relevance, and EU-added value in implementing the Directive in the context of the original design intent. The analysis incorporates data to establish a North Sea performance benchmark, based primarily on trend data published by the UK. From international data Europe can be placed as a regional performer, but doubts persist as to the completeness of international reporting on a voluntary basis. The Commission established three reports, for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018, on the safety performance of the EU offshore sector, based on reporting templates of the Implementing Regulation. Taking also note of data from the global operators’ association (IOGP) and the UK the assessment attempts to establish trend data. Regarding the financial cost of implementation, it does not appear that there has been a calculation by operators or regulators of one-off costs of implementation and uplift of running costs against which we may compare the estimate in the Commission’s Impact Assessment. North Sea Operators and some regulators have claimed, anecdotally, that start-up costs have been excessive, but the organisations concerned have not investigated the data to support their claims. There is some data from south-east Member States that have introduced the regime as virtually a starting point for regulation in this area, providing no insight into uplift of prior running costs, nor one-off costs. Furthermore, data is provided by 34 of the 37 North Sea MODU fleet from which introductory costs can be identified. These are relatively modest, in line with expectation that the change in operational requirements are themselves relatively modest in the North Sea region. At this stage there is insufficient data to differentiate incident performance between Member States, and to compare with the baseline. In the coming years new data will allow for the establishment of trends in EU offshore safety and to compare them with the situation before application of the Directive. Currently however, it is not possible to estimate the risk of a major polluting blowout in EU waters following the application of the Directive, nor to compare it with the baseline calculation in the Commission’s 2011 impact assessment. Not all initial suggestions and proposals required a follow-up. For example, it appeared that cyber security at offshore installations do not require more specific measures than other industrial sectors, and that horizontal legislations provides the necessary legal frame. 4State of play and implementation 4.1The offshore oil and gas sector 4.1.1Offshore operations and the Green Deal End of 2019, the European Commission published the “European Green Deal” Communication , with the objective to reset the Commission’s commitment to tackling climate and environmental-related challenges that is this generation’s defining task …”.It is a new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in the year 2050; economic growth shall decouple from the use of resources. It also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the EU's natural capital, and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts”. The European Green Deal also introduces the “green oath to do no harm” principle. As part of this strategy, the European Commission intends to assess EU legislation – that includes the Offshore Safety Directive - to bring it in line with the objectives of the Green Deal. . The offshore hydrocarbons industry has, by virtue of the Green Deal, a clear instruction to further improve its environmental performance within the EU. Operators and Member States alike are now expected to suggest and implement more ambitious means of reducing their environmental footprint. These may include large-scale approaches ranging from examples such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), to facility-specific measures like increasingly stringent targets for offshore flaring, as well as other more novel solutions. The Offshore Safety Directive is concerned with the prevention and management of major accidents, which – if they occur – are typically comprised of both safety and environmental aspects. For example, an accident that results in injuries or fatalities to offshore personnel may also be responsible for a release or spill of hydrocarbons into the environment. The Directive is a tool for nudging operators and Member States, also via industry and EU fora, towards more sustainable environmental practices.

As the transition to a low carbon economy occurs, personnel safety will continue to be a priority for society and there is hence little doubt of the continuing relevance of the Offshore Safety Directive for Member States with an upstream hydrocarbons industry. In an era in which operators strive to make the most of ageing assets this must certainly be the case. However, regardless of the level of activity occurring within the sector at any given moment, a comprehensive, risk-based and functional Directive is considered a minimum requirement for ongoing high EU safety performance. 4.1.2Offshore Safety and COVID-19 The COVID-19 viral pandemic of 2019-2020 brought about unprecedented global change in terms of societal adaptation to new health and safety issues, cross-border and domestic mobility restrictions, and social and cultural norms. While the long-term effects of this pandemic are still being evaluated throughout the EU and elsewhere, and although the scale of economic impact is yet to be fully realized, a number of immediate repercussions within specific sectors are clear, including in the offshore hydrocarbons industry. One important impact of the crisis on the industry was that the price of crude oil fell significantly in a short time, taking billions off the stock prices of major oil and gas companies. This left many offshore projects in doubt due to their vulnerability in what is typically a higher operating cost environment. For existing facilities this meant trying to achieve required output without adding new infrastructure, while for planned projects cancellation or suspension were preferred, pending market stabilization. In the early days of the pandemic, understanding the spread of COVID-19 was challenging, leading to varied approaches by individual Member States and industry to limit its spread within their own contexts. For the offshore industry, an immediate concern was preventing infections in a workforce with personnel commuting from a wide geography. This brought with it several implications, not least of which was ensuring personnel could be tested for the virus and their health status tracked. As offshore facilities have limited space and hence potential for higher infection risk, interim strategies were adopted to try to reduce this risk. One example was “minimum manning” whereby Operators limit the number of personnel offshore by temporarily deferring non-essential tasks. On some facilities, workers were also requested to remain offshore for longer shifts, to limit the risk of infection brought about by the arrival of any new personnel. Such strategies could be considered a stopgap rather than a long-term sustainable strategy. In the event of a drawn-out crisis, Member State Competent Authorities have an increasingly important role in ensuring that offshore strategies adopted by operators do not compromise safety. Although the Offshore Safety Directive was not developed with a pandemic such as COVID-19 as context, it is nevertheless considered fit-for-purpose in this situation. It provides meaningful steer on how Competent Authorities may adapt to ever-changing circumstances, including a focus on risk management approaches, key roles and responsibilities and reporting requirements. It is to consider whether the Directive in light of COVID-19 is warranted to strengthen its remit, or for considering renewed policies relating to different ways of working offshore and throughout industry. With regard to national rules and legislation that are implementing the Directive, Member States may identify potential amendments extenuating circumstances as a viral pandemic. 4.1.3Oil prices, investments and offshore safety The first quarter of 2020 began with a gradual fall in the world crude oil price following the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in China. The global market viewed the virus as likely to affect oil demand, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) subsequently met to negotiate supply cuts. Due to the unstable nature of these negotiations against the backdrop of an ongoing pandemic, dramatic price falls ensued leaving parts of the hydrocarbons industry facing unsustainable operating costs. Fluctuations in oil prices are not uncommon, the most recent substantial falls having occurred in 2014, also because of market oversupply. The effect on the offshore industry at the time was similar, with many unviable projects cancelled or suspended, and major cost-cutting exercises implemented amid significant industry consolidation. The lessons from this period are perhaps useful in the current crisis, particularly with respect to the challenges faced by operators of reducing operating costs without compromising safety. In order to ensure high safety performance, close links between company safety strategies, their implementation, critical spending decisions and appropriate performance indicators are required. Previous surveys conducted within the offshore industry indicate that many feel industry cost reductions have an inevitable impact on safety performance. However, it is also true that major operators tend to set high standards for safety and have active programs in place to embed the values of their Safety Management Systems within workforce culture. Going forward, the mandate for applying the Directive as implemented by Member States is as strong as ever, particularly when the global industry is in a state of flux. The Directive stands as a benchmark for rules and legislation in Member States, which ultimately push companies towards better safety and environmental performance. Equally clear is the remit of the EU and competent authorities working closely with operators to provide them with the best advice and to facilitate continuous improvement in all of their offshore activities. Looking back to recent years and summarising the prospects and ambitions of the petroleum sector in European waters, there was a sharp decline in exploration activity and capital expenditure for the development of production throughout the period of implementing the Directive (2014-2018). This change was caused by a fall in crude oil prices from $110 down to $30 per barrel. Since 2016 but only until February 2020 when oversupply and the impact of the corona virus hit the oil markets, a ‘new normal’ price has stabilised at ca. $65 per barrel. The sharp decline of oil prices in the first and second quarter of 2020 threatens the business model of EU offshore oil and gas production and may lead to the closure of production sites due to the operation’s lack of profitability. Looking forwards from 2019 and 2020 there appears to be a confidence in (i) the critical mass of expertise in the region, (ii) the proximity of the consumer base for natural gas, and (iii) new petroleum basin prospects. Due to the vast consequences of the spread of the corona virus, the expectation is therefore negative for growth, particularly in the North Sea and North East Atlantic, but less negatively pronounced for the southern offshore sectors. In the Mediterranean benefits are derived from the experience in cost reductions and efficiency gains achieved in the North, as well as developments in technology that enable more reliable identification of petroleum reservoir prospects in southern EU waters. Before the spread of the coronavirus and the economic decline, the UK, Netherlands and Denmark were projecting capital expenditure of $20bn, $1.5bn and $1bn respectively in their offshore sectors by 2025. Even without the economic downturn that started in the first half of 2020, overall, growth was expected to remain slow, incremental, and fragile due to much cheaper sources of oil and gas in the Middle East and onshore USA (from shale deposits). 4.1.4The European offshore sector Eight of the ten largest European oil and gas fields are in Norway, and two are in the UK, jointly producing 13.3 billion tonnes of remaining oil equivalent. In 2019, the UK alone produced 72 % of EU offshore oil and gas. After the withdrawal of the UK from the EU on 31 January 2020, both the most important EU producers of offshore oil and gas are Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy. The operators and main co-ventures comprise the super-major oil companies: Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP, Total, Chevron, Equinor, and Conoco Phillips. Large oil companies are also present: Lundin, Petoro (100% owned by Norway), Suncor, INEOS, CNOOC (China), Idemitsu Kosan (Japan), Wintershall DEA, and Eni. Third country companies are purchasing an increasing share of European oil and gas production with Chinese companies most predominant. The Italian Adriatic is the major offshore active country outside the North Sea, with Eni predominant, others include: Edison and Zorh. The following table illustrates the distribution of off-shore oil and gas production in the EU, based on the annual Commission report on offshore safety published in 2018 .



REGION Country Total production in 2018 in ktoe* % EU Total Baltic Sea 210.98 0.19% Poland 210.98 0.19% Black Sea 1138.87 1.01% Bulgaria 4.71 0.00% Romania 1134.16 1.01% Mediterranean 4139.61 3.69% Croatia 528.20 0.47% Greece 211.01 0.19% Italy 3311.00 2.95% Spain 89.40 0.08% North Sea and Atlantic 106727.60 95.11% Denmark 9589.00 8.55% Germany 915.00 0.82% Ireland 311.17 0.28% The Netherlands 11681.00 10.41% United Kingdom 84231.43 75.06% Total 112217.06 100.00% Figure 2: Offshore oil and gas production in the EU in kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe), source: Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the year 2018. * All petroleum: crude oil, condensate; natural gas; kilo tonnes oil equivalent; no offshore production: CY; FR; MT; PT Of the 112 million tonnes (ktoe) produced in EU countries in 2018, the main contributor is the North Sea (UK, Netherlands and Denmark) but Italy is also significant.

Looking back to decades of EU offshore oil and gas operations, the following table recalls the entry of operation of installations in EU regions from 1950. Figures underline a clear downward trend in new installations from the year 2010 onwards. Year of construction Region Baltic Sea Black Sea Mediterranean North Sea and Atlantic EU Total 1950-1959 0 0 0 4 4 1960-1969 0 0 7 21 28 1970-1979 0 0 14 41 55 1980-1989 0 2 53 82 137 1990-1999 1 3 42 119 165 2000-2009 1 3 40 70 114 2010-2019 0 0 10 43 53 2020 0 0 0 0 0 EU Total 2 8 166 380 556 Figure 3: Number of installations present in EU waters, by decade of entry into operation and by region, source, Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the year 2018. 4.1.5Incident rates and safety performance The Commission assesses the safety of the EU’s offshore oil and gas operations based on the data provided by Member States in accordance with the provisions of the Implementing Regulation on reporting. Accordingly, the accuracy of the Commission’s assessment depends on the information submitted by Member States.The table below provides a snapshot of incidents by categories in line with the reporting requirments set out in the Directive and its Implementing Regulation.



Annex IX categories Number of events Share of events in category Share of total events (a) Unintended releases – Total 99 100.0% 79,8% Ignited oil/gas releases – Fires 1 1,06% 0,8% Ignited oil/gas releases – Explosions 0 0.0% 0.0% Not ignited gas releases 56 56,5% 45,2% Not ignited oil releases 31 31,3% 25,0% Hazardous substances releases 11 11,1% 8,9% (b) Loss of well – Total 17 100.0% 13,7 % Blowouts 0 0.0% 0.0% Blowout / diverter activation 8 47.1% 6,4% Well barrier failure 9 52.9% 7,3% (c) Failures of SECE 2 100.0% 1,6% (d) Loss of structural integrity – Total 2 100.0% 1,6% Loss of structural integrity 0 0.0% 0.0% Loss of stability/buoyancy 0 0.0% 0.0% Loss of station keeping 2 100.0% 1,6% (e) Vessel collisions 0 0.0% 0.0% (f) Helicopter accidents 0 0.0% 0.0% (g) Fatal accidents(*) 0 0.0% 0.0% (h) Serious injuries of 5 or more persons in the same accident 0 0.0% 0.0% (i) Evacuation of personnel 2 100.0% 1,6% (j) Environmental accidents(**) 2 100.0% 1,6% Total 124 100.0% 100.0% (*) Only if related to a major accident (**) According to reports of Member States, the major accidents did not qualify as environmental accidents Figure 4: Incidents by categories (Annex IX of the Offshore Safety Directive, EU level), source, Annual Report on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the European Union for the year 2018.

In its report for the year 2018, the Commission concluded: “As in 2016 and 2017, no fatalities were reported in 2018 but 10 injuries and 17 serious injuries occurred. According to the reports of competent authorities, the number of accidents significantly increased in the United Kingdom, which requires both an in-depth analysis of causes and follow-up measures by the competent authority. The Commission will seek cooperation with the United Kingdom to bring the safety performance level back to that of recent years. Apparently, following a high level of safety in 2016 and 2017, maintaining an adequate performance of safety requires additional efforts. 4.2Implementation of the Directive by Member States The Commission has assessed the transposition of the Directive by Member States and has found that the overall level of transposition was adequate, although the integrity and quality of implementation across the Member States varies significantly. Member States presented different approaches for the implementation of the Directive (either in full or in relation to specific provisions). Some Member States have adopted new legislation that transposes the provisions of the Directive, whereas others have amended existing legislation and included the transposition of the Directive’s different provisions into several pieces of legislation. Certain Member States have largely literally included the provisions of the Directive in their national law, while others have partly or fully adapted the wording of the Directive with the intention to convert it better into their specific legislative culture. Drawing attention to specific parts of the Directive, it appears that the implementation of the principles of risk management is satisfactory. Furthermore, most Member States did completely and correctly transpose the rules on the submission of major hazard reports. The same is true for the provisions on the internal emergency response plans and the schemes for independent verification. The overall level of implementation of rules for co-operation between Member States was very comprehensive. Provisions on public participation and involvement in planned offshore oil and gas operations were implemented in a satisfactory manner. The Directive’s Article regarding the liability for environmental damages was correctly transposed. Almost all Member States did correctly transpose provisions on confidential reporting of safety concerns, for example by workers. The same is true for Articles on the sharing of information between owners, operators and competent authorities, and the establishment of rules for investigations following major accidents. In contrast, some Member States had difficulties in setting up effective criteria for the assessment of the technical and financial capability of an applicant for a license. Denmark provides an example of a very good implementation of this part of the Directive. In some Member States there are weaknesses of transposition regarding external emergency response plans and emergency preparedness. With regard to the obligation of Member States to establish effective proportionate and dissuasive penalties applicable to infringements, further analysis is necessary to determine whether this part of the Directive was adequately implemented. Despite the formal implementation it remains unclear whether penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive in the individual social, legal and economic framework of Member States that are active in offshore oil and gas production. Regarding the set-up of Competent Authorities, Member States did less closely implement the provisions (e.g. public availability of information, providing adequate human and financial resources) than expected. The Commission services are in contact with several Member States to clarify the rules for the functioning of the Competent Authority. Additional information on the assessment of the Directive’s implementation by Member States Article by Article provides the Staff Working Document in its Annexe IX. Annex III includes detailed, additional information on the implementation of the Articles of the Directive, which highlights shortcomings. The dialogue with Member States is an ongoing process. If necessary, in order to achieve improvements and a fully adequate level of implementation the Commission may start infringement proceedings in case of severe shortcomings. Technology is constantly developing, however, without major technological pushes. Improved shelter booths and detection devices, supported by artificial intelligence, are deployed on offshore installations. Following the Commission’s analysis of safety performance as published in the annual reports, offshore safety performance appears adequate in all Member States. Member States with offshore waters that do not have offshore oil and gas operations under their jurisdiction (e.g. Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden), and which do not plan to license such operations shall implement only those measures, which are necessary to ensure compliance with Article 20 (operations outside the EU), Article 32 (transboundary emergency preparedness) and Article 34 (penalties). In general terms, these Articles were adequately transposed. In line with the provisions of the Directive, landlocked Member States, e.g. as Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, adequately implemented Article 20 of the Directive. 5Achievements assessed by themes 5.1Overview on the themes analysed The assessment has been structured around themes that each bring together several Articles from the Directive and issues proposed during consultations with stakeholders, the public and experts. The majority (10) of themes concern the functionality of the Articles in the Directive. The next largest category (3) emerge from stakeholder representation on issues only indirectly related to functional Articles. Two themes derive from direct mandated actions in Article 39 (liability, compensation claims, financial security and criminal sanctions). An assessment matrix served as data and information tool for analysing themes and for concluding on the Directive’s achievements measured by criteria (see annex. Part 4, specifically table 4). (1)Themes of functioning of the Directive (2)Themes directly mandated by the Directive (3)Themes of special interest to stakeholders Description Article / Source Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents Art.3(1)(3)(4) Public participation in release of new areas for licensing Art.5 Assignment of the competent authority Art.8,9 Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells Art.17 Safety in operations conducted outside EU Art.19(8), 20 Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention, (relating to protection of whistle-blowers and tripartite consultation mechanisms Art.22, 6(8) Transparency concerning reporting of incidents Art.23, 24, 25 Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of operators/ owners Art.14, 28, 29, 30 Emergency preparedness and response arrangements of Member States Art.28, 29, 30, 31 Availability of dissuasive penalties for breaches of duty Art.34 Assignment of liability; financial responsibility; and schemes of civil compensation Parliament resolution 2015/2352(INI) Art.4, 7, 39(1)(2) Prospect of extending criminal sanctions to breaches of duty to safeguard the environment from major accidents (within the scope of Directive 2008/99/EC) Art.39(3) Post- decommissioning responsibility for ensuring permanent sealing of wells, and for determining extent of removal of fixed installations Art.12, Annex I(6) Deepening of the internal market through mutual recognition between Member States of mobile installations and of common systems that are not Member States-specific Art.13 Recovery of costs of maintaining the competent authority Art.8(5)(7) Figure 5: Overview of themes subject to the assessment 5.2Applying risk management principles for control of major accidents

The foundation of risk assessment in major hazard sectors is the identification of all foreseeable hazards, and the assignment of scale of harm or the consequence of the hazard being realised (see also Article 3 of the Directive). Both industry and authorities observed an occasionally inconsistent use of risk assessment by both operators and regulators as the precursor to a decision on suitability of control measures for identified major hazards. The historical concern of risk assessment is that methodology may be directed to achieve a preferred outcome, for example, deliberately selecting a statistical assumption in the risk calculus that gives a bias in the result. However, there is no statistical evidence that bias is widespread or frequent. The provisions in the Directive directly attempt to mitigate bias in the areas of: independent verification of safety, environmentally critical elements, and well plans. In addition, the expert and independent competent authority’s assessment of the operator’s or owner’s risk assessment report for the installation (Report on Major Hazards or RoMH) is a further control against bias in risk assessment. There is a reported inconsistency when the condition of ‘risks tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)’ is achieved. This may result in disagreement between the operator or owner of the installation and the Competent Authority, regarding the adequacy of the risk assessment presented in the installation RoMH. Alternatively, there may be agreement between the operator/owner and the competent authority where the ALARP condition may not have in fact been achieved: this can be the case where the competent authority fails to undertake a thorough, expert assessment of the RoMH. Linked to the matter of inconsistency in identifying the ALARP threshold in complex risk assessment, are reports that risk assessment measures adopted by Member States are insufficiently stringent. This is a generic concern that applies to different forms of intervention, such as the threshold for taking enforcement action. Although there is no statistical data that supports these concerns, it appears that there is inconsistency in applying risk assessment methodologies between Member States. Since the legal instrument bringing the measures into effect was a Directive, different approaches were anticipated because most of the 16 focal Member States are relatively unfamiliar with risk-based regulation. Accordingly, upskilling of Member States unfamiliar with risk-based regulation may provide substantial added-value. Joint peer reviews carried out by smaller competent authorities from the North Sea and Italy may reveal where weaknesses persist. Civil society needs assurance that industry has improved its control of major accident hazards. Former North Sea joint audits , for example from the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF), demonstrated that there is room for improvement. Taking note of their contribution to offshore safety, the methodologies deployed in the North Sea joint audits could be usefully transferred to the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and the results published by the EUOAG. According to the views of workers unions, efforts may be needed by employers to upskill their field staff. Unions argue that worker representatives in particular should reserve more input time, to contribute both more confidently and more comfortably to the formulation of the installation’s RoMH. Finally, according to views received from experts, risk assessment and management should take note of climate change. Predictions suggest that in the coming years and decades, climate change may lead to extreme heat, stronger winds, and higher waves. To adequately address these risks, safety and environmental critical elements at installations may require adjustments. 5.3Public participation in release of new areas for licensing Environmental assessment is a procedure that ensures environmental implications of decisions are taken into account before the decisions are made. Environmental assessment can be undertaken for individual projects, such as a dam, motorway, airport or factory, on the basis of Directive 2011/92/EU (known as 'Environmental Impact Assessment' – EIA Directive) or for public plans or programmes on the basis of Directive 2001/42/EC (known as 'Strategic Environmental Assessment' – SEA Directive). The common principle of both Directives is to ensure that plans, programmes and projects likely to have significant effects on the environment are made subject to an environmental assessment, to provide a high level of protection of the environment and to contribute to the integration of environmental considerations into the preparation of such projects, plans and programmes with a view to reduce their environmental impacts, prior to their approval or authorisation. Consultation with the public is a key feature of environmental assessments. The provisions of Article 5 of the Directive for public participation apply to new areas for licensing from 19 July 2013. These areas are regions in the sea anticipated to be utilised for exploration and production. Article 5 should prevent drilling, including explorative drilling unless the public was consulted and the results of the assessment accommodated. Paragraph 2 (a) to (f) describes minimum suitable arrangements to achieve the aims. According to information provided for the assessment by NGOs, it appears that Member States have taken due note of these aims of the Directive but did not always fully implement these provisions. The environmental NGO community has raised certain concerns, primarily directed at licensing and re-licensing in mature basins, which partially have been exploited for decades. The practice that the Member States’ licensing authority may re-license a previously licensed area without recommencing the full SEA procedures and associated public participation, is not transparent. However, it has not been possible to collect data that demonstrates the approaches adopted in different Member States under the provisions of the Directive. In general, there is limited public awareness of the offshore oil and gas sector in general, with its technology and functions scarcely understood. These factors may prevent the public from taking a deeper interest in consultations. Most citizens may not be aware of public consultations or may hesitate to participate, due to a perceived lack of expert knowledge. However, if stakeholders as NGOs, enterprises, local authorities carry out a campaign participation rates can substantially increase. Taking note of national rules and legislation regarding public participation in Member States, the provisions for stimulating public consultation relating to offshore projects appear suitable. However, their practical application may require additional efforts from national administrations. Member States may publish citizen’s guidance to facilitate access of citizens to the sector and to encourage their informed participation in consultation exercises. Furthermore, NGOs would welcome arrangements made by the Member States that ensure consultees can be confident that their views are processed effectively in decision making. 5.4Assignment of the Competent Authority Whenever six or more installations operate in a Member State, according to Articles 8 and 9 of the Directive, Member States shall establish a Competent Authority to assure structural independence from economic interests (e.g. maximising revenues from offshore activities). The upward reporting chain, within which the priorities, strategies and work plans of the competent authorities are agreed, should be entirely separated from economic regulation. It follows from consultations with stakeholders and NGOs that it is often not entirely clear as to whether or not suitable and sufficient independence has been attained in all competent authorities, following the formal implementation of the Directive.

Some respondents and interviewees from the industry have expressed a reservation that the intended unification of environmental and safety oversight by regulators is insufficiently joined-up compared to expectations, and that duplication of effort and an additional administrative burden results from this. However, even where the competent authority is not fully integrated, it seems that with the Directive, Member States are in a better position to avoid duplication of interventions and unaligned strategies, which may impact efficiency and costs of the sector. The strong fragmentation of regulatory approaches around the EU, as explained in the Commission’s impact assessment, was a major driver to establish the Directive. It seems that systems and arrangements have been less harmonised than expected. This is supported by survey’s respondents and workshops. Therefore, whilst Member States may well have implemented the Directive in an appropriate manner, the process of harmonising the regulatory playing field in the EU remains incomplete. Therefore, the full benefits of inter alia, standardisation, efficiency, benchmarking, and effectiveness are unlikely to be realised, compared to the situation of adopting a common Regulation. A number of respondents and interviewees, mainly from the industry, have reported that the organisational arrangements of some competent authorities remain unstable, and that the full depth of skills and expertise is yet to be integrated into the body of the regulator. The Commission produced a report in 2016 concerning the adequacy of resources of the Member States’ competent authorities to carry out their functions under the Directive. It noted that Member States were on average 10% under-staffed, recruitment was demonstrably difficult and that pay levels were often a root problem. The report called on Member States to ensure they provide sufficient resources to attract and train expert staff, relative to the size and complexity of the offshore activity of each Member State. It is also important to recall that such inconsistency and instability does impose administrative burdens on industry. There is a lack of clarity concerning whether or not suitable and sufficient independence has been attained in all competent authorities. Given the importance of safety and environmental protection in the management of the marine space, the independence of judgement of offshore competent authorities is a matter of public interest. There is an ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Member States in the framework of the European Offshore Authorities Group. In forthcoming sessions this Group may discuss arrangements for ensuring full compliance with Articles 8(2) and 9(a) of the Directive on independence from economic regulation, with the objective to provide more information to social partners and civil society. Competent authorities may specifically analyse the increased decommissioning of fixed installations. 5.5Functioning of scheme of independent verification for installations and wells Major technical projects of high capital investment will be subject to independent verification by the project owner as a safeguard. The danger from not referring to independent verification is the adoption of unknown bias into project risk assessments. The Directive adopted best international regulatory practice by requiring, in Article 17, the adoption of independent verification for installations and well plans within the safety management systems of operators and owners. The main provisions are: ·The system is to be integral to the operator or owner’s management system rather than a stage of compliance or permitting. ·The arrangements must pass strict tests: oof independence of the verifier from any connection to the installation or well project; and oof the integrity of the working environment of the verifier such that their work is free of influence from the operator or owner. ·The scheme is applied to verification of safety and environment critical elements (SECE’s) and their continuing effectiveness in practice, and to wells including changes to design intent. ·The records are to be retained, and made available to the competent authorities on demand. Most contributors to the assessment express approval of the conceptual system. The Member States active in offshore operations in the North Sea area (UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark) report a ‘significant advantage’ in their major accident prevention systems by virtue of the availability of the independent verifiers’ reports. In contrast, there are also some concerns and misinterpretations of the various entities. ·Member States with decades’ long experience with offshore oil and gas operations (e.g. North Sea and Italy) and co-located operators found introduction of the scheme too difficult. This was due to independent verifiers’ market unreadiness, and lack of specificity in the requirements allowing numerous options. ·Some Member States’ Competent Authorities, and NGOs consider 2nd party verification unsuitable, either on an objection of principle, or because of potential societal aversion. ·Some actors (mainly from large verification-based vendors) favoured strict 3rd party verification but only using large players with extensive experience of independent verifiers’ services. They claim smaller, niche companies, lack capability in depth and become captured by the client. They also claim the Directive spawns an increase of niche vendors.

·The Trade Unions (TU’s) observe that there is insufficient depth of resources with all the relevant expertise and experience to underpin the introduction and proper functioning of the schemes. ·Other actors (the smaller niche vendors) warned of the large verification companies who may encourage homogeneous rather than independent approaches. They also warn of profiteering through standardisation of systems, irrespective of the individual nature of production installations. ·Some Member States consider that there is a lack of sufficient clarity in Article 17 and Annex V relating to the operation of schemes for independent verification, and ask for additional Commission guidelines. According to the information obtained, it appears that the scheme of independent verification complies with the minimum requirements as set out in the Directive. To facilitate the handling of schemes in Member States, it would be useful to collect and disseminate all available guidance of industry and regulator. 5.6Safety in operations conducted outside EU Analysis Article 19(8) of the Directive establishes the principle that an operator’s or owner’s CMAPP is to be the policy of the main board of the company and should apply throughout the organisation. Operators should be able to demonstrate this without ambiguity to their Competent Authority. The measure is in response to apparent and largely unexplained differences of performance of operators as measured by incident reports in different regions of the world. Annex I Part 8 of the Directive provides the minimum components to be incorporated in a CMAPP, and these broadly reflect the worldwide standard for a high integrity organisation . The components of the CMAPP address corporate behaviour such as process auditing, rewarding desirable behaviours for major accident prevention amongst staff, extemporising corporate goals, values and capabilities, and requiring high levels of competency throughout the organisation. There are reports from duty holders regarding inconsistency of requirements by Member States’ Competent Authorities for the demonstration of the CMAPP in the set of productions submitted for assessment alongside the installation RoMH by the duty holder. There are further reports, also in the framework of stakeholder consultation, that the practical application of national laws transposing the Directive, via competent authorities, has included additional features that may be out of context of a CMAPP. It has not been possible within the assessment of the Directive to verify these reports. In any case it would be necessary to take evidence from duty holders, which they may be reluctant to give. However, in the context of a CMAPP, there should by definition be only one version per company throughout its global operations. Any additional relevant requirements should be an addendum to the safety and environmental management system document (SEMS). On the subject of the SEMS, it has been reported that some duty holders do not themselves identify the difference between the SEMS and the CMAPP. The relevant lists of content in the Directive for CMAPP (Annex I Part 8) and SEMS (Annex I Part 9) are distinctively different. If the distinction is not understood by a duty holder, or duplication arises from a Member State’s approach to the handling of, and the relationship between, the two documents, actors may not have fully understood the subject. In the framework of the public consultation, the NGO’s have expressed particular concern on this point by issuing a joint statement: “Companies registered in the EU should be bound worldwide by all Directive obligations that can be applied directly to operators. Allowing companies to skip Directive standards in developing countries does not sit well with the initial intention of avoiding a second Deepwater Horizon…/… In addition, the obligations already applicable for extraterritorial activities should be enforced in a consistent and transparent manner. At this point it is not very clear whether Member States do in fact ask for accident prevention plans covering extraterritorial activities, and even more so if and how they verify that that the plans are applied.” Conclusions The Directive may not always ensure effective accident prevention outside of the EU. However, further research and fact finding appears necessary before being able to draw a firm conclusion. Furthermore, the consistency between Member State provisions for assuring EU-based operators maintain high and equivalent standards in their overseas activities, is a topic that Member States might consider collaboration on. For example, in a management audit exercise for operations outside the EU. As a preliminary exercise, Member States may consider a joint audit to examine the mechanisms that Member States’ deploy for verifying operators’ effectiveness in examining joined-up safety management of their operators throughout their global operations. Safe offshore operations contribute to the protection of the environment and the fight against climate change. For example, by preventing large leakages of methane. 5.7Arrangements for worker involvement in major accident prevention Analysis The practice of tripartite consultation was already adopted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO 144 1976) as the foundation of its strategy making and policy formulation. The ILO has produced a principal standard (#144) for strategic consultation between representatives of workers, regulators and employers, both generically and related to sectors. Despite the maturity of ILO 144 1976 and the widespread adoption of tripartism in the EU, some Member States had no mechanisms for it prior to the Directive. Article 6(8) requires Member States to establish mechanisms for effective tripartite consultation between the competent authority, duty holders, and worker representatives in formulating standards and policies relating to major accident prevention. Aligned to the measure in Article 6(8) is the requirement in Article 22 for owners and operators to put in place arrangements for confidential reporting of concerns by staff on installations and for protection of whistle