COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 19.04.1996 
COM(96)171 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
AND RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
Implementation of the guidelines laid down 
in the communication from Commission of 7 September 1994 
(COM(94)383) and in the conclusions of the Essen European Council 

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
AND RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
Implementation of the guidelines laid down 
in the communication from Commission of 7 September 1994 
(COM(94)383) and in the conclusions of the Essen European Council 
Table of contents 
Introduction 
I. Nuclear trafficking in 1995 
II. Controls on nuclear materials 
III. Radioprotection aspects 
IV. Customs cooperation 
Conclusions 
Annex 1 Cooperation with the republics of the former USSR under the existing 
contractual framework 
Annex 2 Cooperation in the field of safeguards (Safeguards Directorate) 
Annex 3 Cooperation in the framework of Technical Assistance 
yl 
INTRODUCTION 
On 7 September 1994 the Commission adopted a communication to the Council and Parliament 
on the subject of the illegal trade in radioactive substances and nuclear materials (COM(94)383). 
In it the Commission proposed that the EUs response focus on: 
(i) improving the operating conditions in the nuclear sectors of the countries concerned 
(cooperation under the aegis of Tacis, the Moscow-based International Science and 
Technology Centre and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate); 
(ii) dialogue and cooperation with the countries concerned under the various agreements and 
in the context of the common external and security policy; 
(iii) greater cooperation within the EU (customs cooperation and tighter checks, cooperation 
in the context of justice and home affairs policy, and coordination of industrial 
assistance). 
This issue was given high priority under the German Presidency. Five Council working parties 
plus the embassies of the countries concerned were mobilized to prepare a report for the Essen 
European Council, which declared its concern about the smuggling of nuclear material and 
approved a number of measures and guidelines aimed at tackling the problem. It asked the 
Commission and the Member States to step up cooperation in this field and to give the countries 
of origin and of transit effective support for their efforts on the ground. It also asked all states 
that had not yet done so to place sensitive civilian materials (plutonium and enriched uranium) 
under international control. 
The Commission and the Member States have continued work since the summit, liaising with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies. These efforts are spurred 
by the common interest of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European and former 
Soviet countries in this issue, and take the form of cooperation based on specific projects within 
an overall framework. 
The European Parliament has displayed an unflagging interest in the issue of illicit trafFicking. 
MEPS have supported the Commission's initiatives by taking part in conferences and making 
visits. Budgetary resources have been allocated for operations in the Central and Eastern 
European and former Soviet countries. 
This paper describes what has been done by way of follow-up to the Commission's 
communication of September 1994 and the conclusions of (he Essen Summit 
I NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING IN 1995 
Few cases of nuclear trafficking have come to light since publication of the Commission's 
communication of September 1994 but illegal imports of radioactive steel scrap and of illegally 
dumped radioactive sources are on the increase, as are cases involving trafficking of radioactive 
substances, blackmail attempts and hoaxes. 
The Commission's data bank currently contains 33 reported nuclear-related cases, most of them 
in Germany. The Commission has been led to understand, however, through inter-institutional 
channels, that this list is not exhaustive. A few cases have not yet been formally notified to the 
Commission, as they should have been under the Euratom Treaty. The probable reasons for this 
are: 
a lack of awareness of this specific provision of the Treaty on the part of those making 
seizures; 
a concern to maintain confidentiality so that inquiries still under way will not be 
jeopardized; 
1 6>> 
a desire of judicial authorities to prevent interference by the executive in cases still before 
the courts. 
The Commission has become aware of this state of affairs only recently and, in an attempt to 
remedy the situation, has embarked on an information campaign among the Member States to 
encourage them to adopt a procedure for declaring cases in accordance with the requirements and 
time-limits laid down in the Regulations, while receiving an assurance of the necessary 
confidentiality. 
And while the number of new such cases is apparently dwindling in the EU and Europe generally, 
the most noteworthy case so far was discovered in December 1994 by the Czech police, who 
arrested smugglers in possession of nearly three kilos of uranium oxide with an isotope content 
of high strategic value (uranium 235) close on 87%. Military quality is usually at the 93% mark. 
An important distinction must be drawn between the legal frameworks governing the 
materials in question, namely (simplifying somewhat) between: 
nuclear materials, which are materials subject to safeguaids under the Euratom 
Treaty, the IAEA or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NFI) because they 
pose a risk - great or small, depending on the material - of direct or indirect 
military use: these materials (e.g. plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) are very 
dangerous and could lead to nuclear proliferation as well as contamination; 
radioactive substances, which are not subject to safeguaids: the risk of irradiation 
derives from the radiation emitted by the substance but the substance itself cannot 
be used as a fuel in its present state. 
IL CONTROL ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
1. Common foreign and security policy 
The EU has sounded out non-member countries on this issue, notably in connection with the 
implementation of the joint action on the preparation of the 1995 conference on the review and 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the appeal to all states that had not yet done 
so to place sensitive materials for civilian use (plutonium and enriched uranium) under 
international control. 
In follow-up to this joint action, the EU is focusing its diplomatic efforts on the objective of 
achieving universal application of the NPT and strengthening the international system of nuclear 
safeguards (the IAEA's 93+2 programme). 
2. Safeguards Directorate 
Since the end of 1994 the Safeguards Directorate has been trying to establish links with other 
bodies working on the problem with the aim of exchanging information and creating synergy. 
In practical terms, there have been few confiscations of nuclear materials since the Munich airport 
case and it has not proved necessary to send inspectors. 
Its administrative workload has been heavy, however. The Directorate is responsible for 
transmitting all information to the national authorities and the Joint Research Centre in good time. 
Furthermore, in respect of materials seized and stored, it must also ensure that all Chapter VII 
requirements of the Euratom Treaty, which are incumbent on any holder of nuclear materials, are 
complied with. 
3. Cooperation between non-member countries and the Safeguards Directorate 
The September 1994 communication described the programme of cooperation between Safeguards 
Directorate and the Russian Federation set up at the end of 1992. The short-term aim of this 
cooperation was to devise, set up and run a modem system of nuclear material accountancy and 
control. Parliament approved an allocation of ECU 1.8 million under this heading (B4-2001) for 
1995. This programme has fitted in very well with other projects run by Community, national 
and industrial bodies. 
The initial phase was successfully completed at the end of 1994 and focused on: 
training Russian experts in accounting, supervision and control of materials for Russians; 
inspection exercises in real on-site conditions; 
courses on the use of measuring instruments and computers. 
These basic activities continued in 1995, complemented by intensive training courses (two 
months) for groups of four or five in Luxembourg. 
Larger-scale projects are also being implemented: Russian specialists and Euratom inspectors join 
forces as a team to achieve a specific goal in respect of selected groups of installations or areas 
of Russia chosen by the Russians. 
These activities and the main projects under way are described in Annex 2. One operation is 
particularly noteworthy since it was a "first": in November 1995 a team of Euratom inspectors 
was invited to join a Russian team to carry out, not an exercise, but a real inspection of two 
installations in the Dimitrovgrad region. It gave rise to an extremely fruitful exchange of know-
how. 
4. Role of the Joint Research Centre 
Since 1994 the JRC in the form of its Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has made a 
number of contributions to efforts to combat trafficking in nuclear materials: 
(a) It confirmed its role as a laboratory for analysing the materials seized, in particular by: 
the isotopic analysis of the materials seized at Munich airport; 
the comparative analysis of highly enriched uranium seized in Prague and 
Landshut; 
the analysis of uranium seized at Mannheim; 
the analysis of suspect radioactive substances for the German authorities and for 
the Italian authorities. 
(b) A number of courts have called on its expertise, the most significant instances being the 
Munich, Landshut, Konstanz and Bôblingen cases but there were also six others in 
Germany. 
(c) The German authorities have asked the ITU to organize a seminar to inform the federal 
and Land authorities about the handling and analysis of substances liable to be smuggled. 
(d) The same authorities (Bundesloiminalamt and the Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz) have 
called on the ITUs expertise to design preventive measures to deal with the packets of 
nuclear materials associated with chemical explosives and in particular to study 
procedures to track these packets. It is currently working on appropriate techniques to 
do this. 
(e) It is continuing work on setting up a data bank on the characteristics of nuclear materials. 
With the Commission's help, Russian specialists will come to the ITU to provide 
information on the fuel cycle and so maximize its effectiveness. 
(f) An international technical working party on nuclear trafficking (set up on the margins of 
the P8) has decided to launch a round robin test to improve methods of identifying the 
origin of the materials seized and has drawn up a work programme for stepping up 
cooperation, especially as regards to the measures to be taken in situ when such materials 
are found. The Community and some member and non-member countries are involved 
in the working party, which last met in Karlsruhe on 1 February 1996. 
5. Technical assistance cooperation 
The Commission explained in its communication of September 1994 that it had decided to use some 
Phare and Tacis funds to finance technical assistance in support of the efforts of the countries' 
concerned to improve controls on nuclear materials. This decision, confirmed in 1995, won the 
unanimous support of the Member States at the meeting of the Phare-Tacis Management Committee. 
Details of the projects can be found in Annex 3. 
(a) In accordance with the conclusions of the Essen Summit, the priority for Community aid has 
been training in the framework of the Russian Methodological and Training Centre (RMTC) 
of Obninsk, the setting-up of which was officially announced by the Russian authorities in 
March 1995. 
A detailed study of the RMTC course specifications is being drawn up with financing from 
the 1994 Tacis budget and terms of reference have been agreed by the JRC, the Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the federal inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor) and those in charge 
of the Tacis programme. 
But without waiting for the conclusions of this study the first round of invitations of tender 
to fill five posts was launched on the basis of a feasibility study and the first courses were 
given early this year. More ambitious invitations to industry to tender for the instruments 
needed by the RMTC will be published as soon as the detailed study is concluded. The JRC 
is acting as overall project leader, in close liaison with the appointed Russian counterparts. 
This project is conceived in a very different perspective from the courses and seminars 
organised in the CIS and Central and Eastern European countries by the EU, the IAEA and 
other partners to serve more immediate goals. The RMTC should be seen as a longer-term 
project to set up infrastructure that will enable the Russians, and perhaps other countries, to 
assume responsibility for nuclear materials accountancy and control themselves. 
(b) If the Russian authorities and operators are to provide effective accountancy and control of 
nuclear materials at the basic installation level, a great deal of equipment will be needed that 
can only be designed and produced by Russian industry. To this end, a detailed study of the 
possibilities will be undertaken shortly. The bulk of the work will be done by the Russians 
themselves but the study itself will be carried out in the framework of tripartite Russia-EU-US 
cooperation with a view to drawing on the results of the "Lab to Lab" agreements with the 
Americans. 
(c) A detailed study will be carried out on the setting-up of a metrology centre for MINATOM 
and an analysis centre for GOSATOMNADZOR on the lines of the European centres (IRMM, 
ITU and JRC). These two centres will be housed in the premises of the Moscow Institute of 
Inorganic Materials. 
(d) The ITU's know-how will be made available to the Phare programme so that the authorities 
and laboratories of the Central and Eastern European countries can be given advice on the 
handling, treatment and analysis of errant nuclear materials. Specific requests for such help 
have been received from the Hungarian and Czech authorities. The terms of reference for 
technical assistance to these two countries under the Phare programme have been agreed. The 
Bulgarian, Polish and Ukrainian authorities have also expressed great interest in such 
assistance. The Phare-Tacis management committee approved it in principle in September 
1995. 
6. International Science and Technology Center 
The Moscow Centre for Science and Technology has been up and running since March 1994. Its 
purpose is to convert the skills of armament specialists for use in non-military purposes. The Centre 
draws up, approves, finances and supervises scientific and technical projects for pacific purposes, first 
and foremost for Russian institutions and installations but also in the former Soviet republics, should 
these countries express interest. The Centre's projects may concern measures for the physical 
protection and accounting of fissile materials that draw on the know-how of scientists of the former 
Soviet Union. 
One of the most interesting projects (cf annexe 3) is one to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials: the TOMSK/40 project concerns system design for safeguarding nuclear materials utilized 
at complex nuclear facilities (cost USD 815 000) and involves the development of a new approach to 
safeguards in a reprocessing plant. 
The JRC is working with the Los Alamos National Lab and JAERI of Japan in a group responsible 
for the technical coordination of the Centre's project 40. This covers: 
appropriate techniques for destructive and non-destructive measures; 
interaction between the accountancy system for installation materials and the regional control 
authority; 
the planning of inspections and evaluation of their effectiveness. 
The JRC is also providing assistance for a project in Kazakhstan to set up a complete prototype 
storage facility at Baikal 1 that will include surveillance and physical protection and an NMAC system. 
A centre similar to the ICST (USTC) has been set up in Ukraine by Canada, Sweden, the US and 
Ukraine. It began work in May last year. Its Western partners have contributed some USD 14 million 
(the US 10 million, Canada 5 million and Sweden 1.5 million). The EU is planning to contribute an 
amount yet to be decided (ECU 3 to 5 million). 
7. Cooperation from EU Member States 
All operations are the subject of detailed and regular consultations between the Member States and the 
Commission. The aid provided by some Member States since 1992 has mainly consisted in the 
organization of seminars and exchanges of experts with the former Soviet countries. More concrete 
projects are also starting up, examples being the direct cooperation between a reprocessing plant in 
the UK (BNFL) and one in Russia (Mayak RT-1) and between French (EDF) and Russian 
(Rosatomenergo) nuclear power stations. Sweden, Finland and Germany have concentrated their 
efforts in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states, and in particular the development of a local 
accountancy system for nuclear materials. 
Finland, which has a 1200 km border with Russia, maintains close contacts with Russian federal and 
regional authorities so that it can constantly monitor the risks and strengthen border controls, both by 
helping the Russians and by developing its own installations. 
8. Cooperation with the United States 
A new Euratom-US Department of Energy agreement to cooperate on nuclear guarantees R&D was 
signed on 6 January 1995 by Mr Contzen of the Commission on behalf of Euratom and Mr Keliher 
for the DOE. The agreement provides for "scientific coordination of both parties in efforts to transfer 
nuclear safeguard technologies to other countries, upon their request, in order to improve the 
effectiveness of their national safeguards systems". Talks with the DOE and representatives of major 
laboratories showed that the Americans are keen to work closely with the Community and ensure that 
efforts are complementary, so avoiding overlaps and optimizing the use made of limited financial 
resources. The study on what can be offered by MINATOM and Russian industry is a good example 
of this. Cooperation will now extend to training where there will true interaction between separate 
projects: 
use of safeguards in a plant converting uranium and producing fuel; 
development of instruments for measuring, identifying and maintaining surveillance of nuclear 
materials; 
training operators and inspectors; 
close technical cooperation concerning analysis procedures, reference materials and new 
methods of defining suspect consignments. 
m. RAPIOFROTECIION ASPECTS 
Smuggling and other illegal or uncontrolled activities with radioactive susbtances or nuclear material 
imposes considerable danger to the public and the environment. Most of the radioactive contraband 
that has been confiscated or detected by Member States authorities were radioactive sources, 
substances for industrial or medical use and contaminated metal scrap. Since the competent authorities 
of the Member States recognized the1 seriousness of the dangers arising from illicit nuclear traffic, 
many efforts are being made in order to attack the problem. Many of these activities are executed in 
close cooperation with the Commission. 
1. Legal initiatives 
Basic Safety Standards: the performance of an effective combat against the illicit nuclear trade 
is much depending on the legal situation in the Union, in Member States as well as in third 
countries. The Member States subsume trading with radioactive substances in different 
legislations and consequently violations are prosecuted and punished differently. In the Central 
European and Eastern countries and countries of the CIS, most of the national legislations are 
in transitory situations, changing from old soviet-law to individual national legislation. 
Within the EU, this unequal legal consideration of trading in radioactive substances may 
change when the new Basic Safety Standards will be in force. It enlarges the field of 
application of European radiation protection legislation. The new Article 2 includes import and 
export into and from the EU. It provides the advantage that national regulations in relation to 
import into the EU of radioactive substances may be harmonized. The Commission has invited 
Member States authorities to a meeting in July 1996 in order to discuss possibilities to reach 
this objective. Consequently, it will be more difficult for professional dealers to find pathways 
through different European legislation in order to establish networks for illegal trading in 
radioactive substances. 
Furthermore, Article 45 of the Basic Safety Standards Directive at present in force provides 
that Member States shall stipulate measures to be taken by the competent authorities with 
respect to health of the population and in particular of groups of the population who are liable 
to receive a dose in excess of the limits. 
Directive on Information of the Public: complementary to Article 45 of the Basic Safety 
Standards, the Council enacted a Directive on the information of the public in the event of a 
radiological emergency. As defined by Article 2 of this Directive, illicit trade and trafficking 
in radioactive susbstances and nuclear material is not directly considered as a situation where 
a nuclear emergency requires the Member States to take special initiatives and actions in order 
to safeguard the health of the population. This Directive will undergo revision when the new 
Basic Safety Standards will be adopted by the Council. The Commission will take this 
opportunity to discuss to what extent illicit trade should be covered by this Directive. 
2. Cooperation with international organizations 
The EU cooperates with the IAEA inter alia on ways of detecting radioactive substances at 
borders, and sends information to the IAEA database listing seizures of such substances 
worldwide. The IAEA has worked well as a clearing house for this purpose, and the 
Commission for its part has often been instrumental in advancing the work there. Participants 
have on a number of occasions expressed enthusiasm for the results, which can be summarized 
as follows: 
exchange of information on initiatives under way in related fields; 
organization of joint activities including seminars, information packages, drafting of 
procedures to be followed in the event of problems; 
creation of an informal network of contacts accessible at any time. 
The last-mentioned is of particular importance given that a notable feature of the discussions 
and meetings dealing with nuclear frafficking is the sheer range of participants involved, from 
many different walks of life. Apart from police and other representatives dealing with these 
issues as a matter of course there may be spokesmen representing corporate interests 
concerned with protection of employees or of their particular sector. Representatives of the 
WCO (World Customs Organization), IATA (International Air Transport Association), the 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), IFALPA (International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots Associations), the EVIO (International Maritime Organization), INTERPOL, 
EUROPOL and the UPU (Universal Postal Union) may be seated round a table with the UN, 
the IAEA and the Commission. 
IV. CUSTOMS COOPERATION 
1. On 22 November 1994 the Directors-General of Customs approved a twin-track action 
programme drawn up by the Commission involving tighter controls at the external frontier and 
measures to combat actual trafficking. A number of steps have subsequently been taken: 
(a) At a meeting on 9 and 10 February 1995 the Community's Deputy Directors-General of 
Customs approved a draft paper on general risk analysis guidelines and called for the emphasis 
to be placed on application of these techniques to nuclear materials. A section on sensitive 
products, including nuclear materials, is accordingly to be added to the guidelines and the plan 
is ultimately, in liaison with the other Commission departments concerned, to draw up risk 
analysis sheets for this among other fields. 
(b) As part of the MATTHEUS Programme the Commission organized a seminar in Vienna (23-
25 October 1995) on the radiological aspects of nuclear trafficking. This was attended by over 
90 participants from EU countries, 15 Central and East European countries and the CIS, and 
provided an opportunity to draw the attention of all concerned to the issue of radioprotection; 
it is to be followed up by special training courses for customs officals from EU Member States 
and the Central European countries concerned. These will take place over the next few months 
in Member States sharing borders with East European countries. Already the Commission has 
collaborated with the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety to hold two courses for 
a total of 50 customs officers, and similar courses are to be run shortly by the Austrian and 
French authorities. Plans are also being discussed for similar projects in the UK, Denmark and 
Italy. The aim of these courses, which deal with the use of measuring equipment for the 
detection of radioactive substances and other nuclear materials, is to upgrade the skills of 
customs officers responsible for controls at the frontiers. 
(c) Customs have been invited to make greater use of the SCENT/CIS electronic mail network 
which links the Commission and 350 terminals throughout the Community and allows the 
direct real-time exchange of operational information on known or suspected cases of 
trafficking. 
7 
2. The Commission is also preparing a brochure for customs departments which will provide 
officials directly with practical information for use in suspicious cases. 
3. The Commission's technical assistance to CIS countries under the Tacis programme includes 
measures to control nuclear trafficking. It has already supplied detection equipment (eight 
radiation testers to Kazakhstan and five to Ukraine) and plans further operations of this type. 
Under the Phare programme the Commission approved a programme in November to facilitate 
transit which incorporates technical assistance for the prevention of nuclear traffficking. 
Requirements in this and other fields are currently being assessed. 
4. The customs mutual assistance protocols to the various agreements concluded by the 
Community (alone or jointly with the Member States) with non-member (e.g. Central/East 
European and CIS) countries provide the authorities in the contracting parties with a basis for 
administrative cooperation in the fight against trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive 
substances. Since the entry into force of the interim agreements with Russia and Ukraine on 
1 February, the protocols can be used for cooperation with those countries on matters covered 
by the Euratom Treaty. 
5. The Commission is negotiating customs cooperation agreements with the Community's main 
trading partners (the United States and Canada) which include mutual assistance clauses 
covering the areas governed by Community provisions, including matters coming under the 
Euratom Treaty. It also cooperates with the United States in this field, inter alia on training 
for relevant officials, in the context of regular bilateral contacts on customs matters. 
V. JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
1. As proposed in the report on illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear material 
presented to the European Council of Essen in December 1994, the mandate of the Europol 
Drugs Unit (Europol's forerunner until the ratification of the Europol Convention) was 
extended to illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear substances by a Joint Action of the 
Council in March 1995. The EDU has held a workshop of law enforcement officials from 
Member States in which seizures have been made and has organised a European Conference 
on illicit trafficking with experts from the MS, the Commission and International 
Organisations on 26/27 October 1995. At this Conference, the experts recommended several 
projects for the EDU by which the cooperation and exchange of information among Member 
States can be improved (creation of an immediate notification system on seizures, installation 
of a EU Law Enforcement Database, updated list of competent national agencies, quaterly EU 
situation Report, threat assessment analysis, comparative study of national legal instruments, 
equipment review). When the Europol Convention does come into force, illicit trafficking in 
nuclear and radioactive sustances continues to be one of Europol's important objectives. 
According to Article 2 § 2 Europol shall initially act to prevent and combat unlawful 
trafficking in nuclear and radioactive susbstances. As set out in the annex to the Convention 
"crime connected with nuclear and/or radioactive materials" means the criminal offences listed 
in Article 7 (1) of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980 and 
relating to the nuclear and/or radioactive materials defined in Article 197 of the Euratom 
Treaty and Directive 80/836 Euratom of 15 July 1980. 
Further work among Member States in the third pillar in 1995 related to a first evaluation of 
a questionnaire on details about the fight against illicit trafficking which had been distributed 
by the German Presidency. It shows differences with regard to the threat assessement in 
general, the existence of permanently installed technical equipment at land borders, seaports 
and airports as well with regard to bilateral agreements with the CEEC and the CIS. The 
proposals for possible actions within the EU, as agreed by the Steering Group II and endorsed 
by K4 Committee in November 1994, have partly been examined and endorsed by the 
European Conference of the Europol Drug Unit. 
The Italian Presidency wishes to organize during the first semester of 1996 a seminar on the 
illicit traffic of nuclear material and radioactives susbtances in the framework of customs 
cooperation under Title VI of the TEU. 
2. With regard to the cooperation with third States, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of 
the EU and the CEEC met for a Conference on Combatting Drug Crime and organized Crime 
in Europe in September 1994 in Berlin. They declared to develop the cooperation inter alia 
in the fight against crimes involving radioactive and nuclear material and agreed to examine 
certain means of cooperation as preparation of joint situation assessment, cooperation with 
regard to the protection of radioactive and nuclear stocks, the setting up of coordinated 
reporting channels and mutual assistance of the prosecuting authorities. In June 1995, a 
seminar of the EU Member Sates and the CEEC on police cooperation to combat drugs and 
organised crime was held as part of the structured dialogue which specified methods of 
cooperation in different fields of organised crime, including illicit trafficking of radioactive 
and nuclear material. In the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers of the EU and the CEEC agreed at its meeting on 25 September 1995 
on an action programme to fight international organised crime which underlines, amongst other 
things, the need to sign and ratify the 1980 Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear 
Material as well as the appropriateness of the criminalization of the theft and trafficking in 
radioactive and nuclear material not covered by the 1980 Convention. 
With regard to the relations of the EU with Russia, combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear and 
radioactive substances was identified by the K4 Committee as one of the matters which 
should be fostered according to the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of November 
1995. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission considers that the activities described above to a certain extent fulfil the mandate 
given it by the Essen European Council. In some areas the EUs work and decision-making needs to 
be taken further and speeded up, in conjunction with non-EC partners. The Commission is ready to 
present the necessary proposals and will continue the work already well under way. It also considers 
that these activities represent a substantial degree of implementation by the EU of the programme of 
action against nuclear trafficking adopted at the Moscow Nuclear Summit, to whose preparation the 
EU contributed. In the field of cooperation on justice and home affairs the Commission will work 
closely with the EDU and international organizations to make a constructive contribution to Member 
State initiatives implementing the Essen conclusions. 
Annex 1 
COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER USSR 
UNDER THE EXISTING CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Partnership agreement with Russia 
Article 84 of the Agreement signed on 26 June 1994 deals with cooperation on the prevention of illicit 
activities. This is based on two-way consultations and close interaction; technical and administrative 
assistance is also provided. Implementation of cooperation activities under this article is deteirnined 
by specialist Council working parties. 
An agreement with Russia covering trade in nuclear materials is expected to be concluded by January 
next year and this might incorporate provision for measures to prevent nuclear trafficking. 
Partnership agreement with Belarus 
The agreement signed on 6 March 1995 contains a clause (Article 79) specifically on nuclear 
trafficking which reads as follows: "The parties agree on the necessity to make efforts to cooperate, 
within the framework of their respective powers and competences, in order to combat nuclear 
smuggling. Cooperation in this area should include exchange of information, technical support for 
analysing and identifying the material, administrative and technical assistance for the installation of 
efficient customs control. Further cooperation in this field could be identified as need arises." 
Agreements have also been concluded with Ukraine, Moldova, Kyigyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
The first three make no mention of the prevention of illicit activities but the agreement with 
Kazakhstan incorporates a clause providing for cooperation in this field, i.e. the same as Article 84 
of the agreement with Russia. 
The agreements with Georgia, Amienia (initialled 15 December 1995) and with Azeibaijan (initialled 
18 December 1995) also contain provision for certain aspects of prevention of illicit activities. 
All the partnership and cooperation agreements provide: 
either for an agreement on trade in nuclear products (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, 
or for the possibility of such an agreement if necessary, failing which the Euratom 
Treaty applies (Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). 
10 
Annex 2 
CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SAFEGUARDS 
Introduction 
1. The co-operation between Euratom and the Russian Federation in the field of safeguards 
was initiated in 1992 and formalised in 1993. Member States of the European Union, 
the European Parliament and the Commission realised that immediate efforts were 
required to cooperate in the field of nuclear safeguards with CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) republics, including, notably, the Russian Federation. The objectives 
were: 
• To upgrade the nuclear materials accountancy and control system in CIS republics 
to the same standards as those maintained in countries which have substantial 
nuclear programmes. 
• To help to ensure that such a system would comply with the safeguards 
requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and; 
• As a consequence, to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and to 
the minimisation of hazards to the public through the illicit transfer of nuclear 
materials. 
2. Due to the need to make optimum use of the limited resources, a first phase of co­
operation with the Russian Federation was carried out during 1993 and 1994, following 
the provision of funds by the European Parliament under budget line B4-200T. A 
meticulous co-ordination structure - i.e. project-oriented - was agreed with the Russian 
authorities that proved efficient in respect of transparency, documentation of the results, 
project management and resource allocation. 
3. The permanent participants in this co-operation are: 
• Gosatomnadzor (GAN) - the Russian federal inspectorate; 
• the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia (Minatom) which is the major nuclear 
operator in Russia; 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DCS), DG XVII-E, and 
• the Community's Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
Moreover, right from the start, participation and support were requested and obtained from 
Member State authorities and, notably, from operators of nuclear installations in the 
European Union. Without this support the training activities performed during the first 
phase would have remained largely academic. 
4. A first phase of the co-operation - essentially related to training and the elaboration and 
discussion of concepts and approaches - was completed at the end of 1994; three 
application projects (see below) were initiated as a second phase of the co-operation in 
1995, in parallel with continuation of seminars and training activities. 
Results of the first phase 
5. The actions carried out in 1993 and 1994 may be subdivided as follows: 
• Training and familiarisation; 
• Nuclear materials control system design; 
• Seminars; 
• Inspection exercises. 
11 
The objectives of these actions were to familiarise the Russian participants with the 
preparation, execution and evaluation/conclusion of inspections as carried out by Euratom. 
In December 1994 the experience gained was evaluated during a workshop. The main 
conclusions were that inspection activities or exercises provided essential 'on the job' 
training and that they should be expanded to further types of installations. 
6. The cost of the first phase of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in safeguards 
amounted to 1.5 Mo ECU. This expenditure was financed from the budget line, made 
available by the European Parliament. 
The Second Phase of the Co-operation 
7. After completion of the first phase of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in 
safeguards, the Russian side officially proposed four major projects/1) all relating to the 
practical implementation of Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control (NMAC) in 
Russia, based on the results of the first phase described earlier. One of the projects had 
to be abandoned. Three are pursued with success. These projects, usually coded MENS, 
PROCS and CISNER-project, are described in some detail later in the document. The 
Russian side has outlined on record the vital importance of all these projects, their 
appreciation of the work performed and the usefulness of the results achieved, which they 
described as very significant and essential. 
8. The idea underlying the applications projects was that the Russian experts would achieve 
the design of relevant systems, concepts and approaches through day-to-day contacts, 
discussions and co-operation with the corresponding Euratom staff, while the necessary 
design tools (e.g. computers, documentation) and infrastructure would be made available 
by the Commission. 
9. Further projects have been added to this list during the meeting of the Joint Co-ordination 
Group (JCG) in December 1995. Amongst these, it is envisaged to prepare a further 
"Physical Inventory-Taking and Verification Project (PITV)" in complex nuclear facilities. 
This project is proposed to include: 
• The utilisation of Euratom experience in methodological aspects for the development 
of the methods and procedures at the selected installations; 
• The practical execution of physical inventory-takings and verification; 
• Testing of Euratom safeguards equipment and instruments during the practical part 
of the project; 
• Training in nuclear material accounting and physical inventory-taking of the plant 
personnel at the research centre. 
10. The total cost is evaluated to be some six million ECU, of which the Euratom contribution 
is estimated at about 3 MECU for 1996 and was about 1.8 Mo ECU for 1995; the 
Russian side is expected to contribute at least the same amount but mainly in terms of 
manpower. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
11. From the first 3 years of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in the field of 
safeguards it may be concluded that: 
• The training and design phase was completed by the end of 1994. 
(1> Later reduced to 3 due to difficulties of access to data for Gosatomnadzor inspectors. 
12 
The second-project oriented-phase must be encouraged and pursued because it 
appears to be the best means to introduce effective modern nuclear material 
accountancy and control be involving a maximum of executive staff from the 
beginning. 
The results are encouraging and their value has been officially recognised by the 
Russian partners as significant and essential; 
Some practical problems are, however, impeding faster progress: the language 
barrier, the obtaining of visas for Russian experts at short notice, problems of 
logistics such as transport of instruments to Russia, limited manpower resources. 
Euratom safeguards has also benefited from this co-operation, as DCS staff were 
required to reflect on and to describe Euratom safeguards to outsiders who 
professionally reviewed its methodology and practices. 
The funds made available by Parliament were sufficient. 
DETAILED INFORMATION 
ON THE ONGOING PROJECTS 
1. MINATOM CENTRALISED INFORMATION SYSTEM (the NUNS project) 
1.1. Project description 
The MINS project (MINATOM Computerised NMAC Information System) was established 
jointly between Minatom, the main operator of the Russian Federation and the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate. It comprises the study, design, specification, realisation and 
implementation of a centralised and computerised information system for Minatom. It was 
decided that MINS should concentrate at first on a centralised headquarters system, linked to 
computerised work places at two nuclear power plants, at one Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 
fuel fabrication plant and at the controlling operator organisations). The outcome of the project 
should provide Minatom with a solid informatics and accountancy platform, which must enable 
the various users to gain experience with a computerised system and which the responsible 
Russian organisations can subsequently extend to a comprehensive computerised NMAC system 
for the entire fuel cycle in the Russian Federation. 
The general objectives of the MINS project can be summarised as follows: 
development of a regulatory framework and accompanying document 
improvement of the centralised information (headquarters) system 
improvement of the NMAC system at facility level (computerised work stations) 
MTNS includes the following features: high system reliability, optimum use of modern 
technology for fast and secure information transmission and processing, extensive database for 
storage and management of NMAC data. 
Given the scope of the project, the following organisations participate: 
MINATOM, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, which is the 
requesting Authority and eventually responsible for the implementation; 
TSNIIAtominforrn, which is a large research and information handling institute depending 
from Minatom; a specially created section of Atominform has been entrusted to carry out the 
majority of the work involved in MINS; 
13 
• ROSENERGOATOM a public organisation ('operator organisation') grouping and supervising 
most of the RF nuclear power plants; 
• TVEL, the public organisation ('operator organisation') to which belongs the LEU fuel 
fabrication plant at Novosibirsk; 
• VNHA, scientific research institute for automation; 
• VNIINM, scientific research institute for inorganic materials; 
• GOSATOMNADZOR, me RF federal safeguards Authority; 
• EURATOM, the partner providing information and expertise. 
1.2 Project evolution and status 
The MINS project was started officially in September 1994. The period from September 1994 
to July 1995 allowed both sides to get to know each other's working methods, to organise fact 
finding missions and to establish a preliminary work schedule. 
The current project team comprises 21 team members (7 from Euratom) plus an additional 10 
to 15 specialists on the Russian side who get involved depending on specific tasks to be carried 
out. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 1999. 
As a result of intensive periods of information exchange, the Russian experts issued a substantial 
number of technical notes including a detailed feasibility report. The system's architecture had 
been drawn up and relevant documents have been translated and discussed in technical meetings. 
Today the project has arrived at a turning point: the nuclear power plants to be included in MTNs 
were chosen to be Kalilnin (WWER1000) and Smolensk (RBMK 1000). The fuel fabrication 
plant will be the LEU plant at Novosibirsk. Each will be equipped with appropriate 
computerized workstations. Also the operator organisation ROSENERGOATOM, controlling 
the nuclear power plants and the central MINATOM office itself will receive appropriate 
workstations. 
With the initial analysis and feasibility completed, the focus is now on equipment acquisition 
and installation, specific training and preparation for the programming of the database 
management system. A first delivery of equipment is reasonably expected for mid 1996. 
2. PHYSICAL INVENTORY TAKING PROCEDURES: the PROC project 
2.1. Project description 
The PROC project was established between Minatom. Gosatomnadzor and the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate for the development of joint recommendations on Physical Inventory 
Taking (PIT) PROCedures at WWER-1000 Nuclear Power Plants and a LEU Fuel Fabrication 
Plant. 
The intention was to cover the whole range of activities relating to physical inventory taking: 
accounting system arrangements, records audit, documentation, physical preparation, organisation. 
2.2. Project evolution and status 
The project work started in July 1994 and was finalised in February 1996. 
• The specific plants chosen for the exercise were the Kalinin WWER-1000 Nuclear Power 
Plant and the NOVOSIBIRSK LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant. Technical information about 
plant operations, material accounting arrangements and, in particular, on physical inventory 
14 
procedures has been provided by the operators. Both plants have been visited by the project 
team to review the information provided and examine the materials accounting and physical 
inventory arrangements. 
• The second stage was the production of the documents. Euratom provided general 
recommendations on physical inventory taking and this was translated into Russian, 
discussed and agreed. Following this Euratom produced two documents providing 
recommendations on physical inventory taking in Nuclear Power Plants and in LEU Fuel 
Fabrication Plants. Finally the operator (Minatom), on the basis of the agreed guideline 
documents, produced specific PIT procedures for the Kalinin and Novosibirsk plants, 
including operational preparation, inventory methods, evaluation etc. 
• It was agreed that the 5 documents produced in the project ( each available in English and 
Russian) would be implemented in the following project (PITV - full PIT exercises followed 
by physical inventory verification (PIV) by Gosatomnadzor). The documents may then be 
reviewed in the light of experience. 
3. PHYSICAL INVENTORY TAKING AND VERIFICATION: the PITV Project 
3.1. Project description 
This PITV project is a follow-up project of the PROC project. It will offer the opportunity to 
apply, test and evaluate in practice the documents produced during the PROC and PITV projects. 
Therefore all three organisations involved are very interested in the results of this project. 
The PITV project was established between Mnatom. Gosatomnadzor f GAN) and the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate (ESP) for two consecutive Physical Inventory Takings (PIT) with 
Euratom participation at Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Novosibirsk LEU fabrication 
plant based on the recommendations and procedures produced during the above referred to 
PROC project, and Physical Inventory Verifications (PIV) performed by GAN according to PIV 
recommendations and procedures to be developed during this project. 
The intention is to apply, test and if necessary revise the recommendations and procedures for 
PITs produced during the previous PROC project and to develop recommendations and 
procedures for PIVs. To cover a complete Material Balance Period (MBP) two consecutive PITs 
will be performed at Kalinin NPP and the Novosibirsk LEU fabrication plant followed by PIVs 
performed by GAN after the second PITs. 
3.2. Project evolution and status 
3.2.1. The project has just started with a preliminary meeting between the three above-
mentioned organisations in February 1996 in Luxembourg and is expected to be finalised 
in 1998. 
3.2.2. The initial PITs at the two installations chosen will be performed probably towards the 
end of 1996. 
3.2.3. The second PITs closing the MBPs are planned for the end of 1997, followed by the 
PIVs performed by GAN. Use of measurement instrumentation and computers will be 
considered for PITs and PIVs. 
15 
4. COMPUTERISED NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING: the CISNER Project 
4.1. Project description 
The CISNERproject was established jointly between Gosatomnadzor (GAN). the Russian federal 
control agency, and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate for the development and implementation 
of a computerised nuclear material accounting and Control Information System for the North-
European Region of Gosatomnadzor (GAN). 
The system to be developed will be a multi-level nuclear material accounting and control system 
involving all the levels of information flow from the plant operator, over the local GAN 
inspector, the GAN field office up to the GAN Regional Headquarters in St. Petersburg. The 
system will have following features and characteristics : rapid transmission and processing of 
information, high reliability of the information transmitted and processed, high system reliability, 
reduction of routine work to a minimum, creation and maintenance of a database for nuclear 
material accounting and control in the North European Region of GAN and the development of 
computerised tools to optimise decision making. 
4.2. Project evolution and status 
The actual project work started in November 1994 and is expected to be finalised in December 
1997. 
The project started with the analysis of the existing nuclear material accountancy and control 
systems in the installations which are part of the project. Visits to the installations were made: 
these have shown that in most of the cases some form of local nuclear material systems existed 
and in some cases were being updated to include, eventually, requirements for international 
safeguards. 
The visits also revealed that the actual inspection work of Gosatomnadzor is limited to 
accountancy and consistency checks. Physical verifications are marginal as no safeguards 
equipment, e.g. NDA instruments, seals or surveillance systems, is available. It was therefore 
decided to enlarge the CISNER project to include the procurement and installation of the 
safeguards instrumentation necessary to control the plants and training of the Gosatomnadzor 
inspectors in the use of the equipment. 
In parallel the work on the development of the computerised data handling and treatment system 
started. The data flow related to nuclear material accountancy and control involve the 
installations themselves, the local Gosatomnadzor inspector, the Gosatomnadzor field offices in 
Sosnovy Bor, Murmansk, Severodinsk, Kurchatov and Desnogorsk and the North European 
District Directorate of St. Petersburg. 
In order to divide the project into manageable items, a pilot project was defined involving one 
nuclear power plant and all levels of communication from the plant operator, via the local and 
field offices of Gosatomnadzor, to the main regional Gosatomnadzor office of St. Petersburg. 
The pilot project has been defined in detail, hardware and software procurement and 
development is under way. It is expected that the first equipment will be delivered by mid 96. 
After successful testing of the pilot system, the system will be expanded to the other installations 
of the project based on a priority list defined by Gosatomnadzor. 
16 
Annex 3 
Projects implemented or under preparation 
in the framework of Phare and Tacis 
L Co-operation with the Russian Federation on illicit trafficking 
Co-operation in design and development of a data base system for the identification of nuclear 
material of unknown origin 
Partner : Non Organic Chemistry Institute, Moscow 
Objective : 
a) definition of characteristic parameters of nuclear material used in the countries of the FSU. 
b) establishment of characteristics of processes and production facilities (reprocessing, fuel 
fabrication, reactors, enrichment plants) for individual plants in the FSU. 
c) selection of materials which should be further characterized and kept in an archive at ITU for 
reference purposes. 
d) completion of the ITU data base with general data from the former COMECON states and a 
more detailed data base at the Non-Organic Chemistry Institute. 
e) elaboration of a consultation scheme to analyse and interprète analytical results by means of the 
data bases at ITU and the Non-Organic Chemistry Institute. 
IL Cooperation with the Russian Federation on the up-grading of the safeguaids and Nuclear 
Material Accountability and Control (NMAQ system 
II-l. Review of Needs 
As explained in the previous Communication, the knowledge and assessment of the detailed 
technical needs for the creation of a NMAC system is fundamental for the effectiveness of the 
co-operation with the Russian Federation in establishing a technical infrastructure. 
Therefore, the Commission proceeded with a re-assessment of these needs in close cooperation 
with the Russian authorities, MINATOM and GAN, taking into account the specificity and the 
extent of the nuclear fuel cycle to be safeguarded and the type of safeguards system that will be 
applied: 
a) at the facility level: 
each nuclear facility must have a detailed nuclear material accountancy system for all the nuclear 
material that is received, shipped, processed or stored. Accurate measurements and the 
uncertainty of these measurements are required. 
Needs: a study defining the specificity of NMAC for the different parts of the fuel cycle has to 
be performed. Training, regulatory aspects and the establishment of facility specific rules are very 
important at the initial stage of implementation of the new safeguards system. Furthermore, 
needs: for each type of facility, appropriate material balance and statistical accountancy 
evaluation procedures, as well as a list of the most appropriate instruments and measurement 
systems has to be established. The necessary technical support and training have to be provided 
for this purpose. 
b) at the authority level: 
the inspectors have to verify, in an independent way, the declarations made by the individual 
plant operators. 
Needs: this implies training of inspectors and facility personnel in charge of accounting and 
indépendant analytical capabilities, as well as a computerised data base for the collection, the 
retrieval and the analysis of the accountancy data and for the collection of the inspectors 
findings. Measurement techniques adapted to each type of plant and the respective proper 
instrumentation has to be made available for inspections. 
17 
II-2. Education Training and Development of Safeguards Methodologies 
As mentionned in § n.-5.a) of the document, the Russian Federation has decided in March, 1995 
to create the "Russian Safeguards Methodological and Training Centre", called RMTC, at the 
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) at Obninsk in the Kaluga Region, near 
Moscow. The RMTC will be mainly oriented towards the training of inspectors and of plant 
operators depending from MINATOM and other organisations. 
The Centre will be realized modifying existing premises, already licenced for the use of bulk 
quantities of nuclear materials (U, Pu). The structures will consist of class rooms for theoretical 
lessons and of laboratories where hands-on training will be given on nuclear materials 
measurements.Instruments will be provided through Commission (TACIS) support, as well as 
nuclear material standards and reference materials. 
The education and training programme is made-up of basic courses that will be common for 
inspectors and plant operators (Principles of NMA&C, verification techniques) as well as 
specific courses for separatly operator or inspectors, regarding NMA or inspection procedures. 
A study is now being performed by the JRC, IPPE (MINATOM) and GAN to determine the 
detailed technical specifications for each of the course modules (taking account of the quite new 
Russian legislation), the required training facilities, the instrumentation, the reference materials 
and data evaluation capabilities. 
For the first phase of the implementation of the training centre, the JRC and IPPE are now co­
operating, in the framework of the TACIS programme, to create five training courses, addressing 
specific evaluation and measurement techniques of interest both to plant operators and inspectors. 
The first courses for trainers will be organised in the near future at the JRC, Ispra. The first 
training courses at IPPE, Obninsk, are expected to start in June 1996. 
Furthermore, upon special request by GAN, measurement techniques oriented courses and 
physical inventory verification exercises have been and will be organised at the JRC. These 
courses will be transferred to Obninsk, when the RMTC will be fully operational. 
The RMTC is also very important as a forum and a meeting point between plant operators and 
inspectors. They would, through discussions and common seminars, understand their respective 
obligations and how these can be complied with given the present state of the Russian nuclear 
industry. An R&D programme on safeguards concepts and methodologies is also expected to be 
put in place as the RMTC develops. 
II-3. Generic Scientific and Technical Support 
As the Commission stressed in its previous Communication, the setting up of a fully reliable 
safeguards and NMAC system needs specific installations for operators and/or inspectors. The 
modalities for the establishment of these installations are still under discussion with the Russian 
authorities. The main lines, as well as the location have already been agreed and a mission of 
Commission experts is expected in Russia soon in order to elaborate with Russian specialists the 
terms of reference for these projects. 
The purpose of the proposed cooperation is the provision of consultancy to GAN and 
MINATOM, the exchange of practical experience. It is also envisaged to provide some 
instrumentation but this will depend on the availability of relevant equipment in Russian 
laboratories. 
n.3.1. Metrological Centre for Measurements of Nuclear Materials 
In co-operation with experts of different laboratories, it should: 
18 
a) define the state of the practice for routine applications of different measurement techniques 
applied to nuclear materials, 
b) provide a basis for a quality control programme to regularly monitor the measurement 
capabilities in different facilities and in analytical laboratories. 
n.3.2. Safeguards Analytical Capabilities 
The samples taken by safeguards inspectors need to be analysed with a high level of accuracy 
by destructive analysis techniques and in some specific cases also by non-destructive assay 
methods. 
GAN has expressed a great interest in establishing the technical capabilities and required 
infrastructure to implement various approaches, according to the specific needs. Furthermore, the 
independent analysis of "vagabonding,, material is also a requirement gaining an increasing 
interest. 
ÏÏ.3.3. Instrument Development and Procurement 
Very few instruments are used at present in Russian nuclear facilities for the implementation of 
NMAC system. However, several laboratories in the Russian Federation have a large experience 
in the development of instrumentation for process and quality control in production facilities and 
nuclear measurements for sensitive equipment in research centres. 
The purpose of the co-operation between Russian and European R&D laboratories and industry 
is to: 
a) review the existing technologies available and evaluate their possible use or adaptation to NMAC 
purposes, 
b) define specific projects aiming at the development of new instruments suited to the 
implementation of NMAC. 
On the basis of the results obtained, relations should be established between the Russian industry 
or production laboratories and European industry, in order to develop an industrial production 
of instrumentation in Russia. 
EL Co-operation with Phare countries on illicit frafieking 
IH-1. FONSAFE fForensic Nuclear Analysis for Safeguards) Project with Hungary 
Partner : Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission 
Objective : 
a) improve the capacities for analysis of nuclear material seized in Hungary particularly in the field 
of NDA measurements of the nuclide concentrations of U and Pu and NDA determination of 
the matrix. 
b) organise intercomparisons of NDA measurements and equipment. 
c) extend the data base at ITU by all the related data and results of measurements made accessible 
by the Institute of Isotopes, which is responsible for the identification and measurement of 
nuclear material seized in Hungary. 
d) establish a procedure to assist Hungary - upon request - in the measurements of the seized 
nuclear material and in the definition of its origin and intended use including: 
- measurements in ITU on sub samples provided by Hungary or on the seized material itself, in 
case of Pu, with the understanding that the remaining material will be shipped back to Hungary, 
- common analysis and interpretation of the results based on the ITU database. 
e) receive a Hungarian expert for about a month, who will study the experience acquired in the 
above field. 
m-2. FONSAFE Project with the Czech Republic 
Partner : State Office for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic 
Objective : 
19 
A. In the beginning, a supplementary analysis of nuclear material seized in the Czech Republic will 
be performed at ITU. For efficient transfer of know-how and experience, two Czech experts are to be 
involved in the following activities for twice three months and once six months: 
1) shipment of a sample of the highy-enriched uranium (HEU) material seized in Prague from 
November 1994 to June 1995 to ITU for extended analyses covering radionuclide and chemical 
impurities; 
2) evaluation of analytical data for revelation of the possible origin of the material; 
3) development of selected parts of a relational database system for nuclear material at ITU. 
B. In the second phase the contractor and his experts will assist NRI in the following tasks: 
1) upgrading of laboratory equipment of Central Analytical Laboratory in order to improve the in-
house analytical capabilities; 
2) analysis of HEU reference materials from the former Soviet Union. 
C. One or two workshops with Czech and EU representatives are to be organized to exchange 
experience in the area of treatment and analysis of nuclear material. 
ffl-3. Other FONSAFE Projects 
Similar but country - specific projects are in preparation for Bulgaria and Ukraine (more 
emphasis on assistance in on-site handling and identification of radioactive materials by NDA). 
Furthermore, the other Phare countries have expressed their interest for similar collaboration. 
IV. Co-operation in the framework of the ISTC 
IV-1. ISTC project 40 
Project Purpose: to develop an upgraded approach for safeguarding complex & sensitive nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities at Tomsk 7. 
Expected Results of the Project will consist of: 
a) development of regulatory criteria applicable for nuclear material accountancy at specific types 
of fuel cycle facilities, based on feasibility studies for measurement systems development, 
application of inspectorate field equipment, application of containment and surveillance measures; 
b) development of regulatory requirements for inspection procedures and scope; 
c) development of a model approach for nuclear material data transmission and data treatment in 
regional supervising office; 
The Russian participants are coming from GAN, Minatom, the Tomsk 7 Chemical Plant and 
several institutes. 
IV-2. ISTC project K-57 
Creation of system for storage, operative control and physical protection of nuclear materials and 
ampoule sources of ionizing radiation (ASIR) on "Baikal-1" stand complex meeting the 
international requirements of radioactive materials control and accounting. 
Partner : Institute of Atomic Energy of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
The main objectives of the project are focused on the development of the technology for storing, 
operative control and physical protection of nuclear materials and ASIR as well as on the 
development and implementation of systems of control, accounting and physical protection for 
nuclear materials and ampoule sources of ionizing radiation stored on the "Baikal-1" Stand 
Complex 
20 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(96) 171 final 
DOCUMENTS 
EN 12 05 14 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-96-181-EN-C 
ISBN 92-78-02999-8 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
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